Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 1 of 28 Page ID #:9

1 CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR, PC LINDA M. BURROW, State Bar No. 194668
2 burrow~caldwell-Ieslie. com ANDRE ESBENSHADE, State Bar No. 202301
3 esbenshade~caldwell-Ieslie. com
JEFFREY M. HE!vIERINSKY, State Bar No. 270756
4 chemerins1!Jl@caldwell-Iesliftcom
6 725 South Figlleroa Street 31 S Floor
5 Los Angele~ California 9 017-5524 Teleph<;me: 213) 629-9040
6 FacsImIle: ( 13) 629-9022

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7 ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA MARK D. ROSENBAUM, State Bar No. 59940
8 mrosenbaum~clu-sc. org PETER ELIAS ERG, State Bar No. 189110
9 f{liasbe~*~aclu-sc. org 1 13 W. 8t treet
10 Los Angele~ California 90017 Teleph<:me: 213) 977-9500
11 Facs1IDlle: ( 13) 977-5297

12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

14

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION

15
16 REVEREND F ATHER IAN ELLIOTI DAVIES; REVEREND J. EDWIN
17 BACON;}~.; SHAKEEL SYED;
RABBI tlAROLD M. SCHULWEIS;
18 REVEREND TERA LITTLE' RABBI JOHN ROSOVE; REVEREND PETER
19 LAARMAN;DAVIDN.MYEI$,.S; AND RABBI AMY BERNSTEu'l,
20 Plaintiffs,
21 v.
22 LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD
23 OF SUPERVISORS; AND WILLIAM TFUJIOKA,
24 Defendants.
25

\Ia~ 140- 09 07Cf\~ .J-8v\x I
COMPLAINT

26

27

28
CALDWELL LESLIE &
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COMPLAINT

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 2 of 28 Page ID #:10

1

JURISDICTION

2

1. This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C §

3 1331, because those claims arise under the Constitution of the United States, under

4 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), because those claims seek to redress deprivations, under

5 color of state authority, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the United

6 States Constitution; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), because those claims seek to

7 secure equitable relief under an Act of Congress, specifically under 42 U.S.C. §

8 1983. The court also has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims under 28

9 U.S.C. § 1367.

10

VENUE

1 1
2. Venue is proper in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C.

12 § 1391(b) because Defendants are located in this District and all of the acts and/or

13 omissions complained of herein have occurred or will occur in the District.

14

INTRODUCTION

15 3. Symbols of religious faith are the principal means by which organized

16 religion communicates the common belief systems and bond among adherents.

17 Such symbols are instantly and universally recognizable for the religion each

18 exclusively represents. The best known examples are: the cross, as the preeminent

19 symbol of Christianity; the Star of David, as the preeminent symbol of Judaism; and

20 the Crescent and the Star, as the preeminent symbols of Islam.

21

4. The cross is the most readily and widely identifiable of all religious

22 symbols. As both the Ninth Circuit and California state courts have stated, the cross

23 "represents with relative clarity and simplicity the Christian message of the

24 crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, a doctrine at the heart of Christianity."

25 Ellis v. La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518,1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Okrandv. City of 26 Los Angeles, 207 Cal.App.3d 566, 579-80,254 Cal.Rptr. 913, 922 (1989)). 27

28
CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR

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1

5. The cross is the iconic Christian symbol. The cross is omnipresent in

2 Christian religious observances and celebrations: for example, as backdrop for

3 baptisms, weddings, Easter sunrise services, Christmas masses. The cross is

4 frequently found in Christian households, on automobile dashboards and as jewelry

5 worn by Christians. Just this past December, TIME named Pope Francis as "Person

6 of the Year": the cover photograph showed the Pope wearing a necklace with a

7 large and prominent cross and a ring bearing the cross.

8

6. The universal religious message of the cross to Christians begins with

9 its symbolism as the instrument of the crucifixion and triumph of Jesus Christ and

10 includes the message to all Christians of God's love in sacrificing his son for

11 humanity. This significance is expressed in Scripture: See, e.g., Colossians 2:15

12 ("Having disarmed the powers and authorities, he made a public spectacle of them,

13 triumphing over them by the cross."). Throughout the canonical gospels, Christ

14 states: "And he who does not take his cross and follow after Me is not worthy of

15 Me." Matthew 10:38-39; 16:24-25; Mark 8:34-35; Luke 9:23-24, 14:27.

16

7. One of the most famous verses in the New Testament states that

17 acceptance of the doctrine symbolized by the cross - that Jesus is the son of God

18 who was crucified for man's salvation - provides the means of etemallife. John

19 3:16 ("For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that

20 whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.").

21

8. The same chapter of the New Testament also states that those who do

22 not accept the doctrine symbolized by the Cross will not be saved. John 3: 18 ("He

23 that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned

24 already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of

25 God."). In other words, by adding the principal symbol of Christianity to a county

26 seal, the county is lending its authority to a symbol that not only signifies that Jesus

27 is the son of God, but also that anyone who does not accept him as the savior is

28 unworthy of salvation.

CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR

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COMPLAINT

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1

9. Notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal religious significance of the

2 cross, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approved on January 7, 2014

3 the restoration of a cross to the official County seal, placing it conspicuously and

4 starkly on the image of the San Gabriel Mission. Just ten years earlier, in 2004, the

5 Board removed the cross from the County seal in acknowledgment of the fact that

6 its continued presence constituted an endorsement in both actuality and appearance

7 of religious preference. Indeed, in the initial seal, adopted in 1957, the Board

8 included the cross to expressly communicate the influence of the church. Neither

9 the 1957 seal nor the 2014 seal even attempts to moderate the cross's religious

10 message or the preferred status of Christianity with respect to Los Angeles County

11 by including either the symbols of other secular organizations or institutions or

12 comparable symbols of other religions.

13

10. The County seal is affixed prominently in County government

14 buildings, including the County Hall of Administration and other seats of County

15 governmental authority, on the uniforms and badges of County governmental

16 officials and law enforcement personnel, on County governmental motor vehicles,

17 and on official County documents and correspondence.

18

11. Los Angeles County has a widely diverse religious population as well

19 as a large population which does not affiliate with any religious congregation.

20 According to 2000 County population data published by the Los Angeles Almanac

21 website, of the approximate 58% of County residents who identify as affiliated with

22 a religious congregation, 68:8% (3,806,377) identify as adherents to the Christian

23 faith, 10.2% (564,700) identify as Jewish, 1.7% (92,919) identify as Muslims, 1.3%

24 (70,000) identify as Buddhists, and 1.3% (70,000) identify as Hindu. Nearly four

25 million County residents do not identify as affiliating with any religious

26 congregation.

27

12. The restoration of the cross to the County seal favors the Christian

28
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religion over all other religions and divides County residents by religion and by
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1 adherence or non-adherence to religious beliefs. As such, the County seal including

2 the restored cross violates the Establishment Clauses of the United States and

3 California Constitutions, and the "No Preference Clause" and the "No Aid Clause"

4 of the California Constitution.

5

PARTIES

6

13. Plaintiff Reverend Father Ian Elliott Davies has been rector of St.

7 Thomas the Apostle Episcopal Church in Hollywood since 2002. Previously, Father

8 Davies was the assistant priest at the Anglo-Catholic parish of All Saints, Margaret

9 Street, London. He objects to and is offended by the Board's decision to alter the

10 County seal solely to add a cross to it while excluding the symbols any of the other

11 faiths practiced by citizens of Los Angeles. St. Thomas the Apostle Hollywood

12 states that it is "Anglo-Catholic by tradition, meaning we have a great respect for

13 both the rich liturgical heritage of the church, and for living the message of social

14 justice proclaimed by Jesus Christ." The symbol of St. Thomas the Apostle is the

15 cross.

16

14. .Plaintiff Reverend J. Edwin Bacon, Jr. has been the rector of All Saints

17 Church in Pasadena, California since 1995. Rev. Bacon graduated from the Candler

18 School of Theology at Emory University, which named him their Whiteside

19 Distinguished Preacher. In May, 2005, Church Divinity School of the Pacific

20 conferred on Rev. Bacon an honorary Doctor of Ministry degree. In December,

21 2005, he was named an Honorary Canon of the Cathedral ofSt. Paul by the Bishop

22 of the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles. He objects to and is offended by the

23 Board's decision to alter the County seal solely to add a cross to it while excluding

24 the symbols of any of the other faiths practiced by citizens of Los Angeles. All

25 Saints Church's "Mission and Vision" is "[f]ollowing our prophetic call, we seek to

26 embody the inclusive love of God in Christ through Spirituality, Community, and

27 Peace and Justice." All Saints Church describes itself as "worship centered": "Our

28
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pastoral, educational and discernment ministries are strengthened and transformed
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1 by gathering for Word, sacrament and corporate prayer." All Saints Church also

2 states that it is "education minded": "We prize learning, seeking to know the mind

3 and will of God through Scripture, reason, tradition and human experience." The

4 symbol of All Saints Church is the cross.

5

15. Plaintiff Shakeel Syed is a member of the Los Angeles Council of

6 Religious Leaders and Past Chairman of the Board of Clergy & Laity for Economic

7 Justice in Los Angeles. Plaintiff Syed is a devout Muslim and a lay leader in the

8 Southern California Muslim community. He regularly speaks about Islam and

9 Muslims at Churches, Synagogues and other houses of worship and at schools and

10 universities. He is a Los Angeles County citizen and taxpayer. Plaintiff Syed

11 regularly comes into contact with the County seal during meetings at various county

12 offices, including at the Sheriffs Department and in visits to the County jail as a

13 volunteer Muslim chaplain. He objects to and is offended by the Board's decision

14 to alter the County seal solely to add a cross.

15

16. Plaintiff Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis has been rabbi at Valley Beth

16 Shalom in Encino, California since 1970. Rabbi Schulweis is one of the nation's

17 most respected rabbis. He combined a Talmudic education at Yeshiva College with

18 graduate studies in modem philosophical and theological thought at New York

19 University, the Jewish Theological Seminary and the Pacific School of Religion,

20 from which he received his Ph.D in Theology. Rabbi Schulweis has been

21 instrumental in the development of synagogue programs which address issues of

22 Jewish education and interfaith dialogue and is the Founding Chairperson of the

23 Jewish Foundation for the Righteous, an organization that identifies and awards

24 grants to non-Jews who risked their lives to aid those threatened by Nazis. He has

25 received numerous honors and awards, including the 2008 National Jewish Book

26 Award, the Spirit of the Immortal Chaplains Award (2006), and the Israel Prime

27 Minister's Medal (1975). He objects to and is offended by the Board's decision to

28
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alter the County seal solely to add a cross to it while excluding the symbols of any
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1 of the other faiths practiced by citizens of Los Angeles. The philosophy of Valley

2 Beth Shalom is to build "a synagogue community committed to the quest for a

3 Jewish life that is Godly, meaningful, and purposeful." Its mission statement

4 includes the following: "[W]e are commanded in the Torah: ... 'You will be holy,

5 as I am holy,' (Leviticus 19)." The symbol of Valley Beth Shalom is the Star of

6 David.

7

17. Reverend Tera Little serves as minister at Throop Unitarian

8 Universalist Church in Pasadena. She also serves as regional staff for her

9 denomination. She was ordained in 2011. Rev. Little received her M.Div. from

10 Meadville Lombard Theological School in 2010, and was awarded an honor of

11 excellence in religious education. She is a resident and taxpayer of the County of

12 Los Angeles. Rev. Little objects to and is offended by the Board's decision to alter

13 the County seal solely to add a cross to it while excluding the symbols of any of the

14 other faiths practiced by citizens of Los Angeles.

15

18. Plaintiff Rabbi John Rosove has been Senior Rabbi of Temple Israel of

16 Hollywood since 1988. He received a Masters in Hebrew Letters from Hebrew

17 Union College Jewish Institute of Religion ("HUC-JIR"), Los Angeles and Rabbinic

18 Ordination, from HUC-JIR, New York. Rabbi Rosove describes his mission as "to

19 build Jewish community and draw Jews and their families close to God, the Torah,

20 Jewish tradition, the Jewish people, and the State of Israel as a Jewish national

21 home." The symbol of Temple Israel of Hollywood includes the Star of David. He

22 objects to and is offended by the Board's decision to alter the County seal solely to

23 add a cross to it while excluding the symbols of any of the other faiths practiced by

24 citizens of Los Angeles.

25

19. Plaintiff Reverend Peter Laarman recently retired from his position as

26 Executive Director of Progressive Christians Uniting. He was ordained by the

27 United Church of Christ in 1993. Rev. Laarman was called directly from seminary

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to serve as senior minister at New York City's historic Judson Memorial Church,
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1 where he worked for more than ten years. He is a resident and taxpayer of the

2 County of Los Angeles. He regularly comes into contact with the County seal,

3 including when he attends meetings of the Board of Supervisors. He objects to and

4 is offended by the Board's decision to alter the County seal solely to add a cross to it

5 while excluding the symbols of any of the other faiths practiced by citizens of Los

6 Angeles.

7

20. Plaintiff David N. Myers is the Professor and Chair of the UCLA

8 Department of History and former Director of the UCLA Center for Jewish Studies.

9 Dr. Myers received his A.B. from Yale College in 1982, and undertook graduate

10 studies at Harvard and Tel Aviv Universities before completing his doctorate at

11 Columbia in 1991. He has written extensively in the fields of modem Jewish

12 intellectual and cultural history and teaches courses in ancient, medieval and modem

13 Jewish history. Among other topics, Professor Myers has written and taught about

14 the history of anti-Semitism, and is thus cognizant of the recurrent acts of violence

15 against Jews by Christians acting under the cover of the Cross (though often in

16 violation of Church policy). He objects to and is offended by the Board's decision

17 to alter the County seal solely to add a cross to it while excluding the symbols of

18 any of the other faiths practiced by citizens of Los Angeles.

19

21. Plaintiff Rabbi Amy Bernstein serves as associate rabbi at Kehillat

20 Israel. Originally from Atlanta, Georgia, she received her B.A. in English Literature

21 and Cultural Anthropology from Northwestern University. Rabbi Bernstein

22 attended the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College in Philadelphia for her rabbinic

23 training, which included one year as a visiting graduate student at Ben Gurion

24 University of the Negev in Israel. Prior to coming to Los Angeles, Rabbi Bernstein

25 served as the rabbi of Temple Israel in Duluth, Minnesota for 13 years. As the only

26 rabbi in the Northland Region Rabbi Bernstein represented the Jewish community to

27 the greater Northland community. She served two terms as the President of the

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Arrowhead Interfaith Council and six years on the Board of Trustees of the College
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1 of St. Scholastica, where she was also on the founding board of the Oreck!Alpern

2 Interreligious Forum. She was a scholar in residence for the Jewish Chautauqua

3 Society and lectured widely throughout the Northland. She objects to and is

4 offended by the Board's decision to alter the County Seal solely to add a cross to it

5 while excluding the symbols of any of the other faiths practiced by citizens of Los

6 Angeles.

7

22. Defendant Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (the "Board") is

8 the governing body of the County of Los Angeles, a charter county. The Board

9 functions as the executive and legislative head of the largest county government in

10 the United States. The population of Los Angeles County exceeds 10 million

11 people. The Board consists of five elected Supervisors: Supervisor Gloria Molina

12 (District No.1), Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas (District No.2), Supervisor Zev

13 Yaroslavsky (District No.3), Supervisor Don Knabe (District No.4) and Supervisor

14 Michael D. Antonovich (District No.5). The Board is sued in its official capacity.

15 At all times pertinent to the acts and omissions complained of by this lawsuit, the

16 Board was acting under color of state law, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

17

23. Defendant William T Fujioka serves as the Chief Executive Officer of

18 the County of Los Angeles. In this capacity, he oversees implementation of the

19 Board's directives and will be responsible for executing the change to the County

20 seal. Mr. Fujioka is sued in his official capacity. At all times pertinent to the acts

21 and omissions complained of by this lawsuit, he was, and is, acting under color of

22 state law.

23

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

24

A. The Board Initially Adopts the Seal in 1957 as a Religious Statement

25

24. The Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles adopted an

26 official seal for Los Angeles County on January 2, 1957. The seal depicted a Latin

27 cross to symbolize the religious influence of the church and the missions of

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California. The seal also included in separate frames the Roman goddess of gardens
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1 and fruit trees, Pomona, the Spanish galleon San Salvador which sailed into San

2 Pedro Harbor on October 8, 1542, a tuna representing the fishing industry of the

3 county, a cow representing the dairy industry of the county, the Hollywood Bowl,

4 repr~senting the county cultural activities, two stars representing the motion picture

5 and ,television industries and oil derricks representing oil fields discovered on Signal

6 Hill. The cross was situated over the Hollywood Bowl. Contemporaneous with this

7 adoption, the County submitted documentation to the Secretary of State of

8 California which stated that the presence of the cross on the seal was intended, in

9 part, to represent religion. The seal became effective on March 1, 1957. A copy of

.1 0 the 1957 seal is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1.

11

B. The Board Removes the Cross in 2004 in Recognition that It

12

Represented an Inappropriate Statement ofReligious Faith

13

25. The 1957 seal served as the official County seal until 2004. In 2004,

14 the ACLU Foundation of Southern California ("ACLU") stated to County officials

15 that it was prepared to litigate to have the cross removed from the official seal.

16

26. Shortly thereafter and in response to the ACLU statement, the Board

17 voted to redesign the seal. The resulting seal did not include a cross. In all, the

18 cross, the goddess Pomona and the oil derricks were removed. A sketch of the

19 Mission San Gabriel and an Indian woman carrying a basket were put in the frames

20 on the seal where the cross and Pomona had been situated. No image was

21 substituted for the oil derricks. A copy of the 2004 seal is attached to this complaint

22 as Exhibit 2.

23

27. The removal of the cross proved divisive because of the cross's

24 religious significance. There resulted considerable controversy, which included

25 lengthy and emotional testimony accusing the Board of diminishing the religious

26 significance of the seal along with public protests in opposition to the removal for

27 the same reasons. An editorial in The Los Angeles Times supported removal of the

28 cross from the seal on account of its religious message.

CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR

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COMPLAINT

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 11 of 28 Page ID #:19

1

28. On June 8, 2004, at the first of two public hearings about the seal, the

2 Board heard hours of testimony from irate citizens and residents who both supported

3 and objected for religious reasons to the removal of the cross. After listening to

4 considerable testimony, Supervisor Yvonne Burke of the Second District stated with

5 respect to the objectors as follows:

6

SUP. BURKE: I'VE LISTENED HERE FOR A FEW

7

HOURS AND I KEPT TIDNKING THAT, IF THIS

8

CASE GOES TO TRIAL, I WOULD HATE FOR THEM

9

TO PLAY THIS HEARING BECAUSE, IF THERE'S

10

EVER ANY QUESTION OF WHAT WAS BEING

11

MOVED FORWARD AND WHAT THE OBJECTION

12

WAS TO THE VOTE THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN, IT

13

WAS CLEARLY, IT WAS A RELIGIOUS ONE. THAT

14

MOST OF THE PEOPLE HERE SPOKE ...

15

[INTERJECTIONS]

16 Supervisor Burke, a self-described Christian, was repeatedly interrupted by

17 supporters of maintaining the cross on the seal, which she described as a "religious

18 frenzy ."

19

29. Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich of the Fifth District stated during

20 this hearing that "... these individuals do have the right of free speech and religious

21 speech is still a freedom of speech that's given to everyone."

22

30. The second public hearing before the Board took place on

23 September 24,2004. At this hearing, Supervisor Antonovich objected to the

24 depiction of the San Gabriel Mission ultimately adopted because

25

WHAT IS DEPICTED IS A BACK DOOR, THE REAR

26

END OF THE CHURCH. THAT IS NOT THE SY1Y.1BOL

27

OF THE MISSION. THE SY1Y.1BOL OF THE MISSION

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1

WAS AN OPEN DOOR TO BRING THE GOOD NEWS

2

3 Christians often refer to the gospel (the four books in the Bible that describe the life

4 of Jesus Christ" as the "good news" of redemption through the life and death of

5 Jesus). In fact, "gospel" derives from an Old English word meaning "good news."

6

C The Cross Is Restored to the County Seal

7

31. On January 7, 2014, Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe, who had cast

8 the two dissenting votes to the 2004 motion to remove the cross from the then-

9 County seal, introduced a motion to restore a cross to the County seal by placing it

10 on the apex of the roof of the San Gabriel Mission. The motion did not propose any

11 other changes to the seal, nor does the revised seal include any contextualization to

12 even suggest that the addition of the cross serves any secular purpose.

13

32. The motion was opposed by the ACLU and by the Anti-Defamation

14 League ("ADL"). In a letter to the Board dated January 6,2014, the ADL stated in

15 pertinent part:

16

If you vote to add a cross to the County seal, you send the

17

divisive and exclusive message that you not only endorse

18

religion over non-religion, but also prefer Christianity over

19

all the other diverse faiths within the County. This

20

message is contrary to your legal and moral responsibility

21

to treat all people alike. While a cross may be appropriate

22

on a house of worship, private school or university, it is

23

unsuitable on a government seal that represents a

24

religiously and ethnically diverse county of over 10

25

million people. It is also important to note the Mission

26

was added to the seal in 2004 without the cross, and it

27

currently reflects the historical influence of missions in

28
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California without promoting a single religious view. -11-

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1

2

33. An editorial by The Los Angeles Times dated January 3, 2014 also

3 opposed restoration of the cross to the County seal. The editorial stated in pertinent

4 part:

5

Los Angeles County Supervisors Don Knabe and

6

Michael D. Antonovich are beginning 2014 by reopening

7

the contentious debate over whether there should be a

8

Christian cross on the county seal. Words almost fail, but

9

here's one that comes to mind: Seriously?

10

11

Their argument - that the depiction of the mission is

12

"artistically and architecturally inaccurate" because in real

13

life there is now a cross on top of the main building - is

14

laughable. The little image of the mission on the county

15

seal doesn't include bells, either, and San Gabriel's bells

16

are famous.

17

But of course, this is not about the depiction and it's not

18

about the bells, either. It's about a not-very-subtle attempt

19

by two elected officials who were on the losing end of the

20

2004 vote to change the county seal to now sneak the

21

primary symbol of Christianity back in.

22

34. The motion to restore the cross to the County seal passed 3-2, with

23 Supervisors Molina and Yaroslavsky voting against the motion. As the ADL letter

24 states, the presence of the San Gabriel Mission on the 2004 seal represents the

25 historical role of missions in Southern California without promoting or endorsing a

26 particular religion or religious belief. The purpose and effect of the motion was to

27 favor the Christian faith over other religious and non-religious beliefs. A copy of

28
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Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 14 of 28 Page ID #:22

1 the new seal, adopted by the Board on January 7, 2014, is attached to this complaint

2 as Exhibit 3.

3

35. Each of the plaintiffs is a Los Angeles County taxpayer and will see the

4 County seal frequently. Each plaintiff is deeply offended by the inclusion in the

5 County seal of a clearly identifiable religious symbol and each believes that the

6 inclusion was deliberately intended to promote a sectarian purpose of favoring

7 Christianity among all religions practiced in Los Angeles County and disfavor other

8 religious and non-religious beliefs.

9

36. The County seal is prominently displayed throughout the County,

10 including outside County buildings, on County vehicles, on the County letterhead,

11 and numerous other places. The change to the County seal will cost taxpayers

12 thousands of dollars.

13

37. The violations described in the preceding paragraphs are ongoing and

14 will continue until and unless this court grants the relief Plaintiffs seek by this

15 Complaint.

16

CAUSES OF ACTION

17

First Cause of Action

18 Violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983 (Based on the Violation of the Establishment

19 Clause of the United States Constitution as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment)
20

21

38. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this

22 Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

23

39. Defendants, who are charged with respecting on equal terms the

24 religious and non-religious beliefs and affiliations of all residents within Los

25 Angeles County, have denied and continue to deny Plaintiffs their right to practice

26 their faith and religious beliefs freely and without disfavor by their government or

27 government officials. Defendants are denying Plaintiffs rights of religious freedom

28
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COMPLAINT

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1 equality and to government impartiality as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

2 Amendments.

3

40. Defendants have threatened to and will implement the addition of the

4 cross to the Seal in violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth

5 Amendments.

6

41. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct,

7 Plaintiffs will further suffer irreparable hann.

8

Second Cause of Action

9

Violation of the California Constitution, Article I, § 4

10 42. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this
11 Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 12
43. Defendants, who are charged with non-discrimination against and 13 affording no preference toward any religion or religious beliefs, have denied and 14 continue to deny Plaintiffs their right to practice their faith and religious beliefs 15 freely and without disfavor by their government or government officials. 16 Defendants are denying Plaintiffs rights of religious freedom, equality and to 17 government impartiality as guaranteed by Article I, § 4 of the California

18 Constitution.

19

44. Defendants have threatened to and will implement the addition of the

20 cross to the Seal in violation of Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, § 4 of the

21 California Constitution.

22

45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct,

23 Plaintiffs will further suffer irreparable hann.

24

Third Cause of Action

25 Violation of the California Constitution, Article XVI, § 5
26

27

46. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this

28 Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR

-14-

COMPLAINT

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 16 of 28 Page ID #:24

1

47. Defendants, who are charged with not providing any aid to a sectarian

2 purpose under Article XVI, § 5 have violated that duty by authorizing the

3 expenditure of County taxpayer funds to alter the County seal for the sole purpose of

4 adding the preeminent symbol of Christianity to that seal.

5

48. Defendants have threatened to and will implement the addition of the

6 cross to the Seal in violation of Plaintiffs' rights under Article XVI, § 5 of the

7 California Constitution.

8

49. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct,

9 Plaintiffs will further suffer irreparable harm.

10

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

11

Plaintiffs request relief as follows:

12

A. An injunction prohibiting the Board, its officers, agents, and employees

13 from implementing and displaying the newly adopted official seal containing the

14 cross.

15

B. A declaration that the Board's action to restore a cross to the official

16 seal of the County of Los Angeles is unconstitutional under the federal and

17 California Constitutions, as violating Plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth

18 Amendments under the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 4 and Article

19 XVI, § 5 of the California Constitution.

20

C. Costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1920 and 42 U.S. § 1988.

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
CALDWELL LESLIE &
PROCTOR

-15-

COMPLAINT

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS( -JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 17 of 28 Page ID #:25

1

D. Attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988 and California Code of

2 Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and any other appropriate statutory basis.

3

E. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

4

5 DATED: FebruaryS, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

6

CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR, PC

LINDA M. BURROW

7

ANDREW ESBENSHADE

JEFFREY M. CHEMERINSKY

8

9

ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

10

MARK D. ROSENBAUM PETER ELIAS ERG

11

12

13

MARK D. ROSENBAUM

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR

-16-

COMPLAINT

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 18 of 28 Page ID #:26
Exhibit 1

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 19 of 28 Page ID #:27
Seal of the County of Los Angeles, Adopted March 1, 1957
Exhibit 1 Page 17

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 20 of 28 Page ID #:28
Exhibit 2

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 21 of 28 Page ID #:29
Seal of the County of Los Angeles, Adopted September 14, 2004
Exhibit 2 Page 18

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 22 of 28 Page ID #:30
Exhibit 3

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 23 of 28 Page ID #:31
Seal of the County of Los Angeles, Adopted January 7,2014
Exhibit 3 Page 19

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 24 of 28 Page ID #:32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES JUDGES

This case has been assigned to District Judge _ __ ------'C_h_ri_st..i;.n:...a;C-A_.....:S_n..y!...d_ec-r_ ___ and the assigned

Magistrate Judge is

John E. McDermott

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

2:14-cv-00907 CAS-JEMx

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 ofthe United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related motions.
All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge.

February 6,2014 Date

Clerk, U. S. District Court
By SBOURGEOIS Deputy Clerk

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is filed, a copy of this notice must be served on all plaintiffs).

Subsequent documents must be fIled at the following location:

~ Western Division 312 N. Spring Street, G-8 Los Angeles, CA 90012

o Southern Division
411 West Fourth St., Ste 1053
Santa Ana, CA 92701

o Eastern Division
3470 Twelfth Street, Room 134
Riverside, CA 92501

Failure to fIle at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.

CV-18 (08/13)

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES JUDGES

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 25 of 28 Page ID #:33

AO 440 (Rev. 06112) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
_------"C=E=..cN-'--T'--'.R..-'<A--'-'L=----__ District of CALIFORNIA

REVEREND FATHER IAN ELLIOTT DAVIES; REVEREND J. EDWIN BACON, JR.; SHAKEEL SYED; RABBI HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS; REVEREND TERA LITTLE; RABBI JOHN ROSOVE; REVEREND PETER LAARMAN; DAVID N. MYERS;AND RABBI AMY BERNSTEIN
Plainliff(s)
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; AND WILLIAM T FUJIOKA,
Defendant(s)

) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No.
~ CV14-0907~-~twl)(
) ) )

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA

A lawsuit has been filed against you. Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) - or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee ofthe United States described ih Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) - you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR, PC LINDA M. BURROW 725 S. FIGUEROA STREET, 31 ST FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90017-5524
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
Date: FEB. tp. 2014
AO-440

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 26 of 28 Page ID #:34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL COVER SHEET

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS ( Check box if you are representing yourself D )

DEFENDANTS

D ) ( Check box if you are representing yourself

REVEREND FATHER IAN ELLIOTT DAVIES; REVEREND J. EDWIN BACON, JR.; SHAKEEL SYED; RABBI HAROLD M. SCHULWEI5; REVEREND TERA LlTILE; RABBI JOHN ROSOVE; REVEREND PETER LAARMAN; DAVID N. MYERS; AND RABBI AMY BERNSTEIN

LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; AND WILLIAM T FUJIOKA

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff LOS ANGELES
(EXCEPT IN u.s. PLAINTIFF CASES)

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant LOS ANGELES (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONL Y)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are
representing yourself, provide the same information. CALDWELL LESLIE & PROCTOR, PC LINDA M. BURROW 725 S. FIGUEROA STREET, 31ST FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90017-5524

Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are
representing yourself, provide the same information.

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in one box only.)

o 1. U.s. Government
Plaintiff

[8] 3 . Federal Question (U.s.
Government Not a Party)

D 2. U.S. Government
Defendant

D 4. Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES-For Diversity Cases Only

(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant)

Citizen ofThis State

0 PTF DEF

[EJ 1

1 Incorporated or Principal Place

of Business in this State

0PTF 4

0 0 0 Citizen of Another State

2

2 Incorporated and Principal Place

5

Otlzen or Subject of a Foreign Country

of Business in Another State

o 0 3

3 Foreign Nation

DEF
[EJ 4
0 5

IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in one box only.)

'xl 1. Original

D 2. Removed from

D

~ Proceeding

State Court

3. Remanded from Appellate Court

O 4. Rel.nstated or D Reopened

0 5. Tr~nsferred from Another

6. MultiDistrict

District (Specify)

Litigation

V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: JURY DEMAND: DYes [g] No (Check "Yes" only if demanded in complaint.)

CLASS ACTION under F.R.Cv.P. 23: DYes [g] No

D MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $

u.s. VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)

Violation of 42 U.S.c. s. 1983 (U.S. Const. amends. I and XIV); Violation of Cal. Const., Art. I, s. 4; and Violation of Cal. Const., Art. XVI, s. 5.

VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in one box only).

[ OntER STATUTES

CONTRAG'f

0 0 375 False Claims Act

110 Insurance

0 400 State Reapportionment
0 410 Antitrust

0 120 Marine
o 130 Miller A<;t

0 0 430 Banks and Banking

140 Negotiable Instrument

RElIL PROPER'fY (!Ot{T.

IMM,GRATI0ij

0 240 Torts to Land 0 245 Tort Product
Liability
0 290 All Other Real Property T0RTS

0 462 Naturalization Application
o 465 Other Immigration Actions
TORTS eERSONAl. PROPERTY

PRISONER' PETITIOriS Habeas Corpus:
o 463 Alien Detainee o 510 Motions to Vacate
Sentence
o 530 General o 535 Death Penalty

PRO~ERTY RIGHTS
o 820 Copyrights o 830 Patent o 840 Trademark
o SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff)

J
J

0 450 Commerce/lCC Rates/Etc.
0 460 Deportation 0 470 Racketeer Influ-
enced & Corrupt Org.
0 480 Consumer Credit 0 490 Cable/Sat TV 0 850 Securities/Com-
modities/Exchange
0 890 Other Statutory Actions
0 891 Agricultural Acts

150 Recovery of
0 Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment

PERSONAL INJURV
0 310 Airplane 0 315 Airplane
Product Liability

0 0 151 Medicare Act
152 Recovery of
0 0 Defaulted Student Loan (Excl. Vet.) 0
o 0 153 Recovery of Overpayment of
Vet. Benefits
0 160 Stockholders' 0 0 Suits

320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Fed. Employers' Liability
340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability
350 Motor Vehicle 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability

0 370 Other Fraud

Ot.her:

0 0 371 Truth in Lending

540 Mandamus/Other

0 0

0 380 Other Personal
Property Damage
0 385 Property Damage

Product liability

0

550 Civil Rights
555 Prison Condition
560 Civil Detainee Conditions of

BANK~UP.TCY

Confinement

0 422 Appeal 28 USC 158
0 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 CIVIL RIGHTS

FORFEITVRE/PENALT'Y
o 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21
o USC 881 6900ther

o 862 Black Lung (923) o 863 DIWClDIWW (405 (g)) o 864 SSID Title XVI o 865 RSI (405 (g))
FmERAl TAX SUITS
0 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)
0 871 IRS·Third Party 26 USC 7609

I

893 Environmental
0 Matters
o 895 Freedom of Info. Act
o 896 Arbitration

0 190 Other Contract
o 195 Contract Product Liability
o 196 Franchise

0 0

360 Other Personal Injury
362 Personal InjuryMed Malpratice

[EJ 440 Other Civil Rights
o 441 Voting o0 o 442 Employment

I:AB OR
710 Fair Labor Standards Act 720 Labor/Mgmt.

0 0 365 Personal InjuryProduct Liability

443 Housingl Accommodations

Relations
o 740 Railway Labor Act

o o 899 Admin. Procedures Act/Review of Appeal of

REAL PROPERlY 210 Land

Agency Decision
o o 950 Constitutionality of o State Statutes

Condemnation 220 Foreclosure
230 Rent Lease &

Ejectment

367 Health Carel
0 Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability
o 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Uabilb

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

Case Number:

445 American with
0 Disabilities-
o Employment 446 American with

o 751 Family and Medical o Leave Act
790 Other Labor

Disabilities-Other
o 448 Education

o Litigation 791 Employee Ret. Inc. Jl 4-0907 Security Act
l"

CV-71 (11/13)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page 1 of 3

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 27 of 28 Page ID #:35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII. VENUE: Your answers to the questions below will determine the division of the Court to which this case will most likely be initially assigned. This initial assignment
is subject to change, in accordance with the Court's General Orders, upon review by the Court of your Complaint or Notice of Removal.

Question A: Was this case removed from state court?

STATE CASE WAS PENDING IN THE COUNTY OF:
-

0 Yes ~ No

0 Los Angeles

0 If "no, "go to Question B. If "yes," check the

Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo

box to the right that applies, enter the

corresponding division in response to Question D, below, and skip to Section IX.

0 Orange

0 Riverside or San Bernardino

INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD IS: Western Western Southern Eastern

Question B: Is the United States, or one of its agencies or employees, a party to this

If the United States, or one of its agencies or employees, is a party, is It:

action?

A PLAINTIFF?

ADEFENDANTI

0 Yes ~ No

Then check the box below for the county In which the majority of DEFENDANTS relide.

Then check the box below for the count)! In which the majority of PLAINTIFFS rellde.

0 If "no, " go to Question c. If "yes," check the

Los Angeles

box to the right that applies, enter the corresponding division in response to Question D, below, and skip to Section IX.

0 Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo
0 Orange

0 Los Angeles 0 Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis
Obispo
0 Orange

0 Riverside or San Bernardino

0 Riverside or San Bernardino

0 Other

0 Other

INITIAL DIVISION IN
CACDIS:
Western Western Southern Eastern Western

Question C: Location of
plaintiffs, defendants, and c1alms7
(Make only one selection per row)

A.
Los Angeles County

B.
Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo Counties

C.
Orange County

Indicate the location in which a majority of plaintiffs reside:

[8]

0

0

Indicate the location in which a maj ority of defendants reside:

[8]

0

0

Indicate the location in which a

[8]

m aloritv of claims arose:

0

0

D.
Riverside or San Bernardino Counties
0 0 0

E. Outside the Central District of California
0 0 0

F.
Other
0 0 0

C.1. Is either ofthe following true? If so, check the one that applies:
o 2 or more answers in Column C o only 1 answer in Colurnn C and no answers in Column D

C.2. Is either ofthe following true? Ifso, check the one that applies:
o 2 or more answers in Column D o only 1 answer in Column D and no answers in Column C

Your case will initially be assigned to the SOUTHERN DIVISION.
Enter "Southern" in response to Question D, below.
- + If none applies, answer question C2 to the right.

Your case will initia lly be assigned to the EASTERN DIVISION.
Enter "Eastern" in response to Question D, below.
~ If none applies, go to the box below.

Your case will initially be assigned to the WESTERN DIVISION.
Enter "Western" in response to Question D below.

Questlon lD: Initial Dlvlslon1
-+ "-
Enter the Initial division determined by Question A, B, or C above:

INITIAL()IViSlQN IN CACID WESTERN

CV-71 (11/13)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page20f3

Case 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-JEM Document 1 Filed 02/06/14 Page 28 of 28 Page ID #:36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

IX(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed?
If yes, list case number(s):

~ NO

D YES

IX(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed in this court that are related to the present case?
If yes, list case number(s):

~ NO

D YES

Civil cases are deemed related if a previously filed case and the present case:

0 (Check all boxes that apply)

A. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or

D B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or
o C. For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or
o D. Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright...gruLone of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.

X. SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (OR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT):

~'~1l./

.
I

l l/\

~#Y;/(l'

()
1",/' [ \\" d ()o., lV'\. I.) 1-,1' (OOATE: _FE_B_:.,-_>,_2_01_4_ _ _ __

CI~ i Notice to CounsellParties:The CV-71 (JS-44)

ove Sheet and the Information co ntained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings o r

other papers as required by law. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States In September 1974, Is required pursuant to Local Ru le 3-1 Is not fi led but Is used by the Clerk of the Court for the p urpose of statistics, venue and initiating the dvll docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate Instructions sheet).

Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:

Nature of Suit Code Abbreviation

861

HIA

Substantive Statement of Cause of Action
All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Secu rity Act, as amended . Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program. (42 U.S.c. 1935FF(b))

862

BL

All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under TItle 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.c.

923)

All claims filed by insu red workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus

863

DIWC

all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 V.S.c. 405 (g))

863

DIWW

All cla ims filed for w idows o r widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Securit y Act, as amended. (42 U.s.c. 405 (g))

864

SSID

All cla ims for supplemental security income payment s based upon d isability filed under Tit le 16 of the Social Security Act, as amended.

865

RSI

All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended.

(42 U.S.c. 405 (g))

CV-71 (11/13)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page 3 of3

 
 1

JS-6

‘O’

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

WESTERN DIVISION

11

12 REVEREND FATHER IAN ELLIOTT Case No. 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-FFM

13 DAVIES; REVEREND J. EDWIN

ORDER GRANTING

14 BACON, JR.; SHAKEEL SYED;

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

15 RABBI HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS; (Dkt. 84)

REVEREND TERA LITTLE; RABBI 16
JOHN ROSOVE; REVEREND PETER

17 LAARMAN; DAVID N. MYERS;

18 AND RABBI AMY BERNSTEIN,

19

Plaintiffs,

20

v.

21 LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD
22 OF SUPERVISORS; AND WILLIAM
23 T. FUJIOKA,

24

Defendants.

25

26

27

28

1.

1

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

3

On February 6, 2014, plaintiffs Reverend Father Ian Elliott Davies, Reverend

4 J. Edwin Bacon, Jr., Shakeel Syed, Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis, Reverend Tera

5 Little, Rabbi John Rosove, Reverend Peter Laarman, David N. Myers, and Rabbi

6 Amy Bernstein (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed the instant action against defendants

7 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (“the Board” or “the County”), and

8 County Chief Executive Officer William T. Fujioka (collectively, “defendants”).

9 Dkt. 1 (Complaint). In brief, plaintiffs allege that the Board’s January 7, 2014

10 motion approving the restoration of a Latin cross to the official County seal by

11 placing the cross atop the seal’s depiction of the San Gabriel Mission violates (1)

12 the No Aid Clause of article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution; (2) the

13 No Preference Clause of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution; and (3)

14 the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

15 See Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 38-49.

16

On September 17, 2015, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for a permanent

17 injunction. Dkt. 84 (“Motion”).1 On October 8, 2015, defendants filed an

18 opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. Dkt. 97 (“Opp’n”).2 On October 19, 2015,

19

20 1 In support of their motion for a permanent injunction, plaintiffs filed the following declarations:

21 Dkt. 85 (Declaration of Reverend Father Ian Elliott Davies (“Davies Decl.”)); Dkt. 86

(Declaration of Reverend J. Edwin Bacon, Jr. (“Bacon Decl.”)); Dkt. 87 (Declaration of Shakeel
22 Syed (“Syed Decl.”)); Dkt. 88 (Declaration of Reverend Tera Little (“Little Decl.”)); Dkt. 89

23

(Declaration of Rabbi John Rosove (“Rosove Decl.”)); Dkt. 90 (Declaration of Reverend Peter Laarman (“Laarman Decl.”)); Dkt. 91 (Declaration of David N. Myers (“Myers Decl.”)); Dkt. 92

24 (Declaration of Rabbi Amy Bernstein (“Bernstein Decl.”)); Dkt. 93 (Declaration of Michael J.
Gonzalez, Ph. D. (“Gonzalez Decl.”)); Dkt. 94 (Declaration of Jeffrey S. Siker, Ph. D. (“Siker

25 Decl.”)); Dkt. 95 (Declaration of Jill Vesci (“Vesci Decl.”)); and Dkt. 96 (Declaration of Linda

M. Burrow (“Burrow Decl.”)).
26 2 In support of their opposition to the instant motion, defendants filed the following declarations:

27 Dkt. 98 (Declaration of John Dietler, Ph. D. (“Dietler Decl.”)); Dkt. 99 (Declaration of Stephen

W. Hackel, Ph. D. (“Hackel Decl.”)); Dkt. 100 (Declaration of Frank J. Ozello (“Ozello Decl.”));
28 Dkt. 101 (Declaration of Lori Glasgow, Ph. D. (“Glasgow Decl.”)); Dkt. 102 (Declaration of Jho-

2.

1 plaintiffs filed a reply. Dkt. 121 (“Reply”). On November 10, 2015, the Court held

2 a one-day bench trial.3 Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the

3 Court finds and concludes as follows.

4

5 An Ignacio (“Ignacio Decl.”)); Dkt. 103 (Declaration of David Sommers (“Sommers Decl.”);
Dkt. 104 (Declaration of Gerardo Ramirez (“Ramirez Decl.”)); Dkt. 105 (Declaration of Susan

6 Herman (“Herman Decl.”); Dkt. 106 (Declaration of Joseph M. Nicchitta (“Nicchitta Decl.”));

Dkt. 107 (Declaration of Ernestina Rhind (“Rhind Decl.”)); Dkt. 108 (Declaration of Adela
7 Guzman (“Guzman Decl.”)); Dkt. 109 (Declaration of Kenneth A. Maranga (“Maranga Decl.”));

8

and Dkt. 110 (Declaration of Timothy T. Coates (“Coates Decl.”)). In addition, defendants filed objections to plaintiffs’ declarations. See Dkts. 111-117. In particular, defendants object to the

9 testimony of one of plaintiffs’ three experts, Jill Vesci, who offers her opinion as an architectural
historian. See Dkt. 117 (Defendants’ Objections to Vesci Decl.). Pursuant to Federal Rule of

10 Evidence 702(a), defendants object to Vesci’s testimony on the grounds that she lacks the

requisite expertise, knowledge, skill, training, or education necessary to testify about the
11 “architectural history of the Mission.” Id. Defendants contend that Vesci’s deposition testimony

12

revealed that she (1) received no formal education in the history of California Missions or the San Gabriel Mission, (2) has no specialized knowledge or teaching experience regarding mission

13 architecture, (3) does not consider herself to be an expert on California missions, and (4) has

never served as an expert in any field. Id. at 2-3. Defendants further argue that Vesci’s testimony

14 is not the result of reliable principles and methods, and therefore is not based on sufficient facts or

data. Id. at 3 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(d)). Without reaching the merits of defendants’
15 objections, the Court notes that it has not cited or otherwise relied upon Vesci’s testimony in

16 reaching its findings and conclusions here.

3 Throughout this order, the Court cites to exhibits included in the parties’ Joint Exhibit List, dkt.
17 144, as follows: “Tr. Ex. [Exhibit Number].” Defendants lodge blanket objections, under Federal

18

Rules of Evidence 602 (Need for Personal Knowledge) and 901 (Authentication), to many of plaintiffs’ exhibits, including documents that defendants produced in discovery and that plaintiffs

19 attached as exhibits to the Declaration of Linda M. Burrow. See Dkt. 112 (Defendants’
Objections to Burrow Decl.). Of course, “[a]uthentication is a ‘condition precedent to

20 admissibility,’ and this condition is satisfied by ‘evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.’ ” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764,
21 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). A proper foundation need not be established

22 through personal knowledge, but may rest on any manner permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b) or 902. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (providing ten approaches to authentication); Fed. R.

23 Evid. 902 (self-authenticating documents need no extrinsic foundation). Documents that are

produced in response to discovery requests and that contain certain indicia of reliability may be
24 deemed authentic when later offered by a party-opponent. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777

25

(“Authentication can also be accomplished through judicial admissions such as . . . production of items in response to . . . [a] discovery request.”) (quoting 31 Federal Practice & Procedure:

26 Evidence § 7105, at 39); Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889
n.12 (9th Cir. 1996) (documents bearing a party’s letterhead that were produced by the party in

27 discovery were deemed authentic when offered by the party-opponent); Snyder v. Whittaker

Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). To the extent the Court relies upon plaintiffs’
28 documentary evidence (in particular, documents produced by defendants in discovery), the Court

3.

1

II.

2

FINDINGS OF FACT4

3

Plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles who

4 regularly come into contact with the County Seal. See Davies Decl. at ¶ 2; Bacon

5 Decl. at ¶ 2; Syed Decl. at ¶ 2; Little Decl. at ¶ 2; Rosove Decl. at ¶ 2; Laarman

6 Decl. at ¶ 2; Myers Decl. at ¶ 2; and Bernstein Decl. at ¶ 2. Defendant Los Angeles

7 County Board of Supervisors is the governing body of the County of Los Angeles.

8 In 2014, when the instant suit was filed, defendant William T. Fujioka served as the

9 Chief Executive Officer of the County of Los Angeles, and the Board of

10 Supervisors consisted of the following five elected members: Supervisor Gloria

11 Molina (District No. 1), Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas (District No. 2),

12 Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky (District No. 3), Supervisor Don Knabe (District No.

13 4), and Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich (District No. 5).5 Tr. Ex. 67.

14

On January 2, 1957, the Board of Supervisors adopted a new official seal for

15 the County of Los Angeles (the “1957 Seal”). Tr. Ex. 7. The 1957 Seal was

16 designed by former Supervisor Kenneth Hahn and depicted, among other things, an

17 image of the Hollywood Bowl, with two stars and an unadorned Latin cross situated

18 in the sky above it. Id. According to official County documents, the depiction of

19 the Hollywood Bowl on the 1957 Seal represents cultural activities, and the two

20 stars represent the motion picture and television industries. Id. It is unclear from

21

22 deems these items to be authentic under either Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b)(4) (noting the

23 “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item,
taken together with all the circumstances,” may support a finding of authenticity) or 902(1)-(2)

24 (noting certain domestic public documents are self-authenticating).

25 4 To the extent necessary, each of these findings of fact may be deemed to be a conclusion of law.
5 Defendant William T. Fujioka was sued in his official capacity as County Chief Executive
26 Officer and has since resigned from this position. Dkt. 127. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

27

Procedure 25(d), Sachi Hamai, Fujioka’s successor, is automatically substituted as a defendant in this action. Subsequent proceedings should be in the substituted party’s name. Fed. R. Civ. P.

28 25(d).

4.

1 the record whether the unadorned Latin cross was meant to represent “the influence 2 of the church and missions of California,” id., or, more simply, religion.6 In 3 addition to the cross, the 1957 Seal also depicted an image of Pomona, “the goddess 4 of gardens and fruit trees,” to represent agriculture; the Spanish galleon San 5 Salvador, which sailed into San Pedro Harbor on October 8, 1542; a tuna, to 6 represent the fishing industry; the champion cow Pearlette, to represent the dairy 7 industry; engineering instruments, to represent the County’s “contribution to the 8 conquest of space”; and oil derricks, to represent oil fields discovered on Signal 9 Hill. Id. 10

11 6 Plaintiffs argue that the Board of Supervisors originally included the Latin cross on the 1957

12

Seal for religious purposes. In support of this contention, plaintiffs rely upon a letter from the County Chief Clerk, dated February 28, 1957, filing the 1957 Seal with the California Secretary

13 of State. See Tr. Ex. 9. The letter states that it is being forwarded “in conformance with Part 2 of

the Government Code, Paragraph 25004, which provides that a description and impression of the

14 Seal shall be filed in the office of the County Clerk and the Secretary of State.” Id. The body of

the letter lists the following eight items as having been “specified” by the 1957 Seal’s artist,
15 Millard Sheets, on the “mat” of the original design: “Agriculture”; “Earth, Sea, and Sun”; “Oil

16 and Galleon”; “Hollywood Bowl”; “Religion”; “Dairy Farming”; “Fishing”; and “Industry.” Id.
(emphasis added). It is unclear from the record whether or not the artist of the 1957 Seal was a

17 County employee. The County objects to plaintiffs’ reliance upon this document, arguing, among

other things, that the document is not properly authenticated and contains inadmissible hearsay—
18 i.e., the statement that the cross on the Seal symbolizes “[r]eligion.” See Dkt. 112, Objection No.

19

4 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 602, 801, 802, 901). However, pursuant to the Court’s discussion supra at n.3 and Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), the Court finds no reason to question the authenticity

20 of the document, which defendants themselves produced and which contains “distinctive
characteristics” indicative of its authenticity. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4). Furthermore, the

21 statements contained therein are not excluded by the rule against hearsay for at least two reasons.

First, the statements fall under an exception to the rule against hearsay, as they are included “in a
22 document that is at least 20 years old and whose authenticity is established.” Fed. R. Evid.

23

803(16). Second, the statements in the document are not offered for their truth, but rather as an official statement of the County, filed pursuant to California Government Code section 25004.

24 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 25004 (stating Board of Supervisors “may adopt a seal” and that “[a]
description and impression of the seal shall be filed in the office of the county clerk”). In

25 addition, the statements contained in the document were publicly referenced by Supervisor

Yaroslavsky during the Board’s 2004 meetings, and therefore inform the reasonable, objective
26 observer’s perception of the reasons for the County’s revisions of the seal. See Tr. Ex. 13 (June

27

8, 2004 Board Meeting Minutes), at 203 (stating that the County in its 1957 filings with the Secretary of State had “explained what the cross stood for” and “didn’t say [the cross] was part of

28 our history, to represent our history,” but rather said “one word. . . Religion”).

5.

1

The 1957 Seal served as the County’s official seal until 2004. On May 19,

2 2004, the ACLU Foundation of Southern California (“ACLU”) sent a letter to

3 County officials stating that the presence of the cross on the 1957 Seal “reflects an

4 impermissible endorsement of Christianity by the County” and was therefore

5 unconstitutional. See Tr. Ex. 11. In its letter, the ACLU also indicated that it “was

6 prepared to negotiate a reasonable time frame” for the 1957 Seal’s replacement, but

7 would file suit against the County if it did not agree to remove the Latin cross. Id.

8

On June 1, 2004, during a closed session of the Board of Supervisors, the

9 five members of the Board voted 3-2 to instruct County Counsel to “negotiate with

10 the ACLU” to determine whether the ACLU would refrain from filing suit if the

11 County were to (1) add to the seal “a representation of the region’s indigenous

12 peoples,” and (2) replace the Latin cross “with a depiction of a California

13 mission.”7 Tr. Ex. 82.

14

On June 8, 2004, at one of several public meetings wherein the Board

15 discussed potential revisions to the 1957 Seal, the Board heard testimony from

16 members of the public, many of whom objected to the removal of the Latin cross on

17 religious grounds. See Tr. Ex. 13 (June 8, 2004 Board Meeting Minutes), at 86 (“If

18 there’s no cross, there’s no compromise.”), 101 (“This is an attack on the body of

19 Christ.”), 112 (“My lord and savior died on that cross and it would be horrible for

20 me to just let it be erased.”), 135 (“The cross represents not just the passion that we 21 are presenting today but the passion of Christ and [that] this is a Christian nation.”), 22 187 (“It’s a symbol of the love of Christ.”). 23

24

25 7 At the time, the Board consisted of the following five members: Supervisor Gloria Molina

(District No. 1), Supervisor Yvonne Burke (District No. 2), Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky (District
26 No. 3), Supervisor Don Knabe (District No. 4), and Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich (District

27

No. 5). With the exception of Supervisor Burke, who was later replaced by Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas, the composition of the Board remained unchanged through the filing of the

28 instant lawsuit on February 6, 2014.

6.

1

Following the time for public comment, each of the five members of the

2 Board shared his or her views on revising the 1957 Seal. Supervisor Michael D.

3 Antonovich stated his view that “[t]he cross is a part of a historical fact with the 4 founding of the County of Los Angeles, just as the Star of David on the Sheriff’s

5 badge is a reflection of . . . the Judaic heritage and the laws of Moses.” Id. at 192-

6 93; see also id. at 194 (stating that the 1957 Seal “reflects the historical nature of

7 the County of Los Angeles”), 219 (“The County Seal does not lack historical

8 significance and it’s just reporting a historical fact.”), 219 (“In this case, it’s

9 reflecting a historical fact on the County of Los Angeles and there’s been no

10 Supreme Court decision that outlaws that.”). Regarding the proposed changes to

11 the seal, Antonovich stated that “[i]f you replace [the cross] with a mission without

12 a cross[,] that’s not a mission anymore.” Id. at 219-20. He also noted “additional

13 problems” related to “the costs [of] redoing a county seal,” asking, “why should we

14 spend time and effort to make replacements when our time and effort ought to be

15 spent in getting those resources to keep the libraries open, to get the children

16 adopted, and to help public safety?” Id. at 193, 220. Antonovich further stated that

17 changing the 1957 Seal might expose the County to liability for infringing upon the

18 original artist’s intellectual property rights in the depiction, to the extent any such

19 rights existed. Id. at 193. Accordingly, Antonovich proposed a motion to seek

20 additional, outside legal counsel regarding the constitutionality of the 1957 Seal,

21 and to reject the proposal to amend the seal. Id. at 195.

22

Supervisor Don Knabe then stated that the legal issues presented by the 1957

23 Seal were “debatable,” further asserting as follows: 24

25

The issue is, where does it all end? And I think this

Board needs to stand up and say, wait a minute. We have

26

a great history in this County. We have a great history of

27

our people in this County, in this state, and enough is

28

enough.

7.

1 Id.
2 Comments from Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky followed. Yaroslavsky stated
3 that in its 1957 filings with the Secretary of State, the County had “explained what
4 the cross stood for” and “didn’t say [the cross] was part of our history, to represent
5 our history. It was one word. They said Religion.” Id. at 203. Yaroslavsky further
6 stated that although he had been called “anti-Christian” and “insensitive to our
7 history” by members of the public, he felt that “part of a responsible governing
8 body is to be able to stand up like grown men and women and take a legal opinion
9 for what it is.” Id. at 197. Regarding the proposal to remove the cross and add an
10 image of a mission, Yaroslavsky stated:
11

12

If we’re talking about the history of Los Angeles County

13

and the role that the missionaries played in the

development, in the settlement of California in the 18th

14

and 19th century, and it is clearly a part of our history,

15

then a mission depicts that history as much as anything.

If you don’t believe that a mission is a sufficient symbol

16

to represent the history, if you believe alternatively, as I

17

think I said in closed session last week, that the only way

to represent the history of L.A. County, as it relates to the

18

missionaries, is with a religious symbol of the Latin cross,

19

you’ve got a constitutional problem.

20

21 Id. at 202. Yaroslavsky further stated that “if the issue is history and not religion,

22 then there are a thousand and one ways to depict history and I think we chose a

23 pretty good one.” Id. at 203.

24

Supervisor Yvonne Burke characterized the June 8, 2004 meeting, which

25 included many interruptions by members of the public, as a “religious frenzy” and

26 “as close to the inquisition as we have seen in the 21st century.” Id. at 209, 211.

27 She added,

28

8.

1

I’ve listened here for a few hours and I kept thinking that,

2

if this case goes to trial, I would hate for them to play this

hearing because, if there’s ever any question of what was

3

being moved forward and what the objection was to the

4

vote that had been taken, it was clearly, it was a religious

one.

5

6 See id. at 209. Supervisor Gloria Molina also noted the “emotional” and

7 “religiously charged” nature of the hearing. Id. at 214. She added that although she

8 did not “feel that strongly about [the 1957 Seal],” which she felt didn’t “reflect who

9 [she was] or who we are as a county,” she felt “very strongly” that she was

10 “upholding the Constitution” in supporting removal of the cross. Id. at 214, 217.

11 Ultimately, the Board decided to make an administrative request of the County

12 Chief Administrative Office and County Counsel to investigate and report back 13 regarding a process for adopting a new County seal. See Tr. Ex. 83.

14

Over three months later, on September 14, 2004, the County Chief

15 Administrative Officer sent a letter to the Board recommending that it approve and

16 adopt a proposed new County seal, which came attached to the letter. See id. The

17 proposed new seal (the “2004 Seal”) (1) removed the unadorned Latin cross from

18 above the Hollywood Bowl; (2) replaced the image of the oil derricks with a sketch

19 of the eastern façade of the San Gabriel Mission (“the Mission”), without any cross

20 atop its roof; and (3) replaced the goddess Pomona with an image of a Native

21 American woman carrying a basket. See Tr. Ex. 25; see also Tr. Exs. 82-83. At the

22 time, the actual San Gabriel Mission’s eastern façade was not adorned by a cross.

23 See Dietler Decl. at ¶ 36; Hackel Decl. at ¶ 101.

24

Also on September 14, 2004, the Board held a public meeting regarding

25 whether the County should adopt the Chief Administrative Officer’s proposed seal.

26 Tr. Ex. 24. During this meeting, Supervisor Knabe called the existing depiction of

27 the cross on the 1957 Seal “a reflection of the history of this great County.” Id. at

28 297. Knabe accordingly expressed concern that the Board was “trying to change

9.

1 the course of history . . . .” Id. Supervisor Antonovich likewise stated that “[f]or

2 50-plus years, there’s not been a problem with . . . having a seal that signified a

3 historical foundation of the County of Los Angeles.” Id. at 292; see also id. (“The

4 old saying, if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it.”). Antonovich also took issue with the

5 proposed new seal’s depiction of the San Gabriel Mission, noting that the depiction

6 did not include a cross:

7

8

What is depicted is a back door, the rear end of the

church. That is not the symbol of the Mission. The

9

symbol of the Mission was an open door to bring the good

10

news and it was a fact that it reflects the historical

significance of the County of Los Angeles. 11

12 Id. at 294-95.8

13

During the public meeting, the County Administrative Officer stated that a

14 “good figure” for the estimated cost of adopting the 2004 Seal throughout the

15 County was $800,000. Id. at 292-93. Ultimately, the Board voted 3-2 in favor of

16 the proposed revisions, with Supervisors Burke, Molina, and Yaroslavsky voting to

17 pass the motion, and Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe voting against it. See id.

18 at 309-10.

19

On October 26, 2004, the County Chief Administrative Officer sent the

20 Board a final cost estimate of $700,000 to replace the County seal on County-

21 owned and leased facilities, decals affixed to County vehicles, and all computer

22 applications, including websites, electronic letterhead, and software. Tr. Ex. 27.

23 Thereafter, the 2004 Seal was adopted throughout the County.9

24

25 8 Christians often refer to the gospel (the four books in the Bible that describe the life of Jesus
Christ) as the “good news” of redemption through Jesus’s life and death. See Davies Decl. at ¶ 4.
26 The term “gospel” derives from Greek, Old English, and Middle English words meaning, “good
news.” Id.
27
9 In 2004, a resident and employee of the County filed a lawsuit against the Board of Supervisors
28 and the County of Los Angeles alleging that the “removal of the cross from the seal conveyed a

10.

1

In 2009, a Latin cross was placed atop the eastern façade of the actual San

2 Gabriel Mission. See Hackel Decl. at ¶ 101; Dietler Decl. at ¶ 36.

3

On December 31, 2013, Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe introduced a

4 motion to add a Latin cross atop the depiction of the Mission on the 2004 County

5 Seal. See Tr. Ex. 36 (Motion); see also Rhind Decl. at Ex. 1, pp. 4-6 (same). The

6 motion reads, in relevant part, as follows:

7

8

The current rendering of the Mission on the seal is

aesthetically and architecturally inaccurate. At the time

9

that the seal was redesigned in 2004, the cross had been

10

missing from the top of the mission since 1989 when it

was taken down to retrofit the structure after damage from

11

the Whittier Narrows earthquake. The cross was returned

12

to the top of the Mission in 2009 after being lost for

decades.

13

14

WE, THEREFORE, MOVE that the Board of Supervisors

direct the Chief Executive Officer to make the County

15

seal artistically, aesthetically and architecturally correct

16

by placing the cross on top of the San Gabriel Mission in

order to accurately reflect the cultural and historical role

17

that the Mission played in the development of the Los

18

Angeles County region.

19

20 Tr. Ex. 36. The motion did not address the accuracy of the other images on the

21 2004 Seal, and Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe proposed no other changes to

22 the seal. See id. The motion did not cite any confusion by constituents regarding

23 the existing depiction of the Mission (without a cross) on the 2004 Seal. Id.

24

25 state-sponsored message of hostility toward Christians” and thereby violated the Establishment

Clause of the First Amendment. Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1248 (9th Cir.
26 2007). The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the Ninth Circuit later affirmed,

27

finding that defendants’ “removal of the cross is more reasonably viewed as an effort to restore their neutrality,” “ensure their continued compliance with the Establishment Clause,” and “avoid

28 unwanted future litigation.” Id. at 1257.

11.

1

One week later, on January 7, 2014, the Board held a public meeting

2 regarding the motion brought by Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe to add the

3 cross to the 2004 Seal’s depiction of the Mission. See Tr. Ex. 52 (January 7, 2014 4 Board Meeting Minutes). During the period for public comment, some members of

5 the public referenced the County’s 2004 revisions to the 1957 Seal. See id. at 378

6 (“I liked the old seal and I fought to keep it the way it was . . . [and] am glad and

7 sad at the same time to see that item back on the agenda because it never should

8 have been [sic].”), 380 (“[T]his is obviously a very controversial issue. This would

9 be a decade later that we are re-visiting it.”). The ACLU publicly opposed the

10 motion during the meeting. See id. at 380 (Comments of the ACLU’s Peter

11 Eliasberg) (“[T]he government is returning a sectarian religious symbol to a seal

12 less than ten years after its removal and one of the major objections to the removal

13 in the first place [was] very strong religious objection[.]”); see also Ramirez Decl.

14 at Ex. 1, p. 4.

15

Supervisor Antonovich stated that he and Supervisor Knabe introduced the

16 motion “to make a historical correction on [the 2004] seal.” Tr. Ex. 52, at 383.

17 Specifically, Antonovich described the motion as an attempt to place “a

18 proportionately accurate cross at the apex of the [Mission’s] roof . . . in order to

19 accurately reflect the cultural and historical role that the Mission played in the

20 development of Los Angeles County’s region.” Id. at 374, 384 (“[W]e are not

21 changing anything other than the cross.”).

22

Later in the public meeting, Antonovich elaborated as follows:

23

24

The purpose of the Municipal Seal [is to] accurately

25

reflect[] the municipality’s history and culture. As you can see behind me, Ventura County, San Benito County,

26

and San Luis Obispo City, they have seals that also have a

27

cross on top of the missions. Because it reports a historical fact. . . . We all know that the County of Los

28

Angeles’ beginnings began in the San Gabriel Mission . . .

12.

1

So what we have is correcting a situation where the

2

Mission has the cross. Because it is historical, we are not

adding—we are reflecting upon a historical event that

3

occurred in the creation of th[e] County of Los Angeles.

4

5 Id. at 382.

6

Supervisor Yaroslavsky, who a decade earlier had voted to remove the

7 unadorned Latin cross from the 1957 Seal and to adopt the 2004 Seal, stated as

8 follows:

9

[B]ecause we removed the [cross from the 1957 Seal] in

10

2004, . . . restoring it now represents a higher burden on

11

our part to defend the principal symbol of a religion on

our seal. The issue of accuracy is an interesting one but

12

it’s not a constitutional one. Whether the mission is

13

accurately depicted in every aspect or whether the

Hollywood Bowl is accurately depicted in every aspect,

14

which it is not, or the [cow Pearlette] is accurately

15

reflected, which she is not, is not a constitutional issue;

it’s a judgment call by the Board. What is a constitutional

16

issue is the placement of a symbol, a principal symbol of

17

a religion on a county seal.

18

***

19

[T]his is not just about history; it’s about the cross. And

20

to say anything different would be really somewhat

21

disingenuous because if we really wanted to talk about the

history of the role that the Missionaries played in

22

Southern California in the 1700s, we could put a depiction

23

of Father Junipero Serra on the seal. We could put a

depiction of the pobladores walking through the San

24

Gabriel Valley towards what would become Los Angeles.

25

We could even put Angels. Angels are not the principal

symbol of any particular religion. There are 100 ways

26

which we could depict that history. But the one that’s

27

been chosen here is the cross.

28

13.

1 Id. at 386-87.

2

Ultimately, the Board voted 3-2 in favor of the proposed addition of the

3 cross, with Supervisors Antonovich, Knabe, and Ridley-Thomas voting in favor of

4 the motion, and Supervisors Molina and Yaroslavsky voting against it. 10 See

5 Rhind Decl. at Ex. 1, pp. 4-6; Tr. Ex. 52, at 389-90. The only change made to the

6 Seal in 2014 was the addition of the Latin cross.

7

On January 15, 2014, “[c]onsistent with the instructions issued in 2004

8 [regarding implementation of the 2004 Seal],” then-County Chief Executive Officer

9 William T. Fujioka instructed County department heads to “use the new County

10 seal wherever possible and appropriate.” See Tr. Ex. 67. The County subsequently

11 used public resources to design and implement the 2014 Seal. See id. On June 3,

12 2014, and again in late 2014 and early 2015, the County represented to plaintiffs

13 that it would “voluntarily cease further implementation” of the 2014 Seal pending

14 the outcome of this action. See Ozello Decl. at ¶¶ 2-6 (emphasis added), Exs. 1-4;

15 Burrow Decl. at ¶¶ 50-53, Exs. 57-58; Ramirez Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. 2.11

16

17 10 As stated supra, Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas succeeded Supervisor Yvonne Burke, who
had in 2004 voted with Supervisors Yaroslavsky and Molina to adopt the 2004 Seal and thereby
18 remove the unadorned Latin cross from the seal.

19 11 Plaintiffs argue that despite its agreement to cease further implementation of the new seal, the
County “flouted their self-imposed stay” by continuing to use the 2014 Seal on signage that was

20 created after June 2014, as well as on official County webpages that are “continually updated” but

from which the 2014 Seal has not yet been removed. See Motion at 7, 19 n.10. In particular,
21 plaintiffs contend that Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe continued to use the 2014 Seal despite

22 the agreement to stay further implementation, purportedly displaying it on websites and at public
appearances, and by posting it on stationery, pamphlets, and other official publications. Id. at 19

23 n.10. Plaintiffs contend that the County’s purported willingness to violate the voluntary stay

further warrants imposition of an injunction here. Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ assertions,
24 arguing that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the County has, at any point, actually

25

violated its agreement to cease further implementation of the 2014 Seal. See Opp’n at 25-27. According to the County, the evidence upon which plaintiffs rely consists entirely of items either

26 not produced by the County, or of stationery, website templates, and other design templates that
the County changed prior to the voluntary stay. Id. at 26 (citing Guzman Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4;

27 Sommers Decl. at ¶¶ 3-7; Ignacio Decl. at ¶¶ 2-5; Ramirez Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. 1-2; and Herman

Decl. at ¶¶ 3-9). In light of the evidence before it, the Court cannot conclude, despite plaintiffs’
28 contentions to the contrary, that the County has in fact violated its agreement to cease further

14.

1

III.

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW12

3 A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring the Instant Action

4

To have standing to challenge the Board’s addition of the cross to the County

5 seal, plaintiffs must suffer “an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged

6 conduct, and it must be likely that the injury would be redressed by a favorable

7 decision.” 13 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and

8 quotation marks omitted). Because an “allegedly improper expenditure of

9 municipal funds” in support of an action that is alleged to violate the Establishment

10 Clause is a sufficient injury in fact, the Ninth Circuit has held that plaintiffs have

11 standing to pursue equitable actions against municipalities if they can demonstrate

12 their status as municipal taxpayers. Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 770, 772

13 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that state and municipal taxpayers had standing to

14 challenge constitutionality of statute declaring Good Friday a state holiday).

15 Plaintiffs in the instant action have standing as municipal taxpayers to challenge the

16 constitutionality of the 2014 Seal because they pay property taxes to the County.

17 See supra; We Are Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 297 F.R.D. 373, 383

18 (D. Ariz. 2013) (establishing plaintiff’s standing as a municipal taxpayer where

19 plaintiff paid property tax on a residence in the county). Under certain

20 circumstances, taxpayers also have standing under state law to challenge the illegal

21 expenditure of public funds. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 526a.

22

In addition, the “spiritual harm resulting from unwelcome direct contact with

23 an allegedly offensive religious [] symbol is a legally cognizable injury and suffices

24 to confer Article III standing.” Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1253. Each Plaintiff has

25
implementation of the 2014 Seal. The record on this point is ambiguous, at best.
26 12 To the extent necessary, each of these conclusions of law may be deemed a finding of fact. 27 13 The Court notes that defendants do not challenge plaintiffs’ standing to bring the instant action. 28 See generally Opp’n.

15.

1 testified to having suffered spiritual harm from the County’s 2014 addition of the

2 Latin cross to the 2004 Seal. See Davies Decl. at ¶¶ 6-8; Bacon Decl. at ¶ 6;

3 Rosove Decl. at ¶¶ 4-5; Syed Decl. at ¶¶ 4-6; Little Decl. at ¶ 4; Laarman Decl. at

4 ¶¶ 4-10; Myers Decl. at ¶¶ 6-12; and Bernstein Decl. at ¶ 4. Accordingly, plaintiffs

5 have standing to bring the instant action.

6 B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief

7

“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from

8 success on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

9 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313

10 (1982) (“[A] federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to

11 grant an injunction for every violation of law”)). “[T]he balance of equities and

12 consideration of the public interest” are “pertinent in assessing the propriety of any

13 injunctive relief, preliminary or permanent.” Id. at 32; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill.

14 of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary

15 injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception

16 that [for a preliminary injunction] the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on

17 the merits rather than actual success.”). Specifically, “[u]nder ‘well-established

18 principles of equity,’ a plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive relief must satisfy a

19 four-factor test by showing: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that

20 remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate

21 for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

22 and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest

23 would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v.

24 U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing eBay Inc. v.

25 MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).

26

The County appears only to challenge plaintiffs’ contention that they have

27 demonstrated success on the merits. That is, defendants do not argue in their

28

16.

1 opposition that plaintiffs have failed to establish irreparable harm; do not dispute

2 that the balance of hardships favors entry of a permanent injunction; and do not

3 deny that an injunction is in the public interest. For reasons explained below, the

4 Court concludes that plaintiffs have satisfied the standard for injunctive relief: (1)

5 they have demonstrated success on the merits because the addition of the cross to

6 the 2004 Seal violates both the California and United States constitutions; (2) they

7 have suffered an injury in fact and will continue to suffer irreparable harm in the

8 absence of an injunction, see Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208

9 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

10 periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”) (citation and

11 internal alterations omitted); (3) the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs’ favor, see

12 Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, in & for Cnty. of Carson City, 303 F.3d

13 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the balance of hardships tips sharply” toward plaintiffs

14 in First Amendment cases); and (4) an injunction is in the public interest, see id. at

15 974 (recognizing “the significant public interest in upholding First Amendment

16 principles”). See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; see also MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391.

17

1. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Success on the Merits

18

a. The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine

19

In the instant motion, plaintiffs argue that the County’s addition of the Latin

20 cross to the 2004 Seal violates the No Aid and No Preference Clauses of the 21 California Constitution, as well as the Establishment Clause of the First 22 Amendment to the United States Constitution.14 Under the constitutional avoidance 23 doctrine, courts “should avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims when 24 alternative state grounds are available,” Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 25 1385, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994), including “when the alternative ground is one of 26

27 14 Plaintiffs do not assert a claim under the Establishment Clause of article I, section 4 of the 28 California Constitution.

17.

1 state constitutional law,” Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1524 (9th Cir.

2 1993). In light of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has, at

3 times, declined to reach federal constitutional claims when alternative state

4 constitutional grounds exist. See, e.g., Carpenter v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

5 93 F.3d 627, 629, 632 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to reach plaintiff’s federal

6 constitutional claims because “the religion clauses of the California Constitution are

7 read more broadly than their [federal] counterparts” and the Court had already held

8 “that the Cross violates the No Preference Clause”); Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d

9 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to address federal constitutional claims after

10 holding that the county’s ownership of a park featuring religious statues violated

11 California’s No Aid and No Preference Clauses). Plaintiffs accordingly contend

12 that because the County’s conduct runs afoul of the California Constitution, the

13 Court need not reach plaintiffs’ claims under the United States Constitution.

14

However, in light of the relative dearth of authority assessing the

15 constitutionality of governmental displays under the No Aid and No Preference

16 Clauses of the California Constitution—and in consideration of the fair number of

17 cases to have considered federal Establishment Clause challenges to the display of 18 Latin crosses on county and municipal seals—the Court finds it prudent to reach the 19 merits of both plaintiffs’ state and federal claims. C.f. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. City 20 of Lake Elsinore, No. 5:13-CV-00989-SVW, 2014 WL 791800, at *5-*6 (C.D. Cal. 21 Feb. 25, 2014) (Wilson, J.) (applying the Lemon test to plaintiffs’ California and 22 federal constitutional claims in part because those few California cases assessing 23 religious displays under the No Preference Clause were factually distinct and 24 accordingly not instructive). 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28

18.

1

b. The No Aid Clause of the California Constitution

2

i. The No Aid Clause Prohibits the County from

3

Granting a Benefit to a Sectarian Purpose,

4

Irrespective of the County’s Purported Secular

5

Purpose

6

Plaintiffs first argue that the addition of the cross to the 2004 Seal violates

7 the No Aid Clause of article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution.15 The

8 No Aid Clause provides, in relevant part, that “[n]either the Legislature, nor any

9 county . . . shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever,

10 or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian

11 purpose.” Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added). This provision of the

12 California Constitution “does not mirror or derive from any part of the federal

13 Constitution,” Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.3d 792, 801 (1978) (Bird, C.J.,

14 concurring), and “ ‘forbids more than the appropriation or payment of public funds

15 to support sectarian institutions. It bans any official involvement, whatever its

16 form, which has the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of promoting religious

17 purposes.’ ” E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State of California, 24 Cal. 4th 693,

18 721 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12

19 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.12 (1974) (Mosk, J.)).

20

21 15 Article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution reads, in full, as follows:

22

23

Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public

24

fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or

sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school, college, university, hospital, or

25

other institution controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination

whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made

26

by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or other municipal corporation for any

27

religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever; provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 3 of Article XVI.

28

19.

1

“Given the ordinary meaning of [Article XVI, section 5’s] words, the text of

2 the provision has enormous breadth.” Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d

3 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). In Paulson, an en banc panel of the Ninth

4 Circuit “distill[ed] three themes” from relevant California legal precedent

5 construing the No Aid Clause. 294 F.3d at 1130. First, the Ninth Circuit noted that

6 the No Aid Clause “is so broad that state or local governments need not provide a

7 financial benefit or tangible aid in order to violate the provision; they violate it by

8 doing no more than lending their ‘prestige and power’ to a ‘sectarian purpose.’ ”

9 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1571 (the No

10 Aid Clause “admits of no de minimis exception”) (citation omitted).

11

Second, “even a government act that has a secular purpose can violate [the

12 No Aid Clause] if it also has a direct, immediate, and substantial effect of

13 promoting a sectarian purpose.” Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1130; see, e.g., Hewitt, 940

14 F.2d at 1571 (holding that a county park containing religious statues violates the No

15 Aid Clause—despite the county’s assertion that the purpose of the park was to

16 promote tourism—because “the California Constitution forbids the County’s use of

17 a religious statuary park to achieve a secular goal”); Los Angeles Cnty. v.

18 Hollinger, 221 Cal.App.2d 154, 158 (1963) (holding that publicly financing a film

19 of a religious parade violated the No Aid Clause even though “publicizing the

20 attractions of the county is a proper secular purpose”).

21

Third, a “corollary to the second theme” is that “[g]overnment conduct that

22 aids religious or sectarian purposes, but that does not have a direct, immediate, and

23 substantial effect, does not contravene the provision.” Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1131.

24 Stated differently, the No Aid Clause “does not prohibit indirect, remote, or

25 incidental benefits that have a primary public purpose.” Id. (citation omitted).

26 Pursuant to Paulson, a benefit related to a “primary public purpose” qualifies as

27 “indirect, remote, or incidental”—and thus does not run afoul of the No Aid

28

20.

1 Clause—if it is available “on an equal basis” to sectarian and nonsectarian

2 organizations and if it “does not have a substantial effect of supporting religious

3 activities.” Id. (citation omitted).

4

In sum, therefore, the No Aid Clause prohibits the government from:

5

(1) granting a benefit in any form (2) to any sectarian

6

purpose (3) regardless of the government’s secular

7

purpose (4) unless the benefit is properly characterized as

indirect, remote, or incidental. A sectarian benefit that is

8

ancillary to a primary secular purpose may qualify as

9

“incidental” if the benefit is available on an equal basis to

those with sectarian and those with secular objectives.

10

11 Id.

12

ii. The Addition of the Cross to the County Seal Grants a

13

Benefit to a Sectarian Purpose, and Thereby Violates

14

the No Aid Clause of the California Constitution

15

The Latin cross is the “defining and exclusive symbol for the Christian

16 religion” and invokes “the ongoing and exclusive evangelical meaning of the cross

17 for Christians and non-Christians alike.” Siker Decl. at ¶ 6; see also Trunk v. City

18 of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We are masters of the

19 obvious, and we know that the crucifix is a Christian symbol.”) (quoting Gonzales

20 v. North Township, 4 F.3d 1412, 1418 (7th Cir. 1993)). For purposes of the

21 Court’s No Aid Clause analysis, the threshold question is whether the County’s

22 addition of the Latin cross to the seal’s depiction of the Mission grants a “benefit”

23 to any “sectarian purpose,” irrespective of any purported secular purpose offered by

24 the County. In light of the “expansive” scope of the foregoing legal standards, the

25 Court concludes that it does. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1130. Specifically, the Court

26 finds that in modifying the 2004 Seal by adding a Latin cross—even if only as a

27 relatively small symbol situated atop an image of the San Gabriel Mission—the

28 County has violated the No Aid Clause of the California Constitution by (1)

21.

1 “devot[ing] [the County’s] financial resources” and (2) lending its “power and

2 prestige” to the “sectarian purpose” of adding to its official seal the primary symbol

3 of one religion—Christianity—to the exclusion of others. Paulson, 294 F.3d at

4 1133.

5

In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasizes that this case does not

6 simply involve a governmental entity’s continued use of a longstanding symbol or

7 display containing a Latin cross. Rather, plaintiffs challenge the County’s decision

8 to add a cross to a county seal that—unlike its predecessor, the 1957 Seal—has

9 contained no sectarian symbols for nearly a decade. See Complaint, at ¶ 40

10 (challenging County’s attempted “addition of the cross to the [2004] Seal”)

11 (emphasis added), ¶ 31 (noting that the County’s 2014 motion would “restore a

12 cross to the County seal . . . .”) (emphasis added). This distinction, and the

13 foregoing history of the depiction of a cross on the County seal, is significant, if not

14 critical, as it informs the Court’s assessment of whether a specific “grant” or

15 “appropriation” has been made to further a “sectarian purpose.” Cal. Const. art.

16 XVI, § 5. The relevant “benefit” here is not merely the depiction of a relatively

17 small cross on the seal, but rather the County’s addition of the cross—and the

18 implementation that will follow—which comes only ten years after the County, at

19 significant expense, replaced the 1957 Seal to avoid, in the apparent view of a

20 majority of the Board at the time, furthering a sectarian purpose.

21

With this distinction and history in mind, the Court also notes that a valid

22 secular purpose behind the County’s effort to add the cross to the seal—for

23 example, a desire to reflect a more historically or architecturally accurate depiction

24 of the San Gabriel Mission—does not mandate a different result. See, e.g.,

25 Hollinger, 221 Cal.App.2d at 158 (No Aid Clause prohibits publicly financing a

26 film of a religious parade even though “publicizing the attractions of the county is a

27 proper secular purpose”). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Paulson, “even a

28

22.

1 government act that has a secular purpose can violate [the No Aid Clause] if it also

2 has a direct, immediate, and substantial effect of promoting a sectarian purpose.”

3 Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1130. This principle is perhaps best illustrated by the

4 California Court of Appeal’s decision in Frohliger v. Richardson, 63 Cal. App. 209

5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923), wherein the court made a “strong statement . . . that the

6 existence of a legitimate secular purpose will not redeem otherwise prohibited

7 governmental aid to religion.” Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1570 (citing Frohliger with

8 approval).

9

In holding that the use of public funds to restore the San Diego Mission

10 violated the No Aid Clause, the Frohliger court did not challenge the government’s

11 proffered secular motivations:

12

13

We concede that the California missions are of historical

14

and educational interest from a cultural and literary

standpoint, but they approach no such classification as

15

would make them the basis of the state’s bounty or the

16

subject of legislative appropriation in the guise of the

public interest, public good, or public welfare. 17

18

***

19

[W]e are in sympathy with the meritorious movement

20

having for its object the restoration and preservation of

the missions, but no matter how praiseworthy we may

21

believe such efforts to be, we must say that, in our

22

opinion, the state Constitution forbids that such work be

done at the expense of the taxpayers. We believe that the

23

act of the Legislature under consideration is in manifest

24

violation of [the No Aid Clause] . . . .

25

26 Frohliger, 63 Cal. App. at 217. The Frohliger court further reasoned that

27 “[d]isregard[ing] . . . the constitutional bar” of the No Aid Clause by permitting

28 expenditure of public funds to restore the mission “would render the public treasury

23.

1 easy of access for the levying of tribute, under cover of appropriation acts, by sects

2 of every denomination . . . seeking money for the restoration of old buildings, upon

3 the ground that they were of historical and educational interest, and therefore of

4 public concern.” Id.

5

So, too, would permitting expenditure of the County’s time, energy, and

6 resources here for the sole purpose of adding a Latin cross to an otherwise

7 unchanged seal create grounds for “sects of every denomination, and other

8 organizations” to wonder why they are not receiving similar aid from the County.

9 Id. Indeed, there can be little doubt that any modification of the 2004 Seal will

10 necessarily require devotion of substantial County resources. The estimated cost of

11 implementing the 2004 Seal throughout the County—i.e., by replacing the 1957

12 Seal on County-owned and leased facilities, on decals affixed to County vehicles,

13 and on all stationary and computer applications—was estimated to be $700,000.

14 See Tr. Ex. 26-27; see also Tr. Ex. 24, at 292-93. Comparable financial resources

15 and effort will be devoted to complete the implementation of the 2014 Seal, which,

16 again, contains only one modification from the 2004 Seal: the addition of a Latin

17 cross to the otherwise unaltered image of the San Gabriel Mission that adorned the 18 seal for ten years. See Ramirez Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. 2; Tr. Ex. 52 (January 7, 2014 19 Meeting Minutes, Comments of Supervisor Antonovich), at 374-75 (noting that the 20 “phase in” of the 2014 Seal was to be “consistent with the manner in which the 21 [2004 Seal] was phased in following the Board’s 2004 redesign”). Of course, “the 22 power, authority, and financial resources” of the County stand behind any such 23 implementation effort, the sole result of which would be the addition of an 24 undeniably sectarian symbol to the County’s already-ubiquitous 2004 Seal. Priest, 25 12 Cal.3d at 604; c.f. Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1571 (County’s ownership and 26 maintenance of religious statues in park aids religion where county “holds the deed 27 to the park and pays for its maintenance”). 28

24.

1

Irrespective of any appropriation of funds, the Court also concludes that the

2 Board of Supervisors’ 2014 motion imparted a benefit to a sectarian purpose by

3 “enlist[ing] the power and prestige of the [County] in support of the [addition] of

4 the cross” to the County’s preeminent symbol. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1133

5 (emphasis added); Fox, 22 Cal.3d at 806 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (“The ban is on

6 aid to religion in any form”); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist.,

7 68 Cal.App.3d 1, 16 (1977) (upholding school district’s rejection of student Bible

8 study club meetings on campus where meetings “implicate[] school authority and

9 prestige behind the dissemination of religious dogma”); Sands v. Morongo Unified

10 Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 883 (1991) (“[No Aid Clause] prohibits not only

11 material aid to religion, but any official involvement that promotes religion.”)

12 (emphasis in original). Despite the County’s contention to the contrary, the

13 sectarian benefit afforded by adding the cross to the County seal is hardly

14 comparable to any incidental sectarian benefit afforded by the Los Angeles Unified

15 School District’s “instruction on the missions and [use of] textbooks includ[ing]

16 photos of missions with crosses on them,” or California’s use of social studies and

17 history education guidelines that “specifically direct teaching of the role of missions

18 in the history of California.” Opp’n at 9-10. Unlike textbooks or educational

19 guidelines, the County’s seal is not an educational tool, but a symbolic and

20 representative one, not unlike a flag or a badge. It carries with it an aura of

21 prestige, authority, and approval. By singling out the cross for addition to the seal,

22 the County necessarily lends its prestige and approval to a depiction of one faith’s

23 sectarian imagery. The County also provides a platform for broadcasting that

24 imagery on County buildings, vehicles, flags, and stationary.

25

It is true, of course, that the No Aid Clause “does not prohibit indirect,

26 remote, or incidental benefits [to a sectarian purpose].” Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1131

27 (citation omitted); see also Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067,

28

25.

1 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is important to note that, despite the categorical language

2 of the No Aid Clause, the California Supreme Court [has] . . . re-emphasized that

3 the mere conferring of some benefit on a sectarian organization does not ipso facto

4 violate the No Aid Clause.”). A benefit “may qualify as ‘incidental’ if the benefit is

5 available on an equal basis to those with sectarian and those with secular

6 objectives.” See Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1131; see also Cal. Statewide Comm. Dev.

7 Authority v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Validity of Purchase Agreement, 40

8 Cal.4th 788, 801 (2007) (noting that in order to satisfy the No Aid Clause, the

9 government action must be available to “both secular and sectarian institutions on

10 an equal basis”).

11

However, the aid to a sectarian purpose posed here by the addition of the

12 Latin cross is not properly dismissed as merely “incidental.” Again, the only

13 change to the Seal mandated by the County’s 2014 motion—and the sole result of

14 the resources that will necessarily be expended in effectuating the motion—is the

15 addition of the Latin cross to the county’s official seal. Permitting such a change

16 and the associated expenditure of public funds places the County’s power, prestige,

17 and purse behind a single religion, Christianity, without making any such benefit 18 available on an equal basis to those with secular objectives or alternative sectarian 19 views. See Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1571 (noting that “there may be other [non20 Christian] religious groups in [the county] which would appreciate government 21 sponsorship of their religious parks or cemeteries,” and for this reason“[t]he 22 California[n] people have written their constitution to guard against” the county’s 23 “use of a religious statuary park to achieve a secular goal”); c.f. Barnes-Wallace, 24 704 F.3d at 1081 (holding that the lease of public land to Boy Scouts was incidental 25 and not in violation of the No Aid Clause where the services the Scouts provided 26 were “essentially neutral to religion” and the equivalent to a “broad curriculum in 27 secular subjects”). Indeed, plaintiffs’ testimony regarding their perception of the 28

26.

1 2014 Seal as conveying endorsement of Christianity, to the exclusion of other

2 religious and non-religious beliefs, undermines the County’s claim that the benefit

3 to Christianity is incidental.16 See Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1571 (noting that “[e]ach

4 plaintiff was surprised and disturbed by the apparent endorsement the County was

5 giving to the religious message of [the] statues” and that such “testimony at trial

6 undermines any argument that the government support to religion here is only

7 incidental”) (emphasis added).

8

The County resists these conclusions on various grounds, none of which are

9 availing. Specifically, the County argues that missions have played a central role in

10 the history of California and Los Angeles County, as “reflected in the core

11 curriculum of California schools,” where “[m]ission history is taught as a secular

12 subject, and routine depiction[s] of missions with crosses are found in a secular

13 context.” Id. at 8, 10. At bottom, the County’s central argument is that “no

14 reasonable observer—no resident of California, and in particular in the Los Angeles

15 area—would view a depiction of the San Gabriel Mission with a cross as one part

16 of the County Seal . . . as indicating some approval of, or providing a benefit to, a

17 particular religion.” Opp’n at 12. This argument fails for multiple reasons.

18

First, the relevant government act here is not merely the “depiction of the San

19 Gabriel Mission with a cross as one part of the County Seal,” but rather the

20 16 See, e.g., Little Decl. at ¶ 4 (objecting to “the Board’s decision to alter the County seal solely to

21 add a cross to it while excluding the symbols of any of the other faiths practiced by citizens of

Los Angeles”); Rosove Decl. at ¶¶ 4-5 (opposing the addition of the cross “with every fiber of
22 [his] being” and expressing his belief that adding the cross “alienates all faith and non-faith based

23

religions and communities”); Laarman Decl. at ¶¶ 4-10 (stating that he is “offended as a Christian minister and theologian” by the addition of the cross to the 2004 Seal which is “blatantly

24 exclusionary”); Myers Decl. at ¶¶ 7-12 (objecting to the addition of the cross because it is a
“symbol of violence, discrimination, and group hatred” against non-Christian communities); Syed

25 Decl. at ¶¶ 4-6 (objecting to “the Board’s decision to impose . . . the cross, upon [him] and more

than half a million fellow Muslims in Los Angeles”); and Bernstein Decl. at ¶ 4 (stating that she
26 is “insulted by the Board’s decision to add a cross to the County seal” because the cross

27

symbolizes “the oppression and violent persecution of [her] entire faith” and “the seal does not include symbols representing Judaism”).

28

27.

1 County’s specific effort to add a Latin cross, at significant expense, to an otherwise

2 unchanged version of the seal. Second, the County mistakenly argues that recent

3 decisions purportedly “addressing application of the No-Aid Clause concerning

4 governmental use or depiction of religious material[] employ analysis virtually

5 identical to that used in analyzing federal constitutional claims, namely whether a

6 reasonable observer would perceive the government conduct as providing a benefit

7 to religion.” Opp’n at 4 (emphasis added); see also id. at 4-8. In actuality, as

8 plaintiffs rightly note, none of the cases upon which the County relies apply a

9 “reasonable observer” standard in analyzing the No Aid Clause of the California

10 Constitution. See Sedlock v. Baird, 235 Cal.App.4th 874, 889, 889 n.30 (2015)

11 (holding that the teaching of yoga poses did not violate California’s Establishment

12 Clause and declining to analyze California’s No Aid Clause because the Sedlock

13 plaintiffs—unlike those in the instant action—“provide[d] no independent

14 arguments in support of [their No Aid Clause] claim[]”); Barnes-Wallace, 704 F.3d

15 at 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2012) (employing a “reasonable observer” standard only in

16 applying the Lemon test and only after the Court had already concluded its No Aid

17 Clause analysis); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378

18 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the “reasonable observer” standard to determine whether

19 inclusion of witches and sorcerers as characters in a series of reading textbooks

20 violated the “effects” prong of the Lemon test). Thus, the Court is not bound by

21 any such “reasonable observer” standard in its analysis of the No Aid Clause, and

22 therefore does not employ any such analysis here.

23

In sum, the Court finds that in seeking to expend substantial resources to add

24 a depiction of a undeniably religious symbol to an otherwise unchanged version of

25 the 2004 Seal, the County has singled out and conferred the government’s prestige

26 upon the Christian religion, as in Frohliger, 63 Cal. App. at 217 (No Aid Clause

27 prohibits use of public funds to restore the San Diego Mission despite “historical

28

28.

1 and educational interest [in California missions] from a cultural and literary

2 standpoint”), Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1571 (county’s ownership and maintenance of

3 religious statues in a park was “direct” and substantial), Hollinger, 221 Cal.App.2d

4 at 158 (public financing of a film of a religious parade violates the No Aid Clause),

5 and Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132 (the city “directly, immediately, and substantially

6 aided the sectarian purpose of preserving the cross”), among others.17 The Court

7 therefore concludes that adding the cross to the 2004 Seal directly benefits

8 Christianity in violation of the California Constitution’s No Aid Clause, the state’s

9 “definitive statement of the principle of government impartiality in the field of

10 religion.” Priest, 12 Cal.3d at 604 (citation omitted).

11

In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejects the County’s implication that

12 such a finding effectively means that the No Aid Clause is “so broad that it requires

13 expungement of the depiction of any religious image on public property without

14 regard to the context in which it is displayed and the manner in which it is

15

16 17 In advancing their argument regarding the No Aid Clause, plaintiffs also rely upon Fox v. City

17

of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.3d 792, 801 (1978). In Fox, the California Supreme Court held that a large illuminated display of a Latin cross on Los Angeles City Hall violated the California

18 Constitution, despite the city’s contention that the display “constituted no more than ‘participation
in the secular aspects of the Christmas and Easter holidays.’ ” Id. at 798. In its majority opinion,

19 the Supreme Court in Fox did not specify which of California’s various constitutional provisions

the display violated, discussing the relevant provisions of the California Constitution in general
20 terms and without reference to the No Aid Clause:

21

The California Constitution, like the United States Constitution,

22

does not merely proscribe an establishment of religion. Rather, all

laws “respecting an establishment of religion” are forbidden.

23

(Italics added.) The California Constitution also guarantees that

religion shall be freely exercised and enjoyed “without

24

discrimination or preference.” Preference thus is forbidden even

25

when there is no discrimination. The current interpretations of the United States Constitution may not be that comprehensive.

26

27 Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 796 (alteration in original). However, because the Fox majority did not
expressly rely upon the No Aid Clause in its analysis, the Court does not rely upon Fox in
28 reaching its conclusion here regarding the application of the No Aid Clause as to this case.

29.

1 perceived by a reasonable observer.” Opp’n at 5. No such “expungement” is at

2 issue here, where the relevant governmental act is the County’s attempt to devote

3 substantial resources towards an effort whose lone goal is the addition of a religious

4 symbol to the County’s otherwise secular official emblem.

5

c. The No Preference Clause of the California Constitution

6

Plaintiffs also contend that the addition of the Latin cross to the County Seal

7 violates the “No Preference Clause” of article I, section 4 of the California

8 Constitution, which guarantees the “[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion

9 without discrimination or preference.”18 Cal. Const. art. I, § 4. The Ninth Circuit

10 has stated in dicta that the No Preference Clause “has been interpreted by California

11 state courts as being broader than the Establishment Clause of the First

12 Amendment.” Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395 (citing Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207

13 Cal.App.3d 566, 571 (1989) (“California’s constitutional provisions are more

14 comprehensive than those of the federal Constitution.”) (citations omitted); Fox, 22

15 Cal.3d at 796 (“Preference thus is forbidden even when there is no discrimination.

16 The current interpretations of the United States Constitution may not be that

17 comprehensive.”)). Citing to article I, section 4 of the California Constitution, the

18 Ninth Circuit has previously distilled several factors relevant to determining

19 whether, “when viewed in its historical and physical context, a given [religious]

20 display on public property” violates the California Constitution: 21

22

[1] the religious significance of the display, [2] the size

23

and visibility of the display, [3] the inclusion of other

religious symbols, [4] the historical background of the 24

25 18 Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution reads, in full, as follows:

Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are

26

guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or

27

inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. A person is not incompetent to be a witness or

28

juror because of his or her opinions on religious beliefs.

30.

1

display, and [5] the proximity of the display to

2

government buildings or religious facilities.

3

4 Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1525 (holding that San Diego’s ownership of the Mount Helix

5 Cross, a 36-foot Latin cross in a public park, and the Mount Soledad Cross, a 43-

6 foot Latin cross in a public park, violated California’s No Preference Clause).

7 Although the court in Ellis employed the five factors above in finding violation of

8 the No Preference Clause, the factors “are simply a convenient list to guide a

9 court’s analysis; they do not form a definitive test utilized by the California courts.”

10 Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 630 (finding that “all but one of the five Ellis factors counsel

11 that the Mount Davidson Cross violates the No Preference Clause” and that

12 “[b]ecause we hold that the Cross violates the No Preference Clause, we need not

13 reach [plaintiff’s] other claims under the California Constitution or the United

14 States Constitution”). Nonetheless, plaintiffs encourage the Court to employ the

15 Ellis factors and thereby find the County’s addition of the cross as violative of the

16 No Preference Clause.

17

The Court declines to do so, in light of a more recent California Supreme

18 Court decision that casts doubt on the proposition that the No Preference Clause 19 affords broader protection than the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause:

20

21

This court has never had occasion to definitively construe

the no preference clause of article I, section 4 and we

22

need not do so here. In guaranteeing free exercise of

23

religion “without discrimination or preference,” the plain

language of the clause suggests, however, that the intent

24

is to ensure that free exercise of religion is guaranteed

25

regardless of the nature of the religious belief professed,

and that the state neither favors nor discriminates against

26

religion. Having concluded above that an exemption

27

from a landmark preservation law satisfies all prongs of

28

the Lemon test, it follows that the exemption is neither a

31.

1

governmental preference for or discrimination against

2

religion.

3 E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State of California, 24 Cal. 4th 693, 719 (2000)

4 (“East Bay”). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has recently construed the California

5 Supreme Court’s decision in East Bay to “h[o]ld that a governmental action that

6 satisfies the [Lemon] test . . . necessarily passes muster under the California No

7 Preference Clause.” Barnes-Wallace, 704 F.3d at 1082 (“Accordingly, we need not

8 separately analyze the plaintiffs’ claims under these state constitutional provisions

9 because our disposition of this case requires us to address the plaintiffs’ federal

10 Establishment Clause claims.”); see also Am. Humanist, 2014 WL 791800, at *6

11 (“[B]ecause the California Supreme Court in East Bay found the Lemon test to also

12 govern the analysis under California’s Establishment and No Preference Clauses,

13 this Court applies the Lemon test to both the state and federal constitutional issues

14 in question in the instant case.”). Therefore, for purposes of the instant motion, the

15 Court treats the protections of article I, section 4’s No Preference Clause as

16 coterminous with those of the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause, such that

17 application of the Lemon test, discussed infra, decides plaintiffs’ claim under both

18 California’s No Preference Clause and the First Amendment.

19

d. The Federal Establishment Clause

20

The Federal Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making

21 any law “respecting an establishment of religion” or undertaking any act that

22 unduly favors one religion over another. U.S. Const. amend. I. The test articulated

23 by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman “remains the Court’s principal

24 framework for applying the Establishment Clause,” although Lemon has been

25 “much criticized both inside and outside the Court,” and “sometimes ignored by the

26 Court altogether.” Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica,

27 784 F.3d 1286, 1299 n.7 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,

28

32.

1 612 (1971)). Under the Lemon test, a government action violates the Establishment

2 Clause if (1) it lacks a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) “its principal or primary

3 effect” is to “advance[ or] inhibit[ ] religion,” or (3) it “foster[s] an excessive

4 government entanglement with religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal

5 quotation marks omitted). As explained in the discussion below, the Court

6 concludes that the County’s addition of the Latin cross to the 2004 Seal violates

7 both the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test.

8

i. Lemon Test Prong 1: Sectarian or Secular Purpose

9

1. The Court Assesses the Board’s Purpose from the

10

Vantage Point of an Objective Observer Familiar

11

with what History has to Show

12

Under Lemon’s “purpose” inquiry, the Court assesses the underlying purpose

13 of the government action from the vantage point of “an ‘objective observer’ ” who

14 is “presumed to be familiar with the history of the government’s actions and

15 competent to learn what history has to show.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil

16 Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862, 866 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep.

17 Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). In assessing purpose, the Court may

18 “take[] account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘ “text,

19 legislative history, and implementation of the statute,” ’ or comparable official act.”

20 Id. at 862 (citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95

21 (1987) (noting that the Court’s inquiry looks to the “plain meaning of the statute’s

22 words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history

23 [and] the historical context of the statute, . . . and the specific sequence of events

24 leading to [its] passage”).

25

Crucially, “although a [legislative body’s] stated reasons will generally get

26 deference, the secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not

27 merely secondary to a religious objective.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864 (citing

28

33.

1 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 (“When a governmental entity professes a secular

2 purpose for an arguably religious policy, the government’s characterization is, of

3 course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to

4 ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.’ ”)). Plaintiffs

5 accordingly argue that when viewed in light of the seal’s broader history, the Board

6 of Supervisors’ stated purpose for adding the Latin cross to the 2004 Seal—i.e., for

7 purposes of cultural, historical, architectural, and aesthetic accuracy—is not

8 genuine. Motion at 26. For reasons explained more fully below, the Court

9 concludes that a reasonable, objective observer, familiar with what history has to

10 show, would conclude that a predominantly sectarian purpose informed the

11 County’s decision to add the cross to the seal, such that the County’s addition of the

12 cross fails to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test.

13

The touchstone of the Court’s analysis is the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision

14 in McCreary, wherein the Court assessed the decisions of two Kentucky counties to

15 erect large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments in their respective

16 courthouses.19 In one of the counties, the display was set up in a ceremony presided

17 over by the county Judge-Executive, who called the Commandments “good rules to

18 live by” and further recounted the story of an astronaut who became convinced

19 “there must be a divine God” after viewing the Earth from the moon. McCreary,

20 545 U.S. at 851. A pastor who had accompanied the Judge-Executive later told the

21 press that displaying the Commandments was “one of the greatest things the judge

22 could have done to close out the millennium.” Id. The erection of the displays

23 prompted a lawsuit by the ACLU, but before the district court reached the ACLU’s

24 request for a preliminary injunction, the legislative bodies of each county

25 authorized a second, expanded display. Id. at 851. The resolutions enacting this

26

27

19 As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[t]here can be little doubt after McCreary not only that Lemon is still alive but that the secular purpose inquiry has been fortified.” Card v. City of Everett, 520

28 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing McCreary, 545 U.S. at 900-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

34.

1 second display stated that the Ten Commandments are “the precedent legal code

2 upon which the civil and criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded,” and that the

3 “Founding Father[s] [had an] explicit understanding of the duty of elected officials

4 to publicly acknowledge God as the source of America’s strength and direction.”

5 Id. at 852-53. In addition to the Ten Commandments, the second resolution called

6 for the display of eight other documents in smaller frames, each having either a

7 religious theme or excerpted to highlight a religious element. Id. at 853-54.

8

The district court entered a preliminary injunction after finding that the

9 displays failed to satisfy Lemon’s “secular purpose” prong. Id. at 854. Following

10 the court’s ruling, the counties erected a third display in the courthouses, albeit

11 without repealing their previous resolutions or passing a new one. Id. at 855. This

12 third iteration, entitled, “The Foundations of American Law and Government

13 Display,” included the following nine framed documents, each accompanied by a

14 statement about its historical and legal significance: the Ten Commandments, the

15 Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the

16 Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble

17 to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice. Id. at 855-56. The

18 counties offered several explanations for the new version, including desires to (1)

19 “demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American

20 Law and Government,” and to (2) “educate the citizens of the county regarding

21 some of the documents that played a significant role in the foundation of our system

22 of law and government.” Id. at 856-57.

23

The Supreme Court rejected these statements of purpose as a “litigating

24 position,” finding that “[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the

25 Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.” Id. at

26 871-72 (noting that “although repeal of the earlier county authorizations would not

27 have erased them from the record of evidence bearing on current purpose, the

28

35.

1 extraordinary resolutions for the second displays passed just months earlier were

2 not repealed or otherwise repudiated”). The counties’ newfound statements of

3 purpose were further belied by the display itself, which—despite purporting to

4 include documents “foundational” to American government—“odd[ly]” omitted

5 both the original Constitution of 1787 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

6 872. The reasonable observer would be further “puzzled” by the display’s posted

7 claim that the Ten Commandments’ influence was “clearly seen” in the Declaration

8 of Independence, despite the Declaration itself holding that the government’s

9 authority to enforce the law derives “from the consent of the governed,” unlike the

10 Commandments’ “divine imperatives.” Id. at 872-73. Ultimately, the Court

11 observed, “[i]f the observer had not thrown up his hands, he would probably

12 suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious

13 document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious

14 neutrality.” Id. at 873.

15

In assessing purpose in the instant case, as in McCreary, “reasonable

16 observers have reasonable memories, and [Supreme Court] precedent[] sensibly

17 forbid[s] an observer ‘to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the challenged 18 governmental] policy arose.’ ” Id. at 866 (citation omitted). The relevant “context” 19 in this case includes the County’s inclusion of an unadorned cross on the 1957 Seal 20 for nearly fifty years, as well as the Board’s divided vote to remove the cross and 21 adopt a modified seal in 2004. To the extent the County argues otherwise, it asks 22 the Court “to ignore perfectly probative evidence” and appears to “want an 23 absentminded objective observer, not one presumed to be familiar with the history 24 of the government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to show” Id. 25 Plainly, such a position “just bucks common sense.”20 Id. 26

27 20In a separately-filed motion to strike, defendants seek to exclude much of the evidence plaintiffs
proffer in support of their arguments under Lemon’s first prong. Dkt. 119 (“Mot. to Strike”).
28 Specifically, defendants seek to exclude evidence that generally falls into one of three categories:

36.

1

2

(1) non-public emails and letters, sent by members of the public to individual members of the Board of Supervisors or County employees, expressing support or disapproval of the 1957 Seal,

3 the 2004 Seal, or the 2014 Seal, see, e.g., Tr. Exs. 10-11, 14-23, 37, 40-41, 44-47, 50-51, 54-56;
(2) internal emails and memos between County employees regarding the various versions of the

4 seal, including documents purportedly evidencing continued use of the 1957 Seal following its

2004 revision, see, e.g., Tr. Exs. 28-34, 85-87, as well as memos and emails regarding
5 implementation of the 2014 seal, see, e.g., Tr. Exs. 26, 67-69, 83; and (3) various emails that were

6

sent by individual Supervisors and that reference the 2014 Seal, see, e.g., Tr. Exs. 38-39, 42, 4849, and 51.

7
The County contends that McCreary limited the scope of information relevant under Lemon’s

8 purpose prong, such that much of plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is irrelevant and therefore

inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. Specifically, the County notes
9 that “[t]he eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’ ” and in determining the

10

government’s purpose, the Court must not conduct “any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862. The County rightly notes that McCreary does not

11 reference non-public communications to governmental actors, correspondence between
governmental employees, or statements made by governmental actors in a non-public setting—

12 that is, McCreary does not rely upon evidence of purpose uncovered through pretrial discovery,

but rather upon the “traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and
13 implementation of the . . . official act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

14

plaintiffs’ evidence was not publicized or otherwise known to McCreary’s “objective observer,” the County argues that such evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible to the federal Establishment

15 Clause inquiry. The County further asserts that because the challenged evidence is non-public
and has not been produced for public viewing, it is also irrelevant to the No Aid Clause inquiry,

16 as it has “no bearing on the effect of 2014 Seal on religious institutions.” Mot. to Strike at 7.

17 Plaintiffs, however, take a much broader view of relevance under McCreary. Specifically,

18

plaintiffs argue that the challenged evidence, including non-public emails and memos, are relevant to McCreary’s “objective observer” test, as the evidence is part of the complete “history

19 of the [County’s] actions” that the Court is entitled to examine in assessing purpose. Opp’n to
Mot. to Strike at 3 (citing McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866) (explaining that the purpose inquiry is

20 viewed through the eyes of an “objective observer” who is “presumed to be familiar with the

history of the government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to show”). First,
21 plaintiffs argue that evidence indicating continued use of the 1957 Seal following the 2004

22 amendment “is an important part of the sequence of events in this lawsuit” that “can be observed
objectively, i.e., without inquiring into the Supervisors’ subjective thoughts or ‘heart of hearts,’

23 see McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862,” and that such evidence is relevant and admissible to the Court’s

Establishment Clause analysis. Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 4. Second, plaintiffs contend that
24 certain emails sent by individual Supervisors—particularly, Supervisor Antonovich—are relevant

25

to discerning the purpose behind the Board’s 2014 amendment. Id. at 6-8. Third, plaintiffs argue that private email communications and correspondences sent by members of the public to the

26 Supervisors are probative of how the general public, and the “objective observer,” actually
perceived purpose and effect of 2014 amendment. Id. at 9-11. Finally, plaintiffs argue that some

27 of the challenged evidence is relevant to the No Aid Clause inquiry, which does not look to

McCreary’s “objective observer” standard at all. Id. at 3.
28

37.

1

2. A Reasonable, Objective Observer Would Find a

2

Sectarian Purpose Behind the County’s Addition of

3

the Cross

4

In the instant case, the stated purpose behind the Board’s 2014 amendment to

5 the seal is “to make the County seal artistically, aesthetically and architecturally

6 correct by placing the cross on top of the San Gabriel Mission in order to accurately

7 reflect the cultural and historical role that the Mission played in the development of

8 the Los Angeles County region.” See Tr. Ex. 36. “While the Court is normally

9 deferential to a [County’s] articulation of a secular purpose,” Edwards, 482 U.S. at

10 586-87, the County’s stated purpose must be “genuine . . . and not merely

11 secondary to a religious objective,” as assessed through “[t]he eyes . . . [of] an

12 ‘ “objective observer” ’ ” who is “familiar with the history of the government’s

13 actions and competent to learn what history has to show,” McCreary, 545 U.S. at

14 862, 864, 865 (citations omitted). Stated differently, because “the world is not

15 made brand new every morning,” an objective observer cannot infer the Board’s

16 purpose “only from the latest news about the last in a series of governmental

17 actions.” Id. at 865. That is, an objective observer assessing the Board’s purpose 18 could not ignore the County’s nearly fifty-year long depiction of an unadorned 19 cross on its seal prior to the 2004 revisions, nor could such an observer fail to 20 recognize the Board’s 2004 decision to remove the Latin cross following a series of 21

22
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that plaintiffs take an

23 overly broad view of relevance and admissibility under McCreary. Nonetheless, the Court

declines the County’s invitation to strike broad swaths of evidence on the grounds that such
24 evidence is irrelevant under the inquiry that McCreary requires. To the extent the Court relies

25

upon any of plaintiffs’ challenged evidence, the Court addresses the County’s substantive objections on an individualized basis. Accordingly, the County’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

26 Defendants’ supplemental motions to exclude additional evidence, see dkts. 153, 154, 155, are
similarly DENIED AS MOOT, as the Court does not rely upon this evidence in reaching its

27 conclusion here.

28

38.

1 contentious public hearings wherein, as one Supervisor put it at the time, the

2 public’s vocal objection “was clearly . . . a religious one.” Tr. Ex. 13, at 209. In

3 light of these considerations, the Court finds that the Board’s stated goal of

4 achieving artistic, architectural, cultural, and historical accuracy is inconsistent with

5 how a reasonable, objective observer, familiar with what history has to show,

6 would construe the Board’s decision to reintroduce a cross to the seal.

7

First, a reasonable, objective observer would find it “odd[]” that the Board’s

8 purported concern with the seal’s artistic, aesthetic, and architectural accuracy

9 appears limited to the depiction of the Mission—specifically, to its inclusion of the

10 cross, the preeminent symbol of Christianity. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 872. If

11 substantial funds are again to be spent modifying the seal and thereby “accurately

12 reflect[ing] the cultural and historical role that the Mission played in the

13 development of the Los Angeles County region,” an objective observer would

14 necessarily wonder why the Board did not do the same for the seal’s other

15 significant historical depictions, such as the San Salvador, the cow Pearlette, or the

16 Hollywood Bowl. A likely answer, as the County itself suggests, is that the seal “is

17 not intended to be an exact diagram of anything,” as all of its “elements . . . are by 18 necessity somewhat stylized.” Opp’n at 24. And even though, as the County 19 argues, “a stylized representation has to make clear to an observer what is actually 20 being depicted,” an objective observer would find the 2004 Seal’s depiction of the 21 Mission no less clear than its highly-stylized and inaccurate depiction of the 22 Hollywood Bowl, currently represented by a two-dimensional series of concentric 23 half-circles. In short, a reasonable, objective observer would find that the County’s 24 stated purpose behind adding the cross—i.e., achieving “cultural and historical” 25 accuracy by “mak[ing] the . . . seal artistically, aesthetically and architecturally 26 correct”—is inconsistent with the County’s apparent willingness to tolerate 27 inaccurate depictions of other aspects of the seal’s imagery. 28

39.

1

Second, numerous courts have suggested that governmental use of religious

2 symbols where nonreligious imagery would have sufficed generally evinces a

3 religious purpose. See,e.g., ACLU v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc.,

4 698 F.2d 1098, 1111 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding war memorial cross unconstitutional

5 “even if . . . the purpose for constructing the cross was to promote tourism” because

6 “a government may not ‘employ religious means to reach a secular goal unless

7 secular means are wholly unavailing’ ”) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa.

8 v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)); Am. Humanist,

9 2014 WL 791800, at *8 (“Although the cross serves as a tombstone, a religious

10 symbol is not necessary to mark a grave, and . . . the use of a religious symbol

11 where one is not necessary evidences a religious purpose.”); Greater Houston

12 Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (finding

13 religious purpose behind a city’s use of a cross and a Star of David in war memorial

14 statues where the memorial could have honored veterans without using religious

15 symbolism); Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (M.D. Fla.

16 1989) (rejecting contention that a lighted cross monument had “secular and

17 historical value as a guidepost for fisherman and pilots as a landmark” because

18 “[s]ecular means are availing here”).

19

Although the County argues that the seal was “revised for the proper secular

20 purpose of accurately depicting a historic landmark in a matter that makes it readily

21 identifiable,” Opp’n at 8, Dietler Decl. at ¶ 28, Hackel Decl. at ¶¶ 31-32, 35, the

22 Court rejects the notion that the seal must include a cross in order to “readily”

23 identify or “accurately depict” the San Gabriel Mission. It is true, as one of the

24 County’s experts testified, that a cross stood atop the eastern façade of the Mission

25 for nearly one hundred years, from approximately 1889 through 1987, when the

26 cross was removed following the Whittier earthquake. Hackel Decl. at ¶ 36; see

27 also id. at Ex. 2 (containing thirty-five images, dated 1889 through 1973, depicting

28

40.

1 a cross atop the Mission’s eastern façade). However, the record also indicates that

2 for nearly the same amount of time, throughout most of the nineteenth century, no

3 cross adorned this portion of the structure. See Hackel Decl. at ¶¶ 66-70, Exs. 2-6

4 (painting, ca. 1832-1835), 2-8 (sketch, ca. 1856), 2-9 (photo, ca. 1877), 2-10

5 (photo, ca. 1877), 2-11 (photo, ca. 1880), 2-12 (photo, ca. 1885), 2-14 (photo, ca.

6 1877-1880), 2-18 (photo, ca. 1887-1888).

7

More importantly, the County has cited no evidence of confusion on the part

8 of the public regarding the 2004 Seal’s imagery, which for a decade depicted the

9 Mission’s eastern façade without a cross. See Hackel Decl. at ¶ 35. Indeed, one of

10 the County’s own experts notes that the San Gabriel Mission’s eastern façade is

11 “the original entryway of the oldest, largest and most distinctive surviving building

12 associated with the mission.” Dietler Decl. at ¶ 28 (emphasis added); see also

13 Hackel Decl. at ¶ 72 (noting “original front of the [M]ission” was its eastern

14 façade). Its distinctive architectural features contribute to a “fort”-like appearance

15 that, in the opinion of the County’s expert, architecturally distinguishes the San

16 Gabriel Mission from all other California missions. Hackel Decl. at ¶ 35. The

17 Court is not convinced that an objective observer would struggle to recognize the

18 Mission’s “oldest, largest and most distinctive surviving building” unless the

19 depiction of the structure is also adorned by a cross.21 See Dietler Decl. at ¶ 28.

20

Third, additional consideration of “what history has to show”—including

21 “traditional external signs” that show up in the “text, legislative history, and

22 implementation of the [County’s official use of the seal]”—would cast further

23 doubt, in the eyes of a reasonable, objective observer, regarding the County’s

24 proffered secular purpose for adding the cross. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (citation

25 and quotation marks omitted). The County’s 1957 Seal included an image of an

26

27

21 Despite the Mission’s distinctive features, the County, in its opposition to the instant motion, argues that the 2004 Seal depicts the Mission “simply . . . as a large building without conveying

28 its historical significance.” Opp’n at 21.

41.

1 unadorned Latin cross in the sky, flanked by two stars, above an image of the

2 Hollywood Bowl. Tr. Ex. 7. In 2004, following widely publicized and contentious

3 public meetings, the Board voted 3-2 to remove the Latin cross and to add the

4 Mission, unadorned by a cross. Tr. Ex. 24, at 309-10. This vote was publicly

5 presented as a compromise meant to remove all sectarian imagery on the seal and

6 thereby avert a constitutional challenge to it. See Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257

7 (finding the Board’s removal of the cross from the 1957 Seal to be “viewed as an

8 effort to restore their neutrality and to ensure their continued compliance with the

9 Establishment Clause”).

10

A reasonable, objective observer aware of this contentious history would

11 likely view the County’s recent decision to reintroduce a cross at substantial

12 expense as motivated by a sectarian purpose, despite the County’s appeal to

13 considerations of artistic and historical accuracy.22 As the Ninth Circuit has noted,

14 “[t]he argument that a cross has a historic connection cannot, of course, be treated

15 as ‘an argument which [can] always “trump” the Establishment Clause[ ] because

16 of the undeniable significance of religion and religious symbols in the history of

17 many [American] communities.’ ” Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1111 n.11 (citation omitted)

18 (alterations in original); see also Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1413-15

19 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding City Council’s 1986 vote “to retain the [cross on its] seal

20 for historical reasons” to be a “perfunctory appeal to history,” noting that even a 21 city with “a unique history . . . may not honor its history by retaining [a] blatantly 22 sectarian seal, emblem, and logo”); Mendelson, 719 F. Supp. at 1070 (finding no 23

24 22 The Court notes, however, that its holding does not stand for the proposition that a historically

25

accurate depiction of a Latin cross atop a mission on a county seal or other public display is per se impermissible. Nor does the Court’s finding imply that an adoption of such a display

26 necessarily stems from an impermissible sectarian purpose. As the Supreme Court noted in
McCreary, “[o]ne consequence of taking account of the purpose underlying past actions is that the

27 same government action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if

it has a sectarian heritage.” Id. at 866 n.14. This possibility “presents no incongruity, however,
28 because purpose matters.” Id.

42.

1 secular purpose behind the display of a cross on a water tower despite defendants’

2 contention that the cross had “historical value as a guidepost for fishermen and

3 pilots and as a landmark”).

4

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the County’s addition of the cross to

5 the 2004 Seal violates Lemon’s first prong.23 Rather than finding a concern for

6 artistic or historical accuracy behind the County’s addition of the cross, an objective

7 observer, familiar with the seal’s history, “would probably suspect that the

8 Count[y] w[as] simply reaching for any way to keep a religious [symbol] on [an

9 emblem] . . . constitutionally required to [display] religious neutrality.” McCreary,

10 545 U.S. at 873.

11 / / /

12

13 23 The County argues that this case is controlled by Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist.,

14

wherein the Ninth Circuit found a state statute and school district policy calling for voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the phrase, “one Nation under God,” to be

15 constitutional. 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court in the instant case reads Newdow
to stand primarily for two propositions, both of which are consistent with the Court’s analysis and

16 findings here. First, the Newdow court made clear that religious motivations or statements of

individual members of the public cannot, standing alone, themselves defeat a governmental action
17 that is otherwise based on a plausible, predominantly secular purpose. Id. at 1033-34 (“[The]

18

dissent errs . . . in focusing solely on what individuals say when they are making political statements to their constituencies and ending its analysis there . . . [Doing so would] grant[] a

19 heckler’s veto to anyone who ma[kes] just enough noise in support of an enactment so as to
defeat an otherwise valid measure”) (emphasis in original). Here, the Court has not inferred the

20 Board’s purpose from statements or documents bearing upon the views expressed by individual

members of the public. Rather, the Court has focused on how a reasonable, objective observer
21 would perceive the Board’s 2014 motion to change the seal, and the purpose for the change

22 expressly stated by the County—namely, achieving artistic, aesthetic, architectural, cultural, and
historical accuracy. Again, as stated supra, the Court has found this stated purpose to be

23 inconsistent with how a reasonable, objective observer would construe the County’s decision to

add a cross to the seal. Second, while under Newdow the purpose inquiry must focus on “the
24 contemporaneous legislative history” of the challenged governmental act—in this case, the 2014

25

addition of the cross—Newdow also made clear that courts “must examine the relevant history” under the “holistic approach” of Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See Newdow, 597 F.3d

26 at 1019, 1028 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58 (finding an impermissible, sectarian purpose behind
a statute calling for a moment of silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer” based in part upon

27 the “character” of a “sequel” statute, passed a year later, authorizing teachers to lead “willing

students” in a prescribed prayer)). Here, the Court has examined that history in conducting its
28 analysis.

43.

1

ii. Lemon Test Prongs 2 and 3: Effect of Advancing

2

Religion

3

1. The Court Assesses the Effect of Adding the Cross

4

to the Seal from the Vantage Point of an Objective

5

Observer Familiar with what History has to Show

6

Under Lemon’s second prong, a “[g]overnmental act[] has the primary effect

7 of advancing or disapproving of religion if it is ‘sufficiently likely to be perceived

8 by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the

9 nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’ ” Vasquez,

10 487 F.3d at 1256 (citation omitted); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690

11 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of

12 government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message

13 of endorsement or disapproval.”). Under the Lemon test’s third prong, a

14 government action must not “foster[] an excessive government entanglement with

15 religion.” Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm, 784 F.3d at 1299 (citation

16 omitted). While plaintiffs treat these two prongs separately in their motion, “the

17 Supreme Court essentially has collapsed the[] last two prongs to ask whether the

18 challenged governmental practice has the effect of endorsing religion.” Trunk, 629

19 F.3d at 1106 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 1109

20 (defining “endorsement” as “those acts that send the stigmatic message to

21 nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,

22 and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored

23 members’ ”) (citation omitted).

24

Again, the challenged governmental action in this suit is the County’s 2014

25 motion to add a Latin cross to the 2004 Seal. As with the inquiry regarding the

26 County’s purpose in doing so, the Court “conduct[s] [its] inquiry [regarding the

27 effect of the County’s action] from the perspective of an ‘informed and reasonable’

28

44.

1 observer who is ‘familiar with the history of the government practice at issue.’ ” Id.

2 at 1110 (citation omitted). In Vasquez, for example, the Ninth Circuit assessed the

3 constitutionality of the County’s “removal of the cross from the [1957] LA County

4 Seal” from the perspective of “a ‘reasonable observer’ familiar with the history and

5 controversy surrounding the use of crosses on municipal seals.” 487 F.3d at 1257

6 (citing Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,

7 dissenting) (noting that there has been “constant . . . judicial disapproval of

8 government use of Christian crosses . . . on municipal seals” and “[t]he Supreme

9 Court itself has repeatedly disapproved in dicta the governmental display of

10 crosses”)). Applying the relevant standard here, the Court finds that an informed

11 and reasonable observer familiar with the history surrounding the County’s use of a

12 Latin cross on its seal—and the County’s controversial removal of the cross in

13 2004—would find its recent effort to reintroduce a cross to the seal as favoring one

14 set of religious beliefs over another.

15

The Court relies, in large part, on Trunk, wherein the Ninth Circuit found that

16 the Latin cross and veterans’ war memorial atop Mount Soledad in La Jolla,

17 California violated the Establishment Clause. 629 F.3d at 1101-02. The particular 18 display that plaintiffs challenged in Trunk was “the third in a line of Latin crosses” 19 that had stood on Mount Soledad since 1913. Id. at 1119. Accordingly, in 20 considering the propriety of the most recent display under Lemon’s second prong, 21 the Ninth Circuit assessed whether “the entirety” of the memorial, “when 22 understood against the background of its particular history and setting, project[ed] 23 a government endorsement of Christianity.” Id. at 1118 (emphasis added); accord 24 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 25 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry 26 must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in 27 which the religious display appears.”). Ultimately, despite evidence in the record of 28

45.

1 some secular usage of the memorial site, the court concluded that, on balance,

2 “[h]istory would lead the reasonable observer to perceive a religious message in the

3 [m]emorial.” Id. at 1118-19.

4

In finding a sectarian effect to the government’s display of the cross, the

5 Trunk court cited public statements made by the cross’s supporters in the midst of

6 the controversy surrounding its potential removal. See id. at 1119-20. Specifically,

7 the court noted that the cross’s “importance as a religious symbol has been a

8 rallying cry for many involved in the litigation surrounding the [m]emorial,” some

9 of whom publicly characterized the campaign to save the cross as a “spiritual

10 battle.” Id. at 1119-20. Other “Christian advocacy groups” launched national

11 petition campaigns for the cross and, at a meeting of the San Diego City Council,

12 denounced their opponents as “Satanists” or “hate[rs] of Christianity.” Id. at 1120.

13 Still others characterized the efforts to maintain the cross as “saving [a] historic

14 symbol of Christianity in America.” Id.

15

In the instant case, the County’s 2004 consideration of whether to replace the

16 1957 Seal and thereby remove the cross from the County’s emblem was met with

17 similar vocal public opposition. At the first of several public hearings regarding 18 potential revisions to the 1957 Seal, members of the public objected to the removal 19 of the Latin cross on religious grounds, with one characterizing the County’s effort 20 as “an attack on the body of Christ,” Tr. Ex. 13, at 101, and another stating that “[i]f 21 there’s no cross, there’s no compromise,” id. at 86. Others called the cross “a 22 symbol of the love of Christ” and a representation “not just [of] the passion that we 23 are presenting today but [also] the passion of Christ.” Id. at 187, 135. Such 24 rhetoric, and the overall tone of the hearing, prompted Supervisor Burke to 25 characterize the hearing as a “religious frenzy” and “as close to the inquisition as 26 we have seen in the 21st century.” Id. at 209, 211. She further noted that “if 27 there’s ever any question of what was being moved forward [by the Board] and 28

46.

1 what the objection was to the vote that had been taken, it was clearly . . . a religious

2 one.” Id. at 209.

3

Of course, the Court cannot impute the motives of the Board’s constituents to

4 individual members of the Board. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1119 n.19; Newdow, 597

5 F.3d at 1034 (noting that “grant[ing] a heckler’s veto to anyone who ma[kes] just

6 enough noise in support of an enactment so as to defeat an otherwise valid

7 measure” would allow such measures to “be banned by the politically motivated

8 statements of some legislators (or even someone who is not in the legislature . . .

9 .)”). However, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Trunk, irrespective of “imputed intent,

10 the history of the [display] is relevant to determining its effect on the reasonable

11 viewer.” Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1119 n.19. Thus, while evidence of the public’s

12 religiously-motivated opposition to removing the cross “may not be relevant to [the

13 Board’s] purpose [in removing it], it cannot be ignored in assessing the history and

14 context of the [use of the] [c]ross” on the County seal. Id.; see also Am. Humanist,

15 2014 WL 791800, at *13 (noting statements from “members of the community, as

16 well as the overall atmosphere at the . . . Council meeting sent a powerful message

17 that those who considered [using] the cross [on a memorial] to be inappropriate

18 were not welcomed”). Indeed, some outside organizations and members of the

19 public referenced this contentious history in either supporting or opposing the

20 County’s effort to reintroduce the cross in 2014. See Tr. Ex. 52 (January 7, 2014

21 Board Meeting Minutes), at 378 (“I liked the old seal and I fought to keep it the

22 way it was . . . [and] am glad and sad at the same time to see that item back on the

23 agenda . . . .”), 380 (“[T]his is obviously a very controversial issue. This would be

24 a decade later that we are re-visiting it.”).

25

Simply put, irrespective of the Board’s purpose in adopting the 2004 Seal,

26 “[t]he starkly religious message of the [c]ross’s supporters would not escape the

27 notice of the reasonable observer.” Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1120. Nor would the

28

47.

1 charged nature of the controversy and the publicity surrounding it escape a

2 reasonable observer’s notice. See ACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F.Supp.2d 845, 852

3 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (noting few “even knew that the city had a seal” before it was

4 legally challenged, but afterwards “almost everyone [knew] the seal ha[d] a

5 Christian cross,” and “heavy local publicity” surrounding the lawsuit and “the

6 tension it has created in the community” only “exacerbated the effect of causing

7 non-Christians . . . to feel like outsiders”). Armed with the memory of this message

8 and of the County’s decision to replace the 1957 Seal at substantial cost and despite

9 vocal opposition, a reasonable observer in 2014, mindful of what history has to

10 show, would not view the County’s addition of a cross to the Mission as merely an

11 “anodyne” government approval of religion. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1109. Rather, a

12 reasonable observer would likely view the County’s willingness to expend upwards

13 of $700,000 for the sole purpose of adding a cross to the depiction of the Mission as

14 an “act[] that send[s] the stigmatic message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,

15 not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to

16 adherents that they are insiders, favored members.” Id. (internal quotation marks

17 and citation omitted); c.f. id. at 1118-19 (“History would lead the reasonable

18 observer to perceive a religious message in the Memorial.”).

19

The County argues against this conclusion, asserting that plaintiffs “utterly

20 ignore” both (1) “the context in which a cross appears on the 2014 Seal,” as well as

21 (2) “the context in which a reasonable observer would perceive a mission with a

22 cross . . . .” Opp’n at 28. As to the first point, the County emphasizes that unlike

23 governmental displays in which a cross “stands alone or as the [display’s]

24 centerpiece,” the cross on the 2014 Seal is merely a “small, albeit significant

25 architectural and historical feature of a large building [that] mak[es] it readily

26 identifiable as a mission.” Id. As to the second point, the County argues that a

27 reasonable observer “would be aware that missions are routinely depicted with

28

48.

1 crosses in all sorts of secular contexts, including on commemorative stamps issued

2 by the post office.” Id. According to the County, “virtually every public school

3 student in the state has received instruction on the importance of California

4 missions to California history, including depictions of mission[s] with crosses on

5 them.” Id. Thus, the County avers—albeit without reference to authority—that

6 “most Californians” view such depictions as “part and parcel of the history of the

7 state” and not as evincing “some isolated religious purpose.” 24 Id.

8

For purposes of the Court’s analysis here, the County’s arguments are

9 unavailing. Specifically, the County fails to apply the Lemon test from “the

10 perspective of an ‘informed and reasonable’ observer who is ‘familiar with the

11 history of the government practice at issue.’ ”—i.e., familiar with the history of the

12 County’s display of its seal. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1110 (emphasis added) (citation

13 omitted). Instead, the County considers how an “objective observer,” seemingly

14 unaware of the seal’s history but familiar with the history of California missions,

15 might perceive the 2014 Seal’s depiction of the Mission with a cross. However, the

16 Ninth Circuit has reminded courts “assessing the effect of a religious display” that

17 “reasonable observers have reasonable memories” and cannot “turn a blind eye to

18 the context in which [the particular governmental] policy arose.” Trunk, 629 F.3d

19 at 1118 (emphasis added) (citing McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866) (internal quotation

20 marks omitted). Thus, the context and history of the County seal—and not merely

21 the “history of the state,” the “history of the missions,” or “the history of

22 County”—is crucial to assessing the County’s challenged conduct here. Opp’n at

23 28, 32; see Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1117 (“[W]e must gauge the overall impact of the

24 Memorial in the context of its history and setting.”) (emphasis added).

25
24 Specifically, the County argues that “anyone acquainted with the history of the missions and
26 well aware of their inclusion [in the] basic curriculum for students throughout the state, including

27

displaying missions with crosses in textbooks, would not view the display of a mission with a cross on the County Seal as conveying a primarily religious as opposed to secular message

28 signifying the importance of the Mission to the history of County.” Opp’n at 32.

49.

1

Indeed, it is the unique history of the County’s display of the seal that in

2 large part distinguishes the instant case from Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d

3 147 (5th Cir. 1991), and Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir.

4 2008)—the only two cases defendants cite in which use of a Latin cross on a county

5 or municipal seal was found to be permissible. In Murray, a divided panel of the

6 Fifth Circuit held that the city insignia of Austin, Texas, did not violate the

7 Establishment Clause. The insignia, adopted in 1919 and derived from Stephen F.

8 Austin’s family coat of arms, is topped by a small Latin cross flanked by a pair of

9 wings. Id. at 149-50. The court first found that the City of Austin “did not have an

10 improper purpose in adopting the insignia[,]” and the court further recognized the

11 “long and unchallenged use” of the cross on the seal. Id. at 158 (5th Cir. 1991).

12 Such circumstances are unlike the history of the adoption, removal, and re-addition

13 of the cross on the seal in this action. See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,

14 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (distinguishing Van Orden—where the Supreme

15 Court found a Ten Commandments display outside the Texas State Capitol to be

16 permissible in part because the display stood for forty years without legal

17 challenge—from McCreary, where “the short (and stormy) history of the

18 courthouse Commandments’ display demonstrate[ed] the substantially religious

19 objectives of those who mounted them, and the effect of this readily apparent

20 objective upon those who view them”) (emphasis added);25 Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 21

22 25 “[T]he controlling opinion in Van Orden is, of course, that of Justice Breyer.” Card, 520 F.3d

23 at 1018 n.10. According to Justice Breyer, the fact that the Ten Commandments monument in

Van Orden stood for forty years without legal challenge “suggest[ed] more strongly than can any
24 set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have

25

understood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion over nonreligion . . . .”

26 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 682 (plurality opinion) (noting
that plaintiff sued “[f]orty years after the monument’s erection and six years after [he personally]

27 began to encounter the monument frequently”). In the instant case, no such period of tranquility

existed, as the County’s decision to introduce the cross to the 2004 Seal was met with swift
28 opposition: plaintiffs filed suit on February 6, 2014, less than a month after the County passed its

50.

1 852 (distinguishing the seal in Murray “not in appearance but in derivation,” noting

2 “this derivation has constitutional implications”).

3

In Weinbaum, the Tenth Circuit found the use of three Latin crosses on the

4 City of Las Cruces’s municipal seal to be permissible. 541 F.3d at 1035. In

5 reaching its decision, the court repeatedly emphasized that the crosses on the seal

6 were inextricably intertwined with the City’s name—which translates to “The

7 Crosses”—a fact that “militate[d] against the argument that the symbol’s effect is to

8 endorse Christianity.” See Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1033-35 (finding that the “Las

9 Cruces community uses the crosses the way Palo Alto uses the tall green tree”—

10 that is, “to identify the cities by referring (via pictographic shorthand) to the cities’

11 names”). The Weinbaum court also held that the Las Cruces seal “was []

12 understood to be secular by the residents of the City” and even “identif[ies] many

13 secular businesses within the Las Cruces community.” Id. at 1035. Indeed, “it is

14 hardly startling that a City with the name ‘The Crosses’ would be represented by a

15 seal containing crosses.” Id. For reasons explained supra, the evidence in this case

16 demonstrates that the County’s effort to add the cross to the 2004 Seal is not likely

17 to be understood by County residents as a secular action.

18

Accordingly, the Court concludes that an “ ‘informed and reasonable’

19 observer who is ‘familiar with the history of the government practice at issue’ ”

20 would perceive the County’s addition of the cross to the 2004 Seal to constitute

21 approval or endorsement of a particular set of religious beliefs. Trunk, 629 F.3d at

22 1110 (citation omitted). Although each case necessarily turns on its own facts,

23 most courts to have considered challenges to the use of crosses on county or

24 municipal seals have similarly found them to be unconstitutional under Lemon’s

25 second prong. See, e.g., Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779,

26

27 motion to add the cross. See Dkt. 1 (Complaint). 28

51.

1 782 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (finding cross on county seal to be unconstitutional

2 where seal “convey[ed] a strong impression to the average observer that

3 Christianity [was] being endorsed”); Zion, 927 F.2d at 1415 (finding crosses on two

4 city seals to be “unconstitutional endorsements of a particular religious faith”);

5 Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1228, 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1995)

6 (finding cross on city seal to be unconstitutional where “religious significance and

7 meaning of the Latin or Christian cross are unmistakable” and “average observer

8 would perceive . . . endorsement of Christianity” in viewing the seal); Stow, 29

9 F.Supp.2d at 851 (finding cross on city seal to be unconstitutional where the

10 “inclusion of the cross in the seal necessarily excludes other religious beliefs or

11 nonbeliefs and depicts Christianity as the religion recognized and endorsed by the

12 people”). In light of the foregoing, the Court similarly concludes that the County’s

13 addition of the cross to the seal in the instant case violates Lemon’s second prong.

14

2. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Irreparable Injury

15

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the loss of constitutional freedoms

16 “even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”

17 for purposes of issuing an injunction because such issues cannot be adequately 18 remedied through damages. See, e.g., Klein, 584 F.3d at 1208 (finding irreparable 19 harm where city’s anti-littering ordinance violated plaintiff’s rights under the 20 California Constitution and First Amendment); S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 21 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding irreparable harm where plaintiff was likely 22 to succeed on a First Amendment claim). Plaintiffs in the instant action will 23 therefore suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, as defendants 24 have violated their constitutional rights, as explained supra. See Klein, 584 F.3d at 25 1208. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28

52.

1

3. The Balance of Hardships Tips in Plaintiffs’ Favor and a

2

Permanent Injunction is in the Public Interest

3

The fact that plaintiffs have “raise[d] serious First Amendment questions”

4 likewise “compels a finding that . . . the balance of hardships tips sharply in [their]

5 favor.” See Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 973 (internal quotation marks and citation

6 omitted); see also Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1059 (9th Cir.

7 2006) (finding the balance of hardships to tip in favor of plaintiffs alleging that

8 governmental aid “has the ‘effect’ of advancing religion”). Moreover, federal

9 courts have consistently held that public interest concerns are implicated when a

10 constitutional right has been violated because all citizens have a stake in upholding

11 the Constitution. See, e.g., Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 974 (recognizing “the

12 significant public interest in upholding First Amendment principles”).

13

IV.

14

CONCLUSION

15

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent

16 injunction is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs are directed to prepare a form of

17 judgment to be lodged with the Court in accordance with this decision and the 18 Local Rules of this Court. 19

20 DATED: April 6, 2016
21 22

___________________________ Honorable Christina A. Snyder
United States District Judge

23

24

25

26

27

28

53.

1

V.

2

APPENDIX

3

Figure 1 (The 2014 Seal)

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Figure 2 (The 2004 Seal)

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

54.

1

Figure 3 (The 1957 Seal)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

55.

 
 'O' 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

WESTERN DIVISION

11

12 REVEREND FATHER IAN ELLIOTT Case No. 2:14-cv-00907-CAS-FFM

13 DAVIES; REVEREND J. EDWIN 14 BACON, JR.; SHAKEEL SYED;

JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

15 RABBI HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS; 16 REVEREND TERA LITTLE; RABBI
JOHN ROSOVE; REVEREND PETER 17 LAARMAN; DAVID N. MYERS;
18 AND RABBI AMY BERNSTEIN,

19

Plaintiffs,

20

v.

21
22 LOSANGELESCOUNTYBOARD
OF SUPERVISORS; AND WILLIAM 23 TFUJIOKA,

24

Defendants.

25

26

27

28

1.

1

The Court, having granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction and

2 made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Dkt. No. 159, hereby enters

3 judgment as follows:

4

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

5

1. That the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors' January 7, 2014

6 motion approving the addition of a Latin cross to the official seal of Los Angeles

7 County (the "2014 Seal") violates: ( 1) the No Aid Clause of article XVI, section 5

8 of the California Constitution; (2) the No Preference Clause of article I, section 4 of 9 the California Constitution; and (3) the Establishment Clause of the First 10 Amendment to the United States Constitution;

11

2. That the action by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to

12 adopt a revised County seal by placing a Latin Cross on the apex of the roof of the

13 depiction of the San Gabriel Mission on the County seal adopted in September

14 2004 is hereby declared NULL and VOID;

15

3. That Defendant County of Los Angeles shall return the official County

16 seal to the status quo ante existing as January 6, 2014, to wit, the official County

17 seal adopted by Board Order No. 25 of September 14, 2004, in the form attached as

18 Exhibit 1 hereto; and

19

4. That Defendant County of Los Angeles, its officers, agents,

20 employees, and all persons acting in concert therewith, are hereby

21 PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from any and all use, display, or implementation of
22 the 2014 Seal in connection with any County service, program, facility, equipment,
23 activity, or use of County funds, effective one hundred and forty-five (145) days

24 from the date of this Judgment, provided, however, that Defendant County of Los

25 Angeles is immediately enjoined, subject to a 45-day grace period to effectuate this 26 provision, from drafting, printing, designing, or otherwise creating any new 27
materials or displays ofthe 2014 Seal, including but not limited to new materials 28

2.

1 based on templates or other forms created prior to the date of this Judgment.

2

Without otherwise limiting the foregoing, the following uses and/or displays,

3 to the extent existing before the date of this Judgment, shall not violate this

"4 Judgment:

5

(1) the display and/or use of the 2014 Seal on documents and

6 communications that were created prior to entry of Judgment and are intended to be 7 maintained permanently in the ordinary course of business, or maintained until 8 destroyed pursuant to ordinary business practice, including official records, 9 minutes, and correspondence and on scrolls, awards, and commendations issued 10 before the entry of Judgment; and

11

(2) the display of the 2014 Seal, where affixed to a building, structure,

12 monument, statue, or fixture, and which cannot be replaced without damage,

13 deterioration, or structural alteration to the building, structure, monument, statue, or

14 fixture. This exception would not apply to displays or uses such as decals at

15 building entrances, directional signage or displays where the 2014 Seal could be

16 painted, covered over or otherwise removed without causing damage, deterioration

17 or require structural alteration to the building, structure, monument, statue, or

18 fixture in question.

19

This Judgment does not bar Defendant County of Los Angeles from adopting

20 a new seal in the future consistent with the Court's opinion. See Dkt. No. 159.

21

Plaintiffs are found to be the prevailing party in this case and shall be entitled

22 to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Such attorneys' fees and costs

23 of suit shall be awarded by the Court at a later date upon noticed motion filed

24 within 60 days of entry of this judgment.

25

26

27
Christina A. Snyder

28

United States District Judge

3.

EXHIBIT 1

 
 Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 1 of 23
(FFMx),CLOSED,DISCOVERY,FISCAL,MANADR,PROTORD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:14−cv−00907−CAS−FFM

Ian Elliott Davies et al v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors et al Assigned to: Judge Christina A. Snyder Referred to: Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/06/2014 Date Terminated: 04/06/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Reverend Father Ian Elliott Davies

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC 725 South Figueroa Street 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017−5524 213−629−9040 Fax: 213−629−9022 Email: aesbenshade@bsfllp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC 725 South Figueroa Street 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017−5524 213−629−9040 Fax: 213−629−9022 Email: burrow@caldwell−leslie.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum Public Counsel Law Center 610 South Ardmore Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90005 213−385−2977 Fax: 213−385−9089 Email: mrosenbaum@publiccounsel.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West Eighth Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−977−5228 Fax: 213−977−5297 Email: peliasberg@aclusocal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC 725 South Figueroa Street 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017−5524 213−629−9040 Fax: 213−629−9022 Email: johnson@caldwell−leslie.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au Durie Tangri LLP

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 2 of 23

217 Leidesdorff Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−362−6666 Fax: 415−236−6300 Email: bau@durietangri.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky AUSA − Office of the US Attorney General Crimes Section 312 North Spring Street Suite 1100 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213−894−6520 Fax: 213−894−0141 Email: jeffrey.chemerinsky@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC 725 South Figueroa Street 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017−5524 562−629−9040 Fax: 213−629−9022 Email: ksinger@bsfllp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Reverend J. Edwin Bacon, Jr

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 3 of 23

Plaintiff Shakeel Syed
Plaintiff Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 4 of 23

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Reverend Tera Little

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rabbi John Rosove

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 5 of 23

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Reverend Peter Laarman

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 6 of 23

David N. Myers

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Rabbi Amy Bernstein

represented by Andrew A Esbenshade (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M Burrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark D Rosenbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter J Eliasberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arwen Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin B Au (See above for address)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 7 of 23
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey M Chemerinsky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberly Michelle Singer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Defendant

represented by Frank J Ozello , Jr Maranga Morgenstern 5850 Canoga Avenue Suite 600 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 818−587−9146 Fax: 818−587−9147 Email: fozello@marmorlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth A Maranga Maranga & Morgenstern 5850 Canoga Ave, Ste 600 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 818−587−9146 Email: ken.maranga@marmorlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia E Ellyatt Maranga Morgenstern 5850 Canoga Avenue Suite 600 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 818−587−9146 Fax: 818−587−9147 Email: pellyatt@marmorlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia M Ford Maranga Morgenstern 5850 Canoga Avenue Suite 600 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 818−587−9147 Fax: 818−587−9147 Email: pford@marmorlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy Towery Coates Greines Martin Stein and Richland LLP 5900 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90036−3697 310−859−7811 Fax: 310−276−5261 Email: tcoates@gmsr.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 8 of 23

William T. Fujioka

represented by Frank J Ozello , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth A Maranga (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia E Ellyatt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Towery Coates (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia M Ford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/06/2014
02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/11/2014 02/11/2014
02/11/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Case assigned to Judge Christina A. Snyder for all further proceedings. Discovery referred to Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Filing fee $ 400 PAID.), filed by Plaintiffs Tera Little, J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Ian Elliott Davies, Amy Bernstein, Peter Laarman, Shakeel Syed, David N. Myers, Harold M. Schulweis, John Rosove. (et) (jp). (Entered: 02/10/2014)
2 21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint − (Discovery) 1 as to Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (et) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
3 CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (et) (jp). (Entered: 02/10/2014)
4 NOTICE of Related Case(s) filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Related Case(s): Not Indicated. (et) (jp). (Entered: 02/10/2014)
5 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF COURT−DIRECTED ADR PROGRAM filed. (et) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
6 NOTICE TO COUNSEL upon filing of the complaint by Judge Christina A. Snyder. (rba) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
7 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Tera Little, J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Ian Elliott Davies, Amy Bernstein, Peter Laarman, Shakeel Syed, David N. Myers, Harold M. Schulweis, John Rosove, upon Defendant Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors served on 2/10/2014, answer due 3/3/2014. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Marisol Zarate, Deputy Clerk in compliance with statute not specified by substituted service at business address and no service by mail was executed. Original Summons NOT returned. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
8 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Tera Little, J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Ian Elliott Davies, Amy Bernstein, Peter Laarman, Shakeel Syed, David N. Myers, Harold M. Schulweis, John Rosove, upon Defendant William T. Fujioka served on 2/10/2014, answer due 3/3/2014. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Ruben Eza, Assistant County Counsel in compliance with statute not specified by substituted service at business address and no service by mail was executed. Original

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 9 of 23

02/19/2014 02/20/2014 02/20/2014 02/21/2014
02/26/2014 02/26/2014 03/13/2014 03/13/2014 03/13/2014
03/13/2014
03/13/2014

Summons NOT returned. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
9 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed, re Service of Summons and Complaint Returned Executed (21 days),, 8 CORRECTED (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
10 PROOF OF SERVICE J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed, re Initial Order upon Filing of Complaint 6 served on Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
11 PROOF OF SERVICE J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed, re Initial Order upon Filing of Complaint 6 served on William T Fujioka served on 2/11/2014. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
12 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Proof of Service (subsequent documents), 9 . The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Civil Events > Service Documents > Service/Waivers of Summons and Complaints > Service of Summons and Complaint Returned Executed (21 Days). In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (rne) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
13 NOTICE of Association of Counsel associating attorney Timothy T. Coates on behalf of Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Attorney Timothy Towery Coates added to party William T. Fujioka(pty:dft), Attorney Timothy Towery Coates added to party Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors(pty:dft))(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
14 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File as to Complaint − (Discovery), 1 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
15 ANSWER to Complaint − (Discovery), 1 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.(Ellyatt, Patricia) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
16 CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, identifying Reverend Father Ian Elliott Davies, Reverend J. Edwin Bacon, Jr., Shakeel Syed, Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis, Reverend Tera Little, Rabbi John Rosove, Reverend Peter Laarman, David N. Myers, Rabbi Amy Bernstein, County of Los Angeles, William T. Fujioka. (Ellyatt, Patricia) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
17 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Patricia E Ellyatt counsel for Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Adding PATRICIA E. ELLYATT as attorney as counsel of record for LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA. (Ellyatt, Patricia) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
18 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Patricia E Ellyatt counsel for Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Adding KENNETH A. MARANGA as attorney as counsel of record for LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA. (Ellyatt, Patricia) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
19 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Patricia E Ellyatt counsel for Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Adding FRANK J. OZELLO, JR. as attorney as counsel of record for LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T.

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 10 of 23

03/26/2014 05/08/2014
06/03/2014 06/09/2014
10/24/2014 10/28/2014 10/30/2014 11/03/2014 11/10/2014
11/21/2014

FUJIOKA for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA. (Ellyatt, Patricia) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
20 ORDER SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE by Judge Christina A. Snyder. Scheduling Conference set for 6/9/2014 at 11:00 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (cj) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
21 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Kenneth A Maranga counsel for Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Adding PATRICIA M. FORD as attorney as counsel of record for LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA. (Maranga, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
22 JOINT REPORT Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan ; estimated length of trial 2−3 days, filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed.. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
23 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court confers with counsel and schedules the following dates: Request for leave to file amended pleadings or to add parties 9/5/2014. Factual Discovery cut−off 12/15/2014. Exchange of Expert Reports Cut−off 12/12/2014. Exchange of Rebuttal Reports Cut−off 12/29/2014. Expert Discovery Cut−off 1/15/2015. Last Day to File Motion for Preliminary Injunction 1/14/2015. Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction Cut−off 2/4/2015. Reply to Motion for Preliminary Injunction Cut−off 2/16/2014. Telephonic Status Conference re: Settlement Procedure set for 11/10/2014 12:00 PM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Counsel for PLAINTIFF is ordered to initiate the telephone conference call THROUGH THE TELEPHONE OPERATOR to include all counsel of record, and CHAMBERS. Pretrial Conference/Hearing on Motions in Limine WAIVED. Bench Trial set for 3/3/2014 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
24 STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by Defendant William T. Fujioka. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
25 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS: Order re Stipulated Protective Order by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott 24 . [See Order for details.] (san) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
26 Corrected STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by Defendant William T. Fujioka. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
27 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott 26 . (san) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
28 MINUTES OF Telephonic Status Conference if Settlement Procedure is Applicable held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court confers with counsel and the Court finds that the above−referenced action is not applicable to set a settlement procedure, as stated on the record. Based on plaintiffs' counsel's request, as stated on the record, the Court continues the Court Trial to 6/2/2015 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Counsel shall confer and submit a Stipulation and Proposed Order, for the Court's approval, continuing the other pretrial dates based on the new continued trial. Counsel shall further meet and confer whether implementation of the new seal will be deferred until after the new trial date, or if a motion will be filed in this regard. Court Reporter: Lisa Gonzalez. (gk) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
29 Joint STIPULATION to Reschedule filed by plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Modifying Discovery and Motion Schedule as Set Forth in Joint Rule 26(f) Report)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 11 of 23

11/24/2014
01/27/2015 01/27/2015 01/27/2015 01/27/2015 01/27/2015
01/27/2015
02/03/2015 02/03/2015

30 ORDER MODIFYING DISCOVERY AND MOTION SCHEDULE AS SET FORTH IN JOINT RULE 26(F) REPORT by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Upon Stipulation 29 , the schedule for the completion of fact and expert discovery, and for the briefing on Plaintiffs' permanent injunction motion, IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: Fact Discovery cut−off 2/27/2015. Expert Disclosure & Report Deadline 3/6/2015. Rebuttal Expert Disclosure & Report Deadline 3/27/2015. Expert Discovery Cut−Off 4/13/2015. Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 4/13/2015. Opposition to Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 5/4/2015. Reply in support of Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 5/15/2015. Hearing on Motion for Permanent Injunction 6/2/2015 at 9:30 AM. (gk) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
31 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 2/17/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank Ozello in Support of, # 2 Proposed Order)(Attorney Patricia M Ford added to party William T. Fujioka(pty:dft))(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
32 JOINT STIPULATION to MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 31 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
33 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 2/17/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank Ozello in Support of, # 2 Declaration of Joe Nicchitta in Support of, # 3 Proposed Order)(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
34 JOINT STIPULATION to MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
35 DECLARATION of Arwen R. Johnson in Opposition to MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 31 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
36 DECLARATION of Arwen R. Johnson in Opposition to MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
37 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 (Supplemental Memorandum) filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration OF KENNETH A. MARANGA)(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
38 MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 31 (Supplemental Memorandum) filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 02/03/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 12 of 23

02/03/2015 02/03/2015 02/03/2015 02/06/2015 02/09/2015
02/09/2015 02/12/2015 02/12/2015

39 OBJECTIONS In Opposition to Arwen R. Johnson's Declarations re: MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 31 , MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
40 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Protective Order for PrecludingDepositions Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 31 (Supplemental Memorandum) filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
41 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 (Supplemental Memorandum) filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/03/2015)
42 OBJECTION to Declaration of Kenneth Maranga to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Deposition Notices 37 re: MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
43 MINUTE (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PRECLUDING DEPOSITIONS (Docket No. 31 ); AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO QUASH NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF ZEV YAROSLAVSKY, GLORIA MOLINA, MARK RIDLEY−THOMAS, DON KNABE, AND MICHAEL ANTONOVICH (Docket No. 33 ) by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. Before the Court is a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Protective Order to prevent the depositions of members of the LA County Board of Supervisors in this Establishment Clause case challenging the cross on the County seal. This Court has decided to recuse itself from ruling on the above motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (kl) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
44 ORDER RETURNING CASE FOR REASSIGNMENT UPON RECUSAL by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. ORDER case returned to the Clerk for random reassignment Discovery pursuant to General Order 05−07 and General Order 14−03. Case randomly reassigned from Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott to Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm for all further proceedings. The case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge CV14−00907 CAS (FFMx). (mg) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
45 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Linda M Burrow counsel for Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky is no longer attorney of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by plaintiffs Linda M. Burrow. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
46 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Arwen Johnson counsel for Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Adding Arwen R. Johnson as attorney as counsel of record for plaintiffs for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by plaintiffs Arwen R. Johnson. (Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party J. Edwin Bacon, Jr(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Amy Bernstein(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Ian Elliott Davies(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Peter Laarman(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Tera Little(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party David N. Myers(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party John Rosove(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Harold M. Schulweis(pty:pla), Attorney Arwen Johnson added to party Shakeel Syed(pty:pla))(Johnson, Arwen) (Entered: 02/12/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 13 of 23

02/12/2015
02/12/2015
02/17/2015 03/04/2015 03/04/2015 03/04/2015 03/06/2015 03/09/2015 03/10/2015

47 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer counsel for Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Adding Kimberly M. Singer as attorney as counsel of record for plaintiffs for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by plaintiff Kimberly M. Singer. (Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party J. Edwin Bacon, Jr(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Amy Bernstein(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Ian Elliott Davies(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Peter Laarman(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Tera Little(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party David N. Myers(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party John Rosove(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Harold M. Schulweis(pty:pla), Attorney Kimberly Michelle Singer added to party Shakeel Syed(pty:pla))(Singer, Kimberly) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
48 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: ORDER RE HEARING ON MOTIONS TO QUASH FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Set hearings ( Discovery Hearing set for 2/17/2015 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm.) Given the reassignment of this case to Judge Mumm, the Court transfers the hearing on defendants' motions to Courtroom E on the Ninth Floor of the Spring Street Courthouse located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California. The hearing date and time of February 17, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. remain unchanged. (jm) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
49 MINUTES OF Discovery Hearing held before Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO QUASH, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER: Parties request a continuance of today's hearing. Court grants the parties' request. Today's hearing is continued to March 9, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.Court Recorder: CS 02/17/15. (jm) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
50 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Reschedule discovery and motion deadlines and trial date filed by plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Modify Schedule)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 03/04/2015)
51 DECLARATION of Arwen R. Johnson in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION to Reschedule discovery and motion deadlines and trial date 50 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 03/04/2015)
52 STATEMENT of Fact of Death of Plaintiff Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 03/04/2015)
53 OPPOSITION to EX PARTE APPLICATION to Reschedule discovery and motion deadlines and trial date 50 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank J. Ozello, Jr. in Support of, # 2 Proposed Order)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
54 MINUTES OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO QUASH and DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER held before Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: Matter is taken under submission. Court Recorder: CS 03/09/15. (jm) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
55 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTERS re: MOTION to Quash Notice of Taking Deposition of Zev Yaroslavsky, Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley−Thomas, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich 33 , Joint Stipulation re Discovery Motion 32 : (see attached) After further review, the Court adopts its tentative ruling as stated on the record. The Motion to Quash is GRANTED in full; the Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED in part. This ruling is conditional, as the discovery period has passed. Unless the parties obtain an extension of the discovery cut off period, the motions are moot. If the

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 14 of 23

03/10/2015 03/11/2015 03/12/2015 03/13/2015
03/13/2015 03/16/2015
04/21/2015 04/21/2015 04/21/2015
04/28/2015

discovery period is extended, the parties are ordered to meet and confer to establish reasonable time limitations on the deposition of any individual supervisor or former supervisor. (jm) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
56 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE re EX PARTE APPLICATION to Reschedule discovery and motion deadlines and trial date 50 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
57 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Defendant Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Court Smart (CS). Court will contact Veronica Bagga at vbagga@marmorlaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: March 9, 2015. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
58 STIPULATION to Continue Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction and discovery deadlines from June 2, 2015 to November 10, 2015 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
60 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 3/9/15 10:08 a.m.. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: BABYKIN COURTHOUSE SERVICES, phone number (626) 963−0566. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 4/3/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/13/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/11/2015. (ha) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
61 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 3/9/15 10:08 a.m. re Transcript 60 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (ha) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 03/17/2015)
59 ORDER MODIFYING DISCOVERY AND MOTION SCHEDULE by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Upon Stipulation 58 , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: Fact Discovery Cut−Off 7/24/2015. Expert Disclosure & Report Deadline 8/7/2015. Rebuttal Expert Disclosure & Report Deadline 8/28/2015. Expert Discovery Cut−Off 9/17/2015. Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 9/17/2015. Opposition to Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 10/8/2015. Reply in support of Motion for Permanent Injunction Due 10/19/2015. Hearing on Motion for Permanent Injunction/Bench Trial set for 11/10/2015 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (gk) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
62 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 5/12/2015 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank J. Ozello, Jr., # 2 Declaration of Joseph M. Nicchitta, # 3 Proposed Order)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
63 JOINT STIPULATION to MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
64 DECLARATION of Arwen R. Johnson in opposition to MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
65 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 and JOINT STIPULATION filed by

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 15 of 23

04/28/2015 04/28/2015 04/29/2015 05/01/2015 05/11/2015 05/20/2015 06/10/2015
06/11/2015

Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Frank J. Ozello, Jr.)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
66 OBJECTION to the Declarations of Arwen Johnson re: MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
67 SUPPLEMENT to MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
68 OBJECTION to Declaration of Frank J. Ozello, Jr. filed with Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum re: MOTION for Protective Order for Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka Pursuant to Rule 26(B) 62 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
69 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Supplement(Motion related), 65 . The following error(s) was found: Case number is incorrect or missing. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. The discovery judge assigned to this case is the Honorable Frederick F. Mumm. Case number should read: CV14−0907 CAS (FFMx). Document is accepted as filed. No further action required at this time. (es) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
70 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER TAKING MOTION UNDER SUBMISSION AND VACATING HEARING DATE by Judge Christina A. Snyder: vacating 62 Motion for Protective Order : On April 21, 2015, defendants County of Los Angeles and William T. Fujioka fileda Motion for Protective Order Precluding Deposition of William T. Fujioka (motion).The Court will rule on this motion based on the papers submitted. This matter will besubmitted without oral argument absent further order by this Court. The noticed hearingdate of May 12, 2015, is VACATED. (jm) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
71 (IN CHAMBERS) RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: On April 21, 2015, County of Los Angeles and William T. Fujioka ("MovingParties") filed a motion for a protective order with respect to the noticed deposition of William T. Fujioka. After reviewing all the documents filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court issued an order vacating the hearing and taking the matter under submission. After further review, the Court grants the motion for the following reasons: *See Order for details.* (es) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
72 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Benjamin B Au counsel for Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Adding Benjamin B. Au as counsel of record for Plaintiffs for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiffs Benjamin B. Au. (Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party J. Edwin Bacon, Jr(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Amy Bernstein(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Ian Elliott Davies(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Peter Laarman(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Tera Little(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party David N. Myers(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party John Rosove(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Harold M. Schulweis(pty:pla), Attorney Benjamin B Au added to party Shakeel Syed(pty:pla))(Au, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
73 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Review of Order Dated March 10, 2015 re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 55 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 16 of 23

06/11/2015
06/12/2015
06/12/2015 06/12/2015
06/12/2015 08/14/2015 08/17/2015
08/24/2015 09/15/2015 09/16/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015

Order Re March 10, 2015 Order)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
74 DECLARATION of Kimberly M. Singer in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Review of Order Dated March 10, 2015 re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 55 73 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
75 Opposition re: EX PARTE APPLICATION for Review of Order Dated March 10, 2015 re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 55 73 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Frank J. Ozello, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Proof of Service−Declaration)(Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
76 Objection re: EX PARTE APPLICATION for Review of Order Dated March 10, 2015 re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 55 73 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ozello, Frank) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
77 DECLARATION of Kimberly M. Singer AMENDED in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Review of Order Dated March 10, 2015 re Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held,,, 55 73 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
78 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: DENYING 73 Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Clarification of Order Dated March 10, 2015. * Note: Changes Made by the Court.* (es) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
79 Joint Request for Telephonic Status Conference filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
80 ORDER RE: JOINT REQUEST FOR TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Upon Joint Request 79 , a Telephonic Status Conference Call is set for 8/24/2015 12:30 PM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. All parties are ordered to discuss the matter with their clients and opposing counsel prior to the telephone conference. Counsel for PLAINTIFF is ordered to initiate the telephone conference call THROUGH THE TELEPHONE OPERATOR to include all counsel of record, and CHAMBERS on the date and time scheduled. (gk) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
81 MINUTES OF TELEPHONE FURTHER STATUS CONFERENCE held before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Hearing held and counsel are present. The Court confers with counsel, as stated in Court and on the record. The Court informs the parties that all evidence at trial will be received subject to a motion to strike. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (lom) (Entered: 08/25/2015)
82 Joint STIPULATION to Exceed Page Limitation as to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction and Defendants' Opposition brief filed by plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order re Joint Stipulation)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2015)
83 ORDER by Judge Christina A. Snyder, GRANTING Modifying Page Limit for Motion for Permanent Injunction Briefing 82 (pg) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
84 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. Motion set for hearing on 11/10/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
85 DECLARATION of Rev. Father Ian Elliott Davies in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 17 of 23

09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015 09/17/2015

Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
86 DECLARATION of Rev. J. Edwin Bacon, Jr. in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
87 DECLARATION of Shakeel Syed in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
88 DECLARATION of Rev. Tera Little in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
89 DECLARATION of Rabbi John Rosove in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
90 DECLARATION of Rev. Peter Laarman in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
91 DECLARATION of David N. Myers in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
92 DECLARATION of Rabbi Amy Bernstein in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
93 DECLARATION of Michael J. Gonzalez, Ph.D. in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
94 DECLARATION of Jeffrey S. Siker, Ph.D. in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
95 DECLARATION of Jill Vesci in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit 102)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
96 DECLARATION of Linda M. Burrow in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 7, # 2 Exhibit 8 − Part 1, # 3 Exhibit 8 − Part 2, # 4 Exhibit 8 − Part 3, # 5 Exhibits 9−12, # 6 Exhibit

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 18 of 23

10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015
10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015

13 − Part 1, # 7 Exhibit 13 − Part 2, # 8 Exhibits 14−23, # 9 Exhibit 24 − Part 1, # 10 Exhibit 24 − Part 2, # 11 Exhibits 25−40, # 12 Exhibits 41−51, # 13 Exhibit 52, # 14 Exhibits 53−73, # 15 Exhibits 74−87)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
97 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
98 DECLARATION of John Dietler, Ph.D. in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
99 DECLARATION of Stephen W. Hackel, Ph.D. in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit in support)(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
100 DECLARATION of Frank J. Ozello in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−4, # 2 Exhibit Exh. 5, pp. 75−123, # 3 Exhibit Exh. 5, pp. 124−182, # 4 Exhibit Exh. 6, pp. 183−231, # 5 Exhibit Exh. 6, pp. 232−286, # 6 Exhibit Exh. 7)(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
101 DECLARATION of Lori Glasgow, Ph.D. in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
102 DECLARATION of Jho−An Ignacio in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
103 DECLARATION of David Sommers in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
104 DECLARATION of Gerardo Ramirez in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
105 DECLARATION of Susan Herman in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
106 DECLARATION of Joseph M. Nicchitta in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
107 DECLARATION of Ernestina Rhind in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
108 DECLARATION of Adela Guzman in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
109 DECLARATION of Kenneth A. Maranga in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
110 DECLARATION of Timothy T. Coates in opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
111 Objection to Declaration of Gonzalez in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 19 of 23

10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015
10/08/2015 10/19/2015 10/19/2015
10/19/2015
10/19/2015 10/20/2015 10/23/2015

112 Objection to Declaration of Burrow in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
113 Objection to Declaration of Laarman in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
114 Objection to Declaration of Meyers in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
115 Objection to Declaration of Siker in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
116 Objection to Declaration of Syed in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
117 Objection to Declaration of Vesci in opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
118 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 IN OPPOSITION TO filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 3 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 4 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 5 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 6 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 7 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 8 Exhibit 1 (continued), # 9 Exhibit 1 (continued) and Exhibits 2−9)(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
119 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Strike or Exclude Evidence filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 11/10/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
120 NOTICE of Pretrial Disclosures Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
121 REPLY in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law in Support of Motion for Permanent Injunction)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
122 DECLARATION of Kimberly M. Singer in support of Reply NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 88, # 2 Exhibit 89, # 3 Exhibit 90, # 4 Exhibit 91)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
123 OPPOSITION re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Strike or Exclude Evidence 119 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
124 NOTICE of Pretrial Disclosures Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
125 OBJECTIONS to Notice (Other) 124 OF PLAINTIFFS' RULE 26 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 20 of 23

10/23/2015 10/23/2015
10/27/2015 10/27/2015
10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/27/2015

126 OBJECTIONS to Notice (Other) 120 OF DEFENDANTS' RULE 26 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
127 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE to Exclude TRIAL TESTIMONY OF THE SUPERVISORS AND FORMER CEO OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF (FORMER) CEO OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FUJIOKA; AND REQUEST TO STRIKE ALL NON−PUBLIC RECORD COMMUNICATIONS filed by DEFENDANTS William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 11/10/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
128 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors of Original Deposition Transcripts of Thomas P. Adams, Esther Sinofsky, Steven Hackel, John Dietler and Jill Vesci for Trial Purposes. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
129 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed of Original Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey Stephen Siker; Marked Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey Stephen Siker; Marked Deposition Transcript of Michael Gonzalez for Trial Purposes. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
130 TRIAL BRIEF filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
131 JOINT INDEX OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 16−2.7 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors FOR USE AT TRIAL (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
132 STATEMENT of Legal and Factual Issues filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for Use at Trial (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
133 DECLARATION (S) SUBMITTED FOR USE AT TRIAL filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
134 EXHIBIT Filed filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Part 2 of 5 as to Declaration 133 . (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
135 EXHIBIT Filed filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Part 3 of 5 as to Declaration 133 , Exhibit (non−trial) 134 . (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
136 EXHIBIT Filed filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Part 4 of 5 as to Exhibit (non−trial) 135 , Declaration 133 , Exhibit (non−trial) 134 . (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
137 EXHIBIT Filed filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Part 5 of 5 as to Exhibit (non−trial) 135 , Exhibit (non−trial) 136 , Declaration 133 , Exhibit (non−trial) 134 . (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
138 STATEMENT Factual and Legal Issues filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed for Use at Trial (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
139 TRIAL BRIEF filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed.. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
140 DECLARATION of Arwen R. Johnson in Support of Plaintiffs' Trial Brief re Trial Brief 139 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 130, # 2 Exhibit 131)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)

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10/27/2015 10/27/2015
10/27/2015 10/27/2015 10/28/2015
10/29/2015 11/03/2015
11/03/2015 11/04/2015 11/04/2015 11/04/2015 11/05/2015 11/09/2015

141 DECLARATION (S) SUBMITTED FOR USE AT TRIAL filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
142 DECLARATION of Jill Vesci re Declaration 141 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit A, # 10 Exhibit B)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
143 Witness List filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed.. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
144 JOINT Exhibit List filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed.. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
145 NOTICE of Errata to Supplemental Declaration of Jill Vesci and Exhibits Thereto [Dkt. 142] filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Supplemental Declaration of Jill Vesci, # 2 Exhibit 2 to Vesci Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 3 to Vesci Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 4 to Vesci Declaration)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
146 NOTICE of Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
147 OPPOSITION re: MOTION IN LIMINE to Exclude TRIAL TESTIMONY OF THE SUPERVISORS AND FORMER CEO OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF (FORMER) CEO OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FUJIOKA; AND REQUEST TO STRIKE ALL NON−PUBLIC RECORD COMMUNICATIONS 127 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
148 NOTICE OF LODGING PLAINTIFFS' [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
149 DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
150 DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JILL VESCI re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
151 NOTICE of Lodging Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum)(Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
152 SCHEDULING NOTICE SETTING by Judge Christina A. Snyder Status Conference set for 11/9/2015 at 11:00 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder, pursuant to plaintiffs' request. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (cj) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/05/2015)
156 MINUTES OF Status Conference held before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Hearing held and counsel are present. The Court confers with counsel, as stated in Court and on the record. The Court Trial, Motion to Strike or Exclude Evidence 119 , and Motion in

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 22 of 23

11/10/2015 11/10/2015 11/10/2015 11/12/2015 03/21/2016 04/06/2016 04/29/2016 05/02/2016 05/03/2016 05/04/2016
05/05/2016

Limine to Exclude Trial Testimony 127 , set for November 10, 2015 is hereby continued to November 12, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. Court Reporter: DEBBIE GALE. (iv) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
153 Supplemental NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Exclude Plaintiffs' Exhibit 35 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 11/12/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
154 Supplemental NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Exclude Reference to Religious Viewpoints by Third Parties filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 11/12/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
155 Supplemental NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Exclude Plaintiffs' Exhibits 102−129 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Motion set for hearing on 11/12/2015 at 09:30 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ford, Patricia) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
157 MINUTES OF Court Trial 1st Day held and completed before Judge Christina A. Snyder. Opening statements made by Plaintiffs and Defendants. Closing arguments made. Case submitted. The matter is taken under submission. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (iv) (Entered: 11/13/2015)
158 Joint REQUEST for Ruling Re "Joint Request for Court to Render Decision Without Further Delay Pursuant to Local Rule 83−9.2" filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
159 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction 84 is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs are directed to prepare a form of judgment to be lodged with the Court in accordance with this decision and the Local Rules of this Court. See document for details. (MD JS−6. Case Terminated) (gk) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
160 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re Permanent Injunction, 159 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Judgment and Permanent Injunction)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
161 Objection to Proposed Judgment and Permanent Injunction Opposition re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Permanent Injunction 84 filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
162 SCHEDULING NOTICE SETTING by Judge Christina A. Snyder re: Notice of Lodging 160 , and Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 161 received by the Court. Hearing is set on 5/9/2016 at 10:00 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (cj) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 05/03/2016)
163 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Hearing on Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment and Permanent Injunction from May 9, 2016 to May 23, 2016 Re: Text Only Scheduling Notice, 162 filed by Plaintiffs J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Amy Bernstein, Ian Elliott Davies, Peter Laarman, Tera Little, David N. Myers, John Rosove, Harold M. Schulweis, Shakeel Syed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Continuing Hearing Regarding Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment and Permanent Injunction)(Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
164 ORDER CONTINUING HEARING REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION FROM MAY 9, 2016 UNTIL MAY 23, 2016 by Judge Christina A. Snyder. BASED ON THE STIPULATION 163 OF THE PARTIES, and good cause appearing thereof, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing regarding Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment and Permanent Injunction and Defendant's Objection shall be continued from May 9, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. until May 23, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. (clee) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

Case: 2:14-cv-907 As of: 11/05/2017 10:42 PM PST 23 of 23

05/23/2016 05/23/2016
06/06/2016 06/22/2016 06/24/2016 07/20/2016

165 MINUTES OF Hearing on Judgment and Permanent Injunction held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: Tentative Judgment provided. The Court confers with counsel and counsel argue, as stated in Court and on the record. The Court will issue the Judgment forthwith. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
166 JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION by Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court, having granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction 84 , hereby enters judgment as follows: IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors' 1/7/2014 motion approving the addition of a Latin cross to the official seal of Los Angeles County (the "2014 Seal") violates: (1) the No Aid Clause of article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution; (2) the No Preference Clause of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution; and (3) the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The action by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to adopt a revised County seal by placing a Latin Cross on the apex of the roof of the depiction of the San Gabriel Mission on the County seal adopted in September 2004 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Defendant County of Los Angeles shall return the official County seal to the status quo ante existing as 1/6/2014, to wit, the official County seal adopted by Board Order No. 25 of 9/14/2004, in the form attached as Exhibit 1 hereto. Defendant County of Los Angeles, its officers, agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert therewith, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from any and all use, display, or implementation of the 2014 Seal in connection with any County service, program, facility, equipment, activity, or use of County funds, effective 145 days from the date of this Judgment, etc. This Judgment does not bar Defendant County of Los Angeles from adopting a new seal in the future consistent with the Court's opinion. Plaintiffs are found to be the prevailing party in this case and shall be entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Such attorneys' fees and costs of suit shall be awarded by the Court at a later date upon noticed motion filed within 60 days of entry of this judgment. See document for further details. (gk) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
167 APPLICATION to the Clerk to Tax Costs against Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors re: Judgment,,,,,,,,, Permanent Injunction,,,,,,,, 166 , filed by Plaintiffs Tera Little, J. Edwin Bacon, Jr, Ian Elliott Davies, Amy Bernstein, Peter Laarman, Shakeel Syed, David N. Myers, Harold M. Schulweis, John Rosove. (Attachments: # 1 Index to Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5) (Burrow, Linda) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
168 STIPULATION for Attorney Fees in the amount of $915,635.00, STIPULATION for Costs against All Defendants filed by Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS)(Coates, Timothy) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
169 ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Upon Stipulation 168 , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties in the above action, are awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $915,635.00 as against defendants, payment to be made within 90 days. Plaintiffs' statutory costs pursuant to Local Rule 54.4 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1920, will be separately awarded by the court in ruling on plaintiffs' 6/6/2016 unopposed application to tax costs. (gk) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
170 BILL OF COSTS. Costs Taxed in the amount of $13,325.42. RE: APPLICATION to the Clerk to Tax Costs against Defendants William T. Fujioka, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors re: Judgment,,,,,,,,, Permanent Injunction,,,,,,,, 166 , 167 (nl) (Entered: 07/20/2016)