Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 1 of 20

1 MOlIis J Baller, #048928

Roberta L Steele, #188198

2 Nina Rabin, #229403

GOLDSTElN, DEMCHAK, BALLER,

3

BORGEN & DARDARlAN

4 300 Lakeside Dr., Suite 1000

Oakland, CA 94612

5 (510) 763-9800 (telephone)
(510) 835-1417 (telefilx) 6

7 Paul Strauss, #153937 Robert S Libman, #139283 MlNER, BARNHILL & GALLAND
8 14 W. Erie Street Chicago, IL 60610
9 (312) 751-1170 (telephone)
10 (312) 751-0438 (telefax)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11

12

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

14 15

cor; ,03' 11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY HOUSTON and CLIFTON E. COOPER, ) Case No. on behalf of themselves and all others similarly )

~
,J V

~
.Jl",,""t~

16 situated,

) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND

17

Plaintiffs,

) ) )

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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j~f\:\,.\'l:IJ..I.

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p..

"

18 vs .

)

)

19 ClNTAS CORPORATION,

)

)

20

Defendant

)

21 --------------------------)

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 2 of 20

1

Plaintiffs Larry Houston and Clifton E. Cooper, on behalf ofthemselves and all other persons

2 similarly situated, complain of defendant Cintas Corporation ("Cintas" or the "Company") as follows .

3

NATURE OF THE CASE

4

1.. This is an employment discrimination case, brought pursuant to the provisions of the

5 Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 US . C. §1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Section

6 1981"); and the California Unfair Business Practices Act, Business and Professions Code §17200 et

7 seq., also known as the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Plaintiffs allege that defendant Cintas has

8 engaged in, and continues to engage in, a company-wide pattern and practice of employment

9 discrimination, both intentional and systemic, on the basis ofrace, against themselves and a class of

10 similarly situated Afi:ican American employees, former employees, and applicants who have sought

11 management positions in Cintas' Rental Division, as alleged in this Complaint. Cintas' discriminatory

12 practices include, but ar'e not limited to, discrimination in hiring, promotion, and compensation for

13 management positions on a classwide basis, as alleged in this Complaint Plaintiffs seek declaratory,

14 injunctive, and equitable monetary relief from these practices; compensatory and punitive damages;

15 equitable remedies of accounting, restitution and disgorgement; and an award of costs, expenses, and

16 attorneys' fees; all for themselves individually and on behalf ofthe class they seek to represent

17

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

18

2, Jurisdiction, This Court has original jurisdiction of plaintiffS' Section 1981 claims

19 pursuant to 28 u,s,e, §§1331 and 1343(a)(4), The Court has supplementaljurisdiction ofplaintiffs,

20 UCL claims pursuant to 28 U,S,C, §1367

21

3, Venue Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U,S,c.. §1391(c), Cintasis

22 subject to personal jurisdiction in this District in that it maintains facilities and business operations in

23 this District, employed plaintiff Larry Houston and members ofthe class in this District, and

24 cormnitted some of the discriminatory acts alleged herein in this District.

25

4, Intradistrict Assignment Venue is proper in the San Francisco Division of this Court

26 pursuant to Local Rule 3-2(c) and (d) because a substantial part of the events which give rise to the

27 claims asserted in this Complaint occurred in Alameda County. In particular', Cintas employed

28 plaintiff Larry Houston and employs, employed, or rejected employment applications of, other class

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 3 of 20

1 members in its facility in San Leandro, Alameda County, California, and there committed acts of

2 discrimination in employment as alleged in this complaint

3

PARTIES

4 Plaintiffs

5

5. Plaintiff Larry Houston is an African American male and a resident of Oakland,

6 California.. In or about Mar'ch 2002, Mr.. Houston became an employee of Cintas as a management

7 trainee in the San Leandro facility. At the outset of his employment, Mr.. Houston entered into an

8 agreement with Cintas in which Mr. Houston would take part in a training program for ninety days, at

9 the end of which he would become a Service Manager Contrary to the terms ofthis agreement, and in

10 spite ofMr Houston's outstanding qualifications and demonstrated managerial abilities, Cintas failed

11 to promote Mr. Houston to a management position at the end ofthe ninety-day training period. In

12 August 2002, Mr. Houston was constructively discharged from Cintas as a result of the intolerable

13 working conditions to which he had been subjected, including the failure to promote him to a

14 management position for which he was well qualified at the end of his ninety-day training period.

15

6.. Plaintiff Clifton E Cooper is an African American male.. During the period in which

16 the events in this Complaint occurred, he was a resident of Los Angeles, California. In or about July

17 2000, Mr.. Cooper was hired as a Service Manager for Cintas' Pica Rivera facility After two years as

18 Service Manager, he was promoted to Assistant General Manager of the Pica Rivera plant, and shortly

19 thereafter, promoted again to Branch Manager of the El Segundo facility in West Los Angeles. During

20 his time as an Assistant General Manager and Branch Manager at Cintas, Mr.. Cooper learned of

21 significant salary disparities between himself and white managers of comparable background and

22 experience. After only six months as Branch Manager, in January 2004, Mr. Cooper was demoted to

23 Service Manager and received a major cut in his salary, in spite of his outstanding qualifications and

24 demonstrated managerial abilities. In July 2004, he was constructively discharged frum Cintas, as a

25 result ofthe intolerable working conditions to which he had been subjected, including the unwarranted

26 demotion, baseless performance evaluations, pay cuts, and significant disparities he discovered

27 between his salary and that of white managers of comparable background and experience

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 4 of 20

I

a On FeblUary 17, 2004, Mr.. Cooper filed a Charge of Discrimination with the

2 United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was also cross-filed with

3 the California Department off air Employment and Housing (DFEH). Mr. Cooper's Charge alleged

4 the same discriminatory practices against himself and the class as alleged in this Complaint. A copy of

5 Mr Cooper's EEOC Charge is attached hereto as Exhibit A

6

b Upon expiration ofthe period provided by law for the EEOC and/or DFEH to

7 investigate and conciliate the Charge, Mr Cooper will request issuance ofNotice of Right to Sue and

8 plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to state individual and class claims under Title VII of the Civil

9 Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 US.c. §§ 2000e et seq., and the California Fair Employment and

10 Housing Act, Government Code § 12940 et seq.

II Defendant

12

7. Cintas is a national corporation headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio. For fiscal year 2004,

13 Cintas reported $2.8 billion in sales and $272 million in profits

14

8 Defendant Cintas' major business involves renting uniforms, mats, and towels to

15 commercial enterprises.

16

9. Defendant Cintas has more than 27,000 employees and operates approximately 344

17 rental facilities across the country in its Rental Division.

18

10.. The employees in Cintas' Rental Division rental facilities can be glOuped into five

19 categories: (a) production, or laundry workers; (b) service department workers, including drivers, also

20 known as service sales representatives ("SSRs"), and helpers; (c) sales employees; (d) office and

21 human resource employees; and (e) supervisors and managers

22

II.. Management and supervisory positions in Cintas' Rental Division include the

23 following: (a) General Manager, (b) Branch Manager, (c) Production Manager (also known as plant

24 managers), (d) Service Manager, (e) Production Supervisor, (f) Stock Room Manager, and (g) Sales

25 Manager.

26

12. Cintas' production workers clean, repair, hang and assemble the uniforms and materials

27 to be delivered to the customers Each shift of production workers is supervised by a Production

28 Supervisor The production workers in a given facility ar·e supervised by a Production Manager.

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 5 of 20

1

13. Drivers, or SSRs, deliver clean clothing, mats, and towels to customers and pick up

2 dirty items from customers. A single facility may have several groups of SSRs, each of which is

3 supervised by a Service Manager

4

14.. Cintas operates under a nationwide business plan that is established at its headquarters

5 in Cincinnati, Ohio and similarly implemented at each of its Rental Division facilities throughout the

6 country The plan includes strategies and programs regarding methods of operation and service

7 systems.

8

15 Cintas has developed and continually reinforces a centralized corporate cultme that is

9 implemented at each of its Rental Division facilities throughout the country. Cintas regularly moves

10 upper level managers from one Rental Division facility to another, and often from one state to another

11 This practice is done in part to ensme that a uniform Cintas cultme operates consistently throughout all

12 of its Rental Division facilities .

13

CLAIMS OF THE NAMED AND REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS

14 Plaintiff Larry Houston

15

16 Representative Plaintiff Larry Houston was employed by Cintas from in or about March

16 2002 until August 2002.

17

17. In or about February 2002, Mr. Houston contacted the manager at Cintas' San Leandro

18 facility to inquire about employment opportunities for management positions. On the telephone, the

19 manager told Mr Houston that management positions were available, and he should come to the

20 facility to discuss them. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Houston arlived at the San Leandro facility, and the

21 manager, upon meeting Mr. Houston in person, told him that no management positions were currently

22 available

23

18 In a subsequent phone call, the manager of Cintas' San Leandro facility offered Mr.

24 Houston a position as a management tr·ainee, in which he would accompany SSRs for ninety days, at

25 the end of which he would become a Service Manager Mr Houston accepted the position with the

26 understanding that after ninety days, he would become a Service Manager.

27

19 Shortly after Mr. Houston's initial ninety-day employment period, a Service Manager

28 position became available in the San Leandro facility.. Mr Houston expressed interest in the position

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 6 of 20

I to the Human Resources Representative and the General Manager of the San Leandro facility

2 Contrary to Cintas' priOl commitment to Mr Houston, the General Manager in San Leandro told Mr.

3 Houston that he would have to wOlk for two year's as an SSR before becoming a Service Manager

4

20 The Service Manager position in the San Leandro facility for which Mr.. Houston

5 expressed interest was filled by a white male who, on infOlmation and belief, was a friend ol

6 acquaintance ofthe General Manager of the San Leandro facility and who had been pre-selected for

7 the position.

8

21. Neither the initial ninety-day management trainee position, nor the two-year SSR

9 position subsequently ofIered to Mr . Houston, are part of or equivalent to Cintas' established 45-day

10 management training program for newly hired employees who have prior experience in management

11

22. Mr'. Houston was well qualified by his education, prior experience, and training for the

12 Service Manager position in the San Leandro facility, and for numerous other management positions in

13 Cintas Mr. Houston had previously performed in positions similar' to the Service Manager position for

14 other employers, and had experience in the administrative and managerial functions of that and other

15 Cintas management positions as well.

16

23. Because of his race, Cintas failed to promote Mr'. Houston to, or select him for, a

17 management position despite its prior agreement to do so.

18

24. Because Cintas refused to give Mr.. Houston a management position, he left Cintas and

19 assumed a management position in another company in August 2002 .

20 Plaintiff Clifton E. Cooper

21

25. In or around July 2000, Mr'. Cooper interviewed with Cintas in Los Angeles, and was

22 hired as a Service Manager for its Pico Rivera facility. At the time he was hired, upon infOlmation and

23 belief; Mr . Cooper was the only African American Service Manager in the entire Western Region,

24 which includes eleven facilities located throughout Southern CalifOlnia, Nevada, and Arizona

25

26.. After two years as Service Manager, he was promoted to Assistant General Manager of

26 the Pico Rivera plant. Shortly thereafter, in February 2003, he was promoted again to Branch Manager

27 of the El Segundo facility in West Los Angeles, after his immediate supervisor, the General Manager

28 of Pico Rivera, fought for his promotion. When he became Branch Manager, upon information and

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 7 of 20

1 belief, Mr Cooper was the only minority of all the Branch and General Managers in the Westem

2 Region.

3

27. In his capacity as Branch Manager at Cintas' EI Segundo facility, Mr . Cooper learned

4 that there were significant disparities between his salary and those of similarly situated white

5 managers.

6

a. He learned that the preceding Branch Manager ofthe EI Segundo facility, a

7 white man with no greater experience in the field, had been earning more per year than Mr Cooper.

8

b. He learned that the person hired to replace him as Service Manager, an extemal

9 white male candidate who had lesser qualifications and experience, earned more per year than Mr

10 Cooper was earning as a Branch Manager, despite the fact that the white Service Manager was

11 reporting to Mr. Cooper. When Mr. Cooper expressed disappointment about the salary disparity to

12 members of Cintas' upper management, they were unresponsive and no corrective action was taken

13

28 Shortly after Mr·. Cooper assumed the position of Branch Manager, upper level

14 managers began to make his working conditions intolerable. Several months after his promotion, a

15 corporate audit ofthe El Segundo facility was conducted, as is the general practice when a new Branch

16 Manager starts in a facility. Unsurprisingly, given the disorganized state of the facility when Mr.

17 Cooper arrived, the facility received a low audit score. Shortly after the audit, Mr.. Cooper participated

18 in a conference call with the Regional Vice President and Senior Vice President for the Westem

19 Region, who told Mr Cooper that management expected the numbers to come up when the facility was

20 re-audited in June 2004. In January 2004, an Assistant Vice President, Office Manager, and a

21 management trainee showed up at the El Segundo facility unexpectedly and said they were there to

22 conduct a "pre-audit" They completed the pre-audit on a Friday and said it had raised concems about

23 the facility. On the following Monday, on a conference call, management informed Mr Cooper that he

24 was being demoted due to his low audit score and the fact that not enough progress had been made,

25 despite the fact that the re-audit for which he had been told to prepar·e was still five months away

26

29. Upon information and belief; other facilities with white managers had failed multiple

27 audits similar to that conducted at the El Segundo facility and nothing had happened. Upon

28 information and belief; the El Segundo facility never had the re-audit

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 8 of 20

1

30. Management planned to reduce Mr. Cooper's salary by nearly $20,000 upon his

2 demotion. He was able to negotiate the pay cut down to $10,000.

3

31. The unwarranted demotion and salary cut, unjustified performance evaluations, and

4 flagrant salary disparities made Mr. Cooper's working conditions intolerable. He was forced to look

5 for anotherjob, despite his original intention to build a car'eer at Cintas In July 2004, he left Cintas to

6 take a position with another company, which required him to relocate to Missouri.

7

32. Cintas discriminated against Mr. Cooper based on his race by demoting him to a lower

8 level position for reasons that did not also apply to similarly situated white managers and thereafter

9 reducing his salary.

10

33 Cintas discriminated against Mr . Cooper based on his race by denying him a salary for

11 management levels positions that was equal to that received by white managers in the same positions

12 with comparable background and experience

13

34. Cintas constructively discharged Mr. Cooper from his management level position, by

14 making his working conditions intolerable through demotions, pay cuts, salary disparities, and unfair'

15 assessments of his performance These intolerable working conditions were directed at him on account

16 of his race

17

FACTS RELATING TO THE PATTERN OF INTENTIONAL AND

SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION WITH REGARD TO MANAGEMENT POSITIONS BY

18

DEFENDANT CINTAS

19

35. Cintas' failure to promote Mr. Houston to management in spite of its agreement to do

20 so, its discriminatory treatment ofMr. Houston as a management trainee, and its discriminatory

21 treatment of Mr. Cooper, ar'e not isolated incidents. Rather, their experiences are illustrative ofCintas'

22 discriminatory hiring, promotion, and compensation policies and practices for management positions

23 within the Company.

24

36 Defendant Cintas' hiring practices for management positions discriminate against

25 African American employees and applicants on account of their race.. The discriminatory practices

26 engaged in by Cintas' Rental Division are intentional and systemic in nature, and adversely affect

27 plaintiffs and members of the class with respect to opportunities for hiring and promotion to

28 management positions in the Company.

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 9 of 20

1

37. Management positions, including relatively low-level management positions such as

2 production supervisors or stock room managers, are rarely filled by promotions of employees within

3 the Company. Instead, these positions are typically filled by new hires, many of whom have been

4 selected to participate in Cintas' Management I raining Program

5

38. Eighty percent or more of Cintas' managers attain their positions through the

6 Management Training Program. Cintas recruits for participants in this program on college campuses

7 and among recent college graduates. Each Cintas facility in the Rental Division aims to hire two

8 management trainees each year

9

39. Management trainees in the Management Training Program are first rotated tIuough

10 management positions in the sales, service, and production departments for eight month periods before

II moving into a permanent management position in the Company.

12

40 Cintas has a different training program for more experienced applicants who ar·e hired

13 into management positions. These employees ar·e not part ofthe Management Training Program, but

14 instead participate in a more focused 45-day training program specific to the facility and management

15 position they have been hired to fill

16

41.. Cintas does not post supervisory and managerial positions available in its Rental

17 Division. When Cintas fills open positions from its pool of CUllent employees, it typically uses a "tap

18 on the shoulder" method under which the predominantly white male managers make subjective and

19 biased decisions to fill supervisory and managerial positions with non-African American employees.

20 Consequently, open supervisory and managerial positions are unknown to African American

21 employees, and they are not given an opportunity to apply and compete equally for these positions

22

42 Cintas' upper level management, with the exception of a few white women, is

23 comprised almost exclusively of white men. The homogenous racial composition of Cintas'

24 management at the highest levels is reflected in management throughout the Company. Cintas'

25 management is virtually all white, and in many areas (including the positions of facility General

26 Managers, Service Managers, and higher level corporate management) virtually all male as well

27

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 10 of 20

1

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

2

43. Plaintiffs bring their claims under Section 1981 pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)

3 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf ofthemselves and all others similarly situated, as

4 more specifically described below

5

44. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of:

6

a African American employees and former employees of Cintas' Rental Division

7 who have been denied promotions to management positions during the limitations period;

8

b African American applicants who have been denied hire into management

9 positions in Cintas' Rental Division during the limitations period; and

10

c.. African American managers and former managers of Cintas' Rental Division

11 who have been denied equal compensation during the limitations period.

12

45 . Plaintiffs seek to represent a subclass consisting of:

13

a. African American employees and former employees of Cintas' Rental Division

14 in California who have been denied promotions to management positions during the limitations period;

15

b. African American applicants who reside(d) in California andlor applied for

16 employment with Cintas' Rental Division in California, who have been denied hire into management

17 positions during the limitations period; and

18

c. African American managers and former managers of Cintas' Rental Division in

19 California who have been denied equal compensation during the limitations period.

20

46. The named plaintiffs as class and subclass representatives, and the class and subclass

21 defined above, meet each of the requirements of Rule 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) ofthe Federal

22 Rules of Civil Procedure for certification of this case as a class action, for the reasons stated below.

23

47. Rule 23(alCl) - Numerosity. The exact number ofmembers of the class and subclass is

24 not known at present, and will be determined through discovery. It is estimated that there are hundreds

25 of African American employees, former employees, and applicants who are class and subclass

26 members. In addition, the class members are spread throughout the regions and states ofthe country,

27 and are located in dozens of separate facilities and communities. The class and subclass is therefore so

28 numerous and so situated that individualjoinder of class members is impracticable.

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 11 of 20

1

48. Rule 23(a}Q) -- Commonality. There are numerous common questions offact and law

2 in this action that relate to and affect the claims of relief sought by the class, as well as the anticipated

3 defenses thereto. These common questions include, without limitation, the following:

4

a

Whether African American employees and former employees were denied

5 promotions to management positions in Cintas' Rental Division on account of their race dming the

6 limitations period;

7

b. Whether African American applicants were denied hiring opportunities to fill

8 management positions in Cintas' Rental Division on account of their race dming the limitations period;

9

c. Whether African American applicants were denied the opportunity to participate

10 in Cintas' Management I raining Program because of their race;

11

d Whether Cintas has given decision-making authority in the recruitment, training,

12 hiring, promoting, and compensation of management positions in Cintas' Rental Division to managers

13 who exercise uncontrolled, unsupervised discretion that provides a ready means for discrimination, and

14 whether that authority is used to discriminate in decision-making;

15

e.. Whether there is a pattern or class-wide practice of intentional discrimination on

16 the basis of race against African Americans in the hiring and promotion practices for management

17 positions in Cintas' Rental Division;

18

f.

Whether there is a pattern or class-wide practice of intentional discrimination on

19 the basis of race against African Americans in recruitment and selection for Cintas' Management

20 Training Program;

21

g. Whether the promotion, selection, andlor recruitment system(s) for management

22 positions in Cintas' Rental Division and its Management Training Progr·am have an adverse impact on

23 African Americans;

24

h. Whether African American managers and former managers in Cintas' Rental

25 Division have been denied equal compensation on account oftheir race during the limitations period;

26

L

Whether Cintas' above-described discriminatory actions are "intentional" within

27 the meaning of authorities applying Section 1981;

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 12 of 20

I

J

Whether Cintas' above-described discriminatory actions constitute unfair,

2 unlawful, or fraudulent business practices in violation of the UCL;

3

k. The appropriate standards for grant of injunctive relief, both equitable and

4 monetary, to remedy Cintas' above-described discriminatory employment practices;

5

I.

Whether, as a result of Cintas' above-described discriminatory practices, the

6 plaintiffs and the class and subclass suffered lost wages and other lost compensation; and

7

m Whether Cintas acted with malice or reckless indifference by the above-

8 described discrimination against plaintiffs and the class and subclass in the face of a perceived risk that

9 its actions would violate their rights such that an award of punitive damages to the class is appropriate;

10 and, if so, how such award should be determined and distributed to members of the class and subclass.

11

49.. Rule 23(a}{3) -- Typicality. The claims of the named plaintifIs, who are representatives

12 ofthe class and subclass, are typical of the claims of the class and subclass.. The named plaintiffs have

13 been personally affected and discriminated against by the same practices that they allege in this

14 complaint have harmed the class and subclass as a whole and other class and subclass members

15 individually.

16

50. Rule 23(a}{4) -- Adequacy. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent

17 the interests ofthe class and subclass. There is no conflict between the named plaintiffs and other

18 members of the class and subclass with respect to this action or the claims for relief set forth in this

19 complaint The attorneys for the plaintiffs are experienced and competent in representation of classes

20 in employment discrimination actions, and they have and will devote adequate staff and other

21 resources to the case.

22

51. Rule 23(b)(2) -- Case Maintainable Under this Rule. This action is properly maintained

23 as a class action pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of Rule 23 in that defendant Cintas has acted or refused

24 to act on grounds which are generally applicable to the class, in particular race, thereby making

25 appropriate injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

26

52.. Rule 23(b)(3) -- Case Maintainable Under this Rule. This action is also properly

27 maintained as a class action pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of Rule 23, particularly with respect to the

28 claims of class members for damages With respect to those claims, questions of law and fact common

11

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 13 of 20

1 to the members of the class and subclass predominate over questions affecting only individual class

2 and subclass members; and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

3 efficient adjudication ofthe controversy. Individual class and subclass members have minimal interest

4 in individually maintaining or controlling separate actions in this case; no other litigation has been

5 commenced asserting the interests and claims advanced in this case; interests of fairness, efficiency,

6 and consistency of outcome will be served by concentrating the litigation of the class and subclass

'7 members' claims in this particular forum and action; this case will be manageable as a class action, and

8 far more easily marrageable tharr the multiplicity of individual actions in different jurisdictions that

9 would result if this case is not permitted to proceed as a class action.

10

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION -- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.c. §1981

(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND ALL CLASS MEMBERS) 11

53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege, and incorporate by this reference, the allegations set forth 12

in paragraph 1 through 52, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein. 13

54. Defendant's discrimination against Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, and the members 14

of the class is in violation of the rights of plaintiffs arrd the class afforded them by the Civil Rights Act 15

of1866, 42 U,S.,C § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of1991 (hereafter "Section 1981 ")., 16

55 By the conduct described above, defendarrt Cintas intentionally deprived the plaintiffs 17

and class members ofthe same rights as ar'e enjoyed by white citizens to the creation, performance, 18

enjoyment, and all benefits and privileges, of their contractual employment relationship with Cintas, in 19

violation of Section 1981.
20

56, As a result of defendant Cintas' discrimination in violation of Section 1981, the 21

22 plaintiffs arrd class members have been denied employment opporturrities providing substarrtial

compensation and benefits, thereby entitling them to injunctive and equitable monetary relief 23

24

57" In its discriminatory actions as alleged above, Cintas has acted with malice or reckless

indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs and class members, thereby entitling them to arr award of 25

punitive damages, 26

27

58" To remedy the violations ofthe rights of the plaintiffs and the class secured by Section

1981, plaintiffs request that the Court award them the relief prayed for below 28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 14 of 20

I

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -- VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODEIUNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

2

(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND SUBCLASS MEMBERS

WHO RESIDE(D), WORK(ED), OR APPLIED

3

FOR EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA)

4

59 Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege, and incorporate by this reference, the allegations of

5 paragraphs 1 through 58, inclusive, as set forth above

6

60. The UCL, Califomia Business and Professions Code §§17200 et seq., prohibits "unfair

7 competition." Under the UCL, "unfair competition" is defined as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

8 business act or practice . . " Violations of other statutes, including §1981, Title VII ofthe Civil
9 Rights Act of 1964,42 u.s.c §§2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title

10 VII"), and Califomia Govemment Code §§12940 et seq ("FEHA"), as alleged herein, which constitute

11 unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices, also violate the UCL and give rise to a claim for

12 reliefas specified in Business & Professions Code §17203

13

61 Plaintiffs Larry Houston and Clifton E. Cooper were residents of Califomia and were

14 employed by defendant Cintas in Califomia in its Rental Division within the period actionable under

15 the UCL.

16

62 . Plaintiffs Larry Houston and Clifton E. Cooper bring this case as a representative action

17 on behalf of themselves and African Americans who reside(d) in Califomia, andlor work(ed) in Cintas'

18 Rental Division in California, andlor who applied for management positions in Cintas' Rental Division

19 in California, and on behalf of the general public, pursuant to §17204 of the California Business and

20 Professions Code. Under this Cause of Action, plaintiffs seeks relief under the DCL only for those

21 members ofthe subclass who reside(d) in Califomia andlorwork(ed) in Cintas' Rental Division in

22 California, andlor applied for employment in Cintas' Rental Division in Califomia.

23

63. Defendant's discrimination against the plaintiffs and all members of the subclass is in

24 violation ofthe rights secured to plaintiffs and the subclass by Section 1981 and Title VII ofthe Civil

25 Rights Act of1964, 42 U.8.C §§2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of1991.

26

64. By the conduct described above, defendant intentionally violated the rights of plaintiffs

27 and members of the subclass under Section 1981 and Title VII.

28

1~

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 15 of 20

I

65. Defendant's conduct also has had an adverse impact against plaintiffs and members of

2 the class, and is neitherjob-related nor consistent with business necessity, and therefore violates the

3 rights ofplaintiffS and members ofthe subclass under Title VII.

4

66. Defendant's discrimination against the plaintiffs and members of the subclass who

5 reside(d) in California, and/or work(ed) for Cintas' Rental Division in California, and/or applied for

6 employment in Cintas' Rental Division in California, is in violation of the rights secured to plaintiffs

7 and members of the subclass by FERA, Califomia Government Code §§12940 et seq .

8

67 By the conduct described above, defendant intentionally violated the rights of plaintiffs

9 and members ofthe subclass under FEHA.

10

68. Defendant's conduct also has had an adverse impact on plaintiffs and members ofthe

11 subclass, and is neitherjob-related nor consistent with business necessity, and therefore violates the

12 rights ofplaintiffs and these members ofthe subclass under FEHA.

13

69. Defendant's discrimination against plaintiffs and members of the subclass they seek to

14 represent constitutes unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices that violate the VCL

15

70. To remedy the violation of the rights of the plaintiffs and subclass members who

16 reside(d) in California, and/or work(ed) for Cintas' Rental Division in California, and/or applied for

17 employment in Cintas' Rental Division in California, as secured by the VCL, on behalf ofthemselves

18 and the general public, and in order to enforce California's public policy and laws against employment

19 discrimination and to seek restitution and disgorgement of defendant's ill-gotten gains secured in

20 violation oflaw, plaintiffs request that the Court award them the relief prayed for below.

21

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION -- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.c. §1981

(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS INDIVDUALLy) 22

7L Plaintiffs repeat and reallege, and incorporate by this reference, the allegations of 23

par·agraphs 1 through 70, inclusive, as set forth above. 24

72 Defendant's failure to promote Larry Houston to a management position at the end of 25

his ninety-day training period violated his rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 US.C § 1981, 26

as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 27

28

1L1.

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 16 of 20

1

73.. Defendant's demotion of Clifton E Cooper to a lower level position and reduction of

2 his salary violated his rights under the Civil Rights Act of1866, 42 U S.C § 1981, as amended by the

3 Civil Rights Act of 1991 .

4

74.. Defendant's constructive discharge of Mr. Houston andMr Cooper violated theirrights

5 under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.SC. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

6

75.. By the conduct described above, deftmdant Cintas intentionally deprived Mr.. Houston

7 and My. Cooper ofthe same rights as are enjoyed by white citizens to the creation, performance,

8 enjoyment, and all benefits and privileges oftheir contractnal employment relationship with Cintas, in

9 violation of42 U.S.C. §1981.

10

76. As a result of defendant Cintas' discrimination in violation of Section 1981, Mr.

11 Houston and Mr. Cooper have been denied employment opportnnities providing substantial

12 compensation and benefits, thereby entitling them to injunctive and equitable monetary relief.

13

77 In its discriminatory actions as alleged above, Cintas has acted with malice or reckless

14 indifference to the rights ofMr. Houston and Mr.. Cooper, thereby entitling them to an award of

15 punitive damages.

16

78 To remedy the violations ofthe rights ofMr Houston and Mr. Cooper secmed by

17 Section 1981, they request that the Court award the reliefprayed for below

18

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

19

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court grant relief on the First, Second, and Third

20 Causes of Action as specified below:

21

79. That the Court certify a class defined as:

22

a. African American employees and former employees of Cintas' Rental Division

23 who have been denied promotions to management positions in Cintas during the limitations period;

24

b

African American applicants who have been denied hire into management

25 positions in Cintas' Rental Division during the limitations period; and

26

c. African American managers and former managers in Cintas' Rental Division

27 who have been denied equal compensation during the limitations period.

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 17 of 20

I

80 That the COUIt certify a subclass defined as:

2

a

African American employees and former employees of Cintas' Rental Division

3 in California who have been denied promotions to management positions in Cintas dUIing the

4 limitations period;

5

b. African American applicants who reside(d) in California andlor applied for

6 employment with Cintas' Rental Division in California, who have been denied hire into management

7 positions dUIing the limitations period; and

8

c. African American managers and former managers of Cintas' Rental Division in

9 California who have been denied equal compensation dUIing the limitations period.

10

81.. That the COUIt certifY the named plaintiffs and their attorneys as representatives of this

II class, pUIsuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil ProcedUIe.

12

82. That the COUIt issue a declaratory judgment against defendant Cintas finding that

13 Cintas' has violated the rights ofplaintiffs and the class and subclass under Section 1981, by denying

14 and depriving plaintiffs and the class and subclass of equal employment opportunities in its Rental

15 Division on the basis of race, as alleged in this complaint; and that the violations of Section 1981 rights

16 as specified above constitute unfair, unlawful andlor fraudulent business practices in violation of the

17 VCL

18

83. That the COUIt issue a preliminary and permanent injunction pUIsuant to § 1981 and the

19 VCL, enjoining defendant Cintas, its officers, agents, employees, and all others acting for or

20 succeeding Cintas, frum engaging in the discriminatory employment practices alleged in this

21 complaint, which discriminate against plaintiffs, the class, or the subclass in violation of Section 1981

22 and the VCL on the basis ofrace.

23

84. That the COUIt enter a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering and requiring that

24 defendant Cintas formulate, institute, adopt and maintain policies and practices which will provide

25 equal employment opportunities to plaintiffs and the class and subclass, and futme African American

26 employees and applicants for employment in management positions in Cintas' Rental Division, and

27 which will to the extent practicable remedy the continuing effects of past discrimination against

28

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 18 of 20

1 plaintiffs and the class and subclass, and restore them to the employment status and management

2 positions they would have held and enjoyed but for the unlawful discrimination complained of herein .

.3

85. That the Court award monetary relief as follows:

4

a .

On the First Cause of Action, order defendant to pay equitable monetary relief

5 and punitive damages to plaintiffs and members ofthe class on whose behalf claims are asserted under

6 Section 1981 in that Cause of Action, in an amount to be proved at trial;

7

h. On the Second Cause of Action, order defendant to make restitution to the

8 plaintiffs and members of the subclass who reside(d) in California, and/or work(ed) in Cintas' Rental

9 Division in California, and/or applied for employment in Cintas' Rental Division in California and

10 who were adversely treated and/or affected by Cintas' discriminatory practices, and who were deprived

11 of wages, compensation, fringe benefits, or other monetary benefits as a result of Cintas' violations of

12 law for which the DCL provides such remedies; and to disgorge profits or ill-gotten gains obtained by

1.3 Cintas from its practices which violate §1981, as alleged herein, in an amount to be proved at trial; and

14

c. On the Third Cause of Action, order defendant to pay equitable monetary relief

15 and punitive damages to Larry Houston and Clifton E. Cooper for their individual claims of

16 constructive discharge in violation of Section 1981, as asserted in that Cause of Action, in an amount

17 to be proved at trial.

18

86.. That the Court award them the costs, expenses and attorneys' fees, payable by

19 defendant Cintas, as follows:

20

a. By determining that plaintiffs ar·e the prevailing parties on the First Cause of

21 Action, and thereupon awarding plaintiffs their reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred

22 in bringing this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1988;

23

h. By awarding plaintiffs their reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees on

24 the Second Cause of Action based on the creation of a common fund to the benefit of the subclass, and

25 pursuant to California Civil Code §1021 5 for the benefits, including monetary relief, obtained on

26 behalf ofplaintiffs and members ofthe subclass who reside(d) and/or work(ed) in Cintas' Rental

27 Division in California and/or applied for employment in Cintas' Rental Division in California, and the

28

1'7

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 19 of 20

1 general public of California, and for serving as "private attorneys general" in acting to enforce the

2 public policy, interest and law of the State of California; and

3

c

By determining that Mr Houston and Mr Cooper are prevailing parties on the

4 Third Cause of Action, and thereupon awarding them their reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys'

5 fees incurred in bringing this action, pursuant to 42 US C. §1988

6

87.. That the Court order Cintas to pay pre- and post-judgment interest in all monetary

7 amounts awarded in this action, as provided by law

8

88. That the Court retainjurisdiction of this case for a sufficient period oftime to assure

9 that defendant Cintas has fully complied with the preliminary and permanent injunctions requested

10 herein and has remedied to the greatest extent practicable the discriminatory policies and practices

11 complained of herein, and that Cintas is operating in full compliance with the requirements of §1981

12 and the UCL with regard to its employment policies and practices

13 III

14 III

15 III

16 III

17 III 18 III

19 III

20 III

21 III

22 III

23 III

24 III

25 III

26 III

27 III

28 III

1 Q

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-2 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 20 of 20

1

89. That the Court award such other and further relief as this Court deems equitable and

2 just.

3 Dated: August 3, 2005
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Respectfully submitted,
GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN &
~-~b'D=ARrDlA-R~IAN ~,<--dL
Manis J. Baller, #048928 Roberta L Steele, #188198 Nina Rabin, #229403 GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN &
DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763-9800 (510) 835-1417 (fax)
Paul Strauss, #153937 Robert S. Libman, #139283 MlNER, BARNHILL & GALLAND 14 W. Erie Street Chicago,IL 60610 (312) 751-1170 (telephone) (312) 751-0438 (telefax)

17

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1Q

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-3 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 1 of 2

1 Monis J Baller, #048928 Roberta L Steele, #188198

2 Nina Rabin, #229403

GOLDSTElN, DEMCHAK, BALLER,

3

BORGEN & DARDARIAN

4 300 Lakeside Dr. , Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612

5 (510) 763-9800 (telephone)

(510) 835-1417 (te1efax) 6

Paul Strauss, #153937 7 Robert S. Libman, #139283
Nancy Maldonado 8 MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND
14 W. Erie Street 9 Chicago, IL 60610
(312) 751-1170 (telephone) 10 (312) 751-0438 (te1efax)

11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

12

: .j
- ~ ~L.,

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 15

LARRY HOUSTON and CLIFTON E COOPER,) Case No. C05-03145 JCS 16 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly )

situated, 17

) CLASS ACTION )

Plaintiffs, 18

) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL )

vs. 19

) ) Complaint filed August 3, 2005

ClNTAS CORPORATION,

)

20

)

Defendant

)

21

)

)

22

)

23 --------------------------)

24

25

26

27

28

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - CASE NO C05·03145 JCS

Case 3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document 1-3 Filed 08/03/2005 Page 2 of 2

1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
2
Plaintiffs LallY Houston and Clifton E. Cooper, on behalf of themselves and the class and
3 subclass, demand a trial by jury on all claims stated in their complaint to which they are entitled to a
4 jury trial.
5

6

7 Dated: August 5, 2005
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22

Respectfully submitted,
GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN &
DARDARIAN ~
-1")~~~, ~"'<~l 11
Monis L Baller, #048928 Roberta L. Steele, #188198 Nina Rabin, #229403 GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN &
DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763-9800 (510) 835-1417 (fax)
Paul Strauss, #153937 Robert S. Libman, #139283 Nancy Maldonado MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND 14 W. Erie Street Chicago, IL 60610 (312) 751-1170 (telephone) (312) 751-0438 (telefax)
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

23

24

25

26

27

28

 
 1 Morris J. Baller, #048928

Roberta L. Steele, #188198 2 Joseph E. Jaramillo, #178566

3

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN

4 300 Lakeside Dr., Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612

5 (510) 763-9800 (telephone)

(510) 835-1417 (fax) 6

7 Betty Eberle, #196914 MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND
8 44 E. Mifflin Street, Suite 803 Madison, WI 53703
9 (608) 255-5200 (telephone) (608) 255-5380 (fax)
10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
11

Nancy Abell, #88785 Heather A. Morgan, #177425 PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 (213) 683-60000 (telephone) (213) 627-0705 (fax)
Attorneys for Defendant Cintas Corporation

12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14

LARRY HOUSTON, CLIFTON COOPER et al., Case No. C05-3145-JSW

15 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly

situated, 16
17 vs.

Plaintiffs,

JOINT STATUS REPORT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMS ON WHICH ARBITRATION WAS COMPELLED

18

CINTAS CORPORATION,

19

Defendant.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JOINT STATUS REPORT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMS ON WHICH ARBITRATION WAS COMPELLED - CASE NO. C05-3145-JSW

1

By order of the Court dated May 24, 2006, the parties submit the following joint status report.

2 The claims of Plaintiffs Larry Houston and Clifton Cooper (collectively “Claimants”) remain pending

3 before the Honorable Eugene F. Lynch (Ret.) in related arbitration proceedings administered by the

4 American Arbitration Association.

5

The Arbitrator held a hearing regarding Claimants’ proposed discovery on August 16, 2007. At

6 the hearing, the Arbitrator indicated that discovery on Claimant Houston’s claims should be limited to

7 whether his claims were timely filed and that the statute of limitations issue should be adjudicated

8 before proceeding to discovery on his class claims. The parties are currently attempting to reach

9 agreement on various discovery issues including the parties’ exchange of initial disclosures, service of

10 written discovery requests an scheduling of depositions. The Arbitrator has not set a date for a further

11 status conference.

12

The parties will submit their next status report to this Court by June 20, 2008.

13 Dated: February 22, 2008

14 Respectfully submitted,

15

/s/ Joseph E. Jaramillo

/s/ Nancy Abell

16 Morris J. Baller, #048928 Roberta L. Steele, #188198

Nancy Abell, #88785 Heather A. Morgan, #177425

17 Joseph E. Jaramillo, #178566

PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor

18

& DARDARIAN

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228

300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 19 Oakland, CA 94612

(213) 683-60000 (telephone) (213) 627-0705 (fax)

(510) 763-9800 20 (510) 835-1417 (fax)

21 Betty Eberle, #196914 MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND
22 44 E. Mifflin Street, Suite 803 Madison, WI 53703
23 (608) 255-5200 (telephone) (608) 255-5380 (fax)
24 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
25

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT CINTAS CORPORATION

26 LEGAL_US_W # 58248274.1

27

28
1
JOINT STATUS REPORT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMS ON WHICH ARBITRATION WAS COMPELLED - CASE NO. C05-3145-JSW

 
 United States District Court, N.D. California, San Francisco Division.
Robert RAMIREZ, Robert Harris, Luis Pocasangre Cardoza, Jose Salcedo, A. Shappelle Thompson, Coretta Sil Vers (formerly Vick), Sandra Evans, Blanca Nelly Avalos, James Morgan and Anthony Jones, on behalf of them-
selves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CINTALS CORPORATION, Defendant. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff/Intervenor.
No. C 04-0281 JSW. November 28, 2005.
Related to Case No. C05-03145JSW
Defendant Cintas Corporation's Answer to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint
Judge Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Defendant Cintas Corporation (”“Cintas‘’ or ”“Defendant‘’), for itself alone and no other defendant, hereby answers, pleads, and otherwise responds to plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Robert Harris, Luis Pocasangre Cardoza, Jose Salcedo, A. Shappelle Thompson, Coretta Silvers (formerly Vick), Sandra Evans, Blanca Nelly Avalos, James Morgan and Anthony Jones' (”“Plaintiffs‘’) Fourth Amended Complaint (”“Fourth Amended Complaint‘’) as follows:
1. Answering Paragraph 1, Cintas admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring an employment discrimination case pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code §§ 12940 et seq., and the California Unfair Business Practices Act, California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Defendant admits that Plaintiffs have made allegations against Defendant regarding employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex. Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to sue on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated African American, Hispanic, and female current and former employees and applicants of Cintas. Defendant admits that Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief, damages, remedies, restitution, costs, expenses, or fees. Except as herein expressly admitted, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
2. Answering Paragraph 2, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring claims subject to this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), 1367, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Except as herein expressly admitted, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
3. Answering Paragraph 3, Defendant admits that Cintas maintains facilities and business operations in this District, and that it employed Plaintiffs Luis Pocasangre Cardoza (”“CARDOZA‘’) and James Morgan (”“MORGAN‘’) in this District. Except as herein expressly admitted, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
4. Answering Paragraph 4, Defendant admits that it employed CARDOZA and MORGAN in its facility in San Leandro, Alameda County, California. Except as herein expressly admitted, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.

5. Answering Paragraph 5, Defendant admits that Robert Ramirez, Robin Beasley, Sandra Evans, Robert Harris, Luis Pocasangre Cardoza, Jose Salcedo, A. Shappelle Thompson, Coretta Silvers, Sandra Evans and James Morgan are current or former employees of Cintas. Except as herein expressly admitted, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
6. Answering Paragraph 6, Defendant admits that CARDOZA purports to be a Hispanic male, resident of Oakland, California, and native of El Salvador, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that CARDOZA was employed as an unloader at its San Leandro, California facility in 2003. Defendant admits that CARDOZA's resignation was effective on or about August 6, 2003. Defendant admits that CARDOZA purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about November 18, 2003, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and Defendant denies this claim to the extent that the EEOC Charge attached to the Fourth Amended Complaint is dated September 26, 2003 and stamped ”“RECEIVED‘’ December 16, 2003. Defendant further admits that the EEOC issued CARDOZA a Right to Sue Notice that is dated June 9, 2004. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
7. Answering Paragraph 7, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Robert Ramirez (”“RAMIREZ‘’) purports to be a Hispanic male, a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, and born in Mexico, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that it employed RAMIREZ as a ”“Service Sales Representative‘’ and later as a production supervisor from on or about July 6, 1992 until about August 2003. Defendant further admits that RAMIREZ purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on November 18, 2003, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and, on such basis, Defendant denies this claim. Defendant admits that the EEOC issued RAMIREZ a Notice of Right to Sue that is dated June 7, 2004. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
8. Answering Paragraph 8, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Sandra Evans (”“EVANS‘’) purports to be an African American female and a resident of Brookside, Pennsylvania, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that it employed EVANS from on or about March 18, 2002 to the present, in its stockroom at its Aston, Pennsylvania facility. Defendant further admits that EVANS purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about November 17, 2003, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and, on such basis, Defendant denies this claim. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
9. Answering Paragraph 9, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Robert Harris (”“HARRIS‘’) purports to be an African American male and resident of Rochester, New York, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that HARRIS was employed as a loader at its Rochester, New York facility, from in or about May 2003 to October 2003. Defendant admits HARRIS was terminated on or about October 9, 2003. Defendant admits that HARRIS purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about November 18, 2003, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and, on such basis, Defendant denies this claim. Defendant further admits that the EEOC issued HARRIS a Notice of Right to Sue that is dated on or about May 21, 2004. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
10. Answering Paragraph 10, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Jose Salcedo (”“SALCEDO‘’) purports to be a Hispanic male, resident of Freeport, New York, and native of the Dominican Republic, but Defendant alleges that it

lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that SALCEDO was employed at its Central Islip, New York facility, as a production supervisor, from on or about November 1999 to November 2002. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
11. Answering Paragraph 11, Defendant admits that Plaintiff A. Shappelle Thompson (”“THOMPSON‘’) purports to be an African American male and resident of Rochester, New York, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that it employed THOMPSON as a ”“driver‘’ (aka Service Sales Representative), at its Rochester, New York facility, from on or about April 2000 to January 2002. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
12. Answering Paragraph 12, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Coretta Silvers (formerly Vick) (”“SILVERS‘’) purports to be an African American female and resident of Raleigh, North Carolina, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that SILVERS was employed in an accounts receivable position, at its Raleigh, North Carolina facility, from on or about September 23, 2002 to on or about February 5, 2003. Defendant admits that SILVERS purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about January 8, 2004, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and, on such basis, denies this claim. Defendant admits that the EEOC issued SILVERS a Notice of Right to Sue that is dated June 28, 2004. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
13. Answering Paragraph 13, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Blanca Nelly Avalos (”“AVALOS‘’) purports to be a Hispanic female, resident of Panorama City, California, and native of Ecuador, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that AVALOS purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about June 23, 2004, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and, on such basis, Defendant denies this claim. Defendant admits that the EEOC issued AVALOS a Notice of Right to Sue that is dated October 26, 2004. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
14. Answering Paragraph 14, Defendant admits that MORGAN purports to be an African American male resident of Hayward, California, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits that MORGAN was employed at its San Leandro, California facility from on or about December 27, 1999 through on or about March 26, 2004. Defendant admits that an SSR's compensation may be determined by, among other things, route volume and Key Performance Indicators (”“KPI‘’) score. Defendant admits that MORGAN purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about December 29, 2004, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and on such basis, denies the claim. Defendant further admits that the EEOC issued MORGAN a Right to Sue Notice that is dated July 15, 2005. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
15. Answering Paragraph 15, Defendant admits that Plaintiff Anthony Jones (”“JONES‘’) purports to be an African American male resident of Camden, Delaware, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of these claims, and, on such basis, Defendant denies these claims. Defendant admits and alleges that Jones was not hired as an SSR at its Dover, Delaware facility. Defendant admits that JONES purports to have filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about May 11, 2005, but Defendant alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of this claim, and on such basis, denies the claim. Defendant admits that the EEOC issued JONES a Notice of Right to Sue that is dated June 24, 2005.

Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
16. Answering Paragraph 16, Defendant admits and alleges that it is a corporation with corporate headquarters in Mason, Ohio (near Cincinnati). Defendant further admits and alleges that in its fiscal year 2004 Annual Report, it reported approximately $2.8 billion in revenue and approximately $272 million in net income. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
17. Answering Paragraph 17, Defendant admits that its business involves, among other things, renting uniforms, mats, and towels to commercial enterprises. Defendant also admits that some of its production workers, among other things, clean, repair, hang and assemble uniforms and materials to be delivered to customers. Defendant further admits that some of its Service Sales Representatives (”“SSRs‘’), among other things, deliver clean clothing, mats and towels to customers and pick up dirty items from customers. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
18. Answering Paragraph 18, Defendant admits that as of about April 2005, it had more than 27,000 total employees. Defendant admits and alleges that as of about April 2005, it operated approximately 250 Rental Division facilities across the country. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
19. Answering Paragraph 19, Defendant admits and alleges that the positions at its Rental Division facilities vary by facility, but that at some of its Rental Division facilities, it employs individuals in some or all of the following types of positions: various ”“production,‘’ service and sales, office, and human resources positions, among others. These positions include non-supervisory, supervisory, and/or management positions. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
20. Answering Paragraph 20, Defendant admits and alleges that its Board of Directors and Corporate Officers engage in ongoing, general strategic business planning at its corporate headquarters in Mason, Ohio (near Cincinnati). Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
21. Answering Paragraph 21, Defendant admits and alleges that from time to time its managers move from one Rental Division facility to another. Defendant further admits and alleges that it encourages and promotes a corporate culture that values, among other things, humility and respect for its frontline employees, courtesy and enthusiasm, high ethical and moral values, compliance with all laws and regulations, respect for the ethical and moral values of all of its employees, and support of diversity and equal employment opportunity. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
22. Answering Paragraph 22, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
23. Answering Paragraph 23, Defendant admits that many of the Directors and Officers identified on page 52 of Cintas's 2004 Annual Report are white males. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
24. Answering Paragraph 24, Defendant admits that John Milligan once was a regional vice president. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.

25. Answering Paragraph 25, Defendant admits that Al Kocsis currently is a general manager at its Painesville, Ohio facility. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
26. Answering Paragraph 26, Defendant admits Mike Palo currently is the general manager at its Irvington, New Jersey facility. Defendant further admits that Brian Dudley once was a service training coordinator at its Springfield, Missouri facility. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
27. Answering Paragraph 27, Defendant admits that Scott Thomas once was a production supervisor in one of its Michigan facilities. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
28. Answering Paragraph 28, Defendant again admits that Mike Palo currently is the general manager of its Irvington, New Jersey facility. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
29. Answering Paragraph 29, Defendant admits and alleges that the ”“management and supervisory jobs‘’ at its Rental Division facilities vary by facility, and can (but do not always) include, and are not limited to, the following positions: general manager, branch manager, production manager, service manager, production supervisor, sales manager, and office manager. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
30. Answering Paragraph 30, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
31. Answering Paragraph 31, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
32. Answering Paragraph 32, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
33. Answering Paragraph 33, Defendant admits that Service Sales Representatives (”“SSRs‘’) are sometimes referred to as ”“drivers.‘’ Defendant further admits that SSRs, at some of its Rental Division facilities, perform duties including but not limited to delivering clean uniforms, mats, and towels to their customers and picking up dirty items, which they return to the facility for laundering. Defendant admits and alleges that SSRs play an important part in developing good relationships with Cintas's customers, and that their job duties generally include, but are not limited to, selling additional products and services to existing Cintas customers. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
34. Answering Paragraph 34, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
35. Answering Paragraph 35, Defendant admits and alleges that its SSR hiring practices are not ”“uniform‘’ to the extent that these hiring practices vary and/oi have varied by individual facility. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
36. Answering Paragraph 36, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.

37. Answering Paragraph 37, Defendant admits and alleges that as of April 1, 2005, less than 5% of the SSRs in its Rental Division are female. Defendant admits that over 50% of the ”“production‘’ workers in its Rental Division facilities are female. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
38. Answering Paragraph 38, Defendant admits and alleges that some of its Rental Division facilities employ Assistant SSRs and others whose job duties include assisting SSRs in fulfilling customer needs. These duties may include riding routes, and heavy lifting, among others. Defendant further admits and alleges that as of April 1, 2005, more than 50% of the individuals employed as Assistant SSRs and similar SSR assistant (or ”“helper‘’) positions were male. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
39. Answering Paragraph 39, Defendant admits and alleges that while SSR hiring practices can vary by facility, the current SSR hiring process generally includes a route ride (sometimes called a ”“ride along‘’) with a current SSR, or others knowledgeable of the SSR position. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
40. Answering Paragraph 40, Defendant admits and alleges that while SSR hiring practices can vary by facility, the SSR hiring process generally includes a written (or on-line computerized) pre-employment test. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
41. Answering Paragraph 41, Defendant admits and alleges that SSR compensation is based, in part, on route volume and KPI scores. Defendant further admits that some SSR routes may have a higher volume than others, and that SSR routes may vary by, among other things, type of product delivered and location of the customers along the route at any given time. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
42. Answering Paragraph 42, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
43. Answering Paragraph 43, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
44. Answering Paragraph 44, Defendant admits and alleges that, depending on the location, an SSR who worked as a Certified Route Trainer (”“CRT‘’) may have received additional compensation for such work. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
45. Answering Paragraph 45, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
46. Answering Paragraph 46, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
47. Answering Paragraph 47, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring their claims under Section 1981, Title VII, and FEHA as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.

48. Answering Paragraph 48, and each subparagraph thereof, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of which they allege to be members. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph and subparagraphs thereof.
49. Answering Paragraph 49, and each subparagraph thereof, Defendant admits that CARDOZA, AVALOS and MORGAN seek to represent a subclass of which they allege to be members. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph and subparagraphs thereof.
50. Answering Paragraph 50, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
51. Answering Paragraph 51, Defendant admits that African Americans, Hispanics, and women work for Cintas, or are located in communities in different states throughout the country. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
52. Answering Paragraph 52, and each subparagraph thereof, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph and subparagraphs thereof.
53. Answering Paragraph 53, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
54. Answering Paragraph 54, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
55. Answering Paragraph 55, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
56. Answering Paragraph 56, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
57. Answering Paragraph 57, Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 56, hereinbefore, as though fully set forth herein.
58. Answering Paragraph 58, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
59. Answering Paragraph 59, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
60. Answering Paragraph 60, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
61. Answering Paragraph 61, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
62. Answering Paragraph 62, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs request that the Court award them relief. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this

paragraph.
63. Answering Paragraph 63, Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 62, hereinbefore, as though fully set forth herein.
64. Answering Paragraph 64, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
65. Answering Paragraph 65, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
66. Answering Paragraph 66, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
67. Answering Paragraph 67, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
68. Answering Paragraph 68, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
69. Answering Paragraph 69, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
70. Answering Paragraph 70, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs request that the Court award them relief. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
71. Answering Paragraph 71, Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 70, hereinbefore, as though fully set forth herein.
72. Answering Paragraph 72, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
73. Answering Paragraph 73, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
74. Answering Paragraph 74, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
75. Answering Paragraph 75, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in this paragraph.
76. Answering Paragraph 76, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs request that the Court award them relief. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
77. Answering Paragraph 77, Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 76, hereinbefore, as though fully set forth herein.

78. Answering Paragraph 78, Defendant admits that California Business and Professions Code § 17200 defines ”“unfair competition,‘’ in part, as ”“any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.‘’ Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
79. Answering Paragraph 79, Defendant admits that CARDOZA and MORGAN were employed by Cintas at its San Leandro, California location. Defendant admits and alleges that it received a job application purporting to be signed by AVALOS, for a position as a ”“Driver‘’ at a Cintas facility located in Van Nuys, California. Defendant also alleges that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of Plaintiffs' claim that CARDOZA, AVALOS and MORGAN are residents of California, and, on such basis, Defendant denies this claim. Except as expressly admitted and alleged herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
80. Answering Paragraph 80, Defendant admits that CARDOZA, AVALOS and MORGAN purport to bring this case as a representative action on behalf of themselves and others and seek relief under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
81. Answering Paragraph 81, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs request that the Court award them relief. Except as expressly admitted herein, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in this paragraph.
82. Responding to the Prayer for Relief contained in Paragraphs 82 through 92, and each subparagraph thereof, Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that Plaintiffs, or any of them, or purported class members, or any of them, have been or will be damaged by reason of any act or omission of Defendant or any officer, agent, or employee of Defendant. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that any act or omission of Defendant or any officer, agent, or employee of Defendant, violated any rights, statutory or otherwise, of Plaintiffs, or any of them, or purported class members, or any of them. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that the elements of relief sought are available to Plaintiffs on the claims alleged. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that this case should be expedited. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that any class or subclass exists or should be certified in this case. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that declaratory judgment is necessary or appropriate in this case. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that a preliminary or permanent injunction is necessary or appropriate in this case. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that monetary relief is necessary or appropriate in this case. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs, expenses and attorneys fees, payable by Defendant. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, that Plaintiffs are entitled to any prejudgment or post judgment interest on any monetary amounts awarded in this action, if any or at all. Defendant denies that the Court should retain any jurisdiction in this case or award any other relief in this matter. Defendant further denies, generally and specifically, each and every remaining allegation in Paragraphs 82 through 92 and subparagraphs thereof.
AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES
GENERAL DEFENSES
FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State Facts Sufficient to State a Claim)
83. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief Can be Granted)
84. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Lack of Venue)
85. Plaintiffs and putative class members who do not work for, did not work for, or did not apply for work with Defendant in the Northern District of California are barred from pursuing their claims in the Northern District of California because they lack venue and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Decisions)
86. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, is barred in whole or in part because all decisions with respect to Plaintiffs' and putative class members' employment were made by Defendant for legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-pretextual reasons.
FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Mixed Motive)
87. Defendant did not commit the acts or omissions as alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint for discriminatory motives, but assuming that it did, such acts or omissions would have been taken in any event for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-pretextual reasons.
SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Estoppel)
88. Plaintiffs and putative class members are estopped from pursuing the claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, by reason of the Plaintiffs' and putative class members' own actions and course of conduct.
SEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Waiver)
89. Plaintiffs and putative class members have waived their right, if any, to pursue the claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, by reason of their own actions and course of conduct.
EIGHTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Doctrine of Laches)
90. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, is barred by the doctrine of laches.
NINTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Doctrine of Unclean Hands)
91. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
TENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Reasonable Care)
92. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim therein, is barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any alleged discriminatory and/or retaliatory behavior.
ELEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Take Advantage of Corrective Opportunities)
93. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim therein, is barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs and putative class members failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by Defendant to avoid harm or otherwise.
TWELFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Predecessor Liability)
94. To the extent that any of the alleged wrongs were committed by Defendant's predecessor entity or entities, any and all such claims are barred as against Defendant in their entirety.
THIRTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Third Party Liability)
95. To the extent that any of the alleged wrongs were committed by others, any and all such claims are barred as against Defendant in their entirety.
FOURTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Advice of Counsel)
96. To the extent that any of the alleged wrongs were committed after Defendant reasonably relied in good faith on the advice of counsel, any and all claims are barred as against Defendant in their entirety.

FIFTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Subsequent Remedial Measures)
97. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each purported claim contained therein, is barred to the extent it would impermissibly require for proof the admission into evidence of subsequent remedial measures not admissible to prove culpable conduct in connection with the event under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.
SIXTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Prior Settlement and Release Bars Bringing Suit)
98. To the extent that a named Plaintiff, or any putative class member, has executed a settlement and release with Defendant and received consideration therefor, any and all claims he or she purports to bring against Defendant, including, without limitation, the claims alleged herein, are barred in their entirety.
SEVENTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Arbitration Agreements Bar Bringing Suit)
99. To the extent that a named Plaintiff, or any putative class member, has agreed to arbitrate any or all of the purported claims asserted in the Fourth Amended Complaint, the Fourth Amended Complaint violates such agreements to arbitrate and the Fourth Amended Complaint should be dismissed and/or stayed and such Plaintiffs, and/or such putative class members, should be compelled to arbitrate.
EIGHTEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(SALCEDO, THOMPSON and SILVERS'S Claims Stayed Pending Arbitration)
100. The claims of SALCEDO, THOMPSON and SILVERS are stayed pending arbitration, pursuant to the Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion of Defendant Cintas Corporation to (A) Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs Salcedo, Thompson, Silvers, and Severson, or in the Alternative, (B) Stay their Claims and Compel Arbitration, dated March 22, 2005, and SALCEDO, THOMPSON and SILVERS cannot serve as class representatives.
NINETEENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(MORGAN'S Claims Stayed Pending Arbitration)
101. The claims of MORGAN are stayed pending arbitration, pursuant to the Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion of Defendant Cintas Corporation to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiff James Morgan or, in the Alternative, Stay His Claims and Compel Arbitration, dated November 2, 2005, and MORGAN cannot serve as a class representative.
42 U.S.C. § 1981
TWENTIETH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Statute of Limitations - 42 U.S.C. § 1981)
102. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitation, including but not limited to 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
TWENTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(California Statute of Limitations - One Year for Personal Injury)
103. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitation, including but not limited to former California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3).
TWENTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(California Statute of Limitations - Two Years for Personal Injury)
104. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitation, including but not limited to California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1.
TWENTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(California Statute of Limitations - Four Year Residual)
105. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitation, including but not limited to California Code of Civil Procedure § 343.
TWENTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Applicable State Statute of Limitations - California Borrowing Statute)
106. All of plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims that arose in a state other than California are barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitations, including but not limited to, the applicable state's personal injury statute of limitations, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 361.
TITLE VII
TWENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Exhaust Federal Administrative Remedies)
107. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' Title VII claims are barred because Plaintiffs and the putative class members failed, in whole or in part, to exhaust all available administrative remedies, and/or otherwise failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites to the bringing of this action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
TWENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Untimely EEOC Charges)

108. To the extent that Plaintiffs and putative class members make allegations or claims under Title VII with respect to a time period more than 300 days before Plaintiffs and putative class members allegedly filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (”“EEOC‘’), or which were not made the subject of a timely EEOC charge, such allegations or claims are barred. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c)-(e).
TWENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to File Timely Civil Action on Title VII Claims)
109. To the extent that Plaintiffs and putative class members make allegations or claims under Title VII, and failed to file a civil action within ninety (90) days after receiving notice of a right to sue from the EEOC, such allegations or claims are barred. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f).
TWENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Title VII Claims Outside the Scope of Administrative Charges)
110. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' Title VII claims are barred to the extent that the allegations contained therein do not reasonably fall within the scope of claims made in any administrative charge timely filed by any Plaintiffs or putative class members, or each or any of them, with the EEOC.
TWENTY-NINTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Attempt to Resolve Title VII Claims)
111. Some or all of Plaintiffs' and putative class members' Title VII claims are barred due to the EEOC's failure to endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation or persuasion, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
THIRTIETH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Lack of Venue - Special Venue Provisions of Title VII)
112. Plaintiffs and putative class members who do not work for, did not work for, or did not apply for work with Defendant in the Northern District of California are barred from pursuing their Title VII claims in the Northern District of California because they cannot satisfy the special venue requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
THIRTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Practices Consistent with Business Necessity)
113. Insofar as any of Defendant's hiring, assignment, transfer, compensation or promotion policies, or any other employment policy or procedure utilized by Defendant, has had a statistically adverse impact on females, African Americans, or Hispanics, such policies or practices nevertheless are lawful because they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
THIRTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Differential Treatment Based on Bona Fide Factors)
114. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' Title VII claims are barred because any alleged differential treatment of Plaintiffs and putative class members by Defendant was undertaken pursuant to a bonafide merit system, bonafide seniority system, or bonafide factors other than gender, race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
FEHA
THIRTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Exhaust State Administrative Remedies)
115. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims arising under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (”“FEHA‘’) are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs and putative class members did not exhaust the administrative remedies as required and/or otherwise failed to comply with all the statutory prerequisites to bring suit pursuant to the FEHA. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900 et seq.
THIRTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Untimely DFEH Charges)
116. To the extent that Plaintiffs or putative class members make allegations or claims arising under the FEHA with respect to a time period more than one (1) year before the Plaintiffs and putative class members allegedly filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (”“DFEH‘’), or which were not made the subject of a timely DFEH complaint, such allegations or claims are barred. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12960(d).
THIRTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to File Timely Civil Action on FEHA Claims)
117. To the extent that Plaintiffs and putative class members make allegations or claims under the FEHA, and failed to file a civil action within one (1) year after receiving notice of a right to sue from the DFEH, such allegations or claims are barred. CAL. GOV't Code § 12965(b).
THIRTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Claims Outside the Scope of DFEH Charges)
118. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims arising under the FEHA are barred to the extent that the allegations therein do not reasonably fall within the scope of any claims made in any administrative complaints filed by Plaintiffs and putative class members, or each or any of them, with the DFEH.
THIRTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Attempt to Resolve FEHA Claims)
119. Some or all of Plaintiffs' and putative class members' FEHA claims are barred due to the DFEH's failure to

endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice complained of by conference, conciliation or persuasion, as required by California Government Code § 12963.7(a).
THIRTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Practices Consistent with Business Necessity)
120. Insofar as any of Defendant's hiring, assignment, transfer, compensation or promotion policies, or any other employment policy or procedure utilized by Defendant, has had a statistically adverse impact on females, AfricanAmericans, or Hispanics, such policies or practices nevertheless are lawful because they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. CAL. Code REGS. tit. 2, §§ 7286.7(b) & (c), 7287.4(e).
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200
THIRTY-NINTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Statute of Limitations - CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200)
121. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported cause of action under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is barred in whole or in part by all applicable statutes of limitation, including but not limited to California Business and Professions Code § 17208.
FORTIETH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Plaintiffs Lack Standing Under Section 17200 - Private Litigants)
122. Plaintiffs and putative class members, as private litigants, lack standing to bring a claim for relief for damages under California Business and Professions Code § 17203.
FORTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Plaintiffs Lack Standing Under Section 17200 - No Injury In Fact)
123. Plaintiffs and putative class members lack standing to bring a claim for relief under California Business and Professions Code § 17204 because they have not suffered an actual injury or lost money or property as a result of the challenged business practice(s).
FORTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Barred as Class Action Prerequisites Are Not Met)
124. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported cause of action under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is barred because Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the prerequisites for class certification and, therefore, cannot represent the interests of others.
FORTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Limited to Restitution and Injunctive Relief)

125. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported cause of action under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is barred because the remedy for such actions is limited to restitution and injunctive relief.
FORTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutional - Due Process)
126. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violate the California Constitution and/or United States Constitution in that, among other things, they deny and impinge upon procedural and substantive due process rights.
FORTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutional - Equal Protection)
127. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violate the California Constitution and/or United States Constitution in that, among other things, they are violative of equal protection.
FORTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutional - Multiple Suits)
128. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported cause of action under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violates Defendant's rights to due process under the California Constitution and/or the United States Constitution to the extent the cause of action does not afford Defendant the protections against multiple suits and duplicative liability ordinarily provided by class actions.
FORTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutionally Vague)
129. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' purported cause of action under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violates Defendant's rights under the California Constitution and/or the United States Constitution by attempting to enforce California Business and Professions Code § 17200 in a manner that renders the requirements of that statute unconstitutionally vague.
FORTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutional - Freedom of Contract)
130. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violate the California Constitution and/or the United States Constitution in that, among other things, they are violative of the freedom of contract.
FORTY-NINTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Section 17200 Claim Unconstitutional - Interstate Commerce)

131. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., violate the United States Constitution in that, among other things, they place an undue burden upon interstate commerce.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
FIFTIETH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Lack of Standing)
132. Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the prerequisites for class certification and, therefore, lack standing and cannot represent the interests of others.
FIFTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Class Conflicts)
133. Class or subclass certification would be inappropriate herein due to conflicts of interest between Plaintiffs and purported class or subclass members, or between and among purported class or subclass members.
FIFTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Satisfy Prerequisites Under Rule 23 - Arbitration Venue)
134. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the prerequisites under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (”“Rule 23‘’) because some or all of the claims of the named Plaintiffs and putative class members are covered by arbitration agreements that require Plaintiffs and putative class members to resolve their disputes with Defendant through arbitration in the county and the state where the Plaintiff or putative class member works or most recently worked for Defendant.
FIFTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Satisfy Prerequisites Under Rule 23 - Collective Bargaining Agreements)
135. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the prerequisites under Rule 23 because some or all of the claims of the named Plaintiffs and putative class members are governed by the terms of applicable Collective Bargaining Agreements.
RELIEF AND DAMAGES
FIFTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Statutory Damages)
136. Plaintiffs' claims for damages (and certain categories of damages, and the amounts thereof recoverable) are limited by the applicable limit(s) on statutory damages, including but not limited to those limits set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) for claims under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(l) and (b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
FIFTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Mitigate)

137. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each and every purported claim alleged therein, is barred because each Plaintiff and putative class member has failed to mitigate or reasonably attempt to mitigate his or her damages, if any, as required by law.
FIFTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Unjust Enrichment)
138. The Fourth Amended Complaint, and each and every purported claim alleged therein, is barred because any recovery from Defendant would result in a Plaintiff's or a putative class member's unjust enrichment.
FIFTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Workers Compensation Offset)
139. Plaintiffs and putative class members are barred, in whole or in part, from recovery of damages as alleged and prayed for in the Fourth Amended Complaint to the extent that they received any workers' compensation benefits relating to their claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint or, alternatively, any such workers' compensation benefits received by Plaintiffs and/or putative class members should be an offset to any recovery in this action.
FIFTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Legal Remedy Precludes Injunctive and Equitable Relief)
140. Plaintiffs' and putative class members' claims for injunctive and other equitable relief are barred because Plaintiffs and putative class members have an adequate and complete remedy at law.
FIFTY-NINTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine)
141. Plaintiffs and putative class members may be barred, in whole or in part, from recovery of damages as alleged and prayed for in the Fourth Amended Complaint by the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
SIXTIETH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Absence of Intentional Discrimination Precludes Punitive Damages)
142. Defendant alleges that it has not engaged in intentional discrimination with respect to Plaintiffs, and Defendant therefore cannot be liable for punitive damages.
SIXTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Absence of Malice, Reckless Indifference or Fraud Precludes Punitive Damages)
143. Defendant alleges that it has not acted with malice, reckless indifference or fraud toward Plaintiffs and putative class members and, therefore, Defendant cannot be liable for punitive damages.

SIXTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Punitive Damages Would Constitute Denial of Due Process)
144. Plaintiffs and putative class members are not entitled to recover any punitive or exemplary damages as prayed for in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and any allegations with respect thereto should be stricken, because California's laws regarding the alleged conduct in question in this action are too vague to permit the imposition of punitive damages, and because any award of punitive or exemplary damages under California law in general, and/or any such award under California law as applied to the facts in this case, would violate Defendant's constitutional rights under provisions of the United States and California Constitutions, including, but not limited to, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SIXTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Plead Facts Sufficient to Support Punitive Damages)
145. Plaintiffs and putative class members are not entitled to receive punitive damages because Plaintiffs have not pled facts sufficient to support such an award.
SIXTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Good Faith Efforts Preclude Punitive Damages)
146. Plaintiffs and putative class members are not entitled to receive punitive damages because Defendant has made good faith efforts to prevent discrimination in its workplace.
SIXTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Defendant's Policies Preclude Punitive Damages)
147. Plaintiffs and putative class members are barred from recovering punitive damages because Defendant had in place a policy to prevent discrimination and retaliation in its workplace and made good faith efforts to implement and enforce that policy.
SIXTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Punitive Damages Precluded - Individual Decisionmakers)
148. Plaintiffs and putative class members are not entitled to receive punitive damages because, even if they were able to establish that any individual manager allowed unlawful bias to affect any employment decision, which Defendant expressly denies, Defendant, in light of its good faith efforts to prevent bias, is not liable for punitive damages based on any such individual decision.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiffs and putative class members take nothing by reason of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint, that

the Fourth Amended Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, and that judgment be entered for Defendant;
2. That Defendant be awarded its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees; and
3. That Defendant be awarded such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. NANCY L. ABELL MARK W. ATKINSON HEATHER A. MORGAN JOSEPH W. DENG PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP NANCY L. ABELL Attorneys for Defendant CINTAS CORPORATION
Robert RAMIREZ, Robert Harris, Luis Pocasangre Cardoza, Jose Salcedo, A. Shappelle Thompson, Coretta Sil Vers (formerly Vick), Sandra Evans, Blanca Nelly Avalos, James Morgan and Anthony Jones, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CINTALS CORPORATION, Defendant. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff/Intervenor. 2005 WL 3606752 (N.D.Cal. ) (Trial Pleading )
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 Case 3:04-cv-00281-JSW Document 126 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 1 of 8

1 NANCY L. ABELL (SB# 88785) nancyabell@paulhastings.com ELENA R. BACA (SB# 160564) elenabaca@paulhastings.com
2 HEATHER A. MORGAN (SB# 177425) heathermorgan@paulhastings.com JOSEPH W. DENG (SB# 179320) josephdeng@paulhastings.com
3 PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP 515 South Flower Street
4 Twenty-Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228
5 Telephone: (213) 683-6000 Facsimile: (213) 627-0705
6 Attorneys for Defendant
7 CINTAS CORPORATION

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

11 ROBERT RAMIREZ, ROBERT HARRIS,

CASE NO. C04-0281-JSW

12 LUIS POCASANGRE CARDOZA, JOSE SALCEDO, A. SHAPPELLE

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]

13 THOMPSON, CORETTA SILVERS (formerly VICK), SANDRA EVANS,

ORDER TO HAVE CASES RELATED

14 BLANCA NELLY AVALOS, JAMES MORGAN and ANTHONY JONES, on

15 behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

16 Plaintiffs,

17

vs.

Place: Judge:

Courtroom 2, 17th Floor Hon. Jeffrey S. White

Complaint Filed: January 20, 2004

Trial Date:

None Set

18 CINTAS CORPORATION,

19

Defendant.

20

LARRY HOUSTON and CLIFTON 21 COOPER, on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated,

22

Plaintiffs,

23

vs.

CINTAS CORPORATION,

24

Defendant.

25

[PROPOSED] RELATED TO CASE NO. C05-03145 CRB

26

27

28
Case No. C04-0281-JSW

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO HAVE CASES RELATED

Case 3:04-cv-00281-JSW Document 126 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 2 of 8

1

STIPULATION

2

3

The parties in the two above-referenced cases, by and through their counsel of

4 record, hereby stipulate as follows:

5

6

1. WHEREAS, Plaintiffs in the action entitled Robert Ramirez, et al. v.

7 Cintas Corporation, U.S.D.C., Northern District of California, Case No. C04-0281-JSW (the

8 “Ramirez Action”), filed their Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on

9 August 3, 2005;

10

11

2. WHEREAS, Plaintiffs in the action entitled Larry Houston, et al. v. Cintas

12 Corporation, U.S.D.C., Northern District of California, Case No. C05-03145-CRB (the “Houston

13 Action”), filed their Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on August 3, 2005;

14

15

3. WHEREAS, the parties in the Houston Action are represented by the same

16 counsel as the parties in the Ramirez Action;

17

18

4. WHEREAS, on August 23, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion for

19 Administrative Relief to Consider Whether Cases Should be Related, Pursuant to Northern 20 District Civil Local Rules 3-12 and 7-11 (the “Motion to Relate Cases”);

21

22

5. WHEREAS, the parties have now agreed that the two actions should be

23 deemed “related” pursuant to Local Rule 3-12(a), and as set forth in the Motion to Relate Cases,

24 because (a) the two actions concern substantially the same parties, property, transactions and

25 events; and (b) it appears likely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and

26 expense, and a risk of conflicting results if the cases are conducted before different judges; and

27

28
Case No. C04-0281-JSW

-1-

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO HAVE CASES RELATED

Case 3:04-cv-00281-JSW Document 126 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 3 of 8

1

6. WHEREAS, the parties agree that once the Houston Action is deemed

2 related to the Ramirez Action, the Houston Action should be transferred and reassigned to the

3 Honorable Jeffrey S. White for all purposes;

4

5

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties in both actions request that the Court order as

6 follows:

7

8

A. That the Houston Action be deemed related to the Ramirez Action.

9

10

B. That the Houston Action be transferred and reassigned to the Honorable

11 Jeffrey S. White for all purposes.

12

13

SO STIPULATED.

14

15 DATED: August 31, 2005 16

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN

17

By:

/s/ Roberta Steele

18

ROBERTA STEELE

19

Attorneys for Plaintiffs in both the

20

Houston Action and Ramirez Action

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
Case No. C04-0281-JSW

-2-

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO HAVE CASES RELATED

Case 3:04-cv-00281-JSW Document 126 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 4 of 8

1 2
DATED: August 31, 2005 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Case No. C04-0281-JSW

PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP

By:

/s/ Elena Baca

ELENA R. BACA

Attorneys for Defendant CINTAS CORPORATION in both the Houston Action and Ramirez Action

-3-

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO HAVE CASES RELATED

 
 CCaassee33:0:045--ccvv--0003218415--JJSSWW DDooccuummeennt2t4534 FFilieledd0011//2288//1100 PPaaggee11ooff55

1 NANCY L. ABELL (SB# 88785) nancyabell@paulhastings.com HEATHER A. MORGAN (SB# 177425) heatnennorgan@paulhastings.com
2 PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP 515 South Flower Street
3 Twenty-Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228
4 Telephone: (213) 683-6000 Facsllnile: (213) 627-0705
5 Attorneys for Defendant
6 CINTAS CORPORATION

7 Plaintiffs' Counsel Listed on Next Page

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
11

12 ROBERT RAMIREZ, et al.

13

Plaintiffs,

14

vs.

15 CINTAS CORPORATION,

16

Defendanf

17

CASE NO. C04-0281-JSW
Hon. Jeffrey S. White
JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND [PROPOSED] ORDER

18 LARRY HOUSTON, et al.

CASE NO. C05-03145-JSW

19

Plaintiffs,

Hon. Jeffrey S. White

20

vs.

21 CINTAS CORPORATION,

22

Defendant.

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND [PltOPO~ED] ORDER

23

24

25

26

27

28
Case Nos. C04-0281-JSW & COS-314S-JSW

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AND
fPRQPOSED. ORDER]

CCaassee33:0:045--ccvv--0003218415--JJSSWW DDooccuummeennt2t4534 FFilieledd0011//2288//1100 PPaaggee22ooff55

1 ROBERTA L. STEELE (SB# 188198)

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER,

2

BORGEN & DARDARIAN

300 Lakeside Dr., Suite 1000

3 Oakland, CA 94612

Telephone: (510) 763-9800

4 FacsImile: (510) 835-1417

5 SARAH E. SISKIND MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND
6 44 E. Mifflin Street Suite 803
7 Madjson, WI 53703 Telephone: (608) 255-5200
8 FacsImile: (608) 255-5380

9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ROBERT RAMIREZ, JOSE SALCEDO,
10 JAMES MORGAN, LARRY HOUSTON AND CLIFTON COOPER
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case Nos. C04-0281-JSW & COS-314S-JSW

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AND
[pR.QPQSED ORDER]

CCaassee33:0:045--ccvv--0003218415--JJSSWW DDooccuummeennt2t4534 FFilieledd0011//2288//1100 PPaaggee33ooff55

1

STIPULATION

2

3

Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, James Morgan, Larry Houston and

4 Clifton Cooper ("Plaintiffs") and Defendant Cintas Corporation, by and through their

5 respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

6

7

(1) All claims remaining in Case Nos. C04-0281 JSW and C05-03145

8 JSW, previously ordered to arbitration, are hereby dismissed with prejudice;

9

(2) .All claims pending before The Honorable Eugene Lynch (Ret.) in

10 arbitration in AAA Case Nos. 11 1600111905 (Salcedo, et al. v. Cintas Corporation), 11

11 160 00018 06 (Morgan, et al. v. Cintas Corporation), and 11 160 01211 06 (Ramirez v.

12 Cintas Corporation) have been dismissed with prejudice; and

13

(3) All parties shall bear their own costs.

14
Y 15 DATED: January\ ,2010
16 17 18 19 20 21

Respectfully submitted, \
~TZD~~~ ~h~L-t ROBERTA L. STEELE
Roberta L. Steele GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94611 Phone: (510) 763-9800 Fax: (510) 835-1417

22

Sarah Siskind

.

MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND

23

44 E. MIFFLIN ST.

. Suite 803

24

Madison, WI 53703

Telephone: (608) 255-5200

25

Facsimile: (608) 255-5380

26

Counsel/or Plaintiffs

.

Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, James Morgan, Larry

27

Houston and Clifton Cooper

28
-1-
Case No. C04-0281-JSW & C05-3145-JSW

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AND
[MtOPO£Ii:DJ ORDER

CCaassee33:0:045--ccvv--0003218415--JJSSWW DDooccuummeennt2t4534 FFilieledd0011//2288//1100 PPaaggee44ooff55

XL 1 DATED: January 2010
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

By: 1UW\i 'f. .. flkt) Nfj\NCY L. ABELL Nancy L. Abell Heather A. Morgan PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 Phone: (213) 683-6000 Fax: (213) 627-0705 Counsel for Defendant Cintas Corporation

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
-2-
Case No. C04-0281-JSW & C05-3145-JSW

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AND I'PJtOt'OSED~ ORDER

CCaassee33:0:045--ccvv--0003218415--JJSSWW DDooccuummeennt2t4534 FFilieledd0011//2288//1100 PPaaggee55ooff55

1

ORDER

2
BASED ON THE PARTIES' STIPULATION AND GOOD CAUSE 3
APPEARING THEREFOR: 4

5 (1) All claims remaining in Case Nos. C04-0281 JSW and C05-03145
6
JSW are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and 7

8 (2) All parties shall bear their own costs.
9

10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11

12 January 28, 2010
13 DATED: _ _ _ _ _,2G99

14 15

16

17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26

27 28

-3-
Case No. C04-0281-JSW & COS-314S-JSW

 
 Case3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document38 Filed04/03/09 Page1 of 4

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

NOT FOR CITATION

5

6

7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9

10 LARRY HOUSTON, et al.,

No. C 05-3145 JSW

11

Plaintiffs,

12 v.

13 CINTAS CORPORATION,

14

Defendant.

15

16

17

ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF DISMISSAL, WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT NOTICE, OF PUTATIVE CLASS CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS ROBERT RAMIREZ, JOSE SALCEDO, CLIFTON E. COOPER, JAMES MORGAN, AND A. SHAPPELLE THOMPSON
/

18

INTRODUCTION

19

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of an unopposed motion to grant

20 a motion to dismiss the putative class claims of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez (“Ramirez”), Jose

21 Salcedo (“Salcedo”), Clifton E. Cooper (“Cooper”), James Morgan (“Morgan”), and A.

22 Shappelle Thompson (“Thompson”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), and to approve a stipulation of

23 Thompson’s Individual claims with Prejudice and his putative class claims without prejudice.

24 Having considered the parties’ papers, including supplemental briefing ordered by the Court,

25 relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court finds the matter suitable for

26 disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court HEREBY GRANTS

27 the motion and shall enter the stipulation by separate Order, and the hearing date set for April

28 24, 2009 is VACATED.

Case3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document38 Filed04/03/09 Page2 of 4

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1

BACKGROUND

2

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action alleging employment discrimination against

3 Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”) on January 20, 2004. Ramirez and Salcedo allege that Cintas

4 discriminated against Hispanics who have held positions as exempt supervisors or managers at

5 Cintas’ Rental Division below the General Manager (or Branch Manager or equivalent) in

6 promotion out of these positions, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and 42

7 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et. seq. (“Title VII”). Houston alleges that Cintas discriminated against

8 African Americans in promotion to Service Manager positions in Cintas’ Rental Division, in

9 violation of Section 1981 and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“Section

10 17200”). Cooper, alleges that Cintas discriminated against African American managers in

11 compensation in Cintas’ Rental Division, in violation of Section 1981, Title VII, and

12 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12940 et seq. (“FEHA”),

13 and Section 17200. Morgan alleges that Cintas discriminated against African American Service

14 Sales Representatives (“SSR”) through a compensation and assignment scheme that placed

15 them in lower paying SSR jobs than their white counterparts, in violation of Section 1981, Title

16 VII, FEHA and Section 17200. Thompson raises the same claim under Section 1981.

17

Pursuant to Court Order or stipulation, the Plaintiffs instituted an arbitration, on behalf

18 of themselves and the classes they seek to represent, which currently is pending. Neither this

19 Court nor the Arbitrator have certified a class, although the Arbitrator has ruled that the

20 Plaintiffs may seek class certification. The Plaintiffs now seek to dismiss the putative class

21 claims and proceed with their individual claims in the arbitration proceedings.1 Cintas does not

22 oppose the motion.

23

ANALYSIS

24

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a

25 certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismiss, or compromised only with the court’s

26 approval.” Although Rule 23(e) expressly refers to certified classes, before Rule 23(e) was

27

1

Five other current or former Cintas SSRs have expressed an interest in

28 proceeding with individual claims in arbitration. (See Declaration of Heather M. Mills

(“Mills Decl.”), ¶ 8.)

2

Case3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document38 Filed04/03/09 Page3 of 4

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 amended in 2003, the Ninth Circuit had held that the rule applied to pre-certification dismissals

2 and compromises. Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir.

3 1989). In that case, the court stated that pre-certification approval was required “to ensure that

4 [a settlement] is not collusive or prejudicial.” Id. In making that determination, the Ninth

5 Circuit stated that “the district court should inquire into possible prejudice from (1) class

6 members possible reliance on the filing of the action if they are likely to know of it either

7 because of publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of adequate time for class members to file

8 other actions, because of a rapidly approaching statute of limitations, and (3) any settlement or

9 concession for class interests made by the class representative or counsel in order to further

10 their own interests.” Id.

11

Plaintiffs state that they have filed their motion “as a cautionary step,” in light of several

12 decisions arising out of this district, which have approved pre-certification dismissals relying on

13 factors outlined in Diaz. See, e.g., Castro v. Zenith Acquisition Corp., 2007 WL 81905 (N.D.

14 Cal. Jan. 9, 2007); Singer v. Am. Airlines Fed. Credit Union, 2006 WL 3093759 (N.D. Cal. Oct.

15 30, 2006).

16

Assuming without deciding that Rule 23 applies in this instance, the Court concludes

17 that, based on the factors outlined in Diaz, it is appropriate to grant the motion and permit

18 Plaintiffs to dismiss their class claims without notice and to permit Thompson to dismiss his

19 individual claims. First, although there has been some publicity regarding this case and articles

20 in which some of the Plaintiffs were mentioned by name, it has been minimal. (Mills Decl., ¶¶

21 4-6, Exs. A-I.) Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel attests that they have spoken to seven individuals

22 with claims similar to those of the Plaintiff’s putative class claims, and that five of those

23 individuals have expressed interest in pursuing claims through arbitration. Two other

24 individuals have filed their own individual claims against Cintas. (Id. ¶ 8.)

25

Second, the parties do not seek to dismiss the class claims with prejudice and, therefore,

26 they are not impacting the rights of potential class members.

27

Third, the statute of limitations has been tolled since the suit was filed. See American

28 Pine and Construction v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Potential class members who may have

3

Case3:05-cv-03145-JSW Document38 Filed04/03/09 Page4 of 4

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

1 relied on the Plaintiffs’ claims still have time to file suit if they so choose. The one exception

2 pertains to Morgan’s Title VII claims. However, based on the supplemental briefing provided

3 by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that potential plaintiffs with claims similar to Morgan will be

4 adequately protected by their ability to file a claim under Section 1981.

5

Thus, the Court finds that each of the Diaz factors weighs in favor of approving the

6 settlement and dismissal without notice to the class. The motion is, therefore, GRANTED.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

9 Dated: April 3, 2009 10

JEFFREY S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 
 United States District Court, N.D. California.
Robert RAMIREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CINTAS CORPORATION, Defendant. Larry Houston, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cintas Corporation, Defendant.
Nos. C 04-00281 JSW, C 05-03145 JSW.
Nov. 22, 2006.
Paul Strauss, Nancy L. Maldonado, Robert S. Libman, Miner Barnhill & Galland, Sharon K. Legenza, Scott A. Entin, Chicago, IL, Roberta L. Steele, Morris J. Baller, Nina Avny Rabin, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dar, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Rachael Rowe, Michael Womack, Cincinnati, OH, Jon Geier, Maureen E. O'Neill, Washington, DC, Nancy L. Abell, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD
JEFFREY S. WHITE, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Cintas Corporation's (“Cintas”) Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award. Having considered the parties' pleadings, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).) For the reasons set forth in the remainder of this Order, Cintas' Petition is DENIED and the hearing set for December 1, 2006 is VACATED.
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to this dispute are set forth in the Court's Orders granting in part and denying in part

Cintas' motions to dismiss or to compel arbitration and shall not be repeated here. (See Docket Nos. 81, 173.) In those Orders, the Court determined that the issue of whether Cintas' arbitration agreements permitted class arbitration was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. (See Docket No. 81 at p. 14; Docket No. 173 at 12.)
Pursuant to the Court's Order requiring certain plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims with Cintas, the parties commenced arbitration proceedings before the Honorable Eugene F. Lynch (Ret.) (hereinafter the “Arbitrator”) on or about December 29, 2005.
On August 16, 2006, the Arbitrator issued a ruling entitled “Arbitrator's Opinion and Decision re Issues of Class Action Arbitration” (hereinafter the “Award”), in which he found that the arbitration agreements permitted class arbitration, although he expressly stated that he “need not address at this time the merits of whether the facts of this case would allow the class to be certified (i.e., numerosity, commonality, etc.)” (Declaration of Paul Grossman, Ex. V (Award at 00008 n. 2 & 20 (emphasis in original).) The Arbitrator also interpreted the Arbitration Agreement to permit a class arbitration in Alameda County, and not in a county where a Cintas employee currently works or most recently worked. (Id. at 2022.)
Although Cintas does not challenge the Arbitrator's Award with respect to the former issue, it does challenge the latter.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, a court may vacate an arbitration award on the following grounds: “(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-

versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4). FN1
FN1. Cintas does not rely on 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(3) as bases for challenging the Award.
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that arbitrators “exceed their powers” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) “not when they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is ‘completely irrational,’ ... or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’ “ Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.1982) and Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1991)).
*2 “These grounds afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration matters .” Id. at 998; see also G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc., 326 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that courts “have interpreted sections 9 and 10 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] narrowly”).
B. The Question of the Place of Arbitration is Not a “Gateway Issue.”
Cintas contends, relying on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), that the question of where the arbitration may proceed is a “gateway” matter to be determined by this Court. The Court disagrees. In Bazzle, the Supreme Court cited as examples of “gateway” matters the issues of “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452. The Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of a “gateway” matter when it stated that the issue presented in Bazzle was not about the “validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties,” but rather “what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.” Id. at 452-53 (emphasis added).

The Court noted that the answer to that question involved “contract interpretation and arbitration procedures,” questions that an arbitrator is well suited to answer. Id. at 453.
Contrary to Cintas' position, the instant dispute, as in Bazzle, does not involve whether the arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy. Rather, as is evident from Cintas' argument in support of vacating the award, the dispute pertains to the Arbitrator's interpretation of the arbitration clause itself and, specifically, to what kind of arbitration proceedings the parties agreed. As this Court made clear in its Order requiring arbitration of these claims, disputes over the meaning of specific terms are matters for the Arbitrator to decide in the first instance. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding that “a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate”).
C. The Arbitrator's Award Will Not Be Vacated.
As set forth above, this Court's review of the Arbitrator's Award is limited, and the Court should not set it aside unless the Award is ‘completely irrational,’ ... or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’ “ Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997. The Court has considered Cintas' argument that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction but finds that Cintas' argument is nothing more than a disagreement with the Arbitrator's interpretation of the arbitration agreement. That is not a proper basis for this Court to vacate the Award. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. .... [A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of this authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”) (brackets as in original); Pacific Reins. Mgmt. Co. v. Ohio Reins. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.1991) ( “[C]ourts must not decide the rightness or wrongness of the arbitrators' contract interpretation, only whether the panel's decision draws its essence from the contract. In making that determination, the district

court must accord considerable deference to the arbitrator's judgment and should not vacate the award because it interpreted the agreement differently.”) (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted).
*3 Moreover, in reaching his decision, the Arbitrator set forth the applicable principles of contract interpretation and recognized that he could not add to the plain language of the agreement. (See Award at 17, 21.) He then interpreted the agreement to permit a class action in a county other than where an employee last worked. Cintas may disagree with this interpretation, but the Court cannot say that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.FN2 See, e.g., Carter v. Health Net of California, Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir.2004) (“Manifest disregard of the law means something more than just an error of law or a failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law. It must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.”) (quoting Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.1995). Because the Arbitrator determined that the matter can proceed as a class action, the Court also does not find an interpretation of the Agreement that would permit the matter to proceed as a putative nation-wide class action, pending a ruling on class-certification, to be irrational.
FN2. Cintas submitted for the Court's consideration the Award in the Veliz litigation, in which the arbitrator limited the place of arbitration to the county where any given employee last worked. Plaintiffs submit a motion to file additional authority, in which they ask the Court to take notice of an order of clarification regarding the Veliz award. Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Cintas' petition to vacate the arbitration award is DENIED. The parties shall, in accordance with the Court's Order requiring Joint Status Reports, submit their next report to the Court on or before February 28, 2007.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
N.D.Cal.,2006. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3388628 (N.D.Cal.)
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 1 of 6
ADRMOP, CLOSED, E−Filing, RELATE, STAYED
U.S. District Court California Northern District (San Francisco) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:05−cv−03145−JSW

Houston et al v. Cintas Corporation Assigned to: Hon. Jeffrey S. White Relate Case Case: 3:04−cv−00281−JSW Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/03/2005 Date Terminated: 09/25/2009 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Larry Houston individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Roberta Louise Steele Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen &Dar 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 510/763−9800 Fax: 510−835−1417 Email: RLS@gdblegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Marie Mills Goldstein, Demchak, et al. 300 Lakeside Dr., Ste. 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 510−763−9800 Fax: 510−835−1417 Email: hmills@gdblegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph E. Jaramillo Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 510−763−9800 Fax: 510−835−1417 Email: jej@gdblegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Morris J. Baller Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen &Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763−9800 Fax: (510) 835−1417 Email: mjb@gdblegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy L. Abell Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &Walker LLP Employment 555 South Flower Street 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071−2371 213 683−6162 Fax: (213) 627−0705 Email: nancyabell@paulhastings.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Avny Rabin

Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 2 of 6

Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen &Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763−9800 Fax: (510) 835−1417 Email: nrabin@gdblegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul Leonard Strauss 5525 S. Woodlawn Ave. Chicago, IL 60637 773−551−5350 Email: pstrauss@acornhousing.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert S. Libman , Miner, Barnhill &Galland 14 W. Erie Street Chicago, IL 60610

(312) 751−1170 Fax: (312) 751−0438 Email: rlibman@lawmbg.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Clifton E. Cooper

represented by Roberta Louise Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph E. Jaramillo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Morris J. Baller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy L. Abell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Avny Rabin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Paul Leonard Strauss (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert S. Libman , (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Cintas Corporation

represented by Nancy L. Abell (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 3 of 6

Joseph E. Jaramillo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/03/2005
08/03/2005
08/03/2005 08/05/2005 08/09/2005 08/23/2005 08/23/2005 08/24/2005
08/24/2005 08/25/2005 08/25/2005 09/19/2005 09/20/2005 09/20/2005 09/21/2005

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL against Cintas Corporation ( Filing fee $ 250.00, receipt number 4411398.). Filed byLarry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (aaa, Court Staff) (Filed on 8/3/2005) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/9/2005 (gba, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 08/08/2005)
2 ADR SCHEDULING ORDER: Case Management Statement due by 11/28/2005. Case Management Conference set for 12/2/2005 01:30 PM. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero on 08/03/05. (Attachments: # 1 Standing Order)(aaa, Court Staff) (Filed on 8/3/2005) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
CASE DESIGNATED for Electronic Filing. (aaa, Court Staff) (Filed on 8/3/2005) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
4 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (gba, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/5/2005) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
3 CLERK'S NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF RE: Consent to Proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. Form due by AUG. 23, 2005. (klh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/9/2005) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
5 Declination to Proceed Before a U.S. Magistrate Judge by Cintas Corporation and Request for Reassignment to a United States District Judge. (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 8/23/2005) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
6 CLERK'S NOTICE of Impending Reassignment to U.S. District Judge. (kcw, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/23/2005) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/23/2005 (kcw, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 08/23/2005)
7 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Charles R. Breyer for all further proceedings. Judge Joseph C. Spero no longer assigned to case. Signed by EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE on 8/24/05. (ha, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2005) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
8 CLERK'S NOTICE Case Management Conference reset for 12/2/2005 08:30 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Order Setting Case Management Conference# 2 Standing Order) (be, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2005) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
9 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed filed by Larry Houston. Service waived by Cintas Corporation waiver sent on 8/9/2005, answer due 10/11/2005. Nancy L. Abell (Steele, Roberta) (Filed on 8/25/2005) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
10 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Larry Houston Re: Clerk's Notice, Reassignment Order, Order Setting Case Management Conference and Standing Orders (Steele, Roberta) (Filed on 8/25/2005) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
11 ORDER RELATING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Jeffrey S. White for all further proceedings.. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 9/19/05. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/19/2005) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
12 ORDER GRANTING Stipulation to Relate cases. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on September 19, 2005. (jswlc3, COURTSTAFF) (Filed on 9/20/2005) (Entered: 09/20/2005)
Cases associated. (hdj, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/20/2005) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
13 STIPULATION And [Proposed] Order Extending Date By Which Defendant Must Answer Or Otherwise Plead To The Complaint by Larry Houston. (Steele, Roberta) (Filed on 9/21/2005) (Entered: 09/21/2005)

Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 4 of 6

09/21/2005 10/03/2005
10/03/2005 11/22/2005 11/22/2005 05/24/2006 06/28/2006 10/24/2006 10/27/2006 11/22/2006 02/28/2007 06/27/2007 10/25/2007 02/22/2008 06/20/2008 10/17/2008

14 ORDER GRANTING 13 Stipulation Extending Date By Which Defendant Must Answer or Otherwise Plead to the Complaint. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 9/21/05. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/21/2005) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
15 **INCORRECT ENTRY − PLEASE SEE DOCKET NO. 16 FOR CORRECT ENTRY** INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 12/5/2005 01:30 PM. Case Management Statement due by 11/23/2005.. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 10/3/05. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2005) Modified on 10/3/2005 (jjo, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 10/03/2005)
16 INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER: Case Management Conference set for 12/2/2005 01:30 PM. Case Management Statement due by 11/23/2005.. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 10/3/05. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2005) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
17 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER RE: STAY OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS PENDING ARBITRATION by Cintas Corporation. (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 11/22/2005) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
18 ORDER 17 Stipulation re Stay of Claims Pending Arbitration. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on November 22, 2005. (jswlc3, COURTSTAFF) (Filed on 11/22/2005) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
19 ORDER REQUIRING JOINT STATUS REPORTS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on May 24, 2006. (jswlc3, COURTSTAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2006) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
20 STATUS REPORT (JOINT) OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMS ON WHICH ARBITRATION WAS COMPELLED by Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (Strauss, Paul) (Filed on 6/28/2006) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
21 Brief Plaintiffs' Motion To File Additional Authority In Support Of Opposition To Defendants Motion To Vacate Arbitration Award filed byLarry Houston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Order Clarifying Clause Construction Award)(Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 10/24/2006) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
22 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Larry Houston. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 10/27/2006) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
23 ORDER DENYING Petition and Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on November 22, 2006. (jswlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/22/2006) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
24 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Larry Houston. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 2/28/2007) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
25 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report of the Parties re Status of the Claims on which Arbitration was Compelled by Larry Houston. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 6/27/2007) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
26 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Larry Houston. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 10/25/2007) (Entered: 10/25/2007)
27 STATUS REPORT JOINT STATUS REPORT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMS ON WHICH ARBITRATION WAS COMPELLED by Cintas Corporation. (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 2/22/2008) (Entered: 02/22/2008)
28 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 6/20/2008) (Entered: 06/20/2008)
29 STATUS REPORT Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 10/17/2008) (Entered: 10/17/2008)

Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 5 of 6

02/18/2009 03/02/2009 03/02/2009 03/02/2009 03/02/2009 03/02/2009 03/02/2009
03/18/2009 04/03/2009 04/03/2009 06/19/2009 09/25/2009

30 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT Joint Status Report Of The Parties Regarding The Status Of The Claims On Which Arbitration Was Compelled filed by Cintas Corporation, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 2/18/2009) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
31 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal Notice Of Unopposed Motion And Motion For Approval Of Dismissal, Without Prejudice And Without Notice, Of Putative Class Claims Of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, James Morgan, And A. Shappelle Thompson by Larry Houston (Mills, Heather) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
32 MOTION to Dismiss Notice Of Unopposed Motion And Motion For Approval Of Dismissal, Without Prejudice And Without Notice, Of Putative Class Claims Of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, James Morgan, And A. Shappelle Thompson filed by Larry Houston. Motion Hearing set for 4/24/2009 09:00 AM in Courtroom 11, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (Mills, Heather) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
33 Brief re 32 MOTION to Dismiss Notice Of Unopposed Motion And Motion For Approval Of Dismissal, Without Prejudice And Without Notice, Of Putative Class Claims Of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, James Morgan, And A. Sha filed byLarry Houston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Related document(s) 32 ) (Mills, Heather) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
34 Declaration of Heather M. Mills in Support of 33 Brief, Unopposed Motion To Approve Dismissal, Without Prejudice And Without Notice, Of Putative Class Claims Of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, James Morgan, And A. Shappelle Thompson filed byLarry Houston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Related document(s) 33 ) (Mills, Heather) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
35 STIPULATION re 33 Brief, JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF A. SHAPPELLE THOMPSONS INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND HIS PUTATIVE CLASS CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN CURRENT AND FORMER AFRICAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND [PROPOSED] ORDER by Larry Houston. (Mills, Heather) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
36 Statement of Non−Opposition re 31 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Defendant Cintas Corporation's Statement of Non−Opposition to Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Approve Dismissal, Without Prejudice and Without Notice, of Putative Class Claims of Plaintiffs Robert Ramirez, Jose Salcedo, Larry Houston, Clifton E. Cooper, James Morgan, and A. Shappelle Thompson filed byCintas Corporation. (Related document(s) 31 ) (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 3/2/2009) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
37 ORDER REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT NOTICE, OF PUTATIVE CLASS CLAIMS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 3/18/09. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/18/2009) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
38 ORDER by Judge Jeffrey S. White GRANTING 32 Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice Putative Class Claims. (jswlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/03/2009)
39 RESPONSE to re 37 Order Cintas Corporation's Response to Request for Supplemental Briefing on Dismissal, Without Prejudice and Without Notice, of Putative Class Claims by Cintas Corporation. (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 4/3/2009) (Entered: 04/03/2009)
40 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report of the Parties Regarding the Status of the Claims on Which Arbitration Was Compelled by Clifton E. Cooper, Larry Houston. (Jaramillo, Joseph) (Filed on 6/19/2009) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
41 ORDER OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on September 25, 2009. (jswlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/25/2009) (Entered:

Case: 3:05-cv-3145 As of: 09/01/2010 06:30 AM PDT 6 of 6

01/28/2010 01/28/2010

09/25/2009)
42 STIPULATION −− JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND [PROPOSED] ORDER by Cintas Corporation, Clifton E. Cooper, Larry Houston. (Abell, Nancy) (Filed on 1/28/2010) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
43 ORDER GRANTING (42 in 3:05−cv−03145−JSW) Stipulation OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE, (254 in 3:04−cv−00281−JSW) Stipulation OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 1/28/10. (jjo, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2010) (Entered: 01/28/2010)