IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

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CINDY RODRIGUEZ, STEVEN GIBBS, )

PAULA PULLUM, YOLANDA CARNEY, )

JACQUELINE BRINKLEY, CURTIS )

JOHNSON, FRED ROBINSON,

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On behalf of themselves and all others

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similarly situated,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY

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CORRECTIONS, INC.,

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RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )

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JASMINE JACKSON, BRIANA

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WOODLEE, AMANDA ROBERTS,

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TIARA SMITH, KELLY HALEY,

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AMANDA SCHEXNAYDER, KAYLA )

BANKS, KELLY MCCALL, NISHA HYDE)

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Defendants.

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___________________________________ )

Case No.
(Complaint--Class Action) JURY DEMAND

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

This lawsuit is about constitutional violations and corruption in the Rutherford County

probation supervision system. The Plaintiffs in this case are all people living in poverty who are

victims of an extortion scheme in which the Defendants have conspired to extract as much

money as possible from misdemeanor probationers through a pattern of illegal and shocking

behavior. The crux of this scheme is a conspiracy to funnel misdemeanor probation cases in

which court debts are owed to a private company, which then extorts money out of individuals

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who have no ability to pay court costs, let alone private fees. The private company, whose goal
is to maximize its own profits, acts as a “probation officer” to collect those debts—as well as to
assess and collect its own additional and substantial fees and surcharges—through repeated and
continuous threats to arrest, revoke, and imprison individuals who are indigent and disabled if
they do not pay.
As a result of this extortion enterprise, the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have
lost their housing, lost jobs, lost cars, undergone humiliating physical intrusions on their bodies,
suffered severe medical injuries, sold their own blood plasma, sacrificed food and clothing for
their vulnerable children, and/or diverted their low-income disability checks—all in order to pay
private “supervision fees.” They have languished year after year on recurring terms of “user
funded probation” under constant threats to their physical well-being, and they have been
repeatedly jailed because of their poverty. This cycle of ever-increasing debts, threats, and
imprisonment has left the Plaintiffs and thousands of people like them in Rutherford County trapped in a culture of fear and panic.1
This civil rights action is brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), the United States Constitution, and Tennessee law to stop the
Defendants from continuing to operate a racketeering enterprise that is extorting money from
1 Poverty is widespread in Rutherford County. The United States Census Bureau reports that more than one in eight people in Rutherford County (13% of the population) lives below the federal poverty rate, which amounts to surviving on $981 per month or less. According to the Economic Policy Institute, however, one adult with no children needs $2,300 per month for a “secure yet modest” standard of living in Rutherford County. Though many people work full-time and are still struggling to subsist below the federal poverty line, many more people are living in extreme poverty: national statistics show that over 1.5 million families get by on less than $2 a day. Moreover, roughly 3,500 individuals in Rutherford County receive Social Security income for blindness or other disabilities. In Murfreesboro, about one in every five poor adult men is disabled. And yet, impoverished people represent the vast majority of people who owe debts to PCC, Inc. The burden of court debts increases recidivism, blocks productive reentry, devastates families who have to make hard choices about debt payments or food, inhibits mental health care, and makes it harder for people to obtain housing and employment. It is from those among us who are least able to pay that PCC, Inc. profits through jailing and threats of jailing for nonpayment.
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some of the most impoverished people in Rutherford County under constant threat of jail and to prevent the Defendants from misusing the probation supervision process for profit.
The treatment of named Plaintiffs Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, Fred Robinson, and each of the other Plaintiff Class members reveals systemic illegality perpetrated as a matter of ongoing design, policy, and practice by Rutherford County and Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (“PCC, Inc.”), the private company with whom the County has conspired.
By and through their attorneys and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs seek in this civil rights action the vindication of their fundamental rights, compensation for the violations that they suffered, punitive damages to punish the Defendants and to deter similar misconduct in the future, and injunctive relief assuring that their rights will not be violated again. In the year 2015, these practices have no place in our society.
Nature of the Action2 1. Rutherford County and PCC, Inc. entered into a contractual agreement, see Exhibit 1 (“The Contract”), to hand control of the misdemeanor probation system of Rutherford County to the private, for-profit company. Pursuant to the specific terms of the Contract, PCC, Inc. must earn its profit solely and directly from the people that it supervises by operating a “user funded” model in which probationers are ordered to pay, under threat of arrest and revocation of their probation, a variety of fees and surcharges to PCC, Inc., as well as their court costs. According to the agreement, the County will pay PCC, Inc. nothing, and PCC, Inc. will make no profit unless it is able to get money from the people that it supervises. Id. at 1.
2 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters.
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2. This agreement gives birth to a creature previously unknown in American law: a supposedly neutral “probation officer” who has a direct financial stake in every decision and outcome in any individual’s probation case. This specific contractual arrangement violates the basic notions of due process, neutrality, and fairness as those concepts have been understood throughout American legal history.
3. Misdemeanor and traffic probationers are repeatedly threatened that failure to pay PCC, Inc. will result in PCC, Inc.’s “violating” them, which they are told will result in a warrant for their arrest and probation revocation proceedings at which they will be jailed and then placed on another extended period of payment-based probation, during which they will accrue more fees. The contractual arrangement provides that PCC, Inc. will act as the main witness at those proceedings and that PCC, Inc. will advise the County on dispositions and extensions. In most instances, this additional period is 11 months and 29 days, which the Defendants call “11/29.” PCC, Inc. has instituted debt-collection and revocation practices as a private probation company that would be abhorrent if perpetrated by any public probation officer.
4. PCC, Inc. is given the discretion to pay itself first from the money that it extorts, allowing PCC, Inc. routinely to revoke, arrest, jail, and petition for the extension of probation of Rutherford County residents who have already paid enough money to cover the entirety of their original court debts.
5. These proceedings are initiated and conducted without any inquiry into a probationer’s ability to pay—even though the vast majority of PCC, Inc. probationers are indigent—and they result in the imposition of further costs, fees, and surcharges, thus trapping probationers in a cycle of debts, arrest, extended supervision, jail, and more debts.
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6. PCC, Inc. and the County have conspired to make good on these threats by jailing probationers who do not pay in order to create an environment of desperation that has made each of them millions of dollars every year from this illegal scheme.
7. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief for themselves and all others similarly situated.
Jurisdiction and Venue 8. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action asserted in this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims form part of the same case or controversy as the federal law claims. 9. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 10. Plaintiff Cindy Rodriguez is a 51-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Steven Gibbs is a 61-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Paula Pullum is a 48-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Yolanda Carney is a 44-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Jacqueline Brinkley is a 31-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Curtis Johnson is a 56-year-old resident of Rutherford County. Plaintiff Fred Robinson is a 30-year-old resident of Rutherford County. 11. Defendant Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (PCC, Inc.) is a corporation formed in Delaware and registered to do business in Tennessee. PCC, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Providence Service Corporation, a publicly traded multinational company
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incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in Tucson, Arizona, and operating a variety of services in different industries in 44 states and the District of Columbia. PCC, Inc. profits by charging its supervisees for “probation supervision” and other related “services” in Rutherford County pursuant to a Contract with Rutherford County—which was signed by the Mayor of Rutherford County—granting PCC, Inc. an exclusive monopoly controlling misdemeanor probation services in the County. See Exhibit 1 at 5-8. The Contract provides that PCC, Inc. will not charge Rutherford County for its services but will instead make its profit by charging additional fees to its probationers. Id. at 1, 8. The Contract purports to require Rutherford County and its court to ensure the full and total collection of PCC, Inc.’s profits. Id. at 7, 11.
12. Defendant Rutherford County is a municipal government entity organized under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Its officials are responsible for operating the County jail, prosecuting criminal and traffic offenses, providing for a lawful probation supervision system, and supplying adequate indigent defense services.
13. Defendants Jasmine Jackson, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Kelly Haley, Amanda Schexnayder, Kayla Banks, Nisha Hyde, and Kelly McCall are “probation officers” employed by PCC, Inc. at its main Rutherford County office in downtown Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Each of them supervised one or more of the named Plaintiffs and made oral or written threats to the named Plaintiffs to “violate” their probation and to jail them if they did not pay enough money to PCC, Inc. Each of them used their discretion as “probation officers” to apply PCC, Inc. policies and practices in order to determine how much money was owed, how much money was taken by PCC, Inc., how frequently to subject the named Plaintiffs to profitable drug tests, when to report, when to “violate” them, what disposition to recommend, and every other discretionary probationary decision discussed in this Complaint. Together with
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PCC, Inc., these individual defendants will occasionally be referred to as the “Private Probation Defendants.”
Factual Background A. The Private Probation Scheme in Rutherford County 14. The treatment of the Plaintiffs was caused by and is representative of the policies and practices employed by the County and PCC, Inc. to collect debts from the fines, costs, fees, and surcharges that they arrange and assess after the completion of a misdemeanor or traffic case. 15. The experiences of the named Plaintiffs have been corroborated through written policy documents and interviews with approximately 100 other witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and current and former probationers who have been subjected to PCC, Inc.’s threats and extortion scheme. Many of the current and former probationers break down crying when they recount the basic necessities of life that they and their families have had to forego under threat of having their probation revoked and being arrested by PCC, Inc. for not being able to pay what PCC, Inc. probation officers demanded. When they are jailed for probation violations at the request of PCC, Inc., they are forced to endure deplorable conditions and physical and verbal abuse at the County jail.
1. How People Are Assigned To PCC, Inc. 16. When a person is convicted of a traffic or misdemeanor offense in Rutherford County, the County assesses fines and court costs without regard to a person’s ability to pay. Those amounts become part of a judgment that Tennessee law provides can be collected in the same manner as any other civil judgment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a).
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17. The County has an incentive to maximize the collection of these costs because the money collected funds the County budget.
18. As a matter of policy and practice for most offenses, those who can afford to pay in full are generally placed on unsupervised probation. Those people are not required to report to PCC, Inc., pay additional fees, or suffer additional restraints on their liberty. Those who cannot afford to pay in full are placed on supervised probation and assigned to PCC, Inc. as their “probation officer.”3
19. PCC, Inc. employees, referred to as “probation officers,” sit in the courtroom next to the judges and engage in private ex parte conversations with judges and County prosecutors concerning probationers (including discussing recommendations and evidence).
20. All probationers assigned to PCC, Inc. as their “probation officer” are told that they are required to pay a number of additional fees and surcharges. Every probationer is required to pay $45 per month to PCC, Inc. for as long as they are on probation. PCC, Inc. also charges probationers approximately $20 for every drug test that PCC, Inc. probation officers decide in their discretion to administer. PCC, Inc. makes a profit off of each drug test that it chooses to administer. PCC, Inc. also charges various setup fees, community service fees, and fees for each class and other service coordinated by PCC, Inc., profiting on each and every fee. PCC, Inc. has also been caught in the past charging additional unlawful fees (and then demanding payment of them), such as a “picture fee.”
3 As in the cases of Ms. Pullum and Ms. Rodriguez, a materially similar process often occurs prior to trial because PCC, Inc. has contracted with the County to provide pretrial supervision services. All of the same unlawful practices, threats, additional fees, and revocations occur prior to trial or for those seeking “retirement,” a procedure akin to pretrial diversion. In this Complaint, the term “probationer” is intended also to include supervisees in each PCC, Inc. program. The only meaningful difference is that PCC, Inc. charges $35 per month for “retirement” supervision as opposed to $45 per month for supervision after a monetary judgment.
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21. Indigent people placed on “supervised probation” are told that they can convert
their probation to unsupervised probation if they pay their debts in full. If they cannot afford to
pay in full, they are forced to sign a standard document, see Exhibit 2, prepared jointly by PCC,
Inc. and the County, purporting to require them, among other things:
 To allow PCC, Inc. employees and law enforcement to search their homes, vehicles, property, and person at any time without a warrant.
 To obey all orders of PCC, Inc. officers.  To avoid consuming any “intoxicant” and to avoid even entering places that
serve alcohol.  To work at a job.  To allow PCC, Inc. randomly to drug test them at its discretion (and to charge
them for every drug test that PCC, Inc. administers).  To pay all court and PCC, Inc. debts and fees.
Probationers are told by PCC, Inc. probation officers that any violation of these
“conditions,” no matter what the person’s history and no matter what the traffic or misdemeanor
offense of conviction, will result in PCC, Inc.’s petitioning for their probation to be revoked and
a warrant issuing for their arrest.
22. PCC, Inc. “probation officers” do not inform probationers that it is unlawful to
revoke and jail them for nonpayment if they do not have the ability to pay, nor that it is illegal
under Tennessee law to revoke probation for the nonpayment of court costs.4
2. “Supervision” By PCC, Inc.
4 The Tennessee Attorney General has, through formal opinions over the past 15 years, repeatedly made clear that the Defendants’ actions are illegal under Tennessee law.
A criminal defendant may not have his probation revoked through a violation warrant for failing to pay costs assessed in a criminal action. Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 00-162 (October 18, 2000). Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(a) provides that costs “shall not be deemed part of the penalty, and no person shall be imprisoned ... in default of payment of costs ....” Instead, costs may be collected in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.
Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 03-106 (2003); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 03-072 (2003) (“A criminal defendant may not have his probation revoked through a violation warrant for failing to pay costs assessed in a criminal action.”); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 00-162 (2000, 2000 WL 1616911, (“[A] criminal defendant may not have his probation revoked through a violation warrant for failing to pay costs assessed in a criminal action.”); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. Nos. 03106; 03-072; 00-162 (accord); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 06-062 (2006), 2006 WL 1197456 (same).
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23. PCC, Inc. informs probationers that its probation officers have the power to testify about the facts of any violation that they allege (such as a violation for nonpayment) and the power to recommend sentences to the County prosecutors and judges and that the County officials have the power to jail them for an amount of time that spans the entire length of their probation. PCC, Inc. routinely informs probationers that single violations of the standard conditions of probation (including the condition that its own fees and costs be paid) jointly created by PCC, Inc. and the County regularly result in months in the County jail.
24. The County , in conjunction and consultation with PCC, Inc., seeks enormously harsh jail terms for technical violations of misdemeanor probation This practice is incorporated through the Contract between the County and PCC, Inc., in which the County promised to enforce full collection of PCC, Inc.’s profits through the creation of “sanctions” that would ensure its collection. These punishments are routinely imposed, as are the onerous conditions, on people solely because they could not afford to pay in full and were therefore placed on supervised probation. These punishments are thus routinely imposed solely on the indigent and without the provision of adequate counsel in either the original proceeding or in what the County calls a “probation revocation” proceeding.
25. PCC, Inc. employees decide in their discretion what monthly payments to require of any probationer under threat of revocation. Company probation officers make this decision without regard to indigence. They then purport to demand that probationers make those payments in the dollar amount determined by PCC, Inc. outside of any formal legal process and under the threat that PCC, Inc. will “violate” the probationers who do not pay.
26. PCC, Inc. employees determine in their discretion what portion of each payment is to be applied to court debts as opposed to PCC, Inc.’s own fees. Because it relies solely on
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these fees to make its profit, PCC, Inc. has a direct financial incentive to take money for itself first and in disproportionate amounts. This incentive is magnified by the policy of the County to terminate supervised probation when court debts are paid in full and to extend supervised probation repeatedly and indefinitely if they are not paid.
27. PCC, Inc. has a direct pecuniary incentive to ensure that its probationers are on probation for as long as possible. Therefore, an examination of PCC, Inc. receipts of the named Plaintiffs and others similarly situated frequently shows that the entire amount of whatever weekly payments they could scrape together under threat of arrest was diverted to PCC, Inc. instead of to the County. See, e.g., Exhibit 3, Receipts of Cindy Rodriguez and Yolanda Carney. Weekly payments thus regularly result in little or no reduction in the amount of money owed to the County.
28. PCC, Inc. also levies enhanced fees in addition to those fees agreed upon in the Contract. Receipts given by PCC, Inc. to probationers often include fees in addition to those set by Contract with no explanation.
29. PCC, Inc.’s practice is to not inform probationers, even probationers that PCC, Inc. knows to be indigent (such as those receiving means tested Social Security benefits (SSI) and food stamps), that they can have their payments waived or reduced due to indigence. PCC, Inc. also trains its employees not to inform probationers that their probation cannot be violated and that they cannot be jailed simply for non-payment without any inquiry into their ability to pay. PCC, Inc. employees instead threaten probationers that they will be “violated” and jailed, which is a direct violation of the Constitution and flagrant violation of Tennessee law.
30. PCC, Inc. has a direct financial incentive not to inform probationers of these rights and to ensure that probationers erroneously believe that they will be arrested and
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“violated” unless they pay PCC, Inc. As a result, PCC, Inc.’s practice is to demand payment and to tell probationers that PCC, Inc. will “violate” them if they do not pay.
31. Although PCC, Inc. probation officers purport to have the same authority as traditional and current state probation officers, collecting money from supervisees is the primary duty of PCC, Inc. employees. As a matter of everyday routine, employees threaten probationers with jail and revocation in order to ensure larger collection by probation officers.5
32. To take one of many examples, PCC, Inc. currently supervises an amputee who is undergoing life-threatening cancer treatments. Even though PCC, Inc. is aware that he is indigent, destitute, and unable to work, PCC, Inc. probation officers have been threatening him with revocation and arrest for non-payment.
33. As a result, many local lawyers who interact with PCC, Inc. refer to PCC, Inc. as the “collection agency” and state that it provides no legitimate supervision services other than illegally threatening people into paying money.
34. PCC, Inc. has a policy and practice of disallowing or not petitioning for early termination of probation if money has not been paid. If the money has been paid in full, PCC, Inc. does not object to early termination.
35. PCC, Inc.’s practice is specifically to target those people receiving means-tested Social Security disability income because, unlike other destitute probationers, they have a regular source of income that arrives at the beginning of each month. PCC, Inc.’s practice is to threaten SSI recipients that they will have their probation revoked if they do not use their monthly check to obtain a money order to pay PCC, Inc. shortly after receiving the check. Notably, benefits
5 Upon information and belief, private probation companies like PCC, Inc. also make hiring, firing, and promotions decisions—and determine compensation based on—the performance of probation officers in increasing payment rates among supervisees.
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received from social security are exempt from execution, seizure, or attachment under Tennessee
law for the payment of judgments. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111.
36. As a matter of policy, pattern, and practice, PCC, Inc. attempts to hide from
probationers that they have any lawful means of reducing or waiving their debts or fees due to
indigence. PCC, Inc. employees are trained not to volunteer information concerning how a
person might move to waive or reduce those fees. If a person finds out about that mechanism
through another probationer or a lawyer, PCC, Inc. probation officers are trained to erect a
number of successive barriers:
 PCC, Inc. probation officers will first discourage indigence applications by claiming that they do not have an indigency form available, that they need to speak to a supervisor before giving out any forms, and that the probationer should ask again some other time.
 If the probationer persists, PCC, Inc. probation officers will then inform probationers through a written document that they have to take a number of steps prior to applying for indigence. See Exhibit 4. These steps include making payments to PCC, Inc. for “several months” before any indigence application will be considered. PCC, Inc. has a policy of rejecting indigence requests if the person has not yet paid what PCC, Inc. probation officers consider to be enough money.
 PCC, Inc. then informs probationers that it will “most likely deny” any applications for indigence. It tells them in writing, however, that they must still continue to pay PCC, Inc.: “***Do not be discouraged by this.*** Continue to make payments on every report date.”
 After PCC, Inc. denies their indigence request, probationers are often told that they must take and pay roughly $20 for a drug test prior to applying for indigence with the Court.
 Every probationer is told orally and in writing that they must pay $25 for the right to be heard by the Court on their indigence.
 On occasion and after significant delay caused by PCC, Inc.’s own policies, PCC, Inc. probation officers have told probationers that it is “too late” or “impossible” to have their payments and fees reduced or waived because of indigence. Thus, PCC, Inc. enforces a policy of telling probationers to wait and to make payments before they may apply for indigence waivers but then, as in the case of Ms. Rodriguez, tells probationers who make payments and wait before applying that it is “too late” to obtain a waiver.
37. As a result, although most of PCC, Inc.’s threats and extortion scheme is
communicated orally by its employees, PCC, Inc.’s written policy is to refuse to consider
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indigence unless and until a person pays PCC, Inc. enough money in the sole discretion of PCC, Inc.
38. County officials are aware of and complicit in each of these PCC, Inc. policies and practices. These policies and practices are also consistent with the Contract requiring the County to take every step to collect the profits accrued to PCC, Inc. for its probation services. See Exhibit 1.
39. County Court clerks refuse as a matter of policy to consider indigence motions unless PCC, Inc. has reviewed and rejected the indigency request first (and, therefore, unless the probationer complies with PCC, Inc.’s rules and barriers to filing such a request).
40. PCC, Inc. regularly procures false and inaccurate drug test results. Numerous probationers have been told by PCC, Inc. that they have tested positive for drugs when they have not used drugs. Some who have been able to afford independent lab testing arranged by their lawyers have immediately been retested and confirmed the erroneous nature of the PCC, Inc. results. This has led to a belief among local lawyers that PCC, Inc.’s drug tests are, at best, unreliable and, at worst, occasionally fabricated.
41. For example, as discussed later in this Complaint, Mr. Gibbs was told by his PCC, Inc. probation officer in August 2015 that PCC, Inc. would drug test him after his probation officer told him that he was not bringing enough money for PCC, Inc. The PCC, Inc. probation officer told him that he tested positive for marijuana and threatened to revoke his probation. Undersigned counsel immediately arranged for Mr. Gibbs to be tested at an independent laboratory in Murfreesboro. The independent laboratory reported that Mr. Gibbs tested negative for marijuana.
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42. Although any drug testing is supposed to be “random,” PCC, Inc. does not conduct drug testing in a random fashion and instead trains its probation officers to use drug testing and threats of drug testing as often as possible and in a way that maximizes profits.
43. In addition, PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County require all probationers who have been summoned to appear at a revocation hearing to take—and pass—a drug test at PCC, Inc. before they will be allowed to appear in Court. This standard policy applies to all probationers, whether or not their offense or their alleged violation of probation had anything to do with drugs. Each probationer is charged $20 dollars by PCC, Inc. for this test.
44. Thus, the County and PCC, Inc. require probationers to take a drug test, and to pay $20, for the right to appear in Court to defend themselves at their revocation hearing, all of which was initiated in the first place by PCC, Inc. This practice is enforced by the County District Attorney’s Office, which will not meet with a probationer, or provide a probationer (or their counsel) with a copy of a revocation warrant without proof that the probationer has taken, and passed, a drug test that day at PCC, Inc.
45. PCC, Inc. routinely conveys to probationers that PCC, Inc. has the authority to “violate” their probation for non-reporting, failed drug tests, or other technical violations if they are not paying. PCC, Inc. has a policy and practice familiar to its probationers of using the timing of PCC, Inc. probation violation petitions to extort additional payments, using any previously alleged technical violations as leverage to gain future payments under threat of lodging a probation violation petition.
46. PCC, Inc. also has a direct financial incentive to delay notification of the Court of any violation for as long as possible so that it can collect more monthly fees before asking the Court to take action and jail a person and extend their probation term further.
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47. Because PCC, Inc. controls the entire system of when it requires reporting, what it considers to constitute valid reporting, and when to file revocation petitions, it has the power to manufacture “probation violations” by setting rules and then claiming that a probationer broke those rules. Because PCC, Inc. has a financial stake in using alleged rule violations to extract more payments and in obtaining sanctions from the Court (such as extended probation) for rule violations, it has an additional direct financial conflict of interest. PCC, Inc. uses this control to overlook some reporting violations if a person is paying PCC, Inc. and to threaten other people that it may, if they do not pay, choose to use its discretion to petition the Court for revocation for the technical violation if they do not come up with money. Like every other aspect of probation, PCC, Inc.’s financial incentives thus influence the timing of when and whether it chooses to notify the Court of technical violations of its rules.
48. If a person reports to PCC, Inc. offices with insufficient money and tells PCC, Inc. probation officers that he or she could not afford to bring more money, the person is told that they have to bring extra money to the following visit or PCC, Inc. may decide to “violate” them.
49. PCC, Inc. routinely “violates” people and seeks revocation of their probation or pretrial supervision for not completing conditions for which PCC, Inc. charges money. PCC, Inc. performs no indigency inquiry and instead threatens and seeks revocation for the failure to perform actions that the person had no ability to perform (such as paying for a PCC, Inc. class or paying to perform community service).
50. PCC, Inc. has a long history in Rutherford County of assessing and demanding additional fees not authorized by law or the Contract.
51. PCC, Inc. receipts sometimes do not reflect the total actual amount paid by probationers. Many people have made payments to PCC, Inc. only to learn later that there was
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no record of those payments and to be told to make them again. PCC, Inc. also frequently changes and manipulates the amounts of money allegedly owed in order fraudulently to increase the amount of money collected.
52. Because of the additional PCC, Inc. fees and surcharges, the amount of money owed to PCC, Inc. over the course of its supervision often exceeds the amount of money originally owed to the County, and many probationers find themselves owing just as much money as they initially owed even after a full year of payments made to PCC, Inc. under threat of jailing. In this way, the cycle repeats itself year after year when the probationers’ probation is extended due to their continued debts.
3. The Defendants’ Contract and the “User Funded Model” 53. PCC, Inc. and the County agreed nearly a decade ago to enter into an arrangement in which PCC, Inc., would operate a relatively novel “offender-funded” or “user-funded” model in which all of its revenues would be extracted from the people that it supervised. The County agreed to enter into the arrangement implementing this model because PCC, Inc. promised the County that its methods would not only produce a profit for PCC, Inc., but would also result in coercing probationers to pay a larger amount of the County’s court debts. The two parties entered into the Contract that is still in effect. See Exhibit 1. 54. There are many troubling aspects of the Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County. Some of those features include that the agreement:
 Grants PCC, Inc. a monopoly in Rutherford County and purports to require the County Court to refer all misdemeanor probation cases for PCC, Inc.
 Binds the County Court judges to order probationers to pay PCC, Inc. pursuant to a pre-agreed payment schedule.
 Requires the County and the Court to “hold [each probationer] accountable” for “all payment” for all PCC, Inc. fees and to create “appropriate sanctions for failure to pay.”
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 Delegates to PCC, Inc. the authority to set whatever payment plan it chooses for probationers.
 Purports to bind Rutherford County and the Court to order payment to PCC, Inc. in every case and to take away judicial discretion with respect to waiving those fees. The Contract calls this an “obligation” to “order and enforce” all PCC, Inc. fees according to a pre-contracted schedule set by the private company and Rutherford County officials.
 Requires that the County and the Court “fully enforce” payments to PCC, Inc. and mandates that “failure to pay shall constitute a violation.”
 Establishes that PCC, Inc. is given discretion for determining how long and how often to require reporting “as necessary.” Thus, PCC, Inc. can create its own rules and orders and petition for violation of those rules and orders. The Contract also provides that PCC, Inc. will then serve as the witness to those violations by providing “testimony.”
 States that PCC, Inc. will “confer” with prosecutors and judges and that PCC, Inc. will make “recommendations” for revocation or alternative disposition.
 Outlines that the County will hold each probationer “accountable” for all unpaid fees and establishes a purported “obligation” for the County and the County Court to enforce all payments to PCC, Inc.
 Does not contain any provisions for waiving or reducing payments and fees or procedures for treating the indigent.
55. The Contract further requires the County Court to order payments to PCC, Inc. in
particular amounts, removing discretion from the judge. For example, the Contract purports to
require the County to order probationers to pay $45 per month for supervision and $20 for every
drug test.6
56. The Contract unlawfully delegates to PCC, Inc. employees critical decisions in
the probation supervision process, including how and when to report, what counts as reporting,7
how much to require in payments, and when, whether, and how often to do drug testing.
4. PCC, Inc. Revocation Process
6 The actual judgments issued by the Court do not specify these amounts but instead simply place people on probation. The particular contractual amounts are instead enforced through orders of PCC, Inc. probation officers in conjunction with the County prosecutors, and they are constantly subject to being increased without due process based on the supervision and revocation decisions of PCC, Inc. PCC, Inc. and County officials treat these amounts (which they themselves determine and enforce) as required “conditions” of the probation judgment even though they are not specified in the actual court judgments. 7 For example, PCC, Inc. informs probationers in writing that they will be “counted as not having reported” if they are “disrespectful” or talk on their phones.
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57. After PCC, Inc. moves to revoke a person’s probation, the person can be held in jail for weeks or months prior to the PCC, Inc. probation violation petition even being heard.
58. PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County officials coordinate on post-arrest procedures for probationers that PCC, Inc. petitions to revoke. For many people arrested solely for nonpayment, the Defendants have decided to release them on their own recognizance after several hours of booking and fingerprinting at the jail, so long as the person agrees to turn himself or herself in. PCC, Inc. employees and County prosecutors will then attempt to threaten the probationer to pay in full prior to the court date or face revocation and further punishment. This is typically done without a lawyer, even for those threatened with jail time if they do not consent and even for those people who had no lawyer in their original case.
59. For those probationers against whom PCC, Inc. is alleging other violations and for some probationers for whom non-payment is the only violation, they are often held in custody, routinely on preset secured money bonds that they cannot afford to pay.
60. PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County acting through PCC, Inc. as its agent have a pattern and practice of requesting and threatening jail time for probation violations based on nonpayment. The Defendants use these threats to “send a message” to other probationers that they must pay and to get supervisees to agree to extended probation terms in lieu of jail time (and thereby to incur more fees and costs).
61. PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County have instituted a policy, pattern, and practice of dismissing probation violation petitions if the total amount due is paid off before the hearing. If a person is too poor to pay, the person’s probation is revoked upon the motion of PCC, Inc. and the Rutherford County District Attorney. The person is then placed on probation for an
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additional term (usually another “11/29”) and charged additional court costs, fees for the PCC, Inc. arrest warrant, and additional PCC, Inc. supervision surcharges.
62. Even after the dismissal of probation violation cases and the termination of probation, the County has a practice, consistent with the Contract, of directing individuals to call PCC, Inc. to take care of any additional PCC, Inc. fees that may have been subsequently added.
63. It is Rutherford County policy, pattern, and practice to tell individuals to sign an agreement of probation violation form admitting to violations for non-payment without informing them that their probation cannot be violated unless the nonpayment was willful and without conducting any kind of ability to pay hearing. This procedure is followed without informing probationers that it is illegal under Tennessee law for their probation to be revoked for nonpayment of court costs. This is the practice even though the Defendants know that the vast majority of the probationers are indigent and even though many of them have already been held to be indigent for the purposes of appointment of counsel.8 Probationers are also told to sign a waiver of their right to counsel.
64. It is the policy, pattern, and practice of PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County not to inform probationers that their ability to pay is a critical issue at any revocation proceeding concerning their non-payment. At such hearings, PCC, Inc. employees do not advise the court or testify concerning the information in their possession concerning why the person has not paid, even when PCC, Inc. officials know that the person is indigent, disabled, and destitute. PCC, Inc. employees have an incentive not to present an accurate picture of the probationer’s finances.
65. As a result, Defendants obtain probation revocations without ever determining whether violations for nonpayment were willful.
8 Because the typical cost of counsel in Murfreesboro for a misdemeanor offense is often less than the overall fines, court costs, and fees, an inability to afford counsel is a reasonable indicator of the inability to pay debts resulting from conviction and supervision.
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66. It is the pattern, policy, and practice of PCC, Inc. to then seek to extend probation terms as long as possible as a sanction, including charging extra fees for the warrant and the probation violation proceedings that PCC, Inc. itself initiated. When PCC, Inc. successfully petitions for the extension of probation, PCC, Inc. can collect additional $45 in monthly supervision fees, as well as the other fees and surcharges that it levies for things like drug tests. As a result, PCC, Inc. routinely petitions for and successfully obtains the extension of the standard probationary period of 11 months and 29 days into several successive such periods, resulting in people being on probation for years and owing enormous amounts in monthly supervision fees that well exceed the magnitude of any initial court debts.
67. Routinely, PCC, Inc. will wait until just days before the end of a person’s probation term to demand payment in full, despite the fact that the probationer has been unable to pay or has been making only partial payments and therefore has been delinquent in payments for several months. This practice results in the probationer’s being charged several months of additional fees, only to then be extended for another 11/29 and to begin accruing even more PCC, Inc. fees.
68. PCC, Inc. routinely extends periods of probation in increments of 11/29 for multiple years and, in at least one occasion, repeatedly extended in increments of 11/29 for more than eight years. It is not uncommon in Rutherford County to find probationers stuck on repeatedly extended terms of probation for four years or more.
69. All of this unconstitutional conduct is performed even though it is independently illegal under Tennessee law to revoke probation for the failure to pay court costs. See supra note 3. The Tennessee Attorney General has issued numerous opinions to that effect for at least 15 years. The Defendants flagrantly ignore Tennessee law.
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70. Rutherford County has a policy and practice of not conducting adversarial evidentiary hearings concerning violations of probation. Rather, allegations by PCC, Inc. are routinely accepted as fact without affording an opportunity for the probationer to present evidence in his or her defense.
71. To take one of the many typical examples witnessed in the weeks before the filing of this lawsuit: an incarcerated individual appeared in an orange jumpsuit. He appeared on a warrant for his arrest due to failure to pay. The judge was informed that there was a disagreement between the individual and PCC, Inc. concerning whether he had failed a drug test. The probationer explained that he had never gone to PCC, Inc. on the day of the alleged drug screen, and so it was impossible that he had failed the test that day because he had not taken one. The probationer said he had instead gone to the Rutherford County courthouse that day because his probation officer had told him to, and that no one from PCC, Inc. was there. The judge laughed at the probationer, told him the courthouse opens at 7:30 am, and therefore he “accepted” the allegation against the person by PCC, Inc. The probationer was then given a 90day jail sentence without any meaningful process.
72. The Rutherford County probation system has been corrupted by the arrangement with PCC, Inc. and the pursuit of profits from court debts. Upon information and belief, local prosecutors meet with PCC, Inc. officers about how to extract as much money as possible out of individual offenders and about how to send harsh messages to other probationers that nonpayment will be punished. Such decisions are based not on justice but on how to maximize revenue collection. According to PCC, Inc., local officials are bound by their Contract with PCC, Inc. to take aggressive measures to collect all money owed to PCC, Inc. and to craft “sanctions” for non-payment. See Exhibit 1 at 7. The Defendants’ extortion enterprise has
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therefore corrupted the basic delivery of justice in the misdemeanor probation system of Rutherford County.
73. The Contract contemplates that all decisions by the County and PCC, Inc. related to individuals placed on private probation be undertaken with the primary goal of raising money for the County and for PCC, Inc. rather than doing justice. These decisions are influenced and corrupted by the financial arrangement with PCC, Inc.
74. This probation debt-collection scheme is enormously profitable, especially in extorting impoverished probationers and family members with no legal obligation to pay the debts of their loved ones to scramble to come up with money in an attempt to avoid arrest and jail. Defendants PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County earn millions of dollars from this scheme every year.
75. There has been a breakdown of both the neutrality and adversarial components of the legal system in Rutherford County with respect to its misdemeanor probation system. Basic constitutional rights and human dignity are violated rampantly on a daily basis.
76. Law enforcement officers in Murfreesboro and judges in Tennessee have repeatedly warned about the corrupting dangers of “offender funded” private probation schemes, noting that such schemes creates inherent conflicts, lead to rampant corruption, and violate basic principles of neutrality. To take just a few examples:
 A local Rutherford County Sheriff’s Lieutenant recently spoke out publicly in July 2015 about the inherent corruption in the County’s scheme with PCC, Inc.
 A judge in a different Tennessee County admitted last year to a local news station that a similar private probation contract in that County created a system that was designed as a “cash cow” for the court and the company and that they depended on making as much money as possible from probationers for their revenue.
 A prominent Tennessee judge warned the Tennessee legislature over a decade ago that such contracts had led to rampant corruption, extortion, and injustice by allowing “money making machines” to serve in supposedly neutral judicial roles.
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A private probation company recently demanded and received what it called a “due process” hearing when a state District Attorney and defense lawyer in another county jointly requested that a probationer be reassigned after she felt physically threatened by being ordered to report to the private home of her private probation officer. The private probation officer asserted in court that his personal business reputation and property were being deprived by the effort to remove the probationer and to have her report to (and pay) a different company. The court apparently granted the private probation officer such a “due process” hearing relating to this lost profit to the private company and subpoenaed the female probationer to give testimony at a hearing purportedly in the context of her own probation case.

B. The Named Plaintiffs

i.

Plaintiff Cindy Rodriguez

77. Cindy Rodriguez is a 51-year-old individual with a disability and a mother of two

children, ages 28 and 17. She lives in Rutherford County with her 17-year-old daughter.

78. Ms. Rodriguez lives in poverty and struggles to meet the basic necessities of life.

She has no bank account, no real property, and no significant assets. She is so poor that she has

difficulty maintaining active utilities at her home.

79. Ms. Rodriguez depends on Social Security disability (SSI) income to survive.

Ms. Rodriguez is physically disabled and lives in constant pain. She requires prescription

medication from previous surgeries to her back and neck.

80. In 2014, Ms. Rodriguez was arrested for shoplifting from a grocery store in

Murfreesboro. Because of her lack of a criminal record, the District Attorney in her case told her

that her case would be dismissed and would not go on her record so long as she complied with

probation and so long as she paid her court debts. She was told that, pursuant to County policy,

if she could not pay, her case would not be dismissed and she would be prosecuted.

81. Ms. Rodriguez was placed on probation for 11 months and 29 days.

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82. Pursuant to policy, pattern, and practice as described above, as well as the Contract between Rutherford County and PCC, Inc., Ms. Rodriguez was assigned to PCC, Inc. as her “probation officer.”
83. Ms. Rodriguez was forced to sign a list of standard “probation conditions” drafted by PCC, Inc. Among these conditions, PCC, Inc. purported to require Ms. Rodriguez to allow PCC, Inc. employees to search her home and her person at any time of the day or night, without a warrant. PCC, Inc. also purported to require Ms. Rodriguez to avoid drinking alcohol or attending any location where alcohol was served despite the fact that alcohol had no relationship to her offense. PCC, Inc. also required, among other things, Ms. Rodriguez to pay all of the additional fees and costs that it would levy in its discretion for its own services as her “probation officer.”9
84. Ms. Rodriguez first reported to PCC, Inc. in August 2014. PCC, Inc. employees, in accordance with their policy and practice, conducted an “orientation.” Ms. Rodriguez and other new probationers were told that, if they did not make their payments to PCC, Inc., then PCC, Inc. would have their probation revoked. PCC, Inc. trains its employees to tell new probationers that the company will have probationers “violated.” PCC, Inc. uses the verb “violate” to mean that the company will obtain an arrest warrant and file a petition for the revocation of the probationer’s probation.
85. On several occasions, PCC, Inc. employees acting as probation officers pursuant to the County’s Contract told Ms. Rodriguez that they would get a warrant and “violate” her if she did not pay PCC, Inc. its money. Specifically, PCC, Inc. Defendant Briana Woodlee, who
9 Although not listed in the standard conditions, PCC, Inc. officers also orally informed Ms. Rodriguez, pursuant to their standard practice, that she would be forced to comply with other restrictions on her liberty. For example, she was not permitted to leave the County without permission of the company, and even with permission she was not permitted to leave the County (even to visit her elderly parents) for more than seven days.
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was Ms. Rodriguez’s probation officer assigned by PCC, Inc., directly threatened Ms. Rodriguez with an arrest warrant and revocation if she did not pay.
86. On at least one occasion when Defendant Woodlee was absent, Ms. Rodriguez met with a PCC, Inc. supervisor. The supervisor told Ms. Rodriguez that she did not care about paperwork from her doctor concerning her disability and asked where her money was. When Ms. Rodriguez said that she could not afford to bring any money that week, the supervisor threatened Ms. Rodriguez that, if she did not have money the next visit, then the supervisor would “violate” her for nonpayment.
87. On one occasion in which Ms. Rodriguez was not able to bring any money, a PCC, Inc. supervisor got mad at her for not bringing any money and told Ms. Rodriguez: “one more time of this bullshit, and I’m gonna violate you. You’ll spend 7 days in jail.”
88. PCC, Inc. probation officers never told Ms. Rodriguez that she had any legal right or legal mechanism to have her payments waived or reduced on account of her indigence. After many months on probation, Ms. Rodriguez overheard another probationer talking about getting court debts reduced or waived. As a result, Ms. Rodriguez asked her probation officer, Defendant Woodlee, about having her costs and fees reduced or waived. Defendant Woodlee told her that it was “too late in the game now.” Ms. Rodriguez was told that it would “take too long” for that process to work. PCC, Inc. ordered her to keep paying.10
89. Over the course of her probationary period, Ms. Rodriguez was forced on numerous times to be drug tested at PCC, Inc.’s discretion. The drug tests were humiliating and physically intrusive.
10 As discussed supra, PCC, Inc. has a policy and practice of requiring probationers to wait and to make several months of payments before it claims it will even consider an indigency application. In any event, it informs probationers in advance that it will likely deny that application. See Exhibit 4.
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90. Drug tests are typically administered by a female PCC, Inc. employee who accompanies female probationers into the bathroom, and a male security guard employed by PCC, Inc., who accompanies male probationers into the bathroom. Probationers are forced to urinate in a stall-less bathroom, while being watched, into a small plastic drinking cup that has no lid. Probationers are then forced to carry the lidless plastic drinking cup through the lobby, past the other probationers, and into an office for testing. Probationers are then instructed to return to the bathroom to empty the unused portion of the sample from the lidless plastic drinking cup into the toilet. All of this occurs in plain sight of everyone in the waiting room and without basic sanitation, such as soap, water, or hand sanitizer.
91. Even though drugs had nothing to do with Ms. Rodriguez’s offense of shoplifting from a grocery store and even though she had no documented history of drug abuse, PCC, Inc. regularly required her to undergo drug tests at its discretion because PCC, Inc. charges probationers approximately $20 per drug test.
92. PCC, Inc. earns a significant profit on each drug test transaction. 93. On numerous occasions in PCC, Inc.’s offices, Ms. Rodriguez has overheard other PCC, Inc. probation officers threatening probationers that they will be “violated” if they do not bring sufficient amounts of money to PCC, Inc. 94. PCC, Inc.’s repeated threats to have her arrested if she does not pay have nearly debilitated Ms. Rodriguez from the constant stress related to the continuous fear of going to jail. In addition to her fear of going to jail for the first time at age 51 because of her poverty and disability, which prevents her from working, Ms. Rodriguez is terrified of being separated from her teenage daughter.
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95. Ms. Rodriguez is so destitute that she broke a tooth months ago and has not been able to have it fixed. Because of PCC, Inc.’s threats, she paid PCC, Inc. instead of paying her car loan, and she lost her car. Because she has been forced to walk significant distances around Murfreesboro, she has passed out in public on two separate occasions from exhaustion.
96. During the course of her probation supervision by PCC, Inc., PCC, Inc.’s threats were effective in extorting Ms. Rodriguez to forgo basic necessities to make payments to the company because she feared arrest and revocation. In fact, Ms. Rodriguez even directed her disability benefits — her sole source of income — to PCC, Inc.
97. On many occasions, receipts given to Ms. Rodriguez show that the company applied all or a significant portion of her payments to its own fees instead of to her court debts. PCC, Inc. has an incentive to do this because Rutherford County has a policy, pattern, and practice of allowing probationers to enter “unsupervised” probation (i.e without paying PCC, Inc. and without the standard liberty restrictions) so long as they have paid off their court debts. By choosing to apply Ms. Rodriguez’s payments to its own fees, PCC, Inc. ensured that Ms. Rodriguez would not move to “unsupervised” probation and that it would continue to be able to charge her fees for supervised probation. Moreover, PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County have a policy, pattern, and practice of revoking and extending probation for successive terms if a person has not paid off his or her court fines and costs by the end of the probationary period. Thus, PCC, Inc.’s decisions concerning how to apportion Ms. Rodriguez’s payments were designed to have a direct effect on how long she would remain assigned to PCC, Inc. and, as a result, how long it could charge her additional fees for its own profit.
98. By June 2015, Ms. Rodrguez had been on probation with PCC, Inc. for nearly a year. Although her original court costs were only $578, she had paid virtually all of that amount
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to PCC, Inc. Incredibly, PCC, Inc. chose to apply only $66 to her court costs. Thus, according to PCC, Inc., she still owed $512 in court costs despite enduring enormous hardship for an entire year to pay virtually all of her original court debts.
99. Ms. Rodriguez’s probation period ended on July 28, 2015. Defendant Woodley told her that July 28 was the last chance that she had to make full payment of outstanding costs and fees. Despite her poverty, PCC, Inc. demanded a lump sum payment of $533.35. Defendant Woodlee told Ms. Rodriguez that, if she did not pay, Defendant Woodley would ensure that an arrest warrant issued and that Ms. Rodriguez would have to go turn herself in to the County jail. She was told to report to PCC, Inc. even after her probation period was supposed to end so that PCC, Inc. could drug test her again.
100. By the time PCC, Inc. carried out its threats to “violate” her, the company had, according to its own records, extracted enough money to pay almost all of Ms. Rodriguez’s court debts. Nevertheless, it still requested that she be jailed, given additional costs and fees (including a fee for the warrant that PCC, Inc. secured), and required to serve another year on probation, during which it would assess additional fees and surcharges.
101. From the beginning of Ms. Rodriguez’s probationary period, PCC, Inc. and its employees knew that she was indigent, disabled, and destitute. PCC, Inc. and its employees knew that Ms. Rodriguez depended on SSI to survive and that she could not afford both to make payments to PCC, Inc. and to meet the basic necessities of life.
102. PCC, Inc. knew of the availability of a legal mechanism for Ms. Rodriguez to have her costs and fees waived or reduced, but it never informed her of that mechanism.
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103. Just prior to turning herself into the jail on the warrant secured by PCC, Inc., Ms. Rodriguez passed out from a panic attack due to the stress of going to jail. She broke her arm in three places when she fell.
104. When Ms. Rodriguez went to turn herself in, she was humiliated and taunted by County jail officers. Officers stuck their hands into her pants, purportedly to search her private areas even though she was being released on her own recognizance. One officer looked at her broken arm and laughed at her, saying that he was going to make sure the fingerprinting process really hurt her. The officer then grabbed her broken arm, which was in a sling, and moved it forcibly to take prints as Ms. Rodriguez cried. The officer then called the disabled Ms. Rodrguez a “wussy.”
105. Near Ms. Rodriguez was another woman in a wheel chair, wearing a helmet and suffering from physical deformities that limited her movements. The woman could not control her drooling, and she had drooled all over her face. A jail guard went up to the woman and slapped her across the face and swore at her for drooling. These incidents of everyday brutality and inhumanity at the Rutherford County jail are rampant and notorious among probationers, dozens of whom corroborate similar incidents of mistreatment, and are used by PCC, Inc. staff as part of their threats to extort money.
106. Ms. Rodriguez was given a court date for her revocation hearing and left the jail. Afterward, Rutherford County posted a photo of her mug shot on its Facebook account, announcing her arrest to the community. She immediately received calls from her preacher and nearly ten people in the community, telling her that they saw that she had violated her probation. Ms. Rodriguez was humiliated because she had to tell numerous people in her church and her community that she was destitute and disabled and had been “violated” for not being able to pay
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PCC, Inc. It was deeply embarrassing for her to tell people in her community that she was too poor to pay.11

107. When she appeared with pro bono counsel for the revocation hearing, the County

did not permit her to move forward with the revocation hearing until she took and passed a drug

test at PCC, Inc., for which she was charged an additional $20. Along with many other

probationers on the docket that day, Ms. Rodriguez was forced to walk from the court to PCC,

Inc.’s offices for the drug test.

108. After passing the drug test, Ms. Rodriguez was able, with the assistance of

counsel, to apply to the judge to be put on an unsupervised payment plan instead of an additional

11/29 of PCC, Inc. probation. Her payment plan contemplates the payment in full of her court

costs, but she will not be forced to incur the additional debts, burdens, or threats associated with

participation in PCC, Inc.’s illegal private probation scheme. Of course, this option was never

offered to her by PCC, Inc., who only threatened her with “violating her” if she failed to pay. As

a matter of practice, this option is not offered to unrepresented probationers.

ii.

Plaintiff Steven Gibbs

109. Steven Gibbs is a 61-year-old individual with a disability.

110. Mr. Gibbs relies on money from Social Security disability (SSI) to meet the basic

necessities of life.

11 After attending all of her many reporting sessions over the course of a whole year, Ms. Rodriguez received a letter dated August 19, 2015, from PCC, Inc. stating that she had failed to report to an appointment as scheduled. Pursuant to PCC, Inc. policy, PCC, Inc. attempts fraudulently to create “failure to appear” violations for those whose only violation is non-payment. One of the ways in which PCC, Inc. does this is by alleging missed appointments that the person was never aware of. In the case of Ms. Rodriguez, these supposed non appearances allegedly occurred after probation terms had already expired, and no PCC, Inc. employee had told her that she needed to keep reporting after the expiration of the probation term. The notice letter threatened Ms. Rodriguez that PCC, Inc. might notify the judge of her non-appearance and asked her to pay her outstanding costs and fees.
31
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111. Mr. Gibbs has an intellectual disability. Prior to ceasing school attendance around age 12, by which time he had only made it to the Fourth Grade, Mr. Gibbs was enrolled in special education classes because of his disability.
112. Over the past year, Mr. Gibbs has been convicted twice of driving on a suspended license. Pursuant to Tennessee law, he is unable to get his license back because he cannot afford to pay his court costs, fines, and fees to Rutherford County. Mr. Gibbs suffers enormous hardships given the lack of adequate public transportation in the Rutherford County area. He also suffers from debilitating arthritis, which makes it difficult for him to walk distances.
113. After each conviction, Mr. Gibbs was placed on probation with PCC, Inc. Pursuant to Rutherford County’s Contract with PCC, Inc., Mr. Gibbs was forced under threat of jail to sign a list of “probation conditions” drafted by PCC, Inc. and the County. Among these standard conditions, PCC, Inc. purported to require Mr. Gibbs to allow PCC, Inc. employees to search his home and his person at any time of the day or night. PCC, Inc. also purported to require Mr. Gibbs to avoid drinking alcohol or attending any location where alcohol was served despite that condition bearing no rational relationship to his offense. PCC, Inc. also required, among other things, Mr. Gibbs to pay all of the additional fees and costs that it would levy in its discretion for its own services as his “probation officer.”
114. Each time that Mr. Gibbs has been placed on probation with PCC, Inc., he has attended an orientation session at which PCC, Inc. employees threaten new probationers that they will be revoked and arrested if they do not pay.
115. Throughout his supervision by PCC, Inc., Mr. Gibbs has been repeatedly threatened that, if he does not bring money to PCC, Inc., he will be “violated” and jailed because PCC, Inc. will seek the revocation of his probation.
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116. Even though Mr. Gibbs is living in desperate poverty and struggles to have enough money for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities, he would usually try to pay PCC, Inc. at least $5 every time that he went because he feared that they would throw him in jail.
117. At the end of his first probationary period, he still owed significant debts, including the significant additional fees assessed by PCC, Inc. At no point was Mr. Gibbs informed by PCC, Inc. employees that he could seek a waiver or reduction of the fines, costs, or fees. When he had not completed payment, PCC, Inc. followed through on its threats and sought the revocation of his probation, and he was told to report to the County jail. Mr. Gibbs was told that he would not have to go to jail if he paid the remainder of what he owed.
118. In 2015, Mr. Gibbs was again placed on probation with PCC, Inc. for driving with a suspended license. Mr. Gibbs was again forced to endure all of the onerous conditions (including, for example, that he pay for drug tests unrelated to his offense) and threatened that he had to pay all of the substantial PCC, Inc. fees. Mr. Gibbs was jailed for a probation revocation at the request of PCC, Inc. in July 2015.
119. Mr. Gibbs almost died as a result of being jailed. He was denied the inhaler necessary for his emphysema, he was forced to sleep on a concrete floor for the first 11 days, and he was denied other necessary medical care for his severe arthritis. Immediately after being released from jail, Mr. Gibbs suffered a seizure and fell, resulting in serious injury and bruising to his head and body.
120. Mr. Gibbs is currently on six different types of medication, mostly for recent seizures.
121. After he hit his head, Mr. Gibbs’ PCC, Inc. probation officer told him that, if he brought in $400-500, she would let him call in to the office instead of having to report in person.
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PCC, Inc. trains its officers to use their discretion in granting or denying perks such as call in supervision to maximize the profit that it collects.
122. At no point did any PCC, Inc. employee inform Mr. Gibbs that any of his costs or fees could be waived because of his indigence. On the advice of counsel, Mr. Gibbs asked in August 2015 for an indigency form to have his costs and fees waived. A PCC, Inc. probation officer told him that, if he brought in some money to PCC, Inc., he could have an indigency form. She refused to give it to him when he said that he did not have any money.
123. After being released from jail, he was placed back on probation at the request of PCC, Inc. The Tuesday after his release from jail, he went to meet his probation officer at the PCC, Inc. offices in downtown Murfreesboro. He was told that PCC, Inc. could “violate” him if he did not bring enough money to the meeting.
124. Mr. Gibbs asked his previous probation officer, Defendant Jasmine Jackson, if anything could be done to reduce or get rid of his fees. Defendant Jackson falsely told Mr. Gibbs that nothing could be done and that they could not waive his fees.
125. Mr. Gibbs was told that he would be arrested and jailed or have his PCC, Inc. probation extended if he did not pay by the end of his current probationary period.
126. In late August 2015, Mr. Gibbs went to see his probation officer. She told him that, if he did not bring $90 to his next visit then he should not even bother reporting and that she would “violate” him. His probation officer was upset that he had brought only $5 to his previous visit, at which she taunted him and laughed at him for being too poor to afford to bring more money. She told him that she would then have to drug test him as a result of his nonpayment.
127. When he showed up for his next supervision meeting a week later, his PCC, Inc. probation officer claimed that Mr. Gibbs had tested positive for marijuana. Mr. Gibbs knew this
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to be either false or a mistake because he had not used marijuana. He had been drug tested at his

pain clinic and been tested clean. Nonetheless, his probation officer told him that she would

make sure that the court issued a warrant for his arrest for the positive drug test.

128. Mr. Gibbs and his wife went immediately to a private, independent clinic and,

with the assistance of undersigned counsel, took a comprehensive set of drug tests designed for

State of Tennessee probationers. The independent lab test was negative for marijuana and

negative for every other one of the nine common controlled substances included in the standard

probation drug test.

129. On his next visit to PCC, Inc., Mr. Gibbs’s PCC, Inc. officer again told him that

he was behind on payments, threatened him that she was preparing to issue a warrant for his

arrest, and demanded that he make a payment of at least $40. Mr. Gibbs again told her that he

simply could not pay her because he needed his disability money to survive.

130. In late September 2015, PCC, Inc. sought and obtained a warrant for Mr. Gibbs’s

arrest. The warrant contains a preset secured money bond of $10,000, meaning that, when Mr.

Gibbs is arrested, he will languish in jail indefinitely until the Defendants decide to conduct revocation proceedings because he is unable to afford to pay $10,000.12

131. The repeated threats from PCC, Inc. probation officers have dominated Mr.

Gibbs’s life over the past two years. He has lived in constant fear that if he does not divert a

significant portion of his means tested federal disability benefits—his only source of income—to

pay PCC, Inc., he will be jailed and his probation will be extended.

iii.

Plaintiff Paula Pullum

132. Paula Pullum is a 48-year-old individual with a disability.

12 The Defendants have repeatedly refused to provide a copy of the warrant to counsel for Mr. Gibbs or even show counsel a copy of the warrant.
35
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133. Ms. Pullum is the mother of three children, and she has nine grandchildren. 134. Ms. Pullum suffers severe medical conditions. She has a paralyzed bladder, which requires her to urinate through a catheter. She is a breast cancer survivor and had a double mastectomy, enduring 36 chemotherapy and 28 radiation treatments. She suffers from severe back and neck injuries that have each required major surgery. She has had three hip replacement surgeries and has had her lymph nodes removed. She has severe stomach problems that required surgery and necessitate a special diet, and she has a heart condition that requires medication. 135. Ms. Pullum relies on federal SSI disability payments as her only source of income to survive. She receives $767 per month, which she must use for rent, utilities, food, clothing, transportation, and all of the other basic necessities of life. 136. In 2015, Ms. Pullum was arrested and charged with DUI. Prior to trial, Ms. Pullum was assigned to PCC, Inc. for supervision. Ms. Pullum was told that a condition of her pretrial release was that she wear an ankle bracelet product sold by PCC, Inc. Pursuant to County and PCC, Inc. policy and practice, Ms. Pullum was told that she would be jailed if she did not pay approximately $12 per day for this PCC, Inc. product. 137. Ms. Pullum told PCC, Inc. that she could not afford to survive and to pay PCC, Inc. because she relied only on a small disability check. Her PCC, Inc. supervisory officer told her that she had to pay, and that there were “no ifs, ands, or buts.” PCC, Inc. then charged Ms. Pullum an extra $149 “setup fee” in addition to the daily fees. 138. The PCC, Inc. ankle product is part of a PCC, Inc. program called SCRAM, which is designed to force supervisees to pay exorbitant fees for additional supervisory conditions under the threat of pretrial detention in jail for those who cannot afford the services. Pursuant to PCC, Inc. and County policy and practice, no supervisee is informed that the costs of
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those programs and products can be waived or reduced for the indigent. PCC, Inc. and the County conspire to require these extra services in cases in which they are not necessary and are not the least restrictive condition of release required because, on information and belief, they are enormously profitable to PCC, Inc.
139. After two-and-a-half months of paying roughly one-third of her total disability income to PCC, Inc. for SCRAM, Ms. Pullum was removed from the program at the request of a lawyer who agreed to assist her. PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County occasionally make special accommodations for supervisees who are represented by a lawyer as opposed to those who are not.
140. PCC, Inc. agreed to remove the bracelet but insisted that Ms. Pullum begin paying for drug tests at approximately $20 per test, even though nothing about her case involved illegal drug use and she has no history of drug use. It is standard PCC, Inc. policy to force all probationers, regardless of their offense or history, to pay for drug tests. As a result, Ms. Pullum eventually paid over $1,000 to PCC, Inc. before her case was resolved.
141. During this period, PCC, Inc. repeatedly threatened Ms. Pullum with jail if she did not make payments. PCC, Inc. also told Ms. Pullum that she was required to keep a working phone number. Because Ms. Pullum could not afford both to pay PCC, Inc. and to keep her phone, her elderly mother was forced to take money from her own fixed income to lend Ms. Pullum money to pay Ms. Pullum’s phone bill.
142. Ms. Pullum, who had never been to jail, was so frightened that she would die in jail because of her medical needs,13 that she skipped her rent payments so that she could pay PCC, Inc. As a result, she was evicted.
13 Ms. Pullum spent 15 hours in jail after her DUI arrest before her elderly mother could pay for her release. In that time, Ms. Pullum was denied the catheter that she needs to urinate by County jail officials.
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143. After Ms. Pullum pled guilty, she was placed on probation and sent to PCC, Inc., which was again to serve as her “probation officer” pursuant to its exclusive monopoly Contract with the County.
144. On July 1, 2015, Ms. Pullum went to the PCC, Inc. “orientation,” where she saw dozens of other probationers meeting with at least five PCC, Inc. employees who referred to themselves as “probation officers.” PCC, Inc. probation officers made a variety of threats, including that probationers would be “violated” if they did not pay. None of the probationers were informed that they could not be violated and jailed if they were indigent and did not have the ability to pay.
145. Ms. Pullum and the others were also told that if PCC, Inc. determined that any of them violated its office rules, then they would be asked to leave, and PCC, Inc. would inform the County Court that the probationer had not shown up at all.
146. Ms. Pullum told PCC, Inc. again, as she had done prior to pleading guilty, that she was disabled and could not afford to make payments. Her probation officer, Defendant Woodlee, told her: “I need $146 today.” Ms. Pullum told the probation officer that she would not be getting her disability check until July 3. Her probation officer told her that, because of the July 4 holiday, Ms. Pullum would probably be getting her disability check early, on July 2. Defendant Woodlee ordered her to come back to PCC, Inc. the next day, July 2, as soon as she got her check, with a money order made out to PCC, Inc. Of the $146 paid by Ms. Pullum on that occasion, PCC, Inc. chose to apply only $54 to her court debts.
147. On a later date, Defendant Woodlee told Ms. Pullum that she had to bring $400 to the next meeting. Ms. Pullum told Defendant Woodlee that she only gets one check per month and could not pay. Defendant Woodlee told her that PCC, Inc. would “violate” her if she did not
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perform her required community service, complete and pay PCC, Inc. for a DUI class, and pay $400.
148. Pursuant to PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County policy, all probationers are charged fees for the right to do community service and to complete required classes. Ms. Pullum was told that PCC, Inc. would “violate” her if she did not complete those requirements and that she could not complete the requirements (such as the class and community service) if she did not pay for them. PCC, Inc., as is its policy and practice, used its discretion to set dates by which Ms. Pullum had to complete these tasks and told her that they would “violate” her if she did not complete the tasks and pay for them prior to those dates.
149. No PCC, Inc. employee ever informed Ms. Pullum that any of her payments could be reduced or waived if she could not afford them. Instead, she was repeatedly threatened with jail and probation revocation if she did not pay.
150. Ms. Pullum told Ms. Woodlee that there was no way that she could bring $400 to PCC, Inc. by the next meeting. Defendant Woodlee told Ms. Pullum: “you need to bring me a big payment.” Defendant Woodlee again threatened Ms. Pullum that she would “violate” her if she did not pay and told Ms. Pullum: “If I violate you, you will have to do the whole 11 months and 29 days in jail.”
151. Because of PCC, Inc.’s threats, Ms. Pullum was repeatedly forced to forgo basic necessities to divert money to PCC, Inc. She was also forced to borrow money from her elderly mother to make payments.
152. Pursuant to its policies, PCC, Inc. frequently applied Ms. Pullum’s payments to its own fees prior to the costs owed to the County because PCC, Inc. has an incentive to keep people like Ms. Pullum on probation under the threat of jail for as long as possible and because its
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arrangement with the County ensures that probationers will routinely be “extended” on PCC, Inc. probation if their debts to the County are not paid in full.
153. On each of her reporting visits to PCC, Inc., the first thing Ms. Pullum is asked is “do you have the money?” or “do you have your payment?”
154. PCC, Inc. has now again begun requiring Ms. Pullum to show up to its offices every Tuesday for a drug test. Because of Ms. Pullum’s paralyzed bladder and catheter, a PCC, Inc. employee insists on accompanying her to the bathroom to observe her drawing urine through the catheter. Ms. Pullum is therefore forced repeatedly to endure the humiliation of a PCC, Inc. employee watching the most sensitive areas of her body to conduct unjustified drug tests (Ms. Pullum’s offense involved no drugs). To complete the indignity, Ms. Pullum is charged $20 each time and told by PCC, Inc. that, if she does not pay for the drug test, PCC, Inc. will “violate” her.
155. Ms. Pullum was ordered as part of her first-time DUI sentence to serve 20 days in the County jail. Prior to turning herself in, her lawyer prepared a letter listing out her serious medical conditions and required medications. When Ms. Pullum arrived at the jail, a jail employee took the letter out, tore it up in front of her, and said: “this letter don’t mean shit.” The jail employee then threw the letter in the trash. Jail staff then forced Ms. Pullum to go between 10 and 15 hours without her catheters, causing bleeding in her bladder.
156. When Ms. Pullum was released from jail, she called PCC, Inc. A PCC, Inc. supervisor told her that she had to make a $250 payment or PCC, Inc. would violate her and send her right back to the County jail. Ms. Pullum believed that she had almost died during her previous visit, and she was so frightened that she borrowed $250 to pay PCC, Inc.
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157. In September 2015, Ms. Pullum again told a PCC, Inc. supervisor that she was

destitute and disabled and could not afford to pay PCC, Inc. The supervisor taunted her, told her

to take a drug test since she had not paid, and said that there was “no chance” of Ms. Pullum

having her fees waived because her offense involved alcohol. The PCC, Inc. officer then told

Ms. Pullum that she could be “violated” if she did not bring “a big payment” to the next

supervision meeting. She told her that “a nonpayment is not acceptable.”

iv.

Plaintiff Yolanda Carney

158. Yolanda Carney is a 44-year-old individual with a disability.

159. Ms. Carney depends on federal means tested disability benefits to meet the basic

necessities of life.

160. Ms. Carney was placed on probation with PCC, Inc. in the beginning of 2014.

The next year-and-half of her life was a continuing saga of debt, extortion, and enormous stress

caused by PCC, Inc.’s repeated threats to “violate” her probation.

161. Over the course of her probation with PCC, Inc., Ms. Carney told her probation

officer, Defendant Jackson, on at least half a dozen occasions that she could not afford to make

the payments that PCC, Inc. was demanding. She informed Defendant Jackson that she

depended only on SSI to survive. On each occasion, Defendant Jackson, pursuant to PCC, Inc.’s

standard practice, ordered her that she “needed” to make the payments and told her that she

would go back to jail if she did not pay.

162. Pursuant to PCC, Inc. policy, Defendant Jackson also told Ms. Carney that, if

PCC, Inc. decided to “violate” her, then Ms. Carney would be charged additional fees for the

arrest warrant that would be issued and court costs for the violation proceedings. According to

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Defendants’ standard practices, probationers who are revoked are forced to pay additional costs, fees, and surcharges to the Defendants.
163. On one occasion, while Defendant Jackson was in the bathroom watching Ms. Carney urinate, Ms. Carney broke down and begged to Defendant Jackson that she could not afford to keep paying PCC, Inc. for drug tests. Defendant Jackson charged Ms. Carney approximately $20 for each drug test, which were conducted at the frequency and discretion of PCC, Inc.
164. PCC, Inc. told Ms. Carney that she would be required under penalty of revocation to pay $132 for the privilege of being allowed to perform her required community service.
165. After months on probation, Ms. Carney learned from another probationer that she could file a motion with the court to ask that her costs and fees be waived or reduced on the basis of indigence. No PCC, Inc. employee had ever told her of the opportunity to have her fees and costs waived or reduced.
166. Ms. Carney asked Defendant Jackson repeatedly about how to invoke the indigency waiver process. At first, Defendant Jackson declined to provide any information. Eventually, Defendant Jackson told Ms. Carney that she would be charged $25 if she wished to file an “indigency motion.”
167. Ms. Carney went directly to the County Courthouse and asked about filing an indigency motion. The clerk at the County Court told her that she was required to go back to PCC, Inc. to ask for a waiver with PCC, Inc. in the first instance. The clerk said that PCC, Inc. would deny her request and that she would then have to bring that paper back to the court. Until PCC, Inc. did anything, the Court would refuse even to consider her indigency petition because
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that was its policy. The clerk at the court was aware of PCC, Inc.’s policy to deny all indigency waivers.
168. Ms. Carney was given a sheet of paper drafted and disseminated by PCC, Inc. that told her that PCC, Inc. would make the first decision on indigence. See Exhibit 4. The document states that PCC, Inc. would decide the question of indigence before the matter would be heard in court and that PCC, Inc.’s policy would likely result in any indigence request being denied. Id. The document then instructs probationers not to be “discouraged” and to continue making their payments. Id. The document also tells probationers that they are required first to make an unspecified number of payments to PCC, Inc. before any indigency request will even be considered. Id.
169. Ms. Carney brought all of her papers to the courthouse again and asked to see the judge to get her payments reduced or waived. Defendant Jackson saw her in the courtroom and went to the judge and had a private conversation with the judge. Pursuant to County and PCC, Inc. standard practice, PCC, Inc. employees are present, as a matter of routine daily practice, at revocation and other hearings involving PCC, Inc. probationers. These PCC, Inc. employees routinely engage in private ex parte communications with the judges concerning how to handle cases of probationers.
170. After Defendant Jackson spoke to the judge, Mr. Carney saw Defendant Jackson walk away from the judge. The courtroom clerk then approached Ms. Carney and told her that the judge would not see her or hear her motion. The clerk refused to accept the motion, and Ms. Carney was told by the clerk to return to PCC, Inc.
171. In late July 2015, a representative of Equal Justice Under Law spoke to a clerk in the Rutherford County courthouse and asked about the process of obtaining a waiver of fees and
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costs. The clerk informed the representative that she could not give out any indigency forms until a probationer was denied by PCC, Inc. and that it would cost $25 for the right to be heard as a matter of Rutherford County policy. The clerk also reported that, pursuant to County policy, the judge was unlikely to waive PCC, Inc.’s fees even if the judge waived court costs. PCC, Inc.’s Contract with the County purports to require judges to make every effort to ensure the collection of PCC, Inc.’s profits.
172. Courthouse staff informed Ms. Carney that, consistent with courthouse policy, she could go on unsupervised probation the moment she paid her court fines and costs.
173. Numerous PCC, Inc. receipts retained by Ms. Carney demonstrate that PCC, Inc., pursuant to its policies, was deducting Ms. Carney’s payments substantially from its own fees prior to deducting the payments from the debts owed by Ms. Carney to the County. Thus, PCC, Inc. attempted to keep Ms. Carney on supervised probation for a longer period in order to continue collecting fees.
174. For example, on the first nine occasions that Ms. Carney paid PCC, Inc. money that she was forced by threat of jail to take out of her disability check for her weekly visit, PCC, Inc. chose to keep all of the money for itself and did not reduce her court costs at all.
175. According to PCC, Inc.’s own receipts, by early 2015, after a year of making payments to PCC, Inc. at substantial hardship to herself, Ms. Carney had paid a total of $1,843. PCC, Inc. had chosen to take over $1,300 for itself, leaving only $460 allocated to her court costs. Incredibly, the total amount that she still owed after a year of making payments, as a result of additional PCC, Inc. surcharges, was now nearly $200 more than her original court costs.
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176. At the end of Ms. Carney’s probation term, PCC, Inc. told her that she had not completed her payments and that she should therefore sign an agreement to revoke and extend her probation for another year. Pursuant to its policy, PCC, Inc. “violates” probationers and then attempts to obtain their consent (as a punishment for violation and in lieu of a longer jail term) to the extension of their probation without the advice of counsel. Ms. Carney refused to sign the document despite PCC, Inc.’s threats that it would recommend revocation.
177. Instead, Ms. Carney demanded to speak with the judge and ultimately was placed on a payment plan directly with the Court, and she now owes the remainder of her fines, costs, and fees in monthly installments directly to the Court clerk.
v. Plaintiff Jacqueline Brinkley 178. Jackie Brinkley is a 31-year old mother of four young children. Her twins are 12 years old, and her other children are six and four years old. 179. Ms. Brinkley lives in desperate poverty and relies on SSI disability payments and her family’s assistance to survive and to provide basic necessities to her children. 180. Ms. Brinkley was placed on probation with PCC, Inc. in 2015 for driving with a suspended license. She was placed on 30 days probation. 181. Ms. Brinkley attended a required orientation event at the offices of PCC, Inc. She was told to pay approximately $500 in total. Her probation officer told her that if she did not pay on time then PCC, Inc. would “violate” her, that she would have a warrant out for her arrest, and that she would have to turn herself into the Rutherford County jail. She informed her probation officer that she had four children and depended on SSI, food stamps, and a small amount of child support to feed and clothe her children. She asked if anything could be done to help her.
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182. The PCC, Inc. probation officer told her that she would have to pay $25 for the right to go in front of a judge to file a motion seeking reduction of her costs.
183. On another occasion, her probation officer told her that she had to pay or else PCC, Inc. would “violate” her. The probation officer told her that, when she was “violated,” she would have to turn herself into the jail but that the jail would let her out on her own recognizance in advance of her revocation hearing and that PCC, Inc. would add a “warrant fee.”
184. At the end of her probationary period, she had not paid all of her fines and costs because she was indigent and could not afford to pay both PCC, Inc. and meet the basic necessities of life for herself and her children. PCC, Inc. petitioned to revoke her probation for non-payment and obtained a warrant for her arrest.
185. After PCC, Inc. filed for revocation of her probation, PCC, Inc. threatened her that they would also seek revocation for “non-reporting,” even though her probationary period had ended and no one had told her that she needed to keep going to PCC, Inc. PCC, Inc. threatened that it might ask the judge to jail her for the full 30 days because their notes indicated that her probation officer claimed to have told Ms. Brinkley to report one final time after her probation ended and after she was “violated” for not paying PCC, Inc. Ms. Brinkley was told that she would not be violated if she paid in full.
186. Ms. Brinkley was so frightened by the threats of PCC, Inc. that she used almost an entire SSI check that she needed for her family to pay PCC, Inc. so that she would not be taken away from her children. She was particularly frightened because she had previously served several months in jail after her misdemeanor probation was revoked at the request of PCC, Inc.
187. On August 3, 2015, undersigned pro bono counsel represented Ms. Brinkley at her revocation hearing. Prior to the hearing, counsel was informed by the courthouse clerk that
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Ms. Brinkley would not be allowed to participate in her revocation hearing until she took, and paid for, another drug test at PCC, Inc.—which would cost an additional $19.85. This was required of Ms. Brinkley (as it is uniformly for all probationers before they will be permitted to appear at their PCC, Inc.-initiated revocation hearings) despite the fact that her underlying offense was unrelated to drugs, and the fact that her probation period had ended. After taking (and passing) this unnecessary drug test, the District Attorney confirmed that he would agree to dismissal of the revocation petition against Ms. Brinkley if she agreed to pay for the drug test she had just been forced to take at PCC, Inc., and if she proved that she had paid PCC, Inc. all of her court fines, costs, and fees in full.
188. Ms. Brinkley was so frightened that her probation would be revoked and that she would be jailed that she agreed to pay for the additional drug test even though she needed the money for basic necessities for her family (and even though she was no longer on probation). She passed the drug test, she showed the District Attorney and the judge that she had paid PCC, Inc. in full, and the revocation petition was dismissed.
189. On August 12, 2015, Ms. Brinkley learned that, despite being told that her case was over, PCC, Inc. had made an error and that Ms. Brinkley still owed approximately $700 from a case in which PCC, Inc. had supervised her in 2008. PCC, Inc. informed Ms. Brinkley that it had secured a warrant for her arrest and that she needed to turn herself into the County jail. According to PCC, Inc., it had revoked her probation in 2008 for nonpayment.
190. Despite knowledge of her indigence from the beginning of her probationary term, PCC, Inc. failed to inform her of any mechanism to have her costs and fees reduced or waived and never conducted any inquiry into her ability to pay. Ms. Brinkley was told that she could avoid any problems and jailings only by paying what PCC, Inc. claimed that she owed.
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191. In 2008, Ms. Brinkley had served several months in jail (including 40 days prior to even being brought to court) because of a revocation petition issued by PCC, Inc. Ms. Brinkley was sentenced to 90 days in jail at the proceedings initiated by PCC, Inc. despite not having a lawyer to represent her. PCC, Inc. and the County court purportedly obtained a “waiver” of counsel and an “Agreed” revocation to Ms. Brinkley, although none of these actions were taking knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Ms. Brinkley is now being threatened with another jailing arising out of that same incident if she does not pay.
vi. Plaintiff Curtis Johnson 192. Curtis Johnson is a 56-year-old man. He lives in desperate poverty. 193. Mr. Johnson has difficulty working after he fell while working in residential construction from scaffolding that was 45 feet high. He broke his pelvis and vertebrae. He also suffers from a hernia. 194. Mr. Johnson survives on $129 in food stamps every month, and he is currently facing eviction from his home. His previous home burned down in November 2014, and he has no bank account, no car, and no significant assets. 195. Mr. Johnson is currently on probation with PCC, Inc. for driving on a suspended license. He lost his license and cannot get it back because he cannot afford to pay his court and probation costs, fines, and fees. 196. Mr. Johnson was also on probation with PCC, Inc. in 2014. PCC, Inc. routinely threatened him that it would “violate” him if he did not pay. When Mr. Johnson could not pay, PCC, Inc. filed a revocation petition and an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Johnson. He turned himself into the jail. An extra fee was added for the arrest warrant secured by PCC, Inc.
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197. When Mr. Johnson went to court, he was placed on a payment plan directly with the court. He was told that he must pay $100 per month. On a recent visit, the clerk told him that, pursuant to their policy, if he did not start paying the $100 per month, he would be placed back on probation with PCC, Inc.
198. When he was placed on probation with PCC, Inc. again in 2015 for driving on a suspended license, Mr. Johnson went to an orientation at PCC, Inc. His probation officer told him to bring $150 to the initial meeting. Mr. Johnson was not able to bring the money. His probation officer told him that if he did not pay then PCC, Inc. would “violate” him again and that he would have to turn himself into the County jail again. Defendant Tiara Smith, Mr. Johnson’s probation officer, has repeatedly threatened him with probation revocation if he does not pay.
199. At no time did any PCC, Inc. employee tell Mr. Johnson that he had a right to have his payments reduced or waived because of his indigence.
200. Mr. Johnson heard from a friend that people can file indigency motions with the court to seek the reduction or waiver of their fines and costs. As a result, Mr. Johnson asked his PCC, Inc. probation officer about it. Defendant Smith told Mr. Johnson that if he wanted to apply for indigency, he would have to pay for and pass a drug test administered by PCC, Inc., which would cost approximately $20. She told him that he would also have to pay the standard $25 indigency motion fee. Mr. Johnson said that he could not afford to pay. Defendant Smith said that, in any event, she could not give him an indigency application without a supervisor’s approval, and she refused to give it to him during the meeting.
201. On the advice of counsel, Mr. Johnson attempted again to seek an indigency waiver two weeks later. This time, he was given an application, which he filled out. Mr.
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Johnson estimated that his food stamps and scraping money together from odd jobs totaled an income of $429 per month, far below even half of the federal poverty line.
202. After submitting the application, his PCC, Inc. probation officer “rejected” his application because, according to the probation officer, Mr. Johnson had not yet paid enough money to PCC, Inc. to be considered for indigency. The probation officer also told him that he had not proven to PCC, Inc. that he was not able to work.
203. Mr. Johnson was so afraid of being jailed for not bringing any payments to PCC, Inc. that he went without food and paid $20. PCC, Inc. decided to apply that money to itself and to not credit any of it toward his court costs.
204. On September 29, 2015, Mr. Johnson paid PCC, Inc. $10. Defendant Smith told Mr. Johnson that he had to “come up with” over $900 within the next two weeks or else PCC, Inc. would “violate” him.
vii. Fred Robinson 205. Fred Robinson is a 30-year-old indigent individual with a disability. 206. Mr. Robinson relies on SSI disability benefits to survive. He suffers daily from cirrhosis of the liver. Because of his liver malfunction, his body routinely sends toxins to his brain, rendering him periodically confused and disoriented. He also suffers from severe internal bleeding due to chronic stomach ulcers, which render him unable to work. His only source of income is his disability income. 207. Mr. Robinson was convicted of misdemeanor marijuana and paraphernalia charges in December 2011. He was assessed a $500 fine for each charge and court costs of $1,503 dollars. Because he could not afford to pay, he was placed on supervised probation with PCC, Inc.
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208. From the very beginning of his time on PCC, Inc. probation, Mr. Robinson has been repeatedly threatened with jailing if he did not pay PCC, Inc. At his “orientation,” PCC, Inc. probation officers threatened him that if he did not pay them enough money, they would make sure that he would be arrested and “violated.” He was told that, if violated, he would eventually be put back on probation with even more fees. Every time he reported for probation, he would be threatened with jailing for nonpayment.
209. Mr. Robinson informed PCC, Inc. probation officers immediately of his indigence and his disability, but PCC, Inc. officers continued to threaten him. At no point was Mr. Robinson told of any legal mechanism that he might have to having his fees and costs waived or reduced due to indigence.
210. Mr. Robinson persisted in pleading his indigence to PCC, Inc. probation officers. He told them repeatedly when he showed up that he couldn’t pay. His probation officers, Defendants Hyde and Schexnayder would repeatedly tell him: “that’s not my problem.” When Mr. Robinson told his probation officer that he could not afford to pay both PCC, Inc. and his rent, she told him: “we don’t care what other obligations you have. You’ve got to pay this.”
211. PCC, Inc. made Mr. Robinson report in person every week for 2-4 hours under threat of revocation even though he had a serious medical issue that made such reporting onerous and dangerous for him.
212. PCC, Inc. officers also refused to return Mr. Robinson’s phone calls concerning procedures for drug testing and then, when he did not pay, threatened to “violate” him for not following procedures that they had never explained to him. A fellow probationer had to explain the procedures to Mr. Robinson so that he would not break PCC, Inc. rules.
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213. Despite knowing of his severe disability and indigence, PCC, Inc. probation officers threatened him with jail if he did not pay them. Mr. Robinson tried to pay what he could, but he was not able to pay as much as PCC, Inc. demanded.
214. When Mr. Robinson could not come up with enough money to pay PCC, Inc., his probation officer, Defendant Schexnayder, followed through on her threats. She submitted a sworn warrant application to the County court in November 2012 seeking Mr. Robinson’s arrest and seeking a $5,000 secured bond because of his failure to pay PCC, Inc.
215. The sworn PCC, Inc. affidavit stated that he owed supervision fees, court costs, and “warrant fees” added by PCC, Inc. as a result of its decision to petition for his arrest. At the point of the revocation petition, PCC, Inc. had chosen not to apply any of Mr. Robinson’s extorted payments to his court costs, and had taken all of the money he paid for itself.
216. Mr. Robinson was arrested and, because he was destitute, could not afford his bond. Upon motion of his lawyer, the court found him indigent and, noting his SSI disability, reduced his bond to $1,000, an amount he could still not afford. He languished in jail.14
217. When he was eventually brought to court for a hearing on the petition, the court ordered him, at the request of PCC, Inc. and the District Attorney, to return to PCC, Inc. probation for a term of over 23 months. The court explained, pursuant to its policy, that if he paid his court costs (which were now over $2,500), then he could be placed on unsupervised probation.
218. Mr. Robinson remains on PCC, Inc. probation. Each time his probationary period nears an end, PCC, Inc. seeks revocation, has Mr. Robinson arrested, assesses additional fees,
14 On another occasion in 2012, he languished in jail for 19 days because of a warrant sought by PCC, Inc. On each occasion, he was eventually brought to court and had his probation with PCC, Inc. extended. As a result he has been on PCC, Inc. probation for the past four years straight based on two minor misdemeanor convictions in 2011.
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and recommends extension of probation. Mr. Robinson lives in constant fear of continued jailing because of his inability to pay what PCC, Inc. demands.
219. On September 24, 2015, counsel for Mr. Robinson learned that Defendant Hyde had carried through on her previous threats to “violate” Mr. Robinson if he did not pay. Defendant Hyde sought and obtained a warrant for Mr. Robinson’s arrest based on a sworn affidavit that he had failed to pay shortly before his probationary term was set to expire in August 2015. The warrant sought and obtained by PCC, Inc. provides that Mr. Robinson will be arrested and kept in jail unless he pays a preset $10,000 secured money bond.
220. The County Sheriff stated that Mr. Robinson would be arrested and held in jail pursuant to the $10,000 secured money bond as soon as the Sheriff’s office “got their hands on him.”
221. Because Mr. Robinson is indigent and disabled, he is unable to afford the fixed secured bond and will languish in jail for weeks until the County conducts revocation proceedings and before any hearing into his ability to pay would be conducted.
Class Action Allegations 222. Plaintiffs bring this Class action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 223. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unlawful probation and debt-collection scheme. 224. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 225. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
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requirements of those provisions.
226. Plaintiffs propose the following class for which they seek declaratory, injunctive,
and monetary damages: All persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to Rutherford
County from fines, fees, costs, or surcharges arising from traffic and misdemeanor cases in the
County court and who have been placed on probation with PCC, Inc. pursuant to the Contract
between the Defendants Rutherford County and PCC, Inc.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
227. Over the past several months and years, the County has required and currently
requires thousands of people to serve terms of what the Defendants call “probation” through
PCC, Inc. Pursuant to the Defendants’ policy and practice, all of these people are currently
being threatened with arrest and jailing if they do not make the payments in the amount or
frequency demanded by the Defendants.
228. The names, case numbers, probation documents, dates of imprisonment, financial
receipts, and relevant records of the class members are in the possession of the Defendants and
are easily ascertainable.15
15 Numerous efforts by Plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain basic public court records relevant to this case have been met with resistance, outright denials, and various episodes of bizarre behavior by local officials. This behavior included County clerks erroneously telling summer interns working for undersigned counsel that the only way for the clerks to look up public court records was for the students first to get case numbers from the public computer terminal and, then, when the students went to the public terminals, telling the students that no non-Tennessee resident was permitted to use the public terminals and refusing them access. The County clerk later provided a portion of the information requested after undersigned counsel informed the clerk that conditioning access to public records based on state residency was unconstitutional. However, after receiving a small number of records, undersigned counsel was informed that no further records would be received if requested by a non-Tennessee resident. Armed County sheriff’s deputies then detained representatives of Plaintiffs’ counsel and accused them of being members of the media before intimidating them, confiscating their identification, and threatening them with arrest after they asked at the public clerk’s office for copies of court records in their clients’ cases. Many additional efforts to obtain records by interns and several lawyers, including Tennessee-licensed lawyers, have been met with resistance. Furthermore, the County clerk’s office has refused to comply with a properly issued Tennessee Public Records request seeking these public court records. As a result, only a portion of the relevant public records in Defendants’ possession have been obtained to date.
Attempts by undersigned counsel to obtain records from PCC, Inc. concerning the named Plaintiffs have also gone unanswered or been refused by the company.
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229. The Defendants have followed and continue to follow materially the same
policies, practices, and procedures with respect to all of the Class members.
230. Those who still owe debt payments or who will incur such debts will be subjected
to the same ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
231. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions
of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The Plaintiffs seek relief concerning
whether the Defendants’ policies, practices, and procedures violated their rights and relief
requiring that those policies, practices and procedures be changed to protect their rights in the
future.
232. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
 Whether PCC, Inc. and the County contracted for the provision of probation services;
 Factual determinations concerning how PCC, Inc. earns its profit and what fees it charges pursuant to the contractual arrangement;
 All of the facts surrounding how the County and PCC, Inc. operate the probation system pursuant to the Contract, including who is placed on supervised probation; how people are placed on supervised probation; what conditions are imposed by PCC, Inc.; what policies and practices are in place for PCC, Inc. supervision; what policies and practices are in place for drug testing; what policies and practices, if any, are used to determine indigency; what policies and practices are used to initiate revocation proceedings; what policies and practices are in place for collecting money; and how revocation proceedings are conducted.
233. Among the most important common question of law are:
 Whether as a matter of federal law, a County can choose to abandon the traditional neutral probation officer function and contract to employ a probation officer with all of the same duties and powers but who has a personal financial conflict of interest in the management and outcome of every case through a “user funded model”;
 Whether a contract creating a probation officer with such a personal financial stake is void;
 Whether a government can place people on onerous probation plans that involve extra fees and serious intrusions on liberty based on wealth status;
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 Whether a government and a private company, working together, can circumvent state debt-collection protections by imposing onerous actions that no private creditor could lawfully impose;
 Whether it is lawful to issue and execute arrest warrants based solely on nonpayment, especially in the case of people known or adjudged in advance to be indigent;
 Whether it is lawful to detain a person after arrest because the person cannot afford to pay a preset money bond without any inquiry into ability to pay or any other findings;
 Whether it is lawful to use legal process purportedly concerning probation violation and probation judgments with the ulterior motive to earn profit.
234. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set
of policies and practices: the Defendants’ enormously profitable contractual relationship
governing their misdemeanor probation supervision practices. The Defendants operate this
scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day. The material components of the
scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and
factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the relief that
they seek.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
235. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the
Class, and they have the same interests in this case as all other members of the Class that they
represent. Each of them suffered injuries from the failure of the Defendants to comply with the
basic constitutional and statutory provisions detailed below. The answer to whether the
Defendants’ scheme of policies and practices is unlawful in the ways alleged will determine the
claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class member.
236. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in their claims that the Defendants’ policies and
practices concerning debt collection through misdemeanor probation for fines, fees, costs, and
surcharges violate the law in the ways alleged in each claim of the Complaint, then that ruling
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will likewise benefit every other member of the Class. D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 237. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because they are
members of the Class and because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the Class. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class members, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating the constitutional and statutory rights to which they are entitled.
238. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Baker Donelson and Equal Justice Under Law16 who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of the Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law.
239. Counsel’s efforts have so far included extensive investigation over a period of months, including numerous interviews with witnesses, probationers, County employees, former County jail inmates, families, attorneys practicing in Rutherford County, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of Tennessee misdemeanor courts, and national experts in debt collection and constitutional law.
240. Counsel have also observed and participated in numerous courtroom hearings in Rutherford County in order to compile a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel has studied the way that these systems function in other cities and counties in order to investigate the wide array of options in practice for municipalities.
241. As a result, counsel has devoted enormous time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with the Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal
16 Equal Justice Under Law is a non-profit civil rights organization based in Washington, D.C. The organization was founded by Alec Karakatsanis and Phil Telfeyan, and it was funded initially by the Harvard Law School Public Service Venture Fund.
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laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel has also developed relationships
with many of the individuals and families most victimized by the Defendants’ practices.
242. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law who
have experience litigating complex civil rights class action lawsuits in federal court and
extensive knowledge of the relevant constitutional law. Counsel for the Plaintiff has also been
lead counsel in several similar class action constitutional challenges to unlawful municipal debt-
collection regimes. See, e.g., Mitchell et al, v. City of Montgomery, 2014-cv-186 (M.D. Ala.
2014). That case involved a major investigation and landmark litigation to end widespread
injustices involving the use of private probation and the jailing of impoverished people by the
City of Montgomery over a period of years for their non-payment of debt from traffic tickets and other misdemeanor offenses.17 It resulted in the cancelling of the private probation contract, the
release of numerous people from the local jail, and a consent decree mandating new policies and
practices. Counsel is also lead attorney in pending lawsuits challenging the treatment of indigent
people with court debts in the municipal courts and jails of Jennings and Ferguson, Missouri.
See also Jenkins et al. v. City of Jennings, 15-cv-252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. 2015); Fant et al. v. City of
Ferguson, 15-cv-253-AGF (E.D. Mo. 2015).
243. The Plaintiffs are also represented by experienced attorneys from Baker
Donelson, who are among the most accomplished and knowledgeable attorneys in the state
17 Counsel is also lead attorney in several recent class action lawsuits challenging the use of money bail to keep impoverished people in jail prior to trial. See Jones et al. v. City of Clanton, 15-cv-34 (M.D. Ala. 2015); Pierce et. al. v. City of Velda City, 15-cv-570 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Powell et al. v. City of St. Ann, 4:15-cv-840 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Thompson et al. v. City of Moss Point, 1:15-cv-00182-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. 2015). Counsel was also previously the lead attorney in a constitutional civil rights class action against the District of Columbia in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 1:13-cv-00686-ESH (D.D.C. 2013). In that litigation, undersigned counsel was responsible for investigating and building the complex constitutional claims against the District of Columbia, authoring the legal filings in the class action case, and negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the District of Columbia Attorney General that stayed the class action litigation and began to implement sweeping changes to the County’s policies and practices governing the civil forfeiture of property by the District’s Metropolitan Police Department—procedures that affect thousands of putative class members every year.
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concerning issues of access to justice, and who possess the resources to prosecute this case zealously. Counsel from Baker Donelson also have significant experience litigating complex lawsuits in federal and state courts and have extensive knowledge of the relevant federal and state laws.
244. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 245. Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its probation and debt-collection scheme, have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the Class are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to a neutral probation officer without a personal financial conflict of interest in their case would benefit every member of the proposed Class. The same applies to legal rulings on the other claims, including: that the Contract is void; that the arrangement and the Defendants’ policies violate the Equal Protection Clause by imposing onerous probation conditions based on wealth status and by imposing debt-collection methods far more onerous than any private creditor could lawfully impose; that the scheme to issue arrest warrants based solely on non-payment violates the Fourth Amendment and procedural due process; that PCC, Inc. abuses process by commandeering specific legal processes for the ulterior motive of earning profit; that it is unlawful to detain a person after arrest because the person cannot afford to pay a preset money bond without any inquiry into ability to pay or any other findings; and that the policy, pattern, and practice of threats to jail people for nonpayment without informing them of their rights or inquiring into their ability to pay constitutes an extortion enterprise in blatant violation of racketeering laws.
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246. Injunctive relief compelling the Defendants to comply with these constitutional and statutory requirements will similarly protect each member of the Class from being subjected to the Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices with respect to the debts that they still owe and protect those who will incur such debts in the future from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
F: Rule 23(b)(3) 247. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because the common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate in this case. This case turns, for every named Plaintiff, as well as for the members of the Class, on what the Defendants’ policies and practices are and on whether those policies are lawful. 248. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the content and legality of the Defendants’ policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of Rutherford County residents. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was subjected to the unlawful scheme and the amount of money extorted from them. Determining damages for individual Class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records in the Defendants’ possession. If need be, individual hearings on Classmember specific damages based on special circumstances and particular hardships endured as a result of Defendants’ extortion scheme can be held after Class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
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249. The Plaintiffs seek the following relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
Claims for Relief Count One: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) and (d) 250. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-249. 251. The Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (“RICO”), are brought against the Private Probation Defendants and not Rutherford County. 252. The Plaintiffs are “persons” with standing to sue within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c). 253. Defendant PCC, Inc. is a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because it is an entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 254. Defendants Jasmine Jackson, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Kelly Haley, Amanda Schexnayder, Kayla Banks, Nisha Hyde, and Kelly McCall are each a “RICO person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) because they are capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. A. The RICO Enterprise 255. The Private Probation Defendants, together with Rutherford County and the other unnamed conspirators, constitute an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). This RICO Enterprise is an ongoing business relationship with the common purpose of maximizing the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PCC, Inc. without consideration of the probationer’s ability to pay.
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256. The RICO Enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce because its activities and transactions relating to the collection of money, and the movement of the profit received by Defendant PCC, Inc. (an out-of-state corporation incorporated in Delaware) pursuant to this operation, frequently requires movement and communications across state lines. PCC, Inc. probation officers also use the electronic communications and the United States mail to communicate with PCC, Inc. probationers, including using those means to transmit threats of incarceration and revocation for nonpayment.
257. The members of the RICO Enterprise function as a continuing unit. 258. The Private Probation Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because they are associated with an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce and have, directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 259. The Private Probation Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) because they have conspired with each other to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 260. Specifically, the Private Probation Defendants conducted or participated in and conspired to conduct the affairs of the RICO Enterprise by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; b. Extortion in violation of Tenn. Code § 39-14-112; and c. Extortion in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. B. Predicate Acts 261. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previously described extortion allegations.
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262. The Private Probation Defendants have, on their own and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat the various fees discussed in this Complaint, including (but not limited to) the $45 monthly fee and the $20 drug test fee, with intent to deprive supervisees of this money.
263. The Private Probation Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, threatened and continue to threaten Plaintiffs that if they do not agree to pay money to PCC, Inc., they: (a) will be arrested; (b) will have their probation revoked; (c) will be accused by PCC, Inc. of violating the conditions of probation; (d) will face testimony by PCC, Inc. against them regarding non-payment, but without revealing the reasons for non-payment (including an inability to pay); (e) will have their probation extended and will be charged additional fees; (f) will be subjected to intrusive and humiliating supervision, including drug testing in a bathroom observed by PCC, Inc. employees; and (g) will be sent to jail.
264. These threats are inherently wrongful because they are motivated out of a desire to extort, because they are premised on deception concerning the facts and in knowing violation of the legal rights of the victims, and because they are demanded pursuant to an unlawful contract.
265. Because of these unlawful threats, the Plaintiffs paid the fees demanded by PCC, Inc.
i. Extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 266. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previously described extortion allegations.
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267. The Private Probation Defendants have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, obtained fees from Plaintiffs with their consent, which consent has been induced by the wrongful use of fear in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act).
268. The proceeds of Private Probation Defendants’ extortionate activities were used in commerce, and therefore affected commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, as these terms are understood by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
ii. Extortion in Violation of Tennessee Code § 39-14-112. 269. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previously described extortion allegations. 270. The Private Probation Defendants have themselves, and in conspiracy with the other person in the RICO enterprise, obtained by threat fees from the Plaintiffs and impaired their exercise of their state and federal rights.
iii. Extortion in Violation of the Travel Act 271. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previously described extortion allegations. 272. The Private Probation Defendants have, individually and in conspiracy with the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, obtained by threat fees from Plaintiffs, with intent to deprive them of this money and the enjoyment of their state and federal rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act) and Tennessee law. 273. The Private Probation Defendants have traveled in interstate commerce, and have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of the extortionate scheme and to communicate with each other and with their victims concerning the operation of
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the scheme, including by operating a corporate entity, PCC, Inc. that is based outside of Tennessee but is operating the extortionate activities described herein within Rutherford County, Tennessee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1). The Private Probation Defendants have traveled in interstate commerce, and have used the mail and facilities in interstate commerce to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of an extortionate scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
C. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 274. The Private Probation Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise have engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Complaint repeatedly since at least 2006 and continuing through the present with respect to thousands of probationers in Rutherford County. These racketeering acts are part of the enterprise’s regular way of doing business. 275. The racketeering acts of the Private Probation Defendants and the other participants in the RICO enterprise have a similar purpose: to maximize the collection of court fines, costs, and fees by PCC, Inc. without consideration of the individual’s ability to pay and without informing probationers of their legal rights. 276. The racketeering acts of the Private Probation Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise have yielded similar results and caused similar injuries to the Plaintiffs: the Plaintiffs have, inter alia, all been subjected to fees paid to Defendant PCC, Inc. as a result of Private Probation Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have all also been subjected to threats of physical confinement, actual physical confinement, and physically intrusive and humiliating drug tests for the purpose of financial profit to PCC, Inc., as
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well as relinquishing their federal and state rights through onerous and unlawful probation conditions.
277. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts have similar participants: Private Probation Defendants, County officials, and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise.
278. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Private Probation Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise, through the RICO Enterprise, directed their racketeering activities at similar victims: the named Plaintiffs specifically, and also more generally all Rutherford County misdemeanor probationers (and pretrial supervisees).
279. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the racketeering acts of Private Probation Defendants and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise have similar methods of commission, namely: extorting the named Plaintiffs and, more generally, all Rutherford County misdemeanor probationers who cannot afford to pay their entire court debts on the date they are adjudicated or assigned, into paying additional supervision fees to PCC, Inc.
D. Injury 280. As a direct and proximate result of Private Probation Defendants’ and the other participants in the RICO Enterprise’s willful, knowing, and intentional acts discussed in this Complaint, the Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property. Plaintiffs have all been subjected to probation fees and surcharges paid to Defendant PCC, Inc., and they have been forced to continue paying these fees even when they cannot afford to do so without sacrificing the basic necessities of life, resulting in economic harm to themselves and their families. 281. The Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
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Count two: Defendants’ Use of a Private Actor With a Personal Financial Stake in the Outcome of Judicial Proceedings and Probation Case Decisions As a Supposedly
Neutral Probation Officer Violates Plaintiffs’ Due Process Rights. 282. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-281 above. 283. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits neutral judicial officials and neutral civil and criminal law enforcement actors from having a personal financial interest in the cases prosecuted and decided by them in our legal system. The County has contracted with a private, for-profit corporation to perform a traditional court function— probation—and, critically, made the resolution of the Plaintiffs’ cases contingent on the demands, advice, recommendations, discretionary decisions, enforcement actions, testimony, and representations of this private entity. 284. In contrast to the traditional and longstanding role of the probation officer—such as the role performed by Tennessee State Probation Officers and United States Probation Officers—PCC, Inc. has a direct financial stake in every decision that they make regarding case supervision, enforcement, and revocation. PCC, Inc. has a personal financial interest to conduct its role as a probation officer in a way that maximizes its personal profit and not as a neutral public court officer. 285. Because this non-neutral actor profits significantly from the decisions about whether to place people on probation, what conditions to require, what information to provide probationers about their rights and obligations, how to enforce those conditions, what testimony to provide, and what sanction to recommend, there is a clear risk that those financial interests will affect its judgment when it makes in those decisions. There is also overwhelming evidence that these financial interests have and continue to have an impact on every decision of PCC, Inc. probation officers. Because this private entity has a significant personal financial interest in how
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these cases are managed and resolved, unlike a traditional neutral judicial actor, prosecuting authority, or probation department, the Defendants’ policies and practices violate the longstanding due process restrictions against such self-interested financial arrangements in American courts of justice.
286. Under the Defendants’ scheme, PCC, Inc. can not only decide whether to initiate revocation proceedings, but it can also influence what conditions are imposed.18 It can then make rules and determine whether and when to petition for revocation based on the perceived violation of those rules or other conditions. It also controls how probationers are supervised and what information is provided to or withheld from them concerning their legal rights. Then, PCC, Inc. serves as the main witness or, as often happens, PCC, Inc.’s allegations are treated as evidence at any violation proceeding. Finally, PCC, Inc. then meets privately with the district attorney and the Court and recommends a resolution or sanction in the case. These recommendations include whether the person should be placed back on probation for an extended period (and charged additional fees) and/or jailed.
Count Three: The Contract Between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County Is Void and Unenforceable Under Tennessee Law.
287. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-285 above. 288. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief voiding the Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County as contrary to Tennessee law. 289. The Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County, the terms and provisions of which are set forth above, and included as Exhibit 1, is harmful to the public and is in conflict with federal and state law. As set forth more fully herein, and incorporated by reference above,
18 As noted earlier, people placed on “probation” because they cannot afford to pay their fines, fees, costs, and surcharges immediately are also forced to abide by additional restrictions on their liberty, which the Defendants call “conditions” of probation. Those restrictions are imposed solely because of their indigency.
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the Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County violates the U.S. Constitution, the parallel protections of the Tennessee Constitution, as well as Tennessee’s laws and judicial opinions. To take only several of the many examples discussed in this Complaint, the Contract unconstitutionally and unconscionably establishes a private actor with a personal financial stake in the outcome of each case as a supposedly neutral state “probation officer,” mandates that particular actions be taken and particular amounts charged in particular judicial cases, and requires that nonpayment of costs and fees be made a “violation” of probation.
290. The Plaintiffs are intended third-party beneficiaries to the Contract between Rutherford County and PCC, Inc., in that the Contract specifically contemplates the provision of private probation services to residents of Rutherford County, such as the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County provides for a monopoly on probation services in Rutherford County and ensures that all residents placed on private probation (including the Plaintiffs) will be serviced by PCC, Inc.
291. Accordingly, because the Contract between PCC, Inc. and Rutherford County prescribes for private probation services to be conducted through a “user funded model” and in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, the parallel protections of the Tennessee Constitution, and Tennessee’s laws and judicial opinions, the Plaintiffs are forced, and were specifically intended to, suffer the unlawful terms of the Contract.
Count Four: Defendants’ Use of Jail, Threats of Jail, and an Onerous Probation System to Collect Debts Owed to the County Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions On Debtors Whose Creditor Is the Government
Compared To Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors. 292. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-290 above. 293. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup court costs from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position to impose
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unduly restrictive methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. Not only does the County place indigent people on standardized and overly onerous probation supervision lasting years when the cases of wealthier people would be closed or unsupervised, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, onerous liberty-restricting probation conditions, revoked or withheld drivers’ licenses,19 intrusive drug tests, extra fees and surcharges, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs, the County takes advantage of its control over the machinery of the County jail, prosecutorial, court, and police systems to deny debtors the statutory protections that every other Tennessee debtor may invoke against a private creditor. The Defendants deprive the Plaintiffs of these protections even though Tennessee law explicitly states that the debts owed to the Defendants are subject to Tennessee law on civil judgments.
294. Many people like the Plaintiffs owing money to the County have to borrow money, ration public benefits, convert federal means tested disability checks into money orders for PCC, Inc., and go further into debt in order to pay off the County because other nongovernment creditors are not permitted to jail them, threaten to jail them, or compel their repeated arrest and court appearances for years for non-payment of debt. This coercive policy and practice constitutes invidious discrimination and violates the fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
Count Five: Defendants’ Policy and Practice of Placing People Who Owe Debts to the County on Onerous Probation Supervision Based Solely on Their Wealth Status Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
295. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-293 above.
19 It is the policy and practice of the County to initiate the revocation and subsequently prevent the reinstatement of Tennessee driving privileges for unpaid costs and fees without informing court debtors of any legal mechanism to avoid this consequence because of their indigence and inability to pay.
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296. The Defendants’ policy and practice is to use supervised probation for those people who cannot afford to pay the court judgment in full. If the person can pay, the person pays and they are not supervised by PCC, Inc. If the person is too poor to pay, the County has a policy and practice of placing that person on “probation,” including forcing the person to abide by conditions agreed upon by PCC, Inc. and the County that seriously restrict the person’s liberty and that purport to subject the person to punishment in jail if those conditions (including payment of extra fees to PCC, Inc.) are violated. The same is true throughout the duration of probation, which can be converted to unsupervised probation at any time if they person pays the money owed. This policy and practice of altering punishment based solely on wealth status violates fundamental principles of Due Process and Equal Protection.
Count Six: Defendants’ Policy and Practice of Issuing and Executing Arrest Warrants Solely Based on Nonpayment of Monetary Debts Violates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 297. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-295 above. 298. The Defendants’ policy and practice is to seek, issue, and execute arrest warrants against those who have not paid their debt from misdemeanor judgments. These warrants are sought, issued, and served without any inquiry into the person’s ability to pay even when the Defendants have prior knowledge that the person is impoverished and unable to pay the debts or possesses other valid defenses (including against people who the Court itself has found indigent and who PCC, Inc. has actual knowledge of indigence). These warrants are regularly sought, issued, and served without any finding of probable cause that the person has committed the elements of any offense or violation and, indeed, with actual knowledge that no willful violation has occurred. The warrants therefore are procured based on the reckless and knowingly false premise that a violation of probation has occurred. Indeed, the warrants are procured
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notwithstanding Tennessee law that a person cannot have probation revoked for the nonpayment of court costs.
299. The Defendants choose to pursue warrants instead of issuing summons even when they have spoken to people on the phone or in person and have the opportunity to notify them to appear in court, thus allowing PCC, Inc. to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty for nonpayment prior to any meaningful pre-deprivation process (and thereby to levy additional fees and costs). Moreover, the County’s policy and practice is to unreasonably delay presentment for judicial proceedings days or weeks for no legitimate reason. These practices violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and result in a deprivation of fundamental liberty without adequate due process.
Count Seven: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Rights By Jailing Them Solely Because They Cannot Afford A Preset Money Payment Prior to a Court Appearance.
300. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-298 above. 301. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses have long prohibited keeping a person in jail because of the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ rights by placing and keeping them in jail pursuant to arrest warrants sought and obtained by PCC, Inc. for alleged violations of probation when the Plaintiffs cannot afford to pay the amount of money bond preset by the arrest warrant without any inquiry into their indigence and ability to pay, any pre-deprivation process, any assessment of alternatives to detention, or any inquiry into whether the Plaintiffs are a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
Count Eight: Abuse of Process 302. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-300 above
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303. The Defendants abused the legal process to seek arrest warrants and probation
revocation judgments with an ulterior motive to collect additional fees.
304. When probationers are unable to pay what PCC, Inc. demands, PCC, Inc. files
revocation petitions and secures warrants for the arrest of PCC, Inc. probationers. Moreover,
PCC, Inc. then participates through written documents, testimony, and informal ex parte
conversations with Rutherford County prosecutors and judges to secure violation of probation
judgments. PCC, Inc. engages in all of these activities with the ulterior motive of securing the
additional court costs and fees that come as a matter of County policy and practice with each
revocation violation. PCC, Inc. also engages in an abuse of process throughout its probation
supervision by using the order of probation not to do justice and assist probationers, but for the
ulterior motive of making profit by setting fees, performing drug tests, and using the threat of
violating the probation order to extort money.
Request for Relief
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand a jury trial for all issues so appropriate and request
that this Court issue the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that subjecting the Plaintiffs to the Defendants’ conduct as alleged in the Counts listed above is unlawful;
b. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the above-described unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices against the Plaintiffs and the Class of similarly situated people on whose behalf they are bringing suit;
c. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs and the Class of similarly situated individuals for the damages that they suffered as a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
d. A judgment granting the treble and punitive damages authorized by statute based on the Defendants’ willful and egregious violations of the law;
e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted,
s/ Jonathan Cole_______________________ Jonathan Cole (TN #16632) Sarah Murray (TN #33454) Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC 211 Commerce Street, Suite 800 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Tel.: (615) 726-7335 Fax: (615) 744-7335 Email: jcole@bakerdonelson.com
smurray@bakerdonelson.com
_ s/Matthew White_______________________ Lori H. Patterson (TN #19848)(Pro Hac Vice Forthcoming) Kristine L. Roberts (TN #23856) Matthew G. White (TN #30857) Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC First Tennessee Bank Building 165 Madison Avenue, Suite 2000 Memphis, Tennessee 38103 Tel.: (901) 577-8182 Fax: (901) 577-0724 Email: lpatterson@bakerdonelson.com
klroberts@bakerdonelson.com mwhite@bakerdonelson.com
s/ Alec Karakatsanis____________________ Alec Karakatsanis (D.C. #999294)(Pro Hac Vice forthcoming) Phil Telfeyan (Cal. #258270)(Pro Hac Vice forthcoming) Equal Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202)-670-1004 Email: alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, et al. Plaintiffs,
v. PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, INC., et al.
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-01048

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JUDGE SHARP

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MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs are residents and misdemeanor probationers of Rutherford County, Tennessee

who filed suit on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. Defendants are Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the County”), Pathways Community Corrections, Inc. (“PCC”),1 and individual probation officers (“Individual Defendants”).2 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 36), to which Defendants have responded in

opposition (Docket Nos. 39, 41, 51) and Plaintiffs have replied (Docket Nos. 44, 45). Also

pending before the Court are two evidentiary filings: Defendant PCC’s Motion to Exclude

Extraneous Exhibits (Docket No. 48) and Plaintiffs’ Objections to New Evidence Offered by

PCC., Inc. (Docket No. 52). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both evidentiary

requests and grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Plaintiffs have filed a class action lawsuit seeking to address one aspect of the growing

privatization of the criminal justice system, namely, Rutherford County’s use of a profit-driven

1 PCC previously did business as Providence Community Corrections, Inc. 2 The Court refers to the County, PCC, and the Individual Defendants collectively as “Defendants.”
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corporation to administer misdemeanor probation services. Plaintiffs allege that Rutherford County’s current arrangement violates both federal and state law, but they seek injunctive relief based specifically on Count VII of the Complaint, which alleges violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 300-01). The facts giving rise to the instant request for injunctive relief are largely undisputed.
Rutherford County contracts with PCC to provide probation services. (Docket No. 41 at 3). According to the contract, PCC is to “[m]onitor and collect payments for fines, court costs, and restitution” and “[m]onitor compliance with conditions placed on referred cases as ordered by the court.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 6). The contract also binds PCC to “[r]eport to the Court any and all violations of court-ordered conditions for any probationer who is materially in violation of such conditions.” (Id.). The County agreed to “[h]old each referred case accountable for all payment of services, fines, restitution or other court-ordered fees and obligations” and to “[c]reate appropriate sanctions for failure to pay as well as other court-ordered conditions as determined by the Court.” (Id. at 7). The issue now before the Court is how Defendants sanction probationers for violating the conditions of their probation. More specifically, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ failure to account for indigency when the only probation violation alleged is nonpayment and when using secured money bonds to jail probationers pending revocation proceedings.3
When a probationer is in violation of the conditions of his or her probation, whether stemming from inability to pay or otherwise, PCC brings “Affidavits of Complaint for Violation of Probation” to either the Rutherford County General Sessions Court or the Rutherford County
3 A secured bond is one that is backed by some type of security and in the context of confinement, a criminal defendant would post a bond backed by a surety in order to obtain release and promise attendance at a future court proceeding. Bond, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In this case, a secured money bond is one that requires monetary payment to obtain release until revocation proceedings.
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Circuit Court. (E.g., Docket No. 3-2; Docket No. 37-1 and 37-2; Docket No. 44-1; Docket No. 45-2 to 45-5). Once signed by a judge, these affidavits become arrest warrants that can be executed by the County, thereby triggering the process for revocation proceedings. Plaintiffs assert that prior to the initiation of this litigation, PCC brought affidavits to Rutherford County General Sessions Court and/or Rutherford County Circuit Court with the bond amount already filled in by PCC’s probation officers. A General Sessions Court judge, the Honorable Ben Hall McFarlin, confirmed that he had previously received affidavits with bond amounts already listed in the past but does not believe the practice currently exists. (Draft Transcript for Nov. 6, 2015 Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 69) (hereinafter “Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr.”). Where PCC has not filled in the bond line on the affidavit, judges in Rutherford County set the amount of the secured money bond. (Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr. at 68-70).
Because payment of “all required supervision fees, court fines and court costs”4 is a rule of probation, a probationer who is unable to make payments is technically in violation of the conditions of his or her probation. (Docket No. 1-2) (“Rules of Probation”).5 Other conditions of probation also impose costs on probationers. Litter removal, for example, is a condition that is required for first-offense DUI convictions. (Docket No. 51 at 4). This condition costs $132 in Rutherford County, id., and those who wish to satisfy this condition but cannot afford to pick up trash are in violation of the conditions of their probation. Probationers must also make monetary payments to complete alcohol, drug, and domestic violence classes. A probationer who is unable to pay the monetary fees associated with the conditions of his or her probation is precluded from
4 These court-ordered fees, fines and costs, including supervision fees owed to PCC, are collectively referred to herein as “court costs.” 5 Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants have not disputed, that the “Rules of Probation” sheet is “prepared jointly by PCC, Inc. and the County” and must be signed by probationers at the commencement of their period of probation. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 21).
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satisfying those conditions and is in violation. As set forth in the contract, that probationer would become subject to arrest or other sanction by the County.6 Judge McFarlin stated that in the General Sessions court, when a probationer’s only violation is failure to pay, the resulting warrant calls for those arrested to be released on recognizance (“ROR”). (Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr. at 75). Even if true of the General Sessions Court, Plaintiffs submitted at least two arrest warrants from the Rutherford County Circuit Court that subjected probationers whose only violation was failure to pay to imprisonment on secured money bonds. (Docket No. 45-3).7
Defendants use secured money bonds for all other probation violations. Thus, when the probation violation arises out of a probationer’s inability to pay but is technically categorized as a substantive violation—e.g., failure to complete litter removal—the probationer will be held on a secured money bond. These bonds require monetary payment in order for a probationer to obtain release pending his or her revocation hearing. Those who can afford the bond payment are able to purchase immediate freedom and return on their assigned court date. Those who cannot make bond payments are kept in jail until their eventual hearings. According to Judge McFarlin, he issues almost no warrants for secured money bonds lower than $2,500. (Nov. 6. Hr’g Tr. at 96). At no point in this process do Defendants inquire into probationers’ indigency or consider whether another method of ensuring attendance at the revocation hearings might be equally effective. (Id. at 91).
6 Probationers also must pay $20 for drug testing. Defendants assert that if a probationer cannot pay for the drug test when he or she reports to a probation officer, then PCC “absorbs the cost” of the test. (Docket No. 51-1 at 2). However, Plaintiffs have submitted a PCC-generated document which indicates that PCC instead adds the cost of the drug test to the probationer’s total debt. (Docket No. 1-3 at 2). 7 The two nonpayment warrants that Plaintiffs submitted show that Named Plaintiff Fred Robinson was jailed on a $5,000 secured bond in 2012, a bond that nearly doubled the total he owed in court costs, and was jailed on a $10,000 secured bond in 2015, a bond that approximately tripled his total court costs. The utility of such high secured bonds is dubious: if Mr. Robinson could not make PCC’s requisite payments, setting his bond so high virtually ensured his prolonged detention.
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Probationers may receive an informal hearing when Rutherford County judges come to the jail on Mondays and Fridays as part of what is called the “ten-day docket.” At least one of the potential class members has attested to the fact that individuals jailed based on probation violations are not seen as part of the ten-day docket, although other probationer declarations indicate that judges do see PCC probationers during these visits. (Pls. Exs. 5-18 at Nov. 6 Hr’g). Plaintiffs’ declarations reveal that during these ten-day docket “hearings,” the probationers meet with judges and prosecutors, who give them the options of 1) immediately pleading guilty to the alleged probation violation and receiving a sentence; or 2) requesting representation and waiting for a formal revocation hearing. (Id.). According to Plaintiffs’ declarations, probationers are told that pleading guilty will help them obtain swifter release whereas waiting for a public defender will take at least thirty days. (Id.). Confirming these allegations, Judge McFarlin testified that a probationer might have to wait in jail for thirty to sixty days before his or her actual court date.8 (Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr. at 81). Judge McFarlin continued that judges and prosecutors do not engage in any sort of inquiry into indigency when conducting the ten-day docket. (Id. at 91-92).
The Court also finds these jailhouse guilty pleas troubling. Probationers who plead guilty to violations often receive as part of their sentence an extension of their PCC probation term, thus incurring more fees which they cannot pay, resulting in another probation violation and arrest warrant, leading to repeated jailing and perhaps another guilty plea, and so the cycle continues. Indeed, Defendants trap probationers in a pernicious cycle for years on end. One of the arrest warrants Plaintiffs submitted shows a probationer whose term with PCC has been
8 A review of the arrest warrants that Plaintiffs submitted shows probationers’ court dates set from as few as four days to as many as 73 days after arrest.
5

extended at least five times, leaving her trapped by PCC since early 2010. (Pls.’ Ex. 4 at Nov. 6 Hr’g).
Again, if Probationers had the financial means to pay the court costs and probation fees in the first instance, many could avoid violation and arrest entirely. Similarly, if they had the means to post bond, they could secure release pending formal revocation proceedings. Although Defendants do not bother to take it into account, extreme poverty often produces the underlying probation violation and results in prolonged detention.
Plaintiffs previously challenged this probation violation process in reference to two of the Named Plaintiffs, Steven Gibbs and Fred Robinson. (Docket No. 2). After the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) preventing the arrest of Mr. Gibbs and Mr. Robinson (Docket No. 13), the parties stipulated to converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction, (Docket No. 19). The stipulation enjoined Defendants from seeking, serving, or executing arrest warrants based solely on nonpayment of court costs for the arrest of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Gibbs. The stipulated injunction also prohibited seeking, serving, or executing a warrant for violation of probation that would arrest either Plaintiff and subject him to a “preset secured money bond.”9 Plaintiffs now seek injunctive relief on a classwide basis.
II. Evidentiary Objections & Scope of Relief Sought Both parties filed objections to evidence submitted in association with Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs object to a declaration submitted by Defendants (Docket No. 51-1), and Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ submission of declarations
9 It has since come to light that “preset secured money bond” is a not an “industry term” but was coined by Plaintiffs’ counsel. As discussed at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court understands the term to mean a secured money bond imposed without a hearing on or inquiry into the probationer’s ability to pay the bond. (Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr. at 102). In an effort to promote consistency and the economy of words, the Court adopts that definition of the term and occasionally employs it herein.
6

of potential class members (Pls.’ Exs. 5-16 at Nov. 6 Hr’g) and arrest warrants issued for nonpayment of court costs (Docket No. 45-2).
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that neither party submitted any legal authority that would support the exclusion of evidence. Instead, the parties make conclusory allegations that the declarations and arrest warrants are not relevant to the Court’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. This is not so: the declarations – both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ – and arrest warrants contain useful information about the mechanics of Defendants’ probation scheme. The arrest warrants also prove that ROR warrants are a viable alternative to jail when it comes to addressing probation violations. Because the declarations and arrest warrants provide critical context for the injunctive relief sought and because neither party has presented any persuasive grounds for exclusion, the Court will consider all of the evidence on the record.
Defendants do, however, point to one important issue in their objections: the scope of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Early in the litigation, which still remains in its infancy, Plaintiffs endorsed the practice of arresting and releasing probationers on their own recognizance where the only violation alleged was nonpayment. (Docket No. 3 at 1-2) (noting that if Named Plaintiff Fred Robinson had violated his probation by nonpayment of court costs, Defendants “must either issue a valid summons for revocation proceedings or release him after arrest pursuant to his own recognizance or unsecured bond with notice of a court date.”); (Docket No. 37 at 2) (suggesting that after a nonpayment violation Defendants “must either issue a valid summons for revocation proceedings or release them after arrest pursuant to their own recognizance or unsecured bond with notice of a court date.”). In later filings and during the preliminary injunction hearing, however, Plaintiffs made statements indicating that any arrest at all, regardless of whether the probationer is ROR-ed, would be problematic. For example, one of
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Plaintiffs’ reply briefs states that the preliminary injunction is about “whether people can be arrested solely for not paying PCC, Inc.” (Docket No. 45 at 1) (emphasis added). The Court believes that this inconsistency is the unintentional product of imprecise wording, not a late-stage attempt to expand the scope of relief. The Court construes Plaintiffs’ Motion as seeking to enjoin the arrest and detention of probationers where the only probation violation alleged is nonpayment of court costs.
The Court finds it useful to clarify the precise nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs do not argue that PCC may not report probation violations; that Defendants may not arrest probationers for violating their probation; or even that Defendants may never use secured money bonds. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that when Defendants determine that a secured money bond would be the best method to ensure the probationer’s attendance at his or her eventual revocation hearing, they must account for indigency when setting the amount of the bond. Plaintiffs also do not argue that nonpayment does not qualify as a probation violation. Instead, they argue that where nonpayment is the only violation alleged, the probationer cannot be jailed after arrest—the functional equivalent of probation revocation— without an inquiry into whether the nonpayment was willful. With this in mind, the Court turns to the legal issues at hand.
III. Abstention Defendants assert that the Court must abstain from this case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention directs federal courts not to interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding. More specifically, federal courts are not to intervene where there are ongoing state judicial proceedings that implicate important state interests and those proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to address constitutional challenges.
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Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Defendants contend that by virtue of their status as PCC probationers, all potential class members are party to pending state proceedings that implicate important interests. They also assert that probationers may raise constitutional concerns at numerous junctures during the sentencing and probation process, thus satisfying Younger.
Plaintiffs dispute the application of Younger. They rely in part on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.9 (1975), in which the Supreme Court noted that Younger does not bar equitable relief where the injunction is directed not at “state prosecutions as such” but rather “at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.” Id. Gerstein stands for the principle that when it comes to the adequacy of the state court proceedings as an opportunity to address constitutional harms, the opportunity must be available before the harm is inflicted.
Plaintiffs have the better of the argument. Defendants fail to make an inquiry into probationers’ ability to pay before jailing them on secured money bonds. A state court judge has confirmed that no such inquiry occurs as part of the ten-day docket, meaning that such an inquiry could occur, at earliest, at a probationer’s revocation hearing. By that point, the constitutional harm alleged, a liberty deprivation absent an inquiry into indigency, has already occurred. Probationers who plead guilty to the alleged probation violation while in jail do not even have formal revocation hearings at which they could raise constitutional challenges. Even if Defendants did inquire into indigency during the ten-docket, that would still be too little, too late. Probationers are not actually guaranteed to see a judge within ten days and are not represented by an attorney during these jailhouse meetings. By the time they participate in the ten-day docket, probationers have already suffered a liberty deprivation and been forced to remain in jail due to
9

their inability to post bond. Once again, that modicum of process occurs after the alleged constitutional injury.
Plaintiffs also note that their challenge does not disturb or even touch the underlying state court criminal convictions. Plaintiffs therefore dispute the existence of pending state court proceedings. The Sixth Circuit has read Gerstein to require federal courts to ask “whether the issue raised is collateral to the principal state proceeding” before invoking Younger abstention. Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980). This supports Plaintiffs’ contention that no state court proceedings are “pending” within the meaning of Younger. In the same vein, Plaintiffs point to a district court in Alabama that recently rejected the application of Younger where the federal lawsuit challenged probation. Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 2:12-CV-02819-RDP, 2013 WL 5428360 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013). The Ray court declined to abstain in part because the relief sought was “not intended to contradict or overturn the substance of the prior state court proceedings but instead targets [Defendant’s] post-judgment procedure.” Ray, 2013 WL 5428360, at *12. Because the federal lawsuit addressed only post-judgment procedure, the concerns animating Younger were absent. Id.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of certain discrete aspects of Defendants’ postjudgment procedure. The harm alleged—that probationers do not receive inquiries into indigency as required by the Fourteenth Amendment—has been inflicted before a probationer could voice any constitutional concerns. This alleged constitutional infirmity could be remedied without affecting the underlying state court judgments. Accordingly, Younger abstention is inappropriate.
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IV. Classwide Injunctive Relief Defendants argue that the Court should deny classwide injunctive relief because Plaintiffs have not yet certified a class in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Defendants even accuse Plaintiffs of attempting to sidestep Rule 23 entirely by seeking to obtain a classwide preliminary injunction. The Court disagrees with this characterization and finds that the preliminary injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is well-suited to classwide application. Plaintiffs allege a systemic deficiency: the lack of inquiry into indigency before either 1) jailing probationers on secured money bonds; or 2) jailing probationers when the sole violation is nonpayment. A finding that this deficiency violates the Fourteenth Amendment applies with equal force to all probationers trapped in Defendants’ system. The Court can craft injunctive relief that will alleviate this injury pending a final ruling on the merits without necessitating individualized remedies. Put another way, addressing all PCC probationers’ constitutional right to indigency inquiries requires not individualized remedies, but rather universal changes. Neither must Plaintiffs seek Rule 23 certification in order to enjoin the conduct about which they complain. “[A] district court may, in its discretion, award appropriate classwide injunctive relief prior to a formal ruling on the class certification issue based upon either a conditional certification of the class or its general equity powers.” Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879, 917 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (citation omitted). See also Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2013 WL 6490577, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013) (“The court may conditionally certify the class or otherwise order a broad preliminary injunction, without a formal class ruling, under its general equity powers. The lack of formal class certification does not create an obstacle to classwide preliminary injunctive relief when activities of the defendant are directed generally against a class of persons.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), subsequent determination,
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2013 WL 3776962 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2013); Kaiser v. County of Sacramento, 780 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (granting class-wide injunctive relief even though the court had only provisionally certified the class and had not yet fully addressed defendants’ class certification arguments); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:30 (5th ed. 2013) (“[A] court may issue a preliminary injunction in class suits prior to a ruling on the merits.”).
Because Plaintiffs suggest relief that is well-suited to classwide application and because the Court may grant such relief even at this preliminary stage, the Court finds that Defendants’ Rule 23-based arguments unavailing.
V. Injunctive Relief The standard for a preliminary injunction is well-established. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiffs have established these four factors and the Court finds injunctive relief to be warranted. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ lack of inquiry into indigency violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Fourteenth Amendment requires an inquiry into indigency before probationers are held on secured money bonds and before they can be jailed solely on the basis of nonpayment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourteenth Amendment claims.
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1. Defendants’ Use of Secured Money Bonds Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on their claim that jailing probationers subject to preset secured money bonds while they await formal revocation hearings violates the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Defendants are correct that succeeding on this claim involves importing pre-trial jurisprudence into the post-conviction, probation realm. Yet the Court finds that this extension of the Fourteenth Amendment is not so much a logical leap but a constitutionally mandated conclusion. The use of secured money bonds has the undeniable effect of imprisoning indigent individuals where those with financial means who have committed the same or worse probation violations can purchase their freedom. This effect stands in flat contradiction to the long-held and much-cherished principle that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of [treatment] a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). The Fourteenth Amendment precludes imprisoning someone because he or she does not have enough money: “When a defendant is imprisoned for financial inability to pay a fine immediately, he is treated more severely than a person capable of paying a fine immediately. The sole distinction is one of wealth, and therefore the procedure is invalid.” Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1977) vacated as moot, 439 U.S. 1041 (1978). One year after Barnett, the Fifth Circuit explicitly noted the constitutional problems inherent in using secured money bonds without inquiring into indigency: “Utilization of a master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meetings its requirements. The incarceration of those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection
10 Again, the Court uses the phrase “preset secured money bonds “ to refer to secured money bonds that are assigned without an inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay the bond and whether alternative methods of ensuring attendance at revocation hearings would be adequate.
13

requirements.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978). A slew of recent district court cases have aptly and appropriately applied Pugh to invalidate bond systems that have the effect of imprisoning indigent individuals where those with financial resources would go free. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Clanton, 2:15-cv-34-MHT at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sep. 15, 2015) (“The use of a secured bail schedule to detain a person after arrest, without a hearing on the merits that meets the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the person’s indigence and the sufficiency of the bail setting, is unconstitutional as applied to the indigent.”); Cooper v. City of Dothan, 1:15-cv-425-WKW (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015) (issuing a TRO on Fourteenth Amendment grounds where a post-arrest detention scheme was premised upon a secured bond system that failed to account for indigency); Pierce et al. v. City of Velda, 15-cv570-HEA at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (issuing a declaratory judgment stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow holding someone “in custody after an arrest because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond. If the government generally offers prompt release from custody after arrest upon posting a bond . . . it cannot deny prompt release from custody to a person because the person is financially incapable of posting such a bond.”).
The Court finds that the equal protection principles articulated by Pugh and its progeny apply with equal force to the probationers in the instant case. Defendants assert that such cases are inapposite because they address pretrial release, yet they have provided no persuasive reasoning or authority as to why one’s status as a PCC probationer would lessen his or her rights under the equal protection clause. Defendants in this case have determined that PCC probationers are eligible for immediate release upon payment of a monetary bond. They make this determination without any inquiry into indigency. In so doing, Defendants deny release only to those too poor to post bond, meaning that one’s freedom is conditioned upon one’s financial
14

resources. The Constitution protects those in the criminal justice system from such perverse contingencies.
Another line of Fourteenth Amendment cases, those which address the due process rights of probationers and individuals convicted of fine-only offenses, buttresses the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourteenth Amendment claims. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) the Supreme Court disavowed the notion that a conviction under a fine-only statute can give rise to imprisonment where the defendant cannot pay the fine in full. The Supreme Court held that to allow imprisonment under such circumstances would unconstitutionally “convert a fine into a jail term for an indigent defendant.” Id. at 398.11 Ten years later, in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the Supreme Court extended Tate and found that before a court may revoke a defendant’s probation for nonpayment the court must inquire into indigency. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted how “due process and equal protection principles converge” in the context of individuals indebted by virtue of their criminal histories. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665. Although Tate and Bearden do not map precisely on to the probation scheme now before the Court, they underscore courts’ duty to be mindful of indigency when faced with probation violations.
Contrary to their assertions, Defendants are not saved by Morrissey v. Brewer, which held that it was not unreasonable to hold a defendant for two months before holding a formal revocation hearing. 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972). Before reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that probation revocation occurs in two stages: “The first stage occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole officer. The second
11 Tate built on Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), wherein the Supreme Court disallowed imprisoning defendants beyond the statutory maximum solely because they are too poor to pay the associated fine.
15

occurs when parole is formally revoked.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485.12 The Supreme Court’s holding regarding the two-month lapse in time referred to the second of the two stages, the final revocation hearing. Defendants fail to acknowledge the first stage entirely, including Morrissey’s holding that “due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Id. The Morrissey Court then listed several facets of this preliminary hearing, including that the probationer receive notice of the hearing, be given the opportunity to “appear and speak in his own behalf,” and be able to present “letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. This Court views indigency as being among the things that could be addressed during this first stage. Based on the facts now on the record, Defendants do not seem to provide probationers with any sort of preliminary safeguard. Worse, because many probationers are pressured into pleading guilty to the underlying violation before formal revocation hearings can occur, they never get the chance to raise indigency. As noted in Section I, supra, these guilty pleas also often entail extending probationers’ terms with PCC, which keeps probationers trapped in PCC’s abhorrent cycle of debt and liberty deprivations. Morrissey weakens, not supports, Defendants’ position.
2. Jailing Probationers Based Solely on Nonpayment Although the invalidation of Defendants’ use of preset secured money bonds likely disposes of the other conduct about which Plaintiffs’ complain—jailing probationers when the only probation violation alleged is nonpayment—the Court addresses this issue separately. Arresting and detaining probationers solely for failure to pay, without conducting an inquiry into
12 Although the scheme now before the Court pertains to probation, not parole, the two are “constitutionally indistinguishable.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973).
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whether the nonpayment is willful rather than due to an inability to pay, is precisely the conduct
the Supreme Court rejected in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (remanding to a
state court for an inquiry into whether the probationer’s failure to pay was willful and into the
existence of alternatives to imprisonment).
Defendants argue that this point is moot as they do not have a practice of jailing
probationers where the only violation of probation is nonpayment. (Docket No. 39 at 5-6).
According to Defendants, such individuals are arrested, but the arrest warrant provides for them
to be ROR-ed and the individuals are released with instructions to return on the assigned date for
their revocation proceedings. Plaintiffs have, however, provided at least two warrants where
nonpayment resulted in arrest warrants with secured money bonds, one of which is from August
2015. (Docket No. 45-2). To jail an indigent probationer whose only violation is nonpayment on a secured money bond is functionally to revoke her probation.13 A person who cannot afford
to pay her court costs is likely unable to pay for her freedom, meaning that she will be stuck in
jail, perhaps for months, before she can explain her inability to pay. In this way, court costs
become jail sentences in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When Defendants use secured money bonds on their arrest warrants for probation
violations, they simultaneously indicate that probationers are eligible for release but condition
that release on financial resources, thereby implicating the protections of the Equal Protection
Clause. By holding probationers on these secured money bonds, especially those probationers
13 Two other aspects of this case indicate that Defendants’ probation scheme is the functional equivalent of what Bearden prohibits: probation revocation due to nonpayment without an indigency inquiry. First, PCC probationers are, by definition, misdemeanor offenders who could not afford to pay their court costs at the outset. Those who can afford to pay court costs immediately can avoid PCC. Second, as articulated above, a number of probation conditions other than court costs also require monetary payment. If a person cannot afford to pick up trash or attend court-ordered classes, she necessarily violates the terms of her probation and makes herself vulnerable to arrest and prolonged detention on a secured money bond. These characteristics not only put Defendants on notice that indigency is likely to play a part in probation violations, but also amplify the need for inquiries into indigency that are constitutionally required.
17

whose violations arise directly from their indigency, Defendants effectively revoke their probation, raising additional equal protection concerns and also implicating the Due Process Clause. The crucial deficiency is that at no point do Defendants inquire into indigency, a failing the Court finds especially odious given the makeup of PCC probationers and the nature of the probation violations alleged. Because Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence requires more, Plaintiffs have proven that they are likely to succeed on the merits.14 B. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief must also “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original). The irreparable harm alleged here is the unconstitutional liberty deprivation which stems from Defendants’ practice of jailing probationers on secured money bonds within an indigency inquiry. “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, . . . most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” 11A Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2948.1 (3d ed. 1998). In support of their allegations, Plaintiffs have submitted numerous arrest warrants and declarations. Defendants’ witness, Judge McFarlin, testified that he sees approximately one hundred probation violation arrest warrants per week and generally sets a secured money bond of at least $2,500 for all violations other than nonpayment. (Nov. 6 Hr’g Tr. at 88). Plaintiffs’ submissions show that Defendants regularly execute warrants and jail probationers on secured money bonds. The evidence on the record indicates that the constitutional violation alleged here forms an integral and seemingly inevitable aspect of the
14 To be clear, the Court does not find that Defendants are constitutionally required to release probationers pending revocation proceedings. The Court holds only that where Defendants have determined that release on money bond is appropriate—which seems to be Defendants’ default practice for probation violations—indigency must be accounted for when setting the bond.
18

current probation scheme. Plaintiffs have therefore proven that irreparable constitutional harm will likely to occur in the absence of an injunction. C. Balance of the Equities & the Public Interest
The two remaining considerations, the balance of the equities and the public interest, also support granting a preliminary injunction. In each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
Defendants do not allege any injury arising from Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction other than to say that an injunction will necessitate them to “scramble to create alternative measures to deal with probationers.” (Docket No. 39 at 15). Yet some the arrest warrants that Plaintiffs’ filed reveal that a viable alternative—ROR warrants—already exist. Should Defendants feel the need to continue to use money bonds, the Court declines to categorize the need to erect the proper constitutional safeguards as an injury. Both parties agree that enforcing constitutional rights serves the public interest and the Court does not find such an obvious point to require much more explanation.
In sum, all four of the factors a court considers when presented with a request for a preliminary injunction weigh in favor of granting the sought-after relief. Neither abstention nor Rule 23 shields Defendants. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S., 674, 689-90 (2008). But the injustice perpetrated here is just that: extraordinary.
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I. Conclusion Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED. The specific terms of the injunction are set forth in the attached Order. It is SO ORDERED.
____________________________________ KEVIN H. SHARP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE This Settlement Agreement and Release is entered into by named plaintiffs Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson (“Named Plaintiffs”), defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee (“Rutherford County”), defendant Providence Community Corrections, Inc. nka Pathways Community Corrections, Inc. (“PCC”), a Delaware corporation, and individual defendants Jasmine Jackson, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts, Tiarra Smith, and Nisha Hyde (“PCC Individual Defendants,” and collectively with PCC, the “PCC Defendants”) in order to effect a full and final settlement and dismissal with prejudice of all claims against the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County as alleged in the case captioned Rodriguez et al. v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-01048 (“Rodriguez”) (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2015), as well as related appeals Rodriguez et al. v. Providence Community Corrections et al., Case Nos. 16-5057, 165058, 16-6127, 16-6128, and 16-6129 (6th Cir.) (“Rodriguez Appeals,” and collectively with Rodriguez, the “Litigation”) on the terms set forth below and to the full extent reflected herein, subject to approval of the Court. Each of the parties listed in this paragraph is referred to individually as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties.” Capitalized terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them in Section II of this Settlement Agreement.
I. RECITALS A. PCC provided probation services to county governments. Between October 1, 2011 and March 31, 2016, PCC contracted with Rutherford County to provide probation services for Rutherford County, Tennessee. In that capacity, PCC provided probation officers to work with the Rutherford County court system to manage and implement its probation system in nonfelony cases.
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B. On October 1, 2015, Named Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, namely the Rodriguez action. Named Plaintiffs are or have been represented by the following firms: Civil Rights Corps; the Law Office of Kyle Mothershead; Equal Justice Under Law; Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C.; and Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.
C. In the Litigation, Named Plaintiffs purport to represent a class of persons who have at any time owed or who will incur debts to Rutherford County and/or PCC from fines, fees, costs, or surcharges arising from traffic and misdemeanor cases in the County courts and who have been or will be placed on probation with any public or private entity.
D. In the Litigation, Named Plaintiffs allege claims for, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), predicated on extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and Tennessee Code § 39-14-112; violations of due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution; violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and abuse of process.
E. Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants deny all material allegations in the Litigation and have asserted a variety of affirmative defenses.
F. Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have conducted an extensive examination of the facts and documents relating to the Litigation, including, among other things, the following conduct prior to filing the Litigation: (a) conducting interviews of hundreds of probationers over the course of seven months; (b) demanding documents from Rutherford County and PCC in writing and orally; (c) observing court proceedings; (d) reviewing court records; (e) reviewing
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records obtained through Tennessee open records requests; (f) reviewing PCC documents and recordings of PCC probation officers; and (g) representing probationers in probation proceedings.
G. Since filing the Litigation, Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have continued to vigorously pursue this case, including by: (a) seeking and obtaining injunctive relief; (b) successfully defeating motions to dismiss; (c) producing 1,331 documents to defendants; (d) reviewing 6,747 pages of documents produced by defendants; (e) filing a motion for partial summary judgment and seeking an expedited hearing date; (f) engaging in multiple days of inperson mediation over several months; (g) preparing and filing merits briefs in the Sixth Circuit; and (h) continuing to interview dozens of probationers by phone and during travel to Rutherford County.
H. This Settlement was reached after a detailed mediation process ordered by the Court that involved the following efforts, among others:
(i) On May 23, 2016, the Court ordered the parties to engage in good-faith mediation over a 90-day period before mediator Carlos Gonzalez, which period the Court subsequently extended by mutual request of the Parties.
(ii) On July 15, 2016, PCC produced 6,747 pages of documents to Named Plaintiffs, including financial information, documents concerning the Named Plaintiffs, summary reports of individuals placed on probation with PCC, training materials, and documents concerning PCC’s licenses with the State of Tennessee.
(iii) On July 18, 2016, Named Plaintiffs produced 1,331 documents to PCC, including video and audio recordings of PCC probation officers, court records of PCC
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probationers, interviews with and declarations of PCC probationers, and communications allegedly sent by PCC.
(iv) On August 3, 2016, PCC and Named Plaintiffs submitted confidential mediation briefs to Mr. Gonzalez setting forth their views of the case.
(v) Over the following week, PCC, Rutherford County and Named Plaintiffs engaged in multiple in-person and telephonic meetings with Mr. Gonzalez, followed by a twoday arm’s-length mediation in Tennessee on August 8 and 9, 2016.
(vi) On September 2, 2016, Named Plaintiffs and PCC attended another inperson mediation session in Washington, D.C., in which Rutherford County participated telephonically.
(vii) PCC and the Named Plaintiffs reached an agreement in principle on terms which are reflected in this Agreement and began documenting the Agreement.
(viii) Rutherford County and Named Plaintiffs continued negotiations with the assistance of the mediator through 2017, and thereafter reached an agreement on terms which are reflected in this Agreement.
(ix) Throughout the course of these events, the Parties engaged in numerous other teleconferences between themselves and the mediators, and exchanged many letters and other correspondence setting forth their respective positions and seeking to reach a mutually agreeable resolution.
I. The Litigation, if it were to continue, would likely result in expensive and protracted litigation, appeals and continued uncertainty as to the outcome.
J. Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have concluded that this Settlement provides substantial benefits to Named Plaintiffs and to the Settlement Class and resolves the following
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without prolonged litigation and the risks, delays, and uncertainties inherent in litigation: all issues and claims with respect to the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County that were or could have been raised between or among the Named Plaintiffs, Settlement Class Members, the PCC Defendants, and Rutherford County in the Litigation.
K. Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have concluded that this Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interest of the Settlement Class.
L. Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants continue to deny each and every allegation of wrongdoing, liability, and damages that was or could have been asserted in the Litigation and further continue to deny that the claims in the Litigation would be appropriate for class treatment if the Litigation were to proceed through litigation and trial. Nonetheless, without admitting or conceding any wrongdoing, liability, or damages, or the appropriateness of the Named Plaintiffs’ claims or similar claims for class treatment, Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants consent to the Settlement as set forth herein solely to avoid the expense, inconvenience and inherent risk of litigation as well as the concomitant disruption of each Party’s operations.
M. Nothing in this Settlement or Settlement Agreement shall be construed as an admission or concession by Rutherford County or the PCC Defendants of the truth of any allegations raised in the Litigation or of any fault, wrongdoing, liability, or damages of any kind.
N. This Settlement Agreement, its terms, documents related to it and the negotiations or proceedings connected with it shall not be offered or received into evidence in the Litigation or in any other action or proceeding to establish any liability or admission by Rutherford County or the PCC Defendants.
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual covenants, promises, and general releases set forth below and subject to preliminary and final approval of the Court, the sufficiency and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties hereby agree as follows:
II. DEFINITIONS As used herein, the following terms have the meanings set forth below. A. “Attorneys’ Fee Award” means the Court-approved award of fees, expenses and/or costs described in Section VI Paragraph A. B. “Cash Award” means the cash compensation that eligible Settlement Class Members who submit Valid Claims shall be entitled to receive as detailed in Section IV Paragraphs B–E. C. “Claim Deadline” means one hundred twenty (120) Days after the Preliminary Approval Date, which date will be specified in the Class Notice. D. “Claim Form” means the claim form that Settlement Class Members must complete and submit on or before the Claim Deadline to be eligible for the benefits described herein, which document shall be substantially in the form of Exhibit A hereto. The Claim Form requires a sworn signature under penalty of perjury, but does not require a notarization. Additional requirements relating to the completion of Claim Forms are set forth in Section V. Claim Forms will be processed after the Effective Date. E. “Class Counsel” means Civil Rights Corps and the Law Office of Kyle Mothershead. F. “Class Notice” means the Court-approved forms of notice to the Settlement Class, which will notify members of the Settlement Class of entry of the Preliminary Approval
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Order and the scheduling of the Fairness Hearing, among other things, which documents shall be substantially in the form of Exhibit B hereto.
G. “Court” means the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
H. “Days” means calendar days, except that when computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Settlement Agreement, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. Furthermore, when computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Settlement Agreement, the last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a Federal or State of Tennessee legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal or State of Tennessee legal holiday.
I. “Effective Date” means the date described in Section XI. J. “Fairness Hearing” means the hearing at which the Court orders final approval of the Settlement. K. “Final” means final as described in Section XI Paragraph B. L. “Final Order and Judgment” means the order as described in Section IX. Any reduction in any Attorneys’ Fee Award or Incentive Award compared with the amounts requested in the submitted applications shall not be considered a material alteration. M. “Incentive Award” means the final Court-approved award as described in Section VI Paragraph B. N. “Injunction” means the agreed-upon injunction between the Plaintiffs and Rutherford County, which is set forth in Exhibit C hereto.
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O. “Litigation” means the case captioned Rodriguez et al. v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2015), as well as all related appeals in Rodriguez et al. v. Providence Community Corrections et al., Case Nos. 16-5057, 165058, 16-6127, 16-6128, and 16-6129 (6th Cir.).
P. “Named Plaintiffs” means Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson. Individually, Ms. Rodriguez, Mr. Gibbs, Ms. Pullum, Ms. Carney, Ms. Brinkley, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Robinson are each considered a “Named Plaintiff.”
Q. “Notice and Administration Costs” means any and all reasonable and authorized costs and expenses of notice and administration relating to this Settlement.
R. “Notice Date” means the first day on which the Settlement Administrator and/or other parties begin disseminating the Class Notice, and shall be no later than forty-five (45) Days after the Preliminary Approval Date.
S. “Opt-Out” shall refer to a member of the Settlement Class who properly and timely submits a request for exclusion from the Settlement Class as set forth in Section VII Paragraph D. An Opt-Out may rescind a request for exclusion by submitting a Claim Form to the Settlement Administrator to obtain benefits of the Settlement.
T. “Opt-Out List” shall refer to the list compiled by the Settlement Administrator pursuant to Section VII Paragraph G, identifying those who properly and timely submit a request for exclusion from the Settlement Class and become Opt-Outs.
U. “Opt-Out and Objection Date” means the date by which a request for exclusion must be filed with the Settlement Administrator in order for a member of the Settlement Class to be excluded from the Settlement Class, and the date by which Settlement Class Members must
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file objections, if any, to the Settlement. The Opt-Out and Objection Date shall be no later than one hundred and twenty (120) Days after the Preliminary Approval Date.
V. “Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel” means Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C.; Equal Justice Under Law (“EJUL”); and Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (“BDBC”).
W. “Parties” means Named Plaintiffs, Settlement Class Members, Rutherford County, and the PCC Defendants. Named Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members shall be collectively referred to as one “Party.”
X. “PCC” means Defendant Providence Community Corrections, Inc. nka Pathways Community Corrections, Inc.
Y. “PCC Individual Defendants” means Defendants Jasmine Jackson, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts, Tiarra Smith, and Nisha Hyde.
Z. “PCC Defendants” means PCC and the PCC Individual Defendants. AA. “PCC Defendants’ Counsel” means Latham & Watkins LLP and Bass, Berry & Sims PLC. BB. “PCC Fees” means amounts paid to PCC for PCC programs (such as fees for supervision, anger management sessions, alcohol safety school, urinalysis, credit card transactions, domestic violence assessments, and pictures and postage), but excluding amounts PCC collected on behalf of the court, county, or state (such as court costs, warrant fees, and restitution). CC. “PCC Released Persons” means: (i) PCC; (ii) the PCC Individual Defendants; (iii) the past, present, and future direct or indirect predecessors, successors, assigns, parents, subsidiaries, joint venturers, partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, divisions, or
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groups of any of the foregoing Persons or entities described in (i) – (ii) of this Paragraph; and (iv) each of the respective past, present, and future employees, representatives, owners, officers, executives, partners, agents, insurers, heirs, assigns, and attorneys of any of the foregoing entities and Persons described in (i) – (iii) of this Paragraph.
DD. “Person” means an individual, county, corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, association, member, joint stock company, estate, legal representative, trust, unincorporated association, any business or legal entity and such individual’s or entity’s spouse, heirs, predecessors, successors, representatives, and assignees.
EE. “Preliminary Approval Date” means the date the Preliminary Approval Order has been executed and entered by the Court and received by counsel for the Parties.
FF. “Preliminary Approval Order” means the order described in Section VIII and attached hereto without material alteration as Exhibit D.
GG. “Release” means the release and discharge, as of the Effective Date, by and among the Releasing Persons, the PCC Released Persons, the Rutherford County Released Persons, Class Counsel, and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel as described in Section IX Paragraph B.
HH. “Released Claims” means any and all claims, actions, causes of action, rights, demands, suits, debts, liens, contracts, promises, agreements, offsets, liabilities, injuries to person or property, predicate acts, demands, damages, losses, costs or expenses, fixed or contingent, direct or indirect, including but not limited to claims for racketeering, extortion, violation of constitutional rights, abuse of process, tort claims, negligence claims, claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of statutory duties, actual or constructive fraud, misrepresentations, fraudulent inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair
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business or trade practices, false advertising, restitution, rescission, compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, interests, costs, penalties and any other claims, whether known or unknown, alleged or not alleged in the Litigation, suspected or unsuspected, contingent or matured, under federal, state or local law, which any Party had, now has, or may in the future have with respect to any conduct, act, omissions, facts, matters, transactions, or oral or written statements or occurrences on or prior to the Preliminary Approval Date arising from or relating in any way to the following: (i) the Litigation and any claim or allegation set forth therein; (ii) any contract between Rutherford County and PCC concerning probation services; (iii) actions or omissions in connection with PCC’s services in Rutherford County, Tennessee; (iv) actions or omissions in connection with probation sentences, probation supervision, and probation services administered and/or provided by Rutherford County; (v) actions or omissions in connection with the imposition of probation by any court in Rutherford County or any probation hearing or probation-related hearing before any court in Rutherford County (including but not limited to the process or outcome of any such hearing); (vi) actions or omissions by any public or private entity in connection with probation arising from misdemeanor or traffic cases in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court and relating in any way to the imposition or collection, enforcement, or payment of court-imposed financial obligations; (vii) communications and/or documents submitted or exchanged by, between, or among the PCC Defendants and/or Rutherford County concerning probation in Rutherford County, including but not limited to documents submitted to any court in Rutherford County; (viii) any claim or allegation which was asserted in any communications between or among the Parties, Settlement Class Members, Class Counsel, Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, or Rutherford County’s Counsel; and/or (ix) the course of dealing between or among the Parties and
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the Settlement Class Members, with respect to the subject matter of the Litigation and any claim, or allegation asserted therein. The Released Claims include, but are not limited to, the causes of action and allegations made by the Named Plaintiffs in the Litigation as well as causes of action for racketeering, extortion, abuse of process, violation of constitutional rights, and claims under federal law, the common law or statutory law of the State of Tennessee, other states, and the District of Columbia. For the avoidance of doubt, the term “Released Claims” includes any claim for attorneys’ fees, expenses, or costs.
II. “Releasing Persons” means: (i) the Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all Settlement Class Members; (ii) all Settlement Class Members; and (iii) the present, former, and future administrators, family members, agents, assigns, attorneys, executors, heirs, partners, predecessors-in-interest and successors of each of the Named Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members.
JJ. “Rutherford County” means Rutherford County, Tennessee. KK. “Rutherford County Consideration” shall have the meaning set forth in Section IV Paragraph A below. LL. “Rutherford County’s Counsel” means Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC. MM. “Rutherford County Payment” shall have the meaning set forth in Section IV Paragraph B below. NN. “Rutherford County Released Persons” means: (i) Rutherford County; (ii) the affiliates of Rutherford County; and (iii) each of the respective past, present, and future direct and indirect predecessors, successors, assigns, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, joint venturers, partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, unincorporated entities, divisions, groups, directors, officers, shareholders, members, employees, representatives, owners, officers, judicial
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officers, executives, partners, agents, insurers, and attorneys of any of the foregoing entities and Persons described in (i) – (ii) of this Paragraph.
OO. “Settlement” means the settlement among the Parties as set forth in this Settlement Agreement.
PP. “Settlement Administrator” means Dahl Administration LLC, which shall administer Class Notice, maintain the Settlement Website, and administer the Settlement in accordance with this Settlement Agreement and the Court’s orders.
QQ. “Settlement Agreement” means this Settlement Agreement and Release, including all exhibits hereto.
RR. “Settlement Class” means all Persons who fall within the definition of the class identified in Section III Paragraph A.
SS. “Settlement Class Members” means all Persons in the Settlement Class who do not exclude themselves (i.e., become Opt-Outs) pursuant to Section VII Paragraph D.
TT. “Settlement Fund” or “Settlement Fund Payment” means fourteen million three hundred thousand dollars ($14,300,000.00) as described in Section IV Paragraph B.
UU. “Settlement Website” means the dedicated website created and maintained by the Settlement Administrator which will contain relevant documents and information about the Settlement, including this Settlement Agreement, the Class Notice, and the Claim Form. It shall also include the functionality to permit claim forms to be submitted online with electronic certifications and signatures.
VV. “Valid Claim” means a timely and fully completed Claim Form submitted by a Settlement Class Member as more fully described in Section V.
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WW. The plural of any defined term includes the singular, and vice versa, as made
necessary in context.
III. PROPOSED CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES
A. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the Parties hereto agree to certification, for
settlement purposes, of the following Settlement Class:
All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to the Preliminary Approval Order, (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by PCC or Rutherford County’s Probation Department.
B. Solely for the purpose of implementing this Settlement Agreement and
effectuating the Settlement, the Parties stipulate to the entering of an order preliminarily
certifying the Settlement Class, appointing Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum,
Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson as representatives of
the Settlement Class and appointing the following as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class:
Alec Karakatsanis Elizabeth Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 599-0953
Kyle F. Mothershead Law Office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 Telephone: (615) 982-8002 Facsimile: (615) 229-6387
C. Solely for the purpose of implementing this Settlement Agreement and
effectuating the Settlement, the Parties stipulate to the Court entering an order appointing Dahl
Administration LLC as the Settlement Administrator.
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D. Solely for the purpose of implementing this Settlement Agreement and effectuating the Settlement, the Parties stipulate to the Court entering an order preliminarily finding that the Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are adequate representatives of the Settlement Class.
E. Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants do not agree to the certification of the Settlement Class or to the appointment or adequacy of the Named Plaintiffs or Class Counsel for any purpose other than to effectuate the Settlement and the Settlement Agreement.
F. In the event that the Settlement Agreement is terminated pursuant to its terms or is not approved in any material respect by the Court, or such approval is reversed, vacated, or modified in any material respect by the Court or by any other court, the certification of the Settlement Class shall be deemed vacated, the Litigation shall proceed as if the Settlement Class had never been certified, and no reference to the Settlement Class, this Settlement Agreement or any documents, communications, or negotiations related in any way thereto shall be made for any purpose in the Litigation or in any other action or proceeding.
IV. BENEFITS TO THE PARTIES AND CLASS A. Payment By PCC To Rutherford County. PCC shall pay three hundred fiftythousand dollars ($350,000.00) to Rutherford County (the “Rutherford County Consideration”) to settle all potential claims between these two parties. The Rutherford County Consideration shall be the sole and exclusive payment to Rutherford County or Rutherford County’s Counsel in connection with this Settlement Agreement, the Litigation, and the Released Claims. B. Settlement Fund. Pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth below, PCC agrees to pay a total sum of fourteen million dollars ($14,000,000.00) to the Settlement Fund, and Rutherford County agrees to transfer to the Settlement Fund as soon as practicable after Rutherford County receives the Rutherford County Consideration, a sum of three hundred
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thousand dollars ($300,000.00) (the “Rutherford County Payment”). These two payments totaling fourteen million three hundred thousand dollars ($14,300,000.00) shall be referred to as the “Settlement Fund Payment.” The Settlement Fund Payment shall be the sole and exclusive payment to the Named Plaintiffs, the Settlement Class Members, Class Counsel, and/or Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel, including for Notice and Administrative Costs, in connection with this Settlement Agreement, the Litigation, and the Released Claims or attorneys’ fees or costs of any kind. In no event shall the PCC Released Persons be obligated to contribute or pay any monies in excess of fourteen million three hundred fifty-thousand dollars ($14,350,000.00) in the aggregate relating to this Settlement Agreement, the Litigation, or the Released Claims, or attorneys’ fees or costs of any kind. In no event shall the Rutherford County Released Persons be obligated to contribute or pay any monies in excess of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) in the aggregate relating to this Settlement Agreement, the Litigation, the Released Claims, or attorneys’ fees or costs of any kind.
(i) The Settlement Fund Payment will be used to pay in full satisfaction of all Settlement costs including, without limitation, Cash Awards, Notice and Administration Costs, Attorneys’ Fees Awards, and Incentive Awards.
(ii) “Net Settlement Fund” means the Settlement Fund Payment, less the amounts paid in Attorneys’ Fees Awards, Incentive Awards, and Notice and Administration Costs.
C. Timing Of Payment Obligations. PCC and Rutherford County shall have no obligation to make any payments under this Settlement Agreement until the Court enters a Preliminary Approval Order. Once the Court enters a Preliminary Approval Order, the payment obligations of PCC and Rutherford County are as follows:
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(i) After entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, PCC shall pay reasonable Notice and Administration Costs arising under this Settlement Agreement by making such payments directly to the Settlement Administrator (or to such other party incurring such costs) as those costs are incurred and payment becomes due. Both the PCC Defendants’ Counsel and Class Counsel shall approve the amount of Notice and Administration Costs paid to the Settlement Administrator and shall not unreasonably withhold their consent.
(ii) Within seven (7) Days after the Effective Date, PCC will wire transfer the Rutherford County Consideration to Rutherford County. As soon as is practicable after receipt of the Rutherford County Consideration, but in no event more than five (5) Days after receipt, Rutherford County shall wire transfer the entire Rutherford County Payment into an interestbearing bank account (the “Settlement Account”) designated by the Settlement Administrator.
(iii) Within fourteen (14) Days after the Effective Date, PCC will wire transfer the balance of the Settlement Fund Payment into the Settlement Account, less (1) any amounts previously advanced by PCC for Notice and Administration Costs and (2) the Rutherford County Payment.
(iv) Any interest that accrues on the Settlement Fund in the Settlement Account shall be added to the Settlement Fund.
(v) Any future payments for Notice and Administration Costs will be deduced from the Settlement Account.
D. Cash Awards. Settlement Class Members who were on supervised probation with PCC or supervised probation with Rutherford County’s Probation Department and submit Valid Claims shall be entitled to receive Cash Awards as follows:
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(i) Each Settlement Class Member whose probation with PCC ended prior to October 1, 2014, will be entitled to receive a Cash Award equal to one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for PCC Fees beginning October 1, 2011, except that if any such Settlement Class Member paid PCC Fees to PCC prior to October 1, 2011 for an offense for which he or she continued to pay PCC Fees to PCC on or after October 1, 2011, the Cash Award will also include one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for PCC Fees for such offenses before October 1, 2011;
(ii) Each Settlement Class Member who was on probation with PCC on or after October 1, 2014, will be entitled to receive a Cash Award equal to fifty dollars ($50) for each month that he or she was on supervised probation with PCC after October 1, 2014, plus one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for PCC Fees except that if any such Settlement Class Member paid PCC Fees to PCC prior to October 1, 2011 for an offense for which he or she continued to pay PCC Fees to PCC on or after October 1, 2011, the Cash Award will also include one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for PCC Fees for such offenses before October 1, 2011; and
(iii) Each Settlement Class Member who was on probation with Rutherford County’s Probation Department in or after March 2016 and (a) was on supervised probation for the sole purpose of paying court-imposed financial obligations or (b) would have been removed from supervised probation but for the payment of a court-imposed financial obligation, will be entitled to receive a Cash Award equal to fifty dollars ($50) for each month that he or she was on supervised probation with Rutherford County’s Probation Department in or after March 2016 through the Preliminary Approval Order, plus one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the
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amount that he or she actually paid to Rutherford County’s Probation Department for probation fees from March 2016 through the Preliminary Approval Order. In determining the Cash Award under this section, the qualifications in subsections (a) and (b) shall be applied to each month during the period from March 2016 through the Preliminary Approval Order and to the probation fees paid to Rutherford County’s Probation Department.
E. Distribution Of Cash Awards. No later than seven (7) Days after the Parties have resolved any disputes regarding rejected claims in accordance with the process identified in Section V, Paragraphs B and C, the Settlement Administrator will provide Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel with a report identifying the total of the Cash Awards and the amount of money in the Net Settlement Fund available to pay such Cash Awards (“Available Cash Award Total”).
(i) If the Available Cash Award Total exceeds the Cash Awards: a. First, the payment to each Settlement Class Member who
submits a Valid Claim under Paragraph D shall be increased pro rata up to a maximum of five times of the total amount he or she would otherwise be entitled to under Paragraph D above (for example, if the person were to receive one hundred dollars ($100) prior to any increase under this subsection, then the person shall be entitled to receive a maximum of five hundred dollars ($500).
b. If, after the increase identified in Paragraph E(i)(a) above is made, the Available Cash Award Total still exceeds the Cash Awards, then any Additional Attorneys’ Fees Award (as defined below) will be paid to the extent approved by the Court;
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c. If thereafter any additional funds remain in the Settlement Account, they shall be donated to the No Exceptions Prison Collective of the Harriet Tubman House in Nashville, Tennessee.
(ii) If, however, the Cash Awards exceed the Available Cash Award Total, the Cash Awards to the Settlement Class Members who have submitted Valid Claims will be reduced on a pro rata basis until the Cash Awards equal the Available Cash Award Total.
(iii) Except as otherwise provided herein, all payments to eligible Settlement Class Members who submit Valid Claims will be made within one hundred twenty (120) Days after the Effective Date.
F. Injunction. As part of the Settlement, Rutherford County and Plaintiffs will agree to request that the Court enter the injunction set forth in Exhibit C hereto.
V. CLAIMS PROCESS A. Notice And Submission Of Claims. The Class Notice shall provide information regarding the filing of Claim Forms. Claim Forms shall be available from Class Counsel, the Settlement Administrator, on the Settlement Website, and in the Rutherford County Courthouse and Rutherford County Probation Office. To file a Valid Claim, each eligible Settlement Class Member must: (i) complete a Claim Form, providing materially all of the information and documentation required by the Settlement Agreement and the Claim Form; (ii) sign the Claim Form and state under penalty of perjury that he or she believes that he or she is a member of the Settlement Class and that the information submitted is true and correct; and (iii) return the completed and signed Claim Form to the Settlement Administrator no later than one hundred twenty (120) Days after the Preliminary Approval Date, i.e., the Claim Deadline. Only eligible Settlement Class Members who submit Valid Claims shall be entitled to a Cash Award.
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B. Determination Of Validity. The Settlement Administrator shall be responsible for reviewing all claims to determine their validity.
(i) Any claim that is not substantially in compliance with the instructions on the Claim Form or the terms of this Settlement Agreement or is postmarked or submitted electronically later than the Claim Deadline, may be rejected. The Parties and Settlement Administrator will provide Settlement Class Members with a reasonable opportunity to correct technical non-compliance with the instructions on the Claim Form or the terms of this Settlement Agreement prior to rejecting the Claim Form.
(ii) Following the Claim Deadline, the Settlement Administrator shall provide a report of any rejected claims to PCC Defendants’ Counsel, Class Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel. If Class Counsel do not agree with the rejection of a claim, they shall bring it to the attention of PCC Defendants’ Counsel and Rutherford County’s Counsel, and the Parties shall meet and confer and attempt, in good faith, to resolve any dispute regarding the rejected claim. Following their meet and confer, the Parties will provide the Settlement Administrator with their positions regarding the disputed, rejected claim. The Settlement Administrator, after considering the positions of the Parties, will make the final decision in its sole discretion, subject to review of the Court for reasonableness upon request of any Party.
C. Fraudulent Filings. At any time during the claims process, if the Settlement Administrator has a reasonable suspicion of fraud, the Settlement Administrator shall immediately notify Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel of that fact and the basis for its suspicion. Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel shall endeavor to reach an agreed-upon appropriate solution to any
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suspected fraud and, if necessary, either PCC or Rutherford County may suspend the claims

process, and the Parties will promptly seek assistance from the Court.

VI. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AND INCENTIVE AWARDS

A. Attorneys’ Fee Awards. The parties agree not to dispute that Named Plaintiffs’

current and former attorneys are entitled to reasonable fees and expenses subject to approval of

the Court and to be paid from the Settlement Fund. Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’

Counsel, which have previously represented Named Plaintiffs in the Litigation but no longer

represent them, will apply to the Court for awards of attorneys’ fees and expenses (including

their court costs) to be paid exclusively from the Settlement Fund. The parties agree not to

oppose that Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall be awarded, subject to the

approval of the Court, their expenses incurred to date and reasonable attorneys’ fees to be paid

exclusively from the Settlement Fund. The process for petitioning the Court for awards of

attorneys’ fees and expenses shall be as follows:

(i) The parties contemplate a two-step process. In the initial stage, the Class

Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel may petition the Court for the award of (i)

expenses and costs incurred and (ii) reasonable attorneys’ fees not to exceed the following

amounts:

a. Civil Rights Corps:

$336,200

b. EJUL:

$830,800

c. BDBC:

$190,000

d. Kyle Mothershead:

$24,115

The hours and reasonable hourly rates on which this agreement to maximum initial Attorneys’

Fee Awards is based are set forth in Exhibit E.

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(ii) Attorneys’ Fee Award. Each counsel seeking an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award shall file a motion with the Court requesting such an award and justifying why such award is reasonable. The parties seeking reimbursement agree that, for purposes of calculating the initial Attorneys’ Fee Award, the hourly rates identified in Exhibit E will not be considered unreasonable. Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall not petition for an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award of more fees than listed above. Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants agree not to oppose any motion for an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award by any Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel that does not exceed the fee amounts referenced above. Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel seeking an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award may represent to the Court that all parties seeking an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award agree that such award is reasonable under the circumstances, including the hours and rates used to justify such reasonableness, and that no party or counsel will oppose any motion seeking an initial Attorneys’ Fee Award that does not exceed the fee amounts referenced above. Civil Rights Corps will provide such assistance to EJUL as reasonably requested to prepare and file EJUL’s petition, including providing affidavits regarding the work performed by Civil Rights Corps attorneys while employed by EJUL and the reasonableness of the hourly rate for that work. Awards and any expenses incurred by Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel which are approved by the Court shall be paid exclusively from the Settlement Fund as part of the administration of the Class claims. Petitions for initial Attorneys’ Fee Awards shall be filed no later than twenty-eight (28) Days after the Preliminary Approval Order. The sole method for Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiff’s Counsel to obtain attorneys’ fees or costs in this matter shall be through a petition to the Court in accordance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement, and any failure to do so will waive Class Counsel’s and Other Former
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Plaintiff’s Counsel’s ability to obtain fees. If any Other Former Plaintiff’s Counsel that has not signed this Settlement Agreement seeks attorneys’ fees or costs in the Litigation, any Attorneys’ Fee Award provided to them shall in no way increase the Settlement Fund Payment and instead shall be taken exclusively from the Settlement Fund should funds remain.
(iii) Additional Attorneys’ Fees Award. If funds remain in the Settlement Fund after the full administration of the claims process, including eligible Settlement Class Members’ Cash Awards, Class Counsel and/or Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel may petition the Court for an attorneys’ fee award and/or expenses in addition to the initial Attorneys’ Fee Award (“Additional Attorneys’ Fee Award”). Such petitions during this second stage may be based on any grounds pursuant to which fees and/or expenses may be awarded in class action litigation. Unlike the petitions for initial Attorneys’ Fee Awards, any party, including Class Counsel, may object to petitions for Additional Attorneys’ Fee Awards. Once any petitions for such Additional Attorneys’ Fee Awards have been adjudicated, all funds remaining in the Settlement Fund will be awarded to the cy pres, the No Exceptions Prison Collective of the Harriet Tubman House. Petitions for any Additional Attorneys’ Fee Award in this second stage shall be filed no later than twenty-eight (28) Days following notification to the Court that the claims administration process regarding the Cash Awards has been completed.
(iv) The Settlement Administrator shall timely post all applications for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the Settlement Website to provide notice to the Settlement Class.
(v) Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants have no financial obligation other than to fund the Settlement Fund as specified in the Settlement Agreement. Once Rutherford County and the PCC Defendants have fully funded the Settlement Fund as described
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above in Section IV Paragraph B, their obligations to Class Counsel and the Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall be fully satisfied and discharged, and Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall have no further or other claim against any of the PCC Released Persons or the Rutherford County Released Persons, including but not limited to a claim for enforcement of any attorneys’ lien. Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel will agree to release any and all claims against the PCC Released Persons and the Rutherford County Released Persons relating to this litigation.
(vi) Any order or proceedings relating to the applications for attorneys’ fees and expenses, or any appeal from any order relating thereto or reversal or modification thereof, will not operate to terminate or cancel this Agreement, or affect or delay the finality of the Final Order and Judgment approving the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement.
B. Incentive Awards. The Named Plaintiffs will apply collectively to the Court for Incentive Awards of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) per Named Plaintiff to be paid from the Settlement Fund, subject to Court approval. All Parties agree not to dispute that such incentive awards are reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
C. Payment Of Attorneys’ Fee Awards And Incentive Awards. The Attorneys’ Fee Award and any Incentive Award awarded by the Court will be paid by the Settlement Administrator from the Settlement Fund within twenty-one (21) Days after the Effective Date.
D. Attorneys’ Fee Awards And Incentive Awards. Any order or proceedings relating to the applications for any Attorneys’ Fee Awards, Additional Attorneys’ Fee Award, and/or Incentive Awards, or any appeal from any order relating thereto or reversal or modification thereof, will not operate to terminate or cancel this Agreement, or affect or delay
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the finality of the Final Order and Judgment approving the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement.
VII. SETTLEMENT NOTICE, OBJECTIONS, AND OPT-OUT RIGHTS A. The Settlement Administrator will work under the direction of Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel. B. The Parties will seek a determination from the Court regarding the best practicable notice procedure (“Settlement Class Notice Program”) as described in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and in the exhibits thereto. C. Any Settlement Class Member who intends to object must do so on or before the Opt-Out and Objection Date. In order to object, the Settlement Class Member must include in the objection submitted to the Court and served on Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel: (i) the name, address, and telephone number of the Person objecting and, if represented by counsel, of his/her counsel; (ii) a signed declaration under penalty of perjury stating that he or she is a member of the Settlement Class; (iii) a statement of all objections to the Settlement and the legal and factual bases for such objections; and (iv) a statement of whether he or she intends to appear at the Fairness Hearing, either with or without counsel, and if with counsel, the name of his or her counsel who will attend. Any Settlement Class Member who fails to file and serve timely a written objection and notice of his or her intent to appear at the Fairness Hearing pursuant to this Paragraph and as detailed in the Class Notice, shall not be permitted to object to the approval of the Settlement at the Fairness Hearing and shall be foreclosed from seeking any review of the Settlement or the terms of the Settlement Agreement by appeal or other means. D. A member of the Settlement Class who wishes to opt out of the Settlement Class must complete and send to the Settlement Administrator a request for exclusion that is post-
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marked or submitted electronically no later than the Opt-Out and Objection Date. The request for exclusion must be personally signed by the member of the Settlement Class requesting exclusion, contain a statement that indicates his or her desire to be excluded from the Settlement Class and contain a statement under penalty of perjury that he or she is otherwise a member of the Settlement Class. A member of the Settlement Class may opt out on an individual basis only. So-called “mass” or “class” opt-outs, whether filed by third parties on behalf of a “mass” or “class” of class members or multiple class members where no personal statement has been signed by each and every individual class member, shall not be allowed.
E. Except for those members of the Settlement Class who timely and properly file a request for exclusion, all members of the Settlement Class will be deemed to be Settlement Class Members for all purposes under the Settlement Agreement, and upon the Effective Date, will be bound by its terms, regardless of whether they file a Claim Form or receive any monetary relief.
F. Any member of the Settlement Class who properly opts out of the Settlement Class shall not: (i) be bound by any orders or judgments entered in the Litigation or relating to the Settlement; (ii) be entitled to relief under, or be affected by, the Settlement Agreement; (iii) gain any rights by virtue of the Settlement Agreement; or (iv) be entitled to object to any aspect of the Settlement.
G. The Settlement Administrator shall provide Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel with the Opt-Out List within seven (7) Days after the Opt-Out and Objection Date.
VIII. SETTLEMENT APPROVAL PROCESS After execution of this Settlement Agreement, the Parties shall promptly move the Court to enter the Preliminary Approval Order that is without material alteration from Exhibit D hereto, which:
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A. Preliminarily approves this Settlement Agreement; B. Preliminarily certifies the Settlement Class; C. Finds that the proposed Settlement is sufficiently fair, reasonable and adequate to warrant providing notice to the Settlement Class; D. Schedules a Fairness Hearing on final approval of this Settlement and Settlement Agreement to consider the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed Settlement and whether it should be finally approved by the Court, such Fairness Hearing to take place not less than one hundred eighty (180) Days after the Preliminary Approval Date; E. Appoints the Settlement Administrator in accordance with Section III Paragraph C of this Settlement Agreement; F. Approves the Class Notice, the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit B to this Settlement Agreement, and directs the Settlement Administrator to disseminate the Class Notice in accordance with the Settlement Class Notice Program; G. Finds that the Settlement Class Notice Program: (i) is the best practicable notice; (ii) is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise the Settlement Class of the pendency of the Litigation and of their right to object to or to exclude themselves from the proposed settlement; (iii) is reasonable and constitutes due, adequate and sufficient notice to all Persons entitled to receive notice; and (iv) meets all requirements of applicable law; H. Requires the Settlement Administrator to file proof of compliance with the Settlement Class Notice Program at or before the Fairness Hearing; I. Approves the Claim Form, the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit A to this Settlement Agreement, and sets a Claim Deadline;
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J. Approves the creation of the Settlement Website in accordance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement;
K. Requires any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to exclude himself or herself from the Settlement Class to submit an appropriate, timely request for exclusion, postmarked or submitted electronically no later than the Opt-Out and Objection Date, or as the Court may otherwise direct, to the Settlement Administrator at the address on the Class Notice;
L. Orders that any member of the Settlement Class who does not submit a timely, written request for exclusion from the Settlement Class (i.e., becomes an Opt-Out) will be bound by all proceedings, orders and judgments in the Litigation, even if such Settlement Class Member has previously initiated or subsequently initiates individual litigation or other proceedings encompassed by the Release;
M. Requires any Settlement Class Member who does not become an Opt-Out and who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of this Settlement or Settlement Agreement to file with the Court and serve on Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel no later than the Opt-Out and Objection Date, or as the Court may otherwise direct, a statement of the objection signed by the Settlement Class Member containing all of the following information:
(i) The objector’s full name, address, and telephone number; (ii) A signed declaration that he or she is a member of the Settlement Class; (iii) A written statement of all grounds for the objection; (iv) A statement of whether the objector intends to appear at the Fairness Hearing; and
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(v) If the objector intends to appear at the Fairness Hearing through counsel, the objection must also identify the attorney representing the objector who will appear at the Fairness Hearing;
N. Specifies that any response to an objection shall be filed with the Court no later than seven (7) Days prior to the Fairness Hearing;
O. Specifies that any Settlement Class Member who does not file a timely written objection to the Settlement or who fails to otherwise comply with the requirements of Section VII Paragraph C of this Settlement Agreement shall be foreclosed from seeking any adjudication or review of this Settlement by appeal or otherwise;
P. Requires any attorney hired by a Settlement Class Member for the purpose of objecting to the proposed Settlement, the applications for Attorneys’ Fee Awards or Incentive Awards, and who intends to make an appearance at the Fairness Hearing to provide to the Settlement Administrator (who shall forward it to Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel) and to file with the Clerk of the Court a notice of intention to appear no later than the Opt-Out and Objection Date or as the Court may otherwise direct;
Q. Requires that any Settlement Class Member who files and serves a written objection and who intends to make an appearance at the Fairness Hearing shall so state in their objection papers or as the Court otherwise may direct;
R. Directs the Settlement Administrator to establish a post office box in the name of the Settlement Administrator to be used for receiving requests for exclusion and any other communications, and providing that only the Settlement Administrator, Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, Rutherford County’s Counsel, the Court, the Clerk of the Court, and their
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designated agents shall have access to this post office box, except as otherwise provided in this Settlement Agreement;
S. Directs that Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall file any applications for Attorneys’ Fee Awards and/or Named Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards in accordance with the terms set forth in Section VI Paragraphs A and B of this Settlement Agreement;
T. Orders the Settlement Administrator to provide the Opt-Out List to Class Counsel, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel no later than seven (7) Days after the Opt-Out and Objection Date, and then file with the Court the Opt-Out List with an affidavit attesting to the completeness and accuracy thereof no later than five (5) Days thereafter or on such other date as the Parties may direct;
U. Preliminarily enjoins all members of the Settlement Class unless and until they have timely excluded themselves from the Settlement Class from: (i) filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in or participating as plaintiff, claimant or class member in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration or other proceeding in any jurisdiction based on, relating to or arising out of the claims and causes of action or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the Litigation and/or the Released Claims; (ii) filing, commencing, participating in or prosecuting a lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration or other proceeding as a class action on behalf of any member of the Settlement Class who has not timely excluded himself or herself (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to include class allegations or seeking class certification in a pending action), based on, relating to or arising out of the claims and causes of action or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the Litigation and/or the Released Claims; and (iii) attempting to effect Opt-Outs of a class of individuals in any lawsuit
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or administrative, regulatory, arbitration or other proceeding based on, relating to or arising out of the claims and causes of action or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the Litigation and/or the Released Claims. Any Person who knowingly violates such injunction shall pay the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the PCC Released Persons, the Rutherford County Released Persons, and/or Class Counsel as a result of the violation. This Settlement Agreement is not intended to prevent members of the Settlement Class from participating in any action or investigation initiated by a local, state or federal agency; and
V. Contains any additional provisions agreeable to the Parties that might be necessary or advisable to implement the terms of this Settlement Agreement and the proposed settlement.
IX. FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT AND RELEASES A. Final Order. If this Settlement Agreement (including any modification thereto made with the consent of the Parties as provided for herein) is approved by the Court following the Fairness Hearing scheduled by the Court in its Preliminary Approval Order, the Parties shall request the Court to enter a Final Order and Judgment pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all applicable laws that, among other things:
(i) Finds that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members and that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to approve this Settlement and Settlement Agreement and all exhibits thereto;
(ii) Certifies a Settlement Class solely for purposes of this Settlement; (iii) Grants final approval to this Settlement Agreement as being fair, reasonable and adequate as to all Parties and consistent and in compliance with all requirements of due process and applicable law, as to and in the best interests of all Parties and directs the
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Parties and their counsel to implement and consummate this Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms and provisions;
(iv) Declares this Settlement Agreement and the Final Order and Judgment to be binding on and have res judicata and preclusive effect in all pending and future lawsuits or other proceedings encompassed by the Release maintained by or on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members, as well as their respective present, former, and future administrators, agents, assigns, attorneys, executors, heirs, partners, predecessors-ininterest, and successors;
(v) Finds that the Settlement Class Notice Program: (i) constituted the best practicable notice; (ii) constituted notice that was reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise the Settlement Class of the pendency of the Litigation, of their right to object to or exclude themselves from the proposed Settlement, of their right to appear at the Fairness Hearing, and of their right to seek monetary and other relief; (iii) constituted reasonable, due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all Persons entitled to receive notice; and (iv) met all requirements of due process and any other applicable law;
(vi) Approves the Claim Form that was distributed to the Settlement Class, the content of which was without material alteration from Exhibit A to this Settlement Agreement;
(vii) Approves the Class Notice that was distributed to the Settlement Class, the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit B to this Settlement Agreement;
(viii) Finds that Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs adequately represented the Settlement Class for purposes of entering into and implementing the Settlement and Settlement Agreement;
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(ix) Dismisses the Litigation against the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County now pending before the Court on the merits and with prejudice and without fees or costs, in accordance with the terms of the Final Order and Judgment;
(x) Adjudges that the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class have conclusively compromised, settled, dismissed, and released any and all Released Claims against the PCC Released Persons and the Rutherford County Released Persons;
(xi) Approves payment of any Attorneys’ Fee Awards and Named Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards;
(xii) Without affecting the finality of the Final Order and Judgment for purposes of appeal, reserves jurisdiction over the Settlement Administrator, the PCC Defendants, Rutherford County, the Named Plaintiffs, and the Settlement Class Members as to all matters relating to the administration, consummation, enforcement, and interpretation of the terms of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, and Final Order and Judgment and for any other necessary purposes;
(xiii) Provides that upon the Effective Date, the Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members, whether or not they return a Claim Form within the time and in the manner provided for, shall have released and shall be barred from asserting any and all Released Claims against the PCC Released Persons and/or the Rutherford County Released Persons;
(xiv) Determines that the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement provided for therein and any proceedings taken pursuant thereto are not and should not in any event be offered or received as evidence of, a presumption, concession or an admission of liability by the PCC Released Persons and/or the Rutherford County Released Persons or of the suitability of these or similar claims to class treatment in active litigation and trial; provided, however, that reference
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may be made to this Settlement Agreement and the Settlement provided for therein in such proceedings solely as may be necessary to effectuate the Settlement Agreement;
(xv) Bars and permanently enjoins all Settlement Class Members from: (i) filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or participating (as class members or otherwise) in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding in any jurisdiction based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the Litigation and/or the Released Claims; and (ii) organizing Settlement Class Members who have not excluded themselves from the Settlement Class into a separate class for purposes of pursuing as a purported class action any lawsuit or arbitration or other proceeding (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to include class allegations or seeking class certification in a pending action) based on relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the Litigation and/or the Released Claims, except that Settlement Class Members are not precluded from participating in any investigation or suit initiated by a local, state, or federal agency;
(xvi) States that any Person who knowingly violates such injunction shall pay the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the PCC Released Persons, Rutherford County Released Persons and/or Class Counsel as a result of the violation;
(xvii) Approves the Opt-Out List and determines that the Opt-Out List is a complete list of all members of the Settlement Class who have timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Class and, accordingly, shall neither share in nor be bound by the Final Order and Judgment, except for Opt-Outs who subsequently elect to submit Claim Forms during the Claim Period;
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(xviii) Authorizes the Parties, without further approval from the Court, to agree to and adopt such amendments, modifications and expansions of this Settlement Agreement and all exhibits hereto as: (i) shall be consistent in all material respects with the Final Order and Judgment; and (ii) do not limit the rights of the Parties or Settlement Class Members; and
(xix) Issues the Injunction set forth in Exhibit C hereto. B. Release Provisions. As of the Effective Date, the Parties hereby agree to following Releases, by operation of entry of the Final Order and Judgment:
(i) For and in consideration of the Cash Award, any Incentive Award, and other consideration described herein, and except as to the rights and obligations provided for under this Agreement, as of the Effective Date, the Releasing Persons shall and do hereby, finally, fully, and forever release and discharge the PCC Released Persons of and from any and all Released Claims. This Release shall include the agreement and commitment by the Releasing Persons (including Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members) to not now or hereafter initiate, maintain, or assert against the PCC Released Persons, or any of them, any and all causes of action, claims, rights, demands, actions, claims for damages, equitable, legal and/or administrative relief, interest, demands, or rights, including without limitation, claims for damages of any kind, including those in excess of actual damages, whether based on federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, contract, common law, or any other sources that have been, could have been, may be, or could be alleged or asserted now or in the future by the Named Plaintiffs or any Settlement Class Members against the PCC Released Persons, or any of them, in the Litigation or in any other court action or before any administrative body (including any regulatory entity or organization), tribunal, arbitration panel, or other adjudicating body arising out of or related to the Released Claims.
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(ii) For and in consideration of the Cash Award, any Incentive Award, and other consideration described herein, and except as to the rights and obligations provided for under this Agreement, as of the Effective Date, the Releasing Persons shall and do hereby, finally, fully, and forever release and discharge the Rutherford County Released Persons of and from any and all Released Claims. This Release shall include the agreement and commitment by the Releasing Persons (including Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members) to not now or hereafter initiate, maintain, or assert against the Rutherford County Released Persons, or any of them, any and all causes of action, claims, rights, demands, actions, claims for damages, equitable, legal and/or administrative relief, interest, demands, or rights, including without limitation, claims for damages of any kind, including those in excess of actual damages, whether based on federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, contract, common law, or any other sources that have been, could have been, may be, or could be alleged or asserted now or in the future by the Named Plaintiffs or any Settlement Class Members against the Rutherford County Released Persons, or any of them, in the Litigation or in any other court action or before any administrative body (including any regulatory entity or organization), tribunal, arbitration panel, or other adjudicating body arising out of or related to the Released Claims.
(iii) For and in consideration of the Release and other consideration described herein, and except as to the rights and obligations provided for under this Agreement, as of the Effective Date, the PCC Released Persons shall and do hereby, finally, fully, and forever release and discharge the Rutherford County Released Persons of and from any and all Released Claims.
(iv) For and in consideration of the Release, the Rutherford County Consideration, and other consideration described herein, and except as to the rights and obligations provided for under this Agreement, as of the Effective Date, the Rutherford County
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Released Persons shall and do hereby, finally, fully, and forever release and discharge the PCC Released Persons of and from any and all Released Claims.
(v) For and in consideration of any Attorneys’ Fees Award and other consideration described herein, and except as to the rights and obligations provided for under this Agreement, as of the Effective Date, Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel shall and do hereby, finally, fully, and forever release and discharge the PCC Released Persons and the Rutherford County Released Persons from any and all rights, duties, obligations, claims, actions, causes of action, or liabilities, whether arising under local, state, or federal law, whether by statute, contract, common law, or equity, that Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel may now have, own, or hold, or that Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel at any time may have, own, or hold, against the PCC Released Persons and/or the Rutherford County Released Persons, including without limitation claims for attorneys’ fees, expenses, or costs. Class Counsel and Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel agree that any Attorneys’ Fees Awards will be their sole remedy for reimbursement for receipt, directly or indirectly, of any fees, expenses, or costs from the PCC Released Persons and the Rutherford County Released Persons.
(vi) Subject to Court approval, all Settlement Class Members who have not excluded themselves from the Settlement Class shall be bound by this Settlement Agreement and the Release and all of their claims shall be dismissed with prejudice and released, irrespective of whether they received actual notice of the Litigation or this Settlement.
(vii) The Releasing Persons, the PCC Released Persons, and the Rutherford County Released Persons expressly acknowledge that they are familiar with principles of law such as Section 1542 of the Civil Code of the State of California, which provides:
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A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MIGHT HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR. Notwithstanding California, Tennessee, or other law, the Releasing Persons, the PCC Released Persons, and the Rutherford County Released Persons hereby expressly agree that the provisions, rights and benefits of Section 1542 and all similar federal or state laws, rights, rules, or legal principles of any other jurisdiction that may be applicable herein are hereby knowingly and voluntarily waived, released, and relinquished to the fullest extent permitted by law, and the Releasing Persons, the PCC Released Persons, and the Rutherford County Released Persons hereby agree and acknowledge that this is an essential term of the Releases. In connection with the Release, the Releasing Persons, the PCC Released Persons, and the Rutherford County Released Persons acknowledge that they are aware that they may hereafter discover claims presently unknown and unsuspected or facts in addition to or different from those which they now know or believe to be true with respect to matters released herein, and that such claims are hereby released, relinquished, and discharged.
(viii) Nothing in the Releases shall preclude any action to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement, including participation in any of the processes detailed herein.
X. WITHDRAWAL FROM OR TERMINATION OF SETTLEMENT A. Within fifteen (15) Days after the occurrence of any of the following events and upon written notice to counsel for all Parties, a Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Settlement and terminate this Settlement Agreement:
(i) If the Court fails to approve the Settlement Agreement as written in any material respect or if on appeal the Court’s approval is reversed or modified;
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(ii) If the Court materially alters any of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, except that a reduction by the Court from any applications for Attorneys’ Fee Awards, Additional Attorneys’ Fee Awards or Incentive Awards shall not be deemed to be a material alteration; or
(iii) If the Preliminary Approval Order, as described in Section VIII, or the Final Order and Judgment, as described in Section IX, is not entered by the Court or is reversed or modified on appeal, or otherwise fails for any reason.
B. In the event of a withdrawal pursuant to Paragraph A above, any certification of a Settlement Class will be vacated, without prejudice to any Party’s position on the issue of class certification and the amenability of the claims asserted in the Litigation to class treatment, and the Parties shall be restored to their litigation position existing immediately before the execution of this Settlement Agreement.
C. If the number of members of the Settlement Class who properly and timely submit requests for exclusion from the Settlement Class as set forth in Section VII Paragraph D, thereby becoming Opt-Outs, is greater than a number to be submitted to the Court under seal at the time of filing the Motion for Preliminary Approval (the “Opt-Out Threshold”), then PCC may elect in its sole discretion to withdraw from the Settlement and terminate this Settlement Agreement. In that event, all of the Parties’ obligations under this Agreement shall cease to be of any force and effect; the certification of the Settlement Class shall be vacated without prejudice to the PCC Defendants’ and Rutherford County’s position on the issue of class certification; and the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County shall be restored to their litigation position existing immediately before the execution of this Settlement Agreement. In order to elect to withdraw from the Settlement and terminate this Settlement Agreement on the basis set
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forth in this Paragraph, PCC must notify Class Counsel and Rutherford County’s Counsel in writing of its election to do so within fourteen (14) Days after the Opt-Out List has been served on the Parties. In the event that PCC exercises such right, Class Counsel shall have fourteen (14) Days or such longer period as agreed to by the Parties to address the concerns of the Opt-Outs. If through such efforts the total number on the Opt-Out List subsequently becomes and remains fewer than the Opt-Out Threshold, PCC shall withdraw its election to withdraw from the Settlement and terminate the Settlement Agreement. In no event, however, shall the PCC Defendants have any further obligation under this Agreement to any Opt-Out unless he or she withdraws his or her request for exclusion. For purposes of this Paragraph, Opt-Outs shall not include (i) Persons who are specifically excluded from the Settlement Class; (ii) Opt-Outs who elect to withdraw their request for exclusion; and (iii) Opt-Outs who agree to sign an undertaking that they will not pursue an individual claim, class claim, or any other claim that would otherwise be a Released Claim as defined in this Settlement Agreement.
D. In the event of withdrawal by any Party in accordance with the terms set forth in this Section X, the Settlement Agreement (except for the covenants and provisions describing the effect of withdrawal in Section X) shall be null and void, shall have no further force and effect with respect to any Party in the Litigation, and shall not be offered in evidence or used in any litigation for any purpose, including the existence, certification, or maintenance of any proposed or existing class or the amenability of these or similar claims to class treatment. In the event of such withdrawal, this Settlement Agreement and all negotiations, proceedings, documents prepared, and statements made in connection herewith shall be without prejudice to the PCC Defendants, Rutherford County, the Named Plaintiffs, and the Settlement Class Members and shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission or confession in any way by any Party of
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any fact, matter, or proposition of law and shall not be used in any manner for any purpose, and the Parties to the Litigation shall stand in the same position as if this Settlement Agreement had not been negotiated, made, or filed with the Court.
XI. EFFECTIVE DATE A. The Effective Date of this Settlement Agreement shall be the date when each and all of the following conditions have occurred:
(i) This Settlement Agreement has been fully executed by all Parties and their counsel;
(ii) Orders have been entered by the Court certifying the Settlement Class, granting preliminary approval of this Settlement, and approving the forms of Class Notice and Claim Form, all as provided above;
(iii) The Settlement Class Notice Program has been executed in accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order;
(iv) The Court has entered a Final Order and Judgment finally approving this Agreement, as provided above; and
(v) The Final Order and Judgment has become Final as defined in Paragraph B below.
B. “Final,” when referring to a judgment or order, means that: (i) the judgment is a final, appealable judgment; and (ii) either (a) no appeal has been taken from the judgment as of the date on which all times to appeal therefrom have expired, or (b) an appeal or other review proceeding of the judgment having been commenced, the date by which such appeal or other review is finally concluded and no longer is subject to review by any court, whether by appeal, petitions or rehearing or re-argument, petitions for rehearing en banc, petitions for writ of
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certiorari, or otherwise, and such appeal or other review has been finally resolved in a manner that affirms the Final Order and Judgment in all material respects.
C. If, for any reason, this Settlement Agreement fails to become Final pursuant to the foregoing Paragraph B, the orders, judgment, and dismissal to be entered pursuant to this Settlement Agreement shall be vacated, and the Parties will be returned to the status quo ante with respect to the Litigation as if this Settlement Agreement had never been entered into.
XII. NOTICES A. All Notices (other than the Class Notice and notice pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act) required by the Settlement Agreement shall be made in writing and communicated by mail to the following addresses, including by electronic mail to the following addresses:
All Notices to Class Counsel shall be sent to Class Counsel, c/o: Alec Karakatsanis Elizabeth Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 599-0953 alec@civilrightscorps.org elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org Kyle F. Mothershead Law Office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 Telephone: (615) 982-8002 Facsimile: (615) 229-6387 Kyle@mothersheadlaw.com
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All Notices to PCC Defendants’ Counsel provided herein shall be sent to the PCC
Defendants’ Counsel, c/o:
Manny A. Abascal Latham & Watkins LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 485-1234 Facsimile: (213) 891-8763 manny.abascal@lw.com
Lisa S. Rivera Kathryn H. Walker Bass, Berry & Sims PLC 150 Third Avenue South, Suite 2800 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Telephone: (615) 742-6200 Facsimile: (615) 742-6293 LRivera@bassberry.com KWalker@bassberry.com
All Notices to Rutherford County’s Counsel provided herein shall be sent to the
Rutherford County’s Counsel, c/o:
Josh A. McCreary Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square North Murfeesboro, Tennessee 37130 Telephone: (615) 893-5522 jmccreary@mborolaw.com
B. The notice recipients and addresses designated above may be changed by written
notice.
C. Upon the request of any of the Parties, the Parties agree to promptly provide each
other with copies of comments, objections, requests for exclusion, or other documents or filings
received as a result of the Class Notice.
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XIII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS A. Interpretation. This Settlement Agreement contains the entire agreement among the Parties hereto and supersedes any prior discussions, agreements, or understandings among them as well as any and all prior drafts of this Settlement Agreement. All terms are contractual. For the purpose of construing or interpreting this Settlement Agreement, the Parties agree that the Settlement Agreement is to be deemed to have been drafted equally by all Parties hereto and shall not be construed strictly for or against any Party, and the Parties further agree that any prior drafts may not be used to construe or interpret this Settlement Agreement. B. Binding Effect. The terms are and shall be binding upon each of the Parties hereto, their administrators, agents, assigns, attorneys, executors, heirs, partners, representatives, predecessors-in-interest, and successors as well as upon all other Persons claiming any interest in the subject matter hereto through any of the Parties hereto including any Settlement Class Members. C. Headings. The headings contained in this Settlement Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect in any way the meaning or interpretation of this Settlement Agreement. D. No Rescission On Grounds Of Mistake. The Parties acknowledge that they have made their own investigations of the matters covered by this Settlement Agreement to the extent they have deemed it necessary to do so. Therefore, the Parties agree that they will not seek to set aside any part of the Settlement Agreement on the grounds of mistake. Moreover, the Parties understand, agree, and expressly assume the risk that any fact not recited, contained, or embodied in the Settlement Agreement may turn out hereinafter to be other than, different from, or contrary to the facts now known to them or believed by them to be true, and further agree that
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the Settlement Agreement shall be effective in all respects notwithstanding and shall not be subject to termination, modification, or rescission by reason of any such difference in facts.
E. Amendment. This Settlement Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by the Parties or their counsel, except to the extent the amendment or modification would affect the interests of Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel then it shall require their signature as well. Amendments and modifications may be made without notice to the Settlement Class unless notice is required by law or by the Court.
F. Integration Of Exhibits. The exhibits to this Settlement Agreement are an integral and material part of the Settlement and are hereby incorporated and made a part of the Settlement Agreement.
G. Jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has jurisdiction over the Parties to this Settlement Agreement and the Settlement Class.
H. No Admission. Neither this Settlement Agreement nor any of its provisions, exhibits, related documents (including but not limited to drafts of the Settlement Agreement, the Preliminary Approval Order, and the Final Order and Judgment), negotiation, or any proceedings relating in any way to the Settlement shall be construed as or deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession by any person, including the PCC Defendants and Rutherford County, and shall not be offered or received in evidence, or subject to discovery, in this or any other action or proceeding except in an action brought to enforce its terms or except as may be required by law or Court order. The provisions of this Paragraph shall become effective when this Settlement Agreement has been signed by the Parties and shall be binding on the Parties and their counsel regardless of whether the Settlement Agreement is approved by this Court or any
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other court and regardless of whether the Settlement Agreement is otherwise rendered null and void pursuant to Section X.
I. Governing Law. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal laws (as opposed to the conflicts of law provisions) of the State of Tennessee.
J. Counterparts. This Settlement Agreement may be executed in counterparts and may be executed by facsimile, and as so executed shall constitute one agreement.
K. Media Statements. Subject to the Preliminary Approval Order issued by the Court, neither the Named Plaintiffs nor Class Counsel, Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel, or any other counsel acting on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs or the Settlement Class, or Rutherford County or Rutherford County’s Counsel shall issue any public statement or press release, or make any statement to any media or press of any sort, regarding PCC’s parents or affiliates. Any public statements concerning PCC must refer to PCC as “Providence Community Corrections,” “Providence,” or “PCC”; such statements may not refer to PCC as “Pathways Community Corrections” or “Pathways.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Named Plaintiffs, Class Counsel, Other Former Plaintiffs’ Counsel, or any other counsel acting on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs or the Settlement Class, or Rutherford County or Rutherford County’s Counsel may issue statements regarding PCC’s parents or affiliates if PCC Defendants’ Counsel have first reviewed and approved in writing such statements in their entirety. The Parties acknowledge that Rutherford County, and its agents (including Rutherford County Counsel) and officials are subject to sunshine laws and other disclosure agreements. Nothing in this paragraph is intended to prohibit or hinder Rutherford County and its agents and officials from discharging their public duties in accordance with the law.
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L. Confidentiality. All agreements made and orders entered during the course of the Litigation relating to the confidentiality of information shall survive this Settlement Agreement.
M. Return Of Material. Within thirty (30) Days after the Effective Date, Class Counsel, Other Plaintiffs’ Firms, PCC Defendants’ Counsel, and Rutherford County’s Counsel will return all material produced by one to the other in discovery or otherwise in connection with the Litigation, except that counsel for such Parties may keep a copy of such materials for their files provided that the materials not be used for any purpose other than in connection with this Litigation and/or to effectuate this Settlement and Settlement Agreement.
N. No Assignment. Notwithstanding any provision in any engagement letter regarding attorneys’ fees and costs, any right to any attorneys’ fees and costs is described herein and shall be resolved in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and supersedes prior assignments. Other than any prior assignment of attorneys’ fees and costs, which are deemed superseded by this Agreement, each Party represents and warrants that no portion of any claim, right, demand, action, or cause of action that the Party has or may have against another Party arising out of any allegations made in any of the actions comprising the Litigation or pertaining to any of the Released Claims, and no portion of any recovery or settlement to which any Party may be entitled, has been assigned, transferred, or conveyed by or for the Party in any manner. No Person other than the Named Plaintiffs has any legal or equitable interest in the claims, demands, actions, or causes of action referred to in this Agreement as those of the Named Plaintiffs.
O. Stay. Upon execution of this Settlement Agreement, the Parties shall immediately and jointly stipulate to stay the Litigation in its entirety until the approval of this
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Settlement Agreement has been finally determined, with the exception of the following: (i) any motions, affidavits, and other matters necessary to obtain and preserve final judicial approval of this Settlement Agreement; (ii) any filings related to this Agreement, including applications for Attorneys’ Fee Awards, Additional Attorneys’ Fee Awards and/or Incentive Awards; and (iii) any filings related to the issuance and enforcement by PCC of existing or future discovery requests against third parties relating to indemnification, insurance coverage, or other matters relating to settlement.
P. Best Efforts. The Parties shall execute all documents and use their best efforts to perform all acts necessary and proper to promptly effectuate the terms of this Settlement Agreement and to take all necessary or appropriate actions to obtain judicial approval of this Settlement Agreement in order to give this Settlement Agreement full force and effect.
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Case 3:15-cv-01048 Document 190-1 Filed 09/18/17 Page 50 of 57 PageID #: 2477

Class Counsel(orformer Class Counsel):
CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS
By: Alec Karakatsanis 910 17th Street NW,Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone:(202)681-2721

LAW OFFICE OF KYLE M01OTiFvI,ER.SItIeEAAw D ,,A±.1k
By: I Kyle F. 1Viothershead 414 Union Street, Suite 900 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Telephone: (615)982-8002 Facsimile: (615)229-6387

ky6

q)u,

EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW

By: Phil Telfeyan 400 7th Street NW,Suite 602 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202)670-1004

BAKER,DONELSON,BEARMAN,CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ,P.C.
40W II sp 4 itriKssur,
Matthew G. White First Tennessee Bank Building 165 Madison Avenue, Suite 2000 Memphis, TN 38013 Telephone: (901)577-8182

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

)

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY

)

CORRECTIONS, INC., et al.

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________ )

Case No. 3:15-cv-01048
(Class Action) JURY DEMAND

ORDER Upon consideration of the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order by named Plaintiffs' Fred Robinson and Steven Gibbs, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows: 1) Defendant Rutherford County, and its agents, employees, and officers, including specifically the Rutherford County Sheriff, are ordered not to serve or execute any warrant, sought and issued solely on the basis of nonpayment of court costs, fines or probation or other fees, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs. 2) Defendant Rutherford County, and its agents, employees, and officers, including specifically the Rutherford County Sheriff, are ordered not to serve or execute any warrant, sought and issued on the basis of violation of probation, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs that includes a preset secured money bond condition that would require payment in order for Mr. Robinson or Mr. Gibbs to be released from custody. 3) Defendant, PCC, Inc., and its agents, employees, and officers, are ordered not to seek the issuance of any warrant, other than a Release on Recognizance ("ROR") warrant, solely

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on the basis of nonpayment of court costs, fines or probation or other fees, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs.
4) Defendant, PCC, Inc., and its agents, employees, and officers, are ordered not to seek the issuance of any warrant on the basis of violation of probation, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs that seeks a preset secured money bond condition that would require payment in order for Mr. Robinson or Mr. Gibbs to be released from custody.
Signed this c9 hd._ day oebJeb~l5 at Lf~ s<:J p.,...,_,
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, v.

) Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-01048 ) )

PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, INC., AND

) )

Judge Kevin H. Sharp

)

RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )

)

Defendants.

)

STIPULATION AND ORDER CONVERTING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER INTO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THIS MATTER previously came before the Honorable Kevin H. Sharp on October 2, 2015, on Plaintiffs Fred Robinson’s and Steven Gibbs’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”), against Defendants Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (“PCC, Inc.”) and Rutherford County, Tennessee (“Rutherford County”) (collectively “Defendants”). Subsequent to the parties’ agreement for entry of the temporary restraining order (“TRO”), the parties now further agree that the TRO should be converted to a preliminary injunction (“Injunction”).
Plaintiffs and Defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, stipulate and request immediate entry of this preliminary injunction against Defendants on the following terms:

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IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Injunction is hereby GRANTED as follows:
1. Defendant Rutherford County, and its agents, employees, and officers, including specifically the Rutherford County Sheriff, are hereby enjoined from serving or executing any warrant, sought and issued solely on the basis of nonpayment of court costs, fines or probation or other fees, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs;
2. Defendant Rutherford County and its agents, employees, and officers, including specifically the Rutherford County Sheriff, are hereby enjoined from serving and executing any warrant, sought and issued on the basis of violation of probation, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs that includes a preset secured money bond condition that would require payment in order for Mr. Robinson or Mr. Gibbs to be released from custody;
3. Defendant PCC, Inc. and its agents, employees, and officers are hereby enjoined from seeking the issuance of any warrant, other than a Release on Recognizance (“ROR”) warrant, solely on the basis of nonpayment of court costs, fines or probation or other fees for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs;
4. Defendant PCC, Inc. and its agents, employees, and officers are hereby enjoined from seeking the issuance of any warrant on the basis of violation of probation, for the arrest of Fred Robinson or Steven Gibbs that seeks a preset secured money bond condition that would require payment in order for Robinson or Gibbs to be released from custody;
5. The injunction shall remain in effect during the pendency of this case or until further ordered by the Court or stipulated by the parties;
6. Defendants waive all rights to seek judicial review of or otherwise to challenge or contest the validity of this stipulation and order.
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7. Defendants are not currently seeking security to pay for any costs or damages related to the injunction at this time, as otherwise provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c);
8. Based on the parties’ stipulation to convert the TRO to the Injunction, the Court strikes the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction scheduled for the 16th day of October, 2015, at 3:00 p.m. in the United States District Courthouse for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, 801 Broadway #800, Nashville, Tennessee;
SO ORDERED this WKGD\RI2FWREHU ___________________________ Kevin H. Sharp United States District Judge
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Respectfully Submitted:

By: s/ Lisa Rivera Lisa S. Rivera Kathryn H. Walker Bass, Berry & Sims 150 Third Avenue South Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201-3001 T: (615) 742-6200 F: (615) 742-2868 lrivera@bassberry.com kwalker@bassberry.com

By: s/ Jonathan Cole Jonathan Jacob Cole Sarah D. Murray Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC 211 Commerce Street Suite 800 Nashville, TN 37201 T: 615-726-6500 jcole@bakerdonelson.com smurray@bakerdonelson.com

Attorneys for Providence Community Corrections, Inc.
By: s/ Evan Cope Edward Evan Cope James C. Cope Josh A. McCreary Blake Allan Garner Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square N. PO Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 T: 615-893-5522 F: 615-849-2135 ecope@mborolaw.com jcope@mborolaw.com jmccreary@mborolaw.com bgarner@mborolaw.com
Attorneys for Rutherford County, Tennessee

Lori H Patterson Kristine L. Roberts Matthew G. White Baker, Donelson, Berman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC First Tennessee Building 165 Madison Avenue Suite 2000 Memphis TN 38103 T: 901-526-2000 F: 901-577-0732 kroberts@bakerdonelson.com lpatterson@bakerdonelson.com mwhite@bakerdonelson.com
Alec Karakatsanis Phil Telfeyan Equal Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 T: 202-670-1004 alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Fred Robinson and Steven Gibbs
4

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, STEVEN GIBBS, PAULA PULLUM, YOLANDA CARNEY, JACQUELINE BRINKLEY, CURTIS JOHNSON, and FRED ROBINSON,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case Number 15-01048 Honorable David M. Lawson

PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, INC., RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, JASMINE JACKSON, BRIANA WOODLEE, AMANDA ROBERTS, TIARA SMITH, AMANDA SCHEXNAYDER, and NISHA HYDE,

Defendants. _________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART UNOPPOSED MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT CLASS AND DENYING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On September 18, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to certify a settlement class,

give preliminary approval to a proposed class settlement, approve notice of a class action settlement

and set a hearing date for final approval of the settlement. The Court has reviewed the submissions

of the parties and the terms of the proposed settlement and finds that the motion cannot be granted

in full at this time, for the reasons stated below.

On October 1, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their complaint against the County of Rutherford,

Tennessee, defendant Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (PCC), and various officials of those

entities. The plaintiffs, individuals who are under sentences of probation, on behalf of themselves

and a class of those similarly situated, pleaded eight causes of action for various alleged

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constitutional violations, along with a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act claim. They also sought declaratory relief in the form of an order declaring PCC’s contract with the County to be void and unenforceable. A predecessor judge of this Court previously summarized in detail the substance of the allegations in the complaint, but the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claims was that the County’s outsourcing of misdemeanor probation services to a private for-profit corporation, PCC, resulted in an unconstitutional scheme that deprived indigent probationers of their due process and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ arrangement constituted a “conspiracy to funnel misdemeanor probation cases in which court debts are owed to a private company, which then extorts money out of individuals who have no ability to pay court costs, let alone private fees.” Compl. ¶ 1.
Two individual plaintiffs — Fred Robinson and Steven Gibbs — filed a motion for a temporary restraining order barring the County from issuing warrants for their arrest based on their failure to pay court costs and fees assessed under the probation outsourcing program. The Court granted that motion, and, on October 13, 2015, converted the TRO to a preliminary injunction, upon the stipulation of the parties. The Court later granted similar injunctive relief in favor of other named plaintiffs. The defendants each filed motions to dismiss, which were granted in part and denied in part by the Court on June 9, 2016. Under a preliminary scheduling order entered by the Court, the parties engaged in mediation from May through September 2016, which resulted in an agreement in principle to settle the case. The parties had engaged in some discovery up to that point, but, on June 28, 2016, the Court stayed all discovery other than that needed for the purposes of completing the mediation, to allow the parties to focus their efforts on concluding a settlement. Throughout the initial phases of the litigation, the parties pursued several interlocutory appeals of
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the Court’s orders granting preliminary injunctive relief, which eventually were dismissed by agreement of the parties. The Court scheduled a continued case management conference for November 8, 2016, but that conference was adjourned several times at the request of the parties, based on their representations that they were making substantial progress in their settlement negotiations, and that they needed more time to conclude their efforts. The parties continued to engage in written discovery throughout the negotiations.
On September 15, 2017, the parties informed the Court that they had reached a settlement of the individual and class claims in the case, and that they needed only to collect final signatures to memorialize the agreement. On September 18, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement agreement.
The proposed settlement agreement would apply to the following class, which has not yet been certified by the Court:
All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to [October 5, 2017], (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County’s Probation Department. Plf.’s Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement [dkt. #190] at 4 (Pg ID 2412). The parties estimate the class to be composed of 29,000 members. The proposed settlement agreement provides that the defendants will establish a settlement fund of $14,300,000 to be used to pay claims by the plaintiffs and class members, the attorney’s fees of class counsel, and the expenses of administration. Each class member who submits a timely claim would be paid 125% of all amounts paid by them to PCC for purported fees under the probation outsourcing program, and each of the named individual plaintiffs would receive an additional
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incentive payment of $10,000. Any money remaining in the settlement fund after payment of timely-filed claims would be used to increase the payout to class members to a maximum of 500% of the fees paid by them to PCC, applied to additional attorney’s fees for class counsel, or distributed as a cy pres award. In exchange, the plaintiffs would dismiss the case with prejudice and release all of the individual and class claims.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require court approval of settlements in class actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” Rule 23(e)(2) states that a settlement that would bind class members may be approved “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” “The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), and “[a]ny class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under” Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5). The approval of a proposed settlement ordinarily involves a two-stage procedure. “First, counsel submit the proposed terms of [the] settlement and the judge makes a preliminary fairness evaluation. . . . Once the judge is satisfied as to the . . . results of the initial inquiry into the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement, notice of a formal Rule 23(e) fairness hearing is given to the class members.” Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed.) §§ 21.632-.633 (2004); see also Tenn. Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs., Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d 559, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2001).
In deciding whether to approve a class action settlement, the “ultimate issue” for the Court is whether the proposed settlement “is fair, adequate and reasonable.” Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 921 (6th Cir. 1983). District courts must “appraise the reasonableness of particular class-
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action settlements on a case-by-case basis, in the light of all the relevant circumstances.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 742 (1986). “Several factors guide the inquiry: (1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members; and (7) the public interest.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007).
The present action has been pending for just short of two years. The proposed settlement resulted from negotiations that occurred while the defendants’ motions to dismiss were pending and after the Court held a hearing on and later granted in part and denied in part those motions. However, the parties have not furnished enough information to allow the Court to determine whether the terms of the proposed payments to absent class members are fair and reasonable, and whether the amount of the proposed settlement fund is adequate to satisfy the anticipated claims.
The settlement fund of $14,300,000 is a gross amount. The proposed settlement agreement requires expenses of administration of the settlement and fees of class counsel to the paid first. The parties have not furnished an estimate of the administration expenses, and have not provided any background information on the proposed settlement administrator, Dahl Administration, LLC. Class counsel fees are projected to be nearly $1,400,000. The parties estimate that the absent class members could number 29,000 individuals. If all members apply for awards, the individual award would average less than $500, assuming a reasonable amount for administration expenses. The parties have not furnished any information about the amount of fees a probationer paid to the defendants over an average term of supervision. Nor have the parties furnished an estimate of the
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number of likely award applicants and the basis for such an estimate. Without that information, the Court is not able to determine if the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, or reasonable.
Due to this lack of information, the Court also is left at a disadvantage in determining whether the quick-pay attorney fee provision is appropriate. Although quick-pay provisions are not per se unreasonable in this circuit, see Pelzer v. Vassalle, 655 F. App’x 352, 365 (6th Cir. 2016), the Court must nonetheless determine the reasonableness of fee requests, including terms of payment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
The Court is obliged to conduct “an independent analysis of the settlement terms.” Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Pet Food Prod. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2010)). That analysis is mandated by Rule 23(e) because of the alteration of the normal adversary process in such cases, and the status of class counsel as fiduciaries to the absent class members. Ibid.; see also In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 715 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court cannot discharge that obligation without adequate information about the settlement and its likely impact on the class.
The proposed settlement agreement also purports to limit the Court’s discretion to allow objectors to the proposed settlement to appear at the fairness hearing. The Court will not approve a proposed settlement that constricts its discretion that way.
The information furnished by the parties is adequate, however, to allow a determination of the request to certify the proposed settlement class. The Court conditionally will certify the proposed settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). However, the Court’s certification of the class is based upon, and conditioned on the accuracy of, the parties’ representations.
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The motion addresses the factors enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), stating that the class is numerous, that all class members claim that the defendants imposed and attempted to collect from them unlawfully burdensome fees under the probation outsourcing program, that the named plaintiffs’ claims are materially identical to those of all members of the class, the representative plaintiffs do not have any interests that conflict with those of the class members, and the representative plaintiffs have retained skilled attorneys who have, and will, vigorously pursue the interests of the class. Addressing the factors contained in Rule 23(b)(3), the motion states that the claims for recovery of the improper fees form the entire subject of the controversy affecting those persons who were under sentences of probation during the class period, and that pursuing relief in a single suit would be superior to any other form of claim resolution as it would promote judicial economy and clarity of results. The plaintiffs’ lawyers assert that they have extensive experience litigating cases involving class claims of similar type and scope.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to certify a settlement class [dkt #190] is GRANTED IN PART.
It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the following settlement class is conditionally certified in this case:
All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to October 5, 2017, (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County’s Probation Department. It is further ORDERED that counsel of record for the named plaintiffs, namely attorneys Alec Karakatsanis, Elizabeth Rossi, and Kyle F. Mothershead, are appointed as counsel for the designated settlement class. The named plaintiffs are appointed as class representatives.
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It is further ORDERED that the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is DENIED without prejudice. The parties may submit a new motion for preliminary approval with additional information on or before October 18, 2017.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation Dated: October 5, 2017
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, STEVEN GIBBS, PAULA PULLUM, YOLANDA CARNEY, JACQUELINE BRINKLEY, CURTIS JOHNSON, and FRED ROBINSON,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case Number 15-01048 Honorable David M. Lawson

PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, INC., RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, JASMINE JACKSON, BRIANA WOODLEE, AMANDA ROBERTS, TIARA SMITH, AMANDA SCHEXNAYDER, and NISHA HYDE,

Defendants. _________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF ALLOCATION, GRANTING MOTIONS FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES, GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND DISMISSING CASE

Pursuant to notice, the Court conducted a fairness hearing on June 25, 2018 to determine

whether a settlement agreement should be given final approval on behalf of the certified settlement

class in this case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require court approval of settlements in

class actions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be

settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”), and if the

settlement would determine the rights of and bind absent class members, “the court may approve

it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate,” ibid. The June 25

hearing was the second step in the settlement approval process. See Manual for Complex Litigation

§ 23.632-.633 (4th ed.); see also Tennessee Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs., Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d

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559, 565 (6th Cir. 2001). On January 2, 2018, the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) as the first step in the process. The order directed that a written notice to the class be given by February 16, 2018 via first-class mail augmented by other media. Plaintiffs’ counsel retained Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota as the agent of the named plaintiffs and class counsel to give notice in the manner approved by the Court, and ultimately to administer the settlement, process claims, and make distributions. The Court approved the retention of Dahl as the settlement administrator.
I. The proposed settlement addresses the plaintiffs’ claims that the County of Rutherford’s outsourcing of misdemeanor probation services to a private for-profit corporation, Providence Community Corrections (PCC), resulted in an unconstitutional scheme that deprived indigent probationers of their due process and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ arrangement constituted a “conspiracy to funnel misdemeanor probation cases in which court debts are owed to a private company, which then extorts money out of individuals who have no ability to pay court costs, let alone private fees.” Compl. ¶ 1. The Court previously certified the following class, which the Court conditionally certified in an order granting in part the plaintiffs’ first class motion: All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to [October 5, 2017], (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County’s Probation Department. Plf.’s Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement [dkt. #190] at 4 (Pg ID 2412). However, the Court denied the initial motion for preliminary approval of the terms of the settlement agreement and
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directed the parties to supply more information about the scope of the class and the actual damages incurred by class members as a result of the defendants’ conduct. In response, the plaintiffs filed a second unopposed motion in which they asserted that, based on historical records kept by defendant PCC, and database queries run against those records in August 2017, they believed that around 27,000 persons were on probation under the defendant’s authority during the class period, and that the total fees paid by them to the defendant from October 1, 2011 through March 28, 2016 amounted to more than $7.7 million. The Court granted preliminary approval to the revised settlement.
II. Under the proposed settlement, PCC agrees to deposit $14,000,000 into a settlement fund from which claims, expenses, and attorney fees will be paid. PCC also agrees to pay $350,000 to co-defendant Rutherford County, which will add $300,000 of that amount to the settlement fund, resulting in a total of $14,300,000. The County also agrees to issuance of an injunction providing that, under the County’s probation program, “no individual may be held in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and the assistance of appointed counsel.” Ex. C, Injunctive Agreement (ECF Doc. No. 192-5). The agreement calls for payments from the fund to be allocated as follows. First, to cover the costs for the settlement fund administrator, and any other administrative expenses associated
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with the settlement; second, to pay out awards of attorneys’ fees and costs according to hours and reasonable hourly rates approved by the Court; third, to pay $10,000 as an incentive award to each of the seven named plaintiffs (a total of $70,000); fourth, to pay to each class member whose probation ended before October 1, 2014 125% of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for fees from October 1, 2011 to October 1, 2014, as well as 125% of any fees paid by the class member for an offense committed before October 1, 2011, but for which the plaintiff paid related fees on or after October 1, 2011; fifth, to pay to any class member whose probation ended after October 1, 2014 125% of the fees that he or she actually paid to PCC, plus an additional $50 per month for each month on probation after October 1, 2014. Class members in the second category also will be paid 125% of any fees paid after October 1, 2011 related to any offense committed before October 1, 2011. Sixth, to pay to each class member who was on probation under the supervision of the County’s Probation Department from March 2016, based solely on failure to pay court-imposed financial obligations, the same 125% refund and $50 per month awards applicable to the October 1, 2014 probationer category.
Finally, if any money remains in the fund after paying out all expenses, fees, and timely claims according to the above schedule, then those excess funds will be used to increase payments to all claimants on a pro rata basis, up to a maximum of five times the base award determined for each claimant. And if any funds yet remain after applying the five-times multiple to all claims, then those will be deposited as a cy pres award for the benefit of the No Exceptions Prison Collective of the Harriet Tubman House in Nashville, Tennessee.
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III. Under the schedule set by the Court, the period for filing claims, objections, and opt-out notices ran from January 26, 2018 to April 27, 2018. The settlement administrator sent notices to 25,879 class members who were identified from the defendants’ records, via a website set up to provide information about the settlement, as well as notices mailed to each class member. The administrator received 5,309 notices that were returned as undeliverable, and it employed a search firm to locate updated addresses for those persons. The search produced new address results for 2,648 of the claimants, and the administrator mailed new notices to each of them. Of those, only 655 were returned as undeliverable. The administrator also received 86 of the resent notices back with a forwarding address, and it forwarded new notices to all of those addresses. The administrator also identified class members who were in prison and mailed notices to them in custody. It also sent reminder notices to all claimants, after the initial round of mailings. The administrator also ran ads on the internet and by radio, and it ran a phone campaign focused on the 2,000 claimants with the highest valued potential claims who did not respond to the mailings. It also conducted “a strategic in-person ‘grassroots’ outreach facilitated by the local non-profit ‘Free Hearts.’” Finally, the administrator also posted notices of the claims period and procedures around Rutherford County in places such as the courthouse and probation office. As of May 1, 2018, the administrator had received a total of 7,961 claim forms that were timely submitted. The administrator validated 6,462 of those claims as payable, and identified deficiencies in 1,248 other claims. The administrator mailed deficiency letters requesting additional information to all of those claimants with incomplete submissions. The settlement administrator estimates, based on its calculations of the amounts claimed for all timely and valid claims, that all
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claimants will receive some multiple of their nominal claims from the approximately $12,600,000 in settlement funds that would be available to pay claims, after deduction of the costs of administration, the attorney fee awards applied for by counsel, and incentive payments. According to those numbers, based on potential pay outs to between 6,000 and 8,000 claimants, the average award comes to between $1,500 and $2,100 per claimant.
There were no objections to the settlement filed by the deadline set by the Court, and only one opt-out. One individual, Mikesha Graham, filed a “Notice of Pain and Suffering” (ECF Doc. No. 216). However, the settlement administrator contacted Ms. Graham, and she indicated that she has submitted a claim form and intends to participate in the settlement. At the fairness hearing, no one raised any objections to the settlement or appeared in opposition.
IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) imposes certain “rules for the settlement, dismissal, or compromise of class claims.” Whitlock v. FSL Management, LLC, 843 F.3d 1084, 1093 (6th Cir. 2016). “It requires that class-action claims ‘may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.’” Ibid. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). “Approval is only warranted where the court determines, inter alia, that the proposed class settlement would be ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” Ibid. As an initial matter, it appears that the absent class members will receive approximately 90% of the settlement fund proceeds, and that they could receive individual payments of $1,500 to $2,100 each, comprising as much as 500% of the fees paid by them to the defendants. The settlement will produce a very substantial recovery for every absent class member who submitted a timely claim, and they will receive the lion’s share of the settlement fund.
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The plaintiffs have established that the proposed settlement is adequate, reasonable, and fair to the class. “Factors that guide [the assessment by the Court of a proposed class settlement] include: (1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members; and (7) the public interest.” Whitlock, 843 F.3d at 1093 (quoting UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007)).
First, the risk of fraud and collusion is low. The matter has been pending for a bit more than two years and eight months. The parties engaged in hotly contested adversarial proceedings over the grant of preliminary injunctive relief and several interlocutory appeals. They also participated in prolonged negotiations presided over by a professional mediator, spanning more than a year. After the Court stayed discovery in the case and directed the parties to engage in further mediation, they engaged in a two-day facilitation session in Tennessee on August 8 and 9, 2016. On September 2, 2016, the named plaintiffs and the PCC defendants attended another in-person mediation session in Washington, D.C., in which Rutherford County participated by telephone. The parties also communicated and met with the assigned mediator, Carlos Gonzalez, numerous times over several months. The mediation process presided over by Mr. Gonzalez eventually resulted in a settlement that was approved by all parties.
Second, the litigation is complex and the expense and duration already has been substantial, and would grow more so if the case proceeded to trial. The complaint alleges numerous constitutional violations and a conspiracy between the institutional defendants that they believe trenched upon the rights of more than 25,000 probationers through Kafka-esque ordeals. As noted
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above, the case already has been pending for more than two years, during which dispositive motions were filed by both sides and ruled on by the Court, with subsequent appeals. Counsel for the plaintiffs estimated that a trial of the case would take weeks or months, and likely would provoke an appeal regardless of the outcome. If the course of the proceedings to date is an indicator, it is apparent that the parties and the Court all would need to expend considerable additional effort to shepherd the case to its ultimate conclusion.
Third, the parties have engaged in considerable informal investigation and formal discovery to explore the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims. Counsel for the plaintiffs represent that, before the litigation began, they spent numerous hours investigating the defendants’ violations of the plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights by: “(a) conducting interviews of hundreds of probationers over the course of seven months; (b) demanding documents from Rutherford County and PCC in writing and orally; (c) observing court proceedings; (d) reviewing court records; (e) reviewing records obtained through Tennessee open records requests; (f) reviewing PCC documents and recordings of PCC probation officers; and (g) representing probationers in probation proceedings.” They also assert that since the complaint was filed, they engaged in further efforts to vindicate the plaintiffs’ rights that included “(a) seeking and obtaining individual and . . . classwide preliminary injunctive relief after an adversarial evidentiary hearing; (b) successfully defeating motions to dismiss; (c) producing 1,331 documents to [d]efendants; (d) reviewing 6,747 pages of documents produced by defendants; (e) filing a motion for partial summary judgment and seeking an expedited hearing date; (f) engaging in multiple days of in-person mediation over several months; (g) preparing and filing merits briefs in the Sixth Circuit; and (h) continuing to interview dozens of probationers by phone and in person during numerous trips to Rutherford County.”
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Fourth, the plaintiffs’ prospects for success on the merits appear good, but not certain. They prevailed in securing preliminary injunctive relief despite dogged resistance by the defendants. Interlocutory appeals were taken, but they were dismissed by stipulation of the parties. There is no reason to expect that the plaintiffs would do markedly worse in pressing their case to a conclusion through trial than they have done so far. Nevertheless, the defendants did secure early dismissal on some of the claims initially mounted, so the outcome at trial certainly is not foreordained in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Fifth, class counsel and the named plaintiffs have expressed their strong endorsements of the settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel and the individual class representatives — themselves former probationers subjected to the alleged abusive practices by the defendants — represent that they believe that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for all concerned, and they “are particularly pleased that the [a]greement provides for permanent injunctive relief, which will ensure that no one else has to go through what the Class Representatives went through.”
Sixth, the absent class members who received notice and who have responded in any way unanimously favor the settlement. Nearly 8,000 of the 25,000 absent class members filed claims for payments, but there were no objections filed and only one opt-out.
Finally, the public interest favors resolution of the matter by way of a settlement that will secure a substantial recovery for the class members while avoiding the wastage of considerable time and effort by the parties and the Court, likely to reach more or less the same end.
At the fairness hearing, the Court directed the plaintiffs to furnish additional information to support the requests for incentive payments of $10,000 per named plaintiff. They had not at the time submitted any detailed records of the time that they spent in pursuit of the litigation. Late last week,
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however, the plaintiffs supplemented the record with declarations establishing that the time spent by each of the named plaintiffs responding to discovery and assisting class counsel in prosecuting the action substantially justifies the proposed awards, which are in any event a minuscule fraction (less than 1%) of the total recovery for the class. The Court is satisfied that “these amounts are not in fact a bounty,” see Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 311 (6th Cir. 2016), but instead represent just compensation for the time and effort spent on bringing this action to a successful conclusion. These incentive awards may be paid as expenses of administration.
V. As noted in the order preliminarily approving the settlement class, “[a]ny class certification must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s requirement of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.” Clemons v. Norton Healthcare Inc. Retirement Plan, 890 F.3d 254, 278 (6th Cir. 2018). “Further, a class action must fit under at least one of the categories identified in Rule 23(b).” Ibid. “The district court must conduct ‘a rigorous analysis’ as to all the requirements of Rule 23.” Id. at 278-79 (quoting Pipefitters Local 636 Insurance Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 654 F.3d 618, 630 (6th Cir. 2011)). That “rigorous analysis” was performed when the Court conditionally certified the settlement class. The evidence presented by the parties in their motion for final settlement approval fortifies the previous findings. First, the conditionally certified class comprising approximately 25,000 current or former probationers certainly meets the requirement of being so numerous that joinder of all those persons as individual plaintiffs would be impracticable.
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Second, there are prominent common questions of law and fact affecting all of the class members that are pertinent to the defendants’ liability. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant County and PCC operated a sort of “debtors prison” system where they repeatedly were cited for being in violation of the terms of their probation due to the failure to pay fees for “services” provided by defendant PCC, and that those violations would lead to their arrest and detainment pending probation review hearings. Because many probationers had no ability to pay the assessed fees, and could not afford to post the cash bond required for release from detention, they wound up in a downward spiral of repeated violations, with no way to escape. Many probationers also had their terms of probation extended due to the repeated assessments of violations, which only made things worse. The plaintiffs’ principal claims are that their due process rights were violated by this system under which they were subjected to repeated arrest and confinement and increased financial penalties and terms of probation, without any assessment ever being made about whether their failure to pay was a result of their inability to pay, due to lack of resources, or whether they intentionally had refused to pay despite being able to. The assessment of the constitutional propriety of those policies that affected all probationers under supervision by the defendants is amenable to resolution on a common basis, despite the fact that the specific damages suffered by each individual class member could vary based on the duration and circumstances of their probation.
Third, because the claims and defenses of the parties principally would concern the propriety of the defendants’ systematic actions and application of their policies, they are sufficiently typical of all class members to be addressed in common. For the same reasons, those common questions of law and fact about the propriety of the defendants’ systematic practices would be dispositive of the defendants’ liability, and a class proceeding therefore would be a superior vehicle for reaching
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a verdict on those predominant questions that do not depend on any assessment of the particular circumstances of individual class members.
Finally, the named individual plaintiffs and class representatives adequately are positioned to represent the class, and their interests sufficiently are aligned, since they all are former probationers who suffered the same sorts of injuries imposed on all of the class members, and they seek to recover damages suffered under the same allegedly unlawful system.
The plaintiffs also have established that the membership of the proposed class is sufficiently ascertainable for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), as shown by the identification of the approximately 25,000 known class members from the defendants’ records. Based on the record of returns of mailed notices, it appears that the notification was successful in reaching approximately 87% of the identified class members by mailing, with only around 13% of the notices that were returned being ultimately undeliverable.
The Court will certify the settlement class unconditionally. VI.
The three law firms that represented the plaintiffs in this case submitted petitions asking the Court to authorize payments of a combined total of $1,373,603 in attorney fees and $22,158.39 in litigation expenses. “‘When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make sure that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved.’” Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993)). “These two measures of the fairness of an attorney’s award — work done and results achieved — can be in tension with each other.” Ibid. “The lodestar method of calculating fees better accounts for the amount of work done,
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whereas the percentage of the fund method more accurately reflects the results achieved.” Ibid. (citations and quotations omitted in this and following citations except as otherwise noted). “To determine the lodestar figure, the court multiplies the number of hours ‘reasonably expended’ on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ibid. “The court may then, within limits, adjust the lodestar to reflect relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” Ibid. “In contrast, to employ the percentage of the fund method, the court determines a percentage of the settlement to award to class counsel.” Ibid. “As the two methods measure the fairness of the fee with respect to different desired outcomes, it is necessary that district courts be permitted to select the more appropriate method for calculating attorney’s fees in light of the unique characteristics of class actions in general, and of the unique circumstances of the actual cases before them.” Ibid. The Court also may elect to “employ[] the lodestar method to determine the fairness of the fee, then . . . cross-check it with the percentage-of-the-fund calculation.” Id. at 280. However, regardless of the method chosen, the Court’s decision must include “a clear statement of the reasoning used in adopting a particular methodology and the factors considered in arriving at the fee in order to allow effective appellate review for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 279.
“District courts have the discretion to select the particular method of calculation, but must articulate the ‘reasons for adopting a particular methodology and the factors considered in arriving at the fee.’” Ibid. (quoting Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009)). “Moulton set out the germane factors,” which include, “‘(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such
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benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.’” Ibid. (quoting 581 F.3d at 352).
A. The first motion for attorney fees was filed by the law firm Civil Rights Corps, and included a request for fees from a separately employed attorney, Kyle Mothershead. CRC asks the Court to authorize payment of $336,200 in attorney fees for its lawyers who acted as class counsel and $1,619.53 in expenses for travel by counsel to the State of Tennessee. Counsel submitted detailed time records showing that Alec Karakatsanis worked 382.5 hours on the case and Elizabeth Rossi worked 97.2 hours. Based on those figures, the imputed lodestar rate for CRC’s counsel comes out to $700 per hour for a combined total of 480 hours of work. Attorney Kyle Mothershead was local counsel and asks the Court to authorize payment of $24,115 for 55.9 hours of work by him, which also was substantiated by detailed time records. Mothershead’s imputed lodestar hourly rate for 55.9 hours would be $431 per hour. This motion is somewhat confusing because, as with all of the motions, the CRC attorneys assert that they have used “the lodestar method” to calculate their requested fees, but the rates that they purport to claim are far lower than simple arithmetic on their total hours and amounts claimed imply. Attorneys Karakatsanis and Rossi contend that they seek only $450 and $350 per hour, respectively. At those rates, Karakatsanis would be due only $172,125, and Rossi should have billed $34,020. That comes to a total of $206,145. But the petition asks the Court to authorize payment for both lawyers’ services combined of $336,200 — 61% more than the purported rates would imply. The imputed lodestar rate of $700 per hour is somewhat high, but not outside of the realm of reasonable compensation for experienced civil rights counsel on a case of this magnitude. And
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the total number of hours billed is plausible in light of the lengthy pendency of the case, the extensive discovery and settlement efforts, and the extent of the contested adversarial proceedings over the motions for injunctive relief and appeals. Similarly, attorney Mothershead asserts in his declaration that he applied a “discounted rate” of only $350 per hour for his fee request. But that would imply a total fee of only $19,565 for 56 hours of work. The motion does not explain why the actual request was for $24,115, at an imputed rate of $431.
Considering as a cross-check the “percentage of the fund,” calculation, the combined total of $1,395,761 in attorney fees and expenses comes out to 9.5% of the total settlement fund of $14,300,000. That is a modest percentage of the total recovery on its face, and well below percentage of the fund figures that the Sixth Circuit readily has affirmed. See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 275 (affirming award of $2.39 million in attorney fees and costs premised on a percentage of the fund assessed by the district court at 21% of the monetary benefit available to the class). The approval of the total fee requested is not problematic here on a percentage of the fund basis. At the hearing, counsel explained that the conflicting figures resulted from including a total fee request that anticipated additional work after the fee motion was filed, and the total hours worked corresponded more closely to the lodestar calculation based on the stated hourly rates.
When weighing the propriety of the requested attorney fee, the Court considers “(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.” Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, the factors favor
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approval of the fee, despite the incongruities in the math presented by counsel. The value of the benefit rendered by plaintiffs’ counsel certainly is substantial and evidently will result in payments to the claimants of $1,500 to $2,100 each, representing more than five times the allegedly unlawfully extracted fees paid by them to the defendants. The value of the services was high, since able counsel secured decisive victories for their clients at every crucial stage of the proceedings, culminating in a very favorable settlement including damages and injunctive relief. Counsel does not represent that they were engaged on a contingent fee basis, and they assert that they calculated their requested fees on a lodestar basis. As noted above, the litigation was complex, and the proceedings arduous. Every indication in the record is that counsel for the plaintiffs fought ably and hard to vindicate their clients’ interests, and society would do well to reward those attorneys who engage in such practice to defend the rights of those subjected to a sort of “debtors prison” regime that allegedly was a staple of the misdemeanor criminal justice system in Rutherford County until this lawsuit was brought. Taking counsel at their word, the two attorneys who worked on the case under the umbra of CRC are experienced and well regarded civil rights lawyers, deserving of the rates of compensation for which they have applied.
B. The second motion for attorney fees was filed by the law firm Equal Justice Under Law. That motion asks the Court to authorize payment of $827,368.50 in attorney fees, plus litigation expenses in the amount of $14,992.30. In the motion, EJUL asserts that its attorneys billed the following hours on the case: Phil Telfeyan, 318.75 hours; Alec Karakatsanis, 929 hours; and Elizabeth Rossi, 759.66 hours. That comes to a total of 2,007.41 hours. The imputed lodestar rate based on those numbers works out to $412 per hour. The motion represents that EJUL “is a party
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to the settlement agreement submitted to the Court for approval . . . and has been allowed to participate in this matter for the limited purpose of filing this petition for recovery of fees and expenses.” But the docket also indicates that all of the named attorneys have entered appearances in the case as counsel for the plaintiffs. The motion does not explain the circumstances that led to attorneys Karakatsanis and Rossi billing hours under the umbrella of two different firms in the case and seeking payments for fees through two separate petitions. However, at the hearing, counsel explained that Karakatsanis and Rossi simply changed law firms during the litigation, and the billings represent the time spent while employed by the respective entities. Moreover, the fee requests are supported by declarations of the three attorneys accompanied by extensive detailed time records substantiating the hours of work on which the motion is premised. For the same reasons discussed above, EJUL’s motion for attorney’s fees will be granted.
C. The law firm of Baker Donelson filed a motion for attorney fees based on hours worked by unspecified attorneys of the firm. The court docket indicates that five lawyers from the firm entered appearances as counsel of record for the plaintiffs. However, the motion was supported by a declaration by only one of those, Matthew G. White. The firm asks the Court to authorize payment of $185,920 in attorney’s fees and $5,546.56 in litigation expenses. As to the number of hours worked by lawyers at the firm, White declared as follows: “In the exercise of reasonable billing judgment, I have identified a total of 689 hours devoted by our attorneys to this work, including without limitation, document review, communications with clients, with co-counsel and with opposing counsel, document drafting, and hearing preparation and attendance.” This motion was not supported by any specific time records.
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At the motion hearing, the Court pointed out the deficiencies in Baker Donelson’s submission and directed counsel to file a supplement. When counsel inquired about the level of detail required, the Court stated that was up to Baker Donelson, but that the submission must satisfy the basic requirements to permit the Court to conduct a proper examination. Baker Donelson filed its supplement on July 3, 2018. It did not include any itemized time records, but instead only added a bulleted list summarily stating for five attorneys of the firm the total number of hours each attorney worked and in general the nature of the work done by them. For example, the brief states that attorney Jonathan Cole “represented Plaintiffs in connection with the filing of the Complaint, the injunctive proceedings, and participated in the briefing with respect to various motions in this matter,” and that he “worked approximately 122 hours in this matter and his rate as between $380 and $400 per hour.” In that format, the supplement accounts for 596 hours worked by the five lawyers identified on various tasks relating to the litigation. The imputed lodestar rate based on those figures and the total fee request of $185,920 comes out to $311 per hour. As to the litigation expenses of $5,546.56, the supplement offers no documentation at all and only asserts in a generalized manner that several of the attorneys involved worked in the Memphis office of the firm during the case and incurred expenses for travel to Nashville.
The Sixth Circuit has not set any hard standard for the level of actuarial detail that must be supplied for fee requests based upon hours worked. But it has been skeptical of fee petitions not supported by any itemized documentation. “The key requirement for an award of attorney fees is that the documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med.
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Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Considering that Baker Donelson relies entirely on the lodestar calculation to justify its fee request, its supplement falls short of that benchmark.
“Although counsel need not record in great detail each minute he or she spent on an item, the general subject matter should be identified.” Ibid. In Gascho, the Sixth Circuit noted that it was “a close question whether the minimal billing information provided suffices to justify the lodestar award in light of our caselaw.” 822 F.3d at 281 Nevertheless, the panel concluded that it did not need to decide the question, since the district court also had employed the percentage of the fund as a cross-check, and the requested fee passed muster by that method. In this case, where counsel purports to rely only on the lodestar justification, unmoored from any supporting documentation, application of the petition is problematic.
The initial motion was supported by nothing more than a sort of summary accounting analysis proffered by attorney White, and his declaration did not even summarize by name which lawyers did what tasks, or the total number of hours attributable to each attorney of the firm that worked on the case. The supplement gives a very general breakdown of the categories of work various attorneys performed, but there is no information on the amount of time spent on each task, and therefore no basis to determine “the number of hours ‘reasonably expended’” to the respective tasks. Gascho, 822 F.3d at 279. Another reservation about the supplement is that it also states that “[o]ther Baker Donelson attorneys assisted with various tasks,” and that “[d]etailed billing records will be made available to the Court if the Court desires submission of the same.” If “detailed billing records” are available to support the request, then it is not apparent why counsel thought it was appropriate not to submit them. The Sixth Circuit has not found the sort of naked actuarial
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declaration offered here sufficient to support a fee award under the lodestar method. See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 276 (questioning the soundness of the lodestar method where “class counsel had not submitted detailed billing records for review by the court [and merely] provided the number of hours worked and averred under penalty of perjury that those hours were reasonably necessary to prosecute the action”).
Presumably Baker Donelson may eventually be able to submit a properly supported fee request. But to avoid further delays in approving the class settlement and proposed distribution, and in adjudication the other two fees requests, the Court will deny Baker Donelson’s attorney’s fee motion without prejudice to resubmission at a later date, when counsel can expend the time and energy to furnish suitable support.
VII. For the reasons stated, the Court unconditionally certifies the settlement class, approves the settlement, and grants the motions for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for approval of settlement and plan of allocation [dkt. # 217] is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the settlement agreement and plan of allocation is APPROVED. It is further ORDERED that the individual who sent a request for exclusion from the class is hereby deemed excluded from the class and is not bound by, nor may he participate in, the class settlement. It is further ORDERED that Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota is APPOINTED as the administrator of the settlement fund. The administrator shall receive, disburse,
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and account for the settlement proceeds as provided by the formula for distribution of the settlement fund set forth in the settlement agreement. Class Counsel shall provide and file with the Court and the defendants a report setting forth the proposed distribution of all funds paid by the defendants as called for in the settlement agreement upon completion of the evaluation of the requests for payment received from class members. After final distribution, class counsel shall file with the Court a certificate that the settlement fund has been disbursed according to the plan, or that funds remain undistributed, as the case may be.
It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the County of Rutherford, Tennessee is PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from holding any individual in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay must include, without limitation, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and the assistance of appointed counsel.
It is further ORDERED that incentive awards in the amount of $10,000 each are approved for and may be distributed to the named plaintiffs, Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson. The incentive awards may be designated as expenses of administration and paid according to the appropriate priority as outlined in the settlement agreement.
It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel’s respective motions for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses [dkt. #198, 202] are GRANTED, and payments from the settlement fund are approved as follows: Civil Rights Corps shall receive $336,200 for attorney’s fees and $1,619.53
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for litigation expenses; Kyle Mothershead shall receive $24,115 for attorney’s fees; and Equal Justice Under Law shall receive $827,368.50 for attorney fees and $14,992.30 for litigation expenses.
It is further ORDERED that the motion for attorney fees by Baker Donelson [dkt. #208] is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a renewed motion accompanied by adequate supporting documentation as indicated by the Court’s previous directions.
It is further ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; provided, however, that this Court retains jurisdiction over all matters relating to the enforcement of equitable relief, and the administration of the settlement agreement, including allocation and distribution of the settlement fund.
It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel and the settlement administrator Dahl Administration LLC shall remain responsible for completion of the administration of the claims and distribution of the funds, but they may not invade the settlement fund for further reimbursement or payment of fees absent further order of the Court.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation Dated: July 5, 2018
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CINDY RODRIGUEZ, STEVEN GIBBS, PAULA PULLUM, YOLANDA CARNEY, JACQUELINE BRINKLEY, CURTIS JOHNSON, and FRED ROBINSON,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case Number 15-01048 Honorable David M. Lawson

PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, INC., RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, JASMINE JACKSON, BRIANA WOODLEE, AMANDA ROBERTS, TIARA SMITH, AMANDA SCHEXNAYDER, and NISHA HYDE,

Defendants. _________________________________/

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF ALLOCATION, GRANTING MOTIONS FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES, GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND DISMISSING CASE

Pursuant to notice, the Court conducted a fairness hearing on June 25, 2018 to determine

whether a settlement agreement should be given final approval on behalf of the certified settlement

class in this case. The Court entered an order approving the class settlement on July 5, 2018 [dkt.

#228]. However, that order did not include all the terms of the injunctive relief that the parties had

negotiated, and which were a material part of the settlement. Therefore, the Court enters this

amended order, which supersedes the previous order, to include those terms as part of the final

settlement approval.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require court approval of settlements in class actions,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled,

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voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”), and if the settlement would determine the rights of and bind absent class members, “the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate,” ibid. The June 25 hearing was the second step in the settlement approval process. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 23.632-.633 (4th ed.); see also Tennessee Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs., Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2001). On January 2, 2018, the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) as the first step in the process. The order directed that a written notice to the class be given by February 16, 2018 via first-class mail augmented by other media. Plaintiffs’ counsel retained Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota as the agent of the named plaintiffs and class counsel to give notice in the manner approved by the Court, and ultimately to administer the settlement, process claims, and make distributions. The Court approved the retention of Dahl as the settlement administrator.
I. The proposed settlement addresses the plaintiffs’ claims that the County of Rutherford’s outsourcing of misdemeanor probation services to a private for-profit corporation, Providence Community Corrections (PCC), resulted in an unconstitutional scheme that deprived indigent probationers of their due process and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ arrangement constituted a “conspiracy to funnel misdemeanor probation cases in which court debts are owed to a private company, which then extorts money out of individuals who have no ability to pay court costs, let alone private fees.” Compl. ¶ 1. The Court previously certified the following class, which the Court conditionally certified in an order granting in part the plaintiffs’ first class motion:
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All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to [October 5, 2017], (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County’s Probation Department. Plf.’s Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement [dkt. #190] at 4 (Pg ID 2412). However, the Court denied the initial motion for preliminary approval of the terms of the settlement agreement and directed the parties to supply more information about the scope of the class and the actual damages incurred by class members as a result of the defendants’ conduct. In response, the plaintiffs filed a second unopposed motion in which they asserted that, based on historical records kept by defendant PCC, and database queries run against those records in August 2017, they believed that around 27,000 persons were on probation under the defendant’s authority during the class period, and that the total fees paid by them to the defendant from October 1, 2011 through March 28, 2016 amounted to more than $7.7 million. The Court granted preliminary approval to the revised settlement.
II. Under the proposed settlement, PCC agrees to deposit $14,000,000 into a settlement fund from which claims, expenses, and attorney fees will be paid. PCC also agrees to pay $350,000 to co-defendant Rutherford County, which will add $300,000 of that amount to the settlement fund, resulting in a total of $14,300,000. The County also agrees to issuance of an injunction providing that, under the County’s probation program, “no individual may be held in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such
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that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and the assistance of appointed counsel.” Ex. C, Injunctive Agreement (ECF Doc. No. 192-5).
The agreement calls for payments from the fund to be allocated as follows. First, to cover the costs for the settlement fund administrator, and any other administrative expenses associated with the settlement; second, to pay out awards of attorneys’ fees and costs according to hours and reasonable hourly rates approved by the Court; third, to pay $10,000 as an incentive award to each of the seven named plaintiffs (a total of $70,000); fourth, to pay to each class member whose probation ended before October 1, 2014 125% of the amount that he or she actually paid to PCC for fees from October 1, 2011 to October 1, 2014, as well as 125% of any fees paid by the class member for an offense committed before October 1, 2011, but for which the plaintiff paid related fees on or after October 1, 2011; fifth, to pay to any class member whose probation ended after October 1, 2014 125% of the fees that he or she actually paid to PCC, plus an additional $50 per month for each month on probation after October 1, 2014. Class members in the second category also will be paid 125% of any fees paid after October 1, 2011 related to any offense committed before October 1, 2011; sixth, to pay to each class member who was on probation under the supervision of the County’s Probation Department from March 2016, based solely on failure to pay court-imposed financial obligations, the same 125% refund and $50 per month awards applicable to the October 1, 2014 probationer category.
Finally, if any money remains in the fund after paying out all expenses, fees, and timely claims according to the above schedule, then those excess funds will be used to increase payments to all claimants on a pro rata basis, up to a maximum of five times the base award determined for
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each claimant. And if any funds yet remain after applying the five-times multiple to all claims, then those will be deposited as a cy pres award for the benefit of the No Exceptions Prison Collective of the Harriet Tubman House in Nashville, Tennessee.
III. Under the schedule set by the Court, the period for filing claims, objections, and opt-out notices ran from January 26, 2018 to April 27, 2018. The settlement administrator sent notices to 25,879 class members who were identified from the defendants’ records, via a website set up to provide information about the settlement, as well as notices mailed to each class member. The administrator received 5,309 notices that were returned as undeliverable, and it employed a search firm to locate updated addresses for those persons. The search produced new address results for 2,648 of the claimants, and the administrator mailed new notices to each of them. Of those, only 655 were returned as undeliverable. The administrator also received 86 of the resent notices back with a forwarding address, and it forwarded new notices to all of those addresses. The administrator also identified class members who were in prison and mailed notices to them in custody. It also sent reminder notices to all claimants, after the initial round of mailings. The administrator also ran ads on the internet and by radio, and it ran a phone campaign focused on the 2,000 claimants with the highest valued potential claims who did not respond to the mailings. It also conducted “a strategic in-person ‘grassroots’ outreach facilitated by the local non-profit ‘Free Hearts.’” Finally, the administrator also posted notices of the claims period and procedures around Rutherford County in places such as the courthouse and probation office. As of May 1, 2018, the administrator had received a total of 7,961 claim forms that were timely submitted. The administrator validated 6,462 of those claims as payable, and identified
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deficiencies in 1,248 other claims. The administrator mailed deficiency letters requesting additional information to all of those claimants with incomplete submissions. The settlement administrator estimates, based on its calculations of the amounts claimed for all timely and valid claims, that all claimants will receive some multiple of their nominal claims from the approximately $12,600,000 in settlement funds that would be available to pay claims, after deduction of the costs of administration, the attorney fee awards applied for by counsel, and incentive payments. According to those numbers, based on potential pay outs to between 6,000 and 8,000 claimants, the average award comes to between $1,500 and $2,100 per claimant.
There were no objections to the settlement filed by the deadline set by the Court, and only one opt-out. One individual, Mikesha Graham, filed a “Notice of Pain and Suffering” (ECF Doc. No. 216). However, the settlement administrator contacted Ms. Graham, and she indicated that she has submitted a claim form and intends to participate in the settlement. At the fairness hearing, no one raised any objections to the settlement or appeared in opposition.
IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) imposes certain “rules for the settlement, dismissal, or compromise of class claims.” Whitlock v. FSL Management, LLC, 843 F.3d 1084, 1093 (6th Cir. 2016). “It requires that class-action claims ‘may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.’” Ibid. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). “Approval is only warranted where the court determines, inter alia, that the proposed class settlement would be ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” Ibid. As an initial matter, it appears that the absent class members will receive approximately 90% of the settlement fund proceeds, and that they could receive individual payments of $1,500 to $2,100
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each, comprising as much as 500% of the fees paid by them to the defendants. The settlement will produce a very substantial recovery for every absent class member who submitted a timely claim, and they will receive the lion’s share of the settlement fund.
The plaintiffs have established that the proposed settlement is adequate, reasonable, and fair to the class. “Factors that guide [the assessment by the Court of a proposed class settlement] include: (1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members; and (7) the public interest.” Whitlock, 843 F.3d at 1093 (quoting UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007)).
First, the risk of fraud and collusion is low. The matter has been pending for a bit more than two years and eight months. The parties engaged in hotly contested adversarial proceedings over the grant of preliminary injunctive relief and several interlocutory appeals. They also participated in prolonged negotiations presided over by a professional mediator, spanning more than a year. After the Court stayed discovery in the case and directed the parties to engage in further mediation, they engaged in a two-day facilitation session in Tennessee on August 8 and 9, 2016. On September 2, 2016, the named plaintiffs and the PCC defendants attended another in-person mediation session in Washington, D.C., in which Rutherford County participated by telephone. The parties also communicated and met with the assigned mediator, Carlos Gonzalez, numerous times over several months. The mediation process presided over by Mr. Gonzalez eventually resulted in a settlement that was approved by all parties.
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Second, the litigation is complex and the expense and duration already has been substantial, and would grow more so if the case proceeded to trial. The complaint alleges numerous constitutional violations and a conspiracy between the institutional defendants that they believe trenched upon the rights of more than 25,000 probationers through Kafka-esque ordeals. As noted above, the case already has been pending for more than two years, during which dispositive motions were filed by both sides and ruled on by the Court, with subsequent appeals. Counsel for the plaintiffs estimated that a trial of the case would take weeks or months, and likely would provoke an appeal regardless of the outcome. If the course of the proceedings to date is an indicator, it is apparent that the parties and the Court all would need to expend considerable additional effort to shepherd the case to its ultimate conclusion.
Third, the parties have engaged in considerable informal investigation and formal discovery to explore the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims. Counsel for the plaintiffs represent that, before the litigation began, they spent numerous hours investigating the defendants’ violations of the plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights by: “(a) conducting interviews of hundreds of probationers over the course of seven months; (b) demanding documents from Rutherford County and PCC in writing and orally; (c) observing court proceedings; (d) reviewing court records; (e) reviewing records obtained through Tennessee open records requests; (f) reviewing PCC documents and recordings of PCC probation officers; and (g) representing probationers in probation proceedings.” They also assert that since the complaint was filed, they engaged in further efforts to vindicate the plaintiffs’ rights that included “(a) seeking and obtaining individual and . . . classwide preliminary injunctive relief after an adversarial evidentiary hearing; (b) successfully defeating motions to dismiss; (c) producing 1,331 documents to [d]efendants; (d) reviewing 6,747 pages of documents produced by defendants;
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(e) filing a motion for partial summary judgment and seeking an expedited hearing date; (f) engaging in multiple days of in-person mediation over several months; (g) preparing and filing merits briefs in the Sixth Circuit; and (h) continuing to interview dozens of probationers by phone and in person during numerous trips to Rutherford County.”
Fourth, the plaintiffs’ prospects for success on the merits appear good, but not certain. They prevailed in securing preliminary injunctive relief despite dogged resistance by the defendants. Interlocutory appeals were taken, but they were dismissed by stipulation of the parties. There is no reason to expect that the plaintiffs would do markedly worse in pressing their case to a conclusion through trial than they have done so far. Nevertheless, the defendants did secure early dismissal on some of the claims initially mounted, so the outcome at trial certainly is not foreordained in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Fifth, class counsel and the named plaintiffs have expressed their strong endorsements of the settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel and the individual class representatives — themselves former probationers subjected to the alleged abusive practices by the defendants — represent that they believe that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for all concerned, and they “are particularly pleased that the [a]greement provides for permanent injunctive relief, which will ensure that no one else has to go through what the Class Representatives went through.”
Sixth, the absent class members who received notice and who have responded in any way unanimously favor the settlement. Nearly 8,000 of the 25,000 absent class members filed claims for payments, but there were no objections filed and only one opt-out.
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Finally, the public interest favors resolution of the matter by way of a settlement that will secure a substantial recovery for the class members while avoiding the wastage of considerable time and effort by the parties and the Court, likely to reach more or less the same end.
At the fairness hearing, the Court directed the plaintiffs to furnish additional information to support the requests for incentive payments of $10,000 per named plaintiff. They had not at the time submitted any detailed records of the time that they spent in pursuit of the litigation. Late last week, however, the plaintiffs supplemented the record with declarations establishing that the time spent by each of the named plaintiffs responding to discovery and assisting class counsel in prosecuting the action substantially justifies the proposed awards, which are in any event a minuscule fraction (less than 1%) of the total recovery for the class. The Court is satisfied that “these amounts are not in fact a bounty,” see Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 311 (6th Cir. 2016), but instead represent just compensation for the time and effort spent on bringing this action to a successful conclusion. These incentive awards may be paid as expenses of administration.
V. As noted in the order preliminarily approving the settlement class, “[a]ny class certification must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s requirement of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.” Clemons v. Norton Healthcare Inc. Retirement Plan, 890 F.3d 254, 278 (6th Cir. 2018). “Further, a class action must fit under at least one of the categories identified in Rule 23(b).” Ibid. “The district court must conduct ‘a rigorous analysis’ as to all the requirements of Rule 23.” Id. at 278-79 (quoting Pipefitters Local 636 Insurance Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 654 F.3d 618, 630 (6th Cir. 2011)).
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That “rigorous analysis” was performed when the Court conditionally certified the settlement class. The evidence presented by the parties in their motion for final settlement approval fortifies the previous findings. First, the conditionally certified class comprising approximately 25,000 current or former probationers certainly meets the requirement of being so numerous that joinder of all those persons as individual plaintiffs would be impracticable.
Second, there are prominent common questions of law and fact affecting all of the class members that are pertinent to the defendants’ liability. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant County and PCC operated a sort of “debtors prison” system where they repeatedly were cited for being in violation of the terms of their probation due to the failure to pay fees for “services” provided by defendant PCC, and that those violations would lead to their arrest and detainment pending probation review hearings. Because many probationers had no ability to pay the assessed fees, and could not afford to post the cash bond required for release from detention, they wound up in a downward spiral of repeated violations, with no way to escape. Many probationers also had their terms of probation extended due to the repeated assessments of violations, which only made things worse. The plaintiffs’ principal claims are that their due process rights were violated by this system under which they were subjected to repeated arrest and confinement and increased financial penalties and terms of probation, without any assessment ever being made about whether their failure to pay was a result of their inability to pay, due to lack of resources, or whether they intentionally had refused to pay despite being able to. The assessment of the constitutional propriety of those policies that affected all probationers under supervision by the defendants is amenable to resolution on a common basis, despite the fact that the specific damages suffered by each individual class member could vary based on the duration and circumstances of their probation.
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Third, because the claims and defenses of the parties principally would concern the propriety of the defendants’ systematic actions and application of their policies, they are sufficiently typical of all class members to be addressed in common. For the same reasons, those common questions of law and fact about the propriety of the defendants’ systematic practices would be dispositive of the defendants’ liability, and a class proceeding therefore would be a superior vehicle for reaching a verdict on those predominant questions that do not depend on any assessment of the particular circumstances of individual class members.
Finally, the named individual plaintiffs and class representatives adequately are positioned to represent the class, and their interests sufficiently are aligned, since they all are former probationers who suffered the same sorts of injuries imposed on all of the class members, and they seek to recover damages suffered under the same allegedly unlawful system.
The plaintiffs also have established that the membership of the proposed class is sufficiently ascertainable for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), as shown by the identification of the approximately 25,000 known class members from the defendants’ records. Based on the record of returns of mailed notices, it appears that the notification was successful in reaching approximately 87% of the identified class members by mailing, with only around 13% of the notices that were returned being ultimately undeliverable.
The Court will certify the settlement class unconditionally. VI.
The three law firms that represented the plaintiffs in this case submitted petitions asking the Court to authorize payments of a combined total of $1,373,603 in attorney fees and $22,158.39 in litigation expenses. “‘When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make sure that
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counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved.’” Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993)). “These two measures of the fairness of an attorney’s award — work done and results achieved — can be in tension with each other.” Ibid. “The lodestar method of calculating fees better accounts for the amount of work done, whereas the percentage of the fund method more accurately reflects the results achieved.” Ibid. (citations and quotations omitted in this and following citations except as otherwise noted). “To determine the lodestar figure, the court multiplies the number of hours ‘reasonably expended’ on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ibid. “The court may then, within limits, adjust the lodestar to reflect relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” Ibid. “In contrast, to employ the percentage of the fund method, the court determines a percentage of the settlement to award to class counsel.” Ibid. “As the two methods measure the fairness of the fee with respect to different desired outcomes, it is necessary that district courts be permitted to select the more appropriate method for calculating attorney’s fees in light of the unique characteristics of class actions in general, and of the unique circumstances of the actual cases before them.” Ibid. The Court also may elect to “employ[] the lodestar method to determine the fairness of the fee, then . . . cross-check it with the percentage-of-the-fund calculation.” Id. at 280. However, regardless of the method chosen, the Court’s decision must include “a clear statement of the reasoning used in adopting a particular methodology and the factors considered in arriving at the fee in order to allow effective appellate review for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 279.
“District courts have the discretion to select the particular method of calculation, but must articulate the ‘reasons for adopting a particular methodology and the factors considered in arriving
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at the fee.’” Ibid. (quoting Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009)). “Moulton set out the germane factors,” which include, “‘(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.’” Ibid. (quoting 581 F.3d at 352).
A. The first motion for attorney fees was filed by the law firm Civil Rights Corps, and included a request for fees from a separately employed attorney, Kyle Mothershead. CRC asks the Court to authorize payment of $336,200 in attorney fees for its lawyers who acted as class counsel and $1,619.53 in expenses for travel by counsel to the State of Tennessee. Counsel submitted detailed time records showing that Alec Karakatsanis worked 382.5 hours on the case and Elizabeth Rossi worked 97.2 hours. Based on those figures, the imputed lodestar rate for CRC’s counsel comes out to $700 per hour for a combined total of 480 hours of work. Attorney Kyle Mothershead was local counsel and asks the Court to authorize payment of $24,115 for 55.9 hours of work by him, which also was substantiated by detailed time records. Mothershead’s imputed lodestar hourly rate for 55.9 hours would be $431 per hour. This motion is somewhat confusing because, as with all of the motions, the CRC attorneys assert that they have used “the lodestar method” to calculate their requested fees, but the rates that they purport to claim are far lower than simple arithmetic on their total hours and amounts claimed imply. Attorneys Karakatsanis and Rossi contend that they seek only $450 and $350 per hour, respectively. At those rates, Karakatsanis would be due only $172,125, and Rossi should have billed
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$34,020. That comes to a total of $206,145. But the petition asks the Court to authorize payment for both lawyers’ services combined of $336,200 — 61% more than the purported rates would imply. The imputed lodestar rate of $700 per hour is somewhat high, but not outside of the realm of reasonable compensation for experienced civil rights counsel on a case of this magnitude. And the total number of hours billed is plausible in light of the lengthy pendency of the case, the extensive discovery and settlement efforts, and the extent of the contested adversarial proceedings over the motions for injunctive relief and appeals. Similarly, attorney Mothershead asserts in his declaration that he applied a “discounted rate” of only $350 per hour for his fee request. But that would imply a total fee of only $19,565 for 56 hours of work. The motion does not explain why the actual request was for $24,115, at an imputed rate of $431.
Considering as a cross-check the “percentage of the fund,” calculation, the combined total of $1,395,761 in attorney fees and expenses comes out to 9.5% of the total settlement fund of $14,300,000. That is a modest percentage of the total recovery on its face, and well below percentage of the fund figures that the Sixth Circuit readily has affirmed. See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 275 (affirming award of $2.39 million in attorney fees and costs premised on a percentage of the fund assessed by the district court at 21% of the monetary benefit available to the class). The approval of the total fee requested is not problematic here on a percentage of the fund basis. At the hearing, counsel explained that the conflicting figures resulted from including a total fee request that anticipated additional work after the fee motion was filed, and the total hours worked corresponded more closely to the lodestar calculation based on the stated hourly rates.
When weighing the propriety of the requested attorney fee, the Court considers “(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3)
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whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.” Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, the factors favor approval of the fee, despite the incongruities in the math presented by counsel. The value of the benefit rendered by plaintiffs’ counsel certainly is substantial and evidently will result in payments to the claimants of $1,500 to $2,100 each, representing more than five times the allegedly unlawfully extracted fees paid by them to the defendants. The value of the services was high, since able counsel secured decisive victories for their clients at every crucial stage of the proceedings, culminating in a very favorable settlement including damages and injunctive relief. Counsel does not represent that they were engaged on a contingent fee basis, and they assert that they calculated their requested fees on a lodestar basis. As noted above, the litigation was complex, and the proceedings arduous. Every indication in the record is that counsel for the plaintiffs fought ably and hard to vindicate their clients’ interests, and society would do well to reward those attorneys who engage in such practice to defend the rights of those subjected to a sort of “debtors prison” regime that allegedly was a staple of the misdemeanor criminal justice system in Rutherford County until this lawsuit was brought. Taking counsel at their word, the two attorneys who worked on the case under the umbra of CRC are experienced and well regarded civil rights lawyers, deserving of the rates of compensation for which they have applied.
B. The second motion for attorney fees was filed by the law firm Equal Justice Under Law. That motion asks the Court to authorize payment of $827,368.50 in attorney fees, plus litigation
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expenses in the amount of $14,992.30. In the motion, EJUL asserts that its attorneys billed the following hours on the case: Phil Telfeyan, 318.75 hours; Alec Karakatsanis, 929 hours; and Elizabeth Rossi, 759.66 hours. That comes to a total of 2,007.41 hours. The imputed lodestar rate based on those numbers works out to $412 per hour. The motion represents that EJUL “is a party to the settlement agreement submitted to the Court for approval . . . and has been allowed to participate in this matter for the limited purpose of filing this petition for recovery of fees and expenses.” But the docket also indicates that all of the named attorneys have entered appearances in the case as counsel for the plaintiffs. The motion does not explain the circumstances that led to attorneys Karakatsanis and Rossi billing hours under the umbrella of two different firms in the case and seeking payments for fees through two separate petitions. However, at the hearing, counsel explained that Karakatsanis and Rossi simply changed law firms during the litigation, and the billings represent the time spent while employed by the respective entities. Moreover, the fee requests are supported by declarations of the three attorneys accompanied by extensive detailed time records substantiating the hours of work on which the motion is premised. For the same reasons discussed above, EJUL’s motion for attorney’s fees will be granted.
C. The law firm of Baker Donelson filed a motion for attorney fees based on hours worked by unspecified attorneys of the firm. The court docket indicates that five lawyers from the firm entered appearances as counsel of record for the plaintiffs. However, the motion was supported by a declaration by only one of those, Matthew G. White. The firm asks the Court to authorize payment of $185,920 in attorney’s fees and $5,546.56 in litigation expenses. As to the number of hours worked by lawyers at the firm, White declared as follows: “In the exercise of reasonable billing
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judgment, I have identified a total of 689 hours devoted by our attorneys to this work, including without limitation, document review, communications with clients, with co-counsel and with opposing counsel, document drafting, and hearing preparation and attendance.” This motion was not supported by any specific time records.
At the motion hearing, the Court pointed out the deficiencies in Baker Donelson’s submission and directed counsel to file a supplement. When counsel inquired about the level of detail required, the Court stated that was up to Baker Donelson, but that the submission must satisfy the basic requirements to permit the Court to conduct a proper examination. Baker Donelson filed its supplement on July 3, 2018. It did not include any itemized time records, but instead only added a bulleted list summarily stating for five attorneys of the firm the total number of hours each attorney worked and in general the nature of the work done by them. For example, the brief states that attorney Jonathan Cole “represented Plaintiffs in connection with the filing of the Complaint, the injunctive proceedings, and participated in the briefing with respect to various motions in this matter,” and that he “worked approximately 122 hours in this matter and his rate as between $380 and $400 per hour.” In that format, the supplement accounts for 596 hours worked by the five lawyers identified on various tasks relating to the litigation. The imputed lodestar rate based on those figures and the total fee request of $185,920 comes out to $311 per hour. As to the litigation expenses of $5,546.56, the supplement offers no documentation at all and only asserts in a generalized manner that several of the attorneys involved worked in the Memphis office of the firm during the case and incurred expenses for travel to Nashville.
The Sixth Circuit has not set any hard standard for the level of actuarial detail that must be supplied for fee requests based upon hours worked. But it has been skeptical of fee petitions not
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supported by any itemized documentation. “The key requirement for an award of attorney fees is that the documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Considering that Baker Donelson relies entirely on the lodestar calculation to justify its fee request, its supplement falls short of that benchmark.
“Although counsel need not record in great detail each minute he or she spent on an item, the general subject matter should be identified.” Ibid. In Gascho, the Sixth Circuit noted that it was “a close question whether the minimal billing information provided suffices to justify the lodestar award in light of our caselaw.” 822 F.3d at 281 Nevertheless, the panel concluded that it did not need to decide the question, since the district court also had employed the percentage of the fund as a cross-check, and the requested fee passed muster by that method. In this case, where counsel purports to rely only on the lodestar justification, unmoored from any supporting documentation, application of the petition is problematic.
The initial motion was supported by nothing more than a sort of summary accounting analysis proffered by attorney White, and his declaration did not even summarize by name which lawyers did what tasks, or the total number of hours attributable to each attorney of the firm that worked on the case. The supplement gives a very general breakdown of the categories of work various attorneys performed, but there is no information on the amount of time spent on each task, and therefore no basis to determine “the number of hours ‘reasonably expended’” to the respective tasks. Gascho, 822 F.3d at 279. Another reservation about the supplement is that it also states that
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“[o]ther Baker Donelson attorneys assisted with various tasks,” and that “[d]etailed billing records will be made available to the Court if the Court desires submission of the same.” If “detailed billing records” are available to support the request, then it is not apparent why counsel thought it was appropriate not to submit them. The Sixth Circuit has not found the sort of naked actuarial declaration offered here sufficient to support a fee award under the lodestar method. See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 276 (questioning the soundness of the lodestar method where “class counsel had not submitted detailed billing records for review by the court [and merely] provided the number of hours worked and averred under penalty of perjury that those hours were reasonably necessary to prosecute the action”).
Presumably Baker Donelson may eventually be able to submit a properly supported fee request. But to avoid further delays in approving the class settlement and proposed distribution, and in adjudication the other two fees requests, the Court will deny Baker Donelson’s attorney’s fee motion without prejudice to resubmission at a later date, when counsel can expend the time and energy to furnish suitable support.
VII. For the reasons stated, the Court unconditionally certifies the settlement class, approves the settlement, and grants the motions for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for approval of settlement and plan of allocation [dkt. # 217] is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the settlement agreement and plan of allocation is APPROVED.
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It is further ORDERED that the individual who sent a request for exclusion from the class is hereby deemed excluded from the class and is not bound by, nor may he participate in, the class settlement.
It is further ORDERED that Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota is APPOINTED as the administrator of the settlement fund. The administrator shall receive, disburse, and account for the settlement proceeds as provided by the formula for distribution of the settlement fund set forth in the settlement agreement. Class Counsel shall provide and file with the Court and the defendants a report setting forth the proposed distribution of all funds paid by the defendants as called for in the settlement agreement upon completion of the evaluation of the requests for payment received from class members. After final distribution, class counsel shall file with the Court a certificate that the settlement fund has been disbursed according to the plan, or that funds remain undistributed, as the case may be.
It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the County of Rutherford, Tennessee, its employees, officers, and agents and those in active concert and participation with them (the “Enjoined Parties”), are PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from holding any individual in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay must include, without limitation, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and the assistance of appointed counsel. The Enjoined Parties shall act in conformity with the requirements of this Order as follows:
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A. The Enjoined Parties shall not enforce conditions of misdemeanor probation in cases in which the procedures of this Order are not followed nor shall Rutherford County detain any misdemeanor probationer in any case in which the Order’s procedures are not followed.
B. Any person whose income is below 125% of the Federal Poverty Line (“FPL”) shall be presumed to have the inability to pay and shall have all probation and any other discretionary fees and court costs waived, unless it is determined, after a meaningful hearing and opportunity to be heard, that the person’s inability to pay is willful or that he or she has not made good faith efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay. Any finding of willfulness or bad faith must be supported by a statement of reasons made on the record in writing.
C. No person owing money from a misdemeanor case prosecuted in Rutherford County may be incarcerated by the Enjoined Parties solely for the failure to pay any fines, fees, or court costs. No probationer, regardless of financial circumstances, may have his or her probation revoked or extended for failure to pay, nor may any person, regardless of financial circumstances, be put on probation solely because he or she cannot afford to make a payment. (For the avoidance of doubt, the term “solely” means that nonpayment shall not be the basis of any placement on probation [for example, a requirement to pay fines, fees, or court costs shall not be the sole reason that a person is placed on supervised probation], jailing, revocation of probation, or extension of probation. For the avoidance of doubt, this Order does not prohibit placement on probation, jailing, revocation, or extension of probation for other conduct unrelated to payment, including, for example, when a person has committed multiple violations of probation.).
D. People who were assessed fines, fees or court costs or both that have not been waived, including those who have remaining sums owed after the term of any probation, will be placed on a civil payment plan. For those previously placed on probation, their probation will be terminated upon placement on a civil payment plan, provided that all of the other non-financial conditions of probation have been satisfied.
E. The Enjoined Parties shall not contract with, or otherwise permit to operate in its jurisdiction, a for-profit company to provide probation services, including but not limited to a for-profit company that earns profits based on fees paid by probationers. This provision shall not apply to any municipal government entities other than Rutherford County because no other municipal government entity is a party to this case.
F. Conduct of Probation Officers and Conditions of Probation 1. Each probation officer must receive a minimum of 20 hours of one-time training regarding principles of rehabilitation, implicit bias, cultural competence, and best practices for rehabilitation.
2. Probation conditions enforced by Rutherford County probation officers shall be reasonably tailored to the offense of conviction and no greater than necessary to meet
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a specifically identified need and reasonably necessary to promote good and lawful conduct.
3. Only objectively reliable drug tests may be used as a basis for alleging a violation of probation. A probationer alleged to have failed a drug test shall be informed of the statute that governs the admissibility of a drug test at a revocation hearing and given an opportunity to contest the validity of the test: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(c)(1).
G. Subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, all probation fees shall be waived for the indigent. Indigence shall be determined according to an objective standard: any person whose income is below 125% of the FPL shall have all probation and any other discretionary fees and court costs waived. The form utilized by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts for a determination of indigence shall be used to make this determination. The initial determination that a misdemeanor defendant is below 125% FPL does not preclude the court from later determining that a probationer’s financial circumstances have changed such that he or she has moved above 125% FPL, provided that such a determination must be made during the pendency of the probationary period and after notice and an opportunity to present evidence of one’s financial situation. If a probationer is found to be above 125% FPL then fines, court costs, and fees may be imposed on the probationer. A condition of probation may include the requirement that the probationer keep the court informed of changes to his or her financial circumstances.
H. Any person owing outstanding court debts (including fines, fees, or costs) arising from misdemeanor cases in General Sessions Court before April 2016, on request and after submitting a form indicating indigence, and subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, above, will have those debts waived if his or her income is at or below 125% FPL. The Enjoined Parties must provide copies of the indigence form utilized by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts and allow people to fill out the form for the purpose of court debt waivers during business hours at the Clerk’s Office. Rutherford County shall not be required to send out notices regarding the waiver program for the indigent, but it shall post a publicly accessible sign reasonably describing the waiver process in the clerk’s office and in a publicly visible place in the County Probation Office. Outstanding court debts may be re-imposed if the person requesting waiver under this provision is found after notice and a hearing to have willfully misrepresented his or her financial circumstances in order to meet the 125% FPL standard.
I. Notification of Alleged Violations 1. Whenever it comes to the attention of a General Sessions Judge that any probationer has violated the conditions of probation, then the General Sessions Judge may issue a citation or, in his or her discretion, a warrant for the arrest of the probationer as allowed for by Tennessee law. Although release on citation or on a release on recognizance (“ROR”) warrant must be the routine practice, the County may detain a misdemeanor arrestee without bond on a warrant for a probation violation in carefully limited exceptional circumstances, provided that the person is
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brought before a judicial officer and afforded counsel within 48 hours of arrest or the next business day whichever is less. Such detention without bond shall be the carefully limited exception, and the misdemeanor probation arrestee shall be given the opportunity to argue for release at the hearing required by this paragraph or to otherwise contest the validity of the detention. In no event shall any such misdemeanor probation arrestee be detained by the Enjoined Parties under a secured money bond that the person cannot afford.
2. A misdemeanor probationer may be held in Rutherford County custody without bond on a probation revocation warrant, provided that there is a preliminary adversarial hearing with counsel within 48 hours or the next business day, whichever is less, and only in the following circumstances: the probationer has intentionally fled the jurisdiction; probable cause has been found by the judicial officer issuing the warrant that the person has committed a new felony or domestic violence offense; or the warrant articulates in writing to the Sheriff that the person presents a specific imminent danger to any other person in the community. Detention without bond is also permissible if a probationer was alleged to have failed to report to probation more than two consecutive months, was cited to court by the probation officer on an affidavit that the probationer thereby violated probation, and the probationer failed to appear and provide reasonable cause for the failure to report.
3. As has been the practice in Rutherford County, failure to report to probation a single time shall not be the basis for providing notice to the court of a probation violation. Only when an individual has failed to report for more than two consecutive months with no reasonable excuse and has exhibited a pattern of failure to report may the probation officer provide notice to the court of an alleged violation.
J. As is current policy in Rutherford County, legal proceedings in criminal cases (including probation cases) will be held in open court and will be accessible to the public. If proceedings must be held in a secured location, then they shall be open to viewing by the public by live feed television into an area accessible to the public. Defendants will have access to attorneys at all proceedings at which liberty is at stake, including all proceedings at which conditions of release are considered and all hearings at which the willfulness of non-payment is considered.
K. Allowance for Indigence 1. The Enjoined Parties must not require the payment of a fee from any indigent person to make any legal filing in a misdemeanor probation case. (The term “indigent” when used in this document has an objective definition and means any individual whose income falls at or below 125% FPL, subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, above).
2. Collection of Court Debts
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a. Subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, requests for waivers of fees and court costs may be denied only if the person’s finances are such that he or she does not meet the objective standard of indigence (125% FPL), provided, however, that the court retains the discretion to re-impose fees and court costs during any probationary period should the court conclude after notice and an opportunity to be heard that the financial condition of the person requesting the waiver has changed such that his or her income is above the 125% FPL threshold.
b. The determination of whether a person is indigent shall be made based on the Financial Hardship Forms and Affidavits used for that purpose by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts. The requisite forms must be available at the office of the Court Clerk and also provided individually to misdemeanor probationers by the Rutherford County Probation Office at the time of probationer’s first meeting with his or her probation officer.
c. The Court Clerk must make available by public posting information on any available alternatives for payment of court debts, which will include the availability of payment plans or other non-financial alternatives that may be available under state law. Additionally, at the time of probationer’s first meeting with his or her probation officer, the same information to be posted publicly by the Court Clerk shall be provided personally to the probationer.
L. Payment Plans 1. At the time individuals are placed on payment plans, the paperwork setting out the terms of that plan must include a notice informing them that they cannot be arrested or jailed solely because they cannot afford to make their payments and of any procedures available for reviewing and altering their payment arrangements in the event that their current arrangement becomes unaffordable without substantial hardship. Individuals shall be informed of their obligation to report increases in income.
2. For persons placed on a payment plan, the maximum amount that can be required of a person below 125% FPL is $25 per month, provided, however, that such person may request the Clerk of Court to reduce the $25 payment based on financial hardship. The Clerk of Court in her discretion can reduce the minimum payment based on hardship. Should the Clerk of Court refuse to do so, the payer may seek leave of the General Sessions Court to order a reduction in the monthly payment.
3. If a person on a payment plan is alleged to have failed to pay more than two times (regardless of whether or not those non-payments are consecutive), then the person may be cited to court on an affidavit that he or she has violated probation if payment was a condition of probation. Upon such an affidavit, a constitutionally adequate
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compliance hearing shall be scheduled. The probationer must be given adequate notice and be informed that his or her ability to pay will be a critical issue at the hearing. Court-appointed counsel must be provided to any individual who is accused of failing to pay in any case in which revocation of probation or incarceration may be imposed.
4. If allowed under state law, Rutherford County may provide alternatives to payment for individuals who cannot afford to pay court debts.
M. No person shall be required to pay a filing fee or any other fee in connection with the filing of a motion to waive court costs or probation fees. No filing fees of any kind shall be charged to a person who meets the objective definition of indigence (125% FPL, subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, above), provided, however, that the state court retains the discretion to impose such fees during a probationary period should the court conclude after notice and an opportunity to be heard that the financial condition of the person requesting the waiver has changed so that he or she is above the 125% FPL threshold.
N. Subject to the procedures and terms of Section B, above, the Enjoined Parties shall not charge any fees for any condition of misdemeanor probation or pretrial release (such as electronic monitoring) to any person whose income falls below the objective standard of 125% FPL, provided, however, that the court retains the discretion to impose such fees during a probationary period should the court conclude after notice and an opportunity to be heard that the financial condition of the person requesting the waiver has changed such that he or she is above the 125% FPL threshold.
It is further ORDERED that incentive awards in the amount of $10,000 each are approved
for and may be distributed to the named plaintiffs, Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum,
Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson. The incentive awards
may be designated as expenses of administration and paid according to the appropriate priority as
outlined in the settlement agreement.
It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel’s respective motions for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses [dkt. #198, 202] are GRANTED, and payments from the settlement fund are
approved as follows: Civil Rights Corps shall receive $336,200 for attorney’s fees and $1,619.53
for litigation expenses; Kyle Mothershead shall receive $24,115 for attorney’s fees; and Equal
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Justice Under Law shall receive $827,368.50 for attorney fees and $14,992.30 for litigation expenses.
It is further ORDERED that the motion for attorney fees by Baker Donelson [dkt. #208] is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a renewed motion accompanied by adequate supporting documentation as indicated by the Court’s previous directions.
It is further ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; provided, however, that this Court retains jurisdiction over all matters relating to the enforcement of equitable relief, and the administration of the settlement agreement, including allocation and distribution of the settlement fund.
It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel and the settlement administrator Dahl Administration LLC shall remain responsible for completion of the administration of the claims and distribution of the funds, but they may not invade the settlement fund for further reimbursement or payment of fees absent further order of the Court.
s/David M. Lawson DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation Dated: July 18, 2018
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 Case: 16-6129 Document: 34-1 Filed: 09/28/2018 Page: 1

(1 of 2)

Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: September 28, 2018
Mr. David Ruben Esquivel Bass, Berry & Sims 150 Third Avenue, S. Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201
Mr. Alec George Karakatsanis Civil Rights Corps 916 G. Street, N.W. Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001
Ms. Lisa S. Rivera Bass, Berry & Sims 150 Third Avenue, S. Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201
Ms. Kathryn Hannen Walker Bass, Berry & Sims 150 Third Avenue, S. Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201
Re: Case No. 16-6129, Cindy Rodriguez, et al v. Providence Community Corr, et al Originating Case No. : 3:15-cv-01048
Dear Sir or Madam,
The Court issued the enclosed (Order/Opinion) today in this case.
Sincerely yours,
s/Connie A. Weiskittel Mediation Administrator
cc: Mr. Keith Throckmorton
Enclosure
No mandate to issue

Case 3:15-cv-01048 Document 232 Filed 09/28/18 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 3755

Case: 16-6129 Document: 34-2 Filed: 09/28/2018 Page: 1

(2 of 2)

Case No. 16-6129
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ORDER

CINDY RODRIGUEZ; STEVEN GIBBS; PAULA PULLUM; YOLANDA CARNEY; JACQUELINE BRINKLEY; CURTIS JOHNSTON; FRED ROBINSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, nka Pathways Community Corrections, Inc.; RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE;AMANDA SCHEXNAYDER
Defendants
and
JASMINE JACKSON; BRIANA WOODLEE; AMANDA ROBERTS; TIARA SMITH; KELLY HALEY; KAYLA BANKS; KELLY MCCALL; NISHA HYDE
Defendants - Appellants

In accordance with Rule 33, Rules of the Sixth Circuit, and upon consideration of the
parties' stipulation to dismiss,
It is ORDERED that the case is dismissed pursuant to 42(b), Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 33, RULES OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

Issued: September 28, 2018

___________________________________

Case 3:15-cv-01048 Document 232 Filed 09/28/18 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 3756

 
 CASE−CLOSED,HOLMES,STAYED
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:15−cv−01048

Rodriguez et al v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc. et al Assigned to: Judge David M. Lawson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes Case in other court: Sixth Circuit, 16−05057
Sixth Circuit, 16−05058
6CCA, 16−06127
6CCA, 16−06128
6CCA, 16−06129 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/01/2015 Date Terminated: 07/05/2018 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Cindy Rodriguez

represented by Alec Karakatsanis Civil Rights Corps 916 G Street NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 202−681−2721 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire V. Thomas Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C. (Nashville) 424 Church Street Suite 2500 P O Box 198615 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 259−1366 Fax: (615) 259−1389 Email: cthomas@lewisthomason.com TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 599−0953 Fax: (202) 609−8030 Email: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Jacob Cole Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (Nash) 211 Commerce Street Suite 800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 726−5600 Email: jcole@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kristine L. Roberts Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (Memphis) First Tennessee Building 165 Madison Avenue
Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 1 of 32

Suite 2000 Memphis, TN 38103 (901) 526−2000 Fax: (901) 577−0732 Email: klroberts@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead The Law Office of Kyle Mothershead 414 Union Street Suite 900 Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 982−8002 Email: kyle@mothersheadlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (Memphis) First Tennessee Building 165 Madison Avenue Suite 2000 Memphis, TN 38103 (901) 577−8182 Fax: (901) 577−0724 Email: lpatterson@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (Memphis) First Tennessee Building 165 Madison Avenue Suite 2000 Memphis, TN 38103 (901) 577−8182 Fax: (901) 577−0724 Email: mwhite@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan Equal Justice Under Law 601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 505−2058 Email: ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org TERMINATED: 03/27/2017

Sarah D. Murray Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (Nash) 211 Commerce Street Suite 800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 726−5686 Fax: (615) 744−5686 Email: smurray@bakerdonelson.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Plaintiff

Steven Gibbs

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 2 of 32

Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017

Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Plaintiff
Paula Pullum (deceased)

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kristine L. Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White (See above for address)
Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 3 of 32

TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017

Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Plaintiff Yolanda Carney

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kristine L. Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017

Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Plaintiff Jacqueline Brinkley

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 4 of 32

Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kristine L. Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017

Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Plaintiff Curtis Johnston

represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016

Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kristine L. Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Matthew G. White (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017
Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 5 of 32

Plaintiff Fred Robinson on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Christina Alalna as Administrator of the Estate of Paula Pullum

Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
represented by Alec Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire V. Thomas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2016
Elizabeth Anne Rossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Jacob Cole (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
Kristine L. Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori H. Patterson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
Matthew G. White (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2017
Sarah D. Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/20/2016
represented by Kyle F. Mothershead (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Providence Community Corrections, Inc. now known as Pathways Community Corrections, Inc.

represented by David R. Esquivel Bass, Berry & Sims (Nashville Office) 150 Third Avenue South Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−6200 Email: desquivel@bassberry.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 6 of 32

Julie R. F. Gerchik Latham & Watkins, LLP (LA Office) 355 S Grand Avenue Suite 100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 485−1234 Fax: (213) 891−8763 Email: julie.gerchik@lw.com TERMINATED: 07/02/2018

Kathryn Hannen Walker Bass, Berry & Sims (Nashville Office) 150 Third Avenue South Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−6200 Email: kwalker@bassberry.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa S. Rivera Bass, Berry & Sims (Nashville Office) 150 Third Avenue South Suite 2800 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−7707 Email: lrivera@bassberry.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Manuel Abascal Latham & Watkins, LLP (LA Office) 355 S Grand Avenue Suite 100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 485−1234 Fax: (213) 891−8763 Email: manny.abascal@lw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robin A. Kelley Latham & Watkins, LLP (LA Office) 355 S Grand Avenue Suite 100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 485−1234 Fax: (213) 891−8763 Email: robin.kelley@lw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee

represented by Blake Allan Garner Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square, N P O Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 (615) 893−5522 Fax: (615) 849−2135 Email: bgarner@mborolaw.com TERMINATED: 03/05/2018

Edward Evan Cope Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square, N P O Box 884
Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 7 of 32

Murfreesboro, TN 37133 615−893−5522 Fax: 615−849−2135 Email: ecope@mborolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C. Cope Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square, N P O Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 (615) 893−5522 Fax: (615) 849−2135 Email: jcope@mborolaw.com TERMINATED: 10/25/2016

Josh A. McCreary Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square, N P O Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 (615) 893−5522 Email: jmccreary@mborolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jasmine Jackson

represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Briana Woodlee

represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Amanda Roberts

represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Tiara Smith

represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 8 of 32

Kelly Haley TERMINATED: 06/09/2016
Defendant Amanda Schexnayder
Defendant Kayla Banks TERMINATED: 06/09/2016
Defendant Kelly McCall TERMINATED: 06/09/2016
Defendant Nisha Hyde
Interested Party Mikesha Kidd−Graham

represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David R. Esquivel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa S. Rivera (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mikesha Kidd−Graham 1359 Old Lascassas Road Murfreesboro, TN 37130 (615) 775−0377 PRO SE

V. Intervenor Equal Justice Under Law

represented by J. Scott Hickman Sherrard Roe Voight & Harbison, PLC 150 Third Avenue South Suite 1100 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−4200 Email: shickman@srvhlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phillip F. Cramer Sherrard Roe Voight & Harbison, PLC
Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 9 of 32

150 Third Avenue South Suite 1100 Nashville, TN 37201 (615) 742−4200 Email: pcramer@srvhlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

10/01/2015

1 COMPLAINT filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, & Yolanda Carney against Providence Community Corrections, Inc., et al. (Filing fee $400; receipt number 0650−2069271) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Attachment Civil Cover Sheet)(af) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, et al. (af) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/1/2015: # 1 Attachment Proposed TRO) (af). (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

3 MEMORANDUM in Support of 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(af) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

4 RULE 65 DECLARATION of Jonathan Cole filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, et al in support of 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (af) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015 5 Summons issued as to all Defendants. (af) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

6 MOTION for attorney(s) Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2069446) by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

7 MOTION for attorney(s) Phil Telfeyan to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2069461) by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/01/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp: Motion Hearing held on 10/1/2015 re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jacqueline Brinkley. Hearing continued to October 2, 2015, at 3:00 p.m. (Court Reporter Wynette Blathers.) (ab) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/02/2015

8 NOTICE of Appearance by Josh A. McCreary on behalf of Rutherford County, Tennessee (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/02/2015

9 SUPPLEMENT filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 2 Motion for TRO, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 3 Memorandum in Support,. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/02/2015

10 RESPONSE to Motion re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Memorandum of Law filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/02/2015 11 ORDER granting 6 Motion for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/2/15. (af) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/02/2015 12 ORDER granting 7 Motion for Phil Telfeyan to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/2/15. (af) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

10/02/2015

13 ORDER granting 2 Motion for TRO. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/2/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af) (Entered: 10/02/2015)

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10/05/2015
10/06/2015 10/07/2015 10/08/2015 10/09/2015 10/09/2015 10/13/2015 10/13/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015

14 ORDER: This Court has scheduled a hearing on Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction for 3:00 PM on Friday, October 16, 2015. The following briefing deadlines shall apply: Defendants shall be permitted to file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 2 ) on or before 12:00 PM on Tuesday, October 13, 2015. Defendants' response brief shall not exceed twenty (20) pages. Plaintiffs shall be permitted to file a reply brief on or before 12:00 PM on Thursday, October 15, 2015. Plaintiffs' reply brief shall not exceed five (5) pages. By close of business on October 13, 2015, the parties shall exchange witness and exhibit lists. It is SO ORDERED. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/5/2015. (hb) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa S. Rivera on behalf of Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathryn Hannen Walker on behalf of Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (Walker, Kathryn) (Entered: 10/07/2015)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa S. Rivera on behalf of Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
BAR STATUS for Attorneys, Lisa S. Rivera and Kathryn Hannen Walker of TN, verified as active on this date. (afs) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
18 MOTION for Entry of Stipulated Preliminary Injunction by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Proposed Stipulation and Order)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
BAR STATUS for Attorney, Josh McCreary of TN, verified as active on this date. (afs) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
19 STIPULATION AND ORDER CONVERTING TEMPORAY RESTRAINING ORDER INTO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/13/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
20 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Providence Community Corrections, Inc. served on 10/1/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
21 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Yolanda Carney. Rutherford County, Tennessee served on 10/1/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
22 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
23 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Amanda Schexnayder served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
24 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Amanda Roberts served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
25 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Kelly Haley served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
26 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Kelly McCall served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
27 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Jasmine Jackson served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

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10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/21/2015 10/21/2015 10/21/2015
10/21/2015 10/21/2015 10/21/2015
10/22/2015 10/22/2015
11/01/2015 11/02/2015 11/02/2015

28 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Kayla Banks served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
29 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Briana Woodlee served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
30 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Tiara Smith served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
31 SUMMONS returned executed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney. Nisha Hyde served on 10/2/2015. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
32 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
33 MEMORANDUM in Support of 32 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
34 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer − Defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to the Complaint by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
35 NOTICE of Appearance by David R. Esquivel on behalf of Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
37 MEMORANDUM in Support of 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Gibbs Warrant, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Pullum Warrant, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Declaration of Paula Pullum, # 4 Attachment Proposed Preliminary Injunction)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
BAR STATUS for Attorney, David R. Esquivel of TN, verified as active on this date. (afs) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
38 ORDER: Evidentiary Hearing set for 11/6/2015 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom A826 before Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp. Defendants shall be permitted to file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on or before 12:00 PM on Monday, November 2, 2015. Replies due by 11/5/2015. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/22/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
39 RESPONSE in Opposition re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − TN AG Opinion 99−199, # 2 Exhibit B − TN Crim. Trial Prac 29:5)(McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 11/01/2015)
40 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
41 RESPONSE in Opposition re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unreported Cases)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 11/02/2015)

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11/03/2015 11/03/2015 11/03/2015 11/04/2015
11/04/2015 11/05/2015 11/06/2015 11/06/2015
11/06/2015 11/09/2015 11/09/2015
11/16/2015 11/18/2015 11/18/2015 11/19/2015

42 ORDER granting 40 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/3/15. (afs) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
43 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
44 REPLY to Response to Motion re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − $20,000 Warrant)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/03/2015)
45 REPLY to Response to Motion re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Reply to PCC, Inc.'s Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction) filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Exhibit List to Reply Brief, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Arrest Warrants for Nonpayment, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Arrest Warrants for Fred Robinson, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Warrants for Nonpayment for Classes, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Arrest Warrants with Secured Bail)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
47 ORDER granting 46 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/5/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
48 MOTION to Exclude Extraneous Exhibits by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp: Motion Hearing held on 11/6/2015 re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Cindy Rodriguez, Fred Robinson, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnston. Order to enter. (Court Reporter Wynette Blathers.) (ab) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
49 WITNESS/EXHIBIT LIST prepared by Deputy Clerk. re: Motion Hearing.(dt) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
50 ORDER granting 43 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/9/15. (afs) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
51 RESPONSE in Opposition re 36 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction PCC and Individual Defendants' Post−Hearing Memorandum in Opposition to Plantiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Phillips Declaration)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
52 OBJECTIONS to New Evidence Offered by PCC, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1 Example of Court Documents)(Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
53 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 11/18/2015)
54 MEMORANDUM in Support of 53 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 11/18/2015)
55 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer PCC Defendants' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to the Complaint by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 11/19/2015)

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11/20/2015

56 ORDER REFERRING CASE: This case is hereby referred to the Magistrate Judge for case management purposes pursuant to Local Rule 16.01. to Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/20/15. (afs) (Entered: 11/20/2015)

11/24/2015

57 SUPPLEMENT filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 52 Objections. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

11/30/2015

58 ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 12/7/2015 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 764 before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes Pending are four motions for extension of time, Docket Entry Nos. 32 , 34 , 53 and 55 . All four motions are unopposed and are GRANTED. All Defendants are granted until December 2, 2015, to file a responsive pleading.Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 11/30/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) Modified TEXT on 11/30/2015 (afs). (Entered: 11/30/2015)

12/02/2015 59 MOTION to Dismiss by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/02/2015 60 MEMORANDUM in Support of 59 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/02/2015

61 MOTION to Dismiss by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/02/2015

62 MEMORANDUM in Support of 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Rutherford County, Tennessee, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Appendix of Unreported Cases)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/02/2015

63 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/04/2015 64 Joint MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 12/04/2015)

12/07/2015

65 ORDER granting 64 Motion to Continue Case Management Conference. ICMC is reset for 1/21/2016 at 11:00 a.m. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 12/7/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 12/07/2015)

12/15/2015

66 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 61 MOTION to Dismiss , 59 MOTION to Dismiss by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/15/2015)

12/16/2015 67 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 12/16/15. (afs) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015

68 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 12/17/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015

69 ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 36 ), it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 12/17/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/17/2015

70 Transcript filed for dates of 11/6/15 before Judge Kevin Sharp. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Wynette Blathers, 404−215−1547, wynette_blathers@gand.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for

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01/15/2016 01/15/2016 01/15/2016 01/15/2016
01/15/2016 01/15/2016 01/15/2016 01/19/2016 01/19/2016 01/19/2016 01/22/2016 01/22/2016 01/25/2016

Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNSEL TO REVIEW THE TRANSCRIPT AND REQUEST REDACTION OF CONTENT CLASSIFIED AS PRIVATE UNDER THE NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF THE BAR, ELECTRONIC AVAILABILITY OF TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, EFFECTIVE MAY 5, 2008, AVAILABLE ON THE COURT'S WEBSITE UNDER THE CM−ECF LINK at: http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/files/20091201Notice_to_the_Bar_Transcripts.pdf. Intent to Request Transcript Redaction due 12/24/2015. Redaction Request due 1/7/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/19/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/16/2016. (afs) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
71 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 69 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, by Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Tiara Smith. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2128205. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 1/15/2016; ORDER to enter, CMC cont. to 3−24−16 At 2:00 pm. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
72 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 69 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, by Rutherford County, Tennessee. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2128305. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
73 ORDER: Case Management Conference reset for 3/24/2016 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 764 before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. By no later than January 22, 2016, Defendants shall file any motion seeking a stay of some or all of the proceedings, including discovery, in this case. By no later than January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs shall file their response. Any reply by Defendants, which is optional, shall be filed by no later than February 5, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 1/15/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
74 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Response to PCC, Inc. Motion to Dismiss by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (White, Matthew) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
75 RESPONSE in Opposition re 61 MOTION to Dismiss of PCC, Inc., filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (White, Matthew) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
76 RESPONSE in Opposition re 59 MOTION to Dismiss of Rutherford County filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (White, Matthew) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
USCA Case Number 16−5057 − Jeanine R. Hance, Case Manager, for 71 Notice of Appeal, filed by Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Jasmine Jackson, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Tiara Smith. (afs) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
77 ORDER granting 74 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 1/19/16. (afs) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
USCA Case Number 16−5058 − Jeanine R. Hance, Case Manager, for 72 Notice of Appeal filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (afs) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
78 MOTION to Stay Discovery by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
79 MEMORANDUM in Support of 78 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Appendix of Unpublished Cases)(Esquivel, David) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
80 NOTICE of Filing of Transcript by court reporter, Wynette Blathers. (af) (Entered: 01/25/2016)

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01/26/2016 81 First MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Cope, Edward) (Entered: 01/26/2016)

01/26/2016 82 MEMORANDUM in Support of 81 First MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee . (Cope, Edward) (Entered: 01/26/2016)

01/29/2016

83 RESPONSE to Motion re 78 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/29/2016)

02/01/2016

84 RESPONSE in Opposition re 81 First MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/01/2016)

02/05/2016 85 REPLY to Response to 78 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) Modified on 2/10/2016 (afs). (Entered: 02/05/2016)

02/12/2016

86 REPLY filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 85 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee, 78 Motion to Stay filed by Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Tiara Smith, Jasmine Jackson, Kayla Banks, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/12/2016)

02/26/2016

87 MOTION for Leave to to File Reply In Support of Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Memo in Support of Motion to Stay Discovery by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Reply In Support of Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Attachment Supplemental Memo In Support of Motion to Stay Discovery)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 02/26/2016)

02/29/2016 88 ORDER: MOTION 87 GRANTED. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 2/29/16. (afs) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

02/29/2016

89 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM in Support of 78 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (afs) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

02/29/2016

90 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PCC AND INDIVDDUAL DEFENDANTS' 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (afs) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

03/04/2016

91 RESPONSE in Opposition re 78 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/04/2016)

03/04/2016

92 MOTION for Leave to To File Sur−Reply in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Sur−Reply, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Sur−Reply)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/04/2016)

03/08/2016 93 ORDER: MOTION 92 GRANTED. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 3/8/16. (afs) (Entered: 03/08/2016)

03/08/2016

94 SUR−REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO 90 Reply to Response to Motion, filed by Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Jasmine Jackson, Kayla Banks, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Letter to Attorney General Herbert Slatery 12−11−15)(afs) (Entered: 03/08/2016)

03/15/2016

95 ORDER of USCA: Upon consideration of the joint motion of the parties to voluntarily dismiss the appeal herein pursuant to Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, It is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and the appeal is dismissed. (afs) (Entered: 03/15/2016)

03/21/2016 96 Joint MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community

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03/23/2016
03/30/2016 04/05/2016 04/06/2016
04/06/2016 04/08/2016 04/08/2016 04/15/2016 04/15/2016 04/15/2016 04/18/2016
04/18/2016

Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
97 ORDER: Pending before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Continuance of Case Management Conference (the "Motion") (Docket No. 96 ), which is GRANTED IN PART. The initial case management conference is reset for Friday, April 8, 2016, at 11:00 a.m. CDT. A proposed initial case management order shall be filed by no later than April 6, 2016.1 Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 3/23/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
98 NOTICE of Filing by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 49 Witness/Exhibit List (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Joint Factual Stipulations admitted at Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Nov. 6, 2015)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
99 Consent MOTION for Leave to Appear telephonically by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
100 ORDER: Pending before the Court is the Unopposed Motion to Appear Telephonically at Initial Case Management Conference (Docket No. 99 ) filed by Plaintiffs' counsel. Accordingly, rather than conduct the initial case management conference on April 8, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., the Court will conduct a telephonic status conference at that date and time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/6/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
101 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 4/8/2016; ORDER to enter. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
102 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Cole, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
103 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING of Attorney Elizabeth Ann Rossi from the United States District Court of New Hampshire filed by Cindy Rodriguez. (afs) (Main Document 103 replaced on 4/16/2016) (afs). (Entered: 04/16/2016)
104 MOTION for attorney(s) Elizabeth Anne Rossi to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Fee paid, $75) by Cindy Rodriguez. (afs) (Entered: 04/16/2016)
105 ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 5/16/2016 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 764 before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/15/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
106 ORDER: It appears that all the referenced pending motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. No other filings in support of or in opposition to the referenced pending motions shall be made, except with the express permission of the Honorable Kevin H. Sharp, Chief Judge. The Clerk is directed to forward the file in this case to Judge Sharp for his consideration of Defendants motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 59 and 61 ), PCC and Individual Defendants Motion to Stay Discovery (Docket No. 78 ), and Defendant Rutherford County's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (Docket No. 81 ), and the responsive filings as described herein. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/15/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
107 *WITHDRAWN PER ORDER 140 * Partial MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Concise Statement of Facts)(Karakatsanis, Alec) Modified on 6/20/2016 (dt). (Entered: 04/18/2016)

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04/18/2016

108 *WITHDRAWN PER ORDER 140 * MEMORANDUM in Support of 107 Partial MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−−Contract, # 2 Exhibit 2−−Sample warrants, # 3 Exhibit 3−−Rules of probation, # 4 Exhibit 4−−Letters (probation fees first), # 5 Exhibit 5−−Letters (violations but no court costs), # 6 Exhibit 6−−Reporting requirements, # 7 Exhibit 7−−Non−payment warrants, # 8 Exhibit 8−−Hubbard letter, # 9 Exhibit 9−−Hall letter, # 10 Exhibit 10−−Clemmons letter, # 11 Exhibit 11−−Threatening letters, # 12 Exhibit 12−−Tomberlain warrant, # 13 Exhibit 13−−Process to have fines and fees reduced, # 14 Exhibit 14−−Financial assessment denials, # 15 Exhibit 15−−Non−payment warrants, # 16 Exhibit 16−−Warrants for other violations, # 17 Exhibit 17−−Fred Robinson warrant, # 18 Exhibit 18−−Receipts, # 19 Exhibit 19−−Scardina warrant and VOP judgment, # 20 Exhibit 20−−Steven Gibbs drug test and VOP warrant, # 21 Exhibit 21−−Warrants post−financial assessments, # 22 Exhibit 22−−Fees, # 23 Exhibit 23−−Alsup documents, # 24 Exhibit 24−−Warrant fees, # 25**SEE DE 111 for signed Declaration** Exhibit 25−−Declaration of Elizabeth Rossi, # 26 Exhibit 26−−Exhibit list)(Karakatsanis, Alec) Modified on 4/20/2016 (dt). Modified on 6/20/2016 (dt). (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/18/2016

109 NOTICE of Filing by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez Exhibits Admitted at Evidentiary Hearing (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Exhibits Admitted at Evidentiary Hearing)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/18/2016 110 ORDER granting 104 Motion for Elizabeth Rossi to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/18/16. (afs) (Entered: 04/18/2016)

04/19/2016

111 *WITHDRAWN PER ORDER 140 * AMENDED DOCUMENT by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. Amendment to 108 Memorandum in Support,,,,, . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Ex. 25−−Signed declaration of Elizabeth Rossi)(Karakatsanis, Alec) Modified on 6/20/2016 (dt). (Entered: 04/19/2016)

04/19/2016 112 RECEIPT #34675040782 in the amount of $75.00 posted by Equal Justice Under Law re 104 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. (dt) (Entered: 04/20/2016)

04/20/2016

113 ORDER granting 102 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Plaintiff shall have 30 days to obtain new local counsel. Attorney Lori H. Patterson; Kristine L. Roberts; Matthew G. White; Jonathan Jacob Cole and Sarah D. Murray terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 4/20/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 04/20/2016)

04/28/2016

114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit First Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit First Amended Complaint (Redlined), # 3 Exhibit Proposed Order)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/28/2016)

05/05/2016

Note to Filer re DE# 114 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, Certificates of Service shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Please FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document. (dt) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/06/2016

115 CERTIFICATE Certificate of Service filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Cindy Rodriguez, Fred Robinson, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnston. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/06/2016)

05/10/2016 116 Joint MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/10/2016)

05/10/2016 117 RESPONSE in Opposition re 114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/10/2016)

05/10/2016 118 MOTION to Stay Briefing on Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community

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05/10/2016
05/12/2016 05/12/2016 05/12/2016
05/13/2016
05/16/2016 05/17/2016 05/18/2016 05/19/2016 05/20/2016
05/20/2016 05/23/2016 05/31/2016

Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
119 MEMORANDUM in Support of 118 MOTION to Stay Briefing on Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Rick Smith, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Appendix of Unreported Cases)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
120 REPLY to Response to Motion re 114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
121 Joint MOTION to Ascertain Status of Deadline to Submit Revised Case Management Order by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Esquivel, David) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
122 RESPONSE in Opposition re 114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Appendix of Unreported Cases)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
123 ORDER granting 116 Motion to Continue Case Management Conference. Case Management Conference is reset for 5/20/16 at 2:00 p.m. Granting 121 Motion to Ascertain Status of Deadline to Submit Revised Case Management Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 5/13/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
124 REPLY to Response to Motion re 114 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
125 RESPONSE in Opposition re 118 MOTION to Stay Briefing on Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
126 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memo from Mediator Carlos Gonzalez, Esq.)(Esquivel, David) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
127 NOTICE of Appearance by Claire V. Thomas on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Thomas, Claire) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
128 ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Exclude Extraneous Exhibits, 48 , is DENIED.Defendants' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, 81 , is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery, 78 , is DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Stay Briefing, 118 , is DENIED. Defendants' deadline to respond to Plaintiffs' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is EXTENDED by sixty days. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 5/20/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Case Management Conference held on 5/20/2016; ORDER to enter. (Tape #digital recording.) (jwc) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
129 INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 5/23/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
130 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/31/2016)

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06/01/2016 06/09/2016 06/09/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016
06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/20/2016

131 ORDER granting 130 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 107 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/1/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
132 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/9/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
133 ORDER: For the reasons stated in the Memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith, the Court rules as follows: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 59 & 61 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 114 is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refile a renewed motion with the proposed Amended Complaint within 60 days of this Order. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/9/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
134 Second MOTION for Leave to To File First Amended Complaint by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment First Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 6 Attachment First Amended Complaint (Redlined))(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
135 MOTION to Withdraw Document 107, 108, 111 by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
136 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−−Concise Statement of Facts)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
137 MEMORANDUM in Support of 136 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−−Contract, # 2 Exhibit 2−−Sample warrants, # 3 Exhibit 3−−Rules of probation, # 4 Exhibit 4−−Letters (probation fees first), # 5 Exhibit 5−−Letters (violations but no court costs), # 6 Exhibit 6−−Reporting requirements, # 7 Exhibit 7−−Non−payment warrants, # 8 Exhibit 8−−Hubbard letter, # 9 Exhibit 9−−Hall letter, # 10 Exhibit 10−−Clemmons letter, # 11 Exhibit 11−−Threatening letters, # 12 Exhibit 12−−Tomberlain warrant, # 13 Exhibit 13−−Process to have fines and fees reduced, # 14 Exhibit 14−−Financial assessment denials, # 15 Exhibit 15−−Non−payment warrants, # 16 Exhibit 16−−Warrants for other violations, # 17 Exhibit 17−−Fred Robinson warrant, # 18 Exhibit 18−−Receipts, # 19 Exhibit 19−−Scardina warrant and VOP judgment, # 20 Exhibit 20−−Steven Gibbs drug test and VOP warrant, # 21 Exhibit 21−−Warrants post−financial assessments, # 22 Exhibit 22−−Fees, # 23 Exhibit 23−−Alsup documents, # 24 Exhibit 24−−Warrant fees, # 25 Exhibit 25−−Declaration of Elizabeth Rossi, # 26 Exhibit 26−−Exhibit list)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
138 MOTION To Set Briefing Schedule for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re 136 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , 137 Memorandum in Support,,,,, by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Karakatsanis, Alec) Modified on 6/20/2016 (dt). (Entered: 06/17/2016)
139 Sealed Document Report of Mediator per CMO [Docket No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
140 ORDER: Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Docs. 107, 108, and 111 (Docket No. 135) is GRANTED and Docket Nos. 107, 108, and 111 are WITHDRAWN. Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Briefing Schedule (Docket No. 138) is GRANTED. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 136 on or before July 18, 2016. Plaintiffs shall file a reply to Defendants' response on or before August 18, 2016. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/20/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)

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06/22/2016 06/23/2016 06/23/2016 06/24/2016 06/24/2016
06/27/2016 06/27/2016 06/28/2016 06/28/2016
07/11/2016 07/11/2016

(Entered: 06/20/2016)
141 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to the Complaint by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
142 MOTION for attorney(s) Manuel A. Abascal to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2229110) by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
143 MOTION for attorney(s) Julie R. F. Gerchik to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $75 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2229114) by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
144 MOTION for Reconsideration re 140 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion to Withdraw, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply,,,,,, by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
145 MEMORANDUM in Support of 144 MOTION for Reconsideration re 140 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion to Withdraw, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply,,,,,, filed by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Case − Worley v Perfect Equipment, # 2 Attachment Case − Turchan v. United States)(Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
146 ORDER granting 142 Motion for Manuel A. Abascal to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/27/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
147 ORDER granting 143 Motion for Julie R. F. Gerchik to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/27/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
Bar status for attorneys Julie R. F. Gerchik and Manuel A. Abascal of CA verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
148 ORDER: After consultation with Chief Judge Sharp, and to facilitate the parties' mediation efforts, all proceedings in this matter, except for discovery necessary for the mediation as provided for in the Initial Case Management Order (Docket No.129 at 2), are STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on August 17, 2016. Accordingly, the following pending motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew or refile, if necessary, upon completion of the mediation: (i) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint 134 ; (ii) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 136 ; (iii) Defendants' Unopposed Motion for An Extension of Time to Respond to the Complaint 141 ; and, (iv) PCC's and Individual Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Briefing Schedule 144 . Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/28/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
149 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 133 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,, by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2240310. (Abascal, Manuel) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
150 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 133 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,, by Rutherford County, Tennessee. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2240516. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 07/11/2016)

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07/11/2016

151 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 133 Order on Motion to Dismiss,, Order on Motion to Amend/Correct,,, by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0650−2240815. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 07/11/2016)

07/13/2016

Bar status for attorney Claire V. Thomas of TN verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 07/13/2016)

07/13/2016

USCA Case Number 16−6127 for 149 Notice of Appeal filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. Case Manager Jeaninie Hance. (dt) (Entered: 07/13/2016)

07/13/2016

USCA Case Number 16−6128 for 150 Notice of Appeal filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee. Case Manager Jeaninie Hance. (dt) (Entered: 07/13/2016)

07/13/2016

USCA Case Number 16−6129 for 151 Notice of Appeal, filed by Kelly McCall, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Jasmine Jackson, Kayla Banks, Briana Woodlee, Amanda Roberts. Case Manager Jeaninie Hance. (dt) (Entered: 07/13/2016)

07/15/2016 152 Sealed Document Report of Mediator as per Case Management Order [Dkt. No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 07/15/2016)

08/05/2016 153 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney and Notice of Substitution of New Counsel by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Thomas, Claire) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/07/2016 154 NOTICE of Appearance by Kyle F. Mothershead on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 08/07/2016)

08/08/2016

155 ORDER granting 153 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Claire V. Thomas terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 8/8/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/08/2016)

08/08/2016

Bar status for attorney Kyle Mothershead of TN verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 08/08/2016)

08/12/2016

156 Joint MOTION to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference by Kayla Banks, Kelly Haley, Nisha Hyde, Jasmine Jackson, Kelly McCall, Providence Community Corrections, Inc., Amanda Roberts, Amanda Schexnayder, Tiara Smith, Briana Woodlee. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 08/12/2016)

08/12/2016 157 Sealed Document Report of Mediator as per Case Management Order [Dkt. No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 08/12/2016)

08/15/2016

158 ORDER granting 156 Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference. The Aug 17th Conf. Call is rescheduled to 11:00 a.m., 9/2/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 8/12/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/15/2016)

08/18/2016

159 ORDER: On June 28, 2016, the Court entered an Order 148 staying all proceedings in this matter (except for discovery necessary for mediation) pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference scheduled for August 17, 2016. On August 15, 2016, the Court entered an Order 158 granting the parties' Joint Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference 156 , and rescheduling the telephonic conference for September 2, 2016. To clarify, all proceedings in this matter, except for discovery necessary for the ongoing mediation, remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on September 2, 2016 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 8/18/16. (dt) (Entered: 08/18/2016)

08/23/2016 160 ORDER of USCA: Upon consideration of the motion for leave to file an amicus brief for the American Bar Association in support of appellees, It is ORDERED that the motion be, and it hereby is GRANTED. (dt) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
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09/02/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 9/2/2016. (Tape #not revorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/06/2016

161 ORDER: Telephone Conference reset for 9/19/2016 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 9/6/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 09/06/2016)

09/15/2016 162 Sealed Document Report of Mediator as per Case Management Order [Dkt. No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

09/19/2016

163 ORDER Telephonic Case Management Conference is continued to and rescheduled for 11/8/2016 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. All proceedings in this matter, except for discovery necessary for the ongoing mediation, remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on November 8, 2016 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). The Mediator shall file a (sealed) report on the progress of mediation by no later than November 4, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 9/19/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/19/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 9/19/2016. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

10/11/2016 164 NOTICE of Change of Address by Alec Karakatsanis (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016 165 ORDER of USCA as to 72 Notice of Appeal filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee, Case No. 16−5058; The case is dismissed pursuant to 42(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. (dt) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

11/04/2016 166 Sealed Document Report of Mediator as per Case Management Order [Dkt. No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/08/2016 167 First MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney James C. Cope by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Cope, Edward) (Entered: 11/08/2016)

11/09/2016

168 ORDER: Upon the parties' request to allow additional time for ongoing settlement discussions, the telephonic case management conference is continued to and rescheduled for Friday, December 16, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. (Central), at which time counsel for the parties shall provide an update on the status of settlement discussions. The dial−in information remains the same as stated in the parties' joint Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference 156 . All proceedings in this matter, except for discovery necessary for the ongoing settlement discussions, remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on December 16, 2016 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 11/9/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 11/09/2016)

11/10/2016 169 ORDER granting 167 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/10/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 11/10/2016)

12/16/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 12/16/2016. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 12/16/2016)

12/19/2016

170 ORDER: To facilitate the parties efforts toward resolution, the telephonic case management conference is continued to and rescheduled for Wednesday, February 1, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. (Central), at which time counsel for the parties shall provide an update on the status of settlement discussions. The dial−in information remains the same as stated in the parties' joint Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 23 of 32

01/31/2017 02/01/2017 02/01/2017
02/21/2017 03/02/2017 03/02/2017 03/02/2017
03/22/2017 03/22/2017 03/27/2017 03/27/2017 04/11/2017 04/13/2017

156 . All proceedings in this matter, except for discovery necessary for the ongoing settlement discussions, remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on February 1, 2017 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 12/19/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
171 Sealed Document Report of Mediator as per Case Management Order [Dkt. No. 129] filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Rivera, Lisa) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 2/1/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
172 ORDER: Telephone Conference reset for 3/2/2017 at 11:00 AM, at which time counsel for the parties shall provide an update on the status of settlement discussions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 2/1/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
173 STIPULATION and [Proposed] Order for the Production and Exchange of Confidential Information by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Gerchik, Julie) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 3/2/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
174 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR THE PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 3/2/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
175 ORDER: Telephonic Case Management Conference reset for 4/12/2017 at 10:00 AM, at which time counsel for the parties shall provide an update on the status of settlement discussions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 3/2/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
176 Consent MOTION to Intervene by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
177 Consent MOTION to Substitute Attorney by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
178 ORDER granting 176 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 3/27/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 03/27/2017)
179 ORDER granting 177 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 3/27/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 03/27/2017)
Due to the resignation of Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp and pursuant to Administrative Order Nos. 138 and 24, this case is transferred to the Honorable David M. Lawson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan for all purposes. (gb) (Entered: 04/11/2017)
180 ORDER: Telephone Conference RESET for 4/24/2017 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/13/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb) (Entered: 04/13/2017)

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 24 of 32

04/24/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 4/24/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 04/25/2017)

04/25/2017

181 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 4/28/2017 at 9:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Because of the short notice, only one attorney for each party need participate, and the participating attorney need not be lead counsel. The dial−in information remains the same as stated in the parties' joint Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference (Docket No. 156). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 4/25/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 04/25/2017)

04/28/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 4/28/2017; ORDER to enter. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 04/28/2017)

05/02/2017

182 ORDER: An In−Person Case Management Conference is set for 5/19/2017 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 764 before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 5/2/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 05/02/2017)

05/16/2017 183 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Walker, Kathryn) (Entered: 05/16/2017)

05/17/2017

184 ORDER: Immediately prior to the case management conference scheduled for May 19, 2017, the undersigned Magistrate Judge will hold an in−chambers settlement conference, for which at least lead counsel for all parties are expected to appear, and during which the parties shall update the Magistrate Judge on the status of settlement negotiations. The settlement conference shall being at 9:45 a.m. (CDT). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 5/17/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 05/17/2017)

05/19/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 5/19/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 05/24/2017)

05/24/2017

185 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 6/13/2017 at 11:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Case Management Conference set for 6/30/2017 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 764 before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 5/24/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 05/25/2017)

06/13/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 6/13/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 06/19/2017)

06/26/2017

186 ORDER: As discussed during the June 13 status conference, counsel for Defendant Rutherford County subsequently provided the Court with an additional update, and, as a result, the June 30, 2017 case management conference shall be held telephonically rather than in−person. By no later than noon on June 29, 2017, Plaintiffs counsel shall provide dial−in information to all other counsel and by email to Ms. Jeanne Cox, Courtroom Deputy, at Jeanne_W_Cox@tnmd.uscourts.gov. If the dial−in information remains the same as stated in the parties joint Motion to Reschedule Telephonic Status Conference (Docket No. 156 ), Plaintiffs' counsel may just let Ms. Cox know that information by either email or telephone call to 615−736−5164. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/26/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

06/30/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 6/30/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 06/30/2017)

07/03/2017 187 ORDER: The telephonic case management conference/status conference is RESCHEDULED for Wednesday, July 26, 2017, at 11:00 a.m. (CDT), at which time

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 25 of 32

counsel shall provide an update on the status of settlement. The dial−in information remains the same as used for previous conference calls. All proceedings in this matter remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on July 26, 2017 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 7/3/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) Modified text on 7/6/2017 (mg). Modified text on 7/7/2017 (mg). (Entered: 07/03/2017)

07/26/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 7/26/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 07/27/2017)

07/31/2017

188 ORDER: The parties reported that settlement discussions have progressed and that additional time would facilitate a resolution. The telephonic case management conference/status conference is therefore RESCHEDULED for Thursday, August 31, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. (CDT), at which time counsel shall provide an update on the status of settlement. The dial−in information remains the same as used for previous conference calls. All proceedings in this matter remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on August 31, 2017 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 7/31/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 07/31/2017)

08/31/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 8/31/2017; ORDER to enter. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 08/31/2017)

08/31/2017

189 ORDER: The parties reported that settlement discussions have progressed and that additional time would facilitate a resolution. The telephonic case management conference/status conference is therefore RESCHEDULED for Friday, September 15, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. (CDT), at which time counsel shall provide an update on the status of settlement. The dial−in information remains the same as used for previous conference calls. All proceedings in this matter remain STAYED pending further order of the Court following the telephonic case management conference on September 15, 2017 (or such later date as the case management conference may be rescheduled for). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 8/31/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 08/31/2017)

08/31/2017

Reset Hearing: Telephone Conference is RESCHEDULED for 9/15/2017 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes. (mg) (Entered: 08/31/2017)

09/15/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes: Telephone Conference held on 9/15/2017. (Tape #not recorded.) (jwc) (Entered: 09/15/2017)

09/18/2017

190 Consent MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A: Claim Form, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B−1: Long−Form Notice, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B−2: Postcard Notice, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit C−1: Injunctive Agreement, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit C−2: Proposed Injunctive Order, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit D: Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit E: Attorneys Fee Schedule)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 09/18/2017)

10/05/2017

191 ORDER GRANTING IN PART UNOPPOSED MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT CLASS AND DENYING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to certify a settlement class (dkt # 190 ) is GRANTED IN PART. It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the following settlement class is conditionally certified in this case: All persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to October 5, 2017, (1) incurred court−imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County's Probation

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 26 of 32

Department. It is further ORDERED that counsel of record for the named plaintiffs, namely attorneys Alec Karakatsanis, Elizabeth Rossi, and Kyle F. Mothershead, are appointed as counsel for the designated settlement class. It is further ORDERED that the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is DENIED without prejudice. The parties may submit a new motion for preliminary approval with additional information on or before October 18, 2017. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 10/5/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 10/05/2017)

10/18/2017

192 Second MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Revised Final Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit A. Claim Form, # 3 Exhibit B−1. Long−form Notice, # 4 Exhibit B−2. Postcard Notice, # 5 Exhibit C−1. Injunctive Agreement, # 6 Exhibit C−2. Injunctive Agreement (Proposed Order), # 7 Exhibit D. Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, # 8 Exhibit E. Attorneys Fee Schedule, # 9 Exhibit 1. Declaration of James Redus, # 10 Exhibit 2. Dahl Brochure, # 11 Exhibit 3. Redline)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/18/2017)

10/19/2017

Note to Filer re DE# 192 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, Certificates of Service shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Please FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document. (mg) (Entered: 10/19/2017)

10/19/2017

193 ***DISREGARD*** CERTIFICATE of Service filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 192 Second MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval filed by Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Cindy Rodriguez, Fred Robinson, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnston. (Rossi, Elizabeth) Modified text on 10/20/2017 (mg). (Entered: 10/19/2017)

10/20/2017

Note to Filer re DE# 193 : Pursuant to Local Rule 5.01, Certificates of Service shall identify by name the person served, what was served, the method of service, and date of service. Please FILE a conformed Certificate of Service for this document. (mg) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

10/20/2017

194 CERTIFICATE of Service (Corrected) filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 192 Second MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval filed by Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Cindy Rodriguez, Fred Robinson, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnston. (Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/20/2017)

10/31/2017

195 RESPONSE to Motion re 192 Second MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval Statement in Response to Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Abascal, Manuel) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

11/02/2017

196 NOTICE of Filing by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 192 Second MOTION for Settlement Preliminary Approval (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Fully Executed Revised Settlement Agreement)(Rossi, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/02/2017)

01/02/2018

197 ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' second unopposed motion to certify a settlement class and for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement and procedure for providing class notice (dkt # 192 ) is GRANTED, and the proposed settlement agreement is PRELIMINARILY APPROVED, subject to objections by absent class members and except for the determination of attorney's fees and costs, and subject to the following restrictions on payment of attorney fees to class counsel and directions regarding the notice and hearing procedure. It is further ORDERED that a hearing shall be held at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, June 25, 2018 in the United States Courthouse at 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203, to consider any objections to the settlement agreement and to determine whether the settlement agreement should be finally approved as having been negotiated in good faith and as being fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the class members. The courtroom for the hearing will be determined by the Court at a later date. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 1/2/2018. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 27 of 32

01/02/2018 02/03/2018
02/03/2018 02/08/2018
02/09/2018 02/13/2018 02/13/2018 02/13/2018 02/13/2018
02/15/2018
02/16/2018 02/16/2018 02/20/2018

Set Hearing: Status Conference set for 6/25/2018 10:00 AM before Judge David M. Lawson. (mg) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
198 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Karakatsanis Decl, # 2 Exhibit A−1, Karakatsanis Time Log, # 3 Exhibit A−2, Civil Rights Corps Expenses, # 4 Exhibit B, Rossi Decl, # 5 Exhibit B−1, Rossi Time Log, # 6 Exhibit C, Mothershead Decl, # 7 Exhibit C−1, Mothershead Time Log, # 8 Exhibit D, Garrison Decl, # 9 Exhibit E, Herzfeld Decl, # 10 Exhibit F, Briley Decl)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 02/03/2018)
199 MEMORANDUM in Support of 198 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unpublished Case In re Southeastern Milk, # 2 Attachment Unpublished Case Robinson v Ford Motor Co)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 02/03/2018)
200 NOTICE OF HEARING: You are hereby notified to appear before District Judge David M. Lawson at the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. The following are scheduled for hearing: Consideration of Objections to Class Settlement, Consideration of Approval of Class Settlement, Motion for Class Attorney Fees and Expenses (Dkt. 198 ). MOTION HEARING: June 25, 2018 at 10:00 AM. Susan Pinkowski, Case Manager for United States District Judge David M. Lawson, Sitting by special designation. (mg) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
201 NOTICE of Appearance by J. Scott Hickman on behalf of Equal Justice Under Law (Hickman, J.) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
TN State Bar status verified as active for J. Scott Hickman, and Phillip F. Cramer. (mg) Modified text on 2/16/2018 (mg). (Entered: 02/13/2018)
202 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses by Equal Justice Under Law. (Hickman, J.) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
203 MEMORANDUM in Support of 202 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses filed by Equal Justice Under Law . (Hickman, J.) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
204 NOTICE of Filing by Equal Justice Under Law re 202 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Declaration of Phil Telfeyan, # 2 Attachment Declaration of Alec Karakatsanis, # 3 Attachment Declaration of Elizabeth Rossi, # 4 Attachment Declaration of Tricia Herzfeld, # 5 Attachment Declaration of David Garrison, # 6 Attachment Out−of−State and Unpublished Cases)(Hickman, J.) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
205 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION: You are hereby notified to appear before District Judge David M. Lawson at the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. The following are scheduled for hearing: Consideration of Objections to Class Settlement,Consideration of Approval of Class Settlement, Motion for Class Attorney Fees and Expenses (Dkt. 198 ), Motion to Authorize Compensation of Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses (Dkt. 202 ). MOTION HEARING: June 25, 2018 at 10:00 AM. DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation. (mg) Modified text on 2/15/2018 (mg). (Entered: 02/15/2018)
206 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Garner, Blake) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
207 NOTICE by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. [Notice of Compliance with Requirement of Class Action Settlement] (Attachments: # 1 Attachment [Declaration of Jodi Belmont], # 2 Exhibit [Exhibits 1−4 to the Declaration of Jodi Belmont])(Abascal, Manuel) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
208 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses for Baker Donelson by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (White, Matthew) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 28 of 32

02/20/2018

209 MEMORANDUM in Support of 208 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses for Baker Donelson filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − White Declaration)(White, Matthew) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/22/2018

210 SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTIONS: You are hereby notified to appear before District Judge David M. Lawson at the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. The following are scheduled for hearing: Consideration of Objections to Class Settlement, Consideration of Approval of Class Settlement, Motion for Class Attorney Fees and Expenses (Dkt. 198 ), Motion to Authorize Compensation of Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses (Dkt. 202 ), Motion for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses (Dkt. 208 ). MOTION HEARING: June 25, 2018 at 10:00 AM. Susan Pinkowski, Case Manager for DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation. (mg) (Entered: 02/22/2018)

03/05/2018

211 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW: This matter is before the Court on attorney Blake Garner's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel of record for defendant Rutherford County. The Court has reviewed attorney Garner's motion and finds that it should be granted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that attorney Blake Garner's motion for leave to withdraw 206 is GRANTED, attorney Garner's appearance as counsel of record for defendant Rutherford County is TERMINATED, and attorney Garner is discharged from all further obligations to the Court in this matter. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 3/5/2018. (mg) (Entered: 03/06/2018)

03/14/2018

Claim Form for Cash Benefits received from inmate Richard O. Bingham on 3/7/18. Forwarded to the Settlement Administrator this date (3/14/2018). (mg) (Entered: 03/14/2018)

03/23/2018

212 NOTICE of Filing by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 197 Order on Motion for Settlement,,,, PROOF OF MAILING OF CLASS NOTICE (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Affidavit of Kelly Kratz)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 03/23/2018)

04/11/2018

213 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint, UNOPPOSED, MOTION to Substitute Party UNOPPOSED by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1_First Amended Complaint, # 2 Attachment 2_Redlined First Amended Complaint, # 3 Exhibit A_Death Certificate, # 4 Exhibit B_Letters of Administration)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 04/11/2018)

04/13/2018

214 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT SUBSTITUTING PARTIES: This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint to substitute the personal representative of the estate of Paula Pullum in place of Ms. Pullum, who recently died. The Court has reviewed the plaintiffs' motion and finds that it should be granted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint substituting parties 213 is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs must file their amended complaint on or before April 27, 2018. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 4/13/2018. (mg) (Entered: 04/13/2018)

04/16/2018 215 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Fred Robinson, Christina Alalna, Cindy Rodriguez, Paula Pullum, Curtis Johnston, Steven Gibbs, Yolanda Carney.(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 04/16/2018)

04/19/2018

Claim Form for Cash Benefits received from Elizabeth Knus on 4/19/18. Forwarded to the Settlement Administrator this date. (mg) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

04/25/2018

Claim Form for Cash Benefits received from Jessica Lashay Martin on 4/25/18. Forwarded to the Settlement Administrator this date. (af) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

04/26/2018 216 NOTICE of Pain & Suffering filed by Mikesha Kidd−Graham, Interested Party. (af) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

05/01/2018

Claim Form for Cash Benefits received from Jessie Leon Brewer and Patricia (Snyder) LaValley on 4/30/18. Forwarded to the Settlement Administrator this date. (Attached are two letters.) (mg) (Entered: 05/01/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-1048 As of: 11/09/2018 01:47 PM CST 29 of 32

05/04/2018 05/04/2018
05/04/2018
05/16/2018
06/19/2018 06/19/2018 06/20/2018 06/21/2018 06/22/2018 06/22/2018 06/25/2018 06/28/2018
07/02/2018

217 MOTION for Settlement FINAL APPROVAL − UNOPPOSED by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
218 MEMORANDUM in Support of 217 MOTION for Settlement FINAL APPROVAL − UNOPPOSED filed by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A_Kratz Declaration, # 2 Exhibit B_Harrington Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C_Fellows Declaration, # 4 Exhibit D_Karakatsanis Declaration, # 5 Exhibit E_Rossi Declaration, # 6 Exhibit F_Mothershead Declaration)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
219 NOTICE of Filing by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 218 Memorandum in Support,, UNPUBLISHED CASE LAW (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unpublished Case In re Southeastern Milk, # 2 Attachment Unpublished Case In re Packaged Ice, # 3 Attachment Unpublished Case Kimber Baldwin Designs)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
220 THIRD AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing on Motions: You are hereby notified to appear before District Judge David M. Lawson at the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. The following items are scheduled for hearing: Consideration of Objections to Class Settlement Consideration of Approval of Class Settlement Motion for Class Attorney Fees and Expenses (Dkt. 198 ) Motion to Authorize Compensation of Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses (Dkt. 202 ) Motion for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses (Dkt. 208 ) Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Dkt. 217 ). MOTION HEARING: June 25, 2018 at 10:00 AM. Susan Pinkowski, Case Manager for DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge Sitting by special designation. (mg) Modified text on 5/17/2018 (mg). (Entered: 05/17/2018)
221 MOTION for attorney(s) Robin A. Kelley to Appear Pro Hac Vice (paid $100 PHV fee; receipt number 0650−2693854) by Providence Community Corrections, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing)(Abascal, Manuel) (Entered: 06/19/2018)
222 ORDER granting 221 Motion for Robin A. Kelley to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/19/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail.) (mg) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
CA State Bar status verified as active for Robin A. Kelley. (mg) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
The hearing scheduled for Monday, June 25, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. will take place in Courtroom 874. (af) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
223 NOTICE of Appearance by Robin A. Kelley on behalf of Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (Kelley, Robin) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
224 NOTICE of Filing by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez re 217 MOTION for Settlement FINAL APPROVAL − UNOPPOSED (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Dahl Report 6−21−18)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 06/22/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David M. Lawson: Status Conference & Motion Hearing held on 6/25/2018. Additional filings to be made by the parties. Order to enter. Plaintiff Cindy Rodriguez addressed the Court. (Court Reporter Roxann Harkins.) (af) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
225 MEMORANDUM in Support of 217 MOTION for Settlement FINAL APPROVAL − UNOPPOSED filed by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez NAMED PLAINTIFF SERVICE AWARDS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A_Plaintiff Time Log, # 2 Exhibit B_Mothershead Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C_Karakatsanis Declaration, # 4 Exhibit D_Rossi Declaration)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
226 Letter from Anthony Mack, a California state prisoner requesting copy of Complaint in this case. (mg) (Entered: 07/03/2018)

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227 MEMORANDUM in Support of 208 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses for Baker Donelson, Status Conference,, Motion Hearing, filed by Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez Supplemental Memorandum. (White, Matthew) (Entered: 07/03/2018)
228 ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT: For the reasons stated, the Court unconditionally certifies the settlement class, approves the settlement, and grants the motions for attorney's fees. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for approval of settlement and plan of allocation [dkt. # 217 ] is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the settlement agreement and plan of allocation is APPROVED. It is further ORDERED that the individual who sent a request for exclusion from the class is hereby deemed excluded from the class and is not bound by, nor may he participate in, the class settlement. It is further ORDERED that Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota is APPOINTED as the administrator of the settlement fund. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the County of Rutherford, Tennessee is PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from holding any individual in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre−probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. It is further ORDERED that incentive awards in the amount of $10,000 each are approved for and may be distributed to the named plaintiffs, Cindy Rodriguez, Steven Gibbs, Paula Pullum, Yolanda Carney, Jacqueline Brinkley, Curtis Johnson, and Fred Robinson. It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel's respective motions for attorney's fees and litigation expenses [dkt. # 198 , 202 ] are GRANTED, and payments from the settlement fund are approved. It is further ORDERED that the motion for attorney fees by Baker Donelson [dkt. # 208 ] is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a renewed motion accompanied by adequate supporting documentation as indicated by the Court's previous directions. It is further ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; provided, however, that this Court retains jurisdiction over all matters relating to the enforcement of equitable relief, and the administration of the settlement agreement, including allocation and distribution of the settlement fund. It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel and the settlement administrator Dahl Administration LLC shall remain responsible for completion of the administration of the claims and distribution of the funds, but they may not invade the settlement fund for further reimbursement or payment of fees absent further order of the Court. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 7/5/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 07/05/2018)
229 AMENDED ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF ALLOCATION, GRANTING MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND DISMISSING CASE: For the reasons stated, the Court unconditionally certifies the settlement class, approves the settlement, and grants the motions for attorney's fees. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for approval of settlement and plan of allocation [dkt. # 217 ] is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the settlement agreement and plan of allocation is APPROVED. It is further ORDERED that the individual who sent a request for exclusion from the class is hereby deemed excluded from the class and is not bound by, nor may he participate in, the class settlement. It is further ORDERED that Dahl Administration LLC of Minneapolis, Minnesota is APPOINTED as the administrator of the settlement fund. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the County of Rutherford, Tennessee, its employees, officers, and agents and those in active concert and participation with them (the "Enjoined Parties"), are PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from holding any individual in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre−probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel's respective motions for attorney's fees and litigation expenses [dkt. # 198 , 202 ] are GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the motion for attorney fees by Baker Donelson [dkt. # 208 ] is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a renewed motion accompanied by adequate supporting documentation as indicated by the Court's previous directions. It is further ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; provided,

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however, that this Court retains jurisdiction over all matters relating to the enforcement of equitable relief, and the administration of the settlement agreement, including allocation and distribution of the settlement fund. It is further ORDERED that Class Counsel and the settlement administrator Dahl Administration LLC shall remain responsible for completion of the administration of the claims and distribution of the funds, but they may not invade the settlement fund for further reimbursement or payment of fees absent further order of the Court. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 7/18/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
230 MOTION to Amend/Correct 229 Order, UNOPPOSED MOTION TO CORRECT AMENDED FINAL APPROVAL ORDER by Christina Alalna, Jacqueline Brinkley, Yolanda Carney, Steven Gibbs, Curtis Johnston, Paula Pullum, Fred Robinson, Cindy Rodriguez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A_Injunctive Agreement)(Mothershead, Kyle) (Entered: 08/01/2018)
231 ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs' second motion for entry of a corrected or amended order approving the settlement 230 is GRANTED IN PART. It is further hereby ORDERED that the parties shall comply with the terms of the injunctive agreement attached as Exhibit C−1 of the plaintiffs' second unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement [ECF Doc. No. 192−5]. Signed by Judge David M. Lawson on 8/8/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
232 ORDER of USCA: It is ORDERED that the case is dismissed pursuant to 42(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. (jw) (Entered: 10/10/2018)

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