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U.S. District Court U.S. District of Minnesota (DMN) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund Date Filed: 05/19/2020

et al v. Simon

Jury Demand: None

Assigned to: Judge Eric C. Tostrud

Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights:

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung

Voting

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund

represented by Amy Elizabeth Erickson Lathrop GPM LLP 80 S 8th St Ste 500 IDS Center Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-632-3470 Fax: 612-632-4470 Email: amy.erickson@lathropgpm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caleb Jackson Campaign Legal Center Campaign Legal Center 1101 14th St. NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 202-736-2200 Email: cjackson@campaignlegalcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle Marie Lang Campaign Legal Center District of Columbia 1101 14th St. NW

Plaintiff

Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 267-205-0578 Email: dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Diaz Campaign Legal Center 1101 14th St. NW Ste 400 Washington, DC 20005 202-736-2200 Fax: 202-736-2222 Email: jdiaz@campaignlegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Dayton Klein Lathrop GPM LLP 80 S 8th St Ste 500 IDS Center Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-632-3153 Fax: 612-632-4153 Email: julia.daytonklein@lathropgpm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Gaber Campaign Legal Center 1101 14th Street NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 202-736-2200 Email: mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivian Latimer Tanniehill
Plaintiff Isabel Bethke

represented by Amy Elizabeth Erickson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Lang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Dayton Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Gaber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Elizabeth Erickson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Caleb Jackson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Lang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Malea Marxer

Jonathan Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Dayton Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Gaber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amy Elizabeth Erickson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Caleb Jackson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Lang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Diaz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Dayton Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark Gaber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Steve Simon in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota

represented by Cicely R Miltich Office of the Minnesota Attorney General 445 Minnesota Street Suite 1100 Saint Paul, MN 55101 651-757-1243 Fax: 651-282-5832 Email: cicely.miltich@ag.state.mn.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary A. Taylor Minnesota Office of the Attorney General 445 Minnesota Street Suite 1100 St. Paul, MN 55101 651-757-1177 Email: Hillary.Taylor@ag.state.mn.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Marisam Minnesota Attorney General's Office Solicitor General 445 Minnesota Street Ste 1100 St. Paul, MN 55101 651-757-1275 Email: jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Intervenor Defendant Republican National Committee, The
Intervenor Defendant Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. TERMINATED: 02/01/2021

represented by Cameron Thomas Norris Consovoy McCarthy PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209 703-243-9423 Email: cam@consovoymccarthy.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard G Morgan Lewis Brisbois 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 Fax: 612-428-5001 Email: richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas R McCarthy Consovoy McCarthy PLLC 1600 Wilson Boulevard Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209 703-243-9423 Email: tom@consovoymccarthy.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cameron Thomas Norris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard G Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Republican Party of Minnesota

Thomas R McCarthy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cameron Thomas Norris (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard G Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas R McCarthy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/19/2020
05/19/2020 05/19/2020
05/19/2020 05/19/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Steve Simon (filing fee $400, receipt number AMNDC-7733904) filed by League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill. Filer requests summons issued. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3, # 4 Exhibit(s) 4, # 5 Exhibit(s) 5, # 6 Exhibit(s) 6, # 7 Civil Cover Sheet) (Klein, Julia) Modified text on 5/19/2020 (lmb). (Entered: 05/19/2020)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Amy Elizabeth Erickson on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Erickson, Amy) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
3 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: CLERK'S NOTICE OF INITIAL CASE ASSIGNMENT. Case assigned to Judge Eric C. Tostrud per Civil (3rd, 4th - Civil Rights) list, referred to Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Please use case number 20-cv-1205 (ECT/TNL). (lmb) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
4 Summons Issued as to Steve Simon. (lmb) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
5 (Text-Only): Notice re: Non-Admitted Attorney
We have received documents listing Danielle Lang; Jonathan Diaz; Caleb Jackson; Jeffrey Zalesin as counsel of record. If he or she wishes to be listed as an attorney of record in this case, he or she must be admitted

to the bar of the U.S. District Court of Minnesota in accordance with Local Rule 83.5 (a), (b) and (c) or temporarily admitted pro hac vice in accordance with Local Rule 83.5 (d) or (e).

05/19/2020 05/19/2020 05/19/2020 05/20/2020 05/20/2020 05/20/2020
05/28/2020 05/29/2020 05/29/2020

For more admissions information and forms, please see the Attorney Forms Section of the courts website at www.mnd.uscourts.gov/forms/all-forms. (lmb) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
6 RULE 7.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. There is no parent corporation, publicly held corporation or wholly-owned subsidiary to report for Plaintiffs Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
7 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Danielle Lang. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number AMNDC-7734896 filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
8 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Jonathan Diaz. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number AMNDC-7734921 filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Jason Marisam on behalf of Steve Simon. (Marisam, Jason) (Entered: 05/20/2020)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed by League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill. Steve Simon served on 5/19/2020, answer due 6/9/2020. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/20/2020)
11 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: ORDER granting 7 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Danielle Marie Lang for Vivian Latimer Tanniehill and for League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund; granting 8 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Jonathan Diaz for Vivian Latimer Tanniehill and for League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. Approved by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 5/20/2020. (NAH) (Entered: 05/20/2020)
12 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Mark Gaber. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number AMNDC-7757840 filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction - Expedited Handling Requested filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
14 NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction - Expedited Handling Requested : Motion Hearing set for 6/10/2020 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3B (STP) before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

05/29/2020
05/29/2020 05/29/2020 05/29/2020 06/02/2020 06/04/2020 06/05/2020 06/09/2020 06/09/2020

15 MEMORANDUM in Support re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction - Expedited Handling Requested filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate, # 2 Exhibit(s) Index, # 3 Exhibit(s) 1, # 4 Exhibit(s) 2, # 5 Exhibit(s) 3, # 6 Exhibit(s) 4, # 7 Exhibit(s) 5, # 8 Exhibit(s) 6, # 9 Exhibit(s) 7, # 10 Exhibit(s) 8, # 11 Exhibit(s) 9, # 12 Exhibit(s) 10, # 13 Exhibit(s) 11, # 14 Exhibit(s) 12, # 15 Exhibit(s) 13, # 16 Exhibit(s) 14, # 17 Exhibit(s) 15, # 18 Exhibit(s) 16, # 19 Exhibit(s) 17, # 20 Exhibit(s) 18, # 21 Exhibit(s) 19, # 22 Exhibit(s) 20, # 23 Exhibit(s) 21, # 24 Exhibit(s) 22, # 25 Exhibit(s) 23, # 26 Exhibit(s) 24)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
16 MEET and CONFER STATEMENT re 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund.(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
17 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction - Expedited Handling Requested filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund.(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
18 BRIEFING ORDER re: 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 6/5/2020. Replies due by 6/8/2020. Motion Hearing set for 6/10/2020 at 9:00 AM by Video Conference (no courtroom) before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 5/29/2020.(RMM) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
19 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: ORDER granting 12 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Mark Gaber for Vivian Latimer Tanniehill and for League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. Approved by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 6/2/2020. (NAH) (Entered: 06/02/2020)
20 LETTER TO DISTRICT JUDGE by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund . (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/04/2020)
21 AMENDED BRIEFING ORDER re: 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See order for dates and details. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 6/5/2020.(RMM) (Entered: 06/05/2020)
22 ANSWER to Complaint filed by Steve Simon. (Marisam, Jason) (Entered: 06/09/2020)
23 NOTICE OF AND ORDER FOR PRETRIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE: Pretrial Conference set for 8/4/2020 at 10:00 AM in Judge's Chambers 9W (MPLS) before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 6/9/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Form)(HAM) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

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06/16/2020

24 PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE TO JUDGE. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/16/2020)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by Hillary A. Taylor on behalf of Steve Simon. (Taylor, Hillary) (Entered: 06/16/2020)
26 ORDER on 24 Proposed Consent Decree to Judge. A fairness hearing regarding the stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and decree will be held on 6/18/2020 at 11:00 AM by Video Conference before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. Instructions for joining the Video Conference will be sent to counsel separately. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 6/16/2020.(RMM) (Entered: 06/16/2020)
27 (Text-Only) NOTICE: Remote Public Access to available. A hearing on the stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and decree is scheduled to be held by Video Conferencing on 6/18/2020 at 11:00 AM.

If any member of the public would like to attend the hearing, please contact Rachael Morton at 651-848-1190 to obtain dial-in instructions.

06/17/2020 06/18/2020 06/18/2020
06/18/2020 06/18/2020 06/18/2020

(RMM) (Entered: 06/16/2020)
28 LETTER TO DISTRICT JUDGE by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Order)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/17/2020)
29 Emergency MOTION for Continuance re to Continue Hearing filed by Republican Party of Minnesota. (Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
30 MEMORANDUM in Support re 29 Emergency MOTION for Continuance re to Continue Hearing filed by Republican Party of Minnesota. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
31 MEET and CONFER STATEMENT re 29 Motion for Continuance filed by Republican Party of Minnesota.(Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
32 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 29 Emergency MOTION for Continuance re to Continue Hearing filed by Republican Party of Minnesota.(Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
33 ORDER granting 29 Emergency Motion to Continue Hearing. The Fairness Hearing regarding the stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and decree is rescheduled for 6/23/2020 at 11:00 AM by Video Conference (no courtroom) before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. See Order for

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additional deadlines. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 6/18/2020. (RMM) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
34 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Cameron T. Norris. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number CMNDC-7811597 filed by Republican Party of Minnesota. (Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
35 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: ORDER granting 34 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Cameron Thomas Norris for Republican Party of Minnesota. Approved by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 6/19/2020. (NAH) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
36 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Thomas R. McCarthy. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number AMNDC-7815199 filed by Republican Party of Minnesota. (Morgan, Richard) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
37 MOTION to Intervene filed by Republican Party of Minnesota, Republican National Committee, The, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Answer)(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
38 MEMORANDUM in Support re 37 MOTION to Intervene filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
39 MEET and CONFER STATEMENT re 37 Motion to Intervene filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
40 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 37 MOTION to Intervene filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
41 BRIEF re 24 Proposed Consent Decree to Judge . (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
42 (Text-Only) NOTICE: Remote Public Access to available. A hearing on the stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and decree is scheduled to be held by Video Conferencing on 6/23/2020 at 11:00 AM.

If any member of the public would like to attend the hearing, please contact Rachael Morton at 651-848-1190 to obtain dial-in instructions.

06/22/2020

(RMM) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
43 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: ORDER granting 36 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Thomas R McCarthy for Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., The Republican National Committee, and for Republican

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06/22/2020

Party of Minnesota. Approved by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 6/22/2020. (JGK) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
44 LETTER TO DISTRICT JUDGE by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund . (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
45 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Intervene filed by Steve Simon. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Taylor, Hillary) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
46 MEMORANDUM re 41 Brief filed by Steve Simon. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Taylor, Hillary) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
47 DECLARATION of Hillary Taylor re 46 Memorandum by Steve Simon . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1-9)(Taylor, Hillary) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
48 MEMORANDUM re 24 Proposed Consent Decree to Judge filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
49 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Intervene filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
50 NOTICE by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National

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Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota re 41 Brief of Supplemental Authority (Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
51 RESPONSE re 44 Letter to District Judge filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
52 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Eric C. Tostrud: Hearing

held on 6/23/2020 re 24 Proposed Consent Decree and 37 Motion to Intervene. The Motion to Intervene filed by the Republican Party of Minnesota, the Republican National Committee, and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. 37 is GRANTED for the reasons stated on the record during the hearing. Intervenors are permitted to intervene as defendants and shall file their Proposed Answer [37-1] without delay. The Proposed Consent

Decree 24 is not accepted for the reasons stated on the record during the hearing. (Court Reporter Tim Willette) (RMM) (Entered: 06/23/2020)

06/23/2020 53 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST for an Expedited Hourly Transcript (within 2

06/24/2020

hours) of 52 Order on Motion to Intervene,,, Motion Hearing,, to Court Reporter Tim Willette. (Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/23/2020)
54 PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT (Excerpt) from Fairness Hearing on Stipulation and Partial Consent Judgment and Decree [Court's Ruling from the Bench] held on 6/23/2020 before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. (14 pages). Court Reporter: Tim Willette. For a copy of the transcript, please file a Transcript Request under Other Filings/Other Documents.

Transcript temporarily sealed to determine if redactions are required. Parties have 7 days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction or Notice that No Redaction is Required. In accordance with Judicial Conference policy and Local Rule 80.1, the transcript may be released and made remotely electronically available to the public in 90 days. For further information on redaction procedures, please review Local Rule 5.5 and Case Information >Transcripts, Court Reporters and Digital Audio Recordings.

Notice Intent/No Intent to Request Redactions due 7/1/2020. Redaction Request due 7/15/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/27/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/22/2020.

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(TJW) (Entered: 06/24/2020)
55 ANSWER to Complaint filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 06/25/2020)
56 (Text-Only) ORDER/NOTICE TO ATTORNEY. In recognition of the current efforts locally and nationally to protect persons from unnecessary potential exposure to COVID-19, the Pretrial Scheduling Conference in this case will be held by telephone. A call-in number will be provided by the Court. The parties are not required to conduct any applicable meet and confers in person. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 7/10/2020. (HAM) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
57 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. Filed by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. Jointly Signed by Steven Simon, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota.(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 07/29/2020)
58 (Text-Only) AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing: The Pretrial Conference is now set for 8/4/2020 at 11:00 AM, by Telephone Conference, before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. *TIME CHANGE ONLY. (HAM) (Entered: 07/29/2020)

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59 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 8/4/2020. Pretrial scheduling order will be issued. (HAM) (Entered: 08/04/2020)
60 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 12/1/2020. Fact Discovery due by 4/1/2021. Expert Discovery due by 6/15/2021. Motions (non-disp) due 4/1/2021. Motions (disp) due by 8/15/2021. Ready for trial due by 12/15/2021. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 8/4/2020.(HAM) (Entered: 08/04/2020)
61 ORDER FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: Confidential Letter to Court due by 3/11/2021. Settlement Conference set for 3/18/2021 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 9W (MPLS) before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 8/4/2020.(HAM) (Entered: 08/04/2020)
62 STIPULATION Regarding Discovery Procedure by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. Jointly Signed by Secretary of State of Minnesota, Steve Simon and Intervenors Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. RNC, NRSC, NRCC, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 08/14/2020)
63 TEXT-ONLY ORDER on 62 Stipulation. The 62 Stipulation Regarding Discovery Procedure is adopted and shall be enforced by the Court as an agreement between the parties. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 8/20/2020. (EB) (Entered: 08/20/2020)
64 AMENDED ORDER FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: Confidential Letter to Court due by 3/10/2021. Settlement Conference set for 3/17/2021 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 9W (MPLS) before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 10/22/2020. (HAM) (Entered: 10/22/2020)
65 (Text-Only) ORDER: The motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill 13 is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 11/9/2020. (RMM) (Entered: 11/09/2020)
66 STIPULATION re 60 Scheduling Order, by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund. Jointly Signed by Steven Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
67 FILED IN ERROR - WILL BE RE-FILED. AMENDED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 12/30/2020. Fact Discovery due by 4/1/2021. Expert Discovery due by 6/15/2021. Motions (non-disp) due 4/1/2021. Motions (disp) due by 8/15/2021. Ready for trial due by 12/15/2021. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on

12/01/2020
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12/1/2020. (HAM) Modified text on 12/1/2020 (KDS). (Entered: 12/01/2020)
68 ORDER on 66 Stipulation and AMENDED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 12/30/2020. Fact Discovery due by 4/1/2021. Expert Discovery due by 6/15/2021. Motions (non-disp) due 4/1/2021. Motions (disp) due by 8/15/2021. Ready for trial due by 12/15/2021. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 12/1/2020. (HAM) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
69 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota, Steve Simon. filed by League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill. No summons requested. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 12/30/2020)
70 DECLARATION of Malea Marxer re 69 Amended Complaint, by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund . (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 12/30/2020)
71 DECLARATION of Isabel Bethke re 69 Amended Complaint, by Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund . (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 12/30/2020)
72 NOTICE by Isabel Bethke, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women

01/05/2021 01/13/2021 01/13/2021

Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Malea Marxer re 69 Amended Complaint, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 01/05/2021)
73 Amended DECLARATION of Isabel Bethke re 69 Amended Complaint, by Isabel Bethke, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Malea Marxer . (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 01/05/2021)
74 Consent MOTION to withdraw the intervention of Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1FILED IN ERROR - Proposed Order)(Norris, Cameron) Modified text on 1/14/2021 (KDS). (Entered: 01/13/2021)
75 MOTION to Dismiss/General , MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Attachments: # 1 FILED IN ERROR - Notice of Hearing, # 2 FILED IN ERROR - Memorandum of Law, # 3 FILED IN ERROR - LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate, # 4 FILED IN ERROR - LR 7.1(a) Meet-and-Confer Statement, # 5 FILED IN ERROR - Proposed Order)(Norris, Cameron) Modified text on 1/14/2021 (KDS). (Entered: 01/13/2021)

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02/05/2021 02/08/2021

76 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 74 Consent MOTION to withdraw the intervention of Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 01/14/2021)
77 NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction : Motion Hearing set for 3/1/2021 at 11:00 AM in Video Conference (no courtroom) before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. (Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 01/14/2021)
78 MEMORANDUM in Support re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 01/14/2021)
79 MEET and CONFER STATEMENT re 75 Motion to Dismiss/General,, Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 01/14/2021)
80 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota.(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 01/14/2021)
81 ANSWER to Complaint filed by Steve Simon. (Marisam, Jason) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
82 ORDER: Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.'s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw as Intervenor-Defendant 74 is GRANTED. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. shall be dismissed from this action without costs, disbursements, or attorneys' fees to any of the parties. Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 2/1/2021. (RMM) (Entered: 02/01/2021)
83 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Isabel Bethke, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Malea Marxer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Klein, Julia) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
84 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney Caleb Jackson. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number AMNDC-8468105 filed by Isabel Bethke, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Malea Marxer. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
85 TEXT ONLY ENTRY: ORDER granting 84 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Caleb Jackson for Isabel Bethke, Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, and for Malea Marxer. Approved by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 2/8/2021. (NAH) (Entered: 02/08/2021)

02/10/2021 02/10/2021 02/16/2021
02/16/2021 02/18/2021 02/23/2021

86 STIPULATION to Modify Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order by Isabel Bethke, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Malea Marxer. Jointly Signed by Steve Simon, Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
87 PROPOSED ORDER TO JUDGE re 86 Stipulation,. (Klein, Julia) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
88 ORDER on 86 Stipulation and SECOND AMENDED PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Fact Discovery due by 7/1/2021. Expert Discovery due by 9/15/2021. Motions (non-disp) due 7/1/2021. Motions (disp) due by 11/15/2021. Ready for trial due by 3/15/2022. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 2/16/2021. (HAM) (Entered: 02/16/2021)
89 SECOND AMENDED ORDER FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: Confidential Letter to Court due by 5/26/2021. Settlement Conference set for 6/2/2021 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 9W (MPLS) before Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung on 2/16/2021. (HAM) (Entered: 02/16/2021)
90 REPLY re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Attachments: # 1 LR7.1/LR72.2 Word Count Compliance Certificate)(Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
91 (Text-Only) NOTICE of Rescheduling of Hearing: The hearing on 75 MOTION to Dismiss is rescheduled for 3/1/2021 at 11:00 AM by Video Conference (no courtroom) before Judge Eric C. Tostrud. Instructions for joining the hearing by Zoom have been sent separately to counsel of record. Location change only.

Notice to Public: Please visit our website at https://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/court-schedules for audio connection information for this hearing. Note that hearings might not appear on the court schedule or courthouse kiosk until one week before the hearing date.

03/01/2021 03/17/2021

(RMM) (Entered: 02/23/2021)
92 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Eric C. Tostrud: Motion Hearing held on 3/1/2021 re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota. (Court Reporter Tim Willette) (RMM) (Entered: 03/01/2021)
93 NOTICE by Republican National Committee, The, Republican Party of Minnesota re 75 MOTION to Dismiss/General MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction of Supplemental Authority (Norris, Cameron) (Entered: 03/17/2021)

03/29/2021

94 OPINION AND ORDER: Intervenors' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint 75 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. See Order for specifics. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud on 3/29/2021. (RMM) (Entered: 03/29/2021)

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Gillan 0:20-cv-01205-ECTTNL 1.20
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN) and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully submit this memorandum in partial opposition to the Motion to Intervene as Defendants by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (together, “Proposed Intervenors”), ECF 37. While Plaintiffs take no position on permissive intervention, the Court should hold that Proposed Intervenors have no right to join this case as defendants.1
LEGAL STANDARD Intervention as of right is available to a person who “(1) files a timely motion to intervene; (2) ‘claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action’; (3) is situated so that disposing of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that interest; and (4) is not adequately represented by the existing parties.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)). “The intervenor bears the burden of showing that his interests are not
1 For background on Plaintiffs’ claims and the procedural posture of this case, Plaintiffs refer to their Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Consent Decree, which they are filing concurrently with this memorandum.
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adequately represented by existing parties.” Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997). Courts in the Eighth Circuit must “presume that [a] government entity adequately represents the public.” Little Rock School Dist. v. N. Little Rock School Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004). To overcome this presumption, a proposed intervenor must “make a strong showing of inadequate representation.” Id. The proposed intervenor may do this by showing “that its interests are distinct and cannot be subsumed within the public interest represented by the government entity,” id., or “by showing that the [government] has committed misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188. “Absent this sort of clear dereliction of duty, however, the proposed intervenor cannot rebut the presumption of representation by merely disagreeing with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing him.” Id.
ARGUMENT Proposed Intervenors fail to satisfy—at least—the inadequate-representation prong of the test for intervention as of right. Proposed Intervenors do not assert an interest distinct from the public interest, nor can they carry their heavy burden to show that the existing defendant, Secretary of State Steve Simon (the “Secretary”), does not adequately represent the public interest. Proposed Intervenors assert a “broad-based interest in elections” and “a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot with confidence and without confusion.” Mem. in Support of Mot. to Intervene, ECF 38 at 6-7 (citation omitted). These interests are “subsumed within the public interest represented by” the Secretary of State. Little Rock School Dist., 378 F.3d at 780. The Secretary is Minnesota’s chief election official and is responsible for supervising the administration of elections statewide. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. As
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such, it is the Secretary’s job to ensure that all eligible voters “can cast a ballot with confidence and without confusion.” ECF 38 at 6.
Notably, Proposed Intervenors do not (and could not) attempt to show that the outcome of this case will give their favored candidates any particular electoral advantage or disadvantage. They do note that “changes in voting procedures could affect candidates running as Republicans and voters who [are] members of the . . . Republican Party,” ECF 38 at 7 (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 2005 WL 8162665, *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005)). But this does not distinguish Proposed Intervenors’ interest from the generalized public interest in fair and lawful election administration. Nor can Proposed Intervenors particularize their interest by claiming, without evidence, that if Minnesota’s witness requirement is suspended they “will be forced to spend substantial resources informing Republican voters of changes in the law, fighting inevitable confusion, and galvanizing participation.” ECF 38 at 9. By making it possible for Minnesotans of all political persuasions to vote by mail while complying with social-distancing guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic, suspending the witness requirement would increase voter participation, not suppress it. And there is no reason to think the change would cause confusion—especially since the Proposed Consent Decree requires the Secretary to inform the public of the change, which would take place before a single vote in the primary is cast. See ECF 24 at 6.
Having failed to distinguish their interest from the public interest, Proposed Intervenors bear the heavy burden of showing that the Secretary “has committed misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188. The Secretary has done no such thing. As Plaintiffs explain in their Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Consent Decree, filed concurrently with this memorandum, the Secretary properly entered a compromise that avoids
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the risk (or, from Plaintiffs’ perspective, the inevitability) of subjecting Minnesotans to an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote in the August primary, while conserving taxpayer money and preserving the Secretary’s ability to defend the witness requirement for future elections. Unlike in Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996), Proposed Intervenors here have not shown that the Secretary has any bias against their interests or any history of shirking his duty to enforce valid regulations. Proposed Intervenors complain that the Secretary entered the Proposed Consent Decree “despite numerous arguments available in defense of” the witness requirement, and suggest that if they were in charge of the defense, they would have placed higher priority on rigidly adhering to state statutory law despite constitutional concerns and litigation risk. ECF 38 at 10-11. But Proposed Intervenors cannot rebut the presumption of adequate representation “by merely disagreeing with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing [them].” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188.
Because Proposed Intervenors assert only the generalized public interest in fair and orderly elections, and because the Proposed Consent Decree represents a legitimate approach to protecting that interest (albeit not the one Proposed Intervenors would prefer), Proposed Intervenors fail to satisfy the inadequate-representation prong of Rule 24(a).2
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny the Motion to Intervene to the extent it seeks intervention as of right.
2 For essentially the same reasons, Proposed Intervenors fail to show that “disposing of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [their] ability to protect” the only interest they have asserted—i.e., the generalized public interest in sound election administration. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 759 F.3d at 975. However, Plaintiffs are mindful of the Eighth Circuit’s guidance that “this analysis . . . fit[s] more neatly under the rubric of adequacy of representation.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 187.
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Date: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 44501 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Mark Gaber* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200
*Admitted pro hac vice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205 ECT-TNL
LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Julia Dayton Klein, certify that the Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Partial Opposition to

Motion to Intervene complies with Local Rule 7.1(f).

I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used the following word

processing program and version Microsoft Word, Version 2016 and that this word processing

program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and

quotations in the following word count.

I further certify that the above document contains the following number of words: 1,124.

Dated: June 22, 2020

s/ Julia Dayton Klein Julia Dayton Klein LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153

GP:4846-4625-8369 v1

 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN) and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully submit this memorandum in support of the proposed Stipulation and Partial Consent Judgment and Decree (“Proposed Consent Decree”), ECF 24. The Proposed Consent Decree protects Minnesotans’ fundamental right to vote in the August 2020 primary and provides significant benefits to the State. Because the Proposed Consent Decree is both substantively and procedurally fair, the Court should approve it.
BACKGROUND This case concerns Minnesotans’ right to vote safely during the COVID-19 pandemic. Minnesota statutory law requires that absentee voters have their ballots witnessed and signed by another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an official authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45. For many members of Plaintiff LWVMN, including Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill, the witness requirement makes it impossible to vote without interacting face-to-face with another person outside the household, significantly increasing their risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. See Complaint, ECF 1 at ¶¶ 4, 12, 13.

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Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Secretary of State Steve Simon (the “Secretary”) on May 19, 2020, seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness. Id. ¶7. On May 29, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the witness requirement for the duration of 2020; requiring the Secretary to modify official printed materials to avoid explicitly or implicitly directing voters to have their absentee ballots witnessed; and requiring the Secretary to “undertake a public education campaign sufficient to inform the public” that the witness requirement is suspended for 2020. ECF 13. The Secretary has not filed a response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, but answered the complaint on June 9, denying that Plaintiffs were entitled to any relief. ECF 22.
While the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was pending, the parties negotiated an agreement to partially resolve this lawsuit. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted their Proposed Consent Decree to the Court for approval. ECF 24. Under the Proposed Consent Decree, the Secretary would agree not to enforce the witness requirement in the state primary election scheduled for August 11, 2020, and take steps to make local election officials and voters aware that the witness requirement does not apply in that election. ECF 24 at 6. In return, Plaintiffs would withdraw their Motion for Preliminary Injunction without prejudice and would forgo any entitlement to fees, expenses, and costs incurred to date. ECF 24 at ¶¶ 16, 21. The Court scheduled a fairness hearing on the Proposed Consent Decree for June 18.
Also on June 16, Judge Sara Grewing of the Ramsey County District Court approved a Stipulation and Partial Consent Decree in LaRose v. Simon (Court File No. 62-CV-20-3149). The LaRose consent decree, like the Proposed Consent Decree here, suspends the witness
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requirement for the August primary and requires the Secretary to take certain steps to implement and publicize that suspension. See ECF 28-1 (LaRose consent decree).
On June 18, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (together, “Proposed Intervenors”), filed an emergency motion to continue the fairness hearing in this case scheduled for that day and to give Proposed Intervenors an opportunity to seek intervention and oppose the Proposed Consent Decree. ECF 29. The Court granted that motion. ECF 33. On June 20, Proposed Intervenors moved for intervention as of right or permissive intervention, ECF 37, and filed a memorandum in opposition to the Proposed Consent Decree, ECF 41. That same day, the Republican Party of Minnesota, the Republican National Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee filed a notice of intervention in the LaRose state-court proceedings. A copy of the notice of intervention in LaRose is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit 1.
On June 22, Plaintiffs in this case submitted a letter to the Court, requesting that the pending request to enter the Proposed Consent Decree be held in abeyance until the LaRose consent decree is modified or lifted or after the August primary, whichever occurs soonest. ECF 44. This scheduling request does not change Plaintiffs’ substantive position that the Court should, at an appropriate time, approve the Proposed Consent Decree.
ARGUMENT When reviewing a proposed consent decree, the Court must review the agreement to ensure that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1988)). This analysis involves both the substantive and procedural aspects of the settlement. See United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (8th Cir. 2002). The court has the authority to approve a consent decree that overrides state law provisions when such a remedy
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is appropriate to rectify a potential violation of federal law. See St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 270 (8th Cir. 2011); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020) (district court should examine the merits but need not definitively decide them in approving consent decree); LopezAguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F. Supp. 3d 959, 968 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (consent decree may set aside state laws when the parties demonstrate a “probable violation of federal law” based on “particularized findings”) (citing Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1995)); cf. Lawyer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576 (1997) (upholding approval of consent decree in redistricting case, although preexisting redistricting plan was not first adjudicated unconstitutional).
The Proposed Consent Decree here prevents a violation of the Constitution and is in all respects fair, reasonable, and adequate, both for the parties and for non-parties. It should be approved.
I. The Proposed Consent Decree is substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate. “The single most important factor in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate is a balancing of the strength of the plaintiff's case against the terms of the settlement.” Marshall v. National Football League, 787 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 2015). “A consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, must come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and must further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” McCourt v. City of Chaska, No. 18-cv-1559, 2018 WL 5669317, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2018) (Tostrud, J.) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986)). However, the court need not undertake the type of detailed investigation that would be
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necessary to reach a judgment on the merits. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d at 1044; see also Armstrong v. Bd. of School Directors of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1980). The court’s decision need only rest on “well-reasoned conclusions,” rather than “mere boilerplate.” Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 607.
Here, all relevant factors demonstrate that the Proposed Consent Decree is substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate.
A. Plaintiffs have demonstrated more than a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their undue burden claim to support the Proposed Consent Decree.
In the absence of the Proposed Consent Decree, the Court would likely conclude that Minnesota’s application of the witness requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic unduly burdens the right to vote.1
The right to vote is unquestionably a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (declaring that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure”). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). A severe restriction on voting rights “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Id. at 428 (citation omitted). Even if a challenged
1 There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Def. Answer, ECF 22 at ¶¶ 8-11 (agreeing with Plaintiffs that the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Proposed Int. Answer, ECF 37-1 at ¶¶ 8-11 (same).
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restriction falls short of being “severe,” courts must employ a “sliding scale,” subjecting each voting restriction to a level of scrutiny calibrated to the burden it imposes. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124, 1124 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2020).
As Plaintiffs demonstrated in their Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, ECF 15, the witness requirement imposes a severe (or, at a minimum, significant), burden on Minnesotans’ right to vote as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic by denying them any safe method of casting a ballot without risking infection from this deadly disease. This burden is imposed even though the witness provision provides no substantial benefit to the State’s interest in preventing voter fraud, safeguarding voter confidence, and protecting the integrity of the election.
In the interest of conserving judicial resources and avoiding repetition, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the arguments made and evidence presented in their Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction. ECF 15 at 15-23. However, it bears emphasis that one of the cases Plaintiffs previously cited, League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020), addressed precisely the issue now before this Court: whether to approve a consent decree providing that the state would not enforce its witness requirement for absentee voting in a 2020 summer primary election in light of COVID-19. The court approved the Virginia consent decree, finding that enforcing Virginia’s witness requirement during the pandemic was “a probable violation of federal law.” Id. at *6. As the court explained,
[T]he measure is too restrictive in that it will force a large class of Virginians to face the choice between adhering to guidance that is meant to protect not only their own health, but the health of those around them, and undertaking their fundamental right—and, indeed, their civic duty—to vote in an election. The Constitution does not permit a state to force such a choice on its electorate. Id. at *8 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)).
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It is no response to suggest, as Proposed Intervenors have, that in-person voting before and on Election Day is available in Minnesota when in-person voting presents an even greater risk of exposure to COVID-19 than interacting with a witness. See ECF 15 at 9-10, 16.2 The State cannot leave its citizens without any way to vote without exposing themselves to a deadly virus. See Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alternative means of [ballot] access must be provided absent a sufficiently strong state interest”); Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-01552-JMC, 2020 WL 2617329, at *19 n.20 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (“In-person voting, while still technically an available option, forces voters to make the untenable and illusory choice between exercising their right to vote and placing themselves at risk of contracting a potentially terminal disease.”). Nor can it be seriously argued that, merely because Minnesota provides in-person voting, its restrictions on absentee voting are immune from constitutional scrutiny. See Self Advocacy Systems N.D. v. Jaeger, No. 3:20-cv00071, 2020 WL 2951012, at *8 (D.N.D. Jun. 3, 2020) (“Although the right to apply for and vote via absentee ballot is not constitutionally on par with the fundamental right to vote, a state that creates a system for absentee voting must administer it in accordance with the constitution.” (citation omitted)). Given the circumstances, enforcement of that requirement amounts to an unconstitutional burden on Minnesotans’ right to vote.
Proposed Intervenors’ insistence that “the State has determined that in-person voting can be done safely and effectively” while challenging a consent decree to which the chief state election official is a party is bizarre. ECF 41 at 18 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs agree with Proposed Intervenors that “[f]ederal courts cannot and should not second-guess the judgment of
2 Proposed Intervenors argue that COVID-19 has caused the additional burdens on the right to vote and therefore no state action is present. ECF 41 at 17. This is nonsense. Plaintiffs allege that it is Defendant’s enforcement of the witness requirement—in the context of COVID-19—that is unlawful. That enforcement is plainly state action.
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Minnesota’s election officials[,]” and “[q]uestions about how to ‘accommodate voters’ interests while also striving to ensure their safety’ are best left to election officials, who are ‘better positioned . . . to accommodate the many intersecting interests in play in the present circumstances.’” ECF 41 at 19 (quoting Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 30, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020)).
This Proposed Consent Decree represents Minnesota’s chief election official’s sound judgment on how to ensure voters can safely cast their ballots while protecting public health. Thus, the Court should therefore afford significant deference to the Secretary’s determination that it represents the best path toward a constitutionally sound and publicly safe election.3 See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2813056, at *1 (U.S. May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’ When those officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’”). The Secretary has numerous mechanisms at his disposal to prevent fraud but limited means of ensuring safe voting during a pandemic. This Court should not second-guess the Secretary’s judgment on this score.
Conversely, the Court should give little weight to assertions of state interests that are made by self-interested private parties, rather than by the State itself, which is capable of asserting its own interests to the extent that they are threatened. Moreover, as explained in more
3 Proposed Intervenors suggest that in-person “is no more dangerous than other activities that the State deems safe, like going to the grocery store or having 9 friends over for a visit.” ECF 41 at 21. But it should go without saying that Minnesota’s judgment that residents are now allowed— with precautions—to engage in some public activities does not mean Minnesota believes it can require residents to engage in risky social activity in order to vindicate their fundamental right to vote. Moreover, in arguing that the witness requirement is not burdensome, Proposed Intervenors do not even attempt to address Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill’s declaration detailing the burdens it places on her personally.
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detail below, removing the witness requirement would create no significant risk of fraud. See infra, Section III.B.
B. The Purcell Principle Does Not Bar Relief for the August Primary. Proposed Intervenors cite Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), as support for their contention that it is too late for this Court to intervene and approve Plaintiffs’ and the State’s consent decree. In opposing this consent decree, Proposed Intervenors far overstate the breadth of the Purcell decision and the context of its invocation in subsequent cases. Purcell cautions judicial restraint in issuing “orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, [that] can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” 549 U.S. at 4-5 (emphasis added). But the only risk of voter confusion here is that which would arise from an order from this Court denying relief when a state court has already issued similar relief that is already being implemented, and where early and absentee voting have not yet begun. As the Court is aware, the Ramsey County District Court has approved a Stipulation and Partial Consent Decree in LaRose v. Simon (Court File No. 62-CV-20-3149), which suspends the witness requirement for the August primary. See ECF 28-1. Creating a conflict between the state and federal court as to whether the witness requirement is enforceable for the August primary would almost certainly result in voter confusion. First, in the context of Purcell, this Court’s deference to the Secretary should be at its height. At its heart, the Purcell doctrine is about allowing election officials to conduct their election without court interference at the last moment. But there is no Purcell rule against election officials making adjustments to election infrastructure to accommodate emerging needs in the run up to an election. Intervenors cite no case where a Court has invoked Purcell to stop judicial relief that was obtained by consent of the governing election officials. For this Court to
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step in, at the last moment, and insist on the status quo when the Secretary has argued that change is necessary for a smooth election would flip Purcell on its head.
Second, the Proposed Intervenors do not identify any actual confusion that will result from the consent decree. As Proposed Intervenors concede, “[t]he Purcell principle ensures that voters, candidates, and political parties known and adhere to the same neutral rules throughout the election process.” ECF 41 at 10. The proposed consent decree in this case was filed and can be approved before a single vote in Minnesota is cast, thereby ensuring that the entire primary election is conducted under the same set of rules. Moreover, the proposed consent decree does not change who is eligible to vote absentee, nor does it expand the time period for requesting, casting, or counting ballots; it merely facilitates the casting of ballots by already eligible voters by relieving them of the obligation to involve a third party in the process. It is “narrowly tailored so as to infringe state sovereignty as minimally as possible.” Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995).
Proposed Intervenors’ comparison to the Supreme Court’s stay of a judicial order involving the recent Wisconsin primary is misplaced. There, the district court ordered relief well after the early and absentee voting period in Wisconsin had already begun and less than two weeks before Election Day. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (noting that “absentee voting ha[d] been underway for many weeks”). Here, early and absentee voting have not yet begun; the rules will stay the same for the entire voting period, and there is no risk of voter confusion. Moreover, the Court emphasized the “unusual nature” of the District Court Order in Wisconsin, including that court’s issuance of a second order clarifying its initial relief, “in essence enjoin[ing] nonparties to [that] lawsuit,” and that the relief ordered by the District Court was not requested by the Plaintiffs. Id.
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The nature of the relief required by the consent decree also counsels in favor of approval. Unlike the election-related judicial orders stayed under Purcell that Intervenors refer to in their opposition, suspension of the witness requirement does not present a significant judicial intrusion into the electoral process such that voter confusion is likely.4 The consent decree merely removes an administrative and procedural burden from already eligible voters, allowing them to exercise the franchise without risking their personal health or the health of others, without adversely affecting the state’s interest in election integrity.
Finally, Intervenors’ argument, ECF 41 at 12-14, that it is too soon for Plaintiffs to seek preliminary injunctive for the November general election is premature—while otherwise irrelevant and inapposite to this Court’s consideration of the Proposed Consent Decree— undermines their position that it is too late to seek relief for the August primary. Under Intervenors’ theory, there would never be an appropriate time for judicial scrutiny of election laws, because the harms caused by unduly burdensome election regulations would remain “speculative” and “uncertain” until the election approaches, at which point Intervenors invoke Purcell and argue that it is too late for judicial intervention. It cannot always be either too soon or too late to vindicate the right to vote in federal court, and Plaintiffs cannot be expected to
4 The cases cited by Proposed Intervenors in support of their Purcell argument are further distinguishable because they represent much more disruptive and significant interventions into the electoral process than this case, including: challenges to the contents of the ballot, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (denying injunctive relief to place additional candidates on the ballot in a pre-Purcell challenge, where doing so would require the reprinting of all ballots), the time during which voting can take place, Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (denying relief in a challenge to, inter alia, extend the submission deadline for petition signatures); Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (denying relief in a challenge to reduction of early voting dates), a complete overhaul of a state’s election system, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 988 (2014), or the very composition of the electoral map, Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 1090 (2011).
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assert their constitutional rights only when they satisfy Intervenors’ Goldilocks approach to litigation.
II. The Proposed Consent Decree is a procedurally fair compromise negotiated at arm’s length.
In addition to being substantively fair in light of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim, the Proposed Consent Decree is procedurally fair. “[C]ourts in the Eighth Circuit have held that ‘there is a presumption of fairness when a settlement is negotiated at arm’s length by well informed counsel.’” Soderstron v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC, Civil No. 16–233, 2018 WL 692912, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2018) (quoting In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02–1186, 2005 WL 4045741, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2005)). That is exactly the type of process that produced the Proposed Consent Decree in this case.
Proposed Intervenors’ assertion that the Secretary “obtained nothing” in entering the Proposed Consent Decree, ECF 41 at 29, is simply false. To begin, the Secretary successfully negotiated for Plaintiffs to forgo any motion for fees, expenses, or costs incurred until the date when the Proposed Consent Decree is entered. ECF 24 at ¶21. Proposed Intervenors’ claim that this term of the agreement “adds nothing,” ECF 41 at 29, is puzzling. Plaintiffs’ attorney fees and expenses for the work they have done to date—including filing the complaint, gathering evidence, retaining and paying an expert, writing the memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, and negotiating the Proposed Consent Decree5—would be substantial, and the Proposed Consent Decree frees the Secretary from the risk of paying those fees. That
5 Proposed Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs “generated few expenses because they reused prior materials from Virginia.” They are confused. Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case does not overlap with Plaintiffs’ counsel in Virginia. Indeed, Proposed Intervenors repeatedly lump the all litigants involved in voting rights cases across the country as the functional equivalents of the Democratic Party. See, e.g., ECF 41 at 2, 27. Such spurious assertions are unsupported and emphatically false.
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Plaintiffs may seek fees, expenses, and costs for future work is true, but irrelevant. And while Proposed Intervenors argue that “Plaintiffs were unlikely to be a ‘prevailing party’ in this case,” id., it was reasonable—indeed, correct—for the Secretary to believe that Plaintiffs had at least a realistic chance of prevailing and thus obtaining fees, expenses, and costs. See supra, Section I.A.
Nor is fiscal conservation the only benefit the Secretary would derive from the Proposed Consent Decree. The agreement would also compel Plaintiffs to withdraw their pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, thus delaying any adjudication of whether Minnesota may enforce the witness requirement for the November 2020 general election. ECF 24 at ¶16. This delay—while not desired by Plaintiffs, who sought to litigate the November issue as expeditiously as possible—is something the Secretary could reasonably want. The Secretary now has more time to implement a litigation strategy regarding the November election (a higher-stakes matter than the August primary). If the Secretary wishes to develop a thorough record to support enforcement of the witness requirement, the Proposed Consent Decree gives him time to do so. While Proposed Intervenors evidently believe the Secretary could have extracted more concessions than he did, ECF 41 at 29-30, the Court need not decide whether the Secretary drove the hardest conceivable bargain.
Instead, the Court’s focus is properly on whether the parties negotiated in good faith and at arm’s length. They did. Proposed Intervenors claim that “the sequence of events here is inconsistent with arm’s-length negotiations” because the Secretary filed a pleading in opposition to Plaintiffs’ claims on June 9, then submitted the Proposed Consent Decree to the Court on June 16. ECF 41 at 28. This contention is not just wrong, but backward. That the Secretary filed an answer opposing Plaintiffs’ claims is evidence that the parties have an adversarial, not collusive,
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relationship. The Secretary is continuing to defend the witness requirement; he merely conceded that it should be suspended for the August primary, in light of the ongoing pandemic and the likelihood that requiring witnesses for this primary would be found unconstitutional.
Proposed Intervenors’ suggestion that the Secretary “failed to convince the legislature to relax absentee-voting rules” and therefore engineered the Proposed Consent Decree as an endrun around the legislature, ECF 41 at 27, is equally meritless. The Secretary specifically said in April that the legislation he was supporting would not affect the witness requirement.6 It makes no sense that the Secretary would collude with Plaintiffs to implement a policy proposal he explicitly disavowed.
Without actual evidence of any procedural impropriety in this case, Proposed Intervenors rely largely on general grievances about the prevalence of what they see as collusive public-law settlements, and about the Democratic Party’s litigation tactics. ECF 41 at 26-27. Whatever their merits, these complaints are irrelevant here. The Democratic Party and its lawyers are playing no (0) role in this case. Plaintiff LWVMN is a nonpartisan organization that promotes electoral participation by people with all viewpoints; so is Campaign Legal Center, which represents Plaintiffs. Moreover, Plaintiffs have no interest in undermining the Minnesota legislative process, in which LWVMN is regularly engaged. See Declaration of Michelle Witte, ECF 15-21 at ¶17. This case is simply an attempt by Plaintiffs—uninvited and opposed by the Secretary—to vindicate their federal constitutional rights in federal court. There is nothing untoward about bringing, then partially settling, such a lawsuit.
6 Stephen Montemayor, Minnesota secretary of state proposes election changes because of COVID-19, STARTRIBUNE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-secretary-ofstate-pushes-election-changes/569472892/.
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III. The Proposed Consent Decree does not injure non-parties. Proposed Intervenors have also failed to provide evidence that the Proposed Consent
Decree will adversely affect them, or anyone else. They therefore fall well short of the high standard for rejecting a consent decree based on its anticipated impact on non-parties.
Even assuming Proposed Intervenors are allowed to intervene in this case, they do “not have power to block the decree merely by withholding [their] consent.” Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). “[I]n instances in which the rights of third parties are the basis for blocking the entry of, or vacating, a consent decree, there must be a demonstrable injury or adverse effect upon the group not party to the decree. Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1993). Where an objecting third party fails “to allege any specific injury” the Court should approve the consent decree. United States v. Board of Educ. Of City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1993). Even if the objector does demonstrate some harm, that is not necessarily enough: “a consent decree entered by a federal court, like any other injunction, can have adverse consequences on third parties without thereby being rendered invalid.” Id.
A. The Proposed Consent Decree does not adversely affect any non-party’s legal rights or obligations. In arguing that the Proposed Consent Decree should be rejected for the sake of non-
parties, Proposed Intervenors rely primarily on cases involving proposed settlements that deprived third parties of legal rights or saddled them with new legal obligations. These cases are inapposite because the Proposed Consent Decree does no such thing.
For example, the consent decree in United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440–41 (5th Cir. 1981), is easily distinguishable from the Proposed Consent Decree here. In City of Miami, the Fifth Circuit held that the consent decree adversely affected the defendant-union’s
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legally protected interests because the decree bound the defendant-union to a compromise which altered its contractual rights. Id. at 447. Similarly, in Bass v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., “one of the primary litigants was able to make an arrangement with an essentially disinterested third party that had the effect of resolving against the other primary litigants' wishes the immediate dispute over pretrial payout of the escrowed funds.” 698 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1983). And in United States v. City of Hialeah, the consent decree at issue specifically altered the contractual relationship between the objecting intervenors and their employer. 140 F.3d 968, 982-83 (11th Cir. 1998). Unlike the decrees in City of Miami, Bass, and City of Hialeah, the Proposed Consent Decree here “imposes no legal duties or obligations” on Proposed Intervenors or anyone else. Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 530-531. Nor were any of the “primary litigants” cut out of the partial settlement negotiations here. Bass, 698 F.2d at 330.
Proposed Intervenors rely especially on Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987). That case, too, is distinguishable on the ground that the proposed consent decree there threatened the legal rights of third parties—specifically, voters who would be placed at greater risk of being purged from the rolls. Id. at 340. Moreover, Proposed Intervenors fail to acknowledge that the first consideration supporting the court’s decision to deny the parties’ consent decree in Kasper was that the decree “was filed on the eve of the canvass” that the decree sought to affect, which did not give the judge “time to think.” Id. at 339. In this case, the parties filed the consent decree over two months before Minnesota’s August primary and nearly two weeks before the beginning of absentee voting for that election. ECF No. 24.
B. Intervenors have provided no evidence that the Proposed Consent Decree will lead to voter fraud.
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Intervenors allege that the Proposed Consent Decree will injure non-parties by leading to voter fraud. Yet, Proposed Intervenors’ concerns about voter fraud are unsupported by evidence. Proposed Intervenors attempt to distinguish states that routinely conduct all-mail elections without experiencing massive voter-fraud without providing a single distinction between those states’ mail absentee ballot verification process and Minnesota’s. As Proposed Intervenors note, the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform (“Carter-Baker Commission”) suggested that states can prevent absentee ballot voter fraud by “including signature verification.”7 ECF 41 at 35. But Minnesota already includes signature verification in its absentee ballot verification process. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3). This verification step is separate from and unrelated to the witness requirement; Minnesota verifies only voter signatures, not witness signatures. Moreover, none of the five states that hold all-mail elections—Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, and Utah—have any form of a witness requirement for absentee ballots.
Proposed Intervenors incorrectly suggest that the only other mechanism Minnesota has in place to verify the authenticity of absentee ballots is the prosecution of criminal penalties. ECF 41 at 22. As Plaintiffs explained in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 15 at 5, the State’s process for verifying absentee ballots requires a determination by at least two ballot board members—who, in most circumstances, belong to two different major political parties—that each ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness requirement, and one of which is signature verification. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
7 “To verify the identity of voters who cast absentee ballots, the voter’s signature on the absentee ballot can be matched with a digitized version of the signature that the election administrator maintains. While such signature matches are usually done, they should be done consistently in all cases, so that election officials can verify the identity of every new registrant who casts an absentee ballot.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 19-20, COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM (2005), https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/1472/file/3b50795b2d0374cbef5c29766256.pdf.
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First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1). Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2. Third, the ballot board members must check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3. Fourth, the ballot board members must verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4. Fifth, the ballot board members must check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the
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witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5. The ballot board does not check whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id. Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6. The State’s detailed verification process involves more steps than the Carter-Baker Commission suggested and more steps than Oregon, which conducts elections entirely by mail and which Proposed Intervenors concede has “avoided significant fraud.”8 ECF 41 at 35. Minnesota’s safeguards for ballot integrity, even without the witness requirement, are therefore stronger than states which conduct their elections entirely by mail and avoid voter fraud. Proposed Intervenors’ claim that eliminating just one of the state’s six independent steps for verifying absentee ballots will lead to “increased fraud and abuse” is unsubstantiated. The Secretary admitted that Minnesota has no significant history of fraud and Proposed Intervenors have provided no evidence to the contrary. ECF 22 at 23. Proposed Intervenors have likewise failed to prove that eliminating the state’s witness requirement will alter that history.
8 Oregon’s absentee ballot verification process does not include the additional steps of matching the voter’s name, address, driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number on their ballot information on their ballot application or voter record. Or. Stat. § 254.470.
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Ironically, eliminating Minnesota’s witness requirement should ease Proposed Intervenors’ concerns about fraud. One of the Carter-Baker Commission’s foremost concerns about absentee voting was that “citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes, at the workplace, or in church are more susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation,” from the people around them.9 The Proposed Consent Decree would eliminate this concern by allowing voters to cast their absentee ballots in the privacy of their own homes, where they can escape any pressure from unwanted onlookers.
C. The Proposed Consent Decree would not waste the Court’s resources on a moot issue. Finally, Proposed Intervenors suggest that entering the Proposed Consent Decree would
waste the Court’s resources because an overlapping consent decree has been entered in state court. ECF 41 at 34-35. Although Proposed Intervenors do not expressly argue that the Proposed Consent Decree here is moot, it bears emphasis—if only in abundance of caution—that there is no mootness issue here.
A case or controversy is not rendered moot by a parallel state court decision that is likely to be appealed. Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 469 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2006). Some of the Proposed Intervenors have already “moved for intervention in the parallel state court proceeding,” in order to oppose the consent decree entered there. ECF 41 at 34. Therefore, the current controversy “remains live” unless and until all potential appeals are exhausted. Id. at 733. This would be true even if the parallel proceeding completely worked its way through the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 n. 7, (2005) (controversy not moot where state courts had fully resolved same claims as those presented in federal lawsuit, because losing
9 Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 46, COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM (2005) https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/1472/file/3b50795b2d0374cbef5c29766256.pdf.
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party indicated that it would appeal the state Supreme Court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court).
Therefore, although the Court could reasonably abstain from ruling on the Proposed Consent Decree at this time,10 the Proposed Consent Decree is not moot. Indeed, by entering the Proposed Consent Decree, this Court could provide Minnesota with more clarity and assurance by providing a backstop in the case that the state court consent decree is disturbed.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the Proposed Consent Decree.

Date: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 44501 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Mark Gaber* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200

10 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) (recognizing that in some cases federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205 ECT-TNL
LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Julia Dayton Klein, certify that the Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of

Proposed Consent Decree complies with Local Rule 7.1(f).

I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used the following word

processing program and version Microsoft Word, Version 2016 and that this word processing

program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and

quotations in the following word count.

I further certify that the above document contains the following number of words: 6,497.

Dated: June 22, 2020

s/ Julia Dayton Klein Julia Dayton Klein LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153

GP:4844-6020-1665 v1

 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
STIPULATION AND PARTIAL CONSENT JUDGMENT AND DECREE

1. Whereas, on March 13, 2020, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued Executive Order 20-01 in which he declared a peacetime emergency in Minnesota because the COVID-19 pandemic threatens the lives of Minnesotans. Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-01.
2. Whereas, on May 13, 2020, Governor Walz issued another Executive Order prohibiting gatherings of more than ten people, requiring public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requiring workers to work from home if possible, mandating social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and stating that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 2056.
3. Whereas, on June 5, 2020, Governor Walz issued another Executive Order recognizing that the “COVID-19 pandemic continues to present an unprecedented and rapidly evolving challenge to our State,” prohibiting all indoor social gatherings of more than 10 people and outdoor social gatherings of more than 25 people, mandating social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and stating that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of

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Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-74.
4. Whereas COVID-19 positive cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19 in Minnesota continue to rise at a rapid rate. See Minnesota Department of Health, Situation Update for COVID-19, https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#dailyc1.
5. Whereas, on May 28, 2020, State health commissioner Jan Malcolm warned that although Governor Walz’s stay-at-home order slowed the growth of the pandemic in Minnesota, the State’s peak may still be yet to come. Jeremy Olson, STAR TRIBUNE, Minnesota's streak of declining daily COVID-19 case counts ends, https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-virusdeaths-up-29-cases-up-590/570867092/ (May 29, 2020).
6. Whereas, the Minnesota Department of Health continues to advise all Minnesotans to “stay at home as much as possible,” and “stay at least 6 feet apart.” Minnesota Department of Health, Protect Yourself & Others: COVID-19, https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/prevention.html (last visited May 30, 2020).
7. Whereas, on May 19, 2020, Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill filed a complaint against Defendant Steve Simon challenging the state’s witness requirement for absentee voting. Among other relief requested, the Complaint sought to enjoin enforcement of any statute or regulation that directly or indirectly requires any voter to obtain a witness signature in order cast an absentee ballot or mail ballot, and have such ballot counted, in any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020. ECF No. 1 at 28.
8. Whereas on May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting, inter alia, that this Court prohibit Defendant Simon from enforcing any provision of
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law—including Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—insofar as such provisions would require voters casting absentee or mail ballots to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness for any election held in calendar year 2020. ECF. No. 13 at 1.
9. Whereas federal guidelines state that in order to practice social distancing people should keep space between themselves and people outside of their home by staying “at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people.” Social Distancing, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html. And whereas the CDC currently suggests that election officials “encourage voters to use voting methods that minimize direct contact with other people,” “encourage mail-in methods of voting,” and “consider additional social distancing and other measures to protect these individuals during voting.” Ctrs. for Disease and Control, Recommendations for Election Polling Locations, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html (last updated March 27, 2020).
10. Whereas on May 13, 2020, Defendant Simon released a statement which read in part: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections, OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE (May 13, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-theoffice/news-room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/.
11. Whereas, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 203B.081 Subd. 1, primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota
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House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, 2020 with early and absentee voting beginning on June 26, 2020 (the “August Primary”).
12. Whereas Plaintiffs are required to closely interact with individuals who do not live in their households in order to cast their ballots in the August Primary in violation of the CDC and the State’s own social distancing guidelines, Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, the “Parties”) agree that that an expeditious resolution of this matter for the August Primary, in the manner encompassed by the terms of this Consent Decree, is in the best interests of the health, safety, and constitutional rights of the citizens of Minnesota, and therefore in the public interest.
13. Whereas, on April 28, 2020, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services reported that 52 people who voted in person or worked the polls for Wisconsin’s April 7, 2020 primary election have tested positive for COVID-19 thus far.
14. Whereas federal courts in other states have enjoined those states from enforcing witness requirements, similar to Minnesota’s witness requirement, for primary elections this spring. See Thomas v. Andino, -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2020 WL 2617329 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of Elections, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020).
15. Whereas Defendant Simon agrees not to enforce the witness requirement for the August Primary for absentee voters who fear that complying with the requirement will risk their health and safety and possibly expose them to COVID-19.
16. Whereas Plaintiffs agree to withdraw their May 19, 2020, motion for preliminary injunction upon entry of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree.
17. Whereas, the Parties agree that entry of this Consent Decree does not affect the viability of Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection claims with respect
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to enforcement of the witness requirement in any subsequent elections after the August Primary, nor does it affect the Plaintiffs’ right to seek preliminary and temporary relief with respect to enforcement of the witness requirement in any subsequent elections after the August Primary. The Parties also agree that Defendant is not waiving any defenses regarding the enforcement of the witness requirement for any election other than the August Primary, any defenses based on events that occur after the execution of this Partial Consent Decree, or any defenses unrelated to the allegations filed by Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
18. Whereas the terms of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree were negotiated at arm’s length through counsel for the parties.
19. Whereas the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Consent Parties and that the Partial Consent Judgment and Decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable because such agreement preserves the constitutional right to vote of Plaintiffs and other Minnesota voters while promoting public health during a pandemic and does so without harming the integrity of Minnesota’s elections. The Court gives appropriate weight to Defendant’s expertise and public interest responsibility in the area of election administration.
20. Whereas Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim, as shown in their complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, to further support the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree.
21. Whereas the Parties shall each bear their own fees, expenses, and costs incurred as of the date of this Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims raised as to the August Primary against Defendant. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE IN PARAGRAPHS 1-17 THAT:
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1. For the Primary elections scheduled August 11, 2020, Defendant shall not enforce the requirement—as stated in Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—that previously registered voters casting absentee or mail ballots must obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness.
2. Defendant shall issue guidance instructing all relevant local election officials and ballot boards that, for the August Primary, no absentee ballot or mail ballot cast by a previously registered voter may be rejected for failure to include the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness.
3. Defendant shall issue guidance instructing all relevant local election officials to modify, amend, or print the instructions accompanying each absentee ballot to inform voters that any absentee ballot cast by a previously registered voter in the August Primary without a witness signature will not be rejected on that basis and that the witness signature line and associated language for witnesses to certify a previously registered voter’s ballot, Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (1) and (2), be removed from the certification of eligibility altogether for absentee ballot materials sent to previously registered voters. To the extent voting materials are already printed, the guidance shall instruct the local election officials to include, in all future mailings of ballots, a notice informing the voter of the change in the witness requirement.
4. Defendant shall take additional reasonable steps to inform the public that the witness requirement will not be enforced for the August primary. This shall include a notice prominently placed on Defendant’s website.
5. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby withdrawn, without prejudice.
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June 16, 2020

Steve Simon Secretary of State

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 13 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully move for a preliminary injunction directing Defendant Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota, to: (1) refrain, for the duration of calendar year 2020, from enforcing any provision of law—including Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—insofar as such provisions would require voters casting absentee or mail ballots to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; (2) instruct all local officials and ballot boards that, for all elections held during calendar year 2020, no absentee ballot or mail ballot may be rejected for failure to include the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; (3) take steps sufficient to ensure that all official printed materials (including envelopes and instructions) provided to absentee and mail voters in connection with any election in calendar year 2020 do not explicitly or implicitly direct the voter to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; and (4) undertake a public education campaign sufficient to inform the public that no witness is required for absentee

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 13 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 2

or mail voting in any election in calendar year 2020. A memorandum in support of this Motion

will be filed concurrently herewith.

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200

*Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

GP:4828-1652-2686 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION The United States is living through the worst pandemic in over a century. Minnesota officials are rightly urging the public to avoid close contact between households to minimize the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Yet the state is asking its citizens to violate this social distancing practice to vote in upcoming elections. To cast a ballot, Minnesota voters must either go to the polls in person, or have their absentee ballot signed by a witness. For many members of Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, it is impossible to have an absentee ballot witnessed without risking exposure to COVID-19. The danger is especially grave for Minnesotans like Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, whose age and underlying health conditions make her particularly vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying from the virus. The fundamental right to vote cannot be conditioned on voters’ willingness to risk contracting a disease that has killed more than 100,000 Americans over the past few months. The Court should therefore enter a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to suspend

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enforcement of the witness requirement for absentee voting for the duration of 2020 and inform the public of this suspension.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. Absentee Voting in Minnesota
Minnesota permits any eligible voter to vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1.1 However, it is impossible for a voter to cast a valid absentee ballot without interacting in person with someone else.
When a voter properly requests to have an absentee ballot provided by mail, the local county auditor or municipal clerk sends the voter the ballot, together with a package of other materials, including multiple envelopes and directions for casting the ballot. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. One of the envelopes issued to each absentee voter is a signature envelope, on which a blank certificate is printed. To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers; and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.2
1 Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45; see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.46. The process for casting, verifying, and counting ballots in all-mail elections is generally the same as the process for absentee ballots under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (providing that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in all-mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). This Memorandum uses the term “absentee” to refer to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota. 2 By statute, the blank certificate is to be “printed on the back of the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3. In practice, the envelope on which the certificate is printed is known as the signature envelope. See Minn. R. 8210.0600 (standard instructions to absentee voters).
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The blank certificate also contains a section to be filled out by a third-party witness, who must be registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. The witness must sign the certificate and write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
By signing the certificate the witness certifies, at a minimum, that: (1) the voter showed the witness the blank ballot before voting; (2) the voter marked the ballot in private if physically able to do so, or else the ballot was “marked as directed by the voter” by someone else; (3) the voter enclosed and sealed the ballot in its dedicated envelope; and (4) the witness is a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or a person authorized to administer oaths.3 Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.4 In order to complete these steps so the witness can truthfully make the required certifications, the voter and witness must be physically together for the voting process.
It is exceedingly rare for voters to attempt to cast fraudulent absentee ballots, both nationally and in Minnesota. In a comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012,
3 The standard witness certification adopted by regulation states, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. This language is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness. However, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added). 4 Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
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journalists found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). This represents a miniscule fraction of absentee voting. In the November 2012 election alone, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voting Survey) at 9.
Setting aside the witness requirement, Minnesota law provides numerous safeguards against any potential fraud in absentee voting. To begin with, Minnesota provides steep criminal sanctions for absentee voting fraud. It is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
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Minnesota also protects against counting fraudulent absentee votes by subjecting all absentee ballots to a verification process to determine whether the ballot is accepted or rejected. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for making this determination. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before an absentee ballot is accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining the ballot must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
• First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
• Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
• Third, the ballot board members must check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether
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the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3. • Fourth, the ballot board members must verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4. • Fifth, the ballot board members must check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5. The ballot board does not check whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id. • Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
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II. The COVID-19 Pandemic Necessitates Consistent Social Distancing and Will Increase Demand for Absentee Voting
The United States—and much of the rest of the world—“is in the midst of an unprecedented health crisis occasioned by the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic.” In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020). SARS-CoV-2 is a new virus that causes COVID-19. Ex. 3 (Decl. of Dr. Arthur Reingold), at ¶ 7. As of May 28, 2020, there have been 1,678,843 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 99,031 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Ex. 4 (CDC National COVID-19 Case Data). Minnesota has had 22,947 confirmed cases and 967 deaths. Ex. 5 (Minnesota COVID-19 Dashboard). These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths, given limitations in testing. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 13.
Some individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 experience no symptoms or only mild symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12. Others, however, experience respiratory failure or other life-threatening complications from COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. Hospitals treating COVID-19 patients, including all sites of the Minnesota-based Mayo Clinic, are prohibiting or severely restricting visitors to avoid spreading the virus. Ex. 6 (Statement of the Mayo Clinic). Unable to receive visitors, many hospital patients dying of COVID-19 are dying alone. See Ex. 7 (New England Journal of Medicine Report).
Anyone could potentially become severely ill or die from COVID-19. However, certain populations are at a heightened risk of severe illness of death from COVID-19—specifically, patients over age 65, people with immunologic conditions, and people with certain other health conditions, including some heart conditions, asthma, COPD, diabetes, obesity, and chronic kidney disease. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 8.
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SARS-CoV-2 spreads easily from person to person through respiratory droplets. Id. ¶ 9. The virus also may also be capable of aerosolization, meaning it may linger in the air and infect people who enter the airspace. Id. Additionally, the virus can spread through contact with contaminated surfaces. Id. SARS-CoV-2 is so contagious that each infected individual is estimated to infect two to eight others. Id. Infected individuals who are not symptomatic can nevertheless spread the virus Id. ¶ 12.
There is currently no vaccine for COVID-19, and it is unlikely that a vaccine approved by the Food and Drug Administration will be available for at least the next twelve months. Id. ¶ 14. Before the U.S. population can develop “herd immunity” that protects against widespread transmission of COVID-19, approximately 80 to 95 percent of the population must become immune to the virus. Id. ¶ 15. For this to happen, either a vaccine must become widely available, or the majority of U.S. residents must be infected with the virus and develop antibodies to it. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. All told, it is likely that there will be resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions across the U.S. throughout 2020 and into 2021, even accounting for behavioral interventions and government-imposed restrictions designed to control the spread of the virus. Id. ¶ 16. Resurgences in the fall and winter of 2020 are especially likely, given that SARS-CoV-2 may spread most easily in colder weather (although this is not yet confirmed). Id. ¶ 18.
Nevertheless, behavior is an important factor influencing the course of the pandemic. The only known ways to reduce the spread of COVID-19 are frequent handwashing, disinfecting surfaces, social isolation, and social distancing (i.e., maintaining at least six feet of separation between individuals). Id. ¶ 11. The CDC currently advises that “[l]imiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of” COVID-19. Ex. 8 (CDC Social Distancing Recommendations). Early evidence shows that social distancing slows transmission of the virus,
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and jurisdictions that imposed stay-at-home orders early are succeeding in reducing transmission. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 13.
Recognizing the importance of social distancing, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities. Ex. 9 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48). In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people, requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56).
Emerging evidence shows that elections with a large amount of in-person voting are dangerous during the pandemic. In Wisconsin, the presidential primary drew nearly 400,000 inperson voters on April 7, 2020. Ex. 11 (Wisconsin Elections Commission Report). As of May 16, at least 71 people had tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary. Ex. 12 (Madison Article). In Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later. Ex. 13 (Milwaukee County COVID-19 Election Report). An analysis by university economists has preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-
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19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary. Ex. 14 (National Bureau of Economic Research Paper on Wisconsin Primary); see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
To avoid COVID-19 transmission at polling places, the CDC currently recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic. Ex. 15 (CDC Recommendations for Election Polling Locations). Defendant himself has recognized the importance of shifting toward absentee voting during the pandemic, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots).
Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2. Ex. 17 (Minn. SOS Elections Calendar). Given the apparent danger of voting in person, demand for absentee voting in these elections will likely rise to unprecedented levels.
III. Applying the Witness Requirement During the Pandemic Burdens Plaintiffs Although absentee voting offers Minnesotans a safer alternative to in-person voting
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not entirely safe. For Minnesota voters who do not live with a person qualified to witness absentee ballots—i.e., a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths—complying with the witness requirement for absentee voting necessarily means meeting in person with an individual outside their household.
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This increases the voter’s risk of being exposed to COVID-19 or transmitting the virus. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
For Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, the witness requirement may be an insurmountable obstacle to voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. Ex. 18 (Decl. of Vivian Latimer Tanniehill) at ¶ 2. She has previously had open heart surgery, takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health, and has asthma. Id. ¶ 17. The combination of her age and underlying health conditions places her at high risk of developing severe or life-threatening symptoms if she contracts COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 16-18; see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 8. Although she has always voted in person in the past, she believes that voting in person would be too risky during the pandemic. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 21. She therefore hopes to vote absentee in the August and November 2020 elections, and possibly subsequent elections. Id. ¶ 14. However, in order to vote absentee under current Minnesota law, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would need to invite another person into her home or travel to meet with another person, violating the social distancing protocol she has been assiduously following. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. She is anxiously monitoring public health conditions to assess the health risk that would come with having her absentee ballot witnessed, so that she can decide whether the risk is too high to tolerate. Id. ¶ 25.
Ms. Latimer Tanniehill serves as Advocacy Chair of the Board of Directors of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN), and has a passion for democratic participation stemming from her childhood. Latimer Tanniehill Decl. ¶¶ 7-11. As a Black woman originally from Birmingham, Alabama, she experienced segregation and state-sanctioned racism as a day-to-day reality. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. After moving to Minnesota at age seven, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. Id. ¶ 8.
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These early experiences impressed on Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. Id. Giving up her vote to protect her health would be a painful choice for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill. Id. ¶ 25.
Other members of LWVMN are similarly at risk of having to forego voting during the pandemic to avoid the health hazards of having their ballots witnessed. LWVMN is a nonprofit organization with about 2,200 members throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Decl. of Michelle Witte) at ¶ 9. Many of LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and some have additional health conditions that make them especially vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying if they contract COVID-19. Id. ¶ 11. While some LWVMN members live with a registered Minnesota voter or other qualified witness, many others (like Ms. Latimer Tanniehill) live alone or live only with people who cannot witness absentee ballots, such as minor children or non-U.S. citizens. Id. ¶ 12. LWVMN members who cannot have their ballots witnessed at home—especially those at high risk of severe symptoms or death from COVID-19—will face a choice between endangering their health and giving up their vote during the pandemic.
For LWVMN itself, the continued enforcement of the witness requirement during the pandemic has become a drain on its time, energy, and money. LWVMN has scarce resources, with just three full-time employees serving about 2,200 members and 35 local chapters throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶¶ 6, 9, 13. Ordinarily, LWVMN’s core activities include conducting voter registration drives and hosting forum events to help voters learn about candidates and policy issues. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 29. These services to the electorate are most in demand in presidential election years, and 2020 is no exception. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 18. LWVMN is trying to ramp up these activities and adapt them to the current public health situation, which requires a formidable investment of resources. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. On top of this challenge, LWVMN now must
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set aside resources to help Minnesota absentee voters—a much larger group than ever before— understand the witness requirement and comply with it as safely as possible. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. LWVMN is now developing a communications campaign educating voters about the need for an absentee ballot witness and the qualifications for serving as a witness. LWVMN is also developing plans to help voters have their absentee ballots witnessed during the pandemic— potentially by implementing a program in which LWVMN would directly connect voters with volunteers who are willing and able to serve as witnesses (although these volunteers will likely be scarce during the pandemic). Id. ¶¶ 29-30. These projects focused on the witness requirement take time, energy, and money—resources that LWVMN would otherwise devote toward updating and executing its core activities such as voter registration and educational forum events. Id. ¶ 29.
LEGAL STANDARD “Whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). The Court must apply this test in a “flexible” manner appropriate to “the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. “[W]here the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward plaintiff a preliminary injunction may issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation,” even if the district court does not conclude that the movant is more than fifty percent likely to succeed on the merits. Id.
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ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim for a temporary
suspension of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. By applying its witness requirement for absentee ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota puts voters in danger for no good reason. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed in showing that the witness requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this unique situation. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). A severe restriction on voting rights “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (citation omitted). Even if the challenged restriction falls short of being “severe,” courts do not revert to rational basis review but employ a “sliding scale,” subjecting each voting restriction to a level of scrutiny calibrated to the burden it imposes. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124, 1124 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); id. at 1128 (applying “heightened scrutiny” to a “significant” burden on voting rights).
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Minnesota’s enforcement of its witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic cannot survive review under this framework. Requiring voters to have their absentee ballots witnessed and signed during the COVID-19 pandemic, at substantial risk to their health, places a severe burden on the right to vote for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other members of LWVMN. The state derives no significant benefit from keeping the witness requirement in place during the pandemic—and certainly no benefit important enough to justify burdening voters to this degree.
A. The witness requirement severely burdens voting rights as applied to voters during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting puts Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other voters to an impossible choice: exercise their right to vote during the COVID-19 pandemic, or protect their health and the health of others by following social distancing best practices. The state thus imposes a severe burden on voting rights.
In Minnesota and across the nation, life has changed dramatically because of the COVID19 pandemic. Millions of Minnesotans, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and most members of LWVMN, are avoiding close contact with people outside their households to minimize the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ 18-19; Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 20. There is no serious dispute that social distancing is necessary to minimize the spread of what can be a deadly disease, especially for people over 65 and people with certain underlying health conditions. The latest academic research supports this view. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 11, 13. The CDC agrees. Ex. 8 (CDC Guidance on Social Distancing); Ex. 20 (CDC Guidance on Individuals at Higher Risk of COVID-19). So do the Governor of Minnesota and Defendant Simon himself. Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56); Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
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Under these circumstances, the requirement to meet in person with a witness makes absentee voting a health hazard for many voters, leaving these voters without any safe avenue to cast a ballot. The state’s failure to provide safe absentee voting—at a time when in-person voting is irreducibly dangerous—gravely burdens voters. See Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alternative means of [ballot] access must be provided absent a sufficiently strong state interest”); Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-01552JMC, 2020 WL 2617329, at *19 n.20 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (“In-person voting, while still technically an available option, forces voters to make the untenable and illusory choice between exercising their right to vote and placing themselves at risk of contracting a potentially terminal disease.”); see also United States v. Annis, No. 16-195(1), 2020 WL 1812421, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2020) (“There is no question that COVID-19 is a cause for alarm, and the Court does not fault Annis’s concerns, given his health conditions.”).
Other district courts have recognized this reality in cases directly on point. In Thomas v. Andino, the court found that a group of plaintiffs—including individuals at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19—were “likely to prevail on their constitutional challenge to [South Carolina’s] Witness Requirement under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test because the character and magnitude of the burdens imposed on [the] Plaintiffs in having to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic likely outweigh the extent to which the Witness Requirement advances the state’s interests of voter fraud and integrity.” 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of South Carolina’s witness signature requirement in the June 2020 primaries, and ordered state officials “to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement for absentee voting.” Id. at *30.
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Similarly, in League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, the court approved a partial settlement in which Virginia’s election authorities agreed not to enforce the state’s witness requirement for absentee voting in the June 2020 primary. No. 6:20-CV00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020). In approving the agreement, the court found that enforcing Virginia’s witness requirement during the pandemic was “a probable violation of federal law.” Id. at *6. As the court explained,
[T]he measure is too restrictive in that it will force a large class of Virginians to face the choice between adhering to guidance that is meant to protect not only their own health, but the health of those around them, and undertaking their fundamental right—and, indeed, their civic duty—to vote in an election. The Constitution does not permit a state to force such a choice on its electorate. Id. at *8 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)). Even if it were possible to mitigate the health risks by taking certain precautions in voter-witness interactions, the court found that “many would be dissuaded from exercising their vote both on account of the remaining health risks and required steps to mitigate them . . . especially those who are elderly, immunocompromised, or otherwise at grave risk from the virus.” Id. The reasoning in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia squarely applies here. Indeed, Minnesota’s witness requirement imposes a greater burden on voting during the pandemic than the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina. Unlike those states, Minnesota requires absentee ballot witnesses to meet stringent qualifications, increasing the number of voters who must look outside their own household to find a witness. Compare Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (witness must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths”), with Va. Code §§ 24.2-706, 24.2-707 (requiring a witness but not restricting who may serve as a witness), and S.C. Code § 715-220 (same).
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Other courts have similarly recognized that when state laws require in-person signature gathering to exercise First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, those requirements impose severe burdens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Miller v. Thurston, No. 5:20-cv05070-PKH, ECF No. 41, Slip Op. at 14-15 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2020) (finding that in-person signature gathering and notarization requirements “impose severe burdens on Plaintiffs’ core political speech, especially in light of the State-recognized need for social distancing during this pandemic.”); Goldstein v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 142 N.E.3d 560, 570-71 (Mass. 2020) (signature-gathering requirements “now impose a severe burden on, or significant interference with, a candidate’s right to gain access to the . . . primary ballot” in Massachusetts because “if a candidate seeks to obtain signatures on nomination papers in the traditional ways, he or she reasonably may fear that doing so might risk the health and safety not only of the person requesting the signature but also of the persons who are signing, of the families with whom they live, and potentially of their entire community”); Garbett v. Herbert, 2:20-cv-245-RJS, 2020 WL 2064101, at *12 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2020) (finding severe burden because “[i]n light of nearly all public events being canceled, orders for people to stay six feet apart and to stay home, and the extraordinary impact on nearly all aspects of everyday life, it is difficult to imagine a confluence of events that would make it more difficult for a candidate to collect signatures”); Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-2112, 2020 WL 1951687, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020). Notably, most of these cases involve the right to run for office, which is not, on its own, a fundamental right. Libertarian Party of Illinois, 2020 WL 1951687, at *2. The argument for finding a severe burden is even stronger here, where the constitutional interest at stake is the fundamental right to vote. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.5
5 A recent case involving Wisconsin’s witness requirement for absentee voting also supports
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The facts of this case aptly illustrate why courts around the country are recognizing the
severe burdens involved in obtaining physical signatures during the pandemic. For Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill, complying with Minnesota’s witness requirement is such a grave health risk that it
may prevent her from voting in upcoming elections, including the August and November 2020
elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶ 25. Given her personal background and her
activism promoting democratic participation, surrendering her vote during the pandemic is not a
matter Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would take lightly. Id. ¶¶ 7-11. The same goes for Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill’s fellow members of LWVMN, who presumably joined the organization because they
value democratic participation. See Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 4. These voters are at risk of losing a
finding a severe burden in this case. In Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, the district court found that “at least some isolated voters, and in particular those who are immunocompromised or elderly, will likely not be able to secure a witness certification safely even with reasonable efforts, or at minimum have reasonable concerns about their ability to do so.” No. 20-cv-249-wmc, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020). The court recognized that the witness requirement “may impose severe burdens” on these voters, and therefore ordered the defendants “to accept an unwitnessed ballot that contains a written affirmation or other statement by an absentee voter that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, he or she was unable to safely obtain a witness certification despite his or her reasonable efforts to do so, provided that the ballot is otherwise valid.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction as to the witness requirement, primarily because the injunction came too close to the presidential primary, the state had issued guidance allowing for socially distanced signature options, and the state was considering additional accommodations. Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 201538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). In that case, the district court had ordered the relief well after absentee voting was underway and less than two weeks before the election. The Seventh Circuit also suggested that it was premature to draw conclusions about the difficulty Wisconsinites would encounter in having their absentee ballots witnessed, because the Wisconsin Election Commission had recently issued some relevant guidance and might “consider yet other ways for voters to satisfy the statutory signature requirement (if possible, for example, by maintaining the statutory presence requirement but not requiring the witness’s physical signature).” Id. at 4. Whatever the merits of these considerations in the Wisconsin case, they do not apply here. Minnesota’s next statewide election is not until August 11. Moreover, Minnesota has not issued formal guidance on witnessing absentee ballots safely during the pandemic, and it is clear that Minnesota law requires the witness’s physical signature.
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constitutional right they treasure because the health risks of complying with the witness requirement are too serious to ignore.
B. Minnesota’s interest in enforcing the witness requirement during the pandemic is slight.
Minnesota derives no substantial benefit from enforcing the witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The state’s choice to keep this requirement in place throughout the pandemic therefore cannot pass any form of heightened scrutiny, let alone the strict scrutiny that such a severe burden on voting rights demands. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Fish, 957 F.3d at 1128.
Like every other state, Minnesota has a “legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 932 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2019). This interest can justify a restriction on voting, but only if the restriction is appropriately tailored to address the actual threat to election integrity, accounting for the severity of the burden on voters and the availability of other means to serve the state’s interest. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 (“While states certainly have an interest in protecting against voter fraud and ensuring voter integrity, the interest will not suffice absent ‘evidence that such an interest made it necessary to burden voters’ rights.’”) (quoting Fish, 957 F.3d at 1133).
The witness requirements at issue in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia failed this test, based on facts remarkably similar to this case. In both cases, the courts found no evidence that requiring a witness signature was effective in preventing absentee voter fraud. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. Indeed, both witness requirements shared a feature that undermined their effectiveness at preventing fraud: Virginia and South Carolina could not or would not verify the witness’s signature to confirm that the ballot was properly witnessed. League of Women Voters of Virginia,
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2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20-*21. The court in League of Women Voters of Virginia further noted that Virginia had “other means of combatting voter fraud integrated into the absentee-voting system,” including “serious felony charges for absentee voting malfeasance.” 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. “For the fraudster who would dare to sign the name of another qualified voter at the risk of being charged with Class 4 and Class 5 felonies . . . writing out an illegible scrawl on an envelope to satisfy the witness requirement would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” Id.
Minnesota’s interest in election integrity similarly fails to justify the severe burden that its witness requirement imposes on voters during the pandemic. To begin with, fraudulent absentee voting is vanishingly rare throughout the U.S., and especially in Minnesota. A comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012 found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). By way of comparison, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot in the November 2012 election alone. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voter Survey); see also Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 n.21 (noting further evidence that absentee voter fraud is rare). Minnesota expanded the availability of absentee voting in 2013, see 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Ch. 131 (H.F. 894), but there is no evidence that this legislation has led to any pattern of absentee voting fraud.
Without its witness requirement, Minnesota would still have robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud. Like Virginia, Minnesota imposes serious criminal penalties for fraudulent absentee voting. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.03 (creating felony offenses for fraud and other misconduct in absentee voting); Minn. Stat. § 201.014 (any person who votes in Minnesota
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despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony); Minn. Stat. § 609.03 (felonies punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both).
If a fraudulent absentee ballot were returned in defiance of these criminal prohibitions, the ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to rigorous verification process along with all other absentee ballots. Each absentee ballot is rejected unless it satisfies six independent criteria, as judged by a ballot board composed of trained officials who generally must include members of different political parties. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Five of the six criteria have nothing to do with the required witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; see also supra at 5-6.
Even if requiring a witness signature could in theory make a meaningful contribution to preventing fraud, Minnesota’s witness requirement would fail to do so, due to an “enforcement weakness[] apparent in the statute” and its implementing regulations. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. As in Virginia and South Carolina, local ballot boards in Minnesota will not reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5. Instead, the witness requirement is automatically deemed satisfied if the witness’s portion of the certificate is filled out with a signature and any one of the following: a Minnesota address, a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or an affixed notarial stamp. Id. “For the fraudster who would dare” commit absentee ballot fraud in the first place, adding a signature and address for a fictional witness whose existence will never be verified “would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. Luckily, Minnesota has much stronger antifraud mechanisms in place. See supra at 3-6. No doubt the requirement that the voter provide her
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Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number is a much higher barrier for a would-be fraudster than a witness signature.
Like the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina, the witness requirement in Minnesota has “not been justified by countervailing, demonstrated interests.” Id. at *8. By all means, the Court should give “adequate consideration to the state’s interests” and permit Minnesota to maintain overall statutory scheme that “gives . . . effect to the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelman, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). But the evidence in this case shows that applying the witness requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic—and effectively disenfranchising many voters in the process—is not remotely necessary to vindicate this interest. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied challenge to Minnesota’s witness requirement.
II. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief. Minnesota’s witness requirement has caused and will continue to cause Plaintiffs
irreparable damage absent a preliminary injunction. A violation of the right to vote in any election constitutes irreparable injury. After an election has passed, the right to vote is lost permanently and the harm cannot be redressed. Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 752 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
A. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN face a choice between their safety and their vote.
Enforcing Minnesota’s witness requirement during the pandemic would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN by forcing them to risk their health or refrain from voting.
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Ms. Latimer Tanniehill fears that she will have to put her life on the line in order to vote in the upcoming August and November 2020 elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ #21, 25. She is Black, over 65 years old, asthmatic, and an open-heart surgery survivor who takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health. Id. ¶¶ 7, 17.6 Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is therefore particularly vulnerable to becoming severely or fatally ill if she contracts COVID-19. In light of her particular vulnerability to the disease, Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill does not allow anyone inside her home, including her own adult children and grandchildren. Id. ¶ 19. Her youngest daughter visits by standing outside on the sidewalk while Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill talks to her from an upstairs window. When Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill’s oldest daughter and grandchildren visit to help her with lawn work outside, they wear face masks and gloves while practicing social distancing. Id. 19.
In order for Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill to vote absentee, she would have to violate the social distancing guidelines she has been following by inviting someone inside her home or traveling outside of her home to visit someone else. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. She would then have to show that person her blank ballot and have that person sign a statement after she finishes filling out the ballot. This would require her to touch an object immediately after a person who lives outside her household touches it, a process which the CDC has warned may lead to transmission of COVID-19. Ex. 22 (CDC Report on How COVID-19 Spreads). Ms. Latimer Tanniehill’s only other option is to risk voting in person, which would involve waiting in line with other voters, interacting with poll workers, and touching voting equipment that might
6 The CDC has reported that older persons and those with certain preexisting health conditions are at higher risk of contracting, developing serious illness, and dying from COVID-19. See Ex. 20 (CDC Report on Higher Risk Populations). The CDC has also reported that certain racial and ethnic minorities, including Black individuals, are at higher risk of serious illness or death from the virus. See Ex. 21 (CDC Report on COVID-19 and Racial and Ethnic Minorities).
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be contaminated. This form of prolonged exposure to other individuals at a crowded polling place would also put her at serious risk of contracting COVID-19.
If the witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place through the pandemic, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill does not know whether she will be able to vote in the August and November 2020 elections by absentee ballot. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. While she would rather tolerate a small risk of COVID-19 infection than give up her right to vote, if the risk of infection is too high, she may make the painful choice not to vote. Id. Either of these outcomes would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill.
Many other members of LWVMN are in the same position of choosing between two irreparable harms. Many LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is far from the only one with health conditions that elevate the risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶ 11. Nor is it unusual for LWVMN members to live alone, or to live in households without anyone qualified to witness an absentee ballot. Id. ¶ 12. If the witness requirement stays in place through the pandemic, some LWVMN members will forego voting because they reasonably fear exposing themselves to COVID-19 by interacting with a witness. Id. ¶ 32. LWVMN members, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill, therefore face imminent and irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
B. LWVMN also faces irreparable injury in the form of diverted resources. If the witness requirement remains in force throughout the pandemic, LWVMN will have to divert resources from its core activities to take new and unprecedented steps to facilitate absentee voting, with a particular focus on educating voters about the witness requirement for absentee voting and helping them connect with witnesses as safely as possible. Ex. 19 (Witte
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Decl.) at ¶¶ 29-30. This diversion of resources is already happening, and will only increase absent injunctive relief.
Until recently, the witness requirement had not been a major focus of LWVMN’s programming because most Minnesota voters usually vote in person. Id. ¶ 24. However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, LWVMN expects to see an unprecedented surge in absentee voting throughout Minnesota in the August 2020 state primary and the November 2020 general election. Id. ¶ 25. LWVMN will encourage its members to vote absentee if possible, and expects that most of its members will do so. Therefore, LWVMN will have to increase its involvement in educating voters about absentee voting. Id. ¶ 26.
If Minnesota had no witness requirement for absentee voting, LWVMN’s voter education efforts on absentee voting would be relatively simple and straightforward: it would focus on raising awareness of the fact that all registered Minnesota voters have the right to vote absentee. Id. ¶ 27. However, the witness requirement complicates things significantly. LWVMN must inform voters not only that absentee voting requires a witness, but that that witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. LWVMN is developing a communications campaign to tackle the challenge of educating voters about the requirements for absentee voting, particularly the witness requirement. Id. ¶¶ 29 LWVMN’s office staff is currently spending time and energy on developing strategies to educate the public about the witness requirement—time and energy that it would otherwise invest in adapting its core activities, such as voter registration drives and forum events, to the new COVID-19 reality. Id. ¶ 29.
LWVMN’s office staff is also spending significant time and energy developing plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the
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pandemic. Id. ¶ 30. LWVMN is in the early stages of creating a program that would allow voters to request a witness and be connected with others who are eligible and willing to witness absentee ballots. Id. ¶ 30. However, developing this program is an expensive and timeconsuming task. LWVMN has no existing technology or infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses, and no experience brokering these peer-to-peer connections. Id. ¶ 31.
The resources that LWVMN is expending to address the State’s witness requirement cannot be recovered at a later date. “Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). Further, Plaintiffs do not and could not seek damages from Defendant Simon because he is a state official. When a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may not award retroactive monetary relief. Baker Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the harm that LWVMN faces in the absence of a preliminary injunction will be irreparable.
III. The public interest and balance of harms weigh heavily in favor of the preliminary injunction.
Once a party moving for a preliminary injunction “makes a threshold showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits, the district court should then proceed to weigh the other Dataphase factors,” which include the threat of irreparable injury to the movant, the balancing of harms among interested parties, and the effect on the public interest. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). While the usual inquiry on a motion for preliminary injunction “calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest,”
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“[t]hese factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
A. The general public would benefit from the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court has held that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (internal citations omitted). Because the right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Thus, it is clear that the public has a strong interest in all eligible voters being able to vote, because “it is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 2007), modified on reh’g, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he public interest favors protecting core First Amendment freedoms.”). Without injunctive relief, many Minnesotans who are otherwise eligible to vote will face a severe—and potentially insurmountable—burden on their ability to vote. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, approximately 26 percent of voting-age Minnesotans live alone. Ex. 23 (Census Bureau Data). Although under normal circumstances most Minnesotans may be able to find an eligible individual to witness their absentee ballot, the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic prevent a significant portion of Minnesota’s electorate from effectively exercising the franchise without causing harm to themselves and their communities by spreading the disease. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that even “extreme measures” are justified by the global pandemic; this minor alteration to Minnesota’s absentee laws to ensure safe access to the right to vote is certainly justified. In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1029.
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Critically, an injunction temporarily lifting the witness signature requirement for absentee ballots will do nothing to impede the interests of those Minnesota voters who do live with someone who can witness their ballot without risking infection or spread of COVID-19. Even those voters who are able to fulfill the requirement have an interest in the health of Minnesota’s democracy and the perception of a legitimate election—both of which are served by the removal of a barrier that forces Minnesotans to risk either disenfranchisement or their health. That interest is shared by the State, which has an affirmative interest in protecting voters’ confidence in the integrity of elections. See Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
In addition to the election-related interests, an injunction would also serve the public by protecting public health. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1031 (relying on “the State’s admittedly legitimate interests in protecting or promoting the public’s health and safety during the COVID19 pandemic”); see also J.S.G. ex rel. Hernandez v. Stirrup, No. SAG-20-1026, 2020 WL 1985041, at *11 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2020) (“[G]ranting relief that reduces the risk of the further spread of COVID-19 also significantly furthers the public interest.”). The only ways to limit the spread of COVID-19 are self-isolation, social distancing, frequent handwashing, and disinfecting surfaces. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 11. Social distancing requires the maintenance of at least six feet of distance between individuals who do not live in the same household. Id. Critically, requiring someone to come into close proximity with someone outside their household will place them at greater risk of infection, especially for those at greater risk of complications and death from COVID-19. Id. ¶ 19. It is in all Minnesotans’ interest to slow the spread of COVID-19. For that reason, Minnesota officials have not only implemented policies to restrict gatherings and encourage social distancing, see Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56),],
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but also encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots by mail in order to reduce crowding at in-person polling locations and reduce transmission of the virus during upcoming elections. Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
B. Plaintiffs are seeking appropriately tailored relief. The public interest would be served by a Court order granting preliminary relief as to the August and November 2020 elections. To begin, it is not too late for the Court to grant relief that improves the August 2020 primary. Judicial orders issued shortly before elections are sometimes disfavored if they “can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). This motion is being filed well over two months in advance of the next election, leaving ample time for implementation. In any event, the injunction Plaintiffs seek would not cause confusion and depressed voter participation, which were the Supreme Court’s chief concerns in Purcell. The relief sought here is narrowly tailored and would make absentee voting easier for both voters and election administrators without threatening the integrity of the election. Temporary suspension of the witness requirement would cause more voter participation, not less. Nor is it too early for the Court to grant relief from the witness requirement for absentee voting in the November 2020 general election. As explained above, the witness requirement imposes a severe burden on voting rights at this time—not because any given voter is certain to catch COVID-19 from a witness, but because every interaction outside the voter’s own household creates a risk of such transmission. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21 (noting that witness requirement requires voters “to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic”). This reality will not change between now and November. As Plaintiffs’ expert
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epidemiologist Dr. Arthur Reingold confirms, the U.S. will likely see resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions throughout 2020 and into 2021. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 16. Even if infection rates drop over the summer, colder weather in the fall and winter of 2020 may lead to a spike in transmission. Id. ¶ 18. Given this outlook, the risk of COVID-19 will continue to deter voters from meeting with witnesses during the absentee voting period for the November election, regardless of the precise infection rate at that time. And the public is served when, to the extent possible, the rules of an election are set in advance so voters and election officials can plan accordingly.
Finally, if the Court withholds relief as to the November election until the exact health risks around Election Day are known, it may then prove too late to provide fully effective relief. For example, if COVID-19 cases surge one week before the November election, the Court would not be able to as effectively provide the necessary relief to voters (i.e. printed materials with the witness requirement may already be in voters’ hands). Plaintiffs and the broader public would therefore be prejudiced by any undue delay in settling the question of whether the witness requirement will apply in the November election.
C. The burden imposed by a preliminary injunction on Defendant, if any, would be far less severe than the irreparable harm Plaintiffs currently face.
Plaintiffs’ requested relief would impose little, if any, burden on Defendant. First, Defendant has encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots, particularly in the 2020 elections. See Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots). Injunctive relief facilitating absentee voting for many thousands of Minnesota voters by temporarily lifting the onerous witness requirement would further Defendant’s goals, not frustrate them.
Operationally, it would not be difficult for Defendant to suspend the witness requirement for the August and November 2020 elections. Under Minnesota law, the Secretary of State
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unambiguously has the authority to both issue instructions to local election officials and modify or create standard forms sent to absentee voters statewide, such as envelopes and instructions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.125; 204B.27; 204B.45, subd. 3. Most importantly, the Secretary has the specific authority to “adopt alternative election procedures to permit the administration of any election” affected by a judicial order from a state or federal court. Minn. Stat. § 204B.47. Defendant can quickly and easily utilize this authority to suspend the witness requirement for upcoming elections if directed to do so by the court, for example by removing the necessary fields from absentee ballot envelopes and directing local election officials not to reject absentee ballots that lack a witness signature.
Plaintiffs’ requested injunction would impose no additional administrative burdens on the State. The requested relief would not require Defendants to develop or implement any new procedures for processing absentee ballots; in fact, if anything, it would lessen the administrative burden on the state by removing a step from the absentee ballot verification process.
Nor would Defendant be unduly burdened by an order to educate the public about the suspension of the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Defendant is already engaged in publicly promoting absentee voting. See Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots). If the witness requirement is suspended for the 2020 elections, it is not too much to ask that Defendant expand his existing public education efforts to include up-to-date information, preventing potential absentee voters from being deterred by the mistaken belief that a witness is required. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *30 (ordering defendants to “immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement” through channels including “all relevant websites and social media outlets”). The less public
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education Defendant does on this matter, the more this task will fall to LWVMN, a private

organization without the State’s resources.

Finally, an injunction would not compromise Minnesota’s interest in secure elections.

Plaintiffs share Minnesota’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its elections and ensuring that

Minnesota voters have confidence in the fairness and security of their elections. As noted above,

Minnesota has a variety of other safeguards that adequately serve the State’s interest in election

integrity and preventing absentee ballot fraud. Even absent the witness requirement, Defendant

and local Minnesota election officials will undertake a rigorous process to ensure that only

validly cast absentee ballots from eligible voters are counted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion

for Preliminary Injunction.

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 34 of 34 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
GP:4846-3691-5902 v1
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 ÝßÍÛ ðæîðó½ªóðïîðë Ü±½«³»²¬ ï Ú·´»¼ ðëñïçñîð Ð¿¹» ï ±º íð

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. __________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. Minnesotans take pride in having built what is, in many ways, a thriving democracy. Minnesota’s voter turnout routinely tops the nationwide rankings. The state provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters, while successfully protecting its elections from fraud and maintaining public trust in the system. 2. However, the nationwide outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) poses a serious threat to the health of American elections. Minnesota is not immune. In fact, Minnesota’s election system includes a feature that makes it especially vulnerable to the risk of suppressed voter participation during the COVID-19 pandemic. 3. To vote by absentee ballot in Minnesota, a voter must fill out the ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. Requiring a witness for absentee voting places Minnesota in a small minority of states. Moreover, Minnesota imposes unusually restrictive limits on who may serve as a witness for absentee voting. Only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths may play this role.

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4. Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election will be conducted under extraordinary circumstances. At the urging of health experts and their own governmental leaders, millions of Minnesotans—especially senior citizens and those with underlying health conditions—are avoiding contact with people outside their households to slow the spread of COVID-19. Under current state law, absentee voting will require voters to violate this social distancing protocol, unless they happen to live with someone who can serve as a witness.
5. Minnesotans’ constitutional right to vote cannot be conditioned on their willingness to subject themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19. This is particularly true when the state law forcing voters to interact in person with witnesses is, at best, minimally useful to the state.
6. Moreover, even in ordinary times, Minnesota’s restrictive qualifications on who can serve as a witness to an absentee ballot severely burden many Minnesota voters and are not tailored to any state interest. Absentee voting processes are often used because a voter will not be in the state on Election Day. For such voters, finding a Minnesota registered voter witness is obviously a challenge. Minnesota registered voters are not uniquely qualified to attest to a person’s identity; indeed, Minnesota is the only state with such a restrictive stance on who can serve as a witness to a ballot.
7. Plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s unduly restrictive qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Steve Simon, who resides and maintains his office in this District. 10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant resides in this District and because the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District. 11. This Court has jurisdiction to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 12. Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (“LWVMN”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and is an affiliate of the League of Women Voters of the United States. LWVMN encourages informed and active participation in government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public policy through education and advocacy. LWVMN has approximately 2,200 members throughout Minnesota. These members, like all Americans, have all had their daily lives altered by COVID-19. Most, if not all, of these members are adhering to strict social distancing protocols to avoid contracting the coronavirus. Many of LWVMN’s members are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 either due to their age or other underlying health conditions. Others live in households with individuals particularly vulnerable to COVID-
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19. Some of these members live by themselves or live in households that do not include another registered Minnesota voter. Thus, some of LWVMN’s members are registered voters who, under current law, will face a choice between risking their health in order to vote or not voting at all because of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting. LWVMN has diverted resources, and will continue to divert resources, away from its core activities in order to educate voters about the witness requirement and, to the extent possible, help them comply.
13. Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill is a registered voter in Woodbury, Minnesota. She serves as Advocacy Chair of LWVMN and is a member of both LWVMN and the Woodbury-Cottage Grove Area chapter of the League of Women Voters. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. She has lived in Minnesota since she was seven years old, when her family moved from Birmingham, Alabama. As a Black woman who spent her early childhood in the Jim Crow South, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill remembers her mother telling her about schemes of disenfranchisement, from poll taxes to literacy tests written in foreign languages. Shortly after moving to Minnesota, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. These early experiences impressed upon Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. As an adult, she has voted regularly. Although she usually votes in person, she plans to vote by absentee ballot in upcoming elections including those scheduled for August and November 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill has previously had heart surgery, and lives with underlying health conditions that place her at an elevated risk of becoming severely ill if she contracts COVID-19. She fears contracting and spreading COVID-19 if she is forced to interact with another person in order to vote.
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Defendant 14. Defendant Steve Simon (“Secretary Simon” or “Defendant”) is the Secretary of State of Minnesota and is sued in his official capacity. Secretary Simon plays a central role in administering and overseeing Minnesota elections. Secretary Simon is responsible for compiling and publishing Minnesota’s general election laws and has the power to issue “detailed written instructions” to local officials “for complying with election laws relating to the conduct of elections, conduct of voter registration and voting procedures.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. More specifically, Secretary Simon is required to adopt legally binding rules “establishing procedures to be followed by county auditors and municipal clerks to assure accurate and timely return of absentee ballots,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 4, “establishing the form, content, and type size and style for the printing of blank applications for absentee ballots, absentee voter lists, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility to vote by absentee ballot, ballot envelopes, and directions for casting an absentee ballot,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.09, and governing “the conduct of mail balloting,” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.
FACTS Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota,
Especially During the COVID-19 Pandemic 15. Any eligible voter in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1. Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45.
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16. Officials at the state and local levels participate in administering absentee voting.1 The Secretary of State coordinates absentee voting statewide by promulgating rules to establish uniform procedures and prescribe standard forms for printed materials including ballot envelopes, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility, and instructions to voters. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08; Minn. Stat. § 203B.09; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.; see also Minn. R. 8210.0500 (form instructions to absentee voters, promulgated by the Secretary); Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a (form instructions to voters in mail elections, promulgated by the Secretary). County auditors and municipal clerks administer absentee voting locally by, inter alia, printing the necessary materials, accepting absentee ballot applications, providing ballots to eligible voters, receiving voted ballots, and delivering those ballots to the local ballot board for acceptance or rejection. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.05-203B.08, 203B.121, 204B.45. In printing materials for absentee voting, local officials must follow precisely the forms prescribed by the Secretary of State. Minn. Stat. § 203B.09.
17. Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2.
18. In Minnesota’s 2020 elections, access to absentee voting will be substantially more important than it has been in the state’s past elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
1 Except when this Complaint specifically distinguishes between absentee voting under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B and mail elections under Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.45 and 204B.46, the term “absentee” as used herein refers to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota.
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19. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, spreads easily through respiratory droplets. The virus can also be transmitted through contact with contaminated surfaces. Health experts agree that to minimize the chance of contracting COVID-19, it is important for individuals to maintain at least six feet of distance between themselves and others outside their household.
20. COVID-19 causes severe illness in many patients. Among infected individuals, COVID-19 is, by conservative estimates, several times more likely to cause death than seasonal influenza.2 Individuals over age 65 and those with certain underlying health conditions are at heightened risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19.3
21. As of May 18, 2020, there have been 1,480,349 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 89,407 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Minnesota has had 16,372 confirmed cases and 739 deaths. These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 victims, given limitations in testing.
22. Although COVID-19 infection rates may decline over the next few months, subsequent resurgences of the disease in Minnesota and throughout the U.S. are likely to occur in 2020 and 2021. Widespread abandonment or relaxation of social distancing behavior would likely lead to a spike in COVID-19 transmission.
2 See Joel Achenbach, Antibody tests support what’s been obvious: Covid-19 is much more lethal than the flu, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/antibodytests-support-whats-been-obvious-covid-19-is-much-more-lethal-than-flu/2020/04/28/2fc215d887f7-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html. 3 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-athigher-risk.html (updated Apr. 15, 2020).
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23. The Food and Drug Administration has not approved any medication for treatment of COVID-19. While numerous experimental treatments are under investigation, none has been proven safe and effective.
24. There is no vaccine for COVID-19, nor is a vaccine likely to become widely available before the November 2020 general election.
25. Individuals who currently feel and look healthy may nonetheless be contagious carriers of COVID-19. The median incubation period for COVID-19—the length of time between exposure and onset of symptoms—is approximately four to five days. For some individuals, the incubation period may be as long as fourteen days. In some documented cases, individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 never develop symptoms. Infected individuals have been observed to transmit the virus to others while not experiencing symptoms.4
26. Many U.S. residents without COVID-19 symptoms are unable to access testing to determine whether they currently have COVID-19.
27. Recognizing the need for social distancing in order to reduce the spread of COVID-19, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities.5 In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people,

4 Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease

(COVID-19),

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html

(updated May 15, 2020). 5 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48, Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order,

Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public

Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to

Safe Workplaces (Apr. 30, 2020), https://mn.gov/governor/assets/EO%2020-

48%20Final_tcm1055-430499.pdf.

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requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers
to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open,
and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of
severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.”6
28. Given the poor public health conditions, in-person voting at the same levels as
ordinary elections will not be safe in upcoming elections, particularly for those most vulnerable
to COVID-19.
29. The danger of large-scale in-person voting during the COVID-19 pandemic is
illustrated by the Wisconsin presidential primary election held April 7, 2020, which drew more
than 400,000 in-person voters, owing in part to the state’s failure to provide absentee ballots with
sufficient time for many voters to return them. At least 67 people have tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary.7 In
Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person
voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later.8 An analysis by university economists has
preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties
6 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56, Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (May 13, 2020), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-56.pdf. 7 David Wahlberg, 67 got COVID-19 after visiting polls in state's April 7 election but tie to voting unclear, WISC. STATE J. (May 8, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-medfit/67-got-covid-19-after-visiting-polls-in-states-april-7-election-but-tie-to/article_49a42a7e45d8-50cc-bd76-3a583842de39.html. 8 Descriptive Analysis of COVID-19 Infections in Milwaukee County after the Wisconsin Election and Easter/Passover Holidays 7, Milwaukee Cty. COVID-19 Epidemiology Intel Team, WUWM 89.7 (May 5, 2020), https://www.wuwm.com/sites/wuwm/files/202005/milwaukee_county_covid19_election_report_-_final_v3.pdf.
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with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary.9
30. Absentee voting represents the best option for most Minnesota voters to participate safely in the 2020 elections. Defendant Simon himself has recognized this reality, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.”10 This statement accords with guidance from the CDC, which recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic.11
31. Like many Minnesota voters, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill intends to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections because she fears contracting and/or spreading COVID-19 if she votes in person.
32. Other members of LWVMN similarly depend on absentee voting for effective access to the franchise in 2020, given the unacceptable health risks associated with voting in person during the pandemic.

9 Chad D. Cotti et al., The Relationship Between In-Person Voting, Consolidated Polling

Locations, and Absentee Voting on COVID-19: Evidence From the Wisconsin Primary, Working

Paper 27187, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (May 2020), available at

https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187.pdf. 10 Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections, OFFICE OF THE

MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE (May 13, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-the-office/news-

room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/. 11 Recommendations for Election Polling Locations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-

locations.html (updated March 27, 2020).

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Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
33. Unfortunately, Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedures do not provide an adequate solution to the problem of conducting inclusive elections without forcing voters to violate social distancing requirements. Specifically, Minnesota law compels each absentee voter to interact in person with a witness who must be a registered Minnesota voter, notary, or other person authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0710; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
34. Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure means that voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to give oaths face a choice: they can vote in the upcoming elections, or they can comply with social distancing best practices to avoid contracting or spreading COVID-19. They cannot reasonably do both.
35. Each absentee voter in Minnesota receives an envelope on which a blank certificate is printed (“Signature Envelope”). To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers, and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
36. The certificate on the Signature Envelope also contains a statement that must be signed by a witness. In addition to signing, the witness must write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
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37. The witness statement always requires the witness to certify that at least four conditions were met.
38. First, the witness certifies that “the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
39. Second, the witness certifies that “the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
40. Third, the witness certifies that “the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
41. Fourth, the witness certifies, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. Although this form certificate language promulgated by the Secretary of State is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added).
42. Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
43. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 1. A true and correct copy of
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the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 2. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 3.
44. In addition to receiving a Signature Envelope with a form certificate, each absentee voter receives printed instructions. The form instructions, promulgated by the Secretary of State, reiterate that a witness must sign the certificate, affix a notary stamp if applicable, and provide a Minnesota street address or official title. Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a.
45. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 4. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 5. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for voters in mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 6.
46. After a voter submits an absentee ballot, the local ballot board determines, inter alia, whether “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions” provided to the voter. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2); see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (clarifying that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). If the certificate is not completed as prescribed by the directions—for example, if the witness signature is missing—the ballot is rejected, and the voter is notified of the rejection. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
47. Because of the required signed witness statement, an absentee voter in Minnesota must have a witness physically present while marking and sealing the ballot.
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48. It is difficult or impossible for the voter and witness to maintain a constant distance of at least six feet between them throughout the voting process. Moreover, the voter and witness must touch the same Signature Envelope in order to sign the certificate.
49. The voter-witness interaction required by Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure constitutes a violation of recommended social distancing and creates a substantial risk of COVID-19 transmission, unless the voter and witness already live together.
50. To give a conservative estimate, there are likely hundreds of thousands of registered Minnesota voters who do not live with another registered voter or a person authorized to give oaths.
51. According to 2018 data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, about 26 percent of voting-age Minnesota residents, and about 37 percent of those over age 65, live alone.12 Minnesota has almost 3.4 million registered voters.13 If the rate of living alone is approximately the same for Minnesota’s registered-voter population as for its total adult population, then Minnesota has roughly 884,000 registered voters who live alone.
52. Even among voters who do not live alone, there are many who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to administer oaths. This includes individuals that live only with minors, live in mixed-citizenship status households, or simply live with others that choose not to vote.
12 Current Population Survey Table Creator, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html (2018). 13 Voter Registration Counts, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE OF MINN., https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/data-maps/voter-registrationcounts/ (last visited May 14, 2020).
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53. Upon information and belief, if Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place for the 2020 elections, many eligible voters will be deterred from voting because they reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19.
54. Meanwhile, other voters—potentially numbering in the hundreds of thousands— will interact with witnesses outside their household in order to cast absentee ballots. Some of these interactions will lead to transmission of COVID-19. Voters, witnesses, and third parties who come into contact with them may become severely ill or die from COVID-19 cases traceable to absentee voting interactions.
55. LWVMN has numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote and live alone. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is one such member.
56. LWVMN’s membership also includes numerous registered Minnesota voters who do not live alone, but do not live with another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths.
57. LWVMN has had to divert resources away from its core activities, such as voter registration drives and candidate forums, because of the witness requirement for absentee voting.
58. In response to requests from its chapters across the state and its own assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause unprecedented demand for absentee ballots, LWVMN has begun to develop a communications campaign to educate voters about the process for voting by absentee ballot. A major purpose of this anticipated communications campaign is to inform voters that absentee voting requires a witness, and that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths. If not for the witness requirement, LWVMN would not need to spend the amount of time, money, and other resources it now plans to spend on educating voters about the absentee voting process.
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59. LWVMN has also devoted significant time and energy to developing ideas and plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the pandemic. LWVMN is considering developing a program in which voters can request and be connected with eligible witnesses. However, such a program would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to implement. LWVMN has no existing infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses. Moreover, LWVMN anticipates that individuals who are willing and able to serve as witnesses in such a program will be scarce, since many individuals will reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19 if they serve as witnesses.
60. As the 2020 primary and general elections approach, LWVMN will need to devote more resources toward educating voters about the witness requirement and helping them obtain witnesses to the extent possible. This increased diversion of resources comes at the busiest possible time for LWVMN—during the immediate lead-up to a presidential election.
61. Moreover, LWVMN serves as the primary nonprofit facilitating voter registration at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota, assisting many new American citizens to register in Minnesota each year. Many naturalized citizens live in mixed immigration status households where they may be the only adult citizen (and thus only eligible voter). LWVMN has a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot. But under Minnesota’s restrictive eligibility requirements for witnesses to absentee ballots, many such citizens may be unable to do so without violating social distancing protocols.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud 62. Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting produces no benefit remotely on par with the severe burden it places on voters during the COVID-19 pandemic. While Minnesota has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in
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elections, the marginal effect of the witness requirement as an anti-fraud measure is minimal at best.
63. Minnesota has no significant history of fraud in absentee voting. 64. Minnesota’s experience with absentee voting is consistent with the experience of other states. Throughout the U.S., absentee voting fraud is rare. A comprehensive nationwide analysis found 491 cases of absentee voting fraud from 2000 to 2012—a miniscule fraction of all absentee ballots cast during that period. Any given American is more likely to be struck by lightning than to cast a fraudulent absentee ballot.14 65. Most states achieve the same result as Minnesota—no meaningful amount of absentee voting fraud—without requiring a signed witness statement. Minnesota is one of only twelve states where the normal absentee voting process involves a witness or notary. Two of the other eleven—Virginia and Rhode Island—have voluntarily waived or modified their witness requirements for 2020.15 There is no evidence that states without witness requirements have more absentee voting fraud than states with such requirements. 66. Minnesota law provides robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud other than requiring voters to obtain a signed witness statement. 67. Under Minnesota law, it is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee
14 Wendy R. Weiser & Harold Ekeh, The False Narrative of Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2020) https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/falsenarrative-vote-mail-fraud. 15 See League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020) (citation omitted); R.I. Exec. Order 20-27, TwentyFourth Supplemental Emergency Declaration – Further Preparations for a Predominantly Mail Ballot Election (Apr. 17, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-2027.pdf.
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ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03.
68. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014.
69. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
70. In the unlikely event that a fraudulent absentee ballot were submitted despite the harsh criminal penalties for doing so, that ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to extensive verification procedures along with all other absentee ballots.
71. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for determining whether to accept or reject each absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before being accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining each absentee ballot
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must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
72. First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
73. Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
74. Third, the ballot board members check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3.
75. Fourth, the ballot board members verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4.
76. Fifth, the ballot board members check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the
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required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5.
77. Importantly, the ballot board does not check to determine whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id.
78. Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6.
79. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
80. Given the rarity of absentee voting fraud, the harsh criminal penalties for committing such fraud, and the existence of numerous verification steps that are at least as likely—if not more so—to ferret out fraud, it is highly unlikely that any pattern of voter fraud would result if the witness requirement were suspended for the 2020 elections. This modest accommodation for the COVID-19 pandemic would not cause the Minnesota electorate to lose confidence in the integrity of the absentee voting system.
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications For Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless
81. Beyond the particular burdens posed by the COVID-19 crisis, Minnesota’s witness signature requirement—limiting the pool of qualified witnesses to registered Minnesota voters, notaries, and other individuals authorized to administer oaths—is unduly restrictive.
82. Among the twelve states that require a witness for absentee voting, Minnesota is the only one that permits its own registered voters to serve as witnesses but generally prohibits
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other adults from playing that role. Eight of the twelve states allow any adult to witness an absentee ballot, sometimes subject to narrow exceptions such as prohibitions on candidates serving as witnesses.
83. By requiring that a witness be registered to vote in Minnesota (if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths), the state excludes many groups of potential witnesses who are not categorically any less trustworthy than registered Minnesota voters: for example, lawful permanent residents and other non-U.S. citizens; military personnel who are stationed in Minnesota but vote elsewhere; residents of other states; and those who simply exercise their constitutional right not to vote.
84. U.S. citizenship is not required to become a notary public. By allowing notaries to witness absentee ballots, Minnesota repudiates any notion that individuals cannot be trusted as witnesses if they do not meet the eligibility criteria for registering to vote in Minnesota (e.g., if they are non-U.S. citizens).
85. Minnesota’s law generally excluding non-Minnesota voters from serving as absentee ballot witnesses does not serve any important state interest. Indeed, in verifying absentee ballots, local ballot boards are not even permitted to reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5.
86. In other words, the ballot-verification process already is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter. Yet, the state saddles voters with the burden of seeking out a registered Minnesota voter, or else finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths.
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87. Finding another registered voter who is both willing and qualified to serve as a witness is a significant burden for many Minnesota voters. This includes voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter—including those who live alone or live in mixed immigration status households—and are practicing social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also includes voters who temporarily live away from Minnesota, such as students attending college out of state. Indeed, a major reason voters choose to cast absentee ballots is because they are out of the state on Election Day. For those voters, this requirement is very burdensome.
88. In past election cycles, Minnesotans living out of state have resorted to posting on social media, seeking to meet strangers in their vicinity who are fellow Minnesota voters and can witness absentee ballots.
89. For voters who cannot find another Minnesota voter to witness an absentee ballot, the option to seek out a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths is also burdensome. Notaries typically charge for their services. Moreover, simply finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths may be difficult, especially in certain rural areas. This difficulty is only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
90. Even before the pandemic, the requirement to have each absentee ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths has prevented a significant number of Minnesotans from casting absentee ballots and having those ballots counted. In the 2018 election, 1,336 ballots were rejected in Minnesota for failure to comply with the state’s witness requirement, according to data from the Election Administration and Voting Survey conducted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.16 This number is
16 Data available at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.
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likely dwarfed by the unknown number of Minnesotans who never returned absentee ballots in 2018 because it was not reasonably possible for them to find a qualified witness.
91. Numerous members of LWVMN—including some who live or have lived temporarily outside of Minnesota—have had trouble finding witnesses for their absentee ballots because of Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness.
92. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of LWVMN voters experiencing this burden—and the magnitude of the burden on each such voter—will substantially increase. LWVMN expects that it will need to divert resources away from its core activities to educate voters about the qualifications for witnesses, and to help voters connect with qualified witnesses to the extent possible.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 93. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 92. 94. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
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95. As applied to elections conducted during the pendency of the coronavirus pandemic, including those in August and November 2020, Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote because it forces voters to choose between exercising the franchise and violating social distancing guidelines, thus exposing themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19.
96. Minnesota has no interest sufficient to justify maintaining the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Although preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud is a legitimate state interest, that interest can be fully vindicated without the witness requirement. Absentee voting fraud is rare, in Minnesota and throughout the United States. Minnesota already has robust safeguards unrelated to the witness requirement, including a multi-step ballot verification process that includes matching personally identifying numbers and other information and also imposes steep criminal penalties for fraud. Any interest the state has in its witness signature requirement is too slight to justify the severe burden imposed by applying the requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.
97. The witness requirement therefore constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to voters for the duration of the pandemic, including during Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election.
Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 98. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 97. 99. Under Minnesota law, only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary public, or another individual authorized to administer oaths may serve as a witness for an absentee ballot.
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100. Regardless of the public health conditions, these restrictions on who may serve as a witness impose a significant—and in some cases severe—burden on Minnesota voters. Especially for Minnesotans who temporarily live out of state, it can be difficult or impossible to find another registered Minnesota voter who is willing and able to serve as a ballot witness.
101. If a voter fails to find another registered Minnesota voter, she must seek out a notary or other individual authorized to administer oaths. It may be difficult or impossible to find such an individual. Moreover, if the only witness available is a notary, the voter will ordinarily need to pay a fee to have her Signature Envelope notarized.
102. Minnesota derives no appreciable benefit from excluding from the pool of potential witnesses all adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or persons authorized to give oaths. Minnesota registered voters are not categorically more trustworthy than other competent adults.
103. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they prevent Minnesota voters from having their absentee ballots witnessed by competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths.
Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 104. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 103. 105. Minnesota’s qualifications for absentee ballot witnesses discriminate between U.S. citizens and otherwise similarly situated non-U.S. citizens. A U.S. citizen may register to vote in Minnesota (assuming she meets certain other qualifications), Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1,
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and then may witness absentee ballots. A non-U.S. citizen cannot register to vote, id., and therefore cannot witness absentee ballots unless she becomes a notary or otherwise becomes authorized to administer oaths.
106. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law that discriminates against non-U.S. citizens generally “can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). This general rule is subject to only “a narrow exception”: strict scrutiny does not apply when a state bars non-U.S. citizens from serving in “positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.” Id. at 220. To determine whether this exception applies, the Court must focus its inquiry on whether the position in question is “such that the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discretionary power over the formulation or execution of public policies importantly affecting the citizen population—power of the sort that a self-governing community could properly entrust only to full-fledged members of that community.” Id. at 224.
107. Serving as a witness for an absentee ballot is not a position intimately related to democratic self-governance. It is a “clerical and ministerial” function. Id. at 225. The Court therefore must apply strict scrutiny to Minnesota’s requirement that a witness, if not a notary or otherwise authorized to administer oaths, be a registered Minnesota voter and thus a U.S. citizen.
108. This citizenship requirement burdens individuals living in mixed immigration status households and individuals living in immigrant communities overall.
109. This citizenship requirement does not serve any compelling state interest.
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110. To the extent the citizenship requirement for witnesses (besides notaries and other persons authorized to administer oaths) serves any state interest, it is not the least restrictive means to achieve such interest.
111. Indeed, the citizenship requirement fails even the rational-basis test. There is no rational reason why Minnesota registered voters are more trustworthy witnesses than other competent adults. Moreover, the verification system for absentee ballots does not even verify that the witness is a Minnesota registered voter. This only further belies the lack of state interest in imposing this requirement.
112. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore facially violate the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they discriminate between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve as a witness.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:
1. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they require voters to obtain a witness signature when completing an absentee ballot or mail ballot, or authorize any official to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness—violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020;
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2. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents, employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with him to:
(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation that directly or indirectly requires any voter to obtain a witness signature in order cast an absentee ballot or mail ballot, and have such ballot counted, in any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020, (b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the signature, address, title, or notary stamp of a witness for any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020, and (c) temporarily modify all form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary to avoid explicitly or implicitly instructing any voter to interact in person with any witness for the purpose of casting an absentee ballot or mail ballot in any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020; 3. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for absentee or mail ballots— facially violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
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ÝßÍÛ ðæîðó½ªóðïîðë Ü±½«³»²¬ ï Ú·´»¼ ðëñïçñîð Ð¿¹» îç ±º íð

4. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45,

and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they discriminate

between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve

as a witness—facially violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

5. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents,

employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with

him to:

(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation to the extent it would

prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or

individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for

absentee or mail ballots,

(b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or

mail ballot on the ground that the witness is not a registered Minnesota voter,

notary, or individual authorized to administer oaths, and

(c) modify form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and

instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary

to inform voters that any competent adult may serve as a witness;

6. Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action,

and

7. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Date: May 19, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181)

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Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470 CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION The United States is living through the worst pandemic in over a century. Minnesota officials are rightly urging the public to avoid close contact between households to minimize the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Yet the state is asking its citizens to violate this social distancing practice to vote in upcoming elections. To cast a ballot, Minnesota voters must either go to the polls in person, or have their absentee ballot signed by a witness. For many members of Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, it is impossible to have an absentee ballot witnessed without risking exposure to COVID-19. The danger is especially grave for Minnesotans like Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, whose age and underlying health conditions make her particularly vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying from the virus. The fundamental right to vote cannot be conditioned on voters’ willingness to risk contracting a disease that has killed more than 100,000 Americans over the past few months. The Court should therefore enter a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to suspend

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enforcement of the witness requirement for absentee voting for the duration of 2020 and inform the public of this suspension.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Absentee Voting in Minnesota Minnesota permits any eligible voter to vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02,
subd. 1.1 However, it is impossible for a voter to cast a valid absentee ballot without interacting in person with someone else.
When a voter properly requests to have an absentee ballot provided by mail, the local county auditor or municipal clerk sends the voter the ballot, together with a package of other materials, including multiple envelopes and directions for casting the ballot. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. One of the envelopes issued to each absentee voter is a signature envelope, on which a blank certificate is printed. To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers; and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.2
1 Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45; see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.46. The process for casting, verifying, and counting ballots in all-mail elections is generally the same as the process for absentee ballots under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (providing that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in all-mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). This Memorandum uses the term “absentee” to refer to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota. 2 By statute, the blank certificate is to be “printed on the back of the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3. In practice, the envelope on which the certificate is printed is known as the signature envelope. See Minn. R. 8210.0600 (standard instructions to absentee voters).
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The blank certificate also contains a section to be filled out by a third-party witness, who must be registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. The witness must sign the certificate and write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
By signing the certificate the witness certifies, at a minimum, that: (1) the voter showed the witness the blank ballot before voting; (2) the voter marked the ballot in private if physically able to do so, or else the ballot was “marked as directed by the voter” by someone else; (3) the voter enclosed and sealed the ballot in its dedicated envelope; and (4) the witness is a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or a person authorized to administer oaths.3 Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.4 In order to complete these steps so the witness can truthfully make the required certifications, the voter and witness must be physically together for the voting process.
It is exceedingly rare for voters to attempt to cast fraudulent absentee ballots, both nationally and in Minnesota. In a comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012,
3 The standard witness certification adopted by regulation states, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. This language is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness. However, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added). 4 Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
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journalists found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). This represents a miniscule fraction of absentee voting. In the November 2012 election alone, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voting Survey) at 9.
Setting aside the witness requirement, Minnesota law provides numerous safeguards against any potential fraud in absentee voting. To begin with, Minnesota provides steep criminal sanctions for absentee voting fraud. It is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
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Minnesota also protects against counting fraudulent absentee votes by subjecting all absentee ballots to a verification process to determine whether the ballot is accepted or rejected. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for making this determination. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before an absentee ballot is accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining the ballot must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
• First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
• Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
• Third, the ballot board members must check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether
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the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3. • Fourth, the ballot board members must verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4. • Fifth, the ballot board members must check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5. The ballot board does not check whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id. • Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
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II. The COVID-19 Pandemic Necessitates Consistent Social Distancing and Will Increase Demand for Absentee Voting
The United States—and much of the rest of the world—“is in the midst of an unprecedented health crisis occasioned by the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic.” In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020). SARS-CoV-2 is a new virus that causes COVID-19. Ex. 3 (Decl. of Dr. Arthur Reingold), at ¶ 7. As of May 28, 2020, there have been 1,678,843 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 99,031 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Ex. 4 (CDC National COVID-19 Case Data). Minnesota has had 22,947 confirmed cases and 967 deaths. Ex. 5 (Minnesota COVID-19 Dashboard). These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths, given limitations in testing. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 13.
Some individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 experience no symptoms or only mild symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12. Others, however, experience respiratory failure or other life-threatening complications from COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. Hospitals treating COVID-19 patients, including all sites of the Minnesota-based Mayo Clinic, are prohibiting or severely restricting visitors to avoid spreading the virus. Ex. 6 (Statement of the Mayo Clinic). Unable to receive visitors, many hospital patients dying of COVID-19 are dying alone. See Ex. 7 (New England Journal of Medicine Report).
Anyone could potentially become severely ill or die from COVID-19. However, certain populations are at a heightened risk of severe illness of death from COVID-19—specifically, patients over age 65, people with immunologic conditions, and people with certain other health conditions, including some heart conditions, asthma, COPD, diabetes, obesity, and chronic kidney disease. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 8.
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SARS-CoV-2 spreads easily from person to person through respiratory droplets. Id. ¶ 9. The virus also may also be capable of aerosolization, meaning it may linger in the air and infect people who enter the airspace. Id. Additionally, the virus can spread through contact with contaminated surfaces. Id. SARS-CoV-2 is so contagious that each infected individual is estimated to infect two to eight others. Id. Infected individuals who are not symptomatic can nevertheless spread the virus Id. ¶ 12.
There is currently no vaccine for COVID-19, and it is unlikely that a vaccine approved by the Food and Drug Administration will be available for at least the next twelve months. Id. ¶ 14. Before the U.S. population can develop “herd immunity” that protects against widespread transmission of COVID-19, approximately 80 to 95 percent of the population must become immune to the virus. Id. ¶ 15. For this to happen, either a vaccine must become widely available, or the majority of U.S. residents must be infected with the virus and develop antibodies to it. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. All told, it is likely that there will be resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions across the U.S. throughout 2020 and into 2021, even accounting for behavioral interventions and government-imposed restrictions designed to control the spread of the virus. Id. ¶ 16. Resurgences in the fall and winter of 2020 are especially likely, given that SARS-CoV-2 may spread most easily in colder weather (although this is not yet confirmed). Id. ¶ 18.
Nevertheless, behavior is an important factor influencing the course of the pandemic. The only known ways to reduce the spread of COVID-19 are frequent handwashing, disinfecting surfaces, social isolation, and social distancing (i.e., maintaining at least six feet of separation between individuals). Id. ¶ 11. The CDC currently advises that “[l]imiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of” COVID-19. Ex. 8 (CDC Social Distancing Recommendations). Early evidence shows that social distancing slows transmission of the virus,
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and jurisdictions that imposed stay-at-home orders early are succeeding in reducing transmission. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 13.
Recognizing the importance of social distancing, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities. Ex. 9 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48). In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people, requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56).
Emerging evidence shows that elections with a large amount of in-person voting are dangerous during the pandemic. In Wisconsin, the presidential primary drew nearly 400,000 inperson voters on April 7, 2020. Ex. 11 (Wisconsin Elections Commission Report). As of May 16, at least 71 people had tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary. Ex. 12 (Madison Article). In Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later. Ex. 13 (Milwaukee County COVID-19 Election Report). An analysis by university economists has preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-
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19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary. Ex. 14 (National Bureau of Economic Research Paper on Wisconsin Primary); see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
To avoid COVID-19 transmission at polling places, the CDC currently recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic. Ex. 15 (CDC Recommendations for Election Polling Locations). Defendant himself has recognized the importance of shifting toward absentee voting during the pandemic, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots).
Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2. Ex. 17 (Minn. SOS Elections Calendar). Given the apparent danger of voting in person, demand for absentee voting in these elections will likely rise to unprecedented levels.
III. Applying the Witness Requirement During the Pandemic Burdens Plaintiffs Although absentee voting offers Minnesotans a safer alternative to in-person voting
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not entirely safe. For Minnesota voters who do not live with a person qualified to witness absentee ballots—i.e., a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths—complying with the witness requirement for absentee voting necessarily means meeting in person with an individual outside their household.
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This increases the voter’s risk of being exposed to COVID-19 or transmitting the virus. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
For Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, the witness requirement may be an insurmountable obstacle to voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. Ex. 18 (Decl. of Vivian Latimer Tanniehill) at ¶ 2. She has previously had open heart surgery, takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health, and has asthma. Id. ¶ 17. The combination of her age and underlying health conditions places her at high risk of developing severe or life-threatening symptoms if she contracts COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 16-18; see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 8. Although she has always voted in person in the past, she believes that voting in person would be too risky during the pandemic. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 21. She therefore hopes to vote absentee in the August and November 2020 elections, and possibly subsequent elections. Id. ¶ 14. However, in order to vote absentee under current Minnesota law, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would need to invite another person into her home or travel to meet with another person, violating the social distancing protocol she has been assiduously following. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. She is anxiously monitoring public health conditions to assess the health risk that would come with having her absentee ballot witnessed, so that she can decide whether the risk is too high to tolerate. Id. ¶ 25.
Ms. Latimer Tanniehill serves as Advocacy Chair of the Board of Directors of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN), and has a passion for democratic participation stemming from her childhood. Latimer Tanniehill Decl. ¶¶ 7-11. As a Black woman originally from Birmingham, Alabama, she experienced segregation and state-sanctioned racism as a day-to-day reality. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. After moving to Minnesota at age seven, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. Id. ¶ 8.
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These early experiences impressed on Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. Id. Giving up her vote to protect her health would be a painful choice for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill. Id. ¶ 25.
Other members of LWVMN are similarly at risk of having to forego voting during the pandemic to avoid the health hazards of having their ballots witnessed. LWVMN is a nonprofit organization with about 2,200 members throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Decl. of Michelle Witte) at ¶ 9. Many of LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and some have additional health conditions that make them especially vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying if they contract COVID-19. Id. ¶ 11. While some LWVMN members live with a registered Minnesota voter or other qualified witness, many others (like Ms. Latimer Tanniehill) live alone or live only with people who cannot witness absentee ballots, such as minor children or non-U.S. citizens. Id. ¶ 12. LWVMN members who cannot have their ballots witnessed at home—especially those at high risk of severe symptoms or death from COVID-19—will face a choice between endangering their health and giving up their vote during the pandemic.
For LWVMN itself, the continued enforcement of the witness requirement during the pandemic has become a drain on its time, energy, and money. LWVMN has scarce resources, with just three full-time employees serving about 2,200 members and 35 local chapters throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶¶ 6, 9, 13. Ordinarily, LWVMN’s core activities include conducting voter registration drives and hosting forum events to help voters learn about candidates and policy issues. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 29. These services to the electorate are most in demand in presidential election years, and 2020 is no exception. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 18. LWVMN is trying to ramp up these activities and adapt them to the current public health situation, which requires a formidable investment of resources. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. On top of this challenge, LWVMN now must
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set aside resources to help Minnesota absentee voters—a much larger group than ever before— understand the witness requirement and comply with it as safely as possible. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. LWVMN is now developing a communications campaign educating voters about the need for an absentee ballot witness and the qualifications for serving as a witness. LWVMN is also developing plans to help voters have their absentee ballots witnessed during the pandemic— potentially by implementing a program in which LWVMN would directly connect voters with volunteers who are willing and able to serve as witnesses (although these volunteers will likely be scarce during the pandemic). Id. ¶¶ 29-30. These projects focused on the witness requirement take time, energy, and money—resources that LWVMN would otherwise devote toward updating and executing its core activities such as voter registration and educational forum events. Id. ¶ 29.
LEGAL STANDARD “Whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). The Court must apply this test in a “flexible” manner appropriate to “the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. “[W]here the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward plaintiff a preliminary injunction may issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation,” even if the district court does not conclude that the movant is more than fifty percent likely to succeed on the merits. Id.
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ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim for a temporary
suspension of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. By applying its witness requirement for absentee ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota puts voters in danger for no good reason. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed in showing that the witness requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this unique situation. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). A severe restriction on voting rights “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (citation omitted). Even if the challenged restriction falls short of being “severe,” courts do not revert to rational basis review but employ a “sliding scale,” subjecting each voting restriction to a level of scrutiny calibrated to the burden it imposes. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124, 1124 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); id. at 1128 (applying “heightened scrutiny” to a “significant” burden on voting rights).
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Minnesota’s enforcement of its witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic cannot survive review under this framework. Requiring voters to have their absentee ballots witnessed and signed during the COVID-19 pandemic, at substantial risk to their health, places a severe burden on the right to vote for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other members of LWVMN. The state derives no significant benefit from keeping the witness requirement in place during the pandemic—and certainly no benefit important enough to justify burdening voters to this degree.
A. The witness requirement severely burdens voting rights as applied to voters during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting puts Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other voters to an impossible choice: exercise their right to vote during the COVID-19 pandemic, or protect their health and the health of others by following social distancing best practices. The state thus imposes a severe burden on voting rights.
In Minnesota and across the nation, life has changed dramatically because of the COVID19 pandemic. Millions of Minnesotans, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and most members of LWVMN, are avoiding close contact with people outside their households to minimize the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ 18-19; Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 20. There is no serious dispute that social distancing is necessary to minimize the spread of what can be a deadly disease, especially for people over 65 and people with certain underlying health conditions. The latest academic research supports this view. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 11, 13. The CDC agrees. Ex. 8 (CDC Guidance on Social Distancing); Ex. 20 (CDC Guidance on Individuals at Higher Risk of COVID-19). So do the Governor of Minnesota and Defendant Simon himself. Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56); Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
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Under these circumstances, the requirement to meet in person with a witness makes absentee voting a health hazard for many voters, leaving these voters without any safe avenue to cast a ballot. The state’s failure to provide safe absentee voting—at a time when in-person voting is irreducibly dangerous—gravely burdens voters. See Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alternative means of [ballot] access must be provided absent a sufficiently strong state interest”); Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-01552JMC, 2020 WL 2617329, at *19 n.20 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (“In-person voting, while still technically an available option, forces voters to make the untenable and illusory choice between exercising their right to vote and placing themselves at risk of contracting a potentially terminal disease.”); see also United States v. Annis, No. 16-195(1), 2020 WL 1812421, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2020) (“There is no question that COVID-19 is a cause for alarm, and the Court does not fault Annis’s concerns, given his health conditions.”).
Other district courts have recognized this reality in cases directly on point. In Thomas v. Andino, the court found that a group of plaintiffs—including individuals at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19—were “likely to prevail on their constitutional challenge to [South Carolina’s] Witness Requirement under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test because the character and magnitude of the burdens imposed on [the] Plaintiffs in having to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic likely outweigh the extent to which the Witness Requirement advances the state’s interests of voter fraud and integrity.” 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of South Carolina’s witness signature requirement in the June 2020 primaries, and ordered state officials “to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement for absentee voting.” Id. at *30.
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Similarly, in League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, the court approved a partial settlement in which Virginia’s election authorities agreed not to enforce the state’s witness requirement for absentee voting in the June 2020 primary. No. 6:20-CV00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020). In approving the agreement, the court found that enforcing Virginia’s witness requirement during the pandemic was “a probable violation of federal law.” Id. at *6. As the court explained,
[T]he measure is too restrictive in that it will force a large class of Virginians to face the choice between adhering to guidance that is meant to protect not only their own health, but the health of those around them, and undertaking their fundamental right—and, indeed, their civic duty—to vote in an election. The Constitution does not permit a state to force such a choice on its electorate. Id. at *8 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)). Even if it were possible to mitigate the health risks by taking certain precautions in voter-witness interactions, the court found that “many would be dissuaded from exercising their vote both on account of the remaining health risks and required steps to mitigate them . . . especially those who are elderly, immunocompromised, or otherwise at grave risk from the virus.” Id. The reasoning in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia squarely applies here. Indeed, Minnesota’s witness requirement imposes a greater burden on voting during the pandemic than the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina. Unlike those states, Minnesota requires absentee ballot witnesses to meet stringent qualifications, increasing the number of voters who must look outside their own household to find a witness. Compare Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (witness must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths”), with Va. Code §§ 24.2-706, 24.2-707 (requiring a witness but not restricting who may serve as a witness), and S.C. Code § 715-220 (same).
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Other courts have similarly recognized that when state laws require in-person signature gathering to exercise First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, those requirements impose severe burdens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Miller v. Thurston, No. 5:20-cv05070-PKH, ECF No. 41, Slip Op. at 14-15 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2020) (finding that in-person signature gathering and notarization requirements “impose severe burdens on Plaintiffs’ core political speech, especially in light of the State-recognized need for social distancing during this pandemic.”); Goldstein v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 142 N.E.3d 560, 570-71 (Mass. 2020) (signature-gathering requirements “now impose a severe burden on, or significant interference with, a candidate’s right to gain access to the . . . primary ballot” in Massachusetts because “if a candidate seeks to obtain signatures on nomination papers in the traditional ways, he or she reasonably may fear that doing so might risk the health and safety not only of the person requesting the signature but also of the persons who are signing, of the families with whom they live, and potentially of their entire community”); Garbett v. Herbert, 2:20-cv-245-RJS, 2020 WL 2064101, at *12 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2020) (finding severe burden because “[i]n light of nearly all public events being canceled, orders for people to stay six feet apart and to stay home, and the extraordinary impact on nearly all aspects of everyday life, it is difficult to imagine a confluence of events that would make it more difficult for a candidate to collect signatures”); Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-2112, 2020 WL 1951687, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020). Notably, most of these cases involve the right to run for office, which is not, on its own, a fundamental right. Libertarian Party of Illinois, 2020 WL 1951687, at *2. The argument for finding a severe burden is even stronger here, where the constitutional interest at stake is the fundamental right to vote. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.5
5 A recent case involving Wisconsin’s witness requirement for absentee voting also supports
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The facts of this case aptly illustrate why courts around the country are recognizing the
severe burdens involved in obtaining physical signatures during the pandemic. For Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill, complying with Minnesota’s witness requirement is such a grave health risk that it
may prevent her from voting in upcoming elections, including the August and November 2020
elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶ 25. Given her personal background and her
activism promoting democratic participation, surrendering her vote during the pandemic is not a
matter Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would take lightly. Id. ¶¶ 7-11. The same goes for Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill’s fellow members of LWVMN, who presumably joined the organization because they
value democratic participation. See Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 4. These voters are at risk of losing a
finding a severe burden in this case. In Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, the district court found that “at least some isolated voters, and in particular those who are immunocompromised or elderly, will likely not be able to secure a witness certification safely even with reasonable efforts, or at minimum have reasonable concerns about their ability to do so.” No. 20-cv-249-wmc, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020). The court recognized that the witness requirement “may impose severe burdens” on these voters, and therefore ordered the defendants “to accept an unwitnessed ballot that contains a written affirmation or other statement by an absentee voter that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, he or she was unable to safely obtain a witness certification despite his or her reasonable efforts to do so, provided that the ballot is otherwise valid.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction as to the witness requirement, primarily because the injunction came too close to the presidential primary, the state had issued guidance allowing for socially distanced signature options, and the state was considering additional accommodations. Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 201538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). In that case, the district court had ordered the relief well after absentee voting was underway and less than two weeks before the election. The Seventh Circuit also suggested that it was premature to draw conclusions about the difficulty Wisconsinites would encounter in having their absentee ballots witnessed, because the Wisconsin Election Commission had recently issued some relevant guidance and might “consider yet other ways for voters to satisfy the statutory signature requirement (if possible, for example, by maintaining the statutory presence requirement but not requiring the witness’s physical signature).” Id. at 4. Whatever the merits of these considerations in the Wisconsin case, they do not apply here. Minnesota’s next statewide election is not until August 11. Moreover, Minnesota has not issued formal guidance on witnessing absentee ballots safely during the pandemic, and it is clear that Minnesota law requires the witness’s physical signature.
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constitutional right they treasure because the health risks of complying with the witness requirement are too serious to ignore.
B. Minnesota’s interest in enforcing the witness requirement during the pandemic is slight.
Minnesota derives no substantial benefit from enforcing the witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The state’s choice to keep this requirement in place throughout the pandemic therefore cannot pass any form of heightened scrutiny, let alone the strict scrutiny that such a severe burden on voting rights demands. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Fish, 957 F.3d at 1128.
Like every other state, Minnesota has a “legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 932 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2019). This interest can justify a restriction on voting, but only if the restriction is appropriately tailored to address the actual threat to election integrity, accounting for the severity of the burden on voters and the availability of other means to serve the state’s interest. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 (“While states certainly have an interest in protecting against voter fraud and ensuring voter integrity, the interest will not suffice absent ‘evidence that such an interest made it necessary to burden voters’ rights.’”) (quoting Fish, 957 F.3d at 1133).
The witness requirements at issue in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia failed this test, based on facts remarkably similar to this case. In both cases, the courts found no evidence that requiring a witness signature was effective in preventing absentee voter fraud. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. Indeed, both witness requirements shared a feature that undermined their effectiveness at preventing fraud: Virginia and South Carolina could not or would not verify the witness’s signature to confirm that the ballot was properly witnessed. League of Women Voters of Virginia,
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2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20-*21. The court in League of Women Voters of Virginia further noted that Virginia had “other means of combatting voter fraud integrated into the absentee-voting system,” including “serious felony charges for absentee voting malfeasance.” 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. “For the fraudster who would dare to sign the name of another qualified voter at the risk of being charged with Class 4 and Class 5 felonies . . . writing out an illegible scrawl on an envelope to satisfy the witness requirement would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” Id.
Minnesota’s interest in election integrity similarly fails to justify the severe burden that its witness requirement imposes on voters during the pandemic. To begin with, fraudulent absentee voting is vanishingly rare throughout the U.S., and especially in Minnesota. A comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012 found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). By way of comparison, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot in the November 2012 election alone. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voter Survey); see also Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 n.21 (noting further evidence that absentee voter fraud is rare). Minnesota expanded the availability of absentee voting in 2013, see 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Ch. 131 (H.F. 894), but there is no evidence that this legislation has led to any pattern of absentee voting fraud.
Without its witness requirement, Minnesota would still have robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud. Like Virginia, Minnesota imposes serious criminal penalties for fraudulent absentee voting. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.03 (creating felony offenses for fraud and other misconduct in absentee voting); Minn. Stat. § 201.014 (any person who votes in Minnesota
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despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony); Minn. Stat. § 609.03 (felonies punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both).
If a fraudulent absentee ballot were returned in defiance of these criminal prohibitions, the ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to rigorous verification process along with all other absentee ballots. Each absentee ballot is rejected unless it satisfies six independent criteria, as judged by a ballot board composed of trained officials who generally must include members of different political parties. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Five of the six criteria have nothing to do with the required witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; see also supra at 5-6.
Even if requiring a witness signature could in theory make a meaningful contribution to preventing fraud, Minnesota’s witness requirement would fail to do so, due to an “enforcement weakness[] apparent in the statute” and its implementing regulations. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. As in Virginia and South Carolina, local ballot boards in Minnesota will not reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5. Instead, the witness requirement is automatically deemed satisfied if the witness’s portion of the certificate is filled out with a signature and any one of the following: a Minnesota address, a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or an affixed notarial stamp. Id. “For the fraudster who would dare” commit absentee ballot fraud in the first place, adding a signature and address for a fictional witness whose existence will never be verified “would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. Luckily, Minnesota has much stronger antifraud mechanisms in place. See supra at 3-6. No doubt the requirement that the voter provide her
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Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number is a much higher barrier for a would-be fraudster than a witness signature.
Like the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina, the witness requirement in Minnesota has “not been justified by countervailing, demonstrated interests.” Id. at *8. By all means, the Court should give “adequate consideration to the state’s interests” and permit Minnesota to maintain overall statutory scheme that “gives . . . effect to the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelman, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). But the evidence in this case shows that applying the witness requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic—and effectively disenfranchising many voters in the process—is not remotely necessary to vindicate this interest. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied challenge to Minnesota’s witness requirement.
II. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief. Minnesota’s witness requirement has caused and will continue to cause Plaintiffs
irreparable damage absent a preliminary injunction. A violation of the right to vote in any election constitutes irreparable injury. After an election has passed, the right to vote is lost permanently and the harm cannot be redressed. Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 752 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
A. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN face a choice between their safety and their vote.
Enforcing Minnesota’s witness requirement during the pandemic would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN by forcing them to risk their health or refrain from voting.
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Ms. Latimer Tanniehill fears that she will have to put her life on the line in order to vote in the upcoming August and November 2020 elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ #21, 25. She is Black, over 65 years old, asthmatic, and an open-heart surgery survivor who takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health. Id. ¶¶ 7, 17.6 Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is therefore particularly vulnerable to becoming severely or fatally ill if she contracts COVID-19. In light of her particular vulnerability to the disease, Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill does not allow anyone inside her home, including her own adult children and grandchildren. Id. ¶ 19. Her youngest daughter visits by standing outside on the sidewalk while Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill talks to her from an upstairs window. When Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill’s oldest daughter and grandchildren visit to help her with lawn work outside, they wear face masks and gloves while practicing social distancing. Id. 19.
In order for Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill to vote absentee, she would have to violate the social distancing guidelines she has been following by inviting someone inside her home or traveling outside of her home to visit someone else. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. She would then have to show that person her blank ballot and have that person sign a statement after she finishes filling out the ballot. This would require her to touch an object immediately after a person who lives outside her household touches it, a process which the CDC has warned may lead to transmission of COVID-19. Ex. 22 (CDC Report on How COVID-19 Spreads). Ms. Latimer Tanniehill’s only other option is to risk voting in person, which would involve waiting in line with other voters, interacting with poll workers, and touching voting equipment that might
6 The CDC has reported that older persons and those with certain preexisting health conditions are at higher risk of contracting, developing serious illness, and dying from COVID-19. See Ex. 20 (CDC Report on Higher Risk Populations). The CDC has also reported that certain racial and ethnic minorities, including Black individuals, are at higher risk of serious illness or death from the virus. See Ex. 21 (CDC Report on COVID-19 and Racial and Ethnic Minorities).
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be contaminated. This form of prolonged exposure to other individuals at a crowded polling place would also put her at serious risk of contracting COVID-19.
If the witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place through the pandemic, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill does not know whether she will be able to vote in the August and November 2020 elections by absentee ballot. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. While she would rather tolerate a small risk of COVID-19 infection than give up her right to vote, if the risk of infection is too high, she may make the painful choice not to vote. Id. Either of these outcomes would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill.
Many other members of LWVMN are in the same position of choosing between two irreparable harms. Many LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is far from the only one with health conditions that elevate the risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶ 11. Nor is it unusual for LWVMN members to live alone, or to live in households without anyone qualified to witness an absentee ballot. Id. ¶ 12. If the witness requirement stays in place through the pandemic, some LWVMN members will forego voting because they reasonably fear exposing themselves to COVID-19 by interacting with a witness. Id. ¶ 32. LWVMN members, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill, therefore face imminent and irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
B. LWVMN also faces irreparable injury in the form of diverted resources. If the witness requirement remains in force throughout the pandemic, LWVMN will have to divert resources from its core activities to take new and unprecedented steps to facilitate absentee voting, with a particular focus on educating voters about the witness requirement for absentee voting and helping them connect with witnesses as safely as possible. Ex. 19 (Witte
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Decl.) at ¶¶ 29-30. This diversion of resources is already happening, and will only increase absent injunctive relief.
Until recently, the witness requirement had not been a major focus of LWVMN’s programming because most Minnesota voters usually vote in person. Id. ¶ 24. However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, LWVMN expects to see an unprecedented surge in absentee voting throughout Minnesota in the August 2020 state primary and the November 2020 general election. Id. ¶ 25. LWVMN will encourage its members to vote absentee if possible, and expects that most of its members will do so. Therefore, LWVMN will have to increase its involvement in educating voters about absentee voting. Id. ¶ 26.
If Minnesota had no witness requirement for absentee voting, LWVMN’s voter education efforts on absentee voting would be relatively simple and straightforward: it would focus on raising awareness of the fact that all registered Minnesota voters have the right to vote absentee. Id. ¶ 27. However, the witness requirement complicates things significantly. LWVMN must inform voters not only that absentee voting requires a witness, but that that witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. LWVMN is developing a communications campaign to tackle the challenge of educating voters about the requirements for absentee voting, particularly the witness requirement. Id. ¶¶ 29 LWVMN’s office staff is currently spending time and energy on developing strategies to educate the public about the witness requirement—time and energy that it would otherwise invest in adapting its core activities, such as voter registration drives and forum events, to the new COVID-19 reality. Id. ¶ 29.
LWVMN’s office staff is also spending significant time and energy developing plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the
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pandemic. Id. ¶ 30. LWVMN is in the early stages of creating a program that would allow voters to request a witness and be connected with others who are eligible and willing to witness absentee ballots. Id. ¶ 30. However, developing this program is an expensive and timeconsuming task. LWVMN has no existing technology or infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses, and no experience brokering these peer-to-peer connections. Id. ¶ 31.
The resources that LWVMN is expending to address the State’s witness requirement cannot be recovered at a later date. “Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). Further, Plaintiffs do not and could not seek damages from Defendant Simon because he is a state official. When a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may not award retroactive monetary relief. Baker Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the harm that LWVMN faces in the absence of a preliminary injunction will be irreparable.
III. The public interest and balance of harms weigh heavily in favor of the preliminary injunction.
Once a party moving for a preliminary injunction “makes a threshold showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits, the district court should then proceed to weigh the other Dataphase factors,” which include the threat of irreparable injury to the movant, the balancing of harms among interested parties, and the effect on the public interest. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). While the usual inquiry on a motion for preliminary injunction “calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest,”
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“[t]hese factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
A. The general public would benefit from the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court has held that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (internal citations omitted). Because the right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Thus, it is clear that the public has a strong interest in all eligible voters being able to vote, because “it is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 2007), modified on reh’g, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he public interest favors protecting core First Amendment freedoms.”). Without injunctive relief, many Minnesotans who are otherwise eligible to vote will face a severe—and potentially insurmountable—burden on their ability to vote. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, approximately 26 percent of voting-age Minnesotans live alone. Ex. 23 (Census Bureau Data). Although under normal circumstances most Minnesotans may be able to find an eligible individual to witness their absentee ballot, the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic prevent a significant portion of Minnesota’s electorate from effectively exercising the franchise without causing harm to themselves and their communities by spreading the disease. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that even “extreme measures” are justified by the global pandemic; this minor alteration to Minnesota’s absentee laws to ensure safe access to the right to vote is certainly justified. In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1029.
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Critically, an injunction temporarily lifting the witness signature requirement for absentee ballots will do nothing to impede the interests of those Minnesota voters who do live with someone who can witness their ballot without risking infection or spread of COVID-19. Even those voters who are able to fulfill the requirement have an interest in the health of Minnesota’s democracy and the perception of a legitimate election—both of which are served by the removal of a barrier that forces Minnesotans to risk either disenfranchisement or their health. That interest is shared by the State, which has an affirmative interest in protecting voters’ confidence in the integrity of elections. See Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
In addition to the election-related interests, an injunction would also serve the public by protecting public health. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1031 (relying on “the State’s admittedly legitimate interests in protecting or promoting the public’s health and safety during the COVID19 pandemic”); see also J.S.G. ex rel. Hernandez v. Stirrup, No. SAG-20-1026, 2020 WL 1985041, at *11 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2020) (“[G]ranting relief that reduces the risk of the further spread of COVID-19 also significantly furthers the public interest.”). The only ways to limit the spread of COVID-19 are self-isolation, social distancing, frequent handwashing, and disinfecting surfaces. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 11. Social distancing requires the maintenance of at least six feet of distance between individuals who do not live in the same household. Id. Critically, requiring someone to come into close proximity with someone outside their household will place them at greater risk of infection, especially for those at greater risk of complications and death from COVID-19. Id. ¶ 19. It is in all Minnesotans’ interest to slow the spread of COVID-19. For that reason, Minnesota officials have not only implemented policies to restrict gatherings and encourage social distancing, see Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56),],
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but also encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots by mail in order to reduce crowding at in-person polling locations and reduce transmission of the virus during upcoming elections. Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
B. Plaintiffs are seeking appropriately tailored relief. The public interest would be served by a Court order granting preliminary relief as to the August and November 2020 elections. To begin, it is not too late for the Court to grant relief that improves the August 2020 primary. Judicial orders issued shortly before elections are sometimes disfavored if they “can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). This motion is being filed well over two months in advance of the next election, leaving ample time for implementation. In any event, the injunction Plaintiffs seek would not cause confusion and depressed voter participation, which were the Supreme Court’s chief concerns in Purcell. The relief sought here is narrowly tailored and would make absentee voting easier for both voters and election administrators without threatening the integrity of the election. Temporary suspension of the witness requirement would cause more voter participation, not less. Nor is it too early for the Court to grant relief from the witness requirement for absentee voting in the November 2020 general election. As explained above, the witness requirement imposes a severe burden on voting rights at this time—not because any given voter is certain to catch COVID-19 from a witness, but because every interaction outside the voter’s own household creates a risk of such transmission. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21 (noting that witness requirement requires voters “to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic”). This reality will not change between now and November. As Plaintiffs’ expert
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epidemiologist Dr. Arthur Reingold confirms, the U.S. will likely see resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions throughout 2020 and into 2021. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 16. Even if infection rates drop over the summer, colder weather in the fall and winter of 2020 may lead to a spike in transmission. Id. ¶ 18. Given this outlook, the risk of COVID-19 will continue to deter voters from meeting with witnesses during the absentee voting period for the November election, regardless of the precise infection rate at that time. And the public is served when, to the extent possible, the rules of an election are set in advance so voters and election officials can plan accordingly.
Finally, if the Court withholds relief as to the November election until the exact health risks around Election Day are known, it may then prove too late to provide fully effective relief. For example, if COVID-19 cases surge one week before the November election, the Court would not be able to as effectively provide the necessary relief to voters (i.e. printed materials with the witness requirement may already be in voters’ hands). Plaintiffs and the broader public would therefore be prejudiced by any undue delay in settling the question of whether the witness requirement will apply in the November election.
C. The burden imposed by a preliminary injunction on Defendant, if any, would be far less severe than the irreparable harm Plaintiffs currently face.
Plaintiffs’ requested relief would impose little, if any, burden on Defendant. First, Defendant has encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots, particularly in the 2020 elections. See Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots). Injunctive relief facilitating absentee voting for many thousands of Minnesota voters by temporarily lifting the onerous witness requirement would further Defendant’s goals, not frustrate them.
Operationally, it would not be difficult for Defendant to suspend the witness requirement for the August and November 2020 elections. Under Minnesota law, the Secretary of State
31

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 32 of 34
unambiguously has the authority to both issue instructions to local election officials and modify or create standard forms sent to absentee voters statewide, such as envelopes and instructions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.125; 204B.27; 204B.45, subd. 3. Most importantly, the Secretary has the specific authority to “adopt alternative election procedures to permit the administration of any election” affected by a judicial order from a state or federal court. Minn. Stat. § 204B.47. Defendant can quickly and easily utilize this authority to suspend the witness requirement for upcoming elections if directed to do so by the court, for example by removing the necessary fields from absentee ballot envelopes and directing local election officials not to reject absentee ballots that lack a witness signature.
Plaintiffs’ requested injunction would impose no additional administrative burdens on the State. The requested relief would not require Defendants to develop or implement any new procedures for processing absentee ballots; in fact, if anything, it would lessen the administrative burden on the state by removing a step from the absentee ballot verification process.
Nor would Defendant be unduly burdened by an order to educate the public about the suspension of the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Defendant is already engaged in publicly promoting absentee voting. See Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots). If the witness requirement is suspended for the 2020 elections, it is not too much to ask that Defendant expand his existing public education efforts to include up-to-date information, preventing potential absentee voters from being deterred by the mistaken belief that a witness is required. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *30 (ordering defendants to “immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement” through channels including “all relevant websites and social media outlets”). The less public
32

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 33 of 34

education Defendant does on this matter, the more this task will fall to LWVMN, a private organization without the State’s resources.
Finally, an injunction would not compromise Minnesota’s interest in secure elections. Plaintiffs share Minnesota’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its elections and ensuring that Minnesota voters have confidence in the fairness and security of their elections. As noted above, Minnesota has a variety of other safeguards that adequately serve the State’s interest in election integrity and preventing absentee ballot fraud. Even absent the witness requirement, Defendant and local Minnesota election officials will undertake a rigorous process to ensure that only validly cast absentee ballots from eligible voters are counted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion

for Preliminary Injunction.

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP
Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400

33

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 34 of 34 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
GP:4846-3691-5902 v1
34

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-1 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205 ECT-TNL
LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Julia Dayton Klein, certify that the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction complies with Local Rule 7.1(f).

I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used the following word

processing program and version Microsoft Word, Version 2016 and that this word processing

program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and

quotations in the following word count.

I further certify that the above document contains the following number of words:

10,389.

Dated: May 29, 2020

s/ Julia Dayton Klein Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153

GP:4841-4023-9549 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-2 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Document Description
Election Fraud Database Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voting Survey Declaration of Dr. Arthur Reingold CDC National COVID-19 Case Data Minnesota COVID-19 Dashboard Statement of the Mayo Clinic New England Journal of Medicine Report CDC Social Distancing Recommendations Minnesota Emergency Executive Order 20-48 Minnesota Emergency Executive Order 20-56 Wisconsin Elections Commission Report Madison Article Milwaukee County COVID-19 Election Report National Bureau of Economic Research Paper on Wisconsin Primary CDC Recommendations for Election Polling Locations Statement of Def. Simon regarding Absentee Ballots Minnesota Secretary of State Elections Calendar Declaration of Vivian Latimer Tanniehill Declaration of Michelle Witte CDC Guidance on Individuals at Higher Risk of COVID-19 CDC Report on COVID-19 and Racial and Ethnic Minorities CDC Report on How COVID-19 Spreads Census Bureau Data Declaration of Caleb Jackson

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-2 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 2

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200
*Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

GP:4838-7381-5486 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-3 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-3 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 4 5/27/20, 6:41 PM

Search for fraud cases by name, date or jurisdiction: Enter a name, state or fraud type here

Submit

W Minnesota Minnesota has 10 cases of alleged election fraud since 2000. By category, Voter had the highest percentage of accused at 100 percent (10 cases). The most prevalent fraud was Felon Casting Ineligible Vote at 80 percent (8 cases). The status of most cases was Unknown at 70 percent (7 cases). Responses to requests for public records varied from state to state. Some state and local officials were quick to respond by sending available records; others failed to provide a single document.

View the documents
The responses to our requests. The actual cases we received.
Deﬁnitions
Read the database definitions.

Select from
STATE
Minnesota
YEAR
All
TYPE OF ACCUSED All Voter Campaign Official Unknown Third Party Organizations Election Official TYPE OF ACCUSATION All Absentee Ballot Fraud Vote Buying Voter Impersonation Fraud Registration Fraud Non-Citizen Casting Ineligible Vote Petition Fraud Unknown Double Voting Campaign Fraud Intimidation Casting Ineligible Vote Falsification of Election Counts Other Procedural Error Felon Casting Ineligible Vote Voting CASE STATUS All Convicted Dismissed Pleaded Case Pending

Showing 0 to 1 of 1 cases found

NAME

STATE YEAR TYPE OF TYPE OF ACCUSED ACCUSATION

Barbara

MN

Ann

Nyhammer

2008 Voter

Absentee Ballot Fraud, Double Voting

CASE STATUS

SYNOPSIS

Unknown Yes

TYPE OF ACCUSED

Voter

100.0%

TYPE OF ACCUSATION

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Double Voting
CASE STATUS

100.0% 100.0%

Unknown

100.0%

https://www.votingrights.news21.com/fraud/?category=1&type=&status=&offset=0&query=&state=58&year=

Page 1 of 2

5/28/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNWLho CDanoVcoute?m- AenNtew1s251-23012 NFaitlieondal 0Pr5oj/e2ct9/20 Page 3 of 4

Election Fraud in America

This database contains all cases reported to News21 of alleged election fraud across America since 2000. Search it to ﬁnd speciﬁcs about such cases by state, individual and category of fraud. Read our story and the methodology explaining how the data was gathered and its limitations.

BY NEWS21 STAFF, COMPILED BY CORBIN CARSON | NEWS 21

PUBLISHED AUG. 12, 2012, 2:10 P.M.

Share:

Related Stories
Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed News21 Voter Fraud Database: Public Documents Obtained

Search for fraud cases by name, date or jurisdiction: Enter a name, state or fraud type here

Submit

z National The nation has 2,068 cases of alleged election fraud since 2000. By category, Unknown had the highest percentage of accused at 31 percent (645 cases), followed by Voters at 31 percent (633 cases). The most prevalent fraud was Absentee Ballot Fraud at 24 percent (491 cases). The status of most cases was Pleaded at 27 percent (558 cases). Responses to requests for public records varied from state to state. Some state and local officials were quick to respond by sending available records; others failed to provide a single document.

View the documents
The responses to our requests. The actual cases we received.
De nitions
Read the database definitions.

Select from

Showing 0 to 20 of 491 cases found Next

STATE All

NAME

STATE YEAR

YEAR All

Jesus Dario NM 2012 Hernandez

TYPE OF ACCUSED All Voter

Richard E. WA 2012 Williams

Campaign Official Unknown

Alice Crews GA 2012

Third Party Organizations
Election Official

Gary Galuski

NY 2012

TYPE OF ACCUSATION
All
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Johnson

KS

County

Names

Unknown

2012

Vote Buying
Voter Impersonation Fraud

Mitchell Robles

CT 2011

Registration Fraud Non-Citizen Casting Ineligible Vote Petition Fraud Unknown Double Voting

William

GA

Christopher

Twilley

Mark

MA

Evangelous

2011 2011

Campaign Fraud Intimidation

Douglas

IN

Campbell

Casting Ineligible Vote

2011

Falsification of Election Counts

Linda Gunsby

GA 2011

https://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/

TYPE OF ACCUSED
Campaign Official Voter
Election Official Campaign Official Voter
Campaign Official Voter
Campaign Official Campaign Official Campaign Official

TYPE OF ACCUSATION
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

CASE STATUS
Case Pending
Unknown
Consent Order
Case Pending

TYPE OF ACCUSED
SYNOPSIS
Campaign
Yes Official
Unknown
Yes Voter
Election
Yes Official
Third Party Organizations
Yes
TYPE OF ACCUSATION

Double Voting, Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Unknown Yes

Not

Yes

Charged

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Casting Ineligible Vote
Vote Buying

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Consent Yes Order

Unknown Yes

Case

Yes

Pending

Consent Yes Order

Registration Fraud
Other
Double Voting
Campaign Fraud
Procedural Error
F l ifi ti

37.7% 22.8% 21.0% 16.3% 2.2%
100.0% 4.9% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 1.2% 1.0%
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5/28/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNWLho CDanoVcoute?m- AenNtew1s251-23012 NFaitlieondal 0Pr5oj/e2ct9/20

Gunsby

Official

Ballot Fraud Order

Other Procedural Error Felon Casting Ineligible Vote Voting CASE STATUS

Terry Danner
Paulette Parker

IN 2011 Campaign Official
CT 2011 Campaign Official

Absentee

Case

Yes

Ballot Fraud Pending

Absentee

Consent Yes

Ballot Fraud Order

All Convicted

Freddie Higgins

GA 2011 Campaign Official

Absentee

Dismissed Yes

Ballot Fraud

Dismissed Pleaded Case Pending

Alan Lloyd MT Skari

2011 Voter

Absentee

Pleaded Yes

Ballot Fraud

Unknown Not Charged

Phillip

CT

Apruzzese

2011 Third Party Absentee

Consent Yes

Organizations Ballot Fraud Order

Acquitted Consent Order

Willie

GA

James Hall

2011 Voter

Absentee

Pleaded Yes

Ballot Fraud

Page 4 of 4
Falsification of Election Counts
Intimidation
Voting
Felon Casting Ineligible Vote
CASE STATUS
Pleaded
Consent Order
Unknown

Charlotte GA 2011 Unknown Nelson

Absentee Ballot Fraud

Dismissed Yes

Not Charged Case Pending

Hudson Hallum
Laura Fench

AR 2011 Campaign Official
GA 2011 Unknown

Absentee

Case

Ballot Fraud Pending

Absentee

Pleaded

Ballot Fraud

Yes Dismissed
Convicted
Yes
Acquitted

Garland Renchen

OH 2011 Campaign Official

Intimidation, Case

Yes

Absentee

Pending

Ballot Fraud,

Vote Buying

0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
26.1% 21.8% 18.5% 13.6% 8.1% 7.1% 3.1% 1.6%

https://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/

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EXHIBIT 2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 122 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTA NCE COMMISSION
2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey
A Summary of Key Findings, September 2013

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
The 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey
A SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS September 2013

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 122
Table of Contents
Executive Summary.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3 Survey Methodology .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Survey Results.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
Registering to vote.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 How Americans cast their ballots.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 Overseas voting.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11 Casting and counting provisional votes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12 Election administration.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13 Observations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 16 Appendix A .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 17 Appendix B .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18 Appendix C .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 88

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Executive Summary

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) is the nation’s foremost data collection effort on how Americans cast their ballots. The 2012 survey is the fifth sponsored by EAC and forms the basis for this report.
There were approximately 194.2 million total eligible and registered voters in the United States reported for the November 2012 election, an increase of nearly 3.7 million registered voters since the last presidential election in 2008. The 2012 EAC survey collected information on how 131,590,825 Americans participated in the election. Response rates to the survey have been increasing over time, with 2012 seeing the highest jurisdiction-level participation rates since the EAC began conducting this study.1 Although the completeness of State responses varied, valuable voting data were collected from each of the 50 States, three territories, and the District of Columbia.2
Over half of American voters cast a regular ballot in person at a polling place on Election Day in 2012 (56.5%). Others voted by domestic absentee ballot (16.6%); by early voting before Election Day (9.0%); by mail voting (4.9%); by provisional ballot, the validity of which was decided after Election Day (1.6%); or by absentee ballot as overseas or uniformed services voters (0.5%).3
States transmitted nearly 33.1 million domestic absentee ballots and 83.5% were returned and submitted for counting. Oregon and Washington conduct their elections entirely by mail, and in three other Western States (Arizona, Colorado, and Montana), more than half of all voters cast their ballots via absentee voting.
Improved data collection on Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots resulted in a more complete picture of voting by uni-
1 Appendix A to this report provides an overview of response rates for the last three surveys.
2 Throughout this report, the word “States” includes “States, territories, and the District of Columbia.”
3 An additional 0.2% voted by other means. States were unable to classify the remaining 10.7% of ballots.

formed services and overseas voters. States reported transmitting over 876,000 ballots to UOCAVA voters, and 66.0% were returned and submitted for counting. Of UOCAVA ballots cast, 95.8% were counted; the others were rejected for various reasons, including missing ballot return deadlines.
Provisional ballots once again proved to be a substantial source of both ballots and votes in some States, with more than 2,702,000 provisional ballots submitted by voters nationwide. Four States—Arizona, California, New York, and Ohio—each reported more than 100,000 provisional ballots submitted and accounted for 70.6% of the nation’s total. States counted 72.9% of their provisional ballots in whole or in part. Over 651,000 provisional ballots, or 24.1%, were rejected, most commonly because it was determined that the voter was not properly registered. States reported using their provisional ballots in different ways; for example, some States issue provisional ballots when voters wish to change their address on Election Day.
In addition to the voting data, the 2012 survey collected information on a range of election administration topics, including the ages of poll workers, the number of polling places, and the types of voting technology. Among the key findings were that States employed almost 888,000 poll workers in nearly 120,000 polling places in the 2012 election, or roughly 7.4 poll workers per polling place, a slight increase from the last presidential election. Poll workers tend to be older on average than the general population. Ages were reported for over 361,000 poll workers; of those, 59.1% were between ages 41 and 70 and over one-fifth (22.3%) were aged 71 years or older. Over a third of responding jurisdictions (39.0%) reported having some difficulty in obtaining sufficient numbers of poll workers.
The type of voting technologies varies across and within States. Seventeen States reported deploying 121,638 Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines without voterverified paper ballots. Another 18 States reported using 79,357 DREs with voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT).

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 1

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
The most widely deployed technology was the optical or digital scanner that reads voter-marked ballots; 40 States reported using 271,384 such counters or booths in at least some of their jurisdictions.
While gaps remain in the States’ election data collection, response rates to the survey were higher in 2012 than for previous data collections. There were also 3,476 more jurisdictions that participated in the survey than in 2010, largely as a result of a change in the reporting unit in Wisconsin.4 Readers are encouraged to consult the complete county-level data available at EAC’s website, at www.eac.gov, for complete details, including explanatory comments.
4 Wisconsin’s reporting units in 2012 were municipalities. In prior reports, Wisconsin’s data were aggregated by county.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 2

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
Introduction
The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent, bipartisan commission created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Its mission is to assist State and local election officials with the administration of Federal elections. EAC provides assistance by disbursing, administering, and auditing Federal funds for States to implement HAVA requirements; conducting studies and other activities to promote the effective administration of Federal elections; and serving as a source of information regarding election administration.
Since 2004, EAC has collected data on voting, elections, and election administration in the United States. These data form the basis for three biennial reports: a federally mandated report on the impact of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. §1973gg (completed in June 2013), a mandated report on the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §1973ff (completed in July 2013), and this comprehensive report summarizing find¬ings across all areas of the survey.
Detailed information on the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey is presented in this report. It contains summaries of the NVRA and UOCAVA reports and new information on the methods Americans used to vote and how State and local administrators ran their elections in 2012. Summary information at the State level is included in the tables which accompany the report.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Survey Methodology

In 2012, as in previous years, EAC distributed two questionnaires to the States: a quantitative survey, the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) and a qualitative Statutory Overview, which asks States to report on their election laws, definitions, and procedures. In order to minimize the burden on States when preparing to respond to the survey, the 2012 survey contained only minor changes to both the Statutory Overview and the EAVS questionnaire from the 2010 versions. The final, approved version of the survey, posted on the EAC website in May 2012, contained 48 questions in the EAVS questionnaire and 22 questions in the Statutory Overview. A majority of the questions in both surveys contained subquestions.
The quantitative portion of the 2012 EAVS was composed of six sections:
1. Voter registration, which included questions required by the NVRA;
2. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which included questions required by that Act;
3. Domestic civilian absentee ballots, which asked about the number of ballots submitted, counted, and rejected;
4. Election administration, which asked States to report on their precincts, polling places, and poll workers;
5. Provisional ballots, which asked about the number of ballots submitted, counted, and rejected; and
6. Election Day activities, which contained a range of questions, from the number of people who participated in the 2012 election to the types of voting technology employed by local governments.

soft Excel®-based template. The template offered the States two different methods for entering data: a form-based method that resembled the look of the questionnaire, and a sheet-based view that used a familiar spreadsheet format. Embedded in the Microsoft Excel®-based template was a set of error-checking algorithms to help States check their data using logic and consistency rules before submitting their data to EAC. To further ease the data entry burden, the template was preloaded with each State’s jurisdictions, and EAC provided a guide summarizing how to use the template to States.5 Most States chose to submit their data using this instrument via the project website or via email.
States were asked to send their responses to EAC by February 1, 2013. The data provided by the States were then checked for logic and consistency errors. Any errors or questions concerning the submitted data were referred back to the States for review and correction, if necessary. The States had two weeks to review and correct their submissions. Fifty-four States submitted their data to EAC.6
About the States’ Data
In May 2010, EAC adopted a data policy to guide States’ submission and verification of their survey data. The Guide to the Election Administration and Voting Survey document provides information to election officials responsible for completing the survey and offers EAC assurances about States’ validation of the data. The Guide is available on EAC’s website (www.eac.gov). The Guide contains information about:
• EAC processes related to releasing the survey instrument and final reports based on the survey data;

States’ Collection of Election Information
For 2012, EAC continued its efforts to present the survey to State officials earlier in the election cycle and to facilitate the task of responding by providing improved survey instruments and increased technical assistance. The primary survey instrument designed to assist the States in collecting and reporting their statistical data was a Micro-

5 States were allowed to change the list of jurisdictions to match their own reporting and administration systems. Some States, particularly those with township systems, may change the number of local jurisdictions administering elections from year to year, as towns run joint elections to ease the administrative burden.
6 The Virgin Islands did not respond. Its name appears in the tables but without any data.

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

• the technical assistance EAC provides to the States;
• deadlines for submitting the survey data;
• the processes and procedures for States’ submission of the data, including use of the data templates EAC provides;
• the processes and procedures for States’ review, verification, and correction of the data; and
• instructions on how to address errors in the data after the submission deadline has passed.
In response to both media and general public inquiries about State data cited in EAC’s previous EAVS reports and the Federal government’s recent policies related to data quality, EAC formally requested that States verify and certify in writing the data they submit. For the 2012 EAVS, every State submitted with their data a certification page signed by its Chief State Election Official.7
The 54 States that responded to the 2012 survey varied in their approaches to and completeness of their election data collection. Most States relied, at least to some degree, upon centralized voter-registration databases (VRDs) and voter history databases, which allowed State election officials to respond to each survey question with information from the local level. Other States, conversely, collected relatively little election data at the State level and instead relied on cooperation from local jurisdiction election offices to complete the survey. Some States were not able to provide data in all the categories requested in the survey and some did not have data for all of their local jurisdictions.
This report summarizes the results of the 2012 EAVS and includes a set of detailed tables. A complete dataset of responses to the survey is available on EAC’s website at www.eac.gov.
Caution is necessary when interpreting the survey data, particularly when comparing the data from yearto-year or State-to-State, due to changes in State data collection practices over-time and the varying levels of completeness in many States’ responses. Information on the number of jurisdictions in each State is provided in the tables.
7 The numbers reported here from the States may differ from those provided elsewhere by the States. As these have been certified by the States’ Chief Election Officials, they are considered by EAC to be the final and official statistics on the 2012 election.

Guide to Terms
Active Voter: A voter registration designation indicating the voter is eligible to vote. See also Inactive Voter.
Ballots Cast: Total numbers of ballots submitted by all voters for counting, including by all voting methods (absentee, provisional, early, in a polling place, etc.).
Ballots Counted: Number of ballots actually processed, counted, and recorded as votes.
Domestic Absentee Ballot: A ballot submitted, often by mail, in advance of an election, often by a voter who is unable to be present at the polls on Election Day. This excludes ballots sent to overseas voters that are covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA).
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP): Persons who are citizens and of voting age (18 years or older). These numbers are estimates generated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census American Community Survey. See also Voting Age Population.
Early Voting: Refers generally to any in-person voting that occurred prior to the date of the election at specific polling locations for which there were no special eligibility requirements. Early voting is not considered absentee voting under the State’s definitions/requirements for absentee voting.
Electorate: The body of persons eligible to vote.
HAVA: The abbreviation for the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §15301 et seq. The text of HAVA and additional information is available on EAC’s website at www. eac.gov.
Inactive Voter: The NVRA allows election jurisdictions to move voters to an inactive voter list if the registrant: (1) has not either notified the applicable registrar (in person or in writing) or responded during the during the period described in the statute to the notice sent by the applicable registrar; and subsequently (2) has not voted or appeared to vote in two or more consecutive general elections for Federal office. Before moving voters to an inactive list, jurisdictions verify voter rolls through mailings or the U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address (NCOA) service. This inactive status and the fail-safe provisions of the NVRA allow such people to vote if there was an error. See also Active Voter.

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Jurisdictions: Generic term to signify various geographic areas that administer elections. The jurisdictions in this study are also the reporting units and may include counties, parishes, municipalities, independent cities, townships, towns or cities, or, in the case of Alaska, an entire State.
Poll Worker: Election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms that refer to the person or persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits, or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing a ballot or setting up the voting machine; and serve other functions as dictated by State law. This does not include observers stationed at polling places or regular election office staff.
Polling Place: A facility staffed with poll workers and equipped with voting equipment, or paper ballots, at which persons cast ballots in person on Election Day. Several precincts may be combined into one polling place.
Precinct: An administrative division representing a geographic area in which voters are provided ballots for particular offices. These manageable geographic units may also be referred to as electoral districts, voting districts, boxes, beats, or wards, depending on State law. The number of allowed registered voters in precincts will vary according to State law.
Provisional Ballot: A ballot provided: (1) to an individual who claims he or she is registered and eligible to vote but whose eligibility or registration status cannot be confirmed at the time he or she presents him- or herself to vote; or (2) for other reasons allowed by Federal, State or local law.
Section 5: At the time of the 2012 Survey (November through February 2013), some jurisdictions were required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq., to obtain preclearance from the Department of Justice or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing a change in a voting standard, practice, or procedure.
Section 203: Some jurisdictions are required by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq., to provide supplemental voting information to certain language minority groups.
Spoiled ballots: Ballots that, under the applicable State law, are incorrectly marked or impaired in some way by the voter and turned in by the voter at the polling place or mailed in absentee. A replacement ballot is issued so that

the voter can correctly mark the ballot; also referred to in some States as a “voided” ballot.
Voting Age Population (VAP): People who are 18 years of age or older, regardless of whether they are eligible to register to vote, based on estimates made by the Bureau of the Census 2010 U.S. Census and adjusted for the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012. Note that not all persons of voting age may be eligible to vote (e.g., felons, individuals judged to be mentally incompetent, noncitizens, etc.). See also Citizen Voting Age Population.

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Survey Results

REGISTERING TO VOTE
In most places in the United States, voting begins with registration. While North Dakota has no voter registration and some other States allow eligible voters to register and vote on the same day, in most States, registration takes place several weeks prior to the casting of ballots. States maintain their voter registration rolls by removing invalid registrations when voters move out of State or die and by keeping eligible and registered voters on the rolls.
The key Federal legislation on voter registration is the National Voter Registration Act, or NVRA, 42 U.S.C. §1973gg. The information presented in this section is offered in greater detail in the EAC report, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2011–2012, available on EAC’s website. The report includes complete data tables with totals for each State; data cited in this section are contained in those tables.
How Many Are Eligible To Vote?
The United States Census is required by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Obtaining an accurate and complete census of the population remains a daunting task. Complicating the situation is that the decennial census is only a baseline. For example, population estimates must take into account immigration (both legal and illegal), internal migration, mortality rates, and natural population growth and aging.
The Census estimated the domestic Voting Age Population (VAP), which includes those 18 years and older, at 243,003,673 for 2012. Voter participation data by State are shown in Table 29.8 The VAP is based on the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census, with the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012 taken into account.
The EAC obtained estimates of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) from the 2011 American Community

REGISTERING TO VOTE
To register to vote a person must be a U.S. citizen and, meet age and residency requirements. Eligibility varies according to State laws. Persons who have been legally declared mentally incompetent or who have been convicted of a felony and have not had their civil rights legally restored may not be able to vote (based on State law).
Individuals can register to vote by mail when applying for a driver’s license or identity card at their State’s driver’s licensing offices, at offices providing public assistance, at offices providing State-funded programs for people with dis¬abilities, and at Armed Forces recruitment offices. Many states offer voter registration services on their website.
An individual can obtain a registration application from either the local election official in his or her county or city or town of residence, or through reg¬istration outreach programs sponsored by various private groups. Federal registration forms and many State forms are now accessible on the Internet.
The National Mail Voter Registration Form is the one document that allows individuals to register to vote from anywhere in the United States. (North Dakota does not have voter registration; Wyoming and the four territories do not accept this form; New Hampshire accepts the form only as a request for an absentee voter mail-in registration form.) The form is available at www.eac.gov. ★
Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau and applied them to the 2012 VAP. The nationwide estimate for CVAP for 2012 was 222,250,587. The State CVAP data are also reported in Table 29.9

8 Tables 1-7 are presented in The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2011–2012. Tables 8-27 are presented in the 2012 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Survey report. Both reports are available on EAC’s website (www.eac.gov).

9 U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, http://www.census.gov/acs/www. The true number of eligible voters is reduced further by variation in State laws such as the eligibility of those convicted of felony crimes and those judged to be mentally incapacitated.

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Registration
States reported that more than 194 million persons registered to vote for the 2012 election. While EAC’s NVRA report showed that approximately 79.9% of the nation’s estimated voting age population of 243 million was registered to vote, registration rates varied across the country from a low of 54.5% in Wyoming to a high of 97.9% in Michigan.10
The 2012 EAVS asked a question to distinguish between States that did have Election Day or Same Day Registration in 2012 versus States that did not have formal Election Day Registration but in some cases allowed voters to register and vote on the same day for the 2012 election. Most States require eligible persons to register to vote in advance of the election, but an increasing number of States are allowing some form of Same Day or Election Day Registration. Some States have formal same-day voting systems, while others limit same-day voting to certain contests or certain groups of voters. For example, Alaska limits Election Day registrants to voting only for Federal offices. Further, some States experience overlaps between early voting periods and the cutoff date for registration resulting in some voters being able to register and vote on the same day.
Twelve States including Alaska, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming indicated that they had Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration for the November 2012 presidential election. California, Colorado, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington reported a number of voters who were allowed to register and then to vote on the same day, but did not indicate that they have Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration
Active Versus Inactive Voter Rolls
States vary in how they report their registration figures. In 2012, 16 States indicated that they only count active voters in their total number of registrations, 30 States counted both active and inactive voters as registered voters, and seven States had some jurisdictions count only active voters while other jurisdictions counted both active and inactive voters in their registration figures.11 Responses to
10 This excludes North Dakota, which has no voter registration, and Alaska and the District of Columbia, which reported registration rates over 100% of the estimated voting age population.
11 North Dakota does not have voter registration and therefore does not make a distinction between active and inactive voters.

the 2012 survey show that over 23.1 million registrants in the United States remain on the list of inactive voters.”
Voter Turnout Rates in 2012
Every eligible voter does not necessarily register to vote, and not every registered voter casts a ballot in each election. In Table 29, voter turnout is reported using three different measures of the eligible population.
Estimates of voter turnout vary depending on the population base used for comparison. Often turnout is based on a percentage of the total estimated voting age population, an estimate of the number of individuals living in the United States who were 18 or older in 2012. This measure provides the lowest estimate of voter participation in the United States because it does not take into account persons’ citizenship status. Using Census estimates of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) to calculate turnout produces a higher estimate of voter participation because a lower number of eligible voters is assumed.
HOW AMERICANS CAST THEIR BALLOTS
An increasing number of alternatives to voting in person at a polling place on Election Day have expanded the ways that Americans cast their ballots in Federal elections. In some places, such as Oregon and Washington, voters primarily receive and submit their ballots through the mail. Further, more States have adopted “no-excuse” absentee voting, which allows more people to vote by mail or in person before Election Day as a convenience. Twentyfive States reported maintaining “permanent absentee” lists, automating the distribution of ballots to voters who request their ballot through the mail in every election. In some communities, election administrators have set up “vote centers,” central locations where any voter from any precinct can cast his or her ballot. Finally, voters in Federal elections who encounter challenges or problems at the polling place, such as finding their names removed from the registration rolls, can now vote “provisional” ballots, which can be counted later when questions concerning registration are resolved.
Over 56% of Americans who voted in the 2012 general election voted in the traditional way of casting their ballots in person at their local polling place on Election Day. The 2012 survey collected data from over 7,800 jurisdictions (of 8,154 total) on how people who participated in the 2012 elections cast their ballot (see Table 28).
Of the 131,590,825 voters participating in the election, 74,343,638 (56.5%) voted in person at polling places.

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An additional 21,853,762 (16.6%) voters cast their ballots as domestic absentee voters, and States reported 600,048 UOCAVA voters (0.5%).12 Mail voting accounted for 6,459,136 ballots, or 4.9% of the vote. Provisional ballots accounted for 2,139,315 ballots, or 1.6% of the vote.13 Provisional balloting is discussed in greater detail below.
Twenty-nine States reported that 11,794,312 people (9.0%) cast their votes before Election Day through various
12 UOCAVA data on voter participation differs from UOCAVA ballot data because of variations in how States answered the questions and/or track their data.
13 An additional 0.2% voted by other means. States were unable to classify the remaining 10.7% of ballots.

VOTER REGISTRATION
The 2012 election saw a substantial increase in the total number of registration applications received directly over the Internet. In 2012, States reported receiving 3,329,216 Internet applications, up from 768,211 in 2010. The number of States receiving Internet applications has also increased in the past few election cycles, from 8 States in 2008, to 17 in 2010, and to 21 States in 2012. Note: States vary in their interpretation of Internet (or online) voter registration; for some it is defined as offering a fillable PDF while for others it includes the ability to email the voter registration form. ★

Rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

RANKING OF STATE BY PERCENTAGE OF VOTER TURNOUT

Based on Voting Age Population (VAP)

Based on Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)

Rank Based on Voting Age Population (VAP)

Minnesota

71.9% Minnesota

75.3% 27

District of Columbia 56.3%

Wisconsin

69.8% Wisconsin

72.1% 28

Florida

55.9%

New Hampshire

68.7% Colorado

71.0% 29

Connecticut

55.8%

Maine

68.2% New Hampshire

70.8% 30

Alaska

55.6%

Iowa

67.6% Iowa

69.7% 31

Illinois

54.4%

Colorado

65.6% Maine

69.3% 32

South Carolina

54.4%

Ohio

63.4% Massachusetts

66.6% 33

Rhode Island

54.2%

Montana

62.8% Virginia

66.2% 34

Kentucky

54.0%

Michigan

62.8% Maryland

65.8% 35

Indiana

53.9%

Virginia

61.6% Washington

65.7% 36

New Jersey

53.8%

Missouri

61.5% Michigan

65.1% 37

Georgia

52.6%

North Carolina

60.8% Ohio

64.9% 38

Utah

52.0%

Massachusetts

60.7% North Carolina

64.7% 39

Kansas

51.6%

Vermont

60.7% Oregon

64.5% 40

Tennessee

50.0%

Washington

60.4% Montana

63.5% 41

Nevada

48.6%

Maryland

60.2% Florida

63.2% 42

Arkansas

48.3%

Oregon

59.9% Missouri

63.1% 43

Arizona

47.1%

North Dakota

59.9% District of Columbia 62.1% 44

Oklahoma

46.7%

Delaware

58.7% Delaware

62.1% 45

New York

46.6%

South Dakota

58.6% Vermont

61.9% 46

West Virginia

46.6%

Nebraska

58.6% Nebraska

61.4% 47

California

45.5%

Louisiana

57.8% New Jersey

61.2% 48

New Mexico

43.2%

Pennsylvania

57.7% North Dakota

60.9% 49

Texas

41.9%

Idaho

57.0% Connecticut

60.8% 50

Hawaii

40.1%

Wyoming

56.9% Illinois

59.9% 51

Mississippi

39.7%

Alabama

56.3% Idaho

59.8%

Based on Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)

Pennsylvania

59.6%

South Dakota

59.6%

Louisiana

59.3%

Rhode Island

58.7%

Alaska

58.2%

Wyoming

58.2%

Alabama

57.9%

Georgia

56.9%

South Carolina

56.5%

Nevada

56.4%

Utah

55.9%

Indiana

55.7%

California

55.6%

Kentucky

55.3%

Kansas

54.3%

New York

53.2%

Arizona

53.1%

Tennessee

51.8%

Arkansas

50.1%

Oklahoma

48.7%

Texas

48.4%

West Virginia

46.9%

New Mexico

46.9%

Hawaii

44.0%

Mississippi

40.4%

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FIGURE 1. EARLY IN-PERSON VOTING 2012 GENERAL ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
41%–70.99% 21% – 4 0 . 9 9 % 5%–20.99% 0.01% – 4 .9 9 % 0

FL

forms of early voting. In several States, early voting made up a sizeable proportion of the total votes cast. For example, in Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee, early voters constituted over half of all ballots.
In reporting these totals, States drew from various sources to determine their participation numbers14 (see Table 30): • 17 States reported using poll book records;
• 27 States drew from totals of ballots counted;
• 19 States used databases of voter histories; and
• 10 States used the total number of votes for the highest office on the ballot.

FIGURE 2. HOW AMERICANS VOTED IN THE 2012 GENERAL ELECTION
In-person (56.5%) Domestic Absentee (16.6%) Not Categorized (10.7%) Early voting (9.0%) Mail Voting (4.9%) Provisional (1.6%) UOCAVA (0.5%) Other (0.2%)

Domestic Absentee Voting Absentee voting covers a range of circumstances under which voters cast their ballots without appearing at a polling place on Election Day. Some States require valid reasons, such as being out of town on Election Day or having a work schedule that precludes getting to a polling place. Other States allow any voter who requests it to vote by absentee ballot. Absentee voting has gradually expanded through the years, and many States no longer require an
14 Most States used a combination of methods.

excuse. Oregon and Washington have moved to replace their polling place systems entirely with vote-by-mail.15 States reported that 33,070,385 absentee ballots were transmitted to voters (see Table 31). The 2012 EAC survey collected data on absentee voting from 54 States. Approximately 8 out of 10 absentee ballots (27,624,254 ballots, or
15 States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots; some States with vote-by-mail reserve the term “absentee” for specific circum¬stances. Also, the absentee voting discussed in this section generally does not include voters covered by UOCAVA.

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83.5%) were returned and submitted for counting. Additionally, 425,310 (1.3%) of the domestic absentee ballots were reported to have been returned as undeliverable, 266,642 (0.8%) were spoiled, and for 3,760,269 (11.4%) the status was uncertain. As in past elections, Western States had the highest rates of absentee voting, with absentee voting accounting for more than half of all ballots in Arizona, Colorado, and Montana.

HIGHEST ABSENTEE VOTING RATES16
Colorado Arizona Montana Georgia

71.4% 65.9% 57.5% 48.8%

TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING ABSENTEE BALLOTS

Missed deadline Non-matching signature Lack of valid signature First-time voters lacking required ID No witness signature Already voted in person Deceased voter Unofficial envelope Ballot missing from envelope Unsealed envelope No proper address

Number 82,922 45,392 44,748
7,719 4,917 4,717 2,707 1,949 1,848 1,035
600

Percent 32.1% 17.6% 17.3% 3.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%

States reported counting 26,834,076 absentee ballots (97.1%), and rejecting 258,380 (0.9%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). Guam, Kentucky, and Louisiana reported rejecting 5% or more of their absentee ballots. The reasons for rejecting voters’ absentee ballots varied widely. Many States do not track the reasons absentee ballots are rejected, leaving an incomplete picture of why these ballots were not counted.
Readers should note that the “Reasons for Rejected Absentee Ballots” listed below are for ballots submitted for counting; nearly 692,000 absentee ballots were never submitted, but instead were returned as undeliverable or spoiled.
OVERSEAS VOTING
Voting by members of the uniformed services and by U.S. citizens living overseas is an area of critical concern in election administration. The reliance of the United States on local election administration and on casting ballots in physical polling places, as well as State requirements of prior registration, present special difficulties for eligible voters living outside the country. Federal requirements concerning registration and voting by overseas and uniformed services voters are contained in the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §1973ff, signed into law in 1986.
Since 2004, EAC has gathered data on UOCAVA ballots and voters, pursuant to the statutory reporting obligations in UOCAVA and HAVA. In the 2012 survey, 18 questions sought to gather detailed information on overseas voting. What is presented in this section is explained
16 Oregon and Washington - which vote entirely by mail – were also excluded.

in more detail in the 2012 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Survey Observations Report, available at EAC’s website, www.eac.gov.
Improved data collection of UOCAVA-related information resulted in high response rates in 2012 and more jurisdictions responding overall to this portion of the survey than in previous years. While gaps remain, better data are gradually becoming available on UOCAVA voting.
Responding to the survey’s UOCAVA questions, States reported transmitting over 876,000 ballots under 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-3(a) of UOCAVA. Five States (California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington) each transmitted more than 50,000 ballots and together accounted for nearly half of the national total of ballots transmitted. Military voters accounted for slightly more of the ballots transmitted than did civilian voters.
While 876,362 ballots transmitted to uniformed services and overseas civilian voters, 606,425 ballots (69.2%) were submitted for counting including Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWABs) which are not transmitted to voters. Nearly one-quarter of transmitted ballots, 22.2%, were not returned and their status remained unknown. Among the ballots submitted for counting were at least 44,766 FWABs, which UOCAVA voters can use when their requested ballots do not arrive in time. FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of UOCAVA voting for both uniformed services and civilian voters.
Once submitted, 95.8% of UOCAVA ballots were counted. Military voters made up slightly more of the total ballots counted (52.4%) than civilian voters (45.4%). Fortynine States reported rejecting 33,762 UOCAVA ballots. The

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FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF BALLOTS TRANSMITTED TO UOCAVA VOTERS — 2012 ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

FL

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
5 0, 0 0 0 –112 , 3 5 5 20,000–49,999 10, 0 0 0 –19, 9 9 9 1, 6 0 6 – 9, 9 9 9

most common reason for rejecting a UOCAVA ballot was that the voter missed the deadline for returning the ballot; 40.4% of rejected ballots were not counted for this reason.
CASTING AND COUNTING PROVISIONAL VOTES
The 2012 Federal election was the fifth in which voters in all 50 States, the territories, and the District of Columbia were allowed to cast a provisional ballot even if their name did not appear on the voter registration rolls in the jurisdiction where they intended to vote, they failed to have the required identification, their eligibility was challenged by an election official, or for other reasons provided by law. Pursuant to HAVA Section 302(a), such voters were allowed to cast a provisional ballot, which would be later counted if election officials determined the person was eligible to vote.
Before the minimum standards set by HAVA, the rules regarding the use of provisional ballots varied widely among the States, and some variation continues. States that had Election Day Registration when HAVA was passed in 2002 are not required to offer provisional ballots. Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt from the HAVA provisional ballot requirements, but some of them reported small numbers

of provisional ballots, including New Hampshire (2), Wisconsin (135), and Wyoming (33).
A total of 2,702,470 provisional ballots were submitted for counting in 2012. States reported that 1,790,294 (66.2%) of the provisional ballots) were counted in full, and 180,571 (6.7%) were partially counted. States responding to this survey question reported that 651,372 provisional ballots (24.1%) were rejected.
California and New York reported the largest number of provisional ballots, accounting for 56.1% of all provisional ballots cast nationwide in the 2012 election (see Table 34). As a share of voters participating in the election, the District of Columbia (13.1%), California (7.4%), Arizona (6.5%), and Alaska (6.0%) had the largest percentages of voters cast provisional ballots (see Table 28). Readers should note that the different ways in which States use provisional ballots makes comparisons among States difficult. Those States that require a provisional ballot for more circumstances will have a higher incidence of provisional ballot usage when compared to those States with more limited uses. Ohio, for example, uses provisional ballots to process voters’ change of address requests in addition to providing an alternative means to vote.

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FIGURE 4. REJECTION RATES FOR PROVISIONAL BALLOTS — 2012 ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

FL

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
90%–100% 75%–89% 50%–74% 25%–49% 0%–24% No Data

In 2012, 1,970,865 people cast a provisional ballot that was either partially or fully counted, or about 1.5% of all Americans who participated in the election. On average, about 1 out of every 41 voters who cast their vote in a polling place cast a provisional ballot. Approximately 72.9% of all the provisional ballots cast were counted in full or in part (15 States reported counting partial provisional ballots).17 The percentage of provisional ballots being counted grew from the previous presidential election; in 2008, 1,451,086 provisional ballots were counted in full or in part, or 67.3% of provisional ballots cast.
Five States (Alaska, the District of Columbia, Maine, Montana, and Oregon) reported counting 90% or more of their provisional ballots. An additional 11 States reported counting at least 70% of their provisional ballots. Conversely, 26 States reported counting fewer than half of their provisional ballots.
Reasons Provisional Ballots Were Rejected
The reasons for rejecting provisional ballots are shown in Tables 35a and 35b. Most provisional ballots (38.2%) were rejected because the voter was found not to be registered in the State. Another 25.1% were from voters who sought to vote in a precinct or jurisdiction other than where they were
17 A partially counted ballot means the jurisdiction counted only the races for which the voter was eligible.

registered, and State laws mandated that such ballots could not be counted. The principal reasons for the rejection of a provisional ballot are summarized in the table below.
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION Despite the increase in convenient voting options such as ”no excuse” absentee voting and vote-by-mail, over 56% of Americans cast their vote in the 2012 general election in polling places on Election Day. Providing voting services to more than 74 million voters on Election Day required a massive effort organized through thousands of precincts, polling places, and poll workers across the country.

TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING PROVISIONAL BALLOTS

Voter not registered Wrong jurisdiction Wrong precinct Lacked sufficient ID Incomplete or illegible ballot or envelope Voter already voted No signature

Number 248,529 128,923 34,703 13,333
9,233
8,865 8,402

Percent 38.2% 19.8% 5.3% 2.0%
1.4%
1.4% 1.3%

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Polling Places and Precincts States employ some system of precincts (bounded geographic areas to which voters are assigned) and polling places (locations where voting actually takes place) to conduct their elections. In 2012, States operated 176,906 precincts and 119,968 physical polling places (see Table 41).18
Of all polling places, 91,282 were separate from official election offices (schools, community halls, etc.), whereas a reported 1,492 election offices were open for casting ballots. States reported that 4,184 locations were available for early voting, including 1,595 election offices.
Poll Books Electronic poll books, or electronic voter lists, are in use in some fashion in 25 States (see Table 36):
• 23 States reported that a total of 645 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to sign in voters;
• 21 States reported that a total of 610 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to update voter histories;
• 24 States reported that a total of 947 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to look up polling place assignments for voters; and
• 12 States reported using electronic poll books for some other purpose.
Most polling places still use preprinted lists of registered voters (see Table 37). In the preponderance of reporting jurisdictions (3,279 cases), these books were printed by local jurisdictions, with 274 cases where the printing was completed by the State and the poll books shipped to the jurisdictions.
Poll Workers The term “poll worker” encompasses many different names across the United States. Poll workers may be referred to as election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms. As defined in this report, “poll worker” refers to the person or persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits, or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing a ballot or setting up the voting machine; and may serve other functions as dictated by State law. The term does not apply to observers stationed at polling places or to regular election office staff.
18 Fewer jurisdictions reported the number of physical polling places than reported the number of precincts.

The complexity of voting technology and rules has led States to seek poll workers with specialized technological knowledge. In many States, poll technicians are assigned to help keep voting machines and electronic poll books functioning properly.
Fifty States reported deploying 887,854 poll workers for Election Day 2012 (see Table 39). California alone had 89,440 poll workers.
The reliance of many jurisdictions on retirees as poll workers has made their age a topic of interest. The EAC survey asked jurisdictions to report the ages of their poll workers (see Table 39). Thirty States were able to provide at least some data on poll worker ages.
States reported age ranges for 361,135 poll workers. The largest number of poll workers fell into two age groups: 41 to 60 and 61 to 70 years of age (both age groups, respectively, included approximately 30% of poll workers). About 22% of the poll workers with reported age ranges were aged 71 years or older. Young poll workers are relatively rare; 10.8% of poll workers were under 26 years of age.19
The 2012 survey also asked about the difficulty jurisdictions faced in recruiting adequate numbers of poll workers (see Table 40). About 44% of responding jurisdictions reported having a somewhat difficult or very difficult time recruiting poll workers, compared with 28.6% that reported having a somewhat easy or very easy time. Staffing the nation’s polling places continues to be a challenge for many jurisdictions.
The survey found that there were on average 7.4 poll workers assigned to each polling place in the United States during the 2012 election (based on those States which reported answers to questions regarding the number of polling places and number of poll workers). Jurisdictions reported an average of 6.6 poll workers per polling place in the last general election in 2008.
Voting Technology
Voting technology remains highly dynamic in the United States. With the enactment of HAVA, Congress appropriated more than $3.1 billion for EAC to distribute to States to make election administration improvements, including the purchase of voting systems.
Voting technology is a difficult topic to measure in the Election Administration and Voting Survey because many
19 EAC has worked to encourage the recruitment of young poll workers through its College Poll Worker Grant Program, which has awarded grants to colleges and nonprofit organizations to work with election offices to recruit, train, and support college student poll workers.

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jurisdictions use multiple systems. For example, a county may employ a scanner for absentee ballots but a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines for in-person voting. Polling places may have more than one type of voting system technology in use on Election Day. For this reason, the EAVS survey measures the breadth of voting technology being used across the country, and the wealth of local-level data will be of substantial value to researchers.
The 2012 survey collected data on almost 320,000 voting systems. The types of voting technology included the following: • DRE machines with a voter-verified paper audit trail
(V V PAT);
• DRE machines without a VVPAT;
• optical or digital scan systems, in which voters fill out a paper ballot which is then read by a scanner;
• hybrid systems combining a DRE with an optical scanner;
• punch card systems;
• lever machines;
• paper ballots; and
• other systems. The most common single type of voting system was
an optical or digital scan booth; 23 States reported using 214,888 such machines. The most widely deployed technology across the States, however, is the optical or digital scan counter; 40 States reported using 56,496 of these counters in at least some of their jurisdictions.
Eighteen States reported deploying DREs which produce a paper record that can be checked by the voter. Voters in Arkansas, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia were among those most likely to vote on such machines. Most States use more than one type of voting machine, either because of local options or to accommodate voters with special needs.
Only Idaho reported using punch cards. Fourteen States reported using paper ballots in at least some of their polling places. Eight States were not able to provide the numbers of voting systems used, though some of them did provide the types of systems used without corresponding counts.
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Observations
The discussion above represents an overview of the data contained in the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey. EAC encourages individuals interested in election data to further examine the State-by-State data, and the county- (or equivalent) level data, available on EAC’s website. As shown by the response rates and increase in the number of jurisdictions responding to the 2012 survey, data collection and reporting in the United States have improved. While users of the data must take into account State differences in definitions and data reporting and consider the incomplete responses in many categories, the survey is a valuable resource of data on Federal elections for election administrators, advocates, researchers, and the general public.
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APPENDIX A
Response Rates

Summarized below are the response rates for selected questions in the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, with comparisons to 2008 and 2010 response rates where available.20 Coverage varies significantly across the questions. Not all questions were applicable to all States.

Comparing Response Rates from 2012, 2010, and 2008 (excluding Wisconsin)

Survey question

Responding Jurisdictions in 2012

Domestic absentee ballots transmitted

4,520

Domestic absentee ballots cast/counted

4,456

Domestic absentee ballots rejected

4,333

Number of poll workers

4,143

Number of precincts

4,573

Number of polling places

4,301

Provisional ballots submitted

4,111

Provisional ballots rejected

3,471

Number of Jurisdictions Surveyed:

2012
98.0% 96.6% 93.9% 89.8% 99.1% 93.2% 89.1% 75.2% 4,613

2010
97.2% 91.2% 94.7% 75.4% 99.1% 86.5% 94.6% 77.6% 4,606

2008
95.1% 94.7% 91.6% 71.7% 97.9% 95.9% 82.8% 70.9% 4,445

20 Wisconsin’s jurisdictions were excluded from the response rate calculations for all three years reported in the table, as the disproportionately large increase in Wisconsin reporting jurisdictions – from 72 in 2008 and 2010 to 3,541 in 2012 – would skew these results. When including them, the response rates are overly affected by Wisconsin because it comprises nearly half of all jurisdictions. In 2012, Wisconsin switched from reporting data at the county level to the municipality level.
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APPENDIX B
Tables and Cross Reference of Survey Questions to the Tables
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CROSS REFERENCE OF SURVEY QUESTIONS TO TABLES
Section C: Domestic Civilian Absentee Ballots Question C1: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters and the disposition of the ballots
Table 31. Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Question C2: Existence of a permanent absentee voter registration list This question was categorical and not coded for tabular display Question C3: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters due to the existence of a permanent list Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Question C4:Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots submitted for counting and the disposition of the ballots Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Table 33. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Question C5: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected and the reason for rejection Table 33. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C
Section D: Election Administration Question D1: Number of precincts
Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D2: Number of polling places, types of polling places Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places Table 44. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D3:Number of poll workers used Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D4: Age category for poll workers Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers Question D5: Difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers
Section E: Provisional Ballots Question E1: Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots
Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question E2: Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots and disposition of the ballots Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Question E3: Number of provisional ballots rejected and the reason for rejection Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C
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Section F: Election Day Activities Question F1: Number of people who participated in the November 2012 general election
Table 28. Ballots Cast by Means of Voting Table 29. Turnout Rates for Voter Participation Using Different Bases Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place Table 37. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question F2: Source of the number of persons participating Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation Question F3:First-time mail registrants who were required to provide identification to vote Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Question F4: Uses of electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters at the polling place Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place Question F5: Existence of printed lists of registered voters at the polls Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Question F6: Source of poll books used at the polling place Table 38. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place Question F7: Information on the number and type of voting equipment used Table 42. Number and Type of Voting Equipment
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FOOTNOTES TO TABLES
General Notes: State:In the interest of consistency in these tables, the term State includes the District of Columbia and the four territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Jurisdictions in the Survey: For the 2012 survey, information was requested for each local election administration jurisdiction. Generally this would be the county or county equivalent in each State. The following exceptions may apply.
a) The information was compiled by town, city, or township in Wisconsin and the six New England States of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
b) S ome independent cities were treated as counties for reporting purposes in the States of Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia.
c) The response was one record for the whole entity for Alaska, the District of Columbia, and the reporting territories. d) In Hawaii, information for one county, Kalawao, was reported with Maui County. Exceptions are noted by an asterisk below the State name in Table 1a in “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012.” Table 6 in “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012” contains more information on the coverage and reporting for each State. Missing Data: Information for several items remains unavailable for some States for a number of reasons. Missing data are presented in the tables by a blank data cell, a “-999999” value, or a zero value depending on how the State answered the question. A “-999999” value denotes that a State specifically responded that data was not available for the question under consideration. Note that a zero value may also indicate that the jurisdiction does not know or does not collect the information. The count of cases, included in most tables but not for all variables, reflects the presence of a response from the jurisdiction including reported zeros. For many questions, zero is a valid response. In some instances, however, it is unclear if a response of zero is a valid response or an indication of “Data Not Available” or “Data Not Applicable” options. Researchers should consult the jurisdiction-level dataset for more detail. If a calculation is impossible because of missing information, a separate symbol may be indicated, e.g., a series of periods (……). Sum of Above: The information listed in the tables below the State detail is, for most columns, simply the arithmetic sum of the information listed in the table. The number of States providing information is indicated as the count of States with information greater than, or in some cases, less than, zero. The percentages indicated on this line are generally the result of a simple division based upon the appropriate numbers from this line. For the Not Categorized columns, the number and percentage in the “Sum of Above” line will generally reflect a calculation of the appropriate fields listed on this line. Specific Notes for Tables: Notes that are specific to each table appear following each table or group of sub-tables. These notes summarize the comments that States included when completing the survey and are occasionally direct quotes of States’ comments. The notes also occasionally include explanations of decisions made in reporting States’ data.
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Tables Included Table 28. Ballots Cast by Means of Voting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Table 29. Turnout Rates for Voter Participation Using Different Bases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Table 31. Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted: Disposition of Ballots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Table 33a. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Table 33b. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part B  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Table 33c. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Table 35a. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table 35b. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Table 37. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Table 42. Number and Type of Voting Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

2,083,309

67

302,465

1

2,323,579

15

1,080,809

75

13,096,097

57

2,594,628

64

1,560,640

169

417,631

3

294,254

1

8,557,692

67

3,910,557

159

436,774

4

666,290

44

5,339,488

110

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

1,115,281

105

1,815,896

120

2,014,511

64

724,759

500

2,734,189

24

3,184,196

351

4,780,701

83

2,950,780

87

889,914

58

2,840,776

116

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Cases
203,496 633,660 565,716 5,460,518 421,980
396,408 191,166 3,736,946 1,979,776 236,586 496,546 4,021,805 2,073,074 896,757 784,825 1,710,486 1,650,912 536,635 2,068,656 2,913,489 3,505,208 2,640,446 708,020 2,567,998 198,775 595,284 305,122

At the Polls

Total

Cases Percent

0

0.0

1

67.3

45,600

15

27.3

0

75

52.3

477,120

56

41.7

48,604

64

16.3 250,797

0

0.0

3

94.9

0

1

65.0

52,998

67

43.7 2,409,097

159

50.6

4

54.2

40,291

44

74.5

110

75.3 1,185,748

92

77.8

0

99

56.4

105

70.4

188,717

120

94.2

67,773

64

82.0 315,029

500

74.0

24

75.7 430,546

351

91.5

83

73.3

87

89.5

50

79.6

1,051

116

90.4

56

40.4

93

73.0

17

30.0 619,253

In-Person Voting

Early Voting

Total

Cases

Percent

0

0.0

1

15.1

18,255

1

0.0 150,231

75

44.1

2,153

24

0.4 968,077

64

9.7

52,977

0

0.0

3

0.0

437

1

18.0

38,636

67

28.2

31,368

0

0.0

10,545

4

9.2

643

0

0.0

110

22.2

43,772

92

0.0

4,801

0

0.0

4,996

105

16.9

38,865

120

3.7

50

64

15.6

1,321

0

0.0

290

24

15.7

79,876

0

0.0

3,288

0

0.0

2,675

0

0.0

19

0.1

10,260

0

0.0

6,308

0

0.0

5,562

0

0.0

15,130

17

60.8

3,468

Provisional

Total

Cases Percent

0

0.0

0.0

1

6.0

6.2

15

6.5

4.6

73

0.2

0.1

56

7.4

5.0

64

2.0

1.9

0

0.0

0.0

3

0.1

0.0

1

13.1

4.6

66

0.4

0.4

159

0.3

1.3

3

0.1

0.0

0

0.0

0.0

110

0.8

0.7

66

0.2

0.1

99

0.3

0.3

105

3.5

0.0

120

0.0

0.0

64

0.1

0.1

500

0.0

0.0

24

2.9

1.9

351

0.1

0.0

83

0.1

0.1

0

0.0

0.0

43

1.2

1.2

115

0.2

0.1

56

1.1

0.8

93

1.9

0.0

17

0.3

0.3

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TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

718,700 3,677,463
679,080 7,128,852 4,539,729 326,239 5,632,423 1,343,380 1,820,507 5,783,621
451,593 1,981,516
368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

Cases
654,450 3,047,584
225,870 4,342,214 1,743,642
230,890 3,547,582 1,163,957
5,488,684 423,691
1,525,284 209,102
1,006,868 5,606
573,149 219,399 3,431,110
11,828 521,311 2,413,557 183,413 11,903 32,492 1,829,762

131,590,825 F1a

8,120 74,343,638 51 F1b

At the Polls

Total

Cases Percent

320 21 23 57 100 53 88 77 0 67 39 46 58 95 234 29 238 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

91.1

0

82.9

33.3 283,649

60.9

38.4 2,557,256

70.8

63.0 600,647

86.6

112,718

0.0

94.9

190

93.8

77.0 264,754

56.7

15,139

40.6 1,403,486

0.1

860

56.0

244,130

72.1

10,853

88.0

0.4

76.1 150,666

78.4

73.2

90.4

1,062

95.4

1,012

97.4

15,266

7,796

56.5 11,794,312

29

F1f

In-Person Voting

Early Voting

Total

Cases Percent

320

0.0

0

0

0.0

94,721

23

41.8

3,082

0

0.0 129,835

100

56.3

18,041

0

0.0

88

10.7 208,087

77

8.4

1,724

0

0.0

1,771

67

0.0

48,711

0

0.0

2,357

46

13.4

5,473

58

4.1

199

95

56.6

1,758

234

0.0

50,787

29

23.9

43,036

163

3.6

18

0

0.0

12,831

0

0.0

6,832

55

22.0

3,152

0

0.0

44

0

0.0

13

1

8.1

0

1

3.0

144

1

0.8

12,715

2,149

9.0 2,139,315 47 F1e

Provisional

Total

Cases

Percent

320

0.0

0.0

21

2.6

1.8

24

0.5

0.6

57

1.8

2.2

100

0.4

0.6

0

0.0

0.0

88

3.7

3.0

77

0.1

0.2

36

0.1

0.2

67

0.8

0.2

39

0.5

0.2

46

0.3

0.0

58

0.1

0.0

95

0.1

0.0

254

0.6

1.2

29

4.2

3.7

176

0.0

0.0

134

0.3

0.1

39

0.2

1.3

40

0.5

0.6

3,541

0.0

0.0

6

0.0

0.0

1

0.0

0.0

1

0.4

0.3

1

0.7

0.5

0.6

7,537

1.6

1.3

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State

Election Juris.
in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Absentee Voting

Dom. Civilian Absentee

Total

Cases Percent

Total

25,486 1,530,416
30,144 5,214,992 1,851,529
19,492 9,090 2,292,822 1,906,886 157,236 162,156
506,516 684,690 138,366 33,690 42,640 184,763 140,650 259,114 1,259,902 255,141
58,417 256,598 283,097 206,956 78,528

0

0.0

1

8.4

9,628

15

65.9

9,135

74

2.8

3,616

51

39.8

74,521

64

71.4

17,345

0

0.0

3

4.7

1,294

1

3.1

2,364

67

26.8

87,293

159

48.8

13,356

4

36.0

2,018

44

24.3

2,182

0

0.0

92

19.0

5,468

99

43.1

3,508

104

12.4

3,365

120

1.9

3,897

64

2.1

4,609

500

25.5

3,071

24

5.1

14,461

351

8.1

8,305

83

26.4

12,916

87

8.6

10,506

47

6.6

4,568

116

9.0

9,872

56

57.5

4,532

93

25.4

1,267

17

7.7

5,937

UOCAVA Cases 0 1 15 74 51 64 0 3 1 67 159 4 44 0 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 51 116 56 93 17

Percent 0.0 3.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.6

Mail Voting

Vote by Mail Jurisdicition

Total

Cases Percent

0 1,904 1,329,984
0 0 0 2,406
44,687 264
8,347 5,443

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

0.0

10

0.2

48

10.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

0.0

1

0.0

1

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

44

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

87

1.5

11

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10

1.0

17

0.5

Other Means

Other Means of Voting

Total

Cases Percent

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

137

1

0.0

156

3

0.0

18,409

9

0.1

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

102

8

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

47,254

110

0.9

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

10,736

4

1.2

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

118

93

0.0

21

17

0.0

Not Categorized

Balance

Total

Percent

2,083,309 0 0 0
(19,008) 0
1,560,640 0 0 64 (6) 0
3,000 40,909 73,514
0 (38,857)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96,598 0 0 (11,534) 0

100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.1) 0.0
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.5 0.8 2.8 0.0 (3.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 0.0 (1.4) 0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Absentee Voting

Dom. Civilian Absentee

UOCAVA

Total

Cases Percent

Total

Cases

60,846 284,103 52,726 326,189 205,072 94,024 1,259,904 59,523 12,908 241,656 24,387 100,473 32,814 55,365 237,365
62,076 423,481
5,289 658,240
65,742

320 21 17 57 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 58 95 230 0 224 134 0 54 3,541 23

8.5

3,404

7.7

10,827

7.8

3,117

4.6

39,214

4.5

15,718

28.8

1,325

22.4

15,698

4.4

5,458

0.7

11,749

4.2

18,018

5.4

1,158

5.1

6,728

8.9

1,701

2.2

12,605

3.0

40,579

0.0

3,555

20.4

1,914

10.9

29,424

0.0

47,521

0.8

1,681

21.4

6,294

26.2

1,533

320 21 19 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 58 95 233 29 222 134 39 55 3,541 23

86

1

0.7

116

1

96

1

0.3

93

1

2,080

1

0.1

1,584

1

21,853,762

7,619

49

F1d

16.6 600,048

7,701

51

F1c

Percent 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.1
0.5

Mail Voting

Vote by Mail Jurisdicition

Total

Cases Percent

0 7,825
1,794,079 0
100,473 1,506
4,347 3,140,309

320

0.0

0

0.0

17

1.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

36

98.5

67

0.0

0

0.0

46

5.1

58

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

142

1.4

0

0.0

39

97.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

0 17,562

1

0.0

1

0.9

6,459,136

963

4.9

14

F1g

Other Means

Other Means of Voting

Total

Cases Percent

0

320

0.0

240,228

21

6.5

949

5

0.1

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

39

0.0

0

0

0.0

3,708

66

1.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

2,762

25

0.9

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

238

1

0.7

0

0

0.0

Not Categorized

Balance

Total

Percent

0

0.0

0

0.0

101,862

15.0

2,291,400

32.1

0

0.0

0

0.0

505

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

(13,638)

(0.2)

0

0.0

(21,669)

(1.1)

104,647

28.4

100

0.0

7,658,654

95.8

159,166

15.6

3,140

1.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3,000

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

324,818

724

13

F1h+i+j

0.2 14,075,796

10.7

22

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 26

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 31 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F1:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted “F1b. Provisional.” Another jurisdiction noted that two provisional ballots were counted and vote history was credited Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that for F1f (Voted at an early vote center), this total is included in the totals noted in F1d and C1b since each is still considered an “Early Ballot” cast. The breakdown of the number of voters who cast an early ballot in-person at an early voting site is 12,527 but again, is still considered as voters who “voted using a domestic civilian early (absentee) ballot”. Rejected provisional ballots are NOT included in F1a and F1e totals since they are not used to credit the person’s vote history. Rejected Provisional Ballots are considered invalid and/or the individual is not registered so no record exists and therefore no history can be updated. Of the 122,524 provisional ballots cast, 99,684 provisional ballots were deemed valid and counted as reflected in F1e. California: One jurisdiction commented, “F1g(3,116) + F1d(3,799) = C1b(6,915) and F1e-counted Provisional ballots and the remaining 7 Provisional ballots were not registered voters(E1d). A second jurisdiction noted that F1d differs from C1b because C1b includes rejected domestic absentees; F1d does not include rejected as rejected ballots do not count in vote history. Another jurisdiction noted that F1c, F1d, and F1g equal C1b. A fourth jurisdiction commented that the total is not actually greater than F1a. One jurisdiction stated in reference to F1f that it does not have early voting centers, and also that F1d includes ballots cast and duplicated from DRE equipment. Another jurisdiction stated its F1g totals are included in F1d and it removed 19 deceased voters from C1b. A different jurisdiction also noted that F1f is included in F1d as these voters are given vote by mail ballots. One jurisdiction stated, “F1f - 800 ballots were issued from our office ‘over-the-counter’ then returned to our office. These 800 are already accounted for in F1d.” Another jurisdiction stated that early voting is included in vote by mail or absentee. Florida: One jurisdiction commented, “(1) Since there was no break-out section for domestic military, we added that number in with the domestic civilian absentee ballot. (2) One of the provisional ballots was not registered to vote, therefore no voter history could be credited. We excluded that number from F1e.” A second jurisdiction stated that F1f is Early Voting Turnout (D2e is referencing Early Voting locations). A third jurisdiction noted that out of the 16 rejected of provisional ballots, all but 2 received voter history (see E2 and F1h). Another jurisdiction commented, “Total voters that voted by absentee, early, provisional and election day also including referred ballots.” A fifth jurisdiction noted that provisional ballots were included in F1a. Another jurisdiction stated that provisional ballot voters that are rejected are not given credit for voting, but E1 asks for total who voted using a provisional ballot. This jurisdiction is unable to account for the 38 vote difference between the two totals after reviewing all reports submitted by vendor. Guam: In reference to F1h, homebound voting is servicing those who are elderly/physically challenged and are not able to go to the polls. Indiana: Indiana does not have ‘early voting.’ Indiana allows voters to cast absentee ballots prior to election day, but all absentee ballots are counted on election day. That is why F1f = 0 for all counties. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented that the number in F1d includes in-office absentee votes and mail-in. Another jurisdiction stated that these figures are per report election results 11/6/2012. A third jurisdiction stated that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Hampshire: Per EAC Instructions Absentee Ballot Totals include rejected ballots whereas F1a and F1b do not. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented “Ballot Issue Report/How voters voted statistics.” Ohio: One jurisdiction stated Ohio has absentee voting beginning 35 days before an election for non-UOCAVA voters, and also noted that it does not have early voting. Puerto Rico: Under the new Puerto Rico Election Code, people with mobility disabilities have a right to vote by mail, as a domicile vote/ early vote. South Carolina: Totals come from separate sources and cannot always be reconciled. For example an absentee ballot that was challenged could be represented under “absentee and provisional”. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “F1f. In total for domestic civilian absentee ballot.” Another jurisdiction stated that voter at early voting center includes mail returns of votes. A third jurisdiction stated these breakdowns were not done. A fourth jurisdiction commented, “An elderly gentleman voted absentee and at the polling place. The elderly poll worker did not catch the unintentional double voting. The Town Clerk caught the mistake too late.” Another jurisdiction stated that it does not separate ballots received in the
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 27

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION mail and voted at office. A sixth jurisdiction stated that F1c plus F1d breaks down to 92 in early voting center and 133 by mail. Another jurisdiction commented, “See the Absentee Ballot Portal data for Woodstock.” Washington: Physical poll place voters may have voted during early voting. West Virginia: Unlike the totals for F1a, F1b, and F1f, which are determined by ballots counted, totals for F1c, F1d, and F1e are determined by voter history as entered into the Statewide Voter Registration Wyoming: F1a can be greater than the number of registered voters prior to the day of the election. Since Wyoming has Election Day Registration, votes are being cast for registrations that do not appear in the A1 total because they are processed after the election.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 28

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris.
in Survey 67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Voters Participating

Total

Cases

2,083,309

67

302,465

1

2,323,579

15

1,080,809

75

13,096,097

57

2,594,628

64

1,560,640

169

417,631

3

294,254

1

8,557,692

67

3,910,557

159

436,774

4

666,290

44

5,339,488

110

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

1,115,281

105

1,815,896

120

2,014,511

64

724,759

500

2,734,189

24

3,184,196

351

4,780,701

83

2,950,780

87

889,914

58

2,840,776

116

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Estimated Voting Age

Total 3,697,617 544,349 4,932,361 2,238,250 28,801,211 3,956,224 2,796,789
712,042 522,843 15,315,088 7,429,820 1,089,302 1,169,075 9,811,190 4,945,857 2,351,233 2,161,601 3,362,177 3,484,090 1,063,274 4,540,763 5,244,729 7,616,490 4,102,991 2,239,593 4,618,513 783,161 1,392,120 2,095,348

%TO 56.3 55.6 47.1 48.3 45.5 65.6 55.8 58.7 56.3 55.9 52.6 40.1 57.0 54.4 53.9 67.6 51.6 54.0 57.8 68.2 60.2 60.7 62.8 71.9 39.7 61.5 62.8 58.6 48.6

Rank 26 30 43 42 47 6 29 19 27 28 37 50 24 31 35 5 39 34 22 4 16 13 9 1 51 11 8 21 41

Total

Estimated Citizen Voting Age
%TO

3,595,400

57.9

519,629

58.2

4,376,217

53.1

2,159,446

50.1

23,546,880

55.6

3,654,799

71.0

2,565,067

60.8

672,175

62.1

473,487

62.1

13,534,127

63.2

6,867,525

56.9

993,045

44.0

1,114,631

59.8

8,916,661

59.9

4,780,336

55.7

2,280,022

69.7

2,053,815

54.3

3,283,865

55.3

3,396,443

59.3

1,046,057

69.3

4,153,057

65.8

4,784,241

66.6

7,347,850

65.1

3,920,519

75.3

2,200,437

40.4

4,505,205

63.1

774,966

63.5

1,329,041

61.4

1,804,094

56.4

Rank 33 31 43 45 39 3 24 19 18 16 34 50 26 25 38 5 41 40 29 6 9 7 11 1 51 17 15 21 36

Reported Registration

Total 3,162,135 579,304 3,725,362 1,610,364 18,996,338 3,651,091 2,202,278 632,805
557,774 11,934,446 6,050,050
705,668 895,834 8,116,660 4,562,268 2,236,068 1,771,252 3,037,153 2,965,751 1,026,086 3,694,658 4,340,000 7,454,553 3,387,783 1,399,209 4,191,778 681,608 1,163,871 1,258,409

%TO 65.9 52.2 62.4 67.1 68.9 71.1 70.9 66.0 52.8 71.7 64.6 61.9 74.4 65.8 58.4 71.1 63.0 59.8 67.9 70.6 74.0 73.4 64.1 87.1 63.6 67.8 72.2 70.1 80.9

Rank 32 50 39 29 22 15 16 31 49 13 34 41 8 33 46 14 38 44 25 17 9 10 35 2 36 28 11 20 6

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 29

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey 320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55
3,541 23 1 1 1 1
8,154

Voters Participating

Total

Cases

718,700

320

3,677,463

21

679,080

26

7,128,852

62

4,539,729

100

326,239

53

5,632,423

88

1,343,380

77

1,820,507

36

5,783,621

67

451,593

39

1,981,516

46

368,816

66

2,480,182

95

7,993,851

254

1,023,036

29

304,509

245

3,896,846

134

3,206,490

39

685,099

55

3,078,135

3,541

250,701

23

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

131,590,825

8,120

54

F1

Estimated Voting Age

Total 1,045,878 6,838,206 1,571,096 15,307,107 7,465,545
545,020 8,880,551 2,877,457 3,038,729 10,024,150
833,818 3,643,633
629,185 4,962,227 19,073,564 1,967,315
502,060 6,329,130 5,312,045 1,471,372 4,408,841
440,922

%TO 68.7 53.8 43.2 46.6 60.8 59.9 63.4 46.7 59.9 57.7 54.2 54.4 58.6 50.0 41.9 52.0 60.7 61.6 60.4 46.6 69.8 56.9

Rank 3 36 48 45 12 18 7 44 17 23 33 32 20 40 49 38 14 10 15 46 2 25

2,817,721

66.7

…

243,003,673

n/a

52

Pop.Est.

Total

Estimated Citizen Voting Age
%TO

1,014,537

70.8

6,012,270

61.2

1,448,740

46.9

13,408,596

53.2

7,013,407

64.7

536,097

60.9

8,678,945

64.9

2,757,440

48.7

2,822,652

64.5

9,700,796

59.6

768,684

58.7

3,506,606

56.5

619,251

59.6

4,790,345

51.8

16,518,813

48.4

1,829,834

55.9

491,789

61.9

5,883,341

66.2

4,879,174

65.7

1,460,372

46.9

4,271,926

72.1

430,996

58.2

2,756,939

68.2

222,250,587

n/a

52

ACS

Rank 4 22 49 42 13 23 12 46 14 27 30 35 28 44 47 37 20 8 10 48 2 32
…

Reported Registration

Total 878,136
5,415,639 1,252,438 11,720,541 6,655,291 545,020* 7,987,697 2,114,489 2,199,360 8,352,342
725,309 2,875,121
523,410 4,024,960 13,690,729 1,508,372
460,817 5,428,091 3,904,959 1,246,559 3,987,248
240,438 17,764 50,701
2,402,941

%TO 81.8 67.9 54.2 60.8 68.2 59.9 70.5 63.5 82.8 69.2 62.3 68.9 70.5 61.6 58.4 67.8 66.1 71.8 82.1 55.0 77.2
104.3 74.1 67.2 78.2

Rank 5 26 48 43 24 51 18 37 3 21 40 23 19 42 45 27 30 12 4 47 7 1
… … …

193,653,908

n/a

53

A1

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 30

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES Question F1. Calculations for rates of voter participation (turnout) based upon voting age population, citizens of voting age, and registration.
General note: This table represents a comparison of the rates of participation based upon the number of voters participating (F1a) by cal¬culating the rate based upon selected bases. The estimates of voting age and citizen voting age were not available for the four territories; the four territories are therefore not ranked for any of the measures of voter participation to facilitate comparisons across the measures. Reported registration is, with a few exceptions, information also taken from the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey (see Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d of the NVRA Report Appendix). States will vary in whether inactive voters are included in their registration figures. The Estimated Voting Age (VAP) and the Citizens of Voting Age (CVAP) figures are released by the Bureau of the Census. The VAP numbers are from the 2010 Census (with the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012 taken into account). The CVAP numbers are derived from the 2011 3-year Bureau of the Census American Community Survey. All the information used here and released by the Bureau of the Census share some data issues: a) they are estimates initially based upon the 2010 Census and an ongoing review of administrative records or, in the case of the ACS, an ongoing survey; b) the estimates are for the domestic/resident population; thus, UOCAVA voters are not included in the relevant universe of the voting population; and c) these population bases do not address the statutory eligibility of any person to register or to vote. Thirty-three jurisdictions across four States (California, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Vermont) did not provide voter turnout. Voter turnout was provided for the large majority of jurisdictions in each State, thus all States are included in the rankings. The reader should be cognizant of the impact this missing information has on the rankings, the calculation of turnout percentages, and the overall national values.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 31

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

Cases

Voters Checked Off or Poll Book Signatures
Total Cases Pct.

67

2,083,309

67

0 …

Alaska

1

302,465

1

0 …

Arizona

15

2,323,579

15

0 …

Arkansas

75

1,080,809

75 233,965

22 21.6

California

58

13,096,097

57 1,143,863

5 8.7

Colorado

64

2,594,628

64

0 …

Connecticut

169

1,560,640 169 1,560,640 169 100.0

Delaware

3

417,631

3

0 …

District of Columbia

1

294,254

1

0 …

Florida

67

8,557,692

67 2,990,510

27 34.9

Georgia

159

3,910,557 159

0 …

Hawaii

4

436,774

4

0 …

Idaho

44

666,290 44

0 …

Illinois

1

5,339,488 110

0 …

Indiana

92

2,663,373

92 2,663,373

92 100.0

Iowa

99

1,589,951

99

0 …

Kansas

105

1,115,281 105 1,115,281 105 100.0

Kentucky

120

1,815,896 120

0 …

Louisiana

64

2,014,511

64

0 …

Maine

499

724,759 500

0 …

Maryland

24

2,734,189

24

0 …

Massachusetts

351

3,184,196 351

0 …

Michigan

83

4,780,701

83 4,780,701

83 100.0

Minnesota

87

2,950,780

87 2,950,780

87 100.0

Mississippi

82

889,914

58 220,394

16 24.8

Missouri

116

2,840,776 116 227,227

29 8.0

Montana

56

491,966

56

0 …

Nebraska

93

815,568

93

0 …

Ballots Counted

Total Cases

2,023,918

65

0

1,895,333

13

774,439 44

4,705,319

26

0

0

417,631

3

294,254

1

3,466,761

21

0

372,871

3

666,290 44

5,293,802 109

0

1,589,951

99

0

1,815,896 120

0

724,759 500

0

0

0

0

370,660

18

2,298,050

75

491,966

56

0

Pct. 97.1 … 81.6 71.7 35.9 … …
100.0 100.0 40.5
… 85.4 100.0 99.1
… 100.0
… 100.0
… 100.0
… … … … 41.7 80.9 100.0 …

Vote History

Total

Cases 0

0

0

53,707

6

6,860,818

20

0

0

0

0

864,847

11

0

63,903

1

0

45,686

1

0

0

0

0

2,014,511

64

0

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

212,065

18

39,873

4

0

0

Pct. … … … 5.0
52.4 … … … … 10.1 …
14.6 … 0.9 … … … …
100.0 …
100.0 … … …
23.8 1.4 … …

Votes for Highest Office

Total Cases

59,391

2

0

0

0

39,535

1

0

0

0

0

537,235

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10,631

3

3,970

1

0

0

Pct. 2.9 … … … 0.3 … … … … 6.3 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1.2 0.1 … …

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

…

0

0.0

302,465

1 100.0

0

0.0

428,246

2 18.4

0

0.0

18,698

3 1.7

0

0.0

346,562

5 2.6

0

0.0

2,594,628

64 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

698,339

4 8.2

0

0.0

3,910,557 159 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

3,184,196 351 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

76,164

3 8.6

0

0.0

271,656

7 9.6

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

815,568

93 100.0

0

0.0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 32

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION (CONTINUED)

State
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

Cases

Voters Checked Off or Poll Book Signatures
Total Cases Pct.

17

1,017,772

17

2,156

1 0.2

320

718,700 320

0 …

21

3,677,463

21

0 …

33

679,080

26 334,381

6 49.2

62

7,128,852

62

0 …

100

4,539,729 100

0 …

53

326,239

53

0 …

88

5,632,423

88 588,462

14 10.4

77

1,343,380

77

0 …

36

1,820,507

36

0 …

67

5,783,621

67

0 …

39

451,593

39

0 …

46

1,981,516

46

0 …

66

368,816

66

44,974

21 12.2

95

2,480,182

95 396,192

23 16.0

254

7,993,851 254

0 …

29

1,023,036

29

0 …

246

304,509 245 211,133 193 69.3

134

3,896,846 134

0 …

39

3,206,490

39

0 …

55

685,099

55

0 …

3,541

3,078,135 3,541 3,078,135 3,541 100.0

23

250,701

23

0 …

1

13,167

1

0 …

1

34,075

1

0 …

1

1,878,969

1

0 …

1

8,154 131,590,825 8,120 22,542,167 4,434 17.1

17

F1a

F2.1

Ballots Counted

Total Cases

983,151

9

0

0

117,291

5

0

0

326,239

53

3,252,435

52

1,343,380

77

0

0

0

0

294,357

36

344,497

7

0

0

79,107

42

0

0

685,099

55

0

250,701

23

13,167

1

0

0

Pct. 96.6 … … 17.3 … … 100.0 57.7 100.0 … … … … 79.8 13.9 … … 26.0 … … 100.0 … 100.0 100.0 … …

34,891,324 1,557 26.5 27
F2.2

Vote History

Total Cases

4,198

2

0

3,677,463

21

83,347

4

0

4,539,729 100

0

1,076,928

13

0

0

5,783,621

67

0

0

27,463

8

1,739,493

65

0

0

10,642

4

3,896,846 134

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. 0.4 …
100.0 12.3
… 100.0
… 19.1 … … 100.0 … … 7.4 70.1 … … 3.5 100.0 … … … … … … …

33,729,329 567 25.6 19
F2.3

Votes for Highest Office

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

7,128,852

62

0

0

443,295

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,993,851 254

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

Pct. … … … …
100.0 … … 7.9 … … … … … … …
100.0 … … … … … … … …
100.0 100.0

18,129,804 337 13.8 10
F2.4

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

28,267

5 2.8

0

0.0

718,700 320 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

142,097

10 20.9 1,964

0.3

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

271,303

1 4.8

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

1,820,507

36 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

451,593

39 100.0

0

0.0

1,981,516

46 100.0

0

0.0

2,022

1 0.5

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

1,023,036

29 100.0

0

0.0

3,627

6 1.2

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

3,206,490

39 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

22,296,237 1,224 16.9 1,964

0.0

22

1

F2.5+0

calc

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 38 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION Questions F1, F2. Number of persons participating and the source of the number of voters.
General Note: Any misspelled responses to F2 were corrected to align with the categorical responses presented in the questionnaire in order to tabulate the number of voters that participated in the election for each source. Question F2: Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “Election night reporting software – total ballots cast.” Another jurisdiction noted this information was drawn from the ERM Summary Report plus ballots returned but not counted. Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that provisional ballot totals (valid and invalid) are also derived from its verification reports generated from its voter registration system upon assigning a disposition to a given provisional. Florida: One jurisdiction noted, “Totals from tabulation.” Another jurisdiction commented that F1c, d, and e include rejected ballots. A third jurisdiction stated it’s “official” number of ballots cast from results certificates is 95,252; voters whose ballots continue to arrive after the election are always given credit for voting to ensure their voter records remain active. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “How voters voted statistics report/Ballot issue report.” Oklahoma: Number of ballots counted was derived from total votes cast for highest office, plus over votes and under votes in that race. Vermont: One jurisdiction noted that its voting tabulator also digitally keeps track of numbers to compare with the checklist from poll workers. A second jurisdiction stated that this designation includes ballots received after election day. Another jurisdiction commented, “Entrance and Exit Checklist verification.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that F2 also refers to the number of voters checked off (same number). A different jurisdiction noted that “voters checked off voter checklist include early voters as well.” Another jurisdiction noted that F2 also refers to the number of ballots counted.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 34

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 31. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS TRANSMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Total Ballots Transmitted

Total Cases 63,840 39

30,144

1

1,920,746

15

34,257

74

9,394,212 58

2,134,847 64

131,416 169

21,103

3

15,953

1

2,807,295 67

1,942,497 159

174,340

4

168,599 44

328,406 110

562,430

92

736,304

99

199,306 105

33,690 120

55,818

64

193,105 500

160,663

24

282,365 351

1,297,672 83

277,294 87

68,692 58

269,713 116

314,536 56

231,377 93

Returned and Submitted for Counting
Total Cases Pct.

Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted to Voters and Disposition

Returned as Undeliverable

Spoiled or Replaced Ballots

Status Unknown (Not Returned)

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

55,671

39 87.2

0 …

0

…

0 …

25,486

1 84.5

616

1 2.0

0

…

4,042

1 13.4

1,542,855

15 80.3 59,945

12 3.1 63,071

15

3.3 254,874

15 13.3

31,148

74 90.9

154

74 0.4

46

73

0.1

2,678

74

7.8

6,634,717

58 70.6 181,886 45 1.9 58,322

27

0.6 2,311,657

52 24.6

1,868,130

64 87.5

57,258

64 2.7 23,466

64

1.1 185,859 64 8.7

120,041 169 91.3

0 …

0

…

0 …

19,492

3 92.4

32

3 0.2

570

3

2.7

847

3 4.0

11,454

1 71.8

326

1 2.0

223

1

1.4

3,950

1 24.8

2,297,627

67 81.8 40,551

65 1.4

37,618

17

1.3 430,786

67 15.3

1,909,845 159 98.3

544 159 0.0

416 159

0.0

0 …

157,236

4 90.2

355

2 0.2

806

2

0.5 15,943

4 9.1

163,115

44 96.7

447 44 0.3

671

44

0.4

4,356 44 2.6

302,359 110 92.1

0 …

0

…

0 …

558,739

92 99.3

115 92 0.0

3,576

92

0.6

0 …

684,690

99 93.0

2,432 99 0.3

4,605

99

0.6 42,166 99 5.7

139,146 104 69.8

1,601 105 0.8

1,170 105

0.6 13,101 105 6.6

33,690 120 100.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

43,686

64 78.3

0 64 0.0

0

… 10,974 64 19.7

186,930 500 96.8

147 500 0.1

409 500

0.2

5,619 500 2.9

140,650

24 87.5

758

24 0.5

0

… 19,255

24 12.0

259,114 351 91.8

220 351 0.1

3 351

0.0 23,028 351 8.2

1,259,902

83 97.1

1,698

83

0.1

21,031

83

1.6 15,041 83 1.2

265,315

87 95.7

198

87

0.1

1,058

87

0.4 10,723 87 3.9

64,657

55 94.1

211

23 0.3

48

19

0.1

1,668

35 2.4

257,329 116 95.4

389 110 0.1

65

69

0.0

2,066 38 0.8

285,388

56 90.7

3,302 56 1.0

6,367

56

2.0 19,479 56 6.2

206,956

93 89.4

0 …

0

…

17,148

93

7.4

Other Disposition (See Comments) Total Cases Pct.
0 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.
8,169 12.8

0 …

0 0.0

1

1 0.0

0 0.0

229

13 0.7

2 0.0

145,168

22

1.5 62,462 0.7

0 …

134 0.0

0 … 11,375 8.7

162

3 0.8

0 0.0

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

713

6 0.0

0 0.0

0 … 31,692 1.6

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

10 0.0

0 … 26,047 7.9

0 …

0 0.0

2,411

99 0.3

0 0.0

0 … 44,288 22.2

0 …

0 0.0

1,158

64

2.1

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

51

5 0.1

2,057 3.0

4

1 0.0

9,860 3.7

0 …

0 0.0

8,347

10 3.6

(1,074) (0.5)

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 35

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 31. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION (CONTINUED)

State
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
17 320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23
1 1 1 1 8,154

Total Ballots Transmitted

Total Cases

91,634

17

69,354 320

336,640

21

83,642

28

340,169

57

229,672 100

99,458

53

1,346,248

88

72,820

77

17,807

36

282,822

67

27,105

39

408,388

46

74,231

66

59,667

95

253,450 233

242,393

29

71,295 238

441,110 134

3,832,560

39

15,168

55

736,123 3,541

67,554

23

116

1

133

1

20,206

1

33,070,385 54 C1a

8,061

Returned and Submitted for Counting
Total Cases Pct.

Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted to Voters and Disposition

Returned as Undeliverable

Spoiled or Replaced Ballots

Status Unknown (Not Returned)

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

77,908

17 85.0

1,177

17 1.3

731

17 0.8

11,818

17 12.9

66,075 320 95.3

102 320 0.1

0 320 0.0

3,177 320 4.6

284,103

21 84.4

0 …

0

…

52,537

21 15.6

71,386

26 85.3

59

13 0.1

32

13 0.0

601

11 0.7

326,189

57 95.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

205,078 100 89.3

542 100 0.2

9,354 100

4.1

14,571 100 6.3

94,024

53 94.5

32 53 0.0

204

53 0.2

5,198

51 5.2

1,259,904

88 93.6

2,305

88 0.2

10,010

88 0.7

73,827

88 5.5

61,429

77 84.4

343 77 0.5

0

77 0.0

11,048

77 15.2

12,908

36 72.5

542 36 3.0

1,365

36

7.7

2,992

36 16.8

248,561

67 87.9

478 67 0.2

56

67 0.0

33,726

67 11.9

24,425

39 90.1

0 …

0 …

2,680

39 9.9

395,422

46 96.8

0 …

0 …

11,024

46 2.7

72,635

66 97.8

18 66 0.0

16

66 0.0

834

66

1.1

55,270

95 92.6

273 95 0.5

226

95 0.4

3,890

95 6.5

237,365 230 93.7

1,239 227 0.5

1,412 220 0.6

13,434 223 5.3

187,674

29 77.4

4,099 29 1.7

0

…

50,620

29 20.9

68,152 231 95.6

33 189 0.0

152 183 0.2

2,795 202 3.9

423,481 134 96.0

0 …

0 …

17,552 134 4.0

3,140,309

39 81.9

57,653

37 1.5

19,313

21 0.5

0 …

13,792

54 90.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

686,860 3,541 93.3

3,093 3,541 0.4

0 … 50,984 3,541 6.9

65,742

23 97.3

5

23 0.0

230

23 0.3

1,577

23 2.3

86

1 74.1

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

30

1 25.9

96

1 72.2

5

1 3.8

0

1 0.0

27

1 20.3

20,012

1 99.0

127

1 0.6

0

1 0.0

67

1 0.3

27,624,254 8,044 83.5 425,310 7,045

54

41

C1b

C1c

1.3 266,642 3,248 33 C1d

0.8 3,760,269 7,049 11.4 45 C1e

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

0

17 0.0

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.
0 0.0

0 320 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0

2 0.0 11,564 13.8

16,534

57 4.9 (2,554) (0.8)

127 100 0.1

0 0.0

0

53 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

202 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0

67 0.0

1 0.0

0

39 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

1,942 0.5

4

66 0.0

724 1.0

8

1 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

43

32 0.1

120 0.2

0 …

77 0.0

0 … 615,285 16.1

1,339

54 8.8

37 0.2

0 … (4,814) (0.7)

0 …

0 0.0

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

5

1 3.8

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

176,304 1,035 0.5 817,606 2.5

17

23

C1f+g+h

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 36

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 41 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 31. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS TRANSMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS
Questions C1. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters and the disposition of the ballots. General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated. This could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C1: Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that two designated bearers did not get picked up. Another jurisdiction commented, “Voter didn’t download ballot.” A third jurisdiction commented, “Was returned late.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that for C1d addresses of two absentee requests were noted in the wrong precinct; as a result, the precinct spoiled their ballots, changed their addresses, and reissued correct ballots. California: One jurisdiction noted that C1g is included in C1b. A second jurisdiction commented that the total of C1b-h exceeds C1a because the reported number of replacement ballots includes ballots that are being counted in other areas, and therefore they are being counted twice. A third jurisdiction stated that it does not track undeliverable ballots in its EMS system. Another jurisdiction included replacement ballots in all categories showing ballots issued, returned, counted, etc. Delaware: One jurisdiction had to reissue ballots for one Senate District twice due to a withdrawal and substitution of a candidate. Florida: One jurisdiction noted that the data for this question was drawn from the VR EAC Report. A second jurisdiction commented that the Absentee Report shows 2,181, but two FWAB absentee ballots were added in the C1a total. Another jurisdiction commented, “C1b does not include 11 ballots that were returned by ineligible voters and 27 ballots returned with no certificate envelope or other voter identifiers. Ballots received after the deadline are ‘invalid’ and, therefore, no official action is required to ‘reject’ them. As of 01/02/13, we received 706 ‘late’ ballots from civilian domestic voters.” Missouri: One jurisdiction had 19 replaced ballots, which are reflected in the count. Another jurisdiction commented that the three spoiled ballots (C1d) are included in the 329 transmitted ballots (C1a) count. A third jurisdiction stated that not all ballots mailed were returned. A fourth jurisdiction noted that for C1c, ballots were still coming in; for C1d, some replaced, and MCVR report included military through emails. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee Statistics Report/Ballot Issue Report/Absentee Register.” A second jurisdiction states that its absentee board included UOCAVA voters. Oregon: Oregon conducts elections by mail. Numbers reported reflect domestic absentee only because under statute, the permanent absentee process is distinctly different from vote by mail elections. Vermont: One jurisdiction stated that C1 includes all absentee ballots which equaled 144 + 1 FWAB, while C1b includes 137 ballots + 1 FWAB; for E1b, this jurisdiction did not keep a copy of the tally for spoiled out of locked bag. Another jurisdiction commented, “5 ballots were returned the day after election. Postal marks indicate multi date transit intra-state. UNACCEPTABLE. See attached scanned copies of the envelopes.” A third jurisdiction noted that for C1c one ballot returned as undeliverable was for a prisoner who transferred to another facility. Another jurisdiction stated that a returned ballot was requested and sent under a maiden name and was returned as addressee “unknown” because current address was registered under married name. West Virginia: No way to track ballots returned as undeliverable, spoiled, or status unknown.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 37

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: SENT TO PERMANENT LIST; SUBMIT TED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey

Total Ballots Transmitted
Total

Permanent List
Transmissions
Total

67

63,840

1

30,144

15 1,920,746

1,803,314

75

34,257

1,169

58 9,394,212

7,875,263

64 2,134,847

1,803,342

169

131,416

3

21,103

4,120

1

15,953

2,699

67 2,807,295

1,209,030

159 1,942,497

83,942

4

174,340

148,602

44

168,599

110

328,406

92

562,430

99

736,304

105

199,306

31,712

120

33,690

64

55,818

33,774

500

193,105

24

160,663

351

282,365

83 1,297,672

87

277,294

82

68,692

1,385

116

269,713

26,589

56

314,536

257,222

93

231,377

17

91,634

0

Ballots Pct. Submitted

Total

…

55,671

…

25,486

93.9 1,542,855

3.4

31,148

83.8 6,634,717

84.5 1,868,130

… 120,041

19.5

19,492

16.9

11,454

43.1 2,297,627

4.3 1,909,845

85.2 157,236

…

163,115

… 302,359

… 558,739

… 684,690

15.9

139,146

…

33,690

60.5

43,686

… 186,930

… 140,650

…

259,114

… 1,259,902

… 265,315

2.0

64,657

9.9 257,329

81.8 285,388

… 206,956

0.0

77,908

Disposition of Domestic Absentee Ballots Submitted for Counting

Counted

Rejected

Other (See Comments)

Total

Cases 0

24,681

1

1,530,465

15

27,833

72

6,554,199

58

1,768,061

64

117,685 169

19,251

3

11,058

1

2,276,767

67

1,909,136 159

156,130

4

162,156

44

298,121 110

506,516

92

676,522

99

182,169 105

31,876 120

41,312

64

184,763 500

139,136

24

256,616 351

1,228,162

83

257,542

87

61,160

56

251,954 116

284,535

56

203,014

93

76,730

17

Pct. …
96.8 99.2 89.4 98.8 94.6 98.0 98.8 96.5 99.1 100.0 99.3 99.4 98.6 90.7 98.8 130.9 94.6 94.6 98.8 98.9 99.0 97.5 97.1 94.6 97.9 99.7 98.1 98.5

Total

Cases 0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070 57

16,407 64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588 67

709 159

1,106

4

954 44

4,238 110

11,983 92

8,168 99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374 64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049 83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942 93

1,160

17

Pct. … 3.2 0.8 3.0 0.9 0.9 2.0 1.2 3.5 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.2 3.6 5.4 5.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.6 2.9 3.4 2.0 0.3 1.9 1.5

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

1

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

66

1

1

1

0

0

18

17

Pct. … … … … 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 0.1 0.0 … … 0.0

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total

Pct.

55,671 100.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

2,366 7.6

21,448 0.3

83,662 4.5

0 0.0

1 0.0

0 0.0

272 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

5 0.0

0 0.0

40,240 7.2

0 0.0

(48,085) (34.6)

0 0.0

0 0.0

11 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

23,691 1.9

0 0.0

1,223 1.9

298 0.1

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 38

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 43 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: SENT TO PERMANENT LIST; SUBMIT TED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey

Total Ballots Transmitted
Total

Permanent List
Transmissions
Total

320

69,354

0

Ballots Pct. Submitted

Total

0.0

66,075

21

336,640

153,851 45.7 284,103

33

83,642

1,655 2.0

71,386

62

340,169

… 326,189

100

229,672

… 205,078

53

99,458

…

94,024

88 1,346,248

… 1,259,904

77

72,820

18,616 25.6

61,429

36

17,807

17,807 100.0

12,908

67

282,822

7,127 2.5 248,561

39

27,105

…

24,425

46

408,388

… 395,422

66

74,231

…

72,635

95

59,667

8,640 14.5

55,270

254

253,450

… 237,365

29

242,393

…

187,674

246

71,295

200 0.3

68,152

134

441,110

… 423,481

39 3,832,560

3,832,560 100.0 3,140,309

55

15,168

125 0.8

13,792

3,541

736,123

57,010 7.7 686,860

23

67,554

…

65,742

1

116

108 93.1

86

1

133

…

96

1

20,206

…

20,012

1

8,154 33,070,385

17,379,862 52.6 27,624,254

54

25

54

C1a

C3 calc

C1b

Disposition of Domestic Absentee Ballots Submitted for Counting

Counted

Rejected

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases Pct. 64,340 320 97.4

Total Cases Pct. 1,735 320 2.6

Total Cases Pct. 0 320 0.0

276,693

21 97.4

6,534

21 2.3

0 …

68,023 22 95.3

971

17 1.4

0

2 0.0

309,655 57 94.9

0 …

0 …

202,841 100 98.9

2,237 100 1.1

0 …

93,665 53 99.6

359 53 0.4

0

53 0.0

1,247,055 88 99.0

12,849

88 1.0

0 …

59,523 77 96.9

1,905

77

3.1

0 …

12,611 36 97.7

297

36 2.3

0 …

246,716 67 99.3

1,845

67 0.7

0 …

24,099 39 98.7

326

39 1.3

0

39 0.0

123,920 46 31.3

650 46 0.2

0 …

50,326 66 69.3

148

66 0.2

2

66 0.0

54,284 95 98.2

614

95

1.1

0 …

225,041 227 94.8

3,647 225 1.5

0 …

185,673 29 98.9

2,001

29

1.1

0 …

63,154 230 92.7

467 181 0.7

1

22 0.0

421,203 134 99.5

2,278 134 0.5

0 …

3,110,331

39 99.0

29,978

39 1.0

0 …

13,766 54 99.8

26 54 0.2

0 …

658,240 3,541 95.8

4,114 3,541 0.6

0 …

65,557 23 99.7

177

23 0.3

0 …

86

1 100.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

82

1 85.4

14

1 14.6

0 …

19,642

1 98.2

370

1 1.8

0 …

26,834,076 7,997 97.1 258,380 7,874 0.9

88 531 0.0

53

51

5

C4a

C4b

C4c+C4d

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total

Pct.

0 0.0

876 0.3

2,392 3.4

16,534 5.1

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

1 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

270,852 68.5

22,159 30.5

372 0.7

8,677 3.7

0 0.0

4,530 6.6

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

24,506 3.6

8 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

531,710 1.9 24
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 39

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 44 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: PERMANENT LIST; SUBMITTED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION
Questions C1, C3, C4. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters due to the existence of a permanent list; and ballots submitted for counting and the disposition of the ballots.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated. This could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C3:
Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that the C3 total is the number of voters on the Permanent Early Voting List as of the close of requesting to have an early ballot mailed (11 days prior to election). California: One jurisdiction commented, “perm[anent]. vote by mail voter.” Florida: One jurisdiction noted that C3 represents absentee requests on file at the time of its initial mailing of ballots. Missouri: One jurisdiction commented that all PD list voters are entered with some entries as non-PD list, disabled voters. A second jurisdiction notes that this figure is an estimate of the 8,212 permanently disabled applications sent. New Mexico: One jurisdiction noted that three all-mail election precincts are not considered permanent absentee/168 absentee applications were mailed to these voters. Nevada: Although NV does not have a permanent list, NV NRS 293.313 allows a voter who is (a) at least 65 years of age or (b) has a physical disability or condition which substantially impairs his or her ability to go to the polling place, to request an absentee ballot for all elections held during the year he or she requests an absent ballot. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “Applications received.” Wisconsin: Counts of ballots to voters on permanent absentee voter list can only be provided for jurisdictions who track all absentee ballots in the Statewide Voter Registration System. This accounts for most of the large jurisdictions in Wisconsin.
Question C4: Arizona: One jurisdiction noted that C4a does not include the 5,027 UOCAVA ballots that were counted (tabulated), which would bring the grand total of early ballots counted (tabulated) in Maricopa County to 960,391. California: One jurisdiction stated the vote-by-mail count includes all mail precincts. Florida: On jurisdiction commented, “The 503 rejected ballots in C4b includes those ballots received after the deadline. These ballots are not submitted for counting, but you request this information in C5.” Two jurisdictions indicated that this data is drawn from the VR EAC Report. Another jurisdiction noted six instances of no signature and 1 instance of a ballot signed wrong. A different jurisdiction stated, “Signature did not match.” Maine: One jurisdiction had to reject and then reissue ballots due to the death of a candidate. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated ballots were received after the deadline. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee Statistics Report/Ballot Issue Report/Absentee Register.” New York: The New York County data includes all New York City counties (New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond). Oregon: Numbers are for domestic absentee electors. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “Rejected because no voter affidavit returned with ballot.” Another jurisdiction noted the 40 spoiled ballots are not included as they were counted as spoiled. One jurisdiction does not record “counted” ballots versus “spoiled” ballots by voter. A fourth jurisdiction indicated for C4b one left certificate envelope blank, and one registered to vote in another town. Another jurisdiction had 28 ballots returned that were defective and not counted, but it was not tracked at the time if they were military or overseas. These ballots are now sealed in the storage bags. One jurisdiction commented C4 seems to be asking to include Vermont’s category of spoiled ballots; those that were returned by mail and did not have the appropriate envelope or signature were placed in a spoiled ballot envelope and never “submitted” for counting. Therefore, for this county, C5 does not count for its election results. Another jurisdiction noted that, for C4b, two absentee voters did not sign the “certificate envelope.” West Virginia: One county did not record absentee ballot information in the Statewide Voter Registration System after ballots were sent.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33A. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART A

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total

Cases 0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954

44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049 83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942 93

1,160

17

Not Received on Time or Missed Deadline

Total

Cases 0

2

1

4,107

9

315

69

24,609

53

1,462

64

0

225

3

91

1

8,597

51

0

618

1

586

44

0

1,049

91

1,353

99

1,648 105

238 120

975

64

284 500

903

24

2,180 351

5,205 83

1,837 87

52

16

1,846 114

380 56

689 93

611

17

Pct. … 0.2
33.1 33.2 41.7 8.9
… 93.8 23.0 41.8
… 55.9 61.4
… 8.8 16.6 32.6 13.1 41.1 13.2 59.6 87.3 64.7 23.6 2.4 36.4 44.5 17.5 52.7

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part A

No Voter Signature

No Witness Signature Non-matching Signature

Total

Cases 0

206

1

5,256

13

104 68

10,000 54

2,735 64

0

7

3

305

1

5,256 66

5 159

138

3

109 44

0

97 29

1,652 99

918 105

823 120

193 64

876 500

299

24

63 351

900 83

374

87

123

19

637 116

257

56

622 93

158

17

Pct. …
25.6 42.4 11.0 16.9 16.7
… 2.9 77.0 25.5 0.7 12.5 11.4 … 0.8 20.2 18.1 45.4 8.1 40.6 19.7 2.5 11.2 4.8 5.6 12.5 30.1 15.8 13.6

Total

Cases 0

244

1

0

3

34

68

3

30

0

0

0

3

0

1

57

31

71 159

0

0 44

0

0

27

0

0

8 120

980

64

245 500

0

0

0

1,803

87

159

19

0

0

56

0

0

17

Pct. …
30.3 0.0 3.6 0.0 … … 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … … 0.4 41.3 11.4 … … … 23.2 7.2 … 0.0 … 0.0

Total

Cases 0

0

1

2,051

11

74

69

15,206

52

6,206

64

0

1

3

0

1

5,398

67

356 159

220

2

53

44

0

51

29

0

429 105

47 120

0

25 500

0

0

208

83

126

87

5

10

0

160

56

0

195

17

Pct. … 0.0
16.6 7.8
25.7 37.8
… 0.4 0.0 26.2 50.2 19.9 5.6 … 0.4 … 8.5 2.6 … 1.2 … … 2.6 1.6 0.2 … 18.8 … 16.8

No Election Official’sSignature

Total

Cases 0

0

1

0

3

0

68

0

29

0

0

0

3

0

1

0

28

0

0

0

44

0

59

26

0

0

0

37

64

0

0

0

0

0

5

9

0

0 56

4 93

0

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … 0.0 … 0.5 … … … 1.6 … … … … … 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.0

Not Categorized
Balance (See notes) Total Pct.
0 … 353 43.9 976 7.9 422 44.5 9,252 15.7 6,004 36.6 2,356 100.0
7 2.9 0 0.0 1,280 6.2 277 39.1 130 11.8 206 21.6 4,238 100.0 10,727 89.5 5,163 63.2 2,067 40.8 698 38.5 189 8.0 726 33.7 312 20.6 255 10.2 1,736 21.6 3,633 46.7 1,864 84.4 2,593 51.1 56 6.6 2,627 66.6 196 16.9

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 41

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33A. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART A (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases 1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359 53

12,849

88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650 46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26 54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Not Received on Time or Missed Deadline

Total Cases 785 320

1,255

21

477

11

0

772 100

135 53

6,097

88

615

77

152

36

1,373

67

0

650 46

74

66

407

95

3,081 226

0

165 137

437 134

5,859

39

13 54

496 3,541

84

11

0

1

8

1

125

1

Pct. 45.2 19.2 49.1 … 34.5 37.6 47.5 32.3 51.2 74.4 … 100.0 50.0 66.3 84.5 … 35.3 19.2 19.5 50.0 12.1 47.5 … 57.1 33.8

82,922 7,241 32.1 46
C5a

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part A

No Voter Signature

No Witness Signature Non-matching Signature

Total Cases 163 320

1,907

21

95

11

0

214 100

52

53

888

88

125

77

33

36

52

67

128

39

0

38

66

93

95

1,671 224

0

80 132

0

6,972

39

1

54

0

42

7

0

1

4

1

77

1

Pct. 9.4 29.2 9.8 … 9.6 14.5 6.9 6.6 11.1 2.8 39.3 … 25.7 15.1 45.8 … 17.1 … 23.3 3.8 … 23.7 … 28.6 20.8

Total Cases 0 320

0

0

6

0

546 100

0

53

0

394

77

0

0

130

39

0

0

66

4

95

58 222

0

0 113

0

145

39

0

54

0

0

0

1

0

1

36

1

Pct. 0.0 … 0.0 … 24.4 0.0 … 20.7 … … 39.9 … 0.0 0.7 1.6 … 0.0 … 0.5 0.0 … … … 0.0 9.7

Total Cases 321 320

855

21

0

6

0

45 100

129

53

334

88

0

77

81

36

0

60

39

0

21

66

8

95

639 223

0

1 114

0

12,067

39

0 54

0

0

0

1

0

1

20

1

Pct. 18.5 13.1 0.0 … 2.0 35.9 2.6 0.0 27.3 … 18.4 … 14.2 1.3 17.5 … 0.2 … 40.3 0.0 … … … 0.0 5.4

44,748 3,671 17.3 45
C5b

4,917 2,417 1.9 45,392 2,814 17.6

17

31

C5c

C5d

No Election Official’sSignature

Total Cases 0 320

0

0

6

0

0 100

0

0

0 77

0

0

0

39

0

0 66

0

0 223

0

0 114

0

0

39

0 54

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0

Not Categorized
Balance (See notes) Total Pct
466 26.9 2,517 38.5
399 41.1 0 …
660 29.5 43 12.0 5,530 43.0 771 40.5 31 10.4 420 22.8 8 2.5 0 0.0 15 10.1 102 16.6 (1,802) (49.4) 2,001 100.0 221 47.3 1,841 80.8 4,935 16.5 12 46.2 3,618 87.9 51 28.8 0 … 2 14.3 112 30.3

105 1,483 4
C5e

0.0 80,296 31.1 48
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 42

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 47 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33B. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954

44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049

83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942

93

1,160

17

Ballot Returned in Unofficial Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

72

4 0.6

1 68 0.1

32 30 0.1

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

13 32 0.1

0 …

13

1 1.2

9 44 0.9

0 …

10 26 0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

8

10 0.4

0 …

0 56 0.0

0 …

2

17 0.2

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

Ballot Missing from Envelope

Unsealed Envelope

No Resident Address on Envelope

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0

…

0 …

0 …

17

1

2.1

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

173

11

1.4

0

3 0.0

122

4 1.0

8

69

0.8

0

43 0.0

3

46 0.3

579

38

1.0

3

28 0.0

12

32 0.0

79 64 0.5

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

2

3 0.8

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

9 34 0.0

4

29 0.0

0

28 0.0

0

…

0 …

229 159 32.3

16

2

1.4

0 …

0 …

2 44 0.2

0

44 0.0

0 44 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

6

28

0.1

1

25 0.0

0

25 0.0

292 99 3.6

798

99 9.8

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

50 120 2.8

209 120 11.5

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

8 351 0.3

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

3

9

0.1

1

10 0.0

0

9 0.0

1

1 0.0

0 …

67 113 1.3

0

56

0.0

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

10

17

0.9

0

17 0.0

0

17 0.0

Multiple Ballots Returned in Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See notes)
Total Pct

0

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

788 97.9

0

4 0.0 12,023 97.0

3

52

0.3

934 98.4

79

32

0.1 58,365 98.8

11

64

0.1 16,317 99.5

0

… 2,356 100.0

0

3 0.0

238 99.2

0

1 0.0

396 100.0

16

32

0.1 20,546 99.8

0

…

480 67.7

4

2 0.4 1,073 97.0

0

44

0.0

943 98.8

0

… 4,238 100.0

0

27

0.0 11,966 99.9

12

99

0.1

7,066 86.5

0

… 5,062 100.0

0 120 0.0 1,555 85.7

0

…

2,374 100.0

0

…

2,156 100.0

0

…

1,514 100.0

0

… 2,490 99.7

0

… 8,049 100.0

0

…

7,773 100.0

11

9 0.5 2,185 99.0

0

1 0.0 5,008 98.7

0

56

0.0

853 100.0

0

…

3,942 100.0

3

17

0.3

1,145 98.7

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 43

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33B. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359 53

12,849 88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650 46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26 54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Ballot Returned in Unofficial Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

24 320 1.4

0

…

5

6 0.5

0

…

0 100 0.0

0

…

1,477 88 11.5

133

77

7.0

0

…

0

…

0

39

0.0

0

…

0

66

0.0

33

95

5.4

3 224 0.1

0

…

91 126 19.5

0

…

23

39

0.1

0 54 0.0

0

…

0

…

0

1

…

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

1,949 1,530 0.8 17 C5f

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

Ballot Missing from Envelope

Unsealed Envelope

No Resident Address on Envelope

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

27 320 1.6

0 320 0.0

0

320 0.0

66

21

1.0

8

21

0.1

0 …

0

7 0.0

0

6 0.0

0

6 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0 100 0.0

0 100 0.0

0

100 0.0

0 53 0.0

0 …

0

53 0.0

39 88 0.3

0

88 0.0

84

88 0.7

9

77

0.5

0

77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

39

0.0

0

39 0.0

0

39 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

66

0.0

0

66 0.0

0

66 0.0

34

95

5.5

0

92 0.0

0

95 0.0

15 224 0.4

0 224 0.0

73

223 2.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

37 122 7.9

10 116 2.1

2

116 0.4

0

…

0 …

0 …

374

39

1.2

0

39 0.0

0

39 0.0

0 54 0.0

0

54 0.0

0

54 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

1

1 0.6

0 …

0

1

…

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

Multiple Ballots Returned in Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See notes)
Total Pct

0 320 0.0 1,684 97.1

0

…

6,460 98.9

0

7 0.0

966 99.5

0

…

0 …

0 100 0.0 2,237 100.0

0

53

0.0

359 100.0

10

88

0.1 11,239 87.5

0

77

0.0

1,763 92.5

0

…

297 100.0

0

…

1,845 100.0

0

39

0.0

326 100.0

0

…

650 100.0

0

66

0.0

148 100.0

0

95

0.0

547 89.1

51 225 1.4 3,505 96.1

0

…

2,001 100.0

0 115 0.0

327 70.0

0

…

2,278 100.0

4

39

0.0 29,577 98.7

0

54

0.0

26 100.0

0

…

4,114 100.0

2

2

1.1

174 98.3

0

1

…

0 …

0

1 0.0

14 100.0

85

1 23.0

285 77.0

1,848 1,905 0.7 23
C5g

1,035 1,725 0.4 9
C5h

600 2,168 0.2 9
C5i

291 1,847 13 C5j

0.1 252,657 97.8 51
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 44

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 49 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33C. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART C

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954 44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049

83

7,773

87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853

56

3,942

93

1,160

17

Voter Deceased

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

224

6 1.8

22

68 2.3

847

38 1.4

66

64 0.4

0 …

2

3 0.8

0

1 0.0

11

31

0.1

0 …

0 …

3 44 0.3

0 …

19

27 0.2

274

99 3.4

46 105 0.9

34 120 1.9

0 …

0 …

17

24

1.1

50 351 2.0

682

83 8.5

45

87 0.6

7

11 0.3

111 115 2.2

0

56 0.0

37

93 0.9

19

17 1.6

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part C

Already Voted in Person

First-time Voter without No Ballot Application on

Proper Identification

Record

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 0.0

5

1 0.6

17

5 0.1

0

3 0.0

28

3 0.2

14

69 1.5

9

68 0.9

4

69 0.4

18

29 0.0

1,845

32 3.1

12

28 0.0

103

64 0.6

5,288

64 32.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

24

31

0.1

130

42 0.6

39

34 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

158 44 16.6

0

44 0.0

0

44 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

12

27

0.1

0

24 0.0

3

26 0.0

2,129

99 26.1

0 …

84

99 1.0

33 105 0.7

0 …

0 …

4 120 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

115 500 5.3

0 …

0 …

0 …

88

24 5.8

3

24 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

717

83 8.9

0 …

0 …

24

87 0.3

0 …

0 …

14

12 0.6

0

9 0.0

37

13 1.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

17 0.0

24

17

2.1

0

17 0.0

Other (See Comments) Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0 …

331

1 41.1

469 58.3

340

6 2.7 11,781 95.1

238

22 25.1

662 69.8

4,902

36 8.3 51,446 87.1

457

64 2.8 10,493 64.0

0 … 2,356 100.0

3

3 1.3

235 97.9

0

1 0.0

396 100.0

994

38 4.8 19,390 94.2

48 159 6.8

661 93.2

78

2

7.1

1,028 92.9

34

44 3.6

759 79.6

0 … 4,238 100.0

95

26 0.8 11,854 98.9

1,574

99 19.3

4,107 50.3

1,988 105 39.3 2,995 59.2

401

60 22.1

1,375 75.8

189

64 8.0

2,185 92.0

611 500 28.3

1,430 66.3

204

24 13.5

1,202 79.4

0 … 2,448 98.0

337

83 4.2

6,313 78.4

3,564

87 45.9

4,140 53.3

237

10 10.7

1,913 86.6

2,385

85 47.0

2,580 50.8

56

56 6.6

797 93.4

2,588

93 65.7

1,317 33.4

138

17 11.9

979 84.4

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 45

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33C. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART C (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359

53

12,849

88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650

46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26

54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Voter Deceased

Total Cases

25 320

0

0

7

0

0 100

0

118 88

0 77

0

0

0 39

0

12 66

4

1

13 224

0

0 115

0

19

39

0

54

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. 1.4 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.9 0.0 … … 0.0 … 8.1 0.7 0.4 … 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part C

Already Voted in Person

First-time Voter without Proper Identification

No Ballot Application on Record

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

115 320 6.6

1 320 0.1

26

320

1.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

2

8 0.2

8

7 0.8

0

4 0.0

638

57

…

0 …

0 …

5 100 0.2

200 100 8.9

3

100 0.1

19

53 5.3

0 …

0 …

0 88 0.0

50

88 0.4

0 …

0 77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

10

36 3.4

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 39 0.0

8

39 2.5

0

39 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 66 0.0

0

66 0.0

0

66 0.0

2

1 0.3

0 …

0

95 0.0

354 224 9.7

14 224 0.4

91

223 2.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 115 0.0

0 115 0.0

0

115 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

170

39 0.6

50

39 0.2

0

39 0.0

0

54 0.0

2 54 7.7

1

54 3.8

0 …

0 …

0 …

3

2 1.7

2

1 1.1

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

27

1 7.3

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

248 320

2,516

21

0

2

0

415 100

24

53

3,697 87

629 77

21 36

420 67

0 39

0

0 66

16

5

0

0

73

23

1,841 134

4,304

21

9

5

3,618 3,541

40

8

0

1

2

1

0

Pct. 14.3 38.5 0.0 … 18.6 6.7 28.8 33.0 7.1 22.8 0.0 … 0.0 2.6 … … 15.6 80.8 14.4 34.6 87.9 22.6 … 14.3 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
1,320 76.1 4,018 61.5
961 99.0 (638) … 1,614 72.2
316 88.0 8,984 69.9 1,276 67.0
266 89.6 1,425 77.2
318 97.5 650 100.0 136 91.9 592 96.4 3,175 87.1 2,001 100.0 394 84.4 437 19.2 25,435 84.8
14 53.8 496 12.1 132 74.6
0 … 12 85.7 343 92.7

2,707 2,577 1.0 25 C5k

4,717 2,598 1.8 24 C5l

7,719 1,521 3.0 15
C5m

346 1,589 14
C5n

0.1 39,665 6,292 15.4 203,226 78.7

40

52

C5o:v

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 46

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 51 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 33. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PARTS A, B AND C
Questions C4, C5. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected and the reason for rejection. [This table is broken into parts due to the large number of reasons tabulated.]
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C5:
Arizona: One jurisdiction stated: “For C5c, C5e, C5h, C5i, C5l, C5m & C5n, these reject reasons do not apply in Maricopa County, Arizona for an Early Ballot (EB) or cannot occur in Maricopa County due to our early ballot issuing system (e.g. C5l is n/a because EV system will not allow a voter who already voted in-person to be issued another ballot). These categories are therefore marked as “N/A” above. For C5k, the total number provided here reflects the quantity of EB’s initially sent but later canceled due to all cancelation reasons (e.g. death, moved out-ofcounty, felon, etc.) and not just the noted “Voter deceased”. For the remaining line noted only as “Data not available”, this information is not accumulated since it is data that cannot be associated with an actual valid voter (e.g. voter not registered to vote) or is not considered a valid Early Ballot upon receipt so it is therefore not categorized as a rejected early ballot and therefore is not noted as a true reject within the canvass of the election (e.g. ballot returned in unofficial envelope, multiple ballots so one is invalidated but voter still would have one ballot cast, etc.).” California: One jurisdiction indicated that C5o includes missing address and address mis-compares (i.e., voter moved and did not re-register). Colorado: Counts in C5l represent all ballots that were rejected because the voter had already voted, regardless of vote method. Florida: One jurisdiction reported no rejections. Another jurisdiction commented that, in regards to C5a, ballots received after the deadline are “invalid” and, therefore, no official action is required to “reject” them. As of 01/02/13, this jurisdiction had received 706 “late” ballots from civilian domestic voters. Indiana: Clay County does manually track the number of returned absentee ballots that are rejected, and stores them in specifically marked envelopes by precinct. However, it does not manually track the reason for why each rejected absentee ballot was rejected. Clinton County does not compile the requested information. Elkhart County did have some absentee ballots rejected due to voter being deceased, some rejected due to lack of signature or signature not matching SVRS records but did not manually track specific numbers. There were few such instances. In addition, three jurisdictions also generally indicated that they do not track this information, and two jurisdictions noted they do not track this information outside of the SVRS. Another jurisdiction stated that the ballots indicated as rejected were sent to the polls, however, there is no way to ensure the poll workers indeed rejected the ballots, only that they fit the criteria indicated and should have been. One jurisdiction commented, “We are a small county and do not have many issues with rejected ballots. The main reason we do not count absentee ballots is because the voter decides not to vote and never returns the ballot.” Another jurisdiction reported that it had 19 absentee ballots not returned by voters. One jurisdiction stated that it had a Traveling Board team forget to initial the ballot cards. Michigan: Initial decisions on rejected absentee ballots are made in the clerk’s office before the ballots are submitted to the appropriate precinct board for counting. Minnesota: For all jurisdictions, C5d: Only if the number provided by the voter did not match, then voter signature did not match. C5m: Firsttime voters who must show ID must follow absentee election-day registration process. C5: Rejected ballots were replaced/resent if received in time. The number of voters for whom all ballot submissions were rejected for reason other than late is 10. Missouri: One jurisdiction stated, “Ballots received after deadline.” A second jurisdiction commented, “Few ballots still coming in too late.” A third county noted that some of the ballots were received after the deadline, so that is why its numbers are off. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Jersey: Three jurisdictions commented, “Same Ballot has been rejected for multiple reasons.” Ohio: One jurisdiction stated that C5c, C5e, and C5n are not valid reasons for rejection in Ohio. Another jurisdiction commented that the Ohio Board of elections cannot issue an absentee ballot without first receiving a ballot application. South Carolina: Counted = returned before deadline. Rejected = returned after deadline. No data on ABS ballots not accepted for other reasons such as “voter not qualified” or “oath not signed”. Vermont: Three jurisdictions commented that data on defective ballots is sealed in a ballot bag with the defective ballot envelope and tally sheet, and thus the defective ballot reasons are unknown. Of this group, one jurisdiction reported that it had an additional six ballots returned late. Another jurisdiction reported that this number is for the 2012 general election only. One jurisdiction stated, “C5 seems to include categories of Vermont’s spoiled ballots which were never put in the “to count” category though we had one without any signature, and two that were not in an appropriate envelope (not in one at all).”
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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State

Election Juris.
in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Total Ballots Submitted

Total Cases

6,728

52

18,255

1

183,259

15

2,592

73

1,065,156

56

62,847

64

963

169

453

3

38,636

1

42,745

67

0

711

4

0

43,772

110

4,801

66

4,996

99

38,865

105

287

120

6,862

64

315

499

79,876

24

12,920

351

2,675

83

0

22,478

48

6,393

116

5,562

56

15,130

93

8,329

17

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Counted Full Ballot

Counted Part Ballot

Rejected Ballot

Total Cases Pct.

2,319

50 34.5

4,530

1 24.8

150,237

15 82.0

890

73 34.3

706,381

50 66.3

45,435

64 72.3

0 …

35

3 7.7

32,233

1 83.4

24,633

67 57.6

0 …

102

3 14.3

0 …

13,486 110 30.8

804

75 16.7

4,131

99 82.7

25,192 105 64.8

50 120 17.4

2,609

64 38.0

315 499 100.0

54,328

24 68.0

3,288 351 25.4

1,190

83 44.5

0 …

13,483

41 60.0

1,882 113 29.4

5,294

56 95.2

11,871

92 78.5

3,468

17 41.6

Total Cases

0

13,480

1

0

3

5

73

119,322

41

7,542 64

0

0

3

3,158

1

0

0

0

2

0

0

0 92

0

0

0 120

0

0

14,419

24

0

0

0

1,291

14

0

0

0

0

Pct. …
73.8 0.0 0.2 11.2 12.0 … 0.0 8.2 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 18.1 … … … 5.7 … … … …

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870 64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253 64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485 83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268 56

3,258 93

4,861

17

Pct. 65.5 1.3 18.0 65.5 16.7 15.7 87.5 92.3 8.4 42.4 … 85.7 … 69.2 83.3 17.3 34.7 82.6 62.0 … 13.9 74.5 55.5 … 25.5 70.6 4.8 21.5 58.4

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

54,274

10

5.1

7,426

0.7

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

120 12.5

0 …

0

0.0

0

1 0.0

0

0.0

1

6 0.0

5

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

186

0.5

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

11

0.1

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

113

1 0.5 1,869

8.3

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

1

0.0

0

17 0.0

0

0.0

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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Total Ballots Submitted

Total Cases

0

320

97,481

21

6,630

26

451,868

61

51,192

100

0

208,087

88

5,313

77

1,771

36

49,000

67

2,357

39

5,473

23

441

66

7,089

95

50,787

254

53,483

29

19

227

12,862

134

6,832

39

3,152

40

135 3,541

33

10

0

1

144

1

12,715

1

2,702,470 48 E1a

7,652

Counted Full Ballot

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Counted Part Ballot

Rejected Ballot

Total Cases

0 320

77,134

21

1,100

18

322,537

61

18,041 100

0

171,626

88

1,724

77

57

36

17,221

67

751

39

3,365

23

96

66

1,623

95

9,046 254

43,283

29

13 103

0

2,716

37

2,031 40

44 3,541

13

6

0

1

40

1

9,647

1

Pct. …
79.1 16.6 71.4 35.2
… 82.5 32.4 3.2 35.1 31.9 61.5 21.8 22.9 17.8 80.9 68.4
… 39.8 64.4 32.6 39.4
… 27.8 75.9

Total Cases

0 320

0

206

14

0

5,321 100

0

2,139

88

0

77

1,639

36

11,521

67

331

39

0

2

66

0

95

0

0

0 101

0

195

36

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … … 3.1 …
10.4 … 1.0 0.0
92.5 23.5 14.0
… 0.5 0.0 … … 0.0 … 2.9 … … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121

40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

Pct. …
13.4 31.8 28.6 54.4
… 16.5 67.6 4.2 41.3 54.1 38.5 77.8 77.1 82.2 19.1 26.3 62.9 44.6 35.6 57.0 60.6
… 72.2 24.1

1,790,294 7,200 66.2 180,571 1,480 6.7 651,372 7,012 24.1

46

15

47

E1b

E1c

E1d

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct

0 320 …

0

…

7,266

21

7.5

0

0.0

1,150

4 17.3 2,064 31.1

0 …

104

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0

39 0.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0

66 0.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

(11) (0.0)

0 …

2

0.0

1

30 5.3

0

0.0

4,766 134 37.1

0

0.0

0 …

871 12.7

0 …

0

0.0

32 3,541 23.7

(18) (13.3)

0 …

0

0.0

0

1 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

67,603 4,191 2.5 12,630

0.5

8

13

E1e+f

calc

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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS
Questions E1, E2. Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots, disposition of the ballots, and the reason for rejected ballots.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting. Also, the term provisional is used here generically though the meaning, availability, and use will vary by State.
Question E1: Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that one voter was removed by error for felony but provided information which the election commissioners accepted; one voter was registered under her maiden name. Another jurisdiction noted that the majority of rejected ballots were from those voters who said they registered at DMV or DHS, and the county had received no information of their registration. Upon verification with DMV, only 2 of the voters had actually registered. A third jurisdiction commented, “Per county election commissioner.” California: One jurisdiction stated that it does not differentiate between fully counted and partially counted ballots when the data is input into the computer. A second jurisdiction commented, “No provisional ballots – all mail ballot election.” Idaho: Idaho is not required to use provisional ballots due to Election Day Registration. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that out of the 16 rejected provisional ballots, everyone but two received voter history (see E2 and F1h). Indiana: One jurisdiction stated, “Do not like provisional ballots.” Three jurisdictions explicitly noted that no provisional ballots were cast during the 2012 general election. One jurisdiction reported “the already voted was an individual who voted by traveling board first, and then someone took her to vote on Election Day (a family member). She had in fact already voted though and most likely forgot because of her age.” Another jurisdiction stated that most forms were incomplete even if the person was able to vote, and that forms are too complicated and poll workers don’t do them. One jurisdiction commented, “Less categories, we don’t know if they are registered out of state, even if they give Illinois ID.” Another jurisdiction commented, “Since we are the home to a large university, we had many students who were not registered but tried to vote. Instead of turning them away, we instruct our workers to provide them with a provisional ballot which is then reviewed by the election board.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. North Carolina: Two jurisdictions reported that the number of provisional ballots submitted do exceed the number of civilian absentee ballots transmitted. North Dakota: North Dakota does not have provisional balloting. New Hampshire: One jurisdiction commented, “Moderator challenged and rejected absentee ballots.” New Mexico: Four jurisdictions reported they issued no provisional ballots. One jurisdiction indicated that all provisional ballots were rejected. Another jurisdiction commented, “Handwritten provisional Excel spreadsheet.” Ohio: One jurisdiction noted that Ohio permits a registered voter who moves anywhere in the state who fails to timely update his or her address to vote a ballot provisionally in the voter’s new precinct. Pennsylvania: Philadelphia County experienced a change in leadership in the twelve months leading up to the election. In addition, key staff members also retired during that timeframe. As a result, a sufficient knowledge transfer was not conducted thus leading to mistakes in processing SURE jobs, poll book production, and general administration issues. These factors lead to omissions from regular and supplemental poll books which contributed to the high number (26,983) of provisional ballots that were cast. After a thorough analysis, the county concluded that only 7,077 provisional ballots should have been issued. Virginia: VA does not collect stats on counted full vs. counted partial. General situation is full ballot 100% of the time. Vermont: Three jurisdictions indicated they did not have any provisional ballots. Another jurisdiction commented that it does not usually need to offer provisional ballots as they have several State of Vermont affidavits; voters may use these to be reactivated or added on election day. West Virginia: Fifteen jurisdictions commented, “County did not enter provisional ballot information into the Statewide Voter Registration System.”
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Question E2:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction stated, “No record of the voter having registered; the most common complaint from the voter is that he/ she registered to vote through “motor voter,” registered at D.F.A but those records were never received by the county clerk.” Another jurisdiction indicated that the voters counted in E2j said they registered at DMV or DHS; no records found of their registration. A third jurisdiction commented that most were from DMV.
Arizona: One jurisdiction reported that for E2f the “ballot missing from envelope” total does not reflect 23 rejected ballots since these ballots were presumptively already counted at the polling location (i.e., fed through the optical scan reader as a regular ballot), so they cannot be considered a rejected provisional. Another jurisdiction stated, “The ‘Ballot missing from envelope’ total was (218) but this total is not included in the grand total of rejected ballots and not reported on our canvass since these ballots were presumptively already counted at the polling location (i.e., fed through the optical scan reader as a regular ballot), so they cannot be considered a provisional that would have been counted at central tabulation. For E2g (No signature), this total is not tracked separately and is instead included in the totals noted in E2e (Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible) and is categorized as ‘incomplete.’ For E2j (Not Eligible to Vote in this Election), this total includes voters who are registered (so therefore not proper to be part of E2a ‘Not Registered’) but registered AFTER the 29 day registration cutoff period prescribed for in Arizona State statute. As such, these voters were registered, but not eligible to participate or vote in this election.” A third jurisdiction noted that E2j refers to voters who registered after the statutory cutoff date; they are registered but not eligible to vote in the election.
California: One jurisdiction indicated that E2j refers to voters not registered in county. A second jurisdiction noted that the E2a total includes voters registered in within the State but not within Humboldt County. A third jurisdiction indicated that they cannot tell if a voter is registered in another county in the State or any other State; therefore, E2a represents voters not registered in the county itself. Another jurisdiction reported that E3g and E3h are combined. A fifth jurisdiction noted that for E2a it does not check registration outside of the city, and for E2b these voters indicated an address within California but not in the county itself. One jurisdiction indicated it has an all-mail election and does not have provisional ballots.
Idaho: Idaho is not required to use provisional ballots due to Election Day Registration.
Florida: One jurisdiction indicated that out of the 16 rejected provisional ballots, all but two received voter history (see E2 and F1h). A second jurisdiction reported that E2a represents a combination of “registered too late” and ineligible (not registered). Another jurisdiction commented, “Data: VR Report shows Statutory Rejection – Reasons do not match EAC choices. Here is the breakdown by statutory reason: Unable to establish eligibility: 1865, Signature of voter did not match: 38, Already voted Data: VR Report shows Statutory Rejection – Reasons do not match EAC choices. Here is the breakdown by statutory reason: Unable to establish eligibility: 1865, Signature of voter did not match: 38, Already voted early/absentee: 72, Wrong precinct: 368, Incorrect party for ballot: 0, Voter did not provide picture/signature ID: 4, Other: 1.” One jurisdiction stated, “They were all convicted felons.”
Indiana: One jurisdiction indicated, “Poll Worker Error: failed to initial ballot cards.” A second jurisdiction stated that ballots had a cancelled/rejected status because of voter registration acknowledgement cards being returned. A third jurisdiction reported, “No Challenge Form. Military Submitted FWAB, but according to the Indiana Election Division they must submit an application first. Absentee envelope not signed. Initials missing from ballot.” Another jurisdiction commented that it did not have any uncounted provisional ballots. A fifth jurisdiction stated that “Did not have Indiana ID and would not surrender Texas driver’s license; they registered at a WorkOne agency.” Another jurisdiction indicated that ballots were not activated by a poll worker. One jurisdiction stated that three were rejected because the voters moved outside of the State of Indiana and were also proven to be registered in the State they now live in; one was rejected because the voter was deceased; 30 were FWAB that were not eligible to be counted because the voter had not submitted an absentee ballot application. Another jurisdiction indicated that a voter had voted at polls and did not think this vote counted, so she did provisional and check totals, and she had actually voted. One jurisdiction indicated that reasons included late registration, not enough information, no reason given, and more than one same name. One jurisdiction stated that other includes those reasons in fields (E2a, E2b, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E2k, and E2m) that it was unable to capture as they pertain to the survey. Another jurisdiction commented that the provisional ballot information is filed away in the basement with its election materials; time constraints hindered workers’ ability to scour through the sealed envelopes to find the requested information. Three jurisdictions indicated “expired driver licenses,” “they came right after the polls closed,” and “registration cancelled or rejected, no initials on ballot,” respectively.
Mississippi: One jurisdiction reported, “We had 579 provisional ballots – election already sealed.”
North Carolina: All counties: For E2a, a provisional would not count if the voter is not registered in his or her county of residence.
North Dakota: North Dakota does not have provisional balloting.
Pennsylvania: Twenty-eight counties commented, “Pennsylvania counties have the ability to select more than one rejection reason which was done in this case. As a result, the E2a though E2p can and will be greater than E1d.”
Texas: The “in the state” language makes the question Not Applicable for Texas counties. Provisional voting is at the county level would only check to see if the individual voter is eligible to vote within that county.
Vermont: Three jurisdictions explicitly indicated no provisional ballots.
Washington: Ballots for voters who voted in the wrong jurisdiction were sent to the appropriate county for counting.
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TABLE 35A. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870

64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253

64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Voter not Registered in State
Total Cases Pct.

0

…

67

1 27.3

12,481

15 37.8

1,039

69 61.2

113,671

43 63.9

5,001

64 50.7

0

…

361

3 86.4

0

1 0.0

10,305

63 56.9

0

…

380

4 62.4

0

…

12,833

62 42.4

232

46

5.8

0

99

0.0

3,768 105 27.9

80 120 33.8

1,912

64 45.0

0

…

9,277

24 83.4

0

…

90

83

6.1

0

…

2,136

22 37.3

76

1 1.7

8

4 3.0

0

…

4,176

17 85.9

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Voter Registered but in Wrong Juristiction

Voter Registered but in

Failure to Provide

Wrong Precinct

Sufficient Identification

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

6

1 2.4

159

9 0.5 10,979

13 33.2 1,330

13 4.0

106

71 6.2

89

71 5.2

1

73

0.1

3,509

28

2.0

85

20

0.0 4,660

27

2.6

2,562

64 26.0

0

…

280

64

2.8

0

…

0

…

0

…

17

3 4.1

37

3 8.9

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0 1,999

1 61.6

943

1 29.1

304

40

1.7 2,905

54 16.0

137

41 0.8

0

…

0

…

0

…

4

1 0.7

194

3 31.9

16

2 2.6

0

…

0

…

0

…

480

27

1.6 5,326

28 17.6

167

30

0.6

1,247

56 31.2

546

51 13.7

452

58 11.3

0

99

0.0

0

99

0.0

414

99 47.9

6,057 105 44.9

302 105 2.2

525 105 3.9

143 120 60.3

5 120 2.1

3 120 1.3

560

64 13.2

41

64

1.0

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

517

24 4.6

0

…

0

…

48 351 0.5

339

83 22.8

183

83 12.3

709

83 47.7

0

…

0

…

0

…

512

17 8.9

928

25 16.2

0

8 0.0

234

1 5.2

0

…

2

1 0.0

9

3 3.4

18

8 6.7

8

5 3.0

0

…

852

93 26.2

0

…

13

17 0.3

0

17 0.0

13

16 0.3

Incomplete/Illegible Envelope/Ballot
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

… 4,409 100.0

115

1 46.9

57 23.3

2,496

12 7.6 5,577 16.9

10

71 0.6

452 26.6

2,121

36

1.2 53,707 30.2

0

… 2,027 20.5

0

…

843 100.0

3

3 0.7

0 0.0

142

1 4.4

161 5.0

236

37

1.3

4,219 23.3

0

…

0

…

3

1 0.5

12 2.0

0

…

0

…

0

… 11,480 37.9

108

50

2.7

1,412 35.3

0

99

0.0

451 52.1

205 105 1.5 2,630 19.5

0 120 0.0

6 2.5

0

…

1,740 40.9

0

…

0

…

88

24 0.8 1,247 11.2

0

… 9,573 99.5

0

…

164 11.0

0

…

0

…

51

10 0.9 2,095 36.6

56 114 1.2 4,143 91.8

1

1 0.4

224 83.6

211

93

6.5

2,195 67.4

7

17 0.1

652 13.4

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 52

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 57 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35A. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121

40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Voter not Registered in State
Total Cases Pct.

2 320

…

0

…

436

19 20.7

0

…

20,056 100 72.1

0

…

20,119

88 58.6

1,888

77 52.6

16

36 21.3

15,045

67 74.3

1,189

39 93.3

38

3 1.8

100

66 29.2

3,439

95 62.9

0

…

6,494

29 63.7

2 107 40.0

107

35 1.3

1,224

39 40.1

194

40 17.3

0

…

0

…

0

1

…

71

1 68.3

216

1 7.0

248,529 2,073 38.2 37 E2a

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Voter Registered but in Wrong Juristiction

Voter Registered but in

Failure to Provide

Wrong Precinct

Sufficient Identification

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0 320

…

0 320

…

0 320

…

0

21 0.0

0

…

85

21 0.6

408

14 19.3

12

9 0.6

0

10 0.0

94,240

57 72.9

0

…

0

…

69 100 0.2

0 100 0.0

691 100 2.5

0

…

0

…

0

…

9,482

88 27.6

37

88

0.1

363

88

1.1

13

77 0.4 1,523

77 42.4

164

77 4.6

0

…

0

…

0

…

3,681

67 18.2

789

67 3.9

0

…

67

39 5.3

0

39 0.0

12

39

0.9

59

5 2.8 1,299

10 61.6

27

6 1.3

32

66 9.3

15

66 4.4

2

65 0.6

215

95

3.9

286

95 5.2

416

95

7.6

2,823 218 6.8 3,645 215 8.7

71 215 0.2

0

… 2,018

29 19.8

1,195

29 11.7

5 104 100.0

0 101 0.0

0 101 0.0

68

32 0.8

32

28 0.4

13

24 0.2

1,506

39 49.4

23

39

0.8

11

39

0.4

0

…

511

40 45.6

28

40

2.5

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

14

4 70.0

0

1

…

0

1

…

0

1

…

0

1 0.0

24

1 23.1

9

1 8.7

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

1

1 0.0

128,923 2,155 19.8 34,703 2,185 5.3 13,333 2,401 2.0

31

29

35

E2b

E2c

E2d

Incomplete/Illegible Envelope/Ballot
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 320

…

(2)

…

0

… 12,996 99.4

12

10 0.6 1,242 58.9

0

… 34,987 27.1

260 100 0.9 6,754 24.3

0

…

0

…

947

88 2.8 3,374 9.8

0

77 0.0

1 0.0

0

…

59 78.7

642

67 3.2

101 0.5

1

39

0.1

6 0.5

259

3 12.3

426 20.2

0

66 0.0

194 56.6

384

95

7.0

726 13.3

579 216 1.4 34,634 83.0

156

29

1.5

335 3.3

0 101 0.0

(2) (40.0)

5

25

0.1

7,871 97.2

0

39

0.0

286 9.4

0

…

388 34.6

0

…

77 100.0

0

…

6 30.0

0

1

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

135

1 4.4 2,716 88.5

9,233 27 E2e

2,073

1.4 216,651 33.3 44
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 53

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 58 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870

64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253

64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0

…

30

1 12.2

72

9 0.2

4

71 0.2

3,020

31 1.7

52

64

0.5

0

…

0

3 0.0

23

1 0.7

21

36

0.1

0

…

4

1 0.7

0

…

0

…

0

41 0.0

0

99

0.0

0

…

0 120 0.0

40

64

0.9

0

…

101

24 0.9

0

…

0

…

0

…

1

9 0.0

0

…

4

3 1.5

0

…

0

17 0.0

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Resaon, Part B

No Signature

No-matching Signature

Voter already Voted

Total Cases

0

0

1

150

11

1

71

3,444

47

114

64

0

0

3

80

1

225

42

0

1

1

0

15

12

7

43

0

99

860 105

1 120

28

64

0

660

24

0

39

83

0

11

9

0

120

10

0

5

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.9 1.2 … 0.0 2.5 1.2 … 0.2 … 0.0 0.2 0.0 6.4 0.4 0.7 … 5.9 … 2.6 … 0.2 …
44.8 … 0.1

Total Cases

0

0

1

42

9

0

71

4,770

45

0

0

0

3

0

1

182

47

0

0

0

8

10

10

41

0

406 105

0 120

9

64

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

0

47

5

0

40

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.7 … … 0.0 0.0 1.0 … … … 0.0 0.3 … 3.0 0.0 0.2 … … … … … 0.0 … 17.5 … 0.8

Total Cases

0

10

1

1,117

14

20

71

2,793

45

704

64

0

0

3

58

1

390

52

0

6

2

0

0

6

42

101

99

225 105

0 120

12

64

0

386

24

0

0

0

2

7

167 109

27

6

32

93

1

17

Pct. … 4.1 3.4 1.2 1.6 7.1 … 0.0 1.8 2.2 … 1.0 … … 0.2 11.7 1.7 0.0 0.3 … 3.5 … … … 0.0 3.7 10.1 1.0 0.0

Other (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

… 4,409 100.0

17

1 6.9

188 76.7

4,196

8 12.7 27,445 83.1

213

18 12.6 1,459 86.0

25,866

25 14.6 137,860 77.6

1,157

64 11.7

7,843 79.5

0

…

843 100.0

0

…

418 100.0

0

1 0.0 3,084 95.0

3,388

36 18.7 13,900 76.8

0

…

0

…

1

1 0.2

597 98.0

0

…

0

…

17,493

33 57.8 12,770 42.2

933

53 23.3

3,041 76.1

350

99 40.5

414 47.9

360 105 2.7 11,636 86.3

5

5 2.1

231 97.5

1,651

64 38.8

2,513 59.1

0

…

0

…

100

24 0.9 9,882 88.8

9,573 351 99.5

48 0.5

0

… 1,446 97.4

0

…

0

…

339

14 5.9 5,369 93.8

3,962

78 87.8

382 8.5

26

6 9.7

44 16.4

2,139

93 65.7

1,087 33.4

606

17 12.5 4,209 86.6

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 54

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 59 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121 40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 320 …

0 …

0

10 0.0

0 …

64 100 0.2

0 …

197

88 0.6

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

0

39 0.0

0 …

0

66 0.0

98

95

1.8

37 215 0.1

0 …

0 101 0.0

0

24 0.0

2

39

0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

3,770 1,771 0.6 17 E2f

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature

Voter Already Voted

Total Cases

0 320

30

21

2

9

0

0 100

0

2,026 88

0 77

0

0

0 39

55

5

3 66

197 95

79 216

0

0 101

12

24

15

39

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

222

1

Pct. … 0.2 0.1 … 0.0 … 5.9 0.0 … … 0.0 2.6 0.9 3.6 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.5 … … … … 0.0 7.2

Total Cases

0 320

169

21

0

9

0

4 100

0

242

88

0

77

0

22

67

0

39

0

0

66

0

95

20 214

0

0 101

1

24

34

39

1 40

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … 1.3 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.7 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

398

21

4

9

0

161 100

0

793

88

1

77

0

441

67

6

39

6

2

0

66

369

95

222 214

264

29

0 101

15 29

75

39

5

40

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

47

1

Pct. … 3.0 0.2 … 0.6 … 2.3 0.0 … 2.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 6.8 0.5 2.6 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.4 … 5.0 … 0.0 1.5

8,402 2,030 1.3 27 E2g

6,007 1,849 0.9 17
E2h

8,865 2,279 1.4 34 E2i

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

0 320

2,353

21

462

6

13,859

61

6,525 100

0

116 88

0

0

3

67

0

39

365

10

1

66

60

9

0

0

0

19

7,843 122

160

4

298 40

0 3,541

5

3

0

1

0

2,447

1

Pct. …
18.0 21.9 10.7 23.4
… 0.3 … … 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.3 1.1 … … 0.0 96.9 5.2 26.6 0.0 25.0 … … 79.8

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
0 … 10,131 77.4 1,642 77.8 115,368 89.3 21,076 75.7
0 … 30,948 90.2 3,588 100.0
75 100.0 19,792 97.7 1,269 99.5 1,682 79.8
339 98.8 4,742 86.8 41,394 99.1 9,934 97.4
5 100.0 225 2.8 2,764 90.6 817 72.9 77 100.0
14 70.0 0 … 104 100.0 352 11.5

106,872 5,614 16.4 517,456 79.4

34

47

E2j:p

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 55

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 60 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753 55

9,870 64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106 67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865 99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253 64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 …

30

1 12.2

72

9 0.2

4

71 0.2

3,020

31

1.7

52 64 0.5

0 …

0

3 0.0

23

1 0.7

21

36

0.1

0 …

4

1 0.7

0 …

0 …

0

41 0.0

0

99 0.0

0 …

0 120 0.0

40

64 0.9

0 …

101

24 0.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

1

9 0.0

0 …

4

3 1.5

0 …

0

17 0.0

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature Voter Already Voted

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

150

11 0.5

1

71

0.1

3,444

47

1.9

114

64

1.2

0 …

0

3 0.0

80

1 2.5

225

42

1.2

0 …

1

1 0.2

0 …

15

12 0.0

7

43 0.2

0

99 0.0

860 105 6.4

1 120 0.4

28

64 0.7

0 …

660

24 5.9

0 …

39

83 2.6

0 …

11

9 0.2

0 …

120

10 44.8

0 …

5

17

0.1

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

42

9 0.1

0

71 0.0

4,770

45 2.7

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

182

47

1.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

8

10 0.0

10

41 0.3

0 …

406 105 3.0

0 120 0.0

9

64 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

7 0.0

0 …

47

5 17.5

0 …

40

17 0.8

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

10

1 4.1

1,117

14 3.4

20

71 1.2

2,793

45 1.6

704

64

7.1

0 …

0

3 0.0

58

1 1.8

390

52 2.2

0 …

6

2 1.0

0 …

0 …

6

42 0.2

101 99 11.7

225 105 1.7

0 120 0.0

12 64 0.3

0 …

386

24 3.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

2

7 0.0

167 109 3.7

27

6 10.1

32

93

1.0

1

17 0.0

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

17

1 6.9

4,196

8 12.7

213

18 12.6

25,866

25 14.6

1,157 64 11.7

0 …

0 …

0

1 0.0

3,388

36 18.7

0 …

1

1 0.2

0 …

17,493

33 57.8

933 53 23.3

350

99 40.5

360 105 2.7

5

5 2.1

1,651 64 38.8

0 …

100

24 0.9

9,573 351 99.5

0 …

0 …

339

14 5.9

3,962

78 87.8

26

6 9.7

2,139 93 65.7

606

17 12.5

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
4,409 100.0 188 76.7
27,445 83.1 1,459 86.0 137,860 77.6 7,843 79.5
843 100.0 418 100.0 3,084 95.0 13,900 76.8
0 … 597 98.0
0 … 12,770 42.2 3,041 76.1
414 47.9 11,636 86.3
231 97.5 2,513 59.1
0 … 9,882 88.8
48 0.5 1,446 97.4
0 … 5,369 93.8
382 8.5 44 16.4 1,087 33.4 4,209 86.6

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 56

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 61 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121 40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 320 …

0 …

0

10 0.0

0 …

64 100 0.2

0 …

197

88 0.6

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

0

39 0.0

0 …

0

66 0.0

98

95

1.8

37 215 0.1

0 …

0 101 0.0

0

24 0.0

2

39

0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

3,770 1,771 0.6 17 E2f

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature

Voter Already Voted

Total Cases

0 320

30

21

2

9

0

0 100

0

2,026

88

0

77

0

0

0

39

55

5

3 66

197 95

79 216

0

0 101

12

24

15 39

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

222

1

Pct. … 0.2 0.1 … 0.0 … 5.9 0.0 … … 0.0 2.6 0.9 3.6 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.5 … … … … 0.0 7.2

Total Cases

0 320

169

21

0

9

0

4 100

0

242

88

0

77

0

22

67

0

39

0

0

66

0

95

20 214

0

0 101

1

24

34

39

1 40

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … 1.3 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.7 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

398

21

4

9

0

161 100

0

793

88

1

77

0

441

67

6

39

6

2

0

66

369

95

222 214

264

29

0 101

15

29

75

39

5

40

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

47

1

Pct. … 3.0 0.2 … 0.6 … 2.3 0.0 … 2.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 6.8 0.5 2.6 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.4 … 5.0 … 0.0 1.5

8,402 2,030 1.3 27 E2g

6,007 1,849 0.9 17
E2h

8,865 2,279 1.4 34 E2i

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

0 320

2,353

21

462

6

13,859

61

6,525 100

0

116 88

0

0

3 67

0

39

365

10

1 66

60

9

0

0

0

19

7,843 122

160

4

298 40

0 3,541

5

3

0

1

0

2,447

1

Pct. …
18.0 21.9 10.7 23.4
… 0.3 … … 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.3 1.1 … … 0.0 96.9 5.2 26.6 0.0 25.0 … … 79.8

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
0 … 10,131 77.4 1,642 77.8 115,368 89.3 21,076 75.7
0 … 30,948 90.2 3,588 100.0
75 100.0 19,792 97.7 1,269 99.5 1,682 79.8
339 98.8 4,742 86.8 41,394 99.1 9,934 97.4
5 100.0 225 2.8 2,764 90.6 817 72.9 77 100.0
14 70.0 0 … 104 100.0 352 11.5

106,872 5,614 16.4 517,456 79.4

34

47

E2j:p

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 57

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 35. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PARTS A AND B Question E2, Number of provisional ballots rejected and the reason for rejection. [This table is broken into parts due to the large number of reasons tabulated.]
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

Alabama

67

2,083,309

67

Alaska

1

302,465

1

Arizona

15

2,323,579

15

Arkansas

75

1,080,809

75

California

58 13,096,097

57

Colorado

64

2,594,628

64

Connecticut

169

1,560,640 169

Delaware

3

417,631

3

District of Columbia

1

294,254

1

Florida

67

8,557,692

67

Georgia

159

3,910,557 159

Hawaii

4

436,774

4

Idaho

44

666,290

44

Illinois

110

5,339,488 110

Indiana

92

2,663,373

92

Iowa

99

1,589,951

99

Kansas

105

1,115,281 105

Kentucky

120

1,815,896 120

Louisiana

64

2,014,511

64

Maine

500

724,759 500

Maryland

24

2,734,189

24

Massachusetts

351

3,184,196 351

Michigan

83

4,780,701

83

Minnesota

87

2,950,780

87

Mississippi

82

889,914

58

Missouri

116

2,840,776 116

Montana

56

491,966

56

Nebraska

93

815,568

93

Nevada

17

1,017,772

17

Sign Voters In

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

143,789

2 2,179,790

13

115,236

8

965,573

67

142,493

2 12,828,688

51

1,150,149

17 1,444,479

47

0 1,560,640 169

0

417,631

3

0 294,254

1

4,714,439

40 3,843,253

27

0

0

0

436,774

4

0

666,290

44

0

0

239,375

7 2,423,998

85

957,491

53

632,460

46

534,987

44

63,892

10

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0

724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

24,364

4

809,875

53

878,518

28 1,923,020

84

0

491,966

56

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Update Vote History

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

143,789

2 2,179,790

13

73,661

3 1,007,148

72

296,416

3 12,617,093

49

1,194,353

20 1,398,822

42

0 1,560,640 169

0 417,631

3

0 294,254

1

4,574,929

40 3,982,763

27

0

0

0 436,774

4

0 666,290

44

0

0

239,375

7 2,423,998

85

957,491

53 632,460

46

464,048

32

129,224

22

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0 724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

793

1 826,546

55

682,992

17 2,135,897

96

0 491,966

56

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Lookup Polling Places

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

21,823

1 2,301,756

14

120,432

6 960,377

69

718,743

6 12,315,020

48

154,808

8 2,439,820

56

0 1,560,640 169

0 417,631

3

294,254

1

0

5,972,288

39 2,585,404

28

0

0

0 436,774

4

0 666,290

44

0

0

0

0

957,491

53 632,460

46

487,321

30 107,805

23

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0 724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

66,835

2 754,209

53

1,771,587

30 1,033,365

82

0 491,966

56

0 815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Other Use (See Comments)

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

0

0

0

0

932,743

14

0 1,080,809

75

0 8,605,732

35

961,997

10 1,632,631

54

0 1,560,640 169

0

417,631

3

0

0

1,222,293

6 6,833,922 59

0

0

0

372,871

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

20,173

5

520,335

39

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0

724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

0 4,780,701

83

0 2,950,780

87

17,727

2

237,226

16

510,357

5 1,159,740

42

0

0

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 59

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

320

718,700 320

Sign Voters In

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 718,700 320

Update Vote History

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

718,700 320

Lookup Polling Places

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

718,700 320

0

Other Use (See Comments)

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

718,700 320

21

3,677,463

21

33

679,080

26

376,874

62

7,128,852

62

0 3,677,463

21

9

163,093

11

0 7,128,852

62

98,923

0 3,677,463

21

6

441,044

13

0 7,128,852

62

89,582

0 3,677,463

21

5

450,385

14

271,927

0 7,128,852

62

0 3,677,463

21

1

40,964

6

0

0

100

4,539,729 100 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0

53

326,239

53

210,254

88

5,632,423

88 1,140,143

77

1,343,380

77

36

1,820,507

36

67

5,783,621

67

39

451,593

39

8

115,985

45

0

326,239

53

198,489

7

127,750

46

7 4,492,280

81 1,375,608

10 4,256,815

78 1,444,388

10 4,188,035

78

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,820,507

36

0 1,820,507

36

0 1,820,507

36

0 5,783,621

67

0 5,783,621

67

0 5,783,621

67

0

451,593

39

0

451,593

39

0

451,593

39

0

326,239

53

0 5,632,423

88

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,820,507

36

0

0

0

451,593

39

46

1,981,516

46 1,742,248

29

239,268

17 1,742,248

29

239,268

17 1,742,248

29

239,268

17

0

0

66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23

368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701

66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23

24,513 451,468 4,252,658
17,892
7,161

5 344,303

61

23,535

3 2,028,714

92 438,634

156 2,664,599

79 4,252,658

0

0

19 277,873 215

36,989

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

1

677,938

54

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

4

345,281

62

14,546

2 2,041,548 93 894,254

156 2,664,599

79 4,252,658

0

0

22

255,720 208

91,626

0

0

0 3,206,490 39

0

685,099

55

7,161

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

4

354,270

62

6 1,585,928

89

156 2,664,599

79

0

0

30

199,605 198

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

1

677,938

54

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

21,542 256,796
31,551

2

347,274

64

2 2,223,386

93

0

0

0

0

12

158,821 144

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

0

685,099

55

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

1

13,167

1

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

1

34,075

1

1

1,878,969

1

1

8,154 131,590,825 8,120 29,155,621

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

645 83,120,399 6,596 28,628,011

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

610 83,590,672 6,623 32,050,803

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

947 77,606,358 6,193 10,601,448

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

170 63,348,486 6,074

States Included

23

46

21

46

24

43

12

35

Question

F1a

f4a_y

f4a_n

f4b_y

f4b_n

f4c_y

f4c_n

f4d_y

f4d_n

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TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE
Questions F1, F4. Use of electronic poll books at the polling place and the number of voters participating in these polling places.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F4:
Arkansas: sing electronic poll book was new for Perry County; two polling places in this jurisdiction used electronic poll books to sign voters in. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented in reference to F4c that laptops were used with voter registration to look up voters. Pinal County did not use electronic poll books in the 2012 general election cycle. California: One jurisdiction commented that only three of its polling places used electronic poll books; the remaining 95 polling places used paper rosters. Another jurisdiction reported that an electronic list was used for early voting only. A third jurisdiction indicated, “All mail ballot election.” A fourth jurisdiction reported using electronic poll books in 60 of 144 precincts; in each case, a signature was captured on a paper poll book. Sonoma County provided precinct officers a Palm Pilot (Election Assistant) to help voters locate their correct polling location for voters; there is no data collected on these devices. Colorado: One county stated, “Principal use of electronic poll books is to print signature card labels, which in turn gives voter credit for voting at polling place. The voting credit data was then exported from electronic poll books and uploaded into the statewide voter registration system, effectively updating voter history. Electronic poll books were programmed for the entire county, so they could also be used to direct voters to correct precinct or clerk’s office, if appropriate (e.g., poll book reflected mail-in ballot was sent to voter, etc.).” Illinois: Two jurisdictions commented that electronic poll lists are used in “some” or “a few” polling places. Florida: Three jurisdictions stated they used electronic lists or poll books during early voting to sign in voters and update voter history but not on election day. One of these jurisdictions also stated that Palm Pilots are used on election day. A different jurisdiction stated that it used a voter focus counter program for Early Voting only. One jurisdiction stated that it used EVIDs at five precincts; for the three remaining counties it used a paper precinct register, but used an EVID during early voting. Another jurisdiction specified that EVID machines were used for voter look up, check-in, voter signature and to tabulate history. One jurisdiction simply indicated, “VR – EviDs.” Another jurisdiction stated that laptops with complete county rolls are provided to each polling place to expedite voter lookup on election day and reduce the necessity for calls to the office. One jurisdiction stated that electronic poll books were only used in four out of 16 precincts. Another jurisdiction simply indicated, “Look up voter’s eligibility.” Indiana: The State is aware that some counties set up PCs at polling locations to allow staff or voters to look up polling locations on the SVRS Public Portal (www.indianavoters.com). They used the public portal to reduce security concerns, rather than setting up a PC linked to SVRS. However, the State did not collect this information as part of the 2012 General Election survey. Additionally, in the State of Indiana, Electronic Poll Books refer to a jurisdiction utilizing Vote Centers. In these counties, “at the polling place” refers to “at the Vote Center locations.” Michigan: Electronic Poll books and lists of voters are utilized in 80% of precincts. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated that electronic poll books are used at two polling locations, and another jurisdiction reported using electronic poll books at eight out of 15 polling locations. Two jurisdictions reported using Palm Pilots to verify voter status. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented that the poll books and sign-in sheets are not electronic. Another jurisdiction stated, “Call Circuit Clerk office and they were told where to go.” New Mexico: One jurisdiction stated that it only uses a ballot on demand and the IPower for early voting and absentee, not for election day polling places. New York: Not yet accommodated in current statutes. Ohio: One jurisdiction reported using an electronic poll book in one of its 474 polling places. A second jurisdiction indicated, “Not in every precinct.” Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico used paper voter rolls that voters sign in at the polling station after showing their Voter Identification card, and then they are provided with their paper ballots. According to Joint Resolution No. 44 of June 3, 2011, the State Election Commission has a mandate to adopt and implement a statewide optical scanning vote counting system complemented with an electronic poll book system.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION Vermont: One jurisdiction commented that voter history was updated electronically but not at the polling places and not on the day of the election. Another jurisdiction stated that all voters are checked in manually from its checklist. A third jurisdiction reported that the internet was not available at the polling location, while another jurisdiction stated, “Nothing electronic at the polling place.” One jurisdiction stated that an electronic list was used to research and evaluate if a voter had been removed from the checklist. Another jurisdiction simply commented, “We use an entrance and exit checklist.” Washington: We do not have poll sites. Our voting centers are countywide. Any voters on the accessible voting units would be looked up in the voter registration system to see if they have already returned a ballot before voting.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

67

2,083,309

67

1

302,465

1

15

2,323,579

15

75

1,080,809

75

58 13,096,097

57

64

2,594,628 64

169

1,560,640 169

3

417,631

3

1

294,254

1

67

8,557,692

67

159

3,910,557 159

4

436,774

4

44

666,290 44

110

5,339,488 110

92

2,663,373 92

99

1,589,951 99

105

1,115,281 105

120

1,815,896 120

64

2,014,511 64

500

724,759 500

24

2,734,189

24

351

3,184,196 351

83

4,780,701 83

87

2,950,780

87

82

889,914 58

116

2,840,776 116

56

491,966 56

93

815,568 93

17

1,017,772

17

State Printed Poll Books and Shipped to Jurisdiction
Total Cases Pct.
0 …

302,465

1 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

436,774

4 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,815,896 120 100.0

2,014,511

64 100.0

1,430

17 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,293,451

13 43.8

0 …

18,541

1 0.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

Jurisdiction Arranged for Printing of Poll Books

Combination of State and Local Jurisdiction

Information Unavailable

Total Cases

2,083,309

67

0

2,179,790

13

1,040,656

73

12,879,672

51

2,594,628

64

1,560,640 169

0

294,254

1

7,038,699

54

0

0

666,290

44

0

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

0

0

0

723,329 483

2,734,189

24

0

0

1,657,329

74

878,172

56

2,322,009 105

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Pct. 100.0
… 93.8 96.3 98.3 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 82.2
… … 100.0 … 100.0 100.0 … … … 99.8 100.0 … … 56.2 98.7 81.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

417,631

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4,780,701

83

0

6,900

1

0

0

0

0

Pct. Total Cases Pct.

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

… 24,522

1 2.3

… 12,624

3 0.1

…

0 …

…

0 …

100.0

0 …

…

0 …

… 1,058,750

3 12.4

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

100.0

0 …

…

0 …

0.8

0 …

… 66,843

3 2.4

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)

Total

Cases Pct. 0 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total Pct.

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

143,789

2 6.2

0

0.0

15,631

1 1.4

0

0.0

203,801

3 1.6

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

460,243

10 5.4

0

0.0

3,910,557 159 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

5,339,488 110 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,115,281 105 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

3,184,196 351 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

4,842

1 0.5

0

0.0

433,383

7 15.3

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE (CONTINUED)

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

718,700 3,677,463
679,080 7,128,852 4,539,729 326,239 5,632,423 1,343,380 1,820,507 5,783,621
451,593 1,981,516
368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

131,590,825 8,120

F1a

State Printed Poll Books and Shipped to Jurisdiction
Total Cases Pct.
0 …

0 …

607

1 0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,981,516

46 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

5,295

6 1.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,878,969

1 100.0

9,749,455 274 7.4 11
F6.1

Jurisdiction Arranged for Combination of State and

Printing of Poll Books

Local Jurisdiction

Total Cases 718,700 320

3,677,463

21

205,287

14

7,128,852

62

4,204,769

92

235,170

50

5,632,423 88

1,343,380 77

0

5,783,621 67

451,593 39

0

368,816 66

2,480,182

95

7,993,851 254

0

250,473 187

3,896,846 134

0

655,816 53

0

250,701

23

13,167

1

34,075

1

0

Pct. 100.0 100.0 30.2 100.0 92.6
72.1 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 100.0 100.0
… 82.3 100.0
… 95.7
… 100.0 100.0 100.0
…

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10,678

12

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 3.5 … … … … … … … …

90,556,781 38
F6.2

3,279

68.8 5,215,910 4
F6.3

99 4.0

Information Unavailable

Total

Cases 0

0

10,685

1

0

0

11,765

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

33,496 33

0

3,206,490 39

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. … … 1.6 … … 3.6 … … … … … … … … … … 11.0 …
100.0 … … … … … …

4,425,175 8
F6.4

84 3.4

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

462,501

10 68.1

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

334,960

8 7.4

0

0.0

79,304

2 24.3

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,820,507

36 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,023,036

29 100.0

0

0.0

4,567

7 1.5

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

29,283

2 4.3

0

0.0

3,078,135 3,541 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

21,643,504 4,384 16.4

0

0.0

18

0

F6.rem

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 64

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE
Questions F1, F6. Source of poll books used at the polling place and the number of voters participating in these polling places General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F6: Alaska: The State of Alaska conducts federal and state elections and the poll books were provided directly to the poll workers by the state. Arkansas: One jurisdiction indicated it does not use printed books. Two jurisdictions reported that the County Clerk’s Office prints poll books. California: One jurisdiction commented, “No polls.” Another jurisdiction stated that poll books are printed by a local vendor. A third jurisdiction stated that poll books are printed in-house. One jurisdiction indicated, “All mail ballot election.” District of Columbia: District prints poll books and operates the polling places. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that it printed its poll registers in-house. A second jurisdiction reported that its three largest precincts used EViDs (electronic poll books) while the remaining precincts used printed poll books on election day; early voting used EViDs. Another jurisdiction indicated that printed poll books were not used at the polls. Maryland: Printed poll books were used as a backup to electronic poll books. Maine: Seventeen jurisdictions commented, “Municipality lacks internet connection.” Michigan: Counties purchase poll books designed by State from commercial vendors and supply to local jurisdictions. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated, “Backup for epollbook only.” Another jurisdiction stated that poll books were printed from MCVR in County Clerk’s Office. One jurisdiction also stated that these are printed by the County Clerk’s office, while a different jurisdiction stated that it prints out of MCVER. Five jurisdictions stated that they print their poll books in-house. Mississippi: One jurisdiction reported that poll books were printed for all precincts in the Circuit Clerk’s office. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented that signature rosters are printed at the county level. Virginia: State provided ready PDF files to jurisdictions. Vermont: One jurisdiction stated that printed lists of registered voters are used. A second jurisdiction noted that the checklist prints directly from the voter registration database. A third jurisdiction reported using paper ballots that go through its Accuvote system (machine), which prints the totals at the close of the voting day; they are supposed to correspond to the number of voters checked off the voter checklist. One jurisdiction commented, “Checklist,” and another reported no poll books. Another jurisdiction reported that a list is run from State website and printed in local office. Six jurisdictions stated that town checklists are printed from Statewide HAVA checklist. Two jurisdictions reported not using poll books, though one stated this is only true if these do not refer to voter checklists. Similarly, one jurisdiction commented, “Not a ‘poll book.’ It was a checklist.” One jurisdiction stated that the town printed poll books. Another jurisdiction reported that the only printing the State provides is the ballots. Election officials reported printing and distributing checklists themselves. Washington: Printed poll books not used.
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TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

67

2,083,309

1

302,465

15

2,323,579

75

1,080,809

58 13,096,097

64

2,594,628

169

1,560,640

3

417,631

1

294,254

67

8,557,692

159

3,910,557

4

436,774

44

666,290

110

5,339,488

92

2,663,373

99

1,589,951

105

1,115,281

120

1,815,896

64

2,014,511

500

724,759

24

2,734,189

351

3,184,196

83

4,780,701

87

2,950,780

82

889,914

116

2,840,776

56

491,966

93

815,568

17

1,017,772

Cases
67 1 15 75 57 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 58 116 56 93 17

Number of First-time Mail Registrants (Voted or Not)

Total

Cases

0

0

0

1,660

14

13,737

36

0

0

0

756

1

3,857

54

0

24

1

0

0

11,754

92

0

0

0

70,106

64

4,101

500

0

0

0

991

87

77

5

2,678

1

0

0

252

9

Yes Total 2,083,309
302,465 2,179,790 1,040,656 12,889,818 1,551,434 1,560,640
417,631 294,254 6,573,560
436,774 666,290
2,423,998 1,589,951
484,618 1,815,896 2,014,511
724,759 2,734,189
3,911,667 2,950,780
880,956 2,362,174
491,966 815,568 1,017,772

Cases

Use of Printed Lists at the Polls

No

Total

Cases

67

0

1

0

13

143,789

2

73

40,153

2

52

656

1

47

1,043,194

17

169

0

3

0

1

0

50

1,984,132

17

0

0

4

0

44

0

0

0

85

239,375

7

99

0

35

108,295

19

120

0

64

0

500

0

24

0

0

0

64

869,034

19

87

0

56

8,958

2

108

478,602

8

56

0

93

0

17

0

Info. Unavailable

Total

Cases

0

0

0

0

1,822

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

519,520

50

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 66

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

320

718,700

21

3,677,463

33

679,080

62

7,128,852

100

4,539,729

53

326,239

88

5,632,423

77

1,343,380

36

1,820,507

67

5,783,621

39

451,593

46

1,981,516

66

368,816

95

2,480,182

254

7,993,851

29

1,023,036

246

304,509

134

3,896,846

39

3,206,490

55

685,099

3,541

3,078,135

23

250,701

1

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

8,154 131,590,825

F1a

Cases
320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

Number of First-time Mail Registrants (Voted or Not)

Total

Cases

384

320

0

341

6

0

12,490

100

0

2,168

11

0

0

0

0

0

3

1

0

84,707

253

0

442

88

1,780

115

379

39

0

11,902

3,541

0

0

0

0

8,120

224,589

5,338

F3

Yes Total
718,700 3,677,463
225,986 7,128,852 4,204,769
235,170 5,614,754 1,343,380
5,783,621 451,593
1,981,516 368,816
2,480,182
298,808
655,816 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

Cases

Use of Printed Lists at the Polls

No

Total

Cases

320

0

21

0

16

334,108

4

62

0

92

334,960

8

50

91,069

3

86

6,967

1

77

0

0

1,820,507

36

67

0

39

0

46

0

66

0

95

0

0

0

0

0

239

5,178

5

0

0

0

3,206,490

39

53

29,283

2

3,541

0

23

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

94,639,899

6,828 10,744,750

192

46

18

F5.1

F5.2

Info. Unavailable

Total

Cases

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,993,851

254

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8,515,193

305

3

F5.3

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 67

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TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE
Questions F1, F3, F5. First-time mail registrants. Uses of printed registration lists at the polling place with the number of voters participating in these polling places.
Question F3:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction reported, “Must show ID is in each poll book, then have to check each voter history to see if they were a first time voter.” Arizona: Proof of Identity (ID verification) is required at the polls for ALL Arizona voters and not just first time voters. As such, this “first-time” voter identification requirement is not applicable to State of Arizona. California: One jurisdiction commented, “Total Qty was: 284 Not broken out between VBM and Polls.” Idaho: Idaho Code requires all voters to show ID or sign a Personal Identification Affidavit prior to voting. If a voter registered on Election Day, they were required to show a photo ID and proof of residence prior to registering and voting. Delaware: Do not collect this data. Florida: One jurisdiction indicated, “VR-reports.” Another jurisdiction indicated none that it was aware of. A third jurisdiction reported that all voters’ IDs are checked, and a fourth jurisdiction stated, “ID provided by voter.” Louisiana: Total includes all first-time voter mail registrants regardless of voter registration date. Maryland: Not applicable. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “Courthouse burned 1/17/2013.” Montana: Montana requires all voters to provide ID. North Dakota: North Dakota does not have voter registration. New Mexico: One jurisdiction stated that the above includes people who came into the office in person; in-person voters (registrants) do not require ID.” Another jurisdiction commented, “ID required Statistics Report.” Nevada: Five jurisdictions indicated that they do not track this information. Oklahoma: Effective 7-1-2011, Oklahoma requires “proof of identity” from all in-person voters (early voting or at polling place on election day). Oregon: Did not track origin. Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico is exempt from the NVRA, as the rest of the territories, and the HAVA 303(b) mail in registration applies to NVRA jurisdictions. Vermont: One jurisdiction indicated that this number is the people who were able to vote; it does not keep track of who and if they actually cast a ballot. A second jurisdiction reported that no first time voters submitted their registration by mail. Another jurisdiction noted that verifiable numbers are uncertain due to clerk turnover. One jurisdiction commented that the Town Clerk registers and knows everyone. One election official stated, “I send letters out to the first time voters telling them I need identification and they either come in or mail me a copy of their ID before the election.”
Question F5:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “No – Electronic Pollbooks.” California: One jurisdiction reported no polls. Another jurisdiction indicated, “Alpha Roster/Street Index.” A third jurisdiction noted that it ran an all-mail ballot election. Colorado: Nine jurisdictions reported using signature cards; one of these jurisdictions reported that poll books were also available, and another indicated that it also used a poll book exported into a “Master Voter List.” Four jurisdictions reported using poll books as a backup, and one jurisdiction commented, “Printed poll books were deployed as back-ups to electronic poll books. Some polling places used the paper poll books to make initial determination of whether voter was in correct precinct and entitled to vote an official rather than provisional ballot. Problematic voters could be directed quickly to the provisional ballot judges without waiting in line, if appropriate.” One jurisdiction indicated it had a third backup, a PDF file. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that printed lists were used at the polls on election day, and two jurisdictions reported using printed lists in some of their precincts. Eight jurisdictions reported using printed lists as a backup in their polling places (e.g., in the event of a power outage). One jurisdiction reported only using EViDs, and another jurisdiction reported that it used EViDs (electronic poll books) for voter check-in during early voting.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION Maryland: Used as a backup to electronic poll books. Michigan: Paper poll books and printed lists of voters are utilized in 20% of precincts. Missouri: Two jurisdictions reported using printed lists as a backup in case electronic poll books did not work. Another jurisdiction stated that it used printed lists at six polling locations. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee only,” and another jurisdiction reported a mixed use of list/computer. Nevada: Nine jurisdictions reported using both labels for early voting and a pre-printed roster on election day. Eight jurisdictions reported using only pre-printed rosters. South Carolina: One jurisdiction commented, “Used as a backup if electronic list was used.” Tennessee: One jurisdiction indicated that paper poll books were used for election day, while early voting is PC direct connect to database. Another jurisdiction stated that it used electronic poll books on election day, but paper signature lists were prepared as a backup in case of an emergency. Vermont: Two jurisdictions commented that their checklists were printed from HAVA. One jurisdiction indicated, “Voter checklist.” West Virginia: One jurisdiction reported that it uses poll books with registration cards.
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TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey
67

Number of Poll Workers Total

Cases 0

Alaska

1

2,499

1

Arizona

15 11,700

15

Arkansas

75

9,346

72

California

58 89,440

57

Colorado

64 10,790

64

Connecticut

169

4,464 169

Delaware

3

4,129

3

District of Columbia

1

1,708

1

Florida

67 52,086

67

Georgia

159

0

Hawaii

4

2,583

3

Idaho

44

5,860

44

Illinois

110 49,357 110

Indiana

92 22,427

81

Iowa

99

9,821

99

Kansas

105

8,374 105

Kentucky

120 15,290 120

Louisiana

64 17,782

64

Maine

500

5,983 499

Maryland

24 23,603

24

Massachusetts

351 18,946 348

Michigan

83 37,206

83

Minnesota

87 27,602

87

Mississippi

82

6,974

57

Missouri

116 21,588 112

Montana

56

4,201

56

Nebraska

93

8,322

93

Nevada

17

5,165

17

Under 18

Total Pct.

…

…

229 2.0

2 0.0

12,750 14.3

437

4.1

…

228 5.5

2

0.1

128 0.2

…

315 12.2

30 0.5

…

61 0.3

…

…

…

…

20 0.3

252

1.1

…

1,349 3.6

…

0 0.0

…

20 0.5

92

1.1

253 4.9

18 to 25

Total Pct.

…

…

280 2.4

73 0.8

5,263 5.9

175

1.6

…

293

7.1

238 13.9

1,558 3.0

…

301 11.7

182

3.1

…

247

1.1

…

…

…

…

106

1.8

1,017 4.3

…

2,201 5.9

…

94

1.3

…

63

1.5

90

1.1

248 4.8

26 to 40

Total Pct.

…

…

395 3.4

231 2.5

7,743 8.7

281 2.6

…

298

7.2

138

8.1

2,498 4.8

…

245 9.5

450

7.7

…

405

1.8

…

…

…

…

413 6.9

1,937 8.2

…

2,954

7.9

…

197 2.8

…

245 5.8

492 5.9

346 6.7

41 to 60

Total Pct.

…

…

1,763 15.1

743

7.9

18,836 21.1

1,345 12.5

…

1,460 35.4

697 40.8

10,483 20.1

…

1,005 38.9

1,670 28.5

…

1,782

7.9

…

…

…

…

2,154 36.0

8,874 37.6

…

10,899 29.3

…

529

7.6

…

1,217 29.0

2,319 27.9

1,378 26.7

61 to 70

Total Pct.

…

…

2,405 20.6

1,365 14.6

11,068 12.4

1,301 12.1

…

1,028 24.9

362 21.2

11,293 21.7

…

703 27.2

1,765 30.1

…

1,733

7.7

…

…

…

…

1,923 32.1

6,800 28.8

…

11,877 31.9

…

798 11.4

…

1,465 34.9

2,609 31.4

1,570 30.4

71 and Over

Total Pct.

…

…

1,951 16.7

1,348 14.4

8,338 9.3

835

7.7

…

822 19.9

194 11.4

11,488 22.1

…

401 15.5

1,563 26.7

…

1,527 6.8

…

…

…

…

1,367 22.8

3,798 16.1

…

7,926 21.3

…

555 8.0

…

1,191 28.4

2,701 32.5

1,119 21.7

Balance (See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 2,499 4,677 5,584 25,442 6,416 4,464
0 77 14,638 0 (387) 200 49,357 16,672 9,821 8,374 15,290 17,782 0 925 18,946 0 27,602 4,801 21,588 0 19 251

… 100.0 40.0 59.7 28.4 59.5 100.0
0.0 4.5 28.1 … (15.0) 3.4 100.0 74.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 3.9 100.0 0.0 100.0 68.8 100.0 0.0 0.2 4.9

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TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320

Number of Poll Workers Total
2,392

Cases 320

21

0

33

7,671

25

62 82,811

57

100 23,020 100

53

1,286

45

88 45,556

88

77

7,489

77

36

1,402

36

67

0

39

3,016

39

46 13,213

46

66

2,827

66

95 15,879

95

254 36,019 231

29

4,850

10

246

3,055 221

134 24,691 134

39

782

39

55

7,263

37

3,541 34,902 3,541

23

2,449

23

1

336

1

1

286

1

1 89,413

1

1

8,154 887,854 7,684

D3

Under 18

Total Pct.

…

…

170 2.2

…

384

1.7

…

2,107 4.6

…

…

…

…

825 6.2

0 0.0

291

1.8

…

…

21 0.7

332

1.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

543

1.6

14 0.6

…

0 0.0

…

20,855 2.3 25
D4a

18 to 25

Total Pct.

…

…

706 9.2

…

464 2.0

…

1,997 4.4

…

…

…

…

…

12 0.4

454 2.9

…

…

34

1.1

1,128 4.6

32

4.1

92

1.3

567 1.6

28

1.1

…

77 26.9

…

18,020 2.0 29
D4b

26 to 40

Total Pct.

…

…

1,088 14.2

…

1,040 4.5

…

2,057 4.5

…

…

…

…

…

48

1.7

723 4.6

…

…

112

3.7

1,741

7.1

67 8.6

238 3.3

1,611 4.6

93 3.8

…

72 25.2

…

28,158 3.2 29
D4c

41 to 60
Total Pct.
… … 2,378 31.0 … 5,232 22.7 … 10,225 22.4 … … … … … 296 10.5 3,489 22.0 … … 743 24.3 7,579 30.7 161 20.6 638 8.8 8,121 23.3 669 27.3 … 95 33.2 …
106,780 12.0 29
D4d

61 to 70
Total Pct.
… … 1,458 19.0 … 5,887 25.6 … 10,008 22.0 … … … … … 320 11.3 5,421 34.1 … … 725 23.7 7,868 31.9 107 13.7 700 9.6 13,442 38.5 655 26.7 … 33 11.5 …
106,689 12.0 29
D4e

71 and Over

Total Pct.

…

…

968 12.6

…

4,163 18.1

…

7,807 17.1

…

…

…

…

…

259 9.2

4,516 28.4

…

…

407 13.3

4,268 17.3

65 8.3

228

3.1

10,457 30.0

362 14.8

…

9

3.1

…

80,633

9.1

29

D4f

Balance (See Notes)
Total Pct.

2,392 0
903 82,811 5,850 1,286 11,355 7,489 1,402
0 3,016 12,388 1,892
985 36,019 4,850
1,013 1,775
350 5,367
161 628 336
0 89,413

100.0 … 11.8
100.0 25.4 100.0 24.9 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 93.8 66.9
6.2 100.0 100.0 33.2
7.2 44.8 73.9
0.5 25.6 100.0 0.0 100.0

526,719 59.3 45
calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS
Questions D3, D4. Number of poll workers used and age category.
Question D3: Arkansas: One jurisdiction stated, “Approximately. Larger polling sited had more workers, smaller does less.” Arizona: One jurisdiction commented, “As a note, we also hired 119 citizen board Troubleshooters that do not serve as polling place board workers but are assigned several specific polling place locations to assist the board workers at these locations with any issues that come up on Election Day. This quantity of additional workers (119) is NOT reflected in the above grand total.” California: One jurisdiction reported that this figure includes student poll workers. A second jurisdiction reported 1,580 poll workers unknown. Another jurisdiction indicated that 56 are standby poll workers. One jurisdiction commented, “All mail ballot.” District of Columbia: number of poll workers failed to report for duty; this number represents the total that showed for work. Florida: One jurisdiction noted that this number includes Canvassing Board members, tech team, supply return check-in team, and poll workers (both early voting and election day). Another jurisdiction reported 233 worked election day, and 125 worked early voting; a lot of these workers worked both election day and early voting. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Minnesota: Estimated number. Missouri: One jurisdiction stated that several precincts were combined at polling places. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “5 Resolution Board.” North Carolina: Several jurisdictions included specific breakdowns of their types of workers, including poll workers, One-Stop workers, chief judges, judges, clerks, student assistants, computer assistants, and rovers. Five jurisdictions stated generally that most of their One-Stop workers also worked in a precinct on Election Day. Several jurisdictions also noted that their worker counts included individuals who worked at both One-Stop sites and at polling places. In a few instances, these individuals were counted twice; in others, these individuals were only counted once. New Hampshire: Minimum required. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “PSR Report/EW Payroll Report.” Puerto Rico: Poll workers are hired as their volunteer representatives and trained by the political parties. For the Nov.6, 2012 General Election, there were two (2) Principal Parties and four (4) Political Parties by Petition (Third Parties). Each party had the right to have up to three (3) poll workers per polling station (7755, plus 1533 provisional voting stations). South Dakota: One jurisdiction indicated there were five workers at each place. Vermont: One jurisdiction noted that this count includes the Town Clerk. Another jurisdiction stated that this does not include BCA who counted ballots (8). One jurisdiction commented, “Election Officials work in shifts throughout the day.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that this does not include people who only counted votes (23). One jurisdiction specified, “4 people in tow hour shifts from 8am-7pm, then 8 people (not including the Clerk) to count the votes by hand.” Another jurisdiction indicated that its count includes six Boy Scouts that assist voters with finding an open voting booth, replenishing pens and removing campaign materials left in the booths. One jurisdiction specified, “11 Justice of the Peace, 1 Clerk, 2 Constables” Washington: Three jurisdictions reported these figures include election day and early voting. One jurisdiction specified that this number includes an 18-day early voting period and election day workers only. Wyoming: In preparation for the 2012 election cycle, the Albany County election staff designed various efforts to recruit new election judges during new voter registrations at the courthouse and through educational testimony during annual off site VR drives. A mailing was created to generate commitment to participate and when making election judges assignments for the Primary and the General election, the County Clerk and her election staff were thoughtful with regard to pairing seasoned judges with new recruits to facilitate continuity in experiential training. A second jurisdiction reported that it did not count County employees. For another jurisdiction, this number includes election judges assigned to absentee, write-in, and resolution boards. One jurisdiction reported that four of its poll workers worked/helped in the Absentee Polling Place.
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Question D4: Arizona: Maricopa County implemented “Student” poll workers program back in 2008. Since its inception, we have seen a steady increase in participation amongst students. For this 2012 General election, of the 4,820 workers, we had over 167 of these board workers that were “Student” poll workers. California: Five jurisdictions reported that they did not have age information available for a portion of their poll workers. One second jurisdiction specified that there were 26 election day appointments made; those officers are not currently linked to their voter registration (DOB) information so they are not included in breakdown. A third jurisdiction indicated that DIMS does not have a report that contains information on poll worker ages. Another jurisdiction noted that the 126 difference from D3 to D4 is because it does not track all ages of its county support staff. One jurisdiction commented that 56 are standby poll workers, and 23 are Field Supervisors who support the vote centers. Colorado: Six jurisdictions reported that information on poll workers’ ages were unavailable; one jurisdiction simply commented, “These are estimates.” Another jurisdiction specified that 97 judges were county employees for which it does not have birthdates. One jurisdiction noted that it had four student judges included in its total, and a second jurisdiction stated that 34 of the 99 were student judges. One jurisdiction specified, “About 2/3 of our judges were in the 61 to 70 range with a good portion of the other 1/3 in the 71 + range. We had a smattering of younger judges. We did not have any student judges this year.” Florida: One jurisdiction stated that this number only includes election day poll workers. Another jurisdiction commented that it had two poll workers who were 90 years old when they worked the general election. Indiana: Four jurisdictions stated that they do not track poll workers’ ages. One jurisdiction commented, “While the birthdate of poll workers is captured upon their sign-up and assignment, so many changes are made on election day and the pay vouchers do not include a birthdate, thus determining the exact age and ranges of the workers who actually reported on election day.” Another jurisdiction noted generally that its workers’ ages range from 18 to over 70. One jurisdiction commented that most of the poll workers were 60 and older, another jurisdiction reported that the average age of its poll workers was above 70 years old, and a third jurisdiction estimated that the majority of poll workers would be between 60 and 80 but did not have an exact number. Two jurisdictions stated that their worker pools are aging. One jurisdiction commented, “Our oldest poll worker was 91. We had quite a few in their 80s that have worked for years.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Minnesota: Age data not available. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “Courthouse burned 1/17/2013.” North Carolina: Several jurisdictions commented that the majority of their workers were 55 years old or above. A couple of jurisdictions reported they did not track this data or stated that this data was based on an estimate. One jurisdiction commented that the majority of its poll workers are re-appointments. Another jurisdiction commented that only 188 of its reported workers worked in the 2012 general elections; seven of these either didn’t work for some reason or have resigned and are still on the poll worker list. New Hampshire: Data not available. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Run PSR Report/EW.” Nevada: One jurisdiction indicated that D4e may contain workers over 71 years of age. Pennsylvania: Not tracked. South Carolina: Age breakdown unavailable for workers 18+. Vermont: Three jurisdictions indicated that these numbers are estimates only. One jurisdiction indicated that all but one worker were over 40 years old. Wyoming: One jurisdiction indicated that the majority of its election judges are retired senior citizens. Two jurisdictions indicate they do not track this information.
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TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Total of

Juris. in

Voters

Survey Participating

67

2,083,309

1

302,465

15

2,323,579

75

1,080,809

58 13,096,097

64

2,594,628

169

1,560,640

3

417,631

1

294,254

67

8,557,692

159

3,910,557

4

436,774

44

666,290

110

5,339,488

92

2,663,373

99

1,589,951

105

1,115,281

120

1,815,896

64

2,014,511

500

724,759

24

2,734,189

351

3,184,196

83

4,780,701

87

2,950,780

82

889,914

116

2,840,776

56

491,966

93

815,568

17

1,017,772

Cases
67 1 15 75 57 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 58 116 56 93 17

Very Difficult

Cases 0 0 0 4 4 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 0 16 0 0
120 0 32 4 1 0 1 1 9 8 13 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 7.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 50.0 6.8 0.0 17.4 0.0 0.0
100.0 0.0 6.4 16.7 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.7 7.8 14.3 14.0 0.0

Somewhat Difficult

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

1 100.0

6 40.0

25 33.3

18

31.6

33

51.6

169 100.0

3 100.0

0

0.0

13

19.4

0

0.0

2 50.0

16 36.4

0

0.0

34

37.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

64 100.0

165 33.0

6 25.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.4

18

31.0

50 43.1

29

51.8

38 40.9

6 35.3

Neither Diff./Easy

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

7 46.7

17 22.7

17 29.8

12 18.8

0

0.0

0

0.0

1 100.0

23 34.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

12 27.3

0

0.0

21 22.8

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

122

24.4

5 20.8

0

0.0

83 100.0

30 34.5

16

27.6

38 32.8

9

16.1

14

15.1

5 29.4

Somewhat Easy

Cases 0 0 1 18 9 12 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 82 6 3 0 24 10 15 5 14 3

Pct. 0.0 0.0 6.7 24.0 15.8 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.9 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 25.0 0.9 0.0 27.6 17.2 12.9 8.9 15.1 17.6

Very Easy

Cases 0 0 1 8 5 1 0 0 0 13 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 82 3 0 0 3 9 3 2 14 3

Pct. 0.0 0.0 6.7 10.7 8.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 12.5 0.0 0.0 3.4 15.5 2.6 3.6 15.1 17.6

Not Enough Information Cases Pct.
67 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

4.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.3

99 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

2

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

26 29.9

1

1.7

0

0.0

3

5.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

Balance (See Notes)

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

4

7.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

159 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

110 100.0

9

9.8

0

0.0

105 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

15

3.0

0

0.0

347 98.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

5.2

1

0.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Survey Participating

320

718,700

21

3,677,463

33

679,080

62

7,128,852

100

4,539,729

53

326,239

88

5,632,423

77

1,343,380

36

1,820,507

67

5,783,621

39

451,593

46

1,981,516

66

368,816

95

2,480,182

254

7,993,851

29

1,023,036

246

304,509

134

3,896,846

39

3,206,490

55

685,099

3,541

3,078,135

23

250,701

1

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

8,154 131,590,825

F1a

Cases
320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1
8,120

Very Difficult

Cases 0 0 1 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 4 14 23 0 3 0 0 4
909 1 0 0 1

Pct. 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 9.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 6.1 14.7 9.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 7.3 25.7 4.3 0.0 0.0
100.0

1,205

14.8

28

D5.1

Somewhat Difficult

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

5 19.2

0

0.0

50 50.0

0

0.0

41 46.6

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10 25.6

0

0.0

23 34.8

40

42.1

46

18.1

0

0.0

35 14.3

0

0.0

8 20.5

12

21.8

585

16.5

18 78.3

0

0.0

1 100.0

0

0.0

1,573

19.4

33

D5.2

Neither Diff./Easy

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

6 23.1

62 100.0

25 25.0

0

0.0

26 29.5

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10 25.6

0

0.0

22 33.3

20

21.1

101 39.8

0

0.0

74 30.2

0

0.0

7

17.9

10 18.2

959

27.1

1

4.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1,755 21.6 30
D5.3

Somewhat Easy

Cases 0 0 6 0 13 0 18 0 0 0 3 0 16 14 46 0 48 0 6 6
599 3 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 13.0 0.0 20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 24.2 14.7 18.1 0.0 19.6 0.0 15.4 10.9 16.9 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

1,007

12.4

28

D5.4

Very Easy

Cases 0 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 36 0 7 0 1 4 19 0 76 0 9 5
486 0 1 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.3 0.0
100.0 0.0 17.9 0.0 1.5 4.2 7.5 0.0 31.0 0.0 23.1 9.1 13.7 0.0
100.0 0.0 0.0

810 10.0 28 D5.5

Not Enough Information Cases Pct.
320 100.0

21 100.0

2

7.7

0

0.0

0

0.0

53 100.0

0

0.0

77 100.0

0

0.0

67 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.2

18

7.1

0

0.0

3

1.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

768

9.5

17

D5.6

Balance (See Notes)

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

11.5

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

46 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1

0.4

29 100.0

6

2.4

134 100.0

9

23.1

18 32.7

3

0.1

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1,002 12.3 18
calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS
Questions F1, D5. Difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers for the election.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. For this table, the total used for comparison is the number of cases in the State. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, result¬ing in some over-counting.
Question D5:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that workers face long hours, too much paperwork, and a stressful day. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented that people do not want to work long hours for so little pay. Two jurisdictions stated that obtaining poll workers can be hindered by geographic reasons, primarily in rural areas. California: A couple of jurisdictions noted that it was difficult to recruit bilingual poll workers. A few jurisdictions noted that recruiting student poll workers was helpful in obtaining a sufficient number of workers. A few jurisdictions stated that there was lots of interest in volunteering for this election due to the attention around the presidential content. One jurisdiction stated that long hours can be a deterrent to poll workers, and half day shifts seemed to be key for some of its workers. One jurisdiction commented, “Does not apply – all mail ballot.” Colorado: Several jurisdictions reported a high rate of drop outs before the election, making it difficult to recruit and train additional judges. A few jurisdictions noted that they had the most difficulty finding a balance between members of the two major political parties. A couple of jurisdictions noted that student judges were important to obtaining enough poll workers, but one jurisdiction noted that recruiting was difficult because schools did not like students missing a whole day of school. A few jurisdictions noted that there can be long hours and a stressful environment. Florida: One jurisdiction commented that it had to send out two mailings to bring back retired workers and struggled to keep those committed to work the polls to actually be able to show up on election day. One jurisdiction stated that it encourages poll workers to “find a friend,” i.e., find someone they would like to work with and become poll workers, but it struggled to find enough non-Republicans to meet the requirements under the law. One jurisdiction reported it had approximately 100 more election workers available than needed, and nearly 100 more who were interested but did not attend orientation earlier in the year. Indiana: A few jurisdictions reported that their local political parties find their poll workers. A couple of jurisdictions noted that finding workers can be difficult due to long hours and difficult pay, and some quit after training because they didn’t know what they were getting into. One jurisdiction stated that presidential elections prove to be the easiest time to recruit poll as the public is very interested in assisting in the election process. One jurisdiction stated that the difficulty rested in the need to find over 1,500 poll workers, while another jurisdiction commented that it reduced the number of polling locations and boards to reduce the number of poll workers needed. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Missouri: One jurisdiction noted that 145 started training and quit when they saw how much work was involved; also, Missouri law which requires a balance between political parties among workers caused many problems. Another jurisdiction stated that recruitment of both paid and volunteer workers needs to be reviewed and improved with more interest in securing workers from the corporate world and volunteers from more of the area schools. Mississippi: One jurisdiction stated that the local election commission gathers poll workers based on registered voters per voting precinct. Montana: A few jurisdictions noted difficult obtaining workers due to language requirements, the need to fill last minute judge vacancies, and rural geographies. One jurisdiction commented that everyone works; it is hard to find younger people due to jobs and kids. North Carolina: Several jurisdictions commented that it is difficult to find roughly even numbers of workers from each political party. A few jurisdictions noted that finding poll workers can be more difficult in certain precincts, particularly smaller precincts and places with last minute vacancies. One jurisdiction noted that recruiting workers is getting hard, but it has been able to recruit from college and recent retirees. Nebraska: Several jurisdictions noted that finding poll workers is difficult due to long hours, low pay, work commitments, bilingual requirements, and finding even numbers of people to represent each political party. In addition, several jurisdictions also noted that they had a very difficult time recruiting younger poll workers during this election. One jurisdiction indicated that it will possibly consider all mail-in precincts in the future. A couple of jurisdictions reported they have a core group of volunteers who have served for many years, enjoy it, and take their responsibility very seriously.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION New Mexico: One jurisdiction reported difficulty with political party balance. Another jurisdiction stated that it lost a lot of workers due to new rules. A third jurisdiction stated that it is always hard to get presiding judges. New York; Hurricane Sandy affected the ability of poll workers in declared jurisdictions to report for work as originally assigned. Vermont: Two jurisdictions reported that large portions of their Board of Civil Authority worked during the day, and they had to seek others to fill the need. One of these jurisdictions reported they staff elections with retired people. One jurisdiction reported that it had a waiting list of residents who wish to be poll workers for each election. Another jurisdiction reported that it pays workers an attractive stipend and provides meals. When they compensated less, it was more difficult to have enough coverage (easier to find people but a significant expense for the Town). Wyoming: Several jurisdictions noted they had a difficult time recruiting workers, and their workers are getting older and are less likely to work. A few jurisdictions also reported having a difficult time recruiting younger workers. One jurisdiction stated that some precincts were easier to recruit for than others; some individuals did not mind being asked to work in a precinct other than their own, but others did not seem eager to work in a polling place other than their own.
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TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Number of Precincts

Total Cases

2,527

67

438

1

1,667

15

2,747

75

24,349 58

2,917 64

744 169

432

3

151

1

6,242 67

2,850 159

247

4

924 44

10,088 110

5,353 92

1,688 99

3,565 105

3,632 120

4,267 64

563 499

1,865

24

2,164 351

5,454 83

4,103 87

1,376 63

4,615 116

794 56

1,394 93

1,935

17

Number of Polling Places

Total Cases

2,252

67

533

1

1,537

15

1,631

75

14,686

57

1,237

64

744 169

285

3

151

1

4,928

67

0

240

4

807

44

6,520 110

3,976

92

1,787

99

1,308 105

2,506 120

2,256

64

542 499

1,636

24

1,353 351

3,688

83

2,936

87

1,396

63

2,913 116

422

56

1,182

93

556

17

Election Day Voting

Non-election Office

Election Office

Other Type

Total Pct. Total Pct. Total Pct.

2,252 100.0

…

…

453 85.0

…

…

1,458 94.9

0 0.0

0 0.0

1,494 91.6

3 0.2

…

14,493 98.7

69 0.5

2 0.0

1,029 83.2

53 4.3

…

744 100.0

0 0.0

…

283 99.3

2 0.7

0 0.0

143 94.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

4,631 94.0

19 0.4

0 0.0

…

…

…

231 96.3

…

3 1.3

762 94.4

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

3,054 76.8

758 19.1

…

1,688 94.5

0 0.0

…

1,246 95.3

…

…

2,506 100.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

2,166 96.0

…

…

542 100.0

…

…

1,590 97.2

0 0.0

…

1,353 100.0

0 0.0

…

3,544 96.1

144 3.9

0 0.0

2,883 98.2

53 1.8

…

1,257 90.0

36 2.6

…

…

…

…

422 100.0

…

…

1,089 92.1

…

…

412 74.1

8 1.4

0 0.0

Non-election Office
Total Pct.

Early Voting Election Office Total Pct.

…

…

75 14.1

5 0.9

40 2.6

23 1.5

95 5.8

37 2.3

5 0.0

43 0.3

94 7.6

61 4.9

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

8 5.3

0 0.0

194 3.9

95 1.9

…

…

3 1.3

3 1.3

0 0.0

45 5.6

295 4.5

115 1.8

98 2.5

66 1.7

…

99 5.5

62 4.7

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

13 0.6

77 3.4

…

…

45 2.8

1 0.1

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

2 0.1

31 2.2

…

…

…

…

…

93 7.9

123 22.1

13 2.3

Other Type

Total 16 2 2 0 0
0 1 0

Pct. … … 1.0 0.1 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … … … … … … … 0.0 … 0.1 … … … 0.0

Balance (See Notes)

Total 0 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 0 0
6,110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69
2,913 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.2) … 0.0 0.0 93.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

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TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Number of Precincts

Number of Polling Places

Total Cases

336 320

6,440

21

1,393

27

13,966

57

2,756 100

426

53

9,242

88

1,958

77

1,399

36

9,249

67

453

39

2,145

46

785

66

2,089

95

9,142 254

2,105

29

262 238

632 134

6,975

39

1,853

55

3,541 3,541

482

23

18

1

58

1

110

1

Total Cases

307 320

3,409

21

856 27

5,111 57

3,121 100

297 53

4,779 88

2,021 77

36

36

9,283

67

453 39

2,191 46

602

65

2,204

95

6,399 234

0

459 244

694

66

62

39

1,896

55

3,541 3,541

306 23

46

1

22

1

7,865

1

176,906 8,114 119,968 7,842

52

D1

D2a

Election Day Voting

Non-election Office

Election Office

Other Type

Total Pct. Total Pct. Total Pct.

307 100.0

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

622 72.7

71 8.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

2,756 88.3

0 0.0

…

287 96.6

…

…

4,645 97.2

0 0.0

1 0.0

1,944 96.2

0 0.0

…

…

36 100.0

…

4,687 50.5

…

…

413 91.2

40 8.8

0 0.0

2,145 97.9

…

…

496 82.4

21 3.5

0 0.0

1,985 90.1

10 0.5

5 0.2

5,606 87.6

…

…

…

…

…

150 32.7

104 22.7

3 0.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

20 32.3

42 67.7

0 0.0

1,831 96.6

22 1.2

…

3,541 100.0

…

…

301 98.4

…

…

45 97.8

1 2.2

…

21 95.5

0 0.0

…

7,755 98.6

0 0.0

…

91,282 51.6 1,492 0.8

46

19

D2b

D2c

14 0.0 5 D2d

Non-election Office
Total Pct.

Early Voting Election Office Total Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

67 7.8

25 2.9

0 0.0

0 0.0

293 9.4

72 2.3

9 3.0

…

3 0.1

85 1.8

0 0.0

77 3.8

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

46 2.1

5 0.8

47 7.8

106 4.8

88 4.0

860 13.4

…

…

…

27 5.9

156 34.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

42 67.7

15 0.8

53 2.8

…

…

…

5 1.6

…

…

0 0.0

1 4.5

19 0.2

91 1.2

2,556 1.4 1,595 0.9

25

29

D2e

D2f

Other Type

Total 5
0 3 0 4 0 0

Pct. … … 0.6 … … … … … … … 0.0 … 0.5 0.0 … … 0.9 0.0 0.0 … … … … … …

33 0.0 7 D2g

Balance (See Notes)

Total 0
3,409 66
5,111 0 1 45 0 0
4,596 0 0 30 10
(67) 0 15
694 (42) (25)
0 0 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0
100.0 7.7
100.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 49.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.5 (1.0) … 3.3
100.0 (67.7) (1.3)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

22,996 13.0 18
calc

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TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES
Questions D1, D2. Number of precincts, number of polling places, types of polling places.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting. Note: in this case there appears to be much doublecounting which merely indicates the multiple purposes of some polling places, e.g., an election office being used for both Early Voting and Election Day Voting.
Question D1:
Arkansas: Three jurisdictions reported including counts from early vote, precincts and absentee, and precincts plus early voting and absentee, respectively. One jurisdiction reported that this count does not include absentee and early precincts. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented, “Arizona underwent “Redistricting” prior to the 2012 General Election and part of the redistricting efforts for Maricopa County was to redraw and consolidate precincts. Prior to 2012, Maricopa County had 1,124 precincts (since 2006). With the increase in the number of voters in Maricopa County on the Permanent Early Voting List (1,162,067), we were able to merge several precincts to reach a new precinct total for 2012 of 724 precincts.” California: One jurisdiction commented, “Consolidated precincts.” One jurisdiction stated that D1a represents the total number of consolidated precincts for November 2012. One jurisdiction included voting precincts and mailed ballot precincts in its count, while another jurisdiction included precincts, vote by mail precincts, and mail ballot precincts. One jurisdiction reported 22 mail ballot precincts. Idaho: This number only includes physical precincts. It does not include any absentee precincts, which are non-physical precincts to allow the county to count all of the absentee ballots together as a precinct rather than dividing them by precincts. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that during redistricting, it combined a number of polling places together, but kept the precincts separate. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 14 jurisdictions. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Michigan: Totals include physical polling places (jurisdictional precincts) and central count locations (referred to as AVCB, absent voter counting boards). Missouri: One jurisdiction commented that it had “counted the office as (1). Absentee Voting.” Two jurisdictions reported that these figures include absentee. New Mexico: One jurisdiction reported that it had successfully used voting convenience centers. Another jurisdiction commented, “24 to include Ab/EV.” A third jurisdiction reported that this number includes early voting and absentee precincts. One jurisdiction reported that two precincts are split by district. Another jurisdiction commented, “23 Voting Convenience Centers and 12 Regular.” Puerto Rico; The island is divided into 110 precincts, 1533 Voting Units and 7755 polling stations (plus 1533 provisional voting stations, for a total 8557 polling stations). South Carolina: Does not include VR Office. Vermont: The City of Burlington has seven Wards which also serve seven State Representative Districts for 19 total Ward/District combinations. Another jurisdiction commented, “We only have one place to vote.”
Question D2:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “Early voting in the county clerk’s office.” Arizona: One jurisdiction noted, “D2a is a total number of physical polling places (677) IN ADDITION to the 15 early voting centers (3 offices and 12 off-site locations) and the 5 drop off “ballot box” sites for a total of 697. “Election Day” voting (D2b) is only offered at polling place locations. Each of the 724 precincts is technically assigned a polling place. However, in certain areas some precinct polling places were co-located within the same facility and that is why the “physical” polling place location total is less than the number of precincts existing. A co-located polling place consists of two different and separate boards specifically assigned to a given precinct and a specific set of voters within that precinct. Additionally, we had 7 All-Mail Precincts where the total number of registered voters within those precincts was less than 25 registered voters. These All-Mail precincts were still co-located and assigned to a physical polling place in case a voter opted to vote in-person versus by mail.” Another jurisdiction reported that it utilized Vote Centers and not traditional polling places for the 2012 elections.
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California: One jurisdiction reported that it had 787 polling places, with one early voting site that was also an election day voting site. A second jurisdiction indicated that the polling places for D2c and D2f are the same. A third jurisdiction reported that its Elections Office is election day and early voting. Similarly, two other jurisdictions noted that the Elections Office was used as an early voting site and also used on election day; the totals for D2a will not match. One jurisdiction stated that the Truckee early voting site was not open for voting on election day; therefore its count is off by one. Another jurisdiction commented, “18 PP/16 Locations + Office.” A different jurisdiction noted that its two election offices serve as polling places on Election Day and also as a location where voters can pick up their VBM ballot beginning 29 days before the election. Another jurisdiction noted that the county Elections Office is open for voting, by law, 29 days prior to election day; the total number of physical polling places in the county includes the county Elections Office. Idaho: Idaho does not have “Early Voting.” However, the States does have In-Person absentee voting at least 3 weeks before the election. The In-Person absentee polling place is being reported under the Early Voting heading. Florida: Two jurisdictions reported that their elections offices are used for election day voting and for early voting, so these are counted twice in the D2 totals. Three jurisdictions also noted that they use multiple early voting sites and included these in their counts. Another jurisdiction commented, “One City Hall.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Michigan: Total of physical precincts (jurisdictional precincts). Mississippi: Three jurisdictions noted that Mississippi does not have early voting but has absentee voting. One of these jurisdictions commented that its County Clerk’s office served as the only polling place for absentee voting until, but not on. Election Day. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Vote Centers.” A second jurisdiction noted that it had 39 election day, one absentee (Clerk’s Office), one alternate site, three tribal early voting sites, and three all mail precincts/not polling place. Another jurisdiction stated, “2 VCC locations.” A fourth jurisdiction commented that it had 16 precincts on election day and in-person voting and absentee. New York: Early voting not permitted in NY. Oregon: Vote by mail state. No early voting. South Dakota: One jurisdiction indicated that D2f refers to in-house absentee voting; election office is not considered absentee polling place – ballots are all processed at the 22 precincts’ polling places. Another jurisdiction noted that the auditor’s office was open for voters to absentee vote from 9-28-2012 until 3 P.M. election day. Virginia: Virginia is not an early voting state. Election offices may not be actual voting locations. Vermont: One jurisdiction reported that it does not have early voting. One jurisdiction stated that early voters may vote outside the election office at home and return the ballot to the election official before the close of polls on election day. A third jurisdiction stated that voters could vote in the Town Office through November 5, 2012; on November 6, 2012, everyone else had to come to the gymnasium to vote. Four jurisdictions noted that their early voting and election day voting is held in the same place – two at their Town Offices, one at its Town Clerk’s Office, and one at its Town Hall. Another jurisdiction commented, “D2f Same place.” One jurisdiction stated, “One polling placed at the school gym.” Another jurisdiction reported, “D2b. Our election office is not open on election day. D2e. Early voting is conducted in the election office (Town Clerk’s Office).” Washington: In Washington State, polling places are voting centers, centrally located. Each election office is for early voting as well as voting on election day. West Virginia: Nineteen jurisdictions reported that their election offices were used for both election day voting and early voting. Four jurisdictions indicated that one non-election polling place was used for both election day voting and early voting. One jurisdiction stated that two non-election polling places were sued for both election day voting and early voting. Wyoming: Five jurisdictions commented that the absentee polling places are not open on election day.
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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey

Sum of All Voting
Equipment (See Notes)

67

5,267

DRE w/o VVPAT

DRE w/ VVPAT

Total Pct. Total Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

Hybrid of DRE/Optical
Scan

Optical or Digital Scan

Optical or Digital Scan

Punch Card

Punch Card

Total Pct. Counters Pct. Booths BpC Counters Pct. Booths BpC

2,357 44.8 2,910 55.2

…

0 0.0

…

Lever

Paper

Total Pct. Booths Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

Other-1
Total Pct. 0 0.0

Other-2
Total Pct. 0 0.0

Alaska

1

914

… 443 48.5

…

338 37.0

…

…

…

…

133 14.6

…

…

Arizona

15

3,107

… 1,559 50.2

20 0.6

1,528 49.2 14,150 455

…

…

…

…

…

…

Arkansas

75

3,601 139 3.9 3,088 85.8

…

318 8.8

180 5

…

…

…

41 1.1

15 0.4

…

California

58

25,369

98 0.4 18,996 74.9 1,013 4.0 4,397 17.3 23,289 92

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

688 2.7

50 0.2 127 0.5

Colorado

64

4,544 214 4.7 3,732 82.1

…

598 13.2

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Connecticut

169

2,232

…

… 744 33.3

744 33.3 8,166 366

…

…

…

… 744 33.3

…

Delaware

3

1,292 1,288 99.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

4 0.3

2 0

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

District of Columbia

1

579

… 255 44.0 167 28.8

157 27.1

157 27

…

…

…

…

…

…

Florida

67

13,350 4,065 30.4

… 1,190 8.9 7,839 58.7 56,054 420

…

…

…

… 255 1.9

1 0.0

Georgia

159

26,515 26,515 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Hawaii

4

520

… 260 50.0

…

260 50.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Idaho

44

1,590

0 0.0

0 0.0 824 51.8

73 4.6 6,210 391

4 0.3

641 160

0 0.0

689 43.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

Illinois

110

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Indiana

92

9,543 7,427 77.8

… 869 9.1 1,239 13.0 3,605 38

…

…

…

8 0.1

…

…

Iowa

99

3,376

0 0.0

0 0.0 1,688 50.0 1,688 50.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

Kansas

105

6,423 3,617 56.3 1,118 17.4 606 9.4

919 14.3 8,107 126

…

…

…

163 2.5

…

…

Kentucky

120

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Louisiana

64

9,633 9,004 93.5

…

…

84 0.9

…

…

…

…

… 545 5.7

…

Maine

500

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Maryland

24

17,700 17,610 99.5

…

…

90 0.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Massachusetts

351

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Michigan

83

8,998

…

… 3,544 39.4 5,454 60.6

…

…

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

Minnesota

87

6,242

…

… 3,121 50.0

3,121 50.0 23,130 371

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

Mississippi

82

4,693 2,515 53.6 1,758 37.5

…

125 2.7

408

9

…

…

…

1 0.0 294 6.3

…

Missouri

116

6,978

… 3,720 53.3 336 4.8 2,807 40.2 13,679 196

…

…

…

…

64 0.9

51 0.7

Montana

56

1,037

…

… 505 48.7

345 33.3 4,353 420

…

…

…

187 18.0

…

…

Nebraska

93

1,302

…

… 1,087 83.5

215 16.5

…

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

…

Nevada

17

6,608

… 6,577 99.5

…

31 0.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey

Election Juris. in Survey

Sum of All Voting
Equipment (See Notes)

DRE w/o VVPAT Total Pct.

DRE w/ VVPAT Total Pct.

Hybrid of DRE/ Optical or Optical Scan Digital Scan
Total Pct. Counters Pct.

Optical or Digital Scan

Punch Card

Booths BpC Counters Pct.

Punch Card Booths BpC

Lever

Paper

Total Pct. Booths Pct.

Other-1

Other-2

Total Pct. Total Pct.

320

1,546

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

244 15.8 9,335 604

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0 1,302 84.2

0 0.0 0 0.0

21

11,244 11,244 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

New Mexico

33

1,202

53 4.4

179 14.9

413 34.4

531 44.2 3,222 268

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 26 2.2

New York

62

18,649

…

… 7,567 40.6 11,082 59.4

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

North Carolina

100

11,608

0 0.0 7,226 62.3 1,853 16.0

2,514 21.7 18,394 158

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0 15 0.1 0 0.0

North Dakota

53

387

…

…

…

384 99.2

…

…

…

…

…

3 0.8

…

Ohio

88

29,001

… 25,495 87.9 718 2.5 2,769 9.5 14,844 51

…

…

…

… 19 0.1

…

Oklahoma

77

2,064

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 2,064 100.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

… 0 0.0

Oregon

36

71

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

71 100.0

…

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 0 0.0

Pennsylvania

67

22,070 21,300 96.5

… 770 3.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Rhode Island

39

908

…

…

…

454 50.0 3,971 437

…

…

…

… 454 50.0

…

South Carolina

46

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

South Dakota

66

660

…

… 602 91.2

58 8.8

148 22

…

…

…

0 0.0

…

…

Tennessee

95

8,731 8,580 98.3

…

…

151 1.7

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Texas

254

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Utah

29

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Vermont

246

2,469

32 1.3

5 0.2 1,278 51.8

123 5.0 1,697 69

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

978 39.6

52 2.1 1 0.0

Virginia

134

8,273 7,937 95.9

… 184 2.2

…

…

…

…

…

76 0.9 76 0.9

…

Washington

39

426

…

321 75.4

19 4.5

86 20.2

50 12

…

…

…

…

…

…

West Virginia

55

4,667

0 0.0 4,304 92.2

58 1.2

205 4.4 1,737 37

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

100 2.1

0 0.0 0 0.0

Wisconsin

3,541

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Wyoming

23

1,154

0 0.0

321 27.8

360 31.2

473 41.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

…

…

…

American Samoa

1

46

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

…

46 100.0

…

…

Guam

1

3

…

…

…

3 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Puerto Rico

1

23,265

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

… 23,265 100.0

…

…

Virgin Islands

1

Sum of Above

8,154 319,857 121,638 38.0 79,357 24.8 31,893 10.0 56,496 17.7 214,888 4

4 0.0

641 160

0 0.0 27,677 8.7 2,586 0.8 206 0.1

States Included

17

18

26

40

23

1

1

0

14

13

5

Question

calc

F7a

F7b

F7c

F7d[c]

F7d[b]

F7e[c]

F7e[b]

F7f

F7g[b]

F7h

F7i

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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT Question F7. Information on the number and type of voting equipment used in the elections and the purposes for which they are used.
Note: This table is a simple summary of a complex set of information. Researchers are advised to consult the dataset for complete informa¬tion. The “Sum of All Voting Equipment” is a calculated estimate to enable comparative percentage values. This sum is determined by using the number of machines or counters as well as the number of booths for paper ballots and the “other” types of equipment.
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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Polling Places Total
2,252 533
1,537 1,631 14,686 1,237
744 285 151 4,928
240 807 6,520 3,976 1,787 1,308 2,506 2,256 542 1,636 1,353 3,688 2,936 1,396 2,913 422 1,182 556

Precincts

Total per PP

2,527

1.1

438 0.8

1,667

1.1

2,747

1.7

24,349

1.7

2,917 2.4

744

1.0

432

1.5

151

1.0

6,242

1.3

2,850

…

247

1.0

924

1.1

10,088

1.5

5,353

1.3

1,688 0.9

3,565 2.7

3,632

1.4

4,267

1.9

563

1.0

1,865

1.1

2,164

1.6

5,454

1.5

4,103

1.4

1,376

1.0

4,615

1.6

794

1.9

1,394

1.2

1,935 3.5

Registrants

Total

per PP

3,162,135 1,404.1

579,304 1,087

3,725,362 2,424

1,610,364

987

18,996,338 1,293

3,651,091 2,952

2,202,278 2,960

632,805 2,220

557,774 3,694

11,934,446 2,422

6,050,050

…

705,668 2,940

895,834 1,110

8,116,660 1,245

4,562,268 1,147

2,236,068 1,251

1,771,252 1,354

3,037,153 1,212

2,965,751 1,315

1,026,086 1,893

3,694,658 2,258

4,340,000 3,208

7,454,553 2,021

3,387,783 1,154

1,399,209 1,002

4,191,778 1,439

681,608 1,615

1,163,871

985

1,258,409 2,263

Voters

Election Day Voters (exc. Provisionals)

Provisional Ballots

Total per PP Total per PP Total per PP

2,083,309 925.1

…

6,728 3.0

302,465 567 203,496 382

18,255

34

2,323,579 1,512 633,660 412 183,259 119

1,080,809

663

565,716 347

2,592

2

13,096,097 892 5,460,518 372 1,065,156

73

2,594,628 2,098

421,980 341

62,847

51

1,560,640 2,098

…

963

1

417,631 1,465 396,408 1,391

453

2

294,254 1,949

191,166 1,266

38,636 256

8,557,692 1,737 3,736,946 758

42,745

9

3,910,557

… 1,979,776

…

…

436,774 1,820 236,586 986

711

3

666,290 826 496,546 615

…

5,339,488 819 4,021,805 617

43,772

7

2,663,373 670 2,073,074 521

4,801

1

1,589,951 890 896,757 502

4,996

3

1,115,281 853 784,825 600

38,865

30

1,815,896 725 1,710,486 683

287

0

2,014,511 893 1,650,912 732

6,862

3

724,759 1,337 536,635 990

315

1

2,734,189 1,671 2,068,656 1,264

79,876

49

3,184,196 2,353 2,913,489 2,153

12,920

10

4,780,701 1,296 3,505,208 950

2,675

1

2,950,780 1,005 2,640,446 899

…

889,914 637 708,020 507

22,478

16

2,840,776 975 2,567,998 882

6,393

2

491,966 1,166

198,775 471

5,562

13

815,568 690 595,284 504

15,130

13

1,017,772 1,831

305,122 549

8,329

15

Poll Workers

Voting Equipment

Total

per PP …

2,499

5

11,700

8

9,346

6

89,440

6

10,790

9

4,464

6

4,129

14

1,708

11

52,086

11

…

2,583

11

5,860

7

49,357

8

22,427

6

9,821

5

8,374

6

15,290

6

17,782

8

5,983

11

23,603

14

18,946

14

37,206

10

27,602

9

6,974

5

21,588

7

4,201

10

8,322

7

5,165

9

Total per PP 5,267 2.3

914

2

3,107

2

3,601

2

25,369

2

4,544

4

2,232

3

1,292

5

579

4

13,350

3

26,515

…

520

2

1,590

2

…

9,543

2

3,376

2

6,423

5

…

9,633

4

…

17,700

11

…

8,998

2

6,242

2

4,693

3

6,978

2

1,037

2

1,302

1

6,608

12

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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Polling Places Total
307 3,409
856 5,111 3,121 297 4,779 2,021
36 9,283
453 2,191
602 2,204 6,399
459 694 62 1,896 3,541 306 46 22 7,865
119,968

D2a

Precincts

Total per PP

336

1.1

6,440

1.9

1,393

1.6

13,966

2.7

2,756 0.9

426

1.4

9,242

1.9

1,958

1.0

1,399 38.9

9,249

1.0

453

1.0

2,145

1.0

785

1.3

2,089 0.9

9,142

1.4

2,105

…

262 0.6

632 0.9

6,975 112.5

1,853

1.0

3,541

1.0

482

1.6

18 0.4

58 2.6

110 0.0

Registrants

Total

per PP

878,136 2,860

5,415,639 1,589

1,252,438 1,463

11,720,541 2,293

6,655,291 2,132

…

7,987,697 1,671

2,114,489 1,046

2,199,360 61,093

8,352,342 900

725,309 1,601

2,875,121 1,312

523,410

869

4,024,960 1,826

13,690,729 2,140

1,508,372

…

460,817 1,004

5,428,091 7,821

3,904,959 62,983

1,246,559

657

3,987,248 1,126

240,438

786

17,764

386

50,701 2,305

2,402,941 306

Voters

Election Day Voters (exc. Provisionals)

Provisional Ballots

Total per PP Total per PP Total per PP

718,700 2,341 654,450 2,132

0

0

3,677,463 1,079 3,047,584 894

97,481

29

679,080 793 225,870 264

6,630

8

7,128,852 1,395 4,342,214 850 451,868

88

4,539,729 1,455 1,743,642 559

51,192

16

326,239 1,098 230,890 777

…

5,632,423 1,179 3,547,582 742 208,087

44

1,343,380 665 1,163,957 576

5,313

3

1,820,507 50,570

…

1,771

49

5,783,621 623 5,488,684 591

49,000

5

451,593 997 423,691 935

2,357

5

1,981,516 904 1,525,284 696

5,473

2

368,816

613

209,102 347

441

1

2,480,182 1,125 1,006,868 457

7,089

3

7,993,851 1,249

5,606

1

50,787

8

1,023,036

…

573,149

…

53,483

…

304,509

663

219,399 478

19

0

3,896,846 5,615 3,431,110 4,944

12,862

19

3,206,490 51,718

11,828 191

6,832 110

685,099 361

521,311 275

3,152

2

3,078,135 869 2,413,557 682

135

0

250,701

819

183,413 599

33

0

13,167 286

11,903 259

0

0

34,075 1,549

32,492 1,477

144

7

1,878,969 239 1,829,762 233

12,715

2

176,906

1.5 193,653,908 1,614 131,590,825 1,097 74,343,638 620 2,702,470

23

54

53

54

51

48

D1

A1

F1a

F1b

E1

Poll Workers

Voting Equipment

Total per PP

2,392

8

…

7,671

9

82,811

16

23,020

7

1,286

4

45,556

10

7,489

4

1,402

39

…

3,016

7

13,213

6

2,827

5

15,879

7

36,019

6

4,850

…

3,055

7

24,691

36

782

13

7,263

4

34,902

10

2,449

8

336

7

286

13

89,413

11

Total per PP

1,546

5

11,244

3

1,202

1

18,649

4

11,608

4

387

1

29,001

6

2,064

1

71

2

22,070

2

908

2

…

660

1

8,731

4

…

…

2,469

5

8,273

12

426

7

4,667

2

…

1,154

4

46

1

3

0

23,265

3

887,854

7 319,857

3

50

46

D3

F7:calc

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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE Questions A1, D1, D2, D3, E1, F1, F7. Calculations for selected factors per polling place.
Note: This table summarizes information from several tables and calculates the value of the unit in each category per polling place. These values are provided to give an overview of the distribution of these factors amongst the States and are merely illustrative.
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APPENDIX C
Questionnaire
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION 2012 Election Administration & Voting Survey

The ongoing process of improving America’s election systems relies in part on having accurate data about the way Americans cast their ballots. In 2002, Congress chartered the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to collect information on the state of American elections and make it widely available to policy makers, advocates, scholars, journalists and the general public. Since 2004, the Commission has sponsored a biennial survey as its primary tool for fulfilling that mission. We are pleased to present the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, and we ask for your help in making it the most complete and accurate survey in its history. The questions below ask for information about ballots cast; voter registration; overseas and military voting; Election Day activities; voting technology; and other important issues. The section concerning the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA) serves as the EAC’s standardized format for state reporting of UOCAVA voting information as required by 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1. States that complete and timely submit this section to the EAC will fulfill their UOCAVA reporting requirement under 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1(c). Additionally, EAC is mandated by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to collection information from states concerning the impact of that statute on the administration of Federal elections. With this information EAC is required to make a report to Congress and provide recommendations for the improvement of Federal and State procedures, forms, and other NVRA matters. States that timely respond to all questions in this survey concerning voter registration related matters will meet their NVRA reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7 and EAC regulations.
The EAC recognizes the burden that asking for this data places on state and local election officials, and we have worked to minimize that burden as much as possible.
In advance, we thank you for your cooperation and look forward to answering any questions you might have.

Information supplied by: Name Office/Agency name Address 1 Address 2 City E-mail address Telephone (area code and number)

Extension

Title

State

Zip Code

Fax number (area code and number)

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Instructions for Completing the 2012 Election Administration & Voting Survey

1. This survey collects information on election administration issues in local election offices (typically counties or townships) that are responsible for the administration of the November 2012 general election. As such, all data should be reported at the level of the local jurisdiction. However, the State or Territorial level election office may fill out any or all of the information on behalf of the local election offices under its jurisdiction.

2. Do not leave items blank - always provide an answer to the question asked using the “Data not available” or “Other” categories discussed below, if needed.

3. Use the “Data not available” box if the question asks for details that are not required by your state law or the question asks for information that is not currently collected.

4. You may find it helpful to read an entire section before answering any of the questions in that section.

5. Please attempt to record data according to the categories as they are defined in the question. If your jurisdiction uses a different data classification scheme (for instance, collects data in such a way that combines two or more categories listed in a question), you can use the space provided for “Other” to provide numbers and details on these categories. Use as many “Other” categories as you need to adequately report the relevant statistics for your jurisdiction. If you enter information into the “Other” field, please use the comments field to provide an explanation for the answer.

In the example below, the jurisdiction does not collect separate statistics on the number of duplicate and rejected registration forms, but instead has only one number that represents the total number of registration forms that are either duplicated/or rejected.

EXAMPLE: A5. In order to evaluate the workflow of your office over the last election cycle, enter the total number of registration
forms your jurisdiction received from all sources during the period from the close of registration for the November 2010 general election until the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Include here any Election Day or Same Day registrations, if applicable. Also include any special categories of voters who may have extended deadlines, such as returning military personnel, if applicable.

A5a. Total available

...................

5000

Data not

Next, divide the total number of registration application forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A4a.

Data not available
▼

A5b. New registrations

..............................................

4000 ............

A5c. Invalid or rejected (other than duplicates)

..............................................

............

A5d. Duplicate of existing registration

..............................................

............

A5e. Changes to name, party or within-jurisdiction address change .............................

500

............

A5f. Moved into jurisdiction but was registered elsewhere in the state .......................... A5g. Other→ comments: duplicate and invalid registrations combined ........................

200

............

300

A5h. Other→ comments: _ TOTAL

........................................ ..............................................

5000

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SECTION A

VOTER REGISTRATION

EAC is mandated by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to collection information from states concerning the impact of that statute on the administration of Federal elections. With this information EAC is required to make a report to Congress and provide recommendations for the improvement of Federal and State procedures, forms, and other NVRA matters. States that timely respond to all questions in this survey concerning voter registration related matters will meet their NVRA reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7 and EAC regulations.

Roadmap to Section A:
• A1, A2 and A3 ask for information about the number of registered voters in your jurisdiction and how you calculate those statistics.
• A4 asks for information about registration activity on days in which it was possible for a person to both register and vote on the same day.
• A5 asks for information on all registration forms for all types of registration transactions (successful and unsuccessful) received by your office.
• A6 asks for the sources of all registration forms (both successful and unsuccessful). • A7 asks for the sources of new registrations. • A8 asks for the sources of duplicate registrations. • A9 asks for the sources of invalid or rejected registrations. • A10 asks for information on removal notices sent under NVRA Section 8(d) 2. • A11 asks for the number of voters removed from the voter registration rolls and the reason for their removal.

A1. Enter the total number of persons in your jurisdiction who were registered and eligible to vote in the November 2012 general election. Include all persons eligible to vote in the election including special categories of voters with extended deadlines (such as returning military). Do not include any persons under the age of 18 who may be registered under a “pre-registration” program.

A1a. Total ................................................................................

Data not

available

A1 Comments

A2. When you report the number of registered voters in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election (as in A1a) do you include both active and inactive voters in the count, or does your jurisdiction only include active voters? (Select only one)
A2a. Jurisdiction uses both active and inactive registered voters .............................................................. A2b. Jurisdiction only uses active registered voters ................................................................................... A2c. Other → comments: ____________________...................................................................................
A2 Comments

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A3. Enter the total number of persons who were registered and eligible to vote in the November 2012 general election

into the following categories. Do not include any persons under the age of 18 who may be registered under a “pre-registration”

program.

Data not

available ▼

A3a. Active

....................................................................

A3b. Inactive

....................................................................

A3 Comments

A4. If your state’s laws allowed any voters to register and then to vote on the same day, enter the total number of registration forms received on those days in which it was possible to both register for and vote in the November 2012 general election on the same day. This question includes jurisdictions in states that have formal Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration and those states that have other situations that provide Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration. This question includes jurisdictions in states that permit Election Day Registration for voting for office of President, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island.

A4a. Total new registrations…

........................................................ Data not available

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Not applicable

A4b. Are the numbers you provided for question A4a because your state allows Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration for all voters, or does your answer come from a difference circumstance?
…..Yes, our state has Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration. …. No, our state does not have formal Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration, but some voters were able to
register and vote on the same day for the 2012 election. …. Other  comments: ________________________________ …. Not applicable.
A4 Comments

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A5. In order to evaluate the workflow of your office over the last election cycle, enter the total number of forms your jurisdiction received from all sources during the period from the close of registration for the November 2010 general election until the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Include any forms that were processed, such as changes to name, party or address, duplicates, or pre-registrations. Include here any Election Day or Same Day registrations, if applicable. Also include any special categories of voters who may have extended deadlines such as returning military personnel, if applicable.

A5a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of registration application forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A5a.
Data not available ▼

A5b. New valid registrations (excluding pre-registrations of persons under 18)...

..................

A5c. New “pre” registrations of persons under age 18 ........................................

..................

A5d. Duplicate of existing valid registration

..........................................

..................

A5e. Invalid or rejected (other than duplicates)

..........................................

..................

A5f. Changes to name, party or within-jurisdiction address change ....................

..................

A5g. Address changes that cross jurisdiction borders.......................................... A5h. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5i. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

..................

A5j. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5k. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5l. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

A5a

A5 Comments

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A6a through A6o: Divide the total number of all registration forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following sources. A7a through A7o: Divide the total number of new registration forms received (as entered in A5b) into the following sources. A8a through A8o: Divide the total number of duplicate registration forms received (as entered in A5d) into the following sources. A9a through A9o: Divide the total number of invalid or rejected registration forms (as entered in A5e) received into the following sources.

*Sub-question “e” should include all forms handled through the public assistance agency process (i.e., paper, online).

(from A5a)
A6. Total forms received NA ▼

(from A5b)
A7. New registrations
NA ▼

(from A5d) A8. Duplicate of
existing registrations
NA ▼

(from A5e)
A9. Invalid or rejected NA ▼

a. Individual voters submitting applications by mail, fax, or email ................

b. Individual voters registering in person at the election/registrar’s office .....

c. Individual voters submitting registration forms via the Internet.................

d. Motor vehicle offices or other offices that issue drivers licenses............... e.* Public assistance offices mandated as registration sites under NVRA .....

f. State funded agencies primarily serving persons with disabilities.............

g. Armed forces recruitment offices..............................................................

h. Other agencies designated by the State not mandated by NVRA............. i. Registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties ..................

j. Other → comments: _______________________________ ................. k. Other → comments: _______________________________ ............... l. Other → comments: ______________________________ ............... m. Other → comments: _______________________________ ............... n. Other → comments: ______________________________ ............... o. Other → comments: _______________________________ ...............

TOTAL............................................................................................................. A5a

A5b

A5d

A5e

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A6, A7, A8, and A9 Comments

A10. Enter the total number of confirmation notices sent to voters in the period between the close of registration for the November 2010 general election and the close of registration for the November 2012 general election, because the person had not voted or appeared to vote in the two previous federal elections (per NVRA Section 8 (d) (2)).

A10a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of confirmation notices mailed (as entered in A10a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A10a.
Data not available ▼

A10b. Received back from voters confirming registration ...............................................

.......

A10c. Received back confirming registration should be invalidated ................................

.......

A10d. Returned back as undeliverable

.....................................................

.......

A10e. Status unknown (neither received confirmation nor returned undeliverable).........

.......

A10f. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

A10g. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

A10h. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

TOTAL

.................................................

A10a

A10 Comments

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A11. Enter the total number of voters removed from the voter registration rolls in your jurisdiction in the period between the close of registration for the November 2010 general election and the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Note this question asks for those ineligible to vote, not merely those moved into an “inactive” status.

A11a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of voters removed (as entered in A11a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A11a.
Data not available
▼

A11b. Moved outside jurisdiction

..........................................

A11c. Death

..........................................

A11d. Disqualifying felony conviction

..........................................

A11e. Failure to respond to notice sent and failure to vote in the two most recent

federal elections

..........................................

A11f. Declared mentally incompetent

..........................................

A11g. Voter requested to be removed for reasons other than felony conviction,

mental status, or moved outside jurisdiction ..........................................

A11h. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11i. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11j. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11k. Other → comments: ____________________..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

.................. .................. .................. .................. .................. ..................
A11a

A11 Comments

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SECTION B

UNIFORMED & OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT (UOCAVA)

Section B serves as the EAC’s standardized format for the state reporting of UOCAVA voting information as required by 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1. States that complete and timely submit this section to the EAC will fulfill their UOCAVA reporting requirement under 42 U.S.C §1973ff-1(c).
Pursuant UOCAVA, this section collects various data elements needed to determine: (1) the combined number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters; (2) the combined number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters; and (3) the combined number of returned ballots cast by UOCAVA voters (the number of cast ballots is practically determined by collecting data concerning the total votes counted and rejected).

Roadmap to Section B: • B1 and B2 ask for information about the number and type of UOCAVA absentee ballots transmitted. • B3 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted for counting. • B4, B5, B6, and B7 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot returned by type of UOCAVA voter. • B8 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots counted. • B9, B10, B11, and B12 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot counted by type of UOCAVA voter. • B13 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots rejected. • B14 asks for information on reasons why UOCAVA ballots were rejected. • B15, B16, B17, and B18 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot rejected by type of UOCAVA voter.

B1. Enter the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the November 2012 general election.

B1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters (as entered in B1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in B1a.
Data not available ▼

B1b. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign .........................................

..................

B1c. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

..........................................

B1d. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

B1e. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

..................

TOTAL

..........................................

B1a

B1 Comments

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B2. Of the UOCAVA absentee ballots transmitted (as entered in B1a) how many were:

B2a. Returned by voter and submitted for counting (include both those that

were counted and those that were rejected) ..........................................

B2b. Returned as undeliverable

..........................................

B2c. Spoiled or replaced ballots

..........................................

B2d. Status unknown (neither returned undeliverable nor returned from voter) ... B2e. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... B2f. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... B2g. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

B2 Comments

Data not available ▼
.................. .................. .................. ..................
B1a

B3. Enter the total number of all UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)) returned by UOCAVA voters and submitted for counting for the November 2012 general election. Please include both those ballots that were later counted and those that were rejected. Do not include ballots that were returned undeliverable.

B3a. Total

..... Data not available

B3 Comments

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B4a through B4c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by UOCAVA voters and submitted for counting (as entered in B3) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:
• B5a through B5c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting. • B6a through B6c: FWAB returned and submitted for counting. • B7a through B7c: Other type of ballots returned and submitted for counting.
Of the total UOCAVA ballots returned (as entered in B3),
how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B4. All UOCAVA ballots NA ▼

B5. Absentee ballots NA ▼

B6. FWAB
NA ▼

B7. Other type of ballot → NA ▼

Type of UOCAVA voter:

a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

c. Other type of voter→

comments:

TOTAL

B3

B4, B5, B6, and B7 Comments

B8. Enter the total number of all UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and FWAB) counted in the November 2012 general election.

B8a. Total…………………………………………………………… Data not available
B8 Comments

………………..

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B9a through B9c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted (as entered in B8) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:
• B10a through B10c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots counted. • B11a through B11c: FWAB counted. • B12a through B12c: Other type of ballots counted.

Type of UOCAVA voter:
a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign ..............................................................

B9. All UOCAVA
ballots
NA ▼

Of the total UOCAVA ballots counted (as entered in B8), how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B10. Absentee ballots NA ▼

B11. FWAB
NA ▼

B12. Other type of ballot → NA ▼

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters ................

c. Other type of voter →....................................... comments: _________________________
TOTAL................................................................. B8

B9, B10, B11 and B12 Comments

B13. Enter the total number of UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and FWAB) rejected in the November 2012 general election.

B13a. Total………………….

………….……… Data not available

B13 Comments

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B14. Please divide the total number of all UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13a) into the following categories indicating the reason the absentee ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in B13a.
Data not available ▼

B14a. Ballot not received on time/missed deadline. ..........................................

.................

B14b. Problem with voter signature

..........................................

.................

B14c. Ballot lacked a postmark

..........................................

B14d. Other → comments: ________________________________ ..................

B14e. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

B14f. Other → comments: ________________________________ ..................

.................

TOTAL

..........................................

B13a

B14 Comments

B15a through B15c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:

• B16a through B16c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots rejected. • B17a through B17c: FWAB rejected. • B18a through B18c: Other type of ballots rejected.
Of the total UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13),

how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B15. All UOCAVA

B16. Absentee

B17. FWAB

B18. Other type of

ballots

ballots

ballot →

NA

NA

NA

NA

▼

▼

▼

▼

Type of UOCAVA voter:

a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

c. Other type of voter →

comments ____________________________

TOTAL

B13

B15, B16, B17, and B18 Comments

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SECTION C

Domestic Civilian Absentee Ballots

Roadmap to Section C. • C1 asks for information about absentee ballots transmitted and the status of the transmitted ballots. • C2 and C3 ask for information on any voters who may be registered as permanent absentee voters. • C4 asks for information on the status of absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting. • C5 asks for information on the reasons absentee ballots were rejected.

C1. Enter the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters for the November 2012 general election. Do not include absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters

C1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to voters (as entered in C1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in C1a.
Data not available ▼

C1b. Returned by voters and submitted for counting (include both

those that were later counted and those that were rejected)........................

.................

C1c. Returned as undeliverable

..........................................

.................

C1d. Spoiled or replaced ballots

..........................................

.................

C1e. Status unknown (neither returned undeliverable nor returned from voter)....

.................

C1f. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

C1g. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

C1h. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

C1a

C1 Comments

C2. Does your jurisdiction have a permanent absentee voter registration list in which voters may apply to receive an absentee (or mail) ballot for subsequent elections without further application? Do not include UOCAVA voters.
....... Yes → Continue to question C3. ....... No → Skip to question C4.
C2 Comments

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C3. Of the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted (as entered in C1) how many ballots were sent to voters in your jurisdiction because they appear on a permanent absentee (or mail) ballot voter registration list?

Total

..... Data not available

C3 Comments

C4. Of the total number of absentee ballots returned by voters and submitted for counting (as entered in C1b) how many ballots were:

C4a. Counted in the November 2012 general election.......................................... C4b. Rejected in the November 2012 general election ......................................... C4c. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... C4d. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

Data not available ▼
................. .................
C1b

C4 Comments

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C5. Please divide the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected (as entered in C4b) into the following categories indicating the reason why the absentee ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in C4b.
Data not available ▼

C5a. Ballot not received on time/missed deadline. ..........................................

.................

C5b. No voter signature

..........................................

.................

C5c. No witness signature

..........................................

.................

C5d. Non-matching signature

..........................................

.................

C5e. No election official’s signature on ballot

..........................................

.................

C5f. Ballot returned in an unofficial envelope

..........................................

.................

C5g. Ballot missing from envelope

..........................................

.................

C5h. Envelope not sealed

..........................................

.................

C5i. No resident address on envelope

..........................................

.................

C5j. Multiple ballots returned in one envelope.

..........................................

.................

C5k. Voter deceased.

..........................................

.................

C5l. Voter already voted in person

..........................................

.................

C5m. First-time voter without proper identification ..........................................

.................

C5n. No ballot application on record

..........................................

C5o. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

C5p. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

.................

C5q. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5r. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5s. Other → comments: ________________________________..................... C5t. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5u. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

C5v. Other → comments: ________________________________.....................

TOTAL

..........................................

C4b

C5 Comments

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SECTION D

Election Administration

• D1 asks for information on the number of precincts in your jurisdiction • D2 asks for information on the number and type of polling places in your jurisdiction • D3, D4, and D5 ask for information on poll workers utilized in the November 2012 general election.

D1. Enter the total number of precincts in your jurisdictions for the November 2012 general election.

D1a. Total D1 Comments

..... Data not available

D2. Enter the total number of physical polling places in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election. Please include physical polling places in operation on Election Day and physical polling places in operation before Election Day (such as early vote centers).

D2a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total physical polling places in your jurisdiction (as entered in D2a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in D2a. If you do not include election offices in your count of polling places, enter 0.
Data not available ▼
Election Day voting

D2b. Physical polling places other than election offices ........................................

.................

D2c. Election offices

..........................................

.................

D2d. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

Early voting

D2e. Physical polling places other than election offices ........................................

D2f. Election offices

..........................................

D2g. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

TOTAL

..........................................

................. .................
D2a

D2 Comments

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D3. Enter the total number of poll workers used in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election. • Poll workers may include election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms that refer to persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing the voter with a ballot or setting up the voting machine for the voter; and serving other functions as dictated by State law.
• Include all people recruited specifically for the purposes of working at physical polling places in operation on and/or before Election Day, but, do not include observers stationed at the polling places or regular office staff.

D3a. Total D3 Comments

..... Data not available

D4. If your jurisdiction has data on the ages of its poll workers (for example, from voter registration records, payroll records or from poll worker applications), enter the total number of poll workers in each age category.
D4a. Under 18 years old D4b. 18 to 25 D4c. 26 to 40 D4d. 41 to 60 D4e. 61 to 70 D4f. 71 years old and over
................................................................................................................................ Data not available
D4 Comments

D5. How difficult or easy was it for your jurisdiction to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers for the November 2012 general election?
....... Very difficult ....... Somewhat difficult ....... Neither difficult nor easy ....... Somewhat easy ....... Very easy ....... Not enough information to answer
D5 Comments

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SECTION E

Provisional Ballots

• E1 asks for the information on the number and status of provisional ballots submitted. • E2 asks for the information on reasons why provisional ballots were rejected.

E1. Enter the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots in the November 2012 general election.

E1a.Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots in the November 2012 general election (as entered in E1) into the following categories.
Data not available ▼

E1b. Counted the full ballot

..........................................

E1c. Counted part of the ballot

..........................................

E1d. Rejected ballot

..........................................

E1e. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... E1f. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

E1a

E1 Comments

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E2. Please divide the total number of provisional ballots rejected (as entered in E1d) into the following categories indicating the reason the provision ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in E1d.

E2a. Voter not registered in the state

..........................................

E2b. Voter registered in state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction .......

E2c. Voter registered in state but attempted to vote in the wrong precinct............

E2d. Failure to provide sufficient identification

..........................................

E2e. Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible .................................

E2f. Ballot missing from envelope

..........................................

E2g. No signature

..........................................

E2h. Non-matching signature

..........................................

E2i. Voter already voted

..........................................

E2j. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2k. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2l. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2m. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2n. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2o. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2p. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

TOTAL

Ed1

Data not available ▼

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SECTION F

Election Day Activities

• F1 and F2 ask for turnout figures for the November 2012 general election and the source used to arrive at this number.
• F3 asks for the number of first time voters who registered to vote by mail and, under HAVA 303(b), were required to provide identification in order to vote.
• F4 asks for information on electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters that may have been used. • F5 and F6 ask for information on printed poll books or printed lists of voters that may have been used. • F7 asks for the type of primary voting equipment used. • F8 solicits any additional comments jurisdictions may wish to share regarding their Election Day experiences.

F1. Enter the total number of people in your jurisdiction who participated in the November 2012 general election. Include all type of voters (civilian and military) by all types of ballots. Include rejected provisional ballots only if your jurisdiction credits the person’s vote history even though the provisional ballot was rejected.

F1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number people who participated in the November 2012 general election (as entered in F1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in F1a.

Data not available ▼

F1b. Voted at a physical polling place on Election Day (not including provisional ballots

or absentee ballots dropped off at the polls).

..........................................

F1c. UOCAVA voters who voted via absentee or FWAB (as in B2a) ....................

F1d. Voted using a domestic civilian absentee ballot (as in C1b)..........................

F1e. Voted using a provisional ballot (as in E1)

..........................................

F1f. Voted at an early vote center (as in D2e,f,g)…………………………………….

F1g. Voted by mail in a vote by mail jurisdiction

..........................................

F1h. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

F1i. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

F1j. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

F1a

F1 Comments

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F2. Indicate the source used to arrive at the total number of voters entered in F1a. (Select only one source.)
....... Number of voters checked off by poll workers or who signed poll books at physical polling places plus the number of UOCAVA and other absentee or early voters.
....... Number of ballots counted at precincts and/or at a central location (including UOCAVA and other absentee or early vote ballots)
....... Number of voters generated after "vote history" has been added. ....... Number of votes cast for the highest office on the ballot. ....... Other:→ comments: ________________________________
F2 Comments

F3. HAVA 303(b) states that all first-time voters in a State who registered to vote by mail are required to provide identification in order to vote and have their ballot counted. Enter the number of voters who provided identification and were able to vote in the November 2012 general election in your jurisdiction.

Total F3 Comments

..... Data not available ..................

Not applicable

F4. Were electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters used at the polling place for the November 2012 general election in your jurisdiction to (select either Yes or No for each item):
Yes No a. Sign voters in ....................................................................... b. Update voter history............................................................. c. Look up polling places.......................................................... d. Other → comments: _____________________________ . e. Information unavailable ........................................................
F4 Comments

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F5. Did your jurisdiction use printed lists of registered voters at the polls in the November 2012 Federal general election?

Yes ............................................ No .............................................. Information unavailable ..............

→ Continue to F6 → Skip to F7 → Skip to F7

F5 Comments

F6. Did your state print and ship the printed poll books to your local jurisdiction or did your jurisdiction arrange for the printing of the poll books? (Select only one.)
State printed poll books and shipped to jurisdiction...................................... Jurisdiction arranged for printing of poll books ............................................. Combination of printing by the state and local jurisdiction ........................... Information unavailable ................................................................................
F6 Comments

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F7. Enter information on the number and type of voting equipment used for the 2012 November general election. Then, for each type of voting equipment, please identify how the machines were used in the voting process and where the ballots from that machine type were tallied. Do not include backup systems that were not actually used.

Type of Equipment

Number used

F7a. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
(Not Equipped with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT))

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

F7b. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
(Equipped with VVPAT)

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Not Available

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

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Type of Equipment
F7c. Electronic system that prints voter choices on an optical scan ballot (hybrid of a DRE and an optical scan system)

Number used

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available
F7d. Optical/Digital Scan

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Number of counters:

______

Number of booths:
______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment
F7c. Electronic system that prints voter choices on an optical scan ballot (hybrid of a DRE and an optical scan system)

Number used

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available
F7d. Optical/Digital Scan

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Number of counters:

______

Number of booths:
______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment F7e. Punch Card
F7f. Lever

Number used

Make

Model

Number of counters:
______

Number of booths:

______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not

Not

Not

Available Available Available

Version Vendor

Not

Not

Available Available

Not

Not

Available Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Early Vote Site voting Not Available

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

OMB Control No. 3265-0006

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89

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Type of Equipment

Number used

F7g. Hand-counted paper ballots (not optical scan system)

Make

Number of booths:

______

Not Available

Model

F7h. Other

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Version Vendor

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment F7i. Other

Number used

Make

Model

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Version Vendor

Not

Not

Available Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available

F8. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission welcomes any general comments the jurisdiction may wish to share regarding its Election Day experiences
(e.g., problems with voting system anomalies*, recounts, staffing, challenges to eligibility, long lines, etc.), or note-worthy success in administering the
November 2012 general election. Please feel free to attach additional pages as necessary.
* An anomaly is defined as an irregular or inconsistent action or response from the voting system or system component resulting in some disruption to the election process. Incidents resulting from administrator error or procedural deficiencies are not considered anomalies for purposes of this survey question (EAC Voting Systems Testing and Certification Program Manual).

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END OF SURVEY
THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING TO THIS SURVEY *This information collection is required for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to meet its statutory requirements under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15301), the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1 et seq.), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voters Act (UOCAVA) (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1). Respondent’s obligation to reply to this information collection is mandatory as required under NVRA (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1 et seq.) and UOCAVA (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1); respondents include the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories. This information will be made publicly available on the EAC Web site (http://www.eac.gov). According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The valid OMB control number for this information collection is OMB Control No. 3265-0006 (expires 5/31/2013). The time required to complete this information collection is estimated to average 88 hours per State response. This estimate includes the time for reviewing the instructions, gathering information, and completing the form. Comments regarding this burden estimate should be sent the U.S. Election Assistance Commission – 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, 1201 New York Avenue, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20005.

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N ASSISTANCE COM ED STATES OF AM
U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1201 New York Avenue, NW • Suite 300 • Washington, DC 20005 • 866-747-1471 (toll free) • HAVAinfo@eac.gov • www.eac.gov

ELECTIO ERICA

MISSION UNIT

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CURRICULUM VITA

Arthur Lawrence Reingold

PRESENT POSITION:

Professor of Epidemiology Head, Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics School of Public Health University of California, Berkeley 2121 Berkeley Way, #5302 Berkeley, California 94720-7360 Phone: (510) 642-0327 Fax: (510) 643-5056 E-mail: Reingold@berkeley.edu

DATE OF BIRTH:

October 31, 1948

PLACE OF BIRTH:

Chicago, Illinois

MARITAL STATUS: Married

EDUCATION:

1966 - 70 1970 - 76

A.B. M.D.

University of Chicago University of Chicago

POSTGRADUATE TRAINING:

1976 - 78

Internal Medicine Resident, Mount Auburn Hospital Cambridge, Massachusetts

1980 - 82

Preventive Medicine Resident, Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia

November, 2019

POSITIONS HELD:

1979 - 80

1980 - 81

1981 - 85

1985 - 87

Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, State of Connecticut - Department of Health Services Hartford, Connecticut
Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, Special Pathogens Branch - Bacterial Diseases Division Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia
Assistant Chief, Respiratory & Special Pathogens Epidemiology Branch, Center for Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia
CDC Liaison Officer, Office of the Director Centers for Disease Control - Atlanta, Georgia

FACULTY APPOINTMENTS:

1979 - 80 1985 - 87
1987 1989 -

Instructor, Department of Medicine (Epidemiology) University of Connecticut - Hartford, Connecticut
Visiting Lecturer, Department of Biomedical and Environmental Health Sciences (Epidemiology) University of California, Berkeley
Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley
Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics - University of California, San Francisco

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-5 Filed 05/29/20 Page 11 of 42

Arthur Lawrence Reingold

FACULTY APPOINTMENTS: (CONTINUED)

1990 - 94
1991 1994 - 2000 2000 - 2018

Head, Epidemiology Program, Department of Biomedical and Environmental Health Sciences, University of California, Berkeley
Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine University of California, San Francisco
Head, Division of Public Health Biology and Epidemiology University of California, Berkeley
Head, Division of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley

2018 -

Head, Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, School of Public Health University of California, Berkeley

2008 - 2014 Associate Dean for Research, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley

2009 - 2014

MEDICAL LICENSURE:

BOARD CERTIFICATION:

1980

AWARDS:

1970 - 74 1985 1986

MEMBERSHIPS:

1970 1978 1983 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 2003

Edward Penhoet Distinguished Chair for Global Health and Infectious Disease
California
American Board of Internal Medicine
Medical Scientist Training Program Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Charles Shepard Award, Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
Sigma Xi American College of Physicians American Society for Microbiology Society for Epidemiologic Research Infectious Disease Society of America (Fellow) American Epidemiological Society American College of Epidemiology (Fellow) AAAS (Fellow) Institute of Medicine (Member)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

CONSULTATIONS:

1981

1981

1982

1983

1983

1984

Institute of Medicine: Toxic-shock syndrome
Food and Drug Administration: Toxic-shock syndrome
United States Agency for International Development: Control of meningococcal meningitis in West Africa
World Health Organization (WHO): Control of meningococcal meningitis in Nepal
East-West Center, University of Hawaii: Role of indoor air pollution in acute respiratory infections in developing countries
Institute of Medicine: Meningococcal vaccines
2

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

CONSULTATIONS: (CONTINUED)

1986 1987 - 1993 1988 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 - 2000 1996 1998 – 2002 2002 – 2003

World Health Organization (WHO): Control of meningococcal meningitis in South Asia
Center for Child Survival, University of Indonesia: Control of Acute Respiratory Infections
Evaluation of the Combating Communicable Childhood Disease Program, Ivory Coast
Evaluation of National Epidemiology Board Program, Rockefeller Foundation
Planning of a School-based Acute Rheumatic Fever Prevention Project - New Zealand Heart Foundation
Vaccines Advisory Committee, Food & Drug Administration Approval of accellular pertussis vaccine
External Reviewer, NIAID Group B Streptococcus Research Contract with Harvard University
U.S. Food and Drug Administration; Consultant to the Vaccines Advisory Committee
World Health Organization, Consultation on Control of Meningococcal Meningitis in Africa
Advisor to the INCLEN "Indiaclen" project
Evaluation of a School-based Acute Rheumatic Fever Prevention Project – New Zealand Heart Association

ADVISORY BOARDS AND PANELS:

1988 - 1989 1989 - 1990 1989 - 1993 1993 - 1995 1992 - 1994 1996 - 2000 1997 - 2012 1998 - 2003 1998 – 2000

Member, Advisory Committee on Ground Water and Reproductive Outcomes, State of California Department of Health Services
AIDS Advisory Committee, Alameda County Board of Supervisors
Advisory Committee, Birth Defects Monitoring Program, State of California Department of Health Services
Centers for Disease Control (CDC): Public Health Service Advisory Panel on the Case Definition for Lyme Disease
World Health Organization (WHO): Task Force on Strengthening Epidemiologic Capacity; Childhood Vaccine Initiative
Armed Forces Epidemiological Board
University of California, San Francisco AIDS Research Institute Steering Committee
Emerging Infections Committee of the Infectious Diseases Society of America
Panelist, Howard Hughes Medical Institute Predoctoral Fellowship

2001 - 2006

Technical expert, Sub-Committee on the Protection of Public Health; California State Strategic Committee on Terrorism
3

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

ADVISORY BOARDS PANELS (CONTINUED)

2003 - 2008 2004 -

Advisory Board, Chinese University of Hong Kong – Centre for Emerging AND Infectious Diseases
Advisory Board, University of California, Berkeley Clinical Research Center

2004 - 2008 2004 - 2005 2005 - 2012 2005 2007 - 2012 2007 - 2009 2008 - 2012 2008 - 2011 2008 - 2012 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2012 2011 - 2013 2011 - 2014 2012 - 2014 2012 - 2014 2013 - 2018

Advisory Board, New York University School of Medicine Fellowship in Medicine and Public Health Research
Institute of Medicine Committee on Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of CDC Quarantine Station Plan for U.S. Ports of Entry
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) for Vaccine Policy, World Health Organization (WHO) (Deputy Chairman, 2010-2012)
Data and Safety Monitoring Committee; F.I. Proctor Foundation, University of California, San Francisco (UCSF)
NIH Fogarty International Center External Advisory Board
Chair, Working Group on Pneumococcal Vaccine, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Working Group on H5N1 Influenza Vaccines, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, Leptospirosis Burden Epidemiology Reference Group, World Health Organization (WHO)
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to The Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Institute of Medicine Committee on the Review of Priorities in the National Vaccine Plan
Chair, Working Group on Hepatitis A Vaccine, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Member, Institute of Medicine Committee on Vaccine Priorities
Member, Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, Review of the Heterologous Effects of Childhood Vaccines, World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, External Review of the Measles Rubella Initiative (of WHO, CDC, UNICEF, American Red Cross, and United Nations Foundation)
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

2016-2017

Member, Institute of Medicine Committee on a National Strategy for the Elimination of Hepatitis B and C

2018 2018 -

Member, Independent Review Committee, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) Member, Strategic Advisory Group, Partnership for Influenza Vaccination Introduction
4

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

LEADERSHIP POSITIONS:

1997 - 2012 2009 - 2010 2015 – 2016

Secretary-Treasurer, American Epidemiological Society President, Society for Epidemiologic Research President, American Epidemiological Society (AES)

EDITORIAL BOARDS: 1995 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2005 -
2009 - 2010

Board of Editors, American Journal of Epidemiology Board of Editors, Epidemiology Editorial Advisory Board, Global Public Health Editorial Advisory Board, American Journal of Epidemiology

ASSOCIATE EDITORSHIPS:

2017 -

Current Epidemiology Reports

2018 -

Vaccine

5

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold
PUBLICATIONS:
1. Hayes RV, Pottenger LA, Reingold AL, Getz GS, Wissler RW. Degradation of I125 - labeled serum low density lipoprotein in normal and estrogen-treated male rats. Biochem Biophys Res Comm 1971;44:14711477.
2. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Murphy BL, Checko P, Francis DP, Maynard JE. Transmission of hepatitis B by an oral surgeon. J Infect Dis 1982;145:262-268.
3. Reingold AL, Dan BB, Shands KN, Broome CV. Toxic-shock syndrome not associated with menstruation: a review of 54 cases. Lancet 1982;1:1-4.
4. Bartlett P, Reingold AL, Graham DR, et al. Toxic-shock syndrome associated with surgical wound infections. JAMA 1982;247:1448-1450.
5. Reingold AL, Hargrett NT, Shands KN, et al. Toxic-shock syndrome surveillance in the United States, 1980-1981. Ann Intern Med 1982;96:875-880.
6. Reingold AL, Hargrett NT, Dan BB, Shands KN, Strickland BY, Broome CV. Nonmenstrual toxic-shock syndrome: a review of 130 cases. Ann Intern Med 1982;6:871-874.
7. Broome CV, Hayes PS, Ajello GW, Feeley JC, Gibson RJ, Graves LM, Hancock GA, Anderson RJ, Highsmith AK, Mackel DC, Hargrett NT, Reingold AL. In-vitro studies of interactions between tampons and Staphylococcus aureus. Ann Intern Med 1982;96:959-962.
8. Guinan ME, Dan BB, Guidotti RJ, Reingold AL, et al. Vaginal colonization with Staphylococcus aureus in healthy women: a review of four studies. Ann Intern Med 1982;96(pt.2):944-947.
9. Schlech WF III, Shands KN, Reingold AL, et al. Risk factors for development of toxic-shock syndrome: association with a tampon brand. JAMA 1982;248:835-839.
10. Reingold AL, Bank JD. Legionellosis. In: Easmon CSF, Jeljaszewicz J, eds. Medical Microbiology. London: Academic Press 1982 (I):217-239.
11. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Spittell JA Jr., ed. Clinical Medicine. Philadelphia: Harper & Row Publishers 1982 (II):1-6.
12. Kornblatt AN, Reingold AL. Legionellosis. In: Steele JH, Hillyer RV, Hopla CE, eds. CRC Handbook Series in Zoonoses. CRC Press 1982:313-324.
13. Wilkinson HW, Reingold AL, Brake JB, McGiboney DL, Gorman GW, Broome CV. Reactivity of serum from patients with suspected Legionellosis against 29 antigens of legionellaceae and Legionella-like organisms by indirect immunofluorescence assay. J Infect Dis 1983;147:23-31.
14. Meenhorst PL, Reingold AL, Gorman GW, et al. Legionella pneumonia in guinea pigs exposed to aerosols of concentrated potable water from a hospital with nosocomial Legionnaires’ disease. J Infect Dis 1983;147:129-132.
6

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold
15. Reingold AL. Nonmenstrual toxic-shock syndrome: the growing picture. JAMA 1983; 249:932 (editorial).
16. Reingold AL. Meningococcal meningitis. Nepal Paed Soc J 1983; 2:144-148.
17. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Phillips CJ, Meda H, Tiendrebeogo H, Yada A. Evidence of continuing protection against group A meningococcal disease one year after vaccination: a case-control approach. Med Trop 1983;43:225.
18. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Hightower AW. Disinfection procedures and infection control in the outpatient oral surgery practice. J Oral Maxillofac Surg 1984;42:568-572.
19. Broome CV, Reingold AL. Current issues in toxic-shock syndrome. In: Remington JS, Swartz MN, eds. Current clinical topics in infectious diseases. McGraw Hill 1984;65-85.
20. Herwaldt LA, Gorman GW, McGrath T, Toma S, Brake B, Hightower AW, Jones J, Reingold AL, et al. A new Legionella species, Legionella feeleii species nova, causes Pontiac fever in an automobile plant. Ann Intern Med 1984;100:333-338.
21. Ajello GW, Feeley JC, Hayes PS, Reingold AL, Bolan G, et al. Trans-isolate medium: a new medium for primary culturing and transport of Neisseria meningitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Haemophilus influenzae. J Clin Microbial 1984;20:55-58.
22. Hayes PS, Graves LM, Feeley JC, Hancock GA, Cohen ML, Reingold AL, et al. Production of toxicshock-associated protein(s) in Staphylococcus aureus strains isolated from 1956 through 1982. J Clin Microbial 1984;20:42-46.
23. Reingold AL, Thomason BM, Brake BJ, Thacker L, Wilkinson HW, Kuritsky JN. Legionella pneumonia in the United States: the distribution of serogroups and species causing human illness. J Infect Dis 1984;149:819.
24. Blaser M, Reingold AL, Alsever RN, Hightower A. Primary meningococcal pericarditis: A disease of adults associated with serogroup C Neisseria meningitidis. Rev Infect Dis 1984;6:625-632.
25. Jones EE, Alford PL, Reingold AL, et al. Predisposition to invasive pneumococcal illness following parainfluenza type 3 virus infection in chimpanzees. JAVMA 1984;185:1351-1353.
26. Reingold AL, Thomason BM, Kuritsky J. Results of Legionnaires’ disease direct fluorescent-antibody testing at Centers for Disease Control, 1980-1982. In: Thornsberry C, Balows A, Feeley JC, and Jakubowski J, eds. Legionella, ASM 1984;21-22.
27. Kuritsky JN, Reingold AL, Hightower AW, Broome CV. Sporadic Legionellosis in the United States, 1970 to 1982. In: Thornsberry C, Balows A, Feeley JC, and Jakubowski J, eds. Legionella, ASM 1984;243-245.
28. Fleming DW, Reingold AL. Legionella. In: Braude AI ed. Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Second Edition W.B. Saunders 1985;352-358.
7

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold
29. Garbe PL, Arko RJ, Reingold AL, et al. Staphylococcus aureus isolates from patients with non-menstrual Toxic Shock Syndrome: Evidence for Additional Toxins. JAMA 1985;253:2538-2542.
30. Garbe PL, Davis BJ, Weisfeld J, Markowitz L, Miner P, Garrity F, Barbaree JM, Reingold AL. Nosocomial Legionnaires’ Disease: Epidemiologic Demonstration of Cooling Towers as a Source. JAMA 1985;254:521-524.
31. Fleming DW, Cochi SL, MacDonald KL, Brondum J, Haves PS, Plikaytis BD, Holmes MB, Audurier A, Broome CV, Reingold AL. Pasteurized milk as a vehicle of infection in an outbreak of listeriosis. NEJM 1985;312:404-407.
32. Meenhorst P, Reingold AL, Groothius DL, et al. Water-related nosocomial pneumonia caused by Legionella pneumophila serogroups 1 and 10. J Infect Dis 1985;152:356-364.
33. Bolan G, Reingold AL, Carson L, et al. Infections with Mycobacterium chelonei in patients receiving dialysis and using processed hemodialyzers. J Infect Dis 1985;152:1013-1019.
34. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock in the United States of America: epidemiology. Postgrad Med J 1985;61:2122.
35. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Hightower AW, et al. Age-specific differences in duration of clinical protection after vaccination with meningococcal polysaccharide A vaccine. Lancet 1985;II:114-118.
36. Petitti DB, Reingold AL, Chin J. The incidence of toxic-shock syndrome in Northern California: 19721983. JAMA 1986;255:368-372.
37. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome and the contraceptive sponge. JAMA 1986;255:242-243 (editorial).
38. Berkley S, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Kass EH and Platt R, eds. Current Therapy in Infectious Disease. B.C. Decker, Inc. 1986;78-81.
39. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Wheat J and White A, eds. Infectious Diseases, University of Chicago Press, 1986.
40. Reingold AL, Broome CV. Nosocomial central nervous system infections. In: Bennett JV, Brachman PS, eds. Hospital Infections. Little Brown & Co. 1986;521-529.
41. Markowitz L, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Maxcy-Rosenau Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 12th edition Appleton-Century-Crofts 1986;456-459.
42. Reingold AL, Xiao DL, Plikaytis B, Ajello L. Systemic mycoses in the United States, 1980-1982. J Med Vet Mycol 1986;24:433-436.
43. Cochi SL, Markowitz L, Owens Jr RC, Stenhouse DH, Regmi DN, Shrestha RPB, Acharya IL, Manandhar M, Gurubacharya VL, Owens D, Reingold AL. Control of epidemic group A meningococcal meningitis in Nepal. Int J Epid 1987;16:91-97.
44. Markowitz LE, Hightower AW, Broome CV, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome: Evaluation of national surveillance data using a hospital discharge survey. JAMA 1987;258:75-78.
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45. Berkley SF, Hightower AW, Reingold AL, Broome CV. The relationship of tampon characteristics to menstrual toxic-shock syndrome. JAMA 1987;258:917-920.
46. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Hightower AW. Failure of gloves and other protective devices to prevent transmission of hepatitis B virus in oral surgeons. JAMA 1988;259:2558-2560.
47. Reingold AL. The role of Legionellae in acute infections of the lower respiratory tract. Rev Infect Dis 1988;10(5):1018-1028.
48. Harrison LH, Broome CV, Hightower AW, Hoppe CC, Makintubee S, Sitze SL, Taylor JA, Gaventa S, Wenger JD, Facklam RR, and the Haemophilus Vaccine Efficacy Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). A day-care based study of the efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae B polysaccharide vaccine. JAMA 1988;260(10):1413-1418.
49. Schwartz B, Broome CV, Hightower AW, Brown GR, Ciesielski CA, Gaventa S, Gellin BG, Mascola L, and the Listeriosis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Association of sporadic listeriosis with consumption of uncooked hot dogs and undercooked chicken. Lancet 1988;II:779-782.
50. Carson LA, Bland LA, Cusick LB, Favero MS, Bolan G, Reingold AL, et al. Prevalence of nontuberculous mycobacteria in water supplies of hemodialysis centers. Appl Environ Micro 1988; 54:3122-3125.
51. Petitti DB, Reingold AL. Update through 1985 on the incidence of toxic shock syndrome among members of a prepaid health plan. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S22-27.
52. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Gaventa S, Hightower SW, and the Toxic-Shock Syndrome Study Group. Risk factors for menstrual toxic-shock syndrome: results of a multi-state case-control study. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S35-42.
53. Gaventa S, Reingold AL, Hightower AW, et al. Active surveillance for toxic-shock syndrome in the United States, 1986. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S28-34.
54. Schwartz B, Gaventa S, Broome CV, Reingold AL, et al. Non-menstrual toxic-shock syndrome associated with barrier contraceptives: report of a case-control study. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S43-49.
55. Reingold AL, Hearst N. Identifying the health care needs of the community. In: Overall N, Williamson J, eds. Community Oriented Primary Care in Action: A Practice Manual for Primary Care Settings. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
56. Koo D, Bouvier B, Wesley M, Courtright P, Reingold AL. Epidemic keratoconjunctivitis in a university medical center ophthalmology clinic: need for re-evaluation of the design and disinfection of instruments. Inf Control and Hosp Epi 1989;10:547-552.
57. Harrison LH, Broome CV, Hightower AW, and the Haemophilus Vaccine Efficacy Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Haemophilus influenzae type b polysaccharide vaccine: an efficacy study. Pediatrics 1989;84:225-261.
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58. Wenger JD, Harrison LH, Hightower A, Broome CV, Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Day care characteristics associated with Haemophilus influenzae disease. Am J Public Health 1990;80:1455-1458.
59. Morrow HW, Slaten DD, Reingold AL, et al. Risk factors associated with a school-related outbreak of serogroup C meningococcal disease. Pediatric Infect Dis J 1990;9:394-398.
60. Wenger JD, Hightower AW, Facklam RR, Gaventa S, Broome CV, Bacterial Meningitis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Bacterial meningitis in the United States, 1986: Report on a multistate surveillance study. J Infect Dis 1990;162:1316-1323.
61. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Evans AS, Brachman PS, eds. Bacterial Infections of Humans. Plenum, 1991;727-743.
62. Gellin BG, Broome CV, Bibb WF, Weaver RE, Gaventa S, Mascola L, the Listeriosis Study Group. (includes A.L. Reingold). The epidemiology of listeriosis in the United States - 1986. Am J Epi 1991;133:392-401.
63. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Rakel RE, ed. Conn’s Current Therapy. W. B. Saunders, 1991;1010-1012.
64. Reingold AL, Markowitz LE. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Maxcy-Rosenau Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 13th Edition. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1991;304-306.
65. Bauer HM, Ting Y, Greer CE, Chambers JC, Tashiro CJ, Chimera J, Reingold AL, Manos MM. Genital human papillomavirus infection in female university students as determined by a PCR-based method. JAMA 1991;265:472-477.
66. Sutrisna B, Frerichs RR, Reingold AL. Randomised, controlled trial of effectiveness of ampicillin in mild acute respiratory infections in Indonesian children. Lancet 1991;338:471-474.
67. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome: an update. Am J Ob & Gyn 1991;165:1236-1239.
68. Pettiti DB, Reingold AL. Recent trends in the incidence of toxic-shock syndrome in Northern California. Am J Public Health 1991;81:1209-1211.
69. Ley C, Reingold AL, et al. Determinants of genital human papillomavirus infection in young women. JNCI 1991;83:997-1003.
70. Pinner RW, Gellin BG, Bibb WF, Baker CN, Weaver R, Hunter SB, Waterman SH, Mocca LF, Frasch CE, Broome CV, the Meningococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Meningococcal disease in the United States-1986. J Infect Dis 1991;164:368-374.
71. Wenger JD, Pierce R, Deaver KA, Plikaytis BD, Facklam RR, Broome CV, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae type b polysaccharide-diphtheria toxoid conjugate vaccine in U.S. children aged 18-59 months. Lancet 1991; 338:395-398.
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72. Moore PS, Plikaytis BD, Bolan GA, Oxtoby MJ, Yada A, Zoubga A, Reingold AL, Broome CV. Detection of meningitis epidemics in Africa: a population-based analysis. International J Epi 1992;21:155-162.
73. Schuchat A, Deaver KA, Wenger JD, Plikaytis BD, Mascola L, Pinner RW, Reingold AL, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group. Role of foods in sporadic listeriosis. I. Case-control study of dietary risk factors. JAMA 1992;267:2041-2045.
74. Pinner RW, Schuchat A, Swaminathan B, Hayes PS, Deaver KA, Weaver RE, Plikaytis BD, Reeves M, Broome CV, Wenger JD, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Role of foods in sporadic listeriosis. II. Microbiologic and epidemiologic investigation. JAMA 1992; 267:2046-2050.
75. Wenger JD, Pierce R, Deaver K, Franklin R, Bosley G, Pigott N, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease: A population-based evaluation of the role of capsular polysaccharide serotype. J Infect Dis 1992;165(suppl 1):S34-5.
76. Steinhart R, Reingold AL, Taylor F, Anderson G, Wenger JD. Invasive Haemophilus influenzae infections in men with HIV infection. JAMA 1992;268:3350-3352.
77. Hayes PS, Graves LM, Swaminathan B, Ajello GW, Malcolm GB, Weaver RE, Ransom R, Deaver K, Plikaytis BD, Schuchat A, Wenger JD, Pinner RW, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Comparison of three selective enrichment methods for the isolation of Listeria monocytogenes naturally contaminated foods. J of Food Protection, 1992; 55:952-959.
78. Osmond DH, Charlebois E, Sheppard HW, Page KA, Winkelstein W Jr, Moss AR, Reingold AL. A comparison of risk factors for hepatitis C and hepatitis B virus infection in homosexual men. J Infect Dis, 1993;167:66-71.
79. Osmond DH, Padian N, Sheppard HW, Glass S, Shiboski SC, Reingold AL. Risk factors for hepatitis C virus seropositivity in heterosexual couples. JAMA 1993;269:361-365.
80. Tappero JW, Koehler JE, Berger TG, Reingold AL, et al. Bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary splenitis in immunocompetent adults. Ann Int Med, 1993;118:363-365.
81. Tappero JW, Mohle-Boetani J, Koehler JE, Reingold AL, et al. The epidemiology of bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary peliosis. JAMA 1993;269:770-775.
82. Weinstock HS, Bolan G, Reingold AL, Polish LB. Hepatitis C virus infection among patients attending a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases. JAMA 1993;269:392-394.
83. Yajko DM, Nassos PS, Sanders CA, Gonzalez PC, Reingold AL, et al. Comparison of four decontamination methods for recovery of Mycobacterium avium complex from stools. J Clin Micro, 1993;31:302-306.
84. Adams WG, Deaver KA, Cochi SL, Plikaytis BD, Zell ER, Broome CV, Wenger JD, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Decline of childhood Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) disease in the Hib vaccine era. JAMA 1993;269:221-226.
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85. Sutrisna B, Reingold AL, Kresno S, Harrison G, Utomo. Care-seeking for fatal illnesses in young children in Indramayu, West Java, Indonesia. Lancet 1993;342:787-789.
86. Sudarti K, Harrison GG, Sutrisna B, Reingold AL. Acute respiratory infection in children under five years in Indramayu, West Java, Indonesia: a rapid ethnographic assessment. Medical Anthropology. 1994;15:1-10.
87. Ley C, Olshen EM, Chin L, Reingold AL. The use of serologic tests for Lyme disease in a prepaid health plan in California. JAMA 1994;271:460-463.
88. Ley C, Davila I, Mayer N, Murray R, Reingold AL. Lyme disease in Northwestern coastal California. Western J Med, 1994;160:534-539.
89. Chin DP, Reingold AL, Stone EN, Vittinghoff E, Horsburgh Jr CR, et al. The impact of Mycobacterium avium complex bacteremia and its treatment on survival of AIDS patients-a prospective study. J Infect Dis 1994;170:578-584.
90. Horsburgh CR, Chin DP, Yajko DM, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Environmental risk factors for acquisition of Mycobacterium avium complex in persons with human immunodeficiency virus infection. J Infect Dis 1994;170:362-367.
91. Chin DP, Reingold AL, Horsburgh CR, Yajko DM, et al. Predicting Mycobacterium avium complex bacteremia in patients with human immunodeficiency virus - a prospectively validated model. Clin Infect Dis 1994;19:668-674.
92. Chin DP, Hopewell PC, Yajko DM, Vittinghoff E, Horsburgh CR, Hadley WK, Stone EN, Nassos PS, Ostroff SM, Jacobson MA, Matkin CC, Reingold AL. Mycobacterium avium complex in the respiratory or gastrointestinal tract and the risk of M. avium complex bacteremia in patients with human immunodeficiency virus infection. J Infect Dis 1994;169:289-295.
93. Jackson LA, Tenover FC, Baker C, Plikaytis BD, Reeves MW, Stocker SA, Weaver RE, Wenger JD, and the Meningococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Prevalence of Neisseria meningitidis relatively resistant to penicillin in the United States, 1991. J Infect Dis 1994; 169:438-441.
94. Schuchat A, Deaver-Robinson K, Plikayatis BD, Zangwill KM, Mohle-Boetani J, Wenger JD, and the Active Surveillance Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Multistate case-control study of maternal risk factors for neonatal Group B streptococcal disease. Pediatric Infect Dis J 1994; 13:623-629.
95. Weinstock HS, Bolan G, Moran JS, Peterman TA, Polish L, Reingold AL. Routine hepatitis B immunization in a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases. AJPH 1995;85:846-849.
96. Wang F, So Y, Vittinghoff E, Malani H, Reingold A, et al. Incidence proportion of and risk factors for AIDS patients diagnosed with HIV dementia, central nervous system toxoplasmosis, and cryptococcal meningitis. J AIDS 1995;8:75-82.
97. Espinal M, Reingold AL, Koenig E, Lavandera M, Sanchez S. Screening for active tuberculosis in HIV testing centre. Lancet 1995;345:890-893.
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98. Yajko DM, Chin DP, Gonzalez PC, Nassos PS, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Mycobacterium avium complex in water, food, and soil samples collected from the environment of HIV-infected individuals. J AIDS 1995;9:176-182.
99. Lurie P, Fernandes M, Hughes V, Arevalo E, Hudes E, Reingold A, et al. Socioeconomic status and risk for HIV-1, syphilis and hepatitis B infection among sex workers in São Paulo State, Brazil. AIDS 1995 9(suppl 1):S31-S37.
100. Jackson L, Hilsdon R, Farley M, Harrison L, Reingold A, et al. Risk factors for Group B streptococcal disease in adults. Ann Int Med 1995;123:415-420.
101. Tappero J, Schuchat A, Deaver K, Mascola L, Wenger JD, and the Listeriosis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Reduction in the incidence of human listeriosis in the United States – Effectiveness of prevention efforts? JAMA 1995;273:1118-1122.
102. Brandt ME, Hutwagner LC, Kuykendall RJ, Pinner RW, and the Cryptococcal Disease Active Surveillance Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Comparison of multilocus enzyme electrophoresis and random amplified polymorphic DNA analysis for molecular subtyping of Cryptococcus neoformans. J Clin Microbiol 1995:33:1890-1895.
103. Ley C, Olshen EM, Reingold AL. Case-control study of risk factors for incident Lyme disease in California. Am J Epi 1995:142; Suppl:S39-S47.
104. Espinal MA, Reingold AL, Lavandera M. Effect of pregnancy on the risk of developing active tuberculosis. J Inf Dis 1996;173:488-491.
105. Perkins BA, Flood JM, Danila R, Holman RC, Reingold AL, et al. Unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes in the United States: Defining the problem and design of surveillance and laboratory approaches. Emerg Inf Dis 1996;Vol 2:47-53.
106. Hessol NA, Priddy FH, Bolan G, Baumrind N, Vittinghoff E, Reingold AL, Padian NS. Management of pelvic inflammatory disease by primary care physicians: A comparison with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. Sex Trans Dis 1996;Mar-Apr:157-163.
107. Mohle-Boetani JC, Koehler JE, Berger TG, LeBoit PE, Kemper CA, Reingold AL, et al. Bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary peliosis in patients infected with human immunodeficiency virus: Clinical characteristics in a case-control study. Clin Inf Dis 1996;22:794-800.
108. Espinal MA, Reingold AL, Pérez G, et al. Human immunodeficiency virus infection in children with tuberculosis in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Prevalence, clinical findings, and response to antituberculosis treatment. J AIDS 1996;13:155-159.
109. Brandt ME, Hutwagner LC, Klug LA, Baughman WS, Rimland D, Graviss EA, Hamill RJ, Thomas C, Pappas PG, Reingold AL, et al. Molecular subtype distribution of Cryptococcus neoformans in four areas of the United States. J Clin Microbiol, 1996;34:912-917.
110. Bradford WZ, Martin JN, Reingold AL, et al. The changing epidemiology of acquired drug-resistant tuberculosis in San Francisco, USA. Lancet 1996;348:928-931.
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111. Passaro DJ, Waring L, Armstrong R, Bolding F, Bouvier B, Rosenberg J, Reingold AL, et al. Beauty and the beast: Postoperative Serratia marcescens wound infections traced to an out-of-hospital source. J Inf Dis 1997;175:992-995.
112. Urwin G, Krohn JA, Deaver-Robinson K, Wenger JD, Farley MM, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Invasive disease due to Haemophilus influenzae serotype f: Clinical and epidemiologic characteristics in the H. influenzae serotype b vaccine era. Clin Inf Dis, 1996;22:1069-76.
113. Sabino EC, Diaz RC, Brigido LF, Learn GH, Mullins JI, Reingold AL, et al. Distribution of HIV-1 subtypes seen in an AIDS clinic in São Paulo City, Brazil. AIDS 1996; 10:1579-1584.
114. Brandt ME, Pfaller MA, Hajjeh RA, Graviss EA, Rees J, Spitzer ED, Pinner RW, Mayer LW, and the Cryptococcal Disease Active Surveillance Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Molecular subtypes and antifungal susceptibilities of serial Cryptococcus neoformans isolates in human immunodeficiency virus associated cryptococcosis. J Inf Dis 1996;174:812-820.
115. Whitney CG, Pllikaytis BD, Gozansky WS, Wenger JD, Schuchat A, and the Neonatal Group B Streptococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Prevention practices for perinatal group B streptococcal disease: A multi-site surveillance analysis. Obstet & Gyn 1997;89:28-32.
116. McFarland W, MvereD, Shandera W, Reingold A. The epidemiology and prevention of transfusionassociated Human Immunodeficiency Virus transmission in Sub-Saharan Africa. Vox Sanguinis 1997; 72:85-92.
117. Mazurek GH, Chin DP, Hartman S, Reddy V, Horsburgh Jr, CR, Green TA, Yajko DM, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Genetic similarity among Mycobacterium avium isolates from blood, stool, and sputum of persons with AIDS. J Inf Dis 1997; 176:1-8.
118. Schuchat A, Robinson K, Wenger JD, Harrison LH, Farley M, Reingold AL, et al. Bacterial meningitis in the United States in 1995. N Eng J Med 337:970-976, 1997.
119. DeRiemer K, Chin DP, Schecter GF, Reingold AL. Tuberculosis among immigrants and refugees. Arch Int Med, 1998; 158:753-760.
120. Glaser CA, Safrin S, Reingold AL, Newman TB. The association between Cryptosporidium infection and animal exposure in HIV-infected individuals. J AIDS 17:79-82, 1998.
121. Reingold AL. Outbreak investigations: A perspective. Emerg Inf Dis 4:21-27, 1998.
122. Bradford WZ, Koehler J, El-Hajj H, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Dissemination of Mycobacterium tuberculosis across the San Francisco Bay area. J Inf Dis 177:1104-1107, 1998.
123. Rees JR, Pinner RW, Hajjeh RA, Brandt ME, Reingold AL. The epidemiological features of invasive mycotic infections in the San Francisco Bay Area 1992-1993: Results of population-based laboratory active surveillance. Clin Inf Dis, 27:1138-1147, 1998.
124. Ragland DR, Buffler PA, Reingold AL, Syme SL, Winkelstein WW Jr, Buffler M. Disease and injury in California with projections to the year 2007: Implications for medical education. West J Med, 168:1-23, 1998.
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125. Espinal MA, Báez J, Soriano G, Garcia V, Laszlo A, Reingold AL, Sanchez S. Drug-resistant tuberculosis in the Dominican Republic: Results of a nationwide survey. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis, 2:490-498, 1998.
126. Bindman AB, Osmond D, Hecht FM, Lehman S, Vranizan K, Keane D, Reingold A, et al. Multistate evaluation of anonymous HIV testing and access to medical care. JAMA, 280:1416-1420, 1998.
127. Bloch KC, Zwerling L, Pletcher MJ, Hahn JA, Gerberding JL, Ostroff SM, Vugia DJ, Reingold AL. Incidence and clinical implications of isolation of Mycobacterium kansasii: Results of a 5-year, population-based study. Ann Intern Med 129:698-704, 1998.
128. Hajjeh RA, Conn LA, Stephens DS, Baughman W, Hamill R, Graviss E, Pappas PG, Thomas C, Reingold AL, et al. Cryptococcosis: Population-based multistate active surveillance and risk factors in Human Immunodeficiency Virus-infected persons. J Inf Dis, 179:449-454, 1999.
129. DeRiemer K, Daley CL, Reingold AL. Preventing tuberculosis among HIV-infected persons: A survey of physicians’ knowledge and practices. Prev Med, 28:437-444, 1999.
130. Jafari HS, Adams WG, Robinson KA, Plikaytis BD, Wenger JD, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group(includes A.L. Reingold). Efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccines and persistence of disease in disadvantaged populations. AJPH, 89:364-368, 1999.
131. Fonseca LAM, Reingold AL, Casseb JR, Brigido LFM, Duarte AJS. AIDS incidence and survival in a hospital-based cohort of asymptomatic HIV seropositive patients in São Paulo, Brazil. J Inf Dis 28:11561160, 1999.
132. Reingold AL, Phares C. Communicable Diseases (chapter). In: Introduction to International Health (M. Merson, ed.).
133. Kao AS, Brandt ME, Pruitt WR, Conn LA, Perkins BA, Stephens DS, Baughman WS, Reingold AL, et al. The epidemiology of candidemia in two United States cities: Results of a population-based active surveillance. Clin Inf Dis 29:1164-1170, 1999.
134. Rosenstein NE, Perkins BA, Stephens D, Lefkowitz L, Cartter M, Danila R, Cieslak P, Shutt KA, Popovic T, Schuchat A, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, et al. The changing epidemiology of meningococcal disease in the United States, 1992-1996. J Inf Dis, 180:1894-1901, 1999.
135. Hajjeh RA, Reingold AL, Weil A, Shutt K, Schuchat A, Perkins BA. Toxic shock syndrome in the United States: Surveillance update, 1979-1996. Emerg Inf Dis J 5:807-810, 1999.
136. Osmond DH, Bindman AB, Vranizan K, Lehman JS, Hecht FM, Keane D, Reingold AL. Name-based surveillance and public health interventions for persons with HIV infection. Ann Int Med 131:775-779, 1999.
137. Baer JT, Vugia DJ, Reingold AL, Aragon T, Angulo FJ, Bradford WZ. HIV infection as a risk factor for shigellosis. Emerg Inf Dis 6:820-823, 1999.
138. Reingold AL. Infectious disease epidemiology in the twenty-first century - will it be eradicated or will it re-emerge? Epi Reviews 22:57-63, 2000.
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139. Kahane SM, Watt JP, Smith NJ, Wight S, Reingold AL, Newell K, et al. Immunization levels and risk factors for low immunization coverage among private practices. Pediatrics, 2000;105:73-.
140. Espinal MA, Pérez EN, Báez J, Henriquez L, Fernandez K, Lopez M, Olivo P, Reingold AL. Infectiousness of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in HIV-1-infected subjects with tuberculosis: A prospective study. Lancet 355:275-280, 2000.
141. Schrag SJ, Zywicki S, Farley M, Reingold AL, et al. Group B streptococcal disease in the era of intrapartum antibiotic prophylaxis. New Eng J Med 342:15-20, 2000.
142. Nuorti JP, Butler JC, Gelling L, Kool JL, Reingold AL, et al. Epidemiologic relation between HIV and invasive pneumococcal disease in San Francisco County, California. Ann Int Med 132: 182-190, 2000.
143. Hecht FM, Chesney MA, Lehman JS, Osmond D, Vranizan K, Colman S, Keane D, Reingold A, et al. Does HIV reporting by name deter testing? AIDS 14:1801-1808, 2000.
144. Breiman RF, Keller DW, Phelan MA, Sniadack DH, Stephens DS, Rimland D, Farley MM, Schuchat A, Reingold AL. Evaluation of effectiveness of the 23-valent pneumococcal capsular polysaccharide vaccine for HIV-infected patients. Arch Int Med 160:2633-2638, 2000.
145. Whitney CG, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Lexau C, Reingold A, Lefkowitz L, et al. Increasing prevalence of multi-drug resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae in the United States. N Engl J Med 343:1917-1924, 2000.
146. Alpers L, Chrouser K, Halabi S, Moeti T, Reingold A, Binkin N, Kenyon T. Validation of the surveillance system for tuberculosis in Botswana. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis, 2000; 4:737-743.
147. Factor SH, Whitney CG, Zywicki S, Schuchat A. for the ABC Surveillance Team (includes Reingold, A.). Effects of hospital policies on the 1996 group B streptococcal consensus guidelines. Obstet Gynecol 2000; 95:377-382.
148. Factor SF, Whitney CG, Zywicki SS, Schuchat A, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team (includes Reingold, AL). Effects of hospital policies based on 1996 group B streptococcal disease consensus guidelines. Hospital Policies 2000; 95:377-382.
149. Robinson KA, Baughman W, Rothrock G, Barrett NL, Pass M, Lexau C, Damske B, Stefonek K, Barnes B, Patterson J, Zell ER, Schuchat A, Whitney CG for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs)/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Arthur L. Reingold, MD). Epidemiology of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae Infections in the United States, 1995-1998: Opportunities for prevention in the conjugate vaccine era. JAMA 285:1729-1735, 2001.
150. Rosenstein NE, Emery KW, Werner SB, Kao A, Johnson R, Rogers D, Vugia D, Reingold A, Talbot R, et. al. Risk factors for severe pulmonary and disseminated coccidioidomycosis: Kern County, California, 1995-1996. Clin Inf Dis 32:708-715, 2001.
151. Kellam S, Pascopella L, Desmond E, Reingold A, Chin DP. Use of recommended laboratory testing methods among patients with tuberculosis in California. J Clin Micro 39:1969-1971, 2001.
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152. Mesquita F, Kral A, Reingold A, Bueno R, Trigueiros D, Araujo PJ, and the SMR Collaborative Study Group. Trends of HIV infection among injecting drug users in Brazil in the 1990's - the impact of changes in patterns of drug use. J AIDS, 2001; 28:298-302.
153. Mesquita F, Kral A, Reingold A, Haddad I, Sanches M, Turienzo G, Piconez D, Araujo P, Bueno R. Overdoses among cocaine users in Brazil. Addiction, 2001; 96:1809-1813.
154. Larson JI, Ridzon R, Hannan MM, Conde MB, Mello FCQ, Reingold AL, Daley CL, Kritski AL. Sputum induction vs. fiberoptic bronchoscopy in the diagnosis of tuberculosis. Am J Respir Crit Care Med, 2001;163:1279-1280.
155. Schuchat A, Hilger T, Zell E, Farley MM, Reingold A, Harrison L, Lefkowitz L, Danila R, Stefonek K, Barrett N, Morse D, Pinner R. Active bacterial core surveillance of the Emerging Infections Program network. Emerg Inf Dis, 2001; 7:92-99.
156. Brandt ME, Pfaller MA, Hajjeh RA, Hamill RJ, Pappas PG, Reingold AL, Rimland D, et al. Trends in antifungal drug susceptibility of Cryptococcus neoformans isolates in the United States: 1992 to 1994 and 1996 to 1998. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 2001;45:3065-3069.
157. Hajjeh RA, Relman D, Cieslak PR, Sofair AN, Passaro D, Flood J, et al. and the Critical Illness Working Group (includes Reingold, AL.). Surveillance for unexplained deaths and critical illnesses due to possibly infectious causes, United States, 1995-1998. Emerg Inf Dis, 2002;8:145-153.
158. Huang SS, Labus BJ, Samuel MC, Wan DT, Reingold AL. Antibiotic resistance patterns of bacterial isolates from blood in San Francisco county, 1996-1999. Emerg Inf Dis, 2002; 8:195-201.
159. Conde MB, Loivos AC, Rezende VM, Soares SLM, Mello FCQ, Reingold AL, Daley CL, Kritski AL. The yield of sputum induction in the diagnosis of pleural tuberculosis. Am J Respir and Crit Care Med, 2002; 167:723-725.
160. Handley MA, Reingold AL, Shiboski S, Padian NS. Incidence of acute urinary tract infection in young women and use of male condoms with and without nonoxynol-9 spermicides. Epidemiology, 2002;13:431436.
161. Hyde TB, Hilger TM, Reingold A, Farley MM, O’Brien KL, Schuchat A. for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) of the Emerging Infections Program Network. Trends in the incidence and antimicrobial resistance of early-onset sepsis: Population-based surveillance in San Francisco and Atlanta. Pediatrics, 2002;110:690-695.
162. Schrag SJ, Zell ER, Lynfield R, Roome A, Arnold KE, Craig A, Harrison L, Reingold A, Stefonek K, Smith G, Gamble M, Schuchat A for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance team. A population-based comparison of strategies to prevent early-onset group B streptococcal disease in neonates. New Engl J Med 2002;347:233-239.
163. O’Brien KL, Beall B, Barrett NL, Cieslak P, Reingold A, Farley MM, Danila R, Zell ER, Facklam R, Schwartz B, Schuchat A for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance team. Epidemiology of invasive group A streptococcus disease in the United States, 1995-1999. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:268-276.
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164. Morita JY, Zell ER, Danila R, Farley MM, Hadler JH, Harrison LH, Lefkowitz L, Reingold A, Kupronis B, Schuchat A, Whitney CG. Association between antimicrobial resistance among pneumococcal isolates and burden of invasive pneumococcal disease in the community. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:420-427.
165. Chuang I, Van Beneden C, Beall B, Schuchat A. and the ABCs/EIP network (includes Reingold, A.). Population-based surveillance for postpartum invasive group A streptococcal Infections, 1995-2000. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:665-670.
166. Passaro DJ, Smith DS, Hett EC, Reingold AL, Daily P, Van Beneden CA, Vugia DJ. Invasive Group A Streptococcal infections in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1989-1999. Epi&Infect, 2002; 129:471-478.
167. McCormick AW, Whitney CG, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Schaffner W, Reingold A, Hadler J, et al. Geographic diversity and temporal trends of antimicrobial resistance in Streptococcus pneumoniae in the United States. Nature Med 2003;doi:10.1038/nm839.
168. Whitney CG, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Lynfield R, Reingold A, Cieslak PR, Pilishvili T, et al. Decline in invasive pneumococcal disease after the introduction of proteinpolysaccharide conjugate vaccine. N Engl J Med 2003;348:1737-1746.
169. Reingold A. If syndromic surveillance is the answer, what is the question? Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Science, and Practice. 2003;1:1-5.
170. Koehler JE, Sanchez MA, Tye S, Garrido-Rowland CS, Chen FM, Maurer T, Cooper JL, Olson JG, Reingold AL, Hadley WK, Regnery RR, Tappero JW. Prevalence of Bartonella infection among HIVinfected patients with fever. Clin Inf Dis 2003;37:559-566.
171. Schrag SJ, Arnorld KE, Mohle-Boetani JC, Lynfield R, Zell ER, Stefonek K, Noga H, Craig AS, Thomson Sanza L, Smith G, Schuchat A, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team (includes Reingold AL). Prenatal screening for infectious diseases and opportunities for prevention. Obstet Gynecol 2003;102:753-760.
172. King MD, Whitney CG, Parekh F, Farley MM, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). Recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease: A population-based assessment. Clin Inf Dis 2003;37:1029-1036.
173. Carvalho HB, Seibel SD, Burattini MN, Massad E, Reingold A. Hepatitis B and C and Syphilis: Vulnerability Related Infections among Institutionalized Disadvantaged Youth in São Paulo, Brazil. J Bras Doenças Sex Transm 2003;15:41-45.
174. Louie JK, Hacker JK, Mark J, Gavali SS, Yagi S, Espinosa A, Schnurr D, Cossen CK, Isaacson ER, Glaser CA, Fischer M, Reingold AL, Vugia DJ. SARS and common viral infections, Emerg Inf Dis, 2004;10:1143-1146.
175. Flanders SA, Stein J, Shochat G, Sellers K, Holland M, Maselli J, Drew WL, Reingold AL, Gonzales. Performance of a bedside c-reactive protein test in the diagnosis of community-acquired pneumonia in adults with acute cough. Amer J Med 2004;116:529-535.
176. Pascopella L, Kellam S, Ridderhof J, Chin DP, Reingold A, Desmond E, Flood J, Royce S. Laboratory reporting of tuberculosis test results and patient treatment initiation in California. J Clin Micro, 2004;42:4209-4213.
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177. Nicas M, Hubbard AE, Jones RM, Reingold AL. The infectious dose of variola (smallpox) virus. Appl Biosafety 2004;9:118-127.
178. Flannery B, Schrag S, Bennett NM, Lynfield R, Harrison LH, Reingold A, Cieslak PR, Hadler J, Farley MM, Facklam RR, Zell ER, Whiteney CG. Impact of childhood vaccination on racial disparities in invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections. JAMA, 2004;291:2197-2203.
179. Facklam R, Elliott J, Shewmaker L, Reingold A. Identification and characterization of sporadic isolates of Streptococcus iniae isolated from human infections. J Clin Micro 2005; 43:933-937.
180. Heffernan RT, Barrett NL, Gallagher KM, Hadler JL, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Khoshnood K, Holford TR, Schuchat A. Declining incidence of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections among persons living with AIDS in an era of highly-active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), 1995-2000. J Inf Dis, 2005;191:2038-2045.
181. Bakyaita N, Dorsey G, Yeka A, Banek K, Staedke SG, Kamya MR, Talisuna A, Kironde F, Nsobya S, Kilian A, Reingold A, Rosenthal PJ, Wabwire-Mangen F. Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine plus chloroquine or amodiaquine for uncomplicated falciparum malaria: A randomized, multisite trial to guide national policy in Uganda. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2005;72:573-580.
182. Pai M, Gokhale K, Joshi R, Dogra S, Kalantri SP, Mendiratta DK, Narang P, Daley CL, Granich RM, Mazurek GH, Reingold AL, Riley LW, Colford Jr, JM. Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection in health care worker in rural India: Comparison of whole-blood interferon ϒ assay with tuberculin skin testing. JAMA 2005;293:2746-2755.
183. Pai M, Kalantri S, Pascopella L, Riley LW, Reingold AL. Bacteriophage-based assays for the rapid detection of rifampicin resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis: a meta-analysis. Journal of Infection 2005;51:175-187.
184. Lexau CA, Lynfield R, Danila R, Pilishvili T, Facklam R, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Schaffner W, Reingold AL, Bennett NM, Hadler J, Cieslak PR, Whiteny CG (for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team). Changing epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease among older adults in the era of pediatric pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. JAMA 2005;294:2043-2051.
185. Kalantri S, Pai M, Pascopella L, Riley L, Reingold A. Bacteriophage-based tests for the detection of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in clinical specimens: a systematic review and meta-analysis. BMC Inf Dis 2005;5:59; doi:10.1186/1471-2334-5-59.
186. Feikin DR, Klugman KP, Facklam RR, Zell ER, Schuchat A, Whitney CA for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). Increased prevalence of pediatric pneumococcal serotypes in elderly adults. Clin Inf Dis 2005;41:481-487.
187. Tappero JW, Bradford WZ, Agerton TB, Hopewell P, Reingold AL, Lockman S, Oyewo A, Talbot EA, et al. Serum concentrations of antimycobacterial drugs in patients with pulmonary tuberculosis in Botswana. Clin Inf Dis 2005;41:461-469.
188. Kyaw MH, Rose CE, Fry AM, Singleton JA, Moore Z, Zell ER, Whitney CG for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance program of the Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). The influence
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of chronic illnesses on the incidence of invasive pneumococcal diseases in adults. J Inf Dis 2005;192:377386.
189. Flannery B, Heffernan RT, Harrison LH, Ray SM, Reingold AL, Hadler J, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Thomas AR, Jianmin Li DPE, Campsmith DDS, Whitney CG, Schuchat A. Changes in invasive pneumococcal disease among HIV-infected adults living in the era of childhood pneumococcal immunization. Ann Int Med 2006; 144:1-9.
190. Pai M, Joshi R, Dogra S, Mendiratta DK, Narang P, Kalantri S, Reingold AL, Colford JM Jr, Riley LW, Menzies D. Serial testing of health care workers for tuberculosis using interferon-γ assay. Amer J Resp Crit Care Med 2006;doi:10.1164/rccm.200604-4720C.
191. Kyaw MH, Lynfield R, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Hadler J, Reingold A, Thomas AR, Harrison LH, et al. Effect of introduction of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae. New Eng J Med 2006;354:1455-1463.
192. Poehling KA, Talbot TR, Griffin MR, Craig AS, Whitney CG, Zell E, Lexau CA, Thomas AR, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Hadler JL, et al. Invasive pneumococcal disease among infants before and after introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. JAMA 2006;295:1668-1674.
193. Jones RM, Nicas M, Hubbard AE, Reingold AL. The infectious dose of Coxiella burnetii (Q Fever). Appl Biosafety 2006;11:32-41.
194. Whitney CG, Pilishvili T, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Lynfield R, Nyquist A-C, Gershman K, Vazquez M, Bennett NM, Reingold A, Thomas A, et al. Effectiveness of seven-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine against invasive pneumococcal disease: a matched case-control study. Lancet 2006; 368:1495-1502.
195. Hwang J, Bitarakwate E, Pai M, Reingold A, Rosenthal PJ, Dorsey G. Chloroquine or amodiaquine combined with sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine for uncomplicated malaria: a systematic review. Trop Med & Int Hlth 2006;11:789-799.
196. Joshi R, Reingold AL, Menzies D, Pai M. Tuberculosis among health-care workers in low- and middleincome countries: A systematic review. PLoS Med 2006;3(12):e494. Doi:10.1371/journal.pmed. 0030494
197. Pai NP, Lawrence J, Reingold AL, Tulsky JP. Structured treatment interruptions (STI) in chronic unsuppressed HIV infection in adults. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2006;3:CD006148.
198. Schrag SJ, Hadler JL, Arnold KE, et al. Risk factors for invasive, early-onset Escherichia coli infections in the era of widespread intrapartum antibiotic use. Pediatrics. 2006;118(2):570-576.
199. Malamba SS, Mermin J, Reingold A, et al. Effect of cotrimoxazole prophylaxis taken by human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-infected persons on the selection of sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine-resistant malaria parasites among HIV-uninfected household members. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 2006;75(3):375-380.
200. Winkelstein W Jr, Reingold AL. Alex Langmuir and CDC. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2006;12(10):1619; author reply 1619.
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201. Klevens RM, Morrison MA, Fridkin SK, et al. Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and healthcare risk factors. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2006;12(12):1991-1993.
202. Aragón TJ, Vugia DJ, Shallow S, Samuel MC, Reingold A, Angulo FJ, Bradford WZ. Case-control study of shigellosis in San Francisco: The role of sexual transmission and HIV infection. Clin Inf Dis 2007;44:327-334.
203. Dogra S, Narang P, Mendiratta DK, Chaturvedi P, Reingold AL, Colford JM, Riley LW, Pai M. Comparison of a whole blood interfon-γ assay with tuberculin skin testing for the detection of tuberculosis infection in hospitalized children in rural India. J Inf 2007;54:267-276.
204. Nunes CLX, Andrade T, Galvão-Castro B, Bastos FI, Reingold A. Assessing risk behaviors and prevalence of sexually transmitted and blood-borne infections among female crack cocaine users in Salvador--Bahia, Brazil. Braz J Infect Dis. 2007;11(6):561-566.
205. Pai N, Peterson Tulsky J, Cohan D, Colford Jr JM, Reingold AL. Rapid point-of-care HIV testing in pregnant women: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Trop Med and Int Hlth 2007;12:1-12.
206. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, et al. The epidemiology of Herpes simplex virus type-2 infection among married women in Mysore, India. Sex Transm Dis. 2007;34(11):935-937.
207. Chainani-Wu N, Silverman Jr S, Reingold A, Bostrom A, McCulloch C, Lozada-Nur F, Weintraub J. A randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind clinical trial of curcuminoids in oral lichen planus. Phytomed 2007;14:437-446.
208. Veras Maria Ameli SM, Enanoria WTA, Castilho EA, Reingold AL. Effectiveness of the polysaccharide pneumococcal vaccine among HIV-infected persons in Brazil: A case control study. BMC Inf Dis 2007;7:119.
209. Krupp K, Madhivanan P, Karat C, Chandrasekaran V, Sarvode M, Klausner J, Reingold A. Novel recruitment strategies to increase participation of women in reproductive health research in India. Glob Pub Hlth 2007;4:395-403.
210. Lippman SA, Pulerwitz J, Chinaglia M, Hubbard A, Reingold AL, Diaz J. Mobility and its liminal context: Exploring sexual partnering among truck drivers crossing the Southern Brazilian border. Soc Sci & Med 2007;doi:10.1016.
211. Hicks LA, Harrison LH, Flannery B, Hadler JL, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Jackson D, Thomas A, Beall B, Lynfield R, Reingold AL, Farley MM, et al. Incidence of pneumococcal disease due to non-pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) serotypes in the United States during the era of widespread PCV7 vaccination, 1998-2004. J Inf Dis 2007;196:1346-1354.
212. O’Loughlin RE, Roberson A, Cieslak PR, Lynfield R, Gershman K, Craig A, Albanese BA, Farley MM, Barrett NL, Spina NL, Beall B, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Van Beneden C, et al. The epidemiology of invasive group A streptococcal infection and potential vaccine implications: United States, 2000-2004. Clin Inf Dis 2007;45:853-862.
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213. Thigpen MC, Richards Jr CL, Lynfield R, Barrett NL, Harrison LH, Arnold KE, Reingold A, Bennett NM, et al. Invasive group A streptococcal infection in older adults in long-term care facilities and the community, United States, 1998-2003. Emerg Inf Dis 2007;13:1852-1859.
214. Malamba S, Hladik W, Reingold AL, Banage F, McFarland W, Rutherford G, Mimbe D, Nzaro E, Downing R, Mermin J. The effect of HIV on morbidity and mortality in children with severe malarial anaemia. Malaria J 2007;6:143.
215. Pant Pai N, Joshi R, Dogra S, Taksande B, Kalantri SP, Pai M, Narang P, Tulsky JP, Reingold AL. Evaluation of diagnostic accuracy, feasibility, and client preference for rapid oral fluid-based diagnosis of HIV infection in rural India. PLos One 2007;2(4): e367.doi.10.1371/journal.pone.0000367.
216. Chainani-Wu N, Silverman S Jr, Reingold A, Bostrom A, Lozada-Nur F, Weintraub J. Validation of visual analogue scale, numeric rating scale, change in symptoms scale and modified oral mucousitis index for measurement of symptoms and signs of oral lichen planus. Oral Surg Med Oral Pathol Oral Radiol Endod 2008;105:51-58.
217. Koo D, Birkhead GS, Reingold AL. Competency-based epidemiologic training in public health practice. Pub Hlth Rep 2008 (Suppl 1);123:1-3.
218. Joshi R, Colford Jr JM, Reingold AL, Kalantri S. Nonmalarial acute undifferentiated fever in a rural hospital in Central India: Diagnostic uncertainty and overtreatment with anti-malarial agents. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2008;78:393-399.
219. Moore MR, Gertz RE, Woodbury RL, Barkocy-Gallagher GA, Schaffner W, Lexau C, Gershman K, Reingold AL, Farley M, Harrison LH, et al. Population snapshot of emergent Streptococcus pneumoniae Serotype 19A in the United States, 2005. J Inf Dis 2008; 197:1016-1027.
220. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, Karat SC, Reingold AL, Klausner JD. Acceptability of male circumcision among mothers with male children in Mysore, India. AIDS 2008; 22:983-988.
221. Blumenshine P, Reingold A, Egerter S, Mockenhaupt R, Braveman P, Marks J. Pandemic influenza planning in the United States from a health disparities perspective. Emerg Inf Dis 2008; 14:5.
222. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, Karat C, Arun A, Cohen CR, Reingold AL, Klausner JD. Prevalence and correlates of bacterial vaginosis among young women of reproductive age in Mysore, India. Ind J Med Microbiol 2008; 26:132-137.
223. Pant Pai N, Joshi R, Moodie E EM, Taksande B, Kalantri SP, Pai M, Tulsky JP, Reingold AL. Profile of adults seeking voluntary HIV testing and counseling in rural Central India: Results from a hospital-based study. AIDS Care 2009;21:294-300.
224. Hsu HE, Shutt KA, Moore MR, Beall BW, Bennett NM, Craig AS, Farley MM, Jorgensen JH, Lexau CA, Petit S, Reingold A, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Whitney CG, Harrison LH. Effect of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on pneumococcal meningitis. NEJM 2009;360:244-256.
225. Gordon A, Ortega O, Kuan G, Reingold A, Saborio S, Balmaseda A, Harris E. Prevalence and seasonality of influenza-like illness in children, Nicaragua, 2005-2007. Emerg Inf Dis 2009;15:408-414.
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226. Broyles LN, Van Beneden C, Beall B, Facklam R, Shewmaker PL, Malpiedi P, Daily P, Reingold A, Farley MM. Population-based study of invasive disease due to β-hemolytic streptococci of groups other than A and B. Clin Inf Dis 2009;48:706-712.
227. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Hardin J, Karat C, Klausner JD, Reingold AL. Simple and inexpensive point-ofcare tests improve diagnosis of vaginal infections in resource constrained settings. Trop Med & Int Hlth 2009;14:703-708.
228. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Yashodha MN, Marlow L, Klausner JD, Reingold AL. Attitudes toward HPV vaccination among parents of adolescent girls in Mysore, India. Vaccine 2009;27:5203-5208.
229. Madhivanan P, Bartman MT, Pasutti L, et al. Prevalence of Trichomonas vaginalis infection among young reproductive age women in India: implications for treatment and prevention. Sex Health. 2009;6(4):339344.
230. Chideya S, Winston CA, Peloquin CA, Bradford WZ, Hopewell PC, Wells CD, Reingold AL, Kenyon TA, Moeti TL, Tappero JW. Isoniazid, Rifampin, Ethambutol, and Pyrazinamide, pharmokinetics and treatment outcomes among a predominantly HIV-infected cohort of adults with tuberculosis from Botswana. Clin Inf Dis 2009;48:1685-1694.
231. Carvalho M da G, Pimenta FC, Gertz RE Jr, Joshi HH, Trujillo AA, Keys LE, et al. PCR-based quantitation and clonal diversity of the current prevalent invasive serogroup 6 pneumococcal serotype, 6C, in the United States in 1999 and 2006 to 2007. J. Clin. Microbiol. 2009 Mar;47(3):554–9.
232. Gordon A, Videa E, Saborio S, et al. Performance of an influenza rapid test in children in a primary healthcare setting in Nicaragua. PLoS ONE. 2009;4(11):e7907.
233. Pai NP, Estes M, Moodie EEM, Reingold AL, Tulsky JP. The impact of antiretroviral therapy in a cohort of HIV infected patients going in and out of the San Francisco county jail. PLoS ONE. 2009;4(9):e7115.
234. Ahmad Y, Gertz RE Jr, Li Z, et al. Genetic relationships deduced from emm and multilocus sequence typing of invasive Streptococcus dysgalactiae subsp. equisimilis and S. canis recovered from isolates collected in the United States. J. Clin. Microbiol. 2009;47(7):2046-2054.
235. Eisenberg JNS, Aiello AE, Spicknall IH, Monto AS, Reingold A. Protecting the herd from H1N1. Science. 2009;326(5955):934; author reply 934.
236. Pilishvili T, Lexau C, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Reingold A, et al. Sustained reductions in invasive pneumococcal disease in the era of conjugate vaccine. J Inf Dis 2010;201:32-41.
237. Krupp K, Marlow LAV, Kielmann K, et al. Factors associated with intention-to-recommend human papillomavirus vaccination among physicians in Mysore, India. J Adolesc Health. 2010;46(4):379-384.
238. Lippman SA, Donini A, Díaz J, et al. Social-environmental factors and protective sexual behavior among sex workers: the Encontros intervention in Brazil. Am J Public Health. 2010;100 Suppl 1:S216-223.
239. Durrheim DN, Reingold A. Modifying the GRADE framework could benefit public health. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2010;64(5):387.
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240. Pilishvili T, Zell ER, Farley MM, et al. Risk factors for invasive pneumococcal disease in children in the era of conjugate vaccine use. Pediatrics. 2010;126(1):e9-17.
241. Malamba S, Sandison T, Lule J, Reingold A, Walker J, Dorsey G, Mermin J. Plasmodium falciparum dihydrofolate reductase and dihyropteroate syntase mutations and the use of trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole prophylaxis among persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2010;82:766-771.
242. Dawood FS, Fiore A, Kamimoto L, Nowell M, Reingold A, Gershman K, Meek J, et al. Influenzaassociated pneumonia in children hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza, 2003-2008. Ped Inf Dis 2010;29:585-590.
243. Kallen AJ, Mu Y, Bulens S, Reingold A, Petit S, Gershman K, Ray SM, Harrison LH, et al. Health careassociated invasive MRSA infections, 2005-2008. JAMA 2010;304:641-648.
244. Cohn AC, MacNeil JR, Harrison LH, et al. Changes in Neisseria meningitidis disease epidemiology in the United States, 1998-2007: implications for prevention of meningococcal disease. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2010;50(2):184-191.
245. Cohen AL, Harrison LH, Farley MM, et al. Prevention of invasive pneumococcal disease among HIVinfected adults in the era of childhood pneumococcal immunization. AIDS. 2010;24(14):2253-2262.
246. Dao CN, Kamimoto L, Nowell M, et al. Adult hospitalizations for laboratory-positive influenza during the 2005-2006 through 2007-2008 seasons in the United States. J. Infect. Dis. 2010;202(6):881-888.
247. Cochran LW, Black S, Klein NP, et al. Vaccine effectiveness against laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants: A matched case control study. Hum Vaccin. 2010;6(9). Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20855940. Accessed September 26, 2011.
248. Burton DC, Flannery B, Bennett NM, et al. Socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities in the incidence of bacteremic pneumonia among US adults. Am J Public Health. 2010;100(10):1904-1911.
249. Dawood FS, Fiore A, Kamimoto L, et al. Burden of seasonal influenza hospitalization in children, United States, 2003 to 2008. J. Pediatr. 2010;157(5):808-814.
250. Thigpen MC, Whitney CG, Messonnier NE, Zell ER, Lynfield R, Hadler JL, Harrison LH, Farley MM, Reingold AL, et al. Bacterial meningitis in the United States, 1998-2007. New Engl J Med 2011; 364:2016-2025.
251. Pinho AA, Chinaglia M, Lippman SA, Reingold AL, Diaz RS, Sucupira MC, Page K, Diaz J. Prevalence and factors associated with HSV-2 and hepatitis B infections among truck drivers crossing the southern Brazilian border. Sex Trans Infect 2011; doi:10.1136/sextrans-2011-050186.
252. Veras MA de SM, Ribeiro MCA, Jamal LF, et al. The “AMA-Brazil” cooperative project: a nation-wide assessment of the clinical and epidemiological profile of AIDS-related deaths in Brazil in the antiretroviral treatment era. Cad Saude Publica. 2011;27 Suppl 1:S104-113.
253. Madhivanan P, Chen Y-H, Krupp K, et al. Incidence of Herpes simplex virus type 2 in young reproductive age women in Mysore, India. Indian J Pathol Microbiol. 2011;54(1):96-99.
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254. Creanga AA, Kamimoto L, Newsome K, et al. Seasonal and 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection during pregnancy: a population-based study of hospitalized cases. Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 2011;204(6 Suppl 1):S38-45.
255. Weston EJ, Pondo T, Lewis MM, et al. The burden of invasive early-onset neonatal sepsis in the United States, 2005-2008. Ped Inf Dis. 2011. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21654548. Accessed September 26, 2011.
256. Dawood FS, Kamimoto L, D’Mello TA, et al. Children with asthma hospitalized with seasonal or pandemic influenza, 2003-2009. Pediatrics. 2011;128(1):e27-32.
257. Rosen JB, Thomas AR, Lexau CA, et al. Geographic variation in invasive pneumococcal disease following pneumococcal conjugate vaccine introduction in the United States. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2011;53(2):137-143.
258. Rathod SD, Krupp K, Klausner JD, et al. Bacterial vaginosis and risk for Trichomonas vaginalis infection: A longitudinal analysis. Sex Transm Dis. 2011;38(9):882-886.
259. Adamson PC, Krupp K, Freeman AH, Klausner JD, Reingold AL, Madhivanan P. Prevalence & correlates of primary infertility among young women in Mysore, India. Indian J. Med. Res. 2011 Oct;134:440–6.
260. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Reingold A. Correlates of Intimate Partner Physical Violence Among Young Reproductive Age Women in Mysore, India. Asia-Pacific journal of public health / Asia-Pacific Academic Consortium for Public Health [Internet]. 2011 Dec 20 [cited 2012 Jun 18]; Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22186382
261. MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Farley M, Mair R, Baumbach J, Bennett N, et al. Current epidemiology and trends in invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease--United States, 1989-2008. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2011 Dec;53(12):1230–6.
262. Doshi S, Kamimoto L, Finelli L, Perez A, Reingold A, Gershman K, et al. Description of antiviral treatment among adults hospitalized with influenza before and during the 2009 pandemic: United States, 2005-2009. J. Infect. Dis. 2011 Dec 15;204(12):1848–56.
263. MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Zell ER, Schmink S, Miller E, Clark T, et al. Early estimate of the effectiveness of quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine. Pediatr. Infect. Dis. J. 2011 Jun;30(6):451–5.
264. Lippman SA, Chinaglia M, Donini AA, Diaz J, Reingold A, Kerrigan DL. Findings from Encontros: a multilevel STI/HIV intervention to increase condom use, reduce STI, and change the social environment among sex workers in Brazil. Sex Transm Dis. 2012 Mar;39(3):209–16.
265. Vandermeer ML, Thomas AR, Kamimoto L, Reingold A, Gershman K, Meek J, et al. Association between use of statins and mortality among patients hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infections: a multistate study. J. Infect. Dis. 2012 Jan 1;205(1):13–9.
266. Wise ME, Viray M, Sejvar JJ, Lewis P, Baughman AL, Connor W, et al. Guillain-Barre Syndrome during the 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza vaccination campaign: Population-based surveillance among 45 million Americans. Am. J. Epidemiol. 2012 Jun 1;175(11):1110–9.
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267. Luckhaupt SE, Sweeney MH, Funk R, Calvert GM, Nowell M, D’Mello T, et al. Influenza-associated hospitalizations by industry, 2009-10 influenza season, United States. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2012 Apr;18(4):556–62.
268. Hampton LM, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Reingold A, Harrison LH, et al. Prevention of antibiotic-nonsusceptible Streptococcus pneumoniae with conjugate vaccines. J. Infect. Dis. 2012 Feb 1;205(3):401–11.
269. De Serres G, Pilishvili T, Link-Gelles R, Reingold A, Gershman K, Petit S, et al. Use of surveillance data to estimate the effectiveness of the 7-valent conjugate pneumococcal vaccine in children less than 5 years of age over a 9 year period. Vaccine. 2012 Jun 8;30(27):4067–72.
270. Reingold AL. Review: “Smallpox-The Death of a Disease: The Inside Story of Eradicating a Worldwide Killer” by D.A. Henderson. 2010; Am J Epidemiol 171:384-385.
271. Cohen AL, Taylor T Jr, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Lesher LJ, et al. An assessment of the screening method to evaluate vaccine effectiveness: The case of 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in the United States. PLoS One 2012;7:341785. Doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041785.
272. Henry JA, Reingold AL. Prehospital trauma systems reduce mortality in developing countries: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Trauma Acute Care Surg 2012;73:261-268.
273. Rathod SD, Klausner JD, Krupp K, Reingold AL, Madhivanan P. Epidemiologic features of vulvovaginal candidiasis among reproductive-age women in India. Inf Dis Obst Gyn 2012; Article ID 859071; doi:10.1155/2012/859071.
274. Duclos P, Durrheim DN, Reingold AL, Bhutta ZA, Vannice K, et al. Developing evidence-based immunization recommendations and GRADE*. Vaccine 2012;31:12-19.
275. Joshi R, Kalantri SP, Reingold AR, Colford JM. Changing landscape of acute encephalitis syndrome in India: A systematic review. Nat Med J India 2012;25:212-220.
276. Muhammad RD, Oza-Frank R, Zell E, Link-Gelles R, Venkat Narayan KM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiologoy of invasive pneumococcal disease among high-risk adults since the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for children. Clin Inf Dis 2013;56:e59-67.
277. Cox CM, D’Melio T, Perez A, Reingold A, Gershman K, et al. Increase in rates of hospitalization due to laboratory-confirmed influenza among children and adults during the 2009-2010 influenza pandemic. J Inf Dis 2012; 206:1350-1358.
278. Livorsi DJ, MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Bareta J, Zansky S, Petit S, Gershman K, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Invasive Haemophilus influenzae in the United States, 1999-2008: Epidemiology and Outcomes. J Inf Dis 2012; 65:496-504.
279. * Keller AC, Ansell CK, Reingold AL, Bourrier M, Hunter MD, Burrowes S, MacPhail TM. Improving Pandemic Response: A Sensemaking Perspective on the Spring 2009 H1N1 Pandemic. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 1; 2012. DOI: 10.1515/1944-4079.1101.
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280. Terrault NA, Dodge JL, Murphy EL, Tavis JE, Kiss A, Levin TR, Gish RG, Busch MP, Reingold AL, Alter MJ. Sexual transmission of hepatitis C virus among monogamous heterosexual couples: The HCV partners study. Hepatology; 2013;53:881-889.
281. Muhammed RD, Oza-Frank R, Zell E, Link-Gelles R, Venkat Narayan KM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease among high-risk adults since the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for children. Clin Inf Dis 2013;56:e59-e67.
282. Fleming-Dutra KE, Taylor T, Link-Gelles R, Garg S, Jhung MA, Finelli L, Jain S, Shay D, Chaves SS, Baumbach J, Hancock EB, Beall B, Bennett N, Zansky S, Petit S, Yousey-Hindes K, Farley MM, Gershman K, Harrison LH, Ryan P, Lexau C, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Effect of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic on invasive pneumococcal pneumonia. J Inf Dis 2013;207:1135-1143.
283. Kamimoto L, Euler GL, Lu P-J, Reingold A, Hadler J, Gershman K, et al. Seasonal influenza morbidity estimates obtained from telephone surveys, 2007. Am J Pub Hlth 2013;103:755-763.
284. Salmon DA, Proschan M, Forshee R, Gargiullo P, Bleser W, Burwen DR. . .H1N1 GBS Meta-Analysis Working Group (Reingold AL-member). Association between Guillain Barré syndrome and influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent inactivated vaccines in the USA: A meta-analysis. Lancet 2013;381:1461-1468.
285. Ssekitoleko R, Kamya MR, Reingold AL. Primary prophylaxis for cryptococcal meningitis and impact on mortality in HIV: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Future Virol 2013;8:doi: 10.2217/fvl.13.71.
286. Joshi R, Mishra PK, Joshi D, Santhosh SR, Parida MM, Desikan P, Gangane N, Kalantri SP, Reingold A, Colford JM Jr. Clinical presentation, etiology, and survival in adult acute encephalitis syndrome in rural Central India. Clin Neuro Neurosurg 2013;115:1753-1761.
287. Dawood FS, Chaves SS, Perez A, Reingold A, Meek J, Farley MM, et al. Complications and associated bacterial coinfections among children hospitalized with seasonal or pandemic influenza, United States, 2003-2010. J Inf Dis 2013; Epub DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jit473.
288. Thompson MG, Sokolow LZ, Almendares O, Openo K, Farley MM, Meek J, Ray J, Daily Kirley P, Reingold A, et al. Effectiveness of nonadjuvanted monovalent influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 vaccines for preventing reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction-confirmed pandemic influenza hospitalizations: Case-control study of children and adults at 10 U.S. influenza surveillance network sites. Clin Inf Dis 2013;11:1587-1592.
289. Wiringa AE, Shutt KA, Marsh JW, Cohn AC, Messonnier NE, Zansky SM, Petit S, Farley MM, Gershman K, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Geotemporal analysis of Neisseria meningitidis clones in the United States: 2000-2005. PLoS One 2013;8:e82048l doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082048.
290. Woolf-King SE, Steinmaus CM, Reingold AL, Hahn JA. An update on alcohol use and risk of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa: Meta:analysis and future research directions. IJADR, 2013, 2(1), 99-110; doi: 10.7895/ijadr.v2il.45.
291. Jhung MA, D’Mello T, Perez A, Aragon D, Bennett NM, Cooper T, Farley MM, Fowler B, Grube SM, Hancock EB, Lynfield R, Morin C, Reingold A, et al. Hospital-onset influenza hospitalizations – United States, 2010-2011. Am J Inf Control 2014; 42:7-11.
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292. Ayieko J, Abuogi L, Simchowitz B, Bukusi EA, Smith AH, Reingold A. Efficacy of isoniazid prophylactic therapy in prevention of tuberculosis in children: a meta-analysis. BMC Inf Dis 2014; 14:91; doi:10.1186/1471-2334-14-91.
293. Dharan NJ, Sokolow LZ, Cheng PY, Gargiullo P, Gershman K, Lynfield R, Morin C, Thomas A, Meek J, Farley MM, Arnold KE, Reingold A, et al. Child, household, and caregiver characteristics associated with hospitalization for influenza among children 6-59 months of age: an emerging infections program study. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2014 Jun;33(6):e141-50. doi: 10.1097/INF.0000000000000283.PMID: 24642518.
294. Wortham JM, Zell ER, Pondo T, Harrison LH, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Thomas A, Reingold A, et al. Racial disparities in invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections, 1998-2009. Clin Infect Dis. 2014 May;58(9):1250-7. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciu108. Epub 2014 Feb 27.PMID:24585565.
295. Madhivanan P, Raphael E, Rumphs A, Krupp K, Ravi K, Srinivas V, Arun A, Reingold AL, et al. Characterisation of culturable vaginal Lactobacillus species among women with and without bacterial vaginosis from the United States and India: A cross-sectional study. J Med Microbiol. 2014 Jul;63(Pt 7):931-5. doi: 10.1099/jmm.0.073080-0. Epub 2014 May 16.PMID :24836413.
296. Chaves SS, Perez A, Farley MM, Miller L, Schaffner W, Lindegren ML, Sharangpani R, Meek J, YouseyHindes K, Thomas A, Boulton R, Baumbach J, Hancock EB, Bandyopadhyay AS, Lynfield R, Morin C, Zansky SM, Reingold A,et al. The burden of influenza hospitalizations in infants from 2003 to 2012, United States. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2014 Sep;33(9):912-9. doi: 10.1097/INF.0000000000000321.PMID:24577042.
297. Blain A, MacNeil J, Wang X, Bennett N, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lexau C, Miller L, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Invasive Haemophilus Influenzae Disease in Adults ≥65 Years, United States, 2011. Open Forum Infect Dis (Summer 2014) 1 (2): first published online June 13, 2014. doi:10.1093/ofid/ofu044.
298. Greenbaum A, Chaves S S, Perez A, Aragon D, Bandyopadhyay A, Bennett N, Fowler B, Hancock E, Lynfield R, McDonald-Hamm C, Reingold A, et al. Heavy alcohol use as a risk factor for severe outcomes among adults hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza, 2005-2012. Infection (2014) 42:165-170. Doi 10.1007/s15010-013-0534-8.
299. Langley G, Schaffner W, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Bennett NM, Reingold A, et al. Twenty years of Active Bacterial Core surveillance. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Sept. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2109.141333.
300. Vugia DJ, Meek JI, Danila RN, Jones TF, Schaffner W, Baumbach J, Lathrop S, Farley MM, TobinD’Angelo M, Miller L, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Cieslak PR, Cartter ML, Reingold A. Training in Infections Disease Epidemiology through the Emerging Infections Program Sites. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Sept. doi:http//dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2109.150443.
301. MacNeil JR, Bennett N, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of Infant Meningococcal Disease in the United States, 2006-2012. Pediatrics Volume 135, number 2, February 2015. doi:10.1542/peds.2014-2035.
302. Arriola CS, Anderson EJ, Baumbach J, Bennett N, Bohm S, Hill M, Lindegree ML, Lung K, Meek J, Mermel E, Miller L, Monroe ML, Morin C, Oni O, Reingold A, et al. Does Influenza Vaccination Modify
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Influenza Severity: Data on Older Adults Hospitalized With Infuluenza During the 2012-2013 Season in the United States. J. Infect Dis March 2015. doi: 10.10936/infdis/jiv200.
303. Moore MR, Link-Gelles R, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Petit S, Zanksy SM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Effect of use of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in children on invasive pneumococcal disease in children and adults in the USA: analysis of multisite, population-based surveillance. Lancet Infect Dis 2015; 15:301-09. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(14)71081-3.
304. Madhivanan P, Alleyn HN, Raphael E, Krupp K, Ravi K, Nebhrajani R, Arun A, Reingold A, et al. Identification of culturable vaginal Lactobacillus species among reproductive age women in Mysore, India. Med Micro (2015), 64. doi.10.1099/jmm.0.000070.
305. Brito AM, Kendall C, Kerr L, Salani Mota RM, Crosland Guimaraes MD, Dourado I, Pinho A, Schwartz Benzaken A, Brignol S, Reingold A. Factors Associated with Low Levels of HIV Testing among Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) in Brazil. PLOS One (2015). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130445.
306. Dorjee K, Dierberg K, Sadutshang TD, and Reingold A. First report of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in a systemic lupus erythematosus patient. BMC Res Notes (2015) 8:337. doi 10.1186/s13104-015-1302-x.
307. Garg S, Jain S, Dawood F S, Jhung M, Perez A, D’Mello T, Reingold A, et al. Pneumonia among adults hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed seasonal influenze virus infection—United States, 2005-2008. BMC Infectious Diseases (2015) 15:369. Doi 10.1186/s12879-015-1004-y.
308. Shuster M, Eskola J, Duclos P, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Review of vaccine hesitancy: Rationale, remit, and methods. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.035.
309. MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Vaccine hesitancy: Definition, scope and determinants. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.36.
310. Larson H, Jarrett C, Schulz W, Chaudhuri M, Zhou Y, Dube E, Schuster M, MacDonald N, Wilson R, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Measuring vaccine hesitancy: The development of a survey tool. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.37.
311. Butler R, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Diagnosing the determinants of vaccine hesitancy in specific subgroups: The Guide to Tailoring Immunization Programmes (TIP). Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.038.
312. Jarrett C, Wilson R, O’Leary M, Eckersberger E, Larson H, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Strategies for addressing vaccine hesitancy—A systematic review. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.040.
313. Dube E, Gagnon D, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine History. Strategies intended to address vaccine hesitancy: Review of published reviews. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.0041.
314. Nowak G, Gellin B, MacDonald N, Butler R, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Addressing vaccine hesitancy: The potential value of commercial and social marketing principles and practices. Elesevier Ltd. 2015. Vaccine 33 (2015) 4204–4211 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.039.
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315. Goldstein S, MacDonald N, Guirguis S, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Health Communication and vaccine hesitancy. Elesvier Ltd. 2015.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.042.
316. Eskoka J, Duclos P, Schuster M, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. How to deal with vaccine hesitancy? Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016./j.vaccine.2015.04.043.
317. Rathod SD, Li T, Klausner JD, Hubbard A, Reingold AL, and Madhivanan P, Logic regression-derived algorithms for syndromic management of vaginal infections. Medical Informatics and Decision Making. 2015. 15:106. DOI 10.1186/s12911-015-0228-5.
318. Vugia DJ, Meek JI, Danila RN, Jones TF, Schaffner W, Baumbach J, Lathrop S, Farley MM, TobinD’Angelo M, Miller L, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Cieslak PR, Cartter ML, Reingold AL. Training in Infectious Disease Epidemiology through the Emerging Infections Program Sites. Emerging Infectious Diseases. Vol. 21, No. 9; September 2015.
319. Smith EM, Khan MA, Reingold AL, Watt JP. Group B streptococcus infections of soft tissue and bone in California adults, 1995-2012. Epidemiol. Infect. (2015), 143, 3343-3350. doi:10.1017/S0950268815000606.
320. Pekka N, Reingold A. Preventing pneumococcal infections in older adults. The Lancet, Vol 3 November 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/52213-2600(15)00365-3.
321. Tomczyk S, Lynfield R, Schaffner W, Reingold A, et al. Prevention of Antibiotic-Nonsusceptible Invasive Pneumococcal Disease With the 13-Valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine. Clin Infect Dis 2016;62(9):1119-25. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciw067.
322. Cardosa CS, Sabino EC, Oliveira CdL, de Oliveira LC, Ferreira AM, Cunha-Neto E, Bierrenback AL, Ferreira JE, Haikal DS, Reingold AL, et al. Longitudinal study of patients with chronic Chagas cardiomyopathy in Brazil (SaMi-Trop project): a cohort profile. BMJ Open 2016;6:e011181. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011181.
323. Moore MR, Link-Gelles R, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Haltzman C, Harrison LH, Zansky SM, Rosen JB, Reingold A, et al. Effectiveness of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for prevention of invasive pneumococcal disease in children in the USA: a matched case-control study. The Lancet, Vol 4 May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/52213-2600(16)00052-7.
324. Bramley AM, Chaves SS, Dawood FS, Doshi S, Reingold A, et al. Utility of keywords from chest radiograph reports for pneumonia surveillance among hospitalized patients with influenza: The CDC Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network, 2008-2009. Public Health Reports. May/Jun 2016, Vol. 131 Issue 3, p483-490.
325. Blain AE, Sema M, Wu H, MacNeail JR, Harrison LH, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Miller L, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Penicillin use in Meningococcal disease management: Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Sites, 2009. Open Forum Infectious Diseases. 11 July 2016. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofw152.
326. Link-Gelles R, Westreich D, Aiello AE, Shang N, Weber DJ, Holtzman C, Scherzinger K, Reingold A, et al. Bias with respect to socioeconomic status: A closer look at zip code matching in a pneumococcal vaccine effectiveness study. 8 August 2016. Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.08.005.
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327. Higgins JPT, Soares-Weiser K, Lopez JA, Kakourou A, Chaplin K, Martin NK, Sterne JAC, Reingold A. Association of BCG, DTP, and measles containing vaccines with childhood mortality: systematic review. BMJ. 2016;355:i5170. doi:10.1136/bmj.i5170.
328. Andreuccetti G, Leyton V, Lemos NP, Miziara ID, Ye Y, Takitane J, Munoz DR, Reingold AL, et al. Alcohol use among fatally injured victims in São Paulo, Brazil: bridging the gap between research and health services in developing countries. 2016 Nov 6. doi: 10.1111/add.13688. [Epub ahead of print]
329. Harris CM, Wu HM, Li J, Hall HI, Lee A, Zell E, Harrison LH, Petit S, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Miller L, Nichols M, Reingold A, et al. Meningococcal disease in patients with human immunodeficiency virus infection: a review of cases reported through active surveillance in the United States, 2000-2008. Open Forum Infect Dis. 2016 Dec 20;3(4):ofw226. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofw226.
330. Schrag SJ, Farley MM, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of invasive early-onset neonatal sepsis, 2005 to 2014. Pediatrics. 2016 Dec; 138(6). pii: e20162013.
331. Metcalf BJ, Chochua S, Gertz RE, Li Z, et al. Using whole genome sequencing to identify resistance determinants and predict antimicrobial resistance phenotypes for year 2015 invasive pneumococcal disease isolates recovered in the United States. Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 22, Issue 12, 2016,Pages 1002.e1-1002.e8, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2016.08.001.
332. Wesson P, Reingold A, McFarland W. Theoretical and empirical comparisons of methods to estimate the size of hard-to-reach populations: a systematic review. AIDS Behav. 2017 Jan 11. doi: 10.1007/s10461017-1678-9. [Epub ahead of print] Review.
333. Cohn AC, MacNeil JR, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Reingold AL, et al. Effectiveness and duration of protection of one dose of a meningococcal conjugate vaccine. Pediatrics. Volume 139, No. 2; February 2017.
334. Belongia EA, Karron RA, Reingold A, et al. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations regarding the use of live influenza vaccine: A rejoinder. Vaccine (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.06.017.
335. Carmen SA, Garg S, Anderson EJ, Ryan PA, George A, Zansky SM, Bennett N, Reingold A, et al. Influenza vaccination modifies disease severity among community-dwelling adults hospitalized with influenza. Clin Infect Dis 2017 cix468. doi: 10.1093/cid/cix468.
336. Link-Gelles R, Westreich D, Aiello AE, Shang N, Weber DJ, Rosen JB, Motala T, Mascola L, Eason J, Scherzinger K, Holtzman C, Reingold AL, et al. Generalisability of vaccine effectiveness estimates: an analysis of cases included in a postlicensure evaluation of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in the USA. BMJ Open 2017; 7:e017715. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2017-017715.
337. Metcalf BJ, Chochua S, GirtzJr. RE, et al. Short-read whole genome sequencing for determination of antimicrobial resistance mechanisms and capsular serotypes of current invasive Streptococcus agalactiae recovered in the USA, Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 23, Issue 8, 18 Feb 2017,Pages 574.e7-574.e14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2017.02.021.
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338. Arriola C, Garg S, Anderson E, Ryan PA, George A, Zansky SM, Bennett N, Reingold A, et al. Influenza vaccination modifies disease severity among community-dwelling adults hospitalized with influenza. Clin Infect Dis May 2017;00(00):1-9. doi:10.1093/cid/cix468.
339. Wong KK, Burdette E, Mahon B, et al. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices for use of cholera vaccine. MMWR 12 May 2017, 66(18):482-485. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm6618a6.
340. Wesson P, Lechtenberg R, Reingold, A, et al. Evaluating the completeness of HIV surveillance using capture-recapture models, Alameda County, California. AIDS Behav 21 August 2017. doi: 10.1007/s10461-017-1883-6.
341. Orenstein WA, Hinman A, Nkowane B, Olive JM, Reingold A. Measles and Rubella Global Strategic Plan 2012-2020 midterm review. Vaccine 36 (2018); A1-A34; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.09.026
342. Orenstein WA, Cairns L., Hinman .A, Nkowane B., J-M., Olive, Reingold A.L. Measles and Rubella Global Strategic Plan 2012-2020 midterm review report: background and summary. Vaccine 36 (2018) A35-A42: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.10.065.
343. Schille S, Vellozzi C, Reingold A, et al. Prevention of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. Recommendations and Reports:12 January 2018: 67(1);1-31.
344. Gordon A, Reingold A. The Burden of Influenza: a Complex Problem. Current Epidemiology Reports: 05 February 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40471-018-0136-1.
345. Liang JL, Tiwari T, Moro P, et al. Prevention of Pertussis, Tetanus, and Diphtheria with Vaccines in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Recommendations and Reports. 27 April 2018;67(2):1-44. doi:10.15585/mmwr.rr6702a1
346. G. Andreuccetti, C.J. Cherpitel, H.B. Carvalho, V. Leyton, I.D. Miziara, D.R. Munoz, Reingold A, et al. Alcohol in combination with illicit drugs among fatal injuries in Sao Paulo, Brazil: An epidemiological study on the association between acute substance use and injury. Injury, Volume 49, Issue 12, 2018, Pages 2186-2192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.injury.2018.09.035.
347. Soeters HM, Blain A, Pondo T, Doman B, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Miller L, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Current epidemiology and trends in invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease—United States, 2009–2015, Clin Infec Dis, Volume 67, Issue 6, 15 September 2018, Pages 881–889. https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciy187.
348. O’Brien KS, Emerson P, Hooper PJ, Reingold AL, et al. Antimicrobial resistance following mass azithromycin distribution for trachoma: a systematic review. Lancet Infect. Dis 2018. October 3, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30444-4.
349. Mendes Lobão W, Duarte FG, Burns JD, et al. Low coverage of HPV vaccination in the national immunization programme in Brazil: Parental vaccine refusal or barriers in health-service based vaccine delivery PLoS One. 2018;13(11):e0206726. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0206726.
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350. Duarte FG, da Silva Moreir S, da Conceicao C Almeida M, de Souza Teles CA, Andrade CS, Reingold A, et al. Sex differences and correlates of poor glycaemic control in type 2 diabetes: a cross-sectional study in Brazil and Venezuela. BMJ Open. 2019;9:e023401. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-023401.
351. Lewnard JA, Reingold AL. Emerging challenges and opportunities in infectious disease epidemiology. American Journal of Epidemiology. May 2019 Volume 188, Issue 5, Pages 873–882. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwy264
352. Schaffner W, Nichol KL, Reingold AL, Preventing hepatitis in us adults through vaccination. Infectious Diseases In Clinical Practice. November 2018, Volume 26, Issue 6 p 304-312. doi: 10.1097/IPC.0000000000000685.
353. Cardoso CS, Ribeiro ALP, Oliveira CDL, Oliveira LC, Ferreira AM, Bierrenbach AL, Silva JLP, Colosimo EA, Ferreira JE, Lee TH, Busch MP, Reingold AL, et al. Beneficial effects of benznidazole in Chagas disease: NIH SaMi-Trop cohort study. PLoS neglected tropical diseases. 2018.12. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006814.
354. Dorjee K, Choden T, Baxi SM, Steinmaus C, and Reingold AL. Risk of cardiovascular disease associated with exposure to abacavir among individuals with HIV: a systematic review and meta-analyses of results from 17 epidemiologic studies. International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents. 2018, 52(5), pp.541-553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2018.07.010.
355. Ahmed SS, Pondo T, Xing W, McGee L, Farley M, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Reingold A, et al. Early impact of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine use on invasive pneumococcal disease among adults with and without underlying medical conditions--United States. Clinical Infectious Diseases. CID 2019:19. doi:10.1093/cid/ciz739.
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Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Cases in the U.S.
Last updated on May 28, 2020
TOTAL CASES
1,698,523
19,680 New Cases*

TOTAL DEATHS
100,446
1,415 New Deaths*

Want More Data?
CDC COVID Data Tracker
Cases & Deaths by Jurisdiction
31 jurisdictions report more than 10,000 cases of COVID-19. This map shows COVID-19 cases and deaths reported by U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and other U.S.-a liated jurisdictions. Hover over the map to see the number of cases and deaths reported in each jurisdiction. To go to a jurisdiction’s health department website, click on the jurisdiction on the map.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Reported Cases

0 to 1,000 5,001 to 10,000 20,001 to 40,000

1,001 to 5,000 10,001 to 20,000 40,001 or more

AS MH FM PW MP VI GU PR
Jurisdictions

Add U.S. Map to Your Website

Cases & Deaths by County
Select a state to view the number of cases and deaths by county. This data is courtesy of USAFacts.org ÿ

Select a State

View County Data

New Cases by Day
The following chart shows the number of new cases of COVID-19 reported by day in the U.S. since the beginning of the outbreak.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases by Age
The following chart shows the age of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, and age was available for 1,324,111 (99.8%) people.

Cases by Race & Age
The following chart shows the race of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, but race was only available for 653,561 (49.2%) people.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases by Ethnicity & Age
The following chart shows the ethnicity of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, but ethnicity was only available for 613,757 (46.2%) people.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases & Deaths among Healthcare Personnel
Data were collected from 1,365,370 people, but healthcare personnel status was only available for 288,658 (21.1%) people. For the 63,136 cases of COVID-19 among healthcare personnel, death status was only available for 36,043 (57.1%).

CASES AMONG HCP
63,136

DEATHS AMONG HCP
299

Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data
CDC has moved the following information to the Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data When did people in the U.S. get sick from COVID-19, How did people in the U.S. get COVID-19, and Cases of COVID-19 from Wuhan, China and the Diamond Princess cruise.

About the Data

Updated Daily

This page is updated daily based on data con rmed at 4:00pm ET the day before.

Numbers reported on Saturdays and Sundays are preliminary and not yet con rmed by state and territorial health

departments These numbers may be modi ed when numbers are updated on Mondays

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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departments. These numbers may be modi ed when numbers are updated on Mondays.

Number of Jurisdictions
There are currently 55 U.S.-a liated jurisdictions reporting cases of COVID-19. This includes 50 states, District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S Virgin Islands.

Con rmed & Probable Cases
As of April 14, 2020, CDC case counts and death counts include both con rmed and probable cases and deaths. This change was made to re ect an interim COVID-19 position statement Ă ÿ issued by the Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists on April 5, 2020. The position statement included a case de nition and made COVID-19 a nationally noti able disease.
A con rmed case or death is de ned by meeting con rmatory laboratory evidence for COVID-19.
A probable case or death is de ned by one of the following:
Meeting clinical criteria AND epidemiologic evidence with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID-19 Meeting presumptive laboratory evidence AND either clinical criteria OR epidemiologic evidence Meeting vital records criteria with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID19

Case Noti cations
Case noti cations were received by CDC from U.S. public health jurisdictions and the National Noti able Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS).

Accuracy of Data
CDC does not know the exact number of COVID-19 illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths for a variety of reasons. COVID-19 can cause mild illness, symptoms might not appear immediately, there are delays in reporting and testing, not everyone who is infected gets tested or seeks medical care, and there may be di erences in how states and territories con rm numbers in their jurisdictions.
State and local public health departments are now testing and publicly reporting their cases. In the event of a discrepancy between CDC cases and cases reported by state and local public health o cials, data reported by states should be considered the most up to date.

More Information

COVIDView – A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity

Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data

FAQ: COVID-19 Data and Surveillance

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Testing in the U.S. World Map Health Departments

Page last reviewed: May 28, 2020

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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EXHIBIT 5

COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

!
Stay Safe MN About the Order (/covid19/for-minnesotans/stay-safe-mn/stay-safe-mn.jsp) Frequently Asked Questions (/covid19/for-minnesotans/staysafe-mn/faq.jsp) Share Our Message (/covid19/media/share-message/index.jsp)

(/covid19/)
"
COVID-19 Dashboard: Data on Minnesota Cases
When viewed on a smartphone, select bars to view chart labels.

22,947
Conﬁrmed Cases

967
Deceased

16,655
Released From Isolation


+ −
Esri, HERE, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USG…

Confirmed Cases by County Aitkin County: 7
Anoka County: 1,289 Becker County: 36 Beltrami County: 14 Benton County: 173 Big Stone County: 4
Blue Earth County: 126 Brown County: 14 Carlton County: 73 Carver County: 189 Cass County: 13
Chippewa County: 44 Chisago County: 54

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000
0

Total Confirmed Cases by Exposure

5,260

4,930

744

Travel

Congregate Living

1,399

Health Care: staff

Community: known

Community: no known

4,855 Unknown

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000 0

1,956 Hospitalized

Total Confirmed Cases by Hospitalization

5,315 Non-Hospitalized

924 ICU

14,752 Unknown

20,000

15,000

15,305

Total Confirmed Cases by Residency

10,000

5,000
0 Private

2,771

165

408

LTCF Residential

Jail Behavioral

Health

4,130

42

3

Other

Unknown Work Dorm

4,130

23

68

29

3

HHotoeml elesHs oSmheellteesrs Non-Shelter

University

Unknown

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

5,000 4,000 3,000

Total Confirmed Cases by Age

4,212

4,580

3,660

3,335

2,000

1,536

2,103

1,243

1,171

1,000 662
397

38

10

0

0-5

6-19

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

70-79

80-89

90-99

100+

Unk

14,000 12,000 10,000
8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000
0

11,051 Male

Total Confirmed Cases by Gender
11,433

Female

455 Unknown

8 Other

10,000 8,000

7,934

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 White

5,231 Black

Total Confirmed Cases by Race

1,240

185

Asian Amer.

Indian

/

Alaskan

44 Pacific Islander

5,154

2,713

Other

Unknown

446 Multiple

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

14,000 12,000 10,000
8,000 6,000 4,000

Total Confirmed Cases by Ethnicity
12,797

4,421 Hispanic

Non-Hispanic

5,729 Unknown

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-8 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 6

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 2 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
By Kelley Luckstein
Updated visitor policy: Mayo Clinic limits number of visitors during COVID-19 response

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

Page 1 of 3

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 3 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
ROCHESTER, Minn. ― To protect patients and staff, Mayo Clinic is limiting the number of outpatient and hospital visitors while there is concern about COVID-19 transmission.

UPDATED: Saturday, March 21st

As Mayo Clinic continues to monitor the outbreak of the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease), additional changes have been made to policies for visitors to all Mayo Clinic sites. Please read below for additional details.

Effective Sunday, March 22, to ensure the safety of hospital patients and staff, no visitors will be allowed in the hospital setting or emergency department. Exceptions include consideration for childbirth, end-of-life care, hospitalized children, and other rare and unique circumstances assessed by the care team.

Effective Monday, March 23, outpatient clinic patients may have one individual accompany them, with consideration for special exceptions determined by patient care teams.

The ongoing safety of patients, staff and the community remains Mayo Clinic’s primary focus. To protect patients and staff, Mayo Clinic will limit the number of visitors on its campuses while there is a threat of COVID-19 transmission.

These restrictions may be difficult for patients and their loved ones, but Mayo is taking these necessary steps to protect patients and staff. Limiting the number of visitors is temporary and is being done to safeguard the health of all who come to Mayo Clinic.

Following are site-specific updates to hospital visitor policies:

Arizona:

Outpatient/Clinic Patients: Patients may have one individual accompany them in the clinic (outpatient) setting. Due to additional screening activities, please allow extra time upon arrival (approximately 20 minutes).
Hospital Patients: For each hospital patient, one visitor per patient at a time will be allowed. The visitor will be screened to be sure they are free from fever and respiratory symptoms. Additional guidelines apply for patients who are receiving care for respiratory conditions that require isolation.
Florida:

Effectively immediately, to ensure the safety of hospital patients, no visitors will be allowed for patients at Mayo Clinic Hospital and Emergency Department. Requests for exceptions should be sent to the Healthcare Incident Command System (HICS) at 904-956-1800.
Rochester:

Hospital Patients: Effective Sunday, March 22, to ensure the safety of hospital patients and staff, no visitors will be allowed in the hospital setting or emergency department.

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

Page 2 of 3

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 4 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
Exceptions include consideration for childbirth, end-of-life care, hospitalized children, and other rare circumstances as assessed by the care team.
Outpatient/Clinic Patients: Patients may have one individual accompany them in the clinic (outpatient) setting, with consideration for special exceptions as determined by your care team. Due to respiratory illness screening activities, please allow extra time upon arrival (approximately 15 minutes). We ask for your patience as we work to implement these processes in our clinics.
Since Mayo has begun screening visitors in Rochester, staff members are urged to use staff-only entrances to avoid congestion. If you must use an entrance used by patients and visitors, you can move swiftly through by displaying your Mayo Clinic access identification badge.
Mayo Clinic Health System:
Hospitalized patients across Mayo Clinic Health System will no longer be allowed to have visitors. The effective dates are as follows:
Northwest Wisconsin: Effective Sunday, March 22, at 7 a.m. Southwest Wisconsin: Effective Sunday, March 22, at 7 a.m. Southeast Minnesota: Effective as of Friday, March 20 Southwest Minnesota: Effective as of Friday, March 20
A limited number of compassionate exceptions will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and no visitors under age 18 will be allowed. All visitors will be screened to assess the need for a COVID-19 test. If a visitor is tested, they will not be allowed to visit while results are pending, or if results are positive.
Click here for additional information on patient visitor guidelines, including Florida, Arizona and the Mayo Clinic Health system. (https://www.mayoclinic.org/covid-19)
Media contact: Kelley Luckstein, Mayo Clinic Public Affairs, newsbureau@mayo.edu (mailto:newsbureau@mayo.edu)
Check the CDC website (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html) for additional updates on COVID-19. For more information and all your COVID-19 coverage, go to the Mayo Clinic News Network (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/covid-19/) and mayoclinic.org (https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963).
#COVID-19 (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/covid-19/)
#visitor policy (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/visitor-policy/)

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

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EXHIBIT 7

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-9 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 3
The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE

Perspective ﻿

Not Dying Alone — Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic
Glenn K. Wakam, M.D., John R. Montgomery, M.D., Ben E. Biesterveld, M.D., and Craig S. Brown, M.D.​​

Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

Dr. Wakam: I’m 5 hours into my ICU shift at a community hospital in Detroit when the results of another arterial blood gas return. My patient has been hospi-

ourselves telling families, “Because of hospital policy, we cannot allow visitors at this time.” This conversation sometimes takes

talized for 3 days and is Covid-19–positive. Over the past 12 place at the doors to the ICU,

over the phone, or in front of the

hours, his treatment has progressed and helpless. She asks to come into the hospital, as families beg to see

from intubation, to prone positioning hospital to be with her husband, or at their loved ones before they die.

on 100% fractional inspired oxygen, least see him through the door to his A seemingly simple request, which

to medically induced paralysis, and fi- room. Unfortunately, I am told by the in other times would be encour-

nally to bilevel ventilation. The results unit charge nurse that hospital policy aged, has become an ethical and

from the arterial blood gas are dismal: permits no visitors for patients who health care dilemma.

pH 7.19, pCO2 70.1, pO2 63.7, HCO3 have tested positive or are under inves-

It is 12 a.m., and I try to advocate

26.0. He has already experienced epi- tigation for Covid-19.

for the wife with the nursing managers.

sodes of profound hypoxia when we try The fear of dying alone is To complicate matters, the wife admits

to rotate him into a supine position, nearly universal — a fact of that although she hasn’t had any fever

and his heart has begun to show signs which anyone who’s taken care or cough, she has had a headache and a

of strain, with periods of atrial fibrilla- of a critically ill patient is acutely sore throat. With no clear policy in

tion with rapid ventricular response and aware. So we sometimes go to place for family members with symp-

nonsustained runs of ventricular tachy- great lengths to give patients just toms, we call the hospital administra-

cardia. A request to transfer the patient a little more time for family mem- tor at home, and he answers immedi-

for extracorporeal membrane oxygena- bers to arrive and say their good- ately: “No.” Then there’s a long back

tion (ECMO) is denied. It’s 11 p.m., byes. One aspect of the Covid-19 and forth about “extenuating circum-

and I’m worried that my patient won’t pandemic that has been particu- stances” criteria, which allow a single

survive until morning.

larly difficult is that instead of visitor to come to the hospital. But since

I call the patient’s wife to inform her our usual promise that “We’ll do the wife could possibly have symptoms

about her husband’s trajectory. The con- everything we can to keep him and has not been tested for Covid-19,

versation makes her feel overwhelmed alive until you get here,” we find the administrator decides she cannot

n engl j med﻿  nejm.org ﻿

1

The New England Journal of Medicine Downloaded from nejm.org on May 27, 2020. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-9 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 3

PERSPECTIVE

Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

visit. I telephone the wife and relay the final decision, and she rapidly cycles through stages of grief. Her initial anger and threats of a lawsuit quickly give way to pleading and bargaining — “What if I only spent 5 minutes and left?”
The problem is multifaceted. In many cases, family members have already spent time in close contact with the patient, which means they’re reasonably likely to be infected with SARS-CoV-2 themselves. Moreover, there is a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE), and using some on family members means consuming more of a scarce resource. And if the family members are currently uninfected, a visit to a ward full of patients with Covid-19 risks infecting people who lack proper training in PPE use.
This dilemma has led to some creative workarounds: nurses may hold the bedside phone up to the patient’s ear or bring their personal smartphone into the room and hold it up while using Skype, WhatsApp, or FaceTime. But many nurses, owing to concern about HIPAA privacy rules, a heavy workload, or poor connectivity can’t offer such communication with family. And even if a call does take place, families may be left feeling like they didn’t get to say goodbye properly — and we are left feeling like there must be a better way.
My patient’s wife arrives at the emergency department at 1:30 a.m., despite having been told she would not be allowed to see her husband. I go to meet her, and we discuss her husband’s

continued decline. Unfortunately, in the middle of the conversation, a Code Blue rings from the overhead speaker for a patient in the ICU. I step away and find myself entering her husband’s room, where CPR is already in progress.
After 90 minutes of CPR, epinephrine, and defibrillations, my patient still has not regained a sustained pulse. I somberly call time of death. One of the nurses in the hallway has been in contact with the wife throughout the process and has informed her of the death; she now has the wife on FaceTime so that she can see her husband. When she recognizes him in the distorted image, she lets out a wail of sorrow. She is in the midst of her final goodbyes when I have to excuse myself from the room: another patient with Covid-19 is deteriorating a few rooms over.
We, as residents, have spent much of our time these past few weeks in community ICUs around Detroit, one of the epicenters of Covid-19 in the United States, and have all experienced similar scenarios. We have witnessed more death in the past 3 weeks than in all our previous years combined. Unfortunately, similar stories are becoming more common and represent uncharted territory for many of us, as we try to maintain our humanity and patient-centeredness while managing these difficult situations.
We believe that the U.S. health care system can do better. As telehealth and virtual meetings become the new normal, so can telecommunication between isolated patients and their families. Perhaps setting up a tablet com-

puter facing the patient or repurposing a workstation on wheels logged in to a video chat would be a solution. Recently, some guidance has become available regarding difficult but necessary conversations related to Covid-19 and ways of bridging the physical distance we must maintain during the pandemic.1,2 Such efforts may not represent the evidence-based medicine we all strive to practice, but they capture some of the art of caring not just for patients, but also for their families and friends. National guidance would be beneficial, since existing Covid-19 management resources fall short. There may be no way for families to hold patients’ hands or hug them while they’re dying, but with the care and compassion of frontline health care workers, maybe we can harness creative solutions to help them feel some connection, while still keeping everyone safe.
Identifying details have been changed to protect the family’s privacy.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Surgery, University of Michigan , Ann Arbor.
This article was published on April 14, 2020, at NEJM.org.
1. VitalTalk. COVID ready communication playbook (https://www​.vitaltalk​.org/​guides/​ covid​-­19​-­communication​-­skills/​). 2. Hollander JE, Carr BG. Virtually perfect? Telemedicine for Covid-19. N Engl J Med. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2003539.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2007781 Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

2

n engl j med﻿  nejm.org ﻿

The New England Journal of Medicine Downloaded from nejm.org on May 27, 2020. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 5
EXHIBIT 8

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Social Distancing
Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

Page 1 of 4

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
Limiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
What is social distancing?
Social distancing, also called “physical distancing,” means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home. To practice social or physical distancing:
Stay at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people Do not gather in groups Stay out of crowded places and avoid mass gatherings
In addition to everyday steps to prevent COVID-19, keeping space between you and others is one of the best tools we have to avoid being exposed to this virus and slowing its spread locally and across the country and world.
Limit close contact with others outside your household in indoor and outdoor spaces. Since people can spread the virus before they know they are sick, it is important to stay away from others when possible, even if you—or they—have no symptoms. Social distancing is especially important for people who are at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.
Many people have personal circumstances or situations that present challenges with practicing social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Please see the following guidance for additional recommendations and considerations for:
Households Living in Close Quarters: How to Protect Those Who Are Most Vulnerable Living in Shared Housing People with Disabilities People Experiencing Homelessness

!

If you have been exposed or are sick
Separate from others to limit the spread of COVID-19 Take care of yourself while you’re sick

Why practice social distancing?
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

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Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
COVID-19 spreads mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6 feet) for a prolonged period. Spread happens when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. The droplets can also be inhaled into the lungs. Recent studies indicate that people who are infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of COVID-19.
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes. However, this is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads. COVID-19 can live for hours or days on a surface, depending on factors such as sunlight, humidity, and the type of surface. Social distancing helps limit opportunities to come in contact with contaminated surfaces and infected people outside the home.
Although the risk of severe illness may be di!erent for everyone, anyone can get and spread COVID-19. Everyone has a role to play in slowing the spread and protecting themselves, their family, and their community.
Tips for social distancing
Follow guidance from authorities where you live. If you need to shop for food or medicine at the grocery store or pharmacy, stay at least 6 feet away from others. Also consider other options:
Use mail-order for medications, if possible. Consider a grocery delivery service. Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face covering when around others, including when you have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store. Cloth face coverings should NOT be placed on children under age 2, anyone who has trouble breathing, or is unconscious, incapacitated, or otherwise unable to remove the mask without assistance. Keep at least 6 feet between yourself and others, even when you wear a face covering. Avoid gatherings of any size outside your household, such as a friend’s house, parks, restaurants, shops, or any other place. This advice applies to people of any age, including teens and younger adults. Children should not have in-person playdates while school is out. To help maintain social connections while social distancing, learn tips to keep children healthy while school’s out. Work from home when possible. See additional information for critical infrastructure workforce " from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Limit using any kind of public transportation, ridesharing, or taxis, if possible. If you must use public transportation, follow these tips to protect yourself. If you are a student or parent, talk to your school about options for digital/distance learning.
Stay connected while staying away. It is very important to stay in touch with friends and family that don’t live in your home. Call, video chat, or stay connected using social media. Everyone reacts di!erently to stressful situations and having to socially distance yourself from someone you love can be di"cult. Read tips for stress and coping.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

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Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM

#

Need help? Know someone who does?
If you, or someone you care about, are feeling overwhelmed with emotions like sadness, depression, or

anxiety, or feel like you want to harm yourself or others

Call 911 Visit the Disaster Distress Helpline " , call 1-800-985-5990, or text TalkWithUs to 66746 Visit the National Domestic Violence Hotline " or call 1-800-799-7233 and TTY 1-800-787-3224

More Information
How to Protect Yourself Cleaning and Disinfecting Your Home Gatherings and Community Events
Page last reviewed: May 6, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 42
EXHIBIT 9

This document is made available electronically by the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library as part of
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Emergency Executive Order 20-48
Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public
Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain NonCritical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces
I, Tim Walz, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and applicable statutes, issue the following Executive Order: The COVID-19 pandemic presents an unprecedented challenge to our State. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) characterized the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic. Despite efforts to contain COVID-19, the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) indicate that it is expected to spread. Confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Minnesota are rapidly increasing. On March 15, 2020, Minnesota detected the first confirmed cases caused by “community spread”—infections not epidemiologically linked to overseas travel. By March 17, 2020, all fifty states had reported a confirmed case of COVID-19. And on March 21, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”) announced the first confirmed fatality due to COVID-19 in Minnesota. Minnesota has taken proactive steps to ensure that we are ahead of the curve on COVID-19 prevention and response. On March 13, 2020, I issued Executive Order 20-01 and declared a peacetime emergency because this pandemic, an act of nature, threatens the lives of Minnesotans, and local resources are inadequate to address the threat. On April 13, 2020, after notifying the Legislature, I issued Executive Order 20-35, extending the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01. Previous Executive Orders required the closure of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation and directed Minnesotans to stay at home except for certain exempted activities and Critical Sector work. Community spread of COVID-19 continues to increase in Minnesota and nationwide. Just three weeks ago, on April 8, 2020, Minnesota had 1,154 confirmed COVID-19 cases, with 271 hospitalizations and 39 fatalities. As of today, Minnesota has had 5,136 confirmed COVID-19 cases, with 1,044 hospitalizations and 343 fatalities. The United States has recorded over 1,005,000 COVID-19 cases with over 57,500 recorded fatalities. The continued presence of community spread in Minnesota and the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases and deaths require us
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to continue our measures to slow the spread of this pandemic. Slowing the community spread of COVID-19 is critical to ensuring that our healthcare facilities remain able to accommodate those who require intensive medical intervention.
Executive Orders 20-20 and 20-33 permitted work in Critical Sectors based on guidance from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. That Guidance has since been updated and revised. This order adopts and relies on the April 17, 2020 Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response, Version 3.0 (“CISA Guidance (version 3.0)”—attached to, and incorporated into, this Executive Order). The CISA Guidance (version 3.0) identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability. This federal guidance provides a baseline for Minnesota’s efforts to ensure critical infrastructure and services are maintained while slowing the spread of COVID-19.
Many Minnesotans, who neither work in a Critical Sector nor can work from home, have been unable to work during this pandemic. In Executive Order 20-33, seeking to balance public health needs and economic considerations, I directed the MDH Commissioner, and the Commissioners of the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (“DEED”) and the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”) to begin planning to allow certain nonCritical Sector workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. I explained that such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. In Executive Order 20-38, I expanded exemptions related to outdoor recreational activities and facilities. In Executive Order 20-40, I further allowed certain nonCritical Sector workers to return to work once their employers had planned for and provided a safe work environment. This Executive Order continues our plan to safely reopen our economy.
Businesses have the opportunity to resume work through preparation and planning that will allow for compliance with the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 182 (“Minnesota OSHA Standards”), in addition to guidelines related to COVID-19 set forth by the Minnesota Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“MDH and CDC Guidelines”). We will continue to monitor the level of COVID-19 cases and explore whether more workers can safely return to other workplaces.
In Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.02, the Minnesota Legislature conferred upon the Governor emergency powers “in order to (1) ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with disasters, (2) generally protect the public peace, health, and safety, and (3) preserve the lives and property of the people of the state.” Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 1, the Governor has general authority to control the state’s emergency management as well as carry out the provisions of Minnesota’s Emergency Management Act.
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 3(7), authorizes the Governor to cooperate with federal and state agencies in “matters pertaining to the emergency management of the state and nation.” This includes “the direction or control of . . . the conduct of persons in the state, including entrance or exit from any stricken or threatened public place, occupancy of facilities, and . . . public meetings or gatherings.” Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that same section, the Governor may “make, amend, and rescind the necessary orders and rules to carry out the
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provisions” of Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 12. When approved by the Executive Council and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, such orders and rules have the force and effect of law during the peacetime emergency. Any inconsistent rules or ordinances of any agency or political subdivision of the state are suspended during the pendency of the emergency.
For these reasons, I order as follows:
1. Beginning on Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 11:59 pm through Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm, all persons currently living within the State of Minnesota are ordered to stay at home or in their place of residence except to engage in the Activities set forth below in paragraph 5 and to work in Critical Sectors and Non-Critical Exempt Businesses as forth below in paragraphs 6 and 8. Executive Orders 20-33, 20-38, 2040, and 20-47 are rescinded as of Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
2. This Executive Order does not restrict virtual work or telework (i.e., work from home). Minnesotans working in any field, including the Critical Sectors and NonCritical Exempt Businesses set forth below, must work from their home or residence as much as possible. Any worker who can work from home must do so.
3. Masks and face coverings. I strongly encourage all Minnesotans to wear a manufactured or homemade cloth face covering at all times when they leave their homes and travel to any public setting where other social distancing measures are difficult to maintain (e.g., grocery and other stores), and to follow face covering guidelines issued by MDH and the CDC until this order is rescinded. Such face masks and coverings are for source control – to help limit the person wearing the covering from infecting others. They are not yet known to be protective of the wearer and thus are not personal protective equipment.
4. Definitions. For purposes of this Executive Order, homes or residences include mobile homes, hotels, motels, shared rental units, shelters, and similar facilities, to the extent they are used for lodging. As used in this Executive Order, “workers” and “personnel” are broadly defined to include owners, proprietors, employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and interns. As used in this Executive Order, “Critical Sectors” is defined to include the categories found in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the additional categories listed below in paragraph 6.
5. Exemptions – Activities. Minnesotans may leave their homes or residences to engage in the following activities, provided that all persons follow the MDH and CDC Guidelines, including but not limited to social distancing, to the maximum extent possible. Consistent with federal guidance and to protect our neighbors, Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel. This list of Activities may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. Clarifications will be available for public review at: https://mn.gov/covid19/
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a. Relocation to ensure safety. Individuals whose homes or residences are unsafe or become unsafe, including individuals who have suffered or are at risk of domestic violence or for whom the safety, sanitation, or essential operations of their home or residence cannot be maintained, are allowed and urged to leave their home or residence and relocate to a safe alternative home or residence.
b. Health and safety activities. Individuals may seek emergency services; obtain medical services, supplies, and medications; and visit a healthcare or dental professional or facility, or a veterinarian. Individuals may also donate blood.
c. Outdoor Recreational Activity. Individuals must not engage in outdoor recreational activities where they will come into close proximity with others from different households. Individuals may engage in the activities listed below, provided that they follow the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) and MDH guidelines on outdoor recreation and guidelines for facilities and the public (“Outdoor Recreation Guidelines”) available at DNR’s COVID-19 website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid19.html):
i. Individuals may engage in any outdoor activity that is dependent upon or derives its principal benefit from natural surroundings and open space, including but not limited to hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, hiking, biking, golfing, and picnicking for the purposes of pleasure, rest, exercise, or relaxation, provided that the activity can be engaged in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines, including maintaining at least six feet of separation between participants from different households. Groups within a single household may engage in outdoor activities or sports that do not allow for social distancing (e.g., soccer or basketball) but should not engage in such activities with members of other households.
ii. Outdoor recreational activities allowed by this Executive Order do not include performances, competitions, team events, tournaments, races, rallies, organized sports, spectator events, fairs, or any other events that involve the gathering of individuals in a manner that would preclude social distancing. For example, individuals must not partake, as participants or as spectators, in activities such as marathons, fundraising walks, fishing contests, league sports, and tournaments.
iii. All persons participating in outdoor recreational activities under this Executive Order must follow the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
iv. Nothing in this paragraph permits trespass upon private property, and all activities undertaken pursuant to this paragraph must be undertaken in accordance with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license
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and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules. Nothing in this paragraph should be construed to abrogate existing local authority to limit or restrict activities or close facilities.
d. Supplies and services. Individuals may leave their residences to:
i. Obtain food, including delivery or carry-out services, beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic), and other grocery items.
ii. Obtain gasoline.
iii. Obtain supplies needed to work from home.
iv. Obtain commercially available personal protective equipment and supplies and materials necessary to make homemade source control items such as face masks.
v. Obtain products needed to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes and residences, businesses, and personally owned vehicles, including automobiles and bicycles.
vi. Visit and use the services of laundromats and dry cleaners.
vii. Pick up retail products from establishments offering curbside pickup services.
e. Essential intrastate and interstate travel. Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel. Individuals may travel to exempted activities and may travel to return to a home or place of residence. Individuals may also travel into and out of Minnesota.
f. Care of others. Individuals may care for a family member, friend, or pet in another household, and may transport family members, friends, or pets as allowed by this Executive Order, including the transport of children pursuant to existing parenting time schedules or other visitation schedules pertaining to a child in need of protective services (CHIPS) proceeding.
g. Displacement. Individuals without a home are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order, and they may move between emergency shelters, dropin centers, and encampments. Encampments, including both new and existing encampments, should not be subject to sweeps or disbandment by state or local governments, as such sweeps or disbandment increase the potential risk and spread of COVID-19.
i. Law enforcement is not prohibited from addressing trespassing or exigent circumstances (i.e., those requiring immediate action to protect life, prevent injury, or preserve evidence) that occur within
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encampments or among people staying outdoors. Law enforcement and other first responders should respond to trespassing and exigent circumstances as those situations require.
ii. If a local government entity is providing sufficient alternate housing, shelter, or encampment space that complies with MDH’s guidance entitled Homeless Services Settings: Interim Guidance for Providers and the CDC’s guidance entitled Responding to COVID-19 Among People Experiencing Unsheltered Homelessness, or if an encampment has reached a size or status such that is a documented threat to the health, safety, or security of residents, state or local governments may restrict, limit, or close encampment spaces.
iii. The commissioners of the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency and the Minnesota Department of Human Services are authorized, as co-chairs of the Minnesota Interagency Council on Homelessness, to issue additional guidance as needed to clarify this provision or further address the issue of homeless encampments.
h. Moving or relocation. Individuals are permitted to move to a new home or place of residence, provided they follow MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible.
i. Voting. Individuals are permitted and encouraged to vote in all state and local elections. Voters are also encouraged to vote by mail using an absentee ballot where feasible. Additional information from the Secretary of State is available at https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/electionscalendar/2020-elections-and-covid-19/
j. Funerals. Individuals may leave their home or residence to attend funerals, whether at a place of worship, funeral home, burial site, or other similar location, provided that the gathering consists of no more than 10 attendees. The space utilized must allow for social distancing and compliance with MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible. Venues should make accommodations for remote attendance, if possible, for others. Individuals who are at high risk from COVID-19 are strongly encouraged to attend remotely.
k. Weddings. Individuals may leave their home or residence to be married, to serve as witnesses, or to officiate a marriage, provided that the gathering consists of no more than 10 attendees. The wedding location must allow for social distancing and compliance with MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible. The restrictions on places of public accommodation adopted in Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and this Executive Order otherwise remain in effect.
l. Tribal Activities and Lands.
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i. Activities by tribal members within the boundaries of their tribal reservations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
ii. Activities within the boundaries of federal land held in trust for one of the 11 Minnesota Tribal Nations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
iii. Activities by tribal members to exercise their federal treaty rights within the boundaries of their treaty territory (also known as “ceded territory”) are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by applicable tribal authorities.
iv. Tribal members may travel to and from their tribal reservations in accordance with applicable tribal law.
6. Exemptions – Critical Sectors. All workers who can work from home must do so. Workers in the following Critical Sectors, who are performing work that cannot be done at their home or residence through telework or virtual work and can be done only at a place of work outside of their home or residence, are exempted from the prohibition in paragraph 1 of this Executive Order as set forth below. These Critical Sector exemptions apply only to travel to and from an individual’s home or residence and place of work and an individual’s performance of work duties that cannot be done at their home or residence. Travel may include transportation to and from child care or school settings as necessary to ensure the safe care of children. This list of Critical Sectors may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. These clarifications carry the full weight and effect of this Executive Order. Clarifications are available for public review at: http://mn.gov/deed/critical/
a. Healthcare and public health. As applicable, healthcare and public health workers are subject to the restrictions on elective surgeries and procedures as set forth in Executive Orders 20-09 and 20-17. This category is limited to:
i. Healthcare and public health workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
ii. Workers providing or supporting reproductive health care, childbirth services, mental health care, and substance use treatment.
iii. Workers supporting manufacturers, technicians, logistics and warehouse operators, and distributors of personal care, hygiene, and healthcare products.
iv. Workers providing or supporting home care and human services workers from government or non-profit providers who are delivering
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food, prescriptions, case management services, mental health and substance abuse therapy, or who are otherwise caring for a client.
v. Workers providing or supporting home-based care for adults, seniors, and children, including but not limited to people who are blind, deaf, deafblind, or hard of hearing and people with disabilities, including physical disabilities, developmental disabilities, intellectual disabilities, substance use disorders, or mental illness. This includes workers who must travel to a person’s home to provide care or other in-home services including meal delivery and one-on-one interpreting services for people who are blind, deaf, deafblind, or hard of hearing.
vi. Personal care attendants, paid employees of government and nonprofit providers, or volunteers representing government and non-profit providers.
vii. Workers supporting the medical cannabis industry.
viii. Workers in adult daycares are not exempted.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and first responders. This category is limited to law enforcement and public safety workers and first responders listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), and all corrections personnel, state and county probation officers, supervision agents, victims’ advocates, animal control officers, humane officers, and all workers who support electronic security and life-safety services. This category also includes the following:
i. Bail bond agents posting a bond.
ii. Workers supporting indoor gun or shooting ranges when providing qualification shooting or skills maintenance to licensed Minnesota peace officers, law enforcement officers, and federally sworn law enforcement officers assigned to work within the state of Minnesota. Workers supporting outdoor shooting ranges are exempt under paragraph 6.kk of this Executive Order.
iii. Workers and attendees at skills training for the state’s Professional Peace Officer Education (“PPOE”) providers, where such training cannot be given remotely and provided that social distancing and other mitigation strategies are employed.
iv. Evaluators and firefighters at skills training, including evaluation for the state’s firefighter Certification Testing, where such training and evaluations cannot be given remotely.
c. Food and agriculture. This category includes food and agriculture workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0). For clarity, and for the purposes of
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this Executive Order, references to “beverages” include alcoholic beverages. The restrictions on restaurants, bars, and other places of public accommodation adopted in Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, 20-18, and this Executive Order remain in effect. This category also includes:
i. Workers supporting agricultural equipment repair service.
ii. Lawncare and landscaping workers.
iii. Workers supporting garden centers, stores, and nurseries, provided that such centers, stores, or nurseries adhere to guidance provided by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture.
iv. Workers supporting florists for the sale for delivery only of perishable plant stock. Workers delivering perishable plant stock are strongly encouraged to drop off product at the front door of nursing homes and hospitals to avoid contact with vulnerable populations.
v. Workers supporting bait harvesters.
vi. This category does not include workers supporting tobacco and vaping-product shops or cannabidiol (CBD) oil shops, but these workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a NonCritical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
d. Energy. This category is limited to energy workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), workers supporting emergency response operations, and workers supporting the underground storage of natural gas.
e. Water and wastewater. This category is limited to water and wastewater workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to State Parks workers who maintain water and wastewater infrastructure, workers who perform work related to residential wells and septic tanks, and workers who supply bottled water or home filtration systems in areas where that is a health necessity.
f. Transportation and logistics. This category is limited to the transportation and logistics workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to:
i. State, county, and local government agencies and agency workers, as well as private sector workers, who support or enable transportation functions, including engineers, dispatchers, maintenance and repair technicians (including workers at maintenance and repair shops), warehouse workers, truck stop and rest area workers, and workers that maintain and inspect infrastructure (including those that require crossborder travel).
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ii. Workers engaged in roadway construction, maintenance, and utility projects.
iii. Public transit workers.
iv. Bicycle shops and distribution facilities.
v. Automobile, motorcycle, recreational vehicle (RV), and all-terrain vehicle (ATV) sales, when conducted by appointment only.
vi. Workers who clean vehicles used for public transportation, government services, and Critical Sectors.
vii. Workers transporting boats.
viii. Workers necessary for the operation of safe harbors and marinas to provide refuge for boaters when conditions make boating on open water unsafe.
ix. Workers supporting car washes, but only where such car washes are limited to exterior washes, allow for payment without direct contact between workers and customers, and where customers remain in their vehicles.
g. Public works and infrastructure support services. This category is limited to public works and infrastructure support services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to construction material suppliers and workers providing services necessary to maintain construction material sources.
h. Communications and information technology. This category is limited to communications and information technology workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and all workers who support news services of all kinds, including newspapers, radio, television, and other forms of news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions. This category is limited to the other community-based and government essential functions listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to workers who support the following functions and services:
i. Election support services and election administration workers.
ii. Housing, shelter, and homelessness-prevention staff of state and local agencies and organizations responsible for ensuring safe and stable housing, including workers from state and local agencies and organizations with responsibility for ensuring safe and stable housing; shelter outreach or drop-in center programs; financing affordable housing; and administering rent subsidies, homeless interventions,
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operating supports, and similar supports. This includes workers necessary to provide repairs, maintenance, and operations support to residential dwellings.
iii. Workers performing all other governmental functions which are necessary to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the public, to preserve the essential elements of the financial system of government, and to continue priority services as determined by a political subdivision of the State. All political subdivisions of the State will determine the minimum personnel necessary to maintain these governmental operations.
iv. Workers supporting building code enforcement necessary to maintain public safety and health and for all ongoing construction.
v. Workers, including logistical and contract workers, who are critical to facilitating support of national, state, and local emergency response operations.
vi. Workers necessary to process applications for and issue hunting and fishing licenses, where it is impracticable for applicants to apply online.
vii. Workers supporting environmental compliance and assistance activities, field research, monitoring and surveying, habitat restoration, natural land and water management, and plant and animal population management.
j. Critical manufacturing. This includes the critical manufacturing workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers supporting iron ore mining and processing operations and supplier/vendor industries essential to such mining and processing operations.
ii. Workers supporting printing operations that supply other Critical Sectors. Other printing workers are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a NonCritical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
k. Hazardous materials. This category is limited to hazardous materials workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
l. Financial services. This category is limited to financial services workers identified in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to workers at banks, credit unions, insurance companies, and insurance agencies. Debt collection professionals and other workers supporting debt collection are not included in
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this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
m. Chemical. This category is limited to chemical workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
n. Defense industrial base. This category is limited to defense industrial base workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
o. Commercial facilities/essential supply stores. Essential supply stores are strongly encouraged to offer curbside pickup or delivery of products. This category is limited to commercial facilities workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers supporting businesses that sell products, tools, materials, or supplies necessary for: (1) Critical Sectors to continue their essential operations, (2) for workers to work from home, or (3) for the maintenance of the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes or residences.
ii. Workers supporting licensed businesses that sell or service firearms, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 624.7192. Indoor gun clubs and indoor gun and shooting ranges must remain closed pursuant to Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and this Executive Order.
iii. Workers at traditional retail establishments who are working only to take and fulfill online orders for pick up or delivery.
iv. Workers supporting the sale of essential furnishings, including beds, lift chairs, and office furniture and equipment necessary for other workers to work from home. Workers supporting sales of non-essential furnishings are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
v. Workers supporting retailers not listed above may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
p. Residential/shelter facilities and services. This category includes the residential/shelter facilities and services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), including workers supporting moving and relocation services, in addition to workers supporting emergency shelters, drop-in centers, and encampments, as well as outreach workers. Governmental and other entities are strongly urged to make 24-hour shelter available as soon as possible, to the maximum extent practicable, and in compliance with CDC guidance.
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q. Laundry and hygiene products and services. This category includes the hygiene products and services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers in laundromats and all laundry or dry-cleaning services.
ii. Workers cleaning common areas in apartment buildings and other similar common spaces.
iii. Workers providing housecleaning for individuals with disabilities.
iv. Workers doing ordinary residential housecleaning of individual homes are not exempt.
r. Tribal Governments. Tribal officers and workers deemed essential by the relevant Tribal government, regardless of residence.
s. The Judicial Branch. This category is limited to judicial officers and personnel deemed essential by the Chief Justice to ensure the continued operations of Minnesota’s court system.
t. The Executive Branch. This category is limited to personnel deemed necessary to continue priority services of executive branch agencies, offices, departments, divisions, boards, bureaus, councils, committees, institutions, authorities, and commissions, as well as the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities system, Minnesota State Retirement System, Public Employees Retirement Association, and Teacher’s Retirement Association, as determined by the Commissioner of Management and Budget in consultation with those agencies and entities.
u. Executive Constitutional Offices. This category is limited to Constitutional Officers and personnel deemed essential by the applicable Constitutional Officer to ensure the continued operations of the Constitutional Office.
v. The Legislative Branch. This category is limited to personnel deemed essential by the presiding officers of each body.
w. Federal employees. Nothing in this Executive Order will be construed to limit, prohibit, or restrict in any way the operations of the federal government or the movement of federal officials in Minnesota while acting in their official capacity, including federal judicial, legislative, and executive staff and personnel.
x. National Guard. This category is limited to National Guard members that are on orders, to include state active duty, Title 32, or Title 10 orders and members in an Inactive Duty for Training status. At the discretion of the Adjutant General, this category also includes full-time staff of the Minnesota
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National Guard or Department of Military Affairs that are necessary for the execution of the National Guard’s mission.
y. Faith leaders and workers. This category includes officials, workers, and leaders in houses of worship and other places of religious expression or fellowship, wherever their services may be needed. This category also includes workers necessary to plan, record, and distribute online or broadcast content to community members.
z. Education. This category includes educators and other workers supporting public and private schools, as well as higher education (e.g., colleges and universities). This category also includes educators and other workers providing care and food to children as provided by Executive Orders 20-19 and 20-41. Executive Orders 20-19 and 20-41 remain in effect.
aa. Construction and critical trades. This category includes the following:
i. Workers in the skilled trades such as electricians, plumbers, HVAC and elevator technicians, and other workers supporting construction of all kind.
ii. Workers such as exterminators, cleaning and janitorial staff for commercial and governmental properties, moving and relocation services, security staff, operating engineers, and all other service providers who provide services that are necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes and residences and the Critical Sectors listed in this Executive Order.
iii. Workers supporting major appliance sales, related parts sales, and service.
iv. Workers who construct, repair, and maintain decks and fences.
v. Workers cleaning and maintaining the exterior of residential dwellings, including power washing, exterior window cleaning, and gutter cleaning.
bb. Child care providers. This category includes workers in child care centers, family child care, schools, and other facilities. Such providers are encouraged to remain open to provide child care services for workers in the Critical Sectors and Non-Critical Exempt Businesses listed in this Executive Order as possible and insofar as public health guidance can be followed. This category also applies to individuals providing child care for Critical Sector and NonCritical Exempt Businesses workers in a personal home, such as family, friend, and neighbor care required for Critical Sector workers to continue to perform their duties.
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cc. Hotels, residential facilities, and shelters. This category includes workers supporting hotels and motels, facilities and shelters for adults, seniors, and children, including victims of domestic violence and people with developmental disabilities, intellectual disabilities, substance abuse disorders, or mental illness. Such facilities and shelters include halfway houses and residential treatment programs. This category also includes:
i. Workers needed to keep apartment complex buildings and other congregate residences or homes operational and sanitary.
ii. Workers supporting resorts in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidance.
dd. Charitable and social services organizations. This category is limited to workers supporting organizations that are engaged in hunger relief work, and those that provide food, shelter, prescription delivery, mental health and substance abuse treatments, and other social services, as well as other necessities of life for individuals in need of such services, older adults who live alone, people with disabilities, and those who need assistance as a result of this emergency.
ee. Legal services. This category is limited to workers who are necessary to provide essential legal services. Essential legal services include:
i. Advice and representation needed to aid the delivery of all critical government services.
ii. Advice and representation required to ensure the immediate and critical health, safety, and liberties of Minnesotans, including but not limited to, end-of-life planning, immigration, essential services to elders and persons with disabilities, child support, child-protection and domestic abuse matters, protection of personal financial resources necessary to meet basic needs, prosecution or defense in ongoing criminal matters, or all matters in which individuals are held in custody pending a legal proceeding, and proceedings held in the district or appellate courts during the effective period of this order.
iii. Advice and representation related to the continuation of the Critical Sectors identified in this Executive Order, including ensuring compliance with this Executive Order, previous Executive Orders, and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations applying to Critical Sectors.
iv. Supporting housing and shelter-related efforts, including loan applications, loan processing, seeking temporary relief from residential and commercial loan or lease provisions, retention of gas, electric, or water utility services, and seeking temporary relief from residential evictions or foreclosures, or other actions intended to keep people in their homes.
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v. Process servers and legal couriers.
ff. Notaries. This category is limited to notaries performing services that cannot be deferred and which cannot be accomplished via remote services under Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 358.645.
gg. Critical labor union functions. This category includes labor union essential activities, including the administration of health and welfare funds and the monitoring of the wellbeing and safety of members.
hh. Animal care and veterinarians. This category is limited to veterinarians and workers at animal care facilities or DNR workers who provide food, shelter, veterinary services, and other necessities of life for animals. Workers in this category are subject to the restrictions on elective surgeries and procedures as set forth in Executive Orders 20-09 and 20-17. This category also includes the following:
i. Workers providing care (e.g., daycare or boarding) to pets in the following circumstances:
A. Caring for pets owned by other Critical Sector and NonCritical Exempt Businesses workers during their shifts.
B. Caring for pets needing care because the owner is physically or otherwise unable to care for the animal.
C. Caring for pets owned by individuals who are ill or quarantined, provided that contact with the owner is limited to a one-time pick up until the illness or quarantine has passed.
D. Caring for pets currently boarded and circumstances prevent the owner from retrieving them.
ii. Workers supporting pet adoption and animal foster care are exempt, provided that (1) any paperwork and payment is done online, and (2) appropriate social distancing is observed during the adoption process.
iii. Workers at Class A licensed racetracks, which may open their facilities for the receiving, stabling, care and training of horses on their grounds and for preparing and providing housing for workers who care for the horses. In coordination with the Minnesota Racing Commission, the licensees must prepare and allow for the safe entry and exit of personnel necessary for the care, safety, and welfare of the horses and people. Racetracks must remain closed to members of the public.
iv. Workers supporting pet grooming businesses are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer
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qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
ii. Real estate transactions. This category is limited to workers who facilitate and finance real estate transactions and real estate services, including appraisers and title services.
jj. Minimum basic operations. This category includes workers supporting minimum basic operations in businesses and other organizations. Minimum basic operations include (i) minimum necessary activities to maintain the value of the business’s inventory, preserve the condition of a business’s or other organization’s facilities, physical plant, or equipment, ensure security, process payroll and employee benefits, or related functions; and (ii) the minimum necessary activities to facilitate remote work by workers from their residences (e.g., IT personnel who allow workers to operate remotely or personnel who support remote or distance learning).
kk. Outdoor recreational facilities. This category is limited to workers supporting the below publicly and privately maintained or operated outdoor recreational facilities, provided that such facilities adhere to the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. This category includes private, state and local government workers who perform activities necessary to facilitate outdoor recreation, as allowed under this Executive Order. This category does not include workers engaged in services for hire such as charter boats, launches, or fishing guides, or workers at facilities that involve gatherings or people in close proximity (e.g., mini golf, pools, commercial outdoor racetracks, and concert venues). To the extent that any of the facilities listed below have been closed under Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and 20-33, those facilities are permitted to reopen, provided that they adhere to this Executive Order and the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. In accordance with Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and 20-33, all indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities must remain closed except for (a) facilities used only by workers to the extent necessary to facilitate the outdoor recreation, (b) bathroom facilities cleaned and disinfected regularly in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines, (c) sales and service facilities allowed under subparagraph vi below, (d) facilities that provide food and beverage for off-premises consumption, as allowed in Executive Order 20-04, paragraphs 2 and 4, and (e) facilities housing businesses covered by paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
i. Minnesota State Parks, Trails, State Forests, State Recreation Areas, Wildlife Management Areas, Scientific and Natural Areas, and other State managed recreational lands.
ii. Locally, regionally, and privately managed parks and trails.
iii. State, regional, or local public water accesses.
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iv. Public and private marinas and docks that provide storage, docking, and mooring services to slip owners, seasonal renters, and the general public, as well as facilities that provide safety-related services including fueling, emergency dockage, and sanitary pump-out stations.
v. Public and private golf courses and outdoor driving ranges.
vi. Ski areas.
vii. Off-highway vehicles, snowmobiles, and watercraft repair shops, sales facilities, and showrooms by appointment only.
viii. Lake service providers to install, repair, and remove docks, boatlifts, and other water related equipment or deliver boats.
ix. Bait shops for sale of live bait. Sale of other goods must adhere to the requirements for retail businesses in paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
x. Outdoor shooting ranges and game farms.
xi. Outdoor recreational equipment rental outlets, but only for purposes of renting out equipment that can be effectively sanitized between uses. Such outlets must implement clear check-in and check-out procedures that minimize contact between customers and workers. Any such rentals must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
xii. Any other outdoor recreation facilities that may be designated in the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
xiii. All work undertaken pursuant to this paragraph must be undertaken in accordance with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules.
xiv. All private and public campgrounds and dispersed camping sites must remain closed to recreational camping.
7. All exempted Activities and Critical Sector work activities should be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and the MDH and CDC Guidelines related to COVID-19, including social distancing and hygiene. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize employers that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
8. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses. All workers who can work from home must do so. Workers in Non-Critical Exempt Businesses may return to their workplace upon the businesses’ completion of the requirements set forth in this paragraph. These
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exemptions apply only to travel to and from an individual’s home or residence and place of work and an individual’s performance of work duties that cannot be done at their home or residence. Travel may include transportation to and from child care or school settings as necessary to ensure the safe care of children. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses are those within the scope of subparagraph a of this paragraph 8 and that complete and comply with the requirements set forth in subparagraph b:
a. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses are limited to the following sectors:
i. Industrial and manufacturing businesses. Businesses in this category include industrial or manufacturing businesses, to the extent that such businesses’ employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. This category includes wholesale trade, warehousing, and places of employment in which goods are in the process of being created. This category does not include customer-facing retail environments associated with an industrial or manufacturing business in this category. DEED will provide additional guidance related to the businesses included in this category at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
ii. Office-based businesses. Businesses in this category include officebased businesses where workers do their work within an office space, at their desk, and their work is primarily not customer facing, to the extent that their employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. This category does not include customer-facing retail environments associated with officebased businesses in this category. DEED will provide additional guidance related to the businesses included in this category at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
iii. Retail businesses. Businesses in this category include retail stores and other businesses that sell, rent, maintain and repair goods that can be picked up outside, without entering the place of business, with limited interaction between employees and customers, to the extent that such businesses’ employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. Businesses that provide services such as household goods rental, maintenance services, repair services, and pet grooming are included to the extent that they can adhere to the guidelines below. Salons and barbershops are included only to conduct retail product sales, excluding sales of service chemicals not intended for retail. Salons and barbershops may not provide any services. In addition to the other requirements set forth in paragraph 8.b of this Executive Order, businesses in this category must conduct sales only by outdoor pick-up or delivery, adhering to guidance provided by DEED at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
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b. Requirements for Non-Critical Exempt Businesses. Before workers may return to work at a Non-Critical Exempt Business under this Executive Order, the Non-Critical Exempt Business must establish and implement a COVID-19 Preparedness Plan (“Plan”). Each Plan must provide for the business’s implementation of Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in their workplaces. These requirements are set forth in guidance published by DEED and DLI (“Plan Guidance”) and available at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
i. Required Plan content. As set forth in the Plan Guidance, at a minimum, each Plan must adequately address the following areas:
A. Require work from home whenever possible. All Plans must ensure that all workers who can work from home continue to do so.
B. Ensure that sick workers stay home. All Plans must establish policies and procedures, including health screenings, that prevent sick workers from entering the workplace.
C. Social distancing. All Plans must establish social distancing policies and procedures.
D. Worker hygiene and source control. All Plans must establish hygiene and source control policies for workers.
E. Cleaning and disinfection protocols. All Plans must establish cleaning and disinfection protocols for areas within the workplace.
ii. Optional template. A template COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, which covers the above requirements, is available as part of the Plan Guidance, available at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
iii. Certification and signature. Senior management responsible for implementing the Plan must sign and certify the Plan, affirming their commitment to implement and follow the Plan.
iv. Dissemination and posting. A Non-Critical Exempt Business must provide its Plan, in writing, to all workers, and the Plan must be posted at all of the business’s workplaces in locations that will allow for the Plan to be readily reviewed by all workers. Where physical posting is impracticable, the Plan can be posted electronically, provided that the Plan is received by all workers and remains available for their review.
v. Training. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must ensure that training is provided to workers on the contents of their Plan and required procedures, so that all workers understand and are able to perform the
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precautions necessary to protect themselves and their co-workers. This training should be easy to understand and available in the appropriate language and literacy level for all workers. Businesses should also take steps to supervise workers and ensure that workers understand and adhere to necessary precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission. Documentation demonstrating compliance with this training requirement must be maintained and made available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI, upon request.
vi. Compliance. Workers and management must work together to ensure compliance with the Plan, implement all protocols, policies, and procedures, and create a safe and healthy work environment.
vii. Availability to regulatory authorities and public safety officers. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses do not need to submit their Plans for preapproval. Upon request, Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must make their Plans available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI.
c. In the event of a complaint or dispute related to a business’s Plan, DLI is authorized to determine whether the Plan adequately implements Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in its workplaces.
d. All work for Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines, including social distancing and hygiene practices. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize businesses that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
9. Except as necessary to seek medical care and obtain other necessities of life, people at high risk of severe illness from COVID-19 (e.g., elderly people and those with underlying health conditions) are strongly urged to stay in their home or residence, even when the terms of this Executive Order would allow them to leave their home or residence.
10. I urge all Minnesotans to voluntarily comply with this Executive Order. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.45, a worker who willfully violates this Executive Order is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Any business owner, manager, or supervisor who requires or encourages any of their employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, or interns to violate this Executive Order is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $3,000 or by imprisonment for not more than a year. In addition to those criminal penalties, the Attorney General, as well as city and county attorneys, may seek any civil relief available pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 8.31, for
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violations of this Executive Order, including civil penalties up to $25,000 per occurrence from businesses and injunctive relief. Nothing in this Executive Order is intended to encourage or allow law enforcement to transgress individual constitutional rights. 11. I direct the Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, Labor and Industry, and Natural Resources to continue planning on how to allow additional non-Critical Sector workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. Such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. I also direct other cabinet agencies to coordinate expeditiously to develop relevant guidance related to this Executive Order and to provide that guidance to the public. 12. I direct all state agencies to continue to coordinate expeditiously to develop plans to mitigate the economic effects of closures and restrictions necessitated by this peacetime emergency, including potential financial support, regulatory relief, and other executive actions. 13. The closure of bars, restaurants, and other public accommodations set forth in Executive Order 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18, is extended until May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Barbershops and salons may conduct retail product sales in accordance with the requirements set forth in paragraph 8. 14. This Executive Order may be extended by a future Executive Order, with the approval of the Executive Council. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 4.035, subdivision 2, and section 12.32, this Executive Order is effective immediately upon approval by the Executive Council. It remains in effect until the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01 is terminated or until it is rescinded by proper authority. A determination that any provision of this Executive Order is invalid will not affect the enforceability of any other provision of this Executive Order. Rather, the invalid provision will be modified to the extent necessary so that it is enforceable.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 24 of 42
Signed on April 30, 2020.
_____________________________________
Tim Walz
Governor
Filed According to Law:
_____________________________________
Steve Simon
Secretary of State
Approved by the Executive Council on May 1, 2020:
_____________________________________
Alice Roberts-Davis
Secretary, Executive Council

Filed on May 1, 2020

23

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State,

Steve Simon

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 25 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response
Version 3.0 (April 17, 2020)
THE IMPORTANCE OF ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS
Functioning critical infrastructure is imperative during the response to the COVID-19 emergency for both public health and safety as well as community well-being. Certain critical infrastructure industries have a special responsibility in these times to continue operations.
This advisory guidance and accompanying list are intended to support state, local, tribal, territorial and industry partners in identifying the critical infrastructure sectors and the essential workers needed to maintain the services and functions Americans depend on daily and that need to be able to operate resiliently during the COVID-19 pandemic response.
This document gives advisory guidance on defining essential critical infrastructure workers. Promoting the ability of such workers to continue to work during periods of community restriction, access management, social distancing, or closure orders/directives is crucial to community resilience and continuity of essential functions. The term “workers” as used in this guidance is intended to apply to both employees and contractors performing the described functions.
CISA will continually solicit and accept feedback on the list and will evolve the list in response to stakeholder feedback. We will also use our various stakeholder engagement mechanisms to work with partners on how they are using this list and share those lessons learned and best practices broadly. Feedback can be sent to CISA.CAT@CISA.DHS.GOV.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
This list was developed in consultation with federal agency partners, industry experts, and State and local officials, and is based on several key principles:
1. Response efforts to the COVID-19 pandemic are locally executed, state managed, and federally supported.
2. Everyone should follow guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well as state and local government officials, regarding strategies to limit disease spread.
3. Employers must comply with applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for protecting critical infrastructure workers who remain on or return to the job during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the nation relies on these workers to protect public health, safety, and community well-being, they must be protected from exposure to and infection with the virus so that they can continue to carry out

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 26 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
their responsibilities. OSHA has guidance and enforcement information for workplaces at www.osha.gov/coronavirus.
4. Businesses and government agencies may continue to implement organization-specific measures, which protect the workforce while meeting mission needs.
5. Workers should be encouraged to work remotely when possible and focus on core business activities. Inperson, non-mandatory activities should be delayed until the resumption of normal operations.
6. When continuous remote work is not possible, businesses should enlist strategies to reduce the likelihood of spreading the disease. This includes, but is not limited to, physically separating staff, staggering work shift hours or days, and other social distancing measures. While the CDC recommends that everyone wear a cloth face cover to contain respiratory droplets when around others, critical infrastructure employers must consider how best to implement this public health recommendation for source control in the workplace. For example, employers may provide disposable facemasks (e.g., surgical masks) instead of cloth face coverings when workers would need to wear masks for extended periods of time (e.g., the duration of a work shift) or while performing tasks in which the face covering could become contaminated.
7. Consider the impact of workplace sick leave policies that may contribute to an employee decision to delay reporting medical symptoms. Sick employees should not return to the workplace until they meet the criteria to stop home isolation.
8. Critical infrastructure has an obligation to limit to the extent possible the reintegration of in-person workers who have experienced an exposure to COVID-19 but remain asymptomatic in ways that best protect the health of the worker, their co-workers, and the general public. An analysis of core job tasks and workforce availability at worksites can allow the employer to match core activities to other equally skilled and available in-person workers who have not experienced an exposure. CDC guidance on safety practices for critical infrastructure workers is maintained at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/criticalworkers/implementing-safety-practices.html
9. All organizations should implement their business continuity and pandemic plans or put plans in place if they do not exist. Delaying implementation is not advised and puts at risk the viability of the business and the health and safety of the workers.
10. Reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to ensure continuity of functions. The vast majority of our economy relies on technology and therefore information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) workers for critical infrastructure operations are essential. This includes workers in many roles, including workers focusing on management systems, control systems, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and data centers; cybersecurity engineering; and cybersecurity risk management.
11. Government workers, such as emergency managers, and the business community need to establish and maintain lines of communication.
12. Essential critical infrastructure workers need continued and unimpeded access to sites, facilities, and equipment within quarantine zones, containment areas, or other areas where access or movement is limited to perform functions for community relief and stability; for public safety, security and health; for maintaining essential supply chains and preserving local, regional, and national economic well-being.
13. Essential critical infrastructure workers need sustained access to designated quarantine, containment, or

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 27 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
restricted areas; and should be exempted from curfews, shelter-in-place orders, and transportation restrictions or restrictions on movement. 14. Whenever possible, local governments should consider adopting specific state guidance on essential workers to reduce potential complications of workers crossing jurisdictional boundaries. When this is not possible, local jurisdictions should consider aligning access and movement control policies with neighboring jurisdictions to reduce the burden of cross-jurisdictional movement of essential critical infrastructure workers.
IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS
The following list of identified essential critical infrastructure workers is intended to be overly inclusive reflecting the diversity of industries across the United States.

HEALTHCARE / PUBLIC HEALTH
• Workers, including laboratory personnel, that perform critical clinical, biomedical and other research, development, and testing needed for COVID-19 or other diseases.
• Healthcare providers including, but not limited to, physicians; dentists; psychologists; mid-level practitioners; nurses; assistants and aids; infection control and quality assurance personnel; pharmacists; physical, respiratory, speech and occupational therapists and assistants; social workers; optometrists; speech pathologists; chiropractors; diagnostic and therapeutic technicians; and radiology technologists.
• Workers required for effective clinical, command, infrastructure, support service, administrative, security, and intelligence operations across the direct patient care and full healthcare and public health spectrum. Personnel examples may include, but are not limited, to accounting, administrative, admitting and discharge, engineering, accrediting, certification, licensing, credentialing, epidemiological, source plasma and blood donation, food service, environmental services, housekeeping, medical records, information technology and operational technology, nutritionists, sanitarians, respiratory therapists, etc. o Emergency medical services workers. o Prehospital workers included but not limited to urgent care workers. o Inpatient & hospital workers (e.g. hospitals, critical access hospitals, long-term acute care

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 28 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

hospitals, long-term care facilities, inpatient hospice, ambulatory surgical centers, etc.). o Outpatient care workers (e.g. end-stage-renal disease, Federally Qualified Health Centers, Rural
Health Clinics, community mental health clinics, organ transplant/procurement centers, and other ambulatory care settings/providers, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, etc.). o Home care workers (e.g. home health care, at-home hospice, home dialysis, home infusion, etc.). o Workers at Long-term care facilities, residential and community-based providers (e.g. Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities, Religious Nonmedical Health Care Institutions, etc.). o Workplace safety workers (i.e., workers who anticipate, recognize, evaluate, and control workplace conditions that may cause workers' illness or injury). • Workers needed to support transportation to and from healthcare facility and provider appointments. • Workers needed to provide laundry services, food services, reprocessing of medical equipment, and waste management. • Workers that manage health plans, billing, and health information and who cannot work remotely. • Workers performing cybersecurity functions at healthcare and public health facilities and who cannot work remotely. • Workers performing security, incident management, and emergency operations functions at or on behalf of healthcare entities including healthcare coalitions, who cannot practically work remotely. • Childcare, eldercare, and other service providers for essential healthcare personnel. • Vendors and suppliers (e.g. imaging, pharmacy, oxygen services, durable medical equipment, etc.). • Workers at manufacturers (including biotechnology companies and those companies that have shifted production to medical supplies), materials and parts suppliers, technicians, logistics and warehouse operators, printers, packagers, distributors of medical products and equipment (including third party logistics providers, and those who test and repair), personal protective equipment (PPE), isolation barriers, medical gases, pharmaceuticals (including materials used in radioactive drugs), dietary supplements, blood and blood products, vaccines, testing materials, laboratory supplies, cleaning, sanitizing, disinfecting or sterilization supplies (including dispensers), sanitary goods, personal care products, pest control products, and tissue and paper towel products. • Donors of blood, bone marrow, blood stem cell, or plasma, and the workers of the organizations that operate and manage related activities. • Pharmacy staff, including workers necessary to maintain uninterrupted prescription, and other workers for pharmacy operations. • Workers in retail facilities specializing in medical good and supplies. • Public health and environmental health workers, such as: o Workers specializing in environmental health that focus on implementing environmental controls, sanitary and infection control interventions, healthcare facility safety and emergency preparedness planning, engineered work practices, and developing guidance and protocols for appropriate PPE to prevent COVID-19 disease transmission. o Public health/ community health workers (including call center workers) who conduct communitybased public health functions, conducting epidemiologic surveillance and compiling, analyzing, and communicating public health information, who cannot work remotely. • Human services providers, especially for at risk populations such as: o Home delivered meal providers for older adults, people with disabilities, and others with chronic

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 29 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
health conditions. o Home-maker services for frail, homebound, older adults. o Personal assistance services providers to support activities of daily living for older adults, people
with disabilities, and others with chronic health conditions who live independently in the community with supports and services. o Home health providers who deliver health care services for older adults, people with disabilities, and others with chronic health conditions who live independently in the community with supports and services. • Government entities, and contractors that work in support of local, state, and federal public health and medical mission sets, including but not limited to supporting access to healthcare and associated payment functions, conducting public health functions, providing medical care, supporting emergency management, or other services necessary for supporting the COVID-19 response. • Mortuary service providers, such as: o Workers performing mortuary funeral, cremation, burial, cemetery, and related services, including funeral homes, crematoriums, cemetery workers, and coffin makers. o Workers who coordinate with other organizations to ensure the proper recovery, handling, identification, transportation, tracking, storage, and disposal of human remains and personal effects; certify cause of death; and facilitate access to mental and behavioral health services to the family members, responders, and survivors of an incident.
LAW ENFORCEMENT, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND OTHER FIRST RESPONDERS
• Public, private, and voluntary personnel (front-line and management, civilian and sworn) in emergency management, law enforcement, fire and rescue services, emergency medical services (EMS), and security, public and private hazardous material responders, air medical service providers (pilots and supporting technicians), corrections, and search and rescue personnel.
• Personnel involved in provisioning of access to emergency services, including the provisioning of real-time text, text-to-911, and dialing 911 via relay.
• Personnel that are involved in the emergency alert system (EAS) ((broadcasters, satellite radio and television, cable, and wireline video) and wireless emergency alerts (WEA).
• Workers at Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, and Network Operations staff, engineers and technicians to manage the network or operate facilities.
• Workers at emergency communication center, public safety answering points, public safety communications centers, emergency operation centers, and 911 call centers.
• Fusion Center workers. • Workers, including contracted vendors, who maintain, manufacture, or supply equipment and services
supporting law enforcement, fire, EMS, and response operations (to include electronic security and life safety security personnel). • Workers and contracted vendors who maintain and provide services and supplies to public safety facilities, including emergency communication center, public safety answering points, public safety communications centers, emergency operation centers, fire and emergency medical services stations, police and law enforcement stations and facilities. • Workers supporting the manufacturing, distribution, and maintenance of necessary safety equipment and uniforms for law enforcement and all public safety personnel.

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Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Workers supporting the operation of firearm, or ammunition product manufacturers, retailers, importers, distributors, and shooting ranges.
• Public agency workers responding to abuse and neglect of children, spouses, elders, and dependent adults.
• Workers who support weather disaster and natural hazard mitigation and prevention activities. • Security staff to maintain building access control and physical security measures.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
• Workers supporting groceries, pharmacies, convenience stores, and other retail (including unattended and vending) that sells human food, animal and pet food and pet supply, and beverage products, including retail customer support service and information technology support staff necessary for online orders, pickup, and delivery.
• Restaurant carry-out and quick serve food operations, including dark kitchen and food prep centers, carry-out, and delivery food workers.
• Food manufacturer workers and their supplier workers including those employed at food ingredient production and processing facilities; aquaculture and seafood harvesting facilities; livestock, poultry, seafood slaughter facilities; pet and animal feed processing facilities; human food facilities producing byproducts for animal food; beverage production facilities; and the production of food packaging.
• Farmers, farm and ranch workers, and agribusiness support services to include those employed in auction and sales; grain and oilseed handling, storage, processing, and distribution; animal food, feed, and ingredient production, packaging, and distribution; manufacturing, packaging, and distribution of veterinary drugs; and truck delivery and transport.
• Farmers, farm and ranch workers, and support service and supplier workers producing food supply domestically and for export, to include those engaged in raising, cultivating, harvesting, packing, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to a carrier for transportation to market any agricultural or horticultural commodity for human consumption; agricultural inspection; fuel ethanol facilities; biodiesel and renewable diesel facilities; storage facilities; and other agricultural inputs.
• Workers and firms supporting the distribution of food, feed, and beverage and ingredients used in these products, including warehouse workers, vendor-managed inventory controllers, and blockchain managers.
• Workers supporting the sanitation and pest control of all food manufacturing processes and operations from wholesale to retail.
• Workers supporting the growth and distribution of plants and associated products for home gardens. • Workers in cafeterias used to feed workers, particularly worker populations sheltered against COVID-19. • Workers in animal diagnostic and food testing laboratories. • Government, private, and non-governmental organizations’ workers essential for food assistance
programs (including school lunch programs) and government payments. • Workers of companies engaged in the production, storage, transport, and distribution of chemicals,
medicines, vaccines, and other substances used by the food and agriculture industry, including seeds, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, minerals, enrichments, and other agricultural production aids. • Animal agriculture workers to include those employed in veterinary health (including those involved in supporting emergency veterinary or livestock services); raising, caring for and management of animals for food; animal production operations; livestock markets; slaughter and packing plants, manufacturers, renderers, and associated regulatory and government workforce.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 31 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Transportation supporting animal agricultural industries, including movement of animal medical and reproductive supplies and materials, animal vaccines, animal drugs, feed ingredients, feed and bedding, live animals, animal by-products, and deceased animals for disposal.
• Workers who support sawmills and the manufacture and distribution of fiber and forest products, including, but not limited to timber, paper, and other wood and fiber products, as well as manufacture and distribution of products using agricultural commodities.
• Workers engaged in the manufacture and maintenance of equipment and other infrastructure necessary for agricultural production and distribution.
ENERGY
• Workers supporting the energy sector, regardless of the energy source (including, but not limited to, nuclear, fossil, hydroelectric, or renewable), segment of the system, or infrastructure the worker is involved in, who are needed to construct, manufacture, repair, transport, permit, monitor, operate engineer, and maintain the reliability, safety, security, environmental health, and physical and cyber security of the energy system, including those who support construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, and logistics.
• Workers and contractors supporting energy facilities that provide steam, hot water or chilled water from central power plants to connected customers.
• Workers conducting energy/commodity trading/scheduling/marketing functions who can't perform their duties remotely.
• Workers supporting the energy sector through renewable energy infrastructure (including, but not limited to, wind, solar, biomass, hydrogen, ocean, geothermal, and hydroelectric) and microgrids, including those supporting construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation and maintenance, monitoring, and logistics.
• Workers and security staff involved in nuclear re-fueling operations. • Workers providing services related to energy sector fuels (including, but not limited to, petroleum (crude
oil), natural gas, propane, liquefied natural gas (LNG), compressed natural gas (CNG), natural gas liquids (NGL), other liquid fuels, nuclear, and coal) and supporting the mining, processing, manufacturing, construction, logistics, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, security, waste disposal, storage, and monitoring of support for resources. • Workers providing environmental remediation and monitoring, limited to immediate critical needs technicians. • Workers involved in the manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary to maintain production, maintenance, restoration, and service at energy sector facilities across all energy sector segments.
Electricity Industry
• Workers who maintain, ensure, restore, or who are involved in the development, transportation, fuel procurement, expansion, or operation of, the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power, including call centers, utility workers, engineers, retail electricity, construction, maintenance, utility telecommunications, relaying, and fleet maintenance technicians who cannot perform their duties remotely.
• Workers at coal mines, production facilities, and those involved in manufacturing, transportation,

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 32 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
permitting, operation, maintenance, and monitoring at coal sites. • Workers who produce, process, ship, and handle coal used for power generation and manufacturing. • Workers in the electricity industry including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction,
manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics • Workers needed for safe and secure operations at nuclear generation including, but not limited to, those critical to the broader nuclear supply chain, the manufacture and delivery of parts needed to maintain nuclear equipment, the operations of fuel manufacturers, and the production and processing of fuel components used in the manufacturing of fuel. • Workers at fossil fuel (including but not limited to natural gas, refined, distillate, and/or coal), nuclear, and renewable energy infrastructure (including, but not limited to wind, solar, biomass, hydrogen, geothermal, and hydroelectric), and microgrids, including those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, monitoring, and logistics. • Workers at generation, transmission, and electric black start facilities. • Workers at Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, local distribution control centers, and primary and backup Control Centers, including, but not limited to, independent system operators, regional transmission organizations, and local distribution control centers. • Workers that are mutual assistance/aid personnel, which may include workers from outside of the state or local jurisdiction. • Vegetation management and traffic control for supporting those crews. • Instrumentation, protection, and control technicians. • Essential support personnel for electricity operations. • Generator set support workers, such as diesel engineers used in power generation, including those providing fuel.
Petroleum Industry
• Workers who support onshore and offshore petroleum drilling operations; platform and drilling construction and maintenance; transportation (including helicopter operations), maritime transportation, supply, and dredging operations; maritime navigation; well stimulation, intervention, monitoring, automation and control, extraction, production; processing; waste disposal, and maintenance, construction, and operations.
• Workers in the petroleum industry including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics.
• Workers for crude oil, petroleum, and petroleum product storage and transportation, including pipeline, marine transport, terminals, rail transport, storage facilities, racks, and road transport for use as end- use fuels such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating fuels or feedstocks for chemical manufacturing.
• Petroleum and petroleum product security operations center workers and workers who support maintenance and emergency response services.
• Petroleum and petroleum product operations control rooms, centers, and refinery facilities. • Retail fuel centers such as gas stations and truck stops, and the distribution systems that support them. • Supporting new and existing construction projects, including, but not limited to, pipeline construction. • Manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary for production, maintenance,
restoration, and service of petroleum and petroleum product operations and use, including end-users.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 33 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Transmission and distribution pipeline workers, including but not limited to pump stations and any other required, operations maintenance, construction, and support for petroleum products.
Natural Gas, Natural Gas Liquids (NGL), Propane, and Other Liquid Fuels
• Workers who support onshore and offshore drilling operations, platform and drilling construction and maintenance; transportation (including helicopter operations); maritime transportation, supply, and dredging operations; maritime navigation; natural gas and natural gas liquid production, processing, extraction, storage and transportation; well intervention, monitoring, automation and control; waste disposal, and maintenance, construction, and operations.
• Workers in the natural gas, NGL, propane, and other liquid fuels industries including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics.
• Transmission and distribution pipeline workers, including compressor stations and any other required operations maintenance, construction, and support for natural gas, natural gas liquid, propane, and other liquid fuels.
• Workers at Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facilities. • Workers at natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, liquid fuel storage facilities,
underground facilities, and processing plants and other related facilities, including construction, maintenance, and support operations personnel. • Natural gas processing plants workers and those who deal with natural gas liquids. • Workers who staff natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuel security operations centers, operations dispatch and control rooms and centers, and emergency response and customer emergencies (including leak calls) operations. • Workers supporting drilling, production, processing, refining, and transporting natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels for use as end-use fuels, feedstocks for chemical manufacturing, or use in electricity generation. • Workers supporting propane gas service maintenance and restoration, including call centers. • Workers supporting propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuel distribution centers. • Workers supporting propane gas storage, transmission, and distribution centers. • Workers supporting new and existing construction projects, including, but not limited to, pipeline construction. • Workers supporting ethanol and biofuel production, refining, and distribution. • Workers in fuel sectors (including, but not limited to nuclear, coal, and gas types and liquid fuels) supporting the mining, manufacturing, logistics, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, and monitoring of support for resources. • Workers ensuring, monitoring, and engaging in the physical security of assets and locations associated with natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels. • Workers involved in the manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary to maintain production, maintenance, restoration, and service of natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels operations and use, including end-users.
WATER AND WASTEWATER
Workers needed to operate and maintain drinking water and wastewater and drainage infrastructure, including: • Operational staff at water authorities.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 34 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Operational staff at community water systems. • Operational staff at wastewater treatment facilities. • Workers repairing water and wastewater conveyances and performing required sampling or monitoring,
including field staff. • Operational staff for water distribution and testing. • Operational staff at wastewater collection facilities. • Operational staff and technical support for SCADA Control systems. • Chemical equipment and personal protection suppliers to water and wastewater system. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting water and wastewater operations.
TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS
• Workers supporting or enabling transportation and logistics functions, including truck drivers, bus drivers, dispatchers, maintenance and repair technicians, warehouse workers, truck stop and rest area workers, driver training and education centers, Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) workers, enrollment agents for federal transportation worker vetting programs, towing and recovery services, roadside assistance workers, intermodal transportation personnel, and workers that construct, maintain, rehabilitate, and inspect infrastructure, including those that require cross-jurisdiction travel.).
• Workers supporting the distribution of food, fuels, pharmaceuticals and medical material (including materials used in radioactive drugs), and chemicals needed for water or water treatment and energy maintenance.
• Workers supporting operation of essential highway infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and tunnels (e.g., traffic operations centers and moveable bridge operators).
• Workers of firms providing services, supplies, and equipment that enable warehouse and operations, including cooling, storing, packaging, and distributing products for wholesale or retail sale or use, including cold- and frozen-chain logistics for food and critical biologic products.
• Mass transit workers providing critical transit services and performing critical or routine maintenance to mass transit infrastructure or equipment.
• Workers supporting personal and commercial transportation services including taxis, delivery services, vehicle rental services, bicycle maintenance and car-sharing services, and transportation network providers.
• Workers, including police, responsible for operating and dispatching passenger, commuter, and freight trains and maintaining rail infrastructure and equipment.
• Maritime transportation workers, including port authority and commercial facility personnel, dredgers, port workers, security personnel, mariners, ship crewmembers, ship pilots, tugboat operators, equipment operators (to include maintenance and repair, and maritime-specific medical providers), ship supply workers, chandlers, and repair company workers. Refer to the United States Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information Bulletin “Maintaining Maritime Commerce and Identification of Essential Maritime Critical Infrastructure Workers” for more information.
• Workers, including truck drivers, railroad employees, maintenance crews, and cleaners, supporting transportation of chemicals, hazardous, medical, and waste materials that support critical infrastructure, capabilities, functions, and services, including specialized carriers, crane and rigging industry workers.
• Bus drivers and workers who provide or support intercity, commuter, and charter bus service in support of other essential services or functions.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 35 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Automotive repair, maintenance, and transportation equipment manufacturing and distribution facilities (including those who repair and maintain electric vehicle charging stations).
• Transportation safety inspectors, including hazardous material inspectors and accident investigator inspectors.
• Manufacturers and distributors (to include service centers and related operations) of lighting and communication systems, specialized signage and structural systems, emergency response equipment and support materials, printers, printed materials, packaging materials, pallets, crates, containers, and other supplies needed to support manufacturing, packaging staging and distribution operations, and other critical infrastructure needs.
• Postal Service, parcel, courier, last-mile delivery, and shipping and related workers, to include private companies, who accept, process, transport, and deliver information and goods.
• Workers who supply equipment and materials for maintenance of transportation equipment. • Workers who repair and maintain vehicles, aircraft, rail equipment, marine vessels, bicycles, and the
equipment and infrastructure that enables operations that encompass movement of cargo and passengers. • Workers who support air transportation for cargo and passengers, including operation distribution, maintenance, and sanitation. This includes air traffic controllers, flight dispatchers, maintenance personnel, ramp workers, fueling agents, flight crews, airport safety inspectors and engineers, airport operations personnel, aviation and aerospace safety workers, security, commercial space personnel, operations personnel, accident investigators, flight instructors, and other on- and off-airport facilities workers. • Workers supporting transportation via inland waterways, such as barge crew, dredging crew, and river port workers for essential goods. • Workers critical to the manufacturing, distribution, sales, rental, leasing, repair, and maintenance of vehicles and other transportation equipment (including electric vehicle charging stations) and the supply chains that enable these operations to facilitate continuity of travel-related operations for essential workers. • Warehouse operators, including vendors and support personnel critical for business continuity (including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and electrical engineers, security personnel, and janitorial staff), e-commerce or online commerce, and customer service for essential functions.
PUBLIC WORKS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT SERVICES
• Workers who support the construction, maintenance, or rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. • Workers supporting construction materials production, testing laboratories, material delivery services,
and construction inspection. • Workers who support the operation, inspection, and maintenance of essential public works facilities and
operations, including bridges, water and sewer main breaks, fleet maintenance personnel, construction of critical or strategic infrastructure, traffic signal maintenance, emergency location services for buried utilities, maintenance of digital systems infrastructure supporting public works operations, and other emergent issues. • Workers such as plumbers, electricians, exterminators, builders (including building and insulation), contractors, HVAC Technicians, landscapers, and other service providers who provide services, including temporary construction, that are necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 36 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
of residences, businesses and buildings, such as hospitals and senior living facilities. • Workers personnel, who support operations that ensure, the availability of and access to needed
facilities, transportation, energy, and communications through activities such as road and line clearing. • Workers who support the effective removal, storage, and disposal of residential, industrial, and
commercial solid waste and hazardous waste, including at landfill operations. • Workers who support the operation, inspection, and maintenance of essential dams, locks, and levees. • Workers who support the inspection and maintenance of aids to navigation and other government-
provided services that ensure continued maritime commerce.
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Communications
• Maintenance of communications infrastructure, -- including privately owned and maintained communication systems, -- supported by technicians, operators, call centers, wireline and wireless providers, cable service providers, satellite operations, Internet Exchange Points, Points of Presence, Network Access Points, back haul and front haul facilities, and manufacturers and distributors of communications equipment.
• Government and private sector workers, including government contractors, with work related to undersea cable infrastructure and support facilities, including cable landing sites, beach manhole vaults and covers, submarine cable depots, and submarine cable ship facilities.
• Government and private sector workers, including government contractors, supporting Department of Defense internet and communications facilities.
• Network Operations staff, engineers, and technicians to include IT managers and staff, HVAC and electrical engineers, security personnel, software and hardware engineers, and database administrators that manage the network or operate facilities.
• Workers responsible for infrastructure construction and restoration, including but not limited to engineers, technicians, and contractors for construction and engineering of fiber optic cables, buried conduit, small cells, other wireless facilities, and other communications sector-related infrastructure. This includes permitting, construction of new facilities, and deployment of new technology as required to address congestion or customer usage due to unprecedented use of remote services.
• Installation, maintenance, and repair technicians that establish, support, or repair service as needed. • Central office personnel to maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office
facilities, including critical support personnel assisting front line workers. • Customer service and support staff, including managed and professional services, as well as remote
providers of support to transitioning workers to set up and maintain home offices, who interface with customers to manage or support service environments and security issues including payroll, billing, fraud, logistics, and troubleshooting. • Workers providing electronic security, fire, monitoring, and life safety services, and who ensure physical security, cleanliness, and the safety of facilities and personnel, including those who provide temporary licensing waivers for security personnel to work in other States or Municipalities. • Dispatchers involved with service repair and restoration. • Retail customer service personnel at critical service center locations to address customer needs, including new customer processing, distributing and repairing equipment, and addressing customer issues, in order to support individuals’ remote emergency communications needs

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 37 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Supply chain and logistics personnel to ensure goods and products are available to provision these frontline workers.
• External Affairs personnel to assist in coordinating with local, state, and federal officials to address communications needs supporting COVID-19 response, public safety, and national security.
• Workers responsible for ensuring that persons with disabilities have access to and the benefits of various communications platforms, including those involved in the provision of telecommunication relay services, closed captioning of broadcast television for the deaf, video relay services for deaf citizens who prefer communication via American Sign Language over text, and audio-description for television programming.
Information Technology
• Workers who support command centers, including, but not limited to, Network Operations Command Centers, Broadcast Operations Control Centers, and Security Operations Command Centers.
• Data center operators, including system administrators, HVAC and electrical engineers, security personnel, IT managers and purchasers, data transfer solutions engineers, software and hardware engineers, and database administrators for all industries, including financial services.
• Workers who support client service centers, field engineers, and other technicians and workers supporting critical infrastructure, as well as manufacturers and supply chain vendors that provide hardware and software, support services, research and development, information technology equipment (to include microelectronics and semiconductors), HVAC and electrical equipment for critical infrastructure, and test labs and certification agencies that qualify such equipment (to include microelectronics, optoelectronics, and semiconductors) for critical infrastructure, including data centers.
• Workers needed to preempt and respond to cyber incidents involving critical infrastructure, including medical facilities; state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and federal facilities; energy and utilities; banks and financial institutions; securities and other exchanges; other entities that support the functioning of capital markets, public works, critical manufacturing, food, and agricultural production; transportation; and other critical infrastructure categories and personnel, in addition to all cyber defense workers who can't perform their duties remotely.
• Suppliers, designers, transporters, and other workers supporting the manufacture, distribution, provision, and construction of essential global, national, and local infrastructure for computing services (including cloud computing services and telework capabilities), business infrastructure, financial transactions and services, web-based services, and critical manufacturing.
• Workers supporting communications systems, information technology, and work from home solutions used by law enforcement, public safety, medical, energy, public works, critical manufacturing, food and agricultural production, financial services, education, and other critical industries and businesses.
• Workers required in person to support Software as a Service businesses that enable remote working, performance of business operations, distance learning, media services, and digital health offerings, or required for technical support crucial for business continuity and connectivity.
OTHER COMMUNITY- OR GOVERNMENT-BASED OPERATIONS AND ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
• Workers to ensure continuity of building functions, including but not limited to security and environmental controls (e.g., HVAC), the manufacturing and distribution of the products required for these functions, and the permits and inspections for construction supporting essential infrastructure.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 38 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Elections personnel to include both public and private sector elections support. • Workers supporting the operations of the judicial system, including judges, lawyers, and others providing
legal assistance. • Workers who support administration and delivery of unemployment insurance programs, income
maintenance, employment service, disaster assistance, workers’ compensation insurance and benefits programs, and pandemic assistance. • Federal, State, and Local, Tribal, and Territorial government workers who support Mission Essential Functions and communications networks. • Trade Officials (FTA negotiators; international data flow administrators). • Workers who support radio, print, internet and television news and media services, including, but not limited to front line news reporters, studio, and technicians for newsgathering, reporting, and publishing news. • Workers supporting Census 2020. • Weather forecasters. • Clergy for essential support. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting other critical government operations. • Workers who support necessary permitting, credentialing, vetting, and licensing for essential critical infrastructure workers and their operations. • Customs and immigration workers who are critical to facilitating trade in support of the national emergency response supply chain. • Educators supporting public and private K-12 schools, colleges, and universities for purposes of facilitating distance learning or performing other essential functions. • Workers at testing centers for emergency medical services and other healthcare workers. • Staff at government offices who perform title search, notary, and recording services in support of mortgage and real estate services and transactions. • Residential and commercial real estate services, including settlement services. • Workers supporting essential maintenance, manufacturing, design, operation, inspection, security, and construction for essential products, services, supply chain, and COVID-19 relief efforts. • Workers performing services to animals in human care, including zoos and aquariums.
CRITICAL MANUFACTURING
• Workers necessary for the manufacturing of metals (including steel and aluminum), industrial minerals, semiconductors, materials and products needed for medical supply chains and for supply chains associated with transportation, aerospace, energy, communications, information technology, food and agriculture, chemical manufacturing, nuclear facilities, wood products, commodities used as fuel for power generation facilities, the operation of dams, water and wastewater treatment, processing and reprocessing of solid waste, emergency services, and the defense industrial base. Additionally, workers needed to maintain the continuity of these manufacturing functions and associated supply chains, and workers necessary to maintain a manufacturing operation in warm standby.
• Workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed to manufacture medical equipment and PPE.
• Workers necessary for mining and production of critical minerals, materials and associated essential supply chains, and workers engaged in the manufacture and maintenance of equipment and other

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 39 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
infrastructure necessary for mining production and distribution. • Workers who produce or manufacture parts or equipment that supports continued operations for any
essential services and increase in remote workforce, including computing and communication devices, semiconductors, and equipment such as security tools for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) or data centers. • Workers manufacturing or providing parts and equipment that enable the maintenance and continued operation of essential businesses and facilities.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
• Workers who manage hazardous materials associated with any other essential activity, including but not limited to healthcare waste (medical, pharmaceuticals, medical material production, and testing operations from laboratories processing and testing kits) and energy (including nuclear facilities).
• Workers who support hazardous materials response and cleanup. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting hazardous materials management
operations.
FINANCIAL SERVICES
• Workers who are needed to provide, process, and maintain systems for processing, verification, and recording of financial transactions and services, including payment, clearing, and settlement; wholesale funding; insurance services; consumer and commercial lending; public accounting; and capital markets activities.
• Workers who are needed to maintain orderly market operations to ensure the continuity of financial transactions and services.
• Workers who are needed to provide business, commercial, and consumer access to bank and non-bank financial services and lending services, including ATMs, lending and money transmission, lockbox banking, and to move currency, checks, securities, and payments (e.g., armored cash carriers).
• Workers who support financial operations and those staffing call centers, such as those staffing data and security operations centers, managing physical security, or providing accounting services.
• Workers supporting production and distribution of debit and credit cards. • Workers providing electronic point of sale support personnel for essential businesses and workers.
CHEMICAL
• Workers supporting the chemical and industrial gas supply chains, including workers at chemical manufacturing plants, laboratories, distribution facilities, and workers who transport basic raw chemical materials to the producers of industrial and consumer goods, including hand sanitizers, food and food additives, pharmaceuticals, paintings and coatings, textiles, building materials, plumbing, electrical, and paper products.
• Workers supporting the safe transportation of chemicals, including those supporting tank truck cleaning facilities and workers who manufacture packaging items.
• Workers supporting the production of protective cleaning and medical solutions, PPE, chemical consumer and institutional products, disinfectants, fragrances, and packaging that prevents the contamination of food, water, medicine, among others essential products.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 40 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Workers supporting the operation and maintenance of facilities (particularly those with high risk chemicals and sites that cannot be shut down) whose work cannot be done remotely and requires the presence of highly trained personnel to ensure safe operations, including plant contract workers who provide inspections.
• Workers (including those in glass container manufacturing) who support the production and transportation of chlorine and alkali manufacturing, single-use plastics, and packaging that prevents the contamination or supports the continued manufacture of food, water, medicine, and other essential products.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
• Workers who support the essential services required to meet national security commitments to the federal government and U.S. Military, including, but are not limited to, space and aerospace workers, nuclear matters workers, mechanical and software engineers (various disciplines), manufacturing and production workers, IT support, security staff, security personnel, intelligence support, aircraft and weapon system mechanics and maintainers, and sanitary workers who maintain the hygienic viability of necessary facilities.
• Personnel working for companies, and their subcontractors, who perform under contract or sub-contract to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) (on nuclear matters), as well as personnel at government-owned/contractor operated facilities, and who provide materials and services to the DoD and DoE (on nuclear matters), including support for weapon systems, software systems and cybersecurity, defense and intelligence communications, surveillance, sale of U.S. defense articles and services for export to foreign allies and partners (as authorized by the U.S. government), and space systems and other activities in support of our military, intelligence, and space forces.
COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
• Workers who support the supply chain of building materials from production through application and installation, including cabinetry, fixtures, doors, cement, hardware, plumbing (including parts and services), electrical, heating and cooling, refrigeration, appliances, paint and coatings, and workers who provide services that enable repair materials and equipment for essential functions.
• Workers supporting ecommerce through distribution, warehouse, call center facilities, and other essential operational support functions, that accept, store, and process goods, and that facilitate their transportation and delivery.
• Workers in hardware and building materials stores necessary to provide access to essential supplies, consumer electronics, technology and appliances retail, and related merchant wholesalers and distributors.
• Workers distributing, servicing, repairing, installing residential and commercial HVAC systems, boilers, furnaces and other heating, cooling, refrigeration, and ventilation equipment.
• Workers supporting the operations of commercial buildings that are critical to safety, security, and the continuance of essential activities, such as on-site property managers, building engineers, security staff, fire safety directors, janitorial personnel, and service technicians (e.g., mechanical, HVAC, plumbers, electricians, and elevator).
• Management and staff at hotels and other temporary lodging facilities that provide for COVID-19 mitigation, containment, and treatment measures or provide accommodations for essential workers.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 41 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
RESIDENTIAL/SHELTER FACILITIES AND SERVICES
• Workers providing dependent care services, particularly those whose services ensure essential workers can continue to work.
• Workers who support food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life for needy groups and individuals, including in-need populations and COVID-19 responders including travelling medical staff.
• Workers in animal shelters. • Workers responsible for the leasing of residential properties to provide individuals and families with ready
access to available housing. • Workers responsible for handling property management, maintenance, and related service calls who can
coordinate the response to emergency “at-home” situations requiring immediate attention, as well as facilitate the reception of deliveries, mail, and other necessary services. • Workers performing housing and commercial construction related activities, including those supporting government functions related to the building and development process, such as inspections, permitting, and plan review services that can be modified to protect the public health, but fundamentally should continue and enable the continuity of the construction industry (e.g., allow qualified private third-party inspections in case of federal government shutdown). • Workers performing services in support of the elderly and disabled populations who coordinate a variety of services, including health care appointments and activities of daily living. • Workers responsible for the movement of household goods.
HYGIENE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
• Workers who produce hygiene products. • Workers in laundromats, laundry services, and dry cleaners. • Workers providing personal and household goods, repair, and maintenance. • Workers providing disinfection services for all essential facilities and modes of transportation and who
support the sanitation of all food manufacturing processes and operations from wholesale to retail. • Workers necessary for the installation, maintenance, distribution, and manufacturing of water and space
heating equipment and its components. • Support required for continuity of services, including commercial disinfectant services, janitorial and
cleaning personnel, and support personnel functions that need freedom of movement to access facilities in support of front-line workers. • Workers supporting the production of home cleaning, pest control, and other essential products necessary to clean, disinfect, sanitize, and ensure the cleanliness of residential homes, shelters, and commercial facilities. • Workers supporting agriculture irrigation infrastructure. • Workers supporting the production of home cleaning and pest control products.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 42 of 42
RESOLUTION RESOLVED, by the Executive Council of the State of Minnesota, at its emergency meeting on May 1, 2020, that it approves Emergency Executive Order 20-48 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 12.31 and 12.32.
Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces Approved by Executive Council 05.01.2020 DATE: ______________________________ BY: ________________________________
Filed on May 1, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-12 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 12
EXHIBIT 10

aTnhCios nAdgoSocEiunmg0ed:n2igt0iti-saclmva-ar0cdh1ei2vai0vna5gi-lpaErboClejeTec-tlTe. chNttrLtopn:/icD/awollwycwubym.letehg.ensttMa1tien5.n-m1ens2o.utsaF/Llirelle/gedisxlea0ct5iov/re2d9Re/re2sf/e0erxeenPccoeargLdieebrrs2a.rayospfas1p2art of
Emergency Executive Order 20-56
Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency
I, Tim Walz, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and applicable statutes, issue the following Executive Order:
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to present an unprecedented and rapidly evolving challenge to our State. Since the World Health Organization (“WHO”) characterized the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic on March 11, 2020, confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Minnesota have rapidly increased. On March 15, 2020, Minnesota detected the first confirmed cases caused by “community spread”—infections not epidemiologically linked to overseas travel. By March 17, 2020, all fifty states had reported a confirmed case of COVID-19, and on March 21, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”) announced the first confirmed fatality due to COVID-19 in Minnesota. Minnesota has taken proactive steps to ensure that we are ahead of the curve on COVID-19 prevention and response. On March 13, 2020, I issued Executive Order 20-01 and declared a peacetime emergency because this pandemic, an act of nature, threatens the lives of Minnesotans, and local resources are inadequate to address the threat. After notifying the Legislature, on April 13, 2020 and again on May 13, 2020, I issued Executive Orders extending the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01. The need to slow the spread of the virus required the closure of certain non-critical businesses in our economy. Consistent with national trends, over 650,000 Minnesotans have applied for unemployment insurance since March 16, 2020. In Executive Order 20-33, seeking to balance public health needs and economic considerations, I directed the Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, and Labor and Industry to begin planning to allow more Minnesota workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. I explained that such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. Executive Order 20-38 expanded exemptions related to outdoor recreational activities and facilities. Executive Orders 20-40 and 20-48 allowed for certain noncritical businesses to reopen after they had planned for and provided a safe work environment.
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In light of our increased preparedness to treat those most vulnerable to COVID-19 and mitigate these ongoing economic impacts, this Executive Order continues our plan to safely reopen our economy by allowing even more non-critical businesses to reopen, provided that they follow guidance from MDH, the Department of Employment and Economic Development (“DEED”), and the Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”). In particular, such businesses must ensure compliance with the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 182 (“Minnesota OSHA Standards”), in addition to guidelines related to COVID19 set forth by MDH and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“MDH and CDC Guidelines”).
Despite the progress we have made since declaring the COVID-19 peacetime emergency, certain establishments—including those in which people gather and linger, those with communal facilities, and those in which close physical contact is expected—continue to pose a public health risk. We must continue to carefully consider and prepare for the reopening of such businesses.
Likewise, certain non-work activities outside of the home are conducive to social distancing and hygiene, while others raise significant public health risks. Large social and other gatherings of people for extended time periods raise the risk of COVID-19 transmission from household to household. The risks of such transmission are diminished in transitory settings, such as retail establishments, where individual interactions and contact are more limited in duration.
In Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.02, the Minnesota Legislature conferred upon the Governor emergency powers “in order to (1) ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with disasters, (2) generally protect the public peace, health, and safety, and (3) preserve the lives and property of the people of the state.” Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 1, the Governor has general authority to control the state’s emergency management as well as carry out the provisions of Minnesota’s Emergency Management Act.
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 3(7), authorizes the Governor to cooperate with federal and state agencies in “matters pertaining to the emergency management of the state and nation.” This includes “the direction or control of . . . the conduct of persons in the state, including entrance or exit from any stricken or threatened public place, occupancy of facilities, and . . . public meetings or gatherings.” Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that same section, the Governor may “make, amend, and rescind the necessary orders and rules to carry out the provisions” of Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 12. When approved by the Executive Council and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, such orders and rules have the force and effect of law during the peacetime emergency. Any inconsistent rules or ordinances of any agency or political subdivision of the state are suspended during the pendency of the emergency
For these reasons, I order as follows:
1. Executive Order 20-48 is rescinded as of Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
2. Paragraphs 6 through 8 of this Executive Order are effective as of Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm and remain in effect through Sunday, May 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
3. Masks and face coverings strongly encouraged. I strongly encourage all Minnesotans to wear a manufactured or homemade cloth face covering when they
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leave their homes and travel to any public setting where social distancing measures are difficult to maintain (e.g., grocery stores and pharmacies) and to follow face covering guidelines issued by MDH and the CDC until this Executive Order is rescinded. Such face masks and coverings are for source control (to help limit the person wearing the covering from infecting others). They are not yet known to be protective of the wearer and therefore are not personal protective equipment.
4. At-risk persons. All persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19, as defined by Executive Order 20-55, are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence and follow the provisions of Executive Order 20-55.
5. Definitions.
a. “Home” and “homes” and “residence” and “residences” are broadly defined to include mobile homes, hotels, motels, shared rental units, shelters, and similar facilities, to the extent they are used for lodging.
b. “Worker” and “workers” are broadly defined to include owners, proprietors, employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and interns.
c. “Business” and “businesses” are broadly defined to include entities that employ or engage workers, including private-sector entities, public-sector entities, non-profit entities, and state, county, and local governments.
d. “Critical Businesses” are all businesses whose workers qualified for a Critical Sector exemption under paragraph 6 of Executive Order 20-48.
e. “Non-Critical Businesses” are all businesses that are not Critical Businesses and are not closed under Executive Orders 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18.
6. Activities outside of the home. Mindful that we must continue to limit social interactions to protect public health, individuals may leave their homes for activities, subject to the requirements and guidelines set forth below. These requirements may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. Clarifications will be available for public review at the State’s COVID-19 website (https://mn.gov/covid19/).
a. Guidelines. Individuals engaging in activities outside of the home must follow the requirements of this Executive Order and MDH and CDC Guidelines. Individuals engaging in outdoor activities must follow the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) and MDH guidelines on outdoor recreation and guidelines for facilities and the public (“Outdoor Recreation Guidelines”) available at DNR’s website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid-19.html).
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b. Unnecessary travel strongly discouraged. Consistent with federal guidance and to protect our neighbors, Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel.
c. Gatherings. All gatherings of more than 10 people are prohibited. Gatherings are groups of individuals, who are not members of the same household, congregated together for a common or coordinated social, civic, community, faith-based, leisure, or recreational purpose—even if social distancing can be maintained. This prohibition includes planned and spontaneous gatherings, public and private gatherings, and indoor and outdoor gatherings. Examples of prohibited gatherings include, but are not limited to, social, civic, community, faith-based, or leisure events, sporting or athletic events, performances, concerts, conventions, fundraisers, parades, fairs, and festivals that bring together more than 10 people from more than one household. Prohibited gatherings do not include commercial activity by workers and customers of Critical and Non-Critical Businesses.
i. Legislative and other governmental meetings. The limits on gatherings in this Executive Order do not apply to legislative and other governmental meetings. Remote meetings are strongly encouraged whenever possible.
ii. The Judicial Branch. The limits on gatherings in this Executive Order do not apply to proceedings held by the Minnesota Judicial Branch. Proceedings held by the Judicial Branch are subject to the policies established by the chief justice and will occur as directed by court order. Individuals may appear as directed by a Minnesota state court, including to serve as a juror, appear as a party, as a witness, or as legal counsel on behalf of a party, or otherwise to comply as directed by a court order, subpoena, or summons.
iii. Federal activities. Nothing in this Executive Order will be construed to limit, prohibit, or restrict in any way the operations of the federal government or the movement of federal officials in Minnesota while acting in their official capacity, including federal judicial, legislative, and executive staff and personnel.
iv. Drive-in gatherings. To enable safe congregation of more than 10 people, drive-in gatherings are permitted, provided that all participants remain within their own vehicles and follow guidelines provided by MDH and available at MDH’s website (https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/).
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d. Tribal Activities and Lands.
i. Activities by tribal members within the boundaries of their tribal reservations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
ii. Activities within the boundaries of federal land held in trust for one of the 11 Minnesota Tribal Nations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
iii. Activities by tribal members to exercise their federal treaty rights within the boundaries of their treaty territory (also known as “ceded territory”) are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by applicable tribal authorities.
iv. Tribal members may travel to and from their tribal reservations in accordance with applicable tribal law.
7. Workers and businesses. Workers and businesses are subject to the requirements set forth below.
a. Extension of temporary closure of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation. The closure of bars, restaurants, and other public accommodations set forth in Executive Order 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18, is extended until May 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Barbershops and salons may continue to conduct retail product sales in accordance with the requirements for Non-Critical Businesses set forth below.
b. Plan to reopen bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation. The Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, and Labor and Industry are directed to develop a phased plan to achieve the limited and safe reopening of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation beginning on June 1, 2020. This plan will be ready for presentation to the public no later than May 20, 2020.
c. Continue to work from home whenever possible. Any worker who can work from home must do so.
d. Critical Businesses. Businesses whose workers qualified for a Critical Sector exemption under paragraph 6 of Executive Order 20-48 may continue to operate in the same manner as provided in Executive Order 20-48.
i. Child care businesses and youth programming. Child care providers and other businesses providing care and programming to children and youth of Critical Businesses, including workers in child care centers, family child care, certified centers, youth summer programming (including day camps but not overnight camps), and
5

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other activities and facilities, are Critical Businesses. These businesses are encouraged to prioritize enrollment for workers in Critical Businesses according to guidance provided by the Children’s Cabinet and other agencies. This category continues to include workers in a personal home, such as family, friend, and neighbor care necessary for workers to continue to perform their duties. These settings must adhere to MDH and CDC Guidelines.
e. Non-Critical Businesses. If it has not done so already, a Non-Critical Business choosing to open or remain open must establish and implement a COVID-19 Preparedness Plan (“Plan”). Each Plan must provide for the business’s implementation of Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in their workplaces. These requirements are set forth in guidance published by DEED and DLI (“Plan Guidance”) available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
i. Required Plan content. As set forth in the Plan Guidance, at a minimum, each Plan must adequately address the following areas:
A. Require work from home whenever possible. All Plans must ensure that all workers who can work from home continue to do so.
B. Ensure that sick workers stay home. All Plans must establish policies and procedures, including health screenings, that prevent sick workers from entering the workplace.
C. Social distancing. All Plans must establish social distancing policies and procedures.
D. Worker hygiene and source control. All Plans must establish hygiene and source control policies for workers.
E. Cleaning, disinfection, and ventilation protocols. All Plans must establish cleaning, disinfection, and ventilation protocols for areas within the workplace.
ii. Customer facing businesses. All Non-Critical Businesses that are customer facing (i.e., businesses that have in-person customer interactions) must include additional Plan provisions to keep the public and workers safe as set forth in the Plan Guidance available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/). This includes requirements that workers and customers must maintain physical distancing of 6 feet and that store occupancy must not exceed 50 percent of the normal occupant capacity as determined by the fire marshal. In customer facing businesses that share common areas, such as malls, all Plans must similarly include a facility occupancy that
6

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must not exceed 50 percent of the normal occupant capacity as determined by the fire marshal and provide an enhanced sanitizing, cleaning, and disinfecting regimen consistent with Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines for those common areas. All Plans must also include signage in common areas to discourage gathering.
iii. Household services businesses. All Non-Critical Businesses that provide household services (e.g., housecleaning, maid services, and piano tuners) must also develop Plan provisions intended to keep customers and workers safe as set forth in the Plan Guidance available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
iv. Optional template. A template COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, which covers the above requirements, is available as part of the Plan Guidance, available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
v. Certification and signature. Senior management responsible for implementing the Plan must sign and certify the Plan, affirming their commitment to implement and follow the Plan.
vi. Dissemination and posting. Each Non-Critical Business must provide its Plan, in writing, to all workers, and the Plan must be posted at all of the business’s workplaces in locations that will allow for the Plan to be readily reviewed by all workers. Where physical posting is impracticable, the Plan can be posted electronically, provided that the Plan is received by all workers and remains available for their review.
vii. Training. Each Non-Critical Business must ensure that training is provided to workers on the contents of its Plan and required procedures, so that all workers understand and are able to perform the precautions necessary to protect themselves and their co-workers. This training should be easy to understand and available in the appropriate language and literacy level for all workers. Businesses should also take steps to supervise workers and ensure that workers understand and adhere to necessary precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission. Documentation demonstrating compliance with this training requirement must be maintained and made available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI, upon request.
viii. Compliance. Employees and management must work together to ensure compliance with the Plan, implement all protocols, policies, and procedures, and create a safe and healthy work environment.
ix. Availability to regulatory authorities and public safety officers. Non-Critical Businesses do not need to submit their Plans for
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preapproval. Upon request, Non-Critical Businesses must make their Plans available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI.
x. In the event of a complaint or dispute related to a Non-Critical Business’s Plan, DLI is authorized to determine whether the Plan adequately implements Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in its workplaces.
f. Executive Order 20-54 remains in full force and effect. All work must be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines, including social distancing and hygiene practices. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize businesses that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
8. Outdoor recreational activities and associated facilities. Notwithstanding Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, and 20-18, the below facilities are permitted to be open and do business, provided that they adhere to paragraph 6 of this Executive Order and the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines available at DNR’s website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid-19.html). This permission does not extend to charter boats, launches, or facilities that involve prohibited gatherings or people in groups or close proximity (e.g., mini golf, pools, commercial outdoor racetracks, and concert venues). Indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities covered by Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, and 20-18, must comply with those Executive Orders, and all indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities must also conform with the provisions of paragraph 7 of this Executive Order. I encourage public outdoor recreational facilities be open for families and children, and direct all individuals utilizing such facilities to follow the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. All outdoor recreational activities and facilities must comply with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules.
a. Minnesota State Parks, Trails, State Forests, State Recreation Areas, Wildlife Management Areas, Scientific and Natural Areas, and other State managed recreational lands.
b. Locally, regionally, and privately managed parks and trails.
c. State, regional, or local public water accesses.
d. Public and private marinas and docks that provide storage, docking, and mooring services to slip owners, seasonal renters, and the general public, as well as facilities that provide safety-related services including fueling, emergency dockage, and sanitary pump-out stations.
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e. Public and private golf courses and outdoor driving ranges.
f. Ski areas.
g. Off-highway vehicles, snowmobiles, and watercraft repair shops, sales facilities, and showrooms.
h. Lake service providers to install, repair, and remove docks, boatlifts, and other water related equipment or deliver boats.
i. Bait and tackle shops.
j. Outdoor shooting ranges and game farms.
k. Outdoor recreational equipment rental outlets. Equipment may be rented but only if the equipment can be effectively sanitized between uses. Such outlets must implement clear check-in and check-out procedures that minimize contact between customers and workers. Any rentals must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
l. Dispersed and remote camping sites for single household use. A dispersed campsite is a single campsite, not in a developed campground, used for overnight camping. A remote campsite is a designated backpack or watercraft campsite, not in a developed campground, used for overnight camping. Both private and public developed campgrounds remain closed to recreational camping.
m. Outdoor tournaments, competitions, practices, and sports that allow for social distance, do not require group gatherings prohibited by paragraph 6.c, and that adhere to the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
n. Small one-on-one or one-on-two person guided and instructional activities such as guided fishing, birding, or outdoor fitness training. Guided and instructional activities must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
o. Any other outdoor recreation activities and facilities that may be designated in the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
9. Minnesotans must respect the efforts of employers or businesses to protect the safety of their workers and customers by complying with those businesses’ social distancing and hygiene instructions. Employers must post social distancing and hygiene instructions at entrances and in locations that can be easily seen by customers and visitors.
10. I urge all Minnesotans to voluntarily comply with this Executive Order. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.45, an individual who willfully violates this Executive Order is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by
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a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Any business owner, manager, or supervisor who requires or encourages any of their employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, or interns to violate this Executive Order is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $3,000 or by imprisonment for not more than a year. In addition to those criminal penalties, the Attorney General, as well as city and county attorneys, may seek any civil relief available pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 8.31, for violations of this Executive Order, including civil penalties up to $25,000 per occurrence from businesses and injunctive relief. Nothing in this Executive Order is intended to encourage or allow law enforcement to transgress individual constitutional rights.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 4.035, subdivision 2, and section 12.32, this Executive Order is effective immediately upon approval by the Executive Council. It remains in effect until the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01 is terminated or until it is rescinded by proper authority.
A determination that any provision of this Executive Order is invalid will not affect the enforceability of any other provision of this Executive Order. Rather, the invalid provision will be modified to the extent necessary so that it is enforceable.
Signed on May 13, 2020.

Filed According to Law:

_____________________________________
Tim Walz
Governor

_____________________________________
Steve Simon
Secretary of State
Approved by the Executive Council on May 13, 2020:

_____________________________________
Alice Roberts-Davis
Secretary, Executive Council
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Filed May 13, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-12 Filed 05/29/20 Page 12 of 12
RESOLUTION RESOLVED, by the Executive Council of the State of Minnesota, at its emergency meeting on May 13, 2020, that it approves Emergency Executive Order 20-56 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 12.31 and 12.32.
Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency.
Approved by Executive Council DATE: ______M_a_y__1_3_, _2_0_2_0______________ BY: ________________________________
Filed May 13, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

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EXHIBIT 11

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Voting Report
May 15, 2020
Wisconsin Elections Commissioners Dean Knudson, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Julie M. Glancey | Ann S. Jacobs | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Administrator Meagan Wolfe

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FACTS: Absentee Voting Data FINDINGS: Absentee Performance During the April 2020 Primary
General Assessment Case Studies RECOMMENDATIONS: Proposed Courses of Action CONCLUSION Supplemental Absentee Voting Data 2016-2020

PAGE 3 3 8 8 13 21 24
Exhibit A

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 3
I. Executive Summary
Absentee voting in the April 2020 election reached unprecedented levels but Wisconsin voters, local election officials and election administration systems largely adapted to the demand and managed the volume successfully. At a macro level, the processes to request, receive, return, and review absentee ballots proceeded normally and without inconsistencies. At a local level, the extraordinary volume placed enormous stress on election officials, elections systems, and the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).
Absentee voting remains a largely manual, labor-intensive process administered by each individual jurisdiction across the state. While voters can request a ballot and upload a photo ID on their smart phone in just a few minutes, behind the scenes clerks must still manually verify the IDs, stuff and seal envelopes by hand, apply postage, carry boxes of envelopes to the post office, and physically check off each request. These manual processes have worked well in the past, but they are not easy to scale up without advance warning or extensive preparation. When mail volume is up to ten times higher than anticipated, clerks must complete the same tasks without the benefit of having more staff, additional supplies or more hours to meet statutory deadlines.
Despite these challenges, clerks across the state did what was necessary to complete the task. Many jurisdictions hired and trained temporary staff, developed new procedures, and worked long nights and weekends to meet voter needs. The Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC” or “Commission”) likewise hired temporary staff, rapidly expanded technical systems, and worked around the clock to keep up with demand. The data in this report affirms that these efforts were successful, while still revealing opportunities for improvement and important lessons learned.
WEC staff, Wisconsin clerks, and the USPS are working together to make improvements to the absentee voting process and prepare for continued high vote-by-mail volume for the remainder of 2020 and beyond. Process improvements in development will revise the absentee ballot request application, ballot mailing, ballot tracking, and overall quality control. Every step in the process, from the application form, to the envelope, to the tracking tools, is under examination and being evaluated for potential improvements. The tools now in development will provide voters, clerks, and WEC staff with a simpler process and improved communication.
II. Facts: Absentee Voting Data
The April 2020 election broke absentee voting records in Wisconsin while maintaining relatively high turnout for a spring election. Indeed, the April 2020 election produced several state records, including:
• Most by mail ballots ever cast in any Wisconsin election • Most absentee ballots ever cast in any Wisconsin election • Second most total ballots ever cast in a Wisconsin Spring Election • Most in-person absentee ballots in a Wisconsin Spring Election.
The total number of absentee ballots cast by mail easily surpassed the previous record set in April 2016.
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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 4

Table 1.

1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0

170614

Total Ballots Cast by Mail

964433

While the COVID-19 pandemic produced an exceptional shift to vote-by-mail, it is not clear that the crisis influenced overall participation. The total ballots cast in the Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote were not markedly different from previous spring elections. While voter participation for this election was consistent with historic turnout numbers for similar elections, it is also impossible to determine how many voters were unable to cast a ballot for this election due to concerns and complications related to the COVID-19 pandemic. As demonstrated by the chart below, total ballots cast for this election were comparable to the 2008 Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote and trailed only the same election in 2016 where both major political parties had competitive presidential primaries on the ballot in Wisconsin.

Table 2.

2500000 2000000 1500000

1511639

Spring Elections Total Ballots Cast
2113544

1000000

500000

0

1555263

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 5
Absentee ballots cast for the April 2020 election also represented a far greater percentage of the ballots cast than is typical. More than three-quarters of the ballots cast were absentee and more than 60% were delivered by mail. Historically, over 80% of ballots in Wisconsin are cast in person on election day and only 6% are cast as by mail absentee ballots. Wisconsin has seen a steady rise in absentee voting percentages in recent years, but those gains could be attributed to an increase in in-person absentee voting, commonly referred to as early voting. For this election, almost 75% of all ballots cast were by absentee voters with over 60% issued and returned by mail. For this election, Wisconsin local election officials saw increases in both in-person absentee voting and absentee by mail, which created resource issues for a system primarily designed to support polling place voting on election day. Some smaller staffs were nearly overwhelmed by the demand and many had to recruit assistance from other municipal departments or secure temporary staff.
Table 3.
2020 Spring Election and Presidential Preference

Ballots Cast Absentee
1,157,599 74%

Ballots Cast on Election Day
397,664 26%

As compared with earlier elections, the 2020 shift to voting by mail is distinct, with barely one quarter of voters choosing to cast a ballot on election day. In person voting on election day was still required for this election and each municipality had to dedicate resources to securing, staffing and supplying polling places, while also processing the increased volume of absentee voting. Almost 400,000 voters cast their ballot at a Wisconsin polling place on election day and each municipality operated at least one polling place. The combination of increased by mail absentee voting and continued support of in person voting has resulted in many local election officials reporting that their 2020 municipal postal budgets have already been exhausted or are on pace for shortages.

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 6

Table 4.

100.0% 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%

Voting Method

25.6%

89.9%

72.7%

88.8%

89.1%

78.3%

87.9%

61.8%

4.8%

8.1%
4/5/2016

22.5%
11/8/2016

6.9% 4.3%
4/4/2017

6.2%

5.3% 5.6%

15.5%

5.4% 6.7%

4/3/2018 11/6/2018 4/2/2019

In Person Absentee By Mail Absentee Election Day

12.6%
4/7/2020

Nearly 1.3 million absentee ballots were delivered to voters for the April election, either by mail or in person at local clerks’ offices. While almost 90 percent of ballots were returned and counted, approximately 1 in 10 ballots were either not returned to the clerk or were returned but rejected. Almost 121,000 absentee ballots were issued by local election officials, but not returned by voters. This report will provide information about several factors that contributed to the number of unreturned ballots.

Table 5.
April 7, 2020 - Absentee Ballots
Total Absentee Ballots Sent1 Absentee Ballots Returned and Counted Absentee Ballots Returned and Rejected – After 4/13 Absentee Ballots Returned and Rejected - Other Absentee Ballots Not Returned

Absentee Ballot Count
1,303,985 1,159,800
2,659 20,537 120,989

% of Ballots
100.00% 88.94% 0.20% 1.57% 9.28%

1 An additional 21,301 absentee ballot records were created by clerks but deactivated for administrative reasons (e.g. clerk error, voter error, voter request, ineligible voter, etc.). This represents approximately 1.6% of the total absentee ballot records. Since 2016, the median rate of administrative cancellations is approximately 2.3% of the total absentee ballot records created, with a range of 1.1% (November 2018) to 4.0% (April 2016).

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The figures above are largely consistent with the percentage of ballots rejected or not returned in recent April elections. Both the ballot rejection and unreturned ballot rates were consistent with or lower than the previous rates. This comparison does not seek to downplay the concerns and experiences reported by voters who had difficulty receiving or returning their ballot or voters who could not meet the witness requirement due to COVID-19 concerns. It does demonstrate the Wisconsin vote by mail system for the April 7, 2020 election performed consistently with its performance in previous comparable elections, but there are still several opportunities for improvements. The State is currently pursuing multiple initiatives that will improve the by mail absentee process prior to the fall 2020 elections.

Table 6.

Table 7.

20.0%

Absentee Ballots Rejected

Absentee Ballots Not Returned

20.0%

18.9%

15.0% 10.0%
5.0% 2.5% 2.0% 2.3% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0%

15.0%
10.0%
5.4%
5.0%
0.0%

11.4% 10.9% 9.3%

Likewise, most ballots were returned prior to Election Day, but nearly 7% arrived in the window between Election Day and the court ordered deadline of 4:00 p.m. on 4/13/2020. Over 1.1 million of the absentee ballots that were issued for this election were returned in accordance with current Wisconsin state law that requires ballots to be received by 8:00 PM on Election Day in order to be counted. Judge Conley’s extension of the ballot return deadline to 4:00 PM on April 13, 2020 resulted in an additional 79,054 ballots being counted for this election. Local election officials have also reported 2,659 ballots that were returned after the April 13 deadline that were not counted due to their late arrival.

Table 8. April 2020 Absentee Ballot Return Dates

Absentee Ballot Count

% of Ballots

Total Absentee Ballots Returned Ballots returned before 4/8/2020 Ballots returned between 4/8/2020 and 4/13/2020 Ballots returned after 4/13/2020

1,182,996 1,101,324
79,054 2,659

100.00% 93.09% 6.68% 0.22%

Additional historical data is attached to this report as Exhibit A - Absentee Voting Data.

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III. Findings: Absentee Performance During the April 2020 Primary
A. General Assessment
Wisconsin voters demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to the democratic process in the April 2020 election. In the midst of a COVID-19 pandemic and rapidly changing voting rules and protocols, nearly 1.2 million voters cast an absentee ballot in the Spring Election and Presidential Preference Primary. This section assesses the performance of the absentee voting process during the April 2020 election and examines the experiences of voters, election officials, and election systems. The assessment will consider both a broad overview and examine specific case studies from across the state.
1. The Absentee Process in Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Legislature has determined that the vigorous exercise of our constitutional right to vote should be strongly encouraged. The Legislature also recognizes that it is difficult for some individuals to get to their polling place on Election Day. In order to meet this need, the Legislature has established the privilege of absentee voting as an extension of the right to vote on Election Day. The Legislature recognized that the privilege of voting absentee is exercised wholly outside the traditional safeguards of the polling place. It has determined that the privilege of absentee voting must be carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse, overzealous solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate in an election, and undue influence on an absentee elector to vote for or against a candidate or referendum. Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).
Any qualified elector who is unable or unwilling to appear at the polling place on Election Day may vote by absentee ballot. Wis. Stat. § 6.85. Registered electors wishing to vote absentee must submit an absentee ballot request in writing to the municipal clerk. The request is made to the municipal clerk in writing or electronically using the Application for Absentee Ballot (EL-121), or a letter requesting an absentee ballot which provides the information required on the application form. The written request should include the elector’s: 1. Name 2. Residential address 3. Mailing address, if different than residential address 4. Signature 5. Proof of identification, if necessary. Military and Overseas electors may also use the Federal Postcard Application (FPCA), which is a combination registration form and absentee ballot request. Voters may also apply for and vote an absentee ballot in person at the municipal clerk’s office. Wis. Stat. § 6.86.
Municipal clerks prepare official absentee ballots for delivery to electors requesting them. An absentee ballot must be sent to any voter with an absentee application on file, no later than 47 days before a federal election, and no later than 21 days before a primary or other election. Otherwise, the municipal clerk shall send or transmit an official absentee ballot within one business day of the time the elector's request for such a ballot is received. Wis. Stat. § 7.15(1)(cm).
The municipal clerk or the clerk’s designee is required to enter absentee applications and ballot information into the WisVote system maintained by the Commission within 48 hours after mailing or receiving an in-person absentee ballot application. Wis. Stat. § 6.33(5). Or, in the case where the
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municipality relies on the county or another municipality, the clerk shall submit the information to the clerk’s WisVote provider, and the provider shall enter the absentee information into the WisVote system within 24 hours. Wis. Stat. § 6.33(5).
2015 Wisconsin Act 261 charged the Government Accountability Board (G.A.B.), and later the Wisconsin Elections Commission, with developing a subscription service that would allow the public to access absentee ballot data that is tracked in WisVote. Given the implementation of the absentee subscription service available in BADGER Voters as well as increase in absentee voting and the growing public interest in obtaining absentee ballot data, it is important that clerks are able to timely and accurately enter absentee ballot data into WisVote including entry of absentee applications, issuance of ballots, and recording ballot statuses. The WEC staff plays an important role in assisting clerks with entering and tracking absentee ballots in the WisVote system.
a. Support Provided by the WEC
Commission staff do not process or send absentee ballots to voters in Wisconsin; all requests are required to be fulfilled by a local municipal clerk. However, Commission staff provide a range of both technical and direct support to municipalities for the absentee request process. The Commission provides access to and maintains the WisVote system and the MyVote website, along with technical support and training related to these products.
The WisVote system is the primary administrative means of tracking and supporting the absentee process in Wisconsin. Along with voter registration records, WisVote allows clerks to track absentee requests for single and multiple elections, create records for issued ballots, and record the final disposition of ballots. Centralized absentee tracking allows Commission staff to monitor and support clerk compliance with Federal and State UOCAVA requirements. It also allows Commission staff to gather and submit federally required absentee information to the U.S. Elections Administration Commission on behalf of all Wisconsin clerks.
WisVote has several built-in reports and report-building functions to further support clerks in the entering and tracking of absentee applications and ballot records. Commission development will also create new reports based on clerk feedback and needs, such as the recent Photo ID Not on File report created to assist clerks in finding and entering any absentee applications missed due to the large influx of requests. This report was created, tested, and deployed in less than one week.
The MyVote Wisconsin website is another integral piece of the absentee voting process. MyVote is a public-facing website that provides a central location for voters to submit an absentee ballot request regardless of where they reside in the state. All requests submitted via MyVote are then transmitted to the municipal clerk via an email notification that includes a copy of the photo ID file, if required, and a PDF version of the absentee request that includes election information, delivery method, and separate mailing address, if provided. MyVote reduces the number of misdirected absentee requests and speeds the absentee process by providing a standard email to assist in organizing emailed requests and
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automatically assigning them to the correct jurisdiction based on the voter’s address. When a photo ID is not required, the MyVote site will create the tracking record in WisVote automatically while still sending the notification, removing the data-entry requirement for these requests. Voters who do not use the MyVote site may send absentee requests to the incorrect jurisdiction, or even the Elections Commission directly, which leads to requests being delayed or even unfulfilled if the misdirected request is received after a statutory deadline.
Commission staff maintains and develops extensive training materials to update clerks on changes to WisVote and MyVote while also allowing new clerks to obtain the necessary training to use these systems effectively. All clerks and their support staff are given access to an elections training site referred to as The Learning Center (“TLC”). The site includes interactive training modules covering the various functions of WisVote and links to all training webinars produced by Commission training staff. Commission staff also publish and update a user manual for WisVote which includes detailed instructions on using the various functions and features of WisVote. Along with these existing materials, Commission training staff produce and record several training webinars during each election cycle to review topics of concern, preview/review recent updates to WisVote and solicit clerk feedback.
b. Processes at Individual Communities
The absentee request and fulfillment process will include many of the same processes regardless of municipal size or circumstances. Requests must be reviewed to determine type and period of request, if the voter is currently registered, within the jurisdiction, and if an acceptable photo ID was required/provided. All municipalities must mail/email/fax any ballot requests themselves and have a supply of envelopes and ballots to do so. Based on request volume and municipality size, clerks may use WisVote to generate mailing labels while other municipalities will opt for hand-written labels. If a clerk is a self-provider, has WisVote access and tracks their own information, they would also enter the necessary information into WisVote. In municipalities where the clerk is not a WisVote user, they will contract with another municipality or county to enter this information on their behalf while reviewing and fulfilling any absentee requests directly.
For a more detailed accounting of how various municipalities handled the absentee process, please see the Case Studies section below.
2. Voting for April 2020
The April 7 Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote was by all definitions unprecedented. Wisconsin was the only state thus far to conduct a statewide election during a COVID-19 pandemic stay at home order. Wisconsin is also the most decentralized state for election administration, meaning that 1,850 municipal election officials and 72 county election officials had to adapt to significant changes from court rulings, public health guidance and voter behavior shifts towards vote by mail.
The surge in absentee voting was first felt on the MyVote Wisconsin website. On the MyVote website, voters can request an absentee ballot, track when their ballot was sent and received by their clerk,
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register to vote online, find their polling place, view a sample ballot, view their voting history, and more. The site was built and updated regularly by WEC staff with extensive usability studies conducted with hundreds of voters to learn how they use the site.
Based on historical data, most voters went to MyVote to find their polling place or to view a sample ballot. Site analytics show this to be true in February 2020, where traffic to the polling place look up tool reached a new record high. Features like requesting an absentee ballot were previously used by voters, but never at the rate they were utilized in the lead up to the April 2020 election. As a result, the look up tools garnered more attention from developers prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
To accommodate the rapidly evolving environment, WEC staff were required to make more than a dozen changes to the MyVote system in the 60 days prior to the election. Deadlines for online voter registration and for absentee requests were extended multiple times by court actions prior to this election and deadlines for ballots to be returned and witness requirements were also changed initially, but then changed back. Because this information is hardcoded in the MyVote system, each change required extensive reprogramming and testing to avoid unintended consequences.
The other statewide system supporting the absentee process is WisVote. The WisVote database is the system used by almost 3,000 local election officials to administer elections. While WisVote and the WEC do not issue ballots, the clerks use WisVote to record when they send and receive absentee ballots, generate an absentee ballot log, enter voter registrations, and record voter participation. The system was built by the WEC team and launched in 2016.
WisVote was built based on the way Wisconsin conducts elections, which involves mostly voting inperson at the polls and registering to vote at the polls on election day. By mail voting and registration options are accounted for in the system, but most municipalities had never received a large volume of absentee requests for a specific election prior to this election. Clerk activity in WisVote prior to the election was much higher than any prior election because clerks were all entering and issuing record numbers of absentee requests at the same time. The system performed very well but required around the clock monitoring and auditing to handle this unique and unprecedented user behavior and traffic.
Like MyVote, WisVote required several updates to accommodate extended deadlines for absentee requests and online voter registration. These extensions meant changing automation in the system to assign voter records and allow requests to new deadlines and elections. WEC staff also monitored capacity of the system to ensure adequate memory space. Multiple increases of memory were needed to keep pace with absentee requests and attached copies of photo ID’s. WEC staff also created two significant new processes to assist local election officials with the new volume of absentee requests.
One change was to create an absentee ballot request report that documents when a voter submits a request that includes a photo ID. This change was significant because it allowed WisVote to view photo ID files within the system. This process is usually completed by email. Photo files are very large, therefore the storage and capacity in WisVote had to be significantly adjusted.
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WEC staff also created “poll book” reports or pages so that jurisdictions with consolidated polling places could use the WisVote system to check in voters, produce and print an individual poll book page for them, and record new registrations and participation in real time on election day. These were not processes that had been conceptualized previously and required significant development and testing completed in one week.
As the enormous quantity of absentee ballots began entering the mail system, voters began asking more questions and expressing concerns about ballot deliveries. With nearly six times more ballots in circulation, the number of complaints and concerns increased by a similar amount. Some voters also reported not receiving their absentee ballots while others reported that their completed ballots were not returned to the clerk in a timely fashion. Starting on April 8, municipalities began reporting irregular or illegible postmarks on ballot return envelopes. WEC staff asked clerks to report their postmark and mailing issues to the USPS and the WEC for investigation. Findings from that research is discussed in the Case Studies section below.
WEC staff also worked with local election officials to understand and collect postmark examples and postal issues. WEC then worked with USPS personnel at the local, state, regional, and national level to get information about the postmark process. Ultimately, USPS provided information that each postal branch made best attempts to postmark ballots on election day, but in the case of missing or illegible postmarks there was no way to determine what date the ballot was marked. WEC staff also sent a letter to local, state, regional, and national USPS representatives asking for them to provide additional information on ballots that were not received and on outgoing ballots that were returned to municipalities without explanation. A response has not yet been received.
Finally, any report on the April 2020 election must include mention of the tremendous support received from partners not typically involved in the elections process. In addition to our regular law enforcement partners, the WEC received exceptional support from the State Emergency Operations Center, Wisconsin Emergency Management, the Wisconsin National Guard, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, and the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. These agencies, working closely with Wisconsin’s 72 county clerks, played a key role in distributing personal protective equipment, sanitization supplies, and even poll workers to more than 2,000 polling places across the State.
3. Other 2020 Elections
Looking ahead to the remainder of 2020, the WEC staff anticipate continued high demand for by mail absentee voting, even if the COVID-19 pandemic begins to subside. November elections generally see high turnout, particularly in presidential election years. The last three presidential general elections all saw more than 3 million ballots cast. If voting patterns from April hold true, the state could see more than 1.8 million requests for absentee ballots by mail. This kind of volume would present terrific challenges for Wisconsin election officials at all levels.
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Table 9.
Total Ballots Cast: Spring to Fall
3500000 ?
3000000 2500000 2000000 1500000 1000000
500000 0
November presidential elections also tend to see a greater proportion of inexperienced voters. That is, voters who vote infrequently or are voting for the first time. These less-experienced voters are more likely to have difficulty navigating the absentee voting process. As a result, the clarification of the process may help voters in November.
B. Specific Case Studies
The absentee voting experiences of voters and election officials were as varied as the 1,850 jurisdictions in the state. Nearly every community experienced unprecedented absentee request volume, and many hired temporary staff to cope with demand. Many small and medium size jurisdictions learned to use WisVote absentee batch processing tools for the first time, having never previously needed any automation assistance to manage their workload. Larger cities, while used to higher volumes, were forced to work around the clock and conduct much larger batch mailings then previously experienced. For all jurisdictions, the statutory requirement to mail ballots within 24 hours of receiving a request presented a significant challenge.
This section examines specific challenges, problems, complaints, and solutions reported by municipal, county, and state election staff.
1. Meeting Overwhelming Demand
The most fundamental challenge faced by election officials was simply meeting the unprecedented demand. In addition to keeping up with the requests for mailed absentee ballots, clerks continued to service voters in their office wishing to participate through in-person absentee voting. On top of that, clerks were tasked with providing polling places with equipment on election day to meet appropriate
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CDC guidelines, not to mention the challenge of recruiting and training new election inspectors taking the place of long-serving election inspectors, many of whom chose not serve due to their risk category to COVID-19. While meeting the requirements above, clerks had to remain in communication with the WEC on updates and changes applied by all levels of the legal system. Most critically, hundreds of Wisconsin clerks had to complete all the tasks above while working alone and part time.

The increase in demand appeared consistent across the state, with large, medium and small jurisdictions all showing similar patterns.

Table 10.

100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

Madison, WI
Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

15000 10000
5000 0

Oshkosh, WI
Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

Hudson, WI

3000 2000 1000
0

Apr-2018

Apr-2019

Apr-2020

Absentee Ballots

Plymouth, WI
2000
1000
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

Spooner, WI
400 300 200 100
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020
Absentee Ballots

Homestead, WI
80 60 40 20
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020
Absentee Ballots

Rapidly changing guidance further complicated the environment for clerks. Multiple decisions in the weeks leading up to election day required clerks to communicate new deadlines and requirements impacting voters who may have received conflicting information made no longer relevant by late hour court decisions. No city, village, or town was able to avoid these extraordinary challenges presented in

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addition to the increased demand for absentee voting – and their efforts navigating all the situations presented by the pandemic should not be overlooked.
For elections prior to the April 7 election, the City of Racine managed ballot requests received by email with just one election staffer who printed and distributed the requests to four additional staff members for entry into WisVote and for the records to be filed according to public records statutes. Once the pandemic hit and absentee request volume grew exponentially, the city quickly adapted by recruiting 2030 additional city staff members to process absentee ballot requests from printing the request to sending the ballot out the door. Staff are still catching up on filing these documents appropriately.
Some communities, like the Village of Cottage Grove (Dane County), were fortunate to have hired and trained new elections staff just before the pandemic crisis began. Staff were able to manage the demand for absentee ballots by printing off every email notification of an absentee ballot request, whether it required photo ID or not. A staff of three processed each request individually, ensuring the steps of entering the request, issuing the ballot, printing the label, and applying it to the ballot occurred for every printed email. High school students were brought in to assist with the manual work of stuffing envelopes with ballots, while the clerk staff managed work in the voter registration system and fielded calls from voters with limited experience with absentee voting and navigating MyVote. Clerk staff found some success when directing voters to using smartphones (when available) to upload a copy of their photo to complete the absentee ballot request process.
Even the smallest of jurisdictions were not immune from the increased demand. While they did not have to contend with thousands of requests, individual town clerks often worked alone and with limited resources. In the Town of Washington in Shawano County, a part-time clerk went from managing eight absentee ballot requests in February to processing 312 in April. Many clerks were in a similar position of putting in extra hours to scale up their election’s operations with no additional compensation, all while balancing a separate full-time job.
To provide clerks adequate time to complete all their election responsibilities, WEC is committed to reducing the administrative burden of data entry required by the current absentee ballot request process. Proposed adjustments to the system include generating a pending absentee request in WisVote that can be approved or denied once photo ID is reviewed. Additionally, WEC hopes to assist clerks with common issues with absentee ballot requests, such as “selfies” submitted as photo ID, by communicating that information back to the voter through MyVote or available email or phone contact information. Finally, the staff recommends conducting voter outreach programs as described in the CARES Grant memorandum associated with this Commission meeting.
2. Concerns about Mail Service
Clerks in some parts of the state encountered issues with absentee ballots reaching voters or being returned to their offices. In some cases, voters expected to receive a ballot when a request was not submitted or not completed. These issues are discussed further under Voter Experience & Education below. After ruling out cases of voter error, there remained cases that could not be explained or could
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not be explained definitively. For example, the City of Oshkosh and other Fox Valley communities all reported voters complaining that their ballots were arriving late or not arriving at all. WEC staff investigated each complaint received where enough information was available to identify the voter.
On the morning of April 8, 2020, WEC staff received a telephone call from a Political and Election Mail Coordinator at the Great Lakes Regional office of the USPS in Chicago. The USPS official reported that the post office had located “three tubs” of absentee ballots for the Appleton/Oshkosh area and that the ballots were being processed. The official was unable to confirm how many ballots were in the three tubs but stated that “it could be quite a lot” as they were large two-handled tubs. In a follow up communication, the USPS indicated that there were approximately 1,600 ballots in the batch.
WEC staff attempted to follow up with the USPS to further identify the ballots and determine what happened but did not receive any further information about these ballots. Written inquiries to the USPS did not produce any specific information about these ballots. Wisconsin’s two U.S. Senators have asked the USPS Inspector General to investigate, but WEC staff have been unable to learn anything about the status of the inquiry.
The WEC also investigated reports from the City of Oshkosh suggesting that ballot requests were received but not fulfilled. While many of the cases involved incomplete requests (e.g. no photo ID provided) other records appeared complete. WEC staff researched several dozen Oshkosh area ballot requests that were entirely valid, including those of Assembly Representative Gordon Hintz (D – Oshkosh) and his spouse. The ballot records in question were generated as part of a batch on March 24, and analysis of the ballots associated with it showed that a large part of the batch was not returned by voters. Of the first quarter of records generated, more than 90% were returned. Of the remaining threequarters of records, less than 1% were returned. This suggests that something happened to the ballots in the latter portion of the batch.
WEC and Oshkosh staff could find no evidence of a technical failure. The Oshkosh batch was produced very quickly by the system (two minutes and seven seconds), did not include any unexpected applications, and occurred during normal operating hours when no system maintenance was underway. Furthermore, the City of Oshkosh Clerk reports with confidence that the ballots were mailed to voters. Thus, in this case, there is no evidence of a system error and no evidence of a printing problem. Instead, one of two events are possible: either a user did not apply the mailing labels to ballot envelopes, or these ballots were bundled together and collectively encountered an issue in the mailing process.
As with the larger cities, smaller municipalities also reported issues with ballots reaching residents or being returned to the clerk in a timely fashion. The Village of Fox Point was among them and experienced an unusual chain of events that garnered some media attention. For two weeks, absentee ballots that were supposed to be mailed to Fox Point residents were repeatedly returned to the Fox Point Village Hall by the post office before reaching voters.
The village reported receiving anywhere from 20 to 50 of these returned absentee ballots per day two weeks ahead of the election. The problem continued to grow as election day neared. In the week prior
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to the election, 100 to 150 ballots per day were returned to the village. On the morning of Election Day, Fox Point Village Hall received a plastic mail bin with 175 ballots. In each case, the returned ballots were unopened, unmarked and had not been received by voters. The postage was not cancelled, and no explanation was provided.

Each time they received a batch of absentee ballots, village officials immediately drove the ballots back to the nearest post office. They asked post office supervisors what was wrong with the ballots, but they did not receive any explanation. Fox Point Village Clerk Kelly Meyer reports it is unclear how many voters were affected by the undelivered ballots. Residents who did not receive an absentee ballot in the mail were advised to vote in person at their polling place on Election Day. Residents who called village hall inquiring about their absentee ballot on Election Day could retrieve their ballot from village hall if the ballot still un-sent and the resident could confirm their identity with a photo ID.
Statewide, the volume of absentee requests received remained high in the week prior to April 7th. Clerks received over 60,000 requests alone on the Friday before election day. Even if all these requests were mailed on Saturday, it is unknown how long those ballots took to reach voters. Current capabilities do not permit election officials to monitor the movement of ballots in the mail system. Thus, the next data point available to election officials is the date the completed ballot is returned to them.

Table 11.

90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000
0

80593

Absentee Ballot Requests Received

66482

79921

62172

Process Request

1 day

Mail to Voter

2-3 days

Complete Ballot

0 days

Mail to Clerk

2-3 days

---------------------------------------

Turn around time > 5-7 days

under optimal conditions

8970

3262

1849

351

The absence of information about ballots in the mail system is a significant concern for voters, clerks, and Commission staff. To improve visibility of these ballots, WEC staff are working to incorporate Intelligent Mail Bar Codes (IMBs) as a tracking tool for future absentee mailings. The IMB is a 65-bar USPS barcode that allows internal tracking information to be shared with the mailer and or recipient.
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Although still dependent on the postal service, the IMB allows greater visibility of individual pieces in the mail stream. IMBs and tracking tools are discussed further in the Recommendations section below.
3. Process Improvements
The enormous volume of absentee requests for the April 2020 election magnified the effect of typically small concerns that ordinarily presented minor issues. Complex process flows that were a minor annoyance in prior elections became major headaches for April. Counties faced a particularly difficult challenge of attempting to complete the data entry for multiple relier communities where the absentee voting rates had previously been low. This data entry provides these voters with the opportunity to track their ballot on MyVote.
For example, in Shawano County, the clerk’s office typically has three staffers but operated with just two as a result of the pandemic. This reduced staff of just two people was responsible for entering the absentee information for 25 municipalities. The Shawano County staff encountered problems working in the voter registration system, including the inability to pull reports at the county level. Additionally, the ballot count associated to an absentee application does not always immediately update due to allocation of system resources, creating confusion for users looking for confirmation a ballot was created and slowing the processing of information.
Grant County, located in southwest Wisconsin, also provides absentee processing support for its municipalities. Grant County is made up of 52 municipalities, 41 of which rely on the county to enter and update the status of their absentee ballots in WisVote. Previously the volume of absentee ballots was manageable through a simple absentee ballot log passed between the municipality and county. The county clerk’s office revamped this absentee ballot log and asked all 41 reliers to stick with the standard format in the weeks leading up to April 7. The log asks for the necessary information to enter it correctly and efficiently in the voter registration system. The county also asks the reliers to highlight any changes from the last time the absentee ballot log had been sent so they could focus on the work to be completed.
Another contributor to processing time is the requirement to individually validate the photo identification of each voter. While validating any one request is quick, the manual nature of the process proved challenging when contending with high volume and simultaneously responding to hundreds of voter inquiries. Compounding the problem was the fact that MyVote shows only complete, accepted requests. Voters with a request pending ID approval are given no indication that their request is on file. Improving feedback to voters, and tools available to clerks, is therefore a top agency priority before the August 2020 election.
4. Technical Problems.
Some voters and clerks have questioned if technical failures caused absentee requests or ballots to be lost. As a result, WEC technical staff spent considerable time researching this possibility both before and after election day. Detailed auditing were performed on individual complaints and no technical problems were detected prior to election day. WisVote and its associated systems maintain meticulous
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details of each and every transaction occurring in the system, precisely when it occurs to the fraction of a second, and who or what executed the transaction. These highly detailed records allow staff to retrace events, locate errors, and validate system operations. The records enabled staff to review tens of thousands of transactions from hundreds of jurisdictions. This research revealed one isolated and unique incident where technology and volume combined to create an error. Staff found no evidence of any technical error that could have caused an absentee ballot request or a completed ballot to be lost.
The single failure identified came to light after the City of Milwaukee's Election Commission (MEC) conducted a post election review that could only be identified after election participation was entered. Upon investigation, MEC staff discovered that the WisVote record for tracking this voter’s ballot had been created in the middle of the night, at a time when MEC staff would not have been creating ballot records. They further determined that the ballot record was associated with a batch. A batch is a WisVote entity that allows clerks to select broad categories of absentee application records and request the system create ballot tracking records and subsequently generate mailing labels for each of those absentee applications. Many of the absentee ballots associated with this batch had been created in the middle of the night, and many of them had not been returned. MEC referred the issue to the WEC for further investigation during the post-election data reconciliation process.
Upon initial analysis of the batch, WEC staff identified trends that appeared similar to the Oshkosh case. As in Oshkosh, there was a sharp decline in ballot return rates for a specific subset of ballots. Of the 5,913 ballot records created on or before 10:42:32 p.m. on March 22, 5,237 were recorded as having returned in some way to the clerk’s office. This is an 88.5% return rate. Of the 2,693 ballots generated after 10:42:32 p.m., only one was recorded as returned.
Further investigation disclosed several factors unique to Milwaukee. In particular:
• It was the largest batch processed by WisVote; ultimately including 8,607 absentee ballot request records. The median batch size for the same day was 32 records.
• It started at 5:16 p.m. on March 22 and did not complete until 1:31 a.m. on March 23. Typically, batches complete within a few minutes.
• Of the absentee application records associated with the batch, many were created after the batch was generated. Since the first thing the batch does is select the absentee application records that match its criteria, this should not be possible.
Upon review, it was determined that the timeframe of this particular batch overlapped with maintenance on a known server issue. On March 22, WEC staff observed high utilization rates in some WisVote servers that could potentially cause user interface degradation, such as slow page loads or poor performance of some tasks. In consultation with Microsoft, plans were made to implement server improvements to prevent further issues. In the interim, system resources were freed by restarting the servers that process background jobs, called asynchronous servers. Background jobs are intended to be short-running, and by restarting one server at a time during a period when few users would be interacting with the system, staff believed that WisVote’s load balancing would shuffle background jobs as needed and there would be no impact. That has been staff’s experience in past server restarts, and in
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testing no impact was observed. However on subsequent code review it was determined that it is possible, if a batch workflow is restarted, for that workflow to select applicable ballot requests a second time, which would generate ballot tracking records for absentee applications not originally associated with the batch.
It is staff’s belief that an extraordinary confluence of events resulted in additional ballot records being generated after MEC staff printed their mailing labels, leading MEC to believe those ballots had already been sent when in fact they had not. First, Milwaukee’s extraordinarily large batch of more than 8,000 ballots, exacerbated by the high user load on the system in the run up to the April election, resulted in the processing of this batch taking several hours, instead of a few minutes. Second, unbeknownst to MEC, Commission staff conducted an unscheduled restart of the asynchronous servers to address an unrelated issue, interrupting this long-running job. Third, an oversight in the development of this process meant that the system failed to handle the restart gracefully, selecting an entirely new collection of absentee applications instead of continuing from where it had been interrupted.
Since the database contained detailed information tracking batch creation, staff could develop precise criteria to determine the impact and review transactions across the state. As a result, staff can conclusively determine that this restart issue only impacted this one batch in the City of Milwaukee. As a result of this issue, staff believes that 2,693 requested ballots were never sent to City of Milwaukee residents. Of the affected voters, 52.5% voted in the election either on a replacement absentee ballot or at the polls on election day.
Ensuring the voting rights of Wisconsin citizens is a hugely complex task without room for error. It requires, at a minimum, the ability to immediately identify and remedy errors before they affect the voting process. In this instance, detailed records enabled agency staff to retrace these events, they did not provide information in a proactive manner allowing a system problem to be identified in real time. Neither clerks nor the state would have been able to identify this issue in real-time or based on single voter reports. Staff are now adopting real-time performance tracking tools for IT professionals and building user-friendly audit tools for clerks and other election officials. Measures to identify and avoid technical failures like this one are discussed in the Recommendations section below.
5. Voter Experience & Education
The April 2020 election introduced hundreds of thousands of voters to the absentee process for the first time. Naturally, many were unfamiliar with the process and did not understand the requirements. Common errors included:
• providing a written request (letter or e-mail) with insufficient information • submitting a personal photograph instead of an acceptable form of photo ID • not completing the on-line application process
An additional complication resulted from third parties mailing absentee application request forms that did not adequately highlight the photo ID requirement. In these cases, the clerk was unable to fulfill the
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request until they could follow up with the voter to obtain a valid photo ID. Most voters do not provide a phone number or email, so the clerk must rely on a mailed notification to the voter that their request is not yet valid. Clerks in these situations were often unfairly blamed for not fulfilling a request that was not valid in the first place.
WEC staff believes that the creation of voter outreach programs to explain the absentee voting process will be beneficial, particularly if demand for absentee ballots remains high.
IV. Recommendations: Proposed Courses of Action
A. Assessment Resources.
WEC staff is working with various partners to assess and improve the absentee voting experience. Changes to the voter registration system, public facing websites, paper forms, and envelopes will largely impact individuals outside of the agency, and the Commission should provide opportunities to receive and incorporate feedback from our core users.
In addition to the existing Clerk Advisory Committees, a new Clerk Advisory Committee dedicated to Vote by Mail revisions has been created and is meeting on a weekly basis to provide direction and feedback on staff proposals. The committee is composed of clerks from jurisdictions of various sizes and resources. A separate committee dedicated to “reliers” -- clerks who rely on the county or another municipality to complete some or all of their WisVote work -- will also be convened so that new workflows meet their unique needs.
Staff is also working with non-profits in the elections space who are stepping up their efforts to support the nationwide increase in absentee voting. Staff reached out to the Center for Civic Design for guidance on holding and recruiting inexperienced and first-time voters for remote, video conference usability sessions. The Center for Civic Design has previously trained staff on making user-centered design decisions through holding usability sessions, where voters are asked to test-drive new or updated products such as the absentee ballot request form. Staff is in the process of holding remote video conference sessions with voters.
WEC staff is also working with Democracy Works - a nonprofit that builds software applications to assist voters and election officials. WEC has been working with Democracy Works since 2011 in providing our Voting Information Project data feed, which serves as our alternate means for voters to locate Election Day polling places. Ballot Scout is another Democracy Works product that tracks absentee ballots using information from USPS via their Intelligent Barcode and Informed Visibility mail tracking system. Ballot Scout can be inserted as a "widget" or feature into a website like MyVote, allowing voters and clerks to track a ballot as it travels through the USPS mail system.
Since April 23, USPS Election Mail and Business Mail integration experts and WEC staff have been meeting weekly. The focus of these meetings is to provide WEC staff with guidance on the implementation of intelligent mail barcodes and support in absentee ballot envelope revisions. USPS is
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committed to building a relationship with our agency with the goal of improving the experience of voting by mail in Wisconsin.
B. Ballot Request Process
Staff, clerks, and voters have provided ample observations on how to improve the absentee ballot request process. Voters are required to submit a written request to their municipal clerk to receive an absentee ballot. Requests can be submitted in a standard format when requested through MyVote and when using the Absentee Ballot Request form (EL-122) or can be submitted in an unstandardized format through an email or mail correspondence. No matter how the voter submits it, any request that gets to the clerk must be entered by hand into the voter registration system. Many first-time absentee voters visited MyVote in the weeks up to the April 7 election to request their ballots where they had to navigate unfamiliar language and requirements such as uploading a photo ID.
In response, WEC staff will focus on three specific improvements to the process of requesting an absentee ballot. First, we recognize that technology and internet is not accessible to all voters. WEC staff is revising the paper Absentee Ballot Request form (EL-122) to be more user friendly and is exploring the opportunity to mail this form to every registered voter without a current absentee ballot request on file for 2020. Additional directions on how to provide a copy of a valid photo ID will be required for this mailing. Second, while hundreds of thousands of voters successfully navigated the absentee ballot request process on MyVote, the process can be improved, particularly in the areas of photo ID upload and confirmation of submission. Finally, information submitted to clerks through MyVote should not require manual data entry into the voter registration system or rely on an emailbased process for most users. WEC staff will work with clerks and voters to review new designs before implementation of these three improvements ahead of the 2020 Fall elections.
C. Mailing Process and Ballot Tracking
In its current state, the mailing process for absentee ballot requests allows each jurisdiction flexibility to approach the process in the manner that best meets their needs. As a result, there are situations that lead to less visibility of the ballot’s mailing status that may not be ideal. One potential direction for improvements in WisVote is integration of USPS Intelligent Mail Barcodes. Integrating Intelligent Mail Barcodes would allow those who use the Absentee Ballot mailing label features within WisVote to track the delivery status of the absentee ballot.
The USPS has the ability to allow WEC to generate a unique serial number from within WisVote; once the unique serial number is generated, the Absentee Ballot mailing label can be printed using a font that translates the unique number into a bar code used to identify a mail piece as election mail. The bar code also enables scanning and tracking the mail piece as it progresses through USPS facilities. For those who choose to use this function within WisVote once it is developed, clerks will be able to generate and print a label with a barcode that the USPS would then scan once the mail pieces is received at a Postal Service location. Once the mail piece is received, tracking information can be updated as frequently as every hour to track the current location and projected arrival of the mail piece.
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With tracking information provided by USPS, WEC can provide specific updates and enhanced transparency into the vote by mail process to clerks and voters. The hope is that with this addition, the number of calls and emails to clerks will be greatly reduced as voters will be able to track their ballot by accessing MyVote or receiving push notifications to an email or phone number. WEC staff is currently evaluating options for integrating this data and evaluating the effects this may have on existing clerk workflows as well as feasibility and timelines.
While evaluating these options and potential for tracking ballots and their return, we are also very cognizant of WisVote relier clerk access to this information and how reliers may be able to obtain the barcode for their mail pieces. This specific topic requires quite a bit more consideration and input from relier community clerks. WEC staff is actively pursuing input from those clerks in order to carefully assess their current workflow and any potential assistance that could be provided by the intelligent mail barcode tracking as well as any potential unintended workflow requirements that may be imposed on those reliers. Integration of tracking via the intelligent mail barcode will increase the transparency of the mailing process for absentee ballots as they are delivered to voters and as they are returned to their municipal clerk.
D. Reports and Audit Tools
Wisconsin’s voter registration system serves many purposes for clerks and voters. It maintains the list of registered voters, the set of candidates and contests assigned to specific districts, tracks absentee ballot requests and ballots, houses the data displayed to voters on MyVote, and generally facilitates the administration of elections in Wisconsin. Due to the current pandemic environment, the administration of elections is changing to occur increasingly by mail and the voter registration system must be adjusted to support that shift.
The voter registration system currently offers multiple methods to manage absentee ballot request and ballot records, originally meant to meet the needs of all sizes of communities in Wisconsin. While meant to be helpful, multiple methods can create confusion among clerk staff using different methods within an office and require WEC staff to adequately train and support all methods. As utilization of absentee voting by mail increases all across the state, WEC staff will work with clerks to identify which method to process absentee ballot requests, ballot records, and absentee address labels is best in managing high volumes of absentees and then popularize and train clerk staff on this method.
Staff intends to implement additional tracing procedures and tools to enable early detection of issues such as the batch that restarted in Milwaukee. This will give technical staff greater insight into the internal processes of WisVote beyond what it presently visible in logs and reports and give near-realtime data on system performance in a more meaningful way. In addition, some tools under WEC evaluation can provide certainty that workflows and system processes are behaving as expected after system deployment and provide staff instant notifications if a change is detected.
In response to clerk and voter feedback, WEC staff is investigating numerous methods to improve the immediacy and accuracy of user feedback. In addition to increasing user satisfaction, improved
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feedback should reduce the number of incomplete absentee applications from voters and increase confidence from both clerks and voters that requests are being correctly processed, and ballots are sent out timely. Additionally, WEC staff will create reports to help clerks manage and audit absentee ballot requests and ballots coming into and leaving their office so that they identify issues, anomalies, and ensure all requests are successfully fulfilled and tracked. WEC staff hopes to provide clerk staff the tools to monitor their data so that they can identify and resolve issues. Maintaining and verifying data in the voter registration system database enables our critical role in providing accurate information to voters. V. Conclusions The April 7, 2020 election introduced countless challenges that Wisconsin clerks successfully overcame, enabling a record number of voters to cast their ballots through the absentee process. Moreover, the final election data conclusively indicates that the election did not produce an unusual number unreturned or rejected ballots. Despite the overwhelming success of absentee voting as a whole, the experiences leading up to election day were not trouble-free and illuminated several critical areas for improvement. The absentee voting process in Wisconsin can be complex for some users and the current system favor the technically savvy. Voters and clerks would benefit from more information about the status of their absentee ballots, particularly once they enter the mail system. Finally, clerks and WEC staff need more powerful but easy-to-use tools that will enable them to quickly identify and correct problems. The 2020 CARES Act affords Wisconsin the necessary resources to implement many of these improvements, but long-term sustainment will require additional support. With adequate backing, the challenges of April 2020 should ultimately yield voters, clerks, and WEC staff a much-improved absentee voting process.
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EXHIBIT 12

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https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7.html
TOPICAL ALERT
71 people who went to the polls on April 7 got COVID-19; tie to election uncertain
David WahlberMga|yW1i6s,c2o0n2si0n State Journal
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 1/36

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TVthooewtevnrosoteaf nDadmunpidnoltrlhewesoidCrkeOenVrtsIRDwo-eb19reerpteaWnncdiloseuomrnaicgperfaediplteaodre.wsetaor vmoateskast athned ttoawken'osthheigrhpwreaycaguatrioagnse ainfttehreeAffporritls7teoledcetlaioyn. JOHN HART, STATE JOURNAL ARCHIVES
This content is being provided for free as a public service to our readers during the coronavirus outbreak. Please support local journalism by subscribing.
A total of 71 people got COVID-19 after voting in person or working at the polls during Wisconsin’s April 7 election, a state official said Friday, as two new studies present a mixed picture on whether the election contributed to the spread of the coronavirus.
The 71 figure is the “final number,” state Department of Health Services spokeswoman Jennifer Miller said. As DHS indicated earlier with previous tallies, it’s not clear how many of the infections may have been caused by the spring election because many of
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 2/36

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the people had other exposures, Miller said.

A new study by researchers at UW-Oshkosh and Ball State University, using mobile device location data from San Francisco-based SafeGraph, found that counties with more in-person voters per voting location had significantly higher rates of COVID-19 transmission after the election than counties with lower voter density.

On average, an additional 100 people per polling station doubled a county’s COVID-19 positive case test rate two to three weeks following the election, the study found. The consolidation of voting locations may have contributed to the increase in positive testing rates by increasing voter density in polling locations, the researchers said.
Counties with higher absentee voting participation had lower rates of detecting COVID-19 two to three weeks after the election, the researchers said. After removing two counties from their analysis — Brown County, which had an outbreak at a meatpacking plant in Green Bay, and Milwaukee County, where there were long lines to vote in the city of Milwaukee on Election Day — they still had the same conclusions.

“Our hypothesis suggests that in-person voting is most associated with the incidence of new COVID-19 cases through higher numbers of voters in each polling location,” the researchers wrote. “However, it is also likely that the simple number of in-person votes
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 3/36

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in a county matters as well.”

Given the results, “it may be prudent, to the extent possible, that policy makers and election clerks take steps to either expand the number of polling locations or encourage absentee voting for future elections held during the COVID-19 pandemic,” they wrote.
Different take
Another study, by researchers at the University of Hong Kong and Stanford University, found “no detectable surge” in COVID-19 from the election.

It involved an analysis to “reconstruct” the state’s coronavirus epidemic curve to look at dates of infection instead of when cases were reported. The researchers also said hospitalizations for COVID-19 in Wisconsin declined after the election.
They wrote that “there is no evidence to date that there was a surge of infections” from the election.
‘Preprintʼ studies
Both studies, like another one the Wisconsin State Journal reported on last month, are “preprint” studies that have been submitted for publication in a scientific journal but not published yet. That means the methods may not have been scrutinized as much as with published studies. Preprint studies, while controversial among scientists, have become more common, especially in research involving COVID-19.
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 4/36

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67 got COVID-19 after visiting polls in state's April 7 election but tie to
DvoatviindgWuanhclbleeragr| Wisconsin State Journal
The earlier study, led by a Milwaukee doctor, found rates of new confirmed COVID-19 cases didn’t increase in Wisconsin compared with the rest of the country after the April 7 election, though some individual cases could be tied to voting. More than 400,000 state residents voted in person April 7, with 1.1 million more casting absentee ballots. Prior to the election, Democratic Gov. Tony Evers and Republican legislative leaders initially agreed in-person voting should go on. But Evers the day before the election pushed the vote back to June, a move the Supreme Court struck down hours later.
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 5/36

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DNaovbiduWmaphlibneCrgO|VWIDis-c1o9nrsainteSstaatfeteJroWurnisacl onsin's April 7 election, study says

Many have wondered whether in-person voting increased the spread of the coronavirus, especially in Green Bay and Milwaukee, which had few polling stations that drew long lines of people.
In another election Tuesday in northern Wisconsin’s 7th Congressional district, 48% voted absentee, down from 56% who voted absentee in the district April 7, according to the Associated Press. Republican state Sen. Tom Tiffany won the race.
State health officials haven’t tracked whether COVID-19 cases may have resulted from an April 24 protest at the state Capitol against Gov. Tony Evers’ extended “safer at home” order, which the Supreme Court struck down this week. The gathering drew an estimated 1,500 people.

https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 6/36

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Of nearly 2,000 cases of COVID-19 with an onset or diagnosis after April 26, 72

involved people who said they had attended a large gathering, which may have

included the protest, DHS said last week.

Election Day with COVID-19

TgoawrangeofTDueusndnarye.sVidoetenrtsRaonbderptoWll iwlsoornkerresviwewerseheinscsoeuleracgtieodnstoonwehaisrbmaallsoktswahnildetvaokteinogthaetrthperetcoawunti'osnhsigahfwteary efforts to delay the vote amid the COVID-19 pandemic failed.
JOHN HART, STATE JOURNAL Election Day with COVID-19
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 7/36

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 22 Filed 06/09/20 Page 1 of 40

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of MN Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill

Court File No. 20-cv-01205

Plaintiffs,

vs.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

Defendant.

Defendant Steve Simon (“Defendant”), in his official capacity as Secretary of State
for the State of Minnesota, by and through his counsel, the Office of the Minnesota Attorney
General, hereby Answers Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief as follows: Except as hereinafter expressly admitted, qualified, denied, or otherwise answered,
Defendant denies each and every allegation in the Complaint. 1. Minnesotans take pride in having built what is, in many ways, a thriving
democracy. Minnesota’s voter turnout routinely tops the nationwide rankings. The state provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters, while successfully protecting its elections from fraud and maintaining public trust in the system.
ANSWER: Admit. 2. However, the nationwide outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID19”) poses a serious threat to the health of American elections. Minnesota is not

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immune. In fact, Minnesota’s election system includes a feature that makes it especially vulnerable to the risk of suppressed voter participation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ANSWER: Defendant admits that COVID-19 presents a public health crisis that requires measures to minimize public exposure in a variety of settings, including elections. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
3. To vote by absentee ballot in Minnesota, a voter must fill out the ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. Requiring a witness for absentee voting places Minnesota in a small minority of states. Moreover, Minnesota imposes unusually restrictive limits on who may serve as a witness for absentee voting. Only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths may play this role.
ANSWER: Defendant admits the allegations in the first and fourth sentences, and denies the allegations in the second and third sentences.
4. Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election will be conducted under extraordinary circumstances. At the urging of health experts and their own governmental leaders, millions of Minnesotans—especially senior citizens and those with underlying health conditions—are avoiding contact with people outside their households to slow the spread of COVID-19. Under current state law, absentee voting will require voters to violate this social distancing protocol, unless they happen to live with someone who can serve as a witness.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
2

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5. Minnesotans’ constitutional right to vote cannot be conditioned on their willingness to subject themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19. This is particularly true when the state law forcing voters to interact in person with witnesses is, at best, minimally useful to the state.
ANSWER: Deny. 6. Moreover, even in ordinary times, Minnesota’s restrictive qualifications on who can serve as a witness to an absentee ballot severely burden many Minnesota voters and are not tailored to any state interest. Absentee voting processes are often used because a voter will not be in the state on Election Day. For such voters, finding a Minnesota registered voter witness is obviously a challenge. Minnesota registered voters are not uniquely qualified to attest to a person’s identity; indeed, Minnesota is the only state with such a restrictive stance on who can serve as a witness to a ballot. ANSWER: Deny. Defendant affirmatively states that the witness requirement does not apply to Minnesota military voters or voters living abroad. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.16-.24. 7. Plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s unduly restrictive qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness. ANSWER: Defendant admits that Plaintiffs seek this relief, and denies Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization of Minnesota’s witness requirements.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ANSWER: Admit. 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Steve Simon, who resides and maintains his office in this District. ANSWER: Admit. 10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant resides in this District and because the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District. ANSWER: Defendant admits that venue is proper. 11. This Court has jurisdiction to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. ANSWER: Admit.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 12. Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (“LWVMN”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and is an affiliate of the League of Women Voters of the United States. LWVMN encourages informed and active participation in government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public policy through education and advocacy. LWVMN has approximately 2,200 members
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throughout Minnesota. These members, like all Americans, have all had their daily lives altered by COVID-19. Most, if not all, of these members are adhering to strict social distancing protocols to avoid contracting the coronavirus. Many of LWVMN’s members are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 either due to their age or other underlying health conditions. Others live in households with individuals particularly vulnerable to COVID19. Some of these members live by themselves or live in households that do not include another registered Minnesota voter. Thus, some of LWVMN’s members are registered voters who, under current law, will face a choice between risking their health in order to vote or not voting at all because of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting. LWVMN has diverted resources, and will continue to divert resources, away from its core activities in order to educate voters about the witness requirement and, to the extent possible, help them comply.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
13. Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill is a registered voter in Woodbury, Minnesota. She serves as Advocacy Chair of LWVMN and is a member of both LWVMN and the Woodbury-Cottage Grove Area chapter of the League of Women Voters. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. She has lived in Minnesota since she was seven years old, when her family moved from Birmingham, Alabama. As a Black woman who spent her early childhood in the Jim Crow South, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill remembers her mother telling her about schemes of disenfranchisement, from poll taxes to literacy tests written in foreign languages. Shortly
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after moving to Minnesota, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. These early experiences impressed upon Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. As an adult, she has voted regularly. Although she usually votes in person, she plans to vote by absentee ballot in upcoming elections including those scheduled for August and November 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill has previously had heart surgery, and lives with underlying health conditions that place her at an elevated risk of becoming severely ill if she contracts COVID-19. She fears contracting and spreading COVID-19 if she is forced to interact with another person in order to vote.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
Defendant 14. Defendant Steve Simon (“Secretary Simon” or “Defendant”) is the Secretary of State of Minnesota and is sued in his official capacity. Secretary Simon plays a central role in administering and overseeing Minnesota elections. Secretary Simon is responsible for compiling and publishing Minnesota’s general election laws and has the power to issue “detailed written instructions” to local officials “for complying with election laws relating to the conduct of elections, conduct of voter registration and voting procedures.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. More specifically, Secretary Simon is required to adopt legally binding rules “establishing procedures to be followed by county auditors and municipal clerks to assure accurate and timely return of absentee ballots,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 4, “establishing the form, content, and type size
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and style for the printing of blank applications for absentee ballots, absentee voter lists, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility to vote by absentee ballot, ballot envelopes, and directions for casting an absentee ballot,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.09, and governing “the conduct of mail balloting,” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.
ANSWER: Defendant admits that he is the chief election office for the State of Minnesota and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant affirmatively states that his authority and responsibilities are set forth in Minnesota Statutes, chapters 200 to 212, and denies any allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with those chapters.
FACTS Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota, Especially During the
COVID-19 Pandemic 15. Any eligible voter in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1. Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45. ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes. 16. Officials at the state and local levels participate in administering absentee voting. The Secretary of State coordinates absentee voting statewide by promulgating rules to establish uniform procedures and prescribe standard forms for printed materials including ballot envelopes, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility, and instructions to
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voters. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08; Minn. Stat. § 203B.09; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.; see also Minn. R. 8210.0500 (form instructions to absentee voters, promulgated by the Secretary); Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a (form instructions to voters in mail elections, promulgated by the Secretary). County auditors and municipal clerks administer absentee voting locally by, inter alia, printing the necessary materials, accepting absentee ballot applications, providing ballots to eligible voters, receiving voted ballots, and delivering those ballots to the local ballot board for acceptance or rejection. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.05-203B.08, 203B.121, 204B.45. In printing materials for absentee voting, local officials must follow precisely the forms prescribed by the Secretary of State. Minn.Stat. § 203B.09.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes.
17. Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2.
ANSWER: Admit. 18. In Minnesota’s 2020 elections, access to absentee voting will be substantially more important than it has been in the state’s past elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations to the extent it requires him to speculate about conditions in the future.
19. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, spreads easily through respiratory droplets. The virus can also be transmitted through contact with contaminated surfaces. Health experts agree that to minimize the chance of contracting COVID-19, it is important for individuals to maintain at least six feet of distance between themselves and others outside their household.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
20. COVID-19 causes severe illness in many patients. Among infected individuals, COVID-19 is, by conservative estimates, several times more likely to cause death than seasonal influenza. Individuals over age 65 and those with certain underlying health conditions are at heightened risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID19.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
21. As of May 18, 2020, there have been 1,480,349 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 89,407 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Minnesota has had 16,372 confirmed cases and 739 deaths. These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 victims, given limitations in testing.
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ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
22. Although COVID-19 infection rates may decline over the next few months, subsequent resurgences of the disease in Minnesota and throughout the U.S. are likely to occur in 2020 and 2021. Widespread abandonment or relaxation of social distancing behavior would likely lead to a spike in COVID-19 transmission.
ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations to the extent they require him to speculate about conditions in the future.
23. The Food and Drug Administration has not approved any medication for treatment of COVID-19. While numerous experimental treatments are under investigation, none has been proven safe and effective.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies
24. There is no vaccine for COVID-19, nor is a vaccine likely to become widely available before the November 2020 general election.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
25. Individuals who currently feel and look healthy may nonetheless be contagious carriers of COVID-19. The median incubation period for COVID-19—the length of time between exposure and onset of symptoms—is approximately four to five days. For some individuals, the incubation period may be as long as fourteen days. In some documented cases, individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 never develop
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symptoms. Infected individuals have been observed to transmit the virus to others while not experiencing symptoms.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
26. Many U.S. residents without COVID-19 symptoms are unable to access testing to determine whether they currently have COVID-19.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
27. Recognizing the need for social distancing in order to reduce the spread of COVID-19, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities. In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people, requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.”
ANSWER: Defendant admits that the Governor issued the executive order but denies that it is the “current” order.
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28. Given the poor public health conditions, in-person voting at the same levels as ordinary elections will not be safe in upcoming elections, particularly for those most vulnerable to COVID-19.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
29. The danger of large-scale in-person voting during the COVID-19 pandemic is illustrated by the Wisconsin presidential primary election held April 7, 2020, which drew more than 400,000 in-person voters, owing in part to the state’s failure to provide absentee ballots with sufficient time for many voters to return them. At least 67 people have tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary. In Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later. An analysis by university economists has preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
30. Absentee voting represents the best option for most Minnesota voters to participate safely in the 2020 elections. Defendant Simon himself has recognized this
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reality, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” This statement accords with guidance from the CDC, which recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic.
ANSWER: Admit. 31. Like many Minnesota voters, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill intends to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections because she fears contracting and/or spreading COVID-19 if she votes in person. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 32. Other members of LWVMN similarly depend on absentee voting for effective access to the franchise in 2020, given the unacceptable health risks associated with voting in person during the pandemic. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
33. Unfortunately, Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedures do not provide an adequate solution to the problem of conducting inclusive elections without forcing voters to violate social distancing requirements. Specifically, Minnesota law compels each absentee voter to interact in person with a witness who must be a registered
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Minnesota voter, notary, or other person authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0710; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with those statutes and rules.
34. Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure means that voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to give oaths face a choice: they can vote in the upcoming elections, or they can comply with social distancing best practices to avoid contracting or spreading COVID-19. They cannot reasonably do both.
ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations to the extent they require him to speculate about what social distancing best practices will be when the elections are held.
35. Each absentee voter in Minnesota receives an envelope on which a blank certificate is printed (“Signature Envelope”). To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers, and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
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36. The certificate on the Signature Envelope also contains a statement that must be signed by a witness. In addition to signing, the witness must write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules.
37. The witness statement always requires the witness to certify that at least four conditions were met.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the relevant statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
38. First, the witness certifies that “the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
39. Second, the witness certifies that “the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
40. Third, the witness certifies that “the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
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ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
41. Fourth, the witness certifies, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. Although this form certificate language promulgated by the Secretary of State is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added).
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
42. Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
43. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 1. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for non-registered
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absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 2. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 3.
ANSWER: Admit. 44. In addition to receiving a Signature Envelope with a form certificate, each absentee voter receives printed instructions. The form instructions, promulgated by the Secretary of State, reiterate that a witness must sign the certificate, affix a notary stamp if applicable, and provide a Minnesota street address or official title. Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a. ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules. 45. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 4. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 5. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for voters in mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 6. ANSWER: Admit. 46. After a voter submits an absentee ballot, the local ballot board determines, inter alia, whether “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions” provided to the voter. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2); see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (clarifying that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law
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governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). If the certificate is not completed as prescribed by the directions—for example, if the witness signature is missing—the ballot is rejected, and the voter is notified of the rejection. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
47. Because of the required signed witness statement, an absentee voter in Minnesota must have a witness physically present while marking and sealing the ballot.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and rules and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes and rules.
48. It is difficult or impossible for the voter and witness to maintain a constant distance of at least six feet between them throughout the voting process. Moreover, the voter and witness must touch the same Signature Envelope in order to sign the certificate.
ANSWER: Admit. 49. The voter-witness interaction required by Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure constitutes a violation of recommended social distancing and creates a substantial risk of COVID-19 transmission, unless the voter and witness already live together. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 50. To give a conservative estimate, there are likely hundreds of thousands of
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registered Minnesota voters who do not live with another registered voter or a person authorized to give oaths.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
51. According to 2018 data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, about 26 percent of voting-age Minnesota residents, and about 37 percent of those over age 65, live alone. Minnesota has almost 3.4 million registered voters. If the rate of living alone is approximately the same for Minnesota’s registered-voter population as for its total adult population, then Minnesota has roughly 884,000 registered voters who live alone.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
52. Even among voters who do not live alone, there are many who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to administer oaths. This includes individuals that live only with minors, live in mixed-citizenship status households, or simply live with others that choose not to vote.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
53. Upon information and belief, if Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place for the 2020 elections, many eligible voters will be deterred from voting because they reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19.
ANSWER: Defendant admits that COVID-19 may deter voters.
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54. Meanwhile, other voters—potentially numbering in the hundreds of thousands—will interact with witnesses outside their household in order to cast absentee ballots. Some of these interactions will lead to transmission of COVID-19. Voters, witnesses, and third parties who come into contact with them may become severely ill or die from COVID-19 cases traceable to absentee voting interactions.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
55. LWVMN has numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote and live alone. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is one such member.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
56. LWVMN’s membership also includes numerous registered Minnesota voters who do not live alone, but do not live with another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
57. LWVMN has had to divert resources away from its core activities, such as voter registration drives and candidate forums, because of the witness requirement for absentee voting.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
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58. In response to requests from its chapters across the state and its own assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause unprecedented demand for absentee ballots, LWVMN has begun to develop a communications campaign to educate voters about the process for voting by absentee ballot. A major purpose of this anticipated communications campaign is to inform voters that absentee voting requires a witness, and that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths. If not for the witness requirement, LWVMN would not need to spend the amount of time, money, and other resources it now plans to spend on educating voters about the absentee voting process.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
59. LWVMN has also devoted significant time and energy to developing ideas and plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the pandemic. LWVMN is considering developing a program in which voters can request and be connected with eligible witnesses. However, such a program would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to implement. LWVMN has no existing infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses. Moreover, LWVMN anticipates that individuals who are willing and able to serve as witnesses in such a program will be scarce, since many individuals will reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19 if they serve as witnesses.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
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60. As the 2020 primary and general elections approach, LWVMN will need to devote more resources toward educating voters about the witness requirement and helping them obtain witnesses to the extent possible. This increased diversion of resources comes at the busiest possible time for LWVMN—during the immediate lead-up to a presidential election.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
61. Moreover, LWVMN serves as the primary nonprofit facilitating voter registration at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota, assisting many new American citizens to register in Minnesota each year. Many naturalized citizens live in mixed immigration status households where they may be the only adult citizen (and thus only eligible voter). LWVMN has a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot. But under Minnesota’s restrictive eligibility requirements for witnesses to absentee ballots, many such citizens may be unable to do so without violating social distancing protocols.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud
62. Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting produces no benefit remotely on par with the severe burden it places on voters during the COVID-19 pandemic. While Minnesota has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the
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appearance of fraud in elections, the marginal effect of the witness requirement as an anti-fraud measure is minimal at best.
ANSWER: Deny. 63. Minnesota has no significant history of fraud in absentee voting. ANSWER: Admit. 64. Minnesota’s experience with absentee voting is consistent with the experience of other states. Throughout the U.S., absentee voting fraud is rare. A comprehensive nationwide analysis found 491 cases of absentee voting fraud from 2000 to 2012—a miniscule fraction of all absentee ballots cast during that period. Any given American is more likely to be struck by lightning than to cast a fraudulent absentee ballot. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 65. Most states achieve the same result as Minnesota—no meaningful amount of absentee voting fraud—without requiring a signed witness statement. Minnesota is one of only twelve states where the normal absentee voting process involves a witness or notary. Two of the other eleven—Virginia and Rhode Island—have voluntarily waived or modified their witness requirements for 2020.15 There is no evidence that states without witness requirements have more absentee voting fraud than states with such requirements. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
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66. Minnesota law provides robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud other than requiring voters to obtain a signed witness statement.
ANSWER: Defendant admits that Minnesota law provides safeguards against voting fraud.
67. Under Minnesota law, it is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes.
68. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014.
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ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes.
69. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statutes.
70. In the unlikely event that a fraudulent absentee ballot were submitted despite the harsh criminal penalties for doing so, that ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to extensive verification procedures along with all other absentee ballots.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the relevant rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
71. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for determining whether to accept or reject each absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before being accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining each absentee ballot must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
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ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
72. First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
73. Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected. . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
74. Third, the ballot board members check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3.
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ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
75. Fourth, the ballot board members verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
76. Fifth, the ballot board members check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
77. Importantly, the ballot board does not check to determine whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
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78. Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules and statutes and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the rules and statutes.
79. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited rules statute and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statute.
80. Given the rarity of absentee voting fraud, the harsh criminal penalties for committing such fraud, and the existence of numerous verification steps that are at least as likely—if not more so—to ferret out fraud, it is highly unlikely that any pattern of voter fraud would result if the witness requirement were suspended for the 2020 elections. This modest accommodation for the COVID-19 pandemic would not cause the Minnesota electorate to lose confidence in the integrity of the absentee voting system.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications For Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless
81. Beyond the particular burdens posed by the COVID-19 crisis, Minnesota’s
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witness signature requirement—limiting the pool of qualified witnesses to registered Minnesota voters, notaries, and other individuals authorized to administer oaths—is unduly restrictive.
ANSWER: Deny. 82. Among the twelve states that require a witness for absentee voting, Minnesota is the only one that permits its own registered voters to serve as witnesses but generally prohibits other adults from playing that role. Eight of the twelve states allow any adult to witness an absentee ballot, sometimes subject to narrow exceptions such as prohibitions on candidates serving as witnesses. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 83. By requiring that a witness be registered to vote in Minnesota (if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths), the state excludes many groups of potential witnesses who are not categorically any less trustworthy than registered Minnesota voters: for example, lawful permanent residents and other non-U.S. citizens; military personnel who are stationed in Minnesota but vote elsewhere; residents of other states; and those who simply exercise their constitutional right not to vote. ANSWER: To the extent the allegations contain legal conclusions, no response is required. 84. U.S. citizenship is not required to become a notary public. By allowing notaries to witness absentee ballots, Minnesota repudiates any notion that individuals
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cannot be trusted as witnesses if they do not meet the eligibility criteria for registering to vote in Minnesota (e.g., if they are non-U.S. citizens).
ANSWER: Defendant admits the first sentence and denies the second sentence. 85. Minnesota’s law generally excluding non-Minnesota voters from serving as absentee ballot witnesses does not serve any important state interest. Indeed, in verifying absentee ballots, local ballot boards are not even permitted to reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5. ANSWER: Defendant denies the first sentence. For the second sentence, Defendant refers to the cited rule and denies the allegation to the extent it is consistent with the rule. 86. In other words, the ballot-verification process already is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter. Yet, the state saddles voters with the burden of seeking out a registered Minnesota voter, or else finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths. ANSWER: Deny. 87. Finding another registered voter who is both willing and qualified to serve as a witness is a significant burden for many Minnesota voters. This includes voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter—including those who live alone or live in mixed immigration status households—and are practicing social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also includes voters who temporarily live away from Minnesota, such as students attending college out of state. Indeed, a major reason voters
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choose to cast absentee ballots is because they are out of the state on Election Day. For those voters, this requirement is very burdensome.
ANSWER: Deny. 88. In past election cycles, Minnesotans living out of state have resorted to posting on social media, seeking to meet strangers in their vicinity who are fellow Minnesota voters and can witness absentee ballots. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 89. For voters who cannot find another Minnesota voter to witness an absentee ballot, the option to seek out a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths is also burdensome. Notaries typically charge for their services. Moreover, simply finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths may be difficult, especially in certain rural areas. This difficulty is only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. ANSWER: Defendant admits that the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates any difficulties finding a witness. Defendant otherwise lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations about notaries, and therefore denies the allegations. 90. Even before the pandemic, the requirement to have each absentee ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths has prevented a significant number of Minnesotans from casting absentee ballots and having those ballots counted. In the 2018 election, 1,336 ballots were rejected in Minnesota for failure to comply with the state’s witness requirement,
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according to data from the Election Administration and Voting Survey conducted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. This number is likely dwarfed by the unknown number of Minnesotans who never returned absentee ballots in 2018 because it was not reasonably possible for them to find a qualified witness.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
91. Numerous members of LWVMN—including some who live or have lived temporarily outside of Minnesota—have had trouble finding witnesses for their absentee ballots because of Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
92. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of LWVMN voters experiencing this burden—and the magnitude of the burden on each such voter—will substantially increase. LWVMN expects that it will need to divert resources away from its core activities to educate voters about the qualifications for witnesses, and to help voters connect with qualified witnesses to the extent possible.
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)
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93. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 92. ANSWER: Defendant repeats his previous answers. 94. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited case law and denies any allegations inconsistent with the case law. 95. As applied to elections conducted during the pendency of the coronavirus pandemic, including those in August and November 2020, Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote because it forces voters to choose between exercising the franchise and violating social distancing guidelines, thus exposing themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19. ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegation because it requires him to speculate about guidelines and conditions several months from now.
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96. Minnesota has no interest sufficient to justify maintaining the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Although preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud is a legitimate state interest, that interest can be fully vindicated without the witness requirement. Absentee voting fraud is rare, in Minnesota and throughout the United States. Minnesota already has robust safeguards unrelated to the witness requirement, including a multi-step ballot verification process that includes matching personally identifying numbers and other information and also imposes steep criminal penalties for fraud. Any interest the state has in its witness signature requirement is too slight to justify the severe burden imposed by applying the requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ANSWER: Defendant admits that absentee voting fraud is rare and that Minnesota has a multi-step process that safeguards against fraud. The remaining allegations are legal conclusions for which no response is required.
97. The witness requirement therefore constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to voters for the duration of the pandemic, including during Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election.
ANSWER: The allegations are legal conclusions for which no response is required.
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Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications In Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 98. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 97. ANSWER: Defendant repeats the previous answers. 99. Under Minnesota law, only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary public, or another individual authorized to administer oaths may serve as a witness for an absentee ballot. ANSWER: Defendant refers to the relevant statute and denies the allegation to the extent it is inconsistent with the statute. 100. Regardless of the public health conditions, these restrictions on who may serve as a witness impose a significant—and in some cases severe—burden on Minnesota voters. Especially for Minnesotans who temporarily live out of state, it can be difficult or impossible to find another registered Minnesota voter who is willing and able to serve as a ballot witness. ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny, and therefore denies. 101. If a voter fails to find another registered Minnesota voter, she must seek out a notary or other individual authorized to administer oaths. It may be difficult or impossible to find such an individual. Moreover, if the only witness available is a notary, the voter will ordinarily need to pay a fee to have her Signature Envelope notarized.
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ANSWER: Defendant refers to Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, which establishes the witness requirement, and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the statute.
102. Minnesota derives no appreciable benefit from excluding from the pool of potential witnesses all adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or persons authorized to give oaths. Minnesota registered voters are not categorically more trustworthy than other competent adults.
ANSWER: Defendant denies the first sentence and admits the second. 103. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they prevent Minnesota voters from having their absentee ballots witnessed by competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths. ANSWER: Deny.
Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 104. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 103. ANSWER: Defendant repeats his previous answers. 105. Minnesota’s qualifications for absentee ballot witnesses discriminate between U.S. citizens and otherwise similarly situated non-U.S. citizens. A U.S. citizen may register to vote in Minnesota (assuming she meets certain other qualifications),
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Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1, and then may witness absentee ballots. A non-U.S. citizen cannot register to vote, id., and therefore cannot witness absentee ballots unless she becomes a notary or otherwise becomes authorized to administer oaths.
ANSWER: Defendant denies the first sentence. As to the second and third sentences, Defendant refers to the relevant laws for registering to vote and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with those laws.
106. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law that discriminates against non-U.S. citizens generally “can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). This general rule is subject to only “a narrow exception”: strict scrutiny does not apply when a state bars non-U.S. citizens from serving in “positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.” Id. at 220. To determine whether this exception applies, the Court must focus its inquiry on whether the position in question is “such that the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discretionary power over the formulation or execution of public policies importantly affecting the citizen population—power of the sort that a self-governing community could properly entrust only to full-fledged members of that community.” Id. at 224.
ANSWER: Defendant refers to the cited case law and denies the allegations to the extent they are inconsistent with the case law.
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107. Serving as a witness for an absentee ballot is not a position intimately related to democratic self-governance. It is a “clerical and ministerial” function. Id. at 225. The Court therefore must apply strict scrutiny to Minnesota’s requirement that a witness, if not a notary or otherwise authorized to administer oaths, be a registered Minnesota voter and thus a U.S. citizen.
ANSWER: Deny. 108. This citizenship requirement burdens individuals living in mixed immigration status households and individuals living in immigrant communities overall. ANSWER: Deny. 109. This citizenship requirement does not serve any compelling state interest. ANSWER: Deny. 110. To the extent the citizenship requirement for witnesses (besides notaries and other persons authorized to administer oaths) serves any state interest, it is not the least restrictive means to achieve such interest. ANSWER: Deny. 111. Indeed, the citizenship requirement fails even the rational-basis test. There is no rational reason why Minnesota registered voters are more trustworthy witnesses than other competent adults. Moreover, the verification system for absentee ballots does not even verify that the witness is a Minnesota registered voter. This only further belies the lack of state interest in imposing this requirement. ANSWER: Deny.
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112. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore facially violate the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they discriminate between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve as a witness.
ANSWER: Deny.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 2. Defendant was not the cause in fact of any of Plaintiffs’ alleged deprivations. 3. To the extent Plaintiffs seek relief other than injunctive or declaratory relief, the claims are barred because Defendant has immunity from damages and Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for damages against Defendant. 4. Defendant reserves the right to supplement or amend his affirmative defenses as the case progresses.

Dated: June 9, 2020

KEITH ELLISON Attorney General State of Minnesota
s/ Jason Marisam JASON MARISAM Assistant Attorney General Atty. Reg. No. 0398187
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128 (651) 757-1275 (Voice) (651) 282-5832 (Fax) jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS BY DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA
Movants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National

Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, seek to intervene as defendants in

this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and (b). This motion is

accompanied by a memorandum of law that explains why Movants are entitled to

intervention as of right and permissive intervention. For the reasons in that

memorandum, Movants respectfully ask this Court to grant their motion.

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Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.
[PROPOSED] ANSWER BY [PROPOSED] INTERVENORDEFENDANTS DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC.,
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA
Proposed Intervenor Defendants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the

Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, submit this

proposed answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1).

INTRODUCTION 1. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota is a State with

high voter turnout and provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters while

taking steps to protect against fraud and maintaining public trust in the system.

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2. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 poses a serious health risk to some people but deny that it justifies departures from Minnesota laws that protect election integrity.
3. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota law requires voters to have their ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths.
4. Denied. Although COVID-19 poses a serious health risk to some people, the witnessing requirement does not require any unsafe or unreasonable actions by voters.
5. This paragraph consists of legal conclusions to which no response is required.
6. Denied. Minnesota’s witnessing requirement protects the integrity of elections and fosters public trust.
7. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Plaintiffs seek the requested relief but deny that they are entitled to it.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. 10. Admitted. 11. Admitted.
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PARTIES Plaintiffs
12. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
13. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
14. Admitted. FACTS
Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota, Especially During the COVID-19 Pandemic
15. The referenced authorities speak for themselves. 16. The referenced authorities speak for themselves. 17. Admitted. 18. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that some voters may choose to vote absentee because of concerns related to COVID-19, but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph. 19. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 can be transmitted, but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph. 20. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 causes severe illness in some people. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed
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Intervenor-Defendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
21. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
22. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
23. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
24. Proposed Intervenor-Defendant admit there is no vaccine available today for COVID-19 but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
25. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
26. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
27. The cited orders speak for themselves. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants note that Minnesota is now in Phase III of its reopening plan, meaning the State deems it safe to visit (with social-distancing practices) retail stores, gyms, daycares, schools, churches, restaurants, bars, and other venues, and to attend outdoor gatherings of 25 people or less and indoor gatherings of 10 people or less.
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28. Denied. 29. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants admit that Wisconsin conducted an election on April 9 but deny that it demonstrates that voting—including witness-signature requirements—cannot be conducted in a reasonable and safe manner. 30. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants admit that absentee voting is available in Minnesota. 31. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 32. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
33. The cited authorities speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise deny this allegation.
34. Denied. 35. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 36. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 37. Admitted. 38. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 39. The cited authorities speak for themselves.
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40. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 41. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 42. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 43. Admitted. 44. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 45. Admitted. 46. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 47. The cited authority speaks for itself. 48. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that a voter and witness cannot safely complete the absentee ballot procedure while observing social distancing. 49. Denied. 50. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 51. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 52. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 53. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 54. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
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55. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
56. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
57. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
58. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
59. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
60. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
61. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud 62. Denied. 63. Denied. There are multiple and recent examples of criminal cases charging individuals with absentee ballot fraud in Minnesota.
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64. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants deny that the States lack any interest in maintaining ballot integrity but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
65. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that voting requirements vary from State to State but deny that the States lack any interest in maintaining ballot integrity. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
66. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota law provides other measures of ballot integrity but deny any implication that the witness-signature requirement is unreasonable or unnecessary.
67. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 68. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 69. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 70. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that absentee ballots are reviewed by election officials when submitted but deny any implication that the witness-signature requirement is unreasonable or unnecessary. 71. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 72. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 73. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 74. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 75. The cited authorities speak for themselves.
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76. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 77. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 78. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 79. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 80. Denied.
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications for Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless 81. Denied. 82. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that voting laws vary from State to State but deny that Minnesota allows only registered voters to serve as witnesses; Minnesota law also permits absentee ballots to be witnessed by notaries or persons authorized to administer oaths. 83. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that in order to advance public trust and voter integrity, Minnesota has reasonably chosen to limit the categories of individuals who may serve as witnesses for absentee ballots but deny that this reflects a judgment of the general trustworthiness of other individuals. 84. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that notaries need not be U.S. citizens but otherwise deny the implication that Minnesota’s absentee ballot procedures are unreasonable. 85. The cited authorities speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise deny this allegation.
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86. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that “the ballot-verification process is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter” or that the ballot-witnessing requirement presents an unreasonable burden.
87. Denied. 88. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 89. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that the ballot-witnessing requirement presents an unreasonable burden but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 90. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 91. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 92. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)
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93. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 92.
94. The cited authorities speak for themselves; this paragraph otherwise sets forth a legal conclusion to which no response is required.
95. Denied. 96. Denied. 97. Denied.
Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 98. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 97. 99. Admitted. 100. Denied. 101. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota absentee-ballot voters must have their ballot witnessed by another registered voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths, but deny that this presents an unreasonable burden. 102. Denied. 103. Denied.
Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in
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Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
104. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 103.
105. Proposed-Intervenor Defendants deny that Minnesota’s ballot-witnessing requirements unlawfully discriminate.
106. The cited authorities speak for themselves; this paragraph otherwise sets forth a legal conclusion to which no response is required.
107. Denied. 108. Denied. 109. Denied. 110. Denied. 111. Denied.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to their requested relief.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 1. The allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim for relief. 2. The allegations in the Complaint are unripe and too remote and speculative to support equitable relief. 3. The Counts are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of abstention.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 13 of 13

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS BY DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA The Court should allow Movants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the
Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, to intervene
as defendants in this case. As the Democratic Party recently observed, “political parties
usually have good cause to intervene in disputes over election rules.” Issa v. Newsom,
Doc. 23 at 2, No. 2:20-cv-01044-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2020). That is why, in
the recent spate of litigation over COVID-19, the Democratic and Republican parties

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 14
have been granted intervention every time they’ve moved for it.* This Court should do
the same here for two independent reasons.
First, Movants satisfy the criteria for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
Their motion is timely; the complaint was filed barely a month ago, this litigation is still
in its infancy, and no party will be prejudiced by intervention at this early stage. Movants
also have a clear interest in protecting their candidates, voters, and resources from the
parties’ last-minute attempt to fundamentally alter Minnesota election law. Finally, no
other party adequately represents Movants’ interests. The existing Defendants have
demonstrated an unwillingness to defend the law, as evidenced by the consent decree.
Movants’ intervention will provide the only adversarial testing of that decree—and likely
the rest of the case.
Second, and alternatively, the Court should grant Movants’ permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b). Again, this motion is timely. Movants’ defenses share
* See, e.g., Issa v. Newsom, 2020 WL 3074351, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (granting intervention to the DCCC and the Democratic Party of California); Nielsen v. DeSantis, Doc. 101, No. 4:20-cv-236-RH (N.D. Fla. May 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican National Committee, NRCC, and Republican Party of Florida); Priorities USA v. Nessel, 2020 WL 2615504, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Michigan); Thomas v. Andino, 2020 WL 2306615, at *4 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020) (granting intervention to the South Carolina Republican Party); Corona v. Cegavske, Order Granting Mot. to Intervene, No. CV 20-OC644-1B (Nev. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Nevada Republican Party); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, Doc. 57, No. 6:20-cv-24NKM (W.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican Party of Virginia); Paher v. Cegavske, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (granting intervention to four Democratic Party entities); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1505640, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Wisconsin); Gear v. Knudson, Doc. 58, No. 3:20-cv-278 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020) (same); Lewis v. Knudson, Doc. 63, No. 3:20-cv-284 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020) (same).
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common questions of law and fact with the existing parties, and intervention will result in no delay or prejudice. The Court’s resolution of the important questions here will have significant implications for Movants as they work to ensure that candidates and voters have the undeterred opportunity to participate in fair elections, both in the August primary and the November election.
Whether under Rule 24(a)(2) or (b), Movants should be allowed to intervene as defendants.
INTERESTS OF PROPOSED INTERVENORS Movants are a political campaign and political committees who support Republicans in Minnesota. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., is the principal committee for President Donald J. Trump’s reelection campaign. The Republican National Committee is a national committee as defined by 52 U.S.C. §30101. It manages the Republican Party’s business at the national level, supports Republican candidates for public office at all levels, coordinates fundraising and election strategy, and develops and promotes the national Republican platform. The Republican Party of Minnesota is a recognized political party that works to promote Republican values and to assist Republican candidates in obtaining election to partisan federal, state, and local office. All three Movants have interests—their own and those of their members—in the rules governing Minnesota elections.
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ARGUMENT I. Movants are entitled to intervene as of right.
Rule 24 is “liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor.” South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 24(a)(2), this Court must grant intervention as of right if:
1. The motion is timely; 2. Movants have a legally protected interest in this action; 3. This action may impair or impede that interest; and 4. No existing party adequately represents Movants’ interests. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2014). Movants satisfy each of these requirements. A. The motion is timely. The Court considers four factors in determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene: (1) the progress of the litigation at the time of the motion; (2) the prospective intervenor’s prior knowledge of the action; (3) the reason for any delay in seeking intervention; and (4) the likelihood of prejudice to the parties. United States v. Ritchie Special Credit Investments, Ltd., 620 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2010). These factors all favor Movants. Movants filed this motion early—only one month after the complaint was filed and a week after the answer. See e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012) (motion filed over one year after the answer was timely); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (D.S.D. 2011) (motion filed over one month after complaint was “early” and therefore timely); S.D. Farm Bureau,
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38 Filed 06/20/20 Page 5 of 14
Inc. v. South Dakota, 189 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D.S.D. 1999) (motion filed three months after complaint was timely). This litigation has not substantially progressed—briefing on the preliminary-injunction stopped, the court has made no substantive rulings, and the parties proposed the consent decree only four days ago. See, e.g., Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. at 429 (motion filed after the court had ruled on a motion to dismiss was timely); Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 939 (motion filed after court had granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was timely); S.D. Farm Bureau, 189 F.R.D. at 563 (motion filed before any substantive briefing was timely). Movants entered this litigation by filing their emergency motion to continue immediately after learning of the consent decree and securing counsel, followed directly by this motion to intervene. See Taylor v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 251 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2001) (motion filed eleven days after proposed intervenors learned of an injunction was timely).
Nor will Movants’ intervention prejudice the parties. The parties’ proposed consent decree weighs in favor of granting intervention. “Prejudice that results from the mere fact that a proposed intervenor opposes one’s position and may be unwilling to settle always exists when a party with an adverse interest seeks intervention.” United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995). Yet that kind of “prejudice” does not factor into the analysis because “Rule 24(a) protects precisely this ability to intervene in litigation to protect one’s interests.” Id. Therefore, “the court [should] not consider any delay in entry of the Consent Decree because the intervenors oppose its entry as presenting any bar to intervention.” Id.; see also EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921
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F.2d 1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court’s denial of intervention because “the existence of the proposed consent decree resulted in a change in circumstances that made a renewed motion for intervention legitimate”).
If Movants are not allowed to intervene, however, their interests in this case will be irreparably harmed by the consent decree that suspends Minnesota law in the upcoming August primary. Their motion is thus timely.
B. Movants have protected interests in this action. Movants also have “a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” Nat’l Parks, 759 F.3d at 975. Movants’ interest is both “legally protectable” and “bound up with the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 839-40 (8th Cir. 2009). Movants’ interests in this action are, at a minimum, equal to Plaintiffs’. Like Plaintiffs, Movants work to “encourage[] informed and active participation in government, work[] to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influence[] public policy through education and advocacy.” Compl. 3. Like Plaintiffs, Movants “[have] numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote” and “[will have] to divert resources away from [their] core activities” if the consent decree is granted. Compl. 15. Like Plaintiffs, Movants “[have] a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot” with confidence and without confusion. Compl. 16. And like Plaintiffs, Movants “have a legitimate interest in
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preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections” by defending existing law, especially if Defendants will not do so. Compl. 16.
But even considered in isolation, Movants have “direct” and “significant” interests in the continued enforcement of state laws governing witness requirements, absentee ballots, and voter identification, as those laws are designed to serve “the integrity of [the] election process,” Eu v. San Fran. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989), and the “orderly administration” of elections, Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008) (op. of Stevens, J.). Federal courts “routinely” find that political parties have interests supporting intervention in litigation regarding elections and election procedures. Issa, 2020 WL 3074351, at *3. Indeed, given their inherent and broad-based interest in elections, usually “[n]o one disputes” that a political party “meet[s] the impaired interest requirement for intervention as of right.” Citizens United v. Gessler, 2014 WL 4549001, *2 (D. Col. Sept. 15, 2014). That is certainly true where, as here, “changes in voting procedures could affect candidates running as Republicans and voters who [are] members of the … Republican Party.” Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 2005 WL 8162665, *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005); see id. (under such circumstances, “there [was] no dispute that the Ohio Republican Party had an interest in the subject matter of this case”).
In short, because Movants’ candidates “actively seek [election or] reelection in contests governed by the challenged rules,” and because their members’ ability to participate in those elections is governed by the challenged rules, Movants have an
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interest in “demand[ing] adherence” to those requirements. Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
C. This action threatens to impair Movants’ interests. Movants are “so situated that disposing of [this] action may as a practical matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect [their] interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Movants “do not need to establish that their interests will be impaired,” “only that the disposition of the action ‘may’ impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2014). This language in Rule 24 is “obviously designed to liberalize the right to intervene in federal actions.” Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Here, the risks to Movants’ interests are plain. If this court enters the consent decree, then the rules surrounding absentee ballots will be upended just weeks before the August primary. And the consent decree—which would place this Court’s imprimatur on the notion that Plaintiffs’ claims have likely merit, see Doc. 24 at 4-5— will be used as a precedent to obtain the same relief for the November election. Movants’ interests will plainly “suffer if the Government were to lose this case, or to settle it against [Movants’] interests.” Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1996). Not only would it undercut democratically enacted laws that protect voters and candidates (including Movants’ members), it would change the “structur[e] of th[e] competitive environment” and “fundamentally alter the environment in which [Movants] defend their concrete interests (e.g. their interest in … winning [election or]
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38 Filed 06/20/20 Page 9 of 14
reelection).” Shays, 414 F.3d at 85-86. These late changes also threaten to confuse voters and undermine confidence in the electoral process. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 45 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections … can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”). In addition to that independent harm, Movants will be forced to spend substantial resources informing Republican voters of changes in the law, fighting inevitable confusion, and galvanizing participation in the wake of the “consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Id.; accord Pavek v. Simon, 2020 WL 3183249, at *10 (D. Minn. June 15, 2020).
Moreover, “as a practical matter,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), “[s]uccess by [Plaintiffs] in the whole litigation would impair the proposed intervenors’ interests” and could prevent Movants from defending their rights at all. South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003). Even setting aside the long-term effects on the integrity of elections and public confidence in the electoral process, this proceeding might be the only time that Movants can litigate the consent decree. The primary is weeks away. See Compl. 2. In a very real sense, then, this Court’s decision could be the final word on the laws governing the next election. Because the “very purpose of intervention is to allow interested parties to air their views so that a court may consider them before making potentially adverse decisions,” Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 345 (emphasis added), the “best” course—and the one that Rule 24 “implements”—is to give “all parties with a real stake
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in a controversy … an opportunity to be heard” in this suit, Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
D. The parties do not adequately represent Movants’ interests. Finally, Movants “[are] not adequately represented by the existing parties.” Nat’l Parks, 759 F.3d at 975. Inadequacy is not a demanding showing. Movants need meet “only a ‘minimal burden of showing that [their] interests are not adequately represented by the parties.’” Barnett, 317 F.3d at 785. While that burden increases “when a party already in the suit has an obligation to represent the interests of the party seeking to intervene,” Movants can meet the burden by “showing that [their] interests actually differ from or conflict with the government’s interests.” Id. Where “the Government has waived and failed to enforce [the law],” it is clear that “the Government [is] not adequately representing the [Movants’] interests.” Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. Movants’ and Defendant’s interests have already diverged in this litigation. After initially opposing Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant now takes the position that the challenged laws are likely unconstitutional and has agreed to “not enforce … Minn. Stat. §203B.07, Minn. Stat. §204B.45, and their implementing regulations.” Consent Decree 6. Defendant adopted this position despite numerous arguments available in defense of the law, including those made by the Seventh Circuit when it stayed an injunction against a similar requirement. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 4-1 at 25, No. 20-1539 (7th Cir. April 3, 2020). Defendants also failed to invoke the Purcell principle, which easily forecloses Plaintiffs’ ability to get a preliminary injunction
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so close to the August primary. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020); e.g., Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (staying a lower-court order that changed election laws 61 days before election day).
Movants, by contrast, affirmatively seek to enforce the witness-signature requirement and prevent last-minute changes to Minnesota’s election law. It is therefore self-evident that “[Movants’] interests actually differ from or conflict with the government’s interests.” Barnett, 317 F.3d at 786. And Movants’ interests will continue to differ from Defendant’s as this litigation proceeds on the consent decree, the merits as applied to the November elections, and any appeals.
Movants occupy an adversarial position in this case that no existing party serves. Their “intervention [is] vital to the defense of the law[s] at issue” in this case. Miracle v. Hobbs, 333 F.R.D. 151, 155 (D. Ariz. 2019) (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 433 (2009)). Movants should thus be granted intervention as of right. II. Alternatively, Movants are entitled to permissive intervention.
Even if Movants were not entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), this Court should grant them permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Exercising broad judicial discretion, courts grant permissive intervention when the movant has “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The court also must consider “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
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The requirements of Rule 24(b) are met here. As explained, Movants filed a timely motion. Supra I.A. And Movants will raise defenses that share many common questions with the parties’ claims and defenses—including whether COVID-19 means that Minnesota’s well-established election laws now create an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. See Compl. 23-27. Plaintiffs allege that the challenged laws are unconstitutional. Compl. 27. Movants, on the other hand, directly reject those allegations, contending not only that Minnesota’s longstanding laws are constitutional, but also that Plaintiffs’ desired relief would undermine the interests of Movants and their members. “[T]he situations, interests, and even [some of] the claims of the plaintiff and applicants are virtually identical.” Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D. Minn. 1983); see also Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Minn. 2017) (recognizing that “permissive intervention was warranted where movant presented defenses that were ‘directly responsive’ to the plaintiff's claims” (quoting Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2002))); Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Chicago, 170 F.R.D. 435, 441 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (permissive intervention is appropriate where “applicants’ interest in the litigation is the mirror-image” of an original party’s interest).
Movants’ intervention will not unduly delay this litigation or prejudice anyone. Movants swiftly moved to intervene while the “case is in its earliest stages,” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268, and their participation will add no delay beyond the norm for multiparty litigation. After all, Plaintiffs put the constitutionality of the laws at issue
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and “can hardly be said to be prejudiced by having to prove a lawsuit [they] chose to initiate.” Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995). And even if Movants’ entry might “increase the burden on the original litigants … that alone is insufficient to warrant denial of the motion to intervene—the addition must be ‘unduly’ burdensome, not just burdensome.” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268. Movants commit to submitting all filings in accordance with whatever briefing schedule the Court imposes, “which is a promise” that undermines claims of undue delay. Emerson Hall Assocs., LP v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., 2016 WL 223794, *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2016).
Allowing Movants to intervene will promote consistency and fairness in the law, as well as efficiency in this case. It would allow “the Court … to profit from a diversity of viewpoints as they illuminate the ultimate questions posed by the parties,” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268, thus preventing protracted piecemeal litigation and the possibility of conflicting legal decisions. Allowing intervention by political parties in a “time-sensitiv[e]” “election-related dispute” also preempts the delay that otherwise results from sorting out Movants’ rights on appeal. See Jacobson v. Detzner, 2018 WL 10509488 (N.D. Fla.) (“[D]enying [Republican Party organizations’] motion [to intervene] opens the door to delaying the adjudication of this case’s merits for months—if not longer”); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377 (1987) (“[W]hen an order prevents a putative intervenor from becoming a party in any respect, the order is subject to immediate review.”); McLean v. Arkansas, 663 F.2d 47,
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48 (8th Cir. 1981) (similar). Where a court has doubts, “the most prudent and efficient course of action” is to allow permissive intervention. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States, 2002 WL 32350046, *3 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 20, 2002).
CONCLUSION The Court should grant Movants’ motion and allow them to intervene as defendants.

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

14

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I, Cameron T. Norris, certify that the document titled “Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendants by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota” complies with Local Rule 7.1(f). I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used Microsoft Word 2016 and that this word-processing program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and quotations, in the following word count. I further certify that the above document contains 3,350 words.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 2

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

2

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 41 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 37

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,

DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

[PROPOSED] INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 41 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 37
TABLE OF CONTENTS Background ................................................................................................................................1 Legal Standard............................................................................................................................6 Argument ....................................................................................................................................7
I. The consent decree should be rejected because Plaintiffs identified no probable violation of federal law...........................................................................7 A. Under the Purcell principle, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the August primary........................................9 B. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the November election. ............................. 12 C. Plaintiffs could not show that the challenged laws are unconstitutional......................................................................................... 14 i. The witness requirement doesn’t burden voting rights because there is no constitutional right to vote absentee. ...... 16 ii. Even if the witness requirement affected voting rights, it easily satisfies the Anderson-Burdick test...................................... 20
II. The consent decree should be rejected because it does not reflect arm’slength negotiations and gives a windfall to Plaintiffs. ..................................... 25
III. The consent decree should be rejected because it unreasonably injures other parties. .......................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 35
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Intervenors are “entitled to present evidence and have [their] objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree.” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). Proposed Intervenor-Defendants—Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota—thus submit this opposition “to air [their] objections to the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant evidence” and arguments that the parties won’t. Id. This Court should grant their motion to intervene and reject the parties’ proposed consent decree.
BACKGROUND COVID-19 has sparked an unprecedented number of lawsuits that attempt to invalidate or suspend routine election laws. 2020 Was Already Expected to Be a Record Year for Election-Related Lawsuits—Then Coronavirus Happened, Newsweek (Apr. 23, 2020), bit.ly/2zMKVOl. Democrats sought similar reforms long before COVID-19— expanded mail-in voting, no voter-ID requirements, unlimited ballot harvesting, and the like. But even in the wake of COVID-19, Democrats were unable to persuade Congress or the Minnesota Legislature to adopt their legislative agenda. A DFL Push to Move Minnesota to Entirely Vote-By-Mail Is Complicating Bipartisan Efforts Around Other COVID-Related Election Changes, Minn. Post (Apr. 27, 2020), bit.ly/3ekHNIr (DFL Push). So they turned to the courts.
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Democrats now contend that, in light of COVID-19, their legislative agenda is required by the Constitution. The Democratic Party (through its law firm, Perkins Coie) has filed COVID-19 lawsuits in virtually every swing State, including Minnesota. See Where We’re Litigating, Democracy Docket, bit.ly/2V0rF7k. Allied groups have bolstered the Democrats’ effort by filing dozens of copycat suits across the country. For example, the League of Women Voters brought this suit in federal court, while the Alliance for Retired Americans (backed by the Democratic Party) and the NAACP (backed by the ACLU) brought overlapping lawsuits in state court. See Trio of Lawsuits Challenge Minnesota Absentee Balloting Requirements Amid COVID-19, Minn. Post (June 12, 2020), bit.ly/3fGXwSt.
When these COVID-19 lawsuits face adversarial litigation, they usually fail. Wisconsin is the first and most prominent example. Three weeks before the April 7 primary, Democrats challenged several Wisconsin laws, including the requirement that voters obtain a witness’s signature for their absentee ballot—a voter-ID requirement that Wisconsin enacted to deter fraud and promote election integrity. Democrats argued that COVID-19 made this requirement too dangerous because, to find a witness, voters who lived alone “would have to interact with a non-household member to secure a signature, … placing their health in jeopardy.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 62 at 13, No. 3:20-cv-249-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2020); see also id. at 22 (“[The challenged laws] encourage determined registrants and voters to venture out into the world and interact face-to-face with people, … exposing
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Wisconsinites to an ailment that has already claimed thousands of lives internationally.”). The district court agreed, contending that the “hurdles” associated with finding a witness during COVID-19 “are not overcome by the state’s general anti-fraud goals.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020) (DNC I). It preliminarily enjoined the witness requirement for voters who certified that, despite reasonable efforts, they could not safely find a witness. See id.
The district court was swiftly reversed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stayed the part of the injunction that suspended the witness requirement. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 30, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020) (DNC II). The Seventh Circuit stressed that the district court gave short shrift to “the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” Id. at 3. On further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed more of the district court’s decision. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (RNC). The Court relied exclusively on “the Purcell principle”—the doctrine that courts in equity “should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Id. at 1207.
More recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also stayed district-court decisions enjoining election laws in light of COVID-19. See Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020); Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 2020 WL 2982937 (5th Cir. June 4, 2020). And the Eighth Circuit administratively stayed a district-court decision enjoining a witness requirement in light of COVID-19. See Miller v. Thurston, Text
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Order, No. 20-2095 (8th Cir. June 15, 2020). The Eleventh Circuit is likewise considering an emergency stay application in a similar case. See People First of Ala. v. Ala. Sec’y of State, No. 20-12184.1
Plaintiffs filed this action on May 19, 2020, seeking to enjoin Minnesota’s witness requirement, Minn. Stat. §§203B.07, 204B.45. Doc. 1 at 27-29. In their complaint, Plaintiffs acknowledged Minnesota’s “legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections.” Doc. 1 ¶62. Further, they acknowledged that the witness requirement is reasonable and lawful under normal circumstances, challenging it only as applied to elections conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Doc. 1 ¶¶95, 97.
On May 29, Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the witness requirement for both the August primary and the November general election. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs argued that the witness requirement, as applied to elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, violates the constitutional right to vote. Doc. 15. They sought sweeping injunctive relief that would require Defendant to do four things: (1) refrain from enforcing the witness requirement; (2) instruct local officials that no absentee ballot could be rejected for lack of compliance with the witness requirement; (3) take steps
1 Without the benefit of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ rulings, a district court in Virginia approved a consent decree similar to the one at issue here. League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020). As will become clear later, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants disagree with that decision. This Court should not repeat its many errors.
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to ensure that the instructions accompanying absentee ballots do not direct voters to comply with the witness requirement; and (4) inform the public that the witness requirement will not be enforced for the August primary and November general elections. Doc. 13 at 1-2.
Defendant filed an answer on June 9, 2020. Doc. 22. In it, he denied all Plaintiffs’ material allegations. Doc. 22 ¶¶7, 12, 62, 65, 80, 81, 87, 95, 100, 102, 109, 111. He also denied that heightened scrutiny applied to the witness requirement and argued that the requirement would survive any level of judicial scrutiny. Doc. 22 ¶¶106, 107. And he asserted that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Doc. 22 at 40.
At some point in the next seven days, Defendant made a sharp U-turn. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted a proposed consent decree to the Court. Under that decree, Defendant would totally refrain from enforcing the witness requirement and concede to all four kinds of relief that Plaintiffs sought for the August primary. Doc. 24 at 6.2 Further, Defendant would concede that “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim”—a position directly contrary to the one he took in his answer a week earlier. Doc. 24 ¶20. In return for his total capitulation to Plaintiffs’ demands, Defendant obtained little, if anything. Although the decree does
2 Given its general scope, the relief in the proposed consent decree resembles a successful facial challenge. While Plaintiffs have identified a temporal limitation on the scope of the proposed relief, limiting it to the August 2020 primary, they have not limited the relief to any particular voters or any clearly ascertainable class of voters.
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not address the November election, Defendant agreed to let Plaintiffs withdraw their preliminary-injunction motion “without prejudice” so they could refile it again for November. Doc. 24 at 6. In other words, Plaintiffs got everything and took nothing off the table.
Seeing that the proposed consent decree disserved Minnesotans, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants promptly moved to enter this case. Doc. 29. The Court reset the hearing on the proposed consent decree, and ordered Proposed IntervenorDefendants to file their intervention papers and their opposition to the consent decree by 5:00 p.m. today. Doc. 33. The fairness hearing on the proposed consent decree is set for Tuesday. Doc. 33.
LEGAL STANDARD Because a consent decree is a “judgment” of this Court, it cannot be entered without the Court’s “examin[ation]” and “approval.” Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). As this Court has explained, approving a consent decree “requires careful court scrutiny,” not a “mechanistic[] ‘rubber stamp.’” Doc. 26 at 1 (quoting Ibarra v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n, 823 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1987); and United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). After all, “a federal court is more than ‘a recorder of contracts’ from whom parties can purchase injunctions.” Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525. It is “‘an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions,’” and it cannot “lend the aid of the federal court to whatever strikes two parties’ fancy.” Id.; Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of
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Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987). Instead, every consent decree must be “examine[d] carefully” to ensure that its terms are “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring). The court also “must ensure that the agreement is not illegal, a product of collusion, or against the public interest.” United States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991).
ARGUMENT The parties’ proposed consent decree is neither fair nor reasonable nor legal. It suspends a perfectly constitutional law that Plaintiffs had no hope of enjoining. It appears to be, not an arm’s-length deal between adversaries, but a sweetheart deal that gives Plaintiffs everything and Minnesotans nothing. And it unreasonably injures the rights and interests of third parties, including Proposed Intervenor-Defendants and their members. This Court should reject it. I. The consent decree should be rejected because Plaintiffs identified no probable violation of federal law. When deciding whether to approve or reject the consent decree, this Court rightly acknowledged that it “must ‘consider the underlying facts and legal arguments’ that support or undermine the proposal.” Doc. 26 at 1 (quoting United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). While courts needn’t conduct a full-blown trial, they must “reach ‘an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated.’” Flinn, 528 F.2d at
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1173. This Court must determine Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits here for two reasons.
One, the proposed consent decree suspends Minnesota’s witness requirement—a duly enacted state law. See Doc. 24 at 6. “A consent decree is not a method by which state agencies may liberate themselves from the statutes enacted by the legislature that created them.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 341-42. A “consent judgment in which the executive branch of a state consents not to enforce a law is ‘void on its face,’” unless the approving court finds “a probable violation of [federal] law.” Id. at 342. A federal judge cannot “‘put the court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence.’” Doc. 26 at 1-2 (quoting City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441).
Two, the merits are “[t]he most important factor” in determining whether the consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, since these factors can be examined “‘only in light of the strength of the case presented by the plaintiffs.’” Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975). Courts can gauge “the fairness of a proposed compromise” by “weighing the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and form of the relief offered.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). A decree that takes plaintiffs with flimsy claims, gives them most of what they asked for, and gets nothing in return is not fair or reasonable.
Here, the proposed consent decree strikes the following deal: Minnesota will fully suspend its witness requirement for all voters in the August primary, issue
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guidance explaining this change to local election officials, and notify all voters of this change. Plaintiffs will withdraw their motion for a preliminary injunction (which asked the Court to suspend the witness requirement for both the August and November elections)—but without prejudice to their ability to bring a similar motion later. See Doc. 24 at 6. In other words, Plaintiffs got everything they wanted for the August primary and gave up nothing going forward. Quite obviously, that is not a good deal for Minnesotans. For several reasons—all of which have been accepted by the majority of courts to consider these COVID-19/election cases—Plaintiffs had virtually no chance of winning their preliminary-injunction motion or obtaining this kind of relief.
A. Under the Purcell principle, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the August primary.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 19, three months before the August 11 primary and two months before the commencement of absentee voting. Their preliminary-injunction motion would not have been heard until a month later. See Doc. 18 (setting the hearing for June 10). And now, voting is less than a week away, with early and absentee voting beginning on June 26. See Doc. 24 ¶11. If Defendant had contested Plaintiffs’ right to injunctive relief for the August primary, Defendant would have easily defeated it under the Purcell principle.
Under Purcell, “federal courts are not supposed to change state election rules as elections approach.” Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 2020). Invoking
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this strong principle of non-interference, the Supreme Court routinely stays lowercourt orders requiring States to change election laws shortly before elections. In other words, the Court “allow[s] the election to proceed without an injunction suspending [election] rules.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 6. This practice is longstanding. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1968) (denying relief because it would cause “serious disruption of [the] election process” and “confusion” for voters). And it has been invoked in several cases where the amount of time between the court’s order and key election deadlines resembles the timeline here. See, e.g., Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (staying a lower-court order that changed election laws 61 days before election day); Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813 (election day was “months away but important, interim deadlines … [we]re imminent”); Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 1090 (2011) (22 days before the candidate-registration deadline); Purcell, 549 U.S. at 45 (33 days before election day); North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014) (32 days before election day).
The Purcell principle ensures that voters, candidates, and political parties know and adhere to the same neutral rules throughout the election process. As Purcell explains, this stability and predictability promotes “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral process,” which “is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” 549 U.S. at 4. Conversely, courts risk “voter confusion” when they order late-breaking changes to election laws. Id. at 4-5. “As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Id. at 5. Voter confusion, in turn, causes a “consequent incentive to
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remain away from the polls.” Id. In other words, last-minute “interference by the judicial department with the electoral franchise of the people of this state … might well amount to a substantial destruction of that most important civil right.” Beebe v. Koontz, 302 P.2d 486, 490 (Nev. 1956).
Purcell doesn’t care if “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits.” Doc. 24 ¶20. The Purcell principle is a sufficient basis to deny injunctive relief— one that must be invoked even if Plaintiff’s claims are concededly meritorious. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5 (vacating a lower court’s injunction “[g]iven the imminence of the election” while “express[ing] no opinion here on the correct disposition” of the case); Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if the merits question were close, the district court did not abuse its discretion [by denying a preliminary injunction on Purcell grounds]”). “[T]iming … rather than the[] merits” is “the key” to Purcell. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 2014).
In Wisconsin, for example, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s coronavirus-inspired injunction based solely on Purcell, declining to “express[] an opinion” on the merits of the case. RNC, 140 S. Ct. at 1206-08. The Court rejected the Democrats’ argument that, because “‘the electoral status quo’ already has been upended … by the COVID-19 pandemic,” Purcell has no application in 2020. Resp’ts Br. 16, bit.ly/2AKc1Gt. Even in the face of COVID-19, then, Purcell applies with full force. See Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813.
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This Court—if given the chance—would have followed RNC and likely denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Whatever the merits of their claims, the Purcell principle would have prohibited the grant of any injunctive relief for the August primary.3
B. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the November election.
Plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction that would last “for the duration of calendar year 2020.” Doc. 13 at 1. In other words, they wanted the witness requirement suspended for the November election as well. But this Court would not have granted relief for the November election in June. See People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 2020 WL 3207824, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 15, 2020) (holding, in a COVID-19/election case, that “it is premature for the court to consider a preliminary injunction for the elections in August and November”).
To obtain a preliminary injunction (or any equitable relief, really), Plaintiffs must show “irreparable harm.” Regions Treatment Ctr., LLC v. New Stream Real Estate, LLC, 2013 WL 4028148, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2013) (citing Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987)). That showing “requires more than a possibility of remote future injury.” Id. (citing Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th
3 The court in the Virginia case similar to this one did not explain how, less than two months before the June primary, Purcell would have allowed the plaintiffs to secure a preliminary injunction. See League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *3-4. That is the question the court should have asked because, like this case, the preliminary-injunction motion was all that plaintiffs offered to withdraw in exchange for the consent decree. Id. at *4.
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Cir. 1982)). It “requires a presently existing actual threat of injury”; “‘[w]holly speculative’ harm will not” do. Id. (quoting Local Union No. 884, United Rubber Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995)). More specifically, Plaintiffs cannot obtain a preliminary injunction unless their irreparable harm “‘is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.’” Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011).
Yet Plaintiffs have no idea whether, and to what extent, COVID-19 will remain a threat in November—let alone what effect it will have on voters’ ability to find a witness. No one does. Plaintiffs’ only evidence on this question came from their expert, who admits that the coronavirus is “novel,” that he “cannot say definitively whether its incidence and prevalence will rise and fall based on weather or season,” and that “it is difficult to predict whether and when the incidence and prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection will fluctuate.” Doc. 15-5 ¶¶17-18.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief rests on a litany of speculative, unknowable assumptions. It assumes that COVID-19 will resurge in November. That it will resurge to a degree that makes finding a witness or voting in person unreasonably dangerous (even with increased social distancing and sanitization). That Minnesota will make no adjustments to improve safety. That no vaccine will be created. That no herd immunity will develop. And much more. As another court in this Circuit put it, harms that stem from “potentially contracting COVID-19,” “the
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spread of COVID-19,” or the “[inability] to contain it” are simply “too speculative under Eighth Circuit precedent” to warrant a preliminary injunction. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 2145350, at *9-10 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020).4
In short, this Court would have denied Plaintiffs’ motion as applied to the November election because it was overly speculative and premature. The Court could have “declined to exercise its equitable jurisdiction upon these grounds alone.” Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Priest, 117 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1941). Doing so would have honored the Supreme Court’s observation that, “[e]specially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948).
C. Plaintiffs could not show that the challenged laws are unconstitutional.
Even assuming Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief, their constitutional claims would fail on the merits. Plaintiffs pressed only one claim in their preliminary-injunction motion: that Minnesota’s witness requirement violates the
4 Plaintiffs cannot sidestep this problem by arguing that, “regardless of the precise infection rate [in November],” voters’ fears of contracting COVID-19 will still “deter [them] from meeting with witnesses.” Doc. 15 at 31. Even if speculative fears somehow counted as a burden imposed by the State, these predictions about what voters will think or feel in November are equally too “speculative” to support a preliminary injunction. Shaw v. Kaemingk, 2019 WL 6465339, at *2 (D.S.D. Dec. 2, 2019).
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constitutional right to vote. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, burdens on voting rights are subject to the balancing test from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Under the Anderson-Burdick test, States can conduct “substantial regulation of elections.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). Anderson-Burdick is a “flexible standard” that “reject[s] the contention that any law imposing a burden” on constitutional rights “is subject to strict scrutiny.” Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009); Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1241 (Nev. 2006). Every election law “is going to exclude, either de jure or de facto, some people” from exercising their rights; “the constitutional question is whether the restriction and resulting exclusion are reasonable given the interest the restriction serves.” Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
Anderson-Burdick requires Plaintiffs to satisfy a two-step inquiry, imposing a heavy burden at each step. First, Plaintiffs must prove that the challenged laws inflict a cognizable burden on their rights and quantify the severity of that burden. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1354. Second, Plaintiffs must show that the burden outweighs the State’s interests. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. Only when an election law “subject[s]” voting rights “to ‘severe’ restrictions” does a court apply strict scrutiny and assess whether the law “‘is narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” Burdick, 504
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U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). Mine-run election laws that “impose[] only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’” are “‘generally’” justified by “‘the State’s important regulatory interests.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. After all, there is no constitutional right to be free from “the usual burdens of voting.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (op. of Stevens, J.).
Minnesota’s witness requirement does not implicate the right to vote at all. Even if it did, it easily satisfies Anderson-Burdick. Before, during, or after COVID-19, the law imposes only routine burdens that are amply justified by the State’s important interests in deterring fraud and promoting voters’ confidence in the integrity of Minnesota elections.
i. The witness requirement doesn’t burden voting rights because there is no constitutional right to vote absentee.
The witness requirement governs only absentee voting. If voters cannot find a witness, they can still vote in-person on election day or during the 46-day early voting period. See Doc. 15 at 10. Because in-person voting remains available, unburdened by the witness requirement, “the right to vote is not ‘at stake’” here. Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10 (quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)).
The Constitution guarantees one viable method of voting. And “there is no constitutional right to an absentee ballot.” Mays, 951 F.3d at 792; accord Griffin, 385
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F.3d at 1130. When States impose some limitation on absentee voting, but not inperson voting, “[i]t is … not the right to vote that is at stake … but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots”—which is not a constitutional right at all. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807. As the Fifth Circuit recently explained in a COVID-19 case, the Constitution is not violated “unless … the state has ‘in fact absolutely prohibited’ the plaintiff from voting,” and “permit[ting] the plaintiffs to vote in person … is the exact opposite of ‘absolutely prohibit[ing]’ them from doing so.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10.
While Plaintiffs insist that in-person voting is too difficult or dangerous during COVID-19, that rejoinder fails for at least two reasons.
First, “[constitutional] violations require state action,” and Minnesota is not responsible for COVID-19 or private citizens’ responses to it. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 810. While COVID-19 has dramatically changed Minnesotans’ everyday lives, these difficulties are not burdens imposed “by the State.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10 (quoting McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808 n.7). These obstacles to voting “are not caused by or fairly traceable to the actions of the State, but rather are caused by the global pandemic.” Mays v. Thurston, 2020 WL 1531359, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30, 2020). To date, most courts have recognized that “COVID-19 … is not the result of any act or failure to act by the Government. And that fact is important” because “[a]ll of the election cases cited by Plaintiffs in which injunctive relief was granted involved a burden … that was created by the Government. Not so here.” Coalition for
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Good Governance v. Raffensperger, 2020 WL 2509092, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020); accord Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *11 (“The Constitution is not offended … even where voting in person may be extremely difficult … because of circumstances beyond the state’s control, such as the presence of the Virus.” (cleaned up)).
Second, even if Plaintiffs’ think otherwise, the State has determined that inperson voting can be done safely and effectively. The Minnesota Legislature considered and rejected plans to cancel in-person voting and to adopt all-mail elections, opting instead to make in-person voting easier and safer. See DFL Push, supra. The Governor likewise exempted voting from his stay-at-home order; and the Secretary of State has issued guidance on “social distancing …, equipment sanitization, and hygiene for polling places,” and has made “[c]urbside voting available for anyone who cannot enter the polling place for any reason, including concerns for their health.” 2012 Elections and COVID-19, Minn. Sec’y of State, bit.ly/3hJtq2s. Meanwhile, Minnesota has moved into “Phase III” of its reopening plan, deeming it safe for Minnesotans (with social-distancing precautions) to go to stores, gyms, salons, restaurants, bars, swimming pools, daycare, school, and church, and to attend indoor gatherings of up to 10 people. See Safely Reopening Minnesota, Stay Safe MN, staysafe.mn.gov (Safely Reopening).
Federal courts cannot and should not second-guess the judgment of Minnesota’s election officials that in-person voting can be done safely and effectively.
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As the Seventh Circuit explained in Wisconsin, questions about how to “accommodate voters’ interests while also striving to ensure their safety” are best left to election officials, who are “better positioned … to accommodate the many intersecting interests in play in the present circumstances.” DNC II, supra. “[F[ederal courts make poor arbiters of public health.” Sinner v. Jaeger, 2020 WL 3244143, at *6 (D.N.D. June 15, 2020). They do “not have the authority ‘to act as the state’s chief health official’ by making the decision” how best to protect “the health and safety of the community.” Taylor v. Milwaukee Election Comm’n, 2020 WL 1695454, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2020). These “decisions are instead best left ‘to the politically accountable officials of the States,’ not ‘an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.’” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143, at *6 (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2813056, at *1 (U.S. May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of injunctive relief)).5
In short, this Court would likely accept Minnesota’s considered judgment that in-person voting is safe and available. That finding would, in turn, entirely defeat Plaintiffs’ right-to-vote claim.
5 The court in Virginia simply bypassed this issue. It assumed that restrictions on absentee voting implicate the constitutional right to vote, without considering whether in-person voting remained available or whether the State had deemed it safe. See League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *7.
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ii. Even if the witness requirement affected voting rights, it easily satisfies the Anderson-Burdick test.
The witness requirement would satisfy Anderson-Burdick review even accepting the implausible premise that COVID-19 gives Plaintiffs a constitutional right to vote by mail. Plaintiffs agree that the witness requirement satisfies Anderson-Burdick in normal times. See Doc. 15 at 14 (arguing only that “the witness requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this unique situation”); id. at 28 (conceding that “under normal circumstances most Minnesotans may be able to find an eligible individual to witness their absentee ballot”). So the question is whether COVID-19 somehow made the witness requirement unconstitutional. Setting aside obvious state-action problems, the answer is no. The witness requirement remains a minimal burden on voters that is justified by the State’s “‘important regulatory interests.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
Burden on Voters: On the individual side of the Anderson-Burdick balance, Plaintiffs must introduce “evidence” to “quantify the magnitude of the burden” from the challenged laws. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200. “[T]he extent of the burden … is a factual question on which the [plaintiff] bears the burden of proof,” Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016), and the plaintiff must “direct th[e] Court to … admissible and reliable evidence that quantifies the extent and scope of the burden.” Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1354.
That evidence doesn’t exist. If “the inconvenience of making a trip to the [D]MV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does
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not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote,” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198, then neither does finding a qualified person to witness an absentee ballot. It is no more dangerous than other activities that the State deems safe, like going to the grocery store or having 9 friends over for a visit. See Safely Reopening, supra. And “[t]here’s no reason” why the witnessing process cannot be done “within the bounds of our current situation”—for example, by “witnessing the signatures from a safe distance,” staying outdoors, wearing a mask, standing behind glass, or practicing good hygiene. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 810. While these workarounds might be “harder” (as are many tasks during a pandemic), id., inconveniences are not “severe” burdens that trigger strict scrutiny, Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198.
Doubtful, but perhaps there is some tiny, idiosyncratic group of voters who, despite “reasonable effort,” cannot find a witness and cannot take advantage of Minnesota’s 46-day early-voting period or its numerous methods for voting in person. Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 2016) (Frank II). If that is what Plaintiffs’ case turns on, “[z]eroing in on the abnormal burden experienced by a small group of voters is problematic at best, and prohibited at worst.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 631 (6th Cir. 2016). Evidence that a law uniquely burdens one particular group does not justify enjoining the statute as to all voters. Rather, requests for facial, statewide relief—like Plaintiffs make here and the State is prepared to give away in the consent decree—fail when the challenged law “has a plainly legitimate sweep.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202-03; see id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
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(when assessing a burden’s severity, courts must look at the burden’s impact “categorically” upon all voters, without “consider[ing] the peculiar circumstances of individual voters”). The “burden some voters face[]” from a challenged law cannot “prevent the state from applying the law generally.” Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386. Those claims must be vindicated in as-applied challenges that seek relief for “those particular persons.” Id.
Interests of the State: Because the witness requirement imposes little to no burden on voters, Minnesota’s “‘important regulatory interests’” more than justify it. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. Witness requirements for absentee ballots, as the Seventh Circuit explained in Wisconsin, serve the State’s “substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” DNC II, supra; accord Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811 (“witness … requirements help prevent fraud”). By requiring “in-person” verification, witness requirements serve the “unquestionably important interests” of “preventing fraud and protecting the integrity of the electoral process.” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143, at *7. “These interests are not only legitimate, they are compelling.” Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811.
It is no answer to say that Minnesota has other methods to deter fraud, like criminal penalties. See Doc. 15 at 21-22. Minnesota does not have to satisfy strict scrutiny here or prove narrow tailoring. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Under AndersonBurdick’s intermediate balancing test, States can supplement post-hoc punishments with measures aimed at “prophylactically preventing fraud.” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143,
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at *7; see Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986) (“Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.”).
It is also no answer to say that absentee-voting fraud is “rare.” Doc. 15 at 2. It’s not rare enough. See infra III. And “voter fraud” is notoriously “difficult to detect and prosecute.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *3. The whole reason it’s rare, moreover, is precisely because States have integrity measures like the witness requirement in place.
Regardless, Anderson-Burdick treats the State’s interest as a “legislative fact,” accepted as true so long as it’s reasonable. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (Frank I). States are not required to submit “any record evidence in support of [their] stated interests.” Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1353; accord ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) (city need not “present evidence of past instances of voting fraud”). In fact, when responding to an Anderson-Burdick challenge, States can rely on “post hoc rationalizations,” can “come up with its justifications at any time,” and have no “limit[s]” on the type of “record [they] can build in order to justify a burden placed on the right to vote.” Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 789 (6th Cir. 2020). States can rely on examples from other jurisdictions, court decisions, general history, or sheer logic. Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1353; Frank I, 768 F.3d at 750. In Crawford, for example, the Supreme Court found Indiana’s interest in preventing in-person voter fraud compelling even though “[t]he record
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contain[ed] no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.” 553 U.S. at 194.
“[T]here is no suggestion that these widely held concerns about voter fraud will not be present during the pandemic”; to the contrary, COVID-19 makes Minnesota’s interest heightened, as record numbers of voters submit absentee ballots while the State’s resources are already stretched thin. Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *19 (Ho, J., concurring); see @MNSteveSimon, Twitter (June 19, 2020), bit.ly/2V3Hp9z (reporting that Minnesotans have requested 25 times as many absentee ballots as previous years). States should receive more leeway under AndersonBurdick, not less, when dealing with emergencies that affect election. These crises give the State new “important interests” like “focus[ing] their resources on recovering from the emergency, ensuring the accuracy of [electoral records] they have received, … and otherwise minimizing the likelihood of errors or delays in voting.” Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 Emory L.J. 545, 593 (2018).
An “election emergency” should thus “seldom warrant” changes to election laws by judicial fiat. Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. DeSantis, Doc. 12, No. 1:20-cv-67 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2020) (declining to intervene in Florida’s primary election in the face of COVID-19); Bethea v. Deal, 2016 WL 6123241, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2016) (declining to extend Georgia’s voter-registration deadline in the wake of Hurricane Matthew); Doc. 58, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 2:06-cv-611 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2006)
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(denying request to extend the deadline for counting absentee ballots received by mail in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina). This Court would likely reach the same conclusion here.
Because Plaintiffs were never entitled to an injunction and identified no violation of federal law, the proposed consent decree is a raw deal for Minnesotans. Not only that, but it requires this Court to sanction violations of a valid state law. The decree is thus “‘void on its face’” and should be rejected. Kasper, 814 F.2d at 342. II. The consent decree should be rejected because it does not reflect arm’s-
length negotiations and gives a windfall to Plaintiffs. Consent decrees must be not only substantively sound, but also procedurally fair. Procedural fairness is evaluated “from the standpoint of [both] signatories and nonparties to the decree.” United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991). Consent decrees are fair when they flow from negotiations “filled with ‘adversarial vigor.’” City of Waterloo, 2016 WL 254725, at *4. The parties must “negotiat[e] in good faith and at arm’s length.” BP Amoco Oil, 277 F.3d at 1020. Agreements that lack adversarial vigor become “collusive,” and are, by definition, not fair. Colorado, 937 F.2d 509. In fact, a consent decree between non-adverse parties “is no judgment of the court. It is a nullity.” Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 256 (1850). This rule stems from the fundamental constitutional requirement that parties be concretely adversarial before an Article III court can act on their claims. There is “no case or controversy within
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the meaning of Article III of the Constitution” when “both litigants desire precisely the same result.” Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971). Put differently, a collusive suit lacks “the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of the constitutional questions by the Court.” United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
Regrettably, “it is not uncommon for consent decrees to be entered into on terms favorable to those challenging governmental action because of rifts within the bureaucracy or between the executive and legislative branches.” Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 517 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1292, 1294-95 (1983) (discussing phenomenon of “[n]ominal defendants [who] are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose”); Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. L. Forum 19, 30-37 (1987). That is why courts should look skeptically at consent decrees used to enact or modify governmental policy. Otherwise, non-adverse parties can employ consent decrees to “sidestep political constraints” and obtain relief otherwise unavailable through the political process. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 317. In particular, “district judges should be on the lookout for attempts to use consent decrees to make end runs around the legislature.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 340;
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see Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A court must be alert to the possibility that a consent decree is a ploy in some other struggle.”).
These opportunities and incentives are present here. Given that Defendant recently failed to convince the legislature to relax absentee-voting rules, see Minnesota Waives Absentee Ballot Witness Signature Mandate, U.S. News & World Report (June 17, 2020), bit.ly/3dl5tek, the proposed consent decree helps achieve an “end run[] around the legislature.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 340. Defendant is also a member of the League of Women Voters. See Steve Simon’s Biography, Vote Smart, bit.ly/3ejEP6R. And his attorney was recently Deputy Chair of the Democratic Party. See Hayes, DNC’s Second in Command Steps Down After Winning Attorney General Race in Minnesota, USA Today (Nov. 8, 2018), bit.ly/316q8k9. The Democratic Party, of course, is backing a similar lawsuit in state court and just negotiated a very similar consent decree with Defendant over the same timeframe. See Doc. 28. No doubt, these groups believe they are doing a good thing by using lawsuits to “revamp [the] electoral system,” see Eric Holder: Here’s How the Coronavirus Crisis Should Change U.S. Elections—For Good, TIME (Apr. 14, 2020), bit.ly/3fJsjhk, and to “gain …vote[s]” for Democrats, @marcelias, Twitter (May 3, 2020), bit.ly/2XiI74A. But their lack of adversarialness disserves the public and undermines the proposed consent decree. See North Carolina, 180 F.3d at 581; Colorado, 937 F.2d at 509.
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More to the point, the sequence of events here is inconsistent with arm’s-length negotiations. Plaintiffs filed their complaint one month ago yesterday. Doc. 1 at 27-29. In it, they laid out the key principles underlying their case:
• Minnesota’s witness requirement forces voters to risk their health or refrain from voting;
• the witness requirement is ineffective as an anti-fraud measure; • the witness requirement is unduly restrictive and significantly burdensome; • the witness requirement does not serve any important state interest and has
no significant benefit; and • suspending enforcement of the witness requirement would not cause a drop
in voter confidence. Doc. 1 ¶¶12, 95, 62, 65, 7, 81, 87, 100, 109, 111, 102, 80. Ten days later, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for both the August and November elections. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs’ sweeping relief would require Defendant to grant four specific types of relief. See Doc. 13 at 1-2.
When Defendant answered the complaint on June 9, Defendant denied all of the above allegations. Doc. 22 ¶¶12, 95, 62, 65, 7, 81, 87, 100, 109, 111, 102, 80. He also denied that heightened scrutiny applied to the witness requirement and argued that the requirement would survive any level of judicial scrutiny. Doc. 22 ¶¶106, 107. And he asserted that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Doc. 22 at 40.
At some point in the next seven days, Defendant did a complete 180º. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted a proposed consent decree to the Court. Under the
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proposed decree, Defendant agrees to refrain from enforcing the witness requirement and concedes to all four kinds of relief that Plaintiffs sought for the August primary. Doc. 24 at 6. Further, although Plaintiffs had submitted no further briefing, argument, or evidence, the decree makes Defendant concede that “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim”—directly contrary to his answer. Doc. 24 ¶20. Defendant made no attempt to explain this abrupt about-face. Whatever his reasons, the astonishing rapidity with which he turned heel calls into question his statement that the proposed consent decree was “negotiated at arm’s length through counsel for the parties.” Doc. 24 ¶18.
In return for his complete capitulation to Plaintiffs’ demands, Defendant obtained nothing. While the consent decree does not cover the November election, Defendant let Plaintiffs withdraw their preliminary-injunction motion “without prejudice” and seek that exact relief again. Doc. 24 at 6. And while the decree suggests that Plaintiffs will not collect attorney’s fees for their work to date, Doc. 24 at 5 ¶21, that concession adds nothing. Plaintiffs were unlikely to be a “prevailing party” in this case, supra I, they generated few expenses because they reused prior materials from Virginia and filed a motion that was never opposed, and they can still get fees going forward (including, presumably, for any preliminary-injunction motion they refile).
Worse, Defendant did not even narrow Plaintiffs’ egregiously overbroad relief. For the August primary, Plaintiffs got everything they asked for: a complete and total suspension of the witness requirement for all voters. But several narrower
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compromises were obvious. Defendant could have suspended the witness requirement only for the named individual plaintiffs. See Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386. He could have suspended it only for people who are elderly or immunocompromised. E.g., People First, 2020 WL 3207824, at *29. He could have suspended only the statute limiting who can be a witness. See Minn. Stat. §203B.07. Or he could have required voters to provide a “written affirmation” that they tried, but failed, to find a witness for their ballot. DNC I, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20. To be clear, none of these alternatives would have been warranted had the Court reached the merits. But the fact that Defendant got none of them as concessions proves that, whatever the parties were doing from May 29 to June 16, it was not “negotiating.”
Defendant cannot say that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the witness requirement was so strong—or that the August primary was coming so soon—that he thought settlement was the only option. Both Defendant and his counsel took an oath to defend and uphold the State’s elections laws. See Minn. Const. art. V, §§1, 6; Minn. Stat. §8.06. And the caselaw was on their side: most courts have rejected these COVID-19/election lawsuits, and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits recently wrote persuasive opinions rejecting challenges to similar witness requirements. Even if Defendant was (mistakenly) impressed with the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments, but see supra I, the Purcell principle was an easy defense that sidesteps the merits and defeats injunctive relief for the August primary. Purcell was low-hanging fruit, especially if Defendant was genuinely concerned with avoiding last-minute changes to the election
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laws. But he apparently wasn’t—consenting to last-minute changes to election laws is no way to avoid them.
At bottom, a federal court is not a place where parties with mutual interests can “purchase … a continuing injunction.” LULAC, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 846 (5th Cir. 1993). Yet that is precisely what the proposed consent decree seeks. If the parties want “to alter the manner” in which elections are conducted, this Court should send them back to the “bargaining table” until they can come up with something that is actually fair to all sides. Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 983. Better yet, the parties should return to the state legislature—the representative body that Minnesotans have entrusted to enact, suspend, and modify their election laws. See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986). III. The consent decree should be rejected because it unreasonably injures
other parties. Because consent decrees are not mere private contracts between the parties, a “judge has obligations to other litigants … and to members of the public whose interests may not be represented.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338. This Court must reject any consent decree that “affects third parties” where the effect is either “unreasonable” or “proscribed.” Doc. 26 at 2 (quoting City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441). Intervenors, moreover, can outright “block approval of a consent decree” if it “adversely affects” their “legal rights or interests.” Johnson, 393 F.3d at 1107. “[T]he mere threat of injury to [legal] rights [is] … sufficient.” Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 982.
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The proposed consent decree directly threatens the legal rights and interests of Proposed Intervenor-Defendants, their members, and other Minnesota voters. The Minnesota legislature enacted the witness requirement to deter fraud and to promote the integrity of elections. Supra I.C.ii. Removing this requirement—particularly for an election with “unprecedented levels” of absentee voting, Doc. 15 at 10—poses a serious threat that fraudulent or otherwise ineligible ballots will be cast.
As Justice Stevens stated in Crawford, “the risk of voter fraud”—particularly with “absentee ballots”—is “real.” Id. at 195-96; accord Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1130-31 (“Voting fraud is a serious problem in U.S. elections … and it is facilitated by absentee voting.”); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding broad “agreement that voter fraud actually takes place in abundance in connection with absentee balloting”); Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *18 (Ho, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly found that mail-in ballots are particularly susceptible to fraud.”). Groups from across the political spectrum “acknowledge that, when election fraud occurs, it usually arises from absentee ballots.” Morley, Election Emergency Redlines 2, bit.ly/3aIqiPK. “[E]lection officials can neither exercise control over absentee ballots once they are mailed out to voters, nor ensure that they have been received and cast by the voters entitled to do so.” Id. at 5. Stated differently, “absentee voting is to voting in person as a take-home exam is to a proctored one.” Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1131.
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The 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform, co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker, concluded that expanding mail-in voting “increase[s] the risks of fraud.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 35, bit.ly/2KF3WUE (Carter-Baker Report). True, a few States already have allmail voting. But those States took years to build the proper infrastructure; they didn’t “just flip a switch” in the middle of a pandemic. Washington: Where Everyone Votes by Mail, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2020), nyti.ms/3ektSlI. These States have only “avoided significant fraud,” according to the Carter-Baker Commission, because they “introduc[ed] safeguards to protect ballot integrity, including signature verification.” Carter-Baker Report 35. “[W]here the safeguards for ballot integrity are weaker,” as they would be under the proposed consent decree, “[v]ote by mail is … likely to increase the risks of fraud.” Id.
Increased fraud and abuse will, in turn, harm the rights of Proposed Intervenor-Defendants, their members, and other Minnesotans. The constitutional right to vote includes, not just the right to “cast … ballots,” but also the right to “have them counted.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). An individual’s vote “won’t count if it’s cancelled by a fraudulent vote—as the Supreme Court has made clear in case after case.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *18 (Ho, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)); accord Reynolds v. Sims, 77 U.S. 533, 554-55 & n.29 (1964). “Every voter …, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a
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right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being distorted by fraudulently cast votes.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 227 (1974). Whether the dilution is “‘in greater or less degree is immaterial.’” Id. at 226. Because “voting fraud impairs the right of legitimate voters to vote by diluting their votes,” the consent decree is “an impairment of the right to vote.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007).
Even if the consent decree would not cause any ineligible ballots or vote dilution—an unlikely prospect given the expected surge in absentee voting and the large number of voters that Proposed Intervenor-Defendants represent—removing “‘safeguards’” that help “‘deter or detect fraud’” and “‘confirm the identity of voters’” undermines “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197 (quoting Carter-Baker Report 18). So do court orders that are issued close to the election. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5. “Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones,” or who are confused by last-minute court orders, “will feel disenfranchised.” Id. at 4. That “debasement” denies “the right of suffrage … just as effectively as … wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id.
Plaintiffs might argue that these harms are inevitable, since a similar consent decree has been entered in one of the state-court cases. See Doc. 28 (alerting the Court to the consent decree in LaRose v. Simon, No. 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020)). But the Republican Party has moved for intervention in that case too. If that consent decree stands, its approval weighs against approving this one. Given the risk
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of “overlapping and perhaps inconsistent commands,” it would be “particularly inappropriate” for this Court to enter a consent decree when “[m]uch of the relief requested here has been provided by [another consent] decree.” United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1975). At the very least, such an overlapping decree would not be a worthwhile “commitment of the court’s limited resources.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338.
CONCLUSION For all these reasons, and any other reasons this Court deems persuasive in its discretion, the proposed consent decree should be rejected.

Dated: June 20, 2020
Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 45 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO INTERVENE

INTRODUCTION Defendant, the Secretary of State, opposes the motion to intervene filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (collectively, “Proposed Intervenors”) because Proposed Intervenors have not demonstrated a viable basis to participate in this litigation as a party under the standard for either mandatory or permissive intervention in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Proposed Intervenors’ request for mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) should be denied because they cannot satisfy the requirements of that rule. First, Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention is untimely. They waited to file their motion for intervention in this time-sensitive case involving election laws that govern voting for the August 2020 primary that will be begin on June 26, 2020 until after the original parties had negotiated and signed a consent decree and sought approval from the court for that

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 45 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 20
decree. Second, Proposed Intervenors’ claimed interest in the general integrity of Minnesota elections is not a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation sufficient to support intervention under Rule 24(a). Third, because the Secretary has already begun implementing the partial consent decree in order to comply with a ruling from the Ramsey County District Court, any interests of Proposed Intervenors will not be impaired by disposition of this case. Finally, Proposed Intervenors have failed to meet their substantial burden of demonstrating that the Secretary’s representation of their interests is inadequate.
Proposed Intervenors’ request for permissive intervention fails for many of the same reasons. Additionally, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny permissive intervention because the proposed intervention will only cause delay and prejudice to the original parties in this litigation where expeditious resolution is imperative. For these reasons, the Secretary respectfully requests that the Court deny Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this action on May 19, 2020 challenging the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, which requires that, to vote by absentee ballot, a Minnesota voter must fill out his or her ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. (Dkt. 1.) Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 also requires that the witness be registered to vote in Minnesota or be a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that enforcement of this Witness
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Requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote and denies certain Minnesota voters equal protection. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 93-112.)
On May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Witness Requirement for both the August Primary and November General Elections. (Dkts. 13, 15.) On June 9, 2020, the Secretary filed an answer. (Dkt. 22.) Thereafter, the parties met and conferred regarding the pending motion for preliminary injunction. As set forth in more detail in Defendant’s accompanying Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, following arms’ length negotiations, the parties entered into a partial consent decree whereby the Secretary agreed not to enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary with respect to registered voters. On June 16, 2020, that consent decree was filed with the Court. (Dkt. 24.)
A similar consent decree was filed that same day in Ramsey County District Court, in a lawsuit bringing similar claims regarding the Witness Requirement that has been pending since May 13, 2020. The Ramsey County District Court judge approved that consent decree (the “LaRose consent decree”), pursuant to which the Secretary has agreed not to enforce the Witness Requirement for purposes of the August Primary.
Four days after the partial consent decree was filed with this Court, Proposed Intervenors filed their motion seeking intervention. (Dkt. 37.)1
1 Proposed Intervenors have now sought to intervene in the Ramsey County District Court action. Their motion for intervention in those proceedings was filed after the
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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ARGUMENT2 “The Supreme Court has often emphasized that a lawsuit in federal court is not a
forum for the airing of interested onlookers’ concerns, nor an arena for public-policy
debates.” Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[w]hile Rule 24
promotes judicial economy by facilitating, where constitutionally permissible, the
participation of interested parties in others’ lawsuits, the fact remains that a federal case
is a limited affair, and not everyone with an opinion is invited to attend.” Id. Even a
cursory review of Proposed Intervenors’ motion demonstrates that they seek to use Rule
24 solely for an improper purpose—to engage in a public-policy debate regarding the
best means to ensure the integrity of Minnesota elections. Proposed Intervenors’ last-
minute effort to thwart the impact of a negotiated consent decree that has already been
entered by a state court judge, on the eve of an election, during the midst of a global
pandemic, fails to satisfy the requirements of either mandatory or permissive
_________________________________ (Footnote Continued from Previous Page)
Ramsey County District Court approved and entered the LaRose consent decree and remains pending. (See Dkt. 28-1.) 2 As set forth in Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, the Court should consider the mootness arguments raised therein before considering the motion to intervene. Because Proposed Intervenors seek intervention based on Plaintiffs’ requested relief related to the August Primary, which is now moot, the Court need not reach the merits of Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene. See, e.g., Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-CV-03075-JSC, 2015 WL 4537533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider motion to intervene where stipulated dismissal divested the court of jurisdiction over the case, and there was no live case or controversy into which the party could intervene).
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intervention. Accordingly, the Secretary respectfully requests that the motion to

intervene be denied.

I.

PROPOSED INTERVENORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MANDATORY

INTERVENTION.

A party seeking mandatory intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24(a) must make a timely application for intervention and establish that “(1) it has a

recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the interest might be

impaired by the disposition of the case; and (3) the interest will not be adequately

protected by the existing parties.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d

783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

A. Proposed Intervenors’ Request For Intervention Is Untimely.

If a motion for intervention is not timely filed, “the applicant is barred from

intervening.” United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995).

“The timeliness of a motion to intervene is determined from the totality of the

circumstances.” Winbush v. State of Iowa by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1479

(8th Cir. 1995). In determining whether a motion for intervention is timely, courts

consider four factors, including, (1) “how far the litigation has progressed at the time of

the motion for intervention”; (2) “the prospective intervenor’s prior knowledge of the

pending action”; (3) “the reason for the delay in seeking intervention”; and (4) “the

likelihood of prejudice to the parties in the action.” United States v. Ritchie Special

Credit Invs., Ltd., 620 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2010). Consideration of these factors

demonstrates that Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention is untimely.

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First, although this litigation has not been pending for a significant period of time, the litigation had substantially progressed by the time the Proposed Intervenors brought their motion for intervention. See Ark. Elec. Energy Consumers v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 772 F.2d 401, 403 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of motion for intervention filed only twelve days after commencement of the lawsuit where “because of the expedited nature of the proceedings, a substantial amount of the litigation had been completed during these twelve days”); Winbush, 66 F.3d at 1479 (noting the relevant inquiry is “the status of the proceedings at the time of the motion” for intervention). When Proposed Intervenors filed their motion, Plaintiffs had filed their complaint as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction. The Secretary had answered. And—most importantly—by the time Proposed Intervenors filed their motion for intervention the parties had already negotiated, agreed to, and sought Court approval of a consent decree that resolves Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety with respect to the conduct of the August Primary.
The circumstances of this case are therefore distinguishable from those in the cases cited by Proposed Intervenors where motions for intervention were deemed timely where no consent decrees were at issue and the motions were filed before significant proceedings had occurred. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012) (finding motion for intervention filed after court resolved motion for judgment on the pleadings timely and noting the parties did “not contest timeliness of the” motion); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (D.S.D. 2011) (motion for intervention timely less than a month after complaint was filed and immediately after court granted motion for preliminary injunction but no consent decree
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had been filed); S. D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. South Dakota, 189 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D.S.D.
1999) (motion for intervention timely where “only a complaint and answer had been
filed”).3 Indeed, the only cases cited by Proposed Intervenors that actually involved
consent decrees support denial of their motion as untimely. In United States v. Union
Electric Company, 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995) the court found a motion for
intervention timely where it was filed three months prior to the original parties’ motion
for entry of the consent decree, not several days after as Proposed Intervenors did here.
Similarly, in United States EPA v. City of Green Forest, Arkansas, 921 F.2d 1394, 1402
(8th Cir. 1990) the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to
intervene brought after a consent decree was filed.4
Second, it is undisputed that Proposed Intervenors had knowledge of the litigation
and their supposed interest in it. Proposed Intervenors themselves point to the news
3 The same is true of the other COVID-19 related election law challenges Proposed Intervenors cite. Those cases also allowed intervention sought at an early stage, not after the filing of a consent decree. See, e.g., Issa v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-01044, 2020 WL 3074351, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (“Both the Issa and RNC Plaintiffs filed their Complaints on May 21 and 24, 2020, respectively, and the Proposed Intervenors filed the Motions to Intervene on June 3, 2020. To date, no substantive proceedings have occurred . . . .”); Priorities USA v. Nessel, Case No. 19-13341, 2020 WL 2615504, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020) (finding motions to intervene timely that were filed “while this case was still in its pleading stages, before the briefing on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary and permanent injunction and Nessel’s motion to dismiss was complete”); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 320CV00243, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (“Proposed Intervenors moved for intervention within six days from the filing of the action and before the reply brief in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is due. . . .”). 4 The Eighth Circuit ultimately remanded on the issue of intervention, but solely for “the limited purpose of permitting the citizens group to seek attorneys’ fees.” 921 F.2d at 1402.
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coverage received by the litigation. (Dkt. 41 at 2.) And as the basis for their objections to the partial consent decree, Proposed Intervenors describe at length how closely they have followed the efforts of Democrats to change voting requirements in Congress and the Minnesota Legislature as well as the Secretary’s role in those efforts. (See, e.g., Dkt. 41 at 1.) Despite knowing of the litigation, however, Proposed Intervenors made the choice to wait and see what would happen and only chose to intervene after the parties filed a consent decree with which Proposed Intervenors did not agree. This is not an explanation for delay sufficient to satisfy the timeliness requirement of Rule 24(a). In Dalton v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *3 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019), for example, the court found a motion for intervention untimely where the Attorney General did not seek to intervene “until a day after the motion for entry of the consent judgment was filed.” Like Proposed Intervenors here, the Attorney General argued in Dalton that “he did not intervene sooner because he did not know until he saw the proposed consent judgment that the parties would enter into a settlement agreement that would be adverse to the State and its Attorney General.” Id. The court, however, rejected that argument explaining that “the relevant question is when he would have been on notice that there was a risk that his interests would not be adequately protected by the MSPD Defendants.” Id.
Although the Secretary maintains that he has been an adequate representative throughout this litigation, Proposed Intervenors apparent bases for believing he is not long pre-date the June 16 filing of the partial consent decree. For example, Proposed Intervenors insinuate inadequate representation and collusion because the Secretary made
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efforts to get legislation passed that would relax absentee-voting rules and is “a member of the League of Women Voters.” (Dkt. 41 at 27.) Because Proposed Intervenors were aware of the facts that they now contend make the Secretary an inadequate representative, there was no reason for them to wait until the consent decree was filed before seeking to intervene to protect their own asserted interests. See Floyd v. City of N.Y., 770 F.3d 1051, 1059 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding intervention untimely where proposed intervenors “should have know that their interests might not be adequately represented” in advance of settlement); Patriot Party of Pa. v. Mitchell, No. Civ. A. 93-2257, 1993 WL 466522, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1993) (finding motion to intervene untimely where Republican Party was aware of the proceeding but took a “‘wait and see’ approach”).
Finally, the likelihood of prejudice to Plaintiffs and the Secretary if Proposed Intervenors’ motion is granted is significant and weighs in favor of finding Proposed Intervenors’ motion to be untimely. Courts routinely hold that “[o]nce parties have invested time and effort into settling a case it would be prejudicial to allow intervention.” State v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979, 986-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. Illinois, 140 S. Ct. 82 (2019); see also R&G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (“By the time that Doral moved to intervene, the original parties had forged a settlement of their dispute. Because Doral’s proposed intervention was aimed at disrupting that settlement, the harms that intervention would have worked to the original parties was manifest.”); Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 254 F. App’x 769, 771 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of motion for intervention as untimely when filed
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one day prior to the district court’s approval of a consent decree); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We have observed that jeopardizing a settlement agreement causes prejudice to the existing parties to a lawsuit.”); Minor I Doe ex rel. Parent I Doe v. Sch. Bd. for Santa Rosa Cnty., Fla., 264 F.R.D. 670, 688-89 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[R]arely will a motion to intervene be deemed timely where the proposed intervention seeks to undo settlement negotiations that have already culminated in a consent decree.”). Here, Plaintiffs and the Secretary have negotiated the terms of a partial consent decree that the Secretary has already begun to put in place pursuant to the Ramsey County District Court ruling. That partial consent decree resolves Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction with respect to the August Primary and allows the Secretary time to administer absentee voting consistently for that election. Proposed Intervenors’ efforts to upset those negotiations and undermine the certainty afforded by the partial consent decree should be rejected.
B. Proposed Intervenors Do Not Have A Recognized Interest In the Subject Matter Of The Litigation.
Proposed Intervenors claim a recognized interest in the litigation based on their interest in the “continued enforcement of state laws governing witness requirements, absentee ballots, and voter identification, as those laws are designed to serve the integrity of [the] election process.” (Dkt. 38 at 7.) More specifically, Proposed Intervenors explain that they have an interest in the litigation regarding the challenge to the Witness Requirement because “Movants’ candidates actively seek [election or] reelection in contests governed by the challenged rules.” (Id.) But a recognized interest in the subject
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matter of the litigation sufficient to support mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) must rise to the level of “a legally protectable interest.” Curry v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1999). Interests that are “speculative” are insufficient; they must be “direct, substantial and legally protectable.” Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1998). Similarly, “[a]n undifferentiated generalized interest in the outcome of an ongoing action is too porous a foundation on which to premise intervention as of right.” Dalton v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *4 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019).
Proposed Intervenors’ asserted interest is simply a perceived partisan interest in maintaining what they believe to be a favorable landscape in Minnesota’s elections— regardless of whether voters and Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights may be violated by restrictions within that landscape in the context of COVID-19. In other words, unlike Plaintiffs, Proposed Intervenors do not claim that their own legally protectable constitutional rights would be violated if the Witness Requirement is not enforced. Instead, they claim only a preference for their candidates to seek election or reelection where all Minnesota absentee voters must be physically present before a witness in order to complete their August Primary ballot.5 Taken to its logical conclusion, Proposed
5 To be clear, the interest asserted by Proposed Intervenors is based on nothing more than a perceived partisan advantage. The partial consent decree applies equally to all Minnesota voters who choose to vote absentee by eliminating the requirement of finding a witness. Nor does the partial consent decree alter the voting landscape in a manner that prejudices any voters. Voters remain free to vote in person and voters remain equally free to complete their absentee ballots in the presence of a witness. Proposed Intervenors
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Intervenors’ argument would mean that any political party, any organization involved in supporting candidates, or even anyone who votes would be entitled to intervene as of right in any lawsuit impacting an election or voting right.
Proposed Intervenors rely upon Issa v. Newsom, No. 220CV01044, 2020 WL 3074351, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020), but that case actually highlights the generalized nature of the Proposed Intervenors’ interest asserted here. In Issa, plaintiffs sought to enjoin an executive order implementing all-mail balloting in a California election. Democratic committees and campaigns moved to intervene citing as protectable interests, among others “asserting the rights of their members to vote safely without risking their health” and “advancing their overall electoral prospects.” Id. Here, Proposed Intervenors do not assert that the voting rights of any of their members will be burdened. In fact, the relief sought in this litigation does not force any voter to change the way they wish to vote. Voters in Minnesota, including those who will vote for Republican candidates, can still vote in person. And they can also still choose to complete an absentee ballot in front of and have it be certified by a witness. Nor do Proposed Intervenors assert that relaxation of the Witness Requirement will make it harder for Republican candidates to be elected.6 Accordingly, Proposed Intervenors have failed to assert a recognized interest
_________________________________ (Footnote Continued from Previous Page)
have presented no evidence that a relaxation of the Witness Requirement somehow disadvantages their candidates. 6 The other cases cited by Proposed Intervenors are similarly inapposite. In Citizens United v. Gessler, No. 14-cv-002266, 2014 WL 4549001 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) the parties did not dispute the proposed intervenors’ interest in the litigation and instead
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in the particular subject matter of this lawsuit—which entails only a challenge to the
enforcement of the Witness Requirement—sufficient to support mandatory intervention.
C. Any Interest Of Proposed Intervenors Cannot Be Impaired By Disposition Of This Case.
Even if Proposed Intervenors had identified an interest warranting mandatory
intervention, their motion still fails because they cannot identify any impairment by
disposition of this case. Proposed Intervenors assert impairment of their interests on the
basis that “[i]f this court enters the consent decree, then the rules surrounding absentee
ballots will be upended just weeks before the August primary” and claim that due to the
expedited nature of elections “this proceeding might be the only time that Movants can
litigate the consent decree.” (Dkt. 38 at 8-9.) But Proposed Intervenors’ argument
fundamentally ignores this Court’s role and their own role with respect to the partial
consent decree and enforcement of the Witness Requirement.
_________________________________ (Footnote Continued from Previous Page)
disputed intervention on other grounds. Moreover, Citizens United involved a challenge to Colorado’s disclosure and reporting scheme that the political party used to develop strategy, learn who was speaking about its candidates, and determine how to formulate responses, none of which are analogous to the interests asserted by Proposed Intervenors here. Shays v. Federal Election Commission, 414 F.3d 76, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005) did not involve intervention at all. Instead, Shays found that two individual candidates had standing where the at-issue campaign finance restrictions would “harm Shays’s and Meehan’s electoral prospects.” Id. As for Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, No. 04CV-1055, 2005 WL 8162665 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005), Proposed Intervenors fail to mention that no party opposed intervention in that case, the court concluded that it was “debatable whether the Ohio Republican Party has an interest in the outcome of the case which differs from the interest of either the Ohio Secretary of State or the respective County Boards of Elections,” and ultimately the court granted only permissive, not mandatory, intervention. Id. at *2.
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First, tellingly absent from Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention is any mention of the Ramsey County District Court action, in which Judge Grewing has already entered a consent decree pursuant to which the Secretary has agreed not enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. As set forth in the Secretary’s accompanying Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, the existence of the LaRose consent decree—and the fact that the Secretary has already begun taking action to effectuate it—moots Plaintiffs’ claims for relief with respect to the August Primary. The LaRose consent decree also moots Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention because it is based on a purported injury that will be caused if “this court enters the consent decree.” (Dkt. 38 at 8.) But that “injury” has already occurred—the “rules surrounding absentee ballots” have already been changed due to operation of the LaRose consent decree. Thus, Proposed Intervenors’ intervention in this lawsuit will do nothing to protect the interests they claim are being impaired. See Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 266 (D. Minn. 2017) (noting that “the Eighth Circuit requires that prospective Rule 24(a) intervenors demonstrate the existence of an Article III case or controversy.”).7
7 In addition to mooting the basis for Proposed Intervenors’ motion, the LaRose consent decree deprives them of the standing they must show in order to intervene. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009). “To show Article III standing, a [party] has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). At a minimum, Proposed Intervenors cannot show that any injury “likely will be redressed by a favorable decision,” because even if the Court declines to enter the partial consent decree, the Secretary is still bound by the
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Second, contrary to Proposed Intervenors’ unsupported assertion, denying intervention would not impair their interests because even if they are allowed to intervene “they would not be able to block entry of the consent decree.” D.C. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d 227, 233-34 (D.D.C. 2011); see also United States v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 42, 47 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[I]t is well settled that the right to have its objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the right to block any settlement to which it objects.”). Here, Proposed Intervenors have already had the opportunity to be heard with respect to their objections to the partial consent decree, including through their submission of a 35-page brief in which they set forth those objections in detail. Intervention will not provide Proposed Intervenors with any additional rights vis-à-vis the partial consent decree. See Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (denying intervention where proposed intervenors “will be able to present their critiques of the consent decree to the Court and because they could not block the consent decree even if intervention were granted”); see also Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no prejudice from denying motion for intervention where complained-of preliminary injunction “would presumably remain in effect if intervention were granted”).
_________________________________ (Footnote Continued from Previous Page)
LaRose consent decree not to enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011) (determining redressability factor was met because applicants’ alleged injury, impairment of religious freedom, would be redressed by a judicial determination).
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D. Proposed Intervenors’ Interests Are Adequately Represented. Finally, Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention fails because their interests are adequately represented by the Secretary. Proposed Intervenors claim that they bear only a “minimal burden of showing that [their] interests are not adequately represented by the parties.” (Dkt. 38 at 10.) But the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly presumed that defense of a lawsuit by a state official is adequate as a matter of law “because in such cases the government is presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens.” N.D. ex rel. Stenehjem v. United States, 787 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2015); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996). This presumption of adequacy can be rebutted only “by a showing that the applicant’s interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interests of the citizens.” Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, Proposed Intervenors do not seriously dispute that the Secretary shares their asserted interests in ensuring the integrity of the election process, ensuring voters can cast ballots “with confidence and without confusion,” and “preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections.” (Dkt. 38 at 6-7.) Instead, Proposed Intervenors claim inadequacy of representation based solely on the Secretary’s decision to enter into a partial consent decree instead of litigating the motion for preliminary injunction with respect to the August Primary on the merits. “It is not sufficient,” however, “that the party seeking intervention merely disagrees with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing its interests.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, courts have explained that the existence of a consent decree alone is not sufficient to establish inadequate representation. See Dalton
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v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *8 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019) (finding no inadequacy of representation where parties entered into proposed consent decree); Com. of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976) (consent decree did not establish inadequate representation, explaining “[t]hat (intervenors) would have been less prone to agree to the facts and would have taken a different view of the applicable law does not mean that the (defendants) did not adequately represent their interests in the litigation”). II. PROPOSED INTERVENORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for permissive intervention is wholly discretionary.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). In deciding whether to grant permissive intervention, courts consider “(1) whether the motion to intervene is timely; (2) whether the applicant’s claim shares a question of law or fact in common with the main action; and (3) whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012). “The principal consideration in ruling on a Rule 24(b) motion is whether the proposed intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the parties’ rights.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett, 317 F.3d at 787. Here, in addition to being untimely for the reasons explained above, supra § I.A., Proposed Intervenors’ request for permissive intervention should be denied because it threatens to inject delay into time-sensitive proceedings and prejudice the original parties by undermining the benefit of having entered into a partial consent decree. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012)
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(denying permissive intervention because it would cause delay, unnecessary complication, and because the interests of the intervenor were adequately represented); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, No. CV 12-3043, 2013 WL 12074954, at *12 (D. Minn. May 28, 2013) (denying permissive intervention when the third-party lacked standing, had only speculative injury, and their interests were adequately represented by the government).
Absentee voting for the August Primary begins on June 26, 2020. Although Proposed Intervenors were aware of that timeline, they chose to wait to bring a motion for intervention until June 20. Further delay occasioned by the proposed intervention— not the partial consent decree—threatens to undermine the certainty of the rules applicable to absentee voting for the August Primary. Under similar circumstances, courts deny requests for permissive intervention. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. N.Y., 413 U.S. 345, 369 (1973) (“[I]n view of the then rapidly approaching primary elections in New York . . . the granting of a motion to intervene possessed the potential for seriously disrupting the State’s electoral process . . . .”); Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 515 F. App’x 539, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that due to the approaching November election “[a]llowing the applicants’ intervention will prejudice the existing parties and will inhibit, not promote, a prompt resolution”); Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 257 F.R.D. 236, 259 (D.N.M. 2008) (denying permissive intervention where “the deadline for book-closing
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preceding the general election is fast approaching” and therefore it was “important to avoid any unnecessary delays”).8
Intervention here will do nothing more than potentially delay the Secretary’s ability to administer Minnesota’s elections while ensuring that voting regulations are applied consistently. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying intervention that would “upset the delicate balance achieved” by consent decree); D.C. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d 227, 236-37 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying intervention where it would “undermine part of the benefit of entering into a consent decree” including implementing the remedy “expeditiously”); United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 576-77 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (denying intervention where it would “render the negotiations between the original parties a waste of time and stall the implementation of the remedy designed to benefit the public health and safety”).
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Secretary respectfully requests that the Court deny Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene in its entirety.
8 The expedited timeline for this election law challenge differs markedly from the circumstances in Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Minn. 2017), which Proposed Intervenors cite repeatedly as a basis for permissive intervention. When intervention was sought in Franconia, the case was “in its earliest stages.” Id. Moreover, the case was proceeding on a timeframe for typical civil litigation. Therefore, Franconia Minerals has no bearing on the propriety of intervention in a case like the present one where the at-issue statutes impact an election that begins in four days.
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Dated: June 22, 2020

s/ Hillary A. Taylor JASON MARISAM (#0398187) CICELY R. MILTICH (#0392902) HILLARY A. TAYLOR (#0398557) Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128 (651) 757-1275 (Phone) (651) 282-5832 (Fax) jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us cicely.miltich@ag.state.mn.us hillary.taylor@ag.state.mn.us
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 46 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)

Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSED
INTERVENOR’S OBJECTIONS TO PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

The context for the partial consent decree before the Court is not partisan politics,

as Proposed Intervenors portray it, but instead a global pandemic and the health of

Minnesota voters. Over the past few months, Minnesota has been responding to the

COVID-19 public health crisis, which has affected almost every sector and situation,

including elections. While the State has been under Peacetime Emergency executive

powers and orders, the State has partnered with entities to ramp up testing, acquire

personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and ventilators, and make ICU beds available.

The danger has not passed, however. In fact, 636 Minnesotans have died of COVID-19

since Plaintiffs filed suit on May 19. (Declaration of Hillary Taylor (“Taylor Decl.”), ¶

3.) The total number of Minnesotans hospitalized continues to climb steadily, with the

number hospitalized standing at 3,830 on June 22. (Id.) In hopes of keeping

Minnesotans healthy while researchers develop more effective treatments for the virus

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 46 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 23
and a vaccine, Governor Tim Walz and other elected officials, including the Secretary of State, have encouraged Minnesotans to stay home as much as possible.
With COVID-19 spreading in Minnesota, the Secretary has recognized in legislative testimony that the “administration of elections has become a public health issue.”1 The Secretary has been emphatic that: “No one should have to choose between their health and their right to vote.”2 However, designing an election during a pandemic is no easy task. The Secretary has noted: “There are a number of costs, variables, and trade-offs to consider, and planning at all levels of government will be crucial.” Id.
It is in this context that the Secretary and Plaintiffs entered into the partial consent decree on June 16, 2020, which suspended enforcement of the Minnesota’s witness requirement for the August 11, 2020 primary election, for which early voting begins this week on June 26. However, as further detailed below, the Secretary respectfully requests the Court abstain from ruling on the partial consent decree, because the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree approved on June 17, 2020, provides for all the relief that Plaintiffs could obtain from the Secretary on this issue.
To the extent the Court reaches the issue of analyzing the partial consent decree, Defendant requests the decree be approved because it is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in 1 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, Secretary Simon Introduces Plans for an Election in a Pandemic (April 7, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/aboutthe-office/news-room/secretary-simon-introduces-plan-for-elections-in-a-pandemic/ (last accessed June 21, 2020). 2 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, Secretary Simon Statement on Elections amid COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/aboutthe-office/news-room/secretary-simon-statement-on-elections-amid-covid-19-pandemic/ (last accessed June 21, 2020).
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the public interest. Imagine an elderly voter who lives alone. The Proposed Intervenors would require that voter to risk her life to cast a ballot—either by waiting in line at a polling place or by finding a qualified individual outside her home to come witness her fill out her absentee ballot. The parties in this case negotiated a fair and reasonable consent decree that would allow such voters to safely cast their absentee ballots in the upcoming primary election.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus that spreads rapidly through respiratory transmission. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1.) Asymptomatic individuals may carry and spread the virus and there is currently no known vaccine or effective treatment, making response efforts complex and daunting. (Id., Exs. 1-2.) On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Id., Ex. 3.) As of June 22, 2020, 33,227 Minnesotans have tested positive for COVID-19 and 1,384 have died. (Id. ¶ 3.) The virus has claimed over 119,615 lives in the United States since January 22, 2020. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.) II. MINNESOTA’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19.
In response to the COVID-19 public health crisis, Governor Walz declared a peacetime emergency on March 13, 2020. (Id., Ex. 7.) That same day, the President declared a National Emergency, and—for the first time in history—the President has approved major disaster declarations in all 50 states. (Id., Exs. 5-6.) Minnesota has engaged in a comprehensive plan to combat COVID-19 that includes slowing the spread
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of the disease, protecting the capacity of the state’s medical system to respond to the disease, and ensuring the continued operation of critical sectors to protect the public’s access to necessary services and supplies. See Emergency Executive Orders 20-02 through 20-63, 20-66, 20-70, and 20-73 through 20-74.3
Because COVID-19 is primarily spread from person-to-person contact, limiting contact between people is the most effective way to slow the spread of COVID-19. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 8.) Governor Walz issued stay-at-home orders in March and April, directing Minnesotans to stay home through May 17, 2020, except to engage in essential activities, certain types of outdoor recreation, or work in critical sectors. See Emergency Executive Orders 20-20, 20-33, and 20-48. On May 13, 2020, Governor Walz issued Executive Order 20-56 to continue safely reopening Minnesota beginning May 18, 2020. On June 5, 2020, Governor Walz signed Executive Order 20-74, implementing the third phase of the safe and gradual reopening of Minnesota businesses while recognizing the increasing risks this entails. Even under the current “Stay Safe” Minnesota Order, at-risk and vulnerable Minnesotans are strongly encouraged to stay home and exercise extreme caution to minimize the risk of COVID-19 infection. Minnesota remains under the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Order, most recently extended through July 13. Executive Order 20-75.
3 All of Minnesota’s Emergency Executive Orders regarding COVID-19 are available online at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/execorders/eoresults?gov=44.
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III. MINNESOTA’S ABSENTEE WITNESS REQUIREMENT. Eligible voters in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot, so long as they comply
with the requirements. Minnesota Statutes, section 203B.07, sets out the requirements for counties to prepare absentee ballots and for voters to mark them. The Secretary of State establishes the directions that must accompany absentee ballots. See Minn. R. 8210.0500-.0600. Minnesota statute provides that the counties “prepare, print, and transmit a return envelope, a ballot envelope, and a copy of the directions for casting an absentee ballot to each applicant whose application for absentee ballots is accepted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. The absentee ballot must include a certificate of eligibility. Id. § 203B.07, subd. 3. The certificate must contain a space for a witness to sign to attest to three facts: “(1) the ballots were displayed to that individual unmarked; (2) the voter marked the ballots in that individual’s presence without showing how they were marked, or, if the voter was physically unable to mark them, that the voter directed another individual to mark them; and (3) if the voter was not previously registered, the voter has provided proof of residence as required by section 201.061, subdivision 3.” Id. The witness who signs the certificate must be “registered to vote in Minnesota or [be] a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths” (the “Witness Requirement”).4 Id.
4 People authorized to administer oaths include “[a]ll persons holding office under any law of this state, or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal corporation thereof.” Minn. Stat. § 358.10(a).
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Absentee ballots are returned, by mail or in person, to the proper county auditor or municipal clerk. Id. § 203B.08, subd. 1. These local officials, in turn, transmit the absentee ballots to the local ballot board. Id., subd. 3. The ballot board is the local government body with the responsibility of accepting or rejecting absentee ballots. Id. § 203B.121.
Under Minnesota law, early and absentee voting begins election begins 46 days before the date of the election, which is June 26, 2020 for the August Primary. Id. § 203B.081, subd. 1. And absentee instructions, ballots, and envelopes, including the certificate of eligibility, must be prepared in time to have a supply for every precinct available to cover absentee voting prior to that date. Id. § 204B.35. IV. THE SECRETARY IS DEFENDING SEVERAL OTHER CHALLENGES TO ELECTION
STATUTES THIS YEAR. The Secretary is defending a number of cases challenging election laws which have arisen prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary’s response to all cases has been to evaluate the merits of each challenge, and determine whether the law and facts support defending the statutes at issue, or whether it would be fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest to enter into a consent decree. The most relevant and recent cases include:  Schroeder v. Simon, 62-CV-19-7440, A20-0272 (Minn. Dist. Ct. and Minn. Ct.
App.) (served Oct. 21, 2019). In this case, affected Minnesotans challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota’s felony disenfranchisement statutes. The Secretary is defending the statutes and filed a motion for summary judgment;  Pavek v. Simon, No. 19-CV-3000 (SRN/DTS) (D. Minn.) (filed Nov. 27, 2019). In this case, two Minnesotans and two Democratic campaign committees challenge the constitutionality of the “Ballot Order” statute, Minn.
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Stat. § 204D.13, subd. 2. The Secretary moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint and opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The court denied the Secretary’s motion to dismiss and granted the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. 2020 WL 3183249, at *30 (D. Minn. June 15, 2020);
 DSCC v. Simon, 62-CV-20-585 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed Jan. 17, 2020). In this case, Democratic campaign committees challenge the constitutionality of aspects of the Voter Assistance Rules in Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, 203B.03.1(a)(7), and 203B.03.2 The Secretary is defending the statutes and filed a motion to dismiss in addition to opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction;
 Thao v. Simon, 62-CV-20-1044 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (served Feb. 11, 2020). In this case, impacted voters and candidates challenged the constitutionality of aspects of the Voter Assistance Rules. Based on precedent, the Secretary entered into a consent decree concerning the at-issue restrictions set forth in Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1 as preempted by the Voting Rights Act;
 LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed May 13, 2020). In this case, four individual Minnesotans and an association challenge the constitutionality of the Witness Requirement and the requirement that mail-in ballots be received on election day by 8:00 pm. The Secretary entered into a consent decree on June 16, 2020, concerning the challenged requirements for the August Primary only for already registered voters, and the dispute is ongoing concerning the General Election;
 NAACP Minn.-Dakotas Area State Conf. v. Simon, 62-CV-3625 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed June 4, 2020). In this case, non-profits challenge the constitutionality of the Witness Requirement and seek universal absentee ballots for both the August Primary and November General Elections. The dispute is ongoing, but the Secretary notes that the LaRose consent decree provides relief for part of Plaintiffs’ claim concerning the primary.
V. PROCEDURAL POSTURE.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality and enforcement of Minnesota’s Witness
Requirement, in general and specifically during the ongoing public health crisis caused
by COVID-19. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on
May 19, 2020. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on May
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29, seeking to enjoin the Witness Requirement for both the August Primary and November General Elections. (Dkts. 13, 15.)
Defendant began researching and drafting his opposition, in addition to filing his Answer on June 9, defending his position and denying many of the allegations. (Dkt. 22.) The parties met and conferred concerning the pending motion and engaged in armslength negotiations during this time. The result of this work is before the Court with the stipulation and partial consent decree, which suspends the Witness Requirement for already registered voters for the August Primary only. (Dkt. 24.) On June 16, the parties submitted the stipulation and partial consent decree for approval as a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of this portion of the case with the public interest in mind. Id. Separately, in a state court matter, Defendant entered into a partial consent decree that suspends the Witness Requirement, which was approved by the court on June 17. (See Dkt. 28-1, LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020).) Proposed Intervenors have moved to intervene in that state court matter.
ARGUMENT I. THE STATE COURT PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE MOOTS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. “It is a firmly entrenched and fundamental principle of law that a cause is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, could not have any practical effect upon the then existing controversy.” Flight Eng’rs Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO, TWA Chapter v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 305 F.2d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted); see Beck v. Mo. State
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High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating that a case becomes moot when a court can no longer grant effective relief). Mootness divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy. Beck, 18 F.3d at 605; see Abdurrahman v. Dayton, 903 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2018).5
A case becomes moot when subsequent developments in other cases, such as consent decrees, mean relief from a court is no longer needed. See Envt’l Conserv. Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2008). In City of Dallas, the Fifth Circuit held that a lawsuit between an environmental group and the City of Dallas became moot after the city entered a consent decree with the Environmental Protection Agency in a separate lawsuit on the same issues. Id. The court explained that, because the consent decree provided the relief requested by the environmental group, it did not make sense for the defendant to be exposed to duplicative orders in two different cases. Id. at 528.
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims concerning the August Primary and the Proposed Intervenors’ objections to the partial consent decree are now moot because the Secretary has entered into a partial consent decree with identical relief on this same issue in state
5 The Court should consider mootness and the justiciability of the present issue before considering the merits of Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene and opposition to the partial consent decree. See S.E.C. v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (It is well settled that “federal courts may act only in the context of a justiciable case or controversy.”); see, e.g., Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-CV-03075-JSC, 2015 WL 4537533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain motion to intervene where stipulated dismissal divested the court of jurisdiction over the case, and there was no live case or controversy into which the party could intervene).
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court. (See Dkt. 28-1, LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020) (approving partial consent decree filed on June 16, 2020).) In the Ramsey County District Court action, the Secretary stipulated that he will not enforce the Witness Requirement with respect to already registered voters for the August Primary only. (Compare LaRose Partial Consent Decree Sec. VI.A. with LWV of MN Partial Consent Decree p. 6 ¶ 1.) The Secretary agreed to also issue guidance to all relevant local election officials and take reasonable steps to inform the public that the Witness Requirement for voting will not be enforced for the August Primary. (Compare LaRose Partial Consent Decree ¶¶ VI.C, E, G with LWV of MN Partial Consent Decree p. 6 ¶¶ 2-4.) Notably, Proposed Intervenors do not dispute this obvious justiciability issue, and admit that “it would be ‘particularly inappropriate’ for this Court to enter a consent decree when ‘[m]uch of the relief requested here has been provided by [another consent] decree.’” (Dkt. 41, Prop. Intervenors’ Opp. at 35.)
Additionally, after the LaRose partial consent decree was approved on June 17, the Secretary has taken steps presently to abide by the decree. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 9.) There is no remaining controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant concerning the August Primary and the enforcement of the Witness Requirement. Because the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree provides for all of the relief that Plaintiffs could obtain from the Secretary on this issue, the Court should abstain from deciding on
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the present partial consent decree and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief as moot.6 II. THE PRINCIPLES OF COLORADO RIVER SUPPORT ABSTENTION.
Even if the request for judicial approval of the parties’ consent decree is not moot, the present circumstance is one in which the Court should abstain from taking any action under the Colorado River doctrine. The Proposed Intervenors acknowledge as much by suggesting that analyzing the consent decree in this action may not be a “worthwhile ‘commitment of the court’s limited resources.’” (Dkt. 41 at 35.) Because the LaRose case was started first and is the more complete action, and the consent decree is approved and being implemented, this court should abstain in favor of the parallel proceeding in state court.
“Colorado River permits federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases where ‘parallel’ state court litigation is pending, meaning that there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.’” Spectra Commc’ns Group, LLC v. City of Cameron, Mo., 806 F.3d 1113,
6 None of the exceptions to mootness exist here. The voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply because Defendant is not merely ceasing the challenged practice. See City of Dallas, 529 F.3d at 527-28. Defendant is subject to the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree. Nor is this an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008). “That exception applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Id. at 735 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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1121 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see generally 17A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4247 (3d ed.) (describing the development of this type of abstention).
A threshold determination is whether the federal and state proceedings are indeed parallel. Proceedings are parallel when there is “a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding matters not parallel because the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over one of plaintiff’s claims). Considerations include “the sources of law, remedies sought, elements of proof, review on appeal, and events giving rise to each cause of action.” Fru-Con Const. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 537 (8th Cir. 2009).
In this case, it is undisputed that the LaRose consent decree does fully dispose of the consent decree entered between the parties to this case. (See supra.) The consent decree here is subsumed by the broader LaRose consent decree. The decrees arise out of the same events (COVID-19) and statutes, the same law, and provide the same relief with respect to the Witness Requirement. Where there are differences, the LaRose case is broader. Furthermore, the Proposed Intervenors have now sought to intervene in both actions. At least with respect to the issue immediately before the Court—the parties’ consent decree—the LaRose consent decree does dispose of the instant consent decree.7
After establishing the two matters are parallel, courts look at six factors to assess whether abstention is appropriate in favor of the state case: 7 Defendant will leave for another day the question of whether the entire cases are sufficiently parallel that this Court should abstain by staying or dismissing the matter.
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(1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., 806 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Ark. Elec. Coops., Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Eighth Circuit’s decision, affirming Colorado River abstention in Spectra Communications, is on all fours with the instant case. In that dispute between a city and telecommunications company, the city had sued the company in state court for failure to pay taxes and fees. Five months later, the company sued the city in federal court, alleging that the city refused to grant it a construction permit unless and until the company was current in its payment of taxes and fees (the company asserted those same claims as counterclaims in the state litigation). The state court granted partial summary judgment for the city on the issue of the propriety of the taxes and fees. The city then moved to have the company’s federal claims dismissed, and the district court dismissed based on abstention principles. Id. at 1117-18. In applying the six factors of Colorado River, the Eighth Circuit noted that the first two were irrelevant in Spectra Communications. However, the “predominant factor”—the risk of piecemeal litigation—was a real concern and weighed in favor of abstention. Id. at 1121. That was true because: a) the state and federal courts involved the same issues, so there was a risk they would reach conflicting opinions; and b) the
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state court action was also the more complete action – it included all the relevant parties and all the relevant claims. Id. at 1122. The fourth factor also favored abstention because the state court was the first to obtain jurisdiction over the parties and had already entered partial summary judgment. Id. Even though the fifth factor weighed against abstention, because the telecom had raised federal preemption issues, the court still found abstention appropriate, especially as the state court could resolve all claims and protect the telecom’s interests. Id.
In this case too, the first two factors are irrelevant. But the most predominant factor, the risk of conflicting opinions, is a real concern. Furthermore, as in Spectra, the LaRose matter was filed first and has already issued its consent decree. While the Plaintiff here raises federal claims, those First and Fourteenth Amendment are claims commonly addressed in state court and the Plaintiff’s interests can be protected there (especially if they seek to intervene). Just as in Spectra Communications, the Court should abstain in favor of the parallel proceeding in Ramsey County District Court. III. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE AND ENTER THE PARTIAL
CONSENT DECREE BECAUSE IT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, REASONABLE, AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Alternatively, if the Court does not abstain, the Court should approve and enter the consent decree because it is a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of the claims concerning the August Primary, and time is of the essence. A consent decree represents the parties’ agreement to compromise a concrete legal dispute on the merits and waive any right to further litigate the covered issues. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971). Consent decrees have
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attributes of both a contract and a judicial decree, and are considered settlement agreements subject to continued judicial oversight. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 524 n.13 (1986); United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1975). Unsurprisingly, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree, nor may it enter a consent decree that attempts to dispose of the claims of a third party, without that party’s agreement. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529. But neither may “an intervenor . . . preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation” certain issues. Id. (noting “while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent”).
The initial decision to approve or reject a consent decree “is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Courts, however, usually exercise this discretion in a limited and deferential manner. See id. In reviewing a proposed consent decree, the Court does not decide the merits of the parties’ dispute. Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A consent decree . . . should be strictly construed to preserve the bargained for position of the parties. A court has no occasion to resolve the merits of the disputed issues or the factual underpinnings of the various legal theories advanced by the parties.” (internal citations omitted)). Rather, the standard the Court applies when reviewing a proposed consent decree is to determine whether the decree is “fair,
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adequate, and reasonable, as well as consistent with the public interest.” United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 1986); see E.E.O.C. v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 666 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom, Makah Indian Tribe v. United States, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). Once the Court has determined the proposed decree is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest, it should approve the decree even if it “provides broader relief than the court could have awarded.” Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525; see Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
It is well established that public policy strongly favors settlements of disputes without litigation. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 776 F.2d 410, 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Randolph, 736 F.2d at 528. Also, judicial deference to negotiated consent decrees is particularly appropriate where the government has entered into a consent decree. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529; see also United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the balancing of interests “must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General”); United States v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating the “Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining what is in the public interest”).
A. The Partial Consent Decree is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. When considering whether a consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts consider a number of factors, such as whether the decree is the result of armslength negotiations, the strength of plaintiffs’ case and likelihood of success, and whether
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the decree represents a reasonable factual and legal determination. United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84, 86 (1st Cir. 1990); Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581. “A court may not withhold approval simply because the benefits accrued from the decree are not what a successful plaintiff would have received in a fully litigated case.” Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 922; see Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581-82; Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525-26. In assessing the decree, the Court must determine whether it falls within the “range of reasonableness,” not whether it is the most favorable possible result for either party in the litigation. See In re Nationwide Fin. Servs. Litig., No. 2:08-CV-00249, 2009 WL 8747486, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2009); UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-CV73991, 2006 WL 891151, at *17 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006).
Here, the parties entered into arms-length negotiations after Plaintiffs filed and fully briefed a motion for a preliminary injunction on an emergency basis. Defendant had no doubt that Plaintiffs could prove that, given the current situation regarding COVID-19, some isolated voters, and in particular those who are immunocompromised or elderly, will likely not be able to safely secure a qualified witness in order to cast absentee ballots for the upcoming primary election. If the absentee witness requirement were enforced, these voters would have to choose between their health and their right to vote.
Defendant was also aware that a federal court in Virginia had recently approved a consent decree suspending that state’s witness requirement for this year’s primary election, and a federal court in South Carolina had recently enjoined that state’s witness
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requirement for its primary. See, e.g., Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-CV-01552, 2020 WL 2617329, at *22 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *10 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020).
The Virginia court succinctly explained why a witness requirement should not be enforced in the time of COVID-19:
In ordinary times, Virginia’s witness signature requirement may not be a significant burden on the right to vote. But these are not ordinary times. In our current era of social distancing-where not just Virginians, but all Americans, have been instructed to maintain a minimum of six feet from those outside their household–the burden is substantial for a substantial and discrete class of Virginia's electorate. During this pandemic, the witness requirement has become both too restrictive and not restrictive enough to effectively prevent voter fraud. League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *8 (quotation marks and citation omitted). While Proposed Intervenors rely on Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020), this case actually supports the partial consent decree because it establishes that reforms or modifications to state election laws due to the COVID-19 pandemic are appropriate. The case involved the issue of whether several election laws in Wisconsin should be altered or suspended for its April 7, 2020 primary election because of the pandemic. The district court had ordered that absentee ballots received six days after the election should be counted, regardless of when they are postmarked. Id. at 1206. The Supreme Court altered the district court’s injunction so that ballots had to be postmarked by Election Day to be counted. Id. at 1208. While the Supreme Court somewhat narrowed the district court’s order, even the
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Supreme Court’s order marked a departure from Wisconsin’s normal election requirement that ballots must be received by election day. Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, recognizing that COVID-19 required an adjustment to the state election requirement, ordered that ballots must be counted if they are postmarked by Election Day and received within six days of Election Day. Id. at 1208. The Court took no position on “whether other reforms or modifications in election procedures in light of COVID–19 are appropriate,” but did not rule them out. Id.
Here, the agreement before the Court is fair, adequate, and reasonable and recognizes the uncertainties and unique pressures of voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Proposed Intervenors’ hostility to state officials’ good faith efforts to find ways to allow voters to safely cast their ballots during this pandemic is remarkable.8 There is nothing fair, adequate, or reasonable about Proposed-Intervenors’ position that voters should have to risk their health and safety to cast a ballot.
8 Proposed Intervenors insinuate collusion because Defendant made efforts to get legislation passed that would relax absentee-voting rules and is “a member of the League of Women Voters.” (Dkt. 41 at 27.) This is a baseless attempt to undermine the propriety of the partial consent decree and the arms-length negotiation between experienced counsel. “Absent evidence to the contrary, the court may presume that settlement negotiations were conducted in good faith and that the resulting agreement was reached without collusion.” League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *11 (citation omitted); see In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“Courts respect the integrity of counsel and presume the absence of fraud or collusion in negotiating the settlement unless evidence to the contrary is offered.”). Also, if the consent decree “itself is fair, reasonable and adequate, then the court may assume that the negotiations were proper and free of collusion.” IUE-CWA v. Gen. Motors Corp., 238 F.R.D. 583, 598 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
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B. The Partial Consent Decree is in the Public Interest. It is clear here that the Defendant, Plaintiffs, and Proposed Intervenors have different views of what the public interest requires. However, as noted above, it is axiomatic that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, as the Chief Legal Officer and Chief Election Officer respectively, “retain considerable discretion” in the defense of these cases and in “determining what is in the public interest.” Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d at 117. Defendant has determined, as other states have, that temporarily suspending the Witness Requirement for the impending primary election promotes the public interest in safeguarding public health. See, e.g., Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *22 (South Carolina); League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *10 (Virginia).9 Like other states, Minnesota has a “legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 932 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2019). However, this interest must be weighed along with other considerations in the midst of a pandemic where officials are called on to remedy dangerous or unhealthy situations and prevent the further spread of disease. The public interest also “favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible.” Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012).
9 Rhode Island’s Governor suspended the state’s witness requirement in advance of the June primary through executive order. See Rhode Island Executive Orders 20-11, 20-27, available at https://governor.ri.gov/newsroom/orders/ (last accessed June 22, 2020).
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As the Court in Thomas acknowledges, “[w]ere it not for the current pandemic, then this element may have cut the other way.” Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *23. But the Witness Requirement subjects some voters to interaction with people outside their household in a way that could impact their health negatively and be in contravention to current state and federal health experts’ guidelines. Since Defendant reasoned after research, investigation, and consideration of a number of options that maintaining the Witness Requirement with absentee voting starting on June 26 would only increase the risk for contracting COVID-19 for many Minnesotans, he entered into this partial consent decree to promote the public interest.
C. The Court May Approve the Partial Consent Decree Over the Proposed Intervenor’s Objections.
Despite Proposed Intervenors arguments, there is no authority for the Proposed Intervenors to “block” this consent decree given their alleged legal interests in the matter. As the Supreme Court has stated:
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that one party—whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or an intervenor—could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 528-29 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court only provides an exception where “nonconsenting intervenors” have brought “valid claims” that are “properly raised.” Id. at 529; see S. California Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807
21

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(9th Cir.) (citing Local No. 93, finding the district court did not exceed its authority by approving the stipulated settlement without the intervenor’s consent). While the Court may permit input from Proposed Intervenors when considering entry of the consent decree, to accord Proposed Intervenors what amounts to a veto based on their claims would effectively preclude settlement of any election law litigation by the Secretary—an illogical and unsupported outcome.
Here, the Proposed Intervenors have not demonstrated that the partial consent decree concretely affects any of their legal rights. “As in Local No. 93, the consent decree here does not bind [Proposed Intervenors] to do or not to do anything, nor does it impose any legal obligations on [Proposed Intervenors].” Johnson v. Lodge #93 of Fraternal Order of Police, 393 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2004); see Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 528-29. Outside of raising a difference of opinion in how they would have defended this matter, the Proposed Intervenors have not presented any claim for relief to the Court, but rather joined the action solely to protest the proposed consent decree. The interests the Proposed Intervenors raise do not amount to the kind of “valid claims” the Supreme Court envisioned in Local No. 93. It is the Secretary of State who is a necessary party to the litigation and consent decree, and who has authority to make the decision to suspend the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1997) (finding in a redistricting case the state should be given the opportunity to make its own decisions so long as that is practically possible, and the state’s attorney general had the authority “to propose the settlement plan” on the
22

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 46 Filed 06/22/20 Page 23 of 23

state’s behalf). Thus, the Court may approve the partial consent decree over the Proposed

Intervenors’ objections.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully submits that this Court no

longer has jurisdiction over the partial consent decree because the issue is moot, or at

least that the Court should abstain from passing on the partial consent decree’s

appropriateness. To the extent the Court reaches the issue of analyzing the partial

consent decree, Defendant requests the decree be approved because it is fair, adequate,

reasonable, and in the public interest.

Dated: June 22, 2020

KEITH ELLISON Attorney General State of Minnesota

s/ Hillary A. Taylor JASON MARISAM (#0398187) CICELY R. MILTICH (#0392902) HILLARY A. TAYLOR (#0398557) Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131 (651) 757-1275 (Voice) (651) 282-5832 (Fax) jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us cicely.miltich@ag.state.mn.us hillary.taylor@ag.state.mn.us
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON

23

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)
DECLARATION OF HILLARY TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S OBJECTIONS TO PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE

Defendant.

I, HILLARY A. TAYLOR, declare under penalty of perjury:

1. I am an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota and represent

Secretary of State Steve Simon in this action.

2. I make this declaration in good faith based on my personal knowledge of

the facts set forth herein and on documents that are publicly available, but provided here

for the convenience of the Court and the parties.

3. The Minnesota Department of Health has been gathering and publishing

daily data about the impact of COVID-19 on our state. That information is available at a

webpage called “Situation Update for the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” at

https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html. I visited that page on

June 22 after 11:00 a.m., when it is updated, and reviewed the “deaths data table”

(https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#death1),

which

reflected 1,384 total deaths and 636 new deaths since Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. I

also reviewed the “hospitalization data table” (https://www.health.state.mn.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 4
us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#hosp1), which shows that 332 Minnesotans are hospitalized as of June 22, 2020, and 3,830 Minnesotans have required hospitalization overall. Finally, the data shows that 33,227 Minnesotans have tested positive for COVID-19 as of June 22, 2020.
4. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of World Health Organization’s website publication Coronavirus Overview, printed June 22, 2020, available online at www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1.
5. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Minnesota Department of Health website publication, About Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19), printed June 22, 2020, www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/basics.html.
6. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the World Health Organization Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 on March 11, 2020, available online at www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
7. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention gathers and publishes data each day about the impact of COVID-19 on our country. That information is available online at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-inus.html. I visited that website after 11:00 a.m. on June 22, 2020, and it identified 119,615 total deaths in the United States from COVID-19 since January 22, 2020. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the website printed on June 22, 2020.
8. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus
2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 3 of 4
Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, March 13, 2020, available online at www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergencyconcerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
9. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Coleman, J., All 50 States Under Disaster Declaration for First Time in US History, The Hill, Apr. 12, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/public-global-health/492433-all-50-states-underdisaster-declaration-for-first.
10. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-01 (Mar. 13, 2020), available online at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-01.pdf.
11. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s online publication How COVID-19 Spreads, printed June 22, 2020, available online at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.
12. Attached as Exhibit 9 is guidance provided to County Election Administrators sent on June 19, 2020, regarding the suspension of the Witness Requirement as applied to absentee and mail-in ballot voting, in compliance with the partial consent decree entered and approved in LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-30-3149 (June 17, 2020).
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 4 of 4

FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NOT. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATE: June 22, 2020

s/Hillary A. Taylor HILLARY A. TAYLOR

4

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 51 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

[PROPOSED] INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ ABEYANCE REQUEST Plaintiffs’ letter (Doc. 44) confirms what Proposed Intervenor-Defendants advised the Court on Saturday: the proposed consent decree is collusive, unfair, and unreasonable. Now that an actual adversary has shown up, Plaintiffs want this Court to abey a fairness hearing that they asked for on a proposed consent decree that they submitted. Why? Because a similar consent decree was filed in state court a week ago, they say. But Plaintiffs advised the Court of that same consent decree five days ago and still wanted to press forward with a fairness hearing. That Plaintiffs changed their mind only after an actual adversary entered this case is telling. It admits that something is badly wrong with this consent decree. And it’s untenable. With voting

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 51 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 5
set to start in a matter of days, there is no time to wait on parallel state-court proceedings that this Court cannot control.
This Court should do what the parties initially asked: conduct the fairness hearing and rule on the proposed consent decree.
1. Plaintiffs filed their proposed consent decree last Tuesday, June 16. See Doc. 24. This Court immediately scheduled a fairness hearing for June 18. See Doc. 26.
2. The same day that Plaintiffs filed their proposed decree, Democratbacked plaintiffs filed a proposed consent decree in a similar case in state court. See Doc. 28-1 at 13. Without a fairness hearing (state courts do not scrutinize consent decrees like federal courts do), the state court signed the decree one day later. See Doc. 28-1 at 14.
3. Plaintiffs quickly alerted this Court to the state decree, and continued to press for a fairness hearing on their proposed consent decree. See Doc. 28. No party asked this Court to cancel the fairness hearing, or to hold it in abeyance, in light of the state decree. In fact, when Proposed Intervenor-Defendants asked the parties to consent to a brief continuance, the parties refused. See Doc. 31. In other words, even though they knew about the state decree, the parties wanted this Court to move forward, hold the fairness hearing, and enter a decree in this case as well.
4. This Court postponed the hearing, however, and Proposed IntervenorDefendants filed their opposition to the proposed consent decree. See Docs. 33, 41.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 51 Filed 06/22/20 Page 3 of 5
Now, all of a sudden, Plaintiffs want to hold this case in abeyance in light of the state decree. See Doc. 44. Plaintiffs alerted Proposed Intervenor-Defendants to their change of heart this morning—the day their briefs in support of their proposed decree were due.
5. This strategic maneuvering is disappointing. It reveals Plaintiffs’ lack of confidence in their ability to persuade this Court that their consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The fact that Plaintiffs want this case to move forward when no one’s opposing them, but want it to stop in its tracks when opponents arrive, confirms that the consent decree is anything but the product of above-board, arm’slength bargaining.
6. Plaintiffs’ proposal also makes no sense. As they admit, the state decree is not final and, thus, does not moot this case. See Doc. 45 at 20-21. And Plaintiffs still want this Court to “approve the Proposed Consent Decree.” Doc. 45 at 3. But time is short—voting begins on June 26, and the primary will be held on August 11. If this Court waits to see what the state court does, instead of resolving the decree in front of it, it risks having to conduct a hearing and issue a decision on an even shorter timeline—and totally denying the losing side the right to appeal. That is not orderly, fair, efficient, or conducive to sound decision-making. Cf. Doc. 48 at 16 (conceding that late-filed decrees “d[o] not give the judge ‘time to think’”).
7. Plaintiffs and Defendant also invoke the prospect of this Court “abstaining” in favor of the state-court litigation. See Doc. 45 at 21 & n.10; Doc. 46 at
3

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 51 Filed 06/22/20 Page 4 of 5
11-14. But it was Plaintiffs who filed this case in federal court, and it was the parties who asked this Court to approve their proposed consent decree. Parties who “expressly urge[] … the District Court to proceed to an adjudication,” or who “voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction,” cannot ask for abstention. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). Nor could this Court decline its “‘virtually unflagging obligation’” to exercise jurisdiction in favor of a state case that involves different parties, different claims, and no greater convenience to the parties. See Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Ark. Elec. Cooperatives, Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 297-300 (8th Cir. 1995); Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650-51 (5th Cir. 2000).
* * * * This Court should proceed with tomorrow’s fairness hearing.
4

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 51 Filed 06/22/20 Page 5 of 5

Dated: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

5

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. __________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. Minnesotans take pride in having built what is, in many ways, a thriving democracy. Minnesota’s voter turnout routinely tops the nationwide rankings. The state provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters, while successfully protecting its elections from fraud and maintaining public trust in the system. 2. However, the nationwide outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) poses a serious threat to the health of American elections. Minnesota is not immune. In fact, Minnesota’s election system includes a feature that makes it especially vulnerable to the risk of suppressed voter participation during the COVID-19 pandemic. 3. To vote by absentee ballot in Minnesota, a voter must fill out the ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. Requiring a witness for absentee voting places Minnesota in a small minority of states. Moreover, Minnesota imposes unusually restrictive limits on who may serve as a witness for absentee voting. Only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths may play this role.

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4. Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election will be conducted under extraordinary circumstances. At the urging of health experts and their own governmental leaders, millions of Minnesotans—especially senior citizens and those with underlying health conditions—are avoiding contact with people outside their households to slow the spread of COVID-19. Under current state law, absentee voting will require voters to violate this social distancing protocol, unless they happen to live with someone who can serve as a witness.
5. Minnesotans’ constitutional right to vote cannot be conditioned on their willingness to subject themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19. This is particularly true when the state law forcing voters to interact in person with witnesses is, at best, minimally useful to the state.
6. Moreover, even in ordinary times, Minnesota’s restrictive qualifications on who can serve as a witness to an absentee ballot severely burden many Minnesota voters and are not tailored to any state interest. Absentee voting processes are often used because a voter will not be in the state on Election Day. For such voters, finding a Minnesota registered voter witness is obviously a challenge. Minnesota registered voters are not uniquely qualified to attest to a person’s identity; indeed, Minnesota is the only state with such a restrictive stance on who can serve as a witness to a ballot.
7. Plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s unduly restrictive qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Steve Simon, who resides and maintains his office in this District. 10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant resides in this District and because the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District. 11. This Court has jurisdiction to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 12. Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (“LWVMN”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and is an affiliate of the League of Women Voters of the United States. LWVMN encourages informed and active participation in government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public policy through education and advocacy. LWVMN has approximately 2,200 members throughout Minnesota. These members, like all Americans, have all had their daily lives altered by COVID-19. Most, if not all, of these members are adhering to strict social distancing protocols to avoid contracting the coronavirus. Many of LWVMN’s members are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 either due to their age or other underlying health conditions. Others live in households with individuals particularly vulnerable to COVID-
3

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19. Some of these members live by themselves or live in households that do not include another registered Minnesota voter. Thus, some of LWVMN’s members are registered voters who, under current law, will face a choice between risking their health in order to vote or not voting at all because of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting. LWVMN has diverted resources, and will continue to divert resources, away from its core activities in order to educate voters about the witness requirement and, to the extent possible, help them comply.
13. Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill is a registered voter in Woodbury, Minnesota. She serves as Advocacy Chair of LWVMN and is a member of both LWVMN and the Woodbury-Cottage Grove Area chapter of the League of Women Voters. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. She has lived in Minnesota since she was seven years old, when her family moved from Birmingham, Alabama. As a Black woman who spent her early childhood in the Jim Crow South, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill remembers her mother telling her about schemes of disenfranchisement, from poll taxes to literacy tests written in foreign languages. Shortly after moving to Minnesota, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. These early experiences impressed upon Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. As an adult, she has voted regularly. Although she usually votes in person, she plans to vote by absentee ballot in upcoming elections including those scheduled for August and November 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill has previously had heart surgery, and lives with underlying health conditions that place her at an elevated risk of becoming severely ill if she contracts COVID-19. She fears contracting and spreading COVID-19 if she is forced to interact with another person in order to vote.
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Defendant 14. Defendant Steve Simon (“Secretary Simon” or “Defendant”) is the Secretary of State of Minnesota and is sued in his official capacity. Secretary Simon plays a central role in administering and overseeing Minnesota elections. Secretary Simon is responsible for compiling and publishing Minnesota’s general election laws and has the power to issue “detailed written instructions” to local officials “for complying with election laws relating to the conduct of elections, conduct of voter registration and voting procedures.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. More specifically, Secretary Simon is required to adopt legally binding rules “establishing procedures to be followed by county auditors and municipal clerks to assure accurate and timely return of absentee ballots,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 4, “establishing the form, content, and type size and style for the printing of blank applications for absentee ballots, absentee voter lists, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility to vote by absentee ballot, ballot envelopes, and directions for casting an absentee ballot,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.09, and governing “the conduct of mail balloting,” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.
FACTS Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota,
Especially During the COVID-19 Pandemic 15. Any eligible voter in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1. Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45.
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16. Officials at the state and local levels participate in administering absentee voting.1 The Secretary of State coordinates absentee voting statewide by promulgating rules to establish uniform procedures and prescribe standard forms for printed materials including ballot envelopes, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility, and instructions to voters. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08; Minn. Stat. § 203B.09; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.; see also Minn. R. 8210.0500 (form instructions to absentee voters, promulgated by the Secretary); Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a (form instructions to voters in mail elections, promulgated by the Secretary). County auditors and municipal clerks administer absentee voting locally by, inter alia, printing the necessary materials, accepting absentee ballot applications, providing ballots to eligible voters, receiving voted ballots, and delivering those ballots to the local ballot board for acceptance or rejection. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.05-203B.08, 203B.121, 204B.45. In printing materials for absentee voting, local officials must follow precisely the forms prescribed by the Secretary of State. Minn. Stat. § 203B.09.
17. Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2.
18. In Minnesota’s 2020 elections, access to absentee voting will be substantially more important than it has been in the state’s past elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
1 Except when this Complaint specifically distinguishes between absentee voting under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B and mail elections under Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.45 and 204B.46, the term “absentee” as used herein refers to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 7 of 30
19. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, spreads easily through respiratory droplets. The virus can also be transmitted through contact with contaminated surfaces. Health experts agree that to minimize the chance of contracting COVID-19, it is important for individuals to maintain at least six feet of distance between themselves and others outside their household.
20. COVID-19 causes severe illness in many patients. Among infected individuals, COVID-19 is, by conservative estimates, several times more likely to cause death than seasonal influenza.2 Individuals over age 65 and those with certain underlying health conditions are at heightened risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19.3
21. As of May 18, 2020, there have been 1,480,349 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 89,407 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Minnesota has had 16,372 confirmed cases and 739 deaths. These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 victims, given limitations in testing.
22. Although COVID-19 infection rates may decline over the next few months, subsequent resurgences of the disease in Minnesota and throughout the U.S. are likely to occur in 2020 and 2021. Widespread abandonment or relaxation of social distancing behavior would likely lead to a spike in COVID-19 transmission.
2 See Joel Achenbach, Antibody tests support what’s been obvious: Covid-19 is much more lethal than the flu, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/antibodytests-support-whats-been-obvious-covid-19-is-much-more-lethal-than-flu/2020/04/28/2fc215d887f7-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html. 3 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-athigher-risk.html (updated Apr. 15, 2020).
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 8 of 30

23. The Food and Drug Administration has not approved any medication for treatment of COVID-19. While numerous experimental treatments are under investigation, none has been proven safe and effective.
24. There is no vaccine for COVID-19, nor is a vaccine likely to become widely available before the November 2020 general election.
25. Individuals who currently feel and look healthy may nonetheless be contagious carriers of COVID-19. The median incubation period for COVID-19—the length of time between exposure and onset of symptoms—is approximately four to five days. For some individuals, the incubation period may be as long as fourteen days. In some documented cases, individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 never develop symptoms. Infected individuals have been observed to transmit the virus to others while not experiencing symptoms.4
26. Many U.S. residents without COVID-19 symptoms are unable to access testing to determine whether they currently have COVID-19.
27. Recognizing the need for social distancing in order to reduce the spread of COVID-19, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities.5 In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people,

4 Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease

(COVID-19),

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html

(updated May 15, 2020). 5 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48, Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order,

Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public

Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to

Safe Workplaces (Apr. 30, 2020), https://mn.gov/governor/assets/EO%2020-

48%20Final_tcm1055-430499.pdf.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 9 of 30
requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers
to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open,
and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of
severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.”6
28. Given the poor public health conditions, in-person voting at the same levels as
ordinary elections will not be safe in upcoming elections, particularly for those most vulnerable
to COVID-19.
29. The danger of large-scale in-person voting during the COVID-19 pandemic is
illustrated by the Wisconsin presidential primary election held April 7, 2020, which drew more
than 400,000 in-person voters, owing in part to the state’s failure to provide absentee ballots with
sufficient time for many voters to return them. At least 67 people have tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary.7 In
Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person
voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later.8 An analysis by university economists has
preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties
6 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56, Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (May 13, 2020), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-56.pdf. 7 David Wahlberg, 67 got COVID-19 after visiting polls in state's April 7 election but tie to voting unclear, WISC. STATE J. (May 8, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-medfit/67-got-covid-19-after-visiting-polls-in-states-april-7-election-but-tie-to/article_49a42a7e45d8-50cc-bd76-3a583842de39.html. 8 Descriptive Analysis of COVID-19 Infections in Milwaukee County after the Wisconsin Election and Easter/Passover Holidays 7, Milwaukee Cty. COVID-19 Epidemiology Intel Team, WUWM 89.7 (May 5, 2020), https://www.wuwm.com/sites/wuwm/files/202005/milwaukee_county_covid19_election_report_-_final_v3.pdf.
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with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary.9
30. Absentee voting represents the best option for most Minnesota voters to participate safely in the 2020 elections. Defendant Simon himself has recognized this reality, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.”10 This statement accords with guidance from the CDC, which recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic.11
31. Like many Minnesota voters, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill intends to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections because she fears contracting and/or spreading COVID-19 if she votes in person.
32. Other members of LWVMN similarly depend on absentee voting for effective access to the franchise in 2020, given the unacceptable health risks associated with voting in person during the pandemic.

9 Chad D. Cotti et al., The Relationship Between In-Person Voting, Consolidated Polling

Locations, and Absentee Voting on COVID-19: Evidence From the Wisconsin Primary, Working

Paper 27187, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (May 2020), available at

https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187.pdf. 10 Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections, OFFICE OF THE

MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE (May 13, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-the-office/news-

room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/. 11 Recommendations for Election Polling Locations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-

locations.html (updated March 27, 2020).

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Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
33. Unfortunately, Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedures do not provide an adequate solution to the problem of conducting inclusive elections without forcing voters to violate social distancing requirements. Specifically, Minnesota law compels each absentee voter to interact in person with a witness who must be a registered Minnesota voter, notary, or other person authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0710; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
34. Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure means that voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to give oaths face a choice: they can vote in the upcoming elections, or they can comply with social distancing best practices to avoid contracting or spreading COVID-19. They cannot reasonably do both.
35. Each absentee voter in Minnesota receives an envelope on which a blank certificate is printed (“Signature Envelope”). To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers, and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
36. The certificate on the Signature Envelope also contains a statement that must be signed by a witness. In addition to signing, the witness must write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
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37. The witness statement always requires the witness to certify that at least four conditions were met.
38. First, the witness certifies that “the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
39. Second, the witness certifies that “the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
40. Third, the witness certifies that “the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
41. Fourth, the witness certifies, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. Although this form certificate language promulgated by the Secretary of State is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added).
42. Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
43. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 1. A true and correct copy of
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the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 2. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 3.
44. In addition to receiving a Signature Envelope with a form certificate, each absentee voter receives printed instructions. The form instructions, promulgated by the Secretary of State, reiterate that a witness must sign the certificate, affix a notary stamp if applicable, and provide a Minnesota street address or official title. Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a.
45. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 4. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 5. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for voters in mail elections is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 6.
46. After a voter submits an absentee ballot, the local ballot board determines, inter alia, whether “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions” provided to the voter. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2); see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (clarifying that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). If the certificate is not completed as prescribed by the directions—for example, if the witness signature is missing—the ballot is rejected, and the voter is notified of the rejection. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
47. Because of the required signed witness statement, an absentee voter in Minnesota must have a witness physically present while marking and sealing the ballot.
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48. It is difficult or impossible for the voter and witness to maintain a constant distance of at least six feet between them throughout the voting process. Moreover, the voter and witness must touch the same Signature Envelope in order to sign the certificate.
49. The voter-witness interaction required by Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure constitutes a violation of recommended social distancing and creates a substantial risk of COVID-19 transmission, unless the voter and witness already live together.
50. To give a conservative estimate, there are likely hundreds of thousands of registered Minnesota voters who do not live with another registered voter or a person authorized to give oaths.
51. According to 2018 data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, about 26 percent of voting-age Minnesota residents, and about 37 percent of those over age 65, live alone.12 Minnesota has almost 3.4 million registered voters.13 If the rate of living alone is approximately the same for Minnesota’s registered-voter population as for its total adult population, then Minnesota has roughly 884,000 registered voters who live alone.
52. Even among voters who do not live alone, there are many who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to administer oaths. This includes individuals that live only with minors, live in mixed-citizenship status households, or simply live with others that choose not to vote.
12 Current Population Survey Table Creator, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html (2018). 13 Voter Registration Counts, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE OF MINN., https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/data-maps/voter-registrationcounts/ (last visited May 14, 2020).
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53. Upon information and belief, if Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place for the 2020 elections, many eligible voters will be deterred from voting because they reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19.
54. Meanwhile, other voters—potentially numbering in the hundreds of thousands— will interact with witnesses outside their household in order to cast absentee ballots. Some of these interactions will lead to transmission of COVID-19. Voters, witnesses, and third parties who come into contact with them may become severely ill or die from COVID-19 cases traceable to absentee voting interactions.
55. LWVMN has numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote and live alone. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is one such member.
56. LWVMN’s membership also includes numerous registered Minnesota voters who do not live alone, but do not live with another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths.
57. LWVMN has had to divert resources away from its core activities, such as voter registration drives and candidate forums, because of the witness requirement for absentee voting.
58. In response to requests from its chapters across the state and its own assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause unprecedented demand for absentee ballots, LWVMN has begun to develop a communications campaign to educate voters about the process for voting by absentee ballot. A major purpose of this anticipated communications campaign is to inform voters that absentee voting requires a witness, and that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths. If not for the witness requirement, LWVMN would not need to spend the amount of time, money, and other resources it now plans to spend on educating voters about the absentee voting process.
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59. LWVMN has also devoted significant time and energy to developing ideas and plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the pandemic. LWVMN is considering developing a program in which voters can request and be connected with eligible witnesses. However, such a program would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to implement. LWVMN has no existing infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses. Moreover, LWVMN anticipates that individuals who are willing and able to serve as witnesses in such a program will be scarce, since many individuals will reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19 if they serve as witnesses.
60. As the 2020 primary and general elections approach, LWVMN will need to devote more resources toward educating voters about the witness requirement and helping them obtain witnesses to the extent possible. This increased diversion of resources comes at the busiest possible time for LWVMN—during the immediate lead-up to a presidential election.
61. Moreover, LWVMN serves as the primary nonprofit facilitating voter registration at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota, assisting many new American citizens to register in Minnesota each year. Many naturalized citizens live in mixed immigration status households where they may be the only adult citizen (and thus only eligible voter). LWVMN has a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot. But under Minnesota’s restrictive eligibility requirements for witnesses to absentee ballots, many such citizens may be unable to do so without violating social distancing protocols.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud 62. Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting produces no benefit remotely on par with the severe burden it places on voters during the COVID-19 pandemic. While Minnesota has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in
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elections, the marginal effect of the witness requirement as an anti-fraud measure is minimal at best.
63. Minnesota has no significant history of fraud in absentee voting. 64. Minnesota’s experience with absentee voting is consistent with the experience of other states. Throughout the U.S., absentee voting fraud is rare. A comprehensive nationwide analysis found 491 cases of absentee voting fraud from 2000 to 2012—a miniscule fraction of all absentee ballots cast during that period. Any given American is more likely to be struck by lightning than to cast a fraudulent absentee ballot.14 65. Most states achieve the same result as Minnesota—no meaningful amount of absentee voting fraud—without requiring a signed witness statement. Minnesota is one of only twelve states where the normal absentee voting process involves a witness or notary. Two of the other eleven—Virginia and Rhode Island—have voluntarily waived or modified their witness requirements for 2020.15 There is no evidence that states without witness requirements have more absentee voting fraud than states with such requirements. 66. Minnesota law provides robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud other than requiring voters to obtain a signed witness statement. 67. Under Minnesota law, it is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee
14 Wendy R. Weiser & Harold Ekeh, The False Narrative of Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2020) https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/falsenarrative-vote-mail-fraud. 15 See League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020) (citation omitted); R.I. Exec. Order 20-27, TwentyFourth Supplemental Emergency Declaration – Further Preparations for a Predominantly Mail Ballot Election (Apr. 17, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-2027.pdf.
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ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03.
68. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014.
69. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
70. In the unlikely event that a fraudulent absentee ballot were submitted despite the harsh criminal penalties for doing so, that ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to extensive verification procedures along with all other absentee ballots.
71. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for determining whether to accept or reject each absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before being accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining each absentee ballot
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must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
72. First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
73. Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
74. Third, the ballot board members check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3.
75. Fourth, the ballot board members verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4.
76. Fifth, the ballot board members check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the
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required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5.
77. Importantly, the ballot board does not check to determine whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id.
78. Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6.
79. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
80. Given the rarity of absentee voting fraud, the harsh criminal penalties for committing such fraud, and the existence of numerous verification steps that are at least as likely—if not more so—to ferret out fraud, it is highly unlikely that any pattern of voter fraud would result if the witness requirement were suspended for the 2020 elections. This modest accommodation for the COVID-19 pandemic would not cause the Minnesota electorate to lose confidence in the integrity of the absentee voting system.
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications For Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless
81. Beyond the particular burdens posed by the COVID-19 crisis, Minnesota’s witness signature requirement—limiting the pool of qualified witnesses to registered Minnesota voters, notaries, and other individuals authorized to administer oaths—is unduly restrictive.
82. Among the twelve states that require a witness for absentee voting, Minnesota is the only one that permits its own registered voters to serve as witnesses but generally prohibits
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other adults from playing that role. Eight of the twelve states allow any adult to witness an absentee ballot, sometimes subject to narrow exceptions such as prohibitions on candidates serving as witnesses.
83. By requiring that a witness be registered to vote in Minnesota (if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths), the state excludes many groups of potential witnesses who are not categorically any less trustworthy than registered Minnesota voters: for example, lawful permanent residents and other non-U.S. citizens; military personnel who are stationed in Minnesota but vote elsewhere; residents of other states; and those who simply exercise their constitutional right not to vote.
84. U.S. citizenship is not required to become a notary public. By allowing notaries to witness absentee ballots, Minnesota repudiates any notion that individuals cannot be trusted as witnesses if they do not meet the eligibility criteria for registering to vote in Minnesota (e.g., if they are non-U.S. citizens).
85. Minnesota’s law generally excluding non-Minnesota voters from serving as absentee ballot witnesses does not serve any important state interest. Indeed, in verifying absentee ballots, local ballot boards are not even permitted to reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5.
86. In other words, the ballot-verification process already is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter. Yet, the state saddles voters with the burden of seeking out a registered Minnesota voter, or else finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths.
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87. Finding another registered voter who is both willing and qualified to serve as a witness is a significant burden for many Minnesota voters. This includes voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter—including those who live alone or live in mixed immigration status households—and are practicing social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also includes voters who temporarily live away from Minnesota, such as students attending college out of state. Indeed, a major reason voters choose to cast absentee ballots is because they are out of the state on Election Day. For those voters, this requirement is very burdensome.
88. In past election cycles, Minnesotans living out of state have resorted to posting on social media, seeking to meet strangers in their vicinity who are fellow Minnesota voters and can witness absentee ballots.
89. For voters who cannot find another Minnesota voter to witness an absentee ballot, the option to seek out a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths is also burdensome. Notaries typically charge for their services. Moreover, simply finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths may be difficult, especially in certain rural areas. This difficulty is only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
90. Even before the pandemic, the requirement to have each absentee ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths has prevented a significant number of Minnesotans from casting absentee ballots and having those ballots counted. In the 2018 election, 1,336 ballots were rejected in Minnesota for failure to comply with the state’s witness requirement, according to data from the Election Administration and Voting Survey conducted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.16 This number is
16 Data available at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.
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likely dwarfed by the unknown number of Minnesotans who never returned absentee ballots in 2018 because it was not reasonably possible for them to find a qualified witness.
91. Numerous members of LWVMN—including some who live or have lived temporarily outside of Minnesota—have had trouble finding witnesses for their absentee ballots because of Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness.
92. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of LWVMN voters experiencing this burden—and the magnitude of the burden on each such voter—will substantially increase. LWVMN expects that it will need to divert resources away from its core activities to educate voters about the qualifications for witnesses, and to help voters connect with qualified witnesses to the extent possible.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 93. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 92. 94. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
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95. As applied to elections conducted during the pendency of the coronavirus pandemic, including those in August and November 2020, Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote because it forces voters to choose between exercising the franchise and violating social distancing guidelines, thus exposing themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19.
96. Minnesota has no interest sufficient to justify maintaining the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Although preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud is a legitimate state interest, that interest can be fully vindicated without the witness requirement. Absentee voting fraud is rare, in Minnesota and throughout the United States. Minnesota already has robust safeguards unrelated to the witness requirement, including a multi-step ballot verification process that includes matching personally identifying numbers and other information and also imposes steep criminal penalties for fraud. Any interest the state has in its witness signature requirement is too slight to justify the severe burden imposed by applying the requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.
97. The witness requirement therefore constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to voters for the duration of the pandemic, including during Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election.
Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 98. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 97. 99. Under Minnesota law, only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary public, or another individual authorized to administer oaths may serve as a witness for an absentee ballot.
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100. Regardless of the public health conditions, these restrictions on who may serve as a witness impose a significant—and in some cases severe—burden on Minnesota voters. Especially for Minnesotans who temporarily live out of state, it can be difficult or impossible to find another registered Minnesota voter who is willing and able to serve as a ballot witness.
101. If a voter fails to find another registered Minnesota voter, she must seek out a notary or other individual authorized to administer oaths. It may be difficult or impossible to find such an individual. Moreover, if the only witness available is a notary, the voter will ordinarily need to pay a fee to have her Signature Envelope notarized.
102. Minnesota derives no appreciable benefit from excluding from the pool of potential witnesses all adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or persons authorized to give oaths. Minnesota registered voters are not categorically more trustworthy than other competent adults.
103. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they prevent Minnesota voters from having their absentee ballots witnessed by competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths.
Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 104. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 103. 105. Minnesota’s qualifications for absentee ballot witnesses discriminate between U.S. citizens and otherwise similarly situated non-U.S. citizens. A U.S. citizen may register to vote in Minnesota (assuming she meets certain other qualifications), Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1,
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and then may witness absentee ballots. A non-U.S. citizen cannot register to vote, id., and therefore cannot witness absentee ballots unless she becomes a notary or otherwise becomes authorized to administer oaths.
106. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law that discriminates against non-U.S. citizens generally “can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). This general rule is subject to only “a narrow exception”: strict scrutiny does not apply when a state bars non-U.S. citizens from serving in “positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.” Id. at 220. To determine whether this exception applies, the Court must focus its inquiry on whether the position in question is “such that the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discretionary power over the formulation or execution of public policies importantly affecting the citizen population—power of the sort that a self-governing community could properly entrust only to full-fledged members of that community.” Id. at 224.
107. Serving as a witness for an absentee ballot is not a position intimately related to democratic self-governance. It is a “clerical and ministerial” function. Id. at 225. The Court therefore must apply strict scrutiny to Minnesota’s requirement that a witness, if not a notary or otherwise authorized to administer oaths, be a registered Minnesota voter and thus a U.S. citizen.
108. This citizenship requirement burdens individuals living in mixed immigration status households and individuals living in immigrant communities overall.
109. This citizenship requirement does not serve any compelling state interest.
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110. To the extent the citizenship requirement for witnesses (besides notaries and other persons authorized to administer oaths) serves any state interest, it is not the least restrictive means to achieve such interest.
111. Indeed, the citizenship requirement fails even the rational-basis test. There is no rational reason why Minnesota registered voters are more trustworthy witnesses than other competent adults. Moreover, the verification system for absentee ballots does not even verify that the witness is a Minnesota registered voter. This only further belies the lack of state interest in imposing this requirement.
112. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore facially violate the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they discriminate between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve as a witness.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:
1. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they require voters to obtain a witness signature when completing an absentee ballot or mail ballot, or authorize any official to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness—violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020;
27

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 28 of 30
2. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents, employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with him to:
(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation that directly or indirectly requires any voter to obtain a witness signature in order cast an absentee ballot or mail ballot, and have such ballot counted, in any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020, (b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the signature, address, title, or notary stamp of a witness for any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020, and (c) temporarily modify all form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary to avoid explicitly or implicitly instructing any voter to interact in person with any witness for the purpose of casting an absentee ballot or mail ballot in any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020; 3. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for absentee or mail ballots— facially violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
28

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 29 of 30

4. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45,

and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they discriminate

between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve

as a witness—facially violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

5. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents,

employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with

him to:

(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation to the extent it would

prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or

individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for

absentee or mail ballots,

(b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or

mail ballot on the ground that the witness is not a registered Minnesota voter,

notary, or individual authorized to administer oaths, and

(c) modify form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and

instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary

to inform voters that any competent adult may serve as a witness;

6. Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action,

and

7. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Date: May 19, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181)

29

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 30 of 30
Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470 CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
30

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 2
Exhibit 1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-1 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 2

Put the Ballot Envelope in here, then seal ﬂap

Signature Envelope
Voter must complete this sec on
Voter name

please print clearly

{ Voter MN
address

MN

ID number (MN driver’s license #, MN ID card #, or last four digits of SSN)
I do not have a MN-issued driver’s license, MN-issued ID card, or a Social Security Number.
I cer fy that on Elec on Day I will meet all the legal requirements to vote.

Voter Signature

X

Witness must complete this sec on
Witness name

MN street

address (or tle,

{ Street Address

if an oﬃcial

or notary)

City

MN

I certify that: • the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting; • the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots,
the ballots were marked as directed by the voter; • the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope; and • I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am
authorized to give oaths.

Witness Signature

X

If notary, must aﬃx stamp

For Oﬃcial Use Only
Accepted Rejected (reason:)

Signature Envelope– Registered

Exhibit 2

Put the Ballot Envelope and the Voter Registration Application
in here, then seal flap

Signature Envelope
Voter must complete this section
Voter name

please print clearly

{ Voter
MN address

MN

ID number (MN driver’s license #, MN ID card #, or last four digits of SSN)
I do not have a MN-issued driver’s license, MN-issued ID card, or a Social Security Number.

I certify that on Election Day I will meet all the legal requirements to vote.

X Voter
Signature

Witness must complete this section

Witness name

MN street

{ address
(or title, if an official

Street Address

or notary)

MN

City Witness MUST CHECK ONE indicating proof of residence provided by

voter: (See instructions)
MN driver’s license, ID card, permit, or receipt Bill, student fee statement, or residential lease plus photo ID Registered voter in the precinct who vouched for voter’s residence in the precinct (must complete the voucher form on the back of the Voter Registration Application) Tribal ID card Notice of late registration Previous registration in the same precinct An employee of a residential facility in the precinct who vouched for voter’s residence at the facility (must complete the voucher form on the back of the Voter Registration Application)

I certify that: the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting;
the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter;
the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope; the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope;
the voter provided proof of residence as indicated above; and I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.

Witness Signature

X

If notary, must affix stamp

For Official Use Only
Accepted Rejected (reason:)

Signature Envelope– Unregistered

Exhibit 3

Put the Ballot Envelope in here, then seal flap

Signature Envelope
Voter must complete this section
Voter name

please print clearly

Voter MN

{

address

MN

I certify that on Election Day I will meet all the legal requirements to vote.

Voter Signature

X

Witness must complete this section
Witness name

{ MN street
address (or title,

Street Address

if an official

or notary)

City

MN

I certify that: the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting; the voter marked the ballots in secrecy or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter; the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope; and I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.

Witness Signature

X

If notary, must affix stamp

For Official Use Only
Accepted Rejected (reason:)

Signature Envelope– Mail

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-4 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 3
Exhibit 4

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-4 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 3
Instruc ons
How to vote by absentee ballot for registered voters

▪ ▪ You will need: ▪ ▪

Ballot* Tan ballot envelope* White signature envelope* Larger white return envelope*

▪ Pen with black ink
▪ Your ID number Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have any of these numbers.

*If any of these items are missing, please contact your local elec on oﬃcial.

▪ Witness Anyone registered to vote in Minnesota, including your spouse or rela ve, or a notary public,

X Vote!

or a person with the authority to administer oaths 1

▪ Show your witness your blank ballot, then mark your votes in private.

▪ Follow the instruc ons on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed. If you do, your votes for that oﬃce will not

count.

2

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

YSeal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope
▪ Do not write on this envelope.
Z Put the tan ballot envelope into the white signature envelope

[ Fill out the white signature envelope completely

3

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address.

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four

digits of your Social Security number.

Be sure to use one of same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot applica on.

If you do not have any of these numbers, check the box.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

▪ Ask your witness to print their name and Minnesota street address, including city

4

(not a P.O. Box), and sign their name.

If your witness is an oﬃcial or notary, they must print their tle instead of an address.

Notaries must also aﬃx their stamp.

▪ Seal the envelope.
\Put the signature envelope into the larger white return envelope to

 protect your private informa on from view

5

▪ Seal the envelope.
] Return your ballot by Elec on Day to the address on the return envelope

Ballots may not be delivered to your polling place.

You have three op ons:

▪ Send it so it arrives by Elec on Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service,

▪ Deliver it in person before elec on day or by 3:00 p.m. on Elec on Day, or

6

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 3:00 p.m. on Elec on Day.

This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

See the other side for special instruc ons if you have a disability.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit www.mnvotes.org.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-4 Filed 05/19/20 Page 3 of 3
Correc ng a mistake
▪ If me allows, ask for a new ballot from your elec on oﬃce. Contact your elec on oﬃce at [e‐mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not ini al your correc ons).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, your witness may assist you by marking your ballot at your direc on, assembling the materials, and ﬁlling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask your witness to sign for you in your presence. (Have the witness sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask your witness to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, sec on 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Vo ng is not covered by power of a orney. A person with power of a orney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
Conﬁden ality No ce: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elec ons, poli cal and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your signature envelope is restricted to elec on oﬃcials un l 8:00 p.m. on Elec on Day. A er that me, your envelope and the data on it, other than your iden ﬁca on number, are public informa on. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-5 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 3
Exhibit 5

InstrucƟons CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-5 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 3
How to vote by absentee ballot

You will need:

▪ Ballot*

▪

▪ Tan ballot envelope*

▪ Voter registra on applica on*

▪ White signature envelope*

▪ Larger white return envelope*

▪ Pen with black ink

▪

▪ Minnesota driver’s license with your address or other authorized proof of where you live. See other side for a list of op ons

*If any of these items are missing, please

contact your local elec on oﬃcial.

Your ID number Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have any of these numbers.
Witness Anyone registered to vote in Minnesota, including your spouse or rela ve, or a notary public, or a person with the authority to administer oaths

Important: You must submit the voter registraƟon applicaƟon with your ballot

1

(in the white signature envelope) for your vote to be counted.

X Fill out the voter registraƟon applicaƟon and sign it

▪ Show your witness your driver’s license or other authorized proof of where you live.

See the other side for a list of op ons.

Y Vote!

2

▪ Show your witness your blank ballot, then mark your votes in private.

▪ Follow the instruc ons on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed. If you do, your votes for that oﬃce will not count.

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

3

ZSeal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope

▪ Do not write on this envelope.

[ Put the tan ballot envelope and the voter registraƟon applicaƟon in the

white signature envelope

\Fill out the white signature envelope completely

4

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address.

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four

digits of your Social Security number.

Be sure to use one of the same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot applicaƟon.

If you do not have any of these numbers, check the box. ▪ Read and sign the oath.

5

▪ Ask your witness to print their name and Minnesota street address, including city (not a P.O. Box), indicate which proof you showed them, and sign their name.

If your witness is an oﬃcial or notary, they must print their tle instead of an address.

Notaries must also aﬃx their stamp.

▪ Seal the envelope.

6

]Put the signature envelope into the larger white return envelope to protect your

 private informaƟon from view

▪ Seal the envelope.

^Return your ballot by ElecƟon Day to the address on the return envelope

Ballots may not be delivered to your polling place.

7

You have three op ons:

▪ Send it so it arrives by Elec on Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service,

▪ Deliver it in person before elec on day or by 3:00 p.m. on Elec on Day, or

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 3:00 p.m. on Elec on Day.

This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit www.mnvotes.org.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-5 Filed 05/19/20 Page 3 of 3
OpƟons for proof of where you live
A valid Minnesota driver’s license, Minnesota ID card, or permit with your current address or A photo ID that does not have your current address along with a document that has your current address
▪ Eligible photo IDs: Minnesota or another state’s driver’s license, learner’s permit, or ID card; U.S. passport; U.S. military or veteran ID card; Minnesota high school/college/university ID card; or tribal ID card with your signature, from a tribe recognized by the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs (BIA).
▪ Eligible documents with your current address: an original bill, including account statements and start‐of‐ service no ﬁca ons, dated within 30 days before or with a due date 30 days before or a er the elec on; a current student fee statement; or a residen al lease if valid through elec on day. Eligible bills are: gas, electric, solid waste, water, sewer, phone, cell phone, television, Internet provider, credit card, or banking services; or bills for rent or mortgage payments.
or one of the following: ▪ A yellow receipt for a valid Minnesota driver’s license, Minnesota ID card, or permit with your current address ▪ Vouching: the signature of a registered voter who lives in your precinct and personally knows that you live in the precinct. If your witness is registered to vote in this precinct, your witness may vouch for you. This person must complete and sign the voucher form on the back of the voter registra on applica on. ▪ A tribal ID card with your name, address, signature, and picture, from a tribe recognized by the BIA ▪ A “No ce of Late Registra on” if you received one from the county auditor or city clerk ▪ If you have moved within your precinct or changed your name, a current registra on in the precinct ▪ Vouching for residents of certain residen al facili es: the signature of an employee of your residen al facility, including nursing homes, group homes, ba ered women’s shelters, homeless shelters, etc. If you are not sure if the residen al facility where you live is eligible, call your local elec on oﬃcial. The employee must complete and sign the voucher form on the back of the voter registra on applica on.
CorrecƟng a mistake
▪ If me allows, ask for a new ballot from your elec on oﬃce. Contact your elec on oﬃce at [e‐mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not ini al your correc ons).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, your witness may assist you by marking your ballot at your direc on, assembling the materials, and ﬁlling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask your witness to sign for you in your presence. (Have the witness sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask your witness to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, sec on 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Vo ng is not covered by power of a orney. A person with power of a orney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
ConﬁdenƟality NoƟce: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elec ons, poli cal and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your signature envelope is restricted to elec on oﬃcials un l 8:00 p.m. on Elec on Day. A er that me, your envelope and the data on it, other than your iden ﬁca on number, are public informa on. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

Exhibit 6

Instructions
How to vote by mail ballot

▪ Ballot* You will need:
▪ Tan ballot envelope* ▪ White signature envelope* ▪ Pen with black ink

▪ Witness Anyone registered to vote in Minnesota, including your spouse or relative, or a notary public, or a person with the authority to administer oaths

*If any of these items are missing, please contact your local election official.

Vote!

▪ Show your witness your blank ballot, then mark your votes in private.

1

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed.

If you do, your votes for that office will not count.

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

2

Seal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope
▪ Do not write on this envelope.

Put the tan ballot envelope into the white signature envelope

3

Fill out the white signature envelope completely

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

▪ Ask your witness to print their name and Minnesota street address, including city

4

(not a P.O. Box), and sign their name.

If your witness is an official or notary, they must print their title instead of an address.

Notaries must also affix their stamp.

▪ Seal the envelope.

Return your ballot by Election Day to the address on the signature envelope

5

You have three options:

▪ Send it so it arrives by Election Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service,

▪ Deliver it in person by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, or

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.

This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

If you have questions, please call: (…) …-…. .

See other side for special instructions if you have a disability

Correcting a mistake
▪ If time allows, ask for a new ballot from your election office. Contact your election office at [e-mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, your witness may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials, and filling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask your witness to sign for you in your presence. (Have the witness sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask your witness to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
Confidentiality Notice: The data you supply on your signature envelope are public information when used for elections, political or law enforcement purposes as part of a public information list.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-7 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 3

JS 44 (Rev. 09/19)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer
Tanniehill

DEFENDANTS
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Ramsey
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Julia Dayton Klein Lathrop GPM LLP 80 S 8th St, 500 IDS Center, Minneapolis, MN 55402 612.632.3153

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Ramsey
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only)

1 U.S. Government Plaintiff

3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff

(For Diversity Cases Only)

and One Box for Defendant)

PTF DEF

PTF DEF

Citizen of This State

1

1 Incorporated or Principal Place

4

4

of Business In This State

2 U.S. Government Defendant

4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

Citizen of Another State

2

2 Incorporated and Principal Place

of Business In Another State

5

5

Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country

3

3 Foreign Nation

6

6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only)

Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

CONTRACT

TORTS

FORFEITURE/PENALTY

BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES

110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment
& Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran’s Benefits 160 Stockholders’ Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise
REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property

PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product
Liability 320 Assault, Libel &
Slander 330 Federal Employers’
Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product
Liability 350 Motor Vehicle 355 Motor Vehicle
Product Liability 360 Other Personal
Injury 362 Personal Injury -
Medical Malpractice
CIVIL RIGHTS 440 Other Civil Rights 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/
Accommodations 445 Amer. w/Disabilities -
Employment 446 Amer. w/Disabilities -
Other 448 Education

PERSONAL INJURY 365 Personal Injury -
Product Liability 367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal Property Damage 385 Property Damage Product Liability
PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: 463 Alien Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty Other: 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee Conditions of Confinement

625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881
690 Other

422 Appeal 28 USC 158 423 Withdrawal
28 USC 157

LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards
Act 720 Labor/Management
Relations 740 Railway Labor Act 751 Family and Medical
Leave Act 790 Other Labor Litigation 791 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act

PROPERTY RIGHTS 820 Copyrights 830 Patent 835 Patent - Abbreviated
New Drug Application 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405(g))
FEDERAL TAX SUITS 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff
or Defendant) 871 IRS—Third Party
26 USC 7609

IMMIGRATION
462 Naturalization Application -465 Other Immigration
Actions

375 False Claims Act 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
3729(a)) 400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit
(15 USC 1681 or 1692) 485 Telephone Consumer
Protection Act 490 Cable/Sat TV 850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 893 Environmental Matters 895 Freedom of Information
Act 896 Arbitration 899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes

V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)

1 Original

2 Removed from

Proceeding

State Court

3 Remanded from Appellate Court

4 Reinstated or Reopened

5 Transferred from Another District (specify)

6 Multidistrict Litigation Transfer

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION 42 USC 1983
Brief description of cause:

8 Multidistrict Litigation Direct File

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 1-7 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 3

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and the November 2020 general election will be conducted under extraordinary circumstances. At the urging of health experts and their own political leaders, millions of Minnesotans—especially senior citizens and those with underlying health conditions—are avoiding contact with people outside their households to slow the spread of COVID-19. Under current state law, voting by mail will require voters to violate this social distancing protocol, unless they happen to live with someone who can serve as a witness. Moreover, even in ordinary times, Minnesota’s restrictive qualifications on who can serve as a witness to an absentee ballot severely burden many Minnesota voters and are not tailored to any state interest. Absentee voting processes are often used because a voter will not be in the state on Election Day. For such voters, finding a Minnesota registered voter witness is obviously a challenge. Minnesota registered voters are not uniquely qualified to attest to a person’s identity; indeed, Minnesota is the only state with such a restrictive stance on who can serve as a witness to a ballot. Plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by mail in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s unduly restrictive qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness.

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND $

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND:

Yes

No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S)

IF ANY

(See instructions):
JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE
05/18/2020
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
s/ Julia Dayton Klein

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 09/19)

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44
Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

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The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:
I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use (b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the (c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here. United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box. Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.)
III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes. Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts. Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date. Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date. Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers. Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket. PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statue.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P. Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction. Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 13 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully move for a preliminary injunction directing Defendant Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota, to: (1) refrain, for the duration of calendar year 2020, from enforcing any provision of law—including Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—insofar as such provisions would require voters casting absentee or mail ballots to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; (2) instruct all local officials and ballot boards that, for all elections held during calendar year 2020, no absentee ballot or mail ballot may be rejected for failure to include the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; (3) take steps sufficient to ensure that all official printed materials (including envelopes and instructions) provided to absentee and mail voters in connection with any election in calendar year 2020 do not explicitly or implicitly direct the voter to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness; and (4) undertake a public education campaign sufficient to inform the public that no witness is required for absentee

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or mail voting in any election in calendar year 2020. A memorandum in support of this Motion

will be filed concurrently herewith.

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP
Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200
*Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

GP:4828-1652-2686 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION The United States is living through the worst pandemic in over a century. Minnesota officials are rightly urging the public to avoid close contact between households to minimize the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Yet the state is asking its citizens to violate this social distancing practice to vote in upcoming elections. To cast a ballot, Minnesota voters must either go to the polls in person, or have their absentee ballot signed by a witness. For many members of Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, it is impossible to have an absentee ballot witnessed without risking exposure to COVID-19. The danger is especially grave for Minnesotans like Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, whose age and underlying health conditions make her particularly vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying from the virus. The fundamental right to vote cannot be conditioned on voters’ willingness to risk contracting a disease that has killed more than 100,000 Americans over the past few months. The Court should therefore enter a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to suspend

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enforcement of the witness requirement for absentee voting for the duration of 2020 and inform the public of this suspension.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Absentee Voting in Minnesota Minnesota permits any eligible voter to vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02,
subd. 1.1 However, it is impossible for a voter to cast a valid absentee ballot without interacting in person with someone else.
When a voter properly requests to have an absentee ballot provided by mail, the local county auditor or municipal clerk sends the voter the ballot, together with a package of other materials, including multiple envelopes and directions for casting the ballot. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. One of the envelopes issued to each absentee voter is a signature envelope, on which a blank certificate is printed. To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers; and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.2
1 Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45; see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.46. The process for casting, verifying, and counting ballots in all-mail elections is generally the same as the process for absentee ballots under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (providing that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in all-mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). This Memorandum uses the term “absentee” to refer to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota. 2 By statute, the blank certificate is to be “printed on the back of the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3. In practice, the envelope on which the certificate is printed is known as the signature envelope. See Minn. R. 8210.0600 (standard instructions to absentee voters).
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The blank certificate also contains a section to be filled out by a third-party witness, who must be registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. The witness must sign the certificate and write either her Minnesota street address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
By signing the certificate the witness certifies, at a minimum, that: (1) the voter showed the witness the blank ballot before voting; (2) the voter marked the ballot in private if physically able to do so, or else the ballot was “marked as directed by the voter” by someone else; (3) the voter enclosed and sealed the ballot in its dedicated envelope; and (4) the witness is a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or a person authorized to administer oaths.3 Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.4 In order to complete these steps so the witness can truthfully make the required certifications, the voter and witness must be physically together for the voting process.
It is exceedingly rare for voters to attempt to cast fraudulent absentee ballots, both nationally and in Minnesota. In a comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012,
3 The standard witness certification adopted by regulation states, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. This language is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness. However, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added). 4 Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
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journalists found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). This represents a miniscule fraction of absentee voting. In the November 2012 election alone, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voting Survey) at 9.
Setting aside the witness requirement, Minnesota law provides numerous safeguards against any potential fraud in absentee voting. To begin with, Minnesota provides steep criminal sanctions for absentee voting fraud. It is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
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Minnesota also protects against counting fraudulent absentee votes by subjecting all absentee ballots to a verification process to determine whether the ballot is accepted or rejected. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for making this determination. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before an absentee ballot is accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining the ballot must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
• First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
• Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
• Third, the ballot board members must check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether
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the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3. • Fourth, the ballot board members must verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4. • Fifth, the ballot board members must check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5. The ballot board does not check whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id. • Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
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II. The COVID-19 Pandemic Necessitates Consistent Social Distancing and Will Increase Demand for Absentee Voting
The United States—and much of the rest of the world—“is in the midst of an unprecedented health crisis occasioned by the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic.” In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020). SARS-CoV-2 is a new virus that causes COVID-19. Ex. 3 (Decl. of Dr. Arthur Reingold), at ¶ 7. As of May 28, 2020, there have been 1,678,843 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 99,031 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Ex. 4 (CDC National COVID-19 Case Data). Minnesota has had 22,947 confirmed cases and 967 deaths. Ex. 5 (Minnesota COVID-19 Dashboard). These figures almost certainly understate the real numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths, given limitations in testing. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 13.
Some individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 experience no symptoms or only mild symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12. Others, however, experience respiratory failure or other life-threatening complications from COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. Hospitals treating COVID-19 patients, including all sites of the Minnesota-based Mayo Clinic, are prohibiting or severely restricting visitors to avoid spreading the virus. Ex. 6 (Statement of the Mayo Clinic). Unable to receive visitors, many hospital patients dying of COVID-19 are dying alone. See Ex. 7 (New England Journal of Medicine Report).
Anyone could potentially become severely ill or die from COVID-19. However, certain populations are at a heightened risk of severe illness of death from COVID-19—specifically, patients over age 65, people with immunologic conditions, and people with certain other health conditions, including some heart conditions, asthma, COPD, diabetes, obesity, and chronic kidney disease. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 8.
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SARS-CoV-2 spreads easily from person to person through respiratory droplets. Id. ¶ 9. The virus also may also be capable of aerosolization, meaning it may linger in the air and infect people who enter the airspace. Id. Additionally, the virus can spread through contact with contaminated surfaces. Id. SARS-CoV-2 is so contagious that each infected individual is estimated to infect two to eight others. Id. Infected individuals who are not symptomatic can nevertheless spread the virus Id. ¶ 12.
There is currently no vaccine for COVID-19, and it is unlikely that a vaccine approved by the Food and Drug Administration will be available for at least the next twelve months. Id. ¶ 14. Before the U.S. population can develop “herd immunity” that protects against widespread transmission of COVID-19, approximately 80 to 95 percent of the population must become immune to the virus. Id. ¶ 15. For this to happen, either a vaccine must become widely available, or the majority of U.S. residents must be infected with the virus and develop antibodies to it. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. All told, it is likely that there will be resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions across the U.S. throughout 2020 and into 2021, even accounting for behavioral interventions and government-imposed restrictions designed to control the spread of the virus. Id. ¶ 16. Resurgences in the fall and winter of 2020 are especially likely, given that SARS-CoV-2 may spread most easily in colder weather (although this is not yet confirmed). Id. ¶ 18.
Nevertheless, behavior is an important factor influencing the course of the pandemic. The only known ways to reduce the spread of COVID-19 are frequent handwashing, disinfecting surfaces, social isolation, and social distancing (i.e., maintaining at least six feet of separation between individuals). Id. ¶ 11. The CDC currently advises that “[l]imiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of” COVID-19. Ex. 8 (CDC Social Distancing Recommendations). Early evidence shows that social distancing slows transmission of the virus,
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and jurisdictions that imposed stay-at-home orders early are succeeding in reducing transmission. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 13.
Recognizing the importance of social distancing, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued an Executive Order directing all Minnesota residents to stay home through May 17, except when engaging in certain exempt activities. Ex. 9 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48). In a subsequent Executive Order currently in effect, Governor Walz renewed many restrictions while relaxing others. The current Executive Order prohibits gatherings of more than ten people, requires public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requires workers to work from home if possible, mandates social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and states that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56).
Emerging evidence shows that elections with a large amount of in-person voting are dangerous during the pandemic. In Wisconsin, the presidential primary drew nearly 400,000 inperson voters on April 7, 2020. Ex. 11 (Wisconsin Elections Commission Report). As of May 16, at least 71 people had tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary. Ex. 12 (Madison Article). In Milwaukee County alone, at least 52 individuals who participated in the election as in-person voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including 26 who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later. Ex. 13 (Milwaukee County COVID-19 Election Report). An analysis by university economists has preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-
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19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary. Ex. 14 (National Bureau of Economic Research Paper on Wisconsin Primary); see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
To avoid COVID-19 transmission at polling places, the CDC currently recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic. Ex. 15 (CDC Recommendations for Election Polling Locations). Defendant himself has recognized the importance of shifting toward absentee voting during the pandemic, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots).
Minnesota will hold two statewide election days in the remaining part of 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election will be held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2. Ex. 17 (Minn. SOS Elections Calendar). Given the apparent danger of voting in person, demand for absentee voting in these elections will likely rise to unprecedented levels.
III. Applying the Witness Requirement During the Pandemic Burdens Plaintiffs Although absentee voting offers Minnesotans a safer alternative to in-person voting
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not entirely safe. For Minnesota voters who do not live with a person qualified to witness absentee ballots—i.e., a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths—complying with the witness requirement for absentee voting necessarily means meeting in person with an individual outside their household.
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This increases the voter’s risk of being exposed to COVID-19 or transmitting the virus. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 19.
For Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, the witness requirement may be an insurmountable obstacle to voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-seven years old and lives alone. Ex. 18 (Decl. of Vivian Latimer Tanniehill) at ¶ 2. She has previously had open heart surgery, takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health, and has asthma. Id. ¶ 17. The combination of her age and underlying health conditions places her at high risk of developing severe or life-threatening symptoms if she contracts COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 16-18; see also Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶ 8. Although she has always voted in person in the past, she believes that voting in person would be too risky during the pandemic. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 21. She therefore hopes to vote absentee in the August and November 2020 elections, and possibly subsequent elections. Id. ¶ 14. However, in order to vote absentee under current Minnesota law, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would need to invite another person into her home or travel to meet with another person, violating the social distancing protocol she has been assiduously following. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. She is anxiously monitoring public health conditions to assess the health risk that would come with having her absentee ballot witnessed, so that she can decide whether the risk is too high to tolerate. Id. ¶ 25.
Ms. Latimer Tanniehill serves as Advocacy Chair of the Board of Directors of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN), and has a passion for democratic participation stemming from her childhood. Latimer Tanniehill Decl. ¶¶ 7-11. As a Black woman originally from Birmingham, Alabama, she experienced segregation and state-sanctioned racism as a day-to-day reality. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. After moving to Minnesota at age seven, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. Id. ¶ 8.
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These early experiences impressed on Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. Id. Giving up her vote to protect her health would be a painful choice for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill. Id. ¶ 25.
Other members of LWVMN are similarly at risk of having to forego voting during the pandemic to avoid the health hazards of having their ballots witnessed. LWVMN is a nonprofit organization with about 2,200 members throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Decl. of Michelle Witte) at ¶ 9. Many of LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and some have additional health conditions that make them especially vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying if they contract COVID-19. Id. ¶ 11. While some LWVMN members live with a registered Minnesota voter or other qualified witness, many others (like Ms. Latimer Tanniehill) live alone or live only with people who cannot witness absentee ballots, such as minor children or non-U.S. citizens. Id. ¶ 12. LWVMN members who cannot have their ballots witnessed at home—especially those at high risk of severe symptoms or death from COVID-19—will face a choice between endangering their health and giving up their vote during the pandemic.
For LWVMN itself, the continued enforcement of the witness requirement during the pandemic has become a drain on its time, energy, and money. LWVMN has scarce resources, with just three full-time employees serving about 2,200 members and 35 local chapters throughout Minnesota. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶¶ 6, 9, 13. Ordinarily, LWVMN’s core activities include conducting voter registration drives and hosting forum events to help voters learn about candidates and policy issues. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 29. These services to the electorate are most in demand in presidential election years, and 2020 is no exception. Id.. ¶¶ 15, 18. LWVMN is trying to ramp up these activities and adapt them to the current public health situation, which requires a formidable investment of resources. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. On top of this challenge, LWVMN now must
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set aside resources to help Minnesota absentee voters—a much larger group than ever before— understand the witness requirement and comply with it as safely as possible. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. LWVMN is now developing a communications campaign educating voters about the need for an absentee ballot witness and the qualifications for serving as a witness. LWVMN is also developing plans to help voters have their absentee ballots witnessed during the pandemic— potentially by implementing a program in which LWVMN would directly connect voters with volunteers who are willing and able to serve as witnesses (although these volunteers will likely be scarce during the pandemic). Id. ¶¶ 29-30. These projects focused on the witness requirement take time, energy, and money—resources that LWVMN would otherwise devote toward updating and executing its core activities such as voter registration and educational forum events. Id. ¶ 29.
LEGAL STANDARD “Whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). The Court must apply this test in a “flexible” manner appropriate to “the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. “[W]here the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward plaintiff a preliminary injunction may issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation,” even if the district court does not conclude that the movant is more than fifty percent likely to succeed on the merits. Id.
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ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim for a temporary
suspension of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. By applying its witness requirement for absentee ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota puts voters in danger for no good reason. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed in showing that the witness requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this unique situation. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). A severe restriction on voting rights “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (citation omitted). Even if the challenged restriction falls short of being “severe,” courts do not revert to rational basis review but employ a “sliding scale,” subjecting each voting restriction to a level of scrutiny calibrated to the burden it imposes. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124, 1124 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); id. at 1128 (applying “heightened scrutiny” to a “significant” burden on voting rights).
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Minnesota’s enforcement of its witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic cannot survive review under this framework. Requiring voters to have their absentee ballots witnessed and signed during the COVID-19 pandemic, at substantial risk to their health, places a severe burden on the right to vote for Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other members of LWVMN. The state derives no significant benefit from keeping the witness requirement in place during the pandemic—and certainly no benefit important enough to justify burdening voters to this degree.
A. The witness requirement severely burdens voting rights as applied to voters during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting puts Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and many other voters to an impossible choice: exercise their right to vote during the COVID-19 pandemic, or protect their health and the health of others by following social distancing best practices. The state thus imposes a severe burden on voting rights.
In Minnesota and across the nation, life has changed dramatically because of the COVID19 pandemic. Millions of Minnesotans, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and most members of LWVMN, are avoiding close contact with people outside their households to minimize the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ 18-19; Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 20. There is no serious dispute that social distancing is necessary to minimize the spread of what can be a deadly disease, especially for people over 65 and people with certain underlying health conditions. The latest academic research supports this view. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 11, 13. The CDC agrees. Ex. 8 (CDC Guidance on Social Distancing); Ex. 20 (CDC Guidance on Individuals at Higher Risk of COVID-19). So do the Governor of Minnesota and Defendant Simon himself. Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56); Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
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Under these circumstances, the requirement to meet in person with a witness makes absentee voting a health hazard for many voters, leaving these voters without any safe avenue to cast a ballot. The state’s failure to provide safe absentee voting—at a time when in-person voting is irreducibly dangerous—gravely burdens voters. See Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alternative means of [ballot] access must be provided absent a sufficiently strong state interest”); Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-01552JMC, 2020 WL 2617329, at *19 n.20 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (“In-person voting, while still technically an available option, forces voters to make the untenable and illusory choice between exercising their right to vote and placing themselves at risk of contracting a potentially terminal disease.”); see also United States v. Annis, No. 16-195(1), 2020 WL 1812421, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2020) (“There is no question that COVID-19 is a cause for alarm, and the Court does not fault Annis’s concerns, given his health conditions.”).
Other district courts have recognized this reality in cases directly on point. In Thomas v. Andino, the court found that a group of plaintiffs—including individuals at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19—were “likely to prevail on their constitutional challenge to [South Carolina’s] Witness Requirement under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test because the character and magnitude of the burdens imposed on [the] Plaintiffs in having to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic likely outweigh the extent to which the Witness Requirement advances the state’s interests of voter fraud and integrity.” 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of South Carolina’s witness signature requirement in the June 2020 primaries, and ordered state officials “to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement for absentee voting.” Id. at *30.
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Similarly, in League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, the court approved a partial settlement in which Virginia’s election authorities agreed not to enforce the state’s witness requirement for absentee voting in the June 2020 primary. No. 6:20-CV00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020). In approving the agreement, the court found that enforcing Virginia’s witness requirement during the pandemic was “a probable violation of federal law.” Id. at *6. As the court explained,
[T]he measure is too restrictive in that it will force a large class of Virginians to face the choice between adhering to guidance that is meant to protect not only their own health, but the health of those around them, and undertaking their fundamental right—and, indeed, their civic duty—to vote in an election. The Constitution does not permit a state to force such a choice on its electorate. Id. at *8 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)). Even if it were possible to mitigate the health risks by taking certain precautions in voter-witness interactions, the court found that “many would be dissuaded from exercising their vote both on account of the remaining health risks and required steps to mitigate them . . . especially those who are elderly, immunocompromised, or otherwise at grave risk from the virus.” Id. The reasoning in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia squarely applies here. Indeed, Minnesota’s witness requirement imposes a greater burden on voting during the pandemic than the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina. Unlike those states, Minnesota requires absentee ballot witnesses to meet stringent qualifications, increasing the number of voters who must look outside their own household to find a witness. Compare Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (witness must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths”), with Va. Code §§ 24.2-706, 24.2-707 (requiring a witness but not restricting who may serve as a witness), and S.C. Code § 715-220 (same).
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Other courts have similarly recognized that when state laws require in-person signature gathering to exercise First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, those requirements impose severe burdens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Miller v. Thurston, No. 5:20-cv05070-PKH, ECF No. 41, Slip Op. at 14-15 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2020) (finding that in-person signature gathering and notarization requirements “impose severe burdens on Plaintiffs’ core political speech, especially in light of the State-recognized need for social distancing during this pandemic.”); Goldstein v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 142 N.E.3d 560, 570-71 (Mass. 2020) (signature-gathering requirements “now impose a severe burden on, or significant interference with, a candidate’s right to gain access to the . . . primary ballot” in Massachusetts because “if a candidate seeks to obtain signatures on nomination papers in the traditional ways, he or she reasonably may fear that doing so might risk the health and safety not only of the person requesting the signature but also of the persons who are signing, of the families with whom they live, and potentially of their entire community”); Garbett v. Herbert, 2:20-cv-245-RJS, 2020 WL 2064101, at *12 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2020) (finding severe burden because “[i]n light of nearly all public events being canceled, orders for people to stay six feet apart and to stay home, and the extraordinary impact on nearly all aspects of everyday life, it is difficult to imagine a confluence of events that would make it more difficult for a candidate to collect signatures”); Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-2112, 2020 WL 1951687, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020). Notably, most of these cases involve the right to run for office, which is not, on its own, a fundamental right. Libertarian Party of Illinois, 2020 WL 1951687, at *2. The argument for finding a severe burden is even stronger here, where the constitutional interest at stake is the fundamental right to vote. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.5
5 A recent case involving Wisconsin’s witness requirement for absentee voting also supports
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The facts of this case aptly illustrate why courts around the country are recognizing the
severe burdens involved in obtaining physical signatures during the pandemic. For Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill, complying with Minnesota’s witness requirement is such a grave health risk that it
may prevent her from voting in upcoming elections, including the August and November 2020
elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶ 25. Given her personal background and her
activism promoting democratic participation, surrendering her vote during the pandemic is not a
matter Ms. Latimer Tanniehill would take lightly. Id. ¶¶ 7-11. The same goes for Ms. Latimer
Tanniehill’s fellow members of LWVMN, who presumably joined the organization because they
value democratic participation. See Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) ¶ 4. These voters are at risk of losing a
finding a severe burden in this case. In Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, the district court found that “at least some isolated voters, and in particular those who are immunocompromised or elderly, will likely not be able to secure a witness certification safely even with reasonable efforts, or at minimum have reasonable concerns about their ability to do so.” No. 20-cv-249-wmc, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020). The court recognized that the witness requirement “may impose severe burdens” on these voters, and therefore ordered the defendants “to accept an unwitnessed ballot that contains a written affirmation or other statement by an absentee voter that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, he or she was unable to safely obtain a witness certification despite his or her reasonable efforts to do so, provided that the ballot is otherwise valid.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction as to the witness requirement, primarily because the injunction came too close to the presidential primary, the state had issued guidance allowing for socially distanced signature options, and the state was considering additional accommodations. Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 201538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). In that case, the district court had ordered the relief well after absentee voting was underway and less than two weeks before the election. The Seventh Circuit also suggested that it was premature to draw conclusions about the difficulty Wisconsinites would encounter in having their absentee ballots witnessed, because the Wisconsin Election Commission had recently issued some relevant guidance and might “consider yet other ways for voters to satisfy the statutory signature requirement (if possible, for example, by maintaining the statutory presence requirement but not requiring the witness’s physical signature).” Id. at 4. Whatever the merits of these considerations in the Wisconsin case, they do not apply here. Minnesota’s next statewide election is not until August 11. Moreover, Minnesota has not issued formal guidance on witnessing absentee ballots safely during the pandemic, and it is clear that Minnesota law requires the witness’s physical signature.
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constitutional right they treasure because the health risks of complying with the witness requirement are too serious to ignore.
B. Minnesota’s interest in enforcing the witness requirement during the pandemic is slight.
Minnesota derives no substantial benefit from enforcing the witness requirement for absentee voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The state’s choice to keep this requirement in place throughout the pandemic therefore cannot pass any form of heightened scrutiny, let alone the strict scrutiny that such a severe burden on voting rights demands. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Fish, 957 F.3d at 1128.
Like every other state, Minnesota has a “legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 932 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2019). This interest can justify a restriction on voting, but only if the restriction is appropriately tailored to address the actual threat to election integrity, accounting for the severity of the burden on voters and the availability of other means to serve the state’s interest. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 (“While states certainly have an interest in protecting against voter fraud and ensuring voter integrity, the interest will not suffice absent ‘evidence that such an interest made it necessary to burden voters’ rights.’”) (quoting Fish, 957 F.3d at 1133).
The witness requirements at issue in Thomas and League of Women Voters of Virginia failed this test, based on facts remarkably similar to this case. In both cases, the courts found no evidence that requiring a witness signature was effective in preventing absentee voter fraud. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21. Indeed, both witness requirements shared a feature that undermined their effectiveness at preventing fraud: Virginia and South Carolina could not or would not verify the witness’s signature to confirm that the ballot was properly witnessed. League of Women Voters of Virginia,
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2020 WL 2158249, at *9; Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20-*21. The court in League of Women Voters of Virginia further noted that Virginia had “other means of combatting voter fraud integrated into the absentee-voting system,” including “serious felony charges for absentee voting malfeasance.” 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. “For the fraudster who would dare to sign the name of another qualified voter at the risk of being charged with Class 4 and Class 5 felonies . . . writing out an illegible scrawl on an envelope to satisfy the witness requirement would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” Id.
Minnesota’s interest in election integrity similarly fails to justify the severe burden that its witness requirement imposes on voters during the pandemic. To begin with, fraudulent absentee voting is vanishingly rare throughout the U.S., and especially in Minnesota. A comprehensive study covering all elections from 2000 to 2012 found 491 cases of alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally, and just one in Minnesota. Ex. 1 (Election Fraud Database). By way of comparison, over 21.8 million Americans, including 255,141 Minnesotans, voted by domestic absentee ballot in the November 2012 election alone. Ex. 2 (Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voter Survey); see also Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *20 n.21 (noting further evidence that absentee voter fraud is rare). Minnesota expanded the availability of absentee voting in 2013, see 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Ch. 131 (H.F. 894), but there is no evidence that this legislation has led to any pattern of absentee voting fraud.
Without its witness requirement, Minnesota would still have robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud. Like Virginia, Minnesota imposes serious criminal penalties for fraudulent absentee voting. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.03 (creating felony offenses for fraud and other misconduct in absentee voting); Minn. Stat. § 201.014 (any person who votes in Minnesota
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despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony); Minn. Stat. § 609.03 (felonies punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both).
If a fraudulent absentee ballot were returned in defiance of these criminal prohibitions, the ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to rigorous verification process along with all other absentee ballots. Each absentee ballot is rejected unless it satisfies six independent criteria, as judged by a ballot board composed of trained officials who generally must include members of different political parties. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Five of the six criteria have nothing to do with the required witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; see also supra at 5-6.
Even if requiring a witness signature could in theory make a meaningful contribution to preventing fraud, Minnesota’s witness requirement would fail to do so, due to an “enforcement weakness[] apparent in the statute” and its implementing regulations. League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. As in Virginia and South Carolina, local ballot boards in Minnesota will not reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5. Instead, the witness requirement is automatically deemed satisfied if the witness’s portion of the certificate is filled out with a signature and any one of the following: a Minnesota address, a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or an affixed notarial stamp. Id. “For the fraudster who would dare” commit absentee ballot fraud in the first place, adding a signature and address for a fictional witness whose existence will never be verified “would seem to present little to no additional obstacle[.]” League of Women Voters of Virginia, 2020 WL 2158249, at *9. Luckily, Minnesota has much stronger antifraud mechanisms in place. See supra at 3-6. No doubt the requirement that the voter provide her
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Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number is a much higher barrier for a would-be fraudster than a witness signature.
Like the witness requirements in Virginia and South Carolina, the witness requirement in Minnesota has “not been justified by countervailing, demonstrated interests.” Id. at *8. By all means, the Court should give “adequate consideration to the state’s interests” and permit Minnesota to maintain overall statutory scheme that “gives . . . effect to the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” Slip Op. at 3-4, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelman, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). But the evidence in this case shows that applying the witness requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic—and effectively disenfranchising many voters in the process—is not remotely necessary to vindicate this interest. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied challenge to Minnesota’s witness requirement.
II. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief. Minnesota’s witness requirement has caused and will continue to cause Plaintiffs
irreparable damage absent a preliminary injunction. A violation of the right to vote in any election constitutes irreparable injury. After an election has passed, the right to vote is lost permanently and the harm cannot be redressed. Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 752 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
A. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN face a choice between their safety and their vote.
Enforcing Minnesota’s witness requirement during the pandemic would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and other members of LWVMN by forcing them to risk their health or refrain from voting.
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Ms. Latimer Tanniehill fears that she will have to put her life on the line in order to vote in the upcoming August and November 2020 elections. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) ¶¶ #21, 25. She is Black, over 65 years old, asthmatic, and an open-heart surgery survivor who takes a blood-thinning medication daily for her cardiac health. Id. ¶¶ 7, 17.6 Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is therefore particularly vulnerable to becoming severely or fatally ill if she contracts COVID-19. In light of her particular vulnerability to the disease, Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill does not allow anyone inside her home, including her own adult children and grandchildren. Id. ¶ 19. Her youngest daughter visits by standing outside on the sidewalk while Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill talks to her from an upstairs window. When Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill’s oldest daughter and grandchildren visit to help her with lawn work outside, they wear face masks and gloves while practicing social distancing. Id. 19.
In order for Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill to vote absentee, she would have to violate the social distancing guidelines she has been following by inviting someone inside her home or traveling outside of her home to visit someone else. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. She would then have to show that person her blank ballot and have that person sign a statement after she finishes filling out the ballot. This would require her to touch an object immediately after a person who lives outside her household touches it, a process which the CDC has warned may lead to transmission of COVID-19. Ex. 22 (CDC Report on How COVID-19 Spreads). Ms. Latimer Tanniehill’s only other option is to risk voting in person, which would involve waiting in line with other voters, interacting with poll workers, and touching voting equipment that might
6 The CDC has reported that older persons and those with certain preexisting health conditions are at higher risk of contracting, developing serious illness, and dying from COVID-19. See Ex. 20 (CDC Report on Higher Risk Populations). The CDC has also reported that certain racial and ethnic minorities, including Black individuals, are at higher risk of serious illness or death from the virus. See Ex. 21 (CDC Report on COVID-19 and Racial and Ethnic Minorities).
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be contaminated. This form of prolonged exposure to other individuals at a crowded polling place would also put her at serious risk of contracting COVID-19.
If the witness requirement for absentee voting stays in place through the pandemic, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill does not know whether she will be able to vote in the August and November 2020 elections by absentee ballot. Ex. 18 (Latimer Tanniehill Decl.) at ¶ 25. While she would rather tolerate a small risk of COVID-19 infection than give up her right to vote, if the risk of infection is too high, she may make the painful choice not to vote. Id. Either of these outcomes would irreparably harm Ms. Latimer Tanniehill.
Many other members of LWVMN are in the same position of choosing between two irreparable harms. Many LWVMN’s members are over age 65, and Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is far from the only one with health conditions that elevate the risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19. Ex. 19 (Witte Decl.) at ¶ 11. Nor is it unusual for LWVMN members to live alone, or to live in households without anyone qualified to witness an absentee ballot. Id. ¶ 12. If the witness requirement stays in place through the pandemic, some LWVMN members will forego voting because they reasonably fear exposing themselves to COVID-19 by interacting with a witness. Id. ¶ 32. LWVMN members, including Ms. Latimer Tanniehill, therefore face imminent and irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
B. LWVMN also faces irreparable injury in the form of diverted resources. If the witness requirement remains in force throughout the pandemic, LWVMN will have to divert resources from its core activities to take new and unprecedented steps to facilitate absentee voting, with a particular focus on educating voters about the witness requirement for absentee voting and helping them connect with witnesses as safely as possible. Ex. 19 (Witte
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Decl.) at ¶¶ 29-30. This diversion of resources is already happening, and will only increase absent injunctive relief.
Until recently, the witness requirement had not been a major focus of LWVMN’s programming because most Minnesota voters usually vote in person. Id. ¶ 24. However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, LWVMN expects to see an unprecedented surge in absentee voting throughout Minnesota in the August 2020 state primary and the November 2020 general election. Id. ¶ 25. LWVMN will encourage its members to vote absentee if possible, and expects that most of its members will do so. Therefore, LWVMN will have to increase its involvement in educating voters about absentee voting. Id. ¶ 26.
If Minnesota had no witness requirement for absentee voting, LWVMN’s voter education efforts on absentee voting would be relatively simple and straightforward: it would focus on raising awareness of the fact that all registered Minnesota voters have the right to vote absentee. Id. ¶ 27. However, the witness requirement complicates things significantly. LWVMN must inform voters not only that absentee voting requires a witness, but that that witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. LWVMN is developing a communications campaign to tackle the challenge of educating voters about the requirements for absentee voting, particularly the witness requirement. Id. ¶¶ 29 LWVMN’s office staff is currently spending time and energy on developing strategies to educate the public about the witness requirement—time and energy that it would otherwise invest in adapting its core activities, such as voter registration drives and forum events, to the new COVID-19 reality. Id. ¶ 29.
LWVMN’s office staff is also spending significant time and energy developing plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the
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pandemic. Id. ¶ 30. LWVMN is in the early stages of creating a program that would allow voters to request a witness and be connected with others who are eligible and willing to witness absentee ballots. Id. ¶ 30. However, developing this program is an expensive and timeconsuming task. LWVMN has no existing technology or infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses, and no experience brokering these peer-to-peer connections. Id. ¶ 31.
The resources that LWVMN is expending to address the State’s witness requirement cannot be recovered at a later date. “Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). Further, Plaintiffs do not and could not seek damages from Defendant Simon because he is a state official. When a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may not award retroactive monetary relief. Baker Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the harm that LWVMN faces in the absence of a preliminary injunction will be irreparable.
III. The public interest and balance of harms weigh heavily in favor of the preliminary injunction.
Once a party moving for a preliminary injunction “makes a threshold showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits, the district court should then proceed to weigh the other Dataphase factors,” which include the threat of irreparable injury to the movant, the balancing of harms among interested parties, and the effect on the public interest. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). While the usual inquiry on a motion for preliminary injunction “calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest,”
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“[t]hese factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
A. The general public would benefit from the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court has held that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (internal citations omitted). Because the right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Thus, it is clear that the public has a strong interest in all eligible voters being able to vote, because “it is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 2007), modified on reh’g, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he public interest favors protecting core First Amendment freedoms.”). Without injunctive relief, many Minnesotans who are otherwise eligible to vote will face a severe—and potentially insurmountable—burden on their ability to vote. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, approximately 26 percent of voting-age Minnesotans live alone. Ex. 23 (Census Bureau Data). Although under normal circumstances most Minnesotans may be able to find an eligible individual to witness their absentee ballot, the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic prevent a significant portion of Minnesota’s electorate from effectively exercising the franchise without causing harm to themselves and their communities by spreading the disease. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that even “extreme measures” are justified by the global pandemic; this minor alteration to Minnesota’s absentee laws to ensure safe access to the right to vote is certainly justified. In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1029.
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Critically, an injunction temporarily lifting the witness signature requirement for absentee ballots will do nothing to impede the interests of those Minnesota voters who do live with someone who can witness their ballot without risking infection or spread of COVID-19. Even those voters who are able to fulfill the requirement have an interest in the health of Minnesota’s democracy and the perception of a legitimate election—both of which are served by the removal of a barrier that forces Minnesotans to risk either disenfranchisement or their health. That interest is shared by the State, which has an affirmative interest in protecting voters’ confidence in the integrity of elections. See Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
In addition to the election-related interests, an injunction would also serve the public by protecting public health. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1031 (relying on “the State’s admittedly legitimate interests in protecting or promoting the public’s health and safety during the COVID19 pandemic”); see also J.S.G. ex rel. Hernandez v. Stirrup, No. SAG-20-1026, 2020 WL 1985041, at *11 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2020) (“[G]ranting relief that reduces the risk of the further spread of COVID-19 also significantly furthers the public interest.”). The only ways to limit the spread of COVID-19 are self-isolation, social distancing, frequent handwashing, and disinfecting surfaces. See Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 11. Social distancing requires the maintenance of at least six feet of distance between individuals who do not live in the same household. Id. Critically, requiring someone to come into close proximity with someone outside their household will place them at greater risk of infection, especially for those at greater risk of complications and death from COVID-19. Id. ¶ 19. It is in all Minnesotans’ interest to slow the spread of COVID-19. For that reason, Minnesota officials have not only implemented policies to restrict gatherings and encourage social distancing, see Ex. 10 (Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-56),],
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but also encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots by mail in order to reduce crowding at in-person polling locations and reduce transmission of the virus during upcoming elections. Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots).
B. Plaintiffs are seeking appropriately tailored relief. The public interest would be served by a Court order granting preliminary relief as to the August and November 2020 elections. To begin, it is not too late for the Court to grant relief that improves the August 2020 primary. Judicial orders issued shortly before elections are sometimes disfavored if they “can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). This motion is being filed well over two months in advance of the next election, leaving ample time for implementation. In any event, the injunction Plaintiffs seek would not cause confusion and depressed voter participation, which were the Supreme Court’s chief concerns in Purcell. The relief sought here is narrowly tailored and would make absentee voting easier for both voters and election administrators without threatening the integrity of the election. Temporary suspension of the witness requirement would cause more voter participation, not less. Nor is it too early for the Court to grant relief from the witness requirement for absentee voting in the November 2020 general election. As explained above, the witness requirement imposes a severe burden on voting rights at this time—not because any given voter is certain to catch COVID-19 from a witness, but because every interaction outside the voter’s own household creates a risk of such transmission. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *21 (noting that witness requirement requires voters “to place their health at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic”). This reality will not change between now and November. As Plaintiffs’ expert
30

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 31 of 34
epidemiologist Dr. Arthur Reingold confirms, the U.S. will likely see resurgences of COVID-19 transmissions throughout 2020 and into 2021. Ex. 3 (Reingold Decl.) at ¶ 16. Even if infection rates drop over the summer, colder weather in the fall and winter of 2020 may lead to a spike in transmission. Id. ¶ 18. Given this outlook, the risk of COVID-19 will continue to deter voters from meeting with witnesses during the absentee voting period for the November election, regardless of the precise infection rate at that time. And the public is served when, to the extent possible, the rules of an election are set in advance so voters and election officials can plan accordingly.
Finally, if the Court withholds relief as to the November election until the exact health risks around Election Day are known, it may then prove too late to provide fully effective relief. For example, if COVID-19 cases surge one week before the November election, the Court would not be able to as effectively provide the necessary relief to voters (i.e. printed materials with the witness requirement may already be in voters’ hands). Plaintiffs and the broader public would therefore be prejudiced by any undue delay in settling the question of whether the witness requirement will apply in the November election.
C. The burden imposed by a preliminary injunction on Defendant, if any, would be far less severe than the irreparable harm Plaintiffs currently face.
Plaintiffs’ requested relief would impose little, if any, burden on Defendant. First, Defendant has encouraged Minnesota voters to cast absentee ballots, particularly in the 2020 elections. See Ex. 16 (Def. Simon Statement on Absentee Ballots). Injunctive relief facilitating absentee voting for many thousands of Minnesota voters by temporarily lifting the onerous witness requirement would further Defendant’s goals, not frustrate them.
Operationally, it would not be difficult for Defendant to suspend the witness requirement for the August and November 2020 elections. Under Minnesota law, the Secretary of State
31

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 32 of 34
unambiguously has the authority to both issue instructions to local election officials and modify or create standard forms sent to absentee voters statewide, such as envelopes and instructions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.125; 204B.27; 204B.45, subd. 3. Most importantly, the Secretary has the specific authority to “adopt alternative election procedures to permit the administration of any election” affected by a judicial order from a state or federal court. Minn. Stat. § 204B.47. Defendant can quickly and easily utilize this authority to suspend the witness requirement for upcoming elections if directed to do so by the court, for example by removing the necessary fields from absentee ballot envelopes and directing local election officials not to reject absentee ballots that lack a witness signature.
Plaintiffs’ requested injunction would impose no additional administrative burdens on the State. The requested relief would not require Defendants to develop or implement any new procedures for processing absentee ballots; in fact, if anything, it would lessen the administrative burden on the state by removing a step from the absentee ballot verification process.
Nor would Defendant be unduly burdened by an order to educate the public about the suspension of the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Defendant is already engaged in publicly promoting absentee voting. See Ex. 16 (Statement of Def. Simon re: Absentee Ballots). If the witness requirement is suspended for the 2020 elections, it is not too much to ask that Defendant expand his existing public education efforts to include up-to-date information, preventing potential absentee voters from being deterred by the mistaken belief that a witness is required. See Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *30 (ordering defendants to “immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters about the elimination of the Witness Requirement” through channels including “all relevant websites and social media outlets”). The less public
32

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 33 of 34

education Defendant does on this matter, the more this task will fall to LWVMN, a private organization without the State’s resources.
Finally, an injunction would not compromise Minnesota’s interest in secure elections. Plaintiffs share Minnesota’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its elections and ensuring that Minnesota voters have confidence in the fairness and security of their elections. As noted above, Minnesota has a variety of other safeguards that adequately serve the State’s interest in election integrity and preventing absentee ballot fraud. Even absent the witness requirement, Defendant and local Minnesota election officials will undertake a rigorous process to ensure that only validly cast absentee ballots from eligible voters are counted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion

for Preliminary Injunction.

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP
Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400

33

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15 Filed 05/29/20 Page 34 of 34 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
GP:4846-3691-5902 v1
34

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-1 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205 ECT-TNL
LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Julia Dayton Klein, certify that the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction complies with Local Rule 7.1(f).

I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used the following word

processing program and version Microsoft Word, Version 2016 and that this word processing

program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and

quotations in the following word count.

I further certify that the above document contains the following number of words:

10,389.

Dated: May 29, 2020

s/ Julia Dayton Klein Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153

GP:4841-4023-9549 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-2 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Document Description
Election Fraud Database Election Assistance Commission 2012 Voting Survey Declaration of Dr. Arthur Reingold CDC National COVID-19 Case Data Minnesota COVID-19 Dashboard Statement of the Mayo Clinic New England Journal of Medicine Report CDC Social Distancing Recommendations Minnesota Emergency Executive Order 20-48 Minnesota Emergency Executive Order 20-56 Wisconsin Elections Commission Report Madison Article Milwaukee County COVID-19 Election Report National Bureau of Economic Research Paper on Wisconsin Primary CDC Recommendations for Election Polling Locations Statement of Def. Simon regarding Absentee Ballots Minnesota Secretary of State Elections Calendar Declaration of Vivian Latimer Tanniehill Declaration of Michelle Witte CDC Guidance on Individuals at Higher Risk of COVID-19 CDC Report on COVID-19 and Racial and Ethnic Minorities CDC Report on How COVID-19 Spreads Census Bureau Data Declaration of Caleb Jackson

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-2 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 2

Date: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181) Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang (admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan Diaz (admitted pro hac vice) Mark Gaber (pro hac vice admission pending) Caleb Jackson* Jeffrey Zalesin* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200
*Motions for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

GP:4838-7381-5486 v1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-3 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-3 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 4 5/27/20, 6:41 PM

Search for fraud cases by name, date or jurisdiction: Enter a name, state or fraud type here

Submit

W Minnesota Minnesota has 10 cases of alleged election fraud since 2000. By category, Voter had the highest percentage of accused at 100 percent (10 cases). The most prevalent fraud was Felon Casting Ineligible Vote at 80 percent (8 cases). The status of most cases was Unknown at 70 percent (7 cases). Responses to requests for public records varied from state to state. Some state and local officials were quick to respond by sending available records; others failed to provide a single document.

View the documents
The responses to our requests. The actual cases we received.
Deﬁnitions
Read the database definitions.

Select from
STATE
Minnesota
YEAR
All
TYPE OF ACCUSED All Voter Campaign Official Unknown Third Party Organizations Election Official TYPE OF ACCUSATION All Absentee Ballot Fraud Vote Buying Voter Impersonation Fraud Registration Fraud Non-Citizen Casting Ineligible Vote Petition Fraud Unknown Double Voting Campaign Fraud Intimidation Casting Ineligible Vote Falsification of Election Counts Other Procedural Error Felon Casting Ineligible Vote Voting CASE STATUS All Convicted Dismissed Pleaded Case Pending

Showing 0 to 1 of 1 cases found

NAME

STATE YEAR TYPE OF TYPE OF ACCUSED ACCUSATION

Barbara

MN

Ann

Nyhammer

2008 Voter

Absentee Ballot Fraud, Double Voting

CASE STATUS

SYNOPSIS

Unknown Yes

TYPE OF ACCUSED

Voter

100.0%

TYPE OF ACCUSATION

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Double Voting
CASE STATUS

100.0% 100.0%

Unknown

100.0%

https://www.votingrights.news21.com/fraud/?category=1&type=&status=&offset=0&query=&state=58&year=

Page 1 of 2

5/28/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNWLho CDanoVcoute?m- AenNtew1s251-23012 NFaitlieondal 0Pr5oj/e2ct9/20 Page 3 of 4

Election Fraud in America

This database contains all cases reported to News21 of alleged election fraud across America since 2000. Search it to ﬁnd speciﬁcs about such cases by state, individual and category of fraud. Read our story and the methodology explaining how the data was gathered and its limitations.

BY NEWS21 STAFF, COMPILED BY CORBIN CARSON | NEWS 21

PUBLISHED AUG. 12, 2012, 2:10 P.M.

Share:

Related Stories
Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed News21 Voter Fraud Database: Public Documents Obtained

Search for fraud cases by name, date or jurisdiction: Enter a name, state or fraud type here

Submit

z National The nation has 2,068 cases of alleged election fraud since 2000. By category, Unknown had the highest percentage of accused at 31 percent (645 cases), followed by Voters at 31 percent (633 cases). The most prevalent fraud was Absentee Ballot Fraud at 24 percent (491 cases). The status of most cases was Pleaded at 27 percent (558 cases). Responses to requests for public records varied from state to state. Some state and local officials were quick to respond by sending available records; others failed to provide a single document.

View the documents
The responses to our requests. The actual cases we received.
De nitions
Read the database definitions.

Select from

Showing 0 to 20 of 491 cases found Next

STATE All

NAME

STATE YEAR

YEAR All

Jesus Dario NM 2012 Hernandez

TYPE OF ACCUSED All Voter

Richard E. WA 2012 Williams

Campaign Official Unknown

Alice Crews GA 2012

Third Party Organizations
Election Official

Gary Galuski

NY 2012

TYPE OF ACCUSATION
All
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Johnson

KS

County

Names

Unknown

2012

Vote Buying
Voter Impersonation Fraud

Mitchell Robles

CT 2011

Registration Fraud Non-Citizen Casting Ineligible Vote Petition Fraud Unknown Double Voting

William

GA

Christopher

Twilley

Mark

MA

Evangelous

2011 2011

Campaign Fraud Intimidation

Douglas

IN

Campbell

Casting Ineligible Vote

2011

Falsification of Election Counts

Linda Gunsby

GA 2011

https://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/

TYPE OF ACCUSED
Campaign Official Voter
Election Official Campaign Official Voter
Campaign Official Voter
Campaign Official Campaign Official Campaign Official

TYPE OF ACCUSATION
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

CASE STATUS
Case Pending
Unknown
Consent Order
Case Pending

TYPE OF ACCUSED
SYNOPSIS
Campaign
Yes Official
Unknown
Yes Voter
Election
Yes Official
Third Party Organizations
Yes
TYPE OF ACCUSATION

Double Voting, Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Unknown Yes

Not

Yes

Charged

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Casting Ineligible Vote
Vote Buying

Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud
Absentee Ballot Fraud

Consent Yes Order

Unknown Yes

Case

Yes

Pending

Consent Yes Order

Registration Fraud
Other
Double Voting
Campaign Fraud
Procedural Error
F l ifi ti

37.7% 22.8% 21.0% 16.3% 2.2%
100.0% 4.9% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 1.2% 1.0%
1/2

5/28/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNWLho CDanoVcoute?m- AenNtew1s251-23012 NFaitlieondal 0Pr5oj/e2ct9/20

Gunsby

Official

Ballot Fraud Order

Other Procedural Error Felon Casting Ineligible Vote Voting CASE STATUS

Terry Danner
Paulette Parker

IN 2011 Campaign Official
CT 2011 Campaign Official

Absentee

Case

Yes

Ballot Fraud Pending

Absentee

Consent Yes

Ballot Fraud Order

All Convicted

Freddie Higgins

GA 2011 Campaign Official

Absentee

Dismissed Yes

Ballot Fraud

Dismissed Pleaded Case Pending

Alan Lloyd MT Skari

2011 Voter

Absentee

Pleaded Yes

Ballot Fraud

Unknown Not Charged

Phillip

CT

Apruzzese

2011 Third Party Absentee

Consent Yes

Organizations Ballot Fraud Order

Acquitted Consent Order

Willie

GA

James Hall

2011 Voter

Absentee

Pleaded Yes

Ballot Fraud

Page 4 of 4
Falsification of Election Counts
Intimidation
Voting
Felon Casting Ineligible Vote
CASE STATUS
Pleaded
Consent Order
Unknown

Charlotte GA 2011 Unknown Nelson

Absentee Ballot Fraud

Dismissed Yes

Not Charged Case Pending

Hudson Hallum
Laura Fench

AR 2011 Campaign Official
GA 2011 Unknown

Absentee

Case

Ballot Fraud Pending

Absentee

Pleaded

Ballot Fraud

Yes Dismissed
Convicted
Yes
Acquitted

Garland Renchen

OH 2011 Campaign Official

Intimidation, Case

Yes

Absentee

Pending

Ballot Fraud,

Vote Buying

0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
26.1% 21.8% 18.5% 13.6% 8.1% 7.1% 3.1% 1.6%

https://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 122
EXHIBIT 2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 122 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTA NCE COMMISSION
2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey
A Summary of Key Findings, September 2013

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
The 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey
A SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS September 2013

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 122
Table of Contents
Executive Summary.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1 Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3 Survey Methodology .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4 Survey Results.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
Registering to vote.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7 How Americans cast their ballots.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8 Overseas voting.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11 Casting and counting provisional votes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12 Election administration.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13 Observations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 16 Appendix A .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 17 Appendix B .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18 Appendix C .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 88

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Executive Summary

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) is the nation’s foremost data collection effort on how Americans cast their ballots. The 2012 survey is the fifth sponsored by EAC and forms the basis for this report.
There were approximately 194.2 million total eligible and registered voters in the United States reported for the November 2012 election, an increase of nearly 3.7 million registered voters since the last presidential election in 2008. The 2012 EAC survey collected information on how 131,590,825 Americans participated in the election. Response rates to the survey have been increasing over time, with 2012 seeing the highest jurisdiction-level participation rates since the EAC began conducting this study.1 Although the completeness of State responses varied, valuable voting data were collected from each of the 50 States, three territories, and the District of Columbia.2
Over half of American voters cast a regular ballot in person at a polling place on Election Day in 2012 (56.5%). Others voted by domestic absentee ballot (16.6%); by early voting before Election Day (9.0%); by mail voting (4.9%); by provisional ballot, the validity of which was decided after Election Day (1.6%); or by absentee ballot as overseas or uniformed services voters (0.5%).3
States transmitted nearly 33.1 million domestic absentee ballots and 83.5% were returned and submitted for counting. Oregon and Washington conduct their elections entirely by mail, and in three other Western States (Arizona, Colorado, and Montana), more than half of all voters cast their ballots via absentee voting.
Improved data collection on Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots resulted in a more complete picture of voting by uni-
1 Appendix A to this report provides an overview of response rates for the last three surveys.
2 Throughout this report, the word “States” includes “States, territories, and the District of Columbia.”
3 An additional 0.2% voted by other means. States were unable to classify the remaining 10.7% of ballots.

formed services and overseas voters. States reported transmitting over 876,000 ballots to UOCAVA voters, and 66.0% were returned and submitted for counting. Of UOCAVA ballots cast, 95.8% were counted; the others were rejected for various reasons, including missing ballot return deadlines.
Provisional ballots once again proved to be a substantial source of both ballots and votes in some States, with more than 2,702,000 provisional ballots submitted by voters nationwide. Four States—Arizona, California, New York, and Ohio—each reported more than 100,000 provisional ballots submitted and accounted for 70.6% of the nation’s total. States counted 72.9% of their provisional ballots in whole or in part. Over 651,000 provisional ballots, or 24.1%, were rejected, most commonly because it was determined that the voter was not properly registered. States reported using their provisional ballots in different ways; for example, some States issue provisional ballots when voters wish to change their address on Election Day.
In addition to the voting data, the 2012 survey collected information on a range of election administration topics, including the ages of poll workers, the number of polling places, and the types of voting technology. Among the key findings were that States employed almost 888,000 poll workers in nearly 120,000 polling places in the 2012 election, or roughly 7.4 poll workers per polling place, a slight increase from the last presidential election. Poll workers tend to be older on average than the general population. Ages were reported for over 361,000 poll workers; of those, 59.1% were between ages 41 and 70 and over one-fifth (22.3%) were aged 71 years or older. Over a third of responding jurisdictions (39.0%) reported having some difficulty in obtaining sufficient numbers of poll workers.
The type of voting technologies varies across and within States. Seventeen States reported deploying 121,638 Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines without voterverified paper ballots. Another 18 States reported using 79,357 DREs with voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT).

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 6 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
The most widely deployed technology was the optical or digital scanner that reads voter-marked ballots; 40 States reported using 271,384 such counters or booths in at least some of their jurisdictions.
While gaps remain in the States’ election data collection, response rates to the survey were higher in 2012 than for previous data collections. There were also 3,476 more jurisdictions that participated in the survey than in 2010, largely as a result of a change in the reporting unit in Wisconsin.4 Readers are encouraged to consult the complete county-level data available at EAC’s website, at www.eac.gov, for complete details, including explanatory comments.
4 Wisconsin’s reporting units in 2012 were municipalities. In prior reports, Wisconsin’s data were aggregated by county.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 7 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
Introduction
The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent, bipartisan commission created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Its mission is to assist State and local election officials with the administration of Federal elections. EAC provides assistance by disbursing, administering, and auditing Federal funds for States to implement HAVA requirements; conducting studies and other activities to promote the effective administration of Federal elections; and serving as a source of information regarding election administration.
Since 2004, EAC has collected data on voting, elections, and election administration in the United States. These data form the basis for three biennial reports: a federally mandated report on the impact of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. §1973gg (completed in June 2013), a mandated report on the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §1973ff (completed in July 2013), and this comprehensive report summarizing find¬ings across all areas of the survey.
Detailed information on the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey is presented in this report. It contains summaries of the NVRA and UOCAVA reports and new information on the methods Americans used to vote and how State and local administrators ran their elections in 2012. Summary information at the State level is included in the tables which accompany the report.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 3

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Survey Methodology

In 2012, as in previous years, EAC distributed two questionnaires to the States: a quantitative survey, the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) and a qualitative Statutory Overview, which asks States to report on their election laws, definitions, and procedures. In order to minimize the burden on States when preparing to respond to the survey, the 2012 survey contained only minor changes to both the Statutory Overview and the EAVS questionnaire from the 2010 versions. The final, approved version of the survey, posted on the EAC website in May 2012, contained 48 questions in the EAVS questionnaire and 22 questions in the Statutory Overview. A majority of the questions in both surveys contained subquestions.
The quantitative portion of the 2012 EAVS was composed of six sections:
1. Voter registration, which included questions required by the NVRA;
2. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which included questions required by that Act;
3. Domestic civilian absentee ballots, which asked about the number of ballots submitted, counted, and rejected;
4. Election administration, which asked States to report on their precincts, polling places, and poll workers;
5. Provisional ballots, which asked about the number of ballots submitted, counted, and rejected; and
6. Election Day activities, which contained a range of questions, from the number of people who participated in the 2012 election to the types of voting technology employed by local governments.

soft Excel®-based template. The template offered the States two different methods for entering data: a form-based method that resembled the look of the questionnaire, and a sheet-based view that used a familiar spreadsheet format. Embedded in the Microsoft Excel®-based template was a set of error-checking algorithms to help States check their data using logic and consistency rules before submitting their data to EAC. To further ease the data entry burden, the template was preloaded with each State’s jurisdictions, and EAC provided a guide summarizing how to use the template to States.5 Most States chose to submit their data using this instrument via the project website or via email.
States were asked to send their responses to EAC by February 1, 2013. The data provided by the States were then checked for logic and consistency errors. Any errors or questions concerning the submitted data were referred back to the States for review and correction, if necessary. The States had two weeks to review and correct their submissions. Fifty-four States submitted their data to EAC.6
About the States’ Data
In May 2010, EAC adopted a data policy to guide States’ submission and verification of their survey data. The Guide to the Election Administration and Voting Survey document provides information to election officials responsible for completing the survey and offers EAC assurances about States’ validation of the data. The Guide is available on EAC’s website (www.eac.gov). The Guide contains information about:
• EAC processes related to releasing the survey instrument and final reports based on the survey data;

States’ Collection of Election Information
For 2012, EAC continued its efforts to present the survey to State officials earlier in the election cycle and to facilitate the task of responding by providing improved survey instruments and increased technical assistance. The primary survey instrument designed to assist the States in collecting and reporting their statistical data was a Micro-

5 States were allowed to change the list of jurisdictions to match their own reporting and administration systems. Some States, particularly those with township systems, may change the number of local jurisdictions administering elections from year to year, as towns run joint elections to ease the administrative burden.
6 The Virgin Islands did not respond. Its name appears in the tables but without any data.

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• the technical assistance EAC provides to the States;
• deadlines for submitting the survey data;
• the processes and procedures for States’ submission of the data, including use of the data templates EAC provides;
• the processes and procedures for States’ review, verification, and correction of the data; and
• instructions on how to address errors in the data after the submission deadline has passed.
In response to both media and general public inquiries about State data cited in EAC’s previous EAVS reports and the Federal government’s recent policies related to data quality, EAC formally requested that States verify and certify in writing the data they submit. For the 2012 EAVS, every State submitted with their data a certification page signed by its Chief State Election Official.7
The 54 States that responded to the 2012 survey varied in their approaches to and completeness of their election data collection. Most States relied, at least to some degree, upon centralized voter-registration databases (VRDs) and voter history databases, which allowed State election officials to respond to each survey question with information from the local level. Other States, conversely, collected relatively little election data at the State level and instead relied on cooperation from local jurisdiction election offices to complete the survey. Some States were not able to provide data in all the categories requested in the survey and some did not have data for all of their local jurisdictions.
This report summarizes the results of the 2012 EAVS and includes a set of detailed tables. A complete dataset of responses to the survey is available on EAC’s website at www.eac.gov.
Caution is necessary when interpreting the survey data, particularly when comparing the data from yearto-year or State-to-State, due to changes in State data collection practices over-time and the varying levels of completeness in many States’ responses. Information on the number of jurisdictions in each State is provided in the tables.
7 The numbers reported here from the States may differ from those provided elsewhere by the States. As these have been certified by the States’ Chief Election Officials, they are considered by EAC to be the final and official statistics on the 2012 election.

Guide to Terms
Active Voter: A voter registration designation indicating the voter is eligible to vote. See also Inactive Voter.
Ballots Cast: Total numbers of ballots submitted by all voters for counting, including by all voting methods (absentee, provisional, early, in a polling place, etc.).
Ballots Counted: Number of ballots actually processed, counted, and recorded as votes.
Domestic Absentee Ballot: A ballot submitted, often by mail, in advance of an election, often by a voter who is unable to be present at the polls on Election Day. This excludes ballots sent to overseas voters that are covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA).
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP): Persons who are citizens and of voting age (18 years or older). These numbers are estimates generated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census American Community Survey. See also Voting Age Population.
Early Voting: Refers generally to any in-person voting that occurred prior to the date of the election at specific polling locations for which there were no special eligibility requirements. Early voting is not considered absentee voting under the State’s definitions/requirements for absentee voting.
Electorate: The body of persons eligible to vote.
HAVA: The abbreviation for the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §15301 et seq. The text of HAVA and additional information is available on EAC’s website at www. eac.gov.
Inactive Voter: The NVRA allows election jurisdictions to move voters to an inactive voter list if the registrant: (1) has not either notified the applicable registrar (in person or in writing) or responded during the during the period described in the statute to the notice sent by the applicable registrar; and subsequently (2) has not voted or appeared to vote in two or more consecutive general elections for Federal office. Before moving voters to an inactive list, jurisdictions verify voter rolls through mailings or the U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address (NCOA) service. This inactive status and the fail-safe provisions of the NVRA allow such people to vote if there was an error. See also Active Voter.

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Jurisdictions: Generic term to signify various geographic areas that administer elections. The jurisdictions in this study are also the reporting units and may include counties, parishes, municipalities, independent cities, townships, towns or cities, or, in the case of Alaska, an entire State.
Poll Worker: Election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms that refer to the person or persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits, or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing a ballot or setting up the voting machine; and serve other functions as dictated by State law. This does not include observers stationed at polling places or regular election office staff.
Polling Place: A facility staffed with poll workers and equipped with voting equipment, or paper ballots, at which persons cast ballots in person on Election Day. Several precincts may be combined into one polling place.
Precinct: An administrative division representing a geographic area in which voters are provided ballots for particular offices. These manageable geographic units may also be referred to as electoral districts, voting districts, boxes, beats, or wards, depending on State law. The number of allowed registered voters in precincts will vary according to State law.
Provisional Ballot: A ballot provided: (1) to an individual who claims he or she is registered and eligible to vote but whose eligibility or registration status cannot be confirmed at the time he or she presents him- or herself to vote; or (2) for other reasons allowed by Federal, State or local law.
Section 5: At the time of the 2012 Survey (November through February 2013), some jurisdictions were required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq., to obtain preclearance from the Department of Justice or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing a change in a voting standard, practice, or procedure.
Section 203: Some jurisdictions are required by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq., to provide supplemental voting information to certain language minority groups.
Spoiled ballots: Ballots that, under the applicable State law, are incorrectly marked or impaired in some way by the voter and turned in by the voter at the polling place or mailed in absentee. A replacement ballot is issued so that

the voter can correctly mark the ballot; also referred to in some States as a “voided” ballot.
Voting Age Population (VAP): People who are 18 years of age or older, regardless of whether they are eligible to register to vote, based on estimates made by the Bureau of the Census 2010 U.S. Census and adjusted for the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012. Note that not all persons of voting age may be eligible to vote (e.g., felons, individuals judged to be mentally incompetent, noncitizens, etc.). See also Citizen Voting Age Population.

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Survey Results

REGISTERING TO VOTE
In most places in the United States, voting begins with registration. While North Dakota has no voter registration and some other States allow eligible voters to register and vote on the same day, in most States, registration takes place several weeks prior to the casting of ballots. States maintain their voter registration rolls by removing invalid registrations when voters move out of State or die and by keeping eligible and registered voters on the rolls.
The key Federal legislation on voter registration is the National Voter Registration Act, or NVRA, 42 U.S.C. §1973gg. The information presented in this section is offered in greater detail in the EAC report, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2011–2012, available on EAC’s website. The report includes complete data tables with totals for each State; data cited in this section are contained in those tables.
How Many Are Eligible To Vote?
The United States Census is required by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Obtaining an accurate and complete census of the population remains a daunting task. Complicating the situation is that the decennial census is only a baseline. For example, population estimates must take into account immigration (both legal and illegal), internal migration, mortality rates, and natural population growth and aging.
The Census estimated the domestic Voting Age Population (VAP), which includes those 18 years and older, at 243,003,673 for 2012. Voter participation data by State are shown in Table 29.8 The VAP is based on the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census, with the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012 taken into account.
The EAC obtained estimates of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) from the 2011 American Community

REGISTERING TO VOTE
To register to vote a person must be a U.S. citizen and, meet age and residency requirements. Eligibility varies according to State laws. Persons who have been legally declared mentally incompetent or who have been convicted of a felony and have not had their civil rights legally restored may not be able to vote (based on State law).
Individuals can register to vote by mail when applying for a driver’s license or identity card at their State’s driver’s licensing offices, at offices providing public assistance, at offices providing State-funded programs for people with dis¬abilities, and at Armed Forces recruitment offices. Many states offer voter registration services on their website.
An individual can obtain a registration application from either the local election official in his or her county or city or town of residence, or through reg¬istration outreach programs sponsored by various private groups. Federal registration forms and many State forms are now accessible on the Internet.
The National Mail Voter Registration Form is the one document that allows individuals to register to vote from anywhere in the United States. (North Dakota does not have voter registration; Wyoming and the four territories do not accept this form; New Hampshire accepts the form only as a request for an absentee voter mail-in registration form.) The form is available at www.eac.gov. ★
Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau and applied them to the 2012 VAP. The nationwide estimate for CVAP for 2012 was 222,250,587. The State CVAP data are also reported in Table 29.9

8 Tables 1-7 are presented in The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2011–2012. Tables 8-27 are presented in the 2012 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Survey report. Both reports are available on EAC’s website (www.eac.gov).

9 U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, http://www.census.gov/acs/www. The true number of eligible voters is reduced further by variation in State laws such as the eligibility of those convicted of felony crimes and those judged to be mentally incapacitated.

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Registration
States reported that more than 194 million persons registered to vote for the 2012 election. While EAC’s NVRA report showed that approximately 79.9% of the nation’s estimated voting age population of 243 million was registered to vote, registration rates varied across the country from a low of 54.5% in Wyoming to a high of 97.9% in Michigan.10
The 2012 EAVS asked a question to distinguish between States that did have Election Day or Same Day Registration in 2012 versus States that did not have formal Election Day Registration but in some cases allowed voters to register and vote on the same day for the 2012 election. Most States require eligible persons to register to vote in advance of the election, but an increasing number of States are allowing some form of Same Day or Election Day Registration. Some States have formal same-day voting systems, while others limit same-day voting to certain contests or certain groups of voters. For example, Alaska limits Election Day registrants to voting only for Federal offices. Further, some States experience overlaps between early voting periods and the cutoff date for registration resulting in some voters being able to register and vote on the same day.
Twelve States including Alaska, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming indicated that they had Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration for the November 2012 presidential election. California, Colorado, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington reported a number of voters who were allowed to register and then to vote on the same day, but did not indicate that they have Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration
Active Versus Inactive Voter Rolls
States vary in how they report their registration figures. In 2012, 16 States indicated that they only count active voters in their total number of registrations, 30 States counted both active and inactive voters as registered voters, and seven States had some jurisdictions count only active voters while other jurisdictions counted both active and inactive voters in their registration figures.11 Responses to
10 This excludes North Dakota, which has no voter registration, and Alaska and the District of Columbia, which reported registration rates over 100% of the estimated voting age population.
11 North Dakota does not have voter registration and therefore does not make a distinction between active and inactive voters.

the 2012 survey show that over 23.1 million registrants in the United States remain on the list of inactive voters.”
Voter Turnout Rates in 2012
Every eligible voter does not necessarily register to vote, and not every registered voter casts a ballot in each election. In Table 29, voter turnout is reported using three different measures of the eligible population.
Estimates of voter turnout vary depending on the population base used for comparison. Often turnout is based on a percentage of the total estimated voting age population, an estimate of the number of individuals living in the United States who were 18 or older in 2012. This measure provides the lowest estimate of voter participation in the United States because it does not take into account persons’ citizenship status. Using Census estimates of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) to calculate turnout produces a higher estimate of voter participation because a lower number of eligible voters is assumed.
HOW AMERICANS CAST THEIR BALLOTS
An increasing number of alternatives to voting in person at a polling place on Election Day have expanded the ways that Americans cast their ballots in Federal elections. In some places, such as Oregon and Washington, voters primarily receive and submit their ballots through the mail. Further, more States have adopted “no-excuse” absentee voting, which allows more people to vote by mail or in person before Election Day as a convenience. Twentyfive States reported maintaining “permanent absentee” lists, automating the distribution of ballots to voters who request their ballot through the mail in every election. In some communities, election administrators have set up “vote centers,” central locations where any voter from any precinct can cast his or her ballot. Finally, voters in Federal elections who encounter challenges or problems at the polling place, such as finding their names removed from the registration rolls, can now vote “provisional” ballots, which can be counted later when questions concerning registration are resolved.
Over 56% of Americans who voted in the 2012 general election voted in the traditional way of casting their ballots in person at their local polling place on Election Day. The 2012 survey collected data from over 7,800 jurisdictions (of 8,154 total) on how people who participated in the 2012 elections cast their ballot (see Table 28).
Of the 131,590,825 voters participating in the election, 74,343,638 (56.5%) voted in person at polling places.

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An additional 21,853,762 (16.6%) voters cast their ballots as domestic absentee voters, and States reported 600,048 UOCAVA voters (0.5%).12 Mail voting accounted for 6,459,136 ballots, or 4.9% of the vote. Provisional ballots accounted for 2,139,315 ballots, or 1.6% of the vote.13 Provisional balloting is discussed in greater detail below.
Twenty-nine States reported that 11,794,312 people (9.0%) cast their votes before Election Day through various
12 UOCAVA data on voter participation differs from UOCAVA ballot data because of variations in how States answered the questions and/or track their data.
13 An additional 0.2% voted by other means. States were unable to classify the remaining 10.7% of ballots.

VOTER REGISTRATION
The 2012 election saw a substantial increase in the total number of registration applications received directly over the Internet. In 2012, States reported receiving 3,329,216 Internet applications, up from 768,211 in 2010. The number of States receiving Internet applications has also increased in the past few election cycles, from 8 States in 2008, to 17 in 2010, and to 21 States in 2012. Note: States vary in their interpretation of Internet (or online) voter registration; for some it is defined as offering a fillable PDF while for others it includes the ability to email the voter registration form. ★

Rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

RANKING OF STATE BY PERCENTAGE OF VOTER TURNOUT

Based on Voting Age Population (VAP)

Based on Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)

Rank Based on Voting Age Population (VAP)

Minnesota

71.9% Minnesota

75.3% 27

District of Columbia 56.3%

Wisconsin

69.8% Wisconsin

72.1% 28

Florida

55.9%

New Hampshire

68.7% Colorado

71.0% 29

Connecticut

55.8%

Maine

68.2% New Hampshire

70.8% 30

Alaska

55.6%

Iowa

67.6% Iowa

69.7% 31

Illinois

54.4%

Colorado

65.6% Maine

69.3% 32

South Carolina

54.4%

Ohio

63.4% Massachusetts

66.6% 33

Rhode Island

54.2%

Montana

62.8% Virginia

66.2% 34

Kentucky

54.0%

Michigan

62.8% Maryland

65.8% 35

Indiana

53.9%

Virginia

61.6% Washington

65.7% 36

New Jersey

53.8%

Missouri

61.5% Michigan

65.1% 37

Georgia

52.6%

North Carolina

60.8% Ohio

64.9% 38

Utah

52.0%

Massachusetts

60.7% North Carolina

64.7% 39

Kansas

51.6%

Vermont

60.7% Oregon

64.5% 40

Tennessee

50.0%

Washington

60.4% Montana

63.5% 41

Nevada

48.6%

Maryland

60.2% Florida

63.2% 42

Arkansas

48.3%

Oregon

59.9% Missouri

63.1% 43

Arizona

47.1%

North Dakota

59.9% District of Columbia 62.1% 44

Oklahoma

46.7%

Delaware

58.7% Delaware

62.1% 45

New York

46.6%

South Dakota

58.6% Vermont

61.9% 46

West Virginia

46.6%

Nebraska

58.6% Nebraska

61.4% 47

California

45.5%

Louisiana

57.8% New Jersey

61.2% 48

New Mexico

43.2%

Pennsylvania

57.7% North Dakota

60.9% 49

Texas

41.9%

Idaho

57.0% Connecticut

60.8% 50

Hawaii

40.1%

Wyoming

56.9% Illinois

59.9% 51

Mississippi

39.7%

Alabama

56.3% Idaho

59.8%

Based on Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)

Pennsylvania

59.6%

South Dakota

59.6%

Louisiana

59.3%

Rhode Island

58.7%

Alaska

58.2%

Wyoming

58.2%

Alabama

57.9%

Georgia

56.9%

South Carolina

56.5%

Nevada

56.4%

Utah

55.9%

Indiana

55.7%

California

55.6%

Kentucky

55.3%

Kansas

54.3%

New York

53.2%

Arizona

53.1%

Tennessee

51.8%

Arkansas

50.1%

Oklahoma

48.7%

Texas

48.4%

West Virginia

46.9%

New Mexico

46.9%

Hawaii

44.0%

Mississippi

40.4%

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FIGURE 1. EARLY IN-PERSON VOTING 2012 GENERAL ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
41%–70.99% 21% – 4 0 . 9 9 % 5%–20.99% 0.01% – 4 .9 9 % 0

FL

forms of early voting. In several States, early voting made up a sizeable proportion of the total votes cast. For example, in Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee, early voters constituted over half of all ballots.
In reporting these totals, States drew from various sources to determine their participation numbers14 (see Table 30): • 17 States reported using poll book records;
• 27 States drew from totals of ballots counted;
• 19 States used databases of voter histories; and
• 10 States used the total number of votes for the highest office on the ballot.

FIGURE 2. HOW AMERICANS VOTED IN THE 2012 GENERAL ELECTION
In-person (56.5%) Domestic Absentee (16.6%) Not Categorized (10.7%) Early voting (9.0%) Mail Voting (4.9%) Provisional (1.6%) UOCAVA (0.5%) Other (0.2%)

Domestic Absentee Voting Absentee voting covers a range of circumstances under which voters cast their ballots without appearing at a polling place on Election Day. Some States require valid reasons, such as being out of town on Election Day or having a work schedule that precludes getting to a polling place. Other States allow any voter who requests it to vote by absentee ballot. Absentee voting has gradually expanded through the years, and many States no longer require an
14 Most States used a combination of methods.

excuse. Oregon and Washington have moved to replace their polling place systems entirely with vote-by-mail.15 States reported that 33,070,385 absentee ballots were transmitted to voters (see Table 31). The 2012 EAC survey collected data on absentee voting from 54 States. Approximately 8 out of 10 absentee ballots (27,624,254 ballots, or
15 States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots; some States with vote-by-mail reserve the term “absentee” for specific circum¬stances. Also, the absentee voting discussed in this section generally does not include voters covered by UOCAVA.

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83.5%) were returned and submitted for counting. Additionally, 425,310 (1.3%) of the domestic absentee ballots were reported to have been returned as undeliverable, 266,642 (0.8%) were spoiled, and for 3,760,269 (11.4%) the status was uncertain. As in past elections, Western States had the highest rates of absentee voting, with absentee voting accounting for more than half of all ballots in Arizona, Colorado, and Montana.

HIGHEST ABSENTEE VOTING RATES16
Colorado Arizona Montana Georgia

71.4% 65.9% 57.5% 48.8%

TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING ABSENTEE BALLOTS

Missed deadline Non-matching signature Lack of valid signature First-time voters lacking required ID No witness signature Already voted in person Deceased voter Unofficial envelope Ballot missing from envelope Unsealed envelope No proper address

Number 82,922 45,392 44,748
7,719 4,917 4,717 2,707 1,949 1,848 1,035
600

Percent 32.1% 17.6% 17.3% 3.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%

States reported counting 26,834,076 absentee ballots (97.1%), and rejecting 258,380 (0.9%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). Guam, Kentucky, and Louisiana reported rejecting 5% or more of their absentee ballots. The reasons for rejecting voters’ absentee ballots varied widely. Many States do not track the reasons absentee ballots are rejected, leaving an incomplete picture of why these ballots were not counted.
Readers should note that the “Reasons for Rejected Absentee Ballots” listed below are for ballots submitted for counting; nearly 692,000 absentee ballots were never submitted, but instead were returned as undeliverable or spoiled.
OVERSEAS VOTING
Voting by members of the uniformed services and by U.S. citizens living overseas is an area of critical concern in election administration. The reliance of the United States on local election administration and on casting ballots in physical polling places, as well as State requirements of prior registration, present special difficulties for eligible voters living outside the country. Federal requirements concerning registration and voting by overseas and uniformed services voters are contained in the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §1973ff, signed into law in 1986.
Since 2004, EAC has gathered data on UOCAVA ballots and voters, pursuant to the statutory reporting obligations in UOCAVA and HAVA. In the 2012 survey, 18 questions sought to gather detailed information on overseas voting. What is presented in this section is explained
16 Oregon and Washington - which vote entirely by mail – were also excluded.

in more detail in the 2012 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Survey Observations Report, available at EAC’s website, www.eac.gov.
Improved data collection of UOCAVA-related information resulted in high response rates in 2012 and more jurisdictions responding overall to this portion of the survey than in previous years. While gaps remain, better data are gradually becoming available on UOCAVA voting.
Responding to the survey’s UOCAVA questions, States reported transmitting over 876,000 ballots under 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-3(a) of UOCAVA. Five States (California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington) each transmitted more than 50,000 ballots and together accounted for nearly half of the national total of ballots transmitted. Military voters accounted for slightly more of the ballots transmitted than did civilian voters.
While 876,362 ballots transmitted to uniformed services and overseas civilian voters, 606,425 ballots (69.2%) were submitted for counting including Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWABs) which are not transmitted to voters. Nearly one-quarter of transmitted ballots, 22.2%, were not returned and their status remained unknown. Among the ballots submitted for counting were at least 44,766 FWABs, which UOCAVA voters can use when their requested ballots do not arrive in time. FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of UOCAVA voting for both uniformed services and civilian voters.
Once submitted, 95.8% of UOCAVA ballots were counted. Military voters made up slightly more of the total ballots counted (52.4%) than civilian voters (45.4%). Fortynine States reported rejecting 33,762 UOCAVA ballots. The

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FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF BALLOTS TRANSMITTED TO UOCAVA VOTERS — 2012 ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

FL

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
5 0, 0 0 0 –112 , 3 5 5 20,000–49,999 10, 0 0 0 –19, 9 9 9 1, 6 0 6 – 9, 9 9 9

most common reason for rejecting a UOCAVA ballot was that the voter missed the deadline for returning the ballot; 40.4% of rejected ballots were not counted for this reason.
CASTING AND COUNTING PROVISIONAL VOTES
The 2012 Federal election was the fifth in which voters in all 50 States, the territories, and the District of Columbia were allowed to cast a provisional ballot even if their name did not appear on the voter registration rolls in the jurisdiction where they intended to vote, they failed to have the required identification, their eligibility was challenged by an election official, or for other reasons provided by law. Pursuant to HAVA Section 302(a), such voters were allowed to cast a provisional ballot, which would be later counted if election officials determined the person was eligible to vote.
Before the minimum standards set by HAVA, the rules regarding the use of provisional ballots varied widely among the States, and some variation continues. States that had Election Day Registration when HAVA was passed in 2002 are not required to offer provisional ballots. Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt from the HAVA provisional ballot requirements, but some of them reported small numbers

of provisional ballots, including New Hampshire (2), Wisconsin (135), and Wyoming (33).
A total of 2,702,470 provisional ballots were submitted for counting in 2012. States reported that 1,790,294 (66.2%) of the provisional ballots) were counted in full, and 180,571 (6.7%) were partially counted. States responding to this survey question reported that 651,372 provisional ballots (24.1%) were rejected.
California and New York reported the largest number of provisional ballots, accounting for 56.1% of all provisional ballots cast nationwide in the 2012 election (see Table 34). As a share of voters participating in the election, the District of Columbia (13.1%), California (7.4%), Arizona (6.5%), and Alaska (6.0%) had the largest percentages of voters cast provisional ballots (see Table 28). Readers should note that the different ways in which States use provisional ballots makes comparisons among States difficult. Those States that require a provisional ballot for more circumstances will have a higher incidence of provisional ballot usage when compared to those States with more limited uses. Ohio, for example, uses provisional ballots to process voters’ change of address requests in addition to providing an alternative means to vote.

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FIGURE 4. REJECTION RATES FOR PROVISIONAL BALLOTS — 2012 ELECTION

WA
OR ID
NV UT
CA

MT WY CO

AZ NM

AK HI

ND SD NE
KS

MN WI
IA IL
MO

OK TX

AR MS
LA

VT

ME

MI

NY

PA
IN OH
WV VA
KY

TN

NC

SC

AL

GA

FL

NH MA RI CT NJ DE MD DC
90%–100% 75%–89% 50%–74% 25%–49% 0%–24% No Data

In 2012, 1,970,865 people cast a provisional ballot that was either partially or fully counted, or about 1.5% of all Americans who participated in the election. On average, about 1 out of every 41 voters who cast their vote in a polling place cast a provisional ballot. Approximately 72.9% of all the provisional ballots cast were counted in full or in part (15 States reported counting partial provisional ballots).17 The percentage of provisional ballots being counted grew from the previous presidential election; in 2008, 1,451,086 provisional ballots were counted in full or in part, or 67.3% of provisional ballots cast.
Five States (Alaska, the District of Columbia, Maine, Montana, and Oregon) reported counting 90% or more of their provisional ballots. An additional 11 States reported counting at least 70% of their provisional ballots. Conversely, 26 States reported counting fewer than half of their provisional ballots.
Reasons Provisional Ballots Were Rejected
The reasons for rejecting provisional ballots are shown in Tables 35a and 35b. Most provisional ballots (38.2%) were rejected because the voter was found not to be registered in the State. Another 25.1% were from voters who sought to vote in a precinct or jurisdiction other than where they were
17 A partially counted ballot means the jurisdiction counted only the races for which the voter was eligible.

registered, and State laws mandated that such ballots could not be counted. The principal reasons for the rejection of a provisional ballot are summarized in the table below.
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION Despite the increase in convenient voting options such as ”no excuse” absentee voting and vote-by-mail, over 56% of Americans cast their vote in the 2012 general election in polling places on Election Day. Providing voting services to more than 74 million voters on Election Day required a massive effort organized through thousands of precincts, polling places, and poll workers across the country.

TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING PROVISIONAL BALLOTS

Voter not registered Wrong jurisdiction Wrong precinct Lacked sufficient ID Incomplete or illegible ballot or envelope Voter already voted No signature

Number 248,529 128,923 34,703 13,333
9,233
8,865 8,402

Percent 38.2% 19.8% 5.3% 2.0%
1.4%
1.4% 1.3%

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Polling Places and Precincts States employ some system of precincts (bounded geographic areas to which voters are assigned) and polling places (locations where voting actually takes place) to conduct their elections. In 2012, States operated 176,906 precincts and 119,968 physical polling places (see Table 41).18
Of all polling places, 91,282 were separate from official election offices (schools, community halls, etc.), whereas a reported 1,492 election offices were open for casting ballots. States reported that 4,184 locations were available for early voting, including 1,595 election offices.
Poll Books Electronic poll books, or electronic voter lists, are in use in some fashion in 25 States (see Table 36):
• 23 States reported that a total of 645 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to sign in voters;
• 21 States reported that a total of 610 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to update voter histories;
• 24 States reported that a total of 947 jurisdictions used electronic poll books to look up polling place assignments for voters; and
• 12 States reported using electronic poll books for some other purpose.
Most polling places still use preprinted lists of registered voters (see Table 37). In the preponderance of reporting jurisdictions (3,279 cases), these books were printed by local jurisdictions, with 274 cases where the printing was completed by the State and the poll books shipped to the jurisdictions.
Poll Workers The term “poll worker” encompasses many different names across the United States. Poll workers may be referred to as election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms. As defined in this report, “poll worker” refers to the person or persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits, or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing a ballot or setting up the voting machine; and may serve other functions as dictated by State law. The term does not apply to observers stationed at polling places or to regular election office staff.
18 Fewer jurisdictions reported the number of physical polling places than reported the number of precincts.

The complexity of voting technology and rules has led States to seek poll workers with specialized technological knowledge. In many States, poll technicians are assigned to help keep voting machines and electronic poll books functioning properly.
Fifty States reported deploying 887,854 poll workers for Election Day 2012 (see Table 39). California alone had 89,440 poll workers.
The reliance of many jurisdictions on retirees as poll workers has made their age a topic of interest. The EAC survey asked jurisdictions to report the ages of their poll workers (see Table 39). Thirty States were able to provide at least some data on poll worker ages.
States reported age ranges for 361,135 poll workers. The largest number of poll workers fell into two age groups: 41 to 60 and 61 to 70 years of age (both age groups, respectively, included approximately 30% of poll workers). About 22% of the poll workers with reported age ranges were aged 71 years or older. Young poll workers are relatively rare; 10.8% of poll workers were under 26 years of age.19
The 2012 survey also asked about the difficulty jurisdictions faced in recruiting adequate numbers of poll workers (see Table 40). About 44% of responding jurisdictions reported having a somewhat difficult or very difficult time recruiting poll workers, compared with 28.6% that reported having a somewhat easy or very easy time. Staffing the nation’s polling places continues to be a challenge for many jurisdictions.
The survey found that there were on average 7.4 poll workers assigned to each polling place in the United States during the 2012 election (based on those States which reported answers to questions regarding the number of polling places and number of poll workers). Jurisdictions reported an average of 6.6 poll workers per polling place in the last general election in 2008.
Voting Technology
Voting technology remains highly dynamic in the United States. With the enactment of HAVA, Congress appropriated more than $3.1 billion for EAC to distribute to States to make election administration improvements, including the purchase of voting systems.
Voting technology is a difficult topic to measure in the Election Administration and Voting Survey because many
19 EAC has worked to encourage the recruitment of young poll workers through its College Poll Worker Grant Program, which has awarded grants to colleges and nonprofit organizations to work with election offices to recruit, train, and support college student poll workers.

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jurisdictions use multiple systems. For example, a county may employ a scanner for absentee ballots but a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines for in-person voting. Polling places may have more than one type of voting system technology in use on Election Day. For this reason, the EAVS survey measures the breadth of voting technology being used across the country, and the wealth of local-level data will be of substantial value to researchers.
The 2012 survey collected data on almost 320,000 voting systems. The types of voting technology included the following: • DRE machines with a voter-verified paper audit trail
(V V PAT);
• DRE machines without a VVPAT;
• optical or digital scan systems, in which voters fill out a paper ballot which is then read by a scanner;
• hybrid systems combining a DRE with an optical scanner;
• punch card systems;
• lever machines;
• paper ballots; and
• other systems. The most common single type of voting system was
an optical or digital scan booth; 23 States reported using 214,888 such machines. The most widely deployed technology across the States, however, is the optical or digital scan counter; 40 States reported using 56,496 of these counters in at least some of their jurisdictions.
Eighteen States reported deploying DREs which produce a paper record that can be checked by the voter. Voters in Arkansas, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia were among those most likely to vote on such machines. Most States use more than one type of voting machine, either because of local options or to accommodate voters with special needs.
Only Idaho reported using punch cards. Fourteen States reported using paper ballots in at least some of their polling places. Eight States were not able to provide the numbers of voting systems used, though some of them did provide the types of systems used without corresponding counts.
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Observations
The discussion above represents an overview of the data contained in the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey. EAC encourages individuals interested in election data to further examine the State-by-State data, and the county- (or equivalent) level data, available on EAC’s website. As shown by the response rates and increase in the number of jurisdictions responding to the 2012 survey, data collection and reporting in the United States have improved. While users of the data must take into account State differences in definitions and data reporting and consider the incomplete responses in many categories, the survey is a valuable resource of data on Federal elections for election administrators, advocates, researchers, and the general public.
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APPENDIX A
Response Rates

Summarized below are the response rates for selected questions in the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, with comparisons to 2008 and 2010 response rates where available.20 Coverage varies significantly across the questions. Not all questions were applicable to all States.

Comparing Response Rates from 2012, 2010, and 2008 (excluding Wisconsin)

Survey question

Responding Jurisdictions in 2012

Domestic absentee ballots transmitted

4,520

Domestic absentee ballots cast/counted

4,456

Domestic absentee ballots rejected

4,333

Number of poll workers

4,143

Number of precincts

4,573

Number of polling places

4,301

Provisional ballots submitted

4,111

Provisional ballots rejected

3,471

Number of Jurisdictions Surveyed:

2012
98.0% 96.6% 93.9% 89.8% 99.1% 93.2% 89.1% 75.2% 4,613

2010
97.2% 91.2% 94.7% 75.4% 99.1% 86.5% 94.6% 77.6% 4,606

2008
95.1% 94.7% 91.6% 71.7% 97.9% 95.9% 82.8% 70.9% 4,445

20 Wisconsin’s jurisdictions were excluded from the response rate calculations for all three years reported in the table, as the disproportionately large increase in Wisconsin reporting jurisdictions – from 72 in 2008 and 2010 to 3,541 in 2012 – would skew these results. When including them, the response rates are overly affected by Wisconsin because it comprises nearly half of all jurisdictions. In 2012, Wisconsin switched from reporting data at the county level to the municipality level.
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APPENDIX B
Tables and Cross Reference of Survey Questions to the Tables
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CROSS REFERENCE OF SURVEY QUESTIONS TO TABLES
Section C: Domestic Civilian Absentee Ballots Question C1: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters and the disposition of the ballots
Table 31. Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Question C2: Existence of a permanent absentee voter registration list This question was categorical and not coded for tabular display Question C3: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters due to the existence of a permanent list Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Question C4:Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots submitted for counting and the disposition of the ballots Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition Table 33. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Question C5: Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected and the reason for rejection Table 33. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C
Section D: Election Administration Question D1: Number of precincts
Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D2: Number of polling places, types of polling places Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places Table 44. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D3:Number of poll workers used Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question D4: Age category for poll workers Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers Question D5: Difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers
Section E: Provisional Ballots Question E1: Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots
Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question E2: Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots and disposition of the ballots Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C Question E3: Number of provisional ballots rejected and the reason for rejection Table 35. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Parts A, B, and C
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Section F: Election Day Activities Question F1: Number of people who participated in the November 2012 general election
Table 28. Ballots Cast by Means of Voting Table 29. Turnout Rates for Voter Participation Using Different Bases Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place Table 37. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place Question F2: Source of the number of persons participating Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation Question F3:First-time mail registrants who were required to provide identification to vote Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Question F4: Uses of electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters at the polling place Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place Question F5: Existence of printed lists of registered voters at the polls Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place Question F6: Source of poll books used at the polling place Table 38. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place Question F7: Information on the number and type of voting equipment used Table 42. Number and Type of Voting Equipment
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FOOTNOTES TO TABLES
General Notes: State:In the interest of consistency in these tables, the term State includes the District of Columbia and the four territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Jurisdictions in the Survey: For the 2012 survey, information was requested for each local election administration jurisdiction. Generally this would be the county or county equivalent in each State. The following exceptions may apply.
a) The information was compiled by town, city, or township in Wisconsin and the six New England States of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
b) S ome independent cities were treated as counties for reporting purposes in the States of Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia.
c) The response was one record for the whole entity for Alaska, the District of Columbia, and the reporting territories. d) In Hawaii, information for one county, Kalawao, was reported with Maui County. Exceptions are noted by an asterisk below the State name in Table 1a in “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012.” Table 6 in “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012” contains more information on the coverage and reporting for each State. Missing Data: Information for several items remains unavailable for some States for a number of reasons. Missing data are presented in the tables by a blank data cell, a “-999999” value, or a zero value depending on how the State answered the question. A “-999999” value denotes that a State specifically responded that data was not available for the question under consideration. Note that a zero value may also indicate that the jurisdiction does not know or does not collect the information. The count of cases, included in most tables but not for all variables, reflects the presence of a response from the jurisdiction including reported zeros. For many questions, zero is a valid response. In some instances, however, it is unclear if a response of zero is a valid response or an indication of “Data Not Available” or “Data Not Applicable” options. Researchers should consult the jurisdiction-level dataset for more detail. If a calculation is impossible because of missing information, a separate symbol may be indicated, e.g., a series of periods (……). Sum of Above: The information listed in the tables below the State detail is, for most columns, simply the arithmetic sum of the information listed in the table. The number of States providing information is indicated as the count of States with information greater than, or in some cases, less than, zero. The percentages indicated on this line are generally the result of a simple division based upon the appropriate numbers from this line. For the Not Categorized columns, the number and percentage in the “Sum of Above” line will generally reflect a calculation of the appropriate fields listed on this line. Specific Notes for Tables: Notes that are specific to each table appear following each table or group of sub-tables. These notes summarize the comments that States included when completing the survey and are occasionally direct quotes of States’ comments. The notes also occasionally include explanations of decisions made in reporting States’ data.
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Tables Included Table 28. Ballots Cast by Means of Voting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Table 29. Turnout Rates for Voter Participation Using Different Bases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Table 30. Source Used to Determine Voter Participation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Table 31. Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted: Disposition of Ballots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Table 32. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Permanent List; Submitted for Counting: Disposition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Table 33a. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Table 33b. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part B  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Table 33c. Domestic Absentee Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 34. Provisional Ballots Submitted: Disposition of Ballots  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Table 35a. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table 35b. Provisional Ballots: Reasons for Rejection, Part B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Table 36. Use of Electronic Poll Books/Lists at the Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Table 37. Source of Poll Books Used at the Polling Place  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Table 38. First-Time Mail Registrants; Use of Printed Registration Lists at the Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Table 39. Number and Ages of Poll Workers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Table 40. Difficulty of Obtaining Sufficient Poll Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Table 41. Number and Type of Precincts/Polling Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Table 42. Number and Type of Voting Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Table 43. Summary of Selected Factors per Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

2,083,309

67

302,465

1

2,323,579

15

1,080,809

75

13,096,097

57

2,594,628

64

1,560,640

169

417,631

3

294,254

1

8,557,692

67

3,910,557

159

436,774

4

666,290

44

5,339,488

110

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

1,115,281

105

1,815,896

120

2,014,511

64

724,759

500

2,734,189

24

3,184,196

351

4,780,701

83

2,950,780

87

889,914

58

2,840,776

116

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Cases
203,496 633,660 565,716 5,460,518 421,980
396,408 191,166 3,736,946 1,979,776 236,586 496,546 4,021,805 2,073,074 896,757 784,825 1,710,486 1,650,912 536,635 2,068,656 2,913,489 3,505,208 2,640,446 708,020 2,567,998 198,775 595,284 305,122

At the Polls

Total

Cases Percent

0

0.0

1

67.3

45,600

15

27.3

0

75

52.3

477,120

56

41.7

48,604

64

16.3 250,797

0

0.0

3

94.9

0

1

65.0

52,998

67

43.7 2,409,097

159

50.6

4

54.2

40,291

44

74.5

110

75.3 1,185,748

92

77.8

0

99

56.4

105

70.4

188,717

120

94.2

67,773

64

82.0 315,029

500

74.0

24

75.7 430,546

351

91.5

83

73.3

87

89.5

50

79.6

1,051

116

90.4

56

40.4

93

73.0

17

30.0 619,253

In-Person Voting

Early Voting

Total

Cases

Percent

0

0.0

1

15.1

18,255

1

0.0 150,231

75

44.1

2,153

24

0.4 968,077

64

9.7

52,977

0

0.0

3

0.0

437

1

18.0

38,636

67

28.2

31,368

0

0.0

10,545

4

9.2

643

0

0.0

110

22.2

43,772

92

0.0

4,801

0

0.0

4,996

105

16.9

38,865

120

3.7

50

64

15.6

1,321

0

0.0

290

24

15.7

79,876

0

0.0

3,288

0

0.0

2,675

0

0.0

19

0.1

10,260

0

0.0

6,308

0

0.0

5,562

0

0.0

15,130

17

60.8

3,468

Provisional

Total

Cases Percent

0

0.0

0.0

1

6.0

6.2

15

6.5

4.6

73

0.2

0.1

56

7.4

5.0

64

2.0

1.9

0

0.0

0.0

3

0.1

0.0

1

13.1

4.6

66

0.4

0.4

159

0.3

1.3

3

0.1

0.0

0

0.0

0.0

110

0.8

0.7

66

0.2

0.1

99

0.3

0.3

105

3.5

0.0

120

0.0

0.0

64

0.1

0.1

500

0.0

0.0

24

2.9

1.9

351

0.1

0.0

83

0.1

0.1

0

0.0

0.0

43

1.2

1.2

115

0.2

0.1

56

1.1

0.8

93

1.9

0.0

17

0.3

0.3

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TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

718,700 3,677,463
679,080 7,128,852 4,539,729 326,239 5,632,423 1,343,380 1,820,507 5,783,621
451,593 1,981,516
368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

Cases
654,450 3,047,584
225,870 4,342,214 1,743,642
230,890 3,547,582 1,163,957
5,488,684 423,691
1,525,284 209,102
1,006,868 5,606
573,149 219,399 3,431,110
11,828 521,311 2,413,557 183,413 11,903 32,492 1,829,762

131,590,825 F1a

8,120 74,343,638 51 F1b

At the Polls

Total

Cases Percent

320 21 23 57 100 53 88 77 0 67 39 46 58 95 234 29 238 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

91.1

0

82.9

33.3 283,649

60.9

38.4 2,557,256

70.8

63.0 600,647

86.6

112,718

0.0

94.9

190

93.8

77.0 264,754

56.7

15,139

40.6 1,403,486

0.1

860

56.0

244,130

72.1

10,853

88.0

0.4

76.1 150,666

78.4

73.2

90.4

1,062

95.4

1,012

97.4

15,266

7,796

56.5 11,794,312

29

F1f

In-Person Voting

Early Voting

Total

Cases Percent

320

0.0

0

0

0.0

94,721

23

41.8

3,082

0

0.0 129,835

100

56.3

18,041

0

0.0

88

10.7 208,087

77

8.4

1,724

0

0.0

1,771

67

0.0

48,711

0

0.0

2,357

46

13.4

5,473

58

4.1

199

95

56.6

1,758

234

0.0

50,787

29

23.9

43,036

163

3.6

18

0

0.0

12,831

0

0.0

6,832

55

22.0

3,152

0

0.0

44

0

0.0

13

1

8.1

0

1

3.0

144

1

0.8

12,715

2,149

9.0 2,139,315 47 F1e

Provisional

Total

Cases

Percent

320

0.0

0.0

21

2.6

1.8

24

0.5

0.6

57

1.8

2.2

100

0.4

0.6

0

0.0

0.0

88

3.7

3.0

77

0.1

0.2

36

0.1

0.2

67

0.8

0.2

39

0.5

0.2

46

0.3

0.0

58

0.1

0.0

95

0.1

0.0

254

0.6

1.2

29

4.2

3.7

176

0.0

0.0

134

0.3

0.1

39

0.2

1.3

40

0.5

0.6

3,541

0.0

0.0

6

0.0

0.0

1

0.0

0.0

1

0.4

0.3

1

0.7

0.5

0.6

7,537

1.6

1.3

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State

Election Juris.
in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Absentee Voting

Dom. Civilian Absentee

Total

Cases Percent

Total

25,486 1,530,416
30,144 5,214,992 1,851,529
19,492 9,090 2,292,822 1,906,886 157,236 162,156
506,516 684,690 138,366 33,690 42,640 184,763 140,650 259,114 1,259,902 255,141
58,417 256,598 283,097 206,956 78,528

0

0.0

1

8.4

9,628

15

65.9

9,135

74

2.8

3,616

51

39.8

74,521

64

71.4

17,345

0

0.0

3

4.7

1,294

1

3.1

2,364

67

26.8

87,293

159

48.8

13,356

4

36.0

2,018

44

24.3

2,182

0

0.0

92

19.0

5,468

99

43.1

3,508

104

12.4

3,365

120

1.9

3,897

64

2.1

4,609

500

25.5

3,071

24

5.1

14,461

351

8.1

8,305

83

26.4

12,916

87

8.6

10,506

47

6.6

4,568

116

9.0

9,872

56

57.5

4,532

93

25.4

1,267

17

7.7

5,937

UOCAVA Cases 0 1 15 74 51 64 0 3 1 67 159 4 44 0 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 51 116 56 93 17

Percent 0.0 3.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.6

Mail Voting

Vote by Mail Jurisdicition

Total

Cases Percent

0 1,904 1,329,984
0 0 0 2,406
44,687 264
8,347 5,443

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

0.0

10

0.2

48

10.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

0.0

1

0.0

1

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

44

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

87

1.5

11

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10

1.0

17

0.5

Other Means

Other Means of Voting

Total

Cases Percent

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

137

1

0.0

156

3

0.0

18,409

9

0.1

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

102

8

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

47,254

110

0.9

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

10,736

4

1.2

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

118

93

0.0

21

17

0.0

Not Categorized

Balance

Total

Percent

2,083,309 0 0 0
(19,008) 0
1,560,640 0 0 64 (6) 0
3,000 40,909 73,514
0 (38,857)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96,598 0 0 (11,534) 0

100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.1) 0.0
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.5 0.8 2.8 0.0 (3.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 0.0 (1.4) 0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Absentee Voting

Dom. Civilian Absentee

UOCAVA

Total

Cases Percent

Total

Cases

60,846 284,103 52,726 326,189 205,072 94,024 1,259,904 59,523 12,908 241,656 24,387 100,473 32,814 55,365 237,365
62,076 423,481
5,289 658,240
65,742

320 21 17 57 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 58 95 230 0 224 134 0 54 3,541 23

8.5

3,404

7.7

10,827

7.8

3,117

4.6

39,214

4.5

15,718

28.8

1,325

22.4

15,698

4.4

5,458

0.7

11,749

4.2

18,018

5.4

1,158

5.1

6,728

8.9

1,701

2.2

12,605

3.0

40,579

0.0

3,555

20.4

1,914

10.9

29,424

0.0

47,521

0.8

1,681

21.4

6,294

26.2

1,533

320 21 19 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 58 95 233 29 222 134 39 55 3,541 23

86

1

0.7

116

1

96

1

0.3

93

1

2,080

1

0.1

1,584

1

21,853,762

7,619

49

F1d

16.6 600,048

7,701

51

F1c

Percent 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.1
0.5

Mail Voting

Vote by Mail Jurisdicition

Total

Cases Percent

0 7,825
1,794,079 0
100,473 1,506
4,347 3,140,309

320

0.0

0

0.0

17

1.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

36

98.5

67

0.0

0

0.0

46

5.1

58

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

142

1.4

0

0.0

39

97.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

0 17,562

1

0.0

1

0.9

6,459,136

963

4.9

14

F1g

Other Means

Other Means of Voting

Total

Cases Percent

0

320

0.0

240,228

21

6.5

949

5

0.1

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

39

0.0

0

0

0.0

3,708

66

1.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

2,762

25

0.9

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

0

0.0

0

1

0.0

238

1

0.7

0

0

0.0

Not Categorized

Balance

Total

Percent

0

0.0

0

0.0

101,862

15.0

2,291,400

32.1

0

0.0

0

0.0

505

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

(13,638)

(0.2)

0

0.0

(21,669)

(1.1)

104,647

28.4

100

0.0

7,658,654

95.8

159,166

15.6

3,140

1.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3,000

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

324,818

724

13

F1h+i+j

0.2 14,075,796

10.7

22

calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 28. BALLOTS CAST BY MEANS OF VOTING
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F1:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted “F1b. Provisional.” Another jurisdiction noted that two provisional ballots were counted and vote history was credited Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that for F1f (Voted at an early vote center), this total is included in the totals noted in F1d and C1b since each is still considered an “Early Ballot” cast. The breakdown of the number of voters who cast an early ballot in-person at an early voting site is 12,527 but again, is still considered as voters who “voted using a domestic civilian early (absentee) ballot”. Rejected provisional ballots are NOT included in F1a and F1e totals since they are not used to credit the person’s vote history. Rejected Provisional Ballots are considered invalid and/or the individual is not registered so no record exists and therefore no history can be updated. Of the 122,524 provisional ballots cast, 99,684 provisional ballots were deemed valid and counted as reflected in F1e. California: One jurisdiction commented, “F1g(3,116) + F1d(3,799) = C1b(6,915) and F1e-counted Provisional ballots and the remaining 7 Provisional ballots were not registered voters(E1d). A second jurisdiction noted that F1d differs from C1b because C1b includes rejected domestic absentees; F1d does not include rejected as rejected ballots do not count in vote history. Another jurisdiction noted that F1c, F1d, and F1g equal C1b. A fourth jurisdiction commented that the total is not actually greater than F1a. One jurisdiction stated in reference to F1f that it does not have early voting centers, and also that F1d includes ballots cast and duplicated from DRE equipment. Another jurisdiction stated its F1g totals are included in F1d and it removed 19 deceased voters from C1b. A different jurisdiction also noted that F1f is included in F1d as these voters are given vote by mail ballots. One jurisdiction stated, “F1f - 800 ballots were issued from our office ‘over-the-counter’ then returned to our office. These 800 are already accounted for in F1d.” Another jurisdiction stated that early voting is included in vote by mail or absentee. Florida: One jurisdiction commented, “(1) Since there was no break-out section for domestic military, we added that number in with the domestic civilian absentee ballot. (2) One of the provisional ballots was not registered to vote, therefore no voter history could be credited. We excluded that number from F1e.” A second jurisdiction stated that F1f is Early Voting Turnout (D2e is referencing Early Voting locations). A third jurisdiction noted that out of the 16 rejected of provisional ballots, all but 2 received voter history (see E2 and F1h). Another jurisdiction commented, “Total voters that voted by absentee, early, provisional and election day also including referred ballots.” A fifth jurisdiction noted that provisional ballots were included in F1a. Another jurisdiction stated that provisional ballot voters that are rejected are not given credit for voting, but E1 asks for total who voted using a provisional ballot. This jurisdiction is unable to account for the 38 vote difference between the two totals after reviewing all reports submitted by vendor. Guam: In reference to F1h, homebound voting is servicing those who are elderly/physically challenged and are not able to go to the polls. Indiana: Indiana does not have ‘early voting.’ Indiana allows voters to cast absentee ballots prior to election day, but all absentee ballots are counted on election day. That is why F1f = 0 for all counties. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented that the number in F1d includes in-office absentee votes and mail-in. Another jurisdiction stated that these figures are per report election results 11/6/2012. A third jurisdiction stated that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Hampshire: Per EAC Instructions Absentee Ballot Totals include rejected ballots whereas F1a and F1b do not. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented “Ballot Issue Report/How voters voted statistics.” Ohio: One jurisdiction stated Ohio has absentee voting beginning 35 days before an election for non-UOCAVA voters, and also noted that it does not have early voting. Puerto Rico: Under the new Puerto Rico Election Code, people with mobility disabilities have a right to vote by mail, as a domicile vote/ early vote. South Carolina: Totals come from separate sources and cannot always be reconciled. For example an absentee ballot that was challenged could be represented under “absentee and provisional”. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “F1f. In total for domestic civilian absentee ballot.” Another jurisdiction stated that voter at early voting center includes mail returns of votes. A third jurisdiction stated these breakdowns were not done. A fourth jurisdiction commented, “An elderly gentleman voted absentee and at the polling place. The elderly poll worker did not catch the unintentional double voting. The Town Clerk caught the mistake too late.” Another jurisdiction stated that it does not separate ballots received in the
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION mail and voted at office. A sixth jurisdiction stated that F1c plus F1d breaks down to 92 in early voting center and 133 by mail. Another jurisdiction commented, “See the Absentee Ballot Portal data for Woodstock.” Washington: Physical poll place voters may have voted during early voting. West Virginia: Unlike the totals for F1a, F1b, and F1f, which are determined by ballots counted, totals for F1c, F1d, and F1e are determined by voter history as entered into the Statewide Voter Registration Wyoming: F1a can be greater than the number of registered voters prior to the day of the election. Since Wyoming has Election Day Registration, votes are being cast for registrations that do not appear in the A1 total because they are processed after the election.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 28

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris.
in Survey 67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Voters Participating

Total

Cases

2,083,309

67

302,465

1

2,323,579

15

1,080,809

75

13,096,097

57

2,594,628

64

1,560,640

169

417,631

3

294,254

1

8,557,692

67

3,910,557

159

436,774

4

666,290

44

5,339,488

110

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

1,115,281

105

1,815,896

120

2,014,511

64

724,759

500

2,734,189

24

3,184,196

351

4,780,701

83

2,950,780

87

889,914

58

2,840,776

116

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Estimated Voting Age

Total 3,697,617 544,349 4,932,361 2,238,250 28,801,211 3,956,224 2,796,789
712,042 522,843 15,315,088 7,429,820 1,089,302 1,169,075 9,811,190 4,945,857 2,351,233 2,161,601 3,362,177 3,484,090 1,063,274 4,540,763 5,244,729 7,616,490 4,102,991 2,239,593 4,618,513 783,161 1,392,120 2,095,348

%TO 56.3 55.6 47.1 48.3 45.5 65.6 55.8 58.7 56.3 55.9 52.6 40.1 57.0 54.4 53.9 67.6 51.6 54.0 57.8 68.2 60.2 60.7 62.8 71.9 39.7 61.5 62.8 58.6 48.6

Rank 26 30 43 42 47 6 29 19 27 28 37 50 24 31 35 5 39 34 22 4 16 13 9 1 51 11 8 21 41

Total

Estimated Citizen Voting Age
%TO

3,595,400

57.9

519,629

58.2

4,376,217

53.1

2,159,446

50.1

23,546,880

55.6

3,654,799

71.0

2,565,067

60.8

672,175

62.1

473,487

62.1

13,534,127

63.2

6,867,525

56.9

993,045

44.0

1,114,631

59.8

8,916,661

59.9

4,780,336

55.7

2,280,022

69.7

2,053,815

54.3

3,283,865

55.3

3,396,443

59.3

1,046,057

69.3

4,153,057

65.8

4,784,241

66.6

7,347,850

65.1

3,920,519

75.3

2,200,437

40.4

4,505,205

63.1

774,966

63.5

1,329,041

61.4

1,804,094

56.4

Rank 33 31 43 45 39 3 24 19 18 16 34 50 26 25 38 5 41 40 29 6 9 7 11 1 51 17 15 21 36

Reported Registration

Total 3,162,135 579,304 3,725,362 1,610,364 18,996,338 3,651,091 2,202,278 632,805
557,774 11,934,446 6,050,050
705,668 895,834 8,116,660 4,562,268 2,236,068 1,771,252 3,037,153 2,965,751 1,026,086 3,694,658 4,340,000 7,454,553 3,387,783 1,399,209 4,191,778 681,608 1,163,871 1,258,409

%TO 65.9 52.2 62.4 67.1 68.9 71.1 70.9 66.0 52.8 71.7 64.6 61.9 74.4 65.8 58.4 71.1 63.0 59.8 67.9 70.6 74.0 73.4 64.1 87.1 63.6 67.8 72.2 70.1 80.9

Rank 32 50 39 29 22 15 16 31 49 13 34 41 8 33 46 14 38 44 25 17 9 10 35 2 36 28 11 20 6

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 29

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey 320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55
3,541 23 1 1 1 1
8,154

Voters Participating

Total

Cases

718,700

320

3,677,463

21

679,080

26

7,128,852

62

4,539,729

100

326,239

53

5,632,423

88

1,343,380

77

1,820,507

36

5,783,621

67

451,593

39

1,981,516

46

368,816

66

2,480,182

95

7,993,851

254

1,023,036

29

304,509

245

3,896,846

134

3,206,490

39

685,099

55

3,078,135

3,541

250,701

23

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

131,590,825

8,120

54

F1

Estimated Voting Age

Total 1,045,878 6,838,206 1,571,096 15,307,107 7,465,545
545,020 8,880,551 2,877,457 3,038,729 10,024,150
833,818 3,643,633
629,185 4,962,227 19,073,564 1,967,315
502,060 6,329,130 5,312,045 1,471,372 4,408,841
440,922

%TO 68.7 53.8 43.2 46.6 60.8 59.9 63.4 46.7 59.9 57.7 54.2 54.4 58.6 50.0 41.9 52.0 60.7 61.6 60.4 46.6 69.8 56.9

Rank 3 36 48 45 12 18 7 44 17 23 33 32 20 40 49 38 14 10 15 46 2 25

2,817,721

66.7

…

243,003,673

n/a

52

Pop.Est.

Total

Estimated Citizen Voting Age
%TO

1,014,537

70.8

6,012,270

61.2

1,448,740

46.9

13,408,596

53.2

7,013,407

64.7

536,097

60.9

8,678,945

64.9

2,757,440

48.7

2,822,652

64.5

9,700,796

59.6

768,684

58.7

3,506,606

56.5

619,251

59.6

4,790,345

51.8

16,518,813

48.4

1,829,834

55.9

491,789

61.9

5,883,341

66.2

4,879,174

65.7

1,460,372

46.9

4,271,926

72.1

430,996

58.2

2,756,939

68.2

222,250,587

n/a

52

ACS

Rank 4 22 49 42 13 23 12 46 14 27 30 35 28 44 47 37 20 8 10 48 2 32
…

Reported Registration

Total 878,136
5,415,639 1,252,438 11,720,541 6,655,291 545,020* 7,987,697 2,114,489 2,199,360 8,352,342
725,309 2,875,121
523,410 4,024,960 13,690,729 1,508,372
460,817 5,428,091 3,904,959 1,246,559 3,987,248
240,438 17,764 50,701
2,402,941

%TO 81.8 67.9 54.2 60.8 68.2 59.9 70.5 63.5 82.8 69.2 62.3 68.9 70.5 61.6 58.4 67.8 66.1 71.8 82.1 55.0 77.2
104.3 74.1 67.2 78.2

Rank 5 26 48 43 24 51 18 37 3 21 40 23 19 42 45 27 30 12 4 47 7 1
… … …

193,653,908

n/a

53

A1

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 29. TURNOUT RATES FOR VOTER PARTICIPATION USING DIFFERENT BASES Question F1. Calculations for rates of voter participation (turnout) based upon voting age population, citizens of voting age, and registration.
General note: This table represents a comparison of the rates of participation based upon the number of voters participating (F1a) by cal¬culating the rate based upon selected bases. The estimates of voting age and citizen voting age were not available for the four territories; the four territories are therefore not ranked for any of the measures of voter participation to facilitate comparisons across the measures. Reported registration is, with a few exceptions, information also taken from the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey (see Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d of the NVRA Report Appendix). States will vary in whether inactive voters are included in their registration figures. The Estimated Voting Age (VAP) and the Citizens of Voting Age (CVAP) figures are released by the Bureau of the Census. The VAP numbers are from the 2010 Census (with the estimated change in population between 2010 and 2012 taken into account). The CVAP numbers are derived from the 2011 3-year Bureau of the Census American Community Survey. All the information used here and released by the Bureau of the Census share some data issues: a) they are estimates initially based upon the 2010 Census and an ongoing review of administrative records or, in the case of the ACS, an ongoing survey; b) the estimates are for the domestic/resident population; thus, UOCAVA voters are not included in the relevant universe of the voting population; and c) these population bases do not address the statutory eligibility of any person to register or to vote. Thirty-three jurisdictions across four States (California, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Vermont) did not provide voter turnout. Voter turnout was provided for the large majority of jurisdictions in each State, thus all States are included in the rankings. The reader should be cognizant of the impact this missing information has on the rankings, the calculation of turnout percentages, and the overall national values.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 31

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

Cases

Voters Checked Off or Poll Book Signatures
Total Cases Pct.

67

2,083,309

67

0 …

Alaska

1

302,465

1

0 …

Arizona

15

2,323,579

15

0 …

Arkansas

75

1,080,809

75 233,965

22 21.6

California

58

13,096,097

57 1,143,863

5 8.7

Colorado

64

2,594,628

64

0 …

Connecticut

169

1,560,640 169 1,560,640 169 100.0

Delaware

3

417,631

3

0 …

District of Columbia

1

294,254

1

0 …

Florida

67

8,557,692

67 2,990,510

27 34.9

Georgia

159

3,910,557 159

0 …

Hawaii

4

436,774

4

0 …

Idaho

44

666,290 44

0 …

Illinois

1

5,339,488 110

0 …

Indiana

92

2,663,373

92 2,663,373

92 100.0

Iowa

99

1,589,951

99

0 …

Kansas

105

1,115,281 105 1,115,281 105 100.0

Kentucky

120

1,815,896 120

0 …

Louisiana

64

2,014,511

64

0 …

Maine

499

724,759 500

0 …

Maryland

24

2,734,189

24

0 …

Massachusetts

351

3,184,196 351

0 …

Michigan

83

4,780,701

83 4,780,701

83 100.0

Minnesota

87

2,950,780

87 2,950,780

87 100.0

Mississippi

82

889,914

58 220,394

16 24.8

Missouri

116

2,840,776 116 227,227

29 8.0

Montana

56

491,966

56

0 …

Nebraska

93

815,568

93

0 …

Ballots Counted

Total Cases

2,023,918

65

0

1,895,333

13

774,439 44

4,705,319

26

0

0

417,631

3

294,254

1

3,466,761

21

0

372,871

3

666,290 44

5,293,802 109

0

1,589,951

99

0

1,815,896 120

0

724,759 500

0

0

0

0

370,660

18

2,298,050

75

491,966

56

0

Pct. 97.1 … 81.6 71.7 35.9 … …
100.0 100.0 40.5
… 85.4 100.0 99.1
… 100.0
… 100.0
… 100.0
… … … … 41.7 80.9 100.0 …

Vote History

Total

Cases 0

0

0

53,707

6

6,860,818

20

0

0

0

0

864,847

11

0

63,903

1

0

45,686

1

0

0

0

0

2,014,511

64

0

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

212,065

18

39,873

4

0

0

Pct. … … … 5.0
52.4 … … … … 10.1 …
14.6 … 0.9 … … … …
100.0 …
100.0 … … …
23.8 1.4 … …

Votes for Highest Office

Total Cases

59,391

2

0

0

0

39,535

1

0

0

0

0

537,235

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10,631

3

3,970

1

0

0

Pct. 2.9 … … … 0.3 … … … … 6.3 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1.2 0.1 … …

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

…

0

0.0

302,465

1 100.0

0

0.0

428,246

2 18.4

0

0.0

18,698

3 1.7

0

0.0

346,562

5 2.6

0

0.0

2,594,628

64 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

698,339

4 8.2

0

0.0

3,910,557 159 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

3,184,196 351 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

76,164

3 8.6

0

0.0

271,656

7 9.6

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

815,568

93 100.0

0

0.0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 32

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION (CONTINUED)

State
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

Cases

Voters Checked Off or Poll Book Signatures
Total Cases Pct.

17

1,017,772

17

2,156

1 0.2

320

718,700 320

0 …

21

3,677,463

21

0 …

33

679,080

26 334,381

6 49.2

62

7,128,852

62

0 …

100

4,539,729 100

0 …

53

326,239

53

0 …

88

5,632,423

88 588,462

14 10.4

77

1,343,380

77

0 …

36

1,820,507

36

0 …

67

5,783,621

67

0 …

39

451,593

39

0 …

46

1,981,516

46

0 …

66

368,816

66

44,974

21 12.2

95

2,480,182

95 396,192

23 16.0

254

7,993,851 254

0 …

29

1,023,036

29

0 …

246

304,509 245 211,133 193 69.3

134

3,896,846 134

0 …

39

3,206,490

39

0 …

55

685,099

55

0 …

3,541

3,078,135 3,541 3,078,135 3,541 100.0

23

250,701

23

0 …

1

13,167

1

0 …

1

34,075

1

0 …

1

1,878,969

1

0 …

1

8,154 131,590,825 8,120 22,542,167 4,434 17.1

17

F1a

F2.1

Ballots Counted

Total Cases

983,151

9

0

0

117,291

5

0

0

326,239

53

3,252,435

52

1,343,380

77

0

0

0

0

294,357

36

344,497

7

0

0

79,107

42

0

0

685,099

55

0

250,701

23

13,167

1

0

0

Pct. 96.6 … … 17.3 … … 100.0 57.7 100.0 … … … … 79.8 13.9 … … 26.0 … … 100.0 … 100.0 100.0 … …

34,891,324 1,557 26.5 27
F2.2

Vote History

Total Cases

4,198

2

0

3,677,463

21

83,347

4

0

4,539,729 100

0

1,076,928

13

0

0

5,783,621

67

0

0

27,463

8

1,739,493

65

0

0

10,642

4

3,896,846 134

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. 0.4 …
100.0 12.3
… 100.0
… 19.1 … … 100.0 … … 7.4 70.1 … … 3.5 100.0 … … … … … … …

33,729,329 567 25.6 19
F2.3

Votes for Highest Office

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

7,128,852

62

0

0

443,295

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,993,851 254

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

Pct. … … … …
100.0 … … 7.9 … … … … … … …
100.0 … … … … … … … …
100.0 100.0

18,129,804 337 13.8 10
F2.4

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

28,267

5 2.8

0

0.0

718,700 320 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

142,097

10 20.9 1,964

0.3

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

271,303

1 4.8

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

1,820,507

36 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

451,593

39 100.0

0

0.0

1,981,516

46 100.0

0

0.0

2,022

1 0.5

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

1,023,036

29 100.0

0

0.0

3,627

6 1.2

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

3,206,490

39 100.0

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

0

…

0

0.0

22,296,237 1,224 16.9 1,964

0.0

22

1

F2.5+0

calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 30. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION Questions F1, F2. Number of persons participating and the source of the number of voters.
General Note: Any misspelled responses to F2 were corrected to align with the categorical responses presented in the questionnaire in order to tabulate the number of voters that participated in the election for each source. Question F2: Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “Election night reporting software – total ballots cast.” Another jurisdiction noted this information was drawn from the ERM Summary Report plus ballots returned but not counted. Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that provisional ballot totals (valid and invalid) are also derived from its verification reports generated from its voter registration system upon assigning a disposition to a given provisional. Florida: One jurisdiction noted, “Totals from tabulation.” Another jurisdiction commented that F1c, d, and e include rejected ballots. A third jurisdiction stated it’s “official” number of ballots cast from results certificates is 95,252; voters whose ballots continue to arrive after the election are always given credit for voting to ensure their voter records remain active. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “How voters voted statistics report/Ballot issue report.” Oklahoma: Number of ballots counted was derived from total votes cast for highest office, plus over votes and under votes in that race. Vermont: One jurisdiction noted that its voting tabulator also digitally keeps track of numbers to compare with the checklist from poll workers. A second jurisdiction stated that this designation includes ballots received after election day. Another jurisdiction commented, “Entrance and Exit Checklist verification.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that F2 also refers to the number of voters checked off (same number). A different jurisdiction noted that “voters checked off voter checklist include early voters as well.” Another jurisdiction noted that F2 also refers to the number of ballots counted.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 31. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS TRANSMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Total Ballots Transmitted

Total Cases 63,840 39

30,144

1

1,920,746

15

34,257

74

9,394,212 58

2,134,847 64

131,416 169

21,103

3

15,953

1

2,807,295 67

1,942,497 159

174,340

4

168,599 44

328,406 110

562,430

92

736,304

99

199,306 105

33,690 120

55,818

64

193,105 500

160,663

24

282,365 351

1,297,672 83

277,294 87

68,692 58

269,713 116

314,536 56

231,377 93

Returned and Submitted for Counting
Total Cases Pct.

Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted to Voters and Disposition

Returned as Undeliverable

Spoiled or Replaced Ballots

Status Unknown (Not Returned)

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

55,671

39 87.2

0 …

0

…

0 …

25,486

1 84.5

616

1 2.0

0

…

4,042

1 13.4

1,542,855

15 80.3 59,945

12 3.1 63,071

15

3.3 254,874

15 13.3

31,148

74 90.9

154

74 0.4

46

73

0.1

2,678

74

7.8

6,634,717

58 70.6 181,886 45 1.9 58,322

27

0.6 2,311,657

52 24.6

1,868,130

64 87.5

57,258

64 2.7 23,466

64

1.1 185,859 64 8.7

120,041 169 91.3

0 …

0

…

0 …

19,492

3 92.4

32

3 0.2

570

3

2.7

847

3 4.0

11,454

1 71.8

326

1 2.0

223

1

1.4

3,950

1 24.8

2,297,627

67 81.8 40,551

65 1.4

37,618

17

1.3 430,786

67 15.3

1,909,845 159 98.3

544 159 0.0

416 159

0.0

0 …

157,236

4 90.2

355

2 0.2

806

2

0.5 15,943

4 9.1

163,115

44 96.7

447 44 0.3

671

44

0.4

4,356 44 2.6

302,359 110 92.1

0 …

0

…

0 …

558,739

92 99.3

115 92 0.0

3,576

92

0.6

0 …

684,690

99 93.0

2,432 99 0.3

4,605

99

0.6 42,166 99 5.7

139,146 104 69.8

1,601 105 0.8

1,170 105

0.6 13,101 105 6.6

33,690 120 100.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

43,686

64 78.3

0 64 0.0

0

… 10,974 64 19.7

186,930 500 96.8

147 500 0.1

409 500

0.2

5,619 500 2.9

140,650

24 87.5

758

24 0.5

0

… 19,255

24 12.0

259,114 351 91.8

220 351 0.1

3 351

0.0 23,028 351 8.2

1,259,902

83 97.1

1,698

83

0.1

21,031

83

1.6 15,041 83 1.2

265,315

87 95.7

198

87

0.1

1,058

87

0.4 10,723 87 3.9

64,657

55 94.1

211

23 0.3

48

19

0.1

1,668

35 2.4

257,329 116 95.4

389 110 0.1

65

69

0.0

2,066 38 0.8

285,388

56 90.7

3,302 56 1.0

6,367

56

2.0 19,479 56 6.2

206,956

93 89.4

0 …

0

…

17,148

93

7.4

Other Disposition (See Comments) Total Cases Pct.
0 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.
8,169 12.8

0 …

0 0.0

1

1 0.0

0 0.0

229

13 0.7

2 0.0

145,168

22

1.5 62,462 0.7

0 …

134 0.0

0 … 11,375 8.7

162

3 0.8

0 0.0

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

713

6 0.0

0 0.0

0 … 31,692 1.6

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

10 0.0

0 … 26,047 7.9

0 …

0 0.0

2,411

99 0.3

0 0.0

0 … 44,288 22.2

0 …

0 0.0

1,158

64

2.1

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

51

5 0.1

2,057 3.0

4

1 0.0

9,860 3.7

0 …

0 0.0

8,347

10 3.6

(1,074) (0.5)

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 31. SOURCE USED TO DETERMINE VOTER PARTICIPATION (CONTINUED)

State
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
17 320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23
1 1 1 1 8,154

Total Ballots Transmitted

Total Cases

91,634

17

69,354 320

336,640

21

83,642

28

340,169

57

229,672 100

99,458

53

1,346,248

88

72,820

77

17,807

36

282,822

67

27,105

39

408,388

46

74,231

66

59,667

95

253,450 233

242,393

29

71,295 238

441,110 134

3,832,560

39

15,168

55

736,123 3,541

67,554

23

116

1

133

1

20,206

1

33,070,385 54 C1a

8,061

Returned and Submitted for Counting
Total Cases Pct.

Domestic Absentee Ballots Transmitted to Voters and Disposition

Returned as Undeliverable

Spoiled or Replaced Ballots

Status Unknown (Not Returned)

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

77,908

17 85.0

1,177

17 1.3

731

17 0.8

11,818

17 12.9

66,075 320 95.3

102 320 0.1

0 320 0.0

3,177 320 4.6

284,103

21 84.4

0 …

0

…

52,537

21 15.6

71,386

26 85.3

59

13 0.1

32

13 0.0

601

11 0.7

326,189

57 95.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

205,078 100 89.3

542 100 0.2

9,354 100

4.1

14,571 100 6.3

94,024

53 94.5

32 53 0.0

204

53 0.2

5,198

51 5.2

1,259,904

88 93.6

2,305

88 0.2

10,010

88 0.7

73,827

88 5.5

61,429

77 84.4

343 77 0.5

0

77 0.0

11,048

77 15.2

12,908

36 72.5

542 36 3.0

1,365

36

7.7

2,992

36 16.8

248,561

67 87.9

478 67 0.2

56

67 0.0

33,726

67 11.9

24,425

39 90.1

0 …

0 …

2,680

39 9.9

395,422

46 96.8

0 …

0 …

11,024

46 2.7

72,635

66 97.8

18 66 0.0

16

66 0.0

834

66

1.1

55,270

95 92.6

273 95 0.5

226

95 0.4

3,890

95 6.5

237,365 230 93.7

1,239 227 0.5

1,412 220 0.6

13,434 223 5.3

187,674

29 77.4

4,099 29 1.7

0

…

50,620

29 20.9

68,152 231 95.6

33 189 0.0

152 183 0.2

2,795 202 3.9

423,481 134 96.0

0 …

0 …

17,552 134 4.0

3,140,309

39 81.9

57,653

37 1.5

19,313

21 0.5

0 …

13,792

54 90.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

686,860 3,541 93.3

3,093 3,541 0.4

0 … 50,984 3,541 6.9

65,742

23 97.3

5

23 0.0

230

23 0.3

1,577

23 2.3

86

1 74.1

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

30

1 25.9

96

1 72.2

5

1 3.8

0

1 0.0

27

1 20.3

20,012

1 99.0

127

1 0.6

0

1 0.0

67

1 0.3

27,624,254 8,044 83.5 425,310 7,045

54

41

C1b

C1c

1.3 266,642 3,248 33 C1d

0.8 3,760,269 7,049 11.4 45 C1e

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

0

17 0.0

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.
0 0.0

0 320 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0

2 0.0 11,564 13.8

16,534

57 4.9 (2,554) (0.8)

127 100 0.1

0 0.0

0

53 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

202 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0

67 0.0

1 0.0

0

39 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

1,942 0.5

4

66 0.0

724 1.0

8

1 0.0

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

43

32 0.1

120 0.2

0 …

77 0.0

0 … 615,285 16.1

1,339

54 8.8

37 0.2

0 … (4,814) (0.7)

0 …

0 0.0

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

5

1 3.8

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

176,304 1,035 0.5 817,606 2.5

17

23

C1f+g+h

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 36

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 41 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 31. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS TRANSMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS
Questions C1. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters and the disposition of the ballots. General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated. This could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C1: Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that two designated bearers did not get picked up. Another jurisdiction commented, “Voter didn’t download ballot.” A third jurisdiction commented, “Was returned late.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that for C1d addresses of two absentee requests were noted in the wrong precinct; as a result, the precinct spoiled their ballots, changed their addresses, and reissued correct ballots. California: One jurisdiction noted that C1g is included in C1b. A second jurisdiction commented that the total of C1b-h exceeds C1a because the reported number of replacement ballots includes ballots that are being counted in other areas, and therefore they are being counted twice. A third jurisdiction stated that it does not track undeliverable ballots in its EMS system. Another jurisdiction included replacement ballots in all categories showing ballots issued, returned, counted, etc. Delaware: One jurisdiction had to reissue ballots for one Senate District twice due to a withdrawal and substitution of a candidate. Florida: One jurisdiction noted that the data for this question was drawn from the VR EAC Report. A second jurisdiction commented that the Absentee Report shows 2,181, but two FWAB absentee ballots were added in the C1a total. Another jurisdiction commented, “C1b does not include 11 ballots that were returned by ineligible voters and 27 ballots returned with no certificate envelope or other voter identifiers. Ballots received after the deadline are ‘invalid’ and, therefore, no official action is required to ‘reject’ them. As of 01/02/13, we received 706 ‘late’ ballots from civilian domestic voters.” Missouri: One jurisdiction had 19 replaced ballots, which are reflected in the count. Another jurisdiction commented that the three spoiled ballots (C1d) are included in the 329 transmitted ballots (C1a) count. A third jurisdiction stated that not all ballots mailed were returned. A fourth jurisdiction noted that for C1c, ballots were still coming in; for C1d, some replaced, and MCVR report included military through emails. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee Statistics Report/Ballot Issue Report/Absentee Register.” A second jurisdiction states that its absentee board included UOCAVA voters. Oregon: Oregon conducts elections by mail. Numbers reported reflect domestic absentee only because under statute, the permanent absentee process is distinctly different from vote by mail elections. Vermont: One jurisdiction stated that C1 includes all absentee ballots which equaled 144 + 1 FWAB, while C1b includes 137 ballots + 1 FWAB; for E1b, this jurisdiction did not keep a copy of the tally for spoiled out of locked bag. Another jurisdiction commented, “5 ballots were returned the day after election. Postal marks indicate multi date transit intra-state. UNACCEPTABLE. See attached scanned copies of the envelopes.” A third jurisdiction noted that for C1c one ballot returned as undeliverable was for a prisoner who transferred to another facility. Another jurisdiction stated that a returned ballot was requested and sent under a maiden name and was returned as addressee “unknown” because current address was registered under married name. West Virginia: No way to track ballots returned as undeliverable, spoiled, or status unknown.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 37

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 42 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: SENT TO PERMANENT LIST; SUBMIT TED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey

Total Ballots Transmitted
Total

Permanent List
Transmissions
Total

67

63,840

1

30,144

15 1,920,746

1,803,314

75

34,257

1,169

58 9,394,212

7,875,263

64 2,134,847

1,803,342

169

131,416

3

21,103

4,120

1

15,953

2,699

67 2,807,295

1,209,030

159 1,942,497

83,942

4

174,340

148,602

44

168,599

110

328,406

92

562,430

99

736,304

105

199,306

31,712

120

33,690

64

55,818

33,774

500

193,105

24

160,663

351

282,365

83 1,297,672

87

277,294

82

68,692

1,385

116

269,713

26,589

56

314,536

257,222

93

231,377

17

91,634

0

Ballots Pct. Submitted

Total

…

55,671

…

25,486

93.9 1,542,855

3.4

31,148

83.8 6,634,717

84.5 1,868,130

… 120,041

19.5

19,492

16.9

11,454

43.1 2,297,627

4.3 1,909,845

85.2 157,236

…

163,115

… 302,359

… 558,739

… 684,690

15.9

139,146

…

33,690

60.5

43,686

… 186,930

… 140,650

…

259,114

… 1,259,902

… 265,315

2.0

64,657

9.9 257,329

81.8 285,388

… 206,956

0.0

77,908

Disposition of Domestic Absentee Ballots Submitted for Counting

Counted

Rejected

Other (See Comments)

Total

Cases 0

24,681

1

1,530,465

15

27,833

72

6,554,199

58

1,768,061

64

117,685 169

19,251

3

11,058

1

2,276,767

67

1,909,136 159

156,130

4

162,156

44

298,121 110

506,516

92

676,522

99

182,169 105

31,876 120

41,312

64

184,763 500

139,136

24

256,616 351

1,228,162

83

257,542

87

61,160

56

251,954 116

284,535

56

203,014

93

76,730

17

Pct. …
96.8 99.2 89.4 98.8 94.6 98.0 98.8 96.5 99.1 100.0 99.3 99.4 98.6 90.7 98.8 130.9 94.6 94.6 98.8 98.9 99.0 97.5 97.1 94.6 97.9 99.7 98.1 98.5

Total

Cases 0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070 57

16,407 64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588 67

709 159

1,106

4

954 44

4,238 110

11,983 92

8,168 99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374 64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049 83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942 93

1,160

17

Pct. … 3.2 0.8 3.0 0.9 0.9 2.0 1.2 3.5 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.2 3.6 5.4 5.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.6 2.9 3.4 2.0 0.3 1.9 1.5

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

1

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

66

1

1

1

0

0

18

17

Pct. … … … … 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 0.1 0.0 … … 0.0

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total

Pct.

55,671 100.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

2,366 7.6

21,448 0.3

83,662 4.5

0 0.0

1 0.0

0 0.0

272 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

5 0.0

0 0.0

40,240 7.2

0 0.0

(48,085) (34.6)

0 0.0

0 0.0

11 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

23,691 1.9

0 0.0

1,223 1.9

298 0.1

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 38

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 43 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: SENT TO PERMANENT LIST; SUBMIT TED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey

Total Ballots Transmitted
Total

Permanent List
Transmissions
Total

320

69,354

0

Ballots Pct. Submitted

Total

0.0

66,075

21

336,640

153,851 45.7 284,103

33

83,642

1,655 2.0

71,386

62

340,169

… 326,189

100

229,672

… 205,078

53

99,458

…

94,024

88 1,346,248

… 1,259,904

77

72,820

18,616 25.6

61,429

36

17,807

17,807 100.0

12,908

67

282,822

7,127 2.5 248,561

39

27,105

…

24,425

46

408,388

… 395,422

66

74,231

…

72,635

95

59,667

8,640 14.5

55,270

254

253,450

… 237,365

29

242,393

…

187,674

246

71,295

200 0.3

68,152

134

441,110

… 423,481

39 3,832,560

3,832,560 100.0 3,140,309

55

15,168

125 0.8

13,792

3,541

736,123

57,010 7.7 686,860

23

67,554

…

65,742

1

116

108 93.1

86

1

133

…

96

1

20,206

…

20,012

1

8,154 33,070,385

17,379,862 52.6 27,624,254

54

25

54

C1a

C3 calc

C1b

Disposition of Domestic Absentee Ballots Submitted for Counting

Counted

Rejected

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases Pct. 64,340 320 97.4

Total Cases Pct. 1,735 320 2.6

Total Cases Pct. 0 320 0.0

276,693

21 97.4

6,534

21 2.3

0 …

68,023 22 95.3

971

17 1.4

0

2 0.0

309,655 57 94.9

0 …

0 …

202,841 100 98.9

2,237 100 1.1

0 …

93,665 53 99.6

359 53 0.4

0

53 0.0

1,247,055 88 99.0

12,849

88 1.0

0 …

59,523 77 96.9

1,905

77

3.1

0 …

12,611 36 97.7

297

36 2.3

0 …

246,716 67 99.3

1,845

67 0.7

0 …

24,099 39 98.7

326

39 1.3

0

39 0.0

123,920 46 31.3

650 46 0.2

0 …

50,326 66 69.3

148

66 0.2

2

66 0.0

54,284 95 98.2

614

95

1.1

0 …

225,041 227 94.8

3,647 225 1.5

0 …

185,673 29 98.9

2,001

29

1.1

0 …

63,154 230 92.7

467 181 0.7

1

22 0.0

421,203 134 99.5

2,278 134 0.5

0 …

3,110,331

39 99.0

29,978

39 1.0

0 …

13,766 54 99.8

26 54 0.2

0 …

658,240 3,541 95.8

4,114 3,541 0.6

0 …

65,557 23 99.7

177

23 0.3

0 …

86

1 100.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

82

1 85.4

14

1 14.6

0 …

19,642

1 98.2

370

1 1.8

0 …

26,834,076 7,997 97.1 258,380 7,874 0.9

88 531 0.0

53

51

5

C4a

C4b

C4c+C4d

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total

Pct.

0 0.0

876 0.3

2,392 3.4

16,534 5.1

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

1 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

270,852 68.5

22,159 30.5

372 0.7

8,677 3.7

0 0.0

4,530 6.6

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

24,506 3.6

8 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

531,710 1.9 24
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 39

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 44 of 122
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 32. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: PERMANENT LIST; SUBMITTED FOR COUNTING: DISPOSITION
Questions C1, C3, C4. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters due to the existence of a permanent list; and ballots submitted for counting and the disposition of the ballots.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated. This could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C3:
Arizona: One jurisdiction stated that the C3 total is the number of voters on the Permanent Early Voting List as of the close of requesting to have an early ballot mailed (11 days prior to election). California: One jurisdiction commented, “perm[anent]. vote by mail voter.” Florida: One jurisdiction noted that C3 represents absentee requests on file at the time of its initial mailing of ballots. Missouri: One jurisdiction commented that all PD list voters are entered with some entries as non-PD list, disabled voters. A second jurisdiction notes that this figure is an estimate of the 8,212 permanently disabled applications sent. New Mexico: One jurisdiction noted that three all-mail election precincts are not considered permanent absentee/168 absentee applications were mailed to these voters. Nevada: Although NV does not have a permanent list, NV NRS 293.313 allows a voter who is (a) at least 65 years of age or (b) has a physical disability or condition which substantially impairs his or her ability to go to the polling place, to request an absentee ballot for all elections held during the year he or she requests an absent ballot. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “Applications received.” Wisconsin: Counts of ballots to voters on permanent absentee voter list can only be provided for jurisdictions who track all absentee ballots in the Statewide Voter Registration System. This accounts for most of the large jurisdictions in Wisconsin.
Question C4: Arizona: One jurisdiction noted that C4a does not include the 5,027 UOCAVA ballots that were counted (tabulated), which would bring the grand total of early ballots counted (tabulated) in Maricopa County to 960,391. California: One jurisdiction stated the vote-by-mail count includes all mail precincts. Florida: On jurisdiction commented, “The 503 rejected ballots in C4b includes those ballots received after the deadline. These ballots are not submitted for counting, but you request this information in C5.” Two jurisdictions indicated that this data is drawn from the VR EAC Report. Another jurisdiction noted six instances of no signature and 1 instance of a ballot signed wrong. A different jurisdiction stated, “Signature did not match.” Maine: One jurisdiction had to reject and then reissue ballots due to the death of a candidate. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated ballots were received after the deadline. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee Statistics Report/Ballot Issue Report/Absentee Register.” New York: The New York County data includes all New York City counties (New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond). Oregon: Numbers are for domestic absentee electors. Vermont: One jurisdiction commented, “Rejected because no voter affidavit returned with ballot.” Another jurisdiction noted the 40 spoiled ballots are not included as they were counted as spoiled. One jurisdiction does not record “counted” ballots versus “spoiled” ballots by voter. A fourth jurisdiction indicated for C4b one left certificate envelope blank, and one registered to vote in another town. Another jurisdiction had 28 ballots returned that were defective and not counted, but it was not tracked at the time if they were military or overseas. These ballots are now sealed in the storage bags. One jurisdiction commented C4 seems to be asking to include Vermont’s category of spoiled ballots; those that were returned by mail and did not have the appropriate envelope or signature were placed in a spoiled ballot envelope and never “submitted” for counting. Therefore, for this county, C5 does not count for its election results. Another jurisdiction noted that, for C4b, two absentee voters did not sign the “certificate envelope.” West Virginia: One county did not record absentee ballot information in the Statewide Voter Registration System after ballots were sent.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 40

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33A. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART A

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total

Cases 0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954

44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049 83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942 93

1,160

17

Not Received on Time or Missed Deadline

Total

Cases 0

2

1

4,107

9

315

69

24,609

53

1,462

64

0

225

3

91

1

8,597

51

0

618

1

586

44

0

1,049

91

1,353

99

1,648 105

238 120

975

64

284 500

903

24

2,180 351

5,205 83

1,837 87

52

16

1,846 114

380 56

689 93

611

17

Pct. … 0.2
33.1 33.2 41.7 8.9
… 93.8 23.0 41.8
… 55.9 61.4
… 8.8 16.6 32.6 13.1 41.1 13.2 59.6 87.3 64.7 23.6 2.4 36.4 44.5 17.5 52.7

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part A

No Voter Signature

No Witness Signature Non-matching Signature

Total

Cases 0

206

1

5,256

13

104 68

10,000 54

2,735 64

0

7

3

305

1

5,256 66

5 159

138

3

109 44

0

97 29

1,652 99

918 105

823 120

193 64

876 500

299

24

63 351

900 83

374

87

123

19

637 116

257

56

622 93

158

17

Pct. …
25.6 42.4 11.0 16.9 16.7
… 2.9 77.0 25.5 0.7 12.5 11.4 … 0.8 20.2 18.1 45.4 8.1 40.6 19.7 2.5 11.2 4.8 5.6 12.5 30.1 15.8 13.6

Total

Cases 0

244

1

0

3

34

68

3

30

0

0

0

3

0

1

57

31

71 159

0

0 44

0

0

27

0

0

8 120

980

64

245 500

0

0

0

1,803

87

159

19

0

0

56

0

0

17

Pct. …
30.3 0.0 3.6 0.0 … … 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … … 0.4 41.3 11.4 … … … 23.2 7.2 … 0.0 … 0.0

Total

Cases 0

0

1

2,051

11

74

69

15,206

52

6,206

64

0

1

3

0

1

5,398

67

356 159

220

2

53

44

0

51

29

0

429 105

47 120

0

25 500

0

0

208

83

126

87

5

10

0

160

56

0

195

17

Pct. … 0.0
16.6 7.8
25.7 37.8
… 0.4 0.0 26.2 50.2 19.9 5.6 … 0.4 … 8.5 2.6 … 1.2 … … 2.6 1.6 0.2 … 18.8 … 16.8

No Election Official’sSignature

Total

Cases 0

0

1

0

3

0

68

0

29

0

0

0

3

0

1

0

28

0

0

0

44

0

59

26

0

0

0

37

64

0

0

0

0

0

5

9

0

0 56

4 93

0

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … 0.0 … 0.5 … … … 1.6 … … … … … 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.0

Not Categorized
Balance (See notes) Total Pct.
0 … 353 43.9 976 7.9 422 44.5 9,252 15.7 6,004 36.6 2,356 100.0
7 2.9 0 0.0 1,280 6.2 277 39.1 130 11.8 206 21.6 4,238 100.0 10,727 89.5 5,163 63.2 2,067 40.8 698 38.5 189 8.0 726 33.7 312 20.6 255 10.2 1,736 21.6 3,633 46.7 1,864 84.4 2,593 51.1 56 6.6 2,627 66.6 196 16.9

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 41

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33A. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART A (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases 1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359 53

12,849

88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650 46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26 54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Not Received on Time or Missed Deadline

Total Cases 785 320

1,255

21

477

11

0

772 100

135 53

6,097

88

615

77

152

36

1,373

67

0

650 46

74

66

407

95

3,081 226

0

165 137

437 134

5,859

39

13 54

496 3,541

84

11

0

1

8

1

125

1

Pct. 45.2 19.2 49.1 … 34.5 37.6 47.5 32.3 51.2 74.4 … 100.0 50.0 66.3 84.5 … 35.3 19.2 19.5 50.0 12.1 47.5 … 57.1 33.8

82,922 7,241 32.1 46
C5a

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part A

No Voter Signature

No Witness Signature Non-matching Signature

Total Cases 163 320

1,907

21

95

11

0

214 100

52

53

888

88

125

77

33

36

52

67

128

39

0

38

66

93

95

1,671 224

0

80 132

0

6,972

39

1

54

0

42

7

0

1

4

1

77

1

Pct. 9.4 29.2 9.8 … 9.6 14.5 6.9 6.6 11.1 2.8 39.3 … 25.7 15.1 45.8 … 17.1 … 23.3 3.8 … 23.7 … 28.6 20.8

Total Cases 0 320

0

0

6

0

546 100

0

53

0

394

77

0

0

130

39

0

0

66

4

95

58 222

0

0 113

0

145

39

0

54

0

0

0

1

0

1

36

1

Pct. 0.0 … 0.0 … 24.4 0.0 … 20.7 … … 39.9 … 0.0 0.7 1.6 … 0.0 … 0.5 0.0 … … … 0.0 9.7

Total Cases 321 320

855

21

0

6

0

45 100

129

53

334

88

0

77

81

36

0

60

39

0

21

66

8

95

639 223

0

1 114

0

12,067

39

0 54

0

0

0

1

0

1

20

1

Pct. 18.5 13.1 0.0 … 2.0 35.9 2.6 0.0 27.3 … 18.4 … 14.2 1.3 17.5 … 0.2 … 40.3 0.0 … … … 0.0 5.4

44,748 3,671 17.3 45
C5b

4,917 2,417 1.9 45,392 2,814 17.6

17

31

C5c

C5d

No Election Official’sSignature

Total Cases 0 320

0

0

6

0

0 100

0

0

0 77

0

0

0

39

0

0 66

0

0 223

0

0 114

0

0

39

0 54

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0

Not Categorized
Balance (See notes) Total Pct
466 26.9 2,517 38.5
399 41.1 0 …
660 29.5 43 12.0 5,530 43.0 771 40.5 31 10.4 420 22.8 8 2.5 0 0.0 15 10.1 102 16.6 (1,802) (49.4) 2,001 100.0 221 47.3 1,841 80.8 4,935 16.5 12 46.2 3,618 87.9 51 28.8 0 … 2 14.3 112 30.3

105 1,483 4
C5e

0.0 80,296 31.1 48
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 42

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 47 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33B. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954

44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049

83

7,773 87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853 56

3,942

93

1,160

17

Ballot Returned in Unofficial Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

72

4 0.6

1 68 0.1

32 30 0.1

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

13 32 0.1

0 …

13

1 1.2

9 44 0.9

0 …

10 26 0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

8

10 0.4

0 …

0 56 0.0

0 …

2

17 0.2

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

Ballot Missing from Envelope

Unsealed Envelope

No Resident Address on Envelope

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0

…

0 …

0 …

17

1

2.1

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

173

11

1.4

0

3 0.0

122

4 1.0

8

69

0.8

0

43 0.0

3

46 0.3

579

38

1.0

3

28 0.0

12

32 0.0

79 64 0.5

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

2

3 0.8

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

9 34 0.0

4

29 0.0

0

28 0.0

0

…

0 …

229 159 32.3

16

2

1.4

0 …

0 …

2 44 0.2

0

44 0.0

0 44 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

6

28

0.1

1

25 0.0

0

25 0.0

292 99 3.6

798

99 9.8

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

50 120 2.8

209 120 11.5

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

8 351 0.3

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

3

9

0.1

1

10 0.0

0

9 0.0

1

1 0.0

0 …

67 113 1.3

0

56

0.0

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

10

17

0.9

0

17 0.0

0

17 0.0

Multiple Ballots Returned in Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See notes)
Total Pct

0

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

788 97.9

0

4 0.0 12,023 97.0

3

52

0.3

934 98.4

79

32

0.1 58,365 98.8

11

64

0.1 16,317 99.5

0

… 2,356 100.0

0

3 0.0

238 99.2

0

1 0.0

396 100.0

16

32

0.1 20,546 99.8

0

…

480 67.7

4

2 0.4 1,073 97.0

0

44

0.0

943 98.8

0

… 4,238 100.0

0

27

0.0 11,966 99.9

12

99

0.1

7,066 86.5

0

… 5,062 100.0

0 120 0.0 1,555 85.7

0

…

2,374 100.0

0

…

2,156 100.0

0

…

1,514 100.0

0

… 2,490 99.7

0

… 8,049 100.0

0

…

7,773 100.0

11

9 0.5 2,185 99.0

0

1 0.0 5,008 98.7

0

56

0.0

853 100.0

0

…

3,942 100.0

3

17

0.3

1,145 98.7

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 43

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33B. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359 53

12,849 88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650 46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26 54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Ballot Returned in Unofficial Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

24 320 1.4

0

…

5

6 0.5

0

…

0 100 0.0

0

…

1,477 88 11.5

133

77

7.0

0

…

0

…

0

39

0.0

0

…

0

66

0.0

33

95

5.4

3 224 0.1

0

…

91 126 19.5

0

…

23

39

0.1

0 54 0.0

0

…

0

…

0

1

…

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

1,949 1,530 0.8 17 C5f

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

Ballot Missing from Envelope

Unsealed Envelope

No Resident Address on Envelope

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

27 320 1.6

0 320 0.0

0

320 0.0

66

21

1.0

8

21

0.1

0 …

0

7 0.0

0

6 0.0

0

6 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0 100 0.0

0 100 0.0

0

100 0.0

0 53 0.0

0 …

0

53 0.0

39 88 0.3

0

88 0.0

84

88 0.7

9

77

0.5

0

77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

39

0.0

0

39 0.0

0

39 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

66

0.0

0

66 0.0

0

66 0.0

34

95

5.5

0

92 0.0

0

95 0.0

15 224 0.4

0 224 0.0

73

223 2.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

37 122 7.9

10 116 2.1

2

116 0.4

0

…

0 …

0 …

374

39

1.2

0

39 0.0

0

39 0.0

0 54 0.0

0

54 0.0

0

54 0.0

0

…

0 …

0 …

0

…

1

1 0.6

0 …

0

1

…

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

Multiple Ballots Returned in Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See notes)
Total Pct

0 320 0.0 1,684 97.1

0

…

6,460 98.9

0

7 0.0

966 99.5

0

…

0 …

0 100 0.0 2,237 100.0

0

53

0.0

359 100.0

10

88

0.1 11,239 87.5

0

77

0.0

1,763 92.5

0

…

297 100.0

0

…

1,845 100.0

0

39

0.0

326 100.0

0

…

650 100.0

0

66

0.0

148 100.0

0

95

0.0

547 89.1

51 225 1.4 3,505 96.1

0

…

2,001 100.0

0 115 0.0

327 70.0

0

…

2,278 100.0

4

39

0.0 29,577 98.7

0

54

0.0

26 100.0

0

…

4,114 100.0

2

2

1.1

174 98.3

0

1

…

0 …

0

1 0.0

14 100.0

85

1 23.0

285 77.0

1,848 1,905 0.7 23
C5g

1,035 1,725 0.4 9
C5h

600 2,168 0.2 9
C5i

291 1,847 13 C5j

0.1 252,657 97.8 51
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 44

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 49 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33C. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART C

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0

805

1

12,390

15

949

72

59,070

57

16,407

64

2,356 169

240

3

396

1

20,588

67

709 159

1,106

4

954 44

4,238 110

11,983

92

8,168

99

5,062 105

1,814 120

2,374

64

2,156 500

1,514

24

2,498 351

8,049

83

7,773

87

2,208

47

5,076 116

853

56

3,942

93

1,160

17

Voter Deceased

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

224

6 1.8

22

68 2.3

847

38 1.4

66

64 0.4

0 …

2

3 0.8

0

1 0.0

11

31

0.1

0 …

0 …

3 44 0.3

0 …

19

27 0.2

274

99 3.4

46 105 0.9

34 120 1.9

0 …

0 …

17

24

1.1

50 351 2.0

682

83 8.5

45

87 0.6

7

11 0.3

111 115 2.2

0

56 0.0

37

93 0.9

19

17 1.6

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part C

Already Voted in Person

First-time Voter without No Ballot Application on

Proper Identification

Record

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 0.0

5

1 0.6

17

5 0.1

0

3 0.0

28

3 0.2

14

69 1.5

9

68 0.9

4

69 0.4

18

29 0.0

1,845

32 3.1

12

28 0.0

103

64 0.6

5,288

64 32.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

24

31

0.1

130

42 0.6

39

34 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

158 44 16.6

0

44 0.0

0

44 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

12

27

0.1

0

24 0.0

3

26 0.0

2,129

99 26.1

0 …

84

99 1.0

33 105 0.7

0 …

0 …

4 120 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

115 500 5.3

0 …

0 …

0 …

88

24 5.8

3

24 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

717

83 8.9

0 …

0 …

24

87 0.3

0 …

0 …

14

12 0.6

0

9 0.0

37

13 1.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0

56 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

17 0.0

24

17

2.1

0

17 0.0

Other (See Comments) Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0 …

331

1 41.1

469 58.3

340

6 2.7 11,781 95.1

238

22 25.1

662 69.8

4,902

36 8.3 51,446 87.1

457

64 2.8 10,493 64.0

0 … 2,356 100.0

3

3 1.3

235 97.9

0

1 0.0

396 100.0

994

38 4.8 19,390 94.2

48 159 6.8

661 93.2

78

2

7.1

1,028 92.9

34

44 3.6

759 79.6

0 … 4,238 100.0

95

26 0.8 11,854 98.9

1,574

99 19.3

4,107 50.3

1,988 105 39.3 2,995 59.2

401

60 22.1

1,375 75.8

189

64 8.0

2,185 92.0

611 500 28.3

1,430 66.3

204

24 13.5

1,202 79.4

0 … 2,448 98.0

337

83 4.2

6,313 78.4

3,564

87 45.9

4,140 53.3

237

10 10.7

1,913 86.6

2,385

85 47.0

2,580 50.8

56

56 6.6

797 93.4

2,588

93 65.7

1,317 33.4

138

17 11.9

979 84.4

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 45

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 33C. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART C (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

1,735 320

6,534

21

971

17

0

2,237 100

359

53

12,849

88

1,905

77

297

36

1,845

67

326

39

650

46

148

66

614

95

3,647 225

2,001

29

467 181

2,278 134

29,978

39

26

54

4,114 3,541

177

23

0

1

14

1

370

1

258,380 7,874 51
C4b

Voter Deceased

Total Cases

25 320

0

0

7

0

0 100

0

118 88

0 77

0

0

0 39

0

12 66

4

1

13 224

0

0 115

0

19

39

0

54

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. 1.4 … 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.9 0.0 … … 0.0 … 8.1 0.7 0.4 … 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0

Domestic Absentee Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part C

Already Voted in Person

First-time Voter without Proper Identification

No Ballot Application on Record

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

115 320 6.6

1 320 0.1

26

320

1.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

2

8 0.2

8

7 0.8

0

4 0.0

638

57

…

0 …

0 …

5 100 0.2

200 100 8.9

3

100 0.1

19

53 5.3

0 …

0 …

0 88 0.0

50

88 0.4

0 …

0 77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

10

36 3.4

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 39 0.0

8

39 2.5

0

39 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 66 0.0

0

66 0.0

0

66 0.0

2

1 0.3

0 …

0

95 0.0

354 224 9.7

14 224 0.4

91

223 2.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 115 0.0

0 115 0.0

0

115 0.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

170

39 0.6

50

39 0.2

0

39 0.0

0

54 0.0

2 54 7.7

1

54 3.8

0 …

0 …

0 …

3

2 1.7

2

1 1.1

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

27

1 7.3

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

248 320

2,516

21

0

2

0

415 100

24

53

3,697 87

629 77

21 36

420 67

0 39

0

0 66

16

5

0

0

73

23

1,841 134

4,304

21

9

5

3,618 3,541

40

8

0

1

2

1

0

Pct. 14.3 38.5 0.0 … 18.6 6.7 28.8 33.0 7.1 22.8 0.0 … 0.0 2.6 … … 15.6 80.8 14.4 34.6 87.9 22.6 … 14.3 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
1,320 76.1 4,018 61.5
961 99.0 (638) … 1,614 72.2
316 88.0 8,984 69.9 1,276 67.0
266 89.6 1,425 77.2
318 97.5 650 100.0 136 91.9 592 96.4 3,175 87.1 2,001 100.0 394 84.4 437 19.2 25,435 84.8
14 53.8 496 12.1 132 74.6
0 … 12 85.7 343 92.7

2,707 2,577 1.0 25 C5k

4,717 2,598 1.8 24 C5l

7,719 1,521 3.0 15
C5m

346 1,589 14
C5n

0.1 39,665 6,292 15.4 203,226 78.7

40

52

C5o:v

calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 33. DOMESTIC ABSENTEE BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PARTS A, B AND C
Questions C4, C5. Number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected and the reason for rejection. [This table is broken into parts due to the large number of reasons tabulated.]
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question C5:
Arizona: One jurisdiction stated: “For C5c, C5e, C5h, C5i, C5l, C5m & C5n, these reject reasons do not apply in Maricopa County, Arizona for an Early Ballot (EB) or cannot occur in Maricopa County due to our early ballot issuing system (e.g. C5l is n/a because EV system will not allow a voter who already voted in-person to be issued another ballot). These categories are therefore marked as “N/A” above. For C5k, the total number provided here reflects the quantity of EB’s initially sent but later canceled due to all cancelation reasons (e.g. death, moved out-ofcounty, felon, etc.) and not just the noted “Voter deceased”. For the remaining line noted only as “Data not available”, this information is not accumulated since it is data that cannot be associated with an actual valid voter (e.g. voter not registered to vote) or is not considered a valid Early Ballot upon receipt so it is therefore not categorized as a rejected early ballot and therefore is not noted as a true reject within the canvass of the election (e.g. ballot returned in unofficial envelope, multiple ballots so one is invalidated but voter still would have one ballot cast, etc.).” California: One jurisdiction indicated that C5o includes missing address and address mis-compares (i.e., voter moved and did not re-register). Colorado: Counts in C5l represent all ballots that were rejected because the voter had already voted, regardless of vote method. Florida: One jurisdiction reported no rejections. Another jurisdiction commented that, in regards to C5a, ballots received after the deadline are “invalid” and, therefore, no official action is required to “reject” them. As of 01/02/13, this jurisdiction had received 706 “late” ballots from civilian domestic voters. Indiana: Clay County does manually track the number of returned absentee ballots that are rejected, and stores them in specifically marked envelopes by precinct. However, it does not manually track the reason for why each rejected absentee ballot was rejected. Clinton County does not compile the requested information. Elkhart County did have some absentee ballots rejected due to voter being deceased, some rejected due to lack of signature or signature not matching SVRS records but did not manually track specific numbers. There were few such instances. In addition, three jurisdictions also generally indicated that they do not track this information, and two jurisdictions noted they do not track this information outside of the SVRS. Another jurisdiction stated that the ballots indicated as rejected were sent to the polls, however, there is no way to ensure the poll workers indeed rejected the ballots, only that they fit the criteria indicated and should have been. One jurisdiction commented, “We are a small county and do not have many issues with rejected ballots. The main reason we do not count absentee ballots is because the voter decides not to vote and never returns the ballot.” Another jurisdiction reported that it had 19 absentee ballots not returned by voters. One jurisdiction stated that it had a Traveling Board team forget to initial the ballot cards. Michigan: Initial decisions on rejected absentee ballots are made in the clerk’s office before the ballots are submitted to the appropriate precinct board for counting. Minnesota: For all jurisdictions, C5d: Only if the number provided by the voter did not match, then voter signature did not match. C5m: Firsttime voters who must show ID must follow absentee election-day registration process. C5: Rejected ballots were replaced/resent if received in time. The number of voters for whom all ballot submissions were rejected for reason other than late is 10. Missouri: One jurisdiction stated, “Ballots received after deadline.” A second jurisdiction commented, “Few ballots still coming in too late.” A third county noted that some of the ballots were received after the deadline, so that is why its numbers are off. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. New Jersey: Three jurisdictions commented, “Same Ballot has been rejected for multiple reasons.” Ohio: One jurisdiction stated that C5c, C5e, and C5n are not valid reasons for rejection in Ohio. Another jurisdiction commented that the Ohio Board of elections cannot issue an absentee ballot without first receiving a ballot application. South Carolina: Counted = returned before deadline. Rejected = returned after deadline. No data on ABS ballots not accepted for other reasons such as “voter not qualified” or “oath not signed”. Vermont: Three jurisdictions commented that data on defective ballots is sealed in a ballot bag with the defective ballot envelope and tally sheet, and thus the defective ballot reasons are unknown. Of this group, one jurisdiction reported that it had an additional six ballots returned late. Another jurisdiction reported that this number is for the 2012 general election only. One jurisdiction stated, “C5 seems to include categories of Vermont’s spoiled ballots which were never put in the “to count” category though we had one without any signature, and two that were not in an appropriate envelope (not in one at all).”
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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State

Election Juris.
in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Total Ballots Submitted

Total Cases

6,728

52

18,255

1

183,259

15

2,592

73

1,065,156

56

62,847

64

963

169

453

3

38,636

1

42,745

67

0

711

4

0

43,772

110

4,801

66

4,996

99

38,865

105

287

120

6,862

64

315

499

79,876

24

12,920

351

2,675

83

0

22,478

48

6,393

116

5,562

56

15,130

93

8,329

17

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Counted Full Ballot

Counted Part Ballot

Rejected Ballot

Total Cases Pct.

2,319

50 34.5

4,530

1 24.8

150,237

15 82.0

890

73 34.3

706,381

50 66.3

45,435

64 72.3

0 …

35

3 7.7

32,233

1 83.4

24,633

67 57.6

0 …

102

3 14.3

0 …

13,486 110 30.8

804

75 16.7

4,131

99 82.7

25,192 105 64.8

50 120 17.4

2,609

64 38.0

315 499 100.0

54,328

24 68.0

3,288 351 25.4

1,190

83 44.5

0 …

13,483

41 60.0

1,882 113 29.4

5,294

56 95.2

11,871

92 78.5

3,468

17 41.6

Total Cases

0

13,480

1

0

3

5

73

119,322

41

7,542 64

0

0

3

3,158

1

0

0

0

2

0

0

0 92

0

0

0 120

0

0

14,419

24

0

0

0

1,291

14

0

0

0

0

Pct. …
73.8 0.0 0.2 11.2 12.0 … 0.0 8.2 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 0.0 … … 18.1 … … … 5.7 … … … …

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870 64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253 64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485 83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268 56

3,258 93

4,861

17

Pct. 65.5 1.3 18.0 65.5 16.7 15.7 87.5 92.3 8.4 42.4 … 85.7 … 69.2 83.3 17.3 34.7 82.6 62.0 … 13.9 74.5 55.5 … 25.5 70.6 4.8 21.5 58.4

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

54,274

10

5.1

7,426

0.7

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

120 12.5

0 …

0

0.0

0

1 0.0

0

0.0

1

6 0.0

5

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

186

0.5

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

11

0.1

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

113

1 0.5 1,869

8.3

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

1

0.0

0

17 0.0

0

0.0

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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris.
in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Total Ballots Submitted

Total Cases

0

320

97,481

21

6,630

26

451,868

61

51,192

100

0

208,087

88

5,313

77

1,771

36

49,000

67

2,357

39

5,473

23

441

66

7,089

95

50,787

254

53,483

29

19

227

12,862

134

6,832

39

3,152

40

135 3,541

33

10

0

1

144

1

12,715

1

2,702,470 48 E1a

7,652

Counted Full Ballot

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Counted Part Ballot

Rejected Ballot

Total Cases

0 320

77,134

21

1,100

18

322,537

61

18,041 100

0

171,626

88

1,724

77

57

36

17,221

67

751

39

3,365

23

96

66

1,623

95

9,046 254

43,283

29

13 103

0

2,716

37

2,031 40

44 3,541

13

6

0

1

40

1

9,647

1

Pct. …
79.1 16.6 71.4 35.2
… 82.5 32.4 3.2 35.1 31.9 61.5 21.8 22.9 17.8 80.9 68.4
… 39.8 64.4 32.6 39.4
… 27.8 75.9

Total Cases

0 320

0

206

14

0

5,321 100

0

2,139

88

0

77

1,639

36

11,521

67

331

39

0

2

66

0

95

0

0

0 101

0

195

36

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … … 3.1 …
10.4 … 1.0 0.0
92.5 23.5 14.0
… 0.5 0.0 … … 0.0 … 2.9 … … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121

40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

Pct. …
13.4 31.8 28.6 54.4
… 16.5 67.6 4.2 41.3 54.1 38.5 77.8 77.1 82.2 19.1 26.3 62.9 44.6 35.6 57.0 60.6
… 72.2 24.1

1,790,294 7,200 66.2 180,571 1,480 6.7 651,372 7,012 24.1

46

15

47

E1b

E1c

E1d

Other Disposition (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct

0 320 …

0

…

7,266

21

7.5

0

0.0

1,150

4 17.3 2,064 31.1

0 …

104

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0

39 0.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0

66 0.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

(11) (0.0)

0 …

2

0.0

1

30 5.3

0

0.0

4,766 134 37.1

0

0.0

0 …

871 12.7

0 …

0

0.0

32 3,541 23.7

(18) (13.3)

0 …

0

0.0

0

1 …

0

…

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

67,603 4,191 2.5 12,630

0.5

8

13

E1e+f

calc

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TABLE 34. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS
Questions E1, E2. Number of voters who submitted provisional ballots, disposition of the ballots, and the reason for rejected ballots.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting. Also, the term provisional is used here generically though the meaning, availability, and use will vary by State.
Question E1: Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that one voter was removed by error for felony but provided information which the election commissioners accepted; one voter was registered under her maiden name. Another jurisdiction noted that the majority of rejected ballots were from those voters who said they registered at DMV or DHS, and the county had received no information of their registration. Upon verification with DMV, only 2 of the voters had actually registered. A third jurisdiction commented, “Per county election commissioner.” California: One jurisdiction stated that it does not differentiate between fully counted and partially counted ballots when the data is input into the computer. A second jurisdiction commented, “No provisional ballots – all mail ballot election.” Idaho: Idaho is not required to use provisional ballots due to Election Day Registration. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that out of the 16 rejected provisional ballots, everyone but two received voter history (see E2 and F1h). Indiana: One jurisdiction stated, “Do not like provisional ballots.” Three jurisdictions explicitly noted that no provisional ballots were cast during the 2012 general election. One jurisdiction reported “the already voted was an individual who voted by traveling board first, and then someone took her to vote on Election Day (a family member). She had in fact already voted though and most likely forgot because of her age.” Another jurisdiction stated that most forms were incomplete even if the person was able to vote, and that forms are too complicated and poll workers don’t do them. One jurisdiction commented, “Less categories, we don’t know if they are registered out of state, even if they give Illinois ID.” Another jurisdiction commented, “Since we are the home to a large university, we had many students who were not registered but tried to vote. Instead of turning them away, we instruct our workers to provide them with a provisional ballot which is then reviewed by the election board.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Mississippi: One jurisdiction noted that its courthouse burned on 1/17/2013. North Carolina: Two jurisdictions reported that the number of provisional ballots submitted do exceed the number of civilian absentee ballots transmitted. North Dakota: North Dakota does not have provisional balloting. New Hampshire: One jurisdiction commented, “Moderator challenged and rejected absentee ballots.” New Mexico: Four jurisdictions reported they issued no provisional ballots. One jurisdiction indicated that all provisional ballots were rejected. Another jurisdiction commented, “Handwritten provisional Excel spreadsheet.” Ohio: One jurisdiction noted that Ohio permits a registered voter who moves anywhere in the state who fails to timely update his or her address to vote a ballot provisionally in the voter’s new precinct. Pennsylvania: Philadelphia County experienced a change in leadership in the twelve months leading up to the election. In addition, key staff members also retired during that timeframe. As a result, a sufficient knowledge transfer was not conducted thus leading to mistakes in processing SURE jobs, poll book production, and general administration issues. These factors lead to omissions from regular and supplemental poll books which contributed to the high number (26,983) of provisional ballots that were cast. After a thorough analysis, the county concluded that only 7,077 provisional ballots should have been issued. Virginia: VA does not collect stats on counted full vs. counted partial. General situation is full ballot 100% of the time. Vermont: Three jurisdictions indicated they did not have any provisional ballots. Another jurisdiction commented that it does not usually need to offer provisional ballots as they have several State of Vermont affidavits; voters may use these to be reactivated or added on election day. West Virginia: Fifteen jurisdictions commented, “County did not enter provisional ballot information into the Statewide Voter Registration System.”
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Question E2:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction stated, “No record of the voter having registered; the most common complaint from the voter is that he/ she registered to vote through “motor voter,” registered at D.F.A but those records were never received by the county clerk.” Another jurisdiction indicated that the voters counted in E2j said they registered at DMV or DHS; no records found of their registration. A third jurisdiction commented that most were from DMV.
Arizona: One jurisdiction reported that for E2f the “ballot missing from envelope” total does not reflect 23 rejected ballots since these ballots were presumptively already counted at the polling location (i.e., fed through the optical scan reader as a regular ballot), so they cannot be considered a rejected provisional. Another jurisdiction stated, “The ‘Ballot missing from envelope’ total was (218) but this total is not included in the grand total of rejected ballots and not reported on our canvass since these ballots were presumptively already counted at the polling location (i.e., fed through the optical scan reader as a regular ballot), so they cannot be considered a provisional that would have been counted at central tabulation. For E2g (No signature), this total is not tracked separately and is instead included in the totals noted in E2e (Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible) and is categorized as ‘incomplete.’ For E2j (Not Eligible to Vote in this Election), this total includes voters who are registered (so therefore not proper to be part of E2a ‘Not Registered’) but registered AFTER the 29 day registration cutoff period prescribed for in Arizona State statute. As such, these voters were registered, but not eligible to participate or vote in this election.” A third jurisdiction noted that E2j refers to voters who registered after the statutory cutoff date; they are registered but not eligible to vote in the election.
California: One jurisdiction indicated that E2j refers to voters not registered in county. A second jurisdiction noted that the E2a total includes voters registered in within the State but not within Humboldt County. A third jurisdiction indicated that they cannot tell if a voter is registered in another county in the State or any other State; therefore, E2a represents voters not registered in the county itself. Another jurisdiction reported that E3g and E3h are combined. A fifth jurisdiction noted that for E2a it does not check registration outside of the city, and for E2b these voters indicated an address within California but not in the county itself. One jurisdiction indicated it has an all-mail election and does not have provisional ballots.
Idaho: Idaho is not required to use provisional ballots due to Election Day Registration.
Florida: One jurisdiction indicated that out of the 16 rejected provisional ballots, all but two received voter history (see E2 and F1h). A second jurisdiction reported that E2a represents a combination of “registered too late” and ineligible (not registered). Another jurisdiction commented, “Data: VR Report shows Statutory Rejection – Reasons do not match EAC choices. Here is the breakdown by statutory reason: Unable to establish eligibility: 1865, Signature of voter did not match: 38, Already voted Data: VR Report shows Statutory Rejection – Reasons do not match EAC choices. Here is the breakdown by statutory reason: Unable to establish eligibility: 1865, Signature of voter did not match: 38, Already voted early/absentee: 72, Wrong precinct: 368, Incorrect party for ballot: 0, Voter did not provide picture/signature ID: 4, Other: 1.” One jurisdiction stated, “They were all convicted felons.”
Indiana: One jurisdiction indicated, “Poll Worker Error: failed to initial ballot cards.” A second jurisdiction stated that ballots had a cancelled/rejected status because of voter registration acknowledgement cards being returned. A third jurisdiction reported, “No Challenge Form. Military Submitted FWAB, but according to the Indiana Election Division they must submit an application first. Absentee envelope not signed. Initials missing from ballot.” Another jurisdiction commented that it did not have any uncounted provisional ballots. A fifth jurisdiction stated that “Did not have Indiana ID and would not surrender Texas driver’s license; they registered at a WorkOne agency.” Another jurisdiction indicated that ballots were not activated by a poll worker. One jurisdiction stated that three were rejected because the voters moved outside of the State of Indiana and were also proven to be registered in the State they now live in; one was rejected because the voter was deceased; 30 were FWAB that were not eligible to be counted because the voter had not submitted an absentee ballot application. Another jurisdiction indicated that a voter had voted at polls and did not think this vote counted, so she did provisional and check totals, and she had actually voted. One jurisdiction indicated that reasons included late registration, not enough information, no reason given, and more than one same name. One jurisdiction stated that other includes those reasons in fields (E2a, E2b, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E2k, and E2m) that it was unable to capture as they pertain to the survey. Another jurisdiction commented that the provisional ballot information is filed away in the basement with its election materials; time constraints hindered workers’ ability to scour through the sealed envelopes to find the requested information. Three jurisdictions indicated “expired driver licenses,” “they came right after the polls closed,” and “registration cancelled or rejected, no initials on ballot,” respectively.
Mississippi: One jurisdiction reported, “We had 579 provisional ballots – election already sealed.”
North Carolina: All counties: For E2a, a provisional would not count if the voter is not registered in his or her county of residence.
North Dakota: North Dakota does not have provisional balloting.
Pennsylvania: Twenty-eight counties commented, “Pennsylvania counties have the ability to select more than one rejection reason which was done in this case. As a result, the E2a though E2p can and will be greater than E1d.”
Texas: The “in the state” language makes the question Not Applicable for Texas counties. Provisional voting is at the county level would only check to see if the individual voter is eligible to vote within that county.
Vermont: Three jurisdictions explicitly indicated no provisional ballots.
Washington: Ballots for voters who voted in the wrong jurisdiction were sent to the appropriate county for counting.
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TABLE 35A. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870

64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253

64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Voter not Registered in State
Total Cases Pct.

0

…

67

1 27.3

12,481

15 37.8

1,039

69 61.2

113,671

43 63.9

5,001

64 50.7

0

…

361

3 86.4

0

1 0.0

10,305

63 56.9

0

…

380

4 62.4

0

…

12,833

62 42.4

232

46

5.8

0

99

0.0

3,768 105 27.9

80 120 33.8

1,912

64 45.0

0

…

9,277

24 83.4

0

…

90

83

6.1

0

…

2,136

22 37.3

76

1 1.7

8

4 3.0

0

…

4,176

17 85.9

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Voter Registered but in Wrong Juristiction

Voter Registered but in

Failure to Provide

Wrong Precinct

Sufficient Identification

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

6

1 2.4

159

9 0.5 10,979

13 33.2 1,330

13 4.0

106

71 6.2

89

71 5.2

1

73

0.1

3,509

28

2.0

85

20

0.0 4,660

27

2.6

2,562

64 26.0

0

…

280

64

2.8

0

…

0

…

0

…

17

3 4.1

37

3 8.9

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0 1,999

1 61.6

943

1 29.1

304

40

1.7 2,905

54 16.0

137

41 0.8

0

…

0

…

0

…

4

1 0.7

194

3 31.9

16

2 2.6

0

…

0

…

0

…

480

27

1.6 5,326

28 17.6

167

30

0.6

1,247

56 31.2

546

51 13.7

452

58 11.3

0

99

0.0

0

99

0.0

414

99 47.9

6,057 105 44.9

302 105 2.2

525 105 3.9

143 120 60.3

5 120 2.1

3 120 1.3

560

64 13.2

41

64

1.0

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

517

24 4.6

0

…

0

…

48 351 0.5

339

83 22.8

183

83 12.3

709

83 47.7

0

…

0

…

0

…

512

17 8.9

928

25 16.2

0

8 0.0

234

1 5.2

0

…

2

1 0.0

9

3 3.4

18

8 6.7

8

5 3.0

0

…

852

93 26.2

0

…

13

17 0.3

0

17 0.0

13

16 0.3

Incomplete/Illegible Envelope/Ballot
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

… 4,409 100.0

115

1 46.9

57 23.3

2,496

12 7.6 5,577 16.9

10

71 0.6

452 26.6

2,121

36

1.2 53,707 30.2

0

… 2,027 20.5

0

…

843 100.0

3

3 0.7

0 0.0

142

1 4.4

161 5.0

236

37

1.3

4,219 23.3

0

…

0

…

3

1 0.5

12 2.0

0

…

0

…

0

… 11,480 37.9

108

50

2.7

1,412 35.3

0

99

0.0

451 52.1

205 105 1.5 2,630 19.5

0 120 0.0

6 2.5

0

…

1,740 40.9

0

…

0

…

88

24 0.8 1,247 11.2

0

… 9,573 99.5

0

…

164 11.0

0

…

0

…

51

10 0.9 2,095 36.6

56 114 1.2 4,143 91.8

1

1 0.4

224 83.6

211

93

6.5

2,195 67.4

7

17 0.1

652 13.4

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 52

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 57 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35A. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SUBMITTED: DISPOSITION OF BALLOTS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121

40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Voter not Registered in State
Total Cases Pct.

2 320

…

0

…

436

19 20.7

0

…

20,056 100 72.1

0

…

20,119

88 58.6

1,888

77 52.6

16

36 21.3

15,045

67 74.3

1,189

39 93.3

38

3 1.8

100

66 29.2

3,439

95 62.9

0

…

6,494

29 63.7

2 107 40.0

107

35 1.3

1,224

39 40.1

194

40 17.3

0

…

0

…

0

1

…

71

1 68.3

216

1 7.0

248,529 2,073 38.2 37 E2a

Provisional Ballots Submitted by Voters and Disposition

Voter Registered but in Wrong Juristiction

Voter Registered but in

Failure to Provide

Wrong Precinct

Sufficient Identification

Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct. Total Cases Pct.

0 320

…

0 320

…

0 320

…

0

21 0.0

0

…

85

21 0.6

408

14 19.3

12

9 0.6

0

10 0.0

94,240

57 72.9

0

…

0

…

69 100 0.2

0 100 0.0

691 100 2.5

0

…

0

…

0

…

9,482

88 27.6

37

88

0.1

363

88

1.1

13

77 0.4 1,523

77 42.4

164

77 4.6

0

…

0

…

0

…

3,681

67 18.2

789

67 3.9

0

…

67

39 5.3

0

39 0.0

12

39

0.9

59

5 2.8 1,299

10 61.6

27

6 1.3

32

66 9.3

15

66 4.4

2

65 0.6

215

95

3.9

286

95 5.2

416

95

7.6

2,823 218 6.8 3,645 215 8.7

71 215 0.2

0

… 2,018

29 19.8

1,195

29 11.7

5 104 100.0

0 101 0.0

0 101 0.0

68

32 0.8

32

28 0.4

13

24 0.2

1,506

39 49.4

23

39

0.8

11

39

0.4

0

…

511

40 45.6

28

40

2.5

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

0

…

14

4 70.0

0

1

…

0

1

…

0

1

…

0

1 0.0

24

1 23.1

9

1 8.7

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

1

1 0.0

128,923 2,155 19.8 34,703 2,185 5.3 13,333 2,401 2.0

31

29

35

E2b

E2c

E2d

Incomplete/Illegible Envelope/Ballot
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 320

…

(2)

…

0

… 12,996 99.4

12

10 0.6 1,242 58.9

0

… 34,987 27.1

260 100 0.9 6,754 24.3

0

…

0

…

947

88 2.8 3,374 9.8

0

77 0.0

1 0.0

0

…

59 78.7

642

67 3.2

101 0.5

1

39

0.1

6 0.5

259

3 12.3

426 20.2

0

66 0.0

194 56.6

384

95

7.0

726 13.3

579 216 1.4 34,634 83.0

156

29

1.5

335 3.3

0 101 0.0

(2) (40.0)

5

25

0.1

7,871 97.2

0

39

0.0

286 9.4

0

…

388 34.6

0

…

77 100.0

0

…

6 30.0

0

1

…

0

…

0

1 0.0

0 0.0

135

1 4.4 2,716 88.5

9,233 27 E2e

2,073

1.4 216,651 33.3 44
calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 53

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 58 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Juris. in Survey
67 1 15 75 58 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 82 116 56 93 17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753

55

9,870

64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106

67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865

99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253

64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0

…

30

1 12.2

72

9 0.2

4

71 0.2

3,020

31 1.7

52

64

0.5

0

…

0

3 0.0

23

1 0.7

21

36

0.1

0

…

4

1 0.7

0

…

0

…

0

41 0.0

0

99

0.0

0

…

0 120 0.0

40

64

0.9

0

…

101

24 0.9

0

…

0

…

0

…

1

9 0.0

0

…

4

3 1.5

0

…

0

17 0.0

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Resaon, Part B

No Signature

No-matching Signature

Voter already Voted

Total Cases

0

0

1

150

11

1

71

3,444

47

114

64

0

0

3

80

1

225

42

0

1

1

0

15

12

7

43

0

99

860 105

1 120

28

64

0

660

24

0

39

83

0

11

9

0

120

10

0

5

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.9 1.2 … 0.0 2.5 1.2 … 0.2 … 0.0 0.2 0.0 6.4 0.4 0.7 … 5.9 … 2.6 … 0.2 …
44.8 … 0.1

Total Cases

0

0

1

42

9

0

71

4,770

45

0

0

0

3

0

1

182

47

0

0

0

8

10

10

41

0

406 105

0 120

9

64

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

0

47

5

0

40

17

Pct. … 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.7 … … 0.0 0.0 1.0 … … … 0.0 0.3 … 3.0 0.0 0.2 … … … … … 0.0 … 17.5 … 0.8

Total Cases

0

10

1

1,117

14

20

71

2,793

45

704

64

0

0

3

58

1

390

52

0

6

2

0

0

6

42

101

99

225 105

0 120

12

64

0

386

24

0

0

0

2

7

167 109

27

6

32

93

1

17

Pct. … 4.1 3.4 1.2 1.6 7.1 … 0.0 1.8 2.2 … 1.0 … … 0.2 11.7 1.7 0.0 0.3 … 3.5 … … … 0.0 3.7 10.1 1.0 0.0

Other (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0

… 4,409 100.0

17

1 6.9

188 76.7

4,196

8 12.7 27,445 83.1

213

18 12.6 1,459 86.0

25,866

25 14.6 137,860 77.6

1,157

64 11.7

7,843 79.5

0

…

843 100.0

0

…

418 100.0

0

1 0.0 3,084 95.0

3,388

36 18.7 13,900 76.8

0

…

0

…

1

1 0.2

597 98.0

0

…

0

…

17,493

33 57.8 12,770 42.2

933

53 23.3

3,041 76.1

350

99 40.5

414 47.9

360 105 2.7 11,636 86.3

5

5 2.1

231 97.5

1,651

64 38.8

2,513 59.1

0

…

0

…

100

24 0.9 9,882 88.8

9,573 351 99.5

48 0.5

0

… 1,446 97.4

0

…

0

…

339

14 5.9 5,369 93.8

3,962

78 87.8

382 8.5

26

6 9.7

44 16.4

2,139

93 65.7

1,087 33.4

606

17 12.5 4,209 86.6

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 54

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 59 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121 40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 320 …

0 …

0

10 0.0

0 …

64 100 0.2

0 …

197

88 0.6

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

0

39 0.0

0 …

0

66 0.0

98

95

1.8

37 215 0.1

0 …

0 101 0.0

0

24 0.0

2

39

0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

3,770 1,771 0.6 17 E2f

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature

Voter Already Voted

Total Cases

0 320

30

21

2

9

0

0 100

0

2,026 88

0 77

0

0

0 39

55

5

3 66

197 95

79 216

0

0 101

12

24

15

39

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

222

1

Pct. … 0.2 0.1 … 0.0 … 5.9 0.0 … … 0.0 2.6 0.9 3.6 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.5 … … … … 0.0 7.2

Total Cases

0 320

169

21

0

9

0

4 100

0

242

88

0

77

0

22

67

0

39

0

0

66

0

95

20 214

0

0 101

1

24

34

39

1 40

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … 1.3 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.7 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

398

21

4

9

0

161 100

0

793

88

1

77

0

441

67

6

39

6

2

0

66

369

95

222 214

264

29

0 101

15 29

75

39

5

40

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

47

1

Pct. … 3.0 0.2 … 0.6 … 2.3 0.0 … 2.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 6.8 0.5 2.6 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.4 … 5.0 … 0.0 1.5

8,402 2,030 1.3 27 E2g

6,007 1,849 0.9 17
E2h

8,865 2,279 1.4 34 E2i

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

0 320

2,353

21

462

6

13,859

61

6,525 100

0

116 88

0

0

3

67

0

39

365

10

1

66

60

9

0

0

0

19

7,843 122

160

4

298 40

0 3,541

5

3

0

1

0

2,447

1

Pct. …
18.0 21.9 10.7 23.4
… 0.3 … … 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.3 1.1 … … 0.0 96.9 5.2 26.6 0.0 25.0 … … 79.8

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
0 … 10,131 77.4 1,642 77.8 115,368 89.3 21,076 75.7
0 … 30,948 90.2 3,588 100.0
75 100.0 19,792 97.7 1,269 99.5 1,682 79.8
339 98.8 4,742 86.8 41,394 99.1 9,934 97.4
5 100.0 225 2.8 2,764 90.6 817 72.9 77 100.0
14 70.0 0 … 104 100.0 352 11.5

106,872 5,614 16.4 517,456 79.4

34

47

E2j:p

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 55

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-4 Filed 05/29/20 Page 60 of 122

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

4,409

47

245

1

33,022

15

1,697

73

177,753 55

9,870 64

843 169

418

3

3,245

1

18,106 67

0

609

4

0

30,286 110

3,997

76

865 99

13,487 105

237 120

4,253 64

0

11,129

24

9,621 351

1,485

83

0

5,722

39

4,511 112

268

56

3,258

93

4,861

17

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 …

30

1 12.2

72

9 0.2

4

71 0.2

3,020

31

1.7

52 64 0.5

0 …

0

3 0.0

23

1 0.7

21

36

0.1

0 …

4

1 0.7

0 …

0 …

0

41 0.0

0

99 0.0

0 …

0 120 0.0

40

64 0.9

0 …

101

24 0.9

0 …

0 …

0 …

1

9 0.0

0 …

4

3 1.5

0 …

0

17 0.0

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature Voter Already Voted

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

150

11 0.5

1

71

0.1

3,444

47

1.9

114

64

1.2

0 …

0

3 0.0

80

1 2.5

225

42

1.2

0 …

1

1 0.2

0 …

15

12 0.0

7

43 0.2

0

99 0.0

860 105 6.4

1 120 0.4

28

64 0.7

0 …

660

24 5.9

0 …

39

83 2.6

0 …

11

9 0.2

0 …

120

10 44.8

0 …

5

17

0.1

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

0

1 0.0

42

9 0.1

0

71 0.0

4,770

45 2.7

0 …

0 …

0

3 0.0

0

1 0.0

182

47

1.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

8

10 0.0

10

41 0.3

0 …

406 105 3.0

0 120 0.0

9

64 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

7 0.0

0 …

47

5 17.5

0 …

40

17 0.8

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

10

1 4.1

1,117

14 3.4

20

71 1.2

2,793

45 1.6

704

64

7.1

0 …

0

3 0.0

58

1 1.8

390

52 2.2

0 …

6

2 1.0

0 …

0 …

6

42 0.2

101 99 11.7

225 105 1.7

0 120 0.0

12 64 0.3

0 …

386

24 3.5

0 …

0 …

0 …

2

7 0.0

167 109 3.7

27

6 10.1

32

93

1.0

1

17 0.0

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases Pct.

0 …

17

1 6.9

4,196

8 12.7

213

18 12.6

25,866

25 14.6

1,157 64 11.7

0 …

0 …

0

1 0.0

3,388

36 18.7

0 …

1

1 0.2

0 …

17,493

33 57.8

933 53 23.3

350

99 40.5

360 105 2.7

5

5 2.1

1,651 64 38.8

0 …

100

24 0.9

9,573 351 99.5

0 …

0 …

339

14 5.9

3,962

78 87.8

26

6 9.7

2,139 93 65.7

606

17 12.5

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
4,409 100.0 188 76.7
27,445 83.1 1,459 86.0 137,860 77.6 7,843 79.5
843 100.0 418 100.0 3,084 95.0 13,900 76.8
0 … 597 98.0
0 … 12,770 42.2 3,041 76.1
414 47.9 11,636 86.3
231 97.5 2,513 59.1
0 … 9,882 88.8
48 0.5 1,446 97.4
0 … 5,369 93.8
382 8.5 44 16.4 1,087 33.4 4,209 86.6

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 35B. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PART B (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Ballots Rejected

Total Cases

0 320

13,081

21

2,110

22

129,227

61

27,830 100

0

34,322

88

3,589

77

75

36

20,258

67

1,275

39

2,108

23

343

66

5,466

95

41,752 254

10,198

29

5 103

8,096 134

3,050

39

1,121 40

77 3,541

20

6

0

1

104

1

3,068

1

651,372 7,012 47 E1d

Ballot Missing from Envelope
Total Cases Pct.

0 320 …

0 …

0

10 0.0

0 …

64 100 0.2

0 …

197

88 0.6

0

77 0.0

0 …

0 …

0

39 0.0

0 …

0

66 0.0

98

95

1.8

37 215 0.1

0 …

0 101 0.0

0

24 0.0

2

39

0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0

1 …

0

1 0.0

0

1 0.0

3,770 1,771 0.6 17 E2f

Provisional Ballots Rejected and Reason, Part B

No Signature

Non-matching Signature

Voter Already Voted

Total Cases

0 320

30

21

2

9

0

0 100

0

2,026

88

0

77

0

0

0

39

55

5

3 66

197 95

79 216

0

0 101

12

24

15 39

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

222

1

Pct. … 0.2 0.1 … 0.0 … 5.9 0.0 … … 0.0 2.6 0.9 3.6 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.5 … … … … 0.0 7.2

Total Cases

0 320

169

21

0

9

0

4 100

0

242

88

0

77

0

22

67

0

39

0

0

66

0

95

20 214

0

0 101

1

24

34

39

1 40

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Pct. … 1.3 0.0 … 0.0 … 0.7 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 … … … 0.0 0.0

Total Cases

0 320

398

21

4

9

0

161 100

0

793

88

1

77

0

441

67

6

39

6

2

0

66

369

95

222 214

264

29

0 101

15

29

75

39

5

40

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

47

1

Pct. … 3.0 0.2 … 0.6 … 2.3 0.0 … 2.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 6.8 0.5 2.6 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.4 … 5.0 … 0.0 1.5

8,402 2,030 1.3 27 E2g

6,007 1,849 0.9 17
E2h

8,865 2,279 1.4 34 E2i

Other (See Comments)

Total Cases

0 320

2,353

21

462

6

13,859

61

6,525 100

0

116 88

0

0

3 67

0

39

365

10

1 66

60

9

0

0

0

19

7,843 122

160

4

298 40

0 3,541

5

3

0

1

0

2,447

1

Pct. …
18.0 21.9 10.7 23.4
… 0.3 … … 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.3 1.1 … … 0.0 96.9 5.2 26.6 0.0 25.0 … … 79.8

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes) Total Pct.
0 … 10,131 77.4 1,642 77.8 115,368 89.3 21,076 75.7
0 … 30,948 90.2 3,588 100.0
75 100.0 19,792 97.7 1,269 99.5 1,682 79.8
339 98.8 4,742 86.8 41,394 99.1 9,934 97.4
5 100.0 225 2.8 2,764 90.6 817 72.9 77 100.0
14 70.0 0 … 104 100.0 352 11.5

106,872 5,614 16.4 517,456 79.4

34

47

E2j:p

calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 35. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: REASONS FOR REJECTION, PARTS A AND B Question E2, Number of provisional ballots rejected and the reason for rejection. [This table is broken into parts due to the large number of reasons tabulated.]
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

Alabama

67

2,083,309

67

Alaska

1

302,465

1

Arizona

15

2,323,579

15

Arkansas

75

1,080,809

75

California

58 13,096,097

57

Colorado

64

2,594,628

64

Connecticut

169

1,560,640 169

Delaware

3

417,631

3

District of Columbia

1

294,254

1

Florida

67

8,557,692

67

Georgia

159

3,910,557 159

Hawaii

4

436,774

4

Idaho

44

666,290

44

Illinois

110

5,339,488 110

Indiana

92

2,663,373

92

Iowa

99

1,589,951

99

Kansas

105

1,115,281 105

Kentucky

120

1,815,896 120

Louisiana

64

2,014,511

64

Maine

500

724,759 500

Maryland

24

2,734,189

24

Massachusetts

351

3,184,196 351

Michigan

83

4,780,701

83

Minnesota

87

2,950,780

87

Mississippi

82

889,914

58

Missouri

116

2,840,776 116

Montana

56

491,966

56

Nebraska

93

815,568

93

Nevada

17

1,017,772

17

Sign Voters In

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

143,789

2 2,179,790

13

115,236

8

965,573

67

142,493

2 12,828,688

51

1,150,149

17 1,444,479

47

0 1,560,640 169

0

417,631

3

0 294,254

1

4,714,439

40 3,843,253

27

0

0

0

436,774

4

0

666,290

44

0

0

239,375

7 2,423,998

85

957,491

53

632,460

46

534,987

44

63,892

10

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0

724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

24,364

4

809,875

53

878,518

28 1,923,020

84

0

491,966

56

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Update Vote History

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

143,789

2 2,179,790

13

73,661

3 1,007,148

72

296,416

3 12,617,093

49

1,194,353

20 1,398,822

42

0 1,560,640 169

0 417,631

3

0 294,254

1

4,574,929

40 3,982,763

27

0

0

0 436,774

4

0 666,290

44

0

0

239,375

7 2,423,998

85

957,491

53 632,460

46

464,048

32

129,224

22

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0 724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

793

1 826,546

55

682,992

17 2,135,897

96

0 491,966

56

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Lookup Polling Places

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 2,083,309

67

0 302,465

1

21,823

1 2,301,756

14

120,432

6 960,377

69

718,743

6 12,315,020

48

154,808

8 2,439,820

56

0 1,560,640 169

0 417,631

3

294,254

1

0

5,972,288

39 2,585,404

28

0

0

0 436,774

4

0 666,290

44

0

0

0

0

957,491

53 632,460

46

487,321

30 107,805

23

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0 724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

4,744,484

78

36,217

5

0 2,950,780

87

66,835

2 754,209

53

1,771,587

30 1,033,365

82

0 491,966

56

0 815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

Other Use (See Comments)

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

0

0

0

0

932,743

14

0 1,080,809

75

0 8,605,732

35

961,997

10 1,632,631

54

0 1,560,640 169

0

417,631

3

0

0

1,222,293

6 6,833,922 59

0

0

0

372,871

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

20,173

5

520,335

39

0 1,815,896 120

0 2,014,511

64

0

724,759 500

2,734,189

24

0

0

0

0 4,780,701

83

0 2,950,780

87

17,727

2

237,226

16

510,357

5 1,159,740

42

0

0

0

815,568

93

0 1,017,772

17

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TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

320

718,700 320

Sign Voters In

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0 718,700 320

Update Vote History

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

718,700 320

Lookup Polling Places

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

718,700 320

0

Other Use (See Comments)

Yes

No

Total Cases Total Cases

0

718,700 320

21

3,677,463

21

33

679,080

26

376,874

62

7,128,852

62

0 3,677,463

21

9

163,093

11

0 7,128,852

62

98,923

0 3,677,463

21

6

441,044

13

0 7,128,852

62

89,582

0 3,677,463

21

5

450,385

14

271,927

0 7,128,852

62

0 3,677,463

21

1

40,964

6

0

0

100

4,539,729 100 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0 4,539,729 100

0

53

326,239

53

210,254

88

5,632,423

88 1,140,143

77

1,343,380

77

36

1,820,507

36

67

5,783,621

67

39

451,593

39

8

115,985

45

0

326,239

53

198,489

7

127,750

46

7 4,492,280

81 1,375,608

10 4,256,815

78 1,444,388

10 4,188,035

78

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,820,507

36

0 1,820,507

36

0 1,820,507

36

0 5,783,621

67

0 5,783,621

67

0 5,783,621

67

0

451,593

39

0

451,593

39

0

451,593

39

0

326,239

53

0 5,632,423

88

0 1,343,380

77

0 1,820,507

36

0

0

0

451,593

39

46

1,981,516

46 1,742,248

29

239,268

17 1,742,248

29

239,268

17 1,742,248

29

239,268

17

0

0

66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23

368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701

66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23

24,513 451,468 4,252,658
17,892
7,161

5 344,303

61

23,535

3 2,028,714

92 438,634

156 2,664,599

79 4,252,658

0

0

19 277,873 215

36,989

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

1

677,938

54

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

4

345,281

62

14,546

2 2,041,548 93 894,254

156 2,664,599

79 4,252,658

0

0

22

255,720 208

91,626

0

0

0 3,206,490 39

0

685,099

55

7,161

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

4

354,270

62

6 1,585,928

89

156 2,664,599

79

0

0

30

199,605 198

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

1

677,938

54

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

21,542 256,796
31,551

2

347,274

64

2 2,223,386

93

0

0

0

0

12

158,821 144

0

0

0 3,206,490

39

0

685,099

55

0 3,078,135 3,541

0

250,701

23

1

13,167

1

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

13,167

1

0

1

34,075

1

1

1,878,969

1

1

8,154 131,590,825 8,120 29,155,621

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

645 83,120,399 6,596 28,628,011

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

610 83,590,672 6,623 32,050,803

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

947 77,606,358 6,193 10,601,448

0

34,075

1

0 1,878,969

1

170 63,348,486 6,074

States Included

23

46

21

46

24

43

12

35

Question

F1a

f4a_y

f4a_n

f4b_y

f4b_n

f4c_y

f4c_n

f4d_y

f4d_n

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TABLE 36. USE OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS/LISTS AT THE POLLING PLACE
Questions F1, F4. Use of electronic poll books at the polling place and the number of voters participating in these polling places.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F4:
Arkansas: sing electronic poll book was new for Perry County; two polling places in this jurisdiction used electronic poll books to sign voters in. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented in reference to F4c that laptops were used with voter registration to look up voters. Pinal County did not use electronic poll books in the 2012 general election cycle. California: One jurisdiction commented that only three of its polling places used electronic poll books; the remaining 95 polling places used paper rosters. Another jurisdiction reported that an electronic list was used for early voting only. A third jurisdiction indicated, “All mail ballot election.” A fourth jurisdiction reported using electronic poll books in 60 of 144 precincts; in each case, a signature was captured on a paper poll book. Sonoma County provided precinct officers a Palm Pilot (Election Assistant) to help voters locate their correct polling location for voters; there is no data collected on these devices. Colorado: One county stated, “Principal use of electronic poll books is to print signature card labels, which in turn gives voter credit for voting at polling place. The voting credit data was then exported from electronic poll books and uploaded into the statewide voter registration system, effectively updating voter history. Electronic poll books were programmed for the entire county, so they could also be used to direct voters to correct precinct or clerk’s office, if appropriate (e.g., poll book reflected mail-in ballot was sent to voter, etc.).” Illinois: Two jurisdictions commented that electronic poll lists are used in “some” or “a few” polling places. Florida: Three jurisdictions stated they used electronic lists or poll books during early voting to sign in voters and update voter history but not on election day. One of these jurisdictions also stated that Palm Pilots are used on election day. A different jurisdiction stated that it used a voter focus counter program for Early Voting only. One jurisdiction stated that it used EVIDs at five precincts; for the three remaining counties it used a paper precinct register, but used an EVID during early voting. Another jurisdiction specified that EVID machines were used for voter look up, check-in, voter signature and to tabulate history. One jurisdiction simply indicated, “VR – EviDs.” Another jurisdiction stated that laptops with complete county rolls are provided to each polling place to expedite voter lookup on election day and reduce the necessity for calls to the office. One jurisdiction stated that electronic poll books were only used in four out of 16 precincts. Another jurisdiction simply indicated, “Look up voter’s eligibility.” Indiana: The State is aware that some counties set up PCs at polling locations to allow staff or voters to look up polling locations on the SVRS Public Portal (www.indianavoters.com). They used the public portal to reduce security concerns, rather than setting up a PC linked to SVRS. However, the State did not collect this information as part of the 2012 General Election survey. Additionally, in the State of Indiana, Electronic Poll Books refer to a jurisdiction utilizing Vote Centers. In these counties, “at the polling place” refers to “at the Vote Center locations.” Michigan: Electronic Poll books and lists of voters are utilized in 80% of precincts. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated that electronic poll books are used at two polling locations, and another jurisdiction reported using electronic poll books at eight out of 15 polling locations. Two jurisdictions reported using Palm Pilots to verify voter status. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented that the poll books and sign-in sheets are not electronic. Another jurisdiction stated, “Call Circuit Clerk office and they were told where to go.” New Mexico: One jurisdiction stated that it only uses a ballot on demand and the IPower for early voting and absentee, not for election day polling places. New York: Not yet accommodated in current statutes. Ohio: One jurisdiction reported using an electronic poll book in one of its 474 polling places. A second jurisdiction indicated, “Not in every precinct.” Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico used paper voter rolls that voters sign in at the polling station after showing their Voter Identification card, and then they are provided with their paper ballots. According to Joint Resolution No. 44 of June 3, 2011, the State Election Commission has a mandate to adopt and implement a statewide optical scanning vote counting system complemented with an electronic poll book system.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION Vermont: One jurisdiction commented that voter history was updated electronically but not at the polling places and not on the day of the election. Another jurisdiction stated that all voters are checked in manually from its checklist. A third jurisdiction reported that the internet was not available at the polling location, while another jurisdiction stated, “Nothing electronic at the polling place.” One jurisdiction stated that an electronic list was used to research and evaluate if a voter had been removed from the checklist. Another jurisdiction simply commented, “We use an entrance and exit checklist.” Washington: We do not have poll sites. Our voting centers are countywide. Any voters on the accessible voting units would be looked up in the voter registration system to see if they have already returned a ballot before voting.
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TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

67

2,083,309

67

1

302,465

1

15

2,323,579

15

75

1,080,809

75

58 13,096,097

57

64

2,594,628 64

169

1,560,640 169

3

417,631

3

1

294,254

1

67

8,557,692

67

159

3,910,557 159

4

436,774

4

44

666,290 44

110

5,339,488 110

92

2,663,373 92

99

1,589,951 99

105

1,115,281 105

120

1,815,896 120

64

2,014,511 64

500

724,759 500

24

2,734,189

24

351

3,184,196 351

83

4,780,701 83

87

2,950,780

87

82

889,914 58

116

2,840,776 116

56

491,966 56

93

815,568 93

17

1,017,772

17

State Printed Poll Books and Shipped to Jurisdiction
Total Cases Pct.
0 …

302,465

1 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

436,774

4 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,815,896 120 100.0

2,014,511

64 100.0

1,430

17 0.2

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,293,451

13 43.8

0 …

18,541

1 0.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

Jurisdiction Arranged for Printing of Poll Books

Combination of State and Local Jurisdiction

Information Unavailable

Total Cases

2,083,309

67

0

2,179,790

13

1,040,656

73

12,879,672

51

2,594,628

64

1,560,640 169

0

294,254

1

7,038,699

54

0

0

666,290

44

0

2,663,373

92

1,589,951

99

0

0

0

723,329 483

2,734,189

24

0

0

1,657,329

74

878,172

56

2,322,009 105

491,966

56

815,568

93

1,017,772

17

Pct. 100.0
… 93.8 96.3 98.3 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 82.2
… … 100.0 … 100.0 100.0 … … … 99.8 100.0 … … 56.2 98.7 81.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

417,631

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4,780,701

83

0

6,900

1

0

0

0

0

Pct. Total Cases Pct.

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

… 24,522

1 2.3

… 12,624

3 0.1

…

0 …

…

0 …

100.0

0 …

…

0 …

… 1,058,750

3 12.4

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

100.0

0 …

…

0 …

0.8

0 …

… 66,843

3 2.4

…

0 …

…

0 …

…

0 …

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)

Total

Cases Pct. 0 …

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)

Total Pct.

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

143,789

2 6.2

0

0.0

15,631

1 1.4

0

0.0

203,801

3 1.6

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

460,243

10 5.4

0

0.0

3,910,557 159 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

5,339,488 110 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,115,281 105 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

3,184,196 351 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

4,842

1 0.5

0

0.0

433,383

7 15.3

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE (CONTINUED)

State

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Cases Survey Participating

New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

718,700 3,677,463
679,080 7,128,852 4,539,729 326,239 5,632,423 1,343,380 1,820,507 5,783,621
451,593 1,981,516
368,816 2,480,182 7,993,851 1,023,036
304,509 3,896,846 3,206,490
685,099 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

131,590,825 8,120

F1a

State Printed Poll Books and Shipped to Jurisdiction
Total Cases Pct.
0 …

0 …

607

1 0.1

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,981,516

46 100.0

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

5,295

6 1.7

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

0 …

1,878,969

1 100.0

9,749,455 274 7.4 11
F6.1

Jurisdiction Arranged for Combination of State and

Printing of Poll Books

Local Jurisdiction

Total Cases 718,700 320

3,677,463

21

205,287

14

7,128,852

62

4,204,769

92

235,170

50

5,632,423 88

1,343,380 77

0

5,783,621 67

451,593 39

0

368,816 66

2,480,182

95

7,993,851 254

0

250,473 187

3,896,846 134

0

655,816 53

0

250,701

23

13,167

1

34,075

1

0

Pct. 100.0 100.0 30.2 100.0 92.6
72.1 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 100.0 100.0
… 82.3 100.0
… 95.7
… 100.0 100.0 100.0
…

Total

Cases 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10,678

12

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 3.5 … … … … … … … …

90,556,781 38
F6.2

3,279

68.8 5,215,910 4
F6.3

99 4.0

Information Unavailable

Total

Cases 0

0

10,685

1

0

0

11,765

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

33,496 33

0

3,206,490 39

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct. … … 1.6 … … 3.6 … … … … … … … … … … 11.0 …
100.0 … … … … … …

4,425,175 8
F6.4

84 3.4

Other or None Indicated (See Comments)
Total Cases Pct.

Not Categorized Balance
(See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

462,501

10 68.1

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

334,960

8 7.4

0

0.0

79,304

2 24.3

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,820,507

36 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

1,023,036

29 100.0

0

0.0

4,567

7 1.5

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

29,283

2 4.3

0

0.0

3,078,135 3,541 100.0

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

0 …

0

0.0

21,643,504 4,384 16.4

0

0.0

18

0

F6.rem

calc

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 64

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 37. SOURCE OF POLL BOOKS USED AT THE POLLING PL ACE
Questions F1, F6. Source of poll books used at the polling place and the number of voters participating in these polling places General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting.
Question F6: Alaska: The State of Alaska conducts federal and state elections and the poll books were provided directly to the poll workers by the state. Arkansas: One jurisdiction indicated it does not use printed books. Two jurisdictions reported that the County Clerk’s Office prints poll books. California: One jurisdiction commented, “No polls.” Another jurisdiction stated that poll books are printed by a local vendor. A third jurisdiction stated that poll books are printed in-house. One jurisdiction indicated, “All mail ballot election.” District of Columbia: District prints poll books and operates the polling places. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that it printed its poll registers in-house. A second jurisdiction reported that its three largest precincts used EViDs (electronic poll books) while the remaining precincts used printed poll books on election day; early voting used EViDs. Another jurisdiction indicated that printed poll books were not used at the polls. Maryland: Printed poll books were used as a backup to electronic poll books. Maine: Seventeen jurisdictions commented, “Municipality lacks internet connection.” Michigan: Counties purchase poll books designed by State from commercial vendors and supply to local jurisdictions. Missouri: One jurisdiction indicated, “Backup for epollbook only.” Another jurisdiction stated that poll books were printed from MCVR in County Clerk’s Office. One jurisdiction also stated that these are printed by the County Clerk’s office, while a different jurisdiction stated that it prints out of MCVER. Five jurisdictions stated that they print their poll books in-house. Mississippi: One jurisdiction reported that poll books were printed for all precincts in the Circuit Clerk’s office. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented that signature rosters are printed at the county level. Virginia: State provided ready PDF files to jurisdictions. Vermont: One jurisdiction stated that printed lists of registered voters are used. A second jurisdiction noted that the checklist prints directly from the voter registration database. A third jurisdiction reported using paper ballots that go through its Accuvote system (machine), which prints the totals at the close of the voting day; they are supposed to correspond to the number of voters checked off the voter checklist. One jurisdiction commented, “Checklist,” and another reported no poll books. Another jurisdiction reported that a list is run from State website and printed in local office. Six jurisdictions stated that town checklists are printed from Statewide HAVA checklist. Two jurisdictions reported not using poll books, though one stated this is only true if these do not refer to voter checklists. Similarly, one jurisdiction commented, “Not a ‘poll book.’ It was a checklist.” One jurisdiction stated that the town printed poll books. Another jurisdiction reported that the only printing the State provides is the ballots. Election officials reported printing and distributing checklists themselves. Washington: Printed poll books not used.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

67

2,083,309

1

302,465

15

2,323,579

75

1,080,809

58 13,096,097

64

2,594,628

169

1,560,640

3

417,631

1

294,254

67

8,557,692

159

3,910,557

4

436,774

44

666,290

110

5,339,488

92

2,663,373

99

1,589,951

105

1,115,281

120

1,815,896

64

2,014,511

500

724,759

24

2,734,189

351

3,184,196

83

4,780,701

87

2,950,780

82

889,914

116

2,840,776

56

491,966

93

815,568

17

1,017,772

Cases
67 1 15 75 57 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 58 116 56 93 17

Number of First-time Mail Registrants (Voted or Not)

Total

Cases

0

0

0

1,660

14

13,737

36

0

0

0

756

1

3,857

54

0

24

1

0

0

11,754

92

0

0

0

70,106

64

4,101

500

0

0

0

991

87

77

5

2,678

1

0

0

252

9

Yes Total 2,083,309
302,465 2,179,790 1,040,656 12,889,818 1,551,434 1,560,640
417,631 294,254 6,573,560
436,774 666,290
2,423,998 1,589,951
484,618 1,815,896 2,014,511
724,759 2,734,189
3,911,667 2,950,780
880,956 2,362,174
491,966 815,568 1,017,772

Cases

Use of Printed Lists at the Polls

No

Total

Cases

67

0

1

0

13

143,789

2

73

40,153

2

52

656

1

47

1,043,194

17

169

0

3

0

1

0

50

1,984,132

17

0

0

4

0

44

0

0

0

85

239,375

7

99

0

35

108,295

19

120

0

64

0

500

0

24

0

0

0

64

869,034

19

87

0

56

8,958

2

108

478,602

8

56

0

93

0

17

0

Info. Unavailable

Total

Cases

0

0

0

0

1,822

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

519,520

50

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 66

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Jurisdiction
in Survey

Total of Voters Participating

320

718,700

21

3,677,463

33

679,080

62

7,128,852

100

4,539,729

53

326,239

88

5,632,423

77

1,343,380

36

1,820,507

67

5,783,621

39

451,593

46

1,981,516

66

368,816

95

2,480,182

254

7,993,851

29

1,023,036

246

304,509

134

3,896,846

39

3,206,490

55

685,099

3,541

3,078,135

23

250,701

1

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

8,154 131,590,825

F1a

Cases
320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1

Number of First-time Mail Registrants (Voted or Not)

Total

Cases

384

320

0

341

6

0

12,490

100

0

2,168

11

0

0

0

0

0

3

1

0

84,707

253

0

442

88

1,780

115

379

39

0

11,902

3,541

0

0

0

0

8,120

224,589

5,338

F3

Yes Total
718,700 3,677,463
225,986 7,128,852 4,204,769
235,170 5,614,754 1,343,380
5,783,621 451,593
1,981,516 368,816
2,480,182
298,808
655,816 3,078,135
250,701 13,167 34,075
1,878,969

Cases

Use of Printed Lists at the Polls

No

Total

Cases

320

0

21

0

16

334,108

4

62

0

92

334,960

8

50

91,069

3

86

6,967

1

77

0

0

1,820,507

36

67

0

39

0

46

0

66

0

95

0

0

0

0

0

239

5,178

5

0

0

0

3,206,490

39

53

29,283

2

3,541

0

23

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

94,639,899

6,828 10,744,750

192

46

18

F5.1

F5.2

Info. Unavailable

Total

Cases

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,993,851

254

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8,515,193

305

3

F5.3

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 67

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TABLE 38. FIRST-TIME MAIL REGISTRANTS; USE OF PRINTED REGISTRATION LISTS AT THE POLLING PL ACE
Questions F1, F3, F5. First-time mail registrants. Uses of printed registration lists at the polling place with the number of voters participating in these polling places.
Question F3:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction reported, “Must show ID is in each poll book, then have to check each voter history to see if they were a first time voter.” Arizona: Proof of Identity (ID verification) is required at the polls for ALL Arizona voters and not just first time voters. As such, this “first-time” voter identification requirement is not applicable to State of Arizona. California: One jurisdiction commented, “Total Qty was: 284 Not broken out between VBM and Polls.” Idaho: Idaho Code requires all voters to show ID or sign a Personal Identification Affidavit prior to voting. If a voter registered on Election Day, they were required to show a photo ID and proof of residence prior to registering and voting. Delaware: Do not collect this data. Florida: One jurisdiction indicated, “VR-reports.” Another jurisdiction indicated none that it was aware of. A third jurisdiction reported that all voters’ IDs are checked, and a fourth jurisdiction stated, “ID provided by voter.” Louisiana: Total includes all first-time voter mail registrants regardless of voter registration date. Maryland: Not applicable. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “Courthouse burned 1/17/2013.” Montana: Montana requires all voters to provide ID. North Dakota: North Dakota does not have voter registration. New Mexico: One jurisdiction stated that the above includes people who came into the office in person; in-person voters (registrants) do not require ID.” Another jurisdiction commented, “ID required Statistics Report.” Nevada: Five jurisdictions indicated that they do not track this information. Oklahoma: Effective 7-1-2011, Oklahoma requires “proof of identity” from all in-person voters (early voting or at polling place on election day). Oregon: Did not track origin. Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico is exempt from the NVRA, as the rest of the territories, and the HAVA 303(b) mail in registration applies to NVRA jurisdictions. Vermont: One jurisdiction indicated that this number is the people who were able to vote; it does not keep track of who and if they actually cast a ballot. A second jurisdiction reported that no first time voters submitted their registration by mail. Another jurisdiction noted that verifiable numbers are uncertain due to clerk turnover. One jurisdiction commented that the Town Clerk registers and knows everyone. One election official stated, “I send letters out to the first time voters telling them I need identification and they either come in or mail me a copy of their ID before the election.”
Question F5:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “No – Electronic Pollbooks.” California: One jurisdiction reported no polls. Another jurisdiction indicated, “Alpha Roster/Street Index.” A third jurisdiction noted that it ran an all-mail ballot election. Colorado: Nine jurisdictions reported using signature cards; one of these jurisdictions reported that poll books were also available, and another indicated that it also used a poll book exported into a “Master Voter List.” Four jurisdictions reported using poll books as a backup, and one jurisdiction commented, “Printed poll books were deployed as back-ups to electronic poll books. Some polling places used the paper poll books to make initial determination of whether voter was in correct precinct and entitled to vote an official rather than provisional ballot. Problematic voters could be directed quickly to the provisional ballot judges without waiting in line, if appropriate.” One jurisdiction indicated it had a third backup, a PDF file. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that printed lists were used at the polls on election day, and two jurisdictions reported using printed lists in some of their precincts. Eight jurisdictions reported using printed lists as a backup in their polling places (e.g., in the event of a power outage). One jurisdiction reported only using EViDs, and another jurisdiction reported that it used EViDs (electronic poll books) for voter check-in during early voting.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION Maryland: Used as a backup to electronic poll books. Michigan: Paper poll books and printed lists of voters are utilized in 20% of precincts. Missouri: Two jurisdictions reported using printed lists as a backup in case electronic poll books did not work. Another jurisdiction stated that it used printed lists at six polling locations. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Absentee only,” and another jurisdiction reported a mixed use of list/computer. Nevada: Nine jurisdictions reported using both labels for early voting and a pre-printed roster on election day. Eight jurisdictions reported using only pre-printed rosters. South Carolina: One jurisdiction commented, “Used as a backup if electronic list was used.” Tennessee: One jurisdiction indicated that paper poll books were used for election day, while early voting is PC direct connect to database. Another jurisdiction stated that it used electronic poll books on election day, but paper signature lists were prepared as a backup in case of an emergency. Vermont: Two jurisdictions commented that their checklists were printed from HAVA. One jurisdiction indicated, “Voter checklist.” West Virginia: One jurisdiction reported that it uses poll books with registration cards.
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TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey
67

Number of Poll Workers Total

Cases 0

Alaska

1

2,499

1

Arizona

15 11,700

15

Arkansas

75

9,346

72

California

58 89,440

57

Colorado

64 10,790

64

Connecticut

169

4,464 169

Delaware

3

4,129

3

District of Columbia

1

1,708

1

Florida

67 52,086

67

Georgia

159

0

Hawaii

4

2,583

3

Idaho

44

5,860

44

Illinois

110 49,357 110

Indiana

92 22,427

81

Iowa

99

9,821

99

Kansas

105

8,374 105

Kentucky

120 15,290 120

Louisiana

64 17,782

64

Maine

500

5,983 499

Maryland

24 23,603

24

Massachusetts

351 18,946 348

Michigan

83 37,206

83

Minnesota

87 27,602

87

Mississippi

82

6,974

57

Missouri

116 21,588 112

Montana

56

4,201

56

Nebraska

93

8,322

93

Nevada

17

5,165

17

Under 18

Total Pct.

…

…

229 2.0

2 0.0

12,750 14.3

437

4.1

…

228 5.5

2

0.1

128 0.2

…

315 12.2

30 0.5

…

61 0.3

…

…

…

…

20 0.3

252

1.1

…

1,349 3.6

…

0 0.0

…

20 0.5

92

1.1

253 4.9

18 to 25

Total Pct.

…

…

280 2.4

73 0.8

5,263 5.9

175

1.6

…

293

7.1

238 13.9

1,558 3.0

…

301 11.7

182

3.1

…

247

1.1

…

…

…

…

106

1.8

1,017 4.3

…

2,201 5.9

…

94

1.3

…

63

1.5

90

1.1

248 4.8

26 to 40

Total Pct.

…

…

395 3.4

231 2.5

7,743 8.7

281 2.6

…

298

7.2

138

8.1

2,498 4.8

…

245 9.5

450

7.7

…

405

1.8

…

…

…

…

413 6.9

1,937 8.2

…

2,954

7.9

…

197 2.8

…

245 5.8

492 5.9

346 6.7

41 to 60

Total Pct.

…

…

1,763 15.1

743

7.9

18,836 21.1

1,345 12.5

…

1,460 35.4

697 40.8

10,483 20.1

…

1,005 38.9

1,670 28.5

…

1,782

7.9

…

…

…

…

2,154 36.0

8,874 37.6

…

10,899 29.3

…

529

7.6

…

1,217 29.0

2,319 27.9

1,378 26.7

61 to 70

Total Pct.

…

…

2,405 20.6

1,365 14.6

11,068 12.4

1,301 12.1

…

1,028 24.9

362 21.2

11,293 21.7

…

703 27.2

1,765 30.1

…

1,733

7.7

…

…

…

…

1,923 32.1

6,800 28.8

…

11,877 31.9

…

798 11.4

…

1,465 34.9

2,609 31.4

1,570 30.4

71 and Over

Total Pct.

…

…

1,951 16.7

1,348 14.4

8,338 9.3

835

7.7

…

822 19.9

194 11.4

11,488 22.1

…

401 15.5

1,563 26.7

…

1,527 6.8

…

…

…

…

1,367 22.8

3,798 16.1

…

7,926 21.3

…

555 8.0

…

1,191 28.4

2,701 32.5

1,119 21.7

Balance (See Notes)
Total Pct.

0 2,499 4,677 5,584 25,442 6,416 4,464
0 77 14,638 0 (387) 200 49,357 16,672 9,821 8,374 15,290 17,782 0 925 18,946 0 27,602 4,801 21,588 0 19 251

… 100.0 40.0 59.7 28.4 59.5 100.0
0.0 4.5 28.1 … (15.0) 3.4 100.0 74.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 3.9 100.0 0.0 100.0 68.8 100.0 0.0 0.2 4.9

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TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320

Number of Poll Workers Total
2,392

Cases 320

21

0

33

7,671

25

62 82,811

57

100 23,020 100

53

1,286

45

88 45,556

88

77

7,489

77

36

1,402

36

67

0

39

3,016

39

46 13,213

46

66

2,827

66

95 15,879

95

254 36,019 231

29

4,850

10

246

3,055 221

134 24,691 134

39

782

39

55

7,263

37

3,541 34,902 3,541

23

2,449

23

1

336

1

1

286

1

1 89,413

1

1

8,154 887,854 7,684

D3

Under 18

Total Pct.

…

…

170 2.2

…

384

1.7

…

2,107 4.6

…

…

…

…

825 6.2

0 0.0

291

1.8

…

…

21 0.7

332

1.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

543

1.6

14 0.6

…

0 0.0

…

20,855 2.3 25
D4a

18 to 25

Total Pct.

…

…

706 9.2

…

464 2.0

…

1,997 4.4

…

…

…

…

…

12 0.4

454 2.9

…

…

34

1.1

1,128 4.6

32

4.1

92

1.3

567 1.6

28

1.1

…

77 26.9

…

18,020 2.0 29
D4b

26 to 40

Total Pct.

…

…

1,088 14.2

…

1,040 4.5

…

2,057 4.5

…

…

…

…

…

48

1.7

723 4.6

…

…

112

3.7

1,741

7.1

67 8.6

238 3.3

1,611 4.6

93 3.8

…

72 25.2

…

28,158 3.2 29
D4c

41 to 60
Total Pct.
… … 2,378 31.0 … 5,232 22.7 … 10,225 22.4 … … … … … 296 10.5 3,489 22.0 … … 743 24.3 7,579 30.7 161 20.6 638 8.8 8,121 23.3 669 27.3 … 95 33.2 …
106,780 12.0 29
D4d

61 to 70
Total Pct.
… … 1,458 19.0 … 5,887 25.6 … 10,008 22.0 … … … … … 320 11.3 5,421 34.1 … … 725 23.7 7,868 31.9 107 13.7 700 9.6 13,442 38.5 655 26.7 … 33 11.5 …
106,689 12.0 29
D4e

71 and Over

Total Pct.

…

…

968 12.6

…

4,163 18.1

…

7,807 17.1

…

…

…

…

…

259 9.2

4,516 28.4

…

…

407 13.3

4,268 17.3

65 8.3

228

3.1

10,457 30.0

362 14.8

…

9

3.1

…

80,633

9.1

29

D4f

Balance (See Notes)
Total Pct.

2,392 0
903 82,811 5,850 1,286 11,355 7,489 1,402
0 3,016 12,388 1,892
985 36,019 4,850
1,013 1,775
350 5,367
161 628 336
0 89,413

100.0 … 11.8
100.0 25.4 100.0 24.9 100.0 100.0
… 100.0 93.8 66.9
6.2 100.0 100.0 33.2
7.2 44.8 73.9
0.5 25.6 100.0 0.0 100.0

526,719 59.3 45
calc

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TABLE 39. NUMBER AND AGES OF POLL WORKERS
Questions D3, D4. Number of poll workers used and age category.
Question D3: Arkansas: One jurisdiction stated, “Approximately. Larger polling sited had more workers, smaller does less.” Arizona: One jurisdiction commented, “As a note, we also hired 119 citizen board Troubleshooters that do not serve as polling place board workers but are assigned several specific polling place locations to assist the board workers at these locations with any issues that come up on Election Day. This quantity of additional workers (119) is NOT reflected in the above grand total.” California: One jurisdiction reported that this figure includes student poll workers. A second jurisdiction reported 1,580 poll workers unknown. Another jurisdiction indicated that 56 are standby poll workers. One jurisdiction commented, “All mail ballot.” District of Columbia: number of poll workers failed to report for duty; this number represents the total that showed for work. Florida: One jurisdiction noted that this number includes Canvassing Board members, tech team, supply return check-in team, and poll workers (both early voting and election day). Another jurisdiction reported 233 worked election day, and 125 worked early voting; a lot of these workers worked both election day and early voting. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Minnesota: Estimated number. Missouri: One jurisdiction stated that several precincts were combined at polling places. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “5 Resolution Board.” North Carolina: Several jurisdictions included specific breakdowns of their types of workers, including poll workers, One-Stop workers, chief judges, judges, clerks, student assistants, computer assistants, and rovers. Five jurisdictions stated generally that most of their One-Stop workers also worked in a precinct on Election Day. Several jurisdictions also noted that their worker counts included individuals who worked at both One-Stop sites and at polling places. In a few instances, these individuals were counted twice; in others, these individuals were only counted once. New Hampshire: Minimum required. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “PSR Report/EW Payroll Report.” Puerto Rico: Poll workers are hired as their volunteer representatives and trained by the political parties. For the Nov.6, 2012 General Election, there were two (2) Principal Parties and four (4) Political Parties by Petition (Third Parties). Each party had the right to have up to three (3) poll workers per polling station (7755, plus 1533 provisional voting stations). South Dakota: One jurisdiction indicated there were five workers at each place. Vermont: One jurisdiction noted that this count includes the Town Clerk. Another jurisdiction stated that this does not include BCA who counted ballots (8). One jurisdiction commented, “Election Officials work in shifts throughout the day.” A fourth jurisdiction stated that this does not include people who only counted votes (23). One jurisdiction specified, “4 people in tow hour shifts from 8am-7pm, then 8 people (not including the Clerk) to count the votes by hand.” Another jurisdiction indicated that its count includes six Boy Scouts that assist voters with finding an open voting booth, replenishing pens and removing campaign materials left in the booths. One jurisdiction specified, “11 Justice of the Peace, 1 Clerk, 2 Constables” Washington: Three jurisdictions reported these figures include election day and early voting. One jurisdiction specified that this number includes an 18-day early voting period and election day workers only. Wyoming: In preparation for the 2012 election cycle, the Albany County election staff designed various efforts to recruit new election judges during new voter registrations at the courthouse and through educational testimony during annual off site VR drives. A mailing was created to generate commitment to participate and when making election judges assignments for the Primary and the General election, the County Clerk and her election staff were thoughtful with regard to pairing seasoned judges with new recruits to facilitate continuity in experiential training. A second jurisdiction reported that it did not count County employees. For another jurisdiction, this number includes election judges assigned to absentee, write-in, and resolution boards. One jurisdiction reported that four of its poll workers worked/helped in the Absentee Polling Place.
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Question D4: Arizona: Maricopa County implemented “Student” poll workers program back in 2008. Since its inception, we have seen a steady increase in participation amongst students. For this 2012 General election, of the 4,820 workers, we had over 167 of these board workers that were “Student” poll workers. California: Five jurisdictions reported that they did not have age information available for a portion of their poll workers. One second jurisdiction specified that there were 26 election day appointments made; those officers are not currently linked to their voter registration (DOB) information so they are not included in breakdown. A third jurisdiction indicated that DIMS does not have a report that contains information on poll worker ages. Another jurisdiction noted that the 126 difference from D3 to D4 is because it does not track all ages of its county support staff. One jurisdiction commented that 56 are standby poll workers, and 23 are Field Supervisors who support the vote centers. Colorado: Six jurisdictions reported that information on poll workers’ ages were unavailable; one jurisdiction simply commented, “These are estimates.” Another jurisdiction specified that 97 judges were county employees for which it does not have birthdates. One jurisdiction noted that it had four student judges included in its total, and a second jurisdiction stated that 34 of the 99 were student judges. One jurisdiction specified, “About 2/3 of our judges were in the 61 to 70 range with a good portion of the other 1/3 in the 71 + range. We had a smattering of younger judges. We did not have any student judges this year.” Florida: One jurisdiction stated that this number only includes election day poll workers. Another jurisdiction commented that it had two poll workers who were 90 years old when they worked the general election. Indiana: Four jurisdictions stated that they do not track poll workers’ ages. One jurisdiction commented, “While the birthdate of poll workers is captured upon their sign-up and assignment, so many changes are made on election day and the pay vouchers do not include a birthdate, thus determining the exact age and ranges of the workers who actually reported on election day.” Another jurisdiction noted generally that its workers’ ages range from 18 to over 70. One jurisdiction commented that most of the poll workers were 60 and older, another jurisdiction reported that the average age of its poll workers was above 70 years old, and a third jurisdiction estimated that the majority of poll workers would be between 60 and 80 but did not have an exact number. Two jurisdictions stated that their worker pools are aging. One jurisdiction commented, “Our oldest poll worker was 91. We had quite a few in their 80s that have worked for years.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Minnesota: Age data not available. Mississippi: One jurisdiction commented, “Courthouse burned 1/17/2013.” North Carolina: Several jurisdictions commented that the majority of their workers were 55 years old or above. A couple of jurisdictions reported they did not track this data or stated that this data was based on an estimate. One jurisdiction commented that the majority of its poll workers are re-appointments. Another jurisdiction commented that only 188 of its reported workers worked in the 2012 general elections; seven of these either didn’t work for some reason or have resigned and are still on the poll worker list. New Hampshire: Data not available. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Run PSR Report/EW.” Nevada: One jurisdiction indicated that D4e may contain workers over 71 years of age. Pennsylvania: Not tracked. South Carolina: Age breakdown unavailable for workers 18+. Vermont: Three jurisdictions indicated that these numbers are estimates only. One jurisdiction indicated that all but one worker were over 40 years old. Wyoming: One jurisdiction indicated that the majority of its election judges are retired senior citizens. Two jurisdictions indicate they do not track this information.
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TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS

State
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada

Election Total of

Juris. in

Voters

Survey Participating

67

2,083,309

1

302,465

15

2,323,579

75

1,080,809

58 13,096,097

64

2,594,628

169

1,560,640

3

417,631

1

294,254

67

8,557,692

159

3,910,557

4

436,774

44

666,290

110

5,339,488

92

2,663,373

99

1,589,951

105

1,115,281

120

1,815,896

64

2,014,511

500

724,759

24

2,734,189

351

3,184,196

83

4,780,701

87

2,950,780

82

889,914

116

2,840,776

56

491,966

93

815,568

17

1,017,772

Cases
67 1 15 75 57 64 169 3 1 67 159 4 44 110 92 99 105 120 64 500 24 351 83 87 58 116 56 93 17

Very Difficult

Cases 0 0 0 4 4 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 0 16 0 0
120 0 32 4 1 0 1 1 9 8 13 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 7.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 50.0 6.8 0.0 17.4 0.0 0.0
100.0 0.0 6.4 16.7 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.7 7.8 14.3 14.0 0.0

Somewhat Difficult

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

1 100.0

6 40.0

25 33.3

18

31.6

33

51.6

169 100.0

3 100.0

0

0.0

13

19.4

0

0.0

2 50.0

16 36.4

0

0.0

34

37.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

64 100.0

165 33.0

6 25.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.4

18

31.0

50 43.1

29

51.8

38 40.9

6 35.3

Neither Diff./Easy

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

7 46.7

17 22.7

17 29.8

12 18.8

0

0.0

0

0.0

1 100.0

23 34.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

12 27.3

0

0.0

21 22.8

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

122

24.4

5 20.8

0

0.0

83 100.0

30 34.5

16

27.6

38 32.8

9

16.1

14

15.1

5 29.4

Somewhat Easy

Cases 0 0 1 18 9 12 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 82 6 3 0 24 10 15 5 14 3

Pct. 0.0 0.0 6.7 24.0 15.8 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.9 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 25.0 0.9 0.0 27.6 17.2 12.9 8.9 15.1 17.6

Very Easy

Cases 0 0 1 8 5 1 0 0 0 13 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 82 3 0 0 3 9 3 2 14 3

Pct. 0.0 0.0 6.7 10.7 8.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 12.5 0.0 0.0 3.4 15.5 2.6 3.6 15.1 17.6

Not Enough Information Cases Pct.
67 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

4.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.3

99 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

2

0.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

26 29.9

1

1.7

0

0.0

3

5.4

0

0.0

0

0.0

Balance (See Notes)

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

4

7.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

159 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

110 100.0

9

9.8

0

0.0

105 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

15

3.0

0

0.0

347 98.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

5.2

1

0.9

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

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TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Total of Juris. in Voters Survey Participating

320

718,700

21

3,677,463

33

679,080

62

7,128,852

100

4,539,729

53

326,239

88

5,632,423

77

1,343,380

36

1,820,507

67

5,783,621

39

451,593

46

1,981,516

66

368,816

95

2,480,182

254

7,993,851

29

1,023,036

246

304,509

134

3,896,846

39

3,206,490

55

685,099

3,541

3,078,135

23

250,701

1

13,167

1

34,075

1

1,878,969

1

8,154 131,590,825

F1a

Cases
320 21 26 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 245 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1
8,120

Very Difficult

Cases 0 0 1 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 4 14 23 0 3 0 0 4
909 1 0 0 1

Pct. 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 9.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 6.1 14.7 9.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 7.3 25.7 4.3 0.0 0.0
100.0

1,205

14.8

28

D5.1

Somewhat Difficult

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

5 19.2

0

0.0

50 50.0

0

0.0

41 46.6

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10 25.6

0

0.0

23 34.8

40

42.1

46

18.1

0

0.0

35 14.3

0

0.0

8 20.5

12

21.8

585

16.5

18 78.3

0

0.0

1 100.0

0

0.0

1,573

19.4

33

D5.2

Neither Diff./Easy

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

6 23.1

62 100.0

25 25.0

0

0.0

26 29.5

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

10 25.6

0

0.0

22 33.3

20

21.1

101 39.8

0

0.0

74 30.2

0

0.0

7

17.9

10 18.2

959

27.1

1

4.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1,755 21.6 30
D5.3

Somewhat Easy

Cases 0 0 6 0 13 0 18 0 0 0 3 0 16 14 46 0 48 0 6 6
599 3 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 13.0 0.0 20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 24.2 14.7 18.1 0.0 19.6 0.0 15.4 10.9 16.9 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

1,007

12.4

28

D5.4

Very Easy

Cases 0 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 36 0 7 0 1 4 19 0 76 0 9 5
486 0 1 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.3 0.0
100.0 0.0 17.9 0.0 1.5 4.2 7.5 0.0 31.0 0.0 23.1 9.1 13.7 0.0
100.0 0.0 0.0

810 10.0 28 D5.5

Not Enough Information Cases Pct.
320 100.0

21 100.0

2

7.7

0

0.0

0

0.0

53 100.0

0

0.0

77 100.0

0

0.0

67 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

3.2

18

7.1

0

0.0

3

1.2

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

768

9.5

17

D5.6

Balance (See Notes)

Cases Pct.

0

0.0

0

0.0

3

11.5

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

46 100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1

0.4

29 100.0

6

2.4

134 100.0

9

23.1

18 32.7

3

0.1

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

1,002 12.3 18
calc

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TABLE 40. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT POLL WORKERS
Questions F1, D5. Difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers for the election.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. For this table, the total used for comparison is the number of cases in the State. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, result¬ing in some over-counting.
Question D5:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction noted that workers face long hours, too much paperwork, and a stressful day. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented that people do not want to work long hours for so little pay. Two jurisdictions stated that obtaining poll workers can be hindered by geographic reasons, primarily in rural areas. California: A couple of jurisdictions noted that it was difficult to recruit bilingual poll workers. A few jurisdictions noted that recruiting student poll workers was helpful in obtaining a sufficient number of workers. A few jurisdictions stated that there was lots of interest in volunteering for this election due to the attention around the presidential content. One jurisdiction stated that long hours can be a deterrent to poll workers, and half day shifts seemed to be key for some of its workers. One jurisdiction commented, “Does not apply – all mail ballot.” Colorado: Several jurisdictions reported a high rate of drop outs before the election, making it difficult to recruit and train additional judges. A few jurisdictions noted that they had the most difficulty finding a balance between members of the two major political parties. A couple of jurisdictions noted that student judges were important to obtaining enough poll workers, but one jurisdiction noted that recruiting was difficult because schools did not like students missing a whole day of school. A few jurisdictions noted that there can be long hours and a stressful environment. Florida: One jurisdiction commented that it had to send out two mailings to bring back retired workers and struggled to keep those committed to work the polls to actually be able to show up on election day. One jurisdiction stated that it encourages poll workers to “find a friend,” i.e., find someone they would like to work with and become poll workers, but it struggled to find enough non-Republicans to meet the requirements under the law. One jurisdiction reported it had approximately 100 more election workers available than needed, and nearly 100 more who were interested but did not attend orientation earlier in the year. Indiana: A few jurisdictions reported that their local political parties find their poll workers. A couple of jurisdictions noted that finding workers can be difficult due to long hours and difficult pay, and some quit after training because they didn’t know what they were getting into. One jurisdiction stated that presidential elections prove to be the easiest time to recruit poll as the public is very interested in assisting in the election process. One jurisdiction stated that the difficulty rested in the need to find over 1,500 poll workers, while another jurisdiction commented that it reduced the number of polling locations and boards to reduce the number of poll workers needed. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Missouri: One jurisdiction noted that 145 started training and quit when they saw how much work was involved; also, Missouri law which requires a balance between political parties among workers caused many problems. Another jurisdiction stated that recruitment of both paid and volunteer workers needs to be reviewed and improved with more interest in securing workers from the corporate world and volunteers from more of the area schools. Mississippi: One jurisdiction stated that the local election commission gathers poll workers based on registered voters per voting precinct. Montana: A few jurisdictions noted difficult obtaining workers due to language requirements, the need to fill last minute judge vacancies, and rural geographies. One jurisdiction commented that everyone works; it is hard to find younger people due to jobs and kids. North Carolina: Several jurisdictions commented that it is difficult to find roughly even numbers of workers from each political party. A few jurisdictions noted that finding poll workers can be more difficult in certain precincts, particularly smaller precincts and places with last minute vacancies. One jurisdiction noted that recruiting workers is getting hard, but it has been able to recruit from college and recent retirees. Nebraska: Several jurisdictions noted that finding poll workers is difficult due to long hours, low pay, work commitments, bilingual requirements, and finding even numbers of people to represent each political party. In addition, several jurisdictions also noted that they had a very difficult time recruiting younger poll workers during this election. One jurisdiction indicated that it will possibly consider all mail-in precincts in the future. A couple of jurisdictions reported they have a core group of volunteers who have served for many years, enjoy it, and take their responsibility very seriously.
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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION New Mexico: One jurisdiction reported difficulty with political party balance. Another jurisdiction stated that it lost a lot of workers due to new rules. A third jurisdiction stated that it is always hard to get presiding judges. New York; Hurricane Sandy affected the ability of poll workers in declared jurisdictions to report for work as originally assigned. Vermont: Two jurisdictions reported that large portions of their Board of Civil Authority worked during the day, and they had to seek others to fill the need. One of these jurisdictions reported they staff elections with retired people. One jurisdiction reported that it had a waiting list of residents who wish to be poll workers for each election. Another jurisdiction reported that it pays workers an attractive stipend and provides meals. When they compensated less, it was more difficult to have enough coverage (easier to find people but a significant expense for the Town). Wyoming: Several jurisdictions noted they had a difficult time recruiting workers, and their workers are getting older and are less likely to work. A few jurisdictions also reported having a difficult time recruiting younger workers. One jurisdiction stated that some precincts were easier to recruit for than others; some individuals did not mind being asked to work in a precinct other than their own, but others did not seem eager to work in a polling place other than their own.
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TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Number of Precincts

Total Cases

2,527

67

438

1

1,667

15

2,747

75

24,349 58

2,917 64

744 169

432

3

151

1

6,242 67

2,850 159

247

4

924 44

10,088 110

5,353 92

1,688 99

3,565 105

3,632 120

4,267 64

563 499

1,865

24

2,164 351

5,454 83

4,103 87

1,376 63

4,615 116

794 56

1,394 93

1,935

17

Number of Polling Places

Total Cases

2,252

67

533

1

1,537

15

1,631

75

14,686

57

1,237

64

744 169

285

3

151

1

4,928

67

0

240

4

807

44

6,520 110

3,976

92

1,787

99

1,308 105

2,506 120

2,256

64

542 499

1,636

24

1,353 351

3,688

83

2,936

87

1,396

63

2,913 116

422

56

1,182

93

556

17

Election Day Voting

Non-election Office

Election Office

Other Type

Total Pct. Total Pct. Total Pct.

2,252 100.0

…

…

453 85.0

…

…

1,458 94.9

0 0.0

0 0.0

1,494 91.6

3 0.2

…

14,493 98.7

69 0.5

2 0.0

1,029 83.2

53 4.3

…

744 100.0

0 0.0

…

283 99.3

2 0.7

0 0.0

143 94.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

4,631 94.0

19 0.4

0 0.0

…

…

…

231 96.3

…

3 1.3

762 94.4

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

3,054 76.8

758 19.1

…

1,688 94.5

0 0.0

…

1,246 95.3

…

…

2,506 100.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

2,166 96.0

…

…

542 100.0

…

…

1,590 97.2

0 0.0

…

1,353 100.0

0 0.0

…

3,544 96.1

144 3.9

0 0.0

2,883 98.2

53 1.8

…

1,257 90.0

36 2.6

…

…

…

…

422 100.0

…

…

1,089 92.1

…

…

412 74.1

8 1.4

0 0.0

Non-election Office
Total Pct.

Early Voting Election Office Total Pct.

…

…

75 14.1

5 0.9

40 2.6

23 1.5

95 5.8

37 2.3

5 0.0

43 0.3

94 7.6

61 4.9

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

8 5.3

0 0.0

194 3.9

95 1.9

…

…

3 1.3

3 1.3

0 0.0

45 5.6

295 4.5

115 1.8

98 2.5

66 1.7

…

99 5.5

62 4.7

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

13 0.6

77 3.4

…

…

45 2.8

1 0.1

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

2 0.1

31 2.2

…

…

…

…

…

93 7.9

123 22.1

13 2.3

Other Type

Total 16 2 2 0 0
0 1 0

Pct. … … 1.0 0.1 0.0 … … … 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … … … … … … … 0.0 … 0.1 … … … 0.0

Balance (See Notes)

Total 0 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 0 0
6,110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69
2,913 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.2) … 0.0 0.0 93.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Number of Precincts

Number of Polling Places

Total Cases

336 320

6,440

21

1,393

27

13,966

57

2,756 100

426

53

9,242

88

1,958

77

1,399

36

9,249

67

453

39

2,145

46

785

66

2,089

95

9,142 254

2,105

29

262 238

632 134

6,975

39

1,853

55

3,541 3,541

482

23

18

1

58

1

110

1

Total Cases

307 320

3,409

21

856 27

5,111 57

3,121 100

297 53

4,779 88

2,021 77

36

36

9,283

67

453 39

2,191 46

602

65

2,204

95

6,399 234

0

459 244

694

66

62

39

1,896

55

3,541 3,541

306 23

46

1

22

1

7,865

1

176,906 8,114 119,968 7,842

52

D1

D2a

Election Day Voting

Non-election Office

Election Office

Other Type

Total Pct. Total Pct. Total Pct.

307 100.0

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

622 72.7

71 8.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

2,756 88.3

0 0.0

…

287 96.6

…

…

4,645 97.2

0 0.0

1 0.0

1,944 96.2

0 0.0

…

…

36 100.0

…

4,687 50.5

…

…

413 91.2

40 8.8

0 0.0

2,145 97.9

…

…

496 82.4

21 3.5

0 0.0

1,985 90.1

10 0.5

5 0.2

5,606 87.6

…

…

…

…

…

150 32.7

104 22.7

3 0.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

20 32.3

42 67.7

0 0.0

1,831 96.6

22 1.2

…

3,541 100.0

…

…

301 98.4

…

…

45 97.8

1 2.2

…

21 95.5

0 0.0

…

7,755 98.6

0 0.0

…

91,282 51.6 1,492 0.8

46

19

D2b

D2c

14 0.0 5 D2d

Non-election Office
Total Pct.

Early Voting Election Office Total Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

67 7.8

25 2.9

0 0.0

0 0.0

293 9.4

72 2.3

9 3.0

…

3 0.1

85 1.8

0 0.0

77 3.8

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

46 2.1

5 0.8

47 7.8

106 4.8

88 4.0

860 13.4

…

…

…

27 5.9

156 34.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

42 67.7

15 0.8

53 2.8

…

…

…

5 1.6

…

…

0 0.0

1 4.5

19 0.2

91 1.2

2,556 1.4 1,595 0.9

25

29

D2e

D2f

Other Type

Total 5
0 3 0 4 0 0

Pct. … … 0.6 … … … … … … … 0.0 … 0.5 0.0 … … 0.9 0.0 0.0 … … … … … …

33 0.0 7 D2g

Balance (See Notes)

Total 0
3,409 66
5,111 0 1 45 0 0
4,596 0 0 30 10
(67) 0 15
694 (42) (25)
0 0 0 0 0

Pct. 0.0
100.0 7.7
100.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 49.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.5 (1.0) … 3.3
100.0 (67.7) (1.3)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

22,996 13.0 18
calc

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 41. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRECINCTS/POLLING PLACES
Questions D1, D2. Number of precincts, number of polling places, types of polling places.
General note: The Balance/Not Categorized column on the table compares the sum of all the categorical responses with the total indicated. If the balance is a positive number the difference is treated as uncategorized responses. If the balance is a negative number (indicated by the parentheses) the difference indicates the sum of the responses is greater than the total indicated; this could occur by an error in data entry or by the inability to correctly categorize some responses, resulting in some over-counting. Note: in this case there appears to be much doublecounting which merely indicates the multiple purposes of some polling places, e.g., an election office being used for both Early Voting and Election Day Voting.
Question D1:
Arkansas: Three jurisdictions reported including counts from early vote, precincts and absentee, and precincts plus early voting and absentee, respectively. One jurisdiction reported that this count does not include absentee and early precincts. Arizona: One jurisdiction commented, “Arizona underwent “Redistricting” prior to the 2012 General Election and part of the redistricting efforts for Maricopa County was to redraw and consolidate precincts. Prior to 2012, Maricopa County had 1,124 precincts (since 2006). With the increase in the number of voters in Maricopa County on the Permanent Early Voting List (1,162,067), we were able to merge several precincts to reach a new precinct total for 2012 of 724 precincts.” California: One jurisdiction commented, “Consolidated precincts.” One jurisdiction stated that D1a represents the total number of consolidated precincts for November 2012. One jurisdiction included voting precincts and mailed ballot precincts in its count, while another jurisdiction included precincts, vote by mail precincts, and mail ballot precincts. One jurisdiction reported 22 mail ballot precincts. Idaho: This number only includes physical precincts. It does not include any absentee precincts, which are non-physical precincts to allow the county to count all of the absentee ballots together as a precinct rather than dividing them by precincts. Florida: One jurisdiction reported that during redistricting, it combined a number of polling places together, but kept the precincts separate. Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 14 jurisdictions. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Michigan: Totals include physical polling places (jurisdictional precincts) and central count locations (referred to as AVCB, absent voter counting boards). Missouri: One jurisdiction commented that it had “counted the office as (1). Absentee Voting.” Two jurisdictions reported that these figures include absentee. New Mexico: One jurisdiction reported that it had successfully used voting convenience centers. Another jurisdiction commented, “24 to include Ab/EV.” A third jurisdiction reported that this number includes early voting and absentee precincts. One jurisdiction reported that two precincts are split by district. Another jurisdiction commented, “23 Voting Convenience Centers and 12 Regular.” Puerto Rico; The island is divided into 110 precincts, 1533 Voting Units and 7755 polling stations (plus 1533 provisional voting stations, for a total 8557 polling stations). South Carolina: Does not include VR Office. Vermont: The City of Burlington has seven Wards which also serve seven State Representative Districts for 19 total Ward/District combinations. Another jurisdiction commented, “We only have one place to vote.”
Question D2:
Arkansas: One jurisdiction commented, “Early voting in the county clerk’s office.” Arizona: One jurisdiction noted, “D2a is a total number of physical polling places (677) IN ADDITION to the 15 early voting centers (3 offices and 12 off-site locations) and the 5 drop off “ballot box” sites for a total of 697. “Election Day” voting (D2b) is only offered at polling place locations. Each of the 724 precincts is technically assigned a polling place. However, in certain areas some precinct polling places were co-located within the same facility and that is why the “physical” polling place location total is less than the number of precincts existing. A co-located polling place consists of two different and separate boards specifically assigned to a given precinct and a specific set of voters within that precinct. Additionally, we had 7 All-Mail Precincts where the total number of registered voters within those precincts was less than 25 registered voters. These All-Mail precincts were still co-located and assigned to a physical polling place in case a voter opted to vote in-person versus by mail.” Another jurisdiction reported that it utilized Vote Centers and not traditional polling places for the 2012 elections.
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California: One jurisdiction reported that it had 787 polling places, with one early voting site that was also an election day voting site. A second jurisdiction indicated that the polling places for D2c and D2f are the same. A third jurisdiction reported that its Elections Office is election day and early voting. Similarly, two other jurisdictions noted that the Elections Office was used as an early voting site and also used on election day; the totals for D2a will not match. One jurisdiction stated that the Truckee early voting site was not open for voting on election day; therefore its count is off by one. Another jurisdiction commented, “18 PP/16 Locations + Office.” A different jurisdiction noted that its two election offices serve as polling places on Election Day and also as a location where voters can pick up their VBM ballot beginning 29 days before the election. Another jurisdiction noted that the county Elections Office is open for voting, by law, 29 days prior to election day; the total number of physical polling places in the county includes the county Elections Office. Idaho: Idaho does not have “Early Voting.” However, the States does have In-Person absentee voting at least 3 weeks before the election. The In-Person absentee polling place is being reported under the Early Voting heading. Florida: Two jurisdictions reported that their elections offices are used for election day voting and for early voting, so these are counted twice in the D2 totals. Three jurisdictions also noted that they use multiple early voting sites and included these in their counts. Another jurisdiction commented, “One City Hall.” Maine: Municipal Clerks did not report figures in 11 jurisdictions. Kingsburg Plantation figures were included with Guilford. Hersey reported that it shares election workers with Moro Plantation. Edmunds Township figures were included with Dennysville. Michigan: Total of physical precincts (jurisdictional precincts). Mississippi: Three jurisdictions noted that Mississippi does not have early voting but has absentee voting. One of these jurisdictions commented that its County Clerk’s office served as the only polling place for absentee voting until, but not on. Election Day. New Mexico: One jurisdiction commented, “Vote Centers.” A second jurisdiction noted that it had 39 election day, one absentee (Clerk’s Office), one alternate site, three tribal early voting sites, and three all mail precincts/not polling place. Another jurisdiction stated, “2 VCC locations.” A fourth jurisdiction commented that it had 16 precincts on election day and in-person voting and absentee. New York: Early voting not permitted in NY. Oregon: Vote by mail state. No early voting. South Dakota: One jurisdiction indicated that D2f refers to in-house absentee voting; election office is not considered absentee polling place – ballots are all processed at the 22 precincts’ polling places. Another jurisdiction noted that the auditor’s office was open for voters to absentee vote from 9-28-2012 until 3 P.M. election day. Virginia: Virginia is not an early voting state. Election offices may not be actual voting locations. Vermont: One jurisdiction reported that it does not have early voting. One jurisdiction stated that early voters may vote outside the election office at home and return the ballot to the election official before the close of polls on election day. A third jurisdiction stated that voters could vote in the Town Office through November 5, 2012; on November 6, 2012, everyone else had to come to the gymnasium to vote. Four jurisdictions noted that their early voting and election day voting is held in the same place – two at their Town Offices, one at its Town Clerk’s Office, and one at its Town Hall. Another jurisdiction commented, “D2f Same place.” One jurisdiction stated, “One polling placed at the school gym.” Another jurisdiction reported, “D2b. Our election office is not open on election day. D2e. Early voting is conducted in the election office (Town Clerk’s Office).” Washington: In Washington State, polling places are voting centers, centrally located. Each election office is for early voting as well as voting on election day. West Virginia: Nineteen jurisdictions reported that their election offices were used for both election day voting and early voting. Four jurisdictions indicated that one non-election polling place was used for both election day voting and early voting. One jurisdiction stated that two non-election polling places were sued for both election day voting and early voting. Wyoming: Five jurisdictions commented that the absentee polling places are not open on election day.
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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT

State Alabama

Election Juris. in Survey

Sum of All Voting
Equipment (See Notes)

67

5,267

DRE w/o VVPAT

DRE w/ VVPAT

Total Pct. Total Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

Hybrid of DRE/Optical
Scan

Optical or Digital Scan

Optical or Digital Scan

Punch Card

Punch Card

Total Pct. Counters Pct. Booths BpC Counters Pct. Booths BpC

2,357 44.8 2,910 55.2

…

0 0.0

…

Lever

Paper

Total Pct. Booths Pct.

0 0.0

0 0.0

Other-1
Total Pct. 0 0.0

Other-2
Total Pct. 0 0.0

Alaska

1

914

… 443 48.5

…

338 37.0

…

…

…

…

133 14.6

…

…

Arizona

15

3,107

… 1,559 50.2

20 0.6

1,528 49.2 14,150 455

…

…

…

…

…

…

Arkansas

75

3,601 139 3.9 3,088 85.8

…

318 8.8

180 5

…

…

…

41 1.1

15 0.4

…

California

58

25,369

98 0.4 18,996 74.9 1,013 4.0 4,397 17.3 23,289 92

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

688 2.7

50 0.2 127 0.5

Colorado

64

4,544 214 4.7 3,732 82.1

…

598 13.2

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Connecticut

169

2,232

…

… 744 33.3

744 33.3 8,166 366

…

…

…

… 744 33.3

…

Delaware

3

1,292 1,288 99.7

0 0.0

0 0.0

4 0.3

2 0

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

District of Columbia

1

579

… 255 44.0 167 28.8

157 27.1

157 27

…

…

…

…

…

…

Florida

67

13,350 4,065 30.4

… 1,190 8.9 7,839 58.7 56,054 420

…

…

…

… 255 1.9

1 0.0

Georgia

159

26,515 26,515 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Hawaii

4

520

… 260 50.0

…

260 50.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Idaho

44

1,590

0 0.0

0 0.0 824 51.8

73 4.6 6,210 391

4 0.3

641 160

0 0.0

689 43.3

0 0.0

0 0.0

Illinois

110

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Indiana

92

9,543 7,427 77.8

… 869 9.1 1,239 13.0 3,605 38

…

…

…

8 0.1

…

…

Iowa

99

3,376

0 0.0

0 0.0 1,688 50.0 1,688 50.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

Kansas

105

6,423 3,617 56.3 1,118 17.4 606 9.4

919 14.3 8,107 126

…

…

…

163 2.5

…

…

Kentucky

120

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Louisiana

64

9,633 9,004 93.5

…

…

84 0.9

…

…

…

…

… 545 5.7

…

Maine

500

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Maryland

24

17,700 17,610 99.5

…

…

90 0.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Massachusetts

351

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Michigan

83

8,998

…

… 3,544 39.4 5,454 60.6

…

…

…

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

Minnesota

87

6,242

…

… 3,121 50.0

3,121 50.0 23,130 371

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

Mississippi

82

4,693 2,515 53.6 1,758 37.5

…

125 2.7

408

9

…

…

…

1 0.0 294 6.3

…

Missouri

116

6,978

… 3,720 53.3 336 4.8 2,807 40.2 13,679 196

…

…

…

…

64 0.9

51 0.7

Montana

56

1,037

…

… 505 48.7

345 33.3 4,353 420

…

…

…

187 18.0

…

…

Nebraska

93

1,302

…

… 1,087 83.5

215 16.5

…

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

…

Nevada

17

6,608

… 6,577 99.5

…

31 0.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey

Election Juris. in Survey

Sum of All Voting
Equipment (See Notes)

DRE w/o VVPAT Total Pct.

DRE w/ VVPAT Total Pct.

Hybrid of DRE/ Optical or Optical Scan Digital Scan
Total Pct. Counters Pct.

Optical or Digital Scan

Punch Card

Booths BpC Counters Pct.

Punch Card Booths BpC

Lever

Paper

Total Pct. Booths Pct.

Other-1

Other-2

Total Pct. Total Pct.

320

1,546

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

244 15.8 9,335 604

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0 1,302 84.2

0 0.0 0 0.0

21

11,244 11,244 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

New Mexico

33

1,202

53 4.4

179 14.9

413 34.4

531 44.2 3,222 268

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 26 2.2

New York

62

18,649

…

… 7,567 40.6 11,082 59.4

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

North Carolina

100

11,608

0 0.0 7,226 62.3 1,853 16.0

2,514 21.7 18,394 158

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0 15 0.1 0 0.0

North Dakota

53

387

…

…

…

384 99.2

…

…

…

…

…

3 0.8

…

Ohio

88

29,001

… 25,495 87.9 718 2.5 2,769 9.5 14,844 51

…

…

…

… 19 0.1

…

Oklahoma

77

2,064

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 2,064 100.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

… 0 0.0

Oregon

36

71

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0

71 100.0

…

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.0 0 0.0

Pennsylvania

67

22,070 21,300 96.5

… 770 3.5

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Rhode Island

39

908

…

…

…

454 50.0 3,971 437

…

…

…

… 454 50.0

…

South Carolina

46

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

South Dakota

66

660

…

… 602 91.2

58 8.8

148 22

…

…

…

0 0.0

…

…

Tennessee

95

8,731 8,580 98.3

…

…

151 1.7

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Texas

254

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Utah

29

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Vermont

246

2,469

32 1.3

5 0.2 1,278 51.8

123 5.0 1,697 69

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

978 39.6

52 2.1 1 0.0

Virginia

134

8,273 7,937 95.9

… 184 2.2

…

…

…

…

…

76 0.9 76 0.9

…

Washington

39

426

…

321 75.4

19 4.5

86 20.2

50 12

…

…

…

…

…

…

West Virginia

55

4,667

0 0.0 4,304 92.2

58 1.2

205 4.4 1,737 37

0 0.0

0 …

0 0.0

100 2.1

0 0.0 0 0.0

Wisconsin

3,541

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Wyoming

23

1,154

0 0.0

321 27.8

360 31.2

473 41.0

…

0 0.0

…

0 0.0

…

…

…

American Samoa

1

46

…

0 0.0

0 0.0

…

…

…

…

…

46 100.0

…

…

Guam

1

3

…

…

…

3 100.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Puerto Rico

1

23,265

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

… 23,265 100.0

…

…

Virgin Islands

1

Sum of Above

8,154 319,857 121,638 38.0 79,357 24.8 31,893 10.0 56,496 17.7 214,888 4

4 0.0

641 160

0 0.0 27,677 8.7 2,586 0.8 206 0.1

States Included

17

18

26

40

23

1

1

0

14

13

5

Question

calc

F7a

F7b

F7c

F7d[c]

F7d[b]

F7e[c]

F7e[b]

F7f

F7g[b]

F7h

F7i

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TABLE 42. NUMBER AND TYPE OF VOTING EQUIPMENT Question F7. Information on the number and type of voting equipment used in the elections and the purposes for which they are used.
Note: This table is a simple summary of a complex set of information. Researchers are advised to consult the dataset for complete informa¬tion. The “Sum of All Voting Equipment” is a calculated estimate to enable comparative percentage values. This sum is determined by using the number of machines or counters as well as the number of booths for paper ballots and the “other” types of equipment.
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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE

State

Election Juris. in Survey

Alabama

67

Alaska

1

Arizona

15

Arkansas

75

California

58

Colorado

64

Connecticut

169

Delaware

3

District of Columbia

1

Florida

67

Georgia

159

Hawaii

4

Idaho

44

Illinois

110

Indiana

92

Iowa

99

Kansas

105

Kentucky

120

Louisiana

64

Maine

500

Maryland

24

Massachusetts

351

Michigan

83

Minnesota

87

Mississippi

82

Missouri

116

Montana

56

Nebraska

93

Nevada

17

Polling Places Total
2,252 533
1,537 1,631 14,686 1,237
744 285 151 4,928
240 807 6,520 3,976 1,787 1,308 2,506 2,256 542 1,636 1,353 3,688 2,936 1,396 2,913 422 1,182 556

Precincts

Total per PP

2,527

1.1

438 0.8

1,667

1.1

2,747

1.7

24,349

1.7

2,917 2.4

744

1.0

432

1.5

151

1.0

6,242

1.3

2,850

…

247

1.0

924

1.1

10,088

1.5

5,353

1.3

1,688 0.9

3,565 2.7

3,632

1.4

4,267

1.9

563

1.0

1,865

1.1

2,164

1.6

5,454

1.5

4,103

1.4

1,376

1.0

4,615

1.6

794

1.9

1,394

1.2

1,935 3.5

Registrants

Total

per PP

3,162,135 1,404.1

579,304 1,087

3,725,362 2,424

1,610,364

987

18,996,338 1,293

3,651,091 2,952

2,202,278 2,960

632,805 2,220

557,774 3,694

11,934,446 2,422

6,050,050

…

705,668 2,940

895,834 1,110

8,116,660 1,245

4,562,268 1,147

2,236,068 1,251

1,771,252 1,354

3,037,153 1,212

2,965,751 1,315

1,026,086 1,893

3,694,658 2,258

4,340,000 3,208

7,454,553 2,021

3,387,783 1,154

1,399,209 1,002

4,191,778 1,439

681,608 1,615

1,163,871

985

1,258,409 2,263

Voters

Election Day Voters (exc. Provisionals)

Provisional Ballots

Total per PP Total per PP Total per PP

2,083,309 925.1

…

6,728 3.0

302,465 567 203,496 382

18,255

34

2,323,579 1,512 633,660 412 183,259 119

1,080,809

663

565,716 347

2,592

2

13,096,097 892 5,460,518 372 1,065,156

73

2,594,628 2,098

421,980 341

62,847

51

1,560,640 2,098

…

963

1

417,631 1,465 396,408 1,391

453

2

294,254 1,949

191,166 1,266

38,636 256

8,557,692 1,737 3,736,946 758

42,745

9

3,910,557

… 1,979,776

…

…

436,774 1,820 236,586 986

711

3

666,290 826 496,546 615

…

5,339,488 819 4,021,805 617

43,772

7

2,663,373 670 2,073,074 521

4,801

1

1,589,951 890 896,757 502

4,996

3

1,115,281 853 784,825 600

38,865

30

1,815,896 725 1,710,486 683

287

0

2,014,511 893 1,650,912 732

6,862

3

724,759 1,337 536,635 990

315

1

2,734,189 1,671 2,068,656 1,264

79,876

49

3,184,196 2,353 2,913,489 2,153

12,920

10

4,780,701 1,296 3,505,208 950

2,675

1

2,950,780 1,005 2,640,446 899

…

889,914 637 708,020 507

22,478

16

2,840,776 975 2,567,998 882

6,393

2

491,966 1,166

198,775 471

5,562

13

815,568 690 595,284 504

15,130

13

1,017,772 1,831

305,122 549

8,329

15

Poll Workers

Voting Equipment

Total

per PP …

2,499

5

11,700

8

9,346

6

89,440

6

10,790

9

4,464

6

4,129

14

1,708

11

52,086

11

…

2,583

11

5,860

7

49,357

8

22,427

6

9,821

5

8,374

6

15,290

6

17,782

8

5,983

11

23,603

14

18,946

14

37,206

10

27,602

9

6,974

5

21,588

7

4,201

10

8,322

7

5,165

9

Total per PP 5,267 2.3

914

2

3,107

2

3,601

2

25,369

2

4,544

4

2,232

3

1,292

5

579

4

13,350

3

26,515

…

520

2

1,590

2

…

9,543

2

3,376

2

6,423

5

…

9,633

4

…

17,700

11

…

8,998

2

6,242

2

4,693

3

6,978

2

1,037

2

1,302

1

6,608

12

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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE (CONTINUED)

State
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Sum of Above States Included Question

Election Juris. in Survey
320 21 33 62 100 53 88 77 36 67 39 46 66 95 254 29 246 134 39 55 3,541 23 1 1 1 1 8,154

Polling Places Total
307 3,409
856 5,111 3,121 297 4,779 2,021
36 9,283
453 2,191
602 2,204 6,399
459 694 62 1,896 3,541 306 46 22 7,865
119,968

D2a

Precincts

Total per PP

336

1.1

6,440

1.9

1,393

1.6

13,966

2.7

2,756 0.9

426

1.4

9,242

1.9

1,958

1.0

1,399 38.9

9,249

1.0

453

1.0

2,145

1.0

785

1.3

2,089 0.9

9,142

1.4

2,105

…

262 0.6

632 0.9

6,975 112.5

1,853

1.0

3,541

1.0

482

1.6

18 0.4

58 2.6

110 0.0

Registrants

Total

per PP

878,136 2,860

5,415,639 1,589

1,252,438 1,463

11,720,541 2,293

6,655,291 2,132

…

7,987,697 1,671

2,114,489 1,046

2,199,360 61,093

8,352,342 900

725,309 1,601

2,875,121 1,312

523,410

869

4,024,960 1,826

13,690,729 2,140

1,508,372

…

460,817 1,004

5,428,091 7,821

3,904,959 62,983

1,246,559

657

3,987,248 1,126

240,438

786

17,764

386

50,701 2,305

2,402,941 306

Voters

Election Day Voters (exc. Provisionals)

Provisional Ballots

Total per PP Total per PP Total per PP

718,700 2,341 654,450 2,132

0

0

3,677,463 1,079 3,047,584 894

97,481

29

679,080 793 225,870 264

6,630

8

7,128,852 1,395 4,342,214 850 451,868

88

4,539,729 1,455 1,743,642 559

51,192

16

326,239 1,098 230,890 777

…

5,632,423 1,179 3,547,582 742 208,087

44

1,343,380 665 1,163,957 576

5,313

3

1,820,507 50,570

…

1,771

49

5,783,621 623 5,488,684 591

49,000

5

451,593 997 423,691 935

2,357

5

1,981,516 904 1,525,284 696

5,473

2

368,816

613

209,102 347

441

1

2,480,182 1,125 1,006,868 457

7,089

3

7,993,851 1,249

5,606

1

50,787

8

1,023,036

…

573,149

…

53,483

…

304,509

663

219,399 478

19

0

3,896,846 5,615 3,431,110 4,944

12,862

19

3,206,490 51,718

11,828 191

6,832 110

685,099 361

521,311 275

3,152

2

3,078,135 869 2,413,557 682

135

0

250,701

819

183,413 599

33

0

13,167 286

11,903 259

0

0

34,075 1,549

32,492 1,477

144

7

1,878,969 239 1,829,762 233

12,715

2

176,906

1.5 193,653,908 1,614 131,590,825 1,097 74,343,638 620 2,702,470

23

54

53

54

51

48

D1

A1

F1a

F1b

E1

Poll Workers

Voting Equipment

Total per PP

2,392

8

…

7,671

9

82,811

16

23,020

7

1,286

4

45,556

10

7,489

4

1,402

39

…

3,016

7

13,213

6

2,827

5

15,879

7

36,019

6

4,850

…

3,055

7

24,691

36

782

13

7,263

4

34,902

10

2,449

8

336

7

286

13

89,413

11

Total per PP

1,546

5

11,244

3

1,202

1

18,649

4

11,608

4

387

1

29,001

6

2,064

1

71

2

22,070

2

908

2

…

660

1

8,731

4

…

…

2,469

5

8,273

12

426

7

4,667

2

…

1,154

4

46

1

3

0

23,265

3

887,854

7 319,857

3

50

46

D3

F7:calc

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TABLE 43. SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS PER POLLING PLACE Questions A1, D1, D2, D3, E1, F1, F7. Calculations for selected factors per polling place.
Note: This table summarizes information from several tables and calculates the value of the unit in each category per polling place. These values are provided to give an overview of the distribution of these factors amongst the States and are merely illustrative.
THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 87

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2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY REPORT

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

APPENDIX C
Questionnaire
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION 2012 Election Administration & Voting Survey

The ongoing process of improving America’s election systems relies in part on having accurate data about the way Americans cast their ballots. In 2002, Congress chartered the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to collect information on the state of American elections and make it widely available to policy makers, advocates, scholars, journalists and the general public. Since 2004, the Commission has sponsored a biennial survey as its primary tool for fulfilling that mission. We are pleased to present the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, and we ask for your help in making it the most complete and accurate survey in its history. The questions below ask for information about ballots cast; voter registration; overseas and military voting; Election Day activities; voting technology; and other important issues. The section concerning the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA) serves as the EAC’s standardized format for state reporting of UOCAVA voting information as required by 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1. States that complete and timely submit this section to the EAC will fulfill their UOCAVA reporting requirement under 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1(c). Additionally, EAC is mandated by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to collection information from states concerning the impact of that statute on the administration of Federal elections. With this information EAC is required to make a report to Congress and provide recommendations for the improvement of Federal and State procedures, forms, and other NVRA matters. States that timely respond to all questions in this survey concerning voter registration related matters will meet their NVRA reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7 and EAC regulations.
The EAC recognizes the burden that asking for this data places on state and local election officials, and we have worked to minimize that burden as much as possible.
In advance, we thank you for your cooperation and look forward to answering any questions you might have.

Information supplied by: Name Office/Agency name Address 1 Address 2 City E-mail address Telephone (area code and number)

Extension

Title

State

Zip Code

Fax number (area code and number)

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 88

OMB Control No. 3265-0006

Expiration Date 5/31/13

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Instructions for Completing the 2012 Election Administration & Voting Survey

1. This survey collects information on election administration issues in local election offices (typically counties or townships) that are responsible for the administration of the November 2012 general election. As such, all data should be reported at the level of the local jurisdiction. However, the State or Territorial level election office may fill out any or all of the information on behalf of the local election offices under its jurisdiction.

2. Do not leave items blank - always provide an answer to the question asked using the “Data not available” or “Other” categories discussed below, if needed.

3. Use the “Data not available” box if the question asks for details that are not required by your state law or the question asks for information that is not currently collected.

4. You may find it helpful to read an entire section before answering any of the questions in that section.

5. Please attempt to record data according to the categories as they are defined in the question. If your jurisdiction uses a different data classification scheme (for instance, collects data in such a way that combines two or more categories listed in a question), you can use the space provided for “Other” to provide numbers and details on these categories. Use as many “Other” categories as you need to adequately report the relevant statistics for your jurisdiction. If you enter information into the “Other” field, please use the comments field to provide an explanation for the answer.

In the example below, the jurisdiction does not collect separate statistics on the number of duplicate and rejected registration forms, but instead has only one number that represents the total number of registration forms that are either duplicated/or rejected.

EXAMPLE: A5. In order to evaluate the workflow of your office over the last election cycle, enter the total number of registration
forms your jurisdiction received from all sources during the period from the close of registration for the November 2010 general election until the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Include here any Election Day or Same Day registrations, if applicable. Also include any special categories of voters who may have extended deadlines, such as returning military personnel, if applicable.

A5a. Total available

...................

5000

Data not

Next, divide the total number of registration application forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A4a.

Data not available
▼

A5b. New registrations

..............................................

4000 ............

A5c. Invalid or rejected (other than duplicates)

..............................................

............

A5d. Duplicate of existing registration

..............................................

............

A5e. Changes to name, party or within-jurisdiction address change .............................

500

............

A5f. Moved into jurisdiction but was registered elsewhere in the state .......................... A5g. Other→ comments: duplicate and invalid registrations combined ........................

200

............

300

A5h. Other→ comments: _ TOTAL

........................................ ..............................................

5000

OMB Control No. 3265-0006

THE 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY • 89

65OMB Control No. 3265-0006

Expiration DateE5xp/3ir1at/i2o0n1D3ate 5/31/13

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

SECTION A

VOTER REGISTRATION

EAC is mandated by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to collection information from states concerning the impact of that statute on the administration of Federal elections. With this information EAC is required to make a report to Congress and provide recommendations for the improvement of Federal and State procedures, forms, and other NVRA matters. States that timely respond to all questions in this survey concerning voter registration related matters will meet their NVRA reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7 and EAC regulations.

Roadmap to Section A:
• A1, A2 and A3 ask for information about the number of registered voters in your jurisdiction and how you calculate those statistics.
• A4 asks for information about registration activity on days in which it was possible for a person to both register and vote on the same day.
• A5 asks for information on all registration forms for all types of registration transactions (successful and unsuccessful) received by your office.
• A6 asks for the sources of all registration forms (both successful and unsuccessful). • A7 asks for the sources of new registrations. • A8 asks for the sources of duplicate registrations. • A9 asks for the sources of invalid or rejected registrations. • A10 asks for information on removal notices sent under NVRA Section 8(d) 2. • A11 asks for the number of voters removed from the voter registration rolls and the reason for their removal.

A1. Enter the total number of persons in your jurisdiction who were registered and eligible to vote in the November 2012 general election. Include all persons eligible to vote in the election including special categories of voters with extended deadlines (such as returning military). Do not include any persons under the age of 18 who may be registered under a “pre-registration” program.

A1a. Total ................................................................................

Data not

available

A1 Comments

A2. When you report the number of registered voters in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election (as in A1a) do you include both active and inactive voters in the count, or does your jurisdiction only include active voters? (Select only one)
A2a. Jurisdiction uses both active and inactive registered voters .............................................................. A2b. Jurisdiction only uses active registered voters ................................................................................... A2c. Other → comments: ____________________...................................................................................
A2 Comments

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A3. Enter the total number of persons who were registered and eligible to vote in the November 2012 general election

into the following categories. Do not include any persons under the age of 18 who may be registered under a “pre-registration”

program.

Data not

available ▼

A3a. Active

....................................................................

A3b. Inactive

....................................................................

A3 Comments

A4. If your state’s laws allowed any voters to register and then to vote on the same day, enter the total number of registration forms received on those days in which it was possible to both register for and vote in the November 2012 general election on the same day. This question includes jurisdictions in states that have formal Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration and those states that have other situations that provide Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration. This question includes jurisdictions in states that permit Election Day Registration for voting for office of President, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island.

A4a. Total new registrations…

........................................................ Data not available

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Not applicable

A4b. Are the numbers you provided for question A4a because your state allows Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration for all voters, or does your answer come from a difference circumstance?
…..Yes, our state has Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration. …. No, our state does not have formal Election Day Registration or Same Day Registration, but some voters were able to
register and vote on the same day for the 2012 election. …. Other  comments: ________________________________ …. Not applicable.
A4 Comments

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A5. In order to evaluate the workflow of your office over the last election cycle, enter the total number of forms your jurisdiction received from all sources during the period from the close of registration for the November 2010 general election until the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Include any forms that were processed, such as changes to name, party or address, duplicates, or pre-registrations. Include here any Election Day or Same Day registrations, if applicable. Also include any special categories of voters who may have extended deadlines such as returning military personnel, if applicable.

A5a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of registration application forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A5a.
Data not available ▼

A5b. New valid registrations (excluding pre-registrations of persons under 18)...

..................

A5c. New “pre” registrations of persons under age 18 ........................................

..................

A5d. Duplicate of existing valid registration

..........................................

..................

A5e. Invalid or rejected (other than duplicates)

..........................................

..................

A5f. Changes to name, party or within-jurisdiction address change ....................

..................

A5g. Address changes that cross jurisdiction borders.......................................... A5h. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5i. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

..................

A5j. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5k. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... A5l. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

A5a

A5 Comments

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A6a through A6o: Divide the total number of all registration forms received (as entered in A5a) into the following sources. A7a through A7o: Divide the total number of new registration forms received (as entered in A5b) into the following sources. A8a through A8o: Divide the total number of duplicate registration forms received (as entered in A5d) into the following sources. A9a through A9o: Divide the total number of invalid or rejected registration forms (as entered in A5e) received into the following sources.

*Sub-question “e” should include all forms handled through the public assistance agency process (i.e., paper, online).

(from A5a)
A6. Total forms received NA ▼

(from A5b)
A7. New registrations
NA ▼

(from A5d) A8. Duplicate of
existing registrations
NA ▼

(from A5e)
A9. Invalid or rejected NA ▼

a. Individual voters submitting applications by mail, fax, or email ................

b. Individual voters registering in person at the election/registrar’s office .....

c. Individual voters submitting registration forms via the Internet.................

d. Motor vehicle offices or other offices that issue drivers licenses............... e.* Public assistance offices mandated as registration sites under NVRA .....

f. State funded agencies primarily serving persons with disabilities.............

g. Armed forces recruitment offices..............................................................

h. Other agencies designated by the State not mandated by NVRA............. i. Registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties ..................

j. Other → comments: _______________________________ ................. k. Other → comments: _______________________________ ............... l. Other → comments: ______________________________ ............... m. Other → comments: _______________________________ ............... n. Other → comments: ______________________________ ............... o. Other → comments: _______________________________ ...............

TOTAL............................................................................................................. A5a

A5b

A5d

A5e

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A6, A7, A8, and A9 Comments

A10. Enter the total number of confirmation notices sent to voters in the period between the close of registration for the November 2010 general election and the close of registration for the November 2012 general election, because the person had not voted or appeared to vote in the two previous federal elections (per NVRA Section 8 (d) (2)).

A10a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of confirmation notices mailed (as entered in A10a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A10a.
Data not available ▼

A10b. Received back from voters confirming registration ...............................................

.......

A10c. Received back confirming registration should be invalidated ................................

.......

A10d. Returned back as undeliverable

.....................................................

.......

A10e. Status unknown (neither received confirmation nor returned undeliverable).........

.......

A10f. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

A10g. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

A10h. Other → comments: ____________________.....................................................

TOTAL

.................................................

A10a

A10 Comments

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A11. Enter the total number of voters removed from the voter registration rolls in your jurisdiction in the period between the close of registration for the November 2010 general election and the close of registration for the November 2012 general election. Note this question asks for those ineligible to vote, not merely those moved into an “inactive” status.

A11a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of voters removed (as entered in A11a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in A11a.
Data not available
▼

A11b. Moved outside jurisdiction

..........................................

A11c. Death

..........................................

A11d. Disqualifying felony conviction

..........................................

A11e. Failure to respond to notice sent and failure to vote in the two most recent

federal elections

..........................................

A11f. Declared mentally incompetent

..........................................

A11g. Voter requested to be removed for reasons other than felony conviction,

mental status, or moved outside jurisdiction ..........................................

A11h. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11i. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11j. Other → comments: ____________________.......................................... A11k. Other → comments: ____________________..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

.................. .................. .................. .................. .................. ..................
A11a

A11 Comments

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SECTION B

UNIFORMED & OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT (UOCAVA)

Section B serves as the EAC’s standardized format for the state reporting of UOCAVA voting information as required by 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1. States that complete and timely submit this section to the EAC will fulfill their UOCAVA reporting requirement under 42 U.S.C §1973ff-1(c).
Pursuant UOCAVA, this section collects various data elements needed to determine: (1) the combined number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters; (2) the combined number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters; and (3) the combined number of returned ballots cast by UOCAVA voters (the number of cast ballots is practically determined by collecting data concerning the total votes counted and rejected).

Roadmap to Section B: • B1 and B2 ask for information about the number and type of UOCAVA absentee ballots transmitted. • B3 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted for counting. • B4, B5, B6, and B7 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot returned by type of UOCAVA voter. • B8 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots counted. • B9, B10, B11, and B12 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot counted by type of UOCAVA voter. • B13 asks for the number and type of all UOCAVA ballots rejected. • B14 asks for information on reasons why UOCAVA ballots were rejected. • B15, B16, B17, and B18 asks for information on the type of UOCAVA ballot rejected by type of UOCAVA voter.

B1. Enter the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the November 2012 general election.

B1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters (as entered in B1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in B1a.
Data not available ▼

B1b. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign .........................................

..................

B1c. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

..........................................

B1d. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

B1e. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

..................

TOTAL

..........................................

B1a

B1 Comments

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B2. Of the UOCAVA absentee ballots transmitted (as entered in B1a) how many were:

B2a. Returned by voter and submitted for counting (include both those that

were counted and those that were rejected) ..........................................

B2b. Returned as undeliverable

..........................................

B2c. Spoiled or replaced ballots

..........................................

B2d. Status unknown (neither returned undeliverable nor returned from voter) ... B2e. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... B2f. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... B2g. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

B2 Comments

Data not available ▼
.................. .................. .................. ..................
B1a

B3. Enter the total number of all UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)) returned by UOCAVA voters and submitted for counting for the November 2012 general election. Please include both those ballots that were later counted and those that were rejected. Do not include ballots that were returned undeliverable.

B3a. Total

..... Data not available

B3 Comments

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B4a through B4c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by UOCAVA voters and submitted for counting (as entered in B3) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:
• B5a through B5c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting. • B6a through B6c: FWAB returned and submitted for counting. • B7a through B7c: Other type of ballots returned and submitted for counting.
Of the total UOCAVA ballots returned (as entered in B3),
how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B4. All UOCAVA ballots NA ▼

B5. Absentee ballots NA ▼

B6. FWAB
NA ▼

B7. Other type of ballot → NA ▼

Type of UOCAVA voter:

a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

c. Other type of voter→

comments:

TOTAL

B3

B4, B5, B6, and B7 Comments

B8. Enter the total number of all UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and FWAB) counted in the November 2012 general election.

B8a. Total…………………………………………………………… Data not available
B8 Comments

………………..

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B9a through B9c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted (as entered in B8) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:
• B10a through B10c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots counted. • B11a through B11c: FWAB counted. • B12a through B12c: Other type of ballots counted.

Type of UOCAVA voter:
a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign ..............................................................

B9. All UOCAVA
ballots
NA ▼

Of the total UOCAVA ballots counted (as entered in B8), how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B10. Absentee ballots NA ▼

B11. FWAB
NA ▼

B12. Other type of ballot → NA ▼

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters ................

c. Other type of voter →....................................... comments: _________________________
TOTAL................................................................. B8

B9, B10, B11 and B12 Comments

B13. Enter the total number of UOCAVA ballots (including regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and FWAB) rejected in the November 2012 general election.

B13a. Total………………….

………….……… Data not available

B13 Comments

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B14. Please divide the total number of all UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13a) into the following categories indicating the reason the absentee ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in B13a.
Data not available ▼

B14a. Ballot not received on time/missed deadline. ..........................................

.................

B14b. Problem with voter signature

..........................................

.................

B14c. Ballot lacked a postmark

..........................................

B14d. Other → comments: ________________________________ ..................

B14e. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

B14f. Other → comments: ________________________________ ..................

.................

TOTAL

..........................................

B13a

B14 Comments

B15a through B15c. Divide the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13) into each category of UOCAVA voter below.

Next, for each type of UOCAVA voter, enter the number of:

• B16a through B16c: Regular UOCAVA absentee ballots rejected. • B17a through B17c: FWAB rejected. • B18a through B18c: Other type of ballots rejected.
Of the total UOCAVA ballots rejected (as entered in B13),

how many were ballots of each of the following ballot types:

B15. All UOCAVA

B16. Absentee

B17. FWAB

B18. Other type of

ballots

ballots

ballot →

NA

NA

NA

NA

▼

▼

▼

▼

Type of UOCAVA voter:

a. Uniformed services voters – domestic or foreign

b. Non-military/civilian overseas voters

c. Other type of voter →

comments ____________________________

TOTAL

B13

B15, B16, B17, and B18 Comments

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SECTION C

Domestic Civilian Absentee Ballots

Roadmap to Section C. • C1 asks for information about absentee ballots transmitted and the status of the transmitted ballots. • C2 and C3 ask for information on any voters who may be registered as permanent absentee voters. • C4 asks for information on the status of absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting. • C5 asks for information on the reasons absentee ballots were rejected.

C1. Enter the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted to voters for the November 2012 general election. Do not include absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters

C1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to voters (as entered in C1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in C1a.
Data not available ▼

C1b. Returned by voters and submitted for counting (include both

those that were later counted and those that were rejected)........................

.................

C1c. Returned as undeliverable

..........................................

.................

C1d. Spoiled or replaced ballots

..........................................

.................

C1e. Status unknown (neither returned undeliverable nor returned from voter)....

.................

C1f. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

C1g. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

C1h. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

C1a

C1 Comments

C2. Does your jurisdiction have a permanent absentee voter registration list in which voters may apply to receive an absentee (or mail) ballot for subsequent elections without further application? Do not include UOCAVA voters.
....... Yes → Continue to question C3. ....... No → Skip to question C4.
C2 Comments

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C3. Of the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots transmitted (as entered in C1) how many ballots were sent to voters in your jurisdiction because they appear on a permanent absentee (or mail) ballot voter registration list?

Total

..... Data not available

C3 Comments

C4. Of the total number of absentee ballots returned by voters and submitted for counting (as entered in C1b) how many ballots were:

C4a. Counted in the November 2012 general election.......................................... C4b. Rejected in the November 2012 general election ......................................... C4c. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... C4d. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

Data not available ▼
................. .................
C1b

C4 Comments

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C5. Please divide the total number of domestic civilian absentee ballots rejected (as entered in C4b) into the following categories indicating the reason why the absentee ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in C4b.
Data not available ▼

C5a. Ballot not received on time/missed deadline. ..........................................

.................

C5b. No voter signature

..........................................

.................

C5c. No witness signature

..........................................

.................

C5d. Non-matching signature

..........................................

.................

C5e. No election official’s signature on ballot

..........................................

.................

C5f. Ballot returned in an unofficial envelope

..........................................

.................

C5g. Ballot missing from envelope

..........................................

.................

C5h. Envelope not sealed

..........................................

.................

C5i. No resident address on envelope

..........................................

.................

C5j. Multiple ballots returned in one envelope.

..........................................

.................

C5k. Voter deceased.

..........................................

.................

C5l. Voter already voted in person

..........................................

.................

C5m. First-time voter without proper identification ..........................................

.................

C5n. No ballot application on record

..........................................

C5o. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

C5p. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

.................

C5q. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5r. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5s. Other → comments: ________________________________..................... C5t. Other → comments: ________________________________ .................... C5u. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

C5v. Other → comments: ________________________________.....................

TOTAL

..........................................

C4b

C5 Comments

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SECTION D

Election Administration

• D1 asks for information on the number of precincts in your jurisdiction • D2 asks for information on the number and type of polling places in your jurisdiction • D3, D4, and D5 ask for information on poll workers utilized in the November 2012 general election.

D1. Enter the total number of precincts in your jurisdictions for the November 2012 general election.

D1a. Total D1 Comments

..... Data not available

D2. Enter the total number of physical polling places in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election. Please include physical polling places in operation on Election Day and physical polling places in operation before Election Day (such as early vote centers).

D2a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total physical polling places in your jurisdiction (as entered in D2a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in D2a. If you do not include election offices in your count of polling places, enter 0.
Data not available ▼
Election Day voting

D2b. Physical polling places other than election offices ........................................

.................

D2c. Election offices

..........................................

.................

D2d. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

Early voting

D2e. Physical polling places other than election offices ........................................

D2f. Election offices

..........................................

D2g. Other → comments: ________________________________ ....................

TOTAL

..........................................

................. .................
D2a

D2 Comments

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D3. Enter the total number of poll workers used in your jurisdiction for the November 2012 general election. • Poll workers may include election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms that refer to persons who verify the identity of a voter; assist the voter with signing the register, affidavits or other documents required to cast a ballot; assist the voter by providing the voter with a ballot or setting up the voting machine for the voter; and serving other functions as dictated by State law.
• Include all people recruited specifically for the purposes of working at physical polling places in operation on and/or before Election Day, but, do not include observers stationed at the polling places or regular office staff.

D3a. Total D3 Comments

..... Data not available

D4. If your jurisdiction has data on the ages of its poll workers (for example, from voter registration records, payroll records or from poll worker applications), enter the total number of poll workers in each age category.
D4a. Under 18 years old D4b. 18 to 25 D4c. 26 to 40 D4d. 41 to 60 D4e. 61 to 70 D4f. 71 years old and over
................................................................................................................................ Data not available
D4 Comments

D5. How difficult or easy was it for your jurisdiction to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers for the November 2012 general election?
....... Very difficult ....... Somewhat difficult ....... Neither difficult nor easy ....... Somewhat easy ....... Very easy ....... Not enough information to answer
D5 Comments

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SECTION E

Provisional Ballots

• E1 asks for the information on the number and status of provisional ballots submitted. • E2 asks for the information on reasons why provisional ballots were rejected.

E1. Enter the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots in the November 2012 general election.

E1a.Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots in the November 2012 general election (as entered in E1) into the following categories.
Data not available ▼

E1b. Counted the full ballot

..........................................

E1c. Counted part of the ballot

..........................................

E1d. Rejected ballot

..........................................

E1e. Other → comments: ____________________ .......................................... E1f. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

E1a

E1 Comments

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E2. Please divide the total number of provisional ballots rejected (as entered in E1d) into the following categories indicating the reason the provision ballots were rejected. The amounts should sum to the total provided in E1d.

E2a. Voter not registered in the state

..........................................

E2b. Voter registered in state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction .......

E2c. Voter registered in state but attempted to vote in the wrong precinct............

E2d. Failure to provide sufficient identification

..........................................

E2e. Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible .................................

E2f. Ballot missing from envelope

..........................................

E2g. No signature

..........................................

E2h. Non-matching signature

..........................................

E2i. Voter already voted

..........................................

E2j. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2k. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2l. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2m. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2n. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2o. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

E2p. Other → comments: ________________________________...................

TOTAL

Ed1

Data not available ▼

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SECTION F

Election Day Activities

• F1 and F2 ask for turnout figures for the November 2012 general election and the source used to arrive at this number.
• F3 asks for the number of first time voters who registered to vote by mail and, under HAVA 303(b), were required to provide identification in order to vote.
• F4 asks for information on electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters that may have been used. • F5 and F6 ask for information on printed poll books or printed lists of voters that may have been used. • F7 asks for the type of primary voting equipment used. • F8 solicits any additional comments jurisdictions may wish to share regarding their Election Day experiences.

F1. Enter the total number of people in your jurisdiction who participated in the November 2012 general election. Include all type of voters (civilian and military) by all types of ballots. Include rejected provisional ballots only if your jurisdiction credits the person’s vote history even though the provisional ballot was rejected.

F1a. Total

..... Data not available

Next, divide the total number people who participated in the November 2012 general election (as entered in F1a) into the following categories. The amounts should sum to the total provided in F1a.

Data not available ▼

F1b. Voted at a physical polling place on Election Day (not including provisional ballots

or absentee ballots dropped off at the polls).

..........................................

F1c. UOCAVA voters who voted via absentee or FWAB (as in B2a) ....................

F1d. Voted using a domestic civilian absentee ballot (as in C1b)..........................

F1e. Voted using a provisional ballot (as in E1)

..........................................

F1f. Voted at an early vote center (as in D2e,f,g)…………………………………….

F1g. Voted by mail in a vote by mail jurisdiction

..........................................

F1h. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

F1i. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

F1j. Other → comments: ____________________ ..........................................

TOTAL

..........................................

F1a

F1 Comments

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F2. Indicate the source used to arrive at the total number of voters entered in F1a. (Select only one source.)
....... Number of voters checked off by poll workers or who signed poll books at physical polling places plus the number of UOCAVA and other absentee or early voters.
....... Number of ballots counted at precincts and/or at a central location (including UOCAVA and other absentee or early vote ballots)
....... Number of voters generated after "vote history" has been added. ....... Number of votes cast for the highest office on the ballot. ....... Other:→ comments: ________________________________
F2 Comments

F3. HAVA 303(b) states that all first-time voters in a State who registered to vote by mail are required to provide identification in order to vote and have their ballot counted. Enter the number of voters who provided identification and were able to vote in the November 2012 general election in your jurisdiction.

Total F3 Comments

..... Data not available ..................

Not applicable

F4. Were electronic poll books or electronic lists of voters used at the polling place for the November 2012 general election in your jurisdiction to (select either Yes or No for each item):
Yes No a. Sign voters in ....................................................................... b. Update voter history............................................................. c. Look up polling places.......................................................... d. Other → comments: _____________________________ . e. Information unavailable ........................................................
F4 Comments

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F5. Did your jurisdiction use printed lists of registered voters at the polls in the November 2012 Federal general election?

Yes ............................................ No .............................................. Information unavailable ..............

→ Continue to F6 → Skip to F7 → Skip to F7

F5 Comments

F6. Did your state print and ship the printed poll books to your local jurisdiction or did your jurisdiction arrange for the printing of the poll books? (Select only one.)
State printed poll books and shipped to jurisdiction...................................... Jurisdiction arranged for printing of poll books ............................................. Combination of printing by the state and local jurisdiction ........................... Information unavailable ................................................................................
F6 Comments

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F7. Enter information on the number and type of voting equipment used for the 2012 November general election. Then, for each type of voting equipment, please identify how the machines were used in the voting process and where the ballots from that machine type were tallied. Do not include backup systems that were not actually used.

Type of Equipment

Number used

F7a. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
(Not Equipped with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT))

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

F7b. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
(Equipped with VVPAT)

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Not Available

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

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Type of Equipment
F7c. Electronic system that prints voter choices on an optical scan ballot (hybrid of a DRE and an optical scan system)

Number used

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available
F7d. Optical/Digital Scan

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Number of counters:

______

Number of booths:
______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment
F7c. Electronic system that prints voter choices on an optical scan ballot (hybrid of a DRE and an optical scan system)

Number used

Make

Model

Version Vendor

Not Available
F7d. Optical/Digital Scan

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Number of counters:

______

Number of booths:
______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply) In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

Not Available

In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee

A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment F7e. Punch Card
F7f. Lever

Number used

Make

Model

Number of counters:
______

Number of booths:

______

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Not

Not

Not

Available Available Available

Version Vendor

Not

Not

Available Available

Not

Not

Available Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Early Vote Site voting Not Available

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available

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Type of Equipment

Number used

F7g. Hand-counted paper ballots (not optical scan system)

Make

Number of booths:

______

Not Available

Model

F7h. Other

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Version Vendor

Not Available

Not Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting Special Device accessible to disabled voters Provisional Ballot voting Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available A Central Location Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available

Not Available

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Type of Equipment F7i. Other

Number used

Make

Model

Not Available

Not Available

Not Available

Version Vendor

Not

Not

Available Available

Machine use (select all that apply)
In-Precinct regular ballot voting
Special Device accessible to disabled voters
Provisional Ballot voting
Early Vote Site voting Absentee Not Available

Location of Vote Tally (select all that apply)
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available
A Central Location Precinct/Polling Place Not Available Place
A Central Location Not Available

F8. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission welcomes any general comments the jurisdiction may wish to share regarding its Election Day experiences
(e.g., problems with voting system anomalies*, recounts, staffing, challenges to eligibility, long lines, etc.), or note-worthy success in administering the
November 2012 general election. Please feel free to attach additional pages as necessary.
* An anomaly is defined as an irregular or inconsistent action or response from the voting system or system component resulting in some disruption to the election process. Incidents resulting from administrator error or procedural deficiencies are not considered anomalies for purposes of this survey question (EAC Voting Systems Testing and Certification Program Manual).

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END OF SURVEY
THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING TO THIS SURVEY *This information collection is required for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to meet its statutory requirements under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15301), the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1 et seq.), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voters Act (UOCAVA) (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1). Respondent’s obligation to reply to this information collection is mandatory as required under NVRA (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1 et seq.) and UOCAVA (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1); respondents include the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories. This information will be made publicly available on the EAC Web site (http://www.eac.gov). According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The valid OMB control number for this information collection is OMB Control No. 3265-0006 (expires 5/31/2013). The time required to complete this information collection is estimated to average 88 hours per State response. This estimate includes the time for reviewing the instructions, gathering information, and completing the form. Comments regarding this burden estimate should be sent the U.S. Election Assistance Commission – 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, 1201 New York Avenue, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20005.

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N ASSISTANCE COM ED STATES OF AM
U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1201 New York Avenue, NW • Suite 300 • Washington, DC 20005 • 866-747-1471 (toll free) • HAVAinfo@eac.gov • www.eac.gov

ELECTIO ERICA

MISSION UNIT

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CURRICULUM VITA

Arthur Lawrence Reingold

PRESENT POSITION:

Professor of Epidemiology Head, Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics School of Public Health University of California, Berkeley 2121 Berkeley Way, #5302 Berkeley, California 94720-7360 Phone: (510) 642-0327 Fax: (510) 643-5056 E-mail: Reingold@berkeley.edu

DATE OF BIRTH:

October 31, 1948

PLACE OF BIRTH:

Chicago, Illinois

MARITAL STATUS: Married

EDUCATION:

1966 - 70 1970 - 76

A.B. M.D.

University of Chicago University of Chicago

POSTGRADUATE TRAINING:

1976 - 78

Internal Medicine Resident, Mount Auburn Hospital Cambridge, Massachusetts

1980 - 82

Preventive Medicine Resident, Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia

November, 2019

POSITIONS HELD:

1979 - 80

1980 - 81

1981 - 85

1985 - 87

Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, State of Connecticut - Department of Health Services Hartford, Connecticut
Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, Special Pathogens Branch - Bacterial Diseases Division Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia
Assistant Chief, Respiratory & Special Pathogens Epidemiology Branch, Center for Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Atlanta, Georgia
CDC Liaison Officer, Office of the Director Centers for Disease Control - Atlanta, Georgia

FACULTY APPOINTMENTS:

1979 - 80 1985 - 87
1987 1989 -

Instructor, Department of Medicine (Epidemiology) University of Connecticut - Hartford, Connecticut
Visiting Lecturer, Department of Biomedical and Environmental Health Sciences (Epidemiology) University of California, Berkeley
Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley
Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics - University of California, San Francisco

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

FACULTY APPOINTMENTS: (CONTINUED)

1990 - 94
1991 1994 - 2000 2000 - 2018

Head, Epidemiology Program, Department of Biomedical and Environmental Health Sciences, University of California, Berkeley
Clinical Professor, Department of Medicine University of California, San Francisco
Head, Division of Public Health Biology and Epidemiology University of California, Berkeley
Head, Division of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley

2018 -

Head, Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, School of Public Health University of California, Berkeley

2008 - 2014 Associate Dean for Research, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley

2009 - 2014

MEDICAL LICENSURE:

BOARD CERTIFICATION:

1980

AWARDS:

1970 - 74 1985 1986

MEMBERSHIPS:

1970 1978 1983 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 2003

Edward Penhoet Distinguished Chair for Global Health and Infectious Disease
California
American Board of Internal Medicine
Medical Scientist Training Program Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Charles Shepard Award, Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
Sigma Xi American College of Physicians American Society for Microbiology Society for Epidemiologic Research Infectious Disease Society of America (Fellow) American Epidemiological Society American College of Epidemiology (Fellow) AAAS (Fellow) Institute of Medicine (Member)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

CONSULTATIONS:

1981

1981

1982

1983

1983

1984

Institute of Medicine: Toxic-shock syndrome
Food and Drug Administration: Toxic-shock syndrome
United States Agency for International Development: Control of meningococcal meningitis in West Africa
World Health Organization (WHO): Control of meningococcal meningitis in Nepal
East-West Center, University of Hawaii: Role of indoor air pollution in acute respiratory infections in developing countries
Institute of Medicine: Meningococcal vaccines
2

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

CONSULTATIONS: (CONTINUED)

1986 1987 - 1993 1988 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 - 2000 1996 1998 – 2002 2002 – 2003

World Health Organization (WHO): Control of meningococcal meningitis in South Asia
Center for Child Survival, University of Indonesia: Control of Acute Respiratory Infections
Evaluation of the Combating Communicable Childhood Disease Program, Ivory Coast
Evaluation of National Epidemiology Board Program, Rockefeller Foundation
Planning of a School-based Acute Rheumatic Fever Prevention Project - New Zealand Heart Foundation
Vaccines Advisory Committee, Food & Drug Administration Approval of accellular pertussis vaccine
External Reviewer, NIAID Group B Streptococcus Research Contract with Harvard University
U.S. Food and Drug Administration; Consultant to the Vaccines Advisory Committee
World Health Organization, Consultation on Control of Meningococcal Meningitis in Africa
Advisor to the INCLEN "Indiaclen" project
Evaluation of a School-based Acute Rheumatic Fever Prevention Project – New Zealand Heart Association

ADVISORY BOARDS AND PANELS:

1988 - 1989 1989 - 1990 1989 - 1993 1993 - 1995 1992 - 1994 1996 - 2000 1997 - 2012 1998 - 2003 1998 – 2000

Member, Advisory Committee on Ground Water and Reproductive Outcomes, State of California Department of Health Services
AIDS Advisory Committee, Alameda County Board of Supervisors
Advisory Committee, Birth Defects Monitoring Program, State of California Department of Health Services
Centers for Disease Control (CDC): Public Health Service Advisory Panel on the Case Definition for Lyme Disease
World Health Organization (WHO): Task Force on Strengthening Epidemiologic Capacity; Childhood Vaccine Initiative
Armed Forces Epidemiological Board
University of California, San Francisco AIDS Research Institute Steering Committee
Emerging Infections Committee of the Infectious Diseases Society of America
Panelist, Howard Hughes Medical Institute Predoctoral Fellowship

2001 - 2006

Technical expert, Sub-Committee on the Protection of Public Health; California State Strategic Committee on Terrorism
3

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

ADVISORY BOARDS PANELS (CONTINUED)

2003 - 2008 2004 -

Advisory Board, Chinese University of Hong Kong – Centre for Emerging AND Infectious Diseases
Advisory Board, University of California, Berkeley Clinical Research Center

2004 - 2008 2004 - 2005 2005 - 2012 2005 2007 - 2012 2007 - 2009 2008 - 2012 2008 - 2011 2008 - 2012 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2012 2011 - 2013 2011 - 2014 2012 - 2014 2012 - 2014 2013 - 2018

Advisory Board, New York University School of Medicine Fellowship in Medicine and Public Health Research
Institute of Medicine Committee on Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of CDC Quarantine Station Plan for U.S. Ports of Entry
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) for Vaccine Policy, World Health Organization (WHO) (Deputy Chairman, 2010-2012)
Data and Safety Monitoring Committee; F.I. Proctor Foundation, University of California, San Francisco (UCSF)
NIH Fogarty International Center External Advisory Board
Chair, Working Group on Pneumococcal Vaccine, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Working Group on H5N1 Influenza Vaccines, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, Leptospirosis Burden Epidemiology Reference Group, World Health Organization (WHO)
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to The Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Institute of Medicine Committee on the Review of Priorities in the National Vaccine Plan
Chair, Working Group on Hepatitis A Vaccine, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Member, Institute of Medicine Committee on Vaccine Priorities
Member, Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy, Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE), World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, Review of the Heterologous Effects of Childhood Vaccines, World Health Organization (WHO)
Chair, External Review of the Measles Rubella Initiative (of WHO, CDC, UNICEF, American Red Cross, and United Nations Foundation)
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

2016-2017

Member, Institute of Medicine Committee on a National Strategy for the Elimination of Hepatitis B and C

2018 2018 -

Member, Independent Review Committee, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) Member, Strategic Advisory Group, Partnership for Influenza Vaccination Introduction
4

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold

LEADERSHIP POSITIONS:

1997 - 2012 2009 - 2010 2015 – 2016

Secretary-Treasurer, American Epidemiological Society President, Society for Epidemiologic Research President, American Epidemiological Society (AES)

EDITORIAL BOARDS: 1995 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2005 -
2009 - 2010

Board of Editors, American Journal of Epidemiology Board of Editors, Epidemiology Editorial Advisory Board, Global Public Health Editorial Advisory Board, American Journal of Epidemiology

ASSOCIATE EDITORSHIPS:

2017 -

Current Epidemiology Reports

2018 -

Vaccine

5

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold
PUBLICATIONS:
1. Hayes RV, Pottenger LA, Reingold AL, Getz GS, Wissler RW. Degradation of I125 - labeled serum low density lipoprotein in normal and estrogen-treated male rats. Biochem Biophys Res Comm 1971;44:14711477.
2. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Murphy BL, Checko P, Francis DP, Maynard JE. Transmission of hepatitis B by an oral surgeon. J Infect Dis 1982;145:262-268.
3. Reingold AL, Dan BB, Shands KN, Broome CV. Toxic-shock syndrome not associated with menstruation: a review of 54 cases. Lancet 1982;1:1-4.
4. Bartlett P, Reingold AL, Graham DR, et al. Toxic-shock syndrome associated with surgical wound infections. JAMA 1982;247:1448-1450.
5. Reingold AL, Hargrett NT, Shands KN, et al. Toxic-shock syndrome surveillance in the United States, 1980-1981. Ann Intern Med 1982;96:875-880.
6. Reingold AL, Hargrett NT, Dan BB, Shands KN, Strickland BY, Broome CV. Nonmenstrual toxic-shock syndrome: a review of 130 cases. Ann Intern Med 1982;6:871-874.
7. Broome CV, Hayes PS, Ajello GW, Feeley JC, Gibson RJ, Graves LM, Hancock GA, Anderson RJ, Highsmith AK, Mackel DC, Hargrett NT, Reingold AL. In-vitro studies of interactions between tampons and Staphylococcus aureus. Ann Intern Med 1982;96:959-962.
8. Guinan ME, Dan BB, Guidotti RJ, Reingold AL, et al. Vaginal colonization with Staphylococcus aureus in healthy women: a review of four studies. Ann Intern Med 1982;96(pt.2):944-947.
9. Schlech WF III, Shands KN, Reingold AL, et al. Risk factors for development of toxic-shock syndrome: association with a tampon brand. JAMA 1982;248:835-839.
10. Reingold AL, Bank JD. Legionellosis. In: Easmon CSF, Jeljaszewicz J, eds. Medical Microbiology. London: Academic Press 1982 (I):217-239.
11. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Spittell JA Jr., ed. Clinical Medicine. Philadelphia: Harper & Row Publishers 1982 (II):1-6.
12. Kornblatt AN, Reingold AL. Legionellosis. In: Steele JH, Hillyer RV, Hopla CE, eds. CRC Handbook Series in Zoonoses. CRC Press 1982:313-324.
13. Wilkinson HW, Reingold AL, Brake JB, McGiboney DL, Gorman GW, Broome CV. Reactivity of serum from patients with suspected Legionellosis against 29 antigens of legionellaceae and Legionella-like organisms by indirect immunofluorescence assay. J Infect Dis 1983;147:23-31.
14. Meenhorst PL, Reingold AL, Gorman GW, et al. Legionella pneumonia in guinea pigs exposed to aerosols of concentrated potable water from a hospital with nosocomial Legionnaires’ disease. J Infect Dis 1983;147:129-132.
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15. Reingold AL. Nonmenstrual toxic-shock syndrome: the growing picture. JAMA 1983; 249:932 (editorial).
16. Reingold AL. Meningococcal meningitis. Nepal Paed Soc J 1983; 2:144-148.
17. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Phillips CJ, Meda H, Tiendrebeogo H, Yada A. Evidence of continuing protection against group A meningococcal disease one year after vaccination: a case-control approach. Med Trop 1983;43:225.
18. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Hightower AW. Disinfection procedures and infection control in the outpatient oral surgery practice. J Oral Maxillofac Surg 1984;42:568-572.
19. Broome CV, Reingold AL. Current issues in toxic-shock syndrome. In: Remington JS, Swartz MN, eds. Current clinical topics in infectious diseases. McGraw Hill 1984;65-85.
20. Herwaldt LA, Gorman GW, McGrath T, Toma S, Brake B, Hightower AW, Jones J, Reingold AL, et al. A new Legionella species, Legionella feeleii species nova, causes Pontiac fever in an automobile plant. Ann Intern Med 1984;100:333-338.
21. Ajello GW, Feeley JC, Hayes PS, Reingold AL, Bolan G, et al. Trans-isolate medium: a new medium for primary culturing and transport of Neisseria meningitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Haemophilus influenzae. J Clin Microbial 1984;20:55-58.
22. Hayes PS, Graves LM, Feeley JC, Hancock GA, Cohen ML, Reingold AL, et al. Production of toxicshock-associated protein(s) in Staphylococcus aureus strains isolated from 1956 through 1982. J Clin Microbial 1984;20:42-46.
23. Reingold AL, Thomason BM, Brake BJ, Thacker L, Wilkinson HW, Kuritsky JN. Legionella pneumonia in the United States: the distribution of serogroups and species causing human illness. J Infect Dis 1984;149:819.
24. Blaser M, Reingold AL, Alsever RN, Hightower A. Primary meningococcal pericarditis: A disease of adults associated with serogroup C Neisseria meningitidis. Rev Infect Dis 1984;6:625-632.
25. Jones EE, Alford PL, Reingold AL, et al. Predisposition to invasive pneumococcal illness following parainfluenza type 3 virus infection in chimpanzees. JAVMA 1984;185:1351-1353.
26. Reingold AL, Thomason BM, Kuritsky J. Results of Legionnaires’ disease direct fluorescent-antibody testing at Centers for Disease Control, 1980-1982. In: Thornsberry C, Balows A, Feeley JC, and Jakubowski J, eds. Legionella, ASM 1984;21-22.
27. Kuritsky JN, Reingold AL, Hightower AW, Broome CV. Sporadic Legionellosis in the United States, 1970 to 1982. In: Thornsberry C, Balows A, Feeley JC, and Jakubowski J, eds. Legionella, ASM 1984;243-245.
28. Fleming DW, Reingold AL. Legionella. In: Braude AI ed. Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Second Edition W.B. Saunders 1985;352-358.
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29. Garbe PL, Arko RJ, Reingold AL, et al. Staphylococcus aureus isolates from patients with non-menstrual Toxic Shock Syndrome: Evidence for Additional Toxins. JAMA 1985;253:2538-2542.
30. Garbe PL, Davis BJ, Weisfeld J, Markowitz L, Miner P, Garrity F, Barbaree JM, Reingold AL. Nosocomial Legionnaires’ Disease: Epidemiologic Demonstration of Cooling Towers as a Source. JAMA 1985;254:521-524.
31. Fleming DW, Cochi SL, MacDonald KL, Brondum J, Haves PS, Plikaytis BD, Holmes MB, Audurier A, Broome CV, Reingold AL. Pasteurized milk as a vehicle of infection in an outbreak of listeriosis. NEJM 1985;312:404-407.
32. Meenhorst P, Reingold AL, Groothius DL, et al. Water-related nosocomial pneumonia caused by Legionella pneumophila serogroups 1 and 10. J Infect Dis 1985;152:356-364.
33. Bolan G, Reingold AL, Carson L, et al. Infections with Mycobacterium chelonei in patients receiving dialysis and using processed hemodialyzers. J Infect Dis 1985;152:1013-1019.
34. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock in the United States of America: epidemiology. Postgrad Med J 1985;61:2122.
35. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Hightower AW, et al. Age-specific differences in duration of clinical protection after vaccination with meningococcal polysaccharide A vaccine. Lancet 1985;II:114-118.
36. Petitti DB, Reingold AL, Chin J. The incidence of toxic-shock syndrome in Northern California: 19721983. JAMA 1986;255:368-372.
37. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome and the contraceptive sponge. JAMA 1986;255:242-243 (editorial).
38. Berkley S, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Kass EH and Platt R, eds. Current Therapy in Infectious Disease. B.C. Decker, Inc. 1986;78-81.
39. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Wheat J and White A, eds. Infectious Diseases, University of Chicago Press, 1986.
40. Reingold AL, Broome CV. Nosocomial central nervous system infections. In: Bennett JV, Brachman PS, eds. Hospital Infections. Little Brown & Co. 1986;521-529.
41. Markowitz L, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Maxcy-Rosenau Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 12th edition Appleton-Century-Crofts 1986;456-459.
42. Reingold AL, Xiao DL, Plikaytis B, Ajello L. Systemic mycoses in the United States, 1980-1982. J Med Vet Mycol 1986;24:433-436.
43. Cochi SL, Markowitz L, Owens Jr RC, Stenhouse DH, Regmi DN, Shrestha RPB, Acharya IL, Manandhar M, Gurubacharya VL, Owens D, Reingold AL. Control of epidemic group A meningococcal meningitis in Nepal. Int J Epid 1987;16:91-97.
44. Markowitz LE, Hightower AW, Broome CV, Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome: Evaluation of national surveillance data using a hospital discharge survey. JAMA 1987;258:75-78.
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45. Berkley SF, Hightower AW, Reingold AL, Broome CV. The relationship of tampon characteristics to menstrual toxic-shock syndrome. JAMA 1987;258:917-920.
46. Reingold AL, Kane MA, Hightower AW. Failure of gloves and other protective devices to prevent transmission of hepatitis B virus in oral surgeons. JAMA 1988;259:2558-2560.
47. Reingold AL. The role of Legionellae in acute infections of the lower respiratory tract. Rev Infect Dis 1988;10(5):1018-1028.
48. Harrison LH, Broome CV, Hightower AW, Hoppe CC, Makintubee S, Sitze SL, Taylor JA, Gaventa S, Wenger JD, Facklam RR, and the Haemophilus Vaccine Efficacy Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). A day-care based study of the efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae B polysaccharide vaccine. JAMA 1988;260(10):1413-1418.
49. Schwartz B, Broome CV, Hightower AW, Brown GR, Ciesielski CA, Gaventa S, Gellin BG, Mascola L, and the Listeriosis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Association of sporadic listeriosis with consumption of uncooked hot dogs and undercooked chicken. Lancet 1988;II:779-782.
50. Carson LA, Bland LA, Cusick LB, Favero MS, Bolan G, Reingold AL, et al. Prevalence of nontuberculous mycobacteria in water supplies of hemodialysis centers. Appl Environ Micro 1988; 54:3122-3125.
51. Petitti DB, Reingold AL. Update through 1985 on the incidence of toxic shock syndrome among members of a prepaid health plan. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S22-27.
52. Reingold AL, Broome CV, Gaventa S, Hightower SW, and the Toxic-Shock Syndrome Study Group. Risk factors for menstrual toxic-shock syndrome: results of a multi-state case-control study. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S35-42.
53. Gaventa S, Reingold AL, Hightower AW, et al. Active surveillance for toxic-shock syndrome in the United States, 1986. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S28-34.
54. Schwartz B, Gaventa S, Broome CV, Reingold AL, et al. Non-menstrual toxic-shock syndrome associated with barrier contraceptives: report of a case-control study. Rev Infect Dis 1989;11:S43-49.
55. Reingold AL, Hearst N. Identifying the health care needs of the community. In: Overall N, Williamson J, eds. Community Oriented Primary Care in Action: A Practice Manual for Primary Care Settings. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
56. Koo D, Bouvier B, Wesley M, Courtright P, Reingold AL. Epidemic keratoconjunctivitis in a university medical center ophthalmology clinic: need for re-evaluation of the design and disinfection of instruments. Inf Control and Hosp Epi 1989;10:547-552.
57. Harrison LH, Broome CV, Hightower AW, and the Haemophilus Vaccine Efficacy Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Haemophilus influenzae type b polysaccharide vaccine: an efficacy study. Pediatrics 1989;84:225-261.
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58. Wenger JD, Harrison LH, Hightower A, Broome CV, Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Day care characteristics associated with Haemophilus influenzae disease. Am J Public Health 1990;80:1455-1458.
59. Morrow HW, Slaten DD, Reingold AL, et al. Risk factors associated with a school-related outbreak of serogroup C meningococcal disease. Pediatric Infect Dis J 1990;9:394-398.
60. Wenger JD, Hightower AW, Facklam RR, Gaventa S, Broome CV, Bacterial Meningitis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Bacterial meningitis in the United States, 1986: Report on a multistate surveillance study. J Infect Dis 1990;162:1316-1323.
61. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Evans AS, Brachman PS, eds. Bacterial Infections of Humans. Plenum, 1991;727-743.
62. Gellin BG, Broome CV, Bibb WF, Weaver RE, Gaventa S, Mascola L, the Listeriosis Study Group. (includes A.L. Reingold). The epidemiology of listeriosis in the United States - 1986. Am J Epi 1991;133:392-401.
63. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Rakel RE, ed. Conn’s Current Therapy. W. B. Saunders, 1991;1010-1012.
64. Reingold AL, Markowitz LE. Toxic-shock syndrome. In: Maxcy-Rosenau Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 13th Edition. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1991;304-306.
65. Bauer HM, Ting Y, Greer CE, Chambers JC, Tashiro CJ, Chimera J, Reingold AL, Manos MM. Genital human papillomavirus infection in female university students as determined by a PCR-based method. JAMA 1991;265:472-477.
66. Sutrisna B, Frerichs RR, Reingold AL. Randomised, controlled trial of effectiveness of ampicillin in mild acute respiratory infections in Indonesian children. Lancet 1991;338:471-474.
67. Reingold AL. Toxic-shock syndrome: an update. Am J Ob & Gyn 1991;165:1236-1239.
68. Pettiti DB, Reingold AL. Recent trends in the incidence of toxic-shock syndrome in Northern California. Am J Public Health 1991;81:1209-1211.
69. Ley C, Reingold AL, et al. Determinants of genital human papillomavirus infection in young women. JNCI 1991;83:997-1003.
70. Pinner RW, Gellin BG, Bibb WF, Baker CN, Weaver R, Hunter SB, Waterman SH, Mocca LF, Frasch CE, Broome CV, the Meningococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Meningococcal disease in the United States-1986. J Infect Dis 1991;164:368-374.
71. Wenger JD, Pierce R, Deaver KA, Plikaytis BD, Facklam RR, Broome CV, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae type b polysaccharide-diphtheria toxoid conjugate vaccine in U.S. children aged 18-59 months. Lancet 1991; 338:395-398.
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72. Moore PS, Plikaytis BD, Bolan GA, Oxtoby MJ, Yada A, Zoubga A, Reingold AL, Broome CV. Detection of meningitis epidemics in Africa: a population-based analysis. International J Epi 1992;21:155-162.
73. Schuchat A, Deaver KA, Wenger JD, Plikaytis BD, Mascola L, Pinner RW, Reingold AL, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group. Role of foods in sporadic listeriosis. I. Case-control study of dietary risk factors. JAMA 1992;267:2041-2045.
74. Pinner RW, Schuchat A, Swaminathan B, Hayes PS, Deaver KA, Weaver RE, Plikaytis BD, Reeves M, Broome CV, Wenger JD, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Role of foods in sporadic listeriosis. II. Microbiologic and epidemiologic investigation. JAMA 1992; 267:2046-2050.
75. Wenger JD, Pierce R, Deaver K, Franklin R, Bosley G, Pigott N, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease: A population-based evaluation of the role of capsular polysaccharide serotype. J Infect Dis 1992;165(suppl 1):S34-5.
76. Steinhart R, Reingold AL, Taylor F, Anderson G, Wenger JD. Invasive Haemophilus influenzae infections in men with HIV infection. JAMA 1992;268:3350-3352.
77. Hayes PS, Graves LM, Swaminathan B, Ajello GW, Malcolm GB, Weaver RE, Ransom R, Deaver K, Plikaytis BD, Schuchat A, Wenger JD, Pinner RW, Broome CV, and the Listeria Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Comparison of three selective enrichment methods for the isolation of Listeria monocytogenes naturally contaminated foods. J of Food Protection, 1992; 55:952-959.
78. Osmond DH, Charlebois E, Sheppard HW, Page KA, Winkelstein W Jr, Moss AR, Reingold AL. A comparison of risk factors for hepatitis C and hepatitis B virus infection in homosexual men. J Infect Dis, 1993;167:66-71.
79. Osmond DH, Padian N, Sheppard HW, Glass S, Shiboski SC, Reingold AL. Risk factors for hepatitis C virus seropositivity in heterosexual couples. JAMA 1993;269:361-365.
80. Tappero JW, Koehler JE, Berger TG, Reingold AL, et al. Bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary splenitis in immunocompetent adults. Ann Int Med, 1993;118:363-365.
81. Tappero JW, Mohle-Boetani J, Koehler JE, Reingold AL, et al. The epidemiology of bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary peliosis. JAMA 1993;269:770-775.
82. Weinstock HS, Bolan G, Reingold AL, Polish LB. Hepatitis C virus infection among patients attending a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases. JAMA 1993;269:392-394.
83. Yajko DM, Nassos PS, Sanders CA, Gonzalez PC, Reingold AL, et al. Comparison of four decontamination methods for recovery of Mycobacterium avium complex from stools. J Clin Micro, 1993;31:302-306.
84. Adams WG, Deaver KA, Cochi SL, Plikaytis BD, Zell ER, Broome CV, Wenger JD, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Decline of childhood Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) disease in the Hib vaccine era. JAMA 1993;269:221-226.
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85. Sutrisna B, Reingold AL, Kresno S, Harrison G, Utomo. Care-seeking for fatal illnesses in young children in Indramayu, West Java, Indonesia. Lancet 1993;342:787-789.
86. Sudarti K, Harrison GG, Sutrisna B, Reingold AL. Acute respiratory infection in children under five years in Indramayu, West Java, Indonesia: a rapid ethnographic assessment. Medical Anthropology. 1994;15:1-10.
87. Ley C, Olshen EM, Chin L, Reingold AL. The use of serologic tests for Lyme disease in a prepaid health plan in California. JAMA 1994;271:460-463.
88. Ley C, Davila I, Mayer N, Murray R, Reingold AL. Lyme disease in Northwestern coastal California. Western J Med, 1994;160:534-539.
89. Chin DP, Reingold AL, Stone EN, Vittinghoff E, Horsburgh Jr CR, et al. The impact of Mycobacterium avium complex bacteremia and its treatment on survival of AIDS patients-a prospective study. J Infect Dis 1994;170:578-584.
90. Horsburgh CR, Chin DP, Yajko DM, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Environmental risk factors for acquisition of Mycobacterium avium complex in persons with human immunodeficiency virus infection. J Infect Dis 1994;170:362-367.
91. Chin DP, Reingold AL, Horsburgh CR, Yajko DM, et al. Predicting Mycobacterium avium complex bacteremia in patients with human immunodeficiency virus - a prospectively validated model. Clin Infect Dis 1994;19:668-674.
92. Chin DP, Hopewell PC, Yajko DM, Vittinghoff E, Horsburgh CR, Hadley WK, Stone EN, Nassos PS, Ostroff SM, Jacobson MA, Matkin CC, Reingold AL. Mycobacterium avium complex in the respiratory or gastrointestinal tract and the risk of M. avium complex bacteremia in patients with human immunodeficiency virus infection. J Infect Dis 1994;169:289-295.
93. Jackson LA, Tenover FC, Baker C, Plikaytis BD, Reeves MW, Stocker SA, Weaver RE, Wenger JD, and the Meningococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Prevalence of Neisseria meningitidis relatively resistant to penicillin in the United States, 1991. J Infect Dis 1994; 169:438-441.
94. Schuchat A, Deaver-Robinson K, Plikayatis BD, Zangwill KM, Mohle-Boetani J, Wenger JD, and the Active Surveillance Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Multistate case-control study of maternal risk factors for neonatal Group B streptococcal disease. Pediatric Infect Dis J 1994; 13:623-629.
95. Weinstock HS, Bolan G, Moran JS, Peterman TA, Polish L, Reingold AL. Routine hepatitis B immunization in a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases. AJPH 1995;85:846-849.
96. Wang F, So Y, Vittinghoff E, Malani H, Reingold A, et al. Incidence proportion of and risk factors for AIDS patients diagnosed with HIV dementia, central nervous system toxoplasmosis, and cryptococcal meningitis. J AIDS 1995;8:75-82.
97. Espinal M, Reingold AL, Koenig E, Lavandera M, Sanchez S. Screening for active tuberculosis in HIV testing centre. Lancet 1995;345:890-893.
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98. Yajko DM, Chin DP, Gonzalez PC, Nassos PS, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Mycobacterium avium complex in water, food, and soil samples collected from the environment of HIV-infected individuals. J AIDS 1995;9:176-182.
99. Lurie P, Fernandes M, Hughes V, Arevalo E, Hudes E, Reingold A, et al. Socioeconomic status and risk for HIV-1, syphilis and hepatitis B infection among sex workers in São Paulo State, Brazil. AIDS 1995 9(suppl 1):S31-S37.
100. Jackson L, Hilsdon R, Farley M, Harrison L, Reingold A, et al. Risk factors for Group B streptococcal disease in adults. Ann Int Med 1995;123:415-420.
101. Tappero J, Schuchat A, Deaver K, Mascola L, Wenger JD, and the Listeriosis Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Reduction in the incidence of human listeriosis in the United States – Effectiveness of prevention efforts? JAMA 1995;273:1118-1122.
102. Brandt ME, Hutwagner LC, Kuykendall RJ, Pinner RW, and the Cryptococcal Disease Active Surveillance Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Comparison of multilocus enzyme electrophoresis and random amplified polymorphic DNA analysis for molecular subtyping of Cryptococcus neoformans. J Clin Microbiol 1995:33:1890-1895.
103. Ley C, Olshen EM, Reingold AL. Case-control study of risk factors for incident Lyme disease in California. Am J Epi 1995:142; Suppl:S39-S47.
104. Espinal MA, Reingold AL, Lavandera M. Effect of pregnancy on the risk of developing active tuberculosis. J Inf Dis 1996;173:488-491.
105. Perkins BA, Flood JM, Danila R, Holman RC, Reingold AL, et al. Unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes in the United States: Defining the problem and design of surveillance and laboratory approaches. Emerg Inf Dis 1996;Vol 2:47-53.
106. Hessol NA, Priddy FH, Bolan G, Baumrind N, Vittinghoff E, Reingold AL, Padian NS. Management of pelvic inflammatory disease by primary care physicians: A comparison with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. Sex Trans Dis 1996;Mar-Apr:157-163.
107. Mohle-Boetani JC, Koehler JE, Berger TG, LeBoit PE, Kemper CA, Reingold AL, et al. Bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary peliosis in patients infected with human immunodeficiency virus: Clinical characteristics in a case-control study. Clin Inf Dis 1996;22:794-800.
108. Espinal MA, Reingold AL, Pérez G, et al. Human immunodeficiency virus infection in children with tuberculosis in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Prevalence, clinical findings, and response to antituberculosis treatment. J AIDS 1996;13:155-159.
109. Brandt ME, Hutwagner LC, Klug LA, Baughman WS, Rimland D, Graviss EA, Hamill RJ, Thomas C, Pappas PG, Reingold AL, et al. Molecular subtype distribution of Cryptococcus neoformans in four areas of the United States. J Clin Microbiol, 1996;34:912-917.
110. Bradford WZ, Martin JN, Reingold AL, et al. The changing epidemiology of acquired drug-resistant tuberculosis in San Francisco, USA. Lancet 1996;348:928-931.
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111. Passaro DJ, Waring L, Armstrong R, Bolding F, Bouvier B, Rosenberg J, Reingold AL, et al. Beauty and the beast: Postoperative Serratia marcescens wound infections traced to an out-of-hospital source. J Inf Dis 1997;175:992-995.
112. Urwin G, Krohn JA, Deaver-Robinson K, Wenger JD, Farley MM, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Invasive disease due to Haemophilus influenzae serotype f: Clinical and epidemiologic characteristics in the H. influenzae serotype b vaccine era. Clin Inf Dis, 1996;22:1069-76.
113. Sabino EC, Diaz RC, Brigido LF, Learn GH, Mullins JI, Reingold AL, et al. Distribution of HIV-1 subtypes seen in an AIDS clinic in São Paulo City, Brazil. AIDS 1996; 10:1579-1584.
114. Brandt ME, Pfaller MA, Hajjeh RA, Graviss EA, Rees J, Spitzer ED, Pinner RW, Mayer LW, and the Cryptococcal Disease Active Surveillance Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Molecular subtypes and antifungal susceptibilities of serial Cryptococcus neoformans isolates in human immunodeficiency virus associated cryptococcosis. J Inf Dis 1996;174:812-820.
115. Whitney CG, Pllikaytis BD, Gozansky WS, Wenger JD, Schuchat A, and the Neonatal Group B Streptococcal Disease Study Group (includes A.L. Reingold). Prevention practices for perinatal group B streptococcal disease: A multi-site surveillance analysis. Obstet & Gyn 1997;89:28-32.
116. McFarland W, MvereD, Shandera W, Reingold A. The epidemiology and prevention of transfusionassociated Human Immunodeficiency Virus transmission in Sub-Saharan Africa. Vox Sanguinis 1997; 72:85-92.
117. Mazurek GH, Chin DP, Hartman S, Reddy V, Horsburgh Jr, CR, Green TA, Yajko DM, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Genetic similarity among Mycobacterium avium isolates from blood, stool, and sputum of persons with AIDS. J Inf Dis 1997; 176:1-8.
118. Schuchat A, Robinson K, Wenger JD, Harrison LH, Farley M, Reingold AL, et al. Bacterial meningitis in the United States in 1995. N Eng J Med 337:970-976, 1997.
119. DeRiemer K, Chin DP, Schecter GF, Reingold AL. Tuberculosis among immigrants and refugees. Arch Int Med, 1998; 158:753-760.
120. Glaser CA, Safrin S, Reingold AL, Newman TB. The association between Cryptosporidium infection and animal exposure in HIV-infected individuals. J AIDS 17:79-82, 1998.
121. Reingold AL. Outbreak investigations: A perspective. Emerg Inf Dis 4:21-27, 1998.
122. Bradford WZ, Koehler J, El-Hajj H, Hopewell PC, Reingold AL, et al. Dissemination of Mycobacterium tuberculosis across the San Francisco Bay area. J Inf Dis 177:1104-1107, 1998.
123. Rees JR, Pinner RW, Hajjeh RA, Brandt ME, Reingold AL. The epidemiological features of invasive mycotic infections in the San Francisco Bay Area 1992-1993: Results of population-based laboratory active surveillance. Clin Inf Dis, 27:1138-1147, 1998.
124. Ragland DR, Buffler PA, Reingold AL, Syme SL, Winkelstein WW Jr, Buffler M. Disease and injury in California with projections to the year 2007: Implications for medical education. West J Med, 168:1-23, 1998.
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125. Espinal MA, Báez J, Soriano G, Garcia V, Laszlo A, Reingold AL, Sanchez S. Drug-resistant tuberculosis in the Dominican Republic: Results of a nationwide survey. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis, 2:490-498, 1998.
126. Bindman AB, Osmond D, Hecht FM, Lehman S, Vranizan K, Keane D, Reingold A, et al. Multistate evaluation of anonymous HIV testing and access to medical care. JAMA, 280:1416-1420, 1998.
127. Bloch KC, Zwerling L, Pletcher MJ, Hahn JA, Gerberding JL, Ostroff SM, Vugia DJ, Reingold AL. Incidence and clinical implications of isolation of Mycobacterium kansasii: Results of a 5-year, population-based study. Ann Intern Med 129:698-704, 1998.
128. Hajjeh RA, Conn LA, Stephens DS, Baughman W, Hamill R, Graviss E, Pappas PG, Thomas C, Reingold AL, et al. Cryptococcosis: Population-based multistate active surveillance and risk factors in Human Immunodeficiency Virus-infected persons. J Inf Dis, 179:449-454, 1999.
129. DeRiemer K, Daley CL, Reingold AL. Preventing tuberculosis among HIV-infected persons: A survey of physicians’ knowledge and practices. Prev Med, 28:437-444, 1999.
130. Jafari HS, Adams WG, Robinson KA, Plikaytis BD, Wenger JD, and the Haemophilus influenzae Study Group(includes A.L. Reingold). Efficacy of Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccines and persistence of disease in disadvantaged populations. AJPH, 89:364-368, 1999.
131. Fonseca LAM, Reingold AL, Casseb JR, Brigido LFM, Duarte AJS. AIDS incidence and survival in a hospital-based cohort of asymptomatic HIV seropositive patients in São Paulo, Brazil. J Inf Dis 28:11561160, 1999.
132. Reingold AL, Phares C. Communicable Diseases (chapter). In: Introduction to International Health (M. Merson, ed.).
133. Kao AS, Brandt ME, Pruitt WR, Conn LA, Perkins BA, Stephens DS, Baughman WS, Reingold AL, et al. The epidemiology of candidemia in two United States cities: Results of a population-based active surveillance. Clin Inf Dis 29:1164-1170, 1999.
134. Rosenstein NE, Perkins BA, Stephens D, Lefkowitz L, Cartter M, Danila R, Cieslak P, Shutt KA, Popovic T, Schuchat A, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, et al. The changing epidemiology of meningococcal disease in the United States, 1992-1996. J Inf Dis, 180:1894-1901, 1999.
135. Hajjeh RA, Reingold AL, Weil A, Shutt K, Schuchat A, Perkins BA. Toxic shock syndrome in the United States: Surveillance update, 1979-1996. Emerg Inf Dis J 5:807-810, 1999.
136. Osmond DH, Bindman AB, Vranizan K, Lehman JS, Hecht FM, Keane D, Reingold AL. Name-based surveillance and public health interventions for persons with HIV infection. Ann Int Med 131:775-779, 1999.
137. Baer JT, Vugia DJ, Reingold AL, Aragon T, Angulo FJ, Bradford WZ. HIV infection as a risk factor for shigellosis. Emerg Inf Dis 6:820-823, 1999.
138. Reingold AL. Infectious disease epidemiology in the twenty-first century - will it be eradicated or will it re-emerge? Epi Reviews 22:57-63, 2000.
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139. Kahane SM, Watt JP, Smith NJ, Wight S, Reingold AL, Newell K, et al. Immunization levels and risk factors for low immunization coverage among private practices. Pediatrics, 2000;105:73-.
140. Espinal MA, Pérez EN, Báez J, Henriquez L, Fernandez K, Lopez M, Olivo P, Reingold AL. Infectiousness of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in HIV-1-infected subjects with tuberculosis: A prospective study. Lancet 355:275-280, 2000.
141. Schrag SJ, Zywicki S, Farley M, Reingold AL, et al. Group B streptococcal disease in the era of intrapartum antibiotic prophylaxis. New Eng J Med 342:15-20, 2000.
142. Nuorti JP, Butler JC, Gelling L, Kool JL, Reingold AL, et al. Epidemiologic relation between HIV and invasive pneumococcal disease in San Francisco County, California. Ann Int Med 132: 182-190, 2000.
143. Hecht FM, Chesney MA, Lehman JS, Osmond D, Vranizan K, Colman S, Keane D, Reingold A, et al. Does HIV reporting by name deter testing? AIDS 14:1801-1808, 2000.
144. Breiman RF, Keller DW, Phelan MA, Sniadack DH, Stephens DS, Rimland D, Farley MM, Schuchat A, Reingold AL. Evaluation of effectiveness of the 23-valent pneumococcal capsular polysaccharide vaccine for HIV-infected patients. Arch Int Med 160:2633-2638, 2000.
145. Whitney CG, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Lexau C, Reingold A, Lefkowitz L, et al. Increasing prevalence of multi-drug resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae in the United States. N Engl J Med 343:1917-1924, 2000.
146. Alpers L, Chrouser K, Halabi S, Moeti T, Reingold A, Binkin N, Kenyon T. Validation of the surveillance system for tuberculosis in Botswana. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis, 2000; 4:737-743.
147. Factor SH, Whitney CG, Zywicki S, Schuchat A. for the ABC Surveillance Team (includes Reingold, A.). Effects of hospital policies on the 1996 group B streptococcal consensus guidelines. Obstet Gynecol 2000; 95:377-382.
148. Factor SF, Whitney CG, Zywicki SS, Schuchat A, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team (includes Reingold, AL). Effects of hospital policies based on 1996 group B streptococcal disease consensus guidelines. Hospital Policies 2000; 95:377-382.
149. Robinson KA, Baughman W, Rothrock G, Barrett NL, Pass M, Lexau C, Damske B, Stefonek K, Barnes B, Patterson J, Zell ER, Schuchat A, Whitney CG for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs)/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Arthur L. Reingold, MD). Epidemiology of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae Infections in the United States, 1995-1998: Opportunities for prevention in the conjugate vaccine era. JAMA 285:1729-1735, 2001.
150. Rosenstein NE, Emery KW, Werner SB, Kao A, Johnson R, Rogers D, Vugia D, Reingold A, Talbot R, et. al. Risk factors for severe pulmonary and disseminated coccidioidomycosis: Kern County, California, 1995-1996. Clin Inf Dis 32:708-715, 2001.
151. Kellam S, Pascopella L, Desmond E, Reingold A, Chin DP. Use of recommended laboratory testing methods among patients with tuberculosis in California. J Clin Micro 39:1969-1971, 2001.
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152. Mesquita F, Kral A, Reingold A, Bueno R, Trigueiros D, Araujo PJ, and the SMR Collaborative Study Group. Trends of HIV infection among injecting drug users in Brazil in the 1990's - the impact of changes in patterns of drug use. J AIDS, 2001; 28:298-302.
153. Mesquita F, Kral A, Reingold A, Haddad I, Sanches M, Turienzo G, Piconez D, Araujo P, Bueno R. Overdoses among cocaine users in Brazil. Addiction, 2001; 96:1809-1813.
154. Larson JI, Ridzon R, Hannan MM, Conde MB, Mello FCQ, Reingold AL, Daley CL, Kritski AL. Sputum induction vs. fiberoptic bronchoscopy in the diagnosis of tuberculosis. Am J Respir Crit Care Med, 2001;163:1279-1280.
155. Schuchat A, Hilger T, Zell E, Farley MM, Reingold A, Harrison L, Lefkowitz L, Danila R, Stefonek K, Barrett N, Morse D, Pinner R. Active bacterial core surveillance of the Emerging Infections Program network. Emerg Inf Dis, 2001; 7:92-99.
156. Brandt ME, Pfaller MA, Hajjeh RA, Hamill RJ, Pappas PG, Reingold AL, Rimland D, et al. Trends in antifungal drug susceptibility of Cryptococcus neoformans isolates in the United States: 1992 to 1994 and 1996 to 1998. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 2001;45:3065-3069.
157. Hajjeh RA, Relman D, Cieslak PR, Sofair AN, Passaro D, Flood J, et al. and the Critical Illness Working Group (includes Reingold, AL.). Surveillance for unexplained deaths and critical illnesses due to possibly infectious causes, United States, 1995-1998. Emerg Inf Dis, 2002;8:145-153.
158. Huang SS, Labus BJ, Samuel MC, Wan DT, Reingold AL. Antibiotic resistance patterns of bacterial isolates from blood in San Francisco county, 1996-1999. Emerg Inf Dis, 2002; 8:195-201.
159. Conde MB, Loivos AC, Rezende VM, Soares SLM, Mello FCQ, Reingold AL, Daley CL, Kritski AL. The yield of sputum induction in the diagnosis of pleural tuberculosis. Am J Respir and Crit Care Med, 2002; 167:723-725.
160. Handley MA, Reingold AL, Shiboski S, Padian NS. Incidence of acute urinary tract infection in young women and use of male condoms with and without nonoxynol-9 spermicides. Epidemiology, 2002;13:431436.
161. Hyde TB, Hilger TM, Reingold A, Farley MM, O’Brien KL, Schuchat A. for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) of the Emerging Infections Program Network. Trends in the incidence and antimicrobial resistance of early-onset sepsis: Population-based surveillance in San Francisco and Atlanta. Pediatrics, 2002;110:690-695.
162. Schrag SJ, Zell ER, Lynfield R, Roome A, Arnold KE, Craig A, Harrison L, Reingold A, Stefonek K, Smith G, Gamble M, Schuchat A for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance team. A population-based comparison of strategies to prevent early-onset group B streptococcal disease in neonates. New Engl J Med 2002;347:233-239.
163. O’Brien KL, Beall B, Barrett NL, Cieslak P, Reingold A, Farley MM, Danila R, Zell ER, Facklam R, Schwartz B, Schuchat A for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance team. Epidemiology of invasive group A streptococcus disease in the United States, 1995-1999. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:268-276.
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164. Morita JY, Zell ER, Danila R, Farley MM, Hadler JH, Harrison LH, Lefkowitz L, Reingold A, Kupronis B, Schuchat A, Whitney CG. Association between antimicrobial resistance among pneumococcal isolates and burden of invasive pneumococcal disease in the community. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:420-427.
165. Chuang I, Van Beneden C, Beall B, Schuchat A. and the ABCs/EIP network (includes Reingold, A.). Population-based surveillance for postpartum invasive group A streptococcal Infections, 1995-2000. Clin Infect Dis, 2002;35:665-670.
166. Passaro DJ, Smith DS, Hett EC, Reingold AL, Daily P, Van Beneden CA, Vugia DJ. Invasive Group A Streptococcal infections in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1989-1999. Epi&Infect, 2002; 129:471-478.
167. McCormick AW, Whitney CG, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Schaffner W, Reingold A, Hadler J, et al. Geographic diversity and temporal trends of antimicrobial resistance in Streptococcus pneumoniae in the United States. Nature Med 2003;doi:10.1038/nm839.
168. Whitney CG, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Lynfield R, Reingold A, Cieslak PR, Pilishvili T, et al. Decline in invasive pneumococcal disease after the introduction of proteinpolysaccharide conjugate vaccine. N Engl J Med 2003;348:1737-1746.
169. Reingold A. If syndromic surveillance is the answer, what is the question? Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Science, and Practice. 2003;1:1-5.
170. Koehler JE, Sanchez MA, Tye S, Garrido-Rowland CS, Chen FM, Maurer T, Cooper JL, Olson JG, Reingold AL, Hadley WK, Regnery RR, Tappero JW. Prevalence of Bartonella infection among HIVinfected patients with fever. Clin Inf Dis 2003;37:559-566.
171. Schrag SJ, Arnorld KE, Mohle-Boetani JC, Lynfield R, Zell ER, Stefonek K, Noga H, Craig AS, Thomson Sanza L, Smith G, Schuchat A, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team (includes Reingold AL). Prenatal screening for infectious diseases and opportunities for prevention. Obstet Gynecol 2003;102:753-760.
172. King MD, Whitney CG, Parekh F, Farley MM, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). Recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease: A population-based assessment. Clin Inf Dis 2003;37:1029-1036.
173. Carvalho HB, Seibel SD, Burattini MN, Massad E, Reingold A. Hepatitis B and C and Syphilis: Vulnerability Related Infections among Institutionalized Disadvantaged Youth in São Paulo, Brazil. J Bras Doenças Sex Transm 2003;15:41-45.
174. Louie JK, Hacker JK, Mark J, Gavali SS, Yagi S, Espinosa A, Schnurr D, Cossen CK, Isaacson ER, Glaser CA, Fischer M, Reingold AL, Vugia DJ. SARS and common viral infections, Emerg Inf Dis, 2004;10:1143-1146.
175. Flanders SA, Stein J, Shochat G, Sellers K, Holland M, Maselli J, Drew WL, Reingold AL, Gonzales. Performance of a bedside c-reactive protein test in the diagnosis of community-acquired pneumonia in adults with acute cough. Amer J Med 2004;116:529-535.
176. Pascopella L, Kellam S, Ridderhof J, Chin DP, Reingold A, Desmond E, Flood J, Royce S. Laboratory reporting of tuberculosis test results and patient treatment initiation in California. J Clin Micro, 2004;42:4209-4213.
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177. Nicas M, Hubbard AE, Jones RM, Reingold AL. The infectious dose of variola (smallpox) virus. Appl Biosafety 2004;9:118-127.
178. Flannery B, Schrag S, Bennett NM, Lynfield R, Harrison LH, Reingold A, Cieslak PR, Hadler J, Farley MM, Facklam RR, Zell ER, Whiteney CG. Impact of childhood vaccination on racial disparities in invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections. JAMA, 2004;291:2197-2203.
179. Facklam R, Elliott J, Shewmaker L, Reingold A. Identification and characterization of sporadic isolates of Streptococcus iniae isolated from human infections. J Clin Micro 2005; 43:933-937.
180. Heffernan RT, Barrett NL, Gallagher KM, Hadler JL, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Khoshnood K, Holford TR, Schuchat A. Declining incidence of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections among persons living with AIDS in an era of highly-active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), 1995-2000. J Inf Dis, 2005;191:2038-2045.
181. Bakyaita N, Dorsey G, Yeka A, Banek K, Staedke SG, Kamya MR, Talisuna A, Kironde F, Nsobya S, Kilian A, Reingold A, Rosenthal PJ, Wabwire-Mangen F. Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine plus chloroquine or amodiaquine for uncomplicated falciparum malaria: A randomized, multisite trial to guide national policy in Uganda. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2005;72:573-580.
182. Pai M, Gokhale K, Joshi R, Dogra S, Kalantri SP, Mendiratta DK, Narang P, Daley CL, Granich RM, Mazurek GH, Reingold AL, Riley LW, Colford Jr, JM. Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection in health care worker in rural India: Comparison of whole-blood interferon ϒ assay with tuberculin skin testing. JAMA 2005;293:2746-2755.
183. Pai M, Kalantri S, Pascopella L, Riley LW, Reingold AL. Bacteriophage-based assays for the rapid detection of rifampicin resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis: a meta-analysis. Journal of Infection 2005;51:175-187.
184. Lexau CA, Lynfield R, Danila R, Pilishvili T, Facklam R, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Schaffner W, Reingold AL, Bennett NM, Hadler J, Cieslak PR, Whiteny CG (for the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Team). Changing epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease among older adults in the era of pediatric pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. JAMA 2005;294:2043-2051.
185. Kalantri S, Pai M, Pascopella L, Riley L, Reingold A. Bacteriophage-based tests for the detection of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in clinical specimens: a systematic review and meta-analysis. BMC Inf Dis 2005;5:59; doi:10.1186/1471-2334-5-59.
186. Feikin DR, Klugman KP, Facklam RR, Zell ER, Schuchat A, Whitney CA for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance/Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). Increased prevalence of pediatric pneumococcal serotypes in elderly adults. Clin Inf Dis 2005;41:481-487.
187. Tappero JW, Bradford WZ, Agerton TB, Hopewell P, Reingold AL, Lockman S, Oyewo A, Talbot EA, et al. Serum concentrations of antimycobacterial drugs in patients with pulmonary tuberculosis in Botswana. Clin Inf Dis 2005;41:461-469.
188. Kyaw MH, Rose CE, Fry AM, Singleton JA, Moore Z, Zell ER, Whitney CG for the Active Bacterial Core surveillance program of the Emerging Infections Program Network (includes Reingold AL). The influence
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of chronic illnesses on the incidence of invasive pneumococcal diseases in adults. J Inf Dis 2005;192:377386.
189. Flannery B, Heffernan RT, Harrison LH, Ray SM, Reingold AL, Hadler J, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Thomas AR, Jianmin Li DPE, Campsmith DDS, Whitney CG, Schuchat A. Changes in invasive pneumococcal disease among HIV-infected adults living in the era of childhood pneumococcal immunization. Ann Int Med 2006; 144:1-9.
190. Pai M, Joshi R, Dogra S, Mendiratta DK, Narang P, Kalantri S, Reingold AL, Colford JM Jr, Riley LW, Menzies D. Serial testing of health care workers for tuberculosis using interferon-γ assay. Amer J Resp Crit Care Med 2006;doi:10.1164/rccm.200604-4720C.
191. Kyaw MH, Lynfield R, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Hadler J, Reingold A, Thomas AR, Harrison LH, et al. Effect of introduction of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae. New Eng J Med 2006;354:1455-1463.
192. Poehling KA, Talbot TR, Griffin MR, Craig AS, Whitney CG, Zell E, Lexau CA, Thomas AR, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Hadler JL, et al. Invasive pneumococcal disease among infants before and after introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. JAMA 2006;295:1668-1674.
193. Jones RM, Nicas M, Hubbard AE, Reingold AL. The infectious dose of Coxiella burnetii (Q Fever). Appl Biosafety 2006;11:32-41.
194. Whitney CG, Pilishvili T, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Lynfield R, Nyquist A-C, Gershman K, Vazquez M, Bennett NM, Reingold A, Thomas A, et al. Effectiveness of seven-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine against invasive pneumococcal disease: a matched case-control study. Lancet 2006; 368:1495-1502.
195. Hwang J, Bitarakwate E, Pai M, Reingold A, Rosenthal PJ, Dorsey G. Chloroquine or amodiaquine combined with sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine for uncomplicated malaria: a systematic review. Trop Med & Int Hlth 2006;11:789-799.
196. Joshi R, Reingold AL, Menzies D, Pai M. Tuberculosis among health-care workers in low- and middleincome countries: A systematic review. PLoS Med 2006;3(12):e494. Doi:10.1371/journal.pmed. 0030494
197. Pai NP, Lawrence J, Reingold AL, Tulsky JP. Structured treatment interruptions (STI) in chronic unsuppressed HIV infection in adults. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2006;3:CD006148.
198. Schrag SJ, Hadler JL, Arnold KE, et al. Risk factors for invasive, early-onset Escherichia coli infections in the era of widespread intrapartum antibiotic use. Pediatrics. 2006;118(2):570-576.
199. Malamba SS, Mermin J, Reingold A, et al. Effect of cotrimoxazole prophylaxis taken by human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-infected persons on the selection of sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine-resistant malaria parasites among HIV-uninfected household members. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 2006;75(3):375-380.
200. Winkelstein W Jr, Reingold AL. Alex Langmuir and CDC. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2006;12(10):1619; author reply 1619.
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201. Klevens RM, Morrison MA, Fridkin SK, et al. Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and healthcare risk factors. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2006;12(12):1991-1993.
202. Aragón TJ, Vugia DJ, Shallow S, Samuel MC, Reingold A, Angulo FJ, Bradford WZ. Case-control study of shigellosis in San Francisco: The role of sexual transmission and HIV infection. Clin Inf Dis 2007;44:327-334.
203. Dogra S, Narang P, Mendiratta DK, Chaturvedi P, Reingold AL, Colford JM, Riley LW, Pai M. Comparison of a whole blood interfon-γ assay with tuberculin skin testing for the detection of tuberculosis infection in hospitalized children in rural India. J Inf 2007;54:267-276.
204. Nunes CLX, Andrade T, Galvão-Castro B, Bastos FI, Reingold A. Assessing risk behaviors and prevalence of sexually transmitted and blood-borne infections among female crack cocaine users in Salvador--Bahia, Brazil. Braz J Infect Dis. 2007;11(6):561-566.
205. Pai N, Peterson Tulsky J, Cohan D, Colford Jr JM, Reingold AL. Rapid point-of-care HIV testing in pregnant women: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Trop Med and Int Hlth 2007;12:1-12.
206. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, et al. The epidemiology of Herpes simplex virus type-2 infection among married women in Mysore, India. Sex Transm Dis. 2007;34(11):935-937.
207. Chainani-Wu N, Silverman Jr S, Reingold A, Bostrom A, McCulloch C, Lozada-Nur F, Weintraub J. A randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind clinical trial of curcuminoids in oral lichen planus. Phytomed 2007;14:437-446.
208. Veras Maria Ameli SM, Enanoria WTA, Castilho EA, Reingold AL. Effectiveness of the polysaccharide pneumococcal vaccine among HIV-infected persons in Brazil: A case control study. BMC Inf Dis 2007;7:119.
209. Krupp K, Madhivanan P, Karat C, Chandrasekaran V, Sarvode M, Klausner J, Reingold A. Novel recruitment strategies to increase participation of women in reproductive health research in India. Glob Pub Hlth 2007;4:395-403.
210. Lippman SA, Pulerwitz J, Chinaglia M, Hubbard A, Reingold AL, Diaz J. Mobility and its liminal context: Exploring sexual partnering among truck drivers crossing the Southern Brazilian border. Soc Sci & Med 2007;doi:10.1016.
211. Hicks LA, Harrison LH, Flannery B, Hadler JL, Schaffner W, Craig AS, Jackson D, Thomas A, Beall B, Lynfield R, Reingold AL, Farley MM, et al. Incidence of pneumococcal disease due to non-pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) serotypes in the United States during the era of widespread PCV7 vaccination, 1998-2004. J Inf Dis 2007;196:1346-1354.
212. O’Loughlin RE, Roberson A, Cieslak PR, Lynfield R, Gershman K, Craig A, Albanese BA, Farley MM, Barrett NL, Spina NL, Beall B, Harrison LH, Reingold AL, Van Beneden C, et al. The epidemiology of invasive group A streptococcal infection and potential vaccine implications: United States, 2000-2004. Clin Inf Dis 2007;45:853-862.
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213. Thigpen MC, Richards Jr CL, Lynfield R, Barrett NL, Harrison LH, Arnold KE, Reingold A, Bennett NM, et al. Invasive group A streptococcal infection in older adults in long-term care facilities and the community, United States, 1998-2003. Emerg Inf Dis 2007;13:1852-1859.
214. Malamba S, Hladik W, Reingold AL, Banage F, McFarland W, Rutherford G, Mimbe D, Nzaro E, Downing R, Mermin J. The effect of HIV on morbidity and mortality in children with severe malarial anaemia. Malaria J 2007;6:143.
215. Pant Pai N, Joshi R, Dogra S, Taksande B, Kalantri SP, Pai M, Narang P, Tulsky JP, Reingold AL. Evaluation of diagnostic accuracy, feasibility, and client preference for rapid oral fluid-based diagnosis of HIV infection in rural India. PLos One 2007;2(4): e367.doi.10.1371/journal.pone.0000367.
216. Chainani-Wu N, Silverman S Jr, Reingold A, Bostrom A, Lozada-Nur F, Weintraub J. Validation of visual analogue scale, numeric rating scale, change in symptoms scale and modified oral mucousitis index for measurement of symptoms and signs of oral lichen planus. Oral Surg Med Oral Pathol Oral Radiol Endod 2008;105:51-58.
217. Koo D, Birkhead GS, Reingold AL. Competency-based epidemiologic training in public health practice. Pub Hlth Rep 2008 (Suppl 1);123:1-3.
218. Joshi R, Colford Jr JM, Reingold AL, Kalantri S. Nonmalarial acute undifferentiated fever in a rural hospital in Central India: Diagnostic uncertainty and overtreatment with anti-malarial agents. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2008;78:393-399.
219. Moore MR, Gertz RE, Woodbury RL, Barkocy-Gallagher GA, Schaffner W, Lexau C, Gershman K, Reingold AL, Farley M, Harrison LH, et al. Population snapshot of emergent Streptococcus pneumoniae Serotype 19A in the United States, 2005. J Inf Dis 2008; 197:1016-1027.
220. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, Karat SC, Reingold AL, Klausner JD. Acceptability of male circumcision among mothers with male children in Mysore, India. AIDS 2008; 22:983-988.
221. Blumenshine P, Reingold A, Egerter S, Mockenhaupt R, Braveman P, Marks J. Pandemic influenza planning in the United States from a health disparities perspective. Emerg Inf Dis 2008; 14:5.
222. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Chandrasekaran V, Karat C, Arun A, Cohen CR, Reingold AL, Klausner JD. Prevalence and correlates of bacterial vaginosis among young women of reproductive age in Mysore, India. Ind J Med Microbiol 2008; 26:132-137.
223. Pant Pai N, Joshi R, Moodie E EM, Taksande B, Kalantri SP, Pai M, Tulsky JP, Reingold AL. Profile of adults seeking voluntary HIV testing and counseling in rural Central India: Results from a hospital-based study. AIDS Care 2009;21:294-300.
224. Hsu HE, Shutt KA, Moore MR, Beall BW, Bennett NM, Craig AS, Farley MM, Jorgensen JH, Lexau CA, Petit S, Reingold A, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Whitney CG, Harrison LH. Effect of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on pneumococcal meningitis. NEJM 2009;360:244-256.
225. Gordon A, Ortega O, Kuan G, Reingold A, Saborio S, Balmaseda A, Harris E. Prevalence and seasonality of influenza-like illness in children, Nicaragua, 2005-2007. Emerg Inf Dis 2009;15:408-414.
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226. Broyles LN, Van Beneden C, Beall B, Facklam R, Shewmaker PL, Malpiedi P, Daily P, Reingold A, Farley MM. Population-based study of invasive disease due to β-hemolytic streptococci of groups other than A and B. Clin Inf Dis 2009;48:706-712.
227. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Hardin J, Karat C, Klausner JD, Reingold AL. Simple and inexpensive point-ofcare tests improve diagnosis of vaginal infections in resource constrained settings. Trop Med & Int Hlth 2009;14:703-708.
228. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Yashodha MN, Marlow L, Klausner JD, Reingold AL. Attitudes toward HPV vaccination among parents of adolescent girls in Mysore, India. Vaccine 2009;27:5203-5208.
229. Madhivanan P, Bartman MT, Pasutti L, et al. Prevalence of Trichomonas vaginalis infection among young reproductive age women in India: implications for treatment and prevention. Sex Health. 2009;6(4):339344.
230. Chideya S, Winston CA, Peloquin CA, Bradford WZ, Hopewell PC, Wells CD, Reingold AL, Kenyon TA, Moeti TL, Tappero JW. Isoniazid, Rifampin, Ethambutol, and Pyrazinamide, pharmokinetics and treatment outcomes among a predominantly HIV-infected cohort of adults with tuberculosis from Botswana. Clin Inf Dis 2009;48:1685-1694.
231. Carvalho M da G, Pimenta FC, Gertz RE Jr, Joshi HH, Trujillo AA, Keys LE, et al. PCR-based quantitation and clonal diversity of the current prevalent invasive serogroup 6 pneumococcal serotype, 6C, in the United States in 1999 and 2006 to 2007. J. Clin. Microbiol. 2009 Mar;47(3):554–9.
232. Gordon A, Videa E, Saborio S, et al. Performance of an influenza rapid test in children in a primary healthcare setting in Nicaragua. PLoS ONE. 2009;4(11):e7907.
233. Pai NP, Estes M, Moodie EEM, Reingold AL, Tulsky JP. The impact of antiretroviral therapy in a cohort of HIV infected patients going in and out of the San Francisco county jail. PLoS ONE. 2009;4(9):e7115.
234. Ahmad Y, Gertz RE Jr, Li Z, et al. Genetic relationships deduced from emm and multilocus sequence typing of invasive Streptococcus dysgalactiae subsp. equisimilis and S. canis recovered from isolates collected in the United States. J. Clin. Microbiol. 2009;47(7):2046-2054.
235. Eisenberg JNS, Aiello AE, Spicknall IH, Monto AS, Reingold A. Protecting the herd from H1N1. Science. 2009;326(5955):934; author reply 934.
236. Pilishvili T, Lexau C, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Reingold A, et al. Sustained reductions in invasive pneumococcal disease in the era of conjugate vaccine. J Inf Dis 2010;201:32-41.
237. Krupp K, Marlow LAV, Kielmann K, et al. Factors associated with intention-to-recommend human papillomavirus vaccination among physicians in Mysore, India. J Adolesc Health. 2010;46(4):379-384.
238. Lippman SA, Donini A, Díaz J, et al. Social-environmental factors and protective sexual behavior among sex workers: the Encontros intervention in Brazil. Am J Public Health. 2010;100 Suppl 1:S216-223.
239. Durrheim DN, Reingold A. Modifying the GRADE framework could benefit public health. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2010;64(5):387.
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240. Pilishvili T, Zell ER, Farley MM, et al. Risk factors for invasive pneumococcal disease in children in the era of conjugate vaccine use. Pediatrics. 2010;126(1):e9-17.
241. Malamba S, Sandison T, Lule J, Reingold A, Walker J, Dorsey G, Mermin J. Plasmodium falciparum dihydrofolate reductase and dihyropteroate syntase mutations and the use of trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole prophylaxis among persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2010;82:766-771.
242. Dawood FS, Fiore A, Kamimoto L, Nowell M, Reingold A, Gershman K, Meek J, et al. Influenzaassociated pneumonia in children hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza, 2003-2008. Ped Inf Dis 2010;29:585-590.
243. Kallen AJ, Mu Y, Bulens S, Reingold A, Petit S, Gershman K, Ray SM, Harrison LH, et al. Health careassociated invasive MRSA infections, 2005-2008. JAMA 2010;304:641-648.
244. Cohn AC, MacNeil JR, Harrison LH, et al. Changes in Neisseria meningitidis disease epidemiology in the United States, 1998-2007: implications for prevention of meningococcal disease. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2010;50(2):184-191.
245. Cohen AL, Harrison LH, Farley MM, et al. Prevention of invasive pneumococcal disease among HIVinfected adults in the era of childhood pneumococcal immunization. AIDS. 2010;24(14):2253-2262.
246. Dao CN, Kamimoto L, Nowell M, et al. Adult hospitalizations for laboratory-positive influenza during the 2005-2006 through 2007-2008 seasons in the United States. J. Infect. Dis. 2010;202(6):881-888.
247. Cochran LW, Black S, Klein NP, et al. Vaccine effectiveness against laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants: A matched case control study. Hum Vaccin. 2010;6(9). Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20855940. Accessed September 26, 2011.
248. Burton DC, Flannery B, Bennett NM, et al. Socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities in the incidence of bacteremic pneumonia among US adults. Am J Public Health. 2010;100(10):1904-1911.
249. Dawood FS, Fiore A, Kamimoto L, et al. Burden of seasonal influenza hospitalization in children, United States, 2003 to 2008. J. Pediatr. 2010;157(5):808-814.
250. Thigpen MC, Whitney CG, Messonnier NE, Zell ER, Lynfield R, Hadler JL, Harrison LH, Farley MM, Reingold AL, et al. Bacterial meningitis in the United States, 1998-2007. New Engl J Med 2011; 364:2016-2025.
251. Pinho AA, Chinaglia M, Lippman SA, Reingold AL, Diaz RS, Sucupira MC, Page K, Diaz J. Prevalence and factors associated with HSV-2 and hepatitis B infections among truck drivers crossing the southern Brazilian border. Sex Trans Infect 2011; doi:10.1136/sextrans-2011-050186.
252. Veras MA de SM, Ribeiro MCA, Jamal LF, et al. The “AMA-Brazil” cooperative project: a nation-wide assessment of the clinical and epidemiological profile of AIDS-related deaths in Brazil in the antiretroviral treatment era. Cad Saude Publica. 2011;27 Suppl 1:S104-113.
253. Madhivanan P, Chen Y-H, Krupp K, et al. Incidence of Herpes simplex virus type 2 in young reproductive age women in Mysore, India. Indian J Pathol Microbiol. 2011;54(1):96-99.
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254. Creanga AA, Kamimoto L, Newsome K, et al. Seasonal and 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection during pregnancy: a population-based study of hospitalized cases. Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 2011;204(6 Suppl 1):S38-45.
255. Weston EJ, Pondo T, Lewis MM, et al. The burden of invasive early-onset neonatal sepsis in the United States, 2005-2008. Ped Inf Dis. 2011. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21654548. Accessed September 26, 2011.
256. Dawood FS, Kamimoto L, D’Mello TA, et al. Children with asthma hospitalized with seasonal or pandemic influenza, 2003-2009. Pediatrics. 2011;128(1):e27-32.
257. Rosen JB, Thomas AR, Lexau CA, et al. Geographic variation in invasive pneumococcal disease following pneumococcal conjugate vaccine introduction in the United States. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2011;53(2):137-143.
258. Rathod SD, Krupp K, Klausner JD, et al. Bacterial vaginosis and risk for Trichomonas vaginalis infection: A longitudinal analysis. Sex Transm Dis. 2011;38(9):882-886.
259. Adamson PC, Krupp K, Freeman AH, Klausner JD, Reingold AL, Madhivanan P. Prevalence & correlates of primary infertility among young women in Mysore, India. Indian J. Med. Res. 2011 Oct;134:440–6.
260. Madhivanan P, Krupp K, Reingold A. Correlates of Intimate Partner Physical Violence Among Young Reproductive Age Women in Mysore, India. Asia-Pacific journal of public health / Asia-Pacific Academic Consortium for Public Health [Internet]. 2011 Dec 20 [cited 2012 Jun 18]; Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22186382
261. MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Farley M, Mair R, Baumbach J, Bennett N, et al. Current epidemiology and trends in invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease--United States, 1989-2008. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2011 Dec;53(12):1230–6.
262. Doshi S, Kamimoto L, Finelli L, Perez A, Reingold A, Gershman K, et al. Description of antiviral treatment among adults hospitalized with influenza before and during the 2009 pandemic: United States, 2005-2009. J. Infect. Dis. 2011 Dec 15;204(12):1848–56.
263. MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Zell ER, Schmink S, Miller E, Clark T, et al. Early estimate of the effectiveness of quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine. Pediatr. Infect. Dis. J. 2011 Jun;30(6):451–5.
264. Lippman SA, Chinaglia M, Donini AA, Diaz J, Reingold A, Kerrigan DL. Findings from Encontros: a multilevel STI/HIV intervention to increase condom use, reduce STI, and change the social environment among sex workers in Brazil. Sex Transm Dis. 2012 Mar;39(3):209–16.
265. Vandermeer ML, Thomas AR, Kamimoto L, Reingold A, Gershman K, Meek J, et al. Association between use of statins and mortality among patients hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infections: a multistate study. J. Infect. Dis. 2012 Jan 1;205(1):13–9.
266. Wise ME, Viray M, Sejvar JJ, Lewis P, Baughman AL, Connor W, et al. Guillain-Barre Syndrome during the 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza vaccination campaign: Population-based surveillance among 45 million Americans. Am. J. Epidemiol. 2012 Jun 1;175(11):1110–9.
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267. Luckhaupt SE, Sweeney MH, Funk R, Calvert GM, Nowell M, D’Mello T, et al. Influenza-associated hospitalizations by industry, 2009-10 influenza season, United States. Emerging Infect. Dis. 2012 Apr;18(4):556–62.
268. Hampton LM, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Reingold A, Harrison LH, et al. Prevention of antibiotic-nonsusceptible Streptococcus pneumoniae with conjugate vaccines. J. Infect. Dis. 2012 Feb 1;205(3):401–11.
269. De Serres G, Pilishvili T, Link-Gelles R, Reingold A, Gershman K, Petit S, et al. Use of surveillance data to estimate the effectiveness of the 7-valent conjugate pneumococcal vaccine in children less than 5 years of age over a 9 year period. Vaccine. 2012 Jun 8;30(27):4067–72.
270. Reingold AL. Review: “Smallpox-The Death of a Disease: The Inside Story of Eradicating a Worldwide Killer” by D.A. Henderson. 2010; Am J Epidemiol 171:384-385.
271. Cohen AL, Taylor T Jr, Farley MM, Schaffner W, Lesher LJ, et al. An assessment of the screening method to evaluate vaccine effectiveness: The case of 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in the United States. PLoS One 2012;7:341785. Doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041785.
272. Henry JA, Reingold AL. Prehospital trauma systems reduce mortality in developing countries: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Trauma Acute Care Surg 2012;73:261-268.
273. Rathod SD, Klausner JD, Krupp K, Reingold AL, Madhivanan P. Epidemiologic features of vulvovaginal candidiasis among reproductive-age women in India. Inf Dis Obst Gyn 2012; Article ID 859071; doi:10.1155/2012/859071.
274. Duclos P, Durrheim DN, Reingold AL, Bhutta ZA, Vannice K, et al. Developing evidence-based immunization recommendations and GRADE*. Vaccine 2012;31:12-19.
275. Joshi R, Kalantri SP, Reingold AR, Colford JM. Changing landscape of acute encephalitis syndrome in India: A systematic review. Nat Med J India 2012;25:212-220.
276. Muhammad RD, Oza-Frank R, Zell E, Link-Gelles R, Venkat Narayan KM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiologoy of invasive pneumococcal disease among high-risk adults since the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for children. Clin Inf Dis 2013;56:e59-67.
277. Cox CM, D’Melio T, Perez A, Reingold A, Gershman K, et al. Increase in rates of hospitalization due to laboratory-confirmed influenza among children and adults during the 2009-2010 influenza pandemic. J Inf Dis 2012; 206:1350-1358.
278. Livorsi DJ, MacNeil JR, Cohn AC, Bareta J, Zansky S, Petit S, Gershman K, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Invasive Haemophilus influenzae in the United States, 1999-2008: Epidemiology and Outcomes. J Inf Dis 2012; 65:496-504.
279. * Keller AC, Ansell CK, Reingold AL, Bourrier M, Hunter MD, Burrowes S, MacPhail TM. Improving Pandemic Response: A Sensemaking Perspective on the Spring 2009 H1N1 Pandemic. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 1; 2012. DOI: 10.1515/1944-4079.1101.
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280. Terrault NA, Dodge JL, Murphy EL, Tavis JE, Kiss A, Levin TR, Gish RG, Busch MP, Reingold AL, Alter MJ. Sexual transmission of hepatitis C virus among monogamous heterosexual couples: The HCV partners study. Hepatology; 2013;53:881-889.
281. Muhammed RD, Oza-Frank R, Zell E, Link-Gelles R, Venkat Narayan KM, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease among high-risk adults since the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for children. Clin Inf Dis 2013;56:e59-e67.
282. Fleming-Dutra KE, Taylor T, Link-Gelles R, Garg S, Jhung MA, Finelli L, Jain S, Shay D, Chaves SS, Baumbach J, Hancock EB, Beall B, Bennett N, Zansky S, Petit S, Yousey-Hindes K, Farley MM, Gershman K, Harrison LH, Ryan P, Lexau C, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Effect of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic on invasive pneumococcal pneumonia. J Inf Dis 2013;207:1135-1143.
283. Kamimoto L, Euler GL, Lu P-J, Reingold A, Hadler J, Gershman K, et al. Seasonal influenza morbidity estimates obtained from telephone surveys, 2007. Am J Pub Hlth 2013;103:755-763.
284. Salmon DA, Proschan M, Forshee R, Gargiullo P, Bleser W, Burwen DR. . .H1N1 GBS Meta-Analysis Working Group (Reingold AL-member). Association between Guillain Barré syndrome and influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent inactivated vaccines in the USA: A meta-analysis. Lancet 2013;381:1461-1468.
285. Ssekitoleko R, Kamya MR, Reingold AL. Primary prophylaxis for cryptococcal meningitis and impact on mortality in HIV: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Future Virol 2013;8:doi: 10.2217/fvl.13.71.
286. Joshi R, Mishra PK, Joshi D, Santhosh SR, Parida MM, Desikan P, Gangane N, Kalantri SP, Reingold A, Colford JM Jr. Clinical presentation, etiology, and survival in adult acute encephalitis syndrome in rural Central India. Clin Neuro Neurosurg 2013;115:1753-1761.
287. Dawood FS, Chaves SS, Perez A, Reingold A, Meek J, Farley MM, et al. Complications and associated bacterial coinfections among children hospitalized with seasonal or pandemic influenza, United States, 2003-2010. J Inf Dis 2013; Epub DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jit473.
288. Thompson MG, Sokolow LZ, Almendares O, Openo K, Farley MM, Meek J, Ray J, Daily Kirley P, Reingold A, et al. Effectiveness of nonadjuvanted monovalent influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 vaccines for preventing reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction-confirmed pandemic influenza hospitalizations: Case-control study of children and adults at 10 U.S. influenza surveillance network sites. Clin Inf Dis 2013;11:1587-1592.
289. Wiringa AE, Shutt KA, Marsh JW, Cohn AC, Messonnier NE, Zansky SM, Petit S, Farley MM, Gershman K, Lynfield R, Reingold A, et al. Geotemporal analysis of Neisseria meningitidis clones in the United States: 2000-2005. PLoS One 2013;8:e82048l doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082048.
290. Woolf-King SE, Steinmaus CM, Reingold AL, Hahn JA. An update on alcohol use and risk of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa: Meta:analysis and future research directions. IJADR, 2013, 2(1), 99-110; doi: 10.7895/ijadr.v2il.45.
291. Jhung MA, D’Mello T, Perez A, Aragon D, Bennett NM, Cooper T, Farley MM, Fowler B, Grube SM, Hancock EB, Lynfield R, Morin C, Reingold A, et al. Hospital-onset influenza hospitalizations – United States, 2010-2011. Am J Inf Control 2014; 42:7-11.
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292. Ayieko J, Abuogi L, Simchowitz B, Bukusi EA, Smith AH, Reingold A. Efficacy of isoniazid prophylactic therapy in prevention of tuberculosis in children: a meta-analysis. BMC Inf Dis 2014; 14:91; doi:10.1186/1471-2334-14-91.
293. Dharan NJ, Sokolow LZ, Cheng PY, Gargiullo P, Gershman K, Lynfield R, Morin C, Thomas A, Meek J, Farley MM, Arnold KE, Reingold A, et al. Child, household, and caregiver characteristics associated with hospitalization for influenza among children 6-59 months of age: an emerging infections program study. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2014 Jun;33(6):e141-50. doi: 10.1097/INF.0000000000000283.PMID: 24642518.
294. Wortham JM, Zell ER, Pondo T, Harrison LH, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Thomas A, Reingold A, et al. Racial disparities in invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae infections, 1998-2009. Clin Infect Dis. 2014 May;58(9):1250-7. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciu108. Epub 2014 Feb 27.PMID:24585565.
295. Madhivanan P, Raphael E, Rumphs A, Krupp K, Ravi K, Srinivas V, Arun A, Reingold AL, et al. Characterisation of culturable vaginal Lactobacillus species among women with and without bacterial vaginosis from the United States and India: A cross-sectional study. J Med Microbiol. 2014 Jul;63(Pt 7):931-5. doi: 10.1099/jmm.0.073080-0. Epub 2014 May 16.PMID :24836413.
296. Chaves SS, Perez A, Farley MM, Miller L, Schaffner W, Lindegren ML, Sharangpani R, Meek J, YouseyHindes K, Thomas A, Boulton R, Baumbach J, Hancock EB, Bandyopadhyay AS, Lynfield R, Morin C, Zansky SM, Reingold A,et al. The burden of influenza hospitalizations in infants from 2003 to 2012, United States. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2014 Sep;33(9):912-9. doi: 10.1097/INF.0000000000000321.PMID:24577042.
297. Blain A, MacNeil J, Wang X, Bennett N, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lexau C, Miller L, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Invasive Haemophilus Influenzae Disease in Adults ≥65 Years, United States, 2011. Open Forum Infect Dis (Summer 2014) 1 (2): first published online June 13, 2014. doi:10.1093/ofid/ofu044.
298. Greenbaum A, Chaves S S, Perez A, Aragon D, Bandyopadhyay A, Bennett N, Fowler B, Hancock E, Lynfield R, McDonald-Hamm C, Reingold A, et al. Heavy alcohol use as a risk factor for severe outcomes among adults hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed influenza, 2005-2012. Infection (2014) 42:165-170. Doi 10.1007/s15010-013-0534-8.
299. Langley G, Schaffner W, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Bennett NM, Reingold A, et al. Twenty years of Active Bacterial Core surveillance. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Sept. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2109.141333.
300. Vugia DJ, Meek JI, Danila RN, Jones TF, Schaffner W, Baumbach J, Lathrop S, Farley MM, TobinD’Angelo M, Miller L, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Cieslak PR, Cartter ML, Reingold A. Training in Infections Disease Epidemiology through the Emerging Infections Program Sites. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Sept. doi:http//dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2109.150443.
301. MacNeil JR, Bennett N, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of Infant Meningococcal Disease in the United States, 2006-2012. Pediatrics Volume 135, number 2, February 2015. doi:10.1542/peds.2014-2035.
302. Arriola CS, Anderson EJ, Baumbach J, Bennett N, Bohm S, Hill M, Lindegree ML, Lung K, Meek J, Mermel E, Miller L, Monroe ML, Morin C, Oni O, Reingold A, et al. Does Influenza Vaccination Modify
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Influenza Severity: Data on Older Adults Hospitalized With Infuluenza During the 2012-2013 Season in the United States. J. Infect Dis March 2015. doi: 10.10936/infdis/jiv200.
303. Moore MR, Link-Gelles R, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Lexau C, Bennett NM, Petit S, Zanksy SM, Harrison LH, Reingold A, et al. Effect of use of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in children on invasive pneumococcal disease in children and adults in the USA: analysis of multisite, population-based surveillance. Lancet Infect Dis 2015; 15:301-09. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(14)71081-3.
304. Madhivanan P, Alleyn HN, Raphael E, Krupp K, Ravi K, Nebhrajani R, Arun A, Reingold A, et al. Identification of culturable vaginal Lactobacillus species among reproductive age women in Mysore, India. Med Micro (2015), 64. doi.10.1099/jmm.0.000070.
305. Brito AM, Kendall C, Kerr L, Salani Mota RM, Crosland Guimaraes MD, Dourado I, Pinho A, Schwartz Benzaken A, Brignol S, Reingold A. Factors Associated with Low Levels of HIV Testing among Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) in Brazil. PLOS One (2015). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130445.
306. Dorjee K, Dierberg K, Sadutshang TD, and Reingold A. First report of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in a systemic lupus erythematosus patient. BMC Res Notes (2015) 8:337. doi 10.1186/s13104-015-1302-x.
307. Garg S, Jain S, Dawood F S, Jhung M, Perez A, D’Mello T, Reingold A, et al. Pneumonia among adults hospitalized with laboratory-confirmed seasonal influenze virus infection—United States, 2005-2008. BMC Infectious Diseases (2015) 15:369. Doi 10.1186/s12879-015-1004-y.
308. Shuster M, Eskola J, Duclos P, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Review of vaccine hesitancy: Rationale, remit, and methods. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.035.
309. MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Vaccine hesitancy: Definition, scope and determinants. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.36.
310. Larson H, Jarrett C, Schulz W, Chaudhuri M, Zhou Y, Dube E, Schuster M, MacDonald N, Wilson R, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Measuring vaccine hesitancy: The development of a survey tool. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.37.
311. Butler R, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Diagnosing the determinants of vaccine hesitancy in specific subgroups: The Guide to Tailoring Immunization Programmes (TIP). Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.038.
312. Jarrett C, Wilson R, O’Leary M, Eckersberger E, Larson H, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Strategies for addressing vaccine hesitancy—A systematic review. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.040.
313. Dube E, Gagnon D, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine History. Strategies intended to address vaccine hesitancy: Review of published reviews. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.0041.
314. Nowak G, Gellin B, MacDonald N, Butler R, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Addressing vaccine hesitancy: The potential value of commercial and social marketing principles and practices. Elesevier Ltd. 2015. Vaccine 33 (2015) 4204–4211 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.039.
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315. Goldstein S, MacDonald N, Guirguis S, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. Health Communication and vaccine hesitancy. Elesvier Ltd. 2015.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.042.
316. Eskoka J, Duclos P, Schuster M, MacDonald N, SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. How to deal with vaccine hesitancy? Elsevier Ltd. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016./j.vaccine.2015.04.043.
317. Rathod SD, Li T, Klausner JD, Hubbard A, Reingold AL, and Madhivanan P, Logic regression-derived algorithms for syndromic management of vaginal infections. Medical Informatics and Decision Making. 2015. 15:106. DOI 10.1186/s12911-015-0228-5.
318. Vugia DJ, Meek JI, Danila RN, Jones TF, Schaffner W, Baumbach J, Lathrop S, Farley MM, TobinD’Angelo M, Miller L, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Cieslak PR, Cartter ML, Reingold AL. Training in Infectious Disease Epidemiology through the Emerging Infections Program Sites. Emerging Infectious Diseases. Vol. 21, No. 9; September 2015.
319. Smith EM, Khan MA, Reingold AL, Watt JP. Group B streptococcus infections of soft tissue and bone in California adults, 1995-2012. Epidemiol. Infect. (2015), 143, 3343-3350. doi:10.1017/S0950268815000606.
320. Pekka N, Reingold A. Preventing pneumococcal infections in older adults. The Lancet, Vol 3 November 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/52213-2600(15)00365-3.
321. Tomczyk S, Lynfield R, Schaffner W, Reingold A, et al. Prevention of Antibiotic-Nonsusceptible Invasive Pneumococcal Disease With the 13-Valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine. Clin Infect Dis 2016;62(9):1119-25. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciw067.
322. Cardosa CS, Sabino EC, Oliveira CdL, de Oliveira LC, Ferreira AM, Cunha-Neto E, Bierrenback AL, Ferreira JE, Haikal DS, Reingold AL, et al. Longitudinal study of patients with chronic Chagas cardiomyopathy in Brazil (SaMi-Trop project): a cohort profile. BMJ Open 2016;6:e011181. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011181.
323. Moore MR, Link-Gelles R, Schaffner W, Lynfield R, Haltzman C, Harrison LH, Zansky SM, Rosen JB, Reingold A, et al. Effectiveness of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for prevention of invasive pneumococcal disease in children in the USA: a matched case-control study. The Lancet, Vol 4 May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/52213-2600(16)00052-7.
324. Bramley AM, Chaves SS, Dawood FS, Doshi S, Reingold A, et al. Utility of keywords from chest radiograph reports for pneumonia surveillance among hospitalized patients with influenza: The CDC Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network, 2008-2009. Public Health Reports. May/Jun 2016, Vol. 131 Issue 3, p483-490.
325. Blain AE, Sema M, Wu H, MacNeail JR, Harrison LH, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Miller L, Nichols M, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Penicillin use in Meningococcal disease management: Active Bacterial Core Surveillance Sites, 2009. Open Forum Infectious Diseases. 11 July 2016. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofw152.
326. Link-Gelles R, Westreich D, Aiello AE, Shang N, Weber DJ, Holtzman C, Scherzinger K, Reingold A, et al. Bias with respect to socioeconomic status: A closer look at zip code matching in a pneumococcal vaccine effectiveness study. 8 August 2016. Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.08.005.
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327. Higgins JPT, Soares-Weiser K, Lopez JA, Kakourou A, Chaplin K, Martin NK, Sterne JAC, Reingold A. Association of BCG, DTP, and measles containing vaccines with childhood mortality: systematic review. BMJ. 2016;355:i5170. doi:10.1136/bmj.i5170.
328. Andreuccetti G, Leyton V, Lemos NP, Miziara ID, Ye Y, Takitane J, Munoz DR, Reingold AL, et al. Alcohol use among fatally injured victims in São Paulo, Brazil: bridging the gap between research and health services in developing countries. 2016 Nov 6. doi: 10.1111/add.13688. [Epub ahead of print]
329. Harris CM, Wu HM, Li J, Hall HI, Lee A, Zell E, Harrison LH, Petit S, Farley MM, Lynfield R, Miller L, Nichols M, Reingold A, et al. Meningococcal disease in patients with human immunodeficiency virus infection: a review of cases reported through active surveillance in the United States, 2000-2008. Open Forum Infect Dis. 2016 Dec 20;3(4):ofw226. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofw226.
330. Schrag SJ, Farley MM, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Epidemiology of invasive early-onset neonatal sepsis, 2005 to 2014. Pediatrics. 2016 Dec; 138(6). pii: e20162013.
331. Metcalf BJ, Chochua S, Gertz RE, Li Z, et al. Using whole genome sequencing to identify resistance determinants and predict antimicrobial resistance phenotypes for year 2015 invasive pneumococcal disease isolates recovered in the United States. Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 22, Issue 12, 2016,Pages 1002.e1-1002.e8, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2016.08.001.
332. Wesson P, Reingold A, McFarland W. Theoretical and empirical comparisons of methods to estimate the size of hard-to-reach populations: a systematic review. AIDS Behav. 2017 Jan 11. doi: 10.1007/s10461017-1678-9. [Epub ahead of print] Review.
333. Cohn AC, MacNeil JR, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Reingold AL, et al. Effectiveness and duration of protection of one dose of a meningococcal conjugate vaccine. Pediatrics. Volume 139, No. 2; February 2017.
334. Belongia EA, Karron RA, Reingold A, et al. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations regarding the use of live influenza vaccine: A rejoinder. Vaccine (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.06.017.
335. Carmen SA, Garg S, Anderson EJ, Ryan PA, George A, Zansky SM, Bennett N, Reingold A, et al. Influenza vaccination modifies disease severity among community-dwelling adults hospitalized with influenza. Clin Infect Dis 2017 cix468. doi: 10.1093/cid/cix468.
336. Link-Gelles R, Westreich D, Aiello AE, Shang N, Weber DJ, Rosen JB, Motala T, Mascola L, Eason J, Scherzinger K, Holtzman C, Reingold AL, et al. Generalisability of vaccine effectiveness estimates: an analysis of cases included in a postlicensure evaluation of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in the USA. BMJ Open 2017; 7:e017715. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2017-017715.
337. Metcalf BJ, Chochua S, GirtzJr. RE, et al. Short-read whole genome sequencing for determination of antimicrobial resistance mechanisms and capsular serotypes of current invasive Streptococcus agalactiae recovered in the USA, Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 23, Issue 8, 18 Feb 2017,Pages 574.e7-574.e14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2017.02.021.
31

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-5 Filed 05/29/20 Page 41 of 42
Arthur Lawrence Reingold
338. Arriola C, Garg S, Anderson E, Ryan PA, George A, Zansky SM, Bennett N, Reingold A, et al. Influenza vaccination modifies disease severity among community-dwelling adults hospitalized with influenza. Clin Infect Dis May 2017;00(00):1-9. doi:10.1093/cid/cix468.
339. Wong KK, Burdette E, Mahon B, et al. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices for use of cholera vaccine. MMWR 12 May 2017, 66(18):482-485. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm6618a6.
340. Wesson P, Lechtenberg R, Reingold, A, et al. Evaluating the completeness of HIV surveillance using capture-recapture models, Alameda County, California. AIDS Behav 21 August 2017. doi: 10.1007/s10461-017-1883-6.
341. Orenstein WA, Hinman A, Nkowane B, Olive JM, Reingold A. Measles and Rubella Global Strategic Plan 2012-2020 midterm review. Vaccine 36 (2018); A1-A34; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.09.026
342. Orenstein WA, Cairns L., Hinman .A, Nkowane B., J-M., Olive, Reingold A.L. Measles and Rubella Global Strategic Plan 2012-2020 midterm review report: background and summary. Vaccine 36 (2018) A35-A42: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.10.065.
343. Schille S, Vellozzi C, Reingold A, et al. Prevention of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. Recommendations and Reports:12 January 2018: 67(1);1-31.
344. Gordon A, Reingold A. The Burden of Influenza: a Complex Problem. Current Epidemiology Reports: 05 February 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40471-018-0136-1.
345. Liang JL, Tiwari T, Moro P, et al. Prevention of Pertussis, Tetanus, and Diphtheria with Vaccines in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Recommendations and Reports. 27 April 2018;67(2):1-44. doi:10.15585/mmwr.rr6702a1
346. G. Andreuccetti, C.J. Cherpitel, H.B. Carvalho, V. Leyton, I.D. Miziara, D.R. Munoz, Reingold A, et al. Alcohol in combination with illicit drugs among fatal injuries in Sao Paulo, Brazil: An epidemiological study on the association between acute substance use and injury. Injury, Volume 49, Issue 12, 2018, Pages 2186-2192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.injury.2018.09.035.
347. Soeters HM, Blain A, Pondo T, Doman B, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Miller L, Petit S, Reingold A, et al. Current epidemiology and trends in invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease—United States, 2009–2015, Clin Infec Dis, Volume 67, Issue 6, 15 September 2018, Pages 881–889. https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciy187.
348. O’Brien KS, Emerson P, Hooper PJ, Reingold AL, et al. Antimicrobial resistance following mass azithromycin distribution for trachoma: a systematic review. Lancet Infect. Dis 2018. October 3, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30444-4.
349. Mendes Lobão W, Duarte FG, Burns JD, et al. Low coverage of HPV vaccination in the national immunization programme in Brazil: Parental vaccine refusal or barriers in health-service based vaccine delivery PLoS One. 2018;13(11):e0206726. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0206726.
32

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Arthur Lawrence Reingold
350. Duarte FG, da Silva Moreir S, da Conceicao C Almeida M, de Souza Teles CA, Andrade CS, Reingold A, et al. Sex differences and correlates of poor glycaemic control in type 2 diabetes: a cross-sectional study in Brazil and Venezuela. BMJ Open. 2019;9:e023401. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-023401.
351. Lewnard JA, Reingold AL. Emerging challenges and opportunities in infectious disease epidemiology. American Journal of Epidemiology. May 2019 Volume 188, Issue 5, Pages 873–882. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwy264
352. Schaffner W, Nichol KL, Reingold AL, Preventing hepatitis in us adults through vaccination. Infectious Diseases In Clinical Practice. November 2018, Volume 26, Issue 6 p 304-312. doi: 10.1097/IPC.0000000000000685.
353. Cardoso CS, Ribeiro ALP, Oliveira CDL, Oliveira LC, Ferreira AM, Bierrenbach AL, Silva JLP, Colosimo EA, Ferreira JE, Lee TH, Busch MP, Reingold AL, et al. Beneficial effects of benznidazole in Chagas disease: NIH SaMi-Trop cohort study. PLoS neglected tropical diseases. 2018.12. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006814.
354. Dorjee K, Choden T, Baxi SM, Steinmaus C, and Reingold AL. Risk of cardiovascular disease associated with exposure to abacavir among individuals with HIV: a systematic review and meta-analyses of results from 17 epidemiologic studies. International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents. 2018, 52(5), pp.541-553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2018.07.010.
355. Ahmed SS, Pondo T, Xing W, McGee L, Farley M, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Reingold A, et al. Early impact of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine use on invasive pneumococcal disease among adults with and without underlying medical conditions--United States. Clinical Infectious Diseases. CID 2019:19. doi:10.1093/cid/ciz739.
33

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EXHIBIT 4

5/28/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL DocuCmasees inntth1e U5.-S6. | CDFCiled 05/29/20 Page 2 of 8

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Cases in the U.S.
Last updated on May 28, 2020
TOTAL CASES
1,698,523
19,680 New Cases*

TOTAL DEATHS
100,446
1,415 New Deaths*

Want More Data?
CDC COVID Data Tracker
Cases & Deaths by Jurisdiction
31 jurisdictions report more than 10,000 cases of COVID-19. This map shows COVID-19 cases and deaths reported by U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and other U.S.-a liated jurisdictions. Hover over the map to see the number of cases and deaths reported in each jurisdiction. To go to a jurisdiction’s health department website, click on the jurisdiction on the map.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Reported Cases

0 to 1,000 5,001 to 10,000 20,001 to 40,000

1,001 to 5,000 10,001 to 20,000 40,001 or more

AS MH FM PW MP VI GU PR
Jurisdictions

Add U.S. Map to Your Website

Cases & Deaths by County
Select a state to view the number of cases and deaths by county. This data is courtesy of USAFacts.org ÿ

Select a State

View County Data

New Cases by Day
The following chart shows the number of new cases of COVID-19 reported by day in the U.S. since the beginning of the outbreak.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases by Age
The following chart shows the age of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, and age was available for 1,324,111 (99.8%) people.

Cases by Race & Age
The following chart shows the race of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, but race was only available for 653,561 (49.2%) people.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases by Ethnicity & Age
The following chart shows the ethnicity of people with COVID-19. Data were collected from 1,327,267 people, but ethnicity was only available for 613,757 (46.2%) people.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases & Deaths among Healthcare Personnel
Data were collected from 1,365,370 people, but healthcare personnel status was only available for 288,658 (21.1%) people. For the 63,136 cases of COVID-19 among healthcare personnel, death status was only available for 36,043 (57.1%).

CASES AMONG HCP
63,136

DEATHS AMONG HCP
299

Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data
CDC has moved the following information to the Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data When did people in the U.S. get sick from COVID-19, How did people in the U.S. get COVID-19, and Cases of COVID-19 from Wuhan, China and the Diamond Princess cruise.

About the Data

Updated Daily

This page is updated daily based on data con rmed at 4:00pm ET the day before.

Numbers reported on Saturdays and Sundays are preliminary and not yet con rmed by state and territorial health

departments These numbers may be modi ed when numbers are updated on Mondays

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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departments. These numbers may be modi ed when numbers are updated on Mondays.

Number of Jurisdictions
There are currently 55 U.S.-a liated jurisdictions reporting cases of COVID-19. This includes 50 states, District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S Virgin Islands.

Con rmed & Probable Cases
As of April 14, 2020, CDC case counts and death counts include both con rmed and probable cases and deaths. This change was made to re ect an interim COVID-19 position statement Ă ÿ issued by the Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists on April 5, 2020. The position statement included a case de nition and made COVID-19 a nationally noti able disease.
A con rmed case or death is de ned by meeting con rmatory laboratory evidence for COVID-19.
A probable case or death is de ned by one of the following:
Meeting clinical criteria AND epidemiologic evidence with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID-19 Meeting presumptive laboratory evidence AND either clinical criteria OR epidemiologic evidence Meeting vital records criteria with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID19

Case Noti cations
Case noti cations were received by CDC from U.S. public health jurisdictions and the National Noti able Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS).

Accuracy of Data
CDC does not know the exact number of COVID-19 illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths for a variety of reasons. COVID-19 can cause mild illness, symptoms might not appear immediately, there are delays in reporting and testing, not everyone who is infected gets tested or seeks medical care, and there may be di erences in how states and territories con rm numbers in their jurisdictions.
State and local public health departments are now testing and publicly reporting their cases. In the event of a discrepancy between CDC cases and cases reported by state and local public health o cials, data reported by states should be considered the most up to date.

More Information

COVIDView – A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity

Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data

FAQ: COVID-19 Data and Surveillance

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Testing in the U.S. World Map Health Departments

Page last reviewed: May 28, 2020

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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EXHIBIT 5

COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

!
Stay Safe MN About the Order (/covid19/for-minnesotans/stay-safe-mn/stay-safe-mn.jsp) Frequently Asked Questions (/covid19/for-minnesotans/staysafe-mn/faq.jsp) Share Our Message (/covid19/media/share-message/index.jsp)

(/covid19/)
"
COVID-19 Dashboard: Data on Minnesota Cases
When viewed on a smartphone, select bars to view chart labels.

22,947
Conﬁrmed Cases

967
Deceased

16,655
Released From Isolation


+ −
Esri, HERE, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USG…

Confirmed Cases by County Aitkin County: 7
Anoka County: 1,289 Becker County: 36 Beltrami County: 14 Benton County: 173 Big Stone County: 4
Blue Earth County: 126 Brown County: 14 Carlton County: 73 Carver County: 189 Cass County: 13
Chippewa County: 44 Chisago County: 54

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000
0

Total Confirmed Cases by Exposure

5,260

4,930

744

Travel

Congregate Living

1,399

Health Care: staff

Community: known

Community: no known

4,855 Unknown

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000 0

1,956 Hospitalized

Total Confirmed Cases by Hospitalization

5,315 Non-Hospitalized

924 ICU

14,752 Unknown

20,000

15,000

15,305

Total Confirmed Cases by Residency

10,000

5,000
0 Private

2,771

165

408

LTCF Residential

Jail Behavioral

Health

4,130

42

3

Other

Unknown Work Dorm

4,130

23

68

29

3

HHotoeml elesHs oSmheellteesrs Non-Shelter

University

Unknown

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

5,000 4,000 3,000

Total Confirmed Cases by Age

4,212

4,580

3,660

3,335

2,000

1,536

2,103

1,243

1,171

1,000 662
397

38

10

0

0-5

6-19

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

70-79

80-89

90-99

100+

Unk

14,000 12,000 10,000
8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000
0

11,051 Male

Total Confirmed Cases by Gender
11,433

Female

455 Unknown

8 Other

10,000 8,000

7,934

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 White

5,231 Black

Total Confirmed Cases by Race

1,240

185

Asian Amer.

Indian

/

Alaskan

44 Pacific Islander

5,154

2,713

Other

Unknown

446 Multiple

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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COVID-19 dashboard / CCOAVSID-E190U:p2d0at-ecs van-d0I1nf2or0m5at-ioEnC- STt-aTteNofLMinnDesooctaument 15-7 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 5 5/28/20, 5(54 PM

14,000 12,000 10,000
8,000 6,000 4,000

Total Confirmed Cases by Ethnicity
12,797

4,421 Hispanic

Non-Hispanic

5,729 Unknown

https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-8 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 6

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 2 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
By Kelley Luckstein
Updated visitor policy: Mayo Clinic limits number of visitors during COVID-19 response

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

Page 1 of 3

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 3 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
ROCHESTER, Minn. ― To protect patients and staff, Mayo Clinic is limiting the number of outpatient and hospital visitors while there is concern about COVID-19 transmission.

UPDATED: Saturday, March 21st

As Mayo Clinic continues to monitor the outbreak of the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease), additional changes have been made to policies for visitors to all Mayo Clinic sites. Please read below for additional details.

Effective Sunday, March 22, to ensure the safety of hospital patients and staff, no visitors will be allowed in the hospital setting or emergency department. Exceptions include consideration for childbirth, end-of-life care, hospitalized children, and other rare and unique circumstances assessed by the care team.

Effective Monday, March 23, outpatient clinic patients may have one individual accompany them, with consideration for special exceptions determined by patient care teams.

The ongoing safety of patients, staff and the community remains Mayo Clinic’s primary focus. To protect patients and staff, Mayo Clinic will limit the number of visitors on its campuses while there is a threat of COVID-19 transmission.

These restrictions may be difficult for patients and their loved ones, but Mayo is taking these necessary steps to protect patients and staff. Limiting the number of visitors is temporary and is being done to safeguard the health of all who come to Mayo Clinic.

Following are site-specific updates to hospital visitor policies:

Arizona:

Outpatient/Clinic Patients: Patients may have one individual accompany them in the clinic (outpatient) setting. Due to additional screening activities, please allow extra time upon arrival (approximately 20 minutes).
Hospital Patients: For each hospital patient, one visitor per patient at a time will be allowed. The visitor will be screened to be sure they are free from fever and respiratory symptoms. Additional guidelines apply for patients who are receiving care for respiratory conditions that require isolation.
Florida:

Effectively immediately, to ensure the safety of hospital patients, no visitors will be allowed for patients at Mayo Clinic Hospital and Emergency Department. Requests for exceptions should be sent to the Healthcare Incident Command System (HICS) at 904-956-1800.
Rochester:

Hospital Patients: Effective Sunday, March 22, to ensure the safety of hospital patients and staff, no visitors will be allowed in the hospital setting or emergency department.

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

Page 2 of 3

Updated visitor policy:CMaAyoSCElin0ic:l2im0it-scnvum-0be1r2of0v5is-itEorCs dTur-iTngNCLOVIDD-1o9 creuspmonesen–t M1a5yo-8CliniFc Nileewds N0e5tw/2or9k /20 Page 4 of 4 5/27/20, 6:48 PM
Exceptions include consideration for childbirth, end-of-life care, hospitalized children, and other rare circumstances as assessed by the care team.
Outpatient/Clinic Patients: Patients may have one individual accompany them in the clinic (outpatient) setting, with consideration for special exceptions as determined by your care team. Due to respiratory illness screening activities, please allow extra time upon arrival (approximately 15 minutes). We ask for your patience as we work to implement these processes in our clinics.
Since Mayo has begun screening visitors in Rochester, staff members are urged to use staff-only entrances to avoid congestion. If you must use an entrance used by patients and visitors, you can move swiftly through by displaying your Mayo Clinic access identification badge.
Mayo Clinic Health System:
Hospitalized patients across Mayo Clinic Health System will no longer be allowed to have visitors. The effective dates are as follows:
Northwest Wisconsin: Effective Sunday, March 22, at 7 a.m. Southwest Wisconsin: Effective Sunday, March 22, at 7 a.m. Southeast Minnesota: Effective as of Friday, March 20 Southwest Minnesota: Effective as of Friday, March 20
A limited number of compassionate exceptions will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and no visitors under age 18 will be allowed. All visitors will be screened to assess the need for a COVID-19 test. If a visitor is tested, they will not be allowed to visit while results are pending, or if results are positive.
Click here for additional information on patient visitor guidelines, including Florida, Arizona and the Mayo Clinic Health system. (https://www.mayoclinic.org/covid-19)
Media contact: Kelley Luckstein, Mayo Clinic Public Affairs, newsbureau@mayo.edu (mailto:newsbureau@mayo.edu)
Check the CDC website (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html) for additional updates on COVID-19. For more information and all your COVID-19 coverage, go to the Mayo Clinic News Network (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/covid-19/) and mayoclinic.org (https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963).
#COVID-19 (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/covid-19/)
#visitor policy (https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/tag/visitor-policy/)

https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limits-number-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/#

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EXHIBIT 7

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-9 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 3
The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE

Perspective ﻿

Not Dying Alone — Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic
Glenn K. Wakam, M.D., John R. Montgomery, M.D., Ben E. Biesterveld, M.D., and Craig S. Brown, M.D.​​

Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

Dr. Wakam: I’m 5 hours into my ICU shift at a community hospital in Detroit when the results of another arterial blood gas return. My patient has been hospi-

ourselves telling families, “Because of hospital policy, we cannot allow visitors at this time.” This conversation sometimes takes

talized for 3 days and is Covid-19–positive. Over the past 12 place at the doors to the ICU,

over the phone, or in front of the

hours, his treatment has progressed and helpless. She asks to come into the hospital, as families beg to see

from intubation, to prone positioning hospital to be with her husband, or at their loved ones before they die.

on 100% fractional inspired oxygen, least see him through the door to his A seemingly simple request, which

to medically induced paralysis, and fi- room. Unfortunately, I am told by the in other times would be encour-

nally to bilevel ventilation. The results unit charge nurse that hospital policy aged, has become an ethical and

from the arterial blood gas are dismal: permits no visitors for patients who health care dilemma.

pH 7.19, pCO2 70.1, pO2 63.7, HCO3 have tested positive or are under inves-

It is 12 a.m., and I try to advocate

26.0. He has already experienced epi- tigation for Covid-19.

for the wife with the nursing managers.

sodes of profound hypoxia when we try The fear of dying alone is To complicate matters, the wife admits

to rotate him into a supine position, nearly universal — a fact of that although she hasn’t had any fever

and his heart has begun to show signs which anyone who’s taken care or cough, she has had a headache and a

of strain, with periods of atrial fibrilla- of a critically ill patient is acutely sore throat. With no clear policy in

tion with rapid ventricular response and aware. So we sometimes go to place for family members with symp-

nonsustained runs of ventricular tachy- great lengths to give patients just toms, we call the hospital administra-

cardia. A request to transfer the patient a little more time for family mem- tor at home, and he answers immedi-

for extracorporeal membrane oxygena- bers to arrive and say their good- ately: “No.” Then there’s a long back

tion (ECMO) is denied. It’s 11 p.m., byes. One aspect of the Covid-19 and forth about “extenuating circum-

and I’m worried that my patient won’t pandemic that has been particu- stances” criteria, which allow a single

survive until morning.

larly difficult is that instead of visitor to come to the hospital. But since

I call the patient’s wife to inform her our usual promise that “We’ll do the wife could possibly have symptoms

about her husband’s trajectory. The con- everything we can to keep him and has not been tested for Covid-19,

versation makes her feel overwhelmed alive until you get here,” we find the administrator decides she cannot

n engl j med﻿  nejm.org ﻿

1

The New England Journal of Medicine Downloaded from nejm.org on May 27, 2020. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-9 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 3

PERSPECTIVE

Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

visit. I telephone the wife and relay the final decision, and she rapidly cycles through stages of grief. Her initial anger and threats of a lawsuit quickly give way to pleading and bargaining — “What if I only spent 5 minutes and left?”
The problem is multifaceted. In many cases, family members have already spent time in close contact with the patient, which means they’re reasonably likely to be infected with SARS-CoV-2 themselves. Moreover, there is a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE), and using some on family members means consuming more of a scarce resource. And if the family members are currently uninfected, a visit to a ward full of patients with Covid-19 risks infecting people who lack proper training in PPE use.
This dilemma has led to some creative workarounds: nurses may hold the bedside phone up to the patient’s ear or bring their personal smartphone into the room and hold it up while using Skype, WhatsApp, or FaceTime. But many nurses, owing to concern about HIPAA privacy rules, a heavy workload, or poor connectivity can’t offer such communication with family. And even if a call does take place, families may be left feeling like they didn’t get to say goodbye properly — and we are left feeling like there must be a better way.
My patient’s wife arrives at the emergency department at 1:30 a.m., despite having been told she would not be allowed to see her husband. I go to meet her, and we discuss her husband’s

continued decline. Unfortunately, in the middle of the conversation, a Code Blue rings from the overhead speaker for a patient in the ICU. I step away and find myself entering her husband’s room, where CPR is already in progress.
After 90 minutes of CPR, epinephrine, and defibrillations, my patient still has not regained a sustained pulse. I somberly call time of death. One of the nurses in the hallway has been in contact with the wife throughout the process and has informed her of the death; she now has the wife on FaceTime so that she can see her husband. When she recognizes him in the distorted image, she lets out a wail of sorrow. She is in the midst of her final goodbyes when I have to excuse myself from the room: another patient with Covid-19 is deteriorating a few rooms over.
We, as residents, have spent much of our time these past few weeks in community ICUs around Detroit, one of the epicenters of Covid-19 in the United States, and have all experienced similar scenarios. We have witnessed more death in the past 3 weeks than in all our previous years combined. Unfortunately, similar stories are becoming more common and represent uncharted territory for many of us, as we try to maintain our humanity and patient-centeredness while managing these difficult situations.
We believe that the U.S. health care system can do better. As telehealth and virtual meetings become the new normal, so can telecommunication between isolated patients and their families. Perhaps setting up a tablet com-

puter facing the patient or repurposing a workstation on wheels logged in to a video chat would be a solution. Recently, some guidance has become available regarding difficult but necessary conversations related to Covid-19 and ways of bridging the physical distance we must maintain during the pandemic.1,2 Such efforts may not represent the evidence-based medicine we all strive to practice, but they capture some of the art of caring not just for patients, but also for their families and friends. National guidance would be beneficial, since existing Covid-19 management resources fall short. There may be no way for families to hold patients’ hands or hug them while they’re dying, but with the care and compassion of frontline health care workers, maybe we can harness creative solutions to help them feel some connection, while still keeping everyone safe.
Identifying details have been changed to protect the family’s privacy.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Surgery, University of Michigan , Ann Arbor.
This article was published on April 14, 2020, at NEJM.org.
1. VitalTalk. COVID ready communication playbook (https://www​.vitaltalk​.org/​guides/​ covid​-­19​-­communication​-­skills/​). 2. Hollander JE, Carr BG. Virtually perfect? Telemedicine for Covid-19. N Engl J Med. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2003539.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2007781 Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic

2

n engl j med﻿  nejm.org ﻿

The New England Journal of Medicine Downloaded from nejm.org on May 27, 2020. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2020 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

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EXHIBIT 8

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Social Distancing
Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

Page 1 of 4

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
Limiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
What is social distancing?
Social distancing, also called “physical distancing,” means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home. To practice social or physical distancing:
Stay at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people Do not gather in groups Stay out of crowded places and avoid mass gatherings
In addition to everyday steps to prevent COVID-19, keeping space between you and others is one of the best tools we have to avoid being exposed to this virus and slowing its spread locally and across the country and world.
Limit close contact with others outside your household in indoor and outdoor spaces. Since people can spread the virus before they know they are sick, it is important to stay away from others when possible, even if you—or they—have no symptoms. Social distancing is especially important for people who are at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.
Many people have personal circumstances or situations that present challenges with practicing social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Please see the following guidance for additional recommendations and considerations for:
Households Living in Close Quarters: How to Protect Those Who Are Most Vulnerable Living in Shared Housing People with Disabilities People Experiencing Homelessness

!

If you have been exposed or are sick
Separate from others to limit the spread of COVID-19 Take care of yourself while you’re sick

Why practice social distancing?
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

Page 2 of 4

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM
COVID-19 spreads mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6 feet) for a prolonged period. Spread happens when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. The droplets can also be inhaled into the lungs. Recent studies indicate that people who are infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of COVID-19.
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes. However, this is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads. COVID-19 can live for hours or days on a surface, depending on factors such as sunlight, humidity, and the type of surface. Social distancing helps limit opportunities to come in contact with contaminated surfaces and infected people outside the home.
Although the risk of severe illness may be di!erent for everyone, anyone can get and spread COVID-19. Everyone has a role to play in slowing the spread and protecting themselves, their family, and their community.
Tips for social distancing
Follow guidance from authorities where you live. If you need to shop for food or medicine at the grocery store or pharmacy, stay at least 6 feet away from others. Also consider other options:
Use mail-order for medications, if possible. Consider a grocery delivery service. Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face covering when around others, including when you have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store. Cloth face coverings should NOT be placed on children under age 2, anyone who has trouble breathing, or is unconscious, incapacitated, or otherwise unable to remove the mask without assistance. Keep at least 6 feet between yourself and others, even when you wear a face covering. Avoid gatherings of any size outside your household, such as a friend’s house, parks, restaurants, shops, or any other place. This advice applies to people of any age, including teens and younger adults. Children should not have in-person playdates while school is out. To help maintain social connections while social distancing, learn tips to keep children healthy while school’s out. Work from home when possible. See additional information for critical infrastructure workforce " from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Limit using any kind of public transportation, ridesharing, or taxis, if possible. If you must use public transportation, follow these tips to protect yourself. If you are a student or parent, talk to your school about options for digital/distance learning.
Stay connected while staying away. It is very important to stay in touch with friends and family that don’t live in your home. Call, video chat, or stay connected using social media. Everyone reacts di!erently to stressful situations and having to socially distance yourself from someone you love can be di"cult. Read tips for stress and coping.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

Page 3 of 4

Social Distancing, QuaCraAntSineE, a0nd:2Is0ol-actiovn-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-10 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 5 5/27/20, 6:51 PM

#

Need help? Know someone who does?
If you, or someone you care about, are feeling overwhelmed with emotions like sadness, depression, or

anxiety, or feel like you want to harm yourself or others

Call 911 Visit the Disaster Distress Helpline " , call 1-800-985-5990, or text TalkWithUs to 66746 Visit the National Domestic Violence Hotline " or call 1-800-799-7233 and TTY 1-800-787-3224

More Information
How to Protect Yourself Cleaning and Disinfecting Your Home Gatherings and Community Events
Page last reviewed: May 6, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 42
EXHIBIT 9

This document is made available electronically by the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library as part of
an onCgoAiSngEd0ig:i2ta0l -acrcvh-0iv1in2g0p5r-oEjeCctT. h-TttNp:L//wDwowc.luegm.setantte1.m5n-1.u1s/lrFl/eilxeedco0r5d/e2rs9//e2x0ecoPrdaegrse.a2spof 42
Emergency Executive Order 20-48
Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public
Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain NonCritical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces
I, Tim Walz, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and applicable statutes, issue the following Executive Order: The COVID-19 pandemic presents an unprecedented challenge to our State. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) characterized the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic. Despite efforts to contain COVID-19, the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) indicate that it is expected to spread. Confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Minnesota are rapidly increasing. On March 15, 2020, Minnesota detected the first confirmed cases caused by “community spread”—infections not epidemiologically linked to overseas travel. By March 17, 2020, all fifty states had reported a confirmed case of COVID-19. And on March 21, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”) announced the first confirmed fatality due to COVID-19 in Minnesota. Minnesota has taken proactive steps to ensure that we are ahead of the curve on COVID-19 prevention and response. On March 13, 2020, I issued Executive Order 20-01 and declared a peacetime emergency because this pandemic, an act of nature, threatens the lives of Minnesotans, and local resources are inadequate to address the threat. On April 13, 2020, after notifying the Legislature, I issued Executive Order 20-35, extending the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01. Previous Executive Orders required the closure of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation and directed Minnesotans to stay at home except for certain exempted activities and Critical Sector work. Community spread of COVID-19 continues to increase in Minnesota and nationwide. Just three weeks ago, on April 8, 2020, Minnesota had 1,154 confirmed COVID-19 cases, with 271 hospitalizations and 39 fatalities. As of today, Minnesota has had 5,136 confirmed COVID-19 cases, with 1,044 hospitalizations and 343 fatalities. The United States has recorded over 1,005,000 COVID-19 cases with over 57,500 recorded fatalities. The continued presence of community spread in Minnesota and the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases and deaths require us
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to continue our measures to slow the spread of this pandemic. Slowing the community spread of COVID-19 is critical to ensuring that our healthcare facilities remain able to accommodate those who require intensive medical intervention.
Executive Orders 20-20 and 20-33 permitted work in Critical Sectors based on guidance from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. That Guidance has since been updated and revised. This order adopts and relies on the April 17, 2020 Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response, Version 3.0 (“CISA Guidance (version 3.0)”—attached to, and incorporated into, this Executive Order). The CISA Guidance (version 3.0) identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability. This federal guidance provides a baseline for Minnesota’s efforts to ensure critical infrastructure and services are maintained while slowing the spread of COVID-19.
Many Minnesotans, who neither work in a Critical Sector nor can work from home, have been unable to work during this pandemic. In Executive Order 20-33, seeking to balance public health needs and economic considerations, I directed the MDH Commissioner, and the Commissioners of the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (“DEED”) and the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”) to begin planning to allow certain nonCritical Sector workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. I explained that such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. In Executive Order 20-38, I expanded exemptions related to outdoor recreational activities and facilities. In Executive Order 20-40, I further allowed certain nonCritical Sector workers to return to work once their employers had planned for and provided a safe work environment. This Executive Order continues our plan to safely reopen our economy.
Businesses have the opportunity to resume work through preparation and planning that will allow for compliance with the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 182 (“Minnesota OSHA Standards”), in addition to guidelines related to COVID-19 set forth by the Minnesota Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“MDH and CDC Guidelines”). We will continue to monitor the level of COVID-19 cases and explore whether more workers can safely return to other workplaces.
In Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.02, the Minnesota Legislature conferred upon the Governor emergency powers “in order to (1) ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with disasters, (2) generally protect the public peace, health, and safety, and (3) preserve the lives and property of the people of the state.” Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 1, the Governor has general authority to control the state’s emergency management as well as carry out the provisions of Minnesota’s Emergency Management Act.
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 3(7), authorizes the Governor to cooperate with federal and state agencies in “matters pertaining to the emergency management of the state and nation.” This includes “the direction or control of . . . the conduct of persons in the state, including entrance or exit from any stricken or threatened public place, occupancy of facilities, and . . . public meetings or gatherings.” Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that same section, the Governor may “make, amend, and rescind the necessary orders and rules to carry out the
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provisions” of Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 12. When approved by the Executive Council and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, such orders and rules have the force and effect of law during the peacetime emergency. Any inconsistent rules or ordinances of any agency or political subdivision of the state are suspended during the pendency of the emergency.
For these reasons, I order as follows:
1. Beginning on Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 11:59 pm through Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm, all persons currently living within the State of Minnesota are ordered to stay at home or in their place of residence except to engage in the Activities set forth below in paragraph 5 and to work in Critical Sectors and Non-Critical Exempt Businesses as forth below in paragraphs 6 and 8. Executive Orders 20-33, 20-38, 2040, and 20-47 are rescinded as of Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
2. This Executive Order does not restrict virtual work or telework (i.e., work from home). Minnesotans working in any field, including the Critical Sectors and NonCritical Exempt Businesses set forth below, must work from their home or residence as much as possible. Any worker who can work from home must do so.
3. Masks and face coverings. I strongly encourage all Minnesotans to wear a manufactured or homemade cloth face covering at all times when they leave their homes and travel to any public setting where other social distancing measures are difficult to maintain (e.g., grocery and other stores), and to follow face covering guidelines issued by MDH and the CDC until this order is rescinded. Such face masks and coverings are for source control – to help limit the person wearing the covering from infecting others. They are not yet known to be protective of the wearer and thus are not personal protective equipment.
4. Definitions. For purposes of this Executive Order, homes or residences include mobile homes, hotels, motels, shared rental units, shelters, and similar facilities, to the extent they are used for lodging. As used in this Executive Order, “workers” and “personnel” are broadly defined to include owners, proprietors, employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and interns. As used in this Executive Order, “Critical Sectors” is defined to include the categories found in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the additional categories listed below in paragraph 6.
5. Exemptions – Activities. Minnesotans may leave their homes or residences to engage in the following activities, provided that all persons follow the MDH and CDC Guidelines, including but not limited to social distancing, to the maximum extent possible. Consistent with federal guidance and to protect our neighbors, Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel. This list of Activities may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. Clarifications will be available for public review at: https://mn.gov/covid19/
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a. Relocation to ensure safety. Individuals whose homes or residences are unsafe or become unsafe, including individuals who have suffered or are at risk of domestic violence or for whom the safety, sanitation, or essential operations of their home or residence cannot be maintained, are allowed and urged to leave their home or residence and relocate to a safe alternative home or residence.
b. Health and safety activities. Individuals may seek emergency services; obtain medical services, supplies, and medications; and visit a healthcare or dental professional or facility, or a veterinarian. Individuals may also donate blood.
c. Outdoor Recreational Activity. Individuals must not engage in outdoor recreational activities where they will come into close proximity with others from different households. Individuals may engage in the activities listed below, provided that they follow the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) and MDH guidelines on outdoor recreation and guidelines for facilities and the public (“Outdoor Recreation Guidelines”) available at DNR’s COVID-19 website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid19.html):
i. Individuals may engage in any outdoor activity that is dependent upon or derives its principal benefit from natural surroundings and open space, including but not limited to hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, hiking, biking, golfing, and picnicking for the purposes of pleasure, rest, exercise, or relaxation, provided that the activity can be engaged in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines, including maintaining at least six feet of separation between participants from different households. Groups within a single household may engage in outdoor activities or sports that do not allow for social distancing (e.g., soccer or basketball) but should not engage in such activities with members of other households.
ii. Outdoor recreational activities allowed by this Executive Order do not include performances, competitions, team events, tournaments, races, rallies, organized sports, spectator events, fairs, or any other events that involve the gathering of individuals in a manner that would preclude social distancing. For example, individuals must not partake, as participants or as spectators, in activities such as marathons, fundraising walks, fishing contests, league sports, and tournaments.
iii. All persons participating in outdoor recreational activities under this Executive Order must follow the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
iv. Nothing in this paragraph permits trespass upon private property, and all activities undertaken pursuant to this paragraph must be undertaken in accordance with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license
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and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules. Nothing in this paragraph should be construed to abrogate existing local authority to limit or restrict activities or close facilities.
d. Supplies and services. Individuals may leave their residences to:
i. Obtain food, including delivery or carry-out services, beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic), and other grocery items.
ii. Obtain gasoline.
iii. Obtain supplies needed to work from home.
iv. Obtain commercially available personal protective equipment and supplies and materials necessary to make homemade source control items such as face masks.
v. Obtain products needed to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes and residences, businesses, and personally owned vehicles, including automobiles and bicycles.
vi. Visit and use the services of laundromats and dry cleaners.
vii. Pick up retail products from establishments offering curbside pickup services.
e. Essential intrastate and interstate travel. Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel. Individuals may travel to exempted activities and may travel to return to a home or place of residence. Individuals may also travel into and out of Minnesota.
f. Care of others. Individuals may care for a family member, friend, or pet in another household, and may transport family members, friends, or pets as allowed by this Executive Order, including the transport of children pursuant to existing parenting time schedules or other visitation schedules pertaining to a child in need of protective services (CHIPS) proceeding.
g. Displacement. Individuals without a home are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order, and they may move between emergency shelters, dropin centers, and encampments. Encampments, including both new and existing encampments, should not be subject to sweeps or disbandment by state or local governments, as such sweeps or disbandment increase the potential risk and spread of COVID-19.
i. Law enforcement is not prohibited from addressing trespassing or exigent circumstances (i.e., those requiring immediate action to protect life, prevent injury, or preserve evidence) that occur within
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encampments or among people staying outdoors. Law enforcement and other first responders should respond to trespassing and exigent circumstances as those situations require.
ii. If a local government entity is providing sufficient alternate housing, shelter, or encampment space that complies with MDH’s guidance entitled Homeless Services Settings: Interim Guidance for Providers and the CDC’s guidance entitled Responding to COVID-19 Among People Experiencing Unsheltered Homelessness, or if an encampment has reached a size or status such that is a documented threat to the health, safety, or security of residents, state or local governments may restrict, limit, or close encampment spaces.
iii. The commissioners of the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency and the Minnesota Department of Human Services are authorized, as co-chairs of the Minnesota Interagency Council on Homelessness, to issue additional guidance as needed to clarify this provision or further address the issue of homeless encampments.
h. Moving or relocation. Individuals are permitted to move to a new home or place of residence, provided they follow MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible.
i. Voting. Individuals are permitted and encouraged to vote in all state and local elections. Voters are also encouraged to vote by mail using an absentee ballot where feasible. Additional information from the Secretary of State is available at https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/electionscalendar/2020-elections-and-covid-19/
j. Funerals. Individuals may leave their home or residence to attend funerals, whether at a place of worship, funeral home, burial site, or other similar location, provided that the gathering consists of no more than 10 attendees. The space utilized must allow for social distancing and compliance with MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible. Venues should make accommodations for remote attendance, if possible, for others. Individuals who are at high risk from COVID-19 are strongly encouraged to attend remotely.
k. Weddings. Individuals may leave their home or residence to be married, to serve as witnesses, or to officiate a marriage, provided that the gathering consists of no more than 10 attendees. The wedding location must allow for social distancing and compliance with MDH and CDC Guidelines to the maximum extent possible. The restrictions on places of public accommodation adopted in Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and this Executive Order otherwise remain in effect.
l. Tribal Activities and Lands.
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i. Activities by tribal members within the boundaries of their tribal reservations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
ii. Activities within the boundaries of federal land held in trust for one of the 11 Minnesota Tribal Nations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
iii. Activities by tribal members to exercise their federal treaty rights within the boundaries of their treaty territory (also known as “ceded territory”) are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by applicable tribal authorities.
iv. Tribal members may travel to and from their tribal reservations in accordance with applicable tribal law.
6. Exemptions – Critical Sectors. All workers who can work from home must do so. Workers in the following Critical Sectors, who are performing work that cannot be done at their home or residence through telework or virtual work and can be done only at a place of work outside of their home or residence, are exempted from the prohibition in paragraph 1 of this Executive Order as set forth below. These Critical Sector exemptions apply only to travel to and from an individual’s home or residence and place of work and an individual’s performance of work duties that cannot be done at their home or residence. Travel may include transportation to and from child care or school settings as necessary to ensure the safe care of children. This list of Critical Sectors may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. These clarifications carry the full weight and effect of this Executive Order. Clarifications are available for public review at: http://mn.gov/deed/critical/
a. Healthcare and public health. As applicable, healthcare and public health workers are subject to the restrictions on elective surgeries and procedures as set forth in Executive Orders 20-09 and 20-17. This category is limited to:
i. Healthcare and public health workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
ii. Workers providing or supporting reproductive health care, childbirth services, mental health care, and substance use treatment.
iii. Workers supporting manufacturers, technicians, logistics and warehouse operators, and distributors of personal care, hygiene, and healthcare products.
iv. Workers providing or supporting home care and human services workers from government or non-profit providers who are delivering
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food, prescriptions, case management services, mental health and substance abuse therapy, or who are otherwise caring for a client.
v. Workers providing or supporting home-based care for adults, seniors, and children, including but not limited to people who are blind, deaf, deafblind, or hard of hearing and people with disabilities, including physical disabilities, developmental disabilities, intellectual disabilities, substance use disorders, or mental illness. This includes workers who must travel to a person’s home to provide care or other in-home services including meal delivery and one-on-one interpreting services for people who are blind, deaf, deafblind, or hard of hearing.
vi. Personal care attendants, paid employees of government and nonprofit providers, or volunteers representing government and non-profit providers.
vii. Workers supporting the medical cannabis industry.
viii. Workers in adult daycares are not exempted.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and first responders. This category is limited to law enforcement and public safety workers and first responders listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), and all corrections personnel, state and county probation officers, supervision agents, victims’ advocates, animal control officers, humane officers, and all workers who support electronic security and life-safety services. This category also includes the following:
i. Bail bond agents posting a bond.
ii. Workers supporting indoor gun or shooting ranges when providing qualification shooting or skills maintenance to licensed Minnesota peace officers, law enforcement officers, and federally sworn law enforcement officers assigned to work within the state of Minnesota. Workers supporting outdoor shooting ranges are exempt under paragraph 6.kk of this Executive Order.
iii. Workers and attendees at skills training for the state’s Professional Peace Officer Education (“PPOE”) providers, where such training cannot be given remotely and provided that social distancing and other mitigation strategies are employed.
iv. Evaluators and firefighters at skills training, including evaluation for the state’s firefighter Certification Testing, where such training and evaluations cannot be given remotely.
c. Food and agriculture. This category includes food and agriculture workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0). For clarity, and for the purposes of
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this Executive Order, references to “beverages” include alcoholic beverages. The restrictions on restaurants, bars, and other places of public accommodation adopted in Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, 20-18, and this Executive Order remain in effect. This category also includes:
i. Workers supporting agricultural equipment repair service.
ii. Lawncare and landscaping workers.
iii. Workers supporting garden centers, stores, and nurseries, provided that such centers, stores, or nurseries adhere to guidance provided by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture.
iv. Workers supporting florists for the sale for delivery only of perishable plant stock. Workers delivering perishable plant stock are strongly encouraged to drop off product at the front door of nursing homes and hospitals to avoid contact with vulnerable populations.
v. Workers supporting bait harvesters.
vi. This category does not include workers supporting tobacco and vaping-product shops or cannabidiol (CBD) oil shops, but these workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a NonCritical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
d. Energy. This category is limited to energy workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), workers supporting emergency response operations, and workers supporting the underground storage of natural gas.
e. Water and wastewater. This category is limited to water and wastewater workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to State Parks workers who maintain water and wastewater infrastructure, workers who perform work related to residential wells and septic tanks, and workers who supply bottled water or home filtration systems in areas where that is a health necessity.
f. Transportation and logistics. This category is limited to the transportation and logistics workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to:
i. State, county, and local government agencies and agency workers, as well as private sector workers, who support or enable transportation functions, including engineers, dispatchers, maintenance and repair technicians (including workers at maintenance and repair shops), warehouse workers, truck stop and rest area workers, and workers that maintain and inspect infrastructure (including those that require crossborder travel).
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ii. Workers engaged in roadway construction, maintenance, and utility projects.
iii. Public transit workers.
iv. Bicycle shops and distribution facilities.
v. Automobile, motorcycle, recreational vehicle (RV), and all-terrain vehicle (ATV) sales, when conducted by appointment only.
vi. Workers who clean vehicles used for public transportation, government services, and Critical Sectors.
vii. Workers transporting boats.
viii. Workers necessary for the operation of safe harbors and marinas to provide refuge for boaters when conditions make boating on open water unsafe.
ix. Workers supporting car washes, but only where such car washes are limited to exterior washes, allow for payment without direct contact between workers and customers, and where customers remain in their vehicles.
g. Public works and infrastructure support services. This category is limited to public works and infrastructure support services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to construction material suppliers and workers providing services necessary to maintain construction material sources.
h. Communications and information technology. This category is limited to communications and information technology workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and all workers who support news services of all kinds, including newspapers, radio, television, and other forms of news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions. This category is limited to the other community-based and government essential functions listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to workers who support the following functions and services:
i. Election support services and election administration workers.
ii. Housing, shelter, and homelessness-prevention staff of state and local agencies and organizations responsible for ensuring safe and stable housing, including workers from state and local agencies and organizations with responsibility for ensuring safe and stable housing; shelter outreach or drop-in center programs; financing affordable housing; and administering rent subsidies, homeless interventions,
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operating supports, and similar supports. This includes workers necessary to provide repairs, maintenance, and operations support to residential dwellings.
iii. Workers performing all other governmental functions which are necessary to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the public, to preserve the essential elements of the financial system of government, and to continue priority services as determined by a political subdivision of the State. All political subdivisions of the State will determine the minimum personnel necessary to maintain these governmental operations.
iv. Workers supporting building code enforcement necessary to maintain public safety and health and for all ongoing construction.
v. Workers, including logistical and contract workers, who are critical to facilitating support of national, state, and local emergency response operations.
vi. Workers necessary to process applications for and issue hunting and fishing licenses, where it is impracticable for applicants to apply online.
vii. Workers supporting environmental compliance and assistance activities, field research, monitoring and surveying, habitat restoration, natural land and water management, and plant and animal population management.
j. Critical manufacturing. This includes the critical manufacturing workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers supporting iron ore mining and processing operations and supplier/vendor industries essential to such mining and processing operations.
ii. Workers supporting printing operations that supply other Critical Sectors. Other printing workers are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a NonCritical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
k. Hazardous materials. This category is limited to hazardous materials workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
l. Financial services. This category is limited to financial services workers identified in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), in addition to workers at banks, credit unions, insurance companies, and insurance agencies. Debt collection professionals and other workers supporting debt collection are not included in
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this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
m. Chemical. This category is limited to chemical workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
n. Defense industrial base. This category is limited to defense industrial base workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0).
o. Commercial facilities/essential supply stores. Essential supply stores are strongly encouraged to offer curbside pickup or delivery of products. This category is limited to commercial facilities workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers supporting businesses that sell products, tools, materials, or supplies necessary for: (1) Critical Sectors to continue their essential operations, (2) for workers to work from home, or (3) for the maintenance of the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes or residences.
ii. Workers supporting licensed businesses that sell or service firearms, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 624.7192. Indoor gun clubs and indoor gun and shooting ranges must remain closed pursuant to Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and this Executive Order.
iii. Workers at traditional retail establishments who are working only to take and fulfill online orders for pick up or delivery.
iv. Workers supporting the sale of essential furnishings, including beds, lift chairs, and office furniture and equipment necessary for other workers to work from home. Workers supporting sales of non-essential furnishings are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
v. Workers supporting retailers not listed above may return to work if their employer qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
p. Residential/shelter facilities and services. This category includes the residential/shelter facilities and services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0), including workers supporting moving and relocation services, in addition to workers supporting emergency shelters, drop-in centers, and encampments, as well as outreach workers. Governmental and other entities are strongly urged to make 24-hour shelter available as soon as possible, to the maximum extent practicable, and in compliance with CDC guidance.
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q. Laundry and hygiene products and services. This category includes the hygiene products and services workers listed in the CISA Guidance (version 3.0) and the following:
i. Workers in laundromats and all laundry or dry-cleaning services.
ii. Workers cleaning common areas in apartment buildings and other similar common spaces.
iii. Workers providing housecleaning for individuals with disabilities.
iv. Workers doing ordinary residential housecleaning of individual homes are not exempt.
r. Tribal Governments. Tribal officers and workers deemed essential by the relevant Tribal government, regardless of residence.
s. The Judicial Branch. This category is limited to judicial officers and personnel deemed essential by the Chief Justice to ensure the continued operations of Minnesota’s court system.
t. The Executive Branch. This category is limited to personnel deemed necessary to continue priority services of executive branch agencies, offices, departments, divisions, boards, bureaus, councils, committees, institutions, authorities, and commissions, as well as the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities system, Minnesota State Retirement System, Public Employees Retirement Association, and Teacher’s Retirement Association, as determined by the Commissioner of Management and Budget in consultation with those agencies and entities.
u. Executive Constitutional Offices. This category is limited to Constitutional Officers and personnel deemed essential by the applicable Constitutional Officer to ensure the continued operations of the Constitutional Office.
v. The Legislative Branch. This category is limited to personnel deemed essential by the presiding officers of each body.
w. Federal employees. Nothing in this Executive Order will be construed to limit, prohibit, or restrict in any way the operations of the federal government or the movement of federal officials in Minnesota while acting in their official capacity, including federal judicial, legislative, and executive staff and personnel.
x. National Guard. This category is limited to National Guard members that are on orders, to include state active duty, Title 32, or Title 10 orders and members in an Inactive Duty for Training status. At the discretion of the Adjutant General, this category also includes full-time staff of the Minnesota
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National Guard or Department of Military Affairs that are necessary for the execution of the National Guard’s mission.
y. Faith leaders and workers. This category includes officials, workers, and leaders in houses of worship and other places of religious expression or fellowship, wherever their services may be needed. This category also includes workers necessary to plan, record, and distribute online or broadcast content to community members.
z. Education. This category includes educators and other workers supporting public and private schools, as well as higher education (e.g., colleges and universities). This category also includes educators and other workers providing care and food to children as provided by Executive Orders 20-19 and 20-41. Executive Orders 20-19 and 20-41 remain in effect.
aa. Construction and critical trades. This category includes the following:
i. Workers in the skilled trades such as electricians, plumbers, HVAC and elevator technicians, and other workers supporting construction of all kind.
ii. Workers such as exterminators, cleaning and janitorial staff for commercial and governmental properties, moving and relocation services, security staff, operating engineers, and all other service providers who provide services that are necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of homes and residences and the Critical Sectors listed in this Executive Order.
iii. Workers supporting major appliance sales, related parts sales, and service.
iv. Workers who construct, repair, and maintain decks and fences.
v. Workers cleaning and maintaining the exterior of residential dwellings, including power washing, exterior window cleaning, and gutter cleaning.
bb. Child care providers. This category includes workers in child care centers, family child care, schools, and other facilities. Such providers are encouraged to remain open to provide child care services for workers in the Critical Sectors and Non-Critical Exempt Businesses listed in this Executive Order as possible and insofar as public health guidance can be followed. This category also applies to individuals providing child care for Critical Sector and NonCritical Exempt Businesses workers in a personal home, such as family, friend, and neighbor care required for Critical Sector workers to continue to perform their duties.
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cc. Hotels, residential facilities, and shelters. This category includes workers supporting hotels and motels, facilities and shelters for adults, seniors, and children, including victims of domestic violence and people with developmental disabilities, intellectual disabilities, substance abuse disorders, or mental illness. Such facilities and shelters include halfway houses and residential treatment programs. This category also includes:
i. Workers needed to keep apartment complex buildings and other congregate residences or homes operational and sanitary.
ii. Workers supporting resorts in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidance.
dd. Charitable and social services organizations. This category is limited to workers supporting organizations that are engaged in hunger relief work, and those that provide food, shelter, prescription delivery, mental health and substance abuse treatments, and other social services, as well as other necessities of life for individuals in need of such services, older adults who live alone, people with disabilities, and those who need assistance as a result of this emergency.
ee. Legal services. This category is limited to workers who are necessary to provide essential legal services. Essential legal services include:
i. Advice and representation needed to aid the delivery of all critical government services.
ii. Advice and representation required to ensure the immediate and critical health, safety, and liberties of Minnesotans, including but not limited to, end-of-life planning, immigration, essential services to elders and persons with disabilities, child support, child-protection and domestic abuse matters, protection of personal financial resources necessary to meet basic needs, prosecution or defense in ongoing criminal matters, or all matters in which individuals are held in custody pending a legal proceeding, and proceedings held in the district or appellate courts during the effective period of this order.
iii. Advice and representation related to the continuation of the Critical Sectors identified in this Executive Order, including ensuring compliance with this Executive Order, previous Executive Orders, and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations applying to Critical Sectors.
iv. Supporting housing and shelter-related efforts, including loan applications, loan processing, seeking temporary relief from residential and commercial loan or lease provisions, retention of gas, electric, or water utility services, and seeking temporary relief from residential evictions or foreclosures, or other actions intended to keep people in their homes.
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v. Process servers and legal couriers.
ff. Notaries. This category is limited to notaries performing services that cannot be deferred and which cannot be accomplished via remote services under Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 358.645.
gg. Critical labor union functions. This category includes labor union essential activities, including the administration of health and welfare funds and the monitoring of the wellbeing and safety of members.
hh. Animal care and veterinarians. This category is limited to veterinarians and workers at animal care facilities or DNR workers who provide food, shelter, veterinary services, and other necessities of life for animals. Workers in this category are subject to the restrictions on elective surgeries and procedures as set forth in Executive Orders 20-09 and 20-17. This category also includes the following:
i. Workers providing care (e.g., daycare or boarding) to pets in the following circumstances:
A. Caring for pets owned by other Critical Sector and NonCritical Exempt Businesses workers during their shifts.
B. Caring for pets needing care because the owner is physically or otherwise unable to care for the animal.
C. Caring for pets owned by individuals who are ill or quarantined, provided that contact with the owner is limited to a one-time pick up until the illness or quarantine has passed.
D. Caring for pets currently boarded and circumstances prevent the owner from retrieving them.
ii. Workers supporting pet adoption and animal foster care are exempt, provided that (1) any paperwork and payment is done online, and (2) appropriate social distancing is observed during the adoption process.
iii. Workers at Class A licensed racetracks, which may open their facilities for the receiving, stabling, care and training of horses on their grounds and for preparing and providing housing for workers who care for the horses. In coordination with the Minnesota Racing Commission, the licensees must prepare and allow for the safe entry and exit of personnel necessary for the care, safety, and welfare of the horses and people. Racetracks must remain closed to members of the public.
iv. Workers supporting pet grooming businesses are not included in this category, but such workers may return to work if their employer
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qualifies as a Non-Critical Exempt Business under paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
ii. Real estate transactions. This category is limited to workers who facilitate and finance real estate transactions and real estate services, including appraisers and title services.
jj. Minimum basic operations. This category includes workers supporting minimum basic operations in businesses and other organizations. Minimum basic operations include (i) minimum necessary activities to maintain the value of the business’s inventory, preserve the condition of a business’s or other organization’s facilities, physical plant, or equipment, ensure security, process payroll and employee benefits, or related functions; and (ii) the minimum necessary activities to facilitate remote work by workers from their residences (e.g., IT personnel who allow workers to operate remotely or personnel who support remote or distance learning).
kk. Outdoor recreational facilities. This category is limited to workers supporting the below publicly and privately maintained or operated outdoor recreational facilities, provided that such facilities adhere to the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. This category includes private, state and local government workers who perform activities necessary to facilitate outdoor recreation, as allowed under this Executive Order. This category does not include workers engaged in services for hire such as charter boats, launches, or fishing guides, or workers at facilities that involve gatherings or people in close proximity (e.g., mini golf, pools, commercial outdoor racetracks, and concert venues). To the extent that any of the facilities listed below have been closed under Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and 20-33, those facilities are permitted to reopen, provided that they adhere to this Executive Order and the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. In accordance with Executive Orders 20-04, 20-18, and 20-33, all indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities must remain closed except for (a) facilities used only by workers to the extent necessary to facilitate the outdoor recreation, (b) bathroom facilities cleaned and disinfected regularly in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines, (c) sales and service facilities allowed under subparagraph vi below, (d) facilities that provide food and beverage for off-premises consumption, as allowed in Executive Order 20-04, paragraphs 2 and 4, and (e) facilities housing businesses covered by paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
i. Minnesota State Parks, Trails, State Forests, State Recreation Areas, Wildlife Management Areas, Scientific and Natural Areas, and other State managed recreational lands.
ii. Locally, regionally, and privately managed parks and trails.
iii. State, regional, or local public water accesses.
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iv. Public and private marinas and docks that provide storage, docking, and mooring services to slip owners, seasonal renters, and the general public, as well as facilities that provide safety-related services including fueling, emergency dockage, and sanitary pump-out stations.
v. Public and private golf courses and outdoor driving ranges.
vi. Ski areas.
vii. Off-highway vehicles, snowmobiles, and watercraft repair shops, sales facilities, and showrooms by appointment only.
viii. Lake service providers to install, repair, and remove docks, boatlifts, and other water related equipment or deliver boats.
ix. Bait shops for sale of live bait. Sale of other goods must adhere to the requirements for retail businesses in paragraph 8 of this Executive Order.
x. Outdoor shooting ranges and game farms.
xi. Outdoor recreational equipment rental outlets, but only for purposes of renting out equipment that can be effectively sanitized between uses. Such outlets must implement clear check-in and check-out procedures that minimize contact between customers and workers. Any such rentals must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
xii. Any other outdoor recreation facilities that may be designated in the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
xiii. All work undertaken pursuant to this paragraph must be undertaken in accordance with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules.
xiv. All private and public campgrounds and dispersed camping sites must remain closed to recreational camping.
7. All exempted Activities and Critical Sector work activities should be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and the MDH and CDC Guidelines related to COVID-19, including social distancing and hygiene. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize employers that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
8. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses. All workers who can work from home must do so. Workers in Non-Critical Exempt Businesses may return to their workplace upon the businesses’ completion of the requirements set forth in this paragraph. These
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exemptions apply only to travel to and from an individual’s home or residence and place of work and an individual’s performance of work duties that cannot be done at their home or residence. Travel may include transportation to and from child care or school settings as necessary to ensure the safe care of children. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses are those within the scope of subparagraph a of this paragraph 8 and that complete and comply with the requirements set forth in subparagraph b:
a. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses are limited to the following sectors:
i. Industrial and manufacturing businesses. Businesses in this category include industrial or manufacturing businesses, to the extent that such businesses’ employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. This category includes wholesale trade, warehousing, and places of employment in which goods are in the process of being created. This category does not include customer-facing retail environments associated with an industrial or manufacturing business in this category. DEED will provide additional guidance related to the businesses included in this category at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
ii. Office-based businesses. Businesses in this category include officebased businesses where workers do their work within an office space, at their desk, and their work is primarily not customer facing, to the extent that their employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. This category does not include customer-facing retail environments associated with officebased businesses in this category. DEED will provide additional guidance related to the businesses included in this category at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
iii. Retail businesses. Businesses in this category include retail stores and other businesses that sell, rent, maintain and repair goods that can be picked up outside, without entering the place of business, with limited interaction between employees and customers, to the extent that such businesses’ employees are not exempt Critical Sector workers under paragraph 6 of this Executive Order. Businesses that provide services such as household goods rental, maintenance services, repair services, and pet grooming are included to the extent that they can adhere to the guidelines below. Salons and barbershops are included only to conduct retail product sales, excluding sales of service chemicals not intended for retail. Salons and barbershops may not provide any services. In addition to the other requirements set forth in paragraph 8.b of this Executive Order, businesses in this category must conduct sales only by outdoor pick-up or delivery, adhering to guidance provided by DEED at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
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b. Requirements for Non-Critical Exempt Businesses. Before workers may return to work at a Non-Critical Exempt Business under this Executive Order, the Non-Critical Exempt Business must establish and implement a COVID-19 Preparedness Plan (“Plan”). Each Plan must provide for the business’s implementation of Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in their workplaces. These requirements are set forth in guidance published by DEED and DLI (“Plan Guidance”) and available at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
i. Required Plan content. As set forth in the Plan Guidance, at a minimum, each Plan must adequately address the following areas:
A. Require work from home whenever possible. All Plans must ensure that all workers who can work from home continue to do so.
B. Ensure that sick workers stay home. All Plans must establish policies and procedures, including health screenings, that prevent sick workers from entering the workplace.
C. Social distancing. All Plans must establish social distancing policies and procedures.
D. Worker hygiene and source control. All Plans must establish hygiene and source control policies for workers.
E. Cleaning and disinfection protocols. All Plans must establish cleaning and disinfection protocols for areas within the workplace.
ii. Optional template. A template COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, which covers the above requirements, is available as part of the Plan Guidance, available at https://mn.gov/deed/safework/
iii. Certification and signature. Senior management responsible for implementing the Plan must sign and certify the Plan, affirming their commitment to implement and follow the Plan.
iv. Dissemination and posting. A Non-Critical Exempt Business must provide its Plan, in writing, to all workers, and the Plan must be posted at all of the business’s workplaces in locations that will allow for the Plan to be readily reviewed by all workers. Where physical posting is impracticable, the Plan can be posted electronically, provided that the Plan is received by all workers and remains available for their review.
v. Training. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must ensure that training is provided to workers on the contents of their Plan and required procedures, so that all workers understand and are able to perform the
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precautions necessary to protect themselves and their co-workers. This training should be easy to understand and available in the appropriate language and literacy level for all workers. Businesses should also take steps to supervise workers and ensure that workers understand and adhere to necessary precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission. Documentation demonstrating compliance with this training requirement must be maintained and made available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI, upon request.
vi. Compliance. Workers and management must work together to ensure compliance with the Plan, implement all protocols, policies, and procedures, and create a safe and healthy work environment.
vii. Availability to regulatory authorities and public safety officers. Non-Critical Exempt Businesses do not need to submit their Plans for preapproval. Upon request, Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must make their Plans available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI.
c. In the event of a complaint or dispute related to a business’s Plan, DLI is authorized to determine whether the Plan adequately implements Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in its workplaces.
d. All work for Non-Critical Exempt Businesses must be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines, including social distancing and hygiene practices. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize businesses that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
9. Except as necessary to seek medical care and obtain other necessities of life, people at high risk of severe illness from COVID-19 (e.g., elderly people and those with underlying health conditions) are strongly urged to stay in their home or residence, even when the terms of this Executive Order would allow them to leave their home or residence.
10. I urge all Minnesotans to voluntarily comply with this Executive Order. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.45, a worker who willfully violates this Executive Order is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Any business owner, manager, or supervisor who requires or encourages any of their employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, or interns to violate this Executive Order is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $3,000 or by imprisonment for not more than a year. In addition to those criminal penalties, the Attorney General, as well as city and county attorneys, may seek any civil relief available pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 8.31, for
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violations of this Executive Order, including civil penalties up to $25,000 per occurrence from businesses and injunctive relief. Nothing in this Executive Order is intended to encourage or allow law enforcement to transgress individual constitutional rights. 11. I direct the Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, Labor and Industry, and Natural Resources to continue planning on how to allow additional non-Critical Sector workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. Such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. I also direct other cabinet agencies to coordinate expeditiously to develop relevant guidance related to this Executive Order and to provide that guidance to the public. 12. I direct all state agencies to continue to coordinate expeditiously to develop plans to mitigate the economic effects of closures and restrictions necessitated by this peacetime emergency, including potential financial support, regulatory relief, and other executive actions. 13. The closure of bars, restaurants, and other public accommodations set forth in Executive Order 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18, is extended until May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Barbershops and salons may conduct retail product sales in accordance with the requirements set forth in paragraph 8. 14. This Executive Order may be extended by a future Executive Order, with the approval of the Executive Council. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 4.035, subdivision 2, and section 12.32, this Executive Order is effective immediately upon approval by the Executive Council. It remains in effect until the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01 is terminated or until it is rescinded by proper authority. A determination that any provision of this Executive Order is invalid will not affect the enforceability of any other provision of this Executive Order. Rather, the invalid provision will be modified to the extent necessary so that it is enforceable.
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Signed on April 30, 2020.
_____________________________________
Tim Walz
Governor
Filed According to Law:
_____________________________________
Steve Simon
Secretary of State
Approved by the Executive Council on May 1, 2020:
_____________________________________
Alice Roberts-Davis
Secretary, Executive Council

Filed on May 1, 2020

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Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State,

Steve Simon

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Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response
Version 3.0 (April 17, 2020)
THE IMPORTANCE OF ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS
Functioning critical infrastructure is imperative during the response to the COVID-19 emergency for both public health and safety as well as community well-being. Certain critical infrastructure industries have a special responsibility in these times to continue operations.
This advisory guidance and accompanying list are intended to support state, local, tribal, territorial and industry partners in identifying the critical infrastructure sectors and the essential workers needed to maintain the services and functions Americans depend on daily and that need to be able to operate resiliently during the COVID-19 pandemic response.
This document gives advisory guidance on defining essential critical infrastructure workers. Promoting the ability of such workers to continue to work during periods of community restriction, access management, social distancing, or closure orders/directives is crucial to community resilience and continuity of essential functions. The term “workers” as used in this guidance is intended to apply to both employees and contractors performing the described functions.
CISA will continually solicit and accept feedback on the list and will evolve the list in response to stakeholder feedback. We will also use our various stakeholder engagement mechanisms to work with partners on how they are using this list and share those lessons learned and best practices broadly. Feedback can be sent to CISA.CAT@CISA.DHS.GOV.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
This list was developed in consultation with federal agency partners, industry experts, and State and local officials, and is based on several key principles:
1. Response efforts to the COVID-19 pandemic are locally executed, state managed, and federally supported.
2. Everyone should follow guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well as state and local government officials, regarding strategies to limit disease spread.
3. Employers must comply with applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for protecting critical infrastructure workers who remain on or return to the job during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the nation relies on these workers to protect public health, safety, and community well-being, they must be protected from exposure to and infection with the virus so that they can continue to carry out

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 26 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
their responsibilities. OSHA has guidance and enforcement information for workplaces at www.osha.gov/coronavirus.
4. Businesses and government agencies may continue to implement organization-specific measures, which protect the workforce while meeting mission needs.
5. Workers should be encouraged to work remotely when possible and focus on core business activities. Inperson, non-mandatory activities should be delayed until the resumption of normal operations.
6. When continuous remote work is not possible, businesses should enlist strategies to reduce the likelihood of spreading the disease. This includes, but is not limited to, physically separating staff, staggering work shift hours or days, and other social distancing measures. While the CDC recommends that everyone wear a cloth face cover to contain respiratory droplets when around others, critical infrastructure employers must consider how best to implement this public health recommendation for source control in the workplace. For example, employers may provide disposable facemasks (e.g., surgical masks) instead of cloth face coverings when workers would need to wear masks for extended periods of time (e.g., the duration of a work shift) or while performing tasks in which the face covering could become contaminated.
7. Consider the impact of workplace sick leave policies that may contribute to an employee decision to delay reporting medical symptoms. Sick employees should not return to the workplace until they meet the criteria to stop home isolation.
8. Critical infrastructure has an obligation to limit to the extent possible the reintegration of in-person workers who have experienced an exposure to COVID-19 but remain asymptomatic in ways that best protect the health of the worker, their co-workers, and the general public. An analysis of core job tasks and workforce availability at worksites can allow the employer to match core activities to other equally skilled and available in-person workers who have not experienced an exposure. CDC guidance on safety practices for critical infrastructure workers is maintained at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/criticalworkers/implementing-safety-practices.html
9. All organizations should implement their business continuity and pandemic plans or put plans in place if they do not exist. Delaying implementation is not advised and puts at risk the viability of the business and the health and safety of the workers.
10. Reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to ensure continuity of functions. The vast majority of our economy relies on technology and therefore information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) workers for critical infrastructure operations are essential. This includes workers in many roles, including workers focusing on management systems, control systems, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and data centers; cybersecurity engineering; and cybersecurity risk management.
11. Government workers, such as emergency managers, and the business community need to establish and maintain lines of communication.
12. Essential critical infrastructure workers need continued and unimpeded access to sites, facilities, and equipment within quarantine zones, containment areas, or other areas where access or movement is limited to perform functions for community relief and stability; for public safety, security and health; for maintaining essential supply chains and preserving local, regional, and national economic well-being.
13. Essential critical infrastructure workers need sustained access to designated quarantine, containment, or

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 27 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
restricted areas; and should be exempted from curfews, shelter-in-place orders, and transportation restrictions or restrictions on movement. 14. Whenever possible, local governments should consider adopting specific state guidance on essential workers to reduce potential complications of workers crossing jurisdictional boundaries. When this is not possible, local jurisdictions should consider aligning access and movement control policies with neighboring jurisdictions to reduce the burden of cross-jurisdictional movement of essential critical infrastructure workers.
IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS
The following list of identified essential critical infrastructure workers is intended to be overly inclusive reflecting the diversity of industries across the United States.

HEALTHCARE / PUBLIC HEALTH
• Workers, including laboratory personnel, that perform critical clinical, biomedical and other research, development, and testing needed for COVID-19 or other diseases.
• Healthcare providers including, but not limited to, physicians; dentists; psychologists; mid-level practitioners; nurses; assistants and aids; infection control and quality assurance personnel; pharmacists; physical, respiratory, speech and occupational therapists and assistants; social workers; optometrists; speech pathologists; chiropractors; diagnostic and therapeutic technicians; and radiology technologists.
• Workers required for effective clinical, command, infrastructure, support service, administrative, security, and intelligence operations across the direct patient care and full healthcare and public health spectrum. Personnel examples may include, but are not limited, to accounting, administrative, admitting and discharge, engineering, accrediting, certification, licensing, credentialing, epidemiological, source plasma and blood donation, food service, environmental services, housekeeping, medical records, information technology and operational technology, nutritionists, sanitarians, respiratory therapists, etc. o Emergency medical services workers. o Prehospital workers included but not limited to urgent care workers. o Inpatient & hospital workers (e.g. hospitals, critical access hospitals, long-term acute care

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 28 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

hospitals, long-term care facilities, inpatient hospice, ambulatory surgical centers, etc.). o Outpatient care workers (e.g. end-stage-renal disease, Federally Qualified Health Centers, Rural
Health Clinics, community mental health clinics, organ transplant/procurement centers, and other ambulatory care settings/providers, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, etc.). o Home care workers (e.g. home health care, at-home hospice, home dialysis, home infusion, etc.). o Workers at Long-term care facilities, residential and community-based providers (e.g. Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities, Religious Nonmedical Health Care Institutions, etc.). o Workplace safety workers (i.e., workers who anticipate, recognize, evaluate, and control workplace conditions that may cause workers' illness or injury). • Workers needed to support transportation to and from healthcare facility and provider appointments. • Workers needed to provide laundry services, food services, reprocessing of medical equipment, and waste management. • Workers that manage health plans, billing, and health information and who cannot work remotely. • Workers performing cybersecurity functions at healthcare and public health facilities and who cannot work remotely. • Workers performing security, incident management, and emergency operations functions at or on behalf of healthcare entities including healthcare coalitions, who cannot practically work remotely. • Childcare, eldercare, and other service providers for essential healthcare personnel. • Vendors and suppliers (e.g. imaging, pharmacy, oxygen services, durable medical equipment, etc.). • Workers at manufacturers (including biotechnology companies and those companies that have shifted production to medical supplies), materials and parts suppliers, technicians, logistics and warehouse operators, printers, packagers, distributors of medical products and equipment (including third party logistics providers, and those who test and repair), personal protective equipment (PPE), isolation barriers, medical gases, pharmaceuticals (including materials used in radioactive drugs), dietary supplements, blood and blood products, vaccines, testing materials, laboratory supplies, cleaning, sanitizing, disinfecting or sterilization supplies (including dispensers), sanitary goods, personal care products, pest control products, and tissue and paper towel products. • Donors of blood, bone marrow, blood stem cell, or plasma, and the workers of the organizations that operate and manage related activities. • Pharmacy staff, including workers necessary to maintain uninterrupted prescription, and other workers for pharmacy operations. • Workers in retail facilities specializing in medical good and supplies. • Public health and environmental health workers, such as: o Workers specializing in environmental health that focus on implementing environmental controls, sanitary and infection control interventions, healthcare facility safety and emergency preparedness planning, engineered work practices, and developing guidance and protocols for appropriate PPE to prevent COVID-19 disease transmission. o Public health/ community health workers (including call center workers) who conduct communitybased public health functions, conducting epidemiologic surveillance and compiling, analyzing, and communicating public health information, who cannot work remotely. • Human services providers, especially for at risk populations such as: o Home delivered meal providers for older adults, people with disabilities, and others with chronic

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 29 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
health conditions. o Home-maker services for frail, homebound, older adults. o Personal assistance services providers to support activities of daily living for older adults, people
with disabilities, and others with chronic health conditions who live independently in the community with supports and services. o Home health providers who deliver health care services for older adults, people with disabilities, and others with chronic health conditions who live independently in the community with supports and services. • Government entities, and contractors that work in support of local, state, and federal public health and medical mission sets, including but not limited to supporting access to healthcare and associated payment functions, conducting public health functions, providing medical care, supporting emergency management, or other services necessary for supporting the COVID-19 response. • Mortuary service providers, such as: o Workers performing mortuary funeral, cremation, burial, cemetery, and related services, including funeral homes, crematoriums, cemetery workers, and coffin makers. o Workers who coordinate with other organizations to ensure the proper recovery, handling, identification, transportation, tracking, storage, and disposal of human remains and personal effects; certify cause of death; and facilitate access to mental and behavioral health services to the family members, responders, and survivors of an incident.
LAW ENFORCEMENT, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND OTHER FIRST RESPONDERS
• Public, private, and voluntary personnel (front-line and management, civilian and sworn) in emergency management, law enforcement, fire and rescue services, emergency medical services (EMS), and security, public and private hazardous material responders, air medical service providers (pilots and supporting technicians), corrections, and search and rescue personnel.
• Personnel involved in provisioning of access to emergency services, including the provisioning of real-time text, text-to-911, and dialing 911 via relay.
• Personnel that are involved in the emergency alert system (EAS) ((broadcasters, satellite radio and television, cable, and wireline video) and wireless emergency alerts (WEA).
• Workers at Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, and Network Operations staff, engineers and technicians to manage the network or operate facilities.
• Workers at emergency communication center, public safety answering points, public safety communications centers, emergency operation centers, and 911 call centers.
• Fusion Center workers. • Workers, including contracted vendors, who maintain, manufacture, or supply equipment and services
supporting law enforcement, fire, EMS, and response operations (to include electronic security and life safety security personnel). • Workers and contracted vendors who maintain and provide services and supplies to public safety facilities, including emergency communication center, public safety answering points, public safety communications centers, emergency operation centers, fire and emergency medical services stations, police and law enforcement stations and facilities. • Workers supporting the manufacturing, distribution, and maintenance of necessary safety equipment and uniforms for law enforcement and all public safety personnel.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 30 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Workers supporting the operation of firearm, or ammunition product manufacturers, retailers, importers, distributors, and shooting ranges.
• Public agency workers responding to abuse and neglect of children, spouses, elders, and dependent adults.
• Workers who support weather disaster and natural hazard mitigation and prevention activities. • Security staff to maintain building access control and physical security measures.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
• Workers supporting groceries, pharmacies, convenience stores, and other retail (including unattended and vending) that sells human food, animal and pet food and pet supply, and beverage products, including retail customer support service and information technology support staff necessary for online orders, pickup, and delivery.
• Restaurant carry-out and quick serve food operations, including dark kitchen and food prep centers, carry-out, and delivery food workers.
• Food manufacturer workers and their supplier workers including those employed at food ingredient production and processing facilities; aquaculture and seafood harvesting facilities; livestock, poultry, seafood slaughter facilities; pet and animal feed processing facilities; human food facilities producing byproducts for animal food; beverage production facilities; and the production of food packaging.
• Farmers, farm and ranch workers, and agribusiness support services to include those employed in auction and sales; grain and oilseed handling, storage, processing, and distribution; animal food, feed, and ingredient production, packaging, and distribution; manufacturing, packaging, and distribution of veterinary drugs; and truck delivery and transport.
• Farmers, farm and ranch workers, and support service and supplier workers producing food supply domestically and for export, to include those engaged in raising, cultivating, harvesting, packing, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to a carrier for transportation to market any agricultural or horticultural commodity for human consumption; agricultural inspection; fuel ethanol facilities; biodiesel and renewable diesel facilities; storage facilities; and other agricultural inputs.
• Workers and firms supporting the distribution of food, feed, and beverage and ingredients used in these products, including warehouse workers, vendor-managed inventory controllers, and blockchain managers.
• Workers supporting the sanitation and pest control of all food manufacturing processes and operations from wholesale to retail.
• Workers supporting the growth and distribution of plants and associated products for home gardens. • Workers in cafeterias used to feed workers, particularly worker populations sheltered against COVID-19. • Workers in animal diagnostic and food testing laboratories. • Government, private, and non-governmental organizations’ workers essential for food assistance
programs (including school lunch programs) and government payments. • Workers of companies engaged in the production, storage, transport, and distribution of chemicals,
medicines, vaccines, and other substances used by the food and agriculture industry, including seeds, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, minerals, enrichments, and other agricultural production aids. • Animal agriculture workers to include those employed in veterinary health (including those involved in supporting emergency veterinary or livestock services); raising, caring for and management of animals for food; animal production operations; livestock markets; slaughter and packing plants, manufacturers, renderers, and associated regulatory and government workforce.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 31 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Transportation supporting animal agricultural industries, including movement of animal medical and reproductive supplies and materials, animal vaccines, animal drugs, feed ingredients, feed and bedding, live animals, animal by-products, and deceased animals for disposal.
• Workers who support sawmills and the manufacture and distribution of fiber and forest products, including, but not limited to timber, paper, and other wood and fiber products, as well as manufacture and distribution of products using agricultural commodities.
• Workers engaged in the manufacture and maintenance of equipment and other infrastructure necessary for agricultural production and distribution.
ENERGY
• Workers supporting the energy sector, regardless of the energy source (including, but not limited to, nuclear, fossil, hydroelectric, or renewable), segment of the system, or infrastructure the worker is involved in, who are needed to construct, manufacture, repair, transport, permit, monitor, operate engineer, and maintain the reliability, safety, security, environmental health, and physical and cyber security of the energy system, including those who support construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, and logistics.
• Workers and contractors supporting energy facilities that provide steam, hot water or chilled water from central power plants to connected customers.
• Workers conducting energy/commodity trading/scheduling/marketing functions who can't perform their duties remotely.
• Workers supporting the energy sector through renewable energy infrastructure (including, but not limited to, wind, solar, biomass, hydrogen, ocean, geothermal, and hydroelectric) and microgrids, including those supporting construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation and maintenance, monitoring, and logistics.
• Workers and security staff involved in nuclear re-fueling operations. • Workers providing services related to energy sector fuels (including, but not limited to, petroleum (crude
oil), natural gas, propane, liquefied natural gas (LNG), compressed natural gas (CNG), natural gas liquids (NGL), other liquid fuels, nuclear, and coal) and supporting the mining, processing, manufacturing, construction, logistics, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, security, waste disposal, storage, and monitoring of support for resources. • Workers providing environmental remediation and monitoring, limited to immediate critical needs technicians. • Workers involved in the manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary to maintain production, maintenance, restoration, and service at energy sector facilities across all energy sector segments.
Electricity Industry
• Workers who maintain, ensure, restore, or who are involved in the development, transportation, fuel procurement, expansion, or operation of, the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power, including call centers, utility workers, engineers, retail electricity, construction, maintenance, utility telecommunications, relaying, and fleet maintenance technicians who cannot perform their duties remotely.
• Workers at coal mines, production facilities, and those involved in manufacturing, transportation,

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 32 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
permitting, operation, maintenance, and monitoring at coal sites. • Workers who produce, process, ship, and handle coal used for power generation and manufacturing. • Workers in the electricity industry including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction,
manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics • Workers needed for safe and secure operations at nuclear generation including, but not limited to, those critical to the broader nuclear supply chain, the manufacture and delivery of parts needed to maintain nuclear equipment, the operations of fuel manufacturers, and the production and processing of fuel components used in the manufacturing of fuel. • Workers at fossil fuel (including but not limited to natural gas, refined, distillate, and/or coal), nuclear, and renewable energy infrastructure (including, but not limited to wind, solar, biomass, hydrogen, geothermal, and hydroelectric), and microgrids, including those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, monitoring, and logistics. • Workers at generation, transmission, and electric black start facilities. • Workers at Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, local distribution control centers, and primary and backup Control Centers, including, but not limited to, independent system operators, regional transmission organizations, and local distribution control centers. • Workers that are mutual assistance/aid personnel, which may include workers from outside of the state or local jurisdiction. • Vegetation management and traffic control for supporting those crews. • Instrumentation, protection, and control technicians. • Essential support personnel for electricity operations. • Generator set support workers, such as diesel engineers used in power generation, including those providing fuel.
Petroleum Industry
• Workers who support onshore and offshore petroleum drilling operations; platform and drilling construction and maintenance; transportation (including helicopter operations), maritime transportation, supply, and dredging operations; maritime navigation; well stimulation, intervention, monitoring, automation and control, extraction, production; processing; waste disposal, and maintenance, construction, and operations.
• Workers in the petroleum industry including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics.
• Workers for crude oil, petroleum, and petroleum product storage and transportation, including pipeline, marine transport, terminals, rail transport, storage facilities, racks, and road transport for use as end- use fuels such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating fuels or feedstocks for chemical manufacturing.
• Petroleum and petroleum product security operations center workers and workers who support maintenance and emergency response services.
• Petroleum and petroleum product operations control rooms, centers, and refinery facilities. • Retail fuel centers such as gas stations and truck stops, and the distribution systems that support them. • Supporting new and existing construction projects, including, but not limited to, pipeline construction. • Manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary for production, maintenance,
restoration, and service of petroleum and petroleum product operations and use, including end-users.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 33 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Transmission and distribution pipeline workers, including but not limited to pump stations and any other required, operations maintenance, construction, and support for petroleum products.
Natural Gas, Natural Gas Liquids (NGL), Propane, and Other Liquid Fuels
• Workers who support onshore and offshore drilling operations, platform and drilling construction and maintenance; transportation (including helicopter operations); maritime transportation, supply, and dredging operations; maritime navigation; natural gas and natural gas liquid production, processing, extraction, storage and transportation; well intervention, monitoring, automation and control; waste disposal, and maintenance, construction, and operations.
• Workers in the natural gas, NGL, propane, and other liquid fuels industries including but not limited to those supporting safety, construction, manufacturing, transportation, permitting, operation/maintenance, engineering, physical and cyber security, monitoring, and logistics.
• Transmission and distribution pipeline workers, including compressor stations and any other required operations maintenance, construction, and support for natural gas, natural gas liquid, propane, and other liquid fuels.
• Workers at Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facilities. • Workers at natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, liquid fuel storage facilities,
underground facilities, and processing plants and other related facilities, including construction, maintenance, and support operations personnel. • Natural gas processing plants workers and those who deal with natural gas liquids. • Workers who staff natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuel security operations centers, operations dispatch and control rooms and centers, and emergency response and customer emergencies (including leak calls) operations. • Workers supporting drilling, production, processing, refining, and transporting natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels for use as end-use fuels, feedstocks for chemical manufacturing, or use in electricity generation. • Workers supporting propane gas service maintenance and restoration, including call centers. • Workers supporting propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuel distribution centers. • Workers supporting propane gas storage, transmission, and distribution centers. • Workers supporting new and existing construction projects, including, but not limited to, pipeline construction. • Workers supporting ethanol and biofuel production, refining, and distribution. • Workers in fuel sectors (including, but not limited to nuclear, coal, and gas types and liquid fuels) supporting the mining, manufacturing, logistics, transportation, permitting, operation, maintenance, and monitoring of support for resources. • Workers ensuring, monitoring, and engaging in the physical security of assets and locations associated with natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels. • Workers involved in the manufacturing and distribution of equipment, supplies, and parts necessary to maintain production, maintenance, restoration, and service of natural gas, propane, natural gas liquids, and other liquid fuels operations and use, including end-users.
WATER AND WASTEWATER
Workers needed to operate and maintain drinking water and wastewater and drainage infrastructure, including: • Operational staff at water authorities.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 34 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Operational staff at community water systems. • Operational staff at wastewater treatment facilities. • Workers repairing water and wastewater conveyances and performing required sampling or monitoring,
including field staff. • Operational staff for water distribution and testing. • Operational staff at wastewater collection facilities. • Operational staff and technical support for SCADA Control systems. • Chemical equipment and personal protection suppliers to water and wastewater system. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting water and wastewater operations.
TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS
• Workers supporting or enabling transportation and logistics functions, including truck drivers, bus drivers, dispatchers, maintenance and repair technicians, warehouse workers, truck stop and rest area workers, driver training and education centers, Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) workers, enrollment agents for federal transportation worker vetting programs, towing and recovery services, roadside assistance workers, intermodal transportation personnel, and workers that construct, maintain, rehabilitate, and inspect infrastructure, including those that require cross-jurisdiction travel.).
• Workers supporting the distribution of food, fuels, pharmaceuticals and medical material (including materials used in radioactive drugs), and chemicals needed for water or water treatment and energy maintenance.
• Workers supporting operation of essential highway infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and tunnels (e.g., traffic operations centers and moveable bridge operators).
• Workers of firms providing services, supplies, and equipment that enable warehouse and operations, including cooling, storing, packaging, and distributing products for wholesale or retail sale or use, including cold- and frozen-chain logistics for food and critical biologic products.
• Mass transit workers providing critical transit services and performing critical or routine maintenance to mass transit infrastructure or equipment.
• Workers supporting personal and commercial transportation services including taxis, delivery services, vehicle rental services, bicycle maintenance and car-sharing services, and transportation network providers.
• Workers, including police, responsible for operating and dispatching passenger, commuter, and freight trains and maintaining rail infrastructure and equipment.
• Maritime transportation workers, including port authority and commercial facility personnel, dredgers, port workers, security personnel, mariners, ship crewmembers, ship pilots, tugboat operators, equipment operators (to include maintenance and repair, and maritime-specific medical providers), ship supply workers, chandlers, and repair company workers. Refer to the United States Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information Bulletin “Maintaining Maritime Commerce and Identification of Essential Maritime Critical Infrastructure Workers” for more information.
• Workers, including truck drivers, railroad employees, maintenance crews, and cleaners, supporting transportation of chemicals, hazardous, medical, and waste materials that support critical infrastructure, capabilities, functions, and services, including specialized carriers, crane and rigging industry workers.
• Bus drivers and workers who provide or support intercity, commuter, and charter bus service in support of other essential services or functions.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 35 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Automotive repair, maintenance, and transportation equipment manufacturing and distribution facilities (including those who repair and maintain electric vehicle charging stations).
• Transportation safety inspectors, including hazardous material inspectors and accident investigator inspectors.
• Manufacturers and distributors (to include service centers and related operations) of lighting and communication systems, specialized signage and structural systems, emergency response equipment and support materials, printers, printed materials, packaging materials, pallets, crates, containers, and other supplies needed to support manufacturing, packaging staging and distribution operations, and other critical infrastructure needs.
• Postal Service, parcel, courier, last-mile delivery, and shipping and related workers, to include private companies, who accept, process, transport, and deliver information and goods.
• Workers who supply equipment and materials for maintenance of transportation equipment. • Workers who repair and maintain vehicles, aircraft, rail equipment, marine vessels, bicycles, and the
equipment and infrastructure that enables operations that encompass movement of cargo and passengers. • Workers who support air transportation for cargo and passengers, including operation distribution, maintenance, and sanitation. This includes air traffic controllers, flight dispatchers, maintenance personnel, ramp workers, fueling agents, flight crews, airport safety inspectors and engineers, airport operations personnel, aviation and aerospace safety workers, security, commercial space personnel, operations personnel, accident investigators, flight instructors, and other on- and off-airport facilities workers. • Workers supporting transportation via inland waterways, such as barge crew, dredging crew, and river port workers for essential goods. • Workers critical to the manufacturing, distribution, sales, rental, leasing, repair, and maintenance of vehicles and other transportation equipment (including electric vehicle charging stations) and the supply chains that enable these operations to facilitate continuity of travel-related operations for essential workers. • Warehouse operators, including vendors and support personnel critical for business continuity (including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and electrical engineers, security personnel, and janitorial staff), e-commerce or online commerce, and customer service for essential functions.
PUBLIC WORKS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT SERVICES
• Workers who support the construction, maintenance, or rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. • Workers supporting construction materials production, testing laboratories, material delivery services,
and construction inspection. • Workers who support the operation, inspection, and maintenance of essential public works facilities and
operations, including bridges, water and sewer main breaks, fleet maintenance personnel, construction of critical or strategic infrastructure, traffic signal maintenance, emergency location services for buried utilities, maintenance of digital systems infrastructure supporting public works operations, and other emergent issues. • Workers such as plumbers, electricians, exterminators, builders (including building and insulation), contractors, HVAC Technicians, landscapers, and other service providers who provide services, including temporary construction, that are necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 36 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
of residences, businesses and buildings, such as hospitals and senior living facilities. • Workers personnel, who support operations that ensure, the availability of and access to needed
facilities, transportation, energy, and communications through activities such as road and line clearing. • Workers who support the effective removal, storage, and disposal of residential, industrial, and
commercial solid waste and hazardous waste, including at landfill operations. • Workers who support the operation, inspection, and maintenance of essential dams, locks, and levees. • Workers who support the inspection and maintenance of aids to navigation and other government-
provided services that ensure continued maritime commerce.
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Communications
• Maintenance of communications infrastructure, -- including privately owned and maintained communication systems, -- supported by technicians, operators, call centers, wireline and wireless providers, cable service providers, satellite operations, Internet Exchange Points, Points of Presence, Network Access Points, back haul and front haul facilities, and manufacturers and distributors of communications equipment.
• Government and private sector workers, including government contractors, with work related to undersea cable infrastructure and support facilities, including cable landing sites, beach manhole vaults and covers, submarine cable depots, and submarine cable ship facilities.
• Government and private sector workers, including government contractors, supporting Department of Defense internet and communications facilities.
• Network Operations staff, engineers, and technicians to include IT managers and staff, HVAC and electrical engineers, security personnel, software and hardware engineers, and database administrators that manage the network or operate facilities.
• Workers responsible for infrastructure construction and restoration, including but not limited to engineers, technicians, and contractors for construction and engineering of fiber optic cables, buried conduit, small cells, other wireless facilities, and other communications sector-related infrastructure. This includes permitting, construction of new facilities, and deployment of new technology as required to address congestion or customer usage due to unprecedented use of remote services.
• Installation, maintenance, and repair technicians that establish, support, or repair service as needed. • Central office personnel to maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office
facilities, including critical support personnel assisting front line workers. • Customer service and support staff, including managed and professional services, as well as remote
providers of support to transitioning workers to set up and maintain home offices, who interface with customers to manage or support service environments and security issues including payroll, billing, fraud, logistics, and troubleshooting. • Workers providing electronic security, fire, monitoring, and life safety services, and who ensure physical security, cleanliness, and the safety of facilities and personnel, including those who provide temporary licensing waivers for security personnel to work in other States or Municipalities. • Dispatchers involved with service repair and restoration. • Retail customer service personnel at critical service center locations to address customer needs, including new customer processing, distributing and repairing equipment, and addressing customer issues, in order to support individuals’ remote emergency communications needs

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 37 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Supply chain and logistics personnel to ensure goods and products are available to provision these frontline workers.
• External Affairs personnel to assist in coordinating with local, state, and federal officials to address communications needs supporting COVID-19 response, public safety, and national security.
• Workers responsible for ensuring that persons with disabilities have access to and the benefits of various communications platforms, including those involved in the provision of telecommunication relay services, closed captioning of broadcast television for the deaf, video relay services for deaf citizens who prefer communication via American Sign Language over text, and audio-description for television programming.
Information Technology
• Workers who support command centers, including, but not limited to, Network Operations Command Centers, Broadcast Operations Control Centers, and Security Operations Command Centers.
• Data center operators, including system administrators, HVAC and electrical engineers, security personnel, IT managers and purchasers, data transfer solutions engineers, software and hardware engineers, and database administrators for all industries, including financial services.
• Workers who support client service centers, field engineers, and other technicians and workers supporting critical infrastructure, as well as manufacturers and supply chain vendors that provide hardware and software, support services, research and development, information technology equipment (to include microelectronics and semiconductors), HVAC and electrical equipment for critical infrastructure, and test labs and certification agencies that qualify such equipment (to include microelectronics, optoelectronics, and semiconductors) for critical infrastructure, including data centers.
• Workers needed to preempt and respond to cyber incidents involving critical infrastructure, including medical facilities; state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and federal facilities; energy and utilities; banks and financial institutions; securities and other exchanges; other entities that support the functioning of capital markets, public works, critical manufacturing, food, and agricultural production; transportation; and other critical infrastructure categories and personnel, in addition to all cyber defense workers who can't perform their duties remotely.
• Suppliers, designers, transporters, and other workers supporting the manufacture, distribution, provision, and construction of essential global, national, and local infrastructure for computing services (including cloud computing services and telework capabilities), business infrastructure, financial transactions and services, web-based services, and critical manufacturing.
• Workers supporting communications systems, information technology, and work from home solutions used by law enforcement, public safety, medical, energy, public works, critical manufacturing, food and agricultural production, financial services, education, and other critical industries and businesses.
• Workers required in person to support Software as a Service businesses that enable remote working, performance of business operations, distance learning, media services, and digital health offerings, or required for technical support crucial for business continuity and connectivity.
OTHER COMMUNITY- OR GOVERNMENT-BASED OPERATIONS AND ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
• Workers to ensure continuity of building functions, including but not limited to security and environmental controls (e.g., HVAC), the manufacturing and distribution of the products required for these functions, and the permits and inspections for construction supporting essential infrastructure.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 38 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce

• Elections personnel to include both public and private sector elections support. • Workers supporting the operations of the judicial system, including judges, lawyers, and others providing
legal assistance. • Workers who support administration and delivery of unemployment insurance programs, income
maintenance, employment service, disaster assistance, workers’ compensation insurance and benefits programs, and pandemic assistance. • Federal, State, and Local, Tribal, and Territorial government workers who support Mission Essential Functions and communications networks. • Trade Officials (FTA negotiators; international data flow administrators). • Workers who support radio, print, internet and television news and media services, including, but not limited to front line news reporters, studio, and technicians for newsgathering, reporting, and publishing news. • Workers supporting Census 2020. • Weather forecasters. • Clergy for essential support. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting other critical government operations. • Workers who support necessary permitting, credentialing, vetting, and licensing for essential critical infrastructure workers and their operations. • Customs and immigration workers who are critical to facilitating trade in support of the national emergency response supply chain. • Educators supporting public and private K-12 schools, colleges, and universities for purposes of facilitating distance learning or performing other essential functions. • Workers at testing centers for emergency medical services and other healthcare workers. • Staff at government offices who perform title search, notary, and recording services in support of mortgage and real estate services and transactions. • Residential and commercial real estate services, including settlement services. • Workers supporting essential maintenance, manufacturing, design, operation, inspection, security, and construction for essential products, services, supply chain, and COVID-19 relief efforts. • Workers performing services to animals in human care, including zoos and aquariums.
CRITICAL MANUFACTURING
• Workers necessary for the manufacturing of metals (including steel and aluminum), industrial minerals, semiconductors, materials and products needed for medical supply chains and for supply chains associated with transportation, aerospace, energy, communications, information technology, food and agriculture, chemical manufacturing, nuclear facilities, wood products, commodities used as fuel for power generation facilities, the operation of dams, water and wastewater treatment, processing and reprocessing of solid waste, emergency services, and the defense industrial base. Additionally, workers needed to maintain the continuity of these manufacturing functions and associated supply chains, and workers necessary to maintain a manufacturing operation in warm standby.
• Workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed to manufacture medical equipment and PPE.
• Workers necessary for mining and production of critical minerals, materials and associated essential supply chains, and workers engaged in the manufacture and maintenance of equipment and other

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 39 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
infrastructure necessary for mining production and distribution. • Workers who produce or manufacture parts or equipment that supports continued operations for any
essential services and increase in remote workforce, including computing and communication devices, semiconductors, and equipment such as security tools for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) or data centers. • Workers manufacturing or providing parts and equipment that enable the maintenance and continued operation of essential businesses and facilities.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
• Workers who manage hazardous materials associated with any other essential activity, including but not limited to healthcare waste (medical, pharmaceuticals, medical material production, and testing operations from laboratories processing and testing kits) and energy (including nuclear facilities).
• Workers who support hazardous materials response and cleanup. • Workers who maintain digital systems infrastructure supporting hazardous materials management
operations.
FINANCIAL SERVICES
• Workers who are needed to provide, process, and maintain systems for processing, verification, and recording of financial transactions and services, including payment, clearing, and settlement; wholesale funding; insurance services; consumer and commercial lending; public accounting; and capital markets activities.
• Workers who are needed to maintain orderly market operations to ensure the continuity of financial transactions and services.
• Workers who are needed to provide business, commercial, and consumer access to bank and non-bank financial services and lending services, including ATMs, lending and money transmission, lockbox banking, and to move currency, checks, securities, and payments (e.g., armored cash carriers).
• Workers who support financial operations and those staffing call centers, such as those staffing data and security operations centers, managing physical security, or providing accounting services.
• Workers supporting production and distribution of debit and credit cards. • Workers providing electronic point of sale support personnel for essential businesses and workers.
CHEMICAL
• Workers supporting the chemical and industrial gas supply chains, including workers at chemical manufacturing plants, laboratories, distribution facilities, and workers who transport basic raw chemical materials to the producers of industrial and consumer goods, including hand sanitizers, food and food additives, pharmaceuticals, paintings and coatings, textiles, building materials, plumbing, electrical, and paper products.
• Workers supporting the safe transportation of chemicals, including those supporting tank truck cleaning facilities and workers who manufacture packaging items.
• Workers supporting the production of protective cleaning and medical solutions, PPE, chemical consumer and institutional products, disinfectants, fragrances, and packaging that prevents the contamination of food, water, medicine, among others essential products.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 40 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
• Workers supporting the operation and maintenance of facilities (particularly those with high risk chemicals and sites that cannot be shut down) whose work cannot be done remotely and requires the presence of highly trained personnel to ensure safe operations, including plant contract workers who provide inspections.
• Workers (including those in glass container manufacturing) who support the production and transportation of chlorine and alkali manufacturing, single-use plastics, and packaging that prevents the contamination or supports the continued manufacture of food, water, medicine, and other essential products.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
• Workers who support the essential services required to meet national security commitments to the federal government and U.S. Military, including, but are not limited to, space and aerospace workers, nuclear matters workers, mechanical and software engineers (various disciplines), manufacturing and production workers, IT support, security staff, security personnel, intelligence support, aircraft and weapon system mechanics and maintainers, and sanitary workers who maintain the hygienic viability of necessary facilities.
• Personnel working for companies, and their subcontractors, who perform under contract or sub-contract to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) (on nuclear matters), as well as personnel at government-owned/contractor operated facilities, and who provide materials and services to the DoD and DoE (on nuclear matters), including support for weapon systems, software systems and cybersecurity, defense and intelligence communications, surveillance, sale of U.S. defense articles and services for export to foreign allies and partners (as authorized by the U.S. government), and space systems and other activities in support of our military, intelligence, and space forces.
COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
• Workers who support the supply chain of building materials from production through application and installation, including cabinetry, fixtures, doors, cement, hardware, plumbing (including parts and services), electrical, heating and cooling, refrigeration, appliances, paint and coatings, and workers who provide services that enable repair materials and equipment for essential functions.
• Workers supporting ecommerce through distribution, warehouse, call center facilities, and other essential operational support functions, that accept, store, and process goods, and that facilitate their transportation and delivery.
• Workers in hardware and building materials stores necessary to provide access to essential supplies, consumer electronics, technology and appliances retail, and related merchant wholesalers and distributors.
• Workers distributing, servicing, repairing, installing residential and commercial HVAC systems, boilers, furnaces and other heating, cooling, refrigeration, and ventilation equipment.
• Workers supporting the operations of commercial buildings that are critical to safety, security, and the continuance of essential activities, such as on-site property managers, building engineers, security staff, fire safety directors, janitorial personnel, and service technicians (e.g., mechanical, HVAC, plumbers, electricians, and elevator).
• Management and staff at hotels and other temporary lodging facilities that provide for COVID-19 mitigation, containment, and treatment measures or provide accommodations for essential workers.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 41 of 42
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce
RESIDENTIAL/SHELTER FACILITIES AND SERVICES
• Workers providing dependent care services, particularly those whose services ensure essential workers can continue to work.
• Workers who support food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life for needy groups and individuals, including in-need populations and COVID-19 responders including travelling medical staff.
• Workers in animal shelters. • Workers responsible for the leasing of residential properties to provide individuals and families with ready
access to available housing. • Workers responsible for handling property management, maintenance, and related service calls who can
coordinate the response to emergency “at-home” situations requiring immediate attention, as well as facilitate the reception of deliveries, mail, and other necessary services. • Workers performing housing and commercial construction related activities, including those supporting government functions related to the building and development process, such as inspections, permitting, and plan review services that can be modified to protect the public health, but fundamentally should continue and enable the continuity of the construction industry (e.g., allow qualified private third-party inspections in case of federal government shutdown). • Workers performing services in support of the elderly and disabled populations who coordinate a variety of services, including health care appointments and activities of daily living. • Workers responsible for the movement of household goods.
HYGIENE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
• Workers who produce hygiene products. • Workers in laundromats, laundry services, and dry cleaners. • Workers providing personal and household goods, repair, and maintenance. • Workers providing disinfection services for all essential facilities and modes of transportation and who
support the sanitation of all food manufacturing processes and operations from wholesale to retail. • Workers necessary for the installation, maintenance, distribution, and manufacturing of water and space
heating equipment and its components. • Support required for continuity of services, including commercial disinfectant services, janitorial and
cleaning personnel, and support personnel functions that need freedom of movement to access facilities in support of front-line workers. • Workers supporting the production of home cleaning, pest control, and other essential products necessary to clean, disinfect, sanitize, and ensure the cleanliness of residential homes, shelters, and commercial facilities. • Workers supporting agriculture irrigation infrastructure. • Workers supporting the production of home cleaning and pest control products.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-11 Filed 05/29/20 Page 42 of 42
RESOLUTION RESOLVED, by the Executive Council of the State of Minnesota, at its emergency meeting on May 1, 2020, that it approves Emergency Executive Order 20-48 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 12.31 and 12.32.
Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces Approved by Executive Council 05.01.2020 DATE: ______________________________ BY: ________________________________
Filed on May 1, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

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EXHIBIT 10

aTnhCios nAdgoSocEiunmg0ed:n2igt0iti-saclmva-ar0cdh1ei2vai0vna5gi-lpaErboClejeTec-tlTe. chNttrLtopn:/icD/awollwycwubym.letehg.ensttMa1tien5.n-m1ens2o.utsaF/Llirelle/gedisxlea0ct5iov/re2d9Re/re2sf/e0erxeenPccoeargLdieebrrs2a.rayospfas1p2art of
Emergency Executive Order 20-56
Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency
I, Tim Walz, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and applicable statutes, issue the following Executive Order:
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to present an unprecedented and rapidly evolving challenge to our State. Since the World Health Organization (“WHO”) characterized the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic on March 11, 2020, confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Minnesota have rapidly increased. On March 15, 2020, Minnesota detected the first confirmed cases caused by “community spread”—infections not epidemiologically linked to overseas travel. By March 17, 2020, all fifty states had reported a confirmed case of COVID-19, and on March 21, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”) announced the first confirmed fatality due to COVID-19 in Minnesota. Minnesota has taken proactive steps to ensure that we are ahead of the curve on COVID-19 prevention and response. On March 13, 2020, I issued Executive Order 20-01 and declared a peacetime emergency because this pandemic, an act of nature, threatens the lives of Minnesotans, and local resources are inadequate to address the threat. After notifying the Legislature, on April 13, 2020 and again on May 13, 2020, I issued Executive Orders extending the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01. The need to slow the spread of the virus required the closure of certain non-critical businesses in our economy. Consistent with national trends, over 650,000 Minnesotans have applied for unemployment insurance since March 16, 2020. In Executive Order 20-33, seeking to balance public health needs and economic considerations, I directed the Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, and Labor and Industry to begin planning to allow more Minnesota workers to return to work when it is safe to do so. I explained that such a plan must include guidelines and requirements for appropriate social distancing, hygiene, and public health best practices. Executive Order 20-38 expanded exemptions related to outdoor recreational activities and facilities. Executive Orders 20-40 and 20-48 allowed for certain noncritical businesses to reopen after they had planned for and provided a safe work environment.
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In light of our increased preparedness to treat those most vulnerable to COVID-19 and mitigate these ongoing economic impacts, this Executive Order continues our plan to safely reopen our economy by allowing even more non-critical businesses to reopen, provided that they follow guidance from MDH, the Department of Employment and Economic Development (“DEED”), and the Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”). In particular, such businesses must ensure compliance with the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 182 (“Minnesota OSHA Standards”), in addition to guidelines related to COVID19 set forth by MDH and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“MDH and CDC Guidelines”).
Despite the progress we have made since declaring the COVID-19 peacetime emergency, certain establishments—including those in which people gather and linger, those with communal facilities, and those in which close physical contact is expected—continue to pose a public health risk. We must continue to carefully consider and prepare for the reopening of such businesses.
Likewise, certain non-work activities outside of the home are conducive to social distancing and hygiene, while others raise significant public health risks. Large social and other gatherings of people for extended time periods raise the risk of COVID-19 transmission from household to household. The risks of such transmission are diminished in transitory settings, such as retail establishments, where individual interactions and contact are more limited in duration.
In Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.02, the Minnesota Legislature conferred upon the Governor emergency powers “in order to (1) ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with disasters, (2) generally protect the public peace, health, and safety, and (3) preserve the lives and property of the people of the state.” Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 1, the Governor has general authority to control the state’s emergency management as well as carry out the provisions of Minnesota’s Emergency Management Act.
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.21, subdivision 3(7), authorizes the Governor to cooperate with federal and state agencies in “matters pertaining to the emergency management of the state and nation.” This includes “the direction or control of . . . the conduct of persons in the state, including entrance or exit from any stricken or threatened public place, occupancy of facilities, and . . . public meetings or gatherings.” Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that same section, the Governor may “make, amend, and rescind the necessary orders and rules to carry out the provisions” of Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 12. When approved by the Executive Council and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, such orders and rules have the force and effect of law during the peacetime emergency. Any inconsistent rules or ordinances of any agency or political subdivision of the state are suspended during the pendency of the emergency
For these reasons, I order as follows:
1. Executive Order 20-48 is rescinded as of Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
2. Paragraphs 6 through 8 of this Executive Order are effective as of Sunday, May 17, 2020 at 11:59 pm and remain in effect through Sunday, May 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
3. Masks and face coverings strongly encouraged. I strongly encourage all Minnesotans to wear a manufactured or homemade cloth face covering when they
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leave their homes and travel to any public setting where social distancing measures are difficult to maintain (e.g., grocery stores and pharmacies) and to follow face covering guidelines issued by MDH and the CDC until this Executive Order is rescinded. Such face masks and coverings are for source control (to help limit the person wearing the covering from infecting others). They are not yet known to be protective of the wearer and therefore are not personal protective equipment.
4. At-risk persons. All persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19, as defined by Executive Order 20-55, are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence and follow the provisions of Executive Order 20-55.
5. Definitions.
a. “Home” and “homes” and “residence” and “residences” are broadly defined to include mobile homes, hotels, motels, shared rental units, shelters, and similar facilities, to the extent they are used for lodging.
b. “Worker” and “workers” are broadly defined to include owners, proprietors, employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and interns.
c. “Business” and “businesses” are broadly defined to include entities that employ or engage workers, including private-sector entities, public-sector entities, non-profit entities, and state, county, and local governments.
d. “Critical Businesses” are all businesses whose workers qualified for a Critical Sector exemption under paragraph 6 of Executive Order 20-48.
e. “Non-Critical Businesses” are all businesses that are not Critical Businesses and are not closed under Executive Orders 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18.
6. Activities outside of the home. Mindful that we must continue to limit social interactions to protect public health, individuals may leave their homes for activities, subject to the requirements and guidelines set forth below. These requirements may be clarified, as deemed necessary by the Governor, to ensure the health, safety, and security of all Minnesotans. Clarifications will be available for public review at the State’s COVID-19 website (https://mn.gov/covid19/).
a. Guidelines. Individuals engaging in activities outside of the home must follow the requirements of this Executive Order and MDH and CDC Guidelines. Individuals engaging in outdoor activities must follow the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) and MDH guidelines on outdoor recreation and guidelines for facilities and the public (“Outdoor Recreation Guidelines”) available at DNR’s website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid-19.html).
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b. Unnecessary travel strongly discouraged. Consistent with federal guidance and to protect our neighbors, Minnesotans are encouraged to stay close to home and are strongly discouraged from engaging in unnecessary travel.
c. Gatherings. All gatherings of more than 10 people are prohibited. Gatherings are groups of individuals, who are not members of the same household, congregated together for a common or coordinated social, civic, community, faith-based, leisure, or recreational purpose—even if social distancing can be maintained. This prohibition includes planned and spontaneous gatherings, public and private gatherings, and indoor and outdoor gatherings. Examples of prohibited gatherings include, but are not limited to, social, civic, community, faith-based, or leisure events, sporting or athletic events, performances, concerts, conventions, fundraisers, parades, fairs, and festivals that bring together more than 10 people from more than one household. Prohibited gatherings do not include commercial activity by workers and customers of Critical and Non-Critical Businesses.
i. Legislative and other governmental meetings. The limits on gatherings in this Executive Order do not apply to legislative and other governmental meetings. Remote meetings are strongly encouraged whenever possible.
ii. The Judicial Branch. The limits on gatherings in this Executive Order do not apply to proceedings held by the Minnesota Judicial Branch. Proceedings held by the Judicial Branch are subject to the policies established by the chief justice and will occur as directed by court order. Individuals may appear as directed by a Minnesota state court, including to serve as a juror, appear as a party, as a witness, or as legal counsel on behalf of a party, or otherwise to comply as directed by a court order, subpoena, or summons.
iii. Federal activities. Nothing in this Executive Order will be construed to limit, prohibit, or restrict in any way the operations of the federal government or the movement of federal officials in Minnesota while acting in their official capacity, including federal judicial, legislative, and executive staff and personnel.
iv. Drive-in gatherings. To enable safe congregation of more than 10 people, drive-in gatherings are permitted, provided that all participants remain within their own vehicles and follow guidelines provided by MDH and available at MDH’s website (https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/).
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d. Tribal Activities and Lands.
i. Activities by tribal members within the boundaries of their tribal reservations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
ii. Activities within the boundaries of federal land held in trust for one of the 11 Minnesota Tribal Nations are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by tribal authorities.
iii. Activities by tribal members to exercise their federal treaty rights within the boundaries of their treaty territory (also known as “ceded territory”) are exempt from the restrictions in this Executive Order but may be subject to restrictions by applicable tribal authorities.
iv. Tribal members may travel to and from their tribal reservations in accordance with applicable tribal law.
7. Workers and businesses. Workers and businesses are subject to the requirements set forth below.
a. Extension of temporary closure of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation. The closure of bars, restaurants, and other public accommodations set forth in Executive Order 20-04, as amended by Executive Orders 20-08 and 20-18, is extended until May 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Barbershops and salons may continue to conduct retail product sales in accordance with the requirements for Non-Critical Businesses set forth below.
b. Plan to reopen bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation. The Commissioners of Health, Employment and Economic Development, and Labor and Industry are directed to develop a phased plan to achieve the limited and safe reopening of bars, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation beginning on June 1, 2020. This plan will be ready for presentation to the public no later than May 20, 2020.
c. Continue to work from home whenever possible. Any worker who can work from home must do so.
d. Critical Businesses. Businesses whose workers qualified for a Critical Sector exemption under paragraph 6 of Executive Order 20-48 may continue to operate in the same manner as provided in Executive Order 20-48.
i. Child care businesses and youth programming. Child care providers and other businesses providing care and programming to children and youth of Critical Businesses, including workers in child care centers, family child care, certified centers, youth summer programming (including day camps but not overnight camps), and
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other activities and facilities, are Critical Businesses. These businesses are encouraged to prioritize enrollment for workers in Critical Businesses according to guidance provided by the Children’s Cabinet and other agencies. This category continues to include workers in a personal home, such as family, friend, and neighbor care necessary for workers to continue to perform their duties. These settings must adhere to MDH and CDC Guidelines.
e. Non-Critical Businesses. If it has not done so already, a Non-Critical Business choosing to open or remain open must establish and implement a COVID-19 Preparedness Plan (“Plan”). Each Plan must provide for the business’s implementation of Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in their workplaces. These requirements are set forth in guidance published by DEED and DLI (“Plan Guidance”) available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
i. Required Plan content. As set forth in the Plan Guidance, at a minimum, each Plan must adequately address the following areas:
A. Require work from home whenever possible. All Plans must ensure that all workers who can work from home continue to do so.
B. Ensure that sick workers stay home. All Plans must establish policies and procedures, including health screenings, that prevent sick workers from entering the workplace.
C. Social distancing. All Plans must establish social distancing policies and procedures.
D. Worker hygiene and source control. All Plans must establish hygiene and source control policies for workers.
E. Cleaning, disinfection, and ventilation protocols. All Plans must establish cleaning, disinfection, and ventilation protocols for areas within the workplace.
ii. Customer facing businesses. All Non-Critical Businesses that are customer facing (i.e., businesses that have in-person customer interactions) must include additional Plan provisions to keep the public and workers safe as set forth in the Plan Guidance available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/). This includes requirements that workers and customers must maintain physical distancing of 6 feet and that store occupancy must not exceed 50 percent of the normal occupant capacity as determined by the fire marshal. In customer facing businesses that share common areas, such as malls, all Plans must similarly include a facility occupancy that
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must not exceed 50 percent of the normal occupant capacity as determined by the fire marshal and provide an enhanced sanitizing, cleaning, and disinfecting regimen consistent with Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines for those common areas. All Plans must also include signage in common areas to discourage gathering.
iii. Household services businesses. All Non-Critical Businesses that provide household services (e.g., housecleaning, maid services, and piano tuners) must also develop Plan provisions intended to keep customers and workers safe as set forth in the Plan Guidance available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
iv. Optional template. A template COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, which covers the above requirements, is available as part of the Plan Guidance, available on DEED’s website (https://mn.gov/deed/safework/).
v. Certification and signature. Senior management responsible for implementing the Plan must sign and certify the Plan, affirming their commitment to implement and follow the Plan.
vi. Dissemination and posting. Each Non-Critical Business must provide its Plan, in writing, to all workers, and the Plan must be posted at all of the business’s workplaces in locations that will allow for the Plan to be readily reviewed by all workers. Where physical posting is impracticable, the Plan can be posted electronically, provided that the Plan is received by all workers and remains available for their review.
vii. Training. Each Non-Critical Business must ensure that training is provided to workers on the contents of its Plan and required procedures, so that all workers understand and are able to perform the precautions necessary to protect themselves and their co-workers. This training should be easy to understand and available in the appropriate language and literacy level for all workers. Businesses should also take steps to supervise workers and ensure that workers understand and adhere to necessary precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission. Documentation demonstrating compliance with this training requirement must be maintained and made available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI, upon request.
viii. Compliance. Employees and management must work together to ensure compliance with the Plan, implement all protocols, policies, and procedures, and create a safe and healthy work environment.
ix. Availability to regulatory authorities and public safety officers. Non-Critical Businesses do not need to submit their Plans for
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preapproval. Upon request, Non-Critical Businesses must make their Plans available to regulatory authorities and public safety officers, including DLI.
x. In the event of a complaint or dispute related to a Non-Critical Business’s Plan, DLI is authorized to determine whether the Plan adequately implements Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines in its workplaces.
f. Executive Order 20-54 remains in full force and effect. All work must be conducted in a manner that adheres to Minnesota OSHA Standards and MDH and CDC Guidelines, including social distancing and hygiene practices. Under existing law and authority, DLI may issue citations, civil penalties, or closure orders to places of employment with unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and DLI may penalize businesses that retaliate against employees who raise safety and health concerns.
8. Outdoor recreational activities and associated facilities. Notwithstanding Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, and 20-18, the below facilities are permitted to be open and do business, provided that they adhere to paragraph 6 of this Executive Order and the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines available at DNR’s website (https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/covid-19.html). This permission does not extend to charter boats, launches, or facilities that involve prohibited gatherings or people in groups or close proximity (e.g., mini golf, pools, commercial outdoor racetracks, and concert venues). Indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities covered by Executive Orders 20-04, 20-08, and 20-18, must comply with those Executive Orders, and all indoor facilities associated with outdoor recreational facilities must also conform with the provisions of paragraph 7 of this Executive Order. I encourage public outdoor recreational facilities be open for families and children, and direct all individuals utilizing such facilities to follow the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines. All outdoor recreational activities and facilities must comply with Minnesota law, including but not limited to license and permit requirements, invasive species regulations, and park rules.
a. Minnesota State Parks, Trails, State Forests, State Recreation Areas, Wildlife Management Areas, Scientific and Natural Areas, and other State managed recreational lands.
b. Locally, regionally, and privately managed parks and trails.
c. State, regional, or local public water accesses.
d. Public and private marinas and docks that provide storage, docking, and mooring services to slip owners, seasonal renters, and the general public, as well as facilities that provide safety-related services including fueling, emergency dockage, and sanitary pump-out stations.
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e. Public and private golf courses and outdoor driving ranges.
f. Ski areas.
g. Off-highway vehicles, snowmobiles, and watercraft repair shops, sales facilities, and showrooms.
h. Lake service providers to install, repair, and remove docks, boatlifts, and other water related equipment or deliver boats.
i. Bait and tackle shops.
j. Outdoor shooting ranges and game farms.
k. Outdoor recreational equipment rental outlets. Equipment may be rented but only if the equipment can be effectively sanitized between uses. Such outlets must implement clear check-in and check-out procedures that minimize contact between customers and workers. Any rentals must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
l. Dispersed and remote camping sites for single household use. A dispersed campsite is a single campsite, not in a developed campground, used for overnight camping. A remote campsite is a designated backpack or watercraft campsite, not in a developed campground, used for overnight camping. Both private and public developed campgrounds remain closed to recreational camping.
m. Outdoor tournaments, competitions, practices, and sports that allow for social distance, do not require group gatherings prohibited by paragraph 6.c, and that adhere to the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
n. Small one-on-one or one-on-two person guided and instructional activities such as guided fishing, birding, or outdoor fitness training. Guided and instructional activities must be conducted in accordance with the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
o. Any other outdoor recreation activities and facilities that may be designated in the Outdoor Recreation Guidelines.
9. Minnesotans must respect the efforts of employers or businesses to protect the safety of their workers and customers by complying with those businesses’ social distancing and hygiene instructions. Employers must post social distancing and hygiene instructions at entrances and in locations that can be easily seen by customers and visitors.
10. I urge all Minnesotans to voluntarily comply with this Executive Order. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.45, an individual who willfully violates this Executive Order is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by
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a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Any business owner, manager, or supervisor who requires or encourages any of their employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, or interns to violate this Executive Order is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and upon conviction must be punished by a fine not to exceed $3,000 or by imprisonment for not more than a year. In addition to those criminal penalties, the Attorney General, as well as city and county attorneys, may seek any civil relief available pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 8.31, for violations of this Executive Order, including civil penalties up to $25,000 per occurrence from businesses and injunctive relief. Nothing in this Executive Order is intended to encourage or allow law enforcement to transgress individual constitutional rights.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 4.035, subdivision 2, and section 12.32, this Executive Order is effective immediately upon approval by the Executive Council. It remains in effect until the peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01 is terminated or until it is rescinded by proper authority.
A determination that any provision of this Executive Order is invalid will not affect the enforceability of any other provision of this Executive Order. Rather, the invalid provision will be modified to the extent necessary so that it is enforceable.
Signed on May 13, 2020.

Filed According to Law:

_____________________________________
Tim Walz
Governor

_____________________________________
Steve Simon
Secretary of State
Approved by the Executive Council on May 13, 2020:

_____________________________________
Alice Roberts-Davis
Secretary, Executive Council
10

Filed May 13, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-12 Filed 05/29/20 Page 12 of 12
RESOLUTION RESOLVED, by the Executive Council of the State of Minnesota, at its emergency meeting on May 13, 2020, that it approves Emergency Executive Order 20-56 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 12.31 and 12.32.
Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency.
Approved by Executive Council DATE: ______M_a_y__1_3_, _2_0_2_0______________ BY: ________________________________
Filed May 13, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

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EXHIBIT 11

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Voting Report
May 15, 2020
Wisconsin Elections Commissioners Dean Knudson, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Julie M. Glancey | Ann S. Jacobs | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Administrator Meagan Wolfe

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FACTS: Absentee Voting Data FINDINGS: Absentee Performance During the April 2020 Primary
General Assessment Case Studies RECOMMENDATIONS: Proposed Courses of Action CONCLUSION Supplemental Absentee Voting Data 2016-2020

PAGE 3 3 8 8 13 21 24
Exhibit A

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I. Executive Summary
Absentee voting in the April 2020 election reached unprecedented levels but Wisconsin voters, local election officials and election administration systems largely adapted to the demand and managed the volume successfully. At a macro level, the processes to request, receive, return, and review absentee ballots proceeded normally and without inconsistencies. At a local level, the extraordinary volume placed enormous stress on election officials, elections systems, and the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).
Absentee voting remains a largely manual, labor-intensive process administered by each individual jurisdiction across the state. While voters can request a ballot and upload a photo ID on their smart phone in just a few minutes, behind the scenes clerks must still manually verify the IDs, stuff and seal envelopes by hand, apply postage, carry boxes of envelopes to the post office, and physically check off each request. These manual processes have worked well in the past, but they are not easy to scale up without advance warning or extensive preparation. When mail volume is up to ten times higher than anticipated, clerks must complete the same tasks without the benefit of having more staff, additional supplies or more hours to meet statutory deadlines.
Despite these challenges, clerks across the state did what was necessary to complete the task. Many jurisdictions hired and trained temporary staff, developed new procedures, and worked long nights and weekends to meet voter needs. The Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC” or “Commission”) likewise hired temporary staff, rapidly expanded technical systems, and worked around the clock to keep up with demand. The data in this report affirms that these efforts were successful, while still revealing opportunities for improvement and important lessons learned.
WEC staff, Wisconsin clerks, and the USPS are working together to make improvements to the absentee voting process and prepare for continued high vote-by-mail volume for the remainder of 2020 and beyond. Process improvements in development will revise the absentee ballot request application, ballot mailing, ballot tracking, and overall quality control. Every step in the process, from the application form, to the envelope, to the tracking tools, is under examination and being evaluated for potential improvements. The tools now in development will provide voters, clerks, and WEC staff with a simpler process and improved communication.
II. Facts: Absentee Voting Data
The April 2020 election broke absentee voting records in Wisconsin while maintaining relatively high turnout for a spring election. Indeed, the April 2020 election produced several state records, including:
• Most by mail ballots ever cast in any Wisconsin election • Most absentee ballots ever cast in any Wisconsin election • Second most total ballots ever cast in a Wisconsin Spring Election • Most in-person absentee ballots in a Wisconsin Spring Election.
The total number of absentee ballots cast by mail easily surpassed the previous record set in April 2016.
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Table 1.

1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0

170614

Total Ballots Cast by Mail

964433

While the COVID-19 pandemic produced an exceptional shift to vote-by-mail, it is not clear that the crisis influenced overall participation. The total ballots cast in the Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote were not markedly different from previous spring elections. While voter participation for this election was consistent with historic turnout numbers for similar elections, it is also impossible to determine how many voters were unable to cast a ballot for this election due to concerns and complications related to the COVID-19 pandemic. As demonstrated by the chart below, total ballots cast for this election were comparable to the 2008 Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote and trailed only the same election in 2016 where both major political parties had competitive presidential primaries on the ballot in Wisconsin.

Table 2.

2500000 2000000 1500000

1511639

Spring Elections Total Ballots Cast
2113544

1000000

500000

0

1555263

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April 7, 2020 Absentee Ballot Report Page 5
Absentee ballots cast for the April 2020 election also represented a far greater percentage of the ballots cast than is typical. More than three-quarters of the ballots cast were absentee and more than 60% were delivered by mail. Historically, over 80% of ballots in Wisconsin are cast in person on election day and only 6% are cast as by mail absentee ballots. Wisconsin has seen a steady rise in absentee voting percentages in recent years, but those gains could be attributed to an increase in in-person absentee voting, commonly referred to as early voting. For this election, almost 75% of all ballots cast were by absentee voters with over 60% issued and returned by mail. For this election, Wisconsin local election officials saw increases in both in-person absentee voting and absentee by mail, which created resource issues for a system primarily designed to support polling place voting on election day. Some smaller staffs were nearly overwhelmed by the demand and many had to recruit assistance from other municipal departments or secure temporary staff.
Table 3.
2020 Spring Election and Presidential Preference

Ballots Cast Absentee
1,157,599 74%

Ballots Cast on Election Day
397,664 26%

As compared with earlier elections, the 2020 shift to voting by mail is distinct, with barely one quarter of voters choosing to cast a ballot on election day. In person voting on election day was still required for this election and each municipality had to dedicate resources to securing, staffing and supplying polling places, while also processing the increased volume of absentee voting. Almost 400,000 voters cast their ballot at a Wisconsin polling place on election day and each municipality operated at least one polling place. The combination of increased by mail absentee voting and continued support of in person voting has resulted in many local election officials reporting that their 2020 municipal postal budgets have already been exhausted or are on pace for shortages.

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Table 4.

100.0% 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%

Voting Method

25.6%

89.9%

72.7%

88.8%

89.1%

78.3%

87.9%

61.8%

4.8%

8.1%
4/5/2016

22.5%
11/8/2016

6.9% 4.3%
4/4/2017

6.2%

5.3% 5.6%

15.5%

5.4% 6.7%

4/3/2018 11/6/2018 4/2/2019

In Person Absentee By Mail Absentee Election Day

12.6%
4/7/2020

Nearly 1.3 million absentee ballots were delivered to voters for the April election, either by mail or in person at local clerks’ offices. While almost 90 percent of ballots were returned and counted, approximately 1 in 10 ballots were either not returned to the clerk or were returned but rejected. Almost 121,000 absentee ballots were issued by local election officials, but not returned by voters. This report will provide information about several factors that contributed to the number of unreturned ballots.

Table 5.
April 7, 2020 - Absentee Ballots
Total Absentee Ballots Sent1 Absentee Ballots Returned and Counted Absentee Ballots Returned and Rejected – After 4/13 Absentee Ballots Returned and Rejected - Other Absentee Ballots Not Returned

Absentee Ballot Count
1,303,985 1,159,800
2,659 20,537 120,989

% of Ballots
100.00% 88.94% 0.20% 1.57% 9.28%

1 An additional 21,301 absentee ballot records were created by clerks but deactivated for administrative reasons (e.g. clerk error, voter error, voter request, ineligible voter, etc.). This represents approximately 1.6% of the total absentee ballot records. Since 2016, the median rate of administrative cancellations is approximately 2.3% of the total absentee ballot records created, with a range of 1.1% (November 2018) to 4.0% (April 2016).

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The figures above are largely consistent with the percentage of ballots rejected or not returned in recent April elections. Both the ballot rejection and unreturned ballot rates were consistent with or lower than the previous rates. This comparison does not seek to downplay the concerns and experiences reported by voters who had difficulty receiving or returning their ballot or voters who could not meet the witness requirement due to COVID-19 concerns. It does demonstrate the Wisconsin vote by mail system for the April 7, 2020 election performed consistently with its performance in previous comparable elections, but there are still several opportunities for improvements. The State is currently pursuing multiple initiatives that will improve the by mail absentee process prior to the fall 2020 elections.

Table 6.

Table 7.

20.0%

Absentee Ballots Rejected

Absentee Ballots Not Returned

20.0%

18.9%

15.0% 10.0%
5.0% 2.5% 2.0% 2.3% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0%

15.0%
10.0%
5.4%
5.0%
0.0%

11.4% 10.9% 9.3%

Likewise, most ballots were returned prior to Election Day, but nearly 7% arrived in the window between Election Day and the court ordered deadline of 4:00 p.m. on 4/13/2020. Over 1.1 million of the absentee ballots that were issued for this election were returned in accordance with current Wisconsin state law that requires ballots to be received by 8:00 PM on Election Day in order to be counted. Judge Conley’s extension of the ballot return deadline to 4:00 PM on April 13, 2020 resulted in an additional 79,054 ballots being counted for this election. Local election officials have also reported 2,659 ballots that were returned after the April 13 deadline that were not counted due to their late arrival.

Table 8. April 2020 Absentee Ballot Return Dates

Absentee Ballot Count

% of Ballots

Total Absentee Ballots Returned Ballots returned before 4/8/2020 Ballots returned between 4/8/2020 and 4/13/2020 Ballots returned after 4/13/2020

1,182,996 1,101,324
79,054 2,659

100.00% 93.09% 6.68% 0.22%

Additional historical data is attached to this report as Exhibit A - Absentee Voting Data.

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III. Findings: Absentee Performance During the April 2020 Primary
A. General Assessment
Wisconsin voters demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to the democratic process in the April 2020 election. In the midst of a COVID-19 pandemic and rapidly changing voting rules and protocols, nearly 1.2 million voters cast an absentee ballot in the Spring Election and Presidential Preference Primary. This section assesses the performance of the absentee voting process during the April 2020 election and examines the experiences of voters, election officials, and election systems. The assessment will consider both a broad overview and examine specific case studies from across the state.
1. The Absentee Process in Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Legislature has determined that the vigorous exercise of our constitutional right to vote should be strongly encouraged. The Legislature also recognizes that it is difficult for some individuals to get to their polling place on Election Day. In order to meet this need, the Legislature has established the privilege of absentee voting as an extension of the right to vote on Election Day. The Legislature recognized that the privilege of voting absentee is exercised wholly outside the traditional safeguards of the polling place. It has determined that the privilege of absentee voting must be carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse, overzealous solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate in an election, and undue influence on an absentee elector to vote for or against a candidate or referendum. Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).
Any qualified elector who is unable or unwilling to appear at the polling place on Election Day may vote by absentee ballot. Wis. Stat. § 6.85. Registered electors wishing to vote absentee must submit an absentee ballot request in writing to the municipal clerk. The request is made to the municipal clerk in writing or electronically using the Application for Absentee Ballot (EL-121), or a letter requesting an absentee ballot which provides the information required on the application form. The written request should include the elector’s: 1. Name 2. Residential address 3. Mailing address, if different than residential address 4. Signature 5. Proof of identification, if necessary. Military and Overseas electors may also use the Federal Postcard Application (FPCA), which is a combination registration form and absentee ballot request. Voters may also apply for and vote an absentee ballot in person at the municipal clerk’s office. Wis. Stat. § 6.86.
Municipal clerks prepare official absentee ballots for delivery to electors requesting them. An absentee ballot must be sent to any voter with an absentee application on file, no later than 47 days before a federal election, and no later than 21 days before a primary or other election. Otherwise, the municipal clerk shall send or transmit an official absentee ballot within one business day of the time the elector's request for such a ballot is received. Wis. Stat. § 7.15(1)(cm).
The municipal clerk or the clerk’s designee is required to enter absentee applications and ballot information into the WisVote system maintained by the Commission within 48 hours after mailing or receiving an in-person absentee ballot application. Wis. Stat. § 6.33(5). Or, in the case where the
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municipality relies on the county or another municipality, the clerk shall submit the information to the clerk’s WisVote provider, and the provider shall enter the absentee information into the WisVote system within 24 hours. Wis. Stat. § 6.33(5).
2015 Wisconsin Act 261 charged the Government Accountability Board (G.A.B.), and later the Wisconsin Elections Commission, with developing a subscription service that would allow the public to access absentee ballot data that is tracked in WisVote. Given the implementation of the absentee subscription service available in BADGER Voters as well as increase in absentee voting and the growing public interest in obtaining absentee ballot data, it is important that clerks are able to timely and accurately enter absentee ballot data into WisVote including entry of absentee applications, issuance of ballots, and recording ballot statuses. The WEC staff plays an important role in assisting clerks with entering and tracking absentee ballots in the WisVote system.
a. Support Provided by the WEC
Commission staff do not process or send absentee ballots to voters in Wisconsin; all requests are required to be fulfilled by a local municipal clerk. However, Commission staff provide a range of both technical and direct support to municipalities for the absentee request process. The Commission provides access to and maintains the WisVote system and the MyVote website, along with technical support and training related to these products.
The WisVote system is the primary administrative means of tracking and supporting the absentee process in Wisconsin. Along with voter registration records, WisVote allows clerks to track absentee requests for single and multiple elections, create records for issued ballots, and record the final disposition of ballots. Centralized absentee tracking allows Commission staff to monitor and support clerk compliance with Federal and State UOCAVA requirements. It also allows Commission staff to gather and submit federally required absentee information to the U.S. Elections Administration Commission on behalf of all Wisconsin clerks.
WisVote has several built-in reports and report-building functions to further support clerks in the entering and tracking of absentee applications and ballot records. Commission development will also create new reports based on clerk feedback and needs, such as the recent Photo ID Not on File report created to assist clerks in finding and entering any absentee applications missed due to the large influx of requests. This report was created, tested, and deployed in less than one week.
The MyVote Wisconsin website is another integral piece of the absentee voting process. MyVote is a public-facing website that provides a central location for voters to submit an absentee ballot request regardless of where they reside in the state. All requests submitted via MyVote are then transmitted to the municipal clerk via an email notification that includes a copy of the photo ID file, if required, and a PDF version of the absentee request that includes election information, delivery method, and separate mailing address, if provided. MyVote reduces the number of misdirected absentee requests and speeds the absentee process by providing a standard email to assist in organizing emailed requests and
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automatically assigning them to the correct jurisdiction based on the voter’s address. When a photo ID is not required, the MyVote site will create the tracking record in WisVote automatically while still sending the notification, removing the data-entry requirement for these requests. Voters who do not use the MyVote site may send absentee requests to the incorrect jurisdiction, or even the Elections Commission directly, which leads to requests being delayed or even unfulfilled if the misdirected request is received after a statutory deadline.
Commission staff maintains and develops extensive training materials to update clerks on changes to WisVote and MyVote while also allowing new clerks to obtain the necessary training to use these systems effectively. All clerks and their support staff are given access to an elections training site referred to as The Learning Center (“TLC”). The site includes interactive training modules covering the various functions of WisVote and links to all training webinars produced by Commission training staff. Commission staff also publish and update a user manual for WisVote which includes detailed instructions on using the various functions and features of WisVote. Along with these existing materials, Commission training staff produce and record several training webinars during each election cycle to review topics of concern, preview/review recent updates to WisVote and solicit clerk feedback.
b. Processes at Individual Communities
The absentee request and fulfillment process will include many of the same processes regardless of municipal size or circumstances. Requests must be reviewed to determine type and period of request, if the voter is currently registered, within the jurisdiction, and if an acceptable photo ID was required/provided. All municipalities must mail/email/fax any ballot requests themselves and have a supply of envelopes and ballots to do so. Based on request volume and municipality size, clerks may use WisVote to generate mailing labels while other municipalities will opt for hand-written labels. If a clerk is a self-provider, has WisVote access and tracks their own information, they would also enter the necessary information into WisVote. In municipalities where the clerk is not a WisVote user, they will contract with another municipality or county to enter this information on their behalf while reviewing and fulfilling any absentee requests directly.
For a more detailed accounting of how various municipalities handled the absentee process, please see the Case Studies section below.
2. Voting for April 2020
The April 7 Spring Election and Presidential Preference Vote was by all definitions unprecedented. Wisconsin was the only state thus far to conduct a statewide election during a COVID-19 pandemic stay at home order. Wisconsin is also the most decentralized state for election administration, meaning that 1,850 municipal election officials and 72 county election officials had to adapt to significant changes from court rulings, public health guidance and voter behavior shifts towards vote by mail.
The surge in absentee voting was first felt on the MyVote Wisconsin website. On the MyVote website, voters can request an absentee ballot, track when their ballot was sent and received by their clerk,
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register to vote online, find their polling place, view a sample ballot, view their voting history, and more. The site was built and updated regularly by WEC staff with extensive usability studies conducted with hundreds of voters to learn how they use the site.
Based on historical data, most voters went to MyVote to find their polling place or to view a sample ballot. Site analytics show this to be true in February 2020, where traffic to the polling place look up tool reached a new record high. Features like requesting an absentee ballot were previously used by voters, but never at the rate they were utilized in the lead up to the April 2020 election. As a result, the look up tools garnered more attention from developers prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
To accommodate the rapidly evolving environment, WEC staff were required to make more than a dozen changes to the MyVote system in the 60 days prior to the election. Deadlines for online voter registration and for absentee requests were extended multiple times by court actions prior to this election and deadlines for ballots to be returned and witness requirements were also changed initially, but then changed back. Because this information is hardcoded in the MyVote system, each change required extensive reprogramming and testing to avoid unintended consequences.
The other statewide system supporting the absentee process is WisVote. The WisVote database is the system used by almost 3,000 local election officials to administer elections. While WisVote and the WEC do not issue ballots, the clerks use WisVote to record when they send and receive absentee ballots, generate an absentee ballot log, enter voter registrations, and record voter participation. The system was built by the WEC team and launched in 2016.
WisVote was built based on the way Wisconsin conducts elections, which involves mostly voting inperson at the polls and registering to vote at the polls on election day. By mail voting and registration options are accounted for in the system, but most municipalities had never received a large volume of absentee requests for a specific election prior to this election. Clerk activity in WisVote prior to the election was much higher than any prior election because clerks were all entering and issuing record numbers of absentee requests at the same time. The system performed very well but required around the clock monitoring and auditing to handle this unique and unprecedented user behavior and traffic.
Like MyVote, WisVote required several updates to accommodate extended deadlines for absentee requests and online voter registration. These extensions meant changing automation in the system to assign voter records and allow requests to new deadlines and elections. WEC staff also monitored capacity of the system to ensure adequate memory space. Multiple increases of memory were needed to keep pace with absentee requests and attached copies of photo ID’s. WEC staff also created two significant new processes to assist local election officials with the new volume of absentee requests.
One change was to create an absentee ballot request report that documents when a voter submits a request that includes a photo ID. This change was significant because it allowed WisVote to view photo ID files within the system. This process is usually completed by email. Photo files are very large, therefore the storage and capacity in WisVote had to be significantly adjusted.
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WEC staff also created “poll book” reports or pages so that jurisdictions with consolidated polling places could use the WisVote system to check in voters, produce and print an individual poll book page for them, and record new registrations and participation in real time on election day. These were not processes that had been conceptualized previously and required significant development and testing completed in one week.
As the enormous quantity of absentee ballots began entering the mail system, voters began asking more questions and expressing concerns about ballot deliveries. With nearly six times more ballots in circulation, the number of complaints and concerns increased by a similar amount. Some voters also reported not receiving their absentee ballots while others reported that their completed ballots were not returned to the clerk in a timely fashion. Starting on April 8, municipalities began reporting irregular or illegible postmarks on ballot return envelopes. WEC staff asked clerks to report their postmark and mailing issues to the USPS and the WEC for investigation. Findings from that research is discussed in the Case Studies section below.
WEC staff also worked with local election officials to understand and collect postmark examples and postal issues. WEC then worked with USPS personnel at the local, state, regional, and national level to get information about the postmark process. Ultimately, USPS provided information that each postal branch made best attempts to postmark ballots on election day, but in the case of missing or illegible postmarks there was no way to determine what date the ballot was marked. WEC staff also sent a letter to local, state, regional, and national USPS representatives asking for them to provide additional information on ballots that were not received and on outgoing ballots that were returned to municipalities without explanation. A response has not yet been received.
Finally, any report on the April 2020 election must include mention of the tremendous support received from partners not typically involved in the elections process. In addition to our regular law enforcement partners, the WEC received exceptional support from the State Emergency Operations Center, Wisconsin Emergency Management, the Wisconsin National Guard, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, and the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. These agencies, working closely with Wisconsin’s 72 county clerks, played a key role in distributing personal protective equipment, sanitization supplies, and even poll workers to more than 2,000 polling places across the State.
3. Other 2020 Elections
Looking ahead to the remainder of 2020, the WEC staff anticipate continued high demand for by mail absentee voting, even if the COVID-19 pandemic begins to subside. November elections generally see high turnout, particularly in presidential election years. The last three presidential general elections all saw more than 3 million ballots cast. If voting patterns from April hold true, the state could see more than 1.8 million requests for absentee ballots by mail. This kind of volume would present terrific challenges for Wisconsin election officials at all levels.
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Table 9.
Total Ballots Cast: Spring to Fall
3500000 ?
3000000 2500000 2000000 1500000 1000000
500000 0
November presidential elections also tend to see a greater proportion of inexperienced voters. That is, voters who vote infrequently or are voting for the first time. These less-experienced voters are more likely to have difficulty navigating the absentee voting process. As a result, the clarification of the process may help voters in November.
B. Specific Case Studies
The absentee voting experiences of voters and election officials were as varied as the 1,850 jurisdictions in the state. Nearly every community experienced unprecedented absentee request volume, and many hired temporary staff to cope with demand. Many small and medium size jurisdictions learned to use WisVote absentee batch processing tools for the first time, having never previously needed any automation assistance to manage their workload. Larger cities, while used to higher volumes, were forced to work around the clock and conduct much larger batch mailings then previously experienced. For all jurisdictions, the statutory requirement to mail ballots within 24 hours of receiving a request presented a significant challenge.
This section examines specific challenges, problems, complaints, and solutions reported by municipal, county, and state election staff.
1. Meeting Overwhelming Demand
The most fundamental challenge faced by election officials was simply meeting the unprecedented demand. In addition to keeping up with the requests for mailed absentee ballots, clerks continued to service voters in their office wishing to participate through in-person absentee voting. On top of that, clerks were tasked with providing polling places with equipment on election day to meet appropriate
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CDC guidelines, not to mention the challenge of recruiting and training new election inspectors taking the place of long-serving election inspectors, many of whom chose not serve due to their risk category to COVID-19. While meeting the requirements above, clerks had to remain in communication with the WEC on updates and changes applied by all levels of the legal system. Most critically, hundreds of Wisconsin clerks had to complete all the tasks above while working alone and part time.

The increase in demand appeared consistent across the state, with large, medium and small jurisdictions all showing similar patterns.

Table 10.

100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

Madison, WI
Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

15000 10000
5000 0

Oshkosh, WI
Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

Hudson, WI

3000 2000 1000
0

Apr-2018

Apr-2019

Apr-2020

Absentee Ballots

Plymouth, WI
2000
1000
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020 Absentee Ballots

Spooner, WI
400 300 200 100
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020
Absentee Ballots

Homestead, WI
80 60 40 20
0 Apr-2018 Apr-2019 Apr-2020
Absentee Ballots

Rapidly changing guidance further complicated the environment for clerks. Multiple decisions in the weeks leading up to election day required clerks to communicate new deadlines and requirements impacting voters who may have received conflicting information made no longer relevant by late hour court decisions. No city, village, or town was able to avoid these extraordinary challenges presented in

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addition to the increased demand for absentee voting – and their efforts navigating all the situations presented by the pandemic should not be overlooked.
For elections prior to the April 7 election, the City of Racine managed ballot requests received by email with just one election staffer who printed and distributed the requests to four additional staff members for entry into WisVote and for the records to be filed according to public records statutes. Once the pandemic hit and absentee request volume grew exponentially, the city quickly adapted by recruiting 2030 additional city staff members to process absentee ballot requests from printing the request to sending the ballot out the door. Staff are still catching up on filing these documents appropriately.
Some communities, like the Village of Cottage Grove (Dane County), were fortunate to have hired and trained new elections staff just before the pandemic crisis began. Staff were able to manage the demand for absentee ballots by printing off every email notification of an absentee ballot request, whether it required photo ID or not. A staff of three processed each request individually, ensuring the steps of entering the request, issuing the ballot, printing the label, and applying it to the ballot occurred for every printed email. High school students were brought in to assist with the manual work of stuffing envelopes with ballots, while the clerk staff managed work in the voter registration system and fielded calls from voters with limited experience with absentee voting and navigating MyVote. Clerk staff found some success when directing voters to using smartphones (when available) to upload a copy of their photo to complete the absentee ballot request process.
Even the smallest of jurisdictions were not immune from the increased demand. While they did not have to contend with thousands of requests, individual town clerks often worked alone and with limited resources. In the Town of Washington in Shawano County, a part-time clerk went from managing eight absentee ballot requests in February to processing 312 in April. Many clerks were in a similar position of putting in extra hours to scale up their election’s operations with no additional compensation, all while balancing a separate full-time job.
To provide clerks adequate time to complete all their election responsibilities, WEC is committed to reducing the administrative burden of data entry required by the current absentee ballot request process. Proposed adjustments to the system include generating a pending absentee request in WisVote that can be approved or denied once photo ID is reviewed. Additionally, WEC hopes to assist clerks with common issues with absentee ballot requests, such as “selfies” submitted as photo ID, by communicating that information back to the voter through MyVote or available email or phone contact information. Finally, the staff recommends conducting voter outreach programs as described in the CARES Grant memorandum associated with this Commission meeting.
2. Concerns about Mail Service
Clerks in some parts of the state encountered issues with absentee ballots reaching voters or being returned to their offices. In some cases, voters expected to receive a ballot when a request was not submitted or not completed. These issues are discussed further under Voter Experience & Education below. After ruling out cases of voter error, there remained cases that could not be explained or could
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not be explained definitively. For example, the City of Oshkosh and other Fox Valley communities all reported voters complaining that their ballots were arriving late or not arriving at all. WEC staff investigated each complaint received where enough information was available to identify the voter.
On the morning of April 8, 2020, WEC staff received a telephone call from a Political and Election Mail Coordinator at the Great Lakes Regional office of the USPS in Chicago. The USPS official reported that the post office had located “three tubs” of absentee ballots for the Appleton/Oshkosh area and that the ballots were being processed. The official was unable to confirm how many ballots were in the three tubs but stated that “it could be quite a lot” as they were large two-handled tubs. In a follow up communication, the USPS indicated that there were approximately 1,600 ballots in the batch.
WEC staff attempted to follow up with the USPS to further identify the ballots and determine what happened but did not receive any further information about these ballots. Written inquiries to the USPS did not produce any specific information about these ballots. Wisconsin’s two U.S. Senators have asked the USPS Inspector General to investigate, but WEC staff have been unable to learn anything about the status of the inquiry.
The WEC also investigated reports from the City of Oshkosh suggesting that ballot requests were received but not fulfilled. While many of the cases involved incomplete requests (e.g. no photo ID provided) other records appeared complete. WEC staff researched several dozen Oshkosh area ballot requests that were entirely valid, including those of Assembly Representative Gordon Hintz (D – Oshkosh) and his spouse. The ballot records in question were generated as part of a batch on March 24, and analysis of the ballots associated with it showed that a large part of the batch was not returned by voters. Of the first quarter of records generated, more than 90% were returned. Of the remaining threequarters of records, less than 1% were returned. This suggests that something happened to the ballots in the latter portion of the batch.
WEC and Oshkosh staff could find no evidence of a technical failure. The Oshkosh batch was produced very quickly by the system (two minutes and seven seconds), did not include any unexpected applications, and occurred during normal operating hours when no system maintenance was underway. Furthermore, the City of Oshkosh Clerk reports with confidence that the ballots were mailed to voters. Thus, in this case, there is no evidence of a system error and no evidence of a printing problem. Instead, one of two events are possible: either a user did not apply the mailing labels to ballot envelopes, or these ballots were bundled together and collectively encountered an issue in the mailing process.
As with the larger cities, smaller municipalities also reported issues with ballots reaching residents or being returned to the clerk in a timely fashion. The Village of Fox Point was among them and experienced an unusual chain of events that garnered some media attention. For two weeks, absentee ballots that were supposed to be mailed to Fox Point residents were repeatedly returned to the Fox Point Village Hall by the post office before reaching voters.
The village reported receiving anywhere from 20 to 50 of these returned absentee ballots per day two weeks ahead of the election. The problem continued to grow as election day neared. In the week prior
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to the election, 100 to 150 ballots per day were returned to the village. On the morning of Election Day, Fox Point Village Hall received a plastic mail bin with 175 ballots. In each case, the returned ballots were unopened, unmarked and had not been received by voters. The postage was not cancelled, and no explanation was provided.

Each time they received a batch of absentee ballots, village officials immediately drove the ballots back to the nearest post office. They asked post office supervisors what was wrong with the ballots, but they did not receive any explanation. Fox Point Village Clerk Kelly Meyer reports it is unclear how many voters were affected by the undelivered ballots. Residents who did not receive an absentee ballot in the mail were advised to vote in person at their polling place on Election Day. Residents who called village hall inquiring about their absentee ballot on Election Day could retrieve their ballot from village hall if the ballot still un-sent and the resident could confirm their identity with a photo ID.
Statewide, the volume of absentee requests received remained high in the week prior to April 7th. Clerks received over 60,000 requests alone on the Friday before election day. Even if all these requests were mailed on Saturday, it is unknown how long those ballots took to reach voters. Current capabilities do not permit election officials to monitor the movement of ballots in the mail system. Thus, the next data point available to election officials is the date the completed ballot is returned to them.

Table 11.

90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000
0

80593

Absentee Ballot Requests Received

66482

79921

62172

Process Request

1 day

Mail to Voter

2-3 days

Complete Ballot

0 days

Mail to Clerk

2-3 days

---------------------------------------

Turn around time > 5-7 days

under optimal conditions

8970

3262

1849

351

The absence of information about ballots in the mail system is a significant concern for voters, clerks, and Commission staff. To improve visibility of these ballots, WEC staff are working to incorporate Intelligent Mail Bar Codes (IMBs) as a tracking tool for future absentee mailings. The IMB is a 65-bar USPS barcode that allows internal tracking information to be shared with the mailer and or recipient.
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Although still dependent on the postal service, the IMB allows greater visibility of individual pieces in the mail stream. IMBs and tracking tools are discussed further in the Recommendations section below.
3. Process Improvements
The enormous volume of absentee requests for the April 2020 election magnified the effect of typically small concerns that ordinarily presented minor issues. Complex process flows that were a minor annoyance in prior elections became major headaches for April. Counties faced a particularly difficult challenge of attempting to complete the data entry for multiple relier communities where the absentee voting rates had previously been low. This data entry provides these voters with the opportunity to track their ballot on MyVote.
For example, in Shawano County, the clerk’s office typically has three staffers but operated with just two as a result of the pandemic. This reduced staff of just two people was responsible for entering the absentee information for 25 municipalities. The Shawano County staff encountered problems working in the voter registration system, including the inability to pull reports at the county level. Additionally, the ballot count associated to an absentee application does not always immediately update due to allocation of system resources, creating confusion for users looking for confirmation a ballot was created and slowing the processing of information.
Grant County, located in southwest Wisconsin, also provides absentee processing support for its municipalities. Grant County is made up of 52 municipalities, 41 of which rely on the county to enter and update the status of their absentee ballots in WisVote. Previously the volume of absentee ballots was manageable through a simple absentee ballot log passed between the municipality and county. The county clerk’s office revamped this absentee ballot log and asked all 41 reliers to stick with the standard format in the weeks leading up to April 7. The log asks for the necessary information to enter it correctly and efficiently in the voter registration system. The county also asks the reliers to highlight any changes from the last time the absentee ballot log had been sent so they could focus on the work to be completed.
Another contributor to processing time is the requirement to individually validate the photo identification of each voter. While validating any one request is quick, the manual nature of the process proved challenging when contending with high volume and simultaneously responding to hundreds of voter inquiries. Compounding the problem was the fact that MyVote shows only complete, accepted requests. Voters with a request pending ID approval are given no indication that their request is on file. Improving feedback to voters, and tools available to clerks, is therefore a top agency priority before the August 2020 election.
4. Technical Problems.
Some voters and clerks have questioned if technical failures caused absentee requests or ballots to be lost. As a result, WEC technical staff spent considerable time researching this possibility both before and after election day. Detailed auditing were performed on individual complaints and no technical problems were detected prior to election day. WisVote and its associated systems maintain meticulous
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details of each and every transaction occurring in the system, precisely when it occurs to the fraction of a second, and who or what executed the transaction. These highly detailed records allow staff to retrace events, locate errors, and validate system operations. The records enabled staff to review tens of thousands of transactions from hundreds of jurisdictions. This research revealed one isolated and unique incident where technology and volume combined to create an error. Staff found no evidence of any technical error that could have caused an absentee ballot request or a completed ballot to be lost.
The single failure identified came to light after the City of Milwaukee's Election Commission (MEC) conducted a post election review that could only be identified after election participation was entered. Upon investigation, MEC staff discovered that the WisVote record for tracking this voter’s ballot had been created in the middle of the night, at a time when MEC staff would not have been creating ballot records. They further determined that the ballot record was associated with a batch. A batch is a WisVote entity that allows clerks to select broad categories of absentee application records and request the system create ballot tracking records and subsequently generate mailing labels for each of those absentee applications. Many of the absentee ballots associated with this batch had been created in the middle of the night, and many of them had not been returned. MEC referred the issue to the WEC for further investigation during the post-election data reconciliation process.
Upon initial analysis of the batch, WEC staff identified trends that appeared similar to the Oshkosh case. As in Oshkosh, there was a sharp decline in ballot return rates for a specific subset of ballots. Of the 5,913 ballot records created on or before 10:42:32 p.m. on March 22, 5,237 were recorded as having returned in some way to the clerk’s office. This is an 88.5% return rate. Of the 2,693 ballots generated after 10:42:32 p.m., only one was recorded as returned.
Further investigation disclosed several factors unique to Milwaukee. In particular:
• It was the largest batch processed by WisVote; ultimately including 8,607 absentee ballot request records. The median batch size for the same day was 32 records.
• It started at 5:16 p.m. on March 22 and did not complete until 1:31 a.m. on March 23. Typically, batches complete within a few minutes.
• Of the absentee application records associated with the batch, many were created after the batch was generated. Since the first thing the batch does is select the absentee application records that match its criteria, this should not be possible.
Upon review, it was determined that the timeframe of this particular batch overlapped with maintenance on a known server issue. On March 22, WEC staff observed high utilization rates in some WisVote servers that could potentially cause user interface degradation, such as slow page loads or poor performance of some tasks. In consultation with Microsoft, plans were made to implement server improvements to prevent further issues. In the interim, system resources were freed by restarting the servers that process background jobs, called asynchronous servers. Background jobs are intended to be short-running, and by restarting one server at a time during a period when few users would be interacting with the system, staff believed that WisVote’s load balancing would shuffle background jobs as needed and there would be no impact. That has been staff’s experience in past server restarts, and in
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testing no impact was observed. However on subsequent code review it was determined that it is possible, if a batch workflow is restarted, for that workflow to select applicable ballot requests a second time, which would generate ballot tracking records for absentee applications not originally associated with the batch.
It is staff’s belief that an extraordinary confluence of events resulted in additional ballot records being generated after MEC staff printed their mailing labels, leading MEC to believe those ballots had already been sent when in fact they had not. First, Milwaukee’s extraordinarily large batch of more than 8,000 ballots, exacerbated by the high user load on the system in the run up to the April election, resulted in the processing of this batch taking several hours, instead of a few minutes. Second, unbeknownst to MEC, Commission staff conducted an unscheduled restart of the asynchronous servers to address an unrelated issue, interrupting this long-running job. Third, an oversight in the development of this process meant that the system failed to handle the restart gracefully, selecting an entirely new collection of absentee applications instead of continuing from where it had been interrupted.
Since the database contained detailed information tracking batch creation, staff could develop precise criteria to determine the impact and review transactions across the state. As a result, staff can conclusively determine that this restart issue only impacted this one batch in the City of Milwaukee. As a result of this issue, staff believes that 2,693 requested ballots were never sent to City of Milwaukee residents. Of the affected voters, 52.5% voted in the election either on a replacement absentee ballot or at the polls on election day.
Ensuring the voting rights of Wisconsin citizens is a hugely complex task without room for error. It requires, at a minimum, the ability to immediately identify and remedy errors before they affect the voting process. In this instance, detailed records enabled agency staff to retrace these events, they did not provide information in a proactive manner allowing a system problem to be identified in real time. Neither clerks nor the state would have been able to identify this issue in real-time or based on single voter reports. Staff are now adopting real-time performance tracking tools for IT professionals and building user-friendly audit tools for clerks and other election officials. Measures to identify and avoid technical failures like this one are discussed in the Recommendations section below.
5. Voter Experience & Education
The April 2020 election introduced hundreds of thousands of voters to the absentee process for the first time. Naturally, many were unfamiliar with the process and did not understand the requirements. Common errors included:
• providing a written request (letter or e-mail) with insufficient information • submitting a personal photograph instead of an acceptable form of photo ID • not completing the on-line application process
An additional complication resulted from third parties mailing absentee application request forms that did not adequately highlight the photo ID requirement. In these cases, the clerk was unable to fulfill the
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request until they could follow up with the voter to obtain a valid photo ID. Most voters do not provide a phone number or email, so the clerk must rely on a mailed notification to the voter that their request is not yet valid. Clerks in these situations were often unfairly blamed for not fulfilling a request that was not valid in the first place.
WEC staff believes that the creation of voter outreach programs to explain the absentee voting process will be beneficial, particularly if demand for absentee ballots remains high.
IV. Recommendations: Proposed Courses of Action
A. Assessment Resources.
WEC staff is working with various partners to assess and improve the absentee voting experience. Changes to the voter registration system, public facing websites, paper forms, and envelopes will largely impact individuals outside of the agency, and the Commission should provide opportunities to receive and incorporate feedback from our core users.
In addition to the existing Clerk Advisory Committees, a new Clerk Advisory Committee dedicated to Vote by Mail revisions has been created and is meeting on a weekly basis to provide direction and feedback on staff proposals. The committee is composed of clerks from jurisdictions of various sizes and resources. A separate committee dedicated to “reliers” -- clerks who rely on the county or another municipality to complete some or all of their WisVote work -- will also be convened so that new workflows meet their unique needs.
Staff is also working with non-profits in the elections space who are stepping up their efforts to support the nationwide increase in absentee voting. Staff reached out to the Center for Civic Design for guidance on holding and recruiting inexperienced and first-time voters for remote, video conference usability sessions. The Center for Civic Design has previously trained staff on making user-centered design decisions through holding usability sessions, where voters are asked to test-drive new or updated products such as the absentee ballot request form. Staff is in the process of holding remote video conference sessions with voters.
WEC staff is also working with Democracy Works - a nonprofit that builds software applications to assist voters and election officials. WEC has been working with Democracy Works since 2011 in providing our Voting Information Project data feed, which serves as our alternate means for voters to locate Election Day polling places. Ballot Scout is another Democracy Works product that tracks absentee ballots using information from USPS via their Intelligent Barcode and Informed Visibility mail tracking system. Ballot Scout can be inserted as a "widget" or feature into a website like MyVote, allowing voters and clerks to track a ballot as it travels through the USPS mail system.
Since April 23, USPS Election Mail and Business Mail integration experts and WEC staff have been meeting weekly. The focus of these meetings is to provide WEC staff with guidance on the implementation of intelligent mail barcodes and support in absentee ballot envelope revisions. USPS is
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committed to building a relationship with our agency with the goal of improving the experience of voting by mail in Wisconsin.
B. Ballot Request Process
Staff, clerks, and voters have provided ample observations on how to improve the absentee ballot request process. Voters are required to submit a written request to their municipal clerk to receive an absentee ballot. Requests can be submitted in a standard format when requested through MyVote and when using the Absentee Ballot Request form (EL-122) or can be submitted in an unstandardized format through an email or mail correspondence. No matter how the voter submits it, any request that gets to the clerk must be entered by hand into the voter registration system. Many first-time absentee voters visited MyVote in the weeks up to the April 7 election to request their ballots where they had to navigate unfamiliar language and requirements such as uploading a photo ID.
In response, WEC staff will focus on three specific improvements to the process of requesting an absentee ballot. First, we recognize that technology and internet is not accessible to all voters. WEC staff is revising the paper Absentee Ballot Request form (EL-122) to be more user friendly and is exploring the opportunity to mail this form to every registered voter without a current absentee ballot request on file for 2020. Additional directions on how to provide a copy of a valid photo ID will be required for this mailing. Second, while hundreds of thousands of voters successfully navigated the absentee ballot request process on MyVote, the process can be improved, particularly in the areas of photo ID upload and confirmation of submission. Finally, information submitted to clerks through MyVote should not require manual data entry into the voter registration system or rely on an emailbased process for most users. WEC staff will work with clerks and voters to review new designs before implementation of these three improvements ahead of the 2020 Fall elections.
C. Mailing Process and Ballot Tracking
In its current state, the mailing process for absentee ballot requests allows each jurisdiction flexibility to approach the process in the manner that best meets their needs. As a result, there are situations that lead to less visibility of the ballot’s mailing status that may not be ideal. One potential direction for improvements in WisVote is integration of USPS Intelligent Mail Barcodes. Integrating Intelligent Mail Barcodes would allow those who use the Absentee Ballot mailing label features within WisVote to track the delivery status of the absentee ballot.
The USPS has the ability to allow WEC to generate a unique serial number from within WisVote; once the unique serial number is generated, the Absentee Ballot mailing label can be printed using a font that translates the unique number into a bar code used to identify a mail piece as election mail. The bar code also enables scanning and tracking the mail piece as it progresses through USPS facilities. For those who choose to use this function within WisVote once it is developed, clerks will be able to generate and print a label with a barcode that the USPS would then scan once the mail pieces is received at a Postal Service location. Once the mail piece is received, tracking information can be updated as frequently as every hour to track the current location and projected arrival of the mail piece.
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With tracking information provided by USPS, WEC can provide specific updates and enhanced transparency into the vote by mail process to clerks and voters. The hope is that with this addition, the number of calls and emails to clerks will be greatly reduced as voters will be able to track their ballot by accessing MyVote or receiving push notifications to an email or phone number. WEC staff is currently evaluating options for integrating this data and evaluating the effects this may have on existing clerk workflows as well as feasibility and timelines.
While evaluating these options and potential for tracking ballots and their return, we are also very cognizant of WisVote relier clerk access to this information and how reliers may be able to obtain the barcode for their mail pieces. This specific topic requires quite a bit more consideration and input from relier community clerks. WEC staff is actively pursuing input from those clerks in order to carefully assess their current workflow and any potential assistance that could be provided by the intelligent mail barcode tracking as well as any potential unintended workflow requirements that may be imposed on those reliers. Integration of tracking via the intelligent mail barcode will increase the transparency of the mailing process for absentee ballots as they are delivered to voters and as they are returned to their municipal clerk.
D. Reports and Audit Tools
Wisconsin’s voter registration system serves many purposes for clerks and voters. It maintains the list of registered voters, the set of candidates and contests assigned to specific districts, tracks absentee ballot requests and ballots, houses the data displayed to voters on MyVote, and generally facilitates the administration of elections in Wisconsin. Due to the current pandemic environment, the administration of elections is changing to occur increasingly by mail and the voter registration system must be adjusted to support that shift.
The voter registration system currently offers multiple methods to manage absentee ballot request and ballot records, originally meant to meet the needs of all sizes of communities in Wisconsin. While meant to be helpful, multiple methods can create confusion among clerk staff using different methods within an office and require WEC staff to adequately train and support all methods. As utilization of absentee voting by mail increases all across the state, WEC staff will work with clerks to identify which method to process absentee ballot requests, ballot records, and absentee address labels is best in managing high volumes of absentees and then popularize and train clerk staff on this method.
Staff intends to implement additional tracing procedures and tools to enable early detection of issues such as the batch that restarted in Milwaukee. This will give technical staff greater insight into the internal processes of WisVote beyond what it presently visible in logs and reports and give near-realtime data on system performance in a more meaningful way. In addition, some tools under WEC evaluation can provide certainty that workflows and system processes are behaving as expected after system deployment and provide staff instant notifications if a change is detected.
In response to clerk and voter feedback, WEC staff is investigating numerous methods to improve the immediacy and accuracy of user feedback. In addition to increasing user satisfaction, improved
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feedback should reduce the number of incomplete absentee applications from voters and increase confidence from both clerks and voters that requests are being correctly processed, and ballots are sent out timely. Additionally, WEC staff will create reports to help clerks manage and audit absentee ballot requests and ballots coming into and leaving their office so that they identify issues, anomalies, and ensure all requests are successfully fulfilled and tracked. WEC staff hopes to provide clerk staff the tools to monitor their data so that they can identify and resolve issues. Maintaining and verifying data in the voter registration system database enables our critical role in providing accurate information to voters. V. Conclusions The April 7, 2020 election introduced countless challenges that Wisconsin clerks successfully overcame, enabling a record number of voters to cast their ballots through the absentee process. Moreover, the final election data conclusively indicates that the election did not produce an unusual number unreturned or rejected ballots. Despite the overwhelming success of absentee voting as a whole, the experiences leading up to election day were not trouble-free and illuminated several critical areas for improvement. The absentee voting process in Wisconsin can be complex for some users and the current system favor the technically savvy. Voters and clerks would benefit from more information about the status of their absentee ballots, particularly once they enter the mail system. Finally, clerks and WEC staff need more powerful but easy-to-use tools that will enable them to quickly identify and correct problems. The 2020 CARES Act affords Wisconsin the necessary resources to implement many of these improvements, but long-term sustainment will require additional support. With adequate backing, the challenges of April 2020 should ultimately yield voters, clerks, and WEC staff a much-improved absentee voting process.
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EXHIBIT 12

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CASE 0:20-7c1vp-e0op1le2w0h5o w-EenCt toTth-eTpNollLs on DAporilc7ugmot CeOnVtID1-519-;1tie4to eFleciltieondun0c5ert/a2in9| /L2oc0al NePwas |gmead2isono.cfom8

https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7.html
TOPICAL ALERT
71 people who went to the polls on April 7 got COVID-19; tie to election uncertain
David WahlberMga|yW1i6s,c2o0n2si0n State Journal
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 1/36

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TVthooewtevnrosoteaf nDadmunpidnoltrlhewesoidCrkeOenVrtsIRDwo-eb19reerpteaWnncdiloseuomrnaicgperfaediplteaodre.wsetaor vmoateskast athned ttoawken'osthheigrhpwreaycaguatrioagnse ainfttehreeAffporritls7teoledcetlaioyn. JOHN HART, STATE JOURNAL ARCHIVES
This content is being provided for free as a public service to our readers during the coronavirus outbreak. Please support local journalism by subscribing.
A total of 71 people got COVID-19 after voting in person or working at the polls during Wisconsin’s April 7 election, a state official said Friday, as two new studies present a mixed picture on whether the election contributed to the spread of the coronavirus.
The 71 figure is the “final number,” state Department of Health Services spokeswoman Jennifer Miller said. As DHS indicated earlier with previous tallies, it’s not clear how many of the infections may have been caused by the spring election because many of
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 2/36

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the people had other exposures, Miller said.

A new study by researchers at UW-Oshkosh and Ball State University, using mobile device location data from San Francisco-based SafeGraph, found that counties with more in-person voters per voting location had significantly higher rates of COVID-19 transmission after the election than counties with lower voter density.

On average, an additional 100 people per polling station doubled a county’s COVID-19 positive case test rate two to three weeks following the election, the study found. The consolidation of voting locations may have contributed to the increase in positive testing rates by increasing voter density in polling locations, the researchers said.
Counties with higher absentee voting participation had lower rates of detecting COVID-19 two to three weeks after the election, the researchers said. After removing two counties from their analysis — Brown County, which had an outbreak at a meatpacking plant in Green Bay, and Milwaukee County, where there were long lines to vote in the city of Milwaukee on Election Day — they still had the same conclusions.

“Our hypothesis suggests that in-person voting is most associated with the incidence of new COVID-19 cases through higher numbers of voters in each polling location,” the researchers wrote. “However, it is also likely that the simple number of in-person votes
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 3/36

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in a county matters as well.”

Given the results, “it may be prudent, to the extent possible, that policy makers and election clerks take steps to either expand the number of polling locations or encourage absentee voting for future elections held during the COVID-19 pandemic,” they wrote.
Different take
Another study, by researchers at the University of Hong Kong and Stanford University, found “no detectable surge” in COVID-19 from the election.

It involved an analysis to “reconstruct” the state’s coronavirus epidemic curve to look at dates of infection instead of when cases were reported. The researchers also said hospitalizations for COVID-19 in Wisconsin declined after the election.
They wrote that “there is no evidence to date that there was a surge of infections” from the election.
‘Preprintʼ studies
Both studies, like another one the Wisconsin State Journal reported on last month, are “preprint” studies that have been submitted for publication in a scientific journal but not published yet. That means the methods may not have been scrutinized as much as with published studies. Preprint studies, while controversial among scientists, have become more common, especially in research involving COVID-19.
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 4/36

5/27/2020

CASE 0:20-7c1vp-e0op1le2w0h5o w-EenCt toTth-eTpNollLs on DAporilc7ugmot CeOnVtID1-519-;1tie4to eFleciltieondun0c5ert/a2in9| /L2oc0al NePwas |gmead6isono.cfom8

67 got COVID-19 after visiting polls in state's April 7 election but tie to
DvoatviindgWuanhclbleeragr| Wisconsin State Journal
The earlier study, led by a Milwaukee doctor, found rates of new confirmed COVID-19 cases didn’t increase in Wisconsin compared with the rest of the country after the April 7 election, though some individual cases could be tied to voting. More than 400,000 state residents voted in person April 7, with 1.1 million more casting absentee ballots. Prior to the election, Democratic Gov. Tony Evers and Republican legislative leaders initially agreed in-person voting should go on. But Evers the day before the election pushed the vote back to June, a move the Supreme Court struck down hours later.
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 5/36

5/27/2020

CASE 0:20-7c1vp-e0op1le2w0h5o w-EenCt toTth-eTpNollLs on DAporilc7ugmot CeOnVtID1-519-;1tie4to eFleciltieondun0c5ert/a2in9| /L2oc0al NePwas |gmead7isono.cfom8

DNaovbiduWmaphlibneCrgO|VWIDis-c1o9nrsainteSstaatfeteJroWurnisacl onsin's April 7 election, study says

Many have wondered whether in-person voting increased the spread of the coronavirus, especially in Green Bay and Milwaukee, which had few polling stations that drew long lines of people.
In another election Tuesday in northern Wisconsin’s 7th Congressional district, 48% voted absentee, down from 56% who voted absentee in the district April 7, according to the Associated Press. Republican state Sen. Tom Tiffany won the race.
State health officials haven’t tracked whether COVID-19 cases may have resulted from an April 24 protest at the state Capitol against Gov. Tony Evers’ extended “safer at home” order, which the Supreme Court struck down this week. The gathering drew an estimated 1,500 people.

https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 6/36

5/27/2020

CASE 0:20-7c1vp-e0op1le2w0h5o w-EenCt toTth-eTpNollLs on DAporilc7ugmot CeOnVtID1-519-;1tie4to eFleciltieondun0c5ert/a2in9| /L2oc0al NePwas |gmead8isono.cfom8

Of nearly 2,000 cases of COVID-19 with an onset or diagnosis after April 26, 72

involved people who said they had attended a large gathering, which may have

included the protest, DHS said last week.

Election Day with COVID-19

TgoawrangeofTDueusndnarye.sVidoetenrtsRaonbderptoWll iwlsoornkerresviwewerseheinscsoeuleracgtieodnstoonwehaisrbmaallsoktswahnildetvaokteinogthaetrthperetcoawunti'osnhsigahfwteary efforts to delay the vote amid the COVID-19 pandemic failed.
JOHN HART, STATE JOURNAL Election Day with COVID-19
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-ﬁt/71-people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-1de069c320c7… 7/36

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 22
EXHIBIT 14

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 22
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IN-PERSON VOTING, CONSOLIDATED POLLING LOCATIONS, AND ABSENTEE VOTING ON
EVIDENCE FROM THE WISCONSIN PRIMARY Chad D. Cotti
Bryan Engelhardt Joshua Foster Erik T. Nesson
Paul S. Niekamp Working Paper 27187 http://www.nber.org/papers/w27187
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 May 2020
We thank Safegraph for providing access to their data. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2020 by Chad D. Cotti, Bryan Engelhardt, Joshua Foster, Erik T. Nesson, and Paul S. Niekamp. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 22

The Relationship between In-Person Voting, Consolidated Polling Locations, and Absentee Voting on Covid-19: Evidence from the Wisconsin Primary Chad D. Cotti, Bryan Engelhardt, Joshua Foster, Erik T. Nesson, and Paul S. Niekamp NBER Working Paper No. 27187 May 2020 JEL No. D72,H75,I1,I18
ABSTRACT
On April 7, 2020, Wisconsin held a major election for state positions and presidential preferences for both major parties. News reports showed pictures of long lines of voters due to fewer polling locations and suggested that the election may further the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. A contact-tracing analysis by the Wisconsin Department of Health identified 71 confirmed cases of COVID-19 to in-person voting, but no research has conducted a broader analysis of the extent to which in-person voting increased the number of COVID-19 cases. We use county level data on voting and COVID-19 tests to connect the election to the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. We find a statistically and economically significant association between in-person voting and the spread of COVID-19 two to three weeks after the election. Our results offer estimates of the potential increased costs of in-person voting during a pandemic.

Chad D. Cotti Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh and Center for Demography of Health and Aging University of Wisconsin-Madison cottic@uwosh.edu
Bryan Engelhardt Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh engelhab@uwosh.edu

Erik T. Nesson Department of Economics Ball State University Muncie, IN 47306 and NBER etnesson@bsu.edu
Paul S. Niekamp Department of Economics Ball State University pniekamp@bsu.edu

Joshua Foster Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh fosterj@uwosh.edu

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 22
1 Introduction
A headline on the New York Times website on April 7th read, “Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty” (New York Times, 2020). The headline referred to the Wisconsin election for state positions and presidential preferences for both major parties held on that day. The New York Times article referenced long lines, especially in Milwaukee, where only ﬁve polling places were open, and concerns that in-person voting would lead to increased COVID-19 cases. It is well established that increased social interactions increase the probability of the transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and as of May 15th, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services had directly traced 71 conﬁrmed cases of COVID-19 to in-person voting that occurred on April 7th. While the test and trace method used to determine the sources of infection cannot exclude other potential sources, the investigation also missed cases caused by in-person voting activity that were not successfully tested and traced by the state’s Department of Health (Associated Press, 2020).
To circumvent these issues, we attempt to estimate the relationship between in-person voting and the number of cases of COVID-19 using data aggregated at the county level. Our aim is to oﬀer a general estimate on the increased spread of infection, if any, related to in-person voting during a pandemic, and by extension provide insights into the potential beneﬁts of absentee voting (voteby-mail). We combine information on the number of tests for COVID-19 and number of positive test results from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services with information on in-person and absentee voting from the Wisconsin Elections Commission to examine the trajectory of COVID-19 in counties with higher in-person vs. absentee voting.
Our results indicate that Wisconsin counties with higher levels of in-person voting overall and per polling location led to increases in the weekly positive rate of COVID-19 tests. Furthermore, counties with higher absentee voting participation had lower rates of detecting COVID-19 after the election as well. We show that this ﬁnding is unlikely to be a function of diﬀering trajectories by population density, and controls for demographics and measures of social distancing do not explain our ﬁndings either.
Our work relates to the literature on modeling the trajectory of new cases of COVID-19 in a community. The trajectory, or number of cases and deaths, of the COVID-19 pandemic is often modeled by larger structural models such as the highly publicized report from an Imperial College
2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 22
team, Flaxman, Mishra, Gandy, Unwin, Coupland, Mellan, Zhu, Berah, Eaton, Perez Guzman et al. (2020), or alternatively, IHME and Murray (2020). These are based to diﬀering degrees on the “standard epidemiological model,” or SIR model (refer to Avery, Bossert, Clark, Ellison, and Ellison (2020) for a COVID-19 related survey). As we are investigating a potential link between behavior and the virus’s spread, we take an alternative reduced-form approach that builds on the general understanding that increased socialization is a primary vector for transmission of the virus. Our strategy is similar to other economics papers which examine associations between the virus and various social factors (e.g. Allcott, Boxell, Conway, Gentzkow, Thaler, and Yang, 2020; Bursztyn, Rao, Roth, and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020; Courtemanche, Garuccio, Le, Pinkston, and Yelowitz, 2020a,b).
The aforementioned Wisconsin Department of Health Services investigation directly traced and linked COVID-19 cases to in-person voting, which conﬁrms transmission in this circumstance, yet the investigation was not comprehensive and doesn’t allow for a broad conversation about the overall relationship at hand. Our work looks at geographical diﬀerences in voting/quantity of polling locations COVID-19 positive case test rates to estimate how voting impacted the disease’s spread. As a result, our work relates to Harris (2020), Almagro and Orane-Hutchinson (2020) and Kuchler, Russel, and Stroebel (2020) among others looking at how geographical diﬀerences in behavior (e.g., public transit availability or occupation characteristics) aﬀects the spread of COVID-19. As we measure the impact of polling locations, we also inform models such as Gosc´e, Barton, and Johansson (2014) who analyze the impact of the proximity of persons on the spread of a disease. Relatedly, an emerging literature examines the determinants and eﬀects of social distancing orders on the spread of COVID-19 cases (Andersen, 2020; Courtemanche et al., 2020a,b; Friedson, McNichols, Sabia, and Dave, 2020).
Due to the political nature of the decision in switching to absentee voting (vote-by-mail), our work relates to an emerging economics literature suggesting that political beliefs and actions may impact the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Allcott et al. (2020) uses cellphone location data from Safegraph to suggest that areas with higher Republican vote share in the 2016 presidential election engaged in less social distancing than areas with higher Democratic vote share in the 2016 presidential election. Relatedly, Adolph, Amano, Bang-Jensen, Fullman, and Wilkerson (2020) also analyze diﬀering social distancing policy responses for COVID-19 based on the politics of the local government(s). Finally, Bursztyn et al. (2020) suggests that people responded to the COVID-19 pan-
3

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 6 of 22
demic diﬀerently based on likely viewership of the two most widely-viewed cable news shows, Tucker Carlson Tonight and Hannity. Also, as our work may inform future public debate on switching to absentee voting, our work oﬀers insights on the costs and beneﬁts of absentee voting. Therefore, we tie into the analysis of districts switching to absentee voting (vote-by-mail).
2 Data
In this section we outline the data used to study the eﬀect of in-person voting on the measurable spread of COVID-19. Our sample was taken from the state of Wisconsin, USA, which had a statewide election on April 7, 2020.
The timing of Wisconsin’s election, in conjunction with the spread of COVID-19 throughout the state, makes it uniquely suited to oﬀer relevant insights into the eﬀects of voting on the spread of COVID-19. First, voting took place during a “Safer at Home” order where Wisconsin residents were restricted to essential activities only, allowing for better identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of in-person voting. Second, the “Safer at Home” order was issued only two weeks prior to the date of the election, on March 23, 2020, making it diﬃcult for all eligible voters to receive and return an absentee ballot before election day.1 And third, the Wisconsin Elections Commission allowed County and Municipal Clerks to alter the voting setup and number of voting locations at their own discretion in the weeks leading up to the election. Among those clerks who modiﬁed the voting locations available to their registered voters, nearly all sought to consolidate – a decision that almost certainly increased the in-person voter density per voting location.2
2.1 Voting Data
We use voting data provided by the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC). The WEC maintains a publicly available database of oﬃcial election results and voter participation metrics, all of which are available at the county level.3 Of particular interest to this paper are the data on (1) total in-person votes, (2) total absentee ballots requested, (3) total absentee ballots returned, (4) number
1On April 6, 2020 – the day before the election – Wisconsin governor Tony Evers issued an executive order that moved the election to June 9, 2020. Later that same day, the State Supreme Court ruled that the Governor cannot unilaterally move the date of an election, thus maintaining the in-person voting.
2In some cases reductions in the number of voting locations were signiﬁcant. For example, the city of Green Bay, WI (in Brown County), which typically has 31 voting locations, had only two open during the April 7th election, resulting a signiﬁcant consolidation of in-person voters.
3See https://elections.wi.gov/ for more information on these data.
4

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 7 of 22
of registered voters, and (5) number of voting locations. Total in-person votes is the only item that is not directly reported by the WEC. To measure this, we use oﬃcial county-level vote data provided by the County Clerks for the State Supreme Court seat election, adjusting for the number of over/under-votes, and then from that number subtract the total absentee ballots returned.4
According to a memorandum released by the WEC on March 30, 2020, County and Municipal Clerks expressed concern with hosting voters in buildings serving relatively vulnerable portions of the population (e.g. nursing homes, senior centers).5 As a result on March 12, 2020, the WEC gave County and Municipal Clerks the ability to consolidate polling places. Of course, the decision to consolidate polling locations poses a unique problem for these Clerks: closing locations can create some insulation to the relatively vulnerable, but it also increases the likelihood of infection at the remaining locations due to the increase in voter density.
Between March 12, 2020 and April 4, 2020, County and Municipal Clerks in 22 counties (of 72) consolidated the number of polling locations oﬀered to voters, the average reduction among these counties being approximately 15%. In total, Wisconsin used 2,132 voting locations for this election, each of which can be categorized by the venue’s normal purpose. Statewide, approximately 90% of the voting locations were hosted in governmental buildings (e.g. city halls, ﬁre stations), approximately 10% were hosted in social or commercial locations (e.g. churches, VFWs, grocery stores), and 5% were hosted in local primary, secondary, and post-secondary education buildings.6
2.2 COVID-19 Data
We use COVID-19 infection data provided by the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (WDHS). From March 30, 2020 to May 17, 2020 (the observation window of this study), the WDHS updated their database daily and exclusively reported laboratory-conﬁrmed COVID-19 cases as well as the total number of tests performed. The primary items of interest from this database are (1) total positive cases, (2) total negative cases, and (3) total COVID-19 test performed each at the county level, from which we construct weekly measures of the percent of total COVID-19 tests that are positive.
4If a number of absentee ballots are returned but not counted (an outcome we are unable to observe), then our measure of in-person voting exposure would be biased downward.
5See https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-03/Consolidated%20Polling%20Places. pdf.
6Some locations shared functions across our categories (e.g. a town hall that houses a senior center), thus their collective representation will exceed 100%.
5

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 8 of 22
We aggregate the COVID-19 testing data to the weekly level to account for within week patterns of testing that vary by day of week within the time period observed. As the testing data begin on March 30th, we construct weeks from this date. Our ﬁrst week (Week -1), corresponds to March 30 - April 5. The next week, Week 0, references the week of the election: April 6 - April 12. Week 1 references April 13 - April 19, Week 2 references April 20 - April 26, Week 3 references April 27 May 3, Week 4 references May 4 - May 10, and Week 5 references May 11 - May 17.
2.3 Demographics and Social Distancing Measures
Additionally, we supplement the voting and COVID-19 data with measures of social distancing and county-level demographics.
We use Safegraph Social Distancing Metrics data, which are collected from anonymized GPS pings derived from smartphone app usage. The dataset provides daily metrics of human movement at a highly granular level (Geohash-7) and is continuously updated with a three day lag. We use median home dwelling time, percent of devices completely home, and median distance traveled from home to provide a localized measure of social distancing. While Safegraph data are reported at the Census Block Group level by day, we aggregate the data to the county by week level to match the level COVID-19 and voting data.7
In addition, we use Safegraph Weekly Patterns over the period of March 1st to May 2nd. This dataset also uses GPS pings from smartphones but provides device counts to speciﬁc Points-ofInterest (POIs) for every day of the week. Safegraph provides a 6-digit NAICS code and a text string of the business or building name for every POI. After merging this dataset with Safegraph POI data, we have the coordinates of approximately 70,000 POIs in Wisconsin. We then calculate the distance between each POI and the closest of the 2,132 voting locations in Wisconsin. Matching these three datasets allows us to measure increases in traﬃc to highly localized voting locations that would not be visible in Social Distancing Metrics. While measuring general human traﬃc during pandemics is important, it is especially pertinent to measure the impact that policies have on forcing individuals into population dense situations.
We also include estimates of county population and population density, both of which are provided by the US Census Bureau (2010 Census data), and a number of additional demographics from
7All social distancing measures have been lagged one week to better account for the delay in detecting a the COVID-19 infection after transmission.
6

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 9 of 22
the 2018 5-Year American Community Survey Estimates, including the percent of the population without a high school degree, the percent of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, the 2018 unemployment rate, the median household income, and the percent of the population age 65 or older.
2.4 Summary Statistics
We ﬁrst show the geographic variation in voter density and the correlation between voter density and the evolution of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Figure 1a provides a visual representation of voter density by county (created using Kahle and Wickham (2013)), as represented by the average number of inperson votes per county voting location open during the election. Figures 1b and 1c demonstrate county level variation in the positive COVID-19 test rates overtime. Collectively, these ﬁgures show increases in positive test results are much higher in locations with higher in-person voting.
Table 1 oﬀers summary statistics on our primary measures relevant to the empirical analysis presented below. We split the summary statistics by counties which have above-median numbers of in-person votes per polling location compared to counties which are below the median. Consistent with Figures 1b and 1c, Table 1 shows that COVID-19 positive test rates are approximately twice as high (5.6% versus 2.6%) in above-median counties. Individuals in above-median counties are 2.4 percentage points (62.2% versus 64.6%) less likely to leave home and are approximately 7 percentage points (26.6% versus 19.6%) more likely to have at least a Bachelor’s degree. In addition, abovemedian counties are higher income and have younger populations. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in population density between above-median and below-median in-person vote counties (298.1 versus 34.3). Therefore, it is important that we be diligent in designing our speciﬁcations to account for the dynamic eﬀect of population density on the evolution of COVID-19 growth. For example, we investigate the robustness of the results to the omission of population dense areas like Milwaukee County.
While voter data provide an imperfect measure of the number of individuals traveling to a voting location, they do not indicate how many individuals visit these buildings or surrounding areas on other days of the year. Any detrimental impact of in-person voting on COVID-19 cases would be derived from excess human activity above and beyond baseline levels. Figure 2 displays mean visits to approximately 70,000 POIs in Wisconsin for the fourteen days before and after April 7th. We use the coordinates of the POI data to focus on visits to businesses and buildings directly next to,
7

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 10 of 22

or including, voting locations. It is clear that POIs within 50 meters and over 50 meters exhibit parallel trends in visitation before and after April 7th. While visits to POIs greater than 50 meters from voting polls are unaﬀected by voting, visits to POIs less than 50 meters from a polling location exhibit a remarkable increase.

3 Methods

3.1 Measures of New COVID-19 Cases
To understand the impact of in-person voting on the spread of COVID-19, we focus on the percent of COVID-19 tests that are positive in each county and week. While another strategy may be to examine new conﬁrmed COVID-19 cases, it is likely that the implementation of testing can inhibit this analysis.8 Schmitt-Groh´e, Teoh, and Uribe (2020) document concerns that testing is not random and widespread. Almagro and Orane-Hutchinson (2020) also recognizes this issue and as a result analyzes changes in the percentage of positive tests. Speciﬁcally, Almagro and Orane-Hutchinson (2020) analyze the percent of positive tests, rather than the number of new cases, because
“First, random testing has not been possible in NYC,9 as only those with certain conditions are tested because of limited capacity. Second, Borjas (2020) points out that the incidence of diﬀerent variables on positive results per capita is composed of two things: A diﬀerential incidence on those who are tested, but also a diﬀerential incidence on those with a positive result conditional on being tested. Therefore, we believe that the fraction of positive tests is the variable that correlates the most with the actual spread of the disease within a neighborhood throughout our sample.” (p. 2)
As a result, we follow Almagro and Orane-Hutchinson (2020) and focus on estimating the impact on the proportion of positive tests, or

IPV

IPV

Positive Ratec,t

=

δ

Location

+ δt
c

Location

× Weekt
c

(1)

+βAbsenteec + βtAbsenteec × Weekt + γXc + ηtWeekt + c,t

8While suﬀering from this concern, we did analyze the eﬀect of voting metrics on the number of new COVID-19 cases rather than the positive case test rate. The number of new case results were consistent with the positive test rate analysis.
9Refer to Wahlberg (2020) among many others discussing limited testing capacity.

8

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 11 of 22

where

Positive Ratec,t

is

the

proportion

of

positive

cases

per

week

in

each

county,

IPV Location

is

in-

person votes (in 1000s) per polling location, Absenteec is absentee ballots returned (in 10,000s) per

county, Weekt are weekly dummies, with the week of the election (April 7th) serving as the reference (omitted) category, and Xc are county level controls. Based on Papke and Wooldridge (1996a) and Papke and Wooldridge (2008a), we estimate models associated with equation (1) using a fractional

logistic regression model with robust standard errors (clustered at the county-level).10

Further, we also estimate equation (2):

IPV

IPV

Positive Ratec,t

=

δ

Location

+ δt
c

Location

× Weekt
c

(2)

+βAbsenteec + βtAbsenteec × Weekt + γXc + ηtWeekt + δcCountyc + c,t

where we add county ﬁxed eﬀects (Countyc) to the speciﬁcation described in equation (1). In these cases, we utilize OLS estimation, owing to the incidental parameters problem.
To account for the incubation period of the disease, lags associated with seeking testing, and
lags in labs acquiring results, we interact voting metrics and weekly dummies as we should not
see a relationship between voting behavior and COVID-19 cases prior to a week after the election.
As a result, the key estimates of interest (treatment variables) are the estimates of the interaction
between the weekly dummies, which run from one week before the election through the end of the
available data, with voting per location (δt) and absentee voting (βt). In addition to the treatment variables, we control for the demographic and social distancing measures outlined in Section 2. We
additionally interact population density with the week dummies in some speciﬁcations to account
for diﬀerential trends in COVID-19 cases by population density. In one speciﬁcation, we also include
the number tests performed that week to control for the prevalence of testing by county and across
time.
10Papke and Wooldridge (1996b, 2008b) have noted that the usual least-squares approach to estimating fractional response models suﬀers from a retransformation problem in using the estimated parameters to infer the magnitude of responses. The implication is that the usual marginal eﬀects should be considered biased when calculated from estimates of the transformed model. They instead suggest estimation directly by quasi-likelihood (e.g., fractional logistic regression).

9

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4 Results
Table 2 shows results from our models described in Equations (1) and (2). Columns (1) - (5) of the table show logit coeﬃcients, standard errors in parentheses, and marginal eﬀects in brackets from estimating Equation (1). Moving from left to right, we systematically add in controls, culminating in our preferred speciﬁcation in Column (4). Column (5) adds in controls for the number of tests performed that week.11 In Column (6) we estimate Equation (2), including county ﬁxed-eﬀects into the model to fully account for all time-invariant diﬀerences between counties. The ﬁxed eﬀects also absorb all county demographics variables that do not vary over time. As this estimation is conducted using OLS, the coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects. We also include clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Across all models, we ﬁnd an increase in the positive share of COVID-19 cases in the weeks following the election in counties that had more in-person votes per voting location, all else equal.12 Our results support and extend the Wisconsin Department of Health Services ﬁndings on the link between the spread of COVID-19 and in-person voting. The coeﬃcient magnitudes and statistical signiﬁcance levels are consistent across the diﬀerent models. We further observe a decreased weekly positive test rates in counties with relatively more absentee votes. 13
Beyond ﬁnding a statistically signiﬁcant impact in Table 2, we provide more clarity on the economic signiﬁcance of the relationship with the marginal eﬀects from the models reported in brackets below each corresponding standard error in Columns (1) - (5), or analogously in the reported OLS estimate in Column (6). The marginal eﬀects two weeks after the election suggest that every additional 100 voters per location (a tenth of a unit increase in voters per location) is associated with an increase in the positive test rate by about 0.4 percentage points. Transforming this into an elasticity, a 10% diﬀerence in in-person voters per polling location between counties is associated with approximately a 14% to 20% increase in the positive test rate.
The marginal eﬀects are similar in size three weeks after the election, but begin to fade in subsequent weeks. Overall, estimates suggest that counties with a higher numbers of voters per polling location observed higher positive test rates in the weeks following the election, relative to those with
11While measures of testing may be endogenous, Almagro and Orane-Hutchinson (2020) argue that including measures of testing are important as controls.
12Week 0, the week of the election, serves as a reference category. 13We also conducted analyses on the number of new COVID-19 cases using a Poisson speciﬁcation and ﬁnd similar results. These results are available upon request.
10

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lower in-person votes per location realities. The estimates from absentee ballot voting suggest that every unit increase in absentee ballots (an additional 10,000 absentee ballots), is associated with a decrease in the positive test rate of between 0.05 and 0.08 three weeks after the election as well.
The initial hypothesis forwarded suggests that in-person voting is most associated with the incidence of new COVID-19 cases through higher numbers of voters in each polling location. However, it is also likely that the simple number of in person votes in a county matters as well. Thus, in addition to analyzing in-person voting per location and absentee voting, we also provide an analysis of the impact of overall in-person voting (not accounting for variation in the number of voting locations per county) and absentee voting on new cases in Table 3. Here, the major diﬀerence is that we have replaced in-person votes per polling location with in-person votes in tens of thousands. We still see a similar pattern between in-person voting and the percent of positive cases as well as the negative relationship between absentee voting and the percent of positive cases two to three weeks after the election.
Lastly, in Table 4, we investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to removing Brown and Milwaukee Counties from our main empirical speciﬁcations. Brown County contains the City of Green Bay, and saw a large outbreak of COVID-19 traced to a meat-packing facility. Milwaukee County has the highest population density in Wisconsin and reported long lines at the polls on the election day. Overall the results are relatively consistent to those presented in Tables 2 and 3, although eﬀects seem to fade faster and are somewhat smaller when Milwaukee County is excluded from the sample. This is not unexpected given that Milwaukee had one of the highest in-person voters per polling location values in the state, and indicates that the eﬀect in Milwaukee County was likely more pronounced than in the state overall.
5 Conclusion
Using county level data from the entire state of Wisconsin, we analyze whether the election held in Wisconsin on April 7, 2020 is associated with the spread of COVID-19.
Our results conﬁrm the Wisconsin Department of Health Services ﬁndings on the link between the spread of COVID-19 and voting using testing and tracing methods. However, the tracing investigation undertaken was not comprehensive, and our results indicate a notable association between the concentration of in-person voters and positive test rates of COVID-19. Speciﬁcally, results show
11

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 14 of 22
that counties which had more in-person voting per voting location (all else equal) had a higher rate of positive COVID-19 tests than counties with relatively fewer in-person voters. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between absentee voting and the rate of positive COVID-19 tests.
An important policy consideration among County and Municipal Clerks is that of location consolidation for forthcoming elections, and the results reported here may aid in their decision on the matter. As discussed in Section 2, when given the ability to modify the location of polling places at their own discretion, the overwhelming majority of clerks that made changes chose to consolidate locations, which eﬀectively led to increases in voter density per location. Our results show such an increase in density is associated with increase in the rate of positive COVID-19 tests beginning two weeks following the election. The delayed increased is expected and the ﬁndings are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 1% level across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Likewise, the data support the hypothesis that voter density per polling location will not vary with the positive rate in the week immediately preceding or during the the election, again as expected, as neither parameter is signiﬁcant as seen in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
The association we ﬁnd between COVID-19 and voting provides an additional piece of evidence towards a causal link. Although our results are not deﬁnitive, they do suggest it may be prudent, to the extent possible during the COVID-19 epidemic and weighed against other factors, for policy makers and election clerks to take steps to either expand the number of polling locations, voting times, early voting opportunities, or encourage absentee voting in order to keep the population density of voters as low as possible.
References
Adolph, Christopher, Kenya Amano, Bree Bang-Jensen, Nancy Fullman, and John Wilkerson. 2020. “Pandemic politics: timing state-level social distancing responses to covid-19.” medRxiv .
Allcott, Hunt, Levi Boxell, Jacob Conway, Matthew Gentzkow, Michael Thaler, and David Y Yang. 2020. “Polarization and public health: Partisan diﬀerences in social distancing during the Coronavirus pandemic.” NBER Working Paper (w26946).
Almagro, Milena and Angelo Orane-Hutchinson. 2020. “The diﬀerential impact of COVID-19 across
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demographic groups: Evidence from NYC.” The diﬀerential impact of COVID-19 across demographic groups: Evidence from NYC (April 10, 2020) . Andersen, Martin. 2020. “Early evidence on social distancing in response to COVID-19 in the United States.” Working Paper . Associated Press. 2020. “52 positive cases tied to wisconsin election.” URL apnews.com/ b1503b5591c682530d1005e58ec8c267. Online; retrieved 29-April-2020. Avery, Christopher, William Bossert, Adam Clark, Glenn Ellison, and Sara Fisher Ellison. 2020. “Policy Implications of Models of the Spread of Coronavirus: Perspectives and Opportunities for Economists.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research. Borjas, George J. 2020. “Demographic determinants of testing incidence and COVID-19 infections in New York City neighborhoods.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research. Bursztyn, Leonardo, Aakaash Rao, Christopher Roth, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2020. “Misinformation during a pandemic.” Working Paper (2020-44). Courtemanche, Charles J, Joseph Garuccio, Anh Le, Joshua C Pinkston, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2020a. “Did Social-Distancing Measures in Kentucky Help to Flatten the COVID-19 Curve?” Working Paper . ———. 2020b. “Strong Social Distancing Measures in the United States Reduced the COVID-19 Growth Rate, While Weak Measures Did Not.” Working Paper . Flaxman, Seth, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy, H Unwin, H Coupland, T Mellan, H Zhu, T Berah, J Eaton, P Perez Guzman et al. 2020. “Report 13: Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries.” . Friedson, Andrew I, Drew McNichols, Joseph J Sabia, and Dhaval Dave. 2020. “Did California’s Shelter-in-Place Order Work? Early Coronavirus-Related Public Health Eﬀects.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research. Gosc´e, Lara, David AW Barton, and Anders Johansson. 2014. “Analytical modelling of the spread of disease in conﬁned and crowded spaces.” Scientiﬁc reports 4:4856.
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Harris, Jeﬀrey E. 2020. “The Subways Seeded the Massive Coronavirus Epidemic in New York City.” NBER Working Paper (w27021).
IHME, COVID-19 Health Service Utilization Forecasting Team and Christopher Murray. 2020. “Forecasting COVID-19 impact on hospital bed-days, ICU-days, ventilator-days and deaths by US state in the next 4 months.” medRxiv .
Kahle, David and Hadley Wickham. 2013. “ggmap: Spatial Visualization with ggplot2.” The R Journal 5 (1):144–161. URL https://journal.r-project.org/archive/2013-1/kahle-wickham. pdf.
Kuchler, Theresa, Dominic Russel, and Johannes Stroebel. 2020. “The geographic spread of COVID19 correlates with structure of social networks as measured by Facebook.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
New York Times. 2020. “Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty.” URL https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/ wisconsin-primary-election.htmln.
Papke, Leslie E and Jeﬀrey M Wooldridge. 1996a. “Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401 (k) plan participation rates.” Journal of applied econometrics 11 (6):619–632.
———. 1996b. “Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401 (k) plan participation rates.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 11 (6):619–632.
———. 2008a. “Panel data methods for fractional response variables with an application to test pass rates.” Journal of Econometrics 145 (1-2):121–133.
———. 2008b. “Panel data methods for fractional response variables with an application to test pass rates.” Journal of Econometrics 145 (1-2):121–133.
Schmitt-Groh´e, Stephanie, Ken Teoh, and Mart´ın Uribe. 2020. “Covid-19: Testing Inequality in New York City.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Wahlberg, David. 2020. “COVID-19 testing capacity growing in Wisconsin, but some patients still can’t get tested.” URL https://bit.ly/2L8NufM. Online; retrieved 5-May-2020.
14

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 17 of 22
Figure 1: Average Voter Density and Positive Test Rates Over Time, by County
(a) Average Voter Density

(b) COVID-19 Positive Rate: Week of Election

(c) COVID-19 Positive Rate: 3 Weeks After Election

Notes: Voting data in 1a from the Wisconsin Elections Commission; Positive COVID-19 test rates in 1b and 1c from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 18 of 22
Figure 2: Average Visits To POIs By Distance From Voting Location Voting Day

5

4

3

Mean Visits To Point Of Interest

2

1

03/24/20

03/31/20

04/07/20

< 50 Meters From Poll

04/14/20

04/21/20

> 50 Meters From Poll

Notes: Figure displays mean visits to approximately 70,000 points of interest (POIs) in Wisconsin for the fourteen days before and after April 7th. Data demonstrate that visits to POIs greater than 50 meters from voting polls are unaﬀected on election day, while visits to POIs less than 50 meters from a polling location exhibit a large increase. Data are from Safegraph Core Places and Weekly Patterns, which use GPS pings from smartphones to track devices that enter a point of interest each day. POIs consist of restaurants, religious institutions, schools, and other commonly visited locations.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 19 of 22

Table 1: Summary Statistics

All Counties Mean Std. Dev.

Above Median Votes/Polling
Location
Mean Std. Dev.

Below Median Votes/Polling
Location
Mean Std. Dev.

T-Test

Election Variables

In-Person Votes (k) per Polling Location In-Person Votes (10k) Absentee Votes (10k) Polling Locations Open
COVID-19 Testing Variables

0.171 0.591 1.581 30.708

0.095 0.632 2.986 16.920

0.240 0.918 2.803 36.083

0.089 0.756 3.847 20.828

0.102 0.263 0.359 25.333

0.024 0.119 0.255 9.052

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Weekly New Positive Covid-19 Cases Weekly New Positive Covid-19 Tests Weekly Positive Covid-19 Test Rate
Demographic Variables

22.683 268.135 0.041

90.647 629.793 0.061

43.397 455.242 0.056

124.871 846.017 0.069

1.968 81.028 0.026

3.519 93.894 0.047

0.000 0.000 0.000

% Population with less than a H.S. Degree % Population with at least a B.A. Degree Unemployment Rate (2018) Median Household Income ($k) Percent of Population Age 65 or Older
SafeGraph Social Distancing Variables

8.400 23.065 3.307 58.009 20.161

2.532 7.526 0.738 9.129 4.339

7.497 26.578 3.131 61.087 18.489

1.812 8.170 0.645 8.977 3.991

9.303 19.553 3.483 54.930 21.832

2.814 4.688 0.783 8.210 4.025

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Average Time in Dwelling % Leaving Home Average Distance Traveled County-Week Observations Counties

727.827 0.634 10007.035 504
72

117.732 0.035 3442.082

765.657 0.622 8896.539 252
36

115.795 0.035 3206.551

689.996 0.646 11117.531 252
36

107.212 0.031 3314.342

0.000 0.000 0.000

Notes: Data from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, the U.S. Census, The American Community Survey, and Safegraph.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 20 of 22

Table 2: Relationship between COVID-19 and In-Person Voting per Polling Location and Absentee Voting

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

IPV/Loc × Week -1 IPV/Loc × Week 1 IPV/Loc × Week 2 IPV/Loc × Week 3 IPV/Loc × Week 4 IPV/Loc × Week 5 AV × Week -1 AV × Week 1 AV × Week 2 AV × Week 3 AV × Week 4 AV × Week 5 N

2.652 (2.194) [0.1410] 5.513* (2.885) [0.2051] 11.094*** (3.602) [0.3373] 10.049*** (2.772) [0.3487] 5.997** (2.765) [0.1751] 9.021*** (2.771) [0.2242] -0.022 (0.041) [-0.0010] -0.082 (0.051) [-0.0037] -0.197** (0.079) [-0.0071] -0.194*** (0.057) [-0.0076] -0.115** (0.051) [-0.0045] -0.153*** (0.054) [-0.0052]
504

2.718 (2.432) [0.1385] 5.888* (3.136) [0.2378] 11.742*** (3.763) [0.3885] 10.742*** (2.881) [0.3964] 6.539** (3.039) [0.2242] 9.598*** (2.996) [0.2803] -0.027 (0.051) [-0.0017] -0.101* (0.061) [-0.0028] -0.229*** (0.080) [-0.0054] -0.226*** (0.058) [-0.0067] -0.139** (0.060) [-0.0027] -0.181*** (0.059) [-0.0026]
504

2.767 (2.450) [0.1367] 6.364** (3.102) [0.2711] 12.003*** (3.720) [0.4214] 10.977*** (2.800) [0.4239] 6.281** (2.942) [0.2416] 8.891*** (2.683) [0.2943] -0.029 (0.055) [-0.0016] -0.113* (0.064) [-0.0039] -0.239*** (0.080) [-0.0068] -0.234*** (0.054) [-0.0078] -0.140** (0.060) [-0.0037] -0.174*** (0.051) [-0.0038]
504

2.938 (2.476) [0.1439] 6.374** (3.036) [0.2773] 11.884*** (3.423) [0.4276] 11.070*** (2.785) [0.4341] 6.305** (2.951) [0.2517] 8.928*** (2.762) [0.3072] 0.017 (0.055) [0.0003] -0.055 (0.051) [0.0000] -0.127 (0.078) [-0.0003] -0.225*** (0.054) [-0.0052] -0.116* (0.071) [-0.0001] -0.178*** (0.048) [-0.0002]
504

2.962 (2.471) [0.1464] 6.237** (3.025) [0.2667] 11.644*** (3.198) [0.4109] 10.055*** (2.714) [0.3898] 5.059* (2.777) [0.2026] 7.905*** (3.022) [0.2672] 0.016 (0.057) [0.0004] -0.052 (0.051) [-0.0005] -0.125* (0.069) [-0.0014] -0.231*** (0.061) [-0.0062] -0.110* (0.067) [-0.0010] -0.235*** (0.042) [-0.0031]
504

0.174 (0.133)
0.283* (0.165)
0.483** (0.206)
0.464*** (0.155)
0.232 (0.139)
0.249* (0.129)
0.001 (0.003)
-0.002 (0.002)
-0.003 (0.003)
-0.006** (0.003)
-0.002 (0.003)
-0.003 (0.003)
504

Demographic Controls Social Distancing Controls Pop. Dens × Week Controls Control for Tests County Fixed Eﬀects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Notes: Data sources are identical to Table 1. The table shows logit coeﬃcients, standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses, and marginal eﬀects in brackets for the ﬁrst ﬁve columns and OLS coeﬃcients and standard errors clustered at the county level in the last column. Controls include county population, population density, the percent of the population without a high school degree, the percent of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, the 2018 unemployment rate, the median household income, and the percent of the population age 65 or older. The Safegraph Social Distancing Controls include median home dwelling time, percent of devices completely home, and median distance traveled from home and are lagged by one week. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance levels: * 10% ** 5% and *** 1%.
18

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 21 of 22

Table 3: Relationship between New COVID-19 and In-Person Voting and Absentee Voting

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

IPV × Week -1 IPV × Week 1 IPV × Week 2 IPV × Week 3 IPV × Week 4 IPV × Week 5 AV × Week -1 AV × Week 1 AV × Week 2 AV × Week 3 AV × Week 4 AV × Week 5 N

0.741 (0.942) [0.0351] 1.492 (0.991) [0.0714] 2.189** (1.001) [0.0927] 1.973** (0.974) [0.0886] 1.637* (0.966) [0.0744] 1.542 (0.985) [0.0699] -0.106 (0.158) [-0.0046] -0.249 (0.161) [-0.0128] -0.379** (0.160) [-0.0175] -0.350** (0.156) [-0.0168] -0.295* (0.156) [-0.0148] -0.252 (0.160) [-0.0136]
504

1.224 (1.325) [0.0587] 2.183 (1.420) [0.1006] 3.010** (1.482) [0.1238] 2.668* (1.439) [0.1170] 2.220 (1.411) [0.0977] 2.332* (1.396) [0.0979] -0.176 (0.212) [-0.0091] -0.344 (0.224) [-0.0131] -0.485** (0.233) [-0.0152] -0.439* (0.225) [-0.0156] -0.372* (0.221) [-0.0113] -0.365* (0.219) [-0.0092]
504

1.145 (1.215) [0.0544] 2.462* (1.331) [0.1119] 3.395** (1.409) [0.1370] 2.855** (1.326) [0.1243] 2.035* (1.236) [0.0929] 1.990 (1.266) [0.0900] -0.158 (0.192) [-0.0079] -0.378* (0.208) [-0.0153] -0.532** (0.219) [-0.0184] -0.457** (0.202) [-0.0175] -0.338* (0.190) [-0.0120] -0.308 (0.194) [-0.0100]
504

1.056 (1.207) [0.0480] 2.453* (1.297) [0.1192] 3.368** (1.326) [0.1488] 3.020** (1.272) [0.1398] 2.081* (1.200) [0.1073] 2.197* (1.201) [0.1121] -0.101 (0.182) [-0.0053] -0.365* (0.191) [-0.0134] -0.512*** (0.187) [-0.0153] -0.526*** (0.197) [-0.0181] -0.359** (0.173) [-0.0102] -0.393** (0.191) [-0.0091]
504

1.045 (1.192) [0.0480] 2.411* (1.284) [0.1149] 3.229** (1.291) [0.1399] 2.794** (1.277) [0.1281] 1.709 (1.202) [0.0908] 1.838 (1.236) [0.0964] -0.099 (0.180) [-0.0052] -0.361* (0.191) [-0.0135] -0.506*** (0.189) [-0.0155] -0.524** (0.214) [-0.0182] -0.313* (0.175) [-0.0091] -0.402* (0.214) [-0.0098]
504

0.039 (0.058)
0.099 (0.062)
0.126** (0.061)
0.134** (0.062)
0.094* (0.051)
0.091* (0.048)
-0.005 (0.013)
-0.020 (0.014)
-0.024* (0.013)
-0.029** (0.014)
-0.020* (0.011)
-0.020* (0.011)
504

Demographic Controls Social Distancing Controls Pop. Dens × Week Controls Control for Tests County Fixed Eﬀects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Notes: The data sources and models are identical to Table 2, with the exception that we replace in-person voting per location with in-person votes (in ten thousands). The table shows logit coeﬃcients, standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses, and marginal eﬀects in brackets for the ﬁrst ﬁve columns and OLS coeﬃcients and standard errors in parentheses clustered at the county level in the last column. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance levels: * 10% ** 5% and *** 1%.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-16 Filed 05/29/20 Page 22 of 22

Table 4: Relationship between New COVID-19 and Voting (Excluding Green Bay and Milwaukee)

IPV × Week -1 IPV × Week 1 IPV × Week 2 IPV × Week 3 IPV × Week 4 IPV × Week 5 AV × Week -1 AV × Week 1 AV × Week 2 AV × Week 3 AV × Week 4 AV × Week 5 N

IPV/Polling Location

Frac Logit

OLS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

3.538 (2.642) [0.1736] 5.169* (3.085) [0.2185] 9.210*** (2.881) [0.3053] 10.479*** (2.895) [0.3884] 5.400* (3.032) [0.2096] 9.612*** (2.905) [0.3134] 0.011 (0.060) [0.0005] -0.049 (0.052) [-0.0016] -0.116** (0.054) [-0.0029] -0.236*** (0.058) [-0.0077] -0.115* (0.068) [-0.0033] -0.180*** (0.060) [-0.0046]
497

6.324 (4.270) [0.3017] 5.757 (4.797) [0.2680] 12.367*** (4.603) [0.4669] 9.502** (3.899) [0.3932] 5.820 (4.374) [0.2672] 7.818* (4.264) [0.3157] 0.057 (0.041) [0.0022] -0.054 (0.047) [0.0007] -0.115 (0.071) [0.0009] -0.225*** (0.045) [-0.0040] -0.115 (0.078) [0.0008] -0.176*** (0.054) [0.0012]
497

0.205 (0.142)
0.211 (0.158)
0.319** (0.140)
0.411** (0.156)
0.185 (0.139)
0.278** (0.135)
0.001 (0.003)
-0.001 (0.002)
-0.002 (0.002)
-0.006** (0.003)
-0.002 (0.002)
-0.003 (0.003)
497

0.293 (0.204)
0.204 (0.215)
0.378* (0.207)
0.261 (0.181)
0.199 (0.189)
0.204 (0.173)
0.003 (0.003)
-0.003 (0.002)
-0.005 (0.004)
-0.010*** (0.004)
-0.003 (0.003)
-0.004 (0.003)
497

IPV (10k)

Frac Logit

OLS

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1.150 (1.215) [0.0539] 2.147* (1.295) [0.0971] 2.870** (1.245) [0.1125] 2.794** (1.277) [0.1178] 1.908 (1.209) [0.0868] 2.240* (1.213) [0.0950] -0.115 (0.182) [-0.0055] -0.331* (0.197) [-0.0134] -0.457** (0.184) [-0.0149] -0.512** (0.207) [-0.0190] -0.349** (0.175) [-0.0126] -0.399** (0.187) [-0.0133]
497

1.237 (1.317) [0.0561] 2.144 (1.386) [0.1033] 2.870** (1.426) [0.1266] 2.241* (1.350) [0.1072] 1.810 (1.331) [0.0942] 1.711 (1.309) [0.0944] -0.092 (0.181) [-0.0046] -0.377* (0.205) [-0.0137] -0.517** (0.207) [-0.0154] -0.526*** (0.196) [-0.0175] -0.383** (0.187) [-0.0114] -0.413** (0.184) [-0.0101]
497

0.042 (0.058)
0.088 (0.061)
0.104* (0.055)
0.124** (0.061)
0.088* (0.051)
0.094* (0.048)
-0.006 (0.013)
-0.018 (0.014)
-0.021* (0.012)
-0.028** (0.014)
-0.019* (0.011)
-0.021* (0.011)
497

0.039 (0.057)
0.084 (0.057)
0.102* (0.053)
0.105* (0.053)
0.085* (0.048)
0.080* (0.045)
-0.005 (0.013)
-0.021 (0.013)
-0.027** (0.013)
-0.032*** (0.012)
-0.021* (0.011)
-0.022** (0.010)
497

Demographic Controls

Y

Social Distancing Controls

Y

Pop. Dens × Week Controls

Y

County Fixed Eﬀects

No Green Bay

Y

No Milwaukee

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Notes: The data sources are identical to Table 2. Models are either fractional logit regressions, with coeﬃcients, standard errors in parentheses, and marginal eﬀects in brackets, or OLS regressions with coeﬃcients and standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions include county ﬁxed eﬀects but exclude time invariant demographic controls. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance levels: * 10% ** 5% and *** 1%.

20

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 5
EXHIBIT 15

Recommendations forCElAecStioEn P0ol:li2ng0L-occva-ti0on1s2| 0CD5C-ECT-TNL Document 15-17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 5 5/27/20, 7:13 PM
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Recommendations for Election Polling Locations
Interim guidance to prevent spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html

Page 1 of 4

Recommendations forCElAecStioEn P0ol:li2ng0L-occva-ti0on1s2| 0CD5C-ECT-TNL Document 15-17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 5 5/27/20, 7:13 PM
Updated March 27, 2020
Summary of changes: Encourage moving election polling locations away from long term care facilities and facilities housing older persons to minimize COVID-19 exposure among older individuals and those with chronic medical conditions. Updated EPA COVID Disinfectant link.

Background
There is much to learn about the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Based on what is currently known about SARS-CoV-2 and about similar coronaviruses, spread from person-to-person happens most frequently among close contacts (within about 6 feet). This type of transmission occurs via respiratory droplets. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to persons from surfaces contaminated with the virus has not been documented. Transmission of coronavirus in general occurs much more commonly through respiratory droplets than through contact with contaminated surfaces. Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2 may remain viable for hours to days on surfaces made from a variety of materials. Cleaning of visibly dirty surfaces followed by disinfection is a best practice measure for prevention of COVID-19 and other viral respiratory illnesses in election polling locations.
Purpose
This guidance provides recommendations on the routine cleaning and disinfection of polling location areas and associated voting equipment (e.g., pens, voting machines, computers). It suggests actions that polling station workers can take to reduce the risk of exposure to COVID-19 by limiting the survival of the virus in the environment. This guidance will be updated if additional information becomes available.
De!nitions:
Community settings (e.g. polling locations, households, schools, daycares, businesses) encompass most nonhealthcare settings and are visited by the general public. Cleaning refers to the removal of dirt and impurities including germs from surfaces. Cleaning alone does not kill germs. But by removing them, it decreases the number of germs and therefore any risk of spreading infection. Disinfecting kills germs on surfaces. Disinfecting works by using chemicals to kill germs on surfaces. This process does not necessarily clean dirty surfaces or remove germs. But killing germs remaining on a surface after cleaning further reduce any risk of spreading infection.
Actions for elections o"cials in advance of election day
Encourage voters to use voting methods that minimize direct contact with other people and reduce crowd size at polling stations.
Encourage mail-in methods of voting if allowed in the jurisdiction. Encourage early voting, where voter crowds may be smaller throughout the day. This minimizes the number

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html

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of individuals a voter may come in contact with. Encourage drive-up voting for eligible voters if allowed in the jurisdiction. Encourage voters planning to vote in-person on election day to arrive at o#-peak times. For example, if voter crowds are lighter mid-morning, advertise that in advance to the community. Encourage relocating polling places from nursing homes, long-term care facilities, and senior living residences, to minimize COVID-19 exposure among older individuals and those with chronic medical conditions. Consider additional social distancing and other measures to protect these individuals during voting.
Preventive actions polling workers can take
Stay at home if you have fever, respiratory symptoms, or believe you are sick Practice hand hygiene frequently: wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. If soap and water are not readily available, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol. Practice routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces: including tables, doorknobs, light switches, handles, desks, toilets, faucets, sinks, etc. Disinfect surfaces that may be contaminated with germs after cleaning: A list of products with EPAapproved emerging viral pathogens claims ! is available. Products with EPA-approved emerging viral pathogens claims are expected to be e#ective against the virus that causes COVID-19 based on data for harder to kill viruses. Follow the manufacturer’s instructions for all cleaning and disinfection products (e.g., concentration, application method and contact time, use of personal protective equipment). Clean and disinfect voting-associated equipment (e.g., voting machines, laptops, tablets, keyboards) routinely. Follow the manufacturer’s instructions for all cleaning and disinfection products.
Consult with the voting machine manufacturer for guidance on appropriate disinfection products for voting machines and associated electronics. Consider use of wipeable covers for electronics. If no manufacturer guidance is available, consider the use of alcohol-based wipes or spray containing at least 70% alcohol to clean voting machine buttons and touch screens. Dry surfaces thoroughly to avoid pooling of liquids.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html

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Recommendations forCElAecStioEn P0ol:li2ng0L-occva-ti0on1s2| 0CD5C-ECT-TNL Document 15-17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 5 5/27/20, 7:13 PM
Preventive action polling stations workers can take for themselves and the general public
Based on available data, the most important measures to prevent transmission of viruses in crowded public areas include careful and consistent cleaning of one’s hands. Therefore:
Ensure bathrooms at the polling station are supplied adequately with soap, water, and drying materials so visitors and sta# can wash their hands.. Provide an alcohol-based hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol for use before or after using the voting machine or the !nal step in the voting process. Consider placing the alcohol-based hand sanitizer in visible, frequently used locations such as registration desks and exits. Incorporate social distancing strategies, as feasible.Social distancing strategies increase the space between individuals and decrease the frequency of contact among individuals to reduce the risk of spreading a disease. Keeping individuals at least 6 feet apart is ideal based on what is known about COVID-19. If this is not feasible, e#orts should be made to keep individuals as far apart as is practical. Feasibility of strategies will depend on the space available in the polling station and the number of voters who arrive at one time. Polling station workers can:
Increase distance between voting booths. Limit nonessential visitors. For example, poll workers should be encouraged not to bring children, grandchildren, etc. with them as they work the polls. Remind voters upon arrival to try to leave space between themselves and others. Encourage voters to stay 6 feet apart if feasible. Polling places may provide signs to help voters and workers remember this. Discourage voters and workers from greeting others with physical contact (e.g., handshakes). Include this reminder on signs about social distancing.
Recommendations for processing mail-in ballots
Workers handling mail in ballots should practice hand hygiene frequently No additional precautions are recommended for storage of ballots
References
Community Mitigation Guidance for COVID-19 Response in the United States: Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Community Preparedness and Outbreak Response Handwashing: Clean Hands Save Lives Protect Yourself & Your Family
Page last reviewed: March 10, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-18 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 2
EXHIBIT 16

Minnesota Secretary OCf AStaSteE- S0e:c2. 0Si-mcovn -U0rg1e2s 0Mi5nn-eEsCotaTns-TtoNReLqueDst oAbcsuenmteeeBnatllo1ts5f-o1r 82020FEilleectdion0s5/29/20 Page 2 of 2 5/27/20, 7:15 PM
Important Changes to Ofﬁce Operations: COVID-19 Information
OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON
NEWS ROOM
Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections
May 13, 2020 SAINT PAUL — Today, Secretary of State Steve Simon is calling on all eligible Minnesota voters to apply for their absentee ballots now using the online absentee ballot request tool. The tool, which opened today, allows registered voters to request that their ballot to be sent to them by mail for the August 11 statewide primary and the November 3 general election. “We need to treat the upcoming statewide elections as a public health issue," said Secretary Simon. "To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home. In the face of this pandemic, it is the right thing to do to protect Minnesotans who are most at risk - and the people who care for them. Fortunately, it’s very easy to do." Who can get an absentee ballot? All eligible Minnesota voters may request an absentee ballot for the primary and general elections at mnvotes.org. The online application will ask for an e-mail address and an identiﬁcation number, either a Minnesota-issued driver's license, Minnesota ID card, or last 4 digits of Social Security Number. You can check your voter registration status online. You can also register or update your voter registration online.
 RETURN TO LIST

© 2020 Ofﬁce of the Minnesota Secretary of State - Terms & Conditions

! Subscribe for email updates!

https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-the-office/news-room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/

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EXHIBIT 17

Minnesota Secretary OCf AStaSteE- E0le:c2t0ion-cs vCa-l0en1d2ar05-ECT-TNL Document 15-19 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 2 5/27/20, 7:16 PM
Important Changes to Ofﬁce Operations: COVID-19 Information OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON

ELECTIONS CALENDAR

2020 Election Dates

MAR
3 Presidential Primary

MAR
10 Township Elections

JUN Vote by mail or in person

26

June 26 through August 10 for the Primary

JUL Register in advance by

21

July 21 to save time on Primary Election Day

AUG
11 Primary Election

SEP Vote by mail or in person

18

September 18 through November 2

OCT
13

Register in advance by October 13 to save time on Election Day

NOV
3 Election Day

Detailed election administration calendars are also available.
Future Election Dates
2020-2022 ELECTION DATES
© 2020 Ofﬁce of the Minnesota Secretary of State - Terms & Conditions

What's on the Election Day ballot in 2020?
All voters will have these races on their general election ballot: U.S. President U.S. Senator U.S. Representative State Senator State Representative Judicial seats
Voters may also have one or more of these races on their ballot: County Ofﬁcials City Ofﬁcers School Board Members Township Ofﬁcers Local ballot questions
Special Elections
Special elections are used to ﬁll vacant ofﬁces or decide ballot questions; they can be scheduled at various times during the year, and may be held in conjunction with a regularly scheduled election. View list of upcoming special elections
! Subscribe for email updates!

https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/elections-calendar/

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EXHIBIT 18

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-20 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

DECLARATION OF VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare as follows: 1. My name is Vivian Latimer Tanniehill. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration. The facts in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge. If called upon as a witness, I would testify to these facts. 2. I am sixty-seven years old and will turn sixty-eight years old on July 27, 2020. 3. I am a retired Human Resources Director of a healthcare organization. However, I spent most of my career—about 30 years—with Northwest Airlines in Minnesota in a variety of frontline and managerial roles. 4. I earned my bachelor’s degree from Macalester College and a master’s degree in organizational leadership from Augsburg University. 5. I have resided in Minnesota since May 1959. I currently reside in Woodbury, Minnesota. I have lived at my current address since June 1994, when I moved here with my late husband. I have lived alone since my husband’s passing. 6. I am originally from Birmingham, Alabama. I moved to Roseville, Minnesota with my
1

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family when I was seven years old, but continued to spend summers in Alabama until 1968 when I was sixteen years old. I continued to visit Alabama after my mother moved back to Birmingham in 1974. 7. I am a Black woman, and my family experienced segregation and state-sanctioned racism as a day-to-day reality during my early childhood in Alabama. In particular, I remember my mother often telling me about the many forms of voter suppression used to disenfranchise Black people under the Jim Crow system. From her, I learned about how local officials would keep Black people off the voter rolls through poll taxes, or through selectively administered tests of irrelevant skills like writing neatly on wax paper or reading foreign languages. 8. My mother was never able to vote in Alabama. After we moved to Minnesota, she registered to vote, and I went with her to the polls to see her vote in the 1960 election. Based on genealogy research I did many years later, I believe this was the first time anyone in my family had been able to vote since the Nineteenth Century. I know for certain that it was a landmark moment for my mother, and an impactful experience for me. 9. More generally, the contrasts between life in Alabama and Minnesota were impossible to miss. While Alabama in the late 1950s and early 1960s was still a heavily segregated society, Minnesota was much more integrated, from schools to restaurants to the voting booth. The connection between a more inclusive democracy and a more inclusive society was not lost on me, even as a young person. 10. These early experiences inspired my lifelong passion for democratic participation and eliminating obstacles that prevent qualified voters from exercising their right to vote. 11. I currently serve as Advocacy Chair of the Board of Directors of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN). I have been a member of LWVMN since Fall
2

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2015. I am also a member of the Woodbury-Cottage Grove Area chapter of the League of Women Voters. 12. I regularly vote in federal, state, and local elections. I have been registered to vote in Minnesota since at least 1984. It is important to me to participate in and exercise my voice in the democratic process. 13. In the past, I have always voted in person. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, I planned to vote in person in the August 11, 2020, statewide primary election and the November 3, 2020, presidential election. 14. Because of the pandemic, I requested absentee ballots for both the August 2020 and the November 2020 elections and received confirmation that my application was received on May 15, 2020. 15. Based on news coverage I have read, I am aware that the virus that causes COVID-19 is highly contagious and spreads through a variety of means, including respiratory droplets and contact between individuals. I understand that while some infected individuals experience no symptoms or mild symptoms from COVID-19, others become seriously ill, sometimes with severe buildup of fluid in their lungs that can lead to death. 16. I also understand that some people are particularly vulnerable to becoming severely sick from COVID-19—specifically, people over 65 and people of any age who are immunocompromised, or have other underlying conditions like asthma, heart conditions, chronic lung disease, diabetes, or obesity. 17. I am over 65 years old, and I have previously had open heart surgery. I take a bloodthinning medication daily for my cardiac health. I also have asthma. 18. As a person at high risk of becoming severely ill or dying if I contract COVID-19, I have
3

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been taking every possible precaution to avoid exposing myself to the virus. I live alone and leave my house only when absolutely necessary, such as when I need to buy groceries. If I need to go shopping, I wear a face mask and gloves and spend as little time as possible in the store, while keeping as much distance from other shoppers as I can. 19. No one except me is allowed inside my house. My youngest daughter visits me by standing outside my house on the front sidewalk, while I talk to her from an upstairs window. When my oldest daughter and grandchildren come to help with lawn work, we all wear face masks and gloves while practicing safe social distancing. I allow them to help with lawn work because the City of Woodbury will levy fines on me if my grass is overgrown or my home is not in good repair and my underlying conditions make it extremely painful for me to do the work alone. 20. I know that millions of other Minnesotans are similarly practicing social distancing, but normal interactions are starting to resume. I am aware that Governor Tim Walz recently issued an executive order allowing Minnesota businesses to reopen slowly, but instructing people at high risk—people like me—to stay home. I am worried that as restrictions are rolled back, there could be another spike in COVID-19 infections anytime in the next year or so. 21. Given the public health situation, I cannot risk voting in person, which could involve waiting in line with other voters, interacting with poll workers, and touching voting equipment that might be contaminated. I am concerned that prolonged exposure to other individuals at a crowded polling place would put me at serious risk of contracting COVID-19. 22. Although I believe absentee voting is safer than in-person voting, I understand it is not entirely safe. In order to vote absentee, I would have to meet in person with a witness, show the witness my blank ballot, and have the witness sign a statement after I finish filling out the ballot.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-21 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 9
EXHIBIT 19

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-21 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

DECLARATION OF MICHELLE WITTE Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare as follows: 1. My name is Michelle Witte. I am a resident of Minnesota, over 18 years old, and competent to make this declaration. The facts in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge. If called upon as a witness, I would testify to these facts. 2. I am the current Executive Director of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN). I have served in this position since May 2017. 3. LWVMN is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization established under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Our sole office is located in Saint Paul, Minnesota. 4. LWVMN’s mission is to encourage informed and active participation in government, increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influence public policy through education and advocacy. We envision and work toward a democracy where every person has the desire, the right, the knowledge and the confidence to participate. 5. LWVMN is affiliated with the League of Women Voters of the United States and the League of Women Voters Education Fund. These national entities advocate for voting rights and
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civic engagement at the national level, and coordinate the activities of state-level Leagues of Women Voters like LWVMN (“State Leagues”) throughout the United States. 6. LWVMN is also affiliated with 35 local League of Women Voters chapters (“Local Leagues”) throughout Minnesota. 7. LWVMN traces its roots to the struggle for women’s suffrage. LWVMN’s predecessor organization, the Minnesota Suffrage Association, was at the forefront of the fight to secure the franchise for women in Minnesota. In October 1919—after the Nineteenth Amendment had been ratified by a sufficient number of states to become part of the Constitution, expanding voting rights for women nationwide—the Minnesota Suffrage Association dissolved and became the Minnesota League of Women Voters, an affiliate of the newly formed national League of Women Voters. 8. For the past century, LWVMN has been a leading advocate for an inclusive and vibrant democracy in Minnesota. 9. Today, LWVMN is one of the largest State Leagues in the country, with approximately 2,200 members throughout Minnesota either as part of local Leagues or as at-large members of the State League. 10. Our membership includes members of both major political parties, independents, and members of minor parties. We welcome people of all ages and genders as members, although the majority of our members are women and the median age of our membership is over 55. 11. Many members of LWVMN are over age 65, and I understand that many may have health conditions that make them especially vulnerable to becoming severely ill or dying if they contract COVID-19. Some of our members need assistance to walk, or have other mobility limitations. 12. Based on my experience and general familiarity with our membership, LWVMN members vary widely in terms of their living situations. Some live with spouses, partners, other family
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members, or roommates who are adult U.S. citizens registered to vote in Minnesota. Some live alone. Some live in households with people who are ineligible to vote in Minnesota (for example, minor children and non-U.S. citizens) or who have chosen not to register to vote in Minnesota. While most LWVMN members live in Minnesota, some live out of state. This includes some LWVMN members who remain registered Minnesota voters while they temporarily live or visit elsewhere. 13. Despite the size of its membership, LWVMN operates with an office staff of just three fulltime employees, plus two part-time staff members. We rely on the volunteer work of our individual members and Local Leagues to drive the success of our activities. 14. Typically, LWVMN engages in three broad categories of activities. 15. First: We are deeply involved in voter engagement activities. We organize voter registration drives throughout Minnesota, often sending volunteers with clipboards and voter registration forms to high schools, colleges, and other community gathering places. We are also the primary organization working to register new American citizens to vote at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota. In a typical year, LWVMN registers thousands of new voters, including roughly 6,500-9,000 new citizens at their naturalization ceremonies. These numbers are consistently higher in presidential election years than in other years. In 2016, for example, LWVMN registered over 11,000 new voters, including approximately 7,929 new citizens. Additionally, we organize nonpartisan candidate forums to help inform the electorate where candidates stand on important issues. We also provide significant voter education to explain how voters can be engaged in the democratic process; for example, LWVMN and its local Leagues hosted multiple events to help voters understand the presidential nomination primary that was new
3

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to Minnesota voters this year. We also have provided training on how voters can participate in caucuses and how to request absentee ballots. 16. Second: We work extensively on civic education. This includes organizing issue and education forum events in partnership with Local Leagues; publishing studies on the democratic process in Minnesota; and running a Youth Civic Engagement program, in which young Minnesotans partner with Local Leagues to promote democratic participation. 17. Third: We engage in state and local advocacy, focusing primarily on our core issue area— the democratic system, including voting rights, redistricting, and money in politics. We formulate policy positions through consensus after extensive research, then advocate for these positions in the Minnesota State Legislature with help from our volunteers, who can sign up to observe the Legislature or join our lobbying efforts. 18. The need and demand for LWVMN’s core activities is even greater in 2020 than in a typical year. Voter turnout and overall interest in politics generally increase in presidential election years, increasing demand for our voter engagement work, especially our voter registration services. In addition to being a presidential election year, 2020 is a decennial census year. Because an accurate census is crucial for a fair democracy, LWVMN is actively working to encourage Minnesotans to respond to the census this year, as we have done in prior census years. 19. The COVID-19 pandemic makes it significantly more difficult for LWVMN to keep up with this unusually busy year. Like all Americans, LWVMN’s members are adjusting to a new reality, where interacting with others is dangerous and gatherings of more than ten people are prohibited by the Governor of Minnesota. Many of our members are older adults, which makes them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 and gives them greater reason to avoid contact with others outside their households.
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20. With our members and other Minnesotans staying home as much as possible, we have been forced to rethink and redesign some of our core activities. For example, we can no longer send volunteers to community events to register new voters. In-person candidate and issue forums are similarly impossible at this time. 21. LWVMN’s office staff—together with our Board of Directors and leaders of our Local Leagues—has been spending significant time and energy planning and starting to implement new strategies to continue our traditional work during the pandemic. For example, we are brainstorming ways to adjust our work to do voter registration and outreach while complying with social distancing practices. We are also working through the technical challenges involved in holding virtual forum events that are accessible to our members, many of whom have little experience with videoconference technology. 22. On top of everything else, it has recently become clear that LWVMN will need to take new and unprecedented steps to facilitate absentee voting, with a particular focus on educating voters about the witness requirement for absentee voting and helping them connect with witnesses as safely as possible. 23. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, LWVMN was aware that to vote by absentee ballot, a Minnesota voter needs the signature of a witness, who must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person who is eligible to administer oaths. We were also aware that this requirement created significant burdens for some Minnesota voters, especially those who live out of state and do not know any registered Minnesota voters in their area. I am familiar with this problem from personal experience. My two adult daughters live temporarily away from Minnesota, and both were unable to vote in Minnesota’s presidential primary in early March 2020 because they were unable to find a qualified witness. It is my understanding that other members of
5

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LWVMN temporarily out of state have also had trouble finding qualified witnesses for absentee voting in the past. 24. However, until recently, the witness requirement has not been a major focus of LWVMN’s programming. We have focused our limited resources on other aspects of voter engagement, mindful that most Minnesota voters usually vote in person. 25. This year will be different. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we expect to see an unprecedented surge in absentee voting throughout Minnesota in the August 2020 state primary and the November 2020 general election—possibly continuing into later elections, depending on how long the pandemic lasts. LWVMN will be encouraging our members to vote absentee if possible, and we expect that most of our members will do so. 26. With greatly increased demand for absentee ballots, LWVMN will have to increase its involvement in educating voters about absentee voting. I understand that my board president and a staff member recently participated in a conference call with leaders of several Local Leagues, who stressed that there is an urgent need for clear, consistent, and accurate messaging to voters on the absentee voting process. 27. If Minnesota had no witness requirement for absentee voting, our voter education efforts on absentee voting would be relatively simple and straightforward: we would focus on raising awareness of the fact that all registered Minnesota voters have the right to vote absentee. However, the witness requirement complicates things significantly. Voters need to be informed not only that absentee voting requires a witness, but that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to give oaths. We also have to explain that witnesses must see the blank ballot before voters can begin filling out their ballot, and that the signature envelope
6

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must be completed in a specific way. This is a complex and confusing message to communicate on a mass scale. 28. Additionally, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic further complicates our education efforts on absentee voting. During the duration of the pandemic, we are unable to recommend to our members and Minnesota voters generally that they vote via absentee ballot if doing so would require them to seek out a witness who lives outside their own household and thereby expose them to the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. 29. LWVMN is now developing a communications campaign to tackle the challenge of educating voters about the requirements for absentee voting, particularly the witness requirement. Our office staff is currently spending time and energy on developing strategies to educate the public about the witness requirement—time and energy that we would otherwise invest in adapting our core activities, such as voter registration drives and forum events, to the new COVID-19 reality. 30. Our office staff is also spending significant time and energy developing plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the pandemic. We are in the early stages of creating a program that would allow voters to request a witness and be connected with others who are eligible and willing to witness absentee ballots. 31. Developing this program is an expensive and time-consuming task. LWVMN has no existing technology or infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses, and no experience brokering these peer-to-peer connections. Even if we design a theoretically workable system, it will be challenging or impossible to find enough volunteers to serve as witnesses. Many of LWVMN’s members will not be willing to serve as witnesses because they understandably do not want to interact with people outside their households during the pandemic.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-22 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT 20

People Who Are at HigCheAr RSisEk fo0r:S2e0ve-rcevIl-ln0e1ss2|0C5DC-ECT-TNL Document 15-22 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 3 5/27/20, 7:17 PM
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness
COVID-19 is a new disease and there is limited information regarding risk factors for severe disease. Based on currently available information and clinical expertise, older adults and people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions might be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.
Based on what we know now, those at high-risk for severe illness from COVID-19 are:
People 65 years and older People who live in a nursing home or long-term care facility
People of all ages with underlying medical conditions, particularly if not well controlled, including:
People with chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma People who have serious heart conditions People who are immunocompromised
Many conditions can cause a person to be immunocompromised, including cancer treatment, smoking, bone marrow or organ transplantation, immune de!ciencies, poorly controlled HIV or AIDS, and prolonged use of corticosteroids and other immune weakening medications People with severe obesity (body mass index [BMI] of 40 or higher) People with diabetes People with chronic kidney disease undergoing dialysis People with liver disease

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html

Page 1 of 2

People Who Are at HigCheAr RSisEk fo0r:S2e0ve-rcevIl-ln0e1ss2|0C5DC-ECT-TNL Document 15-22 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 3 5/27/20, 7:17 PM

! Older Adults

# People with Asthma

" At Risk For Severe Illness

$ People with HIV

! People with Liver Disease

! People Who Are Immunocompromised

COVID-19: Are You at Higher Risk for Severe Illness?

Resources
ASL Video Series: COVID-19: Are You at Higher Risk for Severe Illness? Learn how you can help protect yourself if you are at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19 %
Page last reviewed: May 14, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html

Page 2 of 2

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EXHIBIT 21

COVID-19 in Racial anCd EAthSniEc M0in:o2ri0ty-Gcrvou-0ps1|2C0DC5-ECT-TNL Document 15-23 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 7 5/27/20, 7:18 PM

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups
The e!ects of COVID-19 on the health of racial and ethnic minority groups is still emerging; however, current data suggest a disproportionate burden of illness and death among racial and ethnic minority groups. A recent CDC MMWR report included race and ethnicity data from 580 patients hospitalized with lab-con"rmed COVID-19 found that 45% of individuals for whom race or ethnicity data was available were white, compared to 59% of individuals in the surrounding community. However, 33% of hospitalized patients were black compared to 18% in the community and 8% were Hispanic, compared to 14% in the community. These data suggest an overrepresentation of blacks among hospitalized patients. Among COVID-19 deaths for which race and ethnicity data were available, New York City ! " identi"ed death rates among Black/African American persons (92.3 deaths per 100,000 population) and Hispanic/Latino persons (74.3) that were substantially higher than that of white (45.2) or Asian (34.5) persons. Studies are underway to con"rm these data and understand and potentially reduce the impact of COVID-19 on the health of racial and ethnic minorities.

Factors that inﬂuence racial and ethnic minority group health

Where we live, learn, work, and play a!ects our health The conditions in which people live, learn, work, and play contribute to their health. These conditions, over time, lead to di!erent levels of health risks, needs, and outcomes among some people in certain racial and ethnic minority groups.
Health di!erences between racial and ethnic groups are often due to economic and social conditions that are more common among some racial and ethnic minorities than whites. In public health emergencies, these conditions can also isolate people from the resources they need to prepare for and respond to outbreaks.1,13, 14

Living conditions
For many people in racial and ethnic minority groups, living conditions may contribute to underlying health conditions and make it di#cult to follow steps to prevent getting sick with COVID-19 or to seek treatment if they do get sick.

Members of racial and ethnic minorities may be more likely to live in densely populated areas because of institutional racism in the form of residential housing segregation. People living in densely populated areas may "nd it more di#cult to practice prevention measures such as social distancing.
Research also suggests that racial residential segregation is a fundamental cause of health disparities. For example, racial residential segregation is linked with a variety of adverse health outcomes and underlying health conditions.2-5 These underlying conditions can also increase the likelihood of severe illness from COVID-19.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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Many members of racial and ethnic minorities live in neighborhoods that are further from grocery stores and medical facilities, making it more di#cult to receive care if sick and stock up on supplies that would allow them to stay home. Multi-generational households, which may be more common among some racial and ethnic minority families6, may "nd it di#cult to take precautions to protect older family members or isolate those who are sick, if space in the household is limited. Racial and ethnic minority groups are over-represented in jails, prisons, and detention centers, which have speci"c risks due to congregate living, shared food service, and more.
Work circumstances
The types of work and policies in the work environments where people in some racial and ethnic groups are overrepresented can also contribute to their risk for getting sick with COVID-19. Examples include:
Critical workers: The risk of infection may be greater for workers in essential industries who continue to work outside the home despite outbreaks in their communities, including some people who may need to continue working in these jobs because of their economic circumstances.
Nearly a quarter of employed Hispanic and Black or African American workers are employed in service industry jobs compared to 16% of non-Hispanic whites. Hispanic workers account for 17% of total employment but constitute 53% of agricultural workers; Black or African Americans make up 12% of all employed workers, but account for 30% of licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses.7 A lack of paid sick leave: Workers without paid sick leave might be more likely to continue to work even when they are sick for any reason. This can increase workers exposure to other workers who may have COVID-19, or, in turn, expose others them if they themselves have COVID-19. Hispanic workers have lower rates of access to paid leave than white non-Hispanic workers.8
Underlying health conditions and lower access to care
Existing health disparities, such as poorer underlying health and barriers to getting health care, might make members of many racial and ethnic minority groups especially vulnerable in public health emergencies like outbreaks of COVID-19.
Not having health insurance: Compared to whites, Hispanics are almost 3 times as likely to be uninsured, and African Americans are almost twice as likely to be uninsured.9 In all age groups, blacks were more likely than whites to report not being able to see a doctor in the past year because of cost.10 Inadequate access is also driven by a long-standing distrust of the health care system, language barriers, and "nancial implications associated with missing work to receive care. Serious underlying medical conditions: Compared to whites, black Americans experience higher death rates, and higher prevalence rates of chronic conditions.10 Stigma and systemic inequalities may undermine prevention e!orts, increase levels of chronic and toxic stress, and ultimately sustain health and health care disparities.
What can be done

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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History shows that severe illness and death rates tend to be higher for racial and ethnic minority groups during public health emergencies.12 Addressing the needs of vulnerable populations in emergencies includes improving day-to-day life and harnessing the strengths of these groups. Shared faith, family, and cultural institutions are common sources of social support. These institutions can empower and encourage individuals and communities to take actions to prevent the spread of COVID-19, care for those who become sick, and help community members cope with stress. For example, families, churches and other groups in a!ected populations can help their communities face an epidemic by consulting CDC guidance documents for their organization type.

The federal government is undertaking the following:
Collecting data to monitor and track disparities among racial and ethnic groups in the number of COVID-19 cases, complications, and deaths to share broadly and inform decisions on how to e!ectively address observed disparities. These data will be translated into information to improve the clinical management of patients, allocation of resources, and targeted public health information. Supporting partnerships between scienti"c researchers, professional organizations, community organizations, and community members to address their need for information to prevent COVID-19 in racial and ethnic minority communities.
Providing clinical guidance and guidance to support actions to slow the spread of COVID-19 in schools, workplaces and community settings, including those serving racial and ethnic minorities.

Public health professionals can do the following:
Ensure that communications about COVID-19 and its impact on di!erent population groups is frequent, clear, transparent, and credible.
Work with other sectors, such as faith and community education, business, transportation, and housing organizations, to share information and implement strategies to address social and economic barriers to implementing steps to slow the spread of COVID-19.
Link more people among racial and ethnic minority groups to healthcare services for serious underlying medical conditions — for example, services to help them obtain necessary medications, follow treatment plans, or get testing and treatment if they have COVID-19 symptoms. Provide information for healthcare professionals and health systems to understand cultural di!erences among patients and how patients interact with providers and the healthcare system. The National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health and Health Care " (The National CLAS Standards) aim to improve health care quality and advance health equity by establishing a framework for organizations to serve the nation’s increasingly diverse communities.
Use evidence-based strategies to reduce health disparities. Those most vulnerable before an emergency are also the most vulnerable during and after an emergency.

Community organizations can do the following:
Prepare community health workers in underserved racial and ethnic minority communities to educate and link people to free or low-cost services. Prioritize resources for clinics, private practices, and other organizations that serve minority populations. Leverage e!ective health promotion programs in community, work, school, and home settings to disseminate recommendations and information about COVID-19.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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Work across sectors to connect people with services, such as grocery delivery or temporary housing, that help them practice social distancing. Connect people to healthcare providers and resources to help them get medications they may need. To prevent the spread of COVID-19, promote precautions to protect individuals in your community, including the correct use of cloth face coverings and equip communities with supplies to make them. Help combat the spread of rumors and misinformation by providing credible information from o#cial sources.
Learn more about what community organizations can do.
Healthcare systems and healthcare providers can do the following:
Implement standardized protocols in accordance with CDC guidance and quality improvement initiatives, especially in facilities that serve large minority populations.
Identify and address implicit bias that could hinder patient-provider interactions and communication.11
Provide medical interpretation services for patients who need them. Work with communities and healthcare professional organizations to reduce cultural barriers to care. Connect patients with community resources that can help older adults and people with underlying conditions adhere to their care plans, including help getting extra supplies and medications they need and reminders for them to take their medicines. Learn about social and economic conditions " that may put some patients at higher risk for getting sick with COVID-19 than others — for example, conditions that make it harder for some people to take steps to prevent infection. Promote a trusting relationship by encouraging patients to call and ask questions.
What individuals can do
Follow CDC’s Guidance for seeking medical care if you think you have been exposed to COVID-19 and develop a fever, cough or di#culty breathing. Follow steps to prevent the spread of COVID-19 if you are sick. If you or someone you care for is at higher risk of getting very sick from COVID-19, take steps to protect them and you from getting sick. Take precautions to protect yourself, your community, and others. Cope with stress to make yourself, the people you care about, and your community stronger. Find ways to connect with your friends and family members and engage with your community while limiting faceto-face contact with others.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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References
1. Fothergill A, Maestas EG, Darlington JD. Race, ethnicity and disasters in the United States: A review of the literature. Disasters. 1999; 23(2): 156-173.
2. Bravo MA, Anthopolos R, Kimbro RT, Miranda ML. Residential racial isolation and spatial patterning of type 2 diabetes mellitus in Durham, North Carolina. Am J Epidemiol 2018;187(7):1467–7.
3. Anthopolos R, James SA, Gelfand AE, Miranda ML. A spatial measure of neighborhood level racial isolation applied to low birthweight, preterm birth, and birthweight in North Carolina. Spat Spatio-Temporal Epidemiol 2011;2(4):235–46.
4. Hearst MO, Oakes JM, Johnson PJ. The e!ect of racial residential segregation on black infant mortality. Am J Epidemiol 2008;168(11):1247–54.
5. Jackson SA, Anderson RT, Johnson NJ, Sorlie PD. The relation of residential segregation to all-cause mortality: a study in black and white. Am J Public Health 2000;90(4):615–7.
6. Loftquist D. Multigenerational Households: 2009-2011. Current Population Reports, P60-267(RV), (Washington, DC) 2012.
7. Berchick ER, Barnett JC, Upton RD. Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018. Current Population Reports, P60-267(RV). U.S. Government Printing O#ce (Washington, DC) 2019.
8. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report 1082, Labor force characteristics by race and ethnicity, 2018. October 2019. https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm.
9. Bartel AP, Kim S, Nam J, Rossin-Slater M, Ruhm C, Waldfogel J. Racial and ethnic disparities in access to and use of paid family and medical leave: evidence from four nationally representative datasets, Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 2019. https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2019.2.
10. Cunningham, T. J., Croft, J. B., Liu, Y., Lu, H., Eke, P. I., & Giles, W. H. (2017). Vital signs: racial disparities in age-speci"c mortality among blacks or African Americans—United States, 1999–2015. MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report, 66(17), 444.
11. Hall, W. J., Chapman, M. V., Lee, K. M., Merino, Y. M., Thomas, T. , Payne, B. K., Eng, E., Day, S. H., & Coyne-Beasley, T. (2015). Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its In$uence on Health Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review. American journal of public health, 105(12), e60–e76. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2015.302903.
12. Dash N. Race and Ethnicity. In: Thomas DSK, Phillips BD, Lovekamp WE, Fothergill A. editors. Social Vulnerability to Disasters. 2nd edition. Boca Raton (FL): CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group. 2013. P. 113-128.
13. Thomas, D.S., Phillips, B.D., Lovekamp, W.E. and Fothergill, A., 2013. Social vulnerability to disasters. CRC Press. 14. Bolin, Bob, and Liza C. Kurtz. “Race, class, ethnicity, and disaster vulnerability.” Handbook of disaster research.
Springer, Cham, 2018. 181-203.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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More Information
Schools, Workplaces & Community Locations CDC’s O#ce of Minority Health and Health Equity Healthypeople.gov: Social Determinants of Health " Health System Transformation and Improvement Resources for Health Departments Strategies for Reducing Health Disparities
Page last reviewed: April 22, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-24 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 3
EXHIBIT 22

How Coronavirus SpreCadAs |SCEDC0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-24 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 3 5/27/20, 7:19 PM

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

How COVID-19 Spreads
COVID-19 is thought to spread mainly through close contact from person-to-person. Some people without symptoms may be able to spread the virus. We are still learning about how the virus spreads and the severity of illness it causes.
Person-to-person spread
The virus is thought to spread mainly from person-to-person.
Between people who are in close contact with one another (within about 6 feet). Through respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks. These droplets can land in the mouths or noses of people who are nearby or possibly be inhaled into the lungs. COVID-19 may be spread by people who are not showing symptoms.
The virus spreads easily between people
How easily a virus spreads from person-to-person can vary. Some viruses are highly contagious, like measles, while other viruses do not spread as easily. Another factor is whether the spread is sustained, which means it goes from person-toperson without stopping.
The virus that causes COVID-19 is spreading very easily and sustainably between people. Information from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic suggest that this virus is spreading more e!ciently than in"uenza, but not as e!ciently as measles, which is highly contagious.
The virus may be spread in other ways
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or possibly their eyes. This is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads, but we are still learning more about how this virus spreads.
Spread between animals and people
At this time, the risk of COVID-19 spreading from animals to people is considered to be low. Learn about COVID19 and pets and other animals. It appears that the virus that causes COVID-19 can spread from people to animals in some situations. CDC is aware of a small number of pets worldwide, including cats and dogs, reported to be infected with the virus that

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html

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How Coronavirus SpreCadAs |SCEDC0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-24 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 3 5/27/20, 7:19 PM
causes COVID-19, mostly after close contact with people with COVID-19. Learn what you should do if you have pets.
Protect yourself and others
The best way to prevent illness is to avoid being exposed to this virus. You can take steps to slow the spread. Maintain good social distance (about 6 feet). This is very important in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Wash your hands often with soap and water. If soap and water are not available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol. Routinely clean and disinfect frequently touched surfaces.
Learn more about what you can do to protect yourself and others.
More Information
ASL Video Series: How does COVID-19 Spread?
Page last reviewed: May 22, 2020 Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of Viral Diseases

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-25 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 23

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-25 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 4
CPS Data Collected in Year: 2018 Persons - All

(Numbers in Thousands)

State: MN
Totals Age 00 to 17 18 to 64 65 to 80+

Totals 5,622

1 1,126

Family Size
9 or 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 More 1,375 868 1,079 659 392 51 57 14

1,305

4 91 221 415 317 178 33 35 10

3,417 793 805 589 649 325 214 18 20

4

900 329 480 58 15 16 . . 2

.

Inferences should be made with extreme caution when the cell sizes are small. To examine cell sizes, select "Display Unweighted Record Counts" Some CPS questions, such as income, ask about the previous year. Others, such as age, refer to the time of the survey. The column labels indicate Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2018 Source: U.S. Census Bureau

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-25 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 4
ord Counts" under the Statistics Option. bels indicate any subject with a reference year which differs from the survey year.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 7
EXHIBIT 24

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

DECLARATION OF CALEB JACKSON Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare as follows:
1. I am an attorney at the Campaign Legal Center (CLC), counsel to Plaintiffs in this action. I am over age 18 and competent to make this declaration. The facts set forth in this Declaration are based on my personal knowledge. I would testify to these facts in open court if called upon to do so. This Declaration is submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
2. News21 maintains an online database of cases of alleged election fraud from 2000 through 2012 at https://www.votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/. During the week of May 25, 2020, I queried this database for information about alleged absentee ballot fraud in Minnesota. On May 28, 2020, my colleague Jeffrey Zalesin at CLC queried this database for information about alleged absentee ballot fraud nationally. True and correct copies of web pages reflecting the results of both queries are attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
3. In September 2013, the Election Assistance Commission published the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey. During the week of May 25, 2020, I accessed this document
1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 7
at https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2012ElectionAdministrationandVoterSurv ey.pdf. A true and correct copy of the 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey is attached as Exhibit 2 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
4. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains a webpage with statistics on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases and deaths in the United States, updated daily. On May 28, 2020, Mr. Zalesin accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 28, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
5. The State of Minnesota maintains a webpage with regularly updated statistics on COVID19 cases and deaths in Minnesota. On May 28, 2020, Mr. Zalesin accessed this webpage at https://mn.gov/covid19/data/covid-dashboard/index.jsp. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 28, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 5 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
6. On March 21, 2020, the Mayo Clinic published a statement about its updated visitor policy on its website. On March 27, 2020, I accessed this statement at https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/updated-visitor-policy-mayo-clinic-limitsnumber-of-visitors-during-covid-19-response/. A true and correct copy of the March 21 statement is attached as Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
7. On April 14, 2020, the New England Journal of Medicine published an article titled “Not Dying Alone — Modern Compassionate Care in the Covid-19 Pandemic” on its website. On March 27, 2020, I accessed this article at https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2007781. A true
2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 7
and correct copy of this article is attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
8. The CDC maintains a webpage with information about social distancing. During the week of May 25, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/social-distancing.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared at that time, is attached as Exhibit 8 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
9. On April 30, 2020, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued Emergency Executive Order 2048, titled “Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation, and Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces.” During the week of May 25, 2020, I accessed a copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-48 at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-48.pdf. A true and correct copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-48 is attached as Exhibit 9 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
10. On May 13, 2020, Governor Walz issued Emergency Executive Order 20-56, titled “Safely Reopening Minnesota’s Economy and Ensuring Safe Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency.” During the week of May 25, 2020, I accessed a copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-56 at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-56.pdf. A true and correct copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-56 is attached as Exhibit 10 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
11. On May 15, 2020, the Wisconsin Elections Commission published its April 7, 2020 Absentee Voting Report. During the week of May 25, 2020, I accessed this report at https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-
3

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 7

05/April%202020%20Absentee%20Voting%20Report.pdf. A true and correct copy of this report

is attached as Exhibit 11 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

12. On May 16, 2020, the Wisconsin State Journal published an article on its website titled “71

people who went to the polls on April 7 got COVID-19; tie to election uncertain.” During the week

of May 25, 2020, I accessed this article at https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/71-

people-who-went-to-the-polls-on-april-7-got-covid-19-tie-to/article_ef5ab183-8e29-579a-a52b-

1de069c320c7.html. A true and correct copy of this article is attached as Exhibit 12 to Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

13. On May 5, 2020, the Milwaukee County COVID-19 Epidemiology Intel Team released an

updated version of a report titled “Descriptive Analysis of COVID-19 Infections in Milwaukee

County after the Wisconsin Election and Easter/Passover Holidays.” During the week of May 25,

2020,

I

accessed

this

report

at

https://www.wuwm.com/sites/wuwm/files/202005/milwaukee_county_covid-

19_election_report_-_final_v3.pdf. A true and correct copy of this report is attached as Exhibit 13

to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

14. In May 2020, a working paper titled “The Relationship between In-Person Voting,

Consolidated Polling Locations, and Absentee Voting on Covid-19: Evidence from the Wisconsin

Primary” was posted on the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research. During the

week of May 25, 2020, I accessed this working paper at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187.pdf.

A true and correct copy of this working paper is attached as Exhibit 14 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction.

15. The CDC maintains a webpage titled “Recommendations for Election Polling Locations.”

On May 27, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

4

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 6 of 7
ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 27, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 15 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
16. On May 13, 2020, the office of Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon published a statement titled “Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections” online. On May 27, 2020, I accessed this statement at https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-theoffice/news-room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/. A true and correct copy of this statement is attached as Exhibit 16 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
17. The office of Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon maintains an elections calendar webpage. On May 27, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.sos.state.mn.us/electionadministration-campaigns/elections-calendar/. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 27, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 17 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
18. The CDC maintains a webpage titled “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness.” On May 27, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 27, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 20 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
19. The CDC maintains a webpage titled “COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups.” On May 27, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/needextra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it
5

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 15-26 Filed 05/29/20 Page 7 of 7
appeared on May 27, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 21 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
20. The CDC maintains a webpage titled “How COVID-19 Spreads.” On May 27, 2020, I accessed this webpage at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/howcovid-spreads.html. A true and correct copy of this webpage, as it appeared on May 27, 2020, is attached as Exhibit 22 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
21. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS) and makes data from the CPS available online through the CPS Table Creator at https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html. On May 4, 2020, Mr. Zalesin used the CPS Table Creator to create and download a table containing statistics on the 2018 CPS sample of Minnesota residents by age group and family size. Mr. Zalesin used this table to calculate that, based on 2018 CPS data, approximately 26 percent of Minnesota residents over age 18 lived alone. A true and correct copy of the table created with the CPS Table Creator is attached as Exhibit 23 to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed on May 28, 2020 at Washington, District of Columbia. /s/ Caleb Jackson Caleb Jackson
6

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 24 Filed 06/16/20 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
STIPULATION AND PARTIAL CONSENT JUDGMENT AND DECREE

1. Whereas, on March 13, 2020, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued Executive Order 20-01 in which he declared a peacetime emergency in Minnesota because the COVID-19 pandemic threatens the lives of Minnesotans. Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-01.
2. Whereas, on May 13, 2020, Governor Walz issued another Executive Order prohibiting gatherings of more than ten people, requiring public accommodations including restaurants and bars to stay closed, requiring workers to work from home if possible, mandating social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and stating that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 2056.
3. Whereas, on June 5, 2020, Governor Walz issued another Executive Order recognizing that the “COVID-19 pandemic continues to present an unprecedented and rapidly evolving challenge to our State,” prohibiting all indoor social gatherings of more than 10 people and outdoor social gatherings of more than 25 people, mandating social distancing protocols in workplaces that open, and stating that “[a]ll persons currently living within the State of

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Minnesota who are at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 . . . are strongly urged to stay at home or in their place of residence.” Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-74.
4. Whereas COVID-19 positive cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19 in Minnesota continue to rise at a rapid rate. See Minnesota Department of Health, Situation Update for COVID-19, https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#dailyc1.
5. Whereas, on May 28, 2020, State health commissioner Jan Malcolm warned that although Governor Walz’s stay-at-home order slowed the growth of the pandemic in Minnesota, the State’s peak may still be yet to come. Jeremy Olson, STAR TRIBUNE, Minnesota's streak of declining daily COVID-19 case counts ends, https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-virusdeaths-up-29-cases-up-590/570867092/ (May 29, 2020).
6. Whereas, the Minnesota Department of Health continues to advise all Minnesotans to “stay at home as much as possible,” and “stay at least 6 feet apart.” Minnesota Department of Health, Protect Yourself & Others: COVID-19, https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/prevention.html (last visited May 30, 2020).
7. Whereas, on May 19, 2020, Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill filed a complaint against Defendant Steve Simon challenging the state’s witness requirement for absentee voting. Among other relief requested, the Complaint sought to enjoin enforcement of any statute or regulation that directly or indirectly requires any voter to obtain a witness signature in order cast an absentee ballot or mail ballot, and have such ballot counted, in any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, including all elections conducted during 2020. ECF No. 1 at 28.
8. Whereas on May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting, inter alia, that this Court prohibit Defendant Simon from enforcing any provision of
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law—including Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—insofar as such provisions would require voters casting absentee or mail ballots to obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness for any election held in calendar year 2020. ECF. No. 13 at 1.
9. Whereas federal guidelines state that in order to practice social distancing people should keep space between themselves and people outside of their home by staying “at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people.” Social Distancing, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html. And whereas the CDC currently suggests that election officials “encourage voters to use voting methods that minimize direct contact with other people,” “encourage mail-in methods of voting,” and “consider additional social distancing and other measures to protect these individuals during voting.” Ctrs. for Disease and Control, Recommendations for Election Polling Locations, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html (last updated March 27, 2020).
10. Whereas on May 13, 2020, Defendant Simon released a statement which read in part: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.” Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections, OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE (May 13, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-theoffice/news-room/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/.
11. Whereas, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 203B.081 Subd. 1, primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota
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House of Representatives, among others, will be held on August 11, 2020 with early and absentee voting beginning on June 26, 2020 (the “August Primary”).
12. Whereas Plaintiffs are required to closely interact with individuals who do not live in their households in order to cast their ballots in the August Primary in violation of the CDC and the State’s own social distancing guidelines, Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, the “Parties”) agree that that an expeditious resolution of this matter for the August Primary, in the manner encompassed by the terms of this Consent Decree, is in the best interests of the health, safety, and constitutional rights of the citizens of Minnesota, and therefore in the public interest.
13. Whereas, on April 28, 2020, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services reported that 52 people who voted in person or worked the polls for Wisconsin’s April 7, 2020 primary election have tested positive for COVID-19 thus far.
14. Whereas federal courts in other states have enjoined those states from enforcing witness requirements, similar to Minnesota’s witness requirement, for primary elections this spring. See Thomas v. Andino, -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2020 WL 2617329 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of Elections, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020).
15. Whereas Defendant Simon agrees not to enforce the witness requirement for the August Primary for absentee voters who fear that complying with the requirement will risk their health and safety and possibly expose them to COVID-19.
16. Whereas Plaintiffs agree to withdraw their May 19, 2020, motion for preliminary injunction upon entry of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree.
17. Whereas, the Parties agree that entry of this Consent Decree does not affect the viability of Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection claims with respect
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to enforcement of the witness requirement in any subsequent elections after the August Primary, nor does it affect the Plaintiffs’ right to seek preliminary and temporary relief with respect to enforcement of the witness requirement in any subsequent elections after the August Primary. The Parties also agree that Defendant is not waiving any defenses regarding the enforcement of the witness requirement for any election other than the August Primary, any defenses based on events that occur after the execution of this Partial Consent Decree, or any defenses unrelated to the allegations filed by Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
18. Whereas the terms of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree were negotiated at arm’s length through counsel for the parties.
19. Whereas the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Consent Parties and that the Partial Consent Judgment and Decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable because such agreement preserves the constitutional right to vote of Plaintiffs and other Minnesota voters while promoting public health during a pandemic and does so without harming the integrity of Minnesota’s elections. The Court gives appropriate weight to Defendant’s expertise and public interest responsibility in the area of election administration.
20. Whereas Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim, as shown in their complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, to further support the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of this Partial Consent Judgment and Decree.
21. Whereas the Parties shall each bear their own fees, expenses, and costs incurred as of the date of this Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims raised as to the August Primary against Defendant. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE IN PARAGRAPHS 1-17 THAT:
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1. For the Primary elections scheduled August 11, 2020, Defendant shall not enforce the requirement—as stated in Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and their implementing regulations—that previously registered voters casting absentee or mail ballots must obtain the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness.
2. Defendant shall issue guidance instructing all relevant local election officials and ballot boards that, for the August Primary, no absentee ballot or mail ballot cast by a previously registered voter may be rejected for failure to include the signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness.
3. Defendant shall issue guidance instructing all relevant local election officials to modify, amend, or print the instructions accompanying each absentee ballot to inform voters that any absentee ballot cast by a previously registered voter in the August Primary without a witness signature will not be rejected on that basis and that the witness signature line and associated language for witnesses to certify a previously registered voter’s ballot, Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (1) and (2), be removed from the certification of eligibility altogether for absentee ballot materials sent to previously registered voters. To the extent voting materials are already printed, the guidance shall instruct the local election officials to include, in all future mailings of ballots, a notice informing the voter of the change in the witness requirement.
4. Defendant shall take additional reasonable steps to inform the public that the witness requirement will not be enforced for the August primary. This shall include a notice prominently placed on Defendant’s website.
5. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby withdrawn, without prejudice.
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June 16, 2020

Steve Simon Secretary of State

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 26 Filed 06/16/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,

File No. 20-cv-1205 (ECT/TNL)

Plaintiffs, v.

ORDER

Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

Defendant. ________________________________________________________________________
The Parties have filed a stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and

decree. ECF No. 24. “Approval of a consent decree requires careful court scrutiny.”

Ibarra v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n, 823 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1987). “Even though the

[proposed] decree is predicated on consent of the parties,” United States v. City of Miami,

664 F.2d 435, 440–41 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J., concurring), a district court may not

“mechanistically ‘rubber stamp’ the consent decree,” but rather must “consider the

underlying facts and legal arguments” that support or undermine the proposal, United

States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002). The consent decree

must be found to “spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction, . . . come within the general scope of the case made by the

pleadings, . . . and must further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was

based.” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525

(1986) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). Furthermore, the proposed

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 26 Filed 06/16/20 Page 2 of 2

decree must be “examine[d] carefully to ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement but also that it does not put the court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence.” City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441; see also, e.g., Illinois v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2019); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581–82 (9th Cir. 1990) Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983). “If the decree also affects third parties, the court must be satisfied that the effect on them is neither unreasonable nor proscribed.” City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Bass v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 698 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, a fairness hearing regarding the stipulation and proposed partial consent judgment and decree will be held on Thursday, June 18, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. by videoconference. Instructions for joining the videoconference will be sent to counsel separately.
SO ORDERED.

Date: June 16, 2020

s/ Eric C. Tostrud Eric C. Tostrud United States District Court

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 29 Filed 06/18/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

v.

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant. EMERGENCY MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING Movants—Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota—respectfully ask this Court to continue the fairness hearing scheduled for today. Movants strongly object to the parties’ proposed consent decree, which would rewrite Minnesota election law shortly before the election and significantly injure Movants. A brief continuance will allow Movants to intervene in this case and to participate at the fairness hearing. For the reasons outlined in the attached memorandum, Movants have “good cause” for a continuance. LR 6.1(a). Movants respectfully request a ruling on this motion before 11:00 A.M. today, Thursday, June 18, 2020, when the hearing is scheduled to begin. See Doc. 26.

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Dated: June 18, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Richard G. Morgan Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com
Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice forthcoming) Jeffrey M. Harris (pro hac vice forthcoming) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice forthcoming) CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 tom@consovoymccarthy.com jeff@consovoymccarthy.com cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Counsel for Movants

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 30 Filed 06/18/20 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

v.

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING Movants—Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota—respectfully ask this Court to
continue the fairness hearing scheduled for today. Movants strongly object to the parties’ proposed consent decree, which would rewrite Minnesota election law shortly before the next election and significantly injure Movants. A brief continuance would allow Movants to intervene in this case and participate at the fairness hearing. As
explained in more detail below, Movants have “good cause” for a continuance. LR 6.1(a). Movants respectfully request a ruling on their motion before 11:00 A.M. today, Thursday, June 18, 2020.
1. Plaintiffs filed their complaint less than a month ago. Doc. 1. Their
complaint alleges that, due to COVID-19, two Minnesota elections laws are now

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unconstitutional: the law requiring absentee voters to have someone witness their ballot, Minn. Stat. §203B.07, and the law specifying who can serve as a witness, §204B.45. Plaintiffs want these laws enjoined for the August primary election and the November general election. See Doc. 1 at 23-25.
2. Dozens of similar lawsuits have been filed by the Democratic Party and other groups across the country, all alleging that COVID-19 has made otherwise valid election laws unconstitutional. When Republican Party organizations have moved to intervene in these cases, the courts have granted intervention. See, e.g., Nielsen v. DeSantis, Doc. 101, No. 4:20-cv-236-RH (N.D. Fla. May 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican National Committee, NRCC, and Republican Party of Florida); Priorities USA v. Nessel, 2020 WL 2615504, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Michigan); Thomas v. Andino, 2020 WL 2306615, at *4 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020) (granting intervention to the South Carolina Republican Party); Corona v. Cegavske, Order Granting Mot. to Intervene, No. CV 20OC-644-1B (Nev. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Nevada Republican Party); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, Doc. 57, No. 6:20-cv-24-NKM (W.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican Party of Virginia); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1505640, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Wisconsin); Gear v. Knudson, Doc. 58, No. 3:20-cv-278 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31,
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2020) (same); Lewis v. Knudson, Doc. 63, No. 3:20-cv-284 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020) (same).
3. Some of these lawsuits were filed against Democratic officials, who declined to defend their laws. But when courts have reached the merits of these cases, they usually reject them.
4. In Wisconsin, for example, the Democratic Party challenged a witness requirement similar to Minnesota’s. The Republican Party successfully intervened. Over the course of the litigation, Wisconsin’s Democratic attorney general withdrew from the case, Wisconsin’s Democratic governor tried to moot the case, and Wisconsin’s election officials refused to defend the challenged laws. The district court enjoined the witness requirement, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020), but the Seventh Circuit stayed its decision. States maintain their “substantial interest in combatting voter fraud” during a pandemic, the Seventh Circuit explained, and so the plaintiffs were unlikely to show that witness requirements are now unconstitutional. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 30, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
5. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also stayed district-court decisions enjoining election laws in light of COVID-19. See Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020); Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 2020 WL 2982937 (5th Cir. June 4, 2020). And the Eighth Circuit administratively stayed a district-court decision that enjoined a witness requirement in light of COVID-19. See Miller v. Thurston, Text Order, No. 20-
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2095 (8th Cir. June 15, 2020). The Eighth Circuit expedited briefing in that case so the Court can issue a decision before August. Id.
6. In this case, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on May 29. See Doc. 13. Defendant filed an answer on June 9, denying all of Plaintiffs’ substantive claims and stating that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim.” Doc. 22 at 33-40.
7. Nevertheless, on June 16, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree. In it, Defendant agrees not to enforce the witness requirement in the August primary. Doc. 24 at 6. The decree represents that Plaintiffs made a “sufficiently strong showing on the merits,” Doc. 24 at 5, and cites two district-court decisions—one that contains little reasoning and was never appealed, and one that involved only a consent decree. Doc. 24 at 4 (citing Thomas v. Andino, 2020 WL 2617329 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020)). No mention is made of the many cases denying this kind of relief.
8. This Court scheduled a fairness hearing for 11 A.M. this morning. In its order, the Court stressed that it will not approve the consent decree unless “‘the underlying facts and legal arguments’” support it, the decree “‘further[s] the objectives of the law,’” and the decree does not unreasonably “‘affect[] third parties.’” Doc. 26 at 1-2. Plaintiffs and Defendant, of course, are not adverse on these questions.
9. After learning of these developments, Movants worked diligently to secure counsel. Once counsel was secured, Movants drafted and filed this motion as quickly as they could.
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10. Movants will soon file a motion to intervene in this case, which should be granted. Intervention is necessary to protect Movants’ candidates, voters, and resources from the parties’ last-minute attempt to fundamentally alter Minnesota election law. Movants’ intervention is also necessary to give the Court their views on the important questions surrounding the proposed consent decree—likely the only adversarial argument that this Court will hear.
11. Movants thus ask this Court for a brief continuance of today’s hearing. Without a continuance, Movants cannot intervene, participate in the fairness hearing, and potentially appeal. The consent decree will irreparably harm Movants’ interests in the August primary, and will be entered without the benefit of Movants’ views.
12. A short continuance will not prejudice the parties. Movants’ intervention motion can be filed, briefed, and decided on a highly expedited basis. And while the August election is approaching, a slight delay should make little difference to the parties. If the consent decree is issued a week or two later, the parties would still have plenty of time to “not enforce” the witness requirement, to “issue guidance,” to mail “a notice,” and to “inform the public.” Doc. 24 at 6.
For all these reasons, Movants respectfully ask this Court to continue the fairness hearing for a short time so that Movants have a chance to participate.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 30 Filed 06/18/20 Page 6 of 6

Dated: June 18, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Richard G. Morgan Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com
Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice forthcoming) Jeffrey M. Harris (pro hac vice forthcoming) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice forthcoming) CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 tom@consovoymccarthy.com jeff@consovoymccarthy.com cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Counsel for Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota

6

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS BY DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA
Movants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National

Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, seek to intervene as defendants in

this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and (b). This motion is

accompanied by a memorandum of law that explains why Movants are entitled to

intervention as of right and permissive intervention. For the reasons in that

memorandum, Movants respectfully ask this Court to grant their motion.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 2

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.
[PROPOSED] ANSWER BY [PROPOSED] INTERVENORDEFENDANTS DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC.,
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA
Proposed Intervenor Defendants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the

Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, submit this

proposed answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1).

INTRODUCTION 1. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota is a State with

high voter turnout and provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters while

taking steps to protect against fraud and maintaining public trust in the system.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 13
2. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 poses a serious health risk to some people but deny that it justifies departures from Minnesota laws that protect election integrity.
3. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota law requires voters to have their ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths.
4. Denied. Although COVID-19 poses a serious health risk to some people, the witnessing requirement does not require any unsafe or unreasonable actions by voters.
5. This paragraph consists of legal conclusions to which no response is required.
6. Denied. Minnesota’s witnessing requirement protects the integrity of elections and fosters public trust.
7. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Plaintiffs seek the requested relief but deny that they are entitled to it.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. 10. Admitted. 11. Admitted.
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 3 of 13
PARTIES Plaintiffs
12. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
13. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
14. Admitted. FACTS
Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota, Especially During the COVID-19 Pandemic
15. The referenced authorities speak for themselves. 16. The referenced authorities speak for themselves. 17. Admitted. 18. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that some voters may choose to vote absentee because of concerns related to COVID-19, but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph. 19. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 can be transmitted, but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph. 20. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that COVID-19 causes severe illness in some people. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 37-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 4 of 13
Intervenor-Defendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
21. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
22. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
23. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
24. Proposed Intervenor-Defendant admit there is no vaccine available today for COVID-19 but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
25. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph.
26. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
27. The cited orders speak for themselves. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants note that Minnesota is now in Phase III of its reopening plan, meaning the State deems it safe to visit (with social-distancing practices) retail stores, gyms, daycares, schools, churches, restaurants, bars, and other venues, and to attend outdoor gatherings of 25 people or less and indoor gatherings of 10 people or less.
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28. Denied. 29. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants admit that Wisconsin conducted an election on April 9 but deny that it demonstrates that voting—including witness-signature requirements—cannot be conducted in a reasonable and safe manner. 30. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants admit that absentee voting is available in Minnesota. 31. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 32. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
33. The cited authorities speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise deny this allegation.
34. Denied. 35. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 36. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 37. Admitted. 38. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 39. The cited authorities speak for themselves.
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40. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 41. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 42. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 43. Admitted. 44. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 45. Admitted. 46. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 47. The cited authority speaks for itself. 48. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that a voter and witness cannot safely complete the absentee ballot procedure while observing social distancing. 49. Denied. 50. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 51. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 52. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 53. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 54. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
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55. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
56. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
57. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
58. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
59. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
60. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
61. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud 62. Denied. 63. Denied. There are multiple and recent examples of criminal cases charging individuals with absentee ballot fraud in Minnesota.
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64. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants deny that the States lack any interest in maintaining ballot integrity but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
65. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that voting requirements vary from State to State but deny that the States lack any interest in maintaining ballot integrity. The cited documents speak for themselves. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
66. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota law provides other measures of ballot integrity but deny any implication that the witness-signature requirement is unreasonable or unnecessary.
67. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 68. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 69. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 70. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that absentee ballots are reviewed by election officials when submitted but deny any implication that the witness-signature requirement is unreasonable or unnecessary. 71. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 72. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 73. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 74. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 75. The cited authorities speak for themselves.
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76. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 77. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 78. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 79. The cited authorities speak for themselves. 80. Denied.
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications for Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless 81. Denied. 82. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that voting laws vary from State to State but deny that Minnesota allows only registered voters to serve as witnesses; Minnesota law also permits absentee ballots to be witnessed by notaries or persons authorized to administer oaths. 83. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that in order to advance public trust and voter integrity, Minnesota has reasonably chosen to limit the categories of individuals who may serve as witnesses for absentee ballots but deny that this reflects a judgment of the general trustworthiness of other individuals. 84. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that notaries need not be U.S. citizens but otherwise deny the implication that Minnesota’s absentee ballot procedures are unreasonable. 85. The cited authorities speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise deny this allegation.
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86. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that “the ballot-verification process is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter” or that the ballot-witnessing requirement presents an unreasonable burden.
87. Denied. 88. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 89. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that the ballot-witnessing requirement presents an unreasonable burden but otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 90. The cited documents speak for themselves; Proposed IntervenorDefendants otherwise lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 91. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 92. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)
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93. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 92.
94. The cited authorities speak for themselves; this paragraph otherwise sets forth a legal conclusion to which no response is required.
95. Denied. 96. Denied. 97. Denied.
Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 98. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 97. 99. Admitted. 100. Denied. 101. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants admit that Minnesota absentee-ballot voters must have their ballot witnessed by another registered voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths, but deny that this presents an unreasonable burden. 102. Denied. 103. Denied.
Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in
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Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
104. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants repeat and reallege their responses in paragraphs 1 through 103.
105. Proposed-Intervenor Defendants deny that Minnesota’s ballot-witnessing requirements unlawfully discriminate.
106. The cited authorities speak for themselves; this paragraph otherwise sets forth a legal conclusion to which no response is required.
107. Denied. 108. Denied. 109. Denied. 110. Denied. 111. Denied.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Proposed Intervenor-Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to their requested relief.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 1. The allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim for relief. 2. The allegations in the Complaint are unripe and too remote and speculative to support equitable relief. 3. The Counts are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of abstention.
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Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS BY DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA The Court should allow Movants, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the
Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota, to intervene
as defendants in this case. As the Democratic Party recently observed, “political parties
usually have good cause to intervene in disputes over election rules.” Issa v. Newsom,
Doc. 23 at 2, No. 2:20-cv-01044-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2020). That is why, in
the recent spate of litigation over COVID-19, the Democratic and Republican parties

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have been granted intervention every time they’ve moved for it.* This Court should do
the same here for two independent reasons.
First, Movants satisfy the criteria for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
Their motion is timely; the complaint was filed barely a month ago, this litigation is still
in its infancy, and no party will be prejudiced by intervention at this early stage. Movants
also have a clear interest in protecting their candidates, voters, and resources from the
parties’ last-minute attempt to fundamentally alter Minnesota election law. Finally, no
other party adequately represents Movants’ interests. The existing Defendants have
demonstrated an unwillingness to defend the law, as evidenced by the consent decree.
Movants’ intervention will provide the only adversarial testing of that decree—and likely
the rest of the case.
Second, and alternatively, the Court should grant Movants’ permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b). Again, this motion is timely. Movants’ defenses share
* See, e.g., Issa v. Newsom, 2020 WL 3074351, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (granting intervention to the DCCC and the Democratic Party of California); Nielsen v. DeSantis, Doc. 101, No. 4:20-cv-236-RH (N.D. Fla. May 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican National Committee, NRCC, and Republican Party of Florida); Priorities USA v. Nessel, 2020 WL 2615504, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Michigan); Thomas v. Andino, 2020 WL 2306615, at *4 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020) (granting intervention to the South Carolina Republican Party); Corona v. Cegavske, Order Granting Mot. to Intervene, No. CV 20-OC644-1B (Nev. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Nevada Republican Party); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, Doc. 57, No. 6:20-cv-24NKM (W.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2020) (granting intervention to the Republican Party of Virginia); Paher v. Cegavske, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (granting intervention to four Democratic Party entities); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1505640, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2020) (granting intervention to the RNC and Republican Party of Wisconsin); Gear v. Knudson, Doc. 58, No. 3:20-cv-278 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020) (same); Lewis v. Knudson, Doc. 63, No. 3:20-cv-284 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020) (same).
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common questions of law and fact with the existing parties, and intervention will result in no delay or prejudice. The Court’s resolution of the important questions here will have significant implications for Movants as they work to ensure that candidates and voters have the undeterred opportunity to participate in fair elections, both in the August primary and the November election.
Whether under Rule 24(a)(2) or (b), Movants should be allowed to intervene as defendants.
INTERESTS OF PROPOSED INTERVENORS Movants are a political campaign and political committees who support Republicans in Minnesota. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., is the principal committee for President Donald J. Trump’s reelection campaign. The Republican National Committee is a national committee as defined by 52 U.S.C. §30101. It manages the Republican Party’s business at the national level, supports Republican candidates for public office at all levels, coordinates fundraising and election strategy, and develops and promotes the national Republican platform. The Republican Party of Minnesota is a recognized political party that works to promote Republican values and to assist Republican candidates in obtaining election to partisan federal, state, and local office. All three Movants have interests—their own and those of their members—in the rules governing Minnesota elections.
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ARGUMENT I. Movants are entitled to intervene as of right.
Rule 24 is “liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor.” South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 24(a)(2), this Court must grant intervention as of right if:
1. The motion is timely; 2. Movants have a legally protected interest in this action; 3. This action may impair or impede that interest; and 4. No existing party adequately represents Movants’ interests. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2014). Movants satisfy each of these requirements. A. The motion is timely. The Court considers four factors in determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene: (1) the progress of the litigation at the time of the motion; (2) the prospective intervenor’s prior knowledge of the action; (3) the reason for any delay in seeking intervention; and (4) the likelihood of prejudice to the parties. United States v. Ritchie Special Credit Investments, Ltd., 620 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2010). These factors all favor Movants. Movants filed this motion early—only one month after the complaint was filed and a week after the answer. See e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012) (motion filed over one year after the answer was timely); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (D.S.D. 2011) (motion filed over one month after complaint was “early” and therefore timely); S.D. Farm Bureau,
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Inc. v. South Dakota, 189 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D.S.D. 1999) (motion filed three months after complaint was timely). This litigation has not substantially progressed—briefing on the preliminary-injunction stopped, the court has made no substantive rulings, and the parties proposed the consent decree only four days ago. See, e.g., Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. at 429 (motion filed after the court had ruled on a motion to dismiss was timely); Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 939 (motion filed after court had granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was timely); S.D. Farm Bureau, 189 F.R.D. at 563 (motion filed before any substantive briefing was timely). Movants entered this litigation by filing their emergency motion to continue immediately after learning of the consent decree and securing counsel, followed directly by this motion to intervene. See Taylor v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 251 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2001) (motion filed eleven days after proposed intervenors learned of an injunction was timely).
Nor will Movants’ intervention prejudice the parties. The parties’ proposed consent decree weighs in favor of granting intervention. “Prejudice that results from the mere fact that a proposed intervenor opposes one’s position and may be unwilling to settle always exists when a party with an adverse interest seeks intervention.” United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995). Yet that kind of “prejudice” does not factor into the analysis because “Rule 24(a) protects precisely this ability to intervene in litigation to protect one’s interests.” Id. Therefore, “the court [should] not consider any delay in entry of the Consent Decree because the intervenors oppose its entry as presenting any bar to intervention.” Id.; see also EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921
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F.2d 1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court’s denial of intervention because “the existence of the proposed consent decree resulted in a change in circumstances that made a renewed motion for intervention legitimate”).
If Movants are not allowed to intervene, however, their interests in this case will be irreparably harmed by the consent decree that suspends Minnesota law in the upcoming August primary. Their motion is thus timely.
B. Movants have protected interests in this action. Movants also have “a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” Nat’l Parks, 759 F.3d at 975. Movants’ interest is both “legally protectable” and “bound up with the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 839-40 (8th Cir. 2009). Movants’ interests in this action are, at a minimum, equal to Plaintiffs’. Like Plaintiffs, Movants work to “encourage[] informed and active participation in government, work[] to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influence[] public policy through education and advocacy.” Compl. 3. Like Plaintiffs, Movants “[have] numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote” and “[will have] to divert resources away from [their] core activities” if the consent decree is granted. Compl. 15. Like Plaintiffs, Movants “[have] a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot” with confidence and without confusion. Compl. 16. And like Plaintiffs, Movants “have a legitimate interest in
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preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections” by defending existing law, especially if Defendants will not do so. Compl. 16.
But even considered in isolation, Movants have “direct” and “significant” interests in the continued enforcement of state laws governing witness requirements, absentee ballots, and voter identification, as those laws are designed to serve “the integrity of [the] election process,” Eu v. San Fran. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989), and the “orderly administration” of elections, Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008) (op. of Stevens, J.). Federal courts “routinely” find that political parties have interests supporting intervention in litigation regarding elections and election procedures. Issa, 2020 WL 3074351, at *3. Indeed, given their inherent and broad-based interest in elections, usually “[n]o one disputes” that a political party “meet[s] the impaired interest requirement for intervention as of right.” Citizens United v. Gessler, 2014 WL 4549001, *2 (D. Col. Sept. 15, 2014). That is certainly true where, as here, “changes in voting procedures could affect candidates running as Republicans and voters who [are] members of the … Republican Party.” Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 2005 WL 8162665, *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005); see id. (under such circumstances, “there [was] no dispute that the Ohio Republican Party had an interest in the subject matter of this case”).
In short, because Movants’ candidates “actively seek [election or] reelection in contests governed by the challenged rules,” and because their members’ ability to participate in those elections is governed by the challenged rules, Movants have an
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interest in “demand[ing] adherence” to those requirements. Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
C. This action threatens to impair Movants’ interests. Movants are “so situated that disposing of [this] action may as a practical matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect [their] interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Movants “do not need to establish that their interests will be impaired,” “only that the disposition of the action ‘may’ impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2014). This language in Rule 24 is “obviously designed to liberalize the right to intervene in federal actions.” Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Here, the risks to Movants’ interests are plain. If this court enters the consent decree, then the rules surrounding absentee ballots will be upended just weeks before the August primary. And the consent decree—which would place this Court’s imprimatur on the notion that Plaintiffs’ claims have likely merit, see Doc. 24 at 4-5— will be used as a precedent to obtain the same relief for the November election. Movants’ interests will plainly “suffer if the Government were to lose this case, or to settle it against [Movants’] interests.” Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1996). Not only would it undercut democratically enacted laws that protect voters and candidates (including Movants’ members), it would change the “structur[e] of th[e] competitive environment” and “fundamentally alter the environment in which [Movants] defend their concrete interests (e.g. their interest in … winning [election or]
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reelection).” Shays, 414 F.3d at 85-86. These late changes also threaten to confuse voters and undermine confidence in the electoral process. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 45 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections … can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”). In addition to that independent harm, Movants will be forced to spend substantial resources informing Republican voters of changes in the law, fighting inevitable confusion, and galvanizing participation in the wake of the “consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Id.; accord Pavek v. Simon, 2020 WL 3183249, at *10 (D. Minn. June 15, 2020).
Moreover, “as a practical matter,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), “[s]uccess by [Plaintiffs] in the whole litigation would impair the proposed intervenors’ interests” and could prevent Movants from defending their rights at all. South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003). Even setting aside the long-term effects on the integrity of elections and public confidence in the electoral process, this proceeding might be the only time that Movants can litigate the consent decree. The primary is weeks away. See Compl. 2. In a very real sense, then, this Court’s decision could be the final word on the laws governing the next election. Because the “very purpose of intervention is to allow interested parties to air their views so that a court may consider them before making potentially adverse decisions,” Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 345 (emphasis added), the “best” course—and the one that Rule 24 “implements”—is to give “all parties with a real stake
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in a controversy … an opportunity to be heard” in this suit, Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
D. The parties do not adequately represent Movants’ interests. Finally, Movants “[are] not adequately represented by the existing parties.” Nat’l Parks, 759 F.3d at 975. Inadequacy is not a demanding showing. Movants need meet “only a ‘minimal burden of showing that [their] interests are not adequately represented by the parties.’” Barnett, 317 F.3d at 785. While that burden increases “when a party already in the suit has an obligation to represent the interests of the party seeking to intervene,” Movants can meet the burden by “showing that [their] interests actually differ from or conflict with the government’s interests.” Id. Where “the Government has waived and failed to enforce [the law],” it is clear that “the Government [is] not adequately representing the [Movants’] interests.” Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. Movants’ and Defendant’s interests have already diverged in this litigation. After initially opposing Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant now takes the position that the challenged laws are likely unconstitutional and has agreed to “not enforce … Minn. Stat. §203B.07, Minn. Stat. §204B.45, and their implementing regulations.” Consent Decree 6. Defendant adopted this position despite numerous arguments available in defense of the law, including those made by the Seventh Circuit when it stayed an injunction against a similar requirement. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 4-1 at 25, No. 20-1539 (7th Cir. April 3, 2020). Defendants also failed to invoke the Purcell principle, which easily forecloses Plaintiffs’ ability to get a preliminary injunction
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so close to the August primary. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020); e.g., Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (staying a lower-court order that changed election laws 61 days before election day).
Movants, by contrast, affirmatively seek to enforce the witness-signature requirement and prevent last-minute changes to Minnesota’s election law. It is therefore self-evident that “[Movants’] interests actually differ from or conflict with the government’s interests.” Barnett, 317 F.3d at 786. And Movants’ interests will continue to differ from Defendant’s as this litigation proceeds on the consent decree, the merits as applied to the November elections, and any appeals.
Movants occupy an adversarial position in this case that no existing party serves. Their “intervention [is] vital to the defense of the law[s] at issue” in this case. Miracle v. Hobbs, 333 F.R.D. 151, 155 (D. Ariz. 2019) (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 433 (2009)). Movants should thus be granted intervention as of right. II. Alternatively, Movants are entitled to permissive intervention.
Even if Movants were not entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), this Court should grant them permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Exercising broad judicial discretion, courts grant permissive intervention when the movant has “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The court also must consider “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
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The requirements of Rule 24(b) are met here. As explained, Movants filed a timely motion. Supra I.A. And Movants will raise defenses that share many common questions with the parties’ claims and defenses—including whether COVID-19 means that Minnesota’s well-established election laws now create an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. See Compl. 23-27. Plaintiffs allege that the challenged laws are unconstitutional. Compl. 27. Movants, on the other hand, directly reject those allegations, contending not only that Minnesota’s longstanding laws are constitutional, but also that Plaintiffs’ desired relief would undermine the interests of Movants and their members. “[T]he situations, interests, and even [some of] the claims of the plaintiff and applicants are virtually identical.” Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D. Minn. 1983); see also Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Minn. 2017) (recognizing that “permissive intervention was warranted where movant presented defenses that were ‘directly responsive’ to the plaintiff's claims” (quoting Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2002))); Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Chicago, 170 F.R.D. 435, 441 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (permissive intervention is appropriate where “applicants’ interest in the litigation is the mirror-image” of an original party’s interest).
Movants’ intervention will not unduly delay this litigation or prejudice anyone. Movants swiftly moved to intervene while the “case is in its earliest stages,” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268, and their participation will add no delay beyond the norm for multiparty litigation. After all, Plaintiffs put the constitutionality of the laws at issue
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and “can hardly be said to be prejudiced by having to prove a lawsuit [they] chose to initiate.” Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995). And even if Movants’ entry might “increase the burden on the original litigants … that alone is insufficient to warrant denial of the motion to intervene—the addition must be ‘unduly’ burdensome, not just burdensome.” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268. Movants commit to submitting all filings in accordance with whatever briefing schedule the Court imposes, “which is a promise” that undermines claims of undue delay. Emerson Hall Assocs., LP v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., 2016 WL 223794, *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2016).
Allowing Movants to intervene will promote consistency and fairness in the law, as well as efficiency in this case. It would allow “the Court … to profit from a diversity of viewpoints as they illuminate the ultimate questions posed by the parties,” Franconia Minerals, 319 F.R.D. at 268, thus preventing protracted piecemeal litigation and the possibility of conflicting legal decisions. Allowing intervention by political parties in a “time-sensitiv[e]” “election-related dispute” also preempts the delay that otherwise results from sorting out Movants’ rights on appeal. See Jacobson v. Detzner, 2018 WL 10509488 (N.D. Fla.) (“[D]enying [Republican Party organizations’] motion [to intervene] opens the door to delaying the adjudication of this case’s merits for months—if not longer”); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377 (1987) (“[W]hen an order prevents a putative intervenor from becoming a party in any respect, the order is subject to immediate review.”); McLean v. Arkansas, 663 F.2d 47,
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48 (8th Cir. 1981) (similar). Where a court has doubts, “the most prudent and efficient course of action” is to allow permissive intervention. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States, 2002 WL 32350046, *3 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 20, 2002).
CONCLUSION The Court should grant Movants’ motion and allow them to intervene as defendants.

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

LR 7.1(f) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I, Cameron T. Norris, certify that the document titled “Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendants by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota” complies with Local Rule 7.1(f). I further certify that, in preparation of the above document, I used Microsoft Word 2016 and that this word-processing program has been applied specifically to include all text, including headings, footnotes, and quotations, in the following word count. I further certify that the above document contains 3,350 words.

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 38-1 Filed 06/20/20 Page 2 of 2

Dated: June 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 41 Filed 06/20/20 Page 1 of 37

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA EDUCATION FUND and VIVIAN LATIMER TANNIEHILL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL

STEVE SIMON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,

DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA,
[Proposed] Intervenor-Defendants.

[PROPOSED] INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Background ................................................................................................................................1 Legal Standard............................................................................................................................6 Argument ....................................................................................................................................7
I. The consent decree should be rejected because Plaintiffs identified no probable violation of federal law...........................................................................7 A. Under the Purcell principle, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the August primary........................................9 B. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the November election. ............................. 12 C. Plaintiffs could not show that the challenged laws are unconstitutional......................................................................................... 14 i. The witness requirement doesn’t burden voting rights because there is no constitutional right to vote absentee. ...... 16 ii. Even if the witness requirement affected voting rights, it easily satisfies the Anderson-Burdick test...................................... 20
II. The consent decree should be rejected because it does not reflect arm’slength negotiations and gives a windfall to Plaintiffs. ..................................... 25
III. The consent decree should be rejected because it unreasonably injures other parties. .......................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 35
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Intervenors are “entitled to present evidence and have [their] objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree.” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). Proposed Intervenor-Defendants—Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota—thus submit this opposition “to air [their] objections to the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant evidence” and arguments that the parties won’t. Id. This Court should grant their motion to intervene and reject the parties’ proposed consent decree.
BACKGROUND COVID-19 has sparked an unprecedented number of lawsuits that attempt to invalidate or suspend routine election laws. 2020 Was Already Expected to Be a Record Year for Election-Related Lawsuits—Then Coronavirus Happened, Newsweek (Apr. 23, 2020), bit.ly/2zMKVOl. Democrats sought similar reforms long before COVID-19— expanded mail-in voting, no voter-ID requirements, unlimited ballot harvesting, and the like. But even in the wake of COVID-19, Democrats were unable to persuade Congress or the Minnesota Legislature to adopt their legislative agenda. A DFL Push to Move Minnesota to Entirely Vote-By-Mail Is Complicating Bipartisan Efforts Around Other COVID-Related Election Changes, Minn. Post (Apr. 27, 2020), bit.ly/3ekHNIr (DFL Push). So they turned to the courts.
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Democrats now contend that, in light of COVID-19, their legislative agenda is required by the Constitution. The Democratic Party (through its law firm, Perkins Coie) has filed COVID-19 lawsuits in virtually every swing State, including Minnesota. See Where We’re Litigating, Democracy Docket, bit.ly/2V0rF7k. Allied groups have bolstered the Democrats’ effort by filing dozens of copycat suits across the country. For example, the League of Women Voters brought this suit in federal court, while the Alliance for Retired Americans (backed by the Democratic Party) and the NAACP (backed by the ACLU) brought overlapping lawsuits in state court. See Trio of Lawsuits Challenge Minnesota Absentee Balloting Requirements Amid COVID-19, Minn. Post (June 12, 2020), bit.ly/3fGXwSt.
When these COVID-19 lawsuits face adversarial litigation, they usually fail. Wisconsin is the first and most prominent example. Three weeks before the April 7 primary, Democrats challenged several Wisconsin laws, including the requirement that voters obtain a witness’s signature for their absentee ballot—a voter-ID requirement that Wisconsin enacted to deter fraud and promote election integrity. Democrats argued that COVID-19 made this requirement too dangerous because, to find a witness, voters who lived alone “would have to interact with a non-household member to secure a signature, … placing their health in jeopardy.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 62 at 13, No. 3:20-cv-249-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2020); see also id. at 22 (“[The challenged laws] encourage determined registrants and voters to venture out into the world and interact face-to-face with people, … exposing
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Wisconsinites to an ailment that has already claimed thousands of lives internationally.”). The district court agreed, contending that the “hurdles” associated with finding a witness during COVID-19 “are not overcome by the state’s general anti-fraud goals.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020) (DNC I). It preliminarily enjoined the witness requirement for voters who certified that, despite reasonable efforts, they could not safely find a witness. See id.
The district court was swiftly reversed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stayed the part of the injunction that suspended the witness requirement. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 30, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020) (DNC II). The Seventh Circuit stressed that the district court gave short shrift to “the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” Id. at 3. On further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed more of the district court’s decision. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (RNC). The Court relied exclusively on “the Purcell principle”—the doctrine that courts in equity “should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Id. at 1207.
More recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also stayed district-court decisions enjoining election laws in light of COVID-19. See Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020); Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 2020 WL 2982937 (5th Cir. June 4, 2020). And the Eighth Circuit administratively stayed a district-court decision enjoining a witness requirement in light of COVID-19. See Miller v. Thurston, Text
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Order, No. 20-2095 (8th Cir. June 15, 2020). The Eleventh Circuit is likewise considering an emergency stay application in a similar case. See People First of Ala. v. Ala. Sec’y of State, No. 20-12184.1
Plaintiffs filed this action on May 19, 2020, seeking to enjoin Minnesota’s witness requirement, Minn. Stat. §§203B.07, 204B.45. Doc. 1 at 27-29. In their complaint, Plaintiffs acknowledged Minnesota’s “legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections.” Doc. 1 ¶62. Further, they acknowledged that the witness requirement is reasonable and lawful under normal circumstances, challenging it only as applied to elections conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Doc. 1 ¶¶95, 97.
On May 29, Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the witness requirement for both the August primary and the November general election. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs argued that the witness requirement, as applied to elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, violates the constitutional right to vote. Doc. 15. They sought sweeping injunctive relief that would require Defendant to do four things: (1) refrain from enforcing the witness requirement; (2) instruct local officials that no absentee ballot could be rejected for lack of compliance with the witness requirement; (3) take steps
1 Without the benefit of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ rulings, a district court in Virginia approved a consent decree similar to the one at issue here. League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020). As will become clear later, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants disagree with that decision. This Court should not repeat its many errors.
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to ensure that the instructions accompanying absentee ballots do not direct voters to comply with the witness requirement; and (4) inform the public that the witness requirement will not be enforced for the August primary and November general elections. Doc. 13 at 1-2.
Defendant filed an answer on June 9, 2020. Doc. 22. In it, he denied all Plaintiffs’ material allegations. Doc. 22 ¶¶7, 12, 62, 65, 80, 81, 87, 95, 100, 102, 109, 111. He also denied that heightened scrutiny applied to the witness requirement and argued that the requirement would survive any level of judicial scrutiny. Doc. 22 ¶¶106, 107. And he asserted that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Doc. 22 at 40.
At some point in the next seven days, Defendant made a sharp U-turn. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted a proposed consent decree to the Court. Under that decree, Defendant would totally refrain from enforcing the witness requirement and concede to all four kinds of relief that Plaintiffs sought for the August primary. Doc. 24 at 6.2 Further, Defendant would concede that “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim”—a position directly contrary to the one he took in his answer a week earlier. Doc. 24 ¶20. In return for his total capitulation to Plaintiffs’ demands, Defendant obtained little, if anything. Although the decree does
2 Given its general scope, the relief in the proposed consent decree resembles a successful facial challenge. While Plaintiffs have identified a temporal limitation on the scope of the proposed relief, limiting it to the August 2020 primary, they have not limited the relief to any particular voters or any clearly ascertainable class of voters.
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not address the November election, Defendant agreed to let Plaintiffs withdraw their preliminary-injunction motion “without prejudice” so they could refile it again for November. Doc. 24 at 6. In other words, Plaintiffs got everything and took nothing off the table.
Seeing that the proposed consent decree disserved Minnesotans, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants promptly moved to enter this case. Doc. 29. The Court reset the hearing on the proposed consent decree, and ordered Proposed IntervenorDefendants to file their intervention papers and their opposition to the consent decree by 5:00 p.m. today. Doc. 33. The fairness hearing on the proposed consent decree is set for Tuesday. Doc. 33.
LEGAL STANDARD Because a consent decree is a “judgment” of this Court, it cannot be entered without the Court’s “examin[ation]” and “approval.” Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). As this Court has explained, approving a consent decree “requires careful court scrutiny,” not a “mechanistic[] ‘rubber stamp.’” Doc. 26 at 1 (quoting Ibarra v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n, 823 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1987); and United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). After all, “a federal court is more than ‘a recorder of contracts’ from whom parties can purchase injunctions.” Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525. It is “‘an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions,’” and it cannot “lend the aid of the federal court to whatever strikes two parties’ fancy.” Id.; Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of
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Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987). Instead, every consent decree must be “examine[d] carefully” to ensure that its terms are “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring). The court also “must ensure that the agreement is not illegal, a product of collusion, or against the public interest.” United States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991).
ARGUMENT The parties’ proposed consent decree is neither fair nor reasonable nor legal. It suspends a perfectly constitutional law that Plaintiffs had no hope of enjoining. It appears to be, not an arm’s-length deal between adversaries, but a sweetheart deal that gives Plaintiffs everything and Minnesotans nothing. And it unreasonably injures the rights and interests of third parties, including Proposed Intervenor-Defendants and their members. This Court should reject it. I. The consent decree should be rejected because Plaintiffs identified no probable violation of federal law. When deciding whether to approve or reject the consent decree, this Court rightly acknowledged that it “must ‘consider the underlying facts and legal arguments’ that support or undermine the proposal.” Doc. 26 at 1 (quoting United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). While courts needn’t conduct a full-blown trial, they must “reach ‘an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated.’” Flinn, 528 F.2d at
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1173. This Court must determine Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits here for two reasons.
One, the proposed consent decree suspends Minnesota’s witness requirement—a duly enacted state law. See Doc. 24 at 6. “A consent decree is not a method by which state agencies may liberate themselves from the statutes enacted by the legislature that created them.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 341-42. A “consent judgment in which the executive branch of a state consents not to enforce a law is ‘void on its face,’” unless the approving court finds “a probable violation of [federal] law.” Id. at 342. A federal judge cannot “‘put the court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence.’” Doc. 26 at 1-2 (quoting City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441).
Two, the merits are “[t]he most important factor” in determining whether the consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, since these factors can be examined “‘only in light of the strength of the case presented by the plaintiffs.’” Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975). Courts can gauge “the fairness of a proposed compromise” by “weighing the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and form of the relief offered.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). A decree that takes plaintiffs with flimsy claims, gives them most of what they asked for, and gets nothing in return is not fair or reasonable.
Here, the proposed consent decree strikes the following deal: Minnesota will fully suspend its witness requirement for all voters in the August primary, issue
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guidance explaining this change to local election officials, and notify all voters of this change. Plaintiffs will withdraw their motion for a preliminary injunction (which asked the Court to suspend the witness requirement for both the August and November elections)—but without prejudice to their ability to bring a similar motion later. See Doc. 24 at 6. In other words, Plaintiffs got everything they wanted for the August primary and gave up nothing going forward. Quite obviously, that is not a good deal for Minnesotans. For several reasons—all of which have been accepted by the majority of courts to consider these COVID-19/election cases—Plaintiffs had virtually no chance of winning their preliminary-injunction motion or obtaining this kind of relief.
A. Under the Purcell principle, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the August primary.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 19, three months before the August 11 primary and two months before the commencement of absentee voting. Their preliminary-injunction motion would not have been heard until a month later. See Doc. 18 (setting the hearing for June 10). And now, voting is less than a week away, with early and absentee voting beginning on June 26. See Doc. 24 ¶11. If Defendant had contested Plaintiffs’ right to injunctive relief for the August primary, Defendant would have easily defeated it under the Purcell principle.
Under Purcell, “federal courts are not supposed to change state election rules as elections approach.” Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 2020). Invoking
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this strong principle of non-interference, the Supreme Court routinely stays lowercourt orders requiring States to change election laws shortly before elections. In other words, the Court “allow[s] the election to proceed without an injunction suspending [election] rules.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 6. This practice is longstanding. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1968) (denying relief because it would cause “serious disruption of [the] election process” and “confusion” for voters). And it has been invoked in several cases where the amount of time between the court’s order and key election deadlines resembles the timeline here. See, e.g., Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (staying a lower-court order that changed election laws 61 days before election day); Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813 (election day was “months away but important, interim deadlines … [we]re imminent”); Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 1090 (2011) (22 days before the candidate-registration deadline); Purcell, 549 U.S. at 45 (33 days before election day); North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014) (32 days before election day).
The Purcell principle ensures that voters, candidates, and political parties know and adhere to the same neutral rules throughout the election process. As Purcell explains, this stability and predictability promotes “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral process,” which “is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” 549 U.S. at 4. Conversely, courts risk “voter confusion” when they order late-breaking changes to election laws. Id. at 4-5. “As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Id. at 5. Voter confusion, in turn, causes a “consequent incentive to
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remain away from the polls.” Id. In other words, last-minute “interference by the judicial department with the electoral franchise of the people of this state … might well amount to a substantial destruction of that most important civil right.” Beebe v. Koontz, 302 P.2d 486, 490 (Nev. 1956).
Purcell doesn’t care if “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits.” Doc. 24 ¶20. The Purcell principle is a sufficient basis to deny injunctive relief— one that must be invoked even if Plaintiff’s claims are concededly meritorious. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5 (vacating a lower court’s injunction “[g]iven the imminence of the election” while “express[ing] no opinion here on the correct disposition” of the case); Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if the merits question were close, the district court did not abuse its discretion [by denying a preliminary injunction on Purcell grounds]”). “[T]iming … rather than the[] merits” is “the key” to Purcell. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 2014).
In Wisconsin, for example, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s coronavirus-inspired injunction based solely on Purcell, declining to “express[] an opinion” on the merits of the case. RNC, 140 S. Ct. at 1206-08. The Court rejected the Democrats’ argument that, because “‘the electoral status quo’ already has been upended … by the COVID-19 pandemic,” Purcell has no application in 2020. Resp’ts Br. 16, bit.ly/2AKc1Gt. Even in the face of COVID-19, then, Purcell applies with full force. See Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813.
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This Court—if given the chance—would have followed RNC and likely denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Whatever the merits of their claims, the Purcell principle would have prohibited the grant of any injunctive relief for the August primary.3
B. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiffs could not obtain a preliminary injunction for the November election.
Plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction that would last “for the duration of calendar year 2020.” Doc. 13 at 1. In other words, they wanted the witness requirement suspended for the November election as well. But this Court would not have granted relief for the November election in June. See People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 2020 WL 3207824, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 15, 2020) (holding, in a COVID-19/election case, that “it is premature for the court to consider a preliminary injunction for the elections in August and November”).
To obtain a preliminary injunction (or any equitable relief, really), Plaintiffs must show “irreparable harm.” Regions Treatment Ctr., LLC v. New Stream Real Estate, LLC, 2013 WL 4028148, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2013) (citing Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987)). That showing “requires more than a possibility of remote future injury.” Id. (citing Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th
3 The court in the Virginia case similar to this one did not explain how, less than two months before the June primary, Purcell would have allowed the plaintiffs to secure a preliminary injunction. See League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *3-4. That is the question the court should have asked because, like this case, the preliminary-injunction motion was all that plaintiffs offered to withdraw in exchange for the consent decree. Id. at *4.
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Cir. 1982)). It “requires a presently existing actual threat of injury”; “‘[w]holly speculative’ harm will not” do. Id. (quoting Local Union No. 884, United Rubber Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995)). More specifically, Plaintiffs cannot obtain a preliminary injunction unless their irreparable harm “‘is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.’” Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011).
Yet Plaintiffs have no idea whether, and to what extent, COVID-19 will remain a threat in November—let alone what effect it will have on voters’ ability to find a witness. No one does. Plaintiffs’ only evidence on this question came from their expert, who admits that the coronavirus is “novel,” that he “cannot say definitively whether its incidence and prevalence will rise and fall based on weather or season,” and that “it is difficult to predict whether and when the incidence and prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection will fluctuate.” Doc. 15-5 ¶¶17-18.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief rests on a litany of speculative, unknowable assumptions. It assumes that COVID-19 will resurge in November. That it will resurge to a degree that makes finding a witness or voting in person unreasonably dangerous (even with increased social distancing and sanitization). That Minnesota will make no adjustments to improve safety. That no vaccine will be created. That no herd immunity will develop. And much more. As another court in this Circuit put it, harms that stem from “potentially contracting COVID-19,” “the
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spread of COVID-19,” or the “[inability] to contain it” are simply “too speculative under Eighth Circuit precedent” to warrant a preliminary injunction. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 2145350, at *9-10 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020).4
In short, this Court would have denied Plaintiffs’ motion as applied to the November election because it was overly speculative and premature. The Court could have “declined to exercise its equitable jurisdiction upon these grounds alone.” Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Priest, 117 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1941). Doing so would have honored the Supreme Court’s observation that, “[e]specially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948).
C. Plaintiffs could not show that the challenged laws are unconstitutional.
Even assuming Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief, their constitutional claims would fail on the merits. Plaintiffs pressed only one claim in their preliminary-injunction motion: that Minnesota’s witness requirement violates the
4 Plaintiffs cannot sidestep this problem by arguing that, “regardless of the precise infection rate [in November],” voters’ fears of contracting COVID-19 will still “deter [them] from meeting with witnesses.” Doc. 15 at 31. Even if speculative fears somehow counted as a burden imposed by the State, these predictions about what voters will think or feel in November are equally too “speculative” to support a preliminary injunction. Shaw v. Kaemingk, 2019 WL 6465339, at *2 (D.S.D. Dec. 2, 2019).
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constitutional right to vote. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, burdens on voting rights are subject to the balancing test from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Under the Anderson-Burdick test, States can conduct “substantial regulation of elections.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). Anderson-Burdick is a “flexible standard” that “reject[s] the contention that any law imposing a burden” on constitutional rights “is subject to strict scrutiny.” Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009); Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1241 (Nev. 2006). Every election law “is going to exclude, either de jure or de facto, some people” from exercising their rights; “the constitutional question is whether the restriction and resulting exclusion are reasonable given the interest the restriction serves.” Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
Anderson-Burdick requires Plaintiffs to satisfy a two-step inquiry, imposing a heavy burden at each step. First, Plaintiffs must prove that the challenged laws inflict a cognizable burden on their rights and quantify the severity of that burden. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1354. Second, Plaintiffs must show that the burden outweighs the State’s interests. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. Only when an election law “subject[s]” voting rights “to ‘severe’ restrictions” does a court apply strict scrutiny and assess whether the law “‘is narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” Burdick, 504
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U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). Mine-run election laws that “impose[] only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’” are “‘generally’” justified by “‘the State’s important regulatory interests.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. After all, there is no constitutional right to be free from “the usual burdens of voting.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (op. of Stevens, J.).
Minnesota’s witness requirement does not implicate the right to vote at all. Even if it did, it easily satisfies Anderson-Burdick. Before, during, or after COVID-19, the law imposes only routine burdens that are amply justified by the State’s important interests in deterring fraud and promoting voters’ confidence in the integrity of Minnesota elections.
i. The witness requirement doesn’t burden voting rights because there is no constitutional right to vote absentee.
The witness requirement governs only absentee voting. If voters cannot find a witness, they can still vote in-person on election day or during the 46-day early voting period. See Doc. 15 at 10. Because in-person voting remains available, unburdened by the witness requirement, “the right to vote is not ‘at stake’” here. Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10 (quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)).
The Constitution guarantees one viable method of voting. And “there is no constitutional right to an absentee ballot.” Mays, 951 F.3d at 792; accord Griffin, 385
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F.3d at 1130. When States impose some limitation on absentee voting, but not inperson voting, “[i]t is … not the right to vote that is at stake … but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots”—which is not a constitutional right at all. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807. As the Fifth Circuit recently explained in a COVID-19 case, the Constitution is not violated “unless … the state has ‘in fact absolutely prohibited’ the plaintiff from voting,” and “permit[ting] the plaintiffs to vote in person … is the exact opposite of ‘absolutely prohibit[ing]’ them from doing so.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10.
While Plaintiffs insist that in-person voting is too difficult or dangerous during COVID-19, that rejoinder fails for at least two reasons.
First, “[constitutional] violations require state action,” and Minnesota is not responsible for COVID-19 or private citizens’ responses to it. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 810. While COVID-19 has dramatically changed Minnesotans’ everyday lives, these difficulties are not burdens imposed “by the State.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *10 (quoting McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808 n.7). These obstacles to voting “are not caused by or fairly traceable to the actions of the State, but rather are caused by the global pandemic.” Mays v. Thurston, 2020 WL 1531359, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30, 2020). To date, most courts have recognized that “COVID-19 … is not the result of any act or failure to act by the Government. And that fact is important” because “[a]ll of the election cases cited by Plaintiffs in which injunctive relief was granted involved a burden … that was created by the Government. Not so here.” Coalition for
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Good Governance v. Raffensperger, 2020 WL 2509092, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020); accord Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *11 (“The Constitution is not offended … even where voting in person may be extremely difficult … because of circumstances beyond the state’s control, such as the presence of the Virus.” (cleaned up)).
Second, even if Plaintiffs’ think otherwise, the State has determined that inperson voting can be done safely and effectively. The Minnesota Legislature considered and rejected plans to cancel in-person voting and to adopt all-mail elections, opting instead to make in-person voting easier and safer. See DFL Push, supra. The Governor likewise exempted voting from his stay-at-home order; and the Secretary of State has issued guidance on “social distancing …, equipment sanitization, and hygiene for polling places,” and has made “[c]urbside voting available for anyone who cannot enter the polling place for any reason, including concerns for their health.” 2012 Elections and COVID-19, Minn. Sec’y of State, bit.ly/3hJtq2s. Meanwhile, Minnesota has moved into “Phase III” of its reopening plan, deeming it safe for Minnesotans (with social-distancing precautions) to go to stores, gyms, salons, restaurants, bars, swimming pools, daycare, school, and church, and to attend indoor gatherings of up to 10 people. See Safely Reopening Minnesota, Stay Safe MN, staysafe.mn.gov (Safely Reopening).
Federal courts cannot and should not second-guess the judgment of Minnesota’s election officials that in-person voting can be done safely and effectively.
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As the Seventh Circuit explained in Wisconsin, questions about how to “accommodate voters’ interests while also striving to ensure their safety” are best left to election officials, who are “better positioned … to accommodate the many intersecting interests in play in the present circumstances.” DNC II, supra. “[F[ederal courts make poor arbiters of public health.” Sinner v. Jaeger, 2020 WL 3244143, at *6 (D.N.D. June 15, 2020). They do “not have the authority ‘to act as the state’s chief health official’ by making the decision” how best to protect “the health and safety of the community.” Taylor v. Milwaukee Election Comm’n, 2020 WL 1695454, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2020). These “decisions are instead best left ‘to the politically accountable officials of the States,’ not ‘an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.’” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143, at *6 (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2813056, at *1 (U.S. May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of injunctive relief)).5
In short, this Court would likely accept Minnesota’s considered judgment that in-person voting is safe and available. That finding would, in turn, entirely defeat Plaintiffs’ right-to-vote claim.
5 The court in Virginia simply bypassed this issue. It assumed that restrictions on absentee voting implicate the constitutional right to vote, without considering whether in-person voting remained available or whether the State had deemed it safe. See League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *7.
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ii. Even if the witness requirement affected voting rights, it easily satisfies the Anderson-Burdick test.
The witness requirement would satisfy Anderson-Burdick review even accepting the implausible premise that COVID-19 gives Plaintiffs a constitutional right to vote by mail. Plaintiffs agree that the witness requirement satisfies Anderson-Burdick in normal times. See Doc. 15 at 14 (arguing only that “the witness requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this unique situation”); id. at 28 (conceding that “under normal circumstances most Minnesotans may be able to find an eligible individual to witness their absentee ballot”). So the question is whether COVID-19 somehow made the witness requirement unconstitutional. Setting aside obvious state-action problems, the answer is no. The witness requirement remains a minimal burden on voters that is justified by the State’s “‘important regulatory interests.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
Burden on Voters: On the individual side of the Anderson-Burdick balance, Plaintiffs must introduce “evidence” to “quantify the magnitude of the burden” from the challenged laws. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200. “[T]he extent of the burden … is a factual question on which the [plaintiff] bears the burden of proof,” Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016), and the plaintiff must “direct th[e] Court to … admissible and reliable evidence that quantifies the extent and scope of the burden.” Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1354.
That evidence doesn’t exist. If “the inconvenience of making a trip to the [D]MV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does
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not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote,” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198, then neither does finding a qualified person to witness an absentee ballot. It is no more dangerous than other activities that the State deems safe, like going to the grocery store or having 9 friends over for a visit. See Safely Reopening, supra. And “[t]here’s no reason” why the witnessing process cannot be done “within the bounds of our current situation”—for example, by “witnessing the signatures from a safe distance,” staying outdoors, wearing a mask, standing behind glass, or practicing good hygiene. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 810. While these workarounds might be “harder” (as are many tasks during a pandemic), id., inconveniences are not “severe” burdens that trigger strict scrutiny, Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198.
Doubtful, but perhaps there is some tiny, idiosyncratic group of voters who, despite “reasonable effort,” cannot find a witness and cannot take advantage of Minnesota’s 46-day early-voting period or its numerous methods for voting in person. Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 2016) (Frank II). If that is what Plaintiffs’ case turns on, “[z]eroing in on the abnormal burden experienced by a small group of voters is problematic at best, and prohibited at worst.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 631 (6th Cir. 2016). Evidence that a law uniquely burdens one particular group does not justify enjoining the statute as to all voters. Rather, requests for facial, statewide relief—like Plaintiffs make here and the State is prepared to give away in the consent decree—fail when the challenged law “has a plainly legitimate sweep.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202-03; see id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
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(when assessing a burden’s severity, courts must look at the burden’s impact “categorically” upon all voters, without “consider[ing] the peculiar circumstances of individual voters”). The “burden some voters face[]” from a challenged law cannot “prevent the state from applying the law generally.” Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386. Those claims must be vindicated in as-applied challenges that seek relief for “those particular persons.” Id.
Interests of the State: Because the witness requirement imposes little to no burden on voters, Minnesota’s “‘important regulatory interests’” more than justify it. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. Witness requirements for absentee ballots, as the Seventh Circuit explained in Wisconsin, serve the State’s “substantial interest in combatting voter fraud.” DNC II, supra; accord Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811 (“witness … requirements help prevent fraud”). By requiring “in-person” verification, witness requirements serve the “unquestionably important interests” of “preventing fraud and protecting the integrity of the electoral process.” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143, at *7. “These interests are not only legitimate, they are compelling.” Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811.
It is no answer to say that Minnesota has other methods to deter fraud, like criminal penalties. See Doc. 15 at 21-22. Minnesota does not have to satisfy strict scrutiny here or prove narrow tailoring. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Under AndersonBurdick’s intermediate balancing test, States can supplement post-hoc punishments with measures aimed at “prophylactically preventing fraud.” Sinner, 2020 WL 3244143,
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at *7; see Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986) (“Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.”).
It is also no answer to say that absentee-voting fraud is “rare.” Doc. 15 at 2. It’s not rare enough. See infra III. And “voter fraud” is notoriously “difficult to detect and prosecute.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *3. The whole reason it’s rare, moreover, is precisely because States have integrity measures like the witness requirement in place.
Regardless, Anderson-Burdick treats the State’s interest as a “legislative fact,” accepted as true so long as it’s reasonable. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (Frank I). States are not required to submit “any record evidence in support of [their] stated interests.” Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1353; accord ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) (city need not “present evidence of past instances of voting fraud”). In fact, when responding to an Anderson-Burdick challenge, States can rely on “post hoc rationalizations,” can “come up with its justifications at any time,” and have no “limit[s]” on the type of “record [they] can build in order to justify a burden placed on the right to vote.” Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 789 (6th Cir. 2020). States can rely on examples from other jurisdictions, court decisions, general history, or sheer logic. Common Cause/Ga., 554 F.3d at 1353; Frank I, 768 F.3d at 750. In Crawford, for example, the Supreme Court found Indiana’s interest in preventing in-person voter fraud compelling even though “[t]he record
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contain[ed] no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.” 553 U.S. at 194.
“[T]here is no suggestion that these widely held concerns about voter fraud will not be present during the pandemic”; to the contrary, COVID-19 makes Minnesota’s interest heightened, as record numbers of voters submit absentee ballots while the State’s resources are already stretched thin. Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *19 (Ho, J., concurring); see @MNSteveSimon, Twitter (June 19, 2020), bit.ly/2V3Hp9z (reporting that Minnesotans have requested 25 times as many absentee ballots as previous years). States should receive more leeway under AndersonBurdick, not less, when dealing with emergencies that affect election. These crises give the State new “important interests” like “focus[ing] their resources on recovering from the emergency, ensuring the accuracy of [electoral records] they have received, … and otherwise minimizing the likelihood of errors or delays in voting.” Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 Emory L.J. 545, 593 (2018).
An “election emergency” should thus “seldom warrant” changes to election laws by judicial fiat. Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. DeSantis, Doc. 12, No. 1:20-cv-67 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2020) (declining to intervene in Florida’s primary election in the face of COVID-19); Bethea v. Deal, 2016 WL 6123241, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2016) (declining to extend Georgia’s voter-registration deadline in the wake of Hurricane Matthew); Doc. 58, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 2:06-cv-611 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2006)
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(denying request to extend the deadline for counting absentee ballots received by mail in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina). This Court would likely reach the same conclusion here.
Because Plaintiffs were never entitled to an injunction and identified no violation of federal law, the proposed consent decree is a raw deal for Minnesotans. Not only that, but it requires this Court to sanction violations of a valid state law. The decree is thus “‘void on its face’” and should be rejected. Kasper, 814 F.2d at 342. II. The consent decree should be rejected because it does not reflect arm’s-
length negotiations and gives a windfall to Plaintiffs. Consent decrees must be not only substantively sound, but also procedurally fair. Procedural fairness is evaluated “from the standpoint of [both] signatories and nonparties to the decree.” United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991). Consent decrees are fair when they flow from negotiations “filled with ‘adversarial vigor.’” City of Waterloo, 2016 WL 254725, at *4. The parties must “negotiat[e] in good faith and at arm’s length.” BP Amoco Oil, 277 F.3d at 1020. Agreements that lack adversarial vigor become “collusive,” and are, by definition, not fair. Colorado, 937 F.2d 509. In fact, a consent decree between non-adverse parties “is no judgment of the court. It is a nullity.” Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 256 (1850). This rule stems from the fundamental constitutional requirement that parties be concretely adversarial before an Article III court can act on their claims. There is “no case or controversy within
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the meaning of Article III of the Constitution” when “both litigants desire precisely the same result.” Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971). Put differently, a collusive suit lacks “the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of the constitutional questions by the Court.” United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
Regrettably, “it is not uncommon for consent decrees to be entered into on terms favorable to those challenging governmental action because of rifts within the bureaucracy or between the executive and legislative branches.” Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 517 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1292, 1294-95 (1983) (discussing phenomenon of “[n]ominal defendants [who] are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose”); Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. L. Forum 19, 30-37 (1987). That is why courts should look skeptically at consent decrees used to enact or modify governmental policy. Otherwise, non-adverse parties can employ consent decrees to “sidestep political constraints” and obtain relief otherwise unavailable through the political process. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 317. In particular, “district judges should be on the lookout for attempts to use consent decrees to make end runs around the legislature.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 340;
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see Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A court must be alert to the possibility that a consent decree is a ploy in some other struggle.”).
These opportunities and incentives are present here. Given that Defendant recently failed to convince the legislature to relax absentee-voting rules, see Minnesota Waives Absentee Ballot Witness Signature Mandate, U.S. News & World Report (June 17, 2020), bit.ly/3dl5tek, the proposed consent decree helps achieve an “end run[] around the legislature.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 340. Defendant is also a member of the League of Women Voters. See Steve Simon’s Biography, Vote Smart, bit.ly/3ejEP6R. And his attorney was recently Deputy Chair of the Democratic Party. See Hayes, DNC’s Second in Command Steps Down After Winning Attorney General Race in Minnesota, USA Today (Nov. 8, 2018), bit.ly/316q8k9. The Democratic Party, of course, is backing a similar lawsuit in state court and just negotiated a very similar consent decree with Defendant over the same timeframe. See Doc. 28. No doubt, these groups believe they are doing a good thing by using lawsuits to “revamp [the] electoral system,” see Eric Holder: Here’s How the Coronavirus Crisis Should Change U.S. Elections—For Good, TIME (Apr. 14, 2020), bit.ly/3fJsjhk, and to “gain …vote[s]” for Democrats, @marcelias, Twitter (May 3, 2020), bit.ly/2XiI74A. But their lack of adversarialness disserves the public and undermines the proposed consent decree. See North Carolina, 180 F.3d at 581; Colorado, 937 F.2d at 509.
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More to the point, the sequence of events here is inconsistent with arm’s-length negotiations. Plaintiffs filed their complaint one month ago yesterday. Doc. 1 at 27-29. In it, they laid out the key principles underlying their case:
• Minnesota’s witness requirement forces voters to risk their health or refrain from voting;
• the witness requirement is ineffective as an anti-fraud measure; • the witness requirement is unduly restrictive and significantly burdensome; • the witness requirement does not serve any important state interest and has
no significant benefit; and • suspending enforcement of the witness requirement would not cause a drop
in voter confidence. Doc. 1 ¶¶12, 95, 62, 65, 7, 81, 87, 100, 109, 111, 102, 80. Ten days later, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for both the August and November elections. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs’ sweeping relief would require Defendant to grant four specific types of relief. See Doc. 13 at 1-2.
When Defendant answered the complaint on June 9, Defendant denied all of the above allegations. Doc. 22 ¶¶12, 95, 62, 65, 7, 81, 87, 100, 109, 111, 102, 80. He also denied that heightened scrutiny applied to the witness requirement and argued that the requirement would survive any level of judicial scrutiny. Doc. 22 ¶¶106, 107. And he asserted that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Doc. 22 at 40.
At some point in the next seven days, Defendant did a complete 180º. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted a proposed consent decree to the Court. Under the
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proposed decree, Defendant agrees to refrain from enforcing the witness requirement and concedes to all four kinds of relief that Plaintiffs sought for the August primary. Doc. 24 at 6. Further, although Plaintiffs had submitted no further briefing, argument, or evidence, the decree makes Defendant concede that “Plaintiffs made a sufficiently strong showing on the merits of the claim”—directly contrary to his answer. Doc. 24 ¶20. Defendant made no attempt to explain this abrupt about-face. Whatever his reasons, the astonishing rapidity with which he turned heel calls into question his statement that the proposed consent decree was “negotiated at arm’s length through counsel for the parties.” Doc. 24 ¶18.
In return for his complete capitulation to Plaintiffs’ demands, Defendant obtained nothing. While the consent decree does not cover the November election, Defendant let Plaintiffs withdraw their preliminary-injunction motion “without prejudice” and seek that exact relief again. Doc. 24 at 6. And while the decree suggests that Plaintiffs will not collect attorney’s fees for their work to date, Doc. 24 at 5 ¶21, that concession adds nothing. Plaintiffs were unlikely to be a “prevailing party” in this case, supra I, they generated few expenses because they reused prior materials from Virginia and filed a motion that was never opposed, and they can still get fees going forward (including, presumably, for any preliminary-injunction motion they refile).
Worse, Defendant did not even narrow Plaintiffs’ egregiously overbroad relief. For the August primary, Plaintiffs got everything they asked for: a complete and total suspension of the witness requirement for all voters. But several narrower
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compromises were obvious. Defendant could have suspended the witness requirement only for the named individual plaintiffs. See Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386. He could have suspended it only for people who are elderly or immunocompromised. E.g., People First, 2020 WL 3207824, at *29. He could have suspended only the statute limiting who can be a witness. See Minn. Stat. §203B.07. Or he could have required voters to provide a “written affirmation” that they tried, but failed, to find a witness for their ballot. DNC I, 2020 WL 1638374, at *20. To be clear, none of these alternatives would have been warranted had the Court reached the merits. But the fact that Defendant got none of them as concessions proves that, whatever the parties were doing from May 29 to June 16, it was not “negotiating.”
Defendant cannot say that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the witness requirement was so strong—or that the August primary was coming so soon—that he thought settlement was the only option. Both Defendant and his counsel took an oath to defend and uphold the State’s elections laws. See Minn. Const. art. V, §§1, 6; Minn. Stat. §8.06. And the caselaw was on their side: most courts have rejected these COVID-19/election lawsuits, and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits recently wrote persuasive opinions rejecting challenges to similar witness requirements. Even if Defendant was (mistakenly) impressed with the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments, but see supra I, the Purcell principle was an easy defense that sidesteps the merits and defeats injunctive relief for the August primary. Purcell was low-hanging fruit, especially if Defendant was genuinely concerned with avoiding last-minute changes to the election
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laws. But he apparently wasn’t—consenting to last-minute changes to election laws is no way to avoid them.
At bottom, a federal court is not a place where parties with mutual interests can “purchase … a continuing injunction.” LULAC, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 846 (5th Cir. 1993). Yet that is precisely what the proposed consent decree seeks. If the parties want “to alter the manner” in which elections are conducted, this Court should send them back to the “bargaining table” until they can come up with something that is actually fair to all sides. Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 983. Better yet, the parties should return to the state legislature—the representative body that Minnesotans have entrusted to enact, suspend, and modify their election laws. See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986). III. The consent decree should be rejected because it unreasonably injures
other parties. Because consent decrees are not mere private contracts between the parties, a “judge has obligations to other litigants … and to members of the public whose interests may not be represented.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338. This Court must reject any consent decree that “affects third parties” where the effect is either “unreasonable” or “proscribed.” Doc. 26 at 2 (quoting City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441). Intervenors, moreover, can outright “block approval of a consent decree” if it “adversely affects” their “legal rights or interests.” Johnson, 393 F.3d at 1107. “[T]he mere threat of injury to [legal] rights [is] … sufficient.” Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 982.
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The proposed consent decree directly threatens the legal rights and interests of Proposed Intervenor-Defendants, their members, and other Minnesota voters. The Minnesota legislature enacted the witness requirement to deter fraud and to promote the integrity of elections. Supra I.C.ii. Removing this requirement—particularly for an election with “unprecedented levels” of absentee voting, Doc. 15 at 10—poses a serious threat that fraudulent or otherwise ineligible ballots will be cast.
As Justice Stevens stated in Crawford, “the risk of voter fraud”—particularly with “absentee ballots”—is “real.” Id. at 195-96; accord Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1130-31 (“Voting fraud is a serious problem in U.S. elections … and it is facilitated by absentee voting.”); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding broad “agreement that voter fraud actually takes place in abundance in connection with absentee balloting”); Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *18 (Ho, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly found that mail-in ballots are particularly susceptible to fraud.”). Groups from across the political spectrum “acknowledge that, when election fraud occurs, it usually arises from absentee ballots.” Morley, Election Emergency Redlines 2, bit.ly/3aIqiPK. “[E]lection officials can neither exercise control over absentee ballots once they are mailed out to voters, nor ensure that they have been received and cast by the voters entitled to do so.” Id. at 5. Stated differently, “absentee voting is to voting in person as a take-home exam is to a proctored one.” Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1131.
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The 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform, co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker, concluded that expanding mail-in voting “increase[s] the risks of fraud.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 35, bit.ly/2KF3WUE (Carter-Baker Report). True, a few States already have allmail voting. But those States took years to build the proper infrastructure; they didn’t “just flip a switch” in the middle of a pandemic. Washington: Where Everyone Votes by Mail, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2020), nyti.ms/3ektSlI. These States have only “avoided significant fraud,” according to the Carter-Baker Commission, because they “introduc[ed] safeguards to protect ballot integrity, including signature verification.” Carter-Baker Report 35. “[W]here the safeguards for ballot integrity are weaker,” as they would be under the proposed consent decree, “[v]ote by mail is … likely to increase the risks of fraud.” Id.
Increased fraud and abuse will, in turn, harm the rights of Proposed Intervenor-Defendants, their members, and other Minnesotans. The constitutional right to vote includes, not just the right to “cast … ballots,” but also the right to “have them counted.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). An individual’s vote “won’t count if it’s cancelled by a fraudulent vote—as the Supreme Court has made clear in case after case.” Tex. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 2982937, at *18 (Ho, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)); accord Reynolds v. Sims, 77 U.S. 533, 554-55 & n.29 (1964). “Every voter …, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a
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right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being distorted by fraudulently cast votes.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 227 (1974). Whether the dilution is “‘in greater or less degree is immaterial.’” Id. at 226. Because “voting fraud impairs the right of legitimate voters to vote by diluting their votes,” the consent decree is “an impairment of the right to vote.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007).
Even if the consent decree would not cause any ineligible ballots or vote dilution—an unlikely prospect given the expected surge in absentee voting and the large number of voters that Proposed Intervenor-Defendants represent—removing “‘safeguards’” that help “‘deter or detect fraud’” and “‘confirm the identity of voters’” undermines “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197 (quoting Carter-Baker Report 18). So do court orders that are issued close to the election. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5. “Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones,” or who are confused by last-minute court orders, “will feel disenfranchised.” Id. at 4. That “debasement” denies “the right of suffrage … just as effectively as … wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id.
Plaintiffs might argue that these harms are inevitable, since a similar consent decree has been entered in one of the state-court cases. See Doc. 28 (alerting the Court to the consent decree in LaRose v. Simon, No. 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020)). But the Republican Party has moved for intervention in that case too. If that consent decree stands, its approval weighs against approving this one. Given the risk
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of “overlapping and perhaps inconsistent commands,” it would be “particularly inappropriate” for this Court to enter a consent decree when “[m]uch of the relief requested here has been provided by [another consent] decree.” United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1975). At the very least, such an overlapping decree would not be a worthwhile “commitment of the court’s limited resources.” Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338.
CONCLUSION For all these reasons, and any other reasons this Court deems persuasive in its discretion, the proposed consent decree should be rejected.

Dated: June 20, 2020
Richard G. Morgan LEWIS BRISBOIS 90 South 7th Street Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 612-428-5000 612-428-5001 (fax) richard.morgan@lewisbrisbois.com

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Cameron T. Norris T Thomas R. McCarthy (pro hac vice) Cameron T. Norris (pro hac vice) Jeffrey M. Harris CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 243-9423 cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Patrick Strawbridge CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Ten Post Office Square 8th Floor South PMB #706 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Republican National Committee, and Republican Party of Minnesota

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 45 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO INTERVENE

INTRODUCTION Defendant, the Secretary of State, opposes the motion to intervene filed by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (collectively, “Proposed Intervenors”) because Proposed Intervenors have not demonstrated a viable basis to participate in this litigation as a party under the standard for either mandatory or permissive intervention in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Proposed Intervenors’ request for mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) should be denied because they cannot satisfy the requirements of that rule. First, Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention is untimely. They waited to file their motion for intervention in this time-sensitive case involving election laws that govern voting for the August 2020 primary that will be begin on June 26, 2020 until after the original parties had negotiated and signed a consent decree and sought approval from the court for that

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decree. Second, Proposed Intervenors’ claimed interest in the general integrity of Minnesota elections is not a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation sufficient to support intervention under Rule 24(a). Third, because the Secretary has already begun implementing the partial consent decree in order to comply with a ruling from the Ramsey County District Court, any interests of Proposed Intervenors will not be impaired by disposition of this case. Finally, Proposed Intervenors have failed to meet their substantial burden of demonstrating that the Secretary’s representation of their interests is inadequate.
Proposed Intervenors’ request for permissive intervention fails for many of the same reasons. Additionally, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny permissive intervention because the proposed intervention will only cause delay and prejudice to the original parties in this litigation where expeditious resolution is imperative. For these reasons, the Secretary respectfully requests that the Court deny Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this action on May 19, 2020 challenging the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, which requires that, to vote by absentee ballot, a Minnesota voter must fill out his or her ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. (Dkt. 1.) Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 also requires that the witness be registered to vote in Minnesota or be a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that enforcement of this Witness
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Requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote and denies certain Minnesota voters equal protection. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 93-112.)
On May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Witness Requirement for both the August Primary and November General Elections. (Dkts. 13, 15.) On June 9, 2020, the Secretary filed an answer. (Dkt. 22.) Thereafter, the parties met and conferred regarding the pending motion for preliminary injunction. As set forth in more detail in Defendant’s accompanying Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, following arms’ length negotiations, the parties entered into a partial consent decree whereby the Secretary agreed not to enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary with respect to registered voters. On June 16, 2020, that consent decree was filed with the Court. (Dkt. 24.)
A similar consent decree was filed that same day in Ramsey County District Court, in a lawsuit bringing similar claims regarding the Witness Requirement that has been pending since May 13, 2020. The Ramsey County District Court judge approved that consent decree (the “LaRose consent decree”), pursuant to which the Secretary has agreed not to enforce the Witness Requirement for purposes of the August Primary.
Four days after the partial consent decree was filed with this Court, Proposed Intervenors filed their motion seeking intervention. (Dkt. 37.)1
1 Proposed Intervenors have now sought to intervene in the Ramsey County District Court action. Their motion for intervention in those proceedings was filed after the
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ARGUMENT2 “The Supreme Court has often emphasized that a lawsuit in federal court is not a
forum for the airing of interested onlookers’ concerns, nor an arena for public-policy
debates.” Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[w]hile Rule 24
promotes judicial economy by facilitating, where constitutionally permissible, the
participation of interested parties in others’ lawsuits, the fact remains that a federal case
is a limited affair, and not everyone with an opinion is invited to attend.” Id. Even a
cursory review of Proposed Intervenors’ motion demonstrates that they seek to use Rule
24 solely for an improper purpose—to engage in a public-policy debate regarding the
best means to ensure the integrity of Minnesota elections. Proposed Intervenors’ last-
minute effort to thwart the impact of a negotiated consent decree that has already been
entered by a state court judge, on the eve of an election, during the midst of a global
pandemic, fails to satisfy the requirements of either mandatory or permissive
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Ramsey County District Court approved and entered the LaRose consent decree and remains pending. (See Dkt. 28-1.) 2 As set forth in Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, the Court should consider the mootness arguments raised therein before considering the motion to intervene. Because Proposed Intervenors seek intervention based on Plaintiffs’ requested relief related to the August Primary, which is now moot, the Court need not reach the merits of Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene. See, e.g., Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-CV-03075-JSC, 2015 WL 4537533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider motion to intervene where stipulated dismissal divested the court of jurisdiction over the case, and there was no live case or controversy into which the party could intervene).
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intervention. Accordingly, the Secretary respectfully requests that the motion to

intervene be denied.

I.

PROPOSED INTERVENORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MANDATORY

INTERVENTION.

A party seeking mandatory intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24(a) must make a timely application for intervention and establish that “(1) it has a

recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the interest might be

impaired by the disposition of the case; and (3) the interest will not be adequately

protected by the existing parties.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d

783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

A. Proposed Intervenors’ Request For Intervention Is Untimely.

If a motion for intervention is not timely filed, “the applicant is barred from

intervening.” United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995).

“The timeliness of a motion to intervene is determined from the totality of the

circumstances.” Winbush v. State of Iowa by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1479

(8th Cir. 1995). In determining whether a motion for intervention is timely, courts

consider four factors, including, (1) “how far the litigation has progressed at the time of

the motion for intervention”; (2) “the prospective intervenor’s prior knowledge of the

pending action”; (3) “the reason for the delay in seeking intervention”; and (4) “the

likelihood of prejudice to the parties in the action.” United States v. Ritchie Special

Credit Invs., Ltd., 620 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2010). Consideration of these factors

demonstrates that Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention is untimely.

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First, although this litigation has not been pending for a significant period of time, the litigation had substantially progressed by the time the Proposed Intervenors brought their motion for intervention. See Ark. Elec. Energy Consumers v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 772 F.2d 401, 403 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of motion for intervention filed only twelve days after commencement of the lawsuit where “because of the expedited nature of the proceedings, a substantial amount of the litigation had been completed during these twelve days”); Winbush, 66 F.3d at 1479 (noting the relevant inquiry is “the status of the proceedings at the time of the motion” for intervention). When Proposed Intervenors filed their motion, Plaintiffs had filed their complaint as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction. The Secretary had answered. And—most importantly—by the time Proposed Intervenors filed their motion for intervention the parties had already negotiated, agreed to, and sought Court approval of a consent decree that resolves Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety with respect to the conduct of the August Primary.
The circumstances of this case are therefore distinguishable from those in the cases cited by Proposed Intervenors where motions for intervention were deemed timely where no consent decrees were at issue and the motions were filed before significant proceedings had occurred. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012) (finding motion for intervention filed after court resolved motion for judgment on the pleadings timely and noting the parties did “not contest timeliness of the” motion); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 836 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (D.S.D. 2011) (motion for intervention timely less than a month after complaint was filed and immediately after court granted motion for preliminary injunction but no consent decree
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had been filed); S. D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. South Dakota, 189 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D.S.D.
1999) (motion for intervention timely where “only a complaint and answer had been
filed”).3 Indeed, the only cases cited by Proposed Intervenors that actually involved
consent decrees support denial of their motion as untimely. In United States v. Union
Electric Company, 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir. 1995) the court found a motion for
intervention timely where it was filed three months prior to the original parties’ motion
for entry of the consent decree, not several days after as Proposed Intervenors did here.
Similarly, in United States EPA v. City of Green Forest, Arkansas, 921 F.2d 1394, 1402
(8th Cir. 1990) the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to
intervene brought after a consent decree was filed.4
Second, it is undisputed that Proposed Intervenors had knowledge of the litigation
and their supposed interest in it. Proposed Intervenors themselves point to the news
3 The same is true of the other COVID-19 related election law challenges Proposed Intervenors cite. Those cases also allowed intervention sought at an early stage, not after the filing of a consent decree. See, e.g., Issa v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-01044, 2020 WL 3074351, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (“Both the Issa and RNC Plaintiffs filed their Complaints on May 21 and 24, 2020, respectively, and the Proposed Intervenors filed the Motions to Intervene on June 3, 2020. To date, no substantive proceedings have occurred . . . .”); Priorities USA v. Nessel, Case No. 19-13341, 2020 WL 2615504, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020) (finding motions to intervene timely that were filed “while this case was still in its pleading stages, before the briefing on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary and permanent injunction and Nessel’s motion to dismiss was complete”); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 320CV00243, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (“Proposed Intervenors moved for intervention within six days from the filing of the action and before the reply brief in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is due. . . .”). 4 The Eighth Circuit ultimately remanded on the issue of intervention, but solely for “the limited purpose of permitting the citizens group to seek attorneys’ fees.” 921 F.2d at 1402.
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coverage received by the litigation. (Dkt. 41 at 2.) And as the basis for their objections to the partial consent decree, Proposed Intervenors describe at length how closely they have followed the efforts of Democrats to change voting requirements in Congress and the Minnesota Legislature as well as the Secretary’s role in those efforts. (See, e.g., Dkt. 41 at 1.) Despite knowing of the litigation, however, Proposed Intervenors made the choice to wait and see what would happen and only chose to intervene after the parties filed a consent decree with which Proposed Intervenors did not agree. This is not an explanation for delay sufficient to satisfy the timeliness requirement of Rule 24(a). In Dalton v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *3 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019), for example, the court found a motion for intervention untimely where the Attorney General did not seek to intervene “until a day after the motion for entry of the consent judgment was filed.” Like Proposed Intervenors here, the Attorney General argued in Dalton that “he did not intervene sooner because he did not know until he saw the proposed consent judgment that the parties would enter into a settlement agreement that would be adverse to the State and its Attorney General.” Id. The court, however, rejected that argument explaining that “the relevant question is when he would have been on notice that there was a risk that his interests would not be adequately protected by the MSPD Defendants.” Id.
Although the Secretary maintains that he has been an adequate representative throughout this litigation, Proposed Intervenors apparent bases for believing he is not long pre-date the June 16 filing of the partial consent decree. For example, Proposed Intervenors insinuate inadequate representation and collusion because the Secretary made
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efforts to get legislation passed that would relax absentee-voting rules and is “a member of the League of Women Voters.” (Dkt. 41 at 27.) Because Proposed Intervenors were aware of the facts that they now contend make the Secretary an inadequate representative, there was no reason for them to wait until the consent decree was filed before seeking to intervene to protect their own asserted interests. See Floyd v. City of N.Y., 770 F.3d 1051, 1059 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding intervention untimely where proposed intervenors “should have know that their interests might not be adequately represented” in advance of settlement); Patriot Party of Pa. v. Mitchell, No. Civ. A. 93-2257, 1993 WL 466522, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1993) (finding motion to intervene untimely where Republican Party was aware of the proceeding but took a “‘wait and see’ approach”).
Finally, the likelihood of prejudice to Plaintiffs and the Secretary if Proposed Intervenors’ motion is granted is significant and weighs in favor of finding Proposed Intervenors’ motion to be untimely. Courts routinely hold that “[o]nce parties have invested time and effort into settling a case it would be prejudicial to allow intervention.” State v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979, 986-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 v. Illinois, 140 S. Ct. 82 (2019); see also R&G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (“By the time that Doral moved to intervene, the original parties had forged a settlement of their dispute. Because Doral’s proposed intervention was aimed at disrupting that settlement, the harms that intervention would have worked to the original parties was manifest.”); Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 254 F. App’x 769, 771 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of motion for intervention as untimely when filed
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one day prior to the district court’s approval of a consent decree); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We have observed that jeopardizing a settlement agreement causes prejudice to the existing parties to a lawsuit.”); Minor I Doe ex rel. Parent I Doe v. Sch. Bd. for Santa Rosa Cnty., Fla., 264 F.R.D. 670, 688-89 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[R]arely will a motion to intervene be deemed timely where the proposed intervention seeks to undo settlement negotiations that have already culminated in a consent decree.”). Here, Plaintiffs and the Secretary have negotiated the terms of a partial consent decree that the Secretary has already begun to put in place pursuant to the Ramsey County District Court ruling. That partial consent decree resolves Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction with respect to the August Primary and allows the Secretary time to administer absentee voting consistently for that election. Proposed Intervenors’ efforts to upset those negotiations and undermine the certainty afforded by the partial consent decree should be rejected.
B. Proposed Intervenors Do Not Have A Recognized Interest In the Subject Matter Of The Litigation.
Proposed Intervenors claim a recognized interest in the litigation based on their interest in the “continued enforcement of state laws governing witness requirements, absentee ballots, and voter identification, as those laws are designed to serve the integrity of [the] election process.” (Dkt. 38 at 7.) More specifically, Proposed Intervenors explain that they have an interest in the litigation regarding the challenge to the Witness Requirement because “Movants’ candidates actively seek [election or] reelection in contests governed by the challenged rules.” (Id.) But a recognized interest in the subject
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matter of the litigation sufficient to support mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) must rise to the level of “a legally protectable interest.” Curry v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1999). Interests that are “speculative” are insufficient; they must be “direct, substantial and legally protectable.” Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1998). Similarly, “[a]n undifferentiated generalized interest in the outcome of an ongoing action is too porous a foundation on which to premise intervention as of right.” Dalton v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *4 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019).
Proposed Intervenors’ asserted interest is simply a perceived partisan interest in maintaining what they believe to be a favorable landscape in Minnesota’s elections— regardless of whether voters and Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights may be violated by restrictions within that landscape in the context of COVID-19. In other words, unlike Plaintiffs, Proposed Intervenors do not claim that their own legally protectable constitutional rights would be violated if the Witness Requirement is not enforced. Instead, they claim only a preference for their candidates to seek election or reelection where all Minnesota absentee voters must be physically present before a witness in order to complete their August Primary ballot.5 Taken to its logical conclusion, Proposed
5 To be clear, the interest asserted by Proposed Intervenors is based on nothing more than a perceived partisan advantage. The partial consent decree applies equally to all Minnesota voters who choose to vote absentee by eliminating the requirement of finding a witness. Nor does the partial consent decree alter the voting landscape in a manner that prejudices any voters. Voters remain free to vote in person and voters remain equally free to complete their absentee ballots in the presence of a witness. Proposed Intervenors
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Intervenors’ argument would mean that any political party, any organization involved in supporting candidates, or even anyone who votes would be entitled to intervene as of right in any lawsuit impacting an election or voting right.
Proposed Intervenors rely upon Issa v. Newsom, No. 220CV01044, 2020 WL 3074351, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020), but that case actually highlights the generalized nature of the Proposed Intervenors’ interest asserted here. In Issa, plaintiffs sought to enjoin an executive order implementing all-mail balloting in a California election. Democratic committees and campaigns moved to intervene citing as protectable interests, among others “asserting the rights of their members to vote safely without risking their health” and “advancing their overall electoral prospects.” Id. Here, Proposed Intervenors do not assert that the voting rights of any of their members will be burdened. In fact, the relief sought in this litigation does not force any voter to change the way they wish to vote. Voters in Minnesota, including those who will vote for Republican candidates, can still vote in person. And they can also still choose to complete an absentee ballot in front of and have it be certified by a witness. Nor do Proposed Intervenors assert that relaxation of the Witness Requirement will make it harder for Republican candidates to be elected.6 Accordingly, Proposed Intervenors have failed to assert a recognized interest
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have presented no evidence that a relaxation of the Witness Requirement somehow disadvantages their candidates. 6 The other cases cited by Proposed Intervenors are similarly inapposite. In Citizens United v. Gessler, No. 14-cv-002266, 2014 WL 4549001 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) the parties did not dispute the proposed intervenors’ interest in the litigation and instead
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in the particular subject matter of this lawsuit—which entails only a challenge to the
enforcement of the Witness Requirement—sufficient to support mandatory intervention.
C. Any Interest Of Proposed Intervenors Cannot Be Impaired By Disposition Of This Case.
Even if Proposed Intervenors had identified an interest warranting mandatory
intervention, their motion still fails because they cannot identify any impairment by
disposition of this case. Proposed Intervenors assert impairment of their interests on the
basis that “[i]f this court enters the consent decree, then the rules surrounding absentee
ballots will be upended just weeks before the August primary” and claim that due to the
expedited nature of elections “this proceeding might be the only time that Movants can
litigate the consent decree.” (Dkt. 38 at 8-9.) But Proposed Intervenors’ argument
fundamentally ignores this Court’s role and their own role with respect to the partial
consent decree and enforcement of the Witness Requirement.
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disputed intervention on other grounds. Moreover, Citizens United involved a challenge to Colorado’s disclosure and reporting scheme that the political party used to develop strategy, learn who was speaking about its candidates, and determine how to formulate responses, none of which are analogous to the interests asserted by Proposed Intervenors here. Shays v. Federal Election Commission, 414 F.3d 76, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005) did not involve intervention at all. Instead, Shays found that two individual candidates had standing where the at-issue campaign finance restrictions would “harm Shays’s and Meehan’s electoral prospects.” Id. As for Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, No. 04CV-1055, 2005 WL 8162665 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005), Proposed Intervenors fail to mention that no party opposed intervention in that case, the court concluded that it was “debatable whether the Ohio Republican Party has an interest in the outcome of the case which differs from the interest of either the Ohio Secretary of State or the respective County Boards of Elections,” and ultimately the court granted only permissive, not mandatory, intervention. Id. at *2.
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First, tellingly absent from Proposed Intervenors’ motion for intervention is any mention of the Ramsey County District Court action, in which Judge Grewing has already entered a consent decree pursuant to which the Secretary has agreed not enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. As set forth in the Secretary’s accompanying Memorandum of Law in Response to Proposed Intervenors’ Objections to Partial Consent Decree, the existence of the LaRose consent decree—and the fact that the Secretary has already begun taking action to effectuate it—moots Plaintiffs’ claims for relief with respect to the August Primary. The LaRose consent decree also moots Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention because it is based on a purported injury that will be caused if “this court enters the consent decree.” (Dkt. 38 at 8.) But that “injury” has already occurred—the “rules surrounding absentee ballots” have already been changed due to operation of the LaRose consent decree. Thus, Proposed Intervenors’ intervention in this lawsuit will do nothing to protect the interests they claim are being impaired. See Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 266 (D. Minn. 2017) (noting that “the Eighth Circuit requires that prospective Rule 24(a) intervenors demonstrate the existence of an Article III case or controversy.”).7
7 In addition to mooting the basis for Proposed Intervenors’ motion, the LaRose consent decree deprives them of the standing they must show in order to intervene. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009). “To show Article III standing, a [party] has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). At a minimum, Proposed Intervenors cannot show that any injury “likely will be redressed by a favorable decision,” because even if the Court declines to enter the partial consent decree, the Secretary is still bound by the
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Second, contrary to Proposed Intervenors’ unsupported assertion, denying intervention would not impair their interests because even if they are allowed to intervene “they would not be able to block entry of the consent decree.” D.C. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d 227, 233-34 (D.D.C. 2011); see also United States v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 42, 47 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[I]t is well settled that the right to have its objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the right to block any settlement to which it objects.”). Here, Proposed Intervenors have already had the opportunity to be heard with respect to their objections to the partial consent decree, including through their submission of a 35-page brief in which they set forth those objections in detail. Intervention will not provide Proposed Intervenors with any additional rights vis-à-vis the partial consent decree. See Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (denying intervention where proposed intervenors “will be able to present their critiques of the consent decree to the Court and because they could not block the consent decree even if intervention were granted”); see also Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no prejudice from denying motion for intervention where complained-of preliminary injunction “would presumably remain in effect if intervention were granted”).
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LaRose consent decree not to enforce the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011) (determining redressability factor was met because applicants’ alleged injury, impairment of religious freedom, would be redressed by a judicial determination).
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D. Proposed Intervenors’ Interests Are Adequately Represented. Finally, Proposed Intervenors’ request for intervention fails because their interests are adequately represented by the Secretary. Proposed Intervenors claim that they bear only a “minimal burden of showing that [their] interests are not adequately represented by the parties.” (Dkt. 38 at 10.) But the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly presumed that defense of a lawsuit by a state official is adequate as a matter of law “because in such cases the government is presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens.” N.D. ex rel. Stenehjem v. United States, 787 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2015); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996). This presumption of adequacy can be rebutted only “by a showing that the applicant’s interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interests of the citizens.” Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, Proposed Intervenors do not seriously dispute that the Secretary shares their asserted interests in ensuring the integrity of the election process, ensuring voters can cast ballots “with confidence and without confusion,” and “preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections.” (Dkt. 38 at 6-7.) Instead, Proposed Intervenors claim inadequacy of representation based solely on the Secretary’s decision to enter into a partial consent decree instead of litigating the motion for preliminary injunction with respect to the August Primary on the merits. “It is not sufficient,” however, “that the party seeking intervention merely disagrees with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing its interests.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, courts have explained that the existence of a consent decree alone is not sufficient to establish inadequate representation. See Dalton
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v. Barrett, No. 2:17-CV-04057, 2019 WL 3069856, at *8 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2019) (finding no inadequacy of representation where parties entered into proposed consent decree); Com. of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976) (consent decree did not establish inadequate representation, explaining “[t]hat (intervenors) would have been less prone to agree to the facts and would have taken a different view of the applicable law does not mean that the (defendants) did not adequately represent their interests in the litigation”). II. PROPOSED INTERVENORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for permissive intervention is wholly discretionary.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). In deciding whether to grant permissive intervention, courts consider “(1) whether the motion to intervene is timely; (2) whether the applicant’s claim shares a question of law or fact in common with the main action; and (3) whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012). “The principal consideration in ruling on a Rule 24(b) motion is whether the proposed intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the parties’ rights.” S.D. ex rel. Barnett, 317 F.3d at 787. Here, in addition to being untimely for the reasons explained above, supra § I.A., Proposed Intervenors’ request for permissive intervention should be denied because it threatens to inject delay into time-sensitive proceedings and prejudice the original parties by undermining the benefit of having entered into a partial consent decree. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 288 F.R.D. 423, 429 (D. Minn. 2012)
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(denying permissive intervention because it would cause delay, unnecessary complication, and because the interests of the intervenor were adequately represented); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, No. CV 12-3043, 2013 WL 12074954, at *12 (D. Minn. May 28, 2013) (denying permissive intervention when the third-party lacked standing, had only speculative injury, and their interests were adequately represented by the government).
Absentee voting for the August Primary begins on June 26, 2020. Although Proposed Intervenors were aware of that timeline, they chose to wait to bring a motion for intervention until June 20. Further delay occasioned by the proposed intervention— not the partial consent decree—threatens to undermine the certainty of the rules applicable to absentee voting for the August Primary. Under similar circumstances, courts deny requests for permissive intervention. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. N.Y., 413 U.S. 345, 369 (1973) (“[I]n view of the then rapidly approaching primary elections in New York . . . the granting of a motion to intervene possessed the potential for seriously disrupting the State’s electoral process . . . .”); Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 515 F. App’x 539, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that due to the approaching November election “[a]llowing the applicants’ intervention will prejudice the existing parties and will inhibit, not promote, a prompt resolution”); Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 257 F.R.D. 236, 259 (D.N.M. 2008) (denying permissive intervention where “the deadline for book-closing
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preceding the general election is fast approaching” and therefore it was “important to avoid any unnecessary delays”).8
Intervention here will do nothing more than potentially delay the Secretary’s ability to administer Minnesota’s elections while ensuring that voting regulations are applied consistently. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying intervention that would “upset the delicate balance achieved” by consent decree); D.C. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d 227, 236-37 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying intervention where it would “undermine part of the benefit of entering into a consent decree” including implementing the remedy “expeditiously”); United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 576-77 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (denying intervention where it would “render the negotiations between the original parties a waste of time and stall the implementation of the remedy designed to benefit the public health and safety”).
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Secretary respectfully requests that the Court deny Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene in its entirety.
8 The expedited timeline for this election law challenge differs markedly from the circumstances in Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v. United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Minn. 2017), which Proposed Intervenors cite repeatedly as a basis for permissive intervention. When intervention was sought in Franconia, the case was “in its earliest stages.” Id. Moreover, the case was proceeding on a timeframe for typical civil litigation. Therefore, Franconia Minerals has no bearing on the propriety of intervention in a case like the present one where the at-issue statutes impact an election that begins in four days.
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Dated: June 22, 2020

s/ Hillary A. Taylor JASON MARISAM (#0398187) CICELY R. MILTICH (#0392902) HILLARY A. TAYLOR (#0398557) Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128 (651) 757-1275 (Phone) (651) 282-5832 (Fax) jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us cicely.miltich@ag.state.mn.us hillary.taylor@ag.state.mn.us
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON

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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 46 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)

Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSED
INTERVENOR’S OBJECTIONS TO PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

The context for the partial consent decree before the Court is not partisan politics,

as Proposed Intervenors portray it, but instead a global pandemic and the health of

Minnesota voters. Over the past few months, Minnesota has been responding to the

COVID-19 public health crisis, which has affected almost every sector and situation,

including elections. While the State has been under Peacetime Emergency executive

powers and orders, the State has partnered with entities to ramp up testing, acquire

personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and ventilators, and make ICU beds available.

The danger has not passed, however. In fact, 636 Minnesotans have died of COVID-19

since Plaintiffs filed suit on May 19. (Declaration of Hillary Taylor (“Taylor Decl.”), ¶

3.) The total number of Minnesotans hospitalized continues to climb steadily, with the

number hospitalized standing at 3,830 on June 22. (Id.) In hopes of keeping

Minnesotans healthy while researchers develop more effective treatments for the virus

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 46 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 23
and a vaccine, Governor Tim Walz and other elected officials, including the Secretary of State, have encouraged Minnesotans to stay home as much as possible.
With COVID-19 spreading in Minnesota, the Secretary has recognized in legislative testimony that the “administration of elections has become a public health issue.”1 The Secretary has been emphatic that: “No one should have to choose between their health and their right to vote.”2 However, designing an election during a pandemic is no easy task. The Secretary has noted: “There are a number of costs, variables, and trade-offs to consider, and planning at all levels of government will be crucial.” Id.
It is in this context that the Secretary and Plaintiffs entered into the partial consent decree on June 16, 2020, which suspended enforcement of the Minnesota’s witness requirement for the August 11, 2020 primary election, for which early voting begins this week on June 26. However, as further detailed below, the Secretary respectfully requests the Court abstain from ruling on the partial consent decree, because the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree approved on June 17, 2020, provides for all the relief that Plaintiffs could obtain from the Secretary on this issue.
To the extent the Court reaches the issue of analyzing the partial consent decree, Defendant requests the decree be approved because it is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in 1 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, Secretary Simon Introduces Plans for an Election in a Pandemic (April 7, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/aboutthe-office/news-room/secretary-simon-introduces-plan-for-elections-in-a-pandemic/ (last accessed June 21, 2020). 2 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, Secretary Simon Statement on Elections amid COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/aboutthe-office/news-room/secretary-simon-statement-on-elections-amid-covid-19-pandemic/ (last accessed June 21, 2020).
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the public interest. Imagine an elderly voter who lives alone. The Proposed Intervenors would require that voter to risk her life to cast a ballot—either by waiting in line at a polling place or by finding a qualified individual outside her home to come witness her fill out her absentee ballot. The parties in this case negotiated a fair and reasonable consent decree that would allow such voters to safely cast their absentee ballots in the upcoming primary election.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus that spreads rapidly through respiratory transmission. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1.) Asymptomatic individuals may carry and spread the virus and there is currently no known vaccine or effective treatment, making response efforts complex and daunting. (Id., Exs. 1-2.) On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Id., Ex. 3.) As of June 22, 2020, 33,227 Minnesotans have tested positive for COVID-19 and 1,384 have died. (Id. ¶ 3.) The virus has claimed over 119,615 lives in the United States since January 22, 2020. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.) II. MINNESOTA’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19.
In response to the COVID-19 public health crisis, Governor Walz declared a peacetime emergency on March 13, 2020. (Id., Ex. 7.) That same day, the President declared a National Emergency, and—for the first time in history—the President has approved major disaster declarations in all 50 states. (Id., Exs. 5-6.) Minnesota has engaged in a comprehensive plan to combat COVID-19 that includes slowing the spread
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of the disease, protecting the capacity of the state’s medical system to respond to the disease, and ensuring the continued operation of critical sectors to protect the public’s access to necessary services and supplies. See Emergency Executive Orders 20-02 through 20-63, 20-66, 20-70, and 20-73 through 20-74.3
Because COVID-19 is primarily spread from person-to-person contact, limiting contact between people is the most effective way to slow the spread of COVID-19. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 8.) Governor Walz issued stay-at-home orders in March and April, directing Minnesotans to stay home through May 17, 2020, except to engage in essential activities, certain types of outdoor recreation, or work in critical sectors. See Emergency Executive Orders 20-20, 20-33, and 20-48. On May 13, 2020, Governor Walz issued Executive Order 20-56 to continue safely reopening Minnesota beginning May 18, 2020. On June 5, 2020, Governor Walz signed Executive Order 20-74, implementing the third phase of the safe and gradual reopening of Minnesota businesses while recognizing the increasing risks this entails. Even under the current “Stay Safe” Minnesota Order, at-risk and vulnerable Minnesotans are strongly encouraged to stay home and exercise extreme caution to minimize the risk of COVID-19 infection. Minnesota remains under the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Order, most recently extended through July 13. Executive Order 20-75.
3 All of Minnesota’s Emergency Executive Orders regarding COVID-19 are available online at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/execorders/eoresults?gov=44.
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III. MINNESOTA’S ABSENTEE WITNESS REQUIREMENT. Eligible voters in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot, so long as they comply
with the requirements. Minnesota Statutes, section 203B.07, sets out the requirements for counties to prepare absentee ballots and for voters to mark them. The Secretary of State establishes the directions that must accompany absentee ballots. See Minn. R. 8210.0500-.0600. Minnesota statute provides that the counties “prepare, print, and transmit a return envelope, a ballot envelope, and a copy of the directions for casting an absentee ballot to each applicant whose application for absentee ballots is accepted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. The absentee ballot must include a certificate of eligibility. Id. § 203B.07, subd. 3. The certificate must contain a space for a witness to sign to attest to three facts: “(1) the ballots were displayed to that individual unmarked; (2) the voter marked the ballots in that individual’s presence without showing how they were marked, or, if the voter was physically unable to mark them, that the voter directed another individual to mark them; and (3) if the voter was not previously registered, the voter has provided proof of residence as required by section 201.061, subdivision 3.” Id. The witness who signs the certificate must be “registered to vote in Minnesota or [be] a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths” (the “Witness Requirement”).4 Id.
4 People authorized to administer oaths include “[a]ll persons holding office under any law of this state, or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal corporation thereof.” Minn. Stat. § 358.10(a).
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Absentee ballots are returned, by mail or in person, to the proper county auditor or municipal clerk. Id. § 203B.08, subd. 1. These local officials, in turn, transmit the absentee ballots to the local ballot board. Id., subd. 3. The ballot board is the local government body with the responsibility of accepting or rejecting absentee ballots. Id. § 203B.121.
Under Minnesota law, early and absentee voting begins election begins 46 days before the date of the election, which is June 26, 2020 for the August Primary. Id. § 203B.081, subd. 1. And absentee instructions, ballots, and envelopes, including the certificate of eligibility, must be prepared in time to have a supply for every precinct available to cover absentee voting prior to that date. Id. § 204B.35. IV. THE SECRETARY IS DEFENDING SEVERAL OTHER CHALLENGES TO ELECTION
STATUTES THIS YEAR. The Secretary is defending a number of cases challenging election laws which have arisen prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary’s response to all cases has been to evaluate the merits of each challenge, and determine whether the law and facts support defending the statutes at issue, or whether it would be fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest to enter into a consent decree. The most relevant and recent cases include:  Schroeder v. Simon, 62-CV-19-7440, A20-0272 (Minn. Dist. Ct. and Minn. Ct.
App.) (served Oct. 21, 2019). In this case, affected Minnesotans challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota’s felony disenfranchisement statutes. The Secretary is defending the statutes and filed a motion for summary judgment;  Pavek v. Simon, No. 19-CV-3000 (SRN/DTS) (D. Minn.) (filed Nov. 27, 2019). In this case, two Minnesotans and two Democratic campaign committees challenge the constitutionality of the “Ballot Order” statute, Minn.
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Stat. § 204D.13, subd. 2. The Secretary moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint and opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The court denied the Secretary’s motion to dismiss and granted the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. 2020 WL 3183249, at *30 (D. Minn. June 15, 2020);
 DSCC v. Simon, 62-CV-20-585 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed Jan. 17, 2020). In this case, Democratic campaign committees challenge the constitutionality of aspects of the Voter Assistance Rules in Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, 203B.03.1(a)(7), and 203B.03.2 The Secretary is defending the statutes and filed a motion to dismiss in addition to opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction;
 Thao v. Simon, 62-CV-20-1044 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (served Feb. 11, 2020). In this case, impacted voters and candidates challenged the constitutionality of aspects of the Voter Assistance Rules. Based on precedent, the Secretary entered into a consent decree concerning the at-issue restrictions set forth in Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1 as preempted by the Voting Rights Act;
 LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed May 13, 2020). In this case, four individual Minnesotans and an association challenge the constitutionality of the Witness Requirement and the requirement that mail-in ballots be received on election day by 8:00 pm. The Secretary entered into a consent decree on June 16, 2020, concerning the challenged requirements for the August Primary only for already registered voters, and the dispute is ongoing concerning the General Election;
 NAACP Minn.-Dakotas Area State Conf. v. Simon, 62-CV-3625 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (filed June 4, 2020). In this case, non-profits challenge the constitutionality of the Witness Requirement and seek universal absentee ballots for both the August Primary and November General Elections. The dispute is ongoing, but the Secretary notes that the LaRose consent decree provides relief for part of Plaintiffs’ claim concerning the primary.
V. PROCEDURAL POSTURE.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality and enforcement of Minnesota’s Witness
Requirement, in general and specifically during the ongoing public health crisis caused
by COVID-19. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on
May 19, 2020. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on May
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29, seeking to enjoin the Witness Requirement for both the August Primary and November General Elections. (Dkts. 13, 15.)
Defendant began researching and drafting his opposition, in addition to filing his Answer on June 9, defending his position and denying many of the allegations. (Dkt. 22.) The parties met and conferred concerning the pending motion and engaged in armslength negotiations during this time. The result of this work is before the Court with the stipulation and partial consent decree, which suspends the Witness Requirement for already registered voters for the August Primary only. (Dkt. 24.) On June 16, the parties submitted the stipulation and partial consent decree for approval as a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of this portion of the case with the public interest in mind. Id. Separately, in a state court matter, Defendant entered into a partial consent decree that suspends the Witness Requirement, which was approved by the court on June 17. (See Dkt. 28-1, LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020).) Proposed Intervenors have moved to intervene in that state court matter.
ARGUMENT I. THE STATE COURT PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE MOOTS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. “It is a firmly entrenched and fundamental principle of law that a cause is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, could not have any practical effect upon the then existing controversy.” Flight Eng’rs Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO, TWA Chapter v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 305 F.2d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted); see Beck v. Mo. State
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High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating that a case becomes moot when a court can no longer grant effective relief). Mootness divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy. Beck, 18 F.3d at 605; see Abdurrahman v. Dayton, 903 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2018).5
A case becomes moot when subsequent developments in other cases, such as consent decrees, mean relief from a court is no longer needed. See Envt’l Conserv. Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2008). In City of Dallas, the Fifth Circuit held that a lawsuit between an environmental group and the City of Dallas became moot after the city entered a consent decree with the Environmental Protection Agency in a separate lawsuit on the same issues. Id. The court explained that, because the consent decree provided the relief requested by the environmental group, it did not make sense for the defendant to be exposed to duplicative orders in two different cases. Id. at 528.
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims concerning the August Primary and the Proposed Intervenors’ objections to the partial consent decree are now moot because the Secretary has entered into a partial consent decree with identical relief on this same issue in state
5 The Court should consider mootness and the justiciability of the present issue before considering the merits of Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene and opposition to the partial consent decree. See S.E.C. v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (It is well settled that “federal courts may act only in the context of a justiciable case or controversy.”); see, e.g., Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-CV-03075-JSC, 2015 WL 4537533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain motion to intervene where stipulated dismissal divested the court of jurisdiction over the case, and there was no live case or controversy into which the party could intervene).
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court. (See Dkt. 28-1, LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-20-3149 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2020) (approving partial consent decree filed on June 16, 2020).) In the Ramsey County District Court action, the Secretary stipulated that he will not enforce the Witness Requirement with respect to already registered voters for the August Primary only. (Compare LaRose Partial Consent Decree Sec. VI.A. with LWV of MN Partial Consent Decree p. 6 ¶ 1.) The Secretary agreed to also issue guidance to all relevant local election officials and take reasonable steps to inform the public that the Witness Requirement for voting will not be enforced for the August Primary. (Compare LaRose Partial Consent Decree ¶¶ VI.C, E, G with LWV of MN Partial Consent Decree p. 6 ¶¶ 2-4.) Notably, Proposed Intervenors do not dispute this obvious justiciability issue, and admit that “it would be ‘particularly inappropriate’ for this Court to enter a consent decree when ‘[m]uch of the relief requested here has been provided by [another consent] decree.’” (Dkt. 41, Prop. Intervenors’ Opp. at 35.)
Additionally, after the LaRose partial consent decree was approved on June 17, the Secretary has taken steps presently to abide by the decree. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 9.) There is no remaining controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant concerning the August Primary and the enforcement of the Witness Requirement. Because the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree provides for all of the relief that Plaintiffs could obtain from the Secretary on this issue, the Court should abstain from deciding on
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the present partial consent decree and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief as moot.6 II. THE PRINCIPLES OF COLORADO RIVER SUPPORT ABSTENTION.
Even if the request for judicial approval of the parties’ consent decree is not moot, the present circumstance is one in which the Court should abstain from taking any action under the Colorado River doctrine. The Proposed Intervenors acknowledge as much by suggesting that analyzing the consent decree in this action may not be a “worthwhile ‘commitment of the court’s limited resources.’” (Dkt. 41 at 35.) Because the LaRose case was started first and is the more complete action, and the consent decree is approved and being implemented, this court should abstain in favor of the parallel proceeding in state court.
“Colorado River permits federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases where ‘parallel’ state court litigation is pending, meaning that there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.’” Spectra Commc’ns Group, LLC v. City of Cameron, Mo., 806 F.3d 1113,
6 None of the exceptions to mootness exist here. The voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply because Defendant is not merely ceasing the challenged practice. See City of Dallas, 529 F.3d at 527-28. Defendant is subject to the Ramsey County District Court partial consent decree. Nor is this an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008). “That exception applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Id. at 735 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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1121 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see generally 17A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4247 (3d ed.) (describing the development of this type of abstention).
A threshold determination is whether the federal and state proceedings are indeed parallel. Proceedings are parallel when there is “a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding matters not parallel because the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over one of plaintiff’s claims). Considerations include “the sources of law, remedies sought, elements of proof, review on appeal, and events giving rise to each cause of action.” Fru-Con Const. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 537 (8th Cir. 2009).
In this case, it is undisputed that the LaRose consent decree does fully dispose of the consent decree entered between the parties to this case. (See supra.) The consent decree here is subsumed by the broader LaRose consent decree. The decrees arise out of the same events (COVID-19) and statutes, the same law, and provide the same relief with respect to the Witness Requirement. Where there are differences, the LaRose case is broader. Furthermore, the Proposed Intervenors have now sought to intervene in both actions. At least with respect to the issue immediately before the Court—the parties’ consent decree—the LaRose consent decree does dispose of the instant consent decree.7
After establishing the two matters are parallel, courts look at six factors to assess whether abstention is appropriate in favor of the state case: 7 Defendant will leave for another day the question of whether the entire cases are sufficiently parallel that this Court should abstain by staying or dismissing the matter.
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(1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., 806 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Ark. Elec. Coops., Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Eighth Circuit’s decision, affirming Colorado River abstention in Spectra Communications, is on all fours with the instant case. In that dispute between a city and telecommunications company, the city had sued the company in state court for failure to pay taxes and fees. Five months later, the company sued the city in federal court, alleging that the city refused to grant it a construction permit unless and until the company was current in its payment of taxes and fees (the company asserted those same claims as counterclaims in the state litigation). The state court granted partial summary judgment for the city on the issue of the propriety of the taxes and fees. The city then moved to have the company’s federal claims dismissed, and the district court dismissed based on abstention principles. Id. at 1117-18. In applying the six factors of Colorado River, the Eighth Circuit noted that the first two were irrelevant in Spectra Communications. However, the “predominant factor”—the risk of piecemeal litigation—was a real concern and weighed in favor of abstention. Id. at 1121. That was true because: a) the state and federal courts involved the same issues, so there was a risk they would reach conflicting opinions; and b) the
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state court action was also the more complete action – it included all the relevant parties and all the relevant claims. Id. at 1122. The fourth factor also favored abstention because the state court was the first to obtain jurisdiction over the parties and had already entered partial summary judgment. Id. Even though the fifth factor weighed against abstention, because the telecom had raised federal preemption issues, the court still found abstention appropriate, especially as the state court could resolve all claims and protect the telecom’s interests. Id.
In this case too, the first two factors are irrelevant. But the most predominant factor, the risk of conflicting opinions, is a real concern. Furthermore, as in Spectra, the LaRose matter was filed first and has already issued its consent decree. While the Plaintiff here raises federal claims, those First and Fourteenth Amendment are claims commonly addressed in state court and the Plaintiff’s interests can be protected there (especially if they seek to intervene). Just as in Spectra Communications, the Court should abstain in favor of the parallel proceeding in Ramsey County District Court. III. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE AND ENTER THE PARTIAL
CONSENT DECREE BECAUSE IT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, REASONABLE, AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Alternatively, if the Court does not abstain, the Court should approve and enter the consent decree because it is a fair, adequate, and reasonable resolution of the claims concerning the August Primary, and time is of the essence. A consent decree represents the parties’ agreement to compromise a concrete legal dispute on the merits and waive any right to further litigate the covered issues. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971). Consent decrees have
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attributes of both a contract and a judicial decree, and are considered settlement agreements subject to continued judicial oversight. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 524 n.13 (1986); United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1975). Unsurprisingly, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree, nor may it enter a consent decree that attempts to dispose of the claims of a third party, without that party’s agreement. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529. But neither may “an intervenor . . . preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation” certain issues. Id. (noting “while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent”).
The initial decision to approve or reject a consent decree “is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Courts, however, usually exercise this discretion in a limited and deferential manner. See id. In reviewing a proposed consent decree, the Court does not decide the merits of the parties’ dispute. Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A consent decree . . . should be strictly construed to preserve the bargained for position of the parties. A court has no occasion to resolve the merits of the disputed issues or the factual underpinnings of the various legal theories advanced by the parties.” (internal citations omitted)). Rather, the standard the Court applies when reviewing a proposed consent decree is to determine whether the decree is “fair,
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adequate, and reasonable, as well as consistent with the public interest.” United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 1986); see E.E.O.C. v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 666 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom, Makah Indian Tribe v. United States, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). Once the Court has determined the proposed decree is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest, it should approve the decree even if it “provides broader relief than the court could have awarded.” Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525; see Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
It is well established that public policy strongly favors settlements of disputes without litigation. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 776 F.2d 410, 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Randolph, 736 F.2d at 528. Also, judicial deference to negotiated consent decrees is particularly appropriate where the government has entered into a consent decree. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529; see also United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the balancing of interests “must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General”); United States v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating the “Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining what is in the public interest”).
A. The Partial Consent Decree is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. When considering whether a consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts consider a number of factors, such as whether the decree is the result of armslength negotiations, the strength of plaintiffs’ case and likelihood of success, and whether
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the decree represents a reasonable factual and legal determination. United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84, 86 (1st Cir. 1990); Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581. “A court may not withhold approval simply because the benefits accrued from the decree are not what a successful plaintiff would have received in a fully litigated case.” Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 922; see Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581-82; Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525-26. In assessing the decree, the Court must determine whether it falls within the “range of reasonableness,” not whether it is the most favorable possible result for either party in the litigation. See In re Nationwide Fin. Servs. Litig., No. 2:08-CV-00249, 2009 WL 8747486, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2009); UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-CV73991, 2006 WL 891151, at *17 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006).
Here, the parties entered into arms-length negotiations after Plaintiffs filed and fully briefed a motion for a preliminary injunction on an emergency basis. Defendant had no doubt that Plaintiffs could prove that, given the current situation regarding COVID-19, some isolated voters, and in particular those who are immunocompromised or elderly, will likely not be able to safely secure a qualified witness in order to cast absentee ballots for the upcoming primary election. If the absentee witness requirement were enforced, these voters would have to choose between their health and their right to vote.
Defendant was also aware that a federal court in Virginia had recently approved a consent decree suspending that state’s witness requirement for this year’s primary election, and a federal court in South Carolina had recently enjoined that state’s witness
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requirement for its primary. See, e.g., Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-CV-01552, 2020 WL 2617329, at *22 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *10 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020).
The Virginia court succinctly explained why a witness requirement should not be enforced in the time of COVID-19:
In ordinary times, Virginia’s witness signature requirement may not be a significant burden on the right to vote. But these are not ordinary times. In our current era of social distancing-where not just Virginians, but all Americans, have been instructed to maintain a minimum of six feet from those outside their household–the burden is substantial for a substantial and discrete class of Virginia's electorate. During this pandemic, the witness requirement has become both too restrictive and not restrictive enough to effectively prevent voter fraud. League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *8 (quotation marks and citation omitted). While Proposed Intervenors rely on Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020), this case actually supports the partial consent decree because it establishes that reforms or modifications to state election laws due to the COVID-19 pandemic are appropriate. The case involved the issue of whether several election laws in Wisconsin should be altered or suspended for its April 7, 2020 primary election because of the pandemic. The district court had ordered that absentee ballots received six days after the election should be counted, regardless of when they are postmarked. Id. at 1206. The Supreme Court altered the district court’s injunction so that ballots had to be postmarked by Election Day to be counted. Id. at 1208. While the Supreme Court somewhat narrowed the district court’s order, even the
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Supreme Court’s order marked a departure from Wisconsin’s normal election requirement that ballots must be received by election day. Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, recognizing that COVID-19 required an adjustment to the state election requirement, ordered that ballots must be counted if they are postmarked by Election Day and received within six days of Election Day. Id. at 1208. The Court took no position on “whether other reforms or modifications in election procedures in light of COVID–19 are appropriate,” but did not rule them out. Id.
Here, the agreement before the Court is fair, adequate, and reasonable and recognizes the uncertainties and unique pressures of voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Proposed Intervenors’ hostility to state officials’ good faith efforts to find ways to allow voters to safely cast their ballots during this pandemic is remarkable.8 There is nothing fair, adequate, or reasonable about Proposed-Intervenors’ position that voters should have to risk their health and safety to cast a ballot.
8 Proposed Intervenors insinuate collusion because Defendant made efforts to get legislation passed that would relax absentee-voting rules and is “a member of the League of Women Voters.” (Dkt. 41 at 27.) This is a baseless attempt to undermine the propriety of the partial consent decree and the arms-length negotiation between experienced counsel. “Absent evidence to the contrary, the court may presume that settlement negotiations were conducted in good faith and that the resulting agreement was reached without collusion.” League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *11 (citation omitted); see In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“Courts respect the integrity of counsel and presume the absence of fraud or collusion in negotiating the settlement unless evidence to the contrary is offered.”). Also, if the consent decree “itself is fair, reasonable and adequate, then the court may assume that the negotiations were proper and free of collusion.” IUE-CWA v. Gen. Motors Corp., 238 F.R.D. 583, 598 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
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B. The Partial Consent Decree is in the Public Interest. It is clear here that the Defendant, Plaintiffs, and Proposed Intervenors have different views of what the public interest requires. However, as noted above, it is axiomatic that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, as the Chief Legal Officer and Chief Election Officer respectively, “retain considerable discretion” in the defense of these cases and in “determining what is in the public interest.” Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d at 117. Defendant has determined, as other states have, that temporarily suspending the Witness Requirement for the impending primary election promotes the public interest in safeguarding public health. See, e.g., Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *22 (South Carolina); League of Women Voters of Va., 2020 WL 2158249, at *10 (Virginia).9 Like other states, Minnesota has a “legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 932 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2019). However, this interest must be weighed along with other considerations in the midst of a pandemic where officials are called on to remedy dangerous or unhealthy situations and prevent the further spread of disease. The public interest also “favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible.” Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012).
9 Rhode Island’s Governor suspended the state’s witness requirement in advance of the June primary through executive order. See Rhode Island Executive Orders 20-11, 20-27, available at https://governor.ri.gov/newsroom/orders/ (last accessed June 22, 2020).
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As the Court in Thomas acknowledges, “[w]ere it not for the current pandemic, then this element may have cut the other way.” Thomas, 2020 WL 2617329, at *23. But the Witness Requirement subjects some voters to interaction with people outside their household in a way that could impact their health negatively and be in contravention to current state and federal health experts’ guidelines. Since Defendant reasoned after research, investigation, and consideration of a number of options that maintaining the Witness Requirement with absentee voting starting on June 26 would only increase the risk for contracting COVID-19 for many Minnesotans, he entered into this partial consent decree to promote the public interest.
C. The Court May Approve the Partial Consent Decree Over the Proposed Intervenor’s Objections.
Despite Proposed Intervenors arguments, there is no authority for the Proposed Intervenors to “block” this consent decree given their alleged legal interests in the matter. As the Supreme Court has stated:
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that one party—whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or an intervenor—could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 528-29 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court only provides an exception where “nonconsenting intervenors” have brought “valid claims” that are “properly raised.” Id. at 529; see S. California Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807
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(9th Cir.) (citing Local No. 93, finding the district court did not exceed its authority by approving the stipulated settlement without the intervenor’s consent). While the Court may permit input from Proposed Intervenors when considering entry of the consent decree, to accord Proposed Intervenors what amounts to a veto based on their claims would effectively preclude settlement of any election law litigation by the Secretary—an illogical and unsupported outcome.
Here, the Proposed Intervenors have not demonstrated that the partial consent decree concretely affects any of their legal rights. “As in Local No. 93, the consent decree here does not bind [Proposed Intervenors] to do or not to do anything, nor does it impose any legal obligations on [Proposed Intervenors].” Johnson v. Lodge #93 of Fraternal Order of Police, 393 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2004); see Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 528-29. Outside of raising a difference of opinion in how they would have defended this matter, the Proposed Intervenors have not presented any claim for relief to the Court, but rather joined the action solely to protest the proposed consent decree. The interests the Proposed Intervenors raise do not amount to the kind of “valid claims” the Supreme Court envisioned in Local No. 93. It is the Secretary of State who is a necessary party to the litigation and consent decree, and who has authority to make the decision to suspend the Witness Requirement for the August Primary. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1997) (finding in a redistricting case the state should be given the opportunity to make its own decisions so long as that is practically possible, and the state’s attorney general had the authority “to propose the settlement plan” on the
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state’s behalf). Thus, the Court may approve the partial consent decree over the Proposed

Intervenors’ objections.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully submits that this Court no

longer has jurisdiction over the partial consent decree because the issue is moot, or at

least that the Court should abstain from passing on the partial consent decree’s

appropriateness. To the extent the Court reaches the issue of analyzing the partial

consent decree, Defendant requests the decree be approved because it is fair, adequate,

reasonable, and in the public interest.

Dated: June 22, 2020

KEITH ELLISON Attorney General State of Minnesota

s/ Hillary A. Taylor JASON MARISAM (#0398187) CICELY R. MILTICH (#0392902) HILLARY A. TAYLOR (#0398557) Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131 (651) 757-1275 (Voice) (651) 282-5832 (Fax) jason.marisam@ag.state.mn.us cicely.miltich@ag.state.mn.us hillary.taylor@ag.state.mn.us
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,

Civil No. 0:20-cv-01205 (ECT/TNL)
DECLARATION OF HILLARY TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S OBJECTIONS TO PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE

Defendant.

I, HILLARY A. TAYLOR, declare under penalty of perjury:

1. I am an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota and represent

Secretary of State Steve Simon in this action.

2. I make this declaration in good faith based on my personal knowledge of

the facts set forth herein and on documents that are publicly available, but provided here

for the convenience of the Court and the parties.

3. The Minnesota Department of Health has been gathering and publishing

daily data about the impact of COVID-19 on our state. That information is available at a

webpage called “Situation Update for the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” at

https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html. I visited that page on

June 22 after 11:00 a.m., when it is updated, and reviewed the “deaths data table”

(https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#death1),

which

reflected 1,384 total deaths and 636 new deaths since Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. I

also reviewed the “hospitalization data table” (https://www.health.state.mn.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 4
us/diseases/coronavirus/situation.html#hosp1), which shows that 332 Minnesotans are hospitalized as of June 22, 2020, and 3,830 Minnesotans have required hospitalization overall. Finally, the data shows that 33,227 Minnesotans have tested positive for COVID-19 as of June 22, 2020.
4. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of World Health Organization’s website publication Coronavirus Overview, printed June 22, 2020, available online at www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1.
5. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Minnesota Department of Health website publication, About Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19), printed June 22, 2020, www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/basics.html.
6. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the World Health Organization Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 on March 11, 2020, available online at www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
7. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention gathers and publishes data each day about the impact of COVID-19 on our country. That information is available online at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-inus.html. I visited that website after 11:00 a.m. on June 22, 2020, and it identified 119,615 total deaths in the United States from COVID-19 since January 22, 2020. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the website printed on June 22, 2020.
8. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 3 of 4
Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, March 13, 2020, available online at www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergencyconcerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
9. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Coleman, J., All 50 States Under Disaster Declaration for First Time in US History, The Hill, Apr. 12, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/public-global-health/492433-all-50-states-underdisaster-declaration-for-first.
10. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of Emergency Executive Order 20-01 (Mar. 13, 2020), available online at https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-01.pdf.
11. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s online publication How COVID-19 Spreads, printed June 22, 2020, available online at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.
12. Attached as Exhibit 9 is guidance provided to County Election Administrators sent on June 19, 2020, regarding the suspension of the Witness Requirement as applied to absentee and mail-in ballot voting, in compliance with the partial consent decree entered and approved in LaRose v. Simon, 62-CV-30-3149 (June 17, 2020).
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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47 Filed 06/22/20 Page 4 of 4

FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NOT. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATE: June 22, 2020

s/Hillary A. Taylor HILLARY A. TAYLOR

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TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 1

6/22/2020

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There is a current outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) disease

Find out more →

©
Coronavirus

Overview

Prevention

Symptoms

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus.
Most people infected with the COVID-19 virus will experience mild to moderate respiratory illness and recover without requiring special treatment. Older people, and those with underlying medical problems like cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and cancer are more likely to develop serious illness.

https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1

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The best way to prevent and slow down transmission is be well informed about the COVID-19 virus, the disease it causes and how it spreads. Protect yourself and others from infection by washing your hands or using an alcohol based rub frequently and not touching your face.
The COVID-19 virus spreads primarily through droplets of saliva or discharge from the nose when an infected person coughs or sneezes, so it’s important that you also practice respiratory etiquette (for example, by coughing into a flexed elbow).
At this time, there are no specific vaccines or treatments for COVID-19. However, there are many ongoing clinical trials evaluating potential treatments. WHO will continue to provide updated information as soon as clinical findings become available.
Stay informed:
Protect yourself: advice for the public Myth busters Questions and answers Situation reports All information on the COVID-19 outbreak

Stay safe

+

Situation updates

+

Research and guidance

+

https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1

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TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 2

6/22/2020

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(http://www.health.state.mn.us/index.html)

About COVID-19
On this page: COVID-19 disease How it spreads Severity Treatment Many unknowns More
COVID-19 disease
COVID-19 is an infec ous disease. The disease is caused by a coronavirus not found in people before. It causes viral respiratory illness. We are s ll learning about the new virus. We do not know yet:
How sick it may make diﬀerent people. How well it passes between people. Other features the new coronavirus may have. We will share more informa on when we have it.

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Key Messages (http://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/materials/keymessages.html) Basic overview of COVID-19 in mul ple languages.
How it spreads
People can spread the COVID-19 disease to each other. The disease is thought to spread by nose and mouth droplets when someone who is infected coughs, sneezes or exhales. The droplets can land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. It may be possible for people to breathe the droplets into their lungs. It is important to stay 6 feet away from other people in public. At home, someone who is sick should stay alone, in one room, as much as possible. Droplets can land on surfaces and objects that other people then touch. It is important to wash your hands before you touch your mouth, nose, face or eyes. Clean surfaces that are touched o en. Clean surfaces o en if someone in the house is sick. Infected people may be able to spread the disease before they have symptoms or feel sick.

Severity

https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/basics.html

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Many people with COVID-19 have mild illness. However, anyone can become severely ill from this virus. Based on current informa on and experience, older adults and people of any age who have serious underlying medical condi ons have a greater risk of ge ng very sick from COVID-19. Ask your health care provider if you have greater risk of ge ng sicker. People at higher risk may be:
Age 65 and older. Living in a nursing home or long-term care facility. Any age if they have underlying health condi ons, especially if the condi ons are not well controlled:
Chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma. Serious heart condi ons. Severe obesity with body mass index (BMI) of 40 or higher. Diabetes. Chronic kidney disease undergoing dialysis. Liver disease. Immunocompromised. Many condi ons can cause a person to be immunocompromised, including cancer treatment, smoking, bone marrow or organ transplanta on, immune deﬁciencies, poorly controlled HIV or AIDS, and prolonged use of cor costeroids and other immune weakening medica ons. For more informa on, see: Managing Chronic Condi ons during COVID-19 (http://www.health.state.mn.us/people/conditions/index.html) CDC: COVID-19 and HIV (https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/covid-19/index.html) MATEC: COVID-19 Informa on for Persons Living with HIV in Minnesota (Google Doc) (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OpEzQqNP0dNDowYjxaf0PVARbh2b_Me-/edit)

Treatment
COVID-19 has no known speciﬁc treatment. Rest and drink lots of liquids. If your symptoms get worse and you need a doctor, call your clinic or an emergency room before you go there.

Many unknowns

As doctors and scien sts con nue to gather new informa on, it is important to take COVID-19 seriously. We know some of the nega ve eﬀects it can have, but we do not yet know all of the nega ve eﬀects it may have. It is important to keep working to slow the spread of the virus by staying home when you can, staying 6 feet away from others, wearing a mask, covering your coughs and sneezes, and washing your hands o en and well.

Physical health effects

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The virus that causes COVID-19 can aﬀect people in diﬀerent ways. Some can get very sick, while most have mild or moderate symptoms and get be er without going to a clinic or into a hospital. Some have no symptoms. Some people die. Some people are in the hospital for weeks. Some may need to be put on a ven lator in order to breathe and survive. Some may need to be put on a heart-lung bypass machine. The virus that causes COVID-19 has been linked to increased:
Blood clo ng. Strokes. Heart damage. Other organ damage. For those that do get be er, they may have long-term health problems from the virus. The disease may cause damage to the lungs, leading to ongoing trouble with breathing. New evidence shows that COVID-19 can also lead to health problems in children. More research is needed to be er understand how the virus may cause short and long-term illness. More informa on: Nervous system damage: Neurologic Manifesta ons of Hospitalized Pa ents With Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Wuhan, China (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaneurology/fullarticle/2764549) Heart damage: The Harvard Gaze e: Coronavirus and the heart (https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/04/covid-19s-consequences-for-theheart/) Risks for pregnant women and infants: Neonatal Early-Onset Infec on With SARS-CoV-2 in 33 Neonates Born to Mothers With COVID-19 in Wuhan, China (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/2763787) New complica ons in children: For Parents: Mul system Inﬂammatory Syndrome in Children (MIS-C) associated with COVID-19 (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/children/mis-c.html) Possible sexual transmission: Clinical Characteris cs and Results of Semen Tests Among Men With Coronavirus Disease 2019 (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2765654)

Other health effects
COVID-19 disease can cause more than physical health problems. COVID-19 is a con nuing threat to the personal, ﬁnancial, and mental well-being of Minnesotans This stress can lead to health problems. COVID-19 can cause stress when people:
Must be in the hospital. Lose their jobs or cannot go to work. Do not have money to pay bills. Are separated from family and friends.

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More

Symptoms & Tes ng: COVID-19 (http://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/symptoms.html) What are the symptoms, when to get tested, and where to get tested. If You Are Sick: COVID-19 (http://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/sick.html) What to do if you are sick and informa on on going to the doctor. Protect Yourself & Others: COVID-19 (http://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/prevention.html) How to slow the spread, including informa on on masks and cloth face coverings and cleaning your home. Daily Life & Coping: COVID-19 (http://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/cope.html) Mul genera onal living, stress and coping, pets, and more.

Updated Tuesday, 16-Jun-2020 15:28:38 CDT

https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/basics.html

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TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 3

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WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020
11 March 2020
Good afternoon.
In the past two weeks, the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China has increased 13-fold, and the number of affected countries has tripled.
There are now more than 118,000 cases in 114 countries, and 4,291 people have lost their lives.
Thousands more are fighting for their lives in hospitals.
In the days and weeks ahead, we expect to see the number of cases, the number of deaths, and the number of affected countries climb even higher.
WHO has been assessing this outbreak around the clock and we are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction.
We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.
Pandemic is not a word to use lightly or carelessly. It is a word that, if misused, can cause unreasonable fear, or unjustified acceptance that the fight is over, leading to unnecessary suffering and death.

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020

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Describing the situation as a pandemic does not change WHO’s assessment of the threat posed by this virus. It doesn’t change what WHO is doing, and it doesn’t change what countries should do.
We have never before seen a pandemic sparked by a coronavirus. This is the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus.
And we have never before seen a pandemic that can be controlled, at the same time.
WHO has been in full response mode since we were notified of the first cases.
And we have called every day for countries to take urgent and aggressive action.
We have rung the alarm bell loud and clear.
===
As I said on Monday, just looking at the number of cases and the number of countries affected does not tell the full story.
Of the 118,000 cases reported globally in 114 countries, more than 90 percent of cases are in just four countries, and two of those – China and the Republic of Korea - have significantly declining epidemics.
81 countries have not reported any cases, and 57 countries have reported 10 cases or less.
We cannot say this loudly enough, or clearly enough, or often enough: all countries can still change the course of this pandemic.
If countries detect, test, treat, isolate, trace, and mobilize their people in the response, those with a handful of cases can prevent those cases becoming clusters, and those clusters becoming community transmission.
Even those countries with community transmission or large clusters can turn the tide on this virus.
Several countries have demonstrated that this virus can be suppressed and controlled.
The challenge for many countries who are now dealing with large clusters or community transmission is not whether they can do the same – it’s whether they will.
Some countries are struggling with a lack of capacity.
Some countries are struggling with a lack of resources.

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020

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Some countries are struggling with a lack of resolve.
We are grateful for the measures being taken in Iran, Italy and the Republic of Korea to slow the virus and control their epidemics.
We know that these measures are taking a heavy toll on societies and economies, just as they did in China.
All countries must strike a fine balance between protecting health, minimizing economic and social disruption, and respecting human rights.
WHO’s mandate is public health. But we’re working with many partners across all sectors to mitigate the social and economic consequences of this pandemic.
This is not just a public health crisis, it is a crisis that will touch every sector – so every sector and every individual must be involved in the fight.
I have said from the beginning that countries must take a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach, built around a comprehensive strategy to prevent infections, save lives and minimize impact.
Let me summarize it in four key areas.
First, prepare and be ready.
Second, detect, protect and treat.
Third, reduce transmission.
Fourth, innovate and learn.
I remind all countries that we are calling on you to activate and scale up your emergency response mechanisms;
Communicate with your people about the risks and how they can protect themselves – this is everybody’s business;
Find, isolate, test and treat every case and trace every contact;
Ready your hospitals;
Protect and train your health workers.

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020

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And let’s all look out for each other, because we need each other. === There’s been so much attention on one word. Let me give you some other words that matter much more, and that are much more actionable. Prevention. Preparedness. Public health. Political leadership. And most of all, people. We’re in this together, to do the right things with calm and protect the citizens of the world. It’s doable. I thank you.
Subscribe to the WHO newsletter →

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 14 of 54
TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 4

6/22/2020

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL DocuCmaseenstin4th7e-U1.S. F| CilDeCd 06/22/20 Page 15 of 54

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Cases in the U.S.
Last updated on June 21, 2020
TOTAL CASES
2,248,029
32,411 New Cases*

TOTAL DEATHS
119,615
560 New Deaths*

Want More Data?
CDC COVID Data Tracker

Cases & Deaths by Jurisdiction
38 jurisdictions report more than 10,000 cases of COVID-19.
This map shows COVID-19 cases and deaths reported by U.S. states, the District of Columbia, New York City, and other U.S.a liated jurisdictions. Hover over the map to see the number of cases and deaths reported in each jurisdiction. To go to a jurisdiction’s health department website, click on the jurisdiction on the map.

Reported Cases

0 to 1,000 5,001 to 10,000 20,001 to 40,000

1,001 to 5,000 10,001 to 20,000 40,001 or more

AS GU MH FM MP PW PR VI
Cases & Deaths by County
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

Add U.S. Map to Your Website
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Select a state to view the number of cases and deaths by county. This data is courtesy of USAFacts.org 

Select a State

View County Data

New Cases by Day
The following chart shows the number of new COVID-19 cases reported each day in the U.S. since the beginning of the outbreak. Hover over the bars to see the number of new cases by day.

Number of New Cases

40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000
5,000 0 01/22/2020

02/07/2020

02/23/2020

03/10/2020

03/26/2020

04/11/2020

04/27/2020

05/13/2020

05/29/2020

06/14/2020

View Data

Cases Reset

Cases by Age
The following chart shows the age of people with COVID-19. Hover over each bar or click on the plus (+) sign below the chart to see the number of cases in each age group. Data were collected from 1,934,566 people, and age was available for 1,932,051 (99.9%) people.

Number of Cases

836,619

717,102

597,585

478,068

358,551

239,034

119,517

0

0-17

18-44

45-64

65-74

75+

View Data

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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Cases by Race/Ethnicity
The following chart shows the race/ethnicity of people with COVID-19. Hover over each bar or click on the plus (+) sign below the chart to see the percentage for each race/ethnicity group. Select from the “Age” dropdown list to see the percentage for each age group.
Data were collected from 1,934,566 people, but race/ethnicity was only available for 932,488 (48.2 %) people. CDC is working with states to provide more information on race/ethnicity for reported cases. The percent of reported cases that include race/ethnicity data is increasing.

Filtered by Age: All Ages

Age All Ages

Percent of Cases

30% 25% 20% 15% 10%
5% 0%
NAomnIne-drHANiicilasaaanpsntika/vanei,c

Non-HiAsspiaanni,c

Non-HiBsplaacnki,c

Hispanic/Lianto

MNuoltnip-Hlei/sOpatehnri,c

HNaowNnaa-IisOHtiPaliavatinshnecpeid/fariecnri,c

Non-HWisphaitnei,c

View Data

These data only represent the geographic areas that contributed data on race/ethnicity. Every geographic area has a di erent racial and ethnic composition. These data are not generalizable to the entire U.S. population.
If cases were distributed equally across racial and ethnic populations, one would expect to see more cases in those populations that are more highly represented in geographic areas that contributed data.

Cases & Deaths among Healthcare Personnel
Data were collected from 1,934,565 people, but healthcare personnel status was only available for 420,053 (21.7%) people. For the 83,365 cases of COVID-19 among healthcare personnel, death status was only available for 53,613 (64.3%).

CASES AMONG HCP
83,365

DEATHS AMONG HCP
463

Previous Data

CDC has moved the following information to the Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data page.

Level of community transmission by jurisdiction last updated May 18 2020

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL DocuCmaseenstin4th7e-U1.S. F| CilDeCd 06/22/20 Page 18 of 54 Level of community transmission by jurisdiction — last updated May 18, 2020 Total number of cases by day — last updated April 28, 2020 Number of cases by source of exposure — last updated April 16, 2020 Number of cases from Wuhan, China and the Diamond Princess cruise — last updated April 16, 2020 Number of cases by illness start date — last updated April 15, 2020

About the Data
Updated Daily This page is updated daily based on data con rmed at 4:00pm ET the day before.
Reported by Jurisdiction’s Health Department Data on this page are reported voluntarily to CDC by each jurisdiction’s health department. CDC encourages all jurisdictions to report the most complete and accurate information that best represents the current status of the pandemic in their jurisdiction.
Number of Jurisdictions There are currently 56 U.S.-a liated jurisdictions reporting cases of COVID-19. This includes 50 states, District of Columbia, Guam, New York City, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S Virgin Islands. New York State’s case and death counts do not include New York City’s counts as they are separate jurisdictions.
Con rmed & Probable Counts As of April 14, 2020, CDC case counts and death counts include both con rmed and probable cases and deaths. This change was made to re ect an interim COVID-19 position statement   issued by the Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists on April 5, 2020. The position statement included a case de nition and made COVID-19 a nationally noti able disease. Nationally noti able disease cases are voluntarily reported to CDC by jurisdictions. A con rmed case or death is de ned by meeting con rmatory laboratory evidence for COVID-19. A probable case or death is de ned by one of the following:
Meeting clinical criteria AND epidemiologic evidence with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID-19 Meeting presumptive laboratory evidence AND either clinical criteria OR epidemiologic evidence Meeting vital records criteria with no con rmatory laboratory testing performed for COVID19 Not all jurisdictions report con rmed and probable cases and deaths to CDC. When not available to CDC, it is noted as N/A.
Accuracy of Data

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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CDC does not know the exact number of COVID-19 illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths for a variety of reasons. COVID-19 can cause mild illness, symptoms might not appear immediately, there are delays in reporting and testing, not everyone who is infected gets tested or seeks medical care, and there may be di erences in how jurisdictions con rm numbers.

Changes & Fluctuations in Data
Health departments may update case data over time when they receive more complete and accurate information.
The number of new cases reported each day uctuates. There is generally less reporting on the weekends and holidays.

Di erences between CDC and Jurisdiction Data
If the number of cases or deaths reported by CDC is di erent from the number reported by jurisdiction health departments, data reported by jurisdictions should be considered the most up to date. The di erences may be due

More Information
COVIDView – A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity Previous U.S. COVID-19 Case Data FAQ: COVID-19 Data and Surveillance Testing Data in the U.S. World Map Health Departments

Page last reviewed: June 21, 2020

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 20 of 54
TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 5

6/22/2020

CAPrSocElam0at:i2on0o-ncDve-c0la1ri2ng0a5N-EatiConTal-ETmNerLgencDy Coocnucemrneinng th4e 7No-v1el CForiolenadvir0us6D/2ise2a/s2e0(COPVIaD-g19e) O2u1tbroefak5|4The White House

PROCLAMATIONS
Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak
Issued on: March 13, 2020
★★★
In December 2019, a novel (new) coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2 (“the virus”) was first detected in Wuhan, Hubei Province, People’s Republic of China, causing outbreaks of the coronavirus disease COVID-19 that has now spread globally. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared a public health emergency on January 31, 2020, under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d), in response to COVID-19. I have taken sweeping action to control the spread of the virus in the United States, including by suspending entry of foreign nationals seeking entry who had been physically present within the prior 14 days in certain jurisdictions where COVID-19 outbreaks have occurred, including the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Schengen Area of Europe. The Federal Government, along with State and local governments, has taken preventive and proactive measures to slow the spread of the virus and treat those a ected, including by instituting Federal quarantines for individuals evacuated from foreign nations, issuing a declaration pursuant to section 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6d), and releasing policies to accelerate the acquisition of personal protective equipment and streamline bringing new diagnostic capabilities to laboratories. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization announced that the COVID-19 outbreak can be characterized as a pandemic, as the rates of infection continue to rise in many locations around the world and across the United States.
The spread of COVID-19 within our Nation’s communities threatens to strain our Nation’s healthcare systems. As of March 12, 2020, 1,645 people from 47 States have been infected with the virus that
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ 1/3

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causes COVID-19. It is incumbent on hospitals and medical facilities throughout the country to

assess their preparedness posture and be prepared to surge capacity and capability. Additional

measures, however, are needed to successfully contain and combat the virus in the United States.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 201 and 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and consistent with section 1135 of the Social Security Act (SSA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5), do hereby find and proclaim that the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a national emergency, beginning March 1, 2020. Pursuant to this declaration, I direct as follows:

Section 1. Emergency Authority. The Secretary of HHS may exercise the authority under section 1135 of the SSA to temporarily waive or modify certain requirements of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance programs and of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule throughout the duration of the public health emergency declared in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Sec. 2. Certification and Notice. In exercising this authority, the Secretary of HHS shall provide certification and advance written notice to the Congress as required by section 1135(d) of the SSA (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5(d)).

Sec. 3. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise a ect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the O ice of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its o icers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ 2/3

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirteenth day of March, in the year of our

Lord two thousand twenty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two

hundred and forty-fourth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ 3/3

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 24 of 54
TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 6

6/22/2020

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All 50 states under disaster declaration for irst time in US history

BY JUSTINE COLEMAN - 04/12/20 04:31 PM EDT

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All 50 states are under a major disaster declaration for the irst time in U.S. history, after President Trump approved Wyoming’s declaration Saturday.
Within 22 days, Trump declared a major emergency in all 50 states and most territories through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The inal disaster declaration occurred on the same day U.S. surpassed Italy to become the country with the most deaths from the virus.
Trump approved the irst major disaster declaration for coronavirus in New York on March 20, followed two days later by Washington and California, the early hot spots of the virus. New York has become the hardest-hit state, recording 188,694 positive cases and 9,385 deaths from the virus, according to the state’s health department.
The U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, Washington, D.C., Guam and Puerto Rico all received approved major disaster declarations. American Samoa is the only U.S. territory that has not received a disaster designation.
Trump praised the declarations in a tweet Sunday, saying, "We are winning, and will win, the war on the Invisible Enemy!"

https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/public-global-health/492433-all-50-states-under-disaster-declaration-for-first

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VIEW ALL

Donald J. Trump
@realDonaldTrump
For the first time in history there is a fully signed Presidential Disaster Declaration for all 50 States. We are winning, and will win, the war on the Invisible Enemy!
238K 2:25 PM - Apr 12, 2020

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The FEMA declaration makes federal funding available to the states to use to ight the spread of the virus. State and local governments have struggled to obtain enough medical supplies amid the pandemic, with some governors saying there have been bidding wars between states and with the federal government.
The U.S. has the most cases in the world at at least 547,681, leading to at least 21,686 deaths, according to data from Johns Hopkins University. Italy has documented at least 19,899 fatalities.
Worldwide, more than 1.8 million cases have been identi ied, leading to at least 113,362 deaths.
TAGS DONALD TRUMP FEMA FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATION CORONAVIRUS DEATHS

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TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 7

ThiCs dAoScuEm0e:n2t0is-cmva-d0e12av0a5il-aEblCeTel-eTcNtroLnicDalolycbuymtheenMt 4in7n-e1sotFaiLlegdis0la6ti/v2e2R/2e0ferePncaegLeib2ra8ryoafs5p4art of
an ongoing digital archiving project. http://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/execorders/execorders.asp
Governor Tim Walz
Emergency Executive Order 20-01
Declaring a Peacetime Emergency and Coordinating Minnesota's Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19
I, Tim Walz, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and applicable statutes, issue the following Executive Order: The infectious disease known as COVID-19, an act of nature, has now been detected in 118 countries and territories, including the United States. COVID-19 has been reported in 42 states. There are over 1,600 confirmed cases nationwide, including fomieen in Minnesota. The U.S. Depaiiment of Health and Human Services Secretai·y has declared a public health emergency for the United States to aid the nation's healthcare community in responding to COVID-19. The World Health Organization has recently assessed that this outbreak can be characterized as a pandemic. In coordination with other state agencies, local governments, and paiiners in the private sector, the Minnesota Depaiiment of Health ("MDH") has been preparing for and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in Minnesota. On April 4, 2019, I issued Executive Order 19-22, which assigned emergency responsibilities to state agencies to respond to and assist in recovery from the effects of natural or technological emergencies, including responsibility to engage in emergency preparedness effo1ts. On April 4, 2019, I also issued Executive Order 19-23, which directed state agencies to engage in continuity of government and continuity of operations planning. That Executive Order established the Continuity Policy Coordination Sub-Cabinet to develop and maintain a framework for a continuity of government plan, and to oversee agency continuity of operations planning, led by Minnesota Management and Budget ("MMB"). Minnesota has taken proactive steps to ensure that we are ahead of the curve on COVID-19 prevention and response. Our State has been actively conducting continuity planning for state agency operations. MMB activated its Statewide Contingency Response Team ("SCRT"), which meets regularly to coordinate and direct state agencies to ensure priority government services continue. State agency emergency managers and continuity coordinators from the agencies have
1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 29 of 54
been meeting together and sharing information related to emergency management and continuity of operations planning activities.
The State also has activated our Joint Information Center ("JIC"), led by the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") and MDH. The JIC is responsible for sharing operational updates and keeping the public informed on COVID-19. This group convenes daily to provide consistent, coordinated, and timely information.
Agencies have activated their internal command or continuity teams and have been reviewing their emergency response and continuity plans, which are plans in place that outline how agencies will provide priority services during an emergency. Agencies have been reviewing their priority services and preparing their employees with the goal of providing uninterrupted priority services throughout an emergency.
On January 29, 2020, MDH instituted its Incident Command System ("ICS"). The ICS provides a standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of emergency response. MDH convened a state agency COVID-19 coordinating group on March 3, 2020. DPS's Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management ("HSEM") activated the State Emergency Operations Center on March 6, 2020.
MDH remains in close contact with federal, state, and local partners, and the Commissioner of Health recently convened a group of experts, including healthcare professionals (doctors, nurses, administrators, insurers), government partners (cities, counties, tribal nations), business and labor leaders, educators (child care, K-12, higher ed), public health experts, and authorities on long term care and Minnesota's aging population. This cross-sector group provides guidance to the Commissioner on MDH's strategies for responding to COVID-19.
As part of the response, MDH experts have been providing timely information and education to the public and stakeholders through up-to-date website information, regular press briefings, and calls for stakeholders such as schools, long-tern care facilities, healthcare providers, and the business community. MDH's COVID-19 website, with materials available in 16 languages, has been accessed by thousands of Minnesotans.
Local resources are inadequate to fully address the COVID-19 pandemic. We must continue to take this pandemic seriously, and there are sensible steps that Minnesotans and our state government can take to protect all Minnesotans by slowing the spread of COVID-19, prioritizing our healthcare resources, and safeguarding at-risk communities.
For these reasons, I declare a peacetime emergency in Minnesota and order as follows:
1. In consultation with federal, state, and local partners, tribal nations, relevant experts, and stakeholders, MDH will continue to lead the coordination of the State's response to COVID-19.
2. HSEM will continue to assist MDH and coordinate support through the State Emergency Operations Center and in accordance with the Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan.
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3. All state agencies, in cooperation with appropriate federal agencies, will work to support healthcare providers, tribal and local governments, and public health organizations as they respond to COVID-19.
4. The Minnesota National Guard will ensure that it is ready to assist as needed during this peacetime emergency.
5. In consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as public health, medical, and other experts, MDH will continue to provide guidance that is accessible and transparent to all Minnesotans, including guidance on how to best prevent and reduce community spread of COVID-19 within Minnesota and manage critical healthcare resources.
6. I encourage individual Minnesotans to help protect all Minnesotans by continuing their individual prevention efforts such as staying home when feeling sick, frequently washing their hands, and monitoring information about COVID-19.
7. I urge and advise Minnesotans to follow MDH guidance regarding hygiene, public gatherings, social distancing, and healthcare use. Minnesotans should regularly check MDH's COVID-19 webpage: https://wwvv.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/
8. As circumstances require, and pursuant to relevant law, I will issue orders and rules to protect public health and safety. All state agencies are directed to submit proposals for such orders and rules to my office.
This Executive Order and declaration of peacetime emergency is effective immediately under Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 4.035, subdivision 2, and its duration is governed by Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 12.31, subdivision 2. Signed on March 13, 2020.
Filed According to Law:
Steve Simon
Secretary of State
3

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 31 of 54 RESOLUTION
RESOLVED, by the Executive Council of the State of Minnesota, at its emergency meeting on March 16, 2020, that it approves the following:
Extend peacetime emergency declared in State of Minnesota, Executive Department, Emergency Executive Order 20-01 Declaring a Peacetime Emergency and Coordinating Minnesota’s Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 as required by Minnesota Statutes 9.061. Approved by Executive Council DATE: ____M__a_r_c_h_1_6_,_2_0_2_0______________ BY: ________________________________
Filed on March 16, 2020 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 32 of 54
TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 8

6/22/2020

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Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

How COVID-19 Spreads
Updated June 16, 2020
COVID-19 is thought to spread mainly through close contact from person-to-person. Some people without symptoms may be able to spread the virus. We are still learning about how the virus spreads and the severity of illness it causes.

Person-to-person spread
The virus is thought to spread mainly from person-to-person.
Between people who are in close contact with one another (within about 6 feet). Through respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks. These droplets can land in the mouths or noses of people who are nearby or possibly be inhaled into the lungs. COVID-19 may be spread by people who are not showing symptoms.

The virus spreads easily between people
How easily a virus spreads from person-to-person can vary. Some viruses are highly contagious, like measles, while other viruses do not spread as easily. Another factor is whether the spread is sustained, which means it goes from person-toperson without stopping.
The virus that causes COVID-19 is spreading very easily and sustainably between people. Information from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic suggests that this virus is spreading more e ciently than in uenza, but not as e ciently as measles, which is highly contagious. In general, the more closely a person interacts with others and the longer that interaction, the higher the risk of COVID-19 spread.

The virus may be spread in other ways
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or possibly their eyes. This is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads, but we are still learning more about how this virus spreads.

Spread between animals and people
At this time, the risk of COVID-19 spreading from animals to people is considered to be low. Learn about COVID-19 and pets and other animals.
It appears that the virus that causes COVID-19 can spread from people to animals in some situations. CDC is aware of a small number of pets worldwide, including cats and dogs, reported to be infected with the virus that causes COVID-19, mostly after close contact with people with COVID-19. Learn what you should do if you have pets.

Protect yourself and others
The best way to prevent illness is to avoid being exposed to this virus. You can take steps to slow the spread.

Maintain good social distance (about 6 feet). This is very important in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Wash your hands often with soap and water. If soap and water are not available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least 60% alcohol. Routinely clean and disinfect frequently touched surfaces.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html

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6/22/2020

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Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face covering when around others.

Learn more about what you can do to protect yourself and others.

More Information
ASL Video Series: How does COVID-19 Spread?

Page last reviewed: June 16, 2020

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html

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TAYLOR DECLARATION EXHIBIT 9

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 36 of 54

From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments:
Importance:

Hegg, Stella (OSS) <stella.hegg@state.mn.us> Friday, June 19, 2020 4:47 PM Department, Elections (OSS) 2020 State Primary AB-MB Witnesses & Postmark Changes related to LaRose et al v. Simon, Case 62-CV-20-3149 AB Instructions_Reg_ThirdEnv-2020STP.pdf; AB Instructions_NR_ThirdEnv-2020STP.pdf; MB Instructions-2020STP.pdf; AB Instructions_UOCAVA_ThirdEnv-2020STP.pdf; AB Instructions_UOCAVA_ET-2020STP.pdf; AB-MB Insert for Registered Voters 2020STP.pdf; AB Insert for Non-Registered Voters - 2020STP.pdf; Reg Voter Signature Envelope Sticker-Stamp Suggestion Sheet.pdf
High

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Elections Division
For Your Immediate Attention!
Dear County Election Administrators:
Please share (ASAP) this email and attachments with your municipalities who are delegated to conduct absentee voting for their residents.
These changes are necessitated by the order of the court in LaRose et al v. Simon, on June 17, 2020, Case 62‐CV‐20‐ 3149.
Attached you will find:
1. A new set of instructions for all absentee and mail ballot voters to be sent out with 2020 state primary ballot packets.  These must be sent with all 2020 state primary ballot packets.
2. Two types of “inserts” that should be placed in registered, mail ballot and non‐registered ballot packets.  The “inserts” to be photocopied on “brightly colored” paper so that it stands out to the voter.
3. A suggestion/informational document regarding registered and mail ballot voter signature envelopes.
OSS Webpages Regarding Absentee & Mail Ballot Voting We are “in the works” to update all OSS webpages regarding “witnesses” and “postmarking” of returned ballots. We hope to have everything updated by Monday.
Automated emails with attachments for UOCAVA “email” voters We are working with IT today to update the “hard coded” sentences that are in the auto‐email and the attachments. It should all be updated by late Monday. Please do not send UOCAVA “email” voters their emails until all the language is updated to reflect the “post mark” of returned ballots.
Absentee & Mail Voting Guides We are working to update both guides so that we address “witnesses” for registered and mail ballot voters and “post marks” for returned ballots. I hope to have these both done by early Tuesday morning. I am spending a great deal of time updating the “pictures” of envelopes to “reject” or to “accept.”
1

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 37 of 54
These are challenging, ever changing times. We appreciate all your work and your patience with us as we navigate and try to quickly communicate “all the changes.” Best,
Stella Mary Hegg, MPA
Senior State Program Administrator Office of Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon 180 State Office Building, 100 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. St. Paul, MN 55155 Phone: 651‐556‐0646 E‐mail: stella.hegg@state.mn.us Website: https://www.sos.state.mn.us/
2

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 38 of 54
The “Witness” section of 2020 State Primary AB & MB registered voter signature envelopes
You have several options to alter the witness portion of the envelope for a registered voter, or inform a registered voter that the witness is not required, as the consent decree does not require a sticker/stamp to be placed over the signature envelope’s “witness” section. If 2020 state primary “registered” AB-MB ballot packets have already been prepared and it is difficult to place stickers/stamp on the “registered” AB-MB signature envelopes, rest assured, it is not required. However, if you do not choose to place the sticker on the envelope over the witness signature area, you must either include with each ballot the insert that OSS has provided explaining that the witness signature is not required for the 2020 Primary Election or draw an “X” through the witness signature area on the envelope, or both. If a sticker/stamp is not placed on the “registered” AB-MB signature envelope, make sure that the ballot board members are well-trained and overly-reminded that missing witness information and signature is not a reason to reject a registered voter’s AB or MB returned, voted ballot. If you would like to add a sticker or stamp to signature envelopes, here are our suggestions:
A witness is not required for registered absentee voters for
the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.
Signature Envelope-Registered (horizontal version)  A sticker or stamp that is 4 x 4” should cover the Witness section.  It should state: A witness is not required for registered absentee voters for the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 39 of 54
Signature Envelope-Registered  A sticker or stamp that is 4 x 4” should cover the Witness section.  It should state: A witness is not required for registered absentee voters for the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 40 of 54
Signature Envelope-Registered-Agent Delivery  A sticker or stamp that is 4 x 4” should cover the Witness section.  It should state: A witness is not required for registered absentee voters for the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 41 of 54
A witness is not required for registered mail ballot voters for
the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.
Signature Envelope-Mail Ballot (horizontal version)  A sticker or stamp that is 4 x 4” should cover the Witness section.  It should state: A witness is not required for registered mail ballot voters for the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 42 of 54 Signature Envelope-Mail Ballot (horizontal version)  A sticker or stamp that is 4 x 4” should cover the Witness section.  It should state: A witness is not required for registered mail ballot voters for the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.
A witness is not required for registered mail ballot voters for
the 2020 Minnesota State Primary.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 43 of 54
New for the 2020 State Primary!!
Non-Registered Minnesota Voters
Your returned ballot must be postmarked on or before
Election Day (August 11, 2020) and received by your county by the day before the county canvass, which may
take place on the second or third day following the election.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 44 of 54
Instructions
How to vote by absentee ballot for military and overseas voters sent ballots electronically for the 2020 state primary

Note: Your ballot must be printed out and physically returned. It cannot be returned electronically.

You will need:

▪ A printer ▪ A pen with black ink ▪ Two envelopes (you have 3 options):
 Address your own blank envelopes by hand  Print the envelope templates directly onto envelopes (print the mailing envelope
onto an envelope approximately 4 ⅛ inches by 9 ½ inches so that everything is positioned according to postal regulations)  If you do not have access to any envelopes, create the envelopes by folding and taping or gluing the attachments. ▪ Your ID number Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, U.S. passport number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have access to any of these numbers.

 Print the materials

▪ Print your ballot, the Certificate of Eligibility, and the envelope templates if you are

1

using them.

▪ Please note that the ballot may take multiple pages.

▪ Your printer should automatically scale the documents to fit on the printable area of the page. Just be sure that none of the words or ovals are cut off.

 Vote!

▪ Mark your votes in private.

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

2

▪ Do not write your name or an ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed.

If you do, your votes for that office will not count.

See below if you make a mistake on your ballot.

 Use one of the envelopes as the ballot envelope

▪ Put your ballot in this envelope to keep your votes private.

3

▪ Seal the envelope.

▪ Do not write on this envelope.

 Fill out the Certificate of Eligibility completely

▪ Print your name and your Minnesota street address, including city (present or last).

▪ Print your e-mail address and phone number (optional).

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number,

4 4

passport number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number.

Be sure to use one of the same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot application.
If you do not have access to any of these documents, leave this space blank.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 45 of 54
 Put it all together

▪ Attach the Certificate of Eligibility to the ballot envelope.

▪ Your second envelope is the return (mailing) envelope.

5

▪ Put the ballot envelope and the Certificate of Eligibility into the return envelope.

▪ Seal the return envelope.

▪ Address the return envelope to:

Official Absentee Balloting Material

_________ County

[Street address]

[City], MN [Zip Code]

USA
 Return your ballot by Election Day to the address above

▪ Send it so it postmarked on or before Election Day, using mail, a package delivery

service, or the diplomatic pouch at a U.S. embassy or consulate.

6

▪ Important Detail regarding returned ballots: Your returned ballot must be postmarked on or before Election Day (August 11, 2020) and received by your county by the day before the county canvass, which may take place on the second or third day following the election.

▪ Postage is not required if the postal permit is on the envelope and it is sent using U.S. mail, U.S. military mail, or the diplomatic pouch. Postage may be required if you use a foreign mail service or a package delivery service.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit http://www.mnvotes.org If you need any help while voting, please contact your county elections office at [insert e-mail address] or [insert telephone number].

Correcting a mistake
▪ Print out a new ballot, or ▪ Ask for a new ballot from your election office, or ▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked
and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).

If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, another person may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials, and filling out the forms for you.
When signing the Certificate of Eligibility, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the Certificate yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask another person to sign for you in your presence. (Have this person sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp
or ask another person to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by a power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.

Confidentiality Notice: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elections, political and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your Certificate of Eligibility is restricted to election officials until 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. After that time, your certificate and the data on it, other than your identification number, are public information. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 46 of 54
New for the 2020 State Primary!!
Registered & Mail Ballot Minnesota Voters
Due to COVID19, you do not need to have a witness as part of the absentee ballot or mail balloting process.
Please make sure your voter information is complete on the signature envelope (name, address, ID number and signature).
Your returned ballot must be postmarked on or before
Election Day (August 11, 2020) and received by your county by the day before the county canvass, which may take place on
the second or third day following the election.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 47 of 54
Instructions
How to vote by absentee ballot for military and overseas voters for the 2020 state primary

▪ Ballot*

▪ Pen with black ink

You will need: ▪ Tan ballot envelope*

▪ Your ID number

▪ White signature envelope*
▪ Larger white return envelope* *If any of these items are missing, please contact your local election official.

Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, U.S. passport number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have any of these numbers.

 Vote!

1

▪ Mark your votes in private.

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed. If you do, your votes for that office will not

count.

2

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

 Seal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope

▪ Do not write on this envelope.

 Put the tan ballot envelope into the white signature envelope
3
 Fill out the white signature envelope completely

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address (present or last).

▪ Print your e-mail address and phone number (optional).

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, passport number
or the last four digits of your Social Security number.

Be sure to use one of the same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot application.

4

If you do not have access to any of these documents, leave this space blank.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

▪ Seal the envelope.

 Put the signature envelope into the larger white return envelope to protect

your private information from view

5

▪ Seal the envelope.

Return your ballot by Election Day to the address on the return envelope

▪ Send it postmarked on or before Election Day, using mail, a package delivery service, or the

diplomatic pouch at a U.S. embassy or consulate. SEE IMPORTANT NOTE ON OTHER SIDE

▪ Postage is not required if the postal permit is on the envelope and it is sent using the U.S.

mail, U.S. military mail, or the diplomatic pouch. Postage may be required if you use a

6

foreign mail service or a package delivery service.

See the other side for special instructions if you have a disability.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit http://www.mnvotes.org.

If you have any questions, contact your county elections office at [insert e-mail address] or [insert telephone number].

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 48 of 54
IMPORTANT NOTE: Your returned ballot must be postmarked on or before Election Day (August 11, 2020) and received by your county by the day before the county canvass, which may take place on the second or third day following the election.
Correcting a mistake ▪ If time allows, ask for a new ballot from your election office. Contact your election
office at [e-mail] or [phone number], or ▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked
and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, another person may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials, and filling in the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask another person to sign for you in your presence. (Have this person sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask another person to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence as outlined above.
Confidentiality Notice: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elections, political and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your signature envelope is restricted to election officials until 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. After that time, your envelope and the data on it, other than your identification number, are public information. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

Instructions CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 49 of 54
How to vote by absentee ballot for non-registered voters in the 2020 state primary

You will need:

▪ Ballot*

▪ Your ID number

▪ Tan ballot envelope*

Minnesota driver’s license number,

▪ Voter registration application*

Minnesota ID card number,

▪ White signature envelope* ▪ Larger white return envelope*

or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have any of these numbers.

▪ Pen with black ink

▪ Witness

▪ Minnesota driver’s license with your address or other authorized proof of where you live. See other side for a list of options
*If any of these items are missing, please

Anyone registered to vote in Minnesota, including your spouse or relative, or a notary public, or a person with the authority to administer oaths

contact your local election official.

Important: You must submit the voter registration application with your ballot

(in the white signature envelope) for your vote to be counted.

1

 Fill out the voter registration application and sign it

▪ Show your witness your driver’s license or other authorized proof of where you live. See the other side for a list of options.

 Vote!

▪ Show your witness your blank ballot, then mark your votes in private.

2

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed. If you do, your votes for that office will not count.

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

 Seal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope

3

▪ Do not write on this envelope.
 Put the tan ballot envelope and the voter registration application in the
white signature envelope

 Fill out the white signature envelope completely

4

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address.

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. Be sure to use one of the same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot application. If you do not have any of these numbers, check the box.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

5

▪ Ask your witness to print their name and Minnesota street address, including city (not a P.O. Box), indicate which proof you showed them, and sign their name.

If your witness is an official or notary, they must print their title instead of an address.

Notaries must also affix their stamp.

▪ Seal the envelope.

 Put the signature envelope into the larger white return envelope to protect your

6

private information from view

▪ Seal the envelope.

 Return your ballot by Election Day to the address on the return envelope

Ballots may not be delivered to your polling place.

7

You have three options:

▪ Send it so it is postmarked on or before Election Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service (SEE INSERT FOR IMPORTANT DETAILS ABOUT THIS),

▪ Deliver it in person before election day or by 3:00 p.m. on Election Day, or

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 3:00 p.m. on Election Day. This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit www.mnvotes.org.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 50 of 54 Options for proof of where you live
A valid Minnesota driver’s license, Minnesota ID card, or permit with your current address or A photo ID that does not have your current address along with a document that has your current address
▪ Eligible photo IDs: Minnesota or another state’s driver’s license, learner’s permit, or ID card; U.S. passport; U.S. military or veteran ID card; Minnesota high school/college/university ID card; or tribal ID card with your signature, from a tribe recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
▪ Eligible documents with your current address: an original bill, including account statements and start-ofservice notifications, dated within 30 days before or with a due date 30 days before or after the election; a current student fee statement; or a residential lease if valid through election day. Eligible bills are: gas, electric, solid waste, water, sewer, phone, cell phone, television, Internet provider, credit card, or banking services; or bills for rent or mortgage payments.
or one of the following: ▪ A yellow receipt for a valid Minnesota driver’s license, Minnesota ID card, or permit with your current address ▪ Vouching: the signature of a registered voter who lives in your precinct and personally knows that you live in the precinct. If your witness is registered to vote in this precinct, your witness may vouch for you. This person must complete and sign the voucher form on the back of the voter registration application. ▪ A tribal ID card with your name, address, signature, and picture, from a tribe recognized by the BIA ▪ A “Notice of Late Registration” if you received one from the county auditor or city clerk ▪ If you have moved within your precinct or changed your name, a current registration in the precinct ▪ Vouching for residents of certain residential facilities: the signature of an employee of your residential facility, including nursing homes, group homes, battered women’s shelters, homeless shelters, etc. If you are not sure if the residential facility where you live is eligible, call your local election official. The employee must complete and sign the voucher form on the back of the voter registration application.
Correcting a mistake
▪ If time allows, ask for a new ballot from your election office. Contact your election office at [e-mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, your witness may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials, and filling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask your witness to sign for you in your presence. (Have the witness sign their own name as well.) ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask your witness to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
Confidentiality Notice: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elections, political and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your signature envelope is restricted to election officials until 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. After that time, your envelope and the data on it, other than your identification number, are public information. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 51 of 54

Instructions
How to vote by mail ballot—2020 state primary

You will need:

▪ ▪

Ballot* Tan ballot envelope*

▪ White signature envelope*

▪ Pen with black ink

*If any of these items are missing, please contact your local election official.

 Vote!

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

1

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed.

If you do, your votes for that office will not count.

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

2

 Seal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope
▪ Do not write on this envelope.

 Put the tan ballot envelope into the white signature envelope 3

 Fill out the white signature envelope completely
▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address. ▪ Read and sign the oath.
4
▪ NOTE: A witness is not required for registered mail ballot voters
for the 2020 state primary
▪ Seal the envelope.

 Return your ballot

Postmarked by Election Day to the address on the signature envelope

5

You have three options:

▪ Send it postmarked on or before Election Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service

(SEE INSERT FOR IMPORTANT DETAILS ABOUT THIS),

▪ Deliver it in person by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, or

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.

This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

If you have questions, please call: (…) …-…. .

See other side for special instructions if you have a disability

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 52 of 54
Correcting a mistake
▪ If time allows, ask for a new ballot from your election office. Contact your election office at [e-mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, anyone may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials and filling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask someone to sign for you in your presence. Have the person sign their own name as well. ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask someone to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
Confidentiality Notice: The data you supply on your signature envelope are public information when used for elections, political or law enforcement purposes as part of a public information list.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 53 of 54
Instructions
How to vote by absentee ballot for registered 2020 state primary voters

▪ ▪
You will need: ▪
▪

Ballot* Tan ballot envelope* White signature envelope* Larger white return envelope*

*If any of these items are missing, please contact your local election official.

▪ Pen with black ink
▪ Your ID number Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four digits of your Social Security number. See below if you do not have any of these numbers.

 Vote!

1

▪

▪ Follow the instructions on the ballot.

▪ Do not write your name or ID number anywhere on the ballot.

▪ Do not vote for more candidates than allowed. If you do, your votes for that office will not

count.

2

See the other side if you make a mistake on your ballot.

 Seal your ballot in the tan ballot envelope
▪ Do not write on this envelope.

 Put the tan ballot envelope into the white signature envelope

 Fill out the white signature envelope completely

3

▪ If there is no label, print your name and Minnesota address.

▪ Print your Minnesota driver’s license number, Minnesota ID card number, or the last four

digits of your Social Security number.

Be sure to use one of same numbers that you provided on your absentee ballot application.

If you do not have any of these numbers, check the box.

▪ Read and sign the oath.

4

▪ NOTE: A witness is not needed for the absentee ballots of

registered voters in the 2020 Minnesota state primary

▪ Seal the envelope.

 Put the signature envelope into the larger white return envelope to

protect your private information from view

5

▪ Seal the envelope.

 Return your ballot

Postmarked by Election Day to the address on the return envelope

Ballots may not be delivered to your polling place.

You have three options:

▪ Send it so it is postmarked by Election Day, using U.S. mail or a package delivery service

6

(SEE INSERT FOR IMPORTANT DETAILS ABOUT THIS),

▪ Deliver it in person before election day or by 3:00 p.m. on Election Day, or

▪ Ask someone to deliver it by 3:00 p.m. on Election Day.

This person cannot deliver more than 3 ballots.

See the other side for special instructions if you have a disability.

To check the status of your absentee ballot, visit www.mnvotes.org.

CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 47-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 54 of 54
Correcting a mistake
▪ If time allows, ask for a new ballot from your election office. Contact your election office at [e-mail] or [phone number], or
▪ Completely cross out the name of the candidate you accidentally marked and then mark your ballot for the candidate you prefer (do not initial your corrections).
If you have a disability:
If you have a disability or cannot mark your ballot, anyone may assist you by marking your ballot at your direction, assembling the materials, and filling out the forms for you.
When signing the envelope, Minnesota law says you may: ▪ Sign the return envelope yourself, or ▪ Make your mark, or ▪ Ask someone to sign for you in your presence. Have the person sign their own name as well. ▪ If you have adopted the use of a signature stamp for all purposes of signature, you may use your signature stamp or
ask someone to use your signature stamp in your presence. Minnesota Statutes, section 645.44, subdivision 14
Please note: Voting is not covered by power of attorney. A person with power of attorney may only sign for you in your presence, as outlined above.
Confidentiality Notice: If your ballot envelope is accepted, your name and address is available to the public upon that acceptance, when used for elections, political and law enforcement purposes. Otherwise, the data you supply on your signature envelope is restricted to election officials until 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. After that time, your envelope and the data on it, other than your identification number, are public information. Your ID number is required to ensure that the ballot is returned by the same voter who applied for it. You may refuse to provide it, but doing so may lead your absentee ballot to be rejected and will prevent you from checking on the status of your absentee ballot online.

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 48 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN) and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully submit this memorandum in support of the proposed Stipulation and Partial Consent Judgment and Decree (“Proposed Consent Decree”), ECF 24. The Proposed Consent Decree protects Minnesotans’ fundamental right to vote in the August 2020 primary and provides significant benefits to the State. Because the Proposed Consent Decree is both substantively and procedurally fair, the Court should approve it.
BACKGROUND This case concerns Minnesotans’ right to vote safely during the COVID-19 pandemic. Minnesota statutory law requires that absentee voters have their ballots witnessed and signed by another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an official authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45. For many members of Plaintiff LWVMN, including Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill, the witness requirement makes it impossible to vote without interacting face-to-face with another person outside the household, significantly increasing their risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19. See Complaint, ECF 1 at ¶¶ 4, 12, 13.

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Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Secretary of State Steve Simon (the “Secretary”) on May 19, 2020, seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness. Id. ¶7. On May 29, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the witness requirement for the duration of 2020; requiring the Secretary to modify official printed materials to avoid explicitly or implicitly directing voters to have their absentee ballots witnessed; and requiring the Secretary to “undertake a public education campaign sufficient to inform the public” that the witness requirement is suspended for 2020. ECF 13. The Secretary has not filed a response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, but answered the complaint on June 9, denying that Plaintiffs were entitled to any relief. ECF 22.
While the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was pending, the parties negotiated an agreement to partially resolve this lawsuit. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted their Proposed Consent Decree to the Court for approval. ECF 24. Under the Proposed Consent Decree, the Secretary would agree not to enforce the witness requirement in the state primary election scheduled for August 11, 2020, and take steps to make local election officials and voters aware that the witness requirement does not apply in that election. ECF 24 at 6. In return, Plaintiffs would withdraw their Motion for Preliminary Injunction without prejudice and would forgo any entitlement to fees, expenses, and costs incurred to date. ECF 24 at ¶¶ 16, 21. The Court scheduled a fairness hearing on the Proposed Consent Decree for June 18.
Also on June 16, Judge Sara Grewing of the Ramsey County District Court approved a Stipulation and Partial Consent Decree in LaRose v. Simon (Court File No. 62-CV-20-3149). The LaRose consent decree, like the Proposed Consent Decree here, suspends the witness
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requirement for the August primary and requires the Secretary to take certain steps to implement and publicize that suspension. See ECF 28-1 (LaRose consent decree).
On June 18, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (together, “Proposed Intervenors”), filed an emergency motion to continue the fairness hearing in this case scheduled for that day and to give Proposed Intervenors an opportunity to seek intervention and oppose the Proposed Consent Decree. ECF 29. The Court granted that motion. ECF 33. On June 20, Proposed Intervenors moved for intervention as of right or permissive intervention, ECF 37, and filed a memorandum in opposition to the Proposed Consent Decree, ECF 41. That same day, the Republican Party of Minnesota, the Republican National Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee filed a notice of intervention in the LaRose state-court proceedings. A copy of the notice of intervention in LaRose is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit 1.
On June 22, Plaintiffs in this case submitted a letter to the Court, requesting that the pending request to enter the Proposed Consent Decree be held in abeyance until the LaRose consent decree is modified or lifted or after the August primary, whichever occurs soonest. ECF 44. This scheduling request does not change Plaintiffs’ substantive position that the Court should, at an appropriate time, approve the Proposed Consent Decree.
ARGUMENT When reviewing a proposed consent decree, the Court must review the agreement to ensure that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1988)). This analysis involves both the substantive and procedural aspects of the settlement. See United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (8th Cir. 2002). The court has the authority to approve a consent decree that overrides state law provisions when such a remedy
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is appropriate to rectify a potential violation of federal law. See St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 270 (8th Cir. 2011); League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020) (district court should examine the merits but need not definitively decide them in approving consent decree); LopezAguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 296 F. Supp. 3d 959, 968 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (consent decree may set aside state laws when the parties demonstrate a “probable violation of federal law” based on “particularized findings”) (citing Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1995)); cf. Lawyer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576 (1997) (upholding approval of consent decree in redistricting case, although preexisting redistricting plan was not first adjudicated unconstitutional).
The Proposed Consent Decree here prevents a violation of the Constitution and is in all respects fair, reasonable, and adequate, both for the parties and for non-parties. It should be approved.
I. The Proposed Consent Decree is substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate. “The single most important factor in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate is a balancing of the strength of the plaintiff's case against the terms of the settlement.” Marshall v. National Football League, 787 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 2015). “A consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, must come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and must further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” McCourt v. City of Chaska, No. 18-cv-1559, 2018 WL 5669317, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2018) (Tostrud, J.) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986)). However, the court need not undertake the type of detailed investigation that would be
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necessary to reach a judgment on the merits. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d at 1044; see also Armstrong v. Bd. of School Directors of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1980). The court’s decision need only rest on “well-reasoned conclusions,” rather than “mere boilerplate.” Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 607.
Here, all relevant factors demonstrate that the Proposed Consent Decree is substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate.
A. Plaintiffs have demonstrated more than a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their undue burden claim to support the Proposed Consent Decree.
In the absence of the Proposed Consent Decree, the Court would likely conclude that Minnesota’s application of the witness requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic unduly burdens the right to vote.1
The right to vote is unquestionably a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (declaring that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure”). When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). A severe restriction on voting rights “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Id. at 428 (citation omitted). Even if a challenged
1 There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Def. Answer, ECF 22 at ¶¶ 8-11 (agreeing with Plaintiffs that the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Proposed Int. Answer, ECF 37-1 at ¶¶ 8-11 (same).
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restriction falls short of being “severe,” courts must employ a “sliding scale,” subjecting each voting restriction to a level of scrutiny calibrated to the burden it imposes. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124, 1124 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2020).
As Plaintiffs demonstrated in their Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, ECF 15, the witness requirement imposes a severe (or, at a minimum, significant), burden on Minnesotans’ right to vote as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic by denying them any safe method of casting a ballot without risking infection from this deadly disease. This burden is imposed even though the witness provision provides no substantial benefit to the State’s interest in preventing voter fraud, safeguarding voter confidence, and protecting the integrity of the election.
In the interest of conserving judicial resources and avoiding repetition, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the arguments made and evidence presented in their Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction. ECF 15 at 15-23. However, it bears emphasis that one of the cases Plaintiffs previously cited, League of Women Voters of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020), addressed precisely the issue now before this Court: whether to approve a consent decree providing that the state would not enforce its witness requirement for absentee voting in a 2020 summer primary election in light of COVID-19. The court approved the Virginia consent decree, finding that enforcing Virginia’s witness requirement during the pandemic was “a probable violation of federal law.” Id. at *6. As the court explained,
[T]he measure is too restrictive in that it will force a large class of Virginians to face the choice between adhering to guidance that is meant to protect not only their own health, but the health of those around them, and undertaking their fundamental right—and, indeed, their civic duty—to vote in an election. The Constitution does not permit a state to force such a choice on its electorate. Id. at *8 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)).
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It is no response to suggest, as Proposed Intervenors have, that in-person voting before and on Election Day is available in Minnesota when in-person voting presents an even greater risk of exposure to COVID-19 than interacting with a witness. See ECF 15 at 9-10, 16.2 The State cannot leave its citizens without any way to vote without exposing themselves to a deadly virus. See Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner Cty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alternative means of [ballot] access must be provided absent a sufficiently strong state interest”); Thomas v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-01552-JMC, 2020 WL 2617329, at *19 n.20 (D.S.C. May 25, 2020) (“In-person voting, while still technically an available option, forces voters to make the untenable and illusory choice between exercising their right to vote and placing themselves at risk of contracting a potentially terminal disease.”). Nor can it be seriously argued that, merely because Minnesota provides in-person voting, its restrictions on absentee voting are immune from constitutional scrutiny. See Self Advocacy Systems N.D. v. Jaeger, No. 3:20-cv00071, 2020 WL 2951012, at *8 (D.N.D. Jun. 3, 2020) (“Although the right to apply for and vote via absentee ballot is not constitutionally on par with the fundamental right to vote, a state that creates a system for absentee voting must administer it in accordance with the constitution.” (citation omitted)). Given the circumstances, enforcement of that requirement amounts to an unconstitutional burden on Minnesotans’ right to vote.
Proposed Intervenors’ insistence that “the State has determined that in-person voting can be done safely and effectively” while challenging a consent decree to which the chief state election official is a party is bizarre. ECF 41 at 18 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs agree with Proposed Intervenors that “[f]ederal courts cannot and should not second-guess the judgment of
2 Proposed Intervenors argue that COVID-19 has caused the additional burdens on the right to vote and therefore no state action is present. ECF 41 at 17. This is nonsense. Plaintiffs allege that it is Defendant’s enforcement of the witness requirement—in the context of COVID-19—that is unlawful. That enforcement is plainly state action.
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Minnesota’s election officials[,]” and “[q]uestions about how to ‘accommodate voters’ interests while also striving to ensure their safety’ are best left to election officials, who are ‘better positioned . . . to accommodate the many intersecting interests in play in the present circumstances.’” ECF 41 at 19 (quoting Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Doc. 30, No. 20-1538 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020)).
This Proposed Consent Decree represents Minnesota’s chief election official’s sound judgment on how to ensure voters can safely cast their ballots while protecting public health. Thus, the Court should therefore afford significant deference to the Secretary’s determination that it represents the best path toward a constitutionally sound and publicly safe election.3 See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2813056, at *1 (U.S. May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’ When those officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’”). The Secretary has numerous mechanisms at his disposal to prevent fraud but limited means of ensuring safe voting during a pandemic. This Court should not second-guess the Secretary’s judgment on this score.
Conversely, the Court should give little weight to assertions of state interests that are made by self-interested private parties, rather than by the State itself, which is capable of asserting its own interests to the extent that they are threatened. Moreover, as explained in more
3 Proposed Intervenors suggest that in-person “is no more dangerous than other activities that the State deems safe, like going to the grocery store or having 9 friends over for a visit.” ECF 41 at 21. But it should go without saying that Minnesota’s judgment that residents are now allowed— with precautions—to engage in some public activities does not mean Minnesota believes it can require residents to engage in risky social activity in order to vindicate their fundamental right to vote. Moreover, in arguing that the witness requirement is not burdensome, Proposed Intervenors do not even attempt to address Plaintiff Latimer Tanniehill’s declaration detailing the burdens it places on her personally.
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detail below, removing the witness requirement would create no significant risk of fraud. See infra, Section III.B.
B. The Purcell Principle Does Not Bar Relief for the August Primary. Proposed Intervenors cite Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), as support for their contention that it is too late for this Court to intervene and approve Plaintiffs’ and the State’s consent decree. In opposing this consent decree, Proposed Intervenors far overstate the breadth of the Purcell decision and the context of its invocation in subsequent cases. Purcell cautions judicial restraint in issuing “orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, [that] can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” 549 U.S. at 4-5 (emphasis added). But the only risk of voter confusion here is that which would arise from an order from this Court denying relief when a state court has already issued similar relief that is already being implemented, and where early and absentee voting have not yet begun. As the Court is aware, the Ramsey County District Court has approved a Stipulation and Partial Consent Decree in LaRose v. Simon (Court File No. 62-CV-20-3149), which suspends the witness requirement for the August primary. See ECF 28-1. Creating a conflict between the state and federal court as to whether the witness requirement is enforceable for the August primary would almost certainly result in voter confusion. First, in the context of Purcell, this Court’s deference to the Secretary should be at its height. At its heart, the Purcell doctrine is about allowing election officials to conduct their election without court interference at the last moment. But there is no Purcell rule against election officials making adjustments to election infrastructure to accommodate emerging needs in the run up to an election. Intervenors cite no case where a Court has invoked Purcell to stop judicial relief that was obtained by consent of the governing election officials. For this Court to
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step in, at the last moment, and insist on the status quo when the Secretary has argued that change is necessary for a smooth election would flip Purcell on its head.
Second, the Proposed Intervenors do not identify any actual confusion that will result from the consent decree. As Proposed Intervenors concede, “[t]he Purcell principle ensures that voters, candidates, and political parties known and adhere to the same neutral rules throughout the election process.” ECF 41 at 10. The proposed consent decree in this case was filed and can be approved before a single vote in Minnesota is cast, thereby ensuring that the entire primary election is conducted under the same set of rules. Moreover, the proposed consent decree does not change who is eligible to vote absentee, nor does it expand the time period for requesting, casting, or counting ballots; it merely facilitates the casting of ballots by already eligible voters by relieving them of the obligation to involve a third party in the process. It is “narrowly tailored so as to infringe state sovereignty as minimally as possible.” Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995).
Proposed Intervenors’ comparison to the Supreme Court’s stay of a judicial order involving the recent Wisconsin primary is misplaced. There, the district court ordered relief well after the early and absentee voting period in Wisconsin had already begun and less than two weeks before Election Day. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (noting that “absentee voting ha[d] been underway for many weeks”). Here, early and absentee voting have not yet begun; the rules will stay the same for the entire voting period, and there is no risk of voter confusion. Moreover, the Court emphasized the “unusual nature” of the District Court Order in Wisconsin, including that court’s issuance of a second order clarifying its initial relief, “in essence enjoin[ing] nonparties to [that] lawsuit,” and that the relief ordered by the District Court was not requested by the Plaintiffs. Id.
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The nature of the relief required by the consent decree also counsels in favor of approval. Unlike the election-related judicial orders stayed under Purcell that Intervenors refer to in their opposition, suspension of the witness requirement does not present a significant judicial intrusion into the electoral process such that voter confusion is likely.4 The consent decree merely removes an administrative and procedural burden from already eligible voters, allowing them to exercise the franchise without risking their personal health or the health of others, without adversely affecting the state’s interest in election integrity.
Finally, Intervenors’ argument, ECF 41 at 12-14, that it is too soon for Plaintiffs to seek preliminary injunctive for the November general election is premature—while otherwise irrelevant and inapposite to this Court’s consideration of the Proposed Consent Decree— undermines their position that it is too late to seek relief for the August primary. Under Intervenors’ theory, there would never be an appropriate time for judicial scrutiny of election laws, because the harms caused by unduly burdensome election regulations would remain “speculative” and “uncertain” until the election approaches, at which point Intervenors invoke Purcell and argue that it is too late for judicial intervention. It cannot always be either too soon or too late to vindicate the right to vote in federal court, and Plaintiffs cannot be expected to
4 The cases cited by Proposed Intervenors in support of their Purcell argument are further distinguishable because they represent much more disruptive and significant interventions into the electoral process than this case, including: challenges to the contents of the ballot, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (denying injunctive relief to place additional candidates on the ballot in a pre-Purcell challenge, where doing so would require the reprinting of all ballots), the time during which voting can take place, Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (denying relief in a challenge to, inter alia, extend the submission deadline for petition signatures); Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (denying relief in a challenge to reduction of early voting dates), a complete overhaul of a state’s election system, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 988 (2014), or the very composition of the electoral map, Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 1090 (2011).
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assert their constitutional rights only when they satisfy Intervenors’ Goldilocks approach to litigation.
II. The Proposed Consent Decree is a procedurally fair compromise negotiated at arm’s length.
In addition to being substantively fair in light of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim, the Proposed Consent Decree is procedurally fair. “[C]ourts in the Eighth Circuit have held that ‘there is a presumption of fairness when a settlement is negotiated at arm’s length by well informed counsel.’” Soderstron v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC, Civil No. 16–233, 2018 WL 692912, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2018) (quoting In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02–1186, 2005 WL 4045741, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2005)). That is exactly the type of process that produced the Proposed Consent Decree in this case.
Proposed Intervenors’ assertion that the Secretary “obtained nothing” in entering the Proposed Consent Decree, ECF 41 at 29, is simply false. To begin, the Secretary successfully negotiated for Plaintiffs to forgo any motion for fees, expenses, or costs incurred until the date when the Proposed Consent Decree is entered. ECF 24 at ¶21. Proposed Intervenors’ claim that this term of the agreement “adds nothing,” ECF 41 at 29, is puzzling. Plaintiffs’ attorney fees and expenses for the work they have done to date—including filing the complaint, gathering evidence, retaining and paying an expert, writing the memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, and negotiating the Proposed Consent Decree5—would be substantial, and the Proposed Consent Decree frees the Secretary from the risk of paying those fees. That
5 Proposed Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs “generated few expenses because they reused prior materials from Virginia.” They are confused. Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case does not overlap with Plaintiffs’ counsel in Virginia. Indeed, Proposed Intervenors repeatedly lump the all litigants involved in voting rights cases across the country as the functional equivalents of the Democratic Party. See, e.g., ECF 41 at 2, 27. Such spurious assertions are unsupported and emphatically false.
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Plaintiffs may seek fees, expenses, and costs for future work is true, but irrelevant. And while Proposed Intervenors argue that “Plaintiffs were unlikely to be a ‘prevailing party’ in this case,” id., it was reasonable—indeed, correct—for the Secretary to believe that Plaintiffs had at least a realistic chance of prevailing and thus obtaining fees, expenses, and costs. See supra, Section I.A.
Nor is fiscal conservation the only benefit the Secretary would derive from the Proposed Consent Decree. The agreement would also compel Plaintiffs to withdraw their pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, thus delaying any adjudication of whether Minnesota may enforce the witness requirement for the November 2020 general election. ECF 24 at ¶16. This delay—while not desired by Plaintiffs, who sought to litigate the November issue as expeditiously as possible—is something the Secretary could reasonably want. The Secretary now has more time to implement a litigation strategy regarding the November election (a higher-stakes matter than the August primary). If the Secretary wishes to develop a thorough record to support enforcement of the witness requirement, the Proposed Consent Decree gives him time to do so. While Proposed Intervenors evidently believe the Secretary could have extracted more concessions than he did, ECF 41 at 29-30, the Court need not decide whether the Secretary drove the hardest conceivable bargain.
Instead, the Court’s focus is properly on whether the parties negotiated in good faith and at arm’s length. They did. Proposed Intervenors claim that “the sequence of events here is inconsistent with arm’s-length negotiations” because the Secretary filed a pleading in opposition to Plaintiffs’ claims on June 9, then submitted the Proposed Consent Decree to the Court on June 16. ECF 41 at 28. This contention is not just wrong, but backward. That the Secretary filed an answer opposing Plaintiffs’ claims is evidence that the parties have an adversarial, not collusive,
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relationship. The Secretary is continuing to defend the witness requirement; he merely conceded that it should be suspended for the August primary, in light of the ongoing pandemic and the likelihood that requiring witnesses for this primary would be found unconstitutional.
Proposed Intervenors’ suggestion that the Secretary “failed to convince the legislature to relax absentee-voting rules” and therefore engineered the Proposed Consent Decree as an endrun around the legislature, ECF 41 at 27, is equally meritless. The Secretary specifically said in April that the legislation he was supporting would not affect the witness requirement.6 It makes no sense that the Secretary would collude with Plaintiffs to implement a policy proposal he explicitly disavowed.
Without actual evidence of any procedural impropriety in this case, Proposed Intervenors rely largely on general grievances about the prevalence of what they see as collusive public-law settlements, and about the Democratic Party’s litigation tactics. ECF 41 at 26-27. Whatever their merits, these complaints are irrelevant here. The Democratic Party and its lawyers are playing no (0) role in this case. Plaintiff LWVMN is a nonpartisan organization that promotes electoral participation by people with all viewpoints; so is Campaign Legal Center, which represents Plaintiffs. Moreover, Plaintiffs have no interest in undermining the Minnesota legislative process, in which LWVMN is regularly engaged. See Declaration of Michelle Witte, ECF 15-21 at ¶17. This case is simply an attempt by Plaintiffs—uninvited and opposed by the Secretary—to vindicate their federal constitutional rights in federal court. There is nothing untoward about bringing, then partially settling, such a lawsuit.
6 Stephen Montemayor, Minnesota secretary of state proposes election changes because of COVID-19, STARTRIBUNE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-secretary-ofstate-pushes-election-changes/569472892/.
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III. The Proposed Consent Decree does not injure non-parties. Proposed Intervenors have also failed to provide evidence that the Proposed Consent
Decree will adversely affect them, or anyone else. They therefore fall well short of the high standard for rejecting a consent decree based on its anticipated impact on non-parties.
Even assuming Proposed Intervenors are allowed to intervene in this case, they do “not have power to block the decree merely by withholding [their] consent.” Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). “[I]n instances in which the rights of third parties are the basis for blocking the entry of, or vacating, a consent decree, there must be a demonstrable injury or adverse effect upon the group not party to the decree. Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1993). Where an objecting third party fails “to allege any specific injury” the Court should approve the consent decree. United States v. Board of Educ. Of City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1993). Even if the objector does demonstrate some harm, that is not necessarily enough: “a consent decree entered by a federal court, like any other injunction, can have adverse consequences on third parties without thereby being rendered invalid.” Id.
A. The Proposed Consent Decree does not adversely affect any non-party’s legal rights or obligations. In arguing that the Proposed Consent Decree should be rejected for the sake of non-
parties, Proposed Intervenors rely primarily on cases involving proposed settlements that deprived third parties of legal rights or saddled them with new legal obligations. These cases are inapposite because the Proposed Consent Decree does no such thing.
For example, the consent decree in United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440–41 (5th Cir. 1981), is easily distinguishable from the Proposed Consent Decree here. In City of Miami, the Fifth Circuit held that the consent decree adversely affected the defendant-union’s
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legally protected interests because the decree bound the defendant-union to a compromise which altered its contractual rights. Id. at 447. Similarly, in Bass v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., “one of the primary litigants was able to make an arrangement with an essentially disinterested third party that had the effect of resolving against the other primary litigants' wishes the immediate dispute over pretrial payout of the escrowed funds.” 698 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1983). And in United States v. City of Hialeah, the consent decree at issue specifically altered the contractual relationship between the objecting intervenors and their employer. 140 F.3d 968, 982-83 (11th Cir. 1998). Unlike the decrees in City of Miami, Bass, and City of Hialeah, the Proposed Consent Decree here “imposes no legal duties or obligations” on Proposed Intervenors or anyone else. Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 530-531. Nor were any of the “primary litigants” cut out of the partial settlement negotiations here. Bass, 698 F.2d at 330.
Proposed Intervenors rely especially on Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987). That case, too, is distinguishable on the ground that the proposed consent decree there threatened the legal rights of third parties—specifically, voters who would be placed at greater risk of being purged from the rolls. Id. at 340. Moreover, Proposed Intervenors fail to acknowledge that the first consideration supporting the court’s decision to deny the parties’ consent decree in Kasper was that the decree “was filed on the eve of the canvass” that the decree sought to affect, which did not give the judge “time to think.” Id. at 339. In this case, the parties filed the consent decree over two months before Minnesota’s August primary and nearly two weeks before the beginning of absentee voting for that election. ECF No. 24.
B. Intervenors have provided no evidence that the Proposed Consent Decree will lead to voter fraud.
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Intervenors allege that the Proposed Consent Decree will injure non-parties by leading to voter fraud. Yet, Proposed Intervenors’ concerns about voter fraud are unsupported by evidence. Proposed Intervenors attempt to distinguish states that routinely conduct all-mail elections without experiencing massive voter-fraud without providing a single distinction between those states’ mail absentee ballot verification process and Minnesota’s. As Proposed Intervenors note, the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform (“Carter-Baker Commission”) suggested that states can prevent absentee ballot voter fraud by “including signature verification.”7 ECF 41 at 35. But Minnesota already includes signature verification in its absentee ballot verification process. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3). This verification step is separate from and unrelated to the witness requirement; Minnesota verifies only voter signatures, not witness signatures. Moreover, none of the five states that hold all-mail elections—Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, and Utah—have any form of a witness requirement for absentee ballots.
Proposed Intervenors incorrectly suggest that the only other mechanism Minnesota has in place to verify the authenticity of absentee ballots is the prosecution of criminal penalties. ECF 41 at 22. As Plaintiffs explained in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 15 at 5, the State’s process for verifying absentee ballots requires a determination by at least two ballot board members—who, in most circumstances, belong to two different major political parties—that each ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness requirement, and one of which is signature verification. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
7 “To verify the identity of voters who cast absentee ballots, the voter’s signature on the absentee ballot can be matched with a digitized version of the signature that the election administrator maintains. While such signature matches are usually done, they should be done consistently in all cases, so that election officials can verify the identity of every new registrant who casts an absentee ballot.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 19-20, COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM (2005), https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/1472/file/3b50795b2d0374cbef5c29766256.pdf.
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• First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
• Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
• Third, the ballot board members must check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3.
• Fourth, the ballot board members must verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4.
• Fifth, the ballot board members must check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the
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witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5. The ballot board does not check whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id. • Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6. The State’s detailed verification process involves more steps than the Carter-Baker Commission suggested and more steps than Oregon, which conducts elections entirely by mail and which Proposed Intervenors concede has “avoided significant fraud.”8 ECF 41 at 35. Minnesota’s safeguards for ballot integrity, even without the witness requirement, are therefore stronger than states which conduct their elections entirely by mail and avoid voter fraud. Proposed Intervenors’ claim that eliminating just one of the state’s six independent steps for verifying absentee ballots will lead to “increased fraud and abuse” is unsubstantiated. The Secretary admitted that Minnesota has no significant history of fraud and Proposed Intervenors have provided no evidence to the contrary. ECF 22 at 23. Proposed Intervenors have likewise failed to prove that eliminating the state’s witness requirement will alter that history.
8 Oregon’s absentee ballot verification process does not include the additional steps of matching the voter’s name, address, driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number on their ballot information on their ballot application or voter record. Or. Stat. § 254.470.
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Ironically, eliminating Minnesota’s witness requirement should ease Proposed Intervenors’ concerns about fraud. One of the Carter-Baker Commission’s foremost concerns about absentee voting was that “citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes, at the workplace, or in church are more susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation,” from the people around them.9 The Proposed Consent Decree would eliminate this concern by allowing voters to cast their absentee ballots in the privacy of their own homes, where they can escape any pressure from unwanted onlookers.
C. The Proposed Consent Decree would not waste the Court’s resources on a moot issue. Finally, Proposed Intervenors suggest that entering the Proposed Consent Decree would
waste the Court’s resources because an overlapping consent decree has been entered in state court. ECF 41 at 34-35. Although Proposed Intervenors do not expressly argue that the Proposed Consent Decree here is moot, it bears emphasis—if only in abundance of caution—that there is no mootness issue here.
A case or controversy is not rendered moot by a parallel state court decision that is likely to be appealed. Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 469 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2006). Some of the Proposed Intervenors have already “moved for intervention in the parallel state court proceeding,” in order to oppose the consent decree entered there. ECF 41 at 34. Therefore, the current controversy “remains live” unless and until all potential appeals are exhausted. Id. at 733. This would be true even if the parallel proceeding completely worked its way through the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 n. 7, (2005) (controversy not moot where state courts had fully resolved same claims as those presented in federal lawsuit, because losing
9 Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 46, COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM (2005) https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/1472/file/3b50795b2d0374cbef5c29766256.pdf.
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party indicated that it would appeal the state Supreme Court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court).
Therefore, although the Court could reasonably abstain from ruling on the Proposed Consent Decree at this time,10 the Proposed Consent Decree is not moot. Indeed, by entering the Proposed Consent Decree, this Court could provide Minnesota with more clarity and assurance by providing a backstop in the case that the state court consent decree is disturbed.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the Proposed Consent Decree.

Date: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 44501 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Mark Gaber* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200

10 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) (recognizing that in some cases federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them).
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EXHIBIT 1

62-CV-20-3149
CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 48-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 4

Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 6/18/2020 6:45 PM

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF RAMSEY
Robert LaRose, Teresa Maples, Mary Sansom, Gary Severson, and Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Minnesota Secretary of State,
Defendant,
Republican Party of Minnesota, Republican National Committee, and National Republican Congressional Committee.
Intervenor-Defendants.

DISTRICT COURT SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Case Type: Civil Other/Misc. Case No. 62-cv-20-3149 Judge Sara Grewing
NOTICE OF INTERVENTION

TO: Plaintiffs above-named and their counsel, Sybil L. Dunlop and Samuel J. Clark of Green Espel PLLP, 222 S. Ninth Street, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55402; sdunlop@greeneespel.com, sclark@greeneespel.com, Marc E. Elias and Amanda R. Callais of Perkins Coie LLP, 700 13th St. N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005, MElias@perkinscoie.com, ACallais@perkinscoie.com, Abha Khanna of Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900, Seattle, WA 98101, AKhanna@perkinscoie.com, and Charles G. Curtis, Jr. of Perkins Coie LLP, 33 East Main Street, Suite 201, Madison, WI 53703, CCurtis@perkinscoie.com.
Defendant above-named and his counsel, Attorney General Keith M. Ellison, Assistant Attorney General Jason Marisam, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400, St. Paul, MN 55101
The Republican Party of Minnesota, Republican National Committee, and National
Republican Congressional Committee support and seek to uphold free and fair elections for all
Minnesotans and for all voters across the country.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, therefore, that the Republican Party of Minnesota, Republican
National Committee, and National Republican Congressional Committee (collectively,
“Republican Committees” or “Intervenors”), respectively a state committee, the national

62-CV-20-3149
CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 48-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 3 of 4

Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 6/18/2020 6:45 PM

committee, and the national congressional committee of the Republican Party, seek to intervene as defendants in the above-captioned matter under Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 24.01 and 24.02. This notice of intervention is timely.
The Republican Committees are entitled, under Rule 24.01, to intervene of right in this action. The Republican Committees have made significant contributions and expenditures in support of Republican candidates up and down the ballot in Minnesota for the past many election cycles, and intend to do so again in 2020. They thus have a substantial and particularized interest in defending this action to preserve the structure of the competitive environment in which their supported candidates participate and to ensure that Minnesota carries out free and fair elections. The disposition of this action may as a practical matter impair or impede the Republican Committees’ ability to protect that interest. Moreover, the existing parties do not adequately represent the Republican Committees’ interests.
Alternatively, the Republican Committees should be granted permissive intervention under Rule 24.02. The Republican Committees’ arguments and defenses have questions of fact and law in common with the claims of Plaintiffs. Intervention, moreover, will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the existing parties.
As required by Rule 24.03, this notice is accompanied by a pleading, in the form of an answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, setting forth the reasons for the claim of entitlement to intervention and the nature and extent of the defenses for which intervention is sought.
Please be advised that pursuant to Rule 24.03, in the absence of an objection by one of the existing parties within thirty (30) days after service of this notice, the Republican Committees’ intervention will be deemed accomplished. In the event of an objection, as directed under Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.03, the Republican Committees will move the Court for leave to intervene in this

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CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 48-1 Filed 06/22/20 Page 4 of 4

Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 6/18/2020 6:45 PM

action within thirty (30) days of such objection.

DATED: June 18, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Benjamin L. Ellison Benjamin L. Ellison (#392777) JONES DAY 90 South Seventh Street, Suite 4950 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Phone: (612) 217-8800 Fax: (844) 345-3178 bellison@jonesday.com
John M. Gore * E. Stewart Crosland * JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 879-3939 Fax: (202) 626-1700 jmgore@jonesday.com scrosland@jonesday.com
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendants the Republican Party of Minnesota, Republican National Committee, and National Republican Congressional Committee
*motion for admission pro hac vice pending

3

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Document 49 Filed 06/22/20 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (LWVMN) and Vivian Latimer Tanniehill respectfully submit this memorandum in partial opposition to the Motion to Intervene as Defendants by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Republican National Committee, and the Republican Party of Minnesota (together, “Proposed Intervenors”), ECF 37. While Plaintiffs take no position on permissive intervention, the Court should hold that Proposed Intervenors have no right to join this case as defendants.1
LEGAL STANDARD Intervention as of right is available to a person who “(1) files a timely motion to intervene; (2) ‘claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action’; (3) is situated so that disposing of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that interest; and (4) is not adequately represented by the existing parties.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)). “The intervenor bears the burden of showing that his interests are not
1 For background on Plaintiffs’ claims and the procedural posture of this case, Plaintiffs refer to their Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Consent Decree, which they are filing concurrently with this memorandum.
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adequately represented by existing parties.” Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997). Courts in the Eighth Circuit must “presume that [a] government entity adequately represents the public.” Little Rock School Dist. v. N. Little Rock School Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004). To overcome this presumption, a proposed intervenor must “make a strong showing of inadequate representation.” Id. The proposed intervenor may do this by showing “that its interests are distinct and cannot be subsumed within the public interest represented by the government entity,” id., or “by showing that the [government] has committed misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188. “Absent this sort of clear dereliction of duty, however, the proposed intervenor cannot rebut the presumption of representation by merely disagreeing with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing him.” Id.
ARGUMENT Proposed Intervenors fail to satisfy—at least—the inadequate-representation prong of the test for intervention as of right. Proposed Intervenors do not assert an interest distinct from the public interest, nor can they carry their heavy burden to show that the existing defendant, Secretary of State Steve Simon (the “Secretary”), does not adequately represent the public interest. Proposed Intervenors assert a “broad-based interest in elections” and “a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot with confidence and without confusion.” Mem. in Support of Mot. to Intervene, ECF 38 at 6-7 (citation omitted). These interests are “subsumed within the public interest represented by” the Secretary of State. Little Rock School Dist., 378 F.3d at 780. The Secretary is Minnesota’s chief election official and is responsible for supervising the administration of elections statewide. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. As
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such, it is the Secretary’s job to ensure that all eligible voters “can cast a ballot with confidence and without confusion.” ECF 38 at 6.
Notably, Proposed Intervenors do not (and could not) attempt to show that the outcome of this case will give their favored candidates any particular electoral advantage or disadvantage. They do note that “changes in voting procedures could affect candidates running as Republicans and voters who [are] members of the . . . Republican Party,” ECF 38 at 7 (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 2005 WL 8162665, *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005)). But this does not distinguish Proposed Intervenors’ interest from the generalized public interest in fair and lawful election administration. Nor can Proposed Intervenors particularize their interest by claiming, without evidence, that if Minnesota’s witness requirement is suspended they “will be forced to spend substantial resources informing Republican voters of changes in the law, fighting inevitable confusion, and galvanizing participation.” ECF 38 at 9. By making it possible for Minnesotans of all political persuasions to vote by mail while complying with social-distancing guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic, suspending the witness requirement would increase voter participation, not suppress it. And there is no reason to think the change would cause confusion—especially since the Proposed Consent Decree requires the Secretary to inform the public of the change, which would take place before a single vote in the primary is cast. See ECF 24 at 6.
Having failed to distinguish their interest from the public interest, Proposed Intervenors bear the heavy burden of showing that the Secretary “has committed misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188. The Secretary has done no such thing. As Plaintiffs explain in their Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Consent Decree, filed concurrently with this memorandum, the Secretary properly entered a compromise that avoids
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the risk (or, from Plaintiffs’ perspective, the inevitability) of subjecting Minnesotans to an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote in the August primary, while conserving taxpayer money and preserving the Secretary’s ability to defend the witness requirement for future elections. Unlike in Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996), Proposed Intervenors here have not shown that the Secretary has any bias against their interests or any history of shirking his duty to enforce valid regulations. Proposed Intervenors complain that the Secretary entered the Proposed Consent Decree “despite numerous arguments available in defense of” the witness requirement, and suggest that if they were in charge of the defense, they would have placed higher priority on rigidly adhering to state statutory law despite constitutional concerns and litigation risk. ECF 38 at 10-11. But Proposed Intervenors cannot rebut the presumption of adequate representation “by merely disagreeing with the litigation strategy or objectives of the party representing [them].” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188.
Because Proposed Intervenors assert only the generalized public interest in fair and orderly elections, and because the Proposed Consent Decree represents a legitimate approach to protecting that interest (albeit not the one Proposed Intervenors would prefer), Proposed Intervenors fail to satisfy the inadequate-representation prong of Rule 24(a).2
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny the Motion to Intervene to the extent it seeks intervention as of right.
2 For essentially the same reasons, Proposed Intervenors fail to show that “disposing of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [their] ability to protect” the only interest they have asserted—i.e., the generalized public interest in sound election administration. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 759 F.3d at 975. However, Plaintiffs are mindful of the Eighth Circuit’s guidance that “this analysis . . . fit[s] more neatly under the rubric of adequacy of representation.” Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 187.
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Date: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Dayton Klein
LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #319181) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 44501 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Mark Gaber* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200
*Admitted pro hac vice

5

 
 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Doc. 69 Filed 12/30/20 Page 1 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund; Vivian Latimer Tanniehill; Isabel Bethke; and Malea Marxer,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
and
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Republican National Committee; and Republican Party of Minnesota
Intervenor-Defendants.

Civil Action No. 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. Minnesotans take pride in having built what is, in many ways, a thriving democracy. Minnesota’s voter turnout routinely tops the nationwide rankings. The state provides access to absentee ballots for all registered voters, while successfully protecting its elections from fraud and maintaining public trust in the system. 2. However, the nationwide outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) poses a serious threat to the health of American elections. Minnesota is not immune. In fact, Minnesota’s election system includes a feature that makes it especially vulnerable to the risk of suppressed voter participation during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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3. To vote by absentee ballot in Minnesota, a voter must fill out the ballot in the physical presence of a witness and have the witness sign a certificate. Requiring a witness for absentee voting places Minnesota in a small minority of states. Moreover, Minnesota imposes unusually restrictive limits on who may serve as a witness for absentee voting. Only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths may play this role.
4. Minnesota’s August 2020 primary and November 2020 general election were conducted under extraordinary circumstances. At the urging of health experts and their own governmental leaders, millions of Minnesotans—especially senior citizens and those with underlying health conditions—scrupulously avoided contact with people outside their households to slow the spread of COVID-19. Under current state law, for as long as the pandemic persists, absentee voting will require voters to violate this social distancing protocol, unless they happen to live with someone who can serve as a witness.
5. Minnesotans’ constitutional right to vote cannot be conditioned on their willingness to subject themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19. This is particularly true when the state law forcing voters to interact in person with witnesses is, at best, minimally useful to the state.
6. Moreover, even in ordinary times, Minnesota’s restrictive qualifications on who can serve as a witness to an absentee ballot severely burden many Minnesota voters and are not tailored to any state interest. Absentee voting processes are often used because a voter will not be in the state on Election Day. For such voters, finding a Minnesota registered voter to serve as a witness is a significant and, at times, impossible, challenge to overcome. Minnesota registered voters are not uniquely qualified to attest to a person’s identity; indeed, among states that have a
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similar witness requirement for absentee ballots, Minnesota is the only state with such a restrictive stance on who can serve as a witness to a ballot.
7. Plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction and declaratory judgment permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in elections conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s unduly restrictive qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Steve Simon, who is a citizen of Minnesota and resides and maintains his office in this District. 10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant resides in this District and because the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District. 11. This Court has jurisdiction to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 12. Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund (“LWVMN”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and is an affiliate of the League of Women Voters of the United States. LWVMN encourages informed and active participation in government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public policy through education and advocacy. LWVMN has approximately
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2,200 members throughout Minnesota. These members, like all Americans, have all had their daily lives altered by COVID-19. Most, if not all, of these members are adhering to strict social distancing protocols to avoid contracting the coronavirus. Many of LWVMN’s members are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 either due to their age or other underlying health conditions. Others live in households with individuals particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Some of these members live by themselves or live in households that do not include another registered Minnesota voter. Thus, some of LWVMN’s members are registered voters who, under current law, will face a choice between risking their health in order to vote or not voting at all because of Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting. LWVMN also has members who travel or temporarily reside out-of-state and must vote absentee while they are away from their permanent residence. These voters face undue barriers to absentee voting due to the requirement that a Minnesota registered voter or notary witness their ballot. Moreover, LWVMN serves as the primary nonprofit organization facilitating voter registration at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota, assisting many new American citizens to register in Minnesota each year. Many naturalized citizens live in mixed immigration status households where they may be the only adult citizen (and thus, the only eligible voter). LWVMN has a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can effectively cast a ballot, but under Minnesota’s restrictive eligibility requirements for witnesses to absentee ballots, many such citizens may face unnecessary burdens that limit their ability to find an eligible witness and effectively cast their ballots—especially during the pandemic, when social distancing requirements and other public health measures are in effect.
13. LWVMN has diverted resources, and will continue to divert resources, away from its core activities in order to educate voters about the witness requirement and, to the extent possible, help them comply.
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14. Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill is a registered voter in Woodbury, Minnesota. She serves as Advocacy Chair of LWVMN and is a member of both LWVMN and the WoodburyCottage Grove Area chapter of the League of Women Voters. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is sixty-eight years old and lives alone. She has lived in Minnesota since she was seven years old, when her family moved from Birmingham, Alabama. As a Black woman who spent her early childhood in the Jim Crow South, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill remembers her mother telling her about schemes of disenfranchisement, from poll taxes to literacy tests written in foreign languages. Shortly after moving to Minnesota, she saw her mother vote in the 1960 election—the first election in which she had ever been able to vote. These early experiences impressed upon Ms. Latimer Tanniehill the paramount importance of voting. As an adult, she has voted regularly. Although she usually votes in person, she voted by absentee ballot in the August and November 2020 elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. She plans to vote by absentee ballot so long as the danger of the COVID19 pandemic persists. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill has previously had heart surgery, and lives with underlying health conditions that place her at an elevated risk of becoming severely ill if she contracts COVID-19. She fears contracting and spreading COVID-19 if she is forced to interact with another person in order to vote.
15. Plaintiff Isabel Bethke is a registered voter in St. Paul, Minnesota. She is a doctoral candidate in English literature at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. She moved to Minnesota from the greater Chicago area in 2020 with her husband, who is a doctoral candidate in theoretical chemistry at the University of Chicago. Ms. Bethke and her husband were married in June 2020. He is a German national, and his application for U.S. citizenship is pending. Ms. Bethke registered to vote upon moving to Minnesota and requested an absentee ballot for the November 2020 general election. Despite her prior registration, when she
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received her absentee ballot, she also received a notice from the Ramsey County Elections Office that she needed to register alongside casting her absentee ballot. Although the witness signature requirement for absentee ballots was waived for registered voters during the November 2020 election, it was not waived for unregistered absentee voters. Thus, Ms. Bethke was required to have another Minnesota registered voter or notary witness her ballot and voter registration application.
16. Because her husband is not a U.S. citizen, Ms. Bethke had to locate someone else outside her household to witness her ballot, despite the recommendations of public health officials to avoid contact with people outside her household. As a newly-arrived Minnesotan, Ms. Bethke did not know anyone in her area who could serve as a witness, and had to seek out a neighbor, introduce herself, and ask them to serve as a witness—all during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. On her third attempt, she was able to make contact with a neighbor who was willing to witness her ballot and registration application.
17. Plaintiff Malea Marxer is a resident of Wayzata, Minnesota who has lived in the North Star State since 2002 and is eligible to vote in Minnesota. Ms. Marxer is an 18-year-old first-year student at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington, where she was temporarily living in a dormitory during the November 2020 election. Ms. Marxer is considering a transfer to the University of Denver in Denver, Colorado for her second year of college, which would similarly require her to temporarily reside out-of-state while maintaining her status as an eligible Minnesota voter.
18. In advance of the November 3, 2020 General Election, Ms. Marxer requested, received, and returned a voter registration form and absentee ballot. Ms. Marxer did not have another Minnesota registered voter witness her ballot or her registration form because she
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understood that the witness requirement was being waived for the 2020 election in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, as a temporary resident of Spokane, Washington, Ms. Marxer was unaware of any other Minnesota registered voters in her proximity that could have witnessed her absentee ballot. Finding such a witness would have been even more difficult in light of the social distancing protocols Gonzaga University put in place in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Just a few days before Election Day, Ms. Marxer received a notice that her absentee ballot was rejected because she did not have another registered Minnesota voter witness her voter registration application. Because Ms. Marxer received notice that her ballot was rejected just days before Election Day, she did not have time to request a new ballot and registration form, find a registered Minnesota voter to serve as a witness, and mail them back in time to be received and counted. Even with additional time, Ms. Marxer was not aware of any available witness for her absentee ballot. As a result, Ms. Marxer was not able to cast a vote in the November 3, 2020 General Election, the first general election for which she was eligible to vote.
Defendant 19. Defendant Steve Simon (“Secretary Simon” or “Defendant”) is the Secretary of State of Minnesota and is sued in his official capacity. Secretary Simon plays a central role in administering and overseeing Minnesota elections. Secretary Simon is responsible for compiling and publishing Minnesota’s general election laws and has the power to issue “detailed written instructions” to local officials “for complying with election laws relating to the conduct of elections, conduct of voter registration and voting procedures.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.27, subd. 2. More specifically, Secretary Simon is required to adopt legally binding rules “establishing procedures to be followed by county auditors and municipal clerks to assure accurate and timely return of absentee ballots,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 4, “establishing the form, content, and
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type size and style for the printing of blank applications for absentee ballots, absentee voter lists, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility to vote by absentee ballot, ballot envelopes, and directions for casting an absentee ballot,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.09, and governing “the conduct of mail balloting,” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.
Intervenor-Defendants 20. Intervenor Defendant Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (“Trump Campaign”) is the principal committee for President Donald J. Trump’s reelection campaign in the 2020 presidential election. 21. Intervenor Defendant the Republican National Committee (“RNC”) is a national committee as defined by 52 U.S.C. § 30101. The RNC manages the Republican Party’s business at the national level, supports Republican candidates for public office at all levels, coordinates fundraising and election strategy, and develops and promotes the national Republican platform. 22. Intervenor Defendant the Republican Party of Minnesota (“RPM”) is a recognized political party that works to promote Republican values and to assist Republican candidates in obtaining election to partisan federal, state, and local office in Minnesota.
FACTS Absentee Ballots are Crucial to Voter Access in Minnesota,
Especially During the COVID-19 Pandemic 23. Any eligible voter in Minnesota may vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1. Minnesota law also permits elections in certain towns, cities, and unorganized territories to be conducted entirely by mail, “with no polling place other than the office of the auditor or clerk or other locations designated by the auditor or clerk.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.45.
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24. Officials at the state and local levels participate in administering absentee voting.1 The Secretary of State coordinates absentee voting statewide by promulgating rules to establish uniform procedures and prescribe standard forms for printed materials including ballot envelopes, return envelopes, certificates of eligibility, and instructions to voters. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08; Minn. Stat. § 203B.09; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 3.; see also Minn. R. 8210.0500 (form instructions to absentee voters, promulgated by the Secretary); Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a (form instructions to voters in mail elections, promulgated by the Secretary). County auditors and municipal clerks administer absentee voting locally by, inter alia, printing the necessary materials, accepting absentee ballot applications, providing ballots to eligible voters, receiving voted ballots, and delivering those ballots to the local ballot board for acceptance or rejection. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.05-203B.08, 203B.121, 204B.45. In printing materials for absentee voting, local officials must follow precisely the forms prescribed by the Secretary of State. Minn. Stat. § 203B.09.
25. Minnesota held two statewide election days in 2020. Primary elections for offices including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives, among others, were held on August 11, with early voting from June 26 to August 10. The general Presidential election was held on November 3, with early voting from September 18 to November 2.
26. Minnesota’s next upcoming statewide elections will take place in 2022. Primary elections for offices including Governor, Minnesota Senate, Minnesota House of Representatives, and U.S. House of Representatives will take place on August 10, 2022. The general gubernatorial, legislative, and Congressional elections will take place on November 8, 2022.
1 Except when this Amended Complaint specifically distinguishes between absentee voting under Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B and mail elections under Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.45 and 204B.46, the term “absentee” as used herein refers to all ballots transmitted by mail in Minnesota.
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27. Many townships and city offices will be up for election in 2021, including school board elections in Wayzata, where Ms. Marxer lives, mayoral elections in St. Paul, where Ms. Bethke lives, and mayoral elections in Minneapolis, where several members of LWVMN live and are registered to vote. LWVMN also has members throughout the state who are eligible to vote in local elections in 2021, including in Brooklyn Park and Bloomington. Township Elections are scheduled to take place on March 9, 2021 and the Minneapolis and St. Paul Mayoral elections are scheduled to take place on November 2, 2021.
28. In Minnesota’s 2020 elections, access to absentee voting was substantially more important than it has been in the state’s past elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As long as the pandemic continues and public health measures limit Minnesotans’ ability to gather in person with others outside their immediate households, Minnesota voters will increasingly rely upon absentee voting to exercise their fundamental right to vote without risking their health and the health of their communities.
29. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, spreads easily. Health experts agree that to minimize the chance of contracting COVID-19, it is important for individuals to maintain at least six feet of distance between themselves and others outside their household.
30. COVID-19 causes severe illness in many patients. Among infected individuals, COVID-19 is, by conservative estimates, several times more likely to cause death than seasonal
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influenza.2 Individuals over age 65 and those with certain underlying health conditions are at heightened risk of becoming severely ill or dying from COVID-19.3
31. As of December 30, 2020, there have over 19 million confirmed cases of COVID19 and more than 330,000 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). Minnesota has had more than 411,000 confirmed cases and nearly 5,200 deaths attributed to COVID-19.
32. Although COVID-19 infection rates may decline over the next few months, particularly in light of the approval of vaccine treatments by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), subsequent resurgences of the disease in Minnesota and throughout the U.S. may occur in 2021. As of December 2020, COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are at their highest levels since the pandemic began both nationwide and in Minnesota. Until widespread immunity and vaccination can be achieved—a process that will likely take many months, if not longer—widespread abandonment or relaxation of social distancing behavior will likely lead to a spike in COVID-19 transmission.
33. Individuals who currently feel and look healthy may nonetheless be contagious carriers of COVID-19. The median incubation period for COVID-19—the length of time between exposure and onset of symptoms—is approximately four to five days. For some individuals, the incubation period may be as long as fourteen days. In some documented cases, individuals infected
2 See Joel Achenbach, Antibody tests support what’s been obvious: Covid-19 is much more lethal than the flu, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/antibody-testssupport-whats-been-obvious-covid-19-is-much-more-lethal-than-flu/2020/04/28/2fc215d8-87f711ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html. 3 People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (updated Apr. 15, 2020).
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with SARS-CoV-2 never develop symptoms. Infected individuals have been observed to transmit the virus to others while not experiencing symptoms.4
34. Many U.S. residents without COVID-19 symptoms are unable to access testing to determine whether they currently have COVID-19.
35. Recognizing the need for social distancing in order to reduce the spread of COVID19, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz issued a series of Executive Orders directing Minnesota residents to stay home and refrain from engaging in direct social interaction with others outside their immediate households, except when engaging in certain exempt activities.5 Governor Walz declared a COVID-19 peacetime emergency on March 13, 2020, and has extended the emergency several times, including through at least January 13, 2021.6 The current Executive Orders prohibit indoor gatherings of more than ten people involving persons from more than two households and outdoor gatherings involving more than fifteen people from more than three different households (provided that in both indoor and outdoor gatherings, persons from different households maintain at least six feet of distance from each other); requires certain public accommodations, including indoor entertainment and events venues to stay closed; and mandates social distancing protocols and capacity limits for commercial establishments such as restaurants and bars that remain open.7

4 Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease

(COVID-19),

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html

(updated May 15, 2020).

5 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-48, Extending and Modifying Stay at Home Order, Continuing

Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation, and

Allowing Additional Workers in Certain Non-Critical Sectors to Return to Safe Workplaces (Apr.

30, 2020), https://mn.gov/governor/assets/EO%2020-48%20Final_tcm1055-430499.pdf.

6 Minn. Emergency Exec. Order 20-100.

7 Minn. Exec. Order 20-103.

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36. Given the poor public health conditions, in-person voting at the same levels as ordinary elections will not be safe in upcoming elections, particularly for those most vulnerable to COVID-19.
37. The danger of large-scale in-person voting during the COVID-19 pandemic is illustrated by the Wisconsin presidential primary election held April 7, 2020, which drew more than 400,000 in-person voters, owing in part to the state’s failure to provide absentee ballots with sufficient time for many voters to return them. At least sixty-seven people tested positive for COVID-19 after voting in person or serving as poll workers in the Wisconsin primary.8 In Milwaukee County alone, at least fifty-two individuals who participated in the election as inperson voters or poll workers had tested positive for COVID-19 by May 4, including twenty-six who did not begin experiencing symptoms until April 9 or later.9 An analysis by university economists has preliminarily found that, controlling for other potentially relevant factors, Wisconsin counties with more in-person voters per voting location had higher rates of positive COVID-19 tests, while counties with more absentee voting had lower positive COVID-19 test rates—patterns that emerged in the weeks following the primary.10
8 David Wahlberg, 67 got COVID-19 after visiting polls in state's April 7 election but tie to voting unclear, WISC. STATE J. (May 8, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/67got-covid-19-after-visiting-polls-in-states-april-7-election-but-tie-to/article_49a42a7e-45d850cc-bd76-3a583842de39.html. 9 Descriptive Analysis of COVID-19 Infections in Milwaukee County after the Wisconsin Election and Easter/Passover Holidays 7, Milwaukee Cty. COVID-19 Epidemiology Intel Team, WUWM 89.7 (May 5, 2020), https://www.wuwm.com/sites/wuwm/files/202005/milwaukee_county_covid19_election_report_-_final_v3.pdf. 10 Chad D. Cotti et al., The Relationship Between In-Person Voting, Consolidated Polling Locations, and Absentee Voting on COVID-19: Evidence From the Wisconsin Primary, Working Paper 27187, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (May 2020), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187.pdf.
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38. Absentee voting represents the best option for most Minnesota voters to participate safely in elections during the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant Simon himself has recognized this reality, saying in a recent statement: “To slow the spread of COVID-19 we need to reduce large gatherings, including at polling places. I’m challenging all eligible Minnesota voters to cast their vote from the safety of their home.”11 This statement accords with guidance from the CDC, which recommends that election officials “[e]ncourage mail-in methods of voting” during the pandemic.12
39. In the 2020 general election, Minnesota voters turned out in record numbers, with over 3.2 million Minnesotans casting ballots. Defendant Simon’s office has noted that fewer than half of Minnesota voters voted in-person on Election Day—only about 1.38 million voters voted at a polling place. The remaining approximately 1.9 million voters cast their ballots absentee, either early in-person or by mail.13
40. Like many Minnesota voters, Ms. Latimer Tanniehill and Ms. Bethke voted by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections because they feared contracting and/or spreading COVID-19 if they voted in person.
11 Sec. Simon Urges Minnesotans to Request Absentee Ballots for 2020 Elections, OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE (May 13, 2020), https://www.sos.state.mn.us/about-the-office/newsroom/sec-simon-urges-minnesotans-to-request-absentee-ballots-for-2020-elections/. 12 Recommendations for Election Polling Locations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html (updated March 27, 2020). 13 Outstanding Absentee and Mail Ballots in 2020 General Election, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE OF MINN., https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/election-results/2020/2020general-election-results/outstanding-absentee-and-mail-ballots-in-2020-general-election/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
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41. Many of LWVMN’s members similarly depended on absentee voting for effective access to the franchise in 2020, given the unacceptable health risks associated with voting in person during the pandemic.
Minnesota’s Witness Signature Requirement Undermines Access to Voting During the Pandemic
42. Unfortunately, Minnesota’s existing absentee voting procedures do not provide an adequate solution to the problem of conducting inclusive elections without forcing voters to violate public health recommendations and mandates. Specifically, under normal circumstances, Minnesota law compels each absentee voter to interact in person with a witness who must be a registered Minnesota voter, notary, or other person authorized to administer oaths. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.0710; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
43. Minnesota’s absentee voting procedure means that voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to give oaths face a choice: they can vote in the upcoming elections, or they can comply with social distancing best practices to avoid contracting or spreading COVID-19. They cannot reasonably do both.
44. Each absentee voter in Minnesota receives an envelope on which a blank certificate is printed (“Signature Envelope”). To fill out the certificate, the voter must (1) provide her Minnesota driver’s license number, state identification number, or the last four digits of her Social Security number, or indicate that she does not have any of these numbers, and (2) sign a sworn statement that the voter meets all legal requirements to cast this ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3; Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000.
45. The certificate on the Signature Envelope also contains a statement that must be signed by a witness. In addition to signing, the witness must write either her Minnesota street
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address or her title indicating that she is a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths. If the witness is a notary, she must also affix her notary stamp. See Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
46. The witness statement requires the witness to certify that at least four conditions were met.
47. First, the witness certifies that “the voter showed me the blank ballots before voting.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
48. Second, the witness certifies that “the voter marked the ballots in private or, if physically unable to mark the ballots, the ballots were marked as directed by the voter.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
49. Third, the witness certifies that “the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b.
50. Fourth, the witness certifies, “I am or have been registered to vote in Minnesota, or am a notary, or am authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4b. Although this form certificate language promulgated by the Secretary of State is ambiguous as to whether a former registered Minnesota voter qualifies as a witness, the statute establishing the witness requirement specifies that the witness, if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths, must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added).
51. Additionally, if the voter is not yet registered to vote and is submitting a voter registration application with an absentee ballot, the witness must certify that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in this envelope” and that the
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voter provided appropriate proof of residence. Minn. R. 8210.0600, supb. 1a; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3.
52. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for registered absentee voters is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 1. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 2. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s sample Signature Envelope for mail elections is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 3.
53. In addition to receiving a Signature Envelope with a form certificate, each absentee voter receives printed instructions. The form instructions, promulgated by the Secretary of State, reiterate that a witness must sign the certificate, affix a notary stamp if applicable, and provide a Minnesota street address or official title. Minn. R. 8210.0500; Minn. R. 8210.3000, subp. 4a.
54. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for registered absentee voters is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 4. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for non-registered absentee voters is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 5. A true and correct copy of the Secretary of State’s form instructions for voters in mail elections is attached to this Amended Complaint as Exhibit 6.
55. After a voter submits an absentee ballot, the local ballot board determines, inter alia, whether “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions” provided to the voter. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2); see also Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2 (clarifying that “the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law governing deposit and counting of ballots” generally apply in mail elections, and “[t]he mail and absentee ballots for a precinct must be counted together”). If the certificate is not completed as prescribed by the directions—for example,
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if the witness signature is missing—the ballot is rejected, and the voter is notified of the rejection. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
56. Because of the required signed witness statement, an absentee voter in Minnesota must have a witness physically present while marking and sealing the ballot.
57. It is difficult or impossible for the voter and witness to maintain a constant distance of at least six feet between them throughout the voting process. Moreover, the voter and witness must touch the same Signature Envelope in order to sign the certificate.
58. The voter-witness interaction required by Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure constitutes a violation of recommended social distancing and creates a substantial risk of COVID-19 transmission, unless the voter and witness already live together.
59. To give a conservative estimate, there are likely hundreds of thousands of registered Minnesota voters who do not live with another registered voter or a person authorized to give oaths.
60. According to 2018 data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, about 26 percent of voting-age Minnesota residents, and about 37 percent of those over age 65, live alone.14 Minnesota has almost 3.4 million registered voters.15 If the rate of living alone is approximately the same for Minnesota’s registered-voter population as for its total adult population, then Minnesota has roughly 884,000 registered voters who live alone.
61. Even among voters who do not live alone, there are many who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter or a person authorized to administer oaths. This includes
14 Current Population Survey Table Creator, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html (2018). 15 Voter Registration Counts, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE OF MINN., https://www.sos.state.mn.us/election-administration-campaigns/data-maps/voter-registrationcounts/ (last visited May 14, 2020).
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individuals that live only with minors, live in mixed-citizenship status households, or simply live with others who choose not to register to vote.
62. LWVMN has numerous members throughout Minnesota who are registered to vote and live alone. Ms. Latimer Tanniehill is one such member.
63. LWVMN’s membership also includes numerous registered Minnesota voters who do not live alone, but do not live with another registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths.
64. During prior election cycles and in preparation of forthcoming elections, LWVMN has had to divert resources away from its core activities, such as voter registration drives and candidate forums, because of the witness requirement for absentee voting.
65. In the run up to the 2020 elections, in response to requests from its chapters across the state and its own assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause unprecedented demand for absentee ballots, LWVMN developed a communications campaign to educate voters about the process for voting by absentee ballot. A major purpose of this anticipated communications campaign was to inform voters that absentee voting requires a witness, and that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths. If not for the witness requirement, LWVMN would not have needed to spend the amount of time, money, and other resources it did prior to the witness signature requirement’s suspension on educating voters about the absentee voting process. Absent a continuation of this suspension, LWVMN will be forced to divert resources anew to addressing the witness requirement.
66. LWVMN also devoted significant time and energy to developing ideas and plans for how voters can have their absentee ballots witnessed as quickly and safely as possible during the pandemic. LWVMN considered developing a program in which voters could request and be
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connected with eligible witnesses. However, such a program would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to implement. Absent a continuation of the suspension of the witness requirement, LWVMN will reconsider such plans anew. LWVMN has no existing infrastructure for connecting voters with witnesses. Moreover, LWVMN anticipates that individuals who are willing and able to serve as witnesses in such a program will be scarce, since many individuals will reasonably fear contracting or spreading COVID-19 if they serve as witnesses.
67. During the 2020 election cycle, LWVMN would have had to devote more resources toward educating voters about the witness requirement and helping them obtain witnesses to the extent possible—but for the Ramsey County District Court order suspending the requirement. This increased diversion of resources would have come at the busiest possible time for LWVMN— during the immediate lead-up to a presidential election.
68. If the witness requirement is reinstated during the pandemic, LWVMN will need to divert resources from existing programs towards educating voters on how to safely secure a witness signature to vote absentee.
69. Moreover, LWVMN serves as the primary nonprofit facilitating voter registration at naturalization ceremonies in Minnesota, assisting many new American citizens to register in Minnesota each year. Many naturalized citizens live in mixed immigration status households where they may be the only adult citizen (and thus only eligible voter). LWVMN has a strong interest in ensuring that the voters it registers can cast a ballot. But under Minnesota’s restrictive eligibility requirements for witnesses to absentee ballots, many such citizens may be unable to do so without violating social distancing protocols.
70. Even in non-pandemic circumstances, the witness eligibility requirements impose a severe burden on Minnesotans who are out-of-state during the voting period, such as out-of-state
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college students like Ms. Marxer, or who are part of mixed citizenship status households like Ms. Bethke. Such voters must undertake burdensome efforts to locate and procure another Minnesota registered voter to witness their ballot, notwithstanding the presence of competent adults who could witness their ballots, but for the fact that they may be registered to vote in another State or are not yet U.S. citizens. Procuring a notary witness on their absentee ballot is similarly burdensome, requiring voters to identify notify services in their area, pay a fee, and often provide photo identification not required to vote in Minnesota.
Safeguards Other Than Witness Statements Adequately Protect Minnesota Elections From Any Threat of Absentee Ballot Fraud 71. Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting produces no benefit remotely on par with the severe burden it places on voters during the COVID-19 pandemic. While Minnesota has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud in elections, the marginal effect of the witness requirement as an anti-fraud measure is minimal at best. 72. Minnesota has no significant history of fraud in absentee voting. 73. Minnesota’s experience with absentee voting is consistent with the experience of other states. Throughout the U.S., absentee voting fraud is rare. A comprehensive nationwide analysis found 491 cases of absentee voting fraud from 2000 to 2012—a miniscule fraction of all absentee ballots cast during that period. Any given American is more likely to be struck by lightning than to cast a fraudulent absentee ballot.16 74. Most states achieve the same result as Minnesota—no meaningful amount of absentee voting fraud—without requiring a signed witness statement. Minnesota is one of only
16 Wendy R. Weiser & Harold Ekeh, The False Narrative of Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2020) https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/falsenarrative-vote-mail-fraud.
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twelve states where the normal absentee voting process involves a witness or notary. Two of the other eleven—Virginia and Rhode Island—voluntarily waived or modified their witness requirements for 2020.17 There is no evidence that states without witness requirements have more absentee voting fraud than states with such requirements.
75. Minnesota law provides robust safeguards against absentee voting fraud other than requiring voters to obtain a signed witness statement.
76. Under Minnesota law, it is a felony for any individual to “make or sign any false certificate” required by Minn. Stat. Chapter 203B, the statutory chapter on absentee voting; “make any false or untrue statement in any application for absentee ballots;” “apply for absentee ballots more than once in any election with the intent to cast an illegal ballot;” “exhibit a ballot marked by that individual to any other individual;” violate Chapter 203B “for the purpose of casting an illegal vote in any precinct or for the purpose of aiding another to cast an illegal vote;” “use information from absentee ballot materials or records for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement;” “provide assistance to an absentee voter” except as specifically authorized by law; “solicit the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the individual knows the absentee voter is voting;” or “alter an absentee ballot application after it has been signed by the voter, except by an election official for administrative purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.03.
77. Similarly, any person who votes in Minnesota despite knowing that she is ineligible to vote is guilty of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 201.014.
17 See League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020) (citation omitted); R.I. Exec. Order 20-27, TwentyFourth Supplemental Emergency Declaration – Further Preparations for a Predominantly Mail Ballot Election (Apr. 17, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-2027.pdf.
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78. A felony in Minnesota is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 609.03.
79. In the unlikely event that a fraudulent absentee ballot were submitted despite the harsh criminal penalties for doing so, that ballot would not automatically be counted, but would be subjected to extensive verification procedures along with all other absentee ballots.
80. Local ballot boards composed of trained officials are responsible for determining whether to accept or reject each absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2. Each absentee ballot must be examined by at least two ballot board members who, subject to limited exceptions, must belong to different major political parties. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, subd. 2; Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 1. Before being accepted for counting, the majority of the ballot board members examining each absentee ballot must determine that the ballot satisfies six independent criteria, five of which have nothing to do with the witness statement. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2.
81. First, “[t]he voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match the voter’s name and address on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2; see also Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1).
82. Second, the ballot board members must determine that “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). “A ballot must be rejected . . . on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.
83. Third, the ballot board members check whether “the voter’s Minnesota driver’s license, state identification number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s absentee ballot application or voter record.” If so, the
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ballot may move on to the next verification step; if not, the ballot board members “must compare the signature provided by the applicant to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom they were transmitted.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 3.
84. Fourth, the ballot board members verify that “the voter is registered and eligible to vote in the precinct or has included a properly completed voter registration application in the return envelope.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(4); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 4.
85. Fifth, the ballot board members check that “the certificate has been completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(5). This is the only one of the six verification steps that depends on the presence of a witness signature. The witness requirement is deemed satisfied if the witness has signed the required statement and done any one of the following: provided a Minnesota address, provided a title indicating that the witness is eligible to administer oaths, or affixed a notarial stamp. Minn. R. 8210.2450, supb. 5.
86. Importantly, the ballot board does not check to determine whether the witness’s name or address matches an existing voter registration record for purposes of determining whether the ballot in question should be accepted or rejected. See id.
87. Sixth, it must be confirmed that “the voter has not already voted at that election, either in person or, if it is after the close of business on the seventh day before the election, by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(6); see also Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 6.
88. If the majority of ballot board members examining a ballot determine that it fails to satisfy any of these six criteria, the ballot is rejected. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(c)(1).
89. Given the rarity of absentee voting fraud, the harsh criminal penalties for committing such fraud, and the existence of numerous verification steps that are at least as likely—
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if not more so—to ferret out fraud, it is highly unlikely that any pattern of voter fraud would result if the witness requirement were suspended. This modest accommodation for the COVID-19 pandemic would not cause the Minnesota electorate to lose confidence in the integrity of the absentee voting system.
Minnesota’s Restrictive Qualifications For Absentee Ballot Witnesses Are Burdensome and Needless
90. Beyond the particular burdens posed by the witness requirement generally during the COVID-19 crisis, Minnesota’s witness eligibility requirements—limiting the pool of qualified witnesses to registered Minnesota voters, notaries, and other individuals authorized to administer oaths—is unduly restrictive.
91. Among the twelve states that require a witness for absentee voting, Minnesota is the only one that permits its own registered voters to serve as witnesses but generally prohibits other adults from playing that role. Eight of the twelve states allow any adult to witness an absentee ballot, sometimes subject to narrow exceptions such as prohibitions on candidates serving as witnesses.
92. By requiring that a witness be registered to vote in Minnesota (if not a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths), the state excludes many groups of potential witnesses who are not categorically any less trustworthy than registered Minnesota voters: for example, lawful permanent residents and other non-U.S. citizens; military personnel who are stationed in Minnesota but vote elsewhere; residents of other states, such as students temporarily residing in Minnesota while maintaining their voting domicile elsewhere; and those who simply exercise their constitutional right not to register to vote.
93. U.S. citizenship is not required to become a notary public. By allowing notaries to witness absentee ballots, Minnesota repudiates any notion that individuals cannot be trusted as
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witnesses if they do not meet the eligibility criteria for registering to vote in Minnesota (e.g., if they are non-U.S. citizens).
94. Minnesota’s law generally excluding non-Minnesota voters from serving as absentee ballot witnesses does not serve any important state interest. Indeed, in verifying absentee ballots, local ballot boards are not even permitted to reject a ballot on the ground that the witness’s name, address, or signature fails to match a name, address, or signature contained in the witness’s voter registration record. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 5.
95. In other words, the ballot-verification process already is effectively indifferent to whether an absentee ballot is witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter. Yet, the state saddles absentee voters—including those who are out-of-state—with the burden of seeking out a registered Minnesota voter, or else finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths.
96. Finding another registered voter who is both willing and qualified to serve as a witness is a significant burden for many Minnesota voters. This includes voters who do not live with another registered Minnesota voter—including those who live alone or live in mixed immigration status households—and are practicing social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also includes voters who temporarily live away from Minnesota, such as students attending college out of state. Indeed, a major reason that voters choose to cast absentee ballots is because they are out of the state on Election Day. For those voters, this requirement is very burdensome.
97. In past election cycles, Minnesotans living out of state have resorted to posting on social media, seeking to meet strangers in their vicinity who are fellow Minnesota voters and can witness absentee ballots.
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98. For voters who cannot find another Minnesota voter to witness an absentee ballot, the option to seek out a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths is also burdensome. Notaries typically charge for their services. Notaries also typically require presentation of photo identification not required to vote in Minnesota. Moreover, simply finding a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths is difficult, especially for voters residing in certain rural areas or who have limited access to transportation services. These difficulties are only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
99. Even before the pandemic, the requirement to have each absentee ballot witnessed by a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another person authorized to administer oaths has prevented a significant number of Minnesotans from casting absentee ballots and having those ballots counted. In the 2018 election, 1,336 ballots were rejected in Minnesota for failure to comply with the state’s witness requirement, according to data from the Election Administration and Voting Survey conducted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.18 This number is likely dwarfed by the unknown number of Minnesotans who never returned absentee ballots in 2018 because it was not reasonably possible for them to find a qualified witness.
100. This requirement proved burdensome for Plaintiff Isabel Bethke, who recently moved to Minnesota with her husband, a German national who does not have U.S. citizenship. Due to an apparent error with her initial voter registration, Ms. Bethke was required to obtain a witness signature to confirm her voter registration before voting absentee, notwithstanding the suspension of the witness requirement for absentee ballots by the Ramsey County District Court. Ms. Bethke’s husband was not able to witness her absentee ballot for the 2020 general election, so
18 Data available at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys. 27

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she had to make repeated, high-risk efforts to seek out a neighbor whom she did not know during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic to be able to cast her absentee ballot in November.
101. Likewise, Plaintiff Malea Marxer, who turned eighteen earlier in 2020 and was attending college out of state at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington during the 2020 general election did not have an eligible witness sign the voter registration application that accompanied her absentee ballot because she thought the witness requirement was suspended. Like Ms. Bethke, Ms. Marxer was required to provide a witness signature with her ballot because she was registering to vote as a first-time voter. As a result, the State rejected her absentee ballot and she was not able to cast a vote in the 2020 general election.
102. Numerous members of LWVMN—including some who live or have lived temporarily outside of Minnesota—have faced significant challenges finding witnesses for their absentee ballots because of Minnesota’s restrictions on who may serve as a witness.
103. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of LWVMN voters experiencing this burden—and the magnitude of the burden on each such voter—will substantially increase. LWVMN expects that it will need to divert resources away from its core activities to educate voters about the qualifications for witnesses, and to help voters connect with qualified witnesses to the extent possible.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments As Applied to Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 104. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 103. 105. The constitutional right to vote “is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). When analyzing the
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constitutionality of a restriction on voting, the Court “must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
106. As applied to elections conducted during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote because it forces voters to choose between exercising the franchise and violating social distancing guidelines, thus exposing themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19.
107. Minnesota has no interest sufficient to justify maintaining the witness requirement for the 2020 elections. Although preventing fraud and the appearance of fraud is a legitimate state interest, that interest can be fully vindicated without the witness requirement. Absentee voting fraud is rare, in Minnesota and throughout the United States. Minnesota already has robust safeguards unrelated to the witness requirement, including a multi-step ballot verification process that includes matching personally identifying numbers and other information and also imposes steep criminal penalties for fraud. Any interest the state has in its witness signature requirement is too slight to justify the severe burden imposed by applying the requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.
108. The witness requirement therefore constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to voters for the duration of the pandemic.
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Count II: Undue Burden on the Right to Vote Through Unduly Restrictive Witness Qualifications in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 109. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 108. 110. Under Minnesota law, only a registered Minnesota voter, a notary public, or another individual authorized to administer oaths may serve as a witness for an absentee ballot. 111. Regardless of the public health conditions, these restrictions on who may serve as a witness impose a significant—and in some cases severe—burden on Minnesota voters. Especially for Minnesotans who temporarily live out of state, it can be difficult or impossible to find another registered Minnesota voter who is willing and able to serve as a ballot witness. 112. If a voter fails to find another registered Minnesota voter, she must seek out a notary or other individual authorized to administer oaths. It may be difficult or impossible to find such an individual. Moreover, if the only witness available is a notary, the voter will ordinarily need to present additional identification and pay a fee to have her Signature Envelope notarized. 113. Minnesota derives no appreciable benefit from excluding from the pool of potential witnesses all adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or persons authorized to give oaths. Minnesota registered voters are not categorically more trustworthy than other competent adults. 114. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they prevent Minnesota voters from having their absentee ballots witnessed by competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths.
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Count III: Denial of Equal Protection On Account of Citizenship Status in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 115. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 114. 116. Minnesota’s qualifications for absentee ballot witnesses discriminate between U.S. citizens and otherwise similarly situated non-U.S. citizens. A U.S. citizen may register to vote in Minnesota (assuming she meets certain other qualifications), Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1, and then may witness absentee ballots. A non-U.S. citizen cannot register to vote, id., and therefore cannot witness absentee ballots unless she becomes a notary or otherwise becomes authorized to administer oaths. 117. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law that discriminates against non-U.S. citizens generally “can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). This general rule is subject to only “a narrow exception”: strict scrutiny does not apply when a state bars non-U.S. citizens from serving in “positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.” Id. at 220. To determine whether this exception applies, the Court must focus its inquiry on whether the position in question is “such that the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discretionary power over the formulation or execution of public policies importantly affecting the citizen population—power of the sort that a self-governing community could properly entrust only to full-fledged members of that community.” Id. at 224. 118. Serving as a witness for an absentee ballot is not a position intimately related to democratic self-governance. It is a “clerical and ministerial” function. Id. at 225. The Court
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therefore must apply strict scrutiny to Minnesota’s requirement that a witness, if not a notary or otherwise authorized to administer oaths, be a registered Minnesota voter and thus a U.S. citizen.
119. This citizenship requirement burdens individuals living in mixed immigration status households and individuals living in immigrant communities overall.
120. This citizenship requirement does not serve any compelling state interest. 121. To the extent the citizenship requirement for witnesses (besides notaries and other persons authorized to administer oaths) serves any state interest, it is not the least restrictive means to achieve such interest. 122. Indeed, the citizenship requirement fails even the rational-basis test. There is no rational reason why Minnesota registered voters are more trustworthy witnesses than other competent adults. Moreover, the verification system for absentee ballots does not even verify that the witness is a Minnesota registered voter. This only further belies the lack of state interest in imposing this requirement. 123. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07 and Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, together with their implementing regulations, therefore facially violate the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they discriminate between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve as a witness.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:
1. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they require voters to obtain a witness signature when completing an absentee ballot or mail ballot, or authorize any official to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the
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signature, address, title, or notarial stamp of a witness—violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic; 2. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents, employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with him to:
(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation that directly or indirectly requires any voter to obtain a witness signature in order cast an absentee ballot or mail ballot, and have such ballot counted, in any election conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, (b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or mail ballot for failure to obtain the signature, address, title, or notary stamp of a witness for any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic, and (c) temporarily modify all form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary to avoid explicitly or implicitly instructing any voter to interact in person with any witness for the purpose of casting an absentee ballot or mail ballot in any election held during the COVID-19 pandemic; 3. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45, and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for absentee or mail ballots— facially violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
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4. Enter a declaratory judgment that Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, Minn. Stat. § 204B.45,

and all Minnesota regulations implementing such statutes—insofar as they discriminate

between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens for purposes of determining who may serve as

a witness—facially violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

5. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant, his agents,

employees, and successors, and all those persons acting in concert or participation with

him to:

(a) refrain from enforcing any statute or regulation to the extent it would

prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or

individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for

absentee or mail ballots,

(b) direct all local officials in Minnesota not to reject any absentee ballot or

mail ballot on the ground that the witness is not a registered Minnesota voter,

notary, or individual authorized to administer oaths, and

(c) modify form printed materials (including but not limited to envelopes and

instructions) and/or create new form printed materials, to the extent necessary

to inform voters that any competent adult may serve as a witness;

6. Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action,

and

7. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Date: December 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Dayton Klein

LATHROP GPM LLP Julia Dayton Klein (MN Bar #0319181)

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Amy Erickson (MN Bar #0399214) 500 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Julia.DaytonKlein@lathropgpm.com Amy.Erickson@lathropgpm.com (612) 632-3153 (612) 632-3470 CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER Danielle Lang* Jonathan Diaz* Caleb Jackson** Mark Gaber* 1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org jdiaz@campaignlegalcenter.org cjackson@campaignlegalcenter.org mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org (202) 736-2200 *Admitted pro hac vice ** Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
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 CASE 0:20-cv-01205-ECT-TNL Doc. 94 Filed 03/29/21 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, Isabel Bethke, and Malea Marxer,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Minnesota,
Defendant,
and
The Republican National Committee and Republican Party of Minnesota,
Intervenors.

File No. 20-cv-1205 (ECT/TNL) OPINION AND ORDER

Danielle M. Lang, Caleb Jackson, Jonathan Diaz, and Mark Gaber, Campaign Legal Center, Washington, DC; and Julia Dayton Klein and Amy E. Erickson, Lathrop GPM LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Vivian Latimer Tanniehill, Isabel Bethke, and Malea Marxer.
Cameron T. Norris and Thomas R. McCarthy, Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Arlington, VA; and Richard G. Morgan, Lewis Brisbois, Minneapolis, MN, for Intervenors The Republican National Committee and Republican Party of Minnesota.

In this case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs assert three distinct constitutional challenges to Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness requirements. (1) Plaintiffs allege that the absentee-ballot witness requirements as applied to elections during the COVID-19 pandemic unduly burden the right to vote in violation of the First

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and Fourteenth Amendments. (2) Plaintiffs allege that the witness requirements are facially invalid because they impose excessively restrictive witness qualifications, unduly burdening the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (3) Plaintiffs allege that the witness requirements are facially invalid because they deny equal protection on account of citizenship status in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief “permitting Minnesota voters to vote by absentee ballot in elections conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic without involving a witness, as well as permanent relief from Minnesota’s . . . qualification requirements for who may serve as a witness.” Am. Compl. ¶ 7 [ECF No. 69].
Intervenors—The Republican National Committee and Republican Party of Minnesota—have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and their motion will be granted in part and denied in part.1 Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the in-pandemic enforcement of Minnesota’s witness requirements is not justiciable, meaning there is not subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. Though it seems like a close call, the better conclusion is that there is subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim because Plaintiffs support their as-applied challenge by plausibly alleging a substantial risk of future injury. Intervenors seek Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiffs’ facial undue-burden challenge to the witness requirements, and Eighth Circuit precedent requires dismissal of this claim on its
1 Defendant Secretary of State Steve Simon did not respond or appear in connection with Intervenors’ motion.
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merits. Finally, Intervenors challenge Plaintiffs’ facial equal-protection/citizenship-status claim on both jurisdictional and merits grounds. The doctrine of third-party standing precludes the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim.
Plaintiffs and Intervenors share an understanding of the relevant election statutes. As a general rule in Minnesota, any eligible voter may vote by absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1 (2020). Minnesota uses the term “absentee ballot” to refer to absentee voting that occurs away from a designated polling place (e.g., a voter marks a ballot in her residence) and that involves use of the mail or some other method to deliver the absentee ballot to an appropriate government official. Minn. Stat. § 203B.08. Minnesota also uses the term “absentee ballot” to refer to voting that occurs before election day in-person at a designated polling place. Minn. Stat. § 203B.081. The challenged witness requirements apply only to absentee voting that occurs away from a designated polling place. See Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.07, subd. 3; 203B.08; 203B.081. The witness must be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths[.]” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3. Under the controlling statute, the witness must sign a statement that:
(1) the ballots were displayed to that individual unmarked; (2) the voter marked the ballots in that individual’s presence without showing how they were marked, or, if the voter was physically unable to mark them, that the voter directed another individual to mark them; and (3) if the voter was not previously registered, the voter has provided proof of residence as required by [Minnesota law]. Id., subd. 3(1)–(3). In addition to these requirements, a rule promulgated by the Secretary
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of State requires the witness to “certify” that “the voter enclosed and sealed the ballots in the ballot envelope” and that the witness “[is] or ha[s] been registered to vote in Minnesota, or [is] a notary, or [is] authorized to give oaths.” Minn. R. 8210.0600, subp. 1a, 1b. If the voter was not previously registered, the rule requires the witness to “certify” that “the voter registered to vote by filling out and enclosing a voter registration application in th[e] envelope[.]” Id., subp. 1b.
I In Count I of their operative Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s applied to elections conducted during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota’s witness requirement for absentee voting constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote [in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments] because it forces voters to choose between exercising the franchise and violating social distancing guidelines, thus exposing themselves, their families, and their communities to a heightened risk of COVID-19.” Am Compl. ¶ 106. This is so, Plaintiffs allege, because providing “the required signed witness statement” makes it “difficult or impossible for the voter and witness to maintain a constant distance of at least six feet between them throughout the voting process[]” and requires the voter and witness to touch the same document. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he voter-witness interaction required by Minnesota’s current absentee voting procedure constitutes a violation of recommended social distancing and creates a substantial risk of COVID-19 transmission[.]” Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiffs seem to acknowledge that many Minnesotans do not face this “severe burden.” For example, voters who share a household with an individual who qualifies as a witness (i.e., “a person who is registered to vote in
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Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths,” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3) risk nothing to comply with the witness requirements. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 59, 60–61. Though Plaintiffs allege that “large-scale in-person voting” is dangerous during the COVID-19 pandemic, id. ¶ 37, Plaintiffs acknowledge that “1.38 million voters voted at a polling place[]” in Minnesota during the 2020 general election, id. ¶ 39. Plaintiffs say that Minnesota’s interests in preventing voter fraud and the appearance of election integrity may be “fully vindicated without the witness requirement[,]” and therefore are insufficient to warrant enforcing the witness requirements in any election in Minnesota “during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Id. ¶ 107.
Intervenors seek dismissal of this claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Intervenors argue that this claim is not justiciable because it concerns only November 2021 elections that will occur under unknown and unpredictable COVID-19 conditions. Mem. in Supp. at 4–7 [ECF No. 78]. According to Intervenors, “it is simply unknown how the public-health situation will develop in the coming months, let alone how matters will stand when the next elections relevant to Plaintiffs take place.” Id. at 6. Intervenors’ argument might be formulated several ways, but the point seems clear enough: Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge invites a decision on hypothetical facts, something Article III forbids. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[T]he oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiffs disagree. As Plaintiffs characterize this claim, it is not just about November 2021 elections, but also concerns enforcement of the witness requirements in
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ongoing local elections. Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 8 [ECF No. 83]. Regardless, Plaintiffs
argue that whatever threat COVID-19 may pose in connection with the November 2021
elections, it is enough that COVID-19 posed a public-health emergency when Plaintiffs
filed their Amended Complaint in December 2020 and that it continues to pose a public-
health threat today. Id. at 5–10. As Plaintiffs put it: “As long as the pandemic continues
to alter the way of life for Minnesotans, Plaintiffs have standing to bring their as-applied
challenge to Minnesota’s [witness requirements].” Id. at 6.
The Parties’ arguments implicate settled principles necessary to preserve separation
of powers among the federal branches and to ensure that federal courts stay in their case-
and-controversy lane:
Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution to actual cases and controversies. Therefore, the plaintiff’s standing to sue “is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To show Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an “injury-in-fact,” (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). An injury-in-fact is the “invasion
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[P]rimarily future injuries . . . ‘may suffice if the threatened
injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Dep’t
of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v.
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Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). “[S]tanding is based on the facts as they existed at the time the lawsuit was filed.” Steger, 228 F.3d at 893. Standing “must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017). An organization may show standing on its own behalf “when there is a concrete and demonstrable injury to [the] organization’s activities which drains its resources and is more than simply a setback to its abstract social interests.” Nat’l Fed. of Blind of Mo. v. Cross, 184 F.3d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1999); see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). “A membership organization may sue on behalf of its members if three criteria are satisfied. Its members must have standing to sue, the interests it seeks to protect must be germane to its own purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested may demand the participation of the individual members.” Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of Mo., 184 F.3d at 981 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
“[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction . . . bears the burden to establish these elements, and [that party] must support each element ‘in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.’” Azarax, Inc. v. Syverson, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-2927, 2021 WL 853291, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 8, 2021) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the extent of this burden depends on whether the movant has made a facial or factual attack.
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Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). “In a facial attack, the
court merely needs to look and see if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up). “Conversely, in a factual attack, the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction is challenged in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the
pleadings . . . are considered.” Id. at 914–15 (cleaned up). Here, Intervenors bring
a facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. Mem. in Supp. at 3–7. Therefore, as with
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations in
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of Plaintiffs. See Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. “The plaintiff must assert
facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims (here,
the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent with such a right.”
Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).2
2 Plaintiffs argue that Article III standing may be pleaded through general allegations. It is true that the Supreme Court has written, in the context of “a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings,” that “we must presume that the general allegations in the complaint encompass the specific facts necessary to support those allegations[]” regarding Article III’s requirements. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). It is tempting to think that this statement reflected only the retired “no set of facts” pleading standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). National Wildlife Federation supports this understanding. There, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, cited Conley for the proposition that “a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings . . . presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 889. The Eighth Circuit, however, has continued to say that the general-allegations standard applies to a complaint’s Article III standing allegations. Sarasota Wine Market, LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 1178 (8th Cir. 2021); Miller v.
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The theory underlying Count I establishes what an individual Plaintiff must allege to show Article III injury with respect to this claim. To recap, Plaintiffs allege that compliance with Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness requirements unduly burdens the right to vote of individuals who do not share a household with an individual who is qualified to serve as a witness during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 39, 57–61, 106–107. Therefore, pleading Article III injury requires an individual Plaintiff to plausibly allege: (1) she is eligible to vote in a Minnesota election; (2) she will vote in that election by absentee ballot away from a designated polling place, thus subjecting her to the witness requirements; (3) she does not share a household with an individual who is qualified to serve as a witness; and (4) she suffers the asserted burden with respect to an ongoing election or, with respect to a future election, that the burden is “certainly impending or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Amended Complaint includes no allegations plausibly showing that one of the individual Plaintiffs is experiencing the asserted burden in connection with an ongoing election. “Plaintiff Vivian Latimer Tanniehill is a registered voter in Woodbury, Minnesota.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. “Plaintiff Isabel Bethke is a registered voter in St. Paul, Minnesota.” Id. ¶ 15. And Plaintiff Malea Marxer is eligible to vote and resides in Wayzata, Minnesota, though she may attend college in another state. Id. ¶ 17. The
Thurston, 967 F.3d 727, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2020). Whatever its precise contours, the general-allegations standard is not understood to impose a pleading standard less demanding than the plausibility floor of Twombly and Iqbal.
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Amended Complaint identifies no ongoing elections in any of these cities or in which any of these individual Plaintiffs are eligible or intend to vote. See id. ¶¶ 26–27. The Amended Complaint includes the allegation that certain “[t]ownship [e]lections are scheduled to take place on March 9, 2021,” id. ¶ 27, but those elections are in the past. Regardless, no allegation suggests that any of the individual Plaintiffs intended to vote or voted in a March 2021 township election. The Amended Complaint also alludes to spring 2021 elections in the cities of Brooklyn Park and Bloomington, but no allegation suggests that any of the individual Plaintiffs are eligible to vote in these elections.
Though it could have been clearer, the better answer is that the Amended Complaint includes allegations plausibly showing that Bethke is substantially likely to suffer Article III injury relative to an election for which absentee voting is scheduled to begin September 17, 2021.3 It is plausible that Bethke will vote by absentee ballot in the November 2 St. Paul mayoral election. Bethke is a registered voter and a St. Paul resident. Id. ¶ 15. She endured some difficulty to vote by absentee ballot in the November 2020 elections, shortly after moving to Minnesota. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. It seems plausible—especially considering the trouble she went through to vote in 2020—to infer that Bethke intends to vote in 2021. Though Bethke succeeded in identifying a neighbor to witness her absentee ballot in the November 2020 elections, the Amended Complaint says this occurred “despite the
3 The Amended Complaint identifies no 2021 election in which Tanniehill might vote. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 27. Its allegations regarding Marxer are quite indefinite. We do not know where she will reside in 2021. Id. ¶ 17 (alleging she is “considering a transfer” to a college in another state); ¶ 27 (alleging she “lives” in Wayzata). And, unlike Bethke, there is no allegation that, if Marxer remains in Minnesota, she does not share a household with a qualified witness.
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recommendations of public health officials to avoid contact with people outside her household[]” and “during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Id. ¶ 16. The plausible inference is that she is personally concerned about the health risks posed by compliance with the challenged witness requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. ¶ 40 (“Bethke voted by absentee ballot in the 2020 elections because [she] feared contracting and/or spreading COVID-19 if [she] voted in person.”). She does not share a household with a qualified witness. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.4
The Amended Complaint also includes allegations—essential to the conclusion that Bethke plausibly alleges an Article III injury—plausibly showing that, with respect to November 2021 elections (including the St. Paul mayoral election), the asserted burden imposed by the witness requirements in the COVID-19 pandemic is “certainly impending or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158. The Amended Complaint contains many allegations plausibly showing that the COVID-19 pandemic existed when the Amended Complaint was filed, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–35, and that the risks posed by COVID-19 are heightened for absentee voters whose ballots must be witnessed by individuals from outside the voters’ households, id. ¶¶ 35, 42–58. The Amended Complaint anticipates the possibility that “COVID-19 infection rates may decline over the next few months, particularly in light of the approval of vaccine
4 The answer to these issues would have been clearer had Plaintiffs simply alleged that, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, Bethke intended to vote by absentee ballot in the November 2, 2021 St. Paul mayoral election. Regardless, her allegations permit these inferences, and “Article III standing is not a technical code pleading requirement.” Thurston, 967 F.3d at 734.
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treatments by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration[,]” but plausibly alleges that “subsequent resurgences” and the length of time it will likely take to achieve widespread vaccination and immunity mean that COVID-19 will continue to pose a substantial publichealth risk in connection with November 2021 elections, for which absentee voting begins in September 2021. Id. ¶ 32. In other words, Plaintiffs plausibly allege a certainly impending threat that an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness requirements will combine to burden the right to vote of Bethke (and individuals like her who do not share a household with an individual who is qualified to serve as a witness) in connection with fall 2021 elections.
The Amended Complaint also includes allegations plausibly showing that the League has Article III standing with respect to this claim. Like the individual Plaintiffs, the League alleges no injury relative to an ongoing election. Though the Amended Complaint refers to township elections “scheduled to take place on March 9, 2021,” Am. Compl. ¶ 27, those are in the past, and no allegations hint the League was involved in those elections. The League does, however, plausibly allege injury on its own behalf relative to fall 2021 elections. The Amended Complaint includes extensive allegations describing the League’s voter-education and registration activities in Minnesota. Id. ¶ 12. The League also alleges that, if Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness requirements are enforced for 2021 elections, it will “divert resources[] away from its core activities in order to educate voters about the witness requirement and, to the extent possible, help them comply.” Id. ¶ 13. The League describes this resource diversion in some detail:
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In the run up to the 2020 elections, in response to requests from its chapters across the state and its own assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause unprecedented demand for absentee ballots, [the League] developed a communications campaign to educate voters about the process for voting by absentee ballot. A major purpose of this anticipated communications campaign was to inform voters that absentee voting requires a witness, and that the witness must be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or another individual authorized to administer oaths. If not for the witness requirement, [the League] would not have needed to spend the amount of time, money, and other resources it did prior to the witness signature requirement’s suspension on educating voters about the absentee voting process. Absent a continuation of this suspension, [the League] will be forced to divert resources anew to addressing the witness requirement.
Id. ¶ 65; see id. ¶¶ 66–68. Again, essential to the conclusion that the League alleges Article
III injury, the Amended Complaint includes allegations plausibly showing that, with
respect to fall 2021 elections, there is a substantial risk that the asserted burden imposed
by the witness requirements in the COVID-19 pandemic will occur. Supra at 10–12.5
Intervenors have a point: we could not have known in December 2020 (when
Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint), and we cannot know today, whether or precisely
how COVID-19 may impact November 2021 elections. From this premise, Intervenors
argue that Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness
requirements cannot be justiciable because any future injury Plaintiffs might experience is
“conjectural or hypothetical” and “dependent on contingent future events that may not
5 The absence of briefing and argument regarding whether “the claim asserted [or] the relief requested may demand the participation of the [League’s] individual members[,]” Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of Mo., 184 F.3d at 981, counsels against deciding here whether the League has standing to sue on behalf of its members.
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occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Mem. in Supp. at 5 (cleaned up) (citing Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2020)). The problem with this argument is that it invites judging Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, not by their plausibility, but against the (albeit commonsense) notion that the pandemic’s future is uncertain and its impact on fall 2021 elections may be insignificant or even negligible. Allegations of future injury need not lack uncertainty to be plausible. The law is better understood to require only that Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly showing a certainly impending or substantial risk of harm, and the better conclusion is that they have.
II Plaintiffs allege in Count II that Minnesota’s limits on who may witness an absentee ballot “impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they prevent Minnesota voters from having their absentee ballots witnessed by competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths.” Am. Compl. ¶ 114; see Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3. Plaintiffs allege that “it can be difficult or impossible to find another registered Minnesota voter who is willing and able to serve as a ballot witness.” Id. ¶ 111. “If a voter fails to find another registered Minnesota voter,” Plaintiffs allege that it “may be difficult or impossible to find” a notary or other individual who is authorized to administer oaths. Id. ¶ 112. Further, Plaintiffs allege, “if the only witness available is a notary, the voter will ordinarily need to present additional identification and pay a fee to have her” ballot properly witnessed. Id. Plaintiffs allege that “Minnesota derives no appreciable benefit from excluding from the pool of potential witnesses all adults who are not registered
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Minnesota voters, notaries, or persons authorized to give oaths.” Id. ¶ 113. Plaintiffs allege that these burdens exist “[r]egardless of the public health conditions.” Id. ¶ 111; see id. ¶¶ 90 (alleging that these limitations are unduly restrictive beyond the COVID-19 pandemic); 99 (alleging that “[e]ven before the pandemic,” these limitations “prevented a significant number of Minnesotans from casting absentee ballots”). With respect to this claim, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Minnesota statutes and rules—“insofar as they prevent competent adults who are not registered Minnesota voters, notaries, or individuals authorized to administer oaths from serving as witnesses for absentee or mail ballots—facially violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments[.]” Id. at 33, ¶ 3. Plaintiffs seek no relief that is unique to any of them or any one Plaintiff’s circumstances. See id. at 32–34, ¶¶ 1–7.
Plaintiffs assert their facial challenge to these restrictions under the AndersonBurdick framework. Mem. in Opp’n at 16. Named for the cases from which the claim is derived—Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)—the Anderson-Burdick framework “require[s] that a court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality opinion) (cleaned up). “Where a statute imposes a severe burden on a plaintiff’s rights, it must be ‘narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest.’” Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)). “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less
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exacting review, and a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” Id. (cleaned up). “A plaintiff seeking relief that would invalidate an election provision in all of its applications bears ‘a heavy burden of persuasion[.]’” Brakebill v. Jaeger, 905 F.3d 553, 558 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200).
Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs’ challenge to Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness restrictions should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).6 Specifically, Intervenors argue that the law requires the severity of the challenged election regulation to be determined categorically—that is, by reference to its impact “on all voters, without ‘consider[ing] the peculiar circumstances of individual voters.’” Mem. in Supp. at 8 (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). Intervenors argue that “[a]ny suggestion that absentee voters in general are severely burdened by having to find one registered voter—out of a pool of millions—to witness their ballots would be implausible.” Id. at 10. Intervenors point out that “Plaintiffs wisely avoid that suggestion, instead asserting that the burden is severe only ‘in some cases.’” Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 111). Plaintiffs’ “in-some-cases” theory of their claim, Intervenors contend, does not plausibly show what the law requires: that Minnesota’s “witness qualifications are unconstitutional for voters generally.” Id. As Intervenors confirmed at the hearing, their challenge to Count
6 Intervenors’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion is decided with the now-familiar controlling standards in mind. In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor. Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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II does not require weighing the burdens and benefits of Minnesota’s witness qualifications under Anderson-Burdick.
Intervenors’ motion thus implicates a purely legal question: To be plausible, must a facial constitutional challenge to a law regulating voting procedures allege a burden on voters generally, or may it merely allege a burden based on the peculiar circumstances of individual voters? Crawford’s answer to this question seems fairly debatable. There, writing for a three-justice plurality, Justice Stevens described the plaintiffs’ claim as “ask[ing] this Court, in effect, to perform a unique balancing analysis that looks specifically at a small number of voters who may experience a special burden under the statute and weighs their burdens against the State’s broad interests in protecting election integrity.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200. Justice Stevens did not reject this claim on the basis that it concerned a “special burden” on a “small number of voters” but instead considered the plaintiffs’ evidence and determined that “on the basis of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes excessively burdensome requirements on any class of voters.” Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In a concurrence joined by two other justices, Justice Scalia appeared to approach the issue differently, explaining that the Supreme Court’s “precedents refute the view that individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden [a challenged law] imposes.” Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The right question, he explained, is a challenged law’s “reasonably foreseeable effect on voters generally.” Id. at 206. It is not obvious that the plurality’s willingness to decide the case based on the burdens alleged by the Crawford plaintiffs—“a somewhat heavier burden [that] may be
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placed on a limited number of persons,” id. at 199—meant that it disagreed with the concurring justices’ understanding of the law or perhaps instead that the plurality merely thought it wiser to decide the case on a narrower ground. If the plurality and concurrence disagreed on this point of law, it is not explicit.
Though there is disagreement among the federal circuits regarding Crawford’s rule in this respect,7 our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is best understood to have resolved the question in Brakebill and determined that a showing of excessive burden “on some voters” cannot plausibly support a facial constitutional challenge to a law regulating election procedures. Brakebill, 905 F.3d at 558. In Brakebill, the “North Dakota Secretary of State [moved] to stay an order of the district court that enjoined parts of the North Dakota elections statutes[,]” including one part that “require[d] a voter to present at the polls a valid form of identification that provide[d] the voter’s current residential street address.” Id. at 555. On facial constitutional grounds only, the district court enjoined the Secretary’s enforcement of the requirement “that a voter produce identification or a supplemental document with a current residential street address, and ordered that the Secretary accept another form of identification that includes either a current residential street address or a current mailing address (P.O. Box or other address) in North Dakota.” Id. at 556 (internal
7 See, e.g., Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d 220, 236 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that “the severity analysis is not limited to the impact that a law has on a small number of voters”); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 631 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Zeroing in on the abnormal burden experienced by a small group of voters is problematic at best, and prohibited at worst.”); id. at 663 (disagreeing with majority and concluding that “Justice Stevens, quite simply, did not make the same assertion that Justice Scalia made[]” regarding the severity analysis) (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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quotation marks omitted). The district court supported its injunction with evidence
showing “that Native American communities often lack residential street addresses or do
not have clear residential addresses.” Id. at 557. In granting the Secretary’s stay motion,
the Eighth Circuit analyzed the merits of the facial challenge to the statutory requirement
of a residential street address:
A plaintiff seeking relief that would invalidate an election provision in all of its applications bears “a heavy burden of persuasion,” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.), as facial challenges are disfavored. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008). Even assuming that a plaintiff can show that an election statute imposes “excessively burdensome requirements” on some voters, Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202, (opinion of Stevens, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted), that showing does not justify broad relief that invalidates the requirements on a statewide basis as applied to all voters. As the lead opinion in Crawford explained, “[w]hen evaluating a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure, we must keep in mind that a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.” Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Here, the district court thought the statutory requirement to produce an identification with a current residential street address posed a legal obstacle to the right to vote for Native Americans, because Native American communities often lack residential street addresses. The Secretary disputes whether street addresses are truly lacking in those communities, and complains that the district court mistakenly relied on outdated evidence about two counties that had not finished assigning addresses as of 2011. But even assuming that some communities lack residential street addresses, that fact does not justify a statewide injunction that prevents the Secretary from requiring a form of identification with a residential street address from the vast majority of residents who have residential street addresses.
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Id. at 558 (footnote omitted). The court’s conclusion that a showing of “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on some voters . . . does not justify broad relief that invalidates the requirements on a statewide basis as applied to all voters” necessarily understands Crawford to say that a facial constitutional challenge to a law regulating voting procedures is not plausible if it is based only on burdens tied to the peculiar circumstances of individual voters.8
Understanding Brakebill this way requires the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to Minnesota’s absentee-ballot witness limits in Count II of their Amended Complaint. It is true that Count II includes the allegation that the witness restrictions “impose a significant . . . burden on Minnesota voters[]” generally. Am Compl. ¶ 111. But Plaintiffs have not defended this conclusory allegation or the claim with non-conclusory allegations or arguments regarding Minnesota voters generally. In their brief and at the hearing, Plaintiffs defended this claim by arguing that Anderson-Burdick and Crawford recognize facial challenges to an election law based on burdens the law imposes on “particular populations disparately burdened by a voting restriction.” Mem. in Opp’n at 17. To meet this standard, Plaintiffs’ allegations concerned the particular circumstances of
8 Plaintiffs argue that Brakebill reached the opposite conclusion—i.e., that a facial challenge may be supported with allegations showing a burden on “‘some voters’” and that “‘the courthouse doors remain open’ in the Eighth Circuit to Anderson-Burdick challenges focusing on the burdens that certain voters uniquely face.” Mem. in Opp’n at 18 (quoting Brakebill, 905 F.3d at 558–59, 561). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Brakebill’s “some voters” language as support for their position requires ignoring the second half of the sentence in which it appears (where the court explained “that showing does not justify broad relief that invalidates the requirements on a statewide basis as applied to all voters,” 905 F.3d at 558). And Brakebill’s statement that “the courthouse doors remain open” plainly referenced the possibility of as-applied challenges. Id. at 561.
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“Minnesotans who temporarily reside out-of-state, like Ms. Marxer, and Minnesotans who live in mixed-citizenship households, like Ms. Bethke[.]” Id. at 19. For Marxer, Bethke, and others in like circumstances, Plaintiffs allege, “the challenge of finding a qualified witness to be able to cast their ballots is more significant than for a voter who resides with another registered Minnesota voter.” Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 96–98, 100–02). Plaintiffs, in other words, assert a facial challenge to the witness limits based on burdens tied to the peculiar circumstances of individual voters, a claim the Eighth Circuit understands the law to forbid.
At oral argument, Plaintiffs appeared to suggest that their Amended Complaint also should be understood to assert an as-applied challenge to the witness limits and that this as-applied challenge should be allowed to proceed if the facial challenge is dismissed. If Plaintiffs intended to present that argument, there are problems with it. (1) Plaintiffs do not seek as-applied relief with respect to Count II in their Amended Complaint; they explicitly seek only facial relief—that is, only relief that “reach[es] beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs.” Free the Nipple – Springfield Residents Promoting Equality v. City of Springfield, 923 F.3d 508, 509 n.2 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see Am. Compl. at 33–34, ¶¶ 3–5. That is how Intervenors reasonably understood the claim, and that’s how Plaintiffs defended it. (2) The argument was raised for the first time at the hearing. Plaintiffs’ brief cannot reasonably be understood to argue either that Count II asserts an as-applied challenge or that, failing a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge should be allowed to proceed. See Mem. in Opp’n at 16–20. Federal courts, as a general rule, are not to entertain arguments made by a party for the first time at a hearing. Wirtz v.
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Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 987 F.3d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 2021); Anderson v. Rugged Races LLC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 18-cv-2272 (PJS/HB), 2020 WL 6276017, at *12, n.11 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2020). (3) Plaintiffs’ focus on facial relief in Count II is explicit and exclusive and therefore removes the Amended Complaint from that category of complaints that might reasonably be construed to assert facial and as-applied challenges to the same voting regulation. See Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 387–88 (7th Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs cited and research has identified no authority for a rule that as-applied challenges should be allowed to proceed whenever facial challenges fail. (4) Finally, all of this discussion might be beside the point if Plaintiffs remained free to amend the Amended Complaint, but that deadline was December 30, 2020. Second Am. Pretrial Scheduling Order at 3, ¶ 4(b) [ECF No. 88]. Intervenors’ motion to dismiss therefore will be granted with respect to Count II in its entirety.
III In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that the witness restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating based on citizenship. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 115–23. The Minnesota Constitution restricts voting eligibility, among other requirements, to individuals who have been United States citizens “for three months.” Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1. In other words, non-citizens are not eligible, and cannot register, to vote in Minnesota. Therefore, because Minnesota law requires any absentee-ballot witness to be “a person who is registered to vote in Minnesota or . . . a notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths[,]” Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (emphasis added), any non-citizen who wishes to witness an absentee ballot would have to
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become a “notary public or other individual authorized to administer oaths.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that the registered-voter limitation discriminates against non-citizens and fails under any standard of review. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 117, 120–22. Plaintiffs allege that this restriction “proved burdensome” for Bethke specifically during the November 2020 general election. Id. ¶¶ 15, 100. Bethke moved to Minnesota in 2020. Id. ¶ 15. Her husband “is a German national, and his application for U.S. citizenship is pending.” Id. “Although the witness signature requirement for absentee ballots was waived for registered voters during the November 2020 election, it was not waived for unregistered absentee voters[,]” like Bethke. Id. “Thus, Ms. Bethke was required to have another Minnesota registered voter or notary witness her ballot and voter registration application.” Id. Because Bethke’s husband was not a U.S. citizen—and because he was either unwilling or unable to become a notary or obtain authorization to administer oaths—Bethke successfully identified a neighbor to serve as a witness. Id. ¶ 16. There is no non-citizen plaintiff; Plaintiffs therefore seek to assert the constitutional rights of non-parties.
Intervenors seek dismissal of this claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and alternatively on its merits under Rule 12(b)(6). Intervenors argue that Plaintiffs lack third-party standing to prosecute noncitizens’ equal-protection rights. Mem. in Supp. at 11–12; Reply Mem. at 13–16 [ECF No. 90]. Failing their jurisdictional challenge, Intervenors argue that this claim falls on its merits because the witness restrictions impose no alienage classification, and if they did, the classification would survive rational-basis review. Mem. in Supp. at 12–14; Reply Mem. at 16–20.
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The third-party-standing doctrine is generally considered an exception to a federal court’s duty to adjudicate cases and controversies within its jurisdiction. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125–26, 127 n.3 (2014). “This rule assumes that the party with the right has the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). Under the doctrine, a litigant ordinarily “‘must assert his own legal rights’ and ‘cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights . . . of third parties.’” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this prohibition in “circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third party standing to assert the rights of another.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30. The Court “ha[s] limited this exception by requiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional showings.” Id. at 130. First, “the party asserting the right [must have] a close relationship with the person who possesses the right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, there must be “a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the right holder faces “some genuine obstacle to” asserting his own rights, his “absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default the right’s best available proponent.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976).
Plaintiffs try to meet this two-part test in two ways. Plaintiffs first argue that Bethke has a close relationship with her husband and that he is sufficiently hindered from asserting
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a claim in his own right. Mem. in Opp’n at 12–15. Intervenors concede that Bethke has a sufficiently close relationship with her husband, so this argument comes down to whether Bethke’s husband is sufficiently hindered from protecting his own interests. Reply Mem. at 13–16. Second, Plaintiffs argue that “voters—including Plaintiff Bethke and [the League’s] members—seeking to rely on non-U.S. citizen witnesses to their absentee ballots have the type of relationship to non-U.S. citizen witnesses to justify third party standing.” Mem. in Opp’n at 13. Intervenors characterize this argument as a “nonstarter” under Kowalski. Reply Mem. at 14, n.3.
Bethke does not have third-party standing because she has neither alleged nor identified any hindrance to her husband’s ability to protect his own interests. The only fact Bethke mentions to support her hindrance argument is that her spouse is a “non-U.S. citizen[].” Mem. in Opp’n at 14; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15 (“He is a German national, and his application for U.S. citizenship is pending.”), 100 (same).9 She argues that non-citizens “often wish to avoid the publicity and controversy of litigation” and that this is especially true “if they are—like Bethke’s spouse—in the midst of seeking legal permanent residency or other adjustments to their immigration status from the government.” Mem. in Opp’n at 14. Bethke identifies no specific reason why “publicity and controversy” associated with this case (or any other aspect of the case) might negatively influence her spouse’s path to lawful permanent residency and citizenship or adversely impact him in some other way.
9 Plaintiffs mentioned in their brief, Mem. in Opp’n at 14, and clarified at oral argument, that Bethke’s husband has a pending application for lawful permanent residency.
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Her argument seems to be that non-citizens as a group are hindered from protecting their own interests. No authority is cited to support this proposition generally.10
The three cases Bethke cites to show that non-citizens sometimes face hindrances to protecting their own rights are not binding, address different facts, and are just not persuasive here. The first case Bethke cites, Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2008), describes specific and meaningful hindrances peculiar to the non-citizen right holders at issue in that case. There, the court determined that a landlord (Young Apartments) had third-party standing to raise its tenants’ constitutional rights. Id. at 1041–44. The court determined specifically that the non-citizens whose rights the landlord sought to raise faced long-running hostility from the community and held a legitimate “fear of provoking additional policing measures[]” if they raised their own claims. Id. at 1044. The court “presume[d]” that these non-citizens reasonably “fear[ed] drawing attention to the immigration status of themselves and their neighbors[]” that could “invite other legal risks.” Id. at 1044. Nothing like that is alleged here. In the second cited case, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d 452 (D. Md. 2019), the court determined “the City’s immigrants face significant obstacles in bringing this suit on their own, as they may hold a credible fear that suing the federal government would torpedo the visa application of a family member whom they are sponsoring or seek to sponsor.” Id. at 490. The court cited no factual allegations or evidentiary material to
10 Of course, non-citizens often sue to vindicate their rights, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017), and they can do so pseudonymously and using other “prophylactic measures” available to protect their legitimate privacy concerns, Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo, 13 F. Supp. 3d 289, 301–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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support this conclusion. If the court intended to refer implicitly to hindrances faced by the group of non-citizens whose rights the case implicated—immigrants potentially subject to inadmissibility under the “public charge” rule, see id. at 470—nothing comparable is alleged or identified here. This case is distinguishable from Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in another respect—there is no relevant connection between the rights Plaintiffs seek to advance in this case and the application for lawful permanent residency filed by Bethke’s husband. This lack of connection makes it difficult to accept that court’s concerns over possible retaliation in a case like this where the federal government is not a party. In the third case Bethke cites, Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 165 F. Supp. 3d 718 (S.D. Ind. 2016), aff’d, 838 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016), the court identified “clear” and “significant hindrances” the right holders (Syrian refugees) faced to bringing suit on their own. Id. at 732. These included that “they [were] newly arrived refugees, escaping political or religious persecution[,]” and that bringing suit on their own would have required them to be adverse to the state official (then-Governor Pence) directly responsible for “suspending the resettlement of Syrian refugees in the State.” Id. Again, nothing comparable is alleged here.11
Separate from Bethke’s third-party standing based on her spouse, Plaintiffs argue that they (and all “voters”) “have the type of relationship to non-U.S. citizen witnesses to
11 Plaintiffs argue that the required hindrance showing “is not a particularly high hurdle to clear.” Mem. in Opp’n at 13–14. It is true that the Supreme Court “ha[s] been quite forgiving with [the third-party standing] criteria in certain circumstances.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130. Regardless, there is a hurdle to clear, and if Bethke clears it based just on her spouse’s non-citizenship and pending application for lawful permanent residency, it’s hard to imagine a non-party right holder who wouldn’t clear the hindrance hurdle.
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justify third party standing.” Mem. in Opp’n at 13. This contention can’t get past Kowalski. There, the plaintiffs were two attorneys seeking to advance “a constitutional challenge to Michigan’s procedure for appointing appellate counsel for indigent defendants who plead guilty.” 543 U.S. at 127. The two attorneys sought to vindicate, not their own constitutional rights, but rights belonging to indigent criminal defendants. Id. To demonstrate they had a close relationship with the right holders, the attorneys “rel[ied] on a future attorney-client relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal defendants who w[ould] request, but be denied, the appointment of appellate counsel, based on the operation of the [challenged] statute.” Id. at 130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court rejected this contention, observing that a hypothetical relationship is “no relationship at all.” Id. at 131. If a hypothetical attorneyclient relationship is insufficient, then so is a hypothetical voter-witness relationship. See Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The relationship between [the organizational plaintiff] AMOS and the persons whom it seeks to help— unidentified, future late jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court.”). Further, as discussed with respect to Bethke’s spouse, Plaintiffs identify no hindrance to noncitizens bringing suit on their own other than a general allegation that “non-U.S. citizen ballot witnesses have relatively little incentive to litigate this matter.” Mem. in Opp’n at 15. That broad assertion is not enough to show the requisite hindrance. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) (noting that the right possessors faced “daunting” practical barriers to bringing suit on their own).
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ORDER Based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 75] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 1. Defendants’ motion is DENIED insofar as it seeks dismissal of Count I for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks dismissal of Count II
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Count II is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 3. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks dismissal of Count III for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Count III is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated: March 29, 2021

s/ Eric C. Tostrud Eric C. Tostrud United States District Court

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