CLOSED,JURY,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16−cv−02405−DLF

JONES v. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Assigned to: Judge Dabney L. Friedrich Case: 1:19−cv−00453−KBJ Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/07/2016 Date Terminated: 10/17/2019 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

RICHARD JONES

represented by Lynn E. Cunningham LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM 306 Westview Drive Dubois, WY 82513 (307) 431−4158 Fax: (307) 455−3334 Email: lcunningham@law.gwu.edu TERMINATED: 01/31/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Charles Cole Claiborne , III CLAIBORNELAW 717 D Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 824−0700 Email: claibornelaw@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Amanda J. Montee OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−5691 Fax: (202) 741−8934 Email: amanda.montee@dc.gov TERMINATED: 12/20/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Michael A. Tilghman U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 202−252−7113 Email: michael.tilghman@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan Russell Heath OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Public Interest Division, Equity Section 441 4th Street Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9880 Email: Brendan.Heath@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Wade Dansby OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC Public Interest Division/Civil Enforcement Section 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9880 Fax: (202) 730−0647 Email: joshua.dansby@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/18/2019
Scott Patrick Kennedy OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−8044 Fax: (202) 741−5955 Email: scott.kennedy@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ty Micha Johnson OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 Fourth Street Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9880 Email: ty.johnson@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/18/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/07/2016
12/09/2016 12/09/2016
12/09/2016
02/08/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT Class Action against GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA with Jury Demand ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−4768627) filed by RICHARD C. JONES. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons DC Mayor, # 3 Summons DC OAG)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 12/07/2016)
Case Assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. (sb) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
2 SUMMONS (2) Issued Electronically as to District of Columbia Attorney General, and the District of Columbia Mayor. (Attachment: # 1 Consent Form)(sb) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
3 ORDER Establishing Procedures for Cases Assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on December 9, 2016. (NS) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
4 Rule 4(m) Order. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 2/8/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 02/08/2017)

02/08/2017 03/01/2017 03/01/2017
03/02/2017
03/02/2017 03/03/2017 03/20/2017 03/21/2017 03/22/2017
03/22/2017 03/27/2017 03/29/2017
03/29/2017 04/05/2017
04/06/2017
04/06/2017 04/06/2017

Set/Reset Deadlines: Time to effectuate service upon party due by 3/7/2017. (dot) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
5 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Date of Service Upon the Mayor for the District of Columbia on 2/28/2017. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
6 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the District of Columbia Attorney General. Date of Service Upon District of Columbia Attorney General 2/28/2017. Answer due for ALL D.C. DEFENDANTS by 3/21/2017. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 6 Summons Returned Executed as to DC Attorney General; emailed to claibornelaw@gmail.com, cc'd 1 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Affidavit shows date of service of March 28, 2017; Refile corrected affidavit with February 28, 2017 date of service as an ERRATA. (znmw, ) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
7 ERRATA DC OAG return of service by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Amanda Montee on behalf of GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Ty Micha Johnson on behalf of All Defendants (Johnson, Ty) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
10 MOTION to Dismiss by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendant's 10 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall file a response to Defendant's Motion by no later than APRIL 5, 2017. Defendant shall file a reply by no later than APRIL 12, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/22/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff shall file a Response to 10 4/5/2017. Reply due by 4/12/2017. (dot) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
11 MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for class action treatment by RICHARD JONES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit email on concent, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/27/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's 11 Motion to Extend Deadline Nunc Pro Tunc for Filing Motion for Class Action Treatment. Defendant shall file a response to Plaintiff's Motion by no later than APRIL 11, 2017. Plaintiff shall file a reply by no later than APRIL 18, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 3/29/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 03/29/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant shall file Response to 11 by 4/11/2017. Reply due by 4/18/2017. (dot) (Entered: 03/29/2017)
12 AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by right per Rule 15(a)(1)(B) against RICHARD JONES with Jury Demand filed by RICHARD JONES. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit redlined copy of FAC showing changes from original)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/05/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff's 12 Amended Complaint, filed as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) within 21 days after service of Defendant's 10 Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's 10 Motion to Dismiss is accordingly DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT. Defendant shall respond to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by no later than APRIL 20, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/6/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer to Amended Complaint due by 4/20/2017. (dot) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
13 ENTERED IN ERROR......First AMENDED COMPLAINT against GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA with Jury Demand filed by RICHARD JONES.

04/07/2017 04/11/2017 04/17/2017 04/18/2017 04/19/2017 04/19/2017
04/19/2017 05/03/2017 05/09/2017 10/06/2017
10/10/2017 12/05/2017 01/18/2018 01/31/2018 02/05/2018 08/22/2018
08/22/2018 08/22/2018

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redlined Version)(td) Modified on 4/7/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 04/06/2017)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Docket Entry 13 Amended Complaint was entered in error as a duplicate of Docket Entry 12 Amended Complaint. (znmw) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
14 Memorandum in opposition to re 11 MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for class action treatment filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Johnson, Ty) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Lynn E. Cunningham on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Cunningham, Lynn) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
16 REPLY to opposition to motion re 11 MOTION for Extension of Time to file motion for class action treatment filed by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
17 MOTION to Dismiss by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 04/19/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court is in receipt of Defendant's 17 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall file a response to Defendant's Motion by no later than MAY 3, 2017. Defendant shall file a reply by no later than MAY 10, 2017. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on 4/19/2017. (lcckk3) (Entered: 04/19/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff's Response to 17 by 5/3/2017. Reply due by 5/10/2017. (dot) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
18 Memorandum in opposition to re 17 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 05/03/2017)
19 REPLY to opposition to motion re 17 MOTION to Dismiss filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
20 MOTION for Leave to File leave to present supplemental authorities re 18 Memorandum in Opposition by RICHARD JONES (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) Modified event title on 10/10/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 10/06/2017)
21 RESPONSE re 20 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
Case directly reassigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly is no longer assigned to the case. (ztnr) (Entered: 12/05/2017)
22 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Ty Micha Johnson terminated. (Johnson, Ty) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
23 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to RICHARD JONES. Attorney Lynn E. Cunningham terminated. (Cunningham, Lynn) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua Wade Dansby on behalf of All Defendants (Dansby, Joshua) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
25 ORDER granting in part and denying in part the defendant's 17 Motion to Dismiss. The defendant shall file an answer to the remaining allegations in the 12 Amended Complaint on or before September 5, 2018. See order for further details. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on August 22, 2018. (lcdlf2) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
26 MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding the defendant's 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on August 22, 2018. (lcdlf2) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's answer to remaining allegations due by 9/5/2018. (jl) Modified on 8/22/2018 (zjl). (Entered: 08/22/2018)

08/30/2018 08/31/2018 09/05/2018 09/13/2018 09/17/2018 12/20/2018 01/10/2019
01/15/2019 01/16/2019
01/16/2019 01/18/2019 02/15/2019

27 MOTION for Reconsideration re 26 Memorandum & Opinion by RICHARD JONES (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Claiborne, William) (Entered: 08/30/2018)
28 ORDER denying the plaintiff's 11 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Class Action Treatment. See Order for additional details. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on August 31, 2018. (lcdlf2). (Entered: 08/31/2018)
29 Defendant's ANSWER to 13 Amended Complaint by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.(Dansby, Joshua) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
30 RESPONSE re 27 MOTION for Reconsideration re 26 Memorandum & Opinion filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
31 REPLY to opposition to motion re 27 MOTION for Reconsideration re 26 Memorandum & Opinion filed by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
32 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Michael A. Tilghman on behalf of GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Substituting for attorney Amanda J. Montee (Tilghman, Michael) (Entered: 12/20/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. The Court has reviewed the plaintiff's 27 Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 22, 2018 memorandum opinion and order. The plaintiff limits his request for reconsideration to the Court's dismissal of his common−law claims. However, certain of the plaintiff's arguments, if accepted, would appear to impact the Court's holdings with respect to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. See Pl.s' Mot. for Recons. at 8 (arguing that "not every violation of a 4th Amendment requires a seizure or an 'arrest'"); id. at 9 (arguing that the plaintiff's return to the general population of D.C. jail was caused by his false imprisonment and that "[e]ven in the 4th Amendment context, neither Florence nor Bell ever suggested that arrestees and other prisoners lose their expectations of privacy in their bodies just because they are in jail"). The Court will therefore direct the parties to appear for a hearing at which they should be prepared to address both the merits of the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and its relationship, if any, to the Fourth Amendment claims previously dismissed. It is ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint status report on or before January 15, 2019 proposing at least three possible dates for such a hearing and indicating whether either party seeks permission to file supplemental briefing in advance of the hearing. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on January 10, 2019. (lcdlf1) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
33 Joint STATUS REPORT by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Tilghman, Michael) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. In light of the parties' 33 Joint Status Report, it is ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a hearing on March 28, 2019 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 12. It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's request to file a supplemental brief addressing the Court's January 10, 2019 Minute Order is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that (1) the plaintiff shall file his supplemental brief on February 15, 2019; (2) the defendant shall file its response on or before March 8, 2019; and (3) the plaintiff shall file his reply on or before March 15, 2019. The Court expresses no view on the plaintiff's intention to file a second motion for reconsideration or on the timing or merits of such a motion. Should the plaintiff file such a motion, the defendant may, if it wishes, consolidate its response to such motion with its response to the plaintiff's supplemental brief. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on January 16, 2019. (lcdlf1) (Entered: 01/16/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 3/28/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. (jl) (Entered: 01/16/2019)
34 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Joshua Wade Dansby terminated. (Dansby, Joshua) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
35 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM re 27 MOTION for Reconsideration re 26 Memorandum & Opinion filed by RICHARD JONES by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) Modified event title on 2/20/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 02/15/2019)

03/08/2019 03/15/2019 03/26/2019 04/02/2019 04/03/2019
06/13/2019 06/28/2019
07/03/2019 07/03/2019
07/03/2019 07/03/2019 07/17/2019 07/31/2019 08/15/2019 08/16/2019 08/16/2019

36 RESPONSE re 35 Memorandum filed by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Tilghman, Michael) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
37 REPLY to opposition to motion re 27 MOTION for Reconsideration re 26 Memorandum & Opinion filed by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference reset for 4/3/2019 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. (zcdw) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
38 NOTICE of Appearance by Scott Patrick Kennedy on behalf of All Defendants (Kennedy, Scott) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Dabney L. Friedrich: Motion Hearing held on 4/3/2019 re 27 MOTION for Reconsideration. Oral Arguments Was Presented By Both Parties. The Court Will Take This Matter Under Advisement. (Court Reporter SARA WICK.) (mac) (Entered: 04/03/2019)
39 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting the plaintiff's 27 Motion for Reconsideration. See text for details. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on June 13, 2019. (lcdlf1) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. In light of the Court's June 13, 2019 39 Memorandum Opinion & Order, it is ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint status report on or before July 3, 2019 proposing a schedule for further proceedings, including a proposed deadline for the defendant to file an amended answer, if any. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on June 28, 2019. (lcdlf1) (Entered: 06/28/2019)
40 Joint STATUS REPORT by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Tilghman, Michael) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of the parties' 40 Joint Status Report, it is ORDERED that the defendant shall file an amended answer, if any, to the plaintiff's amended complaint on or before July 17, 2019. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall confer in accordance with Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 16.3 and file, on or before July 31, 2019, a joint meet and confer report as set forth in Local Civil Rule 16.3(d). After receiving the joint meet and confer report, the Court will set a scheduling conference unless the Court determines, on the basis of the report, that a conference is unnecessary. See Local Civil Rule 16.4. Signed by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on July 3, 2019. (lcdlf3) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
41 NOTICE of Appearance by Brendan Russell Heath on behalf of GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Heath, Brendan) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer due by 7/17/2019. Meet & Confer Statement due by 7/31/2019. (zcal) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
42 Amended ANSWER to 12 AMENDED Complaint with Jury Demand by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.(Tilghman, Michael) Modified on 7/17/2019 to add linkage (zrdj). (Entered: 07/17/2019)
43 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 8/16/2019 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. (zcal) (Entered: 08/15/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Dabney L. Friedrich: Telephone Status Conference held on 8/16/2019. Further Order to be issued by the Court. Court Reporter: Sara Wick. (zcal) (Entered: 08/16/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. As ordered during the August 16, 2019 status conference, the parties shall file a joint status report on or before September 13, 2019. The following schedule shall govern further proceedings: fact discovery shall be completed on or before January 28, 2020; plaintiff's expert witness designations and diclosures shall be filed on or before March 13, 2020; defendant's rebuttal expert witness designations and disclosures shall be filed on or before April 13, 2020; and expert discovery shall be completed on or before June 12, 2020. It is further ORDERED that, on or before June 19, 2020, the parties shall file a joint post−discovery status report advising the Court whether (a) the parties request referral for mediation or settlement; (b) dispositive

08/16/2019 09/13/2019 09/13/2019
09/13/2019 10/16/2019 10/17/2019

motions are anticipated and, if so, proposing a briefing schedule; or (c) the parties request a date for a pretrial conference. Before bringing a discovery dispute to the Court's attention the parties shall confer in good faith in an attempt to resolve the dispute informally. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute informally, they shall jointly contact chambers at (202) 354−3400 to schedule a teleconference. Thereafter, the parties shall prepare a joint email to send to the Court at Friedrich_Chambers@dcd.uscourts.gov that provides a clear, concise description of the issues in dispute. So Ordered by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on August 16, 2019. (lcdlf3) Modified on 9/13/2019 (zcal). (Entered: 08/16/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Rule 26(a)(2) due by 3/13/2020. Rebuttal due by 4/13/2020. Defendant Rule 26(a)(2) due by 4/13/2020. Post Discovery Joint Status Report due by 6/19/2020. (zcal) (Entered: 08/19/2019)
44 Joint STATUS REPORT by GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tilghman, Michael) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of the parties 44 Joint Status Report, it is ORDERED that all deadlines in the Court's August 16, 2019 Minute Order are vacated. It is further ORDERED that if the parties do not file a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice by October 23, 2019, the parties shall file another joint status report on or before October 24, 2019. So Ordered by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on September 13, 2019. (lcdlf3) Modified on 9/13/2019 (zcal). (Entered: 09/13/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 10/24/2019. (zcal) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
45 STIPULATION of Dismissal by RICHARD JONES. (Claiborne, William) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
MINUTE ORDER dismissing this case with prejudice in light of the parties' 45 Stipulation of Dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. So Ordered by Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on October 17, 2019. (lcdlf3) (Entered: 10/17/2019)

 
 Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD JONES 4501 23d Parkway Apt 104 Temple Hills, MD 20748

On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.: 16-2405

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SERVE:

Mayor Muriel Bowser Designee Darlene Fields Civil Litigation Division, Ste 6000 South 441 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 202-724-6507

And

Attorney General Karl Racine Designee Darlene Fields Civil Litigation Division, Ste 6000 South 441 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 202-724-6507

Defendant.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INDIVIDUAL MONEY DAMAGES AND CLASS INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND
Introduction

1

Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 2 of 14
1. This is an action brought by each of Richard Jones (the “Overdetention Named Plaintiff”) on his own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below injured (or presently subject to injury) by the Government of the District of Columbia’s recently revived pattern and practice of allowing its Department of Corrections to overdetain inmates, and by the District’s deliberate indifference to the effect of the practice of overdetention on the rights of inmates. To overdetain means holding a detainee or prisoner in a District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("Department of Corrections") facility past midnight of his or her release date, as defined below.
2. This is also an action brought by Richard Jones (the "Strip Search Named Plaintiff") on his own behalf and on behalf of a Strip Search Class of individuals who were injured (or presently subject to injury) by the District’s conduct in subjecting them to blanket strip searches and visual body cavity searches (both described below) after they were returned to a Department of Corrections facility after a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention, other than to be processed for release, and by District’s deliberate indifference to the effect of the practice of blanket strip searches and visual body cavity searches on the rights of inmates.
3. Mr. Jones also brings common law over-detention (false imprisonment) and stripsearch (invasion of privacy) claims. Mr. Jones timely submitted “12-309” notice to the District pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309 on behalf of himself and the classes.
4. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff brings this action against the Government of the District of Columbia under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them, because the District overdetained them and other members of the class at a Department of Corrections facility.
2

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5. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff brings this action against the Government of the District of Columbia under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, for injuries suffered by them, because the District subjected them and the class to the blanket strip searches.
Jurisdiction and Venue 6. This Court has jurisdiction over the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff’ § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). 7. Venue is appropriate in this District. Each of the claims for relief arose in this judicial district.
Class Action Allegations 8. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility from August 1, 2013 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired (or within two hours of being ordered released or otherwise becoming entitled to release if the person was a court return). 9. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff also bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each member of the class who was, or in the future will be, from August 1, 2013, forward: (i) in the custody of the Department of Corrections; (ii) taken to court from a Department of Corrections facility; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court
3

Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 4 of 14
appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned from court to the DC Jail or CTF or other District facility, to be processed out of Department of Corrections custody; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons; before being released, regardless of whether he was overdetained.
10. Certification of these two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate, because the District of Columbia has a pattern and practice that has uniformly affected all members of both classes, and injunctive relief against the District will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member. Although the District had agreed to stop these practices, and indeed had done so in the context of the settlement of Bynum v. District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 02-956 (RCL) and Barnes v. District of Columbia, 06-315 (RCL), the practices stop have not stopped based on public filings and discussions with attorneys practicing in the District courts.
11. The classes are entitled to injunctive relief on their § 1983 claims, for example, setting up an independent monitor to supervise the Department of Corrections' inmate management system to ensure that all inmates are released on or before their release dates, and other relief as specified below.
12. Regarding the Overdetained Named Plaintiff, and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been
4

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overdetained, and the answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the Department of Corrections' records.
13. Computer records and DOC over-detention reports are available for inspection on the overdetentions and the strip-searches.
14. Regarding the Strip Search Named Plaintiff, and members of the Strip Search Class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability, because neither the DC Jail nor CTF keeps records of the searches and therefore neither the DC Jail nor CTF can show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion.
15. Among the questions of law and fact common to the classes are: a) whether the Constitution provides a maximum length of time
measured in hours beyond which the District cannot hold a person to perform administrative tasks incident to release before releasing that person from jail;
b) whether the District has exceeded that maximum for each class member;
c) whether the District has a pattern and practice of holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;
d) whether the District has a pattern and practice of being deliberately indifferent to the rights of detainees and inmates by holding them past their release dates;
e) whether the District’s acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the United States by holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;
5

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f) whether the District has a policy of and practice of subjecting persons to blanket strip searches and visual body cavity searches after they have become entitled to release;
g) whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth and/or Fifth Amendments; and
h) whether plaintiffs and the members of the Overdetention Class and the Strip Search Class and future members are entitled to equitable relief, and, if so, what is the nature of that relief. 16. Each of the Overdetention Class and the Strip Search Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of Overdetention Class and Strip Search Class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least one hundred people, and likely substantially more than that. 17. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, as plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the overdetentions. 18. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Strip Search Class, as the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and all other members of the Strip Search Class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the blanket strip searches. 19. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Overdetention Class and Strip Search Class and have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation.
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20. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the class or Strip Search Class.
Parties 21. Plaintiff Richard Jones held past his Release Date at the DC Jail and was strip searched without reasonable suspicion after being ordered to be released from custody. 22. The District Government of the District of Columbia (hereinafter the District of Columbia or the District) is a municipal corporation capable of being sued under D.C. Code § 1102.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Components of the Department of Corrections 23. The District of Columbia Department of Corrections holds prisoners committed by the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia District Court, and other agencies, in the Central Detention Facility (“DC Jail”), the Correctional Treatment Facility ("CTF") and at various halfway houses located in the District of Columbia. 24. Most prisoners held in the custody of the Department of Corrections are either pre-trial detainees, misdemeanants serving sentences, or parole and probation violators.
The Inmate Management System 25. The records office located at the DC Jail ("Records Office") is responsible for administering and maintaining the records, including the judgment and commitment files, of all persons housed at the DC Jail, CTF and the halfway houses. 26. The Records Office is responsible for ensuring that all persons housed at the DC Jail, CTF and the halfway houses are released according to their Release Dates specified in their court orders.
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27. The District of Columbia Superior Court enforces a policy pursuant to which an incustody-defendant or a defendant ordered into custody may not leave the courtroom without an order (commitment order or release order) for each case on which he appeared.
The Overdetention Problem 28. "Overdetain" means holding a detainee or prisoner in Department of Corrections' custody past the person’s release date. 29. “Release Date” for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 30. “Exit Date” for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is actually released from the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. 31. The Department of Corrections had a long and documented history of overdetaining detainees and inmates past their release dates. 32. The Department of Corrections, in response to a class action lawsuit, instituted reforms that ameliorated and for periods eliminated the overdetention problem. 33. However, on information and belief, and based on publically available filing, the Department of Corrections has again begun overdetaining large numbers of inmates.
The Court Return Strip Search Problem 34. Prior to late 2000 or early 2001, the Department of Corrections followed a practice under which most inmates taken from custody of the Department of Corrections to court and ordered released by a judicial officer because the charge was no longer pending or because of a change in conditions of release was returned to the DC Jail or CTF for processing for release rather than being released from the courthouse.
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35. In late 2000 or early 2001, the Department of Corrections instituted a policy under which every inmates taken from custody of the Department of Corrections to court and ordered released by a judicial officer because the charge was no longer pending or because of a change in conditions of release was returned to the DC Jail or CTF for processing for release rather than being released from the courthouse.
36. In August 2005 the Department of Corrections instituted a policy of diverting incustody defendants ordered released or otherwise entitled to release from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to a holding facility on the grounds of DC General Hospital where they would not be subject to a strip search, absent individualized suspicion, while the record review for detainers and warrants and property retrieval was conducted prior to release.
37. However, the Department of Corrections has been returning some in-custody defendants entitled to release from the courthouses to the DC Jail or CTF and subjecting them to strip searches after a judge has ordered their release without a finding of individual reasonable suspicion.
38. The DOC is supposed to make releases from the courthouses but it does not reliably do so.
39. The exact cause of the recent overdetentions and illegal court return strip searches is not known, but the causes, on information and belief, include recurring problems with the DC Jail’s computerized inmate population accounting system and the Records Office.
Plaintiff Richard Jones’ Overdetention by the DC Jail 40. On or about 12/7/15 Plaintiff Richard Jones, while in the custody of the DOC was sent to the federal courthouse for a hearing.
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41. Mr. Jones was ordered released but instead of being released from the courthouse or the MHU the DOC transported him to the DC Jail and did not release him for several hours.
42. Plaintiff Jones has suffered damages as a result of the over detention. Plaintiff Richard Jones’s Strip Search
43. On 12/7/15 Plaintiff Richard Jones was taken to Court and the Judge ordered his release.
44. Plaintiff Richard Jones was entitled to release on 12/7/15. 45. But, instead of being released or diverted to the holding facility at DC General or released from the courthouse on 12/7/15, Plaintiff Carl A. Barnes was returned to the DC Jail’s general population and subjected to a strip search and visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons even though a court had ordered his release. 46. Plaintiff Jones has suffered damages as a result.
Substantive Allegations Claim 1
§ 1983 Liability of District of Columbia for Overdetentions 47. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 48. The District of Columbia, and its agents and employees, have had a ongstanding custom and practice of detaining people past their release dates, thereby causing unjustified overdetention of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members.
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49. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving force behind the violations of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members’ Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.
50. The District was deliberately indifferent to their rights. 51. Accordingly, all Named Plaintiffs are entitled to damages to be determined at trial, and the Overdetention Class is entitled to injunctive relief.
Claim 2 § 1983 Custom and Practice Liability of District for Illegal Strip Searches 52. Mr. Jones the Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 53. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving force behind the violations of the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Class members’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 54. The District was deliberately indifferent to their rights. 55. Accordingly, Mr. Jones is entitled to damages to be determined at trial, and the Strip-search Class is entitled to injunctive relief.
Claim 3 Common Law Liability of District of Columbia for False Arrest 56. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 57. The District of Columbia, and its agents and employees, have had a longstanding custom and practice of detaining people past their release dates, thereby causing unjustified overdetention of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members.
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58. District’s employees were acting within the scope of their employment at all times. 59. The District is liable for the conduct of its employees in respondeat superior. 60. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, were the proximate cause of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members’ common law rights to be free from false arrest. 61. The District is liable for the conduct of its employees in respondeat superior. 62. The District was deliberately indifferent to their rights. 63. Accordingly, all Named Plaintiffs are entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
Claim 4 Common Law Custom and Practice Liability of District for Illegal Strip Searches 64. Mr. Jones the Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 65. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, were the proximate cause of the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Class members’ common law privacy rights. 66. The District’s employees were acting within the scope of their employment at all times. 67. The District is liable for the conduct of its employees in respondeat superior. 68. Accordingly, Mr. Jones is entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
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Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 13 of 14 Prayer For Relief
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
1. grant a jury trial on all claims so triable; 2. award all named plaintiffs compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 3. award plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 4. grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted, ____/sig/________________________ WILLIAM CLAIBORNE D.C. Bar # 446579 2020 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Ste 395 Washington, DC 20006 202-824-0700
Jury Demand Plaintiffs demand a jury of six as to all claims so triable.
_______/sig/______________________ WILLIAM CLAIBORNE D.C. Bar # 446579 Counsel for the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the classes
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD JONES 4501 23d Parkway Apt 104 Temple Hills, MD 20748
On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 16-2405 (CKK)

CLASS ACTION FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
FILED BY RIGHT Introduction
1. Mr. Jones files this First Amended Complaint by right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(a) because he files the First Amended Complaint within 21 days of the District’s filing its motion [10] to dismiss the original complaint. 2. This is an action brought by Richard Jones (the “Overdetention Named Plaintiff”) on his own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below injured (or presently subject to injury) by the Government of the District of Columbia’s (the “District’s”) revived pattern and practice of allowing its Department of Corrections to overdetain inmates, and by the District’s deliberate indifference to the effect of the practice of overdetention on the rights of inmates. To overdetain means holding a detainee or prisoner in a District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("Department

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or DOC") facility past 10 pm of the date on which they are entitled to release (“Release Date”) (or more than two hours after being ordered released or otherwise becoming entitled to release if the person was a court return), as defined below. The date and time on which a detainee is entitled to release is their Release Time. 3. Mr. Jones also brings the Over-detention Claim pursuant to the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment because District of Columbia statutes create a liberty interest in release by 10 pm on the Release Date per D.C. Code § 24-201.06 and D.C. Code § 24-211.02a and for an inmate ordered released pursuant to a court order within 5 hours of transfer from the custody of the United States Marshals Service into the custody of the Department of Corrections per D.C. Code § 24-211.02a. 4. This is also an action brought by Richard Jones (the "Strip Search Named Plaintiff") on his own behalf and on behalf of a Strip Search Class of individuals who were injured (or presently subject to injury) by the District’s conduct in subjecting them to blanket strip searches and visual body cavity searches pursuant to the Department’s policy of subjecting all persons committed to the DC Jail of a strip-search regardless of cause after they were returned to the DC Jail and stripsearched after a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention. 5. Mr. Jones also brings common law over-detention (false imprisonment) and strip-search (invasion of privacy) claims. Mr. Jones timely submitted “12-309” notice to the District pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309 on behalf of himself and the classes. 6. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff brings this action against the Government of the District of Columbia under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and under District of Columbia common law, for injuries suffered by him and the class members, because the District overdetained him and other
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members of the class at a Department of Corrections facility. 7. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff brings this action against the Government of the District of Columbia under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and under District of Columbia common law, for injuries suffered by him, because the District subjected him and the class members to the blanket strip searches.
Jurisdiction and Venue 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). 9. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Named Plaintiff’s common law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 10. Venue is appropriate in this District. Each of the claims for relief arose in this judicial district.
Parties 11. Plaintiff Richard Jones was over-detained at the DC Jail and was strip searched at the DC Jail without reasonable suspicion after being ordered to be released from custody. 12. The District Government of the District of Columbia (hereinafter the District of Columbia or the District) is a municipal corporation capable of being sued under D.C. Code § 1-102.
Factual Allegations 13. For over 20 years the District has run a jail system that systemically holds people past their release dates and subjects court returns entitled to release to degrading and unnecessary blanket post release strip searches. 14. The cause of the over-detentions and illegal post release strip searches of court returns entitled to release was and remains the District of Columbia’s maintaining a release system in the
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DOC which in toto simply delays all releases until the system, in its sweet time, and with the resources the government of the District of Columbia chooses provide it, is ready to make releases of inmates from DOC facilities. 15. Regardless of the lawfulness of its release polices the District implements them in a way that violates the constitutional rights of inmates. 16. The District’s system gave great weight to the “only societal interests that justify delay [which] are ensuring that prisoners are not released if they have warrants, or detainers, and efficient marshaling of scarce resources” and gave practically no weight to “the prisoner's absolute right to freedom” in a prompt release. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 117-118 (D.D.C. 2007). The system attaches weight to the governmental interests involved in releases but disregarded the interests of the inmate in a prompt release. 17. The DOC with the full knowledge of the D.C. Council and the Mayor has blindly followed practices that required release dispositions to be transmitted from the Superior Court to the Records Office at the DC Jail in paper format by hand in the first place, and then the District, especially the DOC, “inefficiently implemented” the procedures in the system for transmitting orders from the courtrooms to the Records Office in ways that caused significant delays and losses in the transmission of the orders. 18. The DOC’s determination to (1) make releases at the DC Jail or and only occasionally at the courthouses, and to process releases (2) on the basis of paper orders (as opposed to docket entries or electronically transmitted orders) (3) hand carried back to the Records Office, and the “inefficiently implemented” procedures in the system for transmitting orders added hours and sometimes days to the release process. 19. The DOC’s “inefficient implementation” of its procedures for making releases added
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further delay. The DOC runs a paper system for tracking cases and releases and misplaces jackets, misfiles orders, and runs the system manually. The “inefficient implementation” of the District's release procedures is the result of official “acquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operation procedure of the local government entity.”
District of Columbia Department of Corrections 20. The District of Columbia Department of Corrections holds prisoners committed by the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia District Court, and other agencies, in the Central Detention Facility (“DC Jail”), the Correctional Treatment Facility ("CTF") and at various halfway houses located in the District of Columbia. 21. Most prisoners held in the custody of the Department of Corrections are either pre-trial detainees, misdemeanants serving short sentences, or parole and probation violators.
The Inmate Management System 22. The records office located at the DC Jail ("Records Office") is responsible for administering and maintaining the records, including the judgment and commitment files, of all persons housed at the DC Jail, CTF and the halfway houses. 23. The Records Office is responsible for ensuring that all persons housed at the DC Jail, CTF and the halfway houses are released according to their Release Dates and Release Times specified in their court orders. 24. The DOC through its Records Office enforces a policy of treating court return (each person who leaves a DOC facility for court and returns on the same day) as subject to their original commitment order if the court return returns to the Jail or other facility without a release order for each case on which they are being held/
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25. A person may be subject to commitment on more than one case or charge. The Overdetention Problem
26. "Overdetain" means holding a detainee or prisoner in Department of Corrections' custody past the person’s Release Time on their Release Date. 27. “Release Date” for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 28. “Release Time” is the date and time on which a detainee is entitled to release. 29. “Exit Date” for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is actually released from the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. 30. The Department of Corrections had a long and documented history of overdetaining detainees and inmates past their Release Dates and Release Times. 31. The Department of Corrections, in response to class action lawsuits, instituted reforms that ameliorated and for periods eliminated the overdetention problem. 32. However, based on publically available filing, the Department of Corrections has again begun overdetaining large numbers of inmates.
The Court Return Strip Search Problem 33. Prior to late 2000 or early 2001, the Department of Corrections followed a practice under which most inmates taken from custody of the Department of Corrections to court and ordered released by a judicial officer because the charge was no longer pending or because of a change in conditions of release was returned to the DC Jail or CTF for processing for release rather than being released from the courthouse. 34. In late 2000 or early 2001, the Department of Corrections instituted a policy under which
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every inmates taken from custody of the Department of Corrections to court and ordered released by a judicial officer because the charge was no longer pending or because of a change in conditions of release was returned to the DC Jail or CTF for processing for release rather than being released from the courthouse. 35. In August 2005 the Department of Corrections instituted a policy of diverting in-custody defendants ordered released or otherwise entitled to release from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to a holding facility on the grounds of DC General Hospital (“MHU”) where they would not be subject to a strip search, absent individualized suspicion, while the record review for detainers and warrants and property retrieval was conducted prior to release. 36. However, the Department of Corrections has been returning some in-custody defendants entitled to release from the courthouses to the DC Jail or CTF and subjecting them to strip searches after a judge has ordered their release without a finding of individual reasonable suspicion. 37. The DOC is supposed to make releases from the courthouses but it does not reliably do so. 38. The exact cause of the recent overdetentions and illegal court return strip searches is not known, but the causes, on information and belief, include recurring problems with the DC Jail’s computerized inmate population accounting system and the Records Office and the problems described below.
Split system connected by a “sneaker network” 39. The District, especially the DOC, compounded the inefficiencies inherent in the “split” system by the DOC’s solution to the problem of how to communicate data, especially release dispositions, between the two systems.
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40. The DOC’s solution, largely dictated by the DOC’s longstanding practices by which DOC insisted on making releases based on paper orders hand carried back to the Records Office at DC Jail, and DOC’s insistence on making releases from either the DC Jail or MHU, was to set up a “sneaker” network in which orders and other paperwork associated with in-custody defendants traveling to and from the courthouse and the jail was hand carried. 41. Moreover, the District, especially the DOC, administered the “sneaker” network poorly in ways that created significant delay in the release process because of the “split” system structure and the inefficient and delay laden manner in which the DOC administered it. The DOC is the agency that has responsibility for processing releases. 42. Put another way, the DOC is the agency that blocks the releases of court returns entitled to release until the DOC has obtained their release dispositions in the form it wants (paper copies), and transported the “body1” to the place it chooses to make the release (DC Jail, MHU, and as of July 2008 the Superior Court). 43. The DOC is the agency that has responsibility for obtaining orders for all inmates in its custody so it can make prompt releases. 44. Once of the major causes of the District’s over-detention and court return strip-search problem is that it runs a split system, that is, the DOC sends prisoners to the courthouses for hearings at which the court returns receive paper release or commitment orders, and then the DOC Records Office processes releases based on the paper orders.
1 Each court return going to the courthouse is “body” as distinguished from his “paperwork” such as a court order or a “buck slip” or a Form 40 (manifest listing all bodies on a transport vehicle). Sometimes the body and the paperwork travel separately and sometimes they travel together. Plaintiffs do not intend any disrespect in using the term “body” as opposed to
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45. Compounding the problem is that each system uses its own database (the Superior Court uses CourtView and the DOC uses JACCS) that cannot communicate directly over an electronic network. 46. Instead, a “sneaker network” of DOC transport officers transmitting the orders by hand connects the two systems. 47. In contrast, the MPD arrest booking database communicates via network with the Superior Court booking system so data about arrestees is transmitted electronically from the MPD system to the CourtView system. 48. This is both quicker and more error free. 49. Every release / commitment order issued by the Superior Court or the District Court has to be hand carried from the courtroom clerk by the courthouse Marshals to DOC staff in the courthouse who carry it back to the Records Office with the court returns on the transport vehicles to the Records Office and then re-entered manually into the DOC system. 50. It is a fundamental premise of data management that every time data has to be re-entered into a system by hand is an opportunity for error. 51. Despite years of knowing about the problems caused by transmitting papers orders by hand the DOC has refused to engineer a system of electronically transmitting release / commitment data from the courthouses to the Records Office system. 52. Every release / commitment order issued by a judge is printed out in duplicate, one copy for the court and one copy for the DOC.
individual or person. Body is merely a translation of the venerable Latin term “corpus” (as in “habeas corpus”) and is intended to distinguish between the body and the paperwork.
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53. The District even refuses to set up a network to link the courtroom computers with the Records Office so that paper orders printed out by the courtroom clerks will print in the Records Office. 54. Networking printers at remote locations is so simple these days that people can go online and print documents remotely at their local copy/ print center.
DOC runs a paper system for tracking cases 55. The DOC’s Records Office maintains records for each inmate and processes their releases and commitments. 56. The DOC runs a paper system for tracking cases. 57. Each inmate has a paper hard copy file (their “jacket”). 58. Even though the DOC maintains an electronic inmate management system database (JACCS) each commitment and release requires a review of official hard copy documentation in an inmate's file and the review of hard copy documents provides the primary basis for making release determinations. 59. The District’s Records Office runs the system manually and frequently misplaces jackets, misfiles orders, and fails to process commitments and releases reliably.
The District’s system for handling court returns 60. Every day that court is in session the District sends inmates to the Superior Court and the District Court for court appearances. 61. After a court return appears in court the court return is ordered held or released. 62. Just because a court return receives a single release order does not mean that they are automatically entitled to release.
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63. A court return sent to court on more than charge or case may receive a release order in one case and a commitment order in another. 64. Similarly, a court return who receives release orders in all cases on which they went to court may be subject to continued detention on other cases or subject to a detainer or a warrant. 65. And a court return who was convicted and sentenced may also be entitled to release on that case even if they are convicted (e.g., person sentenced to time served or probation only). 66. It is the job of the Licensed Record Examiners (“LIEs or records examiners”) in the Records Office to process releases by reviewing an inmate’s “jacket” and determining whether an inmate is entitled to release if they received release orders on all the cases on which they went to court or otherwise became entitled to release (e.g., prosecutor dismissed the case, person sentenced to time served or probation only) and there are no other cases on which the person is being held and they are not subject to detainers or warrants. 67. Until about 2000 the DOC maintained one or more records examiners in the Superior Court courthouse to process releases of court returns entitled to release so they could be released directly from the Superior Court or District Court instead of being returned to the DC Jail for outprocessing (all releases from the DC Jail or CTF are processed by the Records Office and all persons released from CTF or the DC Jail pass through the DC Jail’s R&D (Receiving and Discharge) post. 68. But, because the Records Office became so inefficient and unreliable it could not process the daily stream of court returns entitled to release and the DOC had to start returning all court returns including court returns entitled to release back to the DC Jail for release processing. 69. Returning court returns entitled to release to the DC Jail for processing causes two types of problems.
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70. One, it reduces the Records Office’s ability to process releases because it burdens the system in the jail with inmates who should already have been released. This affects not only court returns entitled to release but all other persons in the DOC entitled to release. 71. Two, it subjects court returns entitled to release to degrading and humiliating strip-searches because all persons committed to the DC Jail are (because of official written DOC policy) subjected to blanket (i.e., all persons regardless of suspicion) strip-searches even court returns entitled to release. 72. In the Bynum Settlement (the class action settlement in Bynum v. District of Columbia, 02956 (RCL), a class action brought against the District by persons who were over-detained and subjected to unconstitutional post release strip-searches, the District addressed some of these problems by agreeing to divert court returns entitled to release to a processing facility outside the DC Jail, the Medical Holding Unit or “MHU,” where they could stay while the Records Office processed their entitlement to release to avoid burdening the DC Jail with the flow of court returns entitled to release (which affected the Records Office’s capacity to process all releases) and so court returns entitled to release would not have to undergo strip-searches. 73. The DOC also agreed to build a new Inmate Processing Center outside the DC Jail to process releases of court returns entitled to release so they would not have to reenter the DC Jail for out-processing. 74. But, in practice, the DOC did neither. The DOC never built the Inmate Processing Center and the DOC only sporadically diverted court returns entitled to release to the MHU for release. 75. In fact, in the first year after the Bynum Settlement, the DOC over-detained at least 1,244 court returns entitled to release who did not get released because the DOC could not process releases before 10:00 p.m.
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76. Because of a District of Columbia statute enacted by the D.C. Council in early 2000s, the

DC Jail could not make releases after 10 pm (the 10 pm cut-off statute).

77.

A new class action was filed against the District by persons who were over-detained and

subjected to unconstitutional post release strip-searches, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 06-315

(RCL).

78. As a result of the Barnes case, the DOC began making courthouse releases of

misdemeanor (and certain felony) releases and the DOC began diverting more court returns

entitled to release to MHU for release processing.

79. Judge Lamberth also declared the 10 pm cut-off statute unconstitutional and the DOC

began making releases after midnight.

80. For a certain period of time the over-detention and related strip-search problem was

resolved.

81. But, by 2013, the problem had returned.

Snith v. District of Columbia and the District’s system for handling court returns

82. Discovery and the pleadings in the case of Snith v. District of Columbia, 15-161 (ABJ),

illustrates the problems caused by the split system and its reliance of paper records which caused

the overdetentions and strip-searches of Mr. Jones and the class members as well as the over-

detention and strip-search of Mr. Smith.

83. On March 18, 2014, Judge Juliet McKenna of the Superior Court ordered Mr. Gregory

Smith to be released in the two cases on which he had been committed to the DC Jail.

84. She issued two paper release orders.

85. One was hand carried back to the Records Office in a matter of hours on the transport

vehicle with Mr. Smith.

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86. Mr. Smith was not released at the courthouse nor was he diverted to MHU even though he had at least one release order. 87. When Mr. Smith arrived at the R&D post in the DC Jail (all persons committed to the DOC are processed into the system in R&D which examines their commitment paperwork as they arrive), he told the R&D officers that he was entitled to release on both of his cases. 88. The other release order did not arrive until 9:33 that night. 89. R&D staff did not investigate his claims. 90. Because they found only one release order they assumed per DOC policy that he was still subject to detention on his other case so they subjected him to a strip-search and retuned him to his cell. 91. The Records Office processed one of his orders but not the other. 92. As a result, because the DOC treats a court return coming back to the DC Jail without a release order as still subject to their original commitment, the Records Office continued to hold Mr. Smith. 93. For some reason, even though the Records Office received the second order, the Records Office never processed it. 94. As a result, Mr. Smith was over-detained for 23 days. 95. The Records Office obviously did not do any quality assurance on Mr. Smith’s release decision after March 18, 2014. 96. If they had, a simple check of the CourtView system (the online CourtView system is the official docket of the Superior Court) would have revealed that he was entitled to release in both cases.
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97. The DOC never even discovered that he was over-detained even though Mr. Smith did not appear for an April 10, 2014 court appearance in one of the case. 98. Moreover, the Records Office never reported the over-detention after it was discovered so it was not entered into the early warning system used to track over-detentions and their causes so the DOC can diagnose and correct problems in the system. 99. The District’s deliberate indifference to inmate’s right to timely release is illustrated by how the District’s implementation of its procedures disregard’s inmate rights. 100. The DOC is supposed to release court returns entitled to release from the courthouse or divert them to MHU. The DOC failed to implement its policy here. 101. The DOC failed to promptly transport his release/ commitment orders to the Records Office. Sending orders electronically would have obviated this long standing problem of failing to promptly get release orders to the Records Office. 102. Mr. Smith reported his right to release to R&D staff but they failed to investigate. 103. The Records Office failed to check CourtView to see his release status in his order case. 104. Most significantly and most indicative of a over-detention systemic problem is that a senior Records Office manager failed to make an over-detention report when the over-detention was discovered.
Deliberate indifference to over-detentions 105. Releasing inmates from custody within two hours from when they become entitled to release is the norm for any system of the District’s size that places any weight on the inmate’s interest in a prompt release.
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106. The DC jail is located at1901 E Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003. The superior Courthouse is located at 555 Indiana Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20001. According to Google's “get directions,” the jail is 2.7 miles from the Superior Courthouse and the travel time is 10 minutes. 107. According to DOC data since 2013 the inmate population has gone down almost every year since 2013 from 1718 inmates in 2013 to 1252 in 2016. 108. The number of releases the DOC processes has gone down every year from 12,976 in 2013 to only 8,500 in 2016. 109. The maximum number of court returns sent to court on any day is approximately 100 to 150 and of that number only about 10 percent become entitled to release as a result of their court events. 110. A quick comparison with over-detention figures for the LA County Jail for similar periods underscores the point. The LA County Jail System is the largest in the country. 111. The LA County Jail System books and releases about 200,000 individuals into the jail system in a given year (compared with the District’s current 11277 or less) through its Inmate Reception Center. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 17th Semiannual Report, by Special Counsel Merrick J. Bobb and Staff and Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), November 2003. (“17th Semiannual Report”) http://file.lacounty.gov/lac/mbobb17.pdf. 112. Every weekday nearly 1,300 inmates pass through the Inmate Reception Center from county facilities on their way to 12 Superior Court Districts and 49 courthouses in LA County (about the size of a small European country). 17th Semiannual Report, 17:72.
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113. On any given day, the District sends between 100 to 150 2 court returns to two courthouses 3, the Superior Court house and the District Court courthouse, located across the street from each other, 2.7 miles from the Superior Courthouse and the travel time is 10 minutes.

114. The LA County Jail instituted a courthouse release program in May 2001, the “In-Court Release and Greenband Program.”

115. The following chart shows over detentions in the LA County Jail in the years 1997 to 2003:

Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 2003

Over

607

495

269

249

123

81

49

detentions

Over-detention numbers for the DOC
116. Exact over-detention numbers for the DC Jail and CTF (Central Treatment Facility) and the Half Way Houses are not known to plaintiff without discovery.
117. But, publically available figures and discussions with knowledgeable people such as CJA lawyers indicates that the DOC routinely holds detainees past their Release Times.
118. First of all, the DOC has historically under-reported over-detentions even in its annual
2 DOC newsletter. 3 The DC jail is located at1901 E Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003. The superior Courthouse is located at 555 Indiana Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20001. According to Google's “get directions,” the jail is 2.7 miles from the Superior Courthouse and the travel time is 10 min. http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl (last checked 1/27/2011).
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compliance reports to the Judiciary and Public Safety Committee of the D.C. Council which has oversight for the DOC. 119. The DOC even under-reports over-detentions in litigation. See e.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 15-151 (DAR) [56] 12/6/2016 (District sanctioned for failing to disclose all overdetentions in response to non-objectionable discovery requests). 120. The DOC reported about 12 over-detentions for 2013 to the D.C. Council for 2013 but this number is under-reported. 121. The number of over-detentions the DOC ultimately disclosed to Mr. Smith is under seal and not known to Mr. Jones. 122. In 2015 the DOC over-detained Mr. Smith for 23 days a length which indicates a severe problem in the Records Office. 123. In 2016 the District over-detained Mr. Perrow for about 20 days again a length which indicates a severe problem in the Records Office. 124. Most significantly and most indicative of a over-detention systemic problem is that a senior Records Office manager failed to make an over-detention report when Mr. Smith’s over-detention was discovered. 125. One of the key tools which the DOC and other jails use to prevent over-detentions is to report and track over-detentions so management can identify and fix problems that cause overdetentions (and the flip side of over-detentions, early releases). 126. When senior supervisory staff in a Records Office fail to make reports is indicates a
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systemic problem. Plaintiff Richard Jones’ Overdetention by the DC Jail
127. Without discovery Mr. Jones does not yet know why he was over-detained and stripsearched but the following facts are clear. 128. On or about 12/7/15 Plaintiff Richard Jones, while in the custody of the DOC was sent to the federal courthouse for a hearing. 129. Mr. Jones was ordered released but instead of being released from the courthouse or the MHU the DOC transported him to the DC Jail. 130. At R&D Mr. Jones told the R&D staff that he was entitled to release but the R&D staff did not investigate his claim and hold him in the R&D holding area without a strip-search or send him to MHU during the investigation. 131. Because they found no release order they assumed per DOC policy that he was still subject to detention on the case he went to court on so they subjected him to a strip-search and retuned him to his cell. 132. They did not release him for several hours. 133. Mr. Jones pleads in the alternative that he was held more than five hours before release after being transferred by the Marshals in the courthouse to the DOC transport officers. 134. Plaintiff Jones has suffered damages as a result of the over detention.
Plaintiff Richard Jones’s Strip Search 135. On 12/7/15 Plaintiff Richard Jones was taken to Court and the Judge ordered his release. 136. Plaintiff Richard Jones was entitled to release on 12/7/15. 137. But, instead of being released or diverted to the holding facility at MHU or released from the courthouse on 12/7/15, Plaintiff Richard Jones was returned to the DC Jail’s general
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population and per official DOC policy he was subjected to a strip search and visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons even though a court had ordered his release. 138. Plaintiff Jones has suffered damages as a result. 139. A DOC Sargent described the strip-searches performed on arrestees like Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones -- what the corrections officers call the “dance” -- as follows. 140. The intake stands on a piece of green carpet in front of a long table, takes all their clothes off, and puts their clothes on the table. 141. The guards rifle the hair, pull the ears back, and then open the mouth wide and lift the corners with their hands so that the guard can see left or right in the mouth. 142. Then the intake lifts their arms in the air so the guard can see the arm pits and the backs of the arms. 143. Next the male intake lifts his genitals so the guards can see underneath and in between the legs. 144. A similar procedure is used for female intakes. 145. “At that point, they'll turn around and bend over--and spread their buttocks with their hands. Once that's done then they lift up their back feet, one, two, [the “dance”] and it's over.” 146. In fact, cells were added at MHU as part of the settlement in Bynum v. District of Columbia, 02-956 (RCL) so that court returns entitled to release after their hearings at court could be held there while the DC Jail Records Office was administratively processing their releases.
Substantive Allegations Claim 1
Pattern and Practice § 1983 Liability of District of Columbia for Overdetentions 20

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147. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 148. The District of Columbia, and its agents and employees, have had a longstanding custom and practice of detaining people past their entitlement to release, thereby causing unjustified overdetention of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other Over-detention class members. 149. Court returns entitled to release such as Mr. Jones were entitled to release within two hours of receiving their court ordered releases and all inmates were entitled to release by 10 pm on their Release Dates. 150. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving force behind the violations of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 151. The District was deliberately indifferent to their rights. 152. Named Plaintiff Mr. Jones and all other class members’ suffered thereby general damages such as loss of liberty and special damages such as emotional distress. 153. Accordingly, Mr. Jones and all other class members are entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
Claim 2 Liberty Interest § 1983 Liability of District of Columbia for Overdetentions 154. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 155. Mr. Jones also brings the Over-detention Claim pursuant to the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment because the District of Columbia statutes create a liberty interest in release by 10 pm on the Release Date per D.C. Code § 24-201.06 and D.C. Code § 24-211.02a and for an
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inmate ordered released pursuant to a court order within 5 hours of transfer from the custody of the United States Marshals Service into the custody of the Department of Corrections per D.C. Code § 24-211.02a. 156. Named Plaintiff Mr. Jones and all other class members’ suffered thereby general damages such as loss of liberty and special damages such as emotional distress. 157. The DOC routinely held persons entitled to release longer than these deadlines. 158. Holding persons past their statutorily created liberty interest deadlines violated their Fifth Amendment Rights and the District was the moving force behind the violations.
Claim 3 § 1983 Monell Liability of District for Illegal Strip Searches 159. Mr. Jones the Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 160. The DOC has an official written policy of subjecting all inmates entering the DC Jail to tes without any finding of cause. 161. The DOC applies the policy to all such persons even to court returns entitled to release. 162. The DOC’s policy as applied to court returns entitled to release was the moving force behind the violations of the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Class members’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 163. Named Plaintiff Mr. Jones and all other class members’ suffered thereby general damages such as loss of liberty and special damages such as emotional distress. 164. Accordingly, Mr. Jones and the class are entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
Claim 4 Common Law Liability of District of Columbia for False Arrest
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165. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 166. The District of Columbia, and its agents and employees, held Mr. Jones and the overdetention class members past the time they were entitled to release. 167. District’s employees were acting within the scope of their employment at all times. 168. The District is liable for the conduct of its employees in respondeat superior. 169. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, were the proximate cause of the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and all other class members’ common law rights to be free from false arrest and cause them general damages such as loss of liberty and special damages such as emotional distress. 170. Accordingly, Mr. Jones and all the other Over-detention class members are entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
Claim 5 Common Law Liability of District for Illegal Strip Searches 171. Mr. Jones the Strip Search Named Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint. 172. The conduct of the DOC employees in enforcing the District’s policy of strip-searching all persons entering the DC Jail as applied to court returns entitled to release violated their common law right to privacy. 173. The District's actions, and failure to act, as described above, were the proximate cause of the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Class members’ common law privacy rights. 174. The District’s employees were acting within the scope of their employment at all times. 175. The District is liable for the conduct of its employees in respondeat superior.
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176. Named Plaintiff and all other class members’ suffered thereby general damages such as loss of liberty and special damages such as emotional distress. 177. Accordingly, Mr. Jones and all the other Strip-search class members are entitled to damages to be determined at trial.
Class Action Allegations 178. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility from August 1, 2013 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by 10 pm on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired (or within two hours of being ordered released or otherwise becoming entitled to release if the person was a court return). 179. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff also bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each member of the class who was, or in the future will be, from August 1, 2013, forward: (i) in the custody of the Department of Corrections; (ii) taken to court from a Department of Corrections facility; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned from court to the DC Jail or CTF or other District facility, to be processed out of Department of Corrections custody; and (vii) was subjected
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to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing contraband or weapons; before being released, regardless of whether they were over-detained. The Strip-search class does not include for the same strip-search any person who meets the strip-search class definition in Lewis v. District of Columbia, 15-352 (RBW). 180. Certification of these two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate, because the District of Columbia has a pattern and practice that has uniformly affected all members of both classes, and injunctive relief against the District will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member. Although the District had agreed to stop these practices, and indeed had done so in the context of the settlement of Bynum v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 02-956 (RCL) and Barnes v. District of Columbia, 06-315 (RCL), the practices stop have not stopped based on public filings and discussions with attorneys practicing in the District courts. 181. The classes are entitled to injunctive relief on their § 1983 claims, for example, setting up an independent monitor to supervise the Department of Corrections' inmate management system to ensure that all inmates are released on or before their release dates, and other relief as specified below. 182. Regarding the Overdetained Named Plaintiff, and members of the class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been overdetained, and the answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the Department of Corrections' records. 183. Computer records and DOC over-detention reports are available for inspection on the overdetentions and the strip-searches.
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184. Regarding the Strip Search Named Plaintiff, and members of the Strip Search Class, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability, because neither the DC Jail nor CTF keeps records of the searches and therefore neither the DC Jail nor CTF can show that any of the searches were conducted based on an individual determination of reasonable suspicion. 185. Among the questions of law and fact common to the classes are:
a) whether the Constitution provides a maximum length of time measured in hours beyond which the District cannot hold a person to perform administrative tasks incident to release before releasing that person from custody after the basis for detention is over;
b) Whether DC statutes create liberty interests entitling inmates to release by 10 pm of their Release Dates or for an inmate ordered released pursuant to a court order within 5 hours of transfer from the custody of the United States Marshals Service into the custody of the Department of Corrections.
c) whether the District has exceeded that maximum for each class member;
d) whether the District has a pattern and practice of holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;
e) whether the District has a pattern and practice of being deliberately indifferent to the rights of detainees and inmates by holding them past their release dates;
f) whether the District’s acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the United States by holding detainees and inmates past their release dates;
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g) whether the District has a policy of and practice of subjecting persons to blanket strip searches and visual body cavity searches after they have become entitled to release;
h) whether such policy, if found to exist, violates the Fourth and/or Fifth Amendments. 186. Each of the Overdetention Class and the Strip Search Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of Overdetention Class and Strip Search Class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but is likely to consist of at least one hundred people, and likely substantially more than that. 187. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, as plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the overdetentions. 188. The Strip Search Named Plaintiff’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Strip Search Class, as the Strip Search Named Plaintiff and all other members of the Strip Search Class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the blanket strip searches. 189. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff and the Strip Search Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Overdetention Class and Strip Search Class and have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex federal civil rights class action litigation and/or complex federal prisoner rights litigation. 190. The Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the class or Strip Search Class.
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Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief: 1. grant a jury trial on all claims so triable; 2. award all named plaintiffs compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 3. award plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
4. grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William Claiborne WILLIAM CLAIBORNE D.C. Bar # 446579 717 D Street, NW Ste 300 Washington, DC 20006 202-824-0700 Jury Demand Plaintiffs demand a jury of six as to all claims so triable.
/s/ William Claiborne WILLIAM CLAIBORNE D.C. Bar # 446579 Counsel for the Overdetained Named Plaintiff and Strip Search Named Plaintiff and the classes
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD JONES, et al., Plaintiff,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-cv-2405 (DLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff Richard Jones asserts several claims against the District of Columbia stemming from his alleged overdetention and strip search. Before the Court is the District’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the District’s motion to dismiss. I. BACKGROUND On December 7, 2015, Jones attended a hearing at the federal courthouse and was ordered released from the custody of the Department of Corrections. First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 128, 129, 135, Dkt. 12. Following the hearing, the Marshals transferred Jones to Department of Corrections staff who then transported Jones to the D.C. Jail. Id. At the D.C. Jail, Jones allegedly told the receiving and discharge staff that he had been ordered released, but the staff could not find a release order. Id. ¶¶ 130, 131. Thus, staff subjected Jones to a strip-search and returned him to his cell in the general population. Id. ¶¶ 130, 131, 137. Jones alleges that he was held in the D.C. Jail for several hours. Id. ¶¶ 132. In the alternative, Jones alleges that he was

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held more than five hours from the moment the Marshals transferred him to the Department of Corrections transport officers at the federal courthouse. Id. ¶ 133.
Jones further alleges that the Department of Corrections “routinely” and “systematically” holds detainees past their release times. Id. ¶¶ 13, 117. In particular, Jones claims that the Department of Corrections’ practice of not releasing inmates until it obtains inmates’ paper release dispositions leads to the unconstitutional overdetention of individuals who have been ordered released. Id. ¶ 41. Jones also contends that the Department of Corrections “does not reliably” follow its own policy that requires transporting defendants who have been ordered released to D.C. General Hospital where they are not subjected to strip searches, absent individualized suspicion. Id. ¶ 37.
Jones asserts constitutional claims based on his overdetention and strip search. Additionally, he asserts common law claims for false arrest and invasion of privacy. II. LEGAL STANDARD(S)
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must treat the complaint’s “factual allegations as true and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Center for Responsible Science v. Gottlieb, 311 F. Supp. 3d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “The Court need not accept as true, however, a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (internal citation omitted). A “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
Here, Jones attempts to state several claims for municipal liability. To determine whether Jones has stated a claim, the Court must conduct a two-step inquiry: “First, the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. Second, if so, then the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). III. ANALYSIS
Jones argues that his overdetention and strip search violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.1 He also asserts common law claims for false arrest and invasion of privacy.
A. Constitutional Claims Stemming from Jones’s Overdetention Jones first argues that his overdetention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizure triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs when a person’s freedom of movement is terminated or restrained, either by physical force or a show of authority.” See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 273-74 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, Jones was already in custody when he was ordered
1 In the motion to dismiss, the District argues that Jones has failed to state a claim sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Jones clarified in his opposition that he did “not plead an Eighth Amendment over-detention claim in the First Amended Complaint.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1, n.1, Dkt. 18.
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released. In other words, Jones’s “freedom of movement had already been terminated.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And Jones did not allege or provide any factual support in his complaint suggesting that his overdetention involved a fresh seizure, which would warrant a Fourth Amendment analysis. See id. Moreover, “[m]ost courts that have considered overdetention claims have agreed that they are properly channeled through the Due Process Clause” of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2007). For these reasons, the Court will grant the District’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’s claim that his overdetention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Jones next argues that his overdetention violated his substantive due process right under the Fifth Amendment.2 The “doctrine of substantive due process constrains only egregious government misconduct” and prevents “only grave unfairness.” George Washington University v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can show grave unfairness in two ways. The plaintiff can either show that there was (i) “a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or (ii) “a deliberate flouting of the law that trammel[ed] significant personal or property rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
An overdetention of the kind that Jones alleges potentially violates “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause by infringing upon an individual’s basic liberty interest in being free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793
2 Jones asserts that he has stated “a claim for a predicate constitutional violation of his procedural due process claim.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 19, Dkt. 18. But Jones does not identify any specific procedure that he should have received, and he characterizes the District’s violation as an infringement of his “liberty interest.” That language suggests that substantive due process protections are a better fit for Jones’s Fifth Amendment claim.
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F. Supp. 2d 260, 274-75 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citation omitted). But temporarily “retaining custody over an inmate who is entitled to release in order to accomplish administrative tasks incident to that release is not per se unconstitutional.” Id. at 275 (internal citation omitted). There is no established “bright-line rule for the maximum permissible delay in the overdetention context.” Barnes, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (internal citation omitted). Nonetheless, “courts appear to agree that the maximum permissible administrative delay in the overdetention context likely falls well short of the 48-hour horizon set out” for detentions pending probable cause determinations after warrantless arrests.” Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the District asks the Court to decide that certain delays, at least those for only a few hours, are per se reasonable. “Yet it remains the case that courts have not settled on any concrete number of permissible hours of delay in the context of post-release detentions.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 117 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “the great weight of precedent suggests that release must occur within a matter of hours after the right to it accrues, and that after some period of hours – not days – a presumption of unreasonableness, and thus unconstitutionality, will set in.” Id. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court cannot say that an overdetention lasting more than five hours is per se constitutional. Jones has, therefore, stated a claim for a predicate constitutional violation.
To state a claim for municipal liability, Jones also must state a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the predicate constitutional violation. Jones’s complaint also satisfies that burden. “There are four basic categories of municipal action” that Jones “may rely on to establish municipal liability: (1) express municipal policy; (2) adoption by municipal policymakers; (3) custom or usage; and (4) deliberate indifference.” Hunter v. District of Columbia, 824 F. Supp. 2d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2011). Jones identifies a practice or custom that
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led to his overdetention: he argues that the “cause of the over-detentions and illegal post release strip searches of court returns entitled to release was and remains the District of Columbia’s maintaining a release system in the” Department of Corrections that “delays all releases.” Compl. ¶ 14, Dkt. 12. Specifically, Jones alleges that the Department of Corrections “runs a paper system for tracking cases and releases and misplaces jackets, misfiles orders, and runs the system manually. The inefficient implementation of the District’s release procedures is the result of official acquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard” operating procedure of the District. Id. ¶ 19.
In short, Jones has stated a claim that the District’s release-processing system delays the release of individuals and leads to overdetention. Accordingly, the Court denies the District’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’s claim that his overdetention violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
B. Constitutional Claims Stemming from Jones’s Strip Search Next, Jones argues that the strip search conducted before Jones was returned to his cell violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. According to Jones, strip searching an inmate who has been ordered released before returning that inmate to the general population violates the Fourth Amendment unless the corrections officials have individualized, reasonable suspicion to search the inmate. That argument is belied by D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court established a balancing test for courts to use when evaluating the reasonableness of inmate searches: Courts must balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). “Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. The D.C.
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Circuit has concluded that “nothing in Bell requires individualized, reasonable suspicion before strip searching a person entering a detention facility.” Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that “correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities.” Florence v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 328 (2012). The Supreme Court has even recognized the importance of allowing across-the-board searches because “deterring the possession of contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without predictable exceptions.” Id. at 327-28. The Supreme Court concluded that prison officials have “a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate . . . from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted to the general population.” Id. at 333-34.
Here, the District does not argue that it had individualized, reasonable suspicion to search Jones. Instead, the District argues that whenever a prisoner enters “the general population from the outside” prison officials need to conduct a search to bar “potential contraband from entry into the prison population.” Def’s Mot. at 16, Dkt. 17. The Supreme Court recognized that rationale as legitimate: prison officials have “a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate . . . from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted to the general population.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 333-34. Prison officials do not need individualized reasonable suspicion to conduct a routine search before placing an inmate into the prison population.
Joints argues that this Court should follow the approach adopted in Barnes v. District of Columbia. In Barnes, the plaintiffs also challenged the strip search policy of the District. There, the district court denied the District’s motion to dismiss. See 242 F.R.D. 113 (D.D.C. 2007).
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Later, the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because “the utter lack of a reasonable justification for the blanket strip searches of court returns” mandated a finding that the “blanket strip search policy, as applied to court returns entitled to release, is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But here, the District has offered a justification for the search by arguing that strip searches of individuals who are going to join the prison population are necessary to bar contraband from entry into the prison. More importantly, Barnes was decided before the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit clarified the standards that govern inmate searches. See Florence, 566 U.S. 318; Bame, 637 F.3d 380. Those later cases make clear that prison officials generally do not need individualized, reasonable suspicion to search individuals before they join the prison population.
Moreover, even if Jones were correct that the strip search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Jones has not alleged that a custom or policy of the District caused the strip search. In fact, Jones alleges that the District’s official policy is to divert defendants that have been ordered released “to a holding facility on the grounds of DC General Hospital . . . where they would not be subject to a strip search, absent individualized suspicion.” Compl. ¶ 35, Dkt. 12. Jones, therefore, has not alleged that an express policy or a custom or practice led to his strip search. Thus, the Court grants the District’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’s claim that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Jones’s Fifth Amendment claim also fails: “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of governmental behavior, that Amendment, not the generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The Fourth
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Amendment is the explicit textual source of constitutional protection against unreasonable searches. Therefore, the Court grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss as to the plaintiff’s claim that the strip search violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
C. Common Law Claims Finally, Jones argues that his overdetention and strip search violated the common law torts of false arrest and invasion of privacy. First, Jones argues that his overdetention constituted false arrest or false imprisonment.3 “The gist of any complaint for false arrest or false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.” Dingle v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2008). “In order to support a viable claim of false arrest, a plaintiff must allege that he was unlawfully detained.” Dingle, 571 F. Supp. at 95. The common law “cause of action for false arrest is essentially identical to a cause of action for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.” Maldonado v. District of Columbia, 924 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.6 (D.D.C. 2013). Therefore, the Court analyzes Jones’s common law claim in much the same way as it analyzes Jones’s Fourth Amendment claim. Jones’s Complaint does not contain allegations that he was newly arrested after the court ordered Jones’s release. Therefore, the Court grants the District’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’s claim for false imprisonment or false arrest. Second, Jones argues that his strip search violated his “common law right to privacy.” Compl. ¶ 172, Dkt. 12. An invasion of privacy cause of action may be based on the intrusion upon one’s physical solitude or seclusion.” Harris v. Department of Justice, 600 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135 (D.D.C. 2009). “The tort of intrusion upon seclusion has three elements: (1) an invasion or interference by physical intrusion, by use of a defendant’s sense of sight or hearing,
3 “There is no real difference as a practical matter between false arrest and false imprisonment.” Barnhardt v. District of Columbia, 723 F. Supp. 2d 197, 214 (D.D.C. 2010).
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or by use of some other form of investigation or examination; (2) into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself; or into his private or secret concerns; (3) that would be highly offensive to an ordinary, reasonable person.” Helton v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed above, it is not unreasonable for the District to conduct strip searches of individuals before they enter the general prison population. Jones did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy upon his reentry to the general population at the D.C. Jail and thus has not satisfied the third element of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The Court grants the District’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’s common law claim for invasion of privacy.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies in part and grants in part the District’s motion
to dismiss. Specifically, Counts 3, 4, and 5 are dismissed for failure to state a claim. Counts 1 and 2 survive insofar as they allege that the District violated Jones’s rights under the Fifth Amendment by continuing to detain Jones after a court ordered Jones’s release. Jones’s claim that the District violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by overdetaining him is dismissed. Jones’s Motion for Leave to File supplemental authorities is denied as moot. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: August 22, 2018

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD JONES, Plaintiff,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

No. 16-cv-2405 (DLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Richard Jones brought this action against the District of Columbia alleging that he was detained and strip searched in D.C. Jail after a federal judge ordered him released from custody. This Court previously granted in part the District’s Motion to Dismiss and, as relevant here, dismissed Jones’s Fourth Amendment and common law claims. Mem. Op. at 9, Dkt. 26. Before the Court is Jones’s motion to reconsider and restore those claims.1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion. I. BACKGROUND On December 7, 2015, a federal judge sentenced Jones to time served and ordered that he be released from the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 128, 129,

1 Jones’s initial motion was limited to the dismissal of his common law claims, but the motion included arguments that implicitly challenged the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claims as well. See Jan. 10, 2019 Minute Order (citing Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 8–9, Dkt. 27). The Court ordered supplemental briefing on those claims and held a hearing at which Jones made clear that he seeks reconsideration of both his common law and Fourth Amendment claims. See Apr. 3, 2019 Hr’g Tr. at 1–2.

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135, Dkt. 12; see also United States v. Jones, No. 11-cr-79, Dkt. 39 at 3.2 Jones was then transferred to D.C. Jail, where he told the receiving and discharge staff that he had been ordered released. Am. Compl. ¶ 130. Unconvinced, the staff strip searched him and returned him to a cell in the jail’s general population. Id. ¶¶ 130–31. Jones was then held for “several hours” before he was eventually released. Id. ¶ 132.
According to Jones, his experience was not unique. DOC “routinely” and “systematically” holds detainees past their release times, id. ¶¶ 13, 117, because it relies on a system of paper release orders that are often misplaced or delayed in transit between the courthouse and the jail, id. ¶ 41. Further, while DOC’s official policy is to transport inmates who have been ordered released to a nearby medical facility for processing, it frequently fails to follow that policy and instead transfers these inmates back to the general population, where they are strip searched upon arrival. See id. ¶¶ 35–38, 160–63.
Jones filed this civil action challenging his over-detention and strip search, Dkt. 1, and the District moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Dkt. 17. This Court previously granted the District’s motion in part and, as relevant here, dismissed Jones’s (1) Fourth Amendment challenge to his detention, (2) Fourth Amendment challenge to his strip search, (3) common law false imprisonment claim, and (4) common law intrusion upon seclusion claim. Mem. Op. at 3– 10.
Jones now asks the Court to reconsider and restore all four claims. II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “allows a litigant to move for reconsideration or modification of a district court’s interlocutory order disposing of ‘fewer than
2 The facts here are recited as alleged in the plaintiff’s amended complaint.
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all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties’ ‘at any time’ before the court’s entry of final judgment.” Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). A district court may reconsider an interlocutory order “as justice requires.” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, courts will reconsider a prior opinion when they have “patently misunderstood a party, [when they have] made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the law or facts has occurred since the submission of the issue to the Court.” Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 12, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2017) (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden is on the moving party to show that reconsideration is appropriate and that harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were denied.” United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012). III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fourth Amendment Over-Detention Claim The Court previously dismissed Jones’s Fourth Amendment over-detention claim because he did not allege a “fresh seizure” after he was ordered released from custody. Jones now argues that the Court clearly erred in two respects. First, he contends that the Court overlooked that a seizure that is reasonable at the outset can become unreasonable through the passage of time, making a fresh seizure unnecessary for Fourth Amendment purposes. Pl.’s Supp. Br. at 2–6, Dkt. 35. In the alternative, he argues that he did allege a fresh seizure, either when DOC took him back into custody after a court ordered him released or when DOC placed him back in the jail’s general population. Id. at 4–5. The
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Court disagrees with Jones’s first argument but agrees with his second and will restore his Fourth Amendment claim on that basis.
Jones is correct that, to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny, a seizure must not only be reasonable in the first instance but must also remain reasonable over time and in light of new facts and circumstances. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (“[A] seizure reasonable at its inception because based upon probable cause may become unreasonable as a result of its duration or for other reasons.”). Courts have held, for example, that a vehicle seized for evidentiary purposes cannot continue to be held for months after it has been searched and emptied of all relevant evidence. See Avila v. Dailey, 246 F. Supp. 3d 347, 355 (D.D.C. 2017). Similarly, property reasonably seized under the community caretaking exception cannot remain impounded long after the “exigency that justified the seizure [has] vanished.” Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017).
But this line of cases does not assist Jones because the Supreme Court has recognized a “constitutional division of labor” between the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 n.8 (2017). The former governs pretrial detentions, while the latter takes over as soon as the jury has returned a verdict (or the judge has accepted a guilty plea). Id. In the Court’s words, “once a trial [or guilty plea] has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out,” and the plaintiff must challenge “any ensuing incarceration . . . under the Due Process Clause.” Id. Jones’s guilty plea therefore serves as an intervening event that prevents him from challenging his continued post-conviction confinement under the Fourth Amendment.
Deciding this much, however, only leads to Jones’s second argument: that the Court incorrectly assumed that he had not alleged a second seizure, when he had. On this point, the
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Court agrees with Jones and confesses error. Any confinement that Jones experienced as punishment for his underlying conviction ended the moment he was sentenced to time served and ordered released. And DOC’s subsequent decision to take him back into custody (either in the courtroom or upon his return to D.C. Jail) constituted an actual or constructive re-seizure of his person that required an independent justification. See, e.g., Shultz v. Dart, No. 13 C 3641, 2013 WL 5873325, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2013) (collecting cases holding that a plaintiff who has been “sentenced to time served and told by the judge that he [i]s free to leave” becomes “a free person protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
Although the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have yet to resolve whether a brief period of confinement following a sentence of time served (or acquittal) qualifies as a distinct Fourth Amendment “seizure,” that conclusion follows from the distinction the Supreme Court has elsewhere drawn between punitive and regulatory confinement. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–48 (1987). In assessing which constitutional standards apply to a given confinement, courts look to its nature and purpose. Id. If the confinement serves penological interests, courts require a criminal conviction—with all the procedural and evidentiary safeguards that entails. But if the confinement serves purely regulatory interests, such as community safety, courts balance those interests against the individual’s weighty liberty interest without regard for the specific protections that accompany a criminal trial. See id. at 748–51.
This conceptual distinction between punitive and regulatory confinement sheds light on what happened to Jones in this case. A judge sentenced him to “time served” (past tense) and, in doing so, declared an end to any punitive confinement. But, moments later, a new period of regulatory confinement began. The District does not attempt to characterize this confinement as an extension of Jones’s sentence, which had unquestionably run. Nor does it point to any
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punitive reason—such as retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence—for Jones’s continued confinement. Instead, it points to purely “administrative,” or regulatory, reasons: namely, the need to check for other detention orders and outstanding warrants. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 9, Dkt. 17-1. The different character and purpose of this second period of detention demonstrates that it cannot be viewed as a mere extension of the same detention that began months before with Jones’s initial arrest. Because it took on an entirely different character, it was (or became) a distinct “seizure” that must be justified on its own terms.3
That is not to say that the District necessarily lacks such a justification. As Jones acknowledges, defendants who are released in one matter will often be subject to detention on other court matters, or subject to arrest on outstanding warrants. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 62–64. This far-from-remote possibility distinguishes former inmates from the general public and may well justify at least some brief period of additional custody for administrative processing. See Brass v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . permit[s] a reasonable postponement’ of a prisoner’s release ‘while the County copes with the everyday problem of processing’ the release of the large number of prisoners who pass through its incarceration system” (quoting Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55 (1991)); Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (similar). At this stage, however, the Court is in no position to evaluate the reasons the District might offer for holding Jones for processing. Nor can the Court decide, as a matter of law, where (or for how long) the
3 This conclusion honors the “constitutional division of labor” between the Fourth Amendment and due process discussed above. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8. The Due Process Clauses provide the exclusive standard for detention imposed as punishment for a criminal conviction because those Clauses, rather than the Fourth Amendment, govern the procedures and standards for obtaining such a conviction. But when detention is justified without regard for any criminal conviction, then the general prohibition on unreasonable seizures retains its force.
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District may have held Jones for processing without violating his Fourth Amendment rights. See Lewis, 853 F.2d at 1370 (“Reasonable time must be allowed for such matters as transportation, identity verification, and processing,” and “[w]hat is a reasonable time for detaining a prisoner in custody is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case.”); Arline v. City of Jacksonville, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (jury question whether a two-and-a-half hour detention following the plaintiff’s acquittal on all charges violated the Fourth Amendment); Shultz, 2013 WL 5873325, at *5 (denying motion to dismiss where the reasons for and circumstances surrounding alleged over-detentions remained unclear and subject to dispute).
In short, the Court holds that Jones’s guilty plea forecloses any Fourth Amendment challenge to his continued confinement. However, Jones has adequately alleged that he was seized for a second time by DOC after he was ordered released. Because this Court’s prior decision to the contrary was premised on a misapprehension of Jones’s legal theory, it will restore his Fourth Amendment over-detention claim.4
B. Fourth Amendment Strip Search The Court will also restore Jones’s Fourth Amendment challenge to his strip search in D.C. Jail. In assessing that claim, the Court took the District’s decision to return him to D.C. Jail’s general population as a given and evaluated his strip search in the context of his re-entry
4 The parties have not briefed whether the standards for liability will differ under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The Court does not resolve that question today but notes the possibility that Jones’s two constitutional claims for over-detention may ultimately merge as a practical matter. Cf. Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that “the distinction between . . . search and seizure, and due process” would “[p]robably not” “make any practical difference” in a related context because both provisions require the court to compare “the benefits of confinement to the government” with “the costs to the person confined”).
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into the general population. But, in doing so, the Court overlooked Jones’s argument that the decision to place Jones into the general population was itself an error that lacked any reasonable justification.
As the court in Barnes explained, the security and contraband concerns that justify stripsearching all “persons who are legitimately introduced into the general jail population” do not necessarily extend to prisoners like Jones who are “entitled to release.” 793 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (emphasis added). That is because the latter class of prisoners “are subjected to strip searches solely due to the fact that the DOC has made the unfortunate choice to bring them back into the general inmate population . . ., rather than temporarily housing them apart from that population.” Id. At least in the District of Columbia, “[t]hat choice” ignores other, existing “alternatives” for temporarily housing court returns and “creates the security problem that the . . . strip searches are designed to solve.” Id.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Florence does not require a different conclusion. To be sure, the Court held that prisoners who are properly introduced to a jail’s general population may be subjected to a blanket strip-search policy upon entry. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 328, 338 (2012). But the Florence Court expressly reserved whether those same search procedures could be constitutionally applied to arrestees “who can be held in available facilities removed from the general population.” Id. at 339 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Court’s holding is limited to circumstances in which there is “no alternative” to “holding [the plaintiff] in the general jail population”); id. at 341–42 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
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“admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible”).
In this case, Jones has alleged that the District had in place a readily available alternative to holding him in the general jail population. In fact, DOC’s own stated policy is to “divert[] incustody defendants ordered released” to “a holding facility on the grounds of DC General Hospital” where they can be processed without being subjected to a strip search. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Without discovery, Jones cannot know for sure why he was sent back to the general population instead of the hospital, but he alleges upon information and belief that his strip search was one of many caused by “recurring problems” with D.C. Jail’s computer system, and by DOC’s decision to maintain a system of paper records that often get misplaced during transport to and from court hearings. Id. ¶ 38; see also generally ¶¶ 39–104 (describing in detail the problems with DOC’s system for handling court returns). Under these circumstances, “the DOC’s invasion of [Jones’s] personal rights is balanced against nothing, because the DOC’s blanket strip searches of court returns entitled to release are needless” and inflicted on “persons who are no longer prisoners in the eyes of the law.” Barnes, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
One additional wrinkle remains. The Court previously treated Jones’s re-entry and strip search as an aberration that did not reflect a practice or policy of the District and therefore could not establish municipal liability. But although DOC’s official policy may be to divert court returns entitled to release to the hospital for processing, the complaint alleges that DOC’s other official policies and practices have prevented it from doing so in a consistent fashion. At this stage, assuming the truth of Jones’s allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations in his favor, the Court cannot conclude that the District’s stated policy reflected its actual policy and practice. Accordingly, Jones has stated a Fourth Amendment claim for an
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unreasonable strip search and has adequately alleged a basis for municipal liability against the District. The Court finds that justice requires Jones’s Fourth Amendment claim to be restored.5
C. False Imprisonment Jones next argues that the Court misapprehended his first common law claim by analyzing it as a claim for false arrest, as opposed to a failure to release. He also points to a decision issued after the parties had fully briefed the motion to dismiss in which another Judge in this District granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on a similar false imprisonment claim. See Smith v. District of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 223, 260–61 (D.D.C. 2018). The Court agrees that Smith sheds light on the issues raised here and that justice requires the Court to reconsider its prior order. The Court begins by clarifying the distinction between a common law false arrest claim and a common law false imprisonment claim. Although the two are often practically “indistinguishable,” Enders v. District of Columbia, 4 A.3d 457, 461 (D.C. 2010), they differ in scope. False imprisonment is an umbrella category that includes false arrest. See 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment § 3 (2019) (footnote omitted). Specifically, “[f]alse arrest is a term that describes the setting for false imprisonment when it is committed by an officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest.” Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 41 (2d ed. 2019). It follows that false arrest is not the only way to commit false imprisonment. Indeed, the Second Restatement of Torts provides a list of the many ways that a
5 Jones also challenged his strip search under the doctrine of substantive due process. The Court previously dismissed that claim because the Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against the kind of search Jones challenges, making “the generalized notion of substantive due process” inapplicable. Mem. Op. at 8 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)). Jones does not appear to seek reconsideration of that decision, but to the extent he does, his request is denied.
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defendant can commit false imprisonment, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 38–41 (1965), and the D.C. Court of Appeals has looked to that list to evaluate questions of unlawful confinement, see Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147, 151 n.11 (D.C. 1979).
One way to commit false imprisonment is through a “refusal to release.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45 (capitalization omitted). “If the actor is under a duty to release the other from confinement . . . his refusal to do so with the intention of confining the other is a sufficient act of confinement to make him subject to liability” for false imprisonment. Id. The Second Restatement provides the following illustration: “A is confined in jail under a sentence for a term. At the end of the term B, the jailor, is under a legal duty to release A, but refuses to do so. B is subject to liability to A.” Id. cmt. a, illus. 1.
That the labels “false arrest” and “false imprisonment” can be used to refer to the same act of confinement explains the frequent, but imprecise, observation that “[t]here is no real difference as a practical matter between false arrest and false imprisonment.” Barnhardt v. District of Columbia, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 197, 214 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). That observation holds true where the claim concerns only the illegality of the plaintiff’s initial confinement. See, e.g., Enders, 4 A.3d at 466; Maldonado v. District of Columbia, 924 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.6 (D.D.C. 2013). But it does not apply where, as here, the defendant refuses to release the plaintiff from confinement that began lawfully but has become unlawful over time. See Dent v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 459 A.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C. 1982) (“[A] detention which is unreasonable in length or manner could constitute a false imprisonment despite the legality of the initial confinement.”); cf. Abourezk v. New York Airline, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 656, 664 (D.D.C. 1989) (the refusal to release a plaintiff from confinement upon request
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can establish false imprisonment even if the plaintiff consented to the initial confinement), aff’d, 895 F.2d 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The distinction between false arrest and false imprisonment leads to a related distinction between a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim and a common law false imprisonment claim. In its previous opinion, the Court concluded that Jones’s common law claim was coextensive with his Fourth Amendment claim, and it dismissed both claims because Jones failed to allege a “fresh seizure.” See Mem. Op. at 9. In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court overlooked that the cases equating Fourth Amendment and false imprisonment claims invariably involve the false arrest species of false imprisonment—not a failure to release. See, e.g., Maldonado, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 330 n.6 (false imprisonment claim premised on police officers’ warrantless arrest); Barnhardt, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (same). By contrast, where false imprisonment arises from over-detention, courts do not apply Fourth Amendment principles or require a new seizure or arrest. See Smith, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 260–61 (concluding that holding a prisoner in D.C. Jail beyond his court-ordered release time constituted false imprisonment without analyzing whether a fresh seizure occurred); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1968) (collecting cases and observing that “the breadth of a peace officer’s privilege in an arrest situation is not necessarily the test of the breadth of a jailer’s privilege in the context of a false imprisonment” and concluding that “the jailer is liable for false imprisonment” if “a prisoner is held in jail without a court order”).
Without an additional “seizure” requirement imported from the Fourth Amendment, Jones’s claim requires only: “(1) the detention or restraint of one against his will, within boundaries fixed by the defendant, and (2) the unlawfulness of the restraint.” Faniel, 404 A.2d at 150. “Confinement, no matter how brief, suffices to establish a prima facie case of false
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arrest,” Marshall v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1381 (D.C. 1978), and a “showing of detention without process raises a presumption of unlawful restraint and shifts to defendant the burden of justifying the restraint as lawful,” id. at 1380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under this standard, Jones has stated a false imprisonment claim. Jones alleges that he was restrained when he was taken to D.C. jail after a judge ordered his release. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 128–29. He further alleges that this detention violated DOC policy and a settlement agreement that required the District to either make releases from courthouses or to take prisoners ordered released to a holding facility at D.C. General Hospital while they await processing. Id. ¶¶ 67–74, 129. The District did not raise any affirmative defenses in its Motion to Dismiss, and Jones was not required to plead the absence of potential affirmative defenses. See Flying Food Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
This conclusion follows directly from Smith, which was decided after the completion of briefing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss and which the Court considers persuasive. The District does not dispute that Smith was correctly decided. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5–6. Instead, it tries to distinguish Smith. Id. Its efforts are unpersuasive.
First, the District argues that Smith involved a false imprisonment claim, whereas the complaint here alleges only a false arrest claim. Id. at 5. To support that interpretation of Jones’s complaint, the District relies on the fact that Jones labeled his claim “False Arrest” in the heading of count 4. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4 (citing Am. Compl. at 22). Elsewhere, however, the complaint describes the same count as a “common law over-detention (false imprisonment) . . . claim[].” Id. ¶ 5. And, regardless, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam). The allegations in the complaint—
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including those specific to count 4—clearly advance a false imprisonment claim premised on over-detention, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 26, 130–32, 166, and no more is required.
The District next argues that Smith is distinguishable because it involved a longer period of detention—twenty-three days compared to a few hours here. Def.’s Opp’n at 5. But the length of detention, while potentially relevant to damages and affirmative defenses, has no bearing on Jones’s prima facie case. See Marshall, 391 A.2d at 1381 (“Confinement, no matter how brief, suffices to establish a prima facie case of false arrest.”).
Lastly, the District argues that, unlike the detention in Smith, Jones’s detention was lawful because he was “sent directly back to D.C. Jail while his arrest was processed.” Id. at 6. This argument simply ignores Jones’s allegations—which this Court must take as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage—that his over-detention violated a federal court order, DOC policy, an existing settlement agreement, and the D.C. Code. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 26–29, 37, 72, 129, 166. At a minimum, Jones has alleged continued confinement without process, and the burden now shifts to the District to justify that confinement as lawful. See Marshall, 391 A.2d at 1380.
Given the Court’s error in analyzing Jones’s claim exclusively under Fourth Amendment principles of false arrest, as well as the existence of new and persuasive authority, the Court concludes that justice requires the restoration of Jones’s common-law false imprisonment claim.6
D. Intrusion upon Seclusion Finally, Jones argues that the Court clearly erred in dismissing his common law privacy claim. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 9. The Court agrees.
6 The Court has also now held that Jones did allege a fresh seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That holding provides another, independent basis for restoring Jones’s common law false imprisonment claim, though it is not necessary to the Court’s decision.
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“The tort of intrusion upon seclusion has three elements: (1) an invasion or interference by physical intrusion, by use of a defendant’s sense of sight or hearing, or by use of some other form of investigation or examination; (2) into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself; or into his private or secret concerns; (3) that would be highly offensive to an ordinary, reasonable person.” Helton v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court previously concluded that Jones failed to establish the third element because a strip search would not be viewed as unreasonable in the context of Jones’s re-entry into the general population. Mem. Op. at 10. In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court assumed that Jones’s strip search was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment—a position it has now disavowed. In addition, the Court underestimated the extent to which the District of Columbia might provide common law privacy protections that go beyond the minimum requirements of the Constitution. See Helton, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion based on strip searches conducted by the U.S. Marshals Service and rejecting the District’s contention “that District of Columbia law limits the availability of invasion of privacy to the bounds recognized by the United States Constitution”). For these reasons, justice requires that the Court restore Jones’s common law privacy claim.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Counts 1 and 3 are restored to the extent they assert claims under the Fourth Amendment, and counts 4 and 5 are restored in full.
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Date: June 13, 2019

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge

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 Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 45 Filed 10/16/19 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD JONES, Plaintiff,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-2405 (DLF)

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The Parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff’s claims in the above-captioned

action against defendant the District of Columbia have been resolved and are

dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

Dated: October 16, 2019.

STIPULATED BY:

/s/ William Claiborne WILLIAM CLAIBORNE (446579) CLAIBORNELAW 717 D Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 824-0700 claibornelaw@gmail.com
Counsel for Plaintiff

KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia
TONI MICHELLE JACKSON Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Division
/s/ Fernando Amarillas FERNANDO AMARILLAS (974858) Chief, Equity Section

/s/ Michael A. Tilghman II MICHAEL A. TILGHMAN II (988441)

Case 1:16-cv-02405-DLF Document 45 Filed 10/16/19 Page 2 of 2
SCOTT P. KENNEDY
BRENDAN HEATH [1619960] Assistant Attorneys General 441 4th Street, N.W., Suite 600 South Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 727-6247 (202) 741-8776 (fax) michael.tilghman@dc.gov Counsel for Defendant
 Admitted to practice only in the State of Washington. Practicing in the District of Columbia under the direct supervision of Fernando Amarillas, a member of the D.C. Bar. See LCvR 83.2(f).
2