Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page1 of 23

1

Jahan C. Sagafi (SBN 227887) jsagafi@outtengolden.com

2 Katrina L. Eiland (SBN 275701)
keiland@outtengolden.com

3 OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor
4 San Francisco, CA 94111

5

Telephone: (415) 638-8800 Facsimile: (415) 638-8810

6
Meredith Desautels (SBN 259725)

7 mdesautels@lccr.com

Stephanie Funt (SBN 300152)
8 sfunt@lccr.com

9

LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

10 131 Steuart Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94105

11 Telephone: (415) 543-9444

Facsimile: (415) 543-0296
12

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff and proposed Class Members

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16

SAN FRANCISCO / OAKLAND DIVISION

17

18 PETER LEE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
19
Plaintiff,
20

21

v.

22 THE HERTZ CORPORATION, DOLLAR
THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.;
23 STERLING INFOSYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a
“STERLINGBACKCHECK,” and DOES
24 1-20, inclusive,

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF FCRA
CLASS ACTION DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

25

Defendants.

26

27

28
Complaint for Violations of FRCA

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1

Plaintiff Peter Lee, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleges,

2 upon personal knowledge as to himself and upon information and belief as to other matters, as

3 follows:

4

INTRODUCTION

5

1. Plaintiff Peter Lee (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Lee”) brings this case as a class action

6 pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. against the

7 Hertz Corporation and its subsidiary, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (“Hertz”), and

8 Sterling Infosystems, Inc., d/b/a SterlingBackcheck (“Sterling”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

9

2. Hertz routinely rejects job applicants, including Mr. Lee, based on information

10 contained in background check reports (“consumer reports”) that it obtains from background

11 check companies called “consumer reporting agencies” or “CRAs,” such as Sterling.

12

3. In doing so, Hertz fails to strictly comply with federal law governing the

13 procurement and use of consumer reports for employment purposes.

14

4. Sterling, one of the largest consumer reporting agencies in the United States,

15 provides consumer reports to companies, including Hertz, to be used for employment purposes,

16 such as making hiring decisions.

17

5. In doing so, Sterling fails to strictly comply with federal law governing the

18 procurement and use of consumer reports for employment purposes.

19

6. Specifically, Hertz systematically violates section 1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA

20 by using consumer reports to make adverse employment decisions without first providing the

21 applicant who is the subject of the report with sufficient and timely notification of its intent to

22 take an adverse action, a copy of the report, and a summary of the applicants’ rights under the

23 FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii).

24

7. Sterling also violates section 1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA by failing to timely

25 provide applicants with appropriate pre-adverse action disclosures, including a copy of the

26 relevant consumer report and a written description of the applicant’s rights under the FCRA, in

27 violation of FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii).

28

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Complaint for Violations of FCRA

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1

8. Before procuring consumer reports from Sterling and/or other CRAs, Hertz also

2 fails to inform job applicants in a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that

3 consists solely of the disclosure, that it may procure a consumer report for employment purposes,

4 in violation of U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

5

9. Hertz similarly fails to obtain authorization of job applicants in writing to procure

6 such consumer reports, in violation of U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2(A)(ii).

7

10. Sterling has further violated the FCRA by failing to notify job applicants when it

8 furnishes consumer reports that are likely to adversely affect the applicants’ ability to obtain

9 employment and failing to follow strict procedures to ensure the timely and complete nature of

10 those reports, in violation of U.S.C. § 1681k(a).

11

11. Defendants have violated the above-mentioned provisions of the FCRA willfully

12 and pursuant to their respective companywide policies and procedures.

13

12. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and

14 declaratory relief; statutory and/or actual damages; punitive damages; pre-judgment and post-

15 judgment interest; and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses associated with this action.

16

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17

13. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claims

18 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681p and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

19

14. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a

20 substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in

21 this District.

22

15. This Court has personal jurisdiction over this matter because Defendants conduct

23 substantial business activity in this District, and because many of the unlawful acts described

24 herein occurred in this District and gave rise to the claims alleged.

25

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

26

16. A substantial part of the events or omissions which give rise to the claims

27 occurred in San Francisco County and/or adjacent counties in the San Francisco Division, and

28
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1 therefore this action is properly assigned to the San Francisco Division pursuant to Local Rule 3-

2 2(c),(d).

3

PARTIES

4 Plaintiff

5

Peter Lee

6

17. Plaintiff Peter Lee is an African-American man who lives in Richmond,

7 California.

8

18. In May 2014, while employed in a similar position with a competing company,

9 Mr. Lee applied and interviewed for the position of counter sales representative with Hertz’s

10 Dollar/Thrifty-branched rental car location at the San Francisco International Airport.

11

19. Mr. Lee and other Hertz job applicants are “consumers” as defined by the FCRA,

12 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).

13 Defendants

14

Hertz Corporation

15

20. Hertz Corporation operates the Hertz, Dollar, Thrifty and Firefly car rental brands

16 in more than 11,000 corporate and licensee locations in approximately 140 countries.

17

21. Hertz Corporation is the largest worldwide airport general use car rental company

18 with more than 1,700 airport locations in the U.S.

19

22. Hertz Corporation is registered as a Delaware corporation and maintains its

20 headquarters at 999 Vanderbilt Beach Road in Naples, Florida.

21

23. Hertz Corporation owns and operates the relevant Dollar/Thrifty-branded car

22 rental office located at the San Francisco International Airport at 780 McDonnell Road, San

23 Francisco, California, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group,

24 Inc.

25

24. At all relevant times, Hertz Corporation has been a “person” using “consumer

26 reports” of Mr. Lee and similarly situated applicants for “employment purposes,” and has taken

27 “adverse action” against Plaintiff and similarly situated applicants, as defined under 15 U.S.C. §

28
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1 1681a. These adverse actions have been based wholly or in part on those consumer reports.

2

Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group

3

25. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. is wholly owned and operated by the Hertz

4 Corporation.

5

26. There are approximately 340 Dollar and Thrifty corporate locations in the United

6 States and Canada.

7

27. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation and maintains it

8 headquarters at 5330 E. 31st Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

9

28. At all relevant times, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. has been a “person”

10 using “consumer reports” of Mr. Lee and similarly situated applicants for “employment

11 purposes,” and has taken “adverse action” against Plaintiff and similarly situated applicants, as

12 defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1681a. These adverse actions have been based wholly or in part on

13 those consumer reports.

14

Sterling

15

29. Sterling is a private New York-based corporation self-described as “the world’s

16 largest company focused entirely on background checks,” with some 20,000 customers and

17 2,700 employees spread among offices in the United States, Canada, the U.K., India, and the

18 Philippines.

19

30. Sterling has enjoyed exponential growth over the past 15 years, with annual

20 revenue increasing from approximately $7.5 million in 2001 to $250 million in 2013, as

21 employers increasingly conduct background checks on prospective and current employees.

22 Sterling’s founder and chief executive officer stated in 2013 that he expected the company to

23 surpass $1 billion in annual revenue by 2018.

24

31. Through a combination of organic growth, an influx in investment capital, and

25 aggressive pursuit of competitor agencies and complementary firms, Sterling has greatly

26 expanded its geographic reach, consumer report volume, and annual revenue over the past 15

27 years.

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1

32. As of 2013, Sterling conducted a reported 16 million background searches every

2 year for employers.

3

33. Sterling has maintained an operational center in Mumbai, India since at least

4 2006. In November 2013, Sterling reportedly consolidated its global operations there, and

5 entrusted an executive in the Mumbai office with oversight over global quality assurance in

6 consumer reports (including the duty to ensure reports’ accuracy and timeliness).

7

34. Sterling is a “consumer reporting agency” for purposes of FCRA compliance

8 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f), and a “person” as described in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(a).

9

STATEMENT OF FACTS

10 Background Information

11

35. Sterling is among the largest of the nation’s employment background screening

12 companies, i.e., those that provide “consumer reports,” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §

13 1681a(d)(1)(B), to employers.

14

36. In order to provide these consumer reports, Sterling investigates and reviews

15 public record databases and assembles and/or maintains consumer files which contain public

16 record information concerning, among other things, the alleged criminal record history of

17 individuals. Sterling then sells this information to employers, including Hertz.

18

37. Upon information and belief, as part of the services Sterling offers to its employer

19 customers, Sterling agrees to send FCRA- required “pre-adverse action” notices to consumers on

20 behalf of its employer-customers. Upon information and belief, Hertz has contracted with

21 Sterling to provide this service.

22 Plaintiff Lee’s Experience

23

38. In June 2012, while in Richmond, California, visiting relatives, Mr. Lee was

24 arrested.

25

39. Mr. Lee was subsequently charged with felony possession of a controlled

26 substance for sale with a gang enhancement (the “June 2012 charges”).

27

40. While the June 2012 charges were pending, in May 2014, Hertz personnel

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1 recruited Mr. Lee to interview for a counter sales representative position with Hertz at its Dollar/

2 Thrifty-branded car rental location at San Francisco International Airport.

3

41. At the time Hertz recruited him for a position with the company, Mr. Lee worked

4 for a competitor car rental company in a similar position.

5

42. Mr. Lee interviewed for the position with Hertz sometime in the first half of May

6 2014. At the close of the interview, Mr. Lee was given an offer of employment, pending the

7 processing of his application materials.

8

43. To begin this process, a Hertz representative instructed Mr. Lee to complete an

9 online application by following a link sent to him via email.

10

44. Mr. Lee completed the online application as instructed.

11

45. On May 15, 2014, Mr. Lee received an email from Kimberly Kowallis (“Ms.

12 Kowallis”), a field recruiter for Hertz, confirming his conditional offer of employment.

13

46. On May 27, 2014, after Mr. Lee had passed Hertz’s mandatory drug screening, he

14 received an email from Ms. Kowallis with a link to an addendum to the Hertz application

15 specific to California and Hawaii. The email requested that Mr. Lee complete the online

16 application addendum.

17

47. Mr. Lee completed the online application addendum as instructed.

18

48. Also on May 27, 2014, Mr. Lee received an email from Ms. Kowallis with the

19 subject line “Hertz Orientation Package.” This email provided information about Mr. Lee’s

20 onboarding with Hertz.

21

49. Ms. Kowallis subsequently scheduled Mr. Lee to begin working for Hertz on June

22 9, 2014. After receiving confirmation of his start date with Hertz, Mr. Lee provided a notice of

23 resignation, effective June 9, 2014, to his then-current employer.

24

50. At some point during the processing of Mr. Lee’s application, Hertz obtained one

25 or more consumer reports from Sterling containing information about Mr. Lee’s background, one

26 or more of which included information regarding the June 2012 criminal charges pending against

27 Mr. Lee.

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1

51. At no point during the processing of his employment application did Hertz

2 provide Mr. Lee with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in the form of a written document that

3 consisted solely of the disclosure, that it may obtain a consumer report for employment purposes,

4 as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

5

52. Likewise, at no point during the processing of Mr. Lee’s employment application

6 did Hertz obtain Mr. Lee’s authorization in the form of a written document for the procurement

7 of a consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).

8

53. On June 3, 2014, Mr. Lee received a call from Ms. Kowallis informing him that

9 Hertz would not hire him because of the criminal history information contained in his

10 background check. Ms. Kowallis told Mr. Lee that she could not do anything about his rejection

11 because the decision was based on “Hertz policy.”

12

54. Mr. Lee asked Ms. Kowallis for a copy of the background check information that

13 Hertz had obtained and was instructed to contact Sterling.

14

55. Later that same day, Mr. Lee received an email from Ms. Kowallis confirming

15 that Hertz had, indeed, rescinded his job offer because he did not meet the company’s

16 “background qualifications.”

17

56. As a result of the criminal history information contained in the consumer report it

18 procured from Sterling, Hertz stopped the onboarding process, and did not move forward with

19 the job that it had offered Mr. Lee.

20

57. After Ms. Kowallis informed Mr. Lee that he would not be hired because of

21 criminal history information contained in his background check on June 3, 2014, Mr. Lee

22 contacted Sterling by phone and requested a copy of the consumer report that Sterling provided

23 to Hertz in connection with Mr. Lee’s application for employment.

24

58. In response to Mr. Lee’s request, sometime on or after June 3, 2014, Sterling sent

25 Mr. Lee by regular mail a copy of a consumer report prepared by Sterling, which included

26 information about the June 2012 charges (the “June 3rd package”). Mr. Lee did not receive a

27 copy the June 3rd package until sometime after June 3, 2014.

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1

59. Sometime on or after June 4, 2014, Sterling sent to Mr. Lee by regular mail an

2 undated letter that was inaccurately entitled “Pre-Adverse Action Notice,” and which bore Hertz

3 corporate logo (the “June 4th Letter'”). Enclosed with the June 4th letter was a copy of a

4 consumer report prepared by Sterling dated June 4, 2014, which contained information about the

5 June 2012 charges.

6

60. Mr. Lee did not receive the June 4th Letter, which upon information and belief,

7 was sent by Sterling pursuant to its contract with Hertz, until sometime after June 4, 2014.

8

61. The June 4th Letter informed Mr. Lee that, based on a “Criminal Report”

9 provided by Sterling, Hertz was considering revoking Mr. Lee’s conditional offer of

10 employment, subject to Mr. Lee successfully challenging the accuracy of the criminal report

11 information.

12

62. At the time that Sterling mailed Mr. Lee the June 3rd package and the June 4th

13 letter (as well as at the time Mr. Lee received them), however, Sterling had already provided

14 Hertz with a copy of Mr. Lee’s consumer report containing information about the June 2012

15 criminal charges, and Hertz had already revoked Mr. Lee’s conditional offer of employment

16 based upon information contained in that consumer report.

17 Factual Allegations Common to All Class Members

18

63. Employers commonly use criminal background screening reports to determine

19 employment eligibility. A significant percentage of these reports, however, contain incomplete,

20 inaccurate, misleading, or improper records that can erroneously disqualify a job applicant or

21 employee. Recognizing this danger, Congress provided strict reporting and disclosure

22 requirements in the FCRA to ensure that prospective employees have the opportunity to review

23 reports summarizing their background information and to contest any inaccuracies and illegal

24 disclosures and/or provide additional information before these reports influence employment

25 decisions.

26

64. The FCRA requires that “before taking any adverse action based in whole or in

27 part on [a consumer report],” the employer taking the adverse action must provide “the consumer

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1 to whom the report relates” with:

2

3

(i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as

4

prescribed by the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau under section

1681g(c)(3).

5 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii).

6

65. The FCRA defines adverse action as either “a denial of employment or any other

7 decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee,”

8 or “any action taken or determination that is . . . adverse to the interests of the consumer.” 15

9 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(k)(l)(B).

10

66. A consumer reporting agency’s delivery of a consumer report containing

11 information likely to prove detrimental to the consumer’s ability to secure employment is an

12 “adverse action” in itself under this section. See Mattiaccio v. DHA Grp., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1249,

13 2014 WL 717780, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., 620 F.

14 Supp. 2d 319, 332 (D. Conn. 2009) (summary judgment denied on grounds that a reasonable jury

15 could deem CRA’s delivery of negative consumer report a FCRA “adverse action”)).

16

67. Hertz and Sterling have routinely and systematically failed to provide Plaintiff

17 and other job applicants with a copy of their consumer reports prior to taking adverse actions

18 against them.

19

68. Hertz and Sterling further have routinely and systematically failed to provide

20 Plaintiff and other job applicants with a summary of their rights under the FCRA prior to taking

21 adverse actions against them.

22

69. The FCRA also requires that employers “may not procure a consumer report or

23 cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any

24 consumer,” unless:

25

26

(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at

any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document

27

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1

that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and

2
(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the

3

document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

4 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(B)(2)(A)(i) and (ii).

5

70. Hertz routinely and systematically violates these provisions by failing to (1)

6 provide “clear and conspicuous” disclosures in writing, in a document that consists solely of the

7 disclosures, that a consumer report may be obtained and (2) obtain applicants’ authorization in

8 writing to procure a consumer reports for employment purposes.

9

71. Finally, the FCRA mandates that any consumer reporting agency that “furnishes a

10 consumer report for employment purposes” and, in so doing, “compiles and reports items of

11 information on consumers which are matters of public record and are likely to have an adverse

12 effect upon the consumer’s ability to obtain employment” shall:

13

1) at the time such public record information is reported to the user of such

14

consumer report, notify the consumer of the fact that public record

15

information is being reported by the consumer reporting agency, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information is being

16

reported; or

17

2) maintain strict procedures designed to [ensure] that whenever public record

information which is likely to have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability

18

to obtain employment is reported it is complete and up to date.

19 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1) and (2).

20

72. Sterling routinely and systematically fails to provide consumers with timely

21 notice of its reporting of public-record information likely to have an adverse effect on the

22 consumer’s ability to obtain employment. Sterling also routinely and systematically fails to

23 maintain strict procedures to ensure that the public record information that it reports is complete

24 and current. See Poore v. Sterling Testing Sys., 410 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572 (E.D. Ky. 2006)

25 (expressing concern over the absence of “any information regarding any procedures that Sterling

26 may employ to ensure” the accuracy of information received from various subsidiaries and

27

28

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1 affiliates); Jones v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., No. 14-cv-3076 (S.D.N.Y.).

2

73. In failing to fulfill either of these obligations, Sterling systematically violates 15

3 U.S.C. § 1681k(a).

4

74. Defendants have acted willfully in violating the requirements of the FCRA.

5 Defendants knew or should have known about their obligations under the FCRA. These

6 obligations are well-established by the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations and

7 opinion letters of the Federal Trade Commission.

8

75. Despite Defendants’ awareness of their legal obligations, Defendants have acted

9 consciously in breaching their known duties and depriving Plaintiff and other job applicants of

10 their rights under the FCRA.

11

76. At a minimum, Defendants’ conduct has been reckless in failing to make an

12 appropriate inquiry to ascertain its obligations under the FCRA.

13

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

14
77. Mr. Lee brings this Class Action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15
23 on behalf of himself and five classes of persons.
16
78. Plaintiff asserts the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action against
17
Hertz and Sterling on behalf of the “FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class” and “FCRA Summary
18
of Rights Class” defined as follows:
19

20

FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class: All applicants for employment with

21

Hertz in the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole

22

or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a copy

of the consumer report at least five business days prior to the adverse action, as

23

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i).

24

FCRA Summary of Rights Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in

25

the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date

of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part

26

on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a written

description of their rights under the FCRA at least five business days prior to the

27

adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii).

28

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1
79. Plaintiff asserts the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action against Hertz on behalf of
2
the “FCRA Disclosure Class” and the “FCRA Authorization Class” defined as follows:
3

4

FCRA Disclosure Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United

5

States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final

judgment about whom Hertz procured a consumer report without providing a

6

clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of

the disclosure, prior to procuring the consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. §

7

1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).

8

FCRA Authorization Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the

9

United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of

final judgment about whom Hertz procured a consumer report without obtaining

10

the applicants’ authorization in writing prior to procuring the consumer report, as

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
11

80. Plaintiff asserts the Seventh Cause of Action against Sterling on behalf of the

12

“Adverse Public-Record Information Class” defined as follows:

13

14

Adverse Public-Record Information Class: All applicants for employment with

15

Hertz in the United States, except for in New York State, within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment about whom Sterling

16

delivered a consumer report to Hertz containing public-record information likely

to adversely affect the applicant’s ability to obtain employment without either

17

providing advance notice to the affected applicant or maintaining strict procedures

to ensure the information reported was complete and up to date, as required by 15

18

U.S.C. § 1681k(a).

19

20

81. The members of the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class, FCRA Summary of

21 Rights Class, the FCRA Disclosure Class, the FCA Authorization Class, and the Adverse Public-

22 Record Information Class are collectively referred to as “Class Members.”

23

82. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of above-defined classes based

24 on discovery or legal developments.

25

83. The Class Members identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members

26 is impracticable. Hertz employs over 30,000 workers worldwide, with the vast majority located

27 within the United States. Although Plaintiff does not know the precise number of job applicants

28

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1 harmed by Defendants’ violations of FCRA, the number is far greater than feasibly could be

2 addressed through joinder. The precise number is also uniquely within Defendants’ possession.

3

84. There are questions of law and fact common to Class Members, and these

4 questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Common

5 questions include, among others:

6

7

a. whether Defendants violated FCRA by taking adverse action, based wholly or in part on information contained a consumer report, against

8

Plaintiff and other members of the FCRA Consumer Report Copy

Class without first providing them with a copy of the consumer report

9

and at least five business days to respond, as required by 15 U.S.C. §

1681b(b)(3)(A)(i);
10

11

b. whether Defendants violated FCRA by taking adverse action, based wholly or in part on information contained in a consumer report,

12

against Plaintiff and other members of the FCRA Summary of Rights

Class without first providing them with a written summary of their

13

rights under FCRA and at least five business days to respond, as

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii);
14

15

c. whether Hertz violated FCRA by failing to provide Plaintiff and the FCRA Disclosure Class with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in

16

writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, prior to

procuring their consumer reports for employment purposes, as

17

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i);

18

d. whether Hertz violated FCRA by failing to obtain from Plaintiff and

19

the FCRA Authorization Class authorization in writing prior to procuring their consumer reports for employment purposes, as

20

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii);

21

e. whether Sterling violated FCRA by failing either to inform Plaintiff of

the Adverse Public-Record Information Class of its intent to deliver

22

public-record information likely to adversely affect their ability to

23

obtain employment or to maintain strict procedures sufficient to ensure

that the adverse public-record information was complete and up to

24

date;

25

f. whether Defendants were willful in their noncompliance with the

requirements of FCRA;
26

27

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1

g. whether Defendants were negligent in their noncompliance with the requirements of FCRA; and

2
h. whether equitable remedies, injunctive relief, statutory damages,

3

compensatory damages, and punitive damages for Class Members are

warranted.
4

5

85. Mr. Lee is a member of the classes he seeks to represent. Defendants failed to

6 provide Mr. Lee with a copy of the consumer report or a notice of his rights under FCRA prior to

7 taking adverse action against him, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (i) and (ii).

8 Additionally, Hertz failed to provide Mr. Lee with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing,

9 in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, or obtain from Mr. Lee authorization in writing

10 to procure a consumer report for employment purposes prior to procuring such a report, as

11 required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Finally, Sterling failed to either inform Mr.

12 Lee of its reporting to Hertz of public record information likely to adversely affect his ability to

13 secure employment, or to maintain strict procedures sufficient to ensure that the information was

14 complete and up to date, prior to delivering the information to Hertz, as required under 15 U.S.C.

15 § 1681k(a).

16

86. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the classes he seeks to represent.

17 Upon information and belief, it is Defendants’ standard practice to take adverse action against

18 applicants without first providing affected individuals with a copy of their consumer reports and

19 a written summary of their rights under FCRA. Additionally, upon information and belief, it is

20 Hertz’s standard practice to procure consumer reports without first providing a clear and

21 conspicuous disclosure in writing to applicants, in a document that consists solely of the

22 disclosure, or obtaining their written authorization. Finally, upon information and belief, it is

23 Sterling’s standard practice to deliver to Hertz public-record information likely to prove

24 detrimental to the ability of applicants to obtain employment without first (a) notifying the

25 applicants of the fact that the public record information is being reported and the name and

26 address of the recipient; or (b) maintaining strict procedures to ensure the information is

27

28

- 15 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page16 of 23

1 complete and up to date. Mr. Lee is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other

2 Class Members.

3

87. Mr. Lee will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class

4 Members. Mr. Lee has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class

5 actions, employment litigation, and the intersection thereof. There is no conflict between Mr.

6 Lee and the Class Members.

7

88. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

8 Procedure 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally

9 applicable to the Class Members, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate with

10 respect to Mr. Lee and the Class Members as a whole. The Class Members are entitled to

11 injunctive relief to end Defendants’ common, uniform, unfair discriminatory—and illegal—

12 policies and practices.

13

89. Class certification is also appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

14 23(b)(3) because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting

15 only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods

16 for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and

17 are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendants’ uniform policies and practices. Because

18 Defendants have maintained a common policy of failing to properly inform Class Members of

19 their rights under FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been

20 violated.

21

90. The amount of each Class Member’s individual claim is also small compared to

22 the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The FCRA has statutorily

23 specified damages, which Class Members will prove at trial are warranted, that will render

24 calculation of damages for Class Members highly straightforward. The propriety and amount of

25 punitive damages are based on Defendants’ conduct, making these issues common to Class

26 Members.

27

28

- 16 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page17 of 23

1

CAUSES OF ACTION

2

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Hertz’s Failure to Provide Consumer Report Copy Prior to Taking Adverse Action

3

(15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

Himself and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class)
4

91. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.

5

92. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and

6

the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members from a consumer reporting agency.

7

93. Hertz took adverse employment actions against Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer

8

Report Copy Class Members based in whole or in part on the information contained within those

9

consumer reports.

10

94. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Hertz failed to provide Plaintiff

11

and each FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Member with a copy of his or her consumer report

12

and a reasonable amount of time to respond.

13

95. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy

14

Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and

15

effectively contesting the adverse action.

16

96. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,

17

punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court

18

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

19

97. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual

20

damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

21

22

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

23

Hertz’s Failure to Provide Summary of Rights Prior to Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

24

Himself and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class)

25

98. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.

26

99. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and

27 the FCRA Summary of Rights Class Members from a consumer reporting agency.

28

- 17 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page18 of 23

1

100. Hertz took adverse employment actions against Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary

2 of Rights Class Members based in whole or in part on the information contained within those

3 consumer reports.

4

101. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Hertz failed to provide Plaintiff

5 and each FCRA Summary of Rights Class Member with a summary of his or her rights under

6 FCRA and a reasonable amount of time to respond.

7

102. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class

8 Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively

9 contesting the adverse action.

10

103. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,

11 punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court

12 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

13

104. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual

14 damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

15

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

16 Sterling’s Failure to Provide Consumer Report Copy Prior to Taking Adverse Action
(15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

17

Himself and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class)

18

105. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.

19

106. Sterling has compiled and delivered to Hertz consumer reports containing

20 information regarding Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members that were

21 likely to prove harmful to the ability of Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class

22 Members to obtain employment.

23

107. Each instance of delivery of this information constituted an adverse action as

24 defined by FCRA and prevailing case law.

25

108. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Sterling failed to provide

26 Plaintiff and each FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Member with a copy of his or her

27 consumer report.

28

- 18 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page19 of 23

1

109. As a result of Sterling’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy

2 Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and

3 effectively contesting the adverse action.

4

110. Sterling’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,

5 punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court

6 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

7

111. Alternatively, Sterling’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual

8 damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

9

10

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Sterling’s Failure to Provide Summary of Rights Prior to Taking Adverse Action

11

(15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

Himself and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class)

12

112. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.

13

113. Sterling has compiled and delivered to Hertz consumer reports containing

14 information regarding Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class Members that were

15 likely to prove harmful to the ability of Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class

16 Members to obtain employment.

17

114. Each instance of delivery of this information constituted an adverse action as

18 defined by FCRA and prevailing case law.

19

115. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Sterling failed to provide

20 Plaintiff and each FCRA Summary of Rights Class Member with a summary of his or her rights

21 under FCRA.

22

116. As a result of Sterling’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class

23 Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively

24 contesting the adverse action.

25

117. Sterling’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,

26 punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court

27

28

- 19 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page20 of 23

1 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

2

118. Alternatively, Sterling’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual

3 damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

4

5

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Hertz’s Failure to Provide Clear and Conspicuous Disclosure Prior to Procurement of

6

Consumer Report

(15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

7

Himself and the FCRA Disclosure Class)

8
119. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.
9
120. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and
10
the FCRA Disclosure Class Members from a consumer reporting agency for employment
11
purposes without first providing clear and conspicuous notice in writing, in a document that
12
consisted solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment
13
purposes.
14
121. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Disclosure Class Members
15
have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from making informed decisions
16
about whether to permit Hertz to procure their personal information.
17
122. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,
18
punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court
19
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
20
123. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual
21
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
22

23

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

24

Hertz’s Failure Obtain Written Authorization Prior to Procurement of Consumer Report (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

25

Himself and the FCRA Authorization Class)

26

124. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.

27

125. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and

28

- 20 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page21 of 23

1 the FCRA Authorization Class Members from a consumer reporting agency for employment

2 purposes without first obtaining their authorization in writing for the procurement of the report.

3

126. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Authorization Class

4 Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from making informed

5 decisions about whether or not to permit Hertz to procure their personal information.

6

127. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages,

7 punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court

8 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

9

128. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual

10 damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

11

12

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Sterling’s Failure to Either Provide Notice or Maintain Strict Procedures to Ensure

13

Completeness and Currency of Public-Record Information

(15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a), brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of

14

Himself and the Adverse Public-Record Information Class Members)

15
129. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above.
16
130. Sterling compiled consumer reports for Hertz containing information regarding
17
Plaintiff and the Adverse Public-Record Information Class Members.
18
131. Sterling included in these reports information available through public records
19
that was likely to adversely affect the ability of Plaintiff and the Adverse Public-Record
20
Information Class Members to obtain employment.
21
132. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Sterling failed to either:
22

23

a. inform Plaintiff and the Adverse Public-Record Information Class Members

24

of the adverse information contained in the reports as well as the name and address of the report’s recipient; or

25
b. maintain strict procedures intended to ensure that the information contained in

26

the reports was complete and up to date.

27

133. As a result of Sterling’s actions, Plaintiff and the Adverse Public-Record

28

- 21 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page22 of 23

1 Information Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and denied the ability to

2 ensure that the information likely to adversely impact their ability to obtain employment was

3 complete and up to date.

4

134. Defendants’ conduct was willful, making them liable for statutory damages and

5 attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §

6 1681n.

7

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

8

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Class Members pray for relief as follows:

9

(a) Certification of Plaintiff’s FCRA claims as a class action pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 23;

10

(b) Designation of Plaintiff Peter Lee as representative of the Class Members;

11

(c) Designation of Plaintiff’s counsel of record as Class Counsel;
12

13

(d) An order forbidding Defendants from engaging in further unlawful conduct in violation of FCRA;

14
(e) An award of actual or statutory damages for Defendants’ willful or

15

negligent conduct under FCRA;

16

(f) Exemplary and punitive damages to deter future misconduct in an amount

commensurate with Defendants’ ability to pay;
17

(g) Costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys’ fees to the extent

18

allowable by law;

19

(h) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law;

20
(i) Payment of a reasonable service award to Plaintiff, in recognition of the

21

services he has rendered and will continue to render to the Class Members,

and the risks he has taken; and

22

(j) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems

23

necessary, just and proper.

24

JURY DEMAND

25

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in this

26
action.
27

28

- 22 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page23 of 23

1 Dated: June 9, 2015 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Jahan C. Sagafi Jahan C. Sagafi
Jahan C. Sagafi (SBN 227887) jsagafi@outtengolden.com Katrina L. Eiland (SBN 275701) keiland@outtengolden.com OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 638-8800 Facsimile: (415) 638-8810
Meredith Desautels (SBN 259725) mdesautels@lccr.com Stephanie Funt (SBN 300152) sfunt@lccr.com LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 131 Steuart Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 543-9444 Facsimile: (415) 543-0296
Attorneys for Plaintiff and proposed Class Members

- 23 -

Complaint for Violations of FCRA

 
 1

2

3

4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
PETER LEE, 7
Plaintiff, 8
v. 9
THE HERTZ CORPORATION, et al., 10
Defendants. 11

Case No. 15-cv-02545-JSW
ORDER SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND REQUIRING JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT

United States District Court Northern District of California

12

TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:

13

The above matter having been assigned to the Honorable Jeffrey S. White, it is hereby

14 ordered that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and Civil L. R. 16-10, a Case Management

15 Conference shall be held in this case on September 11, 2015, at 11:00 A.M., in Courtroom 5, 2nd

16 Floor, Federal Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California.

17

Plaintiff(s) shall serve copies of this Order immediately on all parties to this action, and on

18 any parties subsequently joined, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and 5. Following service,

19 plaintiff(s) shall file with the Clerk of the Court a certificate reflecting such service, in accordance

20 with Civil L. R. 5-6(a).

21

The parties shall appear in person through lead counsel to discuss all items referred to in

22 this Order and with authority to enter stipulations, to make admissions and to agree to further

23 scheduling dates.

24

The parties shall file a joint case management statement no later than five (5) court days

25 prior to the conference. The joint case management statement shall address all of the topics set

26 forth in the Standing Order for All Judges of the Northern District of California - Contents of Joint

27 Case Management Statement, which can be found on the Court’s website located at

28 http://www.cand.uscourts.gov. See N.D. Civ L.R. 16-9. If any one or more of the parties is

1 proceeding without counsel, the parties may file separate case management statements. Separate

2 statements may also address all of the topics set forth in the Standing Order referenced above.

3 Any request to reschedule the date of the conference shall be made in writing, and by stipulation if

4 possible, at least ten (10) calendar days before the date of the conference and must be based upon

5 good cause. In order to assist the Court in evaluating any need for disqualification or recusal, the

6 parties shall disclose to the Court the identities of any person, associations, firms, partnerships,

7 corporations or other entities known by the parties to have either (1) financial interest in the

8 subject matter at issue or in a party to the proceeding; or (2) any other kind of interest that could

9 be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. If disclosure of non-party interested

10 entities or persons has already been made as required by Civil L. R. 3-16, the parties may simply

11 reference the pleading or document in which the disclosure was made. In this regard, counsel are

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 referred to the Court's Recusal Order posted on the Court website at the Judges Information link at

13 http://www.cand.uscourts.gov.

14

IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 Dated: June 12, 2015

16

______________________________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

17

United States District Judge

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 
 Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document11 Filed08/24/15 Page1 of 2

1

Jahan C. Sagafi (SBN 227887) jsagafi@outtengolden.com

2 Katrina L. Eiland (SBN 275701)
keiland@outtengolden.com

3 OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor
4 San Francisco, CA 94111

5

Telephone: (415) 638-8800 Facsimile: (415) 638-8810

6
Meredith Desautels (SBN 259725)

7 mdesautels@lccr.com

Stephanie Funt (SBN 300152)
8 sfunt@lccr.com

9

LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

10 131 Steuart Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94105

11 Telephone: (415) 543-9444

Facsimile: (415) 543-0296
12

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff and proposed Class Members

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16

SAN FRANCISCO / OAKLAND DIVISION

17

18 PETER LEE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
19
Plaintiff,
20

21

v.

22 THE HERTZ CORPORATION, DOLLAR
THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.;
23 STERLING INFOSYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a
“STERLINGBACKCHECK,” and DOES
24 1-20, inclusive,

Civil Action No.: 4:15-cv-02545-JSW
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(a)(1)(A)(i)
Judge: Hon. Jeffrey S. White
Action Filed: June 9, 2015
Trial Date: None set

25

Defendants.

26

27

28
Notice of Dismissal

Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document11 Filed08/24/15 Page2 of 2

1

Plaintiff Peter Lee, by and through his attorneys at Outten & Golden LLP and Lawyers’

2 Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, gives notice that Plaintiff hereby

3 voluntarily dismisses this action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

5

As Defendants have filed neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment in this

6 action, this dismissal is effective without a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A).

7 8 Dated: August 24, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

9

By: /s/ Jahan C. Sagafi

Jahan C. Sagafi

10

11

Jahan C. Sagafi (SBN 224887) jsagafi@outtengolden.com

12

Katrina L. Eiland (SBN 275701)

keiland@outtengolden.com

13

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor

14

San Francisco, CA 94111

15

Telephone: (415) 638-8800 Facsimile: (415) 638-8810

16
Meredith Desautels (SBN 259725)

17

mdesautels@lccr.com

Stephanie Funt (SBN 300152)

18

sfunt@lccr.com

19

LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

20

131 Steuart Street, Suite 400

San Francisco, CA 94105

21

Telephone: (415) 543-9444

Facsimile: (415) 543-0296
22

23

Attorneys for Plaintiff and proposed Class Members

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Notice of Dismissal

 
 2016 WL 7034060 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. California,
San Jose Division.
Peter Lee, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The Hertz Corporation, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 15-cv-04562-BLF |
Signed 12/02/2016
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jahan C. Sagafi, Katrina Leigh Eiland, Outten & Golden LLP, Elisa Marie Della-Piana, Meredith Patricia Desautels Taft, Stephanie Paula Funt, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, San Francisco, CA, E. Michelle Drake, Joseph C. Hashmall, Berger & Montague, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Robert A. Dolinko, Charles M. Dyke, Matthew J. Frankel, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND REMANDING CASE TO SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
BETH LABSON FREEMAN, United States District Judge
*1 Plaintiffs Peter Lee and Latonya Campbell (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons against Defendants The Hertz Corporation and Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (collectively, “Hertz”1), alleging that Hertz violated two procedural requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) with respect to their applications for employment. First, Plaintiffs allege that the employment application forms Hertz used in the course of its hiring process violated the “stand-alone requirement” of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Second, Plaintiffs allege that by withdrawing their conditional offers of employment without first providing them with a copy of their consumer reports and a summary of their rights to

contest its accuracy, Hertz failed to comply with sections 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) of the FCRA. Hertz now moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) to dismiss this case in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Mot., ECF 77. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion and remands the case to the San Francisco County Superior Court.
I. BACKGROUND Hertz routinely obtains information contained in consumer reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees, and uses the information in the reports as the basis for adverse employment action against such persons, such as refusing to hire them or withdrawing conditional offers of employment. FAC ¶ 2, ECF 43. Plaintiffs allege that the disclosures relating to these background checks violated the FCRA’s stand-alone requirement because they failed to provide “a clear and conspicuous disclosure made in writing, in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.” FAC ¶ 117. Plaintiffs also allege that Hertz’s failure to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of his or her consumer report, a reasonable amount of time to respond prior to taking adverse employment actions, and a summary of their rights under the FCRA, violates the FCRA’s pre-adverse action notice requirement. Id. ¶ 112, 113. Plaintiffs do not allege that the contents of the reports were inaccurate nor do they allege that they were confused by the disclosure notice regarding consent to procure a consumer report.
A. Allegations Relevant to Plaintiff Peter Lee Plaintiff Lee applied to work for Hertz’s Dollar/Thriftybranded car rental location at the San Francisco International Airport in May 2014. Id. ¶ 30. During the hiring process, he used Hertz’s online application form (the “Online Job Application”) to apply for employment with Hertz. Id. ¶ 33; Ex. A to Mot., ECF 47-1. The Online Job Application contained a section disclosing Hertz’s intention to run a criminal background check. FAC ¶ 35. Hertz reviewed the application and conditionally offered Lee a position at the company.Id. ¶ 38. Nearly two weeks later, Hertz asked Lee to fill out an addendum to the application form, which required him to authorize Hertz to procure a consumer report on him. Id. ¶¶ 41, 42; Ex. B to Mot., ECF 47-1. While the consumer report was pending, Hertz informed Lee that he would begin work on June 9, 2014, at which point Lee provided a notice of
1

resignation to his then-current employer. FAC ¶ 44.
*2 At some point between the time Hertz informed Lee of his start date and June 3, 2014, Hertz obtained one or more consumer reports from its third-party consumer reporting agency, Sterling InfoSytems, Inc. (“Sterling”). Id. ¶ 45; Ex. C to Mot., ECF 47-1 (“Sterling Form”). The consumer report contained information about Lee’s background, including information about pending criminal charges for which he had not been convicted. FAC ¶ 45. On June 3, 2014, Hertz informed Lee that, based on company policy, it would not hire him because of the information contained in his background check. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. Lee asked Hertz for a copy of his background check and he was instructed to contact Sterling, which he did. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51. Lee alleges that Sterling sent him a copy of his consumer report sometime on or after June 3, 2014, and that he did not receive this copy until sometime after that date. Id. ¶ 52. Lee also alleges that sometime on or after June 4, 2014, Sterling sent him, by regular mail, an undated letter titled “Pre-Adverse Action Notice,” which bore the Hertz’s corporate logo. Id. ¶ 53. Enclosed with this letter was a copy of the consumer report prepared by Sterling dated June 4, 2014. Id.
B. Allegations Relevant to Plaintiff Latonya Campbell Plaintiff Campbell had a similar experience. Campbell applied to work for a counter sales position at the Dollar/Thrifty-branded car rental location owned by Hertz in San Francisco in late-April 2014. Id. ¶ 59. Campbell filled out the same Online Job Application as did Lee. Id. ¶¶ 59–63; Ex. D to Mot., ECF 47-1. As with Lee, Hertz extended a conditional offer of employment to Campbell pending a criminal background check. FAC ¶ 66. Upon receiving this conditional offer, Campbell declined a second interview with another company because she preferred the job with Hertz. Id. ¶ 67. Shortly thereafter, Campbell also filled out the Sterling background check disclosure and authorization form. Id. ¶ 68; Ex. E to Mot., ECF 47-1.
Campbell’s background report contained information regarding a misdemeanor conviction related to domestic violence for which she was sentenced to three years of probation. FAC ¶ 70. After confirming a start date with Campbell, Hertz informed her that company policy prohibited the hiring of an individual with a criminal conviction involving violence. Id. ¶ 73. Campbell attempted to explain the situation in which this conviction arose, and Hertz’s representative instructed her to send Hertz evidence supporting her status as a victim of domestic violence, which she did. Id. ¶¶ 74, 75. Hertz

then revoked Campbell’s conditional job offer. Id. ¶¶ 76– 78. Sometime after Hertz rescinded her job offer, Campbell received a package, including a copy of the consumer report Hertz procured, in the mail. Id. ¶ 79.
C. Procedural History Plaintiffs initially filed this putative class action in California Superior Court, County of San Francisco, which Defendants then removed to this Court. See generally Notice of Removal & Ex. A, ECF 1, 1-1. Thereafter, Hertz filed a motion to stay the action pending the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in Spokeo. ECF 13. The Court granted Hertz’s motion to stay over Plaintiffs’ objections. ECF 35. After the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons. To address the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Plaintiffs advance two theories of standing: (1) invasion of privacy and (2) informational injury.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction only if the party bringing the action has standing, an inquiry that addresses whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction by filing the complaint, bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may attack the court’s jurisdiction as it appears on the face of the complaint or by presenting affidavits and other evidence. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). For a facial attack, the court must “accept all allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ].” Id.
B. Spokeo and Standing *3 In Spokeo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
2

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Here, it is undisputed that the alleged statutory violations are traceable to Hertz’s conduct, and that the alleged violations are redressable by statutory damages. Accordingly, the remainder of the discussion on the standing issue is addressed solely to the requirement of injury in fact.
To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must have suffered “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Id. at 1548 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To be “particularized,” an injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have alleged a particularized injury.
The Supreme Court in Spokeo distilled several “general principles” from its prior cases with respect to concreteness. Id. at 1549–50. A concrete injury is one that is “ ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ ” Id. at 1548 (citation omitted). Tangible injuries plainly satisfy this requirement. Id. at 1549. Nevertheless, intangible injuries may also be concrete. Id. In evaluating whether an intangible injury satisfies the “concreteness” requirement, the Spokeo Court identified two important considerations (1) “whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts” and (2) the judgment of Congress, which “ ‘has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
The Supreme Court then elaborated on the connection between statutory standing and concrete injury. First, the Court explained that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation [.]” Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)). Therefore, “[a plaintiff] could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id.
At the same time, the Court observed, in cases where “harms may be difficult to prove or measure[,]” “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient ... [and] a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). The Supreme Court noted that although one

of the FCRA’s purposes is to protect against inaccurate credit reporting, “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any risk of harm.” Id. at 1550.
C. The FCRA As relevant here, the FCRA provides that the employer must, in advance, provide the consumer with a clear and conspicuous written disclosure, and obtain the consumer’s consent to obtain a consumer report:
[A] person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.
*4 § 1681b(b)(2). The consumer is also provided the right to review and discuss the content of a report with the prospective employer, before adverse action is taken against him or her based on the report:
In using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates: (i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as presented by the Bureau under Section 1681g(c)(3) of this title.
§ 1681b(b)(3). The purpose of this and other provisions of the FCRA is to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, protect consumer privacy, and promote efficiency in the banking system. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551
3

U.S. 47, 52 (2007); 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (congressional findings and statement of purpose).
III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs bring this claim for improper disclosure under section 1681b(b)(2) and for Hertz’s failure to provide a copy of the report, and allow them an opportunity to review and discuss its content with Hertz before adverse action was taken against them in violation of section 1681b(b)(3). Hertz argues that Plaintiffs have no standing to pursue this claim because they seek statutory damages based solely on Hertz’s bare procedural violation of the FCRA, divorced from any concrete harm. Mot. 1. Plaintiffs respond that Spokeo did not alter constitutional requirements for standing, and that they have alleged two concrete injuries: violation of the right to privacy and informational injuries. Opp’n 1, ECF 50; FAC ¶¶ 92–96. Because the injuries claimed are different as to each cause of action asserted against Hertz, the Court addresses each cause of action below.
A. Count II—Improper Disclosure Count II, for improper disclosure, is based on section 1681b(b)(2), which forbids a person from procuring a consumer report without obtaining the consumer’s express written consent in advance. Under the statute, the consumer’s consent must be made on a single document that contains only required information that is “clear and conspicuous.” Plaintiffs claim that Hertz violated section 1681b(b)(2) by giving them two documents—the Online Job Application and Sterling Form—that contained extraneous information in addition to the required disclosures.

employment purposes. Opp’n 11; see id. at 1, 9, 18, 21. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ position is that Hertz’s procurement of the background report in violation of the FCRA was an invasion of privacy. Id. at 11.
*5 In reply, Hertz correctly distinguishes Thomas from the case at hand. Reply ISO Mot. 10–11, ECF 53. In Thomas, the plaintiff alleged that his former employer procured his and other class members’ consumer reports without first providing the required written disclosure or obtaining the consumers’ written consent, as required by the FCRA. 2016 WL 3653878, at *1. The plaintiff later learned that his employer had received his consumer report when he was denied continued employment based upon the inaccurate information contained in the report. Id. at *3. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs do not allege that the disclosures they received prevented them from understanding that they were authorizing Hertz to procure a background report or that they would not have authorized Hertz to a background report had they received a FCRA-compliant disclosure. See Reply ISO Mot. 10; cf. Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 16-cv-1369, 2016 WL 6902549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016) (“Here, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they may have been confused or distracted by the length of the Consent Form.”). Indeed, Plaintiffs have not proffered such an allegation nor is there any indication that Plaintiffs could plausibly allege those facts. Instead, the crux of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the consent form did not technically comply with the requirements of the FCRA. This is the kind of bare procedural violation that the Supreme Court described in Spokeo as insufficient. See, e.g., Nokchan v. Lyft, Inc., No. 15-cv-3008, 2016 WL 5815287, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016); Larroque v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols., Inc., No. 15-cv-4684, 2016 WL 4577257, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016).

i. Right to Privacy
Plaintiffs allege that Hertz invaded their right to privacy by procuring their background reports without complying with the FCRA’s stand-alone disclosure requirement. FAC ¶ 94. Hertz argues that Plaintiffs did not suffer an invasion of privacy because they knew that Hertz would procure a background check, and consented to the procurement of this report by voluntarily signing or electronically accepting multiple authorizations.2 Mot. 12. Citing Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 13-cv-825, 2016 WL 3653878 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2016), Plaintiffs contend that their signed authorization for Hertz to procure his background report was not “informed,” and thus, it was “illegal” for Hertz to obtain their consumer reports for

ii. Informational Injury
Plaintiffs’ alleged informational injury is also based on the consent form containing extraneous information. In support of their informational injury claim, Plaintiffs relies on Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 440, and Akins, 524 U.S. 11. FAC ¶ 95. Both of these cases were cited by the Supreme Court in Spokeo as examples of a concrete harm being suffered when information authorized by statute was not supplied. In Public Citizen, the harm was the inability of the plaintiff to monitor the judiciary because the ABA refused to release documents that congressional statutes made open records. In Akins, the harm was an inability to obtain information regarding the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s membership,
4

contributions, and expenditures that the plaintiffs believed were required by law.
Hertz attempts to distinguish Akins and Public Citizen by arguing that both cases involved challenges to the government’s failure to comply with a statutory obligation to disclose information of public concern.3 Mot. 13–15. Plaintiffs reject this interpretation, and instead suggest that both cases support standing here because in Akins and Public Citizen, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that plaintiffs who were deprived of information they were entitled to receive had to demonstrate an additional injury—the deprivation of information itself sufficed to constitute the required injury for purposes of Article III. Opp’n 14–15. In reply, Hertz again emphasizes that Akins and Public Citizen involved government records. Reply ISO Mot. 14–15. Hertz also attempts to distinguish the cases Plaintiffs cite, because in those cases, the plaintiffs were actually deprived of information to which they were legally entitled whereas here, Plaintiffs were provided with the information required by the FCRA, albeit along with other alleged extraneous information. Reply ISO Mot. 15–16; see, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (plaintiff was deprived of information to which she was legally entitled); Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 1515708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (same).
The Court agrees that the deprivation of statutorily mandated information can cause an intangible but concrete harm, if that harm is of the type Congress sought to prevent. Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged that Hertz’s disclosure form did not contain the information required by the FCRA. Cf. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (“[A] plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.” (citing Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449)). Instead, Plaintiffs claim that the disclosure was not in the format required by the statute because it contained “extraneous” information. Absent some additional allegation of harm, the Court cannot find an informational injury based on the current record.
B. Count I—Adverse Action *6 Count I, the adverse action claim, is based on section 1681b(b)(3), which provides a consumer the right to receive a copy of the report, and review and discuss its content with the prospective employer, before the adverse action is taken against him or her based on the report. Plaintiffs allege that Hertz rescinded their conditional offers of employment without giving them notice and the opportunity to discuss the content of the report with

Hertz. FAC ¶ 96. Hertz first argues that the Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in Spokeo when it cited as an example of a violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements that may result in no harm, a situation in which a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, but the information provided is accurate. Mot. 11 n.7; 136 S. Ct. at 1550. Hertz also contends that the violation of the FCRA is merely technical, inasmuch as Plaintiffs do not claim the information contained in the reports was inaccurate, and they therefore lack standing to pursue the adverse action claim. Mot. 15–16.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Spokeo did not address the cause of action asserted in this case and that Hertz deprived them the opportunity to discuss the contents of their reports. Opp’n 21–25. As to the former, Plaintiffs contend that the notice referred to in the portion of Spokeo cited by Defendants relates to a different section of the FCRA—section 1681e(d), which requires the consumer reporting agency to provide notice to its customers—and is therefore irrelevant. Opp’n 21. As to the latter, Plaintiffs assert that the FCRA gives them the right to specific information at a specific time, and Hertz’s failure to provide the required information at the proper time constitutes a concrete injury. Id. at 21–22. Citing to some of the legislative history, Plaintiffs state that Congress enacted section 1681b(b)(3) to require employers to provide employees with pre-adverse action disclosures so they may correct or become aware of the consumer information. Id. at 23. Here, however, Hertz took adverse action—i.e., revocation of the conditional offers—before informing Plaintiffs what was in their reports or notifying them of their rights under the FCRA. Id.
In reply, Hertz correctly reiterates that Plaintiffs’ did not suffer any concrete harm by Hertz’s late procurement of pre-adverse action packages. Reply 17. In the complaint, Plaintiffs concede that they communicated with Hertz regarding the contents of their criminal background reports, and Campbell was even given an opportunity to provide written evidence on her own behalf. Moreover, neither Plaintiff alleges that the information on which Hertz relied was inaccurate or that timely receipt of preadverse action packages would have allowed them to successfully contest Hertz’s decision. Although the Court notes that Campbell’s probation officer stated in her letter to Hertz that she would have attempted to terminate Campbell’s probation early and expunge her record, Campbell does not allege that Hertz would have or had any obligation to hold the position open for Campbell to do so.
The Court also agrees that the Spokeo Court addressed
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this very issue by providing the example discussed above. See 136 S. Ct. at 1550. Again, neither Lee nor Campbell contest the accuracy of the information cited in their criminal background reports. Rather, they simply allege that the information was “not relevant” to the positions for which Plaintiffs applied. FAC ¶¶ 58, 80. Thus, it appears that Plaintiffs seek to dispute how Hertz treats accurate information, rather than the lack of an opportunity to timely correct inaccurate information. See Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-4292, 2016 WL 6524390, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016). This is not what the FCRA protects. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk.”).

IV. ORDER In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that under Spokeo and the facts of this case, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement, and the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the San Francisco Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2016 WL 7034060

Footnotes

1

Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. is wholly owned and operated by The Hertz Corporation. FAC ¶ 21.

2

Hertz also argues that Plaintiffs do not allege that the information obtained for the background report was private. Mot. 12.

Plaintiffs contend that it is irrelevant that some of the information comes from public sources, because the act of consolidating it

and providing it to a potential employer implicates privacy concerns. Opp’n 9–10. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiffs

consented to the background check, it declines to address this issue.

3

Hertz also attempts to draw a distinction based on the purported importance of the rights at issue in Akins and Public Citizen.

Mot. 15. However, such a determination is not essential to this motion, so the Court declines to make this distinction.

6

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-2545 As of: 09/22/2017 09:17 AM PDT 1 of 2
ADRMOP,CLOSED
U.S. District Court California Northern District (Oakland) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:15−cv−02545−JSW

Lee v. The Hertz Corporation et al Assigned to: Hon. Jeffrey S. White Cause: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act
Plaintiff Peter Lee individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Date Filed: 06/09/2015 Date Terminated: 08/24/2015 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Jahan C. Sagafi Outten & Golden LLP One Embarcadero Center 38th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111−3339 415−638−8800 Fax: 415−638−8810 Email: jsagafi@outtengolden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katrina Leigh Eiland Outten & Golden LLP One Embarcadero Center 38th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 638−8800 Fax: (415) 638−8810 Email: keiland@outtengolden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Patricia Desautels Taft Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the SF Bay Area 131 Steuart Street Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94105 415−543−9444 Fax: 415−543−0296 Email: mdesautels@lccr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephanie Paula Funt Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the SF Bay Area 131 Steuart Street Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94105 415−543−9697 Fax: 415−543−0296 Email: sfunt@lccr.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant The Hertz Corporation
Defendant

Case: 4:15-cv-2545 As of: 09/22/2017 09:17 AM PDT 2 of 2
Dollar Automotive Group, Inc.
Defendant Sterling Infosystems, Inc. d/b/a "STERLINGBACKCHECK"

Date Filed 06/09/2015
06/09/2015 06/09/2015
06/09/2015 06/10/2015 06/10/2015 06/10/2015 06/12/2015 06/12/2015 06/12/2015 08/24/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Dollar Thrifty Automotive, Sterling Infosystems, Inc. d/b/a "STERLINGBACKCHECK", The Hertz Corporation ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0971−9582700.). Filed byPeter Lee. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet Attachment I.(c))(Sagafi, Jahan) (Filed on 6/9/2015) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
2 Proposed Summons. (Sagafi, Jahan) (Filed on 6/9/2015) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
3 Case assigned to Hon. Jeffrey S. White.
Counsel for plaintiff or the removing party is responsible for serving the Complaint or Notice of Removal, Summons and the assigned judge's standing orders and all other new case documents upon the opposing parties. For information, visit E−Filing A New Civil Case at http://cand.uscourts.gov/ecf/caseopening.
Standing orders can be downloaded from the court's web page at www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges. Upon receipt, the summons will be issued and returned electronically. Counsel is required to send chambers a copy of the initiating documents pursuant to L.R. 5−1(e)(7). A scheduling order will be sent by Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) within two business days. (ha, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/9/2015) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
4 Initial Case Management Scheduling Order with ADR Deadlines: Case Management Statement due by 9/4/2015. Case Management Conference set for 9/11/2015 11:00 AM. (jlmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/9/2015) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
5 Summons Issued as to Dollar Automotive Group, Inc., Sterling Infosystems, Inc. d/b/a "STERLINGBACKCHECK", The Hertz Corporation. (jlmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/10/2015) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
6 NOTICE of Appearance of Katrina Leigh Eiland as Counsel, filed by Peter Lee (Eiland, Katrina) (Filed on 6/10/2015) Modified on 6/11/2015 (jlmS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 06/10/2015)
7 NOTICE of Appearance of Stephanie Paula Funt as Counsel, filed by Peter Lee (Funt, Stephanie) (Filed on 6/10/2015) Modified on 6/11/2015 (jlmS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 06/10/2015)
8 ORDER SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND REQUIRING JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE on 6/12/15. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/12/2015) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
9 NOTICE of Appearance of Meredith Patricia Desautels Taft as Counsel, filed by Peter Lee (Desautels Taft, Meredith) (Filed on 6/12/2015) Modified on 6/15/2015 (jlmS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 06/12/2015)
10 NOTICE of Change of Address by Katrina Leigh Eiland (Eiland, Katrina) (Filed on 6/12/2015) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
11 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice by Peter Lee (Sagafi, Jahan) (Filed on 8/24/2015) (Entered: 08/24/2015)