Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 1 Filed 07/08/11 Page 1 of 118

FILED
2011 Jul-08 PM 01:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; AIDS ACTION COALITION; HUNTSVILLE INTERNATIONAL HELP CENTER; INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA; ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, INC.; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS UNITED; UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1657; DREAMACTIVIST.ORG; GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES; BOAT PEOPLE SOS; MATT WEBSTER; MARIA D. CEJA ZAMORA; PAMELA LONG; JUAN PABLO BLACK ROMERO; CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU; ELLIN JIMMERSON; ROBERT BARBER; DANIEL UPTON; JEFFREY ALLEN BECK; MICHELLE CUMMINGS; ESAYAS HAILE; FISEHA TESFAMARIAM; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6; JOHN DOE #1, a minor, by his legal guardian MATT WEBSTER; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5; and JOHN DOE #6,

Civil Action File No.
_____________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; LUTHER STRANGE, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alabama; JOSEPH B.
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MORTON, in his official capacity as State Superintendent of Education; FREIDA HILL, in her official capacity as Chancellor of Postsecondary Education; E. CASEY WARDYNSKI, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System; JAMIE BLAIR, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System; RANDY FULLER, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System; CHARLES D. WARREN, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System; BARBARA W. THOMPSON, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System; JEFFERY E. LANGHAM, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System; and ROBERT L. BROUSSARD, in his official capacity as District Attorney for Madison County,
Defendants.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This action challenges Alabama’s comprehensive immigration law,
House Bill 56 (“HB 56”), on multiple constitutional grounds and seeks injunctive
and declaratory relief to prevent serious harm that Plaintiffs and countless fellow
Alabamians will suffer if the law goes into effect. Governor Robert Bentley touted
HB 56 as “the strongest immigration bill in the country” and a co-sponsor of the
bill boasted that it regulates “every aspect of a person’s life.” Indeed, HB 56 is a
state immigration law of unprecedented reach—going well beyond recent state
immigration laws in Arizona, Utah, Indiana, and Georgia, which themselves have 2

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been suspended in whole or in part by the federal courts. HB 56 is reminiscent of the worst aspects of Alabama’s history in its pervasive and systematic targeting of a class of persons through punitive state laws that seek to render every aspect of daily life more difficult and less equal.
2. Among other constitutional defects, HB 56 is preempted in its entirety because it encroaches on exclusively federal immigration authority and because it conflicts with federal law in multiple ways.
3. In addition, HB 56 will subject Alabamians—including countless U.S. citizens and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government to remain in the United States—to unlawful interrogations, searches, seizures, and arrests, and will result in racial profiling. See Secs. 12 & 18. This is because HB 56 mandates law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest when they have “reasonable suspicion” that the individual lacks immigration status. Individuals who may be perceived as “foreign” by state or local law enforcement agents will be in constant jeopardy of harassment and unlawfully prolonged detention and arrest by state law enforcement officers operating under HB 56’s new immigration enforcement mandates. And all Alabamians will be required to carry state-approved identity documentation in order to prevent lengthy investigations as to their status. These provisions violate the Fourth Amendment.
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4. HB 56 will deter Alabamian children in immigrant families— including countless U.S. citizens and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government to remain in the United States—from enrolling in public primary and secondary education. See Sec. 28. HB 56 will also bar numerous individuals from attending any public college or university in Alabama. See Sec. 8. These provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause.
5. HB 56 will subject Alabamians—including countless U.S. citizens and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government to remain in the United States—to criminal penalties and incarceration for innocent daily activities, such as giving a ride to a neighbor, hiring a day laborer, or renting a room to a friend. See Secs. 11 & 13. HB 56 also creates an Alabama-specific alien registration scheme and makes it a state crime simply to be in the State of Alabama without lawful status. See Sec. 10. These new state criminal provisions are preempted. And in criminalizing the solicitation of work, HB 56 imposes a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the First Amendment.
6. HB 56 will close the courthouse doors to Alabamians—including countless U.S. citizens and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government to remain in the United States—based on their immigration status or the immigration status of those they contract with, thereby depriving such individuals of redress to which they are legally entitled. See Sec. 27. These
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provisions violate the Due Process Clause and the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art I, § 10.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of Plaintiffs’ civil rights and to secure equitable or other relief for the violation of those rights. 8. This Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 57. 9. Venue is proper in this District and Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendants are sued in their official capacity. Each Defendant resides within the State of Alabama and two Defendants reside within this Division.
PARTIES Organizational Plaintiffs 10. Plaintiff Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (“HICA”) is a nonprofit membership organization formed to facilitate the social, civic, and economic integration of Hispanics into Alabama as well as to help Alabamians understand the diverse Latino culture. HICA was founded in 1999 and has grown significantly since that time. Today, HICA provides a wide range of services, including court
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advocacy for immigrant survivors of domestic violence, a 24/7 Spanish hotline for immigrant victims of crime, immigration legal services, financial literacy, workforce development, volunteer income tax assistance, English and civics classes, advocacy, community education, and leadership development and training to the host community.
11. HICA has over 50 formal members and provides services to more than 15,000 constituents in any given year. HICA does not inquire into the immigration status of its members or constituents, but it is aware that some of its members and constituents lack immigration status, and some are the parents of children born abroad.
12. If HB 56 is implemented, HICA will be at risk of criminal prosecution for violations of state-created criminal immigration offenses, including encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state. HICA provides several services, including English classes, immigration legal assistance, and tax assistance, for the community without regard to whether individuals are undocumented and with knowledge that some of the constituents who receive these services are undocumented. Additionally, HICA periodically transports its constituents, some of whom it has reason to believe are undocumented, to facilitate their participation in hearings or other community trainings or events.
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13. HICA will also suffer directly if HB 56 is implemented because HICA is funded by a federal grant to help immigrants apply for T and U visas, which are special visas available to certain immigrant crime victims who assist law enforcement officials in the prosecution of crime. A key part of this program is encouraging immigrant crime victims to assist law enforcement officials in the prosecution of crime. But if HB 56 takes effect, immigrant victims and witnesses (and victims and witnesses related to immigrants) will be deterred from reporting crimes to law enforcement, making it virtually impossible for HICA to meet this program objective.
14. Plaintiff AIDS Action Coalition (AAC) was established in 1986 as a non-profit agency providing critically needed health care, education, psycho-social services, and emergency financial assistance to men, women and children infected or affected by HIV/AIDS. AAC is based in Huntsville, Alabama and serves twelve counties in North Alabama.
15. Plaintiff AAC provides a broad range of direct services, ranging from screening for sexually transmitted diseases and primary medical care to transportation and housing assistance. AAC currently serves more than 550 clients, many of them residents of Madison County.
16. Due to the critical need to control the spread of infectious disease and because human suffering does not disappear with the expiration of a visa, AAC
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provides services to its clients without regard to their immigration status. AAC necessarily learns its clients’ immigration statuses in the course of registering for prescription drug assistance programs. Seventeen of AAC’s current clients are undocumented immigrants. AAC does not now, nor does it intend to, deny care or services to these clients.
17. Among the services AAC provides to all clients, including undocumented immigrants, are health care provided on AAC premises; transportation to medical appointments in AAC vehicles by AAC staff; and financial assistance for the procurement of rental housing. HB 56 would criminalize AAC’s services to unlawful immigrants because it prohibits harboring these patients in the AAC buildings, transporting these patients to and from medical appointments, and “conspiring” to procure rental housing for them. If HB 56 goes into effect, these activities in which AAC regularly engages will be criminal.
18. Preventative HIV education is among the central objectives and purposes of AAC. AAC employs a Spanish-speaking outreach worker specifically to conduct preventive education in the immigrant community. Since the passage of HB 56, approximately half of the Spanish-speaking outreach worker’s time has been spent answering questions about the new law, rather than addressing matters related to health services and HIV education. The community’s demand for
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information has overwhelmed the Spanish-speaking outreach worker, requiring a diversion of resources to address HB 56. As such, HB 56 has frustrated AAC’s Education and Outreach program in the Spanish-speaking community.
19. Since the passage of HB 56, numerous Hispanic clients have expressed fear of traveling to AAC’s clinics. AAC expects that the Hispanic community will be much more reluctant to interact with AAC staff conducting HIV testing in their communities if HB 56 is implemented. The implementation of HB 56 will frustrate AAC’s efforts to identify new infections in that community and stop the spread of HIV.
20. Plaintiff Huntsville International Help Center (“HIHC”) is a volunteer-based organization in Huntsville, Alabama. HIHC provides services to the Latino community in need in Huntsville, including prayer and bible study groups; support groups for women who are victims of domestic violence; interpretation and translation services for individuals who have medical or legal appointments or who need to go to a domestic violence shelter; Know Your Rights trainings; and health fairs in churches. HIHC staff regularly drive individuals, including undocumented individuals, to appointments of various types around Huntsville and will continue to do so if HB 56 is implemented. HIHC provides these services without regard to immigration status and is aware that a large share of its constituents is undocumented. This would subject HIHC and its staff to
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criminal prosecution under the law for transporting undocumented immigrants or encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state.
21. HB 56 has adversely impacted HIHC because it has deterred many of HIHC’s all-volunteer staff from working with undocumented immigrants. This directly threatens HIHC’s ability to continue its work. Moreover, since the passage of HB 56, HIHC has had great difficulty securing space to hold its meetings and events. Churches and others who normally would provide meeting space are now afraid of being affiliated with the Latino community, which they believe is generally undocumented.
22. Plaintiff Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama (“ITAA”) is a professional membership organization of interpreters and translators, and others who aspire to those careers in the state of Alabama. ITAA has members across the state, including in Huntsville, who provide translation and interpretation in a variety of foreign languages. ITAA’s mission is to promote, advance, and create industry standards for interpreters and translators; to educate the community on the importance of using qualified interpreters; to support continuing education opportunities for professional interpreters and translators; and to further the interests of those employed in or interested in these professions.
23. One of ITAA’s current organizational priorities is to assist its members in obtaining court certification to act as translators and/or interpreters.
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To promote this organizational priority, ITAA conducts trainings to help its members prepare for the certification examination. One such training was held in Birmingham and another is planned for Huntsville. Since HB 56 passed, however, ITAA has had to delay planning such trainings in order to respond to its members’ concerns and requests for information on the new law and its consequences for them. ITAA’s most recent meeting should have involved planning for interpreter and translator trainings, but instead focused exclusively on HB 56 and what it will mean for ITAA’s work and its members. This has undermined the ability of ITAA to move ahead with other organizational priorities such as professionalizing the practice of interpretation and translation across the state, and some members have questioned if they can continue to provide interpretation and translation services if HB 56 goes into effect.
24. In addition, HB 56’s possible implementation poses a direct threat of harm to ITAA’s members. Some ITAA members provide transportation for their clients to medical appointments or to courts where their clients need interpretation or translation assistance. If HB 56 is implemented, these ITAA members risk criminal prosecution for harboring or assisting undocumented immigrants by transporting them to these appointments or otherwise providing assistance to them.
25. In addition, if HB 56 were to take effect, ITAA members would not be able to enforce contracts with undocumented clients because HB 56 bars
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enforcement of a contract in court if one of the contracting parties had direct or constructive knowledge that one of the parties was an alien who was unlawfully present in the United States. In those circumstances ITAA members would have no legal recourse even if they were not paid for their work.
26. Finally, ITAA members who regularly provide interpretation in courts could be forced to disclose information about their client’s immigration status. That would undermine their professional duties to provide competent and confidential services, but failure to disclose clients’ confidential immigration information could expose ITAA members to monetary damages and civil lawsuits.
27. Some ITAA members also fear that they will lose clients if HB 56 takes effect because some immigrants will be afraid to access the courts if officers of the court are mandated to report their immigration status to federal officials.
28. Plaintiff Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. (“Appleseed”) is a non-profit public interest advocacy organization that was founded in 1999. Its mission is to identify root causes of injustice and inequality in Alabama and to develop and advocate for solutions that will improve the lives of all Alabamians. To fulfill its mission, Appleseed undertakes network/coalition organizing and development, research, education, advocacy, and policy development. Appleseed’s current Immigration Policy Project was started in 2007 and is dedicated to promoting policies that advance fundamental fairness, due
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process, and respect for the human rights of new arrivals to the state, and opposing anti-immigrant policies and laws.
29. HB 56’s passage has already substantially diverted scarce organizational resources away from Appleseed’s immigrant policy work. For example, since the passage of HB 56, Appleseed has been inundated with calls from the community about the law and its impact. In addition, since HB 56’s passage, virtually any community event or training that Appleseed puts on as part of its immigrant policy or immigrant welcoming projects turns into a forum on HB 56 and its impact on the community, which also takes time away from existing priorities for its work with immigrant populations in Alabama, including investigation of working conditions in Alabama’s poultry plants. Before the passage of HB 56, interviews with poultry workers (many of whom are immigrants) under this project were conducted in approximately 45 minutes. Since HB 56 passed, however, staff members have had to spend an additional 20 to 30 minutes with each interviewee to allay concerns about HB 56.
30. Plaintiff Appleseed will also be subject to criminal prosecution under Sections 13 and 25 of HB 56 because it has arranged transportation for immigrants to attend rallies, sometimes through its Welcoming Alabama program, which encourages Alabamians to welcome immigrants and support their integration into local communities. All these activities could be construed as encouraging
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undocumented immigrants to remain in the state. For this reason, if HB 56 is implemented Appleseed would have to substantially curtail or stop its immigrant policy, immigrant welcoming, and poultry plant investigation work in order to avoid criminal liability.
31. Plaintiff Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) is one of the largest labor organizations in the world, representing 2.2 million men and women who work primarily in the public sector and in the janitorial, health services, long-term care, and security industries. Many of SEIU’s members are recent immigrants to the United States and many of its members come from racial minority groups. SEIU has long called for and worked toward comprehensive reform of U.S. immigration laws. Another priority for SEIU is fighting discrimination against minorities, women, and other groups in the workplace and the broader community.
32. Plaintiff Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United (“Joint Board”) is a labor union and an affiliate of Plaintiff SEIU. Members of the Joint Board are also members of SEIU. The Joint Board represents approximately 1,105 members in Alabama. They have a significant number of members in Huntsville. Approximately 10 percent of the Joint Board’s Alabama membership is Latino.
33. The primary mission of the Joint Board is to organize, represent, and empower employees in Alabama. In addition, the Joint Board works in partnership
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with SEIU and other groups to combat discrimination and mobilize for immigration reform at the national level.
34. The implementation of HB 56 will have a severe impact on the organizational mission of SEIU and the Joint Board. Some of their Latino members or their families have already been subjected to stops by local law enforcement where they have been asked to produce proof of immigration status. SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because their minority members will be even more likely to be stopped, detained, arrested, and questioned by state and local police. This will cause hardship for members of SEIU and the Joint Board. In addition, SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because their members and potential members, regardless of nationality and immigration status, will refrain from exercising their rights to attend rallies, demonstrations, and union meetings or to engage in leafleting or other traditional labor activities because of the possibility of being stopped by police under HB 56. This will significantly affect the ability of SEIU and the Joint Board to protect their existing members. Finally, HB 56 has created a fear of government officials and has already led to reluctance on the part of members of this community to join the union and to take the perceived risk of supporting new organizing in unorganized workplaces where the National Labor Relations Board is often involved.
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35. Members already have told the Joint Board that they have faced additional police scrutiny and questioning since HB 56 was passed. They believe that this additional police scrutiny was based solely on their ethnic appearance and/or English speaking ability. This discriminatory treatment by law enforcement will significantly impede the ability of the Joint Board and SEIU to protect their current members and to organize new members. Some members of SEIU and the Joint Board lack the identity documents approved by HB 56 to establish a presumption of lawful status or do not regularly carry these documents when traveling through the state, and are therefore at risk of lengthy detention and investigation under the new law.
36. SEIU and the Joint Board will also be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because employers in the state will refrain from hiring members and potential members of the Joint Board that they believe look or sound “foreign” based on a fear that they will be subject to increased liability under HB 56. This will have a serious impact on the ability of SEIU and the Joint Board to recruit new members.
37. In addition, SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 takes effect because of the provision criminalizing the transporting of undocumented immigrants. This provision will have a chilling effect on the Joint Board’s efforts to give rides to people attending union meetings and other events. The Joint Board
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will have a more difficult time organizing transportation to these key union activities because people will be afraid to associate with someone whose racial/ethnic appearance will increase the risk that the driver will be stopped for a minor traffic offense, leading to further police scrutiny and possible criminal prosecution under the law.
38. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, the Joint Board will need to spend significant new time educating members and potential members about the law. This will divert the Joint Board’s resources from other core organizational priorities such as organizing new members. The Joint Board joins this lawsuit to preserve its ability to organize new members and to protect the rights and interests of its members and prospective members.
39. Finally, Joint Board members would be harmed if HB 56 takes effect because of its provision barring enforcement of certain contracts. If implemented, this provision would prohibit Joint Board members from enforcing a broad range of contracts from insurance contracts, to marriage contracts, to settlement agreements. In addition, the Joint Board itself could be prohibited from enforcing a wide range of contracts on behalf of its members such as grievance settlements and contractually mandated payments and, as a result, would risk having complaints filed against it with the National Labor Relations Board for failure to properly represent its members.
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40. Plaintiff United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (“UFCW International”) represents more than 1.3 million workers across the United States in various industries, including poultry and meat packing and other food processing; supermarket and other retail; and hospitals, nursing homes, and other healthcare. All workers represented by local unions of the UFCW are also represented by UFCW International.
41. Plaintiff United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657 (“UFCW Local 1657”) is a local union of UFCW International that represents more than 3600 workers in various industries, including catfish processing, nursing homes, retail food markets, non-food retail, and military bases in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi. In these industries, UFCW-represented workers are cashiers, stockers, and pharmacy technicians, licensed practical nurses, certified nursing assistants, and housekeeping employees, barbers and beauticians, production workers, restaurant workers, and auto mechanics.
42. UFCW Local 1657 represents workers who comprise a wide range of races and ethnicities, with varying degrees of English proficiency. Nearly five percent of the workers represented by Local 1657 are of Latino heritage. In addition, Local 1657 represents African American, Caucasian, and Asian workers. Both UFCW International and Local 1657 (the “UFCW Unions”) have a manifest
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interest in advocating and maintaining discrimination-free workplaces and communities.
43. The UFCW Unions’ missions are to better the terms and conditions of employment of all workers they represent and thereby better the lives of their families and communities. The UFCW Unions work to achieve these objectives through collective bargaining, and representation of existing bargaining unit employees as well as by organizing new employees. These core activities require freedom of association and freedom of speech and communication between the unions and the employees they represent and organize to represent, activities protected by the U.S. Constitution and various federal labor laws. The UFCW Unions also engage in speech, assembly, and petition activities protected by the Constitution and labor laws in conveying their message throughout the communities which surround represented worksites and worksites that the Unions endeavor to organize. These First Amendment speech, assembly, and petition activities include meetings with other employees, the employer, and community members, demonstrations, and petitioning local, state, and national political representatives in the various communities where employees work and reside.
44. If the HB 56 is allowed to go into effect, it will impose direct harm to the UFCW Unions’ core missions and representational obligations by restricting their ability to effectively advocate on behalf of the employees they represent and
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endeavor to represent; subjecting members to unlawful questioning, arrest, and detention by state and local law enforcement officers; and chilling freedom of assembly of UFCW-represented workers by deterring their attendance and participation in UFCW activities. Specifically, the UFCW Unions fear that HB 56, including the provision that criminalizes the transportation of undocumented immigrants, will deter employees from attending UFCW activities, from joining in concerted activities with other employees to protect their labor rights, and from soliciting other employees to join the Unions for fear that when engaging in such activities they will be stopped and questioned because they appear to be Latino or are in the company of workers who appear to be Latino.
45. Additionally, as part of their core activities, the UFCW Unions provide lawyers to educate workers about their rights under federal and state employment and labor laws. If HB 56 is implemented, the UFCW Unions will need to divert these resources towards educating members and potential members about the law, to the detriment of this core organizational function. Moreover, they fear that lawyers who perform this educational function will feel pressured by HB 56’s provisions to report employees who appear to be Latino to enforcement authorities.
46. Plaintiff DreamActivist.org (“DreamActivist”) is a multi-cultural, migrant-led membership organization dedicated to passing the federal DREAM
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Act. The DREAM Act is a bipartisan congressional bill that would address the situation of young students brought to the United States as children by providing a path to legal status for students who graduate from high school, obtain a GED, enroll in college, or serve in the armed forces. DreamActivist is comprised of students who would be eligible for relief if the DREAM Act passes. DreamActivist has members all over the country, including in Alabama.
47. Some of DreamActivist’s Alabama members lack a federal immigration or nonimmigrant visa and would not be able to obtain the identity documents specified by HB 56, such as a driver’s license. If HB 56 is implemented, these members will be subject to interrogation and detention by law enforcement officers because they will be unable to provide a document proving lawful status in the United States.
48. In addition, if HB 56 takes effect, members of DreamActivist will be prohibited from attending public post-secondary institutions in Alabama because they do not have lawful permanent residence or a nonimmigrant visa. As a result, these members will be unable to pursue their educational goals and also will be unable to achieve one of the key pieces of DREAM Act eligibility by enrolling in post-secondary school.
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49. If HB 56 is implemented, many DreamActivist members will also be at risk of criminal prosecution under various provisions of the law creating new state crimes for seeking work or for lacking a federal alien registration document.
50. In addition, younger members will be afraid to enroll in public elementary or secondary school because they will have to disclose their or their parents’ immigration status in order to enroll.
51. Finally, the organization itself will suffer direct harm if HB 56 is implemented because its members will leave the state, fearing prosecution under the law; those members who remain will be too afraid to attend DreamActivist events, fearing that they will be identified as undocumented immigrants by local law enforcement officials who may be present at or near the events.
52. Plaintiff Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”) is a multi-faith, multi-racial, multi-member organization that provides emergency assistance to low-income families in need while working on public policies that can better the quality of life for all. GBM counts Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faith communities among its members, including the Roman Catholic Diocese of Birmingham and the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church, as well as individual temples, churches, and mosques.
53. GBM’s low-income clients include Latino, African, and other immigrant families, including undocumented individuals and school-age children.
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GBM has three main program areas: Economic Justice, Direct Services, and Faith & Community. Its Direct Services program provides services in the form of food, clothing, and financial assistance to immigrant and other communities based only on their level of need.
54. In its Direct Services program, GBM serves approximately 3,000 families per year, which averages 7,000 people, by providing free non-perishable foods and fresh vegetables and fruits; free clothes, including clothes for school-age children; and financial support in the form of rental payments, utility bill payments, bus passes, and prescription drug payments. GBM does not have the need or capacity to ask for immigration status from its clients before offering them services. Under HB 56, GBM fears that this policy may lead them to be prosecuted for encouraging undocumented immigrants to stay in Alabama or for aiding in harboring and transporting them due to paying for their rent, utilities, and bus passes.
55. Additionally, GBM’s members have expressed this fear of prosecution since they often directly provide transportation to undocumented members of their congregations for vacation Bible school for school-age children and for healthcare and childcare.
56. Undocumented individuals from GBM congregations have also expressed concern that their children may not be able to attend school if they have
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to register with their child’s public school under HB 56. These members fear that their immigration status will be sent to the federal government and lead them to being detained and possibly deported under HB 56.
57. GBM is also concerned that it will soon have to divert organizational and financial resources because immigrants from their congregations are already leaving Alabama due to HB 56. GBM relies on members for volunteers, and if its congregations no longer have as many members, GBM will have to decrease the number of services it provides due to the decreasing volunteer base that GBM draws from.
58. Because GBM is publicly opposed to HB 56, it is likely that member congregations that do not agree with GBM will limit, or cease, their support of GBM, which would also lead to a diversion of resources. In the past, GBM has had to divert resources when it has taken controversial positions that led to various member congregations withdrawing or reducing their support for GBM.
59. Plaintiff Boat People SOS (“BPSOS”) is a national non-profit Vietnamese-American community-based organization with the mission to “empower, organize, and equip Vietnamese individuals and communities in their pursuit of liberty and dignity.” Formed in 1980 to assist Vietnamese refugees and immigrants who were fleeing Vietnam, BPSOS has evolved from performing rescue at sea operations, to asylum work in refugee camps, to community
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empowerment work through its network of 11 offices across the United States and four offices in Asia. BPSOS fulfills its mission through direct services, advocacy, community organizing and development, research, and media, aimed at addressing the intertwining and compounding effects of unmet needs on refugee and immigrant families and communities.
60. BPSOS has a robust presence serving isolated, limited English proficient communities along the Gulf Coast, including maintaining an office in Bayou La Batre, Alabama. BPSOS established emergency relief in the Gulf Coast immediately after Hurricane Katrina and set up branch offices shortly thereafter to provide long-term recovery case management. Today, BPSOS’s services in the Gulf Coast equip Vietnamese community members with the tools and skills they need to access services, benefits and opportunities as well as to build community infrastructure for self-help and self-sufficiency.
61. The implementation of HB 56 will have a serious impact on BPSOS’s work with the Vietnamese- and other Southeast Asian-American communities in Alabama. BPSOS’s small staff in Bayou La Batre will need to spend significant time educating community members about the law, answering questions, and calming people’s fears about HB 56. Staff will need to be trained on HB 56 so they can accurately convey information to the community. This will divert
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BPSOS’s limited resources from their core organizational priorities of direct services, community development, and organizing.
Individual Plaintiffs 62. Plaintiff Matt Webster was born in Alabama, where he has lived most of his life. He has always considered himself a Republican politically and is an engineer by training. 63. He and his wife decided that they would like to adopt a child, to make life better for someone who needed a supportive and loving environment. He talked to a friend about possibly adopting children from Mexico, and learned that his friend knew of two young boys in the United States whose mother had passed away, and who were in need of a stable home. Plaintiff Webster and his wife met the children several times, and grew to love them as their own sons. 64. Plaintiff Webster and his wife obtained guardianship over the children, and are currently in the process of finalizing adoption paperwork. However, the two children do not have current federal immigration status, and Plaintiff Webster and his wife will not be able to obtain lawful status for the children until two years after the adoption process has been completed. 65. If HB 56 goes into effect, Plaintiff Webster fears how the law will affect the many Hispanics living in Alabama, and particularly how it will affect his two sons, whom the law criminalizes until he can petition for their federal
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immigration status. In the interim, neither child can obtain an alien registration document or even a state identification card. If HB 56 goes into effect, neither of Plaintiff Webster’s sons can attend any public college in Alabama.
66. Plaintiff Webster also fears what will happen to his children at school when he is required to enroll them and disclose their status.
67. Furthermore, Plaintiff Webster’s own actions in adopting the children, providing for them, and transporting them, would be illegal under HB 56. Plaintiff Webster believes immigration reform is necessary, but that this needs to happen at the federal level, and laws like HB 56 are counterproductive and incredibly punitive to immigrants in Alabama.
68. Plaintiff Maria D. Ceja Zamora is originally from Mexico and has been a resident of Athens, Alabama for over 17 years. Plaintiff Zamora is presently waiting for a visa to become available to her for permanent residence through her naturalized U.S. citizen mother, and she is permitted to remain in the United States under the federal government’s Family Unity Program.
69. Under the program, Plaintiff Zamora is granted voluntary departure and work authorization, with an employment authorization document (“EAD”), for two-year periods. She is able to extend the benefits under the program every two years until a visa becomes available, which she has done since 1988.
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70. Plaintiff Zamora had a valid Alabama driver’s license that recently expired. When she attempted to renew her driver’s license, she presented her EAD and Social Security number as she has done before, but was told by a state official that she was ineligible for an Alabama driver's license. If HB 56 is implemented and Plaintiff Zamora is stopped by police without a valid driver’s license, she fears that they will not understand that the federal immigration agency is aware of her presence in the country and that she is permitted to remain in the United States.
71. If HB 56 is implemented, she also fears racial profiling because of her Latina appearance, and if she is stopped by police, she fears she will be subjected to unlawful interrogation and detention since she is without a valid driver's license. If HB 56 takes effect, Plaintiff Zamora will limit her travel through the state in order to reduce the chance of being stopped, interrogated, and detained by local law enforcement.
72. Plaintiff Pamela Long, a native of Montgomery, Alabama, is an Associate Professor at Auburn University Montgomery and a lay minister in the Hispanic Ministry for the Montgomery-area Episcopal churches. The Hispanic Ministry is a project of the eight Montgomery-area Episcopal churches to provide outreach and spiritual support to meet the needs of immigrants and Latinos in Montgomery.
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73. As a part of her ministry, Plaintiff Long often serves as an interpreter in court proceedings, as well as at medical appointments for members of the community. Plaintiff Long also assists English-language learners with government applications.
74. Plaintiff Long also transports Latino community members to and from church, to doctor’s appointments, to court appearances, or other places as a part of her ministry.
75. Plaintiff Long does not ask the immigration status of people she is ministering to or providing assistance to, but they often disclose this information to her. A considerable number of the individuals she has ministered to over the years are undocumented immigrants. She will continue to provide rides, interpretation, and other support to undocumented members as a part of her faith work if HB 56 is implemented.
76. Plaintiff Long is concerned that HB 56 will require her to disclose information that she receives on individual’s immigration status when she interprets for them in court proceedings.
77. If HB 56 is implemented, Long and the undocumented immigrants whom she serves as a part of her ministry will be subject to criminal prosecution. Plaintiff Long will, however, continue to engage in these activities because doing her ministry work is central to her religious beliefs and part of what she believes it
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means to act in a humane and Christian manner. She refuses to be forced to act against her Christian morals and religious beliefs.
78. Plaintiff Juan Pablo Black Romero is an Alabama resident who is originally from Ecuador. He came to the United States on an F-1 student visa in 2003. Plaintiff Romero is currently a graduate student at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. He completed his master’s degree in Political Science in 2007 and is currently working on his Ph.D. in Political Theory.
79. As an F-1 visa holder, Plaintiff Romero is allowed to study in the United States and to get practical work experience (Optional Practical Training or “OPT”) directly related to his field of study. He must apply for an OPT after the completion of the requirements of his Ph.D. program but before graduation. He therefore must apply for an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”) from the U.S. immigration service, which can take up to three months to receive. Federal authorities do not forbid an applicant for an EAD to apply for jobs prior to receiving the EAD. Plaintiff Romero will begin searching for employment in Alabama for his OPT so that he may start it as soon as he receives his EAD from federal authorities. If HB 56 is implemented, however, Plaintiff Romero will be subject to criminal prosecution for being an “unauthorized alien” who applies for or solicits work.
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80. Plaintiff Christopher Barton Thau (“Pastor Thau”) is a U.S. citizen and has lived in Pelham, Alabama since 1996. He has a wife who is a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”), and a six-year-old child who is attending Alabama public schools.
81. Pastor Thau has been an Associate Pastor of the Pleasant Hill United Methodist Church for two years. Pleasant Hill Church is located in Bessemer, Alabama, and was founded in 1832. Pastor Thau is responsible for the Spanishspeaking bilingual congregation, which consists of mostly Latino members, many of whom do not have any immigration status.
82. In addition to facilitating spiritual growth, Pastor Thau provides the congregation with food assistance, work for members, monetary assistance, counseling, support with Medicaid applications, and any other social services that members may need. While providing these services, he often transports members to and from doctors’ offices, work assignments, benefits appointments, and other appointments.
83. Pastor Thau is concerned that in the course of his work as a Pastor, he could be personally fined or put in jail for transporting his members to various appointments, or for providing one of the many services he provides his congregants.
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84. He also fears that he would be prosecuted for marrying people who are undocumented under the provision in HB 56 that criminalizes individuals for encouraging or facilitating undocumented immigrants to stay in Alabama.
85. Pastor Thau has also heard members of his congregation say they fear going out of their house to go to Church or to get groceries after the passage of HB 56. Additionally, they have said that they can no longer trust the police in case they are victims of crimes.
86. Pastor Thau’s wife, who was undocumented until she became an LPR recently, has an extended family that includes undocumented persons. Often, this family stays with the Pastor and his wife at their house in Pelham. Pastor Thau fears that under HB 56 he could be prosecuted for allowing his undocumented family members to stay with him in his house.
87. Pastor Thau is also afraid that because his wife was not born in the United States, he will have to show documents proving both his and his wife’s immigration status to enroll his child in grade school. Because he feels HB 56 is an invasion of privacy and is unfair to his family and to Latinos generally, Pastor Thau has stated he will not provide proof of immigration status to enroll his child in the upcoming school year. Additionally, Pastor Thau is concerned that schools may cut back on student services out of fear that they would be breaking the law
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by hosting certain programs, which further affects his child because he will no longer have access to these programs if they are cut due to HB 56.
88. Plaintiff Ellin Jimmerson was born in Atmore, Alabama. She lived in Birmingham during her high school and college years, and currently lives in Huntsville, Alabama.
89. Plaintiff Jimmerson was ordained to the gospel ministry by Weatherly Heights Baptist Church in Huntsville. She is Minister to the Community at Weatherly Heights Baptist Church. Her ministry includes making a documentary film about the root causes of unlawful immigration, and in other ways serving the needs of the immigrant community in Huntsville, including those immigrants without lawful status.
90. As a part of her ministry, Plaintiff Jimmerson performs marriages, preaches at various events, and provides spiritual counseling and other services and assistance. Plaintiff Jimmerson routinely provides these services to undocumented immigrants and will continue to do so if HB 56 is implemented. This will put her at risk for criminal prosecution under HB 56’s provisions for encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state. Plaintiff Jimmerson believes that if implemented, HB 56 will interfere with her ability to associate with communities in need by criminalizing basic activities of her religious ministry.
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91. Plaintiff Robert Barber is a resident of Birmingham, Alabama and an active member of the Alabama state bar. He practices law primarily in the areas of employment law, including wage and hour law, as well as immigration and family law matters and general civil litigation. A core part of his practice involves providing for the legal needs of the Latino community in Birmingham. Plaintiff Barber estimates that approximately 95 percent of his Latino clients are currently undocumented. Plaintiff Barber represents these undocumented individuals in applications to regularize their status with the federal government, family law disputes, and suits for lost wages.
92. Because many of his Latino clients do not have cars, Plaintiff Barber routinely drives his clients to court hearings and other legal proceedings.
93. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber will be subject to criminal prosecution for concealing, harboring, or encouraging undocumented immigrants to reside or remain in the state of Alabama. HB 56 will interfere fundamentally with Plaintiff Barber’s ability to practice his profession.
94. Since HB 56 was proposed, Plaintiff Barber has already suffered a decrease in his Latino clientele. He is aware that Latinos and immigrants are increasingly afraid to access the courts to protect their rights, and some families are preparing to leave the state if the law takes effect. If the law is implemented,
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Plaintiff Barber is not sure that he can continue his law practice, as he will lose even more clients and suffer significant financial losses.
95. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber could be subject to civil prosecution and monetary damages for failing to disclose confidential and privileged information on his client’s immigration status since he is an “officer of the court.” Disclosing this information would be in violation of his ethical duty as an attorney to his clients, however, and would undermine his ability to practice his profession. Plaintiff Barber could also face liability on account of his office policy of keeping clients’ information confidential.
96. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber will not be able to enforce contracts against his undocumented clients who fail to pay for his services. In the past, Barber has relied on the Alabama court system to ensure payment of fees owed to him. His inability to enforce basic contracts under HB 56 would severely undermine Plaintiff Barber’s business and economic livelihood.
97. Plaintiff Daniel Upton is an immigration attorney residing in Madison County, Alabama. He works for Justice for Our Neighbors (“JFON”), a program of the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and he provides free, professional legal services to immigrants through clinics operated in local Methodist congregations across the country. The mission of JFON includes
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fulfilling the biblical mandate of hospitality to all people, and advocating for just and compassionate immigration laws and public policy.
98. Plaintiff Upton regularly represents individuals on a range of immigration matters including representing undocumented immigrants who are applying for adjustment of status or family-based immigration visas; former asylum-seekers who have been in the United States for nearly 20 years and qualify for immigration relief; and immigrants applying for visas because they were victims of crimes or domestic violence at the hands of U.S. citizen spouses. Because of the nature of his work, Plaintiff Upton is often aware that the individuals he represents lack valid immigration status.
99. In addition, Plaintiff Upton routinely drives clients to immigration hearings or other related appointments. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Upton could be criminally prosecuted for harboring or transporting undocumented immigrants or for encouraging them to remain in the state under Section 13 of the law.
100. Finally, Plaintiff Upton regularly enters into retainer agreements with his clients with full knowledge that the client lacks immigration status. HB 56 would make these agreements unenforceable, which would severely undermine his ability to conduct its legal practice within the bounds of professional
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responsibility. HB 56 could also impact his malpractice insurance coverage, which requires an enforceable retainer specifying the scope of his representation.
101. Plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Beck is a resident of Guntersville, Alabama. He has owned rental properties throughout Northern Alabama for the past 18 years.
102. The majority of Plaintiff Beck’s tenants are immigrants. Beck does not verify or investigate the immigration status of his tenants. He does not intend to change that practice. He has reason to believe that some of his tenants are undocumented. Plaintiff Beck rents accommodations to some individuals who cannot provide a Social Security number with their rental application. In the past, some of Beck’s tenants were taken into ICE custody. Beck did not and would not move to evict those residents or their remaining family members from their units and would not do so in the future.
103. Plaintiff Beck believes that hardworking people deserve a place to live regardless of their immigration status. Beck and his business entities enter into rental agreements with people they believe may be undocumented.
104. Plaintiff Beck fears he will lose a major portion of his livelihood if HB 56 is implemented because he will be forced to evict many of his tenants to avoid committing the crime of renting to people he has reason to believe are undocumented immigrants. Local police often place driver’s license checkpoints in front of Plaintiff Beck’s properties. Beck’s business operations would be
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disrupted by the arrest and detention of a substantial share of his tenants if HB 56 goes into effect.
105. If implemented, HB 56 will render Plaintiff Beck’s rental agreements with any undocumented person unenforceable. His livelihood depends upon renters being compelled to pay for the accommodations they rent from him.
106. Plaintiff Michelle Cummings is a resident of Huntsville, Alabama. Cummings is a part-owner of a property management business, and she derives most of her income from this business. She owns approximately 140 rental units in the Huntsville area.
107. Plaintiff Cummings has reason to believe that she currently rents properties to approximately 30 undocumented immigrants. She does not verify immigration status when renting and does not intend to change that practice. Plaintiff Cummings does not plan to deny housing to renters merely because they may lack proper immigration documents. She believes it would be inhumane to do so.
108. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Cummings will be subject to criminal prosecution for concealing, harboring, or encouraging undocumented immigrants to reside or remain in the state of Alabama. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Cummings believes that it will deter individuals from renting her properties and cause her business to suffer.
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109. Plaintiff Esayas Haile resides in Boaz, Alabama, and is a native of Eritrea. Plaintiff Haile came to the United States as a refugee in 2010. As a refugee, Plaintiff Haile is allowed to remain in the United States, but he is not a lawful permanent resident and does not possess a nonimmigrant visa. Plaintiff Haile is fluent in Tigrina and Amharic, but wishes to learn the English language to ease his transition into the United States. Plaintiff Haile recently finished taking an English class at a local school. Plaintiff Haile plans to enroll in English as a Secondary Language (ESL) classes at Gadsden State Community College, this fall. Section 8 of HB 56 will prohibit Plaintiff Haile from studying at Gadsden State or any similar public postsecondary institution because he is not a lawful permanent resident or a holder of a nonimmigrant visa.
110. Plaintiff Fiseha Tesfamariam resides in Boaz, Alabama, and is a native of Eritrea. Plaintiff Tesfamariam came to the United States as a refugee in 2010. As a refugee, Plaintiff Tesfamariam is allowed to remain in the United States, but he is not a lawful permanent resident and does not possess a nonimmigrant visa. Plaintiff Tesfamariam wishes to learn the English language to ease his transition into the United States. Plaintiff Tesfamariam recently finished taking an English class at a local school. Plaintiff Tesfamariam plans to enroll in ESL classes at Gadsden State Community College this fall. Section 8 of HB 56 will prohibit Plaintiff Tesfamariam from studying at Gadsden State or any similar
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public postsecondary institution because he is not a lawful permanent resident or a holder of a nonimmigrant visa.
111. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 is a Mexican national who currently lives in Crossville, Alabama, with her husband and two children. Her daughter, who is nine years old, is a U.S. citizen. Her son, who is 17, was born in Mexico and is undocumented.
112. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 does not have lawful immigration status in this country, although she is currently in the process of getting a visa. In fact, her petition for an Alien Relative Visa (I-130) has been approved, and according to usual federal procedures, she is waiting for a visa to become available.
113. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 does not have an Alabama driver’s license and is not eligible to get one. The only document she possesses that reflects her status is a notice acknowledging that her Alien Relative petition was approved. The notice is a simple piece of paper, not a formal identification, and it does not have any indication of its durational validity. Jane Doe #1 is concerned a police officer would not accept it as proof of current immigration status. If HB 56 is implemented and she is stopped by the police, she fears they will not understand that the federal immigration agency is aware that she is in the country without status but has chosen not to deport her.
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114. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #1 will be at risk of police interrogation and detention, as well as prosecution under the state alien registration scheme, if she is stopped by police for any reason. As a result, she will reduce her travel in the state—including travel to attend church each week—in order to avoid the possibility of contact with law enforcement.
115. Jane Doe #1 is concerned that if HB 56 is implemented it will tear her family apart. She worries that her husband or son, who are both undocumented, could be identified by police and would be deported under the law. Her nine-yearold daughter, who is a U.S. citizen, is traumatized by what she hears about the new law at school. She has been asking if the family will be arrested by immigration officials or stopped at police checkpoints.
116. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 lives in Birmingham, Alabama, and is the single mother of three children. Jane Doe #2 has lived in Alabama for 12 years and considers it her home. She immigrated to the United States from her native country in 1999.
117. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 currently lacks federal immigration status, but she has applied to the federal government for a U-visa (a form of federal immigration status for crime victims and witnesses that provides a pathway to permanent residence) based on the fact that she and her child cooperated in the criminal prosecution of a school official who sexually assaulted her child.
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Although the federal government is aware that Jane Doe #2 is undocumented, they have not elected to initiate immigration proceedings against her, and her application for a U-visa is pending.
118. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 does not have a federal alien registration document; nor does she have any document that can easily establish to Alabama law enforcement officials that her presence in the country is known to the federal government. As a result, if HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #2 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by law enforcement officials based on her Latina appearance and lack of state-approved identity documents.
119. If HB 56 takes effect, Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 will curtail her travel in order to reduce the chance that she will be stopped, interrogated, and detained by local law enforcement based on her Latina appearance.
120. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 is considering homeschooling her children because she is afraid school officials will report her undocumented status to federal immigration officials. If she has to home-school her children, her ability to provide for her family financially will suffer.
121. If HB 56 takes effect, Jane Doe #2 will not be able to rent an apartment and or enforce contracts for her work, so that if her landlord or employer violates the terms of any agreement, she will be left without a remedy.
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122. Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 is a U.S. citizen who was born and raised in Alabama. She lives in Montgomery, Alabama, with her husband, who is an undocumented immigrant, and their three U.S. citizen children who are all under the age of six.
123. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #3 will be subject to criminal prosecution for living with and supporting her husband, since she would be considered harboring or encouraging an undocumented immigrant to remain in the United States. She is offended that the law would criminalize her family life.
124. Jane Doe #3 is also fearful that if HB 56 takes effect, school officials will report her husband’s immigration status to federal officials because he will be required to provide information on his immigration status when enrolling their children in public school.
125. Jane Doe #3 will be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because she will not be able to enforce contracts that she enters into along with her husband who is undocumented. For example, she worries that if she dies her husband will not be able to enforce the terms of her life insurance policy, which lists him as the principal beneficiary and successor in interest. This would cause tremendous harm to her U.S. citizen children.
126. Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 is a resident of Pelham, Alabama, and has lived in Alabama for approximately 11 years. She is the mother of three children,
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including one U.S. citizen child. Jane Doe #4 considers Alabama her home. She lives in a rented trailer home in Pelham with her husband and three children.
127. Jane Doe #4 routinely seeks work cleaning houses even though she does not have work authorization. If implemented, HB 56 will criminalize her work and open her up to prosecution simply for working in order to support her family.
128. If HB 56 takes effect, Jane Doe #4 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by police. There are regular police roadblocks in front of the trailer park where Jane Doe #4 lives. She fears that she will be detained when stopped at one of these roadblocks because she lacks the identity documents listed in HB 56.
129. Further, because Jane Doe #4 lacks a federal alien registration document, she will be subject to criminal prosecution under HB 56.
130. Jane Doe #4 fears that under HB 56, her landlord will evict her and her family because they cannot prove they are here legally. Eviction and difficulty finding another home to rent due to HB 56’s renting provisions would cause a substantial disruption to Jane Doe #4’s life, and it would be damaging to her children and their sense of security.
131. Plaintiff Jane Doe #5 lives in Wetumpka, Alabama. She has a 13year-old son. She has lived in Alabama since she left her native country in 2005.
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She does not have valid immigration status in the United States. She also lacks a driver’s license or any other form of government-issued photo ID from the United States.
132. Jane Doe #5 seeks jobs in Alabama even though she does not have work authorization, because she must provide for herself and her son. If implemented, HB 56 will criminalize her attempts to find work and make her vulnerable to criminal prosecution because of her efforts to take care of her family.
133. Because Jane Doe #5 lacks a federal alien registration document, she will be subject to criminal prosecution under HB 56.
134. Jane Doe #5 fears that if HB 56 is implemented, it will make the contracts she enters into for basic necessities unenforceable. This will affect her rental contract, as well as contracts to buy a car or pay her cell phone bill. This will impair her ability to find a place to live and to travel, and to reach her son in an emergency.
135. HB 56 will also interrupt Jane Doe #5’s son’s education. If implemented, HB 56 will require her son’s school to determine Jane Doe #5’s immigration status. Fearing that those school officials may report her as an undocumented immigrant, Jane Doe #5 will not enroll her son in school if HB 56 goes into effect.
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136. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #5 will curtail her activities outside of the house for fear of interacting with the police. She will be hesitant to report any crimes of which she is a victim or a witness. Jane Doe #5 will also have difficulty finding friends who are documented who are willing to help her family, as HB 56 will make it state crime to do so. As a result, Jane Doe #5 will stop attending events, traveling about in public, and going places that she would otherwise go.
137. Plaintiff Jane Doe #6 lives in Huntsville, Alabama, and is the mother of three children. Jane Doe #6 immigrated to the United States in 1996 and has spent most of the last 17 years in Huntsville. She and her three children are undocumented.
138. Jane Doe #6’s youngest son, who is 18 years old, is developmentally disabled. He is unable to care for himself, so he lives with Jane Doe #6, and she expects that he always will.
139. Her son is in a vocational training program through his high school special education program. One requirement of the program is that he work a certain number of hours per week next year. He is not eligible for a work permit, however. If HB 56 is implemented, his attempts to find work will be criminalized, and he will not be able to complete his program.
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140. Jane Doe #6 is also fearful that her son will be unable to complete school because of HB 56’s requirement that the school determine whether he and Jane Doe #6 are undocumented. She will be forced to comply with the registration requirements because obtaining an education is so important to her son and his future. Jane Doe #6 fears, however, that revealing her son’s undocumented status to school officials will cause him harm and mistreatment.
141. Jane Doe #6 also worries that under HB 56, her son will be detained because he lacks immigration papers. She believes that he will not be able to care for himself if he is detained or deported to Mexico, a country he does not know and does not consider his home. The only place he considers home is Alabama.
142. Jane Doe #6 supports herself and her family by cleaning houses. She must drive herself to various work sites, and she must also regularly drive her son to school. Because she lacks a driver’s license, Jane Doe #6 is fearful that she will be stopped and arrested by the police and put into deportation proceedings. If this happens, she worries that her son will be abandoned and unable to care for himself.
143. Plaintiff John Doe #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, is a 16-year old who came to the United States with his younger brother several years ago. His mother passed away when he was 8 or 9 years old, and his elderly grandparents sent him to United States to live with extended family.
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144. John Doe #1 learned English and excelled in school, but his younger brother struggled. Plaintiff Matt Webster and his wife, both U.S. citizens, learned of John Doe #1 and his brother’s plight, and after becoming acquainted, the boys’ extended relatives agreed that Plaintiff Webster and his wife could provide a more stable environment for the boys. Plaintiff Webster and his wife are now in the process of adopting the brothers.
145. John Doe #1 is still without any current immigration status, and he does not have an alien registration card or any form of United States identification. His new parents will be eligible under federal law to apply for immigration relief for him after the adoption has been completed and two years have passed. If HB 56 were to go into effect, however, John Doe #1 would be a criminal until that two-year period passes, as would his new parents.
146. John Doe #1 has done very well in school and has been a leader in the ROTC. He plans to go to college. But right now he is fearful of what will happen to him in school if he is forced to disclose his immigration status, and what will happen to him if he is ever stopped by a police officer.
147. Plaintiff John Doe #2 was born in Mexico and came to the United States in 1995. He has mostly lived in Alabama since that time. He now resides in Crossville, Alabama, with his wife and two children—a daughter who is 9 years
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old and a son who is 17 years old. John Doe #2 does not have lawful immigration status, nor does his 17-year-old son. His daughter, however, is a U.S. citizen.
148. This fall, his daughter will be entering the fourth grade at Crossville Public Elementary School and his son will be a senior at Crossville Public High School. Plaintiff John Doe #2 is deeply concerned that HB 56 will undermine his children’s ability to pursue their educations.
149. If implemented, HB 56 will require school officials to verify whether John Doe #2’s two children were born in the United States and whether John Doe #2 and his wife are unlawfully residing in the United States. Moreover, HB 56 will allow school officials to share information that they gather about the immigration status of students’ parents with federal immigration officials. As a result, if HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #2 may make the very tough choice to keep his children out of school in the fall. He would do this in order to reduce the risk that his family will be identified as undocumented to federal immigration officials through the school enrollment process.
150. Plaintiff John Doe #2 also fears prosecution under Section 10 of HB 56, if it is implemented, because he lacks a federal alien registration document. Since HB 56 passed, John Doe #2 has been afraid to leave the house for any nonessential purpose because he wants to avoid any possibility of encountering law enforcement.
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151. Plaintiff John Doe #3 is an 18-year-old who has grown up in the United States and considers Alabama his home. John Doe #3 does not have a green card or other lawful status in the United States. He recently graduated with honors from Wetumpka High School and was accepted to three different public universities in Alabama.
152. Because he considers Alabama his home and because his family lives here, John Doe #3 plans to attend college in Alabama. John Doe #3 does not have the funds to enroll in college currently, but he intends to enroll as soon as possible and to study aerospace and robotics technology. If HB 56 is implemented, however, it will prohibit him from enrolling in a public college or university in Alabama and thwart his plans to pursue further education.
153. John Doe #3 has suffered racial profiling in the past by Alabama law enforcement officers. A couple years ago, he was stopped while riding in a car with other passengers for the ostensible reason that the registration tag was not properly displayed. However, when the police officers stopped the car, they only asked John Doe #3 to step out of the car and to show a driver’s license or other form of identification, even though he was not the driver. The other passengers, who were all Caucasian, were not asked to get out of the car or to show any documents. John Doe #3 believes he was treated differently because of his Latino appearance.
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154. If HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #3 is afraid that he will be subject to increased racial profiling, discrimination, and arbitrary interrogation and detention by law enforcement based on his Latino appearance. As a result, John Doe #3 will curtail his activities if HB 56 takes effect in order to try to avoid any contact with law enforcement.
155. Plaintiff John Doe #4 is a resident of Auburn, Alabama, and has lived in Auburn for approximately three years. He is currently enrolled at a community college in Alabama where he is taking classes to prepare for the GED exam, which he hopes to take in August 2011. After passing the GED, John Doe #4 intends to study welding or mechanics at a community college in Alabama in order to better himself.
156. If HB 56 is implemented, it will thwart his educational and professional plans. John Doe #4 will not be able to continue his studies after passing the GED exam because he does not have the documentation required by HB 56 to enroll in any public post-secondary educational institution in Alabama, as he does not have lawful permanent resident status or a non-immigrant visa.
157. John Doe #4 currently rents his apartment. If HB 56 takes effect, John Doe #4 will not be able to rent a home. He fears he will have great difficulty finding any place to rent because he does not have the documents required under
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the law to allow a landlord to rent to him, and any landlord would be considered a criminal for renting to him.
158. If HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #4 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by police officers inquiring into his immigration status if he is stopped by police for any reason.
159. John Doe #4 fears detention and deportation under HB 56 because he lacks a federal alien registration document.
160. Plaintiff John Doe #5 lives in Hoover, Alabama, and has frequently performed day labor work in the nearly nine years since he arrived in the United States. He does not have work authorization from the U.S. government, but he works to sustain himself and to send money to cover basic living expenses for his parents, grandparents, and sister who live in Mexico.
161. While looking for work as a day laborer, John Doe #5 tries to make it obvious to people who are hiring that he is available for work. He may cross a street to approach a car whose driver has indicated they want to hire, and he has stood on sidewalks to seek work from people who drive by in their cars looking to hire day laborers.
162. If HB 56 goes into effect, John Doe #5 is worried that he will be targeted, harassed, and potentially arrested for soliciting work in public and for
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working without federal work authorization. He worries that he may be detained and possibly deported and will no longer be able to support his family.
163. Plaintiff John Doe #6 lives in Hoover, Alabama, and works as a day laborer. He does not have work authorization from the U.S. government, but he works about four days per week.
164. As a day laborer, he cuts lawns, prunes trees, cleans gutters, and performs other landscaping tasks at the homes of the people who hire him. He waits on a corner and potential employers who drive by stop and pick him up if they need help with landscaping tasks at their homes. From this work, he sends money to Guatemala to help his wife and his 10-year-old son meet basic living expenses.
165. If HB 56 goes into effect, John Doe #6 fears that police will target and arrest him for trying to earn a living through day labor.
Defendants 166. Defendant Robert Bentley is the Governor of Alabama. Defendant Bentley exercises “[t]he supreme executive power of” Alabama, Ala. Const. art. V., § 113, and is constitutionally required to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” Ala. Const. art. V, § 120. As such, Defendant Bentley is responsible for the enforcement of HB 56 in the State of Alabama and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Bentley is sued in his official capacity.
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167. Defendant Luther Strange is the Attorney General of Alabama. Defendant Strange is “the chief law enforcement officer of the state and has supervisory authority over every district attorney in Alabama.” Ala. Code § 36-1514. The Alabama Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature may require the [A]ttorney [G]eneral to defend any or all suits brought against the state,” Ala. Const. art. V, § 137, and state statute requires that the Attorney General “shall appear in the courts . . . of the United States[] in any case in which the state may be interested in the result.” Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2). Defendant Strange is responsible for the enforcement of HB 56 in the State of Alabama and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Strange is sued in his official capacity.
168. Defendant Joseph B. Morton is the State Superintendent of Education. In that capacity, Defendant Morton is the Chief School Officer in the State of Alabama, responsible for explaining the meaning and intent of laws relating to public schools; deciding all controversies and disputes involving the proper administration of the public school system; and reviewing actions and orders of county and city boards of education, of county superintendents of education, and city superintendents of schools in matters seriously affecting the educational interest. See Ala. Code §§ 16-4-4, 16-4-8. Pursuant to these responsibilities, Defendant Morton has stated publicly that he is developing guidelines for local schools regarding how to enforce HB 56. Defendant Morton has a key role in
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implementing and enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendant Morton is sued in his official capacity.
169. Defendant Freida Hill is Chancellor of Postsecondary Education. In that capacity, Defendant Hill is the Chief Executive Officer of the Postsecondary Education Department of the State Board of Education, and is responsible for directing all matters involving the junior colleges and trade schools pursuant to the policies of the State Board of Education. She is responsible for interpreting, executing, and enforcing the rules and regulations of the State Board of Education governing junior colleges and trade schools. Defendant Hill is authorized to take any and all actions to administer policies, rules and regulations of the State Board of Education in carrying out its responsibility for the management and operation of the junior colleges and trade schools. Ala. Code § 16-60-111.5. Accordingly, Defendant Hill has a key role in the implementing and enforcing the provisions of HB 56 related to postsecondary education. Defendant Hill is sued in her official capacity.
170. Defendant E. Casey Wardynski is the Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System. Defendant Jamie Blair is the Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System. In these capacities, Defendant Wardynski and Blair are the chief executive officers for their respective city boards of education, and are responsible (a) for seeing that all laws relating to the schools and the rules and
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regulations of their city boards of education are carried into effect; (b) for explaining the true intent and meaning of school laws, of rules and regulations of their city boards of education, and of rules and regulations of the State Board of Education; and (c) for deciding all controversies and disputes involving the rules and regulations of their city boards of education and the proper administration of the public schools. Ala. Code § 16-12-3. They are responsible for enforcing school attendance laws. Id. § 16-12-18. They are also responsible for preparing reports required by the State Board of Education. Id. § 16-12-14. Pursuant to these responsibilities, Defendant Wardynski and Blair will be required to interpret the meaning of HB 56 and the meaning of any guidance received from the State Board of Education, and to see that HB 56 is carried into effect. They have a key role in enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendant Wardynski and Blair are sued in their official capacities.
171. Defendant Randy Fuller is the Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System. Defendant Charles D. Warren is the Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System. Defendant Barbara W. Thompson is the Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System. Defendant Jeffery E. Langham is the Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System. In these capacities, Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham are the chief executive officers of their respective county boards of education, and
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are responsible for seeing that the laws relating to the schools, the rules and regulations of the state and county boards of education are carried into effect. Ala. Code § 16-9-13. They are responsible for preparing rules and regulations governing the conditions under which children may be admitted to junior and senior high schools of the county. Id. § 16-9-19. They are responsible for enforcing school attendance laws. Id. § 16-9-30. They are also responsible for preparing reports to be forwarded to the State Board of Education. Id. § 16-9-31. Pursuant to these responsibilities, Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham will be required to interpret the meaning of HB 56 and the meaning of any guidance received from the State Board of Education, and to see that HB 56 is carried into effect. They have a key role in enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham are sued in their official capacities.
172. Defendant Robert L. Broussard is the District Attorney for Madison County. In that capacity, Defendant Broussard is charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal provisions of HB 56 within Madison County. Defendant Broussard is sued in his official capacity.
FACTS History and Intent of HB 56
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173. On June 2, 2011, the Alabama legislature enacted HB 56, a comprehensive state immigration scheme that extensively regulates immigration, immigrants, and those who associate or interact with immigrants.
174. Governor Bentley signed HB 56 on June 9, 2011. The law is scheduled to take effect on September 1, 2011, except for Sections 22 and 23 (related to state law enforcement staffing and coordination), which went into effect immediately, and Sections 9 and 15 (related to employment verification), which will go into effect in 2012.
175. HB 56 was originally introduced in the State House of Representatives by Representative Micky Hammon. Senator Scott Beason introduced a similar omnibus immigration bill, Senate Bill (“SB”) 256, in the Senate. The final bill was a combination of these two measures.
176. In enacting HB 56, Alabama legislated in an area committed exclusively to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, by passing HB 56, Alabama expressly intended not only to intrude into an area of exclusive federal control, but to supplant the federal government in key respects.
177. A primary motivating factor in passing HB 56 was the Alabama legislature’s disagreement with federal immigration policy.
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178. When Representative Hammon introduced HB 56, he explained that “much of what is in this legislation” came from the report produced by the Joint Interim Patriotic Immigration Commission (“Commission”), on which he served.
179. The Commission was created in June 2007 by the Alabama legislature to address the “unprecedented influx of non-English speaking immigrants.” S.J. Res. 22, Reg. Sess. 2007 (Ala. 2007). The Commission was tasked with “outlining suggestions and proposals to address the issues of illegal and legal immigration in Alabama.” Id. In establishing the Commission, the legislature explicitly asserted that “states must exercise power to investigate, apprehend, detain, and remove illegal aliens” and that, while “the federal government has historically been responsible for U.S. border control,” “states are now becoming more involved” in “enforc[ing] and pass[ing] effective immigration laws.” Id. Representative Hammon was appointed as a member of the Commission, and Senator Beason served as the Commission’s Vice Chairman.
180. In February 2008, the Commission issued its report to the legislature, concluding: “We recommend illegal immigrants be discouraged from coming to Alabama.” State of Alabama, Joint Interim Patriotic Immigration Commission Report (Feb. 13, 2008). To achieve this goal, the Commission made sweeping recommendations to the Alabama legislature on how to regulate immigration by making changes in access to public education, benefits, and medical services, as
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well as by making law enforcement policies more punitive and employer hiring practices more restrictive.
181. Alabama held elections in 2010, and during that election cycle Representative Hammon and Senator Beason campaigned on a pledge referred to as the Handshake with Alabama, which, among other things, would address “illegal immigration” because “[p]oliticians in Washington refuse to act, so we must bring the fight to the home front.” Mike Hubbard, Press Release: GOP Legislative Leaders Unveil 2010 “Republican Handshake with Alabama,” Aug. 16, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Handshake with Alabama”). The pledge promised to “push an illegal immigration bill similar to the recently approved Arizona law. The Alabama bill will create a new state criminal trespass statute that allows local law enforcement to arrest illegal immigrants for simply setting foot in Alabama. Another provision will make it a crime to provide an illegal immigrant transportation anywhere in Alabama, whether it is a trip across the state or simply to the corner store.” Id.
182. During the debates over HB 56, legislators expressly stated that the intent of the law was to deport undocumented immigrants and to deter them from living in Alabama. Representative Hammon explained: “This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life. They will not stay in Alabama . . . . [T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport
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themselves.” He also noted, “[W]e do want to affect every aspect of someone’s life and make it a little more difficult for them to live here.” In no uncertain terms, Representative Hammon stated: “[T]he intent of this bill is to slow illegal immigration in Alabama through attrition.” He emphasized: “We are going to deter illegal immigrants from the State of Alabama.”
183. Contrary to long-settled law that establishes the federal government’s exclusive role in regulating immigration, HB 56 reflects the view that the State of Alabama should regulate immigration on its own. Representative Hammon stated, “[I]t is the State’s responsibility to handle this issue and not the federal government.” He explained, “[T]his issue is now the responsibility of the State of Alabama and not the federal government.” He explained that, “[w]e are not going to depend on a broken system. . . . Here in Alabama we are not going to ignore the problem.”
184. HB 56 allows the State of Alabama to take control of immigration enforcement where the federal government has not acted to its satisfaction. Representative Hammon remarked when he introduced the bill, “[I]t appears that the federal government has defaulted on their responsibility of enforcing federal immigration law. And they have forfeited that right to the States.” He continued: “[T]he federal process is not working. . . . They are ignoring the problem.” Hammon further acknowledged that the bill’s “purpose is to put pressure on the
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federal government to solve the illegal immigration problem we have.” Senator
Beason concurred: “If the federal government would enforce their laws that they
have on the books, the states would not be required to begin to do things to help
enforce those laws.” Senator Jimmy Holley echoed this position: “We have a—a
challenge before us, and that is to take the unwillingness of the federal government
to protect our borders and individual states rising up to the occasion of—of the
belief that they have to do it themselves if it is going to get done.” Senator Clay
Scofield likewise remarked: “[T]he federal government is not coming to our aid on
this. It is going to come down to the states doing their part and passing a good
legislation such as this that will give the states the ability to—enforce the—the
federal law.” Representative Rich, who represents the Sand Mountain area, was
more emphatic:
Some people say, “Well, the federal government ought to take care of this. This is a federal government problem.” Well, the federal government should take care of this, but the federal government is not taking care of this. The federal government is derelict in their duty. And, the simple fact is, our house is on fire on Sand Mountain. Some people say, “Well, call the fire department. Let them come and put it out. Call the federal government, let them take care of this.” Well, what we have and what this bill provides here today, we have got a water hose and we have got a fire extinguisher and we have got neighbors standing by with buckets of water to help us put out the fire. If we wait for the fire department, or if we wait for the federal government, to come and put this fire out, our house is going to burn down.
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So, what we have got to do is we have got to do everything that we can to deal with this problem. And this bill, I believe, goes a long way in doing that. 185. Legislators also made similar remarks in the press. See, e.g., Kim Chandler, Alabama House Passes Arizona-Style Immigration Law, Birmingham News, April 5, 2011 (“The illegals in this country are ripping us off. If we wait for the federal government to put this fire out, our house is going to burn down.”) (quoting Representative Kerry Rich); Adam Smith, Slowing Illegals Could Produce Money Drain, The News Courier, Apr. 24, 2011 (“The federal government is not acting and this may give us leverage with them.”) (quoting Senator Bill Holtzclaw); M.J. Ellington, Lawmakers Speak Out on Immigration, The Decatur Daily, May 29, 2011 (“[Senator] Beason . . . said if Alabama has its own immigration law, it will be in a position to lead and put pressure on Congress to change federal law.”); Dana Beyerle, Heart of Republican Legislative Agenda on Tap Tuesday, The Gadsden Times, Mar. 5, 2011 (“Bill sponsor Rep. Micky Hammon, R-Decatur, said his goal is to make the federal government enforce federal immigration laws. ‘We intend to move forward and make it a federal issue by passing these tough laws and forcing their hand,’ Hammon said.”). 186. During the debates, at least two legislators emphasized that HB 56 was unconstitutional. Senator Singleton stated, “[W]e at the State of Alabama continue to try to . . . make some laws when we know they are not going to stand
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constitutional muster.” Representative Newton observed that this was a “feel-good bill[]” that “probably won’t pass constitutional law.”
187. After HB 56 passed the House on April 5, 2011, Representative Hammon explained by video, “Today we passed HB 56, which is our caucus’s immigration legislation that is a part of the Handshake with Alabama. . . . . This immigration bill is designed to deter illegal immigration in the state of Alabama. It is patterned after the Arizona law, but it also has an Alabama flavor. We have added every aspect of a person’s life.” When HB 56 was later adopted by the Legislature, Hammon again stated, “This is an Arizona bill with an Alabama twist.” Alabama Lawmakers Approve Arizona-Style Immigration Bill, Associated Press, June 5, 2011.
188. After signing HB 56 into law, the Governor of Alabama opined, “We have a real problem with illegal immigration in this country,” and lauded Alabama’s enactment of “the strongest immigration bill in the country.” Bob Johnson, Alabama Governor Signs Tough Illegal Immigration Law, Associated Press, June 9, 2011.
189. HB 56 is specifically targeted at making Mexican immigrants and Latinos leave Alabama. Representative Rich, who voted for the bill, remarked that although he “like[s] Hispanic people,”
95 percent of the children that are in the elementary school at Crosswell Elementary School are Hispanic, 95 percent of them. 52
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percent of the children that attend Albertville Elementary and Primary School are Hispanic, and the biggest part of them are illegal. It is costing our area hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to educate these children. And the taxpayers in my area—they don’t deserve to have to pay that bill. They don’t deserve that. 190. Those who opposed the legislation likewise understood that it took aim at Mexicans and Latinos. Senator Holmes stated: “The purpose of this bill is . . . these Mexicans . . . . [Y]ou all are trying to get as many in here out and trying to stop as many coming in [as you can] . . . .” Senator Singleton similarly observed: “[T]he fact of the matter is that we know that when we talk about illegal immigration that it is basically targeted at one ethnic group and that seems to be the Latino Hispanic Americans . . . .” Representative Jackson remarked that the effects of HB 56 would reach even further than targeting Latinos: “It just doesn’t stop at the people coming from Mexico. This is not here just for them. This thing is going to have great repercussion for all minorities.” 191. Indeed, the debate around immigration in Alabama is racially charged at best and at times even tends to violence. For example, at a recent town hall meeting, Alabama Congressman Mo Brooks stated, “As your congressman on the house floor, I will do anything short of shooting them.” Venton Blandin, Congressman Mo Brooks Makes Strong Comments on Illegal Immigration Law, WHNT News 19 (June 29, 2011), at http://www.whnt.com/news/whnt-
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congressman-mo-brooks-makes-strong-comments-on-illegal-immigration-law20110628,0,1001498.story.
192. One of the chief bill sponsors, state Senator Scott Beason, told an audience in February 2011: “‘The reality is that if you allow illegal immigration to continue in your area you will destroy yourself eventually . . . . If you don’t believe illegal immigration will destroy a community go and check out parts of Alabama around Arab and Albertville.’” Beason then “ended his speech by advising Republicans to “‘empty the clip, and do what has to be done.’” Sam Rolley, Beason: Dems Don’t Want To Solve Illegal Immigration Problem, The Cullman Times (Feb. 6, 2011), at http://www.cullmantimes.com/local/x2072622472/ Beason-Dems-don-t-want-to-solve-illegal-immigration-prob.
193. In short, the history of HB 56 makes clear that the legislature enacted the law as a comprehensive state solution to the perceived problem of the federal government’s failure to regulate immigration to Alabama’s liking as well as based on an attempt to drive immigrants, particularly Mexican and other Latino immigrants, out of the state.
Key Provisions of HB 56 194. The full text of HB 56 as enacted is appended to this Complaint as Exhibit A and incorporated herein.
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195. HB 56 is a comprehensive state-law system of immigration regulation. HB 56 is designed to impose new punishments for violations of immigration law (as defined by state law and state officers); to detain and ultimately to cause the expulsion of those the state deems to be unworthy of continued residence; and to criminalize a broad swath of everyday interaction with such individuals. By regulating every aspect of the lives of immigrants, from housing to education to employment, HB 56 is designed explicitly to drive immigrants out of the state of Alabama and to deter immigrants from entering the state of Alabama. Mandatory Investigation of Immigration Status by State and Local Law Enforcement (Sections 12 & 18-20)
196. HB 56 converts many routine encounters with Alabama law enforcement officers into prolonged detention solely for the purpose of investigating immigration status and implementing Alabama’s own immigration policies and rules.
197. Section 12 of HB 56 requires every state, county, and municipal law enforcement officer in Alabama to investigate the immigration status of any person the officer stops, arrests or detains, if the officer has “reasonable suspicion” to believe the person is unlawfully present in the United States. Sec. 12(a). Under Section 12, an officer may demand that any person subject to “any lawful stop, detention or arrest” produce one of six state-approved identity documents. Secs. 12(a), (d) (emphasis added). Only individuals who can produce a state-
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approved document receive a presumption of lawful status. Sec. 12(d). Individuals who cannot produce such a document—which includes many persons who are U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted non-citizens—are subject to a lengthy and intrusive immigration verification process.
198. HB 56 fundamentally changes the primary role and day-to-day operations of state, county, and municipal law enforcement officers in Alabama. Alabama law currently requires these officers “to give full time to the preservation of public order and the protection of life or property or the detection of crime in the state.” Ala. Code § 36-21-60(11). HB 56 undermines these state priorities by injecting civil immigration investigations and enforcement into every stop, detention, or arrest made by Alabama law enforcement officers.
199. Section 12 requires that an officer contact the federal government in the process of investigating immigration status.
200. The federal government does not respond to immigration status queries instantaneously. Federal authorities take over 80 minutes on average to respond to immigration status queries from state and local police under the best case scenarios—when they are given sufficient biographical information and they are readily able to locate the target in the immigration databases that they search. However, the databases searched for immigration status queries often will not contain any information whatsoever. For example, there is no centralized database
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of U.S. citizens. In these circumstances, the federal government will report that there is “no match” for the suspect, and will have to engage in a lengthy and manual file review by immigration officers. If a manual file review is required in response to an inquiry on an individual, this process can take over two days.
201. Section 12 will unreasonably prolong police encounters, such as traffic stops that would ordinary result in a citation that would take only minutes absent HB 56’s mandates. Many citable traffic violations and other minor offenses, such as jaywalking or littering, are deemed criminal violations under Alabama law; under Section 12, officers are authorized to prolong such stops in order to investigate immigration status.
202. Immigration status queries mandated by HB 56 impose a substantial burden on federal authorities, who will be required to respond to an enormous increase in the number of immigration status inquiries and will have less ability to prioritize among their tasks according to federal regulations and policies.
203. Sections 12, 19, and 20 further require an officer to detain individuals solely on the basis of alleged unlawful presence in various contexts.
204. Section 12 also opens the door to racial profiling. The law requires an officer to investigate immigration status where the officer has “reasonable suspicion” “that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States.” Sec. 12(a). But the law fails to enumerate any criteria for what
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“reasonable suspicion” of an individual’s unlawful status might be. That determination is left entirely to an officer’s discretion and increases the likelihood that an officer will engage in discrimination based on an individual’s appearance, language choice, or English-language ability.
205. Section 12 is designed to and will have the effect of requiring everyone in Alabama, particularly those who might be perceived as foreign, to carry identification papers reflecting their immigration status with them at all times to avoid unreasonably prolonged law enforcement encounters while their immigration status is being investigated.
206. Similarly, Section 18 of HB 56 requires that state, local, and municipal law enforcement officers verify the citizenship or immigration status of those found to be driving without a valid driver’s license, and allows individuals to be detained for up to 48 hours solely to verify their immigration status. Sec. 18(c).
207. Under Alabama law, driving without a valid license is a Class C misdemeanor. Those found to be driving without a valid license are typically given a citation and released.
208. Section 18 subjects anyone who is unable to produce a driver’s license during a routine encounter with the police—including U.S. citizens and those lawfully present in the United States—to prolonged detention for the purpose of an immigration status investigation.
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209. Law enforcement officials across the country and in Alabama have stated that HB 56 cannot be implemented in a race-neutral fashion and will inevitably lead law enforcement officers to rely inappropriately on race, ethnicity, and English-language ability in making decisions about whom to subject to additional scrutiny with questions regarding their immigration status.
210. Implementation of HB 56 will have a significant negative impact on the ability of local law enforcement officers to protect immigrant communities and mixed-immigration status communities and families, i.e., those that include individuals with and without lawful status. Because immigrants will avoid the police out of fear that any interaction with law enforcement could lead to immigration status inquiries, Alabama law enforcement officers will not get the assistance they need to prosecute crimes. For example, Plaintiff HICA provides substantial victim assistance and courtroom advocacy services to victims of crime, and the organization anticipates that HB 56 will substantially limit the willingness of victims to seek those services and protections.
211. HB 56’s immigration investigation and arrest provisions (Sections 12 and 18) suffer from the same constitutional defects as provisions in the recent Arizona, Utah, Indiana, and Georgia immigration laws—all of which have been enjoined. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011); Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 11-
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cv-401, slip op. (D. Utah May 11, 2011) (attached hereto as Exhibit B); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 11-cv-708, slip op. (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2011) (attached hereto as Exhibit C); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, Case No. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011). State-Specific Alien Registration Scheme (Section 10)
212. Section 10 of HB 56 enacts a state alien registration regime by creating a new state criminal offense of “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document.” Sec. 10. One element of the offense is that the person “is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a),” federal statutes that impose certain requirements that non-citizens register with the federal government and carry registration documents. Another element is that the person be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Under HB 56, violations of this new state crime are deemed a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $100 and up to 30 days of jail time. Sec. 10(f).
213. The purpose of the state registration provision is to allow the state to identify and imprison individuals it regards as “unlawfully present.”
214. This provision supplants federal alien registration laws (and the federal officers who administer and enforce those laws), federal removal procedures and priorities, and congressional judgments regarding the appropriate penalties for unlawful presence in the United States.
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215. The provision criminalizes certain immigrants for “simply setting foot in Alabama.” Mike Hubbard, Handshake with Alabama, Aug. 16, 2010. A similar provision in Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 has been preliminary enjoined. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339. Education Provisions (Sections 8 and 28)
216. HB 56 also contains provisions aimed at blocking children and young people from attending Alabama public schools, from kindergarten through colleges and universities.
217. Section 8 of HB 56 impermissibly discriminates between citizens and lawfully residing noncitizens, and among groups of lawfully residing noncitizens.
218. Section 8 restricts access to postsecondary education by excluding a host of lawfully present noncitizens from attending any public college or university in Alabama. It provides that only U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and individuals who hold a “nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.” can enroll in or attend an Alabama public postsecondary institution, such as a college or university.
219. Section 8 therefore excludes noncitizens whom the federal government has authorized to remain in the United States indefinitely, but who do not hold lawful permanent resident status or a “nonimmigrant visa”—including those whom the federal government has granted asylum, refugee status, Temporary
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Protected Status because of environmental disaster or armed conflict in their home countries, or deferred action.
220. People who are granted asylum or refugee status are authorized to reside in the United States indefinitely, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1158, and after residing in the United States for one year, they may adjust to lawful permanent resident status and eventually apply to become naturalized citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159. They are given this pathway to citizenship because they face persecution in their home countries. The conferral of asylum or refugee status does not make them LPRs, however, nor does it provide them with a nonimmigrant visa. As such, they would be ineligible to attend postsecondary school in the state of Alabama.
221. Section 28 of HB 56 blocks access to K-12 public education by requiring public schools to inquire into children’s and, in many cases, parents’ immigration status, and permits school officials to share their conclusions regarding immigration status with the federal government.
222. HB 56 is expressly designed to deter undocumented children and the U.S. citizen children of undocumented parents from attending public schools in Alabama. HB 56’s sponsor, Representative Micky Hammon, described the bill as motivated by the costs of “educat[ing] the children of illegal immigrants” (though he cited no data on such costs), and he predicted that HB 56 will result in “cost savings for this state.” David White, Alabama Legislative Panel Delays Voting on
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Illegal Immigration Bill, The Birmingham News, Mar. 3, 2011, available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/03/alabama_legislative_panel_dela.html. Likewise, Senator Beason, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, stated that educating immigrant children “is where one of our largest costs come from . . . . It’s part of the cost factor. Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost?” Brian Lyman, Immigration Law Makes School Officials Uneasy, The Montgomery Advertiser, June 8, 2011.
223. Section 28(a) requires that “[e]very public elementary and secondary school . . . , at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States[.]” Sec. 28(a)(1). To make this determination, schools must require that each child produce his or her birth certificate. Sec. 28(a)(2).
224. If “upon review of the student’s birth certificate it is determined that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if the child’s birth certificate is unavailable, the child’s parents must prove the child’s citizenship or immigration status within 30 days. Sec. 28(a)(3). Otherwise, the school “shall presume . . . that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Sec. 28(a)(5).
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225. Section 28(e) further authorizes school officials to report both children and parents whom they presume to be “unlawfully present” to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Section 28 specifically authorizes school officials to disclose information that personally identifies a student to federal immigration authorities upon obtaining a waiver from the Attorney General, in violation of federal law including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. Section 28 also authorizes school officials to report to DHS every parent who is presumed to be “unlawfully present,” without limitation. Indeed, under HB 56, school officials, like other state or local officials, are forbidden to limit communications with federal immigration officials. Sec. 5, 6. State-Based Harboring-Related Immigration Crimes (Section 13)
226. In Section 13, HB 56 creates four new state law immigration crimes punishable by fines and/or imprisonment. The express intent of these provisions is to implement an Alabama state policy of “attrition through enforcement”—at odds with federal policy.
227. Section 13 criminalizes those who “[c]onceal, harbor or shield” an alien “from detection in any place in this state” if that alien “has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.” Sec. 13(a)(1). This section applies with equal force to an immigrant who entered the United
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States years ago and subsequently regularized her status as it does to an immigrant who currently lacks valid immigration status.
228. Section 13 makes it a crime to “[e]ncourage or induce an alien” without legal status “to come to or reside in this state.” Sec. 13(a)(2).
229. Section 13 makes it illegal to “[t]ransport” an alien if that alien who “has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.” Sec. 13(a)(3). This section applies with equal force to an immigrant who entered the United States years ago and subsequently regularized her status as it does to an immigrant who currently lacks valid immigration status.
230. Section 13 makes it a crime to “harbor an alien unlawfully present . . . by entering into a rental agreement.” Sec. 13(a)(4).
231. Alabama passed its own version of these provisions in Section 13 precisely to bypass the federal government’s definitions and prosecutorial and adjudicatory processes under a parallel federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
232. Alabama intended (and achieved) an extraordinarily broad criminal prohibition in Section 13. For example, the transportation provision was specifically written to apply to “transportation anywhere in Alabama, whether it is a trip across the state or simply to the corner store.” Mike Hubbard, Handshake with Alabama, Aug. 16, 2010.
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233. The new state immigration crimes created by Section 13 criminalize routine behavior undertaken on a daily basis by U.S. citizens and those with legal status in Alabama. Because of HB 56, Alabamians—including Plaintiffs Thau, Long, Jimmerson, Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, or Jane Doe #3—who give a lift to a neighbor, a client, or fellow congregant, who invite a family member to visit from out of state or rent out a room to a friend, or who married a person without considering his or her immigration status, are subject to prosecution, fines, and incarceration if state authorities decide that they knew or recklessly disregarded that the other person was “unlawfully present in the United States” within the meaning of the Alabama criminal code.
234. Section 13 also provides that “[a] verification of an alien’s immigration status received from the federal government . . . shall constitute proof of that alien’s status.” Sec. 13(h). Alabama state courts are prohibited from considering any evidence regarding an individual’s status other than the federal government’s verification. Id.
235. Section 13 suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as a similar provision in Georgia’s HB 87, which has been preliminarily enjoined. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, Case No. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011). State-Based Crimes for Solicitation and Performance of Work (Section 11)
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236. Section 11(a) of HB 56 makes it unlawful for an “unauthorized alien” to “apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.”
237. This absolute prohibition on work-related solicitation speech applies irrespective of the time, place, or manner in which the speech occurs. It applies even in traditional public fora, such as sidewalks and parks.
238. Furthermore, HB 56 fails to define what constitutes “work,” rendering the scope of the conduct and speech criminalized by Section 11(a) impermissibly vague in violation of the First Amendment. Unlike the terms “Contractor,” “Employee,” “Employer,” and “Employment,” which are all defined at Section 3, “work” is left undefined. On its face, therefore, Section 11(a) prohibits activities such as artists painting portraits in a park and students conducting a fundraiser— and even solicitation speech about those activities.
239. Section 11(f) makes it unlawful for “an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” This prohibition applies regardless of immigration status or work authorization.
240. Section 11(g) makes it unlawful for any person “to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . in order to be hired by an occupant of the
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motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” This prohibition, too, applies regardless of immigration status or work authorization.
241. Sections 11(f) and (g) criminalize work-related solicitation speech while leaving other types of speech unregulated. The prohibition is triggered only by communication about work that occurs in public rights of way between a potential employer and a potential employee. HB 56 thus singles out one contentspecific category of expression for criminal sanctions, while leaving other communication that occurs in the same time, place, and manner unregulated.
242. Day laborers and the contractors who hire them cannot find each other through conventional means of signaling availability. Rather, the only effective manner for day laborers to communicate their ability to work is by gathering in areas easily accessible to potential employers.
243. Many Alabamians, including Plaintiffs John Doe #5 and John Doe #6, have previously expressed their availability for employment to people in vehicles on the street, while peacefully standing on a public way. They wish to continue engaging in such expressive activity to communicate their availability to work. Indeed, for many, day labor is a critical means—and often the only available means—to obtain work. However, HB 56 now criminalizes the act of seeking day labor work.
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244. Section 11’s prohibition on work (Section 11) suffers from the same fatal flaw as a provision in Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 that has been preliminary enjoined. See Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1006, aff’d, 641 F.3d at 357-360. Contract Provision (Section 27)
245. With limited exceptions, Section 27 prohibits Alabama state courts from recognizing or enforcing contracts between an alien unlawfully present in the United States and any other party, provided that the other party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States, and provided that the contract “requires the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.” Sec. 27(a).
246. Section 27 effectively excludes undocumented immigrants—and parties who contract with them—from participating in a wide array of civil and commercial affairs. For example, Section 27 facially prohibits Alabama state courts from recognizing or enforcing: marriage contracts, settlement agreements (including divorce and custody agreements), waiver and release agreements, plea agreements, mortgage agreements, insurance contracts, contracts for wages (including minimum wages and overtime wages required by federal law), confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, contracts for the provision of
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childcare, contracts for lodging (for more than one night), arbitration agreements, contracts for transportation (other than transportation intended to facilitate an immigrant’s return to his or her country of origin), warranty agreements, contracts for the purchase of medicine, contracts for the provision of utilities, loan agreements and promissory notes, and all other manner of contracts relating to the conduct of commerce. Both undocumented immigrants and the parties with whom they contract would be free to breach these and various other types of contracts with impunity.
247. Section 27 excludes only an extremely narrow range of contracts from its scope: “a contract for lodging for one night, a contract for the purchase of food to be consumed by the alien, a contract for medical services, or a contract for transportation of the alien that is intended to facilitate the alien’s return to his or her country of origin.” Sec. 27(b).
248. Section 27 is not limited to contracts entered into after the effective date of HB 56. Section 27 also nullifies the enforcement of contracts entered into before HB 56’s enactment or effective date.
249. The effect of Section 27 will be to discourage parties from conducting any business with individuals whom they assume or suspect are “illegal immigrants” and to encourage them to engage in racial profiling accordingly. Transaction Provision (Section 30)
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250. Section 30 makes it a felony for an “unlawfully present alien” to enter or attempt to enter any “transaction” with the state or local government agency. Sec. 30(b). Section 30 also prohibits a third party from entering or attempting to enter into a transaction on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States. Id.
251. The term “transaction” is not defined in HB 56. Section 30 does provide examples of prohibited transactions or attempted transactions—applying for or renewing a motor vehicle license plate, driver’s license, nondriver identification card, or business license—but this list is expressly made nonexclusive.
252. Section 30 effectively criminalizes a host of routine interactions between individuals and state and local government agencies, such as applying for a fishing license or paying a state park entrance fee.
253. By criminalizing “any transaction [or attempted transaction] between a person and the state or a political subdivision,” Section 30 reaches conduct that may be protected by the First Amendment, the due process clause, and other constitutional provisions, such as accessing or using the courts, public hospitals, public highways, or other public accommodations or services in circumstances that require “transactions.” It also reaches such basic, everyday conduct as applying for
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a public library card, paying municipal property taxes, paying for city garbage service, or paying for a parking permit on a municipal street.
254. Under Section 30, any person entering or attempting to enter into a transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state shall be required to demonstrate his or her United States citizenship, or, if he or she is an alien, his or her lawful presence in the United States, to the person conducting the transaction on behalf of the state/political subdivision. An alien’s lawful presence shall be demonstrated by the state’s/political subdivision’s verification of the alien’s lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) program operated by DHS, or by other verification with DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
255. Neither the federal SAVE system nor any federal system for status inquiries under § 1373(c) were intended by the federal government to serve such a purpose and they are not designed to do so.
256. Section 30 is a strict liability statute—i.e., there is no mens rea requirement. Thus, for example, an individual who does not know that she is “unlawfully present” in the United States within the meaning of HB 56 at the time she applies to have her car’s license plate renewed is guilty of a felony. Moreover, if her parent or child submits the application on her behalf, that person also would
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be guilty of a felony, even if that family member did not know that the applicant was not “lawfully present.” General Interpretive Provisions (Sections 5, 6, and 25)
Section 5 257. Section 5 tasks all state and local agencies and officials with the enforcement of federal immigration law and HB 56, under threat of personal civil liability, steep monetary penalties, and the loss of state funding. 258. Section 5 states that “[n]o official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including . . . an officer of a court . . . , may adopt a policy or practice that limits . . . communication between its officers and federal immigration officials in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644.” Sec. 5(a). Section 5 also requires all such officials to “fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of federal law prohibiting the entry into, presence, or residence in the United States of aliens in violation of federal immigration law.” Sec. 5(b). 259. Section 5 creates a private cause of action for any U.S. citizen or “lawfully present” immigrant to sue any official who either “adopts or implements a policy or practice that is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644.” Sec. 5(d). Officials found guilty of such violations face monetary fines of no less than $1,000 per day, and up to $5,000 per day. Sec. 5(d).
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260. Section 5 directs the state Attorney General to “report any violation of [either subsection] . . . to the Governor and the state Comptroller.” Upon such action by the state Attorney General, “that agency or political subdivision shall not be eligible to receive any funds, grants, or appropriations from the State of Alabama until such violation has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified.” Sec. 5(a).
261. Section 5 also provides that “[e]very person working for the State of Alabama or a political subdivision thereof . . . ha[s] a duty to report violations of this act.” § 5(f). Failure to report a violation amounts to “obstructing governmental operations” as defined in Alabama Code § 13A-10-2, which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 1 year, and fines up to $6,000. See Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-7, 13A-5-12.
Section 6 262. Section 6 prohibits any agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof from adopting a policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of HB 56. Sec. 6(a). 263. If the Attorney General determines that any agency violates Section 6(a), the Attorney General must report this to the Governor and Comptroller, and the agency will no longer be eligible to receive any state funding. Id.
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264. Section 6 also requires all state officials, agencies, and personnel to fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of HB 56. Sec. 6(b).
265. Under Alabama state law, sheriffs are state officers and thus bound by Section 6(b).
266. Section 6 creates a private right of action for private citizens to enforce the provisions of Section 6. Sec. 6(d).
267. Section 6 creates a new state crime for any person working for the State of Alabama, or any political subdivision thereof, from failing to report a violation of Section 6 or HB 56. Sec. 6(f).
268. Together, Sections 5 and 6 operate to ensure that Alabama officials and agencies maximally enforce each of the provisions of HB 56, and the provisions of federal immigration law as interpreted by the state Attorney General.
Section 25 269. Section 25 imposes penalties for solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy to violate any criminal provision of HB 56. 270. Under Section 25, individuals who are “harbored,” “transported,” “induced,” or allowed to rent are criminally liable along with the individuals whose conduct is directly prohibited under Section 13, on the theory that they have conspired or solicited such activity.
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Comprehensive Federal Immigration System 271. The federal government has exclusive power over immigration matters. The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government the power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government’s power to control immigration is inherent in the nation’s sovereignty. 272. Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws, agencies, and procedures regulating immigration. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 273. The extensive statutory scheme created by the INA leaves no room for supplemental state immigration laws. 274. In addition, the federal government has issued numerous regulations, policies, and procedures interpreting the provisions of the INA and has established large and complex administrative apparatuses to carry out their mandates. 275. The INA carefully calibrates the nature—criminal or civil—and the degree of penalties applicable to each possible violation of its terms. 276. The INA contains complex and exclusive procedures for determining an individual’s immigration and citizenship status, deciding whether the civil
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provisions of the immigration laws have been violated, and determining whether an individual may lawfully be removed from the United States.
277. Under the INA, a non-citizen’s immigration status may be fluid and subject to change over time. A non-citizen who enters the United States with authorization, with a student visa for example, may remain in the country past his period of authorized stay and thus no longer be in status. (Alternatively, he may overstay his original visa yet remain in status, for example, if he is eligible to change into a different visa classification.) Conversely, a non-citizen who enters the United States without authorization, for example by crossing into the country by foot while evading border authorities, may subsequently gain lawful status, such as through a successful asylum application or U-visa application.
278. The fluidity of immigration status is a fundamental feature of federal immigration law. It is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed and accommodates many important national interests including, for example, the nation’s humanitarian and international law obligations regarding asylum seekers and people fleeing torture.
279. HB 56 presumes that immigration status is definite, not subject to nuance, and readily and quickly ascertained. But those presumptions are not accurate.
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280. Under federal law, there is no single, readily ascertainable category or characteristic that establishes whether a particular person may or may not remain in the United States. The answer to that question is a legal conclusion that can only be reached through the processes set forth in the INA, and which may depend on the discretionary determinations of federal officials.
281. There are many non-citizens who are present in the United States without formal immigration status who would not be removed if placed in federal removal proceedings, or who actually have temporary permission from the federal government to be in the United States. For example, an individual without federal immigration status may be eligible for a form of immigration relief, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or withholding of removal. Some of these individuals are known to the federal government, often because they have applied for immigration relief; others will not be identified until they are actually placed in proceedings by the federal government and their cases are adjudicated.
282. In addition, some individuals like those granted Temporary Protected Status due to turmoil or natural disasters in their native countries have permission to be in the United States, but are unlikely to have one of the enumerated qualifying identity documents under HB 56.
283. The fact that some persons have permission to remain in the United States without having a formal immigration status, or despite being technically
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removable, is also a fundamental feature of federal immigration law and the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed. This system accommodates many important national interests including, for example, Congress’s desire to allow certain individuals to obtain relief from removal, and statutory limits on the detention of individuals ordered removed, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
284. Federal agencies do not and cannot determine definitively, in response to a demand from a state or local official, whether an individual is subject to removal. It is impossible to make a determination of whether an individual is lawfully in the United States based upon a search of the federal databases that are checked for an immigration status query. Such determinations involve complex questions of fact and law and are made through a federal administrative and judicial process that may take years.
285. Moreover, the federal government has established certain priorities that determine where resources for immigration enforcement are focused. For example, the federal government prioritizes the apprehension and removal of the most dangerous aliens. The federal Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), which is responsible for responding to immigration status queries from law enforcement agencies, has experienced continuous and dramatic increases in immigration status determination queries over the past four years. The verification
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process at the LESC is time-intensive and can take between 80 minutes and two days. Following congressional guidance, the LESC has prioritized its efforts in order to focus on those aliens most likely to pose a threat to their communities.
286. In addition, the federal government often exercises its prosecutorial discretion to prioritize certain cases for action over others. The federal government’s decision to exercise such discretion may be based upon a wide range of equitable factors, and its exercise in any given case cannot be predicted in advance.
287. As a result, the question whether any given non-citizen may remain in the United States depends upon a host of complicated and time-consuming legal and discretionary determinations by a variety of federal officials. It cannot be conclusively determined by a status verification query to the federal government. Inquiries made by law enforcement officers to ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) or state agencies to the federal SAVE database yield, at best, a snapshot of what a federal agency believes to be an individual’s current immigration status or eligibility for benefits, respectively, which may not correspond to the ultimate finding of whether she is subject to removal. See Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up Review of the Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration at 41 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0501/final.pdf (noting that, according to
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DHS officials, DHS’s immigration “databases cannot be relied upon to accurately determine immigration status [at any given time] because immigration status is dynamic[,]” and database entries may be outdated).
288. Thus, not all inquiries to the federal government regarding immigration status yield a clear response. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exh. 3 (David C. Palmatier Declaration), United States v. Arizona, No. 10-1413 (D. Ariz., July 7, 2010).
289. Whether a person is a citizen of the United States is not easily ascertained in the contexts demanded by HB 56. U.S. citizens are not required to carry documentary proof of their citizenship. There is no national database that contains information about every U.S. citizen. Some people are actually unaware of their U.S. citizenship because they may have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth by operation of law due to their parents’ citizenship, despite not being born in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1433. Others automatically obtain citizenship when their parents become naturalized U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431.
290. Moreover, HB 56 conflicts with and is preempted by provision of the INA that set forth comprehensive federal schemes addressing: (1) alien registration; (2) transportation and harboring; (3) work authorization and sanctions for unauthorized work; and (4) arrest authority for immigration violations. Federal registration system
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291. The INA includes a national alien registration system that displaces and preempts state alien registration laws.
292. The federal registration scheme has been in place since 1940 and was designed to create a single, uniform, national scheme.
293. The preemptive effect of the federal alien registration scheme was expressly recognized by the President of the United States when the scheme was created and has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
294. The federal regulation implementing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304, and 1306 prescribes as “evidence of registration” specific forms for compliance. See 8 C.F.R. § 264.1. The list, however, has not been updated to include some of the current federal forms that are commonly used. For example, there is no corresponding registration form available for recipients of U visas (given to victims of crime who assist in the prosecution of the case) or T visas (given to victims of human trafficking). As a result, there are categories of noncitizens who have applied for immigration benefits or whose presence in the United States is otherwise known to federal immigration agencies but who do not have registration documents that are valid under the regulations.
295. Many of the changes that have been made to the INA since the enactment of the registration provisions reflect Congress’s decision to focus on and prioritize immigration enforcement against those immigrants who commit serious
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criminal offenses. Targeting immigrants convicted of serious crimes, rather than those who may be in violation of the registration provisions, is the principal priority of federal immigration officers. Federal transportation provision
296. The INA also establishes criminal penalties for the transporting and harboring of certain non-citizens. See 8 U.S.C §§ 1324(a)(1)-(2). Violations of these provisions carry fines and prison terms ranging from five years to life. Id.
297. The federal courts are engaged in an ongoing process of interpreting the statutory language in 8 U.S.C § 1324(a) and determining the reach of the federal prohibitions therein.
298. Section 13 of HB 56 will not be interpreted consistently with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) because there are numerous and material differences between the state and federal statutes. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) does not criminalize renting, but Section 13 does. Section 1324(a)(1)(C) contains First Amendment protections regarding certain religious workers, but Section 13 does not. And § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) outlaws inducing certain aliens to enter the United States, but Section 13 concerns inducing persons to enter Alabama. Federal employment authorization and sanctions system
299. The INA contains a comprehensive scheme to regulate the employment of aliens that reflects a careful balance between multiple objectives,
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including the desire to reduce unauthorized employment, to protect workers against discrimination, and to impose manageable standards on employers and workers.
300. Congress chose to regulate alien employment in the INA by focusing on employers. Employers are required to verify the employment authorization of applicants on Form I-9, and employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers are subject to civil penalties or criminal penalties if the violation is sufficiently severe. Federal law does not impose fines or criminal penalties on unauthorized workers simply for working without authorization.
301. Alabama’s decision to criminalize unauthorized employment despite Congress’s choice of other means to address such conduct directly conflicts with federal law. Federal restrictions on arrest authority
302. Mere presence inside the United States without federal immigration status is not a criminal offense. Rather, it is a civil violation under federal immigration law.
303. State and local law enforcement officers have no general authority to enforce federal civil immigration law. Federal law specifically authorizes state officers to assist in immigration enforcement only in narrowly defined circumstances; otherwise, it reserves immigration enforcement authority to the federal government.
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304. Section 1357(g) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code allows the federal government to “enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision” to carry out “function[s] of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). These agreements are commonly referred to as “287(g) agreements” after the section of the INA in which they are codified. Such agreements, however, may be entered into only if the federal government determines the state officers are “qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer,” id., and the federal government must train and supervise each officer who is authorized under such an agreement.
305. Currently, only one county in Alabama—the Etowah County Sheriff’s Office—and the state Department of Public Safety have agreements with the federal government pursuant to this statutory provision. See U.S. ICE, Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, available at http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm.
306. The other provisions in federal law authorizing state or local participation in immigration enforcement are also carefully constrained. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(10), 1324(c), 1252c.
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307. Congress’s intent that state and local officers are generally prohibited from enforcing civil immigration laws is clear both from the statutory scheme and from legislative history. The Federal Government’s Interests in a Uniform Immigration System and Conducting Foreign Relations
308. The federal government has a core, constitutionally-protected interest in setting a uniform federal immigration scheme, and in conducting foreign relations with other nations. State immigration laws interfere with these core interests.
309. The President of the United States criticized a similar law enacted by the State of Georgia on this basis on April 26, 2011, stating: “It is a mistake for states to try to do this piecemeal. We can’t have 50 different immigration laws around the country. Arizona tried this and a federal court already struck them down.” See Matthew Bigg, Obama Criticizes New Georgia Immigration Law, Reuters, Apr. 26, 2011.
310. Janet Napolitano, the former governor of Arizona and current U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, publicly opposed a similar law enacted by the State of Arizona, saying: “The Arizona immigration law will likely hinder federal law enforcement from carrying out its priorities of detaining and removing dangerous criminal aliens.” Divisive Arizona Immigration Bill Signed Into Law,
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CBS/AP, Apr. 23, 2010, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/23/politics/ main6426125.shtml.
311. As the U.S. Department of Justice argued in its lawsuit against Arizona’s SB 1070—a law on which Alabama’s HB 56 was explicitly modeled— state laws that attempt to supplement the federal immigration scheme with a patchwork of state immigration laws “interfere with vital foreign policy and national security interests by disrupting the United States’ relationship with Mexico and other countries.” Complaint, United States v. Arizona, Case No. 101413 (D. Ariz. filed July 6, 2010) at ¶ 4.
312. Local law enforcement agencies, school districts, and other government agencies across Alabama’s sixty-seven counties inevitably will interpret HB 56’s vague and expansive provisions differently, leading to a patchwork of enforcement even within Alabama. This cacophony of enforcement poses a serious threat to the federal government’s ability to regulate immigration.
313. Because the United States’ immigration policy is inextricably intertwined with foreign relations, Alabama’s attempt to regulate immigration through HB 56 will adversely impact the United States’ ability to conduct foreign relations with other countries. HB 56 will undermine the ability of the U.S. government to speak with a single voice about immigration, including communicating to foreign nations what their nationals can expect when they come
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to visit or reside in the United States. State attempts to interfere with these inherently federal issues can have severe impacts on foreign relations.
314. HB 56 has already impaired the United States’ foreign relations by upsetting a key ally. On the day Governor Bentley signed HB 56 into law, the Mexican government expressed concern that the law will threaten the “human and civil rights of Mexicans who live in or visit Alabama,” and that it is “[in]consistent with the vision of shared responsibility, mutual respect and trust under which the governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed to conduct their bilateral relations.” Mexican Foreign Affairs Ministry, The Mexican Government Regrets the Enactment of HB 56 in Alabama (June 9, 2011), available at http:// www.sre.gob.mx/csocial/contenido/comunicados/2011/jun/cp_200a.html.
315. Alabama’s enactment of HB 56 also undercuts the United States’ stated commitment to its treaty obligations and international human rights law. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”)—part of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member—has announced that it is “troubled by Alabama’s HB 56” and that it “strongly urges the United States authorities to use the legal mechanisms that are available to amend these laws and adapt them to international human rights standards for the protection of immigrants.” IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern over Immigration
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Law in U.S. State of Alabama (June 24, 2011), at http:// www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/63-11eng.htm.
316. HB 56 also interferes with U.S. foreign relations by calling into question the federal government’s ability to ensure compliance with our country’s treaty obligations. In particular, the United States has signed and ratified two international treaties that prohibit racial profiling: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), art. 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173. Those treaties, ratified by the United States, require the U.S. government to combat racial profiling. By encouraging and authorizing racial profiling, and in light of formal statements of concern by foreign governments (see paragraph 317 below), HB 56 interferes with the United States’ compliance with its treaty obligations and subjects the United States to international censure.
317. In response to similar state anti-immigrant laws, such as Arizona SB 1070 and Georgia’s HB 87, numerous foreign governments expressed concern that such laws will cause widespread violations of the United States’ treaty obligations, which would harm their nationals living in or visiting the United States. See, e.g., Brief of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Friendly House et al. v. Whiting et al. at 1, Case No. 10-01061, Doc. No. 299 (D.
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Ariz. filed July 8, 2010); Motion of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru for Leave to Join Brief of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 3, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, et al. v. Deal, et al., Case No. 11-1804, Doc. No. 54 (N.D. Ga. filed June 15, 2011). These governments have also explained that state immigration laws, if implemented, would negatively impact foreign relations by undermining public opinion in their home countries and by making it impossible for their countries to engage on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis with the United States on important issues such as immigration and trade.
CLASS ACTION 318. The Individual Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). The class, as proposed by Plaintiffs, consists of all persons:
(a) who are or will be subject to detention, arrest, or interrogation about their citizenship or immigration status pursuant to the provisions of HB 56; or
(b) who are or will be subject to unlawful detention pursuant to the provisions of HB 56; or
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(c) who are or will be deterred from living, associating, or traveling with immigrants in Alabama because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(d) who are or will be excluded from state colleges or universities because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(e) who are or will be deterred from enrolling their children in public elementary or secondary school because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(f) who are or will be deterred from securing governmental services or governmental licenses or contracting with governmental agencies because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(g) who are or will be chilled from soliciting or speaking about work because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(h) who are or will be chilled from petitioning the government because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(i) who are or will be impaired from enforcing the rights guaranteed to them by 42 U.S.C. 1981 because of the provisions of HB 56; or
(j) who as a result of the criminal sections of HB 56 will be charged with a crime and will be impaired from receiving a fair criminal trial on the central element of immigration status because (i) the government will not be required to prove the element of immigration status beyond a reasonable doubt; (ii) the defendant will not be able to confront witnesses
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against him or her on the element of immigration status; and (iii) the defendant will not be able to introduce evidence in support of himself or herself on the element of immigration status.
319. The requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) are met here, in that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
320. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class, including: (1) whether HB 56 is preempted by the U.S. Constitution and federal law; (2) whether HB 56 violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (3) whether HB 56 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (4) whether HB 56 violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (5) whether HB 56 violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (6) whether HB 56 violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (7) whether HB 56 violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (8) whether HB 56 violates rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. These questions predominate over any questions affecting only the Individual Plaintiffs.
321. The claims of the Individual Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the proposed class.
322. All of the Individual Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all members of the proposed class because they seek relief on behalf of
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the class as a whole and have no interests antagonistic to other members of the class. The Individual Plaintiffs are also represented by pro bono counsel, including the ACLU Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project and Racial Justice Program, the National Immigration Law Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU of Alabama, the Asian Law Caucus, the Asian American Justice Center, and G. Brian Spears, who collectively have extensive expertise in class action litigation, including litigation regarding the rights of immigrants and constitutional law. Finally, Defendants have acted and will act on grounds generally applicable to the class in executing their duties to enforce HB 56, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 323. An actual and substantial controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants as to their respective legal rights and duties. Plaintiffs contend that they face an imminent threat of harm if HB 56 is enforced, and that this law violates the U.S. Constitution and federal law. Defendants are obligated to enforce this law unless it is found to be illegal. 324. In violating Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. Constitution and federal law. Defendants have acted and will be acting under color of law. 325. If allowed to go into effect, HB 56 will cause irreparable injury to Plaintiffs.
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326. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law against HB 56 other than the relief requested in this Complaint.
327. If HB 56 takes effect, the Plaintiffs and other individuals of color in Alabama will be subject to unlawful detention, arrest, and harassment including all Individual Plaintiffs and the staff and members of all the Organizational Plaintiffs, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class.
328. If allowed to take effect, HB 56 would violate the right of plaintiffs, including Plaintiffs Thau, Zamora, Jane Does 2, 4, 5, and 6, John Does 1, 3, and 4, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, to equal protection of law.
329. If allowed to take effect, HB 56 would violate the right of Plaintiffs, including Plaintiffs Jane Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and John Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, as well as members of HICA, DreamActivist, SEIU, Joint Board, UFCW, UFCW Local 1657, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, to free speech.
330. If allowed to take effect, HB 56 would violate the right of Plaintiffs, including Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Doe #2, and members of HICA, DreamActivist, ITAA, Joint Board, UFCW, UFCW Local 1657, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, to enforce contracts.
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331. If allowed to take effect, HB 56 would violate the rights of all Plaintiffs, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
332. If allowed to take effect, HB 56 would violate the rights of Plaintiffs, including Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Doe # 2, and members of HICA, DreamActivist, ITAA, Joint Board, UFCW, UFCW Local 1657, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as members of the proposed plaintiff class, guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. 1981.
333. I n addition, HB 56 will thwart the missions of Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, Joint Board, UFCW International, UFCW Local 1657, Greater Birmingham Ministries, and BPSOS by forcing them to divert their resources in order to respond to their constituents’ questions regarding their rights under the new law, which would undermine their ability to advance pre-existing organizational priorities and services.
334. In addition, HB 56 will thwart the missions of organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, SEIU, Joint Board, UFCW International, UFCW Local 1657, and DreamActivist by deterring their members from participating in membership activities.
335. In doing the things alleged in this Complaint, Defendants will deny Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal law.
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336. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 will constitute an official policy of the state of Alabama.
337. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that HB 56 is unconstitutional on its face and to an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining its enforcement.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT ONE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 338. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 339. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 340. HB 56 is void in its entirety because it is a regulation of immigration, and therefore usurps powers constitutionally vested in the federal government exclusively. 341. HB 56 also conflicts with federal laws, regulations and policies, attempts to legislate in fields occupied by the federal government, imposes burdens
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and penalties on legal residents not authorized by and contrary to federal law, and unilaterally imposes burdens on the federal government’s resources and processes, each in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
342. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution, and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT TWO FOURTH AMENDMENT; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 343. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 344. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees are applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 345. HB 56 requires officers to seize, detain, and arrest individuals without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe a person has engaged in criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 346. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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COUNT THREE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
42 U.S.C. § 1983 347. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 348. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 349. HB 56 impermissibly discriminates against non-citizens on the basis of alienage and against various classes of non-citizens on the basis of immigration status and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 350. HB 56 authorizes impermissible discrimination by Alabama state and local officers and officials on the basis of race, ethnicity, alienage, national origin, and language. 351. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT FOUR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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352. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
353. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
354. HB 56 deprives persons seeking to vindicate their liberty or property interests in civil and criminal cases in the Alabama state courts of due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
355. HB 56 permits Alabama state and local law enforcement officers to deprive persons of their liberty interests without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
356. HB 56 violates the Due Process Clause because its criminal provisions are impermissibly vague and overbroad.
357. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT FIVE FIRST AMENDMENT; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 358. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
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359. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The First Amendment’s guarantees are applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
360. Section 11 of HB 56 violates the First Amendment right to free speech because it is a content-based restriction on speech relating to work and is impermissibly vague.
361. HB 56 violates the Petition Clause of the First Amendment by depriving persons in Alabama of the right to petition the government through court actions for redress of contract disputes and by prohibiting state officials and agencies from exercising discretion not to engage in immigration enforcement to the fullest extent of the law.
362. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT SIX CONTRACTS CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 363. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
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364. The Contracts Clause, Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, provides, in pertinent part, that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
365. Section 27 of HB 56 unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contracts by forbidding courts of the State of Alabama from enforcing “the terms, or otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and alien unlawfully present in the United States, within the meaning of HB 56, if the party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States at the time the contract was entered into, and the performance of the contract required the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.”
366. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT SEVEN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 367. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
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368. The Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
369. HB 56 creates new state crimes that contain as a central element the determination of a person’s immigration status.
370. HG 56’s criminal provisions require that immigration status be determined by one exclusive means only: a verification from the federal government. HB 56 explicitly prohibits consideration of any other evidence on this element.
371. HB 56 violates the Confrontation Clause because the defendant is prohibited from confronting the witness who prepared the federal government verification, and the state court is prohibited from considering any evidence except for the federal government verification.
372. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT EIGHT SIXTH AMENDMENT COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE;
42 U.S.C. § 1983
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373. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
374. The Compulsory Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”
375. HB 56’s criminal provisions violate the Compulsory Process Clause and the Due Process Clause because the defendant is prohibited from presenting a defense on the issue of whether he or she possesses lawful immigration status.
376. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT NINE 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 377. The foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 378. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Codes provides, in pertinent part: (a) Statement of equal rights All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
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pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. (b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
379. HB 56 deprives persons classified by Alabama officers and officials
as “alien[s] unlawfully present in the United States” of the rights enumerated in 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
380. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of
the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing facts and arguments, Plaintiffs
request that the Court:
a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
b. Declare that HB 56 is unconstitutional in its entirety;
c. Enjoin Defendants from enforcing HB 56;
d. Grant Plaintiffs’ costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees
and other expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988; and
e. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: July 8, 2011

Respectfully submitted, 116

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/s/ Mary Bauer Mary Bauer

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe* Naomi Tsu* Daniel Werner* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* Vivek Mittal* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER

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Sin Yen Ling*

405 14th Street, Suite 1400

ASIAN LAW CAUCUS

Oakland, California 94612

55 Columbus Avenue

T: (510) 663-8282

San Francisco, CA 94111

broder@nilc.org

T: (415) 896-1701 x 110

sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R)

Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama

Erin E. Oshiro*

Foundation

ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE

Rubio Law Firm, P.C.

CENTER,

438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1

MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN Birmingham, AL 35209

CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE T: (205) 443-7858

1140 Connecticut Ave., NW

frubio@rubiofirm.com

Suite 1200

Washington, DC 20036

Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H)

T: (202) 296-2300

Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E)

eoshiro@advancingequality.org

Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137-

T64J)

G. Brian Spears*

Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP

1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E.

203 Greene Street

Atlanta, Georgia 30306

P.O. Box 18368

T: (404) 872-7086

Huntsville, Alabama 35804

Bspears@mindspring.com

T: (256) 536-7423

watson@watsonmckinney.com

Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001)

mckinney@watsonmckinney.com

THE BRUNER LAW FIRM

artrip@watsonmckinney.com

1904 Berryhill Road

Montgomery, Alabama 36117

T: (334) 201 0835

brunerlawfirm@gmail.com

* Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 36 Filed 07/20/11 Page 1 of 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

FILED
2011 Jul-20 PM 04:47 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST

)

COALITION OF ALABAMA,

)

et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official )

capacity as Governor of the State )

of Alabama, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND TO STRIKE

Pursuant to Rules 12(e) and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Morton, Chancellor

Hill, and District Attorney Broussard (the State Defendants) respectfully move the

Court to direct the Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement as the Complaint

for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doc. 1, (the Complaint) is a disfavored

shotgun pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), and to strike (or, in the alternative, direct

the Plaintiffs, in providing a more definite statement, to avoid) “any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), as set forth in

detail below.

1

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1. This litigation concerns a challenge to the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act No. 2011-535.1
2. It is brought by twenty four (24) Plaintiffs—half of whom are organizations and half of whom are individuals—against eleven (11) Defendants who hold office at the State, county or local level. Additionally, another dozen individuals are seeking leave to proceed using pseudonyms. See Doc. 2.
3. Because only two Sections of Act No. 2011-535 have taken effect as of this time, the challenge is necessarily a facial one.2
4. The Plaintiffs frame their challenge as directed at Act No. 2011-535 in its entirety, see e.g., ¶ 2, though the Act contains a severability clause3 and the Complaint does not assert fault with respect to each provision of the Act.4

1

Plaintiffs refer to Act No. 2011-535 by the House Bill number assigned to the legislation

while it was being considered and passed by the Alabama Legislature and before it was signed

into law by Governor Bentley. Because the legislation has been enacted, the State Defendants

refer to the Act number.

2

Section 34 of Act No. 2011-535 sets out the effective dates of the various provisions of

the Act. Only Sections 22 and 23 took effect immediately. Section 22 authorizes the Alabama

Department of Homeland Security to “hire, appoint and maintain APOST certified [S]tate law

enforcement officers” and Section 23 authorizes the Department “to coordinate with [S]tate and

local law enforcement the practice and methods required to enforce this [A]ct in cooperation

with federal immigration authorities and consistent with federal immigration laws.”

Section 34 provides that most of the provisions of Act No. 2011-535 take effect on September 1, 2011, though there are State Constitutional reasons as to why many of these provisions might not take effect at the county or municipal level until October 1, 2011. Other provisions of the Act do not take effect until next year.

3

Section 33 of Act No. 2011-535 provides: “The provisions of this [A]ct are severable. If

any part of this [A]ct is declared invalid or unconstitutional, that declaration shall not affect the

part which remains.”

2

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Motion for More Definite Statement

5. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

6. In pertinent part, Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . . If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

7. Applied here, Plaintiffs should have informed each of the State

Defendants—and the Court—which Plaintiffs are bringing which claims against

them. Moreover, each claim should have been separately set out, identifying the

challenged provision in Act No. 2011-535, the federal law or theory supporting

Plaintiffs’ challenge, and any facts in support thereof.

8. As it is, the Complaint begins with a Preliminary Statement, asserts

that jurisdiction exists and venue is proper, and identifies the parties. Doc. 1 at

4

For instance, the Complaint contains no reference to the E-Verify requirements in

Sections 9 and 15 of the Act, perhaps because of the United States Supreme Court’s recent

decision upholding Arizona’s E-Verify requirements. Chamber of Commerce of the United

States of America v. Whiting, 563 U.S. _____, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011). Similarly, the Complaint

contains no reference to the voter registration provisions of Section 29 of the Act.

3

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¶¶ 1-172. It then launches into a Facts section that purports to address the history and intent of Act No. 2011-535 before discussing various elements of the legislation and morphing into a brief on federal immigration law. Id. at ¶¶ 173317. The Complaint next asserts that a class action is proper, id. at ¶¶ 318-322, and offers a sort of overview of the asserted entitlement to relief, id. at ¶¶ 323-337. Only then does the Complaint turn to the actual Causes of Action asserted, and it does so in a superficial and global way. Id. at ¶¶ 338-380. The Complaint wraps up with a broad Prayer for Relief. Id. at p. 116.
9. By “superficial and global way,” we mean that each and every Cause of Action begins with the statement that “[t]he foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein,” doc. 1 at ¶¶ 338, 343, 347, 352, 358, 363, 367, 373 and 377, and then briefly attempts to state a claim.
10. Read literally, each Cause of Action incorporates by reference the Causes of Action that come before it. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 343, 347, 352, 358, 363, 367, 373 and 377.
11. Similarly, the briefing on federal immigration law is incorporated into claims asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment, see doc. 1 at ¶ 343, the First Amendment, id. at ¶ 358, and the Contracts Clause, id. at ¶ 363, among others.
12. No Cause of Action identifies any particular Plaintiff as bringing it. This is problematic both to a basic understanding of the allegations and because
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“[s]tanding is not dispensed in gross. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. Federal Election Com'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
13. No Cause of Action identifies any particular Defendant at which it is aimed. Apparently then, for example, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Superintendent Morton accountable for a Fourth Amendment violation, see Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 343-346, and Chancellor Hill stands accused of violating the Confrontation Clause, id. at ¶¶ 367-372. This cannot be.
14. Only a few Causes of Action mention which specific provision of Act No. 2011-535 is alleged to violate federal law pursuant to the theory asserted therein. So, for example, it is the “criminal provisions” which are alleged to be “impermissibly vague and overbroad,” though the State Defendants are not put on notice as to which of the many “criminal provisions” – or portions thereof – are purportedly vague. Doc. 1 at ¶ 356.
15. Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause claim apparently purports to be directed at every single provision of Act No. 2011-535 when it alleges that the Act “impermissibly discriminates against non-citizens on the basis of alienage and against various classes of non-citizens5 on the basis of immigration status and

5

Which classes is not explained. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 349.

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deprives them of equal protection of the laws” and “authorizes impermissible discrimination by Alabama [S]tate and local officers and officials on the basis of race, ethnicity, alienage, national origin and language.” Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 349-350.
16. Exactly what the Plaintiffs could be claiming in these paragraphs becomes even more unclear when one considers that this is a facial challenge and on its face Act No. 2011-535 repeatedly and explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. See, e.g., Section 7(d) of Act No. 2011535 (“An agency of this [S]tate or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this [S]tate may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section.”) (emphasis added).
17. Even more obviously, it is inconceivable that every Plaintiff could have a Confrontation Clause claim or a Compulsory Process Clause claim against every Defendant based on every provision of Act No. 2011-535, yet that is precisely what the Complaint purports to assert. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 367-376.
18. In pertinent part, Rule 12(e) provides, “A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
19. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals frowns on shotgun pleadings, like this one, and has indicated that defendants facing them should rely on Rule
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12(e) to put a quick end to them.6 Cf. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128 (11th

Cir. 2001) (“The complaints in this case were ‘so vague and ambiguous that [the

defendants] [could] not reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.’

None of the defendants, however, moved the court to order the plaintiff to file a

more definite statement; instead, the defendants simply answered the

complaints.”).

20. “The unacceptable consequences of shotgun pleading are many.

First, and perhaps foremost, shotgun pleading inexorably broadens the scope of

discovery, much of which may be unnecessary.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 981 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted). This is because—

when a defendant fails to move for a more definite statement—a shotgun

Complaint can lead to a shotgun Answer, and “[s]uch disjointed pleadings make it

difficult, if not impossible, to set the boundaries for discovery.” Byrne, 261 F.3d at

1129.

21. “Second, in addition to delaying a just disposition of the case at the

undue expense of one or both of the parties, shotgun pleadings, if tolerated by the

court, lessen the time and resources the court has available to reach and dispose of

the cases and litigants waiting to be heard.” Davis, 516 F.3d at 982 (footnote

6

Shotgun pleadings contain “a long list of general allegations, most of which are

immaterial to most of the claims for relief,” and which “are incorporated by reference into each

count of the complaint.” Johnson Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d

1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 36 Filed 07/20/11 Page 8 of 25

omitted); see also Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1131 (“Shotgun pleadings, if tolerated, harm the court by impeding its ability to administer justice. The time a court spends managing litigation framed by shotgun pleadings should be devoted to other cases waiting to be heard.”).
22. “Third, shotgun pleadings wreak havoc on appellate court dockets.” Davis, 516 F.3d at 982. When litigation involves “nebulous pleadings” which “the district court[ fails] to strip the case down [to] identify each claim and defense,” then the Eleventh Circuit may “ha[ve] to undertake that task from scratch.” Davis, 516 F.3d at 982.
23. “Fourth, the mischief shotgun pleadings causes undermines the public’s respect for the courts – the ability of the courts to process efficiently, economically, and fairly the business placed before them.” Davis, 516 F.3d at 983 (footnote omitted).7
24. The Eleventh Circuit has also recognized, “Lawyers being compensated by the hour may have little incentive to curb the use of shotgun pleadings and the discovery disputes that inevitably result.” Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1129 n. 103.8

7

The Davis Opinion includes a fifth attack on shotgun pleadings, but it is specific to Title

VII cases and, therefore, inapplicable here. See Davis, 516 F.3d at 983.

8

On this point, we note that there are in excess of twenty lawyers appearing for Plaintiffs

and counsel seeks fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Doc. 1 at p. 116.

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25. For all of these reasons, this Court should direct the Plaintiffs to replead their Complaint in compliance with Rules 8 and 10, as informed by Rule 12(e) and the Eleventh Circuit’s aversion to shotgun pleadings.
26. In doing so, the Plaintiffs should necessarily be forced to clearly state their exact causes of action, the Plaintiffs asserting each one, the Defendants accused in each one, the legal grounds for each, and any relevant factual support.
27. This may well lead to a situation where the amended complaint seems to include more claims than the current Complaint, when in fact it only sets out the claims with more clarity. For example, Count Five is labeled “First Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and seems to include a Speech claim aimed at one provision of Act No. 2011-535 and a Petition Clause claim aimed at a separate, unidentified provision of the Act. From all that has been said, it should be obvious that these are separate claims and should be so delineated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count . . . .”).
28. The State Defendants, the Court, and the public would all benefit from a tight, logical Complaint that clearly sets out the Plaintiffs’ attacks on Act No. 2011-535.
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Motion to Strike 29. Turning from the motion for a more definite statement to the motion to strike, Rule 12(f) provides that on motion or sua sponte a “court may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A court may strike such matter sua sponte or on motion. Id. 30. To some extent, it may not be possible to identify every matter appropriately stricken given that the Complaint is vague and ambiguous, as set out above, such that it is not always clear whether a particular statement is immaterial. Nonetheless, there are an abundance of readily identifiable improper statements. Many of these are set out in detail below, but the omission of any statement below is not intended as an admission by the State Defendants that the statement is proper or otherwise not subject to being stricken. 31. To begin, the Preliminary Statement reads like a press release. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1-6. It is full of speculation and to the extent, if any, that it sheds light on the Plaintiffs’ claims, it is redundant of properly pled causes of action. 32. The allegation that Act No. 2011-535 “is reminiscent of the worst aspects of Alabama’s history in its pervasive and systematic targeting of a class of persons through punitive [S]tate laws that seek to render every aspect of daily life more difficult and less equal,” doc. 1 at ¶ 1, is particularly impertinent and scandalous, and should be stricken.
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33. Similarly, portions of the Declaratory and Injunctive Relief section are redundant of properly pled causes of action. Paragraphs 328 through 332 seem to tie some Plaintiffs to some claims, in a manner that suggests the State Defendants and this Court should connect the dots themselves.
34. The Complaint’s repeated references to immigration laws passed by other States and how Courts evaluating those laws have ruled are immaterial. Doc. 1 at ¶ 1, 211, 215, 235, 244. Of course, in briefing the issues, the Plaintiffs may refer to case law from other jurisdictions to the extent that it is applicable and for whatever persuasive value it may have. As to the Complaint, however, these matters do nothing to set out “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); they are immaterial and should be stricken.
35. Likewise, statements about the Plaintiffs’ political views and motivations for bringing the litigation are immaterial and should be be stricken. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 38 (“The Joint Board joins this lawsuit to preserve its ability to organize new members and to protect the rights and interests of its members and prospective members.”); 62 (Plaintiff Webster is a Republican); 67 (“Plaintiff Webster believes immigration reform is necessary, but that this needs to happen at the federal level, and laws like HB 56 [sic] are counterproductive and incredibly punitive to immigrants in Alabama.”); 123 (Jane Doe #3 “is offended that the law would criminalize her family life.”).
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36. Statements about the Plaintiffs’ fears as to how Act No. 2011-535 will be implemented, and the speculations of Plaintiffs and/or their counsel, are immaterial and due to be stricken; this is a facial challenge and the question is whether the Act violates federal law on its face, not as-applied in the mind of any Plaintiff or lawyer. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 13 (final sentence speculating that individuals will be deterred from reporting crimes); 19 (second and third sentences speculating about reluctance to interact with Plaintiff AAC and frustration of AAC’s efforts); 26 (Plaintiff ITAA’s members “could be forced . . . .”); 27 (Plaintiff ITAA’s members may be required to disclose immigration status of clients and “fear that they will lose clients”); 34 (speculating about the impact of implementation of Act No. 2011-535 on members of Plaintiff organizations and how that will impact the organizations, as well as on how members will react); 36 (speculating about how employers will react, thereby impacting Plaintiff organization membership); 37 (speculating that “people will be afraid to associate with someone whose racial/ethnic appearance will increase the risk that the driver will be stopped for a minor traffic offense, leading to further police scrutiny and possible criminal prosecution under the law”); 39 (speculating about contracts that the Plaintiff organization “could be prohibited from enforcing”); 44 (“the UFCW Unions fear that HB 56 [sic] . . . will deter employees” from engaging in various activities because said employees will fear discriminatory treatment); 45 (UFCW
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Unions “fear that lawyers” they use “will feel pressured”); 50 (DreamActivist’s “younger members will be afraid to enroll in public elementary or secondary school”); 51(DreamActivist’s members “will leave the [S]tate” or “be too afraid to attend DreamActivist events”); 54 (Plaintiff organization fears prosecution); 55 (Plaintiff organization’s members fear prosecution); 56 (Plaintiff organization’s members fear children will not be able to attend school because enrollment could lead to detainment and deportation); 65 (“. . . Plaintiff Webster fears how the law will affect the many Hispanics living in Alabama, and particularly how it will affect his two sons”); 66 (“Plaintiff Webster also fears what will happen to his children at school when he is required to enroll them and disclose their status.”); 70 (Plaintiff Zamora “fears that” she will be stopped by police who “will not understand that the federal immigration agency is aware of her presence in the country and that she is permitted to remain in the [US]”); 71 (Plaintiff Zamora “fears racial profiling” as well as “unlawful interrogation and detention”); 76 (“Plaintiff Long is concerned that HB 56 [sic] will require her to disclose . . . .”); 83, 84 & 86 (Plaintiff Thau “in concerned” about criminal prosecution); 85 (Plaintiff Thau knows people who are afraid); 87 (Plaintiff Thau is concerned about school enrollment and school reactions to the law); 99 (Plaintiff Upton fears criminal prosecution); 108 (Plaintiff Cummings “believes that [Act No. 2011-535 will deter individuals from renting her properties and cause her business to
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suffer”); 113 (Plaintiff Jane Doe # 1 “is concerned” about police reaction and “fears they will not understand”); 115 (Plaintiff Jane Doe # 1 is concerned about the impact that the law will have on her family and asserts that her daughter is “traumatized”); 118 (assuming discriminatory implementation of the law); 120 (concern about enrollment and how a potential decision to home school will impact family finances); 125 (concern about husband’s death and impact thereof on enforcement of contract); 136 (“Jane Doe #5 will also have difficulty finding friends who are documented who are willing to help her family . . . .”); 146 (“fearful of . . . what will happen to him if he is ever stopped by a police officer”); 148 (“Plaintiff John Doe #2 is deeply concerned that HB 56 [sic] will undermine his children’s ability to pursue their educations.”); 150 (“fears prosecution”); 154 (fear of racial profiling); 162 (“worried that he will be targeted, harassed, and potentially arrested”); 165 (“fears that police will target and arrest him”); 196 (detentions will be “prolonged”); 197 & 208 (the “immigration verification process” will be “lengthy and intrusive”); 201 (“police encounters” will be “unreasonably prolong[ed]”); 202 (speculating about the impact of the law on federal authorities); 204, 205 & 209 (speculating about racial profiling); 210 (speculating about how persons will respond to the police); 249 (“The effect of Section 27 will be to . . . .”); 312 (speculating about “inevitably . . . different[]” interpretations by various government officials “leading to a patchwork of
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enforcement even within Alabama”). Should Plaintiffs wish to amend their

Complaint to challenge Act No. 2011-535 once the law is effective, this Court may

allow an amendment to include actual, rather than speculative, facts, which the Plaintiffs will shoulder the burden of proving.9

37. Repeatedly the Complaint muses about the inconvenience to certain

organizational Plaintiffs of having to dedicate resources to helping persons

understand Act No. 2011-535. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 18 (third, fourth, and fifth sentences);

23 (final three sentences); 29; 38 (first two sentences); 45 (first and second

sentence); 61. This is not a legally cognizable injury and appears to be immaterial

to any Cause of Action, see Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 338-380, though we recognize that the

Complaint does mention this “thwart[ing of] the missions” of certain

organizational Plaintiffs in the Declaratory and Injunctive Relief section, id. at ¶

333. If a Cause of Action is not intended, the statements are immaterial and due to

be stricken. If a Cause of Action is intended, the State Defendants will have the

opportunity to address the same in a future motion.

38. Relatedly, the concerns of the Greater Birmingham Ministries as to

reduced membership or support based on Act No. 2011-535 and GBM’s public

opposition thereto are immaterial and speculative. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57-58.

9

The State Defendants recognize, of course, that the various speculative statements in the

Complaint may be addressed through a motion to dismiss once the statements have been

meaningfully tied to claims if it is revealed that the claims themselves are not ripe or that the

Plaintiffs lack standing. Nonetheless, speculative statements are as out-of-place in a properly

pled Complaint as speculative claims.

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39. And Plaintiff Barber’s concerns that a change in the law will impact his law practice cannot possibly state a claim and are, therefore, immaterial. Doc. 1 at ¶ 94.
40. Plaintiff Jane Doe #6 is not allowed to assert the injuries of a third party (her son) as her own, and accordingly paragraphs 139 and 141 are immaterial. For the same reason, Plaintiff John Doe #2’s concerns about his children’s education are immaterial to a Complaint not brought by him on their behalf. Doc. 1 at ¶ 148.
41. That the Attorney General is the State’s lawyer is immaterial to his suitability as a defendant in this litigation and, therefore, immaterial. Doc. 1 at ¶ 167 (second sentence).
42. The Facts section of the Complaint contains a sub-section labeled History and Intent of HB 56 [sic]. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 173-193. This sub-section is replete with quotations attributed to individual legislators which are apparently intended by the Plaintiffs to definitively characterize the intent of the Alabama Legislature as whole. It is not at all clear that the intent of the Alabama Legislature is in any way relevant to any claim asserted by the Plaintiffs; if it is not, the statements are due to be stricken as immaterial. In the event that the intent of the
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Alabama Legislature is relevant, it is highly doubtful that it can be proven by the
hand-selected statements of a few legislators.10
43. The statement that the “[S]tate deems [persons] to be unworthy of
continued residence”, Doc. 1 at ¶ 195, is impertinent and scandalous. It is the
federal government that has made a determination that certain persons may not
lawfully reside in this country, and it has done so pursuant to its Constitutional and
inherent sovereign authority.
44. Paragraph 198 asserts that Act No. 2011-535 is a change of policy and
“undermines [certain S]tate priorities.” Since, as a sovereign, the State of Alabama
has every right to change its policies and set its own priorities, which it may also
change at leisure, this paragraph is immaterial.
45. The statement that Act No. 2011-535 “encourag[es] and authoriz[es]
racial profiling,” doc. 1 at ¶ 316, see also id. at 204, 205 & 209, is not only
speculative but also impertinent and scandalous in light of the fact that this is a
10 Cf. U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’ purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.”) (footnote omitted; emphasis added); Eagerton v. Terra Resources, Inc., 426 So.2d 807, 809 (Ala. 1982) (“The motives or reasons of an individual legislator are not relevant to the intent of the full legislature in passing the bill.”)
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facial challenge and the law states on its face that discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin is expressly prohibited. See, e.g., Section 7(d) of Act No. 2011-535 (“An agency of this [S]tate or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this [S]tate may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section.”) (emphasis added).
46. For these reasons, the Court should strike (or, in the alternative, direct the Plaintiffs, in providing a more definite statement, to avoid) the “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), in the Complaint.
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Respectfully submitted,
LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
BY:
s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us
Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Morton, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 20, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Mary Bauer Samuel J. Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org sam.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecilia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.343.0775 Wang
415.343.0778 Desormeau 415.343.0777 Sugarman Facsimile: 415.395.0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.896.1701 ext. 110 Facsimile: 415.896.1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 36 Filed 07/20/11 Page 21 of 25
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: 404.521.6700 Lapointe & Werner
404.221.5846 Tsu Facsimile: 404.221.5857 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.296.2300 Facsimile: 202.296.2318 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
G. Brian Spears G. BRIAN SPEARS PC 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Telephone: 404.872.7086 Facsimile: 404.892.1128 bspears@mindspring.com
Ben E. Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 Telephone: 334.201.0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 36 Filed 07/20/11 Page 22 of 25
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2676 Segura
212.549.2664 Mukherjee 212.549.2620 Jadwat 212.549.2616 Gelernt Facsimile: 212.549.2654 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Vivek Mittal NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 Telephone: 213.639.3900 Facsimile: 213.639.3911 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: 510.663.8282 Facsimile: 510.663.2028 broder@nilc.org
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Freddy Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: 205.443.7858 Facsimile: 205.433.7853 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street Post Office Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35801 Telephone: 256.536.7423 Facsimile: 256.536.2689 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Counsel for Co-Defendants
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, Alabama 35283-0709 Telephone: 205.521.8000 Facsimile: 205.488.6275 dsweeney@babc.com
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and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Andrew H. Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 andrew.turner@splcenter.org
Michael K.T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.7303
Co-Defendants for whom Counsel has not yet entered a Notice of Appearance
E. Casey Wardyndki Superintendent, Huntsville City Schools 200 White Street Huntsville, Alabama 35801
Jamie Blair Superintendent, Vestavia Hills City Schools 1204 Montgomery Highway Vestavia Hills, Alabama 35216
Charles D. Warren Superintendent, DeKalb County Schools 306 Main Street West Rainsville, Alabama 35986-1668
Barbara W. Thompson Superintendent, Montgomery Public Schools 307 South Decatur Street Montgomery, Alabama 36104
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 36 Filed 07/20/11 Page 25 of 25
Jeffrey E. Langham Superintendent, Elmore County Schools 100 H.H. Robison Drive Wetumpka, Alabama 36092
Additionally, a courtesy copy of this pleading is being sent by email to the following, whom we have been informed will represent the non-State Defendants:
J.R. Brooks, Jr. LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804-2087 Telephone: 256.535.1100 Facsimile: 256.533.9322 jrb@lfsp.com
s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us
Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Morton, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard
25

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37 Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 83

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Governor Robert Bentley, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 83
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND....................................................................................1
State Immigration Investigation and Detention (Sections 12, 18, 19, & 20) ......2 Alabama State Alien Registration Scheme (Section 10).....................................3 Provisions Blocking Students from Immigrant Families from Public
Schools, Colleges and Universities (Sections 8 & 28) .................................3 State Laws Criminalizing Work (Section 11)......................................................5 State Alien Harboring Crimes (Section 13).........................................................6 State Laws Penalizing Transactions with Immigrants (Sections 27 & 30) .........6 Provisions Limiting Ability to Present a Defense (Sections 10, 11, & 13).........8 Provisions Mandating Enforcement of Immigration Laws (Sections 5 & 6)......8 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................9 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS .............10
A. HB 56 Is an Unconstitutional State Law Regulating Immigration....... 10 B. HB 56 Violates the Supremacy Clause Because It Conflicts with
Federal Law........................................................................................... 18 1. Alabama State Classifications of Aliens .......................................... 19 2. State and Local Law Enforcement Requirement to Investigate
and Detain for Immigration Purposes .............................................. 22 3. State Alien Registration Scheme...................................................... 26 4. Criminal Penalties for Immigrant Workers...................................... 28 5. State Alien Harboring Crimes .......................................................... 30
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6. Prohibition on the Right to Make and Enforce Contracts................ 33 7. HB 56 Impermissibly Burdens the Federal Government................. 35 C. HB 56 Violates the Fourth Amendment ............................................... 40 1. Prolonged Detention During Stops .................................................. 41 2. Prolonged Detention in State and County Jails................................ 45 D. HB 56 Violates the Equal Protection Clause ........................................ 46 1. Section 8 Unconstitutionally Excludes Lawful Noncitizens from
Higher Education Institutions .......................................................... 46 2. Section 28 Unconstitutionally Deters Children in Immigrant
Families from Enrolling in Public School........................................ 48 E. Section 11 Violates the First Amendment’s Right to Freedom of
Expression ............................................................................................. 53 F. HB 56 Violates Core Sixth Amendment Trial Rights .......................... 57
1. Sections 10, 11, and 13 Violate the Confrontation Clause .............. 58 2. HB 56 Violates the Compulsory Process Clause ............................. 60 II. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF HB 56 IS NOT PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED ........................................................61 III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS STRONGLY FAVORS THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTION ...........................................................68 IV. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.......69 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................70
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 2011 WL 1484077 (N.D. Ala. 2011) .........................56 Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009) ..............................................................42 Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004) ...........................................................45 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ...........................................................64 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876, __ U.S. __, 2011 WL 2472799
(June 23, 2011).....................................................................................................58 Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) .............. 54, 55 CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) ..56 Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) ....................69 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) .......................................................60 Clean Up '84 v. Heinrich, 759 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) .....................................56 Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale,No. 04-3521
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005)......................................................................................66 Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) .........................................62 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)................... 18, 26, 31 De Malherbe v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121
(N.D. Cal. 1977)...................................................................................................34 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)............................................................ passim Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) .......................................................................66 Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000)........64
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English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)...................................................17 Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1991) .................................................53 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) ....................................................................42 Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) ....................32 Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania., 458 U.S. 375 (1982) ...........34 Georgia Latino Alliance For Human Rights (“GLAHR”) v. Deal,
11-CV-1804, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011) ....................... passim Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Gumbs, No. 10-3342, 2011 WL 1667438
(3d Cir. May 4, 2011)...........................................................................................59 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ............................................. 15, 47, 48 Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1984)...................62 Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ...............................................62 Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974)....................34 Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) .........................14 Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ......................................................... passim Jones v. Cochran, No. 92-6913, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20625
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 1994) .......................................................................................45 KH Outdoor, LLC v. Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) .............. 61, 66, 68 Kinney v. Int’l. Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271
(7th Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................................66 Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) ........................68 L.I.H. ex rel. L.H. v. New York City Bd. Of Educ., 103 F. Supp. 2d 658
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) ...................................................................................................64
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Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)......................................................44 Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001)....................................................51 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010)................................. 31, 32 Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936) ..............35 Martinez-Medina v. Holder, No. 06-75778, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 855791
(9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) .......................................................................................24 McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)..........................10 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) ............................... 57, 58 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) ..........................................61 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) .....................................................................42 Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co.,
22 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 1994)..................................................................................67 Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
112 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ................................................................68 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).............................................................. 47, 48 One World One Family Now v. City of Miami Beach, 175 F.3d 1282
(11th Cir. 1999) ....................................................................................................53 Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................17 Pena v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Atlanta, 620 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ga. 1985) .... 47, 48 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).................................................................. passim Republic of Panama v. Air Panama Internacional, S.A.,
745 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1988) .......................................................................69 Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 906 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1995)...........................45
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S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) ....................... 54, 55 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) ............................................. 61, 68 Smith v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999) .............................53 Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) ....... 54, 55 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)..................................34 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) ....................................................................60 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................................................................ 42, 43, 62 Thomas v. Davidson Acad., 846 F. Supp. 611 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) .........................64 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) .................................................................... 11, 19 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011),
aff’g 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) ................................................... passim United States v. Choudhury, 461 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................44 United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2005) .................................42 United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192 (11th Cir. 1997) .....................................42 United States v. Madarikan, 356 Fed. App’x 532 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2009).............59 United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................59 United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................59 United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1999)..........................................42 United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) .......................................42 United States v. Salinas-Valenciano, 220 Fed. App’x 879 (10th Cir. 2007) ..........59 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ...........................................................42
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United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) ....................................................56 United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1990)..........................................43 United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008) ...........................................24 United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2002) .........................................29 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)................53 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch ("Farmers
Branch 2008"), 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008)................................ 22, 32 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch ("Farmers
Branch 2010"), 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010).................... 15, 27, 32, 69 Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572 (11th Cir. 1990).............................................44 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) ...............................................................60 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)..........................................................44 Wis. Dep’t of Indus. Lab & Hum. Rel. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) ..... 26, 39 Statutes 8 U.S.C. § 41 ..................................................................................................... 34, 35 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ....................................................................................................4, 32 8 U.S.C. § 1103 ........................................................................................................23 8 U.S.C. § 1157 ........................................................................................................46 8 U.S.C. § 1158 ........................................................................................................46 8 U.S.C. § 1182 ........................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1252c ............................................................................................... 22, 23 8 U.S.C. § 1304 ....................................................................................................3, 27
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8 U.S.C. § 1306 ....................................................................................................3, 27 8 U.S.C. § 1324 ............................................................................... 22, 23, 29, 30, 31 8 U.S.C. § 1324a ..................................................................................................5, 29 8 U.S.C. § 1357 ................................................................................................. 23, 25 8 U.S.C. § 1373 ................................................................................... 8, 9, 20, 21, 49 8 U.S.C. § 1644 ............................................................................................... 8, 9, 49 20 U.S.C. § 1232g ....................................................................................................49 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ............................................................................................... 33, 35 42 U.S.C. § 10401 ....................................................................................................31 Regulations 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 .....................................................................................................32 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12 .................................................................................................32 24 C.F.R. § 5.508 .....................................................................................................31 Other 65 Fed. Reg. 58301 (Sept. 28, 2000) .......................................................................21
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INTRODUCTION Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), Plaintiffs hereby move for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing House Bill 56 (“HB 56”). Ala. Laws Act 2011-535. (Doc. No. 1-2, Ex. A to Compl.) Federal courts have already enjoined similar state immigration laws in Arizona and Georgia. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’g 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (“GLAHR”) v. Deal, 11-CV-1804, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011). Governor Robert Bentley proclaimed that Alabama’s HB 56 is “the strongest immigration bill in the country.”1 Indeed, HB 56 is a state immigration law of unprecedented reach. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court should enjoin HB 56 because it is a blatantly unconstitutional state law that regulates immigration and will require Alabama state and local officers to violate core constitutional rights. The requested injunction is urgently needed to prevent this unconstitutional law from causing irreparable injury to Plaintiffs and countless other individuals.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Alabama HB 56 is a comprehensive state-law system of immigration regulation. It is designed to impose new punishments for violations of immigration
1 Samuel King, Sheriffs’ Association, Dept. of Justice To Meet Concerning Immigration Law, WSFA.com (June 24, 2011), available at http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=14974594.
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law (as defined by state law and state officers); to cause the detention and expulsion of those the State deems to be unworthy of continued residence; to restrict the civil and human rights of suspected undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of driving them out of the state; and to effectively require all Alabamians, particularly lawful immigrants and citizens of color, to carry documents establishing their immigration and citizenship status at all times, and to subject them to verification of that status in routine transactions undertaken in the course of daily life. HB 56’s provisions impermissibly regulating immigration include the following: State Immigration Investigation and Detention (Sections 12, 18, 19, & 20)
HB 56 mandates state and local law enforcement officers to detain persons for the purpose of immigration enforcement. Section 12(a) of HB 56 requires every state and local law enforcement officer in Alabama to investigate the immigration status of any person the officer stops, arrests or detains if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the person is “unlawfully present in the United States.” Under Section 12, an officer may demand that any person subject to “any lawful stop, detention, or arrest” produce one of six state-approved identity documents. HB 56 §§ 12(a), (d) (emphasis added). Only individuals who can produce such a document receive a presumption that they are not “unlawfully present.” HB 56 § 12(d). If an individual cannot produce such a document, then
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the officer is required to investigate his or her “citizenship and immigration status” by contacting the federal government. This necessarily will result in prolonging the stop strictly for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Sections 18, 19 and 20 mandate the continued custodial detention of individuals in Alabama jails, even after any lawful basis for custody has expired, solely on the basis of suspected federal civil immigration violations. HB 56 §§ 18(d), 19(b), 20. Alabama State Alien Registration Scheme (Section 10)
Section 10 of HB 56 enacts a state-law alien registration regime by creating the new state crime of “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document.” The statute makes it a crime for “an alien unlawfully present in the United States” to be “in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a),” referring to existing federal statutes that impose certain requirements that noncitizens register with the federal government and carry registration documents. Among other penalties, violations of this new state crime may result in incarceration. HB 56 § 10(f). Provisions Blocking Students from Immigrant Families from Public Schools, Colleges and Universities (Sections 8 & 28)
HB 56 contains broad provisions that are aimed at blocking children and young people from attending Alabama public schools, from kindergarten through colleges and universities, if they are noncitizens or even if they are simply the
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children of noncitizens. Section 8 provides that only U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”), and individuals who hold a “nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” can enroll in or attend an Alabama public postsecondary institution. Section 8 thus excludes noncitizens whom the federal government has authorized to remain in the United States but who do not hold LPR status or a “nonimmigrant visa”—including inter alia those whom the federal government has granted asylum, refugee status, Temporary Protected Status because of environmental disaster or armed conflict in their home countries, or deferred action.
Section 28 of HB 56 deters and burdens access to K-12 public education by requiring public schools to inquire into children’s and, in many cases, parents’ immigration status, and permits school officials to share their conclusions regarding immigration status with the federal government.
Section 28(a)(1) requires that “[e]very public elementary and secondary school . . . , at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” To make this determination under Section 28, schools must require that each child produce his or her birth certificate. HB 56 § 28(a)(2). If “upon review of the student’s birth certificate it is determined that the student was
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born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if the child’s birth certificate is unavailable, the child’s parents must prove the child’s citizenship or immigration status within 30 days. HB 56 § 28(a)(3). Otherwise, the school “shall presume . . . that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” HB 56 § 28(a)(5). Section 28 also fails to ensure that information in a student’s educational records remains confidential. HB 56 § 28(e). And Section 28 provides no limitations at all on school officials’ ability to report parents to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). State Laws Criminalizing Work (Section 11)
Section 11 criminalizes the solicitation of work, and is particularly aimed at the ways in which day laborers express their availability for work. Section 11(a) makes it unlawful for an “unauthorized alien”2 to “apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.” Section 11(f) makes it unlawful for “an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . to attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” Section 11(g) makes it unlawful for any person “to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . in order to be hired by an occupant of
2 This term is defined as “[a]n alien who is not authorized to work in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).” HB 56 § 3(16).
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the motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” State Alien Harboring Crimes (Section 13)
Section 13 creates four new state-law immigration crimes punishable by fines and/or imprisonment. First, it criminalizes “[c]onceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing]” an alien “from detection in any place in this state” if the alien “has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.” HB 56 § 13(a)(1). Second, it makes it a crime to “[e]ncourage or induce an alien” “to come to or reside in this state” if the alien’s coming to or residing in the state is or will be in violation of federal law. HB 56 § 13(a)(2). Third, it makes it illegal to “[t]ransport” an alien if that alien “has come to, has entered, or remained [sic] in the United States in violation of federal law.” HB 56 § 13(a)(3). Fourth, Section 13 makes it a crime to “harbor an alien unlawfully present” by entering into an agreement for the alien to rent a place to live. HB 56 § 13(a)(4). State Laws Penalizing Transactions with Immigrants (Sections 27 & 30)
HB 56 renders suspected undocumented immigrants non-persons in the eyes of the law, exempt from civil rights protections. With a few narrow exceptions, Section 27(a) prohibits Alabama state courts from recognizing or enforcing contracts between an alien “unlawfully present in the United States” and any other party, provided that the other party had direct or constructive knowledge that the
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alien was “unlawfully present in the United States,” and provided that the contract “requires the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.”
Section 30 criminalizes a host of routine interactions between individuals and state and local government. Section 30 makes it a felony for an “alien not lawfully present” to enter or attempt to enter into any “transaction” with the state or local government agency. HB 56 § 30(b). Section 30 also prohibits a third party from entering or attempting to enter into a business transaction “on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” Id. The statute does not define the term “business transaction” beyond stating that it “includes any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision,” with only the narrow exception of applying for a marriage license. HB 56 § 30(a) (emphasis added). The statute specifically covers ordinary “transactions” such as applying for a state identification card or business license, id., but it also reaches much further to basic activities like applying for a birth certificate of an infant born in the state, filing a crime victim compensation claim, or filing a worker’s compensation claim. The effect of these provisions is to require anyone suspected of being an immigrant to have to verify his status when entering into any contract or business transaction. If allowed to take effect, these provisions will hinder not only undocumented
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immigrants but also countless people of color, including U.S. citizens, in the State of Alabama who might be suspected of being undocumented, from entering into routine contracts and business transactions. Provisions Limiting Ability to Present a Defense (Sections 10, 11, & 13)
Sections 10, 11, and 13 create crimes for which immigration status is a central element. Sections 10(e) and 13(h) provide that “[a] verification of an alien’s immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) shall constitute proof of that alien’s status.” State courts are prohibited from considering any evidence regarding whether an individual is “lawfully present” other than the federal government’s verification. Id. Section 11(e) creates the same scheme to prove that a person lacks work authorization. Provisions Mandating Enforcement of Immigration Laws (Sections 5 & 6)
Section 5 of HB 56 requires all state and local agencies and officials to enforce federal immigration law, under threat of personal civil liability, steep monetary penalties, and the loss of state funding. Section 5(a) provides that “[n]o official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including . . . an officer of a court . . . , may adopt a policy or practice that limits . . . communication between its officers and federal immigration officials in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644,” which are federal statutory provisions that pertain to information-sharing by state and local agencies with the federal government.
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Section 5(b) requires state officials to “fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of federal law prohibiting the entry into, presence, or residence in the United States of aliens in violation of federal immigration law.” Section 5 contains numerous other provisions to punish state or local officials in the event they do not implement a zero-tolerance immigration enforcement regime, including a private cause of action for any U.S. citizen or “lawfully present” immigrant to sue any official who either “adopts or implements a policy or practice that is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644.” HB 56 § 5(d).
Section 6(a) of HB 56 prohibits any agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof from adopting a policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of HB 56 “to less than the full extent permitted by this act.” Violations of this zero-tolerance policy may result in defunding of the state or local agency, HB 56 § 6(a), and/or personal civil penalties for agency officials, § 6(d).
State or local government employees who fail to report any violations of the Alabama zero-tolerance immigration enforcement law are subject to criminal prosecution for “obstructing governmental operations,” punishable by up to a year in prison. HB 56 §§ 5(f), 6(f); Ala. Code § 13A-10-2.
ARGUMENT Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because: (1) there is a
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substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause Defendants; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
A. HB 56 Is an Unconstitutional State Law Regulating Immigration HB 56 should be preliminarily enjoined in its entirety because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the entire enactment is a state law attempting to regulate immigration. State laws regulating immigration are unconstitutional, regardless of whether or not Congress has exercised its power to regulate in the same area, because “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (emphasis added); Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941). To withstand constitutional scrutiny, a state law relating to immigration must primarily address legitimate local concerns and have only a “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355. HB 56 violates the constitutional prohibition on state regulation of immigration because its express purpose and actual function is to control which classes of immigrants can enter and the conditions under which they can remain in
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Alabama—a brazen usurpation of the federal government’s exclusive authority. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (“determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain,” constitute direct regulation of immigration exclusively reserved for the federal government); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982). HB 56 consists of provisions that directly relate to the expulsion of immigrants from Alabama, including: (1) laws requiring state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of persons they encounter during stops, and necessarily to detain such persons strictly for the purpose of immigration enforcement (HB 56 § 12); (2) a criminal law imposing Alabama-specific penalties for failure to carry alien registration documents (§ 10); (3) investigation and prosecution by state officials for state-defined immigration crimes (§§ 10, 11, 13, 30); and (4) the imposition of obstacles, and in some cases, prohibitions— including criminal penalties—on immigrants’ attempts to seek redress from state courts (§§ 5 & 6), to enroll their children in public K-12 education (§ 28), to attend public postsecondary educational institutions (§ 8), to enter into and enforce contracts (§ 27), to solicit employment (§ 11), to rent housing (§ 13(a)(4)), and even to engage in any type of transaction with a state or local agency, including seeking basic services (§ 30).
These restrictions subject all immigrants, whether documented or not, to
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repeated verification of their status in the course of their normal, daily activities, and fundamentally alter the conditions under which they may remain in Alabama. For example, Section 30 subjects immigrants to verification of their immigration status every time they transact business with the state or local government, whether they are registering a car, paying a parking ticket, or paying property taxes. It prohibits an LPR from performing any of these transactions on behalf of her undocumented spouse, even if she is in the process of sponsoring him for a familybased visa. And it makes it a felony for an immigrant who is not “lawfully present” to attempt to perform any of these transactions, such as applying for a permit for a public assembly or simply a birth certificate for a U.S. citizen child, even though the parent may not be subject to detention or removal by federal immigration authorities. Yet the sweeping restrictions of Section 30 are just one example of the broad sweep of HB 56’s regulation of the conditions under which immigrants may remain in Alabama.
The text of HB 56 as well as the legislative debates make clear that HB 56 is centrally concerned with immigration, and not with matters of traditional state control. The preamble to HB 56 states that it is a law “[r]elating to illegal immigration” and that its purposes include the regulation of documents that immigrants must carry, the employment of immigrants, the classification of immigrants as “lawfully present” or not, and the punishment of perceived
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violations of immigration law. The legislative history also demonstrates that HB 56 is intended to expel
undocumented immigrants from the State of Alabama. The original bill arose through a “Joint Interim Patriotic Immigration Commission” created by the Alabama legislature in 2007 to address the “unprecedented influx of non-English speaking legal and illegal immigrants.” Ex. 42-I, State of Alabama, Joint Interim Patriotic Immigration Commission Report at 1 (Feb. 13, 2008). The Commission made sweeping recommendations to the Alabama legislature on how to regulate immigration by limiting access to public education, benefits, and medical services, as well as by making law enforcement policies more punitive and employer hiring practices more restrictive—all expressly for the purpose of discouraging illegal immigration. Id. at 8-11. One of HB 56’s two primary drafters and sponsors, Representative Hammon, stated that the bill was based on the Commission’s recommendations. Ex. 42-J, Transcript of April 5, 2011 House Debate on HB 56 (“April 5 Debate”) at 24:39-43.3
Legislative supporters of HB 56 expressed disagreement with federal immigration policy and their intent that, with HB 56, the State of Alabama would supplant the federal government as the enforcer and regulator of immigration in Alabama. Representative Hammon repeatedly stated that the federal immigration
3 The other primary sponsor, Senator Beason, introduced a similar bill into the Senate, SB 256. The two bills were subsequently consolidated into HB 56.
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system is “broken” and that “this issue [of immigration enforcement] is now the responsibility of the State of Alabama and not the federal government.” April 5 Debate at 1:12-14, 7:35-42, 73:44-74:1, 86:33-35. Other legislative supporters, including Senators Holley and Scofield and Representative Rich, expressed similar views that the State of Alabama should enact a law to regulate immigrants and to expel and deter undocumented immigrants from the State. April 5 Debate at 16:34-43 (Rep. Rich); Ex. 42-K, Transcript of April 21, 2011 Senate Debate on SB 256 at 54:9-24 (Sen. Schofield); 77:23-40 (Sen. Holley). Specifically, as Representative Hammon stated, HB 56 is intended to implement an Alabama state immigration policy of “attacking every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life . . . so they will deport themselves.” April 5 Debate at 9:3-8 (emphasis added).
It is well settled that such state laws regulating immigration are unconstitutional because they tread on the federal government’s exclusive power.4 The Supreme Court has explained that state laws that subject immigrants to “indiscriminate and repeated interception and interrogation by public officials” and “the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance” are preempted. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66, 74 (striking down state statute requiring aliens to carry
4 Even Speaker of the House Mike Hubbard, who supported the law’s passage, agreed with this. He noted that Alabama “really shouldn’t be in the business of immigration, that’s the federal government’s job,” and went on to acknowledge that “[s]ome of the parts of [HB 56] may be stricken down and we may have to come back and revisit it.” Tommy Steverson, Hubbard Makes No Apologies for Alabama Immigration Bill, Tuscaloosa News (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110714/NEWS/110719860?tc=ar.
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registration card). Courts have repeatedly enjoined such state laws regulating the conditions under which noncitizens may remain in the country—a function exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the federal government. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355-56; see also Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1876) (enjoining statute imposing additional local regulations on immigrants); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-80 (1971) (finding state statutes imposing durational residence requirements not authorized by federal law on immigrants seeking public assistance violated the Supremacy Clause, and observing that the restrictions “necessarily operate . . . to discourage entry into or continued residency in the State”); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (“Farmers Branch 2010”), 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (invalidating ordinance requiring noncitizens to demonstrate immigration status prior to renting housing), appeal docketed No. 10- 10751 (5th Cir. July 28, 2010). In fact, in its regulation of immigration HB 56 far surpasses the laws that were invalidated in these cases, since its status verification requirements and prohibitions extend to every aspect of daily life.
HB 56 has already implicated the U.S. foreign relations interests that underlie the constitutional preemption of state laws regulating immigration. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *11 (finding that international relations concerns raised by Georgia’s HB 87 were direct and immediate); Arizona, 641 F.3d at 368
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(Noonan, J., concurring) (“Whatever in any substantial degree attempts to express a policy by a single state or by several states toward other nations enters an exclusively federal field.”); Hines, 312 U.S. at 64. On the day Governor Bentley signed HB 56 into law, the Mexican government protested that the law will threaten the “human and civil rights of Mexicans who live in or visit Alabama,” and that it is “[in]consistent with the vision of shared responsibility, mutual respect and trust under which the governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed to conduct their bilateral relations.” Mexican Foreign Affairs Ministry, The Mexican Government Regrets the Enactment of HB 56 in Alabama (June 9, 2011).5 Unless it is enjoined, HB 56 will unacceptably strain the United States’ relations with foreign nations. See Ex. 41, Abraham F. Lowenthal Decl. ¶ 11 (explaining with respect to Arizona’s SB 1070 that “if allowed to stand, [it] would significantly impair the relations of Mexico with the United States, the attitudes and opinions of Mexicans, officials and the general public, towards the United States, and the capacity of U.S. Government officials to conduct constructive relations with Mexico in the national interest of the United States and its citizens”).
In response to similar state anti-immigrant laws, such as Arizona’s SB 1070 and Georgia’s HB 87, numerous foreign governments and international bodies expressed concern that such laws will cause widespread violations of the United
5 Available at http://www.consulmexatlanta.org/HB56ALABAMA/PressSRE200.pdf.
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States’ treaty obligations, harming their nationals living in or visiting the United
States. See, e.g., Ex. 42-G, Br. of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in
Supp. of Pls. at 1, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. 10-01061 at 1 (Doc. No. 299)
(D. Ariz. filed July 8, 2010); Ex. 42-H, Mot. of the Gov’ts of Argentina, et al. for
Leave to Join Br. of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls.
at 3, GLAHR, No. 11-1804, Doc. No. 54 (N.D. Ga. filed June 15, 2011); Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States,
IACHR Expresses Concern Over New Immigration Law in U.S. State of Alabama
(June 24, 2011)6; Decl. of the Council of Heads of State and Government of The
Union of South American Nations (May 4, 2010).7 No less than Arizona’s SB
1070 and Georgia’s HB 87, HB 56 intrudes on this sensitive and exclusively
federal realm and must be enjoined.8
6 Available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/63-11eng.htm. 7 Available at http://www.cdsunasur.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=344%3Adeclaration-of-the-council-of-heads-of-state-and-government-of-the-union-ofsouth-american-nations-unasur&catid=58%3Aingles&Itemid=189&lang=es. 8 As set forth above, in the field of immigration, constitutional preemption principles apply. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354. In addition, by enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) (Title 8 of the U.S. Code), Congress has occupied the entire field of immigration enforcement, and thus state immigration laws are subject to statutory “field preemption,” which “occurs when federal regulation in a legislative field is so pervasive that we can reasonably infer that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.” Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 2010). Congress has enacted a comprehensive federal statutory scheme through the INA, and the federal government has promulgated myriad regulations and policies that fully regulate immigration and the employment, registration and requirements for immigrants. In this circumstance, a state scheme for immigration regulation cannot be squared with Congress’s occupation of the field. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67 (“where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . [regarding an immigration-related matter—alien registration in that case], states
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B. HB 56 Violates the Supremacy Clause Because It Conflicts with Federal Law
As set forth above, the Constitution reserves the regulation of immigration exclusively to the federal government, and HB 56 is therefore directly preempted under the Constitution. Congress’s power to regulate immigration is “exclusive.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55. In addition, HB 56 is preempted on the separate and independent ground that its provisions conflict with federal law. Conflict preemption occurs where the challenged law “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *7 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (1941)). Thus, “[e]ven when the Constitution does not itself commit exclusive power to regulate a particular field to the Federal Government, there are situations in which state regulation, although harmonious with federal regulation, must nevertheless be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356. And regardless of whether the state and the federal government share the same concerns, “[t]he fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means” of addressing those concerns. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379. HB 56 is in conflict with federal immigration law or other federal
cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations”) (emphasis added); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (Congress’s intent to occupy a field exclusively may be inferred “when an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject’ ”).
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statutes in several respects, including but not limited to the following: 1. Alabama State Classifications of Aliens HB 56 is fundamentally at odds with federal immigration law in its premise
that there is a clearly defined category of immigrants who are clearly removable or “unlawfully present” and who may be subjected to state-law penalties and burdens. For example, several criminal provisions in HB 56 include as an element that the defendant (or a person interacting with the defendant) be an “alien unlawfully present in the United States.” See HB 56 §§ 3(10) (defining the term for purposes of HB 56), 10(f) (providing criminal penalties for an “alien unlawfully present in the United States” who fails to carry registration documents); 13(a)(4) (setting out criminal penalties for renting to “an alien unlawfully present in the United States”), 30(b) (setting out criminal penalties for “an alien not lawfully present in the United States” who “attempt[s] to enter into a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state”). Other provisions of HB 56 include similar state immigration definitions, such as Section 8 (creating a state definition of “lawfully present” noncitizens for purposes of eligibility for public higher education that includes only LPRs and non-immigrant visa holders); and Section 28 (creating a category of schoolchildren who are “presume[d] … unlawfully present” if they fail to present a birth certificate upon enrollment, or if they present a birth certificate showing birth outside the United States or that a parent is an “an alien not lawfully
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present in the United States” and fail to produce additional proof of status within 30 days). Such immigration categorization is exclusively a federal function, and such state definitions are preempted. See, e.g., Toll, 458 U.S. at 44-46 (invalidating state university policy denying in-state tuition rates to G-4 visa holders).
The INA does not define a category of “unlawfully present” aliens subject to deportation.9 This is an intentional omission on the part of Congress. Under federal law, a noncitizen’s immigration status is governed by numerous sections of the INA; turns on complex legal questions, myriad individualized factors, and in many cases, the exercise of administrative discretion; is fluid and subject to change over time; and ultimately is decided through an administrative adjudication process subject to federal court review. See Ex. 42-D, Bo Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 14-20 (former INS General Counsel).
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “it is impossible for a State to determine which aliens the Federal Government will eventually deport, which the Federal Government will permit to stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 240 n.6 (1982) (Powell, J.,
9 The INA defines the phrase “unlawfully present” only in the narrow and technical context of a statute that establishes bars on the admission of a person who has previously been “unlawfully present” in the United States for certain periods of time. The phrase is explicitly restricted to that context, and its application depends on factors that cannot be quickly and definitively ascertained, such as whether the person “has a bona fide application for asylum pending.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (defining “unlawful presence” “[f]or purposes of this paragraph”); Ex. 42-F, Bo Cooper Decl. ¶ 8.
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concurring). Thus, Alabama’s state laws attempting to define some category of “unlawfully present” immigrants inevitably will lead to conflicts with federal law. Section 3 of HB 56, which defines “unlawful presence,” provides that “[a] person shall be regarded as an alien unlawfully present in the United States only if the person’s unlawful immigration status has been verified by the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).” HB 56 § 3(10). This reliance is at odds with the federal government’s intended purpose for verifications under 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which are carried out through the database checks by the DHS’s Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”). LESC responses “do not always provide a definitive answer as to an alien’s immigration status,” and will often generate “no match” notices that cannot be used to conclusively determine status. Ex. 42-A, David C. Palmatier Decl. ¶¶ 12, 19 (Unit Chief for LESC).10 Section 30(c)’s specific provision (inexplicably in conflict with Section 3) that Alabama state officials rely on the federal government’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) database in determining the lawful presence of immigrants who attempt to engage in a business transaction with the state is similarly at odds with the stated purposes of the federal government. The SAVE database, which is designed to
10 Federal immigration officials have explicitly warned that DHS “databases cannot be relied upon accurately to determine immigration status because immigration status is dynamic[,]” and that database entries may be outdated. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up Review of the Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration, at 41 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0501/final.pdf.
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help determine eligibility for public benefits, is expressly not designed to make “a finding of fact or conclusion of law that [an] individual is not lawfully present.” 65 Fed. Reg. 58301, 58302 (Sept. 28, 2000).
Thus, HB 56 conflicts with federal law by imposing state-created penalties and burdens—including criminal penalties—by using federal tools that are expressly contraindicated for such purposes. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (“Farmers Branch 2008”), 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 874 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
2. State and Local Law Enforcement Requirement to Investigate and Detain for Immigration Purposes
Numerous sections of HB 56, including Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20, require state and local law enforcement officers to investigate immigration violations and to detain persons for immigration purposes. These provisions directly conflict with federal mandates and limitations on immigration enforcement.
Federal law contains narrow authorizations for state and local police to enforce federal immigration laws only in specific circumstances. First, federal law authorizes state and local officers to enforce two specific criminal immigration offenses. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, state and local officers may arrest and detain a noncitizen for the federal crime of illegal re-entry by a previously deported alien, if the federal government provides “appropriate confirmation” of the suspect’s status. And under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c), federal law allows state and local officers to make
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arrests for the federal immigration crimes of transporting, smuggling, or harboring certain aliens.
Outside of those two narrow contexts for enforcing specific federal criminal immigration statutes, Congress has authorized state and local officers to assist with the enforcement of civil immigration offenses in only two specific circumstances. The U.S. Attorney General may authorize “any State or local enforcement officer” to enforce immigration laws upon certification of “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens”—a provision that has never been invoked. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10). And under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), the federal government may enter into written agreements (commonly known as “287(g) agreements”) with state or local agencies in order for certain designated officers to receive specialized training and exercise delegated immigration enforcement authority in clearly specified and carefully monitored circumstances. These officers must first be “determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform [such] functions” and “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(1), (3). The written agreement must specify “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, [and] the duration of the authority of the individual.” 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1357(g)(5).11 See also Ex. 37, Sheriff Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶¶ 4-10 (describing
Etowah County Sheriff Office 287(g) program).
HB 56 directly conflicts with Congress’s careful limitation of state and local
power to enforce immigration law by giving state officers broad authority and
mandates to detain and arrest individuals for perceived violations of civil immigration law.12 Section 12 requires every state and local law enforcement
officer in Alabama to investigate the immigration status of any person the officer
stops, arrests or detains, if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” to believe that
the person is unlawfully present in the United States. HB 56 § 12(a). Under
Section 12, whenever an officer develops such “reasonable suspicion,” the officer
is required to contact the federal government to verify the person’s immigration
status. Id. Thus, Section 12 mandates that officers prolong detentions solely in
11 Section 1357(g)(10) further provides that Section 1357(g) does not forbid police from “cooperat[ing] with the Attorney General” in certain aspects of immigration enforcement. That provision, however, plainly does not authorize states to pursue their own policy objectives or enact their own immigration enforcement initiatives that correct the federal government’s alleged failures, as Alabama has here. Indeed, if Section 1357(g)(10) authorized the enforcement at issue here, the specific authorizations Congress provided in §§ 1103(a)(10), 1357(g)(1)-(9), 1252c, and 1324(c) would be surplusage. “Congress intended for state officers to aid in federal immigration enforcement only under particular conditions, including the Attorney General’s supervision.” Arizona, 641 F.3d at 350; see also GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *9-10. 12 Being present in the United States without lawful immigration status is not a crime. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752, *9 (“mere presence in this country without authorization is not a federal crime”); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, No. 06-75778, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 855791, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) (“unlike illegal entry, which is a criminal violation, an alien’s illegal presence in the United States is only a civil violation”).
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order to investigate a person’s immigration status.13 Id. Similarly, Section 18 of HB 56 requires that state, local, and municipal law
enforcement officers verify the citizenship or immigration status of those found to be driving without a valid driver’s license, and allows individuals to be detained for up to 48 hours solely to verify their immigration status. HB 56 § 18(c), (d). Sections 18, 19 and 20 also mandate the continued custodial detention of individuals in Alabama jails, even after any lawful basis for custody has expired, solely on the basis of suspected federal civil immigration violations. HB 56 §§ 18(d), 19(b), 20.
Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 thus conflict with the federal statutes limiting the role of state and local officers in immigration enforcement. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *11 (finding similar state immigration enforcement provision “attempts an end-run—not around federal criminal law—but around federal statutes defining the role of state and local officers in immigration enforcement”). As the Ninth Circuit held, “[b]y imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, [such provisions] interfere[] with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning [state] officers into state-
13 See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 352 (“states do not have the inherent authority to enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.”); United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2008) (“local law enforcement officers cannot enforce completed violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal presence) unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General under special conditions”).
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directed DHS agents.” Arizona, 641 F.3d at 351-52.
Indeed, HB 56’s immigration enforcement authorization is so broad that it
permits peace officers to make warrantless civil immigration arrests in
circumstances where even federal immigration agents cannot. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2). In order to arrest an individual for undocumented presence without a
warrant, the arresting federal officer must reasonably believe that the alien is in the
country unlawfully and that he is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained
for his arrest. Id. Together, Sections 12(a) and 12(e) of HB 56 permit state and
local officers to make warrantless arrests for perceived immigration violations
without such restrictions.
3. State Alien Registration Scheme Section 10 of HB 56 establishes an Alabama-specific alien registration
regime by creating a new state criminal offense for failure to carry certain immigration documents.14, 15 Federal courts have already enjoined an identical
provision in Arizona’s SB 1070 because the Supreme Court has specifically struck
14 For a detailed description of Section 10, see supra at 3. 15 Plaintiffs’ claims against the state-specific immigration crimes created under HB 56 are not precluded by the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Whiting involved an Arizona statute, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, that was enacted pursuant to an explicit authorization in federal law for state “licensing” laws relating to unauthorized workers and that does not resemble the provisions discussed here. Id. at 1981 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)); GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *14 (“whereas the Arizona statute in Whiting imposed licensing laws specifically authorized by a statutory savings clause, HB 87 imposes additional criminal laws on top of a comprehensive federal scheme that includes no such carve out for state regulation”).
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down state alien registration laws. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355-57 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67). The recent decision on the Arizona analog to Section 10 explains why the explicit reference to federal alien registration statutes does not save the state registration scheme. Id. As a legal matter, even laws that “complement [] the federal [alien registration] law [and] enforce additional or auxiliary regulations” are preempted. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379-80 (“conflict is imminent when two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity”) (internal quotes, citations, and punctuation omitted); Wis. Dep’t of Indus. Lab & Hum. Rel. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286-88 (1986) (invalidating state statute that imposed additional sanction on companies that violated federal law); Farmers Branch 2010, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (“a local regulation may not— though it may share a common goal with federal law—interfere with Congress’s chosen methods”).
HB 56 goes well beyond “complementing” or “enforcing” federal registration provisions. Section 10 provides Alabama state courts with the authority to apply additional penalties to noncitizens in Alabama when they are found to have violated the registration provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a). These additional state criminal penalties are in conflict with those set by federal law. This conflict is particularly glaring because the federal government rarely prosecutes registration violations. See Ex. 42-L, Bureau of Justice Services
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Statistics (showing only 30 such prosecutions in 15 years). Indeed, the statutes referenced in Section 10 specifically rely on a federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 264.1, that is obsolete and that the federal government has chosen not to update or enforce. Bo Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 27, 28.
HB 56’s alien registration scheme is particularly problematic because many foreign nationals who reside in the United States with the permission or knowledge of the United States do not possess or have readily available documentation that is acceptable under HB 56. These categories of foreign nationals include those with explicit permission to remain, such as those with deferred action, travelers visiting from countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program, individuals with Temporary Protected Status, those who have applied for visas as victims of crimes (such as Plaintiff Jane Doe #2), and those who are here through the Family Unity Program (such as Plaintiff Zamora). See Ex. 42-C, Michael Aytes Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21 (Acting Deputy Director, USCIS). Subjecting these immigrants, whom the federal government is not attempting to remove, to criminal prosecution conflicts with federal law and policy. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6 (“Of course, state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress. . . .”).
4. Criminal Penalties for Immigrant Workers
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HB 56’s attempt to impose criminal sanctions on unauthorized workers
impermissibly conflicts with federal law. Section 11(a) makes it a state crime for unauthorized individuals to work or seek work in Alabama.16, 17 This section is
preempted by the comprehensive federal scheme regulating the employment of
noncitizens, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), and
Congress’s express intent to deter the unauthorized employment of immigrants
through employer sanctions rather than punishment of employees. The Ninth
Circuit has held that a nearly identical Arizona state law is preempted for this
reason. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 357-60. The Eleventh Circuit has also
recognized Congress’s decision not to penalize workers. United States v. Zheng,
306 F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “the House Committee was of
the opinion that the most reasonable approach to the problem [of unauthorized
workers] was to make unlawful the ‘knowing’ employment of illegal aliens,” and
that “Congress . . . chose to penalize employers for hiring illegal aliens . . . .” (emphasis added)).18 HB 56’s criminal penalties on individuals who work, or
merely seek work, in Alabama without authorization therefore conflicts directly
16 For a detailed description of Section 11, see supra at 5. 17 As discussed supra at n.15, the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiting is inapposite because Section 11(a) criminalizes workers rather than imposing “licensing or similar laws” on employers. 18 In fact, IRCA sharply limits criminal sanctions against employees to specific acts including making a false statement or presenting fraudulent documents in connection with the employment verification system. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(d)(2)(F) (noting that the forms “may not be used for law enforcement purposes, other than for enforcement of this [Act or sections] 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of title 18, United States Code.”); 1324c (providing penalties for document fraud).
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with federal law regulating the employment of noncitizens. 5. State Alien Harboring Crimes
Section 13 of HB 56 creates new Alabama state crimes relating to (1) concealing, harboring, or shielding; (2) encouraging or inducing; (3) transporting; and (4) renting to certain immigrants.19 HB 56 § 13(a). These new provisions impermissibly conflict with the operation of federal immigration law, as a federal court has already recognized with respect to a similar Georgia statute. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *13
Section 13 materially differs from the federal alien harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324. For example, the federal statute’s “encourage or induce” provision concerns aliens entering the United States—not the movement of noncitizens within the United States. Section 13(a)(2) explicitly criminalizes encouraging or inducing an alien to enter the State of Alabama, regardless of whether the state is the alien’s first destination in the country or whether he or she entered the United States 20 years ago in another state. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *13 (“Once in the United States, it is not a federal crime to induce an illegal alien to enter Georgia from another state.”). Furthermore, Section 13 criminalizes conduct that is specifically exempted from enforcement under federal law. Compare HB 56 § 13(e) (exempting only first responders and protective service providers) with
19 For a detailed description of Section 13, see supra at 6.
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8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) (creating religious exemptions). But even if Section 13 were identical to 8 U.S.C. § 1324, it would still
impermissibly conflict with the federal statute. Section 13 will be enforced at the discretion of state law enforcement officers and prosecutors and will be interpreted by state judges. Thus, as the district court held in enjoining a similar provision in Georgia, “[d]ecisions about when to charge a person or what penalty to seek for illegal immigration will no longer be under the control of the federal government. Similarly, [state] judges will interpret [these] provisions, unconstrained by the line of federal precedent mentioned above.” GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *13. HB 56 includes no provision for federal discretion and no mechanism to accommodate the immense complexity of federal immigration law. Section 13’s resemblance to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 does not make it a “mirror” of federal law. Cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. Instead, it allows the state to challenge and “undermine[] the congressional calibration” of federal law and policy in this area.20 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380.
HB 56 reaches beyond the Georgia state harboring law by defining the rental of a home to an undocumented immigrant as alien harboring. There is no corresponding provision in federal immigration law, and the federal harboring law,
20 The federal government infrequently prosecutes potential Section 1324 violations. For example, from 2001 to 2005 there were only two reported prosecutions under Section 1324 in Alabama, while in 2005—the latest year for which plaintiffs have been able to obtain statistics— there were no prosecutions for such conduct. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Percent of Immigration Criminal Convictions by Lead Charge (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/findings/05/criminal/glawgph05.html.
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8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), “has never been interpreted to apply so broadly as to encompass the typical landlord/tenant relationship.” Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds, No. 10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011).21 Indeed, several federal laws explicitly or implicitly permit landlords to provide housing and other services to undocumented immigrants. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.508(e) (providing that households in which some, but not all, family members establish eligible immigration status may nonetheless receive a federal housing subsidy); 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401 et seq. (providing federal funding to battered women’s shelters without any restrictions on housing undocumented women); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (providing for immigration benefits for undocumented youth residing in foster care). The INA authorizes many persons who currently lack legal immigration status, including those awaiting the processing of their application for lawful status, to work in the United States, and thus implicitly to obtain housing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8)-(11), (14). Thus, far from prohibiting the renting of apartments or provision of housing to undocumented immigrants, Congress has permitted it in numerous circumstances.
Federal courts have been unanimous in striking down state and local rental
21Lozano addressed both a local housing restriction and a local employment eligibility verification regulation; after the Supreme Court upheld a state employment verification regulation in Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011), the Court in Lozano vacated and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of [Whiting].” 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011).
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prohibitions on preemption grounds. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 223; Farmers Branch 2008, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 857; Farmers Branch 2010, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 859; Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1059 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (temporarily enjoining ordinance and finding “serious questions” as to its constitutionality, after which municipality suspended ordinance and settled case). These cases have recognized that a local regulation that restricts the ability of landlords to rent private housing amounts to a restriction on residence, and therefore is an impermissible local effort to regulate immigration that “directly impact[s] immigration in a way that restrictions on employment” do not. Farmers Branch 2010, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855; see also Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220 (“Through its housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on immigration status. Deciding which aliens may live in the United States has always been the prerogative of the federal government”).
6. Prohibition on the Right to Make and Enforce Contracts Section 27 of HB 56 regulates in the area of immigration by prohibiting “aliens unlawfully present” from enforcing or accessing the courts to enforce contracts. The practical effect of the provision is to require all immigrants to verify their status in order to enter into an enforceable contract and to discourage individuals from contracting with those they believe may be undocumented— something which cannot be readily observed or even verified by a private
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individual. In addition to being preempted as a regulation of immigration and based on a conflict with federal immigration statutes, Section 27 is also preempted by a core federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.22
Although Section 1981 was originally drafted in 1866 with a limit on the guarantee of equal contract rights to all “citizens,” Congress explicitly expanded the guarantee of equal contract rights to “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States” when it amended the statute in 1870. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 385 (1982). The very purpose of the change was to extend the protections of the 1866 Act to “aliens.” See Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting district court’s opinion that Congress “explicitly broadened the language of the portion of the 1866 Act that has become § 1981 to include ‘all persons’ in order to bring aliens within its coverage”) (footnotes omitted), overruled on other grounds, Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 492 U.S. 901 (1989), reinstated on remand, 887 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.) (per curiam); see De Malherbe v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1136-38 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”).
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Section 27 of HB 56 should be enjoined not only based on conflict
preemption, but also on the ground that in enacting § 1981, Congress occupied the
field regarding the right of aliens to make and enforce contracts. See
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (describing
§ 1981, then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 41, as part of a “comprehensive legislative plan
for the nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and naturalization”).
Congress having so provided, Alabama’s law creating different “alien”
classifications for purposes of determining who has the right to enforce contracts
and access Alabama’s state courts to enforce contracts is preempted by § 1981.23
7. HB 56 Impermissibly Burdens the Federal Government
HB 56 is also preempted because it imposes an impermissible burden on
federal resources that creates “obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of
23 This conclusion is further supported in a district court’s discussion in Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936). In Martinez, the plaintiff sued for negligence. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain an action because he was subject to deportation. Martinez, 17 F. Supp. at 577. The court rejected the argument:
The position of the defendant is that if an alien . . . is unlawfully in the United States he may be despoiled of his property, contracts with him may be breached, that he may be unlawfully assaulted and injured, and that he is with-out redress . . . . I cannot agree with this contention. It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress to determine what aliens may enter this country and their rights and disabilities while here. Congress has legislated on these subjects, but at no time has it declared that any alien, either lawfully or unlawfully within this country, shall be debarred from access to the courts. On the contrary, it has expressly provided . . . that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. Id. (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 41, re-codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. HB 56 is replete with directives for state and local officers to contact the federal government in order to run immigration database checks on individuals under circumstances in which the federal government has not invited such requests. In attempting to regulate every aspect of life for noncitizens in Alabama—from education to routine police encounters to the right to enforce contracts—HB 56 authorizes and often requires state and local officials to verify a person’s immigration status by directly contacting the federal government, and triggering the federal government’s statutory responsibility to respond. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Federal courts have preliminarily enjoined similar state laws in Arizona and Georgia on this ground. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 351-52; GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *11.
Sections 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 29, and 30 of Alabama’s HB 56 will directly undermine federal immigration enforcement priorities by vastly increasing the number of immigration status verification queries to the federal government. Section 8 allows any public postsecondary education official to seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status at any time. HB 56 § 8. State and local officers would be required to contact the federal government in the enforcement of Alabama’s alien registration scheme, § 10(b), (e); the anti-solicitation of work provision, § 11(b), (e); and the new criminal harboring, encouraging, transporting, and renting provisions, § 13(g), (h).
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Federal immigration queries will be made during routine police encounters, § 12(a), and when individuals are arrested and booked into state custody, or is convicted if any violation of any state or local law, §§ 18(c), 19(a), 20(a).
Provisions restricting employment of unauthorized aliens will similarly require a federal inquiry, §§ 15(h), 17(e). Determinations of whether to enforce a contract will require a federal inquiry, § 27(d), as will prosecutions for entering into unlawful business transactions, § 30(c), (f). Even proving that a person has the right to vote could require a federal inquiry, § 29(k)(4). Furthermore, Sections 5 and 6 create an interlocking scheme compelling Alabama agency officials and “officers of the court” to report individuals to federal immigration officials in order to avoid civil liability, such as steep monetary penalties, and the loss of state funding. See §§ 5(a)-(d), 5(f), 6(a)-(c), 6(f).
By flooding the federal government with uninvited requests for immigration status verification in a wide range of circumstances, HB 56’s immigration enforcement regime thus undermines the federal government’s ability to focus on its priorities, including the apprehension of the most dangerous aliens and to exercise prosecutorial discretion in certain instances. David Palmatier Decl. ¶ 18; Ex. 42-B, Daniel H. Ragsdale Decl. ¶ 41 (Executive Associate Director for Management and Administration at ICE); see also ICE Director John Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and
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Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011)24; ICE Director John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens at 2 (June 17, 2011)25 (explaining that “the term ‘prosecutorial discretion’ applies to a broad range of discretionary enforcement decisions” that includes “deciding whom to stop, question, or arrest for an administrative violation” and “deciding whom to detain”).
The federal LESC, which is responsible for responding to immigration status queries from law enforcement agencies, has experienced “continuous and dramatic increases” in immigration status determination queries over the past four years. David Palmatier Decl. ¶ 9. The verification process at the LESC is time-intensive and takes, on average, over 80 minutes even for simpler cases. Id. ¶ 8. In some cases, where a review of the individual’s physical file is required, the review may take two days or more. Id. ¶ 11. In addition, the LESC is unable to verify the status of most U.S. citizens, since their records are not contained in the LESC databases. Id. ¶ 19. The additional queries created by HB 56, combined with the already time-intensive verification process, will necessarily strain the federal government’s resources. Federal courts have enjoined similar provisions in
24 Available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 25 Available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf.
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Arizona’s and Georgia’s immigration laws because such increased demands on the federal government “will undermine federal immigration enforcement priorities by vastly increasing the number of immigration queries to the federal government from [state and local agencies].” GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *10; accord Arizona, 641 F.3d at 351-52.
Moreover, local law enforcement agencies, school districts, and other government agencies across Alabama’s 67 counties inevitably will interpret HB 56’s vague and expansive provisions differently, leading to a patchwork of enforcement even within Alabama. See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752, at *10; see also Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶¶ 20-21; Ex. 38, Sheriff Mike Hale Decl. ¶¶ 10-11. This discord in enforcement poses a serious threat to the federal government’s ability to regulate immigration. With respect to Georgia’s HB 87, which would impose similar burdens on the federal government, the President of the United States has declared: “It is a mistake for states to try to do this piecemeal. We can’t have 50 different immigration laws around the country.” Matthew Bigg, Obama Criticizes New Georgia Immigration Law, Reuters, Apr. 26, 2011.26 Janet Napolitano, the former governor of Arizona and current U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, publicly opposed Arizona’s SB 1070, saying: “The Arizona immigration law will likely hinder federal law enforcement from carrying out its priorities of detaining
26 Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-obama-immigration-georgiaidUSTRE73P7QD20110427.
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and removing dangerous criminal aliens.” Divisive Arizona Immigration Bill Signed Into Law, CBS/AP, Apr. 23, 2010.27
The Court should also consider the cumulative impact of other states passing similar legislation. See, e.g., GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752, *10 (the “risk [of inconsistent civil immigration policies] is compounded by the threat of other states creating their own immigration laws”) (citing Arizona, 641 F.3d at 354); Gould, 475 U.S. at 288–89 (“Each additional statute incrementally diminishes the [federal government’s] control over enforcement of the [federal statute] and thus further detracts from the ‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.”). This concern is far from speculative. Alabama is one of six states to have passed farreaching immigration enforcement measures.28 Although the similar state laws that preceded HB 56 are either currently enjoined or not yet in effect, the actual implementation individually and, in particular, when aggregated, would further burden the federal government’s immigration priorities. See David Palmatier Decl. ¶ 7.
C. HB 56 Violates the Fourth Amendment HB 56 requires state and local law enforcement officers to detain and arrest individuals solely for the purpose of verifying immigration status, and without any suspicion of criminal conduct. Section 12 mandates the prolonged detention or
27 Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/23/politics/main6426125.shtml. 28 These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah.
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arrest of individuals based only on perceived violation of federal civil immigration law. Sections 18, 19, and 20 likewise require the continued custodial detention of individuals even after any lawful basis for custody has expired—again based solely on suspected violation of federal civil immigration law. These provisions violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing the prolonged detention and arrest of individuals without suspicion of criminal conduct.
1. Prolonged Detention During Stops Section 12(a) mandates that “[u]pon any lawful stop, detention or arrest” law enforcement officers “shall . . . determine the citizenship and immigration status” of a suspect where reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence exists. HB 56 § 12(a) (emphasis added). In these circumstances, officers are required to contact the federal government in order to verify a person’s status, a process that takes an average of 80 minutes when a determination can be made through a database search, and up to several days when a search of paper files is required. David Palmatier Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12, 19; see also Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶ 18 (“From our own experience running the 287(g) program, this is usually not a quick process, but can take hours to complete.”); Mike Hale Decl. ¶ 9. Thus, by mandating verification, Section 12(a) guarantees that stops will be prolonged well past the time needed to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. The verification requirement applies to all stops, even the most minor, and those
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not requiring any probable cause of criminal wrongdoing (e.g., Terry stops requiring only reasonable suspicion). Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶ 13 (When a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is present unlawfully, Section 12(a) requires that officer to “detain the suspect on the side of the road, or in the jail, pending confirmation of the individual’s immigration status.”); Mike Hale Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. 40, Eduardo Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 17-18; Ex. 39, George Gascón Decl. ¶ 16.
Such prolonging of stops based solely on “reasonable suspicion” of undocumented immigration status violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires that “Terry” stops, for example, “must ‘last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Once the purpose of the initial stop has been effectuated, the stop “may not last ‘any longer than necessary to process the [original] violation’ unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 196 (11th Cir. 1997)). And an officer may question a person who has been lawfully stopped on unrelated subjects, but only if such questioning does not unreasonably prolong the stop. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005); Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009);
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United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (extending Muehler to the traffic stop context).
By requiring officers to prolong a traffic stop well beyond the time needed to address the original basis for the stop—by an average of 80 minutes, under the best-case scenario—HB 56 will result in systemic violations of the Fourth Amendment. Section 12 mandates the prolonged detention of persons who have been stopped solely for the purpose of undertaking an immigration investigation and based only on “reasonable suspicion” that a person is an undocumented immigrant. HB 56 § 12(a). “Reasonable suspicion”—even of criminal activity— justifies only a brief investigatory stop. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). More fundamentally, because unlawful presence is a federal civil violation and not a crime, see supra n.12, this scheme violates the Fourth Amendment by requiring seizures without suspicion of or probable cause to believe a person is engaging in criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that officer’s further investigation of a lawfully stopped driver unlawfully prolonged the detention because of lack of suspicion of criminal activity beyond a traffic citation).
Beyond the prolonged detentions required under Section 12(a), Section 12(e) separately violates the Fourth Amendment by requiring law enforcement to take
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custody of individuals if they are verified as being “unlawfully present.” Section 12(e) requires that state and local law enforcement agencies coordinate the transfer of suspects determined to be “unlawfully present,” if the federal government so requests. HB 56 § 12(e). Because of Section 12(e), law enforcement officers will detain a suspect without any basis other than a civil immigration violation while the federal government coordinates taking custody, for which the law specifies no time limit. Id.; Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶ 19; George Gascón Decl. ¶ 15. State and local law enforcement are required to hold the suspect “as long as necessary,” solely on the basis of suspected unlawful status, without regard to how long federal authorities wait to take action. Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶ 19; see also George Gascón Decl. ¶ 15. Thus, under Section 12(e) individuals will be effectively arrested without probable cause of any criminal wrongdoing. It is well established, however, that “an arrest without probable cause to believe a crime ha[s] been committed” violates the Fourth Amendment.29 Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2002). Section 12(e) thus authorizes seizures in clear violation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
29 The only exception to the requirement that the suspicion be of criminal activity is for civil traffic code violations. The Supreme Court has “carve[d] out an exception in the context of traffic stops, i.e., a stop is ‘reasonable’ where an officer suspects an individual has committed a traffic violation.” United States v. Choudhury, 461 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). No similar exception has been created for civil immigration violations, such as unlawful presence in the United States.
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2. Prolonged Detention in State and County Jails Sections 18, 19, and 20 violate the Fourth Amendment by mandating the continued custodial detention of an individual in Alabama jails, even after any lawful basis for custody has expired, solely on the basis of suspected federal civil immigration violations. Section 19(b) mandates the continued detention of anyone “confined for any period in a state, county, or municipal jail,” if the person is determined to be unlawfully present, until he or she is handed over to federal immigration authorities, regardless of whether the lawful basis for their original custody has ended. HB 56 § 19(a) (emphasis added). Section 18(d) similarly mandates detention when an arrest is made for driving without a license. Individuals who would normally be released from custody (because, for example, charges against them were dismissed) will face continued detention based solely on suspicion of federal civil immigration violations. Similarly, Section 20 requires law enforcement officials to continue to detain a person after the conclusion of lawful confinement or upon payment of a fine solely on the basis of suspected unlawful presence in order to transfer the suspect to federal custody. For example, in the case of a person found guilty in court and assessed only a fine, Section 20 allows that he or she be held in custody even after that fine is paid, if he or she is suspected of civil immigration violations. These provisions violate the Fourth Amendment because they require Alabama jails to maintain custody of a person
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solely because an immigration status check is pending and absent any lawful basis for detention.
Courts have regularly found that the Fourth Amendment is violated where plaintiffs who are initially detained on a lawful basis are held in custody after they were entitled to release, or after any lawful basis for detention has expired. See, e.g., Jones v. Cochran, No. 92-6913, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20625 at *14-17 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 1994) (holding that plaintiffs initially held on probable cause, acquitted, and then detained for several hours post-acquittal, were held in violation of Fourth Amendment); Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 906 F. Supp. 55, 57 (D. Mass. 1995); cf. Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing grant of summary judgment to county sheriff on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims where plaintiffs alleged they were detained for periods ranging from 26 to 29 hours after the court authorized their release).
D. HB 56 Violates the Equal Protection Clause Sections 8 and 28 of HB 56 unconstitutionally violate the Equal Protection Clause because each section unlawfully discriminates against certain noncitizens regarding their access to educational activities in Alabama.
1. Section 8 Unconstitutionally Excludes Lawful Noncitizens from Higher Education Institutions
Section 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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by excluding lawful noncitizens from public colleges and universities.30 By its terms, Section 8 bars a host of lawful noncitizens, including those who have a legal right to remain in the United States—sometimes indefinitely—from higher education. For example, individuals who have been granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 or refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (such as Plaintiffs Haile and Tesfamariam), are entitled to remain in the United States. Ex. 23, Esayas Haile Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. 24, Fiseha Tesfamariam Decl. ¶ 3. Yet under Section 8, because they possess neither “lawful permanent residence” nor a “nonimmigrant visa,” HB 56 § 8, they will be barred from attending public postsecondary school. The same is true of individuals granted Temporary Protected Status, petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act whose applications have been approved but who are waiting for visas to become available, and DREAM Act-eligible students whom the federal government has granted deferred action status so that they may continue living and attending school in the United States.
State classifications based on alienage are “‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (quoting Graham, 403 U.S. at 372). This rule applies not only to state laws that distinguish between citizens and aliens, but also to laws that, like Section 8, distinguish among classes of aliens. What ultimately matters is that the state law is “directed at aliens
30 For a detailed description of Section 8, see supra at 3-4.
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and that only aliens are harmed by it.” Id. at 9 (applying strict scrutiny to strike down New York statute providing financial aid only to LPRs who have applied or intend to apply for citizenship); see also Pena v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Atlanta, 620 F. Supp. 293, 299-300 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down school board policy discriminating among nonimmigrant visa holders for the purposes of charging tuition). Thus, Section 8 cannot stand unless “the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is . . . legitimate and substantial” and “the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 8 plainly cannot survive this heightened review, nor even rational basis review. Alabama has no legitimate interest, much less a “substantial” one, in excluding from its public colleges and universities entire categories of noncitizens whom the federal government has authorized to remain in the United States. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-75 (rejecting “fiscal integrity” as basis for alienage discrimination); accord Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 11 n.15; Pena, 620 F. Supp. at 30001.
2. Section 28 Unconstitutionally Deters Children in Immigrant Families from Enrolling in Public School
Section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating an obstacle to the enrollment of children from immigrant
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families in public school.31 Nearly 30 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), that all children have a constitutional right to public primary and secondary education regardless of their immigration status. Section 28 violates this longstanding rule by creating enrollment procedures that will deter not only undocumented students, but also U.S. citizen children in immigrant families, from securing access to the classroom.
Section 28 deters children from enrolling in school in two ways: (1) by requiring that schools determine the citizenship or immigration status of every student and his or her parents at the time of enrollment, and (2) by authorizing and effectively requiring schools to report children and parents whom they presume to be “unlawfully present” to federal immigration authorities. See supra at 4-5. Section 28(e) specifically provides that school officials may “[p]ublic[ly] disclos[e] . . . information obtained pursuant to this section which personally identifies any student . . . for purposes permitted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644,”32 provided they “first apply to the [State] Attorney General and receive a
31 For a detailed description of Section 28, see supra at 3-5. 32 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 limit states’ and localities’ ability to adopt policies restricting the sharing of immigration status information with the federal government. Importantly, however, §§ 1373 and 1644 contemplate voluntary information-sharing by law enforcement and public benefits agencies within the broader enforcement framework the federal government has designed; they are not “an invitation for states to affirmatively enforce immigration laws outside Congress’ carefully constructed . . . system.” Arizona, 641 F.3d at 351 n.11. Like Arizona’s SB 1070, HB 56 attempts to make mandatory the information-sharing that Congress, in enacting §§ 1373 and 1644, made voluntary.
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waiver of confidentiality.” HB 56 § 28(e).33 And, importantly, it provides no limitations on school officials’ ability to report students’ parents to DHS, which
can be done without a waiver from the State Attorney General. Section 28 does not in so many words require school officials to disclose
students’ and parents’ information to federal immigration authorities, but that is
Section 28’s inevitable effect when read in light of HB 56 as a whole. In particular, Sections 5 and 6 forbid state and local agencies, including schools, from maintaining any “policy or practice” that “limits . . . communication between its officers and federal immigration officials,” or “that limits or restricts the
enforcement of [HB 56] to less than the full extent permitted by this act . . . .” HB 56 §§ 5(a), 6(a) (emphasis added). Schools that adopt a policy of not reporting students and their parents to DHS, or that otherwise have a practice of engaging in
immigration enforcement to anything “less than the full extent permitted” by HB 56, are subject to the loss of state funds, and are subject to draconian penalties of $1,000 to $5,000 for each day that the policy or practice is in effect. §§ 5(a) &(d),
6(a) & (d). School officials who fail to report such policies and practices are guilty
33 In this way, Section 28 also violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, which prohibits the disclosure of certain identifying information about a student unless the student’s parent gives written consent. The U.S. Departments of Justice and Education recently reaffirmed that FERPA’s protections apply to noncitizen children, emphasizing that the circumstances in which a school district may disclose noncitizen students’ information are “limited and unlikely to be applicable in the majority of situations school districts confront.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers for School Districts and Parents, at 3, available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices /list/ocr/docs/qa-201101.pdf (emphasis in original).
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of a Class A Misdemeanor. HB 56 §§ 5(f), 6(f). Thus, HB 56 ensures that school officials will be compelled to disclose the identities of students and their parents whom they believe to be unlawfully present.
As a result, Section 28 flatly violates Plyler by imposing an obstacle to the enrollment in public school for children of immigrant parents. By requiring school officials to inquire into immigration status and authorizing them to report that information to DHS, Section 28 ensures that not only undocumented children, but also U.S. citizens and lawfully-residing immigrant children in mixed-status families, will avoid school registration for fear of bringing themselves or their parents to the attention of the immigration authorities. Section 28 thus goes even further than the law Plyler struck down, by hindering educational access not just for undocumented children, but also for U.S. citizen children based on their place of birth and the immigration status of their parents.34
Section 28 does so, moreover, without any relation to a legitimate (let alone compelling) state interest. Although the law professes that the purpose of this intrusive and intimidating data collection scheme is to assess the costs and “other educational impacts on the quality of education provided to students who are citizens of the United States, due to the enrollment of aliens who are not lawfully
34See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Plyler to invalidate the denial of automatic Medicaid eligibility to newborn U.S. citizen children solely because of their mothers’ unlawful immigration status).
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present in the United states,” HB 56 § 28(d)(5), it is clear from HB 56’s history and design that deterring children in immigrant families from enrolling in public school—not assessing educational costs—was the real motivating purpose behind Section 28.
Tellingly, the statements of HB 56’s sponsors confirm that deterrence of enrollment of certain children is the law’s aim. HB 56’s sponsor in the House, Rep. Micky Hammon, described the bill as motivated by the costs of “educat[ing] the children of illegal immigrants” and predicted that HB 56 will result in “cost savings for this state.” David White, Alabama Legislative Panel Delays Voting on Illegal Immigration Bill, The Birmingham News, Mar. 3, 2011.35 Likewise, Senator Beason, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, stated that educating immigrant children and the children of immigrants “is where one of our largest costs come[s] from . . . . It’s part of the cost factor. Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost?” Ex. 42-M, Brian Lyman, Immigration Law Makes School Officials Uneasy, The Montgomery Advertiser, June 8, 2011.
In addition, while Section 28 requires schools to determine the immigration status of students’ parents and report that information to the State Board of Education, see HB 56 § 28(a)(1), (c), the law says nothing about what the State Board of Education should do with that information. Parental information is not
35 Available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/03/alabama_legislative_panel_dela.html.
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included in the list of information the State Board of Education must report to the Legislature, see § 28(d)(2). The only purpose of collecting information about children’s parents, then, is to intimidate mixed-status families and place an obstacle in the path of student enrollment.
Recent federal guidance by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Education specifically recognizes that a school district violates Plyler when it adopts enrollment practices that “may chill or discourage the participation, or lead to the exclusion, of students based on their or their parents’ or guardians’ actual or perceived citizenship or immigration status.”36 Because Section 28 will serve to exclude children of all statuses from the classroom based on alienage (theirs and that of their parents), it violates the Equal Protection Clause and must be enjoined.
E. Section 11 Violates the First Amendment’s Right to Freedom of Expression
Section 11 of HB 56 constitutes an impermissible content-based regulation of speech by criminalizing work-related communications in traditional public fora
36 “Dear Colleague” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., May 6, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerletter.pdf. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers for School Districts and Parents, available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201101.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights of All Children to Enroll in School, available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet201101.pdf.
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and by criminalizing the solicitation of work by certain noncitizens.37 To be upheld, Section 11 must be shown to serve a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means. It cannot satisfy these exacting standards.
Solicitation, including solicitation for financial gain, is clearly First Amendment-protected activity. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980); Smith v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999) (begging protected); Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1991) (in-person solicitation by accountants protected); see also One World One Family Now v. City of Miami Beach, 175 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (using tables to distribute literature protected). Sections 11(f) and (g) infringe on the First Amendment right to engage in such speech by making it unlawful for a person in a vehicle “to attempt to hire or hire” day laborers, and making it unlawful for a person to enter a car “in order to be hired.” HB 56 §§ 11(f), (g). These are content-based regulations of speech because liability attaches only when individuals engage in speech about day labor. Burk v. AugustaRichmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2004) (ordinance that regulated “only political speakers, leaving soccer-players, sidewalk performers, and tailgating groups untouched” was content-based); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) (code that regulated some
37 For a detailed description of Section 11, see supra at 5.
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type of signs “based on the nature of the messages they seek to convey” was “undeniably a content-based restriction on speech.”); see also S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (hallmark of content-based regulation is where official must examine content of message that is conveyed in order to enforce regulation).
Under well-established First Amendment principles, content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if they advance a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive means. Burk, 365 F.3d at 1251. The State cannot show a compelling interest for imposing these restrictions, or that these are the least restrictive means to achieve its goal. Assuming that the State’s goal is to protect traffic safety, the State cannot reasonably justify why it has opted to criminalize only one form of solicitation but has left untouched vast swaths of related conduct that occurs on or near the street—such as soliciting charitable donations from cars or selling newspapers to cars. For this reason, a motion to dismiss a First Amendment challenge to an identical section of Arizona’s SB 1070 was denied, and that court found the identical Arizona provision to be a content-based regulation of speech. See Ex. 42E, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, at *19-20 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010).38 If
38 Although the Arizona district court denied Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction against this provision on First Amendment grounds, the court did so solely to preserve judicial resources in light of the pending decision of the en banc Ninth Circuit court in a related
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the State is concerned with traffic safety, it has ample traffic laws that it could
enforce. Moreover, HB 56 provides no indication that labor solicitation is a
problem of statewide proportions requiring a statewide prohibition.
Section 11(a) also imposes a content-based speech restriction on speech by
criminalizing the application for or solicitation of work in public areas by
noncitizens who do not have federal work authorization. HB 56 § 11(a). Again,
this is a content-based law because it prohibits only one type of solicitation—
solicitation for work. Burk, 365 F.3d at 1254-55; Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1266;
S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1145. Nor can the State establish that Section 11(a) is the
least restrictive means to achieve a compelling interest. See supra at 28-29 (discussing IRCA preemption).39
In addition, Section 11 is unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is
overbroad “if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged
in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 130
case that would likely influence the result on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. See Ex. 42-F, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011). The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, indicating that refiling may be appropriate after the Ninth Circuit decision. Id. This Court need not await a decision from the Ninth Circuit, because as discussed above, under binding Eleventh Circuit law Plaintiffs have clearly established that they are likely to succeed on their claim that Section 11 violates their First Amendment rights. 39 Even if the prohibition on solicitation of work were viewed under the First Amendment standard applied to commercial speech, the prohibition on solicitation in section 11(a) would be an impermissible restraint. See Fane, 945 F.2d at 1517 (“[C]ommercial speech . . . is undeniably entitled to substantial protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . Blanket prohibitions on commercial speech are disfavored.”) (citations omitted). The court in Fane further noted: “Prophylatic restraints on commercial speech based on unsupported assertions or unsubstantiated fears are not acceptable.” Id. at 1518.
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S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 2011 WL 1484077, *1, 24 (N.D. Ala. 2011). “The danger in an overbroad statute is not that actual enforcement will occur or is likely to occur, but that third parties . . . may feel inhibited in utilizing their protected first amendment communications because of the existence of the overly broad statute.” Clean Up ’84 v. Heinrich, 759 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985); see also CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006).
Section 11 will have a profound limiting effect on the exercise of free speech by day laborers across the state. Plaintiffs John Doe #5 and #6 have expressed that HB 56 will inhibit their willingness to seek day labor work. See Ex. 35, John Doe #5 Decl. ¶¶ 8-10; Ex. 36, John Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 6. HB 56 will have a substantial chilling effect on the expressive rights of countless others who regularly solicit work in public forums throughout Alabama, including numerous lawful residents and citizens as well as individuals seeking temporary, informal work for which employment authorization is not required. It will also cause great harm to lawful residents like Plaintiff Romero, who has a student visa but plans to solicit work while waiting for his employment authorization to be approved. Ex. 16, Juan Pablo Black Romero Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7. Because Section 11 prohibits substantial constitutionally protected speech, it is overbroad and should be enjoined.
F. HB 56 Violates Core Sixth Amendment Trial Rights
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HB 56 dramatically and unconstitutionally dictates the manner in which evidence is presented and guilt is determined for the new state crimes it creates. For the crimes of failing to register, soliciting work and harboring, transporting, encouraging/inducing, and renting, immigration status or work authorization status is a central element. HB 56 §§ 10(a), 11(a), 13(a)(1)-(4). The law restricts how this fundamental element can be proven, and in the process violates the Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.40
1. Sections 10, 11, and 13 Violate the Confrontation Clause The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. XVI. “A witness’s testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009). HB 56 contemplates that the prosecution will introduce an immigration status verification from LESC as the sole evidence on the element of a defendant’s unlawful immigration status. HB 56 §§ 10(e), 11(e), 13(h); David Palmatier Decl. (describing LESC). Any such verification from LESC is clearly testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-
40 For a detailed description of the proof requirements for Sections 10, 11, and 13, see supra at 3, 5, 6.
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10876, __ U.S. __, 2011 WL 2472799 at *7 n.6 (June 23, 2011) (“To rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”) (citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether the declarant of a pretrial statement would reasonably expect that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531. The verification received by the State from LESC is “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2532.
The Supreme Court has held that analogous records must be subject to crossexamination under the Confrontation Clause. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that a forensic analyst’s laboratory report is a testimonial statement because it is “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (citation omitted). Similarly, “a clerk's certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it” is testimonial if “the clerk’s statement would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched.” Id. at 2539. Certificates of Nonexistent Records (“CNR”) are inadmissible without
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cross-examination for the same reason.41 See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 584-86 (5th Cir. 2010).42 These testimonial statements are
indistinguishable from the LESC reports HB 56 requires as evidence in criminal
prosecutions.
Because HB 56 mandates that these verifications be admitted without an
opportunity for cross-examination, Sections 10, 11, and 13 violate the Sixth
Amendment and should be enjoined.
2. HB 56 Violates the Compulsory Process Clause HB 56’s exclusive reliance on LESC responses as evidence of unlawful
immigration status also violates the Sixth Amendment right to “compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in [a defendant’s] favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
The Clause has been interpreted broadly to ensure, “at a minimum, that criminal
defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the
attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence
that might influence the determination of guilt.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,
41 For example, it is a federal crime to reenter the United States without authorization from the federal government after having been removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In reentry prosecutions, prior to Melendez-Diaz, the government would often submit a CNR from an immigration officer stating that the officer had searched the federal immigration records and could find no evidence that the accused was permitted to reenter the country. See Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d at 583-85. After Melendez-Diaz, this practice clearly violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. 42 See also United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 946 (Jan 10, 2011); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Gumbs, No. 10-3342, 2011 WL 1667438 at *3-4 (3d Cir. May 4, 2011); United States v. Madarikan, 356 Fed. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2009); United States v. Salinas-Valenciano, 220 Fed. App’x 879, 883-85 (10th Cir. 2007).
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408 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. . . . Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself.” Id.43
By making the federal government’s immigration status determination the only permitted evidence in criminal cases, HB 56 violates the right to compulsory process. “[I]t could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the [Compulsory Process] clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). Yet this is exactly what the State has done through HB 56 by prohibiting defendants from introducing any evidence on the core issue of immigration status. See HB 56 §§ 10(a), (e); 11(a), (e); 13(a), (h). This absolute prohibition is a direct affront to the Compulsory Process Clause, and to the entire adversarial process. II. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF HB 56 IS
NOT PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if HB 56 is not enjoined. “An injury is irreparable if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies” or “if damages would be difficult or impossible to calculate.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts have repeatedly recognized that irreparable harm may result from the enforcement
43 Though the Supreme Court has generally grounded the right to present a defense in the Compulsory Process Clause, it has sometimes also relied on the Due Process Clause. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285, 294 (1973).
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of a law that violates the Supremacy Clause, see, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992); Arizona, 641 F. 3d at 366; GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *18, as well as constitutional guarantees of individual rights, see, e.g., KH Outdoor, LLC v. Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006).
If HB 56 goes into effect, it will immediately subject numerous Plaintiffs and members of Plaintiff organizations to the risk of unconstitutional and extended detention while police officers investigate their immigration status. See Ex. 27, Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. 10, Mohammad Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Ex. 14, Maria D. Ceja Zamora Decl. ¶¶ 7-9; Ex. 7, Eliseo Medina Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12; Ex. 8, Harris Raynor Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Ex. 17, Pastor Christopher Barton Thau Decl. ¶ 20; Ex. 25, Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 4-6; Ex. 26, Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 5, 13; Ex. 29, Jane Doe # 5 Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. 33, John Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. 34, John Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Ex. 9, Joseph Hansen Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. 28, Jane Doe #4, ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiffs are a diverse group of individuals and organizations who represent racial minorities, national origin minorities, individuals who speak foreign languages or who have accents when speaking English, and individuals who lack the registration and qualifying identity documents enumerated in HB 56. See id. If HB 56 takes effect, Plaintiffs will be at risk of discriminatory treatment, unwarranted police scrutiny, prolonged detentions, and arrest every time they come into contact with Alabama law enforcement. These harms are inherently unquantifiable and cannot
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be adequately remedied after the fact. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (describing liberty of person as “sacred” right) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir. 1984) (discriminatory treatment irreparable); Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (unlawful detention irreparable); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 813 (D. Ariz. 2010) (enforcement of discriminatory state statute would cause irreparable injury).
Plaintiffs and their members also face the very real threat of unlawful criminal prosecutions if HB 56 is allowed to take effect. See Mohammed Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Jane Doe #2 Decl.¶ 10; Ex. 22, Michelle Cummings Decl. ¶¶ 3-6; Ex. 15, Pamela Long Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, 12; Ex. 19, Robert Barber Decl. ¶¶ 5-9, 13-17; Ex. 18, Ellin Jimmerson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6-8; Ex. 4, Rosa Toussaint Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9-10, 16; Ex. 6, John Pickens Decl. ¶ 12; Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 2-3; Ex. 20, Daniel Upton Decl. ¶¶ 8-12; Ex. 3, Mary Elizabeth Marr Decl. ¶¶ 4-9; Ex. 2, Isabel Rubio Decl. ¶ 5-8, 14; Ex. 13, Matt Webster Decl. ¶ 6; Pastor Christopher Barton Thau Decl. ¶¶ 7-10; Ex. 5, Jemise Ray Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, 11; Joseph Hansen Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. 21, Jeffrey Beck Decl. ¶¶ 3-6; Jane Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9.
Because of the threat of unreasonable searches and seizures, racial profiling, and unlawful criminal prosecutions, Plaintiffs and countless others will fear contact with law enforcement if HB 56 goes into effect, and several will avoid reporting
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crimes to the police or acting as witnesses, thus making them vulnerable targets for criminals and undermining public safety in their communities. See Eduardo Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 14; George Gascón Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; Isabel Rubio Decl. ¶ 9; Pamela Long Decl. ¶ 19; Pastor Christopher Barton Thau Decl. ¶ 18. Some will avoid contact with police altogether if HB 56 goes into effect. See Ex. 12, Grace Scire Decl. ¶ 9; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 6; Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, some Plaintiffs who do not possess any registration documents that they could show to avoid detention by local police are in heightened peril. See Mohammed Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 5, 13; John Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 7; John Doe #4 Decl. ¶ 10; Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 3. These harms are quintessential examples of irreparable harm because of their intangible and unquantifiable nature.
Countless children in Alabama, including the children of Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff organizations’ members, will be harmed by the implementation of Section 28. They will either face the burden of proving their immigration status to school officials and the risk that school officials will report information about them and their family members to DHS, or they will be chilled from attending school out of fear of being reported to the federal authorities. See Ex. 11, Scott Douglas Decl. ¶ 11; Isabel Rubio Decl. ¶ 15; Pastor Christopher Barton Thau Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 9; Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 8; Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 30, Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 8; Ex. 31, John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 13; Ex. 32, John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 8;
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Jane Doe #4 Decl., ¶ 5. Several Plaintiffs and many other Alabamians cannot afford private school tuition, so if they lose access to public education, they lose access to education entirely. See Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 9-11; Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 6; John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.
These harms are irreparable. As the Supreme Court recognized in Plyler, denying or chilling “innocent children” access to a public education “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status . . . . By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Courts have noted that actions preventing a child from attending school even for a short period of time can irreparably harm the child and diminish his or her chances of educational success. See, e.g., L.I.H. ex rel. L.H. v. New York City Bd. Of Educ., 103 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Thomas v. Davidson Acad., 846 F. Supp. 611, 619 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
For parents, too, Section 28 also threatens irreparable injury. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 is considering home-schooling her children, even though doing so will hinder her ability to provide financially for her family. Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 9.
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Other Plaintiffs face the risk that their families will be torn apart if they are reported to ICE themselves, or if their children or spouses are reported. Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 5; Jane Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7; Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 7; John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 11.
Several Plaintiffs and Plaintiff organizations’ members would be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because Section 8 would forbid them to pursue education at public post-secondary institutions in Alabama. See Fiseha Tesfamariam Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6; Esayas Haile Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6; John Doe #3 Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; John Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Mohammed Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶ 8. As the State of Alabama itself recognizes, “[i]n a growing, global, knowledge-based economy, postsecondary education is a prerequisite for increased opportunity” and is “correlated with higher personal incomes, productivity, economic growth, civic participation, and quality of life.”44 Denying students advanced education will deny them economic opportunity and permanently reduce their life chances.
The First Amendment violations in Sections 5, 6, and 11 constitute further irreparable harms to Plaintiffs. Individuals with the will and ability to work in Alabama will be subject to criminal sanctions for communicating about this subject in a public or private forum. HB § 11. Like Plaintiffs John Doe #5 and John Doe
44Alabama Commission on Higher Education, Forging Strategic Alliances: State Plan for Alabama Higher Education, 2009-2014, at 7, available at http://www.ache.state.al.us/SPAC/ Forging Strategic Alliances 2 19 10.pdf.
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#6, citizens and noncitizens alike will be chilled from lawfully seeking work for fear of prosecution under HB 56’s overbroad speech prohibitions. John Doe #5 Decl. ¶¶ 8-10; John Doe #6 Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 127172.
Plaintiffs would be further harmed by the loss of employment opportunities that flow from this unconstitutional denial of free speech, magnifying the imminent irreparable harms posed by HB 56. See Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, No. 04-3521 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005); see also Kinney v. Int’l. Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271, 1279 (7th Cir. 1993).
Other Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if HB 56 is implemented because they will be unable to enforce their routine business contracts with individuals who they may know or suspect are in the country without federal immigration authorization. See Robert Barber Decl. ¶¶ 19-20; Daniel Upton Decl. ¶ 10; Jemise Ray Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9; Jeffrey Allen Beck Decl. ¶ 8. The labor union Plaintiffs could be prohibited from enforcing a wide range of contracts on behalf of their members and, as a result, would risk having complaints filed against them for failure to properly represent their members. See Eliseo Medina Decl. ¶ 16; Harris Raynor Decl. ¶ 10.
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Finally, the organizational Plaintiffs will suffer and are already suffering irreparable harm because they are required to divert organizational resources away from core mission activities to address their members’ and clients’ concerns about the law and repercussions from its enforcement, and will face diminished membership and clients if the law goes into effect. See John Pickens Decl. ¶ 11; Isabel Rubio Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15; Rosa Toussaint Decl. ¶¶ 17-20; Mary Elizabeth Marr Decl. ¶ 10; Grace Scire Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Eliseo Medina Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15; Harris Raynor Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, 11; Scott Douglas Decl. ¶ ¶ 12, 13, 15; Jemise Ray Decl. ¶ 13; Joseph Hansen Decl. ¶¶ 10-11; see also Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1994) (threat of loss of customers irreparable). The missions of the organizational Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be frustrated as their members will be afraid to gather in public places, attend marches and meetings, and engage in other advocacy and organizing activities that might bring them into contact with law enforcement. See Isabel Rubio Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11-12; Mohammed Abdollahi Ali-Beik Decl. ¶ 9; Rosa Toussaint Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 15; Mary Elizabeth Marr Decl. ¶ 11; Eliseo Medina Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14; Harris Raynor Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9; Joseph Hansen Decl. ¶ 10. None of these harms can be compensated after the fact, making each a quintessential irreparable injury that justifies an injunction. III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS STRONGLY FAVORS THE ISSUANCE
OF AN INJUNCTION
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A preliminary injunction will impose only minimal harm on the State of Alabama because Plaintiffs ask merely for the status quo to be maintained while serious questions about the law’s constitutionality are adjudicated. This is precisely the purpose of a preliminary injunction. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1101 n.13 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he textbook definition of a preliminary injunction . . . [is that it is] issued to preserve the status quo and prevent allegedly irreparable injury until the court ha[s] the opportunity to decide whether to issue a permanent injunction”). The equities tip sharply in favor of granting a preliminary injunction while the constitutionality of HB 56 is decided. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1297; KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272. IV. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The interests of Plaintiffs and the general public are aligned in favor of a preliminary injunction in this case. The public interest is not served by allowing an unconstitutional law to take effect. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1297; KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272. Particularly where civil rights are at stake, an injunction serves the public interest because the injunction “would protect the public interest by protecting those rights to which it too is entitled.” Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2000). And courts have specifically held that enjoining a state statute that is preempted by federal law will serve the public interest. See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson,
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594 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir. 2010); GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *18; Farmers Branch 2010, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (granting permanent injunction).
The harms that will be caused by implementation of HB 56 are particularly acute because of the danger to U.S. foreign relations. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 64; Arizona, 641 F.3d at 365-66. The Government of Mexico has spoken out strongly against HB 56, see supra at 16. Strained diplomatic ties, such as those resulting from HB 56, have far-reaching adverse effects on the nation’s economy, on federal and state governments’ ability to collaborate with foreign governments on issues such as drug and border enforcement and trade, and more broadly on the ability of the United States to maintain peaceable relations with its neighbors. Preserving diplomatic relations with foreign governments is obviously in the public’s interest. See Republic of Panama v. Air Panama Internacional, S.A., 745 F. Supp. 669, 675 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (concluding that a preliminary injunction “buttress[ing] the foreign policy of the United States” serves the public interest).
For all of these reasons, the balance of equities tips sharply in favor of issuing a preliminary injunction while the Court fully considers the constitutionality of HB 56.
CONCLUSION Plaintiffs have met all of the four factors for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court grant their Motion
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for a Preliminary Injunction and enter the attached Proposed Order enjoining: (a) HB 56 in its entirety because it is preempted as a regulation of immigration and thereby violates the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution; (b) Sections 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, and 30 because these sections directly undermine federal immigration priorities and conflict with federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution; (c) Section 11 because it violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (d) Sections 12, 18, 19 and 20 because they violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (e) Sections 10, 11 and 13 of HB 56 because they violate the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (f) Sections 8 and 28 because they likely violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2010.

s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan^ AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37 Filed 07/21/11 Page 81 of 83

mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe* Naomi Tsu* Daniel Werner* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR

New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* Vivek Mittal* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201-0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R)

72

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37 Filed 07/21/11 Page 82 of 83

ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer^ Ghita Schwarz^ Diana S. Sen^ LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St. 14th floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 Bspears@mindspring.com

Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: (205) 443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com

* admitted pro hac vice ^ application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37 Filed 07/21/11 Page 83 of 83
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading, including exhibits and a proposed order, was filed through the Court’s CM/ECF system, and served electronically on all parties registered through that system. Parties may also access this filing through the court’s CM/ECF System.
I further certify that on this day I hand-delivered a copy to the office of Misty S Fairbanks Winfield J. Sinclair Office of the Attorney General, State of Alabama 501 Washington Ave. Montgomery, AL 36104
I further certify that on this day I placed a copy in the mail, first class, postage prepaid, to:
J.R. Brooks, Esq. LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE P.C. P.O. Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804 who has represented that he is authorized to accept service for Defendants Wardynski, Warren, Blair, Fuller, Thompson, and Langham.
s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke
74

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 1 of 17

FILED
2011 Aug-10 AM 09:38 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) ) ) )

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama; et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02736-SLB ) ) ) ) )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants. 1

) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) ) )

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 2 of 17
STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange, and Madison County District Attorney Robert L. Broussard (the State Defendants) respectfully move this Court to certify to the Supreme Court of Alabama the question of what Sections 13 and 27 of Act No. 2011-535 mean, given that they must be interpreted in compliance with the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01.
1. On August 1, 2011, Rt. Rev. Henry N. Parsley, Jr., in his official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama, Rev. Dr. William H. Willimon, in his individual capacity as Bishop of the Northern Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church, Most Rev. Thomas J. Rodi, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Mobile, a corporation sole, and Most Rev. Robert J. Baker, Roman Catholic Bishop of Birmingham in Alabama, a corporate sole, (“Church Leaders”) filed suit against the State Defendants challenging Act No. 2011-535. Case No. 5:11-cv-02726-SLB, doc. 1.
2. The Church Leaders contend that, on its face, Act No. 2011-535 violates various federally protected rights and should be enjoined in its entirety. Case No. 5:11-cv-02726-SLB, doc. 1 at ¶¶ 78-105, id. at Prayer for Relief.
3. Specifically, however, the Church Leaders only focus on Section 13 (which creates new crimes related to concealing, harboring, shielding, inducing, or
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 3 of 17
transporting illegal aliens), Section 27 (which concerns contracting), and Section 25 (which concerns solicitation, attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime created by the Act). Case No. 5:11-cv-02726-SLB, doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57-68.
4. On August 5, 2011, the Church Leaders filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, incorporating a memorandum in support. Case No. 5:11cv-02726-SLB, doc. 15.
5. The Church Leaders’ motion alleges that Act No. 2011-535 “also violates the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment that guarantees that Alabama residents’ freedom of religion is not burdened by [S]tate or local laws.” Case No. 5:11-cv-02726-SLB, doc. 15.
6. “The purpose of the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment is to guarantee that the freedom of religion is not burdened by [S]tate and local law; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious freedom is burdened by government.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01 (III).
7. It was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01 (II)(6); see also historical note indicating that the Amendment was proposed to the electorate at the November 1998 election.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 4 of 17
8. The Amendment prohibits the State of Alabama from “burden[ing] a person’s freedom of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the State “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01 (V).
9. The Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment is to “be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial and deterrent purposes.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01 (VII)(a).
10. The Amendment clearly acts as a constraint on the meaning of Act No. 2011-535. See Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01 (VI)(a) (“This amendment applies to all government rules and implementations thereof, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the effective date of this amendment.”).
11. This Court lacks jurisdiction to direct State officials to comply with State law, including the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (“A federal court’s grant of relief against [S]tate officials on the basis of [S]tate law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on [S]tate sovereignty than when a federal court instructs [S]tate officials
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 5 of 17

on how to conform their conduct to [S]tate law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.”).
12. Accordingly, this Court cannot adjudicate any claim that the Church Leaders may be attempting to put before it concerning the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment.1
13. Nonetheless, as a State law may not violate the State Constitution, the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment is key to interpreting Act No. 2011-535.
14. Act No. 2011-535 is entirely new, and the Alabama “courts have had no occasion to construe the law in the context of actual disputes . . . , or to accord the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).2
15. Only the Alabama Supreme Court can authoritatively construe Act No. 2011-535. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (“Only the Georgia courts can supply the requisite construction, since of course we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1

There is no reference to the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment in the Complaint.

See Case No. 5:11-cv-02726-SLB, doc. 1, generally.

2

A challenge to Act No. 2011-535 was filed in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on

July 22, 2011. See Doe v. Bentley, Case No. CV-2011-882 (Montgomery County Circuit Court,

Hardwick, J.). The Doe litigation originally raised State constitutional claims, and an amended

complaint raising federal claims has been filed. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary

injunction, but have now moved to stay the proceedings. The Circuit Court has set a hearing on

the stay motion for September 7, 2011.

5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 6 of 17
16. If the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment requires that Sections
13 and 27 be read in a more limited manner, it is the Alabama Supreme Court that
can offer “a limiting construction.” Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450;
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964) (“[T]his Court ordinarily accepts the
construction given a state statute in the local courts and also presumes that the
statute will be construed in such a way as to avoid the constitutional question
presented . . . .”).
17. As the Eleventh Circuit has noted:
When substantial doubt exists about the answer to a material [S]tate law question upon which the case turns, a federal court should certify that question to the [S]tate supreme court in order to avoid making unnecessary [S]tate law guesses and to offer the [S]tate court the opportunity to explicate [S]tate law. Only through certification can federal courts get definitive answers to unsettled [S]tate law questions. Only a [S]tate supreme court can provide what we can be assured are ‘correct’ answers to [S]tate law questions, because a [S]tate’s highest court is the one true and final arbiter of [S]tate law. Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc., 93 F.3d 758, 761 (11th Cir.1996) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Riley v.
Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425 (2008) (“A State’s highest court is unquestionably
‘the ultimate exposito[r] of state law.’”) (alteration by the Court; quoting Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)); McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen we write to a state law issue, we write in faint and
disappearing ink.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 7 of 17
18. Alabama’s Rules of Appellate Procedure allow this Court to certify questions to the Alabama Supreme Court to give it the opportunity to interpret the Act once and for all. Rule 18(a) provides:
When it shall appear to a court of the United States that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of law of this State which are determinative of said cause and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, such federal court may certify such questions or propositions of law of this State to the Supreme Court of Alabama for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of [S]tate law, which certified question the Supreme Court of this State, by written opinion, may answer.
Ala. R. App. P. 18(a). 19. If this Court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the
parties to this litigation would have the opportunity, and responsibility, to brief the issues to the State court. Ala. R. App. P. 18(g).
20. Certification of novel questions of State law to the State’s highest court promotes judicial economy. “Certification procedure ... allows a federal court faced with a novel [S]tate-law question to put the question directly to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).
21. In the consolidated case of Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, the State Defendants similarly argued that
7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 8 of 17
this Court should consider certification to the Supreme Court of Alabama as a tool for interpreting Act No. 2011-535. See, e.g., Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, doc. 82 at 25-29.
22. The reasons for certification are all the more compelling in the Church Leaders’ case because a proper construction from the Supreme Court of Alabama may moot the entire litigation.
23. Prompt certification may allow the Supreme Court of Alabama to offer an authoritative construction of Sections 13 and 27 of Act No. 2011-535 before this Court rules on the Church Leaders’ motion for preliminary injunction. In the alternative, prompt certification may help to avoid the expenditure of additional resources thereafter.
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants respectfully move this Court to certify to the Supreme Court of Alabama the question of what Sections 13 and 27 of Act No. 2011-535 mean, given that they must be interpreted in compliance with the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01.
8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 9 of 17

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard

9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 10 of 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 9, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Mary Bauer Samuel J. Brooke Andrew H. Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org sam.brooke@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org
Cecilia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.343.0775 Wang
415.343.0778 Desormeau 415.343.0777 Sugarman Facsimile: 415.395.0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.896.1701 ext. 110 Facsimile: 415.896.1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 11 of 17
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: 404.521.6700 Lapointe & Werner
404.221.5846 Tsu Facsimile: 404.221.5857 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.296.2300 Facsimile: 202.296.2318 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
G. Brian Spears G. BRIAN SPEARS PC 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Telephone: 404.872.7086 Facsimile: 404.892.1128 bspears@mindspring.com
Ben E. Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 Telephone: 334.201.0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 12 of 17
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K.T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2676 Segura
212.549.2664 Mukherjee 212.549.2620 Jadwat 212.549.2616 Gelernt 212.549.7303 Tan Facsimile: 212.549.2654 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Vivek Mittal Melissa S. Keaney Shiu-Ming Cheer NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 Telephone: 213.639.3900 Facsimile: 213.639.3911 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org
12

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 13 of 17
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: 510.663.8282 Facsimile: 510.663.2028 broder@nilc.org
Freddy Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: 205.443.7858 Facsimile: 205.433.7853 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street Post Office Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35801 Telephone: 256.536.7423 Facsimile: 256.536.2689 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 dsen@latinojustice.org
13

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 14 of 17
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwartz LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 Telephone: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Amy Pederson MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: 202.293.2828 apedersen@maldef.org
Jessica Karp National Day Laborer Organizing Network 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Loa Angeles, California 90057 Telephone: 213.380.2785 jkarp@ndlon.org
14

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 15 of 17
J.R. Brooks, Jr. Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804-2087 Telephone: 256.535.1100 Facsimile: 256.533.9322 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, Alabama 35283-0709 Telephone: 205.521.8000 Facsimile: 205.488.6275 dsweeney@babc.com
C. Lee Reeves, II Joshua Wilkenfeld Varu Chilakamarri U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov Joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov Praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov
15

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 16 of 17
Augusta S. Dowd WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD PC 2025 3rd Avenue, North, Suite 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 adowd@waadlaw.com
Terry McElheny DOMINICK FLETCHER YEILDING WOOD & LLOYD P.O. Box 1387 Birmingham, AL 35201 tmc@dfy.com
F. Grey Redditt, Jr. VICKERS RIIS MURRAY & CURRAN LLC 106 St. Francis Street, 11th Floor P.O. Drawer 2568 Mobile, AL 36652-2568 gredditt@vickersriis.com
John F. Whitaker WHITAKER MUDD SIMMS LUKE & WELLS LLC 2001 Park Place North, Suite 400 Birmingham, AL 35203 jwhitaker@wmslawfirm.com
and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 100 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: 210.224.5476 nperales@maldef.org
16

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 94 Filed 08/09/11 Page 17 of 17

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard

17

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 99 Filed 08/10/11 Page 1 of 15

FILED
2011 Aug-10 PM 05:14 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION )

OF ALABAMA; ET AL.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official

)

capacity as Governor of the State of

)

Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in )

his official capacity as Bishop of the

)

Episcopal Church in the Diocese of

)

Alabama, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official

)

capacity as Governor of the State of

)

Alabama,

)

)

Defendants.

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR )

ROBERT J. BENTLEY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-CV-2484-SLB

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 99 Filed 08/10/11 Page 2 of 15
PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 65(a), the leader s of the Episcopal, Methodist and Roman Catho lic churches in Alabam a (“Church Leaders”) move this Court for a prel iminary injunction against Defen dants Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange and Madison County District Attorney Robert Br oussard (hereinafter collectively “Defendants”) enjoining them and all persons acting in active concert with them, including law enforcement offi cers, from enforcing Se ctions 13 and 27 of the Beason-Hamm ond Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act No. 2011-535 of the 2011 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature.
INTRODUCTION In the Episcopal, Methodist and Roman Catholic religions, as well as many other faith traditions, the Word of God as communicat ed through the Bible mandates that followers show hospitality to strangers. The Bible offers a convincing set of arguments, com pelling followers to “love[s] the alien, giving him food and clothing; ” to “love the alien as yourself; ” and to “treat the stranger as a native born.” Deuteronomy 10:18; Leviticus 19:34. Alabama Church Leaders and thei r members follow these biblical commands by providing food, housing, transportation, places to worship as
1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 99 Filed 08/10/11 Page 3 of 15
well as administering the covenants of marriage, baptism and other religious contracts to anyone in need.
While agreeing on the necessity for comprehensive immigration reform, the Church Leaders and their me mbers ask this Court to allow them to legally continue to practice acts of ministry m andated in Scripture and incumbent on every church, Christian m inister and indi vidual Christian in Alabama. The Church Leaders and thei r members do not want to be forced to choose between following the Law of God or the Law of Alabama.
Targeting Sections 13 and 27 allow Church Leaders and thei r members to unam biguously focus on t he precise areas of the Law that outlaw the Biblical mandate to welc ome and care for all people without regard to immigration status. In resp ect to judicial econo my, the Church Leaders are asking for this distinct enjoinm ent so they can continue to practice their faith without fear of criminal prosecution. Section 13 specifically criminalizes the mission of the Church Leaders and their members to engage in works of mercy to feed, shelter and clothe anyone in need without first having to verify immigration documents. Section 13 also criminalizes the con stitutional right to freedom of assembly because th ose conducting and those attendi ng Sunday worship or ot her services will be deterred for fear of being arrested a nd subject to im prisonment. Section 27
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attacks Church Leaders’ and their m embers’ ability to enter into contracts, including the covenants of m arriage, baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, reconciliation, and other religious sacraments.1
Absent an immediate court orde r restraining the defendants from enforcing these key sections of the La w, the Church Leaders, their members and other Alabama residents will suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at la w. The Church Leaders have at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultim ate merits of their case that the Law is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In other states, wh ere similar albeit less prohibitive im migration legislation has been enacted, federal courts have enjoined the enforcement of those laws. Federal courts have grante d temporary injunctions against Utah and Indiana’s anti-immigration laws. In Arizona and Georgia, federal judges have blocked parts of those states' anti-immigration laws.
Finally, the hardship im posed on the defendants by a prelim inary injunction will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the Church Leaders and their members, n amely to be able to continue to freely exer cise their requisite duty to practice the Gospel.
1 Indeed, in the Roman Catholic faith attendance at Mass is an obligation that may not be ignored.
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FACTS2 1. On June 2, 2011, the Alabama legislature passed the nation’s most restrictive anti-immigrant legislati on. Alabama’s Anti-Im migration Law extensively regulates both im migrants and those who associate with, speak to or help them. 2. Representative Micky Hammon sponsored the anti-imm igration bill in the State House of Representatives. Senator Scott Beason introduced a similar omnibus anti-immigration bill in the Senate. The Anti-Imm igration Law is a combination of these two measures and became law 2011-535 after signature by Governor Robert Bentley on June 9, 2011. 3. The law is scheduled to take ef fect on September 1, 2011, except for Sections 22 and 23 (related to state law enforcemen t staffing and coordination), which went int o effect immediately, and Sections 9 a nd 15 (related to employment verification), which will go into effect in 2012. 4. Legislators expressly stated that the intent of the law was to deport undocumented immigrants and to deter them from living in Alabama. Representative Hammon explained: “This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life. Th ey will not stay in Alabam a . . . . [T] his bill is
2 The Church Leaders incorporate herein the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed on August 1, 2011 as if fully and completely set out herein.
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designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport themselves.” Kim Chandler, “Alabama H ouse passes Arizona-style immigration law,” The Birmingham News, April 5, 2011.
5. Senator Beason, speaking about immigration policy in February 2011, suggested that indivi duals “empty the clip, and do what has to be done.” Charles J. Dean, “Sen. Scott B eason catching flak over ‘em pty the clip’ comment,” The Birmingham News, February 8, 2011
6. For decades, Episcopal, Met hodist and Rom an Catholic Church Leaders and their leaders have engage d in m inistry activities that would directly be affected by the Law including, but not limited to:
 Feeding programs including soup kitchens and other activities to provide meals to the hom eless, working poor and anyone who i s hungry without regard to situation or condition.
 Educational programs including church schools, daycares, literacy programs and other activities wher e no validation of imm igration status is required.
 Housing services including temporary and perm anent housing that occur both at church facilities and at other locations.
 Charity re-sale stores where anyone can enter int o contracts t o purchase items.
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 Health care clinics where free medical services are administered to anyone in need.
 Hispanic churches dedicated to ministering to any person of Hispanic descent.
 Camps that are geared to providing Christian education to any child in Alabama regardless of their immigration status.
 Counseling centers where chur ch representatives provi de individual, family and marital counseling to anyone in need.
 Emergency services to help vi ctims of natural disasters and other emergencies including the tornados that devastated some Alabama communities in April 2011.
 Financial assistance to indivi duals in need, reg ardless of their immigration status, on a person-to-person basis.
7. In addition, Church Leader s and their members regularly encourage and welcome anyone in need of church services or assist ance, Bible study and other church gatheri ngs without verifying immigration status.
8. Church Leaders als o engage in religious covenants regardless of immigration status including baptis ms, marriages and other religious sacraments.
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9. In short, the history of the Anti-Immigration Law makes clear that the Alabama legislature intended th e bill to cast out undocum ented persons from the state and consequently proh ibit Alabama residents from freely practicing their faith, worshippi ng or entering into contracts without fear of criminal prosecution.
ARGUMENT Interim injunctive relief is designed to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits may be h ad. In this m atter, preserving the status quo requires the Court to immediately issue an order directing the defendants to cease and desist from enforcing Sections 13 and 27 of the Law on September 1, 2011. Without such an order, the Ch urch Leaders and their m embers will be subject to crim inal prosecution for continuing t o participate in numerous ministry services throughout the state that provide food, clothing and shelter to all residents. In add ition, the Church Leaders’ and their m embers’ ability to assemble freely in worship a ctivities as well as their ability to adm inister the religious covenants of m arriage, baptism and other religious sacraments is in danger under the Law. A preliminary injunction is appropriat e when the movant es tablishes: (1) a threat of irreparable injury; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and, (4) that the plaintiffs'
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injury outweighs any harm an injunction may cause the defendants; See K.H. Outdoors LLC v. City of Trussville , 458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006); Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 992 n. 3 (11th Ci r. 1996). The Church Leaders request for preliminary injunctive relief satisfies each requirement.
A. Without a preliminary injuncti on, the Church Leaders w ill suffer immediate and irreparable harm.
A preliminary injunction is issued to prevent irreparable harm. “An injury is irreparable if it cann ot be undone through m onetary remedies” or “if damages would be difficul t or impossible to calculate.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If enforced, Sections 13 and 27 of Alabama’s Anti-Immigration Law will cause irreparable harm to the Church Leaders and their m embers by violating their rights to freely exercise their religion, to speak freely, and to assemble as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amen dments to the United States Constitution. 3 The Church Leaders a nd their mem bers will suffer irreparable harm because they will no longer be able to live their faith by operating soup kitchens, provi ding transportation, and provi ding
3 To the extent that an infringement of First Amendment rights is shown, federal courts have held that irreparable injury justifying preliminary injunctive relief is presumed. Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983), citing Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001, 102 S.Ct. 2287 (1982).
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temporary and permanent housing fac ilities to all persons without first verifying their immigration status. In addition, the Church Leaders and their members will suffer irreparable harm because mem bers will be deterred from assembling to worship for fear of being arrested. Finally, the Church Leaders and their members will suffer irreparable harm because they will not be able to freely contract without firs t verifying immigration status. Church Leaders will be unable to perform contracts, including marrying residents and baptizing t hem, as well as being abl e to run day cares, t hrift stores or other enterprises involving contractual relations with residents who may be undocumented.
B. The Church Leaders have no adequate remedy at law. Money cannot compensate the Church Leaders and their members for the irreparable harm they will suffer at the hands of the defendants if Sections 13 and 27 of the Law are en forced. The Church Leaders and their members ask to be able to freely practice their faith to welcome and help any person in Alabama, as mandated by God’s Word in the Bible, without fear of prosecution because they failed to ve rify immigration status. No dollar amount can compensate the Church Le aders and their m embers from being denied their consti tutional rights to practice their faith, speak freely, freely assemble, and freely contract.
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C. The Church Leaders have a rea sonable chance of succes s on the merits of its case.
The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall m ake no law respecting an establishm ent of religio n, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....” U.S. Const. amen d. I. The First Amendment protects not only against state interference with religio us beliefs, but also against state interference with religious activity. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ( “[T] he exercise of religion often involves not only belief a nd profession but the perform ance of ... physical acts: assembling with ot hers for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, pr oselytizing....”) (internal quotations omitted); McDaniel v. Paty , 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (“[T]he right to the free exercise of religion unquestionabl y encompasses the right to preach , proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions ....”).
Sections 13 and 27 of Alabama’ s Anti-Immigration Law not only directly violate Church Leaders and their members ability to freely practice their faith, but the sections also infringe on the right to freely assemble and freely contract as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Section 13 of Alabama’s Anti-Immigration Law violates the ability of the Church Leaders and their memb ers to freely practice thei r faith because the section criminalizes church ministry activities when a Church Leader or
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member provides food, shelter, or tran sportation or otherwise encourages an undocumented person to com e to or resi de in this state. Section 13(a)(4) specifically attacks Church Leaders’ freedom to exercise their faith by making it a state crime to “[h]arbor an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering into a rental agreem ent, as defined by Section 35-9A-141 of the Code of Alabam a 1975, with an undocumented person to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the undocumented person is unlawfully present in the United States.”
Section 27 prohibits the ability of Church Leaders to freely contract. Section 27 prevents Alabama state co urts from enforcing the terms or conditions of any contract to whic h an unlawfully present undocum ented person is a party if the other party ha d direct or constructive knowledge that the undocumented person was unlawfully present at the time the parties entered into the contract.
D. The hardship im posed on the defendants by the injunction does not unreasonably outw eigh the benefits accrued by the Church Leaders.
The hardship im posed by a prelim inary injunction does not im pose any undue hardship on th e defendants because it merely preserves the status quo. The law is n ew legislation, so there is nothi ng the defendants woul d “lose” were the Court to grant a pr eliminary injunction. The defendants
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merely would incur a delay, whic h does not unreasonably outweigh the benefits accrued by the Church Leader s and their memb ers to be able to continue performing their essential ministry services throughout Alabama.
CONCLUSION As demonstrated, supra, the Church Leader s are entitled to the preliminary injunction of Sections 13 and 27 requested in this m otion. The Church Leaders have met their burden of dem onstrating that, without the preliminary injunction, the Church Le aders and the ministry services in which their church mem bers engage throughout Alabama will suffer immediate and irreparable injury. In addition, the Church Leaders, their members and other Alabama residents have reason to fear that their rights to speak freely and freely assemble will be violated because persons will be prohibited from attending worship servi ce for fear of criminal prosecution. The Church Leaders will also be pr ohibited from freely contracting through their ministry services as well as when they admi nister the sacraments of Baptism and Marriage, which are essentia lly contracts as they are covenants between the church and its m embers. Accordingly, this Court should grant the requested preliminary injunc tion and thereby preserve the status quo to prevent irreparable injury and harm to the Church Leader s, their members, and Alabama residents.
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RELIEF REQUESTED

The Church Leaders seek an immediate preliminary injunction

directed to the defendants enjoining, restraining, and ordering the defendants

and all persons acting in active

concert with them , including law

enforcement officers, from enforcing sections 13 and 27 of the Beas on-

Hammond Alabama Taxpayer and Citiz en Protection Act, Act No. 2011-

535, until this matter may be tried upon the merits.

Respectf

ully Submitted,

s/ Augusta S. Dowd Augusta S. Dowd Attorney for Henry N. Parsley, JR., Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabam a, in his official capacity
OF COUNSEL: WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD P.C. 2025 Third Avenue North, Suite 500 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 205 323-1888 adowd@whitearnolddowd.com

J.
OF COUNSEL: Dominick Feld Hyde P.C. 2121 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-939-0033 TMcElheny@dfhlaw.com

s/ J. Terrell McElheny Terrell McElheny Attorney for W illiam H. Willimon, Bishop of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church in his individual capacity

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 99 Filed 08/10/11 Page 15 of 15

F.
OF COUNSEL: Vickers Riis P.O. Box 2568 Mobile, AL 36652 251-432-9772 gredditt@vickersriis.com

s/ F. Grey Reddit, Jr. Grey Reddit, Jr. Attorney for Most Rev. Thomas J. Rodi, Archbishop of the Mobile, a corporation sole

s/

John F. Witaker

John

F. Whitaker

Attorney for Robert J. Baker, Bishop of

Birmingham, a corporation sole

OF COUNSEL: Whitaker, Mudd, Simms, Luke & Wells, LLC 2001 Park Place North, Suite 400 Birmingham, AL 35203 205-639-5300 jwhitaker@wmslawfirm.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on A ugust 10, 2011, I electronically f iled the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

s/

Augusta S. Dowd

OF COUNSEL

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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 1 of 15

FILED
2011 Aug-20 PM 05:53 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) ) ) )

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama; et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02736-SLB ) ) ) ) )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) ) )

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 2 of 15
STATE DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ADDRESSING EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
This Court has requested supplemental briefing as to the Equal Protection challenge to Section 28 of Act No. 2011-535. Section 28 calls for data collection and reporting in public elementary and secondary schools.
The Equal Protection clause prohibits disparate treatment of persons similarly situated. As the United State Supreme Court has stated,
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Here, there is no disparate treatment at all. On the contrary, the Act is clear and the evidence is undisputed that the same questions are asked with respect to all children at the time of their enrollment. Doc. 82-3. Moreover, it is undisputed that there is no requirement of an answer. Id. There is no evidence that any use will be made of the data collected, other than the compiling of statistics requested by the Alabama Legislature. Id. Under these circumstances, the Equal Protection clause is not triggered. Local, state, and federal governments often collect and compile statistical data, including data that relate to gender, race, and ethnicity. Doing so does not
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violate the Equal Protection clause, however, when persons are treated the same in the gathering of the data. It is disparate treatment that warrants scrutiny – not simple information gathering. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
On this point, the State Defendants and the United States are in agreement,1 and the State Defendants assert the same position advocated by the United States in Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000). In that case, recipients of census decennial questionnaires sued the United States Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the United States Bureau of the Census, alleging that the federal government’s asking – and demanding answers to – questions about race and medical conditions, among other things, violated their equal protection rights. 116 F. Supp. 2d at 803. In defense of that litigation, the United States denied that the Equal Protection Clause precludes the compilation of demographic data regarding protected groups, and, as summarized by the Court, asserted the following argument:
The government's position is that case law is clear that it is differential treatment, not classification, that implicates equal protection, and cites the opinion Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992): “The equal protection clause does not forbid classification. It simply keeps decision makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”
1 The motion of the United States challenges Section 28, but only on the grounds that its announced interpretation of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), should be given preemptive effect, not on equal protection grounds. U.S. doc. 2 at 42.
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The government also cites Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 583 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir.1978), which held “the Constitution itself does not condemn the collection of this data,” referring to a local census of the racial and ethnic breakdown of public school employees. Id. at 611. Adarand [Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)] held that equal protection guards against government actions based on race, but does not deal with government collection of data on race. Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 813. The facts in Morales were different from this case. In Morales, the plaintiffs faced criminal sanctions if they failed to respond to the federal government’s census form, id. at 812, whereas here, the State Defendants are posing their questions without any threat of prosecution for a failure to comply. Even so, in Morales, the United States District Court agreed with the United States, and granted the federal defendants summary judgment on all claims, including the Equal Protection claim. The same reasoning applies here – it is disparate treatment by the government that warrants Equal Protection scrutiny, not simple information gathering. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at 10. Therefore, as a distinct and severable section of the Act, Section 28 withstands an Equal Protection challenge. The HICA plaintiffs have argued, however, that the entire Act must be taken into account in order to measure the full effect of Section 28. (See, e.g., doc. 109 at 40, “Section 28 does not exist in a vacuum, and sections 5, 6, and 10 make the reporting of children and families to the immigration authorities mandatory.” ) The State Defendants and the HICA plaintiffs disagree on what the other sections
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of the Act actually require of State employees. Even assuming for a moment that the HICA plaintiffs’ reading of the Act is the correct one, it does not follow that Section 28 should be enjoined.
According to the HICA plaintiffs, when the information gathering under Section 28 is combined with the other sections of the Act, the result will be to deter or “chill students from gaining access to the classroom” – a result that they assert would be unconstitutional under Plyler. Doc. 109 at 38. That argument is a novel one, and no support is offered for it, other than the “Dear Colleague” letter from the United States Departments of Justice and Education.
In Plyler, the Court did not go so far as the HICA plaintiffs suggest. Although the Court held that persons illegally present in the United States are persons under the Equal Protection Clause, 457 U.S. at 210-11, the Court also made it clear that illegal aliens are not a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny. Id. at 223; id. at 219 n. 19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’”). Illegal aliens are present in this country due to a violation of federal law, which is “not a constitutional irrelevancy.” Id. at 223; see also id. at 219 at n. 19.
Constitutional concerns over the deterrent or chilling effect that a State statute may have arise primarily in the First Amendment context, where the fundamental right of freedom of speech is in jeopardy. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (lack of notice in law that regulates expression “raises
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 6 of 15
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech”). Here, the only case cited by the HICA plaintiffs in support of their argument makes it clear that there is no fundamental right at stake: “Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). Also, contrary to the HICA plaintiffs’ assertions, the holding in Plyler addressed the denial of education, not imposing a deterrent effect on a fundamental right. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
“Moreover, the existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971). Rather, assuming the analysis applies at all, this Court must weigh the chilling effect of the statute against its plainly legitimate sweep. Id. Section 28 – even read as broadly as the HICA plaintiffs assert – does not burden a fundamental right.
In sum, Section 28 requires data collection, not disparate treatment, and thus the Equal Protection Clause is not triggered. Even if Equal Protection analysis were warranted here, no more than a rational explanation for Section 28 should be demanded of the State, and the Alabama Legislature has given one in Section 2 of the Act.
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Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Margaret L. Fleming Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 20, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Mary Bauer Samuel J. Brooke Andrew H. Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org sam.brooke@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org
Cecilia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.343.0775 Wang
415.343.0778 Desormeau 415.343.0777 Sugarman Facsimile: 415.395.0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.896.1701 ext. 110 Facsimile: 415.896.1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 9 of 15
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: 404.521.6700 Lapointe & Werner
404.221.5846 Tsu Facsimile: 404.221.5857 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.296.2300 Facsimile: 202.296.2318 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
G. Brian Spears G. BRIAN SPEARS PC 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Telephone: 404.872.7086 Facsimile: 404.892.1128 bspears@mindspring.com
Ben E. Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 Telephone: 334.201.0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 10 of 15
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K.T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2676 Segura
212.549.2664 Mukherjee 212.549.2620 Jadwat 212.549.2616 Gelernt 212.549.7303 Tan Facsimile: 212.549.2654 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Vivek Mittal Melissa S. Keaney Shiu-Ming Cheer NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 Telephone: 213.639.3900 Facsimile: 213.639.3911 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org
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Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: 510.663.8282 Facsimile: 510.663.2028 broder@nilc.org
Freddy Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: 205.443.7858 Facsimile: 205.433.7853 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street Post Office Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35801 Telephone: 256.536.7423 Facsimile: 256.536.2689 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 dsen@latinojustice.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 12 of 15
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 Telephone: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: 202.293.2828 apedersen@maldef.org
Jessica Karp National Day Laborer Organizing Network 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Loa Angeles, California 90057 Telephone: 213.380.2785 jkarp@ndlon.org
12

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 13 of 15
J.R. Brooks, Jr. Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804-2087 Telephone: 256.535.1100 Facsimile: 256.533.9322 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, Alabama 35283-0709 Telephone: 205.521.8000 Facsimile: 205.488.6275 dsweeney@babc.com
C. Lee Reeves, II Joshua Wilkenfeld Varu Chilakamarri U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov Joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 14 of 15
Augusta S. Dowd WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD PC 2025 3rd Avenue, North, Suite 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 adowd@waadlaw.com
Terry McElheny DOMINICK FLETCHER YEILDING WOOD & LLOYD P.O. Box 1387 Birmingham, AL 35201 tmc@dfy.com
F. Grey Redditt, Jr. VICKERS RIIS MURRAY & CURRAN LLC 106 St. Francis Street, 11th Floor P.O. Drawer 2568 Mobile, AL 36652-2568 gredditt@vickersriis.com
John F. Whitaker WHITAKER MUDD SIMMS LUKE & WELLS LLC 2001 Park Place North, Suite 400 Birmingham, AL 35203 jwhitaker@wmslawfirm.com
William H. Orrick, III OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION USDOJ CIVIL DIVISION 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20530-0001 Bill.Orrick@usdoj.gov
Sister Lynn Marie McKenzie KNIGHT GRIFFITH MCKENZIE KNIGHT & MCLEROY LLP P.O. Box 930 Cullman, AL 35056 slm@knight-griffith.com
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 15 of 15
R. Champ Crocker R. CHAMP CROCKER, LLC P.O. Box 2700 Cullman, AL 35056-2130 champ@champcrocker.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants: Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 100 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: 210.224.5476 nperales@maldef.org
s/Margaret L. Fleming Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M)
15

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 1 of 20

FILED
2011 Aug-21 PM 04:47 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION

)

OF ALABAMA, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as )

Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his

)

official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal

)

Church in the Diocese of Alabama, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as )

Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02736-SLB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

)

)

) ) )

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02746-SLB

)

)

)

PLAINTIFFS HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA ET AL.’S SUPPLEMENTAL SECTION 28 BRIEFING REGARDING: (1) CLASSIFICATIONS; (2) LEVEL OF SCRUTINY; AND (3) WHETHER THE STATE HAS SATISFIED ITS BURDEN

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 2 of 20
Plaintiffs Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., hereby submit supplemental briefing regarding: (1) which classifications section 28 creates; (2) what level of scrutiny would apply to these classifications; and (3) whether Defendants’ stated interests withstand scrutiny. I. CLASSIFICATIONS: Section 28 Creates Three Impermissible
Classifications: (1) A Classification of Children Born Outside the United States; (2) A Classification of Children Whose Parent(s) are Aliens not Lawfully Present; and (3) A Classification of Children Who are Assumed to Lack Lawful Presence Section 28 places new requirements on students when they enroll in kindergarten or any grade in public school. HB 56 § 28(a)(1). Every student must produce an original or certified copy of her birth certificate at the time of enrollment. § 28(a)(2). When the birth certificate is produced, the school determines that the child was born in the United States and that neither of the child’s parents are “alien[s] not lawfully present in the United States,” the inquiry ends. §§ 28(a)(1)-(3). Additional proof of immigration status of the child is required in two circumstances: if the school determines that the student is “born outside the jurisdiction of the United States,” or if the school determines that the student “is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” §§ 28(a)(1), (3). Additional proof of the child’s immigration status is also required if the child does not produce an original or certified copy of her birth certificate. § 28(a)(3).
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Within 30 days, the child must submit additional proof of status, in the form of “both” an original or notarized copy of documents showing the child’s status,
and an attestation by the parent made under penalty of perjury that the document shows the child’s true identity. § 28(a)(4).1 A student who does not provide proof of lawful immigration status, or who admits to lacking lawful status, is presumed
to be an alien not lawfully present in the United States. §§ 28(a)(4) (soliciting information), (a)(5) (presumption of unlawful status if no information received).
Section 28 thus creates three classifications relevant to this proceeding:
• First, it creates a classification of children born outside the United States; these children are subject to additional documentation requirements of section 28;
• Second, it creates a classification of children who are presumed to be unlawfully present, who are subject to reporting requirements by school officials to both federal and state officials;2 and
• Third, it creates a classification of children whose parent or parents are not lawfully present in the United States; these children are subject to additional documentation requirements of section 28.
II. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
A. First Classification: Section 28’s classification of children born outside the United States must satisfy strict scrutiny to be upheld
1 See also § 28(a)(4)(b) (providing that if the required official documentation is not available, the parent may submit a declaration under penalty of perjury). 2 For a detailed description of the reporting requirements of section 28, see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3-5, 48-53 (Doc. 37) and Plaintiffs’ Reply at 36-42 (Doc. 109).
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The first classification is based on whether a person was born abroad. This classification must satisfy strict scrutiny to be upheld. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
The term “alien” is defined as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). By definition, all aliens must be born abroad, for any person born within the United States is automatically a citizen. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. By focusing on students’ place of birth, the Legislature is seeking to identify aliens, albeit via an over-inclusive category— some students born abroad will be U.S. citizens through naturalization, others will be citizens through birth.3 Nevertheless, this place-of-birth inquiry is clearly a proxy for determining alienage, and specifically for whether the student is lawfully present. See HB 56 §§ 28(a)(1), (3) (requiring foreign-born students to clarify alienage and lawful status). The fact that the classification is over-inclusive does not alter its purpose. See Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 727 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding alienage classification where naturalized citizens treated differently from native-born citizens; applying strict scrutiny and invalidating statute).
State classifications based on alienage are “‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). Such classifications cannot stand unless “the
3 Citizenship of individuals born abroad is defined by Congress. See, e.g., Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631.
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governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is . . . legitimate and substantial” and “the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As explained in Part III below, section 28 cannot survive this heightened review. Nor, for that matter, could this classification satisfy intermediate scrutiny under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982), as described below in the Second Classification.
B. Second Classification: Section 28’s classification of children who are assumed to lack lawful presence must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld
Section 28’s second classification applies to all children who are assumed to lack lawful presence. These children’s presumed status will be recorded in the school’s records along with the children’s identities. Schools will report this information to the State Board of Education, and will be subject to HB 56’s reporting requirements described supra at 2 n.2. This classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it infringes upon an undocumented child’s right to a public education. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
In Plyler, the Court acknowledged that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect class. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. But the Court stressed that access to education is “important” because it “has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society,” and its deprivation would have a “lasting impact . . . on the
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life of the child.” Id. at 221, 222. It acknowledged that undocumented children are necessarily “innocent . . . victims” of legislation targeting them because of their immigration status, for minor children “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” Id. at 220, 224. It thus concluded that intermediate scrutiny is warranted, and the State must show that any regulation that impacts children’s access to a free public education based on their immigration status is “justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.” Id. at 230.
As explained in Part III below, the State cannot meet its burden. C. Third Classification: Section 28’s classification of children whose
parent(s) are aliens not lawfully present must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld Section 28’s third classification is of children whose parent or parents are deemed to be not lawfully present in the United States. These children are subject to section 28’s additional documentation requirements, and their parents’ identities are subject to the reporting requirements of HB 56. This classification must withstand intermediate scrutiny because it is targeting U.S. citizen children as a result of the conduct of their parents. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discrimination based on parents’ nonmarital status); Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001) (discrimination based on parents’ immigration status). This classification is necessarily singling out U.S. citizen children on the
5

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basis of parentage. It is targeting U.S. citizen children in particular4 because
section 28 is already making separate inquiries into the status of any child who was
born abroad, which will encompass all non-citizen and “unlawfully present”
children. Thus, by creating a separate classification for children whose parents are
unlawfully present, section 28 creates a classification that is targeting U.S. citizen
children based on parentage.
A child has no control over her place of birth, the immigration status of her
parents, or her parents’ decision to reside in the United States. As the Supreme
Court articulated in Plyler and in numerous nonmarital children cases, targeting a
child for a parent’s perceived misdeeds “does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. As the Court explained:
Visiting condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the child is an ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of deterring the parent.
Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))
(alterations omitted).
Thus, in analyzing statutes that punished children because their parents were
4 Although some children of undocumented parents are themselves undocumented, the majority of children whose parents lack immigration status—82%—are U.S. citizens. A mere 18% are themselves foreign-born and undocumented. Pew Hispanic Center, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, 13 (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 8 of 20
not married when they were born, the Supreme Court has consistently applied an intermediate level of scrutiny rather than rational basis review. The Court acknowledged that U.S. citizen children are not a suspect class, but they nevertheless deserve protection when they are discriminated against based on “a characteristic determined by causes not within [their] control . . . , [which] bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). Burdening children for the conduct of their parents “is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted).
The children targeted by section 28 are analogous to those in the nonmarital children cases. Each is being categorized by the state based on “a characteristic determined by causes not within [her] control,” particularly circumstances related to the child’s parent. And in each case the issues at stake are substantial. Compare id. with Plyler, 457 U.S. at 119-223 (emphasizing importance of education). Intermediate scrutiny is warranted for this final classification in section 28, and the State must establish that its regulation is substantially related to an important governmental objective. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591.
As explained in Part III below, the State cannot meet this standard of review.
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III. DEFENDANTS’ INTERESTS DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY To justify the inquiry into both students’ and parents’ immigration statuses,
Defendants identify four interests. First they argue that these inquiries are being
made to “help determine if the student qualifies for assignment to an English as Second Language [“ESL”] class.” Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 45-46 (Doc. 110).5
Second, they assert the State has “has an economic interest in the data collection
and reporting,” to permit accurate projection of “costs and services.” Id. at 46.
Third, they assert that the State has an interest in
identify[ing] the effects upon the standard or quality of education provided to students who are citizens of the United States residing in Alabama that may have occurred, or are expected to occur in the future, as a consequence of the enrollment of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States. Id. at 45-46. Finally, they argue that they have an interest in asking these questions
in case the State needs “to supply courts with evidence in future lawsuits
addressing the manner in which Alabama runs its education system.” Id.at 46.
None of these interests justify the classifications or inquiries being made.
A. The State’s Interests Do Not Withstand Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny to Justify The First and Second Classifications
The first interest—ESL enrollment—cannot satisfy strict or intermediate
scrutiny because the questions being asked about immigration status and place of
5 Although this filing was not made in response to HICA Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, it cited additional rationales for section 28. Compare Defs.’ Opp. to HICA at 124-25 with Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 45-47. Plaintiffs herein address all the rationales for section 28 proffered by the State in both the HICA and DOJ cases.
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birth are irrelevant to ESL enrollment. Schools already determine eligibility for
ESL classes by focusing on the child’s fluency in the English language. See Tony
Miller Decl. ¶ 18 (providing detailed data on Alabama schools’ ESL enrollment)
(Doc. 2-3 in Case No. 11-cv-2746). Under federal law, “students are required to
be placed in [English Learners] programs based on their individual English
language proficiency, and not whether they were born in the United States or on
the legal status of their parents.” Id. ¶ 22. Basing ESL enrollment on immigration
status, citizenship status, or place of birth of the child or parent “has no basis in
educational law or policy as it relates to the identification of [English Learners]
students,” id. ¶ 23, for not every child who lacks immigration status is in need of
ESL instruction, and many children who are U.S. citizens and lawful aliens do
require ESL instruction. See id. ¶¶ 18 (noting that 18,633 students receive ESL
instruction and funding from the federal Department of Education (“DOE”); of these, only 1,053 are “immigrant students”6).7 Indeed, the U.S. Department of
6 The term “immigrant student” includes all students born abroad who have been in school for not more than three academic years, and who therefore may need special ESL assistance. Miller Decl. ¶ 14. This term includes all children who lack immigration status, and some who are here with lawful status. This data is compiled not by asking questions at enrollment, but by utilizing data from the American Community Survey. Id. 7 The numbers Miller provides establish that some “immigrant children” do not require ESL instruction. A total of 20,674 students receive ESL instruction, and 18,633 are served under Title III, implying that 2,041 are not served under Title III. Miller Decl. ¶ 18. There are also 3,647 immigrant students, and only 1,053 of these are served under Title III, meaning that 2,596 are not. Id. Of these 2,596, Miller does not specify how many immigrant students receive ESL instruction not funded through Title III, but many of them do not given that only 2,041 of the 20,674 students enrolled in ESL are not funded through Title III. Id. Thus at least 555 immigrant students are not receiving ESL.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 11 of 20
Education has “consistent[ly] . . . advised State Educational Agencies” that they may not lawfully make such inquiries into immigration status. Id. ¶ 14 (explaining that in “determining eligibility for [ESL instruction] . . . inquiries raising the issue of the legal presence of parents or their children should not be made because of the chilling effect it would have.”). Thus asking about immigration status and place of birth does not further the interest of ESL enrollment, Plyler, 452 U.S. at 230, and is not necessary or precisely drawn to achieve that interest, Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
The State’s second interest—financial planning—is misplaced for the same reason. Although sound budgeting is important, the State’s projected costs for various programs do not vary by the immigration status of students or their parents, but rather by the total number of students needing these services. Nor does knowing the current numbers of students (or parents) who were born abroad, who are non-citizens, or who lack immigration status help to predict future demand. The only rational way to achieve sound financial planning is to focus on the number of students utilizing resources—not by focusing on the immigration status of a subset of those students.8 Thus asking about immigration status and place of birth does not further the interest of financial planning, Plyler, 452 U.S. at 230, and is not necessary or precisely drawn to achieve that interest, Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
8 If Defendants are attempting to imply that immigration status is relevant because of some prospect that these children would be removed from the country, this is too speculative to be of any use, as described in detail infra at 12-13.
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The State’s third and fourth interests—to calculate the effect undocumented students have on U.S. citizen students, and “to supply courts with evidence in future lawsuits addressing the manner in which Alabama runs its education system”—cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny under Plyler nor strict scrutiny under Nyquist. Defendants cannot establish that they have a sufficient interest in collecting data on undocumented children, especially when section 28 is viewed in the context of HB 56, which mandates reporting of this information to immigration and state officials. See supra at 2 n.2. To prevail, Defendants must establish now that they have a substantial interest in deterring undocumented children from enrolling; claiming that they must collect data now that will have a deterrent effect on enrollment and school attendance, in order to determine later whether they can credibly claim to have a substantial interest in driving children from school, is quintessentially putting the cart before the horse.
Defendants misread Plyler. In Section V of that opinion, the Court focused on and rejected three possible justifications for a statute that permitted charging tuition to, or outright prohibiting the enrollment of, undocumented students. 457 U.S. at 227-30. The first involved a purported interest of the state to “protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.” Id. at 228. Defendants wisely are not arguing they have such an interest, for as the Plyler Court explained, charging tuition or denying enrollment in public schools would have no meaningful impact
11

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on the overall economy of any state. Id.at 228-29.9 Defendants focus on the second justification examined by the Court: that
excluding undocumented students from state-funded schools would “improve the overall quality of education in the State.” Id. at 229. The Court rejected this claim in part because Texas failed to establish that exclusion would improve the quality of education for others, but the Court went on to note that:
even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are basically indistinguishable from legally resident alien children. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). This point is especially true for Alabama’s schools. DOE calculates the number of “immigrant students” enrolled in public schools, and this definition necessarily includes any child who is here without lawful status and in need of special resources. See supra at 9 n.6. DOE prepares this data by relying on the American Community Survey, not by asking questions at the time of enrollment. Miller Decl. ¶ 14. For the last year data was available, 2009-2010, there were 3,647 immigrant students in Alabama, id. ¶ 18,
9 As Defendants concede, the undocumented population in Alabama is quite small, between 1.6% and 3.3% of the total state population. See Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 2 (noting estimate is 75,000 to 160,000) (Doc. 110); U.S. Census Bureau, Alabama Quick Facts (noting state population of 4,779, 736), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html.
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out of a total system population of 741,115.10 This constitutes less than 0.5% of
statewide enrollment. The notion that excluding this small number could have any
material effect on the overall school budget is hard to fathom. See San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56 (1973) (disputing but not
resolving whether quality of education could be tied directly to money spent on
students).11
Defendants’ argument is further diminished by the fact that many of the
costs they itemize are subsidized by the federal government on a per-student basis.
For example, Defendants note a concern over “the fiscal costs to the state and
political subdivisions thereof of providing . . . free or discounted school meals,”
but free and discounted school meals are federally subsidized.12 Excluding any
subset of children would not save the State money because the federal subsidy
10 Ala. Dep’t of Educ., State Enrollment by Sex and Race, School Year 2009-2010, available at http://www.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx. 11 Furthermore, Defendants have proffered that schools will ascertain immigration status only once, at time of “initial enrollment.” Morton Mem. (Doc. 82-3). Even assuming schools adhere to this limited implementation policy, Defendants still cannot show that their actions meet intermediate or strict scrutiny. Immigration status is fluid and changes over time, making ambiguous any data collected, and further undermining the notion that it will be substantially related to the State’s purported interest. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (“many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and . . . some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.”). 12 For example, the National Student Lunch Program is a federally subsidized program. See ALSDE, Child Nutrition FAQs (noting National School Lunch Program available in state schools), available at http://www.alsde.edu/html/sections/faqs.asp?section=53&footer=sections; see also USDA, National School Lunch Program (“School districts and independent schools that choose to take part in the lunch program get cash subsidies and donated commodities from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for each meal they serve.”), available at http:// www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf
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paying for that meal would be correspondingly reduced. Finally, the Plyler Court dismissed any argument that undocumented
children could be “appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State.” Id. at 229-30. The Court stressed this would be impossible to quantify, both because all children, regardless of status, regularly cross state boundaries and there is no way the State can predict who would stay and who would go. Id. at 230. And as the Court noted in 1982, “the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.” Id. at 230. That fact remains true today. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano observed this past Friday,
The President has said on numerous occasions that it makes no sense to expend our enforcement resources on low-priority cases, such as individuals like those you reference in your letter, who were brought to this country as young children and know no other home. From a law enforcement and public safety perspective, DHS enforcement resources must continue to be focused on our highest priorities. Doing otherwise hinders our public safety mission—clogging immigration court dockets and diverting DHS enforcement resources away from individuals who pose a threat to public safety. Letter of Secretary Napolitano to Senator Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011) (Doc. 113-1). The risk of “promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates
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within [Alabama’s] boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime,” cannot possibly serve any state interest, let alone a substantial one. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
The Supreme Court in Plyler foreclosed the possibility of discriminating against undocumented children in the provision of free public education. Any effort to inquire into immigration status or place of birth at the time of enrollment, where the risk of deterrence is paramount, is prohibited under Plyler, and Defendants cannot possibly justify such inquiry here.13 Nor can Defendants establish that these inquiries are necessary or precisely drawn. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
B. The State’s Interests Do Not Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny to Justify The Third Classification
Assuming arguendo that any of the Defendants’ four articulated interests were important state objectives, the State cannot establish that deterring enrollment of or even collecting data on U.S. citizen children whose parents are not lawfully present has any connection whatsoever to these goals, much less that this is substantially related. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001). As described above (at pages 4-6), the children affected by this classification are U.S. citizens. Inquiry into the status of the
13 See also “Dear Colleague” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., May 6, 2011, at 1 (emphasizing concern over chilling effect), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/ about/edu/documents/plylerletter.pdf.
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child’s parent serves no purpose, for all of the data being collected under section

28 relates to the status of the student child, not the parent. See HB 56 § 28(d). As

such, this classification cannot be characterized as being “substantially related” to

the interests asserted and data being collected.

This classification clarifies the true intent of section 28: to deter enrollment

by families who have undocumented members, even if the children are U.S.

citizens. There is no other reason to make this inquiry. Because of the deterrent

impact this inquiry will have, and because of the reporting requirements that are in

place, see supra at 2 n.2, this classification is impermissible under Clark.

* * *

As articulated above, section 28 creates three classifications which cannot

withstand intermediate scrutiny, much less strict scrutiny. As such, Plaintiffs

respectfully request that section 28 be enjoined pending a full adjudication of this

case.

Dated August 21, 2011

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan*

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400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro*

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* Vivek Mittal* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835

17

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 19 of 20

ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 Bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL

brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300

18

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 20 of 20

FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100
Washington, DC 20036
T: (202) 293-2828 x 12
apedersen@maldef.org

San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 21, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record who have registered through CM/ECF.

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

19

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 1 of 44

FILED
2011 Aug-15 PM 08:03 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) ) ) )

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama; et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02736-SLB ) ) ) ) )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) ) )

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 2 of 44
STATE DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO CHURCH LEADERS’ AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (DOC. 99)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ iii I. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................2 A. Act No. 2011-535........................................................................2 B. Procedural History ......................................................................2 II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS.........................................................................4 A. Bishop Parsley, Bishop Willimon, Archibishop Rodi, and Bishop Baker are the Plaintiffs Seeking a Preliminary Injunction. ...............................................................4 B. The Church Leaders’ Free Exercise, Freedom of Assembly, and Contracts Clause Arguments are the Subject of this Response. ............................................................6 III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD...................................................7 IV. THE CHURCH LEADERS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS.................8 A. The Church Leaders Are Not Likely to Prevail on Their Facial Challenge Because They Accept that Act No. 2011-535 Has Legitimate Applications. ..............................8 B. Even If the Church Leaders’ Claim Against Section 13 was a Pre-Enforcement, As-Applied Challenge, the Church Leaders Would Not Be Likely to Succeed on the Merits Because They Cannot Demonstrate Ripeness in the Form of a Credible Threat of Prosecution. ...............................................................................10
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 3 of 44
C. The Church Leaders’ Concerns About What Religious Activities Fall within the Scope of Section 13 and Section 27 are Exaggerated...........................................14 1. Section 13.............................................................................14 2. Section 27.............................................................................18
D. In the Event that the Court Reaches the Underlying Substantive Law Questions, the Church Leaders Are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits. .......................................19 1. Free Exercise........................................................................20 2. Assembly..............................................................................23 3. Contracts ..............................................................................25
V. CERTIFICATION TO THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT ...........................27 VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................30
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 4 of 44
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)................................................................................ 12, 13
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).........................................................................................9
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).........................................................................................8
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).......................................................................................20
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)...................................................................................6, 21
Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994) ........................................................... 20, 23, 26
Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1985) ..........................................................................24
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)..................................................................................... 4-5
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).......................................................................................23
Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975)................................................................................. 10-12
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988)................................................................................. 27-28
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872 (1990)........................................................................... 21-22, 28
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 5 of 44
Ex parte Phillips, 900 So.2d 412 (Ala. 2004).............................................................................15
First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla., 610 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc granted and opinion vacated by, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), opinion reinstated in part by, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ..............................................................................................................22
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) ..................................................... 12-13
Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).......................................................................................25
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966)...........................................................................................8
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).........................................................................................4
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).......................................................................................13
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010) ...........................................................13
Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).......................................................................................21
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).........................................................................................9
Northeastern Florida Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 896 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir. 1990) .................................................................... 7-8
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827).........................................................................................26
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).........................................................................................21
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 6 of 44
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982).........................................................................................8
Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................19
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)................................................................................. 10-12
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904)................................................................................ 24, 25
United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir.1999) .......................................................................17
United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986) .................................................................... 22-23
United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772 (11th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................17
United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................ 11-12
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)..................................................................................... 8-9
United States v. Uresti-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................16
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)................................................................................. 24-25
United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................................................... 16, 17
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008)............................................................................... 8-9, 27
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 7 of 44
STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 2339B ...................................................................................................12 8 U.S.C. § 1324 ............................................................................................ 14-18, 22 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,
Act 2011-535 ........................................................................................ passim § 2 ..................................................................................................................22 § 3 ..................................................................................................................17 § 13 ........................................................................................................ passim § 25 ..................................................................................................................3 § 30 ................................................................................................................19 § 27 ........................................................................................................ passim OTHER AUTHORITIES ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) (2010)....................................................................................................... 15-18 Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.3, p. 629 (3rd ed. 2006) ......... 26-27 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) ..................................................................................................6 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01................................................................................... 15, 27 U.S. Const. Art. I § 10...................................................................................... passim U.S. Const. Amend. I ....................................................................................... passim U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ................................................................................... 5, 6-7
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 8 of 44

STATE DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO CHURCH LEADERS’ AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (DOC. 99)

Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney

Broussard (the State Defendants) respectfully respond to the Plaintiffs’ Amended

Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support filed by the Church Leaders. Doc. 99.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. ACT NO. 2011-535

To the extent applicable, the State Defendants incorporate their

BACKGROUND section on ACT NO. 2011-535 from the State Defendants’ Response

to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

(“Response”), as if fully set forth herein. Doc. 82 at 2-6.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 2011, Rt. Rev. Henry N. Parsley, Jr., Rev. Dr. William H.

Willimon, Most Rev. Thomas J. Rodi, and Most Rev. Robert J. Baker (“Church

Leaders”) filed suit against Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther

Strange, and Madison County District Attorney Robert L. Broussard, in their

official capacities, challenging Act No. 2011-535. Parsley, doc. 1. The Complaint

1

The State Defendants will reference documents filed in the master case by docket number

only, and documents filed in the consolidated cases by both case name and docket number. Page

numbers in record citations are those assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system.

2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 9 of 44
alleged that, on its face, Act No. 2011-535 violates various federally protected rights and should be enjoined in its entirety. Id. at ¶¶ 78-105, id. at Prayer for Relief. Specifically, however, the Church Leaders focused on Section 13 (which creates State crimes related to concealing, harboring, shielding, encouraging, inducing, or transporting illegal aliens), Section 27 (which concerns contracting), and Section 25 (which concerns solicitation, attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime created by the Act). Id. at ¶¶ 57-68.
On August 5, 2011, the Church Leaders filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Parsley, doc. 15. On August 10, 2011, the Church Leaders filed an amended motion. Doc. 99. The motion requests that Sections 13 and 27 be preliminarily enjoined. Id. at 2, 12. (Any injunction aimed at Sections 13 and 27 would cut the legs out from under Section 25 for the Church Leaders’ purposes, and so no injunction as to that provision would be required; presumably, this is the reason none is sought.)
On August 11, 2011, the Church Leaders filed amended complaints, which added two new Plaintiffs: the Benedictine Sisters of Cullman, Alabama, Inc. (Benedictine Sisters) and the Benedictine Society of Alabama (Benedictine Monks). Parsley, doc. 48 at ¶¶ 42-49; Parsley, doc. 50 at ¶¶ 45-53.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 10 of 44
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS The Church Leaders have filed a sweepingly broad lawsuit which attempts to assert the rights of third parties and makes non-textually-based assumptions about how Act No. 2011-535 will be implemented. It is helpful to start by assessing (A) which parties are moving for this preliminary injunction and (B) on which claims. A. BISHOP PARSLEY, BISHOP WILLIMON, ARCHIBISHOP RODI, AND BISHOP BAKER ARE THE PLAINTIFFS SEEKING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The motion for preliminary injunction was filed by Bishop Parsley, Bishop Willimon, Archibishop Rodi, and Bishop Baker before the Benedictine Sisters and the Benedictine Monks were added in the amended complaints. Compare Doc. 99 (filed August 10, 2011) with Parsley, doc. 48 (filed August 11, 2011) and Parsley, doc. 50 (filed August 11, 2011). Additionally, the motion itself incorporates the original Complaint into its Facts section. Doc. 99 at 5 n.2. Accordingly, any claims or facts relevant to the Benedictine Sisters and the Benedictine Monks are not relevant to the pending motion for preliminary injunction. More critically, there are major standing issues here. This Court is well aware of the jurisdictional requirement for the Church Leaders to demonstrate that they have standing as to each and every claim that they bring, which includes demonstrating a particularized—that is, personal—injury to themselves. See Doc. 82 at 21-23 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Davis
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 11 of 44
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)). Yet the Church Leaders attempt to assert the rights of numerous other persons without any affirmative showing of a legal right to do so.
This problem is apparent in the original complaint. See, e.g., Parsley, doc. 1 at ¶ 1 (“The bishops seek this Court’s declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent irreparable harm to the 338,000 members of Alabama’s Episcopal, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches as well as other residents . . . .”) (emphasis added). And it continues in the current complaint. See, e.g., Parsley, doc. 50 at ¶ 1 (same). It is also present in the motion for preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Doc. 99 at 3 (“[T]he Church leaders and their members ask this Court to . . . .”). At times, the Church Leaders attempt to assert the rights and injuries of the churches themselves, their members, Alabama’s faith community, Alabama citizens generally, and illegal aliens generally. For instance, Count Four is an Equal Protection claim alleging that Act No. 2011-535 “impermissibly discriminates against non-citizens on the basis of immigration status and deprives them of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Parsley, doc. 50 at ¶ 105 (emphasis added).
It does not matter, for these purposes, that Bishop Parsley has asserted that he is suing in his official capacity, while Bishop Willimon sues in his “individual capacity as Bishop of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 12 of 44
Church,” and Archbishop Rodi and Bishop Baker indicate their titles and “a corporation sole.” While public officials are routinely sued in their official capacities (and may bring suit in the same way), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the Church Leaders have not asserted that a similar option is available to them. Churches can sue and be sued. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) . Similarly, church members can assert their own rights, or there exists a procedural mechanism which the Church Leaders have not sought to invoke that may allow them to assert those rights. Whether illegal aliens may assert their own rights depends on whether this Court is in agreement with the Northern District of Oklahoma’s resolution of the prudential standing issue. See doc. 82 at 24. But whether they can or cannot, the Church Leaders have certainly not demonstrated that they can step into the illegal aliens’ shoes.
Accordingly, in evaluating the arguments made in the Church Leaders’ motion for preliminary injunction, this Court should limit its analysis to the rights and injuries of the four Church Leaders themselves. B. THE CHURCH LEADERS’ FREE EXERCISE, FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, AND
CONTRACTS CLAUSE ARGUMENTS ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS RESPONSE. It is also important for the Court to focus on which claims the Church Leaders are actually prosecuting in their motion for preliminary injunction. The second amended complaint sets out six counts: Free Exercise of Religion, Freedom of Assembly, and Freedom of Speech, all under the First Amendment; Equal
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 13 of 44

Protection; Due Process; and, the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I § 10. Parsley, doc. 50 at ¶¶ 88-114.2 By contrast, in the amended preliminary injunction motion, the Church Leaders make no mention of the Equal Protection or Due Process claims.3 Doc. 99 at 9-13. Additionally, while the Church Leaders use the phrase “speak freely” twice in their Argument section, doc. 99 at 9, 10, they fail to

develop a Free Speech claim in this motion. The State Defendants thus respond to the Free Exercise claim, the Free Assembly claim, and the Contracts Clause claim.4

III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD The State Defendants disagree with the articulation of the preliminary

injunction standard set out by the Church Leaders, doc. 99 at 8-9; see also id. at 4,

and incorporate the PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD discussion from their previously filed Response, as if fully set forth herein. Doc. 82 at 9-12. See also

Northeastern Florida Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[P]reliminary

2

The original complaint and the first amended complaint raised the same claims. Parsley,

doc. 1 at ¶¶ 79-105; Parsley, doc. 48 at ¶¶ 87-113.

3

In a footnote attached to the Facts section of their motion, the Church Leaders state that

they “incorporate herein the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed on August 1,

2011 as if fully and completely set out herein.” Doc. 99 at 5 n.2. The State Defendants treat this

as an incorporation of the Facts only, and do not respond to the claims set out in the Complaint

but not developed in the motion for preliminary injunction. The Church Leaders bear the burden

of demonstrating that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction, see doc. 82 at 9-12, and

merely incorporating claims from a complaint is insufficient to do so.

4

While the Free Assembly claim is not developed well, it is mentioned in the section of

the Argument addressing the Church Leaders’ chance of success of the merits. Doc. 99 at 11.

The Free Speech claim is absent there.

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 14 of 44

injunctions of legislative enactments–because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits–must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts.”).
IV. THE CHURCH LEADERS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS
A. THE CHURCH LEADERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THEIR FACIAL CHALLENGE BECAUSE THEY ACCEPT THAT ACT NO. 2011-535 HAS LEGITIMATE APPLICATIONS. The most obvious reason the Church Leaders’ suit fails is procedural: it
presents a facial challenge, and it cannot come close to satisfying the standard for having these provisions struck down on their face. See e.g., Parsley, doc. 1 at ¶ 78 (“The plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that [Act No. 2011-535] is unconstitutional on its face and to an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining its enforcement.”) (emphasis added).5 “Under United States v. Salerno,

5

See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 600 (1988) (“Indeed, in that case it was clear

that only a facial challenge could have been considered, as the Act had not been implemented.”);

Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 658 n.4 (1982) (“Rather than seeking a private

remedy against private parties, respondents in these cases sought to enjoin the enforcement of a

[S]tate statute that they contend to be unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause in its every

application. Indeed, because respondents brought this suit prior to the effective date of the

statute, respondents did not, and could not, challenge any vertical restraints actually employed by

a distiller pursuant to the statute. Instead, respondents challenge the statute on its face without

consideration of particular circumstances.”); id. at 660 n.6 (“As with the instant case, because the

challenged statute had not as yet been put into effect, this Court in [Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,

Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966)] was presented only with a facial challenge to its

constitutionality.”).

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 15 of 44

481 U.S. 739 (1987), a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by

‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be

valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Washington

State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)

(some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the very least, “a facial

challenge must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).6

This means that the Church Leaders’ claims fail from the outset. The Church

Leaders do not allege that Act No. 2011-535 is invalid “in all of its applications” or

that it lacks “a plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at

449 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, they challenge

Act No. 2011-535 specifically and solely because it allegedly interferes with their

religious conduct. While the Church Leaders do not explicitly concede that Act

No. 2011-535 is valid as to some conduct, the concession is implicit in their

6

A different standard for facial challenges applies when a free speech overbreadth claim is

at issue, but it does not appear that there is such a claim in the Second Amended Complaint,

Parsley, doc. 50 at ¶¶ 99-102, and none is developed in the motion for preliminary injunction.

See Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (“Our cases recognize a second type of facial

challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be overturned as

impermissibly overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,

judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) (“The [overbreadth] doctrine is

predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression: persons whose expression is

constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal

sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) (“. . . An

overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech.”).

9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 16 of 44

arguments, and they certainly have not made any showing that Sections 13 and 27

are invalid when applied to non-religious conduct. For this reason, the Church

Leaders will not succeed on the merits of their facial challenge, and have certainly not shown that they are likely to do so.7

B. EVEN IF THE CHURCH LEADERS’ CLAIM AGAINST SECTION 13 WAS A PREENFORCEMENT, AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE, THE CHURCH LEADERS WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE RIPENESS IN THE FORM OF A CREDIBLE THREAT OF PROSECUTION.

While the State Defendants believe that the Church Leaders can only present

a (doomed) facial challenge in these circumstances because Act No. 2011-535 is

not yet effective, the Church Leaders would not even be able to establish this

Court’s jurisdiction to issue an injunction if they reframed their claims as a pre-

enforcement, as-applied challenge to Section 13’s criminal provisions once the law becomes effective.8 Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454-56, 458-60 (1974)

(considering Court’s jurisdiction when the relevant criminal provision was

effective, but had not been enforced against the plaintiff); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S.

426, 427-28, 433-35 (1975) (considering the Court’s jurisdiction when the relevant

criminal provision was effective and had previously been enforced against the

7

With respect to the fact that this is a facial challenge, the State Defendants incorporate

their prior discussion of the concerns presented by such cases, particularly with respect to their

speculative nature. Doc. 82 at 14-18.

8

Section 13 contains criminal provisions; Section 27, the other subject of the Church

Leaders’ suit, does not. Doc. 1-2 at 36-39, 57-58. Accordingly, a pre-enforcement challenge of

the sort discussed in the text is not an option as to Section 27.

10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 17 of 44
plaintiffs; the Supreme Court viewed the case as one about whether there might be future prosecutions).
A case involving a pre-enforcement, as-applied challenge to a criminal provision requires the court to apply the ripeness doctrine, which “keeps federal courts from deciding cases prematurely, and protects [them] from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes. A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration by the Court).
So, to establish ripeness in a pre-enforcement case, plaintiffs must demonstrate “a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed criminal statute.” Steffel, 415 U.S. at 475; see also id. at 476 (Stewart, J. concurring) (“The petitioner in this case has succeeded in objectively showing that the threat of imminent arrest, corroborated by the actual arrest of his companion, has created an actual concrete controversy between himself and the agents of the State. He has, therefore, demonstrated ‘a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute . . . .’”) (quoting Majority Opinion at 1223; ellipsis by Justice Stewart; footnote omitted; emphasis added); Ellis, 421 U.S. at 432-33, 434 (repeating “genuine threat of enforcement” language and recognizing that it goes to a showing of an Article
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III controversy). A “genuine threat of enforcement” establishes that the matter is fit for judicial review, while the threat of criminal prosecution is a serious matter for the plaintiff.9 Compare Rivera, 613 F.3d at 1050 (“In deciding whether a case is ripe, we look primarily at two considerations: the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration and the fitness of the issues for judicial decision.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, the Court watered down the Steffel standard a bit, finding a credible threat where the plaintiffs sought to engage in activities that were prohibited by an effective statute and the government did not “disavow[] any intention of” prosecution. 442 U.S. 289, 298-99, 302 (1979). Most recently, the Supreme Court dealt with a pre-enforcement challenge to “18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to ‘knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (alteration by the Court). In concluding that a genuine threat of prosecution did exist, the Court again considered the government’s failure to disavow prosecution, as it had done in Babbitt, but it also relied on a record of similar prosecutions:

9

See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459 (“petitioner has alleged threats of prosecution that cannot be

characterized as ‘imaginary or speculative’”) (internal citation omitted); id. (“In these

circumstances, it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or

prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his

constitutional rights.”).

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One last point. Plaintiffs seek preenforcement review of a criminal statute. Before addressing the merits, we must be sure that this is a justiciable case or controversy under Article III. We conclude that it is: Plaintiffs face “a credible threat of prosecution” and “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-129 (2007).
Plaintiffs claim that they provided support to the PKK and the LTTE before the enactment of § 2339B and that they would provide similar support again if the statute’s allegedly unconstitutional bar were lifted. See 309 F.Supp.2d, at 1197. The Government tells us that it has charged about 150 persons with violating § 2339B, and that several of those prosecutions involved the enforcement of the statutory terms at issue here. See Brief for Government 5. The Government has not argued to this Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if they do what they say they wish to do. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. See Babbitt, supra, at 302. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. ----, ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 1330-1331, 1340 (2010) (considering an as-applied preenforcement challenge brought under the First Amendment). Based on these considerations, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are suitable for judicial review (as one might hope after 12 years of litigation).
130 S. Ct. at 2717 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Church Leaders assume that Section 13 will be enforced
against them in the conduct of religious activities. They make this assumption
without any record of prosecutions (since Section 13 is not yet effective).
Moreover, and as discussed further below, Section 13 was drafted to match the
terms of a similar federal law, nearly verbatim, and is likely to be interpreted in a
manner consistent with federal law, except insofar as the Alabama Constitution
might actually provide greater protections. Yet the Church Leaders have provided
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no evidence of federal prosecutions of their on-going activities. Nor do they seem to fear federal prosecution, since they have not sued any federal officials. For these reasons, the Church Leaders have not demonstrated a genuine threat of prosecution, such that a pre-enforcement challenge to Section 13 should be deemed ripe, and so they cannot show, as they must, that they are likely to succeed on the merits. C. THE CHURCH LEADERS’ CONCERNS ABOUT WHAT RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SECTION 13 AND SECTION 27 ARE EXAGGERATED. Even if the Church Leaders could establish that this Court has jurisdiction to hear their claims, they would not be able to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits. That is so because, as an initial matter, they have not shown that the activities about which they are concerned are actually covered by the Act. Part of the problem here is that the Church Leaders are vague about what activities they believe are covered, and why they believe the Act’s language covers those activities. That is so both as to Section 13 and Section 27, the two provisions on which they focus in their motion. 1. Section 13: Section 13 is nearly identical to, and modeled after, a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). See doc. 82 at 77-78 (comparing Section 13 with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) and noting that the former “was drafted to precisely match the terminology and scope of” the latter). Even accepting arguendo small
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differences in the two provisions, Section 13 duplicates currently in-force federal law in substantial part, and it will likely be interpreted consistently therewith, cf. Ex parte Phillips, 900 So.2d 412, 417 (Ala. 2004) (recognizing that the Supreme Court of Alabama “attempt[s] to weave a consistent pattern with our interpretations of our rules of civil procedure, which were patterned after the federal rules of civil procedures,” though it is not always done). The Church Leaders apparently do not view their activities as violating federal law, and they have failed to point to a single federal prosecution under the federal law – which again was the basis for Alabama’s statute – for any type of ministry activities. The federal law has not been interpreted so broadly, and there is no reason to think that the same language in Alabama’s statute will be. (In fact, with Alabama’s Religious Freedom Amendment, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01, it is even less likely that Alabama’s statute would be interpreted to cover religious activities or ministry.) The Church Leaders have also failed to specify in what ways they believe that their specific activities could be interpreted to violate the provisions of Section 13.
Additionally, subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4) each contain a scienter element that the defendant “knows or recklessly disregards” either that the alien is unlawfully present or that the federal immigration laws have been or will be violated. This is a high standard. In the ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES), the instructions for 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which is the harboring and concealing provision upon which Section 13(a)(1) is modeled, and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which is the transporting provision upon which Section 13(a)(3) is modeled, each explain:
To act with ‘reckless disregard of the fact’ means to be aware of but consciously and carelessly ignore facts and circumstances clearly indicating that the person . . . was an alien who had entered or remained in the United States illegally. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) at 96.2, 96.3 (2010), available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/jury/ CriminalJury2010.pdf, last visited August 13, 2011 (emphasis added). The manual further references United States v. Zlatogur, wherein the Eleventh Circuit approved of a district court adopting the following standard from the Tenth Circuit:
The phrase “reckless disregard of the fact,” as it has been used from time to time in these instructions, means deliberate indifference to facts which, if considered and weighed in a reasonable manner, indicate the highest probability that the alleged aliens were in fact aliens and were in the United States unlawfully. 271 F.3d 1025, 1029 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Uresti-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 1042, 1046 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Moreover, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit would apply the same interpretation to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which is the encouraging and
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inducing provision upon which Section 13(a)(2) is modeled.10 Similarly, the
federal definition of reckless disregard should be viewed as incorporated
throughout Section 13(a).
Act No. 2011-535 also defines “knows or knowingly” in a way that makes
clear that the person must truly know, as that term is commonly used. Section
3(9)(a) (“A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to . . . [t]he
person’s conduct . . . when the person is aware of the nature of the person’s
conduct . . . .”), doc. 1-2 at 10; id. (“A person acts knowingly or with knowledge
with respect to . . . attendant circumstances when the person is aware . . . that those
circumstances exist.”).
The Eleventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions are helpful too with respect
to Section 13(a)(3), which prohibits only that transportation which is “in
furtherance of the unlawful presence of the alien in the United States.” Doc. 1-2 at
36. As to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the jury instructions explain:
For transportation to further an alien’s unlawful presence, there must be a direct and substantial relationship between the Defendant’s act of transportation and the furthering of the alien’s presence in the
10 See United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We find our interpretations of the same ‘reckless disregard’ terminology in §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii)— both in our Pattern Jury Instructions and in Zlatogur—instructive to our instant analysis of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). Indeed, it is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that identical words used in the same statute are intended to have the same meaning. United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir.1999). Accordingly, we interpret subsection 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)’s ‘reckless disregard’ terminology by reference to our interpretation of the same words in subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii).”) (emphasis added).
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United States. The act of transportation must be something more than merely incidental to furthering the alien’s presence. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) at 96.2 (2010), available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/jury/ CriminalJury2010.pdf, last visited August 13, 2011 (emphasis added). The Annotations and Comments go on to explain that “[t]he Circuits look to the purpose for which transportation is provided to an illegal alien to determine whether this law was violated.” Id. 2. Section 27: This Section directs that the State courts not “enforce the terms of, or otherwise regard as valid” a contract in which one party is an illegal alien, if the other party “had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States are the time the contract was entered into, and the performance of the contract required the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.” Doc. 1-2 at 57. Certain exceptions apply. Id. First, to be clear, Section 27 does not establish a crime. Any suggestion to the contrary is mistaken. See doc. 99 at 7. Second, the Church Leaders can rest assured that Section 27 does not reach the covenants of baptism or marriage, doc. 99 at 13, or other religious sacraments, id. at 3-4 . The State Defendants cannot conceive of the manner in which someone would file suit in State Circuit Court to
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enforce a baptism or other religious sacrament; it is not a matter for the Courts. As to marriages specifically, the State court routinely deal with marriage and divorce, but only insofar as the civil legal status—not religious status—is concerned. For instance, a court will sometimes award someone a divorce when a church will not. Additionally, the fact that Act No. 2011-535 does not purport to interfere with the fundamental right to marriage is evident in Section 30, doc. 1-2 at 70. Generally speaking, Section 30 prohibits illegal aliens from conducting business transactions with the State or with local government, and requires everyone else to demonstrate citizenship or lawful presence. Id. But critically for present purposes, specifically exempted is “applying for a marriage license.” Id. D. IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT REACHES THE UNDERLYING
SUBSTANTIVE LAW QUESTIONS, THE CHURCH LEADERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. Even if the Church Leaders had established that the Act covers the conduct about which they are concerned, they have not established a substantial likelihood that in those circumstances the Act would be unconstitutional. The Church Leaders offer essentially no legal analysis establishing a “substantial likelihood” that they will succeed on the merits of those claims. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010). In particular, they provide no meaningful explanation of how courts have interpreted the constitutional provisions on which they rely (i.e., Free Exercise Clause, Assembly Clause, and Contracts Clause)—let alone in a manner
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that would support the requested injunction. See, e.g., doc. 99 at 10-11. Because the burden of establishing a likelihood of ultimate success is the Church Leaders’ burden to bear, see doc. 82 at 9-12, this deficiency alone is reason to deny the injunction. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Because we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we will not address the three other prerequisites of preliminary injunctive relief.”).
But in the event that the Court reaches these constitutional questions, precedent either forecloses the Church Leaders’ claims or, in the very least, raises serious doubts about their ability to prevail with respect to each constitutional provision on which they rely.
1. Free Exercise: The Supreme Court has explained that the Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts[—]freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Here, the Church Leaders’ claim concerns restrictions on conduct and is squarely foreclosed by established precedent.
The State Defendants assume the Church Leaders’ Free Exercise claim is directed at both Section 13 and Section 27. Each claim will fail under the Supreme
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Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872 (1990). That is so because each of these Sections constitutes “a law that is neutral and of general applicability,” and so it “need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (citing Smith II, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). See also Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-595 (1940) (“Conscientious scruples” cannot “relieve[] the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to polygamy laws).
Neither the text of these Sections nor the circumstances surrounding their passage indicate that they in any sense “discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs.” City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 532, 534. Nor are Section 13 or Section 27 triggered “only when [the harboring, shielding, contracting etc. are] engaged in for religious reasons” or “only because of the religious belief they display.” Smith II, 494 U.S. at 877; accord City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 532 (“the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue . . . regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”) (emphasis added).
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As a result, Sections 13 and 27 are “presumed constitutional” and, under Smith II, need only be “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla., 610 F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc granted and opinion vacated by, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), opinion reinstated in part by, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). These Sections easily meet this standard. As set out in Section 2 of Act No. 2011-535, the Alabama Legislature found “that illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in this [S]tate,” and that “certain practices currently allowed in this [S]tate impede and obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the privileges and immunities of the citizens of Alabama.” Doc. 1-2 at 6-7, doc. 82 at 2-3. These are sufficient for Section 13 and Section 27 to withstand the Church Leaders’ Free Exercise challenge.
There is another reason why the Church Leaders are unlikely to succeed on the merits as to Section 13. As previously noted, Section 13 is similar to a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). The predecessor to that federal statute has itself been upheld against Free Exercise challenges and been recognized as serving a legitimate government interest. E.g., United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding the predecessor federal statute against a Free Exercise challenge as a neutral law preventing circumvention of federal border control
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laws). Section 13 not only complements the federal interest in border security and the enforcement of federal immigration law, but also addresses the Alabama Legislature’s concerns about economic hardship, lawlessness, and the restriction of privileges and immunities of the citizens of Alabama.
2. Assembly: The Church Leaders do not develop their Freedom of Assembly claim, and this Court should deny the requested injunction for that reason. See doc. 82 at 9-12; see also Church, 30 F.3d at 1342. What they do, instead, is assert that they “will suffer irreparable harm because members will be deterred from assembling to worship for fear of being arrested.” Doc. 99 at 10; see also id. at 3. That is, they speculate about how others will behave, presumably in response to Section 13’s provisions. See doc. 82 at 14-18 (facial challenges are disfavored, in part because of speculative nature). To the extent that the Church Leaders are attempting to assert the alleged injuries of other persons whom they speculate will be deterred from assembling, the claim fails for lack of standing. See Section II(A), supra.
To the extent that the Church Leaders believe that their own rights will be violated, Section 13 does not prevent the Church Leaders’ from “assembling.” The First Amendment assembly right has been understood as a right to gather together for “lawful discussion.” especially “in respect to public affairs.” De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 365 (1937). Section 13 prohibits only certain forms of
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aid to illegal aliens, and then only with the requisite knowledge that the aliens are unlawfully present in the United States. It does not prohibit, or even mention, assembling for worship or any other purpose—and the Church Leaders have identified no authority to support their theory that the right to assemble can unconstitutionally be “chilled.” See doc. 99 at 10 (“members will be deterred from assembling to worship for fear of being arrested.”). See also Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he statute does not prevent simple peaceable assembly for the purpose of lawful discussion, which of course, cannot be made a crime”).
Moreover, the First Amendment right of assembly cannot include the right of “assembling to worship” with persons the federal government has determined to have no right to be present. Cf. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (“It is, of course, true, that if an alien is not permitted to enter this country, or, having entered contrary to law, is expelled, he is in fact cut off from worshipping or speaking or publishing or petitioning in the country; but that is merely because of his exclusion therefrom.”). This makes sense, first, as a textual matter. The “right of the people peaceably to assemble,” U.S. Const. Amend. I, most logically refers to the right of the people to assemble with one another, and prior decisions of the Supreme Court support the proposition that “the people” does not include illegal aliens. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
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259, 265 (1990) (“While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”); see also United States ex rel. Turner, 194 U.S. at 292 (an alien “does not become one of the people to whom [protections] are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter, forbidden by law”). It also makes sense as a logical matter. A person asserting a right to assemble with an illegal alien stands in the same (inadequate) shoes as one asserting a right to assemble with someone confined in a nearby prison. See, e.g., Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977) (incarceration necessarily “entails a restriction on the freedom of inmates to associate with those outside of the penal institution”).
3. Contracts: Section 27’s contract regulations and Section 13(a)(4)’s prohibition of rental agreements with illegal aliens are the only provisions that could conceivably be alleged to raise any issue under the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. Art. I, §10, cl.1, but here too the Church Leaders are not entitled to relief.
As to their claim against Section 27, the Church Leaders focus almost exclusively on religious covenants, though they mention “being able to run day
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cares, thrift stores or other enterprises involving contractual relations with residents who may be undocumented.” Doc. 99 at 3-4, 7, 10, 12. Their merits discussion is limited to the assertion Section 27 “prohibits the ability of Church Leaders to freely contract” and a recitation of what that provision provides, without any analysis or case law explaining any alleged constitutional defect. Id. at 12. As to Section 13(a)(4), the Church Leaders simply assert that the prohibition “attacks [their] freedom to exercise their faith.” Accordingly, the Contract Clause claim is inadequately developed and should be denied for that reason. See doc. 82 at 9-12; Church, 30 F.3d at 1342.
What has been written is focused on religious covenants. Initially, as previously pointed out, the Church Leaders are mistaken to believe that any religious covenants will be invalidated by Section 27. See Section IV(C)(2), supra.
As to any contracts that would be subject to State court action and as to rental agreements, the Church Leaders have come nowhere close to satisfying their burden of establishing a likelihood of winning a facial Contracts Clause claim. The Contracts Clause is only even implicated if governmental action affects existing contracts. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 234 (1827) (the Contracts Clause “operat[es] upon antecedent[,] existing contracts”). “[T]he Contracts Clause does not limit the ability of the government to regulate the terms of future contracts.” Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §8.3, p. 629 (3rd
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ed. 2006). Accordingly, the Church Leaders have not established—and cannot establish—that Section 27 and Section 13(a)(4) “[are] unconstitutional in all of [their] applications” or lack “a plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
V. CERTIFICATION TO THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT If the Court is concerned that either Section 13 or Section 27 violates the U.S. Constitution (on any grounds) when applied to certain religious activities, it would be appropriate to first ask the Supreme Court of Alabama for a construction of whether the Sections do in fact apply to those activities in light of the constraints imposed by the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01. See doc. 94 (State Defendants’ Motion to Certify Question to the Supreme Court of Alabama). The U.S. Supreme Court followed a similar path in the Employment Division v. Smith litigation. When the case first arrived in that Court, the Majority determined as follows:
Neither the Oregon Supreme Court nor this Court has confronted the question whether the ingestion of peyote for sincerely held religious reasons is a form of conduct that is protected by the Federal Constitution from the reach of a State’s criminal laws. It may ultimately be necessary to answer that federal question in this case, but it is inappropriate to do so without first receiving further guidance concerning the status of the practice as a matter of Oregon law.
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Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660, 672 (1988) (emphasis added). See also Smith II, 494 U.S. at 875-76 (“Being ‘uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon,’ we determined that it would not be ‘appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.’”). Two years later, following a remand to the State’s Highest Court, the case returned to the Supreme Court with the question squarely presented. This Court should consider the possibility of seeking a construction of Act No. 2011-535 in order to avoid unnecessarily resolving federal questions that are not truly presented.
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VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Church Leaders’ motion for a preliminary

injunction should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 15, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Mary Bauer Samuel J. Brooke Andrew H. Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org sam.brooke@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org
Cecilia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.343.0775 Wang
415.343.0778 Desormeau 415.343.0777 Sugarman Facsimile: 415.395.0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.896.1701 ext. 110 Facsimile: 415.896.1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
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Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: 404.521.6700 Lapointe & Werner
404.221.5846 Tsu Facsimile: 404.221.5857 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.296.2300 Facsimile: 202.296.2318 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
G. Brian Spears G. BRIAN SPEARS PC 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Telephone: 404.872.7086 Facsimile: 404.892.1128 bspears@mindspring.com
Ben E. Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 Telephone: 334.201.0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
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Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K.T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2676 Segura
212.549.2664 Mukherjee 212.549.2620 Jadwat 212.549.2616 Gelernt 212.549.7303 Tan Facsimile: 212.549.2654 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Vivek Mittal Melissa S. Keaney Shiu-Ming Cheer NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 Telephone: 213.639.3900 Facsimile: 213.639.3911 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 39 of 44
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: 510.663.8282 Facsimile: 510.663.2028 broder@nilc.org
Freddy Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: 205.443.7858 Facsimile: 205.433.7853 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street Post Office Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35801 Telephone: 256.536.7423 Facsimile: 256.536.2689 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 dsen@latinojustice.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 40 of 44
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 Telephone: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: 202.293.2828 apedersen@maldef.org
Jessica Karp National Day Laborer Organizing Network 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Loa Angeles, California 90057 Telephone: 213.380.2785 jkarp@ndlon.org
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 41 of 44
J.R. Brooks, Jr. Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804-2087 Telephone: 256.535.1100 Facsimile: 256.533.9322 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, Alabama 35283-0709 Telephone: 205.521.8000 Facsimile: 205.488.6275 dsweeney@babc.com
C. Lee Reeves, II Joshua Wilkenfeld Varu Chilakamarri U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov Joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov
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Augusta S. Dowd WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD PC 2025 3rd Avenue, North, Suite 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 adowd@waadlaw.com
Terry McElheny DOMINICK FLETCHER YEILDING WOOD & LLOYD P.O. Box 1387 Birmingham, AL 35201 tmc@dfy.com
F. Grey Redditt, Jr. VICKERS RIIS MURRAY & CURRAN LLC 106 St. Francis Street, 11th Floor P.O. Drawer 2568 Mobile, AL 36652-2568 gredditt@vickersriis.com
John F. Whitaker WHITAKER MUDD SIMMS LUKE & WELLS LLC 2001 Park Place North, Suite 400 Birmingham, AL 35203 jwhitaker@wmslawfirm.com
William H. Orrick, III OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION USDOJ CIVIL DIVISION 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20530-0001 Bill.Orrick@usdoj.gov
Sister Lynn Marie McKenzie KNIGHT GRIFFITH MCKENZIE KNIGHT & MCLEROY LLP P.O. Box 930 Cullman, AL 35056 slm@knight-griffith.com
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 107 Filed 08/15/11 Page 43 of 44
R. Champ Crocker R. CHAMP CROCKER, LLC P.O. Box 2700 Cullman, AL 35056-2130 champ@champcrocker.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants: Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 100 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: 210.224.5476 nperales@maldef.org
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Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Misty S. Fairbanks Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard

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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 129 Filed 09/06/11 Page 1 of 4

FILED
2011 Sep-06 PM 02:33 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF )

ALABAMA; et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official )

capacity as Governor of the State of )

Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-CV-2484-SLB

ORDER

This case is presently pending before the court on defendants’ Motion for More

Definite Statement and Motion to Strike. (Doc. 36.) Defendants contend plaintiffs’

Complaint is a shotgun pleading and that it contains “redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

[and] scandalous” material that should be stricken. (Id. at 1.)

The court notes that plaintiffs’ Complaint, brought by 36 plaintiffs against 11

defendants, contains 380 paragraphs, including 144 paragraphs of facts and history, and 9

counts. Each count incorporates all “the foregoing allegations;” the Complaint does not

specify which plaintiffs are bringing which counts against which defendants. Therefore,

the court finds the Complaint is a shotgun complaint, repeatedly criticized by the Eleventh

Circuit. See Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 650 n.22 (11th Cir.

2010)(citing Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 984 (11th Cir. 2008); M.T.V.

v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006); Byrne v. Nezhat,

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 129 Filed 09/06/11 Page 2 of 4
261 F.3d 1075, 1131 (11th Cir. 2001); Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991)).1
Plaintiffs oppose defendants Motion for More Definite Statement and contend that their Complaint contains all the information defendants need to discern their claims. (Doc. 104 at 7.)2 However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose upon defendants and the court the task of “sift[ing] through the facts presented and decid[ing] . . . which [facts are] material to the particular cause of action asserted,” Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1518; such task belongs to plaintiffs.
Therefore, defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement, (doc. 36), is
GRANTED. On or before SEPTEMBER 16, 2011, plaintiffs shall file an Amended
1The Eleventh Circuit noted: The complaint was a typical “shotgun” pleading, in that each count incorporated by reference all preceding paragraphs and counts of the complaint notwithstanding that many of the facts alleged were not material to the claim, or cause of action, appearing in a count's heading. . . . The first 50 paragraphs of the complaint contained allegations of fact that appeared to relate to a particular count of the complaint but not to other counts. Utilizing this method of pleading, Count I incorporated the first 50 paragraphs of the complaint, many of which had nothing to do with the Count I claim(s). Counts II through IX successively incorporated the allegations of all preceding paragraphs and counts, such that each succeeding count was loaded down with allegations having no bearing on the claim(s) the count purported to assert. Thompson, 610 F.3d at 650 n. 22.
2Reference to page numbers for document 104 refer to the page numbers assigned by the court’s electronic filing system.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 129 Filed 09/06/11 Page 3 of 4
Complaint. In compliance with Rules 8(a),3 8(e)(1),4 10(b),5 and 11(b)6 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, each count in the Amended Complaint shall contain only one
discrete claim for relief and shall specify the plaintiff or plaintiffs on whose behalf the
claim is asserted, the defendant or defendants against whom relief is sought, and all
allegations of fact that support that discrete claim. See Davis, 516 F.3d at 980 and n.57.
The court notes that many of the grounds asserted in the Motion to Strike have
merit. Nevertheless, defendants’ Motion to Strike, (doc. 36), is DENIED without
3Rule 8(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
4Rule 8(e)(1) Pleading to be Concise and Direct. Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
5Rule 10(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim . . . shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances . . . . Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count . . . whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
6Rule 11(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims . . . and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 129 Filed 09/06/11 Page 4 of 4 prejudice to defendants’ right to refile a motion to strike with regard to the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint should not include any “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter[s].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). (emphasis added.)
DONE, this 6th day of September, 2011. SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 131

Filed 09/16/11 Page 1 of 120

FILED
2011 Sep-16 PM 04:29 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; AIDS ACTION COALITION; HUNTSVILLE INTERNATIONAL HELP CENTER; INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA; ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, INC.; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS UNITED; UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1657; DREAMACTIVIST.ORG; GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES; BOAT PEOPLE SOS; MATT WEBSTER; MARIA D. CEJA ZAMORA; PAMELA LONG; JUAN PABLO BLACK ROMERO; CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU; ELLIN JIMMERSON; ROBERT BARBER; DANIEL UPTON; JEFFREY ALLEN BECK; MICHELLE CUMMINGS; ESAYAS HAILE; FISEHA TESFAMARIAM; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6; JOHN DOE #1, a minor, by his legal guardian MATT WEBSTER; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5; and JOHN DOE #6;

Case No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

CLASS ACTION

v.

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; LUTHER STRANGE, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alabama; LARRY E. CRAVEN, in his official capacity as Interim State

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Superintendent of Education; FREIDA HILL, in her official capacity as Chancellor of Postsecondary Education; E. CASEY WARDYNSKI, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System; JAMIE BLAIR, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System; RANDY FULLER, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System; CHARLES D. WARREN, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System; BARBARA W. THOMPSON, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System; JEFFERY E. LANGHAM, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System; and ROBERT L. BROUSSARD, in his official capacity as District Attorney for Madison County;
Defendants.
1. This action challenges Alabama’s comprehensive immigration law,
House Bill 56 / Act 2011-535 (“HB 56”) on constitutional and statutory grounds
and seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent serious harm that Plaintiffs
and putative class members will suffer if the law goes into effect. Governor Robert
Bentley touted HB 56 as “the strongest immigration bill in the country” and the
author of the bill boasted that it regulates “every aspect of a person’s life.” Indeed,
HB 56 is a state immigration law of unprecedented reach—going well beyond
recent state immigration laws in Arizona, Utah, Indiana, and Georgia, which
themselves have been suspended in whole or in part by the federal courts.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of Plaintiffs’ civil rights and to secure equitable or other relief for the violation of those rights. 3. This Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 57. 4. Venue is proper in this District and Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendants are sued in their official capacity. Each Defendant resides within the State of Alabama and two Defendants reside within this Division.
PARTIES Organizational Plaintiffs 5. Plaintiff Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (“HICA”) is a nonprofit membership organization formed to facilitate the social, civic, and economic integration of Hispanics into Alabama as well as to help Alabamians understand the diverse Latino culture. HICA was founded in 1999 and has grown significantly since that time. Today, HICA provides a wide range of services, including court advocacy for immigrant survivors of domestic violence, a 24/7 Spanish hotline for immigrant victims of crime, immigration legal services, classes on financial
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literacy, English, and civics, workforce development, volunteer income tax assistance, advocacy and community education, and leadership development and training to the host community.
6. HICA has over 50 formal members and provides services to more than 15,000 constituents in any given year. HICA does not inquire into the immigration status of its members or constituents, but is aware that some lack immigration status, and some are the parents of children born abroad.
7. If HB 56 is implemented, HICA will be in violation of state-created criminal immigration offenses, including transporting and encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state in violation of Section 13. HICA provides the services identified above in Paragraph 5 without regard to immigration status, but it is aware that some of the recipients are undocumented, and HICA periodically transports constituents whom it has reason to believe are undocumented, to facilitate their participation in hearings or other community trainings or events.
8. HICA is already being harmed by HB 56, and it reasonably expects this harm will worsen if HB 56 goes into effect. Participation in its programming has declined because of HB 56, and it has been forced to cancel and postpone the programming identified above in Paragraph 5 to instead address the concerns of its constituents about what HB 56 will mean for them—particularly the school
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provisions of Section 28 and the stop-and-verify provisions of Section 12. HICA is also at risk of losing or failing to fulfill its grant obligations because of HB 56. For example, it is funded to help immigrants apply for T and U visas, which are available to immigrant crime victims who assist law enforcement officials in the prosecution of crime, but crime victims have been less willing to come forward to assist law enforcement officials since HB 56 has passed. HICA has been required to expend additional resources to fulfill its objectives as it now has to have additional seminars on HB 56, it has had to expend administrative costs to cancel and/or postpone its existing programming and has had to combat funding challenges—all in frustration of its mission.
9. Plaintiff AIDS Action Coalition (“AAC”) is based in Huntsville. It was established in 1986 as a non-profit agency providing critically needed health care, education, psycho-social services, and emergency financial assistance to men, women and children infected or affected by HIV/AIDS. AAC provides a broad range of direct services, ranging from screening for sexually transmitted diseases and primary medical care to transportation and housing assistance. AAC currently serves more than 550 clients, many of them residents of Madison County.
10. Due to the critical need to control the spread of infectious disease and because human suffering does not disappear with the expiration of a visa, AAC provides services to its clients without regard to their immigration status. AAC
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necessarily learns its clients’ immigration statuses in the course of registering for prescription drug assistance programs. Seventeen of AAC’s current clients are undocumented immigrants. AAC transports these clients, provides medical care, and provides financial assistance for them to secure housing. If HB 56 goes into effect, these activities in which AAC regularly engages will be criminal. Nevertheless, AAC does not now, nor does it intend to, deny care or services to these clients.
11. Preventative HIV education is among the central objectives and purposes of AAC. AAC employs a Spanish-speaking outreach worker specifically to conduct preventive education in the immigrant community. Since the passage of HB 56, approximately half of the Spanish-speaking outreach worker’s time has been spent answering questions about the new law, rather than addressing matters related to health services and HIV education. The community’s demand for information has overwhelmed the Spanish-speaking outreach worker, requiring a diversion of resources to address HB 56. As such, HB 56 has frustrated AAC’s Education and Outreach program in the Spanish-speaking community.
12. Since passage of HB 56, numerous Hispanic clients have expressed fear and reluctance to travel to AAC’s clinics. AAC reasonably expects the Hispanic community will be less likely to interact with AAC staff conducting HIV testing in their communities if HB 56 is implemented. HB 56 will frustrate AAC’s
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efforts to identify new infections in that community and stop the spread of HIV. 13. Plaintiff Huntsville International Help Center (“HIHC”) is a
volunteer-based organization in Huntsville. HIHC provides services to the Latino community in Huntsville, including prayer and bible study groups; support groups for women who are victims of domestic violence; interpretation and translation services for individuals who have medical or legal appointments or who need to go to a domestic violence shelter; Know Your Rights trainings; and health fairs in churches. HIHC staff regularly drives individuals, including undocumented individuals, to appointments of various types around Huntsville and will continue to do so if HB 56 is implemented. HIHC provides these services without regard to immigration status and is aware that a large share of its constituents is undocumented. HIHC’s activities will therefore be criminalized by HB 56.
14. HB 56 has adversely impacted HIHC because it has deterred many of HIHC’s all-volunteer staff from working with undocumented immigrants. This directly threatens HIHC’s ability to continue its work and fulfill its mission. It has had to divert resources to continue its work using fewer volunteers. Moreover, since the passage of HB 56, HIHC has had great difficulty securing space to hold its meetings and events. Churches and others who normally would provide meeting space are now afraid of being affiliated with the Latino community, which they believe is generally undocumented, as it would subject them to criminal
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liability. HIHC reasonably anticipates these problems in fulfilling its mission will worsen if HB 56 went into effect.
15. Plaintiff Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama (“ITAA”) is a professional membership organization of interpreters and translators, and others who aspire to those careers in the state of Alabama. ITAA has members across the state, including in Huntsville, who provide translation and interpretation in a variety of foreign languages. ITAA’s mission is to promote, advance, and create industry standards for interpreters and translators; to educate the community on the importance of using qualified interpreters; to support continuing education opportunities for professional interpreters and translators; and to further the interests of those employed in or interested in these professions.
16. One of ITAA’s current organizational priorities is to assist its members in obtaining court certification to act as translators and/or interpreters. To promote this organizational priority, ITAA conducts trainings to help its members prepare for the certification examination. One such training was held in Birmingham and another is planned for Huntsville. Since HB 56 passed, however, ITAA has had to delay planning such trainings in order to respond to its members’ concerns and requests for information on the new law and its consequences for them. ITAA’s most recent meeting should have involved planning for interpreter and translator trainings, but instead focused exclusively on HB 56 and what it will
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mean for ITAA’s work and its members. Thus, HB 56 has undermined the ability of ITAA to move ahead with other organizational priorities such as professionalizing the practice of interpretation and translation across the state, and some members have questioned if they can continue to provide interpretation and translation services if HB 56 goes into effect.
17. In addition, HB 56’s possible implementation poses a direct threat of harm to ITAA’s members. Some ITAA members provide transportation for their clients to medical appointments or to courts where their clients need interpretation or translation assistance. If HB 56 is implemented, these ITAA members risk criminal prosecution for harboring or assisting undocumented immigrants by transporting them to these appointments or otherwise providing assistance to them.
18. In addition, if HB 56 were to take effect, ITAA members would not be able to enforce contracts with undocumented clients because HB 56 bars enforcement of a contract in court if one of the contracting parties had direct or constructive knowledge that one of the parties was an alien who was unlawfully present in the United States. In those circumstances ITAA members would have no legal recourse even if they were not paid for their work.
19. Finally, ITAA members who regularly provide interpretation in courts could be forced to disclose information about their client’s immigration status. Disclosing this confidential information would undermine their professional duties
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to provide competent and confidential services, yet failure to disclose would expose them to monetary damages and civil lawsuits under Sections 5 and 6 of HB 56.
20. Some ITAA members also reasonably expect that they will lose clients if HB 56 takes effect because some immigrants will be afraid to access the courts if officers of the court are mandated to report their immigration status to federal officials.
21. Plaintiff Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. (“Appleseed”) is a non-profit public interest advocacy organization that was founded in 1999. Its mission is to identify root causes of injustice and inequality in Alabama and to develop and advocate for solutions that will improve the lives of all Alabamians. To fulfill its mission, Appleseed undertakes network/coalition organizing and development, research, education, advocacy, and policy development. Appleseed’s current Immigration Policy Project was started in 2007 and is dedicated to promoting policies that advance fundamental fairness, due process, and respect for the human rights of new arrivals to the state, and opposing anti-immigrant policies and laws.
22. HB 56’s passage has already substantially diverted scarce organizational resources away from Appleseed’s immigrant policy work. For example, since the passage of HB 56, Appleseed has been inundated with calls
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from the community about the law and its impact. In addition, since HB 56’s passage, virtually any community event or training that Appleseed puts on as part of its immigrant policy or immigrant welcoming projects turns into a forum on HB 56 and its impact on the community, and particularly the impact that Section 28 and Section 12 will have on the community. This takes time away from existing priorities for its work with immigrant populations in Alabama, including investigation of working conditions in Alabama’s poultry plants, and frustrates its mission. Before the passage of HB 56, interviews with poultry workers (many of whom are immigrants) under this project were conducted in approximately 45 minutes. Since HB 56 passed, however, staff members have had to spend an additional 20 to 30 minutes with each interviewee to allay concerns about HB 56.
23. Plaintiff Appleseed will also be subject to criminal prosecution under Sections 13 and 25 of HB 56 because it has arranged transportation for immigrants to attend rallies, sometimes through its Welcoming Alabama program, which encourages Alabamians to welcome immigrants and support their integration into local communities. All these activities could be construed as encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state. For this reason, if HB 56 is implemented Appleseed will have to substantially curtail or stop its immigrant policy, immigrant welcoming, and poultry plant investigation work in order to avoid criminal liability.
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24. Plaintiff Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) is one of the largest labor organizations in the world, representing 2.2 million men and women who work primarily in the public sector and in the janitorial, health services, long-term care, and security industries. Many of SEIU’s members are recent immigrants to the United States and many of its members come from racial minority groups. SEIU has long called for and worked toward comprehensive reform of U.S. immigration laws. Another priority for SEIU is fighting discrimination against minorities, women, and other groups in the workplace and the broader community. HB 56 has required SEIU to divert its resources to address its members’ concerns and has frustrated its mission to ensure its members work in a discrimination-free environment.
25. Plaintiff Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United (“Joint Board”) is a labor union and an affiliate of Plaintiff SEIU. The primary mission of the Joint Board is to organize, represent, and empower employees in Alabama. In addition, the Joint Board works in partnership with SEIU and other groups to combat discrimination and mobilize for immigration reform at the national level. Members of the Joint Board are also members of SEIU. The Joint Board represents approximately 1,105 members in Alabama. They have a significant number of members in Huntsville. Approximately 10 percent of the Joint Board’s Alabama membership is Latino.
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26. The implementation of HB 56 will have a severe impact on the organizational mission of SEIU and the Joint Board. Some of their Latino members and their families have already been subjected to stops by local law enforcement where they have been asked to produce proof of immigration status. SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because their minority members will be even more likely to be stopped, detained, arrested, and questioned by state and local police. This will cause hardship for members of SEIU and the Joint Board. In addition, SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because many of their members and potential members, regardless of nationality and immigration status, will refrain from exercising their rights to attend rallies, demonstrations, and union meetings or to engage in leafleting or other traditional labor activities because of the possibility of being stopped by police under HB 56. This will significantly affect the ability of SEIU and the Joint Board to protect their existing members. Finally, HB 56 has created a fear of government officials and has already led to reluctance on the part of members of this community to join the union and to take the perceived risk of supporting new organizing in unorganized workplaces where the National Labor Relations Board is often involved.
27. Members already have told the Joint Board that they have faced additional police scrutiny and questioning since HB 56 was passed. They believe
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that this additional police scrutiny was based solely on their ethnic appearance and/or English speaking ability. This discriminatory treatment by law enforcement will significantly impede the ability of the Joint Board and SEIU to protect their current members and to organize new members. Some members of SEIU and the Joint Board lack the identity documents approved by HB 56 to establish a presumption of lawful status or do not regularly carry these documents when traveling through the state, and are therefore at risk of lengthy detention and investigation under the new law.
28. SEIU and the Joint Board will also be harmed if HB 56 is implemented because employers in the state will refrain from hiring members and potential members of the Joint Board that they believe look or sound “foreign” based on a fear that they will be subject to increased liability under HB 56. This will have a serious impact on the ability of SEIU and the Joint Board to recruit new members.
29. In addition, SEIU and the Joint Board will be harmed if HB 56 takes effect because of the provision criminalizing the transporting of undocumented immigrants. This provision will have a chilling effect on the Joint Board’s efforts to give rides to people attending union meetings and other events. The Joint Board will have a more difficult time organizing transportation to these key union activities because people will be afraid to associate with someone whose
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racial/ethnic appearance will increase the risk that the driver will be stopped for a minor traffic offense, leading to further police scrutiny and possible criminal prosecution under the law.
30. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, the Joint Board will need to spend significant new time educating members and potential members about the law. This will divert the Joint Board’s resources from other core organizational priorities such as organizing new members. The Joint Board joins this lawsuit to preserve its ability to organize new members and to protect the rights and interests of its members and prospective members—which is fundamental to the Joint Board’s existence.
31. Finally, Joint Board members would be harmed if HB 56 takes effect because of its provision barring enforcement of certain contracts. If implemented, this provision would prohibit Joint Board members from enforcing a broad range of contracts from insurance contracts, to marriage contracts, to settlement agreements. In addition, the Joint Board itself could be prohibited from enforcing a wide range of contracts on behalf of its members such as grievance settlements and contractually mandated payments and, as a result, would risk having complaints filed against it with the National Labor Relations Board for failure to properly represent its members.
32. Plaintiff United Food and Commercial Workers International
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Union (“UFCW International”) represents more than 1.3 million workers across the United States in various industries, including poultry and meat packing and other food processing; supermarket and other retail; and hospitals, nursing homes, and other healthcare. All workers represented by local unions of the UFCW are also represented by UFCW International.
33. Plaintiff United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657 (“UFCW Local 1657”) is a local union of UFCW International that represents more than 3600 workers in various industries, including catfish processing, nursing homes, retail food markets, non-food retail, and military bases in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi. In these industries, UFCW-represented workers are cashiers, stockers, pharmacy technicians, licensed practical nurses, certified nursing assistants, housekeeping employees, barbers and beauticians, production workers, restaurant workers, and auto mechanics.
34. UFCW Local 1657 represents workers who comprise a wide range of races and ethnicities, with varying degrees of English proficiency. Nearly five percent of the workers represented by Local 1657 are of Latino heritage. In addition, Local 1657 represents African American, Caucasian, and Asian workers. Both UFCW International and Local 1657 (the “UFCW Unions”) have a manifest interest in advocating and maintaining discrimination-free workplaces and communities.
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35. The UFCW Unions’ missions are to better the terms and conditions of employment of all workers they represent and thereby better the lives of their families and communities. The UFCW Unions work to achieve these objectives through collective bargaining, and representation of existing bargaining unit employees as well as by organizing new employees. These core activities require freedom of association and freedom of speech and communication between the unions and the employees they represent and organize to represent, activities protected by the U.S. Constitution and various federal labor laws. The UFCW Unions also engage in speech, assembly, and petition activities protected by the Constitution and labor laws in conveying their message throughout the communities which surround represented worksites and worksites that the Unions endeavor to organize. These First Amendment speech, assembly, and petition activities include meetings with other employees, the employer, and community members, demonstrations, and petitioning local, state, and national political representatives in the various communities where employees work and reside.
36. If HB 56 is allowed to go into effect, it will impose direct harm to the UFCW Unions’ core missions and representational obligations by restricting their ability to effectively advocate on behalf of the employees they represent and endeavor to represent; subjecting members to unlawful questioning, arrest, and detention by state and local law enforcement officers; and chilling freedom of
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assembly of UFCW-represented workers by deterring their attendance and participation in UFCW activities. Specifically, the UFCW Unions fear that HB 56, including the provision that criminalizes the transportation of undocumented immigrants, will deter employees from attending UFCW activities, from joining in concerted activities with other employees to protect their labor rights, and from soliciting other employees to join the Unions for fear that when engaging in such activities they will be stopped and questioned because they appear to be Latino or are in the company of workers who appear to be Latino. This frustrates its mission.
37. Additionally, as part of their core activities, the UFCW Unions provide lawyers to educate workers about their rights under federal and state employment and labor laws. If HB 56 is implemented, the UFCW Unions will need to divert these resources towards educating members and potential members about the law, to the detriment of this core organizational function
38. Plaintiff DreamActivist.org (“DreamActivist”) is a multi-cultural, migrant-led membership organization dedicated to passing the federal DREAM Act and providing for the educational betterment of youth. The DREAM Act is a bipartisan congressional bill that would address the situation of young students brought to the United States as children by providing a path to legal status for students who graduate from high school, obtain a GED, enroll in college, or serve
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in the armed forces. DreamActivist is comprised of students who would be eligible for relief if the DREAM Act passes. DreamActivist has members all over the country, including in Alabama.
39. Some of DreamActivist’s Alabama members lack a federal immigrant or nonimmigrant visa and would not be able to obtain the identity documents specified by HB 56, such as a driver’s license. If HB 56 is implemented, these members will be subject to interrogation and detention by law enforcement officers because they will be unable to provide a document proving lawful status in the United States.
40. In addition, if HB 56 takes effect, members of DreamActivist will be prohibited from attending public post-secondary institutions in Alabama because they do not have lawful permanent residence or a nonimmigrant visa. As a result, these members will be unable to pursue their educational goals and also will be unable to achieve one of the key pieces of DREAM Act eligibility by enrolling in post-secondary school.
41. If HB 56 is implemented, many DreamActivist members will also be at risk of criminal prosecution under various provisions of the law creating new state crimes for seeking work or for lacking a federal alien registration document.
42. In addition, younger members will be afraid to enroll in public elementary or secondary school because they will have to disclose their or their
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parents’ immigration status to enroll. 43. Finally, the organization itself will suffer direct harm if HB 56 is
implemented because its members will leave the state, fearing prosecution under the law; those members who remain will be too afraid to attend DreamActivist events, fearing that they will be identified as undocumented immigrants by local law enforcement officials who may be present at or near the events. HB 56 frustrates the mission of DreamActivist and will force it to divert its resources to counter the negative impact HB 56 will have on its members, and DreamActivist’s purpose.
44. Plaintiff Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”) is a multi-faith, multi-racial, multi-member organization that provides emergency assistance to low-income families in need while working on public policies that can better the quality of life for all. GBM counts Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faith communities among its members, including the Roman Catholic Diocese of Birmingham and the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church, as well as individual temples, churches, and mosques.
45. GBM’s low-income clients include Latino, African, and other immigrant families, including undocumented individuals and school-age children. GBM has three main program areas: Economic Justice, Direct Services, and Faith & Community. Its Direct Services program provides services in the form of food,
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clothing, and financial assistance to immigrant and other communities based only on their level of need.
46. In its Direct Services program, GBM serves approximately 3,000 families per year, which averages 7,000 people, by providing free non-perishable foods and fresh vegetables and fruits; free clothes, including clothes for school-age children; and financial support in the form of rental payments, utility bill payments, bus passes, and prescription drug payments. Although GBM does not have the need or capacity to ask for immigration status from its clients before offering them services, it is reasonably certain some clients are undocumented. Providing services to these clients after HB 56 goes into effect will expose GBM to criminal prosecution for encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in Alabama or for harboring and transporting them through paying for their rent, utilities, and bus passes.
47. Additionally, GBM’s members fear prosecution since they often directly provide transportation to undocumented members of their congregations for vacation Bible school for school-age children and for healthcare and childcare.
48. GBM has also been forced to divert its scarce resources to address fears of its member congregations regarding the impact of Section 28, the K-12 enrollment provisions of HB 56, on mixed-status families. GBM and its constituent congregations routinely have new members with children coming into
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and leaving the state, which will continue to be the case if Section 28 goes into effect. GBM will have to continue to address these families’ fears and questions over Section 28 if it were to go into effect.
49. GBM is also concerned that it will soon have to divert organizational and financial resources because immigrants from their congregations are already leaving Alabama due to HB 56. GBM relies on members for volunteers, and if its congregations no longer have as many members, GBM will have to decrease the number of services it provides due to the decreasing volunteer base that GBM draws from.
50. Because GBM is publicly opposed to HB 56, it is likely that member congregations that do not agree with GBM will limit, or cease, their support of GBM, which will directly harm the organization. In the past, GBM has suffered when it has taken controversial positions that led to various member congregations withdrawing or reducing their support for GBM. Nevertheless, GBM will remain opposed to HB 56 because HB 56 conflicts with GBM’s core mission to serve people, build community, and pursue justice.
51. Plaintiff Boat People SOS (“BPSOS”) is a national non-profit Vietnamese-American community-based organization with the mission to “empower, organize, and equip Vietnamese individuals and communities in their pursuit of liberty and dignity.” Formed in 1980 to assist Vietnamese refugees and
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immigrants who were fleeing Vietnam, BPSOS has evolved from performing rescue-at-sea operations, to asylum work in refugee camps, to community empowerment work through its network of 11 offices across the United States and four offices in Asia. BPSOS fulfills its mission through direct services, advocacy, community organizing and development, research, and media outreach, aimed at addressing the intertwining and compounding effects of unmet needs on refugee and immigrant families and communities.
52. BPSOS has a robust presence serving isolated, limited English proficient communities along the Gulf Coast, including maintaining an office in Bayou La Batre, Alabama. BPSOS established emergency relief in the Gulf Coast immediately after Hurricane Katrina and set up branch offices shortly thereafter to provide long-term recovery case management. Today, BPSOS’s services in the Gulf Coast equip Vietnamese community members with the tools and skills they need to access services, benefits and opportunities as well as to build community infrastructure for self-help and self-sufficiency.
53. The implementation of HB 56 will have a serious impact on BPSOS’s work with the Vietnamese- and other Southeast Asian-American communities in Alabama and will frustrate its mission. BPSOS’s small staff in Bayou La Batre will need to spend significant time educating community members about the law, answering questions, and calming people’s fears about HB 56. Staff will need to
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be trained on HB 56 so they can accurately convey information to the community. This will divert BPSOS’s limited resources from their core organizational priorities of direct services, community development, and organizing.
54. Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, UFCW International, UFCW Local 1657, DreamActivist, GBM, and BPSOS are collectively referred to herein as “Organizational Plaintiffs.”
Individual Plaintiffs 55. Plaintiff Matt Webster was born in Alabama, where he has lived most of his life. He is an engineer by training. 56. He and his wife decided that they would like to adopt a child, to make life better for someone who needed a supportive and loving environment. Through a friend, he learned of two young boys from Mexico who were in the United States whose mother had passed away, and who were in need of a stable home. Plaintiff Webster and his wife met the children several times, and grew to love them as their own sons. 57. Plaintiff Webster and his wife obtained guardianship over the children, and are currently in the process of finalizing adoption paperwork. However, the two children do not have current federal immigration status, and Plaintiff Webster and his wife will not be able to obtain lawful status for the children until two years after the adoption process has been completed.
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58. If HB 56 goes into effect, Plaintiff Webster fears how the law will affect his two sons, whom the law criminalizes until he is able to obtain federal immigration status for them. In the interim, neither child can obtain an alien registration document or even a state identification card.
59. Plaintiff Webster also fears what will happen to his children at school when he is required to enroll them and disclose their immigration status.
60. Furthermore, Plaintiff Webster’s own actions in adopting the children, providing for them, and transporting them, would be illegal under HB 56. Plaintiff Webster believes immigration reform is necessary, but that laws like HB 56 are counterproductive and incredibly punitive to immigrants and people like himself, who are simply trying to provide for loved ones who are in need.
61. Plaintiff Maria D. Ceja Zamora is originally from Mexico and has been a resident of Athens, Alabama for over 17 years. Plaintiff Zamora is presently waiting for a visa to become available to her for permanent residence through her naturalized U.S. citizen mother, and she is permitted to remain in the United States under the federal government’s Family Unity Program.
62. Under the program, Plaintiff Zamora is granted voluntary departure and work authorization, with an employment authorization document (“EAD”), for two-year periods. She is able to extend the benefits under the program every two years until a visa becomes available, which she has done since 1988. She does not
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currently have a visa. 63. Plaintiff Zamora had a valid Alabama driver’s license that recently
expired. When she attempted to renew her driver’s license, she presented her EAD and Social Security number as she has done before, but was told by a state official that she was ineligible for a driver’s license. If HB 56 is implemented and Plaintiff Zamora is stopped by police without a valid state identification, she will be considered a criminal, for although the federal immigration agency is aware of her presence in the country and she is permitted to remain in the United States, she cannot apply to adjust her status until a visa becomes available.
64. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Zamora also fears racial profiling because of her Latina appearance. If HB 56 takes effect, Plaintiff Zamora will limit her travel through the state to reduce the chance of being stopped, interrogated, and detained by local law enforcement.
65. Plaintiff Pamela Long, a native of Montgomery, Alabama, is an Associate Professor at Auburn University Montgomery and a lay minister in the Hispanic Ministry for the Montgomery-area Episcopal churches. The Hispanic Ministry is a project of the eight Montgomery-area Episcopal churches to provide outreach and spiritual support to meet the needs of immigrants and Latinos in Montgomery.
66. As a part of her ministry, Plaintiff Long often serves as an interpreter
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in court proceedings, as well as at medical appointments for members of the community. Plaintiff Long also assists English-language learners with government applications.
67. Plaintiff Long also transports Latino community members to and from church, to doctor’s appointments, to court appearances, or other places as a part of her ministry.
68. Plaintiff Long does not ask the immigration status of people she is ministering to or providing assistance to, but they often disclose this information to her. A considerable number of the individuals she has ministered to over the years are undocumented immigrants. She will continue to provide rides, interpretation, and other support to undocumented members as a part of her faith work if HB 56 is implemented.
69. Plaintiff Long is concerned that HB 56 will require her to disclose information that she receives on individual’s immigration status when she interprets for them in court proceedings, or else she will be in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of HB 56.
70. If HB 56 is implemented, Long and the undocumented immigrants whom she serves as a part of her ministry will be subject to criminal prosecution. Plaintiff Long will, however, continue to engage in these activities because doing her ministry work is central to her religious beliefs and part of what she believes it
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means to act in a humane and Christian manner. She refuses to be forced to act against her Christian morals and religious beliefs.
71. Plaintiff Juan Pablo Black Romero is an Alabama resident who is originally from Ecuador. He came to the United States on an F-1 student visa in 2003. Plaintiff Romero is currently a graduate student at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. He completed his master’s degree in Political Science in 2007 and is currently working on his Ph.D. in Political Theory.
72. As an F-1 visa holder, Plaintiff Romero is allowed to study in the United States and to get practical work experience (Optional Practical Training or “OPT”) directly related to his field of study. He must apply for an OPT after the completion of the requirements of his Ph.D. program but before graduation. He therefore must apply for an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”) from the federal immigration agency, which can take up to three months to receive. Federal authorities do not forbid an applicant for an EAD to apply for jobs prior to receiving the EAD. Plaintiff Romero will begin searching for employment in Alabama for his OPT so that he may start it as soon as he receives his EAD from federal authorities. If HB 56 is implemented, however, Plaintiff Romero will be subject to criminal prosecution for being an “unauthorized alien” who applies for or solicits work.
73. Plaintiff Christopher Barton Thau (“Pastor Thau”) is a U.S. citizen
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and has lived in Pelham, Alabama since 1996. He has a wife who is a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”), and a six-year-old child who is attending Alabama public schools.
74. Pastor Thau has been an Associate Pastor of the Pleasant Hill United Methodist Church for two years. Pleasant Hill Church is located in Bessemer, Alabama, and was founded in 1832. Pastor Thau is responsible for the Spanishspeaking bilingual congregation, which consists of mostly Latino members. Pastor Thau is aware that many members of his congregation do not have any immigration status.
75. In addition to facilitating spiritual growth, Pastor Thau provides the congregation with food assistance, work for members, monetary assistance, counseling, support with Medicaid applications, and any other social services that members may need. While providing these services, he often transports members to and from doctors’ offices, work assignments, benefits appointments, and other appointments. He also performs marriage ceremonies for individuals who do not have current immigration status.
76. Pastor Thau’s wife, who was undocumented until she became an LPR recently, has an extended family that includes undocumented persons. Pastor Thau supports his wife and her family, both financially and occasionally by providing space for them in his home. He will continue to do this, even though it would be a
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crime under Section 13. 77. Pastor Thau intends to continue these activities, even though they will
be criminalized under HB 56, and he is fearful of being prosecuted. 78. Plaintiff Ellin Jimmerson was born in Atmore, Alabama. She lived
in Birmingham during her high school and college years, and currently lives in Huntsville, Alabama.
79. Plaintiff Jimmerson was ordained to the gospel ministry by Weatherly Heights Baptist Church in Huntsville. She is Minister to the Community at Weatherly Heights Baptist Church. Her ministry includes making a documentary film about the root causes of unlawful immigration, and in other ways serving the needs of the immigrant community in Huntsville, including those immigrants without lawful status.
80. As a part of her ministry, Plaintiff Jimmerson performs marriages, preaches at various events, and provides spiritual counseling and other services and assistance. Plaintiff Jimmerson routinely provides these services to undocumented immigrants and will continue to do so if HB 56 is implemented. This will put her at risk for criminal prosecution under HB 56’s provisions for encouraging undocumented immigrants to remain in the state.
81. Plaintiff Robert Barber is a resident of Birmingham, Alabama and an active member of the Alabama state bar. He practices law primarily in the areas of
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employment law, including wage and hour law, as well as immigration and family law matters and general civil litigation. A core part of his practice involves providing for the legal needs of the Latino community in Birmingham. Approximately 95 percent of his Latino clients are currently undocumented. Plaintiff Barber represents these undocumented individuals in applications to regularize their status with the federal government, family law disputes, and suits for lost wages.
82. Because many of his Latino clients do not have cars, Plaintiff Barber routinely drives his clients to court hearings and other legal proceedings.
83. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber will be subject to criminal prosecution for concealing, harboring, or encouraging undocumented immigrants to reside or remain in the state of Alabama. HB 56 will interfere fundamentally with Plaintiff Barber’s ability to practice his profession.
84. Since HB 56 was proposed, Plaintiff Barber has already suffered a decrease in his Latino clientele. He is aware that Latinos and immigrants are increasingly afraid to access the courts to protect their rights, and some families are preparing to leave the state if the law takes effect. If the law is implemented, Plaintiff Barber is not sure that he can continue his law practice, as he will lose even more clients and suffer significant financial losses.
85. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber would risk civil
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prosecution and monetary damages for failing to disclose confidential and privileged information on his client’s immigration status since he is an “officer of the court.” Disclosing this information would be in violation of his ethical duty as an attorney to his clients, however, and would undermine his ability to practice his profession. Plaintiff Barber could also face liability on account of his office policy of keeping clients’ information confidential.
86. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Barber will not be able to enforce contracts against his undocumented clients who fail to pay for his services. In the past, Barber has relied on the Alabama court system to ensure payment of fees owed to him. His inability to enforce basic contracts under HB 56 would severely undermine Plaintiff Barber’s business and economic livelihood.
87. Plaintiff Daniel Upton is an immigration attorney residing in Madison County, Alabama. He works for Justice for Our Neighbors (“JFON”), a program of the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and he provides free, professional legal services to immigrants through clinics operated in local Methodist congregations across the country. The mission of JFON includes fulfilling the biblical mandate of hospitality to all people, and advocating for just and compassionate immigration laws and public policy.
88. Plaintiff Upton regularly represents individuals in a range of immigration matters including representing undocumented immigrants who are
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applying for adjustment of status or family-based immigration visas; long-term community members who are eligible for immigration relief; and immigrants applying for visas because they were victims of crimes or domestic violence at the hands of U.S. citizen spouses. Because of the nature of his work, Plaintiff Upton is often aware that the individuals he represents lack valid immigration status.
89. Plaintiff Upton routinely drives clients to immigration hearings or other related appointments. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Upton would risk criminal prosecution for harboring or transporting undocumented immigrants or for encouraging them to remain in the state under Section 13 of the law.
90. Finally, Plaintiff Upton regularly enters into retainer agreements with his clients with full knowledge that the client lacks immigration status. HB 56 would make these agreements unenforceable, which would severely undermine his ability to conduct his legal practice within the bounds of professional responsibility. HB 56 could also impact his malpractice insurance coverage, which requires an enforceable retainer specifying the scope of his representation.
91. Plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Beck is a resident of Guntersville, Alabama. He has owned rental properties throughout Northern Alabama for the past 18 years. The majority of Plaintiff Beck’s tenants are immigrants. Beck does not verify or investigate the immigration status of his tenants. He does not intend to change that practice. He has reason to believe that some of his tenants are undocumented.
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Plaintiff Beck rents accommodations to some individuals who cannot provide a Social Security number with their rental application. In the past, some of Beck’s tenants were taken into federal immigration custody. Beck did not and would not move to evict those residents or their remaining family members from their units and would not do so in the future.
92. Plaintiff Beck believes that hardworking people deserve a place to live regardless of their immigration status. Beck and his business entities enter into rental agreements with people they believe may be undocumented.
93. Plaintiff Beck fears he will lose a major portion of his livelihood if HB 56 is implemented because he will be forced to evict many of his tenants to avoid committing the crime of renting to people he has reason to believe are undocumented immigrants. Local police often place driver’s license checkpoints in front of Plaintiff Beck’s properties. Beck’s business operations would be disrupted by the arrest and detention of a substantial share of his tenants if HB 56 goes into effect.
94. If implemented, HB 56 will render Plaintiff Beck’s rental agreements with any undocumented person unenforceable. His livelihood depends upon renters being compelled to pay for the accommodations they rent from him.
95. Plaintiff Michelle Cummings is a resident of Huntsville, Alabama. Cummings is a part-owner of a property management business, and she derives
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most of her income from this business. She owns approximately 140 rental units in the Huntsville area.
96. Plaintiff Cummings has reason to believe that she currently rents properties to approximately 30 undocumented immigrants. She does not verify immigration status when renting and does not intend to change that practice. Plaintiff Cummings does not plan to deny housing to renters merely because they may lack proper immigration documents. She believes it would be inhumane to do so.
97. If HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Cummings will be subject to criminal prosecution for concealing, harboring, or encouraging undocumented immigrants to reside or remain in the state of Alabama. In addition, if HB 56 is implemented, Plaintiff Cummings believes that it will deter individuals from renting her properties and cause her business to suffer.
98. Plaintiff Esayas Haile resides in Boaz, Alabama, and is a native of Eritrea. Plaintiff Haile came to the United States as a refugee in 2010. As a refugee, Plaintiff Haile is allowed to remain in the United States, but he is not a lawful permanent resident and does not possess a nonimmigrant visa. Plaintiff Haile is fluent in Tigrina and Amharic, but wishes to learn the English language to ease his transition into the United States. Plaintiff Haile recently finished taking an English class at a local school. Plaintiff Haile plans to enroll in English as a
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Secondary Language (ESL) classes at Gadsden State Community College, this fall. Section 8 of HB 56 will prohibit Plaintiff Haile from studying at Gadsden State or any similar public postsecondary institution because he is not a lawful permanent resident or a holder of a nonimmigrant visa.
99. Plaintiff Fiseha Tesfamariam resides in Boaz, Alabama, and is a native of Eritrea. Plaintiff Tesfamariam came to the United States as a refugee in 2010. As a refugee, Plaintiff Tesfamariam is allowed to remain in the United States, but he is not a lawful permanent resident and does not possess a nonimmigrant visa. Plaintiff Tesfamariam wishes to learn the English language to ease his transition into the United States. Plaintiff Tesfamariam recently finished taking an English class at a local school. Plaintiff Tesfamariam plans to enroll in ESL classes at Gadsden State Community College this fall. Section 8 of HB 56 will prohibit Plaintiff Tesfamariam from studying at Gadsden State or any similar public postsecondary institution because he is not a lawful permanent resident or a holder of a nonimmigrant visa.
100. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 is a Mexican national who currently lives in Crossville, Alabama, with her husband and two children. Her daughter, who is nine years old, is a U.S. citizen. Her son, who is 17, was born in Mexico and is undocumented.
101. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 does not have lawful immigration status in this
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country, although she is currently in the process of getting a visa. Her petition for an Alien Relative Visa (I-130) has been approved, but pursuant to usual federal procedures, she must now wait for a visa to become available.
102. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 does not have an Alabama driver’s license and is not eligible to get one. The only document she possesses that reflects her status is a notice acknowledging that her Alien Relative petition was approved. The notice is a simple piece of paper, not an identification document, and it does not have any indication of its durational validity. Jane Doe #1 is reasonably concerned a police officer would not accept it as proof of lawful immigration status, because although the federal immigration agency has not chosen to put her in removal proceedings, technically she remains without status until the visa becomes available.
103. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #1 will be in violation of HB 56’s alien registration scheme and at risk of prolonged detention if she is stopped by police for any reason. As a result, she will reduce her travel in the state—including travel to attend church each week—to try to avoid the possibility of contact with law enforcement.
104. Jane Doe #1 is concerned that if HB 56 is implemented it will tear her family apart. She worries that her husband or son, who are both undocumented, could be identified by police and would be deported under the law. Her nine-yearold daughter, who is a U.S. citizen, is traumatized by what she hears about the new
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law at school. She has been asking if the family will be arrested by immigration officials or stopped at police checkpoints.
105. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 lives in Birmingham, Alabama, and is the single mother of three children. Jane Doe #2 has lived in Alabama for 12 years and considers it her home. She immigrated to the United States from her native country in 1999.
106. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 currently lacks federal immigration status, but she has applied to the federal government for a U visa (a form of federal immigration status for crime victims and witnesses that provides a pathway to permanent residence) based on the fact that she and her child cooperated in the criminal prosecution of a school official who sexually assaulted her child. Although the federal government is aware that Jane Doe #2 is undocumented, they have not elected to initiate immigration proceedings against her, and her application for a U visa is pending.
107. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 does not have a federal alien registration document; nor does she have any document that can easily establish to Alabama law enforcement officials that her presence in the country is known to the federal government. As a result, if HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #2 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by law enforcement officials based on her Latina appearance and lack of state-approved identity documents, and to criminal
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prosecution under the alien registration scheme of Section 11. 108. If HB 56 takes effect, Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 will curtail her travel to
reduce the chance that she will be stopped, interrogated, and detained by local law enforcement based on her Latina appearance.
109. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 is considering homeschooling her children because she is afraid school officials will report her undocumented status to federal immigration officials. If she has to home-school her children, her ability to provide for her family financially will suffer.
110. If HB 56 takes effect, Jane Doe #2 will also be committing a crime by renting her home, and she will not be able to enforce contracts for her work or her lease in state court. If her employer or landlord violates the terms of any agreement, she will be left without a remedy.
111. Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 is a U.S. citizen who was born and raised in Alabama. She lives in Montgomery, Alabama, with her husband, who is an undocumented immigrant, and their three U.S. citizen children who are all under the age of six.
112. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #3 will be subject to criminal prosecution under Section 13 for living with and supporting her husband, since she would be considered harboring or encouraging an undocumented immigrant to remain in the United States. She is offended that the law would criminalize her
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family life. 113. Jane Doe #3 is also fearful that if HB 56 takes effect, school officials
will report her husband’s immigration status to federal officials because Section 28 requires schools to collect information on his immigration status when enrolling their children in public school.
114. Jane Doe #3 will be harmed if Section 27 of HB 56 is implemented because she will not be able to enforce contracts that she enters into along with her husband who is undocumented. For example, she worries that if she dies her husband will not be able to enforce the terms of her life insurance policy, which lists him as the principal beneficiary and successor in interest. This would cause tremendous harm to her U.S. citizen children.
115. Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 is a resident of Pelham, Alabama, and has lived in Alabama for approximately 11 years. She and her husband are undocumented. She is the mother of three children, including one U.S. citizen child. Jane Doe #4 considers Alabama her home. She lives in a rented trailer home in Pelham with her husband and three children.
116. Jane Doe #4 routinely seeks work cleaning houses even though she does not have work authorization. If implemented, Section 11 of HB 56 will criminalize her work and open her up to prosecution simply for working to support her family.
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117. If HB 56 takes effect, Jane Doe #4 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by police. There are regular police roadblocks in front of the trailer park where Jane Doe #4 lives. She fears that she will be detained when stopped at one of these roadblocks because she lacks the identity documents listed in HB 56.
118. Further, because Jane Doe #4 lacks a federal alien registration document, she will be subject to criminal prosecution under Section 10.
119. Jane Doe #4 fears that under HB 56, her landlord will evict her and her family because they cannot prove they are here legally, and she will be subject to criminal prosecution for soliciting the rental agreement. Eviction and difficulty finding another home to rent due to Section 13’s renting provisions would cause a substantial disruption to Jane Doe #4’s life, and it would be damaging to her children and their sense of security.
120. Plaintiff Jane Doe #5 lives in Wetumpka, Alabama. She has a 13year-old son. She has lived in Alabama since she left her native country in 2005. She does not have valid immigration status in the United States. She also lacks a driver’s license or any other form of government-issued photo ID from the United States.
121. Jane Doe #5 seeks jobs in Alabama even though she does not have work authorization, because she must provide for herself and her son. If
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implemented, Section 11 will criminalize her attempts to find work and make her vulnerable to criminal prosecution because of her efforts to take care of her family.
122. Because Jane Doe #5 lacks a federal alien registration document, she will be subject to criminal prosecution under Section 10.
123. Jane Doe #5 is renting property, which will make her subject to criminal prosecution under Sections 13 and 25.
124. Jane Doe #5 fears that if HB 56 is implemented, Section 27 will make the contracts she enters into for basic necessities unenforceable. This will affect her rental contract, as well as contracts to buy a car or pay her cell phone bill. This will impair her ability to find a place to live and to travel, and to reach her son in an emergency.
125. HB 56 will also interrupt Jane Doe #5’s son’s education. If implemented, HB 56 will require her son’s school to determine Jane Doe #5’s immigration status. Fearing that those school officials may report her as an undocumented immigrant, Jane Doe #5 will not enroll her son in school if Section 28 and the rest of HB 56 goes into effect.
126. If HB 56 is implemented, Jane Doe #5 will curtail her activities outside of the house for fear of interacting with the police. She will be hesitant to report any crimes of which she is a victim or a witness. Jane Doe #5 will also have difficulty finding friends who are documented who are willing to help her family,
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as HB 56 will make it state crime to do so. As a result, Jane Doe #5 will stop attending events, traveling about in public, and going places that she would otherwise go.
127. Plaintiff Jane Doe #6 lives in Huntsville, Alabama, and is the mother of three children. Jane Doe #6 immigrated to the United States in 1996 and has spent most of the last 17 years in Huntsville. She and her three children are undocumented.
128. Jane Doe #6’s youngest son, who is 18 years old, is developmentally disabled. He is unable to care for himself, so he lives with Jane Doe #6, and she expects that he always will.
129. Her son is in a vocational training program through his high school special education program. One requirement of the program is that he work a certain number of hours per week next year. He is not eligible for a work permit, however. If HB 56 is implemented, his attempts to find work will be criminalized, and he will not be able to complete his program.
130. Jane Doe #6 is also fearful that her son will be unable to complete school because of HB 56’s requirement that the school determine whether he and Jane Doe #6 are undocumented. She will be forced to comply with the registration requirements because obtaining an education is so important to her son and his future. Jane Doe #6 fears, however, that revealing her son’s undocumented status
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to school officials will cause him harm and mistreatment. 131. Jane Doe #6 also worries that under HB 56, her son will be detained
because he lacks immigration papers. She believes that he will not be able to care for himself if he is detained or deported to Mexico, a country he does not know and does not consider his home. The only place he considers home is Alabama.
132. Jane Doe #6 supports herself and her family by cleaning houses. She must drive herself to various work sites, and she must also regularly drive her son to school. Because she lacks a driver’s license, Jane Doe #6 is fearful that she will be stopped and arrested by the police and put into deportation proceedings. If this happens, she worries that her son will be abandoned and unable to care for himself.
133. Plaintiff John Doe #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, is a 16-year old who came to the United States with his younger brother several years ago. His mother passed away when he was 8 or 9 years old, and his elderly grandparents sent him to United States to live with extended family.
134. John Doe #1 learned English and excelled in school, but his younger brother struggled. Plaintiff Matt Webster and his wife, both U.S. citizens, learned of John Doe #1 and his brother’s plight, and after becoming acquainted, the boys’ extended relatives agreed that Plaintiff Webster and his wife could provide a more stable environment for the boys. Plaintiff Webster and his wife are now in the process of adopting the brothers.
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135. John Doe #1 is still without any current immigration status, and he does not have an alien registration card or any U.S. identification. His new parents will be eligible under federal law to apply for immigration relief for him after the adoption has been completed and two years have passed. If HB 56 were to go into effect, however, John Doe #1 would be a criminal until that two-year period passes.
136. John Doe #1 has done very well in school and has been a leader in the ROTC. He plans to go to college. But right now he is fearful of what will happen to him in school if he is forced to disclose his immigration status, and what will happen to him if he is ever stopped by a police officer.
137. Plaintiff John Doe #2 was born in Mexico and came to the United States in 1995. He has mostly lived in Alabama since that time. He now resides in Crossville, Alabama, with his wife and two children—a daughter who is 9 years old and a son who is 17 years old. John Doe #2 does not have lawful immigration status, nor does his 17-year-old son. His daughter, however, is a U.S. citizen.
138. This fall, his daughter will be entering the fourth grade at Crossville Public Elementary School and his son will be a senior at Crossville Public High School. If HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #2 may make the very tough choice to keep his children out of school. He would do so to reduce the risk that his family will be identified as undocumented to immigration officials by the school.
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139. Plaintiff John Doe #2 also fears prosecution under Section 10 of HB 56, if it is implemented, because he lacks a federal alien registration document. Since HB 56 passed, John Doe #2 has been afraid to leave the house for any nonessential purpose because he wants to avoid any possibility of encountering law enforcement.
140. Plaintiff John Doe #3 is an 18-year-old who has grown up in the United States and considers Alabama his home. John Doe #3 does not have a green card or other lawful status in the United States. He recently graduated with honors from Wetumpka High School and was accepted to three different public universities in Alabama.
141. Because he considers Alabama his home and because his family lives here, John Doe #3 plans to attend college in Alabama. John Doe #3 does not have the funds to enroll in college currently, but he intends to enroll as soon as possible and to study aerospace and robotics technology. If HB 56 is implemented, however, it will prohibit him from enrolling in a public college or university in Alabama and thwart his plans to pursue further education.
142. John Doe #3 has suffered racial profiling in the past by Alabama law enforcement officers. A couple years ago, he was stopped while riding in a car with other passengers for the ostensible reason that the registration tag was not properly displayed. However, when the police officers stopped the car, they only
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asked John Doe #3 to step out of the car and to show a driver’s license or other form of identification, even though he was not the driver. The other passengers, who were all Caucasian, were not asked to get out of the car or to show any documents. John Doe #3 believes he was treated differently because of his Latino appearance.
143. If HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #3 is afraid that he will be subject to increased racial profiling, discrimination, and arbitrary interrogation and detention by law enforcement based on his Latino appearance. As a result, John Doe #3 will curtail his activities if HB 56 takes effect to try to avoid any contact with law enforcement.
144. Plaintiff John Doe #4 is a resident of Auburn, Alabama, and has lived in Auburn for approximately three years. He has been enrolled at a community college in Alabama where he is taking classes to prepare for the GED exam, and he will continue his GED courses this fall. He plans to take his GED exam late this year or next year, and he intends to study welding or mechanics at a community college in Alabama to better himself.
145. If HB 56 is implemented, it will thwart his educational and professional plans. John Doe #4 will not be able to continue his GED program, or his studies after passing the GED exam because he does not have the documentation required by Section 8 to enroll in any public post-secondary
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educational institution in Alabama, as he does not have lawful permanent resident status or a non-immigrant visa.
146. John Doe #4 currently rents his apartment. If Sections 13, 25, and the remainder of HB 56 takes effect, John Doe #4 will be committing a crime by renting his home, and may be evicted. He fears he will have great difficulty finding any place to rent because he does not have the documents required under the law to allow a landlord to rent to him, and both he and any landlord would be considered a criminal for renting to him.
147. If HB 56 is implemented, John Doe #4 will be subject to unlawful interrogation and detention by police officers inquiring into his immigration status if he is stopped by police for any reason. John Doe #4 fears detention and deportation under HB 56 because he lacks a federal alien registration document.
148. Plaintiff John Doe #5 lives in Hoover, Alabama, and has frequently performed day labor work in the nearly nine years since he arrived in the United States. He does not have work authorization from the U.S. government, but he works to sustain himself and to send money to cover basic living expenses for his parents, grandparents, and sister who live in Mexico.
149. While looking for work as a day laborer, John Doe #5 tries to make it obvious to people who are hiring that he is available for work. He may cross a street to approach a car whose driver has indicated they want to hire, and he has
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stood on sidewalks to seek work from people who drive by in their cars looking to hire day laborers.
150. If Section 11 and the remainder of HB 56 goes into effect, John Doe #5 is worried that he will be targeted and harassed, and he will be exposed to criminal liability for soliciting work in public and for working without federal work authorization. He worries that he may be detained and possibly deported and will no longer be able to support his family.
151. Plaintiff John Doe #6 lives in Hoover, Alabama, and works as a day laborer. He does not have work authorization from the U.S. government, but he works about four days per week.
152. As a day laborer, he cuts lawns, prunes trees, cleans gutters, and performs other landscaping tasks at the homes of the people who hire him. He waits on a corner and potential employers who drive by stop and pick him up if they need help with landscaping tasks at their homes. From this work, he sends money to Guatemala to help his wife and his 10-year-old son meet basic living expenses.
153. If HB 56 goes into effect, John Doe #6 fears that police will target him for trying to earn a living through day labor, and that he will be subject to arrest under Section 11.
Defendants
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154. Defendant Robert Bentley is the Governor of Alabama. Defendant Bentley exercises “[t]he supreme executive power of” Alabama, Ala. Const. art. V., § 113, and is constitutionally required to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” Ala. Const. art. V, § 120. As such, Defendant Bentley is responsible for the enforcement of HB 56 in the State of Alabama and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Bentley is sued in his official capacity.
155. Defendant Luther Strange is the Attorney General of Alabama. Defendant Strange is the chief law enforcement officer of the state, and has supervisory authority over every district attorney in Alabama. Ala. Code § 36-1514. The Alabama Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature may require the [A]ttorney [G]eneral to defend any or all suits brought against the state,” Ala. Const. art. V, § 137, and state statute requires that the Attorney General “shall appear in the courts . . . of the United States[] in any case in which the state may be interested in the result.” Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2). Defendant Strange is responsible for the enforcement of HB 56 in the State of Alabama and is an appropriate defendant in this case. Defendant Strange is sued in his official capacity.
156. Defendant Robert L. Broussard is the District Attorney for Madison County. In that capacity, Defendant Broussard is charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal provisions of HB 56 within Madison County. Defendant Broussard is sued in his official capacity.
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157. Defendant Freida Hill is Chancellor of Postsecondary Education. In that capacity, Defendant Hill is the Chief Executive Officer of the Postsecondary Education Department of the State Board of Education, and is responsible for directing all matters involving the junior colleges and trade schools pursuant to the policies of the State Board of Education. She is responsible for interpreting, executing, and enforcing the rules and regulations of the State Board of Education governing junior colleges and trade schools. Defendant Hill is authorized to take any and all actions to administer policies, rules and regulations of the State Board of Education in carrying out its responsibility for the management and operation of the junior colleges and trade schools. Ala. Code § 16-60-111.5. Accordingly, Defendant Hill has a key role in the implementing and enforcing the provisions of HB 56 related to postsecondary education. Defendant Hill is sued in her official capacity.
158. Defendant Larry E. Craven is the Interim State Superintendent of Education.1 In that capacity, Defendant Craven is the Chief School Officer in the State of Alabama, responsible for explaining the meaning and intent of laws relating to public schools; deciding all controversies and disputes involving the proper administration of the public school system; and reviewing actions and
1 Plaintiffs originally named State Superintendent Joseph B. Morton as a defendant in his official capacity. Superintendent Morton retired on August 31, 2011, and has been replaced by Interim Superintendent Craven.
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orders of county and city boards of education, county superintendents of education, and city superintendents of schools in matters seriously affecting the educational interest. See Ala. Code §§ 16-4-4, 16-4-8. Pursuant to these responsibilities, Defendant Craven has stated publicly that he is developing guidelines for local schools regarding how to enforce HB 56. Defendant Craven has a key role in implementing and enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendant Craven is sued in his official capacity.
159. Defendant E. Casey Wardynski is the Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System. Defendant Jamie Blair is the Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System. In these capacities, Defendant Wardynski and Blair are the chief executive officers for their respective city boards of education, and are responsible (a) for seeing that all laws relating to the schools and the rules and regulations of their city boards of education are carried into effect; (b) for explaining the true intent and meaning of school laws, of rules and regulations of their city boards of education, and of rules and regulations of the State Board of Education; and (c) for deciding all controversies and disputes involving the rules and regulations of their city boards of education and the proper administration of the public schools. Ala. Code § 16-12-3. They are responsible for enforcing school attendance laws. § 16-12-18. They are also responsible for preparing reports required by the State Board of Education. § 16-12-14. Pursuant
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to these responsibilities, Defendant Wardynski and Blair will be required to interpret the meaning of HB 56 and the meaning of any guidance received from the State Board of Education, and to see that HB 56 is carried into effect. They have a key role in enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendant Wardynski and Blair are sued in their official capacities.
160. Defendant Randy Fuller is the Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System. Defendant Charles D. Warren is the Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System. Defendant Barbara W. Thompson is the Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System. Defendant Jeffery E. Langham is the Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System. In these capacities, Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham are the chief executive officers of their respective county boards of education, and are responsible for seeing that the laws relating to the schools, the rules and regulations of the state and county boards of education are carried into effect. Ala. Code § 16-9-13. They are responsible for preparing rules and regulations governing the conditions under which children may be admitted to junior and senior high schools of the county. § 16-9-19. They are responsible for enforcing school attendance laws. § 16-9-30. They are also responsible for preparing reports to be forwarded to the State Board of Education. § 16-9-31. Pursuant to these responsibilities, Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham will be
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required to interpret the meaning of HB 56 and the meaning of any guidance received from the State Board of Education, and to see that HB 56 is carried into effect. They have a key role in enforcing the provisions of HB 56. Defendants Fuller, Warren, Thompson, and Langham are sued in their official capacities.
FACTS History and Purpose of HB 56 161. Governor Bentley signed HB 56 on June 9, 2011. The law is scheduled to take effect on September 1, 2011, except for Sections 22 and 23 (related to state law enforcement staffing and coordination) which went into effect immediately, and Sections 9 and 15 (related to employment verification) which will go into effect in 2012. 162. HB 56 was introduced in the State House of Representatives by Representative Micky Hammon. Senator Scott Beason introduced a similar omnibus immigration bill, Senate Bill 256, in the Senate. The final bill was a combination of these two measures. 163. In enacting HB 56, Alabama legislated in an area committed exclusively to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, by passing HB 56, Alabama expressly intended not only to intrude into an area of exclusive federal control, but to supplant the federal government in key respects. 164. A primary motivating factor in passing HB 56 was the Alabama
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legislature’s disagreement with federal immigration policy. 165. When Representative Hammon introduced HB 56, he explained that
“much of what is in this legislation” came from the report produced by the Joint Interim Patriotic Immigration Commission (“Commission”), on which he and Senator Beason served. The Commission was created in 2007 by the legislature to address the “unprecedented influx of non-English speaking immigrants.” S.J. Res. 22, Reg. Sess. 2007 (Ala. 2007). In 2008 the Commission issued its report to the legislature, concluding: “We recommend illegal immigrants be discouraged from coming to Alabama.” State of Ala., Commission Report (Feb. 13, 2008).
166. Alabama held elections in 2010, and during that election cycle Representative Hammon and Senator Beason campaigned on a “Handshake with Alabama” pledge which, among other things, would address “illegal immigration” because “[p]oliticians in Washington refuse to act, so we must bring the fight to the home front.” Mike Hubbard, Press Release: GOP Legislative Leaders Unveil 2010 “Republican Handshake with Alabama,” Aug. 16, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Handshake with Alabama”). The pledge promised to “push an illegal immigration bill similar to the recently approved Arizona law. The Alabama bill will create a new state criminal trespass statute that allows local law enforcement to arrest illegal immigrants for simply setting foot in Alabama. Another provision will make it a crime to provide an illegal immigrant transportation anywhere in
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Alabama, whether it is a trip across the state or simply to the corner store.” Id. 167. During the debates over HB 56, legislators stated that the intent of the
law was to deport undocumented immigrants and to deter them from living in Alabama. Representative Hammon explained: “This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life. They will not stay in Alabama . . . . [T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport themselves.” He also noted, “[W]e do want to affect every aspect of someone’s life and make it a little more difficult for them to live here.” In no uncertain terms, Representative Hammon stated: “[T]he intent of this bill is to slow illegal immigration in Alabama through attrition.” He emphasized: “We are going to deter illegal immigrants from the State of Alabama.”
168. HB 56 allows Alabama to take control of immigration enforcement where the federal government has not acted to its satisfaction. Representative Hammon remarked when he introduced the bill, “[I]t appears that the federal government has defaulted on their responsibility of enforcing federal immigration law. And they have forfeited that right to the States.” He continued: “[T]he federal process is not working. . . . They are ignoring the problem.” Hammon went on to explain that “it is the State’s responsibility to handle this issue and not the federal government.” Hammon further acknowledged that the bill’s “purpose is to put pressure on the federal government to solve the illegal immigration
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problem we have.”
169. Senator Beason concurred: “If the federal government would enforce
their laws that they have on the books, the states would not be required to begin to
do things to help enforce those laws.” Senator Jimmy Holley echoed this position:
“We have a—a challenge before us, and that is to take the unwillingness of the
federal government to protect our borders and individual states rising up to the
occasion of—of the belief that they have to do it themselves if it is going to get
done.” Senator Clay Scofield likewise remarked: “[T]he federal government is not
coming to our aid on this. It is going to come down to the states doing their part
and passing a good legislation such as this that will give the states the ability to—
enforce the—the federal law.” Representative Rich, who represents the Sand
Mountain area, was more emphatic:
Some people say, “Well, the federal government ought to take care of this. This is a federal government problem.” Well, the federal government should take care of this, but the federal government is not taking care of this. The federal government is derelict in their duty. And, the simple fact is, our house is on fire on Sand Mountain. Some people say, “Well, call the fire department. Let them come and put it out. Call the federal government, let them take care of this.” Well, what we have and what this bill provides here today, we have got a water hose and we have got a fire extinguisher and we have got neighbors standing by with buckets of water to help us put out the fire. If we wait for the fire department, or if we wait for the federal government, to come and put this fire out, our house is going to burn down.
170. After HB 56 passed the House on April 5, 2011, Representative
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Hammon explained by video, “Today we passed HB 56, which is our caucus’s immigration legislation that is a part of the Handshake with Alabama. . . . . This immigration bill is designed to deter illegal immigration in the state of Alabama. It is patterned after the Arizona law, but it also has an Alabama flavor. We have added every aspect of a person’s life.” When HB 56 was later adopted by the Legislature, Hammon again stated, “This is an Arizona bill with an Alabama twist.” Alabama Lawmakers Approve Arizona-Style Immigration Bill, Associated Press, June 5, 2011.
171. After signing HB 56 into law, the Governor of Alabama opined, “We have a real problem with illegal immigration in this country,” and lauded Alabama’s enactment of “the strongest immigration bill in the country.” Bob Johnson, Alabama Governor Signs Tough Illegal Immigration Law, Associated Press, June 9, 2011.
172. In short, the legislature enacted HB 56 as a comprehensive state solution to the perceived problem of the federal government’s failure to regulate immigration to Alabama’s liking as well as based on an attempt to drive immigrants, particularly Mexican and other Latino immigrants, out of the state.
Key Provisions of HB 56 173. The full text of HB 56 as enacted is appended to this Complaint as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein.
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Mandatory Investigation of Immigration Status by State and Local Law Enforcement (Sections 12 & 18-20)
174. HB 56 fundamentally changes the primary role and day-to-day operations of state, county, and municipal law enforcement officers in Alabama. Alabama law currently requires these officers “to give full time to the preservation of public order and the protection of life or property or the detection of crime in the state.” Ala. Code § 36-21-60(11). HB 56 undermines these state priorities by converting routine police encounters into prolonged detention solely for the purpose of investigating immigration status and implementing Alabama’s own immigration policies and rules.
175. Section 12 of HB 56 requires every state, county, and municipal law enforcement officer in Alabama to investigate the immigration status of any person the officer stops, arrests or detains, if the officer has “reasonable suspicion” to believe the person is unlawfully present in the United States. Sec. 12(a). Under Section 12, an officer may demand that any person subject to “any lawful stop, detention or arrest” produce one of six state-approved identity documents. Secs. 12(a), (d) (emphasis added). Only individuals who can produce a stateapproved document receive a presumption of lawful status. Sec. 12(d). Individuals who cannot produce such a document—which includes many persons who are U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted non-citizens—are subject to a lengthy and intrusive immigration verification process.
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176. Section 12 requires that an officer contact the federal government in the process of investigating immigration status.
177. The federal government does not respond to immigration status queries instantaneously. Federal authorities take over 80 minutes on average to respond to immigration status queries from state and local police under the best case scenarios—when they are given sufficient biographical information and they are readily able to locate the target in the immigration databases that they search. However, the databases searched for immigration status queries often will not contain any information whatsoever. For example, there is no centralized database of U.S. citizens. In these circumstances, the federal government will report that there is “no match” for the suspect, and will have to engage in a lengthy and manual file review by immigration officers. If a manual file review is required in response to an inquiry on an individual, this process can take over two days.
178. Section 12 will unreasonably prolong police encounters, such as traffic stops that would ordinary result in no action or a citation that would take only minutes absent HB 56’s mandates. Many citable traffic violations and other minor offenses, such as jaywalking or littering, are deemed criminal violations under Alabama law; under Section 12, officers are mandated to prolong such stops in order to investigate immigration status.
179. Immigration status queries mandated by HB 56 impose a substantial
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burden on federal authorities, who will be required to respond to an enormous increase in the number of immigration status inquiries and will have less ability to prioritize among their tasks according to federal regulations and policies.
180. Section 12 welcomes racial profiling. The law requires an officer to investigate immigration status where the officer has “reasonable suspicion” “that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States.” Sec. 12(a). But the law fails to enumerate any criteria for what “reasonable suspicion” of an individual’s unlawful status might be. That determination is left entirely to an officer’s discretion and increases the likelihood that an officer will engage in discrimination based on an individual’s appearance, language choice, or Englishlanguage ability.
181. Section 12 is designed to and will have the effect of requiring everyone in Alabama, particularly those who might be perceived as foreign, to carry identification papers reflecting their immigration status with them at all times to avoid unreasonably prolonged law enforcement encounters while their immigration status is being investigated.
182. Section 12 suffers from the same constitutional defects as provisions in the recent Arizona, Utah, Indiana, and Georgia immigration laws—all of which have been preliminarily enjoined or subjected to a temporary restraining order. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641
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F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011); Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 11-401, slip op. (D. Utah May 11, 2011); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 11-708, 2011 WL 2532935 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2011); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights (“GLAHR”) v. Deal, Case No. 11-1804, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011).
183. Similarly, Section 18 of HB 56 requires that state, local, and municipal law enforcement officers verify the citizenship or immigration status of those found to be driving without a valid driver’s license, and allows individuals to be detained for up to 48 hours solely to verify their immigration status, and longer to secure their transfer to federal authorities. Sec. 18(d).
184. Section 18 subjects anyone who lacks a current driver’s license during a routine encounter with the police—including U.S. citizens and those lawfully present in the United States—to prolonged detention for the purpose of an immigration status investigation.
185. Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 further require an officer to detain individuals solely on the basis of alleged unlawful presence in various contexts, even when there is no other basis for their continued detention.
186. Law enforcement officials across the country and in Alabama have stated that HB 56 cannot be implemented in a race-neutral fashion and will inevitably lead law enforcement officers to rely inappropriately on race, ethnicity,
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and English-language ability in making decisions about whom to subject to additional scrutiny with questions regarding their immigration status.
187. Implementation of HB 56 will have a significant negative impact on the ability of local law enforcement officers to protect immigrant communities and mixed-immigration status communities and families, i.e., those that include individuals with and without lawful status. Because immigrants will avoid the police out of fear that any interaction with law enforcement could lead to immigration status inquiries, Alabama law enforcement officers will not get the assistance they need to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes. For example, Plaintiff HICA provides substantial victim assistance and courtroom advocacy services to victims of crime, and the organization anticipates that HB 56 will substantially limit the willingness of victims to seek those services and protections. State-Specific Alien Registration Scheme (Section 10)
188. Section 10 of HB 56 enacts a state alien registration regime by creating a new state criminal offense of “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document.” Sec. 10. One element of the offense is that the person “is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a),” federal statutes that impose certain requirements that non-citizens register with the federal government and carry registration documents. Another element is that the person be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Under HB 56, violations of
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this new state crime are deemed a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $100 and up to 30 days of jail time. Sec. 10(f).
189. The purpose of the state registration provision is to allow the state to identify and imprison individuals it regards as “unlawfully present.”
190. This provision supplants federal alien registration laws (and the federal officers who administer and enforce those laws), federal removal procedures and priorities, and congressional judgments regarding the appropriate penalties for unlawful presence in the United States.
191. The provision criminalizes certain immigrants for “simply setting foot in Alabama.” Mike Hubbard, Handshake with Alabama, Aug. 16, 2010. A similar provision in Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 has been preliminary enjoined. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339. Postsecondary and K-12 Education Provisions (Sections 8 and 28)
192. HB 56 also contains provisions aimed at blocking children and young people from attending Alabama public schools, from kindergarten through colleges and universities.
193. Section 8 of HB 56 impermissibly discriminates among groups of lawfully residing non-citizens.
194. Section 8 restricts access to postsecondary education by excluding a host of lawfully present non-citizens from attending any public college or
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university in Alabama. It provides that only U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and individuals who hold a “nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.” can enroll in or attend an Alabama public postsecondary institution, such as a college or university.
195. Section 8 therefore excludes certain non-citizens whom the federal government has authorized to remain in the United States indefinitely, but who do not hold lawful permanent resident status or a “nonimmigrant visa”—including those whom the federal government has granted asylum, refugee status, Family Unity status, and Temporary Protected Status because of environmental disaster or armed conflict in their home countries, or deferred action.
196. People who are granted asylum or refugee status are authorized to reside in the United States indefinitely, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1158, and after residing in the United States for one year, they may adjust to lawful permanent resident status and eventually apply to become naturalized citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159. They are given this pathway to citizenship because they face persecution in their home countries. The conferral of asylum or refugee status does not make them LPRs, however, nor does it provide them with a nonimmigrant visa. As such, they would be ineligible to attend postsecondary school in the state of Alabama.
197. Section 28 of HB 56 blocks access to K-12 public education by requiring public schools to inquire into children’s and parents’ immigration status,
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and permits school officials to share their conclusions regarding immigration status with the federal government.
198. HB 56 is expressly designed to deter undocumented children and the U.S. citizen children of undocumented parents from attending public schools in Alabama. HB 56’s sponsor, Representative Micky Hammon, described the bill as motivated by the costs of “educat[ing] the children of illegal immigrants” (though he cited no data on such costs), and he predicted that HB 56 will result in “cost savings for this state.” David White, Alabama Legislative Panel Delays Voting on Illegal Immigration Bill, The Birmingham News, Mar. 3, 2011.2 Likewise, Senator Beason, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, stated that educating immigrant children “is where one of our largest costs come from . . . . It’s part of the cost factor. Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost?” Brian Lyman, Immigration Law Makes School Officials Uneasy, The Montgomery Advertiser, June 8, 2011.
199. Section 28(a) requires that “[e]very public elementary and secondary school . . . , at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States[.]” Sec. 28(a)(1). To make this determination, schools must
2 Available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/03/alabama_legislative_panel_dela.html.
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require that each child produce his or her birth certificate. Sec. 28(a)(2). 200. If “upon review of the student’s birth certificate it is determined that
the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if the child’s birth certificate is unavailable, the child’s parents must prove the child’s citizenship or immigration status within 30 days. Sec. 28(a)(3). Otherwise, the school “shall presume . . . that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Sec. 28(a)(5).
201. Section 28(e) further authorizes school officials to report both children and parents whom they presume to be “unlawfully present” to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Section 28 specifically authorizes school officials to disclose information that personally identifies a student to federal immigration authorities upon obtaining a waiver from the Attorney General, in violation of federal law including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. Section 28 also authorizes school officials to report to DHS every parent who is presumed to be “unlawfully present,” without limitation. Indeed, under HB 56, school officials, like other state or local officials, are forbidden to limit communications with federal and state immigration officials. Secs. 5(a), 6(a). Further, school officials are required, on pain of criminal liability, to report any failure to enforce HB 56 to its fullest extent or to communicate with federal officials about individuals they believe to be
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undocumented. Secs. 5(f), 6(f). State-Based Harboring-Related Immigration Crimes (Section 13)
202. In Section 13, HB 56 creates four new state law immigration crimes punishable by fines and/or imprisonment. The express intent of these provisions is to implement an Alabama state policy of “attrition through enforcement”—at odds with federal policy.
203. Section 13 criminalizes those who “[c]onceal, harbor or shield” an alien “from detection in any place in this state” if that alien “has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.” Sec. 13(a)(1). This section applies with equal force to an immigrant who entered the United States years ago and subsequently regularized her status as it does to an immigrant who currently lacks valid immigration status.
204. Section 13 makes it a crime to “[e]ncourage or induce an alien” without legal status “to come to or reside in this state.” Sec. 13(a)(2).
205. Section 13 makes it illegal to “[t]ransport” an alien if that alien who “has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.” Sec. 13(a)(3). This section applies with equal force to an immigrant who entered the United States years ago and subsequently regularized her status as it does to an immigrant who currently lacks valid immigration status.
206. Section 13 makes it a crime to “harbor an alien unlawfully present . . .
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by entering into a rental agreement.” Sec. 13(a)(4). 207. Section 25 makes a solicitation or conspiracy to violate any of HB
56’s criminal provisions a crime with the same penalty as the underlying violation. Thus both the actor and recipient of the conduct targeted by Section 13 are committing a state crime under HB 56.
208. Alabama enacted these provisions in Section 13 precisely to bypass the federal government’s definitions and prosecutorial and adjudicatory processes under the federal harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
209. Alabama intended (and achieved) an extraordinarily broad criminal prohibition in Section 13. For example, the transportation provision was specifically written to apply to “transportation anywhere in Alabama, whether it is a trip across the state or simply to the corner store.” Mike Hubbard, Handshake with Alabama, Aug. 16, 2010.
210. The new state immigration crimes created by Section 13 criminalize routine behavior undertaken on a daily basis by U.S. citizens and those with legal status in Alabama. Because of HB 56, Alabamians—including Plaintiffs Thau, Long, Jimmerson, Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, or Jane Doe #3—who give a lift to a neighbor, a client, or fellow congregant, who invite a family member to visit from out of state or rent out a room to a friend, or who marry someone despite knowing or in “reckless disregard” of the fact that the person could be considered
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“unlawfully present in the United States” within the meaning of HB 56, are subject to prosecution, fines, and incarceration.
211. Section 13 suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as a similar provision in Georgia’s HB 87, which has been preliminarily enjoined. GLAHR v. Deal, Case No. 1:11-1804, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011). State-Based Crimes for Solicitation and Performance of Work (Section 11)
212. Section 11(a) of HB 56 makes it unlawful for an “unauthorized alien” to “apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.”
213. Section 11(a)’s prohibition on work suffers from the same fatal flaw as an identical provision in Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 that has been preliminarily enjoined—it is preempted by federal employer regulations. See Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-02, aff’d, 641 F.3d at 357-360.
214. Section 11(a) also creates an absolute prohibition on work-related solicitation speech, and applies irrespective of the time, place, or manner in which the speech occurs. It applies even in traditional public fora, such as sidewalks and parks.
215. Furthermore, HB 56 fails to define what constitutes “work,” rendering the scope of the conduct and speech criminalized by Section 11(a) impermissibly vague in violation of the First Amendment. Unlike the terms “Contractor,”
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“Employee,” “Employer,” and “Employment,” which are all defined at Section 3, “work” is left undefined. On its face, therefore, Section 11(a) prohibits activities such as artists painting portraits in a park and students conducting a fundraiser— and even solicitation speech about those activities.
216. Section 11(f) makes it unlawful for “an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . to hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” This prohibition applies regardless of immigration status or work authorization.
217. Section 11(g) makes it unlawful for any person “to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street . . . in order to be hired by an occupant of the motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.” This prohibition, too, applies regardless of immigration status or work authorization.
218. Sections 11(f) and (g) criminalize work-related solicitation speech while leaving other types of speech unregulated. The prohibition is triggered only by communication about work that occurs in public rights of way between a potential employer and a potential employee. HB 56 thus singles out one contentspecific category of expression for criminal sanctions, while leaving other communication that occurs in the same time, place, and manner unregulated.
219. Day laborers and the contractors who hire them cannot find each other
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through conventional means of signaling availability. Rather, the only effective manner for day laborers to communicate their ability to work is by gathering in areas easily accessible to potential employers.
220. Many Alabamians, including Plaintiffs John Doe #5 and John Doe #6, have previously expressed their availability for employment to people in vehicles on the street, while peacefully standing on a public way. They wish to continue engaging in such expressive activity to communicate their availability to work. Indeed, for many, day labor is a critical means—and often the only available means—to obtain work. However, HB 56 now criminalizes the act of seeking day labor work. Contract Provision (Section 27)
221. With limited exceptions, Section 27 prohibits Alabama state courts from recognizing or enforcing contracts between an alien unlawfully present in the United States and any other party, provided that the other party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States, and provided that the contract “requires the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.” Sec. 27(a).
222. Section 27 effectively excludes undocumented immigrants—and
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parties who contract with them—from participating in a wide array of civil and commercial affairs. For example, Section 27 facially prohibits Alabama state courts from recognizing or enforcing: marriage contracts, settlement agreements (including divorce and custody agreements), waiver and release agreements, plea agreements, mortgage agreements, insurance contracts, contracts for wages (including minimum wages and overtime wages required by federal law), confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, contracts for the provision of childcare, contracts for lodging (for more than one night), arbitration agreements, contracts for transportation (other than transportation intended to facilitate an immigrant’s return to his or her country of origin), warranty agreements, contracts for the purchase of medicine, contracts for the provision of utilities, loan agreements and promissory notes, and all other manner of contracts relating to the conduct of commerce. Both undocumented immigrants and the parties with whom they contract would be free to breach these and various other types of contracts with impunity.
223. Section 27 excludes only an extremely narrow range of contracts from its scope: “a contract for lodging for one night, a contract for the purchase of food to be consumed by the alien, a contract for medical services, or a contract for transportation of the alien that is intended to facilitate the alien’s return to his or her country of origin.” Sec. 27(b).
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224. Section 27 is not limited to contracts entered into after the effective date of HB 56. Section 27 also nullifies the enforcement of contracts entered into before HB 56’s enactment or effective date.
225. The effect of Section 27 will be to discourage parties from conducting any business with individuals whom they assume or suspect are “illegal immigrants.” Transaction Provision (Section 30)
226. Section 30 makes it a felony for an “unlawfully present alien” to enter or attempt to enter any “transaction” with the state or local government agency. Sec. 30(b). Section 30 also prohibits a third party from entering or attempting to enter into a transaction on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States. Id.
227. The term “transaction” is not defined in HB 56. Section 30 does provide examples of prohibited transactions or attempted transactions—applying for or renewing a motor vehicle license plate, driver’s license, nondriver identification card, or business license—but this list is expressly made nonexclusive.
228. By criminalizing “any transaction [or attempted transaction] between a person and the state or a political subdivision,” Section 30 reaches conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, the due process clause, and other constitutional
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provisions, such as accessing or using the courts, public hospitals, public highways, or other public accommodations or services in circumstances that require “transactions.” It also reaches such basic, everyday conduct as applying for a public library card, paying municipal property taxes, applying and paying for water, sewer, and garbage service, paying for a parking permit on a municipal street, or applying for a fishing license. Indeed, these problems were realized earlier this month. On September 1, 2011, the Montgomery Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board (“MWWSSB”) started requiring any new applicants for water or sewer services to prove their immigration status before services would be connected, and this policy continued until MWWSSB was informed that HB 56 had been temporarily enjoined, at which point they agreed to rescind the policy pending a ruling from this Court. The Allgood, Alabama Water Works company has also posted a sign in its office stating that “to be compliant with new laws concerning immigration, [water customers] must have an Alabama driver’s license or an Alabama picture ID card on file at this office before September 29, 2011, or you may lose water service.”
229. Under Section 30, any person entering or attempting to enter into a transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state shall be required to demonstrate his or her U.S. citizenship or, if he or she is an alien, his or her lawful presence in the United States. An alien’s lawful presence shall be demonstrated by
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the state’s/political subdivision’s verification of the alien’s lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) program operated by DHS, or by other verification with DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
230. Neither the federal SAVE system nor any federal system for status inquiries under § 1373(c) were intended by the federal government to serve such a purpose and they are not designed to do so.
231. Section 30 is a strict liability statute—i.e., there is no mens rea requirement. Thus, for example, an individual who does not know that she is “unlawfully present” in the United States within the meaning of HB 56 at the time she applies to have her car’s license plate renewed is guilty of a felony. Moreover, if her parent or child submits the application on her behalf, that person also would be guilty of a felony, even if that family member did not know that the applicant was not “lawfully present.” Limitations on Ability to Present Criminal Defense (Sections 10, 11, & 13)
232. As described above, Sections 10, 11, and 13 create crimes for which immigration status is a central element. See supra ¶¶ 188-191 (Sec. 10); 212-220 (Sec. 11); 202-211 (Sec. 13).
233. Sections 10(e) and 13(h) provide that “[a] verification of an alien’s immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) shall constitute proof of that alien’s status.” Secs. 10(e), 13(h). HB 56
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prohibits state courts from considering any evidence regarding whether an individual is “lawfully present” other than the federal government’s verification. Id. (“A court of this state shall consider only the federal government’s verification in determining whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”) (emphasis added).
234. Section 11(e) creates an identical mandatory scheme to prove that a person lacks work authorization. Sec. 11(e) (“A verification of an alien’s immigration status received from the federal government . . . shall constitute proof of the alien’s status. A court of this state shall consider only the federal government’s verification in determining whether a person is an unauthorized alien.”) (emphasis added). General Interpretive Provisions (Sections 5, 6, and 25)
Section 5 235. Section 5 tasks all state and local agencies and officials with the enforcement of federal immigration law and HB 56, under threat of personal civil liability, steep monetary penalties, and the loss of state funding. 236. Section 5 states that “[n]o official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including . . . an officer of a court . . . , may adopt a policy or practice that limits . . . communication between its officers and federal immigration officials in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644.” Sec. 5(a).
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Section 5 also requires all such officials to “fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of federal law prohibiting the entry into, presence, or residence in the United States of aliens in violation of federal immigration law.” Sec. 5(b).
237. Section 5 creates a private cause of action for any U.S. citizen or “lawfully present” immigrant to sue any official who either “adopts or implements a policy or practice that is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or . . . § 1644.” Sec. 5(d). Officials found guilty of such violations face monetary fines of no less than $1,000 per day, and up to $5,000 per day. Sec. 5(d).
238. Section 5 directs the state Attorney General to “report any violation of [either subsection] . . . to the Governor and the state Comptroller.” Upon such action by the state Attorney General, “that agency or political subdivision shall not be eligible to receive any funds, grants, or appropriations from the State of Alabama until such violation has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified.” Sec. 5(a).
239. Section 5 also provides that “[e]very person working for the State of Alabama or a political subdivision thereof . . . ha[s] a duty to report violations of this act.” § 5(f). Failure to report a violation amounts to “obstructing governmental operations” as defined in Alabama Code § 13A-10-2, which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 1 year, and fines up to $6,000. See Ala.
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Code §§ 13A-5-7, 13A-5-12. Section 6 240. Section 6 prohibits any agency of the state or any political subdivision
thereof from adopting a policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of HB 56. Sec. 6(a).
241. If the Attorney General determines that any agency violates Section 6(a), the Attorney General must report this to the Governor and Comptroller, and the agency will no longer be eligible to receive any state funding. Id.
242. Section 6 also requires all state officials, agencies, and personnel to fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of HB 56. Sec. 6(b).
243. Under Alabama state law, sheriffs are state officers and thus bound by Section 6(b).
244. Section 6 creates a private right of action for private citizens to enforce the provisions of Section 6. Sec. 6(d).
245. Section 6 creates a new state crime for any person working for the State of Alabama, or any political subdivision thereof, from failing to report a violation of Section 6 or HB 56. Sec. 6(f).
246. Together, Sections 5 and 6 operate to ensure that Alabama officials and agencies maximally enforce each of the provisions of HB 56, and the
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provisions of federal immigration law as interpreted by the state Attorney General. Section 25 247. Section 25 imposes penalties for solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy to
violate any criminal provision of HB 56. Thus under Section 25, individuals who are “harbored,” “transported,” “induced,” or allowed to rent are criminally liable along with the individuals whose conduct is directly prohibited under Section 13, on the theory that they have conspired or solicited such activity.
Comprehensive Federal Immigration System 248. The federal government has exclusive power over immigration matters. The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government the power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government’s power to control immigration is inherent in the nation’s sovereignty. 249. Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws, agencies, and procedures regulating immigration. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 250. The extensive statutory scheme created by the INA leaves no room for supplemental state immigration laws. 251. In addition, the federal government has issued numerous regulations,
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policies, and procedures interpreting the provisions of the INA and has established large and complex administrative apparatuses to carry out their mandates.
252. The INA carefully calibrates the nature—criminal or civil—and the degree of penalties applicable to each possible violation of its terms.
253. The INA contains complex and exclusive procedures for determining an individual’s immigration and citizenship status, deciding whether the civil provisions of the immigration laws have been violated, and determining whether an individual may lawfully be removed from the United States.
254. Under the INA, a non-citizen’s immigration status may be fluid and subject to change over time. A non-citizen who enters the United States with authorization, for example with a student visa, may remain in the country past the period of authorized stay and thus no longer be in status. (Alternatively, the same person is eligible to change into a different visa classification, then he or she may overstay the original period of the visa and remain in status.) Conversely, a noncitizen who enters the United States without authorization, for example by crossing into the country by foot while evading border authorities, may subsequently gain lawful status, such as through a successful asylum application or U visa application.
255. The fluidity of immigration status is a fundamental feature of federal immigration law. It is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the system of
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immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed and accommodates many important national interests including, for example, the nation’s humanitarian and international law obligations regarding asylum seekers and people fleeing torture.
256. HB 56 presumes that immigration status is definite, not subject to nuance, and readily and quickly ascertained. But those presumptions are not accurate.
257. Under federal law, there is no single, readily ascertainable category or characteristic that establishes whether a particular person may or may not remain in the United States. The answer to that question is a legal conclusion that can only be reached through the processes set forth in the INA, and which may depend on the discretionary determinations of federal officials.
258. There are many non-citizens who are present in the United States without formal immigration status who would not be removed if placed in federal removal proceedings, or who actually have temporary permission from the federal government to be in the United States. For example, an individual without federal immigration status may be eligible for a form of immigration relief, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or withholding of removal. Some of these individuals are known to the federal government, often because they have applied for immigration relief; others will not be identified until they are actually placed in proceedings by the federal government and their cases are adjudicated.
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259. In addition, some individuals like those granted Temporary Protected Status due to turmoil or natural disasters in their native countries have permission to be in the United States, but are unlikely to have one of the enumerated qualifying identity documents under HB 56.
260. The fact that some persons have permission to remain in the United States without having a formal immigration status, or despite being technically removable, is also a fundamental feature of federal immigration law and the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed. This system accommodates many important national interests including, for example, Congress’s desire to allow certain individuals to obtain relief from removal, and statutory limits on the detention of individuals ordered removed, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
261. Federal agencies do not and cannot determine definitively, in response to a demand from a state or local official, whether an individual is subject to removal. It is impossible to make a determination of whether an individual is lawfully in the United States based upon a search of the federal databases that are checked for an immigration status query. Such determinations involve complex questions of fact and law and are made through a federal administrative and judicial process that may take years.
262. Moreover, the federal government has established certain priorities
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that determine where resources for immigration enforcement are focused. For example, the federal government prioritizes the apprehension and removal of the most dangerous aliens. The federal Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), which is responsible for responding to immigration status queries from law enforcement agencies, has experienced continuous and dramatic increases in immigration status determination queries over the past four years. The verification process at the LESC is time-intensive and can take between 80 minutes and two days. Following congressional guidance, the LESC has prioritized its efforts to focus on those aliens most likely to pose a threat to their communities.
263. In addition, the federal government often exercises its prosecutorial discretion to prioritize certain cases for action over others. The federal government’s decision to exercise such discretion may be based upon a wide range of equitable factors, and its exercise in any given case cannot be predicted in advance.
264. As a result, the question whether any given non-citizen may remain in the United States depends upon a host of complicated and time-consuming legal and discretionary determinations by a variety of federal officials. It cannot be conclusively determined by a status verification query to the federal government. Inquiries made by law enforcement officers to the LESC or by state agencies to the federal SAVE database yield, at best, a snapshot of what a federal agency believes
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to be an individual’s current immigration status or eligibility for benefits, respectively, which may not correspond to the ultimate finding of whether she is subject to removal. See Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up Review of the Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration at 41 (2004)3 (noting that, according to DHS officials, DHS’s immigration “databases cannot be relied upon to accurately determine immigration status [at any given time] because immigration status is dynamic[,]” and database entries may be outdated).
265. Thus, not all inquiries to the federal government regarding immigration status yield a clear response. See David C. Palmatier Decl. (attached as Ex. A to Exhibit 42 to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj.) (Doc. 37-42 at *6-*15).
266. Whether a person is a citizen of the United States is not easily ascertained in the contexts demanded by HB 56. U.S. citizens are not required to carry documentary proof of their citizenship. There is no national database that contains information about every U.S. citizen. Some people are actually unaware of their U.S. citizenship because they may have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth by operation of law due to their parents’ citizenship, despite not being born in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1433. Others automatically obtain citizenship when their parents become naturalized U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431.
267. Moreover, HB 56 conflicts with and is preempted by provisions of the
3 Available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0501/final.pdf.
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INA that set forth comprehensive federal schemes addressing: (1) alien registration; (2) transportation and harboring; (3) work authorization and sanctions for unauthorized work; and (4) arrest authority for immigration violations. Federal registration system
268. The INA includes a national alien registration system that displaces and preempts state alien registration laws.
269. The federal registration scheme has been in place since 1940 and was designed to create a single, uniform, national scheme.
270. The preemptive effect of the federal alien registration scheme was expressly recognized by the President of the United States when the scheme was created and has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
271. The federal regulation implementing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304, and 1306 prescribes as “evidence of registration” specific forms for compliance. See 8 C.F.R. § 264.1. The list, however, has not been updated to include some of the current federal forms that are commonly used. For example, there is no corresponding registration form available for recipients of U visas (given to victims of crime who assist in the prosecution of the case) or T visas (given to victims of human trafficking). As a result, there are categories of non-citizens who have applied for immigration benefits or whose presence in the United States is otherwise known to federal immigration agencies but who do not have registration
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documents that are valid under the regulations. 272. Many of the changes that have been made to the INA since the
enactment of the registration provisions reflect Congress’s decision to focus on and prioritize immigration enforcement against those immigrants who commit serious criminal offenses. Targeting immigrants convicted of serious crimes, rather than those who may be in violation of the registration provisions, is the principal priority of federal immigration officers. Federal transportation provision
273. The INA also establishes criminal penalties for the transporting and harboring of certain non-citizens. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)-(2). Violations of these provisions carry fines and prison terms ranging from five years to life. Id.
274. The federal courts are engaged in an ongoing process of interpreting the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) and determining the reach of the federal prohibitions therein.
275. Section 13 of HB 56 will not be interpreted consistently with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) because there are numerous and material differences between the state and federal statutes. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) does not criminalize renting, but Section 13 does. Section 1324(a)(1)(C) contains First Amendment protections regarding certain religious workers, but Section 13 does not. And § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) outlaws inducing certain aliens to enter the United States, but
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Section 13 concerns inducing persons to enter Alabama. Federal employment authorization and sanctions system
276. The INA contains a comprehensive scheme to regulate the employment of aliens that reflects a careful balance between multiple objectives, including the desire to reduce unauthorized employment, to protect workers against discrimination, and to impose manageable standards on employers and workers.
277. Congress chose to regulate alien employment in the INA by focusing on employers. Employers are required to verify the employment authorization of applicants on Form I-9, and employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers are subject to civil penalties or criminal penalties if the violation is sufficiently severe. Federal law does not impose fines or criminal penalties on unauthorized workers simply for working without authorization.
278. Alabama’s decision to criminalize unauthorized employment despite Congress’s choice of other means to address such conduct directly conflicts with federal law. Federal restrictions on arrest authority
279. Mere presence inside the United States without federal immigration status is not a criminal offense. Rather, it is a civil violation under federal immigration law.
280. State and local law enforcement officers have no general authority to
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enforce federal civil immigration law. Federal law specifically authorizes state officers to assist in immigration enforcement only in narrowly defined circumstances; otherwise, it reserves immigration enforcement authority to the federal government.
281. Section 1357(g) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code allows the federal government to “enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision” to carry out “function[s] of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). These agreements are commonly referred to as “287(g) agreements” after the section of the INA in which they are codified. Such agreements, however, may be entered into only if the federal government determines the state officers are “qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer,” id., and the federal government must train and supervise each officer who is authorized under such an agreement.
282. Currently, only one county in Alabama—the Etowah County Sheriff’s Office—and the state Department of Public Safety have agreements with the federal government pursuant to this statutory provision. See U.S. ICE, Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act.4
4 Available at http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm.
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283. The other provisions in federal law authorizing state or local participation in immigration enforcement are also carefully constrained. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(10), 1324(c), 1252c.
284. Congress’s intent that state and local officers are generally prohibited from enforcing civil immigration laws is clear both from the statutory scheme and from legislative history. The Federal Government’s Interests in a Uniform Immigration System and Conducting Foreign Relations
285. The federal government has a core, constitutionally-protected interest in setting a uniform federal immigration scheme, and in conducting foreign relations with other nations. State immigration laws interfere with these core interests.
286. The President of the United States criticized a similar law enacted by the State of Georgia on this basis on April 26, 2011, stating: “It is a mistake for states to try to do this piecemeal. We can’t have 50 different immigration laws around the country. Arizona tried this and a federal court already struck them down.” See Matthew Bigg, Obama Criticizes New Georgia Immigration Law, Reuters, Apr. 26, 2011.
287. Janet Napolitano, the former governor of Arizona and current U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, publicly opposed a similar law enacted by the State of Arizona, saying: “The Arizona immigration law will likely hinder federal
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law enforcement from carrying out its priorities of detaining and removing dangerous criminal aliens.” Divisive Arizona Immigration Bill Signed Into Law, CBS/AP, Apr. 23, 2010.5
288. As the U.S. Department of Justice has argued in its own legal challenge to HB 56, state attempts to supplement the federal immigration scheme with a patchwork of state immigration laws “would result in further and significant damage to . . . U.S. foreign relations” and will jeopardize the treatment of “American nationals who are unlawfully present in other countries.” Compl. ¶¶ 36-37, United States v. Alabama, Case No. 11 -02746 (N.D. Ala., filed Aug. 1, 2011). See also Compl. ¶ 4, United States v. Arizona, Case No. 10-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 6, 2010) (explaining SB 1070, on which HB 56 was based, would “interfere with vital foreign policy and national security interests by disrupting the United States’ relationship with Mexico and other countries.”).
289. Local law enforcement agencies, school districts, and other government agencies across Alabama’s sixty-seven counties inevitably will interpret HB 56’s vague and expansive provisions differently, leading to a patchwork of enforcement even within Alabama. This cacophony of enforcement poses a serious threat to the federal government’s ability to regulate immigration.
290. Because the United States’ immigration policy is inextricably
5 Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/23/politics/ main6426125.shtml.
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intertwined with foreign relations, Alabama’s attempt to regulate immigration through HB 56 will adversely impact the United States’ ability to conduct foreign relations with other countries. HB 56 will undermine the ability of the U.S. government to speak with a single voice about immigration, including communicating to foreign nations what their nationals can expect when they come to visit or reside in the United States. State attempts to interfere with these inherently federal issues can have severe impacts on foreign relations.
291. HB 56 has already impaired the United States’ foreign relations by upsetting a key ally. On the day Governor Bentley signed HB 56 into law, the Mexican government expressed concern that the law will threaten the “human and civil rights of Mexicans who live in or visit Alabama,” and that it is “[in]consistent with the vision of shared responsibility, mutual respect and trust under which the governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed to conduct their bilateral relations.” Mexican Foreign Affairs Ministry, The Mexican Government Regrets the Enactment of HB 56 in Alabama (June 9, 2011).6
292. Alabama’s enactment of HB 56 also undercuts the United States’ stated commitment to its treaty obligations and international human rights law. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”)—part of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member—has
6 Available at http://www.sre.gob.mx/csocial/contenido/comunicados/2011/jun/cp_200a.html.
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announced that it is “troubled by Alabama’s HB 56” and that it “strongly urges the United States authorities to use the legal mechanisms that are available to amend these laws and adapt them to international human rights standards for the protection of immigrants.” IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern over Immigration Law in U.S. State of Alabama (June 24, 2011).7
293. HB 56 also interferes with U.S. foreign relations by calling into question the federal government’s ability to ensure compliance with our country’s treaty obligations. In particular, the United States has signed and ratified two international treaties that prohibit racial profiling: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), art. 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173. Those treaties, ratified by the United States, require the U.S. government to combat racial profiling. By encouraging and authorizing racial profiling, and in light of formal statements of concern by foreign governments (see next paragraph), HB 56 interferes with the United States’ compliance with its treaty obligations and subjects the United States to international censure.
294. In response to HB 56 and similar state anti-immigrant laws such as Arizona SB 1070 and Georgia’s HB 87, numerous foreign governments have
7 Available at http:// www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/63-11eng.htm.
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expressed concern that such laws will cause widespread violations of the United States’ treaty obligations, which would harm their nationals living in or visiting the United States. See, e.g., Br. of United Mexican States as Amicus Curie in Supp. of Pls., at 1-2 (Doc. 95); Br. of United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls., Friendly House v. Whiting. at 1, Case No. 10-01061, Doc. No. 299 (D. Ariz. filed July 8, 2010); Mot. of the Gov’ts of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru for Leave to Join Br. of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls. at 3, GLAHR v. Deal, Case No. 11-1804, Doc. No. 54 (N.D. Ga. filed June 15, 2011). These governments have also explained that state immigration laws, if implemented, would negatively impact foreign relations by undermining public opinion in their home countries and by making it impossible for their countries to engage on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis with the United States on important issues such as immigration and trade.
CLASS ACTION 295. The Individual Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). The class, as proposed by Plaintiffs, consists of all persons:
a. who are or will be subject to detention, arrest, or interrogation about their citizenship or immigration status pursuant to the provisions of HB 56; or
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b. who are or will be subject to unlawful detention pursuant to the provisions of HB 56; or
c. who are or will be deterred from living, associating, or traveling with immigrants in Alabama because of the provisions of HB 56; or
d. who are or will be excluded from state colleges or universities because of the provisions of HB 56; or
e. who are or will be deterred from enrolling their children in public elementary or secondary school because of the provisions of HB 56; or
f. who are or will be deterred from securing governmental services or governmental licenses or contracting with governmental agencies because of the provisions of HB 56; or
g. who are or will be chilled from soliciting or speaking about work because of the provisions of HB 56; or
h. who are or will be chilled from petitioning the government because of the provisions of HB 56; or
i. who are or will be impaired from enforcing the rights guaranteed to them by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because of the provisions of HB 56; or
j. who as a result of the criminal sections of HB 56 will be charged with a crime and will be impaired from receiving a fair criminal trial on the central element of immigration status because (i) the defendant will
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not be able to confront witnesses against him or her on the element of immigration status; and (ii) the defendant will not be able to introduce evidence in support of himself or herself on the element of immigration status.
296. The requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) are met here, in that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
297. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class, including: (1) whether HB 56 is preempted by the U.S. Constitution and federal law; (2) whether HB 56 violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (3) whether HB 56 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (4) whether HB 56 violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (5) whether HB 56 violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (6) whether HB 56 violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (7) whether HB 56 violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (8) whether HB 56 violates rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. These questions predominate over any questions affecting only the Individual Plaintiffs.
298. The claims of the Individual Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the proposed class.
299. All of the Individual Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the
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interests of all members of the proposed class because they seek relief on behalf of the class as a whole and have no interests antagonistic to other members of the class. The Individual Plaintiffs are also represented by pro bono counsel, including the ACLU Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project and Racial Justice Program, the National Immigration Law Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU of Alabama Foundation, the Asian Law Caucus, the Asian American Justice Center, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and G. Brian Spears, who collectively have extensive expertise in class action litigation, including litigation regarding the rights of immigrants and constitutional law. Finally, Defendants will act on grounds generally applicable to the class in executing their duties to enforce HB 56, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 300. An actual and substantial controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants as to their respective legal rights and duties. Plaintiffs contend that they face an imminent threat of harm if HB 56 is enforced, and that this law violates the U.S. Constitution and federal law. Defendants are obligated to enforce this law unless it is found to be illegal. 301. In violating Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. Constitution and federal
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law. Defendants will be acting under color of law. 302. If allowed to go into effect, HB 56 will cause irreparable injury to
Plaintiffs. 303. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law against
HB 56 other than the relief requested in this Complaint. 304. In doing the things alleged in this Complaint, Defendants will deny
Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal law. 305. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 will constitute an official policy of
the state of Alabama. 306. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that HB 56 is unconstitutional
on its face and to an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining its enforcement.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT ONE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE ENTIRETY OF HB 56 307. Count One is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Plaintiffs. It is brought with respect to the entirety of HB 56. 308. Count One is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Jimmerson, Upton, Cummings and
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Jane Doe #6. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, and 30 of HB 56.
309. Count One is brought against Defendant Hill by all organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Haile, Tesfamariam, John Doe #3 and John Doe #4. It is brought with respect to Section 8 and the related enforcement and implementation provisions of HB 56.
310. Count One is brought against Defendant Craven by all organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #4, Jane Doe #5, Jane Doe #6, John Doe #1 and John Doe #2. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
311. Count One is brought against Defendant Wardynski by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
312. Count One is brought against Defendant Blair by Plaintiff Jane Doe #2. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
313. Count One is brought against Defendant Fuller by Plaintiffs John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #4. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
314. Count One is brought against Defendant Warren by Plaintiff John Doe #2. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
315. Count One is brought against Defendant Thompson by Plaintiff Jane Doe #3. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
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316. Count One is brought against Defendant Langham by Plaintiff Jane Doe #5. It is brought with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 28 of HB 56.
317. Paragraphs 1-306 are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
318. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 319. HB 56 is void in its entirety because it is a regulation of immigration, and therefore usurps powers constitutionally vested in the federal government exclusively. 320. HB 56, and particularly Sections 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, and 30, also conflicts with federal laws, regulations and policies, attempts to legislate in fields occupied by the federal government, imposes burdens and penalties on legal residents not authorized by and contrary to federal law, and unilaterally imposes burdens on the federal government’s resources and processes, each in violation of the Supremacy Clause. 321. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution, as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of
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state law, and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. COUNT TWO
FOURTH AMENDMENT HB 56 §§ 12, 18-20
322. Count Two is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Zamora, Jane Does ##1-2, Jane Does ##4-6, and John Does ##1-4.
323. Count Two is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6.
324. Paragraphs 5-54, 61-64, 100-110, and 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173-186 and 235-246 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 279-284 (Comprehensive Federal Immigration System); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
325. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees are applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
326. Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 of HB 56 require officers to seize, detain, arrest, and hold individuals without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe a person has engaged in criminal activity in violation of the Fourth
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Amendment. 327. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of
the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT THREE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
HB 56 § 10 328. Count Three is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Jane Does ##1-2, Jane Does ##4-6 and by John Does ##1-4. 329. Count Three is brought against Defendant Broussard by Plaintiffs by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6. 330. Paragraphs 5-54, 100-110, and 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 188-191 and 235-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 331. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 332. Section 10 of HB 56 impermissibly discriminates against non-citizens
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on the basis of alienage and against various classes of non-citizens on the basis of immigration status and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
333. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT FOUR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
HB 56 § 8 334. Count Four is brought against Defendants Bentley, Strange and Hill by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Haile, Tesfamariam, and John Does ##3-4. 335. Paragraphs 5-54, 98, 99, and 140-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 192-196 and 235-246 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 336. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 337. Section 8 of HB 56 impermissibly discriminates against non-citizens on the basis of alienage and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws
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within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by excluding certain categories of aliens from enrolling in or attending public postsecondary institutions.
338. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT FIVE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
HB 56 § 28 339. Count Five is brought against Defendants Bentley, Strange and Craven by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Jane Does ##1-6, and by John Does ##1-2. 340. Count Five is brought against Defendant Wardynski by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6. 341. Count Five is brought against Defendant Blair by Plaintiff Jane Doe #2. 342. Count Five is brought against Defendant Fuller by Plaintiffs John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #4. 343. Count Five is brought against Defendant Warren by Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #2. 344. Count Five is brought against Defendant Thompson by Plaintiff Jane
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Doe #3. 345. Count Five is brought against Defendant Langham by Plaintiff Jane
Doe #5. 346. Paragraphs 5-54, 100-139 (Plaintiffs); 154, 155, and 158-159
(Defendants); 173-186, 197-201 and 235-246 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
347. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
348. Section 28 of HB 56 impermissibly discriminates against certain classifications of U.S. citizens, and certain classifications of non-citizens, on the basis of alienage and national origin, and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
349. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT SIX FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS (PROCEDURAL)
HB 56 §§ 12, 18-20
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350. Count Six is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Zamora, Jane Does ##1-2, Jane Does ##4-6, and John Does ##1-4.
351. Count Six is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6.
352. Paragraphs 5-54, 61-64, 100-110, and 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173-186 and 235-246 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 279-284 (Comprehensive Federal Immigration System); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
353. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
354. Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 of HB 56 permit Alabama state and local law enforcement officers to deprive persons of their liberty interests without due process of law by subjecting Plaintiffs and putative class members to prolonged detention without any process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
355. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of
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the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT SEVEN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS (VAGUENESS)
HB 56 §§ 10, 11, 12, 13, 30 356. Count Seven is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Plaintiffs except Plaintiffs Haile and Tesfamariam. 357. Count Seven is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Jimmerson, Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6. 358. Paragraphs 5-97, and 100-153 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173-186, 188-191, 202-231, and 235-246 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 359. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 360. Sections 10, 12, 13, and 30 base criminal liability on the undefined and vague term of “unlawfully present,” a concept that has no single definition under federal law, but rather is defined only for quite specific purposes that are
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distinct from these provisions of HB 56. 361. Section 3 of HB 56 states that a person can be considered “unlawfully
present” “only if the person's unlawful immigration status has been verified by the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c),” yet Sections 13 and 30 are criminalizing behavior by private parties who are not legally authorized to make a verification request pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), and who for this reason, and because immigration status is otherwise a complex legal determination not readily understood by laypersons, cannot have notice at the time they are required to conform their conduct to the law as to whether a person is “unlawfully present” within the meaning of HB 56.
362. Section 12 further qualifies the term “unlawfully present” by adding the modifier “reasonable suspicion,” which further confuses the meaning of this provision.
363. Section 30 utilizes the term “business transaction,” which is undefined.
364. Section 11 utilizes the term “work,” which is undefined. 365. Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 27, and 30 of HB 56 violate the Due Process Clause because these criminal provisions are impermissibly vague and overbroad. 366. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42
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U.S.C. § 1983. COUNT EIGHT
FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH CLAUSE HB 56 § 11
367. Count Eight is brought by the Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Romero, Jane Does ##4-5, and John Does ##5-6.
368. Count Eight is brought against Defendants Bentley, Strange, and Broussard.
369. Count Eight is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Romero, Jane Does ##4-6, and John Does ##5-6.
370. Count Eight is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiff Jane Doe #6.
371. Paragraphs 5-54, 71-72, 115-126, and 148-153 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 212-220 and 235-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
372. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” The First Amendment’s guarantees are
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applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 373. Sections 11(a), (f), and (g) of HB 56 violate the First Amendment
right to free speech because it is a content-based restriction on speech relating to work and is impermissibly vague.
374. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT NINE FIRST AMENDMENT PETITION CLAUSE
HB 56 §§ 5, 6, 27, 30 375. Count Nine is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Does ##1-2, Jane Does ##4-6, and John Does ##1-4. 376. Count Nine is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6. 377. Paragraphs 5-54, 81-97, 100-110, and 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 221-231 and 235-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 378. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
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“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The First Amendment’s guarantees are applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
379. Section 27 of HB 56 violates the Petition Clause of the First Amendment by depriving Plaintiffs and putative class members the right to petition the government through court actions for redress of contract disputes.
380. Section 30 of HB 56 violates the Petition Clause of the First Amendment by depriving Plaintiffs and putative class members the right to petition the government through any business transaction.
381. Sections 5 and 6 of HB 56 violate the Petition Clause of the First Amendment by depriving Plaintiffs and putative class members the right to petition the government by mandating state officials, including officers of the court, to fully enforce federal immigration laws and HB 56.
382. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT TEN CONTRACTS CLAUSE
HB 56 §§ 27, 30 383. Count Ten is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all
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Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Does ##1-2, Jane Does ##4-6, and by John Does ##1-4.
384. Count Ten is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6.
385. Paragraphs 5-54, 81-97, 100-110, 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 221-231 and 235-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
386. The Contracts Clause, Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, provides, in pertinent part, that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
387. Section 27 of HB 56 unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contracts by forbidding courts of the State of Alabama from enforcing “the terms, or otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and alien unlawfully present in the United States, within the meaning of HB 56, if the party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States at the time the contract was entered into, and the performance of the contract required the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not
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reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.” 388. Section 30 of HB 56 unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of
contracts by criminalizing the act of “enter[ing] into or attempt[ing] to enter into a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state . . . .”
389. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT ELEVEN 42 U.S.C. § 1981 HB 56 §§ 27, 30 390. Count Eleven is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Does ##1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and John Does ##1-4. 391. Count One is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6. 392. Paragraphs 5-54, 81-97, 100-110, and 115-147 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 221-231 and 235-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 393. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Codes provides, in
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pertinent part:
(a) Statement of equal rights All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. (b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
394. Sections 27 and 30 of HB 56 deprives Plaintiffs and putative class
members classified by Alabama officers and officials as “alien[s] unlawfully
present in the United States” of the rights enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
395. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of
the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
COUNT TWELVE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
HB 56 §§ 10, 11, 13
396. Count Twelve is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by
all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Webster, Long, Romero Thau,
Jimmerson, Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Does ##1-6, and John Does
##1-6.
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397. Count Twelve is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Jimmerson, Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6.
398. Paragraphs 5-54, 55-60, 65-97, and 100-153 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 232-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
399. The Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
400. HB 56 creates new state crimes that contain as a central element the determination of a person’s immigration status.
401. Sections 10, 11, and 13 require that immigration status be determined by one exclusive means only: a verification from the federal government. HB 56 explicitly prohibits consideration of any other evidence on this element.
402. Sections 10, 11, and 13 violate the Confrontation Clause because the defendant is prohibited from confronting the witness who prepared the federal government verification, and the state court is prohibited from considering any evidence except for the federal government verification.
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403. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT THIRTEEN SIXTH AMENDMENT COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE
HB 56 §§ 10, 11, 13 404. Count Thirteen is brought against Defendants Bentley and Strange by all Organizational Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs Webster, Long, Romero Thau, Jimmerson, Barber, Upton, Beck, Cummings, Jane Does ##1-6, and John Does ##1-6. 405. Count Thirteen is brought against Defendant Broussard by Organizational Plaintiffs HICA, AAC, HIHC, ITAA, Appleseed, SEIU, Joint Board, DreamActivist, and GBM, and by Plaintiffs Jimmerson, Upton, Cummings and Jane Doe #6. 406. Paragraphs 5-54, 55-60, 65-97, and 100-153 (Plaintiffs); 154-156 (Defendants); 173, 232-247 (Key Provisions of HB 56); 295-299 (Class Action Allegations); and 300-306 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations) are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 407. The Compulsory Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”
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408. Sections 10, 11, and 13 of HB 56 violate the Compulsory Process Clause because the defendant is prohibited from presenting a defense on the issue of whether he or she possesses lawful immigration status.
409. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of Constitutional rights under the color of state law, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing facts and arguments, Plaintiffs request that the Court: a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter; b. Declare that HB 56 is unconstitutional in its entirety as a regulation of immigration and that Sections 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, and 30 unconstitutionally conflict with federal law; c. Declare that Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 violate the Fourth Amendment; d. Declare that Sections 8, 10, and 28 violate the Equal Protection Clause; e. Declare that Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, and 30 violate the Due Process Clause; f. Declare that Sections 5, 6, 11, 27, and 30 violate the First Amendment; g. Declare that Sections 27 and 30 violate the Contracts Clause; h. Declare that Sections 27 and 30 violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
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i. Declare that Sections 10, 11, and 13 violate the Sixth Amendment;

j. Enjoin Defendants from enforcing HB 56;

k. Grant Plaintiffs’ costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other

expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988; and

l. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: September 16, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Samuel Brooke

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010

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Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org

T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com

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dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Allison Neal (ASB 3377-I72N) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203 aneal@aclualabama.org
* admitted pro hac vice.

mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 16, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

s/ Samuel Brooke

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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 138 Filed 09/28/11 Page 1 of 2

FILED
2011 Sep-28 PM 02:51 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION )

OF ALABAMA, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official )

capacity as Governor of the State of )

Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number 5:11-CV-2484-SLB

ORDER

In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion entered contemporaneously herewith,

it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 37), is GRANTED IN PART.

The Motion is GRANTED as to Section 8; the last sentence of Sections 10(e), 11(e), and

13(h); and Section 11(f) and (g) of H.B. 56.

2. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing Section 8 – which prohibits “[a]n

alien who is not lawfully present in the United States” from attending or enrolling in an

Alabama “public postsecondary education institution in this state,” and requires any alien

attending such an institution to possess either “lawful permanent residence or an appropriate

nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” – pending final judgment in this case.

3. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing the last sentence of Sections 10(e),

11(e), and 13(h) of H.B. 56 – “A court of this state shall consider only the federal

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 138 Filed 09/28/11 Page 2 of 2
government’s verification in determining whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States” – pending final judgment in this case.
4. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing Section 11 (f) and (g) of H.B. 56 – “(f) It is unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street, roadway, or highway to attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic,” and “(g) It is unlawful for a person to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street, roadway or highway in order to be hired by an occupant of the motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic,” – pending final judgment in this case.
5. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 37), is MOOT as to their request for an injunction preliminarily enjoining Section 11(a) and Section 13 of H.B. 56. These Section have been enjoined pending final judgment in United States v. Alabama, Case No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB.
6. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 37), is DENIED IN PART. The Motion is DENIED as to H.B. 56 in its entirety, and as to Section 10 (except the last sentence of Section 10(e)), and Sections 12, 18-20, 27, 28, and 30 of H.B. 56.
DONE, this 28th day of September, 2011.
SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN United States District Judge
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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 1 of 20

FILED
2011 Sep-29 PM 12:20 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

)

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION

)

OF ALABAMA, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

) )

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as )

Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENJOIN PORTIONS OF HB 56 PENDING APPEAL
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Plaintiffs petition this Court to enjoin sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 of HB

56, pending appeal, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 8(a).

Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek a temporary injunction of these sections so that a

motion for an injunction pending appeal can be filed with the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Because Plaintiffs present a substantial case on

the merits and the equities favor them, the Court should preserve the status quo and

enjoin Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 pending appeal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction

seeking to enjoin all of HB 56, including sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30, on

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constitutional and federal statutory grounds. (Doc. 37.) On August 1, 2011, the United States also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin numerous sections of HB 56. (See Doc. 2 of Case No. 11-2746.) Religious leaders also filed suit challenging sections 13 and 27. (See Doc. 1 of Case No. 11-2736.) On August 3, 2011, these cases were consolidated, (Doc. 59), and the Court held a hearing on August 24, 2011. On August 29, 2011, the Court temporarily enjoined HB 56 pending its ruling on the motions for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 126.) On September 1, 2011, the three cases were unconsolidated. (Doc. 128.) The Court issued rulings on the three motions for preliminary injunction on September 28, 2011. (See Docs. 137 & 138 of Case No. 11-2484; Docs. 93 & 94 of Case No. 11-2746; and Docs. 83 & 84 of Case No. 11-2736.)
The Court preliminarily enjoined Sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17 of HB 56 on preemption grounds in the case brought by the United States. See DOJ Order (Doc. 94 of 11-2746). The Court also preliminarily enjoined Sections 8, 11(f) and (g), and the last sentences of 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) on constitutional grounds in this case. See Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (HICA) Order (Doc. 138 of 11-2484). However, the Court permitted the other sections of HB 56 to go into effect. It ruled that Sections 10, 12, 27, and 30 were not preempted by federal law. HICA Order at 48 (§ 10), 70-78 (§ 12), 90-93 (§ 27), 102-106 (§ 30). Regarding Section 28, it declined to address the merits of the claim, concluding that Plaintiffs
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lacked standing to challenge the provision. HICA Order at 93-101. The Court also held that the HICA Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge HB 56 in its entirety.1
ARGUMENT I. LEGAL STANDARD
Although this Court found that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the traditional preliminary injunction standard regarding their challenges to Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30, enjoining those provisions pending appeal is appropriate in order to maintain the status quo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) (authorizing grant of injunction to protect party appealing denial of injunctive relief); Fed. R. App. P. 8(a) (party seeking injunction pending appeal must seek this from district court unless impracticable); Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Rule 62(c) authorizes injunction while appeal is pending, if done to maintain status quo). To warrant an injunction pending appeal, the movant must generally satisfy the traditional preliminary injunction requirements. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 975 F.2d 1488, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992). However, where the “balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the [injunction],” the movant need only show a “substantial case on the merits,” rather than a “‘probability’ of success on the merits.” Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565
1 In the event that the Court’s determination that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge HB 56 in its entirety was considered legal error, the Court concluded that HB 56 is not an unconstitutional regulation of immigration.
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(5th Cir. 1981); see also id. (“If a movant were required in every case to establish that the appeal would probably be successful, [Fed. R. Civ. P. 62 and Fed. R. App. P. 8] would not require as it does a prior presentation to the district judge whose order is being appealed.”); United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322, 323 (11th Cir. 1992); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). Both tests are satisfied here, and Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 should be enjoined pending appeal. II. SECTION 10 SHOULD BE ENJOINED PENDING APPEAL
The balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of staying Section 10 pending appeal. As the Court recognized in the HICA Order, Plaintiffs such as John Doe #1 have standing to challenge Section 10, and will face “real and imminent” injury if Section 10 takes effect. HICA Order at 48. In opposing Plaintiffs’ challenge to Section 10, Defendants did not contest the strong equities shown by Plaintiffs, focusing only on the merits of this claim. See Defs.’ Opp. at 63-70 (Doc. 82). As Plaintiffs explain in detail in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Section 10 will cause irreparable injury to Jane Does #’s 1-2 and 4-6, and John Does #’s 1-4, members of DreamActivist, Service Employees International Union (SEIU,), the Joint Board, HICA, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as putative class members, because they lack the registration documents required by Section 10 and will be subject to these new state criminal
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penalties. (See Doc. 37 at 62-63.) This section would also inflict irreparable harm
to the Organizational Plaintiffs if it went into effect. (See id. at 67.) Thus the
balance of equities tips sharply in favor of the Plaintiffs, and the public interest
would not be adversely affected by an injunction pending appeal. (Id. at 69-70).
Plaintiffs have also presented a substantial case on the merits, and will
continue to do so on appeal. As articulated in their Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Reply briefs, Section 10 is a regulation of immigration, is in direct
conflict with the federal alien registration scheme, and poses an impermissible
burden on the federal government. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3, 11, 26-28, 35-40
(Doc. 37); Reply at 15-18 (Doc. 109). Although this Court did not find that
Plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on this claim, see HICA Order at 48;
DOJ Order at 16-36, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona reached the opposite conclusion when considering a virtually identical provision,2 and the
2 Compare HB 56 §§ 10(a), (d): (a) In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), and the person is an alien unlawfully present in the United States. . . . . (d) This section does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be present in the United States.
with Ariz. SB 1070 § 3, codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1509(A), (F): (A) In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a). . . . .
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that injunction. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 990, 998-1000, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010); aff’d, 641 F.3d 339, 354-357, 366 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court distinguished those cases, in part, by suggesting that Arizona law “did not, as H.B. 56 § 10 does, apply only to those ‘unlawfully present.’” DOJ Order at 28. This is factually incorrect—both the Arizona and Alabama laws state that anyone who “maintains authorization from the federal government” will not be prosecuted, which means that the only individuals who could be prosecuted would be those who are “unlawfully present.” Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1509(F) with HB56 § 10(d). Regardless, Plaintiffs have established a substantial case on the merits of their claim, given that both a District Court and Court of Appeals have agreed with Plaintiffs’ position.
Because “the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of” enjoining Section 10, and Plaintiffs have “show[n] a substantial case on the merits,” enjoining Section 10 pending appeal is warranted. Hamilton, 963 F.2d at 323. III. SECTION 12 SHOULD BE ENJOINED PENDING APPEAL
The balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of staying Section 12 pending appeal. As the Court recognized in the HICA Order, plaintiffs such as Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 have standing to challenge Section 12, and will face “real and
(F) This section does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to remain in the United States.
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imminent” injury if the law were to go into effect. HICA Order at 72. The Court also recognized that “state law enforcement officers do not have the inherent authority to stop and arrest an individual for mere unlawful presence,” HICA Order at 74, and that as-applied challenges may well be appropriate. However, in the Court’s view, at least some inquiries under Section 12 could be permissible, so it denied Plaintiff’s preliminary facial challenge. Id. at 74-77.
As Plaintiffs explain in detail in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Reply, Section 12 will cause irreparable injury to Plaintiffs Zamora, Jane Doe #’s 1-2 and 4-6, John Doe #’s 1-4, members of DreamActivist, SEIU, the Joint Board, HICA, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as putative class members, because they and their members lack the identity documents required by Section 12 that would enable them to avoid impermissible immigration inquiries. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 61-63 (Doc. 37), Reply at 56-59 (Doc. 109). The Organizational Plaintiffs would also be irreparably harmed in their own right and would suffer further harms in addition to the ones they already have suffered if this provision went into effect. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 67. In comparison to these articulated harms, Defendants rely on the legislative “findings” of Section 2 of HB 56, which assert that “illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in this state . . . .” HB 56 § 2. See Defs.’ Opp. at 114 (Doc. 82). This broad, conclusory assertion, unsupported by any evidentiary findings, does not constitute
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a harm in any way comparable to the specific harms Plaintiffs have established they would suffer if Section 12 were to be enforced. Nor would the public interest be adversely affected by an injunction of Section 12. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 68-70; Reply at 65.
Plaintiffs have also presented a substantial case on the merits with respect to Section 12, and will continue to do so on appeal. As articulated in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Reply briefs, Section 12 is in direct conflict with the federal immigration law and is preempted. (See Doc. 37 at 2-3, 10-18, 22-26; Doc. 109 at 7-10, 13-15.) Although this Court did not find that Plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on this claim, see HICA Order at 70-78, three other courts have considered similar provisions and reached the opposite conclusion. See Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, Case No. 11-1804, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69600, at *29-38, 59 (N.D. Ga.) (enjoining Ga. HB 87 § 8, codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989, 993998, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010) (enjoining Ariz. SB 1070 § 2(B), codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B)); aff’d, 641 F.3d 339, 346-354, 366 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus Plaintiffs have a substantial case to present on the merits of their claim.
Because “the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of” staying Section 12, and Plaintiffs have “show[n] a substantial case on the merits,” enjoining Section 12 pending appeal is warranted. Hamilton, 963 F.2d at 323.
8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 9 of 20
IV. SECTION 28 SHOULD BE ENJOINED PENDING APPEAL Plaintiffs challenge Section 28 on equal protection grounds, based on three
impermissible classifications. See Pls.’ Supp. Sec. 28 Br. (Doc. 116). This Court found Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge Section 28. HICA Order at 93101. It reached this decision by first finding that Section 28(a)(1)’s requirement to determine the immigration status of the parents of children has no actual effect, and by accepting Defendants’ current reading of the provision that inquiry as to children would typically occur only once, when the child first enters the Alabama public school system. HICA Order at 97 (“Section 28 does not compel school officials to determine the immigration status of a parent of a student.”), 98 (“Defendants have presented evidence that “enrollment” only occurs when a child enters the Alabama school system.”). The Court next reasoned that the only Plaintiff Organizations to claim any harm by Section 28 were HICA and Greater Birmingham Ministries, but neither had shown sufficient injury, particularly because although they have “discuss[ed]” Section 28, neither had “discussions involv[ing] enrollment of an alien.” HICA Order at 101, see also id. at 99-101.
Plaintiffs have a substantial case to make on appeal that the finding of a lack of standing to challenge Section 28 was in error. First, absent an injunction, Defendants remain free to retract their current reading of the statute and decide that students “enroll” in school annually, so the imminent threat of harm to
9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 10 of 20
undocumented students continues. See Harrell v. Florida Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Pls.’ Reply at 41 n.27 (Doc. 109). Second, Plaintiffs Alabama Appleseed, HICA, and Greater Birmingham Ministries have each shown that Section 28 is causing their organizations specific and articulable harm, and that the harm was directly related to enrollment. See Pls.’ Reply at 41 n.27, 60; see also John Pickens Aug. 13, 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 2 (diversion of resources) 7 (“at virtually every single presentation, parents and other service providers have asked questions . . . [and] for information about how to enroll their children in school; whether to enroll their children in school; what will happen to the registration information that is collected by the school when they enroll their children; [and] whether registration information will be shared with immigration authorities . . . .”) (Doc. 109-2); Isabel Rubio Aug. 15, 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 3 (noting thirteen information sessions conducted “to give information on HB 56 and . . . specifically information on enrollment of students in Alabama public schools”), 5, 7 (harm to HICA) (Doc. 109-3); Scott Douglas Aug. 15, 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 2 (noting diversion of resources to educate people about how to “‘enroll’ in Alabama schools”), 3 (harm to members) (Doc. 109-4). Once this evidence is considered— which was properly before the Court given that the State’s new interpretation of “enrollment” was disclosed for the first time in its papers opposing the Motion for Preliminary Injunction—the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of
10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 11 of 20
staying Section 28 pending appeal. Section 28 will continue to cause immediate irreparable injury to Alabama Appleseed, HICA, and Greater Birmingham Ministries. Additionally, Plaintiffs Jane Doe #’s 1-6, John Doe #’s 1-2, as well as members of DreamActivist, SEIU, and the Joint Board remain at risk of being inappropriately chilled from accessing public elementary and secondary education Defendants’ interpretation were to change. See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 64-66 (Doc. 37), Pls.’ Reply at 41 n.7, 60 (Doc. 109). The harm to any child of being chilled from receiving an education vastly outweighs any harm to Defendants by having Section 28 stayed, particularly because the number of undocumented children in Alabama schools comprises, at most, 0.5% of the entire Alabama school system, see Pls.’ Supp. Sec. 28 Br. at 12-13 (Doc. 116), and Defendants concede that it will take a very long time for them to collect any data through Section 28, see Defs.’ Opp. at 128 (Doc. 82), so a delay pending appeal will not cause Defendants significant harm.3 For the same reason, the public interest would not be adversely affected by staying Section 28 pending appeal. See Pls.’ Mot. for PI at 68-70 (Doc. 37); Pls.’ Reply at 65 (Doc. 109). Thus the balance of equities tips sharply in favor of the Plaintiffs.
3 “As noted above, this information will be collected only slowly, as individual students initially enroll in the Alabama K-12 system.” Defs.’ Opp. at 128. Based on this, Defendants argue that “It is therefore imperative to begin this process as soon as possible.” Id. In fact, the opposite is true. By enacting Section 28, Defendants chose a process that will take years to provide any information, much less useful information. They cannot now object that they are being harmed by adding a few more months or a year to that timeframe while appeals are taken.
11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 12 of 20
Plaintiffs have also presented a substantial case on the merits, and will continue to do so on appeal, given the U.S. Department of Education’s and Department of Justice’s own views, set forth in a recent federal guidance, that inquiries about immigration status at the time of enrollment would violate Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). (See Doc. 37 at 53 & n.36).
Because “the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of” staying Section 28, and Plaintiffs have “show[n] a substantial case on the merits,” enjoining Section 28 pending appeal is warranted. Hamilton, 963 F.2d at 323. V. SECTION 27 SHOULD BE ENJOINED PENDING APPEAL
The balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of staying Section 27 pending appeal. As the Court recognized in the HICA Order, plaintiffs such as Plaintiffs Barber, Upton, and Jane Doe #5 have standing to challenge Section 27, and will face “real and imminent” injury if the law were to go into effect. HICA Order at 91. Section 27 will also cause irreparable injury to Plaintiffs Jane Does ## 1-6, John Does ## 1-4, Cummings, Beck, members of DreamActivist, SEIU, the Joint Board, HICA, and Greater Birmingham Ministries, as well as putative class members, who will be prohibited from enforcing numerous contracts. See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 67 (Doc. 37). Harm to the Organizational Plaintiffs would also be irreparable and would increase if this provision went into effect. See id. at 67. In their Opposition Brief, Defendants did not question any of these harms, nor
12

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 13 of 20
point to any interest that Section 27 is alleged to serve. See generally Defs.’ Opp. (Doc. 82). Nor did the legislature—the purported legislative “findings” appearing in Section 2 of HB 56 do not provide any basis for Section 27’s limitations on the right to contract. See HB 56 § 2. It is also against the public interest to deny the right to enforce a bargained-for agreement, which upsets settled expectations, so long as the subject matter of the contract is not itself against the public interest. See, e.g., A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 44 (1941) (“If it definitely appears that enforcement of a contract will not be followed by injurious results, generally, at least, what the parties have agreed to ought not to be struck down.”). Thus the balance of equities also tips sharply in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have also presented a substantial case on the merits, and will continue to do so on appeal. Plaintiffs challenge Section 27 on preemption grounds because it: (1) is a direct regulation of the conditions under which immigrants may remain in the country; (2) conflicts with federal regulations and laws on immigration; (3) conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1981; and (4) impermissibly burdens the federal government. See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-8, 11, 33-35, 37 (Doc. 37); Pls.’ Reply at 8, 26-29 (Doc. 109). Although this Court did not find that Plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on this claim, see HICA Order at 91-93, Plaintiffs nevertheless have a substantial case on the merits of this claim
13

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 14 of 20
given that Section 27 would render meaningless numerous contracts that could be enforced in state courts only (because they do not involve a federal question or do not satisfy diversity requirements), including contracts as common as a lease to rent. Cf. Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 530-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (enjoining ordinance placing restrictions on renting to undocumented individuals); aff’d, 620 F.3d 170, 219-24 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds, No.10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (invalidating ordinance placing restrictions on renting to undocumented individuals), appeal docketed No. 10-10751 (5th Cir. July 28, 2010). Thus Plaintiffs have a substantial case to present on the merits of their claim.
Because “the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of” staying Section 27, and Plaintiffs have “show[n] a substantial case on the merits,” enjoining Section 27 pending appeal is warranted. Hamilton, 963 F.2d at 323. VI. SECTION 30 SHOULD BE ENJOINED PENDING APPEAL
The balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of staying Section 30 pending appeal. Section 30 will cause irreparable injury. It is clear that agencies throughout the state, from probate offices to water and sewer companies, are interpreting Section 30 to require them to deny services to anyone who cannot prove that they are lawfully present. See Notice of Supp. Evid. Re: Sec. 30 (Doc.
14

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 15 of 20
134) (detailing how water companies have prepared policies to deny water service to people who cannot prove lawful status, and how probate offices will do the same). Thus plaintiffs like Jane Doe #1, who is waiting for a visa to become available before she can become a lawful permanent resident, and Jane Doe #2, who is waiting for the federal government to adjudicate her application for a visa, will be at risk of being denied water and sewer services if Section 30 goes into effect, notwithstanding the fact that the federal government is aware that Jane Doe #’s 1 and 2 are in the United States and has not elected to seek to remove them. The balance of equities also tips sharply in favor of the Plaintiffs. In opposing the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, Defendants did not articulate any harm that would occur to them if Section 30 were not enjoined, see generally Defs.’ Opp. (Doc. 82), and no public interest would be served by denying anyone basic water and sewer services.
Plaintiffs have also presented a substantial case on the merits, and will continue to do so on appeal. Plaintiffs challenge Section 30 on preemption grounds because Section 30 is a direct regulation of the conditions under which immigrants may remain in the country, and because Section 30 is inconsistent with federal regulations and laws on immigration. See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-8, 10-12, 19-21, 35-40 (Doc. 37). This Court found that Plaintiffs were not substantially likely to prevail on this claim. See HICA Order at 102-106. It
15

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 16 of 20
reached this conclusion without acknowledging Section 30’s implementation on the ground—denying water and sewer services—and by interpreting and narrowing Section 30 to apply to a limited yet undefined set of “commercial contract” and licensing circumstances, which the Court acknowledges is not evident from Section 30’s plain text. See DOJ Order at 113 (“Although not a ‘business transaction,’ the court finds . . . .”). Plaintiffs have a substantial case on the merits of this claim given that Section 30, as written and understood by public corporations like water and sewer services, would literally make it impossible for undocumented immigrants—including those in immigration court proceedings and those with pending immigration petitions—to reside in Alabama. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 530-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (enjoining ordinance placing restrictions on renting to undocumented individuals); aff’d, 620 F.3d 170, 219-24 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds, No.10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (invalidating ordinance placing restrictions on renting to undocumented individuals), appeal docketed No. 10-10751 (5th Cir. July 28, 2010).
Because “the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of” staying Section 30, and Plaintiffs have “show[n] a substantial case on the merits,” enjoining Section 30 pending appeal is warranted. Hamilton, 963 F.2d at 323. At
16

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 17 of 20

a minimum, given the evidence previously submitted on public utilities’ intent and

actions to implement Section 30 in a fashion to include basic water services, if the

Court intended to exclude public utilities and similar services from the restrictions

of Section 30, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court issue a clarification to

that effect in order to avoid some portion of the immediate and irreparable harms

from Section 30 to countless Alabamans.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court maintain

the status quo by enjoining Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 of HB 56 pending

appeal. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek a temporary injunction of these sections so

that a motion for an injunction pending appeal can be filed with the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, and request that such temporary injunction extend until such

time that the Eleventh Circuit rules upon Plaintiffs’ Rule 8 motion.

Dated September 29, 2011

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ Samuel Brooke

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave.

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

17

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 18 of 20

Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE

UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R)

18

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 19 of 20

CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Allison Neal (ASB 3377-I72N) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION

Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206

19

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 140 Filed 09/29/11 Page 20 of 20

207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203 aneal@aclualabama.org

nperales@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 29, 2011, I electronically filed the

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send

notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

s/ Samuel Brooke

20

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 147 Filed 10/05/11 Page 1 of 4

FILED
2011 Oct-05 PM 03:21 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION )

OF ALABAMA, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official )

capacity as Governor of the State of )

Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number 5:11-CV-2484-SLB

ORDER

This case is currently before the court on plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Enjoin

Portions of H.B. 56 Pending Appeal. (Doc. 140.)1 Specifically, plaintiffs move the court

to enjoin Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 of H.B. 56, pending appeal, pursuant to FED. R. CIV.

P. 62(c) and FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). For the reasons set forth below, the court is of the opinion

that plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion is due to be and hereby is DENIED. Plaintiffs’

alternative request for a temporary injunction so that a motion for an injunction pending

appeal can be filed with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is also DENIED.

In relevant part, Rule 62(c) provides that, “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). An injunction pending an appeal is considered an

1 Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each document as it is filed in the court’s record.

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 147 Filed 10/05/11 Page 2 of 4
“extraordinary remedy,” Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 2000), “for which the moving party bears a ‘heavy burden.’” Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (Thompson, J.)(citation omitted). In deciding whether to issue an injunction pending an appeal, the Eleventh Circuit requires movants to show “(1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) a substantial risk of irreparable injury to the [movants] unless the injunction is granted; (3) no substantial harm to other interested persons; and (4) no harm to the public interest.” Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1132; see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)(explaining that, while different procedural rules govern the authority of district courts and courts of appeals to stay an order pending appeal, the factors for consideration generally are the same)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) & Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)).
Reed v. Riley, No. 2:07-cv-0190-WKW [wo], 2008 WL 3931612, *1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 25,
2008)(parallel citations omitted); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th
Cir. 1986). “[W]here the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the
[injunction], the movant need only show a substantial case on the merits.” Gonzalez ex rel.
Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-11424-D, 2000 WL 381901, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000)(quoting
Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))(internal quotations and other
citations omitted)(unpublished).2
For the reasons set forth in the court’s Memorandum Opinion, the court finds that
plaintiffs have not shown that they are “likely to prevail” nor that they have a “substantial
case” on the merits. The court carefully and thoroughly reviewed all issues raised by the
2“In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), this Court adopted as binding precedent decisions of the Fifth Circuit, including Unit A panel decisions of that circuit, handed down prior to October 1, 1981.” W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., L.L.C. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., L.P., 566 F.3d 979, 985 n.6 (11th Cir. 2009)(citing United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997)).
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 147 Filed 10/05/11 Page 3 of 4
parties and its lengthy Memorandum Opinion represents the product of its time and effort. It does not foresee a “substantial” case for reversal.
“It is unnecessary to engage in a protracted analysis of the balancing of the equities in this case because the Court finds that under either standard discussed above, [plaintiffs have] not demonstrated a question for appeal sufficient to warrant the issuance of a stay pending appeal.” United States v. Engelhard Corp., No. 6–95–CV–45 (WLS), 1997 WL 834205, *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 1997); see also MacBride v. Askew, 541 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, even if the court was to accept plaintiffs’ assertion that they have a substantial case on the merits, the court finds that the balance of the equities does not weigh heavily in favor of plaintiffs.
The court notes that some of plaintiffs’ evidence of irreparable injury appear to have been caused by a misinterpretation of the Act. Jane Doe #7 (not a plaintiff) filed a declaration stating that a school teacher questioned her daughter about her immigration status and the immigration status of her parents. (Doc. 143-1 at 2.) Certainly this conduct is not compelled by any Section of H.B. 56. Assuming this questioning occurred, it does not demonstrate irreparable harm and, as noted, such questioning is not based on the enforcement of H.B. 56 § 28 or any other section of H.B. 56. Any injuries caused by intentional or unintentional misapplication of H.B. 56 cannot be said to be the result of the implementation and enforcement of the Act.
The court has found that plaintiffs are not likely to be able to show that Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 are due to be enjoined. Alabama has an interest in enforcing laws
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 147 Filed 10/05/11 Page 4 of 4 properly enacted by its Legislature and not likely to be found unconstitutional. Moreover, the public has an interest in having properly enacted valid laws enforced. Plaintiffs’ interests in enjoining Sections 10, 12, 27, 28, and 30 of H.B. 56 at this point in the proceedings do not tip the scales heavily in their favor.
Therefore, plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Enjoin Portions of H.B. 56 Pending Appeal, (doc. 140), is DENIED.
As an alternative, plaintiffs ask this court to issue “a temporary injunction of these sections so that a motion for an injunction pending appeal can be filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.” (Doc. 140 at 17.) This Motion is also DENIED.
DONE, this 5th day of October, 2011.
SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 1 of 9

FILED
2012 May-23 AM 11:26 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION

)

OF ALABAMA; et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

) Case Number:

) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity )

as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs,
vs. STATE OF ALABAMA; and GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case Numbers: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) )

JOINT STIPULATION AS TO APPLICABILITY OF PRELIMINARY INUNCTION TO SECTION 6 OF H.B. 658

Come now Plaintiffs Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al. (“HICA

Plaintiffs”) in Case No. 5:11-cv-02484, Plaintiffs United States of America (“USA

Plaintiff”) in Case No. 2:11-cv-2746, and Defendants the State of Alabama,

Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange, Superintendent

Tommy Bice, Chancellor Freida Hill, and District Attorney Robert L. Broussard

1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 2 of 9
(collectively, “State Defendants”) in both actions, to jointly stipulate that the parties agree that the preliminary injunction (hereinafter “the Preliminary Injunction”) issued September 28, 2011, in case No. 2:11-cv-02746-SLB,1 applies to Section 6 of H.B. 658, 2012 Regular Session (which was signed into law and became effective on May 18, 2012) at this time. As a basis for this joint stipulation, the parties state as follows:
1. This litigation involves a challenge to H.B. 56, which was passed by the Alabama Legislature in 2011. After hearings on motions for preliminary injunction brought by HICA Plaintiffs and the USA Plaintiff, the Court preliminarily enjoined some but not all of the provisions of H.B. 56 on September 28, 2011. One of the provisions preliminarily enjoined was Section 13 of H.B. 56, codified at Section 31-13-13 of the Alabama Code, which makes it a crime to, among other things, “[h]arbor an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code 31-13-13(a)(4); see
1 Case No. 2:11-cv-02746-SLB is the case in which the United States of America is a plaintiff. In case no. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (HICA) and other private plaintiffs similarly moved to enjoin section 13, but the HICA Plaintiffs’ motion was denied as moot following the entry of the injunction in case no. 5:11-cv-02746-SLB.
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 3 of 9
United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1336, 1328-37 (N. D. Ala. 2011)
(preliminarily enjoining Section 13).
2. Defendants appealed, inter alia, the Court’s ruling preliminarily
enjoining Section 13 of H.B., and the appeal remains pending in the Eleventh
Circuit.
3. On May 16, 2012, the Alabama Legislature passed legislation
amending some of the provisions it originally had enacted into law through H.B.
56. This new Act, originally denominated H.B. 658 at its introduction in the Legislature, became law on May 18, 2012. Of particular relevance to this filing2 is
Section 6 of H.B. 658, which is identical in all material respects to Section 13(a)(4)
of H.B. 56. Section 6 of H.B. 658 reads as follows:
Section 6. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for a person to harbor an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.
H.B. 658 § 6 (attached as Ex. A, pgs. 57-58). H.B. 658, including Section 6, went
into effect immediately upon the signature of the Governor. See id. § 10 (Ex. A at
p. 59).
2 H.B. 658 made numerous other modifications to H.B. 56. This filing relates to Section 6 of H.B. 658 only, because of Plaintiffs’ time-sensitive need for confirmation that Defendants agree that the Preliminary Injunction applies to Section 6 of H.B. 658. The parties seek to reserve the right to submit additional filings related to the impact of other aspects of H.B. 658 on this litigation.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 4 of 9
4. Without conceding any issues arising from the Preliminary Injunction, and without Defendants waiving any objection to the validity of that Preliminary Injunction as it relates to Section 13(a)(4) of H.B. 56 or otherwise, all parties take the position that the Preliminary Injunction entered by the District Court on September 28, 2011, nominally applying to Section 13(a)(4) of H.B. 56, applies with equal force to Section 6 of H.B. 658.
5. Because of their understanding of the applicability of the Preliminary Injunction to Section 6 of H.B. 658, the Defendants stipulate that the Preliminary Injunction enjoins them from enforcing Section 6 of H.B. 658, unless and until the Preliminary Injunction is vacated or otherwise modified by this Court or another court as it relates to criminalizing the act of “entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.” However, by so stipulating, Defendants expressly preserve, and do not waive, any and all of their objections to original entry of the Preliminary Injunction and their appeal of that aspect of the order.
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 5 of 9

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Samuel L. Brooke Samuel L. Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for HICA Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org

5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 6 of 9

Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B

Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL

6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 7 of 9

Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice. Counsel for HICA Plaintiffs

BY:__/s/ John C. Neiman, Jr.________

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Joshua K. Payne (ASB-1041-A55P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue

7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 8 of 9

Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

Counsel for the State of Alabama, Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Bice, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard

BY: _/s/ William H. Orrick, III____
Tony West U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 tony.west@usdoj.gov
William H. Orrick, III U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, CIVIL DIVISION 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 bill.orrick@usdoj.gov

Arthur R. Goldberg C. Lee Reeves, II Varu Chilakamarri Joshua Wilkenfeld U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov

Counsel for the United States of America

8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 9 of 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 23, 2012, I have electronically filed the foregoing using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to all counsel of record.
__/s/ Samuel L. Brooke_________ Counsel for HICA Plaintiffs
9

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 1 of 12

FILED
2012 May-24 AM 11:37 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,

Defendants.

)

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) TIME SENSITIVE ) OPPOSED ) )

STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST SECTION 8 OF
ACT NO. 2011-535 BASED ON CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION

Defendants Governor Robe rt Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange,

Superintendent Dr. Thomas R. Bice, Inte rim Chancellor Susan Price, and District

Attorney Robert L. Broussard, sued

in their official capacities (“State

Defendants”), request that t he Court dissolve its inj unction of September 28, 2011

against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 ( doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2), as the basis for the

Court’s injunction – the second sentence of Section 8 – has been rem oved by Act No. 2012-491, which is attached as Exhibi t A.1 In the alternative, the State

1 Superintendent Dr. Thom as R. Bice and Inte rim Chancellor Susan Price ar e substituted as named defendants for their predecessors by operation of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 2 of 12
Defendants request that the Court stay th e injunction against Section 8 while the appeal remains pending.
1. Undersigned counsel contacted opposing counsel to determ ine whether counsel will oppose the motion, and understand that opposing counsel are opposed to the motion.
2. Plaintiffs instituted this actio n on July 8, 2011, seeking inj unctive relief against enforc ement of Act No . 2011-535, also known as the BeasonHammon Alabama Taxpayer and C itizen Protection Act, or H.B. 56. On July 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. One of the sections of the Act Plaintiffs sought t o enjoin was S ection 8, the central provisi on of which stated that “[a]n alien who is not lawfull y present in the United States shall not be permitted to enroll in or a ttend any public postsecondary education institution” in Alabama. See doc. 37 (Plaintiffs’ Mot. for Pre lim. Inj.) at 55-57; Act No. 2011535, § 8.2
3. In its Opinion dated Septembe r 28, 2011, that accompanied the Preliminary-Injunction Order, the Court recognized that Alabam a could exclude unlawfully present aliens from enrolling in and attending the State’s postsecondary public education institutions, consistent w ith federal law. The Court noted that
2 Citations to documents filed with the Court are to docket entries as “Doc . __”, and citations to page numbers for such docum ents are to th e page numbers electronically printed on the document by the CM/ECF system.
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 3 of 12

“Alabama may, without conflicting with Congress’s classifications of aliens,

exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as dete rmined by federal law, from enrolling in

and attending its public postseconda ry educational institutions. See Equal Access

Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 601-08.” Doc. 137 (Opinion) at 44 n. 13.

4. What Alabama could not do “wit hout conflicting with federal law,”

according to the Court, was “exclu de unlawfully-present aliens from its

postsecondary institutions if its definition of unlawfully-present aliens confl icts

with Congress’s definition.” Id. The Court read the second sentence of Section 8 –

“An alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either

possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8

U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” – as conflicting w ith Congress’s definition for unlawfully

present aliens, and therefore preempted. Id. at 43-44 (“Section 8 closes Alabama’s

public postsecondary inst itutions to aliens who are not lawfully present in the

United States and to lawfully-present aliens w ho do not have lawful permanent

resident status or a nonimmigration visa. This ‘classification’ of aliens for purposes

of determining who is eligible to

attend Alabama’s public postsecondary

institutions is preempted as only Congre ss may classify aliens. Therefore, Section

8 is preempted.”) (emphasis in original).

5. On this preemption basis, the Court enjoined enforcement of Section 8

in its entirety. Doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2 (Prel iminary-Injunction Order). The State

3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 4 of 12
Defendants appealed that order, arguing that at most, the Court should have simply enjoined the problematic sentence, not the entire Section.
6. Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 was c odified as Ala. Code § 31-13-8. That Section of the Code was amended by Act No. 2012-491, which passed the Legislature on May 16, 2012, and was signe d by the Governor on May 18, 2012. Act 2012-491 became effective immediat ely upon approval by the Governor on May 18, 2012. See Act No. 2012-491, § 10 (“T his act shall become effective immediately following its passage and appr oval by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law.”).
7. Section 1 of Act No. 2012-491 amended Ala. Code § 31-13-8 (Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 as codified) by rem oving the second sentence – “An alien attending any publ ic postsecondary institution in this state m ust either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate noni mmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.”
8. As the basis of the Court’s i njunction against Section 8 was the second sentence, which the Court read to be a state “classification” of aliens preempted by Congress’s classifications, and as that second sentence has been removed by Act No. 2012-491, the basis for the Court’s injunction against Section 8 no longer exists.
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 5 of 12
9. As the Court has a lready determined that “Alabama may, without conflicting with Con gress’s classifications of aliens, exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as determ ined by fe deral law, from enrolling in and attending its public postsecondary educational institutions,” doc. 137 at 44 n. 13, and a s that is a ll Section 8 (codified at Ala. Code § 31 -13-8), as a mended by Act No. 2012-491, currently does, the injunction against Section 8 is due to be dissolved. See doc. 137 at 36 (quoting Section 8) (“For the purposes of this section, a public postsecondary education institution officer may seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status with the federal government pur suant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). A publ ic postsecondary education inst itution officer or official shall not attem pt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”); Act No. 2012-491, § 1 (retaining this provision).
10. This Court’s Preliminary-Injunction Order is on appeal. See docs. 149 (Plaintiffs’ Amended Notice of Interl ocutory Appeal) and 150 (State Defendants’ Notice of Cross-Appeal). However, pursu ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), this Court m ay modify its Prelim inary-Injunction Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) (“While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgm ent that grants, dissolves, or deni es an in junction, the court may suspend, m odify, restore, or grant an injunction on term s for bond or other term s that secure the opposing party’s rights.”). See also Decatur Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia ,
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 6 of 12
2005 WL 607881, *2 (D.D.C. Ma rch 16, 2005) (a distri ct court “m ay properly entertain a motion to dissolve an interlocut ory order that has b een appealed” when there is a “change in circumstances”).
11. This Court may prefer to stay the Preliminary-Injunction Order with respect to Section 8 pending a ppeal, and to issue an order informing the El eventh Circuit that in light of the amendment, upon remand this Court would dissolve the Preliminary Injunction against Section 8. See Wyatt by and through Rawlins v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1080, n. 14 (11th Cir. 1996) (dist rict court stayed the preliminary injunction because it found the need for the preliminary injunction was moot, and it inform ed the court of appeal s that upon remand it would dissolve the preliminary injunction).
12. A similar procedure, often called an indicative ruling, is em bodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, wh ich provides that “[i]f a timely m otion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending,” the district court may “(3) state either th at it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). “The distri ct court may decide the motion if the c ourt of appeals remands for t hat purpose.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(c). Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 12.1-1(c), “[i]f the motion filed in the district court requests substantive relief from the order or judgment under appeal, such as a
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 7 of 12
motion to m odify a prelim inary injunction . . .,” and if “the di strict court determines that t he motion should be gran ted, the dist rict court should enter an order stating that it intends to grant the motion if [the court of appeals] returns jurisdiction to it.” 11th Cir. R. 12.1-1(c)(2). The Eleventh Circuit then may decide to remand the case for the district court to enter an order granting the motion. Id.
13. The equities favor dissolution, as enforcement of the State’s validly enacted statutes is at stak e. Such statutes “should be recognized and enforced by the courts as em bodying the will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably, beyond al l question, in violation of t he fundamental law of the Constitution.” Atkin v. Kansas , 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) . Indeed, “the publi c interests imperatively demand” this result. Id. For this reason, “the harm which would result” from a continued injuncti on barring enforcement of Section 8 “ti ps in favor of [State] Defendants and the public , both of whom have an interest in noninterference by a federa l court in a state’s ‘l egislative enactments.’” Reed v. Riley, 2008 WL 3931612 *3 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 25, 2008) (citing Atkin, 191 U.S. at 223).
WHEREFORE, the State Defendants re spectfully request that the Court dissolve its Preliminary Injunction of September 28, 2011 against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535, codified at Ala. Code § 31-13-8, (doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2). In the alternative, the State Defendants request that the Court stay the Prelim inary-
7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 8 of 12

Injunction Order with respect to Section 8 pending the appeal, and to issue an order

with an indicative ruling inform ing the El eventh Circuit that upon remand this

Court would dissolve the Preliminary Injunction against Section 8.

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

BY:
s/ Joshua K. Payne Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Joshua K. Payne (ASB-1041-A55P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us
R. Cooper Shattuck GOVERNOR’S LEGAL OFFICE 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: 244-242-7120 Facsimile: 334-242-2335 legal@governor.alabama.gov

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent 8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 9 of 12
Bice, Interim Chancellor Price, and District Attorney Broussard
9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 10 of 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 24, 2012, I electroni cally filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record:

Mary Bauer Andrew H. Turner Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 broder@nilc.org

10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 11 of 12

Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com

Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 nperales@maldef.org

11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 12 of 12

Allison Neal AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 aneal@aclualabama.org

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 apedersen@maldef.org

J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804-2087 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, 7th Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, AL 35283-0709 dsweeney@babc.com

s/ Joshua K. Payne

Of

Counsel

12

 
 Case: 11-14535 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 1 of 27
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 11-14535; 11-14675 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, AIDS ACTION COALITION, HUNTSVILLE INTERNATIONAL HELP CENTER, INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA, ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, INC., SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS UNITED, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1657 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, DREAMACTIVIST.ORG, GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES, BOAT PEOPLE SOS, MATT WEBSTER, MARIA D. CEJA ZAMORA, PAMELA LONG, JUAN PABLO BLACK ROMERO, CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU, ELLIN JIMMERSON, ROBERT BARBER, DANIEL UPTON, JEFFREY ALLEN BECK, MICHELLE CUMMINGS, ESAYAS HAILE,

Case: 11-14535 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 2 of 27
FISEHA TESFAMARIAM, JANE DOE, #1, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #2, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #3, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #4, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #5, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #6, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #2, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #3, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #4, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #5, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #6, allowed by order [103]
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllCross Appellees,
versus
GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA, ALABAMA STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, ALABAMA CHANCELLOR OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR MADISON COUNTY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

Case: 11-14535 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 3 of 27
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllCross Appellants, SUPERINTENDENT OF HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees, CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER, FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF NORTHERN ALABAMA, et al., llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllAmicus Curiae.
________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________ (August 20, 2012)
Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and VOORHEES,* District Judge. WILSON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the challenges of private plaintiffs to various provisions of Alabama’s House Bill 56, the “Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act” (H.B. 56). Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiffs here (the HICA Plaintiffs) brought suit against defendants (the State Officials) contending that sections 8, 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 18, 27, 28, and 301 are preempted
* Honorable Richard L. Voorhees, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
1 Consistent with how this case has been presented, we reference the originally designated sections of H.B. 56 rather than the Alabama Code section where the provisions are currently
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by federal law; that section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause; and that the
last sentence of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) violates the Compulsory Process
Clause.2 In the companion case brought by the United States, we have concluded
that preliminary injunction of sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), and 27 is appropriate, and
that injunction of sections 12, 18, and 30 is not supportable at this stage of
litigation.3 See United States v. Alabama, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674. The
operation of those sections and rationale for our disposition are set forth fully in
the companion case, and herein we address the HICA Plaintiffs’ challenges not
already covered in that opinion.4
Section 8 provides that an unlawfully present alien “shall not be permitted
housed. 2 Additional provisions that were unsuccessfully challenged in the district court are not
contested here. Furthermore, the district court’s ruling concerning section 13 is not contested in this appeal.
3 In briefing filed after the decision in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), the HICA Plaintiffs maintain that sections 12 and 18 are preempted as requiring extended detention to conduct immigration status checks. As we stated in the United States’s companion case, however, Arizona instructs that a facial challenge is premature insofar as the statutes could be construed not to require unlawful detention. We therefore reject the HICA Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary and affirm the district court’s decision regarding sections 12 and 18. Additionally, to the extent that the HICA Plaintiffs now challenge a portion of section 19, we do not consider that argument, which was raised for the first time in the post-Arizona supplemental briefing. Finally, for the reasons stated in the United States’s companion case, we do not find at this time that section 30 is facially invalid.
4 Insofar as the HICA Plaintiffs argue that sections 10 and 27 are preempted, we dismiss the appeal as moot in light of our ruling in the companion case.
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to enroll in or attend any public postsecondary education institution” in Alabama. Ala. Code § 31-13-8. In order to execute this prohibition, officers of those institutions may “seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status with the federal government” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) but cannot independently make a final determination about the immigration status of an alien. Id. Section 8 also renders unlawfully present aliens ineligible for “any postsecondary education benefit, including, but not limited to, scholarships, grants, or financial aid” not otherwise required by law. Id.
Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) each prescribe the means by which a conviction for the corresponding criminal provision may be attained. Each section ends in a common sentence mandating that the Alabama courts “shall consider only the federal government’s [§ 1373(c)] verification in determining whether an alien is” lawfully present in the United States, Ala. Code §§ 31-13-10(e), -13(h), or authorized to work, id. § 31-13-11(e).
Section 28 provides a process for schools to collect data about the immigration status of students who enroll in public school. Schools are required to determine whether an enrolling child “was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(1). That determination is made based on the birth certificate of
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the child. Id. § 31-13-27(a)(2). If none is available, or if the certificate reflects that “the student was born outside . . . the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States,” then the enrolling child’s parent or guardian must notify the school of the “actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under federal law.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(3). This notification consists of (a) official citizenship or immigration documentation and (b) an attestation under penalty of perjury that the document identifies the child. Id. § 31-13-27(a)(4). If the statutory notification is not provided, then the student is presumed to be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5).
Before H.B. 56 became effective, the HICA Plaintiffs, along with the United States, filed suit to invalidate certain provisions of the law. The HICA Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the operation of numerous provisions of the law, and the district court consolidated its case with the related suit brought by the United States for purposes of deciding the injunction. Relevant here, the district court enjoined sections 8, 11(a), and 13 as preempted by federal law and sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) as violative of the Compulsory Process Clause. It also found that none of the HICA Plaintiffs had standing to challenge section 28.
Both sides appealed. The United States and HICA Plaintiffs contested the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, and Alabama cross-appealed the
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district court’s grant of preliminary injunctive relief. After filing its notice of appeal, the United States and HICA Plaintiffs sought from this court an injunction pending appeal to prevent enforcement of the sections for which the district court denied an injunction. A panel of this court granted in part the motion for injunction pending appeal, enjoining enforcement of sections 10 and 28. Later, after briefing and oral argument, we modified the injunction pending ultimate disposition of this appeal and enjoined enforcement of sections 27 and 30.
Having closely considered the positions and new briefing of the parties in light of the recent decision in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the order of the district court, and we dismiss parts of the HICA Plaintiffs’ appeal as moot. Specifically, we affirm the district court with respect to the challenges to sections 12, 18, and 30. We further conclude that at least one organization has standing to challenge section 28 and that the HICA Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the claim that section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s decision regarding this section and remand for the entry of a preliminary injunction. Because the Alabama legislature has eliminated the challenged language from section 8, we vacate as moot the district court’s injunction of that provision and remand for the dismissal of the challenge to that
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section.5 In light of our decision regarding the substantive provisions of sections 10, 11, and 13, we vacate as moot the district court’s injunction of the last sentence of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). Finally, because we find sections 10 and 27 preempted in the companion case brought by the United States, we dismiss as moot the HICA Plaintiffs’ appeal as to these sections.
I. Standard of Review We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Legal determinations underlying the grant of an injunction are reviewed de novo, and factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1171–72 (11th Cir. 2002).
II. Discussion A preliminary injunction may be granted to a moving party who establishes “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.”
5 In the United States’s companion case, we found a likelihood of success on the preemption claims made against sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), 16, 17, and 27.
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Robertson, 147 F.3d at 1306. We address these factors in turn, focusing in particular on the most contested determination—whether the HICA Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 1. Section 8
As originally enacted, section 8 prohibited a wide array of aliens from attending public postsecondary educational institutions in Alabama. The first sentence of that section prohibited enrollment of “[a]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code § 31-13-8. The second sentence, however, expressly limited enrollment to aliens who “possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” Id. The district court enjoined section 8 in its entirety on the ground that it constituted an unconstitutional classification of aliens. Since that ruling, the Alabama legislature has amended section 8 to remove the second sentence entirely, which was understood to define lawful presence as requiring lawful permanent residence or a nonimmigrant visa.
There is no doubt that “[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2399 (1982) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941)). In its
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complaint and briefs, HICA challenges the classification of—not the underlying prohibition on—unlawfully present aliens who seek to attend an educational postsecondary institution. Complaint at ¶¶ 217–220 (charging that section 8 “impermissibly discriminates between citizens and lawfully residing noncitizens, and among groups of lawfully residing noncitizens”); Appellants’ CrossAppellees’ Reply/Response Br. at 48 (urging correctness of the district court’s ruling on the merits that section 8 “creates an unlawful state classification of aliens”). The complained-of sentence, which the district court concluded ran afoul of federal law and Supreme Court precedent, see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225, 102 S. Ct. at 2399, has been removed by the state legislature. Because section 8 has been “amended so as to remove its challenged feature[],” the HICA Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief has no basis in the present statute. Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992). We therefore vacate the district court’s injunction of section 8 as moot and remand for the dismissal of the challenge.
2. Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) The HICA Plaintiffs claim that the final sentences of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) violate the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We need not reach the merits of this contention in light of our ruling in the United States’s companion case that sections 10, 11(a), and 13(a) are preempted. The
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challenged provisions limiting the evidentiary presentation for violations of those provisions will not be applied because the underlying criminal prohibitions are unenforceable. We therefore vacate the district court’s injunction of these specific sentences as moot.
3. Section 28 The HICA Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s threshold finding that none of the individuals or organizations had standing to challenge section 28. We agree with Plaintiffs that at least one organization has standing to challenge this provision. We further conclude that the HICA Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
a. Standing “‘[A]n organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if the defendant’s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.’” Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008)). In Common Cause, we found that an organizational plaintiff suffered cognizable injury when it was forced to “divert resources from its regular activities to educate and assist [affected individuals] in complying with the [challenged] statute.” Id. Browning presented
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an injury similar to that in Common Cause, and we found organizational standing proper in that case on the ground that the organizations “reasonably anticipate[d] that they [would] have to divert personnel and time to educating volunteers and [affected individuals] on compliance” with the statute’s requirements. 522 F.3d at 1165–66.
Here, Plaintiff Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. has claimed injuries analogous to those present in Common Cause and Browning. John A. Pickens, the Executive Director of Alabama Appleseed, submitted declarations to explain the manner in which H.B. 56, and particularly section 28, has affected and will continue to affect his organization. Pickens declared that many of the inquiries received by the organization were prompted by the passage of H.B. 56 and related to the education provision at issue, including questions about how to enroll children in school, whether children should be enrolled, how schools will use the information collected, and whether parents will suffer immigration consequences as a result of a child’s enrollment. In response to the passage of H.B. 56, Alabama Appleseed has hosted presentations to convey information about the consequences of the law, including its education provision. Furthermore, the time and money expended on the planning and execution of these events has forced the organization to divert resources from other immigration
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policy work. According to Pickens, these endeavors “will continue to be detrimentally impacted” as they will have to be “substantially curtail[ed] or stop[ped].” These alleged injuries are sufficient under our precedent to confer standing on Alabama Appleseed.6 See Common Cause, 554 F.3d at 1350; Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165–66.
b. Merits Section 28 requires every public elementary and secondary school within Alabama to determine upon enrollment whether the enrolling child “was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1). The school must make this determination by examining the birth certificate the student has presented. Id. § 31-13-27(a)(2). If the birth certificate reveals “that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if the birth certificate is unavailable, then the child’s guardian must within thirty days notify the school of the “actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under federal law.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(3); see
6 Because one plaintiff with standing is sufficient to permit our review of the constitutionality of section 28, we proceed to address the merits without regard to the standing of other individuals or organizations. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part on other grounds, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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also id. § 31-13-27(a)(4) (setting forth the notification procedure). If the notification procedure laid out in the statute is not satisfied, then “the school official shall presume for the purposes of reporting under this section that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5). Public disclosure of information that identifies a student is prohibited “except for purposes permitted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644.” Id. § 31-13-27(e).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “direct[s] that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). Practically, though, “most legislation classifies for one purpose of another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). In light of this reality, certain statutory classifications require more exacting scrutiny when the court reviews their compatibility with the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440–42, 105 S. Ct. at 3254–55 (summarizing constitutionally protected classifications and providing the character of judicial scrutiny to be applied on review).
Apart from certain classifications, the Supreme Court has recognized that where a statute significantly interferes with the exercise of a protected right, it
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must also be reviewed under a similarly heightened level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S. Ct. 673, 682 (1978) (addressing equal protection in the context of the right to marry); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 262 n.21, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 1084 (1974) (context of the right to interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–28, 630, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 1889–90, 1891 (1969) (context of the right to vote); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997) (utilizing the rational basis standard to review New York statutes governing the right to physician-assisted suicide because they involved neither a protected right nor a suspect classification).
Together, the specific interplay between the types of individuals affected by the statute and the deprivation at issue may justify requiring a heightened level of scrutiny to uphold the statute’s categorization. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24, 102 S. Ct. at 2398 (explaining that Texas’s law preventing unlawfully present children from obtaining a free public education “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State”); id. at 235, 102 S. Ct. at 2404 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 238, 102 S. Ct. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990) (collecting cases to illustrate that statutes implicating a
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combination of protected rights are comparatively less likely to survive review);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1542 (1972) (“[W]hen the
interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature
revealed by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s
requirement . . . .”).
The State Officials assert that heightened scrutiny is not warranted because
section 28 is only a means to collect data, which does not implicate any right protected by the Equal Protection Clause.7 See, e.g., Morales v. Daley, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 801, 814–15 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (upholding the national census against a
Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge). This argument, though, does not
conclusively resolve the whole of the equal protection inquiry before us. Nor is it
enough to argue that, unlike the statute at issue in Plyler, section 28 does not by its
terms purport to deny an education to any child. Our duty, instead, is to analyze
whether section 28 operates in such a way that it “significantly interferes with the
7 We reject the argument that the Equal Protection Clause is not triggered by section 28’s reporting requirement. “A violation of the equal protection clause may occur when a legislative body enacts a law which ‘has a special impact on less than all the persons subject to its jurisdiction.’” Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820, 822 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587–88, 99 S. Ct. 1355, 1367 (1979) (ellipsis omitted)). A statute requiring children and their parents to reveal their immigration status upon enrollment in school certainly has a “special impact” on a subset of Alabama’s population seeking to so enroll.
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exercise of” the right to an elementary public education as guaranteed by Plyler. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383, 98 S. Ct. at 679. We conclude that it does and, further, find that no substantial state interest justifies the interference.
In Plyler the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute denying free public education to undocumented children violated the Equal Protection Clause. 457 U.S. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2401–02. The Court addressed the constitutional infirmities of the state’s refusal to reimburse local school boards for the educational expenses of unlawfully present children as well as the requirement of local school boards that those children pay a tuition fee in order to attend public school. See id. at 215–16, 102 S. Ct. at 2394. In finding an equal protection violation, the Court emphasized the blamelessness of the children who were subject to the burden, see id. at 219–20, 102 S. Ct. at 2396, and underscored the importance of providing education free of “unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit,” id. at 222, 102 S. Ct. at 2397. In light of the “fundamental role” of education “in maintaining the fabric of our society,” id. at 221, 102 S. Ct. at 2397, the Court required a heightened justification—a substantial interest of the state—in order to sustain the debilitating effects that a lack of education can have on the specific community of individuals affected by the law and the country as a whole, id. at 224, 102 S. Ct. at 2398.
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The Court analyzed four goals that could arguably legitimize the statute, finding each insufficient to uphold the Texas law. First, the Court quickly dismissed an interest in preservation of resources for the state’s lawful residents as no more than “a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.” Id. at 227, 102 S. Ct. at 2400. The Court next explained that the goal of deterring illegal immigration was not a sufficient goal to justify the law, recognizing that other means would be much more effective at accomplishing that objective. Id. at 228–29, 102 S. Ct. at 2400–01 (“Charging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration, at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens.” (quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Third, the Court clarified that undocumented children did not so burden the provision of educational resources as to require the statutory distinction from legally resident alien children. See id. at 229, 102 S. Ct. at 2401. Finally, it dismissed any distinction between documented and undocumented children in the context of which students might put their education to productive use within the state’s territorial boundaries, see id. at 229–30, 102 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court concluded by questioning the use of a law that works to promote “the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates,” which would “surely add[] to the
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problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.” Id. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2402.
The State Officials differentiate Plyler on the ground that, by its terms, section 28 affects every child who enrolls in school. It is true that the preliminary requirement of showing a birth certificate applies equally to each child, but that does not fully describe the operation of section 28. The “special impact” challenged here is not an inability to show a birth certificate but the statemandated disclosure of the immigration status of the child (and possibly his or her parents) upon enrollment. Other sections of H.B. 56 compel the conclusion that, despite the characterization of the State Officials, section 28 targets the population of undocumented school children in Alabama. For example, section 2 states that one of the goals of the bill is “to accurately measure and assess the population of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code § 31-13-2 (emphasis added). Clearly, the law contemplates no interest in the birthplace of any child who is lawfully present, and the blanket requirement that all students show a birth certificate is simply a necessary means by which section 28 forces unlawfully present aliens to divulge their unlawful status.
Under the terms of section 28, the parent or guardian of any student who (1) is not lawfully present, (2) was born outside of the United States, or (3) cannot
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produce a birth certificate “shall notify the school . . . of the actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under federal law.” Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(3) (emphasis added). The form of this notification is also governed by statute and requires official documentation (or a notarized recognition of the documentation) in addition to a parental attestation under penalty of perjury verifying the identity of the child in order to satisfy school officials of a student’s legal status. Id. § 3113-27(a)(4). Undocumented children, obviously, cannot produce the requisite documentation to satisfy these criteria; likewise the failure to submit any required notification documents means that the school “shall presume . . . that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5). Consequently, section 28 operates to place undocumented children, and their families, in an impossible dilemma: either admit your unlawful status outright or concede it through silence. In either scenario, the relevant state database will identify the student as an unlawfully present alien, even though that individual may be a “child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 102 S. Ct. at 2399.
Compared to the tuition requirement struck down in Plyler, section 28 imposes similar obstacles to the ability of an undocumented child to obtain an education—it mandates disclosure of the child’s unlawful status as a prerequisite
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to enrollment in public school. This hurdle will understandably deter this
population from enrolling in and attending school because, as unlawfully present
aliens, “these children are subject to deportation,” and removal proceedings can be
instituted upon the federal government being informed of their undocumented
status. Id. Alabama learns of this status upon enrollment in school, and as fully
explained below, federal statutes prohibit Alabama from restricting the disclosure
of this information. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644. Moreover, revealing the illegal
status of children could lead to criminal prosecution, harassment, and
intimidation.8 See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that revealing the immigration status of the plaintiffs could lead to
legal consequences and would likely deter them from exercising legal rights); Liu
v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). We are of
the mind that an increased likelihood of deportation or harassment upon
8 It is this reality that has led federal courts—including the district court here—to permit the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in immigration-related cases. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (vacating for further consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Tile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2000); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, No. 11-1804 (N.D. Ga. July 8, 2011) (order granting motion to proceed under pseudonyms); see also Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323–24 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (setting forth relevant factors to consideration of a motion to proceed under a pseudonym). It is also relevant that the Supreme Court case to address the rights of undocumented children in education, Plyler v. Doe, involved plaintiffs who were allowed to proceed anonymously.
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enrollment in school significantly deters undocumented children from enrolling in
and attending school, in contravention of their rights under Plyler.9
The State Officials understandably counter that section 28 restricts the
dissemination of the private information of these children and their families, which
presumably would eliminate the risk of adverse immigration consequences. These
privacy restrictions, however, are wholly ineffectual in themselves. Section 28
limits the public disclosure of information “except for purposes permitted pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644.” Ala. Code. § 31-13-27(e). Sections 1373 and
1644, in turn, require Alabama to provide immigration-related information to the
federal government and other states upon request and prohibit Alabama from
restricting this transfer of information.10 Any textual prohibition on revealing the
9 Nor are we alone in arriving at this conclusion. Indeed, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been conducting an investigation into the increased absentee rate of undocumented children that occurred immediately after the passage of H.B. 56—a rate that tripled. See Mary Orndorff, DOJ Looks at State School Records, Birmingham News, Nov. 5, 2011, at A1; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, to Dr. Thomas R. Bice, State Superintendent of Education (May 1, 2012).
10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”); id. § 1373(b)(3) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from . . . [e]xchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity.”); id. § 1644 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding
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immigration status of the children and their families is of little comfort when federal law requires that disclosure upon request. Consequently, the risks that accompany revealing the illegal status of the school children is not mitigated by the ineffectual privacy restrictions of section 28.
Having concluded that section 28 substantially burdens the rights secured by Plyler, we may only uphold it if the provision “furthers some substantial state interest.” 457 U.S. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2402. We note initially that, as the HICA Plaintiffs point out, the State Officials have only attempted to defend section 28 under the rational basis standard. This alone is sufficient to allow us to conclude that section 28 cannot be upheld because under heightened scrutiny, it is the state that bears the burden of demonstrating that the measure is constitutional. See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 262–63, 94 S. Ct. at 1084.
Even assuming that the various justifications offered by the State Officials are advanced in an attempt to survive heightened scrutiny, we find none to be convincing. First, the State Officials justify section 28 with the school-related legislative findings of H.B. 56. See Ala. Code § 31-13-2. The State Officials cite to the desire to collect data about “the costs incurred by school districts” to educate unlawfully present children in order “to accurately measure and assess”
the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.”). 23

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the undocumented student population and “to forecast and plan for any impact”
that their presence may have on the state’s public-education program. Id. The
briefing of the State Officials in the companion case, No. 11-14532, concedes that
section 28 “is . . . unlikely to yield particularly precise data,” thereby recognizing
that the stated legislative purpose will probably not be effectuated by the data-
collection provision.11 Corrected Response Brief for Appellees at 53. Along those
lines, it is difficult to fathom how admittedly inaccurate data would be used to
forecast the needs and plan for impact of populations of undocumented school
children, especially given that the population of interest cannot be denied a free
public elementary or secondary education in the first place. See Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 228–29, 102 S. Ct. at 2401. Aside from that, the State Officials have not
suggested that the relevant data could not be obtained in any other way. The
conclusion that Section 28 “unnecessarily impinge[s]” upon the children’s rights
11 The State Officials also argue that, “[t]o the extent that the count [s]ection 28 generates is not precise, that is only because the statute goes out of its way not to force parents or their students to release immigration-status information if they choose not to do so.” Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala., Nos. 11-14535, 11-14675, Response Brief for Appellees at 58. We find this humanitarian justification implausible, given the mandatory language of section 28 that each school shall determine the immigration status of each student, that each parent shall inform the school of the child’s status, and that each school shall label the student as unlawfully present in the event no paperwork is provided. The position of the State Officials is further undermined by section 6, which requires maximum enforcement of H.B. 56. Specifically, section 6 forbids state actors from restricting the enforcement of H.B. 56 “to less than the full extent permitted” therein, Ala. Code § 31-13-6(a), and provides for civil penalties in the event the law is not enforced to the maximum extent, id. § 31-13-6(d). See also id. § 31-13-6(f) (imposing a duty on all public employees to report violations of H.B. 56).
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Case: 11-14535 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 25 of 27
under Plyler is thus inescapable. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388, 98 S. Ct. at 682. The State Officials posit additional justifications at a general level,
supposing that the data could be used to defend “litigation in which the costs of illegal immigration are at issue” or to “enlighten the public about the impacts of illegal immigration.” Although those might be legitimate state interests, the means chosen by Alabama “unnecessarily burden[s]” the children’s right to a basic education. Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 263, 94 S. Ct. at 1084. Again, the State Officials concede that the data collected through section 28 is inaccurate, and they have not otherwise suggested that the relevant data cannot be obtained in other ways. In short, we do not find these justifications, which fit into the general category of “because we want to know,” substantial enough to justify the significant interference with the children’s right to education under Plyler. We therefore conclude that section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Equitable Factors The equities favor enjoining the operation of section 28. As explained above, that provision imposes a substantial burden on the right of undocumented school children to receive an education. Alabama has no interest in enforcing a state law that is unconstitutional, and the interference with the educational rights of undocumented children is not a harm that can be compensated by monetary
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damages. See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An injury is irreparable ‘if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.’” (quoting Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987))). In Plyler, the Supreme Court distinguished education as essential to maintaining “the fabric of our society” and noted “the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child.” 457 U.S. at 221, 102 S. Ct. at 2396, 2397. Given the important role of education in our society, and the injuries that would arise from deterring unlawfully present children from seeking the benefit of education, we conclude that the equities favor enjoining this provision.
III. Conclusion Because we have found that the United States is likely to succeed on its claims that sections 10 and 27 are preempted, we dismiss the HICA Plaintiffs’ appeal as to those sections as moot. We vacate as moot the district court’s injunction of section 8 and remand for the dismissal of the challenge to that section, as the statutory amendment has removed the challenged language. In light of our decision on the substantive provisions of sections 10, 11, and 13, we vacate as moot the district court’s order insofar as it preliminarily enjoins the last sentence of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). We find that at least one of the HICA Plaintiffs has standing to challenge section 28 and that section 28 violates the
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Case: 11-14535 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 27 of 27
Equal Protection Clause. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision and remand for the entry of a preliminary injunction. Finally, we conclude, for the reasons stated in the United States’s companion case, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674, that the HICA Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits of their facial challenge to sections 12, 18, and 30 at this time.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
27

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 1 of 12

FILED
2013 Oct-29 PM 03:29 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) ) ) )

JOINT REPORT REGARDING CASE STATUS AND DISPOSITION Plaintiffs (collectively “HICA Plaintiffs”), State Defendants 1 and Local Superintendent Defendants2 (collectively “Defendants”) have conferred about the proper disposition of this matter in light of decisions by the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit. (The parties in United States v. Alabama, No. 5:11-cv-02746SLB, and Parsley v. Bentley, No. 5:11-cv-02736-SLB, have also conferred about the proper disposition of those related matters.) All parties believe a full consensual resolution of these cases is now possible. In the interests of aiding the

1 The State Defendants are Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Bice, Chancellor Heinrich, and District Attorney Broussard. The State Defendants are sued in their official capacities.
2 The Local Superintendent Defendants are: E. Casey Wardyniski, Jamie Blair, Randy Fuller, Charles D. Warren, Barbara W. Thompson, and Jeffrey E. Langham. The Local Superintendent Defendants are sued in their official capacities.
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Court to bring about a proper and efficient resolution of these cases, the parties in HICA make the following representations and requests regarding the various statutory provisions at issue:
1. Section 28 of H.B. 56.3 The parties in HICA agree that the Eleventh Circuit panel’s decision in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012), holds that Section 28 of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code § 31-1327) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants agree that the plaintiff previously expressly found by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to have standing to challenge Section 28, Alabama Appleseed, satisfies the other requirements for obtaining a final injunction against Section 28. 4 The parties therefore agree that a final injunction is due to be issued in the HICA case against Section 28. State Defendants reserve their rights, should circumstances change in the future, to seek modification of a final injunction against these provisions via a post-judgment motion, to the extent permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3 All references herein to H.B. 56 incorporate any amendments made thereto by H.B. 658 (Act 2012-491). 4 The HICA Plaintiffs maintain all organizational plaintiffs and plaintiffs Jane Does ##1-6, and John Does ##1-2 have standing to challenge Section 28 and satisfy the other requirements for obtaining a final injunction against Section 28.
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2. Section 11(f) and (g) of H.B. 56. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants agree that in light of this Court’s reasoning in its previous preliminaryinjunction order (Doc. # 137) and other considerations, Sections 11(f) and (g) of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code § 31-13-11(f) and (g)) violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants agree that the plaintiff previously expressly found by this Court to have standing to challenge Section 11(f) and (g), John Doe #6, satisfies the other requirements for obtaining a final injunction against these provisions. 5 The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants therefore agree that a final injunction is due to be issued in the HICA case against Sections 11(f) and (g). State Defendants reserve their rights, should circumstances change in the future, to seek modification of a final injunction against these provisions via a post-judgment motion, to the extent permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Sections 10, 11(a), 13, and 27 of H.B. 56 and Section 6 of H.B. 658. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants agree that, based on the Eleventh Circuit panel’s decision in United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, Sections 10, 11(a), 13, and 27 of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code §§ 31-13-10, -11(a), -13, & -26), and Section 6 of H.B. 658 (Ala. Code § 31-13-33), violate the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
5 The HICA Plaintiffs maintain that plaintiff John Doe #5 has standing to challenge Section 11(f) and (g) and can satisfy the other requirements for obtaining a final injunction against Section 11(f) and (g).
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the United States Constitution. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants further agree that, because the HICA Plaintiffs also challenged these sections as violating the Supremacy Clause, it i s appropriate for this Court to enter a permanent injunction in the HICA Plaintiffs’ favor as to these provisions. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants further understand that the parties to United States v. Alabama, No. 5:11-cv-02746-SLB, are simultaneously agreeing that this Court is due to issue permanent injunctions in that case against Sections 10, 11(a), 13, and 27 of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code §§ 31-13-10, -11(a), -13, & -26), and Section 6 of H.B. 658 (Ala. Code § 31-13-33).
4. Sections 12, 18, and 20 of H.B. 56. The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants agree that they understand the Supreme Court to have held in Arizona that it would “raise constitutional concerns” for state or local officers to “[d]etain[] individuals solely to ve rify their immigration status” or to “delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2012). The HICA Plaintiffs and State Defendants further agree that they understand the Supreme Court to have held that “[t]he program put in place by Congress does not allow” state or local officers to “hold[] aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision” and thus that a state law that authorized this law-enforcement mechanism would violate the Supremacy Clause
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of the United States Constitution. Id. Accordingly, the State Defendants represent that, to address those constitutional problems, they interpret Sections 12, 18, and 20 of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code §§ 31-13-12, 31-13-19, & 32-6-9) to neither require nor authorize state or local law-enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest, or prolong the detention of any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person’s immigration status or because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration status.6 On the basis of State Defendants’ representations about their interpretation of Sections 12, 18, and 20 as executive officials of the Alabama government, the HICA Plaintiffs will move to voluntarily dismiss their claims as to Sections 12, 18, and 20, without prejudice to the HICA Plaintiffs’ ability to re-file claims against Sections 12, 18, and 20 in the future. The State Defendants consent to the voluntary dismissal of these claims.
5. Section 19 of H.B. 56. The State Defendants represent that, to comport with constitutional requirements as set forth by the Supreme Court in Arizona, they interpret Section 19(a) to neither require nor to authorize state or local law-enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest, or prolong the detention of any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person’s immigration status or
6 The State Defendants note that their representation is limited to the proper meaning of Sections 12, 18, and 20 under state law, and that they are not making any representations in this document about whether officials have separate authority under federal law, independent of any provisions set out in H.B. 56, to take actions at the direction of the federal government.
5

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because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration status. 7 State Defendants further represent that in light of Article 1, Section 16, of the Alabama Constitution, they understand that Section 19(b) of H.B. 56 (Ala. Code § 31-1318(b)) can only be applied to deny bail to persons arrested for a capital crime, and cannot be applied to deny bail to individuals arrested for or charged with solely for non-capital crimes, regardless of their immigration status. On the basis of State Defendants’ representations, HICA Plaintiffs move to voluntarily dismiss their claims as to S ection 19, without prejudice to HICA Plaintiffs’ ability to r e-file claims against Section 19 in the future. The State Defendants consent to th e voluntary dismissal.
6. HICA Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims. The HICA Plaintiffs will voluntarily dismiss all claims not specifically referenced above without prejudice. The Defendants consent to the voluntary dismissal of these claims.
7. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. State Defendants shall remit to counsel for the HICA plaintiffs payment in t he amount of $350,000.00, as settlement of plaintiffs’ claim to any and all attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred, charged, or otherwise generated by counsel for the HICA plaintiffs from the inception of this
7 The State Defendants note that their representation is limited to the proper meaning of Section 19(a) under state law, and that they are not making any representations in this document about whether officials have separate authority under federal law, independent of any provisions set out in H.B. 56, to take actions at the direction of the federal government.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 7 of 12
litigation through the date of entry of this Joint Report and accompanying Proposed Final Judgment. In consideration of the foregoing payment by the State Defendants the HICA plaintiffs and their counsel hereby voluntarily, completely, and unconditionally waive any and all right, claim, and/or entitlement to the recovery of any other monies of any kind from any Defendant in this litigation for any and all attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred, charged, or otherwise generated by counsel for the HICA plaintiffs from the inception of this litigation through the date of entry of this Joint Report and accompanying Proposed Final Judgment. The parties further agree that the above-referenced sum will be paid to HICA plaintiffs’ counsel within 21 days after entry of the accompanying Proposed Final Judgment by the Court.
8. Final order. Accordingly, all parties consent to the form of Final Judgment submitted herewith, subject to the reservations and other statements made herein.
9. Reservations. The HICA Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissals of various claims are without prejudice to the filing of new claims against any of those provisions in the future should there be a legal and factual basis for such claims. Likewise, the State Defendants reserve their right, should pertinent circumstances change in the future, to seek modification of the injunctions in the Final Judgment via a post-judgment motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Respectfully submitted,

tin Cox n behalfofAttorneys for Plaintiffs

Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 samuel. brooke@splcenter. org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu. org kdesormeau@aclu. org
Kristi L. Graunke* Michelle R. Lapointe* Naomi Tsu* Daniel Werner* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 kristi.graunke@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi. tsu@splcenter. org daniel. werner@splcenter. org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu. org ojadwat@aclu. org lgelernt@aclu. org mtan@aclu. org emukherjee@acll}. org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc. org keaney@nilc. org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 9 of 12

Winifred Kao* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 winifredk@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor

9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 10 of 12

Justin B. Cox* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-5854 jcox@aclu.org

Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice.

Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 11 of 12

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
BY:
s/ John C. Neiman, Jr. __________________________________
Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks Messick
(ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mmessick@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Counsel for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Bice, Chancellor Heinrich, and District Attorney Broussard

11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 179 Filed 10/29/13 Page 12 of 12

 
 Nos. 11-14535 and 11-14675
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v.
ROBERT BENTLEY, et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Mary Bauer Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200

Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900

Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Andre I. Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660
Kristi L. Graunke Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700

Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282
Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201-0835
Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney ACLU OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: (205) 443-7858

Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300
Foster S. Maer Diana S. Sen LATINO JUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360

Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney Watson, McKinney &Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133

- ii -

G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785
Winifred Kao Reena Arya ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 T: (415) 896-1701

Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12
Justin Cox AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 230 Peachtree St., NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 T: (404) 523-2721

- iii -

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ......................................................................................................iv ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3 I. Section 10/Ala. Code § 31-13-10 is preempted...............................................3 II. Section 11(a)/Ala. Code § 31-13-11(a) is preempted......................................3 III. Section 28/Ala. Code § 31-13-27 is preempted...............................................4 IV. Section 12/Ala. Code § 31-13-12, Section 18 as amended by H.B.
658/Ala. Code § 32-6-9, and Section 19/Ala. Code § 31-13-18, are preempted. .......................................................................................................5 A. H.B. 56 requires extended detention after immigration status
verification, which is preempted under Arizona v. United States.........6 B. H.B. 56 requires extended detention before immigration status
is verified, which is preempted under Arizona v. United States...........7 V. Section 13/Ala. Code § 31-13-13, as amended by H.B. 658, is
preempted. .......................................................................................................9 VI. Section 27/Ala. Code § 31-13-26, as amended by H.B. 658, is
preempted. .....................................................................................................11 VII. Section 30/Ala. Code § 31-13-29, as amended by H.B. 658, is
preempted. .....................................................................................................13 VIII. Section 8/Ala. Code § 31-13-8, as amended by H.B. 658, should be
remanded for further consideration by the district court...............................14
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Since the Court heard oral argument on March 1, 2012, there have been two developments warranting supplemental briefing. First, on May 18, 2012, Governor Bentley signed H.B. 658 into law, which amends various sections of H.B. 56. None of the amendments cure the statute’s constitutional defects. Second, on June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (slip opinion available at www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/11pdf/11182b5e1.pdf), which reaffirms federal supremacy over immigration and makes even clearer that Alabama’s H.B. 56 cannot stand.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona supports Plaintiffs’ arguments in the instant case. First, the Supreme Court strongly refuted Arizona’s state immigration policy of “attrition through enforcement,” which also pervades Alabama’s H.B. 56. See Arizona, slip op. 1; see also Ala. Code § 31-13-2 (policy of “discouraging illegal immigration”). Second, the Supreme Court held preempted three key provisions of Arizona’s law: (1) an alien registration statute analogous to Section 10 of Alabama’s H.B. 56; (2) a substantive criminal statute penalizing unauthorized employment or solicitation of employment, analogous to Section 11(a) of H.B. 56; and (3) a warrantless arrest provision that would have empowered Arizona officers to make arrests based on probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a “public offense” that made him or her deportable. And third, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s order
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enjoining Arizona’s Section 2(B), which requires immigration status checks during stops and detentions, by finding that the United States had not presented sufficient evidence of a facial conflict with federal law or policy. The Court warned, however, that “it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision,” and that “[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns.” Arizona, slip op. 22. The Court therefore held that Section 2(B) should not have been enjoined, and remanded to permit clarification by lower courts on the provision’s meaning, and for consideration of other constitutional challenges to Section 2(B). Id. at 22-24.
The Arizona decision stands for the basic proposition that when a state enacts its own immigration policy—either by creating immigration crimes or by enforcing federal immigration laws in a manner not contemplated by Congress—it is preempted by federal law. The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that Alabama’s Sections 10 (criminalizing failing to register) and 11(a) (criminalizing solicitation of work) must be enjoined, because they are indistinguishable from parts of the Arizona law the Supreme Court struck down. The Arizona decision also provides further support to maintain this Court’s injunction of Section 28 because it functions as a de facto and impermissible alien registration scheme in conflict with federal law. Sections 12, 18 (as amended by H.B. 658) and 19 also
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must be enjoined because, on the record in this case, they contravene the constitutional limits set in Arizona v. United States. While Sections 13, 27, and 30 have no exact analogues to Arizona’s law, they are clearly invalid under the Court’s analysis. Finally, the injunction of Section 8 should be remanded to the district court in light of H.B. 658’s recent amendment of that section.
ARGUMENT I. Section 10/Ala. Code § 31-13-10 is preempted.
Arizona requires reversal of the district court’s denial of an injunction of Section 10. Section 10 creates a state crime for failing to carry registration papers, and is virtually identical to Section 3 of S.B. 1070. Compare Ala. Code § 31-1310(a) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1509(A) & (F). The Supreme Court found the Arizona provision to be field-preempted. Arizona, slip op. 8-11. The same result is required here. Because “Congress intended to preclude States from ‘complement[ing] the federal law, or enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations’” related to alien registration, id. at 11 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941), alterations in original), Section 10 is preempted. II. Section 11(a)/Ala. Code § 31-13-11(a) is preempted.
Arizona requires affirmance of the district court’s injunction of Section 11(a). Section 11(a), which criminalizes seeking or engaging in work when a
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person lacks federal work authorization, parallels Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070. Compare Ala. Code § 31-13-11(a) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2928(C). The Supreme Court held that Arizona’s provision conflicted with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), reasoning that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.” Arizona, slip op. 15 (citation omitted, alterations in original). Section 11(a) likewise conflicts with IRCA, and is preempted. III. Section 28/Ala. Code § 31-13-27 is preempted.
Section 28, which sets up a system to inquire into the immigration status of students and their parents when the students are enrolled in school, is unconstitutional because it is preempted as a regulation of immigration, conflicts with federal law, and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Blue Br. 44-64; Yellow Br. 32-41. The Arizona decision further supports enjoining Section 28 because it constitutes an impermissible “‘additional or auxiliary regulation’” of immigration registration. Slip op. 11 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S. Ct. 399).
Section 28 creates a de facto immigration registration process with which every immigrant child entering Alabama’s public schools (and parent or guardian thereof) must comply. The data will be stored in a centralized database, along with other demographic information such as date of birth and home address. See, e.g., Morton Mem. at *10 (Vol. II, R. 82-3) (providing screen shot of student
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management system). Indeed, Section 28 not only intrudes into an area of federal dominance, but it also conflicts with the federal registration scheme by imposing requirements on children as young as those entering kindergarten, while the federal registration requirements explicitly exempt children under the age of 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a). It also conflicts with § 1643(a)(2) by serving as a deterrent to enrollment. See Blue Br. 42, Yellow Br. 53-54.
Because Section 28 is designed to deter enrollment of children of immigrants through a de facto registration scheme, it intrudes into an area reserved by Congress, and therefore is preempted. See Arizona, slip op. 11. IV. Section 12/Ala. Code § 31-13-12, Section 18 as amended by H.B.
658/Ala. Code § 32-6-9, and Section 19/Ala. Code § 31-13-18, are preempted. Sections 12, 18, and 19 of H.B. 56 relate to circumstances where an officer must make inquiries into an individual’s immigration status. H.B. 658 did not amend Section 12, but did amend Section 18 by eliminating subparts (b)-(d) and inserting a new subpart (b). See H.B. 658 (amending Ala. Code § 32-6-9). The elimination of Section 18(d) neither resolves nor moots any part of Plaintiffs’ preemption claim however, for an identical provision appears in Section 19(b) of H.B. 56. Compare Ala. Code § 32-6-9(d) (2011) with § 31-13-18(b). See Naturist Soc., Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs’ briefing on identical language in Section 18(d) applies equally to Section 19(b). See Blue Br.
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35; Yellow Br. 16. As explained below, the Court should reverse the district court’s denial of an
injunction of Sections 12, 18, and 19 because these statutes authorize extended detention both after a person is determined to be an alien unlawfully present, and while that verification is occurring. This authorization directly conflicts with federal law and policies, as articulated in Arizona.
A. H.B. 56 requires extended detention after immigration status verification, which is preempted under Arizona v. United States.
The Arizona Court warned that “it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision.” Slip op. 22. Section 19(b) violates this requirement. Where Alabama law enforcement has “determined” that an individual is “an alien unlawfully present,” the individual must continue to “be detained until prosecution or until [the person is] handed over to federal immigration authorities.” Ala. Code § 31-13-18(b). Thus, under Section 19’s plain language, a person will be detained for an indeterminate period until the Alabama officer deems it sufficiently clear that she will not be prosecuted, and that federal authorities will not take her into custody. State Defendants appear to agree with this reading, based on their analysis of the identical Section 18(d) language. See Red Br. 26 (“So if authorities decline to prosecute the defendant and the federal government does not request the person‘s detention, Section 18[(d)]
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envisions that person‘s immediate release.”). Because this provision requires holding noncitizens for as long as is
necessary to determine if the federal government of whether it is interested in that individual, it runs afoul of the guidepost established in Arizona: state statutes may not authorize detention without “federal direction or supervision.” Arizona, slip op. 22; cf. slip op. 19 (state officers generally “may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability”). Section 19(b) is thus preempted.
B. H.B. 56 requires extended detention before immigration status is verified, which is preempted under Arizona v. United States.
Sections 12(a) and 18(b) (as amended by H.B. 658) also authorize extended detention, and are therefore preempted. Section 12(a) provides that a verification of immigration status must occur “where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States . . . .” Ala. Code § 31-13-12(a). Although the provision goes on to say that only “a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable,” this language does not eliminate Section 12(a)’s clear mandate that officers must extend detention. In contrast, Section 12(b) specifically provides that if the “federal verification . . . is delayed beyond the time that the alien would otherwise be released from custody, the alien shall be released from custody.” § 31-13-12(b). The lack of similar language in an adjacent subsection demonstrates that Section 12(a) cannot be read as anything other than a mandate to detain pending status verification. The natural reading of
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the phrase “a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable” is that the officer is authorized to hold the suspect for as long as is necessary to complete the inquiry, absent some exigent circumstance that makes completion of the status check impracticable.
Section 12 also lacks a “limit” the Supreme Court found noteworthy in Arizona: the requirement that the provisions “‘be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.’” Slip op. at 20 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(L)).
Moreover, Section 12(a) must be read in the context of the rest of the statute. In particular, Section 6 prohibits law enforcement agencies from adopting any “policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of this act to less than the full extent permitted by this act.” § 31-13-6(a). Agencies that fail to comply face civil fines, and individuals who fail to report violations face criminal prosecution. § 31-13-6(d), (f). These full-enforcement provisions require local police to do all they can to “discourage illegal immigration,” § 31-13-2, including awaiting a verification before releasing somebody they suspect of being undocumented.
The above analysis applies equally to Section 18, as amended by H.B. 658. Indeed, Section 18 specifically authorizes checks to be commenced “within 48 hours.” § 32-6-9(b) (as amended by H.B. 658). On its face, Section 18 authorizes
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detention for up to 48 hours before an immigration status check is even initiated, in addition to the period of detention while the check is pending.
The language of Sections 12(a) and 18(b) clearly authorizes Alabama officers to “hold[] aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence,” and are therefore preempted. Arizona, slip op. 22. However, in the alternative, if the Court determines that it cannot definitively conclude whether Sections 12(a) and the new 18(b) authorize prolonged detention solely to determine status, Plaintiffs would suggest it certify this issue to the Alabama Supreme Court. See Ala. R. App. Proc. 18. Suggested questions are attached as Exhibit A. V. Section 13/Ala. Code § 31-13-13, as amended by H.B. 658, is preempted.
Section 13, criminalizing harboring, transporting, and inducing/encouraging the presence of certain noncitizens, was amended by H.B. 658 in several ways. However, these amendments do not eliminate Section 13’s “objectionable features,” and so Plaintiffs’ claims are not moot. Naturist Soc., 958 F.2d at 1520. First, H.B. 658 moves subpart (a)(4), expanding the definition of “harbor” to include the act of “entering into a rental agreement,” to a new section of the Alabama Code. Compare Ala. Code § 31-13-13(a)(4) (2011) with H.B. 658 § 6. Because the text of H.B. 658 § 6 is identical to the original Section 13(a)(4), its relocation does not moot Plaintiffs’ claim that that it is preempted. Indeed, the parties have stipulated that the injunction entered by the district court against
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Section 13(a)(4) applies to H.B. 658 § 6. See Joint Stip., attached as Exhibit B. H.B. 658 also added a narrow religious exemption, rearranged wording in
subpart (a)(1), added text to subparts (a)(1)-(3) stating these provisions “shall be interpreted consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A),” and lowered the threshold for a crime to be classified as a felony. See Ala. Code § 31-13-13(a), (c) (as amended by H.B. 658). These amendments also do not affect the legal analysis.
Section 13 still contemplates crimes never envisioned in the federal harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324. These new crimes include: (i) inducing, enticing, or assisting undocumented immigrants to enter the state, Ala. Code § 3113-13(a)(2); (ii) criminalizing conspiracy for all crimes created by Section 13, and for transporting specifically, §§ 31-13-13(a)(3) (conspiracy to transport); 31-13-24 (omnibus conspiracy provision); and (iii) expanding the act of harboring to include renting, H.B. 658 § 6. Furthermore, the criminal penalties of Section 13 do not correspond to the federal statute and can result in harsher sentences. Compare Ala. Code §§ 13-13-13(c) (as amended by H.B. 658) (class C felony to, inter alia, transport more than five individuals); 13A-5-6 (punishable up to ten years) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (establishing graduated penalties based on conduct and harm, with baseline sentence of at most five years for transporting). These conflicts create an impermissible “obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Arizona, slip op. 19.
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Furthermore, Section 13 would be preempted even if it were identical to 8 U.S.C. § 1324, because it vests prosecutorial authority in the hands of state prosecutors, something Congress never intended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c). Section 1324 is part of a federal scheme “so pervasive that it left no room in this area for the state to supplement it.” United States v. South Carolina, Nos. 11-2958,112779, 2011 WL 6973241 at *13 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011). “Were [Section 13] to come into force, the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals suspected of harboring or transporting, even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.” Arizona, slip op. 11. Such auxiliary enforcement to a comprehensive scheme is preempted. Id. VI. Section 27/Ala. Code § 31-13-26, as amended by H.B. 658, is preempted.
Section 27, limiting the ability of certain noncitizens to enforce contracts, was amended by H.B. 658 to make it prospective only and to exempt contracts related to “appointment or retention of legal counsel in legal matters.” Ala. Code § 31-13-26(c) (as amended by H.B. 658). This does not alleviate the “objectionable features” of Section 27, and therefore the amendment does not moot Plaintiffs’ claims. See Naturist Soc., 958 F.2d at 1520.
The Arizona decision establishes that the district court’s denial of an injunction must be reversed, because Section 27 conflicts with federal immigration
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policy and control over foreign relations. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed, the federal government’s control over immigration policy necessarily involves the exercise of discretion and balancing, to enable the federal government to address perceptions that foreign nationals are not being treated fairly under our nation’s laws. See Arizona, slip op. 3. Thus “the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government,” which has the authority to account for “immediate human concerns,” such as prioritizing the removal of “alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime” over “[u]nauthorized workers trying to support their families.” Id. at 18, 4. Congress clearly has contemplated that noncitizens—even those in removal proceedings—will be able to live in the community. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (authorizing immigration judge to review bond determinations). Section 27 intentionally interferes with that federal law and policy by fundamentally undercutting the ability of certain immigrants to live in Alabama.
More broadly, Arizona reaffirms that federal immigration enforcement is a complex undertaking, and the fact that a person is undocumented today does not mean that she will remain so, nor that she will be removed in the future. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982); see also DHS, Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities, available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
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20120612-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-for-young-people.shtm (June 15, 2012). Section 27 contravenes that federal principle, expressly aiming to impose harsh living conditions and penalties in order to achieve the expulsion of undocumented immigrants by largely stripping them of the right to contract. Section 27 intentionally ignores the complexity of federal removal procedures by assuming every person who is undocumented will be immediately removed, and it also undermines the ability of the federal government to act as the nation’s voice on immigration policy related to “perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States.” Arizona, slip op. 3. Section 27 is therefore preempted. VII. Section 30/Ala. Code § 31-13-29, as amended by H.B. 658, is preempted.
Section 30, which criminalizes an attempt by some noncitizens to engage in certain transactions with government entities, was amended by H.B. 658. These amendments have been addressed already in the State Defendants’ motion to dissolve this Court’s injunction pending appeal of Section 30 (filed May 24, 2012); the HICA Plaintiff’s response (filed June 6, 2012); the United States’ response (filed June 7, 2012); and the State Defendants’ reply (filed June 7, 2012). As that briefing explains, the amendment “leaves objectionable features of the prior law substantially undisturbed,” and Plaintiffs’ preemption claim against Section 30 is not moot. Naturist Soc., 958 F.2d at 1520.
The Arizona opinion makes it even clearer that Section 30 is preempted.
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Section 30 makes it a class C felony for any “alien not lawfully present” to request a motor vehicle license plate, driver’s license or nondriver identification card, a business license, a commercial license, or a professional license. Ala. Code § 3113-29(a) & (d) (as amended by H.B. 658). There is “no federal counterpart” to these new state immigration crimes. Arizona, slip op. 12. Indeed, while the State points to federal statutes authorizing the denial of some types of public benefits to immigrants who are not qualified, see Red Br. 32, Congress has never provided that states may criminalize merely asking a government agency for such documents.1 Section 30 therefore would upset Congress’s calibration of penalties. Because Section 30 “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” it is preempted. Arizona, slip op. 14-15 (quotation omitted). VIII. Section 8/Ala. Code § 31-13-8, as amended by H.B. 658, should be
remanded for further consideration by the district court. H.B. 658 amends Section 8—which limits access to postsecondary institutions for certain immigrants—by deleting the second sentence that factored into the district court’s injunction. See HICA v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 5516953, at *20-24 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). State Defendants have moved the
1 In addition to the conflict over creating a new state immigration crime, Section 30 further conflicts with the federal scheme by targeting business licenses and license plates. Federal law does not authorize denying these items. Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) classifies “professional” and “commercial” licenses as a state or local public benefit which may be denied, but is silent regarding business licenses.
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district court to lift its injunction on Section 8, which Plaintiffs have opposed. The motion remains pending, and the filings are attached as Exhibits C, D, and E.
As Plaintiffs explained to the district court, regardless of the change effected by H.B. 658, the State currently has no way to obtain federal verification of students’ “lawful presence,” meaning that the implementation of Section 8 inevitably would require the State to make its own impermissible immigration status determinations. See Ex. D. Moreover, there is no federal standard defining “not lawfully present” for purposes of determining eligibility to enroll in postsecondary institutions.2 Accordingly, H.B. 658 “leaves objectionable features of the prior law substantially undisturbed,” and is not moot. Naturist Soc., 958 F.2d at 1520. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court should leave the injunction in place but dismiss the appeal of Section 8 and remand with instructions for the district court to resolve State Defendants’ pending motion, since Plaintiffs’ opposition to dissolution is based, in part, on new evidence not previously before that court. See Ex. D; Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1352 (11th Cir. 2011) (remanding for district court to determine whether to lift injunction under voluntary cessation theory, which is a “factintensive inquir[y]”).
2 The district court declined to grant an injunction on this basis, HICA, 2011 WL 5516953, at *17-19, but the claim has not been dismissed.
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Dated: July 6, 2012
/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
On behalf of Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Cecillia D. Wang Cecillia D. Wang AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
/s/ Karen C. Tumlin Karen C. Tumlin NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER

Mary Bauer Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660
Kristi L. Graunke Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282
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T: (404) 521-6700
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300
Foster S. Maer Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086

Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835
Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423

Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785
Justin Cox AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 230 Peachtree St. NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 T: (404) 523-2721

Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206

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Winifred Kao Reena Arya ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 T: (415) 896-1701

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees

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Exhibit A
Proposed Questions for Certification to Alabama Supreme Court
Submitted in Support of HICA Plaintiffs’ Response to
June 25, 2012, Order

PROPOSED QUESTIONS FOR CERTIFICATION If this Court decides to certify questions to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding Sections 12, 18, and 19 of H.B. 56, Plaintiffs respectfully propose the following:
(1) Does Ala. Code § 31-13-12 authorize law enforcement officers to detain an individual, including by extending an individual’s detention beyond the point he or she would otherwise be released, in order to determine the individual’s immigration status?
(2) Does Ala. Code § 32-6-9, as amended by H.B. 658, authorize law enforcement officers to detain an individual, including by extending an individual’s detention beyond the point he or she would otherwise be released, in order to determine the individual’s immigration status?
(3) Does Ala. Code § 31-13-18 authorize law enforcement officers to detain an individual, including by extending an individual’s detention beyond the point he or she would otherwise be released, based on a “determination” that the individual is an “alien unlawfully present”?
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 1 of 9

FILED
2012 May-23 AM 11:26 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION

)

OF ALABAMA; et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

) Case Number:

) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity )

as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs,
vs. STATE OF ALABAMA; and GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case Numbers: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) )

JOINT STIPULATION AS TO APPLICABILITY OF PRELIMINARY INUNCTION TO SECTION 6 OF H.B. 658

Come now Plaintiffs Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al. (“HICA

Plaintiffs”) in Case No. 5:11-cv-02484, Plaintiffs United States of America (“USA

Plaintiff”) in Case No. 2:11-cv-2746, and Defendants the State of Alabama,

Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange, Superintendent

Tommy Bice, Chancellor Freida Hill, and District Attorney Robert L. Broussard

1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 2 of 9
(collectively, “State Defendants”) in both actions, to jointly stipulate that the parties agree that the preliminary injunction (hereinafter “the Preliminary Injunction”) issued September 28, 2011, in case No. 2:11-cv-02746-SLB,1 applies to Section 6 of H.B. 658, 2012 Regular Session (which was signed into law and became effective on May 18, 2012) at this time. As a basis for this joint stipulation, the parties state as follows:
1. This litigation involves a challenge to H.B. 56, which was passed by the Alabama Legislature in 2011. After hearings on motions for preliminary injunction brought by HICA Plaintiffs and the USA Plaintiff, the Court preliminarily enjoined some but not all of the provisions of H.B. 56 on September 28, 2011. One of the provisions preliminarily enjoined was Section 13 of H.B. 56, codified at Section 31-13-13 of the Alabama Code, which makes it a crime to, among other things, “[h]arbor an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code 31-13-13(a)(4); see
1 Case No. 2:11-cv-02746-SLB is the case in which the United States of America is a plaintiff. In case no. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (HICA) and other private plaintiffs similarly moved to enjoin section 13, but the HICA Plaintiffs’ motion was denied as moot following the entry of the injunction in case no. 5:11-cv-02746-SLB.
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 3 of 9
United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1336, 1328-37 (N. D. Ala. 2011)
(preliminarily enjoining Section 13).
2. Defendants appealed, inter alia, the Court’s ruling preliminarily
enjoining Section 13 of H.B., and the appeal remains pending in the Eleventh
Circuit.
3. On May 16, 2012, the Alabama Legislature passed legislation
amending some of the provisions it originally had enacted into law through H.B.
56. This new Act, originally denominated H.B. 658 at its introduction in the Legislature, became law on May 18, 2012. Of particular relevance to this filing2 is
Section 6 of H.B. 658, which is identical in all material respects to Section 13(a)(4)
of H.B. 56. Section 6 of H.B. 658 reads as follows:
Section 6. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for a person to harbor an alien unlawfully present in the United States by entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.
H.B. 658 § 6 (attached as Ex. A, pgs. 57-58). H.B. 658, including Section 6, went
into effect immediately upon the signature of the Governor. See id. § 10 (Ex. A at
p. 59).
2 H.B. 658 made numerous other modifications to H.B. 56. This filing relates to Section 6 of H.B. 658 only, because of Plaintiffs’ time-sensitive need for confirmation that Defendants agree that the Preliminary Injunction applies to Section 6 of H.B. 658. The parties seek to reserve the right to submit additional filings related to the impact of other aspects of H.B. 658 on this litigation.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 4 of 9
4. Without conceding any issues arising from the Preliminary Injunction, and without Defendants waiving any objection to the validity of that Preliminary Injunction as it relates to Section 13(a)(4) of H.B. 56 or otherwise, all parties take the position that the Preliminary Injunction entered by the District Court on September 28, 2011, nominally applying to Section 13(a)(4) of H.B. 56, applies with equal force to Section 6 of H.B. 658.
5. Because of their understanding of the applicability of the Preliminary Injunction to Section 6 of H.B. 658, the Defendants stipulate that the Preliminary Injunction enjoins them from enforcing Section 6 of H.B. 658, unless and until the Preliminary Injunction is vacated or otherwise modified by this Court or another court as it relates to criminalizing the act of “entering into a rental agreement, as defined by Section 35-9A-141, with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.” However, by so stipulating, Defendants expressly preserve, and do not waive, any and all of their objections to original entry of the Preliminary Injunction and their appeal of that aspect of the order.
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 5 of 9

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Samuel L. Brooke Samuel L. Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for HICA Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org

5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 6 of 9

Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B

Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL

6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 7 of 9

Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice. Counsel for HICA Plaintiffs

BY:__/s/ John C. Neiman, Jr.________

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Joshua K. Payne (ASB-1041-A55P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue

7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 8 of 9

Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

Counsel for the State of Alabama, Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Bice, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard

BY: _/s/ William H. Orrick, III____
Tony West U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 tony.west@usdoj.gov
William H. Orrick, III U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, CIVIL DIVISION 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 bill.orrick@usdoj.gov

Arthur R. Goldberg C. Lee Reeves, II Varu Chilakamarri Joshua Wilkenfeld U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov

Counsel for the United States of America

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 158 Filed 05/23/12 Page 9 of 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 23, 2012, I have electronically filed the foregoing using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to all counsel of record.
__/s/ Samuel L. Brooke_________ Counsel for HICA Plaintiffs
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 1 of 12

FILED
2012 May-24 AM 11:37 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; et al.,
Plaintiffs, vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants. )

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) TIME SENSITIVE ) OPPOSED ) )

STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST SECTION 8 OF
ACT NO. 2011-535 BASED ON CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION

Defendants Governor Robe rt Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange,

Superintendent Dr. Thom as R. Bice, Inte rim Chancellor Susa n Price, and District

Attorney Robert L. Broussard, sued

in their official capacities (“State

Defendants”), request that t he Court dissolve its inj unction of Septem ber 28, 2011

against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 ( doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2), as the basis for the

Court’s injunction – the second sentence of Section 8 – has been rem oved by Act No. 2012-491, which is attached as Exhibi t A. 1 In the alternative, the State

1 Superinten dent Dr. Thom as R. Bice and Inte rim Chancellor Susan Price ar e subs tituted a s named defendants for their predecessors by operation of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 2 of 12
Defendants request that the Court stay th e injunction against Section 8 while the appeal remains pending.
1. Undersigned counsel contacted opposing counsel to determ ine whether counsel will oppose the motion, and understand that opposing counsel are opposed to the motion.
2. Plaintiffs instit uted this actio n on July 8, 2011, seeking inj unctive relief against enforc ement of Act No . 2011-535, also known as the BeasonHammon Alabama Taxpayer and C itizen Protection Act, or H.B. 56. On July 21, 2011, Plaintiffs fi led a m otion for preliminar y injunction. O ne of t he sections of the Act Plaintiffs sought t o enjoin was S ection 8, the central provisi on of which stated that “[a]n alien who is not lawfull y present in the United States shall not be permitted to enroll in or a ttend any public postsecondary education institution” in Alabama. See doc. 37 (Plaintiffs’ Mot. for Pre lim. Inj.) at 55-57; Act No. 2011535, § 8.2
3. In its Opinion dated Septembe r 28, 2011, that accom panied the Preliminary-Injunction Order, the Court recognized that Alabam a could exclude unlawfully present aliens from enrolling in and attending the State’s postsecondary public education institutions, consistent w ith federal law. The Court noted that
2 Citations to documents filed with the Court are to docket entries as “Doc . __”, and citations to page num bers for such docum ents are to th e page numbers electronically printed on the document by the CM/ECF system.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 3 of 12

“Alabama may, without conflicting with Congress’s classifications of aliens,

exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as dete rmined by federal law, from enrolling in

and attending its public postseconda ry educational institutions. See Equal Access

Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 601-08.” Doc. 137 (Opinion) at 44 n. 13.

4. What Alabam a could not do “wit hout conflicting with federal law,”

according to the Court, was “exclu

de unlawfully-present aliens from its

postsecondary institutions if its definition of unl awfully-present aliens confl icts

with Congress’s definition.” Id. The Court read the second sentence of Section 8 –

“An alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either

possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8

U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” – as conflicting w ith Congress’s defin ition for unlawfully

present aliens, and therefore preempted. Id. at 43-44 (“Section 8 closes Alabama’s

public postsecondary inst itutions to aliens who are not lawfully present in the

United States and to lawfully-present aliens w ho do not have lawful permanent

resident status or a nonimmigration visa. This ‘classification’ of aliens for purposes

of determining who is eligible to

attend Alabam a’s public postsecondary

institutions is preempted as only Congre ss may classify aliens. Therefore, Section

8 is preempted.”) (emphasis in original).

5. On this preemption basis, the Court enjoined enforcement of Section 8

in its entirety. Doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2 (Prel

iminary-Injunction Order). The State

3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 4 of 12
Defendants appealed that order, arguing that at most, the Court should have simply enjoined the problematic sentence, not the entire Section.
6. Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 was c odified as Ala. Code § 31-13-8. That Secti on of the Code was amende d by Act No. 2012-491, which passed the Legislature on May 16, 2012, and was signe d by the Governor on May 18, 2012. Act 2012-491 became effective immediat ely upon approval by the Governor on May 18, 2012. See Act No. 2012-491, § 10 (“T his act shall become effective immediately following its passage and appr oval by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law.”).
7. Section 1 of Act No. 2012-491 amended Ala. Code § 31-13-8 (Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 as codified) by rem oving the second sentence – “An alien attending any publ ic postseconda ry inst itution in this state m ust either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate noni mmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.”
8. As the basis of the Court’s i njunction against Section 8 was the second sentence, which the Court read to be a state “classification” of aliens preempted by Congress’s classifications, and as that second sentence has been removed by Act No. 2012-491, the basis for the Court’s injunction against Section 8 no longer exists.
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 5 of 12
9. As the Court has a lready determ ined that “Alabama may, without conflicting with Con gress’s classifications of aliens, exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as determ ined by fe deral law, from enrolli ng in and attending its public postsecondary educational institutions,” doc. 137 at 44 n. 13, and a s that is a ll Section 8 (codified at Ala. Code § 31 -13-8), as a mended by Act No. 2012-491, currently does, the injunction against Section 8 is due to be dissolved. See doc. 137 at 36 (quoting Section 8) (“For the purposes of this section, a public postsecondary education institution officer may seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status wit h the federal government pur suant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). A publ ic postsecondary education inst itution officer or official shall not attem pt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”); Act No. 2012-491, § 1 (retaining this provision).
10. This Court’s Preliminary-Injunction Order is on appeal. See docs. 149 (Plaintiffs’ Amended Notice of Interl ocutory Appeal) and 150 (State Defendants’ Notice of Cross-Appeal). However, pursu ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), this Court m ay m odify its Prelim inary-Injunction Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) (“While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgm ent that grant s, dissolves, or deni es an in junction, the court may suspend, m odify, restore, or grant an injunction on term s fo r bond or other term s that secure the opposing party’s rights.”). See also Decatur Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia ,
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 6 of 12
2005 WL 607881, *2 (D.D.C. Ma rch 16, 2005) (a distri ct court “m ay properly entertain a motion to dissolve an interlocut ory order that has b een appealed” when there is a “change in circumstances”).
11. This Court may prefer to stay the Preliminary-Injunction Order with respect to Section 8 pending a ppeal, and to issue an order informing the El eventh Circuit that in light of the amendment, upon remand this Court would dissolve the Preliminary Injunction against Section 8. See Wyatt by and through Rawlins v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1080, n. 14 (11th Cir. 1996) (dist rict court stayed the preliminary injunction because it found the need for the preliminary injunction was moot, and it inform ed the court of appeal s that upon remand it would dissolve the preliminary injunction).
12. A similar procedure, often called an indicative ruling, is em bodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, wh ich provides that “[ i]f a timely m otion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending,” the district court may “(3) state either th at it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the m otion raises a su bstantial issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). “The distri ct court may decide the m otion if the c ourt of appeals remands for t hat purpose.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(c). Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 12.1-1(c), “[i]f the motion filed in the district court requests substantive relief from the order or judgment under appeal, such as a
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 7 of 12
motion to m odify a prelim inary injuncti on . . .,” and if “the di strict court determines that t he m otion should be gran ted, the dist rict court shoul d enter an order stating that it intends to grant the motion if [the court of appeals] returns jurisdiction to it.” 11th Cir. R. 12.1-1(c)(2). The Eleventh Circuit then may decid e to remand the case for the district court to enter an order granting the motion. Id.
13. The equities favor dissolution, as enforcement of the State’s validly enacted statutes is at stak e. Such statutes “should be recognized and enforced by the courts as em bodying the will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably, beyond al l question, in violation of t he fundamental law of the Constitution.” Atkin v. Kansas , 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) . Indeed, “the publi c interests im peratively demand” this result. Id. For this reason, “the harm which would result” from a continued injuncti on barring enforcement of Section 8 “ti ps in favor of [State] Defendants and the public , both of whom have an interest in noninterference by a federa l court in a state’s ‘l egislative enactments.’” Reed v. Riley, 2008 WL 3931612 *3 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 25, 2008) (citing Atkin, 191 U.S. at 223).
WHEREFORE, the State Defendants re spectfully request that the Court dissolve its Preliminary Injunction of September 28, 2011 against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535, codified at Ala. Code § 31-13-8, (doc. 138, ¶¶ 1-2). In the alternative, the State Defendants request that the Court stay the Prelim inary-
7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 8 of 12

Injunction Order with respect to Section 8 pending the appeal, and to issue an order

with an indicative ruling inform ing the El eventh Circuit that upon remand this

Court would dissolve the Preliminary Injunction against Section 8.

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L)
Attorney General

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General
(ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General
(ASB-7447-H69F)

BY:
s/ Joshua K. Payne Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Joshua K. Payne (ASB-1041-A55P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us
R. Cooper Shattuck GOVERNOR’S LEGAL OFFICE 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: 244-242-7120 Facsimile: 334-242-2335 legal@governor.alabama.gov

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent 8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 9 of 12
Bice, Interim Chancellor Price, and District Attorney Broussard
9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 10 of 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 24, 2012, I electroni cally filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM /ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record:

Mary Bauer Andrew H. Turner Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 broder@nilc.org

10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 11 of 12

Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com

Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 nperales@maldef.org

11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 159 Filed 05/24/12 Page 12 of 12

Allison Neal AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 aneal@aclualabama.org

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 apedersen@maldef.org

J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804-2087 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, 7th Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, AL 35283-0709 dsweeney@babc.com

s/ Joshua K. Payne

Of

Counsel

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 1 of 20

FILED
2012 Jun-07 PM 03:01 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF )

ALABAMA, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

GOVERNOR ROBERT BENTLEY, et al., )

Defendants.

)

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST SECTION 8 OF ACT NO. 2011-535 BASED ON CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION
TO STAY THE INJUNCTION Plaintiffs oppose State Defendants’1 Motion for Dissolution of the
Preliminary Injunction Against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535 Based on Changed
Circumstances, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Injunction (Doc. No. 159).
State Defendants’ Motion seeks to have the Court lift the preliminary injunction
enjoining Section 8 of H.B. 56, granted on September 28, 2011, or, in the
alternative, to stay the injunction. Plaintiffs oppose this motion because the Court
lacks jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction since Section 8 is under active review

1 The motion was filed by Defendants Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange, Superintendent Dr. Thomas R. Bice, Interim Chancellor Susan Price, and District Attorney Robert L. Broussard. They are referred to collectively as “State Defendants.”
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 2 of 20
by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held oral arguments on
March 1, 2012.2 Staying the injunction would also be inappropriate because the
amendments to Section 8 do not eliminate constitutional questions presented by
Section 8. Finally, it would be improper to issue an indicative ruling pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 at this time.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 8 of H.B. 56, which is codified as Section 31-13-8 of the Alabama
Code, prohibits certain categories of immigrants from enrolling in or attending
Alabama public postsecondary institutions. Section 8 originally stated as follows:
An alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be permitted to enroll in or attend any public postsecondary education institution in this state. An alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. For the purposes of this section, a public postsecondary education institution officer may seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). A public postsecondary education institution officer or official shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States. Except as otherwise provided by law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible for any postsecondary education benefit, including but not limited to, scholarships, grants, or financial aid.
2 During oral argument, the Court of Appeals stated that it likely would wait to rule on the appeal until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (U.S. 2012), which is expected by or before the end of the Supreme Court’s term on June 25, 2012. See Samuel Brooke Decl. ¶ 13.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 3 of 20
Ala. Code § 31-13-8 (2011). This Court preliminarily enjoined Section 8 on September 28, 2011, finding that Section 8 constituted an impermissible statebased classification of alienage. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley (“HICA”), No. 5:11-CV-2484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953, at *19-24 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). State Defendants appealed this ruling. See State Defs.’ Notice of Cross-Appeal (Doc. No. 150). Argument was heard on March 1, 2012, and the appeal remains pending at the Eleventh Circuit.
Subsequent to the preliminary injunction order, Governor Bentley signed into law a new provision, Act 2012-491 (“H.B. 658”), on May 18, 2012. This new law amended Section 8 by eliminating the section’s second sentence, which originally read as follows: “An alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq.” See Act 2012-491 § 1 (Doc. No. 159-1 at 18-193). H.B. 658 left the rest of Section 8 unchanged. The change to Section 8 went into effect immediately upon signature of Governor Bentley. Act 2012-491 § 10 (Doc. No. 159-1 at 63).
In their motion, State Defendants assert that the elimination of the second sentence of Section 8 ensures that college enrollees and applicants will not be
3 Page references to docket entries refer to the page reference of the PDF header assigned through the CM-ECF system, which is not necessarily the same page number that appears in the actual document.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 4 of 20
subjected to an impermissible state-created immigration classifications when Section 8 is enforced. See State Defs.’ Mot. at 3-5 (Doc. 159). As a result, State Defendants now seek to have the injunction of Section 8 dissolved pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively, to have it stayed while an indicative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule 62.1. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiffs herein oppose these requests. II. ARGUMENT
State Defendants’ motion should be denied. The Court is currently divested of jurisdiction over Section 8, which is on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction. Furthermore, a stay of the injunction under Rule 62(c) would be imprudent at this stage because the state-created classification issues are not resolved by eliminating the second sentence of Section 8. For the same reason, and for reasons of judicial economy, Plaintiffs submit the Court should not issue an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 at this time.
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Dissolve its Section 8 Injunction. The Court is currently divested of jurisdiction to dissolve its injunction of Section 8 because the case is on appeal. State Defendants appealed the issuance of this injunction to the Eleventh Circuit on October 7, 2011, and the appeal is still pending. See HICA v. Bentley, No. 11-14535 (11th Cir. filed Oct. 7, 2011). The
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filing of the appeal was “an event of jurisdictional significance—it confer[red] jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divest[ed] the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); see also United States v. Brown, 438 F. App’x 871, 872 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Under our precedent, the filing of a notice of appeal acts to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the matters at issue in the appeal, except to the extent that the trial court must act in aid of appellate review.”) (citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized limited exceptions to this rule. One exception is for situations when a district court “must act in aid of appellate review.” Brown, 438 F. App’x at 872. This exception applies, for example, where a court of appeals directs a trial court to resolve a motion, see id., or where a lower court “reduce[s] its oral findings to writing” after a notice of appeal is filed contesting the oral ruling, see In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). State Defendants’ motion, however, does not even address, much less satisfy these exceptions. Indeed, granting State Defendants’ request to dissolve the injunction while the appeal is pending would detract, rather than aid, the appellate court’s jurisdiction, especially where, as here, the court of appeals has held its ruling in abeyance until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Arizona v. United States,
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which could affect the outcome of some of the provisions in the appeal. See supra note 2.
Similarly, Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a district court to “suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction” while an interlocutory order is being appealed, but this may be done solely to “maintain the status quo of the parties pending appeal.” Coastal Corp. v. Tex. E. Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 819 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing Rule 62(c) and cases). Again, this provision is inapposite to State Defendants’ motion, for dissolving the Section 8 injunction would upset, rather than maintain the status quo. This Court’s injunction of Section 8 has been in place nearly nine months and is currently under review by the Court of Appeals. Allowing the new Section 8 to take effect would lead to confusion as to the legality and proper administration of the statute as it remains under consideration by the Court of Appeals, and possibly lead to abrupt reinstatement of the injunction or re-litigation of an injunction following the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
Moreover, and contrary to State Defendants’ argument, the balance of the equities does not favor the lifting of this Court’s injunction. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (Doc. 159). Notably, State Defendants do not allege that they face a substantial risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is maintained. As previously explained, the public interest weighs against lifting the stay, as doing so prior to the Eleventh
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Circuit’s ruling would create confusion as to the legality and proper administration of the statute, encourage additional unnecessary litigation, and expose students to the denial of college enrollment based on impermissible state determinations of immigration status.
The Court should therefore deny the motion to dissolve the injunction on jurisdictional grounds, so as to avoid simultaneous review of Section 8 by two federal courts.
B. State Defendants’ Motion Pursuant to Rule 62(c) Fails Because State Defendants Do Not Meet the High Burden for Extraordinary Relief and Have Not Established That They Will Use Federal Standards.
The Court should also deny State Defendants’ request to stay the injunction of Section 8, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c). “A motion pursuant to Rule 62(c) seeking to stay an injunction pending appeal is ‘extraordinary relief’ for which the moving party bears a ‘heavy burden.’” Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v. Wash. Nat’l. Ins. Co., No. 08-23401-CIV, 2012 WL 1470236, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2012) (“Such motions are disfavored and granted only in exceptional circumstances.”) (quoting Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2009); see also Garcia–Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986).
State Defendants have not met their heavy burden of showing that they are entitled to the extraordinary relief of the dissolution of the current injunction in
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place. As described more fully below, the amendment to Section 8 does not
eliminate the constitutional problems with this provision, for although the statute
purports to rely on a federal determination of immigration status, there is no
mechanism available to Alabama’s colleges and universities to obtain this
verification, and the State Defendants’ own policies implementing Section 8
explicitly permit state officials to determine for themselves whether an individual
has lawful immigration status. Furthermore, Section 8 does not “adopt a definition
of ‘not lawfully present’ aliens that follows federal law” in this context. See HICA, 2011 WL 5516953, at *24 n.13.4 For all these reasons, individuals will still be
subjected to a state-created immigration classification, and as the Court has noted,
“[t]he law is well established that [t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the
classification of aliens. This power is committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.” Id. at *21 (citations and quotations omitted).5
4 See also Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 19-22 (Doc. No. 37 at 28-31). 5 As discussed infra at 10-12, the most likely mechanism State Defendants would attempt to use to verify immigration status is the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) Program, but they cannot utilize that system at this time because they are not enrolled. The unavailability of a federal mechanism to inquire into status provides a sufficient basis for arguing that the injunction should remain in place. However, Plaintiffs do not concede that enrollment in SAVE would obviate the constitutional problems with Section 8, for the State will still have to engage in its own independent determination of whether the query responses received through SAVE regarding an individuals’ immigration status meets the definition for eligibility adopted by the State of Alabama—namely,
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Section 8 bans students from higher education in Alabama if they are determined to be “not lawfully present.” Ala. Code § 31-13-8. Although Section 8 ostensibly requires that this determination be made by the federal government, see id., at this time there is no mechanism in place that will permit public colleges or universities to obtain such a determination of eligibility for enrollment from the federal government. Moreover, as explained below, State Defendants themselves continue to assert that local officials retain the authority to make a determination of eligibility themselves.
There are only two methods known to Plaintiffs’ counsel for obtaining information about an individual’s immigration status from the federal government.6 The first is the federal government’s Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), which is described in detail in the declaration of William M. Griffen, the Acting Unit Chief of LESC. (Doc. 2-7 in United States v. Alabama, No. 11-2746 (N.D. Ala. filed Aug. 1, 2011)). As its name suggests, the LESC responds to inquiries by law enforcement entities. See Griffin Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5 (describing LESC’s
“lawfully present.” This process will therefore continue to involve a state determination, and thus, classification.
Plaintiffs will develop this argument more fully through discovery, but this argument is not relevant now since State Defendants are not currently enrolled in SAVE. See infra at 10-15. 6 A determination of removability by an actual immigration court, and a determination of federal work authorization via E-Verify, are inapplicable to Section 8 and therefore are not considered.
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“mission” as responding to law enforcement inquiries); see also Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee (“CAFHC”), No. 2:11-CV-982-MHT, 2011 WL 6182334, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2011) (“Currently, law enforcement officials are the only officials authorized to verify immigration status . . . through [LESC].”) (citations omitted); U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Law Enforcement Support Center (“The LESC is a single national point of contact that provides timely customs information and immigration status and identity information and real-time assistance to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected, arrested or convicted of criminal activity.”) (attached as Ex. 3).7 Because Alabama colleges and universities are not law enforcement agencies, they will not be able to use LESC to determine whether a student is “not lawfully present” for purposes of Section 8.
The second federal verification system is the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) Program. SAVE is a limited tool used to assess individuals’ eligibility for certain benefits. It cannot be used to make final determinations of whether a person is “not lawfully present.” Indeed, “[a] Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) response showing no Service record on an individual or an immigration status making the individual
7 Available at http://www.ice.gov/lesc. 10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 11 of 20
ineligible for a benefit is not a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the
individual is not lawfully present.” 65 Fed. Reg. 58,301 (Sept. 28, 2000).
Assuming arguendo that SAVE could properly be used to enforce Section 8,
but see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text, it may not presently fill this
function, for no Alabama college or university has been approved to use SAVE.
The federal government’s list of SAVE user agencies reveals that only seven
entities within the entire state of Alabama are currently enrolled in SAVE, and
none of them are affiliated with public colleges or universities. See Samuel
Brooke Decl. ¶¶ 3-8 (authenticating and summarizing SAVE Customer Agency
List 05.21.2012.xls); see also SAVE Customer Agency List 05.21.2012.xls (attached as Exs. 4-8) (same).8 Furthermore, enrolling in SAVE is a multi-step and
lengthy process. See USCIS, Sign up for SAVE Program (last visited June 6, 2012) (explaining enrollment process) (attached as Ex. 10).9 Indeed, State Defendants
8 The seven agencies are: (1) AL Department of Public Safety; (2) AL Dep’t of Human Resources, Family Assistance; (3) AL Medicaid Agency; (4) AL Dep’t of Public Human Services; (5) AL Dep’t of Industrial Relations; (6) AL ABC Enforcement; and (7) City of Pell City, Revenue Dep’t. Brooke Decl. ¶¶ 3-8. The City of Pell City enrolled in SAVE in 2005, and its use of SAVE is “solely for the purpose of determining the eligibility of persons applying for Professional Licenses issued by [the Pell City Revenue Department].” Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and City of Pell City, Ala., § V (fully executed on April 20, 2005) (attached as Ex. 9). 9 Available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 12 of 20
seek to dissolve this injunction without so much as a showing that any Alabama state college or university has even applied for SAVE approval. The SAVE approval process requires the federal government to engage in a legal review of the claimed basis for enrolling in SAVE, and to negotiate a memorandum of understanding that specifies the precise purpose for which the state or local agency may utilize SAVE. Id.; see also Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and City of Pell City, Ala., § V (fully executed on April 20, 2005) (noting limited purpose of “determining the eligibility of persons applying for Professional Licenses”) (attached as Ex. 9). Simply put, until and unless Alabama public colleges and universities enroll in and are approved to utilize SAVE, this verification mechanism is unavailable to them.
The process of enrolling in SAVE has already complicated the enforcement of H.B. 56. For example, the Department of Revenue’s (“DOR”) Commissioner, Julie Magee, has issued a guidance memorandum directing various county agencies to enroll in SAVE prior to enforcing Section 30 of H.B. 56. Commissioner Magee’s memorandum specifically advises:
[A]fter consultation with the Attorney General’s office, please note the following: until you have been granted access to the federal
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=d283c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM10 00004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=d283c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM10000047181 90aRCRD.
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government’s SAVE program or can verify an alien’s immigration status through some other verification method with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), you should not implement Section 30, and you should not require anyone to demonstrate their U.S. citizenship or lawful presence in the United States.
Comm’r Magee, Updated Instructions Concerning Section 30 of Act. No. 2011-535 (Dec. 1, 2011) (hereinafter “Magee Dec. 1, 2011 Memo”) (attached as Ex. 11);10
see also Comm’r Magee, Modification to Prior Instructions Concerning Act No. 2011-535, Immigration Act (Nov. 28, 2011) (attached as Ex. 12).11 Prior to the
issuance of Commissioner Magee’s guidance memoranda, DOR was relying on a
state-created list of documents that would establish lawful presence. CAFHC,
2011 WL 5878363, at *1-2 & n.2. This list was found to be an impermissible
immigration classification conflicting with federal law. Id.
Just as the former Section 30 could not be enforced until and unless the
affected Alabama agencies successfully obtained approval to use SAVE or some
other reliable process to verify immigration eligibility, Section 8 cannot go into
effect unless and until Alabama colleges and universities obtain such approval.
Both the “well established [law] that ‘[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to
the classification of aliens,’” and the specific requirement in Section 8 that school
10 Available at http://revenue.alabama.gov/documents/Memo - Julie Magee - 1130-11 sm.pdf. 11 Available at http://revenue.alabama.gov/documents/ memo_manuhomes_modification_112011.pdf.
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officials may not make such determinations on their own, dictate this result. HICA, 2011 WL 5516953, at *21 (citations and quotations omitted); see Ala. Code § 31-13-8 (“A public postsecondary education institution officer or official shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”). Until Alabama public colleges and universities “have been granted access to the federal government’s SAVE program or can verify an alien’s immigration status through some other verification method with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c),” they may not comply with the facial requirements of Section 8. See Magee Dec. 1, 2011 Memo.
Nor does the guidance issued by Chancellor Hill on August 5, 2011 demonstrate that State Defendants would be able to comply with the requirement that Alabama’s public colleges and universities not make final determinations of immigration status. See Chancellor Hill Memorandum, Aug. 5, 2011 (Doc. No. 82-4). The Hill Memorandum defers to local determinations made at each college or university, and suggests that an inquiry with the federal government is warranted only where the local official and the General Counsel for the Department of Postsecondary Education are unable to make a determination themselves. Id. This process stands in sharp contrast to what the plain text of
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Section 8 requires, and, in any event, cannot be fully completed until a college or university has enrolled in SAVE.12
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully submit that State Defendants have failed to
establish how Section 8 can be enforced in a manner consistent with federal
supremacy over immigration law. The Court should not dissolve or stay its
injunction, which was entered to ensure that impermissible state immigration
classifications would not be utilized.
C. An Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1 Would Be Improper At this Time.
State Defendants also request an indicative ruling pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(3), advising that the Court would dissolve the injunction
if the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit were to remand the case to it. For
the reasons described above, this request should be denied because State
12 State Defendants also cite Wyatt by and through Rwalins v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.14 (11th Cir. 1996), to support their request for a stay, but Wyatt is inapposite. In Wyatt an injunction regarding the treatment of resident children at the Eufaula Adolescent Center, which became moot because the facility was closed. The district court stayed the injunction because all of the parties involved agreed “that the injunction ha[d] no purpose” after the facility was closed. Wyatt by and through Rawlins v. Poundstone, 941 F. Supp. 1100, 1108 (M.D. Ala. 1996). In contrast, and as noted above, Plaintiffs in the instant case do not agree that the Section 8 injunction has no purpose following the revisions of H.B. 56. To the contrary, it is vital that the injunction remain in place to ensure that the State will not immediately commence impermissible state immigration classifications of college students.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 16 of 20
Defendants have not established that impermissible state immigration classifications will not occur.
Furthermore, State Defendants’ Rule 62.1 request is premature due to the complex procedural history and posture of this case. Three separate orders granting injunctions have already been entered in this case, one by this Court on September 28, 2011, and two more by the Court of Appeals while the appeal has been pending. Oral arguments have been held in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals has indicated that it will wait to issue a ruling until after the Supreme Court issues its ruling in Arizona v. United States. Rather than engaging in piecemeal decision-making, this Court should deny State Defendants’ request or at least should defer its consideration of the request, pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)(1)(2), until the Court and the parties have the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
If the Court nevertheless decides to issue an indicative ruling, it should state only that the amendment to Section 8 raises a “substantial issue” related to the injunction, rather than ruling on the motion. As explained by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for an indicative ruling,
may present complex issues that require extensive litigation and that may either be mooted or be presented in a different context by decision of the issues raised on appeal. In such circumstances the district court may prefer to state that the motion raises a substantial
16

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 17 of 20

issue, and to state the reasons why it prefers to decide only if the court of appeals agrees that it would be useful to decide the motion before decision of the pending appeal. The district court is not bound to grant the motion after stating that the motion raises a substantial issue; further proceedings on remand may show that the motion ought not be granted.

Advisory Comm. note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend

that the complexity of the procedural posture of this case warrants no action by the

Court at this time, but if the Court disagrees, noting a “substantial issue” would be

preferable to issuing a substantive indicative ruling.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny

State Defendants’ request to dissolve and/or stay the injunction granted against

Section 8, and that it deny State Defendants’ request to issue an indicative ruling

on the same.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004
17

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 18 of 20

samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang* Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe* Naomi Tsu* Daniel Werner* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro* ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW

T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C.

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 19 of 20

Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org

438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com

Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Justin Cox* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 230 Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 523-2721 jcox@aclu.org

Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 162 Filed 06/07/12 Page 20 of 20

* admitted pro hac vice.

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 7, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
/s/ Samuel Brooke

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FILED
2012 Jun-11 PM 05:16 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA; et al.,
Plaintiffs, vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) OPPOSED ) TIME-SENSITIVE ) ) )

STATE DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF TIME-SENSITIVE MOTION TO DISSOLVE OR STAY PENDING APPEAL THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST SECTION 8 OF ACT NO. 2011-535 / ALA. CODE § 31-13-8

Defendants Governor Robert Bentley, Attorney General Luther Strange,

Superintendent Dr. Thomas R. Bice, Interim Chancellor Susan Price, and District

Attorney Robert L. Broussard, sued in their official capacities (“State

Defendants”), respectfully submit this reply brief in support of their motion (doc.

159) to dissolve or stay the injunction against Section 8 of Act No. 2011-535,

codified at Ala. Code § 31-13-8.

I. This Court has jurisdiction to modify or stay the injunction, or to enter an indicative order.

Plaintiffs erroneously argue that this Court has no authority to modify or

stay its preliminary injunction while an appeal of that injunction is pending.

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 2 of 12
However, the State Defendants cited to Rule 62(c), which permits modification while an appeal is pending; Rule 62.1, which permits an indicative ruling which the parties may then present to the appellate court; and circuit case law which permits a stay of the injunction, see Wyatt by and through Rawlins v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.14 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Pacific Ins. Co. v. General Dev. Corp., 28 F.3d 1093, 1096 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that a district court’s modification of an injunction during pendency of appeal “arguably was proper under rule 62(c)”); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 706 F.Supp.2d 120, 123 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The Eleventh Circuit appears to be in agreement with the D.C. District Court, suggesting that a court may vacate an injunction pursuant to Rule 62(c).”) (citing Pacific Ins. Co., supra).
There is no doubt that under Rule 62(c), this Court at least has authority to stay the injunction during the appeal. Indeed, the HICA Plaintiffs themselves effectively asked for equivalent relief from this Court, after they filed their appeal, when they asked the Court to enjoin other provisions of the statute during the appeal. The only jurisprudential question here is whether the Court has jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction permanently at this point. On this point, admittedly, the authorities are split. Wright & Miller, however, properly observe that the Court does have this power. They note that the District’s Court’s authority to amend or dissolve an injunction that is on appeal is supported by the fact that the District
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Court remains free to reach the merits of the case, including dismissal of the action. Federal Practice & Procedure § 3921.2. The rules permit this Court to act, and common sense confirms that the District Court which has heard the evidence is in the best position to first address a change in circumstances. Id.
But in the very least, this Court has unambiguous power to stay the injunction during the appeal under Rule 62(c). Likewise, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an application “for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the district court.” Fed.R.App.P. 8(a). It makes no sense to require State Defendants to come here first if this Court has no authority to act. Indeed, this is the procedure Plaintiffs followed when they filed their motion for injunction pending appeal. See doc. 140. Thus, in the very least, this Court should stay the injunction during the pendency of the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
II. Plaintiffs have presented no valid reason to keep the injunction in place when the basis for the injunction no longer exists.
Plaintiffs’ only non-jurisdictional argument is their rather ironic assertion that the injunction should remain in place in spite of the change in the statute because the relevant state agencies are not yet registered in the SAVE program, which is one way to confirm a person’s immigration status with the federal
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government.1 To be clear, the statute expressly says that status determinations will be made solely “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c),” and SAVE is one way for the State to make inquiries under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). But even assuming, for sake of this motion, that the SAVE program is the only permissible way to confirm immigration status under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), that is no basis to keep the injunction in place.
Plaintiffs appear to argue, in Catch-22 fashion, that the reason the Section 8 injunction cannot be lifted is because the State Defendants have not taken every step necessary to enforce Section 8. It is not at all clear that Alabama’s Department of Postsecondary Education could register for SAVE while the injunction is in place. In order to register, an agency must provide the “[s]ection of law authorizing your agency to administer the benefit or license or engage in another activity for which your agency will be verifying immigration status,” as well as the “[s]ection of law requiring or authorizing the verification of immigration status.” See online SAVE registration instructions, available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f 6d1a/?vgnextoid=d283c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextch
1 Ala. Code § 31-13-8 provides, “For purposes of this section, a public postsecondary education institution officer may seek federal verification of an alien’s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).” This federal statute provides, “The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
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annel=d283c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last visited June 8, 2012). So long as Section 8 is enjoined, it does not require or authorize anyone to verify immigration status.
It is thus the height of irony for the HICA Plaintiffs to argue that the injunction must remain in place because the pertinent agencies have not registered for SAVE. The primary reason these agencies are not registered for SAVE is that the Plaintiffs sought and obtained this injunction. By arguing that the agencies should register for SAVE in order to comply with the law, Plaintiffs are actually making a powerful equitable argument as to why the injunction should be lifted as soon as possible, to allow state officials to begin complying with what Plaintiffs concede to be the law.
The Court should also keep in mind that Plaintiffs brought a facial challenge. The burden is not on the State to show that every instance of enforcement will be permissible; rather, the burden is on the Plaintiffs to prove that there is no possible circumstance under which the statute can be enforced consistently with federal law. They plainly have not done so. If Plaintiffs are correct, then the State simply must register with SAVE (and the State Defendants can represent that the Department of Post-Secondary Education intends to do so). Even if registration is a necessary step before enforcement can begin, that is no basis for an injunction that bars enforcement in all circumstances.
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The memo from former Chancellor Hill, issued under the prior version of Section 8, changes nothing. As Plaintiffs point out, the State indicated that with respect to other sections not enjoined, it will not enforce those sections until the applicable agency has registered with SAVE. See doc. 162 at 12-13. This guidance was given well after the out-of-date Hill memorandum.
The bottom line is that Plaintiffs argue that Section 8 should remain enjoined in all circumstances because the State has not yet registered for a program that is unavailable to the State while the injunction is in place. The law of preemption does not require such a result.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even the use of SAVE will not permit a lawful application of Section 8 because state officials still must interpret the federal government’s responses to State inquiries, and state officials still must determine whether a person is “lawfully present.” Doc. 162 at 8-9, n.5. Not so. Section 8 specifically provides that “[a] public postsecondary education institution or officer or official shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.” Ala. Code § 31-13-8. Moreover, the SAVE program does not purport to provide clues to immigration status, but instead provides a means for “[v]erifying immigration status.” See “About the SAVE Program” (available at
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 7 of 12
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f 6d1a/?vgnextoid=e112feb9a2ca8210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextcha nnel=e112feb9a2ca8210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited June 8, 2012). According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, SAVE enables government officials to “[c]omply[] with legislative mandates to verify applicants’ immigration status and ensure that only entitled applicants receive federal, state, or local public benefits and licenses.” Id. And 8 U.S.C. § 1621 says that unlawfully present aliens are not eligible for “state and local public benefits,” including “postsecondary education” benefits. Congress’s statutes thus expressly contemplate that state and local governments will cooperate with the federal government, via 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), in making these determinations for these purposes.
Assuming, then, that the State can only enforce Section 8 after registering for SAVE, that is indeed something that the Department of Postsecondary Education intends to do; it is not something that can be done while the injunction is in place; and when done, it will permit Section 8 to be enforced in a manner wholly consistent with federal law. Whether the State is registered at this moment is not relevant to a facial challenge, where Plaintiffs must show that there are no possible circumstances under which enforcement is permissible.
7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 8 of 12
The HICA Plaintiffs are thus stalling, and their opposition—filed two weeks after the State Defendants filed their time-sensitive motion—offers no basis for keeping the injunction in place. The simple fact is that the sentence no longer exists in Section 8 that led this Court to enter a preliminary injunction. As the State may “exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as determined by federal law, from enrolling in and attending its public secondary educational institutions” there is no reason for the injunction to stand. Doc. 137 at 44 n. 13. This is particularly so as “preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments – because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits – must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts.” Id. at 2 (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).
For all the above reasons, and as stated in the State Defendants’ motion, the preliminary injunction against Section 8, codified at Ala. Code § 31-13-8, should be dissolved or at least stayed pending appeal.
8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 9 of 12

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

OF COUNSEL:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us
R. Cooper Shattuck GOVERNOR’S LEGAL OFFICE 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: 244-242-7120 Facsimile: 334-242-2335 legal@governor.alabama.gov

BY:
s/ James W. Davis Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Joshua K. Payne (ASB-1041-A55P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Bice, Interim Chancellor Price, and District Attorney Broussard

9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 10 of 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 11, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record:

Mary Bauer Andrew H. Turner Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org

Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 broder@nilc.org

10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 11 of 12

Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com

Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales Mexican American Legal Defense And Educational Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 nperales@maldef.org

11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 163 Filed 06/11/12 Page 12 of 12

Allison Neal AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 aneal@aclualabama.org

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 apedersen@maldef.org

J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804-2087 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, 7th Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, AL 35283-0709 dsweeney@babc.com

s/ James W. Davis Of Counsel

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on July 6, 2012, I served the foregoing

Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief by electronic mail upon:

John C. Neiman, Jr. Margaret L. Fleming James W. Davis Misty S. Fairbanks William G. Parker, Jr. Joshua K. Payne Office of the Alabama Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 jneiman@ago.state.al.us mfleming@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C. P.O. Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Donald B. Sweeney Jr. Bradley ArantBoult Cummings, LLP 1819 5th Avenue N. Birmingham, AL 35203-2120 dsweeney@babc.com

Roland Cooper Shattuck Office of the Governor of Alabama Legal Office 600 Dexter Ave. Montgomery, Al 36130 cooper.shattuck@governor.alabama.gov

Dated: July 6, 2012

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

 
 No. 11-14535-CC and No. 11-14675 _______________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _______________________________

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, ET AL.
Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v. ROBERT BENTLEY, ET AL.,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants. _______________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB _______________________________

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS ON ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES AND HB658 _______________________________

R. Cooper Shattuck Legal Advisor to the Governor
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA Legal Office, N103 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7120
Counsel for Governor Bentley

Luther Strange Attorney General
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440

Counsel for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Craven, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard

July 6, 2012

HICA v. Bentley 11th Circuit Case Nos. 11-14535-CC & 11-14675 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The following is a list of all additional known judges, attorneys, persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities that have an interest in the outcome of this case, including subsidiaries, conglomerates, affiliates and parent corporations, any publicly held company that owns 10 percent or more of a party’s stock, and other identifiable legal entities related to a party: [no new entries]
C-1 of 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS.......................................................................1 TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. ii TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF ......................................................... iii ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................1
I. Section 8 is not preempted. ........................................................................1 II. Arizona refutes the HICA Plaintiffs’ “regulation of
immigration” theory. ..................................................................................3 III. Arizona and HB658 shed no light on the non-preemption
issues. .......................................................................................................... 4 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................5 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................................7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................................................................8
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES *Arizona v. United States,
No. 11-182, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ____, 2012 WL 2368661 ...........................................................................................4 *Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980) ...........................................................................3 Equal Access Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004) ..............................................................2 Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................3 STATUTES 8 U.S.C. §1373...........................................................................................................3 8 U.S.C. §1621...........................................................................................................3 *Ala. Act No. 2012-491 (HB658) §1.........................................................................2 ALA. CODE §31-13-8 ..............................................................................................1, 3 * marks authorities on which this brief chiefly relies
ii

Brief Page #
2

TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF
Description
Memorandum Opinion

Docket/Tab #
137

iii

ARGUMENT The State Defendants adopt the arguments regarding Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 from the State and Governor’s supplemental brief in the United States’ case. See Ala. Supp. Br., Nos. 11-14532-CC and 11-14674-CC, at 1-11.1 This brief addresses the one additional provision, Section 8, for which preemption-related issues are presented in HICA. It also addresses the general effect of the Arizona decision on the HICA Plaintiffs’ overarching regulation-of-immigration theory.
I. Section 8 is not preempted. HB658 moots the HICA Plaintiffs’ challenge to Section 8 and requires
vacatur of the District Court’s judgment against that provision. See Red Br. 64-68. Section 8 states that “[a]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United
States shall not be permitted to enroll in or attend any public postsecondary education institution” in Alabama. ALA. CODE §31-13-8. The HICA Plaintiffs’ challenge to this provision was premised on a single sentence. That sentence said “[a]n alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8
1 Because the District Court is due to be reversed on the Section 10 issue in the United States’ case, this Court can vacate the District Court’s judgment on Section 10 in the HICA Plaintiffs’ appeal and allow the District Court on remand to deny their motion on that provision as moot, as the District Court did with respect to Section 13.
1

U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.” Id. The District Court preliminarily enjoined the entire provision based on that sentence. It reasoned, correctly, that “Alabama may, without conflicting with Congress’s classifications of aliens, exclude unlawfullypresent aliens, as determined by federal law, from enrolling in and attending its public postsecondary educational institutions.” Doc. 137 – Pg 44 n. 13 (citing Equal Access Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 601-08 (E.D. Va. 2004)). But it found that the sentence in question was flawed because it precluded some lawfully present persons from enrolling in and attending postsecondary institutions. Id. at 38, 44. On that basis the District Court enjoined the entirety of Section 8. Id. Before this Court, the State Defendants argued that the District Court should have enjoined only the sentence, not the whole provision. See Red Br. 6468.
The HICA Plaintiffs’ claims against Section 8 are now moot because HB658 eliminated that sentence. See Ala. Act No. 2012-491 §1, at p. 17. The District Court identified only one plaintiff, Esayas Haile, as having standing to challenge Section 8. Doc 137 – Pg 37. Amended Section 8, by its terms, should no longer preclude Haile, who is alleged to be lawfully present, from obtaining a postsecondary education.
Because the HICA Plaintiffs have not argued that a preliminary injunction would be appropriate for any other reason, see Yellow Br. 48-51, they no longer
2

have any argument that the provision is preempted. The federal code specifically authorizes states to deny postsecondary-education benefits to unlawfully present persons. See 8 U.S.C. §1621. Section 8 expressly defers to the federal government’s determination as to whether the person is unlawfully present under 8 U.S.C. §1373(c). See ALA. CODE §31-13-8. Under the binding former Fifth Circuit decision in Doe v. Plyler, a state can “deny illegal aliens its largess,” including educational benefits, without fear of preemption. 628 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). Nothing in Arizona is to the contrary.
The Court thus should vacate the district court’s judgment on Section 8. “Where a law is amended so as to remove its challenged features, the claim for injunctive relief becomes moot as to those features.” Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the HICA Plaintiffs offer no other basis for a claim against Section 8, this Court should vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to deny their request for a preliminary injunction as moot.
II. Arizona refutes the HICA Plaintiffs’ “regulation of immigration” theory. One additional point about the HICA Plaintiffs’ particular preemption
theory, beyond what is noted in the State and Governor’s supplemental brief in the United States’ case, bears emphasis in light of what the Supreme Court said in Arizona.
3

The HICA Plaintiffs’ overarching theory is that HB56 as a whole, and particularly Sections 10 and 12, amounts to an unconstitutional regulation of immigration. See Blue Br. 33-34, 36-38. That theory is incompatible with the way the Supreme Court analyzed the Arizona statute. The Supreme Court did not hold that Arizona’s version of Section 10 was preempted because it regulated immigration; it instead held that the provision was preempted because Congress has occupied the particular field of alien registration. See Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ____, 2012 WL 2368661, at *8-*10 (June 25, 2012). Likewise, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Arizona’s version of Section 12 was facially preempted. See id. at *15-*17. Under HICA’s sweeping theory, both of those provisions would have been facially invalid on the theory that they were regulations of immigration. The Supreme Court’s approach thus makes clear that HICA was mistaken to suggest that all state laws that “place[] special burdens on” unlawfully present persons are unconstitutional regulations of immigration. Blue Br. 33.
III. Arizona and HB658 shed no light on the non-preemption issues. HICA’s appeal also presents Fourteenth Amendment issues relating to
Section 28, and the State Defendants’ cross-appeal presents Sixth Amendment issues under Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). The cross-appeal as to Sections 10(e)
4

and 11(e) appear to be moot because Arizona means that Section 10 and Section 11(a) are preempted. See Ala. Supp. Br., Nos. 11-14532-CC and 11-14674-CC, at 3. But the cross-appeal as to Section 13(h) remains ripe, and neither HB658 nor Arizona affects the analysis on this point. The Court should resolve those constitutional claims in the State Defendants’ favor for the reasons set forth in the briefs. See Red Br. 49-64; Gray Br. 1-3.
Also, for the first time in this appeal, the HICA Plaintiffs have argued in their supplemental brief that Section 19 is preempted. See HICA Supp. Br. 5-7. This provision is not the subject of this appeal, and that portion of the HICA supplemental brief should be stricken.
CONCLUSION This Court should do the following: (1) affirm the District Court’s judgment on Sections 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30; (2) reverse the District Court’s judgment on Section 13(h); and (3) vacate the District Court’s judgment on Sections 8, 10, 10(e), and 11(e) and remand with instructions to deny the request for a preliminary injunction on these provisions as moot.
5

Respectfully submitted,
LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
BY:
s/John C. Neiman, Jr.
John C. Neiman, Jr. (ASB-8093-O68N) Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 jneiman@ago.state.al.us
Counsel for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Craven, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard
OF COUNSEL:
R. Cooper Shattuck Legal Advisor to the Governor
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA Legal Office, N103 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 (334) 242-7120 cooper.shattuck@governor.alabama.gov
Counsel for Governor Robert Bentley
6

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify this brief complies with the applicable page limitation under this Court’s order. I prepared this brief in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2007 in 14-point, Times New Roman font.
s/ John C. Neiman, Jr. OF COUNSEL
7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On July 6, 2012, I filed and served this brief via PACER. On that same day, I dispatched this brief to Federal Express for delivery to the Court within three business days. I served the following attorneys for the United States by electronic mail:

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Michelle R. Lapointe Kristi Graunke Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org kristi.graunke@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org

8

Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org

G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com

9

Allison Neal (ASB 3377-I72N) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203 aneal@aclualabama.org
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. P.O. Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com

Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersen@maldef.org

s/ John C. Neiman, Jr. OF COUNSEL
10

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-10

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 7

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 10
Declaration of Mohammad Abdollahi Ali-Beik
On behalf of DreamActivist.org

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-10 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 7
DECLARATION Oll MOHAMMAD ABDOLLAHI ALI··BEIK I, Mohammad Abdollahi Ali-Beik, make this declaration based on my personal knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as fo!lows:
1. My name is Mohammad Abdollahi Ali Beik, and I am a co-founder of an org:mization called DREAM Activist.org. DREAM Activist.org is a multicultural. migrant· youth led movement to pass tbe federal DRE~M Act, also known as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act.
2. The DREAM Act is a bipartisan bill that seeks to address the situation faced by many young students who were brought to the United States as young infants. Under the most recent version of the DREAM Act, students with good motal character wbo came to the United States at age !5 or younger at least five years before the date of the legislati.Jn's enactment wmdd qualif)' for "conditional penuanoot resident stattt~" upon acceptance m rol!ege, graduation from a U.S. high school, or being awarded aGED in the United States or if they have served in the armed forces.
3. I currently live in Atlanta, Georgia. I was bom in Iran. I came to the United States when I was llbout tlnee,yet1.rs old with my parents who immigrated. t(· study at a state university. I have been living in the United States for the past 22 years. I am a DREAM Act eligible student
4. DREAM Activist.org is a national membership-based organization comprised of DREAM Act students from all across the country, including in Alabama. DREAM Activist.org is split into ten regions across the country. I work to coordinate Region Forlr, which covers the Southeast United States, including Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi. We provide cainpaign support to DREAM Act students
l

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-10 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 7
tacing removal from the United States in Alabama and all across the countr)", and we promote the passage of the DREAM Act.
5. Dream Activist.org has 3!5 members in Alabama. Our members include students in multiple stages of the federal immigration court system. Some of our members, including our Alabama members, are unknown to the federal Department of Homeland Secudty's Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") department. But many others have been encountered by ICE and have been given a ternpotary reprieve from removal.
6. For example, some members have been granted "deferred action," which is a
discretionary decision by ICE to not arrest or deport a person for immigration putposes.
Defetted action is often gr~nted for one-year intervals, but can be renewed. However, a person granted deferred action is still removable and is still without lawful status in the United States. Because of the temporary and indefinite nal.urc of defe1red action, individuals who have been granted it are not eligible to obtain the identity documents HB 56 requires in Alabama, such as a driver's license. ICE also does not issue any sort of an identity ea(d to those who have received defen-ed action. Sometimes ICE does not provide letters indicating that a P•'>rson was granted deterred action. but 1hese hardly qualify as an identity document.
7. Some DREAM Activist.org members also have private immigration bills introduced by a local Senator or House of Representative preventing their r<)moval from the United States. Upon issuance of a private bill, a DREAM Act student's removal is delayed at least until the end of the congressional session. A DREAM Act student with a private bill introduced may not have proof that the bill wru; introduced or a law enforcement officer may be confused as to whether a DREAM Act student with a private bill can remai11 in the United States.
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Under HB 56, Alabama DREAM Act students with a private bill introduced but not passed in

either the House or Senate may be targeted and arrested under the law.
8. HB 56 poses a severe risk for members of Dream Activist.org who reside in

Alabama. These risks include the following:

a.

Under Section 8 ofHB 56, the only immigrants who -em attend a public

postsecondary institution are lawful permanent residents and persons on a nonimmigrant visas.

This means DREAM Act students in Alabama will be prohibited from attending public
postsecondary institutions. This is a severe harm for many of our members in Alabama, for not
only does it deny them of the right to attend college and fulfill their dreams, but it also means that our members in Alabama will be denied one ofthe ma_in paths to conditional residency

under the current DREAM Act being considered in Congress. b. Under Section 10 ofHB 56, it is a crime to be in Alabama without a

proper alieo registration document. Many of our members in Alabama do not have such a «registration document" because they do not have current immigration status, and so will be at risk of a criminal convictiOll merely for being present in Alabama even though the federal

government is aware that some of our Alabama members are in the cou:ntry and ha.9 elected not

to initiate removal proceedings against them.

c.

Under Section 11 of HB 56, it is illegal to apply for or to work in the State

of Alab:l.ll1a without prior work authorization. Meny of our members in Alabama do not have

work authorization because they do not have current immigration status (though some of our

1nembers who have been granted deferred action can qualify for work authorization while their

deferred action status remains current). They will thm: fac-e risk of criminal prosecution if they

3

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attempt to support themselves and their .families while they work to fulfill their American

dreams.

d. Under Section 12 ofHB 56, law enforcement officen: are required to

detain individ\lals ifthey suspect the person is without current irm:nigration Status. Many of our

members in Alabama will be subjected to mlawful detention under this ruk. For example,

members who have been granted deferred action by the federal govemrrtent would never be arrested by federal ilnlll.igration officers (because federal authorities have already decided to not act on that person's case at this time), but there is no way that a local police Dfficer will be able to quicldy verify this_ Instead, the officer will have to hold om members for as long as it takes to

get verification of this status from federal authorities, meaning om membem will be subject to

prolonged and untrur detention. e. Under Section 13 ofHB 56, it will be a crime for A[;,bamaresidents to

give our members a ride, provide help to our members to stay i11 Alabama, •Jr even to rent lodging to our members. Our members are going to be severely harmed by this provision

because it will make living in Alabama nearly impossible, even for our men1bers who have deferred action or a private congressional bill; because although ICE will not try to remove these

students, they nevertheless are without current status and thus anyone who helps them in

Alabama. could be criminally prosecuted.
f. The various sections ofHB 56 wotk togethe1· in ways that will inflict

substantial hmn'ls on our Alabama member, ifthe law is allowed to take effect Under Sections 18 and 19 of HB 56, anyone who lacks current immigration status cannot br; granted bond. Again our members, even those with deferred action, nevertheless lack current immigration status, and as Sttch ifthey are ever stopped by police for a minor infraction, they will be denied

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bond. So for example, if an officer suspects that one of our members is witrtout status, the

offic<;r mu~t verify their status (per Section 12). The officer also will arrest our member for

violating the registration requirement (Section 10). And the member will spend however long it takes to get a court hearing on the chru:ge, because the member will not be available for bond

(per Section 18). g.

In addition, under Section 27 off:!B 56, our members cannot safely enter

into contracts with anyone. The contract will be unenforceable for our members who lack current immigration status, including those who have beetl granted deferred action. This is going

to have a profound effect on our members, some of whom have already expressed fears of being

able to enter into rental agreements or plans to purchase a car if the law takes effect.

h. Under Section28 ofHB 56, our members will have t·) disclose the

immigration status of themselves and their parents when they enroll in schooL This is going to

have a profound adverse effect on our members, some of whom have already expressed fears of

having d1e!r family members reported and detained. This is an illlcon.scioneble proposition created by HB 56. On the one ham~ America is a country that encourages ~'veryone to work hru:d

to be their very best, and everyone recognizes the best way to do so is by getting an education. Yet this section reqttites young children and youths to decide between pursuing their dreams and

exposing their fbunily to incredible risk ofdetection.

9. Dream Activist.org members in Alaliama will suffer severely if this law is

pe!mitted to go into effect, and Dream Activist.org will similarly suffer as our members become afraid to engage in advocacy through our net\vork, or even to associate themselves with the

organization. For example, we have organized on-line events in Alabama to push for passage of the DREAM Act, we have held regional events and invited our Alabama ru~-n•bers to attend, and

5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-10 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 7 we have $upported organizing by local DRE.<\M students irt Alabama. Irt fad, we are organizing a DREAM Activist summit in September or October in Alabama. All ofthi:; is at risk as many ofour members are considering leaving Alabama ifHB 56 is implemented end tlwse who stay have indicated that they will minimize their exposure to local law enforcement by avoiding public events. I declare under penalty ofpel:i\l!Y that the foregoing is true ;md correct EXECUTED this 5 day of July, 2011 in Atlanta, Georgia.
6

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-11

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 7

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 11
Declaration of Scott Douglas On behalf of Greater Birmingham Ministries

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-11 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 7
DECLARATION OF SCOTT DOUGLAS I, Scott Douglas, hereby make this declaration based on my personal knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows.
1. My name is Scott Douglas. I am the Executive Director of the Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), based in Birmingham, Alabama.
2. GBM is a 501(c)(3) organization and is a multi-faith, multi-racial, multi-member organization. GBM provides emergency assistance to low-income families in need while working on public policies that can better the quality of life for all. GBM counts Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faith communities among its members, including the Roman Catholic Diocese and the Conference of the United Methodist Church, and individual temples, churches, and mosques. GBM’s members also have congregations that comprise Latino, African, Middle Eastern and other immigrant families, including undocumented individuals and school-age children. GBM has three main program areas: Economic Justice, Direct Services, and Faith In Community. Its direct services project provides services in the form of food and financial assistance to immigrant and other communities based on their level of need.
3. There are eight full-time staff, three part-time staff and several hundred volunteers that work with me to operate GBM. Every year, we have 400
1

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volunteers to assist with GBM’s programs. Most of these volunteers come from GBM’s member congregations.
4. Our membership consists of twenty different faith communities. To become a member of GBM, potential members must agree with GBM’s mission, agree to provide volunteer services, and provide financial assistance. Members must support GBM through contributions of at least $500 per year, and members can provide support upwards of $20,000 per year.
5. The constituencies that we serve are low-income families from the Birmingham Metropolitan region, which consists of five counties. Our services reach approximately 4,000 families every year. Those families are composed of over 7,000 individuals including men, women, and children, including undocumented individuals.
6. GBM’s Direct Services program provides a variety of services to lowincome families. In the course of a week, GBM provides approximately fifty families, or about 150 people, nonperishable foods, fresh fruits and vegetables and other needed grocery items. GBM also provides families with assistance in the form of paying their rent and utility bills, and paying for their medicine prescriptions. Additionally, twice a week, GBM distributes free clothes to families.
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7. In the course of its work, GBM members often provide transportation to immigrant members, including individuals who we believe to be undocumented. Many times these individuals will share with GBM volunteers where they are from, which are often foreign countries. We even have had to recruit a volunteer interpreter who speaks a native Guatemalan language to accommodate the need to communicate with some of these clients.
8. The population that GBM serves is diverse. Our constituency includes African American, White, and immigrant families. Our immigrant constituents are primarily Latino, African, and Middle Eastern, and our population of Latino Spanish-speaking constituents is increasing. In order to address this growing need we have recruited a student intern who is bilingual because of the increasing number of Spanish-speaking-only clients.
9. HB 56 would greatly burden GBM. The greatest harm would be to require our members to provide us with proof of citizenship for the constituents we assist. As of now, we only ask our members to provide us with proof of income and proof of residence. As an organization, we simply do not have the capacity or desire to document more than what we already require for our services.
10. If HB 56 is implemented, GBM fears that, because of its services to people it believes to be undocumented, its members and volunteers may be prosecuted for encouraging undocumented immigrants to stay in Alabama. GBM
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also fears that it will be prosecuted under HB 56’s harboring and transportation provision because our members and volunteers often do provide transportation to our constituents to Hispanic worship services, to vacation bible school for children, to medical and dental appointments, and some do even provide a regular route to medical clinics. Often, volunteers provide rides to families who come to GBM to pick up groceries. Further, along with the rides, many of our members provide bus tickets, and pay for rent and utilities for many of our clients whom they know or believe to be undocumented. These bus passes are intended for people to get to and from work.
11. GBM is also affected by HB 56’s education provision because our member congregations serve a large number of school-age children and provide these children with brand new school clothes. Undocumented individuals from GBM congregations have expressed that because of HB 56 they are afraid to enroll their children in school. These members fear that their immigration status will be sent to the federal government and lead them to being detained and possibly deported under HB 56.
12. HB 56 is causing our member congregations to lose families and individuals as they leave the state out of fear that they will be detained. One of these members shared with us that they “don’t want to be in a state where they hate us.” Due to this sentiment, GBM will soon have to reallocate organizational and
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financial resources, since GBM draws from its members for its volunteer base. If congregations have fewer members because of HB 56, GBM will have to decrease its services due to the decreasing volunteer base.
13. Under HB 56, GBM will have to redirect efforts towards documenting clients’ immigration status in addition to what GBM already documents in terms of need. This would involve spending more staff time and money to guarantee that the assistance GBM provides to each of its clients comes within the purview of the law. This will substantially slow down GBM’s work, and cause GBM to reprioritize all of its projects. Additionally, since under HB 56, GBM would have to withhold assistance to people who could not verify their immigration status, GBM would have to develop new procedures on how to handle this new group of people that GBM would no longer provide services to, which would also involve a reallocation of our limited resources.
14. GBM has decided to continue implementing the mission of the organization regardless of the implementation of HB 56, even if that stance affects us negatively. This includes to continue providing services to our clients regardless of immigration status, including transporting them as needed, providing food and clothing to them, and all other services that we currently provide.
15. GBM receives approximately 20% of its income from congregations or religious bodies, and in the past, taking a controversial stance has led some
5

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congregations to limit or cease their financial support of GBM. Since we are publicly opposed to HB 56, it is likely that member congregations that do not agree with GBM will limit or cease their support of GBM, which would cause a diversion and a significant loss of organizational and financial resources, including laying off staff and reducing programming.
16. HB 56 conflicts with GBM’s mission, and GBM is not going to change its mission. Very simply put, HB 56 stands in stark contradiction to GBM’s mission and everything we stand for. GBM will continue our work with respect to our mission, which is to serve people based on need alone. Our mission requires that GBM serve people, build community, and pursue justice. HB 56 is a disservice to people, breaks community, and is unjust.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this __ day of July, 2011 in Birmingham, Alabama.
________________________________ Scott Douglas
6

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-13

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 5

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 13
Declaration of Matt Webster

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-13 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 5
DECLARATION OF MATT WEBSTER I, MATT WEBSTER, make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows:
1. I was born in Tuscaloosa, Alabama in 1967. I have lived in Alabama most of my life and am a graduate of the University of Alabama. I have been married to my wife for 11 years. I work as an engineer for a steel mill.
2. A few years back, my wife and I were considering adopting a child. I asked one of my friends about possibly adopting a child from Mexico and learned that he knew of two children in the U.S. whose mother had passed away and were in need of a stable home. The children were extended relatives of his and had been moved around the U.S. among different relatives and one child was struggling in school. Over the next year or so, my wife and I met the children several times, and we grew to love them as our own sons.
3. My wife and I felt that we could give the boys a stable and loving home in which they could both thrive, and their extended relatives agreed. We obtained guardianship over the children, and are currently in the process of finalizing the adoption paperwork. The children are brothers and are ages 11 and 16. They were not born in the U.S. and are not lawfully present.
4. The adoption process is very complicated. I have been working with an adoption attorney and I recently hired an immigration attorney as well. At each
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turn, I have been surprised by the all the steps involved in adoption. We recently had a home visit from the Alabama Department of Human Resources and my understanding is that the adoption should be final sometime in July or August. After the adoption is final there is still a two year waiting period until we can petition for legal permanent resident status for the boys.
5. I am fearful of what could happen to the two boys, who I now consider my sons, during the next year if HB56 goes into effect. They do not have and they are not eligible for any federal alien registration documents, and until we petition for them in two years, they would be “criminals” under this law. This is so cruel and mean. My boys have done nothing wrong and they should not be treated any differently from anyone else.
6. Even before HB56 was passed, Alabama will not issue a fishing license to my oldest son, John Doe #1 because he does not have the proper documents to qualify. If HB56 is implemented, I will be considered a criminal for harboring, encouraging and transporting my own sons to do basic activities a father would do with his sons. My wife and I are law abiding citizens and want to do things the right way and follow the law.
7. My oldest son attends public high school. He will be a junior in high school this fall and is an excellent student. Under HB56, the officials at his school will require proof of his immigration status, which I cannot provide. I am worried
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about how my son’s school officials’ inquiries into his immigration status will affect him, his studies and his future. Because of this I am considering not enrolling him in public schools.
8. I am also concerned about what could happen if both boys were stopped and detained, even while riding their bikes, if I weren’t there to protect them. I am also fearful that one or both of my sons could be subject to discrimination or retaliatory actions for the way they look or sound because of their Hispanic appearance and because English is not their first language.
9. I am furious that our state representatives have wasted and will continue to waste tax payer money with this law. I am a Republican and probably agree with many of our Republican legislators on most issues. On this one issue, on this law, however, I do not.
10. There is already so much red tape and bureaucracy in the immigration process and to add another level of bureaucracy by implementing state level laws that conflict with federal law is crazy to me.
11. I think this bill intentionally targets Hispanics. I have worked with Hispanic people for years and they are good, hardworking people. They come here to support their families and better themselves. I believe we need to reform our immigration laws, but I believe it should be done at the federal level, not state by state. This law is not going to make people leave; it is just going to push families
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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 8

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 17
Declaration of Christopher Barton Thau

07-19-11;10:21AM;

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 8

DECLARATION OF PASTOR CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU
I, Christopher Barton Thau, do hereby make this declaration based on my own · personal knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows: 1. My name is Christopher Barton Thau. I was born in Tennessee and am a . United States citizen. I have lived in Pelham, Alabama for the past fifteen years, since 1996. I have a wife who is a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") and a six year old child born in the United States. I have been a Pastor at the Pleasant Hill United Methodist Church for the past two years. At the Church, I have responsibilities for the bilingual congregation and the administration. 2. The Pleasant Hill United Methodist Church was founded in 1832 and is located in Bessemer, Alabama. The Church is a member of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church. 3. My congregation is bilingual in Spanish and English, and consists of both Latino and White families. This congregation includes first and second generation immigrants with and without children, as well as U.S. citizens. I am aware that many members of my congregation do not have immigration status. 4. In addition to facilitating spiritual growth, as part of my ministry, I provide food assistance, occasional work assignments, monetary assistance, counseling, help in seeking public benefits such as helping congregants complete Medicaid
1
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 8

applications for U.S.-bom citizens as well as applications for Food Stamps or any other social services they might need. 5. In the course .of my ministry, I often transp01t people to doctor's appointments, to work, to benefits appointments, to public agencies so that they can file applications with Medicaid and Food Stamps offices? and any other important appointments. 6. Additionally, I lmow that many in my congregationdo not have lawful immigration status because it is has come up as part of the counseling I provide. I have also performed marriages of members of my congregation where at least one person is undocumented. 7. If HB 56 is implemented, I fear that I could be subject to criminal prosecution for transporting and harboring undocumented congregation members between important appointments, orfor providing one of the many services I provide to my congregation. 8. I also fear that marrying undocumented individuals will lead to my prosecution since marrying individuals encourages them to stay in Alabama, in violation of HB 56. 9. Additionally,. I assist the Mexican Consulate in their mobile consulate at our Church, and since many of our members do not have immigration status, I fear that assisting those individuals to get Mexican passports and consular identification
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 8

documents (also known as "matriculas") will subject me to criminal prosecution under HB 56 since I would be encouraging these individuals to stay in Alabama. 10. In my family, my wife was undocumented until she adjusted status recently in 200 I to become an LPR. Her brothers and sisters have lived with us, and often continue to visit our home in Pelham. In the course of 10 years, all of my wife's family that resides in Alabama has stayed with us. Many of the members of her family are undocmnented, and they often visit us. Under HB 56, I fear that I would be fined or put in jail for harbo1ing undocumented immigrants simply because I allow my family to stay with us during their visits to see us and our U.S. citizen child. 11. My family has already been deeply affected by HB 56. Certain family members are already planning on moving out of Alabama. I personally have many houses and cars in my name since I am a U.S. citizen, and if people leave the state · or are deported out of fear due to HB 56, there will be a great financial burden to my family. 12. I have one child that was born in 2005 and is now six years old. He is now attending Alabama public schools. I do not like that we should be required to show our immigration status so that our children can attend school. Even though · my wife and I have proper status under Alabama law, and my son is a U.S. citizen, it is unconscionable that we must provide our status and other Latino families must
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 8

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provide their undocumented status in order to enroll their children in public schools, regardless of the child's status. Because I feel that HB 56 is an invasion of privacy, and is unfair to my family and to Latinos generally, I will not provide proof of immigration status to enroll my child in the upcoming school year. 13. I think there is a great potential for HB 56 to be selectively enforced by schools, so that some people are required to show documents to their schools and others are not simply based on their, or their child's, race or accent. IfHB 56 is enacted, I am also concerned that there is a potential that schools will cut back on services because the schools will fear that they might break the law by having certain programs. I am also concerned that as a father, my child will not be able to access those programs if they are cut due to complying with HB 56. 14. After the passage ofHB 56, I have counseled many in my congregation who have immense fears about what will happen under the law. Many of those who are undocumented have mortgages and legally incorporated businesses, and they are fearful that they will lose their investment in their property because they might have to abandon those properties and go to another state under HB 56. They are also concerned that they may be forced to take their U.S. citizen children back with them to their home country, even if they have never been there before.

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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 8

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15. The congregation has already been affected by the law as one family has already moved to New York, and another family is considering moving to Nebraska. 16. Others in my congregation that I have personally counseled who do not have these types of investments live under fear every day since HB 56 was passed, and fear leaving their house to come to Church, to go to the grocery store, or do other every day errands. 17. I also learned about these concerns during many connnunity meetings that I facilitated at our Church regarding HB 56 and its impact on the connnunity and congregation. Because we advertised the meetings, attendees were concerned that police will be sent to these meetings to detain and deport anyone coming to the meeting. 18. Members of my congregation whom I have counseled have indicated a fear of reporting crime even if they are victims, since under HB 56 there is a duty by police to investigate everyone with whom they have lawful contact to immigration authorities. They are concerned that they can no longer trust the police, and that this is going to teach an entire generation of children that the police are to be feared rather than trusted. 19. In counseling my family and my congregation, they ask what they should do because they fear for their children. They are concerned about what will happen to
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-17 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 8

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their children jJ they have to leave the state or are detained by the police and potentially deported. They are concerned about the kind of preparations do they· need to make should they return to their home.country, about whether to keep their kids in Alabama or to take them to their home country with them. I tell them whether there are LPRs or U.S. citizens that they could assign custody of their children to for purposes of education. I ask whether their children have passports to travel back and forth between Alabama and their home country. I tell them also to be prepared by August 1, 2011 that in case the law still stands on September 1, 2011, to be ready to leave the state to go to another place where they will not be treated like criminals. 20. I also advise them to know all the risks under HB 56, including that they could be profiled and picked up by the police outside a roadblock outside El Pueblo and Super Mercado, or at while walking down the street. This is particularly true since there are some municipalities that have a history of harassing immigrants. 21. I am concerned that if HB 56 becomes the law of Alabama, I will have to personally provide triage counseling and support to families in crisis. I believe that the Church will become a physical site of sanctuary for families in crisis. I will likely get calls from family members that have been picked up by the police and arrested. I am also concerned that I will have to start working on writs of habeas
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corpus for these individuals, and will have. to organize teams of lawyers to assist people t1ned or put in jail due to provisions of HB 56. 22. HB 56 forces me to have to make a choice about whether to follow my calling as a Pastor and honor my humanity or to adhere to HB 56. It is a conscious · choice I make, and every time I will choose my calling and break the law if · necessary, even if that means I must go to jail. I am currently considering moving out of the state if this draconian HB 56 law stands because I will not live in a state where my family and my congregation are always at risk of being stopped by the police and detained for a long period of time, or where I have to provide documentation of my immigration status to enroll my child in school.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
EXECUTED this}L day of July, 2011 in~Alabama.
--

7

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 7

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 26
Declaration of Jane Doe #2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 7

I,

hereby make this declaration based on my personal kllowledge

and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows .

. . 1. I currently live in Birmingham, Alabama. I am the mother of three

··children. I am a single mother. I have lived in Alabari:la for the past 12 years.

2. I came to the United States in 1999 on a visa. When my visa expired,

I decided to remain because I felt I could make a better life for myself here. I do

not have a green card, and because of this I also do not have a driver'slice11se or

.any kind of governmenHssued photo identification from tl1e United States. I do

p.ot have a passport witl1 a valid visa either. ·

3. . One of my children was the victim of a serious crime committed by an

official at her school. My child and another child were both sexually assaulted by

the official. When the mother ofthe other child told nie about this, I was shocked
and horrified for what had happened t? my baby. I sought therapy for my child

and myself to deal with this traumatic experience.· The other mother wanted to

press charges, and did so. She asked me if I would join her in talking to the police

about what happened to my child. I wanted to. I wanted to make sure other

children would be rrotected from this school official. But I was afraid to do so

because I had overstayed my visa and I was fearful I could be detained and

. deported, so I.refused. But the police learned why I would not talk to them, and

1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 7
they explained that since my child was a victim of crime, my child, and I as the child's parent, could apply for a visa from the federal government, called aU nonimmigrant visa, if I participated in the prosecution. ·We did participate in the· prosecution, and the official is now serving time in prison for what he did, and more importantly, all of the children in the school are safe.
4. My children and I applied for aU visa. My child was certified as a victim of crime by the law officers who helped us. The U-visa application process allows us to file the application with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, . but it does not give me or my children any legal status while the application is pending. I hope that we will be granted aU visa by the federal government. Ifwe are granted U visas; we must wait three. years before we apply for aI green ca.rd. . But right now, I have no proof of any of this. Although I do not fear that the · federal government will try to deport me while my application is pending, I still do not have any simple document that I could show to Alabama law enforcement . oflicers demonstrating that I have legal status or that the federal government is aware that I am in the cotmtry without status, but is not attempting to deport me. ·
5. If HB 56 goes into effect, I worry that I will become a criminai under state law, even though I am eligible for the U-Visa under federal law because my child was the victim of a crime. I do not have any of the federal alien registration . · documents required by HB 56, and until my application is approved, I do not have
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 7

lawful immigration status by the federal government. I also fear I will be detained

· by police while they try to verify my immigration status, simply because my

· petition hasn't been approved yet.

6. IfHB 56 goes into effect, I will try to avoid any possible interaction

.

.

with law enforcement. I will be very unlikely to report a crini.e whether I was a

victim or just happened to witness it because I wouldn't want to be questioned

about my immigration status. It will be just like when my child was hurt by the

official. I would rather keep my famlly together and safe than risk jail time andmy

children being taken away from me.

7. . The saddest paii: about this law is what it is doing to my children. I ·

have always taught them that if they are in trouble or in danger, they should trust

the police officers. I have always told them that the police are their friends and are

there to protect them, But my children are now terrified of the police. They tell

me they are afraid I will be arrested and taken away from them. I try to reassure

them, but what can I say? IfHB 56 becomes law, they could be right.

8. I worry about the fhture of my children ifl were to be detained due to

implementation ofHB 56. I have no other family in the United States. If I were to

. be detained, I have no family who could take care of the children for me. My

· children consider Birmingham their home. All three of them were born in the

United States and have lived their whole lives here.

3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 7
.9. I wony that HB 56 will interrupt my children's education. I understand that HB 56 would require my children's school to determine my immigration status when I enroll them at school. And, ba~ed on my responses, I fear that these school officials may report nie to the police, who would be required to arrest me under HB 56. I also fear my children will be treated as second-class students by the tea.chers and their peers. I do not know what I will do; My children need to be educated. I am considering ifl would need to home school them ifl-IB 56 goes into effect, but if I have to home school them I don't know how l would be able to work in order to provide for them. For this reason, I fear HB 56 will seriously hurt my children's future.
10. I work hard to support my children. We. are on our own because I have divorced my ex-husband, who was abusive to me. I clean houses for a living.
However, even this would become a crime under HB 56 because it criminalizes
· working, and applying for work, without work authorization, and I am not eligible for work authorization until my U-visa is approved. 11. I am afraid that HB 56 will make the contracts 1 enter into unenforceable. Yet, I depet)d on the contracts I enterinto in order to survive. Ifl am unable to enterinto contracts, for example to rent a house, buy a car, or pay for cell phone service, I will be 1mable to have a place to live or a means of travel or communication.· If I am unable to enter into contracts to clean houses; I will no .
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 7
longer have a source of income as Well, and my children will not have their basic
needs met. Therefore, I fear that HB 56 will make it harder, ifi1ot virtually
. impossible for me, to provide basic living for myself and my family. 12. · I also fear that I would be committing a crime by renting an apartment
ifHB 56 W!;)nt into effect. I do rent the apartment that I currently live in with my children, and I currently do not have proper immigration status. The law makes it a crime to rent t() someone without status, and also makes it a crime to conspire or to solicit rentals ifyou are undocumented. I feat that I would be considered a solicitor of illegally renting. ·
13. IfHB 56 goes into effect, I am afraid that I will be stopped·and detained by the police because I cani:lot produce the kinds of identity documents ·specified in 'that law. I have been stopped by police before, but they have never had reason to arrest me. Now I may be stopped and detained, ev-:n though I am petitioning for a federal U-Visa and may therefore obtain.status in the near future.
14. I am afraid I will be racially profiled by law enforcement officers in· Alabama ifl-ffi 56 is allowed to take effect based on my Latino appearance and my foreign accent. This haS already happened to some of my Latino friends, and I an1 . worried it will happen to me, too. I will be afraid to travel or be in public. However, I need to drive in order to be able to work and take my children to school.
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-26 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 7
.15. . I am participating in this lawsuit because I need to stand up for myself ·and my children. However, I am terrified of being identified as a part ofthis lawsuit. My ex-husband has been verbally abusive to me in the past, and also threatened to report me to immigration authmities when! said I would leave him. To this day, he continues to threaten me. He threatens to report me if I try to force him to provide child support for our children or ifl go on a date with someone and · he finds out. IfHB 56 goes into effect, I will be even more fearful of :fiuther abuse by my ex-husband and less lil<ely to repmt crimes for fear of detention and deportation. Under HB 56, 1would be even more vulnerable to crimes and threats by my ex~husband. I fear that my ex-husband will report tne and that I will be
subject to criminal prosecution,. even though I am applying for a fedenil U-Visa because my child was the victim of a crime. HB 56 would make me a state criminal and even more vulnerable to prosecution, even though I may obtain status in the near future. I also fear being subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory treatment by the police and members of the general public if my role in this lawsuit . · is made public. I declare under penalty ofpeJ.;jury that the foregoing is true and correct.
EXECUTED this __12 day ofJuly, 2011 in r'b l('ffilng\wn, AL.
6

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 7

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 27
Declaration of Jane Doe #3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 7
·u"'"'" this declaration based on my own personal knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows:
1. I was bom in Montgomery, Alabama in 1983. I have lived in Alabama my whole life, and cunently reside in Montgomery, Alabama. I am a United States citizen.
2. In March of 2010, I manied a man who is an undocumented immigrant. He and I live together with our three children, who are all under the age of six. All of our children were born in the United States. We are a very happy family and are frightened about the impact on all of us ifHB 56 goes into effect:
3. Ifimplemented, HB 56 would make it a crime for me to live with and support my husband. In order to avoid committing the crime of harboring or helping an undocumented immigrant under HB 56, I would have to separate from my husband. If I understand HB 56 conectly, the intent is to make me divorce my husband. I am offended and upset by this idea. I have no intention of ever separating from or divorcing my husband. I do not think the state should be able to tell me who I can love and who I can build a family with.
4. My children are healthy, but like all small children, they often need to go the doctor's office. Because of my work schedule, 1rely on my husband to take
1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 7
our children to most oftheir doctor appointments. Since he cannot get a driver's license, my grandmother, who is 70 years old, drives him and my children to the doctor or to any other appointments when I cannot accompany them. I am scared that if my grandmother is stopped by the police for any reason during one of these outings that she will get arrested for transporting an undocumented immigrant.
5. I fear that my husband will be detained in any routine traffic stop, whether mygrandmother or I are driving him. I fear he will be depmted and that our family will be broken apmt. He would no longer be here to help raise our children. Without my husband to help raise my children, I might have to quit my job and would not be able to suppmt them financially.
6. Money is tight these days. Therefore, when my husband is unable to find work for months at a time, he takes care of the children. I recently started a job that enables me to better support my family financially. As a result, I rely on him to watch our children while I'm at work.
7. Although I have an Alabama driver's license, I sometimes leave it at home when I have to drive because I either forget it or because I fear it getting stolen. Once I was stopped by a police officer when I did not have my license. I was cited for not having the license, but I resolved it by taking my license to the police station and showing it to an officer there. If HB 56 is implemented, I would
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 7
be arrested for not having my driver's license. I feel that this is a harsh punishment for having forgotten or left the license at home for safekeeping.
8. I am concerned that ifHB 56 goes into effect, it will affect niy daughter's school attendance. Under the law, my husband and I will be required to write down our immigration status when registering our children for school. I don't know how school officials will use the information. I am very frightened that school officials will report my husband to immigration. I have seen a police officer outside my daughter's school and I know he is there frequently because my daughter talks about his presence. People say he is there to monitor speed but I suspect he is there to stoppeople who look like my husband, even ifthey are not speeding. I suspect that more officers like him will monitor the school in the following months. I will be concemed about adding my husband as an emergency contact on school forms because this would give school officials more information on where to find him, which they may tum over to immigration officials. I have been considering not giving my husband's name to school officials in order to avoid any problems with the new HB 56 rules, but then my husband would not be able to pick up our children from school. Tills is a worry for me since I do not have a lot of family members in the area or people who I trust to care for my children in case of an emergency.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 7
9. I also worry about my son, who is 2 years old. I fear that people around us will discriminate against him because he looks Hispanic and prefers to speak in Spanish. People will not be able to tell whether he is a U.S. Citizen or not. Many will assume that because he does not look white or black, he is in this country illegally, even though he was bom in Alabama. I am scared about how this will make him feel. I think about the first time I applied for his U.S. passport and how the man who took his application asked me the whereabouts of my son's mother. I had given that man all the proper identification to prove I was my son's mother yet he still assumed that because my son does not lookwhite 1must not be his mother. After I replied that I was the child's mother the man continued processing our application. I am concerned that such instances will increase or even worsen if HB 56 is implemented because so many public officials will be making judgments about who they think are legally in the country based on nothing more than what people look or sound like.
10. . I worry that my life insurance contract would be void ifHB 56 is implemented. On July 18 of this year, my life insurance benefits will begin. I have named my husband as sole beneficiary in the event that something happens to me. IfHB 56 is implemented, I don't know that my husband would be able to recover any benefits that he would be entitled to if he were documented. This
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 7
would be detrimental to my family, including to my U.S. citizen children, because they would need the money to get by without me.
11. Lastly, I fear that ifthis law is implemented, I will be forced to find a new home. The neighborhood where we live is largely populated by Hispanic people. I fear we will be forced to move ifthe landlord is committing a crime under HB 56 by renting to undocumented people.
12. If it became known publicly that I am participating in this lawsuit, I am afraid that my family would be retaliated against. I share my husband's last name, and I am afraid that he would be identified and sought out for retaliation. I fear that my school-age child would be mistreated by those in the school who would not agree with my challenging HB 56. I am concerned that I would be targeted for retaliation because I would be transporting and harboring my husband.
13. HB 56, if it goes into effect, will make my life, my family's life, and the lives offamilies like ours so difficult, from trying to ilnd a place to live because landlords will be criminalized for renting to us, to being afraid to send our children to school because we will have to face the consequences of registering my husband as an undocumented person. I fear that our family will be divided by arrest, detention, and deportation if my grandmother or I are caught driving my undocumented husband in the car. I cannot believe that my native state of Alabama wants me to leave the state in order to have a united family. I fear
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-27 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 7

discrimination against my husband and son for the color of their skin, because HE

56 creates such an environment ofhate.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and conect.

l tb.

Executed this

day of July, 2011 in Montgomery, Alaban"Ia.

6

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 6

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 28
Declaration of Jane Doe #4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 6

I,

hereby make this declaration on my own personal

knowledge and if called to testifY I could and would do so competently as follows:

1. I live in Pelham, Alabama. I immigrated to the United States and have been

here for about eleven years. My first language is Spanish. I speak little

English. My husband and I and our two older children are undocumented.

2. My husband and I live with our three children in a trailer park in Pelham. I

have two daughters, 16 and 12 years of age, and an 8 year old son who was

born in the United States. Many Latinos in Pelham live in the same trailer

park where we live.

3. Recently I have experienced more racism directed towards me by white

people, and I am fearful that my children will be discriminated against. I

believe this new anger I'm seeing has to do with the publicity around HB 56

and the atmosphere of hatred it is creating. About two weeks ago a white

woman was aggressive and mean towards me in the grocery store even

though I had done nothing to bother her. I was with my children and I was

fearful that she was going to hurt them or me. Because ofthis new

atmosphere of racism and anger towards Hispanics, and especially to

Hispanics that people think are here unlawfully, my husband and I are

considering moving the family out of Alabama.

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 6
4. I am very fearful of returning to my native country because there is so much kidnapping, mmder, and drug trafficking. It is dangerous to travel to my native country and to live there. My children do not want to go to my native country. My son has never been there and does not know anything but the United States as his home. He has his friends and activities where we live now. He plays several sports and has won trophies for his participation. My two daughters are studying and planning their future studies. One wants to be a nmse and the other one has aspirations of becoming a singer. I do not want to destroy their dreams by moving us out of Alabama, but I also do not want them to experience racism and hate at school because of their immigration status and ethnicity.
5. I am fearful that by having to register my daughters and listing myself and my husband as undocumented, that my children will face discriminatory actions at schools ifHB 56 is implemented. I understand that HB 56 would require school officials to determine whether children were born outside of the United States or if they are children of undocumented parents. Even just registering my daughters as undocumented people will give them an idea that they are second class people. This upsets me very much because I do not want my daughters, their teachers, the school staff, or other students to think of them as criminals or less impmiant people. They are teenagers just

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 6
like all their classmates. My youngest son is a U.S. citizen, but I also fear he will face discrimination at school when I have to register myself and my husband as undocumented. Ifthese provisions are implemented, I am also concerned that the school officials are going to call the police and tell them that my family is undocumented. I am going to register my children at school because I feel I must to preserve their chances of a good future, but I am very fearful of the consequences ifHB 56 goes into effect. 6. There are regular police roadblocks in front of the trailer park where we live. Because of this, I am very fearful that ifHB 56 is implemented that I will be subject to interrogation and arrest by local law enforcement officers because I lack immigration status. I am also concerned that my husband could be interrogated and detained by police for this reason. I fear the police will report my husband or me to ICE if we are detained for any reason and that we will be deported. 7. My work is in cleaning houses, and sometimes I have to drive a long distance to get to my work. IfHB 56 is implemented, I am worried that ifl am stopped by police for any reason while driving to and from work, I would be subject to interrogation and detention because I lack the identity documents listed under HB 56. I do not have these documents and I also do not have a federal alien registration document, so I will be in danger of arrest

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 6
and deportation. I cannot leave my children. They depend on me for their food, for caring for them when they are home for school, and for transportation to their school activities. I also contribute significantly to the economic health of the family. My husband works and cannot be at the house when our children get home from school. 8. I do not have work authorization to work in the United States, but I have an economic necessity to work. I work and seek work cleaning houses in Alabama. I understand that HB 56 would make it a crime for me to do that, but I must continue to work to survive and to support my family. 9. My entire family will also be negatively impacted by HB 56 because we rent the prope1iy where our manufactured home is placed. My husband and I are buying the house, but we rent the property from the trailer park. I believe that we and the majority of the people who live in the trailer park where we live will have to leave, because most of us do not have documents to prove we are in the United States legally. The landlord will probably evict us if we cannot prove we are here legally, because if he does not, he will be breaking the law. 10. I understand that I am filing suit under a pseudonym. If my identity became public, I am afraid I could be arrested and detained by the police. If that happened, I am afraid that I would be detained and deported. I am

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-28 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 6
afraid that would lead to the separation of my family because my son is a citizen here, but the rest of us are not. People have been very hostile to me as an immigrant recently. There is a lot of anger against immigrants in Alabama right now. If some people knew who I was and that I was participating in a lawsuit to challenge HB 56, I fear that they would harass me or threaten my safety or that of my children.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this 11th day of July, 2011 in Pelham, Alabama.

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-29

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 5

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 29
Declaration of Jane Doe #5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-29 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-29 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-29 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-29 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 5

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 6

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 30
Declaration of Jane Doe #6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 6

I,

hereby make this declaration based on my own personal

knowledge and if called to testify I could and would do so competently as follows:

1. I was born in 1965. I have lived in the United States for about 17 years, and most of that time I have lived in Huntsville, Alabama. I came to California with my youngest child in approximately 1996, and my two older children joined us the following year. My children and I are undocumented.
2. My first husband was killed shortly after my children were born, and I moved to Huntsville to give a peaceful life to my children. My three children are now adults. My son, who just turned 18, is developmentally disabled and lives with me. I speak Spanish and understand some English.
3. My son was born with neurological problems. The only diagnosis I have ever been given is severe attention deficit disorder, but I have never had a doctor or a specialist explain my son's problem to me in Spanish.
4. My son has been in special education classes since entering elementary school. He has just fmished his junior year in High School where he is in special education classes. My son needs the support of his specially trained teachers every day. His high school studies are very important for him and forme.

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 6
5. My son is in a vocational program through his special education classes, and he has to work a certain number of hours this year in order to obtain his special education high school diploma. I believe that this work experience and subsequent diploma will help my son obtain some kind of simple employment after graduation from high school, and this will improve his life greatly. He is learning skills that will help him work in the food processing industry. I believe that my son will contribute more to society if he can work and care for himself in this way. I understand, however, that he cannot get a work pennit and that his soliciting work will be a crime ifHB 56 is implemented.
6. My son is generally physically capable, but he is unable to care for himself without supervision, or cook or drive because he is constantly distracted. I guide him through all aspects of his life. I expect that he will have to live with me and depend on me his whole life.
7. Because of my son's dependence on me, I am very fearful of being arrested and deported. I work cleaning houses, and I have to drive myself to various work sites. I also regularly drive my son to and from school, although sometimes a friend does it for me. I do not have a driver's license, so I fear getting stopped by the police and arrested for not having a license or proper immigration documents. IfHB 56 goes into effect, and the police are able to

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 6
check my immigration status, I fear I will be deported and my son will be in danger because of his inability to care for himself without me. 8. I fear sending my son to his final year of school this fall because ofHB 56's requirement that the school register him and myself as undocumented immigrants. I will be forced to comply with the registration requirement despite my fears, because my son's special education classes are so critical to his development and possible future employment. In addition to wanting the credentials of earning a high school diploma, my son is very excited about the idea of graduating in 2012. If my son was unable to continue his studies because of his undocumented status, it would be extremely hard on him. He would be terribly disappointed and he would not understand why he could not attend school any longer or why he would not be able to graduate. 9. My son has been bullied in school because of his developmental disability. He has been teased, given terrible nicknames, and one time, he was intentionally injured by another student. I am grateful that the school officials have tried to protect my son, but they can't always do so. I fear that by having to register myself and my son as undocumented under the new requirements ofHB 56, my son will be teased and mistreated further by people at his school. My son is not able to distinguish what information is

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 6
appropriate to tell others, so I fear he will give the information about having to register as undocumented under the new HB 56 requirements to others who could harm him. lO.I am also afraid that my son will be detained because he lacks immigration papers ifHB 56 takes effect. He does not drive, but I fear that he would be detained in some other situation by police, given their new powers to enforce immigration law under HB 56. My son does not have the proper alien registration documents required by HB 56, and this violation would be a misdemeanor. If detained, my son would not understand what was happening to him, and he would be unable to take care of himself. I would fear for his life if he were deported to Mexico, a country he does not know and does not consider his home. He has only considered Alabama his home. ll.I fear the consequences for my family and for myself if HB 56 goes into effect. My son is in danger from HB 56 registration requirements in his school, from HB 56 criminalization of his solicitation of work that he needs to do in order to graduate from his special education program in High School, and in the possibility that because of HB 56, police will investigate his immigration status if my son is detained for any reason. My son would not be able to care for himself if detained and deported, and that fear affects me greatly. I am fearful that I will be stopped and detained for driving

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-30 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 6
without a license, and then deported, because of the new powers that police will have under HB 56. I have to drive regularly in order to work and to transport my son to school. It would be terrible for me and for my son if I were deported because he is not able to care for himself. 12.1 am greatly concerned that my son would face retaliation, bullying, and threats if my participation in this lawsuit was made public. There is a lot of negative rhetoric about how undocumented immigrants cost our school system money and I am particularly concerned that if it was known that my son is enrolled in special education classes that we could face retaliation. I am also fearful that I would lose my house-cleaning jobs if it were known publicly that I am participating in this lawsuit. I live a quiet life, and if my participation in this lawsuit were known, it could upset the careful routine and peacefulness that I have created so that my family will be safe here.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this 7th day of July, 2011 in Huntsville, Alabama.

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32

Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 7

FILED
2011 Jul-21 AM 08:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit 32
Declaration of John Doe #2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 7

DECLARATION OF

I,

do hereby make this declaration based on my own

personal knowledge and if called to testifY I could and would do so

competently as follows:

1. I was born in 1970 in Mexico. I first entered the United States in

1995 and I have mostly lived in Alabama since that time. I do not

currently have legal immigration status in the United States.

2. I am married with two children. My wife and my oldest son were

born in Mexico and they do not have immigration status in the United

States. My wife's father is a United States citizen and has already

petitioned for her, but there is long waiting period for her to become a

lawful pennanent resident. My youngest daughter, age 9, was born in

Gadsden, Alabama and she is a United States citizen. My daughter

has a birth certificate stating that she was born in the United States.

My son does not have a United States birth certificate because he was

born in Mexico.

3. My youngest daughter goes to Crossville Public Elementary School

and will start the 4th grade next year. My son is seventeen and will be

a senior next year at Crossville Public High School. My wife and I

1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 7
will go to the elementary and high schools in August to register om children for the upcoming school year. 4. If implemented, HB 56 will deny my children the opportunity to study and pursue their dreams. This law states that schools must verify whether a child was born in the United States or is the child of parents unlawfully residing in the United States at the time of enrollment. This provision ofHB 56 is set to take effect on September 1, after the enrollment period for the 2011-2012 school year, but its effect on my family will be immediate. I am already very worried about revealing my undocumented immigration status when enrolling one or both of my children in school. 5. Under HB 56, I will be forced to reveal my undocumented status to my children's school officials and I will be forced to reveal that my son was born outside of the United States and is undocumented. I understand that HB 56 would not bar my children from enrolling in school, but this law would require me to reveal my immigration status and my son's immigration status to the school authorities, and that is a risk that I cannot take. Ifl must reveal my status or my son's status to school officials, I fear the school officials will call the federal immigration authorities and cause me or my son to be deported. I
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 7
would not lie about my immigration status or my son's immigration status to the school officials because I would face criminal penalties under HB 56 for doing that. 6. HB 56, if enacted, places such a great risk on me that it would practically force my children out of school. I am afraid that revealing my undocumented immigration status to the public school system could lead to my arrest by federal immigration authorities. The right for my children to go to school is meaningless if I have to deny my children the chance to enroll in school in order to avoid revealing my undocumented immigration status to the school authorities. 7. I also won-y that the effect ofHB 56 will stigmatize my children at school because the school officials will know whether a child's parents are undocumented. I am worried that my children will be treated worse than the other children because I am undocumented and my wife does not now have legal immigration status. I would also be worried that my undocumented son could be at risk of deportation because his school will know that he does not have immigration status. 8. HB 56 will, in effect, deny my children the chance to go to school. My children have the right to study and the opportunity to go to
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 7
school should not be taken away from them. It is especially disturbing to think that my youngest daughter, who is a United States citizen, will be deterred from studying and attending school ifHB 56 takes effect. 9. Both of my children love school and they are very good students. My youngest daughter does not like to be on summer vacation and is eagerly waiting for the school year to begin. She gets many certificates at school in recognition of her participation and good grades. My son takes many honors classes and has a bright future. He is about to graduate from high school and having to interrupt or terminate his schooling would have a devastating effect on him. It's very important for my children to be able to go to school because it will give them a much better future than the lives that my wife and I have experienced. We have to work very hard in jobs where we risk our health and well-being to be able to provide for our family. The education that my children are getting right now will allow them to succeed and become accomplished, self-supporting adults. An education is very important to my son, who has decided that he would like to become a dentist. My wife and I have started saving money to help him to pay for college.
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 7
lO.IfHB 56 becomes law, my family and I would leave Alabama and my children would probably go to school in Mexico. This would be hard for them since my daughter has never been to Mexico and my son left Mexico as a young child. Both of them have spent their childhood here in America and they would leave behind a part of themselves if they had to go to Mexico. My children would feel like strangers in Mexico. It would be more challenging for them to study in Mexico because I would make less money and might not be able to afford tuition for college for my son. My daughter would have to adjust to a completely different culture and school system.
ll.The prospect ofHB 56 has already affected me and my family in terrible ways. I am afraid to leave my house. I am afraid of the police who will soon have more ability to discriminate against Latino people. Even though the law has not taken effect yet, the local police have begun regularly setting up roadblocks to check for valid driver's licenses. Imposing fines for not having a valid driver's license or impounding my truck and charging me to recover it is depriving me of my ability to support my family because I drive to and from work. Imposing excessive fines and enforcement on immigrants is like taking food away from us and our families.
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-32 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 7
12.Since HB 56 passed, I am even more afraid to report crimes to the police because I am afraid they will inquire into my immigration status and detain me if they determine that I do not have legal immigration status. During the past year, I had tools and other property stolen from my home, but I did not call the police to report this out of fear of discriminatory treatment and/or arrest. Under HB 56, I fear any contact with local or state authorities.
13.1 would like to make this declaration anonymously as a John Doe because I am afraid of what would happen if any Alabama or federal authorities find out that I am undocumented. I do not want to risk that I could be arrested and deported after revealing that I do not have legal immigration status.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this 12th day of July 2011 in Crossville, Alabama.
6

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-43 Filed 07/21/11 Page 90 of 92

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Governor Robert Bentley, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB
Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Memorandum In
Support

Exhibit M to Exhibit 42
Bryan Lyman, Immigration law makes school officials uneasy, The Montgomery Advertiser,
June 8, 2011

Immigration law makes school officials uneasy - Montgomery Advertiser:... http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/montgomeryadvertiser/access/2368911041.h...
Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-43 Filed 07/21/11 Page 91 of 92

Immigration law makes school officials uneasy

Montgomery Advertiser - Montgomery, Ala.

Author:

Brian Lyman

Date:

Jun 8, 2011

Start Page:

n/a

Section:

NEWS

Text Word Count: 724

Document Text

A provision in Alabama's immigration law requiring schools to collect citizenship information on undocumented aliens may raise objections from the U.S. Justice Department and is making some education officials uneasy.
The legislation, passed last week, includes a provision that requires public schools to determine the citizenship of students enrolling in the school, either by confirmation of a birth certificate or of documents establishing the citizenship or immigration status of the child.
Sen. Scott Beason, R-Gardendale, one of the sponsors of the bill, said the section is designed to gather information on the number of undocumented aliens in public schools and the price of educating them.
"That is where one of our largest costs come from," he said. "It's part of the cost factor. Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost?"
The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division said in a May 6 letter to school districts nationwide that "student enrollment practices that may chill or discourage" the enrollment of undocumented aliens, based on their immigration status or their parents', violated federal law.
"The undocumented or non-citizen status of a student (or his or her parent or guardian) is irrelevant to that student's entitlement to an elementary and secondary public education," the letter states.
Louis Fryer, attendance coordinator for Elmore County Public Schools, said asking for papers would effectively discourage student enrollment and create legal issues.
"Once you start asking that question, you get to the point where you're tacitly trying to deny access to school," he said. "Not many people are going to try to enroll students if they are illegal immigrants."
The law, still awaiting the signature of Gov. Robert Bentley, requires school boards to submit citizenship data to the State Board of Education. The State BOE is required to compile that data into an annual report to the Legislature that analyzes the effects or expected effects of the presence of undocumented students on those "who are citizens of the United States residing in Alabama."
The Supreme Court ruled in 1982 that undocumented aliens could not be denied public education based on their immigration status. The case, Plyler v. Doe, involved a Texas law that denied money for the education of undocumented children and a school district that tried to charge children without documentation tuition to attend public school. The court ruled the laws were "directed against children" and violated the 14th Amendment.
Beason said sponsors studied Plyler v. Doe in drafting the legislation and were careful to reflect its requirements.
"This section is specifically designed to know how much the cost is," he said. "I think it's completely within the boundaries."
The Alabama immigration law lists "primary and secondary school education" as one of the public benefits where verification of residency is not required, and contains no specific provisions barring the enrollment of children with questionable immigration status in public schools.
However, schools are mandated to determine the citizenship status of students, while parents of students with questionable status are required to provide documentation to the school within 30 days of the student's enrollment.
"As written, the law does not say you should turn them away at (the) doorstep," said Sam Brooke, an attorney with the Southern Poverty Law Center who works on immigration issues. "But the effect is going to be exactly that. If you pass a law that has chilling effect on constitutional rights, that's just as bad as passing a law banning the right in the first place."
The DOJ said school districts may ask for birth certificates to establish a student's age, but "may not bar a student from enrolling in its schools based on a foreign birth certificate."
Rep. Becky Nordgren, R-Gadsden, introduced a bill earlier this year that would have required school superintendents to

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7/20/2011 8:58 AM

Immigration law makes school officials uneasy - Montgomery Advertiser:... http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/montgomeryadvertiser/access/2368911041.h...
Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 37-43 Filed 07/21/11 Page 92 of 92
notify law enforcement officials of parents who failed to provide proof of citizenship or immigration status to local school districts. The legislation did not make it out of committee.
Sally Howell, executive director of the Alabama Association of School Boards, said school boards would comply with the reporting requirements, but would prefer the section be eliminated, fearing it exposed school boards to litigation.
"School boards are going to comply with (the) law of land," she said. "But we don't want to be caught in the crosshairs of a constitutional battle."
ID_Code: DS201110106080307
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Abstract (Document Summary)
Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost? The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division said in a May 6 letter to school districts nationwide that student enrollment practices that may chill or discourage the enrollment of undocumented aliens, based on their immigration status or their parents', violated federal law.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

2 of 2

7/20/2011 8:58 AM

 
 CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--32 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 11 ooff 22

FILED
2011 Aug-045 APM 112:0263 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

DECLARATION OF MIGUEL PEREZ VARGAS 


I, Miguel A. Perez Vargas, do hereby make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge. The facts stated in this declaration are within my personal knowledge.
1. I am Senior Staff Attorney at Multicultural Education, Training &
Advocacy (META) Inc, META is a public interest law firm that
specializes in issues pertaining to the education and civil rights of limited English proficient and immigrant schoolchildren. I have been a practicing attorney for 20 years. 2. In late June, our office was contacted by the family friends of several Latino families who live in the Boaz , Alabama area. These families, and their neighbors, requested that an attorney from META come to Boaz to hear personally the concerns of Latino residents with H.B. 56. 3. On Saturday, July 9, I met with approximately 60 families at a church in Albertville. These parents expressed to me, and other attorneys present~ their intense fears of what would happen to them as a result ofthe new law. Of specific concern to me, parents ofK-12 schoolchildren stated that they felt they would be risking deportation if they registered their

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--32 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 22 ooff 22
children for school because under the new law, the immigration status of the parents and their children would become known to school officials. 4. I have read the Jane Doe and John Doeaftidavits on tile in this case. TIle fears expressed by the Doe plaintiffs were closely reflected in what the parents told me on July 9 at the church in Albertville.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corre(..1:.
1st
Executed this _ d a y of August~ 2011 at Somerville, MA

 
 CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 11 ooff 77

II I
FILED
2011 Aug-045 APM 112:0263 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

DECLARATION OF DR. ROSA CASTRO FEINBERG
1) Rosa Castro Feinberg, do hereby make this declaration based on my own
personal knowledge. The facts stated in this declaration are within my
personal knowledge.
1. I was, from 1990-2003, Associate 'Professor in the College of Education at Florida International University and before that, Research Professor at the University of Miami. I hold a Ph.D. ill Educational Administration from the University of Miami. The major focus ofmy life long work in education has been the education of students whose first language is not English, English language acquisition for English Language Learners (ELLs) and the training of teachers to teach such children.
2. I have written numerous publications concerning the education ofELLs and served as an editorial board member and editor of several scholarly journals in the area and have presented at numerous academic conferences.

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 22 ooff 77
3. As part of my academic work I have taken part in devel.oping curricula for the teachers of ELL students including, for example, such subjects as Teaching Diverse Populations, TESOL (ESL) Curriculum and Materials and Foundations ofBilingual Education.
4. My academic preparation has required that 1 be thoroughly familiar with research in such areas as second language acquisition, linguistics, and the education ofELL students.
5. Prior to my appointment to the faculty at Florida International
University I served as a consultant to the OtIice of Civil Rights of the U,S, Department of Education and the Department's Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs and as a staff member and subsequently the Director of the University of Miami's National Origin Desegregation Assistance Center. 1 visited school districts throughout the Center's 14 state serv'ice area, including Alabama, in a technical assistance role. 6. Tn addition to knowledge gained through my teaching and study, I was fbI' ten years a member of the Dade County School Board. During this time the Dade County Schools had the largest number of ELL students

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 33 ooff 77
in the state of Florida. Through my work as a School Board member, as well as a supervisor of teacher candidates, I have come into contact with large numbers of teachers ofELL students as well as principals and other educational administrators who work with those students 011 a daily basis. Indeed, my own career in education began as a classroom teacher and ESL Teacher in Miami-Dade County. 7. I have also been appointed to several statewide bodies focused on the educatioll of ELL children or related matters across Florida including the Florida State Task Force on Bilingual Education, the Florida State Task Force on Migrant Education, the Florida Post-Secondary Education Planning Commission and the Florida State Advisory Council on Bilingual Education. 8. Based upon these experiences, and my own personal experience as a member ofthe Latino community in Florida having spoken with countless numbers of parents and students, I know that in Florida and in Dade County there are among the ELL student population, some students who are undocumented and some students whose parents are undocumented. I also know that there are ELL students who are

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 44 ooff 77
United States citizens and ELL students who are not United States citizens but who have one or another form of legal status as permanent or temporary immigrants. As but two examples of the latter, I could point to Haitian children who came to Florida following the earthquake and Cuban children who carne in the past by boat. 9. The question I have been asked to address in this declaration is whether, in my opinion, considering the educational needs of both undocumented ELL children and legally resident alien ELL children, there are cost differences in educating these two groups of ELL children. It is my opinion, based upon more than 40 years of study and
hands on work with ELL students that there are no differences between
the educational needs and costs of these two groups of ELLs, i.e. undocumented ELLs and legally resident ELLs. 10. Like all students, ELL students need to master literacy and content classes such as mathematics, science and social studies and to do so at challenging levels of academic engagement. Again, like all students ELLs will need a range of suppOltive services from counselors and health workers and again, like all students, ELLs will most prosper

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 55 ooff 77
when the school is able to reach out to their parents and form parent and school partnerships. 1I.ELL students are engaged in learning a new or second language, English, while at the same time learning content material to the level of state standards. That means that ELL students will need a specially designed English Language Development program such as English as a Second Language (ESL) and also a mechanism to gain access to content material through either native language instruction or, as in many states including Alabama, sheltered content instruction in English. Those specific needs distinguish all ELLs from students who are native English speakers but they do not distinguish ELLs based upon their immigration status. 12.There are, of course, many aspects to the design and implementation of well organized ESL and other programs for ELL students. At the heart of any ELL program are trained teachers and staff, appropriate curricular materials, and well designed assessment and support services and there are certain costs that are implicated by such programs.

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 66 ooff 77
However, the salient point is that these describe what is needed for all ELLs including, for that matter, those who are United States citizens. 13.Within the population ofELL students there are mUltiple factors that may determine their rate of academic success and commensurate needs. For example, students who have greater exposure to and opportunities to use English are likely to advance at a faster pace than those who do not, particularly when instruction is in English. Similarly, those who came to the United States with solid educational· experiences in their native countries will likely have an advantage over those who came as refugees or asylees from situations where they experienced interruptions in their education. But neither ofthose conditions, exposure to English or prior educational background, are matched with immigration status. 14. To put it another way, an ESL teacher might wen group her students for instructional purposes by their current level of English proficiency, but such grouping would be unrelated to whether those students were lawful permanent resident aliens, had temporary protected status, were refugees or were undocumented. Educational need and addressing

CCaassee 55::1111--ccvv--0022448844--SSLLBB DDooccuummeenntt 6700--54 FFiilleedd 0088//0053//1111 PPaaggee 77 ooff 77
educational need among ELLs is simply not correlated to immigration status.
I declare under penalty of pCljury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 27th day of July, 2011 at Miami, Florida
6~{;;£r(~
Dr. Rosa Castro Feinberg Declarant

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 1 of 10

FILED
2011 Aug-05 PM 10:50 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

Exhibit 3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 2 of 10

STATE OF ALABAMA

(

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Joseph B. Morton State Superintendent of Education

Alabama State Board of Education

August 1, 2011

Governor Robert Bentley
President
Randy McKinney, J.D. District I
VIce President

TO: FROM:

City and County Superintendents
fJ'P)t-- SJotasteephSuBp.eMrionrttoennde~~f Education

RE:

Alabama School Attendance Manual Revisions-September 1, 2011

Act. No. 2011-535 Alabama's Immigration Law

Betty Peters District II

c

Stephanie Bell District Ill

Yvette M. Richardson, Ed.D.
District IV

Ella B. Bell District V

Charles E. Elliott, M.D. District VI

Gary Warren District VII
President Pro Tem

Mary Scott Hunter, J.D. District VIII

Joseph B. Morton, Ph.D. Secretary and
Executive Officer

(

Please find attached a revision to page 6 of the Alabama School Attendance Manual that becomes effective on September 1, 2011. This revision applies to all students enrolling in an Alabama public elementary or secondary school for the first time on or after the September 1, 2011, date and places our enrollmenUadmission process in compliance with Section 28 of Act No. 2011-535.
The Alabama School Attendance Manual, Section C, page 6, (Attachment A), has been renamed ENROLLMENT/ADMISSION DOCUMENTATION and reads as follows:
BIRTH CERTIFICATE
At the time of initial enrollment in the statewide student management system, the board of education should be provided with either an original or a certified copy of the student's birth certificate. If a student has no such certificate or if the birth certificate shows that the student was born outside the United States or its jurisdiction, school personnel will provide information to parents or guardians concerning the submission of supplemental documentation to the board of education. (Attachment B).
If the local board of education is not provided such birth certificate or applicable supplemental documentation within 30 days after enrollment the student will be coded "enrolled without birth certificate" (Attachment C). The number of students enrolled without a birth certificate or supplemental documentation will be reported to the State Department of Education.. No student shall be denied enrollment or admission to the school due to a failure to provide the birth certificate or other supplemental documentation described in this section.
Authority: 2011 Ala. Act 535.
(Note: "the board of education" is interpreted to mean the person at the enrolling school responsible for enrolling new students.)

GORDON PERSONS BUILDING • P.O. BOX 302101 • MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36130-2101 • TELI!PHONE (334) 242-9700 • FAX (334) 242-9708 • WEB SITE: www.alsde.edu

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 3 of 10

(

City and County Superintendents Page2

August 1, 2011

The process described above will only apply to the initial enrollment of a student in the public schools of Alabama on or after September 1, 2011. That information, once entered into the statewide student management system, remains saved. All students currently enrolled prior to September 1, 2011, will follow the current admission requirements. A graphic description entitled "Enrollment of Students in an Alabama Public School" is included in this notice and should be made available along with all other materials to every public school in each local school system. All other previously required admission documentation remains unchanged: 1. IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATE/MEDICAL OR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION 2. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER/TEMPORARY NUMBER 3. PROOF OF AGE: KINDERGARTEN AND GRADE 1 Included in Act No. 2011-535 are certain determinations and reporting requirements for the Alabama State Board of Education. These determinations and reports will be completed by the State Department of Education using data from our statewide student management system. There will be no additional reporting requirements for the local school system. Should you have questions regarding these changes to the Alabama School Attendance Manual, please contact Dr. Tommy Bice, Deputy State Superintendent of Education, at 334-242-8154 or tbice@alsde.edu.
JBM:TRB:LAK Attachments
FY11-2128

(

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 4 of 10
Enrollment of Students in an Alabama Public School

(

Student enrolled prior to 9/1/11

Stude nt e nroll e d ON or AFTER 9/1/11

No further action ne eded.

Does child have o riginal or certifie d copy of birth certificate?

-

Send sa mple letter requesting Supplemental Documentation.

Supplemental Documentiltion Submitted NO

Dul.unlt.:nb mLiudmy t: VId e iHt! uf C 1t1 ze n ~ h1p or 1nlm1 g ro t1 o n ~ tat u s
and "gn e d Attestatoo n ' ubmotted!

Sogn e d d ec laratoo n that stude nt • ~ a l e gt.~l Citize n or
1mm1gra nt ~ ubm1tted?

Insert the number "0" in Birth Certificate
field. No further action needed.

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 PAaTgTeA5CoHfM1E0NT A
(
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
MANUAL

Revised 2011

.

Joseph B. Morton

State Superintendent of Education

Prevention and Support Services Section Alabama Department of Education Gordon Persons Building Montgomery, Alabama 36130-2101
(

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 6 of 10
youths and afforded the opportunity to meet the same challenging state student academic achievement standards to which all students are held.
Authority: McKinney- Vento Homeless Assistance Act 42 U.S. C. 11431 et seq.
Alabama Administrative Code 290-3-1-.02(7)(c) through 290-3-1-.02(7)(i)(iv)
*An opinion of the Attorney General states in effect that under the common law one's age is computed by including the day of birth so that a given age is attained the day before the birthday anniversary.

C. ENROLLMENT/ADMISSION DOCUMENTATION

1. BIRTH CERTIFICATE

At the time of initial enrollment in the statewide student management system, the board of education should be provided with either an original or a certified copy of the student's birth certificate. If a student has no such certificate or if the birth certificate shows that the student was born outside the United States or its jurisdiction, school personnel will provide information to parents or guardians concerning the submission of supplemental documentation to the board of education.

If the local board of education is not provided such birth certificate or applicable

supplemental documentation within 30 days after enrollment the student will be coded

"enrolled without birth certificate". The number of students enrolled without a birth

certificate or supplemental documentation will be reported to the State Department of

(

Education. No student shall be denied enrollment or admission to the school due to a failure to provide the birth certificate or other supplemental documentation described in

this section.

Authority: 2011 Ala. Acts 535

2. IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATES/MEDICAL OR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION

The boards of education shall require each pupil otherwise entitled to admittance into an Alabama public school to present a certificate of immunization, medical or religious exemption upon initial entrance into school.

Authority: Code ofAlabama (1975) §§16-30-3 and -4

3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER/TEMPORARY NUMBER

a. Each child enrolled in an Alabama public school Grades Kindergarten through Grade 12 shall have a social security number and a valid social security card which shall be presented to school official(s) at the time of pre-registration/registration for verification and returned to child/parent/guardian/custodian. For each person who is otherwise entitled to admittance but does not have a social security number, the local superintendent or agency shall assign a temporary number in accordance with the directions as specified by the State Department of Education.

(1) A student may not be denied registration who does not have a social security number or who has not completed an application. Every effort should be made to get each student's social security number.
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 7 of 10
ATTACHMENT B

(

SAMPLE LETTER

Dear <Parent/Guardian or Legal Custodian>:

Let me first take this opportunity to welcome <Student Name> to the <School District Name>. <He/She> is enrolled, and we are ready to get the year started. We expect great things from <Student Name> and look forward to a fulfilling and successful school year.

During the enrollment process, we requested that you provide us with either an original or certified copy of <Student Name>'s birth certificate, as we are required to do under state law. That birth certificate <has not been provided> OR <shows that <Student Name> was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States>, and we will need a little more information to fulfill our obligations. Accordingly, please provide us with the following information, if available, within thirty (30) days ofthe student's enrollment:

1. Official documentation establishing the citizenship or the immigration status for <Student Name> or a notarized copy of that documentation, and attestation by you, under penalty of perjury, that the documents state the true identity of <Student Name>;

OR

2. If the documents described in Item 1 above are not available, a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, that <Student Name> is a United States citizen or is otherwise lawfully in the United States.

Forms have been attached which may be used for these purposes.

Rest assured that it will not be a problem if you are unable or unwilling to provide either of the documents set out above. We request this information solely to comply with data reporting obligations established by State law and for no other purpose.

If there are any questions, please feel free to contact <Contact Name>, at <Contact Number>. Thank you.

Sincerely,

<Contact Name>

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 8 of 10
AITACHMENT B

(

USE IF DOCUMENTATION OF CITIZENSHIP OR IMMIGRATION STATUS IS AVAILABLE

STATE OF ALABAMA ) ____ COUNTY )
DECLARATION I , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -' do hereby declare and attest that I am submitting
[Name of Parent, Guardian, or Legal Representative]
herewith an official or notarized copy of documentation establishing the citizenship of, or, if not a citizen, the immigration status of _ _ _ _--=-=----:-:---:------' and further
[Name of Student]
declare and attest, under penalty of perjury, that the documentation being submitted states the true and correct identity of--=-=---=-=---=---:-----------
[Name of Student]

Date Signed

Signature of Parent, Guardian, or Legal Representative

(

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 9 of 10
ATTACHMENT B

(

USE IF DOCUMENTATION OF CITIZENSHIP OR IMMIGRATION STATUS IS NOT AVAILABLE

STATE OF ALABAMA ) _ _ _ _ COUNTY )

DECLARATION I, -------==-=--~---=-:-:---::---:-=------:----::---' do hereby declare and affirm, under
[Name of Parent, Guardian, or Legal Representative]

penalty of perjury, that I am t h e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' of
[Name of Parent, Guardian, or Legal Representative]

_ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____. and that _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ _ __

[Name of Student]

[Name of Student]

is a United States citizen or is otherwise lawfully present in the United States.

Date Signed

Signature of Parent, Guardian, or Legal Representative

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 82-3 Filed 08/05/11 Page 10 of 10

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 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 1 of 15

FILED
2011 Aug-20 PM 05:53 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02484-SLB ) ) ) )

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama; et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 5:11-cv-02736-SLB ) ) ) ) )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) Case Number: ) 2:11-cv-02746-SLB ) ) ) ) )

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 2 of 15
STATE DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ADDRESSING EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
This Court has requested supplemental briefing as to the Equal Protection challenge to Section 28 of Act No. 2011-535. Section 28 calls for data collection and reporting in public elementary and secondary schools.
The Equal Protection clause prohibits disparate treatment of persons similarly situated. As the United State Supreme Court has stated,
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Here, there is no disparate treatment at all. On the contrary, the Act is clear and the evidence is undisputed that the same questions are asked with respect to all children at the time of their enrollment. Doc. 82-3. Moreover, it is undisputed that there is no requirement of an answer. Id. There is no evidence that any use will be made of the data collected, other than the compiling of statistics requested by the Alabama Legislature. Id. Under these circumstances, the Equal Protection clause is not triggered. Local, state, and federal governments often collect and compile statistical data, including data that relate to gender, race, and ethnicity. Doing so does not
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 3 of 15
violate the Equal Protection clause, however, when persons are treated the same in the gathering of the data. It is disparate treatment that warrants scrutiny – not simple information gathering. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
On this point, the State Defendants and the United States are in agreement,1 and the State Defendants assert the same position advocated by the United States in Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000). In that case, recipients of census decennial questionnaires sued the United States Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the United States Bureau of the Census, alleging that the federal government’s asking – and demanding answers to – questions about race and medical conditions, among other things, violated their equal protection rights. 116 F. Supp. 2d at 803. In defense of that litigation, the United States denied that the Equal Protection Clause precludes the compilation of demographic data regarding protected groups, and, as summarized by the Court, asserted the following argument:
The government's position is that case law is clear that it is differential treatment, not classification, that implicates equal protection, and cites the opinion Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992): “The equal protection clause does not forbid classification. It simply keeps decision makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”
1 The motion of the United States challenges Section 28, but only on the grounds that its announced interpretation of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), should be given preemptive effect, not on equal protection grounds. U.S. doc. 2 at 42.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 4 of 15
The government also cites Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 583 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir.1978), which held “the Constitution itself does not condemn the collection of this data,” referring to a local census of the racial and ethnic breakdown of public school employees. Id. at 611. Adarand [Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)] held that equal protection guards against government actions based on race, but does not deal with government collection of data on race. Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 813. The facts in Morales were different from this case. In Morales, the plaintiffs faced criminal sanctions if they failed to respond to the federal government’s census form, id. at 812, whereas here, the State Defendants are posing their questions without any threat of prosecution for a failure to comply. Even so, in Morales, the United States District Court agreed with the United States, and granted the federal defendants summary judgment on all claims, including the Equal Protection claim. The same reasoning applies here – it is disparate treatment by the government that warrants Equal Protection scrutiny, not simple information gathering. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at 10. Therefore, as a distinct and severable section of the Act, Section 28 withstands an Equal Protection challenge. The HICA plaintiffs have argued, however, that the entire Act must be taken into account in order to measure the full effect of Section 28. (See, e.g., doc. 109 at 40, “Section 28 does not exist in a vacuum, and sections 5, 6, and 10 make the reporting of children and families to the immigration authorities mandatory.” ) The State Defendants and the HICA plaintiffs disagree on what the other sections
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 5 of 15
of the Act actually require of State employees. Even assuming for a moment that the HICA plaintiffs’ reading of the Act is the correct one, it does not follow that Section 28 should be enjoined.
According to the HICA plaintiffs, when the information gathering under Section 28 is combined with the other sections of the Act, the result will be to deter or “chill students from gaining access to the classroom” – a result that they assert would be unconstitutional under Plyler. Doc. 109 at 38. That argument is a novel one, and no support is offered for it, other than the “Dear Colleague” letter from the United States Departments of Justice and Education.
In Plyler, the Court did not go so far as the HICA plaintiffs suggest. Although the Court held that persons illegally present in the United States are persons under the Equal Protection Clause, 457 U.S. at 210-11, the Court also made it clear that illegal aliens are not a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny. Id. at 223; id. at 219 n. 19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’”). Illegal aliens are present in this country due to a violation of federal law, which is “not a constitutional irrelevancy.” Id. at 223; see also id. at 219 at n. 19.
Constitutional concerns over the deterrent or chilling effect that a State statute may have arise primarily in the First Amendment context, where the fundamental right of freedom of speech is in jeopardy. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (lack of notice in law that regulates expression “raises
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 6 of 15
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech”). Here, the only case cited by the HICA plaintiffs in support of their argument makes it clear that there is no fundamental right at stake: “Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). Also, contrary to the HICA plaintiffs’ assertions, the holding in Plyler addressed the denial of education, not imposing a deterrent effect on a fundamental right. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
“Moreover, the existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971). Rather, assuming the analysis applies at all, this Court must weigh the chilling effect of the statute against its plainly legitimate sweep. Id. Section 28 – even read as broadly as the HICA plaintiffs assert – does not burden a fundamental right.
In sum, Section 28 requires data collection, not disparate treatment, and thus the Equal Protection Clause is not triggered. Even if Equal Protection analysis were warranted here, no more than a rational explanation for Section 28 should be demanded of the State, and the Alabama Legislature has given one in Section 2 of the Act.
6

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 7 of 15

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General

BY:

Of counsel:
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General (ASB-8093-O68N)
Prim F. Escalona Deputy Solicitor General (ASB-7447-H69F)

s/Margaret L. Fleming Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) Winfield J. Sinclair (ASB-1750-S81W) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.242-4891 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us wsinclair@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us

Attorneys for Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, and District Attorney Broussard

7

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 8 of 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 20, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Mary Bauer Samuel J. Brooke Andrew H. Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: 334.956.8200 Facsimile: 334.956.8481 mary.bauer@splcenter.org sam.brooke@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org
Cecilia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.343.0775 Wang
415.343.0778 Desormeau 415.343.0777 Sugarman Facsimile: 415.395.0950 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: 415.896.1701 ext. 110 Facsimile: 415.896.1702 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
8

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 9 of 15
Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: 404.521.6700 Lapointe & Werner
404.221.5846 Tsu Facsimile: 404.221.5857 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.296.2300 Facsimile: 202.296.2318 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
G. Brian Spears G. BRIAN SPEARS PC 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Telephone: 404.872.7086 Facsimile: 404.892.1128 bspears@mindspring.com
Ben E. Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 Telephone: 334.201.0835 brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
9

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 10 of 15
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K.T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 Telephone: 212.549.2676 Segura
212.549.2664 Mukherjee 212.549.2620 Jadwat 212.549.2616 Gelernt 212.549.7303 Tan Facsimile: 212.549.2654 asegura@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Vivek Mittal Melissa S. Keaney Shiu-Ming Cheer NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 Telephone: 213.639.3900 Facsimile: 213.639.3911 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org
10

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 11 of 15
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: 510.663.8282 Facsimile: 510.663.2028 broder@nilc.org
Freddy Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: 205.443.7858 Facsimile: 205.433.7853 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street Post Office Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35801 Telephone: 256.536.7423 Facsimile: 256.536.2689 watson@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 dsen@latinojustice.org
11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 12 of 15
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street – 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 Telephone: 212.219.3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 Telephone: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: 202.293.2828 apedersen@maldef.org
Jessica Karp National Day Laborer Organizing Network 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Loa Angeles, California 90057 Telephone: 213.380.2785 jkarp@ndlon.org
12

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 13 of 15
J.R. Brooks, Jr. Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. Post Office Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804-2087 Telephone: 256.535.1100 Facsimile: 256.533.9322 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor Post Office Box 830709 Birmingham, Alabama 35283-0709 Telephone: 205.521.8000 Facsimile: 205.488.6275 dsweeney@babc.com
C. Lee Reeves, II Joshua Wilkenfeld Varu Chilakamarri U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 lee.reeves@usdoj.gov Joshua.i.wilkenfeld@usdoj.gov varudhini.chilakamarri@usdoj.gov
Joyce White Vance Praveen Krishna US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 1801 4th Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203-2101 joyce.vance@usdoj.gov praveen.krishna@usdoj.gov
13

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 14 of 15
Augusta S. Dowd WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD PC 2025 3rd Avenue, North, Suite 600 Birmingham, AL 35203 adowd@waadlaw.com
Terry McElheny DOMINICK FLETCHER YEILDING WOOD & LLOYD P.O. Box 1387 Birmingham, AL 35201 tmc@dfy.com
F. Grey Redditt, Jr. VICKERS RIIS MURRAY & CURRAN LLC 106 St. Francis Street, 11th Floor P.O. Drawer 2568 Mobile, AL 36652-2568 gredditt@vickersriis.com
John F. Whitaker WHITAKER MUDD SIMMS LUKE & WELLS LLC 2001 Park Place North, Suite 400 Birmingham, AL 35203 jwhitaker@wmslawfirm.com
William H. Orrick, III OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION USDOJ CIVIL DIVISION 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20530-0001 Bill.Orrick@usdoj.gov
Sister Lynn Marie McKenzie KNIGHT GRIFFITH MCKENZIE KNIGHT & MCLEROY LLP P.O. Box 930 Cullman, AL 35056 slm@knight-griffith.com
14

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 115 Filed 08/20/11 Page 15 of 15
R. Champ Crocker R. CHAMP CROCKER, LLC P.O. Box 2700 Cullman, AL 35056-2130 champ@champcrocker.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants: Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND 100 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: 210.224.5476 nperales@maldef.org
s/Margaret L. Fleming Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M)
15

 
 Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 1 of 20

FILED
2011 Aug-21 PM 04:47 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION

)

OF ALABAMA, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as )

Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02484-SLB

RT. REV. HENRY N. PARSLEY, JR., in his

)

official capacity as Bishop of the Episcopal

)

Church in the Diocese of Alabama, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, in his official capacity as )

Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02736-SLB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA; GOVERNOR ROBERT J. BENTLEY,
Defendants.

)

)

) ) )

Case Number: 5:11-cv-02746-SLB

)

)

)

PLAINTIFFS HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA ET AL.’S SUPPLEMENTAL SECTION 28 BRIEFING REGARDING: (1) CLASSIFICATIONS; (2) LEVEL OF SCRUTINY; AND (3) WHETHER THE STATE HAS SATISFIED ITS BURDEN

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 2 of 20
Plaintiffs Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., hereby submit supplemental briefing regarding: (1) which classifications section 28 creates; (2) what level of scrutiny would apply to these classifications; and (3) whether Defendants’ stated interests withstand scrutiny. I. CLASSIFICATIONS: Section 28 Creates Three Impermissible
Classifications: (1) A Classification of Children Born Outside the United States; (2) A Classification of Children Whose Parent(s) are Aliens not Lawfully Present; and (3) A Classification of Children Who are Assumed to Lack Lawful Presence Section 28 places new requirements on students when they enroll in kindergarten or any grade in public school. HB 56 § 28(a)(1). Every student must produce an original or certified copy of her birth certificate at the time of enrollment. § 28(a)(2). When the birth certificate is produced, the school determines that the child was born in the United States and that neither of the child’s parents are “alien[s] not lawfully present in the United States,” the inquiry ends. §§ 28(a)(1)-(3). Additional proof of immigration status of the child is required in two circumstances: if the school determines that the student is “born outside the jurisdiction of the United States,” or if the school determines that the student “is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” §§ 28(a)(1), (3). Additional proof of the child’s immigration status is also required if the child does not produce an original or certified copy of her birth certificate. § 28(a)(3).
1

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 3 of 20
Within 30 days, the child must submit additional proof of status, in the form of “both” an original or notarized copy of documents showing the child’s status,
and an attestation by the parent made under penalty of perjury that the document shows the child’s true identity. § 28(a)(4).1 A student who does not provide proof of lawful immigration status, or who admits to lacking lawful status, is presumed
to be an alien not lawfully present in the United States. §§ 28(a)(4) (soliciting information), (a)(5) (presumption of unlawful status if no information received).
Section 28 thus creates three classifications relevant to this proceeding:
• First, it creates a classification of children born outside the United States; these children are subject to additional documentation requirements of section 28;
• Second, it creates a classification of children who are presumed to be unlawfully present, who are subject to reporting requirements by school officials to both federal and state officials;2 and
• Third, it creates a classification of children whose parent or parents are not lawfully present in the United States; these children are subject to additional documentation requirements of section 28.
II. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
A. First Classification: Section 28’s classification of children born outside the United States must satisfy strict scrutiny to be upheld
1 See also § 28(a)(4)(b) (providing that if the required official documentation is not available, the parent may submit a declaration under penalty of perjury). 2 For a detailed description of the reporting requirements of section 28, see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3-5, 48-53 (Doc. 37) and Plaintiffs’ Reply at 36-42 (Doc. 109).
2

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 4 of 20
The first classification is based on whether a person was born abroad. This classification must satisfy strict scrutiny to be upheld. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
The term “alien” is defined as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). By definition, all aliens must be born abroad, for any person born within the United States is automatically a citizen. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. By focusing on students’ place of birth, the Legislature is seeking to identify aliens, albeit via an over-inclusive category— some students born abroad will be U.S. citizens through naturalization, others will be citizens through birth.3 Nevertheless, this place-of-birth inquiry is clearly a proxy for determining alienage, and specifically for whether the student is lawfully present. See HB 56 §§ 28(a)(1), (3) (requiring foreign-born students to clarify alienage and lawful status). The fact that the classification is over-inclusive does not alter its purpose. See Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 727 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding alienage classification where naturalized citizens treated differently from native-born citizens; applying strict scrutiny and invalidating statute).
State classifications based on alienage are “‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). Such classifications cannot stand unless “the
3 Citizenship of individuals born abroad is defined by Congress. See, e.g., Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631.
3

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 5 of 20
governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is . . . legitimate and substantial” and “the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As explained in Part III below, section 28 cannot survive this heightened review. Nor, for that matter, could this classification satisfy intermediate scrutiny under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982), as described below in the Second Classification.
B. Second Classification: Section 28’s classification of children who are assumed to lack lawful presence must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld
Section 28’s second classification applies to all children who are assumed to lack lawful presence. These children’s presumed status will be recorded in the school’s records along with the children’s identities. Schools will report this information to the State Board of Education, and will be subject to HB 56’s reporting requirements described supra at 2 n.2. This classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it infringes upon an undocumented child’s right to a public education. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
In Plyler, the Court acknowledged that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect class. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. But the Court stressed that access to education is “important” because it “has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society,” and its deprivation would have a “lasting impact . . . on the
4

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 6 of 20
life of the child.” Id. at 221, 222. It acknowledged that undocumented children are necessarily “innocent . . . victims” of legislation targeting them because of their immigration status, for minor children “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” Id. at 220, 224. It thus concluded that intermediate scrutiny is warranted, and the State must show that any regulation that impacts children’s access to a free public education based on their immigration status is “justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.” Id. at 230.
As explained in Part III below, the State cannot meet its burden. C. Third Classification: Section 28’s classification of children whose
parent(s) are aliens not lawfully present must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld Section 28’s third classification is of children whose parent or parents are deemed to be not lawfully present in the United States. These children are subject to section 28’s additional documentation requirements, and their parents’ identities are subject to the reporting requirements of HB 56. This classification must withstand intermediate scrutiny because it is targeting U.S. citizen children as a result of the conduct of their parents. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discrimination based on parents’ nonmarital status); Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001) (discrimination based on parents’ immigration status). This classification is necessarily singling out U.S. citizen children on the
5

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 7 of 20
basis of parentage. It is targeting U.S. citizen children in particular4 because
section 28 is already making separate inquiries into the status of any child who was
born abroad, which will encompass all non-citizen and “unlawfully present”
children. Thus, by creating a separate classification for children whose parents are
unlawfully present, section 28 creates a classification that is targeting U.S. citizen
children based on parentage.
A child has no control over her place of birth, the immigration status of her
parents, or her parents’ decision to reside in the United States. As the Supreme
Court articulated in Plyler and in numerous nonmarital children cases, targeting a
child for a parent’s perceived misdeeds “does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. As the Court explained:
Visiting condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the child is an ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of deterring the parent.
Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))
(alterations omitted).
Thus, in analyzing statutes that punished children because their parents were
4 Although some children of undocumented parents are themselves undocumented, the majority of children whose parents lack immigration status—82%—are U.S. citizens. A mere 18% are themselves foreign-born and undocumented. Pew Hispanic Center, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, 13 (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 8 of 20
not married when they were born, the Supreme Court has consistently applied an intermediate level of scrutiny rather than rational basis review. The Court acknowledged that U.S. citizen children are not a suspect class, but they nevertheless deserve protection when they are discriminated against based on “a characteristic determined by causes not within [their] control . . . , [which] bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). Burdening children for the conduct of their parents “is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted).
The children targeted by section 28 are analogous to those in the nonmarital children cases. Each is being categorized by the state based on “a characteristic determined by causes not within [her] control,” particularly circumstances related to the child’s parent. And in each case the issues at stake are substantial. Compare id. with Plyler, 457 U.S. at 119-223 (emphasizing importance of education). Intermediate scrutiny is warranted for this final classification in section 28, and the State must establish that its regulation is substantially related to an important governmental objective. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591.
As explained in Part III below, the State cannot meet this standard of review.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 9 of 20
III. DEFENDANTS’ INTERESTS DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY To justify the inquiry into both students’ and parents’ immigration statuses,
Defendants identify four interests. First they argue that these inquiries are being
made to “help determine if the student qualifies for assignment to an English as Second Language [“ESL”] class.” Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 45-46 (Doc. 110).5
Second, they assert the State has “has an economic interest in the data collection
and reporting,” to permit accurate projection of “costs and services.” Id. at 46.
Third, they assert that the State has an interest in
identify[ing] the effects upon the standard or quality of education provided to students who are citizens of the United States residing in Alabama that may have occurred, or are expected to occur in the future, as a consequence of the enrollment of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States. Id. at 45-46. Finally, they argue that they have an interest in asking these questions
in case the State needs “to supply courts with evidence in future lawsuits
addressing the manner in which Alabama runs its education system.” Id.at 46.
None of these interests justify the classifications or inquiries being made.
A. The State’s Interests Do Not Withstand Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny to Justify The First and Second Classifications
The first interest—ESL enrollment—cannot satisfy strict or intermediate
scrutiny because the questions being asked about immigration status and place of
5 Although this filing was not made in response to HICA Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, it cited additional rationales for section 28. Compare Defs.’ Opp. to HICA at 124-25 with Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 45-47. Plaintiffs herein address all the rationales for section 28 proffered by the State in both the HICA and DOJ cases.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 10 of 20
birth are irrelevant to ESL enrollment. Schools already determine eligibility for
ESL classes by focusing on the child’s fluency in the English language. See Tony
Miller Decl. ¶ 18 (providing detailed data on Alabama schools’ ESL enrollment)
(Doc. 2-3 in Case No. 11-cv-2746). Under federal law, “students are required to
be placed in [English Learners] programs based on their individual English
language proficiency, and not whether they were born in the United States or on
the legal status of their parents.” Id. ¶ 22. Basing ESL enrollment on immigration
status, citizenship status, or place of birth of the child or parent “has no basis in
educational law or policy as it relates to the identification of [English Learners]
students,” id. ¶ 23, for not every child who lacks immigration status is in need of
ESL instruction, and many children who are U.S. citizens and lawful aliens do
require ESL instruction. See id. ¶¶ 18 (noting that 18,633 students receive ESL
instruction and funding from the federal Department of Education (“DOE”); of these, only 1,053 are “immigrant students”6).7 Indeed, the U.S. Department of
6 The term “immigrant student” includes all students born abroad who have been in school for not more than three academic years, and who therefore may need special ESL assistance. Miller Decl. ¶ 14. This term includes all children who lack immigration status, and some who are here with lawful status. This data is compiled not by asking questions at enrollment, but by utilizing data from the American Community Survey. Id. 7 The numbers Miller provides establish that some “immigrant children” do not require ESL instruction. A total of 20,674 students receive ESL instruction, and 18,633 are served under Title III, implying that 2,041 are not served under Title III. Miller Decl. ¶ 18. There are also 3,647 immigrant students, and only 1,053 of these are served under Title III, meaning that 2,596 are not. Id. Of these 2,596, Miller does not specify how many immigrant students receive ESL instruction not funded through Title III, but many of them do not given that only 2,041 of the 20,674 students enrolled in ESL are not funded through Title III. Id. Thus at least 555 immigrant students are not receiving ESL.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 11 of 20
Education has “consistent[ly] . . . advised State Educational Agencies” that they may not lawfully make such inquiries into immigration status. Id. ¶ 14 (explaining that in “determining eligibility for [ESL instruction] . . . inquiries raising the issue of the legal presence of parents or their children should not be made because of the chilling effect it would have.”). Thus asking about immigration status and place of birth does not further the interest of ESL enrollment, Plyler, 452 U.S. at 230, and is not necessary or precisely drawn to achieve that interest, Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
The State’s second interest—financial planning—is misplaced for the same reason. Although sound budgeting is important, the State’s projected costs for various programs do not vary by the immigration status of students or their parents, but rather by the total number of students needing these services. Nor does knowing the current numbers of students (or parents) who were born abroad, who are non-citizens, or who lack immigration status help to predict future demand. The only rational way to achieve sound financial planning is to focus on the number of students utilizing resources—not by focusing on the immigration status of a subset of those students.8 Thus asking about immigration status and place of birth does not further the interest of financial planning, Plyler, 452 U.S. at 230, and is not necessary or precisely drawn to achieve that interest, Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
8 If Defendants are attempting to imply that immigration status is relevant because of some prospect that these children would be removed from the country, this is too speculative to be of any use, as described in detail infra at 12-13.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 12 of 20
The State’s third and fourth interests—to calculate the effect undocumented students have on U.S. citizen students, and “to supply courts with evidence in future lawsuits addressing the manner in which Alabama runs its education system”—cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny under Plyler nor strict scrutiny under Nyquist. Defendants cannot establish that they have a sufficient interest in collecting data on undocumented children, especially when section 28 is viewed in the context of HB 56, which mandates reporting of this information to immigration and state officials. See supra at 2 n.2. To prevail, Defendants must establish now that they have a substantial interest in deterring undocumented children from enrolling; claiming that they must collect data now that will have a deterrent effect on enrollment and school attendance, in order to determine later whether they can credibly claim to have a substantial interest in driving children from school, is quintessentially putting the cart before the horse.
Defendants misread Plyler. In Section V of that opinion, the Court focused on and rejected three possible justifications for a statute that permitted charging tuition to, or outright prohibiting the enrollment of, undocumented students. 457 U.S. at 227-30. The first involved a purported interest of the state to “protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.” Id. at 228. Defendants wisely are not arguing they have such an interest, for as the Plyler Court explained, charging tuition or denying enrollment in public schools would have no meaningful impact
11

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 13 of 20
on the overall economy of any state. Id.at 228-29.9 Defendants focus on the second justification examined by the Court: that
excluding undocumented students from state-funded schools would “improve the overall quality of education in the State.” Id. at 229. The Court rejected this claim in part because Texas failed to establish that exclusion would improve the quality of education for others, but the Court went on to note that:
even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are basically indistinguishable from legally resident alien children. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). This point is especially true for Alabama’s schools. DOE calculates the number of “immigrant students” enrolled in public schools, and this definition necessarily includes any child who is here without lawful status and in need of special resources. See supra at 9 n.6. DOE prepares this data by relying on the American Community Survey, not by asking questions at the time of enrollment. Miller Decl. ¶ 14. For the last year data was available, 2009-2010, there were 3,647 immigrant students in Alabama, id. ¶ 18,
9 As Defendants concede, the undocumented population in Alabama is quite small, between 1.6% and 3.3% of the total state population. See Defs.’ Opp. to DOJ at 2 (noting estimate is 75,000 to 160,000) (Doc. 110); U.S. Census Bureau, Alabama Quick Facts (noting state population of 4,779, 736), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html.
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out of a total system population of 741,115.10 This constitutes less than 0.5% of
statewide enrollment. The notion that excluding this small number could have any
material effect on the overall school budget is hard to fathom. See San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56 (1973) (disputing but not
resolving whether quality of education could be tied directly to money spent on
students).11
Defendants’ argument is further diminished by the fact that many of the
costs they itemize are subsidized by the federal government on a per-student basis.
For example, Defendants note a concern over “the fiscal costs to the state and
political subdivisions thereof of providing . . . free or discounted school meals,”
but free and discounted school meals are federally subsidized.12 Excluding any
subset of children would not save the State money because the federal subsidy
10 Ala. Dep’t of Educ., State Enrollment by Sex and Race, School Year 2009-2010, available at http://www.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx. 11 Furthermore, Defendants have proffered that schools will ascertain immigration status only once, at time of “initial enrollment.” Morton Mem. (Doc. 82-3). Even assuming schools adhere to this limited implementation policy, Defendants still cannot show that their actions meet intermediate or strict scrutiny. Immigration status is fluid and changes over time, making ambiguous any data collected, and further undermining the notion that it will be substantially related to the State’s purported interest. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (“many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and . . . some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.”). 12 For example, the National Student Lunch Program is a federally subsidized program. See ALSDE, Child Nutrition FAQs (noting National School Lunch Program available in state schools), available at http://www.alsde.edu/html/sections/faqs.asp?section=53&footer=sections; see also USDA, National School Lunch Program (“School districts and independent schools that choose to take part in the lunch program get cash subsidies and donated commodities from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for each meal they serve.”), available at http:// www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf
13

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 15 of 20
paying for that meal would be correspondingly reduced. Finally, the Plyler Court dismissed any argument that undocumented
children could be “appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State.” Id. at 229-30. The Court stressed this would be impossible to quantify, both because all children, regardless of status, regularly cross state boundaries and there is no way the State can predict who would stay and who would go. Id. at 230. And as the Court noted in 1982, “the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.” Id. at 230. That fact remains true today. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano observed this past Friday,
The President has said on numerous occasions that it makes no sense to expend our enforcement resources on low-priority cases, such as individuals like those you reference in your letter, who were brought to this country as young children and know no other home. From a law enforcement and public safety perspective, DHS enforcement resources must continue to be focused on our highest priorities. Doing otherwise hinders our public safety mission—clogging immigration court dockets and diverting DHS enforcement resources away from individuals who pose a threat to public safety. Letter of Secretary Napolitano to Senator Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011) (Doc. 113-1). The risk of “promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates
14

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 16 of 20
within [Alabama’s] boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime,” cannot possibly serve any state interest, let alone a substantial one. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
The Supreme Court in Plyler foreclosed the possibility of discriminating against undocumented children in the provision of free public education. Any effort to inquire into immigration status or place of birth at the time of enrollment, where the risk of deterrence is paramount, is prohibited under Plyler, and Defendants cannot possibly justify such inquiry here.13 Nor can Defendants establish that these inquiries are necessary or precisely drawn. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7.
B. The State’s Interests Do Not Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny to Justify The Third Classification
Assuming arguendo that any of the Defendants’ four articulated interests were important state objectives, the State cannot establish that deterring enrollment of or even collecting data on U.S. citizen children whose parents are not lawfully present has any connection whatsoever to these goals, much less that this is substantially related. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001). As described above (at pages 4-6), the children affected by this classification are U.S. citizens. Inquiry into the status of the
13 See also “Dear Colleague” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., May 6, 2011, at 1 (emphasizing concern over chilling effect), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/ about/edu/documents/plylerletter.pdf.
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Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 17 of 20

child’s parent serves no purpose, for all of the data being collected under section

28 relates to the status of the student child, not the parent. See HB 56 § 28(d). As

such, this classification cannot be characterized as being “substantially related” to

the interests asserted and data being collected.

This classification clarifies the true intent of section 28: to deter enrollment

by families who have undocumented members, even if the children are U.S.

citizens. There is no other reason to make this inquiry. Because of the deterrent

impact this inquiry will have, and because of the reporting requirements that are in

place, see supra at 2 n.2, this classification is impermissible under Clark.

* * *

As articulated above, section 28 creates three classifications which cannot

withstand intermediate scrutiny, much less strict scrutiny. As such, Plaintiffs

respectfully request that section 28 be enjoined pending a full adjudication of this

case.

Dated August 21, 2011

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Andrew H. Turner (ASB-8682-W84T) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER

Andre Segura* Elora Mukherjee* Omar C. Jadwat* Lee Gelernt* Michael K. T. Tan*

16

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 18 of 20

400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (404) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org andrew.turner@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau* Kenneth J. Sugarman* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org
Michelle R. Lapointe * Naomi Tsu * Daniel Werner * SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 naomi.tsu@splcenter.org michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling* ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org
Erin E. Oshiro*

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Shiu-Ming Cheer* Melissa S. Keaney* Vivek Mittal* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org mittal@nilc.org
Tanya Broder* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-001) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835

17

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 19 of 20

ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer* Ghita Schwarz* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org
G. Brian Spears* 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 Bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman* Jessica Karp* NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org
Amy Pedersen* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL

brunerlawfirm@gmail.com
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781-O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com
Victor Viramontes* Martha L. Gomez* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vviramontes@maldef.org mgomez@maldef.org
Nina Perales* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300

18

Case 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Document 116 Filed 08/21/11 Page 20 of 20

FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100
Washington, DC 20036
T: (202) 293-2828 x 12
apedersen@maldef.org

San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperales@maldef.org

* admitted pro hac vice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 21, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record who have registered through CM/ECF.

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

19

 
 Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 1 of 121
CLOSED,APPEAL
U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama (Northeastern) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama et al v. Bentley et al Assigned to: Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn Case in other court: 11th Circuit, 11−14535 C Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/08/2011 Date Terminated: 11/25/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama

represented by Allison E Neal 6525 Loma de Cristo El Paso, TX 79912 334−333−5203 Email: allison.neal@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 202−293−2828 Fax: 202−293−2849 Email: apedersen@maldef.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−549−2676 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: asegura@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Mongtomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: andrew.turner@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM P O Box 231293 Montgomery, AL 36123 334−201−0835 Fax: 334−263−4766 Email: brunerlawfirm@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang ACLU IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 2 of 121
San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0775 Fax: 415−395−0950 Email: cwang@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree Street, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−521−6700 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−219−3360 Fax: 212−431−4276 Email: dsen@latinojustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−549−2664 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: emukherjee@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip MASTANDO &ARTRIP LLC 301 Washington Street Suite 302 Huntsville, AL 35801 256−532−2222 Fax: 256−513−7489 Email: artrip@mastandoartrip.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro Asian Americans Advancing Justice − AAJC 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 202−296−2300 Fax: 202−296−2318 Email: eoshiro@advancinjustice−aajc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−739−7507 Fax: 212−431−4276 Email: fmaer@latinojustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears G BRIAN SPEARS PC

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 3 of 121
1126 Ponce De Leon Avenue Atlanta, GA 30306 404−872−7086 Fax: 404−892−1128 Email: bspears@mindspring.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−739−7504 Fax: 212−431−4276 Email: gschwarz@latinojustice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr WATSON MCKINNEY LLP 203 Greene Street P O Box 18368 Huntsville, AL 35801 256−536−7423 Fax: 256−536−2689 Email: watson@watsonmckinney.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S Park View Street Suite B Los Angeles, CA 90057 213−380−2785 Email: jkarp@ndlon.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin Cox AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 230 Peachtree Street NW Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303−2721 404−523−2721 Fax: 404−653−0331 Email: jcox@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: tumlin@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0778 Email: kdesormeau@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 4 of 121
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 415−343−0777 Email: irp_ks@aclu.org TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad St New York, NY 10004 212−549−2616 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: lgelernt@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2909 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: joaquin@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 South Spring Street 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 213−629−2512 Fax: 213−629−0266 Email: mgomez@maldef.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: mary.bauer@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: keaney@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 124 Broad Street

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 5 of 121
New York, NY 10004 212−284−7303 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: mtan@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree Street NE, #2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−221−5846 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: naomi.tsu@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 210−224−5476 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 212−549−2620 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: ojadwat@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON MCKINNEY LLP 203 Greene Street Huntsville, AL 35801 256−536−7423 Fax: 256−536−2689 Email: mckinney@watsonmckinney.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: sam.brooke@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 6 of 121
Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: cheer@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio RUBIO LAW FIRM PC 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, AL 35209 205−443−7858 Fax: 205−433−7853 Email: frubio@rubiofirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 415−896−1701 Fax: 415−896−1702 Email: sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 401 Oakland, CA 94612 510−663−8282 Fax: 510−663−2028 Email: broder@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 213.629.2512 Fax: 213.629.0266 Email: vviramontes@maldef.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: mittal@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94111 415−848−7702 Fax: 415−896−1702 Email: winifredk@asianlawcaucus.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 7 of 121

Aids Action Coalition

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 8 of 121
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 9 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Huntsville International Help Center

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 10 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 11 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 12 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 13 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 14 of 121

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc.

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 15 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 16 of 121

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Service Employees International Union

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 17 of 121
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 18 of 121
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 19 of 121

Plaintiff
Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 20 of 121

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner BRUNER LAW FIRM 505 South Perry Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334−201−0835 Fax: 334−263−4766 Email: brunerlawfirm@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 21 of 121
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 22 of 121
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 23 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 24 of 121
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 25 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dreamactivist.org

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 26 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 27 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Greater Birmingham Ministries

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 28 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 29 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 30 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Boat People SOS

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 31 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 32 of 121

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Matt Webster

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 33 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 34 of 121
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 35 of 121

Plaintiff Maria D. Ceja Zamora

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 36 of 121
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 37 of 121

Plaintiff Pamela Long

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 38 of 121
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 39 of 121
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 40 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Juan Pablo Black Romero

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 41 of 121
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 42 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Christopher Barton Thau

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 43 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 44 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 45 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ellin Jimmerson

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 46 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 47 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Robert Barber

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 48 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 49 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel Upton

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 50 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 51 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 52 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Beck

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 53 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 54 of 121

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michelle Cummings

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 55 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 56 of 121
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 57 of 121

Plaintiff Esayas Haile

Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 58 of 121
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 59 of 121

Plaintiff Fiseha Tesfamariam

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Pedersen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 60 of 121
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Werner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Foster S Maer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ghita R Schwarz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jessica Devlin Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Sugarman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/01/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 61 of 121
Martha L Gomez (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Naomi Tsu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nina Perales (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sigfredo Rubio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victor G Viramontes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivek Mittal (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 62 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #1, allowed at order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 63 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #2 allowed by order [103

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 64 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 65 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #3 allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 66 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #4 allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 67 of 121
TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 68 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #5 allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman Watson , Jr

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 69 of 121

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jane Doe #6 allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address)

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TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 71 of 121

Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Doe #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 72 of 121
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 73 of 121

Plaintiff
John Doe #2 allowed by order [103]

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 74 of 121

Plaintiff
John Doe #3, allowed by order [103]

Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 75 of 121
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 76 of 121

Plaintiff
John Doe #4, allowed by order [103]

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 77 of 121

Plaintiff
John Doe #5, allowed by order [103]

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 78 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Brian Spears (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 79 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winifred Virginia Kao (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Doe # 6, allowed by order [103]

represented by Allison E Neal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/17/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andre Segura (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew H Turner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2011 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ben E Bruner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cecillia Wang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elora Mukherjee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eric J Artrip (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Emi Oshiro (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

G Brian Spears (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 80 of 121
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman Watson , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen C Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Desormeau (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary Catherine Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa S Keaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Kt Tan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Lapointe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar Jadwat (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rebekah Keith McKinney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shiu−Ming Cheer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sin Yen Ling (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/19/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tanya Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Winifred Virginia Kao

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 81 of 121
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Robert Bentley in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama

represented by Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7300 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: mmessick@ago.state.al.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7300 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: jimdavis@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John C Neiman , Jr MAYNARD COOPER &GALE PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1228 Fax: 205−254−9999 Email: jneiman@maynardcooper.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua K Payne SPOTSWOOD SANSOM &SANSBURY LLC 1819 5th Avenue North Auire 1050 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−986−3620 Fax: 205−986−3639 Email: jpayne@spotswoodllc.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret L Fleming OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7300 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: mfleming@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Prim Formby Escalona MAYNARD COOPER &GALE PC

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 82 of 121

1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 2400 Birmingham, AL 35203 205−254−1000 Fax: 205−254−1999 Email: pescalona@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 06/05/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R Cooper Shattuck GOVERNOR'S LEGAL OFFICE 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 244−242−7120 Fax: 334−242−2335 Email: legal@governor.alabama.gov TERMINATED: 10/22/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G Parker , Jr OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue PO Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7997 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: wparker@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winfield J Sinclair OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue PO Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−353−9110 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: wsinclair@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Luther Strange in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alabama

represented by Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C Neiman , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua K Payne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret L Fleming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Prim Formby Escalona

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 83 of 121

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G Parker , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winfield J Sinclair (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Larry E Craven in his official capacity as Interim State Superintendent of Education

represented by Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C Neiman , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua K Payne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret L Fleming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Prim Formby Escalona (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G Parker , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winfield J Sinclair (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Freida Hill in her official capacity as Chancellor of Postsecondary Education

represented by Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John C Neiman , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua K Payne (See above for address)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 84 of 121

TERMINATED: 08/13/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret L Fleming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Prim Formby Escalona (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G Parker , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winfield J Sinclair (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
E. Casey Wardynski in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System

represented by J R Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER &PAYNE PC 2101 Clinton Avenue West Suite 102 P O Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35805−3077 256−535−1100 Fax: 256−533−9322 Email: jrb@lfsp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor P Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER &PAYNE 2101 Clinton Avenue West, Suite 102 P O Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804 256−535−1100 Fax: 256−533−9322 Email: tpb@lanierford.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jamie Blair in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Vestavia HIlls City School System

represented by J R Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Taylor P Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Randy Fuller in his official capacity as Superintendent of hte Shelby County Public School System

represented by Donald B Sweeney , Jr BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP One Federal Place 1819 Fifth Avenue North, Seventh Floor PO Box 830709 Birmingham, AL 35283−0709 205−521−8000 Fax: 488−6275 Email: dsweeney@babc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 85 of 121

Defendant Charles D. Warren in his official capacity as Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System
Defendant Barbara W. Thompson in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System
Defendant Jeffery E. Langham in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System
Defendant Robert L. Broussard in his official capacity as District Attorney for Madison County

J R Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor P Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by J R Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor P Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by J R Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor P Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by J R Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Taylor P Brooks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John C Neiman , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua K Payne (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret L Fleming (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Prim Formby Escalona (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/05/2012

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 86 of 121

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G Parker , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Winfield J Sinclair (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus LULAC

represented by Miguel A Perez−Vargas MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING INC, META INC 240 A Elm Street Suite 22A Somerville, MA 02144 617−628−2226 Fax: 617−628−0322 Email: perezvargasmiguel@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roger L Rice MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, TRAINING &ADVOCACY (META) INC 240A Elm Street, Suite 22 Somerville, MA 02144 6176282226 Fax: 6176280322 Email: rlr@shore.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus META, Inc.

represented by Miguel A Perez−Vargas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roger L Rice (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Hispanic College Fund

represented by Miguel A Perez−Vargas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roger L Rice (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
United Mexican States United Mexican States (Mexico)

represented by W Edward Still EDWARD STILL LAW FIRM LLC 429 Green Springs Hwy STE 161−304 Birmingham, AL 35209 205−320−2882 Fax: 205−320−2882 Email: Still@votelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus

represented by

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 87 of 121

Argentina Argentina

W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Bolivia Bolivia

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Brazil Brazil

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Chile Chile

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Colombia Columbia

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Costa Rica

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Ecuador Ecuador

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
El Salvador El Salvador

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Guatemala Guatemala

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Honduras Honduras

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Nicaragua Nicaragua

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 88 of 121

Amicus Paraguay Paraguay Amicus Peru Peru Amicus Uruguay Uruguay Amicus Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU) Amicus National Education Association
Amicus Alabama Education Association
Amicus National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Miguel A Perez−Vargas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jesse Cecil Gardner THE GARDNER FIRM PC P.O. Drawer 3103 Mobile, AL 36652 251−433−8100 Fax: 251−433−8181 Email: jcg@thegardnerfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Dodge Simpson NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION Office of General Counsel 1201 16th St., NW Washington, DC 20036 202−822−7935 Fax: 202−822−7933 Email: msimpson@nea.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jesse Cecil Gardner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Dodge Simpson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas J Spina FAWAL &SPINA 1330 21st Way South Suite 200 Birmingham, AL 35205 205−939−1330 Fax: 205−933−0101

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 89 of 121

Email: TOMMYSPINA@BELLSOUTH.NET LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

represented by Vikram Badrinath VIKRAM BADRINATH PC 100 North Stone Avenue Suite 302 Tucson, AZ 85701−1514 520−620−6000 Fax: 520−620−6797 Email: vbadrinath@vkblaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Central Alabama Fair Housing Center

represented by James Uriah Blacksher JAMES U. BLACKSHER, ATTORNEY P O Box 636 Birmingham, AL 35201 205−591−7238 Fax: 866−845−4395 Email: jblacksher@ns.sympatico.ca ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L Crook RELMAN DANE &COLFAX 1225 19th Street, NW, Ste. 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Email: jcrook@relmanlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Anne Gillespie RELMAN DANE &COLFAX 1225 19th Street, NW, Ste. 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Email: kgillespie@relmanlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Dane RELMAN DANE &COLFAX 1225 19th Street NW, Ste. 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Email: sdane@relmanlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama

represented by James Uriah Blacksher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L Crook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Anne Gillespie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 90 of 121

Stephen M Dane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
South Alabama Center for Fair Housing

represented by James Uriah Blacksher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L Crook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Anne Gillespie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M Dane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc.

represented by James Uriah Blacksher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Anti−Defamation League

represented by David I Schoen 2800 Zelda Road, Suite 100−6 Montgomery, AL 36106 334−395−6611 Fax: 917−591−7586 Email: DSchoen593@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence

represented by Klari B Tedrow KLARI B. TEDROW, ATTORNEY AT LAW 4 Office Park Circle, Suite 214 Birmingham, AL 35209 205−871−8084 Fax: 205−871−8014 Email: ktedrow@usimmigrant.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus NAACP Alabama Conference

represented by David Gespass GESPASS &JOHNSON P O Box 550242 Birmingham, AL 35222 205−323−5966 Fax: 205−323−5990 Email: pass.gandjlaw@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus ACHR

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 91 of 121

Amicus Alabama NOW
Amicus AALDEF
Amicus Birmingham Peace Project
Amicus Dominican American National Roundtable
Amicus Equality Alabama
Amicus Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund
Amicus Hispanic Federation
Amicus Immigration Equality
Amicus Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Amicus Montgomery Improvement Association
Amicus National Asian−Pacific Bar Association
Amicus

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 92 of 121

National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials

David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus National Council of La Raza

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus National Employment Law Project

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus National Guestworker Alliance

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
National Immigration Law Project of the National Lawyers Guild

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
New Orleans Workers Center for Racial Justice

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Society of American Law Teachers

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
Southern Christian Leadership Conference

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus Southern Coalition for Social Justice

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
United States Hispanic Leadership Institute

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus National Lawyers Guild

represented by David Gespass (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 93 of 121

Amicus American Unity Legal Defense Fund

represented by Barnaby White Zall WEINBERG JACOBS &TOLANI LLP 11300 Rockville Pike Suite 1200 Rockville, MD 20852 301−231−6943 Fax: 301−984−1200 Email: bzall@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J Park , Jr STRICKLAND BROCKINGTON LEWIS LLP 1170 Peachtree Street NE, Suite. 2200 Atlanta, GA 30309 678−347−2208 Fax: 678−347−2210 Email: jjp@sbllaw.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/08/2011
07/08/2011
07/08/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with Exibits against all Defendants filed by Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(SPT ) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
2 MOTION for leave to Proceed under Pseudonyms by Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum, # 2 Index of Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6 Part 1, # 9 Exhibit 6 Part 2, # 10 Proposed Order)(SPT ) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
3 Summons Issued as to all Defendnants by Clerk and delivered to Plaintiff for service. (SPT ) (Entered: 07/08/2011)
4 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Tanya Broder obo all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Shiu−Ming Cheer obo all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
6 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Katherine Desormeau obo all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
7 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Lee Gelernt by all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
8 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Omar Jadwat by all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
9 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Linton Joaquin by all pltfs (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
10 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Melissa Keaney by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)

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07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011

11 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Michelle Lapointe by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
12 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Sin Yen Ling by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
13 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Vivek Mittal by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
14 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Elora Mukherjee by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
15 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Erin Oshiro by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
16 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Andre Segura by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero,

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 95 of 121

07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011

Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
17 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − G. Brian Spears by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
18 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Kenneth Sugarman by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
19 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Naomi Tsu by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
20 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Karen Tumlin by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
21 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Cecillia Wang by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 96 of 121

07/13/2011
07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011

22 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Daniel Werner by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437474. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437476. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437484. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437485. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437486. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437487. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437489. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437490. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437491. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437492. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437493. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437494. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437495. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437496. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437498. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437501. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437503. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437507. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1437509. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/13/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 97 of 121

07/14/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011
07/15/2011
07/15/2011
07/15/2011

23 NOTICE of Appearance by Donald B Sweeney, Jr on behalf of Randy Fuller (Sweeney, Donald) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
NOTICE ALND rec#B4601024963 in the amount of $950.00 for 19 motions to appear phv paid via credit card (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
NOTICE of Appearance by Michelle Lapointe, Naomi Tsu, Lee Gelernt, Elora Mukherjee, G Brian Spears, Cecilia Wang, Katherine Desormeau, Andre Segura, Tanya Broder, Omar Jadwat, Kenneth J Sugarman, Linton Joaquin on behalf of All Plaintiffs (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
ORDER granting 4 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Tanya Broder. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/14/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
ORDER granting 5 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Shiu−Ming Cheer; granting 6 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Katherine Desormeau; granting 7 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Lee Gelernt; granting 8 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Omar Jadwat; granting 9 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Linton Joaquin; granting 10 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Melissa Keaney; granting 11 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Michelle Lapointe; granting 12 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Sin Yen Ling; granting 13 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Vivek Mittal; granting 14 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Elora Mukherjee; granting 15 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Erin Oshiro; granting 16 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Andre Segura; granting 17 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by G. Brian Spears; granting 18 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Kenneth Sugarman; granting 19 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Naomi Tsu; granting 20 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Karen Tumlin; granting 21 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Cecilia Wang; granting 22 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Daniel Werner. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/14/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
24 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Robert Bentley served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
25 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Jamie Blair served on 7/13/2011, answer due 8/3/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
26 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Robert L. Broussard served on 7/8/2011, answer due 7/29/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 98 of 121

07/15/2011 07/15/2011 07/15/2011 07/15/2011 07/15/2011 07/15/2011

27 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Randy Fuller served on 7/13/2011, answer due 8/3/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
28 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Freida Hill served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
29 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Jeffery E. Langham served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
30 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Joseph B. Morton served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
31 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Luther Strange served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
32 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 99 of 121

07/15/2011
07/15/2011
07/19/2011 07/20/2011
07/20/2011 07/20/2011 07/20/2011 07/21/2011

Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Barbara W. Thompson served on 7/12/2011, answer due 8/2/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
33 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. E. Casey Wardynski served on 7/11/2011, answer due 8/1/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
34 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Pamela Long, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Dreamactivist.org, Michelle Cummings, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Matt Webster, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Christopher Barton Thau, Aids Action Coalition, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Ellin Jimmerson, Service Employees International Union, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Esayas Haile, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1657, Huntsville International Help Center. Charles D. Warren served on 7/13/2011, answer due 8/3/2011. (Tsu, Naomi) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
NOTICE of Appearance by Karen C Tumlin, Sin Yen Ling, Erin Emi Oshiro, Vivek Mittal, Daniel Werner on behalf of All Plaintiffs (PHV appearance granted) (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/19/2011)
35 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Michael Tan by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1442565. (Brooke, Samuel) ALND Rcpt #: B4601025093 − Modified on 7/21/2011 (FNC). (Entered: 07/20/2011)
ORDER granting 35 Motion for Leave to Appear. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 07/20/2011. (SDB, ) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
36 MOTION for More Definite Statement, MOTION to Strike 1 Complaint by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange. (Fairbanks, Misty) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
37 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D.

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 100 of 121

07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/21/2011

Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 1−Index of Exhibits, # 2 Ex 2−Decl of Isabel Rubio, # 3 Ex 3−Decl of Mary Elizabeth Marr, # 4 Ex 4−Decl of Rosa Toussaint, # 5 Ex 5−Decl of Jemise Ray, # 6 Ex 6−Decl of John Pickens, # 7 Ex 7−Decl of Eliseo Medina, # 8 Ex 8−Decl of Harris Raynor, # 9 Ex 9−Decl of Joseph Hansen, # 10 Ex 10−Decl of Mohammad Abdollahi Ali−Beik, # 11 Ex 11−Decl of Scott Douglas, # 12 Ex 12−Decl of Grace Scire, # 13 Ex 13−Decl of Matt Webster, # 14 Ex 14−Decl of Maria D. Ceja Zamora, # 15 Ex 15−Decl of Pamela Long, # 16 Ex 16−Decl of Juan Pablo Black Romero, # 17 Ex 17−Decl of Christopher Barton Thau, # 18 Ex 18−Decl of Ellin Jimmerson, # 19 Ex 19−Decl of Robert Barber, # 20 Ex 20−Decl of Daniel Upton, # 21 Ex 21−Decl of Jeffrey Beck, # 22 Ex 22−Decl of Michelle Cummings, # 23 Ex 23−Decl of Esayas Haile, # 24 Ex 24−Decl of Fiseha Tesfamariam, # 25 Ex 25−Decl of Jane Doe #1, # 26 Ex 26−Decl of Jane Doe #2, # 27 Ex 27−Decl of Jane Doe #3, # 28 Ex 28−Decl of Jane Doe #4, # 29 Ex 29−Decl of Jane Doe #5, # 30 Ex 30−Decl of Jane Doe #6, # 31 Ex 31−Decl of John Doe #1, # 32 Ex 32−Decl of John Doe #2, # 33 Ex 33−Decl of John Doe #3, # 34 Ex 34−Decl of John Doe #4, # 35 Ex 35−Decl of John Doe #5, # 36 Ex 36−Decl of John Doe #6, # 37 Ex 37−Decl of Todd Entrekin, # 38 Ex 38−Decl of Mike Hale, # 39 Ex 39−Decl of George Gascn, # 40 Ex 40−Decl of Eduardo Gonzalez, # 41 Ex 41−Decl of Abraham Lowenthal, # 42 Ex 42−Decl of Rosi Gross−Smith with Exhibits A−E, # 43 Exhibits F−M to Gross−Smith Decl, # 44 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
38 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Foster Maer by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
39 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Ghita Schwartz by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
40 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Diana Sen by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1443391. (Brooke, Samuel) USDC Rcpt #: B4601025103 − Modified on 7/21/2011 (FNC). (Entered: 07/21/2011)

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07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/21/2011
07/21/2011 07/21/2011 07/22/2011 07/22/2011 07/26/2011 07/28/2011
07/28/2011
07/28/2011

PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1443392. (Brooke, Samuel) USDC Rcpt #: B4601025104 − Modified on 7/21/2011 (FNC). (Entered: 07/21/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1443393. (Brooke, Samuel) USDC Rcpt #: B4601025105 − Modified on 7/21/2011 (FNC). (Entered: 07/21/2011)
ORDER granting 38 Motion for Leave to Appear ; granting 39 Motion for Leave to Appear ; granting 40 Motion for Leave to Appear. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 07−21−2011. (SDB, ) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
41 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 37 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support : Motion Hearing set for 8/24/2011 09:00 AM before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn; any opposition to plas' motion shall be filed on or before 8/5/11; plas may file their argument in reply on or before 8/15/11. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/21/11. (ASL) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
42 NOTICE of Appearance by J R Brooks on behalf of Jamie Blair, Randy Fuller, Jeffery E. Langham, Barbara W. Thompson, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren (Brooks, J) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Taylor P Brooks on behalf of Jamie Blair, Randy Fuller, Jeffery E. Langham, Barbara W. Thompson, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren (Brooks, Taylor) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
44 ORDER that any amicus curiae brief shall be filed on or before 8/5/11. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/22/11. (ASL) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
45 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 37 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support : Motion Hearing set for 8/24/2011 09:00 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/22/11. (ASL) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
46 RESPONSE to Motion re 2 MOTION for leave to proceed under pseudonyms filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange. (Fairbanks, Misty) (Entered: 07/26/2011)
47 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Amy Pedersen by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/28/2011)
48 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Martha Gomez by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/28/2011)
49 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Nina Perales by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 102 of 121

07/28/2011
07/28/2011 07/28/2011 07/28/2011 07/28/2011 07/29/2011
08/01/2011 08/01/2011 08/02/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011

Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/28/2011)
50 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Victor Viramontes by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/28/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1447833. (Brooke, Samuel) ALND rec# B4601025224 for Amy Pendersen Modified on 7/29/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 07/28/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1447841. (Brooke, Samuel) ALND rec# B4601025227 for Martha L. Gomez Modified on 7/29/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 07/28/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1447842. (Brooke, Samuel) ALND rec# B4601025226 for Nina Perales Modified on 7/29/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 07/28/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1447844. (Brooke, Samuel) NDAL rec # B4601025223 for Victor Viramontes Modified on 7/29/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 07/28/2011)
ORDER granting 47 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV for Amy Pedersen 48 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV for Martha L. Gomez; granting 49 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV for Nina Perales; granting 50 Motion for Leave to Appear PHV for PHV for Victor Viramontes. Counsel must register for electronic case filing.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 7/29/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
51 ANSWER to Complaint by Jamie Blair, Randy Fuller, Jeffery E. Langham, Barbara W. Thompson, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren.(Brooks, Taylor) (Entered: 08/01/2011)
52 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 36 MOTION for More Definite Statement MOTION to Strike 1 Complaint : any opposition is due by 8/12/2011; Oral argument is set for 8/24/2011 09:00 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/1/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 08/01/2011)
53 MOTION to Consolidate Cases by United States of America. (Reeves, C) (Entered: 08/02/2011)
54 MOTION to Consolidate Cases and for Additional Time by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
55 ORDER re 53 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by United States of America; parties shall file any opposition to the motion by 8/8/2011. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/3/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
56 RESPONSE to Motion re 53 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange.

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08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011
08/03/2011
08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/03/2011 08/04/2011

(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1452083. (Rice, Roger) NDAL rec# B4601025474 Modified on 8/4/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
57 MOTION for Leave to Appear PRO HAC VICE by LULAC, META, Inc., Hispanic College Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Rice, Roger) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/4/2011: # 1 cert, # 2 po) (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
58 RESPONSE to Motion re 53 MOTION to Consolidate Cases, 54 MOTION to Consolidate Cases and for Additional Time NOT OPPOSING MOTIONS TO CONSOLIDATE, BUT OPPOSING MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME filed by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
59 ORDER granting motions to consolidate; motions for additional time are denied; PARTIES SHALL FILE ALL PLEADINGS IN LEAD CASE 5:11CV2484 SLB; Oral argument on the pending motions for preliminary injunction is set for 8/24/2011 09:00 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn. Dfts shall file their opposition to USA's motion for preliminary injunction by 8/15/2011; USA shall reply by 8/22/2011. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/3/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−LSC, 5:11−cv−02736−CLS(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/03/2011)
60 MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae by Hispanic College Fund, LULAC, META, Inc.. (Attachments: # Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Rice, Roger) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/4/2011: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit) (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
61 MOTION for Leave to Appear PRO HAC VICE by Hispanic College Fund, LULAC, META, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Perez−Vargas, Miguel) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/4/2011: # 1 Exhibit) (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
62 MOTION for leave to file Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Edward Still on behalf of United Mexican States. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix brief, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Still, Edward) Modified on 8/4/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1452513. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Perez−Vargas, Miguel) NDAL rec# B4601025475 Modified on 8/4/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
63 MOTION for leave to file Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by Edward Still on behalf of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Still, Edward) Modified on 8/4/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/03/2011)
64 MOTION for Leave to File to Join Brief of Amici Curiae by Hispanic College Fund, LULAC, META, Inc., Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU). Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB,

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 104 of 121

08/04/2011
08/04/2011
08/04/2011 08/04/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011

5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Perez−Vargas, Miguel) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
ORDER granting (57) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Roger Rice; granting (61) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV by Miguel Perez−Vargas in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (14) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 2:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (7) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/4/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
ORDER granting (60) Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae brief by Hispanic College Fund, LULAC, META, Inc; granting (62) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae by United Mexican States; granting (63) Motion for Leave to join Amicus Curiae by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Comombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uraguay; granting (64) Motion for Leave to join brief of Amici Curiae by HACU in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (19) Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae brief; granting (13) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae in case 2:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (6) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae; granting (10) Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/4/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
65 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by − Jessica Karp obo all pltfs in 5:11−2484−SLB (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1453466. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Brooke, Samuel)ALND rec # B4601025531 Modified on 8/9/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/04/2011)
66 MOTION for Leave to File As Amici Curiae by National Education Association, Alabama Education Association. (Attachments: # 1 Brief)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
67 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Alabama Education Association, National Education Association. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
68 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Henry N. Parsley, Jr. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Dowd, Augusta) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
69 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction by National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Spina, Thomas) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
70 Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), Hispanic College Fund, LULAC, META, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Dear Colleage Letter 1997, # 2 Exhibit B−Delaration MPV, # 3 Exhibit C−Declaration M. Fix, # 4 Exhibit D−Declaration Dr. Castro)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Perez−Vargas, Miguel) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
71 Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti−Defamation League in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Schoen, David) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
72 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB,

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 105 of 121

08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011 08/05/2011
08/05/2011 08/05/2011

5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Badrinath, Vikram) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
73 MOTION for Leave to Appear As Amicus Curiae by AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Badrinath, Vikram) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
74 Brief of Amicus Curiae (AILA). Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Badrinath, Vikram) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1454047. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Badrinath, Vikram) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
75 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, South Alabama Center for Fair Housing, National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Amicus Brief, # 3 Disclosure Statement)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
76 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion (15 in 5:11−cv−02736−SLB) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction : Oral argument set for 8/24/2011 09:00 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn; dfts shall file their opposition by 8/15/2011; plas' reply is due by 8/22/2011. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/5/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
77 NOTICE of Appearance by David I Schoen on behalf of Anti−Defamation League Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Schoen, David) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
78 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A, # 2 Attachment B, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Tedrow, Klari) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
79 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by NAACP Alabama Conference, ACHR, Alabama NOW, AALDEF, Birmingham Peace Project, Dominican American National Roundtable, Equality Alabama, Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund, Hispanic Federation, Immigration Equality, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Montgomery Improvement Association, National Asian−Pacific Bar Association, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, National Council of La Raza, National Employment Law Project, National Guestworker Alliance, National Immigration Law Project of the National Lawyers Guild, New Orleans Workers Center for Racial Justice, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society of American Law Teachers, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, United States Hispanic Leadership Institute, National Lawyers Guild. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief of Amici Curiae &Appendix)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Gespass, David) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
80 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Steven P. Rice by Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Tedrow, Klari) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
81 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Thy B. Bui by Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Tedrow, Klari) (Entered: 08/05/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 106 of 121

08/05/2011
08/06/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011

82 RESPONSE in Opposition re (37 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Haran Lowe), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Declaration of Jerry Bassett), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Letter from Superintendent Morton), # 4 Exhibit 4 (Letter from Chancellor Hill))Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
83 Amicus Curiae APPEARANCE entered by David Gespass on behalf of NAACP Alabama Conference. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Gespass, David) (Entered: 08/06/2011)
84 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc., South Alabama Center for Fair Housing. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
85 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc., South Alabama Center for Fair Housing, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
86 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc., South Alabama Center for Fair Housing. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
PHV Fee paid: for Jamie L. Crook $ 50, receipt number 1126−1454701. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) ALND rec # B4601025582 Modified on 8/9/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/08/2011)
PHV Fee paid: for Katherine Gillaspie $ 50, receipt number 1126−1454704. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James)ALND rec # B4601025584 Modified on 8/9/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/08/2011)
PHV Fee paid: for Stephen Dane $ 50, receipt number 1126−1454707. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Blacksher, James) ALND rec# B4601025583 Modified on 8/9/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/08/2011)
87 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae by Anti−Defamation League. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit "A" − ADL Amicus Brief [DE 71])Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Schoen, David) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
88 MOTION for Leave to Appear PHV by Bonard I. Molina Garcia by NAACP Alabama Conference. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
89 MOTION for Leave to Appear PHV for Gaela K. Gehring Flores by NAACP Alabama Conference. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
PHV Fee paid: for Stephen P. Rice and Thy B. Bui $100, receipt number B4601025575 Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
ORDER granting (65) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (72) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (80) Motion Appear PHV; granting (81) Motion Appear PHV; granting (84) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (85) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (86) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (20) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV;

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 107 of 121

08/09/2011
08/09/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011 08/09/2011

granting (28) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (36) Motion Appear PHV; granting (37) Motion Appear PHV; granting (40) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (41) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (42) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 2:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (19) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (27) Motion Appear PHV; granting (28) Motion Appear PHV; granting (31) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (32) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (33) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (11) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB ; Counsel are reminded that they must register for electronic filing through this court's website www.alnd.uscourts.gov. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/9/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
ORDER granting (66) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (69) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (73) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiae; granting (75) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (78) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (79) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae; granting (87) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiae in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (22) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (25) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (29) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiae; granting (31) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (34) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (35) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (43) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiae in case 2:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (13) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (16) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (20) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiae; granting (22) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (25) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (26) Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae brief; granting (34) Motion for Leave to Appear Amicus Curiaein case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB ; Amici are DIRECTED to electronically file their briefs FORTHWITH. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/9/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
90 ORDER the court will not hear oral argument on motion for more definite statement and to strike − hearing set for 8/24/2011 is cancelled; any opposition to the motion remains due by 8/12/2011. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/9/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
91 NOTICE of Appearance by Prim Formby Escalona on behalf of Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange, Alabama, State of, Robert J Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Escalona, Prim) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
92 NOTICE of Appearance by John C Neiman, Jr on behalf of Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange, Alabama, State of, Robert J Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Neiman, John) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
93 Amicus Curiae Brief re(37 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) by Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence in Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 2:11−cv−02746−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB(Tedrow, Klari) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
94 MOTION to certify question to the Supreme Court of Alabama by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 2:11cv2746 50 (KAM, ) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $50, receipt number 4601025631 re: Garcia (doc 88 in lead, doc 35 in 2736 and doc 44 in 2746) Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(FNC) (Entered: 08/10/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 108 of 121

08/09/2011 08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011 08/12/2011
08/12/2011

PHV Fee paid: $50, receipt number 4601025632 re: Flores. (doc 89 in lead; doc 36 in 2736 and doc 45 in 2746). Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(FNC) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
95 AMICI CURIAE BRIEF by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, United Mexican States, Uruguay. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Still, Edward) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
96 Brief re(66 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 22 in 5:11−cv−02746−SLB, 13 in 5:11−cv−02736−SLB) MOTION for Leave to File As Amici Curiae. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
97 NOTICE by Alabama Education Association, National Education Association Certification of Service of Motion for Leave, Brief and Corporate Disclosure Statement Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
98 MOTION to Amend/Correct (95 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) Trial Brief, (amicus) by United Mexican States. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Still, Edward) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
99 Amended MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Robert J. Baker, Henry N. Parsley, Jr, Thomas J. Rodi, William H. Willimon. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Dowd, Augusta) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1458556. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Schoen, David) ALND rec# B4601025745 Modified on 8/12/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/12/2011)
100 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Dale M. Schwartz, Esquire by Anti−Defamation League. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Schoen, David) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
101 MOTION for Leave to Appear PHV by United Mexican States for Carla Gorniak, Henry Solano and Christopher Clark. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Still, Edward) Modified on 8/15/2011 (CVA). (Entered: 08/12/2011)
102 MOTION for Leave to File Pro Hac Vice by Alabama Education Association, National Education Association. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
103 ORDER granting (2) Motion for leave to proceed under pseudonyms in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/12/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
ORDER granting (88) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (89) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (100) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (44) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (45) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (59) Motion for Leave to Appear PHVin case 5:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (35) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (36) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV; granting (51) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/12/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
104 Opposition to re (36 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 36 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement and To Strike filed by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 109 of 121

08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/15/2011
08/15/2011 08/17/2011

Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic College Fund, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration with Exhibits)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Viramontes, Victor) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
105 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Barnaby Zall by American Unity Legal Defense Fund. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Park, John) Modified on 8/15/2011 (CVA). (Entered: 08/15/2011)
106 MOTION for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae by American Unity Legal Defense Fund. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Park, John) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
PHV Fee paid for Carla Gorniak, Henry Solano and Christopher Clark, receipt number B4601025753, $150 (for Motion 101 in lead case). Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(CVA) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
107 RESPONSE in Opposition re (57 in 5:11−cv−02746−SLB, 47 in 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 99 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) Amended MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (State Defendants' Response to Church Leaders' Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support) filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Fairbanks, Misty) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
108 MOTION for Leave to Appear by Alabama Legislators. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit proposed amicus brief, # 2 Exhibit list of individual amici, # 3 Exhibit 1996 OLC opinion, # 4 Exhibit 2002 Bybee memo)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Williams, Stephen) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
109 REPLY to Response to Motion re (37 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support filed by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Wang, Cecillia) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
110 RESPONSE in Opposition re (2 in 5:11−cv−02746−SLB) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Alabama, State of, Robert J Bentley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Neiman, John) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
111 Evidentiary Material re:(47 in 5:11−cv−02736−SLB) Amended MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB,

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 110 of 121

08/19/2011 08/19/2011
08/20/2011 08/20/2011 08/21/2011 08/22/2011 08/22/2011 08/23/2011 08/23/2011

5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Dowd, Augusta) (Entered: 08/17/2011)
112 REPLY to Response to Motion re (47 in 5:11−cv−02736−SLB) Amended MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Robert J. Baker, Benedictine Sisters of Cullman, Alabama, Inc, Benedictine Society of Alabama, Henry N. Parsley, Jr, Thomas J. Rodi, William H. Willimon. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Dowd, Augusta) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
113 NOTICE by Robert J. Baker, Benedictine Sisters of Cullman, Alabama, Inc, Benedictine Society of Alabama, Henry N. Parsley, Jr, Thomas J. Rodi, William H. Willimon, United States of America, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora re (37 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Napolitano Memo)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Tumlin, Karen) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
114 NOTICE by Alabama, State of, Robert J Bentley, Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange re (82 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) Response in Opposition to Motion,, (110 in 5:11−cv−02484−SLB) Response in Opposition to Motion, Correction Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Neiman, John) (Entered: 08/20/2011)
115 Brief (State Defendants' Supplemental Briefing Addressing Equal Protection Challenge) filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Fleming, Margaret) (Entered: 08/20/2011)
116 Brief HICA Plaintiffs' Supplemental Briefing on Section 28 Equal Protection Challenge. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/21/2011)
117 Opposition to (Surreply to) Church Leaders' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 99) filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Parker, William) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
118 NOTICE by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Notice of Supplemental Evidence (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Turner, Andrew) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
119 MOTION Leave to File Corrected Cover Page of Reply Brief by United States of America. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Reeves, C) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
ORDER granting (101) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (60) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (52) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/23/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 111 of 121

08/23/2011 08/23/2011 08/23/2011
08/23/2011 08/23/2011
08/23/2011 08/23/2011 08/24/2011 08/25/2011 08/25/2011 08/25/2011 08/29/2011
08/30/2011

ORDER in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (71) Motion to correct cover page reflecting consolidated case numbers in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/23/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
120 UNITED STATES OF AMERICAS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION filed by United States of America. (Deemed filed 8/22/2011 in 5:11cv2746) Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
ORDER granting (105) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (64) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (56) Motion for Leave to Appear PHV in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/23/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1465176. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Gardner, J) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
ORDER granting (102) Motion for Leave Appear PHV by Michael D. Simpson in case 5:11−cv−02484−SLB; granting (61) Motion for Leave to File in case 5:11−cv−02746−SLB; granting (53) Motion for Leave to File in case 5:11−cv−02736−SLB. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/23/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
121 MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Parsley, et al. (Doc. 50 in Case No. 11−cv−2736) by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Luther Strange. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
122 MOTION to Dismiss the United States' Complaint (Doc. 1 in Case No. 11−cv−2746) by Alabama, State of, Robert J Bentley. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn: Motion Hearing held on 8/24/2011 re Pltfs' MOTIONS for Preliminary Injunction. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(SMH) (Entered: 08/24/2011)
123 NOTICE of Appearance by J Mark White on behalf of Henry N. Parsley, Jr Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(White, J) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
124 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew C Allen on behalf of Henry N. Parsley, Jr Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Allen, Andrew) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
125 NOTICE of Appearance by Katherine R Brown on behalf of Henry N. Parsley, Jr Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(Brown, Katherine) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
126 ORDER that Act 2011−535 [H.B. 56] is TEMPORARILY ENJOINED, and may not be executed or enforced. In entering this order the court specifically notes that it is in no way addressing the merits of the motions. The court will issue detailed Memorandum Opinions and Orders ruling on the merits of the pending Motions for Preliminary Injunction no later than September 28, 2011. This temporary injunction shall remain in effect until September 29, 2011, or until the court enters its rulings, whichever comes first. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 8/29/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/29/2011)
127 Transcript of Proceedings held on 8/24/2011, before Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 112 of 121

09/01/2011 09/06/2011 09/09/2011
09/16/2011
09/17/2011
09/19/2011

the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court forms/transcripts/Transcript Redaction Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 9/20/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/30/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/28/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/30/2011)
128 ORDER for case management purposes and ease of appellate review; the 8/3/2011 order of consolidation is vacated; the parties shall file all future pleadings in the individual cases as appropriate. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/1/2011. Associated Cases: 5:11−cv−02484−SLB, 5:11−cv−02736−SLB, 5:11−cv−02746−SLB(KAM, ) (Entered: 09/01/2011)
129 ORDER granting 36 Motion for More Definite Statement; plaintiffs shall by 9/16/2011 file an amended complaint; denying 36 Motion to Strike w/out prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/6/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
130 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Vivek Mittal by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Mittal, Vivek) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
131 AMENDED COMPLAINT FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile, Service Employees International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Dreamactivist.org, Aids Action Coalition, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Robert Barber, Pamela Long, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Boat People SOS, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Huntsville International Help Center, Matt Webster, Daniel Upton, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United. (Attachments: # 1 HB 56 / Act 2011−535)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
132 NOTICE by Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora re 37 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support regarding supplemental authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ninth Circuit en banc decision)(Viramontes, Victor) (Entered: 09/17/2011)
133 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice − Chris Newman, obo all pltfs., by Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 113 of 121

09/19/2011 09/19/2011 09/20/2011 09/22/2011 09/26/2011
09/27/2011 09/27/2011 09/27/2011 09/28/2011 09/28/2011

Translators Assocation of Alabama, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1483453. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
134 NOTICE by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama re 37 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Supplemental Evidence Regarding Section 30 of HB 56 (Attachments: # 1 Montgomery Water Works, # 2 Allgood Water Works, # 3 Houston County Probate Office)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
135 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua Kerry Payne on behalf of Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Joseph B. Morton, Luther Strange (Payne, Joshua) (Entered: 09/20/2011)
ORDER granting 133 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 11/22/2011. (SDB, ) (Entered: 09/22/2011)
136 MOTION to Stay UNOPPOSED Motion to Stay 26(f) Conference and Stay Time to Respond to First Amended Complaint obo all plaintiffs by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tumlin, Karen) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
ORDER granting 98 Motion to Amend/Correct Amicus Brief. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/27/11. (SMH) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
ORDER granting 106 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/27/11. (SMH) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
ORDER granting 108 Motion for Leave to filed amicus brief. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/27/11. (SMH) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
137 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/28/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
138 ORDER in accordance with the memo opn entered contemporaneously, granting in part and denying in part 37 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, The Motion is GRANTED as to Section 8; the last sentence of Sections 10(e), 11(e), and13(h); and Section 11(f) and (g) of H.B. 56. The dfts are ENJOINED from enforcing those sections; Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 37), is MOOT as to theirrequest for an injunction preliminarily enjoining Section 11(a) and Section 13 of H.B. 56.These Section have been enjoined pending final judgment in United States v. Alabama, CaseNo. 2:11−CV−2746−SLB. The Motion is DENIED as to H.B. 56 in its entirety, and as to Section 10 (except the lastsentence of Section 10(e)), and Sections 12, 18−20, 27, 28, and 30 of H.B. 56.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/28/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/28/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 114 of 121

09/28/2011 09/29/2011
09/29/2011
09/29/2011 09/29/2011 09/30/2011 09/30/2011 10/02/2011 10/03/2011 10/03/2011

ORDER granting 136 UNOPPOSED Motion to Stay 26(f) Conference and Stay Time to Respond to First Amended Complaint. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/28/11. (SMH) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
139 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 138 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,,, 137 Memorandum Opinion by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 1126−1491589. (Brooke, Samuel) ALND rec # B4601027083 Modified on 9/30/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 09/29/2011)
140 Emergency MOTION to Stay /Enjoin Portions of HB56 Pending Appeal by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
141 ORDER re 140 Emergency MOTION to Stay /Enjoin Portions of HB56 Pending Appeal; Any opposition is due by 10/3/2011 no later than 9:00am Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/29/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
142 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Andrew H. Turner by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Turner, Andrew) (Entered: 09/29/2011)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 139 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,,,,, (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
ORDER granting 142 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Andrew H Turner terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/30/11. (SMH) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
143 NOTICE by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama re 140 Emergency MOTION to Stay /Enjoin Portions of HB56 Pending Appeal (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Tumlin, Karen) (Entered: 10/02/2011)
144 RESPONSE in Opposition re 140 Emergency MOTION to Stay /Enjoin Portions of HB56 Pending Appeal (Doc. 140) filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
145 REPLY to Response to Motion re 140 Emergency MOTION to Stay /Enjoin Portions of HB56 Pending Appeal filed by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama.

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 115 of 121

10/04/2011 10/05/2011 10/05/2011 10/06/2011
10/07/2011
10/07/2011 10/07/2011 10/11/2011 10/14/2011

(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 10/03/2011)
146 MOTION for Leave to File State Defendants' Motion to Adopt and Incorporate by Reference Their Opposition Brief Filed in Compansion Case,United States v. State of Alabama, et al. (U.S. Doc. 98) by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 10/04/2011)
147 ORDER denying 140 Motion to Enjoin Portions of H.B. 56 Pending Appeal as further set out in this order.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 10/5/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
ORDER granting 146 Motion for Leave to File State Defendants' Motion to Adopt and Incorporate by Reference Their Opposition Brief Filed in Compansion Case,United States v. State of Alabama, et al. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 10/5/2011. (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
148 USCA Case Number 11−14535 C for 139 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,,,,, filed by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Pamela Long, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Juan Pablo Black Romero, John Doe, Ellin Jimmerson, Huntsville International Help Center, Jane Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Esayas Haile, Service Employees International Union, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Matt Webster, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Robert Barber, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Daniel Upton, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Greater Birmingham Ministries. (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/06/2011)
149 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. Amendment to 139 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,,,,, AMENDED NOTICE. (Joaquin, Linton) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
150 NOTICE by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange State Defendants' Notice of Cross−Appeal (Davis, James) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 138 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 137 Memorandum Opinion by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. SEE DOCUMENT 150(KAM, ) (Entered: 10/07/2011)
USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number B46010274724 re Notice of Cross Appeal filed by Luther Strange, Larry E Craven, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Robert Bentley (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
151 ORDER of USCA, before Carnes, Barkett and Hull, USCJ, the motion for injunction pending appeal is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; The State of Alabama is Enjoined from enforcement of HB 56 − Section 10 and Section 28 pending appeal and until further order by the merits panel; Motion is denied as to Sections 12, 18, 27 and 30. (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/14/2011)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 116 of 121

10/14/2011 10/20/2011
11/04/2011
11/04/2011 11/07/2011 12/30/2011 01/10/2012 01/12/2012 02/17/2012 04/27/2012 05/01/2012 05/17/2012 05/17/2012

152 Motion (joint report) to stay Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) requirements and extend time to respond to first amended complaint. (Fairbanks, Misty) Modified on 10/20/2011 (KAM, ) (Entered: 10/14/2011)
ORDER granting 152 Motion to Stay Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) requirements and to extend time to respond to first amended complaint to the extent that by January 12, 2012, the parties will provide the court with a report on the status of the pending cross appeals and with an update on their respective positions regarding how to proceed regarding the Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) requirements and the filing of responsive pleadings. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 10/20/2011. (SMH) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
153 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Neal, Allison) (Entered: 11/04/2011)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1517284. (Neal, Allison) NDAL rec# B4601028190 Modified on 11/7/2011 (KAM, ). (Entered: 11/04/2011)
ORDER granting 153 Motion for Leave to Appear. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 11/7/2011. (SDB, ) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
154 NOTICE of Appearance by R Cooper Shattuck on behalf of Robert Bentley (Shattuck, R) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
155 Joint MOTION to Stay (Joint Report Requesting that the Court Further Stay the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) Conference Requirements and the Time to Respond to the First Amended Complaint) (Fairbanks, Misty) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: Notice of Cross Appeal, 139 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,,,,,, Appeal No. 11−14535. The entire record on appeal is available electronically (KAM, ) (Entered: 01/12/2012)
ORDER granting 130 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 02/17/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 02/17/2012)
156 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Kenneth Sugarman by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Sugarman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
ORDER granting 156 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Kenneth J Sugarman terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 05/01/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
157 MOTION to by Allison Neal to Withdraw as Attorney for ACLU (Neal, Allison) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
ORDER granting 157 Motion to Withdraw as Allison Neal as Attorney.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 5/17/2012. (KAM, ) (Entered: 05/17/2012)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 117 of 121

05/23/2012 05/24/2012 06/01/2012 06/04/2012 06/04/2012 06/05/2012 06/05/2012 06/07/2012
06/11/2012 08/01/2012 08/01/2012

158 STIPULATION of United States, HICA Plaintiffs, and State Defendants by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. filed by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
159 MOTION to Stay State Defendants' Motion for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Against Section 8 of Act No. 2011−535 Based on Changed Circumstances, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Injunction by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Payne, Joshua) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
160 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Prim F. Escalona by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Escalona, Prim) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1676769. (Cox, Justin) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
161 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice attorney Justin Cox by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cox, Justin) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
ORDER granting 161 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 06/05/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
ORDER granting 160 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Prim Formby Escalona terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 06/05/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
162 RESPONSE in Opposition re 159 MOTION to Stay State Defendants' Motion for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Against Section 8 of Act No. 2011−535 Based on Changed Circumstances, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Injunction filed by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 1−Index, # 2 Ex 2−Brooke Decl, # 3 Ex 3−LESC Webpage, # 4 Ex 4−SAVE List−Summary, # 5 Ex 5−SAVE List−Federal, # 6 Ex 6−SAVE List−State, # 7 Ex 7−SAVE List−Local, # 8 Ex 8−SAVE List−DMV, # 9 Ex 9−Pell City SAVE MOU, # 10 Ex 10−SAVE Webpage, # 11 Ex 11−Commr Magee Dec 1 Memo, # 12 Ex 12−Commr Magee Nov 28 Memo)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/07/2012)
163 REPLY to Response to Motion re 159 MOTION to Stay State Defendants' Motion for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Against Section 8 of Act No. 2011−535 Based on Changed Circumstances, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Injunction filed by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1723488. (Brooke, Samuel) NDAL rec# B4601035852 Modified on 8/2/2012 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/01/2012)
164 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Samuel Brooke for Attorney Kristi Graunke by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3,

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 118 of 121

08/03/2012 08/13/2012 08/13/2012 08/27/2012 09/04/2012 09/04/2012 10/18/2012 10/22/2012 12/31/2012
12/31/2012

allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/01/2012)
ORDER granting 164 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 08/03/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 08/03/2012)
165 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Robert Bentley, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Freida Hill, Luther Strange. (Payne, Joshua) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
ORDER granting 165 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Joshua Kerry Payne terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 08/13/2012. (SDB, ) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
166 STATUS REPORT (Joint Report Requesting that the Court Further Stay the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) Conference Requirements and the Time to Respond to the First Amended Complaint) (Messick, Misty) Modified on 9/4/2012 (KAM, ). (Entered: 08/27/2012)
167 ORDER granting 166 Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the first amended complaint; the report of parties and time for filing responsive pleadings are STAYED pending further order of the court. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/4/2012. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
ORDER finding as moot 155 Motion to Stay. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 9/4/2012. (KAM, ) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
168 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Robert Bentley. (Shattuck, R) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
ORDER granting 168 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney R Cooper Shattuck terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 10/22/2012. (SDB) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
169 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (MOTION TO WITHDRAW ATTORNEY DIANA SEN) by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
170 STATUS REPORT (Joint Report Noting the Issuance of the Eleventh Circuit's Mandate and Setting Out the Parties' Respective Positions Recommending Further Action) by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Robert Bentley, Jamie Blair, Boat People SOS, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 119 of 121

01/02/2013
01/02/2013 01/03/2013 01/07/2013

allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Randy Fuller, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Freida Hill, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Jeffery E. Langham, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Luther Strange, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Barbara W. Thompson, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. filed by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Robert Bentley, Jamie Blair, Boat People SOS, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Randy Fuller, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Freida Hill, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Jeffery E. Langham, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Luther Strange, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Barbara W. Thompson, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora (Messick, Misty) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
171 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney WINIFRED KAO on behalf of ALL PLAINTIFFS by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126−1829147, NDAL receipt #B4601039929. (Brooke, Samuel) Modified text on 1/7/2013 (KGE, ). (Entered: 01/02/2013)
ORDER granting 171 Motion for Leave to Appear. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 01/03/2013. (SDB) (Entered: 01/03/2013)
ORDER granting 169 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 01/07/2012. (SDB) (Entered: 01/07/2013)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 120 of 121

03/08/2013
03/11/2013 06/04/2013 06/04/2013

172 STATUS REPORT (Joint Report) by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Robert Bentley, Jamie Blair, Boat People SOS, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Randy Fuller, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Freida Hill, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Jeffery E. Langham, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Luther Strange, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Barbara W. Thompson, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. filed by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Robert Bentley, Jamie Blair, Boat People SOS, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Randy Fuller, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Freida Hill, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Jeffery E. Langham, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Luther Strange, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Barbara W. Thompson, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora (Messick, Misty) (Entered: 03/08/2013)
173 ORDER granting 159 Motion for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Against Section 8 of Act No. 2011−535 Based on Changed Circumstances, or, in the Alternative, Motion to Stay the Injunction. The courts Order enjoining the enforcement of Section 8 of the Actreferred to as HB 56 is VACATED. Plaintiffs challenge to Section 8 is DISMISSED asMOOT.. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 3/11/2013. (KAM, ) (Entered: 03/11/2013)
174 NOTICE of Change of Address by Justin Cox (Cox, Justin) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
175 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney MARY BAUER by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Boat People SOS, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Bauer, Mary) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

Case: 5:11-cv-2484 As of: 11/12/2014 05:13 PM CST 121 of 121

06/05/2013 07/19/2013 07/19/2013 07/19/2013 07/22/2013 10/29/2013
11/25/2013

ORDER granting 175 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Mary Catherine Bauer terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 06/05/2013. (SDB) (Entered: 06/05/2013)
176 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Sin Yen Ling by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. (Kao, Winifred) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
177 NOTICE by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Notice of Name Change (Kao, Winifred) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
ORDER granting 176 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Sin Yen Ling terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 07/19/2013. (SDB) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
178 NOTICE by Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Notice of Name Change (Oshiro, Erin) (Entered: 07/22/2013)
179 Joint MOTION REPORT REGARDING CASE STATUS AND DISPOSITION by Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Robert Bentley, Jamie Blair, Boat People SOS, Robert L. Broussard, Larry E Craven, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe(#1, allowed at order 103 ), Jane Doe(#3 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#2 allowed by order [103), Jane Doe(#4 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#6 allowed by order 103 ), Jane Doe(#5 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#5, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#4, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#2 allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(# 6, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#3, allowed by order 103 ), John Doe(#1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order 103 ), Dreamactivist.org, Randy Fuller, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Freida Hill, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Assocation of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Jeffery E. Langham, Pamela Long, Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law &Justice, Inc., Juan Pablo Black Romero, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Luther Strange, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, Barbara W. Thompson, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton, E. Casey Wardynski, Charles D. Warren, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment 1 − Proposed Final Judgment)(Neiman, John) (Entered: 10/29/2013)
180 DISMISSAL ORDER AND STIPULATED PERMANENT INJUNCTION; the State dfts are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing Sections 11(f) &(g) of AL's HB 56; State dfts and Local Superintendent dfts are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing Section 28 of AL's HB 56; State dfts are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing Sections 10, 11(a), 13, and 27 of H.B. 56,and Section 6 of HB658 ; by agreement, Pla's claims as to Sections 12,18,19 &20 are dimissed w/out prej; pla's remaining claims are dismissed w/out prejudice; by agreement of the parties, State dfts shall remit to pla's counsel $350,000.00 w/in 21 days. Signed by Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 11/25/2013. (KAM, ) (Entered: 11/25/2013)

 
 General Docket United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 11-14535 Nature of Suit: 3950 Constitutionality of State Statutes Hispanic Interest Coalition of, et al v. Governor of Alabama, et al Appeal From: Northern District of Alabama Fee Status: Fee Paid

Docketed: 10/04/2011 Termed: 08/20/2012
Case Handler: Caruso, Joe, CC (404) 335-6177

Case Type Information: 1) Private Civil 2) Federal Question 3) -

Originating Court Information: District: 1126-5 : 5:11-cv-02484-SLB Civil Proceeding: Sharon Lovelace Blackburn, U.S. District Judge Date Filed: 07/08/2011 Date NOA Filed: 09/29/2011

Prior Cases: None

Current Cases: Lead
Cross-appeal 11-14532 11-14535
Related 11-14532

Member
11-14674 11-14675
11-14535

Start

End

10/07/2011 10/07/2011

10/04/2011

AIDS ACTION COALITION Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] Mastando & Artrip, LLC 301 WASHINGTON ST STE 302 HUNTSVILLE, AL 35801
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] National Day Laborer Organizing Network Firm: 213-380-2785 675 S PARK VIEW ST STE B LOS ANGELES, CA 90057
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center

Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center 405 14TH ST STE 1400 OAKLAND, CA 94612-2707
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] The Bruner Law Firm 505 S PERRY ST MONTGOMERY, AL 36104
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center Firm: 213-639-3900 3435 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 2850 LOS ANGELES, CA 90010-1938
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 DRUMM ST SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) Firm: (212) 607-3300 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Firm: 213-629-2512

634 S SPRINT ST 11TH FL LOS ANGELES, CA 90014
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) Firm: (212) 607-3300 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center Firm: 213-639-3900 3435 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 2850 LOS ANGELES, CA 90010-1938
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] Asian Law Caucus 55 COLUMBUS AVE SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-2101
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center Firm: 213-639-3900 3435 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 2850 LOS ANGELES, CA 90010-1938
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 404-221-5836 1989 COLLEGE AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30317
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] Queens Law Associates 118-21 QUEENS BLVD STE 212 FOREST HILLS, NY 11375
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] LatinoJustice PRLDEF Firm: 212-219-3360

99 HUDSON ST FL 14 NEW YORK, NY 10013-2815
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] Watson McKinney, LLP Firm: 256-536-7423 203 GREENE ST SE HUNTSVILLE, AL 35801
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center Firm: 213-639-3900 3435 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 2850 LOS ANGELES, CA 90010-1938
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) Firm: (212) 607-3300 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] Law Office of Allison Neal 6525 LOMA DE CRISTO EL PASO, TX 79912
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] National Day Laborer Organizing Network Firm: 213-380-2785 675 S PARK VIEW ST STE B LOS ANGELES, CA 90057
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] Asian American Justice Center Firm: 202-296-2300 1140 CONNECTICUT AVE NW STE 1200 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828

[NTC Retained] Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Firm: 202-293-2828 1016 16TH ST STE 100 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Firm: 210-224-5476 110 BROADWAY STE 300 SAN ANTONIO, TX 78205
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] Rubio Law Firm, PC Firm: 205-443-7858 438 CARR AVE STE 1 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35209
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] LatinoJustice PRLDEF Firm: 212-219-3360 99 HUDSON ST FL 14 NEW YORK, NY 10013-2815
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) Firm: (212) 607-3300 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] LatinoJustice PRLDEF Firm: 212-219-3360 99 HUDSON ST FL 14 NEW YORK, NY 10013-2815
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] G. Brian Spears, PC Firm: 404-872-7086

1126 PONCE DE LEON AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30306-4517
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 DRUMM ST SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) Firm: (212) 607-3300 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 404-221-5836 1989 COLLEGE AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30317
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] National Immigration Law Center Firm: 213-639-3900 3435 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 2850 LOS ANGELES, CA 90010-1938
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Firm: 213-629-2512 634 S SPRINT ST 11TH FL LOS ANGELES, CA 90014
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775

[COR NTC Retained] ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project 39 DRUMM ST SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] Watson McKinney, LLP Firm: 256-536-7423 203 GREENE ST SE HUNTSVILLE, AL 35801
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 404-221-5836 1989 COLLEGE AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30317

ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, INC.
Plaintiff Appellant-Cross Appellee

Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears

ROBERT BARBER Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal

Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701

[NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326

JEFFREY ALLEN BECK Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)

Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)

JUAN PABLO BLACK ROMERO Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen

Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

BOAT PEOPLE SOS Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer

Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360

MARIA D. CEJA ZAMORA

Plaintiff -

[NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222

Appellant-Cross Appellee

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained]

MICHELLE CUMMINGS Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)

Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)

DREAMACTIVIST.ORG Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin

Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin

GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained]

ESAYAS HAILE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA Plaintiff -
Appellant-Cross Appellee

Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kristi Lee Graunke Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 404-221-5836 1989 COLLEGE AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30317
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775

HUNTSVILLE INTERNATIONAL HELP CENTER Plaintiff -
Appellant-Cross Appellee

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)

Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)

INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA
Plaintiff Appellant-Cross Appellee

Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio

Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)

ELLIN JIMMERSON Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777

LOCAL 1657 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION
Plaintiff Appellant-Cross Appellee

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained]

PAMELA LONG Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee

Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION Plaintiff -
Appellant-Cross Appellee

Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney

Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes

SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS UNITED
Plaintiff Appellant-Cross Appellee

Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained]

FISEHA TESFAMARIAM Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)

Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)

CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION
Plaintiff Appellant-Cross Appellee

Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal

Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701

[NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained]

(see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326

DANIEL UPTON Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)

Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)

MATT WEBSTER Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
John Foster Maer [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)

Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jessica Karp Bansal Direct: 213-380-2214 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Martha L. Gomez Direct: 213-629-2512 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat

Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [COR NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Vivek Mittal Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Allison Neal Direct: 334-333-5203 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro

Direct: 202-296-2300 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Amy Pedersen Direct: 202-293-2828 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Nina Perales Direct: 210-224-5476 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sigfredo Rubio Direct: 205-443-7858 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Ghita R. Schwarz Direct: 212-739-7504 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Kenneth J. Sugarman Direct: 415-343-0777 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)

JANE DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Victor Viramontes Direct: 213-629-2512 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Daniel Werner Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)

JANE DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura

JANE DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained]

JANE DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)

JANE DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney

JANE DOE

Plaintiff -

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Diana S. Sen Direct: 212-219-3360 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Naomi R. Tsu Direct: 404-521-6700 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222

Appellant-Cross Appellee

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained]

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

(see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Government] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Government] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [NTC Government] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Government] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Government] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Government] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)

Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Government] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Government] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Government] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Government] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Government] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Government] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Government] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Government] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Government] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)

Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman

JOHN DOE Appellant-Cross Appellee

Plaintiff -

Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained] (see above)
Eric J. Artrip Direct: 256-532-2222 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary Catherine Bauer Direct: 334-956-8200 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Tanya Broder

Direct: 510-663-8282 ext 307 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ben Elton Bruner Direct: 334-323-4463 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Shiu-Ming Cheer Direct: 213-639-3900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Desormeau Direct: 415-343-0778 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Lee P. Gelernt [NTC Retained] (see above)
Omar C. Jadwat Direct: 212-549-2620 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Linton Joaquin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Winifred V. Kao Direct: 415-896-1701 [NTC Not Applicable] (see above)
Melissa S. Keaney Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michelle Lapointe Direct: 404-521-6700 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Sin Yen Ling Direct: 718-261-3047

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Rebekah Keith McKinney [NTC Retained] (see above)
Elora Mukherjee Direct: 212-549-2664 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Chris Newman Direct: 213-380-2785 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Erin Emi Oshiro Direct: 202-296-2300 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Andre I. Segura Direct: 212-549-2676 [NTC Retained] (see above)
George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael K.T. Tan Direct: 212-549-2600 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Karen Cassandra Tumlin Direct: 213-639-3900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew Hess Turner Direct: 334-956-8326 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Cecillia D. Wang Direct: 415-343-0775 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Herman Austin Watson, Jr. [NTC Retained]

versus

(see above)

ALABAMA CHANCELLOR OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
Defendant Appellee-Cross Appellant

Andrew Lynn Brasher Direct: 334-353-2609 [COR NTC U.S. Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
Margaret L. Fleming Direct: 334-353-3738 [COR NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Direct: 334-353-8674 [NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
John Cowles Neiman, Jr. Direct: 205-254-1228 [NTC Government] Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC Firm: 205-254-1000 1901 6TH AVE N STE 2400 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203-2618
William Glenn Parker, Jr. [COR NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152

MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
Winfield J. Sinclair Direct: 334-353-9110 [NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152
Luther J. Strange, III [NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130-0152

ALABAMA STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION Defendant -
Appellee-Cross Appellant

Andrew Lynn Brasher Direct: 334-353-2609 [COR NTC U.S. Government] (see above)

James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Margaret L. Fleming Direct: 334-353-3738 [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Direct: 334-353-8674 [NTC Government] (see above)

John Cowles Neiman, Jr. Direct: 205-254-1228 [NTC Government] (see above)

William Glenn Parker, Jr. [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Winfield J. Sinclair Direct: 334-353-9110 [NTC Government] (see above)

Luther J. Strange, III

[NTC Government] (see above)

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA Defendant -
Appellee-Cross Appellant

Andrew Lynn Brasher Direct: 334-353-2609 [COR NTC U.S. Government] (see above)
James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Margaret L. Fleming Direct: 334-353-3738 [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Direct: 334-353-8674 [NTC Government] (see above)
John Cowles Neiman, Jr. Direct: 205-254-1228 [NTC Government] (see above)
William Glenn Parker, Jr. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Winfield J. Sinclair Direct: 334-353-9110 [NTC Government] (see above)
Luther J. Strange, III [NTC Government] (see above)

DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR MADISON COUNTY Defendant -
Appellee-Cross Appellant

Andrew Lynn Brasher Direct: 334-353-2609 [COR NTC U.S. Government] (see above)
James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Margaret L. Fleming Direct: 334-353-3738 [COR NTC Government]

(see above)
Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Direct: 334-353-8674 [NTC Government] (see above)
John Cowles Neiman, Jr. Direct: 205-254-1228 [NTC Government] (see above)
William Glenn Parker, Jr. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Winfield J. Sinclair Direct: 334-353-9110 [NTC Government] (see above)
Luther J. Strange, III [NTC Government] (see above)

SUPERINTENDENT OF HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, PC Firm: 256-535-1100 2101 W CLINTON AVE STE 102 HUNTSVILLE, AL 35805
Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, PC Firm: 256-535-1100 2101 W CLINTON AVE STE 102 HUNTSVILLE, AL 35805

GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA Appellee-Cross Appellant

Defendant -

John Cowles Neiman, Jr. Direct: 205-254-1228 [COR LD NTC Government] (see above)
Andrew Lynn Brasher Direct: 334-353-2609 [COR NTC U.S. Government] (see above)
James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government]

(see above)
Margaret L. Fleming Direct: 334-353-3738 [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Direct: 334-353-8674 [COR NTC Government] (see above)
William Glenn Parker, Jr. [COR NTC Government] (see above)
Winfield J. Sinclair Direct: 334-353-9110 [NTC Government] (see above)
Luther J. Strange, III [NTC Government] (see above)

SUPERINTENDENT OF VESTAVIA HILLS CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)

Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)

SUPERINTENDENT OF SHELBY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. Direct: 205-521-8405 [COR NTC Retained] Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP Firm: 205-521-8000 1819 5TH AVE N BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203

SUPERINTENDENT OF DEKALB COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)

SUPERINTENDENT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)

SUPERINTENDENT OF ELMORE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
Defendant Appellee
------------------------------

J. R. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Taylor P. Brooks Direct: 256-535-1100 [NTC Retained] (see above)

FREEDOM NETWORK, USA

Amicus Curiae

Anjan Choudhury Direct: 213-683-9107 [COR NTC Retained] Munger Tolles & Olson, LLP Firm: 213-683-9280 355 S GRAND AVE FL 35 LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-1560

THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES, ET AL. Amicus Curiae

Plaintiff -

META, INC.

Roger L. Rice Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained]
META, INC Firm: 617-628-2226 240 A ELM ST STE 22 SOMERVILLE, MA 02144
Miguel A. Perez Vargas

Direct: 617-628-2226 [COR NTC Retained] META, INC Firm: 617-628-2226 240 A ELM ST STE 22 SOMERVILLE, MA 02144

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER Amicus Curiae

Reed N. Colfax Direct: 202-728-1888 [COR LD NTC Retained] Relman Dane & Colfax, PLLC Firm: 202-728-1888 1225 19TH ST NW STE 600 WASHINGTON, DC 20036

FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF NORTHERN ALABAMA

Reed N. Colfax

Amicus Curiae Direct: 202-728-1888

[COR LD NTC Retained]

(see above)

THE NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, INC.

Reed N. Colfax

Amicus Curiae Direct: 202-728-1888

[COR LD NTC Retained]

(see above)

SOUTH ALABAMA CENTER FOR FAIR HOUSING

Reed N. Colfax

Amicus Curiae Direct: 202-728-1888

[COR LD NTC Retained]

(see above)

JOE BACA

Amicus Curiae

Michael B. de Leeuw Direct: 212-859-8000 [COR NTC Retained] Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson, LLP Firm: 212-859-8000 1 NEW YORK PLZ FL 27 NEW YORK, NY 10004-1901

JIM MCDERMOTT

Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

XAVIER BECERRA

Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

GREGORY MEEKS

Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000

DENNIS CARDOZA GWEN MOORE JUDY CHU JIM MORAN YVETTE CLARKE GRACE NAPOLITANO JOHN CONYERS, JR. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON JIM COSTA PEDRO PIERLUISI

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained]

TED DEUTCH JARED POLIS KEITH ELLISON MIKE QUIGLEY ANNA ESHOO CHARLES RANGEL CHARLES GONZALEZ SILVESTRE REYES AL GREEN LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD

(see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

RAUL GRIJALVA GREGORIO SABLAN JANICE SCHAKOWSKY JOSE SERRANO RUBEN HINOJOSA TERRI SEWELL MIKE HONDA STENY HOYER ZOE LOFGREN CAROLYN MALONEY

Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael B. de Leeuw Amicus Curiae Direct: 212-859-8000
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS

Roger L. Rice

(LULAC)

[COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

THE HISPANIC ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND

Roger L. Rice

UNIVERSITIES (HACU)

[COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

THE HISPANIC COLLEGE FUND (HCF)

Roger L. Rice Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)

NAFSA: ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL

Roger L. Rice

EDUCATORS

[COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, TRAINING &

Roger L. Rice

ADVOCACY, INC. (META, INC.)

[COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

Amicus Curiae

Dale M. Schwartz Direct: 770-951-1100 [COR LD NTC Retained] Dale M. Schwartz & Associates, LLP 5500 INTERSTATE N PKWY RIVEREDGE ONE STE 450 ATLANTA, GA 30328

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

John Roberti Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained]
Mayer Brown, LLP Firm: 202-263-3000 1999 K ST NW WASHINGTON, DC 20006-1101

ALABAMA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Amicus Curiae

Thy B. Bui Direct: 949-798-1304 [COR NTC Retained] Crowell Moring 3 PARK PLZ 20TH FL IRVINE, CA 92614

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
Amicus Curiae

Stuart J. Baskin [COR LD NTC Retained] Shearman & Sterling, LLP Firm: 212-848-4000 599 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, NY 10022-4611

THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Stuart J. Baskin [COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

GLOBAL JUSTICE ECOLOGY PROJECT

Stuart J. Baskin Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)

THE UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST SERVICE COMMITTEE Stuart J. Baskin Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)

PARTNERS IN HEALTH

Stuart J. Baskin Amicus Curiae [COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)

THE GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC AT NEW YORK

Stuart J. Baskin

UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

[COR LD NTC Retained]

Amicus Curiae (see above)

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

Amicus Curiae

Michael D. Simpson Direct: 202-822-7035 [COR NTC Retained] National Education Association Office of General Counsel Firm: 202-822-7035 1201 16TH ST NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036

ALABAMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

Michael D. Simpson Amicus Curiae Direct: 202-822-7035
[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION

Michael D. Simpson

Amicus Curiae Direct: 202-822-7035

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

THE ALABAMA COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] Gespass & Johnson Firm: 205-323-5966 PO BOX 550242 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35255-0242

ALABAMA NOW

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION David Gespass

FUND

Direct: 205-323-5966 Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]
(see above)

BIRMINGHAM PEACE PROJECT

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

DOMINICAN AMERICAN NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

EQUALITY ALABAMA

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

EQUAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

FEDERATION OF SOUTHERN COOPERATIVES/LAND ASSISTANCE FUND
Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

HISPANIC FEDERATION

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

HIV LAW PROJECT

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

IMMIGRATION EQUALITY

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,

David Gespass

INC.

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

THE MONTGOMERY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN BAR

David Gespass

ASSOCIATION

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LATINO ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS
Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NATIONAL COUNSEL OF LA RAZA

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NATIONAL DOMINICAN AMERICAN COUNCIL

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

NATIONAL GUESTWORKER ALLIANCE

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD
Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

Amicus Curiae

David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

NEWS ORLEANS WORKERS' CENTER FOR RACIAL

David Gespass

JUSTICE

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

PROGRESSIVE JEWISH ALLIANCE AND JEWISH FUNDS David Gespass

FOR JUSTICE

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

SIKH AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION David Gespass

FUND

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

David Gespass

CONFERENCE

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

David Gespass

Amicus Curiae Direct: 205-323-5966

[COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

THE UNITED STATES HISPANIC LEADERSHIP

David Gespass

INSTITUTE

Direct: 205-323-5966

Amicus Curiae [COR NTC Retained]

(see above)

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION Amicus Curiae

Vikram K. Badrinath Direct: 520-620-6000 [COR LD NTC Retained] Vikram Badrinath PC Firm: 520-620-6000 100 N STONE AVE STE 302 TUCSON, AZ 85701-1514

AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE Amicus Curiae

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
Amicus Curiae

EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE FUND Amicus Curiae

Lawrence John Joseph Direct: 202-669-5135 [COR LD NTC Retained] Law Office of Lawrence J. Joseph Firm: (202) 261-3593 1250 CONNECTICUT AVE NW STE 200 WASHINGTON, DC 22102

GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY, PERU, URUGUAY
Amicus Curiae

SERVICE

Vikram K. Badrinath Direct: 520-620-6000 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
James Uriah Blacksher Direct: 205-591-7238 [NTC Retained] Attorney at Law Firm: 205-591-7238 PO BOX 636 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35201-0636
Thy B. Bui Direct: 949-798-1304 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Anjan Choudhury Direct: 213-683-9107 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Jamie L. Crook Direct: 202-662-8328 [COR NTC Retained] Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Firm: (202) 662-8314 1401 NEW YORK AVE NW STE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2124
Stephen M. Dane Direct: 202-728-1888 [COR NTC Retained] Relman Dane & Colfax, PLLC Firm: 202-728-1888 1225 19TH ST NW STE 600 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
J. Cecil Gardner Direct: 251-433-8100 [NTC Retained] The Gardner Firm, PC Firm: 251-433-8100 210 S WASHINGTON AVE

PO DRAWER 3103 MOBILE, AL 36652
David Gespass Direct: 205-323-5966 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Katherine Anne Gillespie Direct: 202-728-1888 [NTC Retained] Relman Dane & Colfax, PLLC Firm: 202-728-1888 1225 19TH ST NW STE 600 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
John J. Park, Jr. Direct: 678-347-2208 [NTC Retained] Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP Firm: 678-347-2205 1170 PEACHTREE ST NE STE 2200 ATLANTA, GA 30309-7200
Miguel A. Perez Vargas Direct: 617-628-2226 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Gregory D. Phillips Direct: 213-683-9276 [COR NTC Retained] Munger Tolles & Olson, LLP Firm: 213-683-9280 355 S GRAND AVE FL 35 LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-1560
Roger L. Rice [NTC Retained] (see above)
David I. Schoen Direct: 334-395-6611 [NTC Retained] David I. Schoen, Attorney at Law Firm: 334-395-6611 2800 ZELDA RD STE 100-6 MONTGOMERY, AL 36106-2685
Michael D. Simpson Direct: 202-822-7035 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Thomas J. Spina Direct: 205-939-1330 [COR NTC Retained] Fawal & Spina 1330 21ST WAY S STE 200 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35205
Edward Still [NTC Retained] Edward Still Law Firm, LLC Firm: 205-320-2882 130 WILDWOOD PKWY STE 108 PMB 304 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35209
Klari B. Tedrow Direct: 205-871-8084 [NTC Retained] Klari B. Tedrow, Attorney at Law Firm: 205-871-8084 4 OFFICE PK CIR STE 214 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35209
Barnaby W. Zall Direct: 301-231-6943 [NTC Retained] Weinberg Jacobs & Tolani, LLP Firm: 301-231-6943 11300 ROCKVILLE PIKE STE 1200 ROCKVILLE, MD 20852-3040

EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE FUND

Lawrence John Joseph Direct: 202-669-5135 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, AIDS ACTION COALITION, HUNTSVILLE INTERNATIONAL HELP CENTER, INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA, ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, INC., SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, SOUTHERN REGIONAL JOINT BOARD OF WORKERS UNITED, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1657 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, DREAMACTIVIST.ORG, GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES, BOAT PEOPLE SOS, MATT WEBSTER, MARIA D. CEJA ZAMORA, PAMELA LONG, JUAN PABLO BLACK ROMERO, CHRISTOPHER BARTON THAU, ELLIN JIMMERSON,

ROBERT BARBER, DANIEL UPTON, JEFFREY ALLEN BECK, MICHELLE CUMMINGS, ESAYAS HAILE, FISEHA TESFAMARIAM, JANE DOE, #1, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #2, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #3, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #4, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #5, allowed by order [103], JANE DOE, #6, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #2, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #3, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #4, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #5, allowed by order [103], JOHN DOE, #6, allowed by order [103]
Plaintiffs - Appellants Cross Appellees,
versus
GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA, ALABAMA STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, ALABAMA CHANCELLOR OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR MADISON COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees Cross Appellants,
SUPERINTENDENT OF HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER, FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF NORTHERN ALABAMA, et al.,
Amicus Curiae.

10/04/2011
6 pg, 58.89 KB

CIVIL APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by Appellants Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe#1, Jane Doe#2, Jane Doe#3, Jane Doe#4, Jane Doe#5, Jane Doe#6, John Doe#1, John Doe#2, John Doe#3, John Doe#4, John Doe#5, John Doe#6, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster on 09/29/2011. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Appellant brief due 40 days from 10/04/2011.

10/04/2011

The Transcript Order Form has not been filed as to Appellant Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. There are no hearings to be transcribed.

10/06/2011
4 pg, 405.66 KB

USDC Order Denying Emg. Mtn to Enjoin and Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal as to Appellant Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., was filed on 10/05/2011. Docket Entry 147.

10/06/2011

Added Attorney(s) Chris Newman for party(s) Appellant Huntsville International Help Center Appellant Jane Doe Appellant Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Appellant Dreamactivist.org Appellant Fiseha Tesfamariam Appellant United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Appellant Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United Appellant Greater Birmingham Ministries Appellant Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. Appellant Jeffrey Allen Beck Appellant Pamela Long Appellant Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Appellant Daniel Upton Appellant Michelle Cummings Appellant Aids Action Coalition Appellant Christopher Barton Thau Appellant Robert Barber Appellant Service Employees International Union Appellant Esayas Haile Appellant John Doe Appellant Maria D. Ceja Zamora Appellant Ellin Jimmerson Appellant Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama Appellant Matt Webster Appellant Boat People SOS Appellant Juan Pablo Black Romero, in case 11-14535.

10/07/2011
426 pg, 10.53 MB

TIME-SENSITIVE MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal and Motion for Expedited Appeal construed as Motion for Expedited Briefing Schedule filed by Appellant Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6402197-1]

10/07/2011
24 pg, 851.1 KB

MOTION For Leave to Exceed Page Limit filed by Appellant Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6402227-1]

10/07/2011
4 pg, 185.58 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Samuel J. Brooke for Jane Doe#1-6, John Doe#1-6, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers

10/07/2011
4 pg, 128.08 KB
10/07/2011
4 pg, 194.77 KB
10/07/2011
3 pg, 45.22 KB
10/07/2011 10/11/2011 10/11/2011
130 pg, 5.35 MB

International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam and Michelle R. Lapointe for Jane Doe#1-6, John Doe#1-6, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
ORDER: Motion to Expedite Briefing Schedule filed by Appellant is GRANTED. [6401712-3] Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Briefs on the Merits Shall Be Filed on or Before 10/31/2011. The DefendantsAppellees' Response Briefs on the Mertis Shall Be Filed on or Before 11/22/2011. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Briefs on the Merits Shall Be Filed on or Before 11/29/2011. The Clerk Is DIRECTED to Expedite this Appeal to the Next Oral Argument slot that is available after 11/29/2011. [6402197-3]
Amended Notice of Appeal filed by Attorney Linton Joaquin for Appellants Jane Doe#1-6, John Doe#1-6, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
CIVIL CROSS APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by APPELLEES-CROSS APPELLANTS: Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama on 10/07/2011. Fee Status: Fee Paid.
The Transcript Order Form has not been filed as to APPELLEE-CROSS APPELLANT: Governor of Alabama, et al. There are no hearings to be transcribed.
Appellate fee was paid on 10/11/2011 as to Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama, et al.
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION to Motion for injunction pending appeal filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama

10/11/2011
1 pg, 299.77 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 60.94 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 60.48 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 305.1 KB

in 11-14535 filed by James W. Davis, Misty S. Fairbanks, Margaret L. Fleming, William Glenn Parker, Jr. and Joshua Kerry Payne for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Elora Mukherjee for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Andre I. Segura for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Cecillia D. Wang for Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Omar C. Jadwat for Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black

10/11/2011
1 pg, 59.9 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 59.18 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 59.65 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 64.68 KB
10/11/2011
1 pg, 303.93 KB
10/11/2011
2 pg, 586.73 KB

Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Kenneth John Sugarman for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Katherine Desormeau for John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Lee Gelernt for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Joshua Kerry Payne for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Misty S. Fairbanks for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by James W. Davis for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State

Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County and William Glenn Parker, Jr. for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.

10/11/2011

Added Attorney(s) Elizabeth Escalona for party(s) Appellee-Cross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama, in case 11-14535.

10/11/2011
1 pg, 315.06 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Elizabeth Escalona for Attorney General, State of Alabama.

10/12/2011

Record on Appeal filed. Transcript, 1 volumes

300 pg, 767.38 KB

10/12/2011
1 pg, 39.07 KB

Clerk Communication: E-Mail from Chief Deputy to counsel of record: Counsel directed to file a joint list of affidavits, declarations, exhibits, etc. that were submitted in evidence in the record before USDC (not asking for the docs themselves, just the list); confirm that no oral testimony or depositions were offered to or filed with the USDC; finally, each party is directed to identify what, if anything, they have filed in this Court of Appeal that was not before the USDC at the time of the district's ruling. The joint list and other information should be filed with this court no later than 4:00 pm (Eastern) on Thursday, October 13, 2011. [11-14532, 1114535]

10/12/2011
2 pg, 605.02 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Margaret L. Fleming for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County in 11-14535, Margaret L. Fleming for State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama in 11-14532. [11-14535, 11-14532]

10/12/2011
1 pg, 61.99 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by George Brian Spears for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

10/13/2011

Notice of filing: Joint List of Evidence as to Appellant-Cross Appellee

16 pg, 723.51 KB USA in 11-14532. [11-14532, 11-14535]

10/13/2011
6 pg, 298.59 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Tanya Broder for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers

10/13/2011

International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Linton Joaquin for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Melissa S. Keaney for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam and Karen C. Tumlin for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam in 11-14535. [11-14535, 11-14532]
MOTION to appear pro hac vice filed by Attorney Michael K.T. Tan for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam in 11-14535. [6408874-1] [11-14535, 11-14532]

10/13/2011
16 pg, 1.67 MB
10/13/2011
43 pg, 4.38 MB
10/13/2011
44 pg, 3.32 MB
10/14/2011
22 pg, 898 KB
10/19/2011
1 pg, 33.53 KB
10/19/2011
1 pg, 293.21 KB
10/20/2011
2 pg, 324.39 KB
10/21/2011

State Defendants' supplemental filing of hard copy website print-outs regarding opposition to the appellants' motions for injunction pending appeal filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee USA in 11-14532 filed by Attorney John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Appellees-Cross Appellants State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama in 11-14532. [11-14532, 11-14535]
Supplemental Exhibits Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal... filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama in 11-14535. [11-14532, 11-14535]
Reply in support of motion for preliminary injunction pending appeal and for expedited appeal filed by Samuel Brooke for Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama in 11-14535. [11-14532, 11-14535]
SEE ATTACHED ORDER: Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties' briefs and the district court's order and opinions, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the United States' and the private plaintiffs' motions for injunction pending appeal.... The private plaintiffs' motion for injunction pending appeal are DENIED as to Section 28, and thus we need not reach the standing issues. The United States' and the private plaintiffs' motions for injunction pending appeal are DENIED as to Sections 12, 18, 27, and 30. [6401712-2] in 11-14532, [6402197-2] in 1114535 EEC, RB and FMH [11-14532, 11-14535]
ORDER: Motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Michael K.T. Tan as to appellant is GRANTED by Supervisor. [6408874-2] [11-14535, 1114532]
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Michael K.T. Tan for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Allison Eichenfeld Neal for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
Added Attorney(s) Kristi L. Graunke for party(s) Appellant-Cross

10/21/2011
2 pg, 362.37 KB
10/21/2011
5 pg, 684.81 KB
10/21/2011
2 pg, 324.23 KB
10/21/2011
2 pg, 324.23 KB
10/21/2011
2 pg, 572.29 KB
10/21/2011
4 pg, 436.62 KB
10/25/2011
1 pg, 297.76 KB
10/25/2011
1 pg, 62.04 KB
10/25/2011
1 pg, 301.69 KB

Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, in case 11-14535.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Kristi L. Graunke for Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama et al
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Michael D. Simpson for Service.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.
Civil Appeal Statement filed by Attorney John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.
Civil Appeal Statement filed by Attorney Samuel J. Brooke for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by J. Cecil Gardner for Service in 1114532, 11-14535. [11-14532, 11-14535]
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Vikram K. Badrinath for Service.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Victor Viramontes for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Amy Pedersen for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters

and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

10/25/2011
1 pg, 301.34 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Nina Perales for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

10/25/2011
1 pg, 68.79 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Martha L. Gomez for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

10/27/2011
10 pg, 616.76 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Herman Watson, Jr. for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

10/31/2011

Added Attorney(s) Anjan Choudhury for party(s) Not Party Service, in case 11-14535.

10/31/2011
1 pg, 56.8 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Anjan Choudhury for Freedom Network, USA and Service.

10/31/2011
6 pg, 262.39 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Anjan Choudhury for Freedom Network, USA and Service.

11/02/2011
1 pg, 314.01 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.

11/02/2011

Application to appear pro hac vice filed by Gregory D. Phillips for Amicus Curiae Freedom Network, USA. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6427818-1]

11/03/2011
23 pg, 1 MB

MOTION to file amicus brief filed by The United Mexican States; Not Party Service in 11-14535. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [64234261] [11-14532, 11-14535]--[Edited 11/16/2011 by AGW]

11/03/2011
24 pg, 1.25 MB

MOTION to join the amicusbrief of the United Mexican States filed by Amicus Curiae Government of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6464750-1]

11/07/2011
4 pg, 539.54 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Erin Emi Oshiro for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.

11/09/2011

MOTION to file excess pages filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic

22 pg, 886.25 KB Interest Coalition of Alabama. Motion is Unopposed [6423358-1]

11/09/2011

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. for

1 pg, 302.96 KB Superintendent of Shelby County Public School System.

11/10/2011
2 pg, 65.56 KB

ORDER: Motion to file excess pages filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al is GRANTED. Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross Appellees may file an opening brief of up to 16,500 words. Defendants/Appellees/Cross Appellants may file an initial brief of up to 19,000 words. John Ley-Entered for the Court-By Directions. [6423358-2] --[Edited 11/14/2011 by AGW]

11/14/2011

E-Brief Tendered: Appellant brief for Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic

102 pg, 389.96 KB Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al

11/14/2011

Added Attorney(s) Thy B. Bui for party(s) Not Party Service, in case 1114535.

11/14/2011
7 pg, 701.44 KB
11/14/2011
85 pg, 3.34 MB
11/14/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
2 pg, 91.79 KB
11/15/2011 11/15/2011
6 pg, 476.26 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Thy B. Bui for Service.
MOTION to supplement the record filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6432316-1]
Appellants' Brief filed for Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Deficiencies: see deficiency letter. Service date: 11/14/2011 [11-14535] Attorney for Appellees: Brooks - email; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis - email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona - email; Attorney for AppelleesCross Appellants: Fairbanks - email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Fleming - email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Neiman - email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Parker - email; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Payne - email; Attorney for Not Party: Simpson - email.
Expanded Record Excerpts (4 VOLUMES) filed by Attorney Kristi L. Graunke for Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al. Deficiencies: see deficiency letter. Service date: 11/14/2011 US mail - Attorneys for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks; Attorneys for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Parker, Payne; Attorney for Not Party: Simpson.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Shiu-Ming Cheer for Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
Added Attorney(s) Gregory D. Phillips for party(s) Not Party Service, in case 11-14535.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Gregory D. Phillips for Service.

11/16/2011
3 pg, 122.79 KB
11/16/2011
7 pg, 302.14 KB
11/17/2011
1 pg, 33.33 KB
11/17/2011 11/17/2011 11/17/2011
3 pg, 561.95 KB
11/17/2011
1 pg, 32.75 KB
11/17/2011
3 pg, 560.42 KB
11/21/2011
1 pg, 59.73 KB
11/21/2011
5 pg, 791.24 KB
11/21/2011

According to our records, Diana Sen for Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, et al., Diana is not a member of the Elevent Circuit bar. The appearance of counsel form has not been processed allowing fourteen days to complete and return the required application for admission.
According to our records, Gregory D. Phillips for Service is not a member of the Elevent Circuit bar. The appearance of counsel form has not been processed allowing fourteen days to complete and return the required application for admission.
ORDER: Motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Amicus Curiae Freedom Network, USA as to appellant is GRANTED by Supervisor. [6427818-2]
MOTION to appear pro hac vice filed by Attorney Roger L. Rice for Amicus Curiae META, Inc. and Not Party Service. [6432965-1]
Added Attorney(s) Miguel A Perez Vargas for party(s) Amicus Curiae META, Inc., in case 11-14535.
MOTION to appear pro hac vice filed by Attorney Miguel A Vargas for Amicus Curiae META, Inc.. [6432974-1]
ORDER: Motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Miguel A Vargas as to appellant is GRANTED by Supervisor. [6432974-2]
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Miguel A Vargas for META, Inc.. et al
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Jessica D. Karp for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
Notice of filing: American Jewish Committee's Motion for Leave to File An Amicus Brief construed as a notice that all parties consent to the filing of this brief filed by John Roberti.
Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange;

Attorney for Not Parties: Bui, Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, PerezVargas, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/21/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae Freedom Network, USA. Service date: 11/18/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/21/2011

Freedom Network USA has consent from all parties to file their amicus brief..

11/21/2011

E-Brief Tendered: Amicus brief for Amicus Curiae Freedom Network,

57 pg, 120.79 KB USA.

11/21/2011

Public Communication: Motion to File Amicus Brief on Behalf of The Anti-Defamation League was not processed because amicus has consent from all parties to file this brief..

11/21/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/21/2011
1 pg, 297.94 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by John Roberti for American Jewish Committee.

11/21/2011
1 pg, 305.28 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Dale M. Schwartz for AntiDefamation League.

11/22/2011
5 pg, 609.25 KB
11/22/2011
11/22/2011 11/22/2011

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Reed Neill Colfax for Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, The National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc. and South Alabama Center for Fair Housing.
Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.
Public Communication: Alabama Coalition Against Domestice Violence has consent from all parties to file their amicus brief.
Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curium Congress Keith Ellison, Congressman Al Green, Congressman Charles Gonzalez, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Dennis Cardoza, Congressman Gregorio Sablan, Congressman Gregory Meeks, Congressman Jared Polis, Congressman Jim Costa, Congressman Jim McDermott, Congressman Jim Moran, Congressman Joe Baca, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Congressman Jose Serrano, Congressman Mike Honda, Congressman Mike Quigley, Congressman Pedro Pierluisi, Congressman Raul Grijalva, Congressman Ruben Hinojosa, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Congressman Ted Deutch, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky, Congresswoman Judy Chu, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Congresswoman Terri Sewell, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren in 11-14535. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Von Sternberg; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Abate, Albin, Artrip, Bauer, Brinkmann, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Chilakamarri, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Krishna, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Orrick, Perales, Reeves, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Stern, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Vance, Viramontes, Watson, Werner, West, Wilkenfeld; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Williams, Zall; email Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Shultz, Sugarman, Tan, Tenny, Wang; Attorney for Appellee:

Blacksher; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Schoen, Still. [11-14532, 1114535]

11/22/2011
46 pg, 233.33 KB

E-Brief Tendered: Amicus brief for Amicus Curium Congress Keith Ellison, Congressman Al Green, Congressman Charles Gonzalez, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Dennis Cardoza, Congressman Gregorio Sablan, Congressman Gregory Meeks, Congressman Jared Polis, Congressman Jim Costa, Congressman Jim McDermott, Congressman Jim Moran, Congressman Joe Baca, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Congressman Jose Serrano, Congressman Mike Honda, Congressman Mike Quigley, Congressman Pedro Pierluisi, Congressman Raul Grijalva, Congressman Ruben Hinojosa, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Congressman Ted Deutch, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky, Congresswoman Judy Chu, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Congresswoman Terri Sewell, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren in 1114535. [11-14532, 11-14535]

11/22/2011

Notice of Filing: Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, et al, motion for leave to file an amicus brief construed as a notice that all parties consent to the filing of this brief filed by Reed Colfax.

11/22/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curium Central Alabama Fair Housing Center and Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Centter for Fair Housing, Inc., and National Fair Housing Alliance. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/22/2011
11 pg, 462.36 KB

The Brief filed by Amicus Curium National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, Partners in Health, The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law and The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, et al. has consent from all parties to be filed. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6450090-1]

11/22/2011

Amicus Brief filed by National Education Association, The Alabama Education Association and the National School Boards Association has consent from all parties to file this brief. (Pg. 2 of brief).

11/22/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curium Alabama Education Association, National Education Association and National School Boards Association. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/22/2011

MOTION to file amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae American

16 pg, 697.54 KB Immigration Lawyers Association. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6454125-1]

11/22/2011

E-Brief Tendered: Amicus brief for Amicus Curiae Alabama Coalition

68 pg, 335.57 KB Against Domestic Violence.

11/22/2011

E-Brief Tendered: Amicus brief for Amicus Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association in 11-14535. [11-14532, 11-14535]

11/22/2011

MOTION to appear pro hac vice filed by Attorney Stuart J. Baskin for Amicus Curium National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Global Justice Ecology Project, The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Partners in Health and The Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law. [6460436-1]

11/22/2011

ORDER: Motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Stuart J. Baskin as to appellant is GRANTED by Supervisor. [6460436-2]

11/22/2011
30 pg, 1.7 MB

MOTION to file amicus brief filed by National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Motion is Unopposed [6461968-1]

11/23/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curium Global Justice Ecology Project, National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, Partners in Health, The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law and The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee. Service date: 11/22/2011 US mail Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross

11/25/2011
2 pg, 335.84 KB
11/25/2011
2 pg, 96.71 KB
11/25/2011
9 pg, 581.3 KB
11/25/2011
1 pg, 309.87 KB

Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Michael Birney De Leeuw for Congressman Joe Baca, Congressman Jim McDermott, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Congressman Gregory Meeks, Congressman Dennis Cardoza, Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Congresswoman Judy Chu, Congressman Jim Moran, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congressman Jim Costa, Congressman Pedro Pierluisi, Congressman Ted Deutch, Congressman Jared Polis, Congress Keith Ellison, Congressman Mike Quigley, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Charles Gonzalez, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Al Green, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Congressman Raul Grijalva, Congressman Gregorio Sablan, Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky, Congressman Jose Serrano, Congressman Ruben Hinojosa, Congresswoman Terri Sewell, Congressman Mike Honda, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Michael Birney De Leeuw for Congressman Joe Baca, Congressman Jim McDermott, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Congressman Gregory Meeks, Congressman Dennis Cardoza, Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Congresswoman Judy Chu, Congressman Jim Moran, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congressman Jim Costa, Congressman Pedro Pierluisi, Congressman Ted Deutch, Congressman Jared Polis, Congress Keith Ellison, Congressman Mike Quigley, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Charles Gonzalez, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Al Green, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Congressman Raul Grijalva, Congressman Gregorio Sablan, Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky, Congressman Jose Serrano, Congressman Ruben Hinojosa, Congresswoman Terri Sewell, Congressman Mike Honda, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney.
RESPONSE to Motion to supplement the record filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama in 11-14535 filed by Attorney John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by David Gespass for National Employment Law Project, The Alabama Council on Human Relations, Alabama NOW, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Dominican American National Roundtable, Birmingham Peace Project, Equality Alabama, Equal Justice Society, Federation of Southern

Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund, Hispanic Federation, HIV Law Project, Immigration Equality, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., The Montgomery Improvement Association, National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, National Counsel of La Raza, National Dominican American Council, National Guestworker Allicance, National Immigration Porject of the National Lawyers Guild, The National Lawyers Guild, News Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, Progressive Jewish Alliance and Jewish Funds for Justice, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society of American Law Teachers, The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, The United States Hispanic Leadership Institute and Service.

11/25/2011

Amicus Brief (consent inside of brief) filed by Amicus Curium Alabama NOW, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Birmingham Peace Project, Dominican American National Roundtable, Equal Justice Society, Equality Alabama, Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund, HIV Law Project, Hispanic Federation, Immigration Equality, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, National Counsel of La Raza, National Dominican American Council, National Employment Law Project, National Guestworker Allicance, National Immigration Porject of the National Lawyers Guild, News Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, Progressive Jewish Alliance and Jewish Funds for Justice, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society of American Law Teachers, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, The National Lawyers Guild, The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and The United States Hispanic Leadership Institute. Service date: 11/21/2011 US mail Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Park, Perez-Vargas, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Maer, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Blacksher, Schoen, Still.

11/25/2011
10 pg, 488.51 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to supplement the record filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama in 11-14535 filed by Attorney John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama.

11/28/2011
1 pg, 32.76 KB
11/28/2011
1 pg, 289.5 KB
11/29/2011
2 pg, 38.75 KB

ORDER: Motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Roger L. Rice as to appellant is GRANTED by Supervisor. [6432965-2]
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by John Foster Maer for Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
Notice of Deficient Appellants' Brief filed fby Michelle R. Lapointe for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Karen C. Tumlin for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam and Cecillia D. Wang for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam. Deficiencies: the Brief referenced documents not part of the record for this appeal, the Brief stated that this appeal was consolidated with 11-14532 (ix).

11/29/2011
1 pg, 35.56 KB

Notice of Deficient Appellants' Expanded Record Excerpts filed by Attorney Kristi L. Graunke for Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al. Deficiencies: the Expaneded Record Excerpts include documents not part of the record for this appeal.

11/30/2011
1 pg, 306.78 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Jamie Lorraine Crook for Service.

11/30/2011
1 pg, 300.79 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Stephen Dane for Service.

11/30/2011

Reply memorandum in support of Appellants' Motion to Supplement the

12 pg, 537.67 KB Record on Appeal.

12/02/2011

MOTION to supplement the record filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee

102 pg, 4.29 MB Southern Poverty Law Center, et al. Motion is Unopposed [6445856-1]

12/08/2011

Over the phone extension granted by clerk. Appellee's Brief due on 12/27/2011 as to Appellee

12/09/2011

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae META, Inc. in 11-14532. Service date: 11/16/2011 US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Perez-Vargas, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Von Sternberg; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Albin, Artrip, Bauer, Brinkmann, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Chilakamarri, Gomez, Graunke, Joaquin, Keaney, Krishna, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Orrick, Perales, Reeves, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Stern, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Vance, Viramontes, Watson, Werner, West, Wilkenfeld; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Gardner, Gespass, Park, Phillips, Simpson, Tedrow, Williams, Zall; email - Attorney for Amicus Curiae: de Leeuw; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Abate, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Jadwat, Karp, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Shultz, Sugarman, Tan, Tenny, Wang; Attorney for Appellee: Blacksher; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Badrinath, Schoen, Still. [11-14532, 11-14535]

12/09/2011
46 pg, 233.33 KB

E-Brief Tendered: Amicus brief for Amicus Curium Congress Keith Ellison, Congressman Al Green, Congressman Charles Gonzalez, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Dennis Cardoza, Congressman Gregorio Sablan, Congressman Gregory Meeks, Congressman Jared Polis, Congressman Jim Costa, Congressman Jim McDermott, Congressman Jim Moran, Congressman Joe Baca, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Congressman Jose Serrano, Congressman Mike Honda, Congressman Mike Quigley, Congressman Pedro Pierluisi, Congressman Raul Grijalva, Congressman Ruben Hinojosa, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Congressman Ted Deutch, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky, Congresswoman Judy Chu, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Congresswoman Terri Sewell,

Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren in 1114535. [11-14535, 11-14532]

12/12/2011
4 pg, 137.06 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Stuart J. Baskin for National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Global Justice Ecology Project, The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Partners in Health and The Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law.

12/12/2011

Confirmation letter for a 7-day extension filed by Appellee-Cross-

1 pg, 232.32 KB Appellee State of Alabama.

12/12/2011
130 pg, 5.7 MB

MOTION to stay execution of correction of deficiencies to appellants' brief pending the court's ruling on the motion to supplement the record on appeal. filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. Motion is Unopposed [6460647-1]

12/14/2011
5 pg, 686.28 KB

Amended APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Michael D. Simpson for Alabama Education Association, National Education Association, National School Boards Association and Service and Michael D. Simpson for Service.

12/15/2011
29 pg, 1.01 MB

MOTION to stay further appellate proceedings filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama. Motion is Opposed [6447848-1]

12/19/2011
15 pg, 686.64 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to stay further appellate proceedings filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama in 11-14535 filed by Attorney Kristi L. Graunke for Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama.

12/20/2011

Reply to response of motion to stay appeals and cross appeals filed by

11 pg, 808.65 KB Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama.

12/22/2011
3 pg, 78.98 KB

ORDER: Motion to stay further appellate proceedings filed by AppelleeCross Appellant State of Alabama is DENIED [6447859-2] in 11-14532, Motion to stay further appellate proceedings filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama is DENIED [6447848-2] in 11-14535 filed by the Clerk for the Court [1114532, 11-14535]

12/22/2011
1 pg, 57.57 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Thomas J. Spina for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

12/27/2011

Reply to response filed by Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest

12 pg, 533.78 KB Coalition of Alabama.

12/28/2011
90 pg, 631.7 KB

E-Brief Tendered: Appellee brief for Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama.

12/28/2011

MOTION Motion for leave to cite to brief in related appeal 11-14532-CC

25 pg, 774.23 KB filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama

12/28/2011
12/28/2011
12/29/2011 12/29/2011
6 pg, 650.39 KB
01/03/2012
1 pg, 47.3 KB
01/03/2012
2 pg, 163.63 KB
01/03/2012 01/03/2012
1 pg, 310.9 KB
01/03/2012
61 pg, 2.79 MB
01/03/2012
4 pg, 255.47 KB

and Governor of Alabama. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [64613561]
Appellee's Brief filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama. Service date: 12/27/2011 email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Brooke, Bruner, Cheer, Desormeau, Gelernt, Gomez, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Oshiro, Pedersen, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Segura, Sen, Spears, Sugarman, Tan, Tsu, Tumlin, Viramontes, Wang, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks.
Supplemental Expanded Record Excerpts filed by Attorney Elizabeth Prim Escalona for Appellee-Cross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama. Service date: 12/27/2011 email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Brooke, Bruner, Cheer, Desormeau, Gelernt, Gomez, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Oshiro, Pedersen, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Segura, Sen, Spears, Sugarman, Tan, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Wang, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks.
Oral argument scheduled. Argument Date: Thursday, 03/01/2012 Argument Location: Atlanta Courtroom: Atlanta 339.
Document filed by Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama in support of Motion for leave to cite to appellee's brief in 1114532-CC. - Motion is unopposed
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Edward L White III for American Center for Law and Justice [11-14532, 11-14535] (ECF: Edward White)
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Lawrence J Joseph for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund [11-14535, 11-14532]--[Edited 09/11/2012 by SPT] (ECF: Lawrence Joseph)
Added Attorney(s) Roland Cooper Shattuck for party(s) Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama, in case 11-14535.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Roland Cooper Shattuck for Governor of Alabama.
MOTION to file amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund. Motion is Unopposed [6463167-1]
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by David Gespass for National Employment Law Project, The Alabama Council on Human Relations, Alabama NOW, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Dominican American National Roundtable, Birmingham Peace Project, Equality Alabama, Equal Justice Society, Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund, Hispanic Federation, HIV Law Project, Immigration Equality, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., The Montgomery Improvement Association, National Asian

01/04/2012
68 pg, 2.88 MB
01/04/2012 01/05/2012 01/13/2012
1 pg, 380.87 KB
01/17/2012
11 pg, 28.16 KB
01/18/2012

Pacific American Bar Association, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, National Counsel of La Raza, National Dominican American Council, National Guestworker Alliance, National Immigration Porject of the National Lawyers Guild, The National Lawyers Guild, News Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, Progressive Jewish Alliance and Jewish Funds for Justice, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society of American Law Teachers, The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, The United States Hispanic Leadership Institute and Service in 11-14535. [11-14535, 11-14532]
Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and Justice. Service date: 01/04/2012 email - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Badrinath, Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Hutchison, PerezVargas, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson, Solano, Von Sternberg, White, de Leeuw. [11-14532, 11-14535] - Parties consented to the filing of this amicus brief.--[Edited 01/05/2012 by BHM] (ECF: Edward White)
Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and Justice.
Added Attorney(s) Lawrence John Joseph for party(s) Not Party Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, in case 11-14535. [11-14535]-[Edited 09/11/2012 by SPT]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Justin Cox, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama et al. [11-14535]--[Edited 09/11/2012 by SPT] (ECF: Justin Cox)
MOTION for additional time for oral argument filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Motion is Unopposed [6468628-1] (ECF: Cecillia Wang)
(1-2) Leave to file amicus brief (United Mexican States), (3-4) Join in amicus brief of United Mexican Sttes (various countries), (5-6) Leave to file amicus brief (AILA) (9) Supplement the record (Appellants/CrossAppellees HICA Plaintiffs), (10) Leave to file amicus curiae brief (Nat'l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers), (11) Supplement the record (Appellant-Cross Appellee Southern Poverty Law Ctr), (12) Stay obligations to amend deficiencies (Appellants/Cross-Appellees), (13) Leave to cite Appellees' brief in 11-14532 (Appellees-Cross Appellants) and (14) Leave to file amicus curiae brief (Eagle Forum Educ. and Legal Defense Fund) [6469169-1]

01/19/2012
01/20/2012
01/24/2012
2 pg, 62.84 KB
01/24/2012
4 pg, 317.49 KB

Email Delivery Failure. Message could not be delivered to Attorney Stephen M. Dane for Not Party Service in 11-14535. [11-14535, 1114532, 11-14675, 11-14674] Message hard bounced at for shayes@remanlaw.com, Bounced by destination server with response: 5.1.2 - Bad destination host ('000', ['DNS Hard Error looking up remanlaw.com (MX): NXDomain'])
Email Delivery Failure. Message could not be delivered to Attorney Roger L. Rice <rlr@shore.net> for Amicus Curiae META, Inc. in 11-14532. [1114532, 11-14535, 11-14675, 11-14674] 5.3.0 - Other mail system problem 550-'Administrative prohibition' (delivery attempts: 0)
ORDER: ORDER: Appellants' Unopposed Motion for Additional time for oral argument is hereby GRANTED. Appellants' shall have twenty minutes (20) for oral argument and the Appellee shall have twenty minutes (20) for oral argument...ENTERED FOR THE COURT - BY DIRECTION . [6468628-2]
ORDER: The motion of the United Mexican States ("Mexico") for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff/appellant in case number 11-14532 is GRANTED.. Mexico's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiffs/appellants in case number 11-14535 is GRANTED.. The motion by the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, et al., to join Mexico's amicus curiae brief in case number 1114532 is GRANTED.. The motion by the Government of Argentina, Bolivia, et al., to join Mexico's amicus curiae brief in case number 1114535 is GRANTED.. The American Immigration Lawyers Association's ("AILA's") motin for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff/appellee in case no. 11-14532 is GRANTED.. The AILA's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs/appellees in case no. 11-14535 is...GRANTED..Landmark Legal Foundation's "Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae" in case no. 11-14532 is GRANTED.. Appellees/Cross-Appellants State of Alabama and Governor Robert Bentley's "Motion for Leave to File Corrected Brief" in case no. 11-14532 is GRANTED..Plaintiffs/Appellants Hispanic Interest Coalitin of Alabama, et al.'s November 14, 2011, "Motion to Supplement the Record" in case no. 11-14535 is GRANTED..The motion of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for leave to appear as amicu curiae in support of the plaintiffs/appellants in case no. 11-14535 is GRANTED... Plaintiffs/Appellants Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al.'s December 2, 2011, "Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record" in case no. 11-14535 is GRANTED...Plaintiffs/Appellants Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al.'s December 12, 2011, "Unopposed Motion to Stay Obligations to Amend Deficiencies" in case no. 11-14535 is DENIED AS MOOT..Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants State of Albama, Governor Bentley, et al.'s motion in case no. 11-14535 for leave to cite to the principal brief of Appellees State of Alabama and Governor Bentley filed in case no. 11-14532 is GRANTED..The "Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support of Appellees/Cross-Appellants" in case no. 1114535 is GRANTED...ENTERED FOR THE COURT - BY DIRECTION. [11-14532, 11-14535]

01/24/2012

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

01/24/2012

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Service date: 11/21/2011 email - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Badrinath, Perez Vargas, de Leeuw; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Blacksher, Dane, Joseph, Park, Schoen, Still; US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Crook, Gardner, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall.

01/24/2012

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Amicus Curiae The United Mexican States, et al. in 11-14532. [11-14532, 11-14535]

01/24/2012

Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae The United Mexican States, et al. in 11-14532. Service date: 11/02/2011 email - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Badrinath, Hutchison, Joseph, Muise, Park, Perez Vargas, White, de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Abate, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Krishna, Lapointe, Maer, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Sandberg, Segura, Shultz, Sugarman, Tan, Tenny, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for Appellee: Blacksher; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Dane, Schoen, Still; US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Bursch, Chau, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson, Solano, Von Sternberg, Zall; Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Albin, Artrip, Bauer, Brinkmann, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Chilakamarri, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Newman, Orrick, Perales, Reeves, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Stern, Tsu, Turner, Vance, Viramontes, Watson, Werner, West, Wilkenfeld; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Crook, Gardner, Phillips, Tedrow, Williams. [11-14532, 11-14535]

01/27/2012
49 pg, 188.45 KB

Amicus Brief filed by Leave of Court by Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund. Service date: 01/27/2012 US mail District Judge Blackburn; Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Crook, Gardner, Phillips, Tedrow, Zall; email - Originating Clerk/Ag Harris; Attorney for Amicus Curium: Badrinath, Joseph, Perez Vargas, de

Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for AppelleesCross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker; Attorney for Not Parties: Blacksher, Dane, Park, Schoen, Still. (ECF: Lawrence Joseph)

01/27/2012
5 pg, 101.3 KB

Cover letter to court transmitted amicus brief and e-filing Certificate of Service to Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund amicus brief filed by Attorney Lawrence John Joseph for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund and Not Party Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund (ECF: Lawrence Joseph)

01/27/2012

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund.

01/30/2012
77 pg, 305.63 KB

Appellant-Cross Appellee's Brief filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Service date: 01/30/2012 email - Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Brooke, Bruner, Cheer, Desormeau, Gelernt, Gomez, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Keaney, Lapointe, Ling, Maer, McKinney, Mittal, Mukherjee, Neal, Newman, Oshiro, Pedersen, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Segura, Sen, Spears, Sugarman, Tan, Tsu, Tumlin, Turner, Viramontes, Wang, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Neiman, Parker, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Samuel Brooke)

01/30/2012

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellant-Cross Reply/Response Brief Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama.

01/31/2012

Appellants/Cross-Appellees' Supplemental Expanded Record Excerpts filed by Shiu-Ming Cheer for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Linton Joaquin for Appellants-

02/06/2012
2 pg, 332.68 KB

Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Melissa S. Keaney for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Karen Cassandra Tumlin for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam and Cecillia D. Wang for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam. Service date: 01/30/2012 US mail - Attorney for Appellant-Cross Appellee: Newman; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Parker, Payne, Shattuck.
APPEARANCE of Counsel filed by Diana S. Sen for Jane Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for

02/08/2012
19 pg, 384 KB
02/09/2012
02/27/2012
3 pg, 124.03 KB
02/28/2012
3 pg, 49.65 KB

Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam.
Reply Brief filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. Service date: 02/08/2012 US mail Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for AppelleesCross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker. (ECF: John Neiman)
Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama in 11-14535, Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama in 1114675. [11-14535]--[Edited 09/11/2012 by SPT]
Supplemental Authority filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. Service date: 02/27/2012 US mail - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; email Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker. (ECF: John Neiman)
Response to Supplemental Authority (28J) filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition

of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Service date: 02/28/2012 email - Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Neiman, Parker, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Samuel Brooke)

03/01/2012

Oral argument held. Oral Argument participants were Samuel Jacob Brooke for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam, Cecillia D. Wang for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam and Prim F. Escalona for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.

03/08/2012
4 pg, 102.67 KB

ORDER..... Expanding the Oct. 14, 2011 order of the court and ENJOINING the State of Alabama's enforcement of Sect. 27 and Sect. 30 of H.B. 56 pending complete resolution of these appeals.. CRW, BBM and Voorhees [11-14532, 11-14535]

03/27/2012
40 pg, 448.84 KB

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service

04/05/2012
3 pg, 117.53 KB
05/21/2012
20 pg, 72.34 KB
05/22/2012 05/23/2012
66 pg, 1.46 MB

Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Service date: 03/27/2012 email - Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Neiman, Parker, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Samuel Brooke)
Response to Supplemental Authority (28J) filed by Appellee-Cross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama. Service date: 04/05/2012 email - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Badrinath, Joseph, Perez Vargas, de Leeuw; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Bauer, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker, Payne; Attorney for Not Parties: Blacksher, Crook, Dane, Park, Schoen, Still, Zall; US mail - Attorney for Amicus Curium: Baskin, Bui, Choudhury, Colfax, Gespass, Rice, Roberti, Schwartz, Simpson; Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange; Attorney for Not Parties: Gardner, Phillips, Tedrow. (ECF: Elizabeth Escalona)
MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Allison Neal for Appellants-Cross Appellees Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6570690-1] (ECF: Allison Neal)
Email Delivery Failure. Message could not be delivered to Katherine Anne Gillespie for Not Party Service in 11-14535. [11-14535, 11-14532, 11-14675, 11-14674] Message hard bounced at 64.18.4.10 for kgillespie@relmanlaw.com, Bounced by destination server with response: 5.1.0 - Unknown address error.
Supplemental Authority filed by Appellee-Cross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama. Service date: 05/23/2012 email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker, Payne; US mail Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen,

Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Elizabeth Escalona)

05/24/2012
101 pg, 1.54 MB

MOTION to vacate court's order filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama and Governor of Alabama. Motion is Opposed [6574911-1] (ECF: John Neiman)

06/01/2012
23 pg, 253.73 KB

MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Elizabeth Prim Escalona for Appellee-Cross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6580253-1] (ECF: Elizabeth Escalona)

06/01/2012
3 pg, 74.9 KB

ORDER: Allison Neal's motion to withdraw as counsel for the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, et al., is GRANTED. (CRW)[Edited 06/04/2012 by JC]

06/04/2012
75 pg, 2.43 MB

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Service date: 06/04/2012 email - Attorney for AppellantsCross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang; Attorney for AppelleesCross Appellants: Escalona, Neiman, Parker, Payne; US mail - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Keaney, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Watson, Werner; Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Escalona, Fairbanks, Fleming, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Cecillia Wang)

06/06/2012
17 pg, 37.75 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to vacate court's order filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education and Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education in 11-14535 filed by Attorney Cecillia D. Wang for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org,

Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam. (ECF: Cecillia Wang)

06/07/2012
11 pg, 143.89 KB

Reply to response filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. (ECF: John Neiman)

06/08/2012

ORDER: Elizabeth Prim Escalona's motion to withdraw as counsel for the

3 pg, 326.48 KB Appellees/Cross-Appellants is GRANTED. [6580253-2] (CRW)

06/25/2012
4 pg, 105.99 KB

ORDER: As the parties are aware, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Arizona v. United States. In light of this opinion, we will permit the parties to file a supplemental brief addressing the effect of that opinion on the issues raised in these appeals. Supplemental briefing shall be filed on or before July 6, 2012 and may not exceed fifteen pages. (CRW, BBM and RV2) [11-14532, 11-14535]

07/06/2012
82 pg, 529.95 KB

Appellant's Supplemental Brief filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Service date: 07/06/2012 email - Attorney for Appellees: Brooks, Brooks, Sweeney; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Fairbanks, Fleming, Neiman, Parker, Payne, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: Samuel Brooke)

07/06/2012
15 pg, 370.47 KB

Appellee's Supplemental Brief filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. Service date: 07/06/2012 email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Keaney, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang, Watson; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Neiman, Parker, Payne; US mail - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Werner; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Fairbanks, Fleming, Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: John Neiman)

07/09/2012

Received paper copies of EBriefs. [11-14535]--[Edited 09/11/2012 by SPT]

07/17/2012
07/17/2012
07/25/2012
3 pg, 73.48 KB
08/01/2012
4 pg, 152.69 KB

Added Attorney(s) Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao, Winifred Kao for party(s) Appellant-Cross Appellee Esayas Haile Appellant-Cross Appellee Robert Barber Appellant-Cross Appellee Daniel Upton Appellant-Cross Appellee Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United Appellant-Cross Appellee John Doe Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama Appellant-Cross Appellee Juan Pablo Black Romero Appellant-Cross Appellee Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama Appellant-Cross Appellee Fiseha Tesfamariam Appellant-Cross Appellee Dreamactivist.org AppellantCross Appellee Michelle Cummings Appellant-Cross Appellee Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc. Appellant-Cross Appellee Aids Action Coalition Appellant-Cross Appellee United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Appellant-Cross Appellee Jane Doe Appellant-Cross Appellee Huntsville International Help Center AppellantCross Appellee Boat People SOS Appellant-Cross Appellee Christopher Barton Thau Appellant-Cross Appellee Pamela Long Appellant-Cross Appellee Matt Webster Appellant-Cross Appellee Service Employees International Union Appellant-Cross Appellee Greater Birmingham Ministries Appellant-Cross Appellee Jeffrey Allen Beck Appellant-Cross Appellee Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Appellant-Cross Appellee Ellin Jimmerson Appellant-Cross Appellee Maria D. Ceja Zamora, in case 11-14535.
MOTION to appear pro hac vice filed by Attorney Winifred Kao for Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam. [6619041-1]
ORDER: The motion to appear pro hac vice filed by Winifred Kao is GRANTED. [6619041-2] (CRW)
Supplemental Authority filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. Service date: 08/01/2012 email - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Artrip, Bauer, Brooke, Desormeau, Gelernt, Graunke, Jadwat, Joaquin, Karp, Keaney, Lapointe, Maer, Mukherjee, Neal, Oshiro, Pedersen, Segura, Sugarman, Tan, Tumlin, Wang, Watson; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Davis, Neiman, Parker, Payne; US mail - Attorney for Appellants-Cross Appellees: Broder, Bruner, Cheer, Gomez, Kao, Ling, McKinney, Mittal, Newman, Perales, Rubio, Schwarz, Sen, Spears, Tsu, Turner, Viramontes, Werner; Attorney for Appellees-Cross Appellants: Fairbanks, Fleming,

Shattuck, Sinclair, Strange. (ECF: John Neiman)

08/03/2012
5 pg, 594.87 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Winifred Kao for appellants.

08/13/2012
23 pg, 119.66 KB

MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Joshua Kerry Payne for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County. Motion is Unopposed [6640629-1] (ECF: Joshua Payne)

08/20/2012
3 pg, 76.87 KB

ORDER: Joshua K. Payne's motion to withdraw as counsel for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants is GRANTED. [6640631-2] [6640629-2] (CRW) [11-14532, 11-14535]

08/20/2012
28 pg, 166.34 KB

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, Vacated in part, Dismissed in part and Remanded. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed.

08/20/2012
3 pg, 37.43 KB

Judgment entered as to Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster.

08/20/2012
3 pg, 80.87 KB

ORDER: For the reasons fully set forth in the opinion in United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532, Alabama's motion to partially vacate the preliminary injunction as to H.B. 56, section 30 is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. (CRW, BBM and RV2) [11-14532, 11-14535]

09/10/2012
77 pg, 1.17 MB

Petition for rehearing en banc filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Alabama State

Superintendent of Education, Attorney General, State of Alabama, District Attorney for Madison County and Governor of Alabama. (ECF: John Neiman)

09/10/2012
8 pg, 92.53 KB

MOTION for extension of time to file request for rehearing to 10/04/2012 at 11:59 pm filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Aids Action Coalition, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Robert Barber, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Boat People SOS, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Michelle Cummings, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Esayas Haile, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Ellin Jimmerson, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Pamela Long, Service Employees International Union, Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Fiseha Tesfamariam, Christopher Barton Thau, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Daniel Upton and Matt Webster. Motion is Opposed [6663313-1] (ECF: Cecillia Wang)

09/11/2012
11 pg, 199.33 KB

RESPONSE to Motion for extension to file request for rehearing filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam in 11-14535 [6663313-2] filed by Attorney John Cowles Neiman, Jr. for Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County. (ECF: John Neiman)

09/19/2012

Added Attorney(s) Andrew Lynn Brasher for party(s) Appellee-Cross Appellant District Attorney for Madison County Appellee-Cross Appellant Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education AppelleeCross Appellant Attorney General, State of Alabama Appellee-Cross Appellant Alabama State Superintendent of Education Appellee-Cross Appellant Governor of Alabama, in case 11-14535.

09/19/2012
1 pg, 63.69 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Andrew Lynn Brasher for Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County.

09/20/2012
4 pg, 61.12 KB

ORDER: Motion for extension to file request for rehearing filed by Appellants-Cross Appellees Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe, John Doe,

John Doe, Service Employees International Union, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Aids Action Coalition, Huntsville International Help Center, Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1657 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Dreamactivist.org, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Boat People SOS, Matt Webster, Maria D. Ceja Zamora, Pamela Long, Juan Pablo Black Romero, Christopher Barton Thau, Ellin Jimmerson, Robert Barber, Daniel Upton, Jeffrey Allen Beck, Michelle Cummings, Esayas Haile and Fiseha Tesfamariam is GRANTED. [6663313-2] Petition for Rehearing due on 10/04/2012. CRW

09/20/2012

MOTION to file amicus brief pursuant to FRAP 29(a) filed by Lawrence J.

54 pg, 159.32 KB Joseph, Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund. [66720321] (ECF: Lawrence Joseph)

10/22/2012
23 pg, 1.06 MB

MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney R. Cooper Shattuck. [6698099-1]

10/31/2012
3 pg, 445.05 KB

ORDER: R. Cooper Shattuck's motion to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED. [6698099-2] (CRW)

11/27/2012
3 pg, 91.98 KB

ORDER: The motion of the Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the DefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants' petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. [6672032-2] CRW

11/27/2012
3 pg, 93.65 KB

ORDER: The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled, the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc filed by Appellees-Cross Appellants Attorney General, State of Alabama, Governor of Alabama, Alabama State Superintendent of Education, Alabama Chancellor of Postsecondary Education and District Attorney for Madison County are DENIED.. [6726279-1]

12/17/2012
4 pg, 62.18 KB

Mandate issued as to Appellant-Cross Appellee Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama.

	  

 
 Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUI

. u.s. couR:toFAPPfi~§

ELEVEMTI~ CtRCUIT

No. 11-14532-CC

~OCT 14 2011

JOON LEY
CLERK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross Appellee,

versus

STATE OF ALABAMA, GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA,

Defendants-Appellees, Cross Appellants,

NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, INC., AMERICAN UNITY LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-14535-CC

D.C. Docket No. 5: 11-cv-2484-SLB

HISPAl'fiC INTEREST COALITI9N OF ALABAMA, AlpS ACTION COALITION, et al.,
versus

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross Appellees,

GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA,

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 2 of 16
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Cross Appellants,
SUPERINTENDENT OF HUNTSVILLE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
Before CARNES, BARKETT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
ORDER BY THE COURT:
These two appeals involve the United States' and various plaintiffs' 1 (the
"private plaintiffs") challenges to the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and
Citizen Protection Act, Ala. Laws Act 2011-535 ("H.B. 56"). In the district court,
1The plaintiffs in the second appeal are:(l) Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama; (2) AIDS Action Coalition; (3) Huntsville International Help Center; (4) Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama; (5) Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc.; (6) Service Employees International Union; (7) Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United; (8) United Food and Commercial Workers International Union; (9) United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local1657; (10) DreamActivist.org; (11) Greater Birmingham Ministries; (12) Boat People SOS; (13) Matt Webster; (14) Maria D. Ceja Zamora; (15) Pamela Long; (16) Juan Pablo Black Romero; (17) Christopher Barton Thau; (18) Ellin Jimmerson; (19) Robert Barber; (20) Daniel Upton; (21) Jeffrey Allen Beck; (22) Michelle Cummings; (23) Esayas Haile; (24) Fiseha Tesfamariam; (25) Jane Doe #1; (26) Jane Doe #2; (27) Jane Doe #3; (28) Jane Doe #4; (29) Jane Doe #5; (30) Jane Doe #6; (31) John Doe #1, a minor, by his legal guardian Matt Webster; (32) John Doe #2; (33) John Doe #3; (34) John Doe #4; (35) John Doe #5; and (36) John Doe #6.
2

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 3 of 16
the United States and the private plaintiffs filed motions for a preliminary · injunction as to various sections of H.B. 56. After a hearing, the district court granted the motions as to numerous sections of H.B. 56 but denied them as to other sections. Pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United States and the private plaintiffs move this Court to enjoin pending appeal Alabama's enforcement of six ofthe sections ofH.B. 56 not enjoined by the district court. After review and briefing, we grant in part and deny in part the motions for injunctions pending appeal.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 2, 2011, the Alabama Legislature approved H.B. 56, and Governor Robert Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law on June 9, 2011. The majority of the provisions in H.B. 56 were set to become effective on September 1, 2011. A. United States' Lawsuit Seeking to permanently enjoin enforcement of certain provisions ofH.B. 56, the United States sued the State of Alabama, Governor Robert J. Bentley in his official capacity, the National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc., and the American Unity Legal Defense Fund. The United States argued, inter alia, that Sections 10, 11(a), 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and 30 ofH.B. 56 were preempted under the Supremacy Clause and by federal law, principally the comprehensive registration scheme
3

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 4 of 16
embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et
The contents of the sections challenged by the United States are summarized
as follows:
Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document ifthe person is in violation of8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a),2 and the person is an alien unlawfully present in the United States." Section 1O(b) prohibits law enforcement officers from attempting to independently make a final determination ofwhether an alien is lawfully present in the United States and requires law enforcement to determine immigration status by seeking verification from the federal government under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).3
Section 11(a) makes it a misdemeanor crime for an unauthorized alien to apply for, solicit, or perform work.
Section 12 requires a law enforcement officer-upon ·making "any lawful stop, detention, or arrest" in the enforcement ofstate or local law and upon reasonable suspicion that person stopped, detained, or arrested is unlawfully present in the United States-to make a reasonable attempt, "when practicable," to determine the citizenship and
2Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card; failure to carry the registration card is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $100, imprisonment of no more than 30 days, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e). Section 1306(a) states that an alien's willful failure to apply for registration and to be fingerprinted is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000, imprisonment of no longer than six months, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). ·
3Pursuant to§ 1373(c), "The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information." 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
4

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 5 of 16
immigration status of the person stopped, detained, or arrested, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. A person is presumed not to be an alien who is unlawfully present if the alien presents a valid driver's license, a valid Alabama nondriver identification card, an unexpired, government-issued identification bearing a photograph or other biometric identifier, a tribal identification card, or a foreign passport with an unexpired visa. A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national origin in implementing this section. Section 12(b) requires law enforcement, within 24 hours of arresting an alien, to verify with the federal government the immigration status ofthe arrestee. Ifthe federal verification "is delayed beyond the time that the alien would otherwise be released from custody, the alien shall be released from custody."
Section 13 makes it unlawful for a person to (1) conceal, harbor, or shield an alien unlawfully present in the United States, or attempt or conspire to do so; (2) encourage an unlawful alien to come to the State of Alabama; or (3) transport (or attempt or conspire to transport) an unlawful alien.
Section 16 forbids employers from claiming as business tax deductions any wages paid to an unauthorized alien.
Section 17 establishes a civil cause of action against an employer who fails to hire or discharges a U.S. citizen or an alien who is authorized to work while hiring or retaining an unauthorized alien.
Section 18 amends Ala. Code 32-6-9 to include a provision that if a person is arrested for driving without a license, and the officer is unable to determine by any other· means that the person has a valid driver's license, the officer shall transport the arrested person to the nearest magistrate; a reasonable effort must be made to determine the citizenship ofthe arrested person, and iffound to be unlawfully present in the United States, the arrested person shall be considered a flight risk and must be detained until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.
5

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 6 of 16
Section 27 bars Alabama courts from enforcing a contract to which a person who is unlawfully present in the United States is a party, if the party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States at the time the contract was entered into. This section does not apply to contracts for lodging for one night, contracts for the purchase of food, contracts for medical services, contracts for transportation for an alien to return to his or her country of origin, or any "contract authorized by federal law." In court proceedings, the determination ofwhether an alien is unlawfully present in the United States shall be made by the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
Section 28 requires every public elementary and secondary school in Alabama, "at the time ofenrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school," to determine ifthe student "was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child" of an unlawfully present alien and qualifies for assignment to an English as second language class or other remedial program. Section 28(a)(2) provides that, in making the above determination, the school "shall rely upon presentation ofthe student's original birth certificate, or a certified copy thereof." Section 28 also requires the school or district to compile the data required by the Section and to submit the data to the State Board of Education, which must submit a public report to the legislature. However, Section 28(e) and (f) proscribe public disclosure of information obtained under the section that personally identifies a student (except for purposes permitted by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1371 and 1644), and the student enjoys a right to privacy and a civil remedy for any public disclosure of such information. Any person intending to make a public disclosure of information that is classified as confidential under this section, on the ground that such disclosure constitutes a use permitted by federal law, shall first apply to the Attorney General and receive a waiver of confidentiality from the requirements of Section 28(e).
Section 30 makes it a felony for an alien. not lawfully present in the United States to enter into or attempt to enter into a "business transaction" with the State of Alabama or any political subdivision thereof. Section 30(a) defines a "business transaction" to include
6

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 7 of 16
applying for or renewing a license plate, driver's license, nondriver identification card, or business license. However~ "business transaction" does not include applying for a marriage license. The state and any political subdivision thereof may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section except to the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution or the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
B. Private Plaintiffs' Lawsuit
In a separate lawsuit seeking to enjoin H.B. 56, the private plaintiffs sued not
only the State of Alabama and Governor Robert J. Bentley but also numerous other
state and local officials.4 The private plaintiffs argued that the entire act, and
particularly Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30, are invalid on numerous
constitutional and other grounds.5 But the private plaintiffs' only ground asserted for
4The private plaintiffs sued Robert Bentley, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, and Luther Strange, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alabama. They also named as defendants Joseph B. Morton, State Superintendent of Education and Freida Hill, Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, as well as six school superintendents: E. Casey Wardynski, Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System; Jamie Blair, Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System; Randy Fuller, Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System; Charles D. Warren, Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System; Barbara W. Thompson, Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School System; and Jeffery E. Langham, Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System. They also name R<?bert L. Broussard, District Attorney for Madison County. On September 16, 2011, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which substituted Larry E. Cravin, in his official capacity as Interim State Superintendent of Education, for Morton, who retired on August 31, 2011.
5In their complaint and in the district court, the private plaintiffs also argued that (I) Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) Sections 8, 10, and 12 (in addition to Section 28) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Sections 12, 18, 19, and 20 violate procedural due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) Sections 10, 12, 13, and 30 are vague and overbroad in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) Section 11 effects a content-based restriction on speech relating to work and is impermissibly vague in violation of the First
7

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 8 of 16
purposes oftheir motion for injunction pending appeal as to Sections 10, 12, 18, 27,
and 30 is that the entire act and those sections are preempted under the Supremacy
Clause and by federal law (primarily the INA but also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as to Section
27). The private plaintiffs' motion argues that Section 28 is not only preempted but
also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition to the sections of H.B. 56 challenged by the United States, the
private plaintiffs challenged these provisions of the act, which are summarized as
follows:
Section 8 prohibits an alien not lawfully present in the United States from enrolling in or attending any public post-secondary educational institution and requires any alien attending a public post-secondary educational institution to possess lawful pe~anent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa.
Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) state that verification of an alien's immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) is conclusive proofofthe alien's status and that a state court may consid~r only the federal verification i;n determining whether
Amendment; (6) Section 27 unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contracts by forbidding Alabama state courts from enforcing a contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in the United States; (7) Sections 10(e), 11 (e), and 13(h) violate the Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (8) Sections 27 and 30 violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by prohibiting unlawfully present aliens from making and enforcing contracts.
Because the private plaintiffs have requested an injunction pending appeal only as to Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 and based only on federal preemption as to those sections and on Equal Protection grounds as to Section 28, we have considered only those specific claims of the private plaintiffs.
8

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 9 of 16
an alien is lawfully present in the United States.6
Section 11 (f) and (g) make it unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle stopped on a street or roadway to attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location ifthe motor vehicle blocks or impedes traffic. Section 11 (f) applies to an occupant of a motor vehicle; Section 11 (g) applies to a person picked up by a motor vehicle blocking traffic.
Section 12(e) requires a state law enforcement agency to cooperate in the transfer of an unlawfully present alien to the custody of the federal government, if the federal government so requests.
Section 19 states that, if a person is charged with a crime for which bail is required or confined for any period in state, county, or municipal jail, law enforcement must make a reasonable effort to determine if the person is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.
Section 20 requires the state agency responsible for the incarceration of an unlawfully present alien convicted ofa violation ofstate or local law to notify U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and to assist in the coordination and transfer of the prisoner to the appropriate federal immigration authority.
C. Motions for Preliminary Injunction in the District Court
In the district court, the United States moved for a preliminary injunction of
Sections 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and 30 ofH.B. 56. In the separate
lawsuit, the private plaintiffs moved the district court for a preliminary injunction
ofthe entire act or of Sections 8, 10(a), 10(e), 11(a), 11(e), 11(f), 11(g), 12(a) and
6The private plaintiffs argued that the last sentence of these subsections violated the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment by prohibiting an alien from offering any evidence in defense of an element of a criminal offense.
9

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 10 of 16
(e), 13, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, and 30. The parties proceeded by filing affidavits and briefs before the district court.
In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, the United States submitted, inter alia, eleven declarations, including: (1) the Declaration of William J. Bums, Deputy Secretary of State; and (2) the Declaration of Daniel H. Ragsdale, Executive Associate Director for Management and Administration at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The private plaintiffs submitted, among other documents: ( 1) the text of House Bill 56; (2) over forty declarations; and (3) an article entitled "Alabama Town Closely Watches New Immigration Law."
In response, the State of Alabama presented various documents, including: (1) a Pew Hispanic Center study entitled "Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 201 0"; (2) the affidavit of Henry M. Redden, the Director of Information Systems for the Alabama Department of Corrections; (3) a 2002 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on "Non-preemption of the authority of state and local law enforcement officials to arrest aliens for immigration violations"; (4) a study by the National Education Association entitled "Rankings of the States 2010 & Estimates of School Statistics 2011 "; (5) several declarations; and (6) two letters, including one written by State Superintendent of Education
10

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 11 of 16
Joseph B. Morton. On August 24, 2011, the district court held a full-day hearing on the
motions for a preliminary injunction. Although the district court heard the arguments of counsel, no witnesses testified at the hearing. No depositions have been filed. After the hearing but before the ruling, the private plaintiffs filed additional documents and declarations.
On August 29, 2011, the district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of H.B. 56 until September 29, 2011. However, the court noted that the temporary injunction issued solely to allow more time to consider the various challenges to H.B. 56 and was not addressing the merits of the motions for a preliminary injunction.
Subsequently, in a 115-page opinion dated September 28, 20 11, the district court granted the United States' motion in part and enjoined enforcement of Sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17. The district court denied a preliminary injunction with respect to Sections 10, 12(a), 27, 28, and 30.
In a separate 106-page order also dated September 28, 20 11, the district court granted the private plaintiffs' motion in part and enjoined Sections 8, 10(e),
11

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 12 of 16
11(e), 11{f), and 11(g).7 The district court denied a preliminary injunction with ·respect to Sections 10(a), 12(a) and (e), 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, and 30.
By virtue of the expiration of the temporary injunction, H.B. 56, including the unenjoined Sections 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, and 30, went into effect on September 29, 20 11. The private plaintiffs filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on September 29, 2011, and the United States filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on September 30, 2011. In the district court, both the United States and the private plaintiffs moved for an injunction pending their appeal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction on Sections 10(a), 12(a), 18, 27, 28, and 30. On October 5, 2011, the district court denied the motions for an injunction pending appeal. D. Motions for Injunction Pending Appeal
On October 7, 20 11, both the United States and the private plaintiffs filed the present motions for injunctions pending appeal, but only as to Sections 1O(a), 12(a), 18, 27, 28, and 30.8 They also asked this Court to expedite consideration of
7ln the private plaintiffs' lawsuit, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot with respect to Sections 11(a) and 13 because the district court enjoined enforcement of these sections in the United States' lawsuit.
81n the district court, the private plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction as to Sections 19 and 20, but the private plaintiffs did not move for an injunction pending appeal as to these Sections. Nor do the private plaintiffs move in· this Court for an injunction pending appeal as to Sections 19 and 20.
12

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 13 of 16
the underlying appeals. On October 7, 2011, this Court immediately expedited briefing of, and oral argument on, the merits of the underlying appeal as to the denial of the preliminary injunctions of enforcement ofH.B. 56. (See Order dated October 7, 2011). This order addresses only the parties' motions for an injunction pending appeal.9
III. STANDARD FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL We grant the "extraordinary remedy" of an injunction pending appeal only if the petitioners can show: "(1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) a substantial risk of irreparable injury to the intervenors unless the injunction is granted; (3) no substantial harm to other interested persons; and (4) no harm to the public interest." Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130, 1132 {lith Cir. 2000) (en bane). "A substantial likelihood of success on the merits requires a showing of only likely or probable, rather than certain, success." Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). "Failure to show any of the four factors is fatal, and the most common failure is not showing a substantial likelihood of
91n this appeal, the United States, the private plaintiffs, or the State of Alabama also filed a few additional declarations, documents, and newspaper articles. While the motions panel has considered everything, we leave it to the merits panel to sort out what is properly considered as evidence on appeal.
13

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 14 of 16
success on the merits." Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009). Further, "preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments-because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits-must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts." Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).
IV. DISCUSSION Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties' briefs and the district court's orders and opinions, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the United States' and the private plaintiffs' motions for injunction pending appeal. We conclude that the United States and the private plaintiffs have met their burden as to all four requirements for an injunction pending appeal as to Section 10 and we therefore ENJOIN the State of Alabama's enforcement of Section 10 pending appeal and until further order by the merits panel. We also conclude that the United States has met its burden as to all four requirements for an injunction pending appeal as to Section 28 and we therefore
14

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 15 of 16
ENJOIN the State of Alabama's enforcement of Section 28 pending appeal and until further order by the merits panel. The private plaintiffs' motion for injunction pending appeal is DENIED AS MOOT as to Section 28, and thus we need not reach the standing issues.
The United States' and the private plaintiffs' motions for injunction pending appeal are DENIED as to Sections 12, 18, 27, and 30.10
Our decision does not bind the merits panel, which will consider the case after full briefing and oral argument. See 11th Cir. R. 27-1(g) ("A ruling on a motion or other interlocutory matter, whether entered by a single judge or a panel, is not binding upon the panel to which the appeal is assigned on the merits, and the merits panel may alter, amend, or vacate it.").
MOTIONS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
10The United States' "Motion for Temporary Injunction Pending Full Consideration" of the motions for injunction pending appeal is DENIED AS MOOT.
15

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 16 of 16
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that Sections 10 and 28 should be enjoined and that Sections 27 and
30 should not be enjoined. However, I would find that the United States and the private plaintiffs have met the requirements for an injunction pending appeal as to Sections 12 and 18.
16

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 1 of 6

John Ley Clerk ofCourt

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUIWING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
October 14, 2011

For rules and fonns visit www.call.uscourts.gov

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 11-14532-CC I 11-14535-CC Case Style: USA v. State of Alabama, et al District Court Docket No: 2:11-cv-02746-SLB

The following action has been taken in the referenced case: The enclosed order has been ENTERED. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Brenda F. Wiegmann, CC (dhh) Phone#: (404) 335-6174

MOT-2 Notice of Court Action

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 2 of 6
11-14532-CC /11-14535-CC
Recipients: 11-14532-CC
Abate. Michael P.. Albin. Ramona C.. Blacksher. James U.. Brinkmann. Beth S.. Chilakamarri. Varu. Davis. James W.. Escalona. Prim F.. Fairbanks. Misty S.. Fleming. Mar2aret L.. Gespass. David. Harris. Sharon. Clerk of Court Krishna, Praveen S.. Martin. Julie A..Neiman. John Cowles. Jr.• Orrick. William H.. Ill.Park. John J.• Jr.. Parker. William Glenn. Jr.• Payne. Joshua Kerry. Perez-Vargas. Miguel A.. Reeves. C. Lee. II. Schoen. David 1., Sinclair. Winfield J.. Stem. Mark B.. Still. Edward. Tenny. Daniel. Vance. Joyce White.Wilkenfeld. Joshua, Williams Stephen W.. Zall. Barnaby W.. -

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 3 of 6
Recipients: 11-14535-CC l.
Artrip. Eric J.. Badrinath. Vikram. Bauer. Mary Catherine. Blacksher. James U.. Broder. Tanya. • Brooke. Samuel J.. Brooks. J. R.. Brooks. Taylor P.. Bruner. Ben Elton. Cheer. Shiu-Ming. Crook. Jamie L.. Dane. Stephen M.. Davis. James W.. • Desormeau. Katherine. Escalona. Prim F.. Fairbanks. Mistv S.. Fleming, Margaret L.. Gardner. J. Cecil. • Gelemt, Lee. Gespass. David. Gillespie. Katherine Anne, Gomez. Martha, Harris. Sharon. Clerk of Court Jadwat, Omar C.. Joaquin. Linton. Karo. Jessica Devlin. Keaney. Melissa S.. Lapointe. Michelle R.. Ling, Sin Yen. Maer. Foster. McKinney. Rebekah Keith. -

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 4 of 6
Mittal. Vivek. Mukherjee. Elora, Neal, Allison Eichenfeld, Neiman. John Cowles. Jr.. Newman. Chris, Oshiro. Erin Emi. Park. John J.. Jr., Parker, William Glenn, Jr.. Payne, Joshua Kerrv.Pedersen. Amy, Perales. Nina, Perez-Vargas. Miguel A..Rice, Roger L.. Rubio. Sigfredo.Schoen. David 1.. Schwarz. Ghita R.. Segura. Andre 1.. Sen. Diana. Simpson. Michael D.. Sinclair. Winfield J.. Spears. George Brian. Spina, Thomas J.. Still. Edward. Strange. Luther J.. III. Sugarman. Kenneth John. Sweeney. Donald B.. Jr.. Tan. Michael Kt. Tedrow. Klari B.. Tsu. Naomi R.. Tumlin. Karen C.. Turner. Andrew Hess. Viramontes, Victor G.. Wang. Cecillia D.• -

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 5 of 6
Watson. Hennan. Jr.• Werner. Daniel. Zall, Barnaby W.• -

Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 10/14/2011 Page: 6 of 6
Number of labels printed:84 Inadequate addresses in database:

 
 No. 11-14535
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ROBERT BENTLEY, et al., Defendants-Appellees
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB
APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF

Mary Bauer Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200

Cecillia D. Wang Kenneth J. Sugarman Katherine Desormeau AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900

Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Andre I. Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660
Kristi L. Graunke Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700

Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282
Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201-0835
Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney ACLU OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: (205) 443-7858

Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300

Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133

Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINO JUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. Park View Street, Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785
Allison Neal (ASB 3377-I72N) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery Street, Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203

Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The undersigned attorney for Appellants hereby certifies, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1, that the following have an interest in the outcome of this case: AIDS Action Coalition, Plaintiff/Appellant Alabama Appleseed, Plaintiff/Appellant Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence (ACADV), Amicus Curiae Alabama Council on Human Relations, Amicus Curiae Alabama Education Association (AEA), Amicus Curiae Alabama Fair Housing Center et al., Amici Curiae Alabama New South Coalition, Amicus Curiae Alabama NOW, Amicus Curiae Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), Amicus Curiae Alianza Latina en contra de la Agresión Sexual (ALAS), Amicus Curiae American Friends Service Committee, Amicus Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, Amicus Curiae Argentine Republic, Amicus Curiae
C 1 of 14

Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Artrip, Eric J., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Arte Sana, Amicus Curiae Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Amicus Curiae Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, Amicus Curiae ASISTA Immigration Assistance, Amicus Curiae Abutryn, Russell R., Counsel for Amicus Curiae AILA Badrinath, Vikram K., Counsel for Amicus Curiae AILA Barber, Robert, Plaintiff/Appellant Barr, Mark R., Counsel for Amicus Curiae AILA Bauer Tedrow, Klari, Counsel for Amici Curiae ACADV et al. Barkey, David L., Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League Bauer, Mary, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Beck, Jeff, Plaintiff/Appellant Benach, Andres, Counsel for Amicus Curiae AILA Bensinger, Deborah, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League Bentley, Robert, Governor of the State of Alabama, Defendant/Appellee Birmingham Peace Project, Amicus Curiae Black Romero, Juan Pablo, Plaintiff/Appellant Blackburn, Sharon L., U.S. District Judge
C 2 of 14

Blacksher, James U., Counsel for Amici Curiae Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, et al.
Blair, Jamie, Superintendent of the Vestavia Hills City School System, Defendant/Appellee
Boat People SOS, Plaintiff/Appellant Broder, Tanya, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Break the Chain Campaign, Amicus Curiae Brooke, Samuel, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Brooks, J.R., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Brooks, Taylor P., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Broussard, Robert L., District Attorney for Madison County, Defendant/Appellee Bruner, Ben, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Bui, Thy B., Counsel for Amici Curiae ACADV et al. California Women’s Law Center, Amicus Curiae Casa de Esperanza (Minnesota), Amicus Curiae Casa de Maryland, Inc., Amicus Curiae Ceja Zamora, Maria D., Plaintiff/Appellant Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Amicus Curiae Central American Resource Center, Amicus Curiae Cheer, Shiu-Ming, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
C 3 of 14

Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation (CAASE), Amicus Curiae Clark, Christopher, Counsel for Amici Curiae United States of Mexico et al. Coalition of Labor Union Women, Amicus Curiae Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking (CAST), Amicus Curiae Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., Amicus Curiae Counsel of Mexican Federations in North America/Consejo de Federaciones
Mexicanas en Norteamericana, Amicus Curiae Craven, Larry E., Interim State Superintendent of Education, Defendant/Appellee Crook, Jamie L., Counsel for Amici Curiae Central Alabama Fair
Housing Center et al. Cummings, Michelle, Plaintiff/Appellant Dane, Stephen M., Counsel for Amici Curiae Central Alabama Fair Housing
Center et al. Davis, James W., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Desormeau, Katherine, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Dominican American National Roundtable, Amicus Curiae The Dominican Republic, Amicus Curiae DreamActivist.org, Plaintiff/Appellant Escalona, Prim F., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
C 4 of 14

Equality Alabama, Amicus Curiae Fairbanks, Misty, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Fair Housing Center of North Alabama, Amicus Curiae Family Values @ Work Consortium, Amicus Curiae Fleming, Margaret L., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund, Amicus Curiae Federative Republic of Brazil, Amicus Curiae Freeman, Steven M., Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League Fuller, Randy, Superintendent of the Shelby County Public School System,
Defendant/Appellee Gardner, J. Cecil, Counsel for Amici Curiae AEA et al. Gehring Flores, Gaela K., Counsel for Amici Curiae NAACP et al. Gelernt, Lee, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Gespass, David, Counsel for Amici Curiae NAACP et al. Gillespie, Katherine A., Counsel for Amici Curiae Central Alabama
Fair Housing Center et al. Gomez, Martha L., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Gorniak, Carla, Counsel for Amici Curiae United States of Mexico et al. Graunke, Kristi L., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
C 5 of 14

Greater Birmingham Ministries, Plaintiff/Appellant Haile, Esayas, Plaintiff/Appellant Hall, Christopher P., Counsel for Amicus Curiae NACDL Hawaii State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Hill, Frieda, Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, Defendant/Appellee Hispanic Association of Colleges & Universities, Amicus Curiae Hispanic College Fund, Amicus Curiae Hispanic Federation, Amicus Curiae Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, Plaintiff/Appellant Huntsville International Help Center, Plaintiff/Appellant Immigration Equality, Amicus Curiae Interpreters and Translators Association of Alabama, Plaintiff/Appellant Iowa Coalition Against Sexual Assault (Iowa CASA), Amicus Curiae Jadwat, Omar C., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Jane Doe # 1, Plaintiff/Appellant Jane Doe # 2, Plaintiff/Appellant Jane Doe # 3, Plaintiff/Appellant Jane Doe # 4, Plaintiff/Appellant Jane Doe # 5, Plaintiff/Appellant Jane Doe # 6, Plaintiff/Appellant
C 6 of 14

Jimmerson, Ellin, Plaintiff/Appellant Joaquin, Linton, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants John Doe # 1, Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe # 2, Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe # 3, Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe # 4, Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe # 5, Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe # 6, Plaintiff/Appellant Karp, Jessica, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Keaney, Melissa S., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Kelly, Nancy, Amicus Curiae Kentucky Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Amicus Curiae Langham, Jefferey E., Superintendent of the Elmore County Public School System,
Defendant/Appellee Lapointe, Michelle R., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Amicus Curiae Legal Momentum, Amicus Curiae League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Amicus Curiae Ling, Sin Yen, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Long, Pamela, Plaintiff/Appellant
C 7 of 14

Maer, Foster S., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants McKinney, Rebekah Keith, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants McMahan, Michael P., Counsel for Amicus Curiae NACDL Molina García, Bonard I., Counsel for Amici Curiae NAACP et al. The Montgomery Improvement Association, Amicus Curiae Mukherjee, Elora, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Multicultural Education, Training & Advocacy, Inc., Amicus Curiae The National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, Amicus Curiae National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, Amicus Curiae National Association for Chicana and Chicano Studies, Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), Amicus Curiae The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, Amicus
Curiae National Association of Social Workers and the Alabama Chapter of NASW,
Amicus Curiae National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae National Council of Jewish Women, Amicus Curiae National Council of La Raza, Amicus Curiae The National Dominican American Council, Amicus Curiae National Education Association (NEA), Amicus Curiae
C 8 of 14

National Employment Law Project, Amicus Curiae The National Fair Housing Alliance, Amicus Curiae National Guestworker Alliance, Amicus Curiae The National Immigration Law Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Amicus
Curiae National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health; National Women’s Law Center
Amicus Curiae National Lawyers Guild, Amicus Curiae Neal, Allison, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Neiman, Jr., John C., Solicitor General of Alabama, Counsel for
Defendants/Appellees Nevada Network Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae New Mexico Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs, Inc., Amicus Curiae The New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, Amicus Curiae Newman, Chris, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Oakes, Brian, Counsel for Amici Curiae AEA et al. O’Brien, Alice, Counsel for Amici Curiae AEA et al. Oshiro, Erin E., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Parker, Jr., William G., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Payne, Joshua Kerry, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
C 9 of 14

Pedersen, Amy, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Perales, Nina, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Perez-Vargas, Miguel A., Counsel for Amici Curiae Hispanic Association of
Colleges and Universities et al. Plurinational State of Bolivia, Amicus Curiae Raksha, Amicus Curiae Republic of Chile, Amicus Curiae Republic of Colombia, Amicus Curiae Republic of Costa Rica, Amicus Curiae Republic of Ecuador, Amicus Curiae Republic of El Salvador, Amicus Curiae Republic of Guatemala, Amicus Curiae Republic of Honduras, Amicus Curiae Republic of Nicaragua, Amicus Curiae Republic of Paraguay, Amicus Curiae Republic of Peru, Amicus Curiae Republic of Uruguay, Amicus Curiae Rice, Roger, Counsel for Amici Curiae Hispanic Association of Colleges and
Universities et al. Rubio, Freddy, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
C 10 of 14

Samuel, Don, Counsel for Amicus Curiae NACDL Sheinburg, Steven C., Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation
League Schwartz, Dale M., Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League Schwarz, Ghita, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Schwartz, Robert A., Counsel for Amici Curiae NAACP et al. Segura, Andre, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Sen, Diana S., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Service Employees International Union, Plaintiff/Appellant Shin, Susan L., Counsel for Amici Curiae NAACP et al. Schoen, David I., Counsel for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League Sikh American Legal Defense & Education Fund, Amicus Curiae Simpson, Michael D., Counsel for Amici Curiae AEA et al. Sinclair, Winfield J., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Smith, Deborah S., Counsel for Amicus Curiae AILA Solano, Henry L. Counsel for Amici Curiae United States of Mexico et al. Society of American Law Teachers, Amicus Curiae South Alabama Center for Fair Housing, Amicus Curiae South Asian Americans Leading Together, Amicus Curiae Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Amicus Curiae
C 11 of 14

Southern Coalition for Social Justice, Amicus Curiae Southern Regional Joint Board of Workers United, Plaintiffs/Appellants Spears, G. Brian, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Spina, Thomas J., Counsel for Amicus Curiae NACDL Strange, Luther, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Defendant/Appellee
and Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Steven P. Rice, Counsel for Amicus Curiae ACADV et al. Still, Edward, Counsel for Amicus Curiae United States of Mexico et al. Sugarman, Kenneth J., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Sweeney, Donald B, Jr., Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Tan, Michael K. T., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Tesfamariam, Fiseha, Plaintiff/Appellant Thau, Christopher Barton, Plaintiffs/Appellants Thompson, Barbara W., Superintendent of the Montgomery County Public School,
System Defendant/Appellee Tsu, Naomi, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Tumlin, Karen C., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants United Food and Commercial Workers (International), Plaintiff/Appellant United Food and Commercial Workers (Local), Plaintiff/Appellant The United States Hispanic Leadership Institute, Amicus Curiae
C 12 of 14

United States of México, Amicus Curiae University of Cincinnati College of Law Domestic Violence and Civil Protection
Order Clinic, Amicus Curiae Upton, Daniel, Plaintiff/Appellant Victim Rights Law Center, Amicus Curiae Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, Amicus Curiae Viramontes, Victor, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Voces de La Frontera, Amicus Curiae Wang, Cecillia D., Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Warkynski, E. Casey, Superintendent of the Huntsville City School System,
Defendant/Appellee Warren, Charles D., Superintendent of the DeKalb County Public School System,
Defendant/Appellee Watson, Jr., Herman, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Washington Empowered Against Violence (WEAVE), Amicus Curiae Webster, Matt, Plaintiff/Appellant Werner, Daniel, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Amicus Curiae
C 13 of 14

9 to 5, National Association of Working Women, Amicus Curiae The undersigned attorney further certifies, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26.1, that Plaintiffs/Appellants have no parent corporations and that no corporation directly or indirectly holds 10% or more of the ownership interest in any of the Appellants.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Michelle R. Lapointe Michelle Lapointe Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
C 14 of 14

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Oral argument is appropriate because it will assist the Court’s understanding of the issues presented in this appeal. See Fed. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS...............................................C 1 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................i TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................iv TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF....................................ix INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................4 STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................9 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...............................................................................9 CONTROLLING LEGAL STANDARDS...........................................................10
Preliminary Injunction Standard........................................................................10 Preemption Standards .........................................................................................11 ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................13 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO
SUCCEED ON THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST SECTIONS 10, 12, AND 18....................................................................................................13 A. Section 10 Is Preempted By Federal Law...............................................13 1. Section 10 Is an Impermissible Regulation of Immigration ....................14 2. Section 10 Intrudes in a Field Occupied Exclusively by
Congress ...................................................................................................15
ii

3. Section 10 Is Preempted Because It Conflicts with Federal Immigration Laws ....................................................................................20
B. Section 12 Is Preempted by Federal Law ...............................................24 1. Section 12 Conflicts with Federal Law ....................................................25 2. Section 12 Intrudes in a Field Exclusively Occupied by Congress ...................................................................................................32 3. Section 12 Is an Impermissible State Regulation of Immigration ...........33
C. Section 18 Is Preempted By Federal Law...............................................34 D. Sections 10, 12, and 18 Together Constitute an Impermissible
Regulation of Immigration.......................................................................36 II. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO
SUCCEED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 27 IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.........................................................38 III. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 30 IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.........................................................41 IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 28 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ............................................................................. 44 A. The District Court Erred in Holding that Plaintiffs Lacked
Standing To Challenge Section 28 ...........................................................47 B. Section 28 Is Preempted by Federal Law ...............................................52 C. Section 28 Violates the Equal Protection Clause ...................................54 V. PLAINTIFFS MET THEIR BURDEN ON THE EQUITABLE
FACTORS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ..............................64 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 68
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).............................................................................................................. 18-19
Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) .........................9 Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 121 S. Ct. 1012
(2001) .................................................................................................................... 19 Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) ..............67, 68 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980) ......................................................53 Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994) ..................................65 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988)..............................................57 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) ............... 47-49 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S. Ct. 2288
(2000)........................................................................................................12, 18, 19 Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d
1167 (11th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................9 De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) .........................................52 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976)......................................passim Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978) ..........................................60 n.17 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) .................12, 32, 33 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 1210
(1963) .................................................................................................................... 12 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (“GLAHR”), No. 11-
CV-1804, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011), appeal pending, No. 11-13044 ..................................................................................passim Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) .................................................................................................................... 12 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 344 (1971) .............................................. 41-42, 55 Haswannee v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 471 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2006) .............................31
iv

Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982) .................................................................................................................... 49
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985)......................................31 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941) ..................................passim Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1986).................... 16-17 Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) ........................67 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995) .......................................................................................37, 53, 54 Lee v. Eufaula City Bd. of Ed., 573 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1978) .................................50 Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001).............................................. 57-59 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011)......................... 14, 39-40, 42 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, (1992) ..................47 McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)..........................11 NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008) ............................................47 Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000)............................................................................68 Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283 (11th
Cir. 1991)..............................................................................................................50 North Dakota ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515, 30 S. Ct. 179
(1910) .................................................................................................................... 18 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977) ...........................................55 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) .......................................passim Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 106 S. Ct. 2234 (1986) .......................................57 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 936
(1999) .................................................................................................................... 31 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976) .........................................53 Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985)..........................51 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102 S. Ct. 2977 (1982)................................................40 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct.
309 (1950).............................................................................................................31
v

United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) ..............................................................................................................passim
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) .........................................................................passim
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) ........................22 United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1992)......................................64 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp.
2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10- 10751 (5th Cir. July 28, 2010) ................................................................................................passim Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981).....................................48 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)......................................28 Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986) .........................................................................19 Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) .......................................31
Federal Statutes and Regulations
8 C.F.R. § 264.1 .......................................................................................... 15, 22 n.4 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)...............................................................................................55 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) ...................................................................................................30 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)...............................................................................................21 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10).............................................................................................25 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) ...................................................................................................30 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) .....................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) ...................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1158 ........................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1201 ........................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1226 ........................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1227 ........................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1229a ......................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) .................................................................................................20
vi

8 U.S.C. § 1231 ........................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1252c ......................................................................................................26 8 U.S.C. § 1254a ......................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1302 ........................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1303 ........................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1304 ........................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) ................................................................................ 13, 15, 18, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1306 ........................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) ...................................................................................... 13, 18, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1306(c) ...................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1306(d) ...................................................................................................15 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) ............................................................................................ 16, 26 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) .................................................................................................16 8 U.S.C. § 1326 ........................................................................................................26 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) ...................................................................................................30 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) ...................................................................................... 16, 25, 31 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)....................................................................................... 27-28 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) ...................................................................................................27 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2)...............................................................................................54 28 U.S.C. § 1292........................................................................................................2 28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................................................................................2
State Statutes Ala. Code § 32-6-9...................................................................................................34 Ala. Code § 32-6-9(d) ........................................................................................ 34-35
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Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ..................................................................................55 U.S. CONST. ART. VI, cl. 2................................................................................. 11-12
Other Authorities
“Dear Colleague” Letter, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., May 6, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerletter.pdf ............. 59, n.16
Ala. Dep’t of Educ., State Enrollment by Sex and Race, School Year 2009-2010, available at http://www.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx............................. 61, n.18
Consolidated Approp. Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007) .............................................................................. 22 n.3, 31
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing Approp. Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008) ................................. 22 n.3, 31
David White, Alabama Legislative Panel Delays Voting on Illegal Immigration Bill, The Birmingham News, Mar. 3, 2011, available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/03/ alabama_legislative_panel_dela.html............................................................. 62-63
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)......................... 53-54
Samuel King, Sheriffs’ Association, Dept. of Justice To Meet Concerning Immigration Law, WSFA.com, June 24, 2011, available at http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=14974594 ................................... 5, n.1
U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights of All Children to Enroll in School, available at http://www2.ed.gov/ about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201101.pdf ................................ .59, n.16
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Follow-up Review of the Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0501/final.pdf ............................. 21, n.2
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TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF

Brief Page # passim 1, 7 7, 8 7
7, 8, 39, 41, 47-49, 52 8
22
22 n.4
24
29 29 29 29

Act 2011-535 / H.B. 56 (“HB56”)
First Amended Complaint
District Court Docket
Docket sheet from consolidated case United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532, No. 11-2746 (N.D. Ala.)
District Court Memorandum of Law (granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction)
District Court Order (granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction)
Bureau of Justice Services Statistics (attached as Ex. L to Smith-Gross Decl.)
Declaration of Bo Cooper, filed in Friendly House v. Whiting, No. 10-CV-1061 (D. Ariz. filed June 21, 2010) (attached as Ex. D to Smith-Gross Decl.)
Declaration of Michael Aytes, filed in United States v. Arizona, 10-CV-1413 (D. Ariz. filed July 7, 2010)
Sheriff Todd Entrekin Declaration
Sheriff Mike Hale Declaration
George Gascón Declaration
Eduardo Gonzalez Declaration

Doc # / Vol. Tab
III 131-1 III 131
I B IV C
IV 137
IV 138
II 37-43 (Ex. L)
II 37-42 (Ex. D)
II 37-42 (Ex. C)
II 37-37 II 37-38 II 37-39 II 37-40

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Brief Page # 29, 36 n.6
29
40, 66 42, 66 42, 43 n.12, 66
42, 43 n.12, 66
42, 43 n.12, 66
42, 43 n.12, 66
42
42, 43 n.12
42, 43 n.12, 66

Daniel H. Ragsdale Declaration, filed in United States v. Alabama
William M. Griffen Declaration, filed in United States v. Alabama
Evangeline Limón Declaration
Dominique Nong Declaration
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Water Department, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Waste Control and Recycling, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Director of Building Inspection, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Director of Public Works, Alabama Act 2011535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)
Montgomery Probate Office – Immigration Flyer
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Probate Judge, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)
Madison County Attorney Memorandum to Director of Animal Control, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011)

Doc # / Vol. Tab IV 2-2 IV 2-7 IV 143-6 IV 143-4 IV D
IV E
IV F
IV G
IV 143-5 IV H
IV I

x

Brief Page #
43, 43 n.12
46, 50
48
48
48
48
49, 50 n.13, 51, 65 n.20
49, 50 n.13, 51, 65 n.20
49, 50 n.13, 51, 52, 65 n.20
49, 50 n.13, 52, 65 n.20
50 n.13, 51, 65 n.20, 67

Madison County Attorney Memorandum to License Director, Alabama Act 2011-535, The “Immigration Act” (Oct. 26, 2011) Joseph Morton Memorandum Isabel Rubio July 6, 2011 (“Rubio I”) Declaration John Pickens July 11, 2011 (“Pickens I”) Declaration John Pickens Aug. 13, 2011 (“Pickens II”) Declaration Isabel Rubio Aug. 15, 2011 (“Rubio II”) Declaration Jane Doe #1 Declaration
Jane Doe #4 Declaration
Jane Doe #6 Declaration
John Doe #2 Declaration
Jane Doe #2 Declaration

Doc # / Vol. Tab IV J
II 82-3 I 37-2 I 37-6 II 109-2 II 109-3 I 37-25
I 37-28
I 37-30
I 37-32
I 37-26

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Brief Page # 50 n.13, 52 50 n.13, 65 n.20, 67 50 n.13, 51, 65 n.20 61 n.18
61
63
65 n.20 65 n.20 65 n.23 67 67 67 67

Jane Doe #3 Declaration Jane Doe #5 Declaration

Doc # / Vol. Tab
I 37-27
I 37-29

John Doe #1 Declaration

I 37-31

Tony Miller Declaration, filed in United States v. Alabama
Letter of Secretary Napolitano to Senator Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011)
Brian Lyman, Immigration Law Makes School Officials Uneasy, The Montgomery Advertiser, June 8, 2011
John Doe #3 Declaration
John Doe #4 Declaration
Maria Ceja Zamora Declaration
Robert Barber Declaration
Daniel Upton Declaration
Jeffrey Beck Declaration
Michelle Cummings Declaration

IV 2-3
II 113-1
II 37-43 (Ex. M)
I 37-33 I 37-34 I 37-14 I 37-19 I 37-20 I 37-21 I 37-22

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INTRODUCTION This case challenges the constitutional of Alabama Act 2011-535 (commonly known as “HB56”) (Vol. III, R. 131-1), a comprehensive state immigration law that was designed, in the words of its House sponsor, to “attack[] every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life…so they will deport themselves” and to implement an Alabama state immigration policy of enforcement through attrition. First Am. Compl. ¶ 167 (Vol. III, R. 131). HB56 has fulfilled its sponsor’s purpose, leading to a civil rights crisis in the State of Alabama for U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants as well as undocumented immigrants. This chaos has been caused largely through Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 of HB56, which turn state and local officers into a roving immigration patrol, impose draconian criminal and civil disabilities as a penalty for immigration violations, and require public school officials to investigate and to report the immigration status and nationality of schoolchildren. These state laws are preempted because they impermissibly attempt to regulate immigration, intrude in areas that Congress has occupied exclusively through the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and directly conflict with provisions in the INA. Section 28, which chills the long-established right of children to attend public elementary and secondary schools regardless of their immigration status, also violates the Equal Protection Clause. In rejecting the
1

merits of these constitutional claims, the district court broke from settled precedents and the decisions of other federal courts that have considered similar state laws.
HB56 effectively banishes people who are deemed to be undocumented immigrants by the State—depriving them of housing, water, and electricity; closing the schoolhouse doors to children; and rendering countless human beings non-persons in the eyes of Alabama law. To reach its erroneous decision, the district court ignored ample evidence that these sections of HB56 will cause irreparable harm to countless individuals—including not just undocumented immigrants but also U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants who will be forced to prove their status—and to our societal interest in the enforcement of fundamental constitutional principles. The district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction against Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 should be reversed.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1. Whether federal law preempts Section 10 of HB56, which makes it a crime under Alabama law to be an undocumented immigrant not in compliance with federal alien registration laws.
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2. Whether federal law preempts Section 12 of HB56, which turns every state and local officer into a de facto immigration agent by requiring investigation of immigration status during any stop, arrest, or detention, when “reasonable suspicion exists that the [subject] is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States.”
3. Whether federal law preempts Section 18 of HB56, which amends Alabama’s driving-without-a-license criminal statute to require investigation of immigration status and, in the event that the suspect is determined to be “unlawfully present in the United States,” requiring detention “until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities,” regardless of whether there is any independent state-law justification for custody.
4. Whether Sections 10, 12, and 18 of HB56 together constitute an impermissible state regulation of immigration.
5. Whether federal law preempts Section 27 of HB56, which prohibits Alabama state courts from enforcing contracts (with narrow enumerated exceptions) when a party had knowledge that another party was an undocumented immigrant at the time the contract was formed.
6. Whether federal law preempts Section 30 of HB56, which makes it an Alabama state crime for certain non-citizens to enter into or attempt to enter into any transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state (with a single
3

exception of a marriage license), or for third parties to enter into or attempt to enter into such a transaction on non-citizens’ behalf.
7. Whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 28 of HB56, which chills the right of children in immigrant families to a public education by requiring schools to determine and to report to state officials whether a child or her parents were born outside the United States or are aliens “not lawfully present in the United States.”
8. Whether federal law preempts Section 28 of HB56. 9. Whether Section 28 of HB56 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it burdens and deters certain citizens’ and noncitizens’ attendance at Alabama’s public schools. 10. Whether the district court erred in failing even to consider the equitable factors that weighed strongly in favor of a preliminary injunction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE On June 9, 2011, Governor Bentley signed HB56 into law. HB56 supplants federal authority over immigration enforcement by creating a comprehensive statelaw scheme to investigate, arrest, detain, and punish alleged undocumented immigrants with the purpose and effect of driving them out of the State of
4

Alabama. HB56 (Vol. III, R. 131-1). During the signing, Governor Bentley proclaimed that HB56 is “the strongest immigration bill in the country.”1
Even in a field of proliferating state immigration laws, HB56 has unprecedented impact on constitutional rights. It turns local and state law enforcement officers into a roving immigration patrol by requiring immigration status checks upon “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is unlawfully present in the United States, HB56 § 12, and it requires immigration detention by state and local officers even when there is no state-law basis for custody, § 18. It creates new state criminal offenses that include immigration status as an element, including: being an alien present in Alabama without an alien registration document, § 10; the solicitation of work by undocumented immigrants and day laborers, § 11; harboring, transporting, or renting to an undocumented immigrant, or encouraging one to reside in Alabama § 13; virtually any attempt by an undocumented immigrant to engage in a transaction with the state or local government entities, § 30; and any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of these crimes, § 25.
HB56 also imposes severe civil disabilities on undocumented immigrants in order to drive them out of Alabama. It renders contracts unenforceable if the
1 Samuel King, Sheriffs’ Association, Dept. of Justice To Meet Concerning Immigration Law, WSFA.com, June 24, 2011, available at http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=14974594.
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parties to the contract knew or should have known that one of them was undocumented. § 27. It prohibits various categories of aliens, including refugees and asylees, those granted Temporary Protected Status because of dangerous conditions in their home countries, and undocumented individuals, from enrolling in any public college or university. § 8. And it creates an immigration verification and reporting scheme mandatory for all children enrolling in public K-12 schools, as well as their parents. § 28.
The law further mandates full enforcement of the provisions of HB56, and also of federal immigration law, by state personnel and entities, including all officers of the court. Failure to comply can result in financial penalties, civil lawsuits against individuals, and individual criminal liability for any state employee who fails to report violations. §§ 5, 6.
The majority of HB56’s provisions were scheduled to go into effect on September 1, 2011. § 34.
Plaintiffs—12 organizations and 24 individuals—brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to challenge the law on July 8, 2011 (Vol. I, R. B Doc. 1), suing the Governor, Attorney General, State Superintendent of Education, and Chancellor of Postsecondary Education (collectively, “the State Defendants”), as well as county and city officials. The State Defendants moved for a more definite statement, (Vol. I, R. B, Doc. 36), and
6

Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on September 16, 2011. (Vol. III, R. 131.)
Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against HB56 in its entirety on July 21, 2011. (Vol. I, R. B, Doc. 37.) Shortly thereafter, the United States also filed a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, challenging Sections 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and 30 of HB56. (Vol. IV, R. C, Doc. 2.) The cases (along with a third one brought by Alabama church leaders) were consolidated for hearing on the preliminary injunction motions on August 24, 2011. (Vol. I, R. B, Doc. 59.)
The district court temporarily enjoined the entire law on August 29, 2011, to permit more time for consideration of the arguments presented (Vol. I, R. B., Doc. 126), and then issued separate orders and opinions in the instant action and United States v. Alabama on September 28, 2011. United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011); HICA Opinion (hereinafter “Opinion”) (Vol. IV, R. 137). The district court enjoined the following provisions:
• Section 8, which bars certain non-citizens from postsecondary institutions in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Opinion at 3644 (Vol. IV, R. 137));
• Section 11(a), which prohibits the solicitation of work by undocumented immigrants in violation of the Supremacy Clause (Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *19-27);
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• Sections 11(f) and (g), which prohibit the solicitation of work by day laborers in violation of the First Amendment (Opinion at 61-70 (Vol. IV, R. 137));
• Section 13, which criminalizes harboring, transporting, or renting a home to an undocumented immigrant, or encouraging or inducing one to enter or reside in Alabama, in violation of the Supremacy Clause (Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *38-45);
• Section 16, which denies a tax deduction for business expenses related to employing unauthorized workers in violation of the Supremacy Clause (Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *46-48);
• Section 17, which creates a cause of action for private citizens to sue employers employing unauthorized workers in violation of the Supremacy Clause (Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *48-52); and
• The final sentence of Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h), which limit the types of evidence that may be used as proof of immigration status, in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause (Opinion at 50-53, 56 (Vol. IV, R. 137)).
The remaining portions of Plaintiffs’ and the United States’ motions for
preliminary injunction were denied, and the provisions of HB56 that were not
enjoined went into effect, (Vol. IV, R. 138; Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, *60),
with the exception of a few provisions with a later effective date.
In both the instant case and United States v. Alabama, the plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal. (Vol. I, R. B., Docs. 139, 149.) Both sets of appellants moved
the district court for an order enjoining Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 pending
appeal. (Vol. I, R. B, Doc. 140). The district court denied these requests on
October 5, 2011. (Vol. I, R. B, Doc. 147.) Plaintiffs and the United States then
8

moved this Court for the same relief, and by order entered October 14, 2011, this Court enjoined Sections 10 (state alien registration criminal offense) and 28 (concerning immigration status checks and reporting in connection with enrollment in K-12 public schools) pending the outcome of this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW An order denying a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002). Underlying legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. Related findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1171 (11th Cir. 2002).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 of HB56. Sections 10, 12, and 18 individually and collectively are impermissible regulations of immigration in that they require state officers to investigate and detain people solely on suspicion of civil immigration law violations, and thus also intrude on a field exclusively occupied by a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. Those three Sections also conflict directly with Congress’s decision,
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through the enactment of four specific provisions in the INA, to limit strictly the participation of state/local officers in immigration enforcement.
Sections 27 and 30 also are preempted by federal law. They are impermissible state regulations of immigration as they impose draconian criminal and civil penalties on undocumented immigrants in order to drive them out of the state. Sections 27 and 30 thus attempt to set the conditions under which noncitizens may remain (or not) in Alabama.
Section 28 is unconstitutional on two grounds. It violates the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court erred in holding that no Plaintiff has standing to challenge Section 28.
Finally, the district court erred in failing even to consider any factor other than the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, including the ample evidence that Plaintiffs and others will suffer irreparable harm under these sections of HB56 and that the public interest will be served by preserving the status quo while these serious constitutional questions are resolved.
CONTROLLING LEGAL STANDARDS Preliminary Injunction Standard
A moving party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if they demonstrate that (1) they are substantially likely to prevail on the merits; (2) they will suffer irreparable injury without a preliminary injunction; (3) those threatened injuries
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outweigh any harms the non-moving party would suffer if the injunction were to issue; and (4) an injunction is not adverse to the public interest. McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Preemption Standards
Immigration laws are subject to a particular preemption analysis. In DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976), the Supreme Court held because “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” a state “regulation of immigration” is “per se preempted by this constitutional power.” Id. at 354-55, 96 S. Ct. at 936. A “regulation of immigration” is a law that is “essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” Id. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936. The exclusive federal power to regulate immigration is preemptive of state law regardless of whether or not it has been exercised by the federal government. Id. at 355-56, 96 S. Ct. 936-37.
But even when a state law cannot be characterized as a “regulation of immigration,” it may nonetheless be preempted under more general preemption standards. Even when Congress has not expressly prohibited states from regulating, a state law may be subject to implied preemption. First, “there are situations in which state regulation, although harmonious with federal regulation, must nevertheless be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause,” U.S. CONST. ART.
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VI, cl. 2. Id. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 937. Such “field” preemption occurs where “‘the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion’” than that federal regulation should be “‘deemed preemptive of state regulatory power,’” id. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 937 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217 (1963)), or where the complete ouster of state power to regulate was Congress’s clear and manifest purpose, id. at 356-57, 96 S. Ct. at 936-37. Whether Congress intended to occupy a field may be inferred a pervasive federal regulatory scheme or when there is a dominant federal interest. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990).
Second, state regulation is preempted when it conflicts with federal law. A state law conflicts with federal law when it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 (2000). The touchstone for preemption is congressional intent. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70, 61 S. Ct. 399, 406 (1941).
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ARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON
THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST SECTIONS 10, 12, AND 18 A. Section 10 Is Preempted By Federal Law The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their preemption claim against Section 10 of HB56. Section 10 makes it a crime under Alabama law to “willful[ly] fail[] to complete or carry an alien registration document.” The elements of the offense are that the defendant be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States” and “in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a),” which are federal statutes that impose certain requirements on non-citizens to register with the federal government and to carry registration documents. Section 10 imposes state criminal liability “[i]n addition to any violation of federal law” (emphasis added). Section 10 is preempted because it is an impermissible regulation of immigration, intrudes into areas exclusively occupied by Congress, and conflicts with federal law. The district court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs’ preemption challenge, breaking from the well-reasoned rulings of both the Arizona district court and the Ninth Circuit in considering a virtually identical provision of Arizona law. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998-99 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339, 355-57 (9th Cir. 2011).
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1. Section 10 Is an Impermissible Regulation of Immigration The district court erred in holding that Section 10 is not an impermissible regulation of immigration. By their very nature, requirements like those imposed by Section 10—i.e., that non-citizens register with the government, carry their registration papers, and produce their registration papers on demand—constitute a regulation of immigration. Section 10 imposes conditions on presence in the United States, effectively criminalizes undocumented presence, and thus effectively determines which non-citizens can live in Alabama. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55, 96 S. Ct. at 936; see Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (local housing ordinance was preempted because it was an “attempt[] to regulate residence based solely on immigration status,” and “[d]eciding which aliens may live in the United States has always been the prerogative of the federal government”); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10- 10751 (5th Cir. July 28, 2010) (holding that local housing ordinance is an “invalid regulation of immigration”); see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 59-60, 65-66, 61 S. Ct. 400-01, 403-04 (requiring aliens to carry registration papers, and produce them to public officials whenever demanded, implicates the welfare and tranquility of all the states, and
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raises questions in the fields of international affairs and naturalization entrusted to Congress).
2. Section 10 Intrudes in a Field Occupied Exclusively by Congress
Section 10 is also preempted because it intrudes in fields fully occupied by federal law. The registration and classification of non-citizens is a field under exclusive federal control. As the Supreme Court recognized long ago, “the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67, 61 S. Ct. at 404. The federal registration scheme is “a single integrated and all-embracing system” through which Congress “plainly manifested a purpose to do so in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system[.]” Id. at 74, 61 S. Ct. at 408.
That “comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration” governs everything from which non-citizens must register and when, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1302-03; 8 C.F.R. § 264.1, to the content of those registration forms, see 8 U.S.C. § 1304, to when registrants must report changes of address, see § 1305, penalties for failing to register, see § 1306, penalties for failing to carry registration documents, see § 1304(e), and penalties for fraudulent statements and counterfeiting, see §§ 1306(c)-(d). See also Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355; Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941,
15

at *12 (acknowledging that “[t]he current federal registration system…creates a comprehensive scheme for alien registration.”).
The INA’s registration provisions contain no saving clauses or other indications that Congress intended for states to have a role in supplementing this comprehensive federal scheme, while in other contexts, Congress has explicitly permitted such state regulation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (states may sanction employers for the knowing employment of “unauthorized aliens” through state licensing laws). Nor is there any indication that Congress intended for state or local officers to have any role in enforcing the federal alien registration laws; to the contrary, Congress has omitted such provisions while elsewhere specifying the limited circumstances in which state and local officers may act. See §§ 1324(c) (authorizing law enforcement officers to make arrests for offenses under federal anti-harboring statute), 1357(g) (delimiting circumstances in which state and local officers may perform functions of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, Congress knew how to make room for states to act in the INA when it wished, and it chose not to do so in the field of alien registration. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355. Preemptive intent is therefore implied, for the federal statutory scheme is “sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation.” Int’l Paper Co. v.
16

Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491, 107 S. Ct. 805, 811 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 73, 61 S. Ct. at 407 (registration of aliens is “a matter of national moment”).
States cannot step into this federally occupied field and add legislation such as Section 10. “When the national government by…statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the…statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such…statute[.]” Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63, 61 S. Ct. at 402. The district court fundamentally departed from this settled law when it held that section 10 is “not inconsistent” with federal law, Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941 at *14 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), on the grounds that its standard is borrowed from the federal registration statutes. Id. This was error.
As Hines made clear, even complementary state laws are preempted when Congress has occupied the field: “[S]tates cannot…curtail or complement[] the federal law” if doing so would “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66– 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404 (emphasis added); Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355-56 (holding that Arizona law similar to Section 10 “plainly stands in opposition to…[this] Supreme Court[] direction); see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63, 61 S. Ct. at 402 (states may not “add to…the force and effect” of the federal scheme). Thus, even outside the
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area of immigration with its special constitutional status as an area of federal control, the Supreme Court has struck down state laws that seek to ensure compliance with federal law by imposing state-law penalties for failure to do so. Cf. North Dakota ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515, 524, 30 S. Ct. 179, 182 (1910) (state law imposing requirements on businesses based on their having paid a special federal tax was repugnant to the Constitution because it impermissibly burdened the federal government’s taxing power).
Section 10 flies in the face of the rule that when Congress has occupied a field, a state may not enact even an identical criminal offense. As the Supreme Court explained in Crosby, “conflict is imminent when two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity,” even if those remedies “share the same goals.” 530 U.S. at 379-80 (internal citation omitted). By enacting the federal criminal statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a), Congress has determined that it is federal prosecutors who should determine when to pursue penalties against an alien who has failed to register, and federal courts that should impose penalties. Because Congress left it to the Executive Branch to calibrate the proper penalty, state prosecutors and courts may not impose penalties under state law where the federal government has chosen not to do so, or impose additional penalties when the federal government has. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 42125, 427, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2390-92 (2003) (where Constitution vested authority in
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President, states may not interfere with delicate balance effected by federal action); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-7, 120 S. Ct. at 2294-96; Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349-51, 121 S. Ct. 1012, 1018-19 (2001) (federal agency’s “flexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework under which [it] pursues difficult (and often competing) objectives”); Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286-88, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1061-62 (1986) (invalidating a state statute that imposed additional sanction on companies that violated federal law); Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (“a local regulation may not—though it may share a common goal with federal law—interfere with Congress’s chosen methods”).
In asserting that Section 10 represents merely an exercise of “dual sovereignty,” as in other criminal areas such as drugs or firearms, Defendants are simply assuming the conclusion they seek to establish and ignoring the fundamental question—whether the field is preempted. If the field of alien registration is intended by Congress to be exclusively occupied by federal law, and it is, Alabama cannot incorporate federal law as its own and add its own enforcement and penalty scheme. In legislating against drugs and firearms, Congress does not act in an area constitutionally committed to the federal government and has not expressed any intent to occupy the field. The registration of aliens is an entirely different matter.
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Section 10 also intrudes into another field exclusively occupied by federal law—the status and treatment of aliens who do not have authorization to be in the United States, including provisions relating to grounds for removability, investigations, arrests, detention and release, penalties, removal, and grounds on which relief from removal may be granted. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 (provisions pertaining to arrest and detention), 1227 (grounds for deportability), 1229a (exclusive removal power vested in federal immigration judges), 1231 (detention of persons after order of removal is issued). By imposing a state-law criminal penalty on individuals whom the state deems to be unlawfully present in the United States and in violation of alien registration requirements, Section 10 intrudes in this area of exclusive federal control.
3. Section 10 Is Preempted Because It Conflicts with Federal Immigration Laws
Section 10 is also preempted because it directly conflicts with federal immigration law in multiple ways. First, Section 10 conflicts with federal laws that permit an undocumented person to acquire lawful status or temporary permission to remain. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a) (adjustment of status due to marriage to a U.S. citizen); § 1158 (asylum); § 1254a (Temporary Protected Status); § 1229b(b) (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for nonpermanent residents). Although Section 10(d) provides that the law does not apply to a person “who maintains authorization from the federal government to be
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present in the United States,” this does not avoid the conflict with federal law.
Under Section 10, an individual may be prosecuted by state authorities and incarcerated, only later to be granted relief by the federal government.2 When
federal authorities investigate violations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a), they
may take such matters into account and elect not to prosecute in the exercise of
their congressionally delegated discretion. State authorities have no such power or
competency in the full range of immigration penalties and provisions for relief.
Thus, Section 10 conflicts with Congress’s enforcement scheme, which
delegates to the U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security,
and other federal Executive Branch officials “the administration and enforcement
of this chapter”—including the alien registration provisions—“and all other laws
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
Decisions about whom to prosecute for registration violations are committed to the
Executive Branch, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is one of the
2 Though Section 10 purports to rely upon federal determinations of immigration status, HB56 § 10(b), such federal determinations are merely a snapshot of an individual’s status at some point prior to the status check. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Follow-up Review of the Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration, at 41 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0501/final.pdf (warning that DHS “databases cannot be relied upon accurately to determine immigration status because immigration status is dynamic” and that database entries may be outdated). They are not designed to determine whether an individual is eligible for relief from removal, and the ICE agents who provide such determinations are not authorized to make such decisions.
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executive’s most basic functions. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
464, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996).
Indeed, Congress has repeatedly directed the Executive Branch to set
priorities for the enforcement of immigration laws, and to focus prosecutorial efforts on individuals with “serious criminal convictions.”3 Registration violations,
in contrast, have been de-prioritized under this authority granted by Congress, and
are rarely prosecuted. See Bureau of Justice Services Statistics (Vol. II, R. 37-43 (Ex. L)) (showing only 30 such prosecutions in 15 years).4 Section 10 disrupts the
balance Congress has struck and frustrates the purpose of delegating authority and
discretion in the enforcement of the federal registration statutes to Executive
Branch agencies. Cf. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (“GLAHR”),
No. 11-CV-1804, 2011 WL 2520752, *13 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011), appeal
pending, No. 11-13044 (11th Cir.) (state alien harboring statute enjoined as
preempted because it removed prosecutorial decisions from federal government
3 See, e.g., Consolidated Approp. Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2050 (2007) (designating $200 million for use in “identify[ing] aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who may be deportable, and remov[ing] them from the United States once they are judged deportable”); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Approp. Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659 (2008) (appropriating $150 million to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime.”). 4 The federal registration statutes rely on a regulatory list of registration documents, 8 C.F.R. § 264.1, that the federal government has chosen not to update for years. See Bo Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 27, 28 (Vol. II, R. 37-42 (Ex. D)).
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control, thereby undermining Congress’s intent); Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (holding that virtually identical Arizona law “stands as an obstacle to the uniform, federal registration scheme and is therefore an impermissible attempt by Arizona to regulate alien registration”) (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 399).
In addition, Section 10 conflicts with Congress’s decision to strictly limit the circumstances in which state and local law enforcement officers or employees may perform the functions of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens. See infra at (I)(B)(1). Section 10 attempts an end-run around Congress’s scheme for federal control of immigration enforcement by directing all state and local law enforcement officers to investigate potential immigration violations and to punish violations of federal registration rules. It thereby “impair[s] the federal superintendence of the field covered by the INA,” and is preempted. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The conflicts between Section 10 and the INA are particularly offensive to established constitutional principles because many foreign nationals who reside in the United States with the permission or knowledge of the United States do not possess or have readily available documentation that is acceptable under HB56. These foreign nationals include those with explicit permission to remain under congressionally created categories, such as those with deferred action, travelers
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covered under the Visa Waiver Program, individuals with Temporary Protected Status, those who have applied for visas as victims of crimes (such as Plaintiff Jane Doe #2), and those who are here through the Family Unity Program (such as Plaintiff Zamora). See Michael Aytes Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21 (Vol. II, R. 37-42 (Ex. C)). Subjecting these immigrants, whom the federal government is not attempting to prosecute or remove, to state criminal prosecution conflicts with the federal government’s enforcement discretion and its ability to mediate among the various objectives of the INA.
For all the foregoing reasons, Section 10 is preempted by federal law. B. Section 12 Is Preempted by Federal Law The district court also erred as a matter of law in holding that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in their challenge to Section 12 of HB56, which unconstitutionally mandates that state and local officers inject immigration enforcement into traffic stops and other routine police encounters throughout the State of Alabama. Section 12 requires all state and local law enforcement officers, in a broad range of circumstances, to investigate the immigration status of persons whom they stop, detain, or arrest; to detain them pending verification of their immigration status (for up to 24 hours in the case of any “alien” arrested and booked into custody); and to further detain those “aliens” determined to be “unlawfully present” in order to facilitate their transfer to federal custody, if the
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federal government so requests. See HB56 §§ 12(a), (b), (e). Other courts have enjoined similar state immigration laws in Arizona and Georgia on preemption grounds. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348-55; GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752, *9-11. The district court below erred as a matter of law in breaking from those wellreasoned decisions.
1. Section 12 Conflicts with Federal Law Section 12(a) is preempted because it conflicts with the INA. In requiring local and state officers in Alabama to check immigration status during any stop, detention, or arrest, Section 12(a) conflicts with Congress’s scheme for the limited participation of state and local law enforcement officers in the enforcement of our nation’s immigration laws. Congress has provided for four specific circumstances in which state or local officers may aid in the enforcement of federal immigration laws: 1) 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10): The Attorney General of the United States may
authorize “any State or local enforcement officer” to enforce immigration laws upon certification of “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens.” 2) 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g): The federal government may enter into written agreements with state or local agencies, permitting designated officers to take specified actions to enforce immigration law, under the training and “subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.”
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3) 8 U.S.C. § 1252c: To enforce the federal statute criminalizing illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326), state and local officers may arrest “an alien illegally present in the United States” who has a previous felony conviction and who was deported or left the United States after that conviction, but only if the federal government confirms the individual’s status as such, and may detain the individual only for the limited time necessary for federal authorities to take custody.
4) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c): Congress provided that “any officer whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws” may make arrests for violations of the federal statute criminalizing the illicit smuggling, harboring, and transportation of aliens.
By enacting these provisions and no others, Congress deliberately chose to limit state and local officers’ participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws to specific and narrow circumstances.
Section 12 far exceeds these specific and narrow circumstances, broadly charging all state and local officers in the state of Alabama with immigration law enforcement authority and enacting a shadow, state law enforcement scheme involving investigations, document requirements, arrests, detentions, and transfers to federal custody. This regulatory scheme is contrary to Congress’s intent as expressed in the INA. If Congress had not intended to foreclose such state
26

regulation, there would have been no need to enact any of the four federal provisions setting out precisely when state and local officers may engage in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.
In the face of Congress’s clear statement as to how and when state and local officers may participate in the enforcement of the INA, the district court relied erroneously on two other federal provisions, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10) and 1373(c). Both sections contemplate that state and local officers will “communicate” with the federal government (§ 1357(g)(10)) and request information about individuals’ immigration status (§ 1373(c)).5 And Section 1357(g)(10) also contemplates that state and local agencies might, absent a written agreement and the other specific requirements of Section 1357(g)(1) through (9), “otherwise…cooperate with the Attorney General” in enforcement activities. But if such “cooperation” meant freeranging state and local agency immigration enforcement activities as required by Section 12(a), there would have been no need for Congress to enact the four statutes that expressly authorize state and local immigration enforcement activities. The district court, like the dissenting judge in Arizona, ignores those four statutes
5 The district court places great weight on 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)’s requirement that the federal government “shall respond” to inquiries from state and local officers. But Section 1373(c) merely requires the sharing of information and contains no provision for arrest and detention by local officers. If the district court’s reading of Section 1373(c) were correct, then the four specific provisions limiting state and local participation would be nugatory. Nothing in Section 1373(c) remotely suggests that Congress intended to broaden state and local authority so radically.
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and unreasonably interprets 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10) as a broad grant of authority to state and local governments to enact their own state immigration enforcement schemes even when not in “cooperat[ion] with the Attorney General.” The district court’s reading of § 1357(g)(10) turns the first nine subsections of § 1357(g) into surplusage, and thus violates a “cardinal principle” of statutory interpretation. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000) (statute should be construed to “give effect, if possible, to every clause”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Apart from directly conflicting with Congress’s intent, Section 12 also more generally “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” regarding federal immigration enforcement. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404. The district court erroneously adopted the Defendants’ characterization of Section 12(a) as merely requiring state and local officers to inform the federal government of an “illegally present” immigrant and then leave further action up to the federal government. See Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *37. In fact, Section 12(a) does not merely contemplate communication, requests for information, or “cooperation” with federal authorities. By its plain terms, it requires state and local officers conducting stops to determine whether there is “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful presence in the United States. HB56 § 12(a). If there is such “reasonable suspicion,” the subject will be detained
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pending the outcome of an investigation into immigration status. Sheriff Todd Entrekin Decl. ¶ 13 (Vol. II, R. 37-37); Sheriff Mike Hale Decl. ¶ 4 (Vol. II, R. 3738); Eduardo Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 18 (Vol. II, R. 37-39); George Gascón Decl. ¶ 15 (Vol. II, R. 37-40).
Section 12 does not assist in federal immigration enforcement; it interferes with it. Like criminal laws, the immigration laws necessarily entail discretion in enforcement because violations far outstrip prosecutorial capacity. The federal immigration system, as designed by Congress, cannot coexist with state laws like Section 12(a). Federal immigration authorities do not seek out unlawful immigrants through street patrols and other activities generally carried out by state and local law enforcement agencies because such an enforcement practice would overwhelm a system designed to function in a far more targeted way. See Daniel Ragsdale Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 40 (Vol. IV, R. 2-2). This problem is compounded by the number of states that have attempted to pass laws like Section 12(a). See GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752, *10. By flooding the federal immigration system indiscriminately with status requests, Section 12(a) interferes with the federal government’s ability to detain and deport those non-citizens who pose a threat to public safety or national security. See Ragsdale Decl. ¶¶ 31-32, 36-38 (Vol. IV, R. 2-2); William Griffen Decl. ¶ 28 (Vol. IV, R. 2-7). It thus “impair[s] the federal
29

superintendence of the field covered by the INA,” and is preempted. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Contrary to the district court’s holding (and the dissenting opinion in United States v. Arizona, on which it relies), Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *32 (quoting 641 F.3d at 371-82 (Bea, J., dissenting)), consideration of these federal immigration enforcement priorities is fully consistent with preemption doctrine. Congressional intent is indeed the touchstone of preemption analysis. But this rule requires the opposite result from that reached by the district court. Federal priorities matter in this case because that is what Congress dictated when it enacted the federal statutes that govern immigration regulation and enforcement.
Congress charged the Secretary of Homeland Security with the administration and enforcement of the INA and all other laws relating to immigration and naturalization of aliens, except those conferred upon the President, the Attorney General, and the Department of State. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Congress charged the Attorney General with the responsibility for the administrative court system that applies the INA. § 1103(g). Congress also charged the Attorney General with the authority to issue regulations on detention and administrative immigration proceedings. Id. Congress specifically granted the power to interrogate and arrest for immigration violations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, § 1357(a), and carved out an exceptionally narrow role for
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state and local agencies to participate under the supervision of the Attorney General, § 1357(g). And Congress approves of the exercise of that delegated power on a yearly basis, through appropriations to the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Consolidated Approp. Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing Approp. Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008). Indeed, this Court has recognized that Congress vested the Executive Branch with prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of immigration laws. Haswannee v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 471 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92, 119 S. Ct. 936, 946-47 (1999)); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542, 70 S. Ct. 309, 312 (1950) (“When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent executive power.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). Thus, in determining whether a law creates obstacles to the accomplishment of congressional immigration objectives, courts must also
31

evaluate whether the state law presents obstacles to the Executive Branch’s scheme for achieving such goals.
Because it interferes with this complex and comprehensive congressional scheme for immigration enforcement, Section 12(a) is preempted.
2. Section 12 Intrudes in a Field Exclusively Occupied by Congress
Section 12(a) is also preempted because it intrudes in an area that Congress intends to be exclusively regulated by federal law. As set forth above, Congress has enacted a comprehensive federal scheme to address aliens who do not have authorization to be in the United States—a matter intrinsically and constitutionally committed to the federal government. Under federal law, persons who are unlawfully in the United States are thus not subject to automatic arrest and detention. Rather, as set forth above, Congress has vested the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General with the discretion to pursue removal or other penalties, or not.
In enacting the INA with its comprehensive system for defining the legal status of non-citizens and imposing consequences on lack of legal status, Congress has established “a scheme of federal regulation…so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S. Ct. at 2275 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in particular, Congress further signaled its intent to occupy this field by
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strictly limiting state participation to specific, narrow circumstances by statute. See supra at (I)(B)(1). In this field, “the federal interest [e.g., the interest in immigration and foreign relations] is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S. Ct. at 2275 (internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, Congress’s intent to have the field of unauthorized presence in the United States be exclusively occupied by federal law must be inferred.
Section 12 impermissibly intrudes on this field by regulating in the area of investigating, arresting, and detaining non-citizens for being present in the United States without lawful authorization.
3. Section 12 Is an Impermissible State Regulation of Immigration
Finally, Section 12 of HB56 is preempted because it is an impermissible state regulation of immigration. Section 12 places special burdens on non-citizens to prove the lawfulness of their presence, determines that certain non-citizens should not be permitted to remain in the United States because they are not “lawfully present” at the particular time of their stop or arrest, and attempts to funnel such persons into removal proceedings. This scheme is an impermissible state regulation of immigration. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936 (regulation of immigration includes determining who should or should not be admitted into the country). See also Hines, 312 U.S. at 66, 61 S. Ct. at 403.
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For the foregoing reasons, Section 12 is preempted by federal law and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
C. Section 18 Is Preempted By Federal Law The district court also erred in rejecting Plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin Section 18(d), which confers broad immigration enforcement authority on state and local officers and requires state and local officers to detain individuals solely for immigration enforcement purposes. Like Section 12, Section 18 impermissibly regulates immigration, intrudes in areas Congress has reserved to the federal government, and conflicts with Congress’s intent. Section 18 amends Alabama’s substantive criminal offense of driving without a license, Ala. Code § 32-6-9 (1975). Under Section 18 of HB56, Section 32-6-9(b) now provides that if a person arrested for driving without a license and the arresting officer is “unable to determine by any other means that the person has a valid driver’s license,” the person shall be transported to a magistrate. Section 32-6-9(c) requires officers to make a “reasonable effort…to determine the citizenship of [the arrestee]” and if he is “an alien,” then to verify status with the federal government. Under Section 18, Alabama Code § 32-6-9(d) now provides that “[a] verification inquiry, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), shall be made within 48 hours to [federal immigration authorities]. If the person is determined to be an alien unlawfully present in the United States, the person shall be considered a
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flight risk and shall be detained until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.”
Section 18 requires state and local officers to determine, at least in the first instance, who is an alien unlawfully present in the United States, and to detain individuals solely for immigration purposes. Under Section 32-6-9(d) of the Code of Alabama, a person who is arrested but whose case the county declines to prosecute may continue to be held for 48 hours before an officer even submits a request for immigration status verification to the federal authorities. During that entire period of detention, where no state charges have been filed, there is no basis other than suspicion of an immigration violation (including merely a civil violation) for continued custody.
In addition, Alabama Code § 32-6-9(d) requires state and local officers to “detain[] until prosecution or until [the person has been] handed over to federal immigration authorities.” Section 18 therefore requires detention regardless of whether the federal government requests continued detention. An individual who is arrested for driving without a license, whether prosecuted criminally or not, will be subject to immigration detention of indeterminate length under Alabama Code § 32-6-9(d). The Alabama statute is entirely inconsistent with the federal government’s immigration enforcement scheme, which permits ICE to exercise discretion in whether to detain or initiate removal proceedings and specifically
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limits the role of state/local officers in the enforcement of immigration laws. Under federal enforcement guidelines, ICE will likely not proceed against an undocumented immigrant who has been arrested for driving without a license but has no other criminal history, so that its limited enforcement resources may be used on individuals who pose a threat to public safety or national security.6 Thus, if ICE notifies the county jail officer that the detainee is without lawful status, the county is required under Section 18 of HB56 to continue custody, even after the person’s charges have been dropped, or after she has completed service of her sentence.
In short, Section 18 requires state and local officers to impose detention purely for immigration enforcement purposes, and without regard to federal law and the decisions of federal immigration officials. Like Section 12, which suffers the same constitutional defects, Section 18 is subject to field and conflict preemption and is also an impermissible regulation of immigration.
D. Sections 10, 12, and 18 Together Constitute an Impermissible Regulation of Immigration
As set forth above, Sections 10, 12, and 18 each constitute an impermissible state regulation of immigration, standing alone. But because the three statutes
6 See Ragsdale Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 (Vol. IV, R. 2-2) (instructing that immigrants with misdemeanors are low enforcement priorities and that ICE agents “should exercise particular discretion when dealing with minor traffic offenses such as driving without a license”).
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have the purpose and effect of operating in concert as part of a comprehensive state system for immigration enforcement, the Court should consider how they function together and with other provisions of HB56. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 771 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
Sections 10, 12, and 18 work in concert with other sections of HB56, including Sections 5, 6, and 19, as a comprehensive state system to detect, apprehend, detain, and punish undocumented immigrants and otherwise to impose consequences on being an unlawfully present alien. This comprehensive state-law system for immigration enforcement creates a state substantive criminal offense that includes immigration status as an element (Section 10), while simultaneously injecting immigration status investigation into traffic stops and other routine police interactions (Section 12), and requiring state jail officials to maintain custody even if there is no state-law basis for it (Sections 18, 19).7 At the same time, Section 6 of HB56 requires state and local officers to enforce these criminal provisions to the fullest extent of the law, or else face criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits.
7 Section 19 requires that “[w]hen a person is…confined for any period in a state, county, or municipal jail, …[and] is determined to be an alien unlawfully present in the United States, the person shall be considered a flight risk and shall be detained until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.” HB56 § 19. Thus, even if a state court would otherwise set bail, or even if statelaw charges have been dismissed or the person has been acquitted, custody will continue.
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Section 5 of HB56 similarly requires state and local officers to enforce federal immigration laws to the fullest extent of the law, on pain of the same penalties.
These provisions of HB56 work together to transform state and local officers in Alabama into a roving immigration patrol. This subjects countless individuals, such as Plaintiffs John Doe #1, #3, and #4 and Jane Doe #2, #4, and #5, to investigation for failure to carry alien registration documents (which the federal government may not even issue under current regulations, see supra at 22 n.4), detention pending an immigration status investigation, and arrest and then incarceration on a state immigration charge—even when federal immigration authorities would choose not to detain the individual. For example, a person who has overstayed a student visa and has been placed in removal proceedings but is pursuing an asylum application may have been released on bond by a federal immigration judge, but HB56’s criminal provisions subject her to arrest, detention, prosecution, and imprisonment under Alabama state law. This is a clear regulation of immigration and is unconstitutional. II. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON
THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 27 IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW Section 27 impermissibly imposes severe penalties on purported undocumented immigrants and regulates immigration by attempting to turn undocumented immigrants into non-persons in the eyes of the law, drastically
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altering the conditions under which certain immigrants can remain in Alabama, and attempting to drive undocumented immigrants out of the state. It prohibits Alabama courts from enforcing contracts between any party and “an alien unlawfully present in the United States, if the party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States at the time the contract was entered into….” HB56 § 27(a). The district court acknowledged the striking breadth of Section 27 by noting that it essentially “strips an unlawfullypresent alien of the capacity to contract except in certain circumstances….”8 Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *54. Nonetheless, the court rejected—without explanation—Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 27 is an impermissible regulation of immigration that fundamentally alters the conditions under which immigrants may remain in Alabama. See id.; see also Opinion at 91-92 (Vol. IV, R. 137).
The district court erred in failing to consider whether Section 27 makes living conditions for non-citizens in Alabama so difficult that it amounts to a regulation of their residence—that is, an impermissible regulation of immigration. Indeed, courts have found that ordinances that effectively restrict the ability of non-citizens to remain in the locality are preempted. See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 224 (striking down ordinance prohibiting rental of housing to undocumented 8 Contracts for “lodging for one night,” “the purchase of food to be consumed by the alien,” “medical services,” or “transportation…intended to facilitate the alien’s” deportation are exempted from this anti-enforcement provision. HB56 § 27(b).
39

immigrants because “th[e] power to effectively prohibit residency based on immigration status…is…clearly within the exclusive domain of the federal government”); Villas at Parkside Partners, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (striking down rental ordinance as unconstitutional regulation of immigration because it places a burden on the “‘entrance and residence of aliens’ that was never contemplated by Congress”) (quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12, 102 S. Ct. 2977, 2983 (1982)). Because it reaches virtually all contracts including rental agreements, Section 27 impermissibly regulates immigration by effectively altering the conditions under which non-citizens may live in Alabama.
Moreover, the impact of this provision will not be borne by undocumented immigrants alone. Section 27 imposes severe burdens on U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants, who will be forced to prove repeatedly to state officials and private contract parties that they are lawfully in the United States in order to enter into transactions including those affecting basic necessities like shelter. See Evangeline Limón Decl. ¶ 7 (Vol. IV, R. 143-6).
In summary, Section 27 is an impermissible regulation of immigration because it fundamentally restricts the residence of immigrants in the state.
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III. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 30 IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW Section 30 of HB56 imposes a wide range of criminal and civil disabilities
on individuals based on their purported lack of lawful immigration status, and thus fundamentally alters the conditions under which they can remain in Alabama. Section 30 requires immigrants to “demonstrate” their “lawful presence” whenever they enter into or attempt to engage in “any transaction” with the state or its political subdivisions, and makes any violation of the Section—including merely attempting to engage in a “business transaction”—a felony. HB56 §§ 30(a), (b), (d). The statutory term “business transactions” is deceptively broad, however—it encompasses “any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision,” with only one exception: marriage licenses. § 30(a) (emphasis added).
The district court erred in its ruling on Section 30 by failing to even address Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 30 is an impermissible regulation of immigration. See Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *59-60; see also Opinion at 105 (Vol. IV, R. 137). Section 30 is preempted under settled Supreme Court precedent striking down state laws that effectively impose restrictions on the “entrance and abode” of non-citizens. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1856 (1971) (state welfare laws that denied benefits to certain non-citizens were
41

constitutionally impermissible).9 See also Lozano, 620 F.3d at 224 (striking down
ordinance prohibiting rental of housing to undocumented immigrants); Villas at
Parkside Partners, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (same). Like these enjoined laws,
Section 30 attempts to classify non-citizens and, in the process, imposes burdens
on lawful immigrants. In doing so, Section 30 regulates the “conditions under
which a legal entrant may remain” and is therefore preempted. See DeCanas, 424
U.S. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936. In addition, Section 30 criminalizes undocumented
immigrants who merely attempt to access essential services, imposing a severe
penalty based solely on their immigration status and presence in the United
States—an area committed exclusively to the federal government.
By design and in practice, Section 30 reaches into every aspect of everyday
life for immigrants in Alabama, including, inter alia: water and sewage services (Vol. IV, RR. 143-4; D)10; sanitation, garbage, and recycling services (Vol. IV R.
E); housing and building occupancy licenses (Vol. IV R. F); obtaining a house
number (Vol. IV R. G); recording a document or engaging in any activity in a
probate office (Vol. IV RR. 143-5, H); obtaining an animal license (Vol. IV, R. I); 9 Though Graham involved a state law denying benefits to lawfully admitted noncitizens, its holding is not so limited. The “regulation of immigration” includes not only restrictions on lawfully admitted non-citizens but also those on undocumented immigrants and, necessarily, the drawing of lines between those categories. 10 The Volume Excerpts D to J in Volume IV are legal memoranda written by Madison County, Alabama, on October 26, 2011. They were written after this appeal was initiated, and therefore were not introduced in the district court. Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record is filed herewith.
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or any sort of business license or car tag (Vol. IV, R. J), among other publicly provided services. As a result, purported undocumented immigrants have been or will be blocked under Section 30 from obtaining essential services from public utilities (like water or power) and are moreover subject to criminal prosecution for attempting to do so. This is a direct regulation of immigration as it effectively expels immigrants from Alabama by depriving them of life’s necessities.
There can be no question that Section 30 directly targets undocumented immigration and is not a legitimate state regulation that only “indirect[ly]” touches upon immigration. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936. Indeed, the state has not identified a specific state or local interest addressed by Section 30 aside from a desire to drive immigrants out of the State of Alabama.
In addition, Section 30 is preempted as a regulation of immigration because state and municipal officials are required to make initial determinations of immigration status in enforcing it.11 State and local officials will inevitably make mistakes in determining whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States or even a non-citizen in the first place.12 This, in turn, will lead to
11 That Section 30(c) provides for state and local officials to rely upon the federal government to confirm immigration status does not save the statute. A state law that “uses those [federal] classifications for purposes not authorized or contemplated by federal law” is an impermissible regulation of immigration. See Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855. 12 For example, attached to the Madison County memoranda in Tabs D to J of Volume IV is a county-generated list of documents purporting to establish lawful
43

discriminatory burdens on “the entrance or residence” of non-citizens in Alabama, in direct contravention of Supreme Court precedent. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358, 96 S. Ct. at 938 (finding preempted “[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States”). IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON
THEIR CLAIM THAT SECTION 28 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL The district court also erred in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction against Section 28, which deters and burdens access to K-12 public education by requiring public schools to inquire into and report children’s and parents’ immigration status. Section 28 requires every public elementary and secondary school in Alabama to determine whether an enrolling student “was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States….” HB56 § 28(a)(1). Each child must produce a birth certificate. § 28(a)(2). “If, upon review of the student’s birth certificate, it is determined that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, or where such certificate is not available for any reason,” the family has 30 days to notify the
presence. There are various categories of lawfully present immigrants who would not possess one of these described documents. For example, a person granted Temporary Protected Status under federal law would not possess any of the listed documents.
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school of the student’s “actual citizenship or immigration status.” § 28(a)(3). They must do so by providing official documentation of the child’s status, or a declaration under penalty of perjury. § 28(a)(4). “If no such documentation or declaration is presented, the school official shall presume for the purposes of reporting under this section that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” § 28(a)(5). School districts must submit annual reports “listing all data obtained pursuant to this section” to the State Board of Education, § 28(c), and the State Board of Education, in turn, must submit annual aggregated reports to the Legislature. § 28(d).
Section 28(e) further authorizes school officials to report information obtained pursuant to this section to federal immigration authorities. While Section 28(e) merely authorizes disclosure, the remainder of HB56 makes such disclosure a requirement. Sections 5 and 6 forbid state and local agencies, including schools, from maintaining any “policy or practice” that “limits…communication between its officers and federal immigration officials,” or “that limits or restricts the enforcement of [HB56] to less than the full extent permitted by this act….” §§ 5(a), 6(a) (emphasis added). School officials must also “fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of federal law prohibiting the entry into, presence, or residence in the United States of aliens in violation of federal immigration law.” § 5(b) (emphasis added). Schools that limit
45

the sharing of information are subject to the loss of state funds and penalties of $1,000 to $5,000 for each day that the policy or practice is in effect. §§ 5(a), (d), 6(a), (d). Individual school officials who fail to report violations of these procedures are guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor. §§ 5(f), 6(f). Thus, HB56 effectively compels school officials to disclose the identities of students and their parents whom they believe to be unlawfully present.
After Section 28’s passage, the State Superintendent of Education issued new enrollment procedures. Under the Superintendent’s scheme, students newly enrolled in a “statewide student management system” will be coded as being enrolled either with or without a birth certificate. Morton Mem. (Vol. II, R. 82-3). This codification, however, is not actually based on the presence or absence of a birth certificate. Students will be coded as being “enrolled with a birth certificate” if they show either (a) that they were born in the United States, or (b) that they are U.S. citizens or lawfully present aliens. Id. All other students—including those who are undocumented, and those who are unable or unwilling to produce a requested document—will be coded as being enrolled “without a birth certificate.” Id. The Superintendent’s memorandum provides no other instruction on how schools should comply with the remainder of Section 28—including the requirement that schools must “determine whether the student…is the child of an alien not lawfully present,” § 28(a)(1), and the requirement that schools must
46

determine the specific immigration status of each student. See § 28(d)(2) (requiring that the State Board of Education’s annual report include “data, aggregated by public school, regarding the numbers of…lawfully present aliens by immigration classification…”) (emphasis added).
A. The District Court Erred in Holding that Plaintiffs Lacked Standing To Challenge Section 28
The district court erroneously held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge to Section 28. Opinion at 98-101 (Vol. IV, R. 137). This decision was in error. Article III requires plaintiffs to establish (1) an injury in fact which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;” and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs met this burden.
First, the Organizational Plaintiffs have standing because Defendants’ “‘illegal acts impair [their] ability to engage in [their] projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.’” Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008)). While all of the plaintiff organizations have established standing because Section 28 has impaired their ability to provide services, this Court need find only one plaintiff has standing.
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Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S. Ct. 205, 212 (1981). For brevity’s sake, Plaintiffs will focus on two, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (“HICA”) and Alabama Appleseed (“Appleseed”).
Both HICA and Appleseed have been unable to devote resources to their core missions because of overwhelming demand for information about HB56 and particularly Section 28. Isabel Rubio July 6, 2011 (“Rubio I”) Decl. ¶¶ 2, 15 (Vol. I, R. 37-2); Isabel Rubio Aug. 15, 2011 (“Rubio II”) Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7 (Vol. II. R. 109-3); John Pickens July 11, 2011 (“Pickens I”) Decl. ¶¶ 3, 11(a)-(c) (Vol. I, R. 37-6); John Pickens Aug. 13, 2011 (“Pickens II”) Decl. ¶¶ 2, 11-13 (Vol. II, R. 109-2). Despite this ample and undisputed evidence that HICA and Appleseed’s core organization missions have been impacted severely by HB56, the district court—discussing only HICA—found that organizational standing was lacking. The court reasoned that “the diversion of HICA resources alleged in this case is only time spent discussing Section 28,” which it considered insufficient to establish standing. Opinion at 101 (Vol. IV, R. 137) (emphasis in original). This is plainly reversible error.
Under settled Eleventh Circuit precedent, HICA and Appleseed more then met their burden to show standing. In Common Cause/Georgia, this Court held that the NAACP had standing to challenge Georgia’s voter identification law based on the direct harm to the organization: namely, that the Georgia law forced the
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NAACP to “divert resources from its regular activities to educate voters about the requirement of photo identification and assist voters in obtaining free identification cards.” 554 F.3d at 1350. See also Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1982) (organization suffers injury in fact where challenged practices perceptibly impair organization’s ability to provide services). The harm that HICA and Appleseed have alleged here is identical.
The district court also erred in holding that no individual Plaintiff had standing to challenge Section 28. The court reasoned that although Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1-6 and John Doe #2 have documented and undocumented children enrolled in school; although John Doe #1 is an undocumented student; and although Jane Doe #1, #2, #4-6, and John Doe #2 are all undocumented parents of public schoolchildren, each lacked standing because the State Superintendent has promised, in the course of this litigation, that Section 28’s enrollment procedures will not apply to any students who are already in school. Opinion at 98-99 (Vol. IV, R. 137); see Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶¶ 8-11 (Vol. I, R. 37-30); Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 11 (Vol. I. R. 37-25); Jane Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 5-8 (Vol. I, R. 37-28); John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, 13 (Vol. I, R. 37-32). This conclusion was erroneous.
The State Superintendent’s statement in response to this litigation does not strip the Plaintiffs of standing. By its terms, Section 28 requires immigration inquiries each time a student enrolls “in kindergarten or any grade in such school.”
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HB56 § 28(a)(1). The State Superintendent has taken the position that “enrollment” should be defined as occurring only once—the first time a child enrolls in any public school in the state system—and not when a child registers for subsequent grades. See Morton Mem. (Vol. II, R. 82-3); but see Lee v. Eufaula City Bd. of Ed., 573 F.2d 229, 234 n.12 (5th Cir. 1978) (“presum[ing] that all students attending the Eufaula schools [in Alabama] are required to enroll annually”). There is no guarantee that the state will continue to implement the statute this way in the future. The term “enrollment” is not defined in the Alabama Code, and since Section 28(a)(1) implies an annual process, the Superintendent can change or retract the current policy at any time. Cf. Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283, 286 (11th Cir. 1991) (district court erred in holding that amendments to city’s sign code rendered case moot, because “[t]he City presently possesses the power and authority to amend the sign code”). Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1-6 and John Doe #1-2 thus remain at risk even though the current policy would not immediately affect them.13
Moreover, it is undisputed that if Section 28 were in effect, its status determination requirements would apply now to new students entering Alabama
13 See Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 8 (Vol. I, R. 37-25)); (Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 9 (Vol. I, R. 37-26)); (Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 8 (Vol. I, R. 37-27)); (Jane Doe #4 Decl. ¶ 5 (Vol. I, R. 37-28)); Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 6 (Vol. I, R. 37-29); Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (Vol. I, R. 37-30); John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 13 (Vol. I, R. 37-31); John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 3-9 (Vol. I, R. 37-32).
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public schools during the current academic year. The operation of these discriminatory procedures in Plaintiffs’ schools creates a threatening and hostile learning environment—and indeed, as discussed infra at 62-63, that is precisely Section 28’s intent. Plaintiffs and their children are effectively being told: “‘[W]e will tolerate you[,] but want no more like you.’” Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720, 724 (6th Cir. 1985). In Smith, the Sixth Circuit held that an African-American city resident had standing to challenge the city’s racially discriminatory housing practice because, although the plaintiff himself was not “steered” away from the city, he was nevertheless injured because the practice “stigmatize[d] him as an inferior member of the community in which he lives.” Id. at 722. Likewise, here, students from immigrant families are being told that they are inferior and unwelcome in Alabama’s schools. For example, Jane Doe #4 fears that Section 28’s documentation requirements “will give [her daughters] an idea that they are second class people.” Jane Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 (Vol. I, R. 37-28). See also Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 8 (Vol. I, R. 37-25); Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 9 (Vol. I, R. 37-26); Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 9 (Vol. I, R. 37-30); John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 13 (Vol. I, R. 37-31); John Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 7 (Vol. I, R. 37-32). These injuries are direct and traceable to Section 28.
Finally, as already noted, questioning at enrollment is not the only harm that Section 28 imposes. Because of Sections 5 and 6, which require full enforcement
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of federal immigration law and HB56 on pain of criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits, schools officials are effectively required to report students’ information, however obtained, to federal immigration authorities and state officials for enforcement purposes. See HB56 § 28(e), 5, 6. These provisions effectively block access to the schools for children in immigrant families. See, e.g., Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 8 (Vol. I, R. 37-27) (fearing that school officials may turn her husband’s immigration status and emergency contact information over to federal officials); Jane Doe #6 Decl, ¶ 9 (Vol. I, R. 37-30) (fearing that her developmentally disabled son will reveal his status to people in his school).
B. Section 28 Is Preempted by Federal Law Although the district court did not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ Section 28 claims, Opinion at 101 (Vol. IV, R. 137), it is appropriate for this Court to do so and it should rule in Plaintiffs’ favor. The general rule that federal appellate courts do not consider issues not decided below is “pragmatic in nature” and “not a jurisdictional limitation.” De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, there is no pragmatic reason for this Court to refrain from considering the merits: The only issues in dispute concern the legality of Section 28; the parties fully briefed these issues below; and Plaintiffs will face irreparable harm if Section 28 is permitted to go into effect on remand. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to exercise its discretion
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to reach the merits. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2877
(1976) (purpose is to avoid prejudice); see also Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772,
790 n.32 (7th Cir. 1980) (reaching merits after district court denied preliminary
injunction on standing).
Section 28 is preempted because it is an impermissible state regulation of
immigration. Section 28 requires verification of student and parental immigration
status and, when viewed in light of HB56 as a whole, effectively guarantees the
reporting of such information to federal immigration and state authorities. See
supra at 45-46. As a result, it is part of “an impermissible scheme to regulate
immigration” and is unconstitutional under DeCanas. See League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see also DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354.14
Section 28 is also preempted by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996), a comprehensive federal statutory scheme regulating alien
eligibility for government benefits. In PRWORA, Congress expressly incorporated 14 As noted supra at 22 n.4, some students whom the federal government has allowed to remain in the United States lack formal documents establishing their status. Section 28(a)(5) mandates that any such student “shall [be] presume[d]…[to be] an alien unlawfully present in the United States” unless her parent or guardian signs a declaration under penalty of perjury, HB56 § 28(a)(4)(b)—which, if the parent is undocumented, puts the parent herself at risk. By creating the designation of “presumed…unlawful[] presen[ce],” Section 28 creates a novel state immigration classification that flies in the face of federal law.
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Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), which held that all children have a constitutional right to public primary and secondary education regardless of immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2) (“Nothing in this chapter may be construed as addressing alien eligibility for a basic public education as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States under Plyler v. Doe”). Consequently, PRWORA preempts any state regulations that would deter children’s access to a public education based on immigration status. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1255-56 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also infra at 58-63 (setting out conflicts between Section 28 and Plyler).
C. Section 28 Violates the Equal Protection Clause Section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating three classifications, each of which stands as an obstacle to the enrollment of children from immigrant families in public school. None of these classifications can withstand any level of constitutional scrutiny. First, Section 28 creates a classification of children born outside the United States—a proxy for alienage. Under Section 28, all students must show a birth certificate to school officials at enrollment. Children “born outside the jurisdiction of the United States,” HB56 § 28(a)(1), however, are subject to additional documentation requirements to prove their immigration status. § 28(a)(3). Schools must record these students as having been born outside the United States,
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§ 28(b), must report that information to the State Board of Education, § 28(c), and may also report such information to the federal immigration authorities. § 28(e).
In Section 28, place of birth functions as a proxy for alienage. By definition, all aliens must be born abroad, for any person born inside the United States is automatically a citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining aliens as non-citizens); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because it creates an alienage classification, Section 28 must withstand strict scrutiny. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (1977) (“[C]lassifications by a State that are based on alienage are ‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny’” (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 (1971)).
Second, Section 28 creates a classification of children who are presumed to be unlawfully present. If a child is unable to produce a birth certificate (or if school officials determine that she was born abroad or that at least one of her parents is undocumented), and if the child is unable to produce the additional documentation or a declaration establishing her immigration status as Section 28 requires, school officials must “presume” that she is “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” HB56 § 28(a)(5). The school must record the child as such, § 28(b), must report the child as such to the State Board of Education, § 28(c), and may report that information to the federal immigration authorities. § 28(e).
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This second classification requires intermediate scrutiny under Plyler v. Doe. In Plyler, considering the constitutionality of a Texas education statute that distinguished between schoolchildren who were “legally admitted” to the United States and those who were not, the Supreme Court applied an intermediate standard of review because of the “fundamental role [of education] in maintaining the fabric of our society,” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 102 S. Ct. at 2397, and because regulations that deter access to education can “impose[] a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status.” Id. at 223, 102 S. Ct. at 2398; see also id. at 220, 102 S. Ct. at 2396 (citing illegitimacy cases). Any state law that serves as a barrier to a public education based on immigration status must be “justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.” Id. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (emphasis added).
Third, Section 28 creates a classification of children based on their parents’ immigration status, which similarly calls for intermediate scrutiny. Section 28 requires schools to determine whether a child “is the child of an alien not lawfully present.” HB56 § 28(a)(1). If the school determines that a child’s parent is “not lawfully present,” the child must produce additional documentation to prove her immigration status. §§ 28(a)(3)-(4). Schools must record this information and report it to the State Board of Education, see § 28(b)-(c), and are also authorized to report it to the federal immigration authorities. § 28(e).
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This third classification targets U.S. citizen children in particular, because Section 28 already requires immigration status determinations for children born abroad (a category that, as noted above, necessarily encompasses all non-citizen children).15 By subjecting U.S. citizen children whose parents are unlawfully present to the statute’s documentation and reporting procedures, Section 28 creates a classification targeting children solely based on their parentage—“a characteristic determined by causes not within [the child’s] control.” Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 n.5, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 2237 n.5 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, like “provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children,” it merits intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 854-55, 106 S. Ct. at 2237; Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988) (“discriminatory classifications based on…illegitimacy” are subject to intermediate scrutiny and “must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”). The Second Circuit in Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001), for example, applied intermediate scrutiny to a law that discriminated among children based on parental immigration status. Id. at 590-91. In Lewis, U.S. citizen children challenged the denial of automatic eligibility for Medicaid based solely on the
15 Only a small minority of children with undocumented parents are themselves undocumented. In fact, 82% of children whose parents lack immigration status are U.S. citizens. Pew Hispanic Center, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, at 13 (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
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immigration status of their mothers. Id. at 569. Because the Medicaid statute “penalize[d] children for the illegal conduct of their parents” and “risk[ed] significant and enduring adverse consequences to the children,” intermediate scrutiny applied. Id. at 591.
Whether the Court applies strict scrutiny (as in the alienage cases) or intermediate scrutiny (as in Plyler and the illegitimacy cases), Defendants cannot justify the classifications drawn by Section 28 and the barriers to education it imposes. Indeed, Section 28 cannot even survive rational basis review.
Section 28 burdens a child’s right to a public education in two impermissible ways: (1) by requiring that schools determine the citizenship or immigration status of every student and her parents at enrollment, and (2) by authorizing and effectively requiring schools to report children and parents whom they presume to be “unlawfully present” to federal immigration and state authorities. See supra at 45-46. These obstacles to enrollment violate the Equal Protection Clause. Recent federal guidance by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Education specifically recognizes that a school district violates Plyler when it adopts enrollment practices that “may chill or discourage the participation, or lead to the exclusion, of students based on their or their parents’ or guardians’ actual or
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perceived citizenship or immigration status.”16
By requiring school officials to inquire into immigration status and
authorizing them to report that information to DHS, Section 28 ensures that
children who are undocumented or whose parents are undocumented will avoid
school registration for fear of bringing themselves or their parents to the attention
of immigration authorities. Indeed, Section 28 goes even further than the law that
Plyler struck down: It burdens educational access not only for undocumented
children, but also for U.S. citizen children based the immigration status of their
parents. See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591 (applying Plyler to invalidate denial of
Medicaid eligibility to newborn U.S. citizen children because of mothers’
undocumented status). This cannot stand.
Defendants cannot provide any valid justification for Section 28’s
classifications or the resulting educational barriers. The only justification offered
appears in Section 2 of HB56, which boldly asserts that the presence of
undocumented students “can adversely affect” the educational experience of U.S.
citizen and lawfully present students without providing any factual support. HB56
16 “Dear Colleague” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., May 6, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/ plylerletter.pdf. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers for School Districts and Parents, available at http://www2.ed.gov/ about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201101.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights of All Children to Enroll in School, available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet201101.pdf.
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§ 2. This unfounded speculation purports to justify a requirement that the “State
Board of Education…accurately measure and assess the population of students
who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States” in order to forecast and
plan for the future. § 2.
This is not a sufficient justification, as Plyler makes clear. In Plyler, the
Court struck down a state law permitting school districts to charge tuition to, or to
prohibit the enrollment of, undocumented students. 457 U.S. at 227-30, 102 S. Ct. at 2400-01.17 The Court rejected the argument that excluding undocumented
students from state-funded schools would “improve the overall quality of
education in the State.” Id. at 229, 102 S. Ct. at 2401. It rejected this claim in part
because Texas failed to establish that exclusion would improve the quality of
education, but also because
even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are basically indistinguishable from legally resident alien children. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in last sentence added). In other words, the lack
of data was not the only problem with Texas’s law; the Court rejected the very idea
17 Plyler was not concerned solely with the outright denial of access to education; in fact, plaintiffs were permitted to enroll but were subjected to a tuition fee because of their undocumented status. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574-75 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
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that a student’s immigration status was relevant to assessing costs.18
The Court in Plyler further dismissed any argument that undocumented
children may be “appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within
the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the
boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political
use within the State.” 457 U.S. at 229-30, 102 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court stressed
this likelihood would be impossible to quantify because all children, regardless of
status, regularly cross state boundaries; there is no way the State can predict who
might stay and who might go at some future date. Id. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2401.
Furthermore, as the Court noted in 1982, “the record is clear that many of the
undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country
indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United
States.” Id. That fact remains true today. See Ltr. of Sect’y Napolitano to Sen.
Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011) (Vol. II, R. 113-1) (explaining that undocumented students
“who were brought to this country as young children and know no other home” are 18 In any event, even if such costs were relevant to the Equal Protection claim, the evidence would not justify Section 28. The U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) already calculates the number of enrolled “immigrant children and youth” based upon existing data and without relying on demands for documentation from students, which chill enrollment. See Tony Miller Decl. ¶ 14 (Vol. IV, R. 2-3). In the 2009-2010 school year, immigrant children and youth (documented and undocumented) constituted less than 0.5% of the statewide student population in Alabama. See Miller Decl. ¶ 18; see also Ala. Dep’t of Educ., State Enrollment by Sex and Race, School Year 2009-2010, available at http://www.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx.
61

not priorities for immigration enforcement). The risk of “promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime,” cannot possibly serve any state interest, let alone a substantial one. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230, 102 S. Ct. at 2401.
Moreover, the plain text of Section 28 belies any claim that its purpose is to accurately measure enrollment. Section 28 creates a scheme that will never produce reliable data. Under Section 28, any student who declines to provide the requested documentation within 30 days—whether because of neglect, lack of access to documents, or intentional refusal—will be “presume[d]” to be undocumented, see HB56 § 28(a)(5), guaranteeing that the resulting numbers will be inaccurate.
The inaccuracy of the data the State is attempting to collect underlines and reinforces the central point about Section 28. It is not designed to collect accurate data; rather, it is designed to deter enrollment by children in immigrant families. Statements by its sponsors confirm that this is Section 28’s purpose. HB56’s sponsor in the House, Rep. Micky Hammon, described the bill as motivated by the costs of “educat[ing] the children of illegal immigrants” and predicted that HB56 will result in “cost savings for this state”—presumably by driving children from immigrant families out of Alabama’s schools. David White, Alabama Legislative
62

Panel Delays Voting on Illegal Immigration Bill, The Birmingham News, Mar. 3, 2011.19 Likewise, Senator Beason, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, stated that educating immigrant children and the children of immigrants “is where one of our largest costs come[s] from…. Are the parents here illegally, and if they were not here at all, would there be a cost?” (Vol. II, R. 37-43 (Ex. M).)
The intent to chill educational access is particularly clear in Section 28’s requirement that schools determine the immigration status of students’ parents— information that is of no relevance whatsoever in assessing the impact of educating undocumented children. See HB56 §§ 28(a)(1), (c). The only conceivable purpose of collecting information about children’s parents is to intimidate mixed-status families and place an obstacle in the path of student enrollment—particularly for citizen students whose parents lack immigration status. The State plainly has no legitimate interest in deterring U.S. citizen children from securing access to a public education based on their parents’ status.
In sum, regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, Alabama cannot justify Section 28 and the burdens it imposes on access to public education.
19 Available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/03/alabama_legislative_panel_dela.html.
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V. PLAINTIFFS MET THEIR BURDEN ON THE EQUITABLE FACTORS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION In its ruling, the district court did not address the three other prongs of the
preliminary injunction test. This was error, as the balance of equities is critical to the analysis. Where the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of the movants, as here, Plaintiffs need not even show probability of success on the merits (though they have) but merely a “substantial case on the merits.” United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322, 323 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs made the requisite showing both on the merits and the equities.
Unless Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30 of HB56 are enjoined, Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class will suffer irreparable harm. The individual Plaintiffs and countless others will suffer direct harms including: unconstitutional deprivation of physical liberty under Sections 10, 12, and 18; unconstitutional chilling of the right of schoolchildren in immigrant families to attend public schools (Section 28); inability to conduct transactions with state/local entities including those for essential services like water and power, and criminal liability for even attempting to do so (Section 30); and deprivation of the right to enter into certain enforceable contracts, including those for basic life necessities such as housing (Section 27).
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Sections 10, 12, and 18 will cause irreparable injury to Plaintiffs such as
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 and others who lack proof of current lawful
immigration status and are therefore at immediate and constant risk of being
detained for immigration purposes during ordinary police encounters such as
traffic stops.20 Although they are in the process of obtaining lawful immigration
status from the federal government, Jane Does #1 and #2 are also subject to arrest
and prosecution under Section 10.21 They therefore have shown irreparable harm
in order to be able to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 10, 12, and 18.
GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *3-4 (preliminarily enjoining a similar provision
and noting that plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm where the state law would
“convert many routine encounters with law enforcement into lengthy and intrusive
immigration status investigations”); cf. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332,
1338-39 (11th Cir. 1994).
20 See Jane Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 (Vol. I, R. 37-25); Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 (Vol. I, R. 37-26). Other Plaintiffs are also at risk. See Jane Doe #4 ¶¶ 1, 6-7 (Vol. I, R. 7-28); Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶¶ 2, 10 (Vol. I, R. 37-29); Jane Doe #6 Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 1011 (Vol. I, R. 37-30); John Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 1, 11-12 (Vol. I, R. 37-31); John Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 1, 11-12 (Vol. I, R. 37-32); John Doe #3 Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11 (Vol. I, R. 3733); John Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (Vol. I, R. 37-34). 21 Even individuals who have the federal government’s permission to remain in the United States are at risk of detention under Section 12 because they do not have any documentation to prove that status. For example, Plaintiff Zamora is authorized to be in the United States through the Family Unity Program, but lacks the documentation required by Section 12 to prove to an Alabama police officer’s satisfaction that she has lawful status. Maria Zamora Decl. ¶¶ 2-5 (Vol. I, R. 3714).
65

Sections 27 and 30 will result in irreparable harm by undermining the ability of all Alabamans—citizens and non-citizens alike—to engage in business transactions with the state and to enter into enforceable contracts. In the short time that the law has been in effect, numerous municipal and county services— including water and sewage services, animal licenses, occupancy permits and housing numbers, to name but a few—have required proof of citizenship or lawful status under Section 30. (Vol. IV, RR. 143-4, D, E, F, G, I). Under Section 30, individual Plaintiffs like Jane Doe #2 could be guilty of a felony under Alabama law for merely attempting to engage in a transaction such as payment for water service. Every day that Section 30 is in place, countless Alabamans—including the individual Doe Plaintiffs —are unable to obtain basic life necessities that are provided by state entities.
Section 27 also causes irreparable harm to U.S. citizens and lawfully present non-citizens by directly encouraging race and national origin discrimination by potential contracting parties. For example, an apartment complex in a Birmingham suburb is requiring all tenants to provide proof of lawful status before it will agree to enter into or renew a lease. See Evangeline Limón Decl. ¶ 5 (Vol. IV, R. 1436).22 Numerous other contracts, including those with attorneys and with landlords,
22 Such a requirement is hardly surprising, given that many landlords ask for a social security number in order to conduct a background check, and if a number
66

are also being called into question. See Robert Barber Decl. ¶¶ 19-21 (Vol. I, R. 37-19); Daniel Upton Decl. ¶ 10 (Vol. I, R. 37-20); Jeffrey Beck Decl. ¶ 8 (Vol. I, R. 37-21); Michelle Cummings Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 (Vol. I, R. 37-22); Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 11 (Vol. I, R. 37-26); Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 5 (Vol. I, R. 37-29)
Section 28 is causing irreparable harms to Plaintiffs and countless others, as set forth above at Section III.A.
Thus, the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction will impose only minimal harm, if any, on the Defendants because Plaintiffs merely seek to maintain the status quo while serious questions about the law’s constitutionality are adjudicated. This is precisely the purpose of a preliminary injunction. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1101 n.13 (11th Cir. 2004). While the Defendants have an interest in seeing state laws enforced, they do not have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of unconstitutional state laws. See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s preliminary injunction because “Oklahoma does not have an interest in enforcing a law that is likely constitutionally infirm.”).
For the same reason, the interests of the Plaintiffs and the general public are aligned in favor of a preliminary injunction. The public interest is not served by cannot be provided, the landlord could be deemed to have constructive knowledge that the tenant lacks immigration status.
67

allowing an unconstitutional law to remain in effect. See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006). Particularly where civil rights are at stake, an injunction serves the public interest because the injunction “would protect the public interest by protecting those rights to which it too is entitled.” Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2000). In addition, courts have specifically held that enjoining a state statute that is preempted by federal law will serve the public interest. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 771; GLAHR, 2011 WL 2520752 at *18; Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (granting permanent injunction). The district court erred by failing to even consider the numerous equities that tip in favor of a preliminary injunction in this case.
CONCLUSION The district court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28 and 30 of HB56 should be reversed and a preliminary injunction should issue. // // // //
68

Dated: November 14, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michelle R. Lapointe Michelle R. Lapointe SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER

_/s/ Cecillia D. Wang Cecillia D. Wang AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT

/s/ Karen C. Tumlin Karen C. Tumlin NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER

On behalf of Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Mary Bauer Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200
Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660
Kristi L. Graunke Michelle R. Lapointe Naomi Tsu SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER

Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775
Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400

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233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110
Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360
G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785

Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282
Ben Bruner THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835
Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation RUBIO LAW FIRM, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858
Herman Watson, Jr. Eric J. Artrip Rebekah Keith McKinney WATSON, MCKINNEY & ARTRIP, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423
Victor Viramontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND

70

Allison Neal AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203

110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12

Counsel for Appellants

71

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I do hereby certify that:
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B), and this Court’s November 10, 2011 Order granting Plaintiffs/Appellants 16,500 words, because this brief contains 16,350 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word, font size 14 Times New Roman.

Dated: November 14, 2011

/s/ Michelle R. Lapointe Michelle R. Lapointe

72

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on November 14, 2011, I served the foregoing

Appellants’ Opening Brief by electronic mail upon:

John C. Neiman, Jr. Elizabeth Prim Escalona Margaret L. Fleming James W. Davis Misty S. Fairbanks William G. Parker, Jr. Joshua K. Payne Office of the Alabama Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 jneiman@ago.state.al.us pescalona@ago.state.al.us mfleming@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us

J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C. P.O. Box 2087 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 jrb@lfsp.com tpb@lanierford.com
Michael Simpson National Education Ass’n Office of General Counsel 1201 16th St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 msimpson@nea.org

The original, signed brief and six additional copies were also hand-delivered to the Clerk’s Office for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. An electronic copy of this Brief was also uploaded to the Court website using the EDF Electronic Brief Uploading system.

Dated: November 14, 2011

/s/ Michelle R. Lapointe Michelle R. Lapointe

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 No. 11-14535-CC and No. 11-14675 _______________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _______________________________
HISPANIC INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, ET AL.
Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v. ROBERT BENTLEY, ET AL.,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants. _______________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Case No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB _______________________________
RESPONSE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AND PRINCIPAL BRIEF FOR CROSS-APPELLANTS GOVERNOR BENTLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL STRANGE, SUPERINTENDENT CRAVEN, CHANCELLOR
HILL, AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY BROUSSARD _______________________________
LUTHER STRANGE Attorney General
John C. Neiman, Jr. Solicitor General
Elizabeth Prim Escalona Deputy Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440
December 27, 2011

HICA v. Bentley 11th Circuit Case No. 11-14535-CC & 11-14675
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The following is a list of all additional known judges, attorneys, persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities that have an interest in the outcome of this case, including subsidiaries, conglomerates, affiliates and parent corporations, any publicly held company that owns 10 percent or more of a party‘s stock, and other identifiable legal entities related to a party: [no new entries]
C-1 of 1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT This case raises many of the preemption issues presented in the United States‘ appeal in No. 11-14532. As there, the interests of judicial economy counsel in favor of postponing oral argument pending the Supreme Court‘s decision in Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (cert. granted U.S. Dec. 12, 2011). That decision should resolve at least three of the preemption questions in HICA‘s case and will likely provide guiding precedent on several others. See Response Brief of Alabama and Governor Bentley, United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532, at i. The HICA Plaintiffs do raise one additional claim in addition to those asserted by the United States: HICA asserts that the District Court should have enjoined Section 28, HB56‘s school-data provision, on Equal Protection grounds. As explained below, that claim is meritless. But in any event, there is no need to resolve it before the Supreme Court decides Arizona this summer. This Court has enjoined that provision pending appeal at the United States‘ request. Once the Supreme Court resolves Arizona, this Court should hold a single, expedited oral argument to resolve all the issues presented by both appeals.
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS.......................................................................1 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................................... I TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. II TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. V TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF ....................................................... XIII STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .....................................................................................1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..............................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................................3
I. Nature of the Case ......................................................................................3 II. Statement of the Facts ................................................................................3 III. Proceedings Below .....................................................................................4 IV. Standards of Review...................................................................................7 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...........................................................................................8 ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................11 I. This Court should affirm in the HICA Plaintiffs‘ appeal.........................12
A. The District Court properly declined to enjoin Sections 10, 12, and 18. ...........................................................................................12
1. Congress has not preempted Section 10. .......................................13 a. Section 10 is not a preempted regulation of immigration. ..............................................................................13 b. Section 10 is not field preempted. ............................................16
ii

c. Section 10 is not conflict preempted.........................................19 2. Congress has not preempted Section 12. .......................................22
a. Section 12 is not conflict preempted.........................................22 b. Section 12 is not field- or constitutionally preempted..............25 3. Congress has not preempted Section 18. .......................................26 4. Sections 10, 12, and 18 taken together are not a regulation
of immigration................................................................................27 B. Congress has not preempted Section 27..............................................29 C. Congress has not preempted Section 30..............................................31 D. The District Court correctly declined to enjoin Section 28. ...............34
1. The HICA Plaintiffs lack standing.................................................35 a. The organizational HICA Plaintiffs lack standing....................35 b. The individual HICA Plaintiffs lack standing. .........................40
2. HICA cannot prevail on its challenge to Section 28......................44 a. Section 28 is not preempted. .....................................................45 b. Section 28 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. .......................................................................................49 i. Section 28 does not trigger the Equal Protection Clause. ..................................................................................49 ii. At most, Section 28 need survive only rationalbasis review..........................................................................53 iii. Section 28 serves a legitimate government purpose............56
E. HICA failed to meet its burden for a preliminary injunction..............58
iii

II. In the Alabama Defendants‘ cross-appeal, this Court should reverse. ......................................................................................................60
A. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) on compulsory-process grounds. ...................61
B. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining the entirety of Section 8. ...........................................................................64
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................69 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................................71 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..........................................................................................72
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct.3315 (1984) .............................................................43
Alley v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 590 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................67
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (cert. granted U.S. Dec. 12, 2011)................................................ i
Ass’n of Cmty. Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1999) .........................................................................39
Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994) ...........................................................................38
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct.955 (2001) ...............................................................53
Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................58
Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 583 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir.1978) .........................................................................50
Cent. Ala. Fair Housing Ctr. v. Magee, No. 2:11cv982-MHT, 2011 WL 6182334 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2011), appeal pending (11th Cir.) .................................................................15
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct.1968 (2010)....................................................................................33
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct.3249 (1985) .............................................................56
Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................................................ 36, 37, 39
v

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S.Ct.2288 (2000) ...................................................... 19, 20
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 128 S.Ct.2759 (2008) .............................................................35
*DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct.933 (1976) ......................................................... passim
Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................56
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004) ..................................................... 14, 64
Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006)..........................................................................28
Ex parte Welch, 519 So.2d 517 (Ala.1987)..............................................................................67
F.D.I.C. v. Verex Assur., Inc., 3 F.3d 391 (11th Cir. 1993) ...........................................................................47
Florida State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 36, 37, 39
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S.Ct.1601 (1979) .................................................................43
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) .........................................................................17
Guy H. James Constr. Co. v. Boswell, 366 So.2d 271 (Ala. 1979).............................................................................67
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct.1114 (1982) ...................................................... 36, 37
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S.Ct.2637 (1993) .............................................................57
vi

Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).......................................................................................19
*Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).................................................................................. 16, 18
In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087 (Cal. 2009).............................................................................17
Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................68
La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................37
Lee v. Eufaula City Board of Education, 573 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1978) .........................................................................40
Leib v. Hillsborough County Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 57, 58
Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 131 S.Ct.2958 (2011)............................................................................................14
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct.2130 (1992) .............................................................35
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987) .......................................................................17
McKissick v. Busby, 936 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................45
Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000)...........................................................51
Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216 (9th Cir. 1995) ...........................................................................28
vii

Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So. 2d 1158 (Ala. 2007)..........................................................................28
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................................................ 36, 37, 39
National Advertising Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283 (11th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................42
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct.2326 (1992) .............................................. 49, 50, 51, 53
*Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct.2382 (1982) .......................................... 48, 51, 54, 65
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct.2329 (1997) .............................................................51
Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981) .........................................................................60
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) .....................................................................59
Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985) .........................................................................43
Smith v. State of Ga., 684 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1982) .......................................................................52
Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. 2004)..........................................................................28
*United States v. Alabama, No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) ................................................................................................ passim
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) .............................................................14
viii

United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................59
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct.2095 (1987) ...............................................................7
United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) .....................................................................17
United States v. South Carolina, No. 2:11-cv-2958 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (slip opinion)..................................................................................................16
United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................18
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-10751 (5th Cir.) ................................................................................................................15
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 128 S.Ct.1184 (2008) .........................................................7, 27
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).................................................................................... 59, 64
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct.746 (1971) ...................................................................51
STATUTES
8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2)...............................................................................................48
8 U.S.C. §1101 .....................................................................................................6, 65
8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(10)..............................................................................................23
8 U.S.C. §1252c ................................................................................................ 18, 23
8 U.S.C. §1301 .........................................................................................................29
8 U.S.C. §1304(e) ............................................................................................. 28, 29 ix

8 U.S.C. §1306(a) ....................................................................................... 21, 28, 29 8 U.S.C. §1324(c) ....................................................................................................23 8 U.S.C. §1357 .................................................................................................. 18, 24 8 U.S.C. §1357(g) ............................................................................................. 23, 24 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(10)(A) ........................................................................................26 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(10)(B) ........................................................................................25 8 U.S.C. §1373 ................................................................................................. passim 8 U.S.C. §1621 .................................................................................................. 32, 47 8 U.S.C. §1621(a) ....................................................................................................33 8 U.S.C. §1621(c) ....................................................................................................33 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(B) ..........................................................................................65 8 U.S.C. §1622 .........................................................................................................48 8 U.S.C. §1623 .........................................................................................................65 8 U.S.C. §1624 .........................................................................................................48 8 U.S.C. §1625 .........................................................................................................48 8 U.S.C. §1643 .........................................................................................................48 8 U.S.C. §1644 .................................................................................................. 33, 46 ALA. CODE §31-13-10
(HB56 Section 10) ................................................................................. passim ALA. CODE §31-13-11
(HB56 Section 11) ................................................................................. passim ALA. CODE §31-13-12
(HB56 Section 12) ................................................................................. passim
x

ALA. CODE §31-13-13 (HB56 Section 13) ................................................................................. passim
ALA. CODE §31-13-2 ......................................................................................... 25, 56
ALA. CODE §31-13-26 (HB56 Section 27) ................................................................................. passim
ALA. CODE §31-13-27 (HB56 Section 28) ................................................................................. passim
ALA. CODE §31-13-29 (HB56 Section 30) ................................................................................. passim
ALA. CODE §31-13-32 ..............................................................................................67
ALA. CODE §31-13-5 (HB56 Section 5) ........................................................................ 27, 28, 43, 44
ALA. CODE §31-13-6 (HB56 Section 6) ........................................................................ 27, 28, 43, 44
ALA. CODE §31-13-8 (HB56 Section 8) ................................................................................... passim
ALA. CODE §32-6-9 (HB56 Section 18) ................................................................................. passim
Pub. L. 109-13, § 202(a)(1) & (c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005)...............................32
Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).......................................................................33
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)............................................................47
OTHER AUTHORITIES
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §46.06 (4th ed. 1984)...........................................................67
ALA. ATT‘Y GEN. GUIDANCE No. 2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ago.state.al.us/Page-Immigration ........................................ 32, 34
xi

S. Rep. No. 104-249, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19-20 (1996)..................................23 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI ...........................................................................................62 * marks authorities on which this brief chiefly relies
xii

Brief Page #
5, 47

TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF

Description

Docket/Tab #

Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

37

38, 39

Exhibit 2 to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

37-2

39

Exhibit 6 to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

37-6

41, 44, 49, 52, Exhibit 3 to Response in Opposition to Motion for

53

Preliminary Injunction

82-3

68

Exhibit 4 to Response in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction

82-4

38

Exhibit 2 to Reply in Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

109-2

38, 39

Exhibit 3 to Reply in Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support

109-3

5

Order

128

4

First Amended Complaint

131

66, 67

Exhibit 1 to First Amended Complaint

131-1

xiii

5, 6, 14, 30, 31,

35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 55,

Memorandum Opinion

137

62, 64, 65

1

State Defendants‘ Notice of Cross-Appeal

150

xiv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction for the same reasons it has jurisdiction in the companion case. See Response Brief of Alabama and Governor Bentley, United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532, at 1 (hereinafter ―Ala. v. U.S. Red Br.‖). In this case, the HICA Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal of the District Court‘s September 28, 2011 order. The Appellees here—Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Craven, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard—filed a notice of cross-appeal on October 7, which was within the 30-day deadline under Rule 4(a)(1)(A). See Doc. 150.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED In addition to the preemption questions presented in the companion appeal, see U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 1-3, and the additional Equal Protection question set forth in HICA‘s opening brief, this case raises the following two questions on the State Defendants‘ cross-appeal: 1. Postsecondary education. The District Court found that a single sentence in Section 8 was contrary to federal law because it created classifications of aliens that differed from the federal classifications. Did the District Court err when it enjoined the entirety of Section 8 instead of the single sentence? 2. Compulsory process. In order to obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must show a threat of imminent injury. The District Court here enjoined three
1

sections of the Act on Sixth Amendment grounds, reasoning that, if applied at a criminal trial, they would violate the defendant‘s right to compulsory process. Did the Court err in preliminarily enjoining these provisions rather than deferring the resolution of those constitutional questions until a subsequent criminal prosecution?
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case The HICA Plaintiffs, to which this brief will refer collectively as HICA, assert
a challenge to HB56 much like the one asserted by the United States. But HICA urges an even more sweeping and unprecedented theory of implied preemption than the United States does. HICA also raises several other constitutional claims, including, most notably for present purposes, an Equal Protection challenge to the Act‘s school-data provision, Section 28. The District Court heard HICA‘s motion for a preliminary injunction alongside the United States‘, and this appeal and crossappeal arise from the separate order the District Court issued in the HICA matter. HICA challenges the District Court‘s denial of an injunction on the same six provisions at issue in the United States‘ appeal. In addition to the four provisions enjoined at the United States‘ request, the District Court enjoined four more provisions at HICA‘s request. Those are the subject of the State Defendants‘ limited cross-appeal.
II. Statement of the Facts In addition to the various provisions at issue in the United States‘ appeal,
see Ala. v. U.S. Red Br. 8-9, this case involves one additional provision of HB56: Section 8, which addresses unlawfully present aliens‘ eligibility for certain benefits
3

in public postsecondary educational institutions. ALA. CODE §31-13-8. This provision prohibits an unlawfully present alien from enrolling in any public postsecondary institution in the State. School officials are directed to seek ―federal verification of an alien‘s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1373(c).‖ Section 8 also limits an unlawfully present alien‘s eligibility for other postsecondary benefits, including scholarships, grants, and financial aid.
III. Proceedings Below The HICA Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit a few days before the United States
did. The plaintiff group consists of 36 different private individuals and associations represented by 37 different attorneys of record. Doc. 131-Pg 1, 118-20. They brought a facial challenge to the entirety of HB56 and sought to block the statute before it went into effect. Id. at 54, 98. They raised preemption claims to the entire statute, but also challenged particular provisions under other provisions of the Constitution, including the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 101-17.
Three differences between the suits are critical. First, unlike the United States, HICA challenged Section 28, the school-data provision, on Equal Protection grounds. Second, also unlike the United States, HICA challenged Section 8, the postsecondary-education provision. Third, also unlike the United
4

States, HICA challenged three of the Act‘s criminal provisions, specifically Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h), on Sixth Amendment grounds. The crux of HICA‘s argument on the latter point was that these provisions made the federal government‘s determination of unlawful status conclusive in criminal proceedings in violation of criminal defendants‘ compulsory-process right to raise a defense.
Like the United States, HICA sought a preliminary injunction. Doc. 37. The District Court consolidated the cases and heard the motions at the same hearing, but later vacated its consolidation order for the ease of appellate review. Doc. 128.
As it did with the United States, the District Court issued a lengthy order denying HICA‘s motion in part and granting it in part. See Doc 137. To the extent HICA sought an injunction against the provisions the United States had challenged on preemption grounds—Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30—the District Court summarily denied the motion, simply cross-referencing the grounds it gave in the United States‘ case. See Doc 137-Pg 48, 72, 86, 91, 105; United States v. Alabama, No. 2:11-cv-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). To the extent HICA sought a preliminary injunction against provisions on which the United States obtained a preliminary injunction—namely, Sections 11(a) and 13— the District Court denied the request as moot. See Doc 137-Pg 61, 82.
As pertinent here, the District Court ruled on HICA‘s other claims as follows:
5

1. Equal protection. On Section 28, the District Court found that HICA had not established that any plaintiffs had standing to challenge the school-data provision. It therefore did not reach the merits of HICA‘s Equal Protection claim. Doc. 137-Pg 101.
2. Postsecondary education. On Section 8, the District Court found that one of the HICA plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act‘s postsecondaryeducation provision. The District Court found this provision preempted because of a sentence, reading ―[a]n alien attending any public postsecondary institution in this state must either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. §1101, et seq.‖ Doc. 137-Pg 38-39. But rather than preliminarily enjoin the sentence, the District Court preliminarily enjoined Section 8 in its entirety. Id. at 44.
3. Compulsory process. The District Court found that HICA had established standing to assert the compulsory-process challenge to the Act‘s various criminal provisions. The Court held that these provisions violated the Sixth Amendment and enjoined the sentences of these provisions stating that ―[a] court of this state shall consider only the federal government‘s verification in determining whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.‖ See ALA. CODE §§31-13-10(e), 31-13-11(e), 31-13-13(h); Doc 137-Pg 55.
6

This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 1
IV. Standards of Review HICA is right about the District Court‘s decision being reviewable only for
abuse of discretion. See HICA Br. 9. But HICA omits one component of the standard review and gets the other wrong.
First, HICA omits any mention of the Salerno test for pre-enforcement facial challenges such as this one. Under that standard, for HICA to have prevailed, it was required to show that every application of the challenged provisions is unconstitutional and otherwise invalid, or, in the very least, that the provisions do not have a plainly legitimate sweep. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008); accord U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 11.
Second and just as important, HICA erroneously asserts that even if it failed to establish that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the District Court still might have been required to grant its request for a preliminary injunction if the equities
1 The District Court also enjoined two additional sections (11(f) and (g)) on First Amendment grounds. Although these provisions are valid, further development of the record is appropriate on these issues. The State Defendants therefore are not challenging the District Court‘s orders on those provisions in this interlocutory appeal and will instead develop the record on these issues before the District Court.
7

were sufficiently pronounced in its favor. See HICA Br. 64. As explained below, see infra at 58-60, that reading of the law is wrong.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This Court should affirm in HICA‘s appeal. The District Court properly rejected HICA‘s radical argument that the provisions of HB56 are an impermissible regulation of immigration. Applying the implied-preemption standard from DeCanas v. Bica, the District Court correctly concluded that the six provisions challenged here did not conflict with federal law. The District Court thus was on eminently solid ground when it concluded that these sections were not likely preempted. 1. In arguing that Sections 10, 12, and 18 are a constitutionallyimpermissible regulation of immigration, HICA ignores the critical language in DeCanas that defines such regulations as those that determine who should be admitted to the country and the conditions under with legal entrants may remain. Section 10, which imposes parallel state penalties for federal registration violations, along with Sections 12 and 18 – the stop and arrest protocols – expressly defer to the federal government‘s determination of immigration status and place no conditions on lawfully present aliens residing within the country. 2. HICA is equally incorrect when it suggests that Section 10 is both field- and conflict-preempted. Congress has repeatedly encouraged cooperation
8

between States and the federal government in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. And Section 10 simply provides for state and federal penalties against the same conduct. Because these penalties – which are premised on the failure to follow federal immigration registration laws – do not create an independent registration scheme, they are not preempted under Hines v. Davidowitz.
3. In arguing that Congress preempted Section 12 and 18‘s stop-andarrest protocols, HICA ignores 8 U.S.C. §1373, which requires the federal government to respond to these sorts of status checks. HICA cannot rely on misinterpretations of Sections 12 and 18 to create a conflict where none exists. These provisions are consistent with Congress‘s intent and are not preempted.
4. Section 27 is not an impermissible regulation on immigration. Contrary to HICA‘s misreading of the statute, Section 27 renders contracts unenforceable only if the contracting party knows that the person is an unlawfully present alien. It does not determine the conditions under which a legal entrant can remain in the country. Section 27 also is consistent with Congress‘s goals. Congress has not precluded States from defining their contract laws to declare contracts knowingly entered into with unlawfully present aliens unenforceable. In fact, federal statutes already make numerous such contracts illegal. HICA‘s
9

speculation that this provision will burden lawfully present aliens is wrong and no ground for a facial challenge.
5. Section 30 also reinforces Congress‘s goals. Numerous federal statutes show that Congress understands that States can prohibit the issuance of licenses to unlawfully present aliens. Section 30‘s criminal penalties reasonably enforce the prohibition.
6. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider HICA‘s challenge to Section 28 because none of the 36 plaintiffs have established the necessary Article III standing. But even if HICA had standing, its claims would fail on the merits. Section 28‘s school-data-collection provision imposes no special burdens on unlawfully-present students and does not bar or deter them from attending school. Because it involves data collection on the costs illegal immigration imposes on schools, not disparate treatment, Section 28 does not violate equal protection.
*** In the cross-appeal, this Court should reverse. 1. The District Court should not have preliminarily enjoined Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) on compulsory-process grounds. Any potential infringement that the plaintiffs may suffer at some undefined point in the future would be best addressed by the state courts when the situation arises in the course of a criminal prosecution.
10

2. The District Court also should not have preliminarily enjoined Section 8 in its entirety. The District Court was correct that a single sentence in Section 8 attempted to classify aliens in conflict with federal classifications. But that conclusion should have led the District Court to enjoin only that sentence, not the Section in its entirety.
ARGUMENT As was the case in the United States‘ appeal, the District Court‘s rulings on the six provisions at issue in HICA‘s appeal were eminently sound. In arguing otherwise, HICA is asking this Court to adopt an even more radical approach to implied preemption than that advanced by the United States. The District Court also prudently declined to rule on HICA‘s Equal Protection claim on standing grounds, and this Court should affirm that conclusion. But the District Court erred when it preliminarily enjoined the entirety of Section 8 based on a single offending sentence and three identical evidentiary provisions (Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h)) on Sixth Amendment grounds long before any prosecution arose. The Alabama Defendants have cross-appealed this ruling, and this Court should reverse the District Court‘s injunction on these grounds.
11

I. This Court should affirm in the HICA Plaintiffs’ appeal. As Alabama and Governor Bentley‘s brief in United States v. Alabama
notes, the District Court correctly held that none of the six provisions at issue in HICA‘s appeal is preempted. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 15-55. HICA says nothing that calls that conclusion into question.
A. The District Court properly declined to enjoin Sections 10, 12, and 18.
HICA sees Sections 10, 12, and 18 as traveling together, see HICA Br. 1338, and the Supreme Court should resolve the preemption issues on all these provisions when it decides Arizona later this summer. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 354, 357 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-182, 2011 WL 3556224 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (preliminarily enjoining Arizona‘s versions of Sections 10, 12, and 18); see HICA Br. 13 (noting that Ninth Circuit ―consider[ed] a virtually identical provision‖ to Section 10); id. at 25 (noting that Ninth Circuit upheld injunction against Arizona law ―similar‖ to Section 12). In any event, each of these provisions is valid, and the arguments HICA sets forth do not change the calculus.
Unlike the United States, HICA tries to fit its arguments within the framework the Supreme Court established in DeCanas v. Bica, under which a law
12

may be either constitutionally preempted, field preempted, or conflict preempted. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-56, 363, 96 S.Ct. 933, 936-37, 940 (1976). But HICA‘s analysis may reveal why the United States did not take this route. HICA has a sufficiently difficult time deciding which kind of preemption applies that, at least as to Sections 10, 12, and 18, HICA does not even try to choose between the three. Instead, HICA takes a scattershot approach, asserting that these provisions are preempted under each part of the test. None of those arguments persuades.
1. Congress has not preempted Section 10. As an initial matter, Section 10 is fully consistent with Congress‘s intent in this area. HICA says otherwise, contending that Section 10 is constitutionally, field, and conflict preempted. But the District Court rightly concluded that HICA is not likely to prevail on any of these arguments.
a. Section 10 is not a preempted regulation of immigration. HICA‘s regulation-of-immigration theory simply cannot get off the ground. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 17-18. As the District Court held and the United States‘ silence appears to concede, none of HB56‘s provisions is a prescribed ―regulation of immigration‖ because DeCanas held that this term applies only to ―essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
13

conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.‖ Doc. 137-Pg 29 (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added)); see also Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that ―it is the creation of standards for determining who is and is not in this country legally that constitutes a regulation of immigration in these circumstances‖). Not even the Ninth Circuit majority in Arizona went so far as to suggest that Arizona‘s versions of Sections 10, 12, and 18 are constitutionally preempted. Indeed, the district court in that case held that the United States was not likely to show that Arizona‘s harboring provision is a prohibited regulation of immigration, and the United States did not appeal. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2010). Because Alabama‘s laws do not determine who will be admitted or the conditions under which legal entrants may remain, there is no colorable argument that any of these provisions, including Section 10, is constitutionally preempted.
HICA cites no controlling precedent suggesting that any of these provisions is constitutionally preempted. It does cite a now-vacated Third Circuit decision and a yet-to-be-reviewed district court decision from Texas enjoining, on constitutional regulation-of-immigration grounds, certain state laws that effectively precluded unlawfully present persons from residing in a particular city. HICA Br. 14; see Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 131 S.Ct. 2958 (2011); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
14

Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2010), appeal pending, No. 1010751 (5th Cir.); accord Cent. Ala. Fair Housing Ctr. v. Magee, No. 2:11cv982MHT, 2011 WL 6182334, at *7-*10 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2011) (preliminarily enjoining Section 30‘s application to mobile-home registrations on regulation-ofimmigration theory), appeal pending (11th Cir.). None of these decisions is binding precedent in any jurisdiction, and none was correct in light of DeCanas. But in any event, each turned on the narrow principle that a state law ―limiting access to housing‖ may count as a regulation of immigration if it effectively renders it impossible for an unlawfully present person not to live within a jurisdiction. Cent. Ala. Fair Housing, 2011 WL 6182334, at *8 (emphasis added); accord Villas at Parkside Partners, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (―Local regulation that conditions the ability to enter private contract for shelter on federal immigration status is of a fundamentally different nature than the sorts of restrictions on employment or public benefits that have been found not to be preempted regulations of immigration.‖).
That reasoning does not apply to Section 10 or any of the provisions at issue in HICA‘s appeal. Unlike a housing restriction, Section 10 does not make it impossible for an unlawfully present person to live in Alabama. It simply imposes a penalty upon unlawfully present persons who fail to comply with their federal registration requirements. It does so while deferring to the federal government‘s
15

determination of an individual‘s immigration status. See ALA. CODE §31-13-10(b). The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that HICA was not likely to show that this is a ―regulation of immigration‖ under DeCanas.
b. Section 10 is not field preempted. HICA also ventures into territory where neither the United States nor the Ninth Circuit has dared to tread when it asserts that Section 10 is field preempted. A district court in South Carolina did recently enjoin South Carolina‘s version of Section 10 on field-preemption grounds. See United States v. South Carolina, No. 2:11-cv-2958 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (slip op. 25-26). But the authority HICA and the South Carolina court offer in support of that proposition—Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941)—cannot carry the weight they seek to give to it. Hines dealt with conflict preemption, not field preemption. ―Our primary function,‖ the Hines Court said, ―is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania‘s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‖ Id. at 67. The Hines Court ―expressly [left] open all of appellees‘ other contentions, including the argument that the federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.‖ Id. at 62.
16

Post-Hines precedent makes clear that federal immigration law is not so comprehensive that it leaves no room for States to act. In DeCanas, the Court found no ―specific indication in either the wording or the legislative history of the INA that Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens in particular.‖ DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 (footnote omitted). It did so despite acknowledging the ―comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization.‖ Id. at 359. As the California Supreme Court has recently noted, the federal circuit courts that have addressed the question ―have unanimously concluded Congress has not occupied the field and preempted state assistance in the enforcement of federal criminal immigration law.‖ In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1100 (Cal. 2009) (citing Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1987); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001)). Instead, ―[t]hese courts recognize that Congress has established a regime of cooperative federalism, in which local, state, and federal governments may work together to ensure the achievement of federal criminal immigration policy.‖ Id.
Any assertion of field preemption in this context is belied by Congress‘s repeated encouragement of States to take a role in this area. As the Tenth Circuit
17

has held, ―Congress passed a series of provisions designed to encourage cooperation between the federal government and the states in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.‖ United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). Three statutes are particularly noteworthy for present purposes. First, 8 U.S.C. §1373 requires the Executive Branch to respond to all local inquiries about any alien‘s status. Second, 8 U.S.C. §1357(g) allows States to enter into agreements to deputize specially-trained state officers to exercise the full ―function[s] of an immigration officer‖ of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(1). Third, 8 U.S.C. §1252c clarifies that federal law does not preempt state and local officers from arresting certain unlawfully present aliens. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1298. Far from ―unmistakably . . . ordain[ing] exclusivity of federal regulation in this field,‖ DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 361, Congress unmistakably ordained the need and desire for state participation.
Nor does the comprehensive nature of the federal alien-registration system show that Congress intended to exclude state assistance in this particular area. Section 10 does not create a new state-specific registration standard or establish a new registration system. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 37-38. Section 10 simply provides for state and federal penalties against the same conduct, and neither Hines nor the statute indicates that Congress intended to preclude States from doing so. ―[M]erely because the federal provisions were sufficiently comprehensive to meet
18

the need identified by Congress did not mean that States and localities were barred from identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements in the field.‖ Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 717, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2377 (1985).
c. Section 10 is not conflict preempted. HICA also falls back on the United States‘ and Ninth Circuit‘s theory that provisions like Section 10 are conflict preempted. Alabama and Governor Bentley have explained why this argument is wrong, see U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 35-41, and the new points HICA offers on this issue do not change that conclusion. First, HICA is wrong to suggest that Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council stands for the proposition that ―‗conflict is imminent‘‖ whenever ―‗two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.‘‖ HICA Br. 18 (quoting 530 U.S. 363, 379-80, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000)). Conflict was imminent in Crosby because the federal government had imposed specific, intentionally limited sanctions on Burma, and Massachusetts had enacted its own set of sanctions. Massachusetts‘s law ―conflict[ed] with federal law at a number of points by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from sanctions.‖ 530 U.S. at 378. Section 10 does no such thing. It simply imposes concurrent penalties, no more substantial than the corresponding
19

federal penalties, for conduct Congress prohibited. Because Congress wants all aliens to register, imposing these penalties will not ―undermine[] the congressional calibration of force,‖ id. at 380.
Second, in asserting that Section 10 ―conflicts with Congress‘s enforcement scheme,‖ HICA Br. 21, HICA is really just repeating the Administration‘s argument that it can use its own sense of ―priorities,‖ and corresponding decisions not to enforce the law, to trump Congress‘s own purposes and objectives in this area. See Ala. v. U.S. Red Br. 22-33. If HICA is correct that the Administration is ―rarely prosecut[ing]‖ federal violations and has even stopped ―updat[ing]‖ the ―regulatory list of registration documents‖ on which the federal statutes ―rely,‖ HICA Br. 22 & n.4, then Section 10 actually will have the effect of reinstating, rather than undermining, the level of punishment and deterrence Congress chose when it enacted these statutes. If any calibration of force is different from Congress‘s here, it is the Administration‘s. And to the extent that the Administration‘s decision not to enforce these provisions is based on its assessment that it does not have the resources to do so, the concurrent enforcement provided by Section 10 can only help.
Third, HICA‘s assertions of ―conflict‖ ignore, again and again, that Section 10 defers to the federal government‘s determination of unlawful presence rather than requiring state officials to engage in the inquiry on their own. HICA asserts
20

that ―Section 10 conflicts with federal laws that permit an undocumented person to acquire lawful status or temporary permission to remain,‖ and adds that ―many foreign nationals who reside in the United States with the permission or knowledge of the United States do not possess or have readily available documentation that is acceptable under HB56.‖ HICA Br. 20, 23. But Section 10 does not apply to ―a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be present in the United States,‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-10(d), so those persons, if they are lawfully present, will not be in violation of Section 10. And 8 U.S.C. §1306(a), on which Section 10 predicates any finding of liability for failing to register, criminalizes only the ―willful‖ failure to register. So if for some reason these persons‘ status renders their failure non-willful, they will not be held in violation of Section 10.
And HICA cannot ground a preemption argument on the speculative assertion that some persons who might be convicted of violating Section 10 might, at some later point, be granted lawful status by the federal government. HICA Br. 20-21. The statutes Congress enacted require federal registration and the carrying of registration papers by certain aliens, even if they are later granted lawful status. Regardless, even if Section 10 were conflict-preempted as applied to that very small subset of persons, it has a plainly legitimate sweep as to other persons, and HICA‘s speculation would be no grounds for its facial invalidation. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449.
21

2. Congress has not preempted Section 12. In asserting that Congress has preempted provisions like Section 12, HICA, like the United States and the Ninth Circuit, looks past 8 U.S.C. §1373. That statute stands as direct evidence that Congress intended for States to make, and for the federal government to respond to, immigration-status inquiries. HICA nevertheless claims that Section 12 fails under all three steps of the DeCanas test. None of HICA‘s arguments is correct.
a. Section 12 is not conflict preempted. HICA‘s conflict-preemption argument is even broader, and thus even weaker, than the United States‘. The United States has conceded that Congress has not preempted state and local officers from making immigration-status inquiries with the federal government, as a general matter. Instead, the United States asserts, it is the mandatory nature of Section 12‘s protocols that renders them preempted. In what is perhaps a tacit acknowledgement of the shakiness of that middle ground, HICA is not willing to make the same concession. It instead asserts that state and local officers can never make these calls because their ―participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws‖ is ―limit[ed]‖ to four ―specific and
22

narrow circumstances‖ set forth in the U.S. Code. HICA Br. 25-26 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1103(a)(10), 1252c, 1324(c), & 1357(g)).
HICA‘s argument cannot be squared with §1373‘s language, and it certainly
cannot be squared with what became a common discretionary practice among state
and local law enforcement long before States began enacting provisions like
Section 12. The Senate Report accompanying §1373 spelled out the objective of
encouraging state law-enforcement agencies to make their own efforts to assist in
enforcement:
Effective immigration law enforcement requires a cooperative effort between all levels of government. The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related information by State and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of considerable assistance to, the Federal regulation of immigration and the achieving of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
S. Rep. No. 104-249, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at *19-20 (1996) (emphasis added).
Section 1373(b) therefore specifically said the Executive Branch could not
―prohibit, or in any way restrict, a . . . State, or local government entity from . . . [s]ending‖ information regarding immigration status to, or ―receiving‖ it from,
DHS. HICA‘s conflict-preemption argument is incompatible with that command. The provisions HICA cites as establishing a ―conflict‖ here only confirm
that Section 12 is consistent with Congress‘s intent. One of these provisions,
Section 1357(g), requires an agreement between a State and the federal
government before state agents can be deputized as ICE agents. See U.S. v. Ala. 23

Red Br. 23. But a proviso to that statute specifically says that nothing in that provision ―require[s] an agreement‖ before state and local officers ―communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States.‖ 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(10)(A). So Congress specifically envisioned that state officers would have the ability to make these inquiries.
Nothing about this interpretation of §§ 1357 and 1373 renders the other provisions cited by HICA ―surplusage.‖ HICA Br. 28. Those provisions address state and local officers‘ ability not to communicate with the federal government about a person‘s status, but rather to arrest persons for federal immigration crimes. But Section 12 does not, on its face, even purport to authorize state officers to make arrests for immigration offenses. It simply requires state officers, during routine stops and arrests, to uniformly make the sort of inquiries, ―when practicable,‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-12(a), that by DHS‘s own admission happen every day throughout the country, see http://www.ice.gov/lesc/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2011). Section 12 provides for a person‘s detention on immigration charges only ―if the federal government so requests.‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-12(e). Far from preempting detention in that circumstance, Congress has recognized that state officers can and should ―cooperate with the Attorney General in the . . .
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apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.‖ 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(10)(B).
In asserting that Section 12 is nonetheless preempted, HICA spends considerable time painting these statutory provisions as doing things they decidedly do not do. Section 12 does not, for example, authorize indefinite detention ―pending the outcome of an investigation into immigration status.‖ HICA Br. 29. See ALA. CODE §31-13-12(a) (requiring offices only to make a ―reasonable attempt, . . . when practicable,‖ to determine someone‘s status under §1373(c)). Nor does Section 12 turn Alabama‘s police officers into ―a roving immigration patrol.‖ HICA Br. 38. Section 12 simply requires officers, when in the course of an otherwise ―lawful stop‖ or ―arrest[],‖ to take the common-sense step of contacting the federal government to confirm a person‘s immigration status in appropriate circumstances. ALA. CODE §31-13-12(a)&(b). This is something officers already do, and there is no indication Congress wanted to preclude States from adopting uniform protocols to ensure that everyone who encounters their lawenforcement officers is treated equally.
b. Section 12 is not field- or constitutionally preempted. The field- and constitutional-preemption arguments HICA makes against Section 12 in passing stand on even shakier ground. See HICA Br. 32-34. In light
25

of §§1357(g)(10)(A) and 1373, HICA cannot seriously maintain that Congress has preempted States from acting in this field. And provisions designed to help the federal government identify unlawfully present aliens, at the federal government‘s invitation and request, can hardly amount to a prohibited regulation of immigration under DeCanas.
3. Congress has not preempted Section 18. HICA‘s Section 18 argument suffers from many of the same defects. HICA once again conjures up an untenable reading of the statute, asserting that Section 18 will require ―detention of indeterminate length‖ even when the person arrested for driving without a license is not ―prosecuted criminally‖ or requested for transfer by ―the federal government.‖ HICA Br. 35; see also id. at 36 (asserting that a ―county is required under Section 18 of HB56 to continue custody, even after the person‘s charges have been dropped, or after she has completed service of her sentence‖). That is not what the statute says. Section 18(d) provides for a person arrested for this state-law crime to be detained only ―until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.‖ ALA. CODE §32-6-9(d). So if authorities decline to prosecute the defendant and the federal government does not request the person‘s detention, Section 18 envisions that person‘s immediate release. And even if HICA‘s speculation that the statute might be misapplied in this way were to come to fruition, the right way to challenge that development
26

would be through a post-enforcement, as-applied challenge, not the preenforcement facial challenge that the District Court properly rejected. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449.
4. Sections 10, 12, and 18 taken together are not a regulation of immigration.
Finally, having failed to establish that any one of these provisions amounts to a regulation of immigration standing alone, HICA asserts that perhaps Sections 10, 12, and 18, taken together, might fit the bill. Because DeCanas limits constitutional preemption to laws regulating the admission and lives of lawfully present aliens, see supra at 13-14, HICA‘s argument is wrong in any event. But three points HICA makes on this front illustrate how, in trying to trot out a parade of horribles about HB56, HICA is routinely describing a statute that does not exist.
First, much of the rhetoric HICA employs rests upon the assertion that Sections 5 and 6 of HB56 will ―require[] state and local officers to enforce these criminal provisions to the fullest extent of the law, or else face criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits.‖ HICA Br. 37-38 (discussing ALA. CODE §31-13-5 & -6). Sovereign immunity takes almost all the air out of those tires. Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution broadly declares ―[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity,‖ and the Alabama Supreme Court has broadly construed this provision to preclude all suits for money damages
27

against state officers. See, e.g., Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 2006). The state constitution also imposes substantial limits on a party‘s standing to sue. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So. 2d 1158, 1164-65 (Ala. 2007); Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Ala. 2004). Accordingly, Sections 5 and 6 notwithstanding, no private plaintiff can sue state officers in their official capacity for money damages in an attempt to enforce HB56.
Second, HICA is overstating matters when it says Sections 10, 12, and 18 turn Alabama‘s police officers into a ―roving immigration patrol.‖ HICA Br. 38. The notion that state officers will go around stopping persons solely on suspected Section 10 violations is just as implausible as the notion that federal officers are going around stopping people on suspected violations of §1304(e) and §1306(a). An officer generally will not have any reason to think someone has violated Section 10 until that person has been stopped or arrested for some other, legitimate reason. It will only be then that the person will fail to produce valid federal registration papers that can give rise to a prosecution under Section 10. Cf. Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1995).
Third, HICA‘s portrayal of what conduct Section 10 prohibits is overblown. HICA suggests that Section 10 would mean a criminal conviction even for ―a person who has overstayed a student visa‖ but ―is pursuing an asylum application.‖
28

HICA Br. 38. There is no reason such a person would be subject to penalties under Section 10. When a student applies and receives his visa, he registers with the federal government at that time and receives the necessary federal documentation. See 8 U.S.C. §1301. Thus, the student overstaying his visa generally will not have willfully failed to register in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1306(a). And so long as he keeps that documentation with him during his asylum-application process, he will not fail to carry his registration papers with him in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1304(e).
On this point and elsewhere, HICA is dreaming up hypothetical situations that may never, and indeed should never, occur. The District Court acted well within its discretion when it held that this speculation was no grounds for HICA‘s pre-enforcement, facial challenge to every conceivable application of Section 10.
B. Congress has not preempted Section 27. Between the presumption against preemption, Congress‘s express statements making certain contracts with unlawfully present aliens illegal, and the States‘ primacy in defining their own contract laws, the District Court rightly concluded that there was no basis for a preliminary injunction against Section 27. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 46-51. On this point, HICA again opts for a more radical approach than the United States, asserting only that Section 27 amounts to an unconstitutional regulation of immigration. HICA Br. 38-40. The District Court
29

properly held that this assertion cannot be squared with DeCanas. Doc 137-Pg 31. But even if HICA‘s premises about what amounts to a ―regulation of immigration‖ were not contrary to DeCanas, its argument that Section 27 is a regulation of immigration would fail because it is based on a misreading of the statute.
HICA‘s argument proceeds on the mistaken assumption that Section 27 makes it impossible for an unlawfully present person to enter into a contract or enforce it in Alabama court. That is not what Section 27 says. The statute focuses not on the unlawfully present alien, but rather on the party on the other side of the transaction. Section 27 renders contracts unenforceable only if that party knows, or has constructive knowledge, that the other person is an unlawfully present alien. See ALA. CODE §31-13-26(a). It thus operates much like the prohibitions on employment at issue in DeCanas, discouraging lawfully present persons from knowingly doing business with unlawfully present aliens to the detriment of persons who are lawfully present. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 48. Thus, Section 27 does not strip an unlawfully present person of all ability to enter into and enforce contracts. So long as the other party does not know or have constructive knowledge that the person is not lawfully present, Section 27 does not render it unenforceable. Thus, Section 27 cannot be a ―regulation of immigration‖ even if HICA were right to suggest that it would be if it ―reach[ed] virtually all contracts‖ involving unlawfully present aliens. HICA Br. 40.
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There is thus no basis for HICA‘s challenge. HICA‘s speculation that Section 27 will place undue burdens on ―U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants‖ is unfounded and no basis for a facial challenge. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 49-51. And to the extent HICA is suggesting that Section 27 might be preempted as applied to ―rental agreements,‖ HICA Br. 40, that argument would be grounds, at most, for an as-applied challenge. The District Court acted well within its discretion when it declined to grant HICA‘s request for a declaration of Section 27‘s facial invalidity here.
C. Congress has not preempted Section 30. HICA limits its analysis of Section 30 to a regulation-of-immigration challenge, but that challenge fails for similar reasons. The District Court rightly concluded that Section 30, like all of the other provisions in HB56, is not a regulation of immigration as DeCanas defined that term. Doc 137-Pg 31. HICA‘s assertions otherwise are based not only in the misreading of DeCanas that permeates its entire brief, but also in yet another misinterpretation of HB56. As was the case on Section 27, HICA proceeds on a mistaken reading of Section 30. HICA asserts that ―Section 30 reaches into every aspect of everyday life for‖ persons who are unlawfully present, including ―sanitation, garbage, and recycling services.‖ HICA Br. 42. But both the District Court and the Alabama
31

Attorney General have rejected that reading of the statute. Instead, as the Attorney General has explained in recent guidance, Section 30 encompasses only ―‗a transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision of the state that involves the issuance of official government documents or like items of similar formality granting authorization to the person to engage in some activity.‘‖ ALA. ATT‘Y GEN. GUIDANCE 2011-02, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ago.state.al.us/Page-Immigration (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); see also U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 41-43. That interpretation, binding on all Alabama state executive officers, means that HICA is wrong about Section 30‘s scope.
It also means that HICA has no foundation for its preemption arguments. As Alabama and Governor Bentley have explained, there is no colorable argument that Section 30‘s prohibition on the issuance of licenses is facially preempted. Through numerous enactments, Congress has recognized that States need not condone the presence of those who are here in violation of immigration laws by issuing them licenses. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(2); id. §1621(a)&(c); Pub. L. 109-13, § 202(a)(1) & (c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005). HICA‘s assertion that States cannot prohibit unlawfully present aliens from obtaining a ―business license‖ simply ignores these provisions.
It is no response for HICA to say that Section 30 must be preempted because States, in the course of making their licensing decisions, will ―make mistakes in
32

determining whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States.‖ HICA Br. 43. Congress has recognized that States may engage in this process regardless of whether there is a risk that they will make mistakes. And like the statute the Supreme Court considered in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, Section 30 goes the extra mile by having the federal government make the unlawful-presence determination ―through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements [a/k/a ―SAVE‖] program operated by the Department of Homeland Security, or by other verification with the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1373(c).‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-29(c); cf. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1981 (2010) (plurality opinion). HICA provides no basis for its assertion that these programs cannot be used for these purposes, and federal statutes say the opposite. See Pub. L. 109-13, §202(c)(3)(C), 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (providing that States can utilize SAVE ―to verify the legal presence status of a person, other than a United States citizen, applying for a driver's license or identification card‖); 8 U.S.C. §1644 (providing that States cannot be prohibited, in the process of verifying eligibility for professional and commercial licenses under 8 U.S.C. §1621(a) & (c), from ―receiving‖ information from DHS regarding ―the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States‖).
Nor can HICA base a claim of facial preemption on alleged mistakes officials may have made in implementing Section 30 when it first went into effect.
33

See HICA Br. 42-43 n.10 & 12. Any time a statute goes into effect, executive officials will face challenges in determining how to apply the statute to whatever circumstances confront them. Section 30 was no exception to that rule. But as these circumstances have arisen, Alabama officials have conferred and implemented Section 30 in a reasonable, principled, uniform way. See ALA. ATT‘Y GEN. GUIDANCE 2011-02, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2011)). The District Court acted well within its discretion when it allowed this process of implementation to proceed.
D. The District Court correctly declined to enjoin Section 28.
The District Court was right when it refused to enjoin Section 28. Because none of the individual or organizational HICA Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Section 28, the Court‘s analysis of Section 28 largely appears in its decision in the United States‘ case. U.S. v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *57-58. There it concluded that Section 28 was not preempted – a conclusion that neither the United States nor HICA has shown to be wrong. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 51-55.
Beyond asserting that it has standing and repeating the United States‘ mistaken preemption argument, HICA attempts to advance a meritless equalprotection challenge to Section 28. As discussed below, HICA is wrong on all these fronts.
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1. The HICA Plaintiffs lack standing. As the District Court correctly held, both the organizational HICA Plaintiffs and individual HICA Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Section 28. Doc. 137 at 98-101. The ―irreducible constitutional minimum of standing‖ requires HICA to establish (1) an actual, concrete, and imminent injury; (2) caused by the conduct complained of; (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Because ―[s]tanding is not dispensed in gross,‖ HICA ―must demonstrate standing for each claim [it] seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.‖ Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2769 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). HICA‘s challenge to Section 28 cannot clear that jurisdictional hurdle.
a. The organizational HICA Plaintiffs lack standing. The organizational HICA Plaintiffs lack standing. These organizations have not identified a single member with standing to challenge Section 28. Cf. Doc. 137-Pg 100. They therefore stake their entire claim of standing with respect to Section 28 on the fact that they have spent their own resources providing information to interested persons about this provision. See HICA Br. 48-49. As they did below, they cite Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350-51
35

(11th Cir. 2009) (organization engaged in mobilizing voters can challenge statute that raises the cost of voting), and Florida State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1164-66 (11th Cir. 2008) (same), for the proposition that an organization‘s expenditure of resources can amount to an ―injury‖ for Article III purposes.
But ―[n]ot every diversion of resources to counteract the defendant[s‘] conduct . . . establishes an injury in fact.‖ N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010). And these two cases—and the Supreme Court decision on which they are based, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (1982)—cannot be extended so far. In each of these decisions, the challenged statute or action effectively required organizational plaintiffs to expend additional resources if they desired to continue engaging in established, preconduct activities. In Billups – a challenge to a Georgia voting statute – the organization was ―actively involved in voting activities‖ prior to passage of the challenged statute and ―would have to divert volunteers and resources from ‗getting [voters] to the polls‘ to helping them obtain acceptable photo identification.‖ 554 F.3d at 1350 (alteration in original). Likewise, in Browning, another challenge to a state voter-registration statute, the organizations had ―to divert scarce time and resources from registering additional voters to helping
36

applicants correct the anticipated myriad of false mismatches due to errors either by the Department of State or by the applicant.‖ 522 F.3d at 1164-65.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, ―an organization may establish injury in fact by showing that it had diverted significant resources to counteract the defendant‘s conduct; hence, the defendant‘s conduct significantly and ‗perceptibly impaired‘ the organization‘s ability to provide its ‗activities—with the consequent drain on the organization‘s resources.‘‖ N.A.A.C.P., 626 F.3d at 238 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379) (emphasis added). The diversion must not only be significant, it must be necessary. An organization ―cannot manufacture the injury by incurring litigation costs or simply choosing to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at all.‖ La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). ―It must instead show that it would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to counteracting the problem.‖ Id.
In other words, there must be a very close connection between the challenged conduct, the established activities of the organization that would be frustrated by that conduct, and the expenditure of the additional resources on concrete activities and efforts. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the HICA Plaintiffs had established no such connection here. Unlike the organizations in Billups and Browning that were actively registering
37

individuals to vote and taking them to the polls, none of the organizational HICA Plaintiffs have alleged that they are engaged in enrolling unlawfully present aliens in school, let alone that they have been doing so on an established basis. Doc. 137Pg 101. As the District Court found, instead of identifying a ―diversion of resources‖ aimed at ―activities designed to counteract or compensate for the effects of the challenged law,‖ here all the organizational HICA Plaintiffs have alleged is that they have spent time ―discussing Section 28.‖ Id. For example, the Executive Director of HICA averred that ―[m]any of the drop-in visitors seek information about the new law‘s provisions regarding K-12 education.‖ Doc. 37-2 – Pg 7; Doc. 109-3 – Pg 3 (―Parents of children . . . are asking what will happen to their children and themselves . . .‖).) Likewise, the Executive Director of Alabama Appleseed contends that his organization has had to respond to ―concerns related to the law,‖ including inquiries ―relate[d] to the education provision.‖ Doc. 109-2 – Pg 1; id. at 3 (―parents of both documented and undocumented children have asked us for information about how to enroll their children in school . . .‖).).
―The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.‖ Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Ass’n of Cmty.
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Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1999). In fact, the efforts identified by HICA fall within the ―normal, day-to-day operations of the group[s],‖ which is an insufficient injury for standing. See id. at 359. HICA already provides ―legal immigration services,‖ ―advocacy,‖ ―community education,‖ and ―training to the host community.‖ Doc. 37-2 – Pg 1. Likewise, Alabama Appleseed, a ―public interest advocacy organization,‖ focuses on ―network/coalition organizing and development, research, education, advocacy and policy development.‖ Doc. 37-6 – Pg 1. Section 28, and Alabama‘s immigration law generally, may have given these organizations another opportunity for advocacy and ―community education,‖ but it did not require the significant diversion of resources and efforts that justified standing in Billups and Browning. That the organizations‘ staffers have ―seen their work expand to include giving information on the impact of HB56 [generally] and listening to and responding to community members‘ fears about the new law‖ (Doc. 109-3 – Pg 4) is ―not a concrete and real injury fairly traceable to Section 28.‖ Doc. 137 – Pg 101; N.A.A.C.P., 626 F.3d at 238 (―Plaintiffs have not explained how the activities described above, which basically boil down to examining and communicating about developments in local zoning and subdivision ordinances, differ from the [organization‘s] routine lobbying activities.‖).
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To hold otherwise would be effectively to allow any organization to manufacture Article III standing on demand. For instance, under HICA‘s expansive theory of standing, any organization displeased with a recently-enacted state or federal law could challenge officials in federal court under the guise that it will now have to expend resources educating the community. And if expending resources to educate the community is sufficient, then direct associational standing could extend to newspapers, bloggers, or any advocacy organization with a penchant for litigation. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the organizational HICA Plaintiffs would be required to make a more substantial showing at the preliminary-injunction stage.
b. The individual HICA Plaintiffs lack standing. The individual HICA Plaintiffs also lack the actual and imminent injury necessary for standing. That is so because the individual Plaintiffs in question will not be subject to the data-collection requirements of Section 28. As the district court found, Section 28‘s status inquiry is triggered upon a child‘s ―enrollment,‖ which occurs only when a student first enters the school system. See Doc. 137-Pg 98. Citing Lee v. Eufaula City Board of Education, 573 F.2d 229, 234 n.12 (5th Cir. 1978), HICA suggests that enrollment occurs annually. HICA Br. 50. But based on ―the record‖ in Lee, the Court could ―only presume that all students
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attending the Eufaula schools are required to enroll annually.‖ 573 F.2d at 234 n.12. Neither the District Court nor this Court is required to make such a presumption here. The record is undisputed that enrollment occurs only once when the student first enters the state school system. Doc. 82-3 (stating that data collection processes under Section 28 ―will only apply to the initial enrollment of a student in the public schools of Alabama‖). Once a child enrolls in an Alabama elementary or secondary school, that child remains enrolled even if he or she moves elsewhere within the State or advances from elementary to secondary school. Only if a child withdraws from the Alabama public school system entirely—e.g., by moving to another State or switching to a private school—can enrollment a second time become necessary. For most children, enrollment will happen only once. The individual Plaintiffs identified in HICA‘s brief—which includes John Doe #1 and the school-aged children of Jane Doe #1-6 and John Doe #2—are already enrolled in Alabama public schools. Section 28 thus simply will not apply to them.
The individual HICA Plaintiffs now speculate that Alabama school officials might ―retract‖ this understanding of ―enrollment‖ and begin requiring annual inquiries into students‘ immigration status. HICA Br. 50. But this unfounded speculation cannot trump the undisputed evidence that ―‗enrollment‘ only occurs when a child enters the Alabama school system.‖ Doc. 137-Pg 98; Doc. 82-3. To
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support their speculation that at some unspecified future point in time the State might change implementation of Section 28, HICA cites National Advertising Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283 (11th Cir. 1991). But that case simply applies the mootness doctrine‘s voluntary-cessation exception and thus hardly speaks to what constitutes a cognizable ―injury‖ in the first instance.
In fact, HICA admits that ―the current policy would not immediately affect them.‖ HICA Br. 50. The individual plaintiffs‘ bare assertion that they ―remain at risk‖ – wholly unsupported by the record – is neither ―concrete‖ nor ―imminent.‖ Unless any of these currently-enrolled students leave the school system and then later attempt to re-enroll—a scenario entirely too speculative to constitute ―imminent harm‖ for standing purposes—they will never be asked for the information required by Section 28 and thus cannot plausibly be injured by it.
HICA also cannot premise its standing on an abstract stigmatic injury it now asserts is created by Section 28. HICA Br. 51. HICA offers no support for the assertion that Section 28 – which occurs at enrollment – ―creates a threatening and hostile learning environment‖ other than unsubstantiated ―fears‖ of some unnamed plaintiffs. Id. Critically, HICA cannot identify a stigmatic injury that is concrete and personal to one of the Plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court has made clear, a stigmatic ―injury accords a basis for standing only to ‗those persons who are
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personally denied equal treatment‘ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.‖ Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3326 (1984) (emphasis added).
The Sixth Circuit case on which HICA relies does not support the individual plaintiffs‘ standing. In Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, the ―direct and concrete connections‖ imposed by a local ordinance on a small and defined community ―demonstrate[d] that Smith‘s injury [wa]s ‗peculiar to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a part,‘ and that he is ‗personally subject to the challenged discrimination.‘‖ 760 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608 (1979); Allen, 468 U.S. at 755). Here, the individual HICA Plaintiffs challenge a broad statewide provision that is not linked to any particular school their child attends. If such attenuated injury were enough to establish standing, any child, parent, or community member across the entire State would have standing to challenge Section 28. This is the type of broad standing analysis that the Supreme Court rejected in Allen.
Nor can HICA create standing by suggesting – with no support – that ―school officials are effectively required to report students‘ information . . . to federal immigration authorities and state officials for enforcement purposes‖ under Sections 5 and 6. HICA Br. 51-52. Section 5(f) and Section 6(f) do not require school employees to report any students or parents whom they ascertain are here
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illegally to anybody. Instead, Section 5(f) and Section 6(f) merely require that Section 28 be enforced as written: the public elementary and secondary schools are to request the data, they are to report the data to the State Board of Education, and the State Board of Education is to analyze the data and report back to the Legislature. ALA. CODE §31-13-27. Nowhere does Section 28 compel school employees to turn in unlawfully present aliens, and, hence, Section 5(f) and Section 6(f) do not ramp up any compulsion to do. In fact, the evidence established that school officials were instructed that, aside from the data collection, ―[t]here will be no additional reporting requirements for the local school system.‖ Doc. 82-3-Pg 3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in crediting that evidence at the preliminary-injunction stage.
Two plaintiffs‘ fears that school officials may voluntarily report a child or parent‘s immigration status—information which, again, they are highly unlikely to obtain—to federal authorities is too speculative to give Jane Doe #3, Jane Doe #6, or any other plaintiff standing.
2. HICA cannot prevail on its challenge to Section 28. Because the District Court concluded that HICA lacked standing to challenge Section 28, it did not reach its substantive arguments that Section 28 should be enjoined. See Doc. 137 – Pg 101. ―As a general rule, [this Court] will not consider issues which the district court did not decide.‖ McKissick v. Busby,
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936 F.2d 520, 522 (11th Cir. 1991). This Court thus should not now consider HICA‘s arguments that Section 28 should be enjoined on preemption and equal protection grounds. Instead, if this Court concludes that HICA has standing, the Court should remand to the District Court to decide whether HICA is entitled to a preliminary injunction in their facial challenge to Section 28.
But even if this Court were to reach the merits of HICA‘s challenge to Section 28, the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction still would not be appropriate. As discussed below, HICA has not established that it is likely to prevail on either of its challenges to Section 28.
a. Section 28 is not preempted. Although the District Court did not directly reach HICA‘s arguments that Section 28 was likely preempted, it considered and rejected the United States‘ similar challenge to the statute. And in doing so, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the United States had not established a substantial likelihood that Section 28 is preempted. U.S. v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *57-58. Alabama and Governor Bentley have explained why that conclusion was eminently sound. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 51-55. The District Court also considered and rejected one of the general preemption arguments HICA again advances before this Court. With little support,
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HICA summarily suggests that Section 28 is an impermissible state regulation of immigration. But this argument cannot withstand review. The District Court concluded that the Act‘s provisions, including Section 28, were not an impermissible regulation of immigration. Doc. 137 – Pg 31. And a review of the statutory language of Section 28 confirms this conclusion. Section 28 does not require schools to verify student and parent immigration statuses. Cf. U.S. v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *56-57 (noting that ―it is possible that children will be presumed unlawfully-present aliens who are neither aliens nor unlawfullypresent‖); U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 52. Nor does it ―effectively guarantee[] the reporting of such information to federal immigration and state authorities.‖ HICA Br. 53; see supra at 43-44, 27-28. But even if it did, HICA has still failed to explain how collecting, or even reporting, information about an individual‘s immigration status to federal officials conflicts with federal law. See 8 U.S.C. §1644 (―Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from [DHS] information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.‖). Critically, Section 28 does not impermissibly determine ―who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.‖ DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (defining a regulation of immigration). As the Supreme Court has
46

explained, ―the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration.‖ Id.
Although HICA gave its Section 28 preemption argument short shrift before the District Court (Doc. 37-Pg 11, 19), HICA attempts to revive it with a novel argument advanced for the first time before this Court. It now argues that Section 28 is preempted by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (―PRWORA‖), which prohibits unlawfully present aliens from receiving federal, state, and local public benefits. HICA Br. 53-54; see Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1621). This argument is ―fatally flawed,‖ however, because HICA failed to raise it before the District Court. F.D.I.C. v. Verex Assur., Inc., 3 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir. 1993). It cannot claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider an argument never placed before it. And HICA has offered no sound reason for this Court to consider this ―late-breaking‖ theory now. See id.
Even if the Court were to consider this argument, it would afford HICA no relief. In a congressional attempt to limit unlawfully-present-alien eligibility for public benefits, the PRWORA restricts state and local public benefits to certain qualified aliens and non-immigrants. See 8 U.S.C. §1621(a). States remain free to provide benefits to other aliens, to restrict benefits to qualified aliens in certain circumstances, and to require verification of eligibility. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§1622,
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1624, 1625. Nothing in the statute suggests that States are not free to parallel their own restrictions based on the federal alien classifications.
Instead, HICA hinges its argument on 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2), a clause that says nothing about preemption or the ability of States to collect data about the immigration status of children in their public-school system. Section 1643(a)(2) simply states that ―[n]othing in this chapter may be construed as addressing alien eligibility for a basic public education as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States under Plyler v. Doe,‖ 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982). From this sentence – which says that the statute is inapplicable to public education – HICA leaps to the illogical conclusion that the statute ―preempts any state regulations that would deter children‘s access to a public education based on immigration status.‖ HICA Br. 54. Putting aside for the moment that Plyler (and the California district court decision cited by HICA) was a case about denial of public education, not deterrence, HICA still fails to explain how Section 28 is a statute designed to deter children from a public education. See infra at 54-55. Section 28 simply involves data collection and does not affect a child‘s ability to enroll in public school. There is no basis to infer that 8 U.S.C. §1643 – or any other federal law – preempts the data-collection directive in Section 28.
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b. Section 28 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. HICA does raise a single, non-preemption argument not asserted in the United States‘ appeal. But this equal-protection argument fares no better than the preemption claims. As discussed below, Section 28 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
i. Section 28 does not trigger the Equal Protection Clause. HICA suggests that Section 28 creates three ―classifications‖ of students, HICA Br. 54, but as the Supreme Court has held, ―[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.‖ Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331 (1992). Instead, ―[i]t simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.‖ Id. (emphasis added.) And Section 28 does not create disparate treatment. On the contrary, as HICA admits, Section 28 is clear and the evidence is undisputed that the same questions are asked with respect to all children at the time of their enrollment. HICA Br. 54 (―Under Section 28, all students must show a birth certificate to school officials at enrollment.‖); Doc. 82-3. Critically, there is no requirement of an answer. Cf. U.S. v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *57. Section 28 imposes no consequences on any student or parent for failing to comply with it—let alone
49

consequences based on immigration status or any other status. And the record is
undisputed that Alabama schools remain open under Section 28 to all children
regardless of their immigration status (or their parents‘ status). At bottom, Section
28 is about data collection, not disparate treatment, and data collection does not
trigger the Equal Protection Clause.
Local, state, and federal governments often collect and compile statistical
data, including data that relate to gender, race, and ethnicity. Cf. HICA Br. 57 n.15
(citing citizenship statistics from a Pew Hispanic Center report). Doing so does
not violate the Equal Protection clause when persons are treated the same in the
gathering of the data. As the United States has argued in an Equal Protection
challenge to census questions about race and medical conditions:
The government‘s position is that case law is clear that it is differential treatment, not classification, that implicates equal protection, and cites the opinion Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992): ―The equal protection clause does not forbid classification. It simply keeps decision makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.‖
The government also cites Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 583 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir.1978), which held ―the Constitution itself does not condemn the collection of this data,‖ referring to a local census of the racial and ethnic breakdown of public school employees. Id. at 611. Adarand [Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)] held that equal protection guards against government actions based on race, but does not deal with government collection of data on race.
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See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 813 (S.D. Tex. 2000). That district court correctly agreed with the United States, and granted the federal defendants summary judgment on all claims, including the Equal Protection claim.
The same reasoning applies with even more force here. Morales involved collecting data on race, the quintessential protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, Morales involved criminal sanctions for failure to provide the requested data, but Section 28 imposes no penalty for refusal to provide the information. As courts have held, it is disparate treatment by the government that warrants Equal Protection scrutiny, not simple informationgathering. See, e.g., Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
HICA cannot evade this conclusion by suggesting that information-gathering under Section 28 will deter or ―chill‖ students from gaining access to the classroom – a result that it asserts would be unconstitutional under Plyler v. Doe. HICA Br. 58-59. As an initial matter, constitutional concerns over chilling effects have arisen primarily in the First Amendment context, where the fundamental right of freedom of speech is in jeopardy. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2344-45 (1997). And there, ―the existence of a ‗chilling effect[]‘ ... has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action.‖ Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51, 91 S.Ct. 746, 754 (1971). But more importantly, even if HICA could assert a deterrence or chilling-effect claim, it has
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offered no support for this argument, other than the ―Dear Colleague‖ letter and fact sheets from the United States Departments of Justice and Education. HICA Br. at 59 n.16.
In fact, the evidence introduced before the District Court established that no child would be deterred or prevented from enrolling in school based on Section 28. The State Superintendent instructed school officials expressly that ―[n]o student shall be denied enrollment or admission to the school due to a failure to provide the birth certificate or other supplemental documentation described in this section.‖ Doc. 82-3. The State Superintendent also emphasized that ―[t]here will be no additional reporting requirements for the local school system.‖ Id. The State Superintendent has made clear that Section 28 will not deter or deny any child the opportunity to enroll in school, even without providing the requested information.
In the very least, HICA‘s speculation that children will be chilled or deterred from enrolling in school is a question of fact that requires a remand. ―Where, as here, the district court did not make a specific finding as to an essential fact, it is appropriate to remand for further findings so that [this Court] may then exercise a meaningful review.‖ Smith v. State of Ga., 684 F.2d 729, 735 (11th Cir. 1982).
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ii. At most, Section 28 need survive only rational-basis review. Even if Equal Protection analysis were warranted here, no more than a rational explanation for Section 28 should be demanded of the State. ―[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification[s] rationally further a legitimate state interest.‖ Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10; accord Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367, 121 S.Ct. 955, 964 (2001) (―Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is so because none of the classifications HICA has identified ―jeopardize[] exercise of a fundamental right or categorize[] on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic,‖ thus requiring heightened scrutiny. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10. HICA is wrong to suggest that ―Section 28 creates a classification‖ that serves as a ―proxy for alienage.‖ HICA Br. 54. At most, Section 28 directs schools to request additional documentation of some students‘ status beyond a birth certificate. Cf. Doc. 82-3. It is incorrect to say, as HICA has suggested, that this group consists only of ―children born outside the United States‖ and constitutes an ―alienage classification.‖ HICA Br. 54-55. This group is broader and in fact consists of all students for whom a request for a birth certificate proves
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inconclusive in determining citizenship, including U.S. citizens whose parents or guardians cannot or will not produce such a document.
HICA is also wrong to suggest that Section 28 is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it requires classification of ―children who are presumed to be unlawfully present.‖ HICA Br. 55-56. As the Supreme Court has recognized, ―[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‗constitutional irrelevancy.‘‖ Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. Nor can HICA elevate this Court‘s scrutiny by invoking the field of education: ―Public education is not a ‗right‘ granted to individuals by the Constitution.‖ Id. at 221. HICA has identified neither a fundamental right nor an inherently suspect characteristic that would warrant heightened scrutiny.
Citing Plyler, HICA erroneously suggests that ―[a]ny state law that serves as a barrier to a public education based on immigration status must be ‗justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.‘‖ HICA Br. 56 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added)). That is not what Plyler held. The Court‘s holding was that Texas failed to demonstrate that its policy of outright denying an education to unlawfully present aliens ―further[ed] some substantial goal of the State‖ such that it could ―be considered rational.‖ 457 U.S. at 224. HICA cannot equate Alabama‘s data-collection-and-reporting requirements to Texas‘s policy of outright denial. HICA‘s allegations that Section 28 will deter
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children—lawful and unlawful, alike—from enrolling in school are not only highly speculative and unsupported by the record, but incorrect as a matter of fact. See supra 52. Regardless of whether the parent or guardian refuses to provide any documentation or how the child is coded in the statewide student management system, the child experiences no real-world impact or disparate treatment: the child is still enrolled in school.
HICA‘s third attempt to invoke heightened scrutiny also fails. Contrary to its assertions, Section 28 does not create ―a classification of children based on their parents‘ immigration status.‖ HICA Br. 56. As the District Court found, ―school officials must rely on the birth certificate to determine ‗whether the student . . . is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.‘‖ Doc. 137 – Pg 96. The District Court found as a factual matter that ―[i]nformation about the immigration status of a parent is not reflected on Alabama birth certificates,‖ so Section 28 ―does not compel school officials to determine the immigration status of a parent of a student.‖ Id. at 96-97. It is thus effectively impossible under the text of Section 28 for the State to make any classification based on a parent‘s immigration status. Moreover, the authority HICA cites to support its argument that the immigration status of parents invokes intermediate scrutiny involves discriminatory treatment. Here it has identified no classification imposed by Section 28, much less any differential treatment based on such a classification.
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HICA has failed to identify any disparate treatment based on a classification that warrants heightened scrutiny. To the extent that that Equal Protection Clause is triggered, Section 28 is subject to the deferential standard of rational-basis review.
iii. Section 28 serves a legitimate government purpose. Because Section 28 is subject to rational-basis review, it must be upheld if it is justified by a rational reason. ―‗The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.‘‖ Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985)). This review ―affords states wide latitude when crafting social or economic legislation.‖ Id. at 1230 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Alabama Legislature has expressly identified at least two rational bases for Section 28: (1) the desire to collect data about ―the costs incurred by school districts‖ to educate ―children who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States‖; and (2) ―to forecast and plan for any impact that the presence [of unlawfully present aliens] may have on publicly funded education in this state.‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-2. The data could help the Legislature budget and plan by highlighting districts that, because they have an unusually high number of
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unlawfully present students, have an insufficient tax base to support the school‘s needs. Id. §31-13-27(d)(4) (requesting information on the ―fiscal costs to the state and political subdivisions thereof of providing educational instruction, computers, textbooks and other supplies, free or discounted school meals, and extracurricular activities to students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States‖).
The data could also help the State defend litigation in which the costs of illegal immigration are at issue. And in the very least, the data could help enlighten the public about the impacts of illegal immigration. By enhancing the public debate, lawmakers and voters will be better informed about the need for particular types of legislation and state and local programs.
Contrary to HICA‘s assertions, the State need not support these rational justifications with ―factual support.‖ HICA Br. 59-60. As the Supreme Court has held, under rational basis review, a State ―has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.‖ Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993). ―Rather, a statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the one attacking the law to negate every conceivable basis that might support it, even if that basis has no foundation in the record.‖ Leib v. Hillsborough County Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). This is a heavy burden that HICA cannot bear: it cannot rightly contend that a state legislature does not have an interest in forecasting the student
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population entering its public schools in an effort to plan for the future and determine the costs borne by the system.
Nor can HICA escape this legitimate basis for Section 28 with its arguments that the data sought will not give a completely precise picture of the number of unlawfully present aliens attending public schools. HICA Br. 62. As this Court has explained, ―[u]nder rational basis review, a court must accept a legislature‘s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.‖ Leib, 558 F.3d at 1306. To the extent that the count Section 28 generates is not precise, that is only because the statute goes out of its way not to force parents or their students to release immigration-status information if they choose not to do so.
HICA cannot overcome Section 28‘s presumed validity when the State has proffered a valid legitimate basis for the statute. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to enjoin Section 28.
E. HICA failed to meet its burden for a preliminary injunction. Contrary to HICA‘s protestations, the District Court did not err when it declined to address the other three prongs of the preliminary injunction standard. As this Court has held, if the movant is ―unable to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, [the Court] need not consider the other requirements.‖ Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011). Because the District
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Court concluded that neither the United States nor HICA could meet the threshold requirement for a preliminary injunction on Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30, it did not need to further consider the remaining equitable factors.
HICA also is wrong when it asserts that the District Court applied the incorrect standard. It suggests that when the ―balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of the movants,‖ it need show only a ―substantial case on the merits.‖ HICA Br. 64. HICA is mistaken. The well-settled standard for a preliminary injunction requires that the plaintiff show ―a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.‖ Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). As this Court has explained, ―[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.‖ Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added).
HICA cannot skirt this rule by citing the standard for a ―stay [of] the trial court‘s mandate.‖ United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322, 323 (11th Cir. 1992); HICA Br. 64. A decision whether to stay a mandate involves a fundamentally different inquiry, under which the trial court may rightly determine that equity requires that it stay the effect of its decision even if the appellant can only show a ―substantial case on the merits.‖ See Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir.
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Unit A June 26, 1981). A preliminary injunction is an entirely different matter. It requires the court to take action, and to alter the currently existing set of legal relations between the parties. This Court‘s jurisprudence thus rightly requires a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction to always show, in the very least, that it is likely to succeed on the merits. (That said, even if HICA were right that the standard for stays applies in the preliminary-injunction context, it has not shown even a substantial case on the merits.)
The District Court applied the correct standard and, in a detailed and wellreasoned decision, concluded that the United States and HICA were not likely to prevail on merits of their claims against Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30. HICA cannot overcome this failure to establish the likelihood-of-success prong by raising the specter of irreparable harm.
II. In the Alabama Defendants’ cross-appeal, this Court should reverse. The District Court did erroneously enjoin four provisions of the Act—three on
compulsory-process grounds, and one on preemption grounds. As discussed below, the District Court should not have enjoined those four provisions, and in those limited respects this Court should reverse.
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A. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) on compulsory-process grounds.
The District Court abused its discretion when it sustained HICA‘s preenforcement, facial challenge to Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). Sections 10, 11, and 13 each create State-law offenses under which an alien‘s unlawful presence in the United States—as determined by the federal government—acts as a predicate for criminal liability. The substantive prohibitions embodied by each of these provisions are the subject of preemption challenges by the United States and HICA: Section 10 is HB56‘s prohibition on the failure to register or carry registration documents; Section 11 contains the Act‘s prohibition on the solicitation of employment by unauthorized aliens; and Section 13 criminalizes, among other things, the harboring of persons not lawfully present. ALA. CODE §§31-13-10, 31-13-11, 31-13-13. See U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 35-41, 55-59, 61-66 (discussing the United States‘ challenge to each of those substantive prohibitions). But at issue in this cross-appeal is not those substantive prohibitions but the mechanisms they provide for determining whether the alien at issue is unlawfully present or not authorized to work. Under subsections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h), the unlawful-presence element of each of these new offenses is to be determined solely by the federal government. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §31-13-10(e) (―A court of this state shall consider only the federal government‘s verification in determining
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whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.‖). In facially enjoining these sections, the District Court concluded that Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) ―violate[] the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment by denying the accused the right to present evidence in his or her defense‖ as to lawful presence in the United States. Doc. 137 – Pg 53-54.
To be clear, these provisions were designed to protect the defendants in these cases, not to limit their ability to mount a defense. These sections are designed to require the state courts to respect the federal government‘s authority to determine immigration status rather than having the state courts reach their own conclusion. They prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence in an attempt to circumvent the federal government‘s determination of a defendant‘s status.
That said, the District Court may have been justified in determining that these provisions, by their plain language, would unconstitutionally preclude a defendant from ―hav[ing] compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.‖ U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. These provisions do not, on their face, allow a defendant to offer evidence disputing the federal government‘s determination of their unlawful status. So although the provisions were intended to help defendants, they may, by their plain terms, actually bar defendants from putting on this evidence. While it is possible that the Alabama Supreme Court would interpret that problem out of these statutes by reading them to allow the defense to put on
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additional evidence on this score—and thus, perhaps, the District Court should have certified this question to the Alabama Supreme Court—the District Court had reasonable grounds for concluding that the language of the provisions does not, by its terms, contemplate a defendant‘s ability to put on this additional evidence.
The District Court still abused its discretion by actually enjoining these provisions. No injunction was necessary or appropriate here because any asserted Sixth Amendment violation could have been addressed by the state courts when the situation arose in the course of a criminal prosecution. To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff needs to show actual and imminent injury. But here, all that was afforded the District Court was layers of speculation. First, the District Court speculated that some of the plaintiffs will be arrested, charged, and prosecuted. Add to that speculation the prediction that the state courts, during their prosecution, will improperly reject the individual HICA Plaintiffs‘ Sixth Amendment arguments and prohibit the defendants from offering witnesses in their favor. Only then – when all of these speculative circumstances converge – are the individual HICA Plaintiffs positioned to suffer an infringement of their Sixth Amendment rights.
Because it takes layers of speculation to arrive at the asserted constitutional violation, the District Court erred in preliminarily enjoining Sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). ―Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of
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irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court‘s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.‖ Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. HICA has not yet made that showing, and the District Court abused its discretion in holding otherwise. The proper means for redressing this Sixth Amendment concern was through adjudication in the state courts during a prosecution, not through a preliminary injunction issued by a federal court.
B. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining the entirety of Section 8.
The District Court also erred in enjoining Section 8. Although the District Court was right that Section 8 may contain a sentence that conflicts with federal law, it abused its discretion when it enjoined the provision in its entirety. Section 8 prohibits an ―alien who is not lawfully present‖ from attending any public postsecondary institution in Alabama. ALA. CODE §31-13-8. As a general matter, there is nothing problematic about such a prohibition. As the District Court recognized, a State is entitled to ―exclude unlawfully-present aliens, as determined by federal law, from enrolling in and attending its public postsecondary educational institutions.‖ Doc. 137 – Pg 44 n.13; see, e.g., Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 603 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that States may deny
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admission to unlawfully present aliens); 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(B) (defining a ―State or local public benefit,‖ for which an unlawfully present alien is not eligible, to include ―postsecondary education‖); id. §1623 (limiting eligibility for preferential treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher education benefits).
The problem identified by the District Court, however, was in a single sentence found in Section 8. That sentence provides that an alien attending a postsecondary institution must possess ―lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. §1101, et seq.‖ ALA. CODE §31-138. Unlike the remainder of the law, this sentence does not defer to the federal definition of lawfully-present alien, but instead appears to create a more limited definition that reaches only lawfully-present aliens who possess a particular status under federal law. Based on this apparent limitation, the District Court concluded that this sentence evidenced an impermissible attempt to create a state classification of aliens that departed from federal classifications. Doc. 137 – Pg 38. Because ―‗States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens[,]‘‖ the District Court concluded that the provision was preempted. Doc. 137 – Pg 38 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225), 44.
Although that reasoning may have been sound, it neither compelled nor allowed the District Court to enjoin the entire provision. The Court should have
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instead done one of two things, either of which would have resulted in that sentence being declared inoperative, and the rest of the provision going into effect.
First, the District Court could have read the sentence as a clear scrivener‘s error that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, had no effect. Section 8 is replete with references to and reliance on federal law. The first sentence of the statute evidences an intent to deny admission to ―[a]n alien who is not lawfully present.‖ ALA. CODE §31-13-8. The section then authorizes an institution official to ―seek federal verification of an alien‘s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1373(c).‖ Id. Critically, the section provides that the official ―shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.‖ Id. When Section 8 is read in its entirety, it evidences a legislative intent to prohibit admission of unlawfully present aliens as determined by federal law. The second sentence – which the District Court read as drawing distinctions not found in federal law – was in clear tension with the overall intent of the section.
Section 8, therefore, should be read to advance the overall intent of the Legislature ―to prohibit a person not lawfully present from being eligible on the basis of residence for education benefits.‖ Act No. 2011-535 (Doc. 131-1), title. Under principles of statutory construction, when a statute contains an obvious mistake or error, a court may correct the error based on the context of the statutory
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language. See Guy H. James Constr. Co. v. Boswell, 366 So.2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1979) (―An obvious error in the language of a statute is self-correcting. In such an instance, the Court may substitute the correct word when it can be ascertained from the context of the act.‖ (citation omitted)); Ex parte Welch, 519 So.2d 517, 519 (Ala.1987) (―‗A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.‘‖ (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §46.06 (4th ed. 1984))). The District Court should have accepted that limiting construction here.
Second, even if it had not been possible to read the problem out of the statute through statutory construction, the right result was not an injunction against Section 8 in its entirety. Instead, the appropriate remedy would have been to sever the second sentence by enjoining it, and to let the rest of the provision go into effect. See Act No. 2011-535 (Doc. 131-1), §33 (―The provisions of this act are severable.‖). As this Court has recognized, ―[i]t is well-settled that a district court abuses its discretion when it drafts an injunction that is unnecessarily broad in scope.‖ Alley v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 590 F.3d 1195, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). That is so because ―[i]njunctive relief should be limited in scope to the extent necessary to protect the interests of the parties.‖ Keener v. Convergys
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Corp., 342 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also U.S. v. Ala. Red Br. 55-59 (arguing that the District Court should have taken a similar approach with respect to Section 13).
The Alabama Defendants offered evidence that its officers planned to implement Section 8 in conjunction with the limiting construction. The Chancellor of Postsecondary Education issued a letter instructing state institutions to accept ―any document issued by the United States government authorizing an alien‘s continued presence in the United States.‖ Doc. 82-4. The letter was explicit that ―[w]hether . . . an alien is ‗lawfully present in the United States‘ is a matter of federal law.‖ Id. Despite the conflicting second sentence of Section 8, the Chancellor‘s letter expressly affirmed that ―there are some categories of aliens who are lawfully present in the United States who are not lawful permanent residents and who are not in possession of a non-immigrant visa. Aliens in these categories are also eligible to enroll in Alabama‘s postsecondary educational institutions.‖ Id. The Chancellor‘s letter makes clear that Section 8 would be implemented in full accordance with federal law.
At most, then, the District Court should have enjoined the second sentence of Section 8. By instead enjoining the entire section, the District Court abused its discretion.
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CONCLUSION In HICA‘s appeal, No. 11-14535, this Court should affirm the District Court‘s decision declining to preliminarily enjoin Sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30. In the State Defendants‘ cross-appeal, No. 11-14675, this Court should reverse the District Court‘s decision preliminarily enjoining Sections 8, 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h) .
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Respectfully submitted,
LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) A ttorn ev Genera!

BY:

-

—
—
Elizabeth Prim Escalona (ASB-7447-H69F) Deputy Solicitor Genera!

John C. Neiman, Jr. (ASB-8093-068N) Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL
501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152 Telephone: 334.242.7300 Facsimile: 334.353.8440 jfleiman(a,ago .state.al .us pescalona(a. ago.state.al.us
Attorneys for the State Defendants Governor Bentley, Attorney General Strange, Superintendent Craven, Chancellor Hill, and District Attorney Broussard

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify this brief complies with the applicable type-volume limitation under Rule 32(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 11th Circuit Rule 32-4. According to the word count in Microsoft Word 2007, there are 15,501 words in this brief. I also certify this brief complies with the applicable type-style requirements limitation under Rule 32(a)(5) and (6). 1 prepared this brief in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2007 in 14-point, Times New Roman font.
OF COUNSEL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On December 27, 2011, I dispatched this brief to Federal Express for delivery to the Court within three business days. I also uploaded this brief in electronic format to the Court‘s website. And I served the following attorneys for the United States by electronic mail:

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Ave. Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Michelle R. Lapointe Kristi Graunke Naomi Tsu Daniel Werner SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 T: (404) 521-6700 michelle.lapointe@splcenter.org kristi.graunke@splcenter.org naomi.tsu@splcenter.org daniel.werner@splcenter.org
Sin Yen Ling ASIAN LAW CAUCUS 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 896-1701 x 110 sinyenL@asianlawcaucus.org

Andre Segura Elora Mukherjee Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Michael K. T. Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 asegura@aclu.org ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org mtan@aclu.org emukherjee@aclu.org
Cecillia D. Wang Katherine Desormeau Kenneth J. Sugarman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS‘ RIGHTS PROJECT 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 T: (415) 343-0775 cwang@aclu.org kdesormeau@aclu.org irp_ks@aclu.org

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Erin E. Oshiro ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER, MEMBER OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN CENTER FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE 1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 296-2300 eoshiro@advancingequality.org
Foster S. Maer Ghita Schwarz Diana S. Sen LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 T: (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org gschwarz@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Shiu-Ming Cheer Melissa S. Keaney NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 639-3900 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org cheer@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org
Tanya Broder NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 405 14th Street, Suite 1400 Oakland, California 94612 T: (510) 663-8282 broder@nilc.org

G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 T: (404) 872-7086 bspears@mindspring.com
Chris Newman Jessica Karp NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK 675 S. park View St., Suite B Los Angeles, California 90057 T: (213) 380-2785 newman@ndlon.org jkarp@ndlon.org

Herman Watson, Jr. (ASB-6781O74H) Eric J. Artrip (ASB-9673-I68E) Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137T64J) Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP 203 Greene Street P.O. Box 18368 Huntsville, Alabama 35804 T: (256) 536-7423 watson@watsonmckinney.com mckinney@watsonmckinney.com artrip@watsonmckinney.com

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Allison Neal (ASB 3377-172N) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION 207 Montgomery St., Suite 910 Montgomery, Alabama 36104 T: (334) 265-2754 x 203 anealaclualabama.org
Freddy Rubio (ASB-5403-D62R) Cooperating Attorney, ACLU of Alabama Foundation Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Carr Avenue, Suite I Birmingham, Alabama 35209 T: 205-443-7858 frubio@rubiofirm.com
Ben Bruner (ASB-BRU-OOl) THE BRUNER LAW FIRM 1904 Berryhill Road Montgomery, Alabama 36117 T: (334) 201 0835 brunerlrnvflrrn@grnail. coin
J.R. Brooks Taylor P. Brooks LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C. P.O. Box 2087 Huntsville, AL 35804 jrb@iftp. corn tpb(djlanierford. corn

Victor Virarnontes Martha L. Gomez MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 1 1 th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 T: (213) 629-2512 x 133 vvira,non tes rnaldeforg rngomez@maldef org
Nina Perales MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, Texas 78205 T: (210) 224-55476 x 206 nperaies @rnaldef org
Amy Pedersen MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 1 6th Street NW, Suite 100 Washington, DC 20036 T: (202) 293-2828 x 12 apedersenrnaidef org

Counsel for RICA consented to service via electronic mail under Rule 25(c)( 1 )(D).

‘,-‘--

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OF-COUNSEL

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 Case: 11-14532 Date Filed: 03/08/2012 Page: 1 of 1

John Ley Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
March 08, 2012

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 11-14532-CC Case Style: USA v. State of Alabama, et al District Court Docket No: 2:11-cv-02746-SLB

The following action has been taken in the referenced case: The enclosed order has been ENTERED. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Joe Caruso, CC /bmc Phone #: (404) 335-6177

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

MOT-2 Notice of Court Action

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