Ca ~e 1:06-cv-00165-OVVW-TAG Document 26 Filed 08/23/2006 Page 1 of 8

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ROBERT TOMAS OLMOS, # 54247

DOLORES Y,, LEAL, #134176

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LAW OFFICES

ALLRED, MAROKO & GOLDBERG

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SUITE 1500

6300 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048-5217

(323) 653-6530 Telephone

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(323) 653-4712 Facsimile

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MARCOS CAMACHO, #123501

THOMAS LYNCH, #159277

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MARIO MARTINEZ,#200721

LAW OFFICES OF MARCOS CAMACHO

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5329 Office Center Court, Ste,, 223

Bakersfield, CALIFORNIA 91803

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(661) 324-8100 Telephone

(661) 324-8103 Facsimile
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11 Attorneys for Applicant-Intervenors: DELIA CASAS, MYRIAM CAZARES, MIRIAM DELGADO, PATRICIA DELGADO, FLOR RIVERA and TERRI SALCIDO
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13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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16 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

17

)

)

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Plaintiff,

)

)

19 and

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20 DELIA CASAS, MYRIAM CAZARES,

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MIRIAM DELGADO, PATRICIA

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21 DELGADO, FLOR RIVERA

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and TERRI SALCIDO

)

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)

)

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Applicant-Intervenors

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)

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VS.

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25 KOVACEVICH "5" FARMS, a partnership, )

)

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Defendant.

)

)

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)

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CASE NO: 1:06-cv-00165 OWW TAG
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION-
CIVIL RIGHTS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

2

1. Plaintiff-Intervenors, DELIA CASAS, MYRIAM CAZARES, MIRIAM

3 DELGADO, PATRICIA DELGADO, FLOR RIVERA and TERRI SALCIDO, bring this action

4 for damages resulting from Defendant’s violation of their civil rights, as secured under the

5 Constitution and the laws of the United States and the State of California, by its maintenance of

6 unlawful employment practices which had the purpose or effect of discriminating against them,

7 and a class of female applicants, on the basis of their sex, female. Plaintiff-I_ntervenors bring this

8 action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated females who were denied

9 employment, and/or were deterred from appl.ying for’ employment, on the basis of their gender,

10 female.

11

12

JURY DEMAND

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2. Plaintiff-Intervenors hereby demand a jury trial as provided by Rule 38(a) of the

14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

15

16

JURISDICTION

17

3. This action is brought to redress violations of Plaintiff-Intervenors’ rights as

18 guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., as amended,

19 California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 12900 et seq., and

20 Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution, to secure protection against and to redress

21 deprivation of their right to be free of sex discrimination in employment. The.jurisdiction of this

22 Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) to secure the above-specified rights. This Court

23 also has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 in that this civil action

24 arises in part under’ the Constitution or’ laws of the United States of America. Plaintiff-Intervenors

25 request that the Court exercise.jurisdiction over’ their’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

26 §1367(a).

27

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

28

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of

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1 Civil Procedure on their own behalf and on behalf of all others persons similarly situated. The

2 members of the class at’e:

3

(a) All women who applied for employment with Defendant Kovacevich "5"

4

Farms and who were denied employment because of their’ gender (female) at

5

any time during the period from January 1998 to the present.

6

(b) All women who were deterred from applying for or seeking employment

7

with Defendant Kovacevich "5" Farms, at any time during the period from

8

January 1998 to the present, because of said company’s known policy and

9

practice of refusing employment to females because of their’ gender’

10

(female).

11

5. The members of these classes are too numerous to be.joined.

12

6. There are common questions of law and fact, including whether the female class

13 members were denied employment, or deterred from seeking employment, because of their gender’,

14 female.

15

7. The claims of the plaintiffs ar’e typical of the class claims.

16

8. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the

17 class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief to the

18 class as a whole.

19

20

PARTIES

21

9. Plaintiff-Intervenors are each experienced female farm workers who applied for’

22 employment with Defendant Kovacevich "5" Farms and were rejected and/or deterred from

23 applying for employment by said Defendant because of their’ gender’ (female), thereby constituting

24 unlawful sex discrimination at the time of the acts giving rise to this action.

25

10. Plaintiff, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, (hereinafter

26 "Plaintiff’) is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration,

27 interpretation and enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and is expressly 28 authorized to bring this action by §706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 2000e(f)(1) and (3).

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1

11. Defendant, at all times relevant herein, was, and is, a California partnership,

2 qualified and doing business in the State of California, and was an employer who continuously

3 had, and does now have at least fifteen employees.. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an

4 employer’ engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b)

5 and (h).

6

7

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

8

12. On or’ about November 13, 2003, Plaintiff-Intervenors filed charges of employment

9 discrimination with Plaintiff alleging sex discrimination by Defendant. These charges of

10 employment discrimination were dual-filed with the California Department of Fair Employment

11 and Housing ("DFEH"). Pursuant to the work-sharing agreement between said agencies, the

12 DFEH issued a right to sue letter to each Plaintiff-Intervenor and Plaintiff assumed responsibility

13 for investigating and processing said charges. On August 18, 2004, Plaintiff issued a letter of

14 Determination, finding that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by

15 refusing to hire Plaintiff-Intervenors, and a class of female applicants, because of their’-sex, female

16

17

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

18

VIOLATION OF TITLE VII: Sex Discrimination

19

13. More than thirty (30) days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Plaintiff-

20 Intervenors filed charges of employment discrimination with Plaintiff Equal Employment

21 Opportunity Commission alleging violation of Title VII by Defendant against Plaintiff-Intervenor 22 and a class of female applicants who were denied employment and/or deterred from applying for 23 employment, because of their’ gender, female. All conditions precedent to the institution of this

24 lawsuit have been fulfilled.

25

14. Since at least January of 1998, Defendant has engaged in unlawful practices of sex

26 discrimination, in violation of §703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2a, by refusing to hire

27 Plaintiff-l.ntervenors and a class of similarly situated females based upon their gender, female.

28

15. The effect of the actions complained of in Paragraph 9 above has been to deprive

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1 Plaintiff-Intereenors, and a class of similarly situated females, of equal employment opportunities

2 and has otherwise adversely affected their status as employees because of their’ gender’, female.

3

16. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above were

4 intentional.

5

17. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above were done

6 with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected fights of the Plaintiff-

7 Intervenors and a class of similarly situated females.

8

9

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

10 CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (Calif. Gov’t §12900 et seq.)

11

18. Plaintiff-Intervenors reallege and incorporate by reference herein each and every

12 allegation stated in Paragraphs 1 through 12, above, as though fully stated herein.

13

19. Plaintiff-hatereenors filed timely charges of employment discrimination with the

14 California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging employment

15 discrimination against them, and a class of female applicants who were rejected for employment

16 and/or deterr’ed from applying for employment, on the basis of their gender, female. The DFEH

17 issued letters of right to sue to each of Plaintiff-Inter-eenors. Plaintiff-Intervenors have exhausted

18 their’ administrative remedies.

19

20. Plaintiff-Intervenors are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that a substantial

20 motivating factor in Defendant’s discrimination was their’ gender, female, in violation of the

21 California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") Calif. Government Code § 12900, et seq.

22

21. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s willful, knowing and intentional

23 discrimination, Plaintiff-Intervenors have suffered and will continue to suffer’ pain and suffering,

24 and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress. Plaintiff-Intervenors are hereby

25 entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

26

22. Plaintiff-Intervenors are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that the

27 outrageous conduct of Defendant described above was done with malice, fraud and oppression and

28 with conscious disregard for their’ rights and with the intent, design and purpose of injuring them.

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Ca }e 1:06-cv-00165-OVVW-TAG Document 26 Filed 08/23/2006 Page 6 of 8

1 Defendant, through its officers, managing agents and or supervisors, authorized, condoned and/or

2 ratified the unlawful conduct. By reason thereof, Plaintiff-Intervenors are entitled to punitive or’

3 exemplary damages from the Defendant in a sum according to proof at trial.

4

5

PRAYER

6

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Intervenor’s pray this Court for’ the relief set forth below;

7

1. For back pay and employment benefits, in order’ to make whole Plaintiff-

8 Intervenors and a class of similarly situated females who were denied employment and/or deterred

9 from applying for employment, for injuries sustained on account of Defendant’s acts;

10

2. For front pay, to compensate Plaintiff-Intervenors and a class of similarly situated

11 females who were denied employment and/or deterred from applying for employment, for the

12 future losses occasioned by Defendant’s acts;

13

3. For’ emotional distress;

14

4. For compensatory damages according to proof at trial;

15

5. For punitive damages according to proof at trial;

16

6. For interest on all back pay and employment benefits awarded to make Plaintiff-

17 Intervenor’s whole and to deter’ Defendant from engaging in discriminatory acts in the future;

18

For’ reasonable attorney fees, costs and disbursements occasioned by this litigation;

19 and 8.

For injunctive relief and for’ such other and further’ relief as the Court may deem

20 proper.

21

22 DATED: June 20, 2006

ALLRED, MAROKO & GOLDBERG

23

24

By

RO,t3..ERT TOMA’~OLMOS

25

DOLORES Y. LEAL

26 ///

27 ///

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LAW OFFICES OF MARCOS CAMACHO

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By

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THOMAS LYNCH

MARIO MARTINEZ

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Attorneys for Applicant-Inter-eenors

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1

PROOF OF SERVICE

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18

and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 6300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500,

4 Los Angeles, California 90048-5217.

5

On August 23, 2006, I served the foregoing document described as COMPLAINT IN

INTER VENTION- CIVIL RIGHTS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION on interested

6 parties in this action

7 []
8
ix]
9

by placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached mailing list:
by placing [ ] the original [X] a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes at Los Angeles, California addressed as follows:

10 Ronald H. Barsamian, Esq.
11 Michael C. Saqui, Esq. Patrick S. Moody, Esq.
12 Anthony P. Raimondo, Esq.
BARSAMIAN~ SAQUI & MOODY
13 1141 W. Shaw Avenue, Suite 104 Fresno, CA 93711-3704
14

William R. Tamayo, Esq. Jonathan T. Peck, Esq. Evangelina Fierro Hemandez, Esq. Linda Ordonio-Dixon, Esq.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
San Francisco District Office 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105

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ix] BY MAIL: I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the

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United States mail at Los Angeles, California.

17 []
18
[]
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20
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[]
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23 [x]
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BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the addressee(s).
BY FAX: by transmitting a true copy via facsimile transmission from telecopier number’ (323) 653-1660 located at 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1500, Los Angeles, California 90048, to the following:
Executed on August 23, 2006 at Los Angeles, California.
State I declare under’ penalty ofperjur3~ under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
Federal I declare that I am employed in the office of a member’ of the bar’ of this Court at whose direction the service was made.

25

26

27

28

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August 23, 2006

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION - CIVIL RIGHTS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 1174444 United States District Court,
E.D. California.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS, Defendant.
No. CV-F-06-165 OWW/TAG. | April 19, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Evangelina Patricia Hernandez, Linda Susan Ordonio-Dixon, William Robert Tamayo, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.
Ronald H. Barsamian, Barsamian Saqui and Moody, Fresno, CA, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER DEFERRING PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS’ MOTION FOR CLASS-CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FRCP 23(a) AND 23(b)(2) (Doc. 41) AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Doc. 51)
OLIVER W. WANGER, United States District Judge.
*1 On February 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a Complaint against Kovacevich “5” Farms (K5) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alleging unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and seeking relief on behalf of six charging parties: Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazares, Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terri Salcedo, and Delia Casas. The EEOC’s Complaint alleges in paragraph 9: “Since at least January of 1998, Defendant have [sic] engaged in unlawful practices of sex discrimination ... by refusing to hire the Charging Parties and similarly situated female employees based on their sex.” The charging parties named in the EEOC’s Complaint have intervened in this action as Plaintiff/Intervenors (hereinafter referred to as Intervenors). The Intervenors allege claims for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and for sex discrimination in employment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code §§ 12900 et seq.
Intervenors move for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of the following class, described in paragraph 4 of the Complaint in Intervention:
(a) All women who applied for employment with Defendant Kovacevich “5” Farms and who were denied employment because of their gender (female) at any time during the period from January 1998 to the present.
(b) All women who were deterred from applying for or seeking employment with Defendant Kovacevich “5” Farms, at any time during the period from January 1998 to the present, because of the company’s known policy and practice of refusing employment to females because of their gender.
The EEOC has filed a Statement of Non-Opposition to the motion. In its Statement of Non-Opposition, the EEOC asserts that certification of the two classes from January 1998 to the present is appropriate because of application of the continuing violation doctrine.
Kovacevich “5” Farms (K5) has filed an opposition to the motion and a reply to the EEOC’s Statement of Non-Opposition, contesting application of the continuing violation doctrine. Because Plaintiff-Intervenors did not address the merits of this issue in their reply brief, Plaintiff-Intervenors were ordered to file a supplemental reply brief. See discussion infra. K5’s objection to class certification essentially is limited to the temporal scope of the class.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Subsequent to the filing of the motion for class certification, K5 filed a motion for summary adjudication, seeking an order “limiting individual damages sought under Title VII by the EEOC and the Intervenors to individuals who can show that they were denied employment or deterred from applying from a date 300 days prior to the filing of Intervenors EEOC charges (February 13, 2003) to the present, and limiting damages sought by Intervenors under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) to individuals who can show that they were denied employment or deterred from applying from a date one year prior to the filing of Intervenors EEOC charges (December 12, 2002) to the present.”
*2 At the hearing on these motions, the parties were ordered to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the issue raised by K5 is appropriate for resolution on summary adjudication and whether there is no statute of limitations period applicable to individual claims when alleged in a pattern or practice case. These supplemental briefs were timely filed.
A. Motion for Summary Adjudication.
1. Temporal Scope of Class. The Charges of Discrimination filed by Terri Salcedo on November 13, 2003 and by Delia Casas on November 19, 2003 allege in pertinent part that Ms. Salcedo and Ms. Casas with a group of women applied for work with K5 “in or about July, 1998”, that K5 employees told Ms. Casas and the other women that K5 does not hire women, and that “[i]n the following seasons, including 2003 (up and through the present), [they were] deterred from applying for work at Kovacevich because [they] knew about the policy of refusing to hire female workers [and they] believed that Kovacevich would reject [them] again based on my sex.” The Charge of Discrimination filed by Miriam Cazares on November 19, 2003 alleges in pertinent part that she and two other women applied for work with K5 “in or about July, 2001”, that they were told by a K5 employee that K5 was not hiring at the time, that K5 was hiring men at the time, that K5 refused to hire them because of their sex, and that “[i]n the following seasons, including 2003 (up to and including the present), I was deterred from applying for work at Kovacevich because I knew about the policy of refusing to hire female workers [and] I believed that Kovacevich would reject me again based on my sex.”
The EEOC and Intervenors argue that the continuing violation doctrine is applicable to a systemic policy or a pattern-or-practice of discrimination and that evidence in addition to that set forth in the Charges of Discrimination provided in discovery substantiates this contention.
In its motion for summary adjudication, K5 assumes arguendo that it had a policy against hiring women and that there were zero women in the work force but contends that only those women who can prove that they were refused hire because of their gender and those who were deterred from applying for an available position within the 300-day period and/or the one year period immediately preceding the filing of the EEOC charges of discrimination are eligible to recover damages. K5 asserts that its motion does not address factual issues but, rather, “K5 asks the court to rule on who may bring timely individual claims for monetary damages, if the EEOC succeeds on its theory of liability”. K5 contends, as a matter of law, the only actionable claims in this case are those that arose during the applicable charge filing period, and damages can only be awarded on those claims.
2. Governing Standard. Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
3. Factual Background.1 *3 K5’s Answer to the First Amended Complaint filed in Gutierrrez v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, No. CV-F-04-5515 OWW/DLB, admits that it is a single integrated enterprise, to grow, pick, pack and ship table grapes and other crops in Tulare County, California. K5’s position statement submitted to the EEOC in connection with the charges of discrimination filed in the instant action states, “[t]he Company’s labor needs fluctuate depending upon seasonal activities, with peak employment levels occurring in the harvest during late summer and early fall”; that K5 “has highly informal hiring procedures in seasonal operations”; and that “[f]arm workers are generally aware of the seasonal activities that occur in the table grape [industry] and will begin to inquire as to the availability of work when those seasonal activities begin.” K5’s
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Employee Handbook states that K5 “does not utilize a seniority system and the company does not guarantee any laid off employees to recall rights.” In K5’s responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, K5 admits the number of its employees during the period 1998 to 2003 ranged from 277 to 301. The Joint Scheduling Report states that it is “undisputed by the parties that K-5 had no female employees from 1998 to October 2003”. K-5’s response to the Charges of Discrimination filed with the EEOC states “there were 95 female applicants in October 2003.” In the Declaration of Lucio Arciniega, a crew boss for K5 submitted to the EEOC in connection with its investigation, Mr. Arciniega averred in pertinent part:
5. My job duties include supervising and overseeing a crew of farm laborers in seasonal agricultural activities. I hire the employees for my crew.
6. When people ask me for work, I consider their past work history with the Company, their past performance and whether their abilities are suited for the job that I need done. If the person has no work history with the Company, I hire the person who asks for work first.
7. I have refused to hire female applicants who have asked for work when no positions are available in my crew. I have never refused to hire a woman because she was female, and have never told any one that I would not hire women.
8. When I need workers for my crew, I will either tell the people in my crew that more jobs are available and they will spread the word, or I will call however many people I need from a list of people who have worked in my crew in the past. I call one or two times, and will leave a message if I can.
9. In 2003, some employees started asking that the Company hire their wives. As I was instructed by management, I told my crew that women were welcome to seek work, and asked for the names of women who wished to work. I prepared a list of names of female applicants, and provided it to the office. The office chose names of women, and I was told to hire those women. If a woman was unavailable, I was provided with another name. Ultimately, both wives and daughters of employees were hired.
*4 Onecimo Calderon, a crew boss for K5, averred in pertinent part:
6. When I hire employees, I consider whether the person has worked for the Company in the past, and whether or not the person has been a good worker. If the person has no work history, I hire the people on a first come, first served basis.
7. I have refused to hire female applicants who applied when there were no available jobs in my crew. When this happens, I tell them to check back later to see if work is available. I have never turned away a woman because she was female, and have never told any applicant that I do not hire women.
8. Most of the people in my crew live near me. If I only need a small number of workers, I may call each person that I need from those who have worked in the crew in the past. If I need a large number of workers, I will call as many as I can, but sometimes the workers are difficult to reach because their phone numbers change frequently. I leave messages when I can, but many workers do not have message machines. I will call one or two times when I need people. I do not remember any woman approaching me to seek work at a time when work was available.
9. During 2003, some of the workers asked me if their wives could work at the Company. I was instructed by management to prepare a list of women who wanted to work for the Company. I announced to my crew that women would be hired, and they provided me with names for the list. The office selected the names of the women who would be hired and gave them to me. I then informed the employees who gave me the names and asked them to let the women know that I had a job for them. If the woman was unavailable, the office provided me with a new name.
Augustin Castillo, a crew boss for K5, averred in pertinent part:
6. When I hire employees, I prefer employees who have worked for the Company in the past and who have a history of good performance. Most of the employees in my crew are employees who have worked for the Company in the past. When I hire applicants who have not worked for the Company before, I will hire the first person who seeks work when work is available.
7. I have turned away female job applicants when they have asked for work at times when no work is available. I have never refused to hire a woman because she was female, and have never told any person that I do not hire women.
8. I almost always have at least a small crew working. When I am told by management to hire more workers, I will tell the
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
members of the crew, and they spread the word that work is available. Those who are interested in working will come to my house or to the fields to ask for work. If there are no crew members working, I will call a few people who have worked before and inform them that work is available. They will spread the word, and people will come to my house or show up at the fields to seek work. The people that I select to call are those for whom I have good contact information. Many of the people in my crew are difficult to contact by telephone, or move frequently. Those who I know I can contact are the people that I call. I usually will try two or three times to reach these people, and I ask them to spread the word that work is available. I never call each and every employee that I need, and I never seek out the people. If they want to work, they must find me. I do not recall a woman ever asking me for work at a time when work was available.
*5 9. In 2003, a number of employees approached me and asked if their wives could work for the Company. I was told by management that the Company would hire any woman who wished to work, and I informed the crew. The members of the crew gave me the names of women who wished to work for the Company, and I gave a list of these names to management. The office selected the names of women I was to hire, and gave me a list of these names. I was not involved in the selection process. I told the men in my crew who gave me the women’s names that I had jobs for them, and they told me whether or not the woman was available. If a woman was available, she was hired, and if not, I was given another name.
In the Declaration of Manuel Hernandez, submitted in opposition to K5’s motion for summary adjudication, Mr. Hernandez avers that he has worked as a farmworker at K5 since 1985 and further avers in pertinent part:
Prior to October 2003, I never saw a woman get hired by K-5. However, I did hear that several years ago a woman disguised herself as a woman [sic] in order to get work at K-5. When the crew leader found out she was a woman, she was immediately fired. Other than that, I don’t know of any woman that was ever hired during my twenty-two years with the company.
4. I heard that the owners did not want women workers because there were no bathrooms for them, women should stay home with their children and because women would want time off from worker [sic] for things like taking their kids to the doctors.
5. I wanted my wife and daughters to work with me at K-5 and over the years when work was available I repeatedly asked the crew leaders if they could work. I was told by a crew leader that the owners did not want women workers. I saw that the crew leaders would only offer work to men. Numerous co-workers confirmed to me that the company did not hire women. And again, I never saw a woman working there prior to October 2003.
6. All the employees’ wives and daughters preferred working at K-5 because of the proximity to their home, less transportation and safer.
7. When the company finally decided to consider women for work, the crew leaders’ wives and daughters were among the first to be hired. I think that the crew leaders wanted to hire women, including their female relatives, but could not do so before October 2003 because the owners directed them not to hire women.
In the Declaration of Yolanda Hernandez, wife of Manual Hernandez, it is averred:2
1. I have worked as a farmworker my entire life. I have specifically worked in grape vineyards since the age of 14 years old and have performed many duties related to the production of grapes including deleafing, pruning, tipping, and picking.
2. Five of my male relatives have worked and continue to work at K-5 for many years, including my husband, Manuel ....
3. I am fully aware of the seasonal cycles for farm work including grape vineyards in the Delano-Earlimart area because my income depends on it. I also know in particular when K-5 has work available because I have so many family members working there.
*6 4. I first sought work at K-5 in 1998, when I along Delia Casas, Myrian Cazarez, Terri Salcido, Adela Hernandez, Isabel Hernandez, Eva Hernandez, Rachel Ramirez, Maria Rocha and some other women walked to K-5 to ask for employment. We knew that K-5 was hiring from friends and relatives.
5. We spoke with Kenny Kovacevich, Sr., and his two sons, Kenny Jr. and Mark Kovacevich. We told them we had experience working in the vineyards and wanted to apply for work. Kenny Kovacevich, Jr., stated that the company did
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not employ women. When we asked why the Kovacevichs said that we needed to be home with our kids. The men then got a truck and drove away. They left us standing there in the dust.
6. I have wanted to work at K-5 so that I could work with my husband and other relatives. Working together costs the family expenses and provides a safer work environment.
7. Over the years, I hoped that the owners would change their mind about women, so I would continue to ask my husband and other men who worked at K-5 if they were hiring women. However, until late 2003, I was repeatedly told that the owners still did not want to hire women workers.
Evidence from K-5’s payroll records demonstrates that at least two of the Charging Parties were rejected for work at K5 on July 23, 2003 but that 20 men were hired from July 24, 2003 to August 4, 2003, all of whom were first time hires. Mark Kovacevich testified at his deposition that the door of a bathroom was marked for women in approximately October 2003. Linda Ordonio-Dixon, counsel for the EEOC in this action, avers:
16. Only limited discovery has been conducted in this case thus far. No depositions have been taken and the parties have only recently begun to identify the victim class in this case. However, the EEOC is informed and believes that subsequent discovery will reveal numerous other victims of K-5’s exclusionary policy. Even at this stage of the lawsuit, the EEOC has interviewed no less than fifty women who have potential claims in this lawsuit. Each of these potential claimants experienced discrimination similar to that which is detailed above.
4. Analysis. K5 asserts that the proposed class definition is defective on its face because of the time covered by the class definition. Specifically, K5 challenges the request that the class run from January 1998.
K5 cites 4 Larson, Employment Discrimination, 2d Ed., § 81.09[2], that “courts follow an initial rule that the class may include only those individuals whose claims are not foreclosed by the Title VII statute of limitations and who therefore could have filed charges with the EEOC in a timely manner on the date that the actual class representative filed charges.” K5 contends that, under federal and state authority, the temporal scope of the class is limited to those who were unlawfully denied employment or who were deterred from applying during the 300-day period to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC for the Title VII causes of action and to the one-year period for filing DFEH charges for the FEHA cause of action. Therefore, the class can include only those who were alleged victims of sex discrimination on or after February 15, 2003 for Title VII and on or after December 12, 2002 for the FEHA claim.
*7 K5 relies on Williams v. Owens-Illinois, 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), modified on denial of rehearing, 1982 WL 308873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 302, 74 L.Ed.2d 283 (1982). In Williams, the Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:
In a class action, a class representative’s EEOC complaint tolls the statute of limitations for all class members ... The trial court established the limitations period for the two classes by subtracting the 180 day statute of limitations for filing with the EEOC complaint filed by a member of each class. The court therefore concluded that claims of sex discrimination based on acts prior to March 1974 and of race discrimination based on acts prior to March 1971 were time-barred. The court rejected the continuing violation doctrine as inapplicable.
The doctrine of continuing violations, as one court observed, is ‘actually a conglomeration of several different ideas.’ ... For present purposes, however, the relevant strain of continuing violation doctrine is that a systematic policy of discrimination is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred prior to the limitations period ... The reason is that the continuing system of discrimination operates against the employee and violates his or her rights up to a point in time that falls within the applicable limitations period. Such continuing violations are most likely to occur in the matter of placements or promotions. A minority employee who is not promoted in 1973, for example, and is subject to a continuing policy against promotion of minorities, may then file a timely charge in 1976, because the policy against promoting him or her continued to violate the employee’s rights up to the time the charge was filed. With regard to such discrimination in promotion, this court has accepted the following formulation:
[A] challenge to systematic discrimination is always timely if brought by a present employee, for the existence of the system deters the employee from seeking his full employment rights or threatens to adversely affect him in the future.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
...
The situation may be different, however, with regard to complainants who have ceased to be employees or never were employees. A refusal to hire or a decision to fire an employee may place the victim out of reach of any further effect of company policy, so that such a complainant must file a charge within the requisite time period after the refusal to hire or termination, or be time-barred. If in those cases the victim can show no way in which the company policy had an impact on them within the limitations period, the continuing violation doctrine is of no assistance or applicability, because mere ‘continuing impact’ from past violations is not actionable. Continuing violations are.’ ....
We agree with the trial court that in this case Owens-Illinois’ refusals to hire and terminations did not give occasion to apply the continuing violations doctrine. Claims based on discriminatory refusals to hire or on terminations occurring before the limitations period were therefore properly excluded.
*8 665 F.2d at 923-924.
K5 also refers to Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.1982), order modified, 742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.1984).
In Domingo, the district court certified the plaintiff class as all nonwhites who were either employed by Nefco, applied for employment by Nefco, or were deterred from applying for employment with Nefco at any time between 300 days prior to November 26, 1971 (the date Domingo filed his charge with the EEOC) and the date of the damages phase of the trial. 727 F.2d at 1442. In pertinent part, Domingo argued on appeal that the continuing violation theory permits victims of discrimination at an earlier time to recover. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court was correct in establishing the starting date of the class action 300 days prior to the date Domingo filed his EEOC charge. Id. The Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:
It is now well settled that a named plaintiff who has filed a timely charge may bring a class action on behalf of class members who have not filed charges ... In addition, the filing of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitation for all class members ... It follows, then, that Domingo may represent all class members whose claims were not already time-barred at the time he filed his charge, irrespective of whether the class members had filed charges of their own.
...
Domingo argues, nevertheless, that the continuing violation doctrine announced in this circuit operates to eliminate the limitation period. The continuing violation theory recognizes the principle that a plaintiff may be able to recover under Title VII if he or she can demonstrate a pattern or practice of discrimination that has continued into the present, notwithstanding his or her ability to prove specific instances of discrimination personally suffered at the hands of the defendant within the limitation period of Title VII ... Thus, Domingo reasons, if a continuing violation has been demonstrated a class member should be able to recover regardless of when the class member was employed. That statement is not quite true.
We note, first, that the defendant’s conduct, as found by the district court, did indeed constitute a continuing violation of Title VII. In order for a violation to be continuing, it must involve a practice, continued over a period of time, which operates to injure the plaintiff either individually or as a member of a class to which the plaintiff belongs ... Here, plaintiffs have attacked Nefco’s hiring and promotion policies. There is no question that these policies remained intact from season to season. Moreover, the practices were not confined in application to any particular individual or group of individuals, but operated against the class generally. Indeed, the district court implicitly found, as a matter of fact, that Nefco’s practices were classwide in application when it certified the class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
*9 Domingo’s argument, however, would effectively read the limitations period out of the statute, which we cannot do. As the Supreme Court has stated:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 ... (1977). The continuing violation theory is a way of introducing this type of background evidence ... It follows that, as a prerequisite to obtaining relief, each class
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member must demonstrate, by fact of employment or otherwise, that he or she has been discriminated against during the limitation period or was a member of a group exposed to discrimination during that time.
727 F.2d at 1442-1443.
With regard to the FEHA, K5 cites Alch v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 377, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 (2004) (“[T]he employers and the agencies would not be liable for any discriminatory refusal to refer or refusal to hire that occurred more than one year before the complaints in these cases were filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing.’).
In Morgan v. National Railroad P. Corp., 232 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.2000), the Ninth Circuit ruled that plaintiff can establish a continuing violation in two ways:
... First, by showing a series of related acts one or more of which are within the limitations period-a serial violation. A serial violation is established if the evidence indicates that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period ... Precedent makes clear that the alleged incidents of discrimination cannot be isolated, sporadic, or discrete ... [T]his court [has] found a sufficient relationship where the acts were ‘plausibly related as acts of discrimination ....“ ....
The second way to establish a continuing violation is to show a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period-a systemic violation ... Systemic violations involve ‘demonstrating a company wide policy or practice’ and most often occurs in matters of placement or promotion.
232 F.3d at 1015-1016. However, in National Railroad P. Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the continuing violation doctrine to “serial violations”. The Supreme Court held:
The Court of Appeals applied the continuing violation doctrine to what it termed ‘serial violations,’ holding that so long as one act falls within the charge filing period, discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or sufficiently related to that act may also be considered for purposes of liability ... With respect to this holding, ... we reverse.
*10 Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ Morgan can only file a charge of discrimination to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within the appropriate time period.
536 U.S. at 114. However, Morgan specifically did not address the timely filing question with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims brought by private litigants. 536 U.S. at 115 n. 9.
Although noting that the Supreme Court in Morgan expressly declined to address the timely filing with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims, K5 asserts that another statement in Morgan suggests that only timely discrete acts are actionable under a pattern or practice theory.
The statement in Morgan upon which K5 relies is not supportive as K5 argues. The Supreme Court was addressing Morgan’s contention that the statute does not require the filing of a charge of discrimination within 180 or 300 days of each discrete act of discrimination, but that the language requires the filing of a charge within the specified number of days after an “unlawful employment practice”. 536 U.S. at 510-511. In rejecting Morgan’s position, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is simply no indication that the term ‘practice’ converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purpose of timely filing” and that “[w]e have repeatedly interpreted the term ‘practice’ to apply to a discrete act or single ‘occurrence,’ even when it has a connection to other acts.” 536 U.S. at 511. This latter statement was made by the Supreme Court in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s position concerning “serial violations”. Given the Supreme Court’s express statement in Morgan that it was not addressing timely filing questions with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims brought by private litigants statement, K5’s assertion that the Supreme Court in Morgan suggests what the resolution might be is speculative.
Nonetheless, in Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir.2003), the plaintiff, a substitute teacher, alleged in pertinent part that the School District subjected her to disparate treatment because of her national origin when it refused to hire her as a permanent teacher during three consecutive hiring cycles, beginning in 1991. The Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
In Morgan, the [Supreme] Court drew a distinction between harassment-based and non-harassment-based claims under Title VII: plaintiffs may not establish employer liability for events occurring prior to the statutory limitations period in non-harassment-based claims, even if events occurring outside of the limitations period form part of a pattern extending to events that are not time-barred. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at 2072 (stating that ‘discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they related to acts alleged in timely filed charges’); see also id. at 2071 (‘We have repeatedly interpreted the term “practice” to apply to a discrete act or single “occurrence,” even when it has connection to other acts.’). In other words, a discriminatory practice, although it may extend over time and through a series of related acts, remains divisible into a set of discrete acts, legal action on the basis of which must be brought within the statutory limitations period.
*11 Here, Raad filed her EEO charge with the ASCHR on September 16, 1993. Because she filed her charge with the state agency, the 300-day limitations period governs her claim. Therefore, the District may be held liable only for discriminatory acts perpetrated within 300 days of September 16, 1993, counting backward from that date. As a result, Raad’s claims based on the District’s denial of her full-time application in August 1993 for the science position at Lathrop, as well as her claims based on the report of a bomb threat and ensuing disciplinary action, are not time-barred. The District may be held liable for damages caused by these acts, assuming that Raad is able to prove her case.
The failure-to-hire claims arising out of Raad’s applications in 1991 and 1992 are time-barred; however, their supporting factual allegations may remain relevant to Raad’s live claims. See Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at 2072; United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 ... (1977). Accordingly, while these claims are not independently actionable, evidence about the District’s refusal to hire Raad for a full-time teaching position in 1991 and 1992 is relevant and admissible insofar as it bears on her claim that she was discriminatorily refused a full-time position in August 1993.
323 F.3d at 1192.
K5 further contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) establishes that persons seeking individual recovery in pattern or practice cases must demonstrate that they have an actionable claim under Title VII. In so arguing, K5 refers to the Supreme Court’s discussions at pp. 361-362, 367-368, and 371.
In Teamsters, the United States instituted federal court actions under Title VII against a nationwide common carrier of motor freight and the union representing many of its employees, alleging that the employer had engaged in a pattern of discrimination against African-Americans and Spanish-surnamed persons with regard to hiring for and transfers or promotions to certain preferred truck driving positions, and that the seniority system in the bargaining agreement between the defendants perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. In pertinent part, the defendants (petitioners before the Supreme Court) then argued that no employee should be entitled to relief unless the United States demonstrates that he was an actual victim of the company’s discriminatory policies. The Supreme Court, relying Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), and cautioning that not all class actions will necessarily follow the Franks model, held in pertinent part:
The plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice action is the Government, and its initial burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer ... At the initial, ‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.....
*12 If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the Government’s prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the Government, a court’s finding of pattern or practice justifies an award of prospective relief ....
When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief. The petitioners’ contention in this case is that if the Government has not, in the course of proving a pattern or practice, already brought forth specific evidence that each individual was discriminatorily denied an employment opportunity, it must carry that burden at the second, ‘remedial’ stage of trial. That basic contention was rejected in the Franks case. As was true of the particular facts in Franks, and as is typical of Title VII pattern-or-practice suits, the question of individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination. The
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force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage of the trial. The employer cannot, therefore, claim that there is no reason to believe that its individual employment decisions were discriminatorily based; it has already been shown to have maintained a policy of discriminatory decisionmaking.
The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy. The Government need only show that an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for a job and therefore was a potential victim of the proved discrimination. As in Franks, the burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reason.
... [W]e have held that the District Court and the Court of Appeals were not in error in finding that the Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice of racial and ethnic discrimination on the part of the company. On remand, therefore, every post-Act minority group applicant for a line-driver position will be presumptively entitled to relief, subject to a showing by the company that its earlier refusal to place the applicant in a line-driver job was not based on its policy of discrimination.
431 U.S. at 361-362. The Supreme Court subsequently discussed the appellate court’s conclusion that where there has been a showing of class-wide discriminatory practices coupled with a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of that discrimination, an individual member of the class need not show that he unsuccessfully applied for the position from which the class had been excluded. The Supreme Court held:
[A]n incumbent employee’s failure to apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority. Individual nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to undertake their difficult task of proving that they should be treated as applicants and therefore presumptively entitled to relief accordingly.
*13 431 U.S. at 364. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court stated in pertinent part:
To conclude that a person’s failure to submit an application for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitlement to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry ... from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such relief. A nonapplicant must show that he was a potential victim of unlawful discrimination. Because he is necessarily claiming that he was deterred from applying for the job by the employer’s discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy burden of proving that he would have applied for the job had it not been for those practices ... When this burden is met, the nonapplicant is in a position analogous to that of an applicant and is entitled to the presumption discussed ... supra.
431 U.S. at 367-368. The Supreme Court further held:
While it may be true that many of the nonapplicant employees desired and would have applied for line-driver jobs but for their knowledge of the company’s policy of discrimination, the Government must carry its burden of proof, with respect to each specific individual, at the remedial hearings to be conducted by the District Court on remand.
431 U.S. at 371.
K5 argues that Teamsters makes
absolutely clear that, notwithstanding an alleged pattern or practice of discrimination, each person seeking individual relief must demonstrate an actionable claim of discrimination under Title VII, and it is equally clear that to demonstrate an actionable claim requires proof of a discriminatory refusal to hire or legitimate deterrence during the 300 days preceding the filing of the underlying EEOC charge. In this case, therefore, the class can only include individuals who can prove that they were refused hire, or legitimately deterred from applying for work on or after February 13, 2003.
The EEOC and Intervenors rely on EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.1992). In Local 350, the EEOC brought an action under the ADEA on behalf of a local union member, Pilot, and similarly situated members
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challenging the union’s policy of refusing to allow retired members to seek work through its hiring hall while receiving pensions. Pilot, who had retired in 1983, had signed on to the union’s work list in 1984. The union removed him from the work list in 1984, advising him that to be eligible he would have to stop receiving his pension. Pilot continued to seek to sign up on the work list up to November 1987. In December 1987, Pilot filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Id. at 643. The Ninth Circuit accepted the EEOC’s argument that Pilot could obtain monetary relief from the date he was first refused listing because the union’s policy constituted a “continuing violation”:
‘Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a systematic policy of discrimination is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred prior to the limitations period.” ‘
*14 Id. Here, the EEOC and Intervenors argue, K5 continued its exclusionary hiring policy into the charge filing period and, following Local 350, K5 “should be held accountable for the entire scope of its systematic discrimination for the duration of the policy’s implementation.”
K5 responds that Local 350 is distinguishable because Pilot had been refused listing within one month of the EEOC charge of discrimination and because Local 350 was decided before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan. K5 contends:
[T]here was a continuing obligation to refer the applicant for employment which could support a continuing violation, at least prior to Morgan, due to the continuing relationship between the applicant and the union. Of course, Morgan eviscerated this approach to alleged continuing violations, by holding that the limitations period begins to run from the date of each discrete discriminatory act, such as a refusal to hire.
The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Douglas v. California Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir.), amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.2001), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 285 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924, 122 S.Ct. 2591, 153 L.Ed.2d 780 (2002). Douglas was a case involving a suit claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by an applicant for employment who was denied employment by CYA because a vision test indicated the applicant was color-blind. The Ninth Circuit, relying on its opinion in Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., held that a plaintiff “may show a ‘systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period-a systemic violation.’ “ 271 F.2d at 822. The Douglas court was aware that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Morgan but concluded that “[b]ecause the present case involves the second method of establishing a continuing violation-a systemic violation-the Supreme Court’s decision is unlikely to control this case.” 271 F.3d at 822 n. 9. The Ninth Circuit, addressing Douglas’ allegation that CYA’s color vision requirement constitutes a systemic policy of discrimination, explained:
A systemic violation claim ‘requires no identifiable act of discrimination in the limitations period, and refers to general practices or policies, such as hiring, promotion, training and compensation.’ Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir.1998). ‘In other words, if both discrimination and injury are ongoing, the limitations clock does not begin to tick until the invidious conduct ends.’ Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir.1989).
271 F.3d at 822. The Ninth Circuit, noting that its decisions applying the systemic policy or practice method of demonstrating a continuing violation have largely arisen in the context of placement or promotion discrimination cases, stated that Douglas presented a case where the plaintiff alleges discrimination in hiring and considered whether “the maintenance of a systemic discrimination policy, when combined with repeated efforts by the plaintiff to gain employment, extends the accrual of the limitations period. Id. at 822-823. After discussing the specific facts relative to the statutes of limitation applicable to Douglas’ claims, the Ninth Circuit referred to Domingo v. New England Fish Co., supra, and EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, supra, and ruled:
*15 Thus, under Domingo and Local 350, the critical inquiry is whether in this case, Douglas has introduced facts, which if viewed in the light most favorable to him, raise material questions about whether he was ‘exposed’ to CYA’s discriminatory policy during the period of limitations. We conclude that Douglas raised material questions of fact about whether CYA continued to discriminate against him by not considering or responding to his pending application during the 1996-1998 period. When Douglas applied in 1994, he proceeded successfully through each of the hiring steps, until he reached the vision test at the end. We have no reason to believe that Douglas was less qualified when he re-applied in 1996. It is a reasonable inference from these facts that CYA failed to respond to Douglas’s 1996 application throughout the 1996-1998 period because of its discriminatory policy
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about the vision test. In any event, by reapplying in the fall of 1996 during the window for applications for hiring in 1996-1998, Douglas remained ‘exposed’ to CYA’s discriminatory vision policy during the entire 1996-1998 period. This exposure renders his claims timely by extending the claims past the June 22, 1996 deadline for filing his ADA claim, and the July 5, 1997 deadline for filing his Rehabilitation Act claim.
271 F.3d at 824. In Douglas, the Ninth Circuit further noted:
We need not decide the broader question whether the maintenance of a systematic policy of discrimination alone is enough to extend the limitations period for a failure to hire case. We note that the Fifth Circuit has answered this question in the negative, reasoning that ‘[i]f the mere existence of a policy is sufficient to constitute a continuing violation, it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which a plaintiff’s claim of an unlawful employment policy could be untimely.’ Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.1986). In our view, this rationale ignores the fact that the employer may end the period of exposure to litigation by disavowing the discriminatory policy.
271 F.3d at 823 n. 10.
K5 argues that Douglas is distinguishable because Douglas could show that he had been denied employment due to the discriminatory policy within the 300-day period. In addition, as in Local 350, there was a continuing relationship between Douglas and CYA as evidenced by the two-year application period, “until the Morgan decision eliminated continuing violations in refusal to hire cases.” K5 contends:
While the [Ninth Circuit in Douglas ] did not address the scope of available remedies, such a factual scenario is clearly distinguishable from the case presented here. Even by the EEOC’s version of the facts, K5 maintains a highly informal hiring process where there are no written applications, much less ones that are retained for multiple years with the right to appeal hiring decisions. Thus, there is nothing ‘continuing’ about the application process at K5 that can support a continuing violation, and of course, after Morgan, it is clear that refusals to hire cannot be a continuing violation.
*16 The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1106-1107 (9th Cir.2002):
... We must conclude from the [Supreme] Court’s statements [in Morgan ] that when ... a plaintiff pursues several disparate treatment claims, based on discrete discriminatory acts, the limitations period will begin to run for each individual claim from the date on which the underlying act occurs. [footnote omitted]. If a plaintiff chooses to bring separate claims based on each discriminatory act, his assertion that this series of discrete acts flows from a company-wide, or systematic, discriminatory practice will not succeed in establishing the employer’s liability for acts occurring outside the limitations period because the Supreme Court has determined that each incident of discrimination constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice.
However, in Lyons, the Ninth Circuit further noted:
We do not mean to suggest that after Morgan the same plaintiff would be precluded from bringing a class-wide pattern-or-practice claim based on a series of discrete acts, including, for example, separate incidents of an employer’s failure-to-train and failure-to-promote the plaintiff because of his membership in a protected class. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 ... (1977), the Supreme Court held that the government successfully proved its case of pattern-or-practice discrimination based on the employer’s ‘refusal to recruit, hire, transfer, or promote minority group members on an equal basis with white people,’ id. at 335,336 ... The Court noted in Morgan that it ‘ha[d] no occasion [ ] to consider the timely filing question with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims brought by private litigants.’ ... Therefore, the question of how Title VII’s filing deadlines should be applied to pattern-or-practice claims based on a series of discriminatory acts, some of which occurred outside the limitations period, has been left unanswered by the Court, and we do not consider it here.
The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir.2003). In Cherosky, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to assert that an employer’s individual denials of respirators for asthma was a pattern-or-practice claim:
... Although the terms ‘pattern-or-practice’ are not defined by statute, we have held that these terms have their ordinary 11

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
meaning ... As the Supreme Court explained, pattern-or-practice claims cannot be based on ‘sporadic discriminatory acts’ but rather must be based on discriminatory conduct that is widespread throughout a company or that is a routine and regular part of the workplace. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 ... (1977).
Here, the Employees have not attempted to show, by argument let alone with statistical or any other evidence, that the Postal Service widely discriminates against employees with disabilities or even that it routinely discriminates with respect to respirator requests.
*17 330 F.3d at 1247.
The EEOC and Intervenors contend that the evidence to be presented in this case will focus on statistical evidence of K5’s failure to hire women and will establish that this failure was systematic and company-wide.
The EEOC and Intervenors argue that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan supports a finding of a “continuing violation” in this case. The “continuing violation” is K5’s policy of excluding women from the workplace, resulting in repeated failures to hire women, “as well as discrimination in the form of on-going deterrence from application for employment at K-5 because of its policy of excluding women from employment.” The EEOC and Intervenors assert: “Unlike the rejection of an actual applicant, a deterred applicant suffers continuous discrimination not manifested in a specific act.” They refer to the discussion in Morgan of the difference between “discrete acts” of discrimination and “hostile environment” claims:
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct ... The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own ... Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. The EEOC and Intervenors contend:
Systemic cases are comparable to hostile work environment cases because they are both comprised of a series of acts that constitute a specific type of violation. As with a hostile work environment claim, a claim of pattern and practice systemic discrimination cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days, months and perhaps years ... Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court left the door open for continuing violation claims based on pattern and practice systemic discrimination which is manifested in such a way. Indeed, the very nature of such a claim requires a court to look beyond the 300-day limit. Just as in hostile environment claims, proof of a violation in pattern and practice case [sic] will require a showing that a policy or practice existed over time.
K5 responds that this attempt to draw an analogy between deterrence and hostile work environment claims is “misguided”, arguing that deterrence is a discrete act and is not analogous to a hostile work environment claim. K5 asserts that “[c]ase law reveals that there is no difference between the claim of an applicant rejected due to a discriminatory policy, and the claim that an individual was deterred from applying for an open position”, citing EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941, 123 S.Ct. 2606, 156 L.Ed.2d 627 (2003).
In Joe’s Stone Crabs, the EEOC brought an action against the restaurant under Title VII, contending that the restaurant intentionally discriminated against four female applicants, none of whom actually applied for a position during the actionable time period. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the actionable period was 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC’s discrimination charge:
*18 The EEOC, however, argues that the discrimination in this case constituted a continuing violation, which extended the limitations period beyond [the 300-day limit]. In determining whether a discriminatory employment practice constitutes a continuing violation, ‘we must distinguish between the present consequence of a one-time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, and the continuation of the violation into the present, which does.’ ... The disparate treatment claims asserted by the EEOC fall into the former category. The alleged acts at issue-the failure to hire the claimants because they were women-were discrete, one-time employment events that should have put the claimants on notice that a cause of action had accrued. See Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at ----.
Id. at 1271-1272. Even though none of the women had applied for a job at the restaurant during the 300 days prior to the 12

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
EEOC charge of discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit held:
... Our precedent demonstrates that a non-applicant may ... establish a prima facie case by showing that she refrained from applying due to a justifiable belief that the employer’s discriminatory practices made application a futile gesture ... To have a ‘justifiable belief’ for purposes of this exception to the application requirement, a person must demonstrate: (1) that she had a real and present interest in the job for which the employer was seeking applications; and (2) that she would have applied for the job but effectively was deterred from doing so by the employer’s discriminatory practices.
Id. at 1274. After concluding that the EEOC had carried its burden with respect to two of the women, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s award of backpay beginning prior to the 300-day period. Id. at 1276. K5 asserts that “[n]othing could be a more clear example of the issue presented to the court here.”
The EEOC and Intervenors further argue that Congressional intent supports a finding of liability beyond the 300-day statute of limitations. They refer to the 1972 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) prohibiting accrual of backpay more than two years prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination and cite Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 290-291 (D.C.Cir.1982):
The legislative history of Congress’ decision to limit Title VII compensation to two years further supports our decision to allow back pay awards to take into account the effects within the accrual period of illegal discrimination that came before. By in effect imposing a statute of limitations on Title VII, Congress intended to protect employers against the ‘enormous monetary penalties’ that might result from ‘indefinite liabilities.’ H.R.Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1971) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 2175 (minority views).
Because courts are “ ‘obliged to give effect, is possible, to every word Congress used,’ “ and to reject “ ‘interpretations that would render a statutory provision surplusage or a nullity’ “, Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir.2006), the EEOC and Intervenors argue:
*19 Congress’s limitation of backpay to two years is only comprehensible if a plaintiff can recover relief for discriminatory acts prior to the 300 day limitation period. That is because backpay is only available in cases based upon wrongful termination, demotion, constructive discharge, failure to hire or failure to promote. Calculation of backpay runs from the date of the wrongful employment action. If recovery were limited to wrongful acts within the 300 day charge-filing period, ... there would be no reason for Congress to enact a two-year (i.e., 730-day) backpay limitation.
K5 responds that this argument is an attempt to show that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan was wrongly decided and that the court “should reject the EEOC’s backhanded effort to evade the clear directive of the Supreme Court to restrict application of the continuing violation doctrine.” K5 further asserts that, “[f]rom the facts presented by the EEOC in their Opposition and supporting declarations, it is clear that the allegedly objectionable hiring decisions were immediate, unequivocal, and final, with no avenue of appeal” and that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more discrete act of explicitly informing an applicant that she will not and cannot be hired because of her gender.”3
3. Conclusion. This is a difficult issue to resolve. The law is anything but clear. K5’s basic premise is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan precludes any continuing violation doctrine if the underlying acts of discrimination are a failure to hire. However, the Supreme Court in Morgan did not address the continuing violation doctrine based on systematic, company-wide discrimination and, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit has indicated in cases following Morgan that such a theory may be sustainable depending on the evidence. It is apparent that the EEOC and the Intervenors have selected 1998 as the starting point for the class and for damages based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Teamsters. K5, with its assumption arguendo of facts supporting the EEOC’s and Intervenors’ position, attempts to present this solely as a question of law. It is not. Pattern or practice or systemic violations that have the potential to extend claims to the time during which the practice or systemic violations occurred. This requires factual development through discovery. Foreclosing pre-limitations period claims is premature on this record.
K5’s motion for summary adjudication as to the applicable statutes of limitations is DENIED without prejudice.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
B. Intervenors’ Motion for Class Certification.
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements.4 Certification of a class of plaintiffs is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which states in pertinent part that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all.” As a threshold matter, in order to certify a class, a court must be satisfied that
*20 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (the “numerosity” requirement); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (the “commonality” requirement); (3) the claims or defenses of representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (the “typicality” requirement); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (the “adequacy of representation” requirement).
In re Intel Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 112 (N.D.Cal.1981) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)).
In opposing the application of the Rule 23(a) factors, K5 addresses only the “numerosity” requirement, stating that “it does appear that [plaintiff/intervenors] can establish the remaining requirements for class certification based upon the allegations in the Complaint in Intervention.” K5, however, asserts that it “reserves the right to move to decertify the class should any conflicts of interest arise between the class representatives and the class, or class counsel and the class.”
(1) Numerosity. The numerosity requirement demands “examination of the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Nevertheless, “Plaintiffs must show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members. Mere speculation as to satisfaction of this numerosity requirement does not satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).” Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 672, 681 (S.D.Cal.1999).
Intervenors assert that it is “readily apparent” that the size of the class will measure in the hundreds, referring to the evidence that K-5 employed almost 300 persons during the years 1998 through 2003. Intervenors contend that “[i]n view of the fact that the allegations and scope of the putative class extend over many years, the potential size of the class will necessarily exceed over one hundred individuals ....“
In challenging the requested class certification, K5 focuses primarily on the “temporal scope” of the proposed class. Specifically the request that the class be defined to run from January 1998. In so contending, K5 cites 4 Larson, Employment Discrimination, 2d Ed., § 81.09[2], that “courts follow an initial rule that the class may include only those individuals whose claims are not foreclosed by the Title VII statute of limitations and who therefore could have filed charges with the EEOC in a timely manner on the date that the actual class representative filed charges.” This issue is discussed above. K-5 further asserts:
Intervenors ask the court to presume numerosity by assuming that hundreds of women were denied jobs on or after the opening date for the class without presenting any evidence regarding the number of job openings during the actionable period, the number of women who applied for or were deterred from applying during that period, or the percentage of the workforce that would be female absent any discrimination. This falls short of their burden.
*21 Intervenors respond that even if the court rules for K-5 on the issue of continuing violation and the actionable period, K-5 admits that the claims would reach back to February 15, 2003, making a minimum of three years of applicants or deterred applicants who will comprise the class. Reference is also made to K-5’s admissions set forth above that K-5 employed nearly 300 employees during each of the years 1998-2003. Intervenors contend that it is “without question that the size of the class will be substantially large enough to merit proceeding as a class.”
Courts have routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied when the class comprises 40 or more members. Ansari v.
14

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Numerosity is also satisfied where joining all Class members would serve only to impose financial burdens and clog the court’s docket. In re Intel Secs. Litig. 89 F.R.D. at 112. Although it appears numerosity will be met, it is prudent to permit class discovery to provide information as to the potential number of class members.
(2) Common Questions of Fact and Law. Commonality exists when there is either a common legal issue stemming from divergent factual predicates or a common nucleus of facts resulting in divergent legal theories. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1998).
Intervenors assert that the common issues of fact are whether the class member was qualified and available to perform the unskilled jobs and whether, during the applicable time, each applied or was deterred from applying because of K-5’s policy of refusing employment to females. Intervenors describe the common questions of law as including whether the denial of employment to females who applied or were deterred from applying violates Title VII and/or the FEHA.
K-5 does not dispute the showing made by the Intervenors. Even without this concession, commonality is not a demanding requirement. Meiresonne v. Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622 (N.D.Ill.1989). Commonality is present.
(2) Typicality. Typicality is satisfied if the representative’s claims arise from the same course of conduct as the class claims and are based on the same legal theory. See e.g., Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir.1995).
Again, K-5 does not dispute the showing made by the Intervenors. Typicality is present.
(3) Fair & Adequate Representation. The final Rule 23(a) requirement is that the class representative fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. This requirement has two parts. First, the representative’s attorney must be “qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the litigation .” In re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Secs. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 257 (C.D.Cal.1998). Second, the suit must not be “collusive” and the named Plaintiff’s interests must not be “antagonistic to the class.” Id.
*22 With regard to the first requirement, the Intervenors represent that class counsel include highly experienced attorneys with many years specializing in employment discrimination, including class actions. Intervenors’ attorneys include Tomas Olmos, who previously served as the Regional Attorney of the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC, Dolores Leal, who previously served as President of the California Employment Lawyers Association, Marcos Camacho, who served for many years as General Counsel to the United Farm Workers of America, and Tom Lynch, who was employed with the EEOC for over three years.
With regard to the second requirement, Intervenors assert that there is no evidence of collusion by class representatives with K-5 or evidence of antagonism between the class representatives and the members of the class
K-5 does not dispute the showing of representativenesss made by counsel for Intervenors as proposed class counsel. Fair and adequate representation is present.
B. Certification as a Mandatory Class under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2). Once the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a class may be certified only if the class action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (b)(3). Here, Plaintiff/Intervenors seek certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(2).
Rule 23(b)(2) permits the maintenance of a class action (assuming Rule 23(a) is also satisfied) if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
15

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “”5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007) corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” K-5 does not oppose that this requirement has been satisfied.

C. Conclusion. For the reasons stated above:
1. K-5’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE following discovery;
2. Intervenors’ motion for class certification is DEFERRED pending discovery to more specifically define the temporal characteristic of class members.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Parallel Citations

100 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 944

Footnotes

1

Although K5 does not dispute the facts set forth for purposes of its motion for summary adjudication, K5 reserves the right to

dispute these facts later in this litigation.

2

The Declaration of Yolanda Hernandez electronically filed with the court is not signed.

3

In its Supplemental Brief filed after the hearing, K5 refers to several unpublished rulings from various United States District Courts

which K5 contends support its position. However, this court is not bound by any ruling of another District Court and unpublished

decisions are not citable as precedent under the applicable rules of court.

4

The EEOC is exempt from the requirements of Rule 23. See General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

333-334, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (“The EEOC may seek class wide relief under § 706(f)(1) without being certified

as the class representative under Rule 23; the EEOC may maintain its § 706 civil actions for the enforcement of Title VII and may

seek relief for a group of aggrieved individuals without first obtaining class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23.”).

16

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 1599772 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. California.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Patricia Delgado, et al., Intervenors, v.
KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS, A Partnership, Defendant.
No. 1:06-cv-0165-OWW-TAG. | June 4, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Plaintiff Evangelina Patricia Hernandez, Linda Susan Ordonio-Dixon, William Robert Tamayo, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.
Robert Tomas Olmos, Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, Los Angeles, CA, for Intervenor Plaintiffs.
Ronald H. Barsamian, Barsamian Saqui and Moody, Fresno, CA, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
THERESA A. GOLDNER, United States Magistrate Judge.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
*1 On February 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), commenced this action on behalf of a class of women against defendant Kovacevich “5” Farms (“Defendant”). (Doc. 1). The complaint alleges unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. (Id.). The original charging parties were granted leave to intervene as of right, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and filed a separate complaint. (Docs.20, 26). The gist of the complaints filed by the EEOC and the intervenors (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) was that their applications for employment with Defendant were denied because they were women and/or that they were deterred from applying due to Defendant’s reputation for not hiring females. (Docs.1, 26).
By order dated September 18, 2006, the issues of liability and damage were bifurcated. (Doc. 31). The bifurcation order reiterates the parties’ stipulation not to seek discovery regarding the Plaintiffs’ immigration status or legal ability to work in this country during the liability phase of the trial. (Id.). On October 5, the Court signed a stipulated protective order, pursuant to which the parties agreed that any confidential information-including, inter alia, Social Security Numbers, disclosed during the course of discovery, trial, or other case-related proceedings, would not be used for any other purpose. (Doc. 36). The protective order further provided that this Court retained jurisdiction to modify it for good cause and directed that all of the confidential materials would be destroyed, with the exception of one archival copy that the EEOC would keep, upon complete resolution of this action. (Id.).
On April 9, 2007, Defendant received an email supplemental responses to the interrogatories that are the subject of this motion, without a verification. On April 11, 2007, Defendant received an email supplemental response to the request for production of documents, with an attached but unsigned verification. On April 11, 2007, Defendant received another email transmitting various additional documents from Defendant EEOC’s investigative file. On April 11, 2007, Defendant also
1

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
received a signed verification dated March 9, 2007, purporting to verify supplemental responses and second supplemental responses to its first set of interrogatories and/or a request for production of documents. It is unclear which discovery request the verification applies to, because it appears to verify a document prepared after March 9, 2007.
Defendant filed a motion to compel discovery responses, which came on regularly for hearing on May 7, 2007, before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. (Doc. 73). Ronald H. Barsamian and Patrick S. Moody appeared on behalf of Defendant. Evangelina Hernandez appeared telephonically on behalf of the EEOC. In the motion, joint statement, and oral arguments, Defendant contended that the EEOC continuously refused to answer completely the interrogatories served upon it, or to provide documents that Defendant had requested, without an adequate reason, which the EEOC disputed. (Id.; Doc. 74). The Court granted Defendant’s motion and ordered the EEOC to provide complete, verified responses to all of the interrogatories except number 2, which it took under submission. The Court further ordered the EEOC to produce all requested documents and/or provide a privilege log explaining the reason why specific documents were withheld. (Doc. 77). This is the Court’s written order on the motion to compel discovery responses. (Doc. 73).
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION
A. Discovery overview *2 The purpose of discovery is to make trial “less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent possible,” United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S.Ct. 983, 987, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and to narrow and clarify the issues in dispute, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947).
F.R.Civ.P. 26(b) establishes the scope of discovery and states in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D.Cal.1998); Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.N.J.1990).
B. Interrogatories Functions of interrogatories include obtaining evidence, information which may lead to evidence and admissions, and to narrow issues to be tried. United States v. West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 36 F.R.D. 250, 252 (S.D.N.Y.1964). The party answering interrogatories must furnish “such information as is available to the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a). Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(1) requires an interrogatory to be answered “fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the reasons for objection and shall answer to the extent the interrogatory is not objectionable.” “The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(3).
“Parties must provide true, explicit, responsive, complete, and candid answers to interrogatories.” Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D.Pa.1996). If a responding party is unable to supply requested information, “the party may not simply refuse to answer, but must state under oath that he is unable to provide the information and ‘set forth the efforts he used to obtain the information.’ “ Hansel, 169 F.R.D. at 305 (quoting Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D.Pa.1977)). Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 “is to be given a broad and liberal interpretation in the interest of according to the parties the fullest knowledge of the facts and of clarifying and narrowing the issues.” West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 36 F.R.D. at 252.
2

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
*3 “All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived ...” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(4). The propounding party may seek an order to compel further responses regarding “an objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(5); see, Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(B).
Interrogatory No. 1: “Identify each of the ten proposed class members who will be the focus of the liability stage of the trial in this case pursuant to the Order Bifurcating Trial.”
The EEOC’s responses to this interrogatory ultimately identified ten class members, but also reserved the right to change its designation within 14 days of the District Court’s decision on motions for class certification (temporal scope of the class) and for summary adjudication on the temporal scope of claims. Since the date of those responses, the District Court has ruled on both motions.
Defendant is entitled to conduct meaningful, reliable discovery regarding the designated class representatives to explore the individual claims of each of them. The Court concludes that the EEOC has failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to Interrogatory No. 1. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 2: “For each person identified in response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, please provide each name, drivers’ license number with issuing jurisdiction and Social Security number used by each during the last ten years (September 1996 to present), and the inclusive dates of such use.”
Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 2 asks the EEOC to provide the name, drivers’ license number (and issuing jurisdiction), and Social Security number used by each of the ten class representatives and the charging parties since September 1996 to the present. In November 2006, the EEOC refused to answer the question, stating that the interrogatory was unduly burdensome, irrelevant to any claims or defenses, not calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence, an invasion of privacy, harassing, and an improper inquiry into the Plaintiffs’ immigration status. In its supplemental and first supplemental responses to interrogatories, the EEOC gave the same answer to this interrogatory. On April 9, 2007, the EEOC, in its second supplemental response, in addition to stating that Defendant was not entitled to inquire into Plaintiffs’ immigration status, contended that Defendant’s alleged necessity for this information-that it was needed to investigate Plaintiffs’ backgrounds and work history to ascertain whether they were qualified for and/or deterred from applying for a job-not only had was unpersuasive but also implicated immigration issues and, therefore, the probative value of the data was far outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Defendant responded that it had no interest in Plaintiffs’ immigration status-only their identifying information-which was required because Plaintiffs would not or, purportedly, could not provide sufficient details concerning their prior work experience. The EEOC replied that, to the extent the information is needed, it would only be relevant during the damages phase of the trial, adding that it would provide a backdoor to eliciting Plaintiffs’ immigration status, which would have a “chilling effect” on immigrants seeking legal recourse for violations of their rights. (See generally Joint Statement of Contentions Regarding Motion to Compel (“Joint Stmt.”), pp. 11-23).
*4 Generally, the Ninth Circuit and other federal courts do not allow defendants in employment-discrimination actions to question plaintiffs directly about their immigration status or to seek the disclosure of Social Security numbers or similar identifying information that could lead to the discovery of the plaintiffs’ immigration status, even when a protective order has been entered and the defendants purportedly have requested the information solely to obtain additional material relevant to their defense.1 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.2004); Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190 (S.D.N.Y.2006); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499 (W.D.Mich.2005). In Nibco, the Circuit Court noted that information regarding immigration status not only would “chill the plaintiffs’ willingness and ability to bring civil rights claims.” 364 F.3d at 1064 (citation omitted). The Court added that all immigrants would be loathe to report incidents of employment discrimination because any undocumented aliens might be prosecuted and removed because of their illegal status, and documented immigrations likely would fear retaliation or implicating family members and/or friends who were illegal aliens. Id. at 1064-65. Further, the presence of a protective order would not be able to provide adequate relief to an immigrant who was either imprisoned and deported or retaliated against by the employer and, thus, the disclosure of
3

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
immigration status would not serve the purpose of Title VII; i.e., to eradicate and deter the various bases of employment discrimination. Id. at 1064-66. Finally, this Circuit, and various district court opinions, found that a plaintiff’s immigration status generally was irrelevant to the issue of liability in most employment cases, and questions directed toward discovery of an immigrant’s legal right to work in the United States were not only unduly burdensome, but prejudicial. Id. at 1066-70 (Title VII); Avila-Blum, 236 F.R.D. at 191-92 (finding, in bifurcated Title VII action, that immigration status was relevant only with respect to damages); Galaviz-Zamora, 230 F.R.D. at 502-03 (Fair Labor Standards Act).
Recognizing that, in an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff’s work history may be relevant to the defense, especially, as in the instant case, where Defendant contends that they require experience in varying areas of pruning the agricultural product and there is some question as to whether or not the “deterred” Plaintiffs actually were interested in the available positions, some Courts have agreed to a compromise wherein Plaintiffs would provide affidavits detailing their past work experience. See, e.g., Galaviz-Zamora, 230 F.R.D. at 502-03 (agreeing to the above compromise but retaining jurisdiction to revisit the defendant’s request for plaintiffs’ Social Security numbers, alien registration numbers, etc., if the affidavits did not provide sufficient information regarding past work history).
*5 In the instant case, Defendant contends that it will use Plaintiffs’ Social Security and drivers’ license numbers solely to obtain information regarding their work histories. As the EEOC notes, it is difficult to fathom how Defendant will be able to obtain the underlying employment history absent Plaintiffs’ written consent. Moreover, many of the interrogatories that Defendant propounded, and the EEOC has not answered completely as of today, request specific information regarding, inter alia, the employment history, periods of disability, and experience of the class representatives and the charging parties. (See Joint Stmt ., Interrogatories 10 through 16, pp. 45-71). Because this Court orders the EEOC to provide detailed responses to these interrogatories, Defendant should receive the work-related information that it hoped to obtain through Interrogatory No. 2. If the EEOC does not provide full and complete answers to Interrogatories 10 through 16, the Court will, upon motion, revisit whether to grant Defendant’s motion to compel responses to Interrogatory No. 2.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to Interrogatory No. 2, without prejudice.
Interrogatory No. 3: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state each address where each person has resided for the last ten years (September 1996 to present), and the inclusive dates of each period of occupancy.”
In response to this interrogatory, the EEOC has added additional representative claimants with some addresses, but not for the last ten years, and failed to provide a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to Interrogatory No. 3. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days. The EEOC is to provide each known address and dates of residence for the past ten (10) years, and is to specifically identify any requested information which it does not know and set forth the efforts used to obtain the information.
Interrogatory No. 4: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state the highest level of education reached by each person and each educational institution attended, including the inclusive dates of each period of attendance an at an educational institution.”
The responses to Interrogatory No. 4 failed to identify the educational institutions attended and the dates of attendance, and did not include a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days. The EEOC is to specifically identify any requested information which it does not know and set forth the efforts used to obtain the information.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Interrogatory No. 5: *6 “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether each has ever been convicted of a felony. If the answer is yes, please provide the charge offense(s), the conviction offense(s), the adjudicating court, the date of conviction, the date of sentencing, and the sentence imposed.”
In response to Interrogatory No. 5, the EEOC denied that any charging party and representative class member has been convicted of a felony, but failed to verify its response. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 6: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether each has been incarcerated at any time for any reason during the last ten years (September 1996 to present), and provide the inclusive dates of such incarceration and the location of such incarceration.”
In response to Interrogatory No. 6, the EEOC denied that any charging party and representative class member has been incarcerated, but failed to verify its response. Accordingly, the Court concludes the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 7: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether each has any family relationship to any present or ast employee of Kovacevich “5” Farms. For each who answers yes, provide the name of such individual and the degree of relation to such person.”
The EEOC answered Interrogatory No. 7 without a contemporaneous verification. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 8: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether they have ever worked for Kovacevich “5” Farms, and if so, the inclusive dates of such employment (including the dates of any period of layoff or absence), and the reason for any period of separation from such employment.”
*7 The response to Interrogatory No. 8 included complete answers as to some representative class members, i.e., Ms. Miriam Delgado, and incomplete or vague answers as to others, i.e., Ms. Patricia Delgado and Ms. Rachel Ramirez. The answers were incomplete and vague because they failed to specify the dates or seasons of employment, layoff, or absence. In addition, no contemporaneous verification was provided. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory.
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days. The EEOC is to provide specific seasons and/or time periods worked,
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
as well as periods of layoff or absence, and is to specifically identify any information which it does not know and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 9: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether they have ever applied for work at Kovacevich “5” Farms. If so, identify the date of each application, the manner in which the application was made, and the person to whom the application was made.”
The response to Interrogatory No. 9 indicated that Ms. Cazarez, Ms. Salcido, and Ms. Casas applied for employment on various occasions between 1998 to 2002, but described only one incident in early 1998, and the response as to other intervenors failed to include the date, manner, or circumstance of the subject applications. In addition, the answers were not verified when made. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, and is to specifically identify any information which it does not know and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 10: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state which position or positions were sought at the time of each application for work at Kovacevich “5” Farms, and describe in detail each person’s qualifications for each position sought.”
In response to Interrogatory No. 10, the EEOC asserts there are no applicable qualifications and thus none were included. Defendant is entitled to discover whether the applicants were qualified to do the work sought, which includes whether and to what extent they were trained and/or experienced to do the work sought. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 11: *8 “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state the date of each application for employment with any employer in the last ten years (September 1996 to present), the name and address of the employer, the position sought, the compensation sought, and describe in detail all qualifications for the position sought.”
The response to Interrogatory No. 11 failed to provide identifying information for any employer other than Defendant, with respect to Ms. Flor Vera, Ms. Patricia Delgado, and Ms. Miriam Delgado, and failed to provide a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 12: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, describe all efforts made by each to obtain work in the last ten years (September 1996 to present), and identify all documents produced, created, or obtained in the course of such efforts.”
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
The response to Interrogatory No. 12 provided no information regarding the representative class members. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 13: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, list each employer for whom each individual has performed work for the last ten years (September 1996 to present). Include the name and location of the employer, inclusive dates in each position, the job classification held, the rate(s) of pay during the period of employment, all earnings, and the reason that the employment ended.”
The response to Interrogatory No. 13 failed to provide the total earnings for each job for Ms. Delia Casas, failed to provide the employer name(s) or locations or the earnings for Ms. Miriam Delgado, failed to provide the total earnings for Ms. Cazarez, failed to provide the dates or seasons of employment, employer name(s), or earnings information for Ms. Patricia Delgado, failed to provide the compensation, total earnings, or dates or seasons of employment for Ms. Terri Salcido, failed to provide the dates or seasons of employment, employer name(s), or earnings information for Ms. Flor Rivera, and failed to provide a contemporaneous verification.
*9 The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory. The court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days. In providing such an answer, the EEOC is to respond to each category of information sought in the interrogatory, specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 14: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether she had been self-employed at any time in the last ten years (September 1996 to present). If yes, then provide the dates of any such self-employment and the nature of the activities performed, and all earnings for each period of self-employment.”
The response to Interrogatory No 14 did not include a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 15: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, identify any period of unemployment and/or disability in the last ten years (September 1996 to present), the reason for such unemployment, and whether the person filed a claim for Unemployment Insurance Benefits, State Disability Insurance Benefits, Workers’ Compensation Benefits, and any other state or private benefit related to such period of unemployment and/or disability.”
The EEOC did not answer Interrogatory No. 15, but indicated that it is in the process of doing so. The Court concludes that the EEOC has failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, candid, and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Interrogatory No. 16: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state whether she claims she was deterred from applying for work at Kovacevich “5” Farms, and if so, state all facts that support such deterrence, including but not limited to the date of such deterrence, and identify any documents related to such deterrence.”
*10 In response to Interrogatory No. 16, the EEOC provided a collective group response, but failed to provide a detailed response as to each charging party and representative class member, and it failed to provide a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide an explicit, responsive, complete, and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide an explicit, responsive, complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
Interrogatory No. 17: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, describe in detail all methods used to learn of job openings at Kovacevich “5” Farms.”
The response to Interrogatory No. 17 did not include a contemporaneous verification. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 18: “State the percentage of the Kovacevich “5” Farms workforce that You believe should be female, and state all facts supporting this percentage.”
The EEOC did not answer Interrogatory No. 18, and objected that it was propounded prematurely, i.e. before expert disclosures are made. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a candid and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a candid and verified answer to this interrogatory, providing its best estimate at this time, within 30 calendar days.
Interrogatory No. 19: “For each person identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 1 and for the Charging Parties, state any and all facts which You assert support Your allegation that any Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including a description of each alleged violation and the specific dates of those violations.”
In its initial response to Interrogatory No. 19, the EEOC failed to provide detailed facts. However, its April 2007 supplemental response provided some specific facts, but did not appear to be verified. The Court concludes that the EEOC failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 by failing to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory. The objections to this interrogatory are overruled. The EEOC is to provide a complete and verified answer to this interrogatory regarding each charging party and representative class member, within 30 calendar days, is to specifically identify any information which it does not know, and set forth the efforts used to obtain such information.
C. Requests for Production of Documents
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
*11 Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a) permits a requesting party to ask for documents “which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b) requires a written response to a request for production to “state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event the reasons for the objection shall be stated.” A party is obligated to produce all specified relevant and nonprivileged documents or other things which are in its “possession, custody or control” on the date specified in the request. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a); Norman Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. H. Wolfe Iron & Metal Co., 576 F.Supp. 511, 512 (W.D.Pa.1983). The propounding party may seek an order for further disclosure regarding “any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection requested.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b). Failure to respond to a Rule 34 request within the time permitted waives all objections, including privilege and work product, absent an extension of time to respond or a showing of good cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(4), Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.1992).
Request for Production of Documents No. 1: “Produce all Documents relevant to any claims by any class members against the Defendant that were not produced as part of the Initial Disclosure required by FRCP 26.”
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART, Defendant’s motion to compel this request, and overrules in part the objections to this request, as follows: The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, except those which it contends are not subject to disclosure under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(b), within 30 calendar days. The EEOC shall identify any documents which are not produced on a new privilege log. If Defendant feels that any documents which are not produced are not subject to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(b), Defendant may file another motion to compel. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 2: “Produce all Documents pertaining to or related to the investigation of EEOC Charge numbers 375-2004-00158 (Patricia Delgado); 375-2004-00159 (Myriam Cazares); 375-2004-00160 (Flor Rivera); 375-2004-00161 (Miriam Delgado); 375-2004-00162 (Terri Salcido); 375-2004-00163 (Delia Casas).”
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART, Defendant’s motion to compel with this request, and overrules in part the objections to this request, as follows: the EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, except those which it contends are not subject to disclosure under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(b), within 30 calendar days. The EEOC shall identify any documents which are not produced on a new privilege log. If Defendant feels that any documents which are not produced are not subject to 42 USC § 2000(e)(5)(b), Defendant may file another motion to compel discovery. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 3: *12 “Produce all Documents pertaining to the Charging Parties’ employment with Kovacevich “5” Farms.”
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are sustained; however an updated and comprehensive privilege log and corresponding of produced documents must be provided. Accordingly, except for such documents that are subject to the attorney-client privilege, work-product, or would result in the disclosure of governmental deliberative process, the EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, Plaintiff is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. Plaintiff shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 4:
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
“Produce all Documents pertaining to employment with Kovacevich “5” Farms” for the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation.”
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The work-product, attorney-client privilege, and governmental deliberative process objections are sustained; all other objections are overruled. Accordingly, except for such documents that are subject to the attorney-client privilege, work-product, or would result in the disclosure of governmental deliberative process, the EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 5: “Produce all Documents pertaining to the Charging parties’ applications for employment at Kovacevich “5” Farms within the last ten years (September 1996 to present).”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 6: *13 “Produce all Documents pertaining to applications for employment at Kovacevich “5” Farms within the past ten years (September 1996 to present) by the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation.”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 7: “Produce all Documents pertaining to the Charging Parties’ applications for employment with any employer within the past ten years (September 1996 to present), including but not limited to job applications, job offers and/or denials, or any other documents.”
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 8: “Produce all documents pertaining to applications for employment with any employer within the past ten years (September 1996 to present) by the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation, including but not limited to job applications, job offers and/or denials, or any other documents.”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 9: “Produce all documents pertaining to applications for employment with any employer within the past ten years (September 1996 to present) for each of the Charging Parties, including but not limited to employee handbooks, job descriptions, performance evaluations, disciplinary records, termination or layoff notices, or any other documents received or provided in the course of employment.”
*14 The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s’s motion to compel this request. The Court sustains the objections on the grounds that the request is unduly overboard and likely irrelevant as to “employee handbooks” and “any other documents received or provided in the course of employment.” As to the remainder of the documents requested, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel, and overrules the remaining objections. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 10: “Produce all documents pertaining to any employment with any employer during the last ten years (September 1996 to present) for each of the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation, including but not limited to employee handbooks, job descriptions, performance evaluations, disciplinary records, termination or layoff notices, or any other documents received or provided in the course of employment.”
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The Court sustains the objections on the grounds that the request is unduly overboard and likely irrelevant as to “employee handbooks” and “any other documents received or provided in the course of employment.” As to the remainder of the documents requested, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel, and overrules the remaining objections. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 11: “Produce all W-2 and/or IRS 1099 forms for each of the Charging Parties for the last ten years (September 1996 to present).”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.
Request for Production of Documents No. 12: *15 “Produce all W-2 and/or IRS 1099 forms for each of the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation for the last ten years (September 1996 to present).”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5’’ Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.

Request for Production of Documents No. 14: “Produce all documents pertaining to the qualifications of each of the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation to work at Kovacevich 5” Farms.”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.

Request for Production of Documents No. 15: “Produce all documents pertaining to each period of unemployment and/or disability for each of the Charging Parties within the last ten years (September 1996 to present).”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.

Request for Production of Documents No. 16: “Produce all documents pertaining to each period of unemployment and/or disability for each of the ten class members who will be the focus of the liability phase of this litigation within the last ten years (September 1996 to present).”
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel this request. The objections to this request are overruled. The EEOC is to produce all responsive documents, along with a list of all documents being produced, within 30 calendar days. If there are no documents to be produced, the EEOC is to clearly and unambiguously state that fact. The EEOC shall provide a new single comprehensive response to this request, including a new verification of the response, and shall reproduce any documents which may have been produced previously, along with any additional documents that should be produced.

*16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The cited cases, as do most opinions that address a defendant’s right to request similar information, are presented in connection

with motions for, or to modify, protective orders, as opposed to the instant case’s motion to compel responses to discovery

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 E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

2006 WL 3060149 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. California.
E.E.O.C., Plaintiff, and
Delia Casas, Myriam Cazares, Miriam Delgado, Patricia Delgado, Flor Rivera and Terri Salcido,
Applicant-Intervenors, v.
KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS, a partnership, Defendant.
No. 1:06 CV 0165 OWW TAG. | Oct. 27, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Evangelina Patricia Hernandez, Linda Susan Ordonio-Dixon, William Robert Tamayo, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.
Robert Tomas Olmos, Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, Los Angeles, CA, for Applicant-Intervenors.
Ronald H. Barsamian, Barsamian Saqui and Moody, Fresno, CA, for Defendant.
Opinion
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION (DOC. 28)
OLIVER W. WANGER, District Judge.
*1 On February 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a Complaint against Kovacevich “5” Farms (K5) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alleging unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and seeking relief on behalf of six charging parties: Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazares, Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terri Salcido, and Delia Casas (Charging Parties/Intervenors).
By Order filed on August 7, 2006, Magistrate Judge Goldner granted the charging parties’ motion to intervene. On August 23, 2004, the Charging Parties/Intervenors filed a Complaint in Intervention against K5. The First Claim for Relief alleges sex discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII. The Second Claim

for Relief alleges sex discrimination in employment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code §§ 12900et seq. The Complaint in Intervention alleges in pertinent part:

12. On or about November 13,

2003, Plaintiff-Intervenors filed

charges

of

employment

discrimination with Plaintiff

[EEOC] alleging sex discrimination

by Defendant. These charges of

employment discrimination were

dual-filed with the California

Department of Fair Employment

and Housing (‘DFEH’). Pursuant to

the work-sharing agreement

between said agencies, the DFEH

issued a right to sue letter to each

Plaintiff-Intervenor and Plaintiff

[EEOC] assumed responsibility for

investigating and processing said

charges. On August 18, 2004,

Plaintiff [EEOC] issued a Letter of

Determination, finding that

Defendant violated Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 by

refusing

to

hire

Plaintiff-Intervenors, and a class of

female applicants, because of their

sex, female.

K5 moves to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the statute of limitations for this claim elapsed and that Charging Parties/Intervenors are not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations.

A. Procedural Issue-Untimely Opposition K5 contends that Charging Parties/Intervenors’ opposition to the motion should be disregarded in resolving the motion because it was untimely served on K5.
K5’s motion to dismiss was filed on September 12, 2006 and noticed for hearing on October 16, 2006. The opposition to the motion was filed with the court and electronically served on K5 on October 2, 2006. Rule 78-230(c), Local Rules of Practice, provides in pertinent part:
Opposition ... shall be filed with the Clerk not less than fourteen (14) days preceding the noticed ... hearing date. Opposition shall be
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

personally served on opposing counsel not less than fourteen (14) days preceding the hearing date (personal service) or mailed or electronic service not less than seventeen (17) days preceding the hearing date ... No party will be entitled to be heard in opposition to a motion at oral arguments if opposition to the motion has not been timely filed by that party....
*2 Because the opposition was not served on K5 on seventeen days prior to the hearing date, K5 requests that the opposition not be considered in resolving the motion and that Charging Parties/Intervenors not be allowed to argue in opposition to the motion on October 16. K5 asserts: “The very lack of diligence that condemns Intervenors’ cause of action under state law continues to this day, and is demonstrated by their failure to comply with the plain terms of the local rules of court.”
K5’s request that the opposing brief not be considered in resolving the motion to dismiss is not allowed by Rule 78-230(c). The only sanction for an untimely filed opposition is that the party will not be allowed to participate in oral argument. Furthermore, the opposition brief was timely filed with the court-K5’s claim relates solely to service of the opposition. Finally, K5 points to no prejudice to itself because of the untimely service of the opposition-K5’s reply brief was filed on Friday, October 6. There was no prejudice to the ability of the court to be prepared for the October 16 hearing.
Consequently, K5’s request is DENIED.
B. Procedural Issue-Request to File Supplemental Authority On October 11, 2006, Charging Parties/Intervenors filed a request to file supplemental authority in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Specifically, they seek to cite the Memorandum Opinion and Order Re Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Intervention filed by Judge Ishii on February 24, 2004 in EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-6199 AWI LJO. Counsel for the Charging Parties/Intervenors asserts that he became aware of Judge Ishii’s Order on October 11, 2006.
K5 objects that the request to file supplemental authority is untimely because the authority should have been included in Charging Parties/Intervenors’ initial opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The request to file supplemental authority is GRANTED. Parties are expected to fully support their positions with appropriate legal authority in accordance with Rule

78-230, Local Rules of Practice. However, on occasion such authority is discovered after the brief has been filed. Because any decision on a motion should comply with the law, appropriate legal authority should not be disregarded merely because it was not cited in an initial brief. Any prejudice to the other party can be alleviated by the allowance of a supplemental response. Here, K5 filed a supplemental response prior to oral argument discussing the merits of Judge Ishii’s Order. In any event, Judge Ishii’s Order is not binding precedent. See Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 n. 13 (9th Cir.1977).
C. Governing Standards A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir .2003). Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th Cir.1988).
D. Evidence in Support of Motion *3 In moving to dismiss, K5 submits two declarations and a number of documents. No objection and no contention are made by Charging Parties/Intervenors that the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.
K5 submits as an exhibit a copy of the charges filed with the DFEH and the EEOC on December 12, 2003. Also
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

submitted are copies of the right-to-sue letters issued by the DFEH on December 15, 2003. The DFEH right-to-sue letters stated in pertinent part:
The EEOC will be responsible for the processing of this complaint. DFEH will not be conducting an investigation into this matter. EEOC should be contacted directly for any discussion of the charge. DFEH is closing its case on the basis of ‘processing waived to another agency.’
...
Since DFEH will not be issuing an accusation, this letter is also your right-to-sue notice. According to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), you may bring a civil action under the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act against the ... employer ... named in the above-referenced complaint ...Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), provides that such a civil action must be brought within one year from the date of this notice. Pursuant to Government Code § 12965(d)(1), this one year period will be tolled during the pendency of the EEOC’s investigation of your complaint. You should consult an attorney to determine with accuracy the date by which a civil action must be filed.....
Ronald Barsamian and Anthony Raimondo, attorneys for K5, aver that, at the time the EEOC charges were filed, attorney Marni Willensen of Miner, Burnhill & Galland, advised them that her firm represented the charging parties. Submitted as an exhibit is a copy of the August 18, 2004 letter from the EEOC to Mr. Raimondo, advising that the EEOC had determined reasonable cause to believe that K5 had discriminated against the Charging Parties and initiating a conciliation conference. Mr. Barsamian avers that he participated in an extended conciliation conference call with the EEOC and attorneys for the Charging Parties on March 29, 2005 and that an agreement was not reached to resolve the dispute. Submitted as exhibits are copies of letters dated April 7, 2005 from the EEOC to Mr. Raimondo advising that conciliation had been unsuccessful and that the case was being forwarded to the EEOC’s Regional Attorney for litigation review. As noted, the EEOC filed its Complaint on February 13, 2006. Mr. Barsamian avers in pertinent part:
6. When the EEOC filed this action in February 2006, EEOC attorney Evangelina Hernandez informed my office that Intervenors were represented by Mr. Tomas Olmos of Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, and stated that Mr. Olmos’ clients would be intervening in the EEOC action.
7. I acknowledged the unconditional right to intervene as established in Title VII, and urged Ms. Hernandez to

instruct Mr. Olmos to intervene without delay so that all parties would be formally involved in the litigation.
*4 8. hPrior to our Rule 26 conference with the EEOC, Ms. Hernandez asked K5 to consent to participation by Intervenors in the conference. K5 declined to give such consent, and again urged intervention without delay to formalize all parties’ participation in this litigation. Intervenors declined, and did not participate in the Rule 26 conference.
A scheduling conference before Magistrate Judge Goldner was held on May 4, 2006. A Scheduling Order was filed on June 9, 2006, wherein Magistrate Judge Goldner ruled in pertinent part:
The parties are informed and believe that the six charging parties in this case will move to intervene into the instant lawsuit in the near future. The parties would not oppose any motion for intervention.
The Court orders that the ... six charging parties shall intervene in this matter within sixty (60) days of the date of this Scheduling Order.
On June 20, 2006, the Charging Parties filed a motion to intervene, noticing the motion for hearing on August 7, 2006. Submitted with the motion to intervene was a proposed Complaint in Intervention, which proposed Complaint alleged the Second Claim for Relief at issue in the instant motion. On July 19, 2006, K5 filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion to intervene, stating that K5 “reserves the right to file an appropriate response to the proposed Complaint In Intervention if the court grants the motion and permits the intervention.”As noted, by Order filed on August 7, 2006, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion to intervene. Another scheduling conference was held on August 17, 2006. By Order filed on August 18, 2006, the Magistrate Judge ordered Charging Parties/Intervenors to file their Complaint in Intervention by August 18, 2006. The Complaint in Intervention was filed on August 23, 2006.1

1

Although the August 18, 2006 Order required the

Complaint in Intervention be filed by August 18, Mr.

Barsamian avers that the Magistrate Judge ordered that

the Complaint be filed by August 25, 2006. Thus, the

date in the written order is a typographical error.

E. Merits of Motion As a general rule, a plaintiff must file an action under the FEHA within one year from the date of the notice of right to sue issued by the FEHA.Cal.Govt.Code § 12965(b).Section 12965(d) provides:

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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), the one-year statute of limitations, commencing on the date of the right-to-sue notice by the Department of Fair Housing and Employment, to the person claiming to be aggrieved, shall be tolled when all of the following requirements have been met:
(A) A charge of discrimination or harassment is timely filed concurrently with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Fair Employment and Housing.
(B) The investigation of the charge is deferred by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing to the Equal Opportunity Commission.
(C) A right-to-sue notice is issued to the person claiming to be aggrieved upon deferral of the charge by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
(2) The time for commencing an action for which the statute of limitations is tolled under paragraph (1) expires when the federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires, or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, whichever is later.
*5 (3) This subdivision is intended to codify the holding in Downs v. Department of Water and Power of City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1093.
Here, the EEOC did not issue a right-to-sue letter to the charging parties because the EEOC itself brought the employment discrimination complaint against K5. There is no statute of limitations applicable to the EEOC when the EEOC brings an employment discrimination action. See Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). When the EEOC pursues an employment discrimination claim under Title VII, the charging party may intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (“The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission ....”); see also Rule 24(a)(1) (“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: [¶] (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene”).2

2

Case authority holds that an aggrieved employee has an

absolute right to intervene in an employment

discrimination action brought by the EEOC against the

employer but that intervention still must be timely

sought. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric

Corporation, 675 F.2d 164 (8th Cir.1982). In granting

Charging Parties/Intervenors’ motion to intervene,

Magistrate Judge Goldner ruled:

Here, where the proceedings have only recently

commenced, where there has been no delay in

moving to intervene, and where no party opposes

the motion, it is appropriate to allow intervention.
K5 concedes that the First Claim for Relief under Title VII in the Complaint in Intervention is timely. K5 argues that the Second Claim for Relief is not timely because “nothing suggests that the California Legislature intended to extend the individual right to sue under the FEHA without limit when it enacted Cal.Govt.Code § 12965(d)(1).”
As noted supra, Section 12965(d)(1) was intended to codify the holding in Downs v. Department of Water & Power, 58 Cal.App.4th 1092 (1997). In Downs, an employee filed an FEHA claim with the DFEH and a claim under Title VII with the EEOC. The DFEH issued a right-to-sue letter, but it deferred investigation to the EEOC under the work-sharing agreement between the agencies. The EEOC dismissed the employee’s Title VII claim, and the employee filed his FEHA action in state court more than one year after the DFEH had issued the right-to-sue letter. The trial court dismissed the FEHA claim, finding that the action was barred by the one-year limitation period set forth in Government Code § 12965(b) because the action was not filed within one year of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. The Court of Appeals reversed based on the doctrine of equitable tolling. The Court of Appeals noted that three factors determine whether a statute of limitations is equitably tolled: (1) timely notice to defendants in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendants in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by plaintiffs in filing the second claim. 58 Cal .App.4th at 1100. The Court of Appeals further noted:
The doctrine of ‘equitable tolling’ is supported by several policy considerations. First, it serves the fundamental purpose of the statutes of limitations by providing timely notice of claims to defendants, without imposing the costs of forfeiture on plaintiffs ... Second, it avoids the hardship of compelling plaintiffs to pursue several duplicative actions simultaneously on the same set of facts ... Third, it lessens the costs incurred by courts and other dispute resolution tribunals, because disposition of a case filed in one forum may render proceedings in the second unnecessary or easier and less expensive to resolve....
*6 The Court of Appeals cited Salgado v. Atlantic
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

Richfield Co., 823 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir.1990), wherein the Ninth Circuit ruled that an EEOC investigation of an employee’s claims tolled the one-year statute of limitations in Section 12965(b) until the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit stated, “the procedures and remedies of Title VII and the [FEHA] are wholly integrated and related. Moreover the practical relationship between Title VII and California’s FEHA, embodied in the work sharing agreement between the EEOC and the [DFEH], provides a basis for tolling § 12965(b)’s one-year statute of limitations during the pendency of the EEOC’s administrative process.” Salgado, 823 F .2d at 1325-1326. The Ninth Circuit further stated: “The state agency deferred investigation and processing of Salgado’s claims to the EEOC. The administrative proceedings of the EEOC replaced those of the state agency. Salgado had to await the outcome of the EEOC’s processing of his claims in order to receive the full benefit of an investigation” and that “[i]f there is an established administrative mechanism in place to give notice to employers charged with a violation and to undertake efforts at conciliation, it would be anomalous indeed to hold that a claimant, whose use of this mechanism put him outside the relevant time period, could not have that period equitably tolled.”Salgado, id. at 1326.The Court of Appeals held:
... When a charge of discrimination or harassment is timely filed concurrently with the EEOC and the DFEH, the investigation of the charge is deferred by the DFEH to the EEOC under a work-sharing agreement, and the DFEH issues a right-to-sue letter upon deferral, then the one-year period to bring an FEHA action is equitably tolled during the pendency of the EEOC investigation until a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC is received.
...
Tolling the one-year statute satisfies the policy considerations [underlying equitable tolling]. The DFEH apparently issues a ‘right-to-sue’ letter under its work-sharing agreement with the EEOC upon deferral of the investigation to the EEOC. If the one-year statute were not tolled, a plaintiff would often be compelled to pursue a state law action before the EEOC had completed its investigation. If the EEOC issued an accusation or achieved conciliation, the state law action would become redundant or moot. Tolling the one-year statute for bringing the FEHA action until the EEOC completes its determination provides a defendant with notice of the charges, but relieves a plaintiff from pursuing duplicative actions simultaneously on the same set of facts. Moreover, disposition of a case by the EEOC may render a state court action unnecessary or easier and less expensive to resolve.
58 Cal.App.4th at 1102.

K5 argues that Downs demonstrates that the Legislature only intended to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of the administrative and investigation process and did not intend to create an unlimited ability to pursue state law claims “by riding on the coattails of an EEOC action in federal court.”K5 argues that “once the EEOC determines that conciliation will not reach a resolution, the reason for tolling vanishes, and the statute of limitations must begin to run on the FEHA claim.”K5 also refers to the Comment to AB 1146, which enacted Section 12965(d) as demonstrating that the Legislature did not intend to extend the FEHA statute of limitations when EEOC conciliation fails and the EEOC decides to file an action on behalf of the charging parties:
*7 This bill codifies the principles in Downs and the federal cases, thus allowing complainants in dual-filed cases to await the outcome of the EEOC process by tolling the one-year state right-to-sue period, under specified conditions, until EEOC completes its administrative processing of the charge. The specified conditions are: 1) that a timely charge has been filed concurrently with both DFEH and EEOC; 2) DFEH has deferred to EEOC for charge processing, or EEOC has initially deferred to the state but subsequently undertakes an independent review; and, 3) a right-to-sue notice has been issued regarding the state claim.
K5, noting that the Charging Parties/Intervenors were represented by counsel throughout the EEOC investigation and conciliation process and actively participated in the conciliation process, asserts that they never took any action to preserve their FEHA claim even when the EEOC waited ten months to file its Complaint with this court after giving notice on April 7, 2005 that the conciliation process had failed. K5 contends that the tolling period for the FEHA claim ended on April 7, 2006. K5 argues:
Intervenors never attempted to intervene and filed their Complaint within the two months between the filing of the EEOC Complaint and the expiration of the limitations period for their FEHA claim ... Intervenors might still be sitting on their hands today had K5 not asked the court to compel them to act.
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

Thus, Intervenors have not acted with the reasonable diligence required under the holding in Downs, and allowed their cause of action under state law to lapse. State law clearly required intervenors to act with reasonable diligence to preserve their claims under the FEHA, but they failed to do so. Despite having ample opportunity to raise their claims under state law, they chose to do nothing, and the price that they pay for their unreasonable inaction is the loss of their cause of action under the FEHA.
Charging Parties/Intervenors note that the conditions for tolling the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 12965(d)(1) existed in this action. The question is the applicable period of that tolling. Pointing to the language in Section 12965(d)(2) that “[t]he time for commencing an action for which the statute of limitations is tolled under paragraph (1) expires when the federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires, or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, whichever is later ” (emphasis added), they argue:
[T]he federal right-to-sue letter was never issued because the EEOC elected to pursue litigation. In this circumstance, the charging party has the ‘right’ to intervene in the pending litigation. The right to intervene thus supplants the purpose of the federal right-to-sue notice. As long as the charging party has the right to intervene on the federal Title VII claim, the charging party should also have the right to pursue the state FEHA claim.
*8 The Charging Parties/Intervenors argue that K5’s position that the tolling provision does not apply when the EEOC elects to file litigation “is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute which ... sets forth three specific criteria to trigger tolling” and that the issuance of an EEOC right-to-sue letter is not one of those criteria. Noting that the purpose of the tolling provision in Section 12965(d)(1) is to give the parties the opportunity to engage in the administrative process and to relieve a charging party from pursuing duplicative actions simultaneously, citing Downs, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at 1102, the Charging Parties/Intervenors contend that K5’s position penalizes them for participating in the

administrative process and allowing the EEOC to explore an administrative resolution:
Defendant’s position rests solely on the fact of the EEOC electing to file litigation. This decision is not one wherein Intervenors have any input, discretion or prior knowledge. Despite the fact that the case may be under ‘legal review,’ the Intervenors cannot assume that such action will be taken. The administrative processing of the EEOC is not completed until a decision is made regarding litigation. If litigation is declined, the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice and the party is given a minimum period of ninety (90) days to file both the state and federal claims. If the EEOC elects to litigate, the time frame for the party is now controlled by the right to intervene.
The position of the Charging Parties/Intervenors is correct. The tolling period set forth in Section 12965(d)(1) ends “when the federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires, or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, whichever is later.”The federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires 90 days after issuance by the EEOC of a notice of right to sue. K5’s position that the “federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action” ran from the date the EEOC notified the parties that conciliation had failed and that litigation review was being conducted by the EEOC’s Regional Attorney is unsupported by any statute or regulation. In Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir.1977), the Ninth Circuit ruled:
The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the statutory ninety-day period within which an aggrieved party must file his private civil action is triggered by notification from the EEOC that conciliation efforts have failed or by the formal Notice of Right to Sue letter. We conclude that the ninety-day period does not begin until the charging party receives a letter specifically informing him of his right to sue.
K5 notes that the Charging Parties/Intervenors never requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in order to bring the claims alleged in the Complaint in Intervention
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

in federal court, despite the fact that they had the right to demand such from the EEOC at any time after May 12, 2004. In so contending, K5 refers to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(1) which provides that the EEOC must issue a right-to-sue notice upon written request if the charge of discrimination has been pending for more than 180 days.
*9 In Lynn, supra, 564 F.2d at 1286-1287, the Ninth Circuit commented:
Our determination of the type of notice necessary to begin the period in which a private action may be filed does not imply that a plaintiff’s lack of diligence in filing an action must be overlooked. The Act provides that an aggrieved party may request a Right to Sue letter from the Commission any time after 180 days following the filing of the charge with the Commission. Particularly where the aggrieved party has consulted counsel and is aware of this right, it becomes inequitable at some point for the employee to delay filing suit. The complainant should not be permitted to prejudice the employer by taking advantage of the Commission’s slowness in processing claims or by procrastinating while being aware that the Commission intends to take no further action. Under such circumstances, it is proper for the district court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, to take the plaintiff’s lack of diligence into account in determining the amount of back pay, if any, to be awarded the plaintiff should he prevail on the merits.
However, in Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 814-815 (9th Cir.1985), the Ninth Circuit held:
Laches is an equitable doctrine. Its application depends upon the facts of the particular case ... To establish laches the defendant must show both an unexcused or unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to himself ... this Circuit has recognized that laches can be used as a defense against a private plaintiff in a Title VII suit....
Continental argues that Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., [609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir.1979) ] is dispositive here. In Boone, this circuit held that a private plaintiff’s Title VII claims was barred by laches

where there was a seven-year delay. The court, however, emphasized that its holding stated the exception and not the general rule. 609 F.2d at 960. The EEOC in that case had frequently informed the plaintiff that it would issue a right-to-sue letter to him and assist him in bringing an action in the courts. The plaintiff, however, repeatedly refused these offers and the EEOC kept his file open at his request. The plaintiff offered no excuse to the court for his seven-year delay and did not challenge the defendant employer’s showing that it had been significantly prejudiced through no fault of its own by plaintiff’s unexcusable delay.
In the instant case, Brown did not deliberately delay seeking a right-to-sue letter. Furthermore, he filed within ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter. This circuit has recognized that EEOC delays are not to be charged against private plaintiffs and that complainants are not required to terminate the administrative process by requesting a notice of right-to-sue. See Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 640 F.2d at 667 n. 8. ‘Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control over a charge, a private party will not be charged with its mistakes.”Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1152.
*10 Although these decisions are not dispositive of the issue raised by K5, they demonstrate that Charging Parties/Intervenors were not required to demand a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC when the EEOC notified them that reconciliation had failed and that the EEOC had forwarded the matter for litigation review.
With regard to K5’s assertion that the Charging Parties/Intervenors failed to act with reasonable diligence in filing the Complaint in Intervention, they respond that the Complaint in Intervention was filed within the time period ordered by the Magistrate Judge and note that K5 did not oppose their motion for intervention on this ground. They further argue:
It is indeed incongruous to claim that the Title VII claim is timely and the FEHA claim (based on the same facts) is untimely when one of the important purposes underlying the tolling principle is the judicial economy. Defendants’ position would require parties to file FEHA claims in state court pending the EEOC administrative processing in order to avoid the risk that the tolling would be retroactively denied in the event EEOC elected to pursue litigation.
They further claim it not their fault that the EEOC took ten months to decide whether to file the Complaint and
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E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

that, had the Charging Parties/Intervenors filed an FEHA claim in state court during that ten month period, K5 “would now be objecting to having to defend in two separate legal forums and the unnecessary costs of multiple litigation.”Finally, they note that K5 has pointed to no prejudice to it resulting from the alleged lack of diligence.
K5 replies that Charging Parties/Intervenors will not be penalized for having engaged in the administrative process and allowing the EEOC to explore administrative resolution.
The critical delay occurred after the administrative process was complete, and there was no further hope of an administrative resolution. Intervenors state that they had no input, discretion, or prior knowledge of the EEOC decision to sue K5, and assert that ‘Despite the fact that the case may be under “legal review,” the Intervenors cannot assume that such action will be taken.’Intervenors actually make K5’s point. Intervenors did not know if the EEOC would sue, and yet they did nothing to preserve their claims under the FEHA. They could have, and should have, requested their right to sue letter, and acted to preserve their claims.
Charging Parties/Intervenors were entitled under Section 12965(b) to tolling of the limitation period until the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. If the EEOC’s litigation review resulted in the decision to issue a notice of right to sue, the tolling period would have terminated at that time and the limitation period set forth in Section 12965(b)(2) would have accrued. There is nothing in the language of Section 12965(b)(2) that supports an interpretation that the complaining party must accelerate issuance of the notice of right to sue by requesting that the EEOC issue one once the EEOC notifies the parties that conciliation has failed. A district court cannot rewrite a state statute to impose conditions not specifically required by the Legislature.
*11 K5 further replies that, had Charging Parties/Intervenors acted promptly when the EEOC filed this action, they could have preserved their FEHA claims. In so contending, K5 asserts that the statute of limitations under the FEHA did not expire until April 14, 2006, four months after the EEOC filed this action. K5 asserts that Charging Parties/Intervenors chose to do nothing to preserve their right to bring their FEHA claims:
Intervenors had any number of options other than filing their FEHA claims in state court to preserve those claims; all that they had to do was act diligently either before the EEOC filed suit by requesting a right to sue letter or after the EEOC filed this action by promptly intervening, but they did nothing. There is simply no reason or authority to extend tolling of the limitations

period for FEHA causes of action without limitation.
Although the statutory condition terminating tolling of the FEHA limitation period did not occur (because the EEOC did not issue a notice of right to sue), it nonetheless remains that Charging Parties/Intervenors did not make any effort to intervene until some months after the EEOC commenced this litigation. It is apparent that Charging Parties/Intervenors believe that their right to intervene in an EEOC Title VII complaint carries with it the right to include FEHA claims. However, no authority is cited for this position. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Charging Parties/Intervenors only had a right to intervene in the EEOC’s Title VII claims.
Nonetheless, given that the statutory condition for termination of the tolling period did not occur, there is no legal basis for a claim that the FEHA claims are time-barred. As discussed supra, K5’s contention that Charging Parties/Intervenors had one year from the date of the DFEH notice of right to sue to file their FEHA claims in court is contrary to the express wording of Section 12965(d)(1). K5 essentially requests that additional terms be implied in the statute to cover the situation where the EEOC determines to file litigation against the employer under Title VII. As noted supra, a federal district court does not have this authority. Here, because K5 raised no contention that Charging Parties/Intervenors’ motion to intervene in the Title VII claims alleged by the EEOC against K5 was not timely, K5 cannot logically argue that the motion to intervene to bring the FEHA claims was untimely absent a statutory provision precluding that intervention. As noted, no statutory provision is cited.
This result is consistent with the statutory purposes of § 12965(b), avoidance of unnecessary filings in state and federal courts, economy in centering the claims in one court, and the absence of prejudice because K5 had full notice of the claims and the ability to investigate.
This conclusion is bolstered by Judge Ishii’s Order in EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-6199 AWI LJO. Judge Ishii addressed a motion to dismiss the FEHA claim filed by the intervenor under identical circumstances to those presented in this case. Harris Farms argued that although the statute of limitations on the FEHA claim was tolled during the pendency of the EEOC investigation, the tolling expired on the later of one year after the DFEH provided her with a notice of right to sue or when the federal right to sue period to commence a civil action expired. In rejecting this claim, Judge Ishii ruled in pertinent part:
*12 Although Defendant states that in [EEOC v. Farmer Brothers, 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir.1994) ] the court ‘held that the plaintiff’s FEHA cause of action as
8

E.E.O.C. v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

tolled until February 20, 1988 (the date the EEOC initiated its lawsuit) and since her amendment related back to her original intervention, the FEHA amendment was timely, ..., this court is unable to locate any such language in the Farmer Brothers opinion. Rather the Ninth Circuit references and relies on a prior ruling in Salgado v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 823 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir.1987) holding that the statute of limitations on a FEHA cause of action is tolled ‘pending resolution of the EEOC investigation.’This court can locate no language in the Farmer Brothers opinion regarding the expiration of the tolling period. Thus, while the court finds that it would be reasonable for the tolling period to expire when the EEOC initiates a civil action, it is unconvinced that Farmer Brothers establishes a rule on this issue.
Moreover ..., the only citation that Defendant provides for the concept that she had ninety days after the expiration of the tolling period to bring her FEHA claim is a citation to 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(f)(1)... This statute establishes a ninety-day time period applicable in certain situations, but it makes no mention of a ninety-day time period after the EEOC has commenced a civil action. The court thus finds, that even if the tolling period expires on the date that the EEOC initiates a civil action, Defendant has not demonstrated that the federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires ninety days later. Because under Government Code section 12965(d) and (e) the time for filing an action for which the statute of limitations was tolled expires when the federal right-to-sue period expires or one year from the right-to-sue notice from the DFEH, whichever is later, and Defendant has not established when the federal right-to-sue period expires in this case, the court concludes that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Intervenor’s second claim for relief is barred by the statute of limitations.
The court is unaware of any authority on when the tolling period would expire in a case like this in which the EEOC conducts an investigation and then files a

civil action without providing the employee with a right-to-sue letter, or how long the statute of limitations would be once it started running. The court acknowledges that this apparent dearth of authority is surprising in light to the parties’ need to have a statute of limitations by which to gauge the ability of an employee to intervene in an action such as this and to specify the factual basis for her claim. However, without such authority, this court is unable to provide the parties with a ruling on these issues. The court can only conclude that Defendants have not shown that they are entitled to dismissal of Intervenor’s second claim for relief.
CONCLUSION
*13 Here, Defendant had specific notice of Plaintiff’s intent to intervene as of right during February 2006, when the EEOC complaint under Title VII was filed. At a May 4, 2006, Scheduling Conference, Magistrate Judge Goldner was advised and memorialized in her June 9, 2006, Scheduling Order that Charging Plaintiffs intended to intervene and they were given until August 8, 2006, to do so. Plaintiffs moved to intervene June 20, 2006, Defendant did not oppose, and their motion to intervene was granted on August 18, 2006. The Complaint in Intervention was ordered filed August 23, 2006. The § 12965(b) tolling requirements were satisfied. Limitations on the federal right-to-sue period where no EEOC right-to-sue notice was issued is undefined by statute. The Defendant had full notice of the state claim, knew it would be filed and has suffered no prejudice. The Complaint in Intervention was filed within six months of the filing of the EEOC complaint.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief under state law is DENIED.
	  

9

 
 1 WILLIAM R. TAMAYO, SBN 084965 DAVID F. OFFEN-BROWN, SBN 063321
2 EVANGELINA FIERRO HERNANDEZ SBN 168879 LINDA ORDONIO-DIXON, SBN 172830
3 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION San Francisco District Office
4 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105-1260
5 Telephone No. (415) 625-5654 Fax No. (415) 625-5657
6 MARCOS CAMACHO, SBN 123501
7 Law Offices of MARCOS CAMACHO
P.O. Box 9009 8 Bakersfield, CA 93389-9009
9 Telephone: (661) 324-8100 Facsimile: (661) 324-8103

10
Attorneys for Plaintiff Intervenors 11

12

ROBERT THOMAS OLMOS, SBN 54247 ALLRED MAROKO & GOLDBERG

13 6300 Wilshire Blvd #1500 Los Angeles, CA 90048

14 Telephone: (323) 653-6530

Facsimile: (323) 653-1660 15

16 Attorneys for Plaintiff Intervenors

17 RONALD H. BARSAMIAN, SBN 381531 PATRICK MOODY, #156928

18 BARSAMIAN & MOODY

A Professional Corporation 19 Attorneys at Law

20

1141 West Shaw Avenue, Suite 104 Fresno, California 93711-3704

21 Telephone: (559) 248-2360 Facsimile: (559) 248-2370

22

Attorneys for Defendant 23 Kovacevich "5" Farms

24

25

26

27

28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165 OWW TAG

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3

4 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
5
Plaintiff, 6
and 7

CIV. NO. CV-06 00165 OWW TAG CONSENT DECREE

DELIA CASAS, MYRIAM CAZARES, 8 MIRIAM DELGADO, PATRICIA
DELGADO, FLOR RIVERA and 9 TERRI SALCIDO,

10

Plaintiff Intervenors

11

v.

12 KOVACEVICH “5" FARMS, A Partnership,
13
Defendant. 14

15

16

Plaintiff U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“Commission” or “EEOC”)

17 brought this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title I of the
18 Civil Rights Act of 1991, to correct alleged unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex
19

20 (female) and to make whole Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazarez, Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terry

21 Salcido, Delia Casas, and a class of rejected female farm workers and deterred female farm workers

22 who were allegedly denied employment during the period and who were allegedly aggrieved by the

23 alleged unlawful practices. Plaintiff EEOC alleged that defendant KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS, a

24 partnership (hereinafter “K-5” or “Defendant”) unlawfully failed to hire Patricia Delgado, Myriam
25 Cazarez, Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terry Salcido, Delia Casas, and a class of rejected female
26
farm workers and deterred female farm workers because of their sex. Each of the named individuals 27

28 intervened alleging claims of discrimination based on sex (female) under Title VII, the California

CONSENT DECREE

2.

CV-06-00165

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1 Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and other California laws. Plaintiff Intervenors filed a

2 motion for class certification pursuant to FRCP Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) to represent a class of rejected

3 female farm workers and deterred female farm workers who were denied employment during the

4 period in violation of Title VII and FEHA. The Court deferred ruling on said motion which is still
5 pending before the Court. Defendant denied all the allegations.
6

7

In the interest of resolving this matter and as a result of having engaged in comprehensive

8 settlement negotiations, the Commission, Plaintiff Intervenors Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazarez,

9 Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terry Salcido, and Delia Casas, and Defendant (hereinafter referred to

10 as “the Parties”) have agreed that the above-captioned lawsuit (the “Lawsuit”) should be fully and
11 finally resolved by entry of this stipulated Consent Decree. This Consent Decree shall not constitute
12 an adjudication and/or a finding on the merits of the Lawsuit.
13 This Consent Decree resolves all claims arising out of EEOC Charge Nos. 375-2004-00158;
14
15 375-2004-00159; 375-2004-00160; 375-2004-00161; 375-2004-00162; 375-2004-00163 and the

16 complaint filed in the Lawsuit, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims of discrimination

17 based on sex (female) under Title VII that were made or could have been made by the Commission
18 in this Lawsuit. This also constitutes a complete resolution of all claims of discrimination based on
19 sex (female) under Title VII, FEHA or any other state law claims that were made or could have been
20 made by the Plaintiff Intervenors, who were represented by counsel, in this Lawsuit. This Consent
21 22 Decree does not, however, resolve any future charges or charges that may be pending with the
23 EEOC other than the charges and complaint specifically referenced in this paragraph.

24

This Consent Decree comprises the full and exclusive agreement of the Parties with respect

25 to the matters discussed herein. No waiver, modification or amendment of any provision of this

26 Consent Decree shall be effective unless made in writing and approved by all the Parties to this
27 Decree, and any substantive change, modification or amendment of any provision of this Consent
28

CONSENT DECREE

3.

CV-06-00165

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1 Decree shall also require approval by the Court.

2

The Court has reviewed this Consent Decree in light of the pleadings, the record herein, and

3 now approves this Consent Decree. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
4 DECREED:
5 I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
6
7 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Parties to this Lawsuit. This Court

8 will retain jurisdiction over this Decree for all purposes until the expiration of Defendant’s

9 obligations as set forth herein

10 2. This Consent Decree is final and binding upon the Parties, their successors and assigns.

11 3. The Commission and Defendant will each bear their own costs and attorney fees in this
12 action.
13
II. NON-ADMISSION OF LIABILITY 14

15

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted or construed as an admission of liability by

16 Defendant. Defendant specifically denies all of the Commission’s and Plaintiffs’/Intervenors’

17 allegations, and denies that it is liable in any amount, under any theory.

18 III. GENERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NON-

19 RETALIATION

20

4. 21

Sex Discrimination: Consistent with Section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2, K-5, and

22 its officers, agents, managers (including supervisory employees), successors and assigns, are

23 enjoined from: (a) discriminating against persons on the basis of sex in the hiring and/or terms and

24 conditions of employment; (b) engaging in or being a party to any action, policy or practice that is

25 intended to, or is known to them, to have the effect of deterring any applicant or denying hire to any

26 applicant on the basis of sex; or (c) creating, facilitating or permitting, to the extent known to them,
27 the existence of discriminatory hiring practices based on sex.
28

CONSENT DECREE

4.

CV-06-00165

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1 5. Retaliation: Consistent with Section 704 of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e-3, Defendant, its

2 officers, agents, managers (including supervisory employees), successors and assigns, are enjoined
3 from engaging in, implementing or permitting any action, policy or practice with the purpose of 4
retaliating against any current or former employee of K-5 because he or she has in the past, or during 5
the term of this Consent Decree (a) opposed any practice of harassment or other discriminatory acts 6 7 on the basis of sex made unlawful under Title VII; (b) filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging any
8 such practice; (c) testified or participated in any manner in any investigation (including, without

9 limitation, any internal investigation undertaken by Defendant), proceeding or hearing in connection

10 with this Lawsuit; (d) was identified as a possible witness in this Lawsuit; (e) asserted any rights
11 under this Consent Decree; or (f) sought and/or received any monetary or non-monetary relief in
12 accordance with this Consent Decree.
13 III. MONETARY RELIEF
14
15 6. K-5 shall pay the total sum of $1,680,000.00 (one million, six hundred and eighty thousand

16 Dollars and No Cents) (the “Settlement Payment”). This amount is the full and complete amount K-

17 5 shall pay, and includes attorney fees and all damages to Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazarez, Flor

18 Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terry Salcido, Delia Casas, and a class of rejected female farm workers

19 and deterred female farm workers who were denied employment during the period and who were
20 aggrieved by the alleged unlawful practices, and any other costs and expenses.
21

22

a.

K-5 shall report the Settlement Payment to Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazarez,

23

Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terry Salcido, Delia Casas by issuance of IRS

24

Form 1099 as specified by the Commission;

25

b.

26

27

28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

K-5 shall pay the Settlement Payment as follows: On February 10, 2009, Defendant shall pay $400,000; On February 10, 2010, Defendant shall pay $400,000;
5.

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1

On February 10, 2011, Defendant shall pay $400,000;

2

3

c.

4

5

6

7

8

On February 10, 2012, Defendant shall pay $480,000; On each due date, K-5 will mail a check for the scheduled amount made payable to Gilardi & Co., LLC at 3301 Kurner Avenue, San Rafael, CA 94901. K-5 will mail a copy of the check to Evangelina Fierro Hernandez, Senior Trial Attorney, c/o Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500, San Francisco, CA 94105-1260 and Marcos

9

Camacho at Law Offices of MARCOS CAMACHO, P.O. Box 9009,

10
11
12 7.
13
14
15

Bakersfield, CA 93389 9009.

d.

K-5 will not pay any interest.

Identified and Unidentified Class Members

a.

Settlement Fund Amount: The sums deposited with Gilardi & Co., LLC

(“Settlement Fund”) will be distributed to all “Eligible Claimants” (as that

16

term is defined below) in accordance with the provisions of this Consent

17

18

b.

19

20
c. 21

22

23

d.

Decree. Costs: K-5 shall not be responsible for any costs incurred in maintaining the Settlement Fund Account. K-5 shall not be responsible for any costs incurred in locating and assisting Eligible Claimants with the claims process. Eligible Claimants Definition: The Settlement Fund shall be used to make

24

payments to persons whom the Commission determines to be eligible to

25

26

e.

27

28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

receive monetary relief in this lawsuit. Notification of Settlement/Claims Process: Notification of this Settlement, Claims Process, and Consent Decree (hereinafter referred to as “notification”)
6.

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1

shall be made in the following manner: K-5 shall post notice on the K-5

2 3 4 5
f. 6 7 8

premises specifically on the portable toilets in the vineyard, regarding the availability of the Settlement Fund for no less than 30 (thirty days). The notice is attached as Exhibit A to this decree. Attorney Fees: Upon receipt of monies from K-5, Gilardi & Co., LLC will also distribute a specific amount of monies to Marcos Camacho at Law Offices of MARCOS CAMACHO, P.O. Box 9009, Bakersfield, CA 93389-

9

9009 for attorney fees and costs.

10

(i.) The amount will be specified by an agreement between the

11 Commission and Marcos Camacho and communicated to Gilardi & Co., LLC
12 20 days after the entry of this decree.
13
(ii.) The amounts received by Marcos Camacho will be in full satisfaction 14

15

of attorney fees and costs due to him and his co-counsel, Tomas Olmos of

16

Allred, Maroko & Goldberg.

17

(iii.) In the event that Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors cannot agree, the

18

EEOC will move for the Court’s assistance in this matter, and the Court will

19 determine the amount to be distributed to Marcos Camacho.
20 (iv.) The Court’s decision will be final and binding on all parties.
21

22 IV. SPECIFIC INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

23 8. Zero-Tolerance

24

K-5 affirms the following “Statement of Zero-Tolerance Policy and Equality Objectives”:

25

K-5 is firmly committed to maintaining a zero-tolerance policy concerning discriminatory

26

hiring, recruiting, harassment and retaliation against individuals who report discrimination in

27 K-5’s workplace; to swiftly and firmly responding to any acts of discrimination or retaliation
28

CONSENT DECREE

7.

CV-06-00165

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1

of which K-5 becomes aware; to imposing appropriate discipline designed to strongly deter

2

future acts of discrimination or retaliation; and to actively monitor its workplace in order to

3

ensure tolerance, respect and dignity for all employees.

4 This paragraph does not create any individual contractual or common law causes of action or
5 other rights that would not otherwise exist under statute.
6

7 9. EEO and Anti-Discrimination Policies

8

a.

K-5 shall revise its EEO & hiring policies, within sixty (60) days of signing

9

the Consent Decree, such that the policies: (i) include definitions of

10

discriminatory treatment, with specific reference to hiring based on sex; (ii)

11 include examples to supplement the definitions of disparate treatment based
12 on sex; (iii) provide for appropriate discipline and/or corrective action for
13
incidents of failing to hire based on the applicant’s sex designed to deter 14

15

future acts of discrimination; (iv) include strong non-retaliation language with

16

examples to supplement the definition of retaliation; (v) provide for

17

appropriate discipline for incidents of retaliation designed to deter future acts

18

of retaliation; (vi) provide that complaints of discrimination and/or retaliation

19 will be accepted irrespective of whether they are made verbally or in writing;
20 (vii) provide a reasonable timetable for commencing an investigation after a
21

22

complaint is made or received and for appropriate remedial action, if

23

warranted, to be taken upon conclusion of an investigation; and (viii) indicate

24

that, promptly upon the conclusion of the investigation of a complaint, K-5

25
26
27 b.
28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

will communicate to the complaining party the results of the investigation and the remedial actions taken or proposed, if any. K-5 shall effectively disseminate its revised policies and procedures required
8.

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1

by the preceding paragraph a. by:

2

3

4

5

6

7

c.

8

i. Distributing copies of the policy to all current employees within 30 days of the entry of this Consent Decree; ii. Giving a copy of the policy to all new employees at all locations upon the employees’ hire. K-5 will submit a copy of the revised EEO and hiring policies to EEOC at the same time it submits the report on the completion of training as described

9

below.

10 10. Complaint Procedure.

11 a.
12
13
14

K-5 shall develop or reaffirm a complaint procedure in English and Spanish designed to encourage employees and applicants to come forward with complaints about violations of its discrimination policy. As part of the policy,

15

K-5 shall provide its employees and applicants with convenient, confidential

16

and reliable mechanisms for reporting incidents of discrimination and

17

18

19 b.
20

21

22

c.

23

retaliation. Said policy shall be continuously posted in a prominent place in the vineyard. K-5 will submit a copy of the complaint procedures to the EEOC twenty (20) days before the completion of training as required below. Within one hundred eighty (180) days after entry of this Decree, K-5 will mail to counsel for the Commission a report containing the following information

24

and documentation:

25
26
27
28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

i. Copies of all complaints received in the last six months that are related to any claim that K-5 failed to hire the complainant because of her sex, and a statement regarding the result of the investigation of each such complaint.
9.

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1

Additionally, the Company will provide the name, address and telephone

2

number of the complainant and name the person who received the complaint.

3

A copy of all records, documents and other writings relevant to such

4 complaints and investigations shall be maintained by the Company during the
5 period of the Consent Decree and will be made available to the Commission
6

7

within ten (10) days following a written request from the Commission.

8

ii. Beginning on June 1, 2009, on the first day of January and June of

9

each year during the duration of this Consent Decree, the Company will mail

10

to counsel for the Commission a report containing the documentation and

11 information specified in the preceding paragraph 10.(c.)(i.)
12 11. Posting.
13
The attached Notice of Settlement, in English and Spanish, shall be, and remain, posted on 14

15 the portable toilets located in the vineyards for thirty (30) days.

16 12. Training of Employees.

17

K-5 shall require all current and new employees to attend an anti-discrimination training

18 session provided by K-5 at the start of every harvest season throughout the duration of this Consent
19 Decree. The purpose of said training shall be to give participants an understanding of discrimination
20 issues, particularly sex discrimination, including but not limited to what constitutes discrimination
21
22 based on gender including the failure to hire women, sources of legal protection for discrimination

23 victims, the employees’ obligation to report sex discrimination, the employer’s obligation to take

24 preventive, investigative and remedial action with respect to discrimination complaints, and a review

25 of company policies (including discipline policies) and practices related to discrimination and

26 retaliation. The training shall be in English and Spanish.
27 13. Training Logistics.
28

CONSENT DECREE

10.

CV-06-00165

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1

The content and method of training and the size of training classes is subject to approval by

2 the Commission which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld and which shall take into

3 consideration K-5’s operational needs. K-5 agrees to provide a description of each training program
4 to counsel for the Commission no later than twenty (20) days before the training programs are
5 scheduled to be held.
6
7 14. Acknowledgment of Training Attendance.

8

All persons attending mandatory anti-discrimination training pursuant to this Consent Decree

9 shall sign an acknowledgment of their attendance at the training, the date thereof, and their position

10 with K-5. K-5 shall retain the originals of these acknowledgments and provide the EEOC with a

11 copy within 30 days of training.

12 15.
13

Reports to the Commission

Training Report: 14

15

Within thirty (30) days of completion of the training required by this Consent Decree, K-5

16 will send the EEOC verification of its completion of discrimination/harassment training for its

17 employees.
18 16. Policies Designed to Promote Supervisor Accountability: Communication of Potential
19 Discipline for Engaging in Sex Discrimination and/or Retaliation.
20 K-5 agrees that it shall impose appropriate discipline, up to and including termination,
21 22 suspension without pay or demotion, upon any supervisor or manager who engages in sex
23 discrimination or retaliation or knowingly permits any such conduct to occur in his or her work area

24 or among employees under his or her supervision, or who retaliates against any person who

25 complains or participates in any investigation or proceeding concerning such conduct. K-5 shall

26 communicate this policy to all of its supervisors and managers.
27 //
28

CONSENT DECREE

11.

CV-06-00165

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1 17. Hiring Goals for Females

2

During the term of this Decree, Defendant shall set goals for the hiring of females in all

3 available positions during the harvest season. In addition, Defendant will make all reasonable effort

4 to promote the hiring of females in all non-harvest activities based upon applications made by
5 female employees during all other seasons.
6

7

a.

K-5 is required to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that females comprise

8

at least one-third of the workforce over the course of the harvest season. The

9

harvest season is approximately July through November of each year.

10

b.

11

12

13 c.
14

15

Defendant is required to make all reasonable efforts to promote the hiring of females in all non-harvest activities based upon applications made by female employees during non-harvest seasons. Hiring Report: For each quarter during the duration of the Consent Decree, K-5 will send the

16

EEOC verification of the above hiring goals. The report shall include the total

17 18 V. 19 20 21 22 23

number of applicants by gender and the total number of hires by gender.

RETENTION OF JURISDICTION AND EXPIRATION OF CONSENT DECREE

a.

This Consent Decree shall terminate five (5) years from the date of its entry

by the Court, unless the Commission petitions this Court for an extension of

the Decree because of non-compliance by K-5. If the Commission determines

that K-5 has not complied with the Consent Decree, the Commission will

24

provide written notification of the alleged breach to K-5 and will not petition

25
26
27
28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

the Court for enforcement sooner than thirty (30) days after providing written notification. The thirty-day period following written notice shall be used by the parties for good faith efforts to resolve the issue. If the Commission
12.

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1

petitions the Court and the Court finds K-5 to be in substantial violation of the

2

3

b.

4

5

6

7

8

terms of the Decree, the Court may extend this Consent Decree Except as provided in the preceding paragraph, five (5) years after the entry of this Consent Decree, this lawsuit will be dismissed with prejudice, provided that K-5 has complied substantially with the terms of this Consent Decree. K5 will be deemed to have complied substantially if the Court has not made any findings or orders during the term of the Decree that K-5 has failed to comply

9

with any of the terms of this Decree. This Consent Decree will automatically

10

expire without further Court Order.

11

12 For Plaintiff EEOC: 13 14 Dated: December 1, 2008

For Defendant K-5: Dated: December 1, 2008

15 /s/ William T. Tamayo
16 WILLIAM R. TAMAYO 17 Regional Attorney

/s/ Ronald H. Barsamian
RONALD H. BARSAMIAN Barsamian & Moody

18 19 Dated: December 1, 2008 20

For Plaintiff-Intervenors Dated: December 1, 2008

21 /s/ David F. Offen-Brown
22 DAVID F. OFFEN-BROWN Supervisory Trial Attorney
23 Dated: December 1, 2008
24

/s/ Marcos Camacho
MARCOS CAMACHO Law Offices of Marcos Camacho
Dated: December 1, 2008

25 /s/ Evangelina Fierro Hernandez
26 EVANGELINA FIERRO HERNANDEZ
27 Senior Trial Attorney
28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

/s/ Thomas Olmos THOMAS OLMOS Allred, Maroko & Goldberg
13.

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1 IT IS SO ORDERED:
2 3 Dated: November 26, 2008 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
CONSENT DECREE CV-06-00165

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER Oliver W. Wanger United States District Court Judge
14.

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 Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 1 of 11
CIVIL,CLOSED
U.S. District Court Eastern District of California − Live System (Fresno) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06−cv−00165−OWW−TAG

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kovacevich 5 Farms Assigned to: Senior Judge Oliver W. Wanger Referred to: Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/13/2006 Date Terminated: 12/01/2008 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Evangelina Patricia Hernandez U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 350 The Embarcadero Ste 500 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 625−5622 Fax: (415) 625−5657 Email: Evangelina.Hernandez@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Forgan Offen−Brown U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Phillip Burton Federal Building, 5 West 450 Golden Gate Avenue, POB 36025 San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 522−3104 Fax: (415) 522−3425 Email: david.offen−brown@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Susan Ordonio−Dixon U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Phillip Burton Federal Building, 5 West 450 Golden Gate Avenue, POB 36025 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 522−3070 Fax: (415) 522−3425 Email: linda.ordonio−dixon@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William Robert Tamayo U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105−1260 (415) 625−5645 Fax: (415) 625−5657 Email: william.tamayo@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Plaintiff Delia Casas

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos Allred, Maroko & Goldberg 6300 Wilshire Boulevard

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 2 of 11

Suite 1500 Los Angeles, CA 90048 323653−6530 Fax: 323653−4712 Email: tolmos@amglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Myriam Cazares

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Miriam Delgado

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Patricia Delgado

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Flor Rivera

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Terri Salcido

represented by Robert Tomas Olmos (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Kovacevich 5 Farms

represented by Ronald H. Barsamian Barsamian & Moody 1141 West Shaw Ave. Suite 104 Fresno, CA 93711−3704 559−248−2360 Fax: 559−248−2370 Email: rbarsam@msn.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacy Renee Lucas Hatmaker Law Group 7522 N. Colonial Avenue, Ste. 105 Fresno, CA 93711 559−374−0077 Fax: 559−374−0078 Email: stacy@hatmakerlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 3 of 11

Date Filed 02/13/2006 02/14/2006
02/14/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/22/2006
02/24/2006 03/08/2006 04/13/2006 04/27/2006 05/05/2006
06/09/2006
06/12/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Kovacevich 5 Farms, filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
2 CLERK'S NOTICE to plaintiff's counsel Evangelina Patricia Hernandez: A fee in the amount of $250.00 is required and may be submitted electronically using the event New Case Credit Card Payments. Your case will not be filed until the fee is paid (Local Rule 77−121c). If you wish to pay the fee in cash, check or money order, you must do so within 48 hours of lodging your complaint. (Hutcheson, C) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
3 NOTICE of APPEARANCE by Evangelina Patricia Hernandez on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
4 SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Kovacevich 5 Farms* with answer to complaint due within *20* days. Attorney *Evangelina Patricia Hernandez* *U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission* *350 The Embarcadero, Ste. 500* *San Francisco, CA 94105*. (Carter−Ford, R) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
5 CIVIL NEW CASE DOCUMENTS ISSUED; Initial Scheduling Conference set for 5/4/2006 at 09:15 AM in Courtroom 7 (SMS) before Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Forms # 2 VDRP Forms) (Carter−Ford, R) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
TEXT MESSAGE ONLY: Clerk's Notice of Docket Correction − case has been reassigned from the docket of Magistrate Judge Sandra Snyder to the docket of Magistrate Judge Theresa Goldner. The case was reassigned because defendant's place of business is in Kern County which, therefore, should be heard before Judge Goldner. (Rooney, M) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
MINUTE ORDER (TEXT Only): Initial Scheduling Conference set for MAY 4, 2006 at 09:30 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun Ave., #120 (TAG) before Judge Theresa A. Goldner. NOTE: hearing was previously set before Judge Snyder for the same day but at 9:15am. (Herman, H) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
6 STIPULATION to Extend Time to Respond to Complaint by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
7 ANSWER to COMPLAINT by Kovacevich 5 Farms.(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
8 JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
9 MINUTES (TEXT ENTRY ONLY) for proceedings held before Judge Theresa A. Goldner: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 5/4/2006. Court to issue Scheduling Conference Order. Plaintiffs Counsel E. Hernandez (telephonic) present. Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian and A. Raimondo (telephonic) present. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
10 SCHEDULING ORDER: Rule 26 disclosures 5/19/2006. Expert Disclosure due by 3/2/2007. Supplemental Expert disclosure deadline 4/6/2007. Expert Discovery due by 6/15/2007. Non−expert discovery due by 4/6/2007. Non−Dispositive Motions due by 6/29/2007, hearing by 7/23/2007. Dispositive Motion due by 8/17/2007, hearing by 9/24/2007. Settlement Conference set for 11/16/2006 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG) before Judge Goldner. Pretrial Conference set for 11/15/2007 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG) before Judge Goldner. Jury Trial set for 1/22/2008 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 1 (REC) before Senior Judge Coyle (jury trial − 15 days if bifurcated, 45 days otherwise) − signed by Judge Goldner on 6/9/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
11 ORDER by Chief Judge David F. Levi ORDERING this action REASSIGNED to Judge Oliver W. Wanger for all further proceedings due to the senior status of Judge Robert E. Coyle. (Kusamura, W) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

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06/14/2006 06/15/2006 06/20/2006
06/27/2006 06/29/2006 07/19/2006 07/20/2006 08/03/2006 08/07/2006 08/10/2006 08/10/2006
08/11/2006
08/18/2006
08/18/2006 08/23/2006 09/07/2006 09/12/2006

12 CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Scheduling Order (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
13 STIPULATION TO AMEND ANSWER by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
14 MOTION to INTERVENE & for leave to intervene by Delia Casas, Myriam Cazares, Miriam Delgado, Patricia Delgado, Flor Rivera, TERRI SALCIDO. Attorney Olmos, Robert Tomas added. Motion Hearing set for 8/7/2006 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 18th Street (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration Olmos & Exhibit A − Complaint in Intervention# 2 Points and Authorities Pts & Auths in Support of Motion to Intervene# 3 Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Leave to Intervene)(Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
15 STATEMENT of NON−OPPOSITION to MOTION re 14 MOTION to INTERVENE & for leave to intervene. (Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
16 FIRST AMENDED ANSWER to COMPLAINT by Kovacevich 5 Farms.(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
17 STATEMENT of NON−OPPOSITION to MOTION re 14 MOTION to INTERVENE & for leave to intervene. OF DEFENDANT KOVACEVICH "5" FARMS (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
18 CERTIFICATE of SERVICE by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
19 ORDER VACATING HEARING on 8/7/2006 re 14 MOTION for Leave to INTERVENE − signed by Judge Goldner on 8/3/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
20 ORDER granting 14 Motion to Intervene signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 8/7/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
21 JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
22 MOTION to BIFURCATE (JOINT) by Kovacevich 5 Farms. Motion Hearing set for 9/18/2006 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 18th Street (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. (Attachments: # 1 Points and Authorities in Support of Joint Motion# 2 Proposed Order)(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
23 MINUTE ORDER (TEXT ENTRY ONLY) by Deputy Clerk ADVANCING Follow−up Scheduling Conference from 9:30 am to 9:00 am on 8/17/2006 before Judge Goldner in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG). Parties may appear telephonically. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
24 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Judge Goldner: TELEPHONIC Follow−up SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 8/17/2006. Court to issue Order. Plaintiffs Counsel E. Hernandez and Plaintiff Counsel in Intervention R. Olmos present. Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian present. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
25 ORDER AMENDING SCHEDULING ORDER 10 − Intervenors to file and serve complaint by 8/18/2006 − signed by Judge Goldner on 8/18/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
26 INTERVENOR COMPLAINT by Delia Casas, Myriam Cazares, Miriam Delgado, Patricia Delgado, Flor Rivera and Terri Salcido by Delia Casas.(Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 08/23/2006)
27 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER re 22 MOTION to BIFURCATE (JOINT) by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
28 MOTION to DISMISS INTERVENORS' SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF by Kovacevich 5 Farms. Motion Hearing set for 10/16/2006 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Attachments: # 1 Points and Authorities Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss# 2 Declaration Declaration of Ronald H. Barsamian in Support of Motion to Dismiss# 3 Proposed Order Proposed

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09/12/2006 09/15/2006
09/19/2006 09/27/2006 09/27/2006
09/29/2006 10/02/2006 10/05/2006 10/06/2006 10/11/2006
10/12/2006 10/16/2006
10/16/2006
10/27/2006 11/03/2006 11/03/2006

Order on Moton to Dismiss# 4 Declaration Declaration of Anthony P. Raimondo in Support of Motion# 5 Declaration Exhibits A−G to Declaration of Anthony P. Raimondo)(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
29 EXHIBIT Attachment 1 to Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
30 MINUTE ORDER (TEXT Only) signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 9/15/2006: The Court hereby VACATES the Motion Hearing of 9/18/06 at 10:00am before Judge Goldner re: 22 Motion to Bifurcate, and the 27 Stipulation and Proposed Order re Motion to Bifurcate − MOTIONS are SUBMITTED on the pleadings. (Herman, H) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
31 ORDER BIFURCATING LIABILITY AND DAMAGE PHASES OF TRIAL signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 09/18/2006. (Lucas, L) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
32 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER TO CONTINUE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
33 MINUTE ORDER (TEXT ONLY) by Deputy Clerk RESETTING Settlement Conference from 11/16/2006 to 12/6/2006 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG) before Judge Goldner. Counsel to submit confidential settlement conference reports directly to Judge Goldner no later than 11/29/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
34 PROPOSED ORDER [STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER] by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
35 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION. Opposition to Defendant;s Motion to Dismiss Intervenors' Second Claim for Reliev (Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
36 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER − signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 10/5/2006. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
37 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. TO DISMISS INTERVENORS' SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 10/06/2006)
38 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 28 MOTION to DISMISS INTERVENORS' SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF. Intervenors' Request to File Supplemental Authority in Opposition re 28 Motion to Dismiss Intervenors' 2nd Claim for Relief (Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
39 REPLY/RESPONSE to to Intervenors' Request to File Supplelmental Authority by Kovacevich 5 Farms re 38 Memorandum/Response in Opposition to Motion,. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
40 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Judge Oliver W. Wanger : MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING held on 10/16/2006. Matter argued and submitted. Plaintiffs Counsel J. Lynch / E. Hernandez present. Defendants Counsel A. Raimondo / R. Barsamian present. Court Reporter/CD Number: P. Crawford. (Robles, S) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
41 MOTION to CERTIFY CLASS Memorandum of Pts & Auths, Declaration of Tomas Olmos in Support by Delia Casas. Motion Hearing set for 11/20/2006 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
42 ORDER denying 28 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 10/27/06. (Robles, S) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
43 ANSWER to INTERVENOR COMPLAINT by Kovacevich 5 Farms.(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
44 STATEMENT of NON−OPPOSITION to MOTION re 41 MOTION to CERTIFY CLASS Memorandum of Pts & Auths, Declaration of Tomas Olmos in Support. by Plaintiff EEOC (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Linda Ordonio−Dixon# 2 Exhibit A through D to Ordonio−Dixon Decl.)(Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

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11/03/2006 11/06/2006 11/13/2006 11/13/2006 11/14/2006
11/14/2006 11/14/2006 11/14/2006 11/14/2006 11/14/2006 11/14/2006 11/15/2006
11/27/2006
11/29/2006 11/30/2006
12/07/2006 12/15/2006

45 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION. TO MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
46 REPLY/RESPONSE to Plaintiff EEOC's Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
47 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. Plaintiff Intervenors' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification (Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
48 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. Plaintiff EEOC's Response to Defendant's Reply to Non−Opposition in Support of Motion for Class Certification (Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
49 ORDER continuing oral argument re plaintiff/intervenors motion for class certification from 11/20/2006 to 12/11/2006 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger and directing plaintiff/intervenors to file supplemental reply brief signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 11/14/2006. (Lucas, G) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
50 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION by Kovacevich 5 Farms. Motion Hearing set for 1/8/2007 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
52 MEMORANDUM by Kovacevich 5 Farms. POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
53 STATEMENT of UNDISPUTED FACTS by Defendant Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
54 DECLARATION of ANTHONY P. RAIMONDO in SUPPORT OF. MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
55 PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
56 MINUTE ORDER: TEXT ONLY ENTRY − In addition to electronic filing, a courtesy paper copy of all MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT shall be submitted to the court. This includes a copy of all moving papers, responses and replies. All documents shall be properly fastened and tabbed. If the courtesy copies have already been sent, this notice may be disregarded. (Lucas, G) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
57 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. Plaintiff Intervenors' Reply Brief in Response to Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Supplemental Declaration of R. Olmos in Support of Plaintiff Intervenors' Reply Brief in Response to Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification)(Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
58 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER Vacate Mediation Set for December 6th and Reset it for February 7th by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
59 STIPULATION and ORDER re 58 . Settlement Conference reset for 2/7/2007 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner − signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 11/30/2006. Parties to submit individual Settlement Conference Statements directly to Judge Goldner no later than 1/31/2007 either by email to tagorders@caed.uscourts.gov or by mail to 1200 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 120, Bakersfield, CA, 93312. DO NOT ELECTRONICALLY FILE on CM/ECF. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
60 MINUTE ORDER: TEXT ONLY ENTRY − The Motion to Certifiy Class Hearing currently set for 12/11/06 has been continued to 1/8/2007 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Robles, S) (Entered: 12/07/2006)
61 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Manuel Hernandez# 2 Affidavit of Yolanda Hernandez# 3 Affidavit of Ordonio−Dixon# 4 Exhibit A through

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12/19/2006 12/21/2006 01/05/2007 01/08/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 02/08/2007
02/14/2007
02/15/2007 02/23/2007 03/07/2007
03/19/2007 04/11/2007

G)(Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 12/15/2006)
62 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION. Plaintiffs−Intervenors' Support of EEOC's Opposition (Olmos, Robert) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
63 REPLY to RESPONSE to MOTION. & POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY ADJUDICATION MOTION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
64 STATEMENT of Errata by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 61 Memorandum/Response in Opposition to Motion. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Ordonio−Dixon# 2 Exhibit)(Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
65 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Judge Oliver W. Wanger : MOTIONS RE CLASS CERTIFICATION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING held on 1/8/2007. Motions argued. Any additional briefs to be filed by 1/16/2007. Matter then is submitted. Court Reporter/CD Number: ECRO. (Lucas, G) (Entered: 01/08/2007)
66 MEMORANDUM/RESPONSE in OPPOSITION re 51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION. *SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF (Ordonio−Dixon, Linda) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
67 SUPPLEMENT by Kovacevich 5 Farms. POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION & IN OPPOSITION TO CLASS CERTIFICATION (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
68 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Judge Theresa A. Goldner: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE held on 2/7/2007. At the request of parties and counsel, and in light of progress made towards settlement, Court agreed to conduct further settlement conference. Counsel to submit joint letter to Court proposing acceptable dates for further settlement conference. Plaintiffs Counsel W. Tamayo and E. Hernandez, Intervenors Counsel R. Tomas Olmos and M. Camacho, Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian and A. Raimondo present. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
69 MINUTE ORDER: (TEXT ONLY) A status conference is set for March 27, 2007 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 8 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. The parties may appear at the conference by arranging a one line conference call and telephoning the court at 559−499−5680. At the conference, the parties should be prepared to discuss the status of the settlement negotiations(Lira, I) (Entered: 02/14/2007)
70 MINUTE ORDER: (TEXT ONLY) A Status Conference set 3/27/07 at 8:30am before Judge O'Neill is VACATED. The status conference was issued in error. (Lira, I) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
71 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER Stipulation to Reset Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Dec. of Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
72 JOINT STIPULATION and ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET LITIGATION SCHEDULE signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/6/07 ORDERING Expert Disclosure due by 10/5/2007. Supplemental Expert Disclosure due by 11/2/07. Discovery: (Non−Expert) due by 11/2/2007; (Expert) due by 12/21/07. Dispositive Motion due by 2/25/2008, Hearing 3/31/08. Non−Dispositive Motions due by 1/14/2008, Hearing 2/18/08. Jury Trial set for 6/17/2008 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. Pretrial Conference set for 5/5/2008 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Carter−Ford, R) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
73 MOTION to COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES FRCP 12(b)(6) by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
74 MOTION to COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES by Kovacevich 5 Farms. Motion Hearing set for 4/16/2007 at 10:00 AM in Bakersfield at Truxtun (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Anthony P. Raimondo# 2 Declaration Anthony P. Raimondo (Supplemental)# 3 Declaration

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 8 of 11

04/13/2007
04/19/2007 05/08/2007
05/16/2007 06/04/2007 06/26/2007 09/20/2007 09/24/2007
12/04/2007 12/28/2007 01/10/2008 01/11/2008

EEOC)(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 04/11/2007)
75 MINUTE ORDER (Text only) by Magistrate Judge Goldner. Local Rule 37−251(a) (discovery matters) requires a notice of motion and motion scheduling a hearing date at least 21 days from date of filing. In this instance, 73 , the moving party filed a motion to compel on March 19, 2007 but did not file a notice of motion, and the electronic filer did not enter a hearing date on the Court's electronic filing system when the motion was filed. A joint statement re discovery disagreement 74 , was filed on April 11, 2007, and at that time, the electronic filer entered on April 16, 2007, motion hearing date, by using an incorrect event screen. In light of the foregoing, the hearing on this matter is continued to 5/7/2007 at 01:30 PM in Bakersfield at 1300 18th Street (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. Counsel may appear telephonically via Court Call by making reservations(866) 582−6878 or appear in person.(Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
76 ORDER DENIED without prejudice 51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION filed by Kovacevich 5 Farms, DEFFERED 41 MOTION to CERTIFY CLASS Memorandum of Pts & Auths, filed by Delia Casas, signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 4/18/7. (Kusamura, W) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
77 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Judge Theresa A. Goldner: MOTION HEARING held on 5/7/2007 73 MOTION to COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES filed by Kovacevich 5 Farms is GRANTED except as to the portion of the motion to compel further responses to Interrogatory No. 2, which the Court takes under submission. Defendant's counsel to submit proposed order forthwith as to the portion of the motion granted; the Court to issue a written ruling as to the portion of the motion taken under submission.Plaintiffs Counsel E. Hernandez (telephonic) present. Defendants Counsel R. Barsamina, P. Moody present. Court Reporter/CD Number: ECRO. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
78 PROPOSED ORDER RE DEFENDANT KOVACEVICH "5" FARMS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES re 73 MOTION to COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES FRCP 12(b)(6) by Kovacevich 5 Farms. (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
79 ORDER granting in part and denying in part defendant Kovacevich 5 Farms' Motion to Compel Discovery signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 6/1/2007. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 06/04/2007)
80 NOTICE by Kovacevich 5 Farms. OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME (Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
81 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER Stipulation to Extend Court Deadlines by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
82 Joint Stipulation and ORDER to VACATE litigation schedule and reset to later dates: Expert Disclosure 03/15/2008, Supplemental disclosure ddl 04/15/2008, Discovery of non−expert ddl 4/2/2008, Expert Discovery ddl 04/21/2008, Non−Dispositive Motions ddl 5/15/2008, Hearing 06/15/2008, Dispositive Motion ddl 6/26/2008, Heairng 07/30/2008, Pretrial Conference set for 9/5/2008 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger, Jury Trial set for 12/2/2008 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger, signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 9/21/07. (Kusamura, W) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
83 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
84 STIPULATION and ORDER 83 . Further Settlement Conference set for 2/11/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 8 (TAG) in Fresno before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner signed by Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 12/28/2007. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
85 SUBSTITUTION of ATTORNEY − PROPOSED, submitted by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
86 CLERK'S NOTICE to plaintiff's counsel re 85 Substitution of Attorney − Proposed : In the future, to add and/or remove attorneys within your agency, please file a

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 9 of 11

02/12/2008 03/10/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/12/2008 03/13/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008 06/19/2008 06/25/2008
06/26/2008
06/27/2008

Designation of Counsel (this form is available on the court's website, and the event for filing it is in the Other Documents category). Attorney David Offen−Brown has been added to the docket in place of Jonathan Peck. (Hutcheson, C) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
88 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE held on 2/11/2008. Case did not settle. Plaintiffs Counsel E. Hernandez, W. Tamayo present. Intervenor Plaintiffs Counsel R. Olmos, M. Camacho present. Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian, P. Moody present. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
89 NOTICE of Unavailability of Counsel by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
90 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER To Vacate And Reset Expert Deadlines by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
91 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
93 CLERK'S NOTICE of DOCKET CORRECTION: Document 90 , Stipulation and Proposed Order, was filed in error. Please disregard. Document correctly refiled as 92 (Robles, S) (Entered: 03/13/2008)
92 STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 03/13/2008)
94 Joint Stipulation Not to Use Claimant Flor Rivera to Establish Liability Order; ORDER signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/13/2008. (Esteves, C) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
95 Jiont Stipulation to Vacate Litigation Schedule and Reset Expert Deadlines to Later Dates and ORDER signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/14/2008. (Expert Disclosure due 4/8/2008; Supplemental Expert Disclosure due 5/5/2008; Expert Discovery due 5/15/2008.) (Esteves, C) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
96 MINUTE ORDER (Text only) by Deputy Clerk: TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE re Settlement is SET for 6/25/2008 at 09:00 AM in Bakersfield at 1200 Truxtun (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. Counsel to telephone 661−326−6620 on a one−line conference call. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
97 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner: TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE re Settlement held on 6/25/2008. Further Settlement Conference set for 7/11/2008 at 10:00 AM U.S. District Court, Fresno in Courtroom 8 (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. No settlement conference statements required. Plaintiffs Counsel E. Hernandez, T. Olmos, M. Camacho present. Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian, P. Moody present. Court Reporter/CD Number: ECRO. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 06/25/2008)
98 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Kovacevich 5 Farms. Motion Hearing set for 7/30/2008 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Attachments: # 1 Points and Authorities in Support of Second Motion for Summary Adjudication, # 2 Declaration of Stacy R. Lucas in Support of Second Motion for Summary Adjudication, # 3 Exhibit A to Declaration of Stacy R. Lucas, # 4 Exhibit B to Declaration of Stacy R. Lucas, # 5 Exhibit C to Declaration of Stacy R. Lucas, # 6 Proposed Order, # 7 Statement of Undisputed Facts)(Barsamian, Ronald) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
99 MINUTE ORDER: (TEXT ONLY ENTRY) As Judge Wanger hears his civil motions on Mondays at 10:00 a.m., the Motion for Summary Judgment 98 currently set for 7/30/08, has been continued to the next available Monday. Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing RESET to 9/15/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. The Pretrial Conference currently set for 9/5/08 has been RESET for 10/20/2008 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Timken, A) (Entered: 06/27/2008)

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 10 of 11

07/11/2008 08/15/2008 08/18/2008 08/20/2008
08/21/2008 08/26/2008 09/23/2008
10/15/2008 10/17/2008 10/29/2008

100 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner on 7/11/2008 in Fresno, California: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE HELD − CASE DID NOT SETTLE. Plaintiffs Counsel W. Taymayo and E. Hernandez present. Intervenors Counsel T. Olmos and H. Camacho present.Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian and P. Moody present. Court Reporter/CD Number: N/A. (Vasquez, J) (Entered: 07/11/2008)
101 MOTION to VACATE Summary Judgment Hearing and Pretrial and Reset Them For A Different Date by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion Hearing set for 9/15/2008 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
102 MINUTE ORDER: ***TEXT ONLY ENTRY*** The docket indicates that you docketed a proposed order, 101 , however you failed to also send it toJudge Wangers order box so it could actually be signed. Please submit the document in Word or WordPerfect format to owworders@caed.uscourts.gov (Timken, A) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
103 STIPULATION and ORDER GRANTING MOTION to VACATE Hearing on Summary Judgment and Pretrial and Reset Them For A Different Date 101 . Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 98 currently set for 9/15/08 is continued to 10/22/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. The Court also continues the pretrial conference currently set for 10/20/08 to 11/3/2008 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger; order signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 8/19/08. (Rooney, M) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
104 MINUTE ORDER: As Judge Wanger hears civil motions on Mondays at 10:00, the motion for summary judgment set for 10/22 in document 103 has been re−set to 10/20/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Kusamura, W) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
105 MINUTE ORDER (Text only) as approved by Magistrate Judge Goldner: By request of the parties in this case, the court sets a Further Settlement Conference for 9/22/2008 at 01:00 PM, Fresno USDC, Courtroom 8 (TAG) before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
106 MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE conducted on 9/22/2008; CASE SETTLED subject to approval of District Judge Wanger; counsel to complete the settlement and file stipulation re settlement by 10/20/2008; counsel to electronically file stipulation re pending summary judgment motion 98 for District Judge Wanger's consideration, to be filed by 9/24/2008, and lodging a copy to Judge Wanger's electronic mailbox. Plaintiffs Counsel W. Tamayo, E. Hernandez present. Plaintiff−Intervenors Counsel M. Camacho, R. Olmos.Defendants Counsel R. Barsamian, P. Moody present. Court Reporter/CD Number: ECRO. (Leon Guerrero, A) (Entered: 09/23/2008)
107 MOTION to VACATE the hearing for the Defendants pending motion for summary judgment scheduled to be heard on October 20, 2008 and reset it November 24, 2008. by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion Hearing set for 11/24/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 8 (WMW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 10/15/2008)
108 ORDER on JOINT STIPULATION to Vacate the Hearing for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reset it for 30 Days Signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 10/16/2008. Defendants pending motion for summary judgment scheduled to be heard on October 20, 2008 is reset to November 24, 2008. (Arellano, S.) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
109 MINUTE ORDER: ***TEXT ONLY ENTRY*** Pursuant to 106 the minute order from the 9/23/2008 settlement conference indicating this matter has settled and settlement documents were to be filed with the Court by 10/20/2008, a Status Conference has been set for 11/21/2008 at 08:15 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger to advise the Court why settlement documents have not been filed. If settlement documents are filed by 11/14/2008, the status conference will be taken off calendar. If counsel do not file their settlement documents, counsel are to file

Case: 1:06-cv-165 As of: 10/24/2016 05:30 AM PDT 11 of 11

11/14/2008 11/18/2008 11/18/2008
11/19/2008 11/20/2008 11/26/2008 11/26/2008 12/01/2008

a joint status report 3 court days prior to the status conference. The 11/3/2008 pretrial conference is vacated. (Timken, A) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
110 MOTION for EXTENSION 2 Business Day Extension to File Settlement Documents by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion Hearing set for 11/21/2008 at 08:15 AM in Courtroom 8 (WMW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 11/14/2008)
111 ORDER granting motion to extend time to file settlement documents from 11/14/2008 to 11/18/2008. Order signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 11/17/2008. (Timken, A) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
112 MOTION for EXTENSION THE TIME AND RESET IT TO NOVEMBER 26 2008, VACATE THE STATUS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 21, 2008 AND RESET IT TO NOVEMBER 28, 2008 by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion Hearing set for 12/1/2008 at 08:15 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Evangelina Hernandez)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
113 MINUTE ORDER: ***TEXT ONLY ENTRY*** As the deadline to file settlement documents has been extended through 11/18/2008, the Status Conference currently set for 11/21/2008 has been continued to 12/1/2008 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW) before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. The status conference will be vacated upon receipt of the settlement documents. (Timken, A) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
114 MINUTE ORDER: ***TEXT ONLY ENTRY*** As the parties have notified this Court that this matter has settled, the hearings re the motion for summary judgment currently set for 11/24/2008 and the jury trial currently set for 12/2/2008 are vacated. The 12/1/2008 status conference remains set and will be vacated upon receipt of the parties settlement documents. (Timken, A) (Entered: 11/20/2008)
115 PROPOSED ORDER Consent Decree by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice to be Posted on Premises)(Hernandez, Evangelina) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
116 MINUTE ORDER: ***TEXT ONLY ENTRY*** As the parties have submitted their consent decree, the status conference set for 12/1/2008 has been vacated. (Timken, A) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
117 CONSENT DECREE signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 11/26/2008. This Consent Decree shall terminate five (5) years from the date of its entry by the Court, unless the Commission petitions this Court for an extension of the Decree because of non−compliance by K−5. (Arellano, S.) (Entered: 12/01/2008)

 
 1 WILLIAM R. TAMAYO – #084965 (CA) JONATHAN T. PECK -- #12303 (VA)
2 EVANGELINA FIERRO HERNANDEZ -- #168879 (CA) LINDA ORDONIO-DIXON –# 172830 (CA)
3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
4 San Francisco District Office 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500
5 San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: (415) 625-5622
6 Facsimile: (415) 625-5657

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10

11

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ) Civil Action No.

12 COMMISSION,

)

)

13

Plaintiff,

) COMPLAINT

)

14 v.

) Civil Rights - Employment

) Discrimination

15 KOVACEVICH “5" FARMS,

)

A Partnership,

)

16

) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)

17

Defendant.

)

_______________________________________ )

18

NATURE OF THE ACTION

19

This action is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

20

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the

21

basis of sex and to provide appropriate relief to Charging Party Patricia Delgado,

22

Charging Party Myriam Cazarez, Charging Party Flor Rivera, Charging Party Miriam

23

Delgado, Charging Party Terri Salcido and Charging Party Delia Casas (collectively

24

“Charging Parties”) and similarly situated female employees who were adversely

25

affected by such practices. Defendant Kovacevich “5" Farms refused to hire the

26

Charging Parties and similarly situated female employees based on their sex.

27

//

28

//

COMPLAINT FOR DISCRIMINATION

Page 1

1

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2

1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331,

3 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to §706(f)(1) and

4 (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) and

5 (3) (“Title VII”) and §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a.

6

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being

7 committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern

8 District of California, Fresno division.

9

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

10

3. This action is appropriate for assignment to Fresno because some of the

11 unlawful employment practices alleged were and are being committed within Kern

12 County, the employment record relevant to the unlawful practices are located in Kern

13 County, and because Defendant’s principal place of business is in Kern County.

14

PARTIES

15

4. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

16 (“Commission”) is the agency of the United States of America charged with the

17 administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized

18 to bring this action by §706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, §2000-e(f)(1) and (3).

19

5. Defendant Kovacevich “5" Farms is a California partnership, doing

20 business in the State of California, in the County of Kern, and has continuously had at

21 least 15 employees.

22

6. At all relevant times, Defendant Kovacevich “5" Farms has continuously

23 been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce, within the meaning of

24 Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000-e(b), (g) and (h).

25

7. At all relevant times, Defendant Kovacevich “5" Farms was the sole

26 employer of Charging Parties for purposes of Title VII liability.

27 //

28 //

COMPLAINT FOR DISCRIMINATION

Page 2

1

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

2

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

3

Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act : Sex Discrimination

4

8. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the Charging

5 Parties filed their charge with Plaintiff Commission, alleging violations of Title VII by

6 Defendants. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been

7 fulfilled.

8

9. Since at least January of 1998, Defendant have engaged in unlawful

9 practices of sex discrimination, in violation §703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), by

10 subjecting refusing to hire the Charging Parties and similarly situated female employees

11 based on their sex.

12

10. The effect of the actions complained of in Paragraph 9 above has been to

13 deprive the Charging Parties and similarly situated female employees of equal

14 employment opportunities and has otherwise adversely affected their status as

15 employees because of their sex.

16

11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above

17 were intentional.

18

12. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above

19 were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of

20 the Charging Parties and similarly situated female employees.

21

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

22

Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:

23

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors,

24 assigns, and all persons acting in concert or participation with Defendant, from

25 engaging in discrimination against its employees, including the failure to hire females

26 because of their sex.

27

B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and

28 programs which prohibit discrimination based on sex and which serve to eradicate the

COMPLAINT FOR DISCRIMINATION

Page 3

1 effects of their unlawful employment practices.

2

C. Order Defendant to make whole the Charging Parties and similarly

3 situated female employees by providing appropriate back pay and benefits with

4 prejudgment interest, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of

5 their unlawful employment practices, including, but not limited to, reinstatement

6 and/or front pay and other appropriate relief to be determined at trial.

7

D. Order Defendant to make whole the Charging Parties and similarly

8 situated female employees harmed by providing compensation for past and future

9 pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices complained of

10 above, including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses such as medical care

11 necessitated by Defendants’ unlawful conduct, in amounts to be determined at trial.

12

E. Order Defendant to make whole the Charging Parties and similarly

13 situated female employees harmed by providing compensation for past and future

14 nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of above,

15 including, but not limited to, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of

16 enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.

17

F. Order Defendant to pay the Charging Parties and similarly situated

18 female employees harmed by Defendant by providing punitive damages for the

19 malicious and reckless conduct described above, in amounts to be determined at trial.

20

G. Grant such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper in the

21 public interest.

22

H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

23

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

24

25

The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

26

James L. Lee

27

Deputy General Counsel

28

Gwendolyn Young Reams

Associate General Counsel

COMPLAINT FOR DISCRIMINATION

Page 4

1 2 3 4
Date: February 13, 2006 5 6 7
Date: February 13, 2006 8 9 10 Date: February 13, 2006 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
COMPLAINT FOR DISCRIMINATION

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20507 __/s/ William R. Tamayo____________ WILLIAM R. TAMAYO Regional Attorney
__/s/ Jonathan T. Peck __________ JONATHAN T. PECK Supervisory Trial Attorney _/s/ Evangelina Fierro Hernandez_______ EVANGELINA FIERRO HERNANDEZ Senior Trial Attorney
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission San Francisco District Office 350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, California 94105
Page 5