• Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS

Document 1

• Filed 09/30/2003

Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF

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. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ,
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

Civil Action No.

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COMPLAINT :i,,- ~ rn

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JURY TRIAL DEMAND -F.

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Defendant.
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NATURE OF THE ACTION

SE'IBER1,j
L\NOS~'I, ~.J.

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis ofrace and/or national

origin and to provide appropriate relief to Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda

Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora Lucia-Sosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz

Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranj 0, Rocio

Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and

a class of similarly situated Hispanic employees adversely affected by such practices. Plaintiff, the

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission"), contends that Defendant, First

Wireless Group, Inc.. ("First Wireless"), has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination

against the above named individuals, all Hispanic, and other similarly situated Hispanics who were

or are employed at First Wireless, by compensating them at lower wages and subjecting them to

unequal terms, conditions and privileges of employment than similarly situated Asian employees

performing the same or substantially similar work, all in continuing violation of Title VII. The

Commission further contends that Defendant First Wireless retaliated against and terminated or

• • Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 1 Filed 09/30/2003 Page 2 of 7
constructively discharged the above listed individuals and a class of similarly situated Hispanic employees for complaining about the wage disparity, a protected activity under Title VII.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction ofthis Court is invoked pursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,1331,1337,1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) and Section 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The unlawful employment practices alleged below were and are now being committed within, but not limited to, the jurisdiction ofthe United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is the agency of the United States ofAmerica charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) and Section 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and §2000e-6(e). 4. At all relevant times, First Wireless has continuously been doing business in the State of New York and the county of Suffolk, and has continuously had at least fifteen employees. 5. At all relevant times, First Wireless has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b),(g), and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora Lucia-Sosa, Estela del
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Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora filed charges with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by First Wireless. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
7. Since at least 2000, First Wireless has engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful employment practices at its Ronkonkoma, New York facility in violation of Sections 703, 704 and 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a), 3(a) and 6. These practices include:
a) engaging in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination against Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda Salcedo, WervinJulian Garcia, Nora LuciaSosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and a class ofsimilarly situated Hispanic employees by compensating them less than similarly situated Asian employees performing the same or substantially similar work,
b) engaging in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination against Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora LuciaSosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and a class of similarly situated Hispanic employees by treating them unequally in regard to terms, conditions or privileges ofemployment than similarly situated Asian
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• • Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 1 Filed 09/30/2003 Page 4 of 7 employees performing the same or substantially similar work, including giving Asian workers easier work to perform and allowing them special privileges; and c) by engaging in a pattern or practice of retaliation, including but not limited to:
(1) terminating shift manager Dilber Jimenez in April 2001 for complaining to Defendant about the wage disparity; (2) terminating Rosa Garcia and Adrianna Torres in April 2001 for circulating a petition among Hispanic workers which protested the wage disparity; (3) pressuring employees to recant their signature on the above referenced petition, intimidation, removal of privileges previously enjoyed, banning the speaking of Spanish andi terminating or constructively discharging Zorayda Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora Lucia-Sosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and a class of similarly situated Hispanic employees in February 2002 for engaging in the protected activity of protesting a discriminatory wage disparity, all in continuing violation of Sections 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 3(a). 8. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraph 7 above has been to deprive Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora LuciaSosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and a class of similarly situated
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• • Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 1 Filed 09/30/2003 Page 5 of 7
Hispanic individuals of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affecting their status as employees on the basis ofrace and/or national origin and retaliation.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained ofin Paragraphs 7 and 8 above were and are intentional.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were and are done with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Rosa Garcia, Dilber Jimenez, Adriana Torres, Zorayda Salcedo, Wervin Julian Garcia, Nora Lucia-Sosa, Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Luz Adela Torres, Jhon Sanchez, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Luz Trejo, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora and a class of similarly situated Hispanic employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, First Wireless, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practices, which discriminate on the basis ofrace and/or national origin and retaliation; B. Order Defendant, First Wireless, to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices; C. Order Defendant, First Wireless, to make whole all those individuals affected by the unlawful employment practices described above, by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest and frontpay, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of Defendant's unlawful employment practices, including, but not limited to reinstatement;
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D. Order Defendant, First Wireless, to make whole all those individuals affected by the unlawful employment practices described above, by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses in amounts to be determined at trial;
E. Order Defendant, First Wireless, to make whole all those individuals adversely affected by the unlawful employment practices described above by providing compensation for nonpecuniary losses, including emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation in amounts to be determined at trial;
F. Order Defendant, First Wireless, to pay all those individuals adversely affected by the unlawful employment practices described above punitive damages for its malicious and/or reckless conduct in amounts to be determined at trial;
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper; and H. Award the Commission its costs in this action.
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• • Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 1 Filed 09/30/2003 JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Page 7 of 7

The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

Dated: New York, New York September 30, 2003

Respectfully submitted,

Eric S. Dreiband General Counsel

James L. Lee Deputy General Counsel

Gwendolyn Y. Reams Associate General Counsel

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 "L" Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
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Eliza eth Grossman (EG-2478) Supervisory Trial Attorney
It~e~
Adela P. Santos (AS-4429) Senior Trial Attorney
Michelle A. Caiola (MC-2110) Senior Trial Attorney
New York District Office 33 Whitehall Street, 5th Floor New York, NY 10004-2112 (212) 336-3702

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 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 73 Filed 11/29/2004 Page 1 of 16

LAW OFFICE OF DELVIS MELÉNDEZ 90 BRADLEY STREET BRENTWOOD, NEW YORK 11717 631-434-1443
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _______________________________________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff

Case NO: 03 CV4990(JS)(AL)

and DILBER JIMENEZ, OLGA CHRISTINA MORALES, SONIA URIBE, JHON SANCHEZ, SONIA BORRERO, MILTON MISNAZA, NATALIA NARANJO, ROCIO RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR MORALES, ERIKA ROMERO, RUTH VIDAL and MARIA ZAMORA

Intervenors,

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-againstFIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.
Defendants _____________________________________________
Plaintiff-Intervenors complaining of defendants First Wireless Group Inc., allege:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is a civil rights action to redress deprivation of
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rights accorded to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A 2000e et seq.( “Title VII”); the Civil Rights Act.
2. All of the Plaintiff Intervenors as past employees of First Wireless Group were subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, Asian employees at Defendant Company, First Wireless Group, Inc., were provided with preferential treatment. Plaintiff-Intervenors allege that they were discriminated against due to their national origin. The discriminatory animus reflected itself in pay disparities between Asian and Hispanic workers. Moreover, Plaintiff-Intervenors allege that they were retaliated against for opposing the unlawful discriminatory practices. Plaintiff-Intervenors bring this action seeking compensatory, emotional distress, punitive damages, cost and attorney fees along with any other relief the court may find just and proper.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to (i) 28 U.S.C §1343(3) and §1343(4), which confer original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action to recover damages secured or to secure equitable relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights; (ii) the Declaratory Judgment Statute, 28 U.S.C §2201; (iii) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq., and (iv) 28 U.S.C §1367(a), in that the state and federal claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact such
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that they are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United State Constitution.
4. Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), in as much as the defendants have an office and conducts business and can be found in the Eastern District of New York, and the causes of action arouse and occurred in the Eastern District of New York. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to § 706(f)(3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e, in as much, as the unlawful employment practices complained of herein occurred within the Eastern District of New York.
PARTIES 5. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission( hereinafter the “EEOC”) is a Commission created by the government of the United States pursuant to section 705 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e-4. The EEOC maintains its principal office in the District of Columbia. The EEOC is authorized to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). 6. The Plaintiff-Intervenors are all persons who reside in the County of Suffolk, State of New York. Plaintiffs all worked for First Wireless in the evening shift. Plaintiffs were all terminated from employment on February 28, 2002. Plaintiffs are authorized to intervene in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 2000(e)-5(f)(1).
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7. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, First

Wireless Group, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing

in the State of New York.

8.

The Defendant First Wireless Group, Inc., is engaged in

an industry affecting commerce, as defined in Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended §701(g)-(h), 42 U.S.C. §2000

e(g)-(h).

9. At all relevant times, the Defendant First Wireless,

had, and still has, at least fifteen (15) or more employees for

each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the

current or preceding calendar year. Therefore, the Defendant is “an

employer” within the meaning of Title VII §701, 42 U.S.C.

§2000(e).

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 10. Plaintiff- Intervenors incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 10 of this Complaint as though the same were set forth full herein. 11. On or about March 2002, the Plaintiffs Intervenors filed a timely charge of discrimination with of the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission. 12. On August 19, 2002, the Plaintiffs requested that their case be transferred to the EEOC for investigation. 13. On or about July 25, 2003, following its investigation of
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that Charge, the EEOC issued a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the Plaintiff- Intervenors were discriminated against due to their national origin and retaliated against for opposing unlawful discriminatory practices.
14. Following the determination set forth above, the EEOC attempted to eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion pursuant to 42 U.S.C §2000e-5(f)(1), but was unable to secure a conciliation agreement.
15. On or about September 30, 2003, the EEOC began their federal law suit for discriminatory practices in employment against Defendant First Wireless.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 16. Plaintiff-Intervenors incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1- 15 of this Complaint as though the same were set forth fully herein. 17. On or about April 20, 2000, Plaintiff- Intervenor, Dilber Jimenez, was hired by the Defendants as a Night Shift Manager. Plaintiff Jimenez is a Hispanic male. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about April 23, 2001. 18. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Sonia Borrero, was hired by the Defendants on or about August 28, 2000. Plaintiff Borrero worked the evening shift. Plaintiff Intervenor was wrongfully
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terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Borrero is a Hispanic female.
19. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Oscar Morales, was hired by the Defendants on or about October 2, 2000. Plaintiff Morales worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Morales is a Hispanic male.
20. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Olga Morales, was hired by the Defendants on or about October 2000. Plaintiff Morales worked as a line leader in the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Morales is a Hispanic female.
21. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Milton Misnaza, was hired by the Defendants on or about March 1, 2001. Plaintiff Miznasa worked the evening shift. Plaintiff Miznasa worked at First Wireless painting phones. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Miznasa is a Hispanic male.
22. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Natalia Naranjo, was hired by the Defendants on or about December 6, 2000. Plaintiff Naranjo worked the evening shift, as a programmer. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Naranjo is a Hispanic female.
23. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Rocio Rodriguez, was hired by the Defendants on or about August 28, 2000. Plaintiff Rodriguez
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worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Rodriguez is a Hispanic female.
24. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Erika Romero, was hired by the Defendants on or about September 25, 2000. Plaintiff Romero worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Romero is a Hispanic female.
25. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Sonia Uribe, was hired by the Defendants on or about November 27, 2000. Plaintiff Uribe worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Uribe is a Hispanic female.
26. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Ruth Vidal, was hired by the Defendants on or about January 15, 2001. Plaintiff Vidal worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Vidal is a Hispanic female.
27. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Maria Zamora, was hired by the Defendants on or about March 26, 2001. Plaintiff Zamora worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Vidal is a Hispanic female.
28. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Jhon Sanchez, was hired by
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the Defendants on or about November 2000. Plaintiff Sanchez worked the evening shift, as a testing technician. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Sanchez is a Hispanic male.
29. Plaintiff-Intervenors worked in a variety of positions ranging from management to testing technicians. Their work performance was exemplary.
30. The majority of the work force at First Wireless Group, Inc., were Hispanics. However, during the course of PlaintiffIntervenors employment more and more Asians were hired.
31. Historically, Dilber Jimenez did most of the hiring of the night shift personal. However, the Asian employees were hired by upper management. It was then Dilber Jimenez’s job, as Night Shift Manager, to assign the Asian employees to a line leader. The line leaders would then supervise the Asian employees work. It was incumbent upon the Plaintiff-Intervenors to train the Asian employees on how to perform the essential job functions assigned to them.
32. Upon information and belief, the Asian employees had limited language skills. Thus, communicating with the Asian employees created difficulties. Upon information and belief, the Asian employees had no previous training in the field. As a result, the Asian employees production was far less then similarly situated Hispanic workers. Nevertheless, the Hispanic workers
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Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 73 Filed 11/29/2004 Page 9 of 16
continued to work and coexist without incident until they became aware that they were being subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, similarly situated Hispanic workers were being paid far less then lessor experienced Asian employees.
33. Incensed over the discriminatory practices, PlaintiffIntervenors complained to Night Shift Manager, Dilber Jimenez. On or about April 20, 2001, in disbelief, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Jiminez complained to Plant Manager, Andrew Ng. Clearly and unequivocally, Plaintiff-Intervenors informed their superior of the discriminatory practices reflected in pay disparities. Mr. Ng refused to take proactive remedial measures and simply told Mr. Jiminez that he “should be concerned with the good of the company and not the employees.”
34. Contemporaneously, the night shift employees circulated a petition calling for Management to put an end to pay disparities between the Asian and Hispanic workers. Upon information and belief, the petition was created and circulated by Adrianna Torres and Rosa Garcia. More than forty Hispanic employees willingly signed the petition. Mostly all of the Plaintiff-Intervenors signed the petition.
35. On or about April 23, 2001, Dilber Jimenez, Rosa Garcia and Adrianna Torres were called into the office and terminated. Allegedly the reason given by the defendants for their termination
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was company reorganization. On information and belief, prior to her termination, Adrianna Torres was recognized by the company as the employee of the month. Moreover, Dilber Jimenez prior to his wrongful termination, was given a raise and assured of a future with a growing company. Clearly, Defendants’ legitimate business reason for Plaintiff-Intervenor Jiminez’s termination was pretextual. The motivating factor in Plaintiff-Intervenors termination was retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices.
36. On information and belief, as a result of their discriminatory discharge on or February 8, 2002, Rosa Garcia, and Adrianna Torres filed a charge of discrimination with the Suffolk County Commission of Human Rights. While the Defendants were acutely aware of their illegal and discriminatory practices, they continued in their pattern and practice of national origin discrimination. The Defendants manifested a blatant disregard for Plaintiffs federally protected rights by continuing to compensate the Asian workers at a higher rate then the Hispanic workers regardless of experience and/or length of service.
37. As a result of the investigation by the Suffolk County Commission of Human Rights, the Defendants escalated their campaign of harassment by singling out the Hispanic workers. Plaintiffs contend that the Asian workers were allowed to remain seated, while Hispanic employees were to remain standing while working; Hispanic
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workers were censored and not allowed to readily speak to one another. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend as productivity was dwindling, because of the lack of production by the Asian workers, Hispanic employees were pressured to increase their output to compensate. However, pay differential remained the same. Hispanic employees earned approximately $7.00 per hour while Asian workers earned approximately $8.50.
38. In December 2001, Plaintiff- Intervenors began to hear rumors that the night shift was going to be eliminated. A new shift was created in which the Asian employees were allowed to transfer into. Not so coincidently, the only Hispanic employees who were allowed to transfer to the newly created shift were those who never signed the petition or those who recanted their previous claim of discrimination.
39. On or about January 22, 2002, as further evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory animus, a letter was circulated to the night shift personnel. The letter called for a formal declaration from each employee who signed the petition as to whether they recanted their previous statement of discrimination based on pay differential.
40. On or about February 28, 2002, as direct evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory animus in retaliation for opposing illegal employment practices all of the employees who signed the petition and did not retract their previous statement were
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terminated. 41. The Defendants have discriminated against the Plaintiff-
Intervenors in violation of Title VII in that its nondiscriminatory business reasons for the pay disparities and Plaintiffs termination are clearly pretextual.
AS AND FOR A FIRST FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION 42. The Plaintiffs repeats and reallege the allegations set forth in paragraphs “1" through “41" as if more fully set forth herein. 43. The Defendants have discriminated against the Plaintiff-Intervenors in the terms and conditions of their employment on the basis on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. 44. The Defendants willfully and knowingly subjected the Hispanic workers at First Wireless Group, Inc., to unequal terms and conditions in employment due to their national origin. 45. By reason of the Defendants’ unlawful actions, the Plaintiffs were caused to suffer economic loss, were made emotionally ill, and were otherwise greatly injured, and therefore demand back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and benefits for Dilber Jimenez, and compensatory, emotional distress, and punitive damages for all other Plaintiff
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Intervenors in a sum to be determined by a jury; interest costs, prejudgment interest, and disbursements; and in addition attorneys fees.
AS AND FOR A SECOND FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RETALIATION
46. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs “1" through “45" with the same force and effect as if stated more fully herein.
47. The Defendants discriminated against PlaintiffIntervenors based upon them opposing unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e). Defendants terminated Plaintiff- Intervenors’ employment in retaliation for them complaining of the different terms and conditions of employment between the Asian and Hispanic Workers at First Wireless Group, Inc.
48. By engaging in the above-described conduct, the Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervenors with malice or reckless indifference to their federally protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have suffered and are entitled to damages, including but not limited to: lost compensation, and/or lost pay for Dilber Jimenez, pain and suffering, mental anguish and other emotional distress damages, compensatory, and punitive damages,
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along with costs and attorney’s fees for all Plaintiffs, and prejudgement interest in an amount to be determined by a jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Intervenors respectfully pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows: (a) As and For a First Federal Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination Based Upon National Origin, an award to the Plaintiff-Intervenors under Title VII of all of the back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and fringe benefits Dilber Jimenez lost as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination against him, together with an award for compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at trial for all other Plaintiffs, with interest costs, disbursements and prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s fees. (b) As and For a Second Federal Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination Based Upon Retaliation, an award to the Plaintiff-Intervenors under Title VII of all of the back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and fringe benefits for Dilber Jimenez as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful retaliation, together with an award for compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages for all other Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined by a jury at trial, with interest costs,
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disbursements and prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s fees.
(c) Prejudgement interest on any amount awarded under subsections (a) and/or (b) and/or (c) and/or (d)and/or (e) of this Prayer for Relief;
(d) That the Court retain jurisdiction over this action until the Defendants has fully complied with the Orders of the Court; and that the Court require the Defendants to file such reports as may be necessary to supervise such compliance; and
(e) To award Plaintiff-Intervenors such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff-Intervenors herein demand a trial by jury of all issues in this action. Dated: Brentwood, New York November 29, 2004
Respectfully submitted,
s/s DELVIS MELÉNDEZ(DM-7975) Attorney for the Intervenors 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717 (631) 434-1443
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 ..

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 1 of 12
F 11..1:: D

I" ~Lt:RI<'S OFFICE

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID S. FEATHER 666 OLD COUNTRY ROAD, SUITE 304 GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 11530

U.S ul"TRIC'1 COURT E.D.N.Y.
* * t,??. 1 1 2e05

(516) 745-9000

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------------------X CV 03-4990 (JS)(ARL)

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ADRIANA TORRES,

Intervenor,

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR'S

.... - -...... "'eOMPLxlNT'A1~D"-~""

-.-~--

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-against-

FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.
------------------------------------------------------------------X
Plaintiff-Intervenor, complaining of Defendant First Wireless Group Inc., alleges:

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 9

1. For the purposes of complying with Local Rule 9, the Plaintiff states that she has

no corporate parent, subsidiary or affiliate and that there are no other interested

parties.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

2. This is a civil rights action to redress deprivation of rights accorded to the

Plaintiffs-Intervenor pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A 2000e

et seq. ("Title VII").

3. The Plaintiff-Intervenor is a past employee of First Wireless Group, and was

subjected to unequal terms and conditions in her employment. Specifically, Asian

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 2 of 12
employees at Defendant Company, First Wireless Group, Inc., were provided with preferential treatment, and the Plaintiff-Intervenor alleges that she was discriminated against due to her national origin. The discriminatory animus reflected itself in pay disparities between Asian and Hispanic workers. Moreover, Plaintiff-Intervenor alleges that she was retaliated against for opposing the unlawful discriminatory practices. Plaintiff-Intervenor brings this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, --------------------attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements, and any other relief the court may find just and proper.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. Plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to (I) 28 U.S.C. §1343(3)
and §1343(4), which confer original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action to recover damages secured or to secure equitable relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection or civil rights; (ii) the Declaratory Judgment Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2201; and (iii) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq.. ,and (iv)
28 u.s.c. §1367(a), in that the state and federal claims arise from a common
nucleus of operative facts such that they are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 5. Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), in as much as the Defendant has an office and conducts business within the Eastern District of New York, and the action arose and occurred in the Eastern District of New York. Venue is also proper in this court pursuant to §706(f)(3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 3 of 12
§2000e, in as much as the unlawful employment practices complained of herein occurred within the Eastern District of New York.
PARTIES 6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter the "EEOC") is a
Commission created by the government of the United States pursuant to section 705 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-4. The EEOC __________~maintains its_~~i!l~~a1~fli~e._i~.~=l)istrict of CoIUIn~i!l: .~~~EgC;.is authorized to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5 (f) (1). 7. The Plaintiff-Intervenor resides in the County of Suffolk, State of New York, and was an employee of the Defendant. Plaintiff-Intervenor is authorized to intervene in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000 (e) -5 (f) (1). 8. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, First Wireless Group, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York. 9. The Defendant First Wireless Group, Inc., is engaged in an industry affecting commerce, as defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended §701 (g) - (h), 42 U.S.C. §2000 e (g) - (h). 9. At all relevant times, the Defendant First Wireless, had, and still has, at least fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Therefore, the Defendant is "an employer" within the meaning of Title VII §701, 42 U.S.C. §2000e - (b).
PROCEDURAL REOUIREMENTS 10. On or about June 27, 2001, the Plaintiff-Intervenor filed a timely charge with the

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 4 of 12

Suffolk County Human Rights Commission.

11. On or about August 19,2002, the Plaintiff-Intervenor's charge was transferred to

the EEOC for investigation.

12. On or about July 25, 2003, following its investigation of that Charge, the EEOC

issued a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the Plaintiff-

Intervenor was discriminated against due to her national origin and retaliated

against for opposing unlawful discriminatory practices.

------~.

. . --~~-

-

--- ----------------

13. Following the determination set forth above, the EEOC attempted to eliminate

unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation

and persuasion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000 e-5 (t) (I), but was unable to secure a

conciliation agreement.

14. On or about September 30, 2003, the EEOC commenced a federal lawsuit for

discriminatory practices in employment against Defendant First Wireless.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

IS. Plaintiff-Intervenor Adrianna Torres, was hired by the Defendants on or about

October 14, 2000 as a shift solder operator. As such, she worked on the assembly

line on the second shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor Torres was terminated on or about

April 24, 2001. Plaintiff-Intervenor Torres is a Hispanic female.

16. Plaintiff-Intervenor's work performance throughout her employment with

Defendant was exemplary. In fact, the Plaintiff-Intervenor received a

commendation dated April 6, 2001 for being the "Employee of the Month".

17. The majority of the work force at First Wireless Group, Inc. were Hispanics.

18. The Plaintiff-Intervenor was hired at an hourly wage of$7.00 per hour, and after

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 5 of 12
seven months, she received an increase to $7.25 per hour. 19. Shortly after her employment commenced, the Plaintiff-Intervenor noticed a
pattern of unfair hiring practices by the Defendant. Many more individuals of Asian descent were being hired, and were being hired at a much higher rate of pay than their Hispanic counterparts. Upon information and belief, these Asian employees had less experience and were less qualified than many of the Hispanic
-_._._.._--e_m.-ployees performing the same or similar job functions. In fact, the Plaintiff-
Intervenor trained many of these Asian employees. 20. In or about April, 2003, the Plaintiff-Intervenor and another Hispanic employee
drafted and circulated a petition, requesting that the Defendant cease its discriminatory policy of pay disparities between the Asian and Hispanic workers. 21. On or about April 23, 2003, and after the petition had been signed by a number of Hispanic employees, the Defendant's Human Resources manager, Eileen Baraniecki, came over to the Plaintiff-Intervenor's work station, and the PlaintiffIntervenor gave her the petition, and had a brief conversation with her regarding the discrepancy in pay between Hispanic and Asian employees. 22. On or about April 24, 2001, the Plaintiff-Intervenor was called into Ms. Baraniecki's office and was terminated. 23. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiff-Intervenor was replaced by an Asian employee at a higher salary. 24. By its actions against the Plaintiff-Intervenor, the Defendant has discriminated against the Plaintiff-Intervenor in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. 2000(e).

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 6 of 12
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS AND FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 25. The Plaintiff-Intervenor avers that by the above acts, the Defendant discriminated against her because of her national origin in the terms, conditions and privileges of her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 26. The Defendant's acts were with malice and reckless disregard for the Plaintiff-
27. The Plaintiff-Intervenor has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable il1iury and monetary damages as a result of the Defendant's discriminatory practices unless and until this Court grants relief.
28. As a result of the Defendant's discrimination on the basis of national origin, the Plaintiff-Intervenor suffered economic losses, and mental anguish, pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses. Plaintiff-Intervenor requests backpay, front pay, and benefits, compensatory damages and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus attorneys' fees, expert fees, costs and disbursements. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS AND FOR RETALIATION
29. The Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervenor based upon her opposing unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §2000(e).
30. By reason of the Defendant's actions, the Plaintiff-Intervenor was retaliated against and caused to suffer economic loss and was otherwise greatly injured, and

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 7 of 12

therefore demands back pay, front pay, and benefits, as well as compensatory

damages and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus

attorneys' fees, expert fees, costs and disbursements.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Intervenor respectfully pray for judgment against the

Defendants as follows:

_____ ______

(a) As ~d.!or the FirstC_aus~ofAction for Empl<>YII1eIlt Discrimiruttion,

awarding to the Plaintiff a money judgment representing back pay, front pay and benefits, as well

as compensatory damages and punitive damages, all in an amount to be determined at trial, plus

attorneys' fees, expert fees, costs and disbursements;

(b) As and for the Second Cause of Action for Retaliation, awarding to the

Plaintiff a money judgment representing back pay, front pay and benefits, as well as

compensatory damages and punitive damages, all in an amount to be determined at trial, plus

attorneys' fees, expert fees, costs and disbursements;

©) An award of prejudgment interest on the money awards requested above in

paragraphs (a) through (b) above;

(d) That the Court retain jurisdiction over this action until the Defendant has

fully complied with the Orders of the Court and that the Court require the Defendant to file such

reports as may be necessary to supervise such compliance; and

(e) To award the Plaintiff-Intervenor such other and further relief as this Court

deems just and proper.

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 8 of 12
JURY DEMAND 31. Plaintiff herein demands a trial by jury of all issues in this action. Dated: December 20, 2004 -Garden City, New York
Respectfully submitted, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID S. FEATHER
A.V .FEAT R(DSF-1832) 666 Old Country Road Suite 304 Garden City, New York 11530 (516) 745~9000

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 9 of 12

LAW OFFICES OF DAVID S. FEATHER 666 OLD COUNTRY ROAD SUITE 304 GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 11530 516-745-9000 DAVID S. FEATHER., ESQ. (DF-1832)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

Docket No.: CV 03-4990 (JS)(ARL)

ADRIANA TORRES,

Intervenor,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

-against-

FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC., Defendant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X STATE OF NEW YORK )
ss.: COUNTY OF NASSAU )

Jodi Rollo, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am not a party to the foregoing action, am over the age of 18 years, and I reside in Massapequa, New York. On December 27, 2004, I served the within documents:

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

by mailing the same in a sealed envelope, with postage prepaid thereon, in a post-office or official depository ofthe U.S. Postal Service within the State of New York, addressed to the following person or persons at the addresses set forth:

Douglas Wigdor, Esq. Thompson, Wigdor & Gilly LLP Empire State Building 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5720 New York, New York 10118

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 10 of 12
· .
Adela P. Santos, Esq. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission New York District Office 33 Whitehall Street New York, New York 10014
Delvis Melendez, Esq. 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717
Sworn to before me this 27TI1 day of December, 2004.
~.~h.b~,-_
NOTARY PUBLIC
CNoomtQaRmurOtias~Nls~ifii~"oeL~nd~?EiGnlG<SP.~JlGf;uet0fs6~l5~02~:'~t8.~!"Y'OG!7It.f

I1uJ,exCNoa.sCeV2:0033--4c9v9-049(J9S0)-J(ASRLfeDarocument 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 11 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ADRIANA TORRES,

-against-

Intervenor,

FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF·INTERVENORlS COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

LAW OFFICES OF DAVID S. FEATHER Attorney(s) for Plaintiff-Intervenor Adriana Torres

666 OLD COUNTRY ROAD SUITE 304
GARDEN ct1Y, NEW YORK 11530 (516) 745-9000

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, the undersigned, an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of New York

State, certifies that, upon information and belief and reasonable inquiry, the contentions contained in the

annexed document are not frivolous.

Dated:~.!:,£!:,.l!\!?!:'.F.....~}.•....~.Q.04

Signature....................................................................................................................................
David S. Feather

Print Signer's Name.••.............................•.....•............................................................................

Service ofa copy ofthe within

is hereby admitted.

Dated:

Attcrney(s) for

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

i o !

that the within is a (certified) true copy ofa

NonCEOF entered in the offiCe of the clerk of the within named Court on

.'it ENTRY

~ o

that an Order ofwhich the within is a true copy will be presented for settlement to the

NOTICE Of Hen.

one ofthe judges ofthe within named Court,

SETTlEMENT at

on

,-at

M.

Dated:

LAW OFFICES OF DAVID S. FEATHER Attomey(s)forPlaintiff-Intervenor Adriana Torres

666 OLD COUNTRY ROAD

SUITE 304

GARDEN CIlY, NEW YORK 11530

To:

(516) 745-9000

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 82 Filed 04/11/2005 Page 12 of 12

( --'

LAW OFFICES OF
DAVID S. FEATHER
666 OLD COUNTRY ROAD SUITE 304
GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 11530

FACSIMILE: 516.228.8349

•

TELEPHONE: 516.745.9000

•

E-MAIL: DSFeatherLaw@aol.com

April 8, 2005

VIA ECF & REGULAR MAIL
Robert C. Heinemann Clerk of the Court U.S. District Court Eastern District Court ofNew York 100 Federal Plaza Central Islip, New York 11722

F" ... ~
IN". ' r U.S. DIS·I"I\..< I "-'''-' ....H, I L.u.N.Y.
*
LOi~G ISL,\ND OFFICE

Re: EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc. 03-CV-4990

Dear Mr. Heinemann:

The undersigned represents Adriana Torres, a plaintiff-intervenor in the abovereferenced matter. Enclosed please find a copy of the Plaintiff-Intervenor's Complaint in the above-referenced matter, as well as a Notice of Appearance.

Please be advised that both ofthese documents were served upon the defendant and all other interested parties on December 27, 2004. However, at that time, my office was having technical problems vis-a-vis electronic case filing. Since that time, these problems have been resolved but I inadvertently neglected to electronically or otherwise file these documents.

I apologize for the delay and any inconvenience it may have caused you or the other parties to this matter. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Res

ly yours,

~~

DaVId S. Feather

DSF/jr Enclosures

 
 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 1 of 18

LAW OFFICE OF DELVIS MELÉNDEZ 90 BRADLEY STREET BRENTWOOD, NEW YORK 11717 631-434-1443
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _______________________________________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff

Case NO: 03 CV4990(JS)(AL)

and DILBER JIMENEZ, OLGA CHRISTINA MORALES, SONIA URIBE, JHON SANCHEZ, SONIA BORRERO, MILTON MISNAZA, NATALIA NARANJO, ROCIO RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR MORALES, ERIKA ROMERO, RUTH VIDAL and MARIA ZAMORA

Intervenors,

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-againstFIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.
Defendants _____________________________________________
Plaintiff-Intervenors complaining of defendants First Wireless Group Inc., allege:
NATURE OF THE ACTION

1

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 2 of 18
1. This is a civil rights action to redress deprivation of rights accorded to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A 2000e et seq.( “Title VII”); the Civil Rights Act.
2. All of the Plaintiff Intervenors as past employees of First Wireless Group were subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, Asian employees at Defendant Company, First Wireless Group, Inc., were provided with preferential treatment. Plaintiff-Intervenors allege that they were discriminated against due to their race and national origin. The discriminatory animus reflected itself in pay disparities between Asian and Hispanic workers. Moreover, Plaintiff-Intervenors allege that they were retaliated against for opposing the unlawful discriminatory practices. Plaintiff-Intervenors bring this action seeking compensatory, emotional distress, punitive damages, cost and attorney fees along with any other relief the court may find just and proper.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to (i) 28 U.S.C §1343(3) and §1343(4), which confer original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action to recover damages secured or to secure equitable relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights; (ii) the Declaratory Judgment Statute, 28 U.S.C §2201; (iii) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq., and (iv) 28 U.S.C §1367(a), in that the state and
2

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 3 of 18
federal claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact such that they are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United State Constitution.
4. Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), in as much as the defendants have an office and conducts business and can be found in the Eastern District of New York, and the causes of action arouse and occurred in the Eastern District of New York. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to § 706(f)(3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e, in as much, as the unlawful employment practices complained of herein occurred within the Eastern District of New York.
PARTIES 5. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission( hereinafter the “EEOC”) is a Commission created by the government of the United States pursuant to section 705 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e-4. The EEOC maintains its principal office in the District of Columbia. The EEOC is authorized to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). 6. The Plaintiff-Intervenors are all persons who reside in the County of Suffolk, State of New York. Plaintiffs all worked for First Wireless in the evening shift. Plaintiffs were all terminated from employment on February 28, 2002. Plaintiffs are authorized to intervene in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C sec. 2000(e)-5(f)(1).
3

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 4 of 18

7. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, First

Wireless Group, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing

in the State of New York.

8.

The Defendant First Wireless Group, Inc., is engaged in

an industry affecting commerce, as defined in Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended §701(g)-(h), 42 U.S.C. §2000

e(g)-(h).

9. At all relevant times, the Defendant First Wireless,

had, and still has, at least fifteen (15) or more employees for

each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the

current or preceding calendar year. Therefore, the Defendant is “an

employer” within the meaning of Title VII §701, 42 U.S.C.

§2000(e).

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 10. Plaintiff- Intervenors incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 10 of this Complaint as though the same were set forth full herein. 11. On or about March 2002, the Plaintiffs Intervenors filed a timely charge of discrimination with of the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission. 12. On August 19, 2002, the Plaintiffs requested that their case be transferred to the EEOC for investigation.

4

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 5 of 18
13. On or about July 25, 2003, following its investigation of that Charge, the EEOC issued a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the Plaintiff- Intervenors were discriminated against due to their race, national origin, and retaliated against for opposing unlawful discriminatory practices.
14. Following the determination set forth above, the EEOC attempted to eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion pursuant to 42 U.S.C §2000e-5(f)(1), but was unable to secure a conciliation agreement.
15. On or about September 30, 2003, the EEOC began their federal law suit for discriminatory practices in employment against Defendant First Wireless.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 16. Plaintiff-Intervenors incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1- 15 of this Complaint as though the same were set forth fully herein. 17. On or about April 20, 2000, Plaintiff- Intervenor, Dilber Jimenez, was hired by the Defendants as a Night Shift Manager. Plaintiff Jimenez is a Hispanic male. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about April 23, 2001. 18. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Sonia Borrero, was hired by the Defendants on or about August 28, 2000. Plaintiff Borrero
5

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 6 of 18
worked the evening shift. Plaintiff Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Borrero is a Hispanic female.
19. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Oscar Morales, was hired by the Defendants on or about October 2, 2000. Plaintiff Morales worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Morales is a Hispanic male.
20. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Olga Morales, was hired by the Defendants on or about October 2000. Plaintiff Morales worked as a line leader in the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Morales is a Hispanic female.
21. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Milton Misnaza, was hired by the Defendants on or about March 1, 2001. Plaintiff Miznasa worked the evening shift. Plaintiff Miznasa worked at First Wireless painting phones. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Miznasa is a Hispanic male.
22. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Natalia Naranjo, was hired by the Defendants on or about December 6, 2000. Plaintiff Naranjo worked the evening shift, as a programmer. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Naranjo is a Hispanic female.
6

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 7 of 18
23. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Rocio Rodriguez, was hired by the Defendants on or about August 28, 2000. Plaintiff Rodriguez worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Rodriguez is a Hispanic female.
24. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Erika Romero, was hired by the Defendants on or about September 25, 2000. Plaintiff Romero worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Romero is a Hispanic female.
25. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Sonia Uribe, was hired by the Defendants on or about November 27, 2000. Plaintiff Uribe worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Uribe is a Hispanic female.
26. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Ruth Vidal, was hired by the Defendants on or about January 15, 2001. Plaintiff Vidal worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Vidal is a Hispanic female.
27. Plaintiff-Intervenor, Maria Zamora, was hired by the Defendants on or about March 26, 2001. Plaintiff Zamora worked the evening shift. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Vidal is a Hispanic
7

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 8 of 18
female. 28. Plaintiff- Intervenor, Jhon Sanchez, was hired by
the Defendants on or about November 2000. Plaintiff Sanchez worked the evening shift, as a testing technician. Plaintiff-Intervenor was wrongfully terminated on or about February 28, 2002. Plaintiff Sanchez is a Hispanic male.
29. Plaintiff-Intervenors worked in a variety of positions ranging from management to testing technicians. Their work performance was exemplary.
30. The majority of the work force at First Wireless Group, Inc., were Hispanics. However, during the course of PlaintiffIntervenors employment more and more Asians were hired.
31. Historically, Dilber Jimenez did most of the hiring of the night shift personal. However, the Asian employees were hired by upper management. It was then Dilber Jimenez’s job, as Night Shift Manager, to assign the Asian employees to a line leader. The line leaders would then supervise the Asian employees work. It was incumbent upon the Plaintiff-Intervenors to train the Asian employees on how to perform the essential job functions assigned to them.
32. Upon information and belief, the Asian employees had limited language skills. Thus, communicating with the Asian employees created difficulties. Upon information and belief, the Asian employees had no previous training in the field. As a
8

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 9 of 18
result, the Asian employees production was far less then similarly situated Hispanic workers. Nevertheless, the Hispanic workers continued to work and coexist without incident until they became aware that they were being subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, similarly situated Hispanic workers were being paid far less then lessor experienced Asian employees.
33. Incensed over the discriminatory practices, PlaintiffIntervenors complained to Night Shift Manager, Dilber Jimenez. On or about April 20, 2001, in disbelief, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Jiminez complained to Plant Manager, Andrew Ng. Clearly and unequivocally, Plaintiff-Intervenors informed their superior of the discriminatory practices reflected in the pay disparities. Mr. Ng refused to take proactive remedial measures and simply told Mr. Jiminez that he “should be concerned with the good of the company and not the employees.”
34. Contemporaneously, the night shift employees circulated a petition calling for Management to put an end to pay disparities between the Asian and Hispanic workers. Upon information and belief, the petition was created and circulated by Adrianna Torres and Rosa Garcia. More than forty Hispanic employees willingly signed the petition. Mostly all of the Plaintiff-Intervenors signed the petition.
35. On or about April 23, 2001, Dilber Jimenez, Rosa Garcia
9

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 10 of 18
and Adrianna Torres were called into the office and terminated. Allegedly the reason given by the defendants for their termination was company reorganization. On information and belief, prior to her termination, Adrianna Torres was recognized by the company as the employee of the month. Moreover, Dilber Jimenez prior to his wrongful termination, was given a raise and assured of a future with a growing company. Clearly, Defendants’ legitimate business reason for Plaintiff-Intervenor Jiminez’s termination was pretextual. The motivating factor in Plaintiff-Intervenors termination was retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices.
36. On information and belief, as a result of their discriminatory discharge on or February 8, 2002, Rosa Garcia, and Adrianna Torres filed a charge of discrimination with the Suffolk County Commission of Human Rights. While the Defendants were acutely aware of their illegal and discriminatory practices, they continued in their pattern and practice of race and national origin discrimination. The Defendants manifested a blatant disregard for Plaintiffs federally protected rights by continuing to compensate the Asian workers at a higher rate then the Hispanic workers regardless of experience and/or length of service.
37. As a result of the investigation by the Suffolk County Commission of Human Rights, the Defendants escalated their campaign of harassment by singling out the Hispanic workers. Plaintiffs
10

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 11 of 18
contend that the Asian workers were allowed to remain seated, while Hispanic employees were to remain standing while working; Hispanic workers were censored and not allowed to readily speak to one another. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend as productivity was dwindling, because of the lack of production by the Asian workers, Hispanic employees were pressured to increase their output to compensate. However, pay differential remained the same. Hispanic employees earned approximately $7.00 per hour while Asian workers earned approximately $8.50.
38. In December 2001, Plaintiff- Intervenors began to hear rumors that the night shift was going to be eliminated. A new shift was created in which the Asian employees were allowed to transfer into. Not so coincidently, the only Hispanic employees who were allowed to transfer to the newly created shift were those who never signed the petition or those who recanted their previous claim of discrimination.
39. On or about January 22, 2002, as further evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory animus, a letter was circulated to the night shift personnel. The letter called for a formal declaration from each employee who signed the petition as to whether they recanted their previous statement of discrimination based on pay differential.
40. On or about February 28, 2002, as direct evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory animus in retaliation for opposing
11

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 12 of 18
illegal employment practices all of the employees who signed the petition and did not retract their previous statement were terminated.
41. The Defendants have discriminated against the PlaintiffIntervenors in violation of Title VII in that its nondiscriminatory business reasons for the pay disparities and Plaintiffs termination are clearly pretextual.
AS AND FOR A FIRST FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION 42. The Plaintiffs repeats and reallege the allegations set forth in paragraphs “1" through “41" as if more fully set forth herein. 43. The Defendants have discriminated against the Plaintiff-Intervenors in the terms and conditions of their employment on the basis on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. 44. The Defendants willfully and knowingly subjected the Hispanic workers at First Wireless Group, Inc., to unequal terms and conditions in employment due to their national origin. 45. By reason of the Defendants’ unlawful actions, the Plaintiffs were caused to suffer economic loss, were made emotionally ill, and were otherwise greatly injured, and therefore demand back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive
12

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 13 of 18
damages and benefits for Dilber Jimenez, and compensatory, emotional distress, and punitive damages for all other Plaintiff Intervenors in a sum to be determined by a jury; interest costs, prejudgment interest, and disbursements; and in addition attorneys fees.
AS AND FOR A SECOND FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE DISCRIMINATION
46. The Plaintiffs repeats and reallege the allegations set forth in paragraphs “1" through “45" as if more fully set forth herein.
47. The Defendants have discriminated against the Plaintiff-Intervenors in the terms and conditions of their employment on the basis on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.
48. The Defendants willfully and knowingly subjected the Hispanic workers at First Wireless Group, Inc., to unequal terms and conditions in employment due to their race.
49. By reason of the Defendants’ unlawful actions, the Plaintiffs were caused to suffer economic loss, were made emotionally ill, and were otherwise greatly injured, and therefore demand back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and benefits for Dilber Jimenez, and compensatory, emotional distress, and punitive damages for all other Plaintiff Intervenors in a sum to be determined by a jury; interest costs,
13

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 14 of 18
prejudgment interest, and disbursements; and in addition attorneys fees.
AS AND FOR A THIRD FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RETALIATION
50. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs “1" through “49" with the same force and effect as if stated more fully herein.
51. The Defendants discriminated against PlaintiffIntervenors based upon them opposing unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e). Defendants terminated Plaintiff- Intervenors’ employment in retaliation for them complaining of the different terms and conditions of employment between the Asian and Hispanic Workers at First Wireless Group, Inc.
52. By engaging in the above-described conduct, the Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff-Intervenors with malice or reckless indifference to their federally protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have suffered and are entitled to damages, including but not limited to: lost compensation, and/or lost pay for Dilber Jimenez, pain and suffering, mental anguish and other emotional distress damages, compensatory, and punitive damages, along with costs and attorney’s fees for all Plaintiffs, and
14

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 15 of 18
prejudgement interest in an amount to be determined by a jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Intervenors respectfully pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows: (a) As and For a First Federal Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination Based Upon National Origin, an award to the Plaintiff-Intervenors under Title VII of all of the back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and fringe benefits Dilber Jimenez lost as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination against him, together with an award for compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at trial for all other Plaintiffs, with interest costs, disbursements and prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s fees. (b) As and For a Second Federal Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination Based Upon Race, an award to the PlaintiffIntervenors under Title VII of all of the back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and fringe benefits Dilber Jimenez lost as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination against him, together with an award for compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at trial for all other Plaintiffs, with interest costs, disbursements and prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s
15

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 16 of 18
fees. (c) As and For a Third Federal Cause of Action for
Employment Discrimination Based Upon Retaliation, an award to the Plaintiff-Intervenors under Title VII of all of the back pay, compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages and fringe benefits for Dilber Jimenez as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful retaliation, together with an award for compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages for all other Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined by a jury at trial, with interest costs, disbursements and prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s fees.
(d) Prejudgement interest on any amount awarded under subsections (a) and/or (b) and/or (c) of this Prayer for Relief;
(e) That the Court retain jurisdiction over this action until the Defendants has fully complied with the Orders of the Court; and that the Court require the Defendants to file such reports as may be necessary to supervise such compliance; and
(f) To award Plaintiff-Intervenors such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff-Intervenors herein demand a trial by jury of all issues in this action. Dated: Brentwood, New York June 2, 2005
16

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 17 of 18 Respectfully submitted, s/s DELVIS MELÉNDEZ(DM-7975) Attorney for the Intervenors 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717 (631) 434-1443
17

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 90 Filed 07/13/2005 Page 18 of 18 18

 
 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 112 Filed 12/23/2005 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Long Island Federal Courthouse 814 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, NY 11722-4451 (631) 712-5730

BEFORE: ARLENE R. LINDSAY United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: December 22, 2005 TIME: 2:00 PM

DOCKET NO:
03-cv-04990-JS-ARL
CASE:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. First Wireless Group, Inc.

INITIAL CONFERENCE STATUS CONFERENCE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE FINAL CONFERENCE ORDER

BY TELEPHONE XX

APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

Michelle Caiola

Adela Santos

The following rulings were made:

FOR DEFENDANT:
Doug Wigdor Scott Gilly

The plaintiffs’ motion to compel was resolved during the telephone conference. The parties shall submit a proposed order based on the court’s oral rulings. The plaintiffs requested an opportunity to submit additional papers concerning the defendant’s motion for order finding that they are in civil contemp of court. That request was granted. The plaintiffs shall submit opposing papers by December 29, 2005. The defendant may reply by January 6, 2006.

SO ORDERED:

___/s/____________________

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------x
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, -againstFIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 03-CV-4990 (JS) (ARL)

Defendant,

------------------------------x
Appearances:

For Plaintiff:

Michelle A. Caiola, Esq.

Lauren G. Dreilinger, Esq.

Katherine E. Bissell, Esq.

Estela Diaz, Esq.

Elizabeth Ann Grossman, Esq.

Adela P. Santos, Esq.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

33 Whitehall Street, 5 th Floor

New York, New York 10004-2112

For Intervener Plaintiffs:

Delvis Melendez, Esq. 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717

For Defendant:

Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq. Thompson Wigdor & Gilly LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5720 New York, New York 10118

SEYBERT, District Judge:

INTRODUCTION

On September 3D, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") commenced this action on behalf of several

former Hispanic employees of First Wireless Group, Inc. ("First

Wireless" or "Defendant")

EEOC alleged that First Wireless

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 200De et seq., ("Title VII") by compensating Hispanic
employees at a lower pay rate than Asian employees performing the
same or substantially similar work, subjecting Hispanic employees
to unequal terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and
terminating some of the employees in retaliation for protesting the
wage disparity. On August 18, 2004, the Court granted two separate
motions to intervene filed by, respectively, twelve former employees, and Adriana Torres, a past employee. The IntervenorPlaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 13, 2005, alleging
essentially the same acts of discrimination and retaliation that
the EEOC alleged. The action now involves a total of thirty-eight
former employees, collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs" or
"Claimants. III Presently pending is Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant' s
motion in part and GRANTS it in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Parties' 56.1
Statement and Counter-Statement and the exhibits thereto.
I The Claimants are Karla Aguilera, Idalia Araujo, Raidy Alvarez, Sonia Arzayus, Estela del Carmen Barahona (a/k/a Andrea Rodriguez), Mireya Bautista, Beatriz Buitrago, Fidelina Caceres, Gloria Cardenas, Ann Maria Castaneda, Carlos Fuentes, Edwin Garcia (a/k/a Wervin Julian Garcia), Beatriz Garcia, Nely Hernandez, Dilber Jimenez, Ivonne Leon, Ligia Lozano, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Mariana Moran, Carlos Morcillo, Natalia Naranjo, Blanca Penaranda, Edis Reyes, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Zorayda Salcedo, Jhon Sanchez, Luis Sanchez (a/k/a Oscar Morales), Elizabeth Santana, Francisca Santana, Nora Lucia Sosa, Luz Adela Torres (a/k/a Adela Ardila), Adriana Torres, Sonia Uribe, Reina Vega, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora.
2

First Wireless is an electronic company that repairs and

refurbishes cellular phones.

(Def's. R. 56.1 Statement ~ 3

("Def' s. Stmt. 1/ ) • )

In or about April 20, 2001, Claimant Adriana Torres ("Torres") learned that a newly-hired Asian co-worker was being paid more than Torres. (EEOC R. 56.1 Statement ~ 82 ("Pls.' Stmt.") .) Torres raised her concerns with Claimant Dilber Jimenez ("Jimenez"), Manager of the second shift. (Id. , 209.) Jimenez informed his supervisor, General Manager Andrew Ng about the alleged pay disparity. (Id. , 209.)

Shortly thereafter, Torres, along with other Hispanic

employees, drafted a letter to management requesting information about the alleged difference in pay (the "Memorandum"). (Id. , 209. ) The employees attached a second page with the names of the employees who supported sending the Memorandum (the "Petition"). (Id. , 209). Jimenez was unaware of both the Memorandum and Petition. (Id. )

The parties dispute the events that occurred next. Plaintiffs contend that Torres took the Memorandum home, translated it into English, and brought the Memorandum and Petition to work on Monday, April 23, 2001, to gather extra signatures and present it to Eileen Lever ("Lever"), Director of Human Resources.

209.) When Torres returned to work, Lever approached her and asked Torres about both documents. (Id.) After reading the Memorandum, Lever allegedly told Torres that she should come directly to her if
3

Torres had a problem. (Id. ) As this was happening, Jimenez arrived at work and saw Lever holding the Memorandum in her hand. (Id. ) After asking an employee what was happening, Jimenez was

informed that the employees had prepared a letter addressing the

alleged pay disparity.

Within an hour, Lever, Ng, and

Brunilda Calderon, a customer service director, told Jimenez that

they were terminating him because First Wireless was reorganizing and/or downsizing. (Id. ~~ 165, 209.) On that day or the next, Defendants also terminated Torres and Rosa Garcia ("Garcia"), who

helped Torres circulate the Memorandum and Petition.

Defendant disputes Plaintiffs narration of the events.

According to Defendant, Lever did not see the Memorandum and

Petition until First Wireless corporate counsel gave it to her. (Def's. Stmt. ~ 232.) Next, Defendant contends that it had to let

go of Jimenez, Torres, and Garcia because the company needed to reorganize after a downturn in business. (Id. ~ 209.) Defendant states that it chose these employees because of the reorganization and because each had work performance problems. (Id. ~~ 208-218.) Plaintiffs dispute that any of the employees had performance issues. (Pls.' Stmt. ~ 210.)

Shortly after their termination, Jimenez, Torres, and

Garcia filed charges of discrimination with the Suffolk county Human Rights Commission ("SCHRC"). (Id. ~~ 228, 234.) In December of 2001, a SCHRC investigator began calling First Wireless

employees to inquire about the claims raised in the charges. (Id.
4

~ 234.) Again, the parties dispute the events that transpired

next.

Plaintiffs contend that Calderon, Lever, and Lever's

assistant, Nancy Juarez ("Juarez") , listened in on the

conversations between the SCHRC investigator and the employees.

(Id.) Defendant states that Lever was not aware of the phone calls

until after the depositions of the Claimants.
234. )

(Def 's. Stmt. ~

At some point in early 2002, Defendant decided to

eliminate the second shift.

lId. ~ 251; P1s.' Stmt. ~ 251.)

Defendant contends that it offered all employees an opportunity to

transfer to the day shift through postings and a memorandum

included with the employees' paychecks, and states that it granted

the request of every employee who requested a transfer to the day

shift.

(Def's. Stmt. ~ 251.)

According to Defendant, the

employees who remained on the second shift were aware that there

were positions available during the day, but choose not to transfer. (rd. ~ 252.) Plaintiffs allege that the Claimants were

not told that the night shift would be eliminated and were "falsely

misled into believing that their jobs were secure," whereas Asian

employees were told that the second shift would be eliminated. (P1s.' Stmt. ~ 251.)

The parties agree that at some point in late January, a

letter was sent to Hispanic workers on the night shift asking the

workers to recant their signature from the 2001 Petition.

314, 315, 318; Def's. Stmt. ~~ 314-321.) 5

However, Defendant

asserts that Juarez wrote the letter because she wanted employees to express their concerns in writing, and Juarez did so without any assistance from anyone else, and without the knowledge of First Wireless managers, officers, or owners. (Def's. Stmt. ~~ 314-321.) Plaintiffs contend that Juarez wrote the letter in response to SCHRC's investigation and with the knowledge of managers at First Wireless.
At approximately the same time, Defendant locked the bathroom. (Def's. Stmt. ~~ 310, 311.) Defendant contends that it locked the bathroom during both shifts because of unsanitary conditions caused by some of the employees. (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that the bathroom was locked in response to the SCHRC investigation, and state that the bathroom may have been locked only during the night shift. (PIs.' Stmt. ~ 310-311.)
In February of 2002, Defendant laid off several employees from the second shift. Defendant contends that the terminations were part of a reorganization necessitated by a downturn in business, and the second shift employees were chosen because these lay-offs would produce higher savings. (Def' s. Stmt. ~~ 271-275.) Plaintiffs state that there was no downturn in business, and that the employees who were terminated were chosen because they signed or had their names associated with the 2001 Petition. (PIs.' Stmt.
~ 271-275.)
In August of 2002, the case was transferred from SCHRC to the EEOC, and on September 30, 2002, EEOC commenced the instant
6

action. EEOC contends that Defendant paid Asian employees more than Hispanic employees, and then retaliated against the Hispanic employees for raising the pay disparity in the Memorandum and

Petition. Defendants deny these allegations, and assert that the

employees' pay rates depended on their experience and educational

n background. (Id.

88-89.) Moreover, Defendant states that it

treated all of its employees well and even sponsored English

classes for at least some of the Claimants. (Id " 325, 329). EEOC disputes this, but does agree that two claimants, W. Garcia

and Olga Morales, ac.tended a few English classes sponsored by Defendant. (Pls.' Stmt. , 329.)

DISCUSSION I. Standard Of Review On Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute concerning any material facts, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. II Harvis Trien & Beck, P.C. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P.), 153 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986)

"The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment. II McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997) i see also
7

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material

fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all

permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." McLee, 109 F.3d at 134.

"Although the moving party bears the initial burden of

establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact,

once such a showing is made, the non-movant must 'set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"

Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256) . "Mere conclusory allegations

or denials will not suffice. II William v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323

(2d Cir. 1986). Indeed, when a motion for summary judgment is

made, it lS time to "to put up or shut up.

[U]nsupported

allegations do not create a material issue of fact." Weinstock,

224 F.3d at 41 (internal citations omitted)

when ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a

discrimination case, "additional considerations should be taken

into account. A trial court must be cautious about granting

summary judgment to an employer when

. its intent is at issue.

. Because writings directly supporting a claim of intentional

discrimination are rarely, if ever, found among an employer I s

corporate papers, affidavits and depositions must be carefully

scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show
8

discrimination." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, a court should not grant an employer's motion for summary judgment unless "the evidence of discriminatory intent is so slight that no rational jury could find in [the PJ laintiff 1 s favor. 1/ Id. at 1226. Although this is a deferential standard, it should not be applied so as to create a de-facto bar on summary judgment in all employment discrimination cases. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2000) ("the 'impression that summary judgment is unavailable to defendants in discrimination cases lS unsupportable.' 1/ (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 38 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1994)). II. Disparate Pay Claim
A. Timeliness On June I, 2007, Defendant filed a letter with the Court
urging the Court to find that Claimants' disparate pay claims are untimely because the majority of Claimants filed a charge of discrimination outside of the charging period. Defendant argues that the charges should have been filed within 300 days of the date on which First Wireless hired each individual Claimant at an allegedly lower salary. In support of this argument, Defendant cites to a recent Supreme Court case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162; 167 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2007).
Defendant's argument is without merit because the facts and holding of Ledbetter are distinguishable from the instant case. Ledbetter did not involve a discriminatory pay structure, but
9

rather involved discrete instances of discrimination against a

specific plaintiff that affected the plaintiff's paychecks. The

plaintiff in Ledbetter alleged that her supervisors discriminated

against her during her employee evaluations, and gave her lower ratings than she deserved. Ledbetter claimed that her paychecks were lower than they would have been had she been evaluated in a

nondiscriminatory manner, and she was unfairly denied a raise in

1998 because of the past poor evaluations. The Supreme Court held

that Ledbetter's claim of reduced paychecks was time-barred because

the complaint relied on discrete acts of past discrimination.

"Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her" rather than waiting until 1998 to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 2169.

Unlike Ledbetter, the present case does not involve

specific acts of past discrimination, but rather deals with an

ongoing discriminatory pay structure.

In addressing this

distinction, the Supreme Court clearly explained that "when an

employer adopts a facially discriminatory pay structure that puts

some employees on a lower scale because of race, the employer

engages in intentional discrimination whenever it issues a check to

one of these disfavored employees." Id. at 2173 (emphasis added) .

The claims in this case were filed within 300 days of the last

issued paycheck, and are therefore timely because "an employer

violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever 10

the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure." Id. at 2174.
B. Standard Of Review Plaintiffs claims of disparate pay in violation of Title
VII are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) i Cabrera v. New York City, 436 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) Under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) Claimants were members of a protected class; (2) Claimants were paid less than similarlysi tuated non-members of the protected class; and (3) evidence of discriminatory animus. See Belii v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); Trotman v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 06-CV-3389, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73641, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
If a plaintiff is able to satisfy this initial burden, a rebuttable presumption exists that the employer unlawfully discriminated. McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Educ. I 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006). The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Cabrera v. New York City, 436 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Once a defendant articulates such a purpose, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the proffered reason set forth by defendant is pretextual. Id. at 644.
11

A. Prima Facie Case
It lS undisputed that Claimants are members of a protected class. The Court's analysis therefore turns on whether Plaintiffs can establish the remaining two elements of a prima facie case of disparate pay. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case because the Claimants were not similarly situated with Asian employees receiving a higher pay, and there is no evidence of discriminatory animus.
1. Similarly Situated In deciding whether employees are similarly situated, the Court may consider several factors, including the employees' work duties, education, seniority, and performance history. Trotman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73641, at *24. The key determinant is whether the circumstances of the employees is "similar in significant respects." Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 101
(2d Cir. 2001).
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot identify any Asian employee with a higher wage that was similarly situated to the Claimants. According to Defendant, the Asian employees who were paid at a higher hourly rate had prior related employment experience or educational backgrounds in technology, engineering, and/or electronics-related fields, whereas the Claimants lacked prior employment experience in the electronics field, and had limited educational backgrounds. However, EEOC has named several Asian employees who performed similar work as the Claimants and
12

received a higher starting wage, despite having a limited
educational background and limited prior experience. 2 A reasonable
juror could infer that these Asian comparators were similarly
situated to the Claimants.
2. Discriminatory Animus
In a disparate pay claim, the plaintiff "bears the burden
of proving that defendant acted with an intent to discriminate
against plaintiff on the basis of (plaintiff's] protected status."
Simpson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 04-CV-2565, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 50331, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006). Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs have not satisfied this burden because they
have not demonstrated that managers or executives at First Wireless
2 EEOC lists eleven Claimants from the day shift that received a starting salary of $6.00, and one who received $7.00, as compared with twenty-five Asian comparators who started at a pay-rate of $8.00 per hour, three at $8.50 per hour, and three at $10.00 an hour. From the night shift, EEOC lists twenty-five Claimants who started at $7.00 an hour, versus one comparator who started at $7.00 and twenty-one comparators who started at the higher rate of $8.50 per hour. Many of the Claimants have had previous work experience, and several have had post-secondary education. Some of the comparators listed with a higher starting pay rate have had limited work experience and limited education. For example, Li Amei and Ming Ming Nu did not list any postsecondary education or prior work experience on their applications, yet were hired at the higher $8.00 an hour rate for the day shift. Claimants Beatriz Buitrago and Karla Aguilera similarly did not have any post-secondary education or prior work experience, yet were hired at $6.00 per hour for the day shift. Claimant Sonia Borrero had post-secondary education and experience in packing, yet was hired at $6.00 to work during the night shift in the shipping/receiving/quality control department; comparatively, Gar Kew Chan, also hired to work in the second shift shipping/receiving/quality control department, had prior experience but no post-secondary education, yet was hired at a starting salary of $8.50 per hour.
13

harbored any discriminatory animus towards Hispanic workers.

Defendant cites to deposition testimony of several Claimants, who

testified that First Wireless owners were kind and that the

Claimants recommended the job to other Hispanic individuals.

Plaintiffs argue that the pay disparity amongst the majority of

Hispanic and Asian employees provides a strong inference of discriminatory animus.

The Court recognizes that "direct proof of [discriminatory animus] will often be lacking: smoking guns are

rarely left in plain view." Brown v. DeFrank, No. 06-CV-2235, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83345, at *88 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. IS, 2006) (quoting

Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir.

2001)) i see also Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92

F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Since it is rare indeed to find in an

employer's records proof that a personnel decision was made for a discriminatory reason, whatever other relevant depositions,

affidavits and materials are before the district court must be

carefully scrutinized for circumstantial evidence that could

support an inference of discrimination.")

Al though proof of

discriminatory animus generally requires "evidence beyond the mere

fact of unequal pay for equal work," David v. Comtech PST Corp., No

06-CV-6480, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68208, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,

2006), the Court notes that in this case, nearly all of the

Hispanic workers were paid less than the Asian employees. A

reasonable jury may infer a discriminatory animus from the large
14

number of Hispanic employees paid at lower rates and the amount of Asian employees receiving a higher salary. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
B. Pretext Defendant proffers several non-discriminatory reasons to
rebut Plaintiffs' disparate pay claims. First, Defendant contends that it paid Hispanic employees less because of the specific qualifications and backgrounds of the employees. However, as noted above, EEOC has presented evidence to rebut this non-discriminatory reason, including a list of several Hispanic employees with backgrounds and qualifications similar to that of Asian employees who received a higher salary.
Next, Defendant contends that the Asian employees with a higher salary lived in the five boroughs of New York City, as opposed to Long Island. Defendant argues that it paid these employees more because the job market in New York City is more competitive and the cost of living is higher. While this may be a legitimate reason for the pay difference, Plaintiffs name several Asian employees who resided in Nassau County, yet were still paid at the higher rate. This creates an issue of fact as to whether locality was actually taken into consideration in determining wages. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could infer that
15

Defendant's pro-offered justifications for the difference in pay are pretextual.
Although Defendant may have paid the Hispanic employees less because of their work experience, educational background, and place of residence, whether Defendant's reasons for the lower pay rate were non-discriminatory or were pre-textual should be left to a jury. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgement on Plaintiffs' Title VII pay disparity claims is DENIED. III. Retaliation
While Title VII retaliation claims, like Title VII discrimination claims, are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm, the elements of a prima facie case are different. See Patane, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 316. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiffs must show that (1) they engaged in protected activity, (2) Defendant was aware of this activity, (3) Defendant took adverse action against Plaintiffs, and (4) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) i Patane, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
A. Claimants Who Signed The Petition The Court finds that the Claimants who signed the 2001
Petition participated in a protected activity. The Memorandum stated that the writers believed that First Wireless was violating their rights by paying Hispanic employees less than Asian
16

employees, and demanded a salary equivalent to that of the Asian employees. This is a clear example of a protected activity.
Although the first prong for a retaliation claim has been met, there are issues of fact that make the remaining prongs more difficul t to determine. On the issue of whether Defendant had knowledge of the protected activity, EEOC submits deposition testimony from several Claimants who state that they either witnessed or overheard Lever discussing the Petition with Torres on April 23, 2001. Additionally, EEOC asserts that Santiago, another manager, was present when second shift employees discussed writing the Memorandum to management. Defendant denies that the above instances occurred, and maintains that First Wireless management did not receive, and was not aware of, the Petition and Memorandum at the time of the alleged adverse actions. Because there is a factual dispute related to Defendant's awareness of the protected activity, summary judgment is inappropriate.
B. Claimants Who Were Not Signatories To The Petition Defendant argues that approximately 22 of the 38 Claimants were not signatories to the 2001 Petition and/or Memorandum, and therefore these Claimants did not engage in any protected activity.3
3 The Claimants whose name appeared on the Petition include Raidy Alvarez, Sonia Arzayus, Estela Barahona, Carlos Fuentes, Edwin Garcia, Olga Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, John Sanchez, Luis Sanches, Adriana Torres, Luz Adela Torres, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora.
17

"The term 'protected activity' refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination. II Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the objection need not rise to the level of a formal complaint, there must be, at the very least, "some form of professional indicia of a complaint made against an unlawful activity." Soliman v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 03-CV-I04, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted) .
Here, although Claimant Jimenez did not sign the Petition, he may have engaged in a protected activity by informing General Manager Ng that some of the employees were questioning the company's pay rates. The exact words Jimenez used are unknown to the Court. There is a question of fact as to whether Jimenez's conversation with Ng constituted some form of a complaint. A jury could conclude that Jimenez was protesting the alleged lower wages for Hispanic employees, or could conclude that Jimenez was merely informing Ng that other employees had come to Jimenez with concerns about the alleged pay disparity.
If the jury concludes that Jimenez's conversation amounted to a protected activity, the remaining prongs of the retaliation claim are also disputed. Defendant argues that a causal connection is lacking because Jimenez's termination was the result of company reorganization and Jimenez's unsatisfactory work performance. Similarly, Defendant contends that even if Jimenez
18

could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the company's need for reorganization and Jimenez's performance issues constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Because material questions of fact remain as to whether Jimenez has established a prima facie case, and whether Defendant had legitimate reasons for taking adverse employment action against Jimenez, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Jimenez's retaliation claim is DENIED.
Claimants Zorada Salcedo ("Salcedo") and Nora Lucia Sosa ("Sosa") al so did not sign the Peti t ion. However, both Salcedo and Sosa may have engaged in protected activity as their full names appear on the Petition, and this could be perceived as participation in the complaint. 4 Nonetheless, summary judgment lS inappropriate for these two Claimants, as there is an issue of fact as to whether First Wireless had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the layoff. First Wireless asserts that it had to reorganize and layoff employees after suffering a loss in business. EEOC disputes this contention, and argues that First Wireless did not undergo a financial loss in 2001, and did not need to reorganize the company. EEOC supports its contention with new hire forms indicating that several employees were hired on or around the same time that some of the Claimants were terminated. Because there is a material issue of fact as to a crucial element of a
4 Salcedo and Sosa's full name appears on the Petition, but the signature line next to their names remains blank.
19

retaliation claim, summary judgment is DENIED as to Salcedo and Sosa's retaliation claims.
The remaining Claimants who did not sign the Petition are Karla Aguilera, Idalia Araujo, Mireya Bautista, Beatriz Buitrago, Fidelina Caceres, Gloria Cardenas, Ana Maria Castaneda, Beatriz Garcia, Nely Hernandez, Ivonne Leon, Ligia Lozano, Milton Misnaza, Mariana Moran, Carlos Morcillo, Blanca Penaranda, Edis Reyes, Elizabeth Santana, Francisca Santana, and Reina Vega ("remaining non-signatory Claimants"). The Court finds that the remaining nonsignatory Claimants cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because they have not alleged any protected activity. The Claimants' names were not on the Petition or Memorandum, and they have not alleged any other activity protesting Defendant's treatment of Hispanic employees. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining nonsignatory Claimants' retaliation claim.
20

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons I Defendant's mot ion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of disparate pay in violation of Title VIr is DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the retaliation claims of Jimenez, Salcedo, Sosa, and the sixteen signatory Claimants is also DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining nineteen non-signatory Claimants' retaliation claim is GRANTED.

Dated:

New York 2008

SO ORDERED

,

/5/ JOANNA SEYBERT

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J.

21

 
 E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

2006 WL 2707442 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. New York.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC., Defendant.
No. CV 03-4990(JS)(ARL). | Sept. 20, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Adela P. Santos, Elizabeth Anne Grossman, Estela Diaz, Katherine E. Bissell, Lauren G. Dreilinger, Michelle A. Caiola, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, New York District Office, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Douglas Holden Wigdor, Thompson, Wigdor & Gilly LLP, New York, NY, John L. Juliano, East Northport, NY, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
LINDSAY, Magistrate Judge.
*1 Before the court is the defendant’s letter application dated September 8, 2006, seeking a protective order precluding the EEOC from communicating with its current and former employees. In the alternative, the defendant requests that the EEOC disclose the contents of any intended communication so that it can raise objections, if any, and prepare counter-communications, if necessary. The EEOC opposes the application by letter dated September 13, 2006. For the reason set forth below, the application is granted, in part.
On May 27, 2004, the court held a conference with the parties during which the defendant expressed its valid concern that in interviewing certain current and former employees, the EEOC might breach the attorney-client privilege. On June 1, 2006, consistent with the parties’ agreement reached at the conference, the court entered an order requiring each party to notify the other party of any intended communication with the defendant’s current and former employees ten days prior to the communication. Pursuant to that order, on September 1, 2006, the EEOC filed an amended notice of its intent to communicate with 245 current and former employees of First Wireless. First Wireless objects to the intended communication on the

grounds that (1) the notice is untimely; (2) the employees listed have nothing to do with the case; (3) ten of the employees are current or former managers who the EEOC should not be entitled to contact; and (4) that the mass communications will disrupt its business.
As a threshold matter, the EEOC has agreed to forgo communications with any current employees in order to resolve the issue concerning the disruption of First Wireless’ business. In order to do so, however, the defendant must identify, in writing, by September 27, 2006, which of the 245 employees are currently employed by First Wireless. The EEOC has agreed not to communicate with any of the current employees identified by the defendant.
With respect to the non-managerial former employees, the court agrees with the EEOC that there is no basis for prohibiting the EEOC’s contact with former employees. “Federal courts [have] long recognized the appropriateness of contacting low-level employees of an institutional defendant.” Merrill v. City of New York, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26693 *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005) citing N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.1983). Further, “[t]he restraint on contact with a party’s employees generally extends only to current servants, not to former ones.” Merrill, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3. The only justification for restricting contact with a former employ would be to protect privileged information that the employee may possess. See Kingsway Fin. Servs. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35615 *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006). This circumstance typically arises only with former managerial or supervisory employees. Accordingly, by September 27, 2006, First Wireless is to identify, from the list provided, any former managerial or supervisory employees with access to privileged information. As to each of these employees, First Wireless is to provide the EEOC with a declaration identifying the position held by each such employee, as well as a description of their duties and responsibilities. Upon receipt of the list form First Wireless, the EEOC is to provide First Wireless with the subject matter of its intended communication with such employees by September 29, 2006. If, after reviewing the subject matter of the intended communication, First Wireless believes that those employees may be asked about information protected by a privilege belonging to First Wireless, it shall communicate its concern to the EEOC. If the issue cannot be resolved by the parties, First Wireless may then renew its application for a protective order with respect to the “manager-level” employees.
*2 Finally, the parties are advised that due to a change in the undersigned’s schedule, the final conference scheduled for September 27, 2006 is adjourned to October
1

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006) 23, 2006 at 11:30 a.m.
	  
SO ORDERED:
2

 
 E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 586720 United States District Court,
E.D. New York.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC., Defendant.
No. 03-CV-4990(JS)(ARL). | Feb. 20, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Michelle A. Caiola, Esq., Lauren G. Dreilinger, Esq., Katherine E. Bissell, Esq., Estela Diaz, Esq., Elizabeth Ann Grossman, Esq., Adela P. Santos, Esq., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Delvis Melendez, Esq., Brentwood, NY, for Intervener Plaintiffs.
Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq., Thompson Wigdor & Gilly LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SEYBERT, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 Pending before the Court are two motions brought by First Wireless Group, Inc., (“Defendant”). Defendant moves to set aside Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay’s Orders, dated June 22, 2006 (“June 2006 Order”) and August 10, 2006 (“August 2006 Order”). Defendant claims that the Magistrate’s Orders are erroneous and contrary to law. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motions.
BACKGROUND
Certain Hispanic employees, who later intervened as Plaintiffs in this case (“Plaintiff-Interveners”) filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Suffolk County

Commission of Human Rights. On August 19, 2002, this case was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On September 30, 2003, the EEOC brought a civil action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against the Defendant. On September 30, 2003, the EEOC filed a Complaint with this Court, claiming Defendant discriminated and retaliated against a group of Hispanics (“Claimants”) that it employed. EEOC specifically alleged that Hispanic employees who worked the evening shift for Defendant were paid less than similarly situated Asian employees. (See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 7.)
EEOC also alleged that Defendant retaliated against the Hispanic employees in the following instances. First, Defendant fired shift manager, Dilber Jimenez, for complaining about wage disparity. Second, Defendant fired Rosa Garcia and Adrianna Torres for circulating a petition that protested the wage disparity. Third, Defendant pressured the Hispanic employees that signed the petition to recant their signatures, and fourth, Defendant ultimately terminated those employees. (Id.)
On July 13, 2005, the Plaintiff-Interveners filed an Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff-Interveners alleged essentially the same acts of discrimination and retaliation that the EEOC alleged. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17-41.)
In 2004, the parties commenced discovery, and on June 15, 2004, Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay issued a Protective Order (“Protective Order”). This Court upheld the Protective Order. See EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 03-CV-4990, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24089, at *8-*9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2004).
During discovery in 2006, Defendant sought to compel Claimants to respond to certain deposition questions concerning the countries of their origin and the accuracy of the information contained in their employment application and their W-4. In the June 2006 Order, the Magistrate issued a ruling that Defendant could ask the Claimants where they were born, whether they filed tax returns, and whether Claimants had made false statements. Claimants did not need to respond, however, to questions regarding the accuracy of the social security numbers provided in their employment applications. (Id. at 2.) Defendant moves to set aside this portion of the June 2006 Order.
In July 2006, Defendant sought independent psychological examinations of certain Claimants pursuant to Federal Rule 35(a). Defendant argues a Rule 35 examination is necessary because some of the Claimants alleged and testified to serious emotional damages. The Magistrate denied the request in the August 2006 Order,
1

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

claiming that the damages were mere “garden variety” damages, not warranting a Rule 35 examination. Further, the EEOC was willing to stipulate to seek only “garden variety” damages on the emotional distress claims. Defendant moves to set aside the entire August 2006 Order.
LEGAL STANDARD
*2 Rule 72 provides in pertinent part the following:
A magistrate judge to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into record a written order setting forth the disposition of the matter. Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and file objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge’s order to which objection was not timely made. The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
This Court may set aside a portion of Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s orders concerning non-dispositive matters if the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. An order is “clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court[, based] on the entire evidence[,] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Weiss v. La Suisse, 161 F.Supp.2d 305, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y.2001). An order is “contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Id.
Discovery matters are generally considered non-dispositive and thus governed by Rule 72(a). See id. “A magistrate judge’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference” and is overruled only if the Magistrate has abused its discretion. Id.; see EEOC v. First Wireless, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24089, at *3.

DISCUSSION
I. This Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion To Set Aside The June 2006 Order. The June 2006 Order precluded the Defendant from inquiring into the accuracy of Claimants’ social security numbers provided to the Defendant during the hiring process. Defendant argues this portion of the June 2006 Order was clearly erroneous and contrary to law. Defendant claims that its inquiry as to the veracity of the social security numbers obtained during the hiring process concerns Claimants’ credibility and not their immigration status.
On June 13, 2006, Defendant sought “to compel the Claimants to respond to certain deposition questions concerning the countries of their origin and the accuracy of the information contained in their employment application and their W-4.” (June 2006 Order 1.) The Defendant also requested that the Magistrate reconsider the Protective Order, barring discovery into Claimants’ immigration status. In the June 2006 Order, Magistrate Judge Lindsay held that “[D]efendant’s attempt to learn whether [P]laintiffs used false [social security numbers] is nothing more than a back door attempt to shed light on their immigration status and thereby avoid the court’s [Protective Order.]” (Id. at 2.) The Protective Order intended “to protect the Plaintiffs from the in terrorem effect of discovery requests aimed at learning their immigration status.” (Id.)
A. Relevance Of Immigration Status And Information Sought By Defendant To Attack Claimants’ Credibility
*3 In upholding the Protective Order, this Court held that There is no evidence in the record which shows that the Defendant had inquired into the Charging Parties’ immigration status at the time of hiring and no evidence pointing to Defendant’s lack of knowledge with respect the Charging Parties’ alleged illegal immigration status. Therefore, it was proper for Judge Lindsay to preclude the Defendant from discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status because the Defendant cannot “ignore immigration laws at the time of hiring but insist upon their enforcement when [its] employees complain.” EEOC v. First Wireless, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24089, at *8-*9, (quoting Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 905, 125 S.Ct. 1603, 161 L.Ed.2d 279 (2005)) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that the Claimants’ alleged use of false social security numbers is relevant to the Claimants’

2

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

credibility, given Defendant’s compliance with I-9 obligations. Defendant claims it “has always complied with the I-9 employment verification process.” (Wigdor Affirm ¶ 3.) Further, only after this action commenced did Defendant develop “a good faith basis to believe that many of the documents furnished by the Claimants to satisfy their I-9 obligations were stolen, forged or altered.” (Id. at ¶ 4 .) Because Defendant’s discovery request is more probative of the Claimants’ credibility and character, it does not violate the Protective Order barring discovery of the Claimants’ immigration status.
This Court disagrees. The Protective Order intended to protect the Claimants’ immigration status due to the in terrorem effect such inquiry would have. Immigration status discovery in cases where plaintiffs are possibly undocumented is a very sensitive area of inquiry. In some cases, such information is not relevant because a claimant is continually employed or it was the employer who failed to comply with immigration laws. In most cases, however, the in terrorem effect of the proposed inquiry outweighs the probative value of the discovery.
Discovery of immigration status-while relevant to damages in an employment discrimination action-is a potential weapon for harassing and intimidating individuals. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (“Granting employers the right to inquire into implicitly the threat of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices or files a Title VII action.”); see also Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 99-CV-6643, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8335, at *14 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2001) (“Unlike employees who have committed application fraud or engaged in wrongdoing while employed, ... undocumented employees face a much more serious ramification from background discovery-possible deportment and criminal prosecution.”).
Defendant proposes that its inquiry into whether Claimants provided false information on their employment application documents is beyond the scope of the Protective Order relating to the parties’ immigration status. (Def.’s Mem. 8.) Defendant cites EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 04-CV-2708, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15959 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 2005). The Bice court granted EEOC’s motion for a protective order relating to the charging parties’ immigration status. In doing so, the Bice court held that “[ d] efendants can inquire about whether aliases of false names were used and whether a party falsified his or her identity in order to attack a deponent’s credibility.” Bice, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15959, at *3. That court further found that “[t]here is no need to delve into why the deponent engaged in such untruthful conduct.” Id.
*4 The Court rejects this argument. The Magistrate appropriately ruled that Defendant can inquire as to the

Claimants’ country of birth. To attack the Claimants’ credibility and establish that Claimants are dishonest, Defendant can ask about any tax returns Claimants filed and whether such tax returns contained false information. But the Magistrate also specifically found that asking if Claimants provided false social security numbers was just another way to find out if Claimants were illegally residing in this country. The Magistrate stated that “a person who may be illegally in this country is likely to use a false SSN to obtain employment.” (June 2006 Order 2.) Therefore, even if Bice controlled-which this Court does not find, Defendant can still impeach Claimants through means other than false social security numbers, i.e., false names. These other ways need not relate to the Claimants’ immigration status or social security numbers.
The Avila-Blum case dealt with analogous facts and legal issues as presented in the case at bar. See Avila-Blum, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30195. The Avila-Blum court held, “a witness’s credibility is always at issue and may be tested in a variety of ways without imposing undue burden on a party.” Id. at *6 (citation omitted). That court concluded that if a defendant had a good faith belief or evidence indicating a plaintiff falsified employment records, a “properly limited and narrowly tailored examination in deposition and at trial may be permissible without opening broader collateral issues pertaining to ... immigration status.” Id.
The Court finds Avila-Blum dispositive. Asking Claimants whether they provided accurate social security numbers on their applications is not sufficiently narrow as to avoid the collateral issues relating to Claimants’ immigration status. Any line of questioning concerning Claimants’ employment applications and W-4 forms must be limited in a way that would avoid implicating Claimants’ immigration status and sufficiently serve Defendant’s need to test Claimants’ credibility. The I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification form and the W-4 form, which are the focus of Defendant’s line of questioning, require the disclosure of the applicant’s name, address, date of birth, and social security number. If Defendant seeks to attack Claimants’ credibility, they may do so by establishing that Claimants falsified any of the information contained in those forms without additional inquiry concerning Claimants’ social security numbers.
B. Reconsideration Of The Magistrate’s Protective Order For Purpose Of Determining Damages Defendant requests that this Court revisit its prior order upholding the Magistrate’s Protective Order. Defendant argues that the Claimants’ immigration status may have contributed to their emotional distress damages. For this reason, Defendant asks that the Court lift the Protective Order and allow Defendant to delve into the immigration
3

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

status of Claimants.
*5 The Court is not persuaded. Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s June 2006 Order held that it “does not believe that the reconsideration of its prior order regarding immigration status discovery is warranted based on the fact that the Claimants are seeking recovery for economic damages.” Nothing in that finding is clearly erroneous or contrary to law, and as such, it is clearly within the proper exercise of the magistrate’s discretion.
Further, the Court finds that at this time, the potential harm to Claimants still outweighs any interest in finding out Claimants’ immigration status-especially at the liability stage of the litigation. This information, however, may become relevant at subsequent stages of litigation, i.e., determination of damages. See Avila-Blum v. Casa De Cambio Delgado, Inc., 05-CV-6435, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30195, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) (finding that the relevance and probative value of a plaintiff’s immigration status is “questionable at best, at least at the liability stage”); Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“If it appears at some later juncture that such discovery would be relevant, and more relevant than harmful, [defendant] may seek leave to renew this request.”); Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064 (“[ T] he protective order was justified because the substantial and particularized harm of the discovery-the chilling effect that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ immigration status could have upon their ability to effectuate their rights-outweighed [defendant’s] interests in obtaining the information at this early stage in the litigation.”).
Based on the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to set aside the Magistrate’s June 2006 Order.
II. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion To Set Aside Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s August 2006, Order. Defendant’s second motion concerns Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s August 2006 Order. On July 25, 2006, Defendant sought “to compel the charging parties and the additional Claimants to submit to independent psychological examinations pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a).” (August 2006 Order 1.) Magistrate Judge Lindsay found that the “charging parties and additional Claimants have not placed their mental condition in controversy so as to warrant psychiatric examinations.” (Id. at 3.)
The Magistrate based her finding in part on the review of Claimants’ deposition testimony. “A review of the [deposition testimony] ... suggests the claims are exactly the ‘garden variety’ claims alleged by the EEOC in its opposition. The eight Claimants only allege typical symptoms such as depression, weight loss, headaches,

lack of appetite, sleep loss, loss of trust, and disorientation.” (Id. at 2-3.) The Magistrate further noted that the EEOC would limit their claims of emotional distress to past emotional suffering. The Magistrate also pointed out that the EEOC would be willing to stipulate that the Claimants’ claims would be limited to “garden variety” emotional distress damages and no expert testimony would be proffered in support of emotional damages. (Id. at 3.)
*6 Defendant claims that certain of Claimants’ allegations exceed typical claims of emotional distress. Defendant argues Claimants are alleging only ‘typical’ garden-variety symptoms to hold that the Claimants “have not placed their mental condition in controversy so as to warrant psychiatric examinations.” “(Def.’ s Mem. 8-9).
A. “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress Claims “A ‘garden variety’ emotional distress claim is one that d[oes] not require medical treatment.” Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Int’ l, 139 F.Supp.2d 469, 480 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Garden variety emotional distress is defined as “ordinary and commonplace emotional distress.... In contrast, emotional distress that is not garden-variety may be complex, such as resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder, or may be unusual, such as to disable one from working.” Ruhlmann v. Ulster Co. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 99-CV-213, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9390, at *13, n. 6 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2000). Courts limit the amount of damage in cases involving garden variety emotional distress claims.
At the low end of the continuum are what have become known as “garden-variety” distress claims in which district courts have awarded damages for emotional distress ranging from $5,000 to $35,000. “Garden-variety” remitted awards have typically been rendered in cases where the evidence of harm was presented primarily through the testimony of the plaintiff, who describes his or her distress in vague or conclusory terms and fails to describe the severity or consequences of the injury.
Rainone v. Potter, 388 F.Supp.2d 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y., 2005) (quoting Michelle Cucuzza, Evaluating Emotional Distress Damage Awards To Promote Settlement Of Employment Discrimination Claims In The Second Circuit, 65 BROOK. L.REV.. 393, 427-28 (1999)).
A plaintiff does not place his or her mental condition in issue, warranting a Rule 35(a) examination by “garden
4

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

variety claims of emotional distress.” Ruhlmann, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9390, at *18. Merely making a claim for physical or emotional distress-as opposed to a claim of a psychiatric disorder requiring psychiatric or psychological counseling-does not warrant a Rule 35(a) examination. See Cody v. Marriott Corp. 83-CV-2603, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22016, at *4, *6 (D. Mass. Nov 14, 1984). On the other hand, claims of severe depression, use of antidepressants, attempts at suicide, and psychiatric treatment do warrant a Rule 35(a) examination. See EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., 02-CV-468S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18351, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug 28, 2003).
A review of deposition testimony reveals the following: Claimant Fuentes deposed that he suffered from depression (Fuentes Dep. 141-143); Claimant Barahona deposed that she “had more and more headaches and [she] would get like a burning in [her] eyes as a result of the headaches.” (Barahona Dep. 113); Claimant Arzayus deposed that she sought medical attention following her termination (Arzayus Dep. 114-116, 119-120); Claimant Araujo testified that she was receiving psychological treatment and medication (Araujo Dep. 9, 120); Claimant Romero consulted her doctor concerning her “nerves.” (Romero Dep. 16); Claimant Garcia would “start crying every once in a while,” and suffers from loss of sleep (Garcia Dep. 128-129); Claimant Jiminez deposed that “[ i] f[ he] had the money [ he] would have” seen a psychologist or a psychiatrist (Jiminez Dep. 157, 181). Claimant Naranjo deposed that he felt that he needed to see a doctor as a result of his emotional problems

(Naranjo Dep. 136-137); Claimant Alvarez deposed that she did not see a psychologist “because [she] didn’t have money to see a psychologist.” (Alvarez Dep. 129).
*7 None of the testimony seem to involve complex psychiatric disorders or require psychological counseling. Teary eyes, loss of sleep, and a desire for counseling do not disable people from working. Further, the EEOC is willing to stipulate to seeking recovery limited to garden-variety claims. In light of this, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for Rule 35 examinations.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant’s motions to set aside the Magistrate’s June 2006 and August 2006 Orders. The Court DENIES Defendant’s application for Rule 35 examinations.
SO ORDERED.
Parallel Citations
89 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,737
	  

5

 
 E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404 (2004)

225 F.R.D. 404 United States District Court,
E.D. New York.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC., Defendant.
No. 03–CV–4990 (JS)(ARL). | Nov. 19, 2004.
Synopsis Background: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought action against employer. Employer moved to set aside a portion of magistrate judge’s order which denied the employer pre-trial access to the immigration status and tax returns of the charging parties.
[Holding:] The District Court, Seybert, J., held that magistrate judge’s order denying employer pre-trial access to the immigration status and tax returns of the charging parties was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
Motion denied.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*405 Adela P. Santos, New York District Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Delvis Melendez, Law Office of Delvis Melendez, Brentwood, NY, David S. Feather, Law Office of David S. Feather, Garden City, NY, for Intervenors.
John L. Juliano, Law Offices of John L. Juliano, East Northport, NY, Douglas H. Wigdor, Thomson Wigdor & Gilly, LLP, New York City, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER
SEYBERT, District Judge.
Currently pending before the Court is a motion by Defendant, First Wireless Group, Inc. (“First Wireless” or

“Defendant”), pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion seeks to set aside a portion of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay’s Order, dated June 15, 2004 (“June Order”), which denied the Defendant pre-trial access to the immigration status and tax returns of the aggrieved parties (“Charging Parties”).1

1

In this case, the Charging Parties are former Hispanic

employees of First Wireless who the EEOC claims

were paid less than similarly-situated Asian employees

and who allegedly were retaliated against when they

complained of the treatment.

[1] [2] [3] [4] Rule 72 provides in pertinent part that
[a] magistrate judge to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into record a written order setting forth the disposition of the matter. Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and file objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge’s order to which objection was not timely made. The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). Pursuant to Rule 72(a), this Court may set aside a portion of Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s June Order concerning a non-dispositive matter only if the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). An order is “clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court[, based] on the entire evidence[,] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” and an order is “contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Weiss v. La Suisse, 161 F.Supp.2d 305, 320–21 (S.D.N.Y.2001). As relevant to the instant matter, discovery matters are generally considered non-dispositive and thus governed by Rule 72(a). Weiss, 161 F.Supp.2d at 320–21. “A magistrate judge’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference” and is overruled only if there is an
1

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404 (2004)

abuse of discretion. Id.; see also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 263, 264 (S.D.N.Y.2001); Albin v. Cosmetics Plus, N.Y., Ltd., No. 97–CV–2670, 1999 WL 111928, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. March 3, 1999) (stating that, where a Magistrate Judge sets a discovery deadline in a scheduling order and denied the motion to extend said date, parties did not show that the Magistrate Judge abused his discretion or demonstrated that the decision was clearly erroneous).
[5] Here, Magistrate Judge Lindsay granted Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC” or “Plaintiff”) application for a protective order against discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status and tax returns. Magistrate Judge Lindsay properly relied on Rivera v. Nibco, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.2004), and Flores v. *406 Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.N.Y.2002), in making her determination. As summarized by Magistrate Judge Lindsay, Rivera and Flores held that discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status was impermissible because it “would constitute unacceptable burden on public interest due to [a] chilling effect,” and “prejudice to plaintiff outweighs any potential relevance this information may have to the defense.” In the present case, Magistrate Judge Lindsay agreed with the Plaintiff that the Court should bar discovery into the Charging Parties’ immigration status based on the “in terrorem effect” of immigration status discovery.
The Defendant objects to the June Order, asserting that (1) it is entitled to the discovery of all relevant non-privileged information pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) that information regarding the Charging Parties’ immigration status is relevant and essential to Defendant’s defense pursuant to Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. With regard to the second claim, the Defendant asserts that evidence of the Charging Parties’ immigration status is relevant to their credibility and to their claim for damages.
After having reviewed the parties’ arguments and the relevant law, this Court finds that nothing in the June Order can be construed as clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. Magistrate Judge Lindsay properly held that although tax returns are not privileged, in order to obtain disclosure the Defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test described by the Southern District of New York in S.E.C. v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (“first, the court must find that the returns are relevant to the subject matter of the action; and second, that there is a compelling need for the returns because the information contained therein is not otherwise readily obtainable.”) Magistrate Judge Lindsay properly held that the Defendant failed to satisfy either of the prongs. Judge Lindsay stated that the Defendant did not argue that discovery of the tax returns was central to the subject matter of the instant litigation. In addition, the

Defendant conceded that the tax returns were sought solely on the issue of the Charging Parties’ credibility. Furthermore, the Defendant’s assertion that the tax returns may contain fraudulent information was not supported by anything in the record. With regard to the second prong, Judge Lindsay allowed the Defendant to inquire at a deposition whether the Charging Parties filed tax returns and whether false statements were made, therefore providing the Defendant with an alternative source of satisfying their inquiry as to whether tax returns were filed.
[6] [7] With regard to the Defendant’s claim that Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed disclosure of information relevant to the Charging Parties’ credibility, Judge Lindsay properly held (1) that Rule 608(b) generally bars introduction of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness’s credibility; and (2) that admissibility of such information at trial is not a standard governing discovery. Therefore, Defendant’s argument based on Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence was properly dismissed by the Judge Lindsay.
Furthermore, Judge Lindsay properly followed the law discussed in Rivera. In Rivera, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[a]fter a showing of good cause, the district court may issue any protective order ‘which justice requires’ to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or under burden or expense, including any order prohibiting the requested discovery altogether, limiting the scope of the discovery, or fixing the terms of disclosure.” Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1063 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)). In the present case, discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status would cause them embarrassment and if their status is found to be illegal would subject them to criminal charges and, possibly, deportation. Therefore, if this Court does not suppress discovery into the Charging Parties’ immigration status, it would significantly discourage employees from bringing actions against their employers who engage in discriminatory employment practices.
[8] Finally, the Defendant argues that Judge Lindsay’s June Order was improperly based on the in terrorem effect that discovery into the immigration status would have on the Charging Parties. The Defendant submits that “it is not for the Courts to *407 decide or opine on what types of criminal misconduct should not be a subject of discovery because of a potential in terrorem effect. ... Any restriction based upon an in terrorem effect is for the legislature....” Although this Court agrees with Defendant’s position regarding the proper role of the judicial and legislative branches of government, Judge Lindsay properly granted EEOC’s protective order against Defendant’s discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status. As pointed out in Rivera:
2

E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404 (2004)

Regrettably, many employers turn a blind eye to immigration status during the hiring process; their aim is to assemble a workforce that is both cheap to employ and that minimizes their risk of being reported for violations of statutory rights. Therefore, employers have a perverse incentive to ignore immigration laws at the time of hiring but insist upon their enforcement when their employees complain.
Id. at 1072. This is exactly what the Defendant, in the instant case, seems to have done. There is no evidence in the record which shows that the Defendant had inquired into the Charging Parties’ immigration status at the time of hiring and no evidence pointing to Defendant’s lack of knowledge with respect to the Charging Parties’ alleged illegal immigration status. Therefore, it was proper for

Judge Lindsay to preclude the Defendant from discovery of the Charging Parties’ immigration status because the Defendant cannot “ignore immigration laws at the time of hiring but insist upon their enforcement when [its] employees complain.” Id.
The reasoning of the June Order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. This Court finds that Magistrate Judge Lindsay has not abused her discretion.
CONCLUSION This Court finds that it was within the Magistrate Judge’s discretion to order the Plaintiff’s protection order. As such, the Rule 72 application to modify part of Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s decision is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
	  

3

 
 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 1 of 21 PageID #: 3975

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------X
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, -againstFIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 03-CV-4990 (JS) (ARL)

Defendant,

------------------------------X
Appearances:

For Plaintiff:

Michelle A. Caiola, Esq.

Lauren G. Dreilinger, Esq.

Katherine E. Bissell, Esq.

Estela Diaz, Esq.

Elizabeth Ann Grossman, Esq.

Adela P. Santos, Esq.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

33 Whitehall Street, 5th Floor

New York, New York 10004-2112

For Intervener Plaintiffs:

Delvis Melendez, Esq. 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717

For Defendant:

Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq. Thompson Wigdor & Gilly LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5720 New York, New York 10118

SEYBERT, District Judge:

INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") commenced this action on behalf of several

former Hispanic employees of First Wireless Group, Inc. ("First

Wireless" or "Defendant")

EEOC alleged that First Wireless

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: 3976
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., ("Title VII") by compensating Hispanic
employees at a lower pay rate than Asian employees performing the
same or substantially similar work, subjecting Hispanic employees
to unequal terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and
terminating some of the employees in retaliation for protesting the
wage disparity. On August 18, 2004, the Court granted two separate motions to intervene filed by, respectively, twelve former employees, and Adriana Torres, a past employee. The IntervenorPlaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 13, 2005, alleging
essentially the same acts of discrimination and retaliation that
the EEOC alleged. The action now involves a total of thirty-eight
former employees, collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs" or "Claimants." 1 Presently pending is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion in part and GRANTS it in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Parties' 56. 1 Statement and Counter-Statement and the exhibits thereto.
1 The Claimants are Karla Aguilera, Idalia Araujo, Raidy Alvarez, Sonia Arzayus, Estela del Carmen Barahona (a/k/a Andrea Rodriguez), Mireya Bautista, Beatriz Buitrago, Fidelina Caceres, Gloria Cardenas, Ann Maria Castaneda, Carlos Fuentes, Edwin Garcia (a/k/a Wervin Julian Garcia), Beatriz Garcia, Nely Hernandez, Dilber Jimenez, Ivonne Leon, Ligia Lozano, Milton Misnaza, Olga Morales, Mariana Moran, Carlos Morcillo, Natalia Naranjo, Blanca Penaranda, Edis Reyes, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Zorayda Salcedo, Jhon Sanchez, Luis Sanchez (a/k/a Oscar Morales), Elizabeth Santana, Francisca Santana, Nora Lucia Sosa, Luz Adela Torres (a/k/a Adela Ardila) , Adriana Torres, Sonia Uribe, Reina Vega, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora.
2

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 3 of 21 PageID #: 3977

First Wireless is an electronic company that repairs and

refurbishes cellular phones.

(Def's. R. 56.1 Statement ~ 3

( "Def' s. Stmt. ") . )

In or about April 20, 2001, Claimant Adriana Torres ("Torres") learned that a newly-hired Asian co-worker was being paid more than Torres. (EEOC R. 56. 1 Statement ~ 82 ( "Pls.' Stmt.").) Torres raised her concerns with Claimant Dilber Jimenez ("Jimenez"), Manager of the second shift. (Id. , 209.1 Jimenez informed his supervisor, General Manager Andrew Ng about the alleged pay disparity. (Id. , 209.1

Shortly thereafter, Torres, along with other Hispanic employees, drafted a letter to management requesting information about the alleged difference in pay (the "Memorandum"). (Id. ,
2 o9. I The employees attached a second page with the names of the
employees who supported sending the Memorandum {the "Petition"). (Id. , 2091. Jimenez was unaware of both the Memorandum and Petition. lid. I

The parties dispute the events that occurred next. Plaintiffs contend that Torres took the Memorandum home, translated it into English, and brought the Memorandum and Petition to work on Monday, April 23, 2001, to gather extra signatures and present it to Eileen Lever ("Lever") , Director of Human Resources. 209.) When Torres returned to work, Lever approached her and asked Torres about both documents. (Id.) After reading the Memorandum, Lever allegedly told Torres that she should come directly to her if
3

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: 3978
Torres had a problem. (Id. I As this was happening, Jimenez arrived at work and saw Lever holding the Memorandum in her hand. (Id. I After asking an employee what was happening, Jimenez was informed that the employees had prepared a letter addressing the alleged pay disparity. ( Id. I Within an hour, Lever, Ng, and Brunilda Calderon, a customer service director, told Jimenez that they were terminating him because First Wireless was reorganizing and/or downsizing. (Id. ~~ 165, 209.1 On that day or the next, Defendants also terminated Torres and Rosa Garcia ("Garcia"), who helped Torres circulate the Memorandum and Petition. (I d. I
Defendant disputes Plaintiffs narration of the events. According to Defendant, Lever did not see the Memorandum and Petition until First Wireless corporate counsel gave it to her. (Def's. Stmt. ~ 232.) Next, Defendant contends that it had to let go of Jimenez, Torres, and Garcia because the company needed to reorganize after a downturn in business. (Id. ~ 209.1 Defendant states that it chose these employees because of the reorganization and because each had work performance problems. (Id. ~~ 208-218.1 Plaintiffs dispute that any of the employees had performance issues. (Pls.' Stmt. ~ 210.1
Shortly after their termination, Jimenez, Torres, and Garcia filed charges of discrimination with the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission ( "SCHRC") . (Id. ~~ 228, 234.1 In December of 2001, a SCHRC investigator began calling First Wireless employees to inquire about the claims raised in the charges. (Id.
4

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: 3979

~ 234.) Again, the parties dispute the events that transpired

next.

Plaintiffs contend that Calderon, Lever, and Lever's

assistant, Nancy Juarez ("Juarez") , listened in on the

conversations between the SCHRC investigator and the employees.

{Id.) Defendant states that Lever was not aware of the phone calls

until after the depositions of the Claimants.
234.)

(De£' s. Stmt. ~

At some point in early 2002, Defendant decided to

eliminate the second shift.

lid. ~ 251; P1s.' Stmt. ~ 251.)

Defendant contends that it offered all employees an opportunity to

transfer to the day shift through postings and a memorandum

included with the employees' paychecks, and states that it granted

the request of every employee who requested a transfer to the day

shift.

(Def's. Stmt. ~ 251.)

According to Defendant, the

employees who remained on the second shift were aware that there

were positions available during the day, but choose not to transfer. (Id. ~ 252.) Plaintiffs allege that the Claimants were

not told that the night shift would be eliminated and were "falsely

misled into believing that their jobs were secure," whereas Asian

employees were told that the second shift would be eliminated. (P1s.' Stmt. ~ 251.)

The parties agree that at some point in late January, a

letter was sent to Hispanic workers on the night shift asking the

workers to recant their signature from the 2001 Petition.

314, 315, 318; Def's. Stmt. ~~ 314-321.) 5

However, Defendant

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: 3980
asserts that Juarez wrote the letter because she wanted employees to express their concerns in writing, and Juarez did so without any assistance from anyone else, and without the knowledge of First Wireless managers, officers, or owners. (Def's. Stmt. ~~ 314-321.) Plaintiffs contend that Juarez wrote the letter in response to SCHRC's investigation and with the knowledge of managers at First Wireless.
At approximately the same time, Defendant locked the bathroom. (Def's. Stmt. ~~ 310, 311.) Defendant contends that it locked the bathroom during both shifts because of unsanitary conditions caused by some of the employees. (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that the bathroom was locked in response to the SCHRC investigation, and state that the bathroom may have been locked only during the night shift. (Pls.' Stmt. ~ 310-311.)
In February of 2002, Defendant laid off several employees from the second shift. Defendant contends that the terminations were part of a reorganization necessitated by a downturn in business, and the second shift employees were chosen because these lay-offs would produce higher savings. (Def' s. Stmt. ~~ 271-275.) Plaintiffs state that there was no downturn in business, and that the employees who were terminated were chosen because they signed or had their names associated with the 2001 Petition. (Pls.' Stmt. ~ 271-275. I
In August of 2002, the case was transferred from SCHRC to the EEOC, and on September 30, 2002, EEOC commenced the instant
6

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: 3981

action. EEOC contends that Defendant paid Asian employees more than Hispanic employees, and then retaliated against the Hispanic employees for raising the pay disparity in the Memorandum and Petition. Defendants deny these allegations, and assert that the

employees' pay rates depended on their experience and educational

n background. (Id.

88-89. I Moreover, Defendant states that it

treated all of its employees well and even sponsored English

classes for at least some of the Claimants. (Id ,, 325, 3291. EEOC disputes this, but does agree that two claimants, W. Garcia

and Olga Morales, ac.tended a few English classes sponsored by Defendant. (Pls.' Stmt. , 329. I

DISCUSSION I. Standard Of Review On Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute concerning any material facts, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Harvis Trien & Beck, P.C. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P.), 153 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(19861

"The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment." MeLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
7

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: 3982

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90s. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material

fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all

permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." MeLee, 109 F.3d at 134.

"Although the moving party bears the initial burden of

establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact,

once such a showing is made, the non-movant must 'set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"

Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). "Mere conclusory allegations

or denials will not suffice. 11 William v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323

(2d Cir. 1986). Indeed, when a motion for summary judgment is

made, it lS time to "to put up or shut up.

[U]nsupported

allegations do not create a material issue of fact." 224 F.3d at 41 (internal citations omitted)

Weinstock,

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a

discrimination case, "additional considerations should be taken

into account. A trial court must be cautious about granting

summary judgment to an employer when

. its intent is at issue.

. Because writings directly supporting a claim of intentional

discrimination are rarely, if ever, found among an employer 1 s corporate papers, affidavits and depositions must be carefully

scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show
8

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 3983
discrimination." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, a court should not grant an employer's motion for summary judgment unless "the evidence of discriminatory intent is so slight that no rational jury could find in [the P] laintiff' s favor. 11 I d. at 1226. Although this is a deferential standard, it should not be applied so as to create a de-facto bar on summary judgment in all employment discrimination cases. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2000) ("the 'impression that summary judgment is unavailable to defendants in discrimination cases lS unsupportable.' 11 (quoting MeLee v. Chrysler Corp., 38 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1994)). II. Disparate Pay Claim
A. Timeliness On June 1, 2007, Defendant filed a letter with the Court
urging the Court to find that Claimants' disparate pay claims are untimely because the majority of Claimants filed a charge of discrimination outside of the charging period. Defendant argues that the charges should have been filed within 300 days of the date on which First Wireless hired each individual Claimant at an allegedly lower salary. In support of this argument, Defendant cites to a recent Supreme Court case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162; 167 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2007).
Defendant's argument is without merit because the facts and holding of Ledbetter are distinguishable from the instant case. Ledbetter did not involve a discriminatory pay structure, but
9

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: 3984

rather involved discrete instances of discrimination against a

specific plaintiff that affected the plaintiff's paychecks. The

plaintiff in Ledbetter alleged that her supervisors discriminated

against her during her employee evaluations, and gave her lower ratings than she deserved. Ledbetter claimed that her paychecks were lower than they would have been had she been evaluated in a

nondiscriminatory manner, and she was unfairly denied a raise in

1998 because of the past poor evaluations. The Supreme Court held

that Ledbetter's claim of reduced paychecks was time-barred because

the complaint relied on discrete acts of past discrimination.

"Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her" rather than waiting until 1998 to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 2169.

Unlike Ledbetter, the present case does not involve

specific acts of past discrimination, but rather deals with an

ongoing discriminatory pay structure.

In addressing this

distinction, the Supreme Court clearly explained that "when an

employer adopts a facially discriminatory pay structure that puts

some employees on a lower scale because of race, the employer

engages in intentional discrimination whenever it issues a check to

one of these disfavored employees." Id. at 2173 (emphasis added) .

The claims in this case were filed within 300 days of the last

issued paycheck, and are therefore timely because "an employer

violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever 10

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 3985
the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure." Id. at 2174.
B. Standard Of Review Plaintiffs claims of disparate pay in violation of Title
VII are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Cabrera v. New York City, 436 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) Under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) Claimants were members of a protected class; (2) Claimants were paid less than similarlysituated non-members of the protected class; and (3) evidence of discriminatory animus. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); Trotman v. CBS Radio Inc., No. 06-CV-3389, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73641, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
If a plaintiff is able to satisfy this initial burden, a rebuttable presumption exists that the employer unlawfully discriminated. McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006). The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Cabrera v. New York City, 436 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Once a defendant articulates such a purpose, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the proffered reason set forth by defendant is pretextual. Id. at 644.
11

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 12 of 21 PageID #: 3986
A. Prima Facie Case It lS undisputed that Claimants are members of a
protected class. The Court's analysis therefore turns on whether Plaintiffs can establish the remaining two elements of a prima facie case of disparate pay. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case because the Claimants were not similarly situated with Asian employees receiving a higher pay, and there is no evidence of discriminatory animus.
1. Similarly Situated In deciding whether employees are similarly situated, the Court may consider several factors, including the employees' work duties, education, seniority, and performance history. Trotman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73641, at *24. The key determinant is whether the circumstances of the employees is "similar in significant respects." Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 101
(2d Cir. 2001) .
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot identify any Asian employee with a higher wage that was similarly situated to the Claimants. According to Defendant, the Asian employees who were paid at a higher hourly rate had prior related employment experience or educational backgrounds in technology, engineering, and/or electronics-related fields, whereas the Claimants lacked prior employment experience in the electronics field, and had limited educational backgrounds. However, EEOC has named several Asian employees who performed similar work as the Claimants and
12

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: 3987
received a higher starting wage, despite having a limited educational background and limited prior experience. 2 A reasonable juror could infer that these Asian comparators were similarly situated to the Claimants.
2. Discriminatory Animus In a disparate pay claim, the plaintiff "bears the burden of proving that defendant acted with an intent to discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of (plaintiff's] protected status." Simpson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 04-CV-2565, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50331, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not satisfied this burden because they have not demonstrated that managers or executives at First Wireless
pFpsepshCa$reaedtrosi1alacgeycaur0yovrheic.c-m0tenrioieraeovxa0dm2aratdauetiatnpEeomedsrartEaynaanspOrhwo.ttaelCeeaewhdfov,d$oshrleSkoow$u7tuiLoaf8.crsi0mhes.ir.att00ahx$tettsiAa0di8pnooarmFt.ee5nwgtnplfrreelio0dieiem emedotsrvnhnaptraietwnectahtelynehdpeaotre-de,crrnufCMyohi$irtovwya,lnmo7ianenr-ou.ioip0ogdgtfrrmha0wnkA.hrMares$otsaeenear6iiteknnvMxctaso.sg0onpheraehsa0mrenifwxaocy,trfrpulioopluteai,om$amersnrdh,nf8ratpciaiEd.etted5eavEvtohdnh0OreoereacenCasnrtenswhopeodudwaClteriaodiswshtrlyshnlloahiipthowiomsmsssatnoohhhtteorsuiaatheiettrne-wfracc,isitsdttgnorseteeeyahaimnctdvenhrehotppetddaryaenavdoau-trddesttscfahati$tatva-hrtrao7theyeraitr.oteed0inw0an.a,hgot cCeenestsashoxxxtihpilam geamppppirihfeeelmiptdttrirrliacaiiiaaneeesrsyanrgannnhhltttyciccsiiiopeeseSvhfna,dptoeibsliilnfianydy,unitinra.,tegypynt/GnBtaorehooweCcttaoefkcrelrpwhaierrnK$soeeiaiemghvv8ersrwohe,te.iia5-pnins0ryhChapgteenaseihi/cdpdrynqtaoeBengundpwpa,r/aedootraalhaaeasssitro$ltctttrsyy--h6ueissozt.iriee0hrec.vcce0dheBoioodnuinunnrphgctieddareiat/dgoraaqtrtaihrlruogyyht$eaonodo6rl,eeeu.i0wpdadt$ry0ynau8uodefr.rcc0tockttaamo0oKrttwiiienaoonwatnatrhnnnsrtloe,oatrhhkahol ehnAdiorrddadaugedpyseurudeprricpisrailnoaoahrregntittrrimoedafawrtteh.fnoeotr;kr
13

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 3988

harbored any discriminatory animus towards Hispanic workers.

Defendant cites to deposition testimony of several Claimants, who

testified that First Wireless owners were kind and that the

Claimants recommended the job to other Hispanic individuals.

Plaintiffs argue that the pay disparity amongst the majority of

Hispanic and Asian employees provides a strong inference of discriminatory animus.

The Court recognizes that "direct proof of [discriminatory animus] will often be lacking: smoking guns are

rarely left in plain view." Brown v. DeFrank, No. 06-CV-2235, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83345, at *88 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2006) (quoting

Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir.

2001)); see also Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92

F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Since it is rare indeed to find in an

employer 1 s records proof that a personnel decision was made for a

discriminatory reason, whatever other relevant depositions,

affidavits and materials are before the district court must be

carefully scrutinized for circumstantial evidence that could

support an inference of discrimination.")

Although proof of

discriminatory animus generally requires "evidence beyond the mere

fact of unequal pay for equal work," David v. Comtech PST Corp., No

06-CV-6480, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68208, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,

2006), the Court notes that in this case, nearly all of the

Hispanic workers were paid less than the Asian employees. A

reasonable jury may infer a discriminatory animus from the large
14

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: 3989
number of Hispanic employees paid at lower rates and the amount of Asian employees receiving a higher salary. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
B. Pretext Defendant proffers several non-discriminatory reasons to
rebut Plaintiffs' disparate pay claims. First, Defendant contends that it paid Hispanic employees less because of the specific qualifications and backgrounds of the employees. However, as noted above, EEOC has presented evidence to rebut this non-discriminatory reason, including a list of several Hispanic employees with backgrounds and qualifications similar to that of Asian employees who received a higher salary.
Next, Defendant contends that the Asian employees with a higher salary lived in the five boroughs of New York City, as opposed to Long Island. Defendant argues that it paid these employees more because the job market in New York City is more competitive and the cost of living is higher. While this may be a legitimate reason for the pay difference, Plaintiffs name several Asian employees who resided in Nassau County, yet were still paid at the higher rate. This creates an issue of fact as to whether locality was actually taken into consideration in determining wages. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could infer that
15

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: 3990
Defendant's pro-offered justifications for the difference in pay are pretextual.
Although Defendant may have paid the Hispanic employees less because of their work experience, educational background, and place of residence, whether Defendant's reasons for the lower pay rate were non-discriminatory or were pre-textual should be left to a jury. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgement on Plaintiffs' Title VII pay disparity claims is DENIED. III. Retaliation
While Title VII retaliation claims, like Title VII discrimination claims, are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm, the elements of a prima facie case are different. See Patane, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 316. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiffs must show that (1) they engaged in protected activity, {2) Defendant was aware of this activity, (3) Defendant took adverse action against Plaintiffs, and {4) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2006); Patane, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
A. Claimants Who Signed The Petition The Court finds that the Claimants who signed the 2001
Petition participated in a protected activity. The Memorandum stated that the writers believed that First Wireless was violating their rights by paying Hispanic employees less than Asian
16

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 17 of 21 PageID #: 3991
employees, and demanded a salary equivalent to that of the Asian employees. This is a clear example of a protected activity.
Although the first prong for a retaliation claim has been met, there are issues of fact that make the remaining prongs more difficult to determine. On the issue of whether Defendant had knowledge of the protected activity, EEOC submits deposition testimony from several Claimants who state that they either witnessed or overheard Lever discussing the Petition with Torres on April 23, 2001. Additionally, EEOC asserts that Santiago, another manager, was present when second shift employees discussed writing the Memorandum to management. Defendant denies that the above instances occurred, and maintains that First Wireless management did not receive, and was not aware of, the Petition and Memorandum at the time of the alleged adverse actions. Because there is a factual dispute related to Defendant's awareness of the protected activity, summary judgment is inappropriate.
B. Claimants Who Were Not Signatories To The Petition Defendant argues that approximately 22 of the 38 Claimants were not signatories to the 2001 Petition and/or Memorandum, and therefore these Claimants did not engage in any protected activity. 3
3 The Claimants whose name appeared on the Petition include Raidy Alvarez, Sonia Arzayus, Estela Barahona, Carlos Fuentes, Edwin Garcia, Olga Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, John Sanchez, Luis Sanches, Adriana Torres, Luz Adela Torres, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora.
17

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 18 of 21 PageID #: 3992
"The term 'protected activity' refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination. 11 Cruz v. Coach Stores Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the objection need not rise to the level of a formal complaint, there must be, at the very least, "some form of professional indicia of a complaint made against an unlawful activity." Soliman v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 03-CV-104, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, although Claimant Jimenez did not sign the Petition, he may have engaged in a protected activity by informing General Manager Ng that some of the employees were questioning the company's pay rates. The exact words Jimenez used are unknown to the Court. There is a question of fact as to whether Jimenez's conversation with Ng constituted some form of a complaint. A jury could conclude that Jimenez was protesting the alleged lower wages for Hispanic employees, or could conclude that Jimenez was merely informing Ng that other employees had come to Jimenez with concerns about the alleged pay disparity.
If the jury concludes that Jimenez's conversation amounted to a protected activity, the remaining prongs of the retaliation claim are also disputed. Defendant argues that a causal connection is lacking because Jimenez's termination was the result of company reorganization and Jimenez's unsatisfactory work performance. Similarly, Defendant contends that even if Jimenez
18

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 19 of 21 PageID #: 3993
could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the company's need for reorganization and Jimenez's performance issues constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Because material questions of fact remain as to whether Jimenez has established a prima facie case, and whether Defendant had legitimate reasons for taking adverse employment action against Jimenez, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Jimenez's retaliation claim is DENIED.
Claimants Zorada Salcedo ("Salcedo") and Nora Lucia Sosa ("Sosa") also did not sign the Petit ion. However, both Salcedo and Sosa may have engaged in protected activity as their full names appear on the Petition, and this could be perceived as participation in the complaint. 4 Nonetheless, summary judgment lS inappropriate for these two Claimants, as there is an issue of fact as to whether First Wireless had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the layoff. First Wireless asserts that it had to reorganize and layoff employees after suffering a loss in business. EEOC disputes this contention, and argues that First Wireless did not undergo a financial loss in 2001, and did not need to reorganize the company. EEOC supports its contention with new hire forms indicating that several employees were hired on or around the same time that some of the Claimants were terminated. Because there is a material issue of fact as to a crucial element of a
4 Salcedo and Sosa's full name appears on the Petition, but the signature line next to their names remains blank.
19

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 20 of 21 PageID #: 3994
retaliation claim, summary judgment is DENIED as to Salcedo and Sosa's retaliation claims.
The remaining Claimants who did not sign the Petition are Karla Aguilera, Idalia Araujo, Mireya Bautista, Beatriz Buitrago, Fidelina Caceres, Gloria Cardenas, Ana Maria Castaneda, Beatriz Garcia, Nely Hernandez, Ivonne Leon, Ligia Lozano, Milton Misnaza, Mariana Moran, Carlos Morcillo, Blanca Penaranda, Edis Reyes, Elizabeth Santana, Francisca Santana, and Reina Vega ("remaining non-signatory Claimants") . The Court finds that the remaining nonsignatory Claimants cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because they have not alleged any protected activity. The Claimants' names were not on the Petition or Memorandum, and they have not alleged any other activity protesting Defendant's treatment of Hispanic employees. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining nonsignatory Claimants' retaliation claim.
20

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 226 Filed 02/11/08 Page 21 of 21 PageID #: 3995

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's mot ion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of disparate pay in violation of Title VII is DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the retaliation claims of Jimenez, Salcedo, Sosa, and the sixteen signatory Claimants is also DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining nineteen non-signatory Claimants' retaliation claim is GRANTED.

Dated:

New York 2008

SO ORDERED
'
/5/ JOANNA SEYBERT
r;:;n~. seybei't? _8'". b. J.

21

 
 I

I

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 5237

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/29/2008 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------)

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

FIRST WIRELESS GROUP, INC.,

)

)

Defendant

)

NO. 03 Clv. 4990 (JS)(ARL)

CONSENT DECREE In September 2003, Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "EEOC"), an agency of the United States Government, filed this action alleging race and/or national origin discrimination and/or retaliation, under Sections 706 and 707 ofTiUe VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.§§2003 et seq., and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against First Wireless Group, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant" or "First Wireless"). This action was brought on behalf of twenty-one (21) named Hispanic fanner employees1 who filed a charge with the EEOC against Defendant (hereinafter "Charging Parties") and additional claimants identified by EEOC (together hereinafter "claimants") as simila~y situated Hispanics
employed by First Wireless and compensated at lower wages and subjected to unequal

1
There are currently eighteen Charging Parties: Estela del Carmen Barahona, Sonia Borrero, Wervin Garcia, Dilber Jiminez, Nora Lucia-Sosa, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Recio Rodriguez, Erica Romero, Zorayda Salcedo, Jhon Sanchez, Adrianna Torres, Luz Adela Torres, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora.

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 5238 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/29/2008 Page 2 of 8
terms, conditions and privileges of employment, than simlla~y situated Asian employees performing the same or substantially similar work2.
On or about August 23, 2003, Sonia Borrero, Dilber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo. Recio Rodriguez, Erica Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Jorge Valencia, Ruth Vidal, and Maria Zamora filed a motion to intervene, together with a complaint in intervention alleging Defendanfs conduct violated Title VII and Section 296 of the New York Executive Law Section (hereinafter "N.Y.H.R.L."). Adrianna Torres filed a similar motion and complaint in intervention on January 16, 2003. The Court granted Plaintiff-Intervenors' motions to intervene with respect to the Title VII claims on August 24, 2004 and Plaintiff-Intervenors filed amended complaints.
The EEOC, Plaintiff-Intervenors, and Defendant desire to settle this action, and therefore do hereby stipulate and consent to the entry of this Consent Decree. The Defendant has denied and continues to deny the allegations made by the Plaintiffs in this case. This Consent Decree resolves all matters raised in the complaints in this action which are filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Defendant, Plaintiff-Intervenors, and EEOC (hereinafter '1he parties") agree that this Decree is being entered into without Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law having been made and entered by the Court.
ARCCreaaairrnullooajossV,MF2MeuTogierrhacene.iytle/acosu,B,rBrBaelueantnatistctrtwaiaze,PGnBetaeynraacatrirdaaizd,nidNBtiaoeu,nliltyEaraldHgdisoeam,iRmGeaalynonedrtsieas,zCFa, rralevar:ondcneKinnsaeacraslLa,eSAFoaingdn,uetiallllienngraaaia,,CERLaloiaczzieadarbynaeosAt,,hlvMASanaraaernizaCt,anaInadsaatM,alianoanreaddna,, 2

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 5239 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/29/2008 Page 3 of 8

In consideration of the mutual promises of each party to this Decree, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows, the Court finds appropriate, and it is thetefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1. This Decree resolves all issues raised in EEOC Charge Numbers 16G-A14982, 16G-A1-4983, 16G-A1-4984, 16G-A1-04802, 16G-A2-04904, 16G-A2-04936, 16G-A2-04950, 16G-A2-04951, 16G-A2-04452, 16G-A2-04853, 16G-A2-04956, 16GA2-04959, 16G-A2-04966, 16G-A2-04967, 16G-A2-04968, 16G-A2-04969, 16G-A204970, 16G-A2-04971, 16G-A2-04972, 16G-A2-04973, 16G-A2-04974, and 16G-A204936, and in the Complaints filed by the EEOC and Plaintiff-Intervenors In this case. This Decree in no way affects EEOC's right 1o process any pending or future charges that may be filed against Defendant and to commence civil actions on any such charges.
2. The parties agree and the Court finds that this Court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter of this action and of the parties, that venue is proper, and that all administrative prerequisites have been met. No party shall contest the validity of this Decree, or the jurisdiction of this Court to enforce this Decree and its terms.
3. Defendant, its managers, officers, agents, successors, and assigns are
enjoined from violating Title VII by discriminating against any current, future, or past employees, including on the basis of his or her race, national origin, and retaliation, and w'1th respect to their pay. termination of employment, and all other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.

4.

Defendant, its managers, officers, agents, successors, and assigns are

enjoined from violating Title VII by retaliating against any individual who has participated

in this action as a claimant or witness.

3

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 5240 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/29/2008 Page 4 of 8
5. In settlement of this dispute, Defendant shall pay a total settlement amount of $435,000 dollars in back pay and/or compensatory damages, inclusive of attorneys' fees. This amount shall be paid as set forth In Exhibit "A" filed under seal in the amounts specified therein. Defendant will make all required deductions and with holdings from the back pay amounts shown in Exhibit A and issue an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Form W-2 to the claimants and Plaintiff-Intervenors for this portion of the settlement. Defendant will issue IRS Forms 1099 for the amounts that represent attorney's fees and compensatory damages.
6. Defendant shall make such payments in three (3) installments, the first within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of the Court's entry of this Consent Decree. The second payment shall be made on or before June 1, 2009 and the third payment shall be made on or before April14, 2010. Defendant shall pay each claimant the amounts as shown in Exhibit A. A release in the form identified in Exhibit B will be executed by each claimant and provided to Defendant prior to the first payment due for that claimant. Payments for the Plaintiff-Intervenors shall be mailed directly to their respective counsel, and to the other claimants directly to the addresses as set forth in Exhibit A. Copies of checks and tax forms sent to claimants shall be forwarded contemporaneously to EEOC, attention Adela Santos, at 33 Whitehall St., NY 100042112. If a release is not returned by any claimant within thirty (30) days of entry of the Decree by the Court, the damages owing to such claimant or claimants will be
redistributed on a pro rata basis by Defendant by the date of the second installment,
June 1, 2009.
4

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 5241 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/29/2008 Page 5 of 8
7. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees and costs except as set forth in Exhib~A.
8. Defendant shall post the EEOC poster at its facilities in places that are visually accessible to all its employees and applicants for employment.
9. Within fourteen (14) days after receiving notice of the Court's entry of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall post at its facilities in a place that is visually accessible to all employees a copy of the notice printed on its letterhead in the form attached as Exhibit C.
10. Within three (3) months of entry of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall provide annually no fewer than eight (8) hours of training in Federal laws that prohib~ discrimination in employment to all present and future officers, managers, supervisors, line leaders, and Human Resource personnel. The training shall be conducted by an outside vendor approved by the EEOC, and the EEOC's approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. A copy of the training materials to be used shall also be reviewed and approved by the EEOC. The names and titles of the persons who attend each session shall be reported to the EEOC on or before December 31" of each year throughout the term of this Consent Decree.
11. Defendant agrees that it will review its wage structure to ensure that it has a compensation system in place that does not discriminate against Hispanic employees and complies with Title VII.
12. Defendant will maintain policies that prohlbij discrimination and retaliation in the workplace and will maintain effective procedures for employees to report complaints of discrimination and to have complaints investigated. Such policies and
s

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 5242 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 1012912008 Page 6 of 8
procedures shall be distributed to all employees within thirty (30) days of entry of this Consent Decree and within thirty (30) days of the commencement of employment of any new hire throughout the duration of this Decree. AU complaints of discrimination and all investigations and results of investigations shall be maintained and not destroyed throughout the duration of this Decree. A copy of Defendant's policy and complaint procedure approved by EEOC are annexed hereto as Exhibit D.
13. Defendant will provide a neutral reference letter to all claimants who make such a request. The reference letter will contain only the following lnfomnation: dates of employment, positions held, and the salary or wage earned in their last position. All requests for a reference letter shall be submitted to Defendant's Director of Human Resources. No mention whatsoever of this lawsuit or charges filed will be made or
transmitted by Defendant to any individual asking for an employment reference or other
employment-related inquiry regarding any claimant. 14. Defendant will provide a report to the EEOC every six (6) months, starting
six 6) months from entry by the Court of this Consent Decree, providing the following information: 1) name of lndividual(s) making an infomnal or formal complaint of employment discrimination, 2) date complaint was made, 3) intlividual(s) to whom complaint was made, 4) description of the nature of the complaint including names of any individuals alleged to be involved, 5) description of any investigation as a result of the complaint(s), and 6) resolution of any complaint(s) and any actions Defendant took to resolve the comptaint(s), including discipline of employees, where applicable.
15. The EEOC may monitor and review Defendant's compliance with the terms of this Consent Decree, including but not limited to, making reasonable requests
6

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 5243 Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 305 Filed 10/2912008 Page 7 of 8

for inspection, copying of records, and interviewing employees regarding complaints of

discrimination, investigation of the complaints, and results of the Investigation.

16. This Consent Decree wifl remain in effect until four (4) years from the date
of its entry by the Court Upon the entry at this Decree, the m-r will be immediately

closed, but the Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce this Decree.

Dated: New York, New Yor1<
October 14-, 2008

l l . Dated: New York, New York

October

2008

ATIORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

THOMPSON WIGDOR & GILLY, LLP
~1~

Andrew Goodstadt

85 Fifth Avenue, 51t1 Floor

New Yor1<, NY 10003

==I (212) 257~800 257~5

:kn

ATIORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
~~~,~~(;:.DoD=rlrl::!:•:::::~=K~~
Elizabeth Grossman Regional Attomey 33 WMeheU Street, 5~ Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 336-3698 (212) 338-3823 (Fax) elizabeth.grossman@eeoc.gov
lisa Sirkin Supervisory Trial Attorney
(212) 336-3697 lisa.sirkin@eeoc.gey
Adela P. Santos Trial Attorney (212) 336-3695 adela.santos@eeoc.gov

7

Case 2:03-cv-04990-JS Document 306 Filed 10/30/08 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 5244

Dated: New York, ~ew York October~. 2008
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS
otkt1

90 Bradley Street Brentwood, New York 11717 (631) 434-1443 (631) 434-1443 (Fax) de!visprlaw@ac!.com

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS

SONIA BORRERO, DILBER JIMENEZ,

MILTON MISNAZA, OLGA MORALES,

OSCAR MORALES, NATALIA NARANJO

ROCIO RODRIGUEZ, ERIKA ROMERO '

JHON SANCHEZ, SONIA URIBE,

'

RUTH VIDAL, AND MARIA ZAMORA

Dated: New York, New York
October U , 2008
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR
666 Old Country Road Suite 304 Garden City, New York 11530 (516) 745-9000 (516) 228-8349 (Fax) dsfeatherlaw@aol.com
PLAINTIFF•INTERVENOR ADRIANA TORRES

Afp·Il,co+'m Gran-ted- :Su'.j ::ee-c-+m :scnec:Jubd -Per
Nov'e{flt:Je.r 3 2-CXf?" is CQiJcelleO· The C/er-F; of-the &urf 1
Is clircctecl -to rna'!? ih0 ffK?-!tcY"" clc&d- and -ferm/{}0-fe
the 1<-/ fe.-,d •'n_j rno+tms ,f) -fhb C09::: _.

SO ORDERED:

8

. I /?/JOANNA &nlERX

LI __~-~-~~-:-J:-C:-e·f- Wj~8:1J-~ i;~lo~p_ ,,~ N1.Y_, -_·

'
j

 
 Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 1 of 26
CLOSED,MAGAPP,MEDSNR
U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York (Central Islip) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:03−cv−04990−JS

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. First Wireless Group, Inc. Assigned to: Judge Joanna Seybert Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Mediator

Date Filed: 09/30/2003 Date Terminated: 10/30/2008 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Esq. David G. Gabor

represented by David George Gabor The Wagner Law Group 99 Summer Street 13th Floor Boston, MA 02110 617−357−5200 Fax: 617−357−5250 Email: dgabor@wagnerlawgroup.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Adela P. Santos Equal Opportunity Employment Commission New York District Office 33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004−2112 212−336−3695 Fax: 212−336−3623 Email: adela.santos@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Anne Grossman Equal Employment Opportunity Commission New York District Office 33 Whitehall Street, 5th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−336−3696 Fax: 212−336−3623 Email: elizabeth.grossman@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Estela Diaz EEOC 33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−336−3693 Fax: 212−336−3623 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine E. Bissell Equal Employment Opportunity Commission NY District Office

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 2 of 26
33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004 Fax: (212) 336−3623 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren G. Dreilinger U.S. EEOC 33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−336−3678 Fax: 212−336−3721 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle A. Caiola EEOC 33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−336−3702 Fax: 212−336−3623 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Ann Malloy U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 33 Whitehall Street 5th Floor New York, NY 10004−2112 212−336−3690 Fax: 212−336−3623 Email: margaret.malloy@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Plaintiff Dilber Jimenez
Intervenor Plaintiff Jhon Sanchez
Intervenor Plaintiff Natalia Naranjo

represented by Delvis Melendez 90 Bradley Street Brentwood, NY 11717 631−434−1443 Fax: 631−434−1443 Email: delvisprlaw@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 3 of 26

Intervenor Plaintiff Sonia Uribe

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Ruth Vidal

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Maria Zamora

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Milton Misnaza

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Rocio Rodriguez

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Sonia Borrero

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Erika Romero

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Oscar Morales

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Olga Morales

represented by Delvis Melendez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Adriana Torres

represented by David S. Feather The Law Offices of David S. Feather 666 Old Country Road Suite 605

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 4 of 26
Garden City, NY 11530 (516) 745−9000 Fax: 516−908−3930 Email: dfeather@featherlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Delvis Melendez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant First Wireless Group, Inc.

represented by Douglas Holden Wigdor Wigdor LLP 85 Fifth Avenue Fifth Floor New York, NY 10003 212−257−6800 Fax: 212−257−6845 Email: dwigdor@wigdorlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John L. Juliano John L. Juliano 39 Doyle Court East Northport, NY 11731 631−499−9300 Fax: 631−462−2532 Email: jlj@johnljulianopc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Scott Goodstadt Thompson, Wigdor & Gilly LLP 85 Fifth Avenue Fifth Floor New York, NY 10003 212−239−9292 Fax: 212−239−9001 Email: agoodstadt@twglawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/30/2003
09/30/2003 10/20/2003
10/20/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against First Wireless Group, Inc., filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Romano, Daniel) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
Summons Issued as to First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Romano, Daniel) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
2 Letter dated 10/15/03 from Delvis Melendez to Judge Seybert RE: Pursuant to Local Rules of Civil Procedure, let this letter serve as notice that the undersigned will move pursuant to FRCP 24(a)(1) on 10/31/03. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
ENDORSED ORDER on 2 Letter. The parties are advised that they are not in compliance with this Court's rules. All papers should be filed contemporarily with service. All papers filed before today's date should be filed immediately with the Court. Signed by Judge Joanna Seybert on 10/20/03. EOD #2 C/M (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/22/2003)

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 5 of 26

10/23/2003
10/23/2003
10/23/2003
11/03/2003 11/10/2003
12/01/2003 12/01/2003 12/01/2003 12/01/2003 01/16/2004 01/16/2004 01/16/2004 01/26/2004 01/26/2004 01/29/2004 02/09/2004 02/23/2004

3 MOTION to Intervene in this action, filed by Diber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Miznaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Eric Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Fagan, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
4 MEMORANDUM in Support re 3 MOTION to Intervene in this action, filed by Sonia Borrero, Diber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora. (Fagan, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
5 AFFIRMATION of Delvis Melendez in Support re 3 MOTION to Intervene in this action, filed filed by Sonia Borrero, Diber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora. (Fagan, Linda) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
6 MEMORANDUM in Opposition Re: Pltff's 3 MOTION to Intervene in this action, filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) Modified on 11/21/2003 (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 11/21/2003)
7 REPLY to Response to Motion Re: Pltff's 3 MOTION to Intervene in this action, filed filed by Sonia Borrero, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Diber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
8 ANSWER to Complaint by First Wireless Group, Inc..(Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by First Wireless Group, Inc. of Answer to Plf's Complaint 11/26/093 (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
10 DISCLOSURE of Interested Parties by First Wireless Group, Inc. :No parent company.(Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
11 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Answer served on E. Grossman, Esq. EEOC & Delvis Melendez, Esq. on 11/26/03, filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
12 Notice of MOTION to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the FRCP and 42:2000e−5(f)(1) by Adriana Torres. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
13 AFFIRMATION of David S. Feather in Support Re: 12 Notice of MOTION to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the FRCP and 42:2000e−5(f)(1) filed by Adriana Torres. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
14 MEMORANDUM in Support Re: 12 Notice of MOTION to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the FRCP and 42:2000e−5(f)(1) by Adriana Torres. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
16 Letter dated 1/26/04 from John J. Juliano to Clerk of Court Re: Dft requests that the Court schedule oral argument on the Motion to Intervene. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/20/2004)
17 MEMORANDUM in Opposition Re: 12 Notice of MOTION to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the FRCP and 42:2000e−5(f)(1) by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/20/2004)
15 ORDER − Initial Conference set for 2/25/2004 at 02:00PM before Magistrate−Judge Arlene R. Lindsay. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 1/29/04. C/M(Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
18 REPLY MEMORANDUM in Support Re: 12 Notice of MOTION to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the FRCP and 42:2000e−5(f)(1) filed by Adriana Torres. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 03/01/2004)
19 Letter APPLICATION dtd. 2/20/04 from John L. Juliano to Mag. J. Lindsay requesting adjournment of conference scheduled for 2/25/04 to 3/25/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 03/15/2004)

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02/23/2004 02/25/2004 02/25/2004 03/17/2004 03/17/2004
05/04/2004 05/05/2004 05/11/2004
05/13/2004
05/14/2004 05/21/2004 05/24/2004
05/24/2004 05/25/2004

ENDORSED ORDER re 19 Letter: The conference is adjourned to 3/17/04 AT 2:00 PM. So Ordered. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 2/23/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 03/15/2004)
20 NOTICE OF FILING − Please take notice that on 2/23/04 pltff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission mailed the attached Notice of Appearance to be filed with the USDC, EDNY. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Lauren G. Dreilinger on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
22 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Initial Conference Hearing held on 3/17/2004 @2:00. (Conference notes attached)Pretrial Scheduling Order adopted. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
23 SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 6/30/2004. Joinder of additional claimants to be completed by 6/30/04. Amendment of pleadings completed by 6/30/04. Phase 1 Discovery after which remaining schedule will be set by 11/12/04. Status Conference on 11/17/04 @11:00am. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 3/17/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
27 Letter dtd. 4/29/04 from Lauren G. Dreilinger, Trial Attorney to Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq. noting enclosure of a Stipulated Order Governing Discovery and Use of Claimants' Confidential Material (protective order). (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
28 Fax Letter dtd. 5/25/04 from Adela P. Santos,(EEOC) in Spanish, to Rubiele Orozeo, with English questionnaire, on behalf of plf indicating Hispanic employees were discriminated against in the conditions and the privileges of their employment at First Wireless. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
32 Letter dtd. 5/11/04 from Douglas H. Wigdor to Mag. J. Lindsay requesting an informal conference with the Court prior to filing a motion for injunctive and other relief preventing the Plf, EEOC from continuing to engage in their fishing expedition by distributing letters and other materials to Dft's current and former employees in an attempt to recruit them as additional plfs in this lawsuit. (Resolved by 5/27/04 order). (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
29 Letter dtd. 5/11/04 from Lauren G. Dreilinger, Trial Attorney to Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq. indicating Dft is unwilling to agree to designate any of the information listed as confidential in the proposed Stipulated Protective Order, therefore she will file a motion with the court for a Protective Order. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
30 Letter dtd. 5/13/04 from Adela P. Santos, Trial Attorney to Mag. J. Lindsay responding to dft's letter dtd. 5/10/04 in its request for a pre−motion conference, injunctions, sanctions, and all other relief is wholly unsupported and should be denied. (Resolved by 5/27/04 order)(Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
25 ORDER − A telephone status conference has been scheduled for 5/27/04 at 11:00AM. Counsel for dft is directed to initiate the call and have all parties on the line before connecting the Court. All parties must participate. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 5/21/04. C/F(Valle, Christine) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
31 Letter dtd. 5/20/04 from Adela P. Santos, Trial Attorney to Mag. J. Lindsay noting EEOC respectfully moves the Court, for a Protective Order barring Dft from pursuing discovery from EEOC, the Charging Parties, and any other claimants relating to their immigration status and income tax returns. (reslved by 5/27/04 order) (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
33 Letter dtd. 5/21/04 from Adela P. Santos, Trial Attorney noting enclosure of two copies of a letter motion mailed to the Court which were inadvertently omitted from the package with the original. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
35 Letter dtd. 5/25/04 from Douglas H. Wigdor to Mag. J. Lindsay in opposition to EEOC's letter dtd 5/20/04 requesting a protective order barring First Wireless "from pursuing discovery". Request Court deny EEOC's request for a protective order barring discovery of information concerning the Charging Parties' immigration status and/or

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05/26/2004 05/27/2004
06/01/2004 06/03/2004 06/03/2004 06/11/2004
06/15/2004 06/29/2004 06/29/2004 07/02/2004 07/02/2004 07/02/2004 07/02/2004

compliance with US immigrations laws, proof of work authorization, and tax filings or tax returns, which would unfairly prejudice First Wireless' right to defend this matter. (Resolved by 5/27/04 order) (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
34 Letter dtd. 5/25/04 from Douglas H. Weigdor to Lauren Drelinger, Esq, EEOC advising the telephone conference re this matter has been rescheduled for 2:00pm on 5/27/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
36 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Telephone Conference held on 5/27/2004 @2:00pm. l. Dft to submit proposed order re: mailings consistent with/discussin at today's conference 2. Plf to submit by close of business June lst any authority for protective orders concerning immigration status. Dept may reply by close of business June 2d. So Ordered. (Mag. J. Lindsay) (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
24 Minute Entry: Before Arlene R. Lindsay on 6/1/04 at 3:30 pm, civil cause forStatus Conference. Case called. Counsel for all parties present. Conf held. (Montero, Edher) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
39 FAX Letter dtd. 6/3/04 from Douglas H. Wigdor to Mag. J. Lindsay, noting First Wireless requests that the court not enter the protective order proposed by the EEOC because it is overly broad and includes oppressve restrictions that have not been addressed or litigated in this case. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
38 Letter dtd. 6/2/04 from Adela P. Santos to Mag. J Lindsay requesting that the court enter the protective order attached to its May 20th letter motion, based on this and the Court's June 1st ruling that Dft is prohibited from inquiring into the Charging Parties' and other claimants' immigration status due to overriding public policy. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
26 ORDER − Pursuant to the telephone conference held on 5/27/04, it is hereby ORDERED that: Each party shall provide to the other party and the Court 10 days prior written notice of any future communications to dft's current or former employees relating to this matter, to enable the other party to prepare responsive or similar communications. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 6/11/04. C/F(Valle, Christine) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
40 ORDER granting plf's application for a protective order. While the Court will permit the dft to seek copies of the tax returns at this time, the court will permit the dfts to inquire at a deposition whether the charging parties filed tax returns and whether false statements were made. So Ordered. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 6/15/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
52 Letter dtd 6/28/04 from Adela P. Santos to Hon. J Lindsay requesting the court compel Dft. to produce the information needed by EEOC to contact potential claimants in this case and to request an exension of the time by which EEOC must identify claimants. (Resolved by 7/22/04 order) (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
53 Letter dtd 6/28/04 from Adela P. Santos to Mag. J. Linday noting enclosure of attachments to the letter which was faxed to you earlier(Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a); Oral Argument Requested by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
45 AFFIRMATION of Douglas H. Wigdor in Support Re: 44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a); Oral Argument Requested filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
46 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support Re: 44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a); Oral Argument Requested by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
54 Letter dtd 7/1/04 from Douglas H. Wigdor to Mag. J. Lindsay in oppositon to the (6/28/04 ltr) request that the court compel First Wireless to produce expansive

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07/13/2004 07/14/2004 07/14/2004 07/19/2004 07/19/2004 07/19/2004
07/19/2004
07/22/2004 07/29/2004 08/19/2004 08/19/2004 08/20/2004 08/20/2004
09/03/2004

documents and information concerning every employee in every department who worked at First Wireless between 2000 and present, AND extend the recently expired Court ordered deadline for the joinder of additional claimants. (Resolved by 7/22/04 order)(Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
41 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/13/2004)
48 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File opposition to motion to 7/19/04 and dft's reply due 7/29/04 by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/06/2004)
ENDORSED ORDER − Granting 48 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by JudgeJoanna Seybert on 7/14/04. EOD #48 C/F (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/06/2004)
42 Plaintiff EEOC's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside a Portion of Judge Lindsay's Order Dated June 15, 2004 (Santos, Adela) Modified on 8/12/2004 (Mahon, Cinthia). (Entered: 07/19/2004)
43 Declaration of Adela P. Santos in support of plaintiff EEOC's memorandum of law in opposition to deft's motion to set aside a portion of Judge Lindsay's Order dated 6/15/04 with attached exhibits (Santos, Adela) Modified on 8/12/2004 (Mahon, Cinthia). (Entered: 07/19/2004)
56 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition Re: 44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a), filed by Sonia Borrero, Diber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/25/2004)
57 AFFIRMATION of Delvis Melendez in Opposition Re: 44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a), filed by Sonia Borrero, Diber Jimenez, Milton Miznaza, Olga Morales, Oscar Morales, Natalia Naranjo, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Jhon Sanchez, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/25/2004)
55 ORDER re 54 Letter,, 52 Letter: Court finds that the requests are relevant and directs the dft to produce responsive documents on/before August 20,04. The plf's time to identify additional plfs is extended to 9/24/04. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 7/22/04. (Barhome, Sydelle) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
47 REPLY MEMORANDUM in Support Re: 44 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of the Order entered by Magistrate Lindsay on 6/15/04, pursuant to Rule 72(a); Oral Argument Requested by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/03/2004)
49 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas Holden Wigdor on behalf of First Wireless Group, Inc. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/19/2004)
50 STIPULATION Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/19/2004)
ORDER re 50 : The Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality is approved. So Ordered. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 8/20/04. (c/ecf)(Goodstein, Alyce) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
51 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 3 Motion to Intervene and granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion to Intervene. Plaintiff−Intervenors' motion to intervene with respect to the Title VII claim is GRANTED, but Plaintiff−Intervenors' Motion to intervene as it relates to the claims brought under the NYHRL and those asserted against McNierney and Corrigan are DENIED. Signed by Judge Joanna Seybert on 08/18/2004. (Plaintiff's counsel is directed to notify all parties of this Order) (copies not mailed)(Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
61 NOTICE OF INTENT to Communicate with Dft First Wireless Group, Inc's Former and Current Non−Managerial Employees, by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 09/24/2004)

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 9 of 26

09/22/2004 09/22/2004
09/24/2004 09/29/2004 10/25/2004 10/25/2004 10/28/2004
10/29/2004 10/29/2004 11/02/2004 11/15/2004 11/17/2004 11/18/2004
11/23/2004
11/29/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 12/23/2004
01/28/2005 03/31/2005

58 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Identity of Additional Class Members by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
59 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Opposition to EEOC's Motion for Extension of Time to Identify Additional Claimants. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
60 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Intent to Communicate with Defendant's Non−Managerial Employees (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
62 See attached order re: 58 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on September 29, 2004. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 09/29/2004)
63 NOTICE by First Wireless Group, Inc. Intent to Communicate with Employees (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
64 Letter from EEOC to Magistrate Judge Arlene Lindsay Regarding disclosure of additional claimants. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
65 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Opposition to EEOC's Request for a Third Extension to Identify Additional Claimants. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
66 Letter from EEOC to Magistrate Judge Arlene Lindsey Regarding permission to file reply to Defendant's October 28, 2004 letter. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
67 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding EEOC's Improperly Filed Reply Letter. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
68 See attached order re 64 . Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on November 2, 2004. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
69 See attached order adjourning conference to November 23, 2004. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on November 15, 2004. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
70 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Request for Adjournment of Status Conference. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 11/17/2004)
ORDER re 70 . Application granted. The conference scheduled for November 23, 2004 is adjourned to November 29, 2004 at 11:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on November 18, 2004. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
71 ORDER DENYING 44 Motion to Set Aside a portion of Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's June 15, 2004 Order. The Court finds that it was within the Magistrate Judge's discretion to order the Plaintiff's protection order. The Rule 72 application to modify part of the Magistrate Judge's decision is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joanna Seybert on 11/19/2004. (c/ECF) (Plaintiff's counsel to notify all parties of this Order)(Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 11/23/2004)
72 ORDER: See attached pretrial scheduling order. Signed by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 11/29/04. (c/ecf)(Goodstein, Alyce) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Interim Pretrial Conference held on 11/29/2004. (c/ecf) (Goodstein, Alyce) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
73 Intervenor COMPLAINT, filed by all plaintiffs.(Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
74 NOTICE of Appearance by Delvis Melendez on behalf of all plaintiffs (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
75 Defendant FIrst Wireless Group, Inc.'s ANSWER to Complaint Filed by Plaintiff−Intervenors by First Wireless Group, Inc..(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
76 Defendant's ANSWER to Complaint Plaintiff−Intervenor's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial by First Wireless Group, Inc..(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 01/28/2005)
77 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Request for Pre−Motion Conference. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 03/31/2005)

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 10 of 26

04/05/2005 04/06/2005 04/08/2005 04/11/2005
04/11/2005 05/09/2005 05/12/2005 05/12/2005 05/18/2005 05/20/2005 06/03/2005 06/03/2005 06/06/2005 07/13/2005
07/13/2005 07/13/2005 07/13/2005 07/14/2005

78 Letter from Adela Santos to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Response to Defendant's Request for Pre−Motion Conference. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 04/05/2005)
79 Letter from Adela Santos to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Follow Up to Letter filed by EEOC on April 5, 2005. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
80 See attached order re 78 , 79 and 77 . Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on April 8, 2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
81 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by David S. Feather on behalf of Adriana Torres, Intervenor−Pltff. ** Attorney previously added to the docket sheet on 1/16/04 by the filing of the 12 Notice of Motion to Intervene. ** (Coleman, Laurie) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
82 Intervenor COMPLAINT and Demand for Jury Trial, filed by Adriana Torres.(Valle, Christine) (Entered: 04/13/2005)
83 Letter from Adela Santos to Honrable Arlene Lindsey Regarding request for pre−motion conference or permission to bring motion to compel. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
84 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding EEOC's May 9, 2005 request for pre−motion conference. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
85 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding Olga Morales' failure to appear at deposition and EEOC's agreement to pay fees and costs needlessly incurred. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
86 Letter from Adela P. Santos to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Defendant's May 12, 2005 request that EEOC pay their attorneys fees. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
87 ORDER re 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 . See attached order for details. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on May 19, 2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
88 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Motion by Michelle A. Caiola for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to attorney Michelle A. Caiola, (See Doc #88 filed as Notice), by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
ORDER granting motion for leave to appear pro hac vice as attorney (Michelle Caiola) in this action. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on June 6, 2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
Incorrect Document Information − Document #89 (Amended Complaint) and Document #90 (Stipulation) filed on 7/12/05 by Delvis Melendez have been deleted. PDF documents attached are incomplete. Attorney advised to refile Stipulation with Proposed Amended Complaint as an attachment. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
89 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding the EEOC's letters regarding non−party subpoenas. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
90 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Diber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Milton Miznaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales.(Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
91 STIPULATION to Amend Plaintiff Intervenors complaint by Diber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Milton Miznaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Eric Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
ORDER re 91 Stipulation permitting plaintiff intervenors to amend complaint and defendants 45 days to answer. So Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on July 14, 2005. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 07/14/2005)

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 11 of 26

07/14/2005
07/15/2005 07/19/2005 07/19/2005 07/20/2005 07/20/2005 07/21/2005 07/25/2005 08/02/2005 08/04/2005
08/05/2005 08/08/2005 08/09/2005 08/10/2005 08/10/2005 08/19/2005 08/29/2005

ORDER re 89 . The defendant has contacted chambers to withdraw its request for an informal conference. The defendant has indicated that it will resubmit a letter application pursuant to local rule 37.3. The plaintiffs need not respond to the July 13, 2005 request. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on July 14, 2005. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
92 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding the EEOC's letters regarding non−party subpoenas.. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
93 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
94 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding EEOC's letter requesting four month extension of discovery. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
95 Letter from Adela Santos to Hon. Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Leave to File Four (4) Page Letter objecting to Third−Party Subpoenas Issued by Defendant. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
96 Letter from Adela Santos to Hon. Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding EEOC's Response to Defendant's Letter to the Court dated July 15, 2005 and Objecting to Defendant's Issuance of Third−Party Subpoenas. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
97 Letter from Adela Santos to Hon.Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Exhibits A, B, and C to EEOC's July 20, 2005 four (4) page letter. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/21/2005)
98 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Defendant's Opposition to the EEOC's Motion to Quash Nonparty Subpoenas. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
99 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Regarding Request for Leave of Court to Propound Additional Interrogatories. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
100 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits A−I# 2 Exhibit J)(Caiola, Michelle) At the request of Ms. Caiola this document was modified on 8/5/2005 to seal the document from public access. (Vaughn, Terry). Modified on 8/11/2005 per MJ Lindsay's chambers to unseal the document, except for Exhibit J. (Vaughn, Terry). (Entered: 08/04/2005)
101 ORDER: See attached order scheduling status conference for August 10, 2005 at 2:30 p.m. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 8/5/05. (c/ecf)(Goodstein, Alyce) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
102 Letter from Adela Santos to Hon. Arlene Lindsay Regarding EEOC's opposition to Defendant's request for leave of Court to serve more than 25 interrogatories. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
103 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Judge Lindsay Regarding EEOC's motion for an order directing Frank McNierney to reappear for deposition. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
104 ORDER: re: 92 93 96 99 and 100 Motions. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on 8/10/05. See attached order for details. c/ecf (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 08/11/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Status Conference held on 8/10/2005. See document 104 for appearance information. (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 08/11/2005)
105 TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE Proceedings held on 8/10/05 before Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay. Court Transcriber: Renette M. Vincelette, Terry Gribben's Transcription Service. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/26/2005)
106 ANSWER to Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff−Intervenors by First Wireless Group, Inc..(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/29/2005)

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11/16/2005 11/17/2005
12/13/2005 12/14/2005
12/16/2005 12/19/2005 12/20/2005
12/23/2005 12/23/2005 12/29/2005 12/29/2005 01/04/2006 01/04/2006 01/06/2006 01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/10/2006

107 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
ORDER granting 107 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The discovery schedule set forth in the plaintiff's November 15, 2005 letter is adopted by the court. A final/settlement conference will be held on June 19, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on November 17, 2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
108 Letter MOTION for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 121305LetterAttachments)(Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
ORDER re 108 : The court is in receipt of the plaintiff's December 13, 2005 letter seeking a premotion conference or permission to file a motion to compel. The court finds that a premotion conference is not necessary. The court will treat the December 13, 2005 letter as the plaintiff's motion to compel. The defendant may submit opposition within three days of receipt of this order. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on December 14, 2005. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
109 Letter MOTION for Contempt of EEOC for violating Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
110 RESPONSE in Opposition re 108 Letter MOTION for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Discovery filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
111 RESPONSE in Opposition re 109 Letter MOTION for Contempt of EEOC for violating Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
112 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 108 Motion to Compel. See attached order for details. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on December 22, 2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Telephone Conference held on 12/22/2005. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
113 Letter Submitting Proposed Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
114 RESPONSE in Opposition re 109 Letter MOTION for Contempt of EEOC for violating Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
115 Letter to Judge Lindsay in response to the EEOC's proposed Order compelling discovery filed on 12/29/05 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
116 Letter responding to Defendant's January 4, 2006 letter by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
117 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay regarding motion for order of civil contempt by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
118 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Portion of Magistrate Judge Lindsay Order dated 12/22/06 by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
119 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Attachments: # 1 Affirmation# 2 Exhibits annexed to Affirmation)(Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
120 ORDER: re 108 Letter MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Compel Discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 1/10/06. See attachment for details. c/ecf(Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 01/10/2006)

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01/10/2006 01/11/2006 01/11/2006
01/17/2006
01/24/2006 02/03/2006 02/17/2006 03/01/2006 03/07/2006 03/08/2006
04/11/2006 04/12/2006 04/12/2006 04/14/2006

121 ORDER: re 108 Letter MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Compel Discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(supplements document 120 order). Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 1/10/06. See attachment for details. c/ecf(Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
122 Letter supplementing EEOC's motion filed 01/09/06 by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
123 ORDER re 111 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 114 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 117 Letter filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 109 Letter MOTION for Contempt of EEOC for violating Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 1/11/06. See attachment for details. c/ecf(Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
Motions terminated, docketed incorrectly 108 Letter MOTION for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission )terminated by documents 120 and 121 . 109 Letter MOTION for Contempt of EEOC for violating Stipulation and Protective Order of Confidentiality filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.,(Terminated by document 123 ). (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
124 RESPONSE in Opposition re 118 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Portion of Magistrate Judge Lindsay Order dated 12/22/06 filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affirmation of Douglas H. Wigdor# 2 Exhibit Exhibits to Affirmation of Douglas H. Wigdor)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
126 Letter application pursuant to the Court's Order dated January 11, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
128 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
129 ORDER re 126 128 . See attached order for details. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on March 1, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
130 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Caiola, Michelle) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
ORDER granting 130 . The court has reconsidered its March 1, 2006 ruling in light of the additional time needed by the defendant to produce court−ordered documents and grants the parties' request to extend the discovery deadlines set forth in the plaintiff?s November 15, 2005 letter by 90 days rather than 45 days. Accordingly the final conference is adjourned to September 27, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on March 8, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
131 STIPULATION and Proposed Order for Referral to Mediation by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
ORDER re 131 : Stipulation and Order For Referral to Mediation. So Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on April 12, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. See order dated 4/12/06 re: document 131 . Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 4/12/06. c/ecf(Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
SELECTION OF MEDIATOR David G. Gabor rep by David George Gabor selected as Mediator. The first mediation session will be from 10:00AM to 5:00PM on 4/24/06 in the offices of the Mediator David G. Gabor, at Gabor & Gabor, 400 Garden City Plaza, Suite 406, Garden City, NY 11530. By 4/19/06, Counsel shall file with the Mediator their client's mediation statement summarizing facts, legal issues, and particulars of any prior settlement discussions. Counsel for Plaintiff, Plaintiff Intervenors and Defendant shall appear in person at the mediation session with (1) requisite authority to settle this matter on behalf of each of their clients; and (2) have the celphone numbers and the ability to communicate with each and every client continuously on 4/19/06 from 10AM to 5PM. Clients with full settlement authority

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04/25/2006 04/26/2006 06/06/2006 06/06/2006
06/07/2006 06/07/2006 06/09/2006
06/13/2006 06/13/2006
06/16/2006 06/16/2006
06/21/2006 06/22/2006 06/26/2006 06/27/2006

shall attend the mediation session whenever possible. The Confidentiality Stipulation on the ADR Website (www.nyed.uscourts.gov/adr) is to be signed by all participants and the mediator and then faxed to the ADR Administrator. In acordance with Administrative Order 2004−08 (as of August 2, 2004) electronic filing became mandatory in the Eastern District of New York for all cases, (pro se cases are excluded).Report of Mediation due by 5/8/2006.(Lepp, Gerald) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
132 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
ORDER granting 132 Motion of Estela Diaz for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on April 26, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
133 Letter MOTION to Dismiss the Charging Parties and Additional Claimants whose depositions cannot be scheduled by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
134 ORDER − Pending before the Court is Pltff's 118 Motion to set aside a portion of the Magistrate Judge's Order. The parties are currently in mediation as ordered by the Magistrate on 4/12/06. In light of this, the Court terminates the motion without prejudice. Counsel is granted leave to renew the motion, if necessary, upon completion of mediation. Ordered by JudgeJoanna Seybert on 6/6/06. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
135 Letter Requesting Leave to Renew Motion by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
REPORT of Mediation UNSETTLED. Per the letter filed 06/07/06, Plaintiff Counsel reported one mediation session was held and was unsuccessful. Case removed from mediation. (Awerdick, Megan) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
136 RESPONSE in Opposition re 133 Letter MOTION to Dismiss the Charging Parties and Additional Claimants whose depositions cannot be scheduled filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits A through K)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
137 Letter MOTION to Compel Claimants to answer deposition questions regarding their national origin, etc. by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
138 ORDER Re: 135 Letter filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Application GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to reinstate EEOC's motion as of 1/9/06. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/13/06. C/ECF(Valle, Christine) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
139 RESPONSE to Motion re 137 Letter MOTION to Compel Claimants to answer deposition questions regarding their national origin, etc. filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
140 MOTION for Protective Order enforcement by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales, Adriana Torres. (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
141 Letter MOTION to Amend/Correct 64 Letter Identifying Additional Claimants by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(Santos, Adela) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
142 ORDER re 133 , 137 , and 140 : See attached order for details. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on June 22, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
143 Letter in Opposition to the EEOC's request purporting the substitution of Blanca Penaranda for Blanca Pineda as a Claimant by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) Modified on 6/27/2006 (Barhome, Sydelle). (Entered: 06/26/2006)
144 ORDER re 141 : See attached order scheduling conference. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on June 27, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 06/27/2006)

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06/30/2006 07/03/2006 07/07/2006
07/07/2006 07/07/2006
07/11/2006 07/11/2006 07/21/2006 07/21/2006
07/21/2006 07/21/2006 07/25/2006 07/28/2006
08/10/2006 08/11/2006 08/16/2006 08/17/2006

145 Letter MOTION to Dismiss the Charging Parties and Additional Claimants whose depositions have not been scheduled by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit June 22 Order)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
146 RESPONSE in Opposition re 145 Letter MOTION to Dismiss the Charging Parties and Additional Claimants whose depositions have not been scheduled filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 07/03/2006)
147 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Order dated June 22, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) Modified on 10/5/2006 to reinstate as a pending motion pursuant to the direction of Chambers. (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 07/07/2006)
148 MEMORANDUM in Support re 147 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Order dated June 22, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
149 AFFIDAVIT in Support re 147 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Order dated June 22, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
150 ORDER granting 141 Motion. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 7/11/06. See attachment for details. c/ecf (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Telephone Conference held on 7/11/2006. See document 150 for appearance information. c/ecf (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
151 RESPONSE in Opposition re 147 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Order dated June 22, 2006 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
152 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 147 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside a Portion of United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Order dated June 22, 2006 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
153 ORDER denying 145 Motion as moot. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on 7/21/06. See attachment for details. c/ecf (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Telephone Conference held on 7/21/2006. See document 153 for appearance information. (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
154 MOTION to Compel Independent Mental Examinations Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
155 RESPONSE in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Compel Independent Mental Examinations Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Diaz, Estela) Additional attachment(s) added on 7/28/2006 (Fagan, Linda). (Entered: 07/28/2006)
156 ORDER denying 154 : See attached order for details. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on August 10, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
157 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
158 RESPONSE in Opposition re 157 First MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 157 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The defendant's request for a two week extension of time to serve its rebuttal expert report is granted. The plaintiff may depose the rebuttal expert on or before September 18, 2006. All expert discovery shall be completed by September 27, 2006. The defendant's application to adjourn the other deadlines for sixty days after Judge Seybert rules on the discovery motions pending before her is

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08/18/2006
08/18/2006 08/24/2006 08/24/2006 08/24/2006 08/25/2006 08/25/2006 08/29/2006 08/30/2006 08/31/2006 09/01/2006 09/05/2006 09/05/2006 09/05/2006

denied. The final conference will go forward as scheduled on September 27, 2006, however, any party planning to make a dispositive motion may take the first step in the motion process by October 13, 2006. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on August 17, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) Modified on 8/17/2006 (Talbott, Thomas). (Entered: 08/17/2006)
159 ORDER Re: 118 Motion to Set Aside a portion of Magistrate's Order is DENIED. Because the Court does not find the Magistrate's December Order to be clearly erroneous or contrary to the law, the Court DENIES the EEOC's motion to set aside a portion of the Magistrate's December Order. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 8/17/2006. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) Modified on 10/5/2006 to correct entry information. (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 08/18/2006)
Motions terminated Re: 118 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Portion of Magistrate Judge Lindsay Order dated 12/22/05 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 159 Order of Judge Joanna Seybert dated 8/18/06. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
160 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
161 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H)(Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
162 MEMORANDUM in Support re 161 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
Motions terminated; docketed incorrectly 160 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
Incorrect Case/Document/Entry Information − Document 160 filed on 8/24/06 by Douglas Wigdor as "Motion to Set Aside Judgment" has been terminated as a Motion. This motion remains pending as Document 161 Motion to Set Aside with Affirmation and Exhibits. All corrections have been made. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
163 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Intent to Communicate with Defendant's Former and Current Non−managerial Employees (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
164 MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery,,, by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−G)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
165 RESPONSE in Opposition re 164 MOTION to Amend/Correct Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery,,, filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
166 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Intent to Communicate with Defendant's Former and Current Employees (Amended) (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
167 RESPONSE in Opposition re 161 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
168 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 161 Notice of MOTION to Set Aside Judgment of Judge Arlene R. Lindsay of August 10, 2006 filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to D# 2 Exhibit E to H)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
169 Letter providing notice that First Wireless will communicate with current non−managerial employees by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 09/05/2006)

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09/07/2006 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 09/11/2006 09/13/2006 09/18/2006 09/20/2006 09/26/2006 09/27/2006 10/05/2006
10/13/2006
10/13/2006 10/16/2006 10/16/2006 10/16/2006
10/17/2006 10/23/2006 10/26/2006

170 ORDER denying 164 : See attached order for details. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on September 6, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
171 Letter to Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay Requesting Protective Order against EEOC's Notice of Intent to Communicate with First Wireless employees by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
172 MOTION for Extension of Time to File 56.1 Statement by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
173 RESPONSE in Opposition re 172 MOTION for Extension of Time to File 56.1 Statement filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to C)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
174 Letter Opposing Defendant's 09/08/06 Request for Protective Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
175 ORDER denying 172 : See attached order for details. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on September 18, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 09/18/2006)
176 ORDER re 171 and 174 : See attached order for details. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on September 20, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
177 Letter requesting adjournment of final conference by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
ORDER re 177 : The final conference scheduled for October 23, 2006 is adjourned to October 30, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on September 26, 2006. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
ORDER: The final conference scheduled for October 30, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. is converted to a telephone final conference. Counsel for the plaintiffs shall initiate the call to (631) 712−5730. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on October 5, 2006. c/ecf(Miller, Dina) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
178 Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts by First Wireless Group, Inc. Responses due by 10/24/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − McNierney Affidavit# 2 Exhibit B − Lever Affidavit# 3 Exhibit C − Dineen Affidavit# 4 Exhibit D − Lucero Affidavit# 5 Exhibit E − Tacuri Affidavit# 6 Exhibit F − Orellana Affidavit# 7 Exhibit G − US Nonwovens Letter)(Wigdor, Douglas) Modified on 10/16/2006 to correct entry information. (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 10/13/2006)
179 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 178 MOTION for Summary Judgment Rule 56.1 Statement Certificate of Service by Douglas Holden Wigdor on behalf of First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
180 Letter to Judge Seybert confirming the October 13, 2006 filing of a Rule 56.1 Concise Statement of Material Facts by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
Motions terminated; docketed incorrectly Re: 178 MOTION for Summary Judgment Rule 56.1 Statement filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
Incorrect Case/Document/Entry Information − Document 178 filed on 10/13/06 by Douglas Wigdor as "Motion for Summary Judgment" has been modified to reflect correct entry information. This document is a Rule 56.1 Statement and NOT a motion. All corrections have been made. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
181 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Rule 56.1 Counter−Statement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 10/17/2006)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 181 Letter/Motion for Extension of Time to File is approved. EEOC's 56.1 counter−statement is due by 11/14/06. Ordered by JudgeJoanna Seybert on 10/20/2006. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
182 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Intent to Communicate with Defendant's Former Employees (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 10/26/2006)

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10/30/2006 10/30/2006 10/30/2006 10/31/2006 11/03/2006 11/06/2006
11/13/2006 11/14/2006 11/15/2006 11/15/2006 11/15/2006 12/01/2006 12/05/2006 12/13/2006 12/14/2006 12/18/2006 12/18/2006
12/18/2006

183 ORDER: Discovery is complete and there is no possibility of settlement at this time. Accordingly, the case is returned to the District Judge for final disposition. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on 10/30/06. c/ecf(Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Arlene R. Lindsay : Final Telephone Conference held on 10/30/2006. See document 183 for appearance information. (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
Judge Arlene R. Lindsay no longer assigned to case. (Morabito, Bryan) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
ORDER. The parties are directed to electronically file the proposed joint pretrial order by November 30, 2006. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on October 31, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
184 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Pre−Trial Order by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
ORDER denying 184 : The parties' application to extend the deadline for the joint pretrial order to thirty days after dispositive motions are adjudicated is denied. The undersigned believes that the joint pretrial order should be prepared immediately following the close of discovery. However, given the number of documents and depositions involved, the deadline for electronically filing the proposed joint pretrial order is adjourned to December 8, 2006. Ordered by JudgeArlene R. Lindsay on November 6, 2006. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
185 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Pre−Trial Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
186 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT Rule 56.1 Counter Statement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E)(Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
187 RESPONSE to Motion re 178 Rule 56.1 Statement Counter Rule 56.1 Statement filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
188 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 178 Rule 56.1 Statement filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
189 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 186 Rule 56.1 Statement (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 185 Letter/Motion for Extension of Time to File Joint Pre−Trial Order is GRANTED. Parties are to file no later than 1/5/07. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 11/17/2006. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 12/01/2006)
190 Letter from Douglas H. Wigdor Requesting Pre−Motion Conference by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
191 REPLY in Opposition pre motion conference by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
192 Letter in response to Defendant's letter requesting a pre−motion conference by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
193 RESPONSE in Opposition re 178 Rule 56.1 Statement Letter in Response to Defendant's Request for a Pre−Motion Conference filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
194 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Affidavit of Adriana Torres and Plaintiff−Intervenors Counter−Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 served on Douglas Wigdor, Esq.; Adela Santos, Esq.; Delvis Melendez, Esq. on November 16, 2006, filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
195 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Affidavit of Service for Letter in Response to Defendant's request for a Pre−Motion Conference served on Douglas Wigdor, Esq.; Adela Santos, Esq.; Delvis Melendez, Esq. on December 15, 2006, filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 12/18/2006)

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12/18/2006 01/05/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/22/2007 01/23/2007 02/02/2007 02/07/2007 02/20/2007
03/09/2007 03/13/2007 03/19/2007 03/19/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007

ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 190 and 191 Letters. All parties have properly filed Rule 56.1 Statements. Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to appear before this Court on 1/19/07 at 3:00 p.m. for a pre−motion conference. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 12/15/2006. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
196 Proposed Pretrial Order (Joint) by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 −− Part 1# 2 Exhibit 1 −− Part 2# 3 Exhibit 2) (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
197 Letter attaching executed signature pages to joint pre−trial order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
198 ORDER re 196 and 197 : See attached order accepting joint pretrial order. Ordered by Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on January 16, 2007. c/ecf (Miller, Dina) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
199 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Joanna Seybert: Pre−Motion Conference held on 1/19/2007. Case referred to Mag. Judge Wall for Settlement Conference. Motion schedule to be set, if necessary, following settlement conference. (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
200 Minute Entry for proceedings held before William D. Wall : Settlement Conference held on 1/19/2007 and order entered. The next settlement conference will be held on January 30, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. See attached order for further directions. Ordered by Judge William D. Wall on 1/19/07. (Hepworth, F.) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
201 Letter re proposed summary judgment briefing schedule by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 201 Letter. The motion schedule as outlined is APPROVED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 2/5/2007. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
202 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER − Pending before the Court are two motions brought by First Wireless Group, Inc. Dft moves to set aside Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay's Orders, dated 6/22/06 and 8/10/06. Dft claims that the Magistrate's Orders are erroneous and contrary to law. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Dft's motions to set aside the Magistrate's June 2006 and August 2006 Orders. The Court DENIES Dft's application for Rule 35 examinations. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 2/20/07. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
203 Letter : Joint Request Regarding Page Limit Extension by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 203 Letter. Memoranda must be no longer than thirty (30) pages. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 3/12/2007. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
204 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
205 MOTION for Summary Judgment by First Wireless Group, Inc..Responses due by 4/30/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law In Support of First Wireless' Motion for Summary Judgment) (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
206 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION of Douglas H. Wigdor in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16 # 17 # 18 # 19 # 20) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
207 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION Declaration of Douglas H Wigdor in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21# 2 Exhibit 22# 3 Exhibit 23# 4 Exhibit 24# 5 Exhibit 25# 6 Exhibit 26# 7 Exhibit 27# 8 Exhibit 28# 9 Exhibit 29# 10 Exhibit 30# 11 Exhibit 31# 12 Exhibit 32# 13 Exhibit 33# 14 Exhibit 34# 15 Exhibit 35# 16 Exhibit 36# 17 Exhibit 37# 18 Exhibit 38# 19 Exhibit 39# 20 Exhibit 40# 21 Exhibit 41# 22 Exhibit 42# 23 Exhibit 43# 24 Exhibit 44# 25 Exhibit 45# 26 Exhibit 46# 27 Exhibit 47# 28 Exhibit 48# 29 Exhibit 49) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 03/26/2007)

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 20 of 26

03/26/2007
03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/29/2007 04/30/2007 04/30/2007 05/01/2007 05/01/2007
05/01/2007 05/01/2007 05/01/2007
05/02/2007 05/02/2007

208 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION Declaration of Douglas H Wigdor in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 50# 2 Exhibit 51# 3 Exhibit 52# 4 Exhibit 53# 5 Exhibit 54# 6 Exhibit 55# 7 Exhibit 56# 8 Exhibit 57# 9 Exhibit 58# 10 Exhibit 59# 11 Exhibit 60# 12 Exhibit 61# 13 Exhibit 62# 14 Exhibit 63# 15 Exhibit 64# 16 Exhibit 65# 17 Exhibit 66# 18 Exhibit 67# 19 Exhibit 68# 20 Exhibit 69# 21 Exhibit 70# 22 Exhibit 71# 23 Exhibit 72# 24 Exhibit 73# 25 Exhibit 74# 26 Exhibit 75# 27 Exhibit 76# 28 Exhibit 77# 29 Exhibit 78) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
Incorrect Document Information − Exhibit #76 as shown in Document #208 in not a sealed document and will be filed on the public docket by counsel. (Lee, Tiffeny) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
209 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION of Douglas H Wigdor in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 76) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 204 Letter/Motion for Extension of Time to File Exhibits to Motion is APPROVED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 3/21/2007. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
212 RESPONSE in Opposition re 205 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
213 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 205 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Part 1# 2 Exhibit A − Part 2# 3 Exhibit A − Part 3# 4 Exhibit A − Part 4# 5 Exhibit A − Part 5# 6 Exhibit A − Part 6# 7 Exhibit B through F) (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
214 RESPONSE to Motion re 205 MOTION for Summary Judgment Memorandum of Law filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
215 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 205 MOTION for Summary Judgment by David S. Feather, Esq. filed by Adriana Torres. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Exhibit R# 19 Exhibit S# 20 Exhibit T# 21 Exhibit U# 22 Exhibit V# 23 Exhibit W# 24 Exhibit X# 25 Exhibit Y# 26 Exhibit Z# 27 Exhibit AA# 28 Exhibit BB# 29 Exhibit CC) (Feather, David) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
216 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment served on EEOC and Plaintiff's legal counsel on April 30, 2007, filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
217 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Affirmation in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits thereto served on EEOC and Plaintiff's Legal Counsel (Douglas Wigdor, Esq.) on April 30, 2007, filed by Adriana Torres. (Feather, David) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
218 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Re: Dft's MOTION for Summary Judgment by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales, Adriana Torres.Responses due by 4/30/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit # 2 Exhibit) (Melendez, Delvis). Modified on 5/2/2007 to correct entry information. (Valle, Christine). Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2007: Redacted Exhibit A (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 05/01/2007)
Motions terminated; docketed incorrectly: Re: 218 MOTION for Summary Judgment opposition filed by Natalia Naranjo, Olga Morales, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Oscar Morales, Erika Romero, Milton Misnaza, Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Rocio Rodriguez, Adriana Torres, Maria Zamora. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
Incorrect Case/Document/Entry Information − Document 218 filed on 5/1/07 by Delvis Melendez on behalf of Pltffs as "Motion for Summary Judgment" has been modified to correct entry information. This document is a Memorandum in Opposition and NOT a Motion. Addtionally, Exhibit A has been modified to redact personal information pursuant to Administrative Order 2004−9 in accordance with the E Govt

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05/16/2007 05/16/2007 06/01/2007 06/05/2007 02/11/2008
03/31/2008 05/02/2008
05/20/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008

Act. Counsel is advised to refer to this Order for future filings containing personal information. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
219 REPLY to Response to Motion re 205 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
220 AFFIDAVIT/AFFIRMATION of Andrew S. Goodstadt in Further Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
221 Letter regarding recent Supreme Court decision concerning equal pay claims by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
222 Letter in response to Defendant's letter regarding recent Supreme Court decision by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A and B) (Diaz, Estela) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
226 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER − For the foregoing reasons, Dft's 205 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dft's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of disparate pay in violation of Title VII is DENIED. Dft's motion for summary judgment with respect to the retaliation claims of Jimemez, Salcedo, Sosa, and the sixteen signatory Claimants is also DENIED. Dft's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining nineteen non−signatory Claimants' retaliation claim is GRANTED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 2/11/08. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
227 NOTICE of Hearing: Pretrial Conference set for 5/2/2008 at 3:00pm in Courtroom 1030 before Judge Joanna Seybert. (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
228 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Joanna Seybert: Pretrial Conference held on 5/2/2008. Motions to be filed by 7/7/2008; Responses by 7/28/2008; Replies by 8/4/2008. Status Conference/Oral argument set for 8/15/2008 at 2:00pm in Courtroom 1030 before Judge Joanna Seybert. Jury Selection & Trial set for 10/6/2008 at 9:30am in Courtroom 1030 before Judge Joanna Seybert. (Court Reporter O. Wicker) (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
229 ORDER − Due to a conflict in the Court's calendar, Jury Selection is re−scheduled for 11/3/2008 at 9:30AM in Courtroom 1030. Jury Trial set for 11/10/2008 at 9:30 AM before Judge Joanna Seybert. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 5/20/08. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
230 MOTION in Limine by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit tnascripts page from deposition, # 2 Notice of Motion, # 3 Affidavit Attorney Declaration) (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
231 MOTION in Limine by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Disposition, # 2 Notice of Motion, # 3 Affidavit Attorney declaration) (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
232 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Calling First Wireless Group's Corporate Counsel as a Witness at Trial by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
233 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of New York State Division of Human Rights Investigator Angel Rivera by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
234 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Submitting the Issue of Economic Damages to the Jury by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
235 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
236 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Third Party Witnesses on the Issue of Compensatory Damages by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)

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07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008
07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008
07/07/2008 07/07/2008

237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
238 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial (Affirmation of Douglas H. Wigdor) filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
239 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by First Wireless Group, Inc. re 238 Affidavit in Support of Motion, 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
241 MOTION in Limine to Admit Deposition Testimony by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Memorandum in Support) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
242 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness (Affirmation of Douglas H. Wigdor) filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
243 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by First Wireless Group, Inc. re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness, 242 Affidavit in Support of Motion, (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
244 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Memorandum in Support) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
245 MOTION in Limine to Admit Inconsistent Statements by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support Margaret A. Malloy Declaration, # 2 Exhibit exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit exhibit 7) (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
246 MEMORANDUM in Support re 245 MOTION in Limine to Admit Inconsistent Statements filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support Margaret A. Malloy Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3) (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
248 MEMORANDUM in Support re 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
249 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration in Support, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
250 MEMORANDUM in Support re 249 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
251 EXHIBIT : Notice of Motions In Limine by First Wireless Group, Inc.. Related document: 234 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Submitting the Issue of Economic Damages to the Jury filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 233 MOTION in

Case: 2:03-cv-4990 As of: 06/05/2017 05:03 PM EDT 23 of 26

07/25/2008 07/25/2008 07/28/2008
07/29/2008 07/30/2008 07/30/2008
07/31/2008 07/31/2008 08/01/2008 08/04/2008 08/13/2008
08/13/2008

Limine to Exclude the Testimony of New York State Division of Human Rights Investigator Angel Rivera filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 232 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Calling First Wireless Group's Corporate Counsel as a Witness at Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 236 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Third Party Witnesses on the Issue of Compensatory Damages filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc., 235 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
255 Letter requesting an extension of the July 28, 2008 deadline for the parties to respond to the respective motions in limine by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 07/25/2008)
256 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 233 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of New York State Division of Human Rights Investigator Angel Rivera filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/25/2008)
ELECTRONIC ORDER re: 255 Letter. Application GRANTED. In light of the parties' representation that they are engaging in settlement negotiations, the conference scheduled for August 15, 2008 is rescheduled for October 3, 2008 at 11:00 a.m. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 7/28/2008. (c/ECF) (Nohs, Bonnie) (Entered: 07/28/2008)
257 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 232 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Calling First Wireless Group's Corporate Counsel as a Witness at Trial filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 07/29/2008)
258 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
259 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
260 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
261 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
262 Letter MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to parties' respective motions in limine by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/01/2008)
263 ORDER Re: 262 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply − Application Granted. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 8/4/08. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
264 OPPOSITION to 235 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Melendez, Delvis) Modified on 9/2/2008 to correct entry information. (Valle, Christine). (Entered: 08/13/2008)
265 NOTICE by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales re 264 MOTION in Limine opposing defendants motion in limine to bifurcate the trial withdrawl of opposition (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 08/13/2008)

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08/13/2008 08/13/2008
08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008 08/13/2008
08/13/2008 08/13/2008
08/13/2008
08/13/2008
08/13/2008
08/13/2008

266 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 236 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Third Party Witnesses on the Issue of Compensatory Damages filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
267 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 236 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Third Party Witnesses on the Issue of Compensatory Damages filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
268 RESPONSE to Motion re 230 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Concerning Dilber Jimenez filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
269 RESPONSE in Opposition re 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
270 RESPONSE in Opposition re 244 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
271 RESPONSE in Opposition re 245 MOTION in Limine to Admit Inconsistent Statements filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
272 RESPONSE to Motion re 235 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
273 Letter Re: Defendant's Motion in Limine requesting that economic damages not be submitted to the jury by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
274 RESPONSE in Opposition re 249 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
275 RESPONSE in Opposition re 231 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence as to Jhon Sanchez filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
276 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 231 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence as to Jhon Sanchez filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
277 RESPONSE in Opposition re 241 MOTION in Limine to Admit Deposition Testimony filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
278 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 241 MOTION in Limine to Admit Deposition Testimony filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
279 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
280 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 249 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
281 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 245 MOTION in Limine to Admit Inconsistent Statements filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
282 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Opposition re 244 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, #

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08/13/2008
08/13/2008 08/20/2008
08/20/2008
08/20/2008 08/20/2008 08/20/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008

2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E) (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
Motions terminated; docketed incorrectly Re: 264 MOTION in Limine opposing defendants motion in limine to bifurcate the trial filed by Natalia Naranjo, Olga Morales, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Oscar Morales, Erika Romero, Sonia Borrero, Milton Misnaza, Jhon Sanchez, Dilber Jimenez, Rocio Rodriguez, Maria Zamora. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 09/02/2008)
Incorrect Case/Document/Entry Information − Document 264 filed on 8/13/08 by Delvis Melendez as "Motion in Limine" has been modified to reflect correct entry information. This document is opposing document and NOT a Motion. All corrections have been made. (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 09/02/2008)
283 REPLY to Response to Motion re 230 MOTION in Limine to exclude character and collateral source evidence filed by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit deposition pages, # 2 Exhibit deposition pages, # 3 Affidavit attorney declaration) (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
284 REPLY to Response to Motion re 231 MOTION in Limine exclude character evidence as to Jhon Sanchez filed by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales. (Melendez, Delvis) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
285 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 10/10/2008 at 11:00am in Courtroom 1030 before Judge Joanna Seybert, rescheduled from 10/3. (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
286 REPLY in Support re 245 MOTION in Limine to Admit Inconsistent Statements filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
287 REPLY in Support re 241 MOTION in Limine to Admit Deposition Testimony filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
288 REPLY in Support re 233 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of New York State Division of Human Rights Investigator Angel Rivera filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
289 REPLY in Support re 232 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Calling First Wireless Group's Corporate Counsel as a Witness at Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
290 REPLY in Support re 236 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Third Party Witnesses on the Issue of Compensatory Damages filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
291 REPLY in Support re 237 MOTION in Limine Requesting that the Court Permit Defendant to Inquire into Claimants' Immigration Status at Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
292 REPLY in Support re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
293 REPLY in Support re 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
295 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 240 MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)

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08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/22/2008 08/22/2008 10/03/2008 10/08/2008 10/08/2008 10/08/2008
10/22/2008 10/22/2008 10/29/2008
10/30/2008
11/03/2008 11/03/2008

296 REPLY in Support re 249 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
297 REPLY in Support re 235 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial filed by First Wireless Group, Inc.. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
298 REPLY in Support re 244 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
Incorrect Case/Document/Entry Information: Document 294 has been deleted at the request of counsel because it was docketed incorrectly. The correct document is filed as DE 299. (Brienza, Lauren) (Entered: 08/22/2008)
299 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION in Support re 247 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Character Evidence filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Malloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/22/2008)
301 Letter by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
302 NOTICE of Change of Contact Information by Douglas Holden Wigdor (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
303 Letter requesting an adjournment of the pre−trial conference by First Wireless Group, Inc. (Wigdor, Douglas) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
ORDER re: 303 Letter filed by First Wireless Group, Inc. Status Conference and/or Oral Argument set for 10/23/2008 at 11:00am in Courtroom 1030 before Judge Joanna Seybert. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 10/8/2008. (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
304 Joint MOTION to Adjourn Conference by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Santos, Adela) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
ORDER granting 304 Motion to Adjourn Conference. The parties are to inform the Court by 10/29/2008 of the status of their settlement negotiations. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 10/22/2008. (Baran, Charles) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
305 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Proposed Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Santos, Adela) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/19/2008: # 5 Exhibit Sealed Exhibit A) (Glueckert, Lisa). (Entered: 10/29/2008)
306 CONSENT DECREE − ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this Decree resolves all issues raised in EEOC Charge Numbers as set forth herein. In settlement of this dispute, Dft shall pay a total settlement amount of $435,000 in back pay and/or compensatory damages, inclusive of attorneys' fees. Application Granted. Jury selection scheduled for 11/3/08 is cancelled. The Clerk of Court is directed to mark this matter closed and terminate the pending motions in this case. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 10/30/08. C/ECF (Valle, Christine) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
307 STIPULATION of Dismissal with Prejudice by Adriana Torres, First Wireless Group, Inc. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
308 STIPULATION of Dismissal with Prejudice by Dilber Jimenez, Jhon Sanchez, Natalia Naranjo, Sonia Uribe, Ruth Vidal, Maria Zamora, Milton Misnaza, Rocio Rodriguez, Sonia Borrero, Erika Romero, Oscar Morales, Olga Morales, First Wireless Group, Inc. (Goodstadt, Andrew) (Entered: 11/03/2008)