Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/04/11 Page 1 of 45 PageID #:1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, DANIEL BAXTER, GEORGE CHILDRESS, HANNIBAL EASON, CURTIS FOSTER, CURTIS HALTERMAN, BILLY JOHNSON, WENDELL LANCASTER, DANIEL LORD, AARON WINFERT, and JASON WRIGHT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Case No. __________

Plaintiffs,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

v. SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director of Illinois Department of Corrections; and L. RACHEL MCKINZIE, Americans with Disabilities Act Coordinator, Illinois Department of Corrections,

Defendants.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiffs are deaf and hard of hearing prisoners who are in the custody of the

Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Department” or “IDOC”). While in IDOC custody,

Plaintiffs have been denied the assistance they need to effectively communicate and participate

in IDOC programs and services, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs seek to represent

a class consisting of all prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing and who are or will be

confined in Illinois’ prisons.

2. As a result of the Department’s failure to provide the assistance required by

prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing to effectively communicate, Plaintiffs have been

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excluded from a variety of programs and activities offered by the Department, have been punished as a result of their disabilities, and have otherwise suffered injury.
3. Among the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of the Department’s failure to provide the assistance required for effective communication, Plaintiffs are unable to adequately: maintain contact with loved ones; benefit from educational opportunities (including academic classes, vocational training, and other programs) offered to prisoners; discuss their medical care because they can not communicate effectively with doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel; communicate with their counselors; participate in religious services; or access telephone and television services. Because the Department has failed to provide them adequate assistance, Plaintiffs are forced to serve their time largely isolated from, and are unable to effectively communicate with, other human beings. Plaintiffs have even missed meals and visitors because they could not hear announcements that they should leave their cells.
4. The Department also has improperly disciplined Plaintiffs because of their disabilities. For example, Plaintiffs have been disciplined for not following orders which they could not hear. Plaintiffs have also been unable to defend themselves in hearings or proceeding stemming from disciplinary charges brought against them, because they could not effectively communicate with hearing officers and investigators.
5. The Department’s failure to properly account for Plaintiffs’ disabilities also has jeopardized Plaintiffs’ safety. For example, the Department has not made auditory safety alerts accessible to Plaintiffs, including such vital warnings as fire alarms, warning shots, and orders to lie down to avoid being shot. In addition, on a daily basis, the Department’s failure to provide Plaintiffs the assistance they need means that Plaintiffs are forced to rely on other prisoners, placing them in constant danger of exploitation by those prisoners.
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6. The Department’s failure to account for Plaintiffs’ disabilities also has resulted in denying Plaintiffs access to an adequate grievance process for their complaints as to the manner in which they have been treated. The Department conducts the grievance process without providing Plaintiffs with needed auxiliary aids and services as required by the ADA.
7. Because the Department’s systematic failure to provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners the assistance they require improperly infringes upon the rights of all deaf or hard of hearing prisoners in IDOC custody, Plaintiffs seek class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to provide the assistance necessary for prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing to adequately participate in programs and services and to enjoy equal rights as hearing prisoners while incarcerated, and enjoining Defendants from denying equal rights to deaf or hard of hearing prisoners as a result of their disabilities, or punishing them because of their disabilities. II. JURISDICTION
8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because: (1) this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); (2) this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of Plaintiffs’ civil rights, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794a and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; (3) Plaintiffs allege that they have been aggrieved by an act or failure to act by a recipient of Federal assistance under 29 U.S.C. § 794, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12133; (4) Plaintiffs allege discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, it is brought in part pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants deprived them of their rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and Federal laws.
9. This Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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10. This Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. III. VENUE
11. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because some Plaintiffs reside at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), which is located in this district; the principal place of business of L. Rachel McKinzie is located in this district; and a substantial number of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district. IV. PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs 12. Named Plaintiffs Ralph Holmes, Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert and Jason Wright, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are individuals with a hearing disability currently incarcerated at facilities under IDOC’s custody and control. 13. Ralph Holmes is a 41-year-old man incarcerated at Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”). He became deaf as a teenager due to a car accident. He does not know American Sign Language (“ASL”). Mr. Holmes requires access to text information for all communications as well as development of sign language skills for rehabilitation purposes. 14. Daniel Baxter is a 57-year-old man who has been incarcerated at Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“Big Muddy River”) since 2007. He has been hard of hearing since 2006, stemming from complications of a medical condition. Mr. Baxter knows some sign language, but requires development of his sign language skills for rehabilitative purposes. He requires hearing aids and to talk face-to-face in a quiet environment for effective communication.
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15. George Childress is a 60-year-old man incarcerated at Dixon. He is deaf in both ears and uses a hearing aid in his left ear. He uses ASL and writing to communicate. He requires an ASL interpreter for effective communication.
16. Hannibal Eason is a 28-year-old man currently incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). He is partially deaf in both ears as a result of contracting meningitis at thirteen months of age. In order to properly understand his surroundings, he needs to wear a hearing aid in both ears. He now wears a hearing aid in only one ear.
17. Curtis Foster is a 46-year-old man incarcerated at Stateville. Mr. Foster was born with deafness in one ear and minimal hearing in the other. Mr. Foster has been in prison since 1998. He spent his first five years at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and was transferred to Stateville in 2003. Mr. Foster relies on ASL to communicate and requires an ASL interpreter to communicate with people who do not know ASL.
18. Curtis Halterman is a 40-year-old man incarcerated at Jacksonville Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”). Mr. Halterman lost his hearing in a car accident. He has significant hearing loss in his left ear and relies on residual hearing in his right ear (assisted by a hearing aid in his left ear), lip-reading, and writing. He communicates effectively by talking face-to-face with individuals in quiet environments. Mr. Halterman has been in IDOC custody since February 1994, beginning at Menard. He was transferred in 1996 to Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western Illinois”) and, in 2001, to Logan Correctional Center (“Logan”). He was subsequently transferred to Illinois River Correctional Center (“Illinois River”) before being transferred to Jacksonville in 2007.
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19. Billy Johnson is a 28-year-old man incarcerated at Menard. He was born deaf in both ears. He grew up using sign language and is fluent in ASL. He is able to communicate with persons who do not know ASL with the aid of an ASL interpreter.
20. Wendell Lancaster is a 37-year-old man incarcerated at Dixon. He has been deaf in both ears since birth. He relies on ASL to communicate and requires an ASL interpreter to allow him to communicate effectively with persons who do not know ASL.
21. Daniel Lord is a 44-year-old man incarcerated at Dixon. He has been deaf since the age of three. ASL is Mr. Lord’s native language and he relies on it to communicate. He requires an ASL interpreter to allow him to communicate effectively with persons who do not know ASL. He was previously incarcerated at Joliet Correctional Center (“Joliet”).
22. Aaron Winfert is a 31-year-old man incarcerated at Menard. He has been deaf in his left ear and hard of hearing in his right ear since early childhood. His primary language is ASL. He is able to communicate with persons who do not know ASL with the use of a hearing aid and/or an ASL interpreter.
23. Jason Wright is a 32-year-old man incarcerated at the Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”). He was born deaf and communicates through ASL. He requires an ASL interpreter for effective communication.
B. Defendants 24. Salvador A. Godinez is the Acting Director of IDOC and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of IDOC. Mr. Godinez is sued in his official capacity. 25. L. Rachel McKinzie is IDOC’s Chief Legal Officer and ADA Coordinator, and is responsible for the administration of the ADA within IDOC. Ms. McKinzie is sued in her official capacity.
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26. At all relevant times, Defendants were acting under color of state law, pursuant to their authority as officials, agents, contractors, or employees of the State of Illinois; within the scope of their employment as representatives of public entities, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); and as representatives of a “department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State” under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). V. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIBILITIES TO DEAF OR HARD OF HEARING
INMATES A. IDOC’s Responsibilities Under the U. S. Constitution 27. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 28. Under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 29. Pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Defendants are prohibited from denying deaf or hard of hearing prisoners basic rights and services, including rights and services offered to hearing inmates, in a manner that results in cruel or unusual punishment or that deprives Plaintiffs of their rights to equal protection of the laws by discriminating against Plaintiffs in the application of Federal laws or the laws of the state of Illinois. B. Defendants’ Responsibilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) 30. On July 12, 1990, Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
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disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
31. Defendants are public entities, as departments, agencies, special purpose districts, or other instrumentalities of the State of Illinois, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
32. Plaintiffs are qualified individuals with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), and have a right not to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their disability by Defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
33. Individuals in the custody of IDOC such as Plaintiffs are wholly dependent on IDOC for medical, dental, educational, mental health, and religious services, among other services. Individuals in the custody of IDOC are also dependent on IDOC and prison staff for all of their basic daily needs, including food, exercise, and safety.
34. Under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a), IDOC must ensure that individuals in its custody are not, on the basis of disability, excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of its services, programs, or activities
35. The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regulation implementing Title II of the ADA requires the provision of effective communication as part of its nondiscrimination mandate. 28 C.F.R. 35.160.
36. The DOJ regulation requires that “[a] public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a).
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37. The DOJ regulation further provides that, to ensure effective communication, “a public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1).
38. To comply with the ADA, IDOC must provide equal access to and effective communication for its programs and services, as set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 and § 35.160(a). This includes the provision without surcharge of appropriate “auxiliary aids and services” to deaf or hard of hearing prisoners. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) and §35.160.
39. “Auxiliary aids and services” include: “(1) Qualified interpreters, note-takers, transcription services, written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD’s), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments; . . . (3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and (4) Other similar services and actions.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
40. The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing varies in accordance with the individual’s amount of hearing loss and the length and complexity of the communication involved. ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual, Section II-7.1000.
41. In determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary, “a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 160(b)(2).
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42. Many individuals who were deaf at birth or who lost their hearing before acquiring language, including some of the Plaintiffs herein, are not fluent or functionally literate in English – written or spoken – because their native language is American Sign Language (“ASL”), not English. Those individuals are often unable to communicate effectively with people who are not fluent in ASL without the aid of an interpreter to facilitate communication. ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual, Section II-7.1100.
43. The ADA regulations include “qualified interpreters” in the list of appropriate auxiliary aids and services, and define the term “qualified interpreter” to mean “an interpreter who is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.1
44. For individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing but do not know ASL, like some of the Plaintiffs, auxiliary aids and services other than qualified sign language interpreters are required to effectively communicate.
45. For example, individuals who lose their hearing later in life may not be familiar with sign language and may communicate effectively through written English. ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual, Section II-7.1100. For these individuals, use of a word processor with a videotext display may provide effective communication in transactions that are long or
1 The Illinois Interpreter for the Deaf Licensure Act of 2007, 225 ILCS Part 443, requires that all sign language interpreters seeking to work as interpreters in Illinois be licensed by the Illinois Deaf and Hard of Hearing Commission (“IDHHC”). Pursuant to 68 Ill.Admin.Code Part 1515, the IDHHC issues four distinct licenses indicating different proficiency levels for different types of interpreting. 68 Ill.Admin.Code § 1515.90(d-f). Illinois state law requirements mandate that interpreters must hold a “Master” or “Advanced Proficiency” level license to provide interpreting services for Plaintiffs seeking access to programs and services within IDOC, with the exception that interpreters holding an “Intermediate Proficiency” level license are permitted to interpret educational classes provided within the IDOC.
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complex, and computer-assisted simultaneous transcription may be necessary for communicating in real-time, such as during educational, disciplinary, or religious proceedings. Id.
46. There are also numerous different means by which deaf or hard of hearing individuals telecommunicate. The most common form of assistive communications device for deaf or hard of hearing individuals is the teletypewriter (“TTY”), also known as a telecommunication device for the deaf (“TDD”). A TTY is a telephone equipped with a keyboard and a display screen, used by individuals who have hearing or speech impairments. A TTY allows individuals to send and receive typed messages using a keyboard attached to a telephone line.
47. TTY units are not the only type of telecommunications device for deaf or hard of hearing individuals. Certain individuals prefer to use a technology known as Voice Carry-Over relay service (“VCO”) when placing phone calls. VCO is for individuals who can speak clearly, yet have hearing loss significant enough to prevent them from hearing through a standard telephone.
48. For deaf or hard of hearing individuals who are fluent in ASL but lacking in their ability to understand a spoken language, videophones and free or low-cost internet-based video links such as Skype are more effective than TTYs, because they allow deaf or hard of hearing individuals to communicate with one another directly in ASL, without having to translate every statement into written English. Increasingly, videophones are the only effective means for deaf individuals to telecommunicate with other deaf individuals because TTYs are almost obsolete.
49. By contrast, hard of hearing inmates who are able to understand sounds that are sufficiently loud may prefer the use of an amplified telephone. Amplified telephones operate identically to normal telephones but are equipped to amplify sound by up to 50 decibels above
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normal levels, and also to amplify specific tones which are particularly difficult for hard of hearing individuals to perceive.
50. Under the ADA, the Department must individually assess each deaf or hard of hearing prisoner to determine what assistance they require to effectively communicate, and must provide such assistance.
C. IDOC’s Responsibilities Under the Rehabilitation Act 51. The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is to ensure that no “qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of [ ] disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 52. Plaintiffs are qualified individuals with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(2), and have a right not to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 53. Defendants receive Federal financial assistance within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 54. Defendants, as departments, agencies, and/or instrumentalities of IDOC, are “program[s] or activit[ies]” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A)-(B) and/or (b)(2)(B) and were and are required to comply with the Rehabilitation Act. 55. The DOJ regulation implementing the Rehabilitation Act clarifies the requirements for Federal financial recipients, including correctional facilities, stating that “[a] recipient that employs fifteen or more persons shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the persons in the program receiving federal financial assistance.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f).
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56. Appropriate auxiliary aids include, but are not limited to, “brailled and taped material, qualified interpreters, readers, and telephonic devices.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f).
57. The Rehabilitation Act and the regulations implementing it prohibit Defendants from denying Plaintiffs, on the basis of their disabilities, the same access to services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges as the access provided to hearing individuals, including with respect to reception and classification programs, orientation programs, educational and vocational programs, employment/work programs, counseling services, healthcare services, religious services, telephones, televisions, library services, disciplinary proceedings, awareness and safety measures, grievances, and pre-release programs.
58. The Rehabilitation Act and the regulations implementing it also prohibit Defendants from discriminatorily impairing Plaintiffs’ ability to communicate effectively with medical personnel, prison staff, other inmates and individuals outside of prison or excluding Plaintiffs from educational, vocational, and religious services and prison-wide announcements, including by failing to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services for individuals with hearing disabilities. VI. IDOC’S FAILURE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO DEAF AND HARD OF
HEARING INMATES AND DENIAL OF RIGHTS TO THOSE INMATES 59. From the day prisoners enter the IDOC system, when they are to participate in an orientation session, to the day prisoners leave the system, after completing a pre-release program, prisoners are required to participate in various programs and activities, and are to be afforded the option of participating in many other programs and activities. Most if not all of the mandatory and optional programs require that the prisoner be able to communicate effectively. Hearing prisoners can fully participate in these programs and activities. Because Defendants do not take
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proper steps to address Plaintiffs’ hearing disabilities and prevent them from communicating effectively, Plaintiffs are denied meaningful and adequate participation in these programs.
60. IDOC’s written policy statements and manuals require IDOC to provide prisoners with disabilities the assistance they need to fully participate in prison programs and activities. Despite these written policy statements and manuals, the actual policy and practice of the Department is not to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates the assistance required by law and by its own manuals and written policies.
61. IDOC, in fact, has established a de facto policy of not providing deaf or hard of hearing inmates with access to, and effective communication for, programs and services within the Department.
62. As is set forth in the following sections, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are routinely denied any assistance at all, are left to fend for themselves, and are not provided the means and opportunity to effectively communicate, resulting in IDOC either formally or effectively excluding, or preventing the adequate participation of, deaf or hard of hearing inmates in many of the programs and activities available to prisoners who can hear.
A. Reception and Classification 63. When prisoners first enter the IDOC system, they are evaluated to determine a number of facts relevant to their incarceration, including: whether they have any special needs; whether they are in need of protection from, or are a danger to, other prisoners or staff; their physical and mental health; their educational level; their religion; and their gang affiliation (if any). The results of this evaluation determine a prisoner’s security classification and, thus, the prison at which the inmate will be housed, and the privileges the inmate will have. These
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evaluations include oral question-and-answer sessions with the prisoner and various professional correctional and medical staff.
64. Each of the named Plaintiffs, and all deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, have been through the reception and classification process.
65. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs, with the assistance they needed to effectively communicate during the reception and classification process. IDOC has failed to provide any means of effective communication to prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing during this intake and evaluation process. Prisoners are not properly identified as deaf or hard of hearing during the process. The Defendants do not make a proper assessment of the assistance that deaf or hard of hearing inmates require for effective communication and do not keep records on which prisoners are deaf or hard of hearing.
66. As a result, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners do not have their mental or physical health care needs properly identified, are regularly given improper security classifications, and do not receive the types of programming opportunities available to hearing prisoners.
B. Orientation 67. After prisoners complete the initial reception and classification process, they are transferred to one of IDOC’s’ 27 prisons. Upon arrival at their assigned prison, prisoners are usually required to participate in an orientation program. During this program, they are provided a copy of the written Orientation Manual which contains the written rules and regulations applicable to that particular prison. These written materials are usually supplemented by an oral presentation (which may include a one-on-one conversation with a counselor, a group session, or a film). This orientation process is repeated every time prisoners are transferred from one prison to another.
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68. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners with any adequate communication assistance during the orientation process. Deaf or hard of hearing inmates therefore are denied an adequate understanding of the rules and procedures explained to hearing prisoners during orientation, are at risk of violating rules they do not know about or fully understand, and are unable to take advantage of programs, activities, and other opportunities that they do not know exist.
69. Each of the named Plaintiffs, and all deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, have gone through this orientation process at least once, and most have been through this process several times.
70. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs, with the assistance they needed to effectively communicate during the orientation process.
71. For example, upon arrival at Menard, Messrs. Winfert and Johnson were given a copy of the Orientation Manual before being escorted to their cells. Neither individual is fluent in written English, and neither was provided an interpreter to explain the Orientation Manual. As a consequence, neither individual could understand the information contained in the Orientation Manual and could not obtain the benefits of that information. Other deaf or hard of hearing inmates have had similar experiences.
C. Educational and Vocational Programs 72. Every prison operated by the Department provides some educational or vocational programming. 73. Pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4), some prisoners are eligible to earn “good time” (i.e., reduce the time they spend in prison) by participating in and completing certain educational, vocational, or substance abuse treatment programs. For example, under 730 ILCS
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5/3-6-3)(a)(4.1), some inmates are eligible to receive 60 days of “Earned Good Conduct Credit” if they pass the high school-level Test of General Educational Development (“GED”).
74. All such programs include an oral component. 75. IDOC has failed to provide effective communication to deaf or hard of hearing prisoners who seek to participate in educational and vocational programs. As a result, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are not able to adequately participate in these programs, or participate in them to the same extent as hearing prisoners. This not only deprives deaf or hard of hearing inmates of the experiences inherent to these programs but also results in deaf or hard of hearing prisoners spending more time in prison, due to their inability to earn good time. 76. Plaintiffs Lancaster, Foster, Lord, Holmes, and Halterman, for example, have all attempted to take educational or vocational courses at one or more prisons and have requested assistance so that they could understand and participate in the oral portions of the course. None of these individuals has been provided with the assistance required for effective communication. D. Employment/Work Programs 77. IDOC provides employment and/or work programs for its inmates but has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates the opportunity to adequately participate in those programs, including by denying or limiting their work opportunities as a result of their hearing disabilities. 78. For example, Messrs. Childress, Wright, Baxter, and Winfert have each applied for employment opportunities but have been repeatedly rejected despite having past experience and/or appropriate physical qualifications for the positions in question. 79. Mr. Foster has been told that he cannot take advantage of employment opportunities until he completes certain prerequisites with respect to his obtaining a GED. However, because Mr. Foster is effectively prohibited from meeting these prerequisites by virtue
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of the fact that IDOC does not provide him with an interpreter, he is prevented from obtaining the work opportunities enjoyed by hearing inmates.
80. IDOC’s practice of denying work opportunities to deaf or hard of hearing inmates deprives them of the benefits other inmates derive from those opportunities and has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs.
E. Counselors 81. Every prisoner is assigned a counselor. The counselor is supposed to be the person to whom prisoners turn for a wide variety of assistance. Among many other services, when prisoners feel that they have been wrongfully denied access to some service or program, or otherwise have a complaint, they are required to try to resolve the problem with their counselor. Only if they are unable to resolve the problem with their counselor are they permitted to use the formal grievance system. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a)). 82. The Department has failed to provide prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing with the assistance they require for effective communication with the counselors. Consequently, deaf or hard of hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs, are unable to effectively communicate with their assigned counselors. 83. For example, rather than utilize interpreters and/or other means of effective communication, IDOC counselors frequently attempt to communicate with deaf or hard of hearing inmates through written notes. Because inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing often have a limited command of written English, and because of the inherent limitations in communicating solely through written notes (including that such communications are slow and tedious), writing notes is generally not an effective means of communication. 84. Other counselors attempt to communicate in spoken language, on the assumption that deaf or hard of hearing inmates can lip-read. However, because only some inmates with
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hearing disabilities know how to read lips, and because even those individuals can read lips only in certain circumstances, such communications also are frequently ineffective. Often, deaf or hard of hearing inmates require hearing aids and/or an ASL interpreter to communicate effectively with their counselors, yet IDOC denies such inmates those methods of communication.
85. As a result of IDOC’s failure to provide prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing with the means to effectively communicate with their counselors, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are not able to obtain assistance, resolve concerns and problems, or otherwise make use of the counselors’ services adequately, or to the same extent as hearing prisoners.
F. Medical, Mental Health, and Rehabilitative Services 86. IDOC provides medical services for prisoners’ mental and physical health needs, as well as counseling, psychiatric, psychological, drug treatment, and drug rehabilitation services. 87. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners with the assistance they require for effective communication with healthcare personnel. Consequently, deaf or hard of hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs, are not able to effectively communicate with these personnel. 88. The following are examples of the harm suffered by Plaintiffs because they have been denied the right to communicate effectively with healthcare personnel:
a. In 1991, Mr. Baxter had a stroke which left him partially paralyzed. He also has cirrhosis of the liver and bipolar disorder. All of these medical conditions require close monitoring, which in turn requires frequent communication between Mr. Baxter and medical personnel. However, Mr. Baxter has never been provided with the assistance he needs to communicate effectively with 19

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medical personnel. He has therefore been unable to discuss what he believes are serious side-effects of certain medicines he is taking for his various medical conditions. b. Mr. Childress has diabetes, and thus must closely monitor his blood sugar levels. This requires that he communicate with his doctors and other medical personnel, so that he can report any instances where he feels dizzy or otherwise has effects from either too high or too low blood sugar. Medical personnel must be able to effectively communicate with Mr. Childress so that he knows whether his blood sugar levels are within the acceptable range. However, the Defendants have failed to provide Mr. Childress with the assistance he needs to effectively communicate with medical personnel. As a result, he has had repeated episodes where his diabetes was uncontrolled, and at least one occasion where he went into a diabetic coma as a result of insufficient blood sugar. c. Mr. Lancaster has desired to participate in a substance abuse program. Mr. Lancaster is required to attend such a program as part of his court-mandated program in connection with visitation and custody of his children. He would obtain good time credits by participating in such a program. Mr. Lancaster has not been able to participate in such a program as the Department has not provided the assistance he needs for effective communication. d. Mr. Foster would benefit from the Alcoholics Anonymous program that is offered by Stateville to hearing inmates. Mr. Foster has attempted to attend and participate in this program. However, no interpreters are provided for the
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program’s meetings and events, denying Mr. Foster the opportunity to adequately participate in and benefit from the program. e. IDOC also routinely handcuffs deaf or hard of hearing inmates during the administration of medical services. This practice prevents deaf or hard of hearing prisoners who communicate through sign language from communicating effectively with medical staff. 89. As a result of the failure of IDOC to provide deaf and hard of hearing prisoners with the means to effectively communicate with healthcare personnel, prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing are not able to understand the treatment they are receiving; cannot bring problems to the attention of the relevant personnel; cannot participate in programs designed to improve their health; and do not receive the same quality of medical care and mental health treatment as hearing prisoners. This also causes deaf or hard of hearing inmates to spend more time in prison because they have been unfairly denied the ability to participate in rehabilitative programs and, as a result, have been unable to obtain good time. G. Religious Services 90. All prisoners are entitled to practice their religion in prison. The Department hires one or more chaplains at most prisons to provide religious services, and most prisons also rely on one or more volunteers to provide additional religious services for prisoners. 91. The Department has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners who are seeking to participate in religious services with the assistance they require for effective communication with chaplains or religious volunteers. Consequently, many deaf or hard of hearing prisoners have been denied the right to effectively practice their respective religions. 92. As a result of IDOC’s failure to provide the assistance necessary to participate in religious services, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are not able to practice their religion to the
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same extent as other prisoners, and their practice of their respective religions is substantially burdened.
93. Messrs. Winfert, Johnson, Lancaster, Lord, Foster, and Halterman are among the prisoners who have all attempted to access religious services in various prisons and have been denied the right to effectively practice their respective religions.
94. The following are examples of the harm Plaintiffs have suffered as a result of not being able to effectively practice their respective religions:
a. Dixon provides a special religious service for prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing. However, this is a “generic” religious service, not tailored to the particular religious beliefs and practices of each individual prisoner. Messrs. Lancaster and Lord have been prevented from practicing their own chosen religions, as they can attend only the special service for prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing, rather than the services for their chosen religion. Further, the times for these services are not made known to prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing in advance and, on at least one occasion, have simply been orally announced.
b. Plaintiffs housed at prisons other than Dixon do not even have access to a generic service designed for prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing.
c. Mr. Foster was simply told that there was no interpreter available for religious services at Stateville. Mr. Foster attends religious services at Stateville, but is not provided with any communication assistance, and thus does not know what is being said during the services.
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d. Mr. Halterman cannot hear the services he attends at Jacksonville because he is not provided with communication assistance. The services are too noisy for him to understand by relying on his hearing aids alone.
H. Telephone Calls 95. Prisoners are generally permitted to make collect telephone calls to their family and friends, unless that right has been revoked for disciplinary reasons. See, e.g., 20 Ill. Admin. Code §525.150. 96. The Department has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners with the assistance they require for effective communication with their family, friends, or legal counsel, either by telephone or other comparable means. Consequently, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, including Plaintiffs, have been unable to make telephone calls to the same extent as other prisoners or otherwise communicate effectively with those outside of prison. The Department does not provide prisoners with the option of using videophones, which would allow deaf or hard of hearing individuals whose native language is ASL to make telephone calls in their true language. 97. In the absence of videophones, Messrs. Johnson and Winfert require use of a TTY device to effectively communicate by telephone. While Menard has a TTY device, prisoners are limited to using it on Tuesday or Wednesday mornings, twice a month, and arrangements for the call must be made in advance. If the party being called is not available, the TTY call is often not rescheduled. In contrast, other prisoners in general population at Menard are able to use a telephone to make collect calls on a daily basis whenever they are on the yard, and at various other times, without making an appointment in advance. They can keep calling until they reach their party.
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98. Similarly, Mr. Foster must make a special request, in advance, to use the TTY device at Stateville. When he makes the request, he often has to wait several days for approval. On several occasions, he has been told that he cannot make a long distance call on the TTY (which is required to reach many of the people he wants to call). On many occasions, no employee has been available who knows how to operate the TTY device, and his call has been denied (even if approved in advance). In contrast, other prisoners in general population at Stateville have a phone available every day from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., which they can use to make long distance calls, without any advance appointment or approval.
99. A central feature of the TTY is the keyboard through which the deaf or hard of hearing individual types the words he or she wishes to express. If the speaker’s hands are restricted in some way, typing on the keypad can be difficult.
100. IDOC at times handcuffs deaf or hard of hearing inmates even while the inmates are attempting to use the TTY, thereby substantially restricting the inmate’s ability to effectively communicate with the outside world.
101. As a result of IDOC’s failure to provide assistance necessary for effective communication by telephone (or similar means), deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are not able to maintain contact with their family, friends, and legal counsel adequately, or to the same extent as other prisoners.
I. Television 102. IDOC generally provides inmates with some access to television, whether in communal rooms or individual cells. 103. For inmates with a hearing disability, it may be difficult or impossible to hear the sounds emanating from the television without either turning the volume to an extremely high level or using headphones.
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104. It is therefore common for hard of hearing inmates to request headphones so that they may perceive sounds from the television without turning the volume so high as to annoy fellow inmates.
105. For deaf inmates unable to hear any sound, it is common to request closedcaptioning for television programs.
106. As a matter of standard practice, the Department does not provide prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing with the assistance they require to access television in a manner equal to their hearing peers.
107. Mr. Winfert, for example, has a television set within his cell at Menard. He can hear sound effects from the television by turning the volume extremely high. Because he worries that turning the volume up will annoy his fellow inmates, Mr. Winfert has requested headphones for his television. His request was denied.
108. Mr. Baxter, Mr. Lancaster, and others have each requested that IDOC ensure that the closed-captioning feature is turned on for all television programming at Dixon, but their requests were denied.
109. As a result of IDOC’s failure to provide assistance necessary to access television, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are unable to enjoy the information and entertainment derived from television adequately, or to the same extent as other prisoners.
J. Library Assistance 110. The prison library is a source of both entertainment and information for inmates in IDOC custody. 111. The assistance of library personnel is often essential for an inmate to satisfactorily navigate the library’s content.
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112. Without the aid of a qualified sign language interpreter or other auxiliary aids, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are unable to communicate effectively with library personnel and are thereby denied equal access to the library’s content.
113. As a matter of standard practice, the Department does not provide deaf or hard of hearing prisoners with the assistance they require for effective communication with library personnel. As a result, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, including Plaintiffs, are not able to participate in library services adequately, or to the same extent as other prisoners.
K. Disciplinary Proceedings 114. IDOC disciplines inmates in connection with violations of prison rules and regulations and sometimes conducts hearings to adjudicate such violations. 115. To effectively participate in the disciplinary process, deaf or hard of hearing inmates require the assistance of sign language interpreters and/or other means of effective communication. Without a means of effective communication, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are unable to understand fully the nature of the charges against them and cannot accurately communicate the factual circumstances of any incidents that may have occurred. 116. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates with adequate access to sign language interpreters or to other methods of effective communication in connection with its disciplinary proceedings and, as a result, has caused harm to deaf and hard of hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs. 117. For example, because of his diabetes, Mr. Childress receives an orange, peanut butter, and bread each night. On one occasion, the warden saw the food and accused Mr. Childress of stealing it. Due to his disability, Mr. Childress was unable to effectively communicate the circumstances of his possession of the food, and the warden took the food and
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gave Mr. Childress a ticket. As punishment, Mr. Childress was deprived of his commissary privileges for 15 days.
118. Mr. Foster has similarly not been provided with an effective means of communication for his disciplinary proceedings. He requires the aid of an interpreter to participate in disciplinary proceedings, but IDOC has refused to provide him with an interpreter for discipline-related hearings and interviews. As a consequence, Mr. Foster has been unable to understand the charges against him, to effectively participate in his disciplinary proceedings, and to articulate a defense to the charges against him.
119. IDOC also routinely handcuffs deaf or hard of hearing inmates during disciplinary hearings, preventing them from communicating through sign language. They are thus unable to effectively communicate the factual circumstances of their behavior and to defend themselves from the charges against them.
120. As a result of IDOC’s failure to provide the assistance required for effective communication with disciplinary personnel, deaf or hard of hearing prisoners are not able to participate in disciplinary proceedings adequately, or to the same extent as other prisoners.
L. Awareness and Safety Measures 121. IDOC is responsible for the safety and well-being of the inmates in its custody. Due to their inability to perceive sounds, such as prison alarms or instructions from guards, as well as the inability of guards and other inmates to recognize and interact with deaf or hard of hearing inmates, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are uniquely susceptible to the dangers posed by prison life. Therefore, deaf or hard of hearing inmates require assistance in order to provide them with safety and protection that is adequate and equal to that enjoyed by hearing inmates. 122. IDOC has failed to implement awareness and safety measures for deaf or hard of hearing inmates that are adequate or equal to those enjoyed by hearing inmates. For example,
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IDOC has failed to implement adequate and equal safety measures for deaf or hard of hearing inmates with respect to three issues: (i) visual notification systems; (ii) identification and housing; and (iii) untrained personnel and use of hearing inmates to interpret.
1. Visual Notification Systems 123. IDOC is responsible for ensuring that deaf and hard of hearing individuals in its custody can understand the numerous life-event announcements and safety alerts made in each correctional facility every day, such as fires, meals, visitors, medical treatment, and open cell doors. IDOC employs auditory means to notify prisoners of these events and has denied requests from deaf and hard of hearing prisoners, including Plaintiffs, to employ a visual alarm system that would allow them to receive the these announcements and alerts. 124. This policy endangers the health and safety of deaf or hard of hearing inmates and has caused them to miss meals, visitors, medical treatment (such as daily medication), showers, and other activities and further caused them to be unaware of dangerous and potentially dangerous events, such as open cell doors and fires. 125. Inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing are also uniquely and particularly vulnerable to shoot to kill policies. When prison officials issue an auditory order that all inmates lie on the ground in the yard, deaf or hard of hearing inmates cannot hear the order, thereby subjecting them to the risk of being shot and killed for perceived disobedience. This danger creates ongoing mental anxiety for deaf or hard of hearing inmates.
2. Identification and Housing 126. Without a means of distinguishing deaf or hard of hearing inmates from hearing inmates, IDOC personnel and other inmates mistake such inmates for hearing inmates, resulting in confusion, conflict, and mistreatment of deaf or hard of hearing inmates.
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127. For example, guards sometimes mistake an inmate’s inability to hear an instruction for disobedience, and hearing inmates sometimes mistake the use of sign language as a rude or inflammatory gesture. A lack of proper identification therefore endangers the health and safety of deaf or hard of hearing inmates, placing them uniquely at risk for disciplinary issues and violence from fellow inmates.
128. Moreover, many prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing and who use ASL need to be around others who also are fluent in ASL. For these prisoners, the feeling of isolation brought about by being unable to communicate with others in ASL or other means has a damaging psychological impact. Thus, for at least some deaf and hard of hearing prisoners, it may be beneficial to their health and safety to be grouped together, rather than to isolate them among populations composed solely of hearing inmates. IDOC has failed to address these health and safety issues.
129. IDOC often does not house deaf or hard of hearing inmates with each other, instead housing them entirely with hearing inmates. IDOC refuses to transfer deaf or hard of hearing inmates to other facilities where there are a greater number of deaf or hard of hearing inmates.
3. Untrained Personnel/Use of Other Inmates to Interpret 130. It is difficult for deaf or hard of hearing inmates to interact with prison personnel who are not trained to work with deaf or hard of hearing prisoners. Deaf or hard of hearing inmates are often unable to request aid from prison personnel when necessary. 131. As a consequence, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are forced to request aid from other inmates, which jeopardizes their safety and security. Likewise, IDOC personnel themselves often use other inmates to interpret for deaf or hard of hearing inmates. This may result in an imbalanced power relationship between the deaf or hard of hearing inmate and the
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interpreting inmate, which threatens the safety and well-being of inmates who are reliant on those other inmates to communicate important information, such as medical needs. Deaf or hard of hearing inmates are also forced to reveal confidential information to other inmates who interpret for them.
132. As a result of IDOC’s failure to implement adequate awareness and safety measures, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are exposed to risks of physical and mental harm not experienced by other prisoners.
M. Grievance Process 133. The Illinois Administrative Code requires all prisoners to abide by certain protocol in order to pursue and obtain relief with respect to any incidents, problems, or complaints (collectively, “grievances”) incurred while in IDOC custody. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.810(a). 134. This protocol requires that prisoners first attempt to resolve grievances with their respective counselors and that, if prisoners are unsatisfied with their counselor’s resolution of the grievance, to then present their grievance in writing to more senior prison officials. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.810(b). 135. The Administrative Code provides, “Staff assistance shall be available as requested by those offenders who cannot prepare their grievances unaided as determined by institutional staff,” and further that “[e]ach facility shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the grievance procedure is accessible to offenders who are impaired, disabled, or unable to communicate in the English language.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.810(c). 136. Certain deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, including some of the named Plaintiffs, are not fluent in written English, and so require the assistance of an interpreter or other aid to comprehend and satisfy the written grievance protocol.
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137. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates with any assistance with respect to the grievance process, rendering certain deaf or hard of hearing inmates unable to effectively communicate and obtain relief from any incidents, problems, or complaints they may have and further rendering them unable to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking relief from a grievance in court.
N. Pre-Release Parole Information 138. Prior to releasing prisoners from its custody under parole or mandatory supervised release, IDOC provides prisoners with oral and written information regarding the terms of their release, including requirements regarding such things as official registration for certain types of offenders, housing, and compliance with the parole program, as well as the consequences stemming from a failure to abide by certain legal mandates. 139. Without the aid of interpreters or other auxiliary aids or services, deaf or hard of hearing inmates are unable to understand the information provided during the pre-release process, subjecting them to heightened risk of violating the terms of their parole as compared with hearing inmates. 140. IDOC has failed to provide deaf or hard of hearing inmates with the assistance necessary for them to adequately understand the information provided during the pre-release process or to effectively communicate any questions they have during this process. Deaf or hard of hearing inmates are therefore denied adequate access to the parole pre-release program and are improperly denied equal treatment as hearing prisoners. VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 141. Plaintiffs Holmes, Baxter, Foster, Winfert, Johnson, Wright, Lancaster, Halterman, Eason, Childress, and Lord bring claims based on the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the United States
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Constitution on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
142. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class composed of (i) all current and future deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated by IDOC (ii) who require ASL or other auxiliary aids or services to effectively communicate and/or to access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC and (iii) who have been denied effective communication and/or denied adequate access to programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC due to lack of qualified sign language interpreters or other auxiliary aids and services (hereinafter “Class”). As a result of their confinement in IDOC custody, members of the Class have been, are, and will be subjected to violations of their statutory and constitutional rights, as described in this Complaint. Plaintiffs represent a class of persons seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to eliminate Defendants’ unlawful and unconstitutional policies and practices.
143. There are currently at least twenty-five deaf or hard of hearing individuals in IDOC custody identified by Plaintiffs who rely on ASL or other auxiliary aids or services to effectively communicate and/or to access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC. There are likely numerous additional individuals in IDOC custody who meet the class definition. The proposed Class is so numerous, and membership so fluid (approximately 30,000 people enter the Illinois correctional system every year), that joinder of all members is impracticable.
144. All Class members are equally subject to the conditions described in this Complaint, and numerous common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members. These common questions include, but are not limited to: whether Defendants systemically fail to provide effective communication and adequate access to IDOC programs and services to
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prisoners who are deaf or hard of hearing; whether Defendants’ conduct has resulted in harm, and may result in serious future harm, to deaf or hard of hearing individuals by denying them effective communication and/or access to IDOC’s programs and services in a manner equal to access provided to hearing individuals in IDOC’s custody; and whether Defendants impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing.
145. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiffs are deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated in IDOC facilities who rely on ASL and/or require auxiliary aids for effective communication and to access programs and services offered or available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC. The policies and practices described in this Complaint apply equally to the named Plaintiffs and to all members of the Class, and the injuries suffered by the named Plaintiffs stem from the same policies and practices that affect all members of the Class.
146. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs’ interests are consistent with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the Class as a whole, and Plaintiffs seek no relief other than the relief sought on behalf of the Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in the protection and enforcement of the statutory and constitutional rights of incarcerated individuals, including deaf or hard of hearing individuals, and have extensive experience in class action litigation.
147. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class and/or would create the risk of substantially impairing or impeding the ability of individuals not parties to the adjudication from protecting their interests.
148. Furthermore, Defendants have refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
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respecting the class as a whole. Specifically, Defendants have uniformly failed to abide by the requirements of federal law and the Constitution of the United States with respect to the provision of an individualized assessment of the needs of each inmate who is deaf or hard of hearing so as to ensure effective communication and access to programs and services offered or available to other inmates. VIII. EXHAUSTION
149. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies available to them. Plaintiffs requested through all of the available avenues of IDOC’s internal grievance process that Defendants provide Plaintiffs equal access to IDOC programs and services provided to hearing inmates. Plaintiffs’ requests were either denied or ignored. IX. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I Discrimination on the Basis of a Disability in Violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.)
150. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein.
151. Defendants have violated the ADA by failing to provide effective communication for Plaintiffs and other inmates with hearing disabilities and denying such inmates, on the basis of their disabilities, the same access to Defendants’ services, benefits, activities, programs, or privileges as provided to hearing individuals.
152. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to discrimination solely on the basis of their disabilities, in violation of their rights under the ADA. They have done this by failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters and/or other auxiliary aids and services to deaf or heard of
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IDOC hearing inmates, including Plaintiffs, thereby denying them effective communication and access to programs and services available to hearing IDOC inmates.
153. Defendants have failed to give consideration to Plaintiffs’ requests, denying them their requests for accommodations which would enable equal access to services, benefits, activities, programs, or privileges available to hearing inmates in IDOC’s custody.
154. Defendants’ failure to provide effective communication and the failure to provide equal access to services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges are policies, regular practices, and/or customs of Defendants, are ongoing, and continue to this date.
155. Defendants’ failure to provide sign language interpreters and/or appropriate auxiliary aids and services has subjected Plaintiffs to discrimination on the basis of their disabilities in violation of their rights under the ADA, in ways that include, but are not limited to, ineffective communication with respect to and/or a lack of access to reception and classification programs, orientation programs, educational and vocational programs, employment/work programs, counseling services, healthcare services, religious services, telephones, televisions, library services, disciplinary proceedings, awareness and safety measures, grievances, and prerelease programs.
156. As a proximate result of Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer from discrimination, unequal treatment, exclusion from Defendants’ services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges, violations of their rights under the laws of the United States, loss of dignity, frustration, humiliation, emotional pain and suffering, anxiety, trauma, embarrassment, unnecessary loss of rights and privileges, including unnecessary disciplinary measures, and injury to their health.
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157. Defendants’ failure to comply with the ADA has resulted, and will continue to result, in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will continue to be in the custody or under the supervision of IDOC and will continue to attempt to use or avail themselves of the services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges available to hearing inmates in IDOC custody. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to the policies, practices, and procedures pursuant to the ADA.
COUNT II Discrimination on the Basis of a Disability in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act
(29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.) 158. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein. 159. Defendants discriminatorily impaired Plaintiffs’ ability to communicate effectively with medical personnel, prison staff, other inmates and individuals outside of prison and/or excluded Plaintiffs from educational, vocational, and religious services and prison-wide announcements. They have done this by failing to provide appropriate auxiliary aids in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 160. Defendants’ failure to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services for individuals with hearing disabilities denied and continues to deny Plaintiffs, on the basis of their disabilities, the same access to Defendants’ services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges as the access provided to hearing individuals. 161. The failure to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services and the failure to provide comparable access to services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges are policies, regular practices, and/or customs of Defendants. These failures are ongoing and continue to this date.
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162. Defendants’ failure to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services has subjected Plaintiffs to discrimination on the basis of their disability in violation of their rights under the Rehabilitation Act, in ways that include exclusion from the participation in, denial of the benefits of, and subjection to discrimination with respect to reception and classification programs, orientation programs, educational and vocational programs, employment/work programs, counseling services, healthcare services, religious services, telephones, televisions, library services, disciplinary proceedings, awareness and safety measures, grievances, and prerelease programs.
163. As a proximate result of Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiffs have suffered, and continue to suffer, from discrimination, unequal treatment, exclusion from Defendants’ services, benefits, activities, programs, and requirements, loss of dignity, frustration, humiliation, emotional pain and suffering, anxiety, trauma, embarrassment, unnecessary loss of rights and privileges, including unnecessary disciplinary measures, and injury to their health.
164. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Rehabilitation Act has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for harms suffered. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Rehabilitation Act will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will continue to be in the custody or under the supervision of IDOC and will continue to attempt to use or avail themselves of the services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges available to hearing inmates in IDOC custody. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to their policies, practices and procedures pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act.
COUNT III Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
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“Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise” (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.)
165. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein.
166. Governments may not impose substantial burdens on the religious exercises of institutionalized persons even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
167. Plaintiffs are “institutionalized persons” within the meaning of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
168. As branches, departments, agencies, instrumentalities, and/or officials of the state of Illinois, Defendants IDOC, Salvador A. Godinez, in his official capacity as Acting Director of IDOC, and L. Rachel McKinzie, in her official capacity as ADA Coordinator of IDOC, are “governments” within the meaning of RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4).
169. Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claim is brought only against Defendants IDOC, Salvador A. Godinez, in his official capacity as Acting Director of IDOC, and L. Rachel McKinzie in her official capacity as ADA Coordinator of IDOC (“IDOC Defendants”).
170. IDOC Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to the free exercise of religion, as secured by RLUIPA, by unlawfully imposing a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise. They have done this by failing to provide interpreters or other means for enabling Plaintiffs to effectively communicate at weekly worship services.
171. IDOC Defendants’ failure to comply with RLUIPA has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will continue to be in IDOC’s custody and continue to attempt to participate in weekly worship services. This harm
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will continue unless and until IDOC Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to IDOC policies, practices, and procedures.
COUNT IV Violation of the United States Constitution Freedom of Speech: First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 172. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein. 173. Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, States “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. 174. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their freedom of speech, as secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, by discriminating against Plaintiffs because of their mode of speech. 175. Defendants’ failure to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will remain in the custody of IDOC and continue to attempt to communicate with others across settings in IDOC. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to its policies, practices, and procedures pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
COUNT V Violation of the United States Constitution Free Exercise of Religion: First and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 176. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein.
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177. Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, states “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
178. Plaintiffs’ Count V is brought only against the IDOC Defendants. 179. IDOC Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, as secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, by substantially burdening their religious exercise. 180. IDOC Defendants’ failure to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will remain in the custody of IDOC and continue to attempt to participate in weekly worship services. This harm will continue unless and until IDOC Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to its policies, practices, and procedures pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
COUNT VI Violation of the United States Constitution Freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 181. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein. 182. Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
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183. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as secured by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
184. Defendants have systematically denied Plaintiffs access to basic human services and vital information during their incarceration in IDOC. Defendants have failed to notify Plaintiffs of prison alerts, announcements, and safety instructions. Moreover, Defendants have not provided effective communication between Plaintiffs and prison officials, other inmates and the medical staff at IDOC. By depriving Plaintiffs of any meaningful way to communicate in their primary language, Defendants have isolated Plaintiffs in a manner equivalent to segregation for the entire duration of their prison sentences. Defendants’ actions place Plaintiffs at a substantial risk of serious future harm. Defendants have actual knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions to which Plaintiffs were, and continue to be, subject, as Plaintiffs have submitted numerous written complaints to IDOC staff requesting that sign language interpreters and other auxiliary aids and services be made available to them.
185. Despite Defendants’ actual knowledge of the substantial medical and safety risks Plaintiffs face while in their custody, they continue to disregard Plaintiffs’ medical and other needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
186. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will remain in the custody of IDOC and continue to attempt to avail themselves of medical treatment and other services. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to their policies, practices and procedures pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
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COUNT VII Violation of the United States Constitution Equal Protection: Fourteenth Amendment
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 187. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein. 188. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 189. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights to equal protection of the laws, as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by discriminating against Plaintiffs in their application of the laws of the state of Illinois. 190. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for harms suffered. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will remain in the custody of IDOC and continue to attempt to avail themselves, without success, of religious services, medical treatment, educational courses, reduced sentences by virtue of good time, and other services and programs that are available to other incarcerated people. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to their policies, practices and procedures pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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COUNT VIII Violation of the United States Constitution
Due Process: Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
191. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation above as if fully set forth herein.
192. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
193. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim is brought only against Defendant Salvador A. Godinez in his official capacity as Acting Director of IDOC.
194. IDOC, at Defendant Salvador A. Godinez’s direction and under his control, has deprived and continues to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to due process, as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by depriving Plaintiffs of interpreters during disciplinary investigations and at disciplinary hearings where certain privileges, rights, property, and/or liberties are at stake.
195. IDOC’s failure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has resulted in harm to Plaintiffs, and Defendant Salvador A. Godinez is liable to Plaintiffs in his official capacity as Director of IDOC for harms suffered. Defendants’ failure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution will continue to result in harm to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs will remain in the custody of IDOC and continue to be unable to adequately participate in IDOC disciplinary investigations and hearings. This harm will continue unless and until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make modifications to their
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policies, practices and procedures pursuant Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
196. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that: 197. The Court conduct a mediated settlement conference or refer the case to its court annexed mediation program in order to assist the parties to bring about a settlement of this case; 198. The Court determine that this action may proceed as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b); 199. The Court appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g); 200. The Court adjudge and decree that Defendants, by the organizations, systems, policies, practices, and conditions described above, have violated and continue to violate Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Constitution of the United States; 201. The Court enter such declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs and the Class as it deems appropriate to remedy past violations of the laws of the United States and to prevent future violations of the same; 202. The Court retain jurisdiction of this matter until Defendants demonstrate that they have fully complied with the orders of this Court, and that there is a reasonable assurance that Defendants will continue to comply in the future absent continuing jurisdiction; and 203. The Court award Plaintiffs and the Class any further relief the Court deems appropriate, including attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
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DATED this 4th day of May, 2011.
Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 Telephone: (773) 769-1411 Facsimile: (773) 769-2224 alanmills@comcast.net
Howard A. Rosenblum National Association of the Deaf 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 Facsimile: (301) 587-1791 howard.rosenblum@nad.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs,
By their attorneys,
/s/ Robert L. Michels
Robert L. Michels Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 Facsimile: (312) 558-5700 rmichels@winston.com
Barry C. Taylor Amy F. Peterson Laura J. Miller Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (312) 341-0022 Facsimile: (312) 341-0295 BarryT@equipforequality.org Amy@equipforequality.org Laura@equipforequality.org

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SALVADOR A. GODINEZ,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 11 C 2961

)

Hon. Marvin E. Aspen

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Court Judge:

Plaintiffs, eleven deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, brought this proposed class action on

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Defendant Salvador A. Godinez, the

Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC” or the “Department”).

Plaintiffs allege that IDOC has denied them hearing accommodations needed to effectively

communicate with IDOC staff and others, participate in IDOC programs and services, and follow

safety warnings and directives. The complaint alleges violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the United States Constitution. Presently before us are

Defendant’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Elizabeth Stanoshek, Plaintiffs’ motion

for class certification, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After a recitation of the

relevant facts, we will address these motions in that order. As described fully below,

Defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony is denied, Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification is granted with a modification to the class definition, and Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Unless otherwise noted, the facts described herein are undisputed and culled from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact and exhibits. (See Def’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. 259 [hereinafter Def’s SOF]; Pls’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. 259 [hereinafter Pls’ SOF].)1 The parties’ statements of fact were, however, riddled with objections and many were disputed as evidenced below. As to the objections, we shall rely on admissible evidence only for purposes of our analysis. See, e.g., Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The evidence relied upon in defending a motion for summary judgment must be competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible at trial.”). We decline to address objections specifically unless warranted. In addition, as we will discuss more below, many of the disputed statements of fact are broad and generalized allegations about IDOC’s conduct and policies or Plaintiffs’ hearing impairments and accommodations. The respective sides often support or dispute these generalized statements by simply citing a handful of anecdotal examples rather than dispositive evidence. Where they have done so, we likewise highlight the competing evidence that each party puts forth and frequently cite to the record to do so. After briefly describing the parties, we provide some background information on deafness and hearing loss before moving into IDOC’s conduct. I. The Parties The single defendant in this case is Salvador Godinez (“Godinez” or “Defendant”), the Director of IDOC. Plaintiffs sue Godinez in his official capacity only. (Def’s SOF ¶ 12.) The
1 The parties consolidated Defendant’s Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs’ Additional Statements of Fact, and their respective responses into one docket entry. (Dkt. 259.) For convenience, we refer to this single docket entry when citing these filings. In addition, our citations to statements of fact paragraph refer to the statement of fact and the response thereto. For example, we cite both Defendant’s first statement of fact and Plaintiffs’ response thereto as “Def’s SOF ¶ 1.”
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Complaint includes eleven named Plaintiffs, each of whom suffer from varying degrees of hearing impairment and are, or were, inmates in the IDOC system. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 1–11.) A brief description of each follows.
Daniel Baxter (“Baxter”) entered IDOC in 2002 and was released from incarceration on May 19, 2014. (IDOC Inmate Status Report for Daniel Baxter, Def’s SOF Ex. 2; Def’s SOF ¶ 2.) Before his release, Baxter resided at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”) for two years and Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”) for eight years before that. (Deposition of Daniel Baxter at 18, Def’s SOF Ex. 29 [hereinafter Baxter Dep.].) Baxter testified that he is not deaf, but has been hard of hearing for at least ten years. (Id. at 25–26.) While incarcerated, Baxter did not wear hearing aids, although he asked IDOC to provide him with them. (Id. at 25.) He testified that he is “getting kind of rusty” at sign language, but did request the assistance of American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters during his sentence. (Id. at 31–35; see Def’s SOF ¶ 2.)
George Childress (“Childress”) has been incarcerated since 2005 and housed at the Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”) since 2012. (Declaration of George Childress ¶ 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 55 [hereinafter Childress Decl.].) He stated that he began to lose his hearing in 1969 following his service in Vietnam, and has recently become completely deaf. (Childress Decl. ¶ 3; Deposition of George Childress at 8, Def’s SOF Ex. 3 [hereinafter Childress Dep.].) He communicates through ASL, lip-reading, and writing. (Childress Decl. ¶ 4.) Childress also suffers from diabetes and kidney disease. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Hannibal Eason (“Eason”) has been incarcerated with IDOC at the Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) since 2009. Eason testified that he needs two hearing aids but currently wears only one in his right ear. (Deposition of Hannibal Eason at 5–6, Def’s SOF Ex. 14
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[hereinafter Eason Dep.].) At his deposition, Eason did not have a battery for his hearing aid and instead relied on ASL interpreters and lip-reading. (Id. at 5, 16–17.)
Curtis Foster (“Foster”) was incarcerated in IDOC from 1998 until May 2015. (Deposition of Curtis Foster at 5, Def’s SOF Ex. 22 [hereinafter Foster Dep.].) On May 12, 2015, he died at Presence Saint Joseph Medical Center from a burst appendix. (See Pls’ Mot. for Additional Discovery, Dkt. 272.) For the thirteen years preceding his death, he was incarcerated at Stateville. Foster testified that he was born deaf. (Foster Dep. at 6.) The record indicates that he communicated to a degree through reading and writing, (id. at 40–42, 68–69), but he testified that ASL was his first language, (id. at 63).
Curtis Halterman (“Halterman”) has worn a hearing aid in his left ear for twenty years, and can hear only a little out of his right ear. (Deposition of Curtis Halterman at 6, Def’s SOF Ex. 24 [hereinafter Halterman Dep.].) Halterman first entered IDOC in 1994, and has been incarcerated at Jacksonville Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”) since 2008. (Id. at 5.) He does not know ASL. (Def’s SOF ¶ 6.)
Ralph Holmes (“Holmes”) has been an inmate at Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”) since 2008 when he was originally incarcerated. (Declaration of Ralph Holmes ¶ 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 6 [hereinafter Holmes Decl.].) Holmes stated that as a child he was hard of hearing and that at age fifteen or sixteen he became completely deaf in both ears. (Id. ¶ 4.) He can hear some sounds in his left hear with the assistance of hearing aids and can use a telephone with an amplifier in his right ear. (Id. ¶ 5.) He communicates through reading, writing and lip-reading, and has taught himself limited ASL. (Id. ¶ 11; Deposition of Randolph Holmes at 21, Def’s SOF Ex. 20 [hereinafter Holmes Dep.].)
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Billy Johnson (“Johnson”) has been incarcerated since 2007 and housed at Stateville since 2012. (Deposition of Billy Johnson at 5, Def’s SOF Ex. 4 [hereinafter Johnson Dep.].) Johnson was born deaf. (Id. at 6.) He testified that sign language is his natural language and, although he can read and write some, English is his second language. (Id. at 13, 42.)
Wendell Lancaster (“Lancaster”) entered IDOC in 2008, was placed in Dixon shortly thereafter, and resides there still. (Declaration of Wendell Lancaster ¶ 2, 4, Pls’ SOF Ex. 5 [hereinafter Lancaster Decl.].) Lancaster stated that he is deaf and he communicates primarily through ASL. (Id. ¶ 3.) He does, however, wear two hearing aids and can hear some sounds. (Deposition of Wendell Lancaster at 10, Def’s SOF Ex. 15 [hereinafter Lancaster Dep.].) The record indicates that he is also able to communicate, at least to some extent, through reading and writing in English. (See id. at 7, 31, 86–87.)
Daniel Lord (“Lord”) was first incarcerated at Joliet Correctional Center (“Joliet”) in 1989 and was transferred to Dixon in 1995. (Declaration of Daniel Lord ¶ 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 7 [hereinafter Lord Decl.].) Lord stated that he was born with hearing loss and became fully deaf by age three. (Id. ¶ 4.) He communicates through ASL and testified that he knows only limited English. (Deposition of Daniel Lord, Def’s SOF Ex. 21 at 28, 41–42 [hereinafter Lord Dep.].)
Aaron Winfert (“Winfert”) has been deaf in his left hear and hard of hearing in his right ear since age three. (Declaration of Aaron Winfert ¶ 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 16 [hereinafter Winfert Decl.].) Winfert was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Mendard”) in 2006 and resides there still. (Id. ¶ 5.) He was also incarcerated at Taylorville Correctional Center (“Taylorville”) for six months in 2004 related to a separate sentence. (Id. ¶ 4.) Winfert communicates through ASL and the record indicates that, to a lesser degree, he can also read, write, and read lips. (Deposition of Aaron Winfert at 13, 63–63, Def’s SOF Ex. 5 [hereinafter
5

Winfert Dep.].) He testified that he understands fifty percent of spoken words when he reads lips. (Id. at 13, 20–22.)
Jason Wright (“Wright”) was incarcerated in 2008 and has been housed at Graham since 2010. (Declaration of Jason Wright ¶ 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 56 [hereinafter Wright Decl.].) He stated that he was born deaf in both ears and communicates through sign language. (Id. ¶ 3.) The record indicates that he can also read and write at least some in English. (Deposition of Jason Wright at 14, 25, 74, Def’s SOF Ex. 13 [hereinafter Wright Dep.].) II. Hearing Disabilities
Plaintiffs’ expert Professor Dennis Cokely, Ph.D. identifies two primary types of hearing disabilities: deaf and hard of hearing. According to Professor Cokely, deaf individuals include those who cannot hear at all and those who can hear loud noises but cannot understand speech. (Expert Report of Dennis Cokely, Ph.D. at 4–5, Cert. Mem. Ex. 17 [hereinafter Cokely Rpt.].) Hard of hearing individuals can hear and understand speech, but they have reduced hearing ability. (Id.) For the purposes of this opinion, we will sometimes refer to both deaf and hard of hearing individuals together as “hearing impaired” or “hearing disabled.”
The ways and extent that hearing disabled individuals communicate vary widely based on the type and degree of their disability and other factors such as life experiences and the age at which their disability manifested. (Id. at 5.) For example, some who have suffered deafness since childhood rely primarily on ASL to communicate, and thus their ability to read and write English and read lips is limited. (Id. at 10–18.) Conversely, late-deafened individuals, even those who have taught themselves ASL, may need to rely heavily on lip reading and written communication, or a combination of English-based communications and ASL. (Id. at 21–22.)
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III. IDOC Hearing Policies and Accommodations The parties have categorized Plaintiffs’ allegations into various sub-topics. We will
roughly adopt that organization of the facts in this memorandum. A. IDOC’s ADA Administrative Directive In 2012, IDOC enacted an ADA related Administrative Directive (“ADA Directive”),
which it amended in 2013. (Def’s SOF Ex. 9, IDOC Administrative Directive § 04.01.111 [hereinafter AD].) Prior to 2012, IDOC did not have a similar ADA-focused directive and the record indicates that the Department placed less focus on ADA compliance. (See Daubert Mem. at 6, Dkt. 242; Deposition of Alan Pasley at 102–05, 152–55, 190–91, Pls’ SOF Ex. 53 [hereinafter Pasley Dep.] (discussing training before the ADA Directive); Kimberly Butler 30(b)(6) Deposition at 10, Def’s SOF Ex. 8 [hereinafter Butler 30(b)(6) Dep.] (testifying that before 2012 IDOC did not have a process to track ADA requests).) The purpose of the ADA Directive is “to provide instructions to staff for providing accommodations to offenders with disabilities.” (Id. at 1.) It directs that the Department “shall not discriminate against offenders with known disabilities and shall provide reasonable accommodations to ensure access to programs, activities, and services in accords with the [ADA].” (Id.) The directive also defines “deaf” and “hard of hearing.” (Id. at 2.) We will discuss specific provisions of the ADA Directive below where relevant, but in general it sets forth ADA compliance requirements and mandates ADA training for IDOC staff. (Id. at 2–6.)
Following and/or in connection with the ADA Directive, IDOC also modified a number of its forms, added ADA inserts into its inmate orientation handbook, and appointed various ADA compliance officers. (Deposition of Rachel McKinzie at 47–48, Pls’ SOF Ex. 13 [hereinafter McKinzie Dep.].) IDOC’s Agency ADA Compliance Officer, Patrick Keane, is
7

responsible for coordinating the Department’s overall compliance with the ADA. (AD at 3.) In addition, each correctional facility has its own ADA Coordinator who is responsible for reviewing inmates’ requests for ADA accommodations, developing and monitoring Communication Plans and other disability accommodations, and submitting an annual compliance report to the Agency ADA Compliance Officer. (AD at 3–4.) Mr. Keane is not aware how each ADA Coordinator monitors accommodations under the ADA Directive at their own facilities. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 3(E).)
The ADA Directive instructs IDOC facilities to audit their compliance with the Directive annually. (AD at 1; Deposition of Glen Austin at 30, Pls’ SOF Ex. 52 [hereinafter Austin Dep.].) According to IDOC’s designated representative on its audit process, as of August 2014, most facilities were still in the process of conducting their first ADA audit. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 3(A).)
We pause here to note that because Plaintiffs are seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief as to IDOC’s future conduct, evidence that predates the 2012 ADA Directive and corresponding shift in IDOC’s ADA compliance policies is significantly less relevant than more recent evidence. (See SJ Mem. at 2–3, Dkt. 238.) We keep this principle in mind as we recite the background facts and conduct our analysis.
B. Identifying, Classifying and Tracking Inmate Hearing Impairments i. Identification
IDOC does not have a comprehensive written procedure for identifying hearing impaired inmates. Nonetheless, inmates in need of hearing accommodations can be identified in a number of ways, beginning with the intake process. When offenders are first admitted to IDOC, they are initially placed in a Reception and Classification Center (“RNC”). (Def’s SOF ¶ 14.) IDOC has four RNC’s, each which adjoins a larger correctional facility. The ADA Coordinator from the
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larger parent facility supports the adjoining RNC. (Alan Pasley 30(b)(6) Deposition at 16, Def’s SOF Ex. 7 [hereinafter Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep.]; see Deposition of Kevin Senor at 83, Pls’ SOF Ex. 8 [hereinafter Senor Dep.].) Offenders reside in one of the four RNC’s for approximately one to three months while IDOC gathers information about the inmate and assigns his permanent placement. (Louis Shicker 30(b)(6) Deposition at 9, Def’s SOF Ex. 6 [hereinafter Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep.]; Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep. at 10–12.)
Since IDOC does not keep sign language interpreters on stand-by at RNCs, they are not available to offenders during their first twenty-four hours at the facility. (Deposition of Louis Shicker at 20–22, Pls’ SOF Ex. 38 [hereinafter Shicker Dep.]; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 12(A).) The parties dispute whether IDOC consistently makes interpreters available after that initial twentyfour hour period. Plaintiffs Wright and Eason both stated that they did not receive sign language interpreters at any point during reception and classification. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 14(B).)
The parties also dispute whether Video Remote Interpreting (“VRI”) is available and in fact employed at RNCs as needed. VRI is a video telecommunication service that uses web cameras to provide sign language interpreting services. (Def’s SOF ¶ 29.) IDOC executed a contract for VRI services in 2013, but as of January 2014 when Mr. Keane gave his deposition, not all facilities were VRI equipped. (VRI Contract, Def’s SOF Ex. 12; Deposition of Patrick Keane at 218–20, Pls’ SOF Ex. 4 [hereinafter Keane Dep.].) Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that even where VRI is available, IDOC arbitrarily denies inmates access, although they do not point to any specific examples. (Def’s SOF ¶ 29.)
Typically within twenty-four hours of arriving at an RNC, offenders meet with both a non-medical Correction Counselor and with a nurse who conducts a preliminary medical screening of the inmate. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 14, 18.) Offenders are also seen by a medical provider
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who performs a physical examination and gathers medical history. (Def’s SOF ¶ 15.) The Administrative Directive covering these intake screenings requires the nurse who conducts the preliminary screening to “observe[]” the offender’s “auditory ability.” (Pls’ SOF ¶ 13(A); see Offender Physical Examination Administrative Directive § 04.02.101(II)(G)(1), Cert. Reply Ex. 4 [hereinafter Physical Exam Directive].)2 The Directive also requires the medical provider who performs the physical examination to complete form DOC 0099, which IDOC’s Medical Director testified involves a “gross assessment of hearing ability.” (Physical Exam Directive § 04.02.101(II)(G)(2); Shicker Dep. at 13–15; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 13(A); Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 12–14.) No medical procedures are conducted to detect hearing loss at this point. (Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 11.) At RNC facilities, hearing disabilities are primarily self-identified by inmates or discovered by medical professionals through visual observation and verbal questioning. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 14–15; Pls’ SOF ¶ 13(D); Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep. at 12–13; Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 11–15.)
If a medical provider detects indication of hearing loss, he may recommend that further screening and formal audiometry testing be conducted after the offender is transferred to his permanent facility.3 (Def’s SOF ¶ 16; Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 17–18.) Plaintiffs contest, however, whether audiometry testing is in fact employed as part of IDOC’s regular screening process, noting that the Administrative Directive regarding offender physical examinations does not mention audiometry testing, and at least three Plaintiffs with hearing deficiencies testified
2 Plaintiffs’ attached to their Additional Statement of Facts what appears to be an outdated version of this Administrative Directive. We assume this was an error, since the corresponding deposition testimony clearly refers to a more recent version attached to Plaintiffs’ Reply to Class Certification as Exhibit 4. 3 The screening machine that IDOC uses to test offenders for hearing loss is not usually available at RNCs. (Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 17–18; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 13(B).)
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that they did not receive any audiometry testing until several years after being incarcerated. (Def’s SOF ¶ 16; see Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 15(B)–15(E).)
In addition to formal screening interviews and medical examinations, other prison staff discover inmates’ hearing impairments through self-reporting, notice from a family member, or notice from the transferring county jail. (Def’s SOF ¶ 19; see Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 11–12.)
The parties also dispute whether RNC personnel adequately document and communicate recognized or reported hearing impairments. (Def’s SOF at ¶¶ 17–19, 21.) Doctor Louis Shicker, IDOC’s 30(b)(6) witness on the Department’s efforts to identify hearing impairments at RNCs, testified that the medical professionals who screened new offenders “would have to make the [prison staff] aware” if an inmate required hearing accommodations. (Shicker 30(b)(6) Dep. at 18–19.) Doctor Shicker could not, however, articulate any procedure, formal or informal, through which this notification occurs. (Id.) Alan Pasley, the individual responsible for the classification of female inmates at Logan Reception and Classification Center, testified that correction counselors record any observed hearing impairment in the Automated Receiving and Classification System (“ARCS”)4 and other staff log notifications of hearing disabilities in incident reports. (Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep. at 15–16.) Mr. Pasley explained that, regardless of how the information was obtained, it would be forwarded up the “chain of command,” including to the facility’s ADA Coordinator. (Id. at 15–16, 18–19, 25–26.) Despite Mr. Pasley’s contention, the ADA Coordinator at Stateville, Kevin Senor, testified that he is not notified when a disabled inmate is identified during the RNC intake process, nor is he aware if anyone else is. (Senor Dep. at 75–76.) Plaintiffs also deny that incident reports are ever generated to record hearing
4 The ARCS is a computer system that IDOC uses during the intake process to collect inmate information. (Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep. at 17.) Mr. Pasley explained that correction counselors directly input information gathered during the intake interview into the system, and at the end of the intake process that information is saved and placed in the offender’s master file. (Id.)
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impairments, and challenge whether IDOC takes appropriate action when self-reporting occurs. (Def’s SOF ¶ 19.)
ii. Central Tracking IDOC does not have a central database or document that identifies all inmates with known hearing impairments. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 1(A).) IDOC’s Agency ADA Coordinator, Patrick Keane, testified that in order to compile a list of all hearing impaired inmates he would have to either call all of the individual facilities or go through 48,000 medical files. (Keane Dep. at 113– 15; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 1(C).) He was unaware, however, whether individual facilities maintain lists of their own hearing impaired inmates. (Keane Dep. at 116.) The record reflects inconsistencies in this regard among the facilities. For example, the ADA Coordinator at Dixon does maintain a list of identified hearing impaired offenders at his facility,5 (Deposition of Troy Hendrix at 83– 88, Pls’ SOF Ex. 9 [hereinafter Hendrix Dep.]), but the ADA Coordinator at Stateville is not aware of any similar list there, (Senor Dep. at 63–64; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 2(C)). Nonetheless, IDOC does maintain an electronic central Offender Tracking System (“OTS”) to store information on its offenders. (Deposition of Sandra Funk at 134–37, Pls’ SOF Ex. 14 [hereinafter Funk Dep.].) Medical staff and counselors can record disabilities in OTS, (id. at 146–47), but IDOC determined that due to its age the system cannot be used to systematically track and identify all hearing impaired inmates, (McKinzie Dep. at 210–11). When a prison transfer is requested for a particular offender, the Transfer Coordinator’s Office (“TCO”) can learn that an inmate has a disability from OTS, the inmate’s RNC intake file, or the TCO’s own file on the inmate. (Id. at 173, 181–82.) The record shows that in some instances
5 Hendrix admitted that even this list was incomplete. There was at least one offender at Dixon who medical personnel identified as having a “profound hearing loss” but who was not included on Dixon’s list of hearing impaired offenders. (Hendrix Dep. at 94–96.)
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receiving facilities have not been notified of an inmate’s known hearing impairment and the disability was not recorded in OTS. (See Funk Dep. at 178–82.)
Currently, offenders may elect to have the word “deaf” written on the back of their identification card. (Def’s SOF ¶ 31.) Defendants claim that inmates may show these identification cards to IDOC staff to “resolve problems.” (Id.) Several Plaintiffs testified that this ID badge has been helpful to them or that they like it, (Childress Dep. at 9; Winfert Dep. at 58; Wright Dep. at 21–22), while other Plaintiffs testified that the badge is not helpful because correctional officers insist that it face forward to show the inmate’s picture, (Eason Dep. at 39– 40; Lord Dep. at 22).
iii. Communication Plans With the adoption of the ADA Directive, IDOC began using Communication Plans to track accommodations for hearing impaired offenders. (Def’s SOF ¶ 28; see AD at 4; Keane Dep. at 308 (explaining Communication Plans are a new procedure that began after the ADA Directive); Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 9–10.) Communication Plans are one-page forms that list possible hearing accommodations—such as sign language services, hearing aids, and closed captioning—with a box to check whether each accommodation is approved for that offender. (Plaintiffs’ Communication Plans, Def’s SOF Ex. 11 [hereinafter Comm. Plans].) It also includes space for IDOC to write notes regarding each approved accommodation as it relates to that offender. (Id.) In some instances, the note section simply states that a certain accommodation is approved for use “as necessary” or “as needed.” (Id.) According to Kimberly Butler, Defendant’s 30(b)(6) witness regarding Communication Plans, if an offender is identified as needing accommodations for hearing loss, the ADA Coordinator meets with the offender in person to discuss what accommodations are needed and
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appropriate. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 22–23; Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 11–14.) The ADA Coordinator— who the ADA Directive does not require to be medically trained or otherwise experienced in identifying communication needs—may consult with a licensed specialist regarding appropriate accommodations if he decides such guidance is required. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 5(A); McKinzie Dep. at 109–14; see AD § II(G)(4)(a)(3).) After or while meeting with the offender and consulting with any licensed professionals, the ADA Coordinator fills out the Communication Plan. (Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 15.) If there is a question as to whether a facility can provide a recommended accommodation, the ADA Coordinator consults with the Warden who has final authority to approve or deny requests. (Id. at 16, 32–33; Def’s SOF ¶ 24.) Butler testified that in making final decisions, IDOC considers each offender’s specific needs, noting that the medical staffs’ determinations regarding the inmate’s disability “weigh heavily,” and also considers the offender’s own preferences. (Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 22–23; Def’s SOF ¶ 24.)
The parties dispute whether the Communication Plans effectively or accurately document and provide for offenders’ hearing accommodation needs. (Def’s SOF ¶ 22.) Although the ADA Directive became effective in 2012, Plaintiffs contend that IDOC did not create Communication Plans for all but one of the named Plaintiffs until 2014. (Id.; Comm. Plans.) Moreover, a number of Plaintiffs stated in sworn declarations that when they met with their ADA Coordinator to discuss their Communication Plan the conversation was very brief and they were not provided with a sign language interpreter. (Def’s SOF ¶ 22; Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(A).) They do not believe that the process involved a detailed or intelligent assessment of their needs, and disagree with some of the determinations made in their Plans. (Def’s SOF ¶ 22; Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(A).) For example, Plaintiff Holmes stated that his meeting with ADA Coordinator Tony Hendrix was “very short and Mr. Hendrix simply summarily checked off a few items on a form.” (Holmes
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Decl. ¶ 24.) A sign language interpreter was not present, and Mr. Holmes does not believe that “[his] opinions or needs were taken into consideration with respect to [the] process.” (Id. ¶¶ 23– 24.) Although his Communication Plan states that auxiliary aids are not applicable to him, he believes that they are. (Id. at 25–26.)
The ADA Directive requires that, once a Communication Plan is completed, copies must be given to the offender and ADA Agency Compliance Officer and placed in the offender’s master file and his medical file. (AD § II(G)(4)(c); Def’s SOF ¶ 26.) Plaintiff Holmes stated that he did not remember receiving a copy of his Communication Plan until his deposition in this case. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(C).) And Plaintiff Winfert stated that the Communication Plan he received contemporaneous to his meeting with ADA Coordinator Butler, dated July 9, 2013, was different from the one that Defendant filed in support of the instant motion for summary judgment, dated June 19, 2013. (Winfert Decl. ¶; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(C).)
Under the ADA Directive, it is the ADA Coordinator’s responsibility to ensure that the approved accommodations are effectively implemented. (Def’s SOF ¶ 25; AD § II(G)(4)(c).) Inmates who have received a copy of their Communication Plan may show it to prison staff to demonstrate that they are entitled to accommodations. (Def’s SOF ¶ 26.) But Plaintiffs contend that these plans are not followed or even consulted by prison staff. (Id.; Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(B).) At least four named Plaintiffs stated that they have either never been provided or are not consistently provided with the accommodations approved in their Communication Plans. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 6(B).) For instance, despite approval for these accommodations, Plaintiff Holmes has missed meals because he does not always receive alternative notification of the audio meal announcements and he has been denied sign language interpreter services on numerous occasions. (Holmes Dep. at 13–16, 94–96.)
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It is possible for modifications to be made to an offender’s Communication Plan over time; although it is unclear whether and how often such modifications are made. (Def’s SOF ¶ 27.) In addition, when an inmate transfers prisons, he must obtain a new Communication Plan based on the accommodations available at the new prison. (Def’s SOF ¶ 27; Pls’ SOF ¶ 5(B); McKinzie Dep. at 123–24.) An offender may bring his old Communication Plan with him to show staff at the new facility, but it is not effective there and, as discussed above, Plaintiffs dispute whether IDOC has sufficient procedures to ensure that receiving facilities are notified of transferring inmates hearing disabilities. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 5(B); McKinzie Dep. at 123–24.)
iv. Grievance System IDOC inmates file grievances through a largely written process. (Def’s SOF ¶ 76; 20 Ill. Admin. Code. § 504.810.) According to the senior Chairperson of the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), Terri Anderson, inmates file all grievances with their counselors first. (Deposition of Terri Anderson at 87, Pls’ SOF Ex. 57 [hereinafter Anderson Dep.].) If an inmate is not satisfied with his counselor’s response, he can forward his grievance to his facility’s grievance office. (Id.) The grievance office then makes a recommendation to the warden, who makes the final facility level determination. (Id.) The offender may then appeal the facility decision to the ARB. (Id. at 87–88.) Under the ADA Directive, ADA grievances should be “promptly” forwarded to the facility ADA Coordinator, but there is no specific time requirement for when this must occur.6 (Pls’ SOF ¶ 39(B).) Nor does IDOC require that ADA accommodations be provided within a certain timeframe. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 39(E).) ADA grievances follow the same resolution timeframe
6 The Stateville ADA Coordinator testified that he usually receives ADA grievances within a few days after they are filed. (Senor Dep. at 116.) On at least one occasion, however, he did not receive a grievance from Plaintiff Foster until three months after filed it. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 39(C).)
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as other grievances. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 39(D).) As of January 2014, the entire grievance process, from
the time the offender filed a grievance until the ARB issued a final decision, lasted an average of eight months.7 (Anderson Dep. at 92; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 39(F).)
C. ADA Training for IDOC Employees
The ADA Directive requires staff with regular offender conduct to receive annual ADA
training, and requires ADA Coordinators to receive additional specialized training on accommodation needs for hearing impaired inmates.8 (AD § II(H).) IDOC’s former manager of
training testified that prison staff does receive annual ADA training that covers inmates’ rights
under the ADA and “very basic knowledge” regarding how to communicate with hearing
impaired offenders. (Pasley 30(b)(6) Dep. at 20–21; Def’s SOF ¶ 20.) IDOC incorporated this
ADA-specific training into its “cycle training,” which is the term used for IDOC’s annual employee training.9 (Pasley Dep. at 22; see Deposition of Kelly Graham at 15–16, Pls’ SOF
Ex. 15 [hereinafter Graham Dep.] (testifying that she recalled receiving ADA training during her
June 2013 cycle training).) This ADA training consists of a thirty-page PowerPoint presentation
that employees review independently on the computer. (Pasley Dep. at 200–01, 234–35;
see ADA Cycle Training Presentation, Pls’ SOF Ex. B.) Since the training is web-based, it is not
interactive and employees cannot ask questions on the spot. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 11(D).) It is possible
for employees to click through the slides without reading them, and IDOC does not administer a
7 According to IDOC policy, this process should take no more than six months: two months at the facility level and four months for ARB review. (Anderson Dep. at 88–90.) Grievances may also be expedited if they qualify as an emergency. (Id. at 91.) 8 A draft paragraph requiring annual specialized training for ADA coordinators and cycle training on deaf and hard of hearing issues for other correctional employees was removed from the final ADA Directive. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 11(A).) 9 Employees must attend minimum of sixteen hours of cycle training annually, typically over the course of two days, although some employees are required to receive twenty-four or forty hours of training. (Pasley Dep. 231–33.)
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test afterwards to gauge comprehension. (Id.) Outside of cycle training, the record indicates that
IDOC employees typically do not receive any additional ADA training, with the exception of the ADA Coordinator training discussed below.10 (See Pasley Dep. at 211–21.)
With the adoption of the new ADA Directive, IDOC also prepared specialized training
for ADA Coordinators. It appears that Patrick Keane first administered this training to all ADA
Coordinators in the summer of 2013. (Pasley Dep. at 167–69; Hendrix Dep. at 238.) Mr. Pasley
and ADA Coordinators recall the training lasting approximately one day, with hour estimates
ranging from three to six hours. (Pasley Dep. at 167; Senor Dep. at 29–31, 53; Hendrix Dep.
at 59.) New ADA Coordinators assigned to the position after the training’s initial roll-out are
directed to Mr. Keane for training on an individual basis. (Pasley Dep. at 165–66, 176–76, 186.)
According to Mr. Pasley, the only additional ADA training that ADA Coordinators receive is the
ADA component of cycle training. (Pasley Dep. at 180, 182.) And ADA Coordinators Hendrix
and Senor testified that they have not received any ADA training other than the one-day ADA Coordinator training.11 (Hendrix Dep. at 238; Senor Dep. at 53; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 12(B).)
Mr. Keane also received ADA training when he assumed the role of Agency ADA
Compliance Officer. He testified that he attended a day-long training at the Attorney General’s
office, and has also discussed ADA issues with Rachel McKinzie, a former legal officer for the
Department. (Keane Dep. at 50–54.) According to Mr. Keane, IDOC does not require him to
participate in any additional ADA training in the future. (Id. at 64–65.) 10 Other trainings may reference the ADA. For instance, IDOC’s Transfer Coordinator testified the training that instructs facilities how to prepare an inmate transfer packets lists the facilities that are ADA preferred, but it does not discuss the ADA in any other way. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 11(E).) Defendants have not, however, identified any other substantive ADA training. 11 Former ADA Coordinator Cassandra Davis does not recall receiving any formal ADA training. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 12(C).) However, her tenure as ADA Coordinator ceased in June 2013, which might have been before IDOC launched its current ADA Coordinator training. (See Deposition of Cassandra Davis at 63, Pls’ SOF Ex. 11 [hereinafter Davis Dep.].)
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Plaintiffs argue that IDOC’s staff is inadequately trained to accommodate, understand, and communicate with hearing impaired offenders. Plaintiff Lancaster stated that he has frequently seen officers making fun of and being disrespectful to him and other deaf inmates. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 12(D).) He also recalls an incident when he first entered IDOC in which he told correction officers that he was deaf but they nonetheless expected him to answer when they called his name out loud in a group. (Id.) Plaintiff Holmes similarly stated, without providing specifics, that IDOC employees often assume that he can hear because he does not know American Sign Language (“ASL”) well, and thus they do not take the time to effectively communicate with him. (Id.)
D. Accommodations for Hearing Impaired Inmates Plaintiffs argue that IDOC systemically discriminates against hearing impaired inmates in large part by failing to provide accommodations necessary for them to participate in or receive benefits from various IDOC services, programs and activities. Before discussing the specific services, programs and activities involved in Plaintiffs’ claims, we will briefly explain the more technical accommodations that Plaintiffs argue should be available to them as needed. Sign Language Interpreters. Plaintiffs contend that some inmates only communicate through ASL. Other hearing impaired inmates do not know ASL at all, or are not fluent. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 1, 2, 6.) It is uncontested that IDOC has not always provided ASL interpreters for hearing impaired inmates, even at preferred facilities.12 (Pls’ SOF ¶ 7(A).) The parties do dispute, however, whether it is IDOC’s current policy to provide interpreters when necessary. (Id.) IDOC’s former legal officer, Ms. McKinzie, testified that IDOC has experienced difficulty finding ASL interpreters who are willing and qualified to work in prisons, and also
12 Preferred facilities are those that have more services and accommodations available for hearing impaired inmates. (See Funk Dep. at 223; McKinzie Dep. at 229.)
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acknowledged that IDOC has had contractual disputes related to payment with its interpretation services provider. (McKinzie Dep. at 37–42; see Funk Dep. at 222–23.) Defendant discredits this testimony by noting that Ms. McKinzie retired from IDOC in June 2013. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 7(A).)
Hearing Aids. IDOC contracts with the healthcare services vendor Wexford Health Sources (“Wexford”) to provide the majority of medical, dental, mental health, pharmaceutical and consultant care at all its correctional facilities. (Shicker Dep. at 6–8.) Wexford’s policy on hearing aids at IDOC facilities permits offenders to have only one hearing aid even if a second hearing aid would improve their hearing ability, except in cases of “severe bilateral hearing loss.” (Pls’ SOF ¶ 8(A).) If an offender’s hearing aid is lost or broken due to negligence, the offender is to be issued a disciplinary ticket and charged for the replacement. (McKinzie Dep. at 284–86 (citing Wexford’s policy on hearing aids).)13 It is undisputed that in some instances it is too loud in prisons for hearing aids to be effective, although Plaintiffs stress that they are normally useful and important. (Def’s SOF ¶ 50.)
Some Plaintiffs testified that they have waited a few months to a year-and-a-half to receive a replacement hearing aid, and IDOC denied Plaintiff Halterman’s request for one altogether even though, according to him, his does not work properly and has needed repair six or seven times. (Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 9(B), 9(C).) In addition, Plaintiff Baxter testified that he does not wear a hearing aid because IDOC denied his requests for one. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 9(C).) Similarly, IDOC has denied Plaintiff Winfert’s requests for a hearing aid in the past, and although he currently wears ones, he testified that the batteries wear out every two months and it takes IDOC a week to replace them. (Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 9(C), 10(B).)
13 Before 2012, Wexford’s policy did not allow replacement for loss under any circumstance. (10/03 Wexford Hearing Aid Policy, Pls’ SOF Ex. 41.)
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Video Remote Interpreting. As previously mentioned, IDOC contracted with a VRI service provider in 2013. Although Defendant asserts that the contract provides for VRI at all IDOC facilities, at the time of Mr. Keane’s deposition in January 2014, not all facilities were equipped. (Keane Dep. at 218–21.) Mr. Keane testified that if an offender at a non-equipped facility wants to use VRI, they will be transferred to a facility that is equipped. (Id.)
Even where VRI is available, Plaintiffs argue that IDOC arbitrarily denies inmate requests to use the equipment. They point to a 2012 email in which an IDOC health care administrator relayed that a Wexford agent instructed staff to only use VRI when “notes and picture pointing does not work since it is very expensive.” (Def’s SOF ¶ 29 (citing 6/13/12 Sudbrink Email to McKinzie, Pls’ SOF Ex. 19).) In addition, during Professor Cokely’s tours of IDOC facilities he observed that the VRI equipment at Dixon was in a locked cabinet and no one that he spoke with knew who had the key. (Cokely Rpt. at 37–38.) At Stateville, the VRI equipment was covered in dust. (Id.) According to Professor Cokely’s report, he was not permitted to see either of the units operate. (Id. at 38.)
Plaintiffs who have been permitted to use VRI recount the service as choppy and ineffective.14 (Def’s SOF ¶ 29.) And another internal IDOC email reveals that insufficient internet bandwidth caused issues with VRI picture clarity and fluidity in 2012. (1/13/12 Sudbrink Email to Moore, Pls’ SOF Ex. 20; see also Cokely Rpt. at 38–39 (explaining inmate testimony suggests Dixon and Stateville have insufficient bandwidth connectivity for VRI)).
14 Plaintiff Lancaster testified that on the five or so occasions that he has used VRI in the medical unit it has been “choppy and laggy,” preventing him from understanding the doctor and causing the conversations with medical staff to go “over his head.” (Lancaster Dep. at 63–64.) Plaintiff Lord similarly described his experience with VRI at IDOC: “It’s pixelated, jumpy. It freezes….It’s not clear, not easy to understand.” (Lord Dep. at 42.) And Plaintiff Holmes said the service was ineffective because the screen continually freezes so the doctor cannot understand what he signs. (Holmes Dep. at 44–45, 91–92.)
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Telephone/Teletypewriting Service. A teletypwriter (“TTY”), also known as a telecommunication device for the deaf (“TDD”), is a telephone equipped with a keyboard and a display screen. TTY devices enable hearing impaired individuals to communicate over telephone lines by sending and receiving typed messages.
Inmate “Helpers.” Hearing-abled inmates can work as helpers for hearing impaired inmates. (See Def’s SOF ¶ 78.) For example, IDOC assigned such a helper to Plaintiff Childress. The helper attends medical appointments with him and has also helped him at meals. (Childress Dep. at 14–16.) Childress testified that the helper is not a sufficient substitute for an ASL interpreter, however, because he does not understand sign language. (Id. at 14–16; 35–36; see also Wright Dep. at 75–76 (testifying that IDOC brought another inmate to help him communicate during his eye exam but it was a “real struggle” to do so).)
Visual Alarms. IDOC uses an audio alarm system to notify inmates of emergency situations, such as fires and tornados; however, many hearing impaired inmates cannot hear or understand these alerts. (Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 36(A), 36(B).) Non-audio alarms, such as flashing lights and vibration devices, could be used in tandem with audio alarms to notify hearing impaired offenders when emergency situations and other scheduled activities occur. (See Pls’ SOF ¶ 35(F); Johnson Dep. at 58–59 (explaining both vibrating and flashing light alarms).)
Other Auxiliary Aids. Other aids such as headphones and telephone amplifiers are also beneficial to some hearing impaired inmates. For example, headphones may allow hard of hearing inmates to hear the television, and telephone amplifiers permit them to use normal telephones. The parties agree that in the past some inmates have been required to purchase auxiliary aids on their own; however, they contest whether that remains IDOC’s current policy. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 10(C).)
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With the descriptions of these primary accommodations in mind, we turn to the services, programs and activities involved in Plaintiffs’ claims. The ADA Directive provides that offenders’ Communication Plans “may include . . . [c]oordination of communication accommodations when information being relayed is complex, exchanged for a lengthy period of time, or involves legal due process.” (AD § II(G)(4)(b).) It further explains that this type of information “may include, but is not limited to” communications such as: orientation; counseling; education and vocational programing; medical and mental health services; religious services; due process hearings; and pre-release instructions. (Id.) Citing this Directive, Defendant asserts that it is IDOC’s policy to provide accommodations for hearing impaired offenders in these and other contexts when necessary and/or subject to reasonable alternatives and security issues. (See Def’s SOF ¶¶ 36, 38, 44, 45, 51, 62.) Plaintiffs’ complaint focuses on these and other categories, each of which we will discuss in turn.
i. Orientation Pursuant to IDOC policy, when offenders first enter IDOC and when they transfer between facilities they participate in an orientation process. (Def’s SOF ¶ 32.) During orientation inmates watch a video presentation and should also receive a written orientation manual. Orientation is intended to educate the offender on the “facility’s expectations” of them and what each offender can expect in return from the facility’s programs and services. (Orientation Administrative Directive § 04.01.105(II)(F)(3), Def’s SOF Ex. 16.) The information covered is complex and important. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 16(A).) It includes topics such as disciplinary rules, grievance procedures, security and emergency procedures, work and educational services, protective custody, etc. (Id.; Orientation Manual, Def’s SOF Ex. 18
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[hereinafter Orientation Manual].) The orientation manual also includes a short section on IDOC’s ADA policies.15 (Orientation Manual § IV(J).)
The IDOC staff who facilitate orientation should have received ADA cycle training, but they are not trained in sign language. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 16(B).) The ADA directive states that offenders’ Communication Plans “may” include accommodations for orientation. (Def’s SOF ¶ 33.) Defendant contends that IDOC offers ASL interpreters during the orientation video when necessary, but there is limited evidence in the record to show that these services are actually provided. Neither IDOC’s Agency ADA Compliance Officer nor its former Legal Officer was aware whether any IDOC facilities have ever provided ASL interpreters during orientation. (Keane Dep. at 296–97; McKinzie Dep. at 222–23; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 16(C).) Plaintiff Wright did receive an interpreter to answer questions about the orientation manual, but this accommodation was first provided in 2012, two years after he entered the facility and four years after he entered the IDOC system. (Def’s SOF ¶ 35; Pls’ SOF ¶ 18(D).) In addition, Plaintiff Lancaster viewed an ASL interpreted orientation video, but not until it was shown at Dixon in 2013 or 2014, at least five years after he entered the facility. (Lancaster Decl. ¶ 6.) The parties have not identified, and we have not seen, any additional evidence of ASL interpretation being offered during orientations. Plaintiffs who described their pre-2012 orientation experiences testified that they did not receive ASL interpreters and some also stated that they had difficulty understanding the oral presentation and/or orientation manuals.16 (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 32, 34; Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 17(A), 17(B), 18(B).) Moreover, some Plaintiffs do not recall participating in an orientation program and/or receiving an orientation manual at all. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 18(A).) 15 Ms. McKinzie testified that prior to 2012 the ADA information in the orientation manuals was inconsistent between facilities, and in some cases was incorrect. (McKinzie Dep. at 52–53; see Def’s SOF ¶ 34; Pls’ SOF ¶ 18(C).) 16 This testimony relates to orientations that occurred prior to the 2012 ADA Directive.
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ii. Educational and Vocational Programs IDOC operates an Office of Adult Education and Vocational Services that offers inmates various educational programs to inmates. Shortly after entering IDOC, offenders are given an education assessment. (Deposition of Christine Ann Boyd, Pls’ SOF Ex. 35 at 47 [hereinafter Boyd Dep.].) If they test below a sixth grade education level, they are required to attend a 90day Adult Basic Education (“ABE”) class. (Id.) Inmates who test above a sixth grade education level or who have passed the ABE exam may take GED classes, and offenders who have obtained their GED diploma and a received an ABE test score of 8.0 or higher are eligible for vocational courses taught through local community colleges. (Id. at 44–49, 120–21.) IDOC also offers inmates other life skills programs such as anger management, addiction recovery, and parenting classes. Participating in any of these educational, vocational, or other programs could lead to a sentencing credit towards an inmate’s early release. (Hendrix Dep. at 25, 153.) The ADA directive states that offenders’ Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for educational and vocational programming. (AD § II(G)(4)(b)(1)(5); Def’s SOF ¶¶ 36, 38.) IDOC’s former Chief of Programs and Support Services testified that it was IDOC’s policy to provide interpreters for offenders to participate in educational and vocational programs. (Deposition of Deborah Denning at 17, Pls’ SOF Ex. 12 [hereinafter Denning Dep.]; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 19(A).) Defendant identified two instances, one in 1998 and the other in 2013, where IDOC provided an ASL interpreter to assist an inmate during ABE. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 37, 41.) IDOC also recently provided Plaintiff Wright with an ASL interpreter for some of his vocational construction classes. (Def’s SOF ¶ 39.) And since April 2014 Plaintiff Holmes received an interpreter for his Inside Outside Dad program—although the interpreter missed a
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few of those classes and IDOC refused to provide him with an interpreter for the Discipleship program. (Def’s SOF ¶ 40.)
The record also contains instances when IDOC has failed to provide inmates with interpreters for educational and vocational programs. (See Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 20(A)–20(C).) For example, Plaintiff Winfert testified that he requested an interpreter for the GED classes that he was taking at the time of his deposition, but IDOC did not provide one. (Winfert Dep. at 35–36.) He explained that he had trouble understanding the classes and failed the exam once already. (Id.) He also testified that he could not participate in anger management courses in 2011 because IDOC could not provide him with an interpreter.17 (Id. at 40–42.) Plaintiff Johnson was also taking GED classes at the time of his deposition, which he found difficult to understand because he did not have an interpreter. (Johnson Dep. at 16.) Plaintiff Lancaster testified that he has not been able to participate in classes such as alcohol abuse and violence prevention because no interpreter was available. (Lancaster Dep. at 69–70, 80.) He also stated that he has been unable to participate in a sex offender program mandated by the criminal court because IDOC has not provided him an interpreter.18 (Lancaster Resp. to Interrog. No. 11–12, Pls’ SOF Ex. 23 [hereinafter Lancaster Interrog.].) He believes that he cannot earn good time credit until he completes this course. (Id.) Other Plaintiffs have also stated more generally that they recall being unable to participate in these programs because an interpreter was not available to them. (See Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 20(A)–20(C); Holmes Decl. ¶ 14.)
17 Defendant objects that many of these examples are inadmissible because Plaintiffs have not established that the offenders are otherwise qualified to enroll in the courses of programs. This objection is surprising and baseless considering Defendant stated in his opening summary judgment brief that “[f]or the purposes of this motion, Defendant does not dispute that deaf inmates are qualified individuals with a disability.” (SJ Mem. at 4.) 18 Lancaster also testified, however, that in the year leading up to his deposition IDOC granted each one of his requests for an interpreter. (Def’s SOF ¶ 80.)
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iii. Job Assignments IDOC runs an employment program allowing inmates to hold jobs and receive wages. (See Boyd Dep. at 70–72; Deposition of Kimberly Butler at 194–95, Pls’ SOF Ex. 54 [hereinafter Butler Dep.]; Hendrix Dep. at 183–86.) Inmates who wish to participate may submit a request for a position, which is then reviewed by assignment officers and, if approved, the warden must sign off on the placement. (Boyd Dep. at 71; Butler Dep. at 195; Hendrix Dep. at 184–85.) Placement in skilled jobs like plumbing typically require that the inmate has some background in that profession, and IDOC may also consider disciplinary issues before approving a placement. (Hendrix Dep. at 185–86; Boyd Dep. at 71–72.) Tony Hendrix was not aware of IDOC offering any accommodations to hearing impaired inmates to participate in job placements at Dixon. (Hendrix Dep. at 186; see Funk Dep. at 62 (testifying that she could not recall providing an accommodation to a hearing impaired inmate at Pittsfield work camp who wanted to hold a job from 1992 to 2002).) And Kimberly Butler, current Warden and former ADA Coordinator at Menard, testified that she has never provided an interpreter to assist an inmate with their job responsibilities, but she has also never received a request for work accommodations from a hearing impaired inmate. (Butler Dep. at 195–96.) Plaintiffs Winfert, Wright, Lord, and Halterman have job assignments. (Def’s SOF ¶ 42.) None of them receive an interpreter to assist them. Plaintiffs Wright and Winfert do not feel they need an interpreter, (Wright Dep. at 58; Winfert Dep. at 13–14), but Plaintiff Lord testified that having an interpreter would be helpful, (Lord. Dep. at 10–11, 14–16). Plaintiff Holmes was employed in the general store until January 2015, but he was fired from that job after he was found with soup and food in his housing unit. (Def’s SOF ¶ 42; 2/17/15 Peterson Ltr. to Lovellette, Pls’ SOF Ex. 36 [hereinafter 2/17/15 Peterson Ltr.].) He claims that he received
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permission to possess those items from his boss, but that he was unable to communicate this defense during his disciplinary hearing because he did not have an interpreter. (Id.)
Although Plaintiff Lord is currently employed repairing eyeglasses, he was previously denied a position as a fork lift operator for the general store. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 21(C); Lord Resp. to Interrog. No. 13, Pls’ SOF Ex. 48 [hereinafter Lord Interrog.].) According to Lord, IDOC told him it was too dangerous for him to work in that role because he is deaf. (Lord Interrog. No. 13.) Similarly, while in Dixon between 2008 and 2010, Plaintiff Wright was told that he could not work as a lawn mower because another deaf inmate was injured while performing that work. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 21(D).)
iv. Communication with Counselors Each inmate is assigned to a Correctional Counselor at their facility. When IDOC is fully staffed, each Correctional Counselor is assigned to one housing unit that holds two hundred inmates. (Deposition of Sarah Robinson at 11, Pls’ SOF Ex. 10 [hereinafter Robsinson Dep.].) Counselors process grievances, transfer requests, work release requests, supplemental sentence credit reviews, etc. (Id. at 10.) They are also available to inmates on a daily basis to discuss requests, grievances, or personal issues, and must meet with each inmate at least once every sixty days. (Id. at 12–13.) The ADA directive states that Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for counseling “when the information being relayed is complex, exchanged for a lengthy period of time, or involves legal due process.” (AD § II(G)(4)(b)(1)(5); see Def’s SOF ¶ 44.) Defendant contends that it is IDOC’s policy to provide accommodations such as VRI and live ASL interpretation for communications with counselors when necessary, without identifying any instances in the record where they have done so. On the other hand, Plaintiffs Holmes,
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Lancaster, and Winfert, stated that IDOC has never provided them with an interpreter to communicate with their counselors, leading to instances where they have been unable to effectively communicate about important matters. (Holmes Decl. ¶ 10; Lancaster Decl. ¶ 7; Winfert Decl. ¶ 20; see Def’s SOF ¶ 43.) And Sarah Johnson, a Correction Counselor at Jacksonville, said that she has never used an interpreter to communicate with a hearing impaired inmate. (Robinson Dep. at 19.)
Defendant also asserts that offenders can communicate with their counselors through written notes. (Def’s SOF ¶ 43.) Indeed, Plaintiffs Johnson and Wright testified that they do this, but that the communication is not always effective. (Johnson Dep. at 23, 55; Wright Dep. at 25–26.) Plaintiff Winfert testified that he used to write notes with his counselor, but now he only reads her lips and must repeatedly ask her to slow down. (Winfert Dep. at 21–22; Winfert Resp. to Interrog. No. 14, Pls’ SOF Ex. 24 [hereinafter Winfert Interrog.].) He only understands about half of their conversations. (Winfert Dep. at 22.) Plaintiff Lancaster also recounted a specific situation when he tried to ask his counselor about the rules on good time through writing. (Lancaster Dep. at 34–35.) She did not answer his question; instead, her response was entirely off-topic, leading him to believe that she did not understand him. (Id.) In addition, the record shows that Plaintiff Holmes has limited writing ability and he reads below the fourth grade level. (Holmes Resp. to Interrog. No. 2, Pls’ SOF Ex. 37.) Thus, it takes longer for him to communicate through writing, and even then he can only communicate effectively on simple subjects. (Id.) He stated that his counselor told him that it takes too long to communicate with him through reading and writing. (Holmes Decl. ¶ 9.)
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v. Medical and Mental Health Services A number of Plaintiffs testified that they have difficulty communicating effectively with medical staff because of their hearing impairment. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 24(E).) The ADA Directive states that Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for medical and mental health services “when the information being relayed is complex, exchanged for a lengthy period of time, or involves legal due process.” (AD § II(G)(4)(b)(1)(5); see Def’s SOF ¶ 45.) Defendant contends that the Health Care Unit employs VRI, ASL interpretation services, and written notes to communicate with hearing impaired inmates. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 46–47.) Inmates indeed communicate with staff in the health care unit through written notes. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 24(A).) Some Plaintiffs report, however, that they are not always able to communicate fully with the doctors and nurses through writing. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs’ expert witness, relying on written communication is not an effective means of communication for most deaf people. (Cokely Rpt. at 13.) In addition, IDOC’s medical director and former legal counsel agreed that “for deaf inmates or hard of hearing inmates whose primary language is ASL, most visits with their treating physician require a sign interpreter for effective communication.” (Pls’ SOF ¶ 23(C).) The parties dispute whether live ASL interpretation is used in the health care unit. IDOC’s medical director was not aware whether anyone in the Department has confirmed whether Wexford ever uses live ASL interpreters to communicate with hearing impaired inmates. (Shicker Dep. at 53–54.) Defendant identifies two IDOC letters, one to Plaintiff Lancaster and one to an unknown inmate, scheduling “interpreter services” for medical
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appointments in August 2013. (Def’s SOF ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs Lancaster,19 Winfert and Lord20
stated, however, that they have never been provided with a live sign language interpreter in the
health care unit.21 (Def’s SOF ¶ 47; Pls’ SOF ¶ 25(A).) Plaintiff Childress similarly testified
that medical staff has denied his requests for interpreters and told him that interpreters are too
expensive.22 (Childress Dep. at 10–11.) Plaintiff Wright stated that he has made nearly fifty
requests for an ASL interpreter prior to medical appointments, and IDOC granted his request on
only one occasion. (Wright Resp. to Interrog. No. 6, Pls’ SOF Ex. 27 [hereinafter Wright
Interrog.].) He recalled that during that visit the physician told him that communication was
“much better” with the interpreter.23 (Id.)
VRI is a possible alternative to live ASL interpretation. As previously mentioned, IDOC
entered into a contract for VRI services in 2013. VRI has been used in the health care units at
some facilities, but the parties dispute whether it is employed as often as needed and whether it
works effectively. IDOC’s medical director was not aware whether the Department or his office
has taken any steps to confirm whether VRI is working properly. (Shicker Dep. at 51–52.) In
19 The medical unit did not provide an interpreter when Lancaster injured his little finger playing basketball. He testified that he was unable to effectively communicate with IDOC medical staff at the time. The medical staff took x-rays and wrapped the finger in tape, but the finger remains permanently bent, hindering his ability to effectively sign. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 26 (C).) 20 In late January 2015, Lord requested an interpreter for a psychiatric appointment. As of February 27, IDOC had not scheduled the appointment, even though hearing-abled inmates who requested appointments around the same time had already met with the doctor. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 26(E).) IDOC told him they were in the process of requesting an interpreter for him. (Id.) 21 Plaintiff Holmes also stated that since his Communication Plan was signed in April 2014 he has requested ASL interpretation services in the medical unit but has not been provided with them, (Holmes Dep. at 96), although at least on some occasions he has used VRI, (id. at 91). 22 Childress believes that ineffective communication with health care staff resulted in repeated episodes of uncontrolled diabetes, including once instance where he went into a diabetic coma, and progressive kidney disease and dialysis dependence. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 26(B).) 23 Wright believes that he is not receiving the proper migraine medication because he cannot communicate fully with medical staff. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 26(D).)
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March 2014, Plaintiff Winfert testified that Menard still does not offer VRI services in the Health Care Unit.24 (Winfert Dep. at 18.) Plaintiff Childress—who is a diabetic, receives dialysis, and has difficulty understanding his doctor—testified that medical staff told him VRI was available but ignored his requests to use it during his appointments. (Childress Dep. at 11–15, 33.) Plaintiff Wright has seen VRI equipment in Graham, but testified that IDOC never told him it could be used for medical appointments. (Wright Dep. at 11.) And Plaintiffs Lancaster and Holmes explained that when they did use VRI in the health care unit, the picture froze and was choppy and unclear, making it difficult for them to understand the interpreter and communicate with their doctors. (Lancaster Dep. at 63–64; Holmes Dep. at 44–45, 91–92.) The last time Plaintiff Johnson was at the health care unit before his deposition, IDOC offered him VRI services, but it appears that he refused them. (Johnson Dep. at 34–35.)
IDOC’s medical director did not identify any formal monitoring done by IDOC to ensure that Wexford is providing ASL interpreters and hearing aids in accordance with their contract. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 12(B).) The record indicates that IDOC’s medical staff could nonetheless learn that Wexford failed to adequately provide ASL interpretation or hearing aids through inmate complaints or monthly facility meetings where IDOC nurses review all the occasions when Wexford denied services to an inmate in the prior month. (Shicker Dep. at 97, 100–101.) If an issue with Wexford’s services was brought to IDOC’s medical director’s attention, he would meet with the vendor on an “as-needed” basis. (Id. at 97, 104.)
24 Although Winfert says that there has never been a time where he did not receive the correct medication due to a communication issue with medical staff, there have been occasions where was unable to explain his malady to them. (Winfert Dep. at 17–20.)
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vi. Religious Services and Programs Inmates at IDOC facilities are generally permitted to practice their religions. (Davis Dep. at 244.) IDOC employs chaplains to work at its facilities and holds services for a variety of religions. (Id. at 245; Denning Dep. at 36–27.) IDOC prisons also have various faith-based programs such as Bible study, and volunteer groups sometimes provide services such as baptisms and religious counseling. (Davis Dep. at 245–56.) The ADA directive states that Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for religious services. (AD § II(G)(4)(b)(1)(5).) Defendant contends that it is IDOC’s policy to provide hearing accommodations for religious services, including ASL interpreters. (Def’s SOF ¶ 51.) Defendant cites two IDOC memoranda, both dated December 9, 2013, which notify Plaintiffs Lord and Lancaster that they will be provided with an interpreter to participate in a Discipleship 101 program beginning December 11, 2013. (Def’s SOF ¶ 51; 12/9/13 IDOC Discipleship Memoranda, Def’s SOF Ex. 23.) Indeed, Plaintiff Lancaster testified that he was receiving an interpreter for a gospel class that began in December 2013. (Lancaster Dep. at 20– 21.) Plaintiff Holmes, however, testified that his request for an interpreter in the Discipleship program was denied. (Def’s SOF ¶ 51.) IDOC agrees that Plaintiffs Winfert and Johnson should also receive interpreters for religious services. (Def’s SOF ¶ 52.) Winfert and Johnson requested such interpretation services sometime before their respective depositions in March and April of 2014, but by January 28, 2015 when Defendant filed his statement of facts, IDOC was still “working to provide” these services. (Id.) Although not discussed in Defendant’s statement facts, the Dixon facility has provided a special religious service for hearing disabled prisoners. (Compl. ¶ 94.) Indeed, Plaintiff Lancaster testified that he attends the deaf religious services at Dixon. (Lancaster Dep. at 27–
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28.) He indicated, however, that these services are run by third parties and are not provided consistently. (Lancaster Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Lord similarly stated that a third party previously ran a deaf religious service at Dixon, but he believes the program is no longer running. (Lord. Interrog. No. 18.) And Plaintiff Wright, who is currently incarcerated at Graham, testified that while he was at Dixon he participated in a deaf Christian ministry. (Wright Dep. at 66.)
The record indicates that, other than the deaf religious service at Dixon, IDOC does not typically provide interpreters for religious services and programs. The Stateville ADA Coordinator, Kevin Senor, testified that Stateville does not provide interpreters for religious services; he does not know why. (Senor Dep. at 159; Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 28(A)–28(B).) He explained that inmates at Stateville have requested interpreters for religious services, but he was not aware of IDOC granting any of those requests. (Senor Dep. at 159–60; see Lancaster Dep. at 39–40 (testifying that he recently asked Senor for an interpreter to attend religious services); but see Davis Dep. at 248 (testifying that she does not recall inmates requesting interpreters for religious services during her time as ADA Coordinator at Dixon).) Plaintiffs likewise testified that IDOC does not provide interpreters for religious services and programs at Dixon, Menard, or Graham. (Holmes Dep. at 90 (prayer room at Dixon); Lord Dep. at 28 (Sunday religious services at Dixon); Winfert Interrog. No. 16 (weekly church services at Menard); Childress Dep. at 24–25 (chapel at Graham); Wright Dep. at 65–66 (various services and programs at Graham).) And Plaintiffs Winfert, Wright, Holmes, and Foster stated that their specific requests for interpreters were denied or ignored. (Holmes Dep. at 96; Wright Dep. at 65–66 (testifying that the chaplain at Graham denied his request for an interpreter during religious services); Winfert Dep. at 42–44 (testifying that he asked the chaplain at Mendard for an interpreter but never received one); Foster Dep. at 40–41 (testifying that he asked the chaplain for an interpreter for religious services
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but has not been provided with one).) A number of Plaintiffs also stated that the absence of interpreters prevents them from participating in these services and programs. (Winfert Interrog. No. 16; Holmes Dep. at 37, 96; Childress Resp. to Interrog. No. 16, Pls’ SOF Ex. 25 [hereinafter Childress Interrog.]; Johnson Resp. to Interrog. No. 16, Pls’ SOF Ex. 51 [hereinafter Johnson Interrog.]; Lancaster Interrog. No. 16; Wright Dep. at 66–69; Foster Dep. at 40–41.)
Plaintiff Baxter, who is hard of hearing but not entirely deaf, attends religious services but stated that he has missed services on occasion because he did not hear the church bells. (Baxter Resp. to Interrog. No. 16, Pls’ SOF Ex. 46.)
vii. Telephones Hearing-abled inmates at IDOC are permitted to use telephones to communicate with family, friends, legal counsel, etc. Deaf inmates cannot communicate through standard telephones at all, and hard of hearing inmates often require hearing aids or amplification devices to use them effectively. IDOC thus employs TTY devices, and occasionally hearing amplified phones or video phones, to allow hearing impaired inmates to communicate with individuals outside the prison.25 The 2012 ADA Directive requires each facility to establish a procedure for offender access to TTY equipment. (AD § II(G)(3)(c).) In particular, offenders who use TTY equipment may not be restricted from using standard telephones, and vice versa. (Id.) Standard telephones are located throughout the prisons, including in the housing unit common rooms, and IDOC staff and inmates testified that offenders are generally permitted to
25 The parties’ statements of fact do not focus on amplification devices or video phones, so neither do we. But we expect that non-TTY telephone accommodations may be an issue in this case going forward. Professor Cokely’s expert report explains that TTY devices are not effective for all hearing impaired individuals and they are going out of use. (See Cokely Rpt. at 39–42.)
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use the phones at their will during dayroom hours seven days a week.26 (Hendrix Dep. at 220; Orientation Manual at 37; Butler Dep. at 182; Holmes Dep. at 92–93; Eason Dep. at 18–19.) TTY machines, however, are housed in separate secure rooms. (See Pls’ SOF ¶ 20(C).) At Western, for example, the primary TTY machine is located in the shift commander’s office and a backup device is located in the health care unit. (Deposition of Forrest Ashby at 26, Pls’ SOF Ex. 47 [hereinafter Ashby Dep.]; see also Holmes Dep. at 92–93 (testifying that the TTY at Dixon is housed in the health care unit); Winfert Dep. at 68–69 (testifying that he would like TTY devices to be located in the yard like regular telephones).) The parties dispute whether it is necessary to store the TTY machines separately from the regular phones. (Def’s SOF ¶ 54.) Defendant explains this placement by asserting that some TTY machines only function on outside telephone lines, and those lines are only available in the administrative parts of the facilities. (Def’s SOF ¶ 54.) In support, Defendant cites testimony of the current Programs Warden at Jacksonville, Michael Brown. Mr. Brown explained that the TTY machine at his facility did not work on the secured telephone line near the central control unit, but it regained functionality when they connected it to an outside line in the clinical services building. (Deposition of Michael Brown at 89–92, Def’s SOF Ex. 27 [hereinafter Brown Dep.].) Mr. Brown also testified that they are currently working to increase TTY availability so that hearing impaired inmates have the same access to telephones as hearing-abled inmates. (Brown Dep. at 89–90.) Plaintiff contests that Mr. Brown’s testimony adequately establishes TTY machines can only function in administrative rooms. (Def’s SOF ¶ 54.)
26 At Western, dayroom hours refers to approximately six hours in total from 8:00 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Orientation Manual at 10.) Similarly, general population offenders at Dixon are permitted to use standard telephones from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Hendrix Dep. at 220; see Holmes Dep. at 59.)
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Since TTY machines are not located in the housing unit common areas, inmates require assistance from IDOC staff to make calls. (Ashby Dep. at 29–30; Hendrix Dep. at 221; Butler Dep. at 182–83.) In order to use a TTY machine, IDOC staff must either escort the offender to the room where the machine is stored or bring the machine to the housing unit. (Ashby Dep. at 28–30; Hendrix Dep. at 221–22; Foster Dep. at 12–13; Johnson Dep. at 7.) The parties seem to dispute whether IDOC consistently provides inmates access to TTY machines in a timely fashion, and whether the delays that do occur are linked to the inmate’s disability. The record shows that offenders are sometimes able to use the TTY machine shortly after making a request. (See Halterman Dep. at 17–18 (explaining that he normally gains access to the TTY within thirty minutes of making a request, although once within the last year he had to wait until the next day); Foster Dep. at 17 (stating a guard typically brings the TTY device within five minutes of his request).) In other instances, however, offenders have been denied access or required to wait hours and even days before using a functional TTY device. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 29(A); see Holmes Dep. at 57; Winfert Dep. at 31–32; Easton Dep. at 20–21.) Plaintiffs have attributed these delays to the unavailability of staff trained to operate the machine, (Halterman Dep. at 19), the limited number of devices at each facility or complete absence of any TTY device, (Holmes Dep. at 57; Winfert Dep. at 31; Pls’ SOF ¶ 30(D); Baxter Dep. at 26–30), the devices’ location within the facility, (Pls’ SOF ¶ 29(C)), broken or otherwise non-functioning devices, (Foster Dep. at 13–20; Johnson Dep. at 6–7), and security lockdowns that bar inmates from leaving their cell block to reach the device, (Winfert Dep. at 29–30). Defendant concedes that TTY access is sometimes limited by the location of the device, (Pls’ SOF ¶ 29(C)), and IDOC staff admitted that TTY machines have been inoperable or unavailable at times, (Hendrix Dep. at 224; Pls’ SOF ¶ 30(E).). Yet Defendant simultaneously argues that, in the instances where IDOC has denied or
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delayed Plaintiffs’ TTY access, Plaintiffs have not proven that they would have been able to use a regular phone if they were hearing abled. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 29(A).)
The parties also dispute whether TTY access is limited to shorter durations, fewer days of the week, and narrower times during the day than regular phone use. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 30(B).) According to IDOC’s Administrative Directive, offenders in the general population may use standard telephones for up to thirty minutes at a time, and administrative detention offenders and eligible offenders in segregation are limited to fifteen minutes. (Def’s SOF ¶ 56; Administrative Directive § 05.03.150(II)(G)(1)(b).) Because typing communications on a TTY takes longer than speaking, offenders using a TTY device are entitled to three times as long (ninety or fourtyfive minutes respectively). (Id.)
In practice, the record reveals that hearing-abled inmates are not always bound by the thirty-minute limit, and as stated above, regular phones are generally available to them each day of the week in common rooms. (Hendrix Dep. at 220; Holmes Dep. at 58 (testifying that his TTY use is limited to ninety minutes but hearing-abled prisoners are allowed to use the phones for “as long as they want”).) There is evidence that TTY use is more restricted. (See Pls’ SOF ¶ 30(B).) Some Plaintiffs testified that IDOC terminates their TTY calls before the ninetyminute limit. (Winfert Dep. at 78–79 (testifying that his counselor ends his TTY calls after thirty to thirty-five minutes); Eason Dep. at 25–27 (testifying that the telephone line goes dead after about fourty minutes on the TTY); Johnson Dep. at 8–9 (officers told him time was limited to thirty minutes); Lancaster Interrog. No. 5; but see Holmes Dep. at 58 (testifying that IDOC gives him approximately ninety minutes to use TTY).) In addition, Plaintiffs testified that TTY machines are accessible for fewer hours each day than regular phones, or only on certain days of the week. (See Eason Dep. at 19 (from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. only); Winfert Dep. at 78–79
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(once a week for thirty minutes); Johnson Dep. at 7 (Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays).) Some Plaintiffs complained that these time restrictions prevent them from accessing the phones when their family members are available. (See Eason Dep. at 23–24; Holmes Decl. ¶ 20.)
ix. Televisions IDOC facilities typically provide televisions for inmates to watch movies and television programs, either in common rooms, individual cells, or both. At facilities where offenders have televisions in their individual cells, IDOC usually requires them to purchase the televisions themselves. (See Butler Dep. at 222–26; Brown Dep. at 117–18.) It appears undisputed that closed captioning is available for television programs in individual cells and common rooms. It is disputed, however, whether closed captioning or subtitles are available and activated for movies. Defendant asserts that closed captioning is not available for all movies, but that IDOC activates it when it is. (Def’s SOF ¶ 61.) Plaintiffs Wright, Winfert, Lancaster, and Lord expressed that closed captioning or subtitles are available for some movies, but not all. (Winfert Dep. at 26; Lancaster Dep. at 86; Lord Interrog. No. 5; Wright Dep. at 29.) On the other hand, Plaintiffs Johnson, Foster, Eason, and Childress testified that no movies have closed captioning. (Johnson Dep. at 25; Foster Dep. at 69; Eason Dep. at 57–58; Childress Dep. at 25–27.) The parties also dispute whether IDOC adequately ensures that the closed captioning function is turned on in common rooms. The ADA Directive requires that closed captioning be activated for dayroom televisions and recreational DVD programing in units that house hearing impaired offenders. (AD § II(F)(8).) But Plaintiffs dispute whether IDOC effectuates this policy in practice. (Def’s SOF ¶ 59.) Defendant asserts that officers and hearing impaired inmates turn closed captioning on in common rooms, but that other offenders are able to turn it off. (Def’s SOF ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs agree that officers can turn closed captioning on, but dispute whether they
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are always willing to do so and whether all hearing impaired offenders likewise have the ability to activate it. (Id.) Of the evidence cited by Defendant, Plaintiff Wright is the only individual who testified that he is personally able to activate closed captioning in the common room. (Wright Dep. at 17.) Plaintiffs Lancaster and Halterman testified that closed captioning is turned on in common rooms when they request it, but neither stated that he could activate it himself. (Lancaster Dep. at 54–55; Halterman Dep. at 17–18.) And Plaintiff Lord merely stated that Dixon has closed captioning in the common room, but that IDOC staff does not always ensure that it remains activated. (Lord Dep. at 33–34; Lord Interrog. No. 5.)
x. Notification of Emergencies and Activities In many cases IDOC employs auditory messaging to notify inmates of emergency situations and other activities. (Brown Dep. at 105–08 (discussing the alert procedures at Jacksonville).) For example, inmates are alerted to certain emergency situations, like fires, with auditory alarms. (Id. at 105.) In addition, when a fight breaks out between inmates, officers issue oral stand-still orders or fire a warning shot.27 (Id. at 206–08; Lord Dep. at 23.) Similarly, many non-emergency activities, such as meal and gym time, are announced verbally by the officers in each cell block.28 (Brown Dep. at 107; Keane Dep. at 381–82; Butler Dep. at 210.) Most hearing impaired inmates cannot hear or understand these announcements and alarms. (Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 36(A), 36(B).) While some housing units and administrative buildings deploy flashing lights in tandem with certain auditory alarms, others do not. (Id.; Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 35(B)– 35(D); Hendrix Dep. at 105, 187 (stating that he does not think Dixon has visual fire alarms); 27 Defendant asserts that when a warning gunshot is fired in a facility, hearing impaired offenders follow what they see other offenders doing. (Def’s SOF ¶ 75.) In support, he cites two anecdotal examples, which Plaintiffs dispute. (Id.) 28 Michael Brown, Programs Warden at Jacksonville, testified that he is currently trying to have a flashing light installed to notify hearing impaired inmates to non-emergency activities like church. (Brown Dep. at 108–09.)
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Wright Decl. ¶ 19 (stating that Graham has only flashing alarms in the school building); Baxter Dep. at 52 (testifying that he never saw flashing lights at Shawnee or Big Muddy); Halterman Dep. at 41–42 (testifying that fire alarm at Jacksonville has a flashing light); Brown Dep. at 105 (same); Butler Dep. at 82 (indicating that Menard has fire alarm strobe lights in some areas).)
The ADA Directive requires facilities to have emergency evacuation plans for ADA inmates, but IDOC’s Agency Compliance Officer is not aware of any such provisions in place. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 37(A).) In addition, the ADA Coordinator at Graham was not aware whether the facility’s emergency evacuation plans include accommodations for hearing impaired inmates. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 37(B).) The warden at Menard testified that in some emergency situations, such as earthquakes or floods, the typical procedure is for IDOC officers to walk down every corridor and evacuate inmates in an orderly fashion. (Butler Dep. at 205–06.)
Defendant contends that it is IDOC’s policy to inform staff which inmates are hearing impaired so that the staff can provide those inmates with alternative forms of auditory notifications. (Def’s SOF ¶ 66.) Plaintiffs dispute whether IDOC has such a policy, pointing out that the ADA Directive only states that an offender’s Communication Plan “may” include “alternative notification methods for auditory announcements.”29 (Id. (citing AD § II(G)(4)(b)(1)(b)).) Since January 2014, IDOC has issued at least one memorandum for each Plaintiff regarding alternative notification of auditory announcements to the housing unit control
29 On Plaintiffs Holmes’s, Lord’s, and Lancaster’s Communication Plans, IDOC checked the box for alternative notification of auditory announcements and indicated that a memorandum would be circulated monthly to notify staff that accommodations are required. (Communication Plans; see Butler 30(b)(6) Dep. at 17.) Plaintiffs Childress’s and Winfert’s Communication Plans state that their cell mates know ASL and relay audible notifications to them, and Plaintiff Halterman’s states that he has a vibrating watch. (Id.)
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officers.30 (Def’s SOF ¶ 68; Alternative Notification Memoranda, Def’s SOF Ex. 30 [hereinafter
Alternative Notification Memo].) The memoranda state that the housing unit is responsible for
communicating every auditory announcement to named offenders through face-to-face
communication. (Id.; Def’s SOF ¶ 67; see Hendrix Dep. at 192 (explaining IDOC’s “fairly new”
policy regarding face-to-face notification of meal time).)
The parties dispute whether, in practice, IDOC officers consistently relay auditory
announcements to hearing impaired inmates in person. (See Def’s SOF ¶¶ 69–73.) Plaintiffs
contend that hearing impaired inmates, who cannot hear the auditory announcements, are often
forced to rely on the goodwill of fellow inmates, and in some cases miss meals, visitors, church
services, medical appointments, etc. (See Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 35(F). 36(A), 36(B), 38(B).) As with
other topics, each side offers a series of anecdotal examples to support their respective positions:
 Plaintiff Wright: Normally other inmates have to alert him if he has a visitor. Only one officer tells him about visitors “once in a while.” (Wright Dep. at 16–17; Def’s SOF ¶ 69.) Officers have notified him of fire drill evacuations in person. (Wright Dep. at 40; Def’s SOF ¶ 69.)
 Plaintiff Johnson: He has not missed a visitor at Stateville. He explained that he asks visitors to come on the weekends when his cellmate is available to notify him of their arrival. (Johnson Dep. at 33; Def’s SOF ¶ 70.) He has missed showers, yard time, and meals when his cell mate is not around. (Johnson Dep. at 29–32.) He testified that since he has been in his current cell block, no officer has notified him of meal time, shower time, or yard time. (Id.)
 Plaintiff Winfert: He testified that on one occasion IDOC staff verbally informed Winfert that a drill was underway. (Winfert Dep. at 52; Def’s SOF ¶ 71.) When his cellmate is not around, he occasionally misses a meal. (Winfert Dep. at 55–56.) Officers at Menard do not tell him individually when it is meal time. (Id.)
 Plaintiff Baxter: During severe weather storms at Big Muddy, he became aware of emergencies only because “people” would run around the deck and “yell it” and someone would point to the alarm. (Baxter Dep. at 51–52; Def’s SOF ¶ 71.)
30 The memoranda for Plaintiffs Winfert and Halterman are dated January 2015, a couple weeks before Defendant filed his motion for summary judgment. (Alternative Notification Memo.)
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 Plaintiff Hannibal: Before being placed in segregation about one year before his deposition, a lieutenant told him when church services began. Since being released from segregation and housed in a different unit, he has not been to church because he cannot hear the announcement. (Hannibal Dep. at 48–49; Def’s SOF ¶ 72.)
 Plaintiff Lancaster: Officers notify him of visitors through writing. (Lancaster Dep. at 39; Def’s SOF ¶ 73.) The last time that he was evacuated for an emergency, an officer did not notify him until “everyone else had left.” (Lancaster Dep. at 41–43; Def’s SOF ¶ 73; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 38(B).) He stated that at Dixon he has missed meals approximately fifty times due to his hearing loss. (Lancaster Interrog. Resp. No. 3.)
 Plaintiff Holmes: His Communication Plan, dated April 2014, states that a memorandum regarding alternative notification of auditory announcements would be sent to housing officers. (Holmes Dep. at 82, 93–94; Def’s SOF ¶ 66.) He testified, however, that since that time no officers have relayed auditory announcements to him. (Holmes Dep. at 94; Def’s SOF ¶ 66.) He has missed visitors and over onehundred meals in the last two years because he could not hear the announcements and staff did not notify him individually. (Holmes Dep. at 13–18.) He also explained that he cannot hear announcements for the medication line, and sometimes his fellow offenders do not relay the notification. (Id. at 6–7; 47–49.) As a result, he has missed taking his medication “a lot of times.” (Id. at 48.)
 Plaintiff Eason: He testified that he has missed meals and yard time because he cannot hear the announcement. (Eason Dep. at 46–47; Eason Interrog. Resp. No. 3.) Officers at Stateville never tell him that it is meal time. (Eason Dep. at 46–47.)
 Plaintiff Lord: Sometimes officers tell him that it is meal time and sometimes they do not. (Lord Dep. at 29.) He has missed many meals when officers failed to notify him individually. (Id. at 30–31.) He also testified that he cannot hear when officers fire shots instructing inmates to “hit the ground.” (Id. at 23.) He has to rely on other inmates gestures, and believes the situation is dangerous. (Id.) In addition, he stated that sometimes officers forget to notify him when a fire drill occurs, and indicated that as a result he does not evacuate as quickly as other inmates. (Id. at 35–36.)
 Plaintiff Childress: While incarcerated at Dixon, he missed over thirty meals because of his hearing loss, but since transferring to Graham in 2012 he does not recall missing any. (Childress Interrog. Resp. No. 3.) During fire and/or tornado drills at Dixon, he and another hearing impaired offender did not evacuate with the other inmates because they could not hear the alarms. (Childress Dep. at 20–21.)
The parties also dispute whether face-to-face communication is the most appropriate
accommodation, or whether visual alarms, such as flashing lights, should be used instead or in
addition. Plaintiffs Holmes and Lancaster stated that they have asked IDOC to provide visual
alarm systems to notify them of emergencies and other events like meals and medication line.
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(Pls’ SOF ¶ 35(E); Lancaster Interrog. Resp. No. 5.) And Plaintiffs Johnson and Foster similarly testified that they would prefer to have a visual alarm instead of relying on officers to relay auditory alarms and notices. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 35(F); Foster Dep. at 53–54.)
Finally, although the parties agree that vibrating watches, which inmates can set to vibrate at scheduled activity times, can be helpful, they dispute whether IDOC provides them to hearing impaired inmates. (Def’s SOF ¶ 74.) IDOC purchased a vibrating watch for Plaintiff Holmes about two months before his deposition. (Holmes Dep. at 69–71.) Plaintiffs Lancaster and Lord, on the other hand, purchased their own vibrating watches in 2012 for nearly $100.00. (Lancaster Dep. at 46–47; Lord Decl. ¶ 15.) And IDOC has denied other inmates’ requests for these watches. (Wright Dep. at 34; Denning Dep. at 79, 108–10; see Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 10(D), 10(E).)
xi. Law Library IDOC facilities have law libraries where offenders can research state and federal law and photocopy legal materials. (See Orientation Manual at 19–21.) Plaintiffs Winfert, Wright, Foster, Halterman, and Baxter all testified that they do not have difficulty using the law library because of their hearing impairments. (Def’s SOF ¶ 58; Baxter Dep. at 7–8, 17–18.) On the other hand, Plaintiff Johnson testified that it is hard for him to communicate with the law library staff because they do not understand ASL. (Johnson Dep. at 41–42.) He would like library staff to assist him, but he cannot understand the librarian because English is his second language. (Id.) Plaintiff Eason also testified that he needs help understanding the legal language in the law library. (Eason Dep. at 40.)
xii. Disciplinary Hearings If an IDOC staff member believes that an inmate has committed an actionable offense while incarcerated, he or she records the offense in a disciplinary report, commonly referred to as
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a ticket. (Graham Dep. at 44.) After the ticket is reviewed by the shift commander, reviewing officer, and hearing officer, the hearing officer schedules a hearing before the Adjustment Committee. (Id. at 41–45.) The Adjustment Committee consists of two members, the Adjustment Committee Chairman who runs the hearings and oversees the process, and a second committee person. (Id. at 39–40.) At the hearing, the Committee reads the offender the charges, asks him to make a plea, and allows him to offer any defenses. (Id. at 45.) Offenders are also supposed to receive a written copy of the report at least twenty-four hours before the hearing. (Id. at 48–49.) After the hearing, the Adjustment Committee makes a recommendation to the warden as to whether the ticket is substantiated and, if so, what punishment is warranted. (Id. at 43, 45.) The warden then makes the final determination.31 (Id. at 45–46.)
The ADA directive states that Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for due process and disciplinary hearings, and Defendant contends that it is IDOC’s policy to provide accommodations at disciplinary hearings when necessary. (Def’s SOF ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs argue, however, that in practice IDOC fails to sufficiently accommodate them. Kelly Graham, the Adjustment Committee Chairman at Western, did not know whether IDOC’s disciplinary hearing rules mention accommodations for disabled inmates. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 32(B).) When an offender tells Mr. Graham that he is hearing impaired, the Adjustment Committee determines for itself whether the inmate can adequately communicate or whether the hearing should be adjourned until accommodations can be made. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 32(C); Graham Dep. at 67–69, 74–75.) Mr. Graham did not receive ADA training specific to his role as Adjustment Committee Chairman, but testified that training on how to determine if an inmate can effectively
31 If the Adjustment Committee and Warden recommend revocation of good time, that recommendation must also be approved by the Office of Inmate Issues and/or the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. (Anderson Dep. at 18, 22.)
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communicate would be “beneficial.” (Graham Dep. at 73.) On at least one occasion, Mr. Graham denied an inmate’s request for hearing accommodations—specifically to communicate through writing—at a disciplinary hearing.32 (Pls’ SOF ¶ 32(D).)
According to the Dixon ADA Coordinator, Tony Hendrix, Dixon did not use sign language interpreters at disciplinary hearings until 2012. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 32(E); see Lancaster Decl. ¶ 10 (stating Dixon first starting providing him interpreters for disciplinary hearings in 2014).) Indeed, Plaintiffs Holmes and Childress testified that IDOC denied requests for interpreters, and even pen and paper, before 2012. (Holmes Dep. at 54–56, 88–89; Childress Dep. at 27–29.) Nonetheless, IDOC has denied requests for accommodations after 2012 as well. (Wright Dep. at 19–20; Johnson Dep. at 43–44; Johnson Suppl. Interrog. Resp. No. 6, Pls’ SOF Ex. 31 [hereinafter Johnson Suppl. Interrog.]; Baxter Dep. at 31–35; Foster Dep. at 23–26; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 33(A).) For example, Plaintiff Johnson requested an ASL interpreter for a disciplinary hearing that occurred on May 13, 2014. (Johnson Suppl. Interrog. No. 6.) According to Johnson, IDOC told him his request was denied because he “can read lips” and because he “speaks.” (Id.) Johnson did not fully understand the hearing or why IDOC also denied his request to have two officers testify as witnesses. (Id.)
The parties appear to dispute whether certain accommodations, such as ASL interpreters, are necessary for hearing impaired inmates to communicate effectively during discipline hearings. Defendant points out that even though Plaintiffs Wright, Johnson, and Baxter did not receive ASL interpreters at recent disciplinary hearings, they were not disciplined. (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 63–65.) Plaintiffs dispute that failure to discipline equates with effective communication. (Id.) For instance, Plaintiff Johnson described one occasion in which the Adjustment Committee
32 It appears this hearing occurred in the first half of 2012. The inmate filed a grievance related to the hearing, which is dated June 2012. (Graham Dep. at 57–58.)
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wrote back and forth with him and expunged his ticket, but he still did not fully understand the hearing. (Johnson Dep. at 43–44; see also Holmes Dep. at 88–89; Holmes Decl. ¶ 19.)
Moreover, Plaintiffs identify other instances, before and after 2012, where IDOC denied an inmate’s request for hearing accommodations and the inmate was disciplined. (Baxter Dep. at 31–34 (eighteen days segregation); Foster Dep. at 23–26, 61–64 (one month segregation and commissary restriction); Childress Dep. at 27–29 (two weeks without commissary); Holmes Dep. at 55–56 (beat up and put in segregation for about thirty days); Johnson Interrog. No. 7 (transferred to a more restrictive prison); 2/17/15 Peterson Ltr. (fired from job); see Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 33(A), 33(C).) For most of these occurrences, the Plaintiff stated that he was not able to fully understand the hearing or effectively communicate his defense. (Childress Dep. at 28–29; Foster Dep. at 23–26, 61–64; Holmes Dep. at 88–89; Lancaster Decl. ¶¶ 10–12; Johnson Interrog. No. 7 (hands handcuffed behind his back with no ASL interpreter); 2/17/15 Peterson Ltr.)
xiv. Prisoner Review Board The Illinois Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”) is a separate entity from IDOC. 730 ILCS § 5/3-3-1. The PRB determines a variety of issues related to prisoners’ release and parole, including eligibility and the conditions of parole. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2. They also review IDOC disciplinary cases when the Department seeks to revoke more than thirty days of an inmate’s sentence credits in a twelve-month period. Id. Prisoners may appear before the PRB during their incarceration, particularly when their sentence is nearing an end. Defendant contends that IDOC sends the PRB a memorandum regarding each hearing impaired offender, notifying the Board that the prisoner requires a sign language interpreter. (Def’s SOF ¶ 77.) IDOC indeed sent a memorandum to this effect regarding Plaintiff Holmes, but Defendant has not identified any evidence that they did so for other hearing impaired offenders. (Id.; see Pls’ SOF ¶ 34(B).)
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IV. Class Action Complaint Named Plaintiffs filed this case as a class action on May 4, 2011, and now move to
certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Plaintiffs define the proposed class as follows: (i) all current and future deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated by IDOC, and (ii) who require accommodations, including interpreters or other auxiliary aids or services, to communicate effectively and/or to access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC [from January 1, 2007, to the present].
(Cert. Mem. at 1–2, Dkt. 203.) They contend that the proposed class consists of at least one hundred individuals spread across nineteen correctional facilities. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(2) to remedy the alleged systemic past violations and to prevent future violations. (Id. at 1.) V. Expert Witness Reports
Plaintiffs disclosed two expert witnesses: Dennis Cokely, a professor of ASL and Modern Languages at Northeastern University, and Elizabeth Stanoshek, the former ADA Coordinator for the Nebraska prison system and a current area director for Prison Fellowship Ministries. Professor Cokely’s report discusses the nature of deafness and the deaf community, forms of communication used by the deaf community, popular misconceptions regarding hearing impairments, and IDOC’s failure to properly identify, understand, and accommodate deaf and hearing impaired inmates, and it recommends ways that IDOC could remedy these failures. (See Cokely Rpt.) Ms. Stanosheck’s report focuses on IDOC’s failure to adopt and/or implement ADA compliant policies and procedures for identifying, understanding, and assisting deaf and hearing impaired inmates. She also discusses IDOC’s actual failures to accommodate deaf and hearing impaired inmates, and opines that effective accommodations would further IDOC’s efforts to maintain security within the prisons. (See Daubert Mem. Ex. B., Expert Report of
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Elizabeth Stanosheck (hereinafter [Stanosheck Rpt.]).) Defendant moves to exclude Ms. Stanosheck’s testimony but not Professor Cokely’s.
DISCUSSION We begin our analysis by addressing Defendant’s motion to exclude Ms. Stanosheck’s testimony, then move to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and end with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. I. Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony Defendant seeks to exclude Ms. Stanosheck’s expert testimony on the grounds that it is cumulative with Professor Cokely’s testimony and is unreliable. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 explains that an expert witness may be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” There is no requirement that an expert hold any particular credentials to give expert opinion testimony. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The court should also consider the proposed expert’s full range of experience and training in the subject area.”); Tuf Racing Prods., Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, an expert’s testimony must be both relevant and reliable to be admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993). The Seventh Circuit has imposed a two-step analysis, requiring first that evidence be established as reliable by verifying that the expert “knows of what he speaks” and is not offering “subjective belief or unsupported speculation,” and, second, that we determine that the evidence will assist us in understanding the evidence. Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 367–68 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Pierce v. Chi. Rail Link, LLC, 3 C 7524, 2005 WL 599980, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2005) (extending the Cummins test to non-scientific expert testimony).
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A. Cumulative Testimony First, we agree with Plaintiff that whether expert testimony is cumulative is an issue more appropriately addressed as a motion in limine before trial. It is true that the cumulativeness of testimony goes to relevance, which in turn is applicable to our analysis under Daubert. See United States v. Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Evidence is ‘cumulative’ when it adds very little to the probative force of the other evidence in the case, so that if it were admitted its contribution to the determination of truth would be outweighed by its contribution to the length of the trial, with all the potential for confusion, as well as prejudice to other litigants.” (quoting United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th Cir. 1996))). Nonetheless, the concerns presented by cumulative testimony—principally, delay of trial and prejudice—do not impact our resolution of summary judgment or class certification. See Abrams v. Van Kampen Funds, Inc., 1 C 7538, 2004 WL 1433620, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2004) (“[A]ny question of whether the opinion of a second expert is unnecessarily cumulative would be an evidentiary issue for a trial before a jury, not an issue to be considered when a judge is ruling on a summary judgment motion.”). Accordingly, we deny Defendant’s motion to exclude Ms. Stanosheck’s testimony as cumulative without prejudice. Defendant may re-raise this argument before trial if he chooses. In proceeding, both parties should keep in mind that we will not allow truly cumulatively evidence at trial, but we also recognize that limited overlap is often unavoidable. Moreover, we will not, now or later, dictate to Plaintiffs which of its qualified experts must discuss each topic. B. Expert Qualifications We now turn to Defendant’s challenges to Ms. Stanosheck’s qualifications, which are meek at best. He asserts that because she has not managed prison security operations or been
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responsible for security decisions, she is not qualified to offer the opinion that IDOC could implement ADA compliant accommodations without interfering with safety needs. (Daubert Reply at 4, Dkt. 260.) He also argues that because Ms. Stanosheck is not an anthropologist she cannot opine on IDOC’s “culture”—i.e., the Department’s policies, procedures, and practices regarding ADA compliance for hearing impaired inmates. (Daubert Mem. at 6.)
Ms. Stanosheck does, however, have twenty years of experience as the ADA Coordinator for the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (“NDCS”).33 In that role, she was responsible for developing and implementing ADA compliance programs and she responded to all deaf and hard of hearing inmate requests for ADA accommodations in Nebraska’s correctional facilities. (Stanosheck Rpt. at 1–4.) Her responsibilities brought her to Nebraska’s facilities, where she interviewed prison staff and inmates extensively and trained NDCS employees on ADA compliance for hearing impaired offenders. (Id. at 2.) She gained “firsthand knowledge” of NDCS administrative operations, programs, services, and activities, and became familiar with the unique struggles that hearing disabled inmates face. (Id. at 2.) In addition to her work in Nebraska, Ms. Stanosheck has assisted at least five other state correctional departments in achieving ADA compliance, aided the development of an ADA Coordinators Certification program, and frequently speaks at ADA presentations and conferences. (Id. at 3–4.) In order to familiarize herself with IDOC’s attempts at ADA compliance, she reviewed the depositions and exhibits in this case, inspected two large IDOC correctional facilities, and held in-person meetings with inmates at those prisons. (Id. at 5.)
Ms. Stanosheck’s extensive work in ADA compliance in Nebraska and elsewhere more than qualifies her to offer opinions regarding IDOC’s ADA compliance. We have no doubt that
33 The following qualifications are taken from Ms. Stanosheck’s report. Defendant has not disputed any of these facts.
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with respect to IDOC’s ADA policies, procedures, and practices, Ms. Stanosheck “knows of what [s]he speaks” and is not offering “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Cummins, 93 F.3d at 367–68. As to her opinions related to prison security, her experience here may be less obvious, but we can reasonably infer that her work developing and implementing ADA compliance programs required consideration of and interaction with prison security and safety measures. Moreover, Defendant will have every opportunity to cross-examine her experience in this regard at trial. Accordingly, we find Ms. Stanosheck is sufficiently qualified to render the opinions articulated in her report.
C. Methodology & Relevance Finally, Defendant attacks the relevance of Ms. Stanosheck’s opinions, in essence arguing that they are not sufficiently tailored to the named Plaintiffs to help the trier of fact decide the issues in this case. (Daubert Mem. at 5.) He argues that her opinions regarding the interplay between ADA accommodations and IDOC security needs are not helpful because they do not take into consideration the specific security precautions of the individual Plaintiffs. (Daubert Mem. at 6.) And he similarly contends that Ms. Stanosheck’s opinions regarding IDOC culture is not probative of whether IDOC discriminated against the individual named Plaintiffs. (Id.; Daubert Reply at 4.) In reply, Defendant specifies that his critiques target the method that Ms. Stanosheck used to reach her conclusions, not the conclusions themselves. (Daubert Reply at 3.) But in effect, we view Defendant’s argument as a critique that Ms. Stanosheck’s opinions are irrelevant because they do not sufficiently address the named Plaintiffs’ unique conditions. Defendant’s arguments seem to ignore that Plaintiffs are not requesting individual damages or other specific relief. Rather, they are bringing a class action seeking declaratory and
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injunctive relief to remedy what they claim to be a widespread and systematic failure by IDOC to provide accommodations for deaf and hearing disabled offenders. Thus, Ms. Stanosheck’s opinions regarding the IDOC’s overarching culture and the interplay between potential accommodations and security concerns hit the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude Ms. Stanosheck’s testimony as unreliable or irrelevant is denied. II. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification
Since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) requires us to decide class certification “as soon as practicable,” we address Plaintiffs’ motion next. Plaintiffs move to certify a class of all current and future deaf or hard of hearing inmates in IDOC custody from January 1, 2007, to the present whom require accommodations to effectively communicate and/or access IDOC programs or services. (Cert. Mem. at 1–2.) This proposed class seems to include those that IDOC identified as deaf or hard of hearing, and those that they have failed to discover. Plaintiffs argue that certification of this class is proper under the Rule 23(a) requirements and seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). Our task, as the Seventh Circuit recently described it, is “to determine if the plaintiffs[] presented a scenario in which judicial efficiency would be served by allowing their claims to proceed en masse through the medium of a class action rather than through individual litigation.” Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., — F.3d —, No. 14-2843, 2015 WL 4667904, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015).
Pursuant to Rule 23(a), a class may be certified “only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
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requirements are satisfied, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the proposed class qualifies under at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012); Cavin v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 387, 391 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Here, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which permits class actions where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). In other words, Plaintiffs must show that a single injunction would provide relief to the entire class. Strait v. Belcan Eng’g Grp., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Finally, the scope of the proposed class must be “sufficiently definite.” Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the proposed class meets the requirements for certification under Rule 23. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.”); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811 (holding that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove disputed Rule 23 requirements by a preponderance of the evidence). The Supreme Court has stressed that “certification is proper only if ‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) [and Rule 23(b)] have been satisfied.’” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551); see also Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he court should assess whether the class allegations are satisf[ied] through evidentiary proof.”). This analysis frequently demands “overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Comcast, 133
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S. Ct. at 1432 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). Thus, the district court “must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary to ensure that requirements for class certification are satisfied before deciding whether a class should be certified.” Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001)); Starr v. Chi. Cut Steakhouse, LLC, 12 C 04416, 2014 WL 7146061, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2014). On the other hand, if factual or legal determinations are not necessary to resolve disputes over Rule 23 requirements, the court should not decide them. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). We retain broad discretion in determining whether class certification is appropriate given the particular facts of the case. Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 2012); Cavin, 236 F.R.D. at 391; Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 295, 298 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Defendant opposes class certification on four grounds, claiming that Plaintiffs: (1) present an indefinite and vague class definition; (2) do not meet the commonality requirement; (3) do not meet the typicality requirement; and (4) fail to establish that Defendant refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire class. (Cert. Resp. at 2, Dkt. 243.) We consider each argument in turn. In addition, we also address two of the named Plaintiffs’ standing, which is an issue that the parties have raised informally throughout their briefings, and briefly consider the additional Rule 23(a) requirements of adequacy and numerosity.
A. Named Plaintiffs’ Standing Daniel Baxter and Curtis Foster, two named Plaintiffs, are no longer in IDOC custody. “To have standing to sue as a class representative it is essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all
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members of the class he represents.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592–93 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2930 (1974)); accord Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1982); Schultz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 678 F. Supp. 2d 771, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2010). This rule relates to the broader principle that “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975)).
Here, the proposed class is limited to inmates who are currently incarcerated with IDOC or who will become incarcerated before expiration of the class period. This class requirement is necessary because Plaintiffs seek only future injunctive relief. Inmates who are no longer incarcerated do not have a legally cognizable interest in enjoining IDOC’s future behavior, particularly absent any showing of a reasonable expectation that he or she will return. Allen v. Murakami, 6 C 125, 2006 WL 2035630, at *2 (D. Haw. July 18, 2006) (finding former inmate’s claims for injunctive relief were moot after he was released on parole); see also Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 524 (D. Ariz. 2013) aff’d, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding an inmate released on parole was not an adequate representative for a class of inmates challenging prison officials’ customs and practices). Without a personal interest in the case, plaintiffs do not have standing themselves, let alone on behalf of putative class members. Since Plaintiffs Baxter and Foster are no longer incarcerated, they do not have a personal interest in the relief requested and thus do not have standing to assert the class claims. They are therefore improper class representatives and are dismissed from the case.
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B. Class Definition An implied requirement of Rule 23(a) dictates that the plaintiffs’ proposed class definition be “sufficiently definite that its members are ascertainable.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 493; Alliance, 565 F.2d at 977. Plaintiffs need not identify every class member at the certification stage. Burrow v. Sybaris Clubs Int’l, Inc., 13 C 2342, 2015 WL 1887930 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015) (citing Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240, 245 (N.D. Ill. 2014)). But to satisfy this requirement, they must define the class with reference to “objective criteria” and propose “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.” Jenkins v. White Castle Mgmt. Co., 12 C 7273, 2015 WL 832409, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2015) (quoting Hayes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)); N.B. v. Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d 756, 763 (N.D. Ill. 2014). When “there is no way to know or readily ascertain who is a member of the class,” the class “lacks the definiteness required for class certification.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 496; Steimel v. Minott, 13 C 957, 2014 WL 1213390, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2014). Since definiteness is a threshold issue for class certification, we address this requirement next. See Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 763. Defendant contends that the proposed class is not ascertainable for two primary reasons. First, he argues that we cannot readily identify all inmates who are “deaf” or “hard of hearing” because those terms are not defined and require medical or other scientific testing. (Cert. Resp. at 12–13.) Second, he asserts that we cannot ascertain which offenders “require accommodations . . . to access programs or services” without first determining, through a highly individualized case-by-case analysis, whether those offenders are otherwise eligible to participate in those programs. (Id. at 13–14.) Plaintiffs respond, primarily to the Defendant’s
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first argument, by pointing to IDOC’s own policies and procedures for identifying deaf and hard of hearing inmates. (Cert. Reply at 12, Dkt. 249.) More specifically, Plaintiffs point out that IDOC’s ADA Directive defines “deaf” and “hard of hearing,” IDOC’s intake and classification process is supposed to include a gross hearing assessment and contemplates the use of audiologist testing, and IDOC’s Communication Plans identify hearing disabled inmates. (Cert Mem. at 13; Cert. Reply. at 12–13.) Although Plaintiffs maintain that IDOC fails to consistently employ these identification methods—glossing over their concurrent argument that these procedures are insufficient—they argue that it has the ability to do so. (Cert. Reply at 12–13.)
As explained below, we find that the proposed class definition is too broad to the extent it includes hearing impaired inmates who remain unidentified by IDOC. This case is similar to Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, where the Seventh Circuit held a class that consisted largely of disabled students “who may have been eligible for special education but were not identified and remain[ed] unidentified” was fatally indefinite. See Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 495. In that case, the plaintiffs brought claims against the Milwaukee Public School System (“MPS”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Their claims focused on the obligation of states that receive federal funding to identify children who require special education, i.e., the Child-Find requirements. Id. at 485. The Seventh Circuit explained that “identifying disabled students who might be eligible for special-education services is a complex, highly individualized task, and cannot be reduced to the application of a set of simple, objective criteria.” Id. at 496. The process is “child specific and requires the application of trained and particularized professional educational judgment.” Id. Since the proposed class was comprised primarily of children that MPS failed to identify, ascertaining class membership would require, at a minimum, submitting all disabled students in Milwaukee schools through this highly
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individualized evaluation. Id.; see also Steimel, 2014 WL 1213390 at *12 (finding the proposed class indefinite when the only way to ascertain class membership was “via a Court mandated individualized inquiry into the specific needs of each [potential class member]”).
Similarly here, Plaintiffs have not articulated an objective and administratively feasible way for us to ascertain the yet-to-be-identified deaf or hard of hearing inmates. Plaintiffs first suggest using audiologists, although they don’t indicate whether these medical professionals must examine all 49,000 IDOC inmates or some subset of that population. (Cert. Mem. at 13.) Either way, Plaintiffs do not propose a standard measure to categorize deafness and hearing loss even after an audiology test were applied. And the definitions of deaf and hard of hearing in the ADA Directive use plain language rather than quantitative objective metrics. (ADA Directive § II(E).) Thus, just as identifying class members in Jamie S. required trained and particularized professional judgment, ascertaining unidentified hearing impaired offenders would require an individualized inquiry that involved some level of medical or scientific judgment. See Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 496.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs did propose an administratively feasible test to determine hearing loss, certain class members might not be ascertained until after liability was established and thus after the class period closed. How would we determine whether the newly identified deaf and hard of hearing inmates first became disabled before, during or after the class period? Only those disabled before or during the class period would be proper members. See id. at 495 (questioning how the court would determine, years after the fact, whether a potential class member might have been eligible for special education services during the class period).
Plaintiffs cite N.B. v. Hamos to support the ascertainability of their proposed class definition. We agree that Hamos is also helpful to our analysis, but we stress a critical fact that
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Plaintiffs’ analogy to the case overlooks. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all child Medicaid recipients in Illinois who were not receiving “medically necessary home and communication based services to treat or ameliorate their disorders.” Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 762. The defendant objected that the class was indefinite because the term “medically necessary” required expert evidence. Id. at 763–64. Judge Tharp agreed that the diagnosis of mental and behavioral disorders “is an individualized and child-specific undertaking,” but found that membership in the class was dependent on a pre-existing diagnosis. Id. at 764. And once a child was diagnosed, the applicable statutory framework objectively defined “medically necessary” services to include all of those recommended by the qualified healthcare provider. Id. at 765–66. The court determined that since completion of the individualized assessment was a precondition to class membership, the court would not need to monitor or review those determinations and thus ascertainment of class membership was administratively feasible. Id. at 767. Importantly, however, before certifying the class, Judge Tharp modified the language of the proposed definition to emphasize this precondition. Under the court’s definition, the class included all Medicaid-eligible children in Illinois who “have been diagnosed with a medical or behavioral disorder,” and “for whom a licensed practitioner [recommended services] to correct or ameliorate their disorders.” Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiffs’ proposed definition does not likewise presuppose a pre-existing diagnosis of deafness or hearing loss, but we find that the class must be limited in a similar way. That is, since there are no objective means by which we can reasonably ascertain unidentified deaf or hard of hearing inmates, the class must be limited to those that IDOC identified and documented or otherwise received written notice of during the class period. See Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 92 C 3409, 2012 WL 2953217, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2012)
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(reaffirming the definiteness of a class comprised of students that the defendant, Chicago Public Schools, itself “classified as having a disability”); Flynn v. Doyle, 6 C 537, 2007 WL 805788, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2007) (finding class of “qualified individuals with a disability” was sufficiently definite where “the defendants’ own records [would] identify which inmates ha[d] a disability”); see also Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, 305 F.R.D. 132, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (certifying a class of inmates with disabilities, as defined by federal and state law). This definition includes all inmates for whom IDOC executed a Communication Plan or otherwise documented as hearing impaired, and for whom IDOC received a grievance alleging hearing loss or deafness, from either the inmate himself or his family member, during the class period.
As thus defined, documented association with deafness or hearing loss is a precondition to class membership, providing objective and administratively feasible means to ascertain the class. See Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 768; see also Birchmeier, 302 F.R.D. at 249 (certifying a class where individuals could prove membership through documentation). Even if ascertainment will require the parties to cull through inmate records to find Communication Plans and grievances, the cost and time involved in identifying class members does not preclude certification. See Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases that found “the size of a potential class and the need to review individual files to identify its members are not reasons to deny class certification”); Moreno v. Napolitano, 11 C 5452, 2014 WL 4911938, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (“[T]he necessity of manually reviewing [tens of thousands of] forms does not preclude certification of the class.”); Birchmeier, 302 F.R.D. at 248 (finding a class was sufficiently ascertainable even if the plaintiff had to exert considerable time and expense to match over 930,000 phone numbers with individuals’ names). In any event, the parties have already begun this process. In his interrogatory responses,
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Defendant identified fifty-six inmates who either self-identified as deaf or hard of hearing during the class period or who IDOC believes to be deaf or hard of hearing. (Def’s Suppl. Interrog. Resp. No. 1, Cert. Mem. Ex. 1.) In addition, Plaintiffs assert that they discovered at least another thirty during discovery, citing IDOC Communication Plans issued to inmates who are not listed in the relevant interrogatory response. (Cert. Mem. at 4; see Cert. Mem., Exs. 2–16.) These individuals likely comprise a large majority of the class.
Before moving on, we will also briefly address Defendant’s argument that the proposed definition requires us to determine whether potential class members were actually qualified to participate in the programs and services that they claim IDOC denied them access to. (Cert. Resp. at 13–14.) It may be true that in order to succeed on their claims Plaintiffs must prove that they would have been able to participate in the programs and services at issue but for IDOC’s failure to provide them the necessary accommodations. This, however, is a merits determination that we do not need to resolve at the class certification stage. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195 (“Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”); Messner, 669 F.3d at 823 (explaining the fact that “some class members’ claims will fail on the merits” is “a fact generally irrelevant to the district court’s decision on class certification”).
To be sure, “a class should not be certified if it is apparent that it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 825 (quoting Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009)). But a class definition is not overbroad simply because it includes some members who Defendant may later prove suffered no injury. Id. at 823–24; see In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 811 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[Wal-Mart] demonstrates that district courts do not err by failing to ascertain at
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the Rule 23 stage whether the class members include persons and entities who have suffered ‘no injury at all.’”); see also Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 4466919, at *5 (3d Cir. July 22, 2015) (“We now squarely hold that unnamed, putative class members need not establish Article III standing.”)). While it may eventually prove true that some class members were ineligible to participate in certain IDOC programs and services due to their unique security restrictions, educational backgrounds, etc., this finding is not readily apparent for “a great many” class members. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 825–26. To the contrary, we expect ineligibility to be the outlier rather than the norm.
To avoid denying class certification based simply on a non-fatal overreach of Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition, we elect to exercise our discretion to narrow the class to a reasonably ascertainable group. Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (suggesting that over-inclusive class definitions “can and often should be resolved by refining the class definition rather than by flatly denying class certification on that basis”); In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 644 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court has the authority to modify a class definition at different stages in litigation.”); see Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 769 (narrowing the proposed class definition). Based on the discussion above, we propose the following class definition:
(i) all individuals incarcerated by IDOC currently and in the future; (ii) who IDOC classified as deaf or hard of hearing or who notified IDOC in writing during the Class Period, either personally or through a family member, that he or she was deaf or hard of hearing; and (iii) who require accommodations, including interpreters or other auxiliary aids or services, to communicate effectively and/or to access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC during the Class Period.34 We review the remaining disputed Rule 23 requirements with this definition in mind.
34 The Class Period is defined as January 1, 2007, to the present. (See Cert. Mem. at 1.) 63

C. Numerosity To satisfy the numerosity requirement, Plaintiffs must prove the class is so large that joinder is impractical. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2009). There is no objective threshold for numerosity, but courts have found that a class of forty is typically enough to satisfy the requirement. Id.; McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 210 F.R.D. 631, 643 (N.D. Ill. 2002). During discovery, Defendant identified fifty-six inmates who either self-identified as hearing impaired during the class period or who IDOC believes are hearing impaired. (Cert. Mem. at 4; Def’s Suppl. Interrog. Resp. No. 1, Cert. Mem. Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs claim that they identified at least thirty additional class members, citing IDOC Communication Plans. (Cert. Mem. at 4; see Cert. Mem., Exs. 2–16.) It appears that most, if not all, of these inmates fall under our modified class definition since IDOC has recognized or received notice of their hearing disabilities. According to Plaintiffs, these class members have limited financial resources and are incarcerated in nineteen different IDOC facilities across the state. (Cert. Mem. at 5.) We find, and Defendant does not contest, that under these circumstances the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all class members would be impractical. Accordingly, Plaintiffs successfully demonstrated Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity. D. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Plaintiffs need only articulate a single common issue, but that question must be “capable of classwide resolution” such that its answer is “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; see Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497. In other words, the “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; see Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC,
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— F.3d —, 2015 WL 4546159, at *17 (7th Cir. July 28, 2015). For that reason, commonality “demands more than a showing that the class members have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law at the hands of the same defendant.” Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 755–56 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). Instead, they must show that the class members “have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
Common questions may arise when defendants engage in standard conduct or practice that affects the entire class. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (quoting In re IKO Roofing Shingle Products Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)); Kurgan v. Chiro One Wellness Centers LLC, 10 C 1899, 2014 WL 642092, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2014). A single system-wide illegal practice or policy can satisfy the commonality requirement. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553; Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Court in Wal–Mart explained that a multi-store (or multi-site) class could satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) if the employer used a procedure or policy that spanned all sites.”); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that commonality was satisfied under Wal-Mart when the plaintiffs challenged the defendant’s company-wide policies); see Kurgan, 2014 WL 642092, at *6 (finding the legality of the defendant’s “uniform, official, corporate policy” was a common issue central to the litigation). In such a case, the plaintiffs must evidence “significant proof” that the systemic policy or practice alleged exists. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553; Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498.
Here, Plaintiffs claim that IDOC’s statewide policies and practices regarding accommodations for deaf and hard of hearing offenders violate the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the RLUIPA, and the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Cert. Mem. at 6.) Within this overarching complaint, they contend there are numerous legal and factual questions common to
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the class. Exemplars include whether IDOC systematically failed to provide class members with effective communication and adequate access to its programs and services; whether IDOC provides class members with safe and effective visual notification systems to advise them of emergencies; whether IDOC has failed to establish sufficient policies to allow class members to participate in religious services under RLUIPA; and whether IDOC’s policies and practices violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiffs’ briefing makes clear that their claims target alleged systemic discrimination against deaf and hard of hearing inmates, “which emanates from generally applicable policies and procedures that altogether fail to account for deaf and hard of hearing inmates.” (Cert. Reply at 7.) They explain that because these issues focus on the failures of IDOC’s system-wide policies and practices, they are common to the entire class. (Cert. Mem. at 8.)
Defendant relies on Wal-Mart to contest commonality. In Wal-Mart, three named plaintiffs sued Wal-Mart under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotion decisions made by thousands of managers across the country. They brought the class claims on behalf of approximately 1.5 million current and former Wal-Mart employees. Although WalMart had an official policy against discrimination, the plaintiffs alleged the company had “a strong and uniform corporate culture” permitting bias against women that influenced the discretionary decision-making of Wal-Mart’s managers. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553, 2548. This corporate culture, the plaintiffs alleged, resulted in a common discriminatory practice that impacted every female employee. Id. In denying certification, the Supreme Court explained that commonality could conceivably be established by “significant proof that [defendant] operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553; see Chi. Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *5; Vang v. Kohler Co., 488 F. App’x 146, 147 (7th Cir. 2012)
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(explaining that a “single, firm-wide policy . . . could satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)”); Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498. In that case, however, the plaintiffs failed to proffer such evidence. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–56; see Chi. Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *5. Without proof of a system-wide policy acting as “glue” to hold thousands of highly individualized employment decisions together, the Supreme Court could not find that the class would “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. at 2551–52; see Bolden, 688 F.3d at 898 (explaining that a “single . . . policy was the missing ingredient in Wal-Mart”).
Defendant attempts to depict Plaintiffs’ claims as likewise challenging hundreds of individual decisions regarding inmate hearing accommodations made by numerous IDOC employees at different facilities.35 (Cert. Resp. at 8.) But, although Plaintiffs’ claims are supported by anecdotal examples, their complaint principally attacks IDOC’s system-wide policies, including its written ADA Directive. See P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 289 F.R.D. 227, 233–34 (E.D. Penn. 2013) (“Defendants fail to recognize, however, that the central tenant of Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a systemic failure, not a failure of the policy as applied to each member individually.”). Even if determining appropriate hearing accommodations requires individualized considerations down the line, common issues bind the Plaintiffs’ claims together if IDOC’s high level policies and practices do not conform to the law. See Chi. Teachers Union, WL 4667904, at *6; see Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 678 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding inmates’ alleged exposure to statewide policies regarding the conditions of confinement and health care services in Arizona prisons satisfied the commonality requirement).
35 Defendant states that Plaintiffs’ basis for commonality is “that they are deaf or hard-of-hearing and accordingly require accommodations.” (Cert. Resp. at 7.) We find this description disingenuous. Plaintiffs’ statement of the common issues, which spans over an entire page in their opening brief, does not allege those facts at all and instead explicitly focuses on IDOC’s “systematic[]” failures and its “policies and practices.” (Cert. Mem. at 8–9.)
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Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has recently confirmed “a [system]-wide practice is appropriate for class challenge even where some decisions in the chain of acts challenged . . . can be exercised by local [officers] with discretion—at least where the class at issue is affected in a common manner, such as where there is a uniform policy or process applied to all.” Chi. Teachers Union, WL 4667904, at *7.
Unlike in Wal-Mart, we find that Plaintiffs have met their burden to show “significant proof” of the system-wide policies and practices alleged. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 680 (explaining that plaintiffs sufficiently proved the system-wide policies alleged with “formal [prison] policies, admissions by [prison] officials in discovery documents, declarations by the named plaintiffs . . . and [plaintiffs’] expert report”); Brand v. Comcast Corp., Inc., 302 F.R.D. 201, 219 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (relying on class members’ testimony to find “significant proof of the common question of whether a hostile work environment existed”); Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 400 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (finding that the named plaintiff showed that a jail’s practices “caused inmates to suffer the same potential injury, which tie[d] all their jail standards claims together”).
First, it is undisputed that IDOC has a written ADA Directive, the purpose of which is “to provide instructions to staff for providing accommodations to offenders with disabilities.” (ADA Directive § II(A).) Defendant concedes that “[t]his Directive applies across all prisons in Illinois to all offenders with hearing issues.” (Cert. Resp. at 5.) Some of Plaintiffs’ claims directly challenge whether this written policy sufficiently protects class members’ rights under federal law. For instance, they allege that to comply with the ADA, the Directive must mandate more in-depth training and experience for ADA Coordinators and other IDOC staff. (Cert. Reply at 4.) Whether the ADA Directive—an express and undisputed statement of IDOC system-wide
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policy—satisfies IDOC’s obligations under the ADA is indeed a common question apt to drive resolution of the litigation.
As for claims not directly derived from IDOC’s written policies, Plaintiffs present expert testimony and anecdotal evidence to support their allegations. Professor Cokely concluded that “the great majority of IDOC’s failures in ensuring effective communication with/by [hearing impaired] inmates is a result of its failure to implement, and ensure the consistent application of, an adequate institutional policy concerning those inmates.” (Cokely Rpt. at 42–43.) Similarly, after listing numerous specific deficiencies—such as inadequate staff training, failure to consider inmates’ accommodation preferences, and failure to provide ASL interpreters—Ms. Stanosheck opined in her report that “[a]t the core of the many shortcomings I’ve outlined above is the IDOC’s failure to put into place, on a system-wide basis, a comprehensive policy or procedure sufficient to ensure effective communication for deaf and hard of hearing inmates.” (Stanosheck Rpt. at 8.) Moreover, Ms. Stanosheck found that the ADA Directive was not only insufficient to ensure compliance with the ADA, but even its requirements were being systematically ignored or misunderstood. (See id. at 19–21.) She concluded that “IDOC has instilled a culture of accepting non-compliance with the ADA’s requirement to provide deaf and hard of hearing inmates with effective communication.” (Id. at 19.) Unlike the expert in Wal-Mart who could not say “whether .05 percent or 95 percent of the employment decisions” were affected by the alleged discriminatory culture, 131 S. Ct. at 2554, Ms. Stanosheck has broadly opined that “inmates in the IDOC system as a whole . . . are not being provided effective communication,” (Deposition of Elizabeth Stanosheck at 92, Cert. Mem. Ex. 24 [hereinafter Stanosheck Dep.]).
In addition, each of the remaining nine named Plaintiffs testified through depositions, affidavits, and interrogatory responses that IDOC has failed to provide and/or specifically denied
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or ignored their requests for accommodations. (See Cert. Reply at 6–7 (highlighting pertinent testimony).) The testimony also indicates that the lack of hearing accommodations has resulted in exclusion from various IDOC programs and services, such as vocational programs, televisions and telephones, and religious services. (Id.) Based on Plaintiffs’ representations, uncontested by Defendants, the class appears to consist of somewhere between eighty-six and a little over one hundred inmates. Taking the high-end of this range, the accounts of each named Plaintiff represent approximately one for every eleven class members. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (explaining that while anecdotal testimony from 1 in every 12,500 class members was statistically insignificant, similar testimony from 1 in every 8 class members in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977) was substantial). This sampling is statistically significant and represents persuasive evidence that IDOC systematically fails to provide inmates with necessary hearing accommodations.
After rigorously reviewing all the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs—IDOC’s express written policies, experts’ reports, and Plaintiffs’ testimony—we find that they have sufficiently proved the existence of the statewide policies and practices alleged. Despite factual variations in putative class members’ situations, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding IDOC’s system-wide failures are the “glue” that ties their claims together. Hill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 12 C 7240, 2015 WL 232127, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2015) (“Rule 23(a)(2) does not demand that every member of the class have an identical claim, and some degree of factual variation will not defeat commonality provided that common questions yielding common answers can be identified.”) Thus, Plaintiffs satisfied the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2).
Our decision is consistent with numerous other courts that have found, after Wal-Mart, that the commonality requirement was met in cases where prisoners alleged system-wide
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practices and/or failures resulting in constitutional and statutory violations. See, e.g., Lacy v. Dart, 14 C 6259, 2015 WL 1995576, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2015) (finding wheelchair bound detainees’ claims that Cook County violated their rights under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act presented common questions of law and fact); Hernandez, 305 F.R.D. at 154 (“Post-Wal-Mart, courts continue to find the commonality requirement satisfied in cases challenging correctional facility conditions similar to those at issue here.”); Scott v. Clarke, 12 C 00036, 2014 WL 6609087, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 20, 2014) (citing cases recognizing that after Wal-Mart “commonality does not serve as a barrier to the certification of class actions in cases involving prisoners’ claims alleging a pattern and practice of conduct resulting in unconstitutional conditions of confinement”); Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 511 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (finding commonality for prisoners’ ADA claims challenging Alabama’s policy of segregating HIV positive inmates); see also Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-Cty. CAP, Inc./GS v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 268 (D.N.H. 2013) (finding whether there was a “systemic deficiency” in defendant’s provision of health services under the ADA and other federal statutes was a common question under Wal-Mart); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 596 (D. Or. 2012) (“Based on Wal-Mart, no court has yet declined to certify an ADA Title II case.”).
E. Typicality Defendant also challenges the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement, which demands that the claims or defenses of the named plaintiffs be typical of those of the punitive class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Claims are typical if they “arise[] from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members” and if they “are based on the same legal theory” as other class members. Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006));
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Streeter, 256 F.R.D. at 612; see Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that courts should look to “the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s legal theory” to analyze typicality). Some factual distinction and variance in the injuries sustained by each class member will not defeat typicality, so long as the plaintiffs’ claims “have the same essential characteristics” as the putative class members’ claims. Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514; see Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018; Chi. Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chic., 12 C 10338, 2015 WL 3372298, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2015); Curry v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 10 C 1288, 2011 WL 4036129, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2011).
Here, the claims of named Plaintiffs and putative class members arise from the same conduct by IDOC, i.e., its policies and practices regarding accommodations for deaf and hard of hearing inmates. Defendant once again attempts to persuade us that this case is about hundreds of individual denials for hearing accommodations instead of IDOC’s systemic policies and practices. (Cert. Resp. at 11.) But, as we have discussed, Plaintiffs could not be clearer that the converse is true.36 While they cite anecdotal examples in support of their system-wide allegations, named Plaintiffs’ and punitive class members’ claims both focus on the same alleged policies and standard practices, which affect hearing impaired inmates across the state. Likewise, the named Plaintiffs and putative class members share the same legal theories; they all allege that IDOC’s statewide practices and policies violate their constitutional rights and federal statutes by not providing deaf and hard of hearing inmates with effective communication or equal access to programs and services.
36 See Chi. Teachers Union, 2015 WL 3372298, at *6 (noting the defendant’s similar “fundamental failure to come to grips with plaintiffs’ theory of the case” where plaintiffs’ theory focused on a school district’s single policy rather than the individual discretion of its principals).
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To take an example, Plaintiff Lancaster’s claim is not that a specific IDOC officer violated his Eighth Amendment right by failing to provide him with an ASL interpreter to communicate with medical staff after he injured his finger playing basketball on a particular date. Nor does he seek damages related to that incident. Rather, his claim—the same as all other named Plaintiffs and putative class members—is that IDOC’s systemic failure to provide meaningful communication with medical staff violates his Eighth Amendment right by exposing him to a substantial risk of harm in the past, present, and future. Thus, despite factual differences, the named Plaintiffs claims are typical of the other class members in that they focus on the same conduct and are based on the same legal theories. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee Cty., 12 C 2115, 2013 WL 5644754, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2013) (finding plaintiff’s claims were typical of the class where plaintiff challenged the same prison strip search policy as class members); Streeter, 256 F.R.D. at 613 (“[T]he likelihood of some range of variation in how different groups of new detainees were treated does not undermine the fact that the claims of each class [member] share a common factual basis and legal theory.” (quoting Young v. Cty. of Cook, 6 C 552, 2007 WL 1238920, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007))); Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 249 F.R.D. 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“That the particular conditions may differ slightly from one cell block to the next, or that there are factual distinctions between the actual injuries suffered by [the named plaintiff] and the class members, does not defeat typicality under Rule 23(a)(e).” (quotation omitted)).
Before moving on, we will briefly address Defendant’s arguments to the contrary. First, Defendant’s case law is either inapplicable or readily distinguishable. His two lead cases do not even deal with typicality. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Court merely explained that named plaintiffs must demonstrate injury to have standing, and East Texas Motor Freight
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Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1981) found that named plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives because they could not have suffered any injury.
In addition, in Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining named plaintiffs were not typical of a class of “any and all persons” confined in a prison where the plaintiffs’ claims were based on a change to the prison’s medical policy that may not have negatively impacted every class member. 694 F.3d at 893. The court distinguished the case from Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 9 C 529, 2010 WL 4791509 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010), where the typicality requirement was satisfied because there was evidence that all class members experienced some injury from the prison’s medical practice at issue. Kress, 694 F.3d at 893. Smentek is more analogous here than Kress because Plaintiffs challenge IDOC policies and practices regarding accommodations for hearing impaired inmates that impact all class members. Equally, we do not find the analysis in Wrightsell v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 8 C 5451, 2009 WL 482370 (N.D. Ill. 2009) relevant. There, a class of detainees claimed that they received untimely dental care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at *1. Unlike in this case, the plaintiffs in Wrightsell sought damages for their injuries under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. The court found typicality was lacking because resolution of the claims would require a case-by-case analysis of each detainees’ unique situation. Id. at *3.
This litigation will focus on whether IDOC’s policies and procedures are illegal as applied to all hearing impaired inmates, and thus will not depend on the intensive individualized analysis the courts were concerned about in Kress and Wrightsell. We will consider individual violations as evidence of the illegality of IDOC’s broader policies and procedures, but the success or failure of each class members’ claims—and whether we grant statewide injunctive relief—does not principally turn on his or her unique circumstances. See Lacy, 2015 WL
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1995576, at *5 (“Plaintiffs’ claims do not require an individual evaluation of plaintiffs’ disabilities or the accommodations allegedly provided, but rather ask the court to determine whether courthouse facilities and defendants’ actions comply with federal statutes.”).
Second, we are also unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs must individually show that they are qualified to participate in the programs and services that they challenge. The vast majority of services and programs that they complain about do not appear to require any special qualification. For example, all inmates are permitted to participate in the grievance process, all inmates would have the right to be notified of emergency situations, and all inmates would have the right to receive proper medical treatment. See Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576, at *5 (“Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs must show that they are qualified to make use of the ‘services, programs and activities in question’ is nonsensical, because plaintiffs have a constitutional right to attend their court proceedings.”). Moreover, although inmates may be subject to occasional disciplinary or safety restrictions that could limit their right to use certain services at certain times, these temporary restrictions would not impact their right to seek future injunctive relief since there is a high likelihood that the restriction would be lifted at some time during their incarceration. We recognize that inmates may be truly ineligible for a program in a handful of cases, but we believe these instances are few and do not defeat typicality where named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members share the same legal claims based on the same conduct. See generally CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996)); Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 412 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]ypicality under Rule 23(a)(3) should be determined with reference to the [defendant’s] actions, not with respect
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to particularized defenses it might have against certain class members.”). Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3).
F. Adequacy Under Rule 23(a)(4), named plaintiffs must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” by having a “sufficient interest in the outcome [of the litigation] to ensure vigorous advocacy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576 at *5. This inquiry has two parts: (1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs’ counsel, and (2) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs themselves as representatives of the class. Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011); Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)). Defendants do not challenge the adequacy of the named Plaintiffs or their counsel. We agree that Plaintiffs’ counsel, experienced and qualified law firms and legal aid agencies, are more than capable of serving as adequate class counsel in this action. Named Plaintiffs can also adequately represent the class. They share the same interest in achieving effective communication and appropriate hearing accommodations in IDOC facilities, and they share the same injury by being exposed to policies and practices that they claim deprive them of such communication and accommodations. They do not appear to have any interests in conflict with the putative class members, and they have been active participants in the case, demonstrating a sufficient interest in vigorously pursuing the litigation. Thus we find the adequacy requirement is met under Rule 23(a)(4). G. Conduct Generally Applicable to the Class In addition to the four Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiffs must show that the proposed class is certifiable under one of the Rule 23(b) subsections, in this case Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) requires that the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
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applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are appropriate only when the class seeks injunctive or declaratory relief and any requested damages are incidental in nature. Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 499 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557). “Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples” of this type of class. Chi. Teachers Union, WL 4667904, at *10 (quoting Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245 (1997)).
Plaintiffs here do not seek damages; rather they ask us for a declaration that IDOC’s policies and practices regarding accommodations for hearing impaired inmates violate federal law, and any other declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate to remedy past violations and prevent future violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 200–201.) A single declaration that the policies and practices alleged violate federal law would be final and would provide relief to each class member equally. This request for relief is sufficient to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2). See Chi. Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *11 (explaining that the plaintiffs’ request for a declaration that the defendant’s system-wide policy violated federal law was sufficient to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), even where the plaintiffs also requested individualized relief); Hernandez, 305 F.R.D. at 163–64; Olson, 284 F.R.D. at 415; Bumgarner, 276 F.R.D. at 457–58.
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Defendant’s primary argument against Rule 23(b)(2) certification echoes his summary judgment brief. He claims that IDOC does have effective policies and practices in place to accommodate deaf and hard of hearing inmates, and those policies and practices are carried out throughout IDOC’s facilities. (Cert. Resp. at 4–6.) In light of this, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs must litigate any individual failures independently. (Id. at 6.) As we explain in our summary judgment analysis, however, there are considerable disputed facts as to whether IDOC has appropriate policies and procedures in place and whether those that do exist are sufficient or even practiced and enforced. In fact, we determined above that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of the systemic failures alleged. Thus, Plaintiffs allegations regarding IDOC’s systemwide policies and practices remain viable in this litigation. Resolution of those claims in Plaintiffs’ favor could be remedied by class-wide declaratory and/or injunctive relief.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs did request individual relief, which they do not, “individualized relief does not preclude certification of a class for common equitable relief.” Chi. Teachers Union, WL 4667904, at *1; see also Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576, at *6 (“The injunctive relief plaintiffs seek as a class would resolve their alleged injuries at one time, regardless of the level of accommodation individual class members require.”). Since all class members seek the same declaratory and injunctive relief regarding IDOC’s statewide policies and practices, we find that certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2).
Having concluded that Plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) to show Plaintiffs’ claims would be more efficiently resolved as a class action than individually, we grant Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with the modification to the class definition described above. We turn next to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant moved for summary judgment on all Plaintiffs’ claims. He largely argues that
IDOC does provide adequate hearing accommodations for its deaf and hard of hearing inmates such that it is not in violation of any federal law. We recognize that since the enactment of the 2012 ADA Directive IDOC has been making some advances, but whether these strides are sufficient to protect hearing impaired inmates under federal law and whether they have been adequately implemented remains unclear. (See, e.g., Senor Dep. at 269 (testifying that IDOC is making improvements to its ADA accommodations, but the advances are slow).) As discussed more below, the record is riddled with factual disputes and evidentiary holes that prevent us from ruling on the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue for trial exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). This standard places the initial burden on the moving party to identify those portions of the record that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden of production, the nonmoving party “must go beyond the pleadings” and identify portions of the record demonstrating that a material fact is genuinely disputed. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, we cannot resolve issues of credibility, weigh evidence, or either draw or reject inferences; these determinations must be left to the finder-of-fact. Williams v. City of Chi., 733 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Neither [the
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Seventh Circuit] nor the district court can resolve issues of credibility when deciding a motion for summary judgment or an appeal from its grant.”); Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007). We must instead accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.
A. ADA & Rehabilitation Act Claims Count I alleges numerous violations of the ADA and Count II alleges Rehabilitation Act violations based on the same conduct. Relief under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are coextensive, and, with one exception that is irrelevant for the purposes of this motion,37 courts use the same standards to analyze claims under both statutes. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012); Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2001)). Thus, our analysis of Plaintiffs’ ADA claim will apply equally to their Rehabilitation Act claim.
i. Legal Framework The ADA is intended to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2003). Title II of the ADA requires that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003). Under Title II’s implementing regulations, “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
37 The Rehabilitation Act also requires that the program in which the plaintiff was involved received federal financial assistance. Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of S. Illinois Univ., 777 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2015); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This element is not disputed here.
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discrimination on the basis of a disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). With regard to hearing
disabilities, public entities must “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with . . .
participants . . . with disabilities are as effective as communications with others,” id.
§ 35.160(a)(1), and to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford
individuals with disabilities . . . an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a
service, program, or activity of a public entity,” id. § 35.160(b)(1).
The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.
Id. § 35.160(b)(2); see id. § 35.104 (listing types of auxiliary aids and services). In providing
appropriate auxiliary aids, “[t]he public entity shall honor the choice of the individual with a
disability unless it can demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or that
use of the means chosen would not be required under § 35.164.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A. The
Appendix to the regulations further explains that:
Although in some circumstances a notepad and written materials may be sufficient to permit effective communication, in other circumstances they may not be sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may be necessary when the information being communicated is complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period of time. Generally, factors to be considered in determining whether an interpreter is required include the context in which the communication is taking place, the number of people involved, and the importance of the communication.
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B. The regulations also require public entities to meet specific standards
when employing VRI. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(d).
Notwithstanding, § 35.164 provides narrow limits on public entities’ obligations to
accommodate hearing impaired participants under § 35.160. Specifically, a public entity is not
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required to “take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” Id. § 35.164. Before denying a proposed accommodation, however, the public entity “has the burden of proving that compliance with [§ 35.160] would result in such alterations or burdens.” Id. It must also issue a “written statement of the reasons” for its conclusion, and ensure that the alternative aids offered provide the hearing-impaired individual with the services at issue “to the maximum extent possible.” Id.
Counts I and II allege that Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodation for Plaintiffs’ hearing impairments under these rules and regulations. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed to provide effective communication tools to inmates with hearing disabilities, and denied them equal access to IDOC services, benefits, activities, programs, or privileges. They claim that these failures are systemic and result from widespread discriminatory policies, procedures, and actions. (See Cert. Reply at 1.) The parties agree that to prove this claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that they are qualified individuals with a disability; (2) who were either excluded from participating in, or denied the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion, denied of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of their disability.38 Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015); Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996); Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 681 F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12132. After these requirements are established, “the burden shifts to the [D]efendant to show that the accommodation[s] provided [were] either effective, or that the accommodation[s] sought and not provided would have
38 Because Plaintiffs do not request compensatory or punitive damages, they need not show that the discrimination was intentional. Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 917 (“[I]t is necessary to show intentional discrimination in order to recover compensatory damages (as opposed, say, to injunctive relief)”); see Strominger v. Brock, 592 F. App’x 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014).
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resulted in a fundamental alteration of the [programs, activities, or services], or an undue financial or administrative burden.” Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1993–94 (2004)).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are qualified individuals with a disability, but they deny that Plaintiffs were excluded from participating in IDOC services, programs, or activities because of their hearing disabilities.39 (SJ Mem. at 4.) In other words, Defendant contends that IDOC does provide effective accommodations for inmates’ hearing disabilities.
In the prison context, whether accommodations are reasonable must be judged “in light of the overall institutional requirements,” including “[s]ecurity concerns, safety concerns, and administrative exigencies.”40 Love, 103 F.3d at 561; see 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h). Determining the reasonableness of a particular accommodation, especially in the prison context, is “highly factspecific” and determined on a case-by-case basis. Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838–89 (7th Cir. 2001); Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (explaining that whether an accommodation is reasonable is an even “more complex” inquiry in the prison context); see Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Generally, the effectiveness of auxiliary aids and/or services is a question of fact precluding summary judgment.”).
39 A plaintiff may prove an ADA or Rehabilitation claim through either direct or indirect proof of discrimination. Novak, 777 F.3d at 974; Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs in this case have chosen to prove their claim through the direct method, thus they must present “either direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantial evidence that creates a ‘convincing mosaic’ of discrimination.” Novak, 777 F.3d at 974 (citing Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009)). 40 It is well established that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act apply to inmates in state prisons. Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209–10, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1953–55 (1998); Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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ii. Analysis Plaintiffs present a slew of different programs, activities, and services for which they contend IDOC fails to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA. These include: (1) reception and classification; (2) orientation; (3) educational and vocational programs; (4) work programs; (5) counselor services; (6) medical, mental health, and rehabilitative services; (7) religious services; (8) telephones; (9) televisions; (10) library services; (11) disciplinary proceedings; (12) emergency and routine notification services; (13) grievance process; and (14) pre-parole services. (See Compl. ¶¶ 63–140.) In conducting our analysis, we consider Plaintiffs’ claims as to each one of these programs separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g); Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (ruling separately on wheelchair-bound plaintiffs’ three claims that prison did not provide them shower chairs, shower bars, and accessible sinks). We reiterate that an ADA violation exists only if the defendant’s action or inaction prevents the plaintiff from participating in a program, activity or service. Certain of Plaintiffs’ complaints, such as IDOC’s alleged failure to properly train its employees and centrally track hearing impaired offenders, do not specifically target programs, activities, or services, and thus cannot alone sustain a claim under the ADA. (See SJ Reply at 4, Dkt. 258.) Despite this limitation, that evidence is still relevant to the extent such inaction contributed to a widespread denial of access to the programs, activities, and services that Plaintiffs do challenge. With the exception of work programs, which we discuss separately, Defendant’s primary argument for each of these services or programs is that IDOC has enacted policies and procedures to provide reasonable accommodations for hearing impaired offenders to participate effectively, and that it is following those policies and procedures. (SJ Mem. at 2.) We start by addressing work programs, and then analyze the remaining programs and services together.
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As we prefaced, Defendant raises a unique argument with respect to IDOC’s work programs. He argues that Plaintiffs’ Title II ADA work program claim must fail because work programs do not constitute “services, programs, or activities” under the statute. (SJ Mem. at 7.) We recognize that typical ADA employment claims must be brought under Title I, not Title II. Brumfield v. City of Chi., 735 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2013); Neisler v. Tuckwell, 13 C 821, 2015 WL 998439, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 5, 2015). We do not, however, agree that prison job programs constitute employment under Title I. Defendant’s reading of Murdoch v. Washington, which he relies on for his position, is incorrect. 193 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1999). In that case the Seventh Circuit held that Title II did apply to the plaintiff’s claim that prison officials prevented him from participating in a vocational program because of his disability, but the district court properly dismissed the claim because he failed to meet his burden of proof under statute. Id. at 512. The court further noted that Title I did not apply because the plaintiff was “an inmate of the prison, not an employee or job applicant.” Id. Numerous other courts, including in this circuit, have permitted prisoners to bring Title II ADA claims related to job assignments. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 673 (permitting plaintiff to proceed with his Rehabilitation Act claim that IDOC prevented him from participating in work release program because of his cane); Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant prevented him from working in a prison kitchen because of his disability stated a claim under Title II of the ADA); Neisler, 2015 WL 998439, at *5 (allowing prisoner to pursue an employment-related claim under Title II of the ADA); Muhammad v. Randle, 9 C 1014, 2010 WL 2680708, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 2, 2010) (allowing prisoner to pursue Title II ADA claim related to prison work); see also Love, 103 F.3d at 560 (affirming verdict under the ADA in favor of prisoner who was denied access to the prison’s work programs). We hold that IDOC’s
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job assignment program constitutes “services, programs, or activities” under Title II of the ADA. Thus, Defendant’s motion is denied as to Plaintiffs’ claims related to accommodations for IDOC job programs.
Turning to the rest of the programs and services challenged, Defendant argues that IDOC’s policies and procedures do reasonably accommodate deaf and hard of hearing inmates. He does not clearly specify whether he is claiming that IDOC provides inmates with the specific hearing accommodations that they request, effective alternate accommodations, or a combination of both. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.160(b)(2), 35.164, pt. 35, app. A (requiring public entities to provide the accommodation requested unless it can demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or that the requested accommodation would result in a fundamental alteration of the program or service or undue financial or administrative burden). We assume, however, that Defendant would assert IDOC employs a combination of those two practices. Regardless, as laid out in detail in our recitation of the facts, an overwhelming number of material facts are still disputed as to IDOC’s accommodations for each program and service at issue. Defendant’s sweeping statements that it provides reasonable accommodations in each category are simply not sufficiently supported by the scant record evidence cited.
For instance, Defendant claims that IDOC has a policy to provide accommodations, including ASL interpreters, to otherwise qualified offenders to participate in educational and vocational programs. (SJ Mem. at 6.) His only evidentiary support for this assertion is the ADA Directive that states Communication Plans “may” include accommodations for educational and vocational programming, and a handful of examples when IDOC did provide ASL interpreters to inmates for these programs. (Id.) Plaintiffs match Defendant’s evidence by citing numerous occasions where IDOC did not, or explicitly refused to, provide interpreters in this context.
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(SJ Resp. at 6–7, Dkt. 254.) What we are left with is competing evidence, which is minimal at best, that creates a disputed issue of fact as to whether IDOC routinely provides hearing impaired inmates with adequate accommodations in educational and vocational programs. Even without Plaintiffs’ countervailing evidence, the language in the ADA Directive and handful of anecdotal examples cited by Defendant is insufficient for us to conclude, as a matter of law, that IDOC has, and consistently employs, a system-wide policy of providing reasonable accommodations for these programs. See Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (denying summary judgment where the plaintiffs disputed the defendant’s contentions that its prison facilities complied with the ADA by providing accommodations to wheelchair bound inmates).
As another example, Defendant’s contention that IDOC accommodates hearing impaired offenders “when necessary” during disciplinary hearings, (SJ Mem. at 10), is also disputed and insufficiently supported at this stage. The ADA Directive simply provides that Communication Plans “may include” accommodations for due process and disciplinary hearings. The only other evidence that Defendant cites are three instances where Plaintiffs did not have the assistance of ASL interpreters at disciplinary hearings and were nonetheless not disciplined. (Id.) He argues the fact Plaintiffs were not disciplined proves that sufficient hearing accommodations were provided. (Id.) Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite numerous instances were IDOC denied inmates requested hearing accommodations during disciplinary hearings, many that did result in discipline. (SJ Resp. at 8.)
Defendant’s argument fails on a number of grounds. First, we are not convinced that failure to discipline equates to sufficient hearing accommodation under the ADA as a matter of law. But even if we assumed Plaintiffs received adequate accommodation in those three instances, three anecdotal examples does not prove, or disprove, widespread practice across all
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IDOC facilities—particularly in light of the countervailing evidence cited by Plaintiffs. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, critical questions of fact thus remain, including whether IDOC has a practice of providing hearing accommodations during disciplinary proceedings and whether any such accommodations are effective. See Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant failed to provide deaf student with reasonable accommodations in the classroom); Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 327–32 (finding numerous issues of fact, including whether accommodations provided to deaf inmate were effective, precluded summary judgment); Gallagher v. Allegheny Cty., 9 C 103, 2011 WL 284128, at *9 (W.D. Penn. Jan. 25, 2011) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff demonstrated “a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the [d]efendants’ efforts to accommodate his hearing impairment were reasonable”). As with educational and vocational programs, these material questions of fact preclude summary judgment.
Our analysis is the same for the remaining programs and services at issue. Defendant consistently fails to support his conclusions that IDOC has, and employs system-wide, policies and practices to adequately accommodate its hearing impaired offenders such that they can effectively participate in the programs and services discussed. Rather than clear and undisputed evidence, we are presented with a spattering of anecdotal examples from each side that is vastly insufficient to reach, as a matter of law, the conclusions that Defendant propounds. Although it appears that IDOC has made some strides since 2012, the record presented to us is far too muddled and incomplete to determine the extent of those efforts and whether they are sufficient. These factual issues must be explored in more detail at trial and ultimately weighed by the
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finder-of-fact. Because we find this case is riddled with material factual disputes, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims is denied.
B. RLUIPA In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has imposed a substantial burden on their right to freely exercise their religion under RLUIPA by failing to provide the hearing accommodations that they need to effectively communicate during IDOC’s worship services. (Compl. ¶ 170; SJ Resp. at 9–10.) Defendant argues summary judgment on this claim is warranted because there is no evidence that IDOC has affirmatively barred any expression of Plaintiffs’ religion. (SJ Mem. at 12.) “Congress enacted RLUIPA, in part, to protect inmates and other institutionalized persons from substantial burdens in freely practicing their religions.” Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2003). The statute prevents a governmental entity from imposing a “substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.”41 24 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). According to the Seventh Circuit, a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that “necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impractical.” Koger, 523 F.3d at 79 (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)). The protections under this statute apply even when the burden “results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Koger, 523 F.3d at 796. To avoid imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise under RLUIPA,
41 If the plaintiff proves that the government has imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of free religion, the defendant must demonstrate that the burden: “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id.; Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). Since Defendant simply argues that it has not imposed any burden at all, this defense is not implicated in our analysis.
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governments may be required to make accommodations and incur expenses to their operations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c); Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 860. The Supreme Court recently explained that RLUIPA protects all forms of religious exercise; the fact that alternative means to practice an inmate’s chosen religion may be available is irrelevant under the Act. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862.
Here, we find Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendant placed a substantial burden on their religious exercise by denying the hearing accommodations needed for them to effectively participate in religious services. Material questions of fact exist as to whether IDOC employs a consistent and widespread practice of denying hearing accommodations to offenders for religious purposes. Principally, the record contains extensive evidence that IDOC has denied or ignored specific requests for ASL interpreters for religious services and programs. (See Senor Dep. at 159–60; Holmes Dep. at 96; Wright Dep. at 65–66; Winfert Dep. at 42–44; Foster Dep. at 40–41.) If proven, this widespread practice would impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ ability to attend religious services of their choice. Therefore, we reject Defendant’s argument and deny his motion as to Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claim.
C. Constitutional Claims Counts IV through VIII assert violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to free speech (Count IV), free religion (Count V), freedom from cruel and unusual punishment (Count VI), equal protection (Count VII) and due process (Count VIII). Plaintiffs bring these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action for individuals to sue government actors in their official capacity for alleged deprivations of federal law. Defendant first argues that each of these counts should be dismissed because the ADA’s enforcement scheme precludes § 1983 constitutional claims based on the same conduct. He then makes
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substantive arguments against each claim individually. Since Defendant’s preclusion argument presents a threshold issue, we will address that first.
i. ADA and § 1983 Constitutional Claims Although § 1983 typically allows private citizens to enforce violations of the Constitution and federal statute by state actors, there are exceptions to its application. Relevant here, a comprehensive remedial scheme set forth by Congress may preclude § 1983 relief to remedy violations of the statute. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626 (1981); Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts impose this limitation to prevent plaintiffs from bypassing specific statutory enforcement procedures and remedies outlined by Congress in the relevant federal statute by bringing suit directly under § 1983. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 254–55, 129 S. Ct. 788, 795 (2009); Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 20, 101 S. Ct. at 2626. The Seventh Circuit has not squarely decided whether the ADA or Rehabilitation Act preclude § 1983 claims for violations of those statutes, although other circuits and district courts in this circuit have found that they do. See, e.g., Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002); Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 610 (5th Cir. 1999); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997); Mulligan v. Vill. of Riverside, 11 C 8200, 2013 WL 2422639, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2013). Consistent with this authority, we find it exceedingly likely that plaintiffs may not employ § 1983 to assert statutory violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Here, however, the question is more complicated because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims allege constitutional violations, not violations of the statutes themselves. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are still precluded by the ADA’s remedial scheme because they
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are based on the same conduct as their ADA claims. (SJ Mem. at 12.) Plaintiffs do not directly deny that their constitutional and ADA claims are based on similar conduct, but they argue that preclusion simply does not apply to § 1983 constitutional claims. (SJ Resp. at 10.)
To support his theory, Defendant cites Grey v. Wilburn, in which the Eighth Circuit determined that the ADA precluded the plaintiff’s § 1983 equal protection claim because it was based on the same facts as his statutory claims. 270 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 5 C 1043, 2006 WL 1579611, at *7–8 (D. Utah May 31, 2006). The Seventh Circuit, however, has generally treated preclusion of § 1983 constitutional claims more cautiously. In Discovery House, the Seventh Circuit recognized Grey but distinguished its own precedent by explaining that it “has consistently declined to find that other similar statutes preclude § 1983 relief when the § 1983 claim is based directly on a constitutional violation, not a statutory one.” Discovery House, 319 F.3d at 281 (citing Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985)); see Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2012) (disagreeing with the weight of other circuits and finding that the ADEA does not preclude constitutional claims despite its “rather comprehensive remedial scheme”).
In deciding whether a statutory scheme precludes § 1983 remedies, the critical consideration is whether Congress intended the statute to preclude the alternative relief sought. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252, 129 S. Ct. at 793–94; Levin, 692 F.3d at 615. In the Seventh Circuit, where the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, “more is required than a comprehensive statutory scheme” to glean Congress’s intent. Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. Absent “clear or manifest congressional intent in either the language of the statute or the legislative history,” we must compare the rights and protections of the statute and the Constitution. Id. at 621. “Where the contours of such rights and protections diverge in significant ways, it is
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not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252–53, 129 S. Ct. at 794.
First, we find neither the statutory text nor the legislative history of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act contain clear or manifest Congressional intent to preclude simultaneous constitutional claims. To the contrary, the sound analysis conducted by Magistrate Judge Denlow in Baumgardner v. County of Cook, indicates that Congress did not intend for ADA claims to limit a disabled individual’s constitutional protections.42 108 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Yates ex rel. Estate of Yates v. Beck, 3 C 10, 2003 WL 22231260, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding that ADA’s “legislative history evidences an intent . . . to supplement, not preempt, other federal and state laws protecting disabled individuals from discrimination”).
Turning to the next step in our analysis, the protections available under the ADA and the constitutional claims alleged vary in material respects. To prove their claims under the ADA, the Plaintiffs must establish that they were qualified individuals with a disability and were excluded from participating in the programs and services challenged because of that disability. Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 592; Love, 103 F.3d at 560. To prove their equal protection claim, however, Plaintiffs must show that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 919 (7th Cir. 2015). And, as another example, to prove their Eighth Amendment inadequate medical treatment claim, Plaintiffs must establish that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). The elements of these and the other constitutional claims alleged vary from the
42 For example, the statute expressly provides: “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
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standard of proof under the ADA, evidencing a lack of Congressional intent that the ADA preclude separate enforcement of disabled individuals’ constitutional rights. See Yates ex rel., 2003 WL 22231260, at *5 (permitting a § 1983 constitutional claim in ADA case and distinguishing between the substantive standards for ADA and equal protection claims).
Our conclusion is further supported by the similarities between the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, the latter two of which the Seventh Circuit has found do not preclude constitutional remedies. Levin, 692 F.3d at 617 (ADEA); Trigg, 766 F.2d at 302 (Title VII). Not only are the purposes and enforcement procedures of these statutes similar. See Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA contain similar statements of congressional purpose); Berryhill v. Ill. State Toll Highway, 12 C 6119, 2013 WL 2241965, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2013) (explaining that the “ADA’s enforcement provision expressly incorporates the enforcement provisions of Title VII”). But in addition, the standards, elements of proof, and available remedies are similar as well. See Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 536 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that the standards and elements of retaliation claims are similar under the ADA and Title VII); Pavlovic v. Bd. of Educ. for City of Chi., 11 C 00830, 2012 WL 4361432, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2012) (“[A]ge discrimination claims under the ADEA and disability discrimination claims under the ADA are analyzed in a similar manner as national origin discrimination claims brought under Title VII.”); Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“ADA reasonable accommodation claims are nearly identical to the corresponding Title VII section.”); Baumgardner, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1044–45 (“[T]he ADA incorporates by reference many of the definitions, powers, procedures, and remedies set forth in specified sections of Title VII.”).
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In light of the similarities between these statutes, we find it highly likely that the Seventh Circuit would find the ADA does not preclude § 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations.
Indeed, numerous district courts in this circuit have permitted simultaneous ADA and constitutional claims.43 Hale v. Pace, 9 C 5131, 2011 WL 1303369, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (dismissing § 1983 claim based “solely on a violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,” but expressly allowing § 1983 equal protection claims); Chalk v. S. Dearborn Cmty. Sch. Corp., 5 C 72, 2005 WL 4889192, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2005) (“In other words, at the pleading stage there is more alleged against the defendants than merely the denial of rights established by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act and there are circumstances imaginable which could support an independent claim on behalf of [plaintiff] for denial of constitutionally protected rights under § 1983.”); Baumgardner, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“[I]t was not the intent of Congress that individuals must lay down their constitutional rights to equal protection at the door of the courthouse when they file an ADA claim.”); see also Jones v. Reg’l Transp. Auth., 11 C 4924, 2012 WL 2905797, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2012) (dismissing § 1983 claims in ADA case in part because “no constitutional-right violation [was] alleged”); Baumgardt v. Wausau Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (explaining that the Seventh Circuit has suggested that the ADA does not preempt equal protection claims).
43 Courts in other jurisdictions have permitted these claims as well. See Damron v. Butler Cty. Children’s Servs., 8 C 257, 2009 WL 5217086, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2009) (“[A]lthough Damron based her § 1983 [constitutional] and statutory discrimination claims on the same core set of facts, her § 1983 claims are not barred.”); Mork v. Salt Lake Cty., 3 C 686, 2005 WL 3050990, at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 15, 2005); Cisneros v. Colorado, 3 C 2122W, 2005 WL 1719755, at *10 (D. Colo. July 22, 2005); Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, MD, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699, 709 (D. Md. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims brought under § 1983 are not preempted by the ADA even though based on the same facts and circumstances as the ADA claims.”).
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Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 constitutional claims are not barred by the remedial statutory schemes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. We now move on to address Defendant’s substantive arguments as to each constitutional claim.
ii. First Amendment Right to Free Speech In Count IV Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has deprived them of their constitutional right to free speech by denying them access to TTY phones and forcing them to rely on unqualified interpreters who are not bound by professional confidentiality standards during medical appointments and disciplinary hearings. (SJ Resp. at 11–12.) Defendant describes these allegations as complaints that IDOC has not aided them in exercising their speech. (SJ Mem. at 13.) He argues that the First Amendment does not require state actors to affirmatively assist inmates in their exercise of speech; rather, it simply bars the government from enacting a rule or law that restricts inmates from doing so. (Id.) We start our analysis with the alleged denial of qualified interpreters. Despite the fact that Plaintiffs discuss the use of unqualified ASL interpreters under the free speech subject heading, they describe this conduct as violating their constitutional right to privacy. (SJ Resp. at 11–12.) Violations of the right to privacy present distinct claims from violations of the right to free speech. As Defendant points out, Plaintiffs did not allege a violation of their right to privacy in their complaint. “[A] plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002)); accord Outlaw v. Regis Corp., 525 F. App’x 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2013). By the summary judgment stage it is typically too late to permit plaintiffs to amend their complaint, thus courts routinely refuse to consider claims raised for the first time during summary judgment. See, e.g., Anderson, 699 F.3d
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at 997 (finding district court did not err by rejecting claims first asserted at summary judgment); Messner v. Calderone, 407 F. App’x 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding “the district court properly declined to consider [a] new theory at summary judgment”); Kirsch v. Brightstar Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 676 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“New claims cannot be introduced at the summary judgment stage.”). Thus, we will not consider Plaintiffs’ privacy arguments.
Plaintiffs’ only other free speech claim alleges that IDOC denied them access to TTY phones, thereby preventing them from communicating with family and friends. (SJ Resp. at 11.) We recognize that some circuits have held that inmates have a First Amendment right to use telephones to communicate with friends and family. See Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]risoner’s have a First Amendment right to telephone access.”); Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit, however, has expressed doubt, stating “[n]ot to allow [inmates] access to a telephone might be questionable on other grounds, but to suppose that it would infringe the First Amendment would be doctrinaire in the extreme.” Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 564–65 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Boriboune v. Litscher, 91 F. App’x 498, 499 (7th Cir. 2003) (“But though prisoners have a right under the First Amendment to communicate with others outside the prison, we have expressed doubt that this amounts to an unqualified right for a prisoner to have access to a telephone.” (citation omitted)). Even courts that hold inmates do have a First Amendment right to telephone access agree that this “right may be limited as long as the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Boriboune, 91 Fed. App’x at 499; see Israel v. Cohn, 6 F. App’x 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Regulations limiting telephone use by inmates . . . have been sustained routinely as reasonable.”).
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Plaintiffs do not support their argument that IDOC denied them access to TTYs with any citation to the record. We will, however, give them the benefit of the doubt and consider the evidence identified in their statement of facts. Although Plaintiffs identify a handful of instances where IDOC denied TTY access, (see Pls’ SOF ¶ 29(A)), the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ complaints focus on the timeliness and frequency at which they have access to the devices, (id. ¶¶ 29(C)–30(D)). The evidence presented might support a claim under the ADA, but it does not establish a constitutional violation. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff did not allege that he was denied telephone access when he had an emergency or specific need to speak with his lawyer); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 11 C 3118, 2015 WL 1470877, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2015) (granting summary judgment because isolated instances of TTY unavailability in prisons did not violate the Constitution). Since no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that IDOC has violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to free speech based on the record presented, Count IV is dismissed.
iii. First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion Count V contends that IDOC burdened Plaintiffs’ exercise of free religion by not making “reasonable efforts” to provide them with opportunities to practice their religions. (Id. at 12.) As with Plaintiffs’ free speech claim, Defendant argues that the free exercise clause does not require IDOC to affirmatively assist Plaintiffs in practicing their religions, as long as it does not enact a rule or law preventing them from doing so. (SJ Mem. at 13.) The free exercise clause prohibits the government from making decisions, rules or laws that selectively burdens the free exercise of religion. Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 743 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating the free exercise clause prohibits states from selectively imposing
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burdens “only on conduct motivated by religious belief” (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2232 (1993))); C.L.U.B. v. City of Chi., 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). A burden exists when the defendant has pressured the plaintiff to change his behavior and violate his beliefs. C.L.U.B., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 914. “[A] burden must be more than a mere inconvenience to rise to the level of a constitutional injury; it must place ‘significant pressure’ on [the plaintiff] to ‘forego religious precepts’ or to engage in ‘religious conduct.’” Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 999 (7th Cir. 2006). Examples of religious burdens include “discriminating against [a plaintiff] because of her religious belief, inhibiting her dissemination of particular religious views or pressuring her to forgo a religious practice.” C.L.U.B., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
Plaintiffs’ widespread policy and practice allegation essentially contends that IDOC has a rule not to offer ASL interpreters or other hearing accommodations for religious services, which restricts Plaintiffs from participating in those services. Inmates have a First Amendment right to attend religious services that are offered to other inmates. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (1987); Burgess v. Goord, 98 C 2077, 1999 WL 33458, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999). Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the alleged systemic failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiffs’ hearing impairments such that they can attend these services would, if proved, burden this Constitutional right. See Hernandez, 2015 WL 3868036, at *13 (finding the exclusion of inmates with disabilities from religious services violated the free exercise clause); Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F. Supp. 2d 720, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (finding wheelchair bound detainees stated a First Amendment claim by alleging prison denied them, unlike detainees without disabilities, access to the religious library and outdoor pagan
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worship area); Burgess, 1999 WL 33458, at *6 (refusing to dismiss free exercise claim based on
the defendant’s alleged failure to provide walking impaired inmates with accommodations to
attend religious services). Since disputed issues of fact remain as to whether IDOC’s policies
and practices fail to accommodate hearing impaired offenders’ religious needs, we cannot find as
a matter of law that Defendant has not burdened Plaintiffs’ religious freedoms.
At trial, the fact-finder’s analysis may not end with a determination of whether Plaintiffs’
free exercise right was infringed because not all burdens on an inmate’s religious freedoms
violate the equal protection clause.44 But because Defendant did not raise other arguments or
present any justifications for the alleged infringement, we will stop here and deny his motion as
to Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim.
iv. Eighth Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits governments from inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. In Count VI, Plaintiffs assert three types of claims under
44 In most cases, if a burden on an individual’s religious freedom is unintentional and caused by a rule that is neutral and generally applicable, it will not violate the First Amendment. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (1990)); Listecki, 780 F.3d at 745 (“We read the Court’s statement that a general and neutral law will be upheld even if it has the ‘incidental effect of burdening’ religion to mean the law will be upheld as long as it only unintentionally burdens religion.”). And even if a rule is not of general and neutral applicability, a resulting religious burden may be justified by a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Listecki, 780, F.3d at 743. To complicate matters even more, in the prison context, whether prisons are required to make exceptions to neutral and generally applicable rules in order to reasonably accommodate inmates’ religious beliefs is currently an open question. See Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013); Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2012). In O’Lone v. Shabazz, the Supreme Court found that under the First Amendment, prison authorities are required to accommodate religious preferences if consistent with penological concerns. 482 U.S. at 348–49, 107 S. Ct. at 2403–04; see Grayson, 666 F.3d at 453; Maddox, 655 F.3d at 719 (“Prisons must permit inmates the reasonable opportunity to exercise religious freedom.”). Although the Seventh Circuit has expressed doubt that the Supreme Court would uphold that rule today, it has yet to be expressly overturned. Lewis, 712 F.3d at 1085; Grayson, 666 F.3d 452–53.
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this clause: (1) cruel and unusual conditions of confinement; (2) inadequate medical treatment; and (3) other exposure to substantial risk of harm. (SJ Resp. at 12–14.) Defendant argues that the record does not support a finding that any of these allegations rise to the level of a constitutional violation. (SJ Reply at 13.)
First, Plaintiffs assert that by limiting their ability to effectively communicate, IDOC placed them in “communicative isolation” akin to segregation throughout the duration of their incarceration. (SJ Resp. on 12–13.) This isolation, they claim, amounts to a cruel and unusual condition of confinement. To establish a condition of confinement claim, plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference in depriving him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2014); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670. Courts have found that life’s necessities include things like shelter, heat, hygiene, clothing, personal safety and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994); Townsend, 759 F.3d at 687; Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Although the record creates an issue of fact as to whether Plaintiffs are able to communicate as effectively as hearing-abled inmates, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the communication barriers described did not render them so isolated that they were deprived of life’s basic necessities. No Plaintiff alleged that they were entirely unable to communicate; at a minimum they interacted with IDOC staff and other inmates through gestures, written notes, or reading lips, and many could even speak and understand at least some English. Moreover, Plaintiffs were not actually segregated from the general population—barring any temporary disciplinary action—and were regularly exposed to other day-to-day human interactions. Thus, Plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment claim fails on this ground.
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Next, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant placed them at substantial risk of serious harm by failing to provide visual notification systems for daily and emergency events such as meals, yard time, visitors, and fire evacuations. (SJ Resp. at 13.) Defendant responds that Plaintiffs fail to explain how flashing lights would be helpful in these situations, and contends that IDOC provides other accommodations such as vibrating watches and individual notifications from IDOC staff. (SJ Reply at 14.) To prove their claim, Plaintiffs must establish that they were exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm, that Defendant knew about that risk of harm, and that he disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it. O’Brien v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr. ex rel. Turner, 495 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984). We already found in our summary judgment analysis on the ADA claim that whether IDOC provides consistent notifications of daily events and emergencies to hearing impaired inmates—i.e., whether Defendant took reasonable measures to prevent the alleged risk of harm—is a disputed issue of fact for trial. Whether Plaintiffs were in fact exposed to a substantial risk of harm, however, still needs to be addressed.
Weighing all disputed issues in favor of Plaintiff, failing to notify Plaintiffs of daily events like meals, showers, and gym time did not expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm. Although numerous Plaintiffs testified that they have missed meals, showers, visitors, etc. because they could not hear the audio announcements, they did not claim that these missed opportunities endangered their health. Courts have found that occasionally missing events like meals and showers do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Braemer, 586 F. App’x 224, 228 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Allowing inmates only two showers and four hours of outside recreation each week does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671 (finding that occasionally missing a morning meal did not amount to cruel and
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unusual punishment); Myrick v. Anglin, 496 F. App’x 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that limiting inmates to weekly showers does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that only two meals per day on “regular, permanent basis” would not violate the Eighth Amendment if nutritionally adequate). Thus, we find as a matter of law that the alleged failure to notify Plaintiffs of non-emergency events does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
On the other hand, widespread failure to alert hearing impaired Plaintiffs to emergency situations could place them at substantial risk of serious harm. At least three Plaintiffs testified that they were evacuated late or not at all during emergency drills. Plaintiff Lancaster stated that during the last evacuation an officer did not notify him until “everyone else had left.” (Lancaster Dep. at 41–43.) Plaintiff Lord testified that officers have sometime forgotten to alert him to fire drills preventing him from evacuating as quickly as other inmates. (Lord Dep. at 35–36.) And Plaintiff Childress explained that during multiple fire and tornado drills he did not evacuate with the other inmates because he could not hear the alarms. (Childress Dep. at 20–21.) In a real emergency situation, such as a fire or tornado, late or non-existent notification would place Plaintiffs at a substantial risk of bodily harm or even death. We also find there is at least a disputed issue as to whether Defendant knew about this risk, since the ADA Directive itself requires facilities to have emergency evacuation plans for ADA inmates and at least some facilities do have flashing alerts. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 37(A); Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 35(B)–35(D); Halterman Dep. at 41–42; Butler Dep. at 82.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not shown how flashing lights would alleviate this risk, but we find this fairly obvious and, in any event, it is an issue of fact not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. Although we found that the absence of non-emergency notifications does not support a cruel and unusual punishment violation, the
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evidence presented regarding emergency notifications could. Therefore, summary judgment is not warranted on the emergency notification aspect of this claim.
Finally, Plaintiffs third Eighth Amendment claim alleges that IDOC provides inadequate medical care to hearing impaired inmates by failing to enable inmates to communicate effectively with medical staff. To establish an Eighth Amendment violation on these grounds, Plaintiffs must show IDOC’s practice of not providing effective communication for hearing impaired inmates resulted in deliberate indifference to objectively serious medical conditions. Perez, 792 F.3d at 776; Holloway v. Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012); see Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Mere negligence or gross negligence is not sufficient; Defendant must be deliberately indifferent. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). Deliberate indifference to a known medical condition can be displayed through inaction, persisting with inappropriate treatment, acting in a manner inconsistent with the recognized standard of care, or delaying necessary treatment and thus aggravating the injury or needlessly prolonging pain. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 498 F. App’x 629, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2012); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 2011); McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640.
Certain Plaintiffs testified that they suffer from medical conditions such as diabetes, kidney disease, a broken finger, and persistent migraines. (Pls’ SOF ¶¶ 26(B)–26(D).) Defendant does not dispute these conditions, which we find are objectively serious. These Plaintiffs further claim that ineffective communication with medical staff—a result of IDOC’s systemic failure to provide effective communication resources for hearing impaired inmates—
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has led to inappropriate treatment, prolonged pain, and aggravation to their injury or illness.45
(Id.) In addition, Plaintiffs testified that when being treated for these conditions they requested
the use of VRI equipment and/or ASL interpreters, alerting IDOC staff to the communication
barriers. (Childress Dep. at 11–15, 33; Wright Interrog. No. 6.) This evidence establishes triable
issues of fact as to whether Defendant employs a widespread practice of deliberate indifference
to hearing impaired inmates serious medical needs. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied
as to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care.
v. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying individuals equal protection of
the law. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254
(1985). Count VII contends that Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs of equal protection under the
law by denying them equal access to IDOC’s programs and services. (Compl. ¶¶ 187–190;
SJ Resp. at 14.) To prove this claim, Plaintiffs must show that Defendant: (1) “treated [them] differently from others who were similarly situated, (2) intentionally treated [them] differently
because of [their] membership in the class to which [they] belonged (i.e., [hearing disabled]), and
(3) because [the disabled] do not enjoy any heightened protection under the Constitution, . . . that
the discriminatory intent was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Schroeder v.
Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2002); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 105
S. Ct. at 3255–56; Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1037–38 (N.D. Ill. 2003). As the
45 Defendant’s suggestion that expert testimony is required to show lack of effective communication exacerbated their conditions, (SJ Reply at 14 n.4), is incorrect. The Seventh Circuit has held that expert testimony is not required to prove an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical treatment claim. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] non-trivial delay in treating serious pain can be actionable even without expert medical testimony showing that the delay aggravated the underlying condition.”); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 13 C 4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014) (finding expert testimony was not needed to show delay in medical treatment caused additional pain and suffering).
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parties seem to agree, a showing of intentional discrimination is critical to proving this claim. Bohen v. City of Chi., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186–87 (7th Cir. 1986); Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645; Doe, 782 F.3d at 919.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim must be dismissed because there is no evidence of discriminatory intent against hearing impaired inmates. (SJ Mem. at 15.) Plaintiffs respond that they can establish intent through the circumstantial evidence of “ongoing knowledge of the disparity in treatment.” (SJ Resp. at 15 (citing Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F. Supp. 2d 858, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2009)).) In other words, Plaintiffs suggest that simply because IDOC has treated hearing impaired inmates differently from hearing-abled inmates for an extended period of time, the fact finder can reasonably conclude that the disparity in treatment was based on their disability. We agree that discriminatory purpose can be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S. Ct. 555, 564, (1977); Williams v. Sheriff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 (7th Cir. 2003); Kaupas v. Vill. of Univ. Park, 2 C 3674, 2003 WL 22048173, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2003). “Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that a decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on the identifiable group.” Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 453–54 (internal quotation omitted); see Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645; Anderson, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. Plaintiffs cannot succeed with proof merely that Defendant was negligent or even that he was aware of the consequences of IDOC’s actions. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 453–54 (internal quotation omitted); Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645. We do not agree that ongoing disparate treatment alone is sufficient to infer discriminatory intent under these standards. Since Plaintiffs have not presented evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could
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find that Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs based on their hearing disabilities, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is dismissed.
vi. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process Finally, in Count VIII Plaintiffs allege that IDOC deprived them of their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by not providing ASL interpreters during disciplinary investigations and hearings. (Compl. ¶ 194; SJ Resp. at 15.) A prisoner who alleges he was denied due process during disciplinary proceedings must establish that: “(1) he has a liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with; and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989)). Defendant does not seem to dispute, at least for the purposes of summary judgment, that Plaintiffs can establish a liberty interest. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held that inmates have a liberty interest in good-time credits, which are often at issue in disciplinary hearings. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 939; Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644–54 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, Defendant contends that the record does not support a finding that IDOC systemically denies hearing accommodations in these settings. (SJ Mem. at 15; SJ Reply at 15.) In other words, Defendant argues that the procedures IDOC affords to hearing impaired inmates are constitutionally sufficient. Due process requires that prisoners in disciplinary proceedings be given the opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker, advance notice of the disciplinary charges against them, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 939; Burton v. Davis, 41 F. App’x 841, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has held that in a criminal proceeding, due process is denied when a defendant is
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unable to comprehend the proceedings because of language barriers. United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2001). Numerous district courts have extended this principle to inmates in disciplinary hearings on the theory that their liberty interest is akin to that of criminal defendants. See Sandoval v. Holinka, 9 C 33, 2009 WL 499110, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2009); Clarkson, 898 F. Supp. at 1049–50 (finding prison’s failure to provide hearing accommodations to deaf inmates disciplinary, grievance and parole hearings constituted denial of due process); Bonner v. Arizona Dept. of Corr., 714 F. Supp. 420, 425 (D. Ariz. 1989) (determining that deaf inmate had a due process liberty interest in a qualified sign language interpreter during disciplinary hearing proceedings); see also Jacobo v. Holder, 15 C 703, 2015 WL 4651525, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2015) (stating that the denial of a Spanish-English interpreter at a prison disciplinary hearing raised due process concerns).
We agree with these district courts and hold that hearing impaired inmates who are not fluent in English may have a due process right to a qualified interpreter at prison disciplinary hearings. Although Plaintiffs again fail to cite to the record to support their contention that IDOC systemically denies ASL interpreters during disciplinary hearings, we will give them the benefit of the doubt and refer to their statement of facts.
First, we are skeptical as to whether IDOC’s process for determining whether an inmate needs an ASL interpreter to be adequately heard is sufficient. Mr. Graham, IDOC’s Adjustment Committee Chairman, testified that when an offender at a disciplinary hearing indicates that he is hearing impaired, the Adjustment Committee makes an impromptu determination as to whether he can communicate sufficiently. (Pls’ SOF ¶ 32(C); Graham Dep. at 67–69, 74–75.) Mr. Graham himself has never received ADA training specific to this role. (Graham Dep. at 73.) According to Plaintiffs’ expert Professor Cokely, deaf individuals’ communication capabilities
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are often misunderstood by the hearing-abled community. (See Cokely Rpt. at 18–23.) Thus, we find it possible that quick and ill-educated judgments could very easily lead a hearing officer to improperly conclude that an inmate can adequately communicate when in fact he cannot.
Moreover, the record is scattered with incidents of hearing impaired offenders being denied hearing accommodations during disciplinary proceedings, both before and after the 2012 ADA Directive. As cited in our recitation of the facts, a number of Plaintiffs testified that they were not able to fully understand the proceedings, and many were disciplined as a result. For example, IDOC denied Plaintiff Johnson’s request for an ASL interpreter at his May 13, 2014 disciplinary hearing. (Johnson Suppl. Interrog. No. 6.) Johnson testified that he did not fully understand the hearing, and did not understand why IDOC denied his request to have two officers testify as witnesses. (Id.) Johnson also recalls a separate disciplinary hearing where he did not have an ASL interpreter present and his hands were handcuffed behind his back preventing him from using gestures to communicate. (Johnson Interrog. No. 7.) In the presence of this evidence, we cannot conclude that IDOC’s policies and practices regarding hearing accommodations at disciplinary hearings afford hearing impaired inmates sufficient due process as a matter of law. There are at least disputed issues of fact as to whether IDOC’s procedure for determining whether an ASL interpreter is needed is sufficient to protect inmates’ due process rights, and whether this process has in fact led to deprivations of hearing impaired inmates’ liberty interests. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion on Count VIII is denied.
CONCLUSION As explained herein, Defendant’s motion to exclude the expert testimony Elizabeth Stanosheck as unreliable is denied with prejudice and his motion to exclude her testimony as cumulative is denied without prejudice.
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In addition, we find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the class certification requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2). Daniel Baxter and Curtis Foster, however, are inadequate class representatives and are dismissed from the case. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted with our modification to the class definition as stated in Section II(B) of our discussion.
Finally, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part. Summary Judgment is denied as to Counts I (ADA), II (Rehabilitation Act), III (RLUIPA), V (free exercise), and VIII (due process), and is granted as to Counts IV (free speech) and VII (equal protection). As for Count VI (cruel and unusual punishment), summary judgment is granted to the extent the claim is based on Plaintiffs’ allegations that IDOC placed them in communicative isolation and failed to notify them of non-emergency events, and is denied as to Plaintiffs’ allegations that IDOC failed to notify them of emergency events and to provide adequate medical care.
Accordingly, Counts IV and VII are dismissed, as are the aspects of Count VI related to communicative isolation and non-emergency notifications. The case will proceed as a class action on Counts I, II, III, V, VIII, and the remaining aspects of Count VI.
It is so ordered.

Dated: October 8, 2015 Chicago, IL

Marvin E. Aspen United States District Judge

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SALVADOR A. GODINEZ,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 11 C 2961

)

Hon. Marvin E. Aspen

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:

Plaintiffs, eleven deaf or hard of hearing prisoners, brought this class action on behalf of

themselves and others similarly situated against Defendant Salvador A. Godinez, the Acting

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). Plaintiffs allege that IDOC has

denied them hearing accommodations needed to effectively communicate with IDOC staff and

others, participate in IDOC programs and services, and follow safety warnings and directives.

The complaint alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the

Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and

the United States Constitution. The parties have requested a bench trial.

Presently before us are eight motions in limine filed by the parties in preparation for trial.

As set forth below, we deny the parties’ motions but reopen discovery for sixty days for the

limited purposes outlined below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to our “inherent authority to manage the course of trials,” we have broad

discretion when ruling on evidentiary questions raised by motions in limine. Luce v.

United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463 (1984); Perry v. City of Chi., 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013); Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). In limine rulings serve “to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); see Tzoumis v. Tempel Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 871, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Such rulings allow the parties to focus their preparations, eliminate delays during trial, and enable us to preemptively exclude “evidentiary submissions that clearly ought not be presented . . . because they clearly would be inadmissible for any purpose.” Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440; Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture LLC, No. 09 C 6455, 2013 WL 1816162, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2013); Casares v. Bernal, 790 F. Supp. 2d 769, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Unless the moving party can demonstrate that the challenged evidence is clearly inadmissible on all possible grounds, we must defer our evidentiary ruling until trial. Thomas, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Anglin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Tzoumis, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 873. We can then accurately assess the foundation, relevance, and potential prejudice of the evidence in the context of the trial as a whole. Casares, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 775; Thomas, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Tzoumis, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 873. In a bench trial, as here, the dangers of unfair prejudice, irrelevancy, and confusion are minimal, so motions in limine are less important than in a jury trial. See United States v. Lim, 57 F. App’x 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2003);United States v. Shukri, 207 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In a bench trial, we assume that the district court was not influenced by evidence improperly brought before it unless there is evidence to the contrary.”); Ashford v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he law presumes that judges are not influenced by improper evidence
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brought before them.”); United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1305 (7th Cir. 1976) (“[W]hen we have held that evidence was improperly admitted in a bench trial, we have refused to presume that the trial judge considered it in reaching his verdict.”); City of Joliet v. Mid-City Nat. Bank of Chi., No. 5 C 6746, 2012 WL 5463792, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2012) (“Rule 403’s concerns carry significantly less weigh in a bench trial, where there is a presumption that the court is not improperly influenced by the evidence brought before it.”); Bone Care Intern., LLC v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 8 C 1083, 2010 WL 3894444, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that in a bench trial, “the trial judge has flexibility to provisionally admit testimony or evidence and then discount or disregard it if upon further reflection it is entitled to little weight or should not have been admitted at all”); Lewis v. City of Chi., No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2005) (“In the context of a bench trial, however, Rule 403 objections have no logical application and are routinely overruled.”) (rev’d on other grounds); Barna v. United States, 183 F.R.D. 235, 239 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[M]otions in limine to strike party experts are less important in bench trials. . . . I will decide at trial whether the opinions should be given credence and what weight to attach to them.”) Because a ruling on a motion in limine is “subject to change as the case unfolds,” we reserve the option of revisiting our preliminary evidentiary determinations as appropriate at trial. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S. Ct. at 463; Perry, 733 F.3d at 252; Thomas, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
ANALYSIS Plaintiff filed six motions seeking to preclude multiple defense exhibits and witnesses. (See Dkt. Nos. 323–26). Defendant filed two motions asking us to bar deposition testimony
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offered by Plaintiffs along with certain exhibits and witnesses. (See Dkt. Nos. 329–30.) We discuss each motion in turn.
I. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Bar Defendant from Calling Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed In their first motion, Plaintiffs request that we bar eleven defense witnesses from
testifying under Rule 37(c). (See Dkt. No. 323 at 1.) Plaintiffs argue that these eleven witnesses, ADA coordinators at various IDOC facilities, were not disclosed until March 28, 2016, a year and a half after discovery had closed. (Id. at 2.) According to Plaintiffs, because Defendant did not disclose the names of the eleven ADA coordinators prior to the end of discovery, Plaintiffs were unable to depose the witnesses and are prejudiced. (Id. at 4.) Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ motion and argues that due to the fluid nature of the ADA coordinator position, Defendant was unable to provide accurate witness lists during initial discovery but disclosed “the facility ADA coordinator” at various IDOC facilities and updated the names of the ADA coordinators as soon as new information became available. (See Dkt. No. 335 at 3.) Defendant additionally notes that because direct examination will be submitted through declarations prior to trial, Plaintiffs will have ample time to review the ADA coordinators’ exact testimony prior to cross-examination at trial. (Id. at 8.) We agree with Defendant and deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
a. Rule 26(a) initial disclosures Rule 26(a) requires a party to voluntarily disclose to the other parties; “(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information–along with the subjects of that information–that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). “The purpose of Rule 26(a)(2) is to allow the parties to prepare their cases adequately and efficiently, and to prevent undue surprise.” Buzinski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 8 C 3966, 2009 WL 1616512, at *2
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(N.D. Ill. June 5, 2009) (citing Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rule 26(e) requires a party to supplement or amend its disclosures, discovery responses, or interrogatory answers if he learns that information previously disclosed or an earlier discovery response is “incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). A party need not supplement an initial disclosure if the new witness’s identity is made known to the opposing party in the course of discovery. Krawczyk v. Centurion Capital Corp., No. 6 C 6273, 2009 WL 395458, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s disclosure of “unknown representatives” adequately notified defendants that plaintiff might rely on company representatives and thus, complied with Rule 26(a)); Weiland v. Linear Const., Ltd., No. 0 C 6172, 2002 WL 31307622, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2002) (finding that plaintiffs had no duty to supplement Rule 26 disclosures where they initially indicated that they intended to call a representative of company and later disclosed the name of the representative when his identity became available). The exclusion of non-disclosed evidence is “mandatory under Rule 37(c)(1) unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless.” Rossi v. City of Chi., 790 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004)).
b. Defendant’s Disclosures Complied with Rule 26(a) On September 7, 2012, Defendant filed initial Rule 26(a) disclosures. (See Dkt. No. 323– 3.) In those disclosures, Defendant identified “the facility ADA coordinator” at ten IDOC facilities as individuals who may have information used to support Defendant’s case, as required under Rule 26(a). (Id. at 2–3.) Along with identifying the broad category of “facility ADA coordinator,” Defendant also named the individual serving as ADA coordinator at the time of
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disclosure. (Id. (“The facility ADA coordinator at Pontiac Correctional Center, currently Marvin Reed . . . .”).) A year later, on November 7, 2013, Defendant supplemented his Rule 26(a) disclosures in accordance with Rule 26(a)(1)(A). (See Dkt. No. 323–4.) The updated disclosures amended the current ADA facility coordinator witness where initial disclosures were out of date due to personnel changes at the ADA coordinator position. (See id. at 5 (“The facility ADA coordinator at Pontiac Correctional Center, currently Annebelle Moteller . . . .”).) Defendant continued to update the list of current ADA coordinators through March 2016. (See Dkt. No. 323–9.) Based on Defendant’s good faith supplemental disclosures, we find that he has complied with Rule 26(a). Krawczyk, 2009 WL 395458, at *6; Weiland, 2002 WL 31307622, at *3.
Even if Defendant did not comply with Rule 26 disclosure requirements, any such failure to disclose is both justified and harmless. Rossi, 790 F.3d at 738. Due to the fluid nature of the ADA coordinator position, Defendant did not know who would hold the position at the time of trial. Accordingly, Defendant notified Plaintiffs of his intention to call the current ADA coordinator at various IDOC facilities. Plaintiffs’ motion in limine concerning undisclosed ADA coordinators is denied. (See Dkt. No. 323.) However, to avoid any prejudice to Plaintiffs, we reopen discovery for sixty days to permit Plaintiffs to depose any newly disclosed witnesses. II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Limit Evidence at Trial to Conditions Existing in IDOC
Facilities as of the Close of Discovery Plaintiffs’ second motion seeks the exclusion of post-discovery IDOC conditions where no discovery was taken. (See Dkt. No. 324.) Plaintiffs argue that without such a restriction “trial would be a free-for-all with Plaintiffs having no notice of the conditions that [Defendant is] challenging and no ability to contest the sufficiency of those conditions through discovery.”
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(See Dkt. No. 324 at 2.) Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunction relief, current prison conditions, not conditions as of September 2014, are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.
a. Current Conditions Evidence The Supreme Court has held that prisoners seeking injunctive relief for a “‘contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue,’ . . . must come forward with evidence from which it can be inferred that defendant-officials were at the time the suit was filed, . . . during the remainder of the litigation and into the future” violating plaintiffs’ rights. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1983 (1994). Accordingly, “the inmate may rely, in the district court’s discretion, on developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions, as the defendants may rely on such developments to establish that the inmate is not entitled to an injunction.” Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 523–34, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1935–36 (2011) (affirming three-judge panel’s discovery order in prison condition case permitting discovery up to a month before trial). Again, to avoid any potential prejudice to either party, discovery will also be reopened for sixty days to allow the parties to inquire into any current prison conditions. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. (See Dkt. No. 324.) III. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Bar Evidence of IDOC’s Financial or Budgetary Constraints, Undue Cost or Expense Plaintiffs’ third motion asks us to bar evidence of IDOC’s financial or budgetary constraints under Rules 401 and 402. (See Dkt. No. 325.) Defendant opposes the motion and argues that evidence concerning IDOC’s budgetary constraints goes directly to whether Plaintiffs’ requested accommodations are “reasonable” under the ADA. (See Dkt. No. 334 at 12.) We agree with Defendant and deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
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a. Reasonable Accommodation Under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that they are qualified individuals with a disability; (2) who were either excluded from participating in, or denied the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of their disability. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015); Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996); Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 681 F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Public entities are only required to make “reasonable modifications 1 in policies, practices or procedures.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). In the prison context, whether accommodations are reasonable must be judged “in light of the overall institutional requirements,” including “[s]ecurity concerns, safety concerns, and administrative exigencies.” Love, 103 F.3d at 561; see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1993–94 (2004)); Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (holding that the reasonableness “inquiry is somewhat more complex when considering Title II claims in the prison context,” but generally must be “determined on a case-by-case basis by balancing the cost to the defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff”) (internal citations omitted); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h).
1 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant is foreclosed from making an “undue burden defense” because Defendant failed to issue a statement disclosing the undue burden defense as is required by statute. See § 35.164 (Before denying a proposed accommodation, the public entity “has the burden of proving that compliance with [§ 35.160] would result in such alterations or burdens.” It must also issue a “written statement of the reasons” for its conclusion, and ensure that the alternative aids offered provide the hearing-impaired individual with the services at issue “to the maximum extent possible.”) Defendant asserts that he is not raising an undue burden or fundamental alternation defense, but is instead alleging that any additional modifications requested by Plaintiffs are not reasonable. Accordingly, Defendant need not issue a written statement under § 35.164.
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Here, Defendant is entitled to present evidence of IDOC’s financial restraints in so much as that testimony sheds light on the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ requested accommodations. Love, 103 F.3d at 561; Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 920. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. (See Dkt. No. 325.) IV. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Bar Evidence of Crimes, Convictions and Sentences
Plaintiffs ask us to exclude any evidence concerning the criminal convictions of Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ witnesses under Rules 401–04 and 609. (See Dkt. No. 325 at 4.) Defendant opposes the motion and argues that such testimony is permissible under Rule 609.
a. Rule 609: Impeachment by Evidence of Criminal Conviction According to Rule 609, a witness’s felony conviction “must be admitted, subject to Rule 4032, in a civil or criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A). Rule 609 does limit the introduction of convictions if more than ten years have passed since “the witness’s conviction or release from confinement, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (emphasis added). Because this is a bench trial, and because the relevant convictions are not barred by the ten year time limit, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. (See Dkt. No. 325.) V. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Evidence of Irrelevant Disciplinary Incidents and Bad Acts In their fifth motion in limine, Plaintiffs request that we bar any evidence of prior bad acts of Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (See Dkt. No. 325 at 7.) Plaintiffs argue that this evidence is improper under Rule 608. We grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part and deny it in part.
2 In the case of a bench trial, Rule 403 objections are typically overruled. See Lim, 57 F. App’x at 704; Shukri, 207 F.3d at 419; Ashford, 167 F.3d at 1136 ; United States ex rel. Placek, 546 F.2d at 1305; City of Joliet, 2012 WL 5463792, at *11; Bone Care Intern., LLC, 2010 WL 3894444, at *1; Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *1 n.1.
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a. Impeachment of a Witness through Evidence of Specific Instances of Conduct Generally, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove “specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). “[T]he court may, on cross-examination, allow [specific instances of conduct] to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness” of any witness. Id. When other acts evidence is offered to show “witness bias, not his character for truthfulness in general, the limitations of Rule 608(b) do not apply.” United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Defendant will be barred from offering bad act propensity evidence, but will be permitted to inquire into specific incidents of conduct on cross-examination to establish bias or the witnesses’ character for truthfulness. VI. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Certain Documents on Defendant’s Proposed Exhibit List Plaintiffs ask us to exclude fifty-two trial exhibits on hearsay grounds and four additional exhibits for failure to timely disclose. (See Dkt. No. 326.) We discuss both objections below.
a. Inadmissible Hearsay Plaintiffs contend that fifty-two defense exhibits, mostly email correspondence between IDOC staff, should be barred because they contain inadmissible hearsay. (Id.) Defendant opposes the motion and argues that the emails and other exhibits3 are not being offered for the truth and, thus, are not hearsay. Hearsay is “a statement,” other than one made by the declarant “while testifying at the current trial or hearing,” offered “in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
3 Along with objecting to internal IDOC emails, Plaintiffs also object to IDOC transfer letters, IDOC communication plans, and various internal IDOC memoranda. (See Dkt. No. 326.)
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Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “Whether a particular statement is hearsay ‘will most often hinge on the purpose for which it is offered.’” United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 810 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). If a statement is hearsay, it is inadmissible at trial unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
One such exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), provides that business records created under certain circumstances are not excluded as hearsay.
“To qualify as a business record under Rule 803(6), (1) the document must be prepared in the normal course of business; (2) it must be made at or near the time of the events it records; and (3) it must be based on the personal knowledge of the entrant or on the personal knowledge of an informant having a business duty to transmit the information to the entrant.” U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ramos, No. 11 C 2899, 2013 WL 1498996, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2013) (internal quotation omitted); see also Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 775–79 (7th Cir. 2006). For our purposes, “[a] prison is clearly a ‘business’ within the meaning of [Rule 803(6)],” Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 738 (7th Cir. 1976), and emails may qualify as “business records” if created in the normal course of business and properly authenticated, Komal v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 833 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that emails were admissible under business records exception). While we question Defendant’s assertion that the emails and other documents are not being offered for the truth, we cannot determine at this time whether Defendant can lay the proper foundation to classify the exhibits as business records under Rule 803(6).4 Accordingly, we decline to rule on Plaintiffs’ objections now and will consider each potential hearsay issue as it arises at trial. Gage v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 365 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“In order to exclude evidence on motions in limine, however, the evidence
4 In fact, in response to a defense motion in limine, Plaintiffs argue that certain IDOC email correspondences are admissible business records. (See Dkt. No. 333 at 10.)
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must be inadmissible on all potential grounds. . . . Otherwise, rulings should be deferred to the time of trial, so that questions of relevancy, foundation and potential prejudice may be resolved.”) To the extent that Defendant intends to offer hearsay exhibits under Rule 803(6) without laying the proper foundation for their admissibility, those exhibits will be barred.
b. Failure to Timely Disclose Plaintiffs additionally object to four defense exhibits under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) and 37(c). (See Dkt. No. 326.) As discussed above, due to the prospective nature of this suit, evidence acquired after the close of discovery over a year ago may be highly relevant to both Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses and any untimely disclosure appears justified or harmless. Rossi, 790 F.3d at 738. Accordingly, in line with our previous ruling, we are reopening discovery for sixty days. At that time, Plaintiffs may also inquire as to exhibits DX 67, 70, 71 and 72. Plaintiffs’ motion seeking to exclude exhibits disclosed after the close of discovery is denied. (See Dkt. No. 326.) VII. Defendant’s Motion to Bar Plaintiffs’ Deposition Testimony and Certain Witnesses In his first motion in limine, Defendant asks us to preclude Plaintiffs from offering deposition testimony of twenty-two witnesses.5 (See Dkt. No. 328.) Defendant also objects to Plaintiffs’ witness list in its entirety. (Id.)
a. Deposition Designations Rule 32(a) governs the use of deposition testimony at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a). According to Rule 32(a)(3), “an adverse party may use for any purpose the deposition of a party or anyone who, when deposed, was the party’s officer, director, managing agent, or designee
5 Specifically, Plaintiff offers deposition testimony of nineteen IDOC employees and three IDOC Rule 30(b)(6) designees. (See PTO (Dkt. No. 332–2).) Thirteen of the witnesses are located over 100 miles from the trial site and twenty of the witnesses were deposed in their official capacity as IDOC employees. (See Dkt. No. 332 at 3.)
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under Rule 30(b)(6).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3). Additionally, “a party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds: (B) that the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). Plaintiffs seek to admit depositions of IDOC employees who either reside more than 100 miles from trial or were previously designated as 30(b)(6) deponents. The use of deposition testimony in these two contexts is permitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)–(4)(B); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 500, 502 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
However, the decision to admit deposition testimony is within the sound discretion of the district court. Hall v. Jung, 819 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, “[i]t follows that the court may control the manner in which deposition testimony is presented; indeed, trial courts are charged to ‘exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth [and to] avoid needless consumption of time. . . .’” Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)). “Requiring deposition summaries can be a reasonable means of implementing the mandate of Rule 611.” Id. at 1180; see also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Amer. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of deposition summaries was within the court’s discretion under 611(a)); Israel Travel Advisory Serv. Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379, 1994 WL 30984, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1994) (finding “that using deposition summaries when the parties designate extensive portions of a deposition in the pretrial order is an efficient way . . . to present deposition testimony in a clear and cogent fashion and to manage cases with numerous witnesses”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 12.331 (2004)
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(“If the contents of a deposition are a necessary element of a party’s proof, the preferred mode of presentation is a succinct stipulated statement or summary of the material facts that can be read to the jury. Most of the contents of pretrial depositions are irrelevant or at least unnecessary at trial; the material portions rarely exceed a few lines or pages. The judge should encourage the parties to agree on a fair statement of the substance of the testimony, possibly with the assistance of a magistrate judge.”)
Here, Plaintiffs have submitted deposition designations from twenty-two witnesses and seek to offer nearly 1500 designations. Based on our review of the designations and Defendant’s objections, we find that a comprehensive review of all designations, objections and proposed counter designations is impractical. Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 6 –545, 2013 WL 4549941, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) (holding that it was not practical for the court to individually rule on 161 objections to deposition designations in a motion in limine). Additionally, many of Plaintiffs’ designations are confusing and incomplete when read in isolation.6 Accordingly, in line with our inherent authority to manage the course of trial, and our duty to establish “procedures effective for determining the truth” under Rule 611, Plaintiffs shall submit depositions summaries for each witness they intend to offer in the form of depositions,
6 E.g., Deposition designation of Forrest Ashby, 26:7–26:15, “Q: (begins on previous, undesignated line) down to the TTY equipment. You had previously mentioned that Western had TTY? A: Yes. Q: What is–to your knowledge, what is the protocol for the TTY? A: If one of our deaf or hard of hearing offenders needs to use it we make it available to them. Q: In what way do you make it available?”
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not to exceed ten pages7 by September 6, 2016. Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs’ summaries by September 16, 2016. Oostendorp, 937 F.2d at 1179.8
b. Plaintiffs’ Witness List
Defendant objects to the number of Plaintiffs’ witnesses under Rule 403. According to
the pre-trial order, Plaintiffs’ intend to offer twenty-one class member witnesses and deposition
testimony of an addition twenty-two IDOC employees. (See PTO.) Defendant argues that these
forty-three witnesses are cumulative and should be barred. (See Dkt. No. 329 ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs
argue that each class member witness will testimony as to his or her specific experience at his or
her specific IDOC facility.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403. Determining whether testimony is cumulative rests within the sound
discretion of the district court. United States v. Garner, 211 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 2000)
(internal citation omitted). “Evidence is ‘cumulative’ when it adds very little to the probative
force of the other evidence in the case, so that if it were admitted its contribution to the
determination of truth would be outweighed by its contribution to the length of the trial, with all
7 If Plaintiffs find that they require more than the allotted number of pages to effectively summarize the witness’s deposition testimony, they may seek leave to file longer summaries by August 12, 2016. Oostendorp, 937 F.2d at 1179. 8 Based on our ruling requiring deposition summaries, we decline to rule on Defendant’s specific objections to Plaintiffs’ designations at this time. (See Dkt. No. 329.) However, when crafting their summaries, Plaintiffs are advised to keep in mind that deposition testimony may only be used at trial “to the extent it would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence if the deponent were present and testifying.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1). Accordingly, deposition testimony may not include inadmissible hearsay under Rule 802 or testimony about which the witness lacked personal knowledge under Rule 602. Fed. R. Civ. P. 602; Fed. R. Civ. P. 802; Sara Lee Corp., 276 F.R.D. at 502.
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the potential for confusion, as well as prejudice to other litigants, who must wait longer for their trial.” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th Cir. 1996).
Here, we find that Plaintiffs’ witness list is not cumulative under Rule 403. Plaintiffs seek to present testimony of class members incarcerated at different IDOC facilities with differing degrees of hearing impairment. Also, because witness testimony will be presented prior to trial through written declarations, we do not believe that the number of witnesses will impact the length of trial. See Williams, 81 F.3d at 1443. Defendant’s motion seeking to limit the number of Plaintiffs’ witnesses is denied. VIII. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Certain of Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
In his second and final motion, Defendant asks us to exclude eighty-three of Plaintiffs’ proposed trial exhibits. (See Dkt. No. 330.) The majority of Defendant’s objections are on either relevance or hearsay grounds. (See id. at 1–9.)
a. Relevance Objections “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Rule 401 provides a low threshold for relevance. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 265, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (2004); United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012). Unlike in a jury trial, where we must balance the probative value of the evidence with the risk of undue prejudice or confusion, in a bench trial, judges typically admit evidence for even its limited relevant purpose. See Lim, 57 F. App’x at 704; Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemoidalysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“There is of course a risk of undue prejudice in a jury trial; but as this was a bench trial, I admitted the evidence for its limited relevance.”)
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Generally, Defendant argues that exhibits concerning accommodations provided prior to the administrative directive, inmate grievance and grievance appeals, Wexford Health policies9, internal IDOC emails concerning hard of hearing inmates or ADA accommodations, and medical records and notes of Plaintiff Foster are all irrelevant and should be excluded. (See Dkt. No. 330 at 1–9.) We disagree. Based on the low bar for relevance, we find that Plaintiffs’ exhibits should not be excluded at this time. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 265, 124 S. Ct. at 2570; Boros, 668 F.3d at 907.
a. Hearsay Objections Defendant also objects to a variety of Plaintiffs’ exhibits under Rule 802 as inadmissible hearsay. (See Dkt. No. 330 at 1–9.) Defendant objects to statements contained in IDOC medical records, grievances, and internal IDOC emails. (See id.) Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant’s hearsay objections should be overruled because the documents are either: (1) not being offered for their truth, or (2) are statements of an opposing party and are excluded from the hearsay rule. (See Dkt. No. 333 at 6–7.) As addressed in our discussion of Plaintiffs’ sixth motion, an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and is inadmissible at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 801. By its definition, a statement not offered for its truth is not hearsay. Id. Additionally, the Rules provides for certain exclusions to the general hearsay definition outlined
9 Defendant argues that Wexford policies do not apply to IDOC and thus are not relevant. (See Dkt. No. 330 at 3.) While we agree with Defendant that without more information concerning the contractual relationship between IDOC and Wexford, we cannot determine IDOC’s vicarious liable for the actions of contractor Wexford, these documents may still be relevant to show Defendant’s knowledge of gaps in the healthcare provided at IDOC. We admit the exhibits now and will rely on them only to the extent they are relevant. See Lim, 57 F. App’x at 704; Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemoidalysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. at 1379.
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in Rule 801. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). Most relevant here, an opposing party’s statement offered against that party is not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
We find that Defendant’s hearsay objections are without merit. The majority of Defendant’s objections concern IDOC documents10 and are excluded from the hearsay rule under Rule 801(d)(2). Inmate grievances, when offered for their non-hearsay notice purpose, are also permissible under Rule 801. Defendant’s motion is denied. (See Dkt. No. 330.)
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we deny Plaintiffs’ motion concerning defense witnesses that were not timely disclosed, Plaintiffs’ motion seeking to limit evidence to conditions at IDOC as of the close of discovery, Plaintiffs’ motions concerning prior conviction evidence, Plaintiffs’ motion concerning the disciplinary history of Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ witnesses; Plaintiffs’ motion concerning budgetary constraints of IDOC and Plaintiffs’ motion asking us to bar certain defense exhibits. (See Dkt. Nos. 323–26.) We also deny Defendant’s motion to bar Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony and certain witnesses and Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ exhibits. (See Dkt. Nos. 329–30.) We reopen discovery to allow the parties to inquire into current prison conditions and to allow Plaintiffs to depose any newly disclosed defense witnesses. Discovery will close on October 10, 2016. By September 6, 2016, Plaintiffs shall submit deposition summaries not to exceed ten pages for each witness Plaintiffs intend to present through deposition testimony. Defendant
10 We also note that many of these internal IDOC emails, memorandum and other documents are likely admissible under the business records exception to hearsay, discussed above. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
Page 18 of 19

shall file any objections to Plaintiffs’ summaries by September 16, 2016. The status date of August 25, 2016 is stricken and reset to December 8, 2016. It is so ordered.

Dated: August 2, 2016 Chicago, Illinois

___________________________________ Honorable Marvin E. Aspen United States District Judge

Page 19 of 19

 
 Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 436 Filed: 04/23/18 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:7369

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of Illinois )

Department of Corrections; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 11 C 2961 Honorable Marvin E. Aspen Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff Ralph Holmes and the other named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the

class of deaf and hard of hearing IDOC inmates certified by the Court (“the Class”), and Defendant

John Baldwin (collectively, the “Parties”), submit this joint memorandum in support of their

Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement (“Motion”). The proposed

Stipulation of Settlement (“Agreement,” attached to the Motion as Exhibit A) is fair and

reasonable, and provides substantial benefits to the entire class while removing the delay, risk, and

expense inherent in the trial on liability and remedy in a case such as this. The Parties ask the Court

to grant preliminary approval of the Agreement, adopt the Notice Plan attached to the Motion, and

proceed to set a date for a Fairness Hearing on the proposed Agreement.

BACKGROUND

I. Summary of the Litigation

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”) on May 4,

2011, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated deaf and hard of hearing inmates

who are in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Department” or “IDOC”).

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Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that (1) requires Defendant to provide the assistance necessary for inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing to adequately participate in programs and services and to enjoy equal rights as hearing inmates while incarcerated and (2) enjoins Defendant from denying equal rights to deaf or hard of hearing inmates as a result of their disabilities or punishing them because of their disabilities.1
Plaintiffs contend that while in IDOC custody, they and other deaf and hard of hearing inmates have been denied the assistance they need to effectively communicate and participate in IDOC programs and services, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUPA”), and the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs contend that, as a result of the IDOC’s failure to provide the assistance inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing need in order to effectively communicate, deaf and hard of hearing inmates have been excluded from a variety of programs and activities offered by the Department as a result of their disabilities, and have suffered injury.
Defendant denies that the Department has violated any of the inmates’ rights and contends the Department has policies, practices, and systems in place to reasonably address the needs of deaf and hearing inmates. Defendant moved for summary judgment and this Court denied in part and granted in part Defendant’s motion. Dkt. 290. Summary judgment was granted on Plaintiffs’ claim that their Constitutional right to free speech was violated (Id. at 98) as well as their equal protection claim (Id. at 106-07). Additionally, this Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim of cruel and unusual punishment “to the extent the claim is based on Plaintiffs’ allegations
1 Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Salvador A. Godinez in his official capacity as Director of IDOC. Pursuant to prior Court order and Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Godinez, who is no longer the Director of IDOC, has been replaced as Defendant by John Baldwin, the current Director of IDOC. Thus, the parties have agreed that Mr. Baldwin is now the defendant in this action.
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that IDOC placed them in communicative isolation and failed to notify them of non-emergency events.” Id. at 110. Summary judgment was denied as to all other claims.
Over the course of many years of litigation, the Parties engaged in substantial written, oral and expert discovery. By the time they reached agreement on the proposed Agreement, hundreds of thousands of pages of documents had been produced and the Parties had conducted over 30 depositions. Plaintiffs worked extensively with two experts in related fields and submitted voluminous expert reports regarding the communication needs and IDOC’s treatment of inmates who are deaf and hard of hearing. In July 2011, this Court referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge Shelia M. Finnegan for the purpose of holding proceedings related to settlement. Dkt. 25. Several conferences were held between the Parties under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Finnegan.2 Around April 2015, settlement discussions discontinued.
In mid-2016, the Parties were preparing for trial and submitted to the Court a Final PreTrial order specifying over 250 trial exhibits and 50 potential trial witnesses. On May 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a number of motions in limine, including a motion to limit the evidence at trial to the conditions existing in IDOC facilities as of the close of discovery. Dkt. 324. On August 2, 2016, the Court denied this motion, and reopened discovery for Plaintiffs to take discovery on IDOC’s conditions after the close of discovery. Dkt. 342.
2 August 15, 2011 (Dkt. 27), October 12, 2011 (Dkt. 30), February 6, 2012 (Dkt. 40), February 16, 2012 (Dkt. 48), March 6, 2012 (Dkt. 49), March 22, 2012 (Dkt. 50), June 21, 2012 (Dkt. 62), August 23, 2012 (Dkt. 65), September 14, 2012 (Dkt. 66), September 19, 2012 (Dkt. 67), April 15, 2013 (Dkt. 77), April 29, 2013 (Dkt. 80), October 10, 2014 (ex-parte, Plaintiffs’ counsel only) (Dkt. 206), October 14, 2014 (exparte, Defendant’s counsel only) (Dkt 208), October 17, 2014 (ex-parte, Plaintiffs’ counsel only) (Dkt 209), November 11, 2014 (ex-parte, Defendant’s counsel only) (Dkt. 215), December 04, 2014 (ex-parte, Plaintiffs’ counsel only) (Dkt. 217), December 5, 2014 (ex-parte, Defendant’s counsel only) (Dkt. 218), January 21, 2015 (Dkt. 233), February 6, 2015 (Dkt. 245), March 9, 2015 (Dkt. 262), and April 13, 2015 (Dkt. 266).
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 436 Filed: 04/23/18 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:7372
After the order re-opening discovery was entered, on September 9, 2016, this Court referred a motion to compel filed by Plaintiffs to United States Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim. Dkt. 346. Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the supplemental discovery period and to expand the referral to Magistrate Judge Kim. This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and Magistrate Judge Kim’s referral was expanded to include “the determination of the proper scope and order of any discovery into the post-September 12, 2014 period.” Dkt. 353. After several months of motions and status hearings regarding the scope of supplemental discovery and related matters, the Parties reengaged in settlement discussions around the end of March 2017. Conferences supervised by Magistrate Judge Kim were held on several dates.3 Those efforts successfully concluded on March 14, 2018 during a status hearing with Magistrate Judge Kim and the Parties (Dkt. 430) whereby the Parties completed the Agreement attached to the Motion. Accordingly, the Parties now jointly move this Court as set forth in that Motion and more fully explained here. II. The Principal Terms of the Agreement
The Agreement fairly, reasonably and adequately affords relief to all class members. Plaintiffs brought this action to ensure that deaf and hard of hearing received the auxiliary aids and services they need for effective communication while incarcerated within the IDOC. The relief afforded by the Agreement achieves that goal. A description of the key provisions follows.
a. IDOC Will Implement a Process to Determine Who is Deaf and Hard of Hearing and What Auxiliary Aids and Services to Provide
The Agreement requires IDOC to implement a two-step process to determine if an inmate is deaf or hard of hearing. IDOC will conduct hearing screenings and, if the screening suggests that an individual is deaf or hard of hearing, will send the individual to an audiologist for an
3 April 5, 2017 (Dkt. 400), May 5, 2017 (Dkt. 402), June 1, 2017 (Dkt. 405), June 15, 2017 (Dkt. 406), June 23, 2017 (Dkt. 407), August 1, 2017 (Dkt. 410), August 28, 2017 (Dkt. 411), September 25, 2017 (Dkt. 413), October 16, 2017 (Dkt. 414), November 16, 2017 (Dkt. 418), December 28, 2017 (Dkt. 423), and March 7, 2018 (Dkt. 429).
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 436 Filed: 04/23/18 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:7373
audiological evaluation. The audiologist will determine the level and nature of the inmate’s hearing loss, and whether the individual would benefit from one or two hearing aids. If an individual is found to be deaf or hard of hearing (as defined by the Agreement), a qualified specialist (as defined by the Agreement) will conduct a communication assessment to evaluate the individual’s communication abilities and determine what auxiliary aids and services IDOC must provide for each specific IDOC program, service and activity. Auxiliary aids and services are defined by the Agreement and include, but are not limited to, sign language interpreters, video phones, video remote interpreting, exchange of written notes in a quiet room. Per the Agreement, these determinations will be memorialized in an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, and then documented in an ADA Communication Plan.
The Agreement requires the qualified specialist and IDOC to follow certain guidelines when deciding what auxiliary aids and services must be provided to deaf and hard of hearing inmates. First, if an inmate’s primary language is American Sign Language, IDOC must make a qualified interpreter available for all high stakes interactions (as defined by the Agreement), which include most medical care and appointments, disciplinary investigations and hearings, educational and vocational programs with a verbal component, transfer and classification meetings, and meetings with IDOC to discuss accommodations. Second, IDOC must ensure that deaf and hard of hearing inmates are provided with the number of hearing aids recommended by the audiologist during the audiological evaluation. Third, primary consideration must be given for the expressed preference for a particular auxiliary aid or service by the deaf or hard of hearing inmate.
b. IDOC Will Provide Deaf and Hard of Hearing Inmates with the Auxiliary Aids and Services Necessary for Effective Communication Subject to Limited Exceptions
IDOC will provide the deaf and hard of hearing inmate, at no cost, the auxiliary aids and services specified in his or her Communication Plan. If an inmate needs an accommodation before
5

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the qualified communication specialist’s review is complete, IDOC will provide a preliminary accommodation, upon an inmate’s request, if it is apparent that the accommodation is necessary and it is feasible to provide. The Agreement sets forth limited circumstances when the IDOC can decline to provide an auxiliary aid or service called for by an inmate’s Communication Plan. If IDOC can show that the auxiliary aid or service would be an undue financial burden, as defined by the ADA (such that the determination is made by the head of IDOC or his/her designee based on all available resources), it may deny the accommodation but must take other action that would not result in an undue burden. IDOC may also refuse to provide a specific auxiliary aid or service if it would pose a clear and present safety or security concern; however, if an accommodation is denied on that basis, IDOC must provide the best alternative means of accommodating the deaf or hard of hearing inmate.
c. IDOC Will Make Available Specific Technology to Ensure Effective Communication The Agreement requires IDOC to acquire certain technologies to ensure effective communication for deaf and hard of hearing inmates. Specifically, IDOC will ensure that all facilities that house deaf or hard of hearing inmates have at least one video phone, two teletypewriters (TTYs) or equivalent technologies, and two telephones that allow for amplification, as well as ensure equal access to such services with limited exception. IDOC will also ensure that deaf and hard of hearing inmates have access to television and movies with open or closed captioning and access to over-the-ear headphones at no cost. IDOC will provide an effective tactile notification system that will advise deaf and hard of hearing inmates about events such as the arrival of visitors, meals, showers, yard time, medical appointments, evacuations and emergencies. Every facility housing a deaf or hard of hearing inmate will have a Video Remote Interpreting, and the Agreement sets forth requirements for VRI.
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d. Additional Requirements to Ensure Effective Communication and Non-Discrimination The Agreement contains various other requirements to ensure effective communication and non-discrimination. IDOC will ensure its orientation is accessible by, among other efforts, using simple English in written materials, playing videos with closed captioning and in American Sign Language. If IDOC has reason to believe that an inmate is deaf or hard of hearing, IDOC will also meet separately with the inmate to review all orientation materials and, if the inmate communicates through American Sign Language, provide a qualified interpreter for this separate meeting. IDOC agrees not to deny prison employment to any otherwise qualified deaf or hard of hearing inmate who can perform the essential functions of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation. IDOC will modify its hand restraints policy to allow deaf and hard of hearing inmates to communicate, unless doing so will pose an undue financial burden to IDOC or a safety/security threat in a particular situation that could not otherwise be addressed. IDOC will continue to offer deaf and hard of hearing inmates an identification card that clearly indicates the inmate is deaf or hard of hearing, which inmates may choose to decline. IDOC will not transfer a deaf or hard of hearing inmate solely because of his disability to a higher security prison or one without comparable programming, and will consider requests for a deaf or hard of hearing inmate to be housed with another deaf or hard of hearing inmate. IDOC will use, and regularly update, a centralized database that will include information about every deaf or hard of hearing inmate’s accommodations. IDOC staff will receive training on a number of topics related to deaf or hard of hearing inmates, including communication needs, using interpreters and telephone technologies. e. Monitoring, Enforcement, Jurisdiction and Termination Provisions The parties will consent to the Magistrate Judge for all proceedings following final approval of the Agreement. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to fully oversee and
7

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 436 Filed: 04/23/18 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:7376
enforce the terms of the Agreement following approval. The Agreement creates a process by which IDOC can show that it has complied with the terms after two years and seek termination of judicial oversight based on such compliance. The Court and Class Counsel will monitor this settlement with IDOC to ensure these changes are made. IDOC will be responsible for providing periodic reports to Class Counsel to assist their monitoring efforts.
f. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs In full settlement of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the lawsuit, which Plaintiffs’ counsel has worked on for over 8 years, Defendant will pay $1,500,000.00 to Class Counsel. This payment also offsets the cost of Class Counsel’s work required to monitor the Agreement.
ARGUMENT I. THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT MERITS PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
Preliminary approval of a proposed settlement is the first in a two-step process required before a class action may be settled. See Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998). In considering preliminary approval, the court must first determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness that ultimately could be given final approval. Id. The court must review the settlement for fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. Id. If the court finds that a settlement is “within the range of possible approval,” it then proceeds to the second step in the review process, the fairness hearing. Id.; see also 4 Robert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 13:10 (5th ed. 2017) (hereinafter “Newberg”). The fairness hearing provides interested parties an opportunity to be heard and for the judge to find whether the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Six factors determine whether a class action settlement should be given final approval: 1. the strength of the plaintiff’s case on the merits; 2. the complexity, length and expense of continued litigation; 3. any opposition to the settlement among affected parties; 4. any collusion in gaining a settlement; 5. the opinion of competent counsel regarding the reasonableness of the settlement; and 6. the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery.
Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006); GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996). “The ‘most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement’ is ... ‘the strength of plaintiff's case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement.’” Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 877 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Synfuel, 463 F.3d at 653). The district court should refrain from resolving the merits of the case or resolving unsettled legal questions. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); see also Kaufman, 877 F.3d at 285; EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985). The approval process should not be converted into an abbreviated trial on the merits. Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604,607 (8th Cir. 1987); Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315. Instead, the court’s inquiry should be “limited to the consideration of whether the proposed settlement is lawful, fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Isby, 75 F.3d at 1196.
1. Strength of the Plaintiffs’ Case on the Merits The terms of the Agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant has failed to provide the assistance they need to effectively communicate and participate in IDOC programs and services, in violation of the ADA, RLUPA, and the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs have developed the necessary proof to support these claims through their extensive fact and expert discovery. Despite the strengths of Plaintiffs’
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case, Plaintiffs are mindful of the potential hurdles to establish Defendants’ liability, ensure an appropriate remedial order, and overcome any affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs also are mindful of the possibility of an adverse ruling on appeal if they prevail at trial.
Importantly, because the proposed Agreement ensures that inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing are provided adequate assistance to effectively communicate and have meaningful participation in IDOC programs and services, the Agreement fully implements the relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which Defendants acknowledge is appropriate for the inmates in its custody. In addition, without conceding the merits of the Plaintiffs’ allegations, Defendants believe that the requirements of the Agreement are consistent with their goals in updating and implementing policies and procedures regarding inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing. Accordingly, all Parties jointly submit that the Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
2. Complexity, Length and Expense of Continued Litigation The Parties submit that if the proposed Agreement is not approved, expensive and
protracted litigation will ensue. Any trial will be complex, contentious and cumbersome. Collectively, the Parties would likely call over forty witnesses, including two expert witnesses and numerous current and former State employees who reside throughout Illinois. The costs and expenses of preparing these witnesses, and for trial in general, would be enormous.
In addition, both Plaintiffs and Defendant submit that if they do not prevail at trial, they will likely appeal the matter to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. An appeal would all but guarantee that this litigation would drag on for several more years without resolution or the implementation of any relief for class members, many of whom have been eager to see relief wellbefore Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed in 2011. One of the primary benefits of the Agreement is
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that it provides reasonably prompt relief to the class, without these additional major expenditures of time and money. These factors strongly weigh in favor of approval of the Agreement.
3. Opposition to the Settlement While some class members may object because it does not offer monetary relief to the
class, this case was not brought to seek monetary relief, and the Agreement does not waive class members’ right to monetary relief in any successful claim they may choose to bring on similar issues. Other class members may object because of the terms under which IDOC is not required to provide the auxiliary aids and services required by the ADA Communication Plan. However, such terms are largely consistent with defenses found in the ADA’s statute, regulations and applicable case law. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.164. Accordingly, the Parties fully expect that they can and will successfully meet any challenge or objection to the Agreement.
4. Lack of Collusion As a matter of law, a court should presume that negotiations were conducted in good faith
and that the resulting agreement was reached without collusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681-84 (7th Cir. 1987); Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 325; Newberg at § 13.14. Nothing supports a different result here where the Parties have vigorously advocated their respective positions throughout the pendency of the case. The proposed Agreement took years to negotiate. Numerous in-person meetings and settlement conferences were conducted. Counsel for the Parties exchanged several drafts, advocating forcefully for language most advantageous to their clients. See, e.g., Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Further, the past year of settlement negotiations have been under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Kim. Thus, because the Agreement resulted from arm’s length negotiations between experienced counsel, under
11

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supervision of the Court, and after significant discovery had occurred, the Agreement should be presumed to have been reached without collusion. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).
5. Opinion of Competent Counsel as to the Reasonableness of the Settlement Counsel for the Parties, who are competent and experienced in class action, civil rights,
prisoner rights, and disability rights litigation, all recommend acceptance of the proposed Agreement. The proposed Agreement provides a fair, reasonable, and adequate; it embodies the most important aspects of the relief sought by Plaintiffs—that all IDOC inmates who are deaf and hard of hearing are provided the assistance necessary to adequately participate in programs and services and to enjoy equal rights as hearing prisoners while incarcerated.
6. Stage of the Proceeding and Amount of Discovery Completed Another factor strongly supporting approval of the Agreement is the extent of written, oral,
fact and expert discovery and fact finding which had been completed in this case before settlement was reached. The Parties have thoroughly explored the factual and legal underpinnings, as well as the merits, of this case. The Parties reached final agreement regarding the Agreement after nearly seven years of litigation and most recently, almost a full year of settlement negotiations. The Parties have produced and reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, conducted over thirty depositions on the merits, and worked extensively with two experts in related fields. Thus, there was a complete factual record upon which experienced class counsel could evaluate what would be a fair resolution for Plaintiffs and the Class. II. THE PROPOSED NOTICE PLAN SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF RULE
23 AND DUE PROCESS Rule 23(e)(1) requires the court to direct notice of a proposed settlement in a “reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” the extent of the notice is
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discretionary, particularly with a Rule 23(b)(2) class with no right of opt-out. See Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 962 (3d Cir. 1983) (Rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement of “the best notice practicable” is inapplicable for notice of settlement of a Rule 23(b)(2) class); Fontana v. Elrod, 826 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1987). In a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad reasonableness standards imposed by due process. Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1979).
In determining what type of notice is reasonable, courts consider whether the notice is sufficient to “bring the proposed settlement to the attention of representative class members who may alert the court to inadequacies in class representation, or conflicts among subclasses, which might bear upon fairness of settlement.” Walsh, 726 F.2d at 963-64. Courts have routinely approved notice plans in Rule 23(b)(2) cases, such as this one, where notice consisted of publication and/or other reasonable forms of direct or indirect notice. Van Horn, 840 F.2d 606; Fresco v. Auto Data Direct, Inc., 2007 WL 2330895, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2007). For example, in Austin v. Hopper, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 1998), the court approved as adequate to inform the inmates who were interested class members “post[ing] [the settlement notice] on community bulletin boards in every dormitory in every prison, as well as in the law libraries and dining areas of each facility; it was also sent to county jails so as to facilitate notice to state inmates who were potential class members.” See also Lambertz-Brinkman v. Kaemingk, 2012 WL 1339148, at *1-2 (D.S.D. Apr. 17, 2012) (same).
It is important to provide notice in the primary language of class members, especially in a case involving communication access issues. In Hubbard v. Donahoe, 958 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122 (D.D.C. 2013), a class settlement notice about employees’ rights to accommodations, including American Sign Language interpreters, was provided to the class in both writing and in sign
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language. The Parties submit that the proposed Notice Plan (Motion, Exhibit B) provides for reasonable notice. The Notice Plan requires: (1) IDOC to provide personal notice of the Long Form Class Notice (Motion, Exhibit B-1) to class members and potential class members currently known by the Parties; (2) IDOC to post the Short Form Class Notice (Motion, Exhibit B-2) in the law library and each living unit in each IDOC facility; and (3) IDOC to show all class members known to use American Sign Language a video produced by Class Counsel and approved by Defendant whereby the Long Form Class Notice is communicated through American Sign Language.
These three notice methods are necessary and, when viewed together, sufficient. While the Parties have a list of potential class members, neither party has a comprehensive list of every possible member so personal delivery to every class member is impossible. Posting in a communal setting is an important safeguard for unknown class members, although independently insufficient given the number of class members who do not have the ability to move around the correctional facility and/or may, as a result of their disability, not be able to understand the notice with a cursory review. Finally, because many class members use American Sign Language as their primary means of communication and are not fluent in English, providing notice via American Sign Language is critical to the effective communication of the notice, especially in light of the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The Parties ask the Court to approve their proposed notice plan. III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
The Parties agree and represent that the Agreement complies in all respects with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). The Parties further agree that the prospective relief specifically contained in the Agreement is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary, is the least intrusive means necessary to address Plaintiffs’ allegations, and is not intended to have an adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.
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The Parties respectfully request that, as part of its evaluation into the fairness of the

Agreement, the Court find that the Agreement satisfies such requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to Rule 23(e), the Parties respectfully request that

the Court enter an Order (1) granting preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement; (2)

directing that the Class be provided notice in the form and method of the Parties’ proposed Notice

Plan; and (3) setting a date for a Fairness Hearing on the proposed Settlement Agreement.

Dated: April 23, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

Barry C. Taylor Amy F. Peterson Laura J. Miller Rachel M. Weisberg Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (312) 341-0022 rweisberg@equipforequality.org
Howard A. Rosenblum National Association of the Deaf 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 howard.rosenblum@nad.org

_/s/ Robert L. Michels_____________ Robert L. Michels Kate Watson Moss Jennifer James Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 rmichels@winston.com
Alan S. Mills Nicole Schult Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 Telephone: (773) 769-1411 alanmills@comcast.net

Counsel for Plaintiffs

_/s/ Michael Arnold_____________ Michael Arnold Assistant Attorney General General Law Bureau 100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 814-3720 marnold@atg.state.il.us Counsel for Defendant

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 Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 455 Filed: 08/06/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:7730

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of Illinois )

Department of Corrections; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 11 C 2961 Honorable Judge Young B. Kim

JOINT STATUS REPORT

Pursuant to the Court’s July 30, 2018 order, Plaintiff Ralph Holmes and the other named

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class of deaf and hard of hearing IDOC inmates

certified by the Court (“the Settlement Class”), and Defendant John Baldwin (collectively, the

“Parties”), hereby submit this joint status report:

Status of Settlement

1. On April 23, 2018, the Parties finalized the Stipulation of Settlement

(“Settlement”). Dkt. No. 436-2.

2. The Parties sought preliminary approval of the Settlement (see Dkt. No. 435),

which the Court granted on April 30, 2018 (see Dkt. No. 438).

3. After effectuating notice to the Settlement Class, the Parties sought final approval

of the Settlement (see Dkt.446). On July 26, 2018, the Court held a fairness hearing about the

Settlement and granted the Parties’ joint motion for final approval of the Settlement and

overruled the objections. Dkt. No. 450; 454. Accordingly, the Effective Date of the Settlement is

July 26, 2018. See Stipulation of Settlement ¶23.

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4. On July 26, 2018, the Parties also consented to proceed in all future litigation before the Honorable Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 451. Schedule of Settlement Requirements
5. The following schedule outlines IDOC’s deadlines for certain settlement requirements. This schedule is meant to summarize, not replace or modify in any way, IDOC’s obligations required by the Settlement. Further, because many dates outlined herein are triggered by another Settlement requirement, and because it is unknown the exact date when IDOC will complete certain actions, some of these deadlines are not tied to specific calendar dates.
6. The Parties are in discussions concerning an issue that they have identified about one deadline—namely, the deadline for IDOC to perform Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessments for all inmates identified as Deaf/HoH as of the Effective Date of the Agreement. As a result, this requirement is not reflected in this chart below.

IDOC Deadline 7/26/2018 Effective Date
Preliminary Accommodations
Hearing Aids

Settlement Requirements
 Take sufficient action so that inmates receive preliminary accommodations if (a) the inmate has requested the accommodation; (b) it is apparent to IDOC staff that an inmate requires assistance due to being Deaf/HoH; and (c) it is feasible for IDOC to provide the accommodation (¶¶54-56)
 Designate at least one employee at each intake facility to serve as the Facility ADA Coordinator responsible for ensuring that necessary preliminary accommodations are provided (¶57)
 Take sufficient action so that if an inmate’s hearing aid is broken, IDOC evaluates whether any additional Auxiliary Aids and Services are needed during the time the inmate is without a hearing aid (¶63)
 Keep an adequate supply of readily available hearing aid batteries so that hearing aid batteries can be replaced promptly upon a need for new batteries; hearing aid batteries shall be replaced within 48 hours after an inmate notifies IDOC of a need for new batteries (¶62)
 Adopt and implement a policy/procedure whereby, if an inmate’s hearing aid is broken, IDOC will exercise reasonable efforts to repair the hearing aid in a timely manner (¶63)
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IDOC Deadline Cost of Communications and Access to Communications
Technological Equipment
Audio-Visual Media Closed Captioning
Tactile Notification System Equal Opportunity to Prison
Employment
Transfers/Housing 8/25/2018 30 days from Effective Date
Identification Cards

Settlement Requirements
 Take sufficient action so that Deaf/HoH inmates pay no more than other inmates in the making and receiving of telephone calls, regardless of the means of the call (¶70(e))
 Take sufficient action so that Deaf/HoH inmates have access to technological equipment during the same times of day and with no greater restrictions, limitations, or access than those placed on non-Deaf/HoH inmates, consistent with the terms of the Agreement (¶72)
 Keep abreast of evolving technology and add additional equipment/services (beyond VRI, TTY, videophones and amplified phones) to reflect technological advances, as warranted and subject to financial considerations (¶71)
 Deaf/HoH individuals shall be permitted to use TTY machines and Video Phones without hand restraints (¶81)
 New televisions purchased for inmate use shall support open or closed captioning (¶74)
 Movies shown through the IDOC system will include either open or closed captioning (¶75)
 Any television in a common area of a facility that houses Deaf/HoH inmates must be set so that the captioning is turned on at all times (¶75)
 Deaf/HoH inmates shall be permitted to purchase televisions which support open or closed captioning with the inmates own funds to the same extent that non-Deaf/HoH inmates are allowed to purchase televisions (¶76)
 Begin making reasonable efforts to provide a safe and effective tactile notification system consistent with the terms of the Agreement (¶78)
 Take sufficient action so that qualified Deaf/HoH inmates are not denied employment opportunities unless, after conducting an individualized assessment, including consultation with the inmate, it is determined that the Deaf/HoH inmate cannot perform the functions of the employment opportunity with or without reasonable accommodation (¶79)
 Take sufficient action so that Deaf/HoH inmates are not transferred, solely because of being Deaf/HoH, to a higher security prison or a prison which does not offer comparable programming to the inmates current facility (¶82)
 Take sufficient action so that if a Deaf/HoH inmate requests to be housed with another Deaf/HoH inmate, IDOC shall consider such request (¶83)
 Offer ID cards to those already identified as Deaf/HoH (¶¶4344)
 Offer ID cards to any newly identified Deaf/HoH inmates within 30 days of the inmates being so identified (¶¶43-44)

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IDOC Deadline 9/24/2018 60 days from Effective Date
Auxiliary Aids & Services Assessment (AASA) Hand Restraint Policy
10/24/2018 90 days from Effective Date
Hearing Screenings (HS)
Audiological Evaluation (AE)
Centralized Database
Telephones and Video Remote Interpreting (VRI)
11/23/2018 120 days from Effective Date
Hearing Screenings

Settlement Requirements
 Enter into contract with Chicago Hearing Society to retain one or more Qualified Specialists (QS) to perform AASAs (¶45)
 Retain Certified Deaf Interpreter (CDI) for AASAs when necessary (¶46)
 Implement a policy/procedure relating to removal of handcuffs for when communicating through ASL, consistent with the Agreement (¶80)
 Adopt policy and procedure requiring a HS as part of Intake Physical Exams for all inmates and Periodic Physical Exams for inmates who self-report or found to have hearing loss (¶32)
 Implement procedure where can request a HS and receive within 30 days (¶34)
 Prominently display notice of right to request a HS and provide notice to inmates who do not have access to the notice (¶35)
 Adopt policy and procedure whereby inmates whose HS indicates may be Deaf/HoH must be referred for an AE and must receive an AE within certain specified periods (¶36)
 Maintain results of all AE in the inmates’ medical files (¶38)  Maintain a centralized database to include specific
requirements on Deaf/HoH inmates, as set forth in Agreement (¶¶38-42)  Promptly and regularly update the centralized database and make it accessible to all IDOC personnel who are responsible for IDOC’s ADA compliance (¶¶38-42)  Comply with VRI requirements in the Agreement, including VRIs for medical issues at facilities that house Deaf/HoH inmate (¶70a)  Have at least two TTY units or equivalent technology at facilities that house Deaf/HoH Inmates, and comply with other TTY requirements in Agreement, including TTYs enabled to access Relay (¶70b)  Any VRI, TTY, VP, amplified phones shall be kept in good working order (¶70)
 Provide Hearing Screenings as part of (a) all Intake Examinations and (b) Periodic Physical Exams for inmates who self-report or have been found to have hearing loss during Intake (¶33)
 Maintain results of all HS in the inmates’ medical files (¶38)

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IDOC Deadline
Auxiliary Aids & Services Assessment (AASA)
Hearing Aids Staff Training
Orientation & Rights Materials
Monitoring 12/23/2018 150 days from Effective Date
Staff Training Monitoring

Settlement Requirements
 Take sufficient action so that inmates identified as Deaf/HoH in AE will receive an AASA from a QS within 30 days of the AE Report, and the QS will consult with the inmate and the Agency ADA Coordinator and/or the Facility ADA Coordinator in the facility where the inmate is housed (¶¶4849)
 Take sufficient action so that the QS follows certain principles in making the AASA (¶52)
 Take sufficient action so that the QS memorializes the AASA determinations per the requirements of the Agreement (¶¶50, 53)
 Take sufficient action so that AASA determinations are implemented promptly following the ASSA, at no cost to the inmate, consistent with the Agreement (¶¶51, 60, 65, 77)
 Take sufficient action so that information concerning the AASs identified in the AASA as required for the inmate to communicate effectively is made available to whoever is providing the inmate AASs (¶64)
 By this date, all IDOC personnel who interface with inmates during the Intake process must have received training on responding to requests for Auxiliary Aids and Services (¶58)
 Take sufficient action so that reasonable efforts will be made to secure, in a timely manner, hearing aids for inmates whose AASA indicate they should be provided a hearing aid or hearing aids (¶61)
 Develop materials for annual ADA training (¶66)  Ensure all written orientation materials are in plain written
English (¶69)  Ensure all orientation videos have closed captioning and ASL,
which has been reviewed by IDHHC or Qualified Interpreter (¶69)  Separate orientation for those identified as Deaf/HoH with interpreter if necessary (¶69)  Front row of seats in orientation sessions reserved for disabled inmates (¶69)  Update each orientation manual with “rights materials” and distribute updated materials to current inmates (¶84)  Provide current Deaf/HoH inmates and future Deaf/HoH inmates new Orientation manual (¶85)  IDOC Report Due (¶89)
 Conduct ADA training and related training (¶¶67, 68)  Court shall conduct hearing with IDOC and class counsel
(¶91)

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IDOC Deadline

Settlement Requirements

1/22/2019 180 days from Effective Date
Audio-Visual Media Closed Captioning
Tactile Notification System

 Pre-owned audio visual equipment should display open/closed captioning (¶73)
 Only purchase products that can support open/closed captioning (¶73)
 Provide tactile notification system, visual/tactile notification for events (visitors, meals, showers, etc) (¶78)
 Ensure visual/tactile notification for “warning shots” (¶78)  Deaf/HoH inmates will be notified/trained on systems (¶78)

1/26/2019 6 months from Effective Date
Video Phones

 Have at least one Videophone (VP) at all facilities that house a Deaf/HoH inmate (¶70)
 Access to VRS/1-800 numbers (¶70)

3/23/2019 240 days from Effective Date

Monitoring

 IDOC Report Due (¶89)

4/26/2019 9 months from Effective Date
Amplified Telephones
Monitoring

 Have two or more amplified phones with amplification to at least 55 decibels at all facilities where Deaf/HoH inmates are houses, and comply with other requirements for amplified phones (¶70)
 Court shall conduct hearing with IDOC and class counsel (¶91)

Approximate Dates for Monitoring Reports and Hearings (first two years of agreement)

7/21/2019

 IDOC Report Due (¶89)

8/20/2019 11/18/2019

 Court shall conduct hearing with IDOC and class counsel (¶91)
 IDOC Report Due (¶89)

12/18/2019 3/17/2020 4/16/2020 7/15/2020

 Court shall conduct hearing with IDOC and class counsel (¶91)
 IDOC Report Due (¶89)
 Court shall conduct hearing with IDOC and class counsel (¶91)
 IDOC Report Due (¶89)

7/26/2020

 First date in which IDOC may petition for Termination (¶¶104, 107)

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30 days of when Illinois General Assembly fully appropriates a budget and Governor authorizes

funds to IDOC for payment

Fees

 IDOC to voucher the entire amount of attorneys’ fees within 30 days (¶97)

Dated: August 6, 2018

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

By: /s/ Robert L. Michels______ One of the attorneys for Plaintiffs

Barry C. Taylor Amy F. Peterson Laura J. Miller Rachel M. Weisberg Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (312) 341-0022 rachelw@equipforequality.org

Robert L. Michels Kate Watson Moss Jennifer James Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 rmichels@winston.com

Howard A. Rosenblum National Association of the Deaf 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 howard.rosenblum@nad.org

Alan S. Mills Elizabeth N. Mazur Nicole Schult Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 Telephone: (773) 769-1411 alanmills@comcast.net

Counsel for Plaintiffs

/s/ Michael Arnold_____________ Michael Arnold Assistant Attorney General General Law Bureau 100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 814-3720 marnold@atg.state.il.us
Counsel for Defendant

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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 455 Filed: 08/06/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:7737 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that on August 6, 2018, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF on all counsel of record.
/s/ Robert L. Michels_____________ One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Exhibit 1

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 2 of 64 PageID #:7624

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of Illinois )

Department of Corrections; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 11 C 2961 Honorable Marvin E. Aspen Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

This Settlement Agreement, dated April 23, 2018, is made and entered into

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and contains the terms of a settlement

entered into by and among the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Plaintiff

Class, and Defendant, through their respective counsel in the above captioned action (collectively,

“the Parties”).

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiffs, Ralph Holmes and the other named Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”), are deaf and

hard of hearing inmates incarcerated in facilities under the control of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”).1 Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Salvador A. Godinez in his official

capacity as director of IDOC. Pursuant to prior Court order and Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Mr. Godinez, who is no longer the Director of the Illinois Department of

Corrections, has been replaced as Defendant by John Baldwin, the current Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections.

1 The term “inmate” as used in this document is interchangeable with the term “offender” as used in IDOC policies and procedures.
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2. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that IDOC has denied Plaintiffs and other deaf and hard of hearing inmates in IDOC custody the assistance they need to communicate effectively and participate in IDOC programs and services, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
3. Plaintiffs brought this action as a class action on behalf of themselves and all current and future deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated in IDOC facilities who require accommodations, including interpreters or other auxiliary aids or services, to communicate effectively, and/or to access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated by IDOC. By order dated October 8, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying a class of deaf and hard of hearing IDOC inmates (the “Class”).
4. Through this action, Plaintiffs have sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the alleged past violations of the statutory and constitutional rights of the Class, and to prevent future violations of the same.
5. In the interest of compromise and settlement and in recognition of the positions of the Parties to the above case, Plaintiffs, by their counsel, and Defendant Baldwin, by his counsel, and in his official capacity as Director of IDOC, have agreed to enter into this Settlement Agreement. Without conceding any infirmity in their claims or defenses, after extensive discovery, the Parties have engaged in arm’s-length settlement negotiations to resolve the claims raised by this action as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Plaintiffs and Defendant have reached an agreement for settling this litigation that the Parties believe is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect the interests of the Parties. The Parties believe that this Settlement Agreement will benefit deaf and hard of hearing inmates who are confined in IDOC correctional facilities.
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6. The terms of this Settlement Agreement shall be applicable to and binding upon the Class, the Defendant in his official capacity as Director of IDOC, the IDOC and its officers, agents, and employees, and the successors and assigns of each of them.
7. This Settlement Agreement applies to all of IDOC’s existing correctional facilities housing adult male and female inmates, as well as any new facilities where adult inmates are confined during the life of this Settlement Agreement.
8. By entering into this Settlement Agreement, neither the Defendant, IDOC, nor the State of Illinois admits any liability regarding the allegations made in this action, and nothing herein shall be deemed as an admission of fault of any kind by the Defendant or IDOC. The Defendant and IDOC specifically deny that any incarcerated individuals’ rights have been violated or will be violated in the future. Moreover, this Settlement Agreement and all reports drafted in response to it may not be used as evidence of liability or lack of liability in any other legal proceeding.
9. The Parties will file this Settlement Agreement with the Court, and ask that the Court approve it; approval is a condition precedent to the Settlement Agreement’s effectiveness. Upon Court approval and subsequent termination of the Court’s jurisdiction and completion of the obligations under this Settlement Agreement, this Settlement Agreement shall constitute full and final settlement of the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ claims that have been brought, and claims for injunctive relief that could have been brought in this action, relating to the factual allegations in the Complaint or the provision of Auxiliary Aids and Services to deaf and hard of hearing inmates while in IDOC custody, from the beginning of time to the Effective Date of this Settlement Agreement.
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II. JURISDICTION 10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343 and the authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65.
11. For purposes of this Settlement Agreement, the Parties consent to and will not contest the jurisdiction of this Court over this matter.
12. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to enforce the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement, to resolve disputes arising hereunder, and for such other actions as may be necessary or appropriate for construction or execution of this Settlement Agreement, as limited by the Termination provisions below. III. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions shall apply to the following terms used in this Stipulation of Settlement:
13. “Agency ADA Coordinator” shall mean an employee of IDOC who has oversight over Class Members receiving the auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication for access to programs and services as set forth in this Settlement Agreement.
14. “Audiological Evaluation” means a procedure performed by a licensed audiologist to measure the type, degree, configuration, and level of a person’s hearing loss through audiological tests that result in an audiogram. The Audiological Evaluation is specifically designed to measure the level of hearing rather than screen whether a person may be deaf or hard of hearing. IDOC will request, and exercise reasonable effort to obtain from all licensed audiologists performing Audiological Evaluations, an “Audiological Report” that makes findings as to (1) the level and nature of hearing loss in each ear of the person subject to the evaluation; and (2) whether
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the person subject to the evaluation would benefit from a hearing aid in the person’s left ear, right ear, both ears, or neither ear.
15. “Auxiliary Aids and Services” that may be provided include, but not be limited to, the following: Qualified Interpreters; Video Remote Interpretation (“VRI”); real-time computeraided transcription services; telephone handset amplifiers; assistive listening devices; assistive listening systems; hearing aids; hearing aid batteries; headphones; vibrating alarm clocks and watches; tactile alarm clocks and watches; telephones compatible with hearing aids; closed caption decoders; open – and closed – captioning, including real-time captioning; voice, text, and videobased telecommunications products and systems, including text telephones (TTYs), videophones, and captioned telephones; and other effective methods of making aurally delivered information available to Deaf or Hard of Hearing individuals.
16. “Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment” shall mean an individualized assessment of an inmate performed by a Qualified Specialist (as defined herein) for the purpose of determining what Auxiliary Aids and/or Services are necessary to ensure effective communication with the inmate and to permit the inmate to adequately, equally and fully participate in all services, programs, activities, benefits, and other opportunities offered at the IDOC facility in which the inmate is incarcerated to inmates who are neither Deaf nor Hard of Hearing.
17. “Certified Deaf Interpreter (CDI)” is an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing who works with a hearing Qualified Interpreter to ensure effective interpretation between a person speaking in English and a person who is deaf or hard of hearing who is not fluent in English or American Sign Language. After the Qualified Interpreter has interpreted spoken English into American Sign Language, the CDI interprets from American Sign Language to a form of sign
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language understood by the deaf or hard of hearing person who does not have fluency in either English or American Sign Language. A CDI is certified to have demonstrated knowledge and understanding of interpreting, deafness, the Deaf community, and Deaf culture, as well as specialized training and/or experience in the use of gesture, mime, props, drawings and other tools to enhance communication, as well as native or near-native fluency in American Sign Language. A CDI may be appropriate in several situations including, but not limited to, when the deaf person has underdeveloped ASL skills, limited socialization in the deaf community, limited education, cognitive challenges, delayed language, organic issues causing affect deficiencies, mental illness, and other physical challenges. In Illinois, all persons working as a CDI are required to be licensed pursuant to the Illinois Interpreter for the Deaf Licensure Act of 2007, 225 ILCS 443/1 et seq., and the regulations thereunder at 68 IL Admin Code 1515.10 et seq.
18. “Chief Administrative Officer” shall mean the highest ranking official of a correctional facility.
19. “Class Counsel” refers to counsel of record for the named Plaintiffs in this matter and the “Class Members.”
20. “Class” or “Class Members” refers to all current and future deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated within IDOC who require accommodations, including interpreters or other Auxiliary Aids or Services, to communicate effectively to adequately access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated within IDOC.
21. “Communication Plan” shall mean the ADA Individualized Communication Plan described in Section IX, which contains the information gathered through the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, and shall list the accommodations approved for the offender.
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22. “Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate” means an inmate who, unaided by hearing aids or any medical device, is unable to hear in either one or both ears to a sufficient degree to be able to understand the spoken word, particularly with the level of noise in the prison environment. Persons who cannot hear in one ear to a decibel level of 40 are presumed to meet the definition of Deaf or Hard of Hearing. For purposes of the accommodations, rights, and other provisions outlined herein, an inmate shall be deemed to meet the definition of “Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate” at the earliest of these points in time: (a) if the inmate, as of the date of this Agreement, has already been designated by, or treated as, Deaf or Hard of Hearing by IDOC; (b) if a Hearing Screening of the inmate demonstrates that the inmate meets the definition; or (c) if an Audiological Examination of the inmate demonstrates that the inmate meets the definition.
23. “Effective Date” shall mean the date upon which this Settlement Agreement is approved and entered by the Court or a motion to approve or enter the Settlement Agreement is granted, whichever occurs first, as recorded on the Court’s docket.
24. “Facility ADA Coordinator” shall mean a person at each IDOC facility responsible for ensuring that Class Members at that facility receive the auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication for access to programs and services.
25. “Hearing Screening” means a standard, recognized medical procedure performed by appropriate medical staff to identify whether an individual may have a hearing issue, including whether they may be deaf or hard of hearing. Such a screening does not measure the level of hearing a person has but identifies only whether a person might have a hearing issue, including whether the person may be deaf or hard of hearing. Such a screening may consist of multiple steps, such as a test for gross hearing loss, then a test using an audioscope.
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26. “High Stakes Interactions” are defined as those in which the risks of miscommunication or misunderstanding are high and the consequences of miscommunications may have serious repercussions for inmates. High Stakes Interactions include: medical care and appointments, including dental, vision, audiological, mental health care and appointments, and include both individual therapy and group counseling sessions (unless the medical care or appointment is routine and does not involve substantial conversation, for example, blood work for routine lab tests or regular allergy shots); disciplinary investigations and disciplinary hearings; educational programs, specific training sessions and general educational opportunities that include a verbal component; vocational programs that include a verbal component; transfer and classification meetings; meetings with the Facility ADA Coordinator to discuss Auxiliary Aids and Services in the development of the inmate’s Communication Plan.
27. “Intake Physical Examination” means the physical examination that IDOC administers to all new inmates upon the inmate entering IDOC custody.
28. “Periodic Physical Examination” means the physical examination that IDOC administers to inmates on a cyclical basis.
29. “Primary Consideration” means that in determining what type of Auxiliary Aids and Services are necessary to comply with the ADA and this Settlement Agreement, IDOC shall give primary consideration and substantial weight to the expressed preference for a particular Auxiliary Aid or Service made by the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate. See 28 C.F.R. §35.160. Primary Consideration is subject to and limited by the provisions in Paragraph 51 of this Settlement Agreement.
30. “Qualified Interpreter” means an interpreter who, via a video remote interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance, is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially,
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both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. Qualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters, oral transliterators, certified deaf interpreters, and cued-language transliterators. 28 C.F.R. §35.104. A Qualified Interpreter must be licensed to practice in the State of Illinois pursuant to the Interpreter for the Deaf Licensure Act of 2007, 225 ILCS 443/1-900. No inmate or Correctional Officer qualifies or may be used as a Qualified Interpreter.
31. “Qualified Specialist” shall mean a person, contracted through the Chicago Hearing Society or otherwise, who is familiar with American Sign Language, oral communication, and gestural communication who has experience assessing the reading and writing ability of Deaf and Hard of Hearing individuals, and who is able to determine when a Certified Deaf Interpreter is necessary. The Qualified Specialist performs an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment. IV. IDENTIFYING DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES THROUGH
HEARING SCREENING AND AUDIOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS 32. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, IDOC (either through amendment of IDOC Administrative Directive No. 04.03.101 §§ II(G)(2)(a) and (b), or otherwise) shall adopt a policy and procedure pursuant to which Hearing Screenings are required as a routine and regular part of (a) IDOC’s Intake Physical Examination for all inmates; and (b) IDOC’s Periodic Physical Examinations of all IDOC inmates who self-report as deaf or hard of hearing or who have been determined to have hearing loss during their Intake Physical Examination. 33. Within thirty (30) days after IDOC takes the action identified in Paragraph 32, a Hearing Screening shall take place for (a) all Intake Physical Examinations and (b) Periodic Physical Examinations of inmates who self-report as deaf or hard of hearing or who have been
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determined to have hearing loss by an Intake Physical Examination. This shall not apply to individuals who are in the custody of the IDOC for less than 24 hours and are then either released or transferred to a different correctional agency or governmental entity.
34. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, IDOC shall implement a procedure whereby inmates can request to receive a Hearing Screening and, if an inmate makes such a request, the inmate will receive such a screening within thirty (30) days. An inmate’s request for a hearing aid or to be identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing will be considered a request for a Hearing Screening.
35. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, IDOC shall prominently display in all IDOC facility inmate living units and medical units a notice informing inmates that they may request a Hearing Screening. This notice shall be in large print, at least 20 point font, and in simple English. It may be removed after being posted for twenty-one (21) calendar days. Inmates who do not have access to the posted notice due to various safety or other restrictions imposed on them shall receive a copy of the notice.
36. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, IDOC (either through amendment of IDOC Administrative Directive No. 04.03.101 §§ II(G)(2)(a) and (b), or otherwise) shall adopt a policy and procedure pursuant to which inmates whose Hearing Screenings determine that they may be Deaf or Hard of Hearing must be referred to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation at the earlier of: (a) thirty (30) days after arrival to their home facility; or (b) 45 days after being admitted into IDOC custody. If, after an initial referral, an inmate is transferred before his audiological appointment, then IDOC shall have fourteen (14) days to issue a new referral. The failure to show appropriate response to presentation stimuli in either ear during the Hearing Screening will indicate that the inmate may be Deaf or Hard of Hearing.
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37. Inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing by Audiological Evaluation shall (a) undergo an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, outlined herein; and (b) undergo a new Audiological Evaluation every three years, to determine if changes in hearing have occurred. If it is determined by both the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate and IDOC that the inmate is to be considered Deaf or Hard of Hearing and does not need a Hearing Screening to prove such status (i.e., profoundly deaf inmate who would not benefit from hearing aids), the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate may be referred directly to the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, without a Hearing Screening.
38. IDOC shall document and maintain in the inmate’s medical file the results of all Hearing Screenings and Audiological Evaluations which will include a record containing a description of the determination made as to the type, degree, and configuration of any hearing loss or hearing level. IDOC shall note in a centralized database of inmates (which contains the characteristics and information set forth below), whether the inmate has been classified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing. V. CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF A CENTRALIZED DATABASE OF DEAF
AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES 39. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, IDOC will employ a centralized database for inmates containing an entry for each Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate. IDOC may choose to use Offender 360 as this centralized database, so long as Offender 360 has the capabilities required to comply with the terms of this Settlement Agreement. 40. This centralized database will include at least the following information:
a. the name of the inmate; b. the facility at which the inmate is housed;
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c. whether the inmate was provided, and whether the inmate accepted, an identification card as described in this Settlement Agreement;
d. a copy, or description of the contents, of the written record of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment and Communication Plan for the inmate, as described in this Settlement Agreement; and
e. a copy, or description of the contents, of any written records concerning the provision of Auxiliary Aids and Services, as described in this Settlement Agreement, including the inmate’s Communication Plan.
41. On a continuing basis after the Effective Date, IDOC shall promptly and regularly update the centralized database to account for information relating to all inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing.
42. This information in the centralized database shall be accessible to all IDOC personnel who are responsible for IDOC’s compliance with the ADA or with this Settlement Agreement. VI. DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATE IDENTIFICATION CARD
43. Subject to Paragraph 44 immediately below, within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date, or within thirty (30) days of being identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing in the case of inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing after the Effective Date, IDOC shall offer inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing an IDOC-issued inmate identification card that clearly indicates the inmate is Deaf or Hard of Hearing.
44. Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates will be given the option of declining to receive such an identification card; each inmate shall be free to change his or her mind about whether to receive and carry such an identification card and, barring unforeseen circumstances, IDOC shall
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accommodate the inmate’s decision within fourteen (14) days provided that once an inmate changes his or her mind pursuant to this paragraph, they must wait either twelve (12) months or upon transfer to a new parent facility, whichever is earlier, to change their mind again. VII. DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATE AUXILIARY AIDS AND SERVICES
ASSESSMENT 45. Within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date, IDOC will enter into a contract with Chicago Hearing Society to retain one or more Qualified Specialists who will perform an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment for every inmate identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing. 46. IDOC shall retain a Certified Deaf Interpreter (“CDI”) for the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment when a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate has no proficiency in either English or American Sign Language, or when the Qualified Specialist determines that a CDI is necessary. 47. As to all current IDOC inmates who have been identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing as of the Effective Date, the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment shall be performed within one hundred twenty (120) days of the events described in Paragraph 33 of this Agreement. If the Chicago Hearing Society is unable to provide a willing and able Qualified Specialist, IDOC shall make reasonable efforts to secure a Qualified Specialist to perform an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment on the inmate. If IDOC is unable to secure a Qualified Specialist for the inmate, the time frames for obtaining an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment outlined in this Agreement will be stayed until such time as the Chicago Hearing Society is able to provide a Qualified Specialist or IDOC is otherwise able to secure one based on reasonable efforts. IDOC will not be considered to be in noncompliance with this provision if it is unable to perform a requirement through no fault of its own. 48. As to all inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing after the Effective Date, once a Qualified Specialist is retained, the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment shall be
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performed promptly after, and in any case no later than thirty (30) days after the Audiological Report for the inmate is issued. If the Chicago Hearing Society is unable to provide a willing and able Qualified Specialist, IDOC shall make reasonable efforts to secure a Qualified Specialist to perform an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment on the inmate. If IDOC is unable to secure a Qualified Specialist for the inmate, the time frames for obtaining an Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment outlined in this Agreement will be stayed until such time as the Chicago Hearing Society is able to provide a Qualified Specialist or IDOC is otherwise able to secure one based on reasonable efforts. IDOC will not be considered to be in noncompliance with this provision if it is unable to perform a requirement through no fault of its own.
49. As part of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, the Qualified Specialist will consult with the Agency ADA Coordinator and/or the Facility ADA Coordinator in the facility where the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate is currently housed, or in the case of incoming inmates, will be housed, as to any specific limitations relevant to the Assessment. As part of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, the Qualified Specialists will consult with the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate as to their needs and preferences for communication.
50. Based on the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, the Qualified Specialists shall make and memorialize a determination, as to each Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmate, of the specific Auxiliary Aids and/or Services the inmate needs to communicate effectively (including whether hearing aids, Qualified Interpreters, or other specific aids and services are needed) in at least each of the following prison settings/environments: (a) disciplinary investigations and proceedings; (b) grievance preparation and proceedings; (c) interviews with Internal Affairs or other investigators; (d) interviews or proceedings relating to placement in or removal from protective custody; (e) safety alerts; (f) medical care and appointments, including dental, vision,
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audiological, mental health care and appointments, including individual and group therapy or counseling sessions; (g) regular daily environments, such as halls, meal rooms, gyms, and recreational settings; (h) pre-release meetings, including pre-release parole meetings; (i) transfer and classification meetings; (j) meetings with Agency or Facility ADA Coordinator to discuss Auxiliary Aids and Services; (k) library services; (1) educational programs and testing; and (m) vocational, religious, and any other programs and services (and benefits) offered by IDOC to inmates at the facility in which the inmate is incarcerated.
51. The determinations of the Qualified Specialists concerning the Auxiliary Aids and Services that each Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmate requires to communicate effectively in various prison settings shall be followed and implemented for each inmate unless the IDOC has documented that such Auxiliary Aids and Services constitute an “undue financial burden” on IDOC and/or present a clear and present safety and/or security concern that cannot be addressed in any manner except by the denial of the Auxiliary Aids and Services, and IDOC provides the best alternative means of accommodating the needs of the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate to effectively communicate that do not implicate the identified security concern. For purposes of this provision, implementing an Auxiliary Aid or Service constitutes an “undue financial burden” when IDOC can meet its burden of showing an undue financial burden under applicable law, including 28 C.F.R. § 35.164, that the determination of an undue financial burden was made by the head of IDOC or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity and was accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. Also, if an action required to comply with this Agreement is denied solely due to an undue financial burden, IDOC shall take other action that would not result
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in such a burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing receive the benefits or services provided by IDOC.
52. The Qualified Specialists will apply the following principles in making the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment:
a. In determining whether a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate should be provided hearing aids in any of the foregoing settings/environments, Qualified Specialists shall defer to and accept the findings in the Audiology Report.
b. If, based on the Audiological Evaluation and Audiology Report, the Qualified Specialist determines that two hearing aids should be provided to any Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate, then two hearing aids, not one, shall be provided. If the Qualified Specialist determines that one hearing aid should be provided, then one hearing aid, not zero, shall be provided for the ear needing the hearing aid, subject to the conditions in Paragraph 51 of this Agreement.
c. If the Qualified Specialist determines that a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate’s primary language is American Sign Language (“ASL”), there is a presumption that the inmate requires an ASL interpreter for High Stakes Interactions.
d. If the Qualified Specialist determines that a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate’s primary language is ASL, then there is a presumption that the inmate requires an ASL interpreter for religious services.
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e. Preference for a particular Auxiliary Aid or Service by a Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmate shall be given Primary Consideration.
53. The results of Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessments for each inmate, including the determinations outlined in Paragraph 50 above, shall be documented in the inmate’s Communication Plan, in a form attached as Exhibit A to this Agreement. Each inmate’s Communication Plan will be placed in the inmate’s medical file and on the centralized database referred to herein, and a copy will be provided to the inmate. VIII. AUXILIARY AIDS AND SERVICES PRIOR TO THE AUXILIARY AIDS AND
SERVICES ASSESSMENT 54. The Parties recognize that in many circumstances, Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates require access to Auxiliary Aids and Services prior to IDOC’s completion of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment. 55. Therefore, prior to the completion of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment for an inmate, IDOC will provide the inmate with a preliminary accommodation if: (a) an inmate has requested an accommodation; (b) it is apparent to IDOC staff that an inmate requires assistance due to being Deaf or Hard of Hearing; and (c) it is feasible for IDOC to provide such accommodation. In such cases, IDOC shall provide the accommodation requested by the inmate until the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment has been completed. 56. As set forth further in this Agreement, it is generally considered feasible to provide the following Auxiliary Aids and Services: hearing aids, batteries/maintenance of existing hearing aids or other devices, Qualified Interpreters, VRI, and accessible telecommunications (such as TTY and videophones/VRS).
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57. IDOC will designate at least one (1) employee at each intake facility to serve as the Facility ADA Coordinator responsible for ensuring that Class Members receive the Auxiliary Aids and Services necessary for effective communication for access to programs and services requested prior to the completing of the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment.
58. All IDOC personnel who interface with inmates during the Intake process will receive training on responding to requests for Auxiliary Aids and Services.
59. Nothing in this Section precludes IDOC from expediting the time frame for performing the Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment. IX. PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE OF AUXILIARY AIDS AND SERVICES TO
DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNICATION PLAN 60. Subject to Paragraph 65 below, promptly following completion of an inmate’s Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment, IDOC will provide the inmate, at no cost to the inmate, the Auxiliary Aids and Services provided for in the inmate’s Communication Plan. 61. IDOC shall exercise reasonable efforts to secure, in a timely manner, hearing aids for inmates whose Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessments indicate they should be provided a hearing aid or hearing aids. 62. IDOC shall keep an adequate supply of readily available hearing aid batteries so that hearing aid batteries can be replaced promptly upon a need for new batteries; hearing aid batteries shall be replaced within forty-eight (48) hours after an inmate notifies IDOC of the need for new batteries. 63. If an inmate’s hearing aid is broken, IDOC shall exercise reasonable efforts to repair the hearing aid in a timely manner. IDOC must evaluate whether any additional Auxiliary Aids and Services are needed during the time the inmate is without a hearing aid.
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64. The information contained in the inmate’s approved Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment concerning the Auxiliary Aids and Services the inmate requires to communicate effectively shall be made available to whoever is responsible for providing the inmate Auxiliary Aids and Services, such as counselors; doctors and other medical personnel; personnel communicating with the inmate concerning grievances, disciplinary proceedings, protective custody matters, pre-release and meetings, and transfer or classification meetings; and personnel communicating with the inmate concerning educational and vocational programs and services and library services.
65. IDOC may deny an inmate an Auxiliary Aid or Service provided for in the inmate’s Communication Plan only if the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate refuses the Auxiliary Aid or Service, if IDOC has a clear and present safety and/or security concern that cannot be addressed in any manner other than by the denial of the Auxiliary Aid or Service, or the acquisition of the Auxiliary Aid or Service would result in an undue financial burden as defined in Paragraph 51 and consistent with the law (including 28 C.F.R. § 35.164), and IDOC provides the next best alternative means of accommodating the needs of the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate for access to the programs and services that do not implicate the identified security concern or present an undue financial burden. Any Auxiliary Aid or Service may be modified, revised, or removed from the Communication Plan by agreement of the inmate and the applicable facility ADA coordinator. If an inmate declines an Auxiliary Aid or Service set out in the inmate’s Communication Plan, IDOC will provide the inmate a document advising the inmate of the right to such Auxiliary Aid or Service and ask the inmate to sign the document. The Auxiliary Aids and Services provided for in the inmate’s Communication Plan will be provided without cost to the inmate unless the inmate intentionally damages, alters, trades, traffics with, or loses the accommodation. In such
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circumstances, the inmate shall pay the replacement costs of the accommodation, including any postage. X. IDOC STAFF TRAINING ON MATTERS REGARDING DEAF AND HARD OF
HEARING INMATES 66. Within one hundred twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, IDOC shall develop materials to be used in the annual ADA training required by IDOC Administrative Directive No. 04.01.111 § H(1), which shall address:
a. communicating with individuals who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing; b. the unique needs and problems encountered by individuals who are Deaf or
Hard of Hearing; c. identification of various communication needs for inmates who are Deaf
and Hard of Hearing; d. the proper use and role of Qualified Interpreters; e. a policy for hand restraints to be removed so that Deaf and Hard of Hearing
inmates can effectively communicate through American Sign Language; f. the use of TTYs, Videophones, and other equipment that IDOC facilities
must provide under this Settlement Agreement; g. the process for Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates to effectively
communicate with IDOC employees during all High Stakes Interactions; and h. such other information as relevant to facilitating compliance with this Settlement Agreement.
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67. Within one hundred and fifty (150) days of the Effective Date, and on an annual basis thereafter, IDOC will conduct ADA training as required by IDOC Administrative Directive No. 04.01.111 § H(1) using the materials referenced in the preceding paragraph.
68. In addition to the training outlined above, prior to assuming the role of Agency ADA Coordinator or Facility ADA Coordinator, such employees shall receive training on the requirements of this Settlement Agreement, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as their specific duties in connection thereof. XI. ORIENTATION
69. Within 120 days of the Effective Date, IDOC shall provide the following accommodations for Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates for the inmate orientation program and procedure, including any Statewide and facility-specific orientation programs and procedures:
a. All written orientation materials including without limitation all orientation manuals, will be drafted in simple and plain English.
b. All videos used during orientation shall include closed captioning using American Sign Language which has been reviewed for accuracy of the interpretation by the Illinois Deaf and Hard of Hearing Commission or a Qualified Interpreter.
c. All orientation content communicated by video shall be interpreted into American Sign Language. Prior to their use, all materials translated into American Sign Language must be approved by a Qualified Interpreter or a qualified linguist proficient in both ASL and English to assess the accuracy of the interpretation.
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d. For all inmates attending orientation who IDOC has reason to believe are or may be Deaf or Hard of Hearing, IDOC shall meet with the inmate in a separate, subsequent orientation session to go over all orientation content provided orally at the initial orientation session. If the inmate communicates through American Sign Language, then during the second, separate orientation session, IDOC shall provide a Qualified Interpreter to assist the inmate in understanding any orientation content provided orally.
e. IDOC shall reserve the first row of seats during the orientation for inmates who are disabled.
XII. COMMUNICATION DEVICES/TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES 70. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, except for subsections (c) and (d)
below which contain their own time frames, IDOC will make the following communication technologies available at any facility that houses a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate:
a. Video Remote Interpreting (“VRI”): All facilities which house a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate for whom sign language interpretation is necessary for effective communication shall have VRI available for communication regarding medical issues. The VRI equipment shall be kept in good working condition at all times and, if broken, shall be fixed, or replaced if necessary, as soon as practicable. The VRI shall comport with 28 C.F.R. 35.160(d).
b. Teletypewriter (“TTY”): All facilities which house a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate shall provide access to at least two TTY units or equivalent technology. IDOC shall enable all such equipment to access publicly
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available relay service phone numbers including, but not limited to, 711 and 1-800 numbers. Such equipment shall be kept in good working condition at all times (subject to normal wear and tear and the intentional damaging of the equipment outside the control of IDOC) and if the equipment breaks, it shall be fixed or replaced as soon as practicable. Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates shall have three times the amount of time to use TTY equipment as non-Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates who use traditional voice telephones, and the Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates will be informed of such additional time for TTY usage. c. Videophones/VRS: Within 6 months of the Effective Date, all facilities which house a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate who communicates primarily through ASL shall provide access to at least one Videophone/VRS. IDOC will ensure that all Videophones/VRS systems are able to call other Videophone/VRS services, which may require the use of 1-800 numbers. Videophones/VRS systems shall be designed to allow voice carry-over relay. The Videophone/VRS equipment shall be kept in good working condition at all times (subject to normal wear and tear and the intentional damaging of the equipment outside the control of IDOC), and if broken, shall be repaired or replaced as soon as practicable. Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates shall have three times the amount of time to use videophones/VRS equipment than non-Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates who use traditional voice telephones, and the Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates will be informed of such additional time for such usage.
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d. Amplified Telephones: Within nine months of the Effective Date, all facilities which house a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate shall provide access to at least two telephones which allow amplification to at least 55 decibels. These amplified telephones shall be kept in good working condition at all times (subject to normal wear and tear and the intentional damaging of the equipment outside the control of IDOC), and if broken, shall be repaired or replaced as soon as practicable.
e. Rates paid for use of telecommunications: IDOC shall ensure that Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates pay no more than other inmates in the making and receiving of telephone calls regardless of the means of the call.
71. The list of technological equipment in this section is not exhaustive. IDOC agrees to keep abreast of evolving technology and to add additional equipment to reflect technological advances, as warranted and subject to financial considerations.
72. Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates shall have access to the technological equipment during the same times of day and with no greater restrictions, limitations, or access than those placed on non-Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmates who use regular telephone equipment, except that in some facilities where communication equipment is not located in the cell houses, IDOC shall grant appointments to use the equipment the same day or, at the latest, before 5:00 p.m. the following day, provided that inmates may only make a request for such appointments during the time when non-Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmates have access to regular telephone equipment.
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XIII. TELEVISION FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES 73. Within one hundred eighty (180) days of the Effective Date, IDOC will ensure that
all audio-visual media already owned shall display open or closed captioning, and any new audiovisual media purchased for inmate use in IDOC facilities shall support open or closed captioning.
74. New televisions purchased by IDOC for inmate use shall support open or closed captioning.
75. Movies shown through the IDOC system will include either open or closed captioning. Any television in a common area of a facility that houses Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates must be set so that the captioning is turned on at all times.
76. IDOC shall permit Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates to purchase televisions which support open or closed captioning with the inmate’s own funds to the same extent that non-Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates are allowed to purchase televisions. In the event that the closed captioning feature contained on televisions purchased through a facility Commissary malfunctions, IDOC personnel will work with the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate to address and resolve the problem as soon as practicable.
77. IDOC shall provide Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates the opportunity to use (at no cost to them) and possess headphones that fit over the ears (compared to ear buds) to allow them to hear television programming without disturbing other inmates, if such headphones are listed on the inmate’s Communication Plan. Such headphones become the property of the inmate to whom they are provided, and if the inmate is transferred to another facility, the headphones will be accepted for use by the inmate at the new facility unless the inmate’s use of the headphones at the new facility presents safety or security concerns. If the headphones break, and it is not the fault of the inmate, or it is because of normal wear and tear, IDOC shall repair or replace the
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headphones as soon as practicable. If such over-the-ear headphones are insufficient for the inmate, other accessories, such as in-line amplifiers or equalizers shall be considered. XIV. VISUAL AND TACTILE ALERT NOTIFICATIONS FOR DEAF AND HARD OF
HEARING INMATES 78. Beginning shortly after the Effective Date and continuing thereafter IDOC will begin making reasonable efforts to provide, and no later than one hundred eighty (180) days of the Effective Date IDOC shall provide Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates with a safe and effective tactile notification system that will advise them of events such as the arrival of visitors, commencement of meals, showers, yard time, medical appointments, evacuations, and emergencies. IDOC shall ensure that visual or tactile notification to all Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates occurs any time a “warning shot” is fired or inmates are ordered to lie on the ground. Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates will be notified and trained regarding the notification system(s) in use by the IDOC. XV. EQUAL ACCESS TO PRISON EMPLOYMENT 79. IDOC shall not deny an employment opportunity to an otherwise qualified Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate unless, after conducting an individualized assessment, including consultation with the inmate, it is determined that the Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate cannot perform the essential functions of the employment opportunity with or without a reasonable accommodation.
XVI. HAND RESTRAINTS REGARDING DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES 80. Within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date, IDOC shall implement a policy
relating to the removal of handcuffs of Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates when they are communicating through American Sign Language.
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81. Deaf and Hard of Hearing individuals using TTY machines or Videophones shall also be permitted to use the equipment without hand restraints. XVII. FACILITY AND CELL ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF DEAF AND
HARD OF HEARING INMATES 82. A Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate may not be transferred solely because of the inmate’s Deaf or Hard of Hearing status to a higher security prison, or to a prison which does not offer comparable programming to the inmate’s current parent facility. 83. If a Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate requests to be housed with another Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate, IDOC shall consider such request. XVIII. CREATION AND DISSEMINATION OF MATERIALS MEMORIALIZING DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES’ RIGHTS 84. Within one hundred twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, IDOC will update, each facility’s Orientation Manual to include information about the rights of Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates, as guaranteed by this Settlement Agreement, along with the services available to them (hereinafter “rights materials”). 85. IDOC will provide current Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates, and any future Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates, with a new Orientation Manual, inclusive of rights materials. XIX. MONITORING AND REPORTING 86. The Court, with the assistance of Class Counsel, shall act as a monitor (“Monitor”) concerning compliance with this Settlement Agreement. 87. In the role of Monitor, the Court shall receive and analyze information regarding IDOC’s compliance with the Settlement Agreement, assess and make findings regarding IDOC’s compliance, and enter appropriate orders to ensure both IDOC’s compliance and adequate monitoring of IDOC’s compliance.
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88. In assisting the Court in its role as Monitor, Class Counsel shall receive and analyze information provided by IDOC as described herein, monitor matters relating to Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates (via such avenues as inmate grievances, inmate interviews, and prison site visits), conduct fact investigation as appropriate, identify actual areas of noncompliance with the Settlement Agreement, attempt resolution of compliance issues with IDOC without Court intervention, make the Court aware of issues that may merit the Court’s attention, and move for appropriate action by the Court in the event an issue cannot be resolved without Court intervention. Class Counsel may request that IDOC provide documents or other information reasonably related to the review and evaluation of IDOC’s compliance with the Settlement Agreement; should IDOC refuse to provide such documents or information, the Court may determine whether such documents or information should be provided.
89. In addition to any other information requested by the Court concerning IDOC’s compliance with the Settlement Agreement, beginning one-hundred twenty (120) days following the Effective Date, and every one-hundred twenty (120) days thereafter, IDOC shall provide the Court and Class Counsel with a report, generated at IDOC’s expense and publicly filed (except that, as indicated below, certain elements of the report may be filed under seal in order to protect the security of IDOC facilities and the medical privacy or IDOC inmates), which shall include the following elements:
a. Implementation of Settlement Generally (i) a report as to the status of implementation of each of the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, which addresses, in separate sections for each of Sections IV through XIX of this Agreement, the factual information showing whether and how IDOC has implemented the
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provisions in each section, including the documents and information set forth in more detail below; b. Deaf and Hard of Hearing Inmates (i) a listing, to be updated as needed with each successive report, of all inmates identified as Deaf or Hard of Hearing and the location where each such inmate is housed (may be filed under seal); c. Hearing Screenings: (i) a copy of any policy or procedure adopted pursuant to Paragraphs 32, 34 and 36 of this Agreement, and the date(s) on which such policies and procedures were implemented; (ii) a report of: (a) the number of inmates who since the date of this Agreement have gone through Intake Physical Examination; (b) the number of such inmates who have received a Hearing Screening; and (c) if applicable, a description of the reasons why any inmates did not receive a Hearing Screening; (iii) a report of: (a) the number of inmates who since the date of this Agreement have gone through a periodic physical examination; (b) the number of such inmates who have received a Hearing Screening; and (c) if applicable, a description of the reasons why any inmates did not receive a hearing screening; (iv) a report of: (a) the names of the inmates who since the date of this Agreement requested a Hearing Screening; (b) whether each such inmate received the requested Hearing Screening; and (c) if
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applicable, the reasons why the inmate did not receive the requested Hearing Screening (may be filed under seal); d. Audiological Examinations: (i) a report listing each inmate who, based on a Hearing Screening after the date of this Agreement, was found to require an Audiological Evaluation, and a copy of any reports of any such inmate’s Hearing Screening(s) (may be filed under seal); (ii) a report of whether each such inmate who, based on a Hearing Screening after the date of this Agreement, was found to require an Audiological Evaluation, received the Audiological Evaluation; and, if applicable, the reasons why the inmate did not receive the Audiological Evaluation (may be filed under seal); (iii) a report of the Audiological Evaluations of each inmate who received an Audiological Evaluation since the date of this Agreement, and a copy of the reports of such Audiological Evaluations (may be filed under seal); e. Qualified Specialists, Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessments, and Communication Plans: (i) a description of facts showing whether and how IDOC has implemented the requirements in Paragraphs 45-59 of this Agreement; (ii) a report of the names and hire dates of any individuals serving the IDOC as Qualified Specialists, or Qualified Interpreters;
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(iii) a copy of the written record of any Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessments provided to any Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate (may be filed under seal);
(iv) a copy of all Communication Plans for Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates completed or updated during the relevant time period (may be filed under seal);
(v) a report of whether determinations made by Qualified Specialists as set out in any Communication Plans are being implemented and, if applicable, a description of the instances in which determinations made by Qualified Specialists have not been implemented, and the reasons why (may be filed under seal);
f. Deaf and Hard of Hearing Inmate Grievances: (i) a copy of all grievances filed after the date of this Agreement alleging facts that, if true, would be violations of this Settlement Agreement (may be filed under seal); (ii) a copy of any responses to such grievances and a description of the resolution of such grievances (may be filed under seal);
g. Deaf and Hard of Hearing Centralized Database: (i) a report describing the implementation of any centralized database required pursuant to Paragraphs 39-42 of this Agreement and the date(s) that such database became effective and operational to meet the requirements in Paragraphs 39-42;
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h. Orientation: (i) a description of facts showing whether and how IDOC has implemented Paragraph 69 of this Agreement; (ii) a copy of the facility inmate orientation manuals implemented pursuant to this Settlement Agreement during the current reporting period, and the date(s) upon which such manuals became effective;
i. ADA Training: (i) a report describing facts showing whether and how IDOC has implemented the requirements in Paragraphs 66-68 of the Agreement; (ii) a copy of all ADA training materials implemented by IDOC pursuant to this Settlement Agreement, and the date(s) upon which such materials became effective; (iii) a copy of all policies and procedures regarding IDOC ADA training created or updated after the date of this Settlement Agreement;
j. ADA Coordinators: (i) a list of ADA coordinators at each facility and the Agency ADA Coordinator;
k. Visual/Tactile Notification Systems: (i) a report describing any visual or tactile notification system implemented, the date(s) upon which such systems were implemented, and the method by which Deaf and Hard of Hearing Inmates have been notified of any such system(s);
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l. Communication Devices and Technologies: (i) a report of facts describing whether and how IDOC has implemented the requirements in Paragraph 70-79 of this Agreement; (ii) data showing Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmate’s usage of communication services including TTY and videophones/VRS;
m. Employment Opportunities: (i) a description of any instance in which any Deaf or Hard of Hearing inmate was denied an employment opportunity (may be filed under seal);
n. Identification Cards: (i) a list of inmates who after the date of the Settlement Agreement received an Identification Card indicating their hearing issue;
o. Hand Restraints and Cell Assignments: (i) a copy of all policies and procedures relating to the implementation of Paragraphs 80-81 of this Agreement, and a description of the date(s) on which such policies and procedures were implemented; (ii) a description of facts showing whether and how IDOC has implemented Paragraphs 80-81 of the Agreement;
p. Interpreters: (i) a record showing interpreter services provided after the date of the Agreement, which includes the inmate for whom each interpreting service was provided; the date the service was provided; the
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reason/event for which the service was provided; and the name of the interpreter; q. Annual Compliance Reports: (i) copies of all annual compliance reports relating to Deaf and Hard of Hearing inmates created pursuant to IDOC Administrative Directive No. 04.01.111 § II(G)(4)(d). 90. Materials and information provided in any report made pursuant to Paragraph 89 do not need to be re-supplied in subsequent reports; only new information since the date of the last report must be provided. However, data and incidents subject to prior reports must be updated with current information at the time of any report. All reports submitted by IDOC pursuant to this Agreement are for the sole purpose of determining compliance with this agreement. 91. Beginning one-hundred-fifty (150) days following the Effective Date, and every one-hundred-twenty (120) days thereafter, or as otherwise scheduled by the Court, the Court shall conduct a hearing with IDOC counsel and Class Counsel to discuss issues relating to IDOC’s compliance with this Settlement Agreement, including: the information generated in the compliance reports outlined above and any further actions that need to be taken by the Court or the Parties. The Court may schedule other hearings as well, as the Court deems fit, to deal with issues as they arise relating to the monitoring and enforcement of this Agreement. XX. COURT’S RESOLUTION OF ISSUES OF NON-COMPLIANCE 92. If Class Counsel believes that IDOC may be in violation of the Settlement Agreement, then Class Counsel may investigate and bring any motion to the Court’s attention regarding any such potential non-compliance. Consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Northern District of Illinois, Class Counsel and IDOC
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counsel shall meet and confer and attempt to resolve any issues of potential non-compliance prior to such issues being the subject of any motion with the Court. The Parties are required to negotiate through this process in good faith.
93. If after a hearing the Court finds that IDOC has been in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement, then the Court has the power to enter, and shall enter, whatever orders are necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including ordering equitable or injunctive relief such as requiring IDOC to take actions to become compliant with the terms of this Settlement Agreement. The Court also may award reasonable attorney’s fees for any work expended by Class Counsel in investigating and litigating such non-compliance. If the Court does not make a finding of non-compliance, Class Counsel will not be entitled to fees and will not seek them.
94. For the Court to have the power to enter orders necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of this Settlement pursuant to Paragraph 93 and the other provisions of this Settlement Agreement, the Court must simply find that there has been substantial non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement, and need not make any additional findings that the noncompliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement (or the conduct by IDOC constituting or resulting in non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement) constitutes a violation of federal law or is the result of deliberate indifference. “Substantial non-compliance” as used here means acts or omissions which do not meet the requirements of a particular provision of this Settlement Agreement and have a material effect on the ability of a Party to meet the goals and objectives of the relevant provision. In determining whether particular acts or omissions constitute “substantial non-compliance,” the Court must consider, at a minimum, the following factors: the nature of the alleged non-compliance, the extent to which the alleged non-compliance deviates from the
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particular settlement terms, such as the number of facilities or inmates affected, the length of any delay in implementing a particular provision in the time allotted under the Agreement, the duration of the alleged non-compliance, and the extent to which the alleged non-compliance has a material effect on the rights of deaf and hard of hearing inmates or the goals and objectives of this Settlement Agreement. No finding of any particular intent – such as deliberate indifference, a lack of diligence, or intentional violation of the Settlement Agreement – is required for a determination of “substantial non-compliance;” however, in fashioning an appropriate remedy for any substantial non-compliance, the Court may consider intent, including any diligence or lack thereof in causing or avoiding any “substantial non-compliance” and whether efforts have been made to cure any “substantial non-compliance.” Neither side will take any position that is contrary to the enforcement terms agreed to herein during the court’s supervision of IDOC’s implementation of the terms of this Settlement Agreement. XXI. DELIVERY OF INFORMATION TO CLASS COUNSEL
95. Delivery of information to Class Counsel pursuant to this Settlement Agreement shall be made to: Equip for Equality, Attn.: Barry C. Taylor, 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300, Chicago, Illinois 60602; Winston & Strawn LLP, Attn.: Robert L. Michels, 35 W. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601; Alan Mills, Uptown People’s Law Center, 413 N. Sheridan Rd., Chicago, IL, 60640; and Howard A. Rosenblum, National Association of the Deaf, 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820, Silver Spring, Maryland 20910. Delivery through electronic means, such as through email or electronic filing with the Court, is acceptable. XXII. NOTICE
96. IDOC shall work with Class Counsel to provide notice of the proposed settlement to all Class Members. The Notice shall be in the form of Exhibit B hereto.
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XXIII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 97. In full settlement of all attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the Litigation,
IDOC shall pay to Class Counsel the amount of $1,500,000.00 (“Fee Payment”). With respect to the first half of this Fee Payment ($750,000.00), IDOC will voucher that amount (i.e. submit that amount to the Illinois Office of the Comptroller for payment) by August 1, 2018, if all of the following three conditions (collectively, the “Three Voucher Conditions”) have been met by June 30, 2018: (i) this Settlement Agreement is fully executed; (ii) the Court approves this Settlement Agreement; and (iii) all paperwork that is necessary for the vouchering of this half of the amount is submitted to IDOC. With respect to the second half of the Fee Payment, IDOC will voucher that amount by August 1, 2018, if by June 30, 2018 the Three Voucher Conditions are met and IDOC has received its full requested supplemental appropriation for Fiscal Year 2018. If the Three Voucher Conditions are not met by June 30th for the first half of the Fee Payment, then IDOC will voucher the entire amount (both halves) once the Voucher Conditions have been met and within 30 days of when the Illinois General Assembly fully appropriates a full Fiscal Year 2019 budget and the Governor authorizes the funds to IDOC for the payment. The date of the actual payment of any amount that IDOC vouchers is subject to the authority of the Illinois Comptroller.
98. Nothing in this Section precludes Class Counsel from seeking reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Paragraphs 92-93 above. XXIV. STIPULATION PURSUANT TO THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT, 18
U.S.C. §3626 99. For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only and in order to settle this matter, the parties agree and represent that this Settlement Agreement complies in all respects with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3626(a).
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100. The parties agree and represent that the prospective relief specifically contained in this Settlement Agreement are narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary, are the least intrusive means necessary to address the Plaintiffs’ allegations, and are not intended to have an adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system. The parties agree to file an agreed motion asking the Court, as part of its evaluation of the fairness of the Settlement Agreement, to enter an order finding that the provisions of the Settlement Agreement are narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to address the violations of federal rights alleged by Plaintiffs, are the least intrusive means necessary to address those alleged violations, and are not intended to have an adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system. XXV. MODIFICATION
101. The terms of this Settlement Agreement may be modified only by the Court upon written agreement by the Parties and the Office of the Illinois Attorney General. XXVI. JUDICIAL RETENTION OF JURISDICTION OF THIS MATTER
102. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to oversee, supervise, and enforce the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement, to resolve disputes arising out of or relating to this Settlement Agreement, and for such other actions as may be necessary or appropriate for execution, construction, or implementation of this Settlement Agreement, as limited by the Termination provisions below.
103. The Parties and the Court shall not take any action to remove, challenge or undermine the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter, including to interpret and enforce the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, prior to the Termination of this Settlement Agreement per the terms outlined herein. If for any reason the Court were to lose or decline to assert
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jurisdiction over this matter consistent with the terms of this Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs shall have the right to proceed with this action and fully litigate their claims. XXII. TERMINATION OF JURISDICTION/SETTLEMENT COMPLETION
104. The Court shall retain such jurisdiction over this matter, including to interpret and enforce this Settlement Agreement, and enter appropriate orders requiring compliance with the Agreement, for not less than two years following the Effective Date. If the Court finds that, during the two years following the Effective Date, IDOC has failed to show that it is in substantial compliance with any portion of this Settlement Agreement, then the Court will extend the period of its jurisdiction to supervise and enforce any such portion of this Settlement Agreement, until IDOC shows it has achieved substantial compliance, for a period of time not to exceed two additional years. Subject to the provisions in Paragraph 107, beginning two years after the Effective Date, the Court’s jurisdiction shall terminate with respect to any and all provisions of this Settlement Agreement with which the Court has found IDOC in substantial compliance.
105. Subject to the provisions in Paragraph 103 allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims in certain circumstances, the Class, and each member thereof, agrees to release, and hereby releases and forever discharges the Defendant and the State of Illinois, their agents, former and present employees, successors, heirs and assigns and all other persons (“Releasees”) from all actions, claims, demands, suits, causes of action, controversies, and disputes seeking equitable relief (but not claims, demands, suits, causes of action, controversies, or disputes for damages) and any related costs and expenses of such released claims, demands, suits, causes of action, controversies, and disputes, which arose or could have arisen from the facts alleged in or claims made in this Litigation, and which the Class, and each member thereof, owns, has or may have
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against the Releasees, whether known or unknown, from the beginning of time until the Effective Date.
106. No promise has been made to pay or give the individual representatives of the Class, or any Class Member, any greater or further consideration other than as stated in this Agreement. All agreements, covenants, representations and warranties, express or implied, oral or written, of the Parties hereto concerning the subject matter of this Agreement are contained in this Agreement. No other agreements, covenants, representations or warranties, express or implied, oral or written, have been made by any Party hereto to any other Party concerning the subject matter of this Agreement. All prior and contemporaneous negotiations, possible and alleged agreements, representations, covenants and warranties, between the Parties concerning the subject matter of this Settlement Agreement are merged into this Settlement Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Parties.
107. The Court’s jurisdiction shall terminate, and the obligations under this Settlement Agreement shall be complete, consistent with the following procedures:
a. At any time after two years from the Effective Date, IDOC may make a written request that the Court terminate the Court’s jurisdiction and the monitoring and reporting process described herein (“Termination Request”). The request can relate to this entire Settlement Agreement, or any portion thereof.
b. Following any Termination Request, Plaintiffs, through Class Counsel, shall have not less than sixty (60) days to respond. During those sixty (60) days, Plaintiffs shall have the opportunity to obtain information from IDOC concerning factual issues relevant to the determination of compliance.
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Should IDOC not provide reasonably complete and timely information during this period, Plaintiffs may ask the Court to order IDOC to do so, and if the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request, the Court shall extend Plaintiffs’ time to respond to the Termination Request as appropriate, to allow Plaintiffs to receive sufficient information and evaluate it. c. If Plaintiffs oppose the Termination Request, in whole or in part, Plaintiffs must file an objection to the Termination Request within sixty (60) days, or within any longer time frame ordered by the Court. d. The Court will grant IDOC’s Termination Request and terminate its jurisdiction and the reporting process, if the Court finds that IDOC has shown it has substantially complied with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Court may terminate its jurisdiction and the reporting process as it relates to the entirety of this Agreement, or any portion thereof. IDOC shall not be deemed in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement (or any portion thereof) if there have been a significant number of violations of provisions of the Settlement Agreement (or any portion thereof). e. Termination of the Court’s jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement, in whole or in part, may occur only in the event ordered by the Court, upon a successful Termination Request consistent with the terms of this Agreement. 108. The Settlement Agreement shall remain in effect, and the Court shall retain its jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement subject to the terms of this Settlement Agreement and
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 43 of 64 PageID #:7624 all applicable statutes, Rules of Court, and case law for no more than four (4) years after the Effective Date. XXIII. AGREEMENT TO ENTRY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
109. IDOC agrees to advocate for, and not to oppose entry of, this Settlement Agreement by this Court, or to challenge any provision of this Settlement Agreement prior to entry of the Settlement Agreement.
110. The parties agree that, upon acceptance of this Settlement Agreement by the Court, the parties shall consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge in this matter for the remainder of this litigation. This litigation will not be dismissed, and will remain on the Magistrate Judge’s active docket, until the Court’s jurisdiction terminates consistent with the terms of this Settlement Agreement.
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EXHIBIT A TO
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

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ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment for Deaf or Hard of Hearing Offenders (Part I) To be completed by Qualified Specialist

Name: ______________________________ ID#: ________________ Facility: __________

□ Date: ______________ Disability (check one):

Deaf

□ Hard of Hearing

1. Assessment of Sign Language Ability

a. Offender uses sign language? (check one):

□ Yes

□ No

b. If yes, sign language is Offender’s primary language: □ Yes

□ No

c. Offender’s proficiency:

□ Beginner □ Conversational

□ Fluent

d. Type of interpreter needed (check one):

□ ASL (American Sign Language)

□ Signed English

□ ASL + Certified Deaf Interpreter

□ Sign Language from other country

□ Other _________________________________

2. Assessment of Reading / Writing Ability

(For example: Is the person able to read and write? Does the person have the ability to engage in basic communications through reading/writing? If so, are there conditions required, such as no time constraints?)
______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________

3. Assessment of Speaking Ability

(For example: Can the person speak sufficiently clearly for the average person to understand them? If so, are there conditions required, such as in a quiet setting?)
______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________

4. Assessment of Lip-reading Ability

(For example: Can the person read lips? If so, are there conditions required, such as only when the person speaking speaks clearly and slowly, or only when the conversation is one-on-one and in a quiet setting, allowing the person to understand through a combination of lip reading and a hearing aid?)
______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________
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5. Communication Devices a. Uses: □ Hearing Aid b. Device: □ Requires batteries

□ Cochlear Implant/Implantable Device □ Is rechargeable

6. If This is a Re-Assessment, Changes Since Prior Assessment ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________

7. Additional Communication Assessment ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________

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ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment for Deaf or Hard of Hearing Offenders (Part II) To be completed by Qualified Specialist

A. Accommodations that must be provided for the following programs and activities:
For Interpreter Needed: Note whether Offender requires an interpreter. If Offender’s primary language is sign language per the Qualified Specialist’s assessment, presume an interpreter is needed for items 1-10.
For Other Accommodation: Note whether Offender requires other Auxiliary Aids/Services or Accommodations, such as one-on-one meetings in quiet room, exchange of written note, visual aids, etc.

Program, Service or Activity
1. Disciplinary investigations and proceedings
2. Interviews with Internal Affairs or investigators
3. Interviews or proceedings re: protective custody
4. Meetings with IDOC staff to discuss auxiliary aids and services
5. Pre-release meetings & programs, including prerelease parole meetings
6. ARB grievance hearings

Interpreter Needed? (yes/no)

Other Accommodation Needed?
(list what is needed)

7. Educational programs and testing that include a verbal component
8. Vocational programs that include a verbal component
9. Religious services

10. Medical and mental health care services, including dental, vision, audiological, individual and group therapy (Unless medical care and appointment is routine and does not involve substantial conversation – see 11 below)
11. Medical care that is routine and does not involve substantial conversation (Routine blood work or tests, regular allergy shots, etc.)
12. Daily environments and basic communications, including
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conversations with counselors, gym, meals, library (Potential accommodations include the exchange of written notes, hand signals, and provision of visual aids or quiet spaces. An interpreter is not required for this section)
B. Hearing Aids

Per the Audiologist Report, Offender will be provided with (mark all that apply):

□ Hearing aid for right ear

□ Hearing aid for left ear

□ No hearing aid

Battery requirements: _________________________________________________________

C. Identification Card

Identification Card will be marked as follows:

□ Deaf

□ Hard of Hearing

□ Offender declines disability on ID Card

D. Other Technologies

Offender shall be entitled to the following (mark all that apply):

□ □ □ TTY

Video Phone

Amplified Phone

□ Vibrating Watch

□ Tactile Notification System

□ Traditional Phone □ Over-the-ear headphones

E. Other Auxiliary Aids/Services or Accommodations Needed ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ Signatures

Qualified Specialist:

______________________________________________________________________________

Printed Name

Signature

Date

Offender:

______________________________________________________________________________

Printed Name

Signature

Date

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ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
ADA Communication Plan To be completed by ADA Coordinator documenting determinations of Qualified Specialist

Name: ______________________________ ID#: ________________ Facility: __________

□ Date: ______________ Disability (check one):

Deaf

□ Hard of Hearing

A. Accommodations that must be provided for the following programs and activities:
For Interpreter Needed: Note whether Offender requires an interpreter. If Offender’s primary language is sign language per the Qualified Specialist’s assessment, presume an interpreter is needed for items 1-10.
For Other Accommodation: Note whether Offender requires other Auxiliary Aids/Services or Accommodations, such as one-on-one meetings in quiet room, exchange of written note, visual aids, etc.

Program, Service or Activity
1. Disciplinary investigations and proceedings
2. Interviews with Internal Affairs or investigators
3. Interviews or proceedings re: protective custody
4. Meetings with IDOC staff to discuss auxiliary aids and services
5. Pre-release meetings & programs, including prerelease parole meetings
6. ARB grievance hearings

Interpreter Needed? (yes/no)

Other Accommodation Needed?
(list what is needed)

7. Educational programs and testing that include a verbal component
8. Vocational programs that include a verbal component
9. Religious services

10. Medical and mental health care services, including dental, vision, audiological, individual and group therapy (Unless medical care and appointment is routine and does not involve substantial conversation – see 11 below)
11. Medical care that is routine and does not involve substantial conversation (Routine blood work or tests, regular allergy shots, etc.)
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12. Daily environments and basic communications, including conversations with counselors, gym, meals, library (Potential accommodations include the exchange of written notes, hand signals, and provision of visual aids or quiet spaces. An interpreter is not required for this section)
B. Hearing Aids

Per the Audiologist Report, Offender will be provided with (mark all that apply):

□ Hearing aid for right ear

□ Hearing aid for left ear

□ No hearing aid

Battery requirements: _________________________________________________________

C. Identification Card

Identification Card will be marked as follows:

□ Deaf

□ Hard of Hearing

□ Offender declines disability on ID Card

D. Other Technologies

Offender shall be entitled to the following (mark all that apply):

□ □ □ TTY

Video Phone

Amplified Phone

□ Vibrating Watch

□ Tactile Notification System

□ Traditional Phone □ Over-the-ear headphones

E. Other Auxiliary Aids/Services or Accommodations Needed ______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

ADA Coordinator:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Printed Name

Signature

Date

Offender:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Printed Name

Signature

Date

Any Auxiliary Aid or Service may be modified, revised, or removed from the Communication Plan by agreement of the inmate and the applicable facility ADA coordinator.

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EXHIBIT B TO
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 52 of 64 PageID #:7624 EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of Illinois )

Department of Corrections; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 11 C 2961 Honorable Marvin E. Aspen Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

NOTICE PLAN

In furtherance of their agreement to see this Court’s approval of the Parties’ proposed

Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff Ralph Holmes and the other named Plaintiffs, on behalf of

themselves and the Class certified by the Court, and Defendant John Baldwin (collectively, the

“Parties”), propose that the notices more fully described below be approved by the Court as fully

comporting with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and due

process:

1. Defendant will provide, via personal delivery, notice set forth in Exhibit B-1 to all

current IDOC inmates known by either Party to be deaf or hard of hearing. The

Parties will work in collaboration to identify this list of possible class members.

Defendant will effectuate such delivery by no later than [DATE].

2. Defendant will post notice in the form set forth in Exhibit B-2 in the law library

and each living unit in each IDOC facility. Defendant will post notices by no later

than [DATE].

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3. Class Counsel will create a video translating the notice set forth in Exhibit B-1 into American Sign Language, and after Department approval, the video shall be shown to all class members known by either Party to use American Sign Language. The parties will work in collaboration to identify this list of possible class members. Defendant will effectuate such notice by no later than [DATE].

Dated: April 23, 2018
Barry C. Taylor Amy F. Peterson Laura J. Miller Rachel M. Weisberg Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (312) 341-0022 rweisberg@equipforequality.org
Howard A. Rosenblum National Association of the Deaf 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 howard.rosenblum@nad.org

Respectfully submitted,
_/s/ Robert L. Michels_____________ Robert L. Michels Kate Watson Moss Jennifer James Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 rmichels@winston.com
Alan S. Mills Nicole Schult Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 Telephone: (773) 769-1411 alanmills@comcast.net
Counsel for Plaintiffs

_/s/ Michael Arnold_____________ Michael Arnold Assistant Attorney General General Law Bureau 100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 814-3720 marnold@atg.state.il.us
Counsel for Defendant

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EXHIBIT B-1 TO
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 55 of 64 PageID #:7624 EXHIBIT B-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of Illinois )

Department of Corrections; et al.

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 11 C 2961 Honorable Marvin E. Aspen Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

LEGAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT AND HEARING

If you are deaf or hard of hearing, this settlement may affect your rights. Please read.

This is a notice about a proposed settlement that will change how the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) helps deaf and hard of hearing inmates communicate in prison.

This notice tells you about (1) the lawsuit; (2) who is impacted by the settlement (the “class”); (3) the proposed settlement agreement; (4) what to do if you do not like the
agreement (how to object); and (5) how to get more information.

1. The Lawsuit

In 2011, a group of deaf and hard of hearing inmates filed a lawsuit against the IDOC called Holmes v. Baldwin. In the lawsuit, these inmates said that they needed “accommodations” or “auxiliary aids or services” to participate in IDOC programs, and that IDOC did not give them what they needed. For example, these inmates said that they needed sign language interpreters, hearing aids, video phones, closed captioning, a better alert system, and more. The lawsuit filed by the inmates does not ask for money. Instead, the lawsuit asks the Court to order IDOC to provide these things to deaf and hard of hearing inmates so they can communicate effectively while in IDOC custody. There is now a possible settlement that will resolve this lawsuit.

2. Who Is Impacted By The Settlement (The “Class”)

This settlement helps IDOC inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing.

The deaf and hard of hearing inmates who will benefit from the settlement are called the “settlement class.”

You are part of the “settlement class” if you:

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• Are in prison in an IDOC facility or will be in the future; and
• Cannot hear in one or both ears enough to understand someone who is speaking without a hearing aid or other hearing device; and
• Need devices or services to help you communicate (examples include hearing aids, sign language interpreters, telephone amplification, video phones or TTYs, closed captioning on your TV).
3. The Proposed Agreement
In the settlement, IDOC has agreed to help deaf and hard of hearing inmates in a number of ways. These ways include:
A. Hearing Screenings. IDOC will use experts and testing to make sure it knows who is deaf and hard of hearing. It will do two types of hearing tests. IDOC will do a test for hearing loss for three groups of people: (1) everyone first coming to IDOC during intake; (2) anyone who says they think they have hearing loss during physical exams; and (3) anyone who asks for it or asks for a hearing aid.
B. Audiological Evaluations. IDOC will send people who need more testing to an audiologist. The audiologist will decide if the person needs hearing aids.
C. Meeting with Communication Specialists. To determine what deaf and hard of hearing inmates need to communicate effectively, IDOC will now use specialists who know how to test communication skills of deaf and hard of hearing inmates. These specialists will decide what IDOC should do to help the inmate communicate in prison. For example, the specialist will decide if the inmate needs accommodations like a sign language interpreter or to communicate in a quiet room. The specialist will decide this for every IDOC program, including medical appointments, classes, meetings and jobs. The name of this test is an “Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment.” Everyone who IDOC knows is deaf or hard of hearing will meet with these specialists. Everyone who is found to be deaf or hard of hearing will meet with these specialists.
D. Communication Plan. The specialist’s findings about what each deaf and hard of hearing inmate needs to communicate effectively will be written in a Communication Plan. Each inmate’s Communication Plan will be placed in their medical file and on a centralized database.
E. Providing Accommodations and Auxiliary Aids and Services. IDOC will provide deaf and hard of hearing inmates with the accommodations and auxiliary aids and services listed in their Communication Plan. There are limited circumstances when IDOC can decide not to provide something written in the Communication Plan. If IDOC can show that the auxiliary aid or service would present a safety or security
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concern, or cause an “undue financial burden,” as defined by the ADA, it may deny the accommodation. But the decision to deny the accommodation must be made by the head of IDOC or his or her designee. Also, if IDOC denies an accommodation because it would cause an undue financial burden or pose a safety or security risk, IDOC must take the next best action that would not pose an undue financial burden or present a safety or security risk.
F. Accommodations Before Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment. If an inmate needs an accommodation before his or her Auxiliary Aids and Services Assessment is finished, IDOC will provide the accommodation if the inmate asks for it, it is clear to IDOC that the inmate needs the accommodation, and IDOC is able to provide it. IDOC has agreed that it is generally able to provide accommodations like interpreters and video phones.
G. Primary Consideration. When determining what auxiliary aid and service to provide, the specialist and IDOC will give primary consideration to the accommodation requests of the deaf or hard of hearing inmate.
H. Sign Language Interpreters. If an inmate’s primary language is American Sign Language, IDOC will provide interpreters for important programs, called “high stakes interactions.” High stakes interactions include most medical and mental health care and appointments, disciplinary investigations and hearings, educational and vocational programs with a verbal component, transfer and classification meetings, and meetings with IDOC to discuss accommodations.
I. Hearing Aids. Deaf and hard of hearing inmates will be given the number of hearing aids recommended by the audiologist. IDOC will also promptly provide hearing aids and batteries and promptly send broken hearing aids for repair.
J. Video Phones, TTYs, and Amplified Phones. IDOC will make sure that every facility that has a deaf or hard of hearing inmate will have at least one video phone, two TTYs or equivalent technologies, and two telephones that allow for amplification. Deaf and hard of hearing inmates will not pay more than other inmates making and receiving calls, and will have equal access to telephones, except that in some facilities, if the communication equipment is not in the cell house, IDOC may require appointments during the same time as others may use the telephone.
K. Televisions. IDOC will make sure that all televisions already owned have open or closed captioning, and will only buy new televisions with open or closed captioning. IDOC also make sure all movies played are available in open or closed captioning. IDOC will provide, at no cost, headphones that are large enough to fit over the ears of deaf and hard of hearing inmates to allow them to hear television programming.
L. Tactile Notification System. The IDOC will provide a safe and effective tactile notification system that will tell deaf and hard of hearing inmates about events like
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the arrival of visitors, meals, showers, yard time, doctor appointments, evacuations and emergencies.
M. Video Remote Interpreting for Medical Appointments. IDOC will make sure that every facility that has a deaf or hard of hearing inmate will have a Video Remote Interpreting (VRI) for communication about medical issues, and that the VRI will work and will meet the Department of Justice’s requirements.
N. Orientation. IDOC will make sure that its orientation is accessible. It will use simple English in its written materials, and will play videos with closed captioning and in American Sign Language. If IDOC knows that an inmate is deaf or hard of hearing, it will meet separately with the inmate to review all materials and answer questions. If the inmate uses American Sign Language, IDOC will provide an interpreter for this separate meeting.
O. Employment. IDOC will not deny prison employment to any otherwise qualified deaf or hard of hearing inmate who can perform the essential functions of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation.
P. Hand Restraint Policy. IDOC may allow deaf and hard of hearing inmates to remove their hand restraints when they need to communicate through American Sign Language.
Q. Identification Card. IDOC will continue to give deaf and hard of hearing inmates an identification card that says the inmate is deaf or hard of hearing, and inmates may continue to say they do not want this ID card.
R. Housing. IDOC will not transfer a deaf or hard of hearing inmates to a different facility with a higher security level or different programming just because of their disability. IDOC will consider requests for deaf and hard of hearing inmates to be housed with another deaf or hard of hearing inmate.
S. Centralized Database. IDOC will use, and regularly update, a centralized database to that will include information about every deaf and hard of hearing inmate’s accommodations.
T. Training. IDOC staff will be trained on a number of topics related to deaf and hard of hearing inmates, including communication needs, using interpreters and using telephone technologies.
U. Rights Materials. IDOC will update its orientation manuals to add information about the rights of deaf and hard of hearing inmates, and will give this information to all current and future deaf and hard of hearing inmates.
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V. Monitoring and Enforcement. The Court and the attorneys representing the deaf and hard of hearing inmates (also called “Class Counsel”) will monitor this settlement with IDOC to make sure that these changes are made. IDOC has to send Class Counsel documents and answer questions about what it is doing to meet the requirements of the settlement. If Class Counsel believes IDOC has not met its obligations under the settlement, the Court will resolve the dispute.
W. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The lawyers who have handled the case for the deaf and hard of hearing inmates are called “Class Counsel.” These lawyers have worked on this case for over 8 years and will continue working on the case for the next 4 years, to monitor IDOC and make sure that IDOC does what it is supposed to do under the settlement. As part of the settlement, IDOC will pay $1,500,000.00 to Class Counsel. This amount will help offset the costs the Class Counsel has spent on this case as well as Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees for the past 8 years and the next 4 years. Class members do not have to pay anything to Class Counsel.
X. Termination. The Court will keep this case open to oversee, supervise and enforce the terms of the Agreement for at least two, but no more than four years, following approval of the Agreement. IDOC can ask the Court to stop monitoring the agreement if it shows that it has met any particular term of the Agreement before the four year time period.
4. What To Do If You Do Not Like The Agreement (How to Object)
If you do not like the agreement, you can tell the lawyers and the judge. This is called sending an objection. To send an objection, mail a letter saying why you do not like the agreement. The judge will think about the objections before deciding whether the agreement is okay. If you have an attorney, you may talk to your attorney about this agreement.
Mail the letter saying why you do not like the agreement to Holmes v. Baldwin Objections, c/o Equip for Equality, 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60602. The lawsuits must get your objection by June 25, 2018. Please be specific about why you do not like the agreement and do not write more than 15 pages.
The judge will hold a hearing to decide whether to approve the agreement. The hearing will take place on July 26, 2018 at 10:30 A.M., in Courtroom 2568 of the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse at 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL.
If you like the agreement, you do not have to do anything.
5. How To Get More Information
If you would like more information, you can contact the lawyers who represent the class. They can send you a copy of the Settlement Agreement and answer your questions.
• Robert Michels, Winston & Strawn, LLP, 35 W. Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60601-9703
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 60 of 64 PageID #:7624 • Alan Mills, Uptown People's Law Center, 4413 N. Sheridan, Chicago, IL 60640 • Barry C. Taylor, Equip for Equality, 20 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60602
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EXHIBIT B-2 TO
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 446-2 Filed: 07/12/18 Page 62 of 64 PageID #:7624
EXHIBIT B-2
LEGAL NOTICE OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF A LAWSUIT BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING INMATES
If you are deaf or hard of hearing, this Legal Notice may affect your rights. Please read.
This is a Legal Notice about a proposed settlement of a lawsuit. The lawsuit was brought to benefit deaf and hard of hearing inmates.
The settlement will change how the Illinois prisons provide deaf and hard of hearing inmates with ways to talk with other people.
WHAT IS THIS ABOUT?
In 2011, a group of deaf and hard of hearing inmates sued the Illinois prisons (called the “Illinois Department of Corrections” or “IDOC”). The name of the court case is Holmes v. Baldwin. These inmates said that they need things like interpreters, captioning, and hearing aids while in prison, but IDOC does not give them what they need. These inmates sued to get a court to order IDOC to give them those things. There was no request for money in this court case. Both sides have now agreed to a settlement. The settlement will end the case if it is approved by the court.
WHO IS PART OF THE SETTLEMENT?
The group of inmates who will benefit from this settlement is called the settlement “Class.” You are part of that group if:
• You are in prison in an Illinois prison or will go to an Illinois prison in the near future; and • Without a hearing aid or other hearing device, you cannot hear in one or both ears enough
to understand someone who is speaking; and • To help you talk with hearing people, you need devices or services (such as hearing aids,
sign language interpreters, amplified telephones, videophones or TTYs, closed captioning on your TV).
WHAT IS THE AGREEMENT?
In the settlement, IDOC has agreed to help deaf and hard of hearing inmates in a number of ways. Here are some of the most important parts of the settlement:
• Hearing Tests. IDOC will give more hearing tests so that it knows who is deaf and hard of hearing. IDOC will send people who need more testing to an audiologist.
• Communication Specialists. IDOC will use specialists who know how to test communication skills of deaf and hard of hearing inmates. These specialists will decide what IDOC should do to help the inmate communicate in prison. For example, the specialist will decide when the inmate needs accommodations like a hearing aid or a sign language interpreter.

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• Communication Plan and Providing Accommodations. What the “communication specialist” finds is the best way for you to talk with people may become your “ADA Communication Plan” if it is possible.
• Hearing Aids. IDOC may give you one or two hearing aids if the audiologist says you need them. If you need new batteries, IDOC must give them to you soon without a long wait. Also, if your hearing aid breaks, the IDOC must send it for repair without a long wait.
• Sign Language Interpreters. If you communicate in American Sign Language (ASL), then IDOC needs to provide you with sign language interpreters for important programs, such as: most doctor and counselor appointments, disciplinary investigations and hearings, classes, work programs that include talking with others, and others.
• Video Phones, TTYs, and Amplified Phones. Every Illinois prison with a deaf or hard of hearing inmate must have at least one videophone (VP), two TTYs, and two amplified telephones.
• Alerts for Fires and Other Things. Every Illinois prison that has a deaf or hard of hearing inmate must have a safe way to notify you about fires, emergencies, evacuations, meals, showers, yard time, your doctor or counselor appointments, and that your visitors are here to see you.
• VRI. The Illinois prisons must also give you Video Remote Interpreting (VRI) for doctor appointments when no sign language interpreter can come to the prison for your meeting with the doctor.
• Information about Prison Rules. For every new inmate who arrives at a prison from court, the Illinois prisons must give those inmates information and rules about what they can or cannot do while in prison. Illinois prisons must give you this information in ASL or with captioning on the videos. Illinois prisons must also meet with you to explain the rules to make sure you understand. Illinois prisons must also explain your rights to you.
• Work. All deaf and hard of hearing inmates can ask to work, and Illinois prisons must give you the same chance to work as any other inmate.
• Hand Restraint. If your hands are handcuffed or restrained, you cannot talk in ASL. Illinois prisons may remove your handcuffs or hand restraints to let you talk in ASL.
• ID Card. You can ask for an ID card that shows you are deaf or hard of hearing. You can also ask for an ID card that does not say you are deaf or hard of hearing.
• Where You Will Go. You can ask to be in a prison with other deaf or hard of hearing inmates. IDOC can decide which prison you go to, but will consider your request. IDOC cannot move you to a prison with higher security just because you are deaf or hard of hearing.
• Monitoring, Enforcement, Attorneys’ Fees. To make sure you are protected, the judge and the lawyers who work for you will watch the IDOC to make sure you get your rights and services. If the lawyers think that IDOC has not given you your rights and services, then the lawyers will ask the judge for help. The lawyers worked for over 8 years to get IDOC to
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agree to give these rights and services to deaf and hard of hearing inmates. The judge will order IDOC to pay $1,500,000.00 to the lawyers for their work and the costs they have spent over the last 8 years, and to watch the IDOC for 4 more years. You do not have to pay any money for this case.
CAN I DISAGREE? If you do not like what the agreement, and you want something different, you can tell the lawyers and the judge by sending an “Objection.” If you want to do this, then you need to write a letter (no more than 15 pages) saying why you do not like this agreement and mail the letter to: Holmes v. Baldwin Objections, c/o Equip for Equality, 20 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60602. If you want to send this Objection, you need to make sure the lawyers get your Objection by June 25, 2018. The judge will consider all objections and then decide yes or no for this agreement. The judge will have a hearing on July 26, 2018 at 10:30 A.M., in Courtroom 2568 of the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse at 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL.
HOW DO I GET MORE INFORMATION? If you want more information, you can contact the lawyers who work for the deaf and hard of hearing inmates. They can answer your questions. They also can send you a copy of the Settlement Agreement. You can write to any of these lawyers: • Robert Michels, Winston & Strawn LLP, 35 W. Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60601 • Alan Mills, Uptown People's Law Center, 4413 N. Sheridan, Chicago, IL 60640 • Barry Taylor, Equip for Equality, 20 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60602
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 Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:36387

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RALPH HOLMES, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROB JEFFREYS, Acting Director of Illinois Department of Corrections,
Defendant.

) ) No. 11 CV 2961 ) ) ) ) ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim ) ) ) ) June 8, 2020 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the parties’ settlement

agreement (“Settlement”) with respect to Audiological Evaluations and for an order

of appropriate relief and sanctions. For the following reasons, the motion is

granted:

Background

In the underlying class action Plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”) unlawfully denied them and “other deaf and hard of hearing

inmates in IDOC custody the assistance they need to communicate effectively and

participate in IDOC programs and services.” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 2.) In July

2018 the parties reached an agreement to settle their dispute, which they believed

would “benefit deaf and hard of hearing inmates who are confined in IDOC

correctional facilities.” (Id. ¶ 5.) During settlement discussions, the parties

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:36388
“vigorously” negotiated aspects relating to Audiological Evaluations. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 3.)
The Settlement defines “Audiological Evaluation” as “a procedure performed by a licensed audiologist to measure the type, degree, configuration, and level of a person’s hearing loss through audiological tests that result in an audiogram.” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 14.) An Audiological Evaluation “measure[s] the level of hearing rather than . . . whether a person may be deaf or hard of hearing.” (Id.) The Settlement requires IDOC to request a report from each audiologist performing an Audiological Evaluation setting forth: “(1) the level and nature of hearing loss in each ear of the person subject to the evaluation; and (2) whether the person subject to the evaluation would benefit from a hearing aid in the person’s left ear, right ear, both ears, or neither ear.” (Id.)
The Settlement includes a number of provisions designed to “identify[] deaf and hard of hearing inmates through Hearing Screening[s] and Audiological Evaluations.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-38.) One of these provisions requires IDOC to “adopt a policy and procedure” to ensure that inmates whose Hearing Screenings show that they may be deaf or hard of hearing are “referred to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation at the earlier of (1) [30] days after arrival to their home facility; or (b) 45 days after being admitted into IDOC custody.” (Id. ¶ 36; see also id. ¶ 25 (defining “Hearing Screening”).) In the event an inmate is transferred, the period may be extended by 14 days. (Id. ¶ 36.)
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Plaintiffs claim that contrary to the terms of the Settlement, IDOC has employed licensed hearing instrument dispensers (“LHIDs”) instead of licensed audiologists for Audiological Evaluations. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 1, 3, 10-12.) An LHID is trained in “the practice of fitting, dispensing, or servicing hearing aid instruments.” (R. 540-1, Cavitt Decl. ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted).) An audiologist, by contrast, is trained in the practice of “screening, identification, measurement, monitoring, testing, appraisal, prediction, interpretation, habilitation, rehabilitation, [and] instruction relating to audiologic or vestibular disorders, including hearing and disorders of hearing.” (Id. ¶ 18 (quoting 225 ILCS 110/3(g) (internal quotations omitted)).) IDOC’s use of LHIDs was “extensive” and occurred in 700 or more evaluations of Class Members1 from 26 IDOC facilities during the first year of the Settlement’s implementation, according to Plaintiffs’ estimates. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 4, 10.)
IDOC admits that it retained LHIDs to perform Audiological Evaluations of Class Members for about a year after the court approved the Settlement. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 1; see also R. 454, Order Approving Settlement.) But it says that, as of July 2019, it discontinued the practice of employing LHIDs.2 (R. 548, IDOC’s
1 The Settlement defines “Class Members” as “all current and future deaf or hard of hearing individuals incarcerated within IDOC who require accommodations . . . to communicate effectively to adequately access programs or services available to individuals incarcerated within IDOC.” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 20.) 2 This is surprising to the court because based on its discussion with Wexford Health Services, Inc., (see R. 514), the court was under the impression that as of November 2019 Wexford was still using LHIDs in those facilities where Wexford experienced difficulties securing audiologists.
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Resp. at 1-2.) In January 2020 IDOC reported that it was “in compliance with [the Settlement’s] mandate” that licensed audiologists be used for Audiological Evaluations. (Id. at 2; see also R. 540-6, Jan. 10, 2020 Hearing Tr. at 19-22.) Plaintiffs assert that, while IDOC may no longer permit the use of LHIDs to conduct Audiological Evaluations, it is not completing such evaluations in a reasonable time period. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot.) Plaintiffs move the court to enforce the Settlement and for sanctions.
Analysis Plaintiffs allege that IDOC has breached the Settlement by failing to ensure that licensed audiologists conduct Audiological Evaluations and by allowing “excessive delays” of up to eight months between Hearing Screenings and Audiological Evaluations. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 10-15.) Given IDOC’s noncompliance, Plaintiffs seek an order: (1) finding that IDOC violated the Settlement by allowing LHIDs to be used to perform Audiological Evaluations; (2) requiring Audiological Evaluations to be conducted within 60 days following a failed Hearing Screening; and (3) sanctioning IDOC by requiring it to pay attorneys’ fees and costs associated with Plaintiffs’ investigation, analysis, and litigation of non-compliance matters raised in the current motion. (Id. at 1, 15.) IDOC responds that because it is now compliant with the requirement that licensed audiologists must conduct Audiological Evaluations, Plaintiffs’ motion is moot and the court does not have the authority to enter the order Plaintiffs seek. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 3 (citing
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R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 93).) IDOC further argues that the Settlement does not specify a timing requirement for Audiological Evaluations. (Id. at 1.) A. The Court’s Authority
IDOC argues that the Settlement permits the court to enter a compliancerelated order only where “necessary to ensure” that IDOC complies with the terms of the agreement. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 2 (citing R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 93).) IDOC says it is now compliant with the Settlement’s provision requiring licensed audiologists to perform Audiological Evaluations, thereby negating the need for such an order. (Id.) IDOC further contends that the Settlement does not include any language permitting sanctions to be imposed. (Id. at 3.)
The court rejects IDOC’s argument that it lacks the authority to grant the relief Plaintiffs seek in their motion. The court has “the inherent or equitable power summarily to enforce an agreement to settle a case before it.” Voso v. Ewton, No. 16 CV 190, 2017 WL 365610, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2017) (internal citation omitted). Here the court explicitly retained jurisdiction to “oversee, supervise, and enforce the terms and conditions of [the Settlement], to resolve disputes arising out of or relating to [the Settlement], and for such other actions as may be necessary or appropriate for execution, construction, or implementation of [the Settlement].” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 102; see also R. 454, Order.) The Settlement’s compliancerelated provisions further state that if the court decides that IDOC “has been in substantial non-compliance” with the Settlement, the court “has the power to enter, and shall enter, whatever orders are necessary to ensure compliance with the terms
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:36392
of the Settlement.” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 93.) This power includes ordering “equitable or injunctive relief” and an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by Plaintiffs to investigate and litigate IDOC’s non-compliance. (Id.)
IDOC admits that it was not compliant for about a year with the Settlement’s requirement that licensed audiologists be retained to conduct Audiological Evaluations. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 1-2.) During a hearing before the court on January 10, 2020, IDOC’s counsel reported that it discontinued the practice in 2019. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. 2-3; see also R. 540-6, 01/10/20 Hearing Tr. at 19-20.) It matters not that, according to IDOC, it is no longer violating the Settlement. (Id.) Instead, what matters is that IDOC was in “substantial non-compliance” with the Settlement for a prolonged period. (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶¶ 93, 94.) Also, IDOC’s current use of licensed audiologists to perform evaluations is a separate issue from the timeliness of these evaluations. Accordingly, the court has the power to grant the relief Plaintiffs seek here. B. Audiological Evaluations
IDOC does not dispute that the Settlement precludes the use of LHIDs to conduct Audiological Evaluations and it admits that for a period of time it violated that provision of the Settlement. Although IDOC reports that it has stopped using LHIDs, Plaintiffs nevertheless ask the court to deem IDOC’s prior practice a violation of the Settlement. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 1; R. 551, Pls.’ Reply at 4.) To ensure that IDOC does not retreat and reinstate its prior practice, the court confirms that under the terms of the Settlement, IDOC may not permit LHIDs to
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:36393
perform Audiological Evaluations for Class Members. The Settlement clearly defines “Audiological Evaluation” as “a procedure performed by a licensed audiologist.” (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 14).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kim Cavitt, a licensed audiologist and Doctor of Audiology (AuD), submitted a declaration stating that Illinois law permits only licensed audiologists and physicians to perform the type of evaluation described in the Settlement. (R. 540-1, Cavitt Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 16-23.) IDOC does not dispute Dr. Cavitt’s attestation. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp.)
Dr. Cavitt opined on the possible dangers that could result when LHIDs, rather than audiologists, perform audiological testing. (R. 540-1, Cavitt Decl.) According to her, the use of LHIDs to conduct Audiological Evaluations could cause Class Members to experience “misdiagnosis or under-diagnosis of otologic or other otolaryngologic medical or surgical conditions,” resulting in balance issues, overutilization of hearing aids, and lack of comprehensive care, remediation, and access to other treatment options. (Id. ¶ 25.) She further attests that LHIDs are not educated, trained, or licensed to practice audiology, which requires a master’s or doctoral degree in audiology, completion of a national audiology examination, and 1,500 hours of supervised clinical experience. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Instead, LHIDs must have only the equivalent of an associate degree with hourly credits in certain courses. (Id. ¶ 23.) Consistent with Dr. Cavitt’s concerns, Plaintiffs surveyed 22 Class Members who underwent Audiological Evaluations performed by LHIDs. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 11.) Those Class Members reported various issues following
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:36394
evaluations by LHIDs, including problems with their hearing aids. (R. 540-5, Email from Plaintiffs to Court.)
Thus, the court directs IDOC to employ only licensed audiologists to perform Audiological Evaluations as required by the Settlement. To the extent that a Class Member received an Audiological Evaluation performed by an LHID, has not since been evaluated by an audiologist, and is still in IDOC custody, the court orders IDOC to allow such Class Member to receive an Audiological Evaluation performed by a licensed audiologist by August 28, 2020. C. Timeliness
Plaintiffs contend that it may take up to eight months for Class Members to receive Audiological Evaluations after failed Hearing Screenings, which they argue is neither reasonable nor medically appropriate. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 2, 10-12.) IDOC responds that the Settlement does not set a time by which Audiological Evaluations must be conducted and asserts that it has not violated any timing requirements. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 1.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Settlement sets only a deadline by which IDOC must refer Class Members to an audiologist following a failed Hearing Screening. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 12-13.) But they argue that the Settlement contemplates that Class Members who are referred to an audiologist must receive an Audiological Evaluation within a reasonable time. (Id.) They argue that delays of up to eight months are unreasonable and may cause them significant harm. (Id.)
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The Settlement requires that once a Class Member fails a Hearing Screening, the inmate “must be referred to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation” within 30 to 45 days after he or she arrives at their home facility or is taken into IDOC custody. (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 36.) IDOC is correct that the Settlement requires a Class Member to be referred within the 30- or 45-day period, not physically evaluated within that time period. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 1.) Nonetheless, to give meaning to the Settlement, the court finds that IDOC must provide Class Members who fail Hearing Screenings an Audiological Evaluation within a reasonable period. If IDOC were required to provide only a referral within a certain period, it could then wait indefinitely to have the Audiological Evaluation completed, flouting the very purpose of the Settlement. In reaching the Settlement the parties expressed their belief that the agreement would benefit IDOC inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing. (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 5.) Abiding by only the timing requirement for a referral and then disregarding timing altogether for the evaluation itself, would not benefit such inmates. (See R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 13.)
As Plaintiffs point out, contracts must be construed to avoid absurd results, such as the one IDOC promotes here. (Id. (citing Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002)).) Courts apply the absurd results rule “to reject one party’s strained, literal reading of contract language in favor of the other party’s reasonable, commonsense reading.” BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTECH Franchise Tr. 2000-1, 572 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2009). Here the court finds IDOC’s “strained, literal reading” of the Settlement to be unreasonable. Id. The court
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Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:36396
instead adopts Plaintiffs’ “commonsense” interpretation that Audiological Evaluations must be performed within a reasonable period. Id.; William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Tomah Broad. Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It is well accepted that . . . when a contract is silent as to a time for performance, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time.”).
The court must next decide what constitutes a reasonable period to complete an Audiological Evaluation. Plaintiffs favor a 60-day window after a failed Hearing Screening. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 15.) IDOC does not offer a proposed time requirement but claims that it cannot perform Audiological Evaluations more quickly than its current time frame because only a limited number of audiologists is available to perform those evaluations. (R. 548, IDOC’s Resp. at 4-10.) For support IDOC submits a declaration from Shannis Stock-Jones, Vice President of Operations for Wexford, IDOC’s principal health care vendor. (R. 548-1, Stannis Decl.) She attests that after July 2019 Wexford “stepped up its efforts to identify additional audiologists” but only a limited number of them were willing to assist. (Id. ¶¶ 6-12.) Wexford also considered creating a staff audiologist position, but it was unable to fill that position because of lack of interest. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 16.) However, the information on IDOC’s efforts to identify qualified audiologists is limited and lacks substance. Plaintiffs point out in their reply that Wexford did not contact 800 audiologists in Illinois in its efforts to identify more providers or indicate whether a market rate of pay was offered to the potential providers. (R. 551, Pls.’ Reply at 14.)
10

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:36397
While the court appreciates IDOC’s difficulties in identifying audiologists to perform Audiological Evaluations, it simply is not reasonable for a Class Member to wait up to eight months after a failed Hearing Screening to receive an Audiological Evaluation. IDOC must not allow the unnecessary delay of proper diagnoses and treatment, or appropriate accommodations, for Class Members. The ability to communicate is essential not only for safety and disciplinary matters, as Plaintiffs assert, but also for the protection of civil rights. (See R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 13-14.) Accordingly, the court orders IDOC to ensure the completion of Audiological Evaluations within 90 days after Class Members receive a referral to an audiologist.3 (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 36); see also William B. Tanner Co., 716 F.2d at 1158. In setting this time period, the court takes into consideration the on-going public health crisis and its impact on the ability to transfer inmates. To extend the time period any longer would not be reasonable, unless there is compelling reason, because even with this 90-day period deadline, an inmate may have trouble hearing during the first four months of his or her incarceration.
Given IDOC’s assertion that it will encounter difficulties complying with any time limit, the court encourages the parties to work together to craft language to stay the deadline where, despite its best efforts, IDOC is unable to comply with the 90-day deadline. In their motion Plaintiffs detailed their efforts to work with IDOC when audiologists are not available (e.g., by using LHIDs under “strict conditions,”
3 Given that IDOC and Wexford do have the identity of audiologists in Illinois willing to treat an inmate population, IDOC should consider securing their professional services every two months and have the audiologists visit the various correctional facilities to provide the necessary audiological services.
11

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:36398
including that Class Members must be examined for hearing issues by a licensed physician). (See R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 6-8.) The parties were unable to reach an agreement, but IDOC now expresses a willingness “to continue this discussion.” (Id.) If the parties are unable to reach any resolution, the court’s ruling herein controls. D. Sanctions
Plaintiffs ask the court to sanction IDOC for its year-long violation of the Settlement. (R. 539, Pls. Mot. at 1, 3.) Plaintiffs say they learned of IDOC’s noncompliance pertaining to Audiological Evaluations through their own monitoring and “concerns raised by Class Members,” not through reporting required under the Settlement. (Id. at 3-9.) Even now, Plaintiffs complain that IDOC has not provided them with data showing the full extent to which it allowed LHIDs to perform Audiological Evaluations. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiffs’ motion details the lengths it took to investigate, analyze, and litigate the improper use of LHIDs to conduct Audiological Evaluations. (Id. at 5-8.) Despite Plaintiffs’ efforts, IDOC did not notify them until January 9, 2020, that it had stopped its unauthorized practice months before. (Id.) IDOC’s counsel blames an “obvious miscommunication” for the notification delay. (R. 540-6, Jan. 10, 2020 Hearing Tr. at 20.)
As explained above, the court finds that IDOC’s year-long violation of the Settlement, during which time it allowed LHIDs instead of audiologists to conduct Audiological Evaluations, constitutes “substantial non-compliance” under the Settlement. (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶¶ 93-94); see also United States v. Norwood, ___
12

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:36399
Fed. Appx. ___, 2020 WL 2185685, at *2-*3 (7th Cir. May 6, 2020) (ruling that district judge did not abuse his discretion by granting injunctive and other relief as a result of “persistent and serious” violations of federal tax laws). Even after numerous inquiries by Plaintiffs, IDOC failed to provide adequate information to allow Plaintiffs to understand the scope of the non-compliance. (R. 539, Pls.’ Mot. at 5-8.) Having determined that IDOC failed to substantially comply with the Settlement’s requirement that licensed audiologists perform Audiological Evaluations, the court finds that sanctions are warranted. (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶¶ 93, 94.) The court orders IDOC to pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to investigate and litigate IDOC’s violation. Plaintiffs have until July 17, 2020, to file a petition for fees and costs if the parties are unable to agree on the reasonable amount to be reimbursed.
Also, according to the terms of the Settlement, the court’s jurisdiction over this matter does not terminate until at least two years after the effective date of the Settlement.4 (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶¶ 12, 104.) The court may extend its retention of jurisdiction if IDOC has not substantially complied with any portion of the Settlement. (Id.) Here, IDOC’s non-compliance lasted for approximately one year. The court therefore extends its jurisdiction by one year to allow for continued supervision and enforcement of the Settlement as required. (See id.)
4 The court approved the Settlement on July 26, 2018, (R. 454), rendering that date the effective date of the Settlement, (R. 446-2, Settlement ¶ 23).
13

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 Document #: 573 Filed: 06/08/20 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:36400 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the Settlement is granted. IDOC is ordered to comply with the Settlement and pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Also, the court extends its jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the Settlement by one year.
ENTER: ____________________________________ Young B. Kim United States Magistrate Judge
14

 
 Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 1 of 65
APPEAL,KIM,PC Scan,PROTO
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11−cv−02961

Holmes et al v. Godinez Assigned to: Honorable Young B. Kim Case in other court: 20−02236 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff
Ralph Holmes

Date Filed: 05/04/2011 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Robert L. Michels Winston & Strawn LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 (312) 558−5600 Email: rmichels@winston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60646 (773) 769−1411 Email: alan@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt Equip For Equality 20 N. Michigan Avenue Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) −895−7330 Email: amanda@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 341−0022 Email: amy@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 895−7317 Email: barryt@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur 2502 W. Division Chicago, IL 60622 773−655−7479 Email: liz@lizmazurlaw.com TERMINATED: 05/04/2020

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 2 of 65
Frederic Charles Shadley Winston & Strawn Llp 35 W. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60610 (312) 558−3271 Email: fshadley@winston.com TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum National Association of the Deaf 8630 Fenton Street Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301) 587−1788 Email: howrose@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung Equip For Equality 20 N. Michigan Ave. Ste. 300 Chicago, IL 60602 312−895−7312 Email: jinho@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross Winston & Strawn Llp 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 558−6202 Email: jross@winston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 558−3728 Email: jmotto@winston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 312−558−5647 Email: kmccormick@winston.com TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Lark Eliot Mulligan Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 895−7310 Email: lark@tjlp.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura J. Miller Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 895−7316

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 3 of 65
Email: laura@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105−1847 (314) 621−5070 Email: lpendry@armstrongteasdale.com TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy Winston & Strawn Llp 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 558−9512 Email: mmccarthy@winston.com TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult Uptown People's Law Center 4413 N Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 (773) 769−1411 Email: nicole@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP 71 S. Wacker Drive Suite 1600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 624−6347 Email: nwrigley@beneschlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma Winston & Strawn Lp 35 W. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 558−3257 Email: nverma@winston.com TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Avenue Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 895−7319 Email: rachelw@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan Winston & Strawn, Llp 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 558−3213 Email: rdunigan@winston.com TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams Equip For Equality

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 4 of 65

Plaintiff
Daniel Baxter TERMINATED: 10/08/2015

20 N Michigan Ave Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 895−7357 Email: samoane@equipforequality.org TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 5 of 65

Plaintiff George Childress

Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 6 of 65

Plaintiff Hannibal Eason

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 7 of 65

Plaintiff
Curtis Foster TERMINATED: 10/08/2015

Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 8 of 65

Plaintiff Curtis Halterman

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 9 of 65
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 10 of 65

Plaintiff Billy Johnson

Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 11 of 65

Plaintiff Wendell Lancaster

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 12 of 65

Plaintiff Daniel Lord

Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 13 of 65
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 14 of 65

Plaintiff Aaron Winfert

Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015
Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 15 of 65

Plaintiff
Jason Wright on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Robert L. Michels (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda C Antholt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Peterson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth N. Mazur (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/04/2020
Frederic Charles Shadley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/28/2015

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 16 of 65

V.
Defendant
Salvador A Godinez Acting Director of Illinois Department of Corrections

Howard A. Rosenblum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jin−Ho Chung (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joelle Lynn Ross (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Laurence Motto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin P. McCormick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/23/2016
Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucas T Pendry (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2015
Mary T McCarthy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Nicole Rae Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole E Wrigley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2019
Nisha Verma (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/08/2012
Rachel M. Weisberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Marc Dunigan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2016
Samoane Eliza Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2020
represented by Kevin R. Lovellette City of Chicago Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 17 of 65

Defendant
Rachel McKinzie Americans with Disabilities Act Coordinator, Illinois Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 07/24/2014

Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−4883 Email: Kevin.Lovellette@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 02/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jessica Megan Scheller Office of the Cook County States Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−6934 Email: jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael D. Arnold Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 W. Randolph St. Suite 1300 Chicago, IL 60601 312 814 3720 Email: marnold@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas A. Ioppolo Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 W) 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312)814−7198 Email: tioppolo@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kevin R. Lovellette (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Thomas A. Ioppolo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Respondent Illinois Department of Corrections
Service List

represented by Prisoner Correspondence − Internal Use Only Email: Prison3_ILND@ilnd.uscourts.gov TERMINATED: 05/04/2011

V. Intervenor Joseph Hoban

represented by Joseph Hoban R−07818 Lawrence − LAW 10930 Lawrence Rd. Sumner, IL 62466 PRO SE

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Date Filed 05/04/2011
05/04/2011 05/04/2011
05/04/2011 05/04/2011 05/06/2011
05/06/2011
05/10/2011
05/11/2011 05/11/2011
05/11/2011 05/12/2011
05/19/2011
05/25/2011 05/25/2011 05/25/2011 05/25/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Curtis Halterman, Jason Wright, George Childress, Billy Johnson, Daniel Lord, Daniel Baxter, Wendell Lancaster, Hannibal Eason, Ralph Holmes, Aaron Winfert, Curtis Foster; Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 0752−5965009.(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Robert L. Michels (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan. (nsf, ) (Entered: 05/04/2011)
4 SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie. (mb, ) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Curtis Halterman, Jason Wright, George Childress, Billy Johnson, Daniel Lord, Daniel Baxter, Wendell Lancaster, Hannibal Eason, Ralph Holmes, Aaron Winfert, Curtis Foster as to Rachel McKinzie on 5/4/2011, answer due 5/25/2011. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Curtis Halterman, Jason Wright, George Childress, Billy Johnson, Daniel Lord, Daniel Baxter, Wendell Lancaster, Hannibal Eason, Ralph Holmes, Aaron Winfert, Curtis Foster as to Salvador A Godinez on 5/4/2011, answer due 5/25/2011. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Amy F. Peterson (Peterson, Amy) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
8 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing set for 6/16/2011 at 10:30 AM., in Courtroom 2525. The plaintiffs are to notify the defendants of status date.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 05/11/2011)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Alan S. Mills (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 05/11/2011)
10 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Plaintiffs complaint has been screened pursuant to 28 § 1915A. Plaintiffs complaint is accepted. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 05/12/2011)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Barry Charlton Taylor (Taylor, Barry) (Entered: 05/12/2011)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Laura J. Miller (Miller, Laura) (Entered: 05/19/2011)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie by Thomas A. Ioppolo (Ioppolo, Thomas) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
14 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie by Kevin R. Lovellette (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
15 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
16 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time 15 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 6/2/2011 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin)

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05/26/2011 05/26/2011 05/26/2011 05/26/2011 05/31/2011
07/22/2011 07/22/2011 07/22/2011 07/25/2011
07/25/2011 07/26/2011 08/15/2011

(Entered: 05/25/2011)
17 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Kevin P. McCormick (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Nicole E Wrigley (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
19 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Joseph Laurence Motto (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
20 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Nisha Verma (Verma, Nisha) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
21 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Defendants' Motion for extension of time 15 to answer or otherwise plead to the plaintiffs' class action complaint, to 7/25/11, is granted. Final extension. Motion terminated. The motion hearing set for 6/2/11 is stricken. The status hearing set for 6/16/11 is stricken and reset to 7/28/2011 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
22 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzieReferral to Magistrate and Enlargement of Time (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
23 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 22 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/28/2011 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time (Omitted Relief from motion 22). (mb, ) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
24 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Agreed Motion 22 for referral and motion for enlargement of time to answer or otherwise plead (22) is granted. The time for defenants to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs' complaint is extended until after the settlement conference. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan for a settlement conference. The Status hearing set for 7/28/11 is stricken and reset to 9/8/2011 at 10:30 AM. The motion hearing set for 7/28/11 is stricken.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
25 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: settlement conference. (gl, )Judicial staff mailed notice. (Entered: 07/25/2011)
26 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan: This case has been referred to Judge Finnegan to conduct a settlement conference. A status hearing is set for 8/15/2011 at 11:00 A.M. to discuss logistical and other issues. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 07/26/2011)
27 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing and preliminary settlement conference (counsel only) held on 8/15/2011 and continued to 10/12/2011 at 10:30 a.m. By agreement of the parties, Defendants will send a written response to Plaintiffs' proposed settlement agreement by 9/28/2011. Prior to the next status hearing, the parties are to meet and confer concerning areas of disagreement and suggested next steps in the settlement process. Plaintiffs are to email a copy of their proposed settlement agreement to Judge Finnegan's proposed order box (Proposed_Order_Finnegan@ilnd.uscourts.gov), and Defendants are to email their written response to that order box. If the parties elect for a telephonic status on 10/12/2011, then Plaintiffs are to initiate the conference call and contact Judge Finnegan's chambers at (312) 435−5657 after all counsel are on the line, or establish a call−bridge and provide a call−in number and passcode. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 08/15/2011)

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09/06/2011 09/07/2011 10/12/2011
10/17/2011 11/03/2011 11/08/2011 12/07/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/15/2011
01/04/2012 01/17/2012 02/06/2012 02/10/2012 02/10/2012 02/14/2012

28 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:The Status hearing set for 9/8/11 is stricken and reset to 10/20/2011 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
29 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Howard A. Rosenblum (Rosenblum, Howard) (Entered: 09/07/2011)
30 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 10/12/2011 and continued to 11/9/2011 at 10:30 a.m. Preliminary settlement conference (counsel only) held on 10/12/2011. Parties have exchanged initial written settlement proposals. Prior to the next status, counsel are to continue settlement discussions in a face−to−face meeting. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
31 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:The Status hearing set for 10/20/11 is stricken and reset to 12/15/2011 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
32 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge Status hearing is reset to 11/9/2011 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
33 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 11/9/2011 is stricken and reset to 12/7/2011 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
34 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement Conference with attorneys is set for 2/6/2012 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
35 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:The Status hearing set for 12/15/11 is stricken and reset to 2/9/2012 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
36 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: The minute entry of 12/7/11 (34) resetting the status hearing date of 12/15/11 to 2/6/12 is vacated. Status hearing date of 2/6/12 is vacated. Status hearing is set for 12/15/2011 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
37 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 12/15/2s011, and continued to 2/16/2012 at 10:30 AM., for report on settlement. Defendants are to respond to plaintiffs complaint by 1/17/12. Parties are to file with the court a joint discovery plan two days in advance of the status hearing, with a courtesy copy to chambers, Room 2578. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 12/15/2011)
38 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Mary Teresa Mccarthy (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
39 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/17/2012)
40 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Conference held with attorneys on 2/6/2012 for a report on status of settlement discussions. Telephonic status hearing is set for 4/5/2012 at 1:15 p.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/06/2012)
41 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzieDefer Discovery Pending Settlement (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
42 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 41 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 2/16/2012 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
43 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Defendants' Motion 41 to defer discovery pending settlement is granted. The status hearing and for the filing of a joint discovery plan set for 2/16/12 is stricken and reset to 5/3/12 at 10:30 a.m. If the case does not settle, a joint discovery plan is to be filed with the Court two days in advance of the 5/3/12 status date, with a courtesy copy to Chambers, Room 2578. The motion

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02/14/2012 02/14/2012 02/14/2012 02/16/2012 02/16/2012
03/06/2012
03/22/2012
04/04/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/25/2012 05/04/2012

hearing set for 2/16/12 is stricken. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
44 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Defer Discovery (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
45 Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
46 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:The minute entry of 2/14/12 (43) granting defendants' motion to defer discovery is vacated. Status hearing and the motion to defer will be heard on 2/16/2012 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
47 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 2/16/2012, and continued to 4/5/2012 at 10:30 AM. For the reasons stated in open court, defendants' motion to defer discovery is denied. Parties are referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan for continued settlement discussions.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
48 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Conference held with attorneys on 2/16/2012. By 3/1/2012, counsel are to confer and attempt to reach agreement concerning (1) what discovery should be taken at this time to facilitate settlement discussions, (2) the structure of future settlement discussions and Judge Finnegan's role in those discussions, and (3) a proposed date for the next conference with Judge Finnegan. After they confer, counsel are to contact the courtroom deputy (312−408−5110) to schedule a telephone or in−person conference with Judge Finnegan. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
49 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference with counsel for the parties held on 3/6/2012 and continued to 3/19/2012 at 11:00 a.m. Counsel report that they are in agreement that no discovery should take place at this time. They are continuing to engage in settlement discussions and will attempt to determine by the next status hearing with the district judge whether settlement is feasible or not. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/07/2012)
50 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with counsel for the parties on 3/22/2012 to discuss settlement issues. The parties have made further progress toward a potential settlement and will be prepared to report to the district judge and magistrate judge on 4/5/2012 whether the parties have resolved one remaining major issue. If so, the parties will seek additional time to continue settlement discussions focused on numerous small issues and details of an agreement. This Court's status hearing on 4/5/2012 is moved from 1:15 p.m. to 10:15 a.m. so counsel may appear immediately after the status hearing with the district judge. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
51 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing is set to 4/5/2012 at 10:45 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/04/2012)
52 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 4/5/2012, and continued to 5/21/2012 at 10:30 AM., for report on settlement.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
53 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 4/5/2012 and continued to 5/4/2012 at 9:15 a.m. for report on settlement. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
54 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:The tatus hearing set for 5/21/12 is srricken and reset to 5/24/2012 at 10:30 AM.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
55 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 5/4/2012 and continued to 5/24/2012 at 11:00 a.m. The parties report on the status of settlement discussions. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/04/2012)

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05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/08/2012 05/24/2012 05/24/2012 06/21/2012 06/21/2012
08/21/2012 08/23/2012
08/23/2012
09/14/2012 09/19/2012 11/01/2012 11/01/2012 11/02/2012

56 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to withdraw as attorney Nisha Verma (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
57 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 56 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 5/10/2012 at 10:30 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
58 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' Motion to withdraw Nisha Verma as attorney 56 is granted. Attorney Nisha Verma terminated. The motion hearing date of 5/10/12 is stricken.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
59 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 5/24/2012 and continued to 6/21/2012 at 10:45 a.m. The parties report on the progress of the settlement discussions. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
60 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 5/24/2012, and continued to 6/21/2012 at 10:30 AM., for report on settlement.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
61 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 6/21/2012, and continued to 8/23/2012 at 10:30 AM.. Parties are to file with the Court a joint discovery plan, and provide a courtesy copy to Chambers, Room 2578 two days in advance of the status hearing. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
62 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Conference with parties to discuss settlement issues held on 6/21/2012 and continued to 8/23/2012 at 10:45 a.m. Parties may contact Judge Finnegan's courtroom deputy to request an interim date for a conference if the parties feel this would be helpful. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 06/21/2012)
63 STATUS Report (Joint Initial) by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Salvador A Godinez, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Rachel McKinzie, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 08/21/2012)
64 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing held on 8/23/2012, and continued to 10/17/13 at 10:30 a.m. All Discovery. including expert discovery, ordered closed by 9/15/2013. Parties are to either file a joint pretrial order or dispositive motions with supporting memorandums in open court on 10/17/2013 at 10:30 AM. Parties are referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan forthwith for further settlement conference. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
65 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan:Status conference was held with parties to discuss settlement issues. By 9/6/2012, each party will submit their most recent settlement proposal to Judge Finnegan via e−mail to her "Proposed Mail Order Box", as well as a short letter with any information that they desire to share with Judge Finnegan on a confidential basis.Mailed notice (ldg, ) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
66 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with counsel for defendants on 9/14/2012 to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
67 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with counsel for plaintiffs on 9/19/2012 to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
68 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
69 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for protective order 68 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 11/8/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
70 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Defendants' motion to enter an agreed protective order 68 is granted. Motion hearing set for 11/8/2012 is cancelled. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

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11/02/2012 01/29/2013 01/31/2013 02/06/2013 02/06/2013
03/18/2013 04/15/2013 04/15/2013 04/17/2013 04/29/2013 04/30/2013 04/30/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013
05/20/2013

71 AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY Order Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 11/2/2012: Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
72 AGREED HIPAA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 1/29/2013: Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
73 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 2/6/2013 at 11:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
74 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Ryan Marc Dunigan (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
75 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 2/6/2013. Parties report on the status of discovery. Judge Finnegan will resume settlement talks with the parties next month after they complete the bulk of ongoing written discovery. Plaintiffs' counsel is to contact the courtroom deputy by 3/13/2013 with available dates for a conference with Judge Finnegan to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
76 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference set for 4/15/2013 at 9:30 a.m. with counsel for plaintiffs to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/18/2013)
77 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held on 4/15/2013 with counsel for Plaintiffs to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
78 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing is set for 5/13/2013 at 9:45 a.m. for a report on progress in completing discovery. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
79 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephonic conference set for 4/29/2013 at 1:45 p.m. with defense counsel to conduct settlement discussions. Defense counsel is to initiate the conference call and contact Judge Finnegan's chambers at (312) 435−5657. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
80 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held on 4/29/2013 with counsel for Defendants to discuss settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/30/2013)
81 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing is reset to 6/6/2013 at 9:45 a.m. for a report on progress in completing discovery. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/30/2013)
82 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Lucas T Pendry (Pendry, Lucas) (Entered: 04/30/2013)
83 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Enter Order on Fact Depositions (Agreed) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
84 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 83 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 5/23/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
85 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Enter HIPAA Qualified Protective Order for Third Parties (Agreed) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
86 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 85 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 5/23/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 05/20/2013)

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05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 06/06/2013 06/14/2013
06/14/2013 06/18/2013 06/18/2013 06/20/2013 06/23/2013
06/23/2013
06/23/2013 06/25/2013
07/19/2013

87 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Enter Agreed Order on Fact Depositions. Plaintiffs' agreed motion to enter order on fact depositions 83 is granted. [For further detail see separate order(s)]. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
88 AGREED ORDER on Fact Depositions Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 5/20/2013. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
89 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Enter Agreed HIPAA Qualified Protective Order for Third Parties. Plaintiffs' agreed motion to enter HIPAA qualified protective order for third parties 85 is granted. [For further details see separate order(s)]. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
90 AGREED HIPPA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE Order for Third Parties Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 5/20/2013: Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
91 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 6/6/2013. Parties report on progress in completing discovery. Magistrate Judge telephonic status hearing set for 7/22/2013 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
92 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Overrule Certain Objections to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests and to Compel Production (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−P)(Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
93 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 92 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 6/20/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
94 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Discovery from Defendants (Second) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−N)(Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
95 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion to compel, 94 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 6/25/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
96 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion Hearing as to Plaintiffs' motion to overrule certain objections to plaintiffs' discovery requests and to compel production 92 is reset to 6/25/2013 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
97 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinziein Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Overrule Certain Objections to Plaintiffs' Discovery 92 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/23/2013)
98 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinziein Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Discovery from Defendants (Second) 94 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/23/2013)
99 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie re response in opposition to motion, 97 , response in opposition to motion, 98 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/23/2013)
100 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 6/25/2013. Plaintiffs' motion to overrule certain objections to plaintiffs' discovery requests and to compel production 92 and Plaintiffs' second motion to compel discovery from defendants 94 are granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated on the record. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 06/25/2013)
101 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Discovery from Defendants (Third)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 25 of 65

07/19/2013 07/22/2013
08/05/2013
08/14/2013 08/14/2013 08/15/2013 08/15/2013 08/19/2013
08/19/2013 08/29/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013

(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
102 NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Laurence Motto for presentment of motion to compel, 101 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 7/25/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
103 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status telephonic status hearing held on 7/22/2013 and continued to 8/5/2013 at 9:15 a.m. Parties report on the status of discovery. Defendants shall respond by 7/30/2013 to Plaintiffs' latest proposal concerning deposition locations. Plaintiffs' third motion to compel discovery from defendants 101 is entered and continued to 8/5/2013 at 9:15 a.m. If the parties will be arguing any issues they must appear in person. If counsel intend merely to provide a report to the Court, they may participate by telephone. Motion hearing set for 7/25/2013 is cancelled. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/22/2013)
104 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing and status hearing held on 8/5/2013. With the Court's assistance, the parties were able to reach agreement on the remaining issues in dispute. Plaintiffs' third motion to compel discovery from defendants 101 is denied as moot. Defendants are to offer available dates for depositions and the special needs list by 8/9/2013. Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 8/29/2013 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
105 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for extension of time to complete discovery (Unopposed) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−W)(Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
106 NOTICE of Motion by Mary Teresa Mccarthy for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 105 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 8/20/2013 at 10:30 AM. (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
107 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for extension of time to complete discovery (Unopposed)105 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
108 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie re response to motion, 107 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
109 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs unopposed Motion for extension of time to complete discovery 105 is granted. Enter Order: 1.Written discovery (including electronic discovery) to be completed by October 4, 2013; 2.All depositions to have firm dates by October 18, 2013; 3.Non−expert discovery to close by January 15, 2014;4. Expert reports due by February 15, 2014; 5.Expert discovery to close by March 15, 2014. 6. Parties are to file either a joint pretrial order or dispositive motions with supporting memorandums in open court on April 17, 2014, at 10:30 a.m. No further extensions of time will be allowed. The motion hearing scheduled for 8/20/13 is stricken. (For further details, see Order in separate docket entry). Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 08/19/2013)
110 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 8/19/2013:Judicial staff mailed notice(gl, ) (Entered: 08/19/2013)
111 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 8/29/2013 and continued to 10/18/2013 at 9:15 a.m. Parties report on the status of discovery. By agreement the parties may call to reschedule the status hearing. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
112 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time to produce electronic discovery results (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
113 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time 112 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 10/10/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/04/2013)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 26 of 65

10/09/2013 10/10/2013 10/11/2013 10/11/2013 10/15/2013 10/16/2013
10/17/2013
10/22/2013 10/22/2013 10/23/2013 10/23/2013 10/23/2013 10/29/2013

114 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time to produce electronic discovery results 112 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
115 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 10/10/2013. Defendants' motion for enlargement to time to respond to the plaintiffs' request for electronic discovery 112 seeks an extension of the discovery deadline imposed by the district judge so must be noticed before him. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
116 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for protective order (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
117 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for protective order 116 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 10/17/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
118 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Frederic Charles Shadley (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
119 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for protective order 116 to Strike Certain Deposition Notices and to Place Time Limits on Certain Other Depositions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
120 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 10/17/2013. Defendants' motion for a protective order to strike certain deposition notices and to place time limits on certain other depositions 116 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated on the record. Defendants to amend their Rule 26(a) disclosures by 11/7/2013. Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 10/8/2013 is reset to 11/7/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
121 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel electronic discovery and for sanctions (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
122 NOTICE of Motion by Frederic Charles Shadley for presentment of motion to compel, 121 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/29/2013 at 10:30 AM. (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
123 MINUTE entry before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery and for sanctions is referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan. The motion hearing scheduled for 10/29/13, before Judge Aspen, is stricken.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 10/23/2013)
124 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery and for sanctions. 121 ..(gl, Judicial staff mailed notice. (Entered: 10/23/2013)
125 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion Hearing set for 10/29/2013 at 9:00 a.m. as to Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery and for sanctions 121 . Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/23/2013)
126 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 10/29/2013. Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery 121 and Defendants' motion for enlargement of time to respond to the plaintiffs' request for electronic discovery 112 are granted for the reasons stated on the record. Plaintiffs' request for sanctions 121 is taken under advisement. The ESI discovery is to be produced on a rolling basis but in no event can the last shipment of emails be provided later than one

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 27 of 65

11/01/2013 12/02/2013
12/19/2013 01/21/2014 02/10/2014 02/10/2014 02/10/2014
02/11/2014 02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/12/2014 02/13/2014

week before the first deposition. By agreement, all deadlines are extended by six weeks. Written discovery (including electronic discovery) to be completed by November 15, 2013. All depositions to have firm dates by November 29, 2013. Non−expert discovery to close by February 26, 2014. Expert reports due by March 31, 2014. Expert discovery to close by April 28, 2014. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
127 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 11/7/2013 is reset to 12/2/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
128 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 12/2/2013 and continued to 2/11/2014 at 9:30 a.m. The parties report that ESI has been produced and approximately 22 depositions are scheduled to take place before the fact discovery deadline of 2/26/2014. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
129 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Joelle Lynn Ross (Ross, Joelle) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
130 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Rachel M. Weisberg (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
131 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time to complete discovery (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
132 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 131 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 2/18/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
133 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Defendants' unopposed Motion for extension of time to complete discovery 131 is granted. Fact discovery to close 4/30/14; Expert reports due by 5/30/14; Expert discovery closure date is extended to 6/30/14. No further extensions will be allowed. The status hearing and for either filing a joint pretrial order or dispositive motions with supporting memoranda set for 4/17/14 is stricken and reset to 7/24/15 at 10:30 a.m. The motion hearing scheduled for 2/18/14 is stricken.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
134 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 2/11/2014 and continued 5/5/2014 at 9:15 a.m. The parties report on the status of discovery. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
135 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file under seal (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
136 SEALED MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Compel Testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − F)(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
137 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker (REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION) (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
138 NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Laurence Motto for presentment of motion to compel, 137 , Sealed motion, 136 , motion for leave to file 135 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 2/18/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
139 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file under seal 135 is granted. Motion hearing set for 2/18/2014 is cancelled. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/13/2014)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 28 of 65

02/13/2014 02/13/2014 02/25/2014 02/25/2014 02/26/2014
02/26/2014 03/03/2014
03/05/2014 03/05/2014
03/06/2014
04/08/2014

140 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: By agreement, Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' motion to compel testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker 137 is due by 2/26/2014. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
141 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: The status date of 7/24/15 entered in the minute entry of 2/10/14 (Dkt. No. 133) is corrected to read 7/24/14.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
142 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie for extension of time (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
143 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time 142 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 3/4/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
144 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinziein Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker (REDACTED PUBL 137 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
145 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie re response in opposition to motion, 144 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
146 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Defendants' motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' first set of requests for admission 142 is granted by agreement. Motion hearing set for 3/4/2014 is cancelled. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
147 NOTICE by Kevin P. McCormick of Change of Address (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
148 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge telephonic status hearing set for 3/6/2014 at 11:30 a.m. for a ruling on Plaintiff's motion to compel testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker 137 . Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
149 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge telephonic status hearing held on 3/6/2014. Plaintiff's motion to compel testimony of Dr. Louis Shicker 136 , 137 is granted for the reasons stated on the record. The deposition of Dr. Louis Shicker is limited to two hours. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
150 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/29/2013 before the Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan. Court Reporter Contact Information: ALEXANDRA ROTH, alexandra_roth@ilnd.uscourts.gov, (312) 408−5038.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

04/23/2014 04/23/2014

Redaction Request due 4/29/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/9/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/7/2014. (Roth, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
151 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file Under Seal (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
152 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Discovery From Defendants (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 29 of 65

04/23/2014 04/23/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 04/25/2014 04/29/2014
04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014

153 MEMORANDUM by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion to compel, 152 (PUBLIC VERSION) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Q)(Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
154 NOTICE of Motion by Ryan Marc Dunigan for presentment of motion for leave to file 151 , motion to compel, 152 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 4/29/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
155 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file under seal 151 is granted. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
156 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Rule 30(B)(6) Deposition of the Illinois Department of Corrections (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
157 MEMORANDUM by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion to compel, 156 (Redacted Public Version) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−L)(Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
158 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file Under Seal (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
159 NOTICE of Motion by Mary Teresa Mccarthy for presentment of motion to compel, 156 , motion for leave to file 158 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 4/29/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
160 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel, 152 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, D, O, P)(Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
161 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 4/29/2014. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from defendants 152 is granted in part and denied in part per the rulings stated on the record. If the parties desire an order setting forth the ruling as to each of the 12 categories of documents that were the subject of the motion, they may submit a proposed order. Plaintiffs' motion to compel Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of the Illinois Department of Corrections 156 is taken under advisement. Parties are to meet and confer concerning the topics to be covered in the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and should be prepared to identify their agreements and disagreements during the status hearing on 5/5/2014. Parties are also to confer concerning the accommodations that one plaintiff seeks during his upcoming deposition. If necessary, the Court will hear argument during the next status hearing. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
162 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Discovery from Third Party Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
163 MEMORANDUM by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion to compel, 162 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−H)(McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
164 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright regarding memorandum in support of motion, 163 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit H)(McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
165 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file Under Seal (McCormick, Kevin)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 30 of 65

04/30/2014 05/01/2014 05/01/2014 05/05/2014
05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/29/2014
06/10/2014
06/23/2014 06/23/2014 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 06/30/2014

(Entered: 04/30/2014)
166 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin P. McCormick for presentment of motion to compel, 162 , motion for leave to file 165 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 5/6/2014 at 09:15 AM. (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
167 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file under seal 165 is granted. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
168 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin P. McCormick for presentment of motion to compel, 162 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 5/5/2014 at 09:15 AM. (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
169 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 5/5/2014 and continued to 6/10/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from third party Wexford Health Sources, Inc. 162 is granted without objection. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. to produce documents no later than 5/30/2014. Motion hearing held on 5/5/2014. Plaintiffs' motion to compel Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of the Illinois Department of Corrections 156 is granted in part, denied in part and deferred in part per the rulings stated on the record. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
170 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for extension of time to complete discovery (AGREED) (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
171 NOTICE of Motion by Frederic Charles Shadley for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 170 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 5/27/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
172 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Agreed motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 170 is entered and continued to 5/29/14 at 10:30 a.m. The motion hearing set for 5/27/14 is stricken. Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
173 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' agreed motion to extend discovery deadlines 170 is granted. Expert reports are extended to 6/30/14; Expert discovery closure date is extended to 7/30/14. No further extensions will be allowed. The status hearing and for either filing a joint pretrial order or dispositive motions with supporting memoranda is set for 8/21/14 at 10:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
174 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 6/10/2014. The parties report on the status of discovery and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Defendants to provide information at issue to plaintiffs by 6/13/2014 and the parties are to confer on 6/17/2014 in an effort to resolve any disagreements. If necessary, Defendants' motion for protective order to be filed by 6/23/2014. Plaintiffs' response due by 6/30/2014. Motion hearing set for 7/2/2014 at 10:00 a.m. If no motion is filed, the hearing date will be stricken. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
175 MOTION by Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections to quash Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
176 NOTICE by Illinois Department Of Corrections re MOTION by Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections to quash Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena 175 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
177 MOTION by Defendants Salvador A Godinez, Rachel McKinzie to depose Mr. Holmes after discovery has closed (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
178 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 177 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 7/2/2014 at 10:00 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
179 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord,

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 31 of 65

06/30/2014 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 07/01/2014 07/01/2014 07/02/2014
07/16/2014
07/22/2014 07/22/2014 07/23/2014 07/24/2014 07/25/2014 07/30/2014

Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections to quash Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena 175 (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
180 MOTION by Defendant Rachel McKinzie for summary judgment (partial) (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
181 RULE 56 L.R. 56.1 Statement by Rachel McKinzie regarding motion for summary judgment 180 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
182 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for summary judgment 180 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/10/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
183 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Defendant Rachel McKinzie's motion for partial summary judgment 180 previously set for 7/10/14 is stricken and reset to 7/24/14 at 10:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
184 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion Hearing is reset to 7/2/2014 at 11:00 a.m. as to Illinois Department of Corrections' motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena under Rule 30(b)(6) 175 and Defendants' motion for leave to depose plaintiff Ralph Holmes after the close of discovery 177 . Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
185 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 7/2/2014. Defendants' motion for leave to depose plaintiff Ralph Holmes after the close of discovery 177 is granted since he is awaiting a new hearing device. Respondent Illinois Department of Corrections' motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena under Rule 30(b)(6) 175 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated on the record. As to any remaining issues, the parties are to confer and, if necessary, the Court will hear argument on 7/16/2014 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
186 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Motion hearing held on 7/16/2014 as to Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. Telephonic status hearing set for 7/23/2014 at 8:45 a.m. By 5:00 p.m. on 7/17/2014 Plaintiffs are to provide Defendants with a list of specific questions relating to the overall topic of explaining the "audit findings" at the five designated institutions. Plaintiffs are to email the same to Judge Finnegan's proposed order box at (Proposed_Order_Finnegan@ilnd.uscourts.gov). Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
187 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 180 is taken under advisement. Plaintiffs' response shall be filed by 8/21/14. Defendants' reply in support shall be filed by 9/5/14. Status and ruling on the motion is set for 10/2/14 at 10:30 a.m. Motion hearing date of 7/24/14 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
188 STIPULATION of Dismissal of claims against Defendant McKinzie only (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/22/2014)
189 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephonic status hearing is reset to 7/28/2014 at 9:30 a.m. at the request of the parties. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
190 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Pursuant to the Parties' stipulation of dismissal, Defendant Rachel McKinzi's motion for partial summary judgment 180 is stricken as moot. Defendant Rachel McKinzie is dismissed as a party in this case. Status hearing remains set for 8/21/14 at 10:30 a.m. Hearing date of 10/2/14 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
191 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephonic status hearing is reset to 7/31/2014 at 1:30 p.m. at the request of the parties. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
192 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to complete discovery (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/30/2014)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 32 of 65

07/30/2014 07/31/2014
08/04/2014
08/20/2014 09/18/2014 10/06/2014
10/07/2014 10/07/2014 10/10/2014 10/10/2014 10/10/2014 10/10/2014

193 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 192 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 8/7/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
194 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan: Magistrate Judge Telephonic status hearing held on 7/31/2014 for discussion of disputes surrounding the planned Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on the topic of the audit process and audit results and conclusions. Defendants shall review the facility audit review questions provided by Plaintiff and identify which questions will be answered by defendants in writing and which will be the subject of testimony by the Rule 30(b)(6) deponent. To the extent that certain questions cannot reasonably be answered in writing or through a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the plaintiff may consider whether to seek deposition testimony from specific fact witnesses. Defendants are to provide written answers by 8/11/2014 and are to promptly work with Plaintiffs to schedule the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Status hearing set for 8/21/2014 at 11 a.m. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
195 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Defendant's unopposed motion for enlargement of time to complete discovery 192 is granted as follows: Discovery is extended to 9/12/14. Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda shall be filed by 10/23/14. Status hearing and submission of pretrial order previously set for 8/21/14 is stricken and reset to 10/23/14 at 10:30 a.m. Motion hearing date of 8/7/14 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
196 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing set for 8/21/2014 is reset to 9/18/2014 at 11:00 a.m. at the request of the parties. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 08/20/2014)
197 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 9/18/2014 and continued to 10/6/2014 at 9:15 a.m. The parties report on the status of discovery. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
198 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 10/6/2014. The parties report on the status of discovery and depositions. By agreement of the parties, Judge Finnegan will speak with counsel for the parties separately concerning settlement issues. A telephone or in−person conference set for 10/10/2014 at 11:00 a.m. with plaintiffs' counsel. In−person conference set for 10/14/2014 at 3:00 p.m. with defense counsel. Counsel if participating by telephone are to initiate the telephone conference by calling Judge Finnegan's chambers at (312) 435−5657. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
199 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to strike a Portion of Plaintiff Eason's Deposition Changes (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
200 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to strike 199 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 10/16/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
201 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to certify class (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
202 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file Under Seal (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
203 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification 201 ) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−25)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
204 MEMORANDUM by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion to certify class 201 (Redacted Public Version) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−30)(Michels, Robert) (Entered:

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 33 of 65

10/10/2014 10/10/2014 10/14/2014 10/15/2014
10/17/2014 10/21/2014 10/21/2014 10/22/2014 10/30/2014
11/17/2014 11/20/2014 12/02/2014 12/04/2014 12/05/2014

10/10/2014)
205 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion to certify class 201 , motion for leave to file 202 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/23/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
206 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement conference held on 10/10/2014 with plaintiffs' counsel. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
208 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement conference held on 10/14/2014 with counsel for defendants. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
207 AGREED ORDER Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 10/15/2014: Defendant's Motion to Strike a Portion of Plaintiff Hannibal Eason's Requested Deposition Transcript Changes 199 is withdrawn by the Defendant and no appearance is necessary on October 16, 2014. [For further details see order.] Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
209 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with plaintiffs' counsel on 10/17/2014 for discussion of settlement issues. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
210 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file a dispositive motion, MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to stay briefing on plaintiffs' motion to certify a class (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
211 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time, motion to stay 210 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/23/2014 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
212 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Hearing on status, submission of pretrial order and parties' pending motions 201 , 202 , and 210 previously set for 10/23/14 is stricken and reset for 10/30/14 at 10:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing held and continued to 12/4/14 at 10:30 a.m. Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motions to certify class 201 and for leave to file under seal 202 are entered and continued to 12/4/14 at 10:30 a.m. Defendants' motion for extension of time and to stay briefing schedule 210 is entered and continued to 12/4/14 at 10:30 a.m. Parties are discussing the possibility of settling this case. This case is stayed for 30 days. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
214 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing and hearing on Parties' pending motions previously set for 12/4/14 is stricken and reset to 12/23/14 at 10:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
215 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with counsel for defendants on 11/20/2014 regarding progress in considering and responding to Plaintiffs' settlement proposal. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
216 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference is set for 12/4/2014 at 2:00 p.m. for report on status of settlement discussions. Plaintiff's counsel is to initiate the conference call and contact chambers (312−435−5657) when all participants are on the line. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
217 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with the parties on 12/4/2014 for discussion of settlement issues. Magistrate Judge Finnegan will speak separately with counsel on 12/4/2014 (defense) and 12/5/2014 at 10:30 a.m. (plaintiffs) to discuss next steps. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
218 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephone conference held with counsel for Defendant on 12/5/2014. By 12/12/2014, Defendants will provide a red−lined draft to Plaintiffs' counsel. Telephone conference held with counsel for Plaintiffs on 12/5/2014 and continued to 12/19/2014 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 34 of 65

12/12/2014 12/12/2014 12/12/2014 12/12/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/23/2014 12/23/2014
01/12/2015
01/12/2015 01/14/2015
01/15/2015
01/15/2015

219 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' settlement demand (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
220 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time 219 before Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 12/16/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
221 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan:Motion for extension of time 219 is granted. Settlement response due no later than 2 p.m. on 12/17/2014.mailed notice (Finnegan, Sheila) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
222 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time (amended) (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/12/2014)
223 DOCUMENT REMOVED PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER DATED 12/22/14. Modified on 12/22/2014 (gcy, ). (Entered: 12/22/2014)
224 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: The Clerk's Office is hereby directed to remove forthwith from the electronic docket the text of the entry and pdf for document #223. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
225 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Defendants' amended motion for enlargement of time to respond to the plaintiffs' settlement demand 222 is denied as moot in light of the order entered on 12/12/2014 221 . Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
226 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing held and continued to 4/9/15 at 10:30 a.m. Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to certify class 201 is taken under advisement. Defendants' response shall be filed by 1/30/15. Plaintiffs' reply in support shall be filed by 2/13/15. Defendant's motion for extension of time to file a dispositive motion 210 is granted to 1/13/15. Plaintiffs' response shall be filed by 1/30/15. Defendants' reply in support shall be filed by 2/13/15. Ruling on pending motions set for 4/9/15 at 10:30 a.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
227 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file a dispositive motion, MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file response/reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Class, MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for leave to file excess pages for his dispositive motion, MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to file in excess of 80 statements of uncontested fact (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
228 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of extension of time, motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for leave to file excess pages, motion for miscellaneous relief,,,, 227 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 1/15/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
229 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file a dispositive motionMOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file response/reply to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a ClassMOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for leave to file excess pages for his dispositive motionMOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to file in excess of 80 statements of uncontested fact 227 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 01/14/2015)
230 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Magistrate Judge status hearing held on 1/15/2015. Plaintiff's counsel participates by telephone. By agreement of the parties, Judge Finnegan will speak with counsel for the parties separately concerning settlement issues. Telephonic conferences set for 1/20/2015 at 1:00 p.m (defense counsel) and 1/20/2015 at 4:30 p.m. (plaintiff's counsel). Counsel are to initiate their respective telephone conferences by calling Judge Finnegan's chambers at (312) 435−5657. Settlement Conference set for 1/22/2015 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
231 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement Conference set for 1/22/2015 is reset to 1/21/2015 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 35 of 65

01/16/2015
01/21/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015
01/28/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015 02/06/2015

232 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Motion hearing held. Parties reported discovery is completed. Defendant Godinez's motion for extension of time to file a dispositive motion and to respond to the motion to certify a class, for leave to exceed the 15−page limit, and for leave to exceed 80 statements of uncontested fact 227 is granted in part and denied in part as stated on the record. Defendant's dispositive motion shall be filed by 1/28/15. Plaintiff's response shall be filed by 2/20/15. Defendant's response shall be field by 2/27/15. Defendant's motion for leave to exceed 80 statement of uncontested facts is denied. Defendant's response to Plaintiffs' motion to certify class 201 shall be filed by 2/6/15. Defendant's reply in support shall be filed by 2/13/15. No further extensions. Briefing on any Daubert motions shall be on the same schedule as the dispositive motion schedule. Parties shall meet with Judge Finnegan for a settlement conference before 2/1/15. Parties shall submit a joint letter with the results of that settlement conference by 2/13/15. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
233 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement Conference held on 1/21/2015 and continued to 2/6/2015 at 2:00 p.m. In the interim, counsel are to make inquiries on designated topics and circulate emails with requested information as this is obtained. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
234 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to withdraw as attorney (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
235 NOTICE of Motion by Frederic Charles Shadley for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 234 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 1/29/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Shadley, Frederic) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
236 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to withdraw counsel 234 is granted. Attorney Frederic Charles Shadley is given leave to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs. Motion hearing date of 1/29/15 is stricken. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
237 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for summary judgment (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
238 MEMORANDUM by Salvador A Godinez in support of motion for summary judgment 237 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
239 RULE 56 Local Rule 56.1 Statement by Salvador A Godinez regarding motion for summary judgment 237 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
240 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A GodinezExclude Expert Testimony (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
241 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for summary judgment 237 , Rule 56 statement,, 239 , memorandum in support of motion 238 , MOTION by Defendant Salvador A GodinezExclude Expert Testimony 240 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
242 MEMORANDUM by Salvador A Godinez in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 240 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
243 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to certify class 201 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/06/2015)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 36 of 65

02/06/2015 02/06/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015
02/13/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015
02/20/2015
02/25/2015

244 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re response in opposition to motion, 243 for class certification (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
245 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement Conference held on 2/6/2015 and tentatively continued to 3/9/2015 at 2:00 p.m. subject to confirmation from defense counsel by 2/10/2015. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
246 STATUS Report of Settlement Proceedings (JOINT) by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
247 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file under seal (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
248 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion for leave to file 247 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 2/26/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
249 SEALED REPLY by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to certify class 201 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−20)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
250 REPLY by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to motion to certify class 201 (PUBLIC VERSION) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−20)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
251 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A GodinezExclude Expert Testimony 240 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
252 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file under seal (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
253 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion for leave to file 252 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 2/26/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
254 RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for summary judgment 237 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
255 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts 239 And Additional Facts that Require the Denial of Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−30, # 3 Exhibit 31−60)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
256 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Rule 56 statement,, 239 (PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION) (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1−30, # 3 Exhibit 31−60)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
257 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file under seal the exhibits accompanying Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class certification, as well as the portions of

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 37 of 65

02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 03/09/2015
04/08/2015 04/09/2015
04/09/2015 04/13/2015 04/15/2015 05/20/2015 05/22/2015
05/22/2015 05/27/2015 06/29/2015

the motion describing those exhibits and certain deposition testimony 247 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file certain exhibits accompanying Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the portions of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts and Additional Facts describing those exhibits under seal 252 is granted. Motion hearing scheduled for 2/26/2015 is stricken.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
258 REPLY by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to motion for summary judgment 237 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
259 RULE 56 combined L.R. 56.1 statements Statement by Salvador A Godinez regarding motion for summary judgment 237 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
260 REPLY by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to motion for miscellaneous relief 240 (to exclude expert witness) (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
261 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re reply 260 , Rule 56 statement 259 , reply 258 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
262 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement conference held on 3/9/2015 and continued to 4/13/2015 at 2:00 p.m. By 4/3/2015, the parties are to exchange the information discussed during today's conference with a copy to the Court's proposed order box. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
263 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing and in−court ruling date on motions is reset from 4/9/2015 to 5/21/2015 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
264 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to withdraw as attorney (Pendry, Lucas) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
265 NOTICE of Motion by Lucas T Pendry for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 264 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 4/16/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Pendry, Lucas) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
266 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Settlement conference held on 4/13/2015. Parties were unable to reach an agreement. Mailed notice. (is, ) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
267 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to withdraw counsel 264 is granted. Lucas T. Pendry is withdrawn as counsel for plaintiffs. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 4/15/2015. Mailed notice. (rb, ) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
268 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing and in−court ruling date on motions is reset from 5/21/2015 to 8/20/2015 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
269 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to withdraw as attorney (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
270 NOTICE of Motion by Mary Teresa Mccarthy for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 269 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 5/28/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Mccarthy, Mary) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
271 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Motion of Mary T. McCarthy to withdraw as attorney for plaintiffs 269 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 5/28/2015.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
272 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Leave to Seek Supplemental Discovery Related to the Death of Named Plaintiff (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 38 of 65

06/29/2015 07/01/2015 07/09/2015 07/09/2015 07/16/2015
07/22/2015
08/06/2015 09/16/2015 09/21/2015 09/21/2015 09/22/2015
09/22/2015

273 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel M. Weisberg for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 272 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/2/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
274 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Response to plaintiffs' motion for leave to seek supplemental discovery related to the death of named plaintiff 272 is due by 7/9/2015. Reply is due by 7/16/2015. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 7/2/2015.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
275 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Leave to Seek Supplemental Discovery Related to the Death 272 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
276 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re response in opposition to motion, 275 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
277 REPLY by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to response in opposition to motion, 275 , MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Leave to Seek Supplemental Discovery Related to the Death 272 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
278 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/22/2015: Plaintiffs' motion for supplemental discovery 272 is granted. Defendant is ordered to produce the documents and information requested in paragraph nine of Plaintiffs' motion by August 21, 2015. The parties must schedule depositions by September 21, 2015, with this limited supplemental discovery completed by that date. (See Mot. 10 (requesting discovery be completed within sixty days).) The rulings on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Defendant's Daubert motion will not be stayed in light of this discovery.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing and in−court ruling date on motions is reset from 8/20/2015 to 9/17/2015 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
280 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing and in−court ruling date on motions 237 and 240 is reset from 9/17/2015 to 11/12/2015 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
281 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
282 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel M. Weisberg for presentment of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 281 before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/24/2015 at 10:30 a.m. (Weisberg, Rachel) Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 9/22/2015 (jh, ). (Entered: 09/21/2015)
283 MOTION to Compel Index of Exhibits by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Corrected Exhibit List and Exhibits) regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel 281 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Weisberg, Rachel) Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 9/23/2015 (jh, ). (Entered: 09/22/2015)
284 Corrected NOTICE of Motion by Rachel M. Weisberg for presentment of motion to compel, 281 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/24/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 09/22/2015)

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 39 of 65

09/24/2015 09/24/2015 09/28/2015 09/30/2015
10/07/2015

285 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Plaintiff's motion to compel 281 is referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan. Motion hearing set for 9/24/2015 at 10:30 a.m. is stricken, no appearance is necessary. Mailed notice. (mgh, ). (Entered: 09/24/2015)
286 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Young B. Kim for Motion to Compel # 281 . Signed by Executive Committee on 9/24/2015. (jh, ) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
287 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to compel 281 is scheduled for September 30, 2015, at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
288 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. In light of the court's order of July 22, 2015, (R. 278), this court does not have the authority to resolve the privilege issue Defendants raise in their privilege log, whether the July 31, 2015 mortality review is subject to protection from disclosure under the Self−Critical Analysis Privilege and/or the Illinois Medical Studies Act. The assigned District Judge specifically ordered Defendants to provide "all mortality reviews." (R. 278 at 3; R. 272 at 3−4.) For this reason, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 281 is granted. Defendants are ordered to provide the July 31, 2015 mortality review (the portions pertaining to Curtis Foster) to Plaintiffs by October 15, 2015. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned District Judge. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
289 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on September 30, 2015 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Ms. Joene Hanhardt, Official Court Reporter, 219 S. Dearborn St., Suite 1744−A, Chicago, Illinois 60604, 312−435−6874.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/08/2015 10/08/2015

Redaction Request due 10/28/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/9/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/5/2016. (Hanhardt, Joene) (Entered: 10/07/2015)
290 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: As explained herein, Defendant's motion to exclude the expert testimony Elizabeth Stanosheck as unreliable is denied with prejudice and his motion to exclude her testimony as Cumulative is denied without prejudice. In addition, we find that Plaintiffs have satisfied the class certification requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2). Daniel Baxter and Curtis Foster, however, are inadequate class representatives and are dismissed from the case. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted with our modification to the class definition as stated in Section II(B) of our discussion. Finally, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part. Summary Judgment is denied as to Counts I (ADA), II (Rehabilitation Act), III (RLUIPA), V (free exercise), and VIII (due process), and is granted as to Counts IV (free speech) and VII (equal protection). As for Count VI (cruel and unusual punishment), summary judgment is granted to the extent the claim is based on Plaintiffs' allegations that IDOC placed them in communicative isolation and failed to notify them of non−emergency events, and is denied as to Plaintiffs' allegations that IDOC failed to notify them of emergency events and to provideadequate medical care. Accordingly, Counts IV and VII are dismissed, as are the aspects of Count VI related to communicative isolation and non−emergency notifications. The case will proceed as a class action on Counts I, II, III, V, VIII, and the remaining aspects of Count VI. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/8/2015. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
291 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing previously set for 11/12/2015 at 10:30 a.m. is stricken and reset to 12/10/2015 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

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10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/15/2015 10/15/2015 10/19/2015
10/22/2015 10/22/2015 10/23/2015 10/26/2015
10/26/2015
11/23/2015
11/23/2015 11/30/2015

292 OBJECTIONS by Salvador A. Godinez to the magistrate judge's order 288 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Lovellette, Kevin) Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 10/15/2015 (jh, ). (Entered: 10/14/2015)
293 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/22/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
294 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A. Godinez to vacate the Magistrate Judge's Order 288 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Lovellette, Kevin) Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 10/15/2015 (jh, ). (Entered: 10/15/2015)
295 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to vacate, motion for relief,,,, 294 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/22/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
296 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Plaintiff shall respond to Defendant's objections to the magistrate judge's order 292 and its motion to vacate the magistrate judge's order 294 by 10/26/2015. Motion hearing set for 10/22/2015 at 10:30 a.m. is stricken, no appearance is necessary. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
297 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to seal (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
298 NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Laurence Motto for presentment of motion to seal 297 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/29/2015 at 10:30 AM. (Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
299 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Plaintiffs' Motion to seal 297 is granted. No appearance is required on 10/29/2015. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
300 SEALED RESPONSE by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to vacate order on motion to compel, terminate hearings, motion hearing, terminate referral, set/clear flags,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 288 294 , appeal of magistrate judge decision to district court 292 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
301 OPPOSITION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright Defendant's objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order and Motion to vacate the Magistrate Judge's Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Motto, Joseph) Docket Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 10/27/2015 (jh, ). (Entered: 10/26/2015)
302 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 11/23/2015: Defendant's motion to vacate 294 is granted in part. Judge Kim's order 288 is vacated and Judge Kim is explicitly authorized to review Defendant's privilege assertion in the context of Plaintiffs' motion to compel. Plaintiffs' motion to compel is re−refered 281 to Judge Kim with instruction to consider Defendant's claim to privilege. Defendant's objections, 292 , are stricken without prejudice.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
303 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Young B. Kim for Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 281 with instruction to consider Defendant's claim to privilege. Signed by Executive Committee on 11/23/2015.(jh, ) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
304 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Plaintiff's motion to compel 281 is referred to this court for a ruling. The court confirmed with the parties by email that they wish to stand on their previous submissions, namely Document Nos. 292, 294, 300, and 301, in support of and in opposition to this motion and not file additional briefs. The court will rule on the motion electronically.Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 11/30/2015)

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12/08/2015 12/18/2015
12/18/2015 02/11/2016
02/11/2016 02/12/2016 03/18/2016 03/18/2016 03/22/2016
03/22/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 04/08/2016
04/12/2016 04/26/2016 05/02/2016

305 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing previously set for 12/10/2015 is stricken and reset to 2/11/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
306 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Plaintiffs' motion to compel 281 is granted. Enter Order. Defendant is ordered to provide the portions of the subject mortality review pertaining to Curtis Foster to Plaintiffs by January 5, 2016. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned District Judge. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
307 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 12/18/2015. (ma,) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
308 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 2/11/2016 and continued to 4/7/2016 at 10:30 AM. Parties shall submit their proposed joint pretrial order in open court on 4/7/2016. No extensions will be allowed. The pretrial order form is located on the Northern District of Illinois website under Local Rule 16.1.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
309 ENTERED IN ERROR. Modified on 2/12/2016 (ek, ). (Entered: 02/12/2016)
310 NOTICE of Correction regarding 309 (ek, ) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
311 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to clarify (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
312 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to clarify 311 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 3/24/2016 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
313 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 3/22/2016: Defendant's motion to clarify 311 is granted in part and taken under advisement in part as stated in the Order. Motion is stricken from the court's call of 3/24/2016. Defendant having conceded that this matter will proceed to bench trial, not a jury trial, the jury demand previously requested is stricken. The status hearing of 4/7/2016 is stricken and reset to 4/21/2016 at 10:30 a.m. The parties shall present their proposed final pretrial order in open court at that time.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
314 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file under seal 202 granted. (mad, ) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
315 RESPONSE by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to terminate hearings, order, set/reset hearings,,,,,, 313 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
316 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re Response 315 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
317 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: We have reviewed Defendant's response 315 to our 3/22/16 order, and we grant Defendant leave to withdraw its request for witnesses to appear by video conference. Defendant's motion to clarify 311 is otherwise granted as set forth in our 3/22/16 order dkt. no. 313 . Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
318 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing previously set for 4/21/2016 is stricken and reset to 4/28/2016 at 10:30 a.m. The parties shall present their proposed final pretrial order in open court at that time. Mailed notice. (mgh, ) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
319 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 4/28/2016 is stricken and reset for 5/5/2016 at 10:30 AM by agreement. The parties shall present their proposed final pretrial order in open court at that time. Mailed and telephoned notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
320 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Amanda C Antholt (Antholt, Amanda) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

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05/04/2016 05/05/2016
05/19/2016
05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016
05/19/2016 05/19/2016 05/19/2016 06/03/2016

321 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Salvador A Godinez by Jessica Megan Scheller Office of the Illinois Attorney General (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
322 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 5/5/2016 and continued to 7/21/2016 at 10:30 a.m. for report on possibility of settlement and to set date for trial. All motions in limine must be filed by 5/19/2016; responses are due by 6/2/2016. Motions raising any other pretrial matters, including objections to the admissibility of designated deposition transcripts, are due by 5/19/2016; responses are due by 6/2/2016. Parties' joint statement of facts that are not in dispute is due by 5/19/2016. List of all exhibits which parties have agreed to as to admissibility, or if not agreed to as to admissibility but agreed to as to foundation, is due by 5/19/2016; objections are due by 6/2/2016. List of all exhibits to which parties have not agreed is due by 5/19/2016; objections are due by 6/2/2016. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
323 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine to Bar Defendant From Calling Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
324 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Limit the Evidence at Trial to Conditions Existing in IDOC Facilities as of the Close of Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
325 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
326 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine to Exclude Certain Documents on Defendant's Proposed Exhibit List (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
327 Plaintiffs' and Defendant's Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts STATEMENT by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
328 Exhibit List Plaintiffs and Defendants Joint Exhibit List identifying (1) exhibits to which the parties have agreed as to admissibility; (2) exhibits to which the parties have agreed as to foundation; and (3) exhibits to which the parties have not agreed and which are subject to objections. by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright. (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
329 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar deposition testimony and bar certain of plaintiffs' witnesses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
330 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar certain of plaintiffs' exhibits (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
331 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar deposition testimony and bar certain of plaintiffs' witnesses 329 , MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar certain of plaintiffs' exhibits 330 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
332 RESPONSE by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar deposition testimony and bar certain of plaintiffs' witnesses 329 (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Motto, Joseph) (Entered: 06/03/2016)

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06/03/2016 06/03/2016
06/03/2016 06/03/2016 06/03/2016 06/08/2016

333 RESPONSE by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinezin limine to bar certain of plaintiffs' exhibits 330 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
334 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine 325 , MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine to Exclude Certain Documents on Defendant's Proposed Exhibit List 326 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
335 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin limine to Bar Defendant From Calling Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed 323 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
336 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to Limit the Evidence at Trial to Conditions Existing in IDOC Facilities as of the Close of 324 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
337 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re response in opposition to motion,, 334 , response in opposition to motion, 336 , response in opposition to motion, 335 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
338 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 02/11/2016 before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen. Court Reporter Contact Information: Rosemary Scarpelli, Rosemary_Scarpelli@ilnd.uscourts.gov, (312)435−5815.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/21/2016 07/19/2016 07/28/2016 08/02/2016
09/06/2016

Redaction Request due 6/29/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/11/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/6/2016. (Scarpelli, Rosemary) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
339 EXHIBIT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez Transcript of Proceedings − Status Before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on February 11, 2016 regarding response in opposition to motion, 336 (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
340 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 7/21/2016 is stricken and reset for 8/18/2016 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
341 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 8/18/2016 is stricken and reset for 8/25/2016 at 10:30 AM by agreement.Mailed and telephoned notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/28/2016)
342 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Presently before us are eight motions in limine filed by the parties in preparation for trial. We deny the parties' motions 323 , 324 , 325 , 326 , 329 , 330 but reopen discovery for sixty days for the limited purposes outlined below. The status date of August 25, 2016 is stricken and reset to December 8, 2016 at 10:30 a.m. It is so ordered. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 8/2/2016. Mailed notice(ntf, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
343 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Defendant to Produce Relevant Discovery for the Post−September 12, 2014 Period, and to set a Schedule for such Discovery and Related Matters (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit

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09/06/2016 09/07/2016 09/07/2016 09/13/2016 09/16/2016 09/16/2016 09/19/2016
09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/23/2016
09/23/2016 09/26/2016

C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
344 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion to compel, 343 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/8/2016 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/06/2016)
345 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiff's motion to compel 343 is being referred to the magistrate judge and is stricken from the Court's call of 9/8/2016.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
346 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Young B. Kim pursuant to Local Rule 72.1. Signed by Executive Committee on 9/7/2016. (ph, ) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
347 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A hearing on Plaintiff's motion to compel 343 is scheduled for September 19, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
348 MOTION by Attorney Kevin P. McCormick to withdraw as attorney for Ralph Holmes. No party information provided (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
349 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin P. McCormick for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 348 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/29/2016 at 10:30 AM. (McCormick, Kevin) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
350 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 343 is entered and continued. Defendant is ordered to respond to the motion by September 30, 2016, and Plaintiffs are ordered to file a reply thereto by October 7, 2016. A hearing on the motion is scheduled for October 19, 2016, at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Defendant is directed to cover the following subjects in his response to the motion: (1) the scope of the assigned District Judge's order permitting discovery; (2) information about the current prison conditions Defendant plans to offer at trial; and (3) applicability of Rule 26(e)(1) to discovery responses already provided to Plaintiffs prior to the close of discovery. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
351 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to stay the Supplemental Discovery Period Pending Magistrate Judge Kim's Ruling on Discovery Disputes and for Expansion of Referral to Magistrate Judge Kim (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
352 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion to stay, 351 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/29/2016 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
353 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' motion for a stay of the supplemental discovery period and for expansion of referral 351 is granted. The existing discovery deadline set in the Court's August 2, 2016 Order is stayed, and the deadline is extended to at least sixty days after Magistrate Judge Kims ruling on Plaintiffs' pending Motion to Compel. The referral to Magistrate Judge Kim is expanded to include the determination of the proper scope and order of any discovery into the post−September 12, 2014 period, including by setting any procedures and new deadlines necessary to effectuate such proper discovery, as well as any supplemental discovery required of Defendant under Rule 26. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of September 29, 2016.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
354 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to withdraw counsel 348 is granted. Kevin McCormick is withdrawn as counsel for plaintiffs. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on September 23, 2016. Mailed notice (ph, ) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
355 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In light of the assigned District Judge's September 23, 2016 ruling on Plaintiffs' motion, the court's order of September 19, 2016, is modified to the extent that Defendant is directed to cover the following subjects in his response to the motion: (1) information about the current prison conditions Defendant plans to offer at trial; (2) the scope of discovery that should be permitted; and (3) applicability of Rule 26(e)(1) to discovery responses already provided to Plaintiffs prior to the close of discovery. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/26/2016)

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09/29/2016 09/29/2016 09/30/2016
10/06/2016 10/06/2016 10/07/2016 10/14/2016
10/14/2016 10/28/2016
11/09/2016 11/17/2016

356 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to compel, 343 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
357 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 356 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 10/11/2016 at 11:00 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
358 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's motion for extension of time 356 is granted. Appearance on October 11, 2016, is not required to present this motion. Defendant now has until October 14, 2016, to file a response. This is a firm deadline. Plaintiffs now have until October 28, 2016, to file a reply in support of their motion to compel. The October 19, 2016 motion hearing is rescheduled for November 10, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
359 MOTION by Attorney Ryan M. Dunigan to withdraw as attorney for George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright. No party information provided (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
360 NOTICE of Motion by Ryan Marc Dunigan for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 359 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/13/2016 at 10:30 AM. (Dunigan, Ryan) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
361 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to withdraw counsel 359 is granted. Ryan M. Dunigan is withdrawn as counsel for plaintiffs. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 10/13/2016. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on October 7, 2016. Mailed notice (ph, ) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
362 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Defendant to Produce Relevant Discovery for the 343 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
363 NOTICE by Salvador A Godinez re response in opposition to motion, 362 to compel (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
364 REPLY by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to motion to compel, 343 Reply in Support of Motion to Compel (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
365 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The motion hearing scheduled for November 10, 2016, is rescheduled for November 17, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. The court needs additional time to consider the parties' submissions. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
366 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 343 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court. The court will supervise supplemental discovery in order to permit Plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to vet Defendant's evidence pertaining to events occurring after September 12, 2014, and to secure "positive evidence" they may wish to adduce during their case−in−chief, but will not permit the parties to conduct all discovery for the period of September 12, 2014, to present. The court finds that the proper scope of the required supplemental discovery must be tied to the nature and scope of the new information Defendant has been permitted to introduce at trial. To that end, first, Defendant is ordered to provide the following documents to Plaintiffs by December 2, 2016: (1) resumes and training records of the new ADA Facility Coordinators who will be called to testify about the period after September 12, 2014; (2) ADA training materials provided to ADA Facility Coordinators after September 12, 2014; (3) types of documents newly created and generated after September 12, 2014, to identify inmates as deaf and/or hard of hearing; (4) a list of inmates, including their inmate numbers and currently assigned facility, who entered the IDOC system after September 12, 2014, who are identified as either deaf or hard of hearing; (5) informal or formal grievances, and appeals, together with any responses thereto, filed after September 12, 2014, wherein an inmate identified himself or herself as deaf

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 46 of 65

12/06/2016 12/07/2016 12/13/2016 12/13/2016

and/or hard of hearing and are related to their access to interpreters, medical, educational, mental health, work, or religious programs and services, prison notifications or alerts, or communications with IDOC personnel; (6) documents related to disciplinary incidents occurring after September 12, 2014, involving deaf and/or hard of hearing inmates; and (7) documents explaining how Offender 360 tracks deaf and hard of hearing inmates at IDOC, including examples of relevant screen shots, and other functionalities that serve the deaf and hard of hearing inmate population. Second, Defendant is ordered to have the deposed ADA Facility Coordinators who are on the parties' witness lists to review their deposition transcript and to update their answers (noting the page and line numbers being updated) as if they are being deposed today, either by serving a declaration or an affidavit to Plaintiffs by December 9, 2016. Third, the parties are ordered to schedule the deposition of Alan Pasley (not to exceed four hours) to take place in December 2016, in Chicago. A status hearing is scheduled for December 13, 2016, at noon in courtroom 1019, to discuss the number of new depositions required. Parties are to confer about the new depositions prior to the status hearing and reach an agreement if possible. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
367 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The December 13, 2016 status hearing will start at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
368 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 12/8/2016 is stricken and reset for 2/9/2017 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/07/2016)
369 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Jin−Ho Chung (Chung, Jin−Ho) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
370 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held. Parties reported that Defendant IDOC has produced documents and information in response to this court's order of November 17, 2016, scheduled the deposition of Alan Pasley to take place on December 20, 2016, and agreed to depose nine witnesses (Dr. Michael Dempsey, Cecil Polley, Glen Austin, Nicollette Duffield, Angel Wilson, Emily Ruskin, Lisa Mincy, Rick Anderson, and Brian Watson) for now. Parties also reported that they are working on a stipulation in order to reduce the total number of depositions needed. With respect to the court's order of November 17, 2016, based on the discussion in open court and for the reasons stated, the court finds that IDOC has complied with the court's order as to categories of documents and information identified as (1), (2), (3), and (7) in the order. However, as to categories (4) and (6), IDOC is ordered to supplement the disclosure with the following: (a) as to category (4), IDOC is ordered to limit the list of inmates to only those inmates entering the prison system after September 12, 2014, and explain how it identified these inmates as either deaf or hard of hearing by no later than December 20, 2016; and (b) as to category (6), IDOC must provide the other documents associated with the disciplinary cards produced, such as tickets, reports, notifications of hearing, and hearing decisions, if available, by no later than January 6, 2017. The court also finds that IDOC did not comply with category (5), but its current response may stand. With respect to the depositions, the following conditions must be followed: (c) proceed with Pasley's deposition as scheduled on December 20, 2016; (d) IDOC to provide the ADA coordinator service dates of Clara Charron, Michael Melvin, Nancy Jacoby, and Jeff Korte by December 20, 2016; (e) Plaintiffs are allotted 50 total hours of deposition when deposing the nine witnesses identified here for depositions; (f) IDOC to present the nine witnesses identified for their depositions in Chicago, but the court urges Plaintiffs to consider using video/telephone conference whenever possible; (g) Plaintiffs to complete the nine depositions identified here by February 17, 2017 (parties are to contact the court as soon as possible in the event of scheduling difficulties); and (h) parties to file a joint status report listing the dates and times for these nine depositions by January 6, 2017. Finally, IDOC is ordered to provide an unredacted copy of its Exhibits 71 and 72 for opposing attorneys' eyes only by December 16, 2016. These exhibits are to be treated as confidential information until further order of the court. A status hearing is scheduled for February 22, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/13/2016)

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12/16/2016 12/16/2016 12/20/2016 12/21/2016
01/06/2017 01/06/2017 01/06/2017 01/09/2017 01/12/2017 01/21/2017

371 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file Defendant's unredacted Trial Exhibit 72, MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to strike court−ordered depositions of Glen Austin and Brian Watson (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
372 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion for extension of time to file, motion to strike,, 371 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 12/21/2016 at 11:00 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
373 RESPONSE by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wrightin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file Defendant's unredacted Trial Exhibit 72MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to strike court−ordered depositions of Glen Austin and Brian Watson 371 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
374 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's motion for an extension of time and to strike court ordered depositions 371 is granted in part and denied in part. Appearance on December 21, 2016, is not required to present this motion. The motion is granted to the extent that Defendant now has until December 23, 2016, to produce an unredacted version of Trial Exhibit 72. While the court has considered and understands the concerns Plaintiffs expressed in their response, Defendant is permitted more time to produce Exhibit 72. However, Defendant is advised that going forward it will be expected to comply with this court's orders in a timely manner unless it is able to provide specific facts amounting to good cause to justify a variation from court−ordered deadlines. Also, the motion is denied without prejudice to the extent that Defendant seeks to have the court strike the depositions of Brian Watson and Glen Austin. These two depositions are to be scheduled to take place as the last two depositions of the nine ordered. That sequencing will allow the parties to gather more details about the scope and nature of Defendant's post−September 2014 information it plans to offer at trial, and allow Plaintiffs to be better informed in the event Defendant renews its motion to strike these two depositions. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
375 STATUS Report (Joint) Pursuant to the Court's December 13, 2016 ORDER by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
376 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Certain Additional Document Discovery Relating to the Post−September 12, 2014 Period (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
377 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 376 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 1/12/2017 at 11:00 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
378 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 376 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 1/12/2017 at 11:00 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
379 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for additional documents 376 is entered and continued. Defendant has until January 27, 2017, to file his response to the motion. A status hearing is scheduled for February 14, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. The deadline for completing the nine depositions identified in this court's December 13, 2016 order, (R. 370), and the February 22, 2017 status hearing are stricken. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/12/2017)
380 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 12−13−2016 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 48 of 65

01/27/2017 01/27/2017 02/02/2017
02/09/2017 02/09/2017
02/09/2017 02/22/2017 02/22/2017 02/27/2017 03/02/2017 03/02/2017 03/03/2017

Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 2/13/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/21/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/21/2017. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 01/21/2017)
381 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Salvador A Godinez by Michael D. Arnold (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
382 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Certain Additional Document Discovery Relating to the Pos 376 (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
383 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 1/12/17 before the Honorable Young B. Kim. Court Reporter Contact Information: Kathleen_Fennell@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 2/23/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/6/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/3/2017. (Fennell, Kathleen) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
384 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing held on 2/9/2017 and continued to 4/13/2017 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
385 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Plaintiffs' motion for additional documents 376 is granted in part and denied in part. Enter Order. Defendant is ordered to comply with this order by February 24, 2017. Parties have until April 21, 2017, to complete the depositions referred to in the court's order of December 13, 2016 (as limited on December 21, 2016), (R. 370; R. 374). This is a firm deadline. The status hearing scheduled for February 14, 2017, is rescheduled for April 24, 2017, at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
386 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 2/9/2017. (ma,) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
387 APPEAL by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright from magistrate order 386 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
388 387 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 3/2/2017 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
389 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Response to plaintiff's appeal from Magistrate Judge's discovery order is due by 3/6/2017; reply is due by 3/9/2017. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 3/2/2017.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
390 MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to Re−Set Deadline to Complete Depositions in Light of Plaintiffs' Appeal of the February 9, 2017 Order (Unopposed) (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
391 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel M. Weisberg for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 390 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 3/13/2017 at 11:00 AM. (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
392 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Plaintiffs' motion to reset deadline 390 is granted. Appearance on March 13, 2017, is not required to present this motion. The court will monitor the docket and issue an order with a new deadline for completing depositions once the assigned District Judge rules on Plaintiffs' objections. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/03/2017)

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03/06/2017 03/09/2017
03/09/2017 03/10/2017 03/13/2017 03/14/2017
03/22/2017
04/05/2017 04/12/2017 05/05/2017
05/17/2017 05/24/2017

393 RESPONSE by Defendant Salvador A Godinez to appeal of magistrate judge decision to district court 387 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
394 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to compel Defendant to Disclose Contact Information for Inmates Subject This Courts Discovery Order Who Were in IDOC Custody After September 12, 2014 But Are No Longer in IDOC Custody (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Chung, Jin−Ho) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
395 NOTICE of Motion by Jin−Ho Chung for presentment of motion to compel, 394 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 3/14/2017 at 11:00 AM. (Chung, Jin−Ho) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
396 REPLY by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to appeal of magistrate judge decision to district court 387 in support of (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
397 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Tomorrow's motion hearing will take place at 9:30 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
398 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion to compel 394 is granted to the extent that IDOC is ordered to provide the contact information it possesses for the hard of hearing inmates who entered IDOC's facilities after September 12, 2014, but are no longer in IDOC's custody. For the 16 former inmates Plaintiffs have identified, IDOC is to provide their contact information by March 24, 2017. If Plaintiffs identify other former inmates falling into this category, IDOC is to provide their contact information within five business days of receiving their request for information. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
399 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, an in−person settlement conference is scheduled for April 5, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Parties are ordered to review and follow the court's standing order on "Settlement Conferences" on its webpage. The individuals with the authority to settle this matter must appear in person. Parties are to prepare a list of issues for discussion at the settlement conference, instead of exchanging position statements, and email the list to the court by April 3, 2017. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
400 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: An in−person settlement conference held and continued to May 5, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. The status hearing scheduled for April 24, 2017, is cancelled. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/05/2017)
401 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 4/13/2017 is stricken and reset for 5/25/2017 at 10:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
402 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Second in−person settlement conference held and continued to June 1, 2017, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiffs are directed to provide the following to Defendant: (1) documents in support of their demand for fees and costs by May 10, 2017; and (2) a revised draft settlement agreement with the changes discussed by May 12, 2017, with a copy to the court. Defendant must be prepared to discuss specific amounts for fees and costs and to comment on the draft settlement agreement at the next settlement conference. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
403 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Status hearing of 5/25/2017 is stricken and reset for 6/29/2017 at 10:30 AM for report on settlement. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
404 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 03−14−2017 before the Honorable Susan E. Cox. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 50 of 65

06/01/2017
06/15/2017 06/23/2017
06/28/2017 07/07/2017 08/01/2017
08/28/2017
08/29/2017 09/25/2017
10/16/2017

Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 6/14/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/26/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/22/2017. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
405 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Third in−person settlement conference held. Defendant is ordered to comment on the draft settlement agreement by no later than June 9, 2017. A status hearing is scheduled for June 15, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. by phone. The conference call number for the status hearing is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. The court wishes to make a decision at the next status hearing whether to continue the settlement discussions or require the parties to move forward with their remaining discovery. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone. A fourth in−person settlement conference is scheduled for June 23, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Plaintiffs are ordered to circulate an updated redlined version of the draft settlement agreement by June 21, 2017. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
407 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Fourth in−person settlement conference held. Plaintiffs are ordered to revise the draft settlement agreement as discussing today by no later than July 5, 2017. Defendant is ordered to then comment on the July 5, 2017 version of the agreement by no later than July 25, 2017. (Parties are to copy the court by email when exchanging these drafts.) A fifth in−person settlement conference is scheduled for July 28, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
408 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 6/29/2017 is stricken and reset for 8/31/2017 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
409 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The July 28, 2017 settlement conference is rescheduled for August 1, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
410 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Fifth in−person settlement conference held. Plaintiffs are ordered to revise the draft settlement agreement as discussed today by no later than August 7, 2017. Defendant is ordered to then comment on the revised draft by no later than August 14, 2017. (Parties are to copy the court by email when exchanging these drafts.) A sixth in−person settlement conference is scheduled for August 28, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
411 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Sixth in−person settlement conference held. Plaintiffs are ordered to revise the draft settlement agreement as discussed today by no later than September 12, 2017. Defendant is ordered to then comment on the revised draft and propose its own suggested changes by no later than September 20, 2017. (Parties are to copy the court by email when exchanging these drafts.) A seventh in−person settlement conference is scheduled for September 25, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
412 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 8/31/2017 is stricken and reset for 10/26/2017 at 10:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/29/2017)
413 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference held and continued to October 16, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Plaintiffs are ordered to revise the draft settlement agreement as discussed today by no later than October 2, 2017. Defendant is ordered to then comment on the revised draft and propose its own suggested changes by no later than October 10, 2017. (Parties are to copy the court by email when exchanging these drafts.) Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
414 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference held and continued to November 8, 2017, at 3:30 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Also, a

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10/20/2017 10/24/2017 11/08/2017 11/16/2017
11/29/2017 11/29/2017 12/07/2017
12/13/2017 12/28/2017
01/23/2018 02/05/2018 02/23/2018 02/23/2018 02/28/2018
03/07/2018 03/14/2018

status hearing is scheduled for October 24, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. by phone. The conference call number for the status hearing is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
415 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 10/26/2017 is stricken and reset for 12/7/2017 at 10:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
416 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone. The in−person settlement conference scheduled for November 8, 2017, to stand. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
417 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, the settlement conference scheduled for today is rescheduled for November 16, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
418 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference held. A status hearing is scheduled for November 29, 2017, at 8:00 a.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call−in information. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 11/16/2017)
419 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone and continued to December 7, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call−in information. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
420 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 12/7/2017 is stricken and reset for 12/14/2017 at 10:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
421 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone. Plaintiffs are ordered to comment on the most recent draft agreement by December 14, 2017. An in−person settlement conference is scheduled for December 28, 2017, at 10:30 a.m in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
422 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 12/14/2017 is stricken and reset for 1/25/2018 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/13/2017)
423 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference held. Plaintiffs will provide their modified settlement agreement to Defendant by January 4, 2018. The court will reach out to the parties by email after it reviews the draft agreement. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 12/28/2017)
424 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 1/25/2018 is reset for 3/22/2018 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
425 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: An in−person settlement conference is scheduled for March 7, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
426 MOTION by Attorney Kevin Lovellette to withdraw as attorney for Salvador A Godinez. No party information provided (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
427 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 426 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 4/5/2018 at 10:30 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
428 ORDER: Defendants' motion for leave to withdraw Kevin Lovellette as its counsel 426 is granted. Kevin Lovellette is withdrawn as counsel for defendants. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 4/5/2018. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 2/28/2018. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
429 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In−person settlement conference held. A status hearing is scheduled for March 14, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call−in information. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
430 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone. Parties have resolved this matter. Parties are urged to file their motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement with the assigned District Judge as soon as possible.

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 52 of 65

03/14/2018 04/16/2018 04/16/2018 04/18/2018 04/23/2018 04/23/2018
04/26/2018
04/30/2018
05/14/2018 05/14/2018 05/15/2018 05/21/2018

All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned District Judge. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/14/2018)
431 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Status hearing of 3/22/2018 is reset for 4/19/2018 at 10:30 a.m. Parties are to file their motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement no later than 4/16/2018 for presentation on 4/19/2018 at 10:30 a.m.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/14/2018)
432 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to file Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement − Agreed (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
433 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Arnold for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 432 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 4/19/2018 at 10:30 AM. (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
434 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to 4/23/2018 to file joint motion for preliminary approval of class settlement agreement 432 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 4/19/2018. Status hearing of 4/19/2018 is reset for 4/26/2018 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
435 MOTION by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Joint) (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
436 MEMORANDUM by Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion for miscellaneous relief, 435 Memorandum In Support Of Joint Motion For Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit B−1, # 5 Exhibit B−2)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
437 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Motion hearing held on 4/26/2018. Joint motion for preliminary approval of class settlement agreement 435 is granted without objection. Parties are to submit their proposed order to chambers via the proposed order mailbox on Judge Aspen's web page on the District Court's website. Status hearing held on 4/26/2018. Fairness Hearing is set for 7/26/2018 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
438 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 4/30/2018: The Court enters the following schedule. The Illinois Department of Corrections is to provide the notice to the Plaintiff class members pursuant to the Notice Plan (attached to this Order as Exhibit A) by May 26, 2018. The Notices shall be in the form attached to this order as Exhibits B1 and B2. Any objections to the settlement should be sent to Plaintiffs' counsel by June 25, 2018. A fairness hearing is set for July 26, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 2568.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
439 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to amend/correct Exhibit A to the Memorandum Filed April 23, 2018 436 − JOINT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
440 NOTICE of Motion by Robert L. Michels for presentment of motion to amend/correct, 439 before Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 5/17/2018 at 10:30 AM. (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
441 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Joint motion for leave to amend 439 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 5/17/2018. Exhibit A to the memorandum filed April 23, 2018 is amended so that docket number 436−2 is replaced with the Stipulation of Settlement attached to this motion.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
442 OBJECTIONS. (Envelope not postmarked; institution mail room 05/17/18). (Received for docketing on 05/23/18). (eaa, ) (Entered: 05/23/2018)

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06/25/2018 06/26/2018 06/28/2018
07/12/2018
07/12/2018 07/18/2018
07/24/2018 07/26/2018
07/26/2018 07/26/2018 07/27/2018 07/30/2018 08/06/2018 09/21/2018 11/19/2018

443 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Elizabeth N. Mazur (Mazur, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
444 OBJECTIONS of Class Members (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Objections 1 − 9, # 2 Exhibit Objections 10 − 12)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
445 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 6/28/2018: To allow sufficient time for review before the July 26, 2018 fairness hearing, the partiesmay file responses to the objections and memoranda in support of final approval of the agreement on or before July 16, 2018. Any previous scheduling orders contrary to the deadlines set forth herein are vacated.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
446 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for Final Approval of Class Settlement Agreement and in Opposition to Objections (JOINT) (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
447 MEMORANDUM by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright in support of motion for miscellaneous relief, 446 (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
448 MOTION by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright for leave to file Late−Received Objection From Named Plaintiff Ralph Holmes and Response Thereto Instanter (JOINT) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
449 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen:Joint motion for leave to file late−received objection from named plaintiff Ralph Holmes and response thereto instanter 448 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/24/2018)
450 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen: Motion hearing held on 7/26/2018. Joint motion for final approval of class settlement agreement 446 is granted without objection. No objectors were voiced in the courtroom. Written objections 444 were overruled as stated on the record. Draft Order to follow. Parties are to submit a proposed draft order to chambers via the proposed order mailbox on Judge Aspen's web page on the District Court's website. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
451 JOINT CONSENT to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
454 ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL TO CLASS SETTLEMENT AND OVERRULING OBJECTIONS. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/26/2018:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
452 ORDER REASSIGNING Case to the Honorable Young B. Kim, pursuant to Local Rule 73.1 for all further proceedings, parties having consented to the reassignment. Honorable Marvin E. Aspen no longer assigned to the case. Signed by Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/27/18. (cc, ) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
453 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Parties are ordered to file a joint status report, by August 6, 2018, including a schedule showing the specific dates (to the extent possible) by when IDOC must complete certain steps under the class settlement. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
455 STATUS Report (Joint) by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
456 LETTER from Hannibal Eason. (jh, ) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
457 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's request to file its status report by November 26, 2018, is granted. Plaintiff Class did not object. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/19/2018)

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11/27/2018 11/27/2018 11/27/2018 11/28/2018 01/02/2019 01/03/2019 01/04/2019 01/04/2019 01/04/2019
01/10/2019
01/11/2019 01/14/2019

458 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's request to file its status report today is granted. This is Defendant's final extension and the report must be filed by no later than 3:00 p.m. today. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
459 STATUS Report of 11/27/2018 by Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B−1, # 2 Exhibit E, # 3 Exhibit G)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
460 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez Exhibits A and B−2 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B−2)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
461 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A status hearing hearing is scheduled for January 4, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
462 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to status report 459 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 01/02/2019)
463 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The status hearing scheduled for 11:00 a.m. tomorrow is rescheduled for 3:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
464 STATUS Report Supplement of January 4, 2019 by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department Of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 6, # 4 Exhibit 7, # 5 Exhibit 9)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
465 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez, Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections Exhibits to Updated Status Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 4, # 3 Exhibit 5−A, # 4 Exhibit 5−B, # 5 Exhibit 5−C, # 6 Exhibit 8)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
466 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to January 16, 2019, at 4:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. IDOC has until January 11, 2019, to submit additional documents in support of its status reports. If Legal Counsel for IDOC, Anne Rayhill, wishes to appear for status hearings in this case by phone, she should contact Courtroom Deputy Michelle Alston to make the necessary arrangements. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
467 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that Sunil R. Harjani has been appointed as a United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, vice the Honorable Daniel Martin, and It further appearing that Internal Operating Procedure 17(b) provides for the creation of an initial calendar for a newly−appointed magistrate judge by equalization; therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the attached list of civil consent cases and civil referrals are hereby reassigned to form the initial calendar of the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the attached list of civil consent cases and civil referrals be reassigned to equalize the calendars of all magistrate judges in the Eastern Division; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That any consent case or civil referral that has been reassigned pursuant to this Order will not be randomly reassigned to create the initial calendar of a magistrate judge for twelve months from the date of this Order, except those cases that were reassigned to Magistrate Judge Harjani. Case reassigned to the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani for all further proceedings. Honorable Young B. Kim no longer assigned to the case. Signed by Executive Committee on 1/10/2019.(rp, ) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
468 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In light of the reassignment, the status hearing scheduled for January 16, 2019, before this court is cancelled. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/11/2019)
469 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani: This case has been reassigned to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani. Initial status hearing set for 1/22/2019 at 9:15 am in Courtroom 1858. All previously set status dates before the predecessor magistrate judge are stricken. All previously set discovery schedules remain intact. All previously set briefing schedules remain intact. All noticed motion dates before the predecessor magistrate judge are stricken. The Court will set a new date for filed but un−noticed motions at the initial status conference. The parties are to confer and prepare a joint initial status report providing the information required by Judge Harjani's Standing Order for Initial Status Report as applicable. The parties shall file the initial status report and deliver a courtesy copy to Judge Harjani's chambers at

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01/14/2019 01/17/2019 01/17/2019 01/18/2019 01/24/2019 01/24/2019 01/24/2019 01/25/2019
02/13/2019 02/14/2019

least three business days before the initial status conference. Please review Judge Harjani's web page for details on the initial status conference and the initial status report. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/14/2019)
470 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani: After further review, the parties need not submit an Initial Status Report as directed by minute entry #469. Status hearing set for 1/22/2019 at 9:15 a.m. stands to discuss the progress of settlement requirements. If out−of−town counsel wish to appear for the status hearing by telephone, they should contact Courtroom Deputy Lynette Santiago to make the necessary arrangements. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/14/2019)
471 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that 11 CV 2961, Holmes et al., v. Godinez, is assigned to the Hon. Sunil R. Harjani; therefore It is hereby ordered that pursuant to IOP 13.4, the Clerk shall reassign 11 CV 2961, Holmes et al., v. Godinez, to Magistrate Judge Kim. Case reassigned to the Honorable Young B. Kim for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 1/17/19. (aee, ) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
472 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sunil R. Harjani: In light of the Executive Committee Order − docket entry no. 471 , initial status hearing previously set for 1/22/2019 before Magistrate Judge Harjani is stricken. Appearance not required. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
473 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A status hearing is scheduled for January 25, 2019, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
474 MOTION by Attorney Nicole E. Wrigley to withdraw as attorney for Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright. No party information provided (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
475 NOTICE of Motion by Nicole E Wrigley for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 474 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 1/31/2019 at 11:00 AM. (Wrigley, Nicole) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
476 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Attorney Nicole Wrigley's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel 474 is granted. Appearance is not necessary on January 31, 2019, to present this motion. Attorney Nicole Wrigley is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
477 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to February 14, 2019, at 3:00 p.m. by phone. The conference call number for the status hearing is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. As discussed, IDOC is ordered to provide additional updates and documents to the Class by February 12, 2019, including the following: (1) updated hearing screening information; (2) 5% of the NRC records related to hearing screening; (3) resolution/plan to ensure that all new inmates have access to the necessary orientation information; (4) a copy of the missing ADA training documents detailed on R. 462−1 at 6; (5) usage data for TTYs; (6) information regarding grievances and use of interpreters at Logan; (7) updated information on inmate requests for hearing screenings and verification of video phones at Stateville; (8) a copy of emails/directives clarifying that IDOC does not have a policy against two hearing aids if medical necessity warrants them; (9) a copy of emails/directives that hearing aids are not to be removed from inmates even when being transferred to segregation; and (10) an update on Chicago Hearing Society's efforts to recruit qualified specialists and IDOC's efforts to complete their background checks. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
478 STATUS Report of February 13, 2019 by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department Of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
479 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to March 12, 2019, at 10:30 a.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call−in information. Parties are working together to resolve their issues. Defendant is

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03/12/2019 03/25/2019 03/25/2019
04/19/2019 04/19/2019
04/24/2019 04/24/2019 04/26/2019 04/29/2019 04/29/2019 05/07/2019 05/16/2019

ordered to include the 5% of the NRC records related to hearing screening in its next status report, which is due by March 25, 2019. Plaintiff Class is directed to consider whether the usage data for TTYs is useful information. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
480 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone and continued to April 24, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
481 STATUS Report March 2019 by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department Of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit C, # 3 Exhibit C1, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit G, # 7 Exhibit I)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 03/25/2019)
482 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez, Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−BMR, # 2 Exhibit A−CEN, # 3 Exhibit A−CRS, # 4 Exhibit A−DAN, # 5 Exhibit A−DEC, # 6 Exhibit A−DIX, # 7 Exhibit A−ELG, # 8 Exhibit A−EMO, # 9 Exhibit A−FOX, # 10 Exhibit A−GRA, # 11 Exhibit A−HIL, # 12 Exhibit A−IRI, # 13 Exhibit A−JAC, # 14 Exhibit A−JTC, # 15 Exhibit A−KEW, # 16 Exhibit A−LAW1, # 17 Exhibit A−LAW2, # 18 Exhibit A−LAW3, # 19 Exhibit A−LIN, # 20 Exhibit A−LOG1, # 21 Exhibit A−LOG2, # 22 Exhibit A−LOG3, # 23 Exhibit A−MEN, # 24 Exhibit A−NLW, # 25 Exhibit A−NRC, # 26 Exhibit A−PEO, # 27 Exhibit A−PNK, # 28 Exhibit A−PON, # 29 Exhibit A_ROB, # 30 Exhibit A−SHA, # 31 Exhibit A−SHE, # 32 Exhibit A−STA, # 33 Exhibit A−SWI, # 34 Exhibit A−TAY, # 35 Exhibit A−VAN, # 36 Exhibit A−VIE, # 37 Exhibit A−WIL, # 38 Exhibit F, # 39 Exhibit H)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 03/25/2019)
483 SEALED RESPONSE by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to status report 481 (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
484 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to status report 481 (FILED WITH REDACTIONS) (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
485 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Today's hearing is cancelled. The court will issue a follow−up order rescheduling the matter. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/24/2019)
486 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: By agreement of the parties, a status hearing is scheduled for April 26, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/24/2019)
487 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to May 20, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
488 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Parties are to review the order and to comply with it by the deadlines set therein. Enter Order. If either side requires the order to be clarified, they are to email the court as soon as possible so that the issue can be addressed quickly. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
489 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 4/29/2019. (ma,) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
490 MOTION by Joseph Hoban to intervene by class member to enforce settlement agreement. (Exhibits). (Envelope postmarked 5/3/2019). (ew, ) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
491 STATUS Report May 16, 2019 by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department Of Corrections (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit C, # 3 Exhibit D, # 4 Exhibit E)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

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05/16/2019 05/20/2019
06/06/2019
07/22/2019 07/22/2019 07/22/2019
07/22/2019 07/23/2019 08/07/2019 08/23/2019 08/23/2019 08/28/2019 09/12/2019

492 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez, Respondent Illinois Department Of Corrections Exhibit A (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
493 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to June 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. by phone. The conference call number for the status hearing is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. At the next status hearing, the parties are to update the court on the following three items: (1) the class's discussion with CHS about properly completing assessment forms; (2) IDOC's ability to implement a quarterly audit of the enforcement of class settlement terms where monitors are not assigned; and (3) progress towards retaining a different vendor to gain 24−hour access to VRI. The motion to intervene filed by class member Joseph Hoban 490 is denied for the reasons stated on the record and because there is no need for an individual class member to intervene. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
494 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held by phone. IDOC's next status report is due by July 22, 2019. IDOC is ordered to include in this report its plan on implementing a form of quarterly auditing/monitoring process to ensure compliance with the terms of class settlement agreements in which there is no court appointed monitor. A status hearing is scheduled for August 14, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
495 STATUS Report of July 22, 2019 by Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit D, # 3 Exhibit F)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
496 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, # 2 Exhibit E)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
497 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1, # 2 Exhibit A−2, # 3 Exhibit A−3, # 4 Exhibit A−4, # 5 Exhibit A−5, # 6 Exhibit A−6, # 7 Exhibit A−7, # 8 Exhibit A−8, # 9 Exhibit A−9, # 10 Exhibit A−10, # 11 Exhibit A−11, # 12 Exhibit A−12, # 13 Exhibit A−13, # 14 Exhibit A−14, # 15 Exhibit A−15, # 16 Exhibit A−16, # 17 Exhibit A−17, # 18 Exhibit A−18, # 19 Exhibit A−19, # 20 Exhibit A−20, # 21 Exhibit A−21, # 22 Exhibit A−22, # 23 Exhibit A−23, # 24 Exhibit A−24, # 25 Exhibit A−25, # 26 Exhibit A−26, # 27 Exhibit A−27, # 28 Exhibit A−28, # 29 Exhibit A−29)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
498 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−30, # 2 Exhibit A−31, # 3 Exhibit A−32, # 4 Exhibit A−33, # 5 Exhibit A−34, # 6 Exhibit A−35, # 7 Exhibit A−36)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2019)
499 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Salvador A Godinez (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−37)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
500 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The class's request to reschedule the August 14, 2019 status hearing to have additional time to review IDOC's report and data is granted. The status hearing is rescheduled for August 29, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
501 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright to status report 495 (Redacted) (Michels, Robert) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
502 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright regarding Response 501 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
503 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Tomorrows status hearing is rescheduled for September 17, 2019, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 08/28/2019)
504 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiffs Daniel Baxter, George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Foster, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright Plaintiff's Request for Enforcement/Interpretation of the Settlement Agreement With Respect to Individual Claims for Alleged Conduct Occurring After the Date of the Holmes Settlement Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Class Counsels

Case: 1:11-cv-02961 As of: 07/23/2020 08:13 AM CDT 58 of 65

09/12/2019
09/12/2019 09/12/2019 09/13/2019 09/17/2019 09/17/2019
10/08/2019

Outstanding Issues List to IDOC on July 12, 2019, # 3 Exhibit 2 − IDOCs Response to Class Counsels Concerns from July 12, 2019 on July 26, 2019, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Petrakiss Amended Complaint filed July 2, 2019, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Petrakiss Motion for Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction filed May 31, 2019, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Defendants Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed July 8, 2019, # 7 Exhibit 6 − July 24, 2019 Memorandum and Order, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Holmes Settlement Agreement)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/12/2019)
505 Other Document by George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright (Public Redacted Version) Plaintiff's Request for Enforcement/Interpretation of the Settlement Agreement With Respect to Individual Claims for Alleged Conduct Occurring After the Date of the Holmes Settlement Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Class Counsels Outstanding Issues List to IDOC on July 12, 2019, # 3 Exhibit 2 − IDOCs Response to Class Counsels Concerns from July 12, 2019 on July 26, 2019, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Petrakiss Amended Complaint filed July 2, 2019, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Petrakiss Motion for Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction filed May 31, 2019, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Defendants Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed July 8, 2019, # 7 Exhibit 6 − July 24, 2019 Memorandum and Order, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Holmes Settlement Agreement)(Michels, Robert) (Entered: 09/12/2019)
506 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Samoane Eliza Williams (Williams, Samoane) (Entered: 09/12/2019)
508 2nd MOTION to REPORT repeated violations by Ralph Holmes. (Attachments). (gcy, ) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
507 Plaintiffs' Notice to the Court of the Parties' Dispute and Attempted Resolutions about Defendant's Use of Licensed Hearing Instrument Dispensers in Lieu of Audiologists by Ralph Holmes (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
509 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to October 8, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Plaintiffs' request for interpretation 504 is denied for the reasons stated in open court. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
510 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Based on the discussion held in court today, Plaintiffs are ordered to provide the names of the two inmates, by September 20, 2019, who require vibrating alarm clocks so that IDOC may evaluate their situation. Also based on the discussion held in court today, IDOC is ordered to accomplish the following prior to the next status hearing: (1) determine whether IDOC is willing to designate a specific individual for each correctional facility to be responsible for collecting and submitting class settlement compliance information; (2) determine whether Offender 360 is being updated with information on hard−of−hearing inmates; (3) determine whether Wexford understands that it is obligated to provide hearing screenings within 30 days of request; (4) identify the inmates who have requested a hearing screening as of today but has not received one; (5) provide to Plaintiff as much of the information Plaintiffs seeks on pages 6 and 7 of their notice, (R. 507), as possible; (6) complete Plaintiffs' Exhibits D (R. 502−4) and E (R. 502−5); (7) be able to provide a specific update on the pager system under IDOC's consideration; (8) determine the possibility of identifying all communication devices available for hard−of−hearing inmates in the communication plan; and (9) provide a copy of the missing records identified on page 22 of Plaintiffs' response to the status report, (R. 502 at 22). Finally, the parties are to confer on the following items prior to the next status hearing: (10) a template each facility should complete for summarizing the information each facility is submitting for purposes of IDOC's status reports; (11) audit tool; (12) training for ADA coordinators; and (13) the continued use of Licensed Hearing Instrument Dispensers. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
511 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: At the parties' request, today's hearing is rescheduled for October 28, 2019, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 10/08/2019)

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512 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to November 12, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. by phone. The conference call number is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. The court will email the parties this afternoon as discussed and IDOC is ordered to respond to the email by November 1, 2019. Also, by November 8, 2019, IDOC is ordered to determine whether to issue an alarm clock to the three inmates discussed today. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
513 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The court spoke with the IDOC's Telecommunications and Infrastructure Manager ("manager") today regarding IDOC's implementation of a visual and tactile notifications ("VTN system") for hard of hearing inmates per the class settlement agreement. According to the manager, the VTN system is up and running at the Jacksonville Correctional Center to determine how the system functions. A pager will be issued to a hard of hearing inmate at Jacksonville this week to test its functionality and usage. The plan is to have a meeting with the Chief Engineers of the other correctional facilities in two weeks to discuss the VTN system so that the engineers can plan accordingly and to determine their needs and requirements for installing the system. The manager will then initiate the procurement process to secure the necessary equipment and hardware. The manager estimates that these steps may take as long as 12 months to complete. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/06/2019)
514 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The court spoke with the representatives of Wexford today on the subject of referring inmates for audiological evaluations. Wexford explained the process for referring inmate patients for audiological evaluations as follows: (1) once an inmate seeks a hearing screening, a nurse uses an audio scope to perform an initial hearing test; (2) the audio scope test involves three different frequencies and a single noise level; (3) the nurse administering the screening test notes whether the inmate patient is able to hear all three frequencies in each ear; (4) if the inmate patient is unable to hear even one frequency, the patient is deemed to have failed the test; (5) a medical director or onsite physician then performs an examination of those inmate patients who failed the screening test to identify any obvious medical reason for the failed test, e.g. earwax; (6) if the patient does not exhibit any obvious medical reason for the failed test, the inmate patient's case is then forwarded for a collegial review process; (7) the collegial review process takes place once per week and for patients who failed the screening test, the purpose of this review process is to verify that the inmate patient meets the screening criteria for further evaluation and to generate the needed authorization for paying an outside treatment provider; and (8) if the patient meets the screening criteria, the patient's name is then forwarded to a scheduler to locate a service provider and to coordinate with IDOC to schedule the audiological evaluation. Wexford confirmed that it is having difficulty locating audiologists to perform audiological evaluations. From Wexford's perspective, the audiogram testing (which is the next level hearing test) can be performed properly by either an audiologist or a Licensed Hearing Instrument Dispensaries ("LHID"). Based on this information, the court is of the opinion that the current delay the class has identified (even if it were to agree to the use of LHIDs) is caused by the collegial review process that is required by Wexford's current protocol because the demand for hearing screening has increased by more than 700% since the class settlement in this case. The court finds that IDOC must find ways to streamline the collegial review process so that the authorization for an outside referral and scheduling take place immediately after a medical finding that there is no obvious medical reason for the failed audio scope test. The reason for this finding is because the threshold for needing an audiological evaluation is finite and simple−−−a single "no" answer to whether an inmate patient can hear one of the three frequencies in one ear. Under these circumstances, the court further finds that the collegial review process is not warranted for those who fail the screening test and there is no obvious medical reason why they failed the test. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/06/2019)
515 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held. As discussed during the hearing, IDOC is ordered to: (1) organize the attachments to its status report (when serving Plaintiffs) by using various folders (identified by the names of the correctional facilities) and sub−folders (identified by the types of documents included in the folders); (2) investigate ways to expedite the procurement process for securing the necessary items for installing tactile notification systems; (3) confer with Wexford about eliminating the collegial review process for those inmate

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patients who fail the hearing screening and the medical director is unable to identify any obvious medical reason for the test failure; (4) issue a total of two vibrating watches to Davis, Wills, Smith, and Barnes; and (5) verify which ADA coordinators are still in need of training as of November 22, 2019. IDOC is ordered to update the court by email on (2), (3), (4), and (5) by November 26, 2019. By this deadline, Plaintiffs are to update the court by email whether they were able to obtain any survey results pertaining to class members' experience with LHIDs. IDOC is not required to file the attachments to its next status report. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/12/2019)
516 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's unopposed request for a one−week extension of time to file its status report is granted. Defendant now has until November 25, 2019, to file its status report. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/12/2019)
517 MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmesto report repeated violations of settlement agreement. (Attachments). (gcy, ) (Entered: 11/14/2019)
518 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Class member Ralph Holmesto's motion 517 is denied without prejudice. Class Counsel may investigate Holmesto's concerns and raise them during the next status hearing if necessary. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
519 STATUS Report November 2019 by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department of Corrections (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 11/25/2019)
520 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A status hearing is scheduled for January 10, 2020, at 1:00 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
521 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to status report 519 (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
522 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to January 21, 2020, at 2:30 p.m. in courtroom 1019. Parties have until January 31, 2020, to confer on the issue of referring hard−of−hearing inmates to audiologists and reducing the wait time for such referrals. If the parties are unable to resolve this issue, the Class is ordered to file a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement by February 14, 2020. As indicated, if the court grants relief as a result of the motion, it will award reasonable attorneys fees to the Class. For purposes of evaluating reasonable attorney fees, the court will consider the hours logged by two attorneys and one paralegal. Also, IDOC should be prepared to update the court on the following subjects at the next status hearing: (1) information needed for Plaintiff's Ex. A; (2) missing "hard−of−hearing" designation for inmates in the Offender 360 system; (3) Dixon Correctional Center's use of ASL interpreters, VRI, and VRS; (3) equipment shortage; and (4) installation of visual and tactile system. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
523 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held and continued to February 19, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1019. The Class is directed to email the court by January 23, 2020, an updated proposed order for the court's review and entry. Defendant is ordered to email the Class by January 24, 2020, a sample of 10 screenshots verifying that the Offender 360 now includes communication plan information for the hard−of−hearing inmates. Defendant's next monitor report is due by March 23, 2020. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/21/2020)
524 THE Illinois Department of Corrections Compliance Failure as in violation of the Homes v. Baldwin settement agreement reached July 26, 2018 by Hannibal Eason, (Attachments). (gcy, ) (Entered: 01/22/2020)
525 MOTION to show cause by Unknown Roy Cord; Affidavit. (Envelope Postmark date 1/16/20). (gcy, ) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
526 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 1/23/2020. (ma,) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
527 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Class member Roy Cord's motion for rule to show cause 525 is denied. The class is represented by attorneys in this matter. Mr. Cord is encouraged to contact Class Counsel Simone Williams with

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any concerns he may have. Having said that, the class has already raised the concerns Mr. Cord expresses in his motion and the court has already directed IDOC to ensure that these issues are addressed promptly. A courtesy copy of this order is mailed to Mr. Roy Cord, IDOC No. B−05438, Lawrence Correctional Center, 10980 Lawrence Road, Sumner, IL 62466. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
MAILED a courtesy copy of today's order to Mr. Roy Cord, IDOC No. B−05438, Lawrence Correctional Center, 10980 Lawrence Road, Sumner, IL 62466. (ma,) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
528 LETTER from Hannibal Eason. (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
529 STATEMENT by Hannibal Eason. (Attachments). (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
530 REQUEST by Plaintiff Hannibal Eason Emergency injunction to be removed from Menard Correctional Facility immediately. (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
531 AFFIDAVIT of Hannibal Eason. (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/11/2020)
532 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Hannibal Eason's request 530 is denied. This type of request is not properly before the court. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 02/19/2020)
533 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held. The Class is ordered to file its motion to enforce by March 6, 2020. Response to the motion is due by March 20, 2020, and the reply is due by March 27, 2020. The court will notify the court if a hearing is necessary. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 02/19/2020)
534 STATUS Report by Salvador A Godinez, Illinois Department of Corrections (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2020)
535 Holmes Violation(s) Emergency Affidavits of Hannibal Eason. (gcy, ) (Entered: 02/25/2020)
536 AFFIDAVIT Emergency of Hannibal Eason, (Attachments). (Incorrect case number on document). (gcy, ) Modified on 2/25/2020 (gcy, ). (Entered: 02/25/2020)
537 MOTION by Attorney Samoane Williams to withdraw as attorney for Ralph Holmes. No party information provided (Williams, Samoane) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
538 NOTICE of Motion by Samoane Eliza Williams for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 537 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 3/12/2020 at 11:00 AM. (Williams, Samoane) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
539 MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to Audiological Evaluations, and for an appropriate order of relief and sanctions (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
540 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to Audiological Evaluations, and for an appropriate order of relief and sanctions 539 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3(a), # 4 Exhibit 3(b), # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7(a), # 9 Exhibit 7(b), # 10 Exhibit 7(c), # 11 Exhibit 7(d), # 12 Exhibit 7(e), # 13 Exhibit 8)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
541 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Attorney Samoane Williams' motion to withdraw 537 is granted, and she is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record for Plaintiffs. Appearance is not necessary on March 12, 2020, to present this motion. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
542 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: IDOC's unopposed request for an extension of time to file a response to the motion to enforce and its next status report is granted. IDOC now has until March 27, 2020, to file the next status report and a response to the motion to enforce, (R. 539). The Class then has until April 3, 2020, to file a reply. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
543 ORDER Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 16, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Amended General Order. See attached

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03/23/2020
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04/17/2020 04/23/2020 04/23/2020 04/24/2020
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Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/16/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
545 ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20−0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and General Order 20−0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/23/2020: Mailed notice. (docket7, ) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
544 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: IDOC's request for additional time to file a response is granted. IDOC now has until April 3, 2020, to file the next status report and a response to the motion to enforce, (R. 539). The Class then has until April 17, 2020, to file a reply. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 03/27/2020)
547 ORDER CORRECTED ENTRY: ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20−0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and General Order 20−0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020: Mailed notice...Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020:Mailed notice(docket7, ) (Entered: 04/03/2020)
546 STATUS Report April 2020 by Salvador A Godinez (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 04/02/2020)
548 RESPONSE by Salvador A Godinezin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to Audiological Evaluations, and for an appropriate order of relief and sanctions 539 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 04/03/2020)
549 MOTION for modification of relief by Edward Lee Clemmons. (gcy, ) (Entered: 04/09/2020)
550 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The motion of Edward Lee Clemmons 549 is denied. First, if class members require the court to enforce certain terms of the class settlement agreement, they must file their requests through their attorneys. Second, the court's current jurisdiction in this case is limited to enforcing the terms of the approved class settlement agreement. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/09/2020)
551 REPLY by Ralph Holmes to MOTION by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to Audiological Evaluations, and for an appropriate order of relief and sanctions 539 , response in opposition to motion, 548 (Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 04/17/2020)
552 MOTION request for three panel court by Edward Lee Clemmons. (gcy, ) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
553 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Edward Clemmons's motion for three panel court 552 is denied. Given the narrow scope of this court's post−class settlement jurisdiction, unless a motion is filed by class counsel, the motion will be summarily denied. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 04/23/2020)
554 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
555 MOTION by Attorney Elizabeth Mazur to withdraw as attorney for George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster,

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05/04/2020
05/13/2020 05/13/2020 05/13/2020 05/15/2020 05/26/2020
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05/29/2020 05/29/2020 06/02/2020
06/02/2020 06/02/2020 06/04/2020

Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright. No party information provided (Mazur, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
556 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Attorney Elizabeth Mazur's motion to withdraw from this case 555 is granted. Attorney Mazur is withdrawn from this case as an attorney of record for Plaintiffs. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
557 INTERVENOR MOTION for modification of relief by Edward Lee Clemmons. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/13/2020)
558 REQUEST for Three−Judge Court by Edward Lee Clemmons. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/13/2020)
559 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Edward Clemmons's motion for modification 557 is denied. (See R. 553.) Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/13/2020)
560 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Ralph Holmes by Lark Eliot Mulligan (Mulligan, Lark) (Entered: 05/15/2020)
561 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non−emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
562 LETTER from Edward L. Clemmons dated 5/26/20. (gcy, ) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
563 MOTION by Attorney Amy F. Peterson to withdraw as attorney for Ralph Holmes. No party information provided (Peterson, Amy) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
564 NOTICE of Motion by Amy F. Peterson for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 563 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/2/2020 at 11:00 AM. (Peterson, Amy) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
565 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Attorney Amy Peterson's motion to withdraw as attorney of record for Plaintiffs 563 is granted. Appearance on June 2, 2020, is not necessary to present this motion. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
566 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A Godinez for extension of time to comply with Order of January 23, 2020 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
567 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Arnold for presentment of extension of time 566 before Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/4/2020 at 11:00 AM. (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 05/29/2020)
568 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Defendant's motion for extension of time 566 is granted. Appearance on June 4, 2020, is not required to present this motion. IDOC now has until July 2, 2020, to install and implement an effective visual and tactile notification system. This is a firm deadline. If IDOC remains not in full compliance, the court will assess $1,000 fine per week per facility without a working system starting on July 6, 2020. IDOC must bear in mind that it is in this predicament because it was not in compliance with the settlement agreement prior to the public health crisis. IDOC is ordered to file a status report by July 6, 2020, advising the court whether it has fully complied with the court's order. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/02/2020)
569 MOTION report repeated violations of the terms of the deaf/hard of hearing settlement agreement. (Attachments). (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/02/2020)
570 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Motion reporting violations 569 is denied. (See R. 553.) Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/02/2020)
574 LETTER from Steve Manson dated 5/13/2020. (Envelope Postmarked 5/18/2020) (jh, ) (Entered: 06/15/2020)

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571 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Ralph Holmes to status report 546 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Draft of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit B, ASL Logs)(Weisberg, Rachel) (Entered: 06/05/2020)
572 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Plaintiffs' motion to enforce 539 is granted. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/08/2020)
573 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 6/8/2020. (ma,) (Entered: 06/08/2020)
575 Regarding Plaintiffs' Response to Status Report STATEMENT by Salvador A Godinez (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
576 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: A status hearing is scheduled for June 26, 2020, at 10:30 a.m. by phone. The conference call number is (877) 336−1839 and the passcode is 4333213. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
577 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs George Childress, Hannibal Eason, Curtis Halterman, Ralph Holmes, Billy Johnson, Wendell Lancaster, Daniel Lord, Aaron Winfert, Jason Wright by Nicole Rae Schult (Schult, Nicole) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
578 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Today's status hearing is canceled and will be rescheduled. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
579 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Today's status hearing is rescheduled for July 2, 2020, at 10:30 a.m. by phone. Parties are to use the same call−in information. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/26/2020)
580 SUBSTANTIAL Non Compliance to Homes Settlement Agreement by Hannibal Eason. (smm, ) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
581 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: Status hearing held. The concerns expressed by the Class are taken under advisement. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/02/2020)
582 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: IDOC is ordered to emailed the court by July 7, 2020, and provide the number of communication plans it still needs to enter into Offender 360 and answer whether attorneys can initiate legal calls to inmates using VP/VRS and TTY. Mailed notice (Kim, Young) (Entered: 07/03/2020)
583 STATUS Report regarding visual and tactile notification by Salvador A Godinez (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/06/2020)
584 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: The court generally agrees with the concerns the Class raises in its response filed on June 5, 2020, (R. 571), and that more accountability is required of IDOC moving forward. As such, the court will consider imposing fines if IDOC neglects to file complete status reports in the future or fails to deliver on its obligations under the class settlement. Fines will be imposed based on the level of non−compliance for each correctional facility and will be payable to Equip for Equality ("EFE"). (The court does not consider any fines to be paid to EFE to amount to a windfall because EFE recovered only a fraction of its attorneys' fees in connection with the class settlement and it is not entitled to any compensation for the work it has performed or will perform monitoring the implementation of the settlement terms on behalf of the Class.) The court also orders IDOC to comply with the following based on discussions held during the hearing on July 2, 2020: (1) enter all communication plans that are in existence as of the date of this order into Offender 360 by October 8, 2020 (this is a firm deadline), and ensure that each communication plan is entered within seven days after it is created or updated (the court finds that ADA coordinators are in the best position to ensure that the necessary information is entered into the system in a timely manner); (2) if communication plans call for an ASL Interpreter, IDOC shall ensure that ASL inmates are provided with ASL interpreters for their High Stakes Interactions without them having to make a request, unless an ASL inmate explicitly waives his right to an interpreter and the waiver is documented; and (3) devise a protocol to be followed by all facilities for approving attorneys within three business days after an attorney seeks a legal call with any class member. As for (3), IDOC is ordered to communicate its protocol to the Class by July 22, 2020. If the parties are unable to agree on a protocol that is acceptable to both

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sides, the parties are to file a joint status report by July 31, 2020, advising the court of the concerns the Class has about IDOC's proposed protocol. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/08/2020)
585 NOTICE of appeal by Salvador A Godinez regarding orders 573 Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752−17183475. Receipt number: n (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/08/2020)
586 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 585 (pj, ) (Entered: 07/09/2020)
587 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 585 . Notified counsel (pj, ) (Entered: 07/09/2020)
589 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 585 ; USCA Case No. 20−2236. (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
588 ORDER Fifth Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on July 10, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. No motions may be noticed for in−person presentment; the presiding judge will notify parties of the need, if any, for a hearing by electronic means or in−court proceeding. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/10/2020: Mailed notice. (Clerk3, Docket) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
590 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Young B. Kim: In light of IDOC's notice of appeal, (R. 585), the class is no longer required to file its fee petition by July 17, 2020. (See R. 573 at 13.) The court will monitor the docket and set a new deadline for submitting a fee petition in the event the appellate court either dismisses the appeal or affirms the court's June 8, 2020 ruling. The class may log attorney hours incurred in connection with the appeal and include these hours in the fee petition if one is filed. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/14/2020)
591 SUBSTANTIAL Noncompliance to the settlement agreement I.D.O.C. disregards the supreme law of the land by Hannibal Eason. (Exhibits) (pj, ) (Entered: 07/15/2020)
592 STATUS Report July 2020 by Salvador A Godinez (Arnold, Michael) (Entered: 07/22/2020)