IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEB WHITEWOnD and SUSAN WHITEWOOD,FREDIA HURDLE and LYNN HURDLE,EDWIN HILL,and DAVID PALMER,HEATHER POEHLER and KATH POEHI,ER,FERNANDO CHANG-MUY and LEN RIESER,DAWN PLUMMER and DIANA POLSON,ANGELA GILLEM and GAIL LLOYD,HELENA MILLER and DARA RASPBERRY,RON GEBHARDTSBAUER and GREG WRIGHT,MARLA CATTERMOLE and JULIA LOBUR,MAUREEN HENNESSEY, and A.W. AND K.W., minor children, by and through their parents and.next friends,DEB WHITEWOOD and SUSAN WHITEWOOD,

Civil Action No.

Plaintiffs,

v.

THOMAS W.CORBETT,in his official capacity as Governor ofPennsylvania; MICHAEL WOLF,in his official capacity as Secretary ofthe Pennsylvania Department of Health; KATHI.,EEN KANE,in her official capacity as Attorney General ofPennsylvania; MARY JO POKNIS,in her official capacity as Register of Wills of Washington County; and DONALD PETRILLE,JR., in his official capacity as Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans' Court ofBucks County,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage and voiding within Pennsylvania the marriages ofsame-sex couples entered into in other states. 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704. 2. Plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood,Fredia and Lynn Hurdle, Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, Dawn Plummer and Diana Poison, Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd, and Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright, are lesbian and gay couples in committed relationships who wish to marry for the same reasons so many other couples get married — to publicly declare their love and commitment before their family,friends and community,and to give one another the security and protections that only marriage provides. 3. Plaintiffs Edwin Hill and David Palmer, Heather and Kath Poehler, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, and Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur are already married, having wed in other states, but are treated as legal strangers in their home state,the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania. 4. Plaintiff Maureen Hennessey is a widow who lost her spouse after 29 years together. Because her spouse was a woman,their marriage is not recognized by the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania and she is not provided the protections afforded to widows under Pennsylvania law.

5. Plaintiffs A.W.and K.W.are the children ofone ofthe plaintiff couples. The fact that their parents are not permitted to marry harms them materially by reducing family resources and stigmatizes them by denying their family social recognition and respect.
6. The plaintiffs come from across the Commonwealth,hailing from Philadelphia, Downingtown,Bangor,Harrisburg, State College,and Pittsburgh. They come from all walks oflife: they include an emergency room doctor, university professors,a truck driver, an executive at BNY Mellon,a psychologist,. a dog trainer, state employees,lawyers,an artist, astay-at-home mom,and retirees. One ofthe plaintiffs served in the Navy in Vietnam; another is a 12-year veteran of the Army. The plaintiffs reflect the rich diversity ofthe Commonwealth: they are African-American,Caucasian,Latino,and Asian;they are Methodist,Baptist, Catholic, Quaker,Jewish,Buddhist,and secular. Many have been together for decades, and some are raising children together. The situations faced by these couples are similar to those faced by the thousands ofsame-sex couples in Pennsylvania who are being denied the basic rights that are afforded by marriage.
7. The plaintiff couples, like other committed couples, have cared for each other, supported each other, sacrificed for each other, and made plans for the future with each other. Some have endured great challenges and hardships together, such as financial troubles and serious illness. Maureen Hennessey's
2

commitment to her spouse endured through her spouse's four year battle with cancer and untimely death.
8. Like other couples who have made a lifetime commitment to each other,the plaintiffcouples are spouses in every sense, except that Pennsylvania law says they cannot marry and,ifthey are married under the laws ofanother state, their marriages are not honored here.
9. The Commonwealth's exclusion ofsame-sex couples from marriage adversely impacts the plaintiffs and same-sex couples across the Commonwealth in significant ways. It excludes them from the many legal protections available to spouses. For example, when one partner dies,the surviving partner may face serious financial hardship, including the loss of her home, because she is denied the inheritance tax exemption provided to widows. Lesbian and gay police officers, firefighters and other first responders are denied the peace of mind of knowing that ifthey make the ultimate sacrifice,their partner will be taken care of through the financial support available to help those who lost their spouses in service to the community. Because ofPennsylvania's refusal to allow or recognize their marriages,same-sex couples are also denied many federal protections afforded to married couples such as the ability to take time off work to care for a sick spouse under the Family Medical Leave Act and access to a spouse's social security retirement benefits.
~~

10. The exclusion from marriage undermines the plaintiffcouples' ability to achieve their life goals and dreams,threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them "a dignity and status ofimmense import." United States v. Windsor,No. 12-307,Slip Op.,at 18(U.S.June 26,2013). Moreover,they and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a second class status by being barred from marriage. The exclusion "tells[same-sexJ couples and all the world-that their relationships are unworthy" ofrecognition. Id. at 22-23. And it"humiliates the ...children now being raised by same-sex couples" and "makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness oftheir own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives." Id. at 23.
11. Some ofthe plaintiffs are old enough to remember when a majority of states had laws prohibiting marriage between people of different races and when the Supreme Court struck down such prohibitions in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12(1967),declaring: "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
12: Our courts and our society have discarded, one by one, marriage laws that violated the Constitution's mandate ofequality, such as anti-miscegenation laws and laws that denied married women legal independence and the right to make decisions for themselves. History has taught us that the vitality of marriage
C!

does not depend on maintaining such discriminatory laws. To the contrary, eliminating these unconstitutional aspects of marriage has enhanced the institution. Ending the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from marriage is no different. Indeed,in 13 states and the District ofColumbia,same-sex couples are marrying and the institution of marriage continues to thrive.
13. This is because, at its heart, marriage is both a personal and a public commitment oftwo people to one another,licensed by the state. Through marriage,the Commonwealth recognizes a couple's.decision to establish a family unit together and support one another and any children ofthe marriage.
14. Marriage contributes to the happiness ofcountless couples and their families and also contributes to society. Pennsylvania, like other states, encourages and regulates marriage through hundreds oflaws that provide benefits to and impose obligations on married couples. In exchange,the Commonwealth. receives the well-established benefits that marriage brings: stable, supportive families that contribute to both the social and economic well-being ofthe Commonwealth.
15. Pennsylvania's exclusion ofsame-sex couples from marriage infringes on the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This discriminatory treatment is subject to heightened scrutiny because it burdens the fundamental right
E

to marry and because it discriminates based on sex and sexual orientation. But it cannot stand under any level ofscrutiny because the exclusion does not rationally further any legitimate government interest. It serves only to disparage and injure

lesbian and gay couples and their families. 16. Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory
and injunctive reliefagainst defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs seek: (a)a declaration that the Commonwealth's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize marriages ofsame-sex couples validly entered into outside ofthe Commonwealth violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and(b)a permanent injunction i)preventing defendants from denying the plaintiff couples and all other same-sex couples otherwise eligible to marry the right to marry in the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania,and ii) directing defendants to recognize the marriages ofthe plaintiffcouples and other same-sex couples validly

entered into outside ofPennsylvania. THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs

Deb and Susan Whitewood and A.W. andK.W.

17. Plaintiffs Deb Whitewood("Deb")and Susan Whitewood("Susan")

have

lived

together

a committed
in

relationship

for 22 years.

Deb

and

Susan live

D

in Bridgeville, in Allegheny County, with their three children. Susan,49,is a human resources executive at BNY Mellon. Deb,45,is a stay-at-home mom. Deb was born and raised in Pittsburgh. Susan has lived in Pennsylvania since attending college in Pittsburgh.
18. Deb and Susan have two daughters,PlaintiffA.W.,who is 16,and Plaintiff A.W., who will turn 15 this month. Deb is the children's biological mother and Susan obtained second parent adoptions after the children's births to establish a legal parent-child relationship with both children. Deb,and Susan also have atwo-year-old son,L.W. He was placed with them by the Allegheny County Department of Children and Youth Services when he was 11 months old. The placement initially was a foster placement. When L.W. was 20 months old, Deb and Susan jointly adopted him. The judge in the Allegheny County Children's Court granted the adoption after determining that the welfare ofL.W. will be promoted by this adoption.
19. Deb and Susan are very involved in their children's school and activities. Susan has coached their volleyball and softball teams. When the girls were younger,Deb was active in the PTA and was the "classroom mom" who planned activities and parties for the class and chaperoned field trips. Deb is currently chair ofthe band festival, which raises most ofthe money to support the high school band. She also coordinates the concession stand at volleyball games.
fll

20. Deb.and Susan are devout Christians and they and their children are members ofand actively involved in the Christ United Methodist Church ofBethel Park. Deb is the president ofthe Altar. Guild, which prepares the church's communion,cares for the sanctuary and holy items, and decorates for the holidays. A.W.and K.W. are in the church choir and sing every Sunday. A.W.is also in the Youth Praise band, which sings contemporary Christian songs at church and at community performances.
21. In 1993, Deb and Susan had a Holy Union ceremony at the church they attended at the time. They both changed their last names to Whitewood,a combination oftheir surnames. They entered into a civil union in Vermont after that became possible.
22. Deb and Susan would like to be able to get married in order to have the legal protections married couples rely on. They are fearful ofhow they might be treated in a time ofcrisis and therefore had a lawyer draw up powers ofattorney for them, which they carry with them everywhere
23. In addition,the exclusion from marriage impacts.the family financially. The health insurance Deb gets from Susari's company is taxable income that costs them approximately $1,600 a year; ifthey were married,it would not be taxed. Moreover,if anything were to happen to Susan,Deb would be
~:3

denied Susan's social security and she would have to pay a 15% inheritance tax on halfofthe couple'sjoint property, a tax from which spouses are exempt.
24. Deb and Susan also want to be able to marry because they are concerned that their children are being taught the message that their family is less deserving ofrespect and support than other families.
25. On June 24,2013,they went to the office ofthe Register of Wills of Washington County to apply for a marriage license. The Register of Wills refused their application for a marriage license because they are asame-sex couple.
26. A.W. and K.W. grew up assuming that their moms were married. As they got older and came to learn that their parents were not allowed to marry in Pennsylvania, both girls felt that this was unfair to the whole family. They know they are a family and want to be legally recognized as one. They believe they should not be deprived ofeconomic resources available to families headed by married couples. And they feel stigmatized by the fact that their parents are excluded from marriage. They believe that allowing their parents to marry would demonstrate that society accepts their family and considers it worthy ofrespect. Fredia and Lynn Hu~clle
27. Plaintiffs Fredia Hurdle("Fredia")and Lynn Hurdle("Lynn")of Pittsburgh have lived together in a committed relationship for 22 years. Fredia,49,
D

is a member ofthe Teamsters' Union and drives a truck for the Pittsburgh PostGazette. Lynn,43,is a pediatric nurse.
28. Fredia and Lynn met in 1990 when Fredia was a Greyhound bus driver and Lynn was a passenger. Fredia had been assigned to a new route and Lynn tried to help her out with directions. They ended up dating via Greyhound for about five months until Fredia moved to Pittsburgh.
29. Fredia and Lynn's family includes Lynn's daughter Ashley, now 25, who lived with Fredia and Lynn from the time she was two years old until she went to college. After Fredia's sister died,two ofFredia's nephews and a niece came to live with Fredia and Lynn until they were ready to move out on their own. One ofthe boys lived with them for 9 years.
30. Fredia and Lynn are caregivers by nature and have become known locally as the couple people go to when there are people in need ofcare. They took care oftwo children in the neighborhood when their families were going through difficult times. And an elderly family friend ofLynn's lived with Fredia and Lynn, who looked after her for 16 years until she passed away.
31. Fredia and Lynn had a commitment ceremony at a church in 2009. More than 200 friends and family members celebrated with them. Lynn took Fredia's last name.
10

32. Fredia and Lynn want to get married because they love each other and believe that families should be recognized through marriage. Because they cannot be married, when Fredia was hospitalized for emergency gall bladder surgery, the nurses refused to give Lynn any information about Fredia's condition because she was not considered family. When Fredia had to undergo medical testing after an injury, Lynn was not allowed to be present because she was not considered a relative. Because ofthese experiences,they hired an attorney to prepare powers of attorney for them, which they carry with them at all times.
33. The exclusion from marriage has also meant that Lynn had to go without health insurance for about 3 years because herjob did not offer health benefits and Fredia could not add Lynn to her employee health plan. During that time, Lynn had an accident in which she injured her shoulder and had to pay about $2,000 in hospital bills.
34. Because they cannot be married in Pennsylvania,the couple worries about how Lynn will support herselfifFredia passes away first because Lynn would not be able to count on Fredia's social security(Fredia earns a larger income than Lynn)or pension for support.
35. Fredia and Lynn also feel that the exclusion from marriage stigmatizes them and other lesbian and gay couples and sends the message that they are not entitled to the same respect other couples enjoy. As an interracial couple, Fredia
11

and Lynn are very aware that before the Supreme Court's historic decision in Loving v. Virginia, they would have been barred from marrying based on their races. And as an African American who grew up in Virginia and attended a segregated school until third grade, Fredia has experienced the profound social and dignitary harms that come with discrimination. She and Lynn pray that they will soon be permitted to marry and be treated as full and equal citizens in Pennsylvania. Edwin Hill and David Pal`ne~
36. Plaintiffs Edwin Hill("Ed")and David Palmer("David")have lived together in a committed relationship for 25 years. Ed,67,and David,65,live in Bangor,in Northampton County,the town where they met in 1988 while attending a Christian retreat.
37. Both Ed and David were born and raised in Pennsylvania. Ed grew up just outside ofPittsburgh and graduated from the- University ofPittsburgh. David is,from Trucksville,just outside ofWilkes-Barre,and he is a graduate of Wilkes University. He also holds a masters' degree in theology from Drew University.
38. Both men are retired. Ed is a veteran ofthe United States Navy, having served from 1968 to 1971. He served in Vietnam as a sonar technician aboard the U.S.S. Brooke. He also worked for over 20 years at the Department of Veterans Affairs where he oversaw programs to support veterans. David worked at
12

a museum for 30 years, eventually obtaining the position of Director of Exhibitions. In 1996,after they retired from their careers,David and Ed opened the Arrowheart Inn, a bed and breakfast in Bangor, which they ran for 12 years until, as they say,they retired "for real" in 2008.
39. Ed and David were married on May 10,2013,in Kennebunk,Maine, accompanied by a few oftheir dearest friends and members ofEd's family who live in Maine. Their marriage license was witnessed by Ed's ninety-year-old aunt and David's oldest friend. They would have preferred to marry in their home state ofFennsylvania, where more oftheir friends and family could have-joined in their celebration. But after 25 years together,they did.not want to wait any longer to marry. And as seniors, they worried that they might not live to see the day when they could marry at home. Since they couldn't have their wedding in Pennsylvania,they are planning a party in their home town in August for more than seventy family members and friends to celebrate their 25th anniversary as a couple.
40. Even after a quarter century together,the act of marrying has had a profound impact on Ed and David. It meant the world to them to be able to stand before loved ones and declare their love and commitment and to be able to call. one another husband.
13

41. However,Ed and David cannot enjoy the protections and security that marriage brings other couples because their marriage is not recognized in their home state ofPennsylvania. Like many seniors on fixed incomes,they are concerned about managing financially in their retirement. They are especially worried about the fact that when one ofthem passes away,the widower will be denied the estate tax protections Pennsylvania law provides to married couples. Any inheritance from one to the other —including one halfofthe value oftheir home and joint bank accounts —will be taxed at the rate of15%,the highest rate. Iftheir marriage were recognized,there would be no such tax. Ed and David have worked hard to save extra money for retirement so that neither ofthem will be forced out oftheir home due to the large tax bill that will come when one ofthem passes. But losing such a large share ofthe family's assets will significantly reduce the economic security ofthe surviving spouse and the standard ofliving he will have for the rest of his years.
42: Ed and David have talked about moving to another state where their marriage would be recognized and they would have more financial security. But they do not want to leave their home and community. They want to grow old together in the place where they met twenty-five.years ago.
14

Heather and Kath Poehler 43. Plaintiffs Heather Poehler("Heather")and Katherine Poehler
("Kath")have lived together in a committed relationship for 10 years. Heather,44, and Kath,41,live in Downingtown,in Chester County. They live offa country road on 8 acres ofland with three dogs that they rescued from an animal shelter, two cats, and seven chickens. Heather is a Medicaid Liaison Manager at a healthcare auditing firm. Kath owns a dog training and dog walking business.
44. On September 10,.2005, Heather and Kath got married in Massachusetts,their home state at the time. Heather changed her last name to share Kath's.
45. In 2007,during difficult economic times,Heather was offered a promising job in Philadelphia and the couple relocated there. Going from being treated as the married couple that they are in Massachusetts to being treated as legal strangers in Pennsylvania has been hard for them logistically, financially, and emotionally. For example,they had difficulty preparing their tax returns and completing mortgage paperwork in Pennsylvania because accountants and bank officials were unsure whether to treat the couple as married or unmarried. They pay more for health insurance than they would iftheir marriage were recognized in Pennsylvania because they must pay taxes on the health insurance for Kath that Heather gets through her employer.
15

46. Having their marriage disregarded by the Commonwealth has also taken an emotional toll on the couple. It is painful not to be respected as a married couple or recognized as a family. And they feel vulnerable about what could happen in times ofcrisis. They felt especially anxious last year when Heather underwent surgeries for a broken leg and Kath had to be hospitalized for a severe allergic reaction. Because they are not recognized as spouses in Pennsylvania, neither is automatically legally authorized to make medical decisions for the other if necessary. Instead, with each trip to the hospital or doctor, they have had to explain their relationship and prove it with paperwork.
47. Heather and Kath have developed roots in Pennsylvania. It has become their home. The idea of having to leave the community they love in order to have their marriage respected saddens them. Fernando ChangMuy and Len Riese~
48. Plaintiffs Fernando Chang-Muy("Fernando")and Len Rieser("Len") have lived together in a committed relationship for 32 years. Fernando, who is 58, was born in Cuba and emigrated to the United States with his family when he was a child. Len,64, grew up in Vermont. The couple moved to Philadelphia in 1982., when Fernando was offered ajob there. Philadelphia has been their home ever
since.

49. Fernando and Len are the proud parents ofIsabel, whom they adopted when she was 10 months old. Isabel, now 21, is a student at Temple University and aspires to be a teacher.
50. Fernando and Len are both lawyers and professors who have dedicated their careers to the public interest. Fernando currently teaches a course on refugee law and policy at the University ofPennsylvania Law School and nonprofit management and immigration policy courses at the University's Graduate School of Social Policy and Practice. Len has dedicated his career to advocating for children in the educational, mental health, and child welfare settings. For approximately 17 years, he co-directed and directed the Education Law Center-PA. He currently teaches in the clinical program at the University'ofPennsylvania Law School and is an adjunct professor at Temple University and Arcadia University.
51. Fernando and Len entered into a civil,union in Vermont on February 14, 2004. They celebrated with their family at Len's parents' house there. Although obtaining the civil union was an important moment for them,it also reinforced the fact that their relationship is not legally recognized in the state where they actually live.
52. Fernando and Len want to be able to be married and have their marriage recognized in Pennsylvania. They see marriage as an appropriate recognition ofthe deep and permanent commitment they have made to each other.
17

More importantly,Fernando and Len know that ifthey could marry,it would mean a lot to their daughter, who would like her parents to be married to each other.
53. When Isabel was growing up, it was important to Fernando and Len for her to have the same sense ofsecurity that any other child gets from being part ofa loving family. Fernando and Len made a point, when Isabel was in elementary and secondary school, of making sure her teachers understood that they were a family and that they desired to be active in the school communityjust like any other parents. Fortunately,they managed to find school personnel who would support them, as well as health care providers, a religious community, neighbors, and other essential components oftheir lives as a family.
54. Fernando and Len recognize that even ifthey had been able to be married,the process ofestablishing themselves and their daughter as a family would still have had its challenges, as they know that there are people who disapprove ofrelationships such as theirs. Butthey are convinced that if marriage had been available to them,a major barrier to their acceptance and well-being as a family would have been removed,and that, even now,.the availability ofmarriage would make a significant, positive difference to their life as a family.
55. Moreover,as lawyers,Fernando and Len are aware ofhow vulnerable they are because they are. excluded from the many legal protections of marriage. They have done everything that lawyers can do to protect themselves in the

absence of marriage,such as drawing up wills and powers ofattorney, but they know that there is nothing they can do to access most ofthe protections available to married couples. Dawn Plummer and Diana Poison
56. Plaintiffs Dawn Plummer("Dawn")and Diana Poison("Diana")of Pittsburgh have lived together in a committed relationship for 13 years. They met as college students on a study abroad program in Brazil.
57. Dawn,36,is a fundraiser for The Poverty Initiative, an anti-poverty organization. Diana, 37, recently finished her Ph.D. and now works for a nonprofit research think tank aimed at improving the Pennsylvania economy for working people.
58. Dawn and Diana settled in Pittsburgh in 2011 because Dawn has Pennsylvania roots, having grown up in Camp Hill and having family in Pittsburgh, and they thought Pittsburgh would be a great city in which to raise children.
59. Dawn and Diana have two sons — afive-year-old, E.P., and a sevenmonth-old, J.P. They each gave birth to one ofthe children. They have completed a second parent adoption for E.P. They plan to do the same for J.P. but need to save money to be able to pay the more than $2,500 they were told it will cost. Until then,they feel vulnerable because ifanything were to happen to Diana,J.P.
19

has no .legal tie to Dawn. Ifthey were legally married in Pennsylvania this would not be the case because both spouses would be recognized as parents from the moment ofthe child's birth.
60. Dawn and Diana had a commitment ceremony in the Catskills in front of50 family members and friends in 2007. They want to be legally married because they want the same legal protections other couples enjoy. Every time they have to check the "single" box on a form, it feels demeaning to their relationship. And it would mean a lot to their relatives for them to marry. Moreover,Dawn and Diana's five-year-old son is beginning to understand what marriage is. He asks a lot of questions, and they struggle to come up with a way to explain to him why his parents aren't allowed to get legally married. Angela Gillem and GailLloyd
61. Plaintiffs Angela Gillem("Angela")and Gail Lloyd("Gail")of Philadelphia have lived together in a committed relationship for 17 years. Angela, 60, is a clinical psychologist and professor at Arcadia University whose current area ofresearch is multi-cultural competency for counselors. Gail,55,is a filmmaker and visual artist who graduated from Temple University's Film and Media Arts Program.
62. Angela and Gail feel incredibly lucky to have found one another and have long known that they would be together forever. They wear matching rings
20

to symbolize their commitment to one another and to show the world that they each "belong to someone." They are registered domestic partners in Philadelphia.
63. Angela and Gail would like to get married and be recognized as a married couple in their home state because they love each other and want the chance to stand up and have their family and community witness them make the fullest commitment two people can make to one another.
64. They also want the security that comes with marriage and the protections the law provides to married couples in times of need. Because Angela is the primary breadwinner and Gail, as an artist, does not draw a steady paycheck to contribute to social security, the couple fears for Gail's economic security should Angela be the first ofthem to pass away. Because they cannot be married, Gail would not get Angela's social security and she would lose a substantial portion ofthe family's assets because she would not be entitled to the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax.
65. They have tried to replicate some ofthe security that comes with marriage by having wills and healthcare and financial powers ofattorney drawn up to grant each other some ofthe rights and decision-making power that would have come automatically with marriage.
21

66. On July 1, 2013, Angela and Gail went to the office ofthe Register of Wills and Clerk ofOrphans' Court ofBucks County to apply for a marriage license. Their.application was refused because they are asame-sex couple. Helena Miller and Dana RaspbeY~y
67. Plaintiffs Helena Miller("Helena")and Dara Raspberry("Dara")of Philadelphia have lived together in a committed relationship for six years. Helena, 39,is a teacher and educational consultant. Dara,43,is an emergency medicine physician at Einstein Medical Center Philadelphia.
68. In 2010, Helena and Dara decided to get married. They wanted to make a public commitment to each other in front oftheir friends and families,to join their families together, and to start a new family together. They got married in Connecticut on September 25,2010, with 140 oftheir loved ones in attendance.
69. In the fall of2011, because they were hoping to soon have children of their own,they decided to move from New York to Philadelphia in order to be closer to their families.
70. Helena and Dara's dream to start a family came true on May 28,2013, when Helena.gave birth to their daughter,Z.R. They have hired an attorney for Dara to do a second parent adoption ofZ.R. This process is expected to take about 6 months, during which time Z.R. will have only one legally recognized parent, and they have been told it will cost about $1,800. Iftheir marriage were
~~

recognized in Pennsylvania, Dara would automatically be recognized as a parent to any child born to her spouse.
71. Sadly,for Helena and Dara,the cost ofmoving to Pennsylvania to be close to family was to be effectively "unmarried" and,thus, considered less ofa family in the eyes ofthe state. Helena and Dara would like their marriage to be recognized in Pennsylvania not only because ofthe concrete protections it would provide to them and their daughter, but also because they feel that being treated as an unmarried couple disrespects the commitment they have made to one another and devalues their family. They hope that their marriage will be recognized in Pennsylvania before their baby is old enough to be aware that the Commonwealth does not consider her family deserving ofthe same respect afforded other families. Ron GebhaYdtsbaue~ and GYeg Wight
72. Plaintiffs Ron Gebhardtsbauer("Ron")and Greg Wright("Greg") have lived together in a committed relationship for 19 years. Ron,who is 60,is a Clinical Associate Professor and head ofthe Actuarial Science Program at Penn State University. Greg,56,is an acupuncturist in private practice. Ron and Greg have lived in State College since 2008.
73. Ron and Greg registered as domestic partners in State College when that became possible in 2011. They are engaged to be married. They want to get married to declare publicly and officially their commitment. They would like to be
F~c3

able to refer to one another officially as spouses. They feel that using the term "partner" is inadequate as it does not convey the level ofcommitment they have

made to one another. 74. It is important to them to marry in Pennsylvania, where they have
made their home and built their lives together. And they would like to be able to marry in their own church. Their minister has already agreed to officiate at the

ceremony ifthat becomes an option for them legally. 75. Because their relationship is not legally recognized in Pennsylvania,
when one ofthem passes away,the surviving partner will be denied the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax and will have to pay a 15%tax on halfof everything the couple owns together, including their home.

Marla Cattermole aid Julia Lobur 76. Plaintiffs Marla Cattermole("Marla")and Julia Lobur("Julia")of
Harrisburg have lived together in a committed relationship for 27 years. They met

during Army basic training.

77. Julia, who is 58, is a lifelong Pennsylvanian, born and raised in New

Kensington,just outside ofPittsburgh.

Marla, 54, grew

up

Iowa but moved to
in

Pennsylvania in 1986 to be with Julia. Marla and Julia both work for the

Commonwealth,Julia as a software architect and project manager and Marla as a

24

senior benefits manager. Julia is also an adjunct lecturer in computer science at Penn State Harrisburg.
78. Marla is a 12-year veteran ofthe Army. She left the Army as a sergeant in 1995, having earned various commendations. Julia attempted to serve her country and enlisted in the Army in 1983 but she was discharged during basic training after her sexual orientation was revealed to her superiors. Military policy at the time barred service by lesbians and gay men.
79. Marla and Julia strongly support each other. They share finances and all oftheir property,including their home,isjointly owned. They not only take. care ofeach other,they also took care ofJulia's mother for 12 years when it became difficult for her physically and financially to live on her own. She lived with them until she passed away in 1997.
80. In 2009, Marla and Julia got married in Carroll, Iowa, where Marla grew up. Marla's mother and sister were there to celebrate with them. They had wanted to marry for years but did not want to do it far from home. They decided to marry in Iowa as soon as that became a possibility because it was the closest thing they thought they would get to marrying at"home."
81. Because their marriage is not recognized in their home state of Pennsylvania, Marla and Julia have gone to considerable expense to have an attorney draw up documents,such as living wills and healthcare proxies,to try to
25

protect themselves. They understand, however, that this affords them only a fraction ofthe protections that come with marriage and they are concerned that those papers will not hold up in times of crisis.
82. The non-recognition oftheir marriage also affects them financially. They pay over $100 a month more for health insurance than they would ifthey had spousal coverage. Moreover,they worked hard to save money for their retirement but worry that when one ofthem dies, the widow will be left financially insecure because she will be denied the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax. A financial advisor estimated that the tax bill could be up to approxirriately $50,000. Marla and Julia pay hundreds of dollars a year to carry life insurance policies in order to cover the cost ofinheritance tax when one ofthem dies.
83. The recognition and legitimacy that marriage provides to them means the world to Marla and Julia when they get to experience it. Most recently, when they visited Washington State,they feltjoyful and free every time they were recognized as a legal couple, even in matters as mundane as renting a car together. They feel the loss ofthat freedom every time they return to home to Pennsylvania after travelling in a state where their marriage is respected.
26

Maureen Hennessey 84. PlaintiffMaureen Hennessey("Maureen"),53,lived in a committed
relationship with Mary Beth McIntyre("Mary Beth")from 1984 until Mary Beth's death on May 18,2013,at the age of55.
85. Both Maureen and Mary Beth were born and raised in Philadelphia and they shared their lives together in Philadelphia for 29 years. They raised 3 children together — Maureen's son from a previous relationship, and Mary Beth's niece and nephew, whose mother died when they were young. And they became grandmothers to three grandchildren,now 19,9,and 8. They registered as Life Partners with the city ofPhiladelphia in 2002.
86. In August 2009, Mary Beth was diagnosed with inoperable Stage 4 lung cancer that had spread to her brain and bones. After Mary Beth fell ill, Maureen left herjob as a middle school teacher in the Philadelphia School District to care for Mary Beth and help Mary Beth run her business, which was the family's primary source ofincome.
87. Maureen and Mary Beth were married in Massachusetts on June 9, 2011. They would have preferred to marry in their home state ofPennsylvania because their loved ones are there and they would have liked to have been able to solemnize their marriage at Germantown Friends Meeting. But getting married in
27

Pennsylvania was not an option and they knew their time together was too limited to try to wait for that to change to come.
88. As Mary Beth's condition deteriorated, she was unable to take basic care of herself. She needed Maureen's help to get in and out of bed and to the bathroom. Maureen helped bathe her and administered her medications. Because Mary Beth had difficulty chewing and swallowing, Maureen prepared foods that were easy to swallow.
$9. While Mary Beth was suffering the physical and emotional pain of end stage cancer,.she had the additional burden ofworrying about how Maureen would manage financially after she was gone. The couple consulted with an attorney about ways to protect Maureen financially. The attorney was able to provide some protections, such as a will to ensure that Mary Beth's wishes to leave her property to Maureen would be honored. But there was nothing the attorney could do to establish most ofthe legal protections that are available to widows and
widowers. 90. Because Maureen's marriage to Mary Beth is not recognized in
Pennsylvania,Maureen must pay a 15% inheritance tax on all ofthe property that Mary Beth left to her, including their shared home. And unless their marriage is recognized in Pennsylvania, Maureen will not be eligible to receive Mary Beth's

social security benefits when she turns 65. Because Mary Beth was the primary breadwinner, this will leave Maureen financially vulnerable in her retirement.
91. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize her marriage to Mary Beth does notjust cause Maureen economic hardship. In her time ofgrief,she is denied the comfort and dignity of being acknowledged as Mary Beth's widow.
92. Plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood,Fredia and Lynn Hurdle, Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd, and Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright are all eligible to marry but for the fact that they wish to marry someone ofthe same sex. They are all over the age of 18,fully competent,are not married to anyone else; are not within a prohibited degree ofconsanguinity ofeach other, and are prepared to provide the required information and pay the license fee. They are willing and able to assume all ofthe obligations ofmarriage.
93. Plaintiffs Edwin Hill and David Palmer, Heather and Kath Poehler, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry,Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur,and Maureen Hennessey.all were married legally under the laws ofother states and their marriages would be recognized within the Commonwealth but for the fact that they are married to a person ofthe same sex.
29

Defendants 94. Defendant THOMAS W.CORBETT is the Governor ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania. In his official capacity, he is the chiefexecutive officer ofthe Commonwealth and is, pursuant to Article IV,Section 2 ofthe Pennsylvania Constitution,responsible for the faithful execution ofthe laws ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania,including the laws that exclude same-sex couples from marrying or having their marriages recognized(23 Pa. C.S.§§ 110: 2 and
1704). 95. Defendant KATHLEEN G.KANE is the Attorney General ofthe
Commonwealth ofPennsylvania. She is sued in her official capacity pursuant to the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-204.
96. Defendant MICHAEL WOLF is the Secretary ofHealth ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania and as such serves as chiefexecutive ofthe Pennsylvania Department ofHealth. In his official capacity, pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1104 and 1306, he is responsible for preparing and approving the marriage license application and marriage license forms used in county offices across the Commonwealth,which presently prohibit persons ofthe same sex from marrying by requiring both a "Bride" and "Groom." In his official capacity, pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. § 1106, he is charged with receiving reports ofissued marriage licenses from individual counties and with publishing statistics derived from those reports.

97. The Commonwealth's Marriage Law provides that "[n]o person shall be joined in marriage in this Commonwealth until a marriage license has been obtained," and "[n]o marriage license shall be issued except upon written and verified application made by both ofthe parties intending to marry." 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 13.01(a), 1302(a).
98. In each county in the Commonwealth,either the county Register of Wills or the county Clerk of Orphans' Court issues marriage licenses.
99. Defendant MARY JO POKNIS is the Register of Wills of Washington County,Pennsylvania,and her office is responsible for issuing marriage licenses in that county.
100. On June 24,2013,invoking Commonwealth law,the office ofMs. Poknis refused to issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood because they are asame-sex couple.
101. Defendant DONALD PETRILLE,JR.,is the Register of Wilis and Clerk ofOrphans' Court ofBucks County,Pennsylvania,and his office is responsible for issuing marriage licenses in that county.
102. On July 1,2013,invoking Commonwealth law,the office ofMr. Petrille refused to issue a marriage license to plaintiffs Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd because they are asame-sex couple.
31

103. All defendants named above are, and at all relevant times have been, acting under color ofstate law,and are sued in their official capacities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 104. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 105. Venue is proper in the Middle District ofPennsylvania under 28 U.S.C.§ 1391(b)because defendants CORBETT,KANE,and WOLF reside in this district.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Pennsylvania's Prohibition of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples 106. Pennsylvania's Marriage Law,23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1101 etseq., governs marriages in the Commonwealth. In 1996,the Marriage Law was amended to expressly prohibit marriage for same-sex couples. The 1996 amendment had two parts. First, it defined marriage as "[a] civil contract by which_ one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife." 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102. Second,in a stark departure from Pennsylvania's usual recognition of marriages entered into in other states, it made "void in this Commonwealth" any "marriage between persons ofthe same sex ...entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into." 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704.
32

107. As a result, marriage in Pennsylvania is legally available only to opposite-sex couples. Same-sex couples may not marry inPennsylvania,and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in Pennsylvania.
Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples Are Similarly Situated for Purposes of Marriage 108. The Supreme Court has called marriage "the most important relation in life," Zablocki u. Redhail,434 U.S.374,384(1978)(internal quotation marks omitted), and an "expression[] ofemotional support and public commitment." Turner v. Safley,482 U.S. 78,95(1987). It is."a far-reaching legal acknowledgement ofthe intimate relationship between two people...." Windsor, Slip. Op. at 20. This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples. 109. Same-sex couples such as the plaintiffcouples are identical to opposite-sex couples in all ofthe characteristics relevant to marriage. 110. Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as opposite-sex couples. Like opposite-sex couples,same-sex couples build their lives together, plan their futures together and hope to grow old together. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care ofone another physically when faced with injury or illness. For example, when plaintiff Maureen Hennessey's spouse, Mary Beth, was dying ofcancer, Maureen left herjob as a teacher to take care ofMary Beth until
33

Mary Beth passed away. Maureen's devotion to Mary Beth,the person with whom

she shared her life for 29 years, is what marriage is about. 111. Like some opposite-sex couples,some same-sex couples like
plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood,Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser,Dawn Plummer and Diana Poison, and Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, are parents

raising children together. 112. Same-sex couples seeking to marry are just as willing and able as

opposite-sex couples to assume the obligations of marriage.

113. The plaintiffcouples and other same-sex couples.in Pennsylvania,if

permitted to marry, would benefit no less than opposite-sex couples from the many

legal protections and the social recognition afforded to married couples.

114. There was a time when an individual's sex was relevant to his or her

legal rights and duties within the marital relationship. For example, husbands had

a duty to support their wives but not vice versa and husbands had legal ownership

ofall property belonging to their wives. But these legal distinctions have all been

removed such that the legal rights and duties ofhusbands and wives are- now

identical.

See

also

1

Pa. C.S. § 2301(a)("[W]here

any
in

statute

heretofore

enacted there is a designation restricted to a single sex,the designation shall be

deemed to refer to both sexes unless the designation does not operate to deny or

34

abridge equality ofrights under the law ofthis Commonwealth because ofthe sex
ofthe individual.").
The Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples from Marriage Causes Substantial Harm to Couples and Their Families
115. By preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to
recognize their marriages from others states, Commonwealth law deprives them of
numerous legal protections that are available to opposite=sex couples in
Pennsylvania by virtue oftheir marriages. By way ofexample only:
a. A married person is exempt from inheritance tax on property left to him by an opposite-sex spouse,including the spouse's share ofthe couple's home,and,thus, protected against economic distress or loss ofa home because ofan estate tax bill. 72 P.S.§ 9116(a)(1.1)(ii). A same-sex surviving spouse or partner is denied this exemption and must pay a 15%tax,the highest rate, which applies to non-family-members. 72P.S.§ 9116(a)(3).
b. A widow or widower ofan opposite-sex spouse is entitled to 50% to 100% ofhis or her deceased spouse's estate ifthe spouse died without a will. 20 Pa. C.S. § 2102. A same-sex surviving spouse or partner in this situation receives nothing.
c. Ifan opposite-sex spouse becomes incapacitated, her spouse is automatically authorized to make decisions regarding her care. 20 Pa. C.S. § 5461(d)(1)(i). This protection does not extend to a same-sex spouse or partner.
d. Under the workers' compensation laws,the opposite-sex spouse of someone who dies or is injured in the workplace is entitled to damages and may bring suit. 77 P.S. §§ 431 et seq. Same-sex spouses or partners have no legal standing to sue over their spouse or partner's workplace injury.
35

e. The Commonwealth requires opposite-sex spouses to support one another financially. 23 Pa. C.S. § 4603(a)(1)(i). There is no support obligation for same-sex spouses or partners.
f. Commonwealth laws promote the stability of marriages through rules such as mandatory waiting periods prior to divorce by mutual consent. 23 Pa. C.S. § 3301(c). The divorce laws,including these provisions, do not apply to same-sex spouses or partners.
g. Opposite-sex widows and widowers ofmilitary personnel and veterans are eligible for numerous assistance programs. E.g., 51 Pa. C.S.§§ 3502,7319,8502;51 P.S.. §§ 20010,20046,20096, 20125, 20305. These programs are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners of military personnel and veterans.
h. Opposite-sex widows and widowers ofpublic employees in the Commonwealth are eligible to receive various pensions and survivor benefits upon their spouse's death. E.g., 53 P.S. §§767(a)(2)(i),23654.1,23654-23654.2(receipt ofpolice officer spouse's pension by surviving spouse); 53 P.S. § 881.115 (tax exemption ofpublic employee spouse's retirement allowance); 53 P.S. §§ 23609.2,23609.3(lifetime survivor benefits for spouse of retired pensioner); 53 P.S.§ 39320(receipt offireman's pension by surviving spouse). These benefits are not provided to surviving same-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
i. Opposite-sex widows and widowers offirefighters, police officers, and other first responders killed in the line of duty are provided financial assistance. 53 P.S.§ 891(d)($100,000 payment to surviving spouse ofa firefighter, ambulance or rescue squad member,hazardous material response team member,law enforcement officer, or National Guard member who died in -the line of duty). This assistance is not provided to same-sex surviving spouses or partners offirst responders.
j. Property tax rebates or rent rebates are available under Pennsylvania law to certain people over the age of50 who are widows and widowers ofopposite-sex spouses. 53 P.S. §§ 6926.1303-6926.1306. They are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners.
36

k. "Gold Star Family" license plates are available to the opposite-sex widows and widowers ofpeople killed on active military duty. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1365. Surviving same-sex spouses or partners are not eligible for license plates recognizing their loved one's sacrifice.
116. Same-sex couples are excluded from these and many other legal protections provided for married couples under Pennsylvania law.
117. The exclusion ofsame-sex couples from marriage also denies them eligibility for numerous federal protections afforded to married couples including in the areas ofimmigration and citizenship,taxes, and social security. Some ofthe federal protections for married couples are only available to couples iftheir marriages are legally recognized in the state in which they live. See, e.g.,42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i)(marriage for eligibility for social security benefits based on law ofstate where couple resides at time ofapplication); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(b)(same for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus,even plaintiffs Edwin Hill and David Palmer,Heather and Kath Poehler,Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur, and Maureen Hennessey, who are already married, cannot access such federal protections as long as Pennsylvania refuses to recognize their existing marriages.
118. The exclusion from marriage also harms same-sex couples and their families in less tangible ways.
37

119. Although the plaintiffcouples are all in long-term committed relationships, they and other same-sex couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crisis or conflict.
120. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage also harms couples and their children by denying them the social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood meanings that command respect for a couple's relationship and the commitment they have made.
121. The exclusion from the esteemed institution of marriage also demeans and stigmatizes lesbian-and gay couples and their children by sending the message that they are less worthy and valued than families headed by opposite-sex couples.
122. The impact ofthe exclusion from marriage on same-sex couples and their families is extensive and real. The denial ofthe right to marry causes these couples and their families to suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic
123. The plaintiff couples recognize that marriage entails both benefits to and obligations on the partners and they welcome both.

Excluding Same-Sex Couples from Marriage Is Not Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest,
-Let Alone Able to Withstand Heightened Scrutiny

124. As the evidence will show,the prohibition against marriage for same-

sex couples in Pennsylvania is not closely tailored to serve an important

government interest or substantially related to an exceedingly persuasive

justification. In fact, as the evidence also will show,the prohibition fails any level

ofconstitutional scrutiny. It is not even rationally related to any legitimate

justifications that were offered in support ofit when the Marriage Law was

amended in 1996 nor to any legitimate interest ofthe Commonwealth that

defendants might now offer as a basis _for denying same-sex couples the freedom to

marry in Pennsylvania.

125. When the Commonwealth enacted the 1996 amendment prohibiting

marriage for same-sex couples,legislators in favor ofthe amendment relied on

"moral opposition to same-sex marriages...and support ofthe traditional family

unit."

1996

Pa.

Legis.

J.(House),

at

2017;

-

id. at
se a e lso

2019("[T]he

large

majority[ofPennsylvanians] do not want our traditional marriage institution and

our state ofmorals to be changed."); id. at 2022("This is a vote about family

values and traditional beliefs ...."). Some legislators said there was a need to

protect against a financial burden on businesses and taxpayers. Id. at 2018("[I]f

we are forced to recognize same-sex marriages,this would put an unfunded

39

mandate on our businesses, another burden on our taxpayers, and so on."); id. at 2017("Social Security,tax and other benefits presently conferred on spouses would have to be expanded to include married partners ofthe same sex. The financial costs imposed on society by the forced recognition ofsame-sex marriage cannot even be calculated at this time."). And,it was argued,"it is imperative that we in Pennsylvania should stand up for traditional marriage for the benefit of families and children in the Commonwealth and our future." Id. at 2022. None of these justifications — or any other justification that might now be offered —passes constitutional muster. Moral Opposition to Ma~~iagefor Same-Sex Couples and Support ofthe Traditional Family
126. Neither tradition nor moral disapproval ofsame-sex relationships or marriage for lesbian and gay couples is a legitimate basis for unequal treatment of same-sex couples under the law. The fact that a discriminatory law is longstanding does not immunize it from constitutional scrutiny. And the Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect to private biases and has expressly rejected moral disapproval of marriage for samesex couples as a legitimate basis for discriminatory treatment oflesbian and gay couples. Windsor, Slip Op., at 21 (an "interest in protecting traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws" was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
C[17

P~ese~ving the Public Fisc and the Coffers ofPrivate Business 127. The Commonwealth cannotjustify its denial ofmarriage to lesbian
and gay couples by claiming an interest in preserving the public fisc or the coffers ofprivate business. Saving money is not ajustification for excluding a group from a government benefit without an independent rationale for why the cost savings ought to be borne by the particular group denied the benefit. Moreover,the evidence will show that there is no factual basis for the notion that allowing and recognizing the marriages ofsame-sex couples will burden the Commonwealth financially or constitute a burden on businesses. Protection ofChildren
128. The Commonwealth's ban on marriage for same-sex couples is not rationally related to child welfare concerns. The government has a vital interest in protecting the well-being ofchildren, but the exclusion ofsame-sex couples from marriage bears no relation to this interest. To the contrary, it harms children in the Commonwealth.
129. Commonwealth law recognizes that neither sexual orientation nor gender has any bearing on a couple's ability to successfully rear children and,thus, treats gay and lesbian couples the same as heterosexual couples with respect to adoption and recognition as parents through the in loco parentis doctrine. Pennsylvania judges routinely grant adoptions to same-sex couples, recognizing
41

that the adoptions are in the best interest ofthe child. Indeed,the government itself places children for adoption with same-sex couples like plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood,whojointly adopted their son L.W. out ofthe foster care system. Any assertion that the Commonwealth does not consider same-sex couples equally effective parents cannot be credited given its own conduct evidencing a different view.
130. Moreover,there is no valid basis for the Commonwealth to assert a preference for child-rearing by opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples. The evidence will demonstrate that there is a consensus within the scientific community,based on over thirty years ofresearch,that children raised by samesex couples are just as well adjusted as children raised by opposite-sex couples. This is recognized by every major professional organization dedicated to children's health and welfare including the American Academy ofPediatrics,the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers and the Child Welfare League of America.
131. Other courts have found, after trials involving expert testimony,that there is no rational basis for favoring parenting by heterosexual couples over gay and lesbian couples. See,e.g.,Pe~~y v. SchwaNzenegge~,704 F. Supp.2d 921,980 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(finding that the research supporting the conclusion that "[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by
42

heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted" is "accepted beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology"), aff'd sub nom. Pe~~y v. Brown,671 F.3d 1052(9th Cir. 2012), vacatedfog lack ofstanding sub nom Hollingsworth v. Pe~~^y, No. 12-144,2013 WL 3196927(U.S. June 26,2013); In ~e Adoption ofDoe,2008 WL 5006172,at *20(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.25,2008) ("[B]ased on the robust nature ofthe evidence available in the field, this Court is satisfied that the issue is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold otherwise; the best interests ofchildren are not preserved by prohibiting homosexual adoption."),aff'dsub nom Florida Dept ofChildren &Families v. Adoption ofX.X.G.,45 So.3d 79(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2010);Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd.,Nos. 1999-9881,2004 WL 3154530,at *9 and 2004 WL 3200916,at *3-4(Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec.29,2004)(holding based on factual findings regarding the well-being ofchildren ofgay parents that"there was no rational relationship between the [exclusion ofgay people from becoming foster parents] and the health, safety, and welfare ofthe foster children."), aff'd sub nom DeptofHuman Sews. v. Howard,238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006).
132. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage has no conceivable benefit to children of heterosexual couples. Denying same-sex couples the right to marry does not encourage opposite-sex couples who have children to marry or stay married for the benefit oftheir children. And regardless ofwhether same-sex
43

couples are permitted to marry,the children ofopposite-sex spouses will continue to enjoy the same benefits and protections that flow from their parents' marriage.
133. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage serves only to harm the children raised by lesbian and gay couples by denying their families significant benefits and by branding their families as inferior and less deserving ofrespect and,thus,encouraging private bias and discrimination. According to the 2010 United States Census,there are over 6,000 same-sex couples raising children in Pennsylvania. The state's interest in the welfare ofchildren oflesbian and gay parents is or should be as great as its interest in the welfare ofother children.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I: Deprivation of the Fundamental Right to Marry in
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983)
134. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all ofthe preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 135. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
precludes any State from "depriv[ing]any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest.

136. The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects offamily, are a central part ofthe liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
137. Pennsylvania law denies the plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples this fundamental right by denying them access to the state-recognized institution ofmarriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they.entered into in other states.
138. The Commonwealth can demonstrate no important interest to justify denying the plaintiff couples this fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate interest at all.
139. The Commonwealth's prohibition ofmarriage between persons ofthe same sex and its refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause.
140. Defendants,acting under color ofstate law,are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the. United States Constitution in violation of42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
L~"

COUNT II: Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in
Violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983) 141. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all ofthe preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 142. The Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that"no State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
:~ 143. By denying the plaintiff couples and other lesbian and gay couples the
ability to marry and to have their out-of-state marriages recognized, the Commonwealth,through defendants,disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis oftheir sexual orientation. It denies them significant legal protections. And it"degrade[s][and]demean[s]"them by "instruct[ing]...all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children," that their relationship is "less worthy" than the relationships o~others. Windsor, Slip Op., at 25.
144. Same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are similarly situated for
purposes of marriage. 145. The evidence will show that classifications based on sexual
_orientation demand heightened scrutiny.

146. Lesbians and gay men are members of a discrete and insular minority that has suffered a history of discrimination in the Commonwealth and across the United States.
147. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society.
148. Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to one's identity that a person may not legitimately be required to abandon it(even if that were possible)as a condition ofequal treatment. Sexual orientation generally is fixed at an early age and highly resistant to change through intervention. Efforts to change a person's sexual orientation through interventions by medical professionals have not been shown to be effective. No mainstream mental health professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual orientation, and many —including the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association —have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the public about these treatments.
149. Prejudice against lesbians and gay men continues to seriously curtail the operation ofthe political process preventing this group from obtaining redress through legislative means. Lesbians and gay men lack statutory protection against discrimination in employment,public accommodations,and housing at the federal level and in more than halfofthe states,including Pennsylvania. Lesbians and gay

men have far fewer civil rights protections at the state and federal level than women and racial minorities had when sex and race classifications-were declared to be.suspect or quasi suspect. They have been stripped ofthe right to marry through 30 state constitutional amendments,and have been targeted through the voter initiative process more than any other group.
150. For all these reasons, classification based on sexual orientation should be reviewed under heightened scrutiny, but this one cannot survive under any level ofconstitutional scrutiny The Commonwealth's exclusion ofsame-sex couples from marriage is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. All it does it disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their children.
151. The Commonwealth's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize the marriages ofsame-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
152. Defendants,acting under color ofstate law,are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution.
,•

COUNT III: Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983) 153. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all ofthe preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 154. The Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution provides that"no State shall...deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws.'.' U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 155. Commonwealth law defines marriage as "[a) civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife." 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102. 156. By defining marriage in this way,the Commonwealth discriminates on the basis ofsex. For example,plaintiff Angela Gillem is not permitted to marry plaintiffGail Lloyd solely because they are both women. IfAngela(or Gail)were a man,the marriage would be allowed. The only reason the marriage is prohibited is the sex ofthe partners. 157. In addition, the Commonwealths has made "void in this Commonwealth" any "marriage between persons ofthe same sex ...entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into." 23 Pa.

C.S. § 1704. The marriage ofEdwin Hill and David Palmer,for example,is denied recognition solely because they are both men.
158. The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation oftraditional gender roles is not a legitimate government interest.
159. Given that there are no longer legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and wives,there is no basis for the sex-based eligibility requirements for marriage.
160. The defendants can demonstrate no exceedingly persuasive justification for this discrimination based on sex.
161. Commonwealth law prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
162. Defendants,acting under color ofstate law,-are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution in violation of42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE,Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 1. Enter a declaratoryjudgment that 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704 violate the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution;
50

2. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704
violate the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.to the United
States Constitution;
3. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from denying the
plaintiff couples and all other same-sex couples the right to marry in the
Commonwealth ofPennsylvania and directing defendants to recognize marriages
validly entered into by the plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples outside of
the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania;
4. Award costs ofsuit, including reasonable attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988; and
5. Enter all further reliefto which plaintiffs may bejustly entitled.
HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL
PUDLIfN~I~ SC ILLE
f/ Mark A. Aronchick(PA ID No.20261) John S. Stapleton(PA ID No.200872) Dylan J. Steinberg(PA ID No.203222) Rebecca S. Melley(PA ID No.206210) One Logan Square,27th Floor Philadelphia;PA 19103 (215)568-6200 maronchick@hangley.com jstapleton@hangley.com dsteinberg@hangley.com rmelley@hangley.com
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James D. Esseks Leslie Cooper AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549-2500 jesseks@aclu.org lcooper@aclu.org
Witold J. Walczak(PA ID No.62976) ACLU FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh,PA 15213 (412)681-7736 vwalczak@aclupa.org
Mary Catherine Roper(PA ID No.71107) Molly Tack-Hooper(PA ID No.307828) ACLU FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia,PA 19106 (215) 592-1513 mroper@aclupa.org mtack-hooper@aclupa.org
Seth F. Kreimer(PA ID No.26102) 3400 Chestnut St. Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 (215) 898-7447 skreimer@law.upenn.edu
fog
Counse P l laintiffs
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 Case 1:13-cv-01861-JEJ Document 133 Filed 05/20/14 Page 1 of 39

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEB WHITEWOOD, et al.,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

MICHAEL WOLF, in his official :

capacity as Secretary, Pennsylvania :

Department of Health, et al.,

:

:

Defendants.

:

1:13-cv-1861 Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM OPINION May 20, 2014
Today, certain citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are not guaranteed the right to marry the person they love. Nor does Pennsylvania recognize the marriages of other couples who have wed elsewhere. Hoping to end this injustice, eleven courageous lesbian and gay couples, one widow, and two teenage children of one of the aforesaid couples have come together as plaintiffs and asked this Court to declare that all Pennsylvanians have the right to marry the person of their choice and consequently, that the Commonwealth’s laws to the contrary are unconstitutional. We now join the twelve federal district courts across the country which, when confronted with these inequities in their own states, have concluded that all couples deserve equal dignity in the realm of civil

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marriage. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this action protest the constitutionality of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s Domestic Relations Code, which limit marriage to opposite-sex couples and prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages legally entered into in other jurisdictions (collectively, “the Marriage Laws”).
A. The Marriage Laws In 1996, Pennsylvania was one of 14 states to amend its laws to add anticeremony and anti-recognition provisions applicable to same-sex couples. The proliferation of such laws across the country – another 11 states added similar provisions the following year – was in response to litigation in Hawaii, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court had held the state’s ban on same-sex marriage to be presumptively violative of the state’s equal protection clause. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In Pennsylvania, Representative C. Allan Egolf of Perry County sponsored the marriage amendment and described it as “an expression of Pennsylvania’s traditional and longstanding policy of moral opposition to same-sex marriages . . . and support of the traditional family unit.” (Doc. 115-18, p. 27). Ultimately, both houses passed the legislation by overwhelming majorities, the House by 177 to 16,
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and the Senate by 43 to 5. The Pennsylvania Marriage Laws define “marriage” as “[a] civil contract by
which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102. In addition, a provision entitled “Marriage between persons of the same sex” states as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth. 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704. As stated, the Marriage Laws have the effect of preventing same-sex couples from marrying in Pennsylvania and nullifying the marriages of same-sex couples legally married elsewhere for purposes of recognition in the Commonwealth. B. The Plaintiffs1 Plaintiffs are Deb and Susan Whitewood, and their teenage daughters, A.W. and K.W.; Maureen Hennessey; Lynn and Fredia Hurdle; Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser; Julia Lobur and Marla Cattermole; Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson; Dara Raspberry and Helena Miller; Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright;
1 The facts regarding Plaintiffs’ personal backgrounds are derived from their Statement of Facts (Doc. 115) and personal declarations. (Docs. 115-2 – 115-14).
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Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato; Heather and Kath Poehler; Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd; and Edwin Hill and David Palmer. Five of the couples are unmarried, seeking to wed in Pennsylvania, and six of the couples, as well as Maureen Hennessey, desire to have their valid, out-of-state marriages recognized by the Commonwealth.
As a group, they represent the great diversity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. They hail from across the state, making their homes in Allegheny, Dauphin, Centre, Northampton, Delaware, Chester, and Philadelphia Counties. They come from all walks of life; they include a nurse, state employees, lawyers, doctors, an artist, a newspaper delivery person, a corporate executive, a dog trainer, university professors, and a stay-at-home parent. They have served our country in the Army and Navy. Plaintiffs’ personal backgrounds reflect a richness and diversity: they are African-American, Caucasian, Latino, and Asian; they are Catholic, Baptist, Methodist, Jewish, Quaker, Buddhist, and secular. In terms of age, they range from a couple in their 30s with young children, to retirees in their 60s. Many of the couples have been together for decades.
As plainly reflected in the way they live their lives, the plaintiff couples are spouses in every sense, except that the laws of the Commonwealth prevent them from being recognized as such.
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For better, for worse The plaintiff couples have shared in life’s joys. They have purchased homes together and blended their property and finances. They have started families, welcoming children through birth and adoption. Some of them have celebrated their commitment to each other through marriage in other states, sharing their wedding day with family and friends. Yet, with each of these joys there has been concomitant hardship resulting from the Marriage Laws. In terms of property ownership, all of the couples face the payment of Pennsylvania’s inheritance tax – including on half of the value of jointly-owned homes and bank accounts – at 15 percent, the highest rate. For those couples who have had children, like Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, the non-biological parent has had to apply for a second-parent adoption. Dawn expresses that she and Diana are presently saving money so that she can legally adopt their second son, J.P. Until the adoption is complete, she has no legal ties to J.P., despite that, together, she and Diana dreamed of welcoming him to their family, prepared for his birth, and functioned as a married couple long before having him. Christine Donato, who together with Sandy Ferlanie completed a second-parent adoption in similar circumstances, describes the process as “long, expensive, and humiliating.” The couples choosing to adopt,
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like Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, had to undergo a two-step process, incurring double the costs, in which one became their child’s legal parent and, later, the other petitioned for a second-parent adoption. For the children of these couples, it can be difficult to understand why their parents are not married or recognized as married. In the words of Deb Whitewood, “It sends the message to our children that their family is less deserving of respect and support than other families. That’s a hurtful message.”
In addition, for the couples who have chosen to marry out-of-state, they are acutely sensitive that their marital status changes when they cross state lines. Edwin Hill describes driving home to Pennsylvania after wedding David Palmer in Maine in 2013, elated to be traveling through all of the northeastern states that recognize their marriage. “And then we crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania,” he recalls, “and we looked at each other and said, ‘We’re not married anymore.’ And that hurt.” Further, the married couples must still identify themselves as single in Pennsylvania, for example, on their state income taxes. Many have remarked on the pain this causes them, describing that it feels “terrible,” “wrong,” and “like a denial of [their] relationship” to tick the box marked “single.”
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For richer, for poorer The plaintiff couples share their resources and support each other financially. But Plaintiffs commonly echo a sense of legal and economic vulnerability because of Pennsylvania’s Marriage Laws. Many of them have paid lawyers to draft protective documents, like wills and powers of attorney, in efforts to emulate some of the protections afforded to couples recognized as married. Susan Whitewood estimates that her family has spent over $10,000 in legal fees for the preparation and maintenance of such documents, which would not have been necessary if the Commonwealth acknowledged their marriage. Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd describe feeling particularly insecure. Angela is a clinical psychologist and the primary bread-winner, while Gail is an artist who does not draw a steady paycheck or contribute to Social Security. Angela expresses that she has “taken every step [she] can to ensure [Gail’s] financial security” but that they still cannot duplicate all of the protections married couples receive, and she “live[s] every day with the fear that the steps [she has] taken will not be enough to protect Gail if something should happen to [her].” In sickness and in health The plaintiff couples have supported each other through illness and medical emergencies. Yet, because Pennsylvania considers them legal strangers, they may
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be left vulnerable in times of crisis. Various of the plaintiffs express anxiety at the possibility that they would not be allowed to comfort or gain information about their partner’s condition in the event of an emergency, despite the fact that they have prepared powers of attorney. Lynn Hurdle remembers feelings of fear and helplessness when her partner, Fredia, was admitted to the hospital for unexpected surgery. Doctors began operating earlier than planned, and when Lynn discovered Fredia’s hospital room to be empty, staff would not tell her why Fredia had been taken early or where she was.
Until death do us part The plaintiff couples demonstrate an intention to live out their lives together. Plaintiff Maureen Hennessey and her partner of 29 years, Mary Beth McIntyre, present a powerful example. When Mary Beth was diagnosed with inoperable Stage 4 lung cancer, Maureen left her job to care for her and to help run Mary Beth’s business until her death. Towards the end of her life, Mary Beth required Maureen’s help to get out of bed and to the bathroom, and to assist in self-care and administer medications. They were married in Massachusetts after Mary Beth fell ill, but because Pennsylvania does not recognize their marriage, the line for “surviving spouse” was left blank and Mary Beth was identified as “never married” on her death certificate. Maureen was listed as the “informant.”
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Wishing to have their relationships recognized for what they are in the state they call home, and by doing so to transcend the pain, uncertainty, and injustice visited by the Marriage Laws, Plaintiffs brought this suit. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs commenced this action on July 9, 2013 against Defendants Governor Thomas Corbett; Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health Michael Wolf; Attorney General Kathleen Kane; Register of Wills of Washington County Mary Jo Poknis; and Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County Donald Petrille, Jr. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs seek declarations that the Marriage Laws violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from depriving Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples of the right to marry and directing Defendants to recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into in other jurisdictions, as well as costs, fees, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court.
On September 30, 2013, Defendants filed motions to dismiss. During the pendency of those motions, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendants Corbett, Kane, and Poknis. Thereafter, on November 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Defendants Wolf and Petrille, and additionally named
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Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue Dan Meuser, as a defendant. (Doc. 64). On November 15, 2013, we denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. 67).
After the conclusion of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 113, 116). The motions have been fully briefed, and the parties agree that there are no genuine disputes of material fact.2 Accordingly, the constitutional issues presented to this Court are fully at issue and ripe for our disposition.3 III. PRELIMINARY CHALLENGES
Before undertaking the due process and equal protection analyses at the heart of this matter, we must first entertain two preliminary, yet threshold, challenges to Plaintiffs’ efforts to have the Marriage Laws declared unconstitutional. First, Defendants contend that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Baker v. Nelson, there is no substantial federal question implicated by any of Plaintiffs’ claims, and thus this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they have not
2 We thank all counsel for their consistent collegiality, dedication to alacrity, and general professionalism exhibited throughout the course of this litigation.
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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established a personal, cognizable harm caused by the enforcement of the Marriage Laws. We shall discuss each of these preliminary contentions seriatim.
A. Baker v. Nelson Although we previously considered, and rejected, Defendants’ argument that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a ruling by the Supreme Court of Minnesota that a state law ban on same-sex marriage did not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution), inasmuch as Defendants have reiterated this jurisdictional challenge, we shall repeat herein our reasons for rejecting this argument. There is no dispute that the summary dismissal in Baker is considered precedential, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question is a decision on the merits), however we, and our sister district courts that have examined precisely this same issue, no longer consider Baker v. Nelson controlling due to the significant doctrinal developments in the four decades that have elapsed since it was announced by the Supreme Court. See id. (“[I]f the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise[.]”); Windsor v. United
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States, 699 F.3d 169, 178-80 (2d Cir. 2012); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 13-1834, 2014
U.S. Dist LEXIS 68171 (D. Oregon May 19, 2014); Latta v. Otter, No. 13-482,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66417, at *22-29, 2014 WL 1909999, at * 7-10 (D. Idaho
May 13, 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-10285, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37274,
at *46, n.6, 2014 WL 1100794, at *17, n.6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); De Leon v.
Perry, No. 13-982, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236, at *23-29, 2014 WL 715741, at
*8-10 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469-70
(E.D. Va. 2014); McGee v. Cole, No. 13-24068, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10864, at
*24-33, 2014 WL 321122, at *8-10 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 29, 2014); Bishop v. U.S. ex
rel. Holder, 962. F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1274-77 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194-95 (D. Utah 2013).
As we previously explained:
The jurisprudence of equal protection and substantive due process has undergone what can only be characterized as a sea change since 1972. The Supreme Court has decided several cases since Baker which demonstrate that it no longer views constitutional challenges based on sex or sexual identity classifications as unsubstantial. For example, when Baker was decided, “‘intermediate scrutiny’ was not yet in the Court’s vernacular” and “classifications based on illegitimacy and sex were not yet deemed quasi-suspect.” Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (coining “intermediate level scrutiny”); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264-65 (1978) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification based on illegitimacy, and describing how heightened scrutiny had been used for such classifications since 1976); Frontiero v.
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Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality) (identifying sex as a suspect class)). The Supreme Court had also not yet ruled that “a classification [based on sexuality] undertaken for its own sake” lacked a rational basis. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). Further, in 1972, governments could lawfully “demean [homosexual persons’] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Finally, in June of [2013], the Supreme Court held that a federal statute defining marriage as only between heterosexual couples violated the equal protection and due process rights of samesex couples who had married in states where same-sex marriage is legally recognized. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. – (2013).
(Doc. 67, pp. 5-6). Defendants have presented us with no compelling reason to
part company with our previous determination, which has been resoundingly
echoed by our sister district courts which have considered, and rejected, Baker’s
precedential value in light of doctrinal developments in the areas of constitutional
due process and equal protection.
The only new component of Defendants’ argument is their contention that,
in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to stay the District of Utah’s order
in Kitchen v. Herbert, the Supreme Court is bound to overturn the District of
Utah’s decision.4 See Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). Simply put, this
constitutes nothing more than speculation on the part of Defendants. Accordingly,
4 In Kitchen, the district judge held that Utah’s prohibition on same-sex marriage conflicts with the guarantees of equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court reasoned that Utah’s laws denied gay and lesbian citizens their fundamental right to marry and, in so doing, demeaned the dignity of these samesex couples for no rational reason. See Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
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we do not agree with Defendants that this procedural order of the Supreme Court forecasts pending disapproval of the District of Utah’s decision or its intention to reaffirm the precedential value of Baker.
Based on the foregoing, we again reject the contention that Baker v. Nelson presents a jurisdictional bar to Plaintiffs’ claims.
B. Burden of Proof under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to their constitutional claims because they have offered no facts establishing that Defendants took an action against them or are likely to be involved in acts or omissions regarding the Marriage Laws that caused or is likely to cause Plaintiffs harm. Defendants’ argument focuses specifically on Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to assert a cognizable injury against them by virtue of enforcement of the Marriage Laws. In view of the reasoning and holding in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), this argument is easily rejected. Writing for the majority in Windsor, Justice Kennedy opined that discrimination caused by the non-recognition of same-sex couples’ marriages “impose[s] a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon” same-sex
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an enabling statute that provides individuals with access to remedies for violations of their federal constitutional or statutory rights.
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couples in the eyes of the state and the broader community. Id. at 2693. Not only are these stigmatizing harms cognizable, they are profoundly personal to Plaintiffs and all other gay and lesbian couples, married or not, who live within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus are subject to the Marriage Laws. Additionally, and as discussed in greater detail above, see discussion supra Part I.B., Plaintiffs suffer a multitude of daily harms, for instance, in the areas of childrearing, healthcare, taxation, and end-of-life planning. With the Plaintiffs’ stories in mind, we easily find that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they suffer actionable harms, and Defendants’ argument to the contrary is rejected. IV. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
Having resolved the preliminary challenges advanced by Defendants against Plaintiffs’ claims, we now turn to the substantive questions presented by Plaintiffs in this action. Specifically, those questions are as follows: (1) whether the Marriage Laws violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) whether the Marriage Laws violate Plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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A. Due Process 1. Fundamental Right to Marry
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that all citizens have certain “fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty [that] are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)). The Supreme Court has described the individual’s right to liberty as “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.” Id. at 851.
Encompassed within the right to liberty is the fundamental right to marry. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “the most important relation in life” and “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”). The fundamental right to marry has been historically and repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court and was perhaps most eloquently described in the concluding lines of Griswold v.
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Connecticut, We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The parties to this action certainly do not dispute that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individuals the fundamental right to marry. They stridently part company, however, over whether the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to marry a person of the same sex. Plaintiffs contend that the fundamental right to marry belongs to the individual and protects each individual’s choice of whom to marry. In stark contrast, Defendants contend that, because “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never recognized that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry a person of one’s choice,” the Marriage Laws do not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights. (Doc. 117, p. 20) (emphasis in original). Against this jurisprudential backdrop, and in view of the parties’ polarized positions, we are tasked to consider and address the scope of the fundamental right to marry.
While the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Due Process Clause only
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“protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (internal citation and quotation marks ommitted), the Supreme Court has clarified the boundaries of the fundamental right to marry when tested by new societal norms. Perhaps the most classic example of such clarification is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, the Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s laws against interracial marriage, finding the state’s anti-miscegenation statutes violative of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court characterized the right to marry as one that “resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” Id. at 12.
In a retrospective discussion of Loving, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that its decision to find Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional was entirely correct, despite a long historical tradition in this nation of prohibiting interracial couples from marrying. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-848; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]either history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”), overruled by Lawrence, 478 U.S. 186; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he Court
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recognized that race restrictions, despite their historical prevalence, stood in stark contrast to the concepts of liberty and choice inherent in the right to marry.”).
Thereafter, in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to marry resides with the individual when it struck down a Missouri regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying unless the prison superintendent approved of the marriage. The Supreme Court held that inmates retained their fundamental right to marry even though they had a reduced expectation of liberty during incarceration and despite the fact that the marriage, at least initially, would not result in procreation. See id. at 95-96.
More recently, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court confirmed that gay and lesbian individuals do not forfeit their constitutional liberties simply because of their sexual orientation, noting that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” 539 U.S. at 574. Emphasizing that these rights are personal to the individual, the Supreme Court stated that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.” Id. In June of last year, the Supreme Court determined that the federal DOMA’s one man and one woman definition of marriage was an unconstitutional “interference with the equal dignity of same-sex
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marriages” legally recognized in some states. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. With the weight and impetus of the foregoing Supreme Court jurisprudence
in mind, this Court is not only moved by the logic that the fundamental right to marry is a personal right to be exercised by the individual, but also rejects Defendants’ contention that concepts of history and tradition dictate that same-sex marriage is excluded from the fundamental right to marry. The right Plaintiffs seek to exercise is not a new right, but is rather a right that these individuals have always been guaranteed by the United States Constitution. As aptly explained by the Supreme Court in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 539 U.S. at 578-79; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse . . . .”); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (“The Constitution is not so rigid that it always mandates the same outcome even when its principles operate on a new set of facts that were previously unknown[.]”). Recognizing that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but
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not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry,” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we specifically hold that the fundamental right to marry as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution encompasses the right to marry a person of one’s own sex.6 We further hold that this fundamental right is infringed upon by 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102, which defines marriage as between one man and one woman and thus precludes same-sex marriage. Accordingly, 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102 is unconstitutional.
2. Marriage Recognition Having reached the conclusion that same-sex marriage is included within the fundamental right to marry and is infringed upon by 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102, it necessarily follows that 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704, which refuses to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other jurisdictions, is also unconstitutional. Specifically, Pennsylvania’s non-recognition law robs those of the Plaintiffs who are already married of their fundamental liberty interest in the legal recognition of their marriages in Pennsylvania. See De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236, at *66 (“[B]y declaring existing, lawful same-sex marriages void and denying
6 Several of our sister district courts have reached precisely this same conclusion in recently penned opinions. See Latta, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66417; Henry v. Himes, No. 14129, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51211, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio April 14, 2014); De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236; Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
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married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process.”); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“When a state effectively terminates the marriage of a same-sex couple married in another jurisdiction, it intrudes into the realm of private marital, family, and intimate relations specifically protected by the Supreme Court.”); Henry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 512111, at *29 (right to remain married is a fundamental liberty interest appropriately protected by the Due Process Clause); Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-355, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63421, 2014 WL 1814064 (S.D. Ind. May 8, 2014); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (When one jurisdiction refuses recognition of family relationships legally established in another, “[t]he differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”). Accordingly, we declare that 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704 violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.
B. Equal Protection Plaintiffs also advocate that the Marriage Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision forbids a state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, see U.S.
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CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, effectively directing the like treatment of similarlysituated persons, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
Laws reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause are subject to various levels of scrutiny depending upon the classification imposed. See generally City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985). Strict scrutiny is reserved for statutes engendering suspect classifications, such as those based on race, alienage, or national origin, and requires the government to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to further compelling state interests. See id. at 440; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). Intermediate or heightened scrutiny has been applied to classifications deemed “quasi-suspect,”7 such as those based on sex or illegitimacy. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). To survive intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Lastly, for classifications that do not target suspect or quasi-suspect groups, courts apply rational-basis review, which is satisfied if a statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See
7 We use the terms “heightened scrutiny” and “intermediate scrutiny” interchangeably to refer to the analysis applicable to laws targeting quasi-suspect classes.
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Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Review for rationality is highly
deferential to the legislature, and the burden rests with the challenger to negate
every possible basis for the law. See id.8
As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the level of scrutiny applicable
to classifications based on sexual orientation. Defendants argue for rational-basis
review, while Plaintiffs would have us apply heightened scrutiny.9
1. Heightened Scrutiny
The Third Circuit has never discoursed on the appropriate level of scrutiny
to be applied to classifications based on sexual orientation, nor has the Supreme
8 An additional strand of equal protection jurisprudence protects against the infringement of fundamental rights and applies strict scrutiny where the government discriminates among people as to the exercise of such rights. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 691 (4th ed. 2011). Based on our discussion supra, determining that Plaintiffs have suffered a deprivation of their fundamental right to marry and be recognized as married, we conclude that strict scrutiny is appropriate under the fundamental rights strand of equal protection jurisprudence. However, we focus our attention on the more typical application of equal protection principles, involving the constitutionality of distinctions among classes.
9 Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that, when evaluating statutes categorizing on the basis of sexual orientation, “[t]his Court should apply at least the intermediate scrutiny applied to quasisuspect classifications . . ..” (Doc. 114, p. 50). Interpreting that Plaintiffs’ arguments largely advocate for the application of intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, we, too, confine our analysis to the appropriateness of heightened scrutiny.
As an additional, alternative argument, Plaintiffs also contend that the Marriage Laws impose sex-based classifications and, on this ground, are subject to intermediate scrutiny. We find this characterization less compelling, observing, as a practical matter, that “the intentional discrimination occurring in this case has nothing to do with gender-based prejudice or stereotypes[.]” Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 439 (Cal. 2008) (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sex[] and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation . . . traditionally have been viewed as distinct phenomena.”).
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Court rendered an explicit holding on that point. Thus, we must consider and determine whether gay and lesbian persons comprise a quasi-suspect class for purposes of an equal protection analysis of the Marriage Laws. While Windsor, the most recent apposite pronouncement by the Supreme Court, offers little concrete guidance, we glean from it and other Supreme Court jurisprudence that heightened scrutiny is, at minimum, not foreclosed. Indeed, in the tea leaves of Windsor and its forebears we apprehend the application of scrutiny more exacting than deferential.
As Justice Scalia cogently remarked in his dissent, “if [Windsor] is meant to be an equal-protection opinion, it is a confusing one.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Windsor did not identify the appropriate level of scrutiny, its discussion is manifestly not representative of deferential review. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles [the rational-basis] framework” (emphasis omitted)). The Court did not evaluate hypothetical justifications for the law but rather focused on the harm resulting from DOMA, which is inharmonious with deferential review. See, e.g., McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (explaining that, under rational-basis scrutiny, legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally “despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
25

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inequality,” and “[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it”). Indeed, far from affording the statute the presumption of validity, Windsor found DOMA unconstitutional because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added); see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbot Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480, 483 (9th Cir. 2014) (examining “what the Court actually did” in Windsor and concluding that the decision requires heightened scrutiny) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
It has been observed that other of the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases purporting to apply deferential review have also, in practice, probed more deeply, especially where the subject group has suffered historic patterns of deprivation. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The Court has . . . undertaken a more careful assessment of the justifications than the light scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review [in examining statutes targeting women, the poor, the mentally impaired, and gays and lesbians].”). Notably, the Court’s sexual orientation jurisprudence has generally afforded considerably less deference than would be expected under usual rational-basis review. See generally Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1362 (2013)
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(referencing Romer and Lawrence, and explaining that many commentators have
characterized the scrutiny applied to sexual orientation classifications as “rational
basis with bite”).
Furthermore, a determination to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications
standing on sexual orientation would be far from unprecedented, as a number of federal and state courts have indicated that such scrutiny is warranted.10
Hence, we proceed to consider whether classifications based on sexual
orientation qualify as quasi-suspect. a. Indicia of Suspectness11
The Supreme Court has established certain criteria for evaluating whether a
class qualifies as suspect or quasi-suspect, which query whether the group: (1) has
been subjected to “a history of purposeful unequal treatment,” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); (2) possesses a characteristic that
“frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,”
10 See, e.g., SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483-84; Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185; Latta, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66417, at *22; Henry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51211, at *46-51; De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236, at *39; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333 (D. Conn. 2012); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (decision of 20 Bankruptcy Judges); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895-96 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 444; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 475-76 (Conn. 2008).
11 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (coining “indicia of suspectness”).
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Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; (3) exhibits “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group[,]” Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); and (4) is “a minority or politically powerless.” Id. Of the four factors, the first two are most meaningful. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181 (“Immutability and lack of political power are not strictly necessary factors to identify a suspect class.”). The criteria function as a lodestar, and as Justice Thurgood Marshall effectually observed, “[n]o single talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Defendants do not advance that sexual orientation is mutable or bears a relation to ability to participate in society. Rather, they dispute only that gay and lesbian persons have suffered requisite historical discrimination and lack political power. Nonetheless, we address each criterion in turn.
i. History of Discrimination That the gay and lesbian community has endured historical discrimination at the national level is uncontested. In terms of government-sanctioned
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discrimination, in 1952, Congress prohibited gay men and women from entering the country or securing citizenship. (Doc. 115-1, pp. 129-30). In 1953, President Eisenhower issued an executive order banning the employment of homosexuals and requiring that private contractors currently employing gay individuals search out and terminate them. (Id. p. 129). Although the ban on hiring gay employees was lifted in 1975, federal agencies were free to discriminate against homosexuals in employment matters until President Clinton forbade the practice in 1998. (Id. p. 137). Beginning in World War II, the military developed systematic policies to exclude personnel on the basis of homosexuality, and, following the war, the Veterans Administration denied GI benefits to service members who had been discharged because of their sexuality. (Id. p. 128).
Within our lifetime, gay people have been the targets of pervasive police harassment, including raids on bars, clubs, and private homes; portrayed by the press as perverts and child molesters; and victimized in horrific hate crimes. (E.g., id. pp. 126-28, 131-32, 141). Gay and lesbian persons have been prevented from adopting and serving as foster parents, and the majority of states prohibit same-sex marriage. (Id. pp. 139, 142).
Perhaps most illustrative of the pervasive historic discrimination faced by gays and lesbians was the widespread and enduring criminalization of homosexual
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conduct. Before the 1960s, all states punished sexual intimacy between men, and,
until the publish of Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, thirteen states categorized sodomy
as a felony offense. (Id. p. 121). Our country’s military continued to make
sodomy a crime until 2013. (Id. p. 128).
The nation’s history of discrimination against gays and lesbians speaks for
itself. What Defendants contest is a record of discrimination in Pennsylvania,
which they appear to believe is required for a finding of historical injustice.
However, Defendants provide no authority directing a narrowed geographic focus
in discerning longstanding discrimination, and our review of Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests no such constraint. Cf., e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (in
assessing the constitutionality of a Massachusetts mandatory retirement law,
evaluating “the treatment of the aged in this Nation”).12
12 To address the merits of Defendants’ concern, however, we pause to note that Pennsylvania’s treatment of homosexuals also evidences long-term discrimination. For example, in the 1950s, the Philadelphia police formed a “morals squad,” arresting some 200 gay men per month. (Doc. 115-1, p. 132). In 1986, a Pennsylvania appellate court upheld an order heavily restricting a father’s custody rights based on his sexuality, endorsing that his daughters were “innocent and impressionable” and that exposure to his homosexual relationship would inevitably result in “emotional disturbance, perhaps severe.” (Id. pp. 135-36) (citing Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715 (Pa.Super. 1986)). Also, state legislators have sponsored bills in every session since 2006 proposing to amend the Constitution to enshrine the definition of marriage as between one man and one woman. (Id. p. 144). During debate, elected officials remarked that failing to exclude same-sex couples from marriage could lead to the legalization of incest and bestiality, and one senator called homosexual relationships “dysfunctional,” comparing same-sex marriage to pedophilia. (Id. p. 145). Further, as discussed infra, Pennsylvania lacks statutory anti-discrimination legislation protecting gay and lesbian persons, thereby permitting discrimination, e.g., in the work place, housing, and public accommodation.
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As an apparently alternative position, Defendants advocate taking a shorter view of national history, focusing on the legal and social progress of the gay community in the past few decades to argue against a finding of historical discrimination. They highlight that many laws adversely targeting homosexuals have been repealed, a number of states have extended anti-discrimination protections to gay men and lesbians, and the media now depicts gay people more widely and positively. (Doc. 115-1, pp. 122, 137, 139). We agree with Plaintiffs that “[t]he fact that some forms of discrimination against gay people have ceased or become less prevalent does not change the fact that lesbian and gay people continue to live with the legacy of a long history of discrimination that created and reinforced the belief that they are an inferior class.” (Doc. 128, p. 6 (citing Doc. 115-1, pp. 120, 378)); see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685-86 (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sex even though “the position of women in America has improved markedly in recent decades”; observing that “women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination” in the public sphere) (footnotes omitted).
In view of the protracted historical record of injustices against gay and
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a.iv. In view of this recitation, we would not find that Pennsylvania lacks a history of discrimination toward gay people.
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lesbian persons in our country (inclusive of this Commonwealth), we find that this consideration points strongly toward the application of heightened scrutiny.
ii. Relation to Ability We need not linger on this criterion: it is axiomatic that sexual orientation has no relevance to a person’s capabilities as a citizen. Accord Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 986 (“[T]here is no dispute in the record or the law that sexual orientation has no relevance to a person’s ability to contribute to society.”).13 Defendants’ silence on this point speaks volumes, and either connotes candor, agreement with Plaintiffs, or both. This factor weighs heavily in favor of recognizing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class.
iii. Distinguishing Characteristic Whether sexual orientation constitutes a sufficiently discernable characteristic is also little in debate and, for our purposes, undisputed by Defendants. Briefly, although this factor is often phrased in terms of “immutability,” the test is broader, encompassing groups whose members can hide
13 See also Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (“Sexual orientation is not a distinguishing characteristic like mental retardation or age which undeniably impacts an individual's capacity and ability to contribute to society. Instead like sex, race, or illegitimacy, homosexuals have been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890 (“Not surprisingly, none of the same-sex marriage decisions from other state courts around the nation have found a person’s sexual orientation to be indicative of the person’s general ability to contribute to society.” (footnote omitted)).
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the distinguishing trait and where the characteristic is subject to change. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (observing that illegitimate children do not “carry an obvious badge”); Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (noting that status as a resident alien or as illegitimate may be subject to change, yet that these classifications compel increased scrutiny). Here, the characteristic in issue is “so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon [it].” Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).
This factor, too, indicates the appropriateness of heightened scrutiny. iv. Political Power
Lastly, we consider whether the subject group lacks political power or is a minority. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602. This consideration centers on relative political influence and inquires whether the “‘discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means.’” Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (to satisfy this factor, the class must be “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). While germane, this factor is not essential for recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J.,
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concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The ‘political powerlessness’ of a group may be relevant, . . . but that factor is neither necessary, as the gender cases demonstrate, nor sufficient, as the example of minors illustrates.”).
In our case, “[t]he question is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes over the years; they clearly have. The question is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184. Defendants contend that the gay community does possess such force, centrally citing Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012). In that case, a district court concluded that homosexuals possessed sufficient political power, noting cultural shifts toward acceptance of gay people, including the President’s endorsement of same-sex marriage, and recent political successes, such as on marriage ballot initiatives at the state level. See id. at 1008, 1013. Defendants highlight that, at present, at least 17 bills have been introduced in Pennsylvania that would protect and benefit gay men and lesbians, four of which redefine marriage inclusively.
While the gay rights movement has undoubtedly gained recognition as a vigorous force and has influenced public policy to some extent, there remains an absence of statutory, anti-discrimination protections which may indicate continuing political weakness. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989; Pedersen,
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881 F. Supp. 2d at 327. Today, in over half of states including Pennsylvania, gay and lesbian individuals lack statewide, statutory protections against discrimination in housing and public accommodation, as well as in firing, refusal to hire, and demotion in private-sector employment. (Doc. 115-1, p. 137). As to the proposed legislation in Pennsylvania, we find it of little assistance to our inquiry as there can be no assurance that such bills will garner sufficient support for passage.
Furthermore, some courts finding homosexuals to be politically powerless have taken guidance from the plurality in Frontiero, noting that women had achieved great political victories at the time of the decision but were nonetheless considered a quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 328-29; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 894. Similar to the status of women in 1973, homosexuals’ position “has improved markedly in recent decades,” but they still “face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . in the political arena.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685-86 (footnotes omitted); see Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184.
This factor appears more equivocal than the others. However, in view of the general lack of statutory protections for homosexual persons, we perceive a weak positive in favor of heightened scrutiny.
To summarize, we find that all four factors weigh in favor of a finding that
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gay and lesbian persons compose a class that is subject to heightened scrutiny. We agree with the Second Circuit, and the district court cases that followed it, that the class is quasi-suspect – as opposed to suspect – “based on the weight of the factors and on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasisuspect.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185.
Having concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation are quasisuspect, we proceed to apply intermediate scrutiny to the Marriage Laws in consideration of their constitutionality.
b. Application of Heightened Scrutiny As stated, a statutory classification survives intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important governmental objective, with the party defending the statute carrying the burden to demonstrate the rationale. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. The Supreme Court has also described the standard as demanding an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Admin’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). Quasi-suspect classifications are subject to heightened review because the preeminent characteristic of the group “generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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In terms of state interests served by Pennsylvania’s Marriage Laws, Defendants advance the following: the promotion of procreation, child-rearing and the well-being of children, tradition, and economic protection of Pennsylvania businesses. Defendants appear to defend only the first two aims, stating that numerous federal and state courts have agreed that responsible procreation and child-rearing are legitimate state interests and providing extensive authority for that proposition. Significantly, Defendants claim only that the objectives are “legitimate,” advancing no argument that the interests are “important” state interests as required to withstand heightened scrutiny. Also, Defendants do not explain the relationship between the classification and the governmental objectives served; much less do they provide an exceedingly persuasive justification. In essence, Defendants argue within the framework of deferential review and go no further.14 Indeed, it is unsurprising that Defendants muster no argument engaging the strictures of heightened scrutiny, as we, too, are unable to fathom an ingenuous defense saving the Marriage Laws from being invalidated under this more-searching standard.15
14 Amicus, a group of current and former Pennsylvania legislators, submitted a brief also arguing that rational basis review is satisfied here. Accordingly, their assertions do not aid our examination under heightened scrutiny.
15 Parenthetically, a number of courts considering the constitutionality of comparable state marriage laws, underpinned by state interests not dissimilar to those forwarded here, have
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In sum, Defendants have failed to carry their burden, and we conclude that the classification imposed by the Marriage Laws based on sexual orientation is not substantially related to an important governmental interest. Accordingly, we hold that the Marriage Laws violate the principles of equal protection and are therefore unconstitutional. V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Pennsylvania’s Marriage Laws violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because these laws are unconstitutional, we shall enter an order permanently enjoining their enforcement. By virtue of this ruling, same-sex couples who seek to marry in Pennsylvania may do so, and already married same-sex couples will be recognized as such in the Commonwealth.
The issue we resolve today is a divisive one. Some of our citizens are made deeply uncomfortable by the notion of same-sex marriage. However, that samesex marriage causes discomfort in some does not make its prohibition constitutional. Nor can past tradition trump the bedrock constitutional guarantees
concluded that those laws cannot withstand even rational-basis review. See, e.g., Geiger, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68171; DeBoer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37274, at *33; Bourke, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17457, at *32; Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1295; Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
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 Case 1:13-cv-01861-JEJ Document 150 Filed 06/18/14 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEB WH ITEWOOD, et al.,

I:I3 -cv-186 1

Plainti ffs, v.

Hon. John E. Jones III

MICHAEL WOLF, in his official capacity as Secretary, Pennsylvania Department ofHealth, et al. ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Ju ne 18, 2014

Presently pendi ng before the Court is the post-j udgment Motion for

Intervention of Proposed Intervenor-De fend ant, Theresa Santai -Gaffn ey,

Schuylki11 County Clerk of the Orphans' Court and Register of Wills (hereinafter

"Santai-Gaffney"). (Doc. 139). For the reasons that fo llow, the Motion shall be

denied.

l. BACKGROUND

By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May 20, 20 14, we declared as

unconstitutional two Pennsylvania statutes that prohibited and refused to

recognize same-sex marriages (collectively "the Marriage Laws") and permanently

enjoined their enforcement. (Docs. 133 and 134). On the fo llowing day, the

Case 1:13-cv-01861-JEJ Document 150 Filed 06/18/14 Page 2 of 10
Governor of the Co mmonwealth announced that the state Defendants would not appeal the deci sion. In excess of two weeks followin g that announcement, SantaiGaffney filed the instant Motion seeking to intervene in this matter for purposes of filing an appeal of our decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. l II. DISCUSSION
Santai-Gaffney seeks to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), providing for intervention of right, and 24(b), outlining permissive intervention. Neither path is successful for Santai-Gaffney, for the reasons set forth hereinafter.
A. Intervention of Right For intervention of right, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relevantly provide that,
[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who ... claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so si tuated that di sposi ng of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the mo vant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
I Santai-Gaffney also fi led a Motion to Stay our decision pending her proposed appeaL (Doc. 141 ). Because we shall deny Santai-Gaffney's intervention request, we need not address the Motion to Stay_
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FED. R. Clv. P. 24(a)(2). The Third Circuit has interpreted that a movant must demonstrate four elements to meet this standard: (I) a timely filing seeking leave to intervene; (2) a sufficient interest in the proceeding; (3) danger that the interest wi ll be impaired or affected, for practical purposes, by the disposition of the underlying matter; and (4) that existing parties to the suit do not adeq uately represent the movant' s interest. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc.,
419 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing Kleissler v. u.s. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d
964,969 (3d Cir. 1998». Since the motion is not technically untimely, we begin by assessing the
sufficiency of the interest asserted by Santai-Gaffney.' Although courts have struggled to explici tly define the nature of the interest required for intervention of right, see Mountain Top Condo. Ass 'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361 , 366 (3 d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit has issued some general guidance. To meet this prong of the test, a prospective intervenor must fundamentally demonstrate that her interest relates to the subject of the underlying proceeding, i.e., that it is "significantly protectable." Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 969 (quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 53 1 ( 1971» (internal quotation marks
2 We do, however, reiterate that Santai-Gaffney waited until the appeal period was halfway expired to file the instant Motion for the purpose of filing an appeal to the Third Circuit.
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omitted). The asserted interest must be "a cognizable legal interest, and not simply an interest ' of a general and indefi nite character. '" Brody By and Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 11 16 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 60 1 (3d Cir. 1987» (internal quotation marks omitted); see Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d at 220-2 1; Mountain Top Condo. Ass 'n, 72 F.3d at 366. But see Benjamin ex rei. Yock v. DPW ojPo., 701 F.3d 938, 95 1 (3d Cir. 2012) ("A proposed intervenor's interest need not be a legal interest, provided that he or she ' will be practically disadvantaged by the disposition of the action. '" (quoting, indirectly, 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1908 (2d ed. 1986» . Furthermore, the interest must be direct. As the Court in Kleiss/er stated,
the polestar for evaluating a claim for intervention is always whether the proposed intervenor's interest is direct or remote . Due regard for efficient conduct of the litigation requires that intervenors should have an interest that is specific to them, is capable of definition, and will be directly affected in a substantially concrete fas hion by the relief sought. The interest may not be remote or attenuated. Kleissler, 15 7 F.3d at 972. Santai-Gaffney contends that she has a significantly protectable interest in discharging her marriage-related duties and enforcing the Marriage Laws. She
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specifically argues that because her "rights and duties" are affected by our declaration that the Marriage Law are unconstitutional that she must be permitted to intervene. These arguments fall far short of the mark.
Santai-Gaffney is the Clerk of the Orphan's Court and Register of Wills for Schuylkill County. Santai-Gaffney, who is elected to serve the Commonwealth in this capacity, issues marriage licenses to couples seeking to celebrate their civil marriage in the Commonwealth. As clarified by the Commonwealth Court, this duty is "purely ministerial," Department ofHealth v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676, 686-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) meaning that Santai-Gaffney must perform her duties "in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to [her] own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed." Council ofCity ofPhilo. v. Street, 856 A. 2d 893, 896 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). Simply stated, Santai-Gaffney's "rights and duties" are to comp ly with the current state of the law, and she may not exercise any independent judgment when issuing marriage licenses. Thus, Santai-Gaffney's only interest in the outcome action is that she must ensure that she applies the correct current requirements when issuing marriage licenses in the performance of her official duties.
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Santai-Gaffney next argues that she must intervene because, in the wake of our decision and the Governor' s decision not to appeal, the state of the Marriage Laws and the scope of her duties have become unclear. Nothin g could be further from the truth.
On May 20, 2014, we issued an Order declaring that the Marriage Laws are unconstitutional because they violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constituti on. We thus permanently enjoined the Defendants, including the Secretary of Hea lth , from enforcing the laws. We did not stay our mandate. The state Defendants, through an announcement made by the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, decided almost immediately to forgo an appeal of both the deci sion and the pennanent injunction. As a result, same-sex couples in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may marry, and their existing marriages performed in other jurisdictions must be recognized by the Commonwealth. Our decision was entirel y unequivocal, as was the Governor's decision not to appeal.
The effect of our decision on Santai-Gaffney's "rights and duties" in her role as Clerk of the Orphans' Court was further clarified by a Notice issued on June 11, 20 14 by the Department of Health to all Clerks of the Orphans' Courts:
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The decision in Whitewood requires every government official who admini sters the Marriage Law - including every clerk of Ihe orphans' courl - to perfonn his or her duties in accordance with the court's order. That means that a clerk of the orphans' court must consider application s for the issuance of a marriage license wilhoul regard 10 Ihe gender oflhe applicants. See Pa. Dep't of Health, General Notice to All Clerks of the Orphans' Court (June 11,2014) (Doc. 146, Ex. C) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). There is simply no unclarity in the current status of the laws governing the issuance of
marriage licenses in Pennsylvania, and Santai-Gatfuey can claim no confusion.
This specious argument is rejected.
Finally, because Santai-Gaffney has no protectable interest in the
constitutionality of the Marriage Laws, she cannot successfully claim that her
rights and interests were not represented by the Defendants to the action. Indeed
and as aforestated , in her capacity as Clerk of the Orphans' Court and Regi ster of
Wi ll s, Santai-Gaffney has no interest in the merits of the outcome of the case. To
reiterate, Santai-Gaffney serves a ministerial role in which she may exercise no
independent judgment relative to issuing marriage licenses . Thus Santai-Gaffney
fails to carry the final intervention factor'
3 Santai-Gaffney tries to bootstrap her proposed intervention on the fact that Donald Petri lie, Jr., Register of Will s of Bucks County, was named as a defendant in this case. Notably however, Petrille was treated as only a nominal defendant throughout the case. By virtue of a stipulation among the parties, he did not participate in any meani ngful way fo llowing the disposition of the motion to dismiss precisely because he had no interest in the outcome.
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B. Permissive Intervention Turning to permissive intervention, a court may allow anyone to intervene who files a timely motion and, inter alia, "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)( I )(B). In making this determination, a court is required to consider whether intervention will "undul y delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights." FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3); see also 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 24.10 ("In essence, considerations of trial convenience dominate the question of whether to allow permissive intervention."). "[AJs the doctrine's name suggests, [it] is within the discretion of the district cou rt" whether to grant permissive intervention. Brody, 957 F. 2d at 1124. It is in the context of permissive intervention that Santai-Gaffney's true moti ves are revealed, for she seeks permissive intervention on the basis that "a comprehensive defense of Pennsylvania 's Marriage Laws before the appellate courts is desirable to ensure that the important constitutional question raised in this case is properly refined by the crucible of appellate review." (Doc. 140, p. 26). Here, Santai-Gaffney is clearly speaking as a private citizen, and not in her capacity as Register of Wills. In thi s sense Santai-Gaffney evinces personal
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disagreement with our ruling. But this does not confer license to intervene and to appeal the same, given the fact that the Governor of the Commonwealth, who also personally disagrees with our decision, has after obviously careful consideration decided not to appeal. If the highest elected official in the Commonwealth chooses to abide by our decision, it defies credulity that we would permit a single citizen to stand in for him to perfect an appeal.
This Court respects Santai-Gaffney's evidently deep personal disagreement with our decision to strike down the Marriage Laws. That said, we lament that she has used her office as a platform to file the Motion we di spose of today. To repeat - there is nothing remotely ambiguous about how Santai-Gaffney must perform her duties relative to issuing marriage licenses. For her to represent otherwise is wholly disingenuous. At bottom, we have before us a contrived legal argument by a private citizen who seeks to accomplish what the chief executive of the Commonwealth, in his wisdom, has declined to do.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Santai-Gaffney's Motion, both as to intervention of right and permissive intervention. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
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I. Motion for Intervention of Proposed Intervenor-Defendant, Theresa Santai-Gaffney, Schuylkill County Clerk of the Orphans' Court and Register of Wills (Doc. 139) is DENIED.
2. Proposed Intervenor's Motion to Stay (Doc. 141) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
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 Case 1:13-cv-01861-JEJ Document 64 Filed 11/07/13 Page 1 of 61

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEB WHITEWOOD and SUSAN WHITEWOOD, FREDIA HURDLE and LYNN HURDLE, EDWIN HILL and DAVID PALMER, HEATHER POEHLER and KATH POEHLER, FERNANDO CHANG-MUY and LEN RIESER, DAWN PLUMMER and DIANA POLSON, ANGELA GILLEM and GAIL LLOYD, HELENA MILLER and DARA RASPBERRY, RON GEBHARDTSBAUER and GREG WRIGHT, MARLA CATTERMOLE and JULIA LOBUR, SANDY FERLANIE and CHRISTINE DONATO, MAUREEN HENNESSEY, and A.W. AND K.W., minor children, by and through their parents and next friends, DEB WHITEWOOD and SUSAN WHITEWOOD,

Civil Action No. 13-1861-JEJ

Plaintiffs,

v.

MICHAEL WOLF, in his official capacity as Secretary, Department of Health; DAN MEUSER, in his official capacity as Secretary, Department of Revenue; and DONALD PETRILLE, JR., in his official capacity as Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County,

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage and voiding within Pennsylvania the marriages of same-sex couples entered into in other states. 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704. 2. Plaintiffs Fredia and Lynn Hurdle, Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd, Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright, and Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato are lesbian and gay couples in committed relationships who wish to marry for the same reasons so many other couples get married – to publicly declare their love and commitment before their family, friends and community, and to give one another the security and protections that only marriage provides. 3. Plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood, Edwin Hill and David Palmer, Heather and Kath Poehler, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, and Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur are already married, having wed in other states, but are treated as legal strangers in their home state, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 4. Plaintiff Maureen Hennessey is a widow who lost her spouse after 29 years together. Because her spouse was a woman, their marriage is not recognized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and she is not provided the protections afforded to widows under Pennsylvania law.

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5. Plaintiffs A.W. and K.W. are the children of one of the plaintiff couples. The fact that their parents’ marriage is not recognized harms them materially by reducing family resources and stigmatizes them by denying their family social recognition and respect.
6. The plaintiffs come from across the Commonwealth, hailing from Philadelphia, Swarthmore, Downingtown, Bangor, Harrisburg, State College, and Pittsburgh. They come from all walks of life: they include an emergency room doctor, university professors, a truck driver, an executive at BNY Mellon, a psychologist, a dog trainer, state employees, lawyers, an artist, a stay-at-home mom, and retirees. One of the plaintiffs served in the Navy in Vietnam; another is a 12-year veteran of the Army. The plaintiffs reflect the rich diversity of the Commonwealth: they are African-American, Caucasian, Latino, and Asian; they are Methodist, Baptist, Catholic, Quaker, Jewish, Buddhist, and secular. Many have been together for decades, and some are raising children together. The situations faced by these couples are similar to those faced by the thousands of same-sex couples in Pennsylvania who are being denied the basic rights that are afforded by marriage.
7. The plaintiff couples, like other committed couples, have cared for each other, supported each other, sacrificed for each other, and made plans for the future with each other. Some have endured great challenges and hardships
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together, such as financial troubles and serious illness. Maureen Hennessey’s commitment to her spouse endured through her spouse’s four year battle with cancer and untimely death.
8. Like other couples who have made a lifetime commitment to each other, the plaintiff couples are spouses in every sense, except that Pennsylvania law says they cannot marry and, if they are married under the laws of another state, their marriages are not honored here.
9. The Commonwealth’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage adversely impacts the plaintiffs and same-sex couples across the Commonwealth in significant ways. It excludes them from the many legal protections available to spouses. For example, when one partner dies, the surviving partner may face serious financial hardship, including the loss of her home, because she is denied the inheritance tax exemption provided to widows. Lesbian and gay police officers, firefighters and other first responders are denied the peace of mind of knowing that if they make the ultimate sacrifice, their partner will be taken care of through the financial support available to help those who lost their spouses in service to the community. Because of Pennsylvania’s refusal to allow or recognize their marriages, same-sex couples are also denied many federal protections afforded to married couples such as the ability to take time off work to care for a
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sick spouse under the Family Medical Leave Act and access to a spouse’s social security retirement benefits.
10. The exclusion from marriage undermines the plaintiff couples’ ability to achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them “a dignity and status of immense import.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (June 26, 2013). Moreover, they and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a second class status by being barred from marriage. The exclusion “tells [same-sex] couples and all the world that their relationships are unworthy” of recognition. Id. at 2694. And it “humiliates the . . . children now being raised by same-sex couples” and “makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Id.
11. Some of the plaintiffs are old enough to remember when a majority of states had laws prohibiting marriage between people of different races and when the Supreme Court struck down such prohibitions in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), declaring: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
12. Our courts and our society have discarded, one by one, marriage laws that violated the Constitution’s mandate of equality, such as anti-miscegenation laws and laws that denied married women legal independence and the right to
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make decisions for themselves. History has taught us that the vitality of marriage does not depend on maintaining such discriminatory laws. To the contrary, eliminating these unconstitutional aspects of marriage has enhanced the institution. Ending the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from marriage is no different. Indeed, in 14 states and the District of Columbia, same-sex couples are marrying and the institution of marriage continues to thrive.1
13. This is because, at its heart, marriage is both a personal and a public commitment of two people to one another, licensed by the state. Through marriage, the Commonwealth recognizes a couple’s decision to establish a family unit together and support one another and any children of the marriage.
14. Marriage contributes to the happiness of countless couples and their families and also contributes to society. Pennsylvania, like other states, encourages and regulates marriage through hundreds of laws that provide benefits to and impose obligations on married couples. In exchange, the Commonwealth receives the well-established benefits that marriage brings: stable, supportive families that contribute to both the social and economic well-being of the Commonwealth.
1 In addition, Illinois is about to become the fifteenth state to allow same sex couples to marry. On November 5, 2013, the Illinois legislature passed a bill legalizing marriage for same-sex couples, and the Illinois Governor has pledged to sign the bill into law.
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15. Pennsylvania’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage infringes on the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This discriminatory treatment is subject to heightened scrutiny because it burdens the fundamental right to marry and because it discriminates based on sex and sexual orientation. But it cannot stand under any level of scrutiny because the exclusion does not rationally further any legitimate government interest. It serves only to disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their families.
16. Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs seek: (a) a declaration that the Commonwealth’s prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the Commonwealth violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (b) a permanent injunction i) preventing defendants from denying the plaintiff couples and all other same-sex couples otherwise eligible to marry the right to marry in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and ii) directing defendants to recognize the marriages of the plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples validly entered into outside of Pennsylvania.
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THE PARTIES Plaintiffs
Deb and Susan Whitewood and A.W. and K.W. 17. Plaintiffs Deb Whitewood (“Deb”) and Susan Whitewood (“Susan”)
have lived together in a committed relationship for 22 years. Deb and Susan live in Bridgeville, in Allegheny County, with their three children. Susan, 49, is a human resources executive at BNY Mellon. Deb, 45, is a stay-at-home mom. Deb was born and raised in Pittsburgh. Susan has lived in Pennsylvania since attending college in Pittsburgh.
18. Deb and Susan have two daughters, Plaintiff A.W., who is 16, and Plaintiff K.W., who is 15. Deb is the children’s biological mother and Susan obtained second parent adoptions after the children’s births to establish a legal parent-child relationship with both children. Deb and Susan also have a two-yearold son, L.W. He was placed with them by the Allegheny County Department of Children and Youth Services when he was 11 months old. The placement initially was a foster placement. When L.W. was 20 months old, Deb and Susan jointly adopted him. The judge in the Allegheny County Children’s Court granted the adoption after determining that the welfare of L.W. will be promoted by this adoption.
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19. Deb and Susan are very involved in their children’s school and activities. Susan has coached their volleyball and softball teams. When the girls were younger, Deb was active in the PTA and was the “classroom mom” who planned activities and parties for the class and chaperoned field trips. Deb is currently chair of the band festival, which raises most of the money to support the high school band. She also coordinates the concession stand at volleyball games.
20. Deb and Susan are devout Christians and they and their children are members of and actively involved in the Christ United Methodist Church of Bethel Park. Deb is the president of the Altar Guild, which prepares the church’s communion, cares for the sanctuary and holy items, and decorates for the holidays. A.W. and K.W. are in the church choir and sing every Sunday. A.W. is also in the Youth Praise band, which sings contemporary Christian songs at church and at community performances.
21. In 1993, Deb and Susan had a Holy Union ceremony at the church they attended at the time. They both changed their last names to Whitewood, a combination of their surnames. They entered into a civil union in Vermont after that became possible. On October 19, 2013, Deb and Susan married in Maryland. They would have preferred to have been married in their home state of Pennsylvania.
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22. Deb and Susan would like their marriage to be recognized in Pennsylvania to have the same legal protections married couples rely on. They are fearful of how they might be treated in a time of crisis and therefore had a lawyer draw up powers of attorney for them, which they carry with them everywhere
23. In addition, the exclusion from marriage impacts the family financially. The health insurance Deb gets from Susan’s company is taxable income in Pennsylvania; if their marriage were recognized, the health insurance benefits would not be taxed. Moreover, if anything were to happen to Susan, Deb would be denied Susan’s social security and she would have to pay a 15% inheritance tax on half of the couple’s joint property, a tax from which spouses are exempt.
24. Deb and Susan also want their marriage recognized because they are concerned that their children are being taught the message that their family is less deserving of respect and support than other families.
25. A.W. and K.W. grew up assuming that their moms were married. As they got older and came to learn that their parents were not allowed to marry in Pennsylvania, and, later, when their parents did marry in another state, that Pennsylvania would not recognize their marriage, both girls felt that this was unfair to the whole family. They know they are a family and want to be legally recognized as one. They believe they should not be deprived of economic
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resources available to families headed by married couples. And they feel stigmatized by the fact that their parents’ marriage is not recognized. They believe that if their parents’ marriage were recognized by the Commonwealth, that would demonstrate that society accepts their family and considers it worthy of respect. Fredia and Lynn Hurdle
26. Plaintiffs Fredia Hurdle (“Fredia”) and Lynn Hurdle (“Lynn”) of Pittsburgh have lived together in a committed relationship for 22 years. Fredia, 50, is a member of the Teamsters’ Union and drives a truck for the Pittsburgh PostGazette. Lynn, 43, is a pediatric nurse.
27. Fredia and Lynn met in 1990 when Fredia was a Greyhound bus driver and Lynn was a passenger. Fredia had been assigned to a new route and Lynn tried to help her out with directions. They ended up dating via Greyhound for about five months until Fredia moved to Pittsburgh.
28. Fredia and Lynn’s family includes Lynn’s daughter Ashley, now 25, who lived with Fredia and Lynn from the time she was two years old until she went to college. After Fredia’s sister died, two of Fredia’s nephews and a niece came to live with Fredia and Lynn until they were ready to move out on their own. One of the boys lived with them for 9 years.
29. Fredia and Lynn are caregivers by nature and have become known locally as the couple people go to when there are people in need of care. They
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took care of two children in the neighborhood when their families were going through difficult times. And an elderly family friend of Lynn’s lived with Fredia and Lynn, who looked after her for 16 years until she passed away.
30. Fredia and Lynn had a commitment ceremony at a church in 2009. More than 200 friends and family members celebrated with them. Lynn took Fredia’s last name.
31. Fredia and Lynn want to get married because they love each other and believe that families should be recognized through marriage. Because they cannot be married, when Fredia was hospitalized for emergency gall bladder surgery, the nurses refused to give Lynn any information about Fredia’s condition because she was not considered family. When Fredia had to undergo medical testing after an injury, Lynn was not allowed to be present because she was not considered a relative. Because of these experiences, they hired an attorney to prepare powers of attorney for them, which they carry with them at all times.
32. The exclusion from marriage has also meant that Lynn had to go without health insurance for about 3 years because her job did not offer health benefits and Fredia could not add Lynn to her employee health plan. During that time, Lynn had an accident in which she injured her shoulder and had to pay about $2,000 in hospital bills.
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33. Because they cannot be married in Pennsylvania, the couple worries about how Lynn will support herself if Fredia passes away first because Lynn would not be able to count on Fredia’s social security (Fredia earns a larger income than Lynn) or pension for support.
34. Fredia and Lynn also feel that the exclusion from marriage stigmatizes them and other lesbian and gay couples and sends the message that they are not entitled to the same respect other couples enjoy. As an interracial couple, Fredia and Lynn are very aware that before the Supreme Court’s historic decision in Loving v. Virginia, they would have been barred from marrying based on their races. And as an African American who grew up in Virginia and attended a segregated school until third grade, Fredia has experienced the profound social and dignitary harms that come with discrimination. She and Lynn pray that they will soon be permitted to marry and be treated as full and equal citizens in Pennsylvania. Edwin Hill and David Palmer
35. Plaintiffs Edwin Hill (“Ed”) and David Palmer (“David”) have lived together in a committed relationship for 25 years. Ed, 67, and David, 66, live in Bangor, in Northampton County, the town where they met in 1988 while attending a Christian retreat.
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36. Both Ed and David were born and raised in Pennsylvania. Ed grew up just outside of Pittsburgh and graduated from the University of Pittsburgh. David is from Trucksville, just outside of Wilkes-Barre, and he is a graduate of Wilkes University. He also holds a masters’ degree in theology from Drew University.
37. Both men are retired. Ed is a veteran of the United States Navy, having served from 1968 to 1971. He served in Vietnam as a sonar technician aboard the U.S.S. Brooke. He also worked for over 20 years at the Department of Veterans Affairs where he oversaw programs to support veterans. David worked at a museum for 30 years, eventually obtaining the position of Director of Exhibitions. In 1996, after they retired from their careers, David and Ed opened the Arrowheart Inn, a bed and breakfast in Bangor, which they ran for 12 years until, as they say, they retired “for real” in 2008.
38. Ed and David were married on May 10, 2013, in Kennebunk, Maine, accompanied by a few of their dearest friends and members of Ed’s family who live in Maine. Their marriage license was witnessed by Ed’s ninety-year-old aunt and David’s oldest friend. They would have preferred to marry in their home state of Pennsylvania, where more of their friends and family could have joined in their celebration. But after 25 years together, they did not want to wait any longer to marry. And as seniors, they worried that they might not live to see the day when they could marry at home. Since they couldn’t have their wedding in
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Pennsylvania, they had a party in their home town in August for more than seventy family members and friends to celebrate their 25th anniversary as a couple.
39. Even after a quarter century together, the act of marrying has had a profound impact on Ed and David. It meant the world to them to be able to stand before loved ones and declare their love and commitment and to be able to call one another husband.
40. However, Ed and David cannot enjoy the protections and security that marriage brings other couples because their marriage is not recognized in their home state of Pennsylvania. Like many seniors on fixed incomes, they are concerned about managing financially in their retirement. They are especially worried about the fact that when one of them passes away, the widower will be denied the estate tax protections Pennsylvania law provides to married couples. Any inheritance from one to the other – including one half of the value of their home and joint bank accounts – will be taxed at the rate of 15%, the highest rate. If their marriage were recognized, there would be no such tax. Ed and David have worked hard to save extra money for retirement so that neither of them will be forced out of their home due to the large tax bill that will come when one of them passes. But losing such a large share of the family’s assets will significantly reduce the economic security of the surviving spouse and the standard of living he will have for the rest of his years.
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41. Ed and David have talked about moving to another state where their marriage would be recognized and they would have more financial security. But they do not want to leave their home and community. They want to grow old together in the place where they met twenty-five years ago. Heather and Kath Poehler
42. Plaintiffs Heather Poehler (“Heather”) and Katherine Poehler (“Kath”) have lived together in a committed relationship for 10 years. Heather, 44, and Kath, 42, live in Downingtown, in Chester County. They live off a country road on 8 acres of land with three dogs that they rescued from an animal shelter, two cats, and seven chickens. Heather is a Medicaid Liaison Manager at a healthcare auditing firm. Kath owns a dog training and dog walking business.
43. On September 10, 2005, Heather and Kath got married in Massachusetts, their home state at the time. Heather changed her last name to share Kath’s.
44. In 2007, during difficult economic times, Heather was offered a promising job in Philadelphia and the couple relocated there. Going from being treated as the married couple that they are in Massachusetts to being treated as legal strangers in Pennsylvania has been hard for them logistically, financially, and emotionally. For example, they had difficulty preparing their tax returns and completing mortgage paperwork in Pennsylvania because accountants and bank
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officials were unsure whether to treat the couple as married or unmarried. They pay more for health insurance than they would if their marriage were recognized in Pennsylvania because they must pay taxes on the health insurance for Kath that Heather gets through her employer.
45. Having their marriage disregarded by the Commonwealth has also taken an emotional toll on the couple. It is painful not to be respected as a married couple or recognized as a family. And they feel vulnerable about what could happen in times of crisis. They felt especially anxious last year when Heather underwent surgeries for a broken leg and Kath had to be hospitalized for a severe allergic reaction. Because they are not recognized as spouses in Pennsylvania, neither is automatically legally authorized to make medical decisions for the other if necessary. Instead, with each trip to the hospital or doctor, they have had to explain their relationship and prove it with paperwork.
46. Heather and Kath have developed roots in Pennsylvania. It has become their home. The idea of having to leave the community they love in order to have their marriage respected saddens them. Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser
47. Plaintiffs Fernando Chang-Muy (“Fernando”) and Len Rieser (“Len”) have lived together in a committed relationship for 32 years. Fernando, who is 58, was born in Cuba and emigrated to the United States with his family when he was
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a child. Len, 64, grew up in Vermont. The couple moved to Philadelphia in 1982, when Fernando was offered a job there. Philadelphia has been their home ever since.
48. Fernando and Len are the proud parents of Isabel, whom they adopted when she was 10 months old. Isabel, now 21, is a student at Temple University and aspires to be a teacher.
49. Fernando and Len are both lawyers and professors who have dedicated their careers to the public interest. Fernando currently teaches a course on refugee law and policy at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and nonprofit management and immigration policy courses at the University’s Graduate School of Social Policy and Practice. Len has dedicated his career to advocating for children in the educational, mental health, and child welfare settings. For approximately 17 years, he co-directed and directed the Education Law Center-PA. He currently teaches in the clinical program at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and is an adjunct professor at Temple University and Arcadia University.
50. Fernando and Len entered into a civil union in Vermont on February 14, 2004. They celebrated with their family at Len’s parents’ house there. Although obtaining the civil union was an important moment for them, it also reinforced the fact that their relationship is not legally recognized in the state where they actually live.
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51. Fernando and Len want to be able to be married and have their marriage recognized in Pennsylvania. They see marriage as an appropriate recognition of the deep and permanent commitment they have made to each other. More importantly, Fernando and Len know that if they could marry, it would mean a lot to their daughter, who would like her parents to be married to each other.
52. When Isabel was growing up, it was important to Fernando and Len for her to have the same sense of security that any other child gets from being part of a loving family. Fernando and Len made a point, when Isabel was in elementary and secondary school, of making sure her teachers understood that they were a family and that they desired to be active in the school community just like any other parents. Fortunately, they managed to find school personnel who would support them, as well as health care providers, a religious community, neighbors, and other essential components of their lives as a family.
53. Fernando and Len recognize that even if they had been able to be married, the process of establishing themselves and their daughter as a family would still have had its challenges, as they know that there are people who disapprove of relationships such as theirs. But they are convinced that if marriage had been available to them, a major barrier to their acceptance and well-being as a family would have been removed, and that, even now, the availability of marriage would make a significant, positive difference to their life as a family.
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54. Moreover, as lawyers, Fernando and Len are aware of how vulnerable they are because they are excluded from the many legal protections of marriage. They have done everything that lawyers can do to protect themselves in the absence of marriage, such as drawing up wills and powers of attorney, but they know that there is nothing they can do to access most of the protections available to married couples. Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson
55. Plaintiffs Dawn Plummer (“Dawn”) and Diana Polson (“Diana”) of Pittsburgh have lived together in a committed relationship for 13 years. They met as college students on a study abroad program in Brazil.
56. Dawn, 37, is a fundraiser for The Poverty Initiative, an anti-poverty organization. Diana, 37, recently finished her Ph.D. and now works for a nonprofit research think tank aimed at improving the Pennsylvania economy for working people.
57. Dawn and Diana settled in Pittsburgh in 2011 because Dawn has Pennsylvania roots, having grown up in Camp Hill and having family in Pittsburgh, and they thought Pittsburgh would be a great city in which to raise children.
58. Dawn and Diana have two sons – a five-year-old, E.P., and a oneyear-old, J.P. They each gave birth to one of the children. They have completed a
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second parent adoption for E.P. They plan to do the same for J.P. but need to save money to be able to pay the more than $2,500 they were told it will cost. Until then, they feel vulnerable because if anything were to happen to Diana, J.P. has no legal tie to Dawn. If they were legally married in Pennsylvania this would not be the case because both spouses would be recognized as parents from the moment of the child’s birth.
59. Dawn and Diana had a commitment ceremony in the Catskills in front of 50 family members and friends in 2007. They want to be legally married because they want the same legal protections other couples enjoy. Every time they have to check the “single” box on a form, it feels demeaning to their relationship. And it would mean a lot to their relatives for them to marry. Moreover, Dawn and Diana’s five-year-old son is beginning to understand what marriage is. He asks a lot of questions, and they struggle to come up with a way to explain to him why his parents aren’t allowed to get legally married. Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd
60. Plaintiffs Angela Gillem (“Angela”) and Gail Lloyd (“Gail”) of Philadelphia have lived together in a committed relationship for 17 years. Angela, 61, is a clinical psychologist and professor at Arcadia University whose current area of research is multi-cultural competency for counselors. Gail, 55, is a
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filmmaker and visual artist who graduated from Temple University’s Film and Media Arts Program.
61. Angela and Gail feel incredibly lucky to have found one another and have long known that they would be together forever. They wear matching rings to symbolize their commitment to one another and to show the world that they each “belong to someone.” They are registered domestic partners in Philadelphia.
62. Angela and Gail would like to get married and be recognized as a married couple in their home state because they love each other and want the chance to stand up and have their family and community witness them make the fullest commitment two people can make to one another.
63. They also want the security that comes with marriage and the protections the law provides to married couples in times of need. Because Angela is the primary breadwinner and Gail, as an artist, does not draw a steady paycheck to contribute to social security, the couple fears for Gail’s economic security should Angela be the first of them to pass away. Because they cannot be married, Gail would not get Angela’s social security and she would lose a substantial portion of the family’s assets because she would not be entitled to the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax.
64. They have tried to replicate some of the security that comes with marriage by having wills and healthcare and financial powers of attorney drawn up
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to grant each other some of the rights and decision-making power that would have come automatically with marriage.
65. On July 1, 2013, Angela and Gail went to the office of the Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County to apply for a marriage license. Their application was refused because they are a same-sex couple. Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry
66. Plaintiffs Helena Miller (“Helena”) and Dara Raspberry (“Dara”) of Philadelphia have lived together in a committed relationship for six years. Helena, 39, is a teacher and educational consultant. Dara, 43, is an emergency medicine physician at Einstein Medical Center Philadelphia.
67. In 2010, while they resided in New York, Helena and Dara decided to get married. They wanted to make a public commitment to each other in front of their friends and families, to join their families together, and to start a new family together. They got married in Connecticut on September 25, 2010, with 140 of their loved ones in attendance.
68. In the fall of 2011, because they were hoping to soon have children of their own, they decided to move from New York to Philadelphia in order to be closer to their families.
69. Helena and Dara’s dream to start a family came true on May 28, 2013, when Helena gave birth to their daughter, Z.R. Dara’s second-parent adoption of
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Z.R. was completed on September 6, 2013. During the time between Z.R.’s birth and the second-parent adoption, Z.R. had only one legally recognized parent. Helena and Dara had to spend more than $1,800 in attorney fees and costs to complete the adoption. If their marriage were recognized in Pennsylvania, Dara would automatically and immediately have been recognized as a parent to any child born to her spouse.
70. Sadly, for Helena and Dara, the cost of moving to Pennsylvania to be close to family was to be effectively “unmarried” and, thus, considered less of a family in the eyes of the state. Helena and Dara would like their marriage to be recognized in Pennsylvania not only because of the concrete protections it would provide to them and their daughter, but also because they feel that being treated as an unmarried couple disrespects the commitment they have made to one another and devalues their family. They hope that their marriage will be recognized in Pennsylvania before their baby is old enough to be aware that the Commonwealth does not consider her family deserving of the same respect afforded other families. Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright
71. Plaintiffs Ron Gebhardtsbauer (“Ron”) and Greg Wright (“Greg”) have lived together in a committed relationship for 19 years. Ron, who is 61, is a Clinical Associate Professor and head of the Actuarial Science Program at Penn
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State University. Greg, 57, is an acupuncturist in private practice. Ron and Greg have lived in State College since 2008.
72. Ron and Greg registered as domestic partners in State College when that became possible in 2011. They are engaged to be married. They want to get married to declare publicly and officially their commitment. They would like to be able to refer to one another officially as spouses. They feel that using the term “partner” is inadequate as it does not convey the level of commitment they have made to one another.
73. It is important to them to marry in Pennsylvania, where they have made their home and built their lives together. And they would like to be able to marry in their own church. Their minister has already agreed to officiate at the ceremony if that becomes an option for them legally.
74. Because their relationship is not legally recognized in Pennsylvania, when one of them passes away, the surviving partner will be denied the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax and will have to pay a 15% tax on half of everything the couple owns together, including their home. Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur
75. Plaintiffs Marla Cattermole (“Marla”) and Julia Lobur (“Julia”) of Harrisburg have lived together in a committed relationship for 27 years. They met during Army basic training.
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76. Julia, who is 58, is a lifelong Pennsylvanian, born and raised in New Kensington, just outside of Pittsburgh. Marla, 54, grew up in Iowa but moved to Pennsylvania in 1986 to be with Julia. Marla and Julia both work for the Commonwealth, Julia as a software architect and project manager and Marla as a senior benefits manager. Julia is also an adjunct lecturer in computer science at Penn State Harrisburg.
77. Marla is a 12-year veteran of the Army. She left the Army as a sergeant in 1995, having earned various commendations. Julia attempted to serve her country and enlisted in the Army in 1983 but she was discharged during basic training after her sexual orientation was revealed to her superiors. Military policy at the time barred service by lesbians and gay men.
78. Marla and Julia strongly support each other. They share finances and all of their property, including their home, is jointly owned. They not only take care of each other, they also took care of Julia’s mother for 12 years when it became difficult for her physically and financially to live on her own. She lived with them until she passed away in 1997.
79. In 2009, Marla and Julia got married in Carroll, Iowa, where Marla grew up. Marla’s mother and sister were there to celebrate with them. They had wanted to marry for years but did not want to do it far from home. They decided to
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marry in Iowa as soon as that became a possibility because it was the closest thing they thought they would get to marrying at “home.”
80. Because their marriage is not recognized in their home state of Pennsylvania, Marla and Julia have gone to considerable expense to have an attorney draw up documents, such as living wills and healthcare proxies, to try to protect themselves. They understand, however, that this affords them only a fraction of the protections that come with marriage and they are concerned that those papers will not hold up in times of crisis.
81. The non-recognition of their marriage also affects them financially. For example, they worked hard to save money for their retirement but worry that when one of them dies, the widow will be left financially insecure because she will be denied the spousal exemption from the inheritance tax. A financial advisor estimated that the tax bill could be up to approximately $50,000. Marla and Julia pay hundreds of dollars a year to carry life insurance policies in order to cover the cost of inheritance tax when one of them dies.
82. The recognition and legitimacy that marriage provides to them means the world to Marla and Julia when they get to experience it. Most recently, when they visited Washington State, they felt joyful and free every time they were recognized as a legal couple, even in matters as mundane as renting a car together.
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They feel the loss of that freedom every time they return to home to Pennsylvania after travelling in a state where their marriage is respected. Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato
83. Plaintiffs Sandra Ferlanie (“Sandy”) and Christine Donato (“Christine”) have lived together in a committed relationship for 17 years. They live in Swarthmore with their five-year-old son, H.F., who is in kindergarten. Sandy, 45, is a trained nurse and works on drug safety at a pharmaceutical company. Christine, 44, is a consultant for pharmaceutical companies.
84. Sandy and Christine’s life is centered around their son and family. After H.F.’s birth, Sandy returned to work at a reduced schedule to have more time at home with him. Sandy and Christine feel blessed to have both sets of their parents close by and that their son is able to spend so much time with his grandparents. Sandy and Christine’s siblings, aunts and uncles, and cousins also live nearby and their son regularly plays with his many cousins. Their home is the center of family life for both of their extended families and is filled with relatives at every holiday.
85. Sandy and Christine would like to get married because they love each other and want their family to be treated no differently than any other. They have hired an attorney to draw up wills and powers of attorney to provide protections
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where possible but know that they cannot access most of the protections and obligations of marriage through any documents.
86. Sandy and Christine have already experienced stresses from the inability to marry. After their son was born, it took about a year for Christine’s second parent adoption to be finalized. During that time, Sandy and Christine felt vulnerable about the lack of legal tie between Christine and H.F. should anything happen to Sandy. A few years later, Sandy was diagnosed with a life-threatening cancer. During this difficult time, the couple realized that their situation would have been even scarier and more precarious for the family if Sandy had fallen gravely ill before Christine’s adoption of their son was final. Dealing with major surgery and chemotherapy reinforced for them the need for the security of marriage as they experienced additional stress about whether Christine would be able to get information from medical staff about Sandy’s condition or be able to make medical decisions for her if necessary given that she wasn’t a legally recognized family member.
87. It’s important for Sandy and Christine to marry in the state where they were raised and have spent their lives. They would also like to be able to marry in their church, Trinity Episcopal, before all of their friends and family.
88. On November 6, 2013, Sandy and Christine went to the office of the Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County to apply for a
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marriage license. Their application was refused because they are a same-sex couple. Maureen Hennessey
89. Plaintiff Maureen Hennessey (“Maureen”), 53, lived in a committed relationship with Mary Beth McIntyre (“Mary Beth”) from 1984 until Mary Beth’s death on May 18, 2013, at the age of 55.
90. Both Maureen and Mary Beth were born and raised in Philadelphia and they shared their lives together in Philadelphia for 29 years. They raised 3 children together – Maureen’s son from a previous relationship, and Mary Beth’s niece and nephew, whose mother died when they were young. And they became grandmothers to three grandchildren, now 19, 9, and 8. They registered as Life Partners with the city of Philadelphia in 2002.
91. In August 2009, Mary Beth was diagnosed with inoperable Stage 4 lung cancer that had spread to her brain and bones. After Mary Beth fell ill, Maureen left her job as a middle school teacher in the Philadelphia School District to care for Mary Beth and help Mary Beth run her business, which was the family’s primary source of income.
92. Maureen and Mary Beth were married in Massachusetts on June 9, 2011. They would have preferred to marry in their home state of Pennsylvania because their loved ones are there and they would have liked to have been able to
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solemnize their marriage at Germantown Friends Meeting. But getting married in Pennsylvania was not an option and they knew their time together was too limited to try to wait for that to change to come.
93. As Mary Beth’s condition deteriorated, she was unable to take basic care of herself. She needed Maureen’s help to get in and out of bed and to the bathroom. Maureen helped bathe her and administered her medications. Because Mary Beth had difficulty chewing and swallowing, Maureen prepared foods that were easy to swallow.
94. While Mary Beth was suffering the physical and emotional pain of end stage cancer, she had the additional burden of worrying about how Maureen would manage financially after she was gone. The couple consulted with an attorney about ways to protect Maureen financially. The attorney was able to provide some protections, such as a will to ensure that Mary Beth’s wishes to leave her property to Maureen would be honored. But there was nothing the attorney could do to establish most of the legal protections that are available to widows and widowers.
95. Because Maureen’s marriage to Mary Beth is not recognized in Pennsylvania, Maureen must pay a 15% inheritance tax on property that Mary Beth left to her, including their shared home. And unless their marriage is recognized in Pennsylvania, Maureen will not be eligible to receive Mary Beth’s social security
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benefits when she turns 65. Because Mary Beth was the primary breadwinner, this will leave Maureen financially vulnerable in her retirement.
96. Pennsylvania’s refusal to recognize her marriage to Mary Beth does not just cause Maureen economic hardship. In her time of grief, she is denied the comfort and dignity of being acknowledged as Mary Beth’s widow.
97. Despite their lengthy committed relationship, which lasted through sickness and health and until death, Mary Beth’s Certificate of Death does not recognize Maureen and Mary Beth’s marriage. Under the heading “Marital Status at Time of Death,” the Certificate of Death states that Mary Beth was “Never Married.” Maureen does not appear under the heading “Surviving Spouse’s Name.” Instead, she is listed under “Informant” as “Partner.”
98. Maureen desires and seeks to have Mary Beth’s Certificate of Death amended to reflect that Mary Beth was married at the time of her death and to identify Maureen as Mary Beth’s surviving spouse.
99. It would be futile to seek this amendment of Mary Beth’s Certificate of Death through the Department of Health because 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704 prohibits the recognition of Maureen and Mary Beth’s marriage and deems their marriage to be “void.”
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100. Plaintiffs Fredia and Lynn Hurdle, Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd, Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright, and Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato are all eligible to marry but for the fact that they wish to marry someone of the same sex. They are all over the age of 18, fully competent, are not married to anyone else, are not within a prohibited degree of consanguinity of each other, and are prepared to provide the required information and pay the license fee. They are willing and able to assume all of the obligations of marriage.
101. Plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood, Edwin Hill and David Palmer, Heather and Kath Poehler, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur, and Maureen Hennessey all were married legally under the laws of other states and their marriages would be recognized within the Commonwealth but for the fact that they are married to a person of the same sex.
102. All of the married plaintiffs are residents of Pennsylvania and file personal income tax returns with the state. All of the married plaintiffs desire and seek to be able to declare themselves as “Married” and not “Single” on their income tax returns and desire and seek to have the option of filing “Jointly,” but 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704 prohibits and will continue to prohibit the same absent relief from this Court.
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103. Upon their deaths, all of the married plaintiffs want their own and their spouse’s respective Certificates of Death issued and maintained by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to reflect their marriage, but 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704 prohibits and will continue to prohibit the same absent relief from this Court. Unless enforcement of 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704 is enjoined, when each of the married plaintiffs dies, their Certificates of Death will, like Mary Beth’s, fail to accurately reflect their marital status and, if their spouse survives, the name of their surviving spouse.
Defendants Michael Wolf, Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
104. Defendant MICHAEL WOLF is the Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such serves as chief executive of the Pennsylvania Department of Health.
105. Secretary Wolf enforces Pennsylvania’s practices, policies, and laws prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples, including 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704.
106. In his official capacity, pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1104 and 1306, he is responsible for preparing and approving the marriage license application and marriage license forms used in county offices across the Commonwealth, which presently prohibit persons of the same sex from marrying by requiring both a
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“Bride” and “Groom.” In his official capacity, pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. § 1106, he is charged with receiving reports of issued marriage licenses from individual counties and with publishing statistics derived from those reports.
107. In his official capacity, he also is responsible for creating forms for Certificates of Death, and the issuance, maintenance, and amendments to such certificates. See, e.g., 35 P.S. §§ 450.201, 450.202, 450.204. The forms prescribed by the Secretary of Health require a declaration of the “Marital Status at Time of Death” and “Surviving Spouse’s Name” of the deceased, if there is one. Those terms are controlled by 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704, and individuals with samesex spouses are prohibited from having their marriage and spouse recognized on their Certificate of Death or from being recognized on their spouse’s Certificate of Death, and they are prohibited from having any previously issued Certificate of Death amended to reflect a deceased person’s marriage to an individual of the same sex. In fact, the 2012 Death Certificate Registration Manual, Revised March 13, 2013, published by the Department of Health, states in emphasized bold-face text that for listing the identity of “Surviving Spouse’s Name” under item 11 of a Certificate of Death, “The name of partner or companion is not acceptable.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original), available at http://www.portal.state. pa.us/portal/portal/server.pt/community/data_provider/20590 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
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108. This refusal to recognize the marriages of plaintiffs denies them dignity, and injures and stigmatizes plaintiffs at one of the must vulnerable periods of life, when they are grieving for the loss of their spouse. Dan Meuser, Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
109. Defendant DAN MEUSER is the Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such serves as chief executive of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue.
110. Secretary Meuser enforces Pennsylvania’s practices, policies, and laws prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples, including 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704.
111. In his official capacity, the Secretary of Revenue is responsible for the preparation of forms used for the assessment and collection of state taxes, including state income taxes. See, e.g., 72 P.S. § 207 (“The Department of Revenue shall prepare, promulgate, and distribute such forms as may be necessary to persons, associations, corporations, public officers, and other debtors, required by law to make and file reports or returns with the department.”); 72 P.S. § 7332 (“The department shall prescribe by regulation the place for filing and return, declaration, statement, or other document required pursuant to this article [Personal Income Tax] and for payment of any tax.”); 72 P.S. § 7335(a) (“The department may prescribe by regulation for the keeping of records, the content and form of
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returns, declarations, statements and other documents and the filing of copies of Federal income tax returns and determinations.”); 61 Pa. Code § 117.9 (“Persons filing returns should use the envelopes and preaddressed prescribed forms furnished to them by the Department.”).
112. The personal income tax return forms set forth by the Department of Revenue (i.e., form PA-40) require a current resident filer to check a box and declare his or her filing status as “S Single,” “J Married, Filing Jointly,” or “M Married, Filing Separately.” Cf. 72 P.S. § 7331 (“Returns of married individuals, deceased or disabled individuals and fiduciaries”); 61 Pa. Code § 117.2 (“Returns of married individuals”). Because of 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704, however, married samesex couples may not file as “Married, Filing Jointly” or “Married, Filing Separately,” but, instead, each individual must separately file as “Single.”
113. These forms mean that married same-sex couples, such as the married plaintiffs in this action, are denied the dignity of filing as the married couples they are. In addition to suffering the indignity of the state denying recognition of their marriages, these couples suffer further by being subject to the state’s demand that they themselves also publicly deny their lifelong commitments to each other and declare themselves to be “Single” under penalty of perjury even though they are not. Further, this also means that married same-sex couples, such as the married plaintiffs, are denied the option of filing their income taxes jointly, which is an
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option the Department states is provided as a matter of “convenience” for married couples and which can save married filers additional costs by preparing just one return instead of two. 2012 Pennsylvania Personal Income Tax Return Booklet, at 7, available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/ community/personal_income_tax/14692 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). Donald Petrille, Jr., Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County
114. The Commonwealth’s Marriage Law provides that “[n]o person shall be joined in marriage in this Commonwealth until a marriage license has been obtained,” and “[n]o marriage license shall be issued except upon written and verified application made by both of the parties intending to marry.” 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1301(a), 1302(a).
115. In each county in the Commonwealth, either the county Register of Wills or the county Clerk of Orphans’ Court issues marriage licenses.
116. Defendant DONALD PETRILLE, JR., is the Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and his office is responsible for issuing marriage licenses in that county.
117. On July 1, 2013, invoking Commonwealth law, the office of Mr. Petrille refused to issue a marriage license to plaintiffs Angela Gillem and Gail Lloyd because they are a same-sex couple.
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118. On November 6, 2013, invoking Commonwealth law, the office of Mr. Petrille refused to issue a marriage license to plaintiffs Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato because they are a same-sex couple.
119. All defendants named above are, and at all relevant times have been, acting under color of state law, and are sued in their official capacities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 120. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 121. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because defendants Wolf and Meuser reside in this district.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Pennsylvania’s Prohibition of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples 122. Pennsylvania’s Marriage Law, 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1101 et seq., governs marriages in the Commonwealth. In 1996, the Marriage Law was amended to expressly prohibit marriage for same-sex couples. The 1996 amendment had two parts. First, it defined marriage as “[a] civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102. Second, in a stark departure from Pennsylvania’s usual recognition of marriages entered into in other states, it made “void in this Commonwealth” any “marriage between persons
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of the same sex . . . entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 1704.
123. As a result, marriage in Pennsylvania is legally available only to opposite-sex couples. Same-sex couples may not marry in Pennsylvania, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in Pennsylvania.
Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples Are Similarly Situated for Purposes of Marriage 124. The Supreme Court has called marriage “the most important relation in life,” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an “expression[] of emotional support and public commitment.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). It is “a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people. . . .” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples. 125. Same-sex couples such as the plaintiff couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage. 126. Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as opposite-sex couples. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples build their lives together, plan their futures together, and hope to grow old together. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically when faced with injury or
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illness. For example, when plaintiff Maureen Hennessey’s spouse, Mary Beth, was dying of cancer, Maureen left her job as a teacher to take care of Mary Beth until Mary Beth passed away. Maureen’s devotion to Mary Beth, the person with whom she shared her life for 29 years, is what marriage is about.
127. Like some opposite-sex couples, some same-sex couples like plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood, Fernando Chang-Muy and Len Rieser, Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, and Sandy Ferlanie and Christine Donato, are parents raising children together.
128. Same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their marriages recognized are just as willing and able as opposite-sex couples to assume the obligations of marriage.
129. The plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples in Pennsylvania, if permitted to marry or have their marriages recognized, would benefit no less than opposite-sex couples from the many legal protections and the social recognition afforded to married couples.
130. There was a time when an individual’s sex was relevant to his or her legal rights and duties within the marital relationship. For example, husbands had a duty to support their wives but not vice versa and husbands had legal ownership of all property belonging to their wives. But these legal distinctions have all been removed such that the legal rights and duties of husbands and wives are now
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identical. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 2301(a) (“[W]here in any statute heretofore enacted
there is a designation restricted to a single sex, the designation shall be deemed to
refer to both sexes unless the designation does not operate to deny or abridge
equality of rights under the law of this Commonwealth because of the sex of the
individual.”).
The Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples from Marriage Causes Substantial Harm to Couples and Their Families
131. By preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to
recognize their marriages from others states, Commonwealth law deprives them of
numerous legal protections that are available to opposite-sex couples in
Pennsylvania by virtue of their marriages. By way of example only:
a. A married person is exempt from inheritance tax on property left to him by an opposite-sex spouse, including the spouse’s share of the couple’s home, and, thus, protected against economic distress or loss of a home because of an inheritance tax bill. 72 P.S. § 9116(a)(1.1)(ii). A same-sex surviving spouse or partner is denied this exemption and must pay a 15% tax, the highest rate, which applies to non-family members. 72 P.S. § 9116(a)(3).
b. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to 50% to 100% of his or her deceased spouse’s estate if the spouse died without a will. 20 Pa. C.S. § 2102. A same-sex surviving spouse or partner in this situation receives nothing.
c. If an opposite-sex spouse becomes incapacitated, her spouse is automatically authorized to make decisions regarding her care. 20 Pa. C.S. § 5461(d)(1)(i). This protection does not extend to a same-sex spouse or partner.
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d. Under the workers’ compensation laws, the opposite-sex spouse of someone who dies or is injured in the workplace is entitled to damages and may bring suit. 77 P.S. §§ 431 et seq. Same-sex spouses or partners have no legal standing to sue over their spouse or partner’s workplace injury.
e. The Commonwealth requires opposite-sex spouses to support one another financially. 23 Pa. C.S. § 4603(a)(1)(i). There is no support obligation for same-sex spouses or partners.
f. Commonwealth laws promote the stability of marriages through rules such as mandatory waiting periods prior to divorce by mutual consent. 23 Pa. C.S. § 3301(c). The divorce laws, including these provisions, do not apply to same-sex spouses or partners.
g. Opposite-sex widows and widowers of military personnel and veterans are eligible for numerous assistance programs. E.g., 51 Pa. C.S. §§ 3502, 7319, 8502; 51 P.S. §§ 20010, 20046, 20096, 20125, 20305. These programs are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners of military personnel and veterans.
h. Opposite-sex widows and widowers of public employees in the Commonwealth are eligible to receive various pensions and survivor benefits upon their spouse’s death. E.g., 53 P.S. §§767(a)(2)(i), 23654.1, 23654–23654.2 (receipt of police officer spouse’s pension by surviving spouse); 53 P.S. § 881.115 (tax exemption of public employee spouse’s retirement allowance); 53 P.S. §§ 23609.2, 23609.3 (lifetime survivor benefits for spouse of retired pensioner); 53 P.S. § 39320 (receipt of fireman’s pension by surviving spouse). These benefits are not provided to surviving same-sex spouses or partners of public employees.
i. Opposite-sex widows and widowers of firefighters, police officers, and other first responders killed in the line of duty are provided financial assistance. 53 P.S. § 891(d) ($100,000 payment to surviving spouse of a firefighter, ambulance or rescue squad member, hazardous material response team member, law enforcement officer, or National Guard member who died in the line of duty). This assistance is not provided to same-sex surviving spouses or partners of first responders.
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j. Property tax rebates or rent rebates are available under Pennsylvania law to certain people over the age of 50 who are widows and widowers of opposite-sex spouses. 53 P.S. §§ 6926.1303-6926.1306. They are not available to same-sex surviving spouses or partners.
k. “Gold Star Family” license plates are available to the opposite-sex widows and widowers of people killed on active military duty. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1365. Surviving same-sex spouses or partners are not eligible for license plates recognizing their loved one’s sacrifice.
132. Same-sex couples are excluded from these and many other legal protections provided for married couples under Pennsylvania law.
133. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also denies them eligibility for numerous federal protections afforded to married couples including in the areas of immigration and citizenship, taxes, and social security. Some of the federal protections for married couples are only available to couples if their marriages are legally recognized in the state in which they live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (marriage for eligibility for social security benefits based on law of state where couple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(b) (same for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, even plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood, Edwin Hill and David Palmer, Heather and Kath Poehler, Helena Miller and Dara Raspberry, Marla Cattermole and Julia Lobur, and Maureen Hennessey, who are already married, cannot access such federal protections as long as Pennsylvania refuses to recognize their existing marriages.
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134. The exclusion from marriage also harms same-sex couples and their families in less tangible ways.
135. Although the plaintiff couples are all in long-term committed relationships, they and other same-sex couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during times of crisis or conflict.
136. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage also harms couples and their children by denying them the social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The terms “married” and “spouse” have universally understood meanings that command respect for a couple’s relationship and the commitment they have made.
137. The exclusion from the esteemed institution of marriage also demeans and stigmatizes lesbian and gay couples and their children by sending the message that they are less worthy and valued than families headed by opposite-sex couples.
138. The impact of the exclusion from marriage on same-sex couples and their families is extensive and real. The denial of the right to marry causes these couples and their families to suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic harms.
139. The plaintiff couples recognize that marriage entails both benefits to and obligations on the partners and they welcome both.
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Excluding Same-Sex Couples from Marriage Is Not Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest,
Let Alone Able to Withstand Heightened Scrutiny 140. As the evidence will show, the prohibition against marriage for samesex couples in Pennsylvania is not closely tailored to serve an important government interest or substantially related to an exceedingly persuasive justification. In fact, as the evidence also will show, the prohibition fails any level of constitutional scrutiny. It is not even rationally related to any legitimate government interests that were offered in support of it when the Marriage Law was amended in 1996 or to any legitimate interest of the Commonwealth that defendants might now offer as a basis for denying same-sex couples the freedom to marry in Pennsylvania. 141. When the Commonwealth enacted the 1996 amendment prohibiting marriage for same-sex couples, legislators in favor of the amendment relied on “moral opposition to same-sex marriages . . . and support of the traditional family unit.” 1996 Pa. Legis. J. (House), at 2017; see also id. at 2019 (“[T]he large majority [of Pennsylvanians] do not want our traditional marriage institution and our state of morals to be changed.”); id. at 2022 (“This is a vote about family values and traditional beliefs . . . .”). Some legislators said there was a need to protect against a financial burden on businesses and taxpayers. Id. at 2018 (“[I]f we are forced to recognize same-sex marriages, this would put an unfunded
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mandate on our businesses, another burden on our taxpayers, and so on.”); id. at 2017 (“Social Security, tax and other benefits presently conferred on spouses would have to be expanded to include married partners of the same sex. The financial costs imposed on society by the forced recognition of same-sex marriage cannot even be calculated at this time.”). And, it was argued, “it is imperative that we in Pennsylvania should stand up for traditional marriage for the benefit of families and children in the Commonwealth and our future.” Id. at 2022. None of these justifications – or any other justification that might now be offered – passes constitutional muster. Moral Opposition to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples and Support of the Traditional Family
142. Neither tradition nor moral disapproval of same-sex relationships or marriage for lesbian and gay couples is a legitimate basis for unequal treatment of same-sex couples under the law. The fact that a discriminatory law is longstanding does not immunize it from constitutional scrutiny. And the Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect to private biases and has expressly rejected moral disapproval of marriage for samesex couples as a legitimate basis for discriminatory treatment of lesbian and gay couples. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (an “interest in protecting traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws” was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
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Preserving the Public Fisc and the Coffers of Private Business 143. The Commonwealth cannot justify its denial of marriage to lesbian
and gay couples by claiming an interest in preserving the public fisc or the coffers of private business. Saving money is not a justification for excluding a group from a government benefit without an independent rationale for why the cost savings ought to be borne by the particular group denied the benefit. Moreover, the evidence will show that there is no factual basis for the notion that allowing and recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples will burden the Commonwealth financially or constitute a burden on businesses. Protection of Children
144. The Commonwealth’s ban on marriage for same-sex couples is not rationally related to child welfare concerns. The government has a vital interest in protecting the well-being of children, but the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage bears no relation to this interest. To the contrary, it harms children in the Commonwealth.
145. Commonwealth law recognizes that neither sexual orientation nor gender has any bearing on a couple’s ability to successfully rear children and, thus, treats gay and lesbian couples the same as heterosexual couples with respect to adoption and recognition as parents through the in loco parentis doctrine. Pennsylvania judges routinely grant adoptions to same-sex couples, recognizing
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that the adoptions are in the best interest of the child. Indeed, the government itself places children for adoption with same-sex couples like plaintiffs Deb and Susan Whitewood, who jointly adopted their son L.W. out of the foster care system. Any assertion that the Commonwealth does not consider same-sex couples equally effective parents cannot be credited given its own conduct evidencing a different view.
146. Moreover, there is no valid basis for the Commonwealth to assert a preference for child-rearing by opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples. The evidence will demonstrate that there is a consensus within the scientific community, based on over thirty years of research, that children raised by samesex couples are just as well adjusted as children raised by opposite-sex couples. This is recognized by every major professional organization dedicated to children’s health and welfare including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America.
147. Other courts have found, after trials involving expert testimony, that there is no rational basis for favoring parenting by heterosexual couples over gay and lesbian couples. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that the research supporting the conclusion that “[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by
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heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted” is “accepted beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology”), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated for lack of standing sub nom Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2013 WL 3196927 (U.S. June 26, 2013); In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *20 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (“[B]ased on the robust nature of the evidence available in the field, this Court is satisfied that the issue is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold otherwise; the best interests of children are not preserved by prohibiting homosexual adoption.”), aff’d sub nom Florida Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., Nos. 1999-9881, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9 and 2004 WL 3200916, at *3-4 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (holding based on factual findings regarding the well-being of children of gay parents that “there was no rational relationship between the [exclusion of gay people from becoming foster parents] and the health, safety, and welfare of the foster children.”), aff’d sub nom Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006).
148. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage has no conceivable benefit to children of heterosexual couples. Denying same-sex couples the right to marry does not encourage opposite-sex couples who have children to marry or stay married for the benefit of their children. And regardless of whether same-sex
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couples are permitted to marry, the children of opposite-sex spouses will continue to enjoy the same benefits and protections that flow from their parents’ marriage.
149. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage serves only to harm the children raised by lesbian and gay couples by denying their families significant benefits and by branding their families as inferior and less deserving of respect and, thus, encouraging private bias and discrimination. According to the 2010 United States Census, there are over 6,000 same-sex couples raising children in Pennsylvania. The state’s interest in the welfare of children of lesbian and gay parents is or should be as great as its interest in the welfare of other children.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I:
Deprivation of the Fundamental Right to Marry in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
150. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
151. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest.
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152. The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
153. Pennsylvania law denies the plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples this fundamental right by denying them access to the state-recognized institution of marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states.
154. The Commonwealth can demonstrate no important interest to justify denying the plaintiff couples this fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate interest at all.
155. The Commonwealth’s prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex and its refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause.
156. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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COUNT II: Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 157. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 158. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 159. By denying the plaintiff couples and other lesbian and gay couples the ability to marry and to have their out-of-state marriages recognized, the Commonwealth, through defendants, disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis of their sexual orientation. It denies them significant legal protections. And it “degrade[s] [and] demean[s]” them by “instruct[ing] . . . all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children,” that their relationship is “less worthy” than the relationships of others. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 160. Same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are similarly situated for purposes of marriage. 161. The evidence will show that classifications based on sexual orientation demand heightened scrutiny.
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162. Lesbians and gay men are members of a discrete and insular minority that has suffered a history of discrimination in the Commonwealth and across the United States.
163. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society.
164. Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to one’s identity that a person may not legitimately be required to abandon it (even if that were possible) as a condition of equal treatment. Sexual orientation generally is fixed at an early age and highly resistant to change through intervention. Efforts to change a person’s sexual orientation through interventions by medical professionals have not been shown to be effective. No mainstream mental health professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual orientation, and many – including the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association – have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the public about these treatments.
165. Prejudice against lesbians and gay men continues to seriously curtail the operation of the political process preventing this group from obtaining redress through legislative means. Lesbians and gay men lack statutory protection against discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and housing at the federal level and in more than half of the states, including Pennsylvania. Lesbians and gay
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men have far fewer civil rights protections at the state and federal level than women and racial minorities had when sex and race classifications were declared to be suspect or quasi suspect. They have been stripped of the right to marry through 30 state constitutional amendments, and have been targeted through the voter initiative process more than any other group.
166. For all these reasons, classification based on sexual orientation should be reviewed under heightened scrutiny, but this one cannot survive under any level of constitutional scrutiny. The Commonwealth’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. All it does it disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their children.
167. The Commonwealth’s prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
168. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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COUNT III: Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 169. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 170. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 171. Commonwealth law defines marriage as “[a] civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102. 172. By defining marriage in this way, the Commonwealth discriminates on the basis of sex. For example, plaintiff Angela Gillem is not permitted to marry plaintiff Gail Lloyd solely because they are both women. If Angela (or Gail) were a man, the marriage would be allowed. The only reason the marriage is prohibited is the sex of the partners. 173. In addition, the Commonwealth has made “void in this Commonwealth” any “marriage between persons of the same sex . . . entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into.” 23 Pa.
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C.S. § 1704. The marriage of Edwin Hill and David Palmer, for example, is denied recognition by the Commonwealth solely because they are both men.
174. The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation of traditional gender roles is not a legitimate government interest.
175. Given that there are no longer legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and wives, there is no basis for the sex-based eligibility requirements for marriage.
176. The defendants can demonstrate no exceedingly persuasive justification for this discrimination based on sex.
177. Commonwealth law prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
178. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 1. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
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2. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704

violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution;

3. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from denying the

plaintiff couples and all other same-sex couples the right to marry in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and directing defendants to recognize marriages

validly entered into by the plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples outside of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;

4. Award costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988; and

5. Enter all further relief to which plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

Dated: November 7, 2013

HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER

By: /s/ Mark A. Aronchick Mark A. Aronchick (PA ID No. 20261) John S. Stapleton (PA ID No. 200872) Dylan J. Steinberg (PA ID No. 203222) Rebecca S. Melley (PA ID No. 206210)
One Logan Square, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 568-6200 maronchick@hangley.com jstapleton@hangley.com dsteinberg@hangley.com rmelley@hangley.com

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Helen E. Casale HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER 401 DeKalb Street, 4th Floor Norristown, PA 19401 (610) 313-1670 hcasale@hangley.com
James D. Esseks Leslie Cooper AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549-2500 jesseks@aclu.org lcooper@aclu.org
Witold J. Walczak (PA ID No. 62976) ACLU FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (412) 681-7736 vwalczak@aclupa.org
Mary Catherine Roper (PA ID No. 71107) Molly Tack-Hooper (PA ID No. 307828) ACLU FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 592-1513 mroper@aclupa.org mtack-hooper@aclupa.org
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Seth F. Kreimer (PA ID No. 26102) 3400 Chestnut St. Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 (215) 898-7447 skreimer@law.upenn.edu Counsel for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 7th day of November, 2013, I caused the foregoing First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to be filed electronically using the Court’s electronic filing system, and that the filing is available to counsel for all parties for downloading and viewing from the electronic filing system.
/s/ Mark A. Aronchick Mark A. Aronchick

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 1 of 40
CLOSED,HBG,SETOFF,SPADFORM
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−01861−JEJ

Whitewood et al v. Corbett et al Assigned to: Honorable John E. Jones, III Referred to: Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson (Settlement) Case in other court: Third Circuit, 14−02871
Third Circuit, 14−03048 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/09/2013 Date Terminated: 05/27/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Deb Whitewood

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin &Schiller One Logan Square, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−496−7375 Email: dsteinberg@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2627 Email: jesseks@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL &PUDLIN One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103−6933 215−496−7048 Fax: 215−568−0300 Email: jstapleton@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2627 Email: lcooper@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick Hangley, Aronchick, Segal &Pudlin 1 Logan Square, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 496−7002 Email: maronchick@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 2 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1513 ext 116 Email: mroper@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper ACLU of Pennsylvania P.O. Box 40008 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−592−1513 Email: mtack−hooper@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley Segal Pudlin &Schiller One Logan Square 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−496−7374 Email: rsantoro@hangley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer 3400 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19144 215−898−7447 Email: skreimer@law.upenn.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak American Civil Liberties Union of PA 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (412) 681−7864 Email: vwalczak@aclupa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin &Schiller 401 DeKalb Street Norristown, PA 19401 610−313−1670 Email: HEC@hangley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Whitewood

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 3 of 40

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Fredia Hurdle

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 4 of 40

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lynn Hurdle

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 5 of 40

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edwin Hill

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 6 of 40

Plaintiff David Palmer

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 7 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Poehler

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 8 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kath Poehler

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Fernando Chang−Muy

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 9 of 40

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Len Rieser

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 10 of 40

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dawn Plummer

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 11 of 40

Plaintiff Diana Polson

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 12 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Angela Gillem

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 13 of 40

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gail Lloyd

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 14 of 40

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Helena Miller

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dara Raspberry

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 15 of 40

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ron Gebhardtsbauer

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 16 of 40

Plaintiff Greg Wright

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 17 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marla Cattermole

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 18 of 40

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Julia Lobur

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 19 of 40

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Maureen Hennessey

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 20 of 40

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.W. and

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
K.W. minor children, by and through their parents and next friends,

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 21 of 40

Plaintiff
Deb Whitewood and

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 22 of 40

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Whitewood

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 23 of 40

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sandy Ferlanie

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 24 of 40

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christine Donato

represented by Dylan J. Steinberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Helen E Casa;e (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D. Esseks (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Stapleton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leslie Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark A. Aronchick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Roper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Molly M. Tack−Hooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 25 of 40

Rebecca S. Melley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth F. Kreimer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Witold J. Walczak (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Plaintiff
James D. Schneller TERMINATED: 02/06/2014

V. Defendant Thomas W. Corbett in his official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania TERMINATED: 11/04/2013
Defendant Michael Wolf in his official capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health
Defendant Kathleen Kane in her official capacity as Attorney

represented by William H. Lamb Lamb McErlane PC 24 E. Market Street P.O. Box 565 West Chester, PA 19381−0565 610−430−8000 Email: wlamb@chescolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alison Taylor Office of Legal Council, Department of Health 625 Forster Street Health and Welfare Bldg. Harrisburg, PA 17120 717−783−2500 Email: altaylor@pa.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel L. Frank Lamb McErlane P.C. 24 East Market Street P.O. Box 565 West Chester, PA 19381−0565 (610) 430−8000 Email: jfrank@lambmcerlane.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Lamb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by M. Abbegael Giunta Office of Attorney General

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 26 of 40

General of Pennsylvania TERMINATED: 11/01/2013

15th Floor Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 717−787−1179 Email: mgiunta@attorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mary Jo Poknis in her official capacity as Register of Wills of Washington County TERMINATED: 10/22/2013

represented by Robert J Grimm Swartz Campbell LLC 4750 U.S. Steel Tower 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412−560−3267 Email: rgrimm@swartzcampbell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas J Jezewski Swartz Campbell, LLC 4750 U.S. Steel Tower 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412−456−5416 Email: tjezewski@swartzcampbell.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Donald Petrille, Jr. in his official capacity as Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans' Court of Bucks County

represented by Frank A. Chernak Ballard Spahr Andrews &Ingersoll LLP 1735 Market St. 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 864−8234 Email: chernakf@ballardspahr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John P. McLaughlin Ballard Spahr Andrews &Ingersoll, LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−864−8241 Email: mclaughlinj@ballardspahr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan D. Fox Begley Carlin &Mandio LLP 680 Middletown Blvd. Langhorne, PA 19047 215.750.0110 Email: nfox@begleycarlin.com TERMINATED: 03/05/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dan Meuser

represented by Alison Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel L. Frank (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William H. Lamb

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 27 of 40

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Matthew Baker

represented by Randall L. Wenger Independence Law Center 23 N. Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 717−657−4990 Email: rwenger@indlawcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor
James D. Schneller TERMINATED: 02/06/2014 also known as Philadelphia Metro Task Force TERMINATED: 02/06/2014
Intervenor
Theresa Santai−Gaffney TERMINATED: 06/18/2014

represented by David W. Crossett Smith Law Group, LLC 14133 Kutztown Road P.O. Box 626 Fleetwood, PA 19522 610−944−8406 Fax: 610−944−9408 Email: dcrossett@smithlawgrp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James M. Smith Smith Law Group, LLC 14133 Kutztown Road P.O. Box 626 Fleetwood, PA 19522 610.944.8406 Email: jsmith@smithlawgrp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey A. Conrad 408 West Chestnut Street P.O. Box 1766 Lancaster, PA 17608−1766 717−299−7101 Email: jeff.conrad@clymerlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/09/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $400, Receipt Number 0314−2827981), filed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(aaa) (Entered: 07/09/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 28 of 40

07/09/2013
07/09/2013 07/10/2013 07/16/2013
07/16/2013
07/16/2013
07/16/2013
07/16/2013
07/23/2013 07/29/2013 07/30/2013 08/02/2013

2 Summons Issued as to All Defendants and provided TO ATTORNEY ELECTRONICALLY VIA ECF for service on Defendant(s)in the manner prescribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (NOTICE TO ATTORNEYS RECEIVING THE SUMMONS ELECTRONICALLY: You must print the summons and the attachment when you receive it in your e−mail and serve them with the complaint on all defendants in the manner prescribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). (Attachments: # 1 Summons Packet) (aaa) (Entered: 07/09/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Case reassigned to Judge Jones. (aaa) (Entered: 07/09/2013)
SPECIAL ADMISSION and ECF Registration FORMs SENT to Leslie Cooper, James Esseks, Rebecca Melley, John Stapleton and dylan Steinberg. (pjr) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
3 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. Thomas W. Corbett served on 7/9/2013, answer due 7/30/2013. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. Kathleen Kane served on 7/9/2013, answer due 7/30/2013. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. Michael Wolf served on 7/9/2013, answer due 7/30/2013. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. Donald Petrille, Jr served on 7/9/2013, answer due 7/30/2013. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy. Mary Jo Poknis served on 7/11/2013, answer due 8/1/2013. (Melley, Rebecca) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
8 SCHEDULING ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 9/30/2013.(eo) (Entered: 07/23/2013)
9 STIPULATION to Extend Time to Respond to Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief by Thomas W. Corbett, Michael Wolf. (Dunlap, Gregory) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
10 Order approving re 9 Stipulation (eo) (Entered: 07/30/2013)
11 SCHEDULING ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 9/30/2013 09:00 AM before Honorable John E. Jones III. (eo) (Entered: 08/02/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 29 of 40

08/05/2013
08/14/2013 08/14/2013 08/14/2013 08/14/2013 09/05/2013 09/09/2013 09/13/2013 09/13/2013 09/17/2013 09/18/2013
09/23/2013 09/30/2013
09/30/2013 09/30/2013
09/30/2013
10/02/2013 10/02/2013 10/02/2013 10/03/2013 10/03/2013 10/03/2013

12 SCHEDULING ORDER: In Person Case Management Conference reset for 9/30/2013 01:30 PM in Harrisburg before Honorable John E. Jones III. See order for details. (eo) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert J Grimm on behalf of Mary Jo Poknis (Grimm, Robert) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas J Jezewski on behalf of Mary Jo Poknis (Jezewski, Thomas) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Nathan D. Fox on behalf of Donald Petrille, Jr. (Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Donald Petrille, Jr re 15 Attorney Appearance − Entry of Appearance (Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by William H. Lamb on behalf of Thomas W. Corbett, Michael Wolf (Lamb, William) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by M. Abbegael Giunta on behalf of Kathleen Kane (Giunta, M.) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
19 STIPULATION by Donald Petrille, Jr. (Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 09/13/2013)
20 Order approving re 19 Stipulation (eo) (Entered: 09/13/2013)
21 Letter from William H. Lamb, Esquire . (Lamb, William) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
22 ORDER: 1. The case management conference currently scheduled for September30, 2013 is CANCELLED.2. The case management conference is RESCHEDULED for October 9,2013, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 4, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 09/18/13. (ma) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
23 DISCLOSURE REPORT by Donald Petrille, Jr by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Mary Jo Poknis. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Grimm, Robert) (Entered: 09/30/2013)
25 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 09/30/2013)
26 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim by Kathleen Kane. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Dismissal of Kathleen Kane)(Giunta, M.) (Entered: 09/30/2013)
27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Lack of Jurisdiction by Thomas W. Corbett, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 09/30/2013)
28 Proposed Order re Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Fox, Nathan) Modified on 10/2/2013 (aaa). (Entered: 10/02/2013)
29 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief by Thomas W. Corbett, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
30 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation (Exceed Word Limitation) by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
31 ORDER granting 29 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (eo) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
32 ORDER granting 30 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (eo) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
33 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation (Exceed Word Limitation) by Mary Jo Poknis. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Grimm, Robert) (Entered: 10/03/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 30 of 40

10/03/2013 10/03/2013
10/03/2013 10/03/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013
10/07/2013 10/07/2013 10/07/2013 10/07/2013
10/08/2013
10/08/2013 10/08/2013 10/08/2013 10/09/2013 10/09/2013

34 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Leslie Cooper on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney Leslie Cooper is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2901602.. (Cooper, Leslie) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
35 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by James D. Esseks on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney James Esseks is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2901623.. (Esseks, James) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Petitioning attorneys and associate counsel's bar status verified. (aaa) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
36 ORDER granting 33 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (eo) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
37 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORMS APPROVED as to James D. Esseks and Leslie Cooper (eo) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
38 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN filed on behalf of all parties by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
39 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 24 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Mary Jo Poknis. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Grimm, Robert) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
40 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 26 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim filed by Kathleen Kane.(Giunta, M.) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
41 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 25 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Donald Petrille, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
42 BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS GOVERNOR THOMAS CORBETT AND SECRETARY OF HEALTH MICHAEL WOLF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) AND (6) re 27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Thomas W. Corbett, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
43 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Helen E Casa;e on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney Helen Casale is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2904776., filed by on behalf of All Plaintiffs.(Casa;e, Helen) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Petitioning attorney and associate counsel's bar status verified. (aaa) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
44 MOTION to Stay Discovery by Donald Petrille, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
45 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 44 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
46 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Helen E. Casale (eo) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
47 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Wendy Yinger of Case Management Conference before Judge Jones on 10/09/2013. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Jones on 10/09/2013. By s/ Wendy Yinger. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (ctrep7) (Entered: 10/09/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 31 of 40

10/09/2013
10/17/2013 10/17/2013 10/17/2013 10/17/2013
10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/21/2013
10/21/2013
10/21/2013
10/21/2013

49 SCHEDULING ORDER: 1. Plaintiffs shall file briefs in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 24, 25, 26, and 27) by or before the close of business on October 21, 2013. 2. The Defendants shall file reply briefs by or before the close of business on November 1, 2013. 3. A second case management conference is protectively scheduled for November 22, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom #2, Harrisburg Federal Courthouse. 4. All discovery is STAYED pending further Order of this Court, and Defendant Petrilles Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 44) is DISMISSED as moot. (eo) (Entered: 10/09/2013)
50 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Dylan J. Steinberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney Dylan Steinberg is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0314−2912344.. (Steinberg, Dylan) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Petitioning attorney and associate counsel's bar status verified. (aaa) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
51 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Dylan J. Steinberg (eo) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
52 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss and for Leave to Incorporate Sections from One Opposition Brief to Another by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
53 ORDER granting 52 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (eo) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: PA Bar Directory shows attorney Dylan Steinberg as active and attorney Rebecca Melley was admitted to practice in the Middle District on 3/13/09. (pjr) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
54 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Lack of Jurisdiction filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A through H, # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
55 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 26 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
56 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 25 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A and B, # 3 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
57 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright of Defendant Mary Jo Poknis Only (Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 10/21/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 32 of 40

11/01/2013
11/01/2013
11/01/2013 11/01/2013 11/05/2013 11/06/2013 11/07/2013
11/07/2013 11/07/2013 11/15/2013
11/18/2013 11/18/2013 11/21/2013 11/21/2013 11/21/2013 11/22/2013

58 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright OF DEFENDANT KATHLEEN KANE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA (Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
59 STIPULATION AND NOTICE OF DISMISSAL by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
60 REPLY BRIEF re 25 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Donald Petrille, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
61 REPLY BRIEF re 27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Lack of Jurisdiction −Reply Brief of Defendant Secretary of Health Michael Wolf in Support of his Motion to Dismiss filed by Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
62 NOTICE of Appearance by Joel L. Frank on behalf of Michael Wolf (Frank, Joel) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
63 Order approving 59 Stipulation. (eo) (Entered: 11/06/2013)
64 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Donald Petrille, Jr, Michael Wolf, Dan Meuser, filed by Heather Poehler, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Kath Poehler, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Deb Whitewood(and), Fredia Hurdle, Len Rieser, Angela Gillem, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Gail Lloyd, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Greg Wright, Edwin Hill, Fernando Chang−Muy.(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
65 NOTICE of Appearance by Joel L. Frank on behalf of Dan Meuser (Frank, Joel) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
66 NOTICE of Appearance by William H. Lamb on behalf of Dan Meuser (Lamb, William) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
67 ORDER 1. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Wolf and Meuser (Doc.27) is DENIED. 2. Defendant Petrilles Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is also DENIED.3. The Court will hold a second case management conference, as scheduled, on Friday, November 22, 2013, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 2, at which time all counsel shall be fully prepared to engage in a discourse regarding the commencement date of a bench trial.(eo) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
68 Letter from Mark A. Aronchick to the Honorable John E. Jones, III. (Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
69 Letter from William H. Lamb . (Lamb, William) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
70 NOTICE of Appearance by Frank A. Chernak on behalf of Donald Petrille, Jr (Chernak, Frank) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
71 NOTICE of Appearance by John P. McLaughlin on behalf of Donald Petrille, Jr (McLaughlin, John) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Frank Chernak. (pjr) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
72 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Wesley J. Armstrong of case management conference held before Judge Jones on 22 November 2013. In accordance with 28 U.S.C., Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 33 of 40

11/22/2013
11/22/2013 11/25/2013
11/25/2013 11/26/2013 11/26/2013 11/27/2013 12/02/2013
12/06/2013 12/10/2013

true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Jones on 22 November 2013. By: s/ Wesley J. Armstrong, RMR (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only.) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
74 SCHEDULING ORDER: 1. Expert witnesses. Plaintiffs shall disclose their expert witnesses on or before December 2, 2013, and Defendants shall disclose their expert witnesses on or before January 15, 2014. Plaintiffs shall file expertreports on or before February 14, 2014, and Defendants shall file theirrespective reports on or before March 14, 2014. Plaintiffs shall file any supplemental reports by March 21, 2014. 2. Discovery. The stay presently imposed on discovery (Doc. 49) is LIFTED. On or before December 16, 2013, the parties shall respond to pending written discovery, as well as to any written discovery that is served by the close of business on November 27, 2013.3. Dispositive motions. The parties shall file dispositive motions, ifany, on or before April 21, 2014, with supporting briefs submittedsimultaneously. Briefs in opposition shall be due by May 5, 2014,and reply briefs shall be filed by May 12, 2014. 4. Motions in limine. Written motions in limine shall be submitted to the Court, with supporting briefs, no later than May 12, 2014. Responses shall be filed by May 19, 2014.5. Pretrial conference. The final pretrial conference shall be held onMay 27, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., in Courtroom 2, Harrisburg Federal Courthouse.6. Trial− Trial shall commence on June 9, 2014, in Courtroom 2, Harrisburg Federal Courthouse. 7. Modification of schedule. The provisions of this scheduling order may be modified by agreement of counsel, the Court sua sponte, or on motion timely filed for good cause.(eo) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
Set/Reset Hearings: Bench Trial set for 6/9/2014 09:00 AM in Harrisburg − Courtroom 2 before Honorable John E. Jones III. (eo) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
75 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Heather Poehler, Deb Whitewood, Julia Lobur, Susan Whitewood, Len Rieser, A.W., K.W., Dara Raspberry, Christine Donato, Gail Lloyd, Helena Miller, Greg Wright, Fernando Chang−Muy, Marla Cattermole, Diana Polson, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Kath Poehler, Sandy Ferlanie, Fredia Hurdle, Angela Gillem, Dawn Plummer, Maureen Hennessey, Lynn Hurdle, David Palmer, Edwin Hill. Dan Meuser served on 11/19/2013, answer due 12/10/2013. (Stapleton, John) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
76 MOTION to Certify and Amendment of Order and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion For Certication and Amendment of Order by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Lamb, William) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
77 MOTION to Intervene filed by James Schneller.(pjr) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
78 STIPULATION For Extension of Time by Dan Meuser, Donald Petrille, Jr, Michael Wolf. (Lamb, William) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
79 ORDER − Advisory. (eo) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
80 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 76 MOTION to Certify and Amendment of Order and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion For Certication and Amendment of Order filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
81 ANSWER to 64 Amended Complaint, with Affirmative Defenses by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 12/06/2013)
82 REPLY BRIEF re 76 MOTION to Certify and Amendment of Order and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion For Certication and Amendment of Order filed by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 12/10/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 34 of 40

12/16/2013
12/16/2013 12/16/2013
12/16/2013 12/17/2013 12/17/2013
12/17/2013 12/17/2013 12/18/2013
12/19/2013 01/08/2014
01/25/2014 02/06/2014 02/14/2014

83 STIPULATION and [Proposed] Order Governing the Production and Exchange of Confidential Information by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
84 Letter from Witold Walczak requesting discovery conference. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Email history)(Walczak, Witold) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
85 SCHEDULING ORDER: 1. The Court shall conduct a telephonic conference with the participation of counsel for all parties on Thursday, December 19, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall initiate the call to Chambers, (717) 221−3986, with all counsel on the line and prepared to proceed. 2. The Defendants shall file a responsive letter by close of business on Tuesday, December 17, 2013.(eo) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
86 Letter from William H. Lamb to the Honorable John Jones re: Discovery Conference. (Lamb, William) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
87 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING defendants' motion for certification &amendment of order pursuant to 28 USC Sect. 1292(b) 76 . (See memo &order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 12/17/13. (ki) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
88 ORDER re: cnsl's letters re: discovery issues − It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Telephonic conference scheduled for 12/19/13 @ 2:30 pm is CANCELLED.; 2. Cnsl shall agree upon a meet &confer date by conclusion of this work week. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 12/17/13. (ki) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
89 MOTION for Leave to Register as an ECF User filed by James D. Schneller.(aaa) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
90 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 77 MOTION to Intervene filed by James D. Schneller.(aaa) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
91 ORDER 1. James D. Schnellers Motion for Leave to Register as an ECF User(Doc. 89) is GRANTED to the extent that Mr. Schneller may enjoy ECF filing privileges during the pendency of his Motion for Leave to Intervene.2. Mr. Schneller should forthwith contact the Clerks Office at (570)207−5600 for assistance in ECF registration. 3. The Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to Mr. Schneller.(eo) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
92 ORDER − 1. Opposition briefs, if any, shall be filed by January 8, 2014.2. Mr. Schnellers reply brief shall be filed by January 22, 2014.3. The Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to Mr. Schneller. (eo) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
93 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 77 MOTION to Intervene filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright.(Roper, Mary) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
94 REPLY BRIEF re 77 MOTION to Intervene of James Schneller and Philadelphia Metro Task Force filed by James D. Schneller.(Schneller, James) (Entered: 01/25/2014)
95 ORDER denying 77 Motion to Intervene (eo) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
96 SCHEDULING ORDER:1. The Court shall conduct a telephonic conference on Wednesday, February 19, 2014, at 11:00 a.m. 2. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall advise the Court and Defendants counsel of the dial−in number for the conference(eo) (Entered: 02/14/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 35 of 40

02/19/2014 02/20/2014 02/20/2014 02/21/2014 02/24/2014 02/27/2014 03/05/2014 03/06/2014
03/07/2014 03/17/2014
03/25/2014 04/02/2014 04/03/2014 04/21/2014
04/21/2014
04/21/2014

98 ORDER 1. Plaintiffs shall file a position letter by the close of business onThursday, February 20, 2014. 2. Defendants shall file a responsive position letter by the close of business on Monday, February 24, 2014. 3. Each letter shall not exceed three (3) pages in length.(eo) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 95 Order on Motion to Intervene by Phila Metro Task Force and by James D. Schneller.(Schneller, James) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
100 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by James D. Schneller. (Schneller, James) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
101 MOTION for Order approving Stipulation by Donald Petrille, Jr.(Chernak, Frank) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
102 ORDER granting 101 Motion for Order (eo) (Entered: 02/24/2014)
103 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 3/5/2014 01:30 AM before Honorable John E. Jones III. See order for details. (eo) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
104 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Nathan D. Fox terminated on behalf of Donald Petrille, Jr.. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Certificate of Service)(Fox, Nathan) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
105 ORDER Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 3/6/14: The Commonwealth Defendants are bound by the following paragraphs of the Stipulation and Order Limiting Further Participation of Defendant Donald Petrille, Jr. (Doc. 102): Paragraphs 4, 13, 14, 16 and 17. The Commonwealth Defendants are not bound by the remaining paragraphs of the Stipulation. The Stipulation remains fully operative as between its signatories. (lg) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
106 MOTION to Stay re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 95 Order on Motion to Intervene by Phila Metro Task Force and Brief In Support of Motion by James D. Schneller.(Schneller, James) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
107 ORDER Mr. James D. Schnellers Motion for Reconsideration of our denial of hisrequest to intervene in this matter (Doc. 99) is DENIED.1 Mr. Schnellers Motionfor Stay Pending Action on Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 106) isDISMISSED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE Mr. Schnellers ECF filing privileges. (eo) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
108 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Motion to Intervene filed by James D. Schneller. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Motion for Leave to Intervene). (ams) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
109 Letter from Joel L. Frank, Esquire . (Frank, Joel) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
110 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 4/4/2014 10:00 AM before Honorable John E. Jones III. See order for details. (eo) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
112 STIPULATION and [Proposed] Order Extending Word Count Limit for Briefs in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
113 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Certificate of Non−Concurrence by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
114 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 113 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Certificate of Non−Concurrence filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy,

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 36 of 40

04/21/2014
04/21/2014 04/21/2014 04/21/2014 04/23/2014 04/24/2014 04/28/2014 04/28/2014 04/29/2014 05/05/2014

Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
115 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 113 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Certificate of Non−Concurrence filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX01 through PX06 Expert Reports, # 2 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX07 through PX08 Whitewood Declarations, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX09 through PX10 Hurdle Declarations, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX11 through PX12 Hill and Palmer Declarations, # 5 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX13 through PX14 Poehler Declarations, # 6 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX15 through PX16 Chang−Muy and Rieser Declarations, # 7 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX17 through PX18 Plummer and Polson Declarations, # 8 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX19 through PX20 Gillem and Lloyd Declarations, # 9 Exhibit(s) Exhbiits PX21 through PX22 Miller and Raspberry Declarations, # 10 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX23 through PX24 Gebhardtsbauer and Wright Declarations, # 11 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX25 through PX26 Lobur and Cattermole Declarations, # 12 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX27 through PX28 Ferlanie and C Donato Declarations, # 13 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX29 Hennessey Declaration, # 14 Exhibit(s) Exhibit PX30 AW Declaration, # 15 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX31 V Donato Declaration, # 16 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX32 through PX40, # 17 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX41 through PX42, # 18 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX43 through PX49, # 19 Exhibit(s) Exhibits PX50 through PX63, # 20 Exhibit(s) Exhibit PX64 Stipulation of Facts)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
116 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
117 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 116 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
118 STATEMENT OF FACTS filed by Michael Wolf. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C)(Lamb, William) (Entered: 04/21/2014)
119 MOTION to Stay re 108 MOTION for Leave to Amend Application to Intervene and C of S filed by James D. Schneller.(pjr) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
120 ORDER 1. The Motion for Leave to Intervene − Amended (Doc. 108) is DENIED.2. The Motion to Stay (doc. 119) is DISMISSED AS MOOT. 3. The Clerk is directed to return any future filings by Mr. Schneller to him upon receipt.(eo) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
121 First MOTION for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief by Matthew Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B, # 4 Exhibit(s) C)(Wenger, Randall) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
122 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 121 First MOTION for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief filed by Matthew Baker.(Wenger, Randall) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
123 ORDER granting 121 Motion for Leave to File (eo) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
124 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 116 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Certificate of Service filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/05/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 37 of 40

05/05/2014
05/05/2014 05/05/2014 05/07/2014 05/08/2014
05/12/2014 05/12/2014
05/13/2014
05/14/2014
05/15/2014

125 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 118 Statement of Facts , Response to Defendants' Statement of Relevant Undisputed Facts, with Certificate of Service filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright.(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
126 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 113 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Certificate of Non−Concurrence filed by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3)(Lamb, William) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
127 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS re 115 Statement of Facts,,,,,,, filed by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Doc. 128 deleted. Per court order dated 4/24/14 James D. Schneller is a restricted filer. (pjr) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
128 REPLY BRIEF re 113 MOTION for Summary Judgment With Certificate of Non−Concurrence , with certificate of Service filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright.(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
129 REPLY BRIEF re 116 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf.(Lamb, William) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
130 NOTICE by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright re 114 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,, Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority, with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
131 NOTICE by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright re 114 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,, Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority, with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
132 NOTICE by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright re 114 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,, Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority, with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
136 NOTICE OF APPEAL in NON−PRISONER Case as to 120 Order on Motion to Stay, 107 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Order on Motion to Stay filed by James D. Schneller. Filing Fee and Docket Fee not paid. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (pjr) (Entered: 05/28/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 38 of 40

05/20/2014 05/20/2014
05/28/2014 05/28/2014
05/29/2014 06/06/2014 06/06/2014 06/06/2014 06/06/2014 06/06/2014 06/10/2014 06/11/2014 06/13/2014
06/14/2014

133 MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) (eo) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
134 ORDER (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry)− In conformity with the Memorandum Opinion issued on todays date, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 113) is GRANTED and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 116) is DENIED. It is further ORDERED and DECLARED that Pennsylvanias Marriage Laws, 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704, which prohibit same−sex marriage and treat as void the marriages of same−sex couples validly entered into in other jurisdictions VIOLATE the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are therefore UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It is further ORDERED that the Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102 and 1704. (eo) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
135 USCA LETTER TO DISTRICT COURT CLERK re: forwarding Notice of Appeal on behalf of James D. Schneller to District Court. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(Davis, Laura) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
137 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
138 ORDER granting 137 Motion for Extension of Time to File (eo) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
139 MOTION to Intervene by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
140 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 139 MOTION to Intervene filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney.(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
141 MOTION to Stay re 134 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry),,, by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
142 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 141 MOTION to Stay re 134 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry),,, filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney.(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
143 Certification Declaration , filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney.(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
144 Letter from Plaintiffs re response to Gaffney motions to intervene and for stay. (Walczak, Witold) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
145 ORDER 1. Plaintiffs brief in opposition shall be filed by the close of business on June 13, 2014. 2. Any reply shall be filed no later than the close of business on June 16, 2014. (eo) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
146 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 139 MOTION to Intervene filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
151 NOTICE OF APPEAL in Case as to 134 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry), by James D. Schneller. Filing Fee and Docket Fee NOT PAID. Filing fee $ 505. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (aaa) (Entered: 06/18/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 39 of 40

06/16/2014 06/16/2014 06/16/2014 06/18/2014 06/18/2014
06/18/2014 06/19/2014 07/07/2014 07/28/2014
07/29/2014 08/12/2014 08/13/2014
08/13/2014 08/28/2014

147 REPLY BRIEF re 139 MOTION to Intervene filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney.(Conrad, Jeffrey) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
148 USCA Case Number 14−2871 for 136 Notice of Appeal, filed by James D. Schneller. USCA Case Manager Caitlyn (CJG) (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF). (Gillie, Caitlyn) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
149 USCA LETTER TO DISTRICT COURT CLERK re: forwarding Notice of Appeal of James D. Schneller to District Court. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(Acerba, Susan) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
150 ORDER denying 139 Motion to Intervene. Dismissing as moot 141 Motion to Stay (eo) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
152 NOTICE OF APPEAL in as to 133 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry), 150 Order on Motion to Intervene, Order on Motion to Stay, 134 Order (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry),,, by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. Filing Fee and Docket Fee PAID. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0314−3133720. The Clerk's Office hereby certifies the record and the docket sheet available through ECF to be the certified list in lieu of the record and/or the certified copy of the docket entries. (Smith, James) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
154 USCA Case Number 14−3048 for 152 Notice of Appeal, filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. USCA Case Manager Tina (TMK) (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF). (Gillie, Caitlyn) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
153 USCA Case Number 14−3049 for 152 Notice of Appeal, filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. USCA Case Manager Caitlyn (CJG) (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF). (Gillie, Caitlyn) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
155 ORDER of USCA summarily affirming the order denying the motion to intervene as to 152 Notice of Appeal, filed by Theresa Santai−Gaffney (Gillie, Caitlyn) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
156 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to to File Petition for Fees and Costs, with attached Certificate of Concurrence and Certificate of Service by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
157 ORDER granting 156 Motion to Extend Time (eo) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
158 MANDATE of USCA as to 152 Notice of Appeal by Theresa Santai−Gaffney. (Attachments: # 1 Mandate Letter)(Koperna, Tina) (Entered: 08/12/2014)
159 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
160 ORDER granting 159 Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs shall have until August 28, 2014 to file any petitionn for an award of fees and costs. Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 8/13/14 (pw) (Entered: 08/13/2014)
161 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle,

Case: 1:13-cv-1861 As of: 03/02/2015 01:33 PM EST 40 of 40

08/29/2014 08/29/2014 08/29/2014
08/29/2014 09/04/2014 09/10/2014 09/18/2014 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015
02/03/2015

Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright.(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Defendant's Counsel is advised to re−file Doc. 162 as a Brief in Opposition to Doc. 161 AND Plaintiff's Counsel is advised to re−file Doc. 163 as a Brief in Support of Doc. 161. (vy) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
164 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 161 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs −Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Fourth Extension of Time to Submit Petition for Attorneys' Fees filed by Michael Wolf.(Frank, Joel) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
165 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 161 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Fees and Costs filed by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright.(Aronchick, Mark) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: Documents 162 &163 have been deleted due to filing error− Counsel re−filed as Documents 164 &165. (vy) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
166 ORDER granting 161 Motion to Extend Time (eo) (Entered: 09/04/2014)
167 ORDER REFERRING CASE for Settlement to Judge Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. See order for details. (eo) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
168 SCHEDULING ORDER: A Settlement Conference is set for 11/12/2014 at 1:00 PM in Harrisburg before Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 18, 2014. (kjn) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
169 NOTICE of Appearance by Alison Taylor on behalf of Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf (Taylor, Alison) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
170 NOTICE by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf Withdrawal of Appearance of Joel L. Frank as counsel for Dan Meuser and Michael Wolf (Frank, Joel) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
171 NOTICE by Dan Meuser, Michael Wolf Withdrawal of Appearance of William H. Lamb as counsel for Dan Meuser and Michael Wolf (Lamb, William) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
172 Unopposed MOTION for Order to Discontinue and Close Case by A.W., Marla Cattermole, Fernando Chang−Muy, Christine Donato, Sandy Ferlanie, Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Angela Gillem, Maureen Hennessey, Edwin Hill, Fredia Hurdle, Lynn Hurdle, K.W., Gail Lloyd, Julia Lobur, Helena Miller, David Palmer, Dawn Plummer, Heather Poehler, Kath Poehler, Diana Polson, Dara Raspberry, Len Rieser, Deb Whitewood, Deb Whitewood(and), Susan Whitewood, Greg Wright. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Walczak, Witold) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
173 ORDER granting 172 Motion for Order. See order for details. (eo) (Entered: 02/03/2015)

 
 ACLU
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION of PENNSYLVANIA
ACLU-PA, ACLU and Hangley Aronchick Seek Freedom to Marry for Pennsylvania Couples
ACLU AIR Announce. Manlllge Lllw1UIIaln Vlrt~ln.. •nd North C•rolna
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July8,2013
a. HARRISBURG, PA -lhe Amertam CIVIl Uberties Union of Pennaylvanla, the Amellam CIVIl Ubert1e11 Union, and volunteer
c:ounsel fivm tile ..w ltm of Hangley Arondlldt Segal Pudlln Schiller flied a federallaw11ult today on behalf of 21
Pennsylvenlllns who wish to Qrry In Pennsylvania or Wlllnt the Glmmanwealtll to reQDgnlze their out-okt11te nrrllges.
lhe lllwsurt aleges t11111t Pennsylvlnl111's Defense of Mlllrrllge Act and refvsal to marry lesbl111n 111nd g111y QDUples or
ree~~gnlre tllelr out-of.sl:lllte rmrrlages violates the fvndamental r1ght to many as well as tile Equal Protection Clause of the Foult:eentll Amendment. lhls lawsuit mmes In the wake of the AC:LU's vktory before tile U.S. Supreme Caurt In
U.S. v. Wllldsor, whldl requires fedl!!ral rl!!mgnltlon far lesbian and gay muples who are rmrrled In their home states.
Plaintiffs a~gue that tile murt should dosely sautlnlze this discriminatory treall'rll!!nt because tile state's Defense of Merrllge Act burdens tile fvndall'll!!ntal right to many and because It dlscrtnmates based on sex and semal orientation.
"We only want what every married muple wanta -to express our love and CC.iiiiibil8nt in l'ront of liiend& and family and the secullty and protactlons that only marrllge provides,• said plalntlll' Deb Whllawood, who has been together with her spouse susan Whll:lllwood ror 22 year&. •our I~ Is built around our Nlallonsh!p and tile llnnly we haw made.•
lhe plalntltlll "dude 10 muples, two mnor chlldnm of those c:ouples, and one widow who n~cantly lost her partner of 29 yeam. lhe lead plalntlll!lln the lawsuit ara Deb and Susan Whitewood of Bridgeville In Allegheny County, along with their teenage daughters, Abbey and Katie. lhelr lllmlly also lndudes two-year-olcl Landon, who was piacad In lbstilr c:ara with Deb and susan by the Allegheny County Department of Children and Youth Servlcas when he was 11 months old and Iaber was adopted by the mupla. Deb and Susan have lived together In a oollllrittad relationship lbr 22 yeam. lhey are devout Chrtftl;rns ;rnd their family Is actively Involved In the Chrfst Unltied Methodist Church of Bethel Par1c.
In 1993, Deb 1nd SUsan had a holy union cel'l!lmany at the church they oJttended 1t tile time, •Iter whldl they both
changed the• last names tD Whitewood, 11 gomblnatlon of their surnames. In 2001, tlley entered Into 11 dYII union In
Vermont. Despite tllelr demanslnlted gorrmltment to e•ch other, Pennsylvania law lre1ts tllem •s leg1l strangers, and they know t111t tlley 111nd tllelr flllmlly do n~:~t hllft the segu1ty or the dignity of 1 ~g111lly rec:ognlzed 11111rr1111ge.
"As the cradle of American liberty, It Is shamefUl that Pennsylvania den~s some faiTIIes tile dignity and n!:spea that can only mme with rmrrlage." said Reggie Shufanl, executive dlrec1or of the ACW of Pennsylvania. "It's wrong that the state wherl!! these muples 11-w, w~:~rlc, and raise families treats them as semnd-dass e~~uples.•
In addition to tile Whitewoods, tile Penn&ytvania plaintiffs indude Dawn Plummer and Diana Polson (Pitt&burgh), Fernando Cheng-Muy and Len Rieser (Philadelphia), Angela Gillem and Gal Lloyd (Philadelphia), Fredla and Lynn Hurdle (Pittllburgh), and RDn Gebhanlt&bauer and Greg Wright (State Colege), who are lesbian and gay couple& in committed Nlallonsh!ps who wish to be legally man'led and to give one anotller tile security and protettlons that only marriage provlcles.
Additional Pennsylvania plalntlll!l Edwin Hill and David Palmer (Bangor, Northa1111ton County), Helena Miller and Dare Raspberry (Phladelphla), Heather and Kath Poehler (Downingtown, Chester County), and Marta Cattermole and Julia Lobur (Hanlsburg} are aln~ady married, having wed In other states, but ara tnlated as legal stnmgers In their home state. PlalnUft'Maureen Hennessey (Philadelphia) Is., widow who lost her spouse •Iter 29 years together. Because her spouse was a woman, their Qrrlage Is not recognized by the c:ommonwealtll of Pennsylvania, and she Is not provided the protecilons allbrded to widows understate law.
"lhe oouples " tills llwsult are united by love, family and Glmmltment, whldl are tile QDmerstones of Qrrlage. lhey - - __ _......,. .......· - - · .............. J .................a ...--~ ......... _ .............. a .................., . 1..... .,...............t~ .........,.. .......h_

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M1'111 ratrnDG .. lltftry ~n..a 01 uta worv, IIUitllll:lp& ona • ullii'Ur ran,.~nlll • • • IVGMf• •Ya. MIMI• w prn~

,.nnt'/Mnll'8 ••nne._ couplet h tr.edomto m~nv,• eeld WIIX>Id watzek.ACLU of Pen......W.n111'811Jael dte~:tor

and •n• oftha atbmeys NpPKtntmg ttla p&atttlt'ftl.

lba p&llt\tltftl mma ftm am:amltle aurvndnwaatth and t»m all walk& (lftfe. 1'My lndude an am.rvanGJ no;.m do.:mr,

1 nurs1, • tad\ar, untvamty pi'D&Maors, • trvdc drtvar, •n aaaad!M at II« Mal-. • p.,mabg~ IWtf,.., law~rs,

a dog lnlnor, ollllll o...,loyoos, on arllot,. • my-~~t-llomo mom. and wlll..no. 11111 plllnlll!l ..- ,.nnoylilonlll'8 IIIII

dM!rwJir: lltoy • .., .Mial-rlaln, CGUCIIallln. Latino, and Allon; lltoy ""' Metllodlll. Baplllt, Calltolrr. Quolo!r,
Jewlth, Bllddh~ and .-lar. Many have been llO&ttherfor decediO, end eo~ne ere nltlrl!l dllldrero tooe'iller.lhe

slllattons tat.8d by ltlese mup.IM ana stnlllrt» !host ftlaad by tha thoua.and& ofsama..tKmuplll: b Pann~nw

_m.. wha ana belnll dan!MI the boolc rtghtl that.,. allbnled by. .~~~ago.

•wa balllw tflat dlilllw mnnot stand underany laveiDtsaudny baaUII •xdudftg 1ama.umupllll hm mrrllge

dooo root fllrthanny lllgltl. .to

nt lnlo,.ot.lt. .,.... onlyto lnsut end hurt lloblllro ond II•Y 111uploo and

lllolrftunlloo." ..ld Mort - I d e GI"Har191oy Alvnchll:k So9oll'llclln • Sonier. 'We h..., -~~~• mao blday

btceuudleutaneet <ltteMI lila MG.IIIIY otknowllg lllat, 11 - • of Clltlt,tllol"loved one• will be Protla~ and

pi\Widodfor.•

lba AC.JJ allio •nnouna.d mdaythat It wl am.nd an •mung aclti,.mn lawsuit In Marth canhna In the mmna days~

w••• •• aloa oukthe ltaodom eo MOny and will ftlt a . .111111• lllw•ult In \'lrglnll aa ..,...,unHI w1111 Lantlda La11alln llwl

CID"*tg

waiL

•••n •Jn llta p..t r.w ,...,., w• h•w

an astonllh.,gand welc:llm. ahlft toward Amlrtc:.ns •mbr.dnglltaldaa 1:11at

nwr*d Nme-sex c:auples and ttlose who wl1h to r111ny •houkl not be reganl~d •~ less thin any 11ttller tardy,• saki

Letllll co-rGI"Ute otoeW IMPIIn Gay !lltelOIII and Tranegoncler PrOJ&Ct, "Whether lt't IIIRIII!Ih ltiRIIIOn.. through lllo

lag"IIIIJN, orat the ballat bo~ wa wll mnlble m workm bmacltn ltle nur!Mrof states where ••ma••• mupiN

can rmny.•

Tho artglnal North C.RIIno ""'" w. . - lost yoar on bohallahllc ...,...•• muplto suldn11 llwl right eo obtain Hmnd11a,.nt adapllonl fortllalrchllll,.ro. rl' partno...,.• - • d to . .,.,, ona """'"' waulll.,. abla to adopt lila
otherspowe.. chld.lbe amended mqJia~ wll seet Ule fleedomto 1111ny•• wela1 emnd1JI~nt adoption!.

Morol~nnotlon oro !he North Corolno caoc.lnlildlng plalntl!l blooo, can be round he"': bl!g:f/www.olii.AQ!/acmnd·

oemgt..ao@o·NC

It..,__ ~dly't moe

r. Q)o8oltoncllt - I n lllo Untod Stotao Dlrtold: CGurt ll>rtl>e Mtlldle DloiiiCt of

,.nntylilonlt. L8W~f8IINON!Id 11111e ceH ~ walcQir, MaiY CGthtmo IIOpor, and Moll'fTtclo+tooparoflllo

otoew afPann&'/Wnlll; • ..,, aulc& and Caaparoftha N1LI Lasblllro C:.y llloXIIOiand Tlllroogondor Proj11:t;

An>ndh11k,lDhn S.llltaploton, Dj1an 1 Stalnborg, and Aa..._ S. MolllyGI"HanllloY Alvndhlck S.VOII'IIclln •Schllor;

and SI:II!KrolmerGI"Ihe UnM:nlty ofPenn•,-nlll La1t School,

Flllln-lon obout Illday's ...o,lndudlng p!ll!ko at!he plllnlll!lond • Wleo oPHonMuoy ond her- opouoe, ,.~be fou~d at: www.tlilpt.OrQ/WhtowOOd
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e l9117-alll ~-Civ!IIA1111• u . - flf ...ft.-.wlvallo P.D. IIGX40008, Phladalphll, PA 10105 2.15-592.4513 lnfb. .duM·PDI • htla:llw-Adupa.gq

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