Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 9 Filed 05/03/2001 Page 1 of 4

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EQUALEMPWYMEN;(cqt'<PORTUNITY §

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COMMISSION and.' ': '; i .',: i,\

§ CIVIL ACTION NO.

Ol-D-276-N

Plaintiff Intervenor,

§

PAMELA JODIE HARRIS,

§

Plaintiffs,

§ COMPLAINT

v.

§

BALLARD REALTY MANAGEMENT

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

COMPANY, INC.

§

And

§

BALLARD REALTY COMPANY, INC., §

Defendants.

§

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

This is a civil action for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, damages and other

appropriate relief to protect and redress the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities
secured under Title vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, §701 et seq., §701(k), 42

U.S.c. §2000e et seq., §2000e(k), the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.c. §1981a. Kathryn

Dickey represents Pamela Jodie Harris ("Ms. Harris") and brings this action on her behalf

JURISDICTION

L Ms. Harris alleges that Federal question jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 US.c.

§1331, 1343, and 2201 and that there exists a justiciable controversy between her and the

Defendants, Ballard Realty Management Company and Ballard Realty Company. Defendants

have continuously employed at least fifteen employees and engages in an industry affecting

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 9 Filed 05/03/2001 Page 2 of 4
interstate commerce. 2. Ms. Harris asserts that she has exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a
Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. Subsequently thereto, the EEOC timely brought the underlying case base on said Charge of Discrimination.
VENUE
3. Ms. Harris is over the age of nineteen (19) years and is a resident of Elmore County, Alabama.
4. Defendants have been an Alabama corporation doing business in the State of Alabama in Montgomery County, Alabama at all times relevant to this complaint.
FACTS 5. Plaintiffllntervenor was employed by Ballard as a Leasing Consultant, from August 26, 1996 to June of 1998. Defendants engaged in a pattern of intentional abuse, pregnancy discrimination against the PlaintifflIntervenor. As a result of the Defendant's actions, Ms. Harris has been denied her rights of equal employment opportunities on the basis of her sex. 6. Ms. Harris became pregnant in April of 1998. She informed management at Ballard of her pregnancy in late April or early May. Just prior to informing Ballard of her pregnancy, in March of 1998 Ms. Harris was Employee ofthe Quarter. After informing Ballard of her pregnancy, Ms. Harris experienced a hostile work environment. 7. Ms. Harris was told that she was not dependable because she came to work late, when in fact she was experiencing morning sickness. Ms. Harris' continued to complete her work Tardiness was never a problem prior to her pregnancy. The Friday prior to being told she was undependable, she had executed eight leases. 8. In June of 1998 Ballard decreased Ms. Harris' work hours from forty (40) hours a

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 9 Filed 05/03/2001 Page 3 of 4

week to sixteen (16) hours a week.

9. Ms. Harris was harassed, discriminated against, and subjected to a hostile

working

environment, in violation to Title VII, as amended and as a result has suffered damages

including but not limited to pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation and loss of income.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Harris requests that the Court grant the following relief:

(1) Declare Defendants unfair and unequal practices in violation ofthe Federal Law;

(2) Enjoin Defendants from further violations ofthe employment rights of individuals

similarly situated;

(3) Grant Ms. Harris such relief as it finds her entitled, including reinstatement, back

pay, monetary damages, punitive damages, interest, Court costs, and reasonable

attorney's fees.

tJf f i RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTIED this

day of April

V '...L-,~---

a Di ey (DIC025) Attorney for PlaintifflInte Pamela Jodie Harris

OF COUNSEL:

Kathryn Dickey

Attorney at Law

492 South Court Street

Montgomery, Alabama 36104

(334) 269-6011

(334) 269-6012

FAX

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 9 Filed 05/03/2001 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing upon the following via U.S.
d Mail with postage pre-paid this the ~ day of April 2001:
Mason D. Barrett Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1130 22nd Street South, Suite 2000 Birmingham, Alabama 35205-2

 
 Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 1 of 13

[FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

~ .--- liAY 1 6 2/cY}, ,
r} u. CLERK S. DISTRICT COURT
l MIDDLE DIST. OF ALA. _

COMMISSION, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

CIVIL ACTION 01-D-276-N

)

BALLARD REALTY MANAGEMENT

)

COMPANY, INC., et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, which was filed on April 10, 2002. (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiff ~qual Employment Opportunity Commission and Plaintiff-Intervenor Pamela Jodie Harris ("EEOC", "Harris", and collectively "Plaintiffs") each filed a Response on April 29. (Doc. Nos. 2324.) Defendants filed a Reply thereto on May 6. (Doc. No. 25.) After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion is due to be granted.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD The court construes the evidence and makes factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) i Adickes
EOD

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 2 of 13
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. civ. P. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determiners] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).
This determination involves applying substantive law to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence presented. See id. at 248; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, which must designate specific facts remaining for trial and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Judgment will be granted when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 587.
2

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 3 of 13
II. DISCUSSION The parties to the present action do not dispute that in the summer of 1998, shortly after Harris announced her pregnancy to her co-workers, her work schedule was cut back from forty hours per week to a mere sixteen. (Harris Aff. ~ 2.) The caliber of Harris' overall skills as a leasing agent is likewise not contested. (Godwin Aff. , 4.) Indeed, shortly before her schedule was altered, Defendant Ballard Realty Company presented Harris with an award entitled "Leasing Agent of The Quarter." (Pl. Ex. 3.) Nonetheless, Harris' hours were cut, so, unable to subsist on the diminished income, Harris resigned. (Harris Aff. , 2.) Harris' replacement was not a pregnant woman. (Id. ) Plaintiffs bring the present cause of action under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Substantively, the court analyzes the foregoing facts under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that analysis under the PDA is the same as that applied under Title VII). Prior to examining the merits, however, the court must address a jurisdictional issue. Namely, the court must determine whether Defendants can be considered Harris' employer under Title VII. See,~, Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 961 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing
3

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 4 of 13
that whether a defendant satisfies the statutory definition of
"employer" is a threshold jurisdictional question) i see also
Laurie v. Ala. Ct. of Crim. Appeals, 88 F. Supp.2d 1334, 1336
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (in resolving the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court may weigh the evidence and resolve
factual disputes which do not implicate an element of the cause
Df action) .1
Defendants contend that Harris' actual employer at the time
relevant to the present cause of action was, in fact, Azalea
Hills Apartment Suites, a property owner who merely hires
Defendants to manage and supervise the property. (Mot. at 4.)
As the parties do not dispute that Azalea Hills does not employ
"fifteen or more employees," it cannot be considered an employer
under Title VII even were it named as a defendant. See 42 U.S.C.
1 The court expresses doubt as to whether a defendant's status as an employer should be treated as a jurisdictional question, particularly in matters such as the present one where the question is highly fact-intensive. Indeed, the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have offered persuasive arguments against such a conclusion, both out of institutional concerns, and due to plain statutory interpretation. See,~, DaSilva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 364-66 (2 nd Cir. 2000) (offering reasons favoring the adoption of the approach employed by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits). Nonetheless, the court is bound by the precedent established by the Eleventh Circuit. But see Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that other courts "have doubted whether the number of employees is a jurisdiction question," but stating that "we will not take this occasion to re-examine our circuit precedent holding that counting employees is a jurisdictional inquiry") .
4

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 5 of 13
§ 2000e(b). However, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are estopped from arguing that they were not Harris' employer inasmuch as their Answer includes an admission that "Harris was employed by Ballard on August 26, 1996, as a leasing agent."
(Compl. 1 12; Answer 1 12.) Of course, as Defendants point out,
the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lawsuit does not turn on a party's assent; rather, it depends on whether the allegations of the Complaint constitute a justiciable controversy arising under federal law. See,~, Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994). In other words, the fact that a defendant concedes the propriety of jurisdiction has no bearing on the purely legal question at issue. Moreover, Plaintiffs overlook the fact that Defendants explicitly denied the allegation that "[a]t all relevant times [Defendants] had at
least fifteen employees." (Compl. 1 4; Answer 1 4.) To say the
least, then, Defendants are not estopped from arguing that they were not Harris' employer for purposes of Title VII.
It is worth noting that the court does not construe Paragraph 12 of the Complaint as alleging jurisdiction; the paragraph merely alleges the date on which Harris became one of Defendants' employees. Defendants admitted that they hired Harris, a fact that is highly relevant to the issue of whether Defendants and the various properties they manage can be viewed
5

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 6 of 13
as an "integrated enterprise." Harriel v. Dialtone, Inc. 179 F. Supp.2d 1309, 1311-12 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (discussing factors considered by the court in determining whether two or more distinct entities should be viewed as a single employer under Title VII). To the extent that the fact itself is not a legal ~onclusion, Defendants are deemed to have admitted having hired Harris, and this fact may be considered in the integrated enterprise analysis. Cf. Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 -14 (11th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between an admission of fact and an admission of a legal conclusion).
Recognizing that the Eleventh Circuit accords "a liberal construction of the term employer," the court previously has found that multiple "ostensibly separate entities [that] are nighly integrated with respect to ownership and operations" can be treated as a single employer under the integrated enterprise test. Harriel, 179 F. Supp.2d at 1311-12. There are four factors which courts consider in making this determination: "(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor operations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control." Id. Not all factors need be present for the court to find that a single employer exists, nor is one factor alone controlling. Id. However, the second factor "is usually accorded greater weight than the others" given that the
6

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 7 of 13
substantive questions raised in Title VII lawsuits concern employment decisions. Id.
Defendants' admission is particularly relevant, then. While Defendants contend that Harris began her employment with Festival Apartments (Mot. at 2), the admission that Defendants hired her indicates some semblance of interrelation between labor operations between Defendants and the property they manage. Indeed, Defendants insist that Harris was "hired" by a property owner in South Carolina in March 1998, but that shortly thereafter she returned to Montgomery whereupon she "was transferred to Azalea Hills." (Id.) What Defendants fail to point out is the fact that the South Carolina property is partially owned by Bowen Ballard, Defendants' president. (Gillenwater Dep. at SO.) Moreover, that Harris was "transferred" implies the existence of an entity with the authority to so transfer Harris from one property to the next. This conclusion provides a context for understanding why Defendants, in answering the interrogatory as to why they cut back Harris' hours, referenced the alleged decline in her work output upon her return from South Carolina. (Id. at 48-49.) Viewed together the facts raise a strong inference of the existence of a centralized decision-maker who determines the
7

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 8 of 13
employment status of those employees working at properties managed by Defendants.
As to what entity or entities might constitute this decision-maker, it is noteworthy that in early 1998, when Harris was awarded "Leasing Agent of the Quarter," the origin of the award was printed in bold letters: Ballard Realty Company. (Pl. Ex. 3.) While Defendants insist they were merely responsible for the management of a loose conglomeration of separately owned properties, they seem to ignore the fact that such management was the area in which Harris worked. Indeed, it was common for the employees in this area to perform work for the various properties falling under the management scheme. (Godwin Aff. , 9.) Similarly, members of Defendants' management regularly would go to the various properties to delegate and oversee the work product of the employees. (Harris Aff. , 4; Gillenwater Dep. at 3S.) Defendants likewise played a role in the implementation of uniform personnel policy at the various properties they managed. (Gillenwater Dep. at 66.) Furthermore, they were involved in the final hiring and firing decisions at the properties, as well as setting the salaries for the employees. (Godwin Aff. , 7.)
With Defendants paying little heed to the distinctions between the various properties as they went about the day-to-day management of such properties, the court sees no reason it should
8

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 9 of 13
not do the same. This is particularly so when one considers the common ownership between the various entities. Indeed, in addition to serving as Defendants' president, Mr. Ballard has an ownership interest in every single property where Harris served as a leasing agent. (Doc. No. 24 Ex. 1.) This fact, when considered in light of the fact that Ballard Management Company signed Harris' paycheck and was responsible for submitting her tax information to the IRS (Pl. Ex. 1), is more than sufficient for the court to find both common ownership and interrelatedness of operations. See,~, McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding interrelatedness when paychecks and bills are paid by parent, and where insurance policy goes through parent); see also Harriel, 179 F. Supp.2d at 1315 (finding an integrated enterprise when there is common ownership and the paychecks are sent from Defendant). Upon consideration of all the factors, the court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have more than proven that Defendants operate an integrated enterprise.
Accordingly, the court may consider the employees of each distinct entity in determining whether jurisdiction is appropriate. Defendants contest that Plaintiffs have not shown there to be even fifteen employees under Defendants' umbrella. It is curious that in the four years of involvement in the matter
9

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 10 of 13
Plaintiffs would not have successfully produced such evidence. However, Defendants have provided as much in documents attached ~o their Reply brief. Such paperwork shows the number of employees employed by both Festival Apartments and Azalea Hills over a number of years. Adding the number of employees listed on the documents for the years 1997 and 1998, the court concludes that the jurisdictional requisite has been satisfied under the payroll method as adopted by the Supreme Court. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997). It goes without saying that this number would be higher still were the evidence af other properties before the court. As this number more than exceeds fifteen, the court concludes that it may exercise jurisdiction over the present matter.
The court may now turn to the substance of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the PDA by showing that Harris (1) was pregnant, (2) was qualified for her position, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) suffered from a differential dpplication of work or disciplinary rules. Spivey v. Beverly Enters.! Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999). Given the award Harris received just months before she became pregnant and had her hours cut back, the court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have satisfied the first three aspects of the prima facie test.
10

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 11 of 13
However, it is not clear that the fourth factor has been
satisfied.
While Plaintiffs point out that Harris was replaced by a
non-pregnant woman, the Eleventh Circuit requires evidence that
work rules were applied differently to non-pregnant employees.
;3ee Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1317 ("While the PDA requires the
employer to ignore the pregnancy, the employer need not ignore
absences, unless the employer likewise ignores the absences of
nonpregnant employees."). 2 Defendants have argued that Harris'
hours were cut only because of her inability to keep regular work
hours. Indeed, included in the record are Harris' employee
evaluation form dated June 4, 1998, and a fax sent two weeks
later noting that the problems highlighted in the evaluation form
had not been improved upon. 3 (Pl. Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs have not
2 An exception to this requirement is permitted upon a showing that an employer violated a company rule which adversely impacted a pregnant employee's working conditions. Byrd v. Lakeshore Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 1994). Nowhere has there been any allegation that Defendants acted inconsistent with the applicable personnel policy.
3 As Plaintiffs point out, Defendants have not technically "produced" such evidence, and the court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment at this stage absent "the introduction of admissible evidence." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 & 255 n.9 (1981) ("An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the defendant '-'!annot meet its burden merely . . . by argument of counsel."). Nonetheless the court sees no reason to ignore the evidence simply because it was produced by Plaintiffs rather than Defendants. In addressing a summary judgment motion, the court
11

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 12 of 13
pointed out a single individual employed by Defendants who was the subject of similar complaints that might serve as a comparator. Absent such evidence, Plaintiffs cannot meet the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiff who was terminated for missing work offered no evidence comparator evidence) .
While Plaintiffs do not so argue, the comparator requirement might be susceptible to the criticism that it conflates the issue of an employer's alleged nondiscriminatory reasons with the employee's prima facie case. However, the McDonnell Douglas Court did not intend for the burden-shifting framework to be an inflexibly, formalistic analysis. See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 439 -4 0 (1996) (insisting that the test not be "mechanized or ritualistic"). The burden is on Plaintiffs at all times to prove intentional discrimination, and the fact remains that, aside from
must determine whether the evidence that a jury will consider is such that a reasonable juror could find in Plaintiffs' favor. See, ~, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ("Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no issue for trial.") (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). Undoubtedly a jury will be able to consider the evidence in question, so the court, too, will consider it presently.
12

Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW Document 27 Filed 05/16/2002 Page 13 of 13
the insistence that Harris was, in fact, a good worker, no evidence has been offered from a jury might infer that Defendants' perceptions to the contrary were merely pretextual. See Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11 th Cir. 2002) (" [W] e must be careful not to allow Title VII plaintiffs simply to litigate whether they are, in fact, good employees."). As such, even assuming Plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, there is insufficient evidence to show that Defendants' statement that Harris was not dependable is in any sense not an "honest one." Id. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate. 4
III. ORDER Based on the foregoing, it is CONSIDERED and ORDERED that Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED. A judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be entered separately. DONE this /L'V,.th of May, 2002.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 It is worth pointing out that an employer need not necessarily accommodate a pregnant employee by offering a flexible schedule unless other non-pregnant employees receive similar accommodation. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321-22. Therefore, the fact that Harris' dependability issues might have arisen from her pregnancy does not mean that Defendants' response thereto constitutes discrimination.
13

 
 Case 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW

Document 48

-:" -'..- Filed 12/09/2002 Page 1 of 1 .•;~:;~'~"": ':.,;, ,,; .,.,',:,:, c, -;;m~b;::" .:~-~' -'~

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF A, PEALS d,S. COURT OF A.r-PE.4L~

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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PAMELA JODIE HARRIS,

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Intervenor- Plaintiff -t~~~~~J ..,~_OURj'
L I L,.,C ... ,81. C ... ALA. '

versus

BALLARD REALTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., BALLARD REALTY COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

BEFORE: DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT:
The Appellants' motions to dismiss their appeals with prejudice, due to settlement, with the parties bearing their own costs and attorneysr fees, are GRANTED.

 
 CM/ECF - U.S. District Court: ALMD - Docket Report

https://ecf.almd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?376112816692729-L_9...

U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:01-cv-00276-ID-SRW

CLOSED

EEOC v. Ballard Realty, et al Assigned to: Judge Ira De Ment Referred to: Mag. Judge Susan Russ Walker Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)
Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Date Filed: 03/07/2001 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Charles Edward Guerrier Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1130 22nd Street South Suite 2000 Birmingham, AL 35205-2881 205-731-2067 Fax: 205-731-1167 Email: charles.guerrier@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gwendolyn Y. Reams Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 "L" Street, Northwest Washington, DC 20507 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jill L. Vincent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1130 22nd Street South Suite 2000 Birmingham, AL 35205-2881 205-731-1039 Fax: 731-2101 TERMINATED: 12/05/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mason D. Barrett Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1130 22nd Street South

1 of 9

3/19/2007 2:57 PM

CM/ECF - U.S. District Court: ALMD - Docket Report
V. Defendant Ballard Realty Management Company, Inc.
2 of 9

https://ecf.almd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?376112816692729-L_9...
Suite 2000 Birmingham, AL 35205-2881 205-731-1039 Fax: 731-2101 Email: mbarret@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Algert Swanson Agricola, Jr. Slaten & O'Connor, PC PO Box 1110 Montgomery, AL 36101-1110 334-396-8882 Fax: 396-8880 Email: aagricola@slatenlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison Alford Ingram Ball Ball Matthews & Novak PA PO Box 2148 Montgomery, AL 36102-2148 334-387-7680 Fax: 387-3222 Email: ala@ball-ball.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin H. Farrow The Anderson Law Firm, L.L.C. 7515 Halcyon Pointe Drive Montgomery, AL 36117 334-272-9880 Fax: 334-272-2551 Email: bfarrow@theandersonlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George Robert Parker Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP Alabama Center for Commerce 401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 Montgomery, AL 36104 334-956-7607 Fax: 205-956-7807 Email: gparker@bradleyarant.com LEAD ATTORNEY
3/19/2007 2:57 PM

CM/ECF - U.S. District Court: ALMD - Docket Report
Defendant Ballard Realty Company, Inc.
3 of 9

https://ecf.almd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?376112816692729-L_9...
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory Dale Crosslin Crosslin & Associates 1008 Airport Road Suite F Destin, FL 32541 850-650-7378 Fax: 850-650-3990 Email: jason@pestcontrollaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason James Baird Slaten & O'Connor, PC 105 Tallapoosa Street Suite 101 Montgomery, AL 36104 334-396-8882 Fax: 334-396-8880 Email: jbaird@slatenlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tabor Robert Novak, Jr. Ball Ball Matthews & Novak PA PO Box 2148 Montgomery, AL 36102-2148 334-387-7680 Fax: 387-3222 Email: tnovak@ball-ball.com TERMINATED: 07/13/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Algert Swanson Agricola, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison Alford Ingram (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin H. Farrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
3/19/2007 2:57 PM

CM/ECF - U.S. District Court: ALMD - Docket Report

https://ecf.almd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?376112816692729-L_9...

Intervenor Plaintiff Pamela Jodie Harris

George Robert Parker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory Dale Crosslin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason James Baird (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tabor Robert Novak, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/13/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kathryn M. Dickey Dickey & McClelland 322 Alabama Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334-262-0728 Fax: 265-7696 Email: kay@dickeyandmcclelland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed
03/07/2001 03/07/2001 03/08/2001 03/14/2001
04/09/2001 04/12/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (ajr) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
1 DEMAND for jury trial by EEOC (ajr) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
File referred to Judge De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
2 REQUEST FOR WAIVER of Service as to Ballard Realty, Ballard Realty 3/13/01 Waiver of Service due by 4/12/01 for Ballard Realty, for Ballard Realty (ajr) (Entered: 03/19/2001)
3 MOTION to Intervene by Pamela Jodie Harris referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 04/10/2001)
4 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE why motion to intervene should not be granted; Response to Order to Show Cause due on 4/26/01 for Ballard Realty Co., for

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04/23/2001 04/25/2001 05/03/2001 05/03/2001 05/10/2001 07/03/2001 07/10/2001
07/10/2001 07/13/2001
07/23/2001 07/25/2001
09/04/2001 09/06/2001

Ballard Realty Mgmt ( signed by Judge Ira De Ment ) , copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
5 MOTION by Pamela Jodie Harris for McPhillips, Shinbaum to Withdraw as Attorney referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 04/24/2001)
6 Stamped ORDER granting [5-1] motion for McPhillips, Shinbaum to Withdraw as Attorney; (by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 04/25/2001)
7 Stamped ORDER granting [3-1] motion to Intervene by Pamela Jodie Harris (by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 05/03/2001)
9 Intervenor's COMPLAINT by Pamela Jodie Harris against Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (ajr) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
8 ANSWER to Complaint by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (Attorney Tabor R. Novak Jr., George R. Parker), referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/11/2001)
10 ANSWER by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. to [9-1] intervenor complaint referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
11 ORDER that the Rule 26 report containing the discovery plan shall be filed no later than two weeks from the date of this order; Planning Meeting report due on 7/24/01 ( signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel, RL. (ajr) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
12 MOTION by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. for Tabor R. Novak, Jr. to Withdraw as Attorney , and to Substitute Attorney Allison L. Alford referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/11/2001)
13 Stamped ORDER granting [12-1] motion for Tabor R. Novak, Jr. to Withdraw as Attorney, granting [12-2] motion to Substitute Attorney Allison L. Alford terminated attorney Tabor R. Novak for Ballard Realty Co., attorney Tabor R. Novak for Ballard Realty Mgmt Added Allison L. Alford (by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel, RL (ajr) (Entered: 07/13/2001)
14 REPORT of Planning Meeting; referred to Judge De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/24/2001)
15 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Rule 16 Pretrial Conference for 7/9/02 before Judge Ira De Ment Motion Filing deadline on 4/11/02 Discovery cutoff 6/25/02; jury trial set for 8/12/02 before Judge Ira De Ment; set amended pleading deadline for 10/9/01 Mediation Notice deadline on 5/7/02; form AO 85 attached; (signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to RL, WAR, YG, HC. (ajr) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
16 MOTION by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. for George R. Parker and Allison L. Alford to Withdraw as Attorney ; referred to Judge Ira De Ment (mfm) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
17 Stamped ORDER granting [16-1] motion for George R. Parker and Allison L. Alford to Withdraw as Attorney; (by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 09/06/2001)

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09/10/2001 11/30/2001 12/05/2001 04/10/2002 04/10/2002
04/15/2002
04/29/2002 04/30/2002 05/07/2002
05/10/2002 05/16/2002 05/16/2002
05/16/2002 05/31/2002 05/31/2002

18 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance for Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. by Gregory D. Crosslin, Benjamin H. Farrow (ajr) (Entered: 09/11/2001)
19 MOTION by EEOC for Jill Lolley Vincent to Withdraw as Attorney referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
20 Stamped ORDER granting [19-1] motion for Jill Lolley Vincent to Withdraw as Attorney; (by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
21 MOTION by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. for Summary Judgment (exhibit A attached); referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
21 MEMORANDUM by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. in support of [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Ballard Realty Co., Ballard Realty Mgmt (exhibit A attached); referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
22 ORDER Response to Motion set to 4/29/02 for [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment , setting reply brief deadline for 5/6/02 for Ballard Realty Co., for Ballard Realty Mgmt [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Ballard Realty Co., Ballard Realty Mgmt set for submission on 5/6/02 (signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel, RL. (ajr) (Entered: 04/15/2002)
23 BRIEF by EEOC in opposition to [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment (attachments); referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 04/30/2002)
24 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in opposition to [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Ballard Realty Co., Ballard Realty Mgmt (attachments); referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/01/2002)
25 Reply MEMORANDUM by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. in support of [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment by Ballard Realty Co., Ballard Realty Mgmt (exhibits A-D attached); referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/08/2002)
26 Notice Concerning Settlement Conference and Mediation filed by EEOC; referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/13/2002)
27 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting [21-1] motion for Summary Judgment (signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel, RL, WAR, MD, YG (ajr) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
28 JUDGMENT for Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. against EEOC, Pamela Jodie Harris; taxing all costs against plaintiff; (signed by Judge Ira De Ment ), copies provided to counsel, RL, WAR, MD, YG (ajr) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
Case closed (ajr) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
29 MOTION by EEOC to Alter Judgment , or to Amend [28-1] judgment order referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/31/2002)
30 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in support of [29-1] motion to Alter Judgment by EEOC, [29-2] motion to Amend [28-1] judgment order by EEOC referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 05/31/2002)

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06/03/2002 06/05/2002 06/17/2002 06/20/2002 06/21/2002 06/27/2002 06/27/2002 07/02/2002
07/03/2002 07/03/2002 07/05/2002 07/09/2002
07/09/2002
07/09/2002

31 ORDER denying [29-1] motion to Alter Judgment, denying [29-2] motion to Amend [28-1] judgment order ( signed by Judge Ira De Ment ) , copies provided; furnished to RL. (ydw) (Entered: 06/03/2002)
32 Bill of costs received in the amount of $301.50 entered by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (attachment) (ajr) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
Costs of $301.50 taxed for Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (ajr) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
33 Bill of costs received in the amount of $ 305.60 entered by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (ajr) (Entered: 06/21/2002)
Costs of $305.60 taxed for Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. (ajr) (Entered: 06/21/2002)
34 MOTION by EEOC for judicial review of defendant's bill of costs referred to Judge De Ment (ajr) Modified on 07/05/2002 (Entered: 06/28/2002)
35 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in support of [34-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's bill of costs by EEOC referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 06/28/2002)
36 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE why the motion for judicial review of defendants' bill of costs filed 6/27/02 should not be granted; Response to Order to Show Cause due on 7/9/02 for Ballard Realty Co., for Ballard Realty Mgmt; allowing plaintiff to file a reply thereto no later than 7/16/02 ( signed by Judge Ira De Ment ) , copies provided to counsel. (djy) (Entered: 07/02/2002)
37 MOTION by EEOC for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs referred to Judge De Ment (ajr) Modified on 07/05/2002 (Entered: 07/05/2002)
38 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in support of [37-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs by EEOC referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
Motion(s) referred to Judge Ira De Ment : [37-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs, [34-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's bill of costs (ajr) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
39 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE why motion for judicial review of supplemental bill of costs should not be granted; Response to Order to Show Cause due on 7/23/02 for Ballard Realty Co., for Ballard Realty Mgmt (signed by Judge Ira De Ment ), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 07/09/2002)
40 RESPONSE by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. to [37-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs by EEOC, [34-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's bill of costs by EEOC referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
41 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit by Pamela Jodie Harris from the final judgment entered in this action on May 16, 2002, and from the order denying a motion under Rule 59 entered on June 3, 2002. FILING FEE $ 105.00 RECEIPT # 92914 Copies Provided (kcg) (Entered: 07/16/2002)

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07/16/2002 07/16/2002 07/18/2002 07/22/2002 07/22/2002 07/25/2002
07/25/2002 08/01/2002
08/02/2002 08/08/2002 08/13/2002 08/16/2002 08/16/2002 08/26/2002 12/09/2002

Notice of Appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [41-1] appeal by Pamela Jodie Harris (kcg) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
42 MEMORANDUM by EEOC in support of [37-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs by EEOC referred to Judge Ira De Ment (ajr) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
Received transcript order information sheet from Attorney Kathryn Dickey with the following notation "No hearing". (kcg) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
43 Response by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. to [39-1] Order to Show Cause. Referred to Judge Ira De Ment (djy) (Entered: 07/23/2002)
USCA Case Number Re: [41-1] appeal by Pamela Jodie Harris USCA NUMBER: 02-13900-JJ (kcg) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
44 ORDER granting [37-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's supplemental bill of costs, granting [34-1] motion for judicial review of defendant's bill of costs ( signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 07/25/2002)
CERTIFICATE OF READINESS of record on appeal mailed to USCA, 11th Circuit and counsel: [41-1] appeal by Pamela Jodie Harris (ydw) (Entered: 07/25/2002)
45 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit by EEOC from the final judgment entered in this action on May 16, 2002, and from the order denying the Pltfs motion under Rule 59 entered on June 3, 2002. Copies Provided (kcg) (Entered: 08/02/2002)
Notice of Appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [45-1] appeal by EEOC (kcg) (Entered: 08/02/2002)
USCA Case Number Re: [45-1] appeal by EEOC USCA NUMBER: 02-13900-JJ (kcg) (Entered: 08/15/2002)
46 MOTION by Ballard Realty Mgmt, Ballard Realty Co. for Reconsideration of [44-1] order ; (w/Exhibit A attached) referred to Judge Ira De Ment (vmc) (Entered: 08/14/2002)
47 ORDER denying [46-1] motion for Reconsideration of [44-1] order (signed by Judge Ira De Ment), copies provided to counsel. (ajr) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
Received transcript order information sheet from Attorney for EEOC with the following notation "No transcript is required for appeal purposes". (kcg) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE OF READINESS of record on appeal mailed to USCA, 11th Circuit and counsel: [45-1] appeal by EEOC (kcg) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
48 ORDER is issued as the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, that the Appellant's motions to dismiss their appeal with prejudice, due to settlement, with the parties bearing their own costs and attorneys' fees, are GRANTED. Before: DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges (kcg) (Entered: 12/11/2002)

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