Case: 4:16-cv-00254-CEJ Doc. #: 14 Filed: 07/08/16 Page: 1 of 36 PageID #: 324

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE FURLOW, RALPH TORRES )

and HOWARD LINER, individually and )

on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JON BELMAR, THE COUNTY OF

)

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,

)

and ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

OFFICER KEVIN WALSH,

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE OFFICER )

CHRISTOPHER PARTIN,

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

DETECTIVE CLEMENTS,

)

and ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-20,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Cause No.: 4:16-cv-00254-CEJ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Ralph Torres, and Howard Liner by and through the

undersigned counsel, for their First Amended Complaint in the above-referenced matter hereby

state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

For years, St. Louis County has allowed individual police officers to unilaterally issue the

equivalent of a statewide arrest warrant without ever going before a neutral and detached

magistrate to obtain a judicial determination of probable cause. St. Louis County police officers

refer to this warrantless arrest procedure as issuing a “Wanted.” Under this system, ordinary

police officers have been given the power to order the arrest of anyone at any time, without any

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judicial oversight whatsoever. Because this unconstitutional tool has been left in the hands of police officers and is not subject to judicial oversight, police in Missouri have issued over 2 Million Wanteds1 in a state with a population of only 6 Million people.2
These Wanteds are often issued and executed without probable cause and in retaliation for an individual’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to refuse questioning by law enforcement officials. Furthermore, no procedural safeguards exist to enable the subject of a Wanted to protect herself from the threat of arrest. Like so many of the unconstitutional and widespread police and court practices throughout the Saint Louis region, this system disproportionately impacts low income communities of color. The use of Wanteds violates the protected liberty interests of poor people and black people and create the modern day equivalent of a police state, where poor people and black people are afraid to leave their houses, drive their cars, go to their jobs, visit friends and family members, or otherwise conduct their daily lives because they are subject to summary arrest and detention at the whim of a St. Louis County police officer. This practice flagrantly violates the United States Constitutiton and has no place in a free society.
NATURE OF THE ACTION Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow (“Mr. Furlow”), Ralph Torres (“Mr. Torres”), and Howard Liner (“Mr. Liner”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, bring this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which were violated by
1 MULES Summary Report for Jan. 2005 – Dec. 2014, MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL online database (Jun. 1, 2016 query showing 2,034,306 wanteds input into the MULES system during the ten-year period). 2 Population Trends, 2013 to 2014, MISSOURI CENSUS DATA CENTER, accessed Jul. 6, 2016, available at http://census.missouri.edu/population-trends/report.php?y=20132014&g=29000&d=1.
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Defendants St. Louis County Chief of Police Jon Belmar (“Defendant Belmar”); the County of St. Louis, Missouri (“Defendant St. Louis County”); St. Louis County Police Officer Kevin Walsh (“Defendant Walsh”); St. Louis County Police Officer Christopher Partin (“Defendant Partin”); St. Louis County Detective Clements (“Defendant Clements”); and St. Louis County Police Officers John Does 1-20, through their use of an unlawful Wanteds procedure.
THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 2. Plaintiff Ralph Torres is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 3. Plaintiff Howard Liner is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 4. Defendant St. Louis County, Missouri, is a political and geographic subdividion of the State of Missouri existing pursuant to Missouri law. 5. Defendant Jon Belmar is the current Chief of Police for the St. Louis County Police Department. Defendant Belmar is sued in his official capacity as the supervising and commanding officer of the St. Louis County Police Department. 6. Defendant Officer Kevin Walsh, Badge #4068, is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Walsh’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Walsh is sued in his individual capacity. 7. Defendant Officer Christopher Partin is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Partin’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Partin is sued in his individual capacity.
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8. Defendant Detective Clements is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Clements’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Clements is sued in her individual capacity.
9. Defendant Officers John Doe 1-20 are as of yet unidentified sworn peace officers or administrators employed by the St. Louis County Police Department who have participated in Plaintiffs arrests and otherwise implemented the County’s unconstitutional Wanted policy. All of Defendants John Does 1-20 actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendants John Does 1-20 are sued in their individual capacities.
10. Where appropriate, Defendants Walsh, Partin, Clements, and Does 1-20 are referred to collectively as “Defendant Officers.”
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This cause is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), since the Defendants are located, and all of the incidents giving rise to this suit occurred, in this judicial district.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 12. Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, an individual arrested without a warrant must be provided with a determination that probable cause existed for such arrest by a disinterested judicial officer without unreasonable delay. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25 (1975); Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52–59 (1991). 13. Officers in St. Louis County circumvent this requirement for judicial review by issuing arrest orders, called “Wanteds,” in statewide databases visible to law enforcement
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agencies throught the state and beyond, without seeking any judicial determination of probable cause, either before or after the subjects of the Wanted are arrested.
14. St. Louis County Police Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1 expressly provides that Wanteds be entered into REJIS and or other data systems “where no warrant has been applied for”.
15. Arrests pursuant to Wanteds often occur days, weeks, months, or even years after a Wanted has been issued.
16. Defendant St. Louis County’s own policies and procedures indicate that Wanteds may remain in these databases indefinitely. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1. provides that Wanteds may be entered into REJIS indefinitely and that a type of Wanted called a “Stop Order” may be entered into MULES and/or NCIC for one year. See Exhibit A.
17. Notwithstanding apparent time restrictions in their policies that apply to Wanteds enterered on certain data systems, Department General Order 15-16 § III.B does not require that a Wanted be quashed at any time, provide a procedure for how or by whom it should be quashed, or require that a warrant application follow a Wanted entry at any time. See Ex. A.
18. The use of Wanteds to arrest and detain individuals without judicial determinations of probable cause is a policy and practice that is known and ratified by Defendant Belmar in his supervisory capacity over the St. Louis County Police Department. Ex. A, Department General Order 15-16, at pg. 5 (“By order of Jon M. Belmar, Chief of Police”).
19. Per department policy supervisor approval is a requirement before a Wanted can be entered into the MULES system. Ex. A, Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1.b.4.
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20. It has been the policy and practice of the Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department that its officers issue Wanteds to cause the arrest of individuals, either by the St. Louis County Police Department, or by some other law enforcement agency.
21. Subjects of Wanteds often do not know they have been designated for arrest by Defendants pursuant to a Wanted, because Defendants do not uniformly provide those persons notice of the Wanted. Even if an individual learns of an active Wanted, she has no procedural recourse for quashing the Wanted, other than turning herself in or submitting to police questioning.
22. Victims of Defendants’ unconstitutional scheme have no procedural recourse other than turning themselves in or submitting to questioning at the whim of St. Louis County Police officers, in a manner most often constituting a custodial arrest and interrogation.
23. Due to the lack of judicial oversight in the Wanted procedure, Defendants use Wanteds in circumstances where there was no probable cause to believe that the individual had committed a crime, or where probable cause no longer existed at the time of the Wanted-arrest.
24. Defendants have issued Wanteds for numerous purposes which include but are not limited to (1) interrogating the individual;3 (2) punishing the individual who refuses to participate in an investigation; (3) punishing the individual against whom a legitimate charge cannot be brought; (4) demonstrating the authority of the officer over the individual; and/or (5) out of deliberate indifference for the rights and liberties of the individual subject to the Wanted.
25. Consistent with these purposes, people arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants were (1) questioned while they were in Defendants’ custody; (2) detained either after
3Law enforcement agencies in Missouri have long employed aspects of this “manifestly unlawful and unconstitutional” practice describable as an “arrest for investigation,” whereupon arrests are made “on mere suspicion, or even without pretext of suspicion, for the purpose of getting a person to a convenient location where he can be questioned or ‘investigated’ as to any crime he or others may have committed. . . .” Scurlock, John, Arrest in Missouri, 29 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 117, 127 (1961).
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questioning by Defendants, after refusing to answer questions, or after demanding to speak with
an attorney; (3) ordered by Defendants to be held for the entire duration permissible under
Missouri Law and beyond; and/or (4) released without any charge being issued by Defendants or
any judicial determination of probable cause being sought by Defendants. All of these constitute
unreasonable delay. See Cty. of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111–25
(discussing the competing interests of the public and law enforcement).
U.S. Department of Justice Report
26. Plaintiffs and the class members they seek to represent are subject to the same
unconstitutional Wanted system maligned by the United States Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division’s March 4, 2015 report titled Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department.
See Exhibit B.
27. The report revealed unconstitutional practices in police departments and courts
throughout St. Louis, including St. Louis County, although it focused on City of Ferguson.
28. The Department of Justice highlighted the county-wide unconstitutional practice
of issuing “Wanteds” without probable cause:
[L]aw enforcement agencies in St. Louis County use a system of “wanteds” or “stop orders” as a substitute for seeking judicial approval for an arrest warrant. When officers believe a person has committed a crime but are not able to immediately locate that person, they can enter a “wanted” into the statewide law enforcement database, indicating to all other law enforcement agencies that the person should be arrested if located. While wanteds are supposed to be based on probable cause, see FPD General Order 424.01, they operate as an end-run around the judicial system. Instead of swearing out a warrant and seeking judicial authorization from a neutral and detached magistrate, officers make the probable cause determination themselves and circumvent the courts. Officers use wanteds for serious state-level crimes and minor code violations alike, including traffic offenses.
Exhibit B at 22: “FPD’s Use of Police-run ‘Wanted’ System Circumvents Judicial Review and
Poses the risk of Abuse.”
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29. The DOJ report describes in detail its findings on how the Wanteds procedure
circumvents the constitutional warrant requirement:
[I]nterviews with command staff and officers indicate that officers do not clearly understand the legal authority necessary to issue a wanted. For example, one veteran officer told us he will put out a wanted “if I do not have enough probable cause to arrest you.” He gave the example of investigating a car theft. Upon identifying a suspect, he would put that suspect into the system as wanted “because we do not have probable cause that he stole the vehicle.” Reflecting the muddled analysis officers may employ when deciding whether to issue a wanted, this officer concluded, “you have to have reasonable suspicion and some probable cause to put out a wanted.”
At times, FPD officers use wanteds not merely in spite of a lack of probable cause, but because they lack probable cause. In December 2014, a Ferguson detective investigating a shooting emailed a county prosecutor to see if a warrant for a suspect could be obtained, since “a lot of state agencies won’t act on a wanted.” The prosecutor responded stating that although “[c]hances are” the crime was committed by the suspect, “we just don’t have enough for a warrant right now.” The detective responded that he would enter a wanted.
Exhibit B at 23.
30. Finally, the DOJ found that police often make arrests for Wanteds that are stale,
or invalid:
In 2010, for instance, an FPD supervisor wrote that “[a]s of late we have had subjects arrested that were wanted for other agencies brought in without being verified first. You guessed it, come to find out they were no longer wanted by the agencies and had to be released.” The same supervisor told us that in 2014 he cleared hundreds of invalid wanteds from the system, some of them over ten years old, suggesting that invalid wanteds have been an ongoing problem. Exhibit B at 23.
INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS
31. The following sections contain the background facts specific to the claims of
Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Ralph Torres, and Howard Liner.
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Mr. Furlow November–December 2015 32. Shortly after Mr. Furlow’s departure from home on the morning of November 11, 2015, Mr. Furlow’s minor son was attacked by his adult female neighbor. 33. When police arrived, the adult female neighbor alleged as the basis for the conflict that Mr. Furlow had stolen her cell phone earlier that morning. 34. Responding to this allegation, Officer Partin of the St. Louis County Police Department called Mr. Furlow on Mr. Furlow’s cell phone. 35. Officer Partin asked Mr. Furlow to return home so that he could answer questions regarding the neighbor’s allegation of cell phone theft. 36. Mr. Furlow declined to answer Officer Partin’s questions. 37. Officer Partin threatened Mr. Furlow that he would issue a Wanted if Mr. Furlow declined to submit for interrogation. 38. Mr. Furlow repeated that he had done nothing wrong, and declined to answer any questions. 39. Officer Partin issued a Wanted for Mr. Furlow. 40. After being informed of this exchange and the issuance of a Wanted, counsel for Mr. Furlow made repeated attempts to contact officers and officials of Defendant St. Louis County. 41. Counsel spoke with Officer Partin and requested that he quash the Wanted, informing Officer Partin, inter alia, that Mr. Furlow’s family had a long history with the complainant, including an active restraining order against the complainant. 42. In addition to multiple phone calls to the St. Louis County Police Department, counsel also sent a letter addressed to Captain Guy Means, First Precinct Commander of the St.
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Louis County Police Department, and St. Louis County Counselor Peter Krane, see Exhibit C,
which stated in part:
Mr. Furlow is not going to speak with the police or answer any questions. If taken into custody, Mr. Furlow will not answer questions and will make no statements.
If the officer secures an arrest warrant arising from the events this morning and alerts us of such a warrant, we will see to it that Mr. Furlow surrenders without delay.
. . .
We alert you that the desire to question Mr. Furlow is NOT a lawful justification for arresting or detaining him. You are on notice that he is not going to speak to the police. In our experience, the police often misunderstand or misapply the law in circumstances such as this, particularly with the use of a “wanted.” It is unlawful for the police to issue a wanted for questioning in the absence of probable cause to make a custodial arrest. If your officer claims that he has probable cuase, then he should seek a warrant but it is not lawful to detain someone for the purpose of questioning with the goal of developing probable cause.
43. Despite these efforts, Mr. Furlow’s counsel received no response and was
informed via telephone by a member of the St. Louis County Counselor’s office, “This office is
not going to get involved.”
44. Nearly one month later, with the Wanted still outstanding, Mr. Furlow decided to
“turn himself in” so that he would no longer be subject to the threat of arrest and detention as he
moved about town, often in the company of his wife and children.
45. Counsel for Mr. Furlow contacted Officer Partin several times by telephone and
attempted to arrange a time to deliver Mr. Furlow to Officer Partin’s station or precinct so that
Mr. Furlow’s detention would not be delayed.
46. Counsel for Mr. Furlow reiterated at this time that Mr. Furlow did not wish to
answer any questions and would invoke his right to remain silent.
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47. Officer Partin insisted that Mr. Furlow would need to remain in custody once delivered to the local precinct until he could be transferred to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri for booking and processing.
48. Not wishing to be transported by St. Louis County officers, Mr. Furlow, accompanied by counsel, turned himself in to St. Louis County’s jail on the evening of December 12, 2015.
49. Nearly an hour after Mr. Furlow’s arrival, Officer Partin arrived to the jail with a supervising officer.
50. After Mr. Furlow’s counsel reiterated to Officer Partin that Mr. Furlow did not intend to answer any questions, Officer Partin and the supervising officer informed counsel that there would be no need to take Mr. Furlow into custody.
51. Instead, Officer Partin issued a summons for Mr. Furlow to appear in court on charges of “Assault Prohibited” and “Larceny Prohibited.”
52. After issuing the summons, Officer Partin stated that the Wanted would be quashed. This occurred just over one month after the Wanted was issued.
53. On February 17, 2016, Mr. Furlow’s counsel appeared on Mr. Furlow’s behalf in the St. Louis County Municipal Court–North Division.
54. While discussing Mr. Furlow’s case, the municipal prosecutor read the charging document written by Officer Partin, apparently for the first time.
55. The prosecutor told Mr. Furlow’s counsel that the document described neither an assault nor a larceny and did not constitute the basis for the issuance of charges.
56. Rather, the document simply recounted the details of the meeting with Mr. Furlow and his counsel at the St. Louis County jail on December 12, 2015.
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57. Before hearing any argument from Mr. Furlow’s counsel, the municipal prosecutor dismissed the charges.
January 2016 58. On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, Defendant Walsh spoke with Mr. Furlow by telephone regarding an allegation against Mr. Furlow. 59. Defendant Walsh requested that Mr. Furlow return home to be questioned by Defendant Walsh regarding said allegations. 60. Mr. Furlow told Defendant Walsh that he had no interest in speaking with the police or answering any questions. 61. Defendant Walsh responded that if Mr. Furlow did not answer his questions, Defendant Walsh would issue a Wanted. 62. Mr. Furlow reiterated that he would not speak to the police. 63. Defendant Walsh issued a Wanted for Mr. Furlow. 64. The next day, on the evening of January 26, 2016, the complainant called Defendant Walsh to retract her domestic assault complaint in its entirety. 65. Defendant Walsh asked the complainant whether she was being pressured to retract her statement. The complainant responded that she was not, and that she had fabricated all of the accusations out of anger. 66. Defendant Walsh told complainant that she needed to call the prosecuting attorney’s office if she wanted to retract the complaint and quash the Wanted. 67. Complainant called a member of the St. Louis County Prosecutor’s office, retracted the complaint, and requested that the Wanted be quashed.
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68. Despite this complete retraction of the allegations and withdrawal of the complaint, the Wanted remained in the system for Mr. Furlow.
69. Two days later, on January 28, 2016 at approximately 5:30 pm, Mr. Furlow was driving south on Goodfellow Blvd. in the City of Jennings when he was stopped by St. Louis County Police.
70. The officers explained that the reason for the stop was because the vehicle’s temporary dealer’s plates were not displayed in the rear of the vehicle. (They were displayed in the front.)
71. During the stop, Mr. Furlow, who was driving, admitted that his license was suspended and that, based on his conversation with Defendant Walsh, Mr. Furlow believed that there was either a warrant or Wanted for him in St. Louis County.
72. The officers told Mr. Furlow he would not be arrested for either the license plate or the suspended license, but that they would need to run his name for any warrants or Wanteds.
73. The officers returned to their vehicle and ran a search for Mr. Furlow’s name, which revealed the Wanted issued by Defendant Walsh.
74. Acting on the Wanted, the officers then took Mr. Furlow into custody and transported him to the Jennings Police Station at 5445 Jennings Station Road.
75. Officers at the Jennings Police Station informed Mr. Furlow that he was on a 24hour hold pursuant to the Wanted and that this was the sole basis for his detention.
76. The officers attempted to question Mr. Furlow. Mr. Furlow stated that he did not wish to talk or answer any questions.
77. The officers then informed Mr. Furlow that he would be held in Jennings until he could be transported to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri. They further stated that he
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would remain at the St. Louis County jail either until Defendant Walsh questioned Mr. Furlow and “cleared” the Wanted or until the end of the 24-hour hold period.
78. Mr. Furlow repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent to officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, both in person and through counsel. Despite this fact, he continued to be held on a Wanted.
79. During the evening of January 28, counsel for Mr. Furlow notified multiple officers of the St. Louis County Police Department that Mr. Furlow was being held on the basis of an unlawful Wanted and in the absence of probable cause. However, St. Louis County Police refused to release Mr. Furlow pursuant to their policy.
80. In his capacity as watch commander of the First Precinct of the St. Louis County Police Department, Sergeant James Grace stated to Mr. Furlow’s counsel that Defendant Walsh “followed department procedures” in issuing the Wanted.
81. Defendants continued to detain Mr. Furlow. 82. Mr. Furlow was released from the St. Louis County jail after being held for 24 hours. 83. Defendant Walsh did not personally attempt to question Mr. Furlow during this 24-hour period. No charges have been filed against Mr. Furlow incident to this arrest. 84. On information and belief, Defendants did not seek a judicial determination of probable cause.
Mr. Torres 85. In late 2014 or early 2015, Ralph Torres faced investigation by the Division of Child Protective Services for alleged sexual misconduct involving his two minor children, which the Division ultimately found to be false accusations made by his ex-wife.
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86. After receiving notice of the Division’s favorable decision to close the investigation, Mr. Torres believes his ex-wife attempted to submit the same false allegations to the St. Louis County police.
87. On or about February 20, 2015, Defendant Clements telephoned Mr. Torres and asked him to come to the St. Louis County police station for questioning about allegations involving Mr. Torres’s minor daughter.
88. Mr. Torres stated that he would be agreeable to answer questions, if his lawyer could also be present.
89. Shortly after the call, Mr. Torres called his lawyer, Melissa Featherston, regarding Defendant Clements’s request.
90. Attorney Featherston telephoned Detective Clements and St. Louis County Police, leaving several messages.
91. Neither Mr. Torres nor Attorney Featherston received a return call from Detective Clements.
92. Unbeknownst to Mr. Torres, Detective Clements issued a Wanted for the arrest of Mr. Torres of which Mr. Torres did not receive notice.
93. On the morning of April 2, 2015, a St. Louis County police officer arrived at Mr. Torres’s residence in the City of Affton in St. Louis County.
94. The officer found Mr. Torres and Mr. Torres’s eight-year-old child in the garage at the rear of the home, where the two were repairing the child’s bicycle.
95. The officer told Mr. Torres that he had a Wanted in St. Louis County. This was the first time that Mr. Torres learned of the Wanted against him.
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96. The officer further informed Mr. Torres that a St. Louis County detective wished to question him, and that Mr. Torres should call someone to pick up his son so that the officer would not have to call Child Protective Services.
97. Mr. Torres was able to contact someone to pick up his child. 98. At or around 10:00 a.m., the officer handcuffed Mr. Torres and transported him to the Affton police station, where Mr. Torres was held for approximately two hours. 99. Mr. Torres was then transported to the St. Louis County jail where officers took his mugshot, fingerprints, and a mouth swab. 100. Mr. Torres remained in a holding cell with dozens of other detainees for the rest of the day. 101. The next day, in the early morning of April 3, 2015, Defendant Clements, along with a second St. Louis County detective, attempted to question Mr. Torres. 102. During this interview, Defendant Clements told Mr. Torres “you brought this on yourself” regarding Mr. Torres’s prior refusal to answer questions without his lawyer. 103. Mr. Torres again informed the St. Louis County detectives that he wished to have his lawyer present for any questioning by the police. 104. In response to this request, Defendant Clements told Mr. Torres that she would “take this to the Prosecutor” and then sent Mr. Torres back to the holding cell. 105. Mr. Torres remained in the St. Louis County jail until his release at around 12:30pm or 1:00pm on April 3, 2015. 106. While Mr. Torres was being processed for release, he noticed a handwritten note on one of his processing papers. Mr. Torres was told that the note, written by Defendant
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Clements, instructed the jail officers to hold Mr. Torres “until the last second possible” of the 24 hour hold pursuant to St. Louis County’s Wanted policy.
107. Mr. Torres was in Defendant St. Louis County’s custody for approximately 26 hours total prior to his release.
108. On information and belief, Defendants did not seek a judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Torres.
109. However, Mr. Torres was never charged with this crime or any other crimes during or after his arrest.
Mr. Liner November 2013 110. In or around November 2013, Howard Liner was arrested on a Wanted issued by the St. Louis County Police Department related to allegations stemming from a domestic dispute. 111. Mr. Liner was taken into custody at the St. Louis County jail and held for around twelve (12) hours before an officer of the St. Louis County Police Department visited him. 112. Mr. Liner was told by the officer from the St. Louis County Police Department he would be released pending investigation if he answered the officer’s questions,. 113. Mr. Liner answered the investigator’s questions. 114. Mr. Liner was released from custody a couple of hours later. 115. Around three weeks later, on or about December 2, 2014, Howard liner was charged by information. 116. Mr. Liner missed work as a result of his arrest.
June 2015
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117. In or around June 16, 2015 Howard Liner was arrested at his home by the St. Louis County Police Department on a Wanted issued by the St. Louis County Police Department regarding a prior allegation of property damage.
118. Mr. Liner was taken to the St. Louis County Police Departments First Precinct at 11815 Benham Rd., St. Louis, Missouri 63138, and held there for four (4) hours.
119. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri, where he was told that he was on twenty-four (24) hour hold while the St. Louis County Police Department decided whether to charge him.
120. Mr. Liner was told that his twenty-four hour hold period began at the time of his arrival at the St. Louis County jail, despite the fact that Mr. Liner had been in the custody of the St. Louis County Police Department since the time of his arrest four (4) hours earlier.
121. Mr. Liner was held at the St. Louis County jail for twenty-four (24) hours and by the St. Louis County Police Department for a total of twenty-eight (28) hours
122. Mr. Liner has never been charged regarding allegations related to his June 2015 arrest.
123. Mr. Liner missed work as the result of his arrest.
July–August 2015 124. Mr. Liner was alerted that a Wanted had been issued for him by the St. Louis County Police Department regarding allegations of theft during the summer of 2015. 125. Months later, on or about October 6, 2015, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department arrested Mr. Liner on the basis of the Wanted issued by St. Louis County Police.
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126. Mr. Liner was held for six (6) hours in a St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Precinct.
127. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis City jail where he was held for another four to five (4-5) hours.
128. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis County jail where he was held for another fifteen (15) hours.
129. After spending approximately 25 hours in two different jails, an officer came to question him.
130. The officer told Mr. Liner that he would have been released sooner if he cooperated with the investigation.
131. The officer asked Mr. Liner what kind of vehicle he owned. 132. Mr. Liner responded that he drove a certain model of B.M.W. 133. The investigating officer responded that he owned the same model of B.M.W., that there was no way that Mr. Liner could have moved the allegedly stolen property with such a small vehicle, that the investigating officer knew that the complainants allegations were false, that he planned to file false report charges against the complainant, and that Mr. Liner should be released promptly. 134. Mr. Liner was released from the St. Louis County jail a few hours later after having spent around twenty-nine (29) hours in custody. 135. Mr. Liner missed work as the result of his arrest. 136. Mr. Liner has never been charged regarding allegations related to this arrest.
Future Wanteds and Arrests are Immanent
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137. As shown above, Defendants arrested Plaintiff Ralph Torres once, Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow twice, and Plaintiff Harold Liner three times in a single year pursuant to Wanteds issued by Defendants where no probable cause existed to justify those arrests and prolonged jailings.
138. In other words, the Defendants’ conduct toward each of the Plaintiffs demonstrates that Plaintiffs and any other law-abiding persons can be arrested by pursuant to Defendants’ Wanteds at any time, for any reason, in the absence of probable cause and even when they have broken no laws.
139. Furthermore, Defendant St. Louis County’s policies and practices of circumventing judicial review permits them to continue issuing Wanteds to arrest and jail innocent persons unchecked, with reckless abandon, and without notice or due process for individuals subject to Wanteds.
140. Thus, Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated face an immanent threat that they can be arrested by any law enforcement agency on Defendants’ Wanteds without warning and without any ability to change their behaviors to avoid that arrest.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 141. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all others similarly situated, as representatives of the following classes (“the Classes”):
Class 1: All persons who, since February 24, 2011 have been arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants without a judicial determination of probable cause either prior to or promptly after their arrest, including those persons who were arrested without probable cause. Class 2: All persons who, since February 24, 2011 have been the subject of a Wanted issued by Defendant St. Louis County and have been denied procedural remedies to quash the Wanted.
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142. Excluded from the Classes are affiliates, predecessors, successors, officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendants, and the immediate family members of such persons. Also excluded are any trial judge who may preside over this action, court personnel and their family members and any juror assigned to this action.
143. Plaintiffs are members of the Classes which they seek to represent. 144. The particular members of the Classes are capable of being described without difficult managerial or administrative problems. The members of the Classes are readily identifiable from the information and records in the possession or control of Defendants. 145. Upon information and belief, the Classes consist of at least hundreds of individuals and therefore are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 146. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those in the Classes and are based on the same legal and factual theories. 147. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and, in fact, the wrongs suffered and remedies sought by Plaintiffs and the other members of the Classes are premised upon an unlawful pattern and practice by Defendants. The principal common issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. the nature and extent of each Defendant’s participation, control, ratification, and promotion of the use of Wanteds for the purpose of effecting unlawful and warrantless, investigative, punitive, retaliatory or arbitrary detentions;
b. the facts concerning how the system of Wanteds functioned, including all police procedures, electronic systems, and policies relating to the issuance and execution of Wanteds;
c. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to seek a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate and instead relying on their own determination to justify the issuance of a Wanted
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constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
d. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to promptly seek valid warrants for Plaintiffs and the other class members between the time they issued Wanteds and the time the individuals were arrested constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
e. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to promptly seek valid warrants for Plaintiffs and the other class members after the individuals were arrested pursuant to Wanteds constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
f. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in detaining Plaintiffs and the other class members arrested on Wanteds for a period of 24 hours violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;
g. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in issuing Wanteds and/or detaining Plaintiffs and the other class members pursuant to Wanteds in retaliation for asserting their right to refuse questioning by law enforcement violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
h. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in denying due process for Plaintiffs and the other class members to quash Wanteds and thereby interfering with their protected liberty interests violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
148. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the
Classes. Plaintiffs have suffered injury from the practices complained of and are ready, willing,
and able to serve as class representatives. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in
handling class actions and actions involving unconstitutional procedures and policies enacted
under the color of law. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest that might cause
them not to vigorously pursue this action.4
4 ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit civil rights law firm based in Saint Louis. It has represented the poor and homeless in the region for the past seven years and is an expert on the ways in which local police and court violate basic constitutional principles. Counsel was recently co-counsel in a case in the Eastern District of Missouri restricting the use of chemical munitions on peaceful protesters, is co-counsel on two federal class actions alleging
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Rule 23(b)(2) Certification of Class 1 and Class 2 149. Certification of Plaintiff Classes 1 and 2 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because St. Louis County, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its use of the Wanteds to circumvent constitutionally-required judicial review, has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory and Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in St. Louis County cannot be arrested and held in jail solely because a Wanted has been issued will apply to each Class member, and further that St. Louis County cannot issue and execute Wanteds for the arrest of persons without probable cause that they have committed an offense and without notice or a hearing prior to the deprivation of their liberty. 150. Injunctive relief compelling St. Louis County to comply with these constitutional mandates will similarly (1) protect each member of the Class from being again subjected to St. Louis County’s unlawful policies and practices with respect to any members for whom a Wanted has been or will become issued; and (2) protect those who will be subject to arrest by St. Louis County in the future pursuant to a Wanted—even if they commit no crimes—from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate. Rule 23(b)(3) Certification of Class 1 151. Certification of these Plaintiff Classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is appropriate in that the Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes seek monetary
the operation of debtors’ prisons in Ferguson and Jennings, Missouri, and is co-counsel in an additional nine state class action suits alleging the imposition of illegal fees and fines in various municipal courts in the St. Louis County region. See Jenkins et al. v. City of Jennings, 15-cv-252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. 2015); Fant et al. v. City of Ferguson, 15cv-253-AGF (E.D. mo. 2015). ArchCity Defenders also published an extensive report detailing similar practices and policies in the cities of Bel-Ridge and Florissant. The report is available at www.archcitydefenders.org.
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damages, common questions predominate over any individual questions, and a plaintiff class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. To that end, the common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. A plaintiff class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the class members’ claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. The question of damages will also be driven by class-wide determinations, such as the policies and practices of the County in the issuance and ensuing arrests pursuant to Wanteds. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the number of times a person was arrested pursuant to a Wanted during the relevant period, and the length of time that person was detained pursuant to each Wanted. Moreover, the individual class members are unlikely to be aware of their rights and not in a position (either through experience or financially) to commence individual litigation against these Defendants.
152. The Plaintiffs seek the following specific relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
COUNT I UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against All Defendants Excluding Officer Partin)
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For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count I, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Class 1, state:
153. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
154. Rather than obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause, Defendant Officers issued Wanteds to cause Plaintiffs’ arrests and circumvent judicial review.
155. By issuing Wanteds, Defendant Officers caused Plaintiffs’ arrests. 156. Defendant Officers did not secure a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate prior to Plaintiffs’ arrests. 157. Even after Plaintiffs were arrested, Defendant Officers did not obtain a prompt determination of proable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate. 158. At all relevant times both before and after Plaintiffs’ arrests, no exigent circumstances existed to prevent Defendant Officers from obtaining a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate. 159. During Plaintiffs’ warrantless detention, Defendant Officers (1) gathered or attempted to gather additional evidence to justify the arrest, (2) prolonged Plaintiffs’ detention maliciously or for delay’s sake, and/or (3) otherwise unreasonably delayed obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause. 160. Defendant Officers’ failure to promptly obtain judicial determinations of probable cause violated Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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161. Pursuant to Defendant St. Louis County’s policies and practices, Defendant Officers were afforded discretion to routinely issue Wanteds to cause the arrest and detention of individuals.
162. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
163. At all relevant times, Defendant St. Louis County has employed a custom, practice and usage of issuing Wanteds in order to cause the arrest and detention of individuals without obtaining a prompt determination of probable cause by a nuetral judicial magistrate in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To wit:
a. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1 expressly provides that Wanteds be entered into REJIS and or other data systems “where no warrant has been applied for”.
b. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1. provides that Wanteds may be entered into REJIS indefinitely and that a type of Wanted called a “Stop Order” may be entered into MULES and/or NCIC for one year.
c. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B does not require that a Wanted be quashed at any time or that a warrant application follow a Wanted entry at any time.
d. The use of Wanteds to arrest and detain individuals without judicial determinations of probable cause is a policy and practice that is known and ratified by Defendant Belmar in his supervisory capacity over the St. Louis
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County Police Department. Department General Order 15-16, at pg. 5 (“By order of Jon M. Belmar, Chief of Police”). 164. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny. 165. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds without obtaining a prompt judicial determinination of probable cause, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate, discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 166. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so. [thus entitling Plaintiffs to declaratory and injunctive relief. LYONS? 167. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs and all members of Class 1 have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: being seized and deprived of their freedom; being detained in custody; fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; lost wages; and loss of faith in society. 168. The acts of Defendant Officers described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
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169. If the Plaintiffs and Class 1 prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief:
A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ and the purported Class 1 members’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendement protections against unlawful seizures by (i) issuing Wanteds; (ii) making arrests pursuant to Wanteds; (iii) without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause; and/or (iv) without actually having probable cause at the time of arrest;
B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs;
C. For a judgment against all Defendants (excluding Defendant Partin) compensating Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 1 for the damages that they suffered as a result of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages:
a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh;
b. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
c. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officers John Doe 1-2;
E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II
RETALIATION AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR EXCERCISING THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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(Against All Defendants Excluding Officer Partin) For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count II, Plaintiffs, individually, state: 170. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 171. Prior to arrest, Defendant Officers attempted to question Plaintiffs. 172. Plaintiffs invoked their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by expressly refusing to make any statements to or answer any questions from Defendant Officers and/or invoked their Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during questioning by Defendant Officers. 173. Defendant Officers retaliated against Plaintiffs for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights by issuing Wanteds against Plaintiffs. 174. Defendant Officers were motivated to issue the Wanteds against Plaintiffs because of Plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 175. While Plaintiffs were detained, Defendant Officers attempted to question Plaintiffs, either personally or through fellow St. Louis County officers. 176. Plaintiffs again refused to make any statements to or answer any questions from Defendant Officers and/or invoked their Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during questioning. 177. Defendant Officers retaliated against Plaintiffs for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights by prolonging Plaintiffs’ detentions. 178. Defendant Officers were motivated to prolong Plaintiffs’ detentions because of Plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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179. The intended effect of Defendant Officers’ actions in retaliating against Plaintiffs was to discourage Plaintiffs from refusing to speak with the police.
180. Defendant Officers’ actions in arresting, detaining, and/or prolonging the detention of individuals would chill a person of ordinary firmness from asserting their Fifth Amendment rights.
181. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
182. Defendant St. Louis County at all relevant times has employed a custom, practice and usage of issuing Wanteds and arresting and detaining individuals pursuant to Wanteds in retaliation for the invocation of rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
183. Defendant Belmar is, and at all relevant times has been, responsible for the control and supervision of the actions and practices of the officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, including department procedures with respect to the issuance of and arrests pursuant to Wanteds.
184. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
185. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds in retaliation for constitutionally-protected conduct, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate,
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discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
186. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so.
187. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: being seized and deprived of their freedom; being detained in custody; fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; and loss of faith in society.
188. The acts of Defendant Officers described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
189. If the Plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief: A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendement rights when, after individuals have asserted their right to remain silent, Defendants, in retaliation and with the intent of discouraging individuals from asserting their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: (i) issue Wanteds for the arrest of those individuals; (ii) detain those individuals; (iii) and/or prolong the detention of such individuals; B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs; C. For a judgment against all Defendants (excluding Defendant Partin) compensating Plaintiffs for the damages that they suffered as a result
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of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages:
a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh;
b. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
c. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officers John Doe 1-2;
E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper. COUNT III
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY INTERESTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against All Defendants)
For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count III, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Class 2, state:
190. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
191. Defendant Officers issued Wanteds in order to cause Plaintiffs’ arrests. 192. The Wanteds deprived Plaintiffs of protected liberty interests by restricting their freedom of movement; making them fear to leave their houses, drive their cars, go to their jobs, visit friends and family members, or otherwise conduct their daily lives; and classifying Plaintiffs in a stigmatizing way as people subject to summary arrest and detention.
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193. Plaintiffs were afforded no process or procedure by which to challenge the Wanteds, and were thus unable to quash the Wanteds.
194. Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests significantly outweigh Defendants’ interests in issuing Wanteds, given the well-established legal standards for executing arrests and detentions in a manner that does not violate the constitutionally-protected liberty interests of arrestees and detainees.
195. By violating Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, or otherwise creating a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, without providing policies or procedures to prevent such violations—particularly given the existence of reasonable alternatives such as securing a valid warrant—Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ right to procedural due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
196. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
197. Defendant St. Louis County at all relevant times has employed a custom, practice and usage of depriving individuals of protected liberty interests by issuing Wanteds without procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
198. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
199. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds without obtaining a prompt judicial determinination of probable
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cause, without affording procedural due process, and/or in retaliation for constitutionallyprotected conduct, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate, discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
200. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so.
201. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; deprivation of protected liberty interests; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; and loss of faith in society.
202. The acts of Defendant Officers were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
203. If the Plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief: A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ and the purported Class 2 members’ Fourteenth Amendement protections against deprivations of protected liberty interests without due process when Defendants, without providing or affording individuals notice of and a process by which Wanteds can be challenged and/or quashed, nonetheless (i) issue Wanteds; (ii) make arrests pursuant to Wanteds; (iii) without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause; (iv) or
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without actually having probable cause at the time of arrest;
B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 2;
C. For a judgment against all Defendants compensating Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 2 for the damages that they suffered as a result of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages:
a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh;
b. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Christopher Partin;
c. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
d. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officers John Doe 1-2;
E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Blake A. Strode #68422MO
/s/ Thomas B. Harvey #61734MO
/s/ Edward J. Hall #0012692IA
/s/ Nathaniel R. Carroll #67988MO
ARCHCITY DEFENDERS
1210 Locust Street, 2nd Floor St. Louis, MO 63103 Tel: 855-724-2489 Fax: 314-925-1307 bstrode@archcitydefenders.org tharvey@archcitydefenders.org ehall@archcitydefenders.org ncarroll@archcitydefenders.org
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and /s/ Baher Azmy (pro hac application pending) /s/ Darius Charney (pro hac application pending) /s/ Omar Farah (pro hac application pending) CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, New York 10012 Tel: 212-614-6464 Fax: 212-614-6499 bazmy@ccrjustice.org dcharney@ccrjustice.org ofarah@ccrjustice.org Attorneys for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served electronically via this Court’s Electronic Filing System to all counsel of record on this 7th day of July, 2016. /s/ Nathaniel R. Carroll
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 Case: 4:16-cv-00254-CEJ Doc. #: 1 Filed: 02/24/16 Page: 1 of 17 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE FURLOW, individually and on )

behalf of all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

JON BELMAR, THE COUNTY OF

)

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,

)

and ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

OFFICER WALSH (BADGE #4068),

)

)

Defendants.

)

Cause No.: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

For years, St. Louis County has allowed individual police officers unilaterally to issue the

equivalent of an electronic arrest warrant without presenting sworn statements to a judicial

officer and without obtaining a lawful arrest warrant. St. Louis County police officers refer to

this warrantless arrest procedure as issuing a "Wanted." Under this system, ordinary police

officers have been given the power to order the arrest ofanyone in the County at any time,

purportedly for the purpose of"questioning" the person in custody without criminal charge or

judicial oversight. This secretive and unaccountable exercise of police power has long devastated

largely impoverished black residents of St. Louis County, as hundreds of human beings have

been swept from their homes, schools, and families, and brought in for "questioning" by St.

Louis County police officers who have been trained that they can arrest and detain people

without a warrant. This system flagrantly violates the United States Constitutiton and has no

place in a free society.

Case: 4:16-cv-00254-CEJ Doc. #: 1 Filed: 02/24/16 Page: 2 of 17 PageID #: 2
Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow ("Mr. Furlow"), individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which were violated by Defendants St. Louis County Chief of Police Jon Belmar ("Defendant Belmar"), the County of St. Louis, Missouri ("Defendant St. Louis County"), and St. Louis County Police Officer Walsh ("Defendant Walsh"), through their use of an unlawful ''wanted for questioning" procedure ("Wanteds"). In support thereof, Plaintiff states as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow is a 31-year-old African-American man arrested by Defendants on January 28, 2016 pursuant to Defendants' "wanted for questioning" procedure. Mr. Furlow brings this class-action lawsuit individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons who Defendants have arrested and detained through the use of unlawful Wanteds, a procedure by which Defendants have violated Plaintiff's and the purported class members' Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) unlawfully seizing the Plaintiff and purported class members, (2) depriving the Plaintiff and purported class members of liberty without due process of law by detention, and (3) retaliating against the Plaintiff for asserting his constitutional right to remain silent.
THE PARTIES 2. Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 3. Defendant St. Louis County, Missouri, is a political and geographic subdividion of the State of Missouri existing pursuant to Missouri law.
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4. Defendant Jon Belmar is the current Chief of Police for the St. Louis County Police Department. Defendant Belmar is sued in his official capacity as the supervising and commanding officer of the St. Louis County Police Department.
5. Officer Walsh, Badge #4068, is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis
County Police Department. All of Defendant Walsh's actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Walsh is sued in his individual capacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This cause is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), since the Defendants are located, and all of the incidents giving rise to this suit occurred, in this judicial district.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 7. Law enforcement agencies in Missouri have long employed a "manifestly unlawful and unconstitutional" practice describable as an "arrest for investigation," whereupon arrests are made "on mere suspicion, or even without pretext of suspicion, for the purpose of getting a person to a convenient location where he can be questioned or 'investigated' as to any crime he or others may have committed...." Sculock, John, Arrest in Missouri, 29 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 117, 127 (1961). 8. At all relevant times herein, Defendants have utilized statewide Wanted bulletins to notify Missouri law enforcement agencies that the St. Louis County Police Department wishes to arrest the named individuals for purposes of investigation.
U.S. Department of Justice Report
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9. On March 4, 2015, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
published a report titled, Investigation ofthe Ferguson Police Department. See Exhibit A.
10. The 105-page report detailed myriad Constitutional violations by the Ferguson
Police Department, some of which are typical ofpolice departments throughout St. Louis
County.
11. Under the section titled, "FPD's Use of a Police-run 'Wanted' System
Circumvents Judicial Review and Poses the Risk of Abuse," the Department of Justice described
the county-wide practice of issuing "Wanteds" without probable cause as follows:
[L]aw enforcement agencies in St. Louis County use a system of"wanteds" or "stop orders" as a substitute for seeking judicial approval for an arrest warrant. When officers believe a person has committed a crime but are not able to immediately locate that person, they can enter a "wanted" into the statewide law enforcement database, indicating to all other law enforcement agencies that the person should be arrested iflocated. While wanteds are supposed to be based on probable cause, see FPD General Order 424.01, they operate as an end-run around the judicial system. Instead of swearing out a warrant and seeking judicial authorization from a neutral and detached magistrate, officers make the probable cause determination themselves and circumvent the courts. Officers use wanteds for serious state-level crimes and minor code violations alike, including traffic offenses.
Exhibit A at 22.
12. The DOJ report describes in detail its findings on how the Wanteds procedure has
been used with impunity to circumvent the constitutional warrant requirement:
[I]nterviews with command staff and officers indicate that officers do not clearly understand the legal authority necessary to issue a wanted. For example, one veteran officer told us he will put out a wanted "if I do not have enough probable cause to arrest you." He gave the example of investigating a car theft. Upon identifying a suspect, he would put that suspect into the system as wanted "because we do not have probable cause that he stole the vehicle." Reflecting the muddled analysis officers may employ when deciding whether to issue a wanted, this officer concluded, "you have to have reasonable suspicion and some probable cause to put out a wanted."
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At times, FPD officers use wanteds not merely in spite ofa lack of probable cause, but because they lack probable cause. In December 2014, a Ferguson detective investigating a shooting emailed a county prosecutor to see if a warrant for a suspect could be obtained, since "a lot ofstate agencies won't act on a wanted." The prosecutor responded stating that although "[c]hances are" the crime was committed by the suspect, "we just don't have enough for a warrant right now." The detective responded that he would enter a wanted. Exhibit A at 23. Defendants Used Wanted Procedure to Arrest and Detain Plaintiff 13. On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, Defendant Walsh spoke with Mr. Furlow over the telephone regarding an allegation against Mr. Furlow for domestic assault. 14. Defendant Walsh requested that Mr. Furlow return home to be questioned by Defendant Walsh regarding said allegations. 15. Mr. Furlow told Defendant Walsh that he had no interest in speaking with the police or answering any questions. 16. Defendant Walsh responded that if Mr. Furlow did not answer his questions, Defendant Walsh would issue a wanted for questioning on the domestic assault. 17. Mr. Furlow reiterated that he would not speak to the police. 18. At some point following this conversation, Defendant Walsh issued a Wanted for Mr. Furlow in an internal law enforcement database. 19. The next day, on the evening of January 26, 2016, the complainant spoke to Defendant Walsh as well as a member of the St. Louis County Prosecutor's office, and retracted her domestic assault complaint in its entirety. 20. Defendant Walsh asked the complainant whether she was being pressured to retract her statement. The complainant responded that she was not, and that she had fabricated all of the accusations out of anger.
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21. Despite this complete retraction of the allegations and withdrawal of the complaint, the Wanted remained in the system for Mr. Furlow.
22. Two days later, on January 28,2016 at approximately 5:30pm, Mr. Furlow was driving south on Goodfellow Blvd. in the City of Jennings when he was stopped by St. Louis County Police.
23. The officers explained that the reason for the stop was because the vehicle's temporary dealer's plates were not displayed in the rear of the vehicle. (They were displayed in the front.)
24. During the stop, Mr. Furlow, who was driving, admitted that his license was suspended and that, based on his conversation with Defendant Walsh, he believed that there was either a warrant or Wanted for him in St. Louis County.
25. The officers told Mr. Furlow he would not be arrested for either the license plate or the suspended license, but that they would need to run his name for any warrants or Wanteds.
26. The officers returned to their vehicle and ran a search for Mr. Furlow's name, which revealed the Wanted issued by Defendant Walsh in connection with a domestic assault.
27. The officers then took Mr. Furlow into custody and transported him to the Jennings Police Station at 5445 Jennings Station Road.
28. Officers at the Jennings Police Station informed Mr. Furlow that he was on a 24hour hold pursuant to the Wanted and that this was the sole basis for his detention.
29. The officers attempted to question Mr. Furlow. Mr. Furlow stated that he did not wish to talk or answer any questions.
30. The officers then informed Mr. Furlow that he would be held in Jennings until he could be transported to the St. Louis County Justice Center in Clayton, Missouri. He would
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remain at the St. Louis County Justice Center either until Defendant Walsh questioned Mr. Furlow and "cleared" the Wanted or until the end of the 24-hour hold period.
31. Mr. Furlow repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent to officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, both in person and through counsel. Despite this fact, he continued to be held on a "wanted for questioning."
32. During the evening of January 28, counsel for Mr. Furlow notified multiple officers of the St. Louis County Police Department that Mr. Furlow was being held on the basis of an unlawful Wanted and in the absence of probable cause. However, St. Louis County Police refused to release Mr. Furlow pursuant to their policy.
33. In his capacity as watch commander of the 1st Precinct of the St. Louis County Police Department, Sergeant James Grace stated to Mr. Furlow's counsel that Defendant Walsh "followed department procedures" in issuing the Wanted.
34. Mr. Furlow was released from the St. Louis County Justice Center after being held for 24 hours.
35. Defendant Walsh did not personally attempt to question Mr. Furlow during this 24-hour period. No charges have been filed against Mr. Furlow with respect to the domestic assault.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 36. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all others similarly situated, as representative of the following class (the "Class"):
All individuals, between February 24, 2011 and the date that notice is mailed to the Class who Defendants arrested for investigation or who were arrested or otherwise detained pursuant to a "Wanted" issued or enforced by Defendants or their agents and for whom Defendants or their agents made no application for warrant from a neutral and detached judicial officer in connection with the arrest.
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37. Excluded from the Class are affiliates, predecessors, successors, officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendants, and the immediate family members of such persons. Also excluded are any trial judge who may preside over this action, court personnel and their family members and any juror assigned to this action.
38. Plaintiff is a member of the Class which he seeks to represent. 39. The particular members of the Class are capable of being described without difficult managerial or administrative problems. The members of the Class are readily identifiable from the information and records in the possession or control of Defendants. 40. Upon information and belief, the Class consists of at least hundreds of individuals and therefore is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 41. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those in the Class and are based on the same legal and factual theories. 42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and, in fact, the wrongs suffered and remedies sought by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are premised upon an unlawful pattern and practice by Defendants. The principal common issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. the nature and extent of each Defendants' participation, control, ratification, and promotion of the use of Wanteds for the purpose of committing unlawful investigative detentions;
b. all of the facts concerning how the system of"Wanteds" functioned, including all police procedures, electronic systems, and policies relating to the issuance and execution of"Wanteds;"
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c. whether Defendants' conduct in failing to seek valid warrants for Plaintiff and the other Class members constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and
d. whether Defendants' policy of detaining people arrested on "Wanteds" for a period of24 hours is consistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests ofthe Class. Plaintiff has suffered injury from the practices complained of and is ready, willing. and able to serve as class representative. Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel is experienced in handling class actions and actions involving unconstitutional procedures and policies enacted under the color of law. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.
44. Certification of a plaintiff class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is appropriate in that the Plaintiff and the Class members seek monetary damages, common questions predominate over any individual questions, and a plaintiff class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. A plaintiff class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the Class members' claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. Moreover, the individual Class members are unlikely to be aware of their rights and not in a position (either through experience or fmancially) to commence individual litigation against these Defendants.
COUNT I § 1983 Claim for Unlawful Seizure by Arrest in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
(Against all Defendants)
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For his cause of action against the Defendants in Count I, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, states:
45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
46. Defendant Walsh, by issuing the Wanted, directly and intentionally caused Mr. Furlow's arrest.
47. The arrest was not authorized by a warrant from a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.
48. The arrest did not otherwise fall within a legal exception to the constitutional warrant requirement for custodial arrests.
49. The arrest was made on the basis of a Wanted issued solely at the discretion of Defendant Walsh, consistent with the policy of the St. Louis County Police.
50. St. Louis County Police routinely, and as a matter of policy and practice, perform unconstitutional seizures on the basis of Wanteds.
51. The use ofWanteds for this purpose is a policy and practice that is known and ratified by Defendant Belmar in his supervisory capacity over the St. Louis County Police Department.
52. The seizures of Mr. Furlow and of all members of the Class were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution ofthe United States.
53. As a direct result of the actions of the Defendants, Mr. Furlow and all class members suffered damages.
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54. The acts of Defendant Walsh described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of the Plaintiff, thus entitling Mr. Furlow to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Walsh.
55. lfthe Plaintiff and the Class prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow prays for judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class against the Defendants for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expenses, costs, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT II § 1983 Claim for Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty by Detention without Due Process of Law in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution (Against all Defendants) For his cause of action against the Defendants in Count II, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, states: 56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow was detained for a 24-hour period on the basis of a Wanted issued by Defendant Walsh. 58. Mr. Furlow's detention pursuant to a Wanted was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, did not comply with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and did not conform with constitutional due process requirements. 59. The Defendants detained Mr. Furlow based on a policy by the St. Louis County Police Department to hold individuals for a period of24 hours in the absence of an arrest warrant, charges, or an independent determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate.
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60. The St. Louis County Police Department, under the control and supervision of Defendant Belmar, has adopted a default policy of holding persons seized on a Wanted either for 24 hours or until the issuing officer has the opportunity to speak with the seized individual and remove the wanted.
61. This policy and practice is an arbitrary exercise of power by officers ofthe St. Louis County Police Department.
62. The detentions of Mr. Furlow and members ofthe Class were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
63. As a direct result of this policy of24-hour detentions and the actions ofthe Defendants, Mr. Furlow and all class members suffered damages.
64. The acts of Defendant Walsh described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of the Plaintiff, thus entitling Mr. Furlow to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Walsh.
65. If the Plaintiffand the Class prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow prays for judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class against the Defendants for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expenses, costs, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT III § 1983 Claim for Reliation against Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow for
Exercise of his Right to Remain Silent Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
(Against All Defendants) For his cause of action against the Defendants on Count III, Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow, individually, states:
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66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
67. Mr. Furlow asserted his Fifth Amendment-protected right to remain silent in refusing to make any statements to, or answer questions from, Defendant Walsh.
68. Defendant Walsh attempted to use the threat of a "wanted for questioning" to coerce Mr. Furlow into speaking.
69. When Mr. Furlow still refused to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, Defendant Walsh retaliated against him by issuing a Wanted.
70. Defendant Walsh was motivated to issue the Wanted against Mr. Furlow because of Mr. Furlow's invocation of his right to remain silent.
71. The intended effect of Defendant Walsh's threat to issue, and eventual issuance of, the Wanted was to discourage Mr. Furlow from refusing to speak with the police.
72. Submitting persons to arrest and detention for refusing to speak with police would chill a person of ordinary firmness from invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
73. Defendant Walsh's acts were consistent with the policy of the St. Louis County Police Department, as evidenced by Sgt. James Grace's statement, in his capacity as watch commander of the 151 Precinct of the St. Louis County Police Department, that Defendant Walsh "followed department procedures."
74. Defendant Belmar is, and at all relevant times has been, responsible for the control and supervision of the actions and practices of the officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, including department procedures with respect to the issuance ofWanteds.
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75. As a result of the acts and policies of the Defendants, Mr. Furlow suffered damages, including being seized and deprived of his freedom, being detained in custody, and emotional distress.
76. The acts of Defendant Walsh were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of the Plaintiff, thus entitling Mr. Furlow to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Walsh.
77. If the Plaintiff prevails, he is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
u.s.c. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow, individually, prays for judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, expenses, costs, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT IV
§ 1983 Monell Claim Against the Defendant County of St. Louis, Missouri for Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Plaintiff as More Fully Described Herein
For his cause of action against the Defendant St. Louis County on Count IV, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, states:
78. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
79. There exist, and at all relevant times have existed, within the St. Louis County Police Department and, on information and belief and with reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the Defendant St. Louis County official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive that they constitute policies of the Defendant St. Louis County and the St Louis County Police Department which have caused and will continue to cause the
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banns and deprivations suffered by the Plaintiff and the Class as described in Counts I-III of this
Complaint.
80. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep 't ofSoc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
81. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware of the unlawful use ofWanteds by officers of the St. Louis County Police Department and failed to act to prevent this unlawful behavior in a way
that amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of County residents. See City ofCanton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
82. The policies, practices, customs, and usages of arresting people in the absence of a warrant by a neutral magistrate upon a determination of probable cause, and in the absence of a timely effort to secure a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, violated the right of the Plaintiff and the Class to be free from unlawful seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
83. The policies, practices, customs, and usages of depriving people ofliberty by detention for a predetermined and arbitrary period of24 hours, in the absence of a timely effort to secure a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate and without due process of law, violated the rights of the Plaintiff and the Class to be free from unlawful seizure and from deprivation of liberty without due process of law under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
84. The policies, practices, customs, and usages of issuing Wanteds in retaliation for refusal to speak with, or answer questions from, officers of the St. Louis County Police
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Department violated the right of the Plaintiff to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
85. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so. The failure of the Defendant St. Louis County to prevent constitutionally vio lative conduct as described above caused the constitutional deprivations that have been suffered by the Plaintiff and the Class.
86. As a direct and proximate result of the actions ofthe Defendant St. Louis County, the Plaintiffand the Class suffered damages to include being retaliated against for assertion of a constitutional right, being seized by arrest, being detained in custody, and emotional distress.
87. If the Plaintiff and the Class prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys· fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE PlaintiffDwayne Furlow prays for judgment in favor of Plainti ff and the Class against the Defendant St. Louis County for compensatory damages, attorneys· fees, expenses, costs, and any other reliefthis Court deems just and appropriate.
Respectfully Submitted.
ARCHCITY DEFENDERS
~/:~ ~
Blake A. Strode #68422MO Thomas B. Harvey #6 1734MO A I Edward J. Hall Edward J. Hall #00 12692IA Of Counsel
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Is/ Nathaniel R. Carroll Nathaniel R. Carroll #67988MO OfCounsel 812 N. Collins St. St. Louis, MO 63102 Tel: 855-724-2489 Local: 314-361-8834 Fax:314-925-1307 bstrode@archcitydefenders.org tharvey@archcitydefenders.org Attorneys for Plaintiff
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 Case: 4:16-cv-00254-HEA Doc. #: 129 Filed: 10/05/18 Page: 1 of 30 PageID #: 4444

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE FURLOW et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN BELMAR et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 4:16CV254 HEA ) ) ) )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. No. 77], Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class [Doc. No. 80], and

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 84]. The parties

oppose the respective motions. A hearing on the motions was held before Judge

John A. Ross on February 28, 2018, and each party submitted a memorandum of

law after the hearing. On March 9, 2018 Judge Ross recused himself and this case

was reassigned to the undersigned.

With respect to the claims of Howard Liner (“Liner”) against Defendant

Officers John Doe 1-2, Plaintiffs have neither substituted named defendants for the

Doe Defendants, nor effectuated service on the Doe Defendants. Liner’s claims

are stayed in accordance with the Order to substitute and serve the Doe Defendants

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dated September 30, 2018, and Liner’s claims are neither considered nor disposed of in this Opinion, Memorandum, and Order.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Defendants Belmar, St. Louis County, Partin, Walsh, and Clements. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is denied except as to Liner’s claims. A ruling on Liner’s motion for summary judgment is stayed pending the outcome of the aforementioned Order. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify class is dismissed without prejudice.
Facts and Background “Wanteds” Under Missouri State Law, a law enforcement officer “may arrest on view, and without a warrant, any person the officer sees violating or who such officer has reasonable grounds to believe has violated any ordinance or law of this state, including a misdemeanor or infraction, over which such officer has jurisdiction.” 544.216 RSMo. A “wanted” is entered into a computer system by law enforcement, and identifies a person who is wanted for a crime, but for whom no warrant has been issued. Wanteds differ from warrants in that no judicial determination of probable cause is required to enter a wanted. The St. Louis County Police Department (“SLCPD”) has utilized “wanteds” for over 20 years. SLCPD’s policies for entering wanteds are contained in a
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general order (“G.O.”). Before 2015, nothing was written in the G.O. about probable cause being a prerequisite to the entry of a wanted. However, each officer who provided deposition testimony in this cause testified that SLCPD policy has always been that probable cause is required to enter a wanted. In 2015, express language about the probable cause requirement was added to the G.O. In 2016, additional language was added to the G.O. requiring supervisory review and approval of wanted requests before their entry into the computer system.
When an individual’s name is run in the computer system and there is a wanted issued for that person, the computer will return the wanted to the officer running the search. The information viewable to the searching officer includes the name of the officer who issued the wanted and the crime for which the person is wanted. The wanted does not describe the probable cause on which it is based. If an SLCPD officer encounters a person with a wanted issued against him or her, the officer is authorized by SLCPD policy to take that person into custody.
Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and Defendant Christopher Partin: Facts Not In Dispute At 8:58 a.m. on November 11, 2015, Defendant St. Louis County Police Officer Christopher Partin, along with field training Officer Slusser, received a dispatch to the home of Janet Virgin based on a 911 call that had been placed at 8:57 a.m.. The officers arrived on the scene at 9:00 a.m. Dwayne Furlow (“Furlow”), who lived next door to Ms. Virgin, was not on the scene when the
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officers arrived. Ofc. Partin spoke to Virgin, who told him that her family was having ongoing issues with Furlow’s family. She said Furlow’s son had started a fight with her sons that morning, so she started video recording the incident on her cell phone for evidence. Virgin told Partin that Furlow then approached her and took her phone with some force, including a strike to her head.
Partin also conducted a canvas of the neighborhood in search of witnesses. Partin spoke to a 16-year-old neighbor who said he observed an altercation between Furlow and Virgin, and saw Furlow take a phone from Virgin. This witness also said he did not see whether Furlow or Virgin initiated the altercation.
At some point, one of the Furlow children handed a cell phone to Partin so that Partin could speak to Furlow. Partin asked Furlow to return home to answer some questions about the alleged assault and theft. Furlow informed Partin that he would not return home. Partin told Furlow that he would issue a Wanted for Furlow if Furlow did not return home. Partin issued a Wanted for Furlow that day.
On December 12, 2015, Furlow, accompanied by counsel, appeared in person at the St. Louis County Justice Center in Clayton, Missouri. There, Furlow’s counsel indicated that Furlow would not answer any questions. After Furlow’s fifth amendment right was invoked, Partin issued a summons to Furlow relating to charges of assault and larceny, gave the summons to Furlow’s attorney, and stated that he would cancel the Wanted. Partin then cancelled the Wanted
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shortly after the meeting with Furlow and his attorney, as he was leaving the Justice Center.
Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and Defendant Kevin Walsh During the noon hour on January 25, 2016, St. Louis County Police Officer Kevin Walsh responded to a 911 call concerning an alleged domestic assault. Walsh arrived to find Latoya Furlow (“Latoya”), who claimed that her husband, Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow, had assaulted her. Walsh’s investigative report includes a summary of Latoya’s statements that day. Latoya told Ofc. Walsh that Furlow had just assaulted her. Latoya claimed that Furlow had come home and immediately started screaming, saying he had heard that Latoya was cheating on him. Latoya said Furlow kept screaming “B****, get the f*** out of my house.” She claimed he then smacked her in the cheek with his right hand, knocking her to the ground. Latoya told Walsh that Furlow then stood over her, stomped on her legs several times, grabbed her by her hair, and began dragging her toward the door. Latoya said that when Furlow let go of her hair to open the door, she ran out of the house and to the neighbors, where she called the police. Latoya told Walsh that she saw Furlow get into his car and drive away. Latoya then told Walsh that she wanted to press charges.
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In his report, Walsh observed that Latoya was “angry, crying, fearful, afraid, [and] nervous.” Walsh observed no bruising, swelling, or lacerations on Latoya, and wrote that she refused medical attention on the scene.
Walsh reported that he conducted an interior sweep of Latoya’s residence while looking for Furlow. Walsh saw a fully loaded AR-15 firearm in plain view in the Furlows’ basement. Latoya told Walsh that she purchased the firearm for her and her husband’s protection, and that she had purchased the firearm in her name because Furlow was on probation. Walsh ran a record check for Dwayne Furlow and found that he was indeed on active probation for burglary in the second degree.
Walsh noted that while he was on the scene, Latoya’s cell phone rang multiple times. Latoya told Walsh that it was Furlow calling, so Walsh answered the phone and identified himself as a St. Louis County Police Officer. Walsh reported that the subject on the phone identified himself as Dwayne Furlow. Walsh informed Furlow of his investigation, to which Furlow reportedly replied that he had spoken to his lawyer and would not turn himself in, because he would get locked up. Furlow reportedly said that Latoya “f***ed around” with another man and was mad because Furlow now wanted a divorce. Walsh advised Furlow that he would be “put out as wanted” for domestic assault in the third degree and
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domestic peace disturbance. The phone conversation ended, and Walsh entered the wanted.
The next day, Walsh received a phone call from a subject who identified herself as Latoya Furlow. Latoya told Walsh that she wanted to recant her statement from the previous day. When Walsh asked if anyone was coercing her into recanting, Latoya said no. It is undisputed that Walsh asked Latoya to come to the precinct and give a written statement, although neither party makes reference to an in-person retraction actually occurring.
On January 28, 2016, Furlow was driving a car with no rear tags and was stopped the police.1 It is undisputed that after he was stopped, Furlow admitted that he had a suspended license and that he believed a wanted or warrant had been issued against him. A computer search returned the wanted that Walsh had issued on January 25. Furlow was arrested and taken into custody at the Jennings, Missouri police station.2 An officer there informed Walsh that Furlow was in custody. Walsh asked the officer to conduct an interview with Furlow. The officer read Furlow his Miranda rights; Furlow invoked his right to remain silent.
While in custody, Furlow contacted his attorney. During Furlow’s detention, his attorney told multiple police officers that Furlow was being held
1 The exact details of the stop and Furlow’s arrest are unclear, as the stop apparently occurred in St. Louis City and Furlow ended up at the City of Jennings precinct in St. Louis County. It is unclear, therefore, which agency actually arrested Furlow and at what time that arrest occurred. However, the Court finds that those facts are ultimately immaterial. 2 See Note 1, supra.
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illegally for lack of probable cause and requested that Furlow be released. Furlow was not released as a result of those requests.
It is the policy of the St. Louis County Police Department to hold individuals accused of domestic violence for 24 hours. Furlow was to be held for 24 hours pursuant to this policy, and was transferred from the Jennings station to the St. Louis County Justice Center during his detention. Justice Center documents show an arrest time of 17:40 on January 28 and a release time of 18:08 on January 29, meaning Furlow was detained for 24 hours and 28 minutes.
It is undisputed that Ofc. Walsh believes that he followed department procedure with respect to this incident.
Plaintiff Ralph Torres and Defendant Laura Clements On December 16, 2014, Detective Laura Clements of the St. Louis County Police Department Child Abuse Unit was directed to begin an investigation into allegations that Ralph Torres (“Torres”) had sexually abused his minor daughter (“Daughter”). On November 13, 2014 Torres’ ex-wife, who is also Daughter’s mother (“Mother”), had contacted the office of the Department of Social Services – Children’s Division (“DSS”) in St. Charles, Missouri alleging the abuse, which triggered an “emergency investigation” by DSS. A forensic interview of Daughter was conducted by a DSS employee on November 26. While Det. Clements would normally attend a forensic interview, on the day of Daughter’s interview, all police
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officers, including Clements, were working mandatory 12-hour shifts due to civil unrest in St. Louis County. Clements instead received a video copy of the forensic interview from her sergeant.
Before viewing the video, Clements called Mother, who told Clements that one day in November, Daughter began rubbing her own buttocks and asked Mother to “touch her bottom.” Mother told Clements that she said “No, I don’t do that,” to which Daughter replied “Well, my dad does.” Mother told Clements that on one prior occasion, Daughter had grabbed the genital area of Mother’s 14-year-old son. Mother also said that Daughter would often return from a visit with Torres and scream and beg not to go with him again. Finally, Mother told Clements that Torres had not contacted her or Daughter since she reported Daughter’s claims to DSS.
Clements then viewed the video of the forensic interview. Her investigative report contains a summary of Daughter’s statement in the video. Daughter reported that she was 5 years old, that her parents were divorced, and that she lived mostly with her mother and siblings. The interviewer asked Daughter if she knew why she was there, and Daughter replied “Because I have to tell you something… My dad begs me to touch his private parts, and I don’t want to.” Daughter said that he sometimes made her touch his “front” and sometimes made her touch his “back.” The interviewer had Daughter identify male and female genital anatomy
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on diagrams. The interviewer asked about the last time she touched her father’s penis and she said it had happened when she was four years old and that her father “begs” her to let him touch her privates. Daughter said that her father made her touch his penis with a tissue, that she had to “clean down there,” and that she had to touch his buttocks with a washcloth. When asked, Daughter reported that her father only touched her privates when he was cleaning her. At this point, the interviewer took a break and left the room. While she was gone, Daughter drew pictures. She later told the interviewer that the pictures were of her father’s penis with pee coming out, her fathers “butt,” her mother’s “pee-pee” [vagina], and her mother’s “butt.” When asked, Daughter said that her father says “yes” when she touches his penis “because he likes it.” Daughter reported that this happens in the living room and that her father makes her “clean it when he pees.” Finally, Daughter said that her father told her not to tell her mother.
Clements did not arrest Torres then. Rather, Clements called Torres and left voicemails. When Torres returned her call, Clements asked him to come to the police department to answer questions about the child abuse allegations. Torres replied that Clements would have to go through his attorney. Clements and the attorney exchanged “several missed calls.” On February 23, 2015, Clements entered a wanted for Torres with a charge of statutory sodomy.
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On April 1, 2015, St. Louis County Police Officer Scott Leible ran a computer check which revealed a wanted for Torres and provided his address. Leible went to the address at 11:00 a.m., found Torres with his son in the garage fixing a bicycle, notified Torres of the outstanding wanted, and arrested Torres.3 Clements, who was not on duty at the time, was notified that Torres was in custody around 11:30 a.m. Clements was scheduled to begin her duty at 4:30 p.m. At 4:30 p.m., she would not have had time to apply for a warrant with the Prosecuting Attorney’s office that day.
Torres, who had initially been taken to the Affton precinct, was booked into the County Justice Center at 4:54 p.m. Clements attempted to interview Torres that night, at 8:45 p.m. Torres invoked his right to silence and right to counsel. Torres was held overnight at the Justice Center.
At 10:00 a.m. the next morning, Clements went to the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office to present her case against Torres. Because Torres was being held, Clements was “bumped up” to speak to the prosecutor sooner. Around 11:00 a.m., the Prosecutor denied Clement’s request for a warrant application. Torres was released from custody at around 11:55 or noon on April 2, 2015. In total, Torres was in custody between 24 and 25 hours.
3 Defendants argue that Torres was arrested after his son’s mother had come to pick the son up and after Leible contacted Clements. This dispute is ultimately immaterial.
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The parties agree that Clements did not have a grudge against, malice toward, or any emotional connection regarding Torres.
Discussion Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition to Plaintiffs’ claims against individual officers, Plaintiffs also claim that St. Louis County and Police Chief Jon Belmar, in his official capacity, are liable for the alleged violations. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains three counts. Plaintiffs seek class certification. Count I alleges that Furlow’s and Torres’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Officers Walsh and Clements, respectively, issued wanteds for their arrest without probable cause, and without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause. Count I further alleges that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated when they were arrested pursuant to wanteds by officers who were without warrants and who had no knowledge of the probable cause on which the issuing officers based the wanteds. Further, Plaintiffs allege a Fourth Amendment violation when Defendants detained them without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause. Count II alleges that Defendants (excluding Officer Partin) retaliated against Plaintiffs based on Plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights to silence and rights to have
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counsel during questioning as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim that the retaliation was in the form of prolonged detention.
Count III alleges that Defendants deprived them of the liberty interests of freedom of movement and freedom to conduct their daily lives without fear, as well as their interest in not being classified stigmatically as a person who is subject to summary arrest and detention. Defendants allege that they were deprived of these interests without due process or procedure with which to challenge the wanteds issued against them, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to Count I only. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all Counts. The Court addresses the wholly4 dispositive motion first.
Summary Judgment Standard The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary
4 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is dispositive of all claims, excepting of course those concerning Plaintiff Harold Liner and Defendants John Doe 1-2.
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judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249.
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must ‘substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’” Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation omitted).
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Qualified Immunity The threshold inquiry is whether the Defendants being sued in their individual capacities, Walsh, Clements, and Partin, are immune from suit under the doctrine of Qualified Immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244, 182 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted). “The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original). Municipal and Governmental Entity Liability
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A suit against a governmental actor in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself. Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991)). Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989).
A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under § 1983 by proving that his or her constitutional rights were violated by an action pursuant to official municipal policy or misconduct so pervasive among non-policymaking employees of the municipality as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n order to state a viable § 1983 claim . . . plaintiff is required to plead facts sufficient to show at least an inference that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of action taken pursuant to an official policy, or as a result of misconduct so pervasive among non-policymakers as to constitute a widespread custom and practice with the force of law.” Davis v. St. Louis County, Mo., 2015 WL 758218, at *12 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 23, 2015) (citation omitted).
Analysis
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Count I against Walsh and Clements: Probable Cause Each Plaintiff was subject to a warrantless arrest. The question, therefore, is whether those arrests violated the Fourth Amendment. “A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there is at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 837 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522–23 (8th Cir. 2011)) (internal citations omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2015). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). “Probable cause exists when the totality of circumstances demonstrates that a prudent person would believe that the arrestee has committed or was committing a crime.” Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir 1999). “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept— turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462
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U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal quotation omitted). “Whether probable cause existed at the time of the arrest is a question of law for the court.” Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010).
For its determination as to whether arguable probable cause existed, the Court relies heavily on record investigative reports. The SLCPD investigative reports from each incident, written contemporaneously by the Defendant officers, go to the heart of the probable cause issue: that is, what the Defendant officer knew at the time that he or she issued the wanted. Moreover, the contents of the investigative reports are undisputed as representative of what the Defendant officers heard, observed, and believed at the time they issued the wanted.
In issuing a wanted against Furlow for allegedly assaulting and stealing the phone of Janet Virgin, Partin relied on the statements of Virgin herself and a 16year-old neighbor who said he witnessed the altercation between Furlow and Virgin. The 16-year-old witness said that he did not see who started the altercation, but he did say that he saw Furlow take a phone from Virgin. Partin also spoke on the phone with Furlow and noted that Furlow changed his account of the incident, first saying that he did not see anyone fighting, and then saying that
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he saw a fight and tried to break it up. These statements, taken together and with other circumstances, such as the fact that Furlow had left the scene within the three minutes it took for Partin to arrive on the scene provided enough for a finding of probable cause.
Plaintiffs argue that Partin should not have relied on the 16-year-old witness in finding probable cause because the witness was of unknown credibility and a minor. This argument is not well taken and spurious in tenor. It is wholly reasonable to believe that an average sixteen-year-old can provide accurate, competent information about an event he has just seen.
Plaintiffs also claim that Partin should have but did not interview a taxi driver at the scene. “[L]aw enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so long as ‘law enforcement would not be unduly hampered...if the agents...wait to obtain more facts before seeking to arrest.’” Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 651 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987)). A police officer “need not conduct a ‘mini-trial before making an arrest, but probable cause does not exist when a minimal further investigation would have exonerated the suspect.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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In his deposition, Partin claimed that he had trouble understanding the driver, while Furlow claims that the driver was always understandable. This argument does not preclude a finding of summary judgment in favor of Partin. There is no indication or allegation that the driver’s statement would have exonerated Furlow. In fact, Furlow testified that he told his son to stay inside until the cab taking him to school arrived, and then left home. It does not follow that the taxi driver, who arrived after Furlow left home, could have witnessed the incident between Furlow and Virgin. Partin had probable cause to believe Furlow assaulted Virgin and took her phone.
In issuing a wanted against Furlow for allegedly assaulting his wife, Latoya, Walsh relied on Latoya’s statements, her emotional state, and the presence of a loaded gun in the Furlow home. Latoya told Walsh that, while screaming and cursing at her, Furlow smacked her, knocked her to the ground, stomped on her legs, and dragged her by her hair. Partin observed that Latoya was “angry, crying, fearful, afraid and nervous.” In a domestic violence situation such as this, where Partin has no reason to believe Latoya was lying or being coerced, her specific, credible statements and heightened emotional state are enough to warrant a finding of arguable probable cause.
Partin also found a fully loaded firearm in the home. Plaintiff’s claim that the firearm and the fact that Latoya bought the firearm in her name because Furlow
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was on probation are immaterial facts. The Court disagrees. Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. While the gun may not be a direct indication of domestic violence, the circumstances of its purchase and the presence of a loaded, deadly weapon in the home could reasonably lead Partin to at least believe that Latoya was not fabricating her allegations, and was actually in fear of her husband.
Latoya did recant her statement the next day, over the phone, and claimed she was not being coerced to do so. Walsh did not cancel the wanted. Walsh testified that based on her statement and demeanor the previous day, Latoya’s recantation seemed “odd” to Walsh. Walsh also testified that Latoya was speaking at a fast pace and she seemed anxious and agitated. Plaintiffs claim that Walsh’s interpretation are not facts and are unsupported by documentary evidence. While that may be true, the issue here is probable cause, the existence of which relies on the reasonable conclusions officers make based on their reasonable beliefs and the totality of the circumstances. Here, Walsh concluded, based on Latoya’s demeanor on the phone, that her recantation was not genuine. Arguable probable cause did not cease to exist based on Latoya’s recantation.
In issuing a wanted against Torres for allegedly abusing his minor daughter, Clements relied on the statement of Mother and the video of the DSS interview of Daughter. Plaintiffs do not seem to argue that the Mother’s statements and the
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video interview do not support a probable cause finding. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that because Clements did not meet Mother to assess her credibility in person or communicate with DSS staff while investigating the allegations, probable cause did not exist. Indeed, unbeknownst to Clements, DSS had closed its investigation two days prior to Torres’ arrest, and Mother would later be found to have fabricated allegations about Torres.5
In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, “Courts must not judge officers with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” City & Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777, 191 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2015). Unlike most cases in which Clements would be involved from the beginning and attend the initial DSS interview of an alleged child victim, in this case, Clements could not attend the interview because SLCPD officers were working 12 hour shifts in response to civil unrest. Rather, Clements called Mother and viewed the video of the interview well after the initial allegations to DSS. It is not alleged what, if anything, about an in-person interview with Mother would have led Clements to believe she was not credible. Clements noted nothing incredible about Mother’s statements over the phone. When Clements issued the wanted, DSS had not yet closed the case against Torres. While Clements testified that she typically communicates with DSS staff concerning allegations, she did not in this case, and
5 So found by Judge Thomas J. Frawley of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. 22

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had no knowledge of the disposition of Torres’ case at DSS. It is very unfortunate that Torres was subjected to arrest and detention for horrific, but false, allegations. Still, qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 546. Clements’ missteps do not rise to those levels. Clements had probable cause, attempted to get Torres’ side of the story, and issued a wanted when she could not. Neither Clements nor Torres or his attorney attempted to resolve the matter between the day the wanted was issued and the day he was arrested, over a month later. This is not plain incompetence. There is no evidence that Clements intended to leave Torres’ arrest warrant out for two days after DSS closed the case, so as to pick him up despite a lack of probable cause. Clements is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs also argue that in general, warrantless arrests pursuant to a wanted are illegal when effectuated by an officer who does not have any knowledge of the grounds on which the issuing officer found probable cause.
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) , the Supreme Court addressed the legality of an investigatory Terry stop when the police officer is relying upon a “wanted flyer,” or notice from another police department, that a person is wanted in connection with the investigation of a crime. “[I]f a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that
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flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232 (internal citations omitted), accord United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2011).
A flyer based on reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a Terry stop even if the flyer omits the specific articulable facts supporting that reasonable suspicion. It follows that a wanted based on probable cause that a subject committed some offense is sufficient to support a warrantless arrest for that offense, even though the wanted lacks a description of the circumstances and facts supporting probable cause. See United States v. Holloman, 2018 WL 1166557, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2018) (“The ‘wanted’ could only justify their detaining Holloman for the purpose for which it was issued—allowing the sex crimes Detective to interview him.”). Here, there is no Fourth Amendment violation because the wanteds in question were based on probable cause.
It is also noted that in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, they claim summary judgment is not appropriate because Defendants have not shown that Torres was arrested outside the curtilage of his home and “Officer Leible violated Mr. Torres’ right to be free from warrantless arrest within his home.” This alleged violation is not pled in the FAC. Officer Leible is not a party to this action. Therefore, an individual claim
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for this alleged violation does not exist in this case. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not argue that there is a question of fact as to whether there is a policy, practice or custom of arresting subjects in the curtilage of their homes, so there is no claim against SLCPD or Chief Belmar. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Summary judgment is not barred by the purported issue of Torres’ arrest “within his home.”
Defendants Walsh and Clements are entitled to summary judgment as to Count I of the FAC.
Count II against Walsh and Clements: Fifth Amendment Claims Furlow and Torres claim that Defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights by issuing retaliatory wanteds, and detaining them pursuant to these wanteds, after they invoked their right to silence and right to have counsel present during questioning while on the phone with Defendant officers. However, Plaintiffs fail to create a question of fact as to whether they actually invoked these rights. Plaintiffs offer no law to support their contention that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked, sight unseen, on a telephone call with a law enforcement officer. As argued by Defendants, an officer cannot be sure to whom he is speaking when on the phone, rendering a purported invocation of rights meaningless, and resulting in no constitutional violation.
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Plaintiffs also allege retaliation for properly invoking their right to silence and right to have counsel present during questioning once they had been arrested and were in custody pursuant to the wanteds. Furlow and Torres claim that as a result of these invocations, Defendants Walsh and Clements, respectively, held them in custody as retaliation with their times in detention exceeding the maximum 24 hours allowed by §544.170 RSMo.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, Defendants say that Furlow was held in custody pursuant to an SLCPD policy that requires those accused of domestic violence to be held for 24 hours. The parties agree that the SLCPD has such policy, though it seems to be unwritten. The parties also agree that Walsh believes he followed all policies in his dealings with Furlow. The issue of mandatory or minimum holds of people accused of domestic violence has not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit. The purported right to be free from a domestic violence hold is not clearly established. It would certainly not be clear to a reasonable officer who by all accounts was acting in accordance with SLCPD policy. Walsh is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. As to the fact that Furlow was held for 24 hours and 28 minutes, Walsh is not alleged to have had control over Furlow’s detention outside of the general directive to hold Furlow for 24 hours. Walsh is not liable for the 28 minute statutory overage.
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Contrary to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, Defendants say that Torres was
held overnight only because it was too late to go to the prosecuting attorney’s
office to apply for a warrant at the time that Clements came on duty. Clements
applied for a warrant the next morning, before she was scheduled to work. The
warrant request was denied, and Torres was released soon after, though more than
24 hours after his arrest.
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court set forth
boundaries on detention pending a probable cause determination:
This is not to say that the probable cause determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster simply because it is provided within 48 hours. Such a hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility. Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.
500 U.S. 44, 56–57, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991). Here, every
delay in seeking a probable cause determination for Torres was based on
reasonable, unavoidable delays. Plaintiffs agree that Clements harbored no ill-will
against Torres. There is no allegation that Clements delayed Torres’ detention by
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seeking additional information to justify Torres’ arrest. Like Walsh, there is no evidence that Clements instructed the Justice Center officers and employees to hold Torres longer than 24 hours. Walsh is entitled to qualified immunity on Torres’ Fifth Amendment retaliation claim.
Defendants Walsh and Clements are entitled to summary judgment as to Count II of the FAC.
Count III against Partin, Walsh , and Clements: Due Process Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants, by issuing wanteds for their arrests, deprived Plaintiffs of liberty interests including freedom of movement and freedom to conduct their daily lives without fear. Plaintiffs also claim that being the subject of wanteds subjected them to classification and stigma as a person who is subject to summary arrest and detention. This claim is not well-founded. Plaintiffs present no evidence of an actual harm. Additionally, Plaintiffs could not fear a deprivation of liberty where no liberty existed, i.e. they were not free from the threat of arrest because there was probable cause to arrest them. To the extent that there was a likely lack of probable cause to arrest Torres for the two days prior to his arrest, Clements is entitled to qualified immunity. Individual Defendants Walsh, Partin, and Clements are entitled to summary judgment as to Count III of the FAC. All Counts, as to Defendants Belmar and St. Louis County
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Plaintiffs name Defendants St. Louis County and SLCPD Chief Belmar, in his official capacity, in all three counts of the FAC. Because Plaintiffs have failed to overcome summary judgment on their claims against the individual SLCPD defendants, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of establishing municipal liability or liability of the governmental entity. Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007). Delmar and the County are entitled to summary judgment as to the claims of Furlow and Torres.
Plaintiffs’ Motions As none of Furlow’s or Torres’ claims survive this motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied without prejudice at this time, pending the outcome of Liner’s claims. Similarly, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is denied without prejudice at this time, pending the outcome of Liner’s claims.
Conclusion The record before the Court establishes that the individual Defendants are entitled qualified immunity from suit. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that immunity does not apply. As such, the Chief Belmar and St. Louis County Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 77], is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 84], is DENIED except as to Liner.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Class, [Doc. No. 80], is DENIED at this time.
A separate judgment will be entered upon the disposition of the remaining issues herein.
Dated this 30th day of September, 2018.
________________________________ HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case: 4:16-cv-00254-HEA Doc. #: 130 Filed: 11/05/18 Page: 1 of 36 PageID #: 4474

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE FURLOW, RALPH TORRES )

and HOWARD LINER, individually and )

on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JON BELMAR, THE COUNTY OF

)

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,

)

and ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

OFFICER KEVIN WALSH,

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE OFFICER )

CHRISTOPHER PARTIN,

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

DETECTIVE CLEMENTS,

)

and ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE

)

OFFICER ED SCHLUETER,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Cause No.: 4:16-cv-00254-HEA JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SECONDAMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Ralph Torres, and Howard Liner by and through the

undersigned counsel, for their Second Amended Complaint in the above-referenced matter

hereby state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

For years, St. Louis County has allowed individual police officers to unilaterally issue the

equivalent of a statewide arrest warrant without ever going before a neutral and detached

magistrate to obtain a judicial determination of probable cause. St. Louis County police officers

refer to this warrantless arrest procedure as issuing a “Wanted.” Under this system, ordinary

police officers have been given the power to order the arrest of anyone at any time, without any

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judicial oversight whatsoever. Because this unconstitutional tool has been left in the hands of police officers and is not subject to judicial oversight, police in Missouri have issued over 2 Million Wanteds1 in a state with a population of only 6 Million people.2
These Wanteds are often issued and executed without probable cause and in retaliation for an individual’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to refuse questioning by law enforcement officials. Furthermore, no procedural safeguards exist to enable the subject of a Wanted to protect herself from the threat of arrest. Like so many of the unconstitutional and widespread police and court practices throughout the Saint Louis region, this system disproportionately impacts low income communities of color. The use of Wanteds violates the protected liberty interests of poor people and black people and create the modern day equivalent of a police state, where poor people and black people are afraid to leave their houses, drive their cars, go to their jobs, visit friends and family members, or otherwise conduct their daily lives because they are subject to summary arrest and detention at the whim of a St. Louis County police officer. This practice flagrantly violates the United States Constitutiton and has no place in a free society.
NATURE OF THE ACTION Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow (“Mr. Furlow”), Ralph Torres (“Mr. Torres”), and Howard Liner (“Mr. Liner”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, bring this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth,
1 MULES Summary Report for Jan. 2005 – Dec. 2014, MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL online database (Jun. 1, 2016 query showing 2,034,306 wanteds input into the MULES system during the ten-year period). 2 Population Trends, 2013 to 2014, MISSOURI CENSUS DATA CENTER, accessed Jul. 6, 2016, available at http://census.missouri.edu/population-trends/report.php?y=20132014&g=29000&d=1.
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and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which were violated by Defendants St. Louis County Chief of Police Jon Belmar (“Defendant Belmar”); the County of St. Louis, Missouri (“Defendant St. Louis County”); St. Louis County Police Officer Kevin Walsh (“Defendant Walsh”); St. Louis County Police Officer Christopher Partin (“Defendant Partin”); St. Louis County Detective Clements (“Defendant Clements”); and St. Louis County Police Officers Ed Schlueter, through their use of an unlawful Wanteds procedure.
THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 2. Plaintiff Ralph Torres is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 3. Plaintiff Howard Liner is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. 4. Defendant St. Louis County, Missouri, is a political and geographic subdividion of the State of Missouri existing pursuant to Missouri law. 5. Defendant Jon Belmar is the current Chief of Police for the St. Louis County Police Department. Defendant Belmar is sued in his official capacity as the supervising and commanding officer of the St. Louis County Police Department. 6. Defendant Officer Kevin Walsh, Badge #4068, is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Walsh’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Walsh is sued in his individual capacity.
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7. Defendant Officer Christopher Partin is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Partin’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Partin is sued in his individual capacity.
8. Defendant Detective Clements is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Clements’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Clements is sued in her individual capacity.
9. Defendant Officer Ed Schlueter is a sworn peace officer employed by the St. Louis County Police Department. All of Defendant Schlueter’s actions set forth in this Complaint were done under color of law. Defendant Schlueter is sued in his individual capacity.
10. Where appropriate, Defendants Walsh, Partin, Clements, and Schlueter are referred to collectively as “Defendant Officers.”
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This cause is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), since the Defendants are located, and all of the incidents giving rise to this suit occurred, in this judicial district.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 12. Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, an individual arrested without a warrant must be provided with a determination that probable cause existed for such arrest by a disinterested judicial officer without unreasonable delay. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25 (1975); Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52–59 (1991).
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13. Officers in St. Louis County circumvent this requirement for judicial review by issuing arrest orders, called “Wanteds,” in statewide databases visible to law enforcement agencies throught the state and beyond, without seeking any judicial determination of probable cause, either before or after the subjects of the Wanted are arrested.
14. St. Louis County Police Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1 expressly provides that Wanteds be entered into REJIS and or other data systems “where no warrant has been applied for”.
15. Arrests pursuant to Wanteds often occur days, weeks, months, or even years after a Wanted has been issued.
16. Defendant St. Louis County’s own policies and procedures indicate that Wanteds may remain in these databases indefinitely. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1. provides that Wanteds may be entered into REJIS indefinitely and that a type of Wanted called a “Stop Order” may be entered into MULES and/or NCIC for one year. See Exhibit A.
17. Notwithstanding apparent time restrictions in their policies that apply to Wanteds enterered on certain data systems, Department General Order 15-16 § III.B does not require that a Wanted be quashed at any time, provide a procedure for how or by whom it should be quashed, or require that a warrant application follow a Wanted entry at any time. See Ex. A.
18. The use of Wanteds to arrest and detain individuals without judicial determinations of probable cause is a policy and practice that is known and ratified by Defendant Belmar in his supervisory capacity over the St. Louis County Police Department. Ex. A, Department General Order 15-16, at pg. 5 (“By order of Jon M. Belmar, Chief of Police”).
19. Per department policy supervisor approval is a requirement before a Wanted can be entered into the MULES system. Ex. A, Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1.b.4.
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20. It has been the policy and practice of the Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department that its officers issue Wanteds to cause the arrest of individuals, either by the St. Louis County Police Department, or by some other law enforcement agency.
21. Subjects of Wanteds often do not know they have been designated for arrest by Defendants pursuant to a Wanted, because Defendants do not uniformly provide those persons notice of the Wanted. Even if an individual learns of an active Wanted, she has no procedural recourse for quashing the Wanted, other than turning herself in or submitting to police questioning.
22. Victims of Defendants’ unconstitutional scheme have no procedural recourse other than turning themselves in or submitting to questioning at the whim of St. Louis County Police officers, in a manner most often constituting a custodial arrest and interrogation.
23. Due to the lack of judicial oversight in the Wanted procedure, Defendants use Wanteds in circumstances where there was no probable cause to believe that the individual had committed a crime, or where probable cause no longer existed at the time of the Wanted-arrest.
24. Defendants have issued Wanteds for numerous purposes which include but are not limited to (1) interrogating the individual;3 (2) punishing the individual who refuses to participate in an investigation; (3) punishing the individual against whom a legitimate charge cannot be brought; (4) demonstrating the authority of the officer over the individual; and/or (5) out of deliberate indifference for the rights and liberties of the individual subject to the Wanted.
3Law enforcement agencies in Missouri have long employed aspects of this “manifestly unlawful and unconstitutional” practice describable as an “arrest for investigation,” whereupon arrests are made “on mere suspicion, or even without pretext of suspicion, for the purpose of getting a person to a convenient location where he can be questioned or ‘investigated’ as to any crime he or others may have committed. . . .” Scurlock, John, Arrest in Missouri, 29 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 117, 127 (1961).
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25. Consistent with these purposes, people arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants were (1) questioned while they were in Defendants’ custody; (2) detained either after questioning by Defendants, after refusing to answer questions, or after demanding to speak with an attorney; (3) ordered by Defendants to be held for the entire duration permissible under Missouri Law and beyond; and/or (4) released without any charge being issued by Defendants or any judicial determination of probable cause being sought by Defendants. All of these constitute unreasonable delay. See Cty. of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111–25 (discussing the competing interests of the public and law enforcement).
U.S. Department of Justice Report 26. Plaintiffs and the class members they seek to represent are subject to the same unconstitutional Wanted system maligned by the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s March 4, 2015 report titled Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. See Exhibit B. 27. The report revealed unconstitutional practices in police departments and courts throughout St. Louis, including St. Louis County, although it focused on City of Ferguson. 28. The Department of Justice highlighted the county-wide unconstitutional practice of issuing “Wanteds” without probable cause: [L]aw enforcement agencies in St. Louis County use a system of “wanteds” or “stop orders” as a substitute for seeking judicial approval for an arrest warrant. When officers believe a person has committed a crime but are not able to immediately locate that person, they can enter a “wanted” into the statewide law enforcement database, indicating to all other law enforcement agencies that the person should be arrested if located. While wanteds are supposed to be based on probable cause, see FPD General Order 424.01, they operate as an end-run around the judicial system. Instead of swearing out a warrant and seeking judicial authorization from a neutral and detached magistrate, officers make the probable cause determination themselves and circumvent the courts. Officers use wanteds for serious state-level crimes and minor code violations alike, including traffic offenses.
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Exhibit B at 22: “FPD’s Use of Police-run ‘Wanted’ System Circumvents Judicial Review and
Poses the risk of Abuse.”
29. The DOJ report describes in detail its findings on how the Wanteds procedure
circumvents the constitutional warrant requirement:
[I]nterviews with command staff and officers indicate that officers do not clearly understand the legal authority necessary to issue a wanted. For example, one veteran officer told us he will put out a wanted “if I do not have enough probable cause to arrest you.” He gave the example of investigating a car theft. Upon identifying a suspect, he would put that suspect into the system as wanted “because we do not have probable cause that he stole the vehicle.” Reflecting the muddled analysis officers may employ when deciding whether to issue a wanted, this officer concluded, “you have to have reasonable suspicion and some probable cause to put out a wanted.”
At times, FPD officers use wanteds not merely in spite of a lack of probable cause, but because they lack probable cause. In December 2014, a Ferguson detective investigating a shooting emailed a county prosecutor to see if a warrant for a suspect could be obtained, since “a lot of state agencies won’t act on a wanted.” The prosecutor responded stating that although “[c]hances are” the crime was committed by the suspect, “we just don’t have enough for a warrant right now.” The detective responded that he would enter a wanted.
Exhibit B at 23.
30. Finally, the DOJ found that police often make arrests for Wanteds that are stale, or
invalid:
In 2010, for instance, an FPD supervisor wrote that “[a]s of late we have had subjects arrested that were wanted for other agencies brought in without being verified first. You guessed it, come to find out they were no longer wanted by the agencies and had to be released.” The same supervisor told us that in 2014 he cleared hundreds of invalid wanteds from the system, some of them over ten years old, suggesting that invalid wanteds have been an ongoing problem.
Exhibit B at 23.
INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS
31. The following sections contain the background facts specific to the claims of
Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Ralph Torres, and Howard Liner.
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Mr. Furlow November–December 2015 32. Shortly after Mr. Furlow’s departure from home on the morning of November 11, 2015, Mr. Furlow’s minor son was attacked by his adult female neighbor. 33. When police arrived, the adult female neighbor alleged as the basis for the conflict that Mr. Furlow had stolen her cell phone earlier that morning. 34. Responding to this allegation, Officer Partin of the St. Louis County Police Department called Mr. Furlow on Mr. Furlow’s cell phone. 35. Officer Partin asked Mr. Furlow to return home so that he could answer questions regarding the neighbor’s allegation of cell phone theft. 36. Mr. Furlow declined to answer Officer Partin’s questions. 37. Officer Partin threatened Mr. Furlow that he would issue a Wanted if Mr. Furlow declined to submit for interrogation. 38. Mr. Furlow repeated that he had done nothing wrong, and declined to answer any questions. 39. Officer Partin issued a Wanted for Mr. Furlow. 40. After being informed of this exchange and the issuance of a Wanted, counsel for Mr. Furlow made repeated attempts to contact officers and officials of Defendant St. Louis County. 41. Counsel spoke with Officer Partin and requested that he quash the Wanted, informing Officer Partin, inter alia, that Mr. Furlow’s family had a long history with the complainant, including an active restraining order against the complainant. 42. In addition to multiple phone calls to the St. Louis County Police Department, counsel also sent a letter addressed to Captain Guy Means, First Precinct Commander of the St.
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Louis County Police Department, and St. Louis County Counselor Peter Krane, see Exhibit C,
which stated in part:
Mr. Furlow is not going to speak with the police or answer any questions. If taken into custody, Mr. Furlow will not answer questions and will make no statements.
If the officer secures an arrest warrant arising from the events this morning and alerts us of such a warrant, we will see to it that Mr. Furlow surrenders without delay.
. . .
We alert you that the desire to question Mr. Furlow is NOT a lawful justification for arresting or detaining him. You are on notice that he is not going to speak to the police. In our experience, the police often misunderstand or misapply the law in circumstances such as this, particularly with the use of a “wanted.” It is unlawful for the police to issue a wanted for questioning in the absence of probable cause to make a custodial arrest. If your officer claims that he has probable cuase, then he should seek a warrant but it is not lawful to detain someone for the purpose of questioning with the goal of developing probable cause.
43. Despite these efforts, Mr. Furlow’s counsel received no response and was
informed via telephone by a member of the St. Louis County Counselor’s office, “This office is
not going to get involved.”
44. Nearly one month later, with the Wanted still outstanding, Mr. Furlow decided to
“turn himself in” so that he would no longer be subject to the threat of arrest and detention as he
moved about town, often in the company of his wife and children.
45. Counsel for Mr. Furlow contacted Officer Partin several times by telephone and
attempted to arrange a time to deliver Mr. Furlow to Officer Partin’s station or precinct so that
Mr. Furlow’s detention would not be delayed.
46. Counsel for Mr. Furlow reiterated at this time that Mr. Furlow did not wish to
answer any questions and would invoke his right to remain silent.
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47. Officer Partin insisted that Mr. Furlow would need to remain in custody once delivered to the local precinct until he could be transferred to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri for booking and processing.
48. Not wishing to be transported by St. Louis County officers, Mr. Furlow, accompanied by counsel, turned himself in to St. Louis County’s jail on the evening of December 12, 2015.
49. Nearly an hour after Mr. Furlow’s arrival, Officer Partin arrived to the jail with a supervising officer.
50. After Mr. Furlow’s counsel reiterated to Officer Partin that Mr. Furlow did not intend to answer any questions, Officer Partin and the supervising officer informed counsel that there would be no need to take Mr. Furlow into custody.
51. Instead, Officer Partin issued a summons for Mr. Furlow to appear in court on charges of “Assault Prohibited” and “Larceny Prohibited.”
52. After issuing the summons, Officer Partin stated that the Wanted would be quashed. This occurred just over one month after the Wanted was issued.
53. On February 17, 2016, Mr. Furlow’s counsel appeared on Mr. Furlow’s behalf in the St. Louis County Municipal Court–North Division.
54. While discussing Mr. Furlow’s case, the municipal prosecutor read the charging document written by Officer Partin, apparently for the first time.
55. The prosecutor told Mr. Furlow’s counsel that the document described neither an assault nor a larceny and did not constitute the basis for the issuance of charges.
56. Rather, the document simply recounted the details of the meeting with Mr. Furlow and his counsel at the St. Louis County jail on December 12, 2015.
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57. Before hearing any argument from Mr. Furlow’s counsel, the municipal prosecutor dismissed the charges.
January 2016 58. On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, Defendant Walsh spoke with Mr. Furlow by telephone regarding an allegation against Mr. Furlow. 59. Defendant Walsh requested that Mr. Furlow return home to be questioned by Defendant Walsh regarding said allegations. 60. Mr. Furlow told Defendant Walsh that he had no interest in speaking with the police or answering any questions. 61. Defendant Walsh responded that if Mr. Furlow did not answer his questions, Defendant Walsh would issue a Wanted. 62. Mr. Furlow reiterated that he would not speak to the police. 63. Defendant Walsh issued a Wanted for Mr. Furlow. 64. The next day, on the evening of January 26, 2016, the complainant called Defendant Walsh to retract her domestic assault complaint in its entirety. 65. Defendant Walsh asked the complainant whether she was being pressured to retract her statement. The complainant responded that she was not, and that she had fabricated all of the accusations out of anger. 66. Defendant Walsh told complainant that she needed to call the prosecuting attorney’s office if she wanted to retract the complaint and quash the Wanted. 67. Complainant called a member of the St. Louis County Prosecutor’s office, retracted the complaint, and requested that the Wanted be quashed.
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68. Despite this complete retraction of the allegations and withdrawal of the complaint, the Wanted remained in the system for Mr. Furlow.
69. Two days later, on January 28, 2016 at approximately 5:30 pm, Mr. Furlow was driving south on Goodfellow Blvd. in the City of Jennings when he was stopped by St. Louis County Police.
70. The officers explained that the reason for the stop was because the vehicle’s temporary dealer’s plates were not displayed in the rear of the vehicle. (They were displayed in the front.)
71. During the stop, Mr. Furlow, who was driving, admitted that his license was suspended and that, based on his conversation with Defendant Walsh, Mr. Furlow believed that there was either a warrant or Wanted for him in St. Louis County.
72. The officers told Mr. Furlow he would not be arrested for either the license plate or the suspended license, but that they would need to run his name for any warrants or Wanteds.
73. The officers returned to their vehicle and ran a search for Mr. Furlow’s name, which revealed the Wanted issued by Defendant Walsh.
74. Acting on the Wanted, the officers then took Mr. Furlow into custody and transported him to the Jennings Police Station at 5445 Jennings Station Road.
75. Officers at the Jennings Police Station informed Mr. Furlow that he was on a 24hour hold pursuant to the Wanted and that this was the sole basis for his detention.
76. The officers attempted to question Mr. Furlow. Mr. Furlow stated that he did not wish to talk or answer any questions.
77. The officers then informed Mr. Furlow that he would be held in Jennings until he could be transported to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri. They further stated that he
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would remain at the St. Louis County jail either until Defendant Walsh questioned Mr. Furlow and “cleared” the Wanted or until the end of the 24-hour hold period.
78. Mr. Furlow repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent to officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, both in person and through counsel. Despite this fact, he continued to be held on a Wanted.
79. During the evening of January 28, counsel for Mr. Furlow notified multiple officers of the St. Louis County Police Department that Mr. Furlow was being held on the basis of an unlawful Wanted and in the absence of probable cause. However, St. Louis County Police refused to release Mr. Furlow pursuant to their policy.
80. In his capacity as watch commander of the First Precinct of the St. Louis County Police Department, Sergeant James Grace stated to Mr. Furlow’s counsel that Defendant Walsh “followed department procedures” in issuing the Wanted.
81. Defendants continued to detain Mr. Furlow. 82. Mr. Furlow was released from the St. Louis County jail after being held for 24 hours. 83. Defendant Walsh did not personally attempt to question Mr. Furlow during this 24-hour period. No charges have been filed against Mr. Furlow incident to this arrest. 84. On information and belief, Defendants did not seek a judicial determination of probable cause.
Mr. Torres 85. In late 2014 or early 2015, Ralph Torres faced investigation by the Division of Child Protective Services for alleged sexual misconduct involving his two minor children, which the Division ultimately found to be false accusations made by his ex-wife.
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86. After receiving notice of the Division’s favorable decision to close the investigation, Mr. Torres believes his ex-wife attempted to submit the same false allegations to the St. Louis County police.
87. On or about February 20, 2015, Defendant Clements telephoned Mr. Torres and asked him to come to the St. Louis County police station for questioning about allegations involving Mr. Torres’s minor daughter.
88. Mr. Torres stated that he would be agreeable to answer questions, if his lawyer could also be present.
89. Shortly after the call, Mr. Torres called his lawyer, Melissa Featherston, regarding Defendant Clements’s request.
90. Attorney Featherston telephoned Detective Clements and St. Louis County Police, leaving several messages.
91. Neither Mr. Torres nor Attorney Featherston received a return call from Detective Clements.
92. Unbeknownst to Mr. Torres, Detective Clements issued a Wanted for the arrest of Mr. Torres of which Mr. Torres did not receive notice.
93. On the morning of April 2, 2015, a St. Louis County police officer arrived at Mr. Torres’s residence in the City of Affton in St. Louis County.
94. The officer found Mr. Torres and Mr. Torres’s eight-year-old child in the garage at the rear of the home, where the two were repairing the child’s bicycle.
95. The officer told Mr. Torres that he had a Wanted in St. Louis County. This was the first time that Mr. Torres learned of the Wanted against him.
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96. The officer further informed Mr. Torres that a St. Louis County detective wished to question him, and that Mr. Torres should call someone to pick up his son so that the officer would not have to call Child Protective Services.
97. Mr. Torres was able to contact someone to pick up his child. 98. At or around 10:00 a.m., the officer handcuffed Mr. Torres and transported him to the Affton police station, where Mr. Torres was held for approximately two hours. 99. Mr. Torres was then transported to the St. Louis County jail where officers took his mugshot, fingerprints, and a mouth swab. 100. Mr. Torres remained in a holding cell with dozens of other detainees for the rest of the day. 101. The next day, in the early morning of April 3, 2015, Defendant Clements, along with a second St. Louis County detective, attempted to question Mr. Torres. 102. During this interview, Defendant Clements told Mr. Torres “you brought this on yourself” regarding Mr. Torres’s prior refusal to answer questions without his lawyer. 103. Mr. Torres again informed the St. Louis County detectives that he wished to have his lawyer present for any questioning by the police. 104. In response to this request, Defendant Clements told Mr. Torres that she would “take this to the Prosecutor” and then sent Mr. Torres back to the holding cell. 105. Mr. Torres remained in the St. Louis County jail until his release at around 12:30pm or 1:00pm on April 3, 2015. 106. While Mr. Torres was being processed for release, he noticed a handwritten note on one of his processing papers. Mr. Torres was told that the note, written by Defendant
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Clements, instructed the jail officers to hold Mr. Torres “until the last second possible” of the 24 hour hold pursuant to St. Louis County’s Wanted policy.
107. Mr. Torres was in Defendant St. Louis County’s custody for approximately 26 hours total prior to his release.
108. On information and belief, Defendants did not seek a judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Torres.
109. However, Mr. Torres was never charged with this crime or any other crimes during or after his arrest.
Mr. Liner November 2013 110. In or around November 2013, Howard Liner was arrested on a Wanted issued by the St. Louis County Police Department related to allegations stemming from a domestic dispute. 111. Mr. Liner was taken into custody at the St. Louis County jail and held for around twelve (12) hours before an officer of the St. Louis County Police Department visited him. 112. Mr. Liner was told by the officer from the St. Louis County Police Department he would be released pending investigation if he answered the officer’s questions,. 113. Mr. Liner answered the investigator’s questions. 114. Mr. Liner was released from custody a couple of hours later. 115. Around three weeks later, on or about December 2, 2014, Howard liner was charged by information. 116. Mr. Liner missed work as a result of his arrest.
June 2015
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117. In or around June 16, 2015 Howard Liner was arrested at his home by the St. Louis County Police Department on a Wanted issued by the St. Louis County Police Department regarding a prior allegation of property damage.
118. Mr. Liner was taken to the St. Louis County Police Departments First Precinct at 11815 Benham Rd., St. Louis, Missouri 63138, and held there for four (4) hours.
119. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis County jail in Clayton, Missouri, where he was told that he was on twenty-four (24) hour hold while the St. Louis County Police Department decided whether to charge him.
120. Mr. Liner was told that his twenty-four hour hold period began at the time of his arrival at the St. Louis County jail, despite the fact that Mr. Liner had been in the custody of the St. Louis County Police Department since the time of his arrest four (4) hours earlier.
121. Mr. Liner was held at the St. Louis County jail for twenty-four (24) hours and by the St. Louis County Police Department for a total of twenty-eight (28) hours
122. Mr. Liner has never been charged regarding allegations related to his June 2015 arrest.
123. Mr. Liner missed work as the result of his arrest. July–August 2015
124. Mr. Liner was alerted that a Wanted had been issued for him by the St. Louis County Police Department regarding allegations of theft during the summer of 2015.
125. Months later, on or about October 6, 2015, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department arrested Mr. Liner on the basis of the Wanted issued by Defendant Officer Schlueter.
126. Mr. Liner was held for six (6) hours in a St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Precinct.
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127. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis City jail where he was held for another four to five (4-5) hours.
128. Mr. Liner was transferred to the St. Louis County jail where he was held for another fifteen (15) hours.
129. After spending approximately 25 hours in two different jails, Defendant Officer Schlueter came to question him.
130. Defendant Schlueter told Mr. Liner that he would have been released sooner if he cooperated with the investigation.
131. Defendant Schlueter asked Mr. Liner what kind of vehicle he owned. 132. Mr. Liner responded that he drove a certain model of B.M.W. 133. Defendant Schlueter responded that he owned the same model of B.M.W., that there was no way that Mr. Liner could have moved the allegedly stolen property with such a small vehicle, that Defendant Schlueter knew that the complainants allegations were false, that he planned to file false report charges against the complainant, and that Mr. Liner should be released promptly. 134. Mr. Liner was released from the St. Louis County jail a few hours later after having spent around twenty-nine (29) hours in custody. 135. Mr. Liner missed work as the result of his arrest. 136. Mr. Liner has never been charged regarding allegations related to this arrest.
Future Wanteds and Arrests are Immanent 137. As shown above, Defendants arrested Plaintiff Ralph Torres once, Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow twice, and Plaintiff Harold Liner three times in a single year pursuant to
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Wanteds issued by Defendants where no probable cause existed to justify those arrests and prolonged jailings.
138. In other words, the Defendants’ conduct toward each of the Plaintiffs demonstrates that Plaintiffs and any other law-abiding persons can be arrested by pursuant to Defendants’ Wanteds at any time, for any reason, in the absence of probable cause and even when they have broken no laws.
139. Furthermore, Defendant St. Louis County’s policies and practices of circumventing judicial review permits them to continue issuing Wanteds to arrest and jail innocent persons unchecked, with reckless abandon, and without notice or due process for individuals subject to Wanteds.
140. Thus, Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated face an immanent threat that they can be arrested by any law enforcement agency on Defendants’ Wanteds without warning and without any ability to change their behaviors to avoid that arrest.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 141. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all others similarly situated, as representatives of the following classes (“the Classes”):
Class 1: All persons who, since February 24, 2011 have been arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants without a judicial determination of probable cause either prior to or promptly after their arrest, including those persons who were arrested without probable cause. Class 2: All persons who, since February 24, 2011 have been the subject of a Wanted issued by Defendant St. Louis County and have been denied procedural remedies to quash the Wanted. 142. Excluded from the Classes are affiliates, predecessors, successors, officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendants, and the immediate family members of
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such persons. Also excluded are any trial judge who may preside over this action, court personnel and their family members and any juror assigned to this action.
143. Plaintiffs are members of the Classes which they seek to represent. 144. The particular members of the Classes are capable of being described without difficult managerial or administrative problems. The members of the Classes are readily identifiable from the information and records in the possession or control of Defendants. 145. Upon information and belief, the Classes consist of at least hundreds of individuals and therefore are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 146. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those in the Classes and are based on the same legal and factual theories. 147. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and, in fact, the wrongs suffered and remedies sought by Plaintiffs and the other members of the Classes are premised upon an unlawful pattern and practice by Defendants. The principal common issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. the nature and extent of each Defendant’s participation, control, ratification, and promotion of the use of Wanteds for the purpose of effecting unlawful and warrantless, investigative, punitive, retaliatory or arbitrary detentions;
b. the facts concerning how the system of Wanteds functioned, including all police procedures, electronic systems, and policies relating to the issuance and execution of Wanteds;
c. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to seek a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate and instead relying on their own determination to justify the issuance of a Wanted constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
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d. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to promptly seek valid warrants for Plaintiffs and the other class members between the time they issued Wanteds and the time the individuals were arrested constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
e. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in failing to promptly seek valid warrants for Plaintiffs and the other class members after the individuals were arrested pursuant to Wanteds constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
f. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in detaining Plaintiffs and the other class members arrested on Wanteds for a period of 24 hours violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;
g. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in issuing Wanteds and/or detaining Plaintiffs and the other class members pursuant to Wanteds in retaliation for asserting their right to refuse questioning by law enforcement violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
h. whether Defendants’ policy and conduct in denying due process for Plaintiffs and the other class members to quash Wanteds and thereby interfering with their protected liberty interests violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
148. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the
Classes. Plaintiffs have suffered injury from the practices complained of and are ready, willing,
and able to serve as class representatives. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in
handling class actions and actions involving unconstitutional procedures and policies enacted
under the color of law. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest that might cause
them not to vigorously pursue this action.4
4 ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit civil rights law firm based in Saint Louis. It has represented the poor and homeless in the region for the past seven years and is an expert on the ways in which local police and court violate basic constitutional principles. Counsel was recently co-counsel in a case in the Eastern District of Missouri restricting the use of chemical munitions on peaceful protesters, is co-counsel on two federal class actions alleging the operation of debtors’ prisons in Ferguson and Jennings, Missouri, and is co-counsel in an additional nine state class action suits alleging the imposition of illegal fees and fines in various municipal courts in the St. Louis County region. See Jenkins et al. v. City of Jennings, 15-cv-252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. 2015); Fant et al. v. City of Ferguson, 15-
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Rule 23(b)(2) Certification of Class 1 and Class 2 149. Certification of Plaintiff Classes 1 and 2 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate because St. Louis County, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its use of the Wanteds to circumvent constitutionally-required judicial review, has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory and Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in St. Louis County cannot be arrested and held in jail solely because a Wanted has been issued will apply to each Class member, and further that St. Louis County cannot issue and execute Wanteds for the arrest of persons without probable cause that they have committed an offense and without notice or a hearing prior to the deprivation of their liberty. 150. Injunctive relief compelling St. Louis County to comply with these constitutional mandates will similarly (1) protect each member of the Class from being again subjected to St. Louis County’s unlawful policies and practices with respect to any members for whom a Wanted has been or will become issued; and (2) protect those who will be subject to arrest by St. Louis County in the future pursuant to a Wanted—even if they commit no crimes—from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate. Rule 23(b)(3) Certification of Class 1 151. Certification of these Plaintiff Classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is appropriate in that the Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes seek monetary damages, common questions predominate over any individual questions, and a plaintiff class
cv-253-AGF (E.D. mo. 2015). ArchCity Defenders also published an extensive report detailing similar practices and policies in the cities of Bel-Ridge and Florissant. The report is available at www.archcitydefenders.org.
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action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. To that end, the common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. A plaintiff class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the class members’ claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. The question of damages will also be driven by class-wide determinations, such as the policies and practices of the County in the issuance and ensuing arrests pursuant to Wanteds. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the number of times a person was arrested pursuant to a Wanted during the relevant period, and the length of time that person was detained pursuant to each Wanted. Moreover, the individual class members are unlikely to be aware of their rights and not in a position (either through experience or financially) to commence individual litigation against these Defendants.
152. The Plaintiffs seek the following specific relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
COUNT I UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against All Defendants Excluding Officer Partin) For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count I, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Class 1, state: 153. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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154. Rather than obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause, Defendant Officers issued Wanteds to cause Plaintiffs’ arrests and circumvent judicial review.
155. By issuing Wanteds, Defendant Officers caused Plaintiffs’ arrests. 156. Defendant Officers did not secure a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate prior to Plaintiffs’ arrests. 157. Even after Plaintiffs were arrested, Defendant Officers did not obtain a prompt determination of proable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate. 158. At all relevant times both before and after Plaintiffs’ arrests, no exigent circumstances existed to prevent Defendant Officers from obtaining a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial magistrate. 159. During Plaintiffs’ warrantless detention, Defendant Officers (1) gathered or attempted to gather additional evidence to justify the arrest, (2) prolonged Plaintiffs’ detention maliciously or for delay’s sake, and/or (3) otherwise unreasonably delayed obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause. 160. Defendant Officers’ failure to promptly obtain judicial determinations of probable cause violated Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 161. Pursuant to Defendant St. Louis County’s policies and practices, Defendant Officers were afforded discretion to routinely issue Wanteds to cause the arrest and detention of individuals. 162. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or
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customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
163. At all relevant times, Defendant St. Louis County has employed a custom, practice and usage of issuing Wanteds in order to cause the arrest and detention of individuals without obtaining a prompt determination of probable cause by a nuetral judicial magistrate in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To wit:
a. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1 expressly provides that Wanteds be entered into REJIS and or other data systems “where no warrant has been applied for”.
b. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B.1. provides that Wanteds may be entered into REJIS indefinitely and that a type of Wanted called a “Stop Order” may be entered into MULES and/or NCIC for one year.
c. Department General Order 15-16 § III.B does not require that a Wanted be quashed at any time or that a warrant application follow a Wanted entry at any time.
d. The use of Wanteds to arrest and detain individuals without judicial determinations of probable cause is a policy and practice that is known and ratified by Defendant Belmar in his supervisory capacity over the St. Louis County Police Department. Department General Order 15-16, at pg. 5 (“By order of Jon M. Belmar, Chief of Police”).
164. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
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165. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds without obtaining a prompt judicial determinination of probable cause, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate, discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
166. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so. [thus entitling Plaintiffs to declaratory and injunctive relief.
167. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs and all members of Class 1 have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: being seized and deprived of their freedom; being detained in custody; fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; lost wages; and loss of faith in society.
168. The acts of Defendant Officers described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
169. If the Plaintiffs and Class 1 prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief: A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ and the purported Class 1 members’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendement
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protections against unlawful seizures by (i) issuing Wanteds; (ii) making arrests pursuant to Wanteds; (iii) without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause; and/or (iv) without actually having probable cause at the time of arrest;
B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs;
C. For a judgment against all Defendants (excluding Defendant Partin) compensating Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 1 for the damages that they suffered as a result of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages:
a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh;
b. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
c. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officers John Doe 1-2;
E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II
RETALIATION AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR EXCERCISING THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against All Defendants Excluding Officer Partin)
For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count II, Plaintiffs, individually, state:
170. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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171. Prior to arrest, Defendant Officers attempted to question Plaintiffs. 172. Plaintiffs invoked their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by expressly refusing to make any statements to or answer any questions from Defendant Officers and/or invoked their Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during questioning by Defendant Officers. 173. Defendant Officers retaliated against Plaintiffs for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights by issuing Wanteds against Plaintiffs. 174. Defendant Officers were motivated to issue the Wanteds against Plaintiffs because of Plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 175. While Plaintiffs were detained, Defendant Officers attempted to question Plaintiffs, either personally or through fellow St. Louis County officers. 176. Plaintiffs again refused to make any statements to or answer any questions from Defendant Officers and/or invoked their Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during questioning. 177. Defendant Officers retaliated against Plaintiffs for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights by prolonging Plaintiffs’ detentions. 178. Defendant Officers were motivated to prolong Plaintiffs’ detentions because of Plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 179. The intended effect of Defendant Officers’ actions in retaliating against Plaintiffs was to discourage Plaintiffs from refusing to speak with the police. 180. Defendant Officers’ actions in arresting, detaining, and/or prolonging the detention of individuals would chill a person of ordinary firmness from asserting their Fifth Amendment rights.
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181. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
182. Defendant St. Louis County at all relevant times has employed a custom, practice and usage of issuing Wanteds and arresting and detaining individuals pursuant to Wanteds in retaliation for the invocation of rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
183. Defendant Belmar is, and at all relevant times has been, responsible for the control and supervision of the actions and practices of the officers of the St. Louis County Police Department, including department procedures with respect to the issuance of and arrests pursuant to Wanteds.
184. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
185. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds in retaliation for constitutionally-protected conduct, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate, discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
186. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so.
187. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: being seized and deprived of their
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freedom; being detained in custody; fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; and loss of faith in society.
188. The acts of Defendant Officers described herein were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
189. If the Plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief: A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendement rights when, after individuals have asserted their right to remain silent, Defendants, in retaliation and with the intent of discouraging individuals from asserting their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: (i) issue Wanteds for the arrest of those individuals; (ii) detain those individuals; (iii) and/or prolong the detention of such individuals; B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs; C. For a judgment against all Defendants (excluding Defendant Partin) compensating Plaintiffs for the damages that they suffered as a result of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages: a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh; b. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
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c. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officer Schlueter;
E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper. COUNT III
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY INTERESTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against All Defendants)
For their cause of action against the Defendants in Count III, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Class 2, state:
190. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations and averments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
191. Defendant Officers issued Wanteds in order to cause Plaintiffs’ arrests. 192. The Wanteds deprived Plaintiffs of protected liberty interests by restricting their freedom of movement; making them fear to leave their houses, drive their cars, go to their jobs, visit friends and family members, or otherwise conduct their daily lives; and classifying Plaintiffs in a stigmatizing way as people subject to summary arrest and detention. 193. Plaintiffs were afforded no process or procedure by which to challenge the Wanteds, and were thus unable to quash the Wanteds. 194. Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests significantly outweigh Defendants’ interests in issuing Wanteds, given the well-established legal standards for executing arrests and detentions in a manner that does not violate the constitutionally-protected liberty interests of arrestees and detainees.
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195. By violating Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, or otherwise creating a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, without providing policies or procedures to prevent such violations—particularly given the existence of reasonable alternatives such as securing a valid warrant—Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ right to procedural due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
196. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officers, as a sworn members of the St. Louis County Police Department, were acting pursuant to either official policies or customs, practices and usages so pervasive as to constitute policies of Defendant St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department.
197. Defendant St. Louis County at all relevant times has employed a custom, practice and usage of depriving individuals of protected liberty interests by issuing Wanteds without procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
198. As such, Defendant St. Louis County is culpable pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny.
199. In the alternative, policymakers for the Defendant St. Louis County, including but not limited to Defendant Belmar, were aware that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department issued Wanteds without obtaining a prompt judicial determinination of probable cause, without affording procedural due process, and/or in retaliation for constitutionallyprotected conduct, and have been deliberately indifferent in their duties to correct, supervise, control and, when appropriate, discipline their officers who have committed these acts which violate the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
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200. The Defendant St. Louis County has the power and responsibility to prevent the existence of the policies and practices described above and has failed and refused to do so.
201. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to: fear, apprehension, depression, anxiety, consternation and emotional distress; violation of their constitutional rights; deprivation of protected liberty interests; interference with their family relationships; interference with their professional and employment relationships; loss of employment or other work opportunities; lost time; and loss of faith in society.
202. The acts of Defendant Officers were intentional, wanton, malicious, and/or were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs, thus entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Officers.
203. If the Plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this honorable Court issue the following relief: A. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ and the purported Class 2 members’ Fourteenth Amendement protections against deprivations of protected liberty interests without due process when Defendants, without providing or affording individuals notice of and a process by which Wanteds can be challenged and/or quashed, nonetheless (i) issue Wanteds; (ii) make arrests pursuant to Wanteds; (iii) without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause; (iv) or without actually having probable cause at the time of arrest; B. For an order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 2; C. For a judgment against all Defendants compensating Plaintiffs and the purported members of Class 2 for the damages that they suffered as a result of the County’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
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D. For a judgment awarding individual punitive damages:
a. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Kevin Walsh;
b. In favor of Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow and against Defendant Christopher Partin;
c. In favor of Plaintiff Ralph Torres and against Defendant Clements; and
d. In favor of Plaintiff Howard Liner and against Defendant Officer Schlueter;

E. For an order and judgment granting Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

F. For any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: November 5, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,

ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, INC.

/s/ Nathaniel R. Carroll Blake A. Strode (#68422MO) Michael-John Voss (#61742MO) Nathaniel R. Carroll (#67988MO) Sima Atri (#70489MO) John M. Waldron (#70401MO) 440 N. 4th Street, Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 Tel: 855-724-2489 Fax: 314-925-1307 bstrode@archcitydefenders.org mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org ncarroll@archcitydefenders.org satri@archcitydefenders.org jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org

and

CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS Baher Azmy (pro hac vice) Darius Charney (pro hac vice) Omar Farah (pro hac vice)

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666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, New York 10012 Tel: 212-614-6464 Fax: 212-614-6499 bazmy@ccrjustice.org dcharney@ccrjustice.org ofarah@ccrjustice.org and PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON AND GARRISON LLP Eric Alan Stone (pro hac vice) Timothy J. Holland (pro hac vice) Elizabeth J. Grossman (pro hac vice) 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 estone@paulweiss.com tholland@paulweiss.com egrossman@paulweiss.com Attorneys for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served electronically via this Court’s Electronic Filing System to all counsel of record on this 5th day of November, 2018. /s/ Nathaniel R. Carroll
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 Case: 4:16-cv-00254-HEA Doc. #: 143 Filed: 03/15/19 Page: 1 of 16 PageID #: 4546

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE FURLOW et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JOHN BELMAR et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 4:16-CV-254 HEA ) ) ) )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ed Schlueter’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 135], Defendants St. Louis County and St. Louis

County Police Chief John Belmar’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 77],

and Plaintiff Howard Liner’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 84].

The parties oppose the respective motions. The motions have been fully briefed.

This Court’s previous Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated October 5,

2018 [Doc. No. 129] (“Previous Order”) fully disposed of two of the three named

Plaintiffs’ claims. The claims of Howard Liner (“Liner”) against Defendants John

Doe 1-2, St. Louis County and John Belmar (“Belmar”) were stayed pending

substitution of named defendants pursuant to this Court’s Order to Substitute and

Serve the Doe Defendants [Doc. No. 128]. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended

Complaint substituting Defendant Ed Schlueter (“Schlueter”) as and for the Doe

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Defendants. Therefore, the claims and parties presently before the Court are Counts I, II and III, each alleged by Plaintiff Liner against Defendants St. Louis County, Belmar, and Schlueter.
The Court now considers Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Liner’s claims against St. Louis County and Belmar and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to Liner’s claims, as they were not ruled on in the Previous Order. Also considered herein is Defendant Schlueter’s separate Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff Liner’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I is denied. Defendant Schlueter’s motion for summary judgement is denied as to Count I and Count III, and granted as to Count II. Defendants St. Louis County and Belmar’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count I and Count II, and denied as to Count III.
Facts and Background “Wanteds” Under Missouri State Law, a law enforcement officer “may arrest on view, and without a warrant, any person the officer sees violating or who such officer has reasonable grounds to believe has violated any ordinance or law of this state, including a misdemeanor or infraction, over which such officer has jurisdiction.” 544.216 RSMo. A “wanted,” which is entered into a computer system by a law
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enforcement officer, identifies a person who is wanted for a crime, but for whom no warrant has been issued. Wanteds differ from warrants in that no judicial determination of probable cause is required to enter a wanted. If a St. Louis County Police officer encounters a person with a wanted entered against him or her, the officer is authorized by St. Louis County Police Department (“SLCPD”) policy to take that person into custody. The wanted, as displayed to the arresting officer, does not include a description of the probable cause on which it is based.
In its Previous Order, this Court held that wanteds are a type of warrantless arrest, and therefore permissible only if the wanted is based on probable cause.
Facts Not In Dispute The underlying “wanted” in this matter was issued by Schlueter on August 25, 2015. It identified Liner as wanted for the theft of a set of 22 inch vehicle wheels and tires from Jaylyn Davis. As for facts, Schlueter’s August 25, 2015 Investigative Report is undisputed as representative of what Schlueter heard, observed, and believed at the time he issued the wanted. For their motions for summary judgement, however, Defendants rely heavily on Schlueter’s deposition. The deposition was taken more than 17 months after the events of August 25, 2015 and includes details about the incident that were not mentioned in the Investigative Report. Liner objects to Defendants’ characterization of the latter provided details as undisputed fact.
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The facts not in dispute, as recorded in Schlueter’s Investigation Report, are summarized as follows. At 7:34 p.m. on August 25, 2015, Schlueter was dispatched to a residence on a larceny call. After he arrived at the residence, Schlueter “contacted the victim identified as Jaylyn Davis.” It is undisputed that Davis was not at the residence when Schlueter arrived, and that Schlueter only spoke to Davis on the phone. Davis stated that he and Liner had been in the front yard, where Davis was trying to sell stereo equipment to Liner. Liner was an acquaintance of Davis. Davis went inside to get some other items he wanted to sell. When he came back out, Davis noticed that Liner was gone and four wheels and tires were missing from the front yard. Davis stated that the wheels and tires were rented from “Rent ‘N’Roll” and had an estimated value of $3,000.00.
Davis told Schlueter that he observed Liner driving away in a silver BMW with Illinois license plates. Davis also told Schlueter that one neighbor had observed a black male putting the wheels into the back of a silver BMW.
Schlueter attempted, but was unable to contact the neighbor, or anyone else, at the address Davis gave him. Schlueter further canvassed the area “with negative results.” Schlueter then entered the wanted for Liner.
At 4:45 p.m. on October 5, 2015, Liner was arrested by the St. Louis Metro Police and taken into custody. The only charge listed on the Metro Police processing document refers to a document with the same reference number as the
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wanted entered by Schlueter on August 25, indicating that Liner was arrested based solely on the outstanding wanted. Liner was then taken into the custody of St. Louis County Police at 6:30 p.m. Schlueter canceled the wanted after he was notified that Liner was in custody.
On October 6, Schlueter interviewed Liner in custody. Liner waived his Miranda rights and told Schlueter that on August 25, he and Davis had argued about money on the phone. Liner said that he had owed Davis for some stereo equipment he bought, but that he was not going to pay Davis back because Davis had stolen money from Liner’s house. Liner’s stepdaughter was a friend of Davis, and had let him into Liner’s house. Liner told Schlueter that Davis was trying to sell the wheels and other stolen items on Craigslist.
Liner told Schlueter that he had been out with his girlfriend on August 25th, and was not at Davis’ home. Liner said he owned a silver BMW, model 325i.
Schlueter noted in his report that “a set of four 22 [inch] rims and wheels would be too large to fit in the trunk of a BMW 325i.” He also referred to his earlier report, noting that he had been unable to locate the neighbor that Davis claimed was a witness to Liner stealing the wheels and tires. Liner was released from the custody of the SLCPD at 10:58 a.m.
Discussion
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Liner claims that Schlueter violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition to Liner’s claims against Schlueter in his individual capacity, Liner also claims that St. Louis County and Police Chief Belmar, in his official capacity, are liable for the alleged violations. Liner’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges three counts.
Count I alleges that Liner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Schlueter issued a wanted for Liner’s arrest without probable cause and without seeking a judicial determination of probable cause. Liner further alleges Fourth Amendment violations based on his arrest and detention pursuant to the wanted and without actual probable cause or a judicial determination of probable cause.
Count II alleges that Schlueter retaliated against Liner for exercising his Fifth Amendment right and refusing to answer questions from Schlueter.1
Count III alleges that Defendants deprived Liner of the liberty interests of freedom of movement and freedom to conduct his daily lives without fear, as well as his interest in not being classified stigmatically as a person who is subject to summary arrest and detention. Liner alleges that he was deprived of these interests without due process or procedure with which to challenge the wanted, thereby violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
1 As discussed below, the Complaint, which applied to all three Plaintiffs, made no allegations that Liner refused to answer questions or invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.
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Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to Count I only. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all Counts.
Summary Judgment Standard The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences
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are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249.
Qualified Immunity Whether Schlueter is immune from suit under the doctrine of Qualified Immunity is a threshold issue. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244, 182 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted). “The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original).
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Municipal and Governmental Entity Liability A suit against a governmental actor in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself. Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991)). Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). “A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under § 1983 by proving that his or her constitutional rights were violated by an action pursuant to official municipal policy or misconduct so pervasive among non-policymaking employees of the municipality as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n order to state a viable § 1983 claim . . . plaintiff is required to plead facts sufficient to show at least an inference that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of action taken pursuant to an official policy, or as a result of misconduct so pervasive among non-policymakers as to constitute a widespread custom and practice with the force of law.” Davis v. St. Louis County, Mo., 2015 WL 758218, at *12 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 23, 2015) (citation omitted).
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Analysis Count I “A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there is at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 837 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522–23 (8th Cir. 2011)) (internal citations omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2015). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). “Probable cause exists when the totality of circumstances demonstrates that a prudent person would believe that the arrestee has committed or was committing a crime.” Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir 1999). “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept— turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
10

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reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal quotation omitted).
“Whether probable cause existed at the time of the arrest is a question of law for the court.” Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). Nevertheless, “the burden remains on the proponent of [qualified] immunity to establish the relevant predicate facts, and at the summary judgment stage the nonmoving party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000). “In the event that a genuine dispute exists concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.” Id.
Here, Liner’s and Schlueter’s cross-motions for summary judgment as to Count I must be denied because there are genuine disputes of fact that are material to the issue of whether or not Schlueter had arguable probable cause to enter a wanted for Liner. Liner disputes many of Defendants’ proposed facts based on the absence of those facts in Schlueter’s Investigative Report. Those proposed facts are taken from Schlueter’s deposition and are relied upon by Defendants for their probable cause argument, namely:
• that Schlueter spoke not only to Davis on the phone, but also to Davis’ mother and other people that were in the house;
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• that Davis’ mother told Schlueter that Liner had stolen the wheels; • that Davis’ mother told Schlueter that she saw Liner drive away.
Defendants claim that Liner cannot defeat their motion for summary judgment because Liner fails to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” This argument is not well taken. Liner clearly argues that the factual dispute concerns the additional material information given in Schlueter’s deposition versus his Investigative Report. Liner distinguishes the Investigative Report, which was made contemporaneously with the events of August 25, 2015 from Schlueter’s deposition, which was taken 17 months later when Schlueter’s memory of the events was not fresh. Moreover, Schlueter testified his investigative reports usually contain the details upon which he bases probable cause, and that he based his probable cause determination on the statements of “[Davis’] mother and the other individuals on scene.” However, the only statements mentioned in the Investigative Report are those of Davis, creating a credibility question that is not in the purview of this Court.
Whether Schlueter had even arguable probable cause to enter a wanted for Liner is subject to a factual dispute regarding the veracity of the deposition details. The undisputed facts alone do not conclusively establish probable cause.
[L]aw enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so long as “law enforcement would not [be] unduly hampered ... if the agents ... wait[ ] to obtain
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more facts before seeking to arrest.” . . . An officer need not conduct a “mini-trial” before making an arrest, Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867, 117 S.Ct. 179, 136 L.Ed.2d 119 (1996); Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 346 (8th Cir.1974), but probable cause does not exist when a “minimal further investigation” would have exonerated the suspect. See Bigford, 834 F.2d at 1219; BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir.1986) (a police officer “may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of an arrest”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476–77 and n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (police need not interview alleged alibi witnesses but must “reasonably interview witnesses readily available at the scene, investigate basic evidence, or otherwise inquire if a crime has been committed at all before invoking the power of warrantless arrest and detention”); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 956–58 (4th Cir.1988) (no probable cause where officer unreasonably failed to interview witnesses at scene of automobile accident who would have corroborated plaintiff's version of story); Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259 (officers may weigh the credibility of witnesses in making a probable cause determination, but they may not ignore available and undisputed facts).
Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650–51 (8th Cir. 1999). Schlueter relied on the
statements of only one witness – the purported victim – who had left the scene
minutes after the alleged larceny. Schlueter also relied on the alleged victim’s
assertions that some other witness saw Liner taking the wheels, even though that
person, like the alleged victim, was not locatable minutes after the events. Based
solely on the undisputed facts, Schlueter could not reasonably have believed there
to be probable cause to arrest Liner without a warrant. The disputed facts, which
cannot be judged by this Court, concern predicate facts material to the issues of
probable cause and qualified immunity, and thus preclude summary judgment as to
Schlueter and Count I.
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As for St. Louis County and Belmar, Count I alleges that they are liable as governmental entities because “issuing Wanteds in order to cause the arrest and detention of individuals without obtaining a prompt determination of probable cause by a neutral judicial magistrate” violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. This Court rejected this argument in its Previous Order, finding that the lack of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause does not render the Wanted system unconstitutional. Accordingly, Defendants St. Louis County and Belmar are entitled to summary judgement as to Count I.
Count II In the SAC, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights by issuing retaliatory wanteds, and detaining them pursuant to these wanteds, after they invoked their right to silence and right to have counsel present during questioning while on the phone with Defendant officers. However, the SAC contains no allegations that Liner ever refused to answer Schlueter’s (or any officer’s) questions or otherwise invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Seemingly, Count II erroneously included a claim by Liner against Schlueter. As there is no allegation of an underlying constitutional violation, summary judgment for Count II will be entered in favor of Defendant Schlueter as well as St. Louis County and Belmar. Count III
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Liner claims that by issuing a wanted for his arrest, Schlueter deprived him of liberty interests including freedom of movement and freedom to conduct his daily lives without fear. Liner alleges that he was deprived of these interests without due process or procedure with which to challenge the wanted issued against him, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Liner also claims that the wanted subjected him to classification and stigma as a person who is subject to summary arrest and detention.
Defendants did not brief any arguments regarding Count III in their first Motion for Summary Judgment or in Schlueter’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, in its Previous Order, this Court granted summary judgment as to Count III in favor of Defendants. That determination was based squarely on the Court’s finding that Defendants had at least arguable probable cause to arrest the relevant Plaintiffs. Here, the question of probable cause cannot be reconciled on summary judgment, and Defendants have not justified their motion for summary judgment as to Count III. Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to Count III.
Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Liner’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I is denied. Defendant Schlueter’s motion for summary judgement is denied as to Count I and Count III, and granted as to Count II. Defendants St. Louis
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County and Belmar’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count I and Count II, and denied as to Count III.
As a matter of clarification, the remaining parties and claims in this case are: Count I – Plaintiff Liner against Defendant Schlueter, and Count III – Plaintiff Liner against Defendants Schlueter, St. Louis County, and Belmar.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants St. Louis County and John Belmar’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 77], with respect to the claims of Plaintiff Howard Liner, is GRANTED as to Count I and Count II and DENIED as to Count III. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Howard Liner’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 84], is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ed Schlueter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 135], is DENIED as to Count I and Count III and GRANTED as to Count II. Dated this 15th day of March, 2019.
________________________________ HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16

 
 U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:16−cv−00254−HEA

TRCK3

Furlow v. Belmar et al Assigned to: District Judge Henry Edward Autrey Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/24/2016 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Dwayne Furlow individually and behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Blake Alexander Strode ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 x1003 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: bstrode@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward James Hall ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: e.j.hall89@gmail.com TERMINATED: 04/13/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY

Eric Alan Stone PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Email: estone@paulweiss.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Cohen PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Email: jaycohen@paulweiss.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael−John Voss ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 x1002 Fax: 855−925−1307 Email: mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. Harvey

ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L. Street NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 314−482−3342 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: tharvey@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angelo R. Guisado CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway 7th Floor New York, NY 10012 212−614−6464 Email: aguisado@ccrjustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles Jordan Hamilton PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Email: chamilton@paulweiss.com TERMINATED: 06/27/2018
Darius Charney CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE LAW 228 Seventh Street, SE Washington, DC 20003−4306 212−614−6475 Email: dcharney@ccrjustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth J. Grossman PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Fax: 212−492−0726 Email: egrossman@paulweiss.com TERMINATED: 04/05/2019
Emily Beth Goldberg PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Email: egoldberg@paulweiss.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−361−8834 x1024 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maureen Hanlon ARCHCITY DEFENDERS

Plaintiff Ralph Torres

440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−361−8834 Email: mhanlon@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll KEANE LAW LLC 7777 Bonhomme Ave. Suite 1600 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−391−4700 Email: nathaniel@keanelawllc.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Ahmed Farah CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway 7th Floor New York, NY 10012 212−614−6485 Email: ofarah@ccrjustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−461−8834 x2006 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: satri@archcitydefenders.org TERMINATED: 02/03/2020
Timothy James Holland PAUL WEISS LLP − New York 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019−6064 212−373−3000 Email: tholland@paulweiss.com TERMINATED: 01/22/2019
represented by Eric Alan Stone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Harold Liner

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angelo R. Guisado (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles Jordan Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/27/2018
Darius Charney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth J. Grossman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019
Emily Beth Goldberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maureen Hanlon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Ahmed Farah (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy James Holland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/22/2019
represented by Eric Alan Stone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Jon Belmar

Angelo R. Guisado (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles Jordan Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/27/2018
Darius Charney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth J. Grossman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2019
Emily Beth Goldberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maureen Hanlon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Ahmed Farah (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy James Holland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/22/2019
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELORS OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314−249−4502 Fax: 314−615−3732 Email: fsmith@stlouisco.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael E. Hughes ST. LOUIS COUNTY COUNSELORS OFFICE 41 S. Central Avenue Clayton, MO 63105 314−615−7009 Fax: 314−615−3732 Email: mhughes2@stlouisco.com TERMINATED: 12/03/2019

Defendant County of St. Louis, Missouri
Defendant Kevin Walsh St. Louis County Police Officer, Badge #4068
Defendant Christopher Partin
Defendant Unknown Clements Detective, St. Louis County Police Department
Defendant John Does 1−20 St. Louis County Police Department TERMINATED: 11/05/2018 Defendant Ed Schlueter St Louis County Police Department

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael E. Hughes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael E. Hughes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael E. Hughes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael E. Hughes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank James Smith , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant
Regional Justice Information Service Commission 4255 West Pine Blvd St. Louis, MO 63108 3145331950

Michael E. Hughes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Raymond B. Flojo ST LOUIS CITY LAW DEPARTMENT − POLICE SECTION 1915 Olive St. Suite 773 St. Louis, MO 63103 314−444−5609 Fax: 314−444−5611 Email: rflojo@slmpd.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/24/2016
02/25/2016 03/23/2016 03/28/2016 04/23/2016 04/25/2016 04/29/2016
05/12/2016 05/18/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against defendant All Defendants with receipt number 0865−5279377, in the amount of $400 Jury Demand,, filed by Dwayne Furlow. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Original Filing Form, # 3 Waiver of Service, # 4 Waiver of Service, # 5 Waiver of Service, # 6 Waiver of Service, # 7 Waiver of Service, # 8 Waiver of Service, # 9 Exhibit)(Strode, Blake) (Entered: 02/24/2016)
Case Opening Notification: Waivers issued 3. Judge Assigned: Honorable Carol E. Jackson. (JWD) (Entered: 02/25/2016)
2 ENTRY of Appearance by Edward James Hall for Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow. (Hall, Edward) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Dwayne Furlow All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Waiver of Service, # 2 Waiver of Service)(Strode, Blake) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
4 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Jon Belmar, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Unknown Walsh.(Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 04/23/2016)
5 ENTRY of Appearance by Nathaniel Richard Carroll for Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
6 RULE 16 ORDER: Joint Proposed Scheduling Plan: No later than seven days before the scheduling conference, counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Court a joint proposed scheduling plan. Rule 16 Conference set for 5/19/2016 01:30 PM in Chambers before District Judge Carol E. Jackson.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/29/16. (KKS) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
7 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow. With Consent of Counsel for Defendants. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
8 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Rule 16 scheduling conference is rescheduled to Tuesday, June 7, 2016, at 11:30 a.m. The conference will be held in chambers. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 1. No later than seven days before the scheduling conference, counsel shall jointly prepare and file with the Clerk of Court a revised proposed scheduling plan that is consisted with a Track 3 Complex schedule, pursuant to E.D. Mo. L.R. 5.01. 2. The revised proposed scheduling plan shall also provide for an initial phase of discovery (Phase I) that allows only for the discovery of information material to the following issues: (a) whether a class should be certified and the scope of any such class and (b) the merits of the claims alleged by the named plaintiff in her individual capacity. 3. The revised proposed scheduling plan shall contain deadlines for completing all Phase I discovery, filing and briefing of any motion for class certification, and filing an briefing any dispositive motion with respect to the claims alleged by the named plaintiff in her individual capacity. Signed by District Judge Carol E.

05/30/2016 06/07/2016 06/07/2016
06/07/2016
07/08/2016
07/08/2016 07/25/2016 07/25/2016 07/25/2016 07/26/2016 07/26/2016
07/29/2016 08/11/2016 09/14/2016

Jackson on 5/18/2016. (KMS) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
9 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow. Revised with consent by all parties. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 05/30/2016)
10 Minute Entry for Rule 16 Conference proceedings held before District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 6/7/2016. Conference held in person and and lasted 50 minutes. CMO to issue. (Notice only, no.pdf attached.). (FTR Gold: No.) (KKS) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
11 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER − PHASE I; Track 3 (Complex) Motion to Join Parties due by 7/7/2016. All requests for Phase I discovery are to be issued by December 1, 2016. Discovery Completion due by 1/31/2017. The deadline for filing a motion to certify a class must is February 28,2017.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 6/7/16. (KKS) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
12 DEPOSITION ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall submit complete transcripts of all deposition testimony that is cited in support of or in opposition to a motion. Excerpted portions of a witness's deposition testimony will not be considered by the Court absent a showing of good cause for not submitting the entire transcript. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit redacted transcripts whenever required to do so in order to comply with the rules governing privacy protection, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) and E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.17(A).. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 6/7/16. (KKS) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
14 AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendant All Defendants Amendment to 1 Complaint, 2 Summons(es) issued, Jury demand, , filed by Dwayne Furlow, Ralph Torres, Harold Liner. Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by Dwayne Furlow. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − St Louis County Gen Order 15−26, # 2 Exhibit B − DOJ report, # 3 Exhibit C − Nov 11 2015 Letter re Furlow)(Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
***REMARK : Document 13 deleted per attorney. See corrected entry #14. (KKS) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
15 MOTION for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defendant St. Louis County, Defendant Jon Blemar, Defendant Kevin Walsh by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support of Request for Entry of Default)(Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
16 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer To First Amended Complaint by Defendants Jon Belmar, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Kevin Walsh. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
17 RESPONSE to Motion re 15 MOTION for Entry of Clerk's Default against Defendant St. Louis County, Defendant Jon Blemar, Defendant Kevin Walsh filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Kevin Walsh. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
***REMARK Motion for Clerk's Entry of Default 15 forwarded to Clerk of Court. (CLO) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
18 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants Jon Belmar, the County of St. Louis, and Kevin Walsh for an extension of time until July 29, 2016, to file their answers to the amended complaint [Doc. # 16 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for entry of default [Doc. # 15 ] is moot. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 7/26/16. (JAB) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
19 ANSWER to 14 Amended Complaint, by Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 07/29/2016)
20 ENTRY of Appearance by Michael−John Voss for Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Voss, Michael−John) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
21 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Darius Charney. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5585239) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Charney, Darius) (Entered: 09/14/2016)

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22 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Omar Farah. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5585485) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Farah, Omar) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
23 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 22 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Omar Farah. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5585485) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Farah, Omar) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres, 21 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Darius Charney. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5585239) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Charney, Darius) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 9/15/2016. (CLO) (Entered: 09/15/2016)
24 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Jay Cohen. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640766) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Cohen, Jay) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
25 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Eric A. Stone. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640797) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Charles J. Hamilton. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640831) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Hamilton, Charles) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
27 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Emily B. Goldberg. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640860) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Goldberg, Emily) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
28 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 24 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Jay Cohen. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640766) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres., 26 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Charles J. Hamilton. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640831) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres., 25 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Eric A. Stone. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640797) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres., 27 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Emily B. Goldberg. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5640860) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 10/21/16. (JAB) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
29 ENTRY of Appearance by Thomas B. Harvey for Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Harvey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
30 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 11 Case Management Order, by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Order)(Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
31 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties joint motion to revise the Case Management Order [Doc. # 30 ] is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply: 1. Disclosure shall proceed in the following manner: (a) All requests for Phase I discovery are to be issued by December 30, 2016. (b) All Phase I discovery is to be completed by March 17, 2017. 2. The deadline for filing a motion to certify a class is April 28, 2017. The response in opposition to that motion will be due on May 26, 2017. The reply in support of the motion will be on June 9, 2017. 3. The deadline for filing a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or motion for judgment of individual claims of named plaintiff(s) will be on April 28, 2017. The response in opposition to such a motion will be due twenty− eight days later, or no later than May 26, 2017. The reply in support

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of the motion will be due fourteen days after the response, or no later than June 9, 2017. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 12/16/16. (JAB) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
32 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Timothy Holland. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5729494) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
33 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 32 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Timothy Holland. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5729494) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Holland, Timothy) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 12/21/2016. (CLO) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
34 MOTION for Leave to Inspect Juvenile Records by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
35 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document Defendants' Exhibit A, deposition of Laura Clements by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
36 SEALED DOCUMENT Defendants' Exhibit A, Deposition of Laura Clements by Defendants County of St. Louis, Missouri, Jon Belmar, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh, Unknown Clements. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
37 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 34 MOTION for Leave to Inspect Juvenile Records filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
38 Docket Text ORDER: GRANTING 35 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document Defendants' Exhibit A, deposition of Laura Clements by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 03/13/17. (KKS) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
39 JOINT MOTION TO AMEND PHASE I SCHEDULING PLAN 31 Case Management Order − Amended by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) Modified text on 3/16/2017 (KKS). (Entered: 03/15/2017)
40 REPLY to Response to Motion re 34 MOTION for Leave to Inspect Juvenile Records filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
41 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' joint motion to revise the Case Management Order [Doc. # 39 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply: 1. All Phase I discovery is to be completed by April 14, 2017. 2. The deadline for filing a motion to certify a class is May 26, 2017. The response in opposition to that motion will be due on June 23, 2017. The reply in support of the motion will be on July 7, 2017. 3. The deadline for filing a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or motion for judgment of individual claims of named plaintiff(s) will be on May 26, 2017. The response in opposition to such a motion will be due twenty− eight days later, or no later than June 23, 2017. The reply in support of the motion will be due fourteen days after the response, or no later than July 7, 2017. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 3/17/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
42 MOTION for Hearing re 34 MOTION for Leave to Inspect Juvenile Records by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
43 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Edward Hall by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Hall, Edward) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
44 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER:IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to inspect the video recording(s) of S.T.s forensic interview [Doc. # 34 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ten (10) days of the date of this order, The Child Center, Inc. shall provide a copy of the DVD of the November 26, 2014, forensic interview of S.T., in addition to other investigative records regarding the allegations of

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sexual misconduct by plaintiff Ralph Torres. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to protect the privacy of all reporters, all names and personal identifying information in the records or reports shall be redacted in advance of disclosure to plaintiffs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the DVD and all other records provided by the Child Center, Inc. shall be limited to use in this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the viewing or use of the DVD and all other records provided by the Child Center, Inc. shall be restricted to counsel for the parties and plaintiff Ralph Torres. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the copying, reproduction, or distribution of the DVD or other records provided by The Child Center is prohibited. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the final disposition of this case, the recording and all other records be returned to The Child Center, Inc., or destroyed with an accompanying certification in accordance with Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.035. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for a hearing [Doc. # 42 ] is moot. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/11/17. (JAB) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
45 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 41 Case Management Order − Amended,,, by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
46 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Elizabeth Grossman. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5907983) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Grossman, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
47 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties joint motion to revise the Case Management Order [Doc. # 45 ] is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply: 1. All Phase I discovery is to be completed by June 9, 2017. 2. The deadline for filing a motion to certify a class is July 7, 2017. The response in opposition to that motion will be due on August 4, 2017. The reply in support of the motion will be due on August 18, 2017. 3. The deadline for filing a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or motion for judgment of individual claims of named plaintiff(s) will be on July 7, 2017. The response in opposition to such a motion will be due twenty− eight days later, or no later than August 4, 2017. The reply in support of the motion will be due fourteen days after the response, or no later than August 18, 2017. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/13/17. (JAB) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
48 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 43 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Edward Hall by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Hall, Edward) ; ORDERED GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/13/17. (JAB) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
49 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 46 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Elizabeth Grossman. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5907983) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Grossman, Elizabeth) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/17/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
50 Joint MOTION to Amend the Phase I Scheduling Plan 47 Case Management Order − Amended by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) Modified text on 6/6/2017 (KKS). (Entered: 06/06/2017)
51 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' joint motion to revise the Case Management Order [Doc. # 50 ] is granted. 47 Case Management Order − Amended filed by Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow, Plaintiff Harold Liner, Plaintiff Ralph Torres ( All Phase I Discovery Completion due by 7/7/2017., Dispositive Motions due by 7/28/2017.) The deadline for filing a motion to certify a class is July 28, 2017.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 6/7/17. (KKS) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
52 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct 51 Case Management Order − Amended, Terminate Motions,,,, by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 07/05/2017)
53 ORDER:IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' joint motion to revise the Case Management Order [Doc. # 52 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply:(SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) ( Discovery Completion

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due by 8/4/2017., Dispositive Motions due by 8/25/2017.). Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 7/6/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
54 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following cases are transferred to the Honorable Charles A. Shaw. All hearings previously scheduled remain set unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 7/28/17. (JAB) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
55 REASSIGNMENT ORDER (GJL). District Judge Charles A. Shaw no longer assigned to case. Case reassigned to District Judge John A. Ross for all further proceedings. (LMY) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration of Timothy J. Holland, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P, # 19 Exhibit Q, # 20 Exhibit R, # 21 Exhibit S, # 22 Exhibit T, # 23 Exhibit U, # 24 Exhibit V, # 25 Exhibit W, # 26 Exhibit X, # 27 Exhibit Y, # 28 Exhibit Z, # 29 Exhibit AA, # 30 Exhibit BB, # 31 Exhibit CC, # 32 Exhibit DD, # 33 Exhibit EE, # 34 Exhibit FF, # 35 Exhibit GG, # 36 Exhibit HH, # 37 Exhibit II, # 38 Exhibit JJ, # 39 Exhibit KK, # 40 Exhibit LL, # 41 Exhibit MM, # 42 Exhibit NN, # 43 Exhibit OO, # 44 Exhibit PP, # 45 Exhibit QQ, # 46 Exhibit RR)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
57 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
58 MOTION to Stay Phase I Deadlines by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
59 ORDER: 56 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Third−Party The Regional Justice Information Service Commission ("REJIS") and/or Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party Rejis and to Reopen Deposition (Doc. No. 56 ) by Friday, August 4, 2017. Any reply shall be filed no later than Tuesday, August 8, 2017. Response to Court due by 8/4/2017.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/2/17. (KKS) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
60 RESPONSE to Motion re 58 MOTION to Stay Phase I Deadlines, 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
61 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Phase I Deadlines 58 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party Rejis and to Reopen Deposition (Doc. No. 56 ) is set for hearing on Thursday, August 10, 2017 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12N. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/3/17. (JAB) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
62 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 59 Scheduling Order, 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS, 57 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 61 Order, by Movant Regional Justice Information Service Commission. (Flojo, Raymond) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
63 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Regional Justice Information Service Commission (REJIS)s motion for additional time to respond to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel up to and including Monday, August 7, 2017 62 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in light of the extension of time to respond granted to REJIS, Plaintiffs shall have until Wednesday, August 9, 2017 to file their reply. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/4/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
64 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS filed by Movant Regional Justice Information Service Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 REJIS Commission v REJIS Inc, # 2 Exhibit 2 Deposition of Meschke, # 3 Exhibit 3 Subpoena Jennings, # 4 Exhibit 4 Deposition Notice Jennings, # 5 Exhibit 5 Email String 1 REJIS Subpoena, # 6 Exhibit 6 Email String 1a

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REJIS Subpoena, # 7 Exhibit 7 Deposition of Jennings, # 8 Exhibit 8 Subpoena to SLMPD, # 9 Exhibit 9 Email String SLMPD Subpoena)(Flojo, Raymond) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
65 REPLY to Response to Motion re 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge John A. Ross: Motion Hearing held on 8/10/2017 re 56 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. Discussion held. Order to issue. (Court Reporter:Lisa Paczkowski) (FTR Gold: No) (CLO) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
67 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Responses to Requests Directed at Third−Party REJIS and to Reopen Deposition 56 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with the rulings herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if non−party REJIS has any legal objections to Plaintiffs' email document requests, those objections shall be asserted no later than Wednesday, August 16, 2017. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if non−party REJIS has any other documents responsive to the original subpoena not heretofore produced, then REJIS shall produce then within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to reopen the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of non−party REJIS is DENIED.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/11/17. (KKS) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
68 TRANSCRIPT of 66 (MOTION HEARING) held on 8/10/2017 before Judge John A. Ross. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Paczkowski, Lisa_Paczkowski@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7985. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/5/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/14/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/13/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
69 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
70 Docket Text ORDER: GRANTING 69 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. **NOTE − Pursuant to the Court's requirements, Plaintiffs shall submit a paper courtesy copy to chambers within three (3) days of the date of this Order.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/17/17. (KKS) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
71 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Angelo Guisado. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6104949) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Guisado, Angelo) (Entered: 08/17/2017)
72 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 71 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Angelo Guisado. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6104949) by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Guisado, Angelo) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/18/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
73 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
74 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document Exhiibit F with Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
75 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 73 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Pursuant to the Courts

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requirements, Defendants shall submit a paper courtesy copy to chambers within three (3) days of filing their Memorandum of Law. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/25/17. (JAB) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
76 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Exhibit F, the deposition of Laura Clements [ 74 ] is GRANTED, subject to reconsideration once the Court has reviewed the deposition to determine whether it can be filed with redactions as opposed to being placed under seal. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/25/17. (JAB) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
77 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Depo of Furlow, # 2 Exhibit B, Depo of Torres, # 3 Exhibit C, Depo of Liner, # 4 Exhibit D, Depo of Partin, # 5 Exhibit E, Depo of Walsh, # 6 Exhibit G, Depo of Schluetet, # 7 Exhibit H, Depo of Monahan, # 8 Exhibit I, Depo of Gomez, # 9 Exhibit J, Depo of Burk, # 10 Exhibit K, Affirmation of Belmar, # 11 Exhibit L, Conviction of Furlow)(Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
78 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
79 STATEMENT of Material Facts re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
80 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration of Darius Charney)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
81 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 80 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
82 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
83 SEALED DOCUMENT re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment Exhibit F, Depo of Clements by Defendants County of St. Louis, Missouri, Jon Belmar, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh, Unknown Clements. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
85 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
86 STATEMENT of Material Facts re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Main Document 86 replaced on 8/28/2017 to correct signature block) (CLO). (Entered: 08/25/2017)
87 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres re 80 MOTION to Certify Class , 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment / Declaration of Eric Alan Stone. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Deposition Transcript Meschke, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Deposition Transcript Gomez, # 3 Exhibit 4 − Deposition Transcript Partin, # 4 Exhibit 5 − Deposition Transcript Walsh, # 5 Exhibit 6 − Deposition Transcript Schlueter, # 6 Exhibit 7 − Deposition Transcript Furlow, # 7 Exhibit 9 − Deposition Transcript Liner, # 8 Exhibit 10 − Deposition Transcript Parr, # 9 Exhibit 11 − Deposition Transcript Woods, # 10 Exhibit 12 − Deposition Transcript Jennings, # 11 Exhibit 13 − Deposition Transcript Morrow, # 12 Exhibit 14 − Deposition Transcript Monahan, # 13 Exhibit 15 − Deposition Transcript Burk, # 14 Exhibit 16 − First Amended Complaint 7/7/2016, # 15 Exhibit 17 − Def. Initial Disclosures 7/1/2016, # 16 Exhibit 18 − RFA Response 1/20/2017, # 17 Exhibit 19 − RFA Response 6/21/2017, # 18 Exhibit 20 − Bureau Proc. 15−29, # 19 Exhibit 21 − G.O. 11−26, # 20 Exhibit 22 − G.O. 15−26, # 21 Exhibit 23 − G.O 16−26, # 22 Exhibit 24 − G.O. 10−37, # 23 Exhibit 25 − G.O. 16−37, #

08/25/2017
08/31/2017 09/05/2017 09/06/2017 09/15/2017 09/15/2017 09/18/2017
09/18/2017
09/26/2017

24 Exhibit 26 − Justice Center Liner 10/5/2015, # 25 Exhibit 27 − Justice Center Furlow 1/29/2016, # 26 Exhibit 28 − Justice Center Torres 4/1/2015, # 27 Exhibit 29 − Liner SLCPD IR, 3−15, # 28 Exhibit 30 − Liner SLCPD 8−15, # 29 Exhibit 32 − Furlow SLCPD IR, 11−15, # 30 Exhibit 33 − Furlow SLCPD IR, 1−16, # 31 Exhibit 34 − Furlow Arrest Notification, # 32 Exhibit 35 − Furlow Prosecutors Note, # 33 Exhibit 37 − Basic Training Curriculum, # 34 Exhibit 38 − SLMPD Liner, # 35 Exhibit 39 − Acknowledgment of Policy, # 36 Exhibit 40 − 2016 MULES Manual, # 37 Exhibit 41 − DOJ Ferguson Report, # 38 Exhibit 42 − LEPAC Bylaws, # 39 Exhibit 43 − Wanted Entry Guide 7−14, # 40 Exhibit 44 − Wanted Entry Guide 1−2017, # 41 Exhibit 45 − LEPAC Procedures 1984, # 42 Exhibit 46 − LEPAC Agenda 5−7−15, # 43 Exhibit 47 − LEPAC Minutes 5−7−15, # 44 Exhibit 48 − LEPAC Minutes 8−6−15, # 45 Exhibit 49 − LEPAC Minutes 5−5−16, # 46 Exhibit 50 − LEPAC Minutes 11−3−16, # 47 Exhibit 51 − Stop Order Change to POI, # 48 Exhibit 52 − Wanted Rules Chart, # 49 Exhibit 53 − Noble Report, # 50 Exhibit 54 − Bowman Report, # 51 Exhibit 55 − Grames CV, # 52 Exhibit 56 − Liner Mugshot, # 53 Exhibit 57 − Torres Mugshot, # 54 Exhibit 58 − Belmar Bio, # 55 Exhibit 59 − SLCPD Wanteds Data, # 56 Exhibit 60 − Ferguson G.O. 424.00, # 57 Exhibit 61 − Means Letter, # 58 Exhibit 62 − CJIS Newsletter, # 59 Exhibit 63 − Liner Fugitive Notification)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
88 SEALED DOCUMENT re 82 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document / Sealed Exhibits 3, 8, 31, & 36 by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 8 − Deposition Transcript Torres, # 2 Exhibit 31 − Torres SLCPD IR, 2−15, # 3 Exhibit 36 − MDSS Letter, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Stone, Eric) Modified on 1/10/2018−Corrected description of attachment 1 (JAB). (Entered: 08/25/2017)
89 ORDER re 82 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal 82 is GRANTED, subject to reconsideration.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 8/31/17. (KKS) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
90 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document Summary Judgment Exhibits A−E and G by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
91 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to File Under Seal Summary Judgment Exhibits A−E and G 90 is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 9/6/17. (KKS) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
92 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 09/15/2017)
93 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 09/15/2017)
94 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 92 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holland, Timothy) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Pursuant to the Court's requirements, Plaintiffs shall submit a paper courtesy copy to chambers within three (3) days of the date of this Order. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 9/18/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
95 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Joint Motion to Amend Phase I Scheduling Plan 93 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply: 1. The parties shall file responses in opposition to motions for summary judgment no later than September 29, 2017. 2. Defendants shall file their response in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification no later than September 29, 2017. 3. The parties shall file replies in further support of their motions no later than October 13, 2017. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 9/18/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
96 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct to Amend Phase I Scheduling Plan by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) Modified docket text on 9/27/2017 (CLO). (Entered: 09/26/2017)

09/27/2017

97 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Joint Motion to Amend Phase I Scheduling Plan 96 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following deadlines shall apply: 1. The parties shall file responses in opposition to motions for summary judgment no later than October 6, 2017. 2. Defendants shall file their response in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification no later than October 6, 2017. 3. The parties shall file replies in further support of their motions no later than October 20, 2017. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 9/27/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 09/27/2017)

10/06/2017

98 RESPONSE to Statement of Material Facts re 86 Statement of Material Facts Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/06/2017 99 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/06/2017 100 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 80 MOTION to Certify Class Certification filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/06/2017 101 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Timothy J. Holland, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Pages 11 − 13 of an undated Central Missouri Police Academy document, # 3 Exhibit 2 − In re the Marriage of: Ralph Torres and Melissa Torres, # 4 Declaration of Ralph Torres, # 5 Exhibit 1 − Torres Residence, # 6 Exhibit 2 − Torres Residence, # 7 Exhibit 3 − Torres Residence, # 8 Exhibit 4 − Torres Residence)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/06/2017 102 RESPONSE to Statement of Material Facts re 79 Statement of Material Facts , and Supplemental Material Facts filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 10/06/2017)

10/16/2017 103 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Joint Motion to Amend Phase I Scheduling Plan by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/16/2017)

10/17/2017 104 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 103 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Joint Motion to Amend Phase I Scheduling Plan by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) filed by Kevin Walsh, Christopher Partin, Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri; MOTION ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 10/17/17. (CSG) (Entered: 10/17/2017)

10/26/2017 105 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/26/2017)

10/27/2017 106 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 105 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) ; ORDERED GRANTED. Pursuant to the Courts requirements, Defendants shall submit a paper courtesy copy to chambers within three (3) days of the date of this Order. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 10/27/2017. (CLO) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017 107 REPLY to Response to Motion re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Elizabeth J. Grossman, # 2 Exhibit 1 − 3/4/08 Article)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017 108 REPLY to Response to Motion re 80 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Mary Fox)(Stone, Eric) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017 109 RESPONSE to Statement of Material Facts re 79 Statement of Material Facts Response to Plaintiffs Supplemental Statement of Facts that Plaintiffs filed with Doc # 102 filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017 110 REPLY to Response to Motion re 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
11/06/2017 111 ENTRY of Appearance by Sima Atri for Plaintiff Dwayne Furlow. (Atri, Sima) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
11/15/2017 112 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge and Memorandum)(Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 11/15/2017)
11/21/2017 113 RESPONSE to 112 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re 84 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , 77 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) Modified on 11/22/2017 (JAB). (Entered: 11/21/2017)
11/28/2017 114 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 77 ), Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 84 ), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. No. 80 ), are set for oral argument on Friday, January 19, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12N.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 11/28/17. (KKS) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
11/29/2017 115 Joint MOTION to Continue and Reschedule Oral Argument by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
11/29/2017 116 ORDER: On Plaintiffs unopposed motion to continue oral argument [ 115 ], IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that oral argument on Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 77), Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 84), and Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Doc. No. 80), is rescheduled for Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 12N. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 11/29/17. (JAB) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
02/28/2018 117 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge John A. Ross: In Court Hearing held on 2/28/2018. Parties present for oral arguments on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 77 and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 84 and Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification 80 . Arguments heard. Both parties to submit briefs within 30 days. (Court Reporter:Lisa Paczkowski, Lisa_Paczkowski@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7985) (FTR Gold: No) (CLO) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
02/28/2018 118 ORDER: Following oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, the parties shall each submit a brief on the legal issue stated on the record no later than March 30, 2018. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 2/28/2018. (CLO) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
02/28/2018 119 AMENDED ANSWER to 14 Amended Complaint, amended form filer filed by Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh being filed because previously filed answer inadvertently was missing one page filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
03/05/2018 120 TRANSCRIPT of 117 (MOTION HEARING) held on FEBRUARY 28, 2018 before Judge JOHN A. ROSS. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Paczkowski, Lisa_Paczkowski@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7985. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/26/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/4/2018. (KKS) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/09/2018 121 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall reassign this case to another Judge. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 3/9/18. (JAB) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
03/09/2018 122 ORDER: Pursuant to the order of recusal by the Honorable John A. Ross on March 9, 2018, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above styled cause is reassigned to the Honorable Henry Edward Autrey. (JAB) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/30/2018 123 MEMORANDUM of Law in Response to the Court's Question Regarding the Legality of the St. Louis County Wanted System by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
03/30/2018 124 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER to File Memorandum of Law Responding to Question posed by the Court at Oral Argument by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
06/21/2018 125 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by Nathaniel Richard Carroll. (Carroll, Nathaniel) Law Firm address updated in CM/ECF (CAR). (Entered: 06/21/2018)
06/26/2018 126 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Charles J. Hamilton III by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
06/27/2018 127 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 126 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres; GRANTED − SO ORDERED. (Attorney Charles Jordan Hamilton terminated.) Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 6/27/18. (KJS) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
09/30/2018 128 ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are given 30 days from the date of the order to substitute and effectuate service on the Doe Defendants. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to serve the Doe Defendants will result in dismissal of the Doe Defendants without prejudice. (Response to Court due by 11/5/2018.) Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 9/30/18. (KJS) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
10/05/2018 129 OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 77 ], is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 84], is DENIED except as to Liner. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class, [Doc. No. 80], is DENIED at this time. A separate judgment will be entered upon the disposition of the remaining issues herein. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 9/30/18. (KJS) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
11/05/2018 130 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second Amended Complaint) against defendant Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Kevin Walsh, Ed Schlueter,Terminating John Does 1−20 (St. Louis County Police Department) Amendment to 14 Amended Complaint, (Second Amended Complaint), filed by Ralph Torres, Harold Liner, Dwayne Furlow. Related document: 14 Amended Complaint, filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres.(Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 131 WAIVER of Service issued defendantEd Schlueter. sent to Officer Ed Schlueter on 11/05/2018 filed by Ralph Torres, Harold Liner, Dwayne Furlow. Waiver of Service due by 12/5/2018. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/29/2018 132 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Nathaniel R. Carroll by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
11/30/2018 133 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 132 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Nathaniel R. Carroll filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; SO ORDERED. (Attorney Nathaniel Richard Carroll terminated.) Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 11/30/18. (KJS) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
12/14/2018 134 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Ed Schlueter Ed Schlueter waiver signed on 11/5/2018, answer due 1/4/2019. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
01/07/2019 135 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Ed Schlueter. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
01/07/2019 136 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 135 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Ed Schlueter. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
01/18/2019 137 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Timothy J. Holland by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
01/22/2019 138 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 137 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Timothy J. Holland by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Holland, Timothy) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; GRANTED. SO ORDERED, Attorney Timothy James Holland terminated.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward

Autrey on 1/22/19. (KJS) (Entered: 01/22/2019)

01/28/2019 139 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 135 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

02/12/2019 140 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to plaintiff Howard Liner's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Ed Schlueter. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/12/2019 141 REPLY to Response to Motion re 135 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Ed Schlueter. (Hughes, Michael) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

02/13/2019 142 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 140 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to plaintiff Howard Liner's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Ed Schlueter. (Hughes, Michael) filed by Ed Schlueter ; ORDERED GRANTED HEA. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 2/13/19. (CLA) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

03/15/2019 143 OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants St. Louis County and John Belmar's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 77 ], with respect to the claims of Plaintiff Howard Liner, is GRANTED as to Count I and Count II and DENIED as to Count III. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Howard Liner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 84 ], is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ed Schlueter's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 135 ], is DENIED as to Count I and Count III and GRANTED as to Count II. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on March 15, 2019. (BRP) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

04/04/2019 144 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Elizabeth J. Grossman by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Grossman, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

04/05/2019 145 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 144 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Elizabeth J. Grossman by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Grossman, Elizabeth) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; GRANTED − SO ORDERED. (Attorney Elizabeth J. Grossman terminated.). Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 4/5/19. (KJS) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

05/20/2019

NOTICE: IF YOU HAVE ALREADY UPGRADED YOUR PACER ACCOUNT YOU CAN DISREGARD THIS NOTICE. IF YOU DO NOT UPGRADE YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FILE IN THE SYSTEM AFTER MAY 31, 2019. PLEASE UPGRADE IMMEDIATELY. If you are using a shared account to file cases, you will need to create an individual account; instructions can be found at:https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Register−for−New−PACER−account.pdf. If you already have an individual account, it will need to be upgraded; instructions can be found https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Upgrade−Current−PACER−Account.pdf. If you need further assistance contact the MOED CM/ECF Help Desk at 314−244−7650 or moedml_cmecf_help@moed.uscourts.gov. (CSAW) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

09/05/2019 146 ENTRY of Appearance by Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder for Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/05/2019)

09/12/2019 147 ENTRY of Appearance by Maureen Hanlon for Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Hanlon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

12/02/2019 148 First MOTION to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm ;attorney or firm Frank J. Smith, Jr./St. Louis County Counselor's Office ;substituted for:Michael E. Hughes by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh. (Smith, Frank) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/03/2019 149 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 148 First MOTION to Substitute Attorney/Law Firm ;attorney or firm Frank J. Smith, Jr./St. Louis County Counselor's Office ;substituted for:Michael E. Hughes by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh. (Smith, Frank) filed by Kevin Walsh, Christopher Partin, Jon Belmar, Ed Schlueter, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri ; GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 12/03/2019. (AAS) (Entered: 12/03/2019)

12/13/2019 150 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 130 Amended Complaint, Second by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh. (Smith, Frank) (Entered: 12/13/2019)
12/16/2019 151 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 150 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 130 Amended Complaint, Second by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh. (Smith, Frank) filed by Kevin Walsh, Christopher Partin, Jon Belmar, Ed Schlueter, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri ; GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 12/16/2019. (AAS) (Entered: 12/16/2019)
12/30/2019 152 AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint amended form filer filed by Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh filed by Defendants Jon Belmar, Unknown Clements, County of St. Louis, Missouri, Christopher Partin, Ed Schlueter, Kevin Walsh. (Smith, Frank) (Entered: 12/30/2019)
01/31/2020 153 MOTION to Withdraw Sima Atri by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
02/03/2020 154 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 153 MOTION to Withdraw Sima Atri by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres ; GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on February 3, 2020. (MCB) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
04/27/2020 155 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within 10 days of the date of this Order, the parties in this matter are to report to the Court as to the status of this matter. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if applicable, the parties are to submit a new proposed joint scheduling plan with their status report. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on April 27, 2020. (MCB) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
05/01/2020 156 STATUS REPORT and REQUEST FOR EXTENSION of Joint Scheduling Plan by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Stone, Eric) Modified on 5/4/2020 (EAB). (Entered: 05/01/2020)
05/04/2020 157 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 156 STATUS REPORT and REQUEST FOR EXTENSION of Joint Scheduling Plan by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres; ORDERED GRANTED (Joint Scheduling Plan and Status Report due by 5/29/2020.) Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 5/4/20.(EAB) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
05/29/2020 158 STATUS REPORT and REQUEST FOR EXTENSION by Plaintiffs Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres. (Plaintiffs' Status Report). (Stone, Eric) Modified on 6/1/2020 (AAT). (Entered: 05/29/2020)
06/01/2020 159 DOCKET TEXT ORDER re 158 Joint Scheduling Plan filed by Dwayne Furlow, Harold Liner, Ralph Torres; ADDITIONAL TIME IS GRANTED UP TO AND INCLUDING JULY 28, 2020. Joint Scheduling Plan due by 7/28/2020. Status Report due by 7/28/2020.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 06/01/2020. (AAT) (Entered: 06/01/2020)