Case: 16-4234 Document: 51-2

Filed: 08/20/2019 Pages: 25

No. 16-4234
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

DELORES HENRY, ET AL., on behalf of a class Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MELODY HULETT, FORMER WARDEN OF LINCOLN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL. Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, No. 3:12-cv-03087 Hon. Richard Mills

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE LAW PROFESSORS AND SCHOLARS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUST DETENTION
INTERNATIONAL, RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER, UPTOWN PEOPLE’S LAW CENTER, AND WOMEN’S PRISON ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Daniel M. Greenfield

Anjana Samant

Counsel of Record

ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT

RODERICK & SOLANGE

125 Broad Street

MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER

New York, NY 10004

NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER

(646) 885-8341

SCHOOL OF LAW

Benjamin S. Wolf

375 East Chicago Avenue

Camille E. Bennett

Chicago, IL 60611

ACLU OF ILLINOIS

(312) 503-8538

150 North Michigan Avenue

daniel-greenfield@law.northwestern.edu Suite 600

Chicago, IL 60601

Jennifer Wedekind

(312) 201-9740

ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT

915 15th Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 548-6610

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Ca$s3e3: (16$-54$2134&( DCoIRcuCmUeITntR: U5L1-E226.DISCFiLleOdS:U0R8E/2S0T/2A0T1E9MENPTages: 25
Appellate Court No: 16-4234 Short Caption: Henry, et al. v. Hulett, et al.
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[✔] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3):
American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (NEW), Brett Dignam (NEW), Gina Fedock, Claudia
Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, American Civil Liberties Union (REVISED), Roger Baldwin
Foundation of ACLU (REVISED)
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party’s or amicus’ stock: N/A

Attorney's Signature: s/ Daniel M. Greenfield
Attorney's Printed Name: Daniel M. Greenfield

Date: August 20, 2019

Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes

No

Address: 375 East Chicago Avenue, Chiacgo, IL 60611-3069

Phone Number: (312) 503-8538

Fax Number: (312) 503-1272

E-Mail Address: daniel-greenfield@law.northwestern.edu

rev. 01/ *$

Ca$s3e3: (16$-54$2134&( DCoIRcuCmUeITntR: U5L1-E226.DISCFiLleOdS:U0R8E/2S0T/2A0T1E9MENPTages: 25
Appellate Court No: 16-4234 Short Caption: Henry, et al. v. Hulett, et al.
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[✔] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3): American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Brett Dignam, Gina Fedock, Claudia
Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin Foundation
of ACLU
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party’s or amicus’ stock: N/A

Attorney's Signature: s/ Jennifer Wedekind
Attorney's Printed Name: Jennifer Wedekind

Date: August 20, 2019

Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes

No

Address: 915 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005

Phone Number: (202) 548-6610 E-Mail Address:

Fax Number:

rev. 01/ *$

Ca$s3e3: (16$-54$2134&( DCoIRcuCmUeITntR: U5L1-E226.DISCFiLleOdS:U0R8E/2S0T/2A0T1E9MENPTages: 25
Appellate Court No: 16-4234 Short Caption: Henry, et al. v. Hulett, et al.
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[✔] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3): American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Brett Dignam, Gina Fedock, Claudia
Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin Foundation
of ACLU
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party’s or amicus’ stock: N/A

Attorney's Signature: s/ Anjana Samant
Attorney's Printed Name: Anjana Samant

Date: August 20, 2019

Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes

No

Address: 125 Broad Street, New York, NY 10004

Phone Number: (646) 885-8341 E-Mail Address:

Fax Number:

rev. 01/ *$

Ca$s3e3: (16$-54$2134&( DCoIRcuCmUeITntR: U5L1-E226.DISCFiLleOdS:U0R8E/2S0T/2A0T1E9MENPTages: 25
Appellate Court No: 16-4234 Short Caption: Henry, et al. v. Hulett, et al.
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[✔] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3): American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Brett Dignam, Gina Fedock, Claudia
Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin Foundation
of ACLU
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party’s or amicus’ stock: N/A

Attorney's Signature: s/ Benjamin S. Wolf
Attorney's Printed Name: Benjamin S. Wolf

Date: August 20, 2019

Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes

No

Address: Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 150 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 600, Chicago, IL 60601

Phone Number: (312) 201-9740 E-Mail Address: bwolf@aclu-il.org

Fax Number: (312) 288-5225

rev. 01/ *$

Ca$s3e3: (16$-54$2134&( DCoIRcuCmUeITntR: U5L1-E226.DISCFiLleOdS:U0R8E/2S0T/2A0T1E9MENPTages: 25
Appellate Court No: 16-4234 Short Caption: Henry, et al. v. Hulett, et al.
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[✔] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3): American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Brett Dignam, Gina Fedock, Claudia
Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin Foundation
of ACLU
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party’s or amicus’ stock: N/A

Attorney's Signature: s/ Camille E. Bennett
Attorney's Printed Name: Camille E. Bennett

Date: August 20, 2019

Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes

No

Address: Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 150 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 600, Chicago, IL 60601

Phone Number: (312) 201-9740

Fax Number: (312) 288-5225

E-Mail Address:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE..............................................................................1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................1 I. Sexual Violence Is A Common Attribute Of Many Of The Darkest Chapters In Recorded History. ......................................................................................................2 II. The Sexual Violence Endured By The Class Members Shares Several Characteristics With The Sexual Violence Employed By Universally Condemned Regimes......................................................................................................................6 III. Forced Public Exposure Does Violence To The Most Fundamental Aspects Of Our Being And Is Bounded By The Fourth Amendment. .........................................9 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019) ..........................................................................7, 10
King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................10, 11
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................11
Thogmorton v. Reynolds, 12–CV–3087, 2016 WL 11265636 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016) ..........................6, 7

Statutes 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-2-5.5 (2018) ............................................................9

Other Authorities
Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135 (2005) .....................4
Alexander Lowen, In Defense of Modesty, 4 J. SEX RES. 51 (1968) .................10, 11
Alvin Rosenfeld et al., Parental Perceptions of Children’s Modesty: A Cross-Sectional Survey of Ages Two to Ten Years, 47 PSYCHIATRY 351 (1984)...................................................................................9
Candace Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women’s Imprisonment, 30 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2003) ...................................................................................7
Catherine C. Classen et al., Sexual Revictimization: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 103 (2005) ....................8
DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1985)...............................................................................2, 3
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Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State, United States Department of State (Aug. 2018) ...................................................5
Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, The Public International Law & Policy Group (2018) .........................................5
Elisabeth Jean Wood, Conflict-related sexual violence and the policy implications of recent research, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 457 (2014) ..................................................................6
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Sexual Violence and the Holocaust, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 43 (2000) ................................................................3, 4
Jessica Reichert & Lindsay Bostwick, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Victimization Among Female Prisoners in Illinois, Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Auth. 8 (2010) ......................................................................8
Katherine R. Allen & Abbie E. Goldberg, Sexual Activity During Menstruation: A Qualitative Study, 46 J. SEX RES. 535 (2009) ...........................9
Kevin Barlow, Rauner signs law creating IDOC women’s division, THE PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 17, 2018 ..........................................................................9
Michele Leiby, The Promise and Peril of Primary Documents: Documenting Wartime Sexual Violence in El Salvador and Peru, in UNDERSTANDING AND PROVING INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIMES 315 (Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschøn Skre, and Elisabeth J. Wood eds., 2012)........................................................................6
Naomi Breslau et al., Previous Exposure to Trauma and PTSD Effects of Subsequent Trauma: Results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 902 (1999) .......................................................8
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998)....................................................2, 4
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) ...........................4, 5

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Rabuy & Kopf, Prison Policy Initiative, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the pre-incarceration incomes of the imprisoned (2015) ....................................................................................................................8
Ruth Seifert, The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars, 19 WOMEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 35 (1996)..........................................6
Sharain Suliman et al., Cumulative Effects of Multiple Trauma on Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety, and Depression in Adolescents, 50 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 121 (2009).......................................................8
Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten – Security Council Briefing on Myanmar (Dec. 12, 2017)....................................................5
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on ConflictRelated Sexual Violence, U.N. Doc. S/2018/250 (Mar. 23, 2018) .......................5
WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET (1999)..........................................................................................2

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici are law professors, scholars of sexual violence, and nonprofit organizations that seek to enforce constitutional rights. More detailed information on amici appears in the appendix to this brief.1 A jury determined that there was no Eighth Amendment remedy against a shocking abuse of state power—here, mass sexual violence—because corrections officers allegedly strip-searched prisoners for training purposes rather than with the express intent to harm. A fractured panel of this Court then—erroneously—held that the Fourth Amendment did not regulate the misconduct because corrections officers did not physically touch the prisoners; rather, they ordered them to violate and degrade themselves. The proper resolution of this case is a matter of grave concern to amici because the panel’s error leaves every prisoner incarcerated in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin vulnerable to state-sponsored sexual violence that has no place in a civilized society.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1. Sexual violence is a hallmark of eras and regimes that repulse us. From the auction blocks of the American South to the fields of Myanmar, sexual violence has been relied upon to dehumanize and set the stage for domination.

1 No counsel for a party authored any part of this brief and no person other than amici curiae and their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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2. Forced public nudity—here, gratuitous strip- and cavity-searches—is a
form of sexual violence. While not part of a campaign of armed conflict, genocide,
or enslavement, the ordeal endured by the prisoners nonetheless shares several
characteristics with the sexual violence utilized by universally reviled regimes. It
was inflicted upon marginalized people. It was inflicted upon vulnerable people. It
violated fundamental mores regarding public exposure.
3. Even behind prison walls, the Fourth Amendment guards against
government encroachment. Here, it continued to shield 200 women from a gratuitous
and aberrant search, notwithstanding the fact that they were forced to degrade and
violate themselves.
I. Sexual Violence Is A Common Attribute Of Many Of The Darkest Chapters In Recorded History. “Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. The incident described by witness KK in which the Accused ordered the Interahamwe to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard … in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence.”2
On auction blocks throughout the American South, enslaved women were stripped naked so that prospective buyers could ogle and jeer.3 Primarily, the

2 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998). 3 DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 32-33 (1985); WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET, 147-49 (1999).
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scrutiny was for the sinister purpose of assessing reproductive capability.4 But sellers and buyers did not shy away from taking pleasure in dehumanizing the women.5 They exchanged degrading remarks—“there’s a breast for you”—while assessing women as a commodity.6 Enforced nudity did not end with the auction.7 With frequency, the women, once sold, were “tied up and exposed to the public gaze of all.”8
In the concentration camps of World War II, Jewish women “not immediately sent to the gas chambers were forced to remove their clothing, their bodies subject to the scrutiny and ridicule” of guards.9 Women were then “shaved of all their bodily hair” in an act of “public spectacle” intended to humiliate.10 It was an “effective act of sexual violation” and dehumanization in part because it was such an “abnormal and grotesque experience.”11 The “shame and humiliation” felt by secular women was amplified among the religiously observant.12 The ordeal was designed to

4 White, supra, at 32-33. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 32. 7 Id. at 33. 8 Id. (citation omitted). 9 Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Sexual Violence and the Holocaust, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 43, 55 (2000). 10 Id. 11 Id. at 63 12 Id.
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“demonstrate” both “the women’s sexual vulnerability” and the community’s powerlessness.13
During the Rwandan genocide, Tutsi women were routinely stripped in public and then forced to degrade themselves.14 For example, one woman was commanded to sit naked in the mud.15 Another was subjected to a forced march while not wearing clothing.16 Others were ordered to perform calisthenics in public while nude.17 Such acts of forced public nudity, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda held, were a form of sexual violence constituting a crime against humanity.18
In the former Yugoslavia, the story was much the same. Muslim women were stripped and ordered to humiliate themselves.19 Some were forced to dance naked atop tables.20 Others were marched through the streets without their clothing.21 One victim described not only terror, but the dehumanizing feeling of being “owned” by

13 Id. 14 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra, ¶ 697. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. at ¶¶ 692-94, 697; see also Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 146–50 (2005). 19 See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgment, ¶¶ 766–74 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). 20 Id. 21 Id. at ¶ 770.
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another.22 These atrocities, too, resulted in convictions for crimes against humanity.23
Even now, in Myanmar, military forces are utilizing forced public nudity, invasive strip searches, and other forms of sexual violence intended to dehumanize, to further a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.24 Victims described being terrorized by soldiers who “forced [them] to strip naked to show their underwear” during searches for contraband.25 Those methods, according to victims and observers, are a calculated “tool of dehumanization.”26
As exemplified by the preceding episodes, sexual violence is a common feature of many of the darkest chapters in recorded history. Its ubiquity is a testament to its effectiveness. Sexually violated targets—i.e., the immediate victims, their

22 Id. at ¶¶ 71–72, 86, 766–74. 23 See id. at ¶¶ 766–774. 24 E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on ConflictRelated Sexual Violence, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/2018/250 (Mar. 23, 2018); Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten – Security Council Briefing on Myanmar (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/statement/statement-by-thespecial-representative-of-the-secretary-general-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-mspramila-patten-security-council-briefing-on-myanmar-12-december-2017/ [hereinafter Statement of Patten]. 25 Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State 39, The Public International Law & Policy Group (2018), shorturl.at/ovxB5; see also Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State, United States Department of State 5-6, 14-17 (Aug. 2018) (similar), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Documentation-of-Atrocitiesin-Northern-Rakhine-State.pdf. 26 Statement of Patten.
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families, and communities—are weakened and therefore easier to vanquish.27 Sexual violence tamps down opposition by emphasizing the risks of dissent.28 Sexual violence is intended to dehumanize its victims, which, once achieved, further emboldens the perpetrators; we are less likely to empathize with those we regard as subhuman.29 II. The Sexual Violence Endured By The Class Members Shares Several
Characteristics With The Sexual Violence Employed By Universally Condemned Regimes. After being rousted by a tactical squad, approximately 200 women were herded—without explanation—into a prison gymnasium.30 The women were culled into smaller groups and then ordered to “stand naked, nearly shoulder-to-shoulder with 8-10 other inmates in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers.”31 Menstruating women were forced to “remove their tampons and sanitary pads” in front of other prisoners and corrections

27 See Elisabeth Jean Wood, Conflict-related sexual violence and the policy implications of recent research, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 457, 463 (2014); Ruth Seifert, The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars, 19 WOMEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 35, 39-41 (1996). 28 See Michele Leiby, The Promise and Peril of Primary Documents: Documenting Wartime Sexual Violence in El Salvador and Peru, in UNDERSTANDING AND PROVING INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIMES 315, 351 (Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschøn Skre, and Elisabeth J. Wood eds., 2012). 29 Seifert, supra, at 39-41. 30 R. 109-1 at 18-23. 31 Thogmorton v. Reynolds, 12–CV–3087, 2016 WL 11265636, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016).
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officers, including those of the opposite gender, and “many got blood on their bodies and clothing and blood on the floor.”32 They were then forced to “stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas.”33 The correctional officers conducting the searches directed derogatory comments at the women, telling them that they were “dirty bitches,” “fucking disgusting,” and “smell like death.”34
Forced public nudity—here, gratuitous strip- and cavity-searches—is a form of sexual violence. While of course not part of a campaign of armed conflict, genocide, or enslavement, the ordeal endured by the prisoners nonetheless incorporates several characteristics of the sexual violence utilized by universally condemned regimes.
First, like the Rohingya, the women belong to an oppressed and marginalized cohort, rendering them susceptible to targeting without sustained opposition from those with political capital. Women prisoners come from the most “economically and politically disadvantaged” segments of society.35 They exist at the intersection of four populations that are traditionally disfavored and discriminated against, the cumulative effect of which is to render them acutely vulnerable to predation: they

32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2019) (Lee, J., dissenting). 35 Candace Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women’s Imprisonment, 30 CRIME & JUST. 1, 4, 18 (2003).
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are prisoners; they are women; they are (almost certainly) disproportionately poor; they are (again, almost certainly) disproportionately of color.36 Thus, by virtue of identity, the women may be seen as less deserving of our attention, let alone protest; they were easy targets.
Second, like enslaved Black women ogled on auction blocks, the prisoners were primed to be especially traumatized by sexual violence. Decades of research demonstrate that prior trauma exacerbates subsequent trauma.37 This general proposition applies with particular force to sexual trauma.38 And data show that women prisoners are overwhelmingly likely to have histories of sexual abuse.39 In

36 The qualifier “almost certainly” is utilized out of an abundance of caution but hardly seems necessary. In 2011, for example, women of color constituted 55% of the Lincoln Correctional Center population, despite constituting a much smaller percentage of the Illinois population. Compare https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Pages/Prison-Population-DataSets.aspx with https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/IL. And, to a striking degree, incarcerated women are impoverished, even prior to imprisonment. E.g., Rabuy & Kopf, Prison Policy Initiative, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the preincarceration incomes of the imprisoned (2015), available at, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html. 37 Sharain Suliman et al., Cumulative Effects of Multiple Trauma on Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety, and Depression in Adolescents, 50 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 121 (2009); Naomi Breslau et al., Previous Exposure to Trauma and PTSD Effects of Subsequent Trauma: Results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 902 (1999). 38 Catherine C. Classen et al., Sexual Revictimization: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 103, 117-119 (2005). 39 Jessica Reichert & Lindsay Bostwick, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Victimization Among Female Prisoners in Illinois, Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Auth. 8 (2010) (noting that 75% of women prisoners in Illinois had experienced some form of sexual abuse and 98% had experienced physical abuse).
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fact, shortly after former Governor Rauner toured a women’s prison, he signed a bill reflecting the prevalence of sexual assault survivors among prisoners in Illinois.40
Third, like all women subjected to enforced nudity, the prisoners were especially susceptible to harm because the public exposure was aberrant. All children—especially girls—are socialized to prioritize bodily modesty.41 Intimate views are reserved for intimate relations.42 And when it comes to menstruation, many women maintain a zone of privacy, even from intimate relations.43 The search was a particularly potent act of sexual humiliation and dehumanization precisely because it was so abnormal. III. Forced Public Exposure Does Violence To The Most Fundamental
Aspects Of Our Being And Is Bounded By The Fourth Amendment. In each of the exemplars plucked from the annals of atrocity, sexual violence was expressly intended to cause harm—e.g., to dehumanize the targets of a campaign of hostility. Thus, the perpetrators were—in constitutional terms—

40 See Kevin Barlow, Rauner signs law creating IDOC women’s division, THE PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 17, 2018, https://www.pantagraph.com/news/local/raunersigns-law-creating-idoc-women-s-division/article_4b467bc9-aa96-591f-a4e4e91deb2db56e.html; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-2-5.5 (2018). 41 Alvin Rosenfeld et al., Parental Perceptions of Children’s Modesty: A CrossSectional Survey of Ages Two to Ten Years, 47 PSYCHIATRY 351, 353, 358 (1984). 42 Id. at 364. 43 Katherine R. Allen & Abbie E. Goldberg, Sexual Activity During Menstruation: A Qualitative Study, 46 J. SEX RES. 535 (2009).
9

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deliberately indifferent, a subjective intent that would render their actions cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.44
Here, in contrast, the summary judgment evidence is that the sexual violence endured by the class members was instituted for training purposes rather than as an assertion of power intended to humiliate and dehumanize the prisoners.45 In the absence of a finding of deliberate indifference, the Eighth Amendment is rendered toothless, as happened here.
Yet the majority now holds the Fourth Amendment powerless, too, because corrections officers did not touch the prisoners.46 Instead, they forced women to degrade and violate themselves.47 That is a distinction without a difference where, as here, the search was aberrant and gratuitous.
The reason enslaved women in the United States, Muslim women in Yugoslavia, Jewish women across Europe, and Rohingya women in Myanmar were forced to undress and expose themselves in public was because it was deeply humiliating and dehumanizing to be compelled to do this against their will. We are taught that control over the most intimate portions of our body—our genitals, for example—is ours and ours alone.48 It is understood that, absent circumstances not

44 E.g., King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015). 45 Henry, 930 F.3d at 837. 46 Henry, 930 F.3d at 838. 47 Id. 48 Alexander Lowen, In Defense of Modesty, 4 J. SEX RES. 51, 52 (1968).
10

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present here, we retain the sole and inviolable power to determine whether and under what conditions we permit access to our “private parts.”49 That the violation of this fundamental social compact came in a prison setting does not diminish its impact.50
Even in prison, the Fourth Amendment stands as a barrier to gratuitous and imperious applications of state power.51 That amendment is aimed at making sure that when the government intrudes upon liberty or autonomy in the course of carrying out necessary state functions—e.g., investigating crime, preserving evidence—its power is still bounded and the government is still held to account for its exercise.52 The Fourth Amendment does not vanish behind prison walls.
CONCLUSION In Illinois in 2011, 200 women were forced by corrections officers—under implied threat of physical violence and severe sanction—to cede to the government dominion over the most fundamental and private aspect of their physical and psychological being despite the lack of a legitimate penological interest. It is quintessentially the province of the Fourth Amendment to regulate that conduct. And

49 Id. 50 Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting the “well established. . . right not to be subjected to a humiliating strip search in full view of . . . others unless the procedure is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” (emphasis original)). 51 See King, 781 F.3d at 903 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part). 52 Id. at 901 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part).
11

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it is the full panoply of rights conferred by the Constitution that preserves our laudable distinction from the worst regimes and practices in recorded history. Amici respectfully urge the Court to rehear this case en banc, and hold the Fourth Amendment applicable to the gratuitous sexual violence inflicted upon the class members.

12

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Dated: August 20, 2019

Respectfully Submitted,
s/ Daniel M. Greenfield Daniel M. Greenfield* Counsel of Record RODERICK & SOLANGE
MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503-8538 daniel-greenfield@law.northwestern.edu
Jennifer Wedekind ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 915 15th Street N.W. Washington, DC 20005 (202) 548-6610
Anjana Samant ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT 125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004 (646) 885-8341
Benjamin S. Wolf Camille E. Bennett ACLU OF ILLINOIS 150 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 201-9740
Counsel for Amici Curiae

* Northwestern Pritzker School of Law student Arielle Tolman, Georgetown University Law Center student Janae Stacier, and Stanford Law School student Noah Breslau contributed substantially to the preparation of this brief.
13

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g)(1), I certify that:

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 29(b)(4) because this brief contains 2,591 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Cir. R. 32(a) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 in 14-point Times New Roman typeface.

Date: August 20, 2019

s/ Daniel M. Greenfield Daniel M. Greenfield

Case: 16-4234 Document: 51-2

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 20, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

Date: August 20, 2019

s/ Daniel M. Greenfield Daniel M. Greenfield

 
 Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 1 of 42
36,37,APPEAL,CLOSED,REFER
U.S. District Court CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (Springfield) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12−cv−03087−RM−TSH

Throgmorton et al v. Reynolds et al Assigned to: Judge Richard Mills Referred to: Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins Case in other court: 7th Circuit, 16−04234 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/20/2012 Date Terminated: 02/14/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Beverly Throgmorton

represented by Arthur Loevy LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5900 Email: arthur@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: jon@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: mike@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: ruth@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: tara@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 2 of 42

LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: rachel@loevy.com TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Delores Henry

represented by Arthur Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patricia Phillips

represented by Arthur Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown (See above for address)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 3 of 42

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqueline Hegwood

represented by Arthur Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sandra Brown

represented by Arthur Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 4 of 42

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ieshia Brown

represented by Arthur Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Steinback (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/12/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ruth Z Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tara Elizabeth Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vincenzo Field (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Reynolds Former Assistant Warden, Lincoln Correctional Center

represented by Joseph N Rupcich CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP Suite 200 111 North 6th Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−572−1714 Fax: 217−572−1613 Email: jrupcich@cassiday.com TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen L McNaught ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−1841 Fax: 217−524−5091 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 5 of 42
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher L Higgerson ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−1841 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: chiggerson@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah L Barnes ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−1841 Fax: 217−524−5091 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin L O'Boyle ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−9026 Fax: 217−524−5091 TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura K Bautista ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62706 217−557−0261 Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: LBautista@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa A Cook ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−9014 Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: lcook@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Fanning ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−2077 Fax: 217−782−8767 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terence J Corrigan O'HALLORAN KOSOFF GEITNER & COOK LLC Fourth Floor Suite 475 650 Dundee Road Northbrook, IL 60062 217−572−1714 Fax: 217−572−1613

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 6 of 42

Email: tcorrigan@okgc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Anderson Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Dallas Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 7 of 42

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Edmonson Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Johnson Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 8 of 42

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Leonetti Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Dowdy Lincoln Correctional Officer

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 9 of 42

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terence J Corrigan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Pfeiffer Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 10 of 42

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Craig Lincoln Correctional Officer

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terence J Corrigan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Slater Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 11 of 42

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Krudup Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin L O'Boyle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 12 of 42

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

Defendant
Melody Hulett In her official capacity as Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terence J Corrigan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Krull Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 13 of 42

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
M Brooks Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

Defendant
Butler Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Last Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Bender Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Boch Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 14 of 42

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Brown Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

Defendant
Dilley Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Hinton Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Johner Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Johnson Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 15 of 42

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Kenney Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Killam Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mathias Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Rickord Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 16 of 42

Spaniol Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 11/09/2016

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Van Middlesworth Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Warden Lincoln Correctional Officer TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Deborah Hatfield IDOC Employee TERMINATED: 03/28/2013

Defendant
Alan Pasley IDOC Employee

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 17 of 42

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terence J Corrigan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Eddie Jones IDOC Chief of Operations TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Renee Hatfield IDOC Employee

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terence J Corrigan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 18 of 42

Angela Locke In her official capacity as Warden of Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Felipe Zavala In his official capacity as Manager of Staff Development and Training at the Illinois Department of Corrections Training Academy

represented by Karen L McNaught (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah L Barnes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura K Bautista (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Joseph Yurkovich In his official capacity as IDOC Chief of Operations TERMINATED: 04/14/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Christine Brannon

represented by Christine Brannon PRO SE

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael Atchison

represented by Michael Atchison PRO SE

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 19 of 42

Date Filed 03/20/2012
03/21/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 04/18/2012 06/11/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Lincoln Correctional Center Former Assistant Warden REYNOLDS, Lincoln Correctional Officer ANDERSON, Lincoln Correctional Officer CRAIG, Lincoln Correctional Officer DALLAS, Lincoln Correctional Officer DOWDY, Lincoln Correctional Officer EDMONSON, Lincoln Correctional Officer JOHNSON, Lincoln Correctional Officer KRUDUP, Lincoln Correctional Officer LEONETTI, Lincoln Correctional Officer PFEIFFER, Lincoln Correctional Officer SLATER, Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0753−1335037.), filed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Arthur Loevy Attorney Appearance, # 3 Jon Loevy Attorney Appearance, # 4 Michael Kanovitz Attorney Appearance, # 5 Rachel Steinback Attorney Appearance, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons, # 10 Summons, # 11 Summons, # 12 Summons, # 13 Summons, # 14 Summons, # 15 Summons, # 16 Summons)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/20/2012)
2 Summonses Issued as to Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, and Slater. Original Summonses mailed to Plaintiffs' Attorneys for service. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
3 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Anderson served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Craig served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Dallas served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Dowdy served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Edmonson served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Johnson served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
9 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Krudup served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Leonetti served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
11 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Pfeiffer served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
12 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Reynolds served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
13 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. Slater served on 4/13/2012, answer due 5/4/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
14 Partial ANSWER to 1 Complaint,,,, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds,

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 20 of 42

06/11/2012 06/11/2012 06/22/2012 06/22/2012 06/22/2012
06/28/2012 07/05/2012 07/05/2012
08/13/2012 08/15/2012 08/15/2012

Slater.(Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
15 MOTION to Dismiss Count III by Defendants Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater. Responses due by 6/28/2012 (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
16 MEMORANDUM in Support re 15 MOTION to Dismiss Count III filed by Defendants Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater. (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
17 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, filed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton.(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 06/22/2012)
18 RESPONSE to Motion re 15 MOTION to Dismiss Count III filed by Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 06/22/2012)
TEXT ORDER: Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count III (d/e 15 ). In the Motion, the Defendants argued that Count III of the Complaint (d/e 1 ) − Indemnfication − is barred by sovereign immunity. Following the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs filed a two−count First Amended Complaint (d/e 17 ) that omits the claim for indemnification. In addition, the Plaintiffs have filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss (d/e 18 ), in which they (1) note the filing of the First Amended Complaint, and (2) request that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss Count III as moot. In light of these developments, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count III (d/e 15 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 06/22/2012. (VM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/22/2012)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Defendants are directed to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 17 on or before 7/12/2012. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
19 ANSWER to 17 Amended Complaint, and Affirmative Defenses by Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
NOTICE OF HEARING: Rule 16 Scheduling Conference set Wednesday, 8/15/2012, at 2:00 PM by telephone (court will place call) before Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore. Attorneys are directed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) by meeting as soon as practicable, and in any event at least fourteen (14) days prior to the scheduling conference, and are to submit a proposed discovery plan in writing to the Court on or before 8/13/2012. Such a plan must include, at a minimum, those items listed in CDIL−LR 26.2(3), Rule 16(b), Rule 26(f), and CDIL−LR 16.2(E) with proposed deadlines. The parties are directed to specifically address the provisions, if any, for discovery or disclosure of electronically stored information, and to discuss agreements, if any, the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial preparation material, after inadvertent production. Any plan filed shall specifically address the need, or lack thereof, concerning discovery of electronically stored information. If a discovery plan is not submitted as required, the scheduling hearing will not be held and costs may be assessed. Lead counsel or other counsel of record with knowledge of the case should be available to participate in the Rule 16 scheduling hearing. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
20 DISCOVERY PLAN − PROPOSED/Report of Rule 26(f)Planning Meeting by Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
21 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Erin L O'Boyle on behalf of Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater (O'Boyle, Erin) (Entered: 08/15/2012)
22 MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before U.S. Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore: Scheduling Conference held on 8/15/2012. Parties are reminded of their option to consent to proceed before US Magistrate Judge. See attached form. Written Scheduling Order to follow. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/15/2012)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 21 of 42

08/15/2012
08/23/2012 08/24/2012
08/24/2012 08/24/2012 08/28/2012 09/06/2012 09/14/2012 10/02/2012 11/07/2012 11/08/2012 11/08/2012 11/09/2012 12/12/2012

23 SCHEDULING ORDER: Attorneys Michael Kanovitz, Rachel Steinback, and Erin O'Boyle present by telephone for Rule 16 conference; Same held at 2:00 PM on 8/15/2012; SCHEDULING TIME LIMITS ORDERED: Initial Disclosures due by 8/27/2012. Class and collective certification discovery due by 11/15/2012. Motion for class certification to be filed by 1/15/2013, response by 2/15/2013, and any reply by 3/1/2013. Additional deadlines, including merit discovery, damages discovery, merit expert discovery, and dispositive motions deadline, final pretrial and trial settings will be set after the Court's ruling on any motions for certification. See written order entered by Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore on 8/15/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Mediation Memorandum, # 2 Courtroom Technology Brochure) (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/15/2012)
24 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 9/10/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Joining One Additional Party 24 ALLOWED without objection. Clerk directed to file the Second Amended Complaint [24−1] instanter. All Defendants to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint by 9/10/2012. Entered on 8/24/2012. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
25 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, Melody Hulett, filed by Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
Set Deadlines: All Defendants to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint by 9/10/2012 per Judge Cudmore's 8/24/2012 Text Order. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
26 Summons Issued as to Melody Hulett. Original mailed to attorney for service. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 08/28/2012)
27 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint, Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 25] by Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 09/06/2012)
28 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips. Melody Hulett served on 9/10/2012, answer due 10/1/2012. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
29 ANSWER to 25 Amended Complaint, and Affirmative Defenses by Melody Hulett.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
30 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Defendants Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater. Responses due by 11/26/2012 (Fanning, Robert) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Motion for Enlargement of Time to Complete Discovery 30 ALLOWED. Discovery extended to 12/7/2012. The Court also extends the deadline for motion for class certification to 2/1/2013, response by 3/1/2013, and any reply by 3/15/2013. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/08/2012)
31 MOTION Clarify Scheduling Order by Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 11/29/2012 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 11/08/2012)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Motion to Clarify 31 ALLOWED in that the Court grants Defendants until 12/7/2012 in which to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests and extends the discovery cutoff date to 12/17/2012. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
32 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Agreed) by Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 1/2/2013 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 12/12/2012)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 22 of 42

12/13/2012
02/28/2013 02/28/2013 02/28/2013 03/01/2013 03/01/2013
03/01/2013 03/07/2013 03/12/2013 03/26/2013 03/27/2013
03/27/2013 03/28/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013

TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Agreed Motion to Extend Fact Discovery 32 ALLOWED. The Court extends the class−related fact discovery cutoff to 2/8/2013, and resets the deadline for Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to 3/1/2013, response by 4/1/2013, and any reply by 4/15/2013. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 12/13/2012)
33 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 3/18/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Third Amended Complaint)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/28/2013)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint 33 ALLOWED without objection. Clerk to file Third Amended Complaint [33−1] forthwith. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead by 3/15/2013. Entered on 2/28/2013. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 02/28/2013)
34 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against all Defendants filed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, and Jacqueline Hegwood. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 02/28/2013)
35 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 3/18/2013 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
36 MEMORANDUM in Support re 35 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Excerpt Pasley Dep Pages, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Group Declarations, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Interrogatory Response)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
37 Exhibit re 36 Memorandum in Support of Motion, (Amended Exhibit 1) by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
38 Summons Issued as to Bender, Boch, M Brooks, Brown, Butler, Dilley, Deborah Hatfield, Hinton, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krull, Last, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Rickord, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden. Originals mailed to attorney. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/07/2013)
39 ANSWER to 34 Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
40 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 4/12/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/26/2013)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint 40 ALLOWED. Clerk directed to file Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint [40−1] attached to motion. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead by 4/10/2013. Entered on 3/27/13. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
41 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood.(ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
42 Summons Issued as to Renee Hatfield and returned to Plaintiffs counsel to effectuate service. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/28/2013)
43 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Lincoln Correctional Officer Bender on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
44 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Boch on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 23 of 42

03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013

45 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Brooks on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
46 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Brown on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
47 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Butler on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
48 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Dilley on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
49 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Hinton on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
50 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Johner on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
51 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Johnson on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
52 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Jones on 3/26/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
53 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Kenney on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
54 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Killam on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
55 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Krull on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
56 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Last on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
57 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Mathias on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
58 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Pasley on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
59 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Rickord on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
60 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Spaniol on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
61 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Van Middlesworth on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 24 of 42

03/29/2013 04/01/2013 04/02/2013 04/05/2013 04/12/2013
04/15/2013 04/17/2013 05/13/2013 07/29/2013 09/09/2013 09/10/2013
11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/18/2013

62 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Warden on 3/13/13, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
63 RESPONSE to Motion re 35 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Defendants Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Robert Patterson)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/01/2013)
TEXT ORDER BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: The Court is in receipt of the Defendants' Response to Motion for Class Certification, 63 , and has reviewed same. Plaintiffs are directed to file a Reply on or before April 12, 2013. Entered on 4/2/2013. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
64 ANSWER to 41 Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Anderson, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
TEXT ORDER BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: The Plaintiffs' Unopposed Oral Motion to Extend the Deadline for Filing a Reply Brief to the Defendants' Response to the Motion for Class Certification is ALLOWED. The deadline for the Reply is hereby extended from April 12, 2013, to April 15, 2013. Entered on 4/12/2013. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
65 REPLY to Response to Motion re 35 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
66 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons served on Renee Hatfield on 4/5/2013, filed by Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
67 ANSWER to 41 Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Bender, Boch, Butler, Dilley, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Johner, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krull, Last, Mathias, Rickord, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
68 ORDER by U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE RICHARD MILLS: Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (d/e 35 ) is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered on 7/29/2013. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
69 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 9/26/2013 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time 69 ALLOWED: Close of class certification fact discovery set 11/15/2013; deadline for Plaintiffs to amend complaint set 11/25/2013; Plaintiff's motion for class certification to be filed by 12/9/2013. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
70 MOTION for Order for Preservation of Evidence by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 11/29/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
71 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 11/29/2013 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Unopposed Motion for Entry of Preservation Order 70 ALLOWED as the Plaintiff advises the motion is unopposed. The Court orders Logan Correctional Center and the Illinois Department of Corrections to preserve any and all evidence within their custody and control that pertains to the 10/31/2013 cadet training exercise, including but not limited to any video recordings depicting shakedowns of inmate cells, strip searches of inmates, and/or interactions between cadets, corrections officers, prison administrators and inmates, and all inmate grievances and/or other written complaints. (LB, ilcd)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 25 of 42

11/18/2013
01/10/2014 01/13/2014
02/13/2014
02/17/2014 02/18/2014 02/26/2014
02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 02/27/2014 03/03/2014 03/03/2014
03/11/2014

(Entered: 11/18/2013)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time 71 ALLOWED in that: Close of class certification fact discovery extended to 1/10/2014; Deadline for Plaintiffs to amend complaint extended to 1/20/2014; and, Plaintiff's motion for class certification to be filed by 2/3/2014. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
72 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Agreed) by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 1/27/2014 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Agreed Motion for an Extension of Time 72 ALLOWED. New deadlines as follows: Close of class certification fact discovery extended to 2/7/2014; deadline for Plaintiffs to amend complaint extended to by 2/17/2014; Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to be filed by 3/3/2014. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to instructions from Chief Judge James E. Shadid, the assignment of this case to Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore is withdrawn due to his resignation. The district judge assigned to this case will handle all matters until a new magistrate judge is appointed. Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 2/13/2014. (MC, ilcd) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
73 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Fifth) against All Defendants, filed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood.(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/17/2014)
74 Summons Issued as to Angela Locke, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Original Summonses mailed to Plaintiffs' attorney for service. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
75 ANSWER to 73 Amended Complaint by Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
76 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood. Felipe Zavala served on 2/18/2014, answer due 4/21/2014. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
77 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood. Joseph Yurkovich served on 2/18/2014, answer due 4/21/2014. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
78 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Delores Henry, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood. Angela Locke served on 2/18/2014, answer due 4/21/2014. (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
79 MOTION for Leave to File (Unopposed) by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton, Sandra Brown. Responses due by 3/17/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − 6th Amended Complaint)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
80 MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23(b)(2) by Plaintiffs Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton, Ieshia Brown. Responses due by 3/20/2014 (Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
81 MEMORANDUM In Support of re 80 MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23(b)(2) by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11)(Steinback, Rachel) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
82 ANSWER to 73 Amended Complaint by Angela Locke, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 03/11/2014)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 26 of 42

03/25/2014 03/31/2014 03/31/2014 04/10/2014 04/10/2014 05/28/2014 10/21/2014 10/31/2014
11/18/2014 11/20/2014 11/20/2014

TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to instructions from Chief Judge James E. Shadid, this case is now referred to Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins due to his appointment as U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Central District of Illinois. Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 3/25/2014. (MC, ilcd) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
TEXT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins: Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Sixth Amended Complaint 79 ALLOWED. Clerk is directed to docket Sixth Amended Complaint [79−1] attached to motion. Defendants given until 4/14/2014 to answer or otherwise plead to the Sixth Amended Complaint. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 3/31/2014. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
83 SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Delores Henry, Sandra Brown, Beverly Thogmorton, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood, Ieshia Brown. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
84 ANSWER to 83 Amended Complaint by Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
85 ANSWER to 83 Amended Complaint by Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
86 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Tara Elizabeth Thompson on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
87 OPINION: The Plaintiffs' Rule 23(b)(2) Motion for Class Certification (d/e 80 ) is ALLOWED. This case is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins for the purpose of determining whether additional discovery is necessary and entering a scheduling order. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/17/2014. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
NOTICE OF HEARING: Telephonic status conference set 11/20/2014 at 11:00 a.m. (court will place call) before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins to discuss scheduling of merits discovery. If merits discovery is necessary, parties to submit a proposed discovery plan in writing to the Court on or before 11/18/2014. Such a plan must include, at a minimum, those items listed in CDIL−LR 26.2(3), Rule 16(b), Rule 26(f), and CDIL−LR 16.2(E) with proposed deadlines. The parties are directed to specifically address the provisions, if any, for discovery or disclosure of electronically stored information, and to discuss agreements, if any, the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial preparation material, after inadvertent production. Any plan filed shall specifically address the need, or lack thereof, concerning discovery of electronically stored information. If a discovery plan is not submitted as required, the scheduling hearing will not be held and costs may be assessed. Lead counsel or other counsel of record with knowledge of the case should be available to participate in the Rule 16 scheduling hearing. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
88 DISCOVERY PLAN − PROPOSED/Report of Rule 26(f)Planning Meeting by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Status conference held with counsel Tara Thompson and Nicole Roth. Supplemental Scheduling Order to follow. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
89 SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULING ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. ADDITIONAL TIME LIMITS AND SETTINGS ARE ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: Amended Pleadings / Joinder of Parties due by 2/1/2015; Fact Discovery due by 5/1/2015; Plaintiff`s Expert Disclosure due by 6/1/2015; Defendant`s Expert Disclosure due by 7/15/2015; Expert Discovery due by 8/15/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 9/15/2015. Final Pretrial Conference set 12/21/2015 at 2:00 PM in chambers in Springfield before U.S. District Judge Richard Mills. Jury Trial set 1/5/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Judge Mills. Telephonic Status Conference set Monday, 7/20/2015, at 1:30 PM (court will place

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 27 of 42

05/01/2015 05/07/2015 05/07/2015 06/30/2015 07/15/2015 07/16/2015 07/23/2015 07/27/2015
08/07/2015 08/17/2015

call) before Magistrate Judge Schanzle−Haskins. See written order. (Attachments: # 1 Mediation Memorandum, # 2 Courtroom Technology Brochure) (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
90 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Unopposed by Defendants by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 5/18/2015 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery 90 is ALLOWED. DEADLINES ARE RESET AS FOLLOWS: Fact Discovery due by 6/30/2015; Plaintiff`s Expert Disclosure due by 7/15/2015; Defendant`s Expert Disclosure due by 8/1/2015; Expert Discovery due by 8/30/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 9/30/2015. Final pretrial conference and jury trial settings remain as scheduled. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/07/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Telephonic Status Conference set 7/20/2015 is CANCELLED and reset Thursday, 8/20/2015, at 10:00 AM (court will place call) before Judge Schanzle−Haskins. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 05/07/2015)
91 MOTION to Compel by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 7/17/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
92 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 91 MOTION to Compel by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 8/3/2015 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiffs' Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Compel 92 ALLOWED, no objection by Defendants. Extension granted to 7/22/2015. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
93 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Enter and Continue Motion to Compel AGREED by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 8/10/2015 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Agreed Motion for Extension of Time and to Enter and Continue Defendants' Motion to Compel 93 is ALLOWED. Response deadline for Defendants' Motion to Compel 91 is extended to 9/15/2015. DEADLINES ARE RESET AS FOLLOWS: Fact Discovery due by 8/31/2015; Plaintiff`s Expert Disclosure due by 9/15/2015; Defendant`s Expert Disclosure due by 9/30/2015; Expert Discovery due by 10/31/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 11/30/2015. Final Pretrial Conference set 12/21/2015 is CANCELLED and reset 2/22/2016 at 1:30 PM in chambers in Springfield before U.S. District Judge Richard Mills. Jury Trial set 1/5/2016 is CANCELLED and reset 3/1/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Judge Mills. Telephonic Status Conference set 8/20/2015 is CANCELLED and reset Monday, 10/26/2015, at 2:30 PM (court will place call) before Magistrate Judge Schanzle−Haskins. COUNSEL IS ADVISED THAT NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE GRANTED. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/27/2015)
94 MOTION to Compel Depositions by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 8/24/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Deposition Notice, # 2 Exhibit B (Group) − Correspondence)(Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Depositions 94 ALLOWED. Defendants are to produce Defendants Reynolds, Hatfield, Paslay, Jones, and Zavala for deposition by 8/31/2015. (LB, ilcd)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 28 of 42

08/31/2015 09/08/2015 09/17/2015
09/29/2015
09/29/2015 10/26/2015
10/30/2015
10/30/2015 11/04/2015 11/16/2015
11/23/2015 11/30/2015

(Entered: 08/17/2015)
95 MOTION to Compel Documents by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 9/17/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Deposition Notice, # 2 Exhibit B − Discovery Requests, # 3 Exhibit C − Correspondence)(Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
96 MOTION to Withdraw Motion to Compel Depositions by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 9/25/2015 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
97 RESPONSE to Motion re 95 MOTION to Compel Documents filed by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 09/17/2015)
98 OPINION entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Defendants' Motion to Compel 91 is ALLOWED and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents 95 is DENIED without prejudice. The Court may allow the Plaintiffs to renew Motion 95 in the future if the documents at issue are not produced in a timely manner. Defense counsel is directed to file a status report by 10/30/2015, on the production of the documents at issue in Motion 95 . See written order. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Motion to Compel Depositions 96 is DENIED as moot. The Court already allowed the Motion to Compel 94 by Text Order entered August 17, 2015. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Telephonic status conference held with counsel for Plaintiffs, Ruth Brown, and counsel for Defendants, Melissa Jennings. Discussion held regarding setting settlement conference or mediation. Parties report that no settlement negotiations are outstanding. Parties to contact the Court for scheduling of mediation or settlement conference if parties deem such appropriate. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
99 STATUS REPORT by Anderson, Bender, Boch, M Brooks, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
100 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Ruth Z Brown on behalf of Beverly Thogmorton (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 10/30/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Before the Court is Defendants' Status Report 99 . Defendants to file supplemental status report on or before 11/16/2015 regarding receipt of the requested materials from the Illinois Department of Corrections. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
101 STATUS REPORT by Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Before the Court is Defendants' Status Report 101 . Defendants to file supplemental status report on or before 12/16/2015 regarding receipt of the requested materials from the Illinois Department of Corrections. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
102 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett,

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 29 of 42

11/30/2015
12/14/2015 12/16/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015
12/21/2015 12/30/2015
01/13/2016

Johner, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 12/24/2015 (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
103 MEMORANDUM in Support re 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Part 1, # 2 Exhibit A − Part 2, # 3 Exhibit A − Part 3, # 4 Exhibit A − Part 4, # 5 Exhibit B − Part 1, # 6 Exhibit B − Part 2, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D − Part 1, # 9 Exhibit D − Part 2, # 10 Exhibit E, # 11 Exhibit F, # 12 Exhibit G, # 13 Exhibit H − Part 1, # 14 Exhibit H − Part 2)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
104 MOTION to Compel Renewed, MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment Unopposed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 12/31/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Summer 2015 Correspondence), # 2 Exhibit B (Discovery Requests), # 3 Exhibit C (Winter 2015 Correspondence))(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 12/14/2015)
105 STATUS REPORT by Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
106 Response by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton re 105 Status Report, . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins: Before the Court is Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel and Unopposed Motion to Defer Response to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion (d/e 104 ). Plaintiff's Motion 104 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is due within 7 days after receipt of the outstanding discovery from Defendant. Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel is set for hearing on 12/23/2015 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 3 in Springfield before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. If parties resolve the discovery dispute prior to the hearing, the parties are to inform the Court and the hearing will be cancelled. Entered on 12/18/2015. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins: The Motion Hearing on Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel set on 12/23/2015 at 1:30 p.m. is RESET to 12/30/2015 at 1:30 p.m. due to a change in the Court's schedule. Entered on 12/21/2015. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins: Motion Hearing held on 12/30/2015 re 104 Renewed MOTION to Compel. Plaintiff's counsel Tara Elizabeth Thompson present in person. Defendants' counsel Christopher Higgerson present in person. Discussion held regarding Renewed Motion and documents requested 104 . Attorney Higgerson advises the Court that some documents listed in paragraph 2(f) and 2(g) of the Renewed Motion 104 were recently provided to Plaintiff's counsel, and all other documents have been requested from the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges same. The Court orders documents listed in paragraph 2(a) through 2(i) be produced on or before 1/13/2016. Ed Huntley is ordered to appear in person on 1/13/2016 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 3 in Springfield before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins if documents are not produced. Final Pretrial and Trial dates remain set. Hearing adjourned. (Tape #SPC 1:30 PM.) (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Motion Hearing held on 1/13/2016 regarding Renewed Motion to Compel 104 . Plaintiff's counsel, Ruth Z. Brown, present in person. Defendants'

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 30 of 42

01/13/2016 01/13/2016 01/20/2016
01/22/2016 01/22/2016 02/02/2016 02/02/2016
02/03/2016 02/09/2016

counsel Christopher Higgerson present in person. Ed Huntley present in person. Discussion held regarding Renewed Motion and documents requested. Defense counsel indicates all existing responsive documents listed in paragraph 2(a) through 2(i) of the Motion 104 not previously provided are in his possession and the parties agree they will be provided to Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of a protective order. Parties to prepare and file proposed protective order on or before 1/20/2016. Plaintiff to file response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 102 on or before 1/30/2016. Defendants to file their reply, if any, to Plaintiff's response on or before 2/13/2016. Final pretrial conference set 2/22/2016 is CANCELLED and reset 4/25/2016 at 2:00 p.m. in chambers in Springfield before U.S. District Judge Richard Mills. Jury trial set 3/1/2016 is CANCELLED and reset 5/3/2016 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Judge Mills. (Tape #SP−C 3:02PM) (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Pursuant to hearing held on 1/13/2016, Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel 104 is DENIED as moot. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
UTILITY: Set Miscellaneous Deadline 1/20/2016 for proposed protective order. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
107 MOTION for Protective Order by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 2/8/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
TEXT ORDER entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Motion for Entry of Protective Order 107 ALLOWED. Written order to follow. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
108 AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 1/22/2016. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
109 MOTION for Leave to File INSTANTER THEIR RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 2/19/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 02/02/2016)
110 Exhibit re 109 MOTION for Leave to File INSTANTER THEIR RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32 part 1, # 33 Exhibit 32 part 2, # 34 Exhibit 32 part 3, # 35 Exhibit 32 part 4, # 36 Exhibit 33)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 02/02/2016)
111 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Lisa A Cook on behalf of Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
112 MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Christopher L. Higgerson, Erin O'Boyle, Joseph Rupcich to be replaced by Lisa Cook, by Defendants Anderson, Bender, Boch, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dilley, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Hinton, Melody Hulett, Johner, Johnson, Eddie Jones, Kenney, Killam, Krudup, Krull, Last, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Mathias, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Rickord, Slater, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 31 of 42

02/11/2016 02/12/2016
02/12/2016 02/29/2016 02/29/2016 03/08/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/25/2016 03/28/2016 03/30/2016 04/05/2016

2/26/2016 (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Defendants' Motion to Substitute Counsel 112 ALLOWED. Attorneys Joseph N Rupcich, Christopher L Higgerson, and Erin L O'Boyle terminated as counsel in this case. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a late response to the pending summary judgment motion is granted ( 109 ). The clerk is directed to docket the attachment to motion 109 as Plaintiffs' response to the pending motion for summary judgment, with a notation that the exhibits in support thereof are filed at docket entry 110 . The final pretrial and trial dates remain as scheduled. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 2/12/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
113 RESPONSE to 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Exhibits filed at d/e 110 . (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
114 MOTION to Strike 113 Response to Motion by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 3/17/2016 (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
115 MOTION to Strike (Exclude) Expert Report and Testimony of Plaintiffs' Tendered Expert Wendy Still by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 3/17/2016 (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
116 Second MOTION to Compel (Renewed) by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 3/25/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
117 RESPONSE to Motion re 114 MOTION to Strike 113 Response to Motion filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Brown, Ruth) Modified on 3/15/2016 (MJ, ilcd). (Entered: 03/15/2016)
118 RESPONSE to Motion re 115 MOTION to Strike (Exclude) Expert Report and Testimony of Plaintiffs' Tendered Expert Wendy Still filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
Notice of Docket Text Modification re 117 Response to Motion: Filing inadvertently linked to wrong Motion. Document relationship and docket text corrected. NEF regenerate to all parties. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
119 RESPONSE to Motion re 116 Second MOTION to Compel (Renewed) filed by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Angela Locke, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Joseph Yurkovich, Felipe Zavala. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
120 OPINION entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiffs' Second Renewed Motion to Compel 116 is ALLOWED IN PART. Defendants are directed to produce all outstanding communications requested by Plaintiffs by April 11, 2016. See written order. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
121 NOTICE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY BY PLAINTIFF re 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The final pretrial conference scheduled for April 25, 2016, is vacated and rescheduled to May 24, 2016, at 3:00 p.m. by personal appearance of counsel. The current trial date of May 3, 2016, is vacated. A new trial date will be set at the final pretrial conference. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 4/5/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 04/05/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 32 of 42

04/14/2016
05/25/2016
05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/27/2016 06/01/2016
06/28/2016 07/05/2016

122 ORDER BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Response is DENIED ( 114 ). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ( 102 ). Summary judgment is granted to the following Defendants: M. Brooks, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Van Middlesworth, the current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, and Eddie Jones. Summary judgment is granted to Defendants on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim (Count I of the Sixth Amended Complaint). Summary judgment is otherwise denied.Defendants' Motion to Strike the report and testimony of Plaintiff's expert is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART ( 115 ). CHRISTINE BRANNON, in her official capacity, is SUBSTITUTED for Defendant Locke pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). MICHAEL ATCHISON, in his official capacity, is SUBSTITUTED for Defendant Yurkovich pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered on 4/14/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Final Pretrial Conference held on 5/25/2016. Plaintiffs' counsel Ruth Z. Brown, Tara Elizabeth Thompson, and Rachel Steinback present in person. Defendants' counsel Lisa Cook present in person. History and status of case discussed. Court received the Pretrial Order along with the Exhibits. Discussion held as to any possibility of a settlement. Further discussion held as to damages, injunctive relief and class certification. Case will move forward based on merit. Discussion held as to trial timeline. Jury selection may commence before Magistrate Judge Schanzle−Haskins on Monday, June 20, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. Opening statements to begin at 1:30 p.m or after jury impanelment. Court is adjourned. ORDER to follow minute entry resetting or confirming trial date. (Tape #SP−C II 3:00 PM.) (VM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
123 FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 5/25/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Lists, # 2 Proposed Jury Instructions)(VM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
126 Joint MOTION to Continue Trial Date by All Parties by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 6/13/2016 (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
127 ORDER BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/20/2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Judge Richard Mills. Jury selection will start at 9:00 a.m. on June 21, 2016 before United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Opening statements will commence at 1:30 p.m., or after jury impanelment on June 21, 2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered on 5/25/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The parties' joint motion to continue the trial date is granted 126 . The jury trial scheduled for June 21, 2016, is vacated and rescheduled to begin on November 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. The jury selection scheduled for June 21, 2016, is vacated and rescheduled to November 9, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. before United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. The final pretrial conference set for June 20, 2016, is vacated and rescheduled to November 10, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. to discuss any pending issues which remain before trial. Any pretrial motions in limine are due no later than November 1, 2016, with response briefs filed no later than November 7, 2016. Class representatives Sandra Brown and Iesha Brown are incarcerated in Logan Correctional Center. The clerk is directed to issue writs to secure the personal presence of Sandra Brown and Iesha Brown at the jury selection and trial. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 6/1/2016. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
128 Joint MOTION Approve Class Notice Form by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton. Responses due by 7/15/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Class Notice, # 2 Exhibit Proposed Opt Out Form, # 3 Exhibit Proposed Order)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The Court has reviewed the joint motion to approve the form of class notice ( 128 ). By July 8, 2016, Plaintiff's counsel is directed to inform the Court how Plaintiff's counsel determined the names of the individuals who were subjected to the strip search on March 31, 2011. Additionally, by July 8, 2016, the parties are directed to: 1) submit a revised notice which informs individuals of the need to consult an attorney regarding the time limit for pursuing individual actions for damages if they

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 33 of 42

07/08/2016 07/18/2016
07/25/2016 07/25/2016 07/25/2016 07/25/2016
07/25/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 08/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016 10/12/2016

opt out; and 2) a revised opt−out form which directs the individual to mail the form to the Clerk at the same address in the notice, rather than to counsel. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 7/5/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
129 Response by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Thogmorton re Order, Set/Reset Deadlines:,,,, Response to Court's Order of July 5, 2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
130 ORDER Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 7/18/16. Joint Motion to Approve theForm of Class Notice GRANTED. Class members will have until September 30,2016 to return their opt−out forms. The clerk is directed to update the docket to show that the correct spelling of the lead Plaintiffs name is Throgmorton. (SW, ilcd) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
131 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Laura K Bautista on behalf of Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
132 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Karen L McNaught on behalf of Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala (McNaught, Karen) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
133 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Deborah L Barnes on behalf of Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala (Barnes, Deborah) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
134 MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Lisa Cook to be replaced by Karen McNaught, Deborah Barnes, and Laura Bautista, by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 8/11/2016 (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Defendants' Motion to Substitute Counsel 134 is ALLOWED. Attorney Lisa A Cook is terminated as counsel in this case. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 07/25/2016)
135 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Vincenzo Q Field on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Field, Vincenzo) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
136 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Rachel Steinback by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. Responses due by 8/29/2016 (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
TEXT ORDER by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins. Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Appearance 136 of Attorney Rachel Steinback is ALLOWED. Attorney Rachel Steinback terminated as counsel for Plaintiffs in this case. (LB, ilcd) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
137 VACATED PER 11/8/16 TEXT ORDER − WRIT issued for Plaintiff Sandra Brown's personal appearance at the Jury Selection scheduled for November 9, 2016 before Judge Schanzle−Haskins. (MJ, ilcd) Modified on 11/8/2016 (MJC, ilcd). (Entered: 10/12/2016)
138 WRIT issued for Plaintiff Ieshia Brown's personal appearance at the Jury Selection scheduled for November 9, 2016 before Judge Schanzle−Haskins. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 10/12/2016)
139 VACATED PER 11/8/16 TEXT ORDER − WRIT issued for Plaintiff Sandra Brown's personal appearance at the Jury Trial scheduled for November 14−18, 2016 before Judge Richard Mills. (MJ, ilcd) Modified on 11/8/2016 (MJC, ilcd). (Entered: 10/12/2016)
140 WRIT issued for Plaintiff Ieshia Brown's personal appearance at the Jury Trial scheduled for November 14−18, 2016 before Judge Richard Mills. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered:

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 34 of 42

10/27/2016
10/27/2016 11/01/2016 11/01/2016 11/01/2016 11/01/2016 11/02/2016
11/02/2016
11/02/2016 11/02/2016

10/12/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions but did not submit any alternatives with the final pretrial order. By November 1, 2016, Defendants are directed to file their proposed jury instructions which are not duplicative of the joint proposed instructions. On a separate matter, Plaintiffs stated at the final pretrial conference that, in addition to the two incarcerated named plaintiffs, they intend to call other incarcerated witnesses during the trial. By November 1, 2016, Plaintiffs are directed to file a motion for a personal writ, listing the names and IDOC numbers of the incarcerated witnesses they intend to call along with the date they will call the incarcerated witnesses. Lastly, the final pretrial is rescheduled to November 7, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. to discuss any pending issues which remain before the trial or the jury selection begins. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/27/16. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/7/2016 03:30 PM in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Judge Richard Mills. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
141 Proposed Jury Instructions by Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
142 MOTION in Limine by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala. Responses due by 11/18/2016 (Barnes, Deborah) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
143 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. Responses due by 11/18/2016 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
144 MOTION in Limine Omnibus by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. Responses due by 11/18/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Defs' Resps. to Requests for Production, # 2 Exhibit B, Defs.' Interrogatory Responses, # 3 Exhibit C, Pl. Throgmorton's Interrogatory Responses, # 4 Exhibit D, Shakedown Slips)(Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Magistrate Judge Schanzle−Haskins' standard voir dire can be found on the Central District's website under Magistrate Judge Schanzle−Haskins' orders and rules. www.ilcd.uscourts.gov (local rules/general orders; orders and rules by Judge; Hon. Tom Schanzle−Haskins; prospective jury questions). By Friday, November 4, 2016, the parties are directed to file any additional voir dire questions they seek to ask. Also by Friday, November 4, 2016, the parties are directed to file an agreed statement of the case to be read to the potential jurors. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 11/2/2016. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs' petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is granted (d/e 143 ). The clerk is directed to issue a writ of habeas corpus for inmates Adrian Maynor (K00930) and Michelle Williams (R85233) to personally appear at the trial on Tuesday, November 15, 2016, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Further, the clerk is directed to issue a writ of habeas corpus for inmates Michelle Clopton (K86846) and Millie Lee (N27281) to personally appear at the trial on Thursday, November 17, 2016, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The writs shall specify that the inmates must be dressed in proper civilian attire. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/2/2016. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
145 WRIT issued for the personal appearance of Adrian Maynor (K00930) and Michelle Williams (R85233) for the Jury Trial on November 15, 2016. (MJC, ilcd) WRIT FOR MICHELLE WILLIAMS VACATED PER 11/8/16 TEXT ORDER − Modified on 11/8/2016 (MJC, ilcd). (Entered: 11/02/2016)
146 WRIT issued for the personal appearance of Michelle Clopton (K86846) and Millie Lee (N27281) for the Jury Trial on November 17, 2016. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/02/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 35 of 42

11/02/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016 11/06/2016 11/07/2016 11/07/2016 11/07/2016
11/08/2016
11/08/2016 11/08/2016

147 Proposed Jury Instructions by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Verdict Form)(Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
148 NOTICE of Agreed Statement of the Case (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
149 Proposed Voir Dire by Craig, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson(Lincoln Correctional Officer), Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
150 Proposed Voir Dire by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Field, Vincenzo) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
151 RESPONSE to Motion re 142 MOTION in Limine filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Report from John Howard Association, # 2 Exhibit B − Excerpts from Hulett Deposition)(Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/06/2016)
152 RESPONSE to Motion re 144 MOTION in Limine Omnibus filed by Defendants Anderson, Butler, Craig, Dallas, Dowdy, Edmonson, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Johnson, Krudup, Krull, Leonetti, Alan Pasley, Pfeiffer, Reynolds, Slater, Spaniol, Felipe Zavala. (Barnes, Deborah) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
153 MOTION to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 14 by Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. Responses due by 11/25/2016 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Final Pretrial Conference held on 11/7/2016. Attorneys Ruth Z Brown, Tara Elizabeth Thompson and Vincenzo Field present on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista present on behalf of the Defendants. Discussion held regarding logistics of courtroom for trial. Discussion held regarding Agreed Statement of the Case provided to the Court. Court will draft a Statement of the Case. Court advised of pending discussions regarding dismissal of some defendants. Counsel for Plaintiffs to file brief regarding admission of grievances by 5:00 p.m on 11/8/2016. Defendants' response due by 5:00 p.m. on 11/9/2016. Court adjourned. (Court Reporter KS) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
154 TEXT ORDER: The Court attaches its own statement of the case for use during voir dire. Plaintiffs indicated at the final pretrial conference that only six Defendants may remain in the case. By 3:00 p.m. today (November 8, 2016), Plaintiffs shall file an appropriate motion to dismiss the Defendants they seek to dismiss and a list of the remaining parties. Plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their motion in limine 14 is granted ( 153 ). On a separate matter, Plaintiffs indicated at the final pretrial conference that they will not call inmate Michelle Williams at trial. Additionally, Plaintiffs indicated that Plaintiff Sandra Brown is a class representative for injunctive purposes only, though she may be called as a testifying witness. Sandra Brown will not sit at the table as a class representative. By Wednesday, November 9, 2016, Plaintiffs are directed to file a notice indicating which day of trial they intend to call Sandra Brown as a Plaintiff. The CLERK IS DIRECTED TO VACATE the writs for Sandra Brown to attend jury selection and trial. The jury selection and trial writs remain in effect for Iesha Brown. Further, THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO VACATE the writ for Michelle Williams. The other trial writs remain in effect. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/8/2016. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
155 Second MOTION in Limine by Defendants Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. Responses due by 11/25/2016 (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiffs request 12 jurors for this trial. Defendants request 8 jurors. Both parties request five peremptory challenges each. The Court rules that the number of jurors chosen shall be 8, and the number of peremptory challenges shall be 3 per side. This is in keeping with the general practice in the Springfield division for civil cases. Additionally, the number of potential jurors already summoned has been based on the goal of an 8−person jury, with 3 peremptory challenges per side. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a)(in civil trial number of jurors shall be at least 6 and no greater than

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 36 of 42

11/08/2016 11/09/2016
11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016
11/10/2016 11/10/2016 11/10/2016 11/13/2016 11/13/2016 11/13/2016 11/14/2016

12); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.) The parties have not demonstrated a reason to deviate from this practice. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/8/2016. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
156 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment Claims Against Certain Defendants by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. Responses due by 11/25/2016 (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Before voir dire, Plaintiffs orally amended their motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Edmonson, Johnson, Leonetti, Pfieiffer, Slater, Dallas, Anderson, Crudup, Spaniol, Krull and Butler. The oral amendment was to dismiss the aforesaid Defendants with prejudice, rather than without prejudice, with the parties to bear their own costs. Defendants had no objection to the motion as amended. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss, as amended, is granted 156 . The Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Edmonson, Johnson, Leonetti, Pfieiffer, Slater, Dallas, Anderson, Crudup, Spaniol, Krull and Butler are dismissed, with prejudice, parties to bear their own costs. The liability phase of this trial proceeds against Defendants Hulett, Reynolds, Pasley, Hatfield, Dawdy, and Craig. Defendants Brannon, Atchison, and Zavala remain as Defendants in their official capacities for purposes of injunctive relief. The clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Edmonson, Johnson, Leonetti, Pfieiffer, Slater, Dallas, Anderson, Crudup, Spaniol, Krull and Butler. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/9/2016. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
157 ORDER: The parties' motions in limine 142 , 144 are granted in part and denied in part. (SEE WRITTEN ORDER). Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/9/2016. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
158 RESPONSE to Motion re 155 Second MOTION in Limine filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Thompson, Tara) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins: Jury Selection held on 11/9/2016. Attorneys Ruth Z Brown, Tara Elizabeth Thompson and Vincenzo Field present with Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood, and Ieshia Brown. Attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista present with Defendants Russell Reynolds, Alan Pasley, Renee Hatfield, Troy Dawdy, and Russell Craig. Prospective jurors sworn. The statement of the case read of record. Prospective jurors called and questioned. Peremptory challenges taken. Jury of eight sworn, admonished and released. Jury Trial to begin on Monday, November 14, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. (Court Reporter K. Sullivan) (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
159 NOTICE on Intent to Call Sandra Brown (Field, Vincenzo) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
160 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM issued for the personal appearance of Sandra Brown for trial on Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 9:30 a.m. before Judge Richard Mills. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
161 ORDER BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: Defendants' second motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part ( 155 ). The motion is granted as to the 2013 strip search (Pls.' Exhibits 87−200). The motion is otherwise denied. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered on 11/10/2016. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
162 Exhibit List Amended by Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 11/13/2016)
163 Exhibit List Updated by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Field, Vincenzo) (Entered: 11/13/2016)
164 Proposed Jury Instructions by Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 11/13/2016)
165 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Terence J Corrigan on behalf of Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds (Corrigan, Terence) (Entered: 11/14/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 37 of 42

11/14/2016 11/14/2016
11/15/2016
11/16/2016
11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/17/2016 11/17/2016

166 Proposed Jury Instructions by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/14/2016. Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood and Ieshia Brown present and with their Attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Vincenzo Field and Ruth Z Brown. Defendants Reynolds, Dowdy, Hulett, Pasley, Craig and Hatfield present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. WITHOUT JURY: Discussion held regarding class representative Beverly Throgmorton. Oral Motion to withdraw Exhibit # 78 GRANTED. WITH JURY: Jury admonished by Court. Opening Statements given. Witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented. Trial adjourned until Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. WITHOUT JURY: Discussion held regarding issues related to motion in limine and expert testimony. (Court Reporter DH) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/15/2016. Plaintiffs Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood and Ieshia Brown present and with their attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Ruth Z Brown and Vincenzo Field. Defendants Reynolds, Hulett, Dowdy, Craig, Pasley and Hatfield present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. WITH JURY: Trial resumed with continued testimony of witness previously called and sworn. Additional witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence entered. Trial adjourned until Wednesday, November 16, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. WITHOUT JURY: Discussion held regarding hearing related to offer of proof prior to trial resuming in morning. (Court Reporter KS) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/16/2016. Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Jacqueline Hegwood, Patricia Phillips and Ieshia Brown present and with their attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Vincenzo Field and Ruth Z Brown. Defendants Dawdy, Hulett, Pasley, Reynolds, Hatfield and Craig present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. Attorney Terrence Corrigan present as counsel for the Defendants for offer of proof hearing only. WITHOUT JURY: Offer of Proof Hearing held. WITH JURY: Witness called, sworn and questioned and admitted as an expert witness for a limited purpose. Previous witness called and sworn returned to stand for further questioning. Additional witness called, sworn and questioned. Evidence entered and admitted. Court adjourned until Thursday, November 17, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. (Court Reporter KS) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
167 Agreed Jury Instruction read during testimony of Wendy Still. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
168 +++ SEALED DOCUMENT − ORIGINAL DOCUMENT (Agreed Jury Instruction) UNREDACTED (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
169 WRIT issued for Plaintiff Ieshia Brown's personal appearance at the Jury Trial scheduled for November 21−22, 2016 before Judge Richard Mills. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/17/2016. Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Jacqueline Hegwood, Patricia Phillips and Ieshia Brown present and with their attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Ruth Z Brown and Vincenzo Field. Defendants Russell Reynolds; Melody Hulett; Troy Dawdy; Renee Hatfield; Alan Pasley and Russell Craig present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. WITH JURY: Continued testimony and examination of previously called and sworn witness. Additional witnesses called, sworn and questioned. WITHOUT JURY: Discussion held regarding discovery matter. Witness examined outside the presence of the jury. WITH JURY: Jury Question presented and answered by Court. Additional witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented; exhibits marked and admitted. Plaintiffs rested their case. WITHOUT JURY: Oral motion by Defendants' counsel for judgment on matter of immunity DENIED. Discussion held regarding demonstrative exhibits to be used by defense counsel. WITH JURY: Defendants' counsel began presentation of case. Witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented including demonstrative exhibits. Jury released until Friday, November 18, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. WITHOUT JURY: Court's Exhibit #1 to be filed of record and placed under SEAL.

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 38 of 42

11/17/2016 11/18/2016 11/18/2016 11/18/2016 11/18/2016
11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016
11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/21/2016 11/22/2016

Copies of demonstrative exhibits to be made and filed of record. Court adjourned. (Court Reporter K.S.) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
173 Jury Note. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
170 Proposed Jury Instructions by Michael Atchison, Christine Brannon, Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds, Felipe Zavala. (Corrigan, Terence) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
171 Proposed Jury Instructions by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
172 Proposed Jury Instructions by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips. (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/18/2016. Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown and Patricia Phillips present and with their attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Ruth Z Brown and Vincenzo Field. Defendants Reynolds, Dawdy, Craig, Pasley and Hatfield present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. WITH JURY: Witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented and exhibits marked, published and admitted. Witness testimony concluded. Defendants rested their case. Jury excused until Monday, November 21, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. WITHOUT JURY: Discussion held regarding jury instruction conference set for 9:30 a.m. on Monday, November 21, 2016. Court adjourned. (Court Reporter D.H.) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
174 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Defendants Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. Responses due by 12/8/2016 (McNaught, Karen) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
175 MEMORANDUM in Support re 174 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by Defendants Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. (McNaught, Karen) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied (74). Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/21/2016. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard Mills: Jury Trial held on 11/21/2016. Plaintiffs Delores Henry, Jacqueline Hegwood, Patricia Phillips and Ieshia Brown present and with their attorneys Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Ruth Z Brown and Vincenzo Field. Defendants Russell Reynolds; Melody Hulett; Troy Dawdy; Renee Hatfield; Alan Pasley and Russell Craig present and with their attorneys Karen L McNaught, Terence Corrigan, Deborah L Barnes and Laura K Bautista. WITHOUT JURY: Jury instruction conference held. Courts Exhibit 3 marked and admitted. WITH JURY: Jury instructions read. At 10:54 AM Plaintiffs closing argument given. At 12:09 PM Defendants closing argument given. At 12:50 PM Plaintiffs rebuttal closing argument given. At 1:07 PM, with one sworn officer, the jury retired to deliberate. At 4:41 PM, Court Security Officer was informed that the jury had reached a verdict. With all parties present, at 4:53 PM, the jury returned to open court with a verdict. Verdict accepted and received by the Court. Verdict read of record. Jury polled and released. Judgment entered on verdict. (Court Reporter D.H.) (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
176 Jury Instructions −− Read to the Jury. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
177 JURY VERDICT. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
178 +++ SEALED DOCUMENT − ORIGINAL DOCUMENT − JURY VERDICT − UNREDACTED (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
180 Exhibit List − Marked at Trial. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
182 Court's Exhibit List − Marked at Trial. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
181 JUDGMENT pursuant to jury verdict rendered on 11/21/2016 −− Judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 39 of 42

11/29/2016
12/14/2016 12/14/2016 12/21/2016 12/21/2016 12/23/2016 12/23/2016 12/27/2016 01/04/2017 01/11/2017 01/25/2017 01/27/2017 02/01/2017 03/16/2017

183 TEXT ORDER: Attached for the record are the Court's proposed instructions, which were emailed to counsel on November 18, 2016, and discussed at the jury instruction conference on Monday, November 21, 2016. These instructions were the instructions read to the jury, except that the Court used Plaintiffs' verdict form. In addition to the joint proposed instructions, the Court included the following instructions: Plaintiffs' 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 (all with modifications by the Court and over Defendants' objections); Defendants' additional 4, 5, 6, 7 (modified by the Court), 8, and 9B. The Court also included Plaintiffs 7, Plaintiffs' verdict form, and 7th Circuit pattern 1.15, over the objection of Defendants. The Court refused the following proposed instructions over objection by the proposing party: Plaintiffs' 5; Plaintiffs' 10; Defendants' additional 2 and 2B and Plaintiffs' alternate thereto; Defendants' verdict form; Defendants' additional 3, 9, 11; Defendants' alternates to Plaintiff's 2, 3, 4, 8. Proposed instructions on damages were not given because liability and damages were bifurcated. At the jury instruction conference on November 21, 2016, Plaintiffs had no objection to the Court's proposed instructions, except as to the refusal of Plaintiffs' proposed 5 and 10. Defendants stated their objections for the record. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/29/2016. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
184 BILL OF COSTS . (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
185 Exhibit re 184 Bill of Costs Affidavit, Invoices, and Certificate of Service by Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
186 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 122 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion to Strike,,, Add and Terminate Parties,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0753−2467172. (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
187 DOCKETING STATEMENT by Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips re 186 Notice of Appeal, (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
188 Short Record of Appeal Sent to US Court of Appeals re 186 Notice of Appeal. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 12/23/2016)
189 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 184 Bill of Costs UNOPPOSED by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips. Responses due by 1/6/2017 (Brown, Ruth) (Entered: 12/23/2016)
190 NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 186 Notice of Appeal, filed by Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Ieshia Brown, Patricia Phillips, Delores Henry. USCA Case Number 16−4234 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Case Opening)(SKN, ilcd) (Entered: 12/28/2016)
Text Order: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' bill of costs is granted 189 . Plaintiffs' response is due January 11, 2017. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 1/4/2017. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
191 RESPONSE to 184 Bill of Costs UNOPPOSED filed by Plaintiffs Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Beverly Throgmorton. (Brown, Ruth) Modified on 1/12/2017 (TK, ilcd). (Entered: 01/11/2017)
192 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 191 Response to Motion by Defendants Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds. Responses due by 2/8/2017 (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
TEXT ORDER: Defendants' motion to extend their deadline for responding to Plaintiff's objection to costs is granted ( 192 ). Defendants' response is due February 1, 2017. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 1/27/2017. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 01/27/2017)
193 Response by Craig, Dowdy, Renee Hatfield, Melody Hulett, Alan Pasley, Reynolds re 191 Response to Motion . (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
194 Letter from Clerk to Attorney Tara Thompson regarding retrieval of Plaintiffs' exhibits admitted at the November 2016 Jury Trial. Please make arrangements to retrieve the

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 40 of 42

03/16/2017
03/21/2017 03/24/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/22/2017 08/23/2017 08/29/2019
09/09/2019

exhibits from the above−referenced case by April 3, 2017, or they will be destroyed. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
195 Letter from Clerk to Attorney Deborah Barnes regarding retrieval of Defendants' exhibits admitted at the November 2016 Jury Trial. Please make arrangements to retrieve the exhibits from the above−referenced case by April 3, 2017, or they will be destroyed. (NOTE: Exhibits have been picked up by AGs office 3/15/2017 − see Receipt). (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/16/2017)
196 Acknowledgment of Receipt by Defendants' as to November 2016 Jury Trial Exhibits. Exhibits returned to Defendants' counsel on 3/15/2017. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
197 Acknowledgment of Receipt by the Plaintiff as to the November 2016 Jury Trial Exhibits. Exhibits returned to Plaintiffs' counsel on 3/23/2017. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
198 Request from USCA for Long Record re 186 Notice of Appeal. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 186 Notice of Appeal. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
199 Letter of Transmittal/Certification to USCA via e−mail re 186 Notice ofAppeal consisting of 3 volume of pleadings. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
200 Letter of Transmittal from USCA re 186 Notice of Appeal, acknowledging receipt of record on appeal. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
201 Supplemental Letter of Transmittal to USCA re 186 Notice of Appeal consisting of 11 volumes of pleadings (exhibits to docket entry 113) sent via e−mail to USCA. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
202 INSTANTER ORDER of U S Court of Appeals as to 186 Notice of Appeal, filed by Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Ieshia Brown, Patricia Phillips and Delores Henry. Motions for Leave to File Amici Briefs are GRANTED. Clerk of U S Court of Appeals directed to file the tendered amici briefs INSTANTER. (SEE WRITTEN ORDER) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/03/2019)
203 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 11/15/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber K. Sullivan, Telephone number 217−492−4810. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista, Attorney General's Office.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

09/09/2019

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/10/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2019. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
204 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 11/16/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber K. Sillivan, Telephone number 217−492−4810. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista, Attorney General's

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 41 of 42

Office.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

09/09/2019

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/10/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2019. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
205 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 11/17/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber K. Sullivan, Telephone number 217−492−4810. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista, Attorney General's Office.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

09/11/2019

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 9/30/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/10/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2019. (MJC, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
206 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on 11/14/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber DJH. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

Case: 3:12-cv-3087 As of: 06/03/2020 12:01 PM CDT 42 of 42

09/11/2019

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/2/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2019. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/11/2019)
207 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on 11/18/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber DJH. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

09/11/2019

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/2/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2019. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/11/2019)
208 NOTICE OF FILING OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings (Jury Trial) held on 11/21/2016, before Judge Richard Mills. Court Reporter/Transcriber DJH. Transcript purchased by: Laura Bautista.

IMPORTANT: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. Within 21 days of the filing of the transcript, a Motion of Requested Redactions shall be e−filed with the Court. Access to this motion will be restricted to the Court and the attorneys of record in the case. If no such Notice and Motion are filed, the transcript may be made remotely, electronically available to the public, without redaction, 90 days from the date initially filed. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may view the transcript at the Clerk's Office public terminal or contact the Court Reporter for purchase. Counsel are strongly urged to share this notice with all clients so that an informed decision about the inclusion of certain materials may be made. The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The Clerk and Court Reporter will not review each transcript for compliance with this rule.

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/2/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/15/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2019. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/11/2019)

 
 3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 1 Page 1 of 14

E-FILED
Tuesday, 20 March, 2012 03:44:29 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BEVERLY THROGMORTON, DELORES

)

HENRY, and PATRICIA PHILLIPS, on

)

behalf of themselves and a class of others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

Lincoln Correctional Center Former Assistant

)

Warden REYNOLDS in his individual capacity, )

Lincoln Correctional Officers ANDERSON,

)

DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON,

)

LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG,

)

SLATER, and KRUDUP, and Unknown Illinois )

Department of Corrections Employees,

)

)

Defendants.

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT Named Plaintiffs BEVERLY THROGMORTON, DELORES HENRY, and PATRICIA PHILLIPS, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, through their attorneys, LOEVY & LOEVY, complaining of Defendants Lincoln Correctional Center Former Assistant Warden REYNOLDS in his individual capacity, Lincoln Correctional Officers ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, state as follows:

3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 1 Page 2 of 14
Introduction 1. This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the unjustified, invasive and humiliating public strip search inflicted upon female inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center (“Lincoln”) on March 31, 2011. 2. On the morning of March 31, 2011, Assistant Warden Reynolds, members of Lincoln’s “Orange Crush” tactical team, and other Lincoln correctional officers stormed the dormitories of Housing Units 2B and 4B and ordered all of the women to line up by the beds. The officers handcuffed the women and marched them to the gym, yelling obscenities and threats as they walked. Once in the gym, the officers forced the women to stand facing the wall, shoulder to shoulder, for more than one hour. The women were then publicly strip searched in groups of four to six, within plain view of male correctional officers, male cadets, and civilians. As the women were being strip searched, many of the correctional officers made derogatory comments and insulting gestures about the women’s body parts and odors. The women were forced to wait until everyone had been strip searched before being permitted to return to their dormitories. 3. The incident lasted nearly four hours and was unsanitary, sexually invasive, degrading, and dehumanizing. The women were never told why they were being searched, and when they inquired, the officers ignored their questions and threatened to punish them if they didn’t stay quiet. 4. In fact, this group strip search was a “training exercise” for Illinois Department of Corrections cadets, organized by one or more as-yet unknown Illinois Department of Corrections employees. There was no legitimate purpose for subjecting the women to this public group strip
2

3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 1 Page 3 of 14
search – it was unrelated to institutional security, discipline or order, and none of the women searched were suspected of possessing contraband or having committed other prohibited activity.
5. Lincoln Correctional Center had no justification to force the women to submit to this public group strip search or to force them to endure such an unsanitary, humiliating and degrading process. Nevertheless, as-yet unknown Illinois Department of Corrections employees organized and approved of this cadet training exercise, thereby instituting an unconstitutional public group strip search and turning a blind eye to the dehumanizing way in which the search was conducted.
6. Plaintiffs bring this class action to compensate those who were victimized by this public group strip search and, hopefully, to bring change.
Jurisdiction and Venue 7. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 as Plaintiffs assert claims under federal law and the state law claim arises out of the same facts as the federal claims. 8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as the events giving rise to the claims in this case all occurred in this judicial district.
Parties 9. Named Plaintiff BEVERLY THROGMORTON is 46 years old. She resides in Decatur, Illinois. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Ms. Throgmorton was incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011.
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10. Named Plaintiff DELORES HENRY is 57 years old. She is an inmate at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011.
11. Named Plaintiff PATRICIA PHILLIPS is 44 years old. She is an inmate at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011.
12. Lincoln Correctional Center is one of three facilities run by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) that houses female inmates. It is a medium security prison and houses approximately one thousand women.
13. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and as-yet Unknown Correctional Officers were employed by the IDOC and worked as “Orange Crush” tactical team members at Lincoln Correctional Center. As such, these Defendants (hereinafter, the “Orange Crush Defendants”) were acting under color of law.
14. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants DALLAS, ANDERSON, KRUDUP, and as-yet Unknown Correctional Officers were employed by the IDOC and worked as correctional officers at Lincoln Correctional Center. As such, these Defendants (hereinafter, the “Defendant Officers”) were acting under color of law.
15. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendant REYNOLDS was employed by the IDOC in the capacity of Assistant Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center. As such, Defendant Reynolds was acting under color of law.
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16. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, one or more as-yet Unknown IDOC employees at Lincoln Correctional Center were in charge of permitting the IDOC cadets to perform this public group strip search at Lincoln. These as-yet Unknown Defendant IDOC Employees were employed by IDOC and, as such, were acting under color of law.
17. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, one or more as-yet Unknown IDOC employees were in charge of organizing and arranging for the IDOC cadets to perform the public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center. These as-yet Unknown Defendant IDOC Employees were employed by IDOC and, as such, were acting under color of law.
Facts Relating to the Named Plaintiffs 18. On the morning of March 31, 2011, Named Plaintiffs Throgmorton, Henry, and Phillips (the “Named Plaintiffs”) were in Housing Unit 2B at Lincoln Correctional Center when the Orange Crush Defendants, Defendants Reynolds and Dowless, and IDOC cadets stormed the Unit. Immediately thereafter, the Defendants and IDOC cadets stormed Housing Unit 4B. 19. The Defendants walked through the Units yelling and banging their batons, and ordered all the inmates to the dormitory. Once in the dormitory, the Defendants searched the women, handcuffed their hands behind their backs, and marched them to the day room. During the walk, several of the Orange Crush Defendants screamed obscenities at the women, called them derogatory names, and threatened to place them in segregation if they disobeyed. There was no need for this abuse, as the women were all compliant. 20. From the day room, the handcuffed women were taken to the gym, where the remaining Defendant Officers were waiting. The Orange Crush Defendants, the Defendant
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Officers and Defendant Reynolds forced the women to stand shoulder to shoulder facing the gym wall for approximately one hour. At no point did any of the Defendants tell Plaintiffs Throgmorton, Henry, Phillips, or any of the other women what was happening, or why. Instead, they continued to scream at and threaten the women.
21. Forced to stand for such a lengthy duration under stress and intimidation, some of the women experienced seizures; others soiled themselves.
22. When approximately one hour had passed, the female Defendants began to take groups of women, ranging in size from four to six women, into two rooms abutting the gym: the bathroom and the beauty shop. The bathroom was open to the gym, giving the male Defendants and the male IDOC cadets clear views of the women. The beauty shop had mirrored walls and a door that remained open for the duration of the strip searches, subjecting the naked women to stares from the correctional officers, civilian employees and cadets who walked by. The beauty shop also had a window that faced the outdoors, permitting anyone outside to observe the women inside. The civilian beauty shop supervisor was never told to leave, and remained in the shop for the duration of the strip searches.
23. Named Plaintiff Henry was among the groups of women taken into the bathroom for public group strip searches. In the bathroom, groups of four to six women were forced to remove their clothing and stand in a line. Due to the number of inmates, cadets, and correctional officers occupying the cramped space, the naked women were forced to stand nearly shoulder to shoulder. The women on their menstrual cycles were told to take out their tampons, but were not permitted to do so privately, so they had to remove them in plain view of the other inmates, correctional officers, and cadets. Because they were not allowed to use the toilets, the women were forced to discard their used tampons into a communal garbage bin.
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24. Standing close together, shoulders touching, the women were forced to raise their breasts, lift their hair, and cough and squat several times. They were then forced to turn their backsides to the cadets, bend over and spread open their buttocks and vaginas. As they did this, male cadets and correctional officers could, and did, watch them from the gym. Some of the Defendant Officers and Orange Crush Defendants made insulting and derogatory comments about the women’s odors and body parts.
25. Throughout the strip searches, the women were forced to stand barefoot on the bathroom floor, which was dirty with menstrual blood and other bodily fluids. The women’s clothes were discarded on that floor during the searches. At no point did any Defendant or other IDOC employee make any attempt to clean the area where the women were standing.
26. Women on their menstrual cycle were not given tampons after the strip searches. Rather, they were forced to put their clothing back on with glib suggestions that they use toilet paper if necessary. Many of these women got blood on their legs, feet, and clothes. They were then sent back to the gym to wait until everyone had been strip searched.
27. Ms. Henry had been strip searched on numerous occasions at Lincoln Correctional Center prior to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. Those strip searches were conducted privately and efficiently.
28. Named Plaintiffs Throgmorton and Phillips were among the women taken to the beauty shop for public group strip searches. One or more Defendants and several IDOC cadets were in the beauty shop, along with the civilian beauty shop supervisor. The Defendants chatted with the beauty shop supervisor and paid little attention to the strip searches taking place before them.
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29. In the beauty shop, the IDOC cadets initially ordered the women, one at a time, to stand in front of the other women and remove all of their clothes. In front of the other inmates and the civilian beauty shop supervisor, and in plain view of the window to the outdoors, Ms. Throgmorton was forced to lift her breasts, raise her hair, hold her buttocks open with her hands and squat and cough three times. Ms. Throgmorton was then forced to stand with her backside facing the inmates, bend over, and spread her buttocks and vagina, in plain view of the other women and any passersby. Ms. Throgmorton was kept naked for 15 to 20 minutes.
30. During her term of incarceration at Lincoln, Ms. Throgmorton was strip searched regularly for her job. Ms. Throgmorton estimates that she was strip searched between 150 and 200 times. Those strip searches were conducted professionally, privately, and quickly.
31. When one or more of the Defendants commented that the individual strip searches were taking too long, the IDOC cadets began to strip search the women in the beauty shop in groups. Ms. Phillips was ordered to disrobe and stand in a group with four other women, nearly touching. Ms. Phillips was subjected to the same strip search process as Ms. Throgmorton: the breast raising, the squat and coughs, and the bending over to expose her private parts. At some point, Ms. Phillips observed one of the Defendant Officers put a bandana over her nose, gesturing rudely about the women’s odors. When it was over, the women were sent back to the gym to wait.
32. Ms. Phillips had experienced other routine strip searches at Lincoln Correctional Center. Those strip searches were conducted privately and professionally.
33. After everyone had been strip searched, the women were finally dismissed. The line to the showers that afternoon was twenty women long. The women were later told that the incident had been a training exercise for the IDOC cadets.
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34. Throughout the incident, Ms. Throgmorton, Ms. Phillips, Ms. Henry, and the other women were forced to endure humiliation, degradation, and threats. These highly intrusive strip searches afforded no privacy to the women; were conducted under unsanitary, harassing and humiliating conditions; and were carried out by the Defendants in an abusive manner.
35. There was no valid justification for these public group strip searches. They were not driven by concerns regarding Lincoln’s institutional security or employee or inmate safety, and there was no suspicion that any of the women in Housing Units 2B and 4B were participating in illicit conduct requiring further investigation, discipline or punishment.
36. The public group strip searches inflicted on the women at Lincoln are the most intrusive types of searches the government can conduct, and the manner in which they were conducted was degrading, dehumanizing, and humiliating.
37. All of the Defendants, from Assistant Warden Reynolds to the individual correctional officers, participated in and were present for the entire duration of the incident.
38. Ms. Throgmorton, Ms. Phillips, Ms. Henry, and others promptly wrote grievances about the strip searches. Their grievances were left in the grievance boxes for days, even as the Named Plaintiffs repeatedly asked Defendants and other correctional officers to attend to them. Although the grievances were finally taken out of the boxes, in the nearly one year that has passed, not a single woman has received a response to her grievance.
Class Allegations 39. Lincoln Correctional Center, located in Logan County, Illinois, is one of three prisons within the Illinois Department of Corrections that houses female inmates.
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40. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS seek to pursue claims both for themselves and for a class of others similarly situated (the “Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
41. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS seek to represent a class consisting of the following people: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center.
42. The individuals in this class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The Named Plaintiffs estimate that at least one hundred women are members of the Class.
43. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the public strip search was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth and/or the Eighth Amendments;
b. Whether the use of the public strip search and/or the way in which it was conducted violates the inmates’ rights under the Fourth and/or Eighth Amendments;
c. Whether the responsible IDOC employees instituted, condoned, and/or were deliberately indifferent to the risk of the violations of the Class members’ rights; and
d. Whether the responsible IDOC employees at Lincoln Correctional Center failed in their supervisory responsibilities to have avoided and/or put a stop to the violations of the Class members’ rights.
44. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class. The Named Plaintiffs were inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center and were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. They seek to prove that the public group strip search violated
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their rights under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments, and that each of the Defendants is liable as a result.
45. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. They have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action, constitutional, and strip search litigation.
46. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any individual issues. In addition, a class action would be the most fair and efficient method of adjudicating the Class members’ claims.
Count I – Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violations of the Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments 47. Plaintiffs re-allege each paragraph of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 48. There was no valid penological justification for the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. 49. By instituting and continuing the public group strip search described in fuller detail above, Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 50. As a direct result of the express decisions of the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections employees in charge of organizing, approving, and/or arranging for this public group strip search, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the Class were subjected to unreasonable body searches that were demeaning, dehumanizing, and humiliating. Furthermore, these as-yet unknown Defendants had supervisory responsibility to terminate the public group strip search and failed to do so. WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS respectfully demand judgment on behalf of themselves and the Class, awarding costs, fees,
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attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and any other appropriate relief against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS further demand an award of punitive damages on behalf of themselves and the Class against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.
Count II – Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violations of the Eighth Amendment
51. Plaintiffs re-allege each paragraph of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 52. There was no valid penological justification for the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. 53. By instituting and continuing the group strip search described in fuller detail above, Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 54. As described more fully above, the Defendants conducted the public group strip search in a harassing manner intended to humiliate the inmates. 55. As a direct result of the express decisions of the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections employees in charge of organizing, approving, and/or arranging for this public group strip search, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the Class were subjected to unreasonable body searches that were demeaning, dehumanizing, and humiliating. Furthermore, these as-yet unknown Defendants had supervisory responsibility to terminate the public group strip search and failed to do so.
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WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS respectfully demand judgment on behalf of themselves and the Class, awarding costs, fees, attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and any other appropriate relief against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS further demand an award of punitive damages on behalf of themselves and the Class against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.
Count III – State Law Claim: Indemnification 56. Plaintiffs re-allege each paragraph of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 57. By all of the above, Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, subjected Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS, and the members of the Class, to the public group strip search described above. 58. These persons’ actions and omissions were taken within the scope of their employment for the Illinois Department of Corrections. 59. Pursuant to 5 ILCS 350/2, the State of Illinois is therefore required to indemnify a judgment awarded in this case against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, and KRUDUP, and as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.
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WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS respectfully demand judgment on behalf of themselves and the members of the Class, awarding costs, fees, attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and any other appropriate relief against the State of Illinois.
Further Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).
Jury Demand Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY and PHILLIPS respectfully demand a trial by jury on behalf of themselves and the Class Members on all issues so triable.

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Rachel Steinback LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May Street, Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, /s/ Michael Kanovitz Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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E-FILED
Monday, 31 March, 2014 12:48:43 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BEVERLY THROGMORTON, DELORES

)

HENRY, PATRICIA PHILLIPS,

)

JACQUELINE HEGWOOD, SANDRA

)

BROWN, and IESHIA BROWN, on behalf of )

themselves and a class of others similarly

)

situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

MELODY HULETT, in her official capacity as )

Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center,

)

Lincoln Correctional Center Former Assistant

)

Warden REYNOLDS in his individual capacity, )

Lincoln Correctional Officers ANDERSON,

)

DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON,

)

LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG,

)

SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS,

)

BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, )

DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON,

)

KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, )

SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and

)

WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE

)

HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief )

of Operations EDDIE JONES, ANGELA LOCKE, )

in her official capacity as Warden of Logan

)

Correctional Center, FELIPE ZAVALA, in his )

official capacity as Manager of Staff Development )

and Training at the Illinois Department of

)

Corrections Training Academy, JOSEPH

)

YURKOVICH, in his official capacity as IDOC )

Chief of Operations, and Unknown

)

Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 3:12-cv-3087 Judge Richard Mills
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

Named Plaintiffs BEVERLY THROGMORTON, DELORES HENRY, PATRICIA

PHILLIPS, JACQUELINE HEGWOOD, SANDRA BROWN, and IESHIA BROWN, on behalf

3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 2 of 20
of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, through their attorneys, LOEVY & LOEVY, complaining of Defendants MELODY HULETT, in her official capacity as Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, Lincoln Correctional Center Former Assistant Warden REYNOLDS in his individual capacity, Lincoln Correctional Officers ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, ANGELA LOCKE, in her official capacity as Warden of Logan Correctional Center, FELIPE ZAVALA, in his official capacity as Manager of Staff Development and Training, JOSEPH YURKOVICH, in his official capacity as IDOC Chief of Operations, and Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, state as follows:
Introduction 1. This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the unjustified, invasive and humiliating public strip search inflicted upon female inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center (“Lincoln”) on March 31, 2011. 2. On the morning of March 31, 2011, Assistant Warden Reynolds, members of Lincoln’s “Orange Crush” tactical team, and other Lincoln correctional officers stormed the dormitories of Housing Units 2B and 4B and ordered all of the women to line up by the beds. The officers handcuffed the women and marched them to the gym, yelling obscenities and threats as they walked. Once in the gym, the officers forced the women to stand facing the wall, shoulder to shoulder, for more than one hour. The women were then publicly strip searched in
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groups of four to six, within plain view of male correctional officers, male cadets, and civilians. As the women were being strip searched, many of the correctional officers made derogatory comments and insulting gestures about the women’s body parts and odors. The women were forced to wait until everyone had been strip searched before being permitted to return to their dormitories.
3. The incident lasted nearly four hours and was unsanitary, sexually invasive, degrading, and dehumanizing. The women were never told why they were being searched, and when they inquired, the officers ignored their questions and threatened to punish them if they didn’t stay quiet.
4. In fact, this group strip search was a “training exercise” for Illinois Department of Corrections cadets, organized by Defendants Hulett, Reynolds, Jones, Hatfield, Pasley, and asyet unknown Illinois Department of Corrections employees. There was no legitimate purpose for subjecting the women to this public group strip search – it was unrelated to institutional security, discipline or order, and none of the women searched were suspected of possessing contraband or having committed other prohibited activity.
5. Lincoln Correctional Center had no justification to force the women to submit to this public group strip search or to force them to endure such an unsanitary, humiliating and degrading process. Nevertheless, Defendants organized and approved of this cadet training exercise, thereby instituting an unconstitutional public group strip search and turning a blind eye to the dehumanizing way in which the search was conducted.
6. Plaintiffs bring this class action to compensate those who were victimized by this public group strip search and, hopefully, to bring change.
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Jurisdiction and Venue 7. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiffs assert claims under federal law. 8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as the events giving rise to the claims in this case all occurred in this judicial district.
Parties 9. Named Plaintiff BEVERLY THROGMORTON is 48 years old. She resides in Bloomington, Illinois. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Ms. Throgmorton was incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011. 10. Named Plaintiff DELORES HENRY is 57 years old. She resides in Peru, Illinois. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Ms. Henry was incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011. 11. Named Plaintiff PATRICIA PHILLIPS is 44 years old. She resides in Washington, Illinois. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Ms. Phillips was incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011. 12. Named Plaintiff JACQUELINE HEGWOOD is 49 years old. She resides in Chicago, Illinois. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Ms. Hegwood was incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and she was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B at Lincoln Correctional Center that was forcibly and publicly strip searched on March 31, 2011. In 2013, Ms. Hegwood was transferred to Logan Correctional Center because Lincoln Correctional Center
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was being converted to an all-male facility. On October 31, 2013, while incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, Ms. Hegwood was forcibly and publicly strip searched during another “cadet training exercise”.
13. Named Plaintiff SANDRA BROWN is an inmate at Logan Correctional Center. On October 31, 2013, Ms. Brown was forcibly and publicly strip searched during a “cadet training exercise”.
14. Named Plaintiff IESHIA BROWN is an inmate at Logan Correctional Center. On March 31, 2011, Ms. Brown was an inmate at Lincoln Correctional Center, and she was one of the women in Housing Unit 2B who was forcibly and publicly strip searched. In 2013, Ms. Brown was transferred to Logan Correctional Center because Lincoln Correctional Center was converted to an all-male facility. On October 31, 2013, while incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, Ms. Brown was forcibly and publicly strip searched during another “cadet training exercise”.
15. On or about March 31, 2011, and until approximately March 2013, Lincoln Correctional Center was one of three facilities run by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) that housed female inmates. At all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, it was a medium security prison and housed approximately one thousand women.
16. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRULL, and as-yet Unknown Correctional Officers were employed by the IDOC and worked as “Orange Crush” tactical team members at Lincoln Correctional Center. As such, these Defendants (hereinafter, the “Orange Crush Defendants”) were acting under color of law.
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17. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants DALLAS, ANDERSON, KRUDUP, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, WARDEN, and as-yet Unknown Correctional Officers were employed by the IDOC and worked as correctional officers. As such, these Defendants (hereinafter, the “Defendant Officers”) were acting under color of law.
18. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendant REYNOLDS was employed by the IDOC in the capacity of Assistant Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center. As such, Defendant Reynolds was acting under color of law.
19. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants HATFIELD and PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, Defendants REYNOLDS, Lincoln Correctional Center Warden HULETT, and one or more asyet Unknown IDOC employees at Lincoln Correctional Center were in charge of permitting the IDOC cadets to perform this public group strip search at Lincoln. These Defendants were employed by IDOC and, as such, were acting under color of law.
20. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendants HATFIELD and PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, Defendant REYNOLDS, Lincoln Correctional Center Warden HULETT, and as-yet Unknown IDOC employees were in charge of organizing and arranging for the IDOC cadets to perform the public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center. These Defendants were employed by IDOC and, as such, were acting under color of law.
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21. On or about March 31, 2011, and at all times relevant to the events at issue in this case, Defendant MELODY HULETT was the Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center. Defendant Hulett is sued in her official capacity for the challenged acts and omissions.
22. As of March 2013, Logan Correctional Center is one of four facilities run by the Illinois Department of Corrections that houses female inmates. It is a multi-level security prison and houses approximately two thousand women. Defendant ANGELA LOCKE is the Acting Warden of Logan Correctional Center and is sued in her official capacity for the challenged acts and omissions.
23. Defendant FELIPE ZAVALA is employed by the IDOC as the IDOC Training Academy Manager of Staff Development and Training and is sued in his official capacity for the challenged acts and omissions.
24. Defendant JOSEPH YURKOVICH is employed by IDOC as the Chief of Operations and is sued in his official capacity for the challenged acts and omissions.
Facts Relating to the Named Plaintiffs 25. On the morning of March 31, 2011, Named Plaintiffs Throgmorton, Henry, Phillips, Hegwood, and Ieshia Brown (the “Named Plaintiffs”) were in Housing Unit 2B at Lincoln Correctional Center when the Orange Crush Defendants, Defendants Reynolds and Dowless, and IDOC cadets stormed the Unit. Immediately thereafter, the Defendants and IDOC cadets stormed Housing Unit 4B. 26. The Defendants walked through the Units yelling and banging their batons, and ordered all the inmates to the dormitory. Once in the dormitory, the Defendants searched the women, handcuffed their hands behind their backs, and marched them to the day room. During the walk, several of the Orange Crush Defendants screamed obscenities at the women, called
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them derogatory names, and threatened to place them in segregation if they disobeyed. There was no need for this abuse, as the women were all compliant.
27. From the day room, the handcuffed women were taken to the gym, where the remaining Defendant Officers were waiting. The Orange Crush Defendants, the Defendant Officers and Defendant Reynolds forced the women to stand shoulder to shoulder facing the gym wall for approximately one hour. At no point did any of the Defendants tell Plaintiffs Throgmorton, Henry, Phillips, Hegwood, or any of the other women what was happening, or why. Instead, they continued to scream at and threaten the women.
28. Forced to stand for such a lengthy duration under stress and intimidation, some of the women experienced seizures; others soiled themselves.
29. When approximately one hour had passed, the female Defendants began to take groups of up to seven women at a time into either of two rooms abutting the gym: the bathroom and the beauty shop. The bathroom was open to the gym, giving the male Defendants and the male IDOC cadets clear views of the women. The beauty shop had mirrored walls and a door that remained open for the duration of the strip searches, subjecting the naked women to stares from the correctional officers, civilian employees and cadets who walked by. The beauty shop also had a window that faced the outdoors, permitting anyone outside to observe the women inside. The civilian beauty shop supervisor was never told to leave, and remained in the shop for the duration of the strip searches.
30. Named Plaintiffs Henry, Hegwood, and Brown were among the groups of women taken into the bathroom for public group strip searches. In the bathroom, the groups of women were forced to remove their clothing and stand in a line. Due to the number of inmates, cadets, and correctional officers occupying the cramped space, the naked women were forced to stand
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 9 of 20
nearly shoulder to shoulder. The women on their menstrual cycles were told to take out their tampons, but were not permitted to do so privately, so they had to remove them in plain view of the other inmates, correctional officers, and cadets. Because they were not allowed to use the toilets, the women were forced to discard their used tampons into a communal garbage bin.
31. Standing close together, shoulders touching, the women were forced to raise their breasts, lift their hair, and cough and squat several times. They were then forced to turn their backsides to the cadets, bend over and spread open their buttocks and vaginas. As they did this, male cadets and correctional officers could, and did, watch them from the gym. Some of the Defendant Officers and Orange Crush Defendants made insulting and derogatory comments about the women’s odors and body parts.
32. Throughout the strip searches, the women were forced to stand barefoot on the bathroom floor, which was dirty with menstrual blood and other bodily fluids. The women’s clothes were discarded on that floor during the searches. At no point did any Defendant or other IDOC employee make any attempt to clean the area where the women were standing.
33. Women on their menstrual cycle were not given tampons after the strip searches. Rather, they were forced to put their clothing back on with glib suggestions that they use toilet paper if necessary. Many of these women got blood on their legs, feet, and clothes. They were then sent back to the gym to wait until everyone had been strip searched.
34. Ms. Henry, Ms. Hegwood, and Ms. Brown had been strip searched on numerous occasions at Lincoln Correctional Center prior to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. Those strip searches were conducted privately and efficiently, and there is no valid reason for failing to conduct the March 31, 2011 strip searches in that manner.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 10 of 20
35. Named Plaintiffs Throgmorton and Phillips were among the women taken to the beauty shop for public group strip searches. One or more Defendants and several IDOC cadets were in the beauty shop, along with the civilian beauty shop supervisor, and they carried on casual conversations amidst the humiliating public group strip searches.
36. In the beauty shop, the IDOC cadets initially ordered the women, one at a time, to stand in front of the other women and remove all of their clothes. In front of the other inmates and the civilian beauty shop supervisor, and in plain view of the window to the outdoors, Ms. Throgmorton was forced to lift her breasts, raise her hair, hold her buttocks open with her hands and squat and cough three times. Ms. Throgmorton was then forced to stand with her backside facing the inmates, bend over, and spread her buttocks and vagina, in plain view of the other women and any passersby. Ms. Throgmorton was kept naked for 15 to 20 minutes.
37. During her term of incarceration at Lincoln, Ms. Throgmorton was strip searched regularly for her job. Ms. Throgmorton estimates that she was strip searched between 150 and 200 times. Those strip searches were conducted professionally, privately, and quickly.
38. When one or more of the Defendants commented that the individual strip searches were taking too long, the IDOC cadets began to strip search the women in the beauty shop in groups. Ms. Phillips was ordered to disrobe and stand in a group with four other women, nearly touching. Ms. Phillips was subjected to the same strip search process as Ms. Throgmorton: the breast raising, the squat and coughs, and the bending over to expose her private parts. At some point, Ms. Phillips observed one of the Defendant Officers put a bandana over her nose, gesturing rudely about the women’s odors. When it was over, the women were sent back to the gym to wait.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 11 of 20
39. Ms. Phillips had experienced other routine strip searches at Lincoln Correctional Center. Those strip searches were conducted privately and professionally.
40. After everyone had been strip searched, the women were finally dismissed. The line to the showers that afternoon was twenty women long. The women were later told that the incident had been a training exercise for the IDOC cadets.
41. Throughout the incident, Ms. Throgmorton, Ms. Phillips, Ms. Henry, Ms. Hegwood, Ms. Brown, and the other women were forced to endure humiliation, degradation, and threats. These highly intrusive strip searches afforded no privacy to the women; were conducted under unsanitary, harassing and humiliating conditions; and were carried out by the Defendants in an abusive manner.
42. There was no valid justification for these public group strip searches. They were not driven by concerns regarding Lincoln’s institutional security or employee or inmate safety, and there was no suspicion that any of the women in Housing Units 2B and 4B were participating in illicit conduct requiring further investigation, discipline or punishment.
43. The public group strip searches inflicted on the women at Lincoln are the most intrusive types of searches the government can conduct, and the manner in which they were conducted was degrading, dehumanizing, and humiliating.
44. All of the Defendants named in their individual capacities, from Assistant Warden Reynolds to the individual correctional officers, participated in and were present for the entire duration of the incident.
45. Ms. Throgmorton, Ms. Phillips, Ms. Henry, Ms. Hegwood, Ms. Brown, and others promptly wrote grievances about the strip searches. Their grievances were left in the grievance boxes for days, even as the Named Plaintiffs repeatedly asked Defendants and other
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 12 of 20
correctional officers to attend to them. Although the grievances were finally taken out of the boxes, in the nearly one year that has passed, not a single woman has received a response to her grievance.
46. In approximately March 2013, all of the female inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center were transferred out of the facility and it was converted to an all-male prison. The women, including Ms. Brown and Ms. Hegwood, were primarily transferred to nearby Logan Correctional Center.
47. On the morning of October 31, 2013, a virtually identical “cadet training exercise” occurred at Logan Correctional Center. Named Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hegwood, Sandra Brown, Ieshia Brown, and more than one hundred and fifty other female inmates at Logan were subjected to degrading and humiliating public group strip searches in full view of male corrections officers, cadets, and other individuals not involved in the strip searches.
48. All of the “cadet training exercises” are organized and approved by the IDOC Training Academy and its Manager of Staff Development and Training, the IDOC Chief of Operations, and the Warden of the facility.
Class Allegations 49. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, HEGWOOD, BROWN, and BROWN (the “Named Plaintiffs”) seek to pursue claims both for themselves and for a class of others similarly situated. Named Plaintiffs believe the class should be organized into the following two subclasses. 50. Class I consists of: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 13 of 20
Class I brings claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, HEGWOOD, and BROWN seek to represent this class.
51. The members of Class I include inmates who are presently in-custody as well as former Lincoln Correctional Center inmates who were released at some time after March 31, 2011. Because the claims of the in-custody class members will be analyzed through the lens of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, it is appropriate to divide Class I into two separate subclasses:
Subclass A consists of: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who have remained in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections since that time. Subclass B consists of: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who were subsequently released from the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. 52. The individuals in Class I are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The Named Plaintiffs estimate that more than 150 women are members of Class I. 53. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the public strip search was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth and/or the Eighth Amendments;
b. Whether the use of the public strip search and/or the way in which it was conducted violates the inmates’ rights under the Fourth and/or Eighth Amendments;
c. Whether the responsible IDOC employees instituted, condoned, and/or were deliberately indifferent to the risk of the violations of the Class members’ rights; and
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 14 of 20
d. Whether the responsible IDOC employees at Lincoln Correctional Center failed in their supervisory responsibilities to have avoided and/or put a stop to the violations of the Class members’ rights.
54. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of Class I. The Named Plaintiffs were inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center and were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, and HEGWOOD are no longer in IDOC custody, and will represent the interests of Subclass A. Named Plaintiff BROWN remains within the custody of IDOC and will represent the interests of Subclass B. Collectively, they seek to prove that the public group strip search violated their rights under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments, and that each of the Defendants is liable as a result.
55. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of Class I. They have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action, constitutional, and strip search litigation.
56. The questions of law and fact common to Class I predominate over any individual issues. In addition, a class action would be the most fair and efficient method of adjudicating the Class members’ claims.
57. Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue an injunctive relief claim both for themselves and for a class of others similarly situated.
58. Class II consists of: All women who are currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, and all women who will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 15 of 20
Class II brings claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment in order to secure injunctive relief. Named Plaintiffs BROWN and BROWN seek to represent this class.
59. The individuals in Class II are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs BROWN and BROWN estimate that approximately 2,000 women are members of Class II.
60. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the public strip search of the type used during the cadet training exercises at Lincoln Correctional Center and Logan Correctional Center was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth and/or the Eighth Amendments;
b. Whether the use of the public strip search and/or the way in which it was conducted violates the inmates’ rights under the Fourth and/or Eighth Amendments;
c. Whether the responsible IDOC employees instituted, condoned, and/or were deliberately indifferent to the risk of the violations of the Class members’ rights;
d. Whether the responsible IDOC employees failed in their supervisory responsibilities to have avoided and/or put a stop to the violations of the Class members’ rights; and
e. Whether there is a cognizable danger that Plaintiffs will be subject to recurring violations of their constitutional rights in the manner described herein.
61. The claims of Named Plaintiffs BROWN and BROWN are typical of the claims of Class II.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 16 of 20
62. Named Plaintiffs BROWN and BROWN will fairly and adequately represent the interests of Class II. They have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action, constitutional, and strip search litigation.
63. The questions of law and fact common to Class II predominate over any individual issues. In addition, a class action would be the most fair and efficient method of adjudicating the Class members’ claims.
Count I – Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violations of the Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments 64. Plaintiffs re-allege each paragraph of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 65. There was no valid penological justification for the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. 66. By instituting and continuing the public group strip search described in fuller detail above, Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and the members of Class I to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 67. As a direct result of the express decisions of the Defendants who were in charge of organizing, approving, and/or arranging for this public group strip search, the Named Plaintiffs and members of Class I were subjected to unreasonable body searches that were demeaning, dehumanizing, and humiliating. Furthermore, these Defendants had supervisory responsibility to terminate the public group strip search and failed to do so. WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, HEGWOOD, and BROWN respectfully demand judgment on behalf of themselves and Class I, awarding costs, fees, attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and any other appropriate relief against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST,
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 17 of 20
BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, and HEGWOOD further demand an award of punitive damages on behalf of themselves and Class I against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.
Count II – Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violations of the Eighth Amendment
68. Plaintiffs re-allege each paragraph of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 69. There was no valid penological justification for the March 31, 2011 public group strip search. 70. By instituting and continuing the group strip search described in fuller detail above, Defendants subjected Named Plaintiffs and the members of Class I to punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 71. As described more fully above, the Defendants conducted the public group strip search in a harassing manner intended to humiliate the inmates. 72. As a direct result of the express decisions of Defendants who were in charge of organizing, approving, and/or arranging for this public group strip search, the Named Plaintiffs
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 18 of 20
and members of Class I were subjected to unreasonable body searches that were demeaning, dehumanizing, and humiliating. Furthermore, these Defendants had supervisory responsibility to terminate the public group strip search and failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, HEGWOOD, and BROWN respectfully demand judgment on behalf of themselves and the Class, awarding costs, fees, attorneys’ fees, actual damages, and any other appropriate relief against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees. Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, and HEGWOOD further demand an award of punitive damages on behalf of themselves and the Class against Defendants REYNOLDS, ANDERSON, DALLAS, EDMONSON, JOHNSON, LEONETTI, DOWDY, PFEIFFER, CRAIG, SLATER, KRUDUP, KRULL, M. BROOKS, BUTLER, LAST, BENDER, BOCH, BROWN, DILLEY, HINTON, JOHNER, JOHNSON, KENNEY, KILLAM, MATHIAS, RICKORD, SPANIOL, VAN MIDDLESWORTH, and WARDEN, IDOC Employees RENEE HATFIELD and ALAN PASLEY, IDOC Chief of Operations EDDIE JONES, and the as-yet Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.
Count III – Injunctive Relief 73. The Illinois Department of Corrections permits and often conducts public group strip searches during “cadet training exercises” in the manner described herein. Indeed, since the
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initial filing of this lawsuit, and following the transfer of the female inmates from Lincoln to Logan, a virtually identical public group strip search took place during a “cadet training exercise” at Logan Correctional Center. There is thus a cognizable danger that Plaintiffs will be subjected to recurrent violations of their constitutional rights in the manner described herein. An injunction prohibiting such strip searches is an appropriate judicial remedy to prevent the recurrence of these improper procedures.
WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs BROWN and BROWN, on behalf of themselves and Class II, respectfully demand that the Court enjoin Defendants LOCKE, YURKOVICH, and ZAVALA, in their official capacities, from continuing the acts and practices set forth in paragraphs 25-48, and for any other and further equitable relief as it may deem just and proper.
Further Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court certify this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief and (b)(3) for damages, and appoint the undersigned as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).
Jury Demand Named Plaintiffs THROGMORTON, HENRY, PHILLIPS, HEGWOOD, BROWN, and BROWN respectfully demand a trial by jury on behalf of themselves and the Class Members on all issues so triable.
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 83 Page 20 of 20

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Rachel Steinback LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May Street, Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/ Rachel Steinback Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 E-FILED
Tuesday, 21 October, 2014 04:48:46 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BEVERLY THOGMORTON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

Lincoln Correctional Center Former )

Assistant Warden REYNOLDS in his )

individual capacity, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

NO. 12-3087

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:

Pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion pursuant to Rule

23(b)(2) for Class Certification. The Defendants have not responded to the

motion.

I.

This action was initiated as a putative class action on March 20, 2012

and relates to actions taken on March 31, 2011, by employees of the

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) at the Lincoln Correctional

Center in Lincoln, Illinois. The Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive

relief. On July 29, 2013, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) “Damages Class.” Although it denied certification of the “Injunctive Relief Class,” the Court granted leave to the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint and file a new motion for class certification. The Sixth Amended Complaint is the operative complaint now before the Court.
The Damages Class is comprised of female inmates who were subjected to a humiliating and degrading public group strip search performed during an IDOC Training Academy “cadet training exercise” on March 31, 2011. The Plaintiffs now seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class so that they may obtain injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and all women at Logan Correctional Center.
Previously, the Plaintiffs proposed two classes: Class I (“Damages Class”): All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center. . . .
2

Subclass A, consisting of: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who remain in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections since that time.
Subclass B, consisting of: All individuals who were subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who were subsequently released from the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
. . .
Class II (Injunctive Relief Class): All women who are currently incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and all women who will be incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center in the future.
In its Order of July 29, 2013, as to Class I, the Court found that the
numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) had been met, as there were
over 100 women who were subjected to the strip search on March 31,
2011. The Court further determined under Rule 23(a)(2) that because the
Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that class members have suffered the same core
injury, the case presented common questions fact and law. Upon reviewing
the declarations, the Court concluded pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) that the
experiences of the named parties were fairly typical of the proposed class.
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Finally, in considering adequacy-of-representation, the Court noted under Rule 23(a)(4) that it was satisfied with the competency of class counsel, and has no reason to doubt that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Based on all of the unique circumstances of the case, the Court found “that the questions of law [and] fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The Court declined to certify Class II, which consisted of women then-incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center and women who will be incarcerated at that facility in the future. Because women were no longer incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center and there were no future plans to house women at the facility, the Court determined that the proposed class was a class of zero and the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) could not be satisfied.
II.
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According to the Plaintiffs’ current motion, the women who had been incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center were transferred out of the facility, primarily to Logan Correctional Center, after Lincoln Correctional Center was converted to an all-male prison.
The Plaintiff now seeks to certify the following class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2):
Class II (Injunctive Relief Class): All women who are currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, and all women who will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future. Under Rule 23(b)(2), a class action may be maintained where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Plaintiffs contend that all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met. Rule 23(a)(1) (the “numerosity prong”) requires that the class be so numerous that it would be impracticable to join all of the members in a single action. The named Plaintiffs have attached to their
5

memorandum declarations from 43 other inmates who “endured the cadet training exercise.” Moreover, Logan Correctional Center’s own records show that approximately 230 women were subjected to the October 31, 2013 public group strip search and its inmate population is approximately 2,000 women. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Class II satisfies the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement.
The Plaintiffs further allege that Class II satisfies the commonality and typicality requirements. Under Rule 23(a)(2), there must be questions of law or fact common to the class. All that is required under Rule 23(a)(2) is a single common question among the class members. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011). However, “[c]ommonality demands more than a showing that the class members have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law at the hands of the same defendant.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there is a common question.” Id. at 756.
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The Plaintiffs assert the claims here are almost identical and thus completely common among the class members. Each of the putative class members was strip searched during a “cadet training exercise,” in the same manner and under the same circumstances. Each individual will rely on the same core unlawful conduct: being forcibly strip searched in groups of two or more in full view of male corrections officers, IDOC administrators and cadets, as well as corrections officer, cadets and civilians not involved in the strip search. The Plaintiffs allege the core conduct is common to both the March 31, 2011 Lincoln Correctional Center “cadet training exercise” and the October 31, 2013 Logan Correctional Center “cadet training exercise.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the commonality requirement. Each putative class members’ claims derive from the same conduct or practice by the same Defendants. There is a common core experience that was shared by all, which took place on different dates at two different correctional centers. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality among the class members.
Under Rule 23(a)(3), the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the
7

experiences of the named parties are fairly typical of the proposed class. To satisfy the typicality requirement, “there must be enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011). A finding of commonality usually results in a finding of typicality. See Gen Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982) (“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.”). Upon reviewing the declarations attached to the Plaintiffs’ memorandum, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Named Class Members Ieshia Brown and Sandra Brown were subjected to the same course of conduct as other class members during the cadet training exercises. Accordingly, those individuals bring the same cause of action as the other class members.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3), the experiences of the named parties are fairly typical of the proposed class.
8

Under Rule 23(a)(4), the class representatives and their counsel must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “[A]dequacy of representation is composed of two parts: the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest of the class members.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The class representative must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as other class members. See Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 985 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court must determine there is no inconsistency between the named parties and the class members. See id.
Based on the information in the record, the Court finds that the class representatives have the same interest and suffered the same injury as other class members. The Court is aware of no inconsistencies between the named parties and class members.
In its July 29, 2013 Order, the Court approved class counsel’s
9

representation of the Plaintiffs. According to the memorandum in support of the current motion, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel has represented the Plaintiffs in multiple class action suits, including suits involving strip searches. The Court has no basis for finding that any of the class representatives are antagonistic to any absent class member or that they do not have a sufficient interest to vigorously pursue the claims.
As was the case before, the Court is satisfied with the competency of class counsel. Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4), the Court has no basis to doubt that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
III. If the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a class action may be maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Citing Amchem Prods v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Plaintiffs
10

note that actions seeking relief to prevent future alleged illegal deprivations of civil rights are a “prime example” of a proper Rule 23(b)(2) class. See id. at 614. “The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory relief warranted–the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (internal quotation marks anc citation omitted). The relief sought “must perforce affect the entire class at once.” Id. at 2558. The Seventh Circuit has observed that “Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.” Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Plaintiffs note that Class II, comprised of all women incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in order to ensure that Defendants are prevented from organizing any mass
11

public group strip searches in the future, either as part of IDOC “training exercises” or in the facility at large. Each class member’s claim depends on the Defendants’ standardized conduct. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) “only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Because each class member is seeking the same injunction, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have met the standard for maintaining a class action for equitable relief.
IV. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ motion satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the motion to certify the class will be Allowed. Class II, the Injunctive Relief Class, is certified as follows: “All women who are currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, and all women who will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future.” The Named Plaintiffs–Beverly Thogmorton, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood, Sandra Brown and Ieshia Brown–shall be
12

representatives of the Class. Loevy & Loevy are appointed as Counsel for the Class. Ergo, the Plaintiffs’ Rule 23(b)(2) Motion for Class Certification [d/e
80] is ALLOWED. Class II is hereby certified under Rule 23(b)(2), as provided in this
Order. The Named Plaintiffs are appointed as representatives of Class II. Counsel for the Named Plaintiffs, Loevy & Loevy, are appointed as
Counsel for Class II. This case is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-
Haskins for the purpose of determining whether additional discovery is necessary and entering a scheduling order. ENTER: October 17, 2014
FOR THE COURT: s/Richard Mills
Richard Mills United States District Judge
13

 
 3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 122 Page 1 of 19

E-FILED
Thursday, 14 April, 2016 10:59:39 AM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BEVERLY THOGMORTON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

RUSSELL REYNOLDS, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

12-CV-3087

ORDER RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiffs in this class action—former and current female inmates—seek damages for a group strip search conducted in Lincoln Correctional Center on March 31, 2011, as part of a cadet training exercise. The plaintiffs also seek to put a stop to the practice.
Before the Court are several motions filed by Defendants: Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ response thereto; and, Defendants’ motion to strike the report and testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert.

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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 122 Page 2 of 19
I. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Response
Defendants’ move to strike Plaintiffs’ response on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ additional proposed facts are too numerous and many of Plaintiffs’ proposed facts are disputed or immaterial to the limited nature of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants ask the Court to strike the entire response or strike certain paragraphs and give Defendants additional time to file a reply.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ response to the summary judgment motion and does not find the response improper. That some of Plaintiffs’ proposed facts are disputed and immaterial to deciding Defendants’ summary judgment motion is not grounds for striking the response and does not preclude a reply.
An extension to file a reply is also not warranted. Defendants do not adequately explain why they did not file a timely reply, particularly given the limited nature of their summary judgment motion. Further, granting an extension would only unnecessarily delay the trial. It is clear from the record that disputed questions of fact exist for trial.
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II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs state in footnote one of their response to the summary judgment motion that they are no longer pursuing their claims against the following 15 Defendants: M. Brooks, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Van Middlesworth, the current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center,1 and Eddie Jones. Summary judgment will be granted to these Defendants. This appears to leave the following 17 Defendants sued for damages in their individual capacities: Hulett, Reynolds, Dawdy,2 Craig, Edmonson, Johnson, 3 Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Slater, Krull, Dallas, Anderson, Crudup,4 Butler, Spaniol, Hatfield, and Pasley. (Pls.’ Resp. d/e 113, footnote 1 and p. 51.) Defendants Yurkovich, Zavala and Locke were sued in their official capacities only for purposes of injunctive relief. (Sixth Amended Complaint, d/e 83.) According to Defendants, Yurkovich and Locke are now replaced by Christine
1 Plaintiffs say only “Warden” in their footnote, but they appear to mean the current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center. The current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center was not involved in the strip search and is not an appropriate party for injunctive relief because the female inmates are now housed in Logan Correctional Center, not Lincoln Correctional Center. 2 This Defendant’s name is spelled “Dowdy” in the sixth amended complaint, but from Defendants’ Answer the correct spelling appears to be “Dawdy.” 3 Two “Johnsons” are listed in the Sixth Amended Complaint. Whether there are two separate Johnson Defendants is not clear. 4 This Defendant’s name is spelled “Krudup” in the sixth amended complaint, but from Defendants’ Answer the correct spelling appears to be “Crudup.”
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Brannon (the current warden of Logan) and Michael Atchison (the current IDOC Deputy Chief of Operations) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
Moving to the merits of Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the following facts are recounted in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. On March 31, 2011, female inmates in two housing units in Lincoln Correctional Center were strip-searched as part of a cadet training exercise. According to Plaintiffs, they were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder with 8-10 other inmates in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their tampons and sanitary pads in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies and clothing and blood on the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough. (Defs.’ Proposed Undisp. Facts 56-62, 73, 74, d/e 113.)
Defendants wisely do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ descriptions support an Eighth Amendment claim if true. A strip search
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3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 122 Page 5 of 19
conducted in an unnecessarily humiliating manner for no legitimate reason can “‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 896 (7th Cir. 2015); Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009)(The Eighth Amendment prohibits strip searches conducted “in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain.”); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003)(“the Eighth Amendment prohibits unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, thus forbidding punishment that is ‘so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.’”)(quoted cite omitted).
The individual capacity Defendants argue instead that the evidence does not support a finding that they were personally responsible for the manner in which the strip search was conducted. A government employee must be personally responsible for the alleged constitutional violation in order to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012)( "'An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.'")(quoted cite omitted); Chavez v. Illinois State Police,
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251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(no respondeat superior liability under § 1983).
However, Defendants’ proposed undisputed facts do not preclude a finding of personal responsibility against any Defendants, even with no response from Plaintiffs. Only a few of Defendants’ proposed facts address personal involvement, and even those few facts address only a few of the Defendants. According to Defendants’ proposed facts relevant to personal responsibility, the Warden decided which units to search; Defendants Pasley and Hatfield accompanied the cadets; Defendant Pasley was not aware of complaints about the search; Defendant Pasley remained in the living units during the shakedowns; and Defendant Reynolds “was in and out of the housing units.” (Defs.’ proposed undisputed facts 9, 10, 20, 32.) None of these proposed facts demonstrates the absence of a material dispute over each Defendants’ knowledge, authority, and participation in the incident.
Further, Defendants’ personal responsibility argument avoids confronting evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1988)(Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that no material factual disputes exist by pointing
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out evidence favorable to them as well as addressing known evidence contrary to their position.) Defendants Hulett (the Warden) and Reynolds (the Assistant Warden of Operations) arguably knew of and approved of, facilitated, or turned a blind eye to the manner in which the strip search was conducted. Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir.2012)(a supervisor is personally responsible for constitutional violations if the supervisor knew of the violation and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye). Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendant Hulett ordered and was ultimately in charge of the shakedown. (Hulett Dep. p. 76, 78.) Defendant Reynolds also instructed and oversaw the cadets and, if Plaintiffs are believed, called the prisoners “bitches.” (Reynolds’ Dep. pp. 85-86; Ieshia Brown Aff. para. 8.) Both Hulett and Reynolds were arguably in a position to intervene and turned a blind eye to how the searches were carried out.
Defendants Pasley and Hatfield, the training instructors, were involved in the training and oversight of the cadets, according to Plaintiffs. Pasley knew that strip searches were occurring and his presence on the housing units allows an inference that he heard the
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derogatory comments and threats made to Plaintiffs by the officers on those units. (Hulett Dep. p.77, 79; Pasley Dep. pp. 6, 7.) Hatfield was present in the gym and observed at least some of the strip searches. (Hatfield Dep. pp. 15-19.) The rest of the individual Defendants, according to Plaintiffs, were directly involved in the unconstitutional aspects of the searches or were present and failed to intervene. For example, Defendants Dawdy, Johnson, Leonetti, Edmonson, Craig, Slater, Pfieiffer, and Krull were part of the tactical team. (Thogmorton Aff. paras. 3, 20; Iesha Brown Aff. para. 2). Defendant Crudup was present during the strip searches and made rude comments. (Crudup Aff. para. 18.) Defendants Dallas, Anderson, and Butler also played a part in the training exercise. (Reynolds Dep. pp. 42-43; Pfieffer’s Resp. to Pls.’ first interrogatory 2; Pfieffer’s Resp. to Pls.’ first interrogatory 2).
In short, the extent of these Defendants’ knowledge and participation in the strip search are disputed questions of fact on this record. Defendants’ personal responsibility argument may ultimately prevail at trial, but that is for the jury to decide.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is not legally viable under Seventh Circuit case precedent.
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The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) held that visual cavity searches of pretrial detainees after contact visits did not violate the Fourth Amendment, “assuming for present purposes that inmate, both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility . . . .” 441 U.S. at 558. Bell, however, involved pretrial detainees, not convicted prisoners.
After Bell, the Seventh Circuit recognized in some cases a convicted inmate’s limited constitutional privacy right in his or her body. In Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit upheld a habeas challenge to an inmate’s discipline for refusing to provide urine sample but acknowledged that “[u]rine tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, and prison inmates retain protect privacy rights in their bodies, although these rights do not extend to their surroundings.” 976 F.2d at 312-13. In Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal at the notice pleading stage of a claim by a male prisoner that female guards strip searched him and regularly observed his naked body. The Canedy Court acknowledged a convicted inmate’s constitutional right to privacy in
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his or her body, a right to be balanced against legitimate prison interests. 16 F.3d at 185, 188 (characterizing the adoption of reasonable measures to protect an inmate’s bodily privacy as a “constitutional mandate.”)
Two years after Canedy, in Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal at the notice pleading stage of a pretrial detainee male prisoner’s claim challenging cross-sex monitoring. The Court in Johnson stated that “[w]e think it best to understand the references to ‘privacy’ in Canedy and similar cases as invocations of the eighth amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.” 69 F.3d at 147. The majority opinion based its conclusion in part on Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), a Supreme Court case which held that prisoners have no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in their cells. 468 U.S. at 536. Judge Posner dissented in part in Johnson, apparently agreeing that the claim fell under the Eighth Amendment but arguing that dismissal was premature and that liability could exist under the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment. 69 F.3d at 155-56 (“If prison officials know that they are subjecting male prisoners to gratuitous humiliation,
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the infliction is deliberate, even if the officials are not actuated by any punitive purpose . . . .”)(Judge Poser, concurring and dissenting).
A few years after Johnson, in Peckham v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit upheld strip searches of a female inmate under the Eighth Amendment, and, arguably, also under the Fourth Amendment. The majority in Peckham wrote:
So, does a prison inmate enjoy any protection at all under the Fourth Amendment . . .? Although we acknowledge the tension between Johnson and Canedy, we think the answer is “yes,” but we hasten to add that given the considerable deference prison officials enjoy to run their institutions it is difficult to conjure up too many real-life scenarios where prison strip searches of inmates could be said to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 141 F.3d at 697. The Court also stated that “regardless of how one views the Fourth Amendment in this context, it is the Eighth Amendment that is more properly posed to protect inmates from unconstitutional strip searches, notably when their aim is punishment, not legitimate institutional concerns.” 141 F.3d at 697. Judge Easterbrook concurred separately, characterizing the above indented quote as dicta
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and arguing that Johnson required strip searches of convicted inmates to be analyzed under Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. Id at 698-99. Later in an unpublished opinion in a different case, the Court characterized Peckham as holding that “prisoner strip-search claims are better addressed under the Eighth Amendment.” Payette v. Hoenisch, 284 Fed.Appx. 348 * 5 (7th Cir. 2008)(not reported in Fed. Rptr).
Defendants do not address the Seventh Circuit’s most recent discussion of privacy rights of convicted prisoners in their bodies: King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs address the case in a notice of supplemental authority filed on March 30, 2016.
In King, a per curiam decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, applied to a convicted prisoner’s claim that he had to wear a “see-through jumpsuit that exposed his genitals and buttocks while he was transported from a county jail to a state prison.” 781 F.3d at 892. The King Court reasoned:
The Supreme Court has adhered to the importance of the subjective element of Eighth Amendment claims by convicted prisoners like King, and the Court has never
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extended Fourth Amendment protection to a prisoner's claim like King's. In light of those facts, we do not believe we should expand the scope of Fourth Amendment protection to strip-searches of convicted prisoners to create an Eighth–Amendment–light standard in which the subjective purposes of prison officials would not be relevant. We conclude that King has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Fourth Amendment.
781 F.3d at 900-901. The Court acknowledged that “case law
indicates that the Fourth Amendment protects, to some
degree, prisoners’ bodily integrity against unreasonable
intrusions into their bodies[,]” but pointed out that the plaintiff
in King had alleged “only a prolonged form of visual search in
which he was not touched.” 781 F.3d at 900 (emphasis in
original). The Court in King characterized the statements in
Peckham as dicta and seemed to confirm Johnson’s
interpretation that Canedy’s statements about privacy invoked
the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.
Judge Hamilton wrote separately in King to urge that the
Fourth Amendment claim proceed for further development.
Judge Hamilton noted the tension between cases in the
Seventh Circuit like Johnson, Canedy, and Forbes, a tension
also recognized in the majority opinion in King. 781 F.3d at
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900-904. Judge Hamilton argued that, “we should recognize that the Fourth Amendment's focus on objective reasonableness may preserve some outer limit on the actions of even well-meaning prison administrators where such bodily searches are involved, while it also requires courts to give substantial—but not complete—deference to the warden's judgment.” 781 F.3d at 904. Judge Hamilton wrote that “a single panel obviously cannot resolve this tension in our circuit’s case law.” 781 F.3d at 903. Petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with Judge Hamilton concurring but noting that the tension about the Fourth Amendment’s application to convicted prisoners would need to be addressed at some point. King v. McCarty, Appeal No. 13-1769 (7th Cir., 6/1/15 order denying rehearing en banc). The case settled on remand. King v. McCarty, 11-CV-1126 (C.D. Ill.)
Plaintiffs argue that King is distinguishable because in this case Plaintiffs had to remove tampons, bend over, and subject their anal and vaginal cavities to inspection. However, Plaintiffs do not appear to allege that officers touched Plaintiffs bodies during the search. The search was limited to visual
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inspection of the naked body as the Court understands the claim, just like in King and Johnson. Plaintiffs point to no controlling case in the Seventh Circuit in which a strip search claim by a convicted prisoner—strip search meaning a visual inspection of the naked body, including the anus and/or vaginal cavities—actually proceeded to disposition under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. In the Court’s opinion, a change in the law would be needed for Plaintiffs to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim. This might be the case to push for a change, but that is a decision for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, not this Court. The Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed.5
Defendants next argue that no injunctive relief is warranted because IDOC policy specifically prohibits how the search was allegedly conducted here, except for allowing group strip searches in general under certain circumstances. However, the IDOC allowance of mass group strip searches is one of the main focuses of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive
5 Concepts of “reasonableness” may still be relevant to the subjective and objective inquiries under the Eighth Amendment. An unreasonable response to a known, substantial risk of serious harm or an objectively serious condition of confinement would support liability under the Eighth Amendment.
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relief. (Pls.’ Sixth Amended Complaint, Count III; Pls.’ Resp. p. 113.) Further, Plaintiffs assert that the IDOC written policies differ from the actual practice which the policymakers knowingly allow to occur. At this point, the Court cannot conclude that no possibility of injunctive relief exists.6
III. Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Report and Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert
Plaintiffs proffer Wendy Still as an expert, whom Defendants appear to agree is qualified “to testify about general correctional standards with respect to strip searches.” (Defs. Mot. Strike Pls.’ Expert, p. 5.) The problem is Ms. Still’s expert report, which Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, contains many conclusions that belong to the jury. (Still Expert Report, d/e 11024.)
Ms. Still’s report reads like a closing argument. She accepts all of Plaintiffs’ contentions as true and concludes that the March 2011 strip search was abusive, without legitimate purpose, and caused severe pain and suffering. A long section recounts the Defendants’ subjective intent, what actually happened during the
6 Another case is pending about an allegedly similar group strip search of female inmates at Logan Correctional Center on October 31, 2013. Brown v. Locke, 15‐CV‐1447 (C.D. Ill.)
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strip search, and what kind of harm Plaintiffs suffered. Her general knowledge of correctional standards is admissible, but not her opinions on what the jury must ultimately decide. Ms. Still’s report will not be admitted, and she will be limited to testifying about correctional standards regarding strip searches. Admissible testimony would include issues that are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims such as generally accepted correctional standards for the planning, overseeing, and conducting of strip searches, but would not include the resolution of disputed questions of fact. Plaintiffs appear to agree. (Pls. Resp., d/e 118, pp. 1, 9-13) If the parties seek further guidance, they may make an offer of proof regarding Ms. Still’s testimony outside of the jury.
IV. Conclusion Material disputes of fact remain for the jury on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, but Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is not viable under King and Johnson. The possibility of injunctive relief cannot be ruled out at this time. Plaintiffs’ expert may testify, but only as to correctional standards regarding strip searches, not to disputed questions of fact.
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Ergo, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Response is DENIED (114). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART (102). Summary judgment is granted to the following Defendants: M. Brooks, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Van Middlesworth, the current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, and Eddie Jones. Summary judgment is granted to Defendants on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim (Count I of the Sixth Amended Complaint). Summary judgment is otherwise denied. Defendants’ Motion to Strike the report and testimony of Plaintiff’s expert is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (115). CHRISTINE BRANNON, in her official capacity, is SUBSTITUTED for Defendant Locke pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). MICHAEL ATCHISON, in his official capacity, is SUBSTITUTED for Defendant Yurkovich pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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The CLERK IS DIRECTED TO TERMINATE the following Defendants: M. Brooks, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Van Middlesworth, the current Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, Eddie Jones, and the “Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees.”7
The CLERK IS DIRECTED TO UPDATE THE DOCKET to substitute Christine Brannon for Defendant Locke and Michael Atchison for Defendant Yurkovich.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTER: April 14, 2016 FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills Richard Mills
United States District Judge
7 No additional Defendants have been identified, and the time has passed to do so. Page 19 of 19

 
 3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 181 Page 1 of 2

E-FILED

Judgment in a Civil Case (02/11)

Tuesday, 22 November, 2016 11:47:12 AM

Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Central District of Illinois

Beverly Throgmorton, Delores

)

Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline

)

Hegwood, Sandra Brown, and Iesha

)

Brown,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Reynolds, Anderson, Dallas,

)

Edmonson, Johnson, Leonetti,

)

Dowdy, Pfeiffer, Craig, Slater,

)

Krudup, Unknown Illinois Department )

Of Corrections Employees,

)

Melody Hulett, Krull, M Brooks,

)

Butler, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown,

)

Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Johnson,

)

Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord,

)

Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden,

)

Deborah Hatfield, Alan Pasley, Eddie

)

Jones, Renee Hatfield, Angela Locke,

)

Felipe Zavala, Joseph Yurkovich,

)

Christine Brannon, and Michael

)

Atchison,

)

)

Defendants. )

Case Number: 12-3087

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
☒ JURY VERDICT. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

☐ DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, pursuant to the jury verdict rendered on 11/21/2016, judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.

3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH # 181 Page 2 of 2
Judgment in a Civil Case (02/11)

3/28/2013 ---- Defendant Deborah Hatfield terminated per Fourth Amended Complaint.
4/14/2016 ---- Defendants Unknown Illinois Department of Corrections Employees, M Brooks, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Joseph Yurkovich, Eddie Jones, and Angela Locke terminated per Order entered by Judge Richard Mills.
11/9/2016 ---- Defendants Anderson, Dallas, Edmonson, Johnson, Leonetti, Pfeiffer, Slater, Krudup, Krull, Butler, Johnson, and Spaniol terminated per Text Order entered by Judge Richard Mills.

Dated: November 22, 2016

s/ Kenneth A. Wells Kenneth A. Wells Clerk, U.S. District Court

 
 General Docket Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Docket #: 16-4234 Nature of Suit: 3550 Prisoner-Civil Rights Delores Henry, et al v. Melody Hulett, et al Appeal From: Central District of Illinois Fee Status: Paid

Docketed: 12/23/2016

Case Type Information: 1) prisoner 2) state 3) civilRights

Originating Court Information: District: 0753-3 : 3:12-cv-03087-RM-TSH Trial Judge: Richard Mills, District Court Judge Date Filed: 03/20/2012 Date Order/Judgment: 11/22/2016

Date NOA Filed: 12/21/2016

Prior Cases: None

Current Cases: None

DELORES HENRY Plaintiff - Appellant

Ruth Z. Brown, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] LOEVY & LOEVY Third Floor 311 N. Aberdeen Street Chicago, IL 60607-1249
Tara E. Thompson, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] LOEVY & LOEVY Third Floor 311 N. Aberdeen Street Chicago, IL 60607-1249
Michael Kanovitz, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [NTC Retained]

PATRICIA PHILLIPS Plaintiff - Appellant
JACQUELINE HEGWOOD Plaintiff - Appellant

LOEVY & LOEVY Third Floor 311 N. Aberdeen Street Chicago, IL 60607-1249
Debra Loevy, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR NTC Retained] LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 N. Aberdeen Street Chicago, IL 60607-1249
Ruth Z. Brown, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Tara E. Thompson, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael Kanovitz, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Debra Loevy, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ruth Z. Brown, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Tara E. Thompson, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael Kanovitz, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900

SANDRA BROWN Plaintiff - Appellant
IESHIA BROWN Plaintiff - Appellant

[NTC Retained] (see above)
Debra Loevy, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ruth Z. Brown, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Tara E. Thompson, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael Kanovitz, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Debra Loevy, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ruth Z. Brown, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Tara E. Thompson, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Michael Kanovitz, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900 [NTC Retained] (see above)
Debra Loevy, Attorney Direct: 312-243-5900

v. RUSSELL REYNOLDS
Defendant - Appellee
ABRAHAM ANDERSON Defendant - Appellee
BENNY DALLAS, Lieutenant Defendant - Appellee

[COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Civil Appeals Division 12th Floor 100 W. Randolph Street State of Illinois Center Chicago, IL 60601-0000
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 12th Floor 100 W. Randolph Street State of Illinois Center Chicago, IL 60601-3218
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)

CARLITA EDMONSON Defendant - Appellee
KIM JOHNSON Defendant - Appellee
MELODY HULETT, former Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center
Defendant - Appellee
-----------------------------MUSLIM ADVOCATES
Amicus Curiae
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Amicus Curiae

Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General Direct: 312-814-2772 [COR LD NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Jane E. Notz, Attorney Direct: 312-814-5058 [COR NTC Gov't State/Local] (see above)
Matthew Callahan, Attorney Direct: 202-897-2622 [COR LD NTC Retained] MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 34440 Washington, DC 20043
Daniel Greenfield, Attorney Direct: 312-503-8538 [COR LD NTC Retained] RODERICK & SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER

375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611-0000

MARTIN F. HORN Amicus Curiae

Danielle Jefferis, Attorney Direct: 303-871-6155 [COR LD NTC Retained] UNIVERSITY OF DENVER Student Law Office Suite 335 2255 E. Evans Avenue Denver, CO 80208

LEGAL SCHOLARS Amicus Curiae

Michael J. Faris, Attorney Direct: 312-876-7700 [COR LD NTC Retained] LATHAM & WATKINS LLP Suite 2800 330 N. Wabash Avenue Chicago, IL 60611

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT AND APPEALS PROJECT
Amicus Curiae

Jessica Lynn Ellsworth, Attorney Direct: 202-637-5886 [COR LD NTC Retained] HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 555 Thirteenth Street N.W. Columbia Square Washington, DC 20004-1109

SCHOLARS OF THE LAW OF PRISONS Amicus Curiae

Meir Feder, Attorney Direct: 212-326-7870 [COR LD NTC Retained] JONES DAY 250 Vesey Street New York, NY 10281

MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS Amicus Curiae
DELORES HENRY, et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants

Seth P. Waxman, Attorney Direct: 202-663-6800 [COR LD NTC Retained] WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20006-0000

v.
MELODY HULETT, former Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, et al., Defendants - Appellees

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State prisoner's civil rights case docketed. Fee Paid. Docketing statement filed. Appellant's brief due on or before 02/01/2017 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Transcript information sheet due by 01/06/2017. [1] [6807315] [16-4234] (AP) [Entered: 12/27/2016 11:32 AM]
THIS CAUSE CONSISTS OF MORE THAN 5 PARTIES FOR EITHER SIDE. The following are those parties to this cause as reflected on the District Court docket, yet are not reflected on the Appellate docket/caption for administrative purposes: APPELLEES Peter Leonetti, Troy Dawdy, Paul Pfeiffer, Russell Craig, Monica Slater, Dominque Krudup, Courtney Krull, M Brooks, Andrea Butler, Last, Bender, Boch, Brown, Dilley, Hinton, Johner, Johnson, Kenney, Killam, Mathias, Rickord, Spaniol, Van Middlesworth, Warden, Deborah Hatfield, Alan Pasley, Eddie Jones, Renee Hatfield, Angela Locke, Felipe Zavala, Joseph Yurkowich, Christine Brannon and Michael Atchinson. [2] [6807320] [16-4234] (AP) [Entered: 12/27/2016 11:41 AM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Tara Thompson for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [3] [6808616] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234]--[Edited 01/03/2017 by MM to reflect addition of counsel.] (Thompson, Tara) [Entered: 01/03/2017 01:47 PM]
Filed Seventh Circuit Transcript Information Sheet by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [4] [6808617] [16-4234] (Thompson, Tara) [Entered: 01/03/2017 01:48 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Mike Kanovitz for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [5] [6808619] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] --[Edited 01/03/2017 by AP- to reflect the addition of counsel] (Kanovitz, Michael) [Entered: 01/03/2017 01:52 PM]
Notice of Circuit Rule 33 mediation issued. The mediation will be conducted in Room 1120, Thursday, February 16, 2017 at

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9:30 a.m. Central Time. See Notice for further details and requirements. JNS [6] [6809491] [16-4234] (AD) [Entered: 01/06/2017 09:53 AM]
ORDER: Pursuant to Circuit Rule 33, briefing will proceed as follows: Appellant's brief due on or before 03/16/2017 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellee's brief due on or before 04/17/2017 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellant's reply brief, if any, is due on or before 05/01/2017 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. JNS [6809493] [16-4234] (AD) [Entered: 01/06/2017 09:56 AM]
Appearance form filed by Attorney Mary E. Welsh for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Additional Parties: Peter Leonetti, Troy Dawdy, Paul Pfeiffer, Russell Craig, Monica Slater, Dominque Crudup, Melody Hullett, Courtney Krull, Andrea Butler, Spaniol, Deborah Hatfield, Alan Pasley, Maggie Burke, and Marcus Hardy. [8] [6810760] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-Yes) [16-4234]--[Edited 01/11/2017 by MM to reflect termination and addition of counsel.] (Welsh, Mary) [Entered: 01/11/2017 01:33 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Ruth Brown for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [9] [6818479] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 02/13/2017 02:42 PM]
ORDER: Pursuant to Circuit Rule 33, briefing is SUSPENDED pending further court order. [10] JNS [6819440] [16-4234] (CG) [Entered: 02/16/2017 02:35 PM]
ORDER: Pursuant to Circuit Rule 33, briefing will proceed as follows: Appellants' brief due on or before 07/19/2017 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellees' brief due on or before 08/18/2017 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 09/01/2017 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. JNS [6848846] [16-4234] (VG) [Entered: 06/20/2017 08:45 AM]

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Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to extend time to file appellant brief. [12] [6852189] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 07/06/2017 10:04 AM]
Order issued GRANTING motion to extend time to file appellants' brief. [12] Appellants' brief due on or before 08/09/2017 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellees' brief due on or before 09/08/2017 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 09/22/2017 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. CMD [13] [6852345] [16-4234] (CMD) [Entered: 07/06/2017 02:00 PM]
Submitted appellant brief by Ruth Brown for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [14] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [6860381] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 08/10/2017 12:16 AM]
Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to file Opening Brief Instanter. [15] [6860382] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 08/10/2017 12:31 AM]
ORDER re: Plaintiff-appellants' motion for leave to file opening brief instanter. [15] IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED because the tendered brief is procedurally deficient. Counsel for the appellants shall resubmit a compliant opening brief by August 18, 2017. Specifically, the section titled "DISCUSSION" should be titled "ARGUMENT." See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Also, counsel must certify that the appendix complies with Circuit Rule 30(a) and 30(b). See Cir. R. 30(d). Finally, the court prefers that the brief's cover fit on one page. For more information, counsel may contact the clerk's office. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that briefing will proceed as follows: Appellants' brief due on or before 08/18/2017 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellees' brief due on or before 09/18/2017 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 10/02/2017 for Appellants

Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips CMD [16] [6860515] [16-4234] (VG) [Entered: 08/10/2017 11:48 AM]

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Motion filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds to file motion for order to transmit the record on appeal. [17] [6861968] [16-4234] (Welsh, Mary) [Entered: 08/16/2017 01:48 PM]

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ORDER re: Defendants-appellees' motion to order transmission of record on appeal. The motion is GRANTED. The clerk of the district court shall transmit the record to this court as soon as possible. See Cir. R. 11(a). [17] CMD [18] [6862049] [16-4234] (CR) [Entered: 08/16/2017 03:32 PM]

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Original record on appeal filed electronically. Contents of record

2193 pg, 87.77 MB : 3 vol. of pleadings. [19] [6862751] [16-4234] (CCG) [Entered:

08/18/2017 04:08 PM]

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Re-Submitted appellant brief by Ruth Brown for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [20] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [6862782] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 08/18/2017 10:10 PM]

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Appellant's brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Paper copies due on 08/28/2017 Electronically Transmitted. [21] [6862818] [16-4234] (RT) [Entered: 08/21/2017 09:47 AM]

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Supplemental record on appeal filed electronically. Contents of

1496 pg, 181.82 MB record : 11 vol. of pleadings, 1 exhibit list. [22] [6863733] [16-

4234] (ME) [Entered: 08/23/2017 03:57 PM]

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Motion filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds to extend time to file appellee brief. [23] [6869521] [16-4234] (Welsh, Mary) [Entered: 09/15/2017 03:24 PM]

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Order issued GRANTING motion to extend time to file appellee's brief [23] Appellees' brief due on or before 10/02/2017 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 10/16/2017 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores

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Henry and Patricia Phillips. CMD [24] [6869557] [16-4234] (VG) [Entered: 09/15/2017 04:07 PM]
Submitted appellee brief by Mary E. Welsh for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. [25] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [6871664] [16-4234] (Welsh, Mary) [Entered: 09/25/2017 08:11 PM]
Appellee's brief filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Paper copies due on 10/03/2017 Electronically Transmitted. [26] [6871685] [16-4234] (ME) [Entered: 09/26/2017 09:34 AM]
Argument set for Thursday, November 30, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. in the Main Courtroom, Room 2721. Each side limited to 20 minutes. [27] [6874709] [16-4234] (RS) [Entered: 10/06/2017 03:44 PM]
Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to extend time to file appellant reply brief. [28] [6874827] [164234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 10/09/2017 08:21 PM]
Order issued GRANTING motion to extend time to file appellants' reply brief [28] Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 11/06/2017 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. CMD [29] [6874919] [16-4234] (AP) [Entered: 10/10/2017 10:57 AM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Debra Loevy for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [30] [6877432] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234]-[Edited 10/18/2017 by CR to reflect addition of counsel] (Loevy, Debra) [Entered: 10/18/2017 02:56 PM]
Received argument confirmation from Debra Loevy for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [31] [6877577] [16-4234] (Loevy, Debra) [Entered: 10/19/2017 09:47 AM]
Received argument confirmation from Mary E. Welsh for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson,

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Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. [32] [6878172] [16-4234] (Welsh, Mary) [Entered: 10/20/2017 06:01 PM]
Submitted appellant reply brief by Debra Loevy for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [33] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [6881830] [16-4234] (Loevy, Debra) [Entered: 11/06/2017 01:14 PM]
Appellant's reply brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Paper copies due on 11/13/2017. Electronically Transmitted. [34] [6881872] [16-4234] (DSL) [Entered: 11/06/2017 02:28 PM]
Case heard and taken under advisement by panel: Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge; Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge and John Z. Lee, District Court Judge. [35] [6887069] [16-4234] (ME) [Entered: 11/30/2017 12:36 PM]
Case argued by Debra Loevy for Appellants Sandra Brown, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood and Ieshia Brown and Ms. Mary Ellen Welsh for Appellees Russell Reynolds, Benny Dallas, Abraham Anderson, Carlita Edmonson and Kim Johnson. [36] [6887071] [16-4234] (ME) [Entered: 11/30/2017 12:37 PM]
Appearance form filed by Attorney Katelin B. Buell for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Additional Parties: Peter leonetti, Troy Dawdy, Paul Pfeifer, Russell Craig, Monica Slater, Dominque Crudup, Meody Hullett, Courtney Krull, Andrea Butler, Spaniol, Deborah Hatfield, & Alan Pasley, in individual capacities. Maggie Burke and Marcus Hardy in official capacity. [37] [6899689] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-Yes) [16-4234]--[Edited 01/26/2018 by CR to reflect termination and addition of counsel] (Buell, Katelin) [Entered: 01/26/2018 03:39 PM]
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Easterbrook. AFFIRMED. Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge; Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge and John Z. Lee, District Court Judge, dissenting. [38] [7017554] [16-4234]--[Edited 07/16/2019 by FP] (FP) [Entered: 07/16/2019 02:20 PM]
ORDER: Final judgment filed per opinion. With costs: yes. [39] [7017660] [16-4234] (FP) [Entered: 07/16/2019 04:24 PM]

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Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to extend time to file petition for rehearing [40] [7018135] [164234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 07/18/2019 12:22 PM]
ORDER re: Plaintiffs-appellants' unopposed motion for extension to petition for rehearing en banc. [40] IT IS ORDERED that the motion to extend time to file a petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. Appellants shall file a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc, if any, on or before August 13, 2019. JLW [41] [7018245] [16-4234] (VG) [Entered: 07/19/2019 08:54 AM]
Submitted petition for rehearing enbanc by Ruth Brown for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [42] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7023337] [164234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 08/13/2019 02:06 PM]
Filed Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing Enbanc by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips, per order. Paper copies due on 08/16/2019. [43] [7023356] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 08/13/2019 02:34 PM]
Sent clerk's copy of request to Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds requesting 30 copies of their answer to the Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing Enbanc filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips on 08/13/2019. Answer to Petition for Rehearing due for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds by 08/28/2019. [7023710] [16-4234] (ER) [Entered: 08/14/2019 04:21 PM]
Motion filed by Appellees Russell Reynolds, Kim Johnson and Abraham Anderson to extend time to file answer to petition for rehearing. [45] [7023927] [16-4234] (Buell, Katelin) [Entered: 08/15/2019 02:58 PM]
ORDER: re: Unopposed motion for extension of time to file answer to petition for rehearing en banc. [45] The motion for an extension of time to file an answer to the petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. Appellees shall file their answer on or

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before September 30, 2019. JLW [46] [7024085] [16-4234] (CG) [Entered: 08/16/2019 11:45 AM]
Paper copies of rehearing enbanc brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. DIST. [47] [7024232] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 08/19/2019 08:39 AM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Daniel M. Greenfield for American Civil Liberties Union, Just Detention International, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association. Additional Parties: Gina Fedock, Claudia Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Elisabeth Jean Wood. [48] [7024768] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (Greenfield, Daniel) [Entered: 08/20/2019 03:43 PM]
Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to file BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE. [49] [7024806] [16-4234] (Callahan, Matthew) [Entered: 08/20/2019 04:39 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Dr. Stuart Grassian, M.D.; Dr. Terry Kupers, M.D., M.S.P.; Dr. Caprice Haverty, Ph.D.; Dr. Sheryl Kubiak, Ph.D.; Dr. TomiAnn Roberts, Ph.D.. [7024813] [16-4234] (Simon, Stephanie) [Entered: 08/20/2019 05:20 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion to File Brief Amici Buriae by Professors and Scholars of Sexual Violence, American Civil Liberties Union, Just Detention International, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Associatioin. [7024818] [16-4234] (Greenfield, Daniel) [Entered: 08/20/2019 06:43 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief of Former Corrections Directors and Experts in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Rehearing by Martin F. Horn, Justin Jones, Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda D. Stewart, Eldon Vail, Jeanne Woodford. [7024819] [16-4234] (Jefferis, Danielle) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:00 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Michael Faris for Amici Curiae Legal Scholars. [53]

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[7024822] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (Faris, Michael) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:30 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc by The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin. [7024823] [16-4234] (Ellsworth, Jessica) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:40 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Jack McNeily for Amici Curiae Legal Scholars. [55] [7024824] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (McNeily, Jack) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:49 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Ellen Marks for Amici Curiae Legal Scholars. [56] [7024825] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (Marks, Ellen) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:53 PM]
Circuit Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement and Appearance filed by Attorney Julia Waterhous for Amici Curiae Legal Scholars. [57] [7024826] (L-No; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234] (Waterhous, Julia) [Entered: 08/20/2019 07:57 PM]
Filed Non-Party Legal Scholars' Motion For Leave To File A Brief As Amici Curiae In Support Of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Petition For Rehearing En Banc by Amici Curiae Legal Scholars. [7024827] [16-4234] (Faris, Michael) [Entered: 08/20/2019 08:36 PM]
Motion filed by Appellees Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Abraham Anderson, Russell Reynolds and Kim Johnson to extend time to file answer to petition for rehearing. [59] [7026923] [16-4234] (Buell, Katelin) [Entered: 08/29/2019 01:09 PM]
Order issued GRANTING motion to extend time to file answer to petition for rehearing. [59] Answer to Petition for Rehearing due for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds by 10/15/2019. No further extensions will be allowed. JLW [60] [7027021] [16-4234] (FP) [Entered: 08/29/2019 03:38 PM]
Instanter order issued GRANTING motions to file amici briefs. [58] [54] [52] [51] [50] The clerk of this court shall file instanter the tendered copies of the amici briefs INSTANTER. [49] JLW [61] [7027069] [16-4234] (ER) [Entered: 08/29/2019 04:40 PM]

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Filed Amicus brief in support of appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Legal Scholars. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [63] [7027115] [16-4234] (DSL) [Entered: 08/30/2019 08:57 AM]
THIS CAUSE CONSISTS OF MORE THAN 5 PARTIES FOR EITHER SIDE. The following are those parties to this cause as reflected on the Amici Briefs, yet are not reflected on the Appellate docket/caption for administrative purposes: Amici: Precious Blood Ministry of Reconciliation, Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association, Reconstructing Judaism, Interfaith Alliance Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Brett Dignam, Gina Fedock, Claudia Flores, Jennifer M. Green, Just Detention International, Michele Leiby, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Roderick & solange MacArthur Justice Center, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Uptown People's Law Center, Women's Prison Association, Elisabeth Jean Wood, Justin Jones, Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda D. Stewart, Eldon Vail, Jeanne Woodford, Ederlina Co, Tracey Maclin, Alan S. Mills, Michael B. Mushlin, Alex A. Reinert, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin, Terry Kupers, Caprice Haverty, Sheryl Kubiak and Tomi-Ann Roberts. [62] [7027112] [16-4234] (ER) [Entered: 08/30/2019 08:52 AM]
Filed Amicus brief in support of Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn, Justin Jones, Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda Stewart, Eldon Vail, and Jeanne Woodford. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [64] [7027140] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 08/30/2019 09:46 AM]
Filed amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [65] [7027156] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 08/30/2019 10:28 AM]
Filed amicus brief in support of Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, and End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [66] [7027159] [16-4234] (DRS) [Entered: 08/30/2019 10:33 AM]

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Filed amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Dr. Stuart Grassian, et al. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [67] [7027263] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 08/30/2019 02:24 PM]
Filed amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates, et al. Electronically transmitted. Filed per order of 08/29/2019. Paper copies due on 09/03/2019. [68] [7027276] [16-4234]-[Edited 09/03/2019 by MAN] (MAN) [Entered: 08/30/2019 02:38 PM]
Paper copies of amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing Enbanc filed by Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, and End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin. DIST. [69] [7027470] [16-4234] (DRS) [Entered: 09/03/2019 11:00 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing Enbanc filed by Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. DIST. [70] [7027485] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 09/03/2019 11:35 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc filed by Amicus Curiae Legal Scholars. DIST. [71] [7027567] [16-4234] (DSL) [Entered: 09/03/2019 02:07 PM]
Paper copies of amicus brief in support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc filed by Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates. [72] [7027839] [16-4234] (SK) [Entered: 09/04/2019 11:09 AM]
Paper copies filed of amicus brief in support of Petition for Rehearing for Enbanc by Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn,Justin Jones, Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda Stewart, Eldon Vail, and Jeanne Woodford. Dist. [73] [7027863] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 09/04/2019 11:31 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief in support of appellant's petition for rehearing en banc filed by Amicus Curiae Stuart Grassian. DIST. [74] [7028249] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 09/05/2019 01:53 PM]

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Submitted answer to petition for rehearing enbanc by Katelin B. Buell for Appellees Russell Reynolds, Kim Johnson, Carlita Edmonson, Benny Dallas and Abraham Anderson. [75] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7036492] [16-4234] (Buell, Katelin) [Entered: 10/15/2019 10:20 AM]
Filed Answer to Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing Enbanc by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds, per order. [76] [7036601] Paper copies due on 10/18/2019 [164234] (MAN) [Entered: 10/15/2019 12:55 PM]
Paper copies of answer to rehearing enbanc brief filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. DIST. [77] [7037043] [164234] (MAN) [Entered: 10/16/2019 02:56 PM]
ORDER: The petition for rehearing en banc is granted. The opinion and judgment entered by the panel are vacated. A new briefing schedule will be set by further order. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set also by further order. [43] [78] [7051054] [16-4234] (CG) [Entered: 12/18/2019 03:21 PM]
Appearance form filed by Attorney Jane Elinor Notz for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Additional Parties: Melody Hulett, Peter Leonetti, Troy Dawdy, Paul Pfeiffer, Russell Craig, Monica Slater, Dominique Crudup, Courtney Krull, Andrea Butler, Stephanie Spaniol, Renee Hatfield, Alan Pasley, Maggie Burke, Filipe Zalava, Michael Atchinson, Emma Bender, Barb Boch. [79] [7051196] (L-Yes; E-Yes; R-No) [16-4234]--[Edited 12/19/2019 by FP to reflect that atty. Notz is added to the docket. ] (Notz, Jane) [Entered: 12/19/2019 11:13 AM]
NOTICE: Attorney Ms. Jane E. Notz for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds will not be available for oral argument February 13 through February 21, 2020; April 20 through April 24, 2020. [80] [7051440] [16-4234] (Notz, Jane) [Entered: 12/19/2019 05:02 PM]
ORDER: On December 18, 2019, the court granted the petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, briefing will now proceed as follows: Appellant's brief due on or before 01/21/2020 for Ieshia

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Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellee's brief due on or before 02/20/2020 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellant's reply brief, if any, is due on or before 03/12/2020 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Please note that 30 paper copies of each brief will be required after each brief is accepted for filing. [7051669] [16-4234] (AD) [Entered: 12/20/2019 02:16 PM]
Motion filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips to extend time to file appellant brief. [82] [7052083] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 12/24/2019 10:11 PM]
Filed Response by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson, Russell Reynolds and Carlita Edmonson to Plaintiffs-Appellants' First Motion for Extension of Time to File Opening Brief. [83][7052238] [16-4234] (Notz, Jane) [Entered: 12/26/2019 12:59 PM]
En Banc Argument set for Thursday, May 14, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. in the Ceremonial Courtroom, Room 2525. Each side limited to 30 minutes. [84] [7052341] [16-4234] (SK) [Entered: 12/26/2019 04:12 PM]
ORDER: re: 1. Plaintiffs-appellants' first motion for extension to file opening brief. 2. Defendants-appellees' response to plaintiffsappellants' first motion for extension to file opening brief. [82] The parties’ requests for extensions of time are partly GRANTED to the extent that each party shall have an additional 14 days to submit their briefs. Accordingly, briefing shall proceed as follows: Appellants' brief due on or before 02/04/2020 for Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Appellees' brief due on or before 03/19/2020 for Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Lieutenant, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Appellants' reply brief, if any, is due on or before 04/09/2020 for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips JLW [85] [7052457] [16-4234] (CG) [Entered: 12/27/2019 11:58 AM]
Submitted appellant brief by Ruth Z Brown for Appellants Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry, Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown and Patricia Phillips. [86] NOTE: Access to this entry is

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limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7060293] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 02/04/2020 02:01 PM]
Appellant's brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. Paper copies due on 02/11/2020 Electronically Transmitted. [87] [7060348] [16-4234] (DRS) [Entered: 02/04/2020 03:41 PM]
Paper copies of appellant brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. [88] [7061340] [16-4234] (DRS) [Entered: 02/10/2020 01:35 PM]
Submitted brief by Danielle Jefferis for Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn amicus Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda D. Stewart, Eldon Vail. Consent from all parties contained within brief. [89] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7061778] [164234] (Jefferis, Danielle) [Entered: 02/11/2020 04:19 PM]
Submitted brief by Jessica L. Ellsworth - Counsel of Record; Rupinder K. Garcha for Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project amicus National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women; End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin; Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence; Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence. Consent from all parties contained within brief. [90] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7061795] [164234] (Ellsworth, Jessica) [Entered: 02/11/2020 05:09 PM]
Submitted brief by Seth P. Waxman for amicus Dr. Terry Kupers, M.D., M.S.P.; Dr. Caprice Haverty, Ph.D.; Dr. Sheryl Kubiak, Ph.D.; Dr. Tomi-Ann Roberts, Ph.D. Consent from all parties contained within brief. [91] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7061800] [16-4234] (Waxman, Seth) [Entered: 02/11/2020 05:24 PM]

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Motion filed by Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union to file Brief Amici Curiae. [92] [7061803] [16-4234] (Greenfield, Daniel) [Entered: 02/11/2020 05:44 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion by Amici Scholars of the Law of Prisons, the Constitution, and the Federal Courts. [7061810] [164234] (Feder, Meir) [Entered: 02/11/2020 07:25 PM]
Non-Party motion filed by Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda D. Stewart, Eldon Vail to file Amicus Brief of Former Corrections Directors in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal. [94] [7061811] [16-4234] (Jefferis, Danielle) [Entered: 02/11/2020 10:14 PM]
Non-Party motion filed by Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates to file Amicus brief. [95] [7061813] [16-4234] (Callahan, Matthew) [Entered: 02/11/2020 11:57 PM]
Filed Non-Party Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by Mental Health Professionals. [7061897] [16-4234] (Waxman, Seth) [Entered: 02/12/2020 11:49 AM]
Filed Non-Party Unopposed Motion For Leave To File Amicus Brief by Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin, Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence. [7061956] [16-4234] (Ellsworth, Jessica) [Entered: 02/12/2020 02:05 PM]
ORDER: Motion for leave to file amicus curiae brief of former corrections directors in support of plaintiffs-appellants and reversal. [94] The motion is GRANTED to the extent that the movants shall submit an amicus curiae brief that complies with this court's rules by February 18, 2020. Specifically the brief must contain disclosure statements for each attorney listed on the cover of the brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(A), 26.1; Circuit Rule 26.1. If a compliant brief is submitted by February 18, the clerk of this court shall file it instanter. JLW [98] [7062711] [164234] (CG) [Entered: 02/14/2020 04:16 PM]
ORDER: re: 1. Motion for leave to file brief amici curiae in support of plaintiffs-appellants. 2. Motion of Scholars of the Law of Prisons, the constitution, and the federal courts for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in support of appellants. 3. Motion for leave to file brief of amicus curiae Muslim Advocates in support of plaintiffs-appellants. 4. Motion for leave to file brief for

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mental health professionsals as amici curiae in support of appellants in support of reversal. 5. Unopposed motion for leave to file brief for amici curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and aappeals project, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, end domestic violence Wisconsin, Illinois, Coalition against domestic violence, and Indiana coalition against domestic violence in support of plaintiff-appellants. [97], [95], [93] The motions for leave to file amici briefs are GRANTED. The clerk of this court shall file the tendered amici briefs INSTANTER. JLW [99] [7062723] [164234] (CG) [Entered: 02/14/2020 04:34 PM]
Re-Submitted brief by Danielle C. Jefferis for Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn amicus Richard Morgan, Dan Pacholke, Jane Parnell, Emmitt Sparkman, Belinda Stewart, Eldon Vail. Leave granted by court order. [100] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7062739] [16-4234] (Jefferis, Danielle) [Entered: 02/14/2020 05:42 PM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn, et al., per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020 Electronically Transmitted. [101] [7062799] [16-4234]--[Edited 02/18/2020 by SK] (SK) [Entered: 02/18/2020 08:58 AM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020. Electronically Transmitted. [102] [7062803] [164234] (CM) [Entered: 02/18/2020 09:04 AM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Mental Health Professional per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020. Electronically Transmitted. [103] [7062815] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/18/2020 09:24 AM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020. Electronically Transmitted. [104] [7062826] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/18/2020 09:48 AM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Scholars of the Law of Prisons per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020. Electronically Transmitted. [105] [7062828] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/18/2020 09:50 AM]
Amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union per order. Paper copies due on 02/21/2020. Electronically

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Transmitted. [106] [7062832] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/18/2020 09:54 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project. [107] [7063217] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/19/2020 10:40 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Mental Health Professionals. [108] [7063218] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/19/2020 10:40 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Scholars of the Law of Prisons. [109] [7063563] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/20/2020 10:33 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates. [110] [7063903] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/21/2020 10:34 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn. [111] [7063904] [16-4234] (SK) [Entered: 02/21/2020 10:35 AM]
Paper copies of amicus brief filed by Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union. [112] [7063923] [16-4234] (CM) [Entered: 02/21/2020 10:56 AM]
Submitted appellee brief by Jane Elinor Notz for Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. [113] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7069426] [164234] (Notz, Jane) [Entered: 03/18/2020 04:57 PM]
Appellee's brief filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. Paper copies due on 03/25/2020 Electronically Transmitted. [114] [7069444] [16-4234] (LJ) [Entered: 03/19/2020 08:59 AM]
Paper copies of appellee brief filed by Appellees Abraham Anderson, Benny Dallas, Carlita Edmonson, Melody Hulett, Kim Johnson and Russell Reynolds. DIST. [115] [7073058] [16-4234] (CAH) [Entered: 04/06/2020 03:38 PM]
Submitted appellant reply brief by Ruth Brown for Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores

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Henry and Patricia Phillips. [116] NOTE: Access to this entry is limited to counsel of record. Once the document is approved by the court, it will be filed onto the court's docket as a separate entry which will be open to the public. [7073902] [16-4234] (Brown, Ruth) [Entered: 04/09/2020 02:46 PM]
Appellant's reply brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. 30 Paper copies due on 04/16/2020 Electronically Transmitted. [117] [7073907] [16-4234] (CAH) [Entered: 04/09/2020 02:52 PM]
Paper copies of appellant reply brief filed by Appellants Ieshia Brown, Sandra Brown, Jacqueline Hegwood, Delores Henry and Patricia Phillips. DIST.[118] [7075454] [16-4234] (CO) [Entered: 04/16/2020 03:43 PM]
ORDER: Counsel in this appeal shall present oral argument using Zoom Video Communications. No attorneys will be present in the courtroom. The clerk’s office will contact counsel with further instructions. SCR [119] [7076921] [16-4234] (MM) [Entered: 04/24/2020 03:45 PM]
Received argument confirmation per argument email form for Attorney Ms. Jane E. Notz for Appellees Russell Reynolds, Benny Dallas, Melody Hulett, Abraham Anderson, Carlita Edmonson and Kim Johnson. [120] [7077973] [16-4234] (CAH) [Entered: 04/30/2020 10:48 AM]
Received argument confirmation per argument email form for Attorney Ruth Z. Brown for Appellants Sandra Brown, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood and Ieshia Brown. [121] [7077990] [16-4234] (CAH) [Entered: 04/30/2020 11:18 AM]
Case heard and taken under advisement by panel: Diane P. Wood, Chief Circuit Judge; Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge; Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge; Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge; Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge; Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge; Diane S. Sykes, Circuit Judge; David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge; Amy C. Barrett, Circuit Judge; Michael B. Brennan, Circuit Judge; Michael Y. Scudder, Circuit Judge and Amy J. St. Eve, Circuit Judge. [122] [7080952] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 05/14/2020 11:17 AM]
Case argued by Ruth Z. Brown for Appellants Sandra Brown, Delores Henry, Patricia Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood and Ieshia

Brown and Ms. Jane E. Notz for Appellees Russell Reynolds, Benny Dallas, Melody Hulett, Abraham Anderson, Carlita Edmonson and Kim Johnson. [123] [7080953] [16-4234] (MAN) [Entered: 05/14/2020 11:17 AM]

 
 Case: 16-4234 Document: 38

Filed: 07/16/2019 Pages: 15

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16-4234 DELORES HENRY, et al., on behalf of a class,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MELODY HULETT, former Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 12-CV-3087 — Richard Mills, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 16, 2019 ____________________
Before EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges, and JOHN Z. LEE, District Judge.*
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Members of a certiﬁed class contend that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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guards. The district court summarized the allegations this way:
[Plaintiﬀs] were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder with 8-10 other inmates in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male oﬃcers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their tampons and sanitary pads in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies and clothing and blood on the ﬂoor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a ﬂoor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194393 at *6 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016). Plaintiﬀs maintained that such an inspection—unnecessary for security and conducted in an oﬀensive manner—violated their rights under both the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment, applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the Fourth Amendment theory, because Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), and King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015), hold that a visual inspection of a convicted prisoner is not subject to analysis under that amendment, though a claim properly lies under the Eighth Amendment if an unnecessary or demeaning inspection amounts to punishment. The Eighth Amendment claim went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiﬀs do not contest the verdict but ask us to reinstate their Fourth Amendment theory. Because analysis under the Fourth Amendment is objective, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), while a successful claim under the Eighth Amendment depends on proof of a culpable mental state, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

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3

312 (1986), plaintiﬀs believe that they could succeed on a Fourth Amendment theory despite the jury’s verdict.
The Fourth Amendment applies only to the extent that prisoners retain a legitimate expectation of privacy. Johnson and King rely on Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524–30 (1984), which holds that prisoners lack privacy interests in their cells and implies that they lack any legitimate expectation of privacy inside prison walls. The judgments of conviction allow wardens to control and monitor their charges’ lives, extinguishing the rights of secrecy and seclusion that free people possess. But Hudson did not consider whether convicted prisoners have some residual privacy interest in their persons, as opposed to their possessions and surroundings. The Justices have not returned to that subject in later decisions. Decisions in this circuit look in both directions on that topic. Compare King with, e.g., Peckham v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998).
King reconciles the circuit’s competing strands of thought this way: the Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual inspections of convicted prisoners but does apply to procedures that entail intrusions within prisoners’ bodies. 781 F.3d at 899–901. That approach is justiﬁed not only by the holding of Hudson but also by the need to maintain the subjective component of Eighth Amendment analysis. In decisions such as Whitley the Justices stressed that guards will take many steps that oﬀend and even injure prisoners, yet contribute to prison management and security. Only those steps that are unnecessary and intended to produce injury, the Court explained, should be actionable.
An appropriate balance of prisoners’ interests against the needs of prison management is achieved through normal

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Eighth Amendment analysis, which has both objective and subjective elements. See also, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Applying the Fourth Amendment to all unwelcome observations of prisoners would eliminate the subjective component and create a sort of Eighth Amendment lite, defeating the objectives that the Justices sought to achieve by limiting liability in Whitley and similar decisions. See King, 781 F.3d at 900–01.
Even when the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause applies, as one or the other will before conviction, strip searches often are reasonable and thus permissible. See Florence v. Board of Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012); Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979). But the absence of a subjective component in determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment would produce outcomes that depart from the approach required by Whitley for prisoners after conviction. It would eﬀectively equate the rights of convicted prisoners with those of arrestees or pretrial detainees. Many decisions hold that convicts’ rights are more limited.
King obliged the district judge to resolve this case as he did. Plaintiﬀs allege a visual inspection, not a physical intrusion. They maintain that each inmate had to manipulate her own body but do not contend that the prison’s staﬀ touched any inmate. A prisoner’s need to touch her own body does not diﬀerentiate this situation from that of Florence, which concluded that a visual inspection (visual on the guards’ part) is reasonable even with respect to pretrial detainees.
Plaintiﬀs ask us to overrule Johnson and King to the extent that they deem the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to visual inspections of convicted prisoners. We decline.

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The law in some other circuits is favorable to plaintiﬀs. See, e.g., Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016); Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007). The law in this circuit does not favor plaintiﬀs, however, and decisions such as Hudson are at best neutral. If the ﬂat declaration in Hudson that a prisoner lacks any legitimate expectation of privacy in a cell, 468 U.S. at 526, applies only while the prisoner is in a cell, that still falls short of establishing that the Fourth Amendment applies elsewhere in a prison. And we know from Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), that even after conditional release a convicted person has a severely diminished expectation of privacy until the end of the sentence. Samson allowed a parolee to be searched without either probable cause or suspicion, and it stressed the extent to which a conviction curtails privacy.
The most one can say for plaintiﬀs is that judges, including those within the Seventh Circuit, have disagreed about whether the Fourth Amendment ever prevents guards from viewing naked prisoners. Johnson was decided over a dissent. A concurring opinion in King expressed doubt about the majority’s analysis, as a concurring opinion in Peckham expressed doubt about the analysis of the majority there.
It has been 35 years since the Justices last considered the extent to which convicted prisoners have rights under the Fourth Amendment while still inside prison walls. For more than 20 years it has been established in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual inspections of prisoners. It is best to leave the law of the circuit alone, unless and until the Justices suggest that it needs change.
AFFIRMED

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LEE, District Judge, dissenting. In prior decisions, we have recognized that convicted prisoners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of their bodies sufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s safeguard against unreasonable searches (although, as we shall see, this line differentiating a prisoner’s bodily interior versus exterior is not mandated by Supreme Court precedent, recognized by any of our sister circuits, or even uniformly applied by this Court, see King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 902–04 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). To this rule, the majority now appends an additional hurdle—a prisoner can invoke the Fourth Amendment only when the physical intrusion into her body is carried out by someone other than the prisoner herself; this is the case even when a prisoner is ordered by correctional officers to probe into her own body. Because this new rule is not supported by our prior decisions or consistent with established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent.
In Hudson v. Palmer, the Supreme Court held that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their living quarters or possessions. 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984). But the Supreme Court has yet to address whether (and to what extent) prisoners maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their persons when it comes to strip searches. Since Hudson, this court has taken various, sometimes inconsistent, tacks to answer this question. Compare Peckham v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (1998) (“So, does a prison inmate enjoy any protection at all under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures? … [W]e think the answer is ‘yes,’…”); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185–86 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Fourth Amendment reasonableness test espoused in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to strip searches),

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with Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting “Canedy and similar cases” as applying only the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth); King, 781 F.3d at 899–900 (no reasonable expectation of privacy where inmate was required to wear see-through clothes for transport).
Our prior decisions, however, seem to coalesce around the following rule—that prisoners retain a legitimate expectation of privacy as to the insides of their bodies, if not the outsides. And so, in Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312–13, 315 (1992), we held that “[u]rine tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, and prison inmates retain protected privacy rights in their bodies, although these rights do not extend to their surroundings.” Id. at 312. In Del Raine v. Williford, we explained that a rectal search conducted by a guard “falls under” the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 32 F.3d 1024, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994). And in Sparks v. Stutler, we assumed that the involuntary catheterization of an inmate was subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 71 F.3d 259, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Certainly Hudson does not establish that the interior of one’s body is as open to invasion as the interior of one’s cell.”).
This rule, which recognizes an inmate’s right to privacy in her body (albeit, we have held, to a limited degree), finds some support in prior Supreme Court decisions. For instance, in Winston v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s expectation of privacy in the inside of his body rendered unreasonable a compelled surgery to obtain evidence. 470 U.S. 753, 758–60 (1985). And in Bell, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that pretrial detainees had a legitimate expectation of privacy as to body-cavity searches. 441

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U.S. at 558; see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326–27 (2012).
At the same time, extending the limiting principle in Hudson, we have refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the exterior of inmates’ bodies. For instance, in Johnson, we held that opposite-sex monitoring in the prison, which led to female guards frequently observing male inmates in various states of undress, did not implicate privacy concerns under the Fourth Amendment. 69 F.3d at 145–47. We reached a similar conclusion in King, which involved an inmate who was forced to wear a jumpsuit that was “less than opaque,” making his genitals and buttocks visible to those around him. 781 F.3d at 893, 899–900.
But this rule—distinguishing between a prisoner’s insides and outsides—has not been pronounced by the Supreme Court or adopted by any other circuit. And its legal foundation has been questioned. See id. at 903 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that “no other circuit applies the categorical rule … finding no Fourth Amendment protection against strip-searches or nudity”).
To this, the majority now attaches the added requirement that, for a prisoner to possess a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of her body, the intrusion of her insides must be performed by someone else. And because in this case “each inmate had to manipulate her own body but do not contend that the prison’s staff touched any inmate,” the majority concludes that the prisoners lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy here.
It seems odd, however, to make the question of whether a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the

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Fourth Amendment in the integrity of his or her intimate body cavities dependent on who it is that does the probing or penetrating. After all, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment hinges on (1) whether an individual has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the search, and (2) whether that expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525. The focus of this inquiry is on an individual’s expectation of privacy “in what was searched,” not who did the searching. United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added); see United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in a particular place or thing must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The manner in which a search is conducted is more appropriately addressed when assessing its reasonableness. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
The facts of this case illustrate the ungainliness of the majority’s new rule. Construing the record in Appellants’ favor, as we must on summary judgment, approximately 200 female inmates were rounded up early one morning by a tactical team in riot gear. R110-3 at 5. Tightly handcuffed by guards who screamed obscenities at them, the women were taken to the gym, where they remained, handcuffed and standing, until the guards searched them. Id. The women were not told what was happening or why. R110-9. This mass strip search of female inmates was conducted solely for training purposes, R.110-6 at 76:7–76:10, but the training was not strictly necessary, as most cadets graduated without it. R974–75.

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The searches took place in a beauty salon and a bathroom off the gym. R110-3. Because the beauty shop had mirrored walls, and the bathroom entry was open to the gym, the searches were visible to the people in the gym, including male and female cadets, correctional officers, and civilians. Id.
During the searches, the women stood naked in groups of four to ten, so close to one another that their bodies were touching. Id. One by one, they were told to raise their breasts, bend over, spread their buttocks to expose their vaginal and anal cavities, and cough. Id. Menstruating inmates were forced to extract tampons from inside their bodies. Id. The female correctional officers and cadets conducting the searches made derogatory comments and gestures about the women’s bodies and odors, telling the women that they were “dirty bitches,” R110-9 at 2, “fucking disgusting,” “deserve to be in here,” R110-9 at 14, and “smell like death.” R110-9 at 36. Male correctional officers watched the women from the gym. R1103.
The majority holds that the female prisoners have no recourse to the Fourth Amendment because it was they themselves who manipulated and intruded upon their own bodies (although, of course, they had no choice because they were ordered to do so). But surely the collecting of urine in Forbes, 976 F.2d at 315, the catherization challenged in Sparks, see 71 F.3d at 261–62, or the rectal probing in Del Raine, see 32 F.3d at 1039, would not fall outside the Fourth Amendment if the prisoners were forced to perform the acts themselves. The distinction between those cases and this one—in which inmates were ordered to probe their own body cavities and subject them to visual inspection—is difficult to discern.

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Our recent decision in King did confuse the matter somewhat by drawing a line between “intrusions into [prisoners’] bodies”—which we acknowledged might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—and searches involving no such “intrusion.” 781 F.3d at 900. The majority seizes on that language, concluding that any search conducted through only visual means—regardless of the subject of the search (whether insides or outsides) or how that visual inspection was achieved (such as by forcing prisoners to probe and manipulate their own bodies)—is not amenable to Fourth Amendment protection. But I think this reads too much into King.
Remember that the initial inquiry under the Fourth Amendment asks whether the person searched has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched— not whether the method of the search implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, I read King’s reference to “intrusions” to merely restate the rule in this circuit that prisoners retain some expectation of privacy in the insides of their bodies; after all, King did not involve physical “intrusions” of any kind. The means of a search, in my view, are still more pertinent to the second inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—whether the search conducted was reasonable.
The majority also draws support from the existence of the Eighth Amendment, which it feels is a superior vehicle for Appellants’ claims. This position reflects a concern with retaining the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment—the requirement that prisoners seeking to prove “cruel and unusual punishment” show both (1) a violation of their substantive rights and (2) a culpable mental state. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1986). Because the Fourth

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Amendment’s inquiry involves only a determination of “reasonableness,” the majority posits, applying it to prison officials’ conduct “would eliminate the subjective component” required under the Eighth Amendment and would equate convicted prisoners with pretrial detainees.
To be sure, we have recognized that “it is the Eighth Amendment that is more properly posed to protect inmates from unconstitutional strip searches, notably when their aim is punishment, not legitimate institutional concerns.” Peckham, 141 F.3d at 697; see also King, 781 F.3d at 899–900 (distinguishing between the Fourth and Eighth Amendments); Johnson, 69 F.3d at 147 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment could be used to “overcome calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs”) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530). But I disagree that the Eighth Amendment is superior in all circumstances, or that the application of the Fourth Amendment in this context would simply be redundant of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Peckham, 141 F.3d at 699 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“If the only way to use the fourth amendment in strip-search cases is to make it functionally identical to the cruel and unusual punishments clause, then what’s the point?”).
First, the notion that prisoners may have overlapping constitutional rights is not an alien concept. In fact, we already recognize that prisoners retain other constitutional rights despite the existence of the Eighth Amendment. For instance, an inmate has due process rights as to discipline received in prison, even though such discipline might be considered “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). And an inmate who is barred from practicing his or her religion or from accessing

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the courts may turn to the First Amendment for redress. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1987); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523. The existence of overlapping rights in the Constitution does not require that one right yield to another, but rather suggests that certain spheres of life are constitutionally entitled to greater protection. As we have seen, religion and speech are two of those areas; I would argue that the right to be free from arbitrary searches by the government of one’s insides is another.
Of course, this is not to say that inspections like the one conducted here are categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The concept of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is elastic enough to account for the legitimate needs of prisons, and we always must be mindful that prison administrators should be accorded “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 328 (courts should defer to the expert judgment of correctional officers unless substantial evidence indicates that those officers exaggerated their responses to security concerns). Indeed, courts in other circuits typically defer to prison administrators and uphold searches under the Fourth Amendment, unless the intrusion on a prisoner’s privacy is widely disproportionate to the purported justification for the search. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding as reasonable visual body-cavity searches of groups of prisoners returning from work duty); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226–28 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a visual body-cavity search where the prisoner failed to present evidence that it was unreasonable); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656–57 (8th Cir.

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1989) (holding that visual body-cavity searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they were justified by “legitimate security concerns”).
Furthermore, this case illustrates why there is still a distinct role for the Fourth Amendment in prisons. Here, although Appellees now attempt to craft a security-based justification for the searches, the summary judgment record indicates that the primary reason was training. Surely a “training” justification need not be treated with the same level of deference as a search conducted due to concerns over smuggled weapons or other contraband? It is rationales like this—that fall somewhere between legitimate security concerns and unjustified harassment—that suggest the continuing need for the Fourth Amendment even in prisons.
In this case, I would start by asking if the prisoners in question had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject of the searches—i.e., in the insides of their bodies and body cavities. To that I would answer yes, and I believe that answer would be supported by precedent in this circuit, although it still needs decisive resolution. See, e.g., Sparks, 71 F.3d at 261– 62; Del Raine, 32 F.3d at 1039; Forbes, 976 F.2d at 312–13.
Only after concluding that a protectible interest exists would I address the searches’ justification and methodology in the context of deciding whether the searches were reasonable. This question of reasonableness necessarily requires “a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails,” including “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. This two-step approach is precisely what was done in Florence. See 566 U.S. at

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325–38 (considering a variety of administrative factors in determining whether a search was reasonable as to pretrial detainees). Because the district court in this case ended its Fourth Amendment analysis after deciding that Appellants had no legitimate expectation of privacy, I would vacate and remand for full consideration of the reasonableness factors.
As a final note, the peculiar circumstances of this case raise the question of whether the time has come for this Court to reconsider its broader position with respect to the application of the Fourth Amendment to inmates’ bodies generally. As the concurring opinion in King pointed out, the distinction this Court has drawn between the interior and exterior of a prisoner’s body was not required by the Supreme Court in Hudson or any subsequent case. See 781 F.3d at 902–04 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And a position recognizing an inmate’s expectation of privacy in his or her body—inside and out—would be consistent with that of every other circuit to have addressed this issue; each has assumed the application of the Fourth Amendment and moved on to address the question of reasonableness. See generally Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 445–46 (1st Cir. 1991); Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2016); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 2016); Lewis, 870 F.3d at 368–69; Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2013); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656–57 (8th Cir. 1989); Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226–28; Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 
 Hammoud, Tanya 10/4/2020 For Educational Use Only
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (2020)
969 F.3d 769 United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Delores HENRY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
Melody HULETT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-4234 |
Argued May 14, 2020 |
Decided August 11, 2020
Synopsis Background: Female inmates filed class action seeking damages and injunctive relief under § 1983, based on allegations that state prison officials violated their rights under Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment by forcing them to undergo mass strip searches as part of training exercise for cadet guards. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Richard Mills, Senior District Judge, 2016 WL 11265636, entered summary judgment in officials' favor on Fourth Amendment claim, and later entered judgment on jury verdict in officials' favor on Eighth Amendment claim. Inmates appealed. The Court of Appeals, 930 F.3d 836, affirmed. Rehearing en banc was granted.
On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, St. Eve, Circuit Judge, held that the Fourth Amendment protects, in a severely limited way, an inmate's right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand, overruling Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, and King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889.
Judgment of district court reversed; remanded.
Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion for Summary Judgment.
*773 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 12-CV-3087 — Richard Mills, Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Ruth Z. Brown, Tara E. Thompson, Michael Kanovitz, Debra Loevy, Attorneys, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffsAppellants.
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, Jane E. Notz, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Matthew Callahan, Attorney, Muslim Advocates, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Muslim Advocates.

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Hammoud, Tanya 10/4/2020 For Educational Use Only
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (2020)
Daniel Greenfield, Attorney, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Chicago, IL, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union.
Nicole Brianne Godfrey, Laura Lee Rovner, Attorneys, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Denver, CO, for Amicus Curiae Martin F. Horn.
Michael J. Faris, Attorney, Latham & Watkins LLP, Chicago, IL, for Amicus Curiae Legal Scholars.
Jessica Lynn Ellsworth, Attorney, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project.
Meir Feder, Attorney, Jones Day, New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae Scholars of the Law of Prisons.
Seth P. Waxman, Attorney, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Mental Health Professionals.
Before Sykes, Chief Judge, and Flaum, Easterbrook, Manion, Kanne, Rovner, Wood, Hamilton, Barrett, Brennan, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
St. Eve, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs—a class of more than 200 current and former female inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center—brought this action following mass strip searches conducted as part of a cadet training exercise in 2011. They contend that the circumstances of the searches—particularly the intrusive and degrading manner in which they occurred—violated their Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights.
Defendants—various prison officials—moved for summary judgment before the district court, arguing that our circuit's prior decisions foreclosed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. The district court agreed, concluding that, under *774 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), and King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), convicted prisoners do not maintain a privacy interest during visual inspections of their bodies. A divided panel of our court affirmed that decision, following the same reasoning. We granted Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel's opinion and judgment.
We hold that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. We therefore reverse the district court's entry of partial summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background
A. Factual Background We consider the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties, as we must do when reviewing a district court's grant of a summary judgment motion. Hall v. City of Chicago, 953 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2020). On March 31, 2011, administrators at Lincoln Correctional Center—a medium security facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) in Logan County, Illinois, housing approximately 1,000 female inmates—held a cadet training exercise. This training exercise simulated a “mass shakedown”—a practice where IDOC employees search inmates’ living areas and perform strip searches of

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Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (2020)
the inmates’ persons to find contraband. Lincoln Warden Melody Hulett testified that she could not “think of any reason other than the training of cadets that [she] ordered a shakedown on March 31st, 2011, at the Lincoln facility.” No evidence in the record indicates the presence of an ongoing emergency or heightened concern on the day that the training exercise took place.
Orange Crush tactical team members, cadets from the IDOC training academy, and correctional officers at Lincoln carried out the mass shakedown. Orange Crush members donned full riot gear—wearing helmets, armored vests, and military boots and carrying batons, pepper spray, and shields. After attending a briefing, Orange Crush members, correctional officers, and cadets stormed two housing units—ones that Hulett chose at random—banging their batons on the walls, doors, and their hands. As the exercise began in the early morning, correctional officers and cadets yelled at inmates to wake up and form a line.
Correctional officers and cadets lined up 200 of the inmates in rows, forced them to stand facing the wall, called them “bitches,” and threatened to put them in segregation if they were not quiet. Cadets practiced handcuffing prisoners. Some elderly prisoners cried in pain as a result of standing for a long period while handcuffed. Prisoners are typically handcuffed at Lincoln only when sent to the segregation unit for committing a serious violation of a prison rule.
The officers directed the women to the gym while screaming obscenities at them and calling them sexually derogatory names. In the gym, correctional staff forced the women to stand facing the wall, shoulder to shoulder. Orange Crush members and other officers ordered cadets to perform strip searches on groups of four to ten women at a time. Prisoners were required to stand until cadets strip searched them—in some cases waiting five to seven hours. The women could not sit, get a drink of water, or use the restroom for the duration of the training exercise.
Female cadets performed the strip searches, which occurred in a bathroom and beauty shop adjacent to the gym. The bathroom was open to the gym, allowing *775 many male correctional officers and cadets to see the strip searches taking place. The beauty shop was also visible from the gym and had mirrored walls, allowing those passing by to witness the strip searches. As a result, many people who were not performing the strip searches nevertheless observed the female inmates.
When cadets strip searched the women, they forced them to remove all clothing and stand in a line, nearly shoulder to shoulder. Officers and cadets ordered the women to raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around and bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough several times. Women were forced to stand naked for as long as fifteen minutes, far longer than a typical strip search because of its group nature.
During the searches, correctional officers made demeaning and derogatory insults, calling Plaintiffs “dirty bitches.” One commented: “No man wants to be with you because you smell like death.” Plaintiffs declared that they received comments like “Your Pussy stinks,” “You all are fucking disgusting,” and “I can't believe women smell like this.”
The officers and cadets ordered menstruating prisoners to remove feminine products and dispose of them on the floor and in overflowing garbage cans, in full view of others. Women stood barefoot on the bathroom floor, which was dirty with menstrual blood and other bodily fluids. While they waited in the gym for the searches to finish, women did not receive replacement feminine hygiene products and were left to bleed on themselves for several hours, soaking through their clothes and getting blood on their legs and feet.
During the strip searches, one inmate pulled three pills out of her vaginal cavity. Prison officials recovered contraband from the cells of approximately 45 of the 200 inmates. Dozens of prisoners submitted grievances after the exercise. Many never received a response. No one ever completed an internal investigation, and no employee received any discipline.

B. Procedural Background

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Hammoud, Tanya 10/4/2020 For Educational Use Only
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (2020)
Ieshia Brown, Delores Henry, Patricia Philipps, and Jacqueline Hegwood filed a putative class action alleging that Warden Melody Hulett, Assistant Warden Russell Reynolds, and a group of other supervisors and correctional officers violated their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief prohibiting future public group strip searches during cadet training exercises.
The district court certified several classes seeking both damages and injunctive relief: (1) women subjected to the March 2011 searches who remain in IDOC custody; (2) women subjected to the March 2011 strip searches who had been released from custody; and (3) women who are currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, the facility that now houses all of the inmates formerly at Lincoln, or will be incarcerated there in the future.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. In their motion, Defendants did not dispute that Plaintiffs’ factual assertions, if true, supported an Eighth Amendment claim. Regarding Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, however, Defendants argued that, pursuant to Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), and Johnson, “there is no Fourth Amendment protection against searches for prison inmates.” Defendants did not raise a qualified immunity defense, nor did they argue that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of physical injury pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. The court reasoned *776 that the strip searches here were limited to visual inspections of the naked body, putting them squarely in line with our decisions in Johnson and King. These cases, the court concluded, foreclosed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. Because the district court concluded that no relief was available to Plaintiffs under the Fourth Amendment, it did not perform the reasonableness analysis that Fourth Amendment claims demand.
The parties proceeded to trial on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim. The court instructed the jury that, to prevail, Plaintiffs had to prove that each defendant “was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that the strip searches were being conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain.” During closing arguments, Defendants stressed: “To prevail, the plaintiffs need to prove that these individuals intended for them to be harassed and humiliated, for them to suffer psychological pain during these strip searches, that they didn't truly intend to find contraband to conduct the strip search.” The jury returned a verdict for Defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's summary judgment ruling on their Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that the district court erred in holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect prisoners during visual bodily searches. In addition to defending the district court's ruling, and after failing to raise the issue below, Defendants argued that we should affirm the district court's decision because, even if the Fourth Amendment does cover the searches at issue, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs are not eligible to receive the relief they seek for several reasons, including that they may not receive compensatory damages because they did not present evidence of physical injury pursuant to the PLRA and that the district court erred in certifying Plaintiffs’ damages classes. Plaintiffs did not appeal the jury verdict on their Eighth Amendment claim.
A divided panel of our court affirmed the district court's judgment. Relying on Hudson and King, the panel determined that the strip searches fell outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. We granted Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel's opinion and judgment.
II. Discussion

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Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (2020)
We review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo and consider the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hall, 953 F.3d at 950. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A. Fourth Amendment We first address the issue at the heart of this appeal: whether convicted prisoners retain a Fourth Amendment right to privacy during visual inspections of their bodies. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Strip and body cavity searches are “searches” of “persons” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326–27, 339, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
The “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” *777 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The Fourth Amendment does not protect every subjective expectation of privacy, but those expectations “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). Assessing whether a search violated a person's Fourth Amendment rights “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the specific question of whether convicted prisoners maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies when it comes to visual strip searches. In Bell v. Wolfish, while addressing a Fourth Amendment claim against a policy of routinely strip searching inmates after contact visits, the Court assumed without deciding “that inmates, both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility.” 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
Subsequently, in Hudson, the Court announced a limited categorical rule: the “Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (emphasis added). Importantly, Hudson left open the question of whether, and to what extent, prisoners maintain a right to privacy in their bodies. As we have stated before, we do not read Hudson so broadly as to foreclose that right. See Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Hudson did not require the Court to decide what interests prisoners retain in their bodies, as opposed to their surroundings.”); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]rison inmates retain protected privacy rights in their bodies, although these rights do not extend to their surroundings.” (citing Hudson)). Justice O'Connor’s concurrence in Hudson emphasized the narrowness of the Court's holding: the Court addressed specifically inmates’ “privacy and possessory interests in personal effects” and “searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell,” not the entirety of rights potentially available to inmates under the Fourth Amendment. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although our dissenting colleague asserts that a conviction extinguishes all of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has never extended the scope of Hudson to exclude any aspect of a prisoner's life beyond her cell from the reaches of the Fourth Amendment. See King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[N]othing in Hudson indicates the Supreme Court intended to abrogate a prisoner's expectation of privacy beyond his cell.”).
Although it did so in Hudson, the Court generally advises “caution in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable” as a categorical rule in a particular context. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (majority opinion); see also id. at 537, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment ‘reasonableness’ determination is generally conducted on a case-by-case basis[.]”). We do not think it naturally follows that, because the Court created a categorical exception to a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights in her cell, the Court intended to expand that rule to also deprive a prisoner

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of all Fourth Amendment protections in her body. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated several times *778 that the privacy interest in one's body is more acute than the interest in one's property. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (“highly intrusive searches of the person” implicate “dignity and privacy interests” that “simply do not carry over to vehicles”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (recognizing that searches of a person's body receive “significantly heightened protection” under the Fourth Amendment as compared with property searches); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91–92, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that a search warrant for a tavern and its bartender did not permit body searches of all the bar's patrons); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (holding that probable cause to search a car did not justify a body search of a passenger). These decisions, at the very least, deter us from assuming that one's privacy interest in her property is tantamount to one's privacy interest in her person.
Although Hudson does not directly address the issue before us, it frames our analysis. No “iron curtain” separates prisons from the Constitution. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Thus, prisoners must “be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.” Id. And, as in all other Fourth Amendment inquiries, prisoners retain Fourth Amendment rights only if a “ ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ ” is at stake. Id. at 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577). As a practical matter, certain rights must be restricted to make way for “a myriad of ‘institutional needs and objectives’ of prison facilities.” Id. at 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (“[S]imply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations.”).
In Hudson, the Court concluded that the right to privacy in possessions and living quarters was one such right that must succumb to these concerns, as it was “fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.” 468 U.S. at 527–28, 104 S.Ct. 3194. As a result, the Court held that “society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell.” Id. at 525–26, 104 S.Ct. 3194. We similarly must now decide whether an inmate's expectation of bodily privacy “is the kind of expectation that ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ ” given the safety and security concerns inherent to the prison context. Id. at 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507).
Strip searches are “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.” Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). We have recognized that “[o]ne of the clearest forms of degradation in Western Society is to strip a person of his clothes. The right to be free from strip searches and degrading body inspections is thus basic to the concept of privacy.” Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994). The privacy interest in one's body is clearly a heightened and fundamental one. And while prison security requires officials to constantly monitor prisoners’ cells, the same is not true of their unclothed persons.
*779 We conclude that a diminished right to privacy in one's body, unlike a right to privacy in one's property and surroundings, is not fundamentally incompatible with imprisonment and is an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. We therefore join every other circuit to have addressed the question and hold that the Fourth Amendment protects (in a severely limited way) an inmate's right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand. See, e.g., Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 445–46 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016); Bushee v. Angelone, 7 F. App'x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2013); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656–57 (8th Cir. 1989); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2010); Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2002); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus, when evaluating a prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip or body cavity search, courts must assess that search for its reasonableness, considering “the scope of the

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particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
We highlight that our holding today—that inmates maintain a privacy interest, although diminished, in their bodies—pertains to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners alike. Importantly, Hudson drew no distinction between these two categories in its analysis; rather, the Court focused on the heightened concerns over safety and security emblematic of any detention facility. The Court explained:
[P]rison administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also visitors. They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the schemes materialize.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526–27, 104 S.Ct. 3194. These concerns relate to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. The Court has instructed that “[t]here is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates. Indeed, it may be that in certain circumstances they present a greater risk to jail security and order.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 n.28, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 334–37, 132 S.Ct. 1510. As a result, the principle of “ ‘mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution’ ... applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (citation omitted). Contrary to the assertion of our dissenting colleague, neither Bell nor Florence limited its holding solely to pretrial detainees. As stated above, Bell expressly assumed that convicted prisoners retain Fourth Amendment rights.
Indeed, many of our sister circuits have concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects a limited right to bodily privacy *780 for convicted prisoners, specifically. See, e.g., Cookish, 945 F.2d at 445–46 (concluding the principle that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of convicted prisoners was well established); Harris, 818 F.3d at 58 n.2 (“Bell arose in the context of a pretrial detainee strip-search policy, but its framework is equally applicable to convicted inmates challenging isolated searches.”); Parkell, 833 F.3d at 324–25 (concluding that the Bell balancing test applies to a convicted prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim); Hutchins, 512 F.3d at 196 (reiterating “that the Fourth and not the Eighth Amendment governs searches of prisoners”); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that “a convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable expectations of privacy while in prison”); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331–32 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing visual body cavity searches of convicted prisoners for reasonableness); Fortner, 983 F.2d at 1030 (recognizing a convicted prisoner's right to bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment). We are not aware of any decision from another circuit court that has announced this right extinguishes upon conviction. *
1. The Interplay of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments Defendants argue that recognizing a Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy, as we do today, undermines the validity of the Eighth Amendment. Applying the Fourth Amendment to strip searches of convicted inmates, they contend, nullifies the Eighth Amendment's subjective intent requirement by permitting Plaintiffs to prove only the objective unreasonableness of the searches. We conclude that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment does not compromise the heightened standard of the Eighth.

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As Defendants concede, constitutional rights can co-exist inside the walls of a prison just as they do outside: prisoners, like all citizens, benefit from the protection of numerous enumerated constitutional rights, and these rights may sometimes overlap. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (“We have rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another.”). As the Supreme Court explained in Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992), “Where ... multiple violations are alleged,” courts do not search for “the claim's ‘dominant’ character” and limit their inquiry to one body of constitutional law. Id. at 70, 113 S.Ct. 538. Instead, they “examine each constitutional provision in turn.” Id. True, the Supreme Court has *781 held unenumerated rights—such as those arising from the due process clause—do not afford a prisoner greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). But this conclusion is specific to the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence—claims “covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment ... must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).
Accordingly, in several circumstances, the Court has deemed that other, enumerated constitutional rights afford prisoners certain protections alongside the Eighth Amendment safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555– 56, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (recognizing due process rights as applied to discipline received in prison); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–50, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (recognizing First Amendment right to freedom of religion in prison); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968) (per curiam) (recognizing equal protection rights in prison). Similarly, we have previously concluded that the digital rectal search of a prisoner “falls under both the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.” Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994).
Importantly, the Fourth and Eighth Amendments have different roles to play with respect to bodily searches and protect different categories of constitutional rights. The Eighth Amendment safeguards prisoners against the use of searches that correctional officers subjectively intend as a form of punishment. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319–20, 106 S.Ct. 1078. Because reasonableness is an objective test, a defendant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant to a court's Fourth Amendment analysis. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 398, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (“[T]he terms ‘cruel’ and ‘punishments’ clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the term ‘unreasonable’ does not.”). The Fourth Amendment thus protects prisoners from searches that may be related to or serve some institutional objective, but where guards nevertheless perform the searches in an unreasonable manner, in an unreasonable place, or for an unreasonable purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This last consideration is particularly salient in the case before us: certainly, a court need not give as much deference to a prison administrator's assessment of the necessity of a training exercise as it does to measures taken in response to the actual presence of weapons, contraband, or other immediate security concerns.

2. Right to Bodily Privacy in Visual Inspections Although today we announce that convicted prisoners maintain a right to bodily privacy during visual inspections of their bodies, we have not always been so clear. In the wake of Hudson, we have taken different, sometimes conflicting, approaches to addressing the scope of that right. In several cases, we concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects some degree of privacy as pertains to bodily searches. See, e.g., *782 Peckham v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (“So, does a prison inmate enjoy any protection at all under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures? ... [W]e think the answer is ‘yes[.]’ ”); Sparks, 71 F.3d at 260 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment applies to the involuntary catheterization of an inmate); Del Raine, 32 F.3d at 1039 (noting that the execution of a digital rectal probe of an inmate for contraband falls “under both the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment”); Canedy, 16 F.3d at 185– 86 (applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test announced in Bell to strip searches); Forbes, 976 F.2d at 312–13

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(concluding that urine tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that these searches must be reasonable pursuant to Bell). Indeed, in Canedy, we explained that Hudson foreclosed some but not all of an inmate's Fourth Amendment rights:
Some diminution of privacy is of course to be expected in prison. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (prisoners are entitled to no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells insuring them of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). Inmates surely do not enjoy the full sweep of constitutional rights afforded other members of society. But even so, those who are convicted of criminal offenses do not surrender all of their constitutional rights.
16 F.3d at 185. We then concluded that body cavity “searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.” Id. at 186 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861). And in Sparks, we recognized, “Certainly Hudson does not establish that the interior of one's body is as open to invasion as the interior of one's cell.” 71 F.3d at 261.
But we have at least one decision pointing in a different direction. In Johnson, we broadly announced that Hudson held that any Fourth Amendment right to privacy extinguished upon conviction, and we affirmed the dismissal of an inmate's Fourth Amendment claim regarding observation of his naked body on that basis. 69 F.3d at 146, 150. Thus, in King, we attempted to reconcile this inconsistency in our case law with a bright-line rule: that prisoners retain an expectation of privacy regarding physical intrusions into their bodies—such as during digital rectal probes and forced catheterizations—but not visual inspections of them. 781 F.3d at 899–901.
As our colleague initially explained in his concurrence in King, this rule is untenable. 781 F.3d at 901–04 (Hamilton, J., concurring). To begin, it draws no support from Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, the strip searches the Court evaluated using a reasonableness analysis in Bell and Florence were visual. Bell, 441 U.S. at 528, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Florence, 566 U.S. at 325, 132 S.Ct. 1510. No other circuit has announced (nor ever entertained the notion) that the Fourth Amendment reaches only searches that involve a physical intrusion by a searching official. This is for good reason, as searches may be attributed to law enforcement when they do not physically do the searching, but it occurs at their command. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420–21, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) (describing a demand by officers for hotel owners to produce records as a search); see also United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when police command a person to reveal something in which he would otherwise have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that thing or that area is revealed as a result of the command.”). This is consistent with the overarching focus of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness *783 analysis, which evaluates an individual's expectation of privacy “in what was searched,” not who did the searching. United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). To conclude otherwise promotes a distinction without a difference: whereas a manual body cavity search conducted by a prison official would fall within the domain of the Fourth Amendment, a search in which an officer orders a prisoner to manipulate her own body and merely looks on would avoid review. In light of these considerations, we thus overrule the section of King addressing the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim and the bright-line rule it announced.
Likewise, we overrule our decision in Johnson to the extent it deems the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to visual inspections during bodily searches. That case, like the one we address today, involved visual bodily searches, although of a less intrusive manner: male prisoners raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to female officers routinely and incidentally observing them in various states of undress in their prison cells, showers, and toilets. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145. In Johnson, we read Hudson as eliminating all rights to privacy under the Fourth Amendment within prisons and thus affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim on that basis. Id. at 146, 150. That reasoning does not survive today's holding. We do note, however,

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that the result in Johnson would have been no different under a reasonableness analysis, given the limited nature of the intrusions at issue and the ever-present institutional concerns over safety and security.
3. Deference to Prison Administrators Having determined that the Fourth Amendment governs the searches at issue here, we turn our attention to how courts must perform the resulting reasonableness analysis and the various considerations they should weigh. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. When evaluating reasonableness, in the context of strip searches of prisoners as in others, courts must afford prison administrators “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 328, 132 S.Ct. 1510. Thus, “in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)).
Accordingly, in Florence, the Supreme Court noted that “[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process,” and that visual bodily inspections for symbols of gang affiliation and contraband that could create safety and security concerns are generally reasonable. 566 U.S. at 330–34, 132 S.Ct. 1510. And in Bell, the Court concluded that visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees after contact visits, absent evidence officials performed the searches in an unreasonable manner, did not violate inmates’ Fourth Amendment rights. 441 U.S. at 558–60, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that prison officials may strip and body cavity search inmates, if the officials conduct those searches in an appropriate manner, because of concerns regarding safety and security. Likewise, incidental observations of undressed inmates—particularly ones that are infrequent or at a distance—that are inherent to the continuous surveillance necessary in prisons are almost always reasonable. Cf. *784 Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985).
Consistent with the principle of deference to the judgment of prison administrators, several of our sister circuits, after undertaking a reasonableness analysis of prison strip searches, have concluded that these searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment where the level of intrusion does not outweigh the purported justification for the search. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sec'y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding as reasonable visual body cavity searches of prisoners returning from work); Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1227–28 (upholding a visual body cavity search where the prisoner failed to produce evidence that it was unreasonable); Franklin, 883 F.2d at 656–57 (holding that visual body cavity searches that were justified by “legitimate security concerns” did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332–33 (policy of performing visual body cavity searches every time prisoner left or returned to maximum security unit served legitimate penological interest of institutional security); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 190–92 (5th Cir. 1994) (“en mass” visual body cavity searches in a nonprivate area were reasonable to effectively respond to a spike in prison violence). The Fourth Amendment can, and must, account for institutional concerns.
As these many decisions demonstrate, though, the fact that institutional concerns significantly diminish the privacy rights of persons in prison does not mean that the Fourth Amendment provides no protection at all. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry in other settings where individuals also have “significantly diminished” privacy rights. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–20, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (applying a reasonableness analysis to the search of a probationer's home, although probationers “do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled”); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–55, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (considering the weakness of a parolee's privacy interest and the strength of the government's interest in public safety to uphold a suspicionless search of a parolee as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
4. Reasonableness of the Search

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Finally, although we have concluded that the Fourth Amendment applies to the strip and body cavity searches at issue, this does not mean that Plaintiffs are necessarily entitled to a trial on their Fourth Amendment claim. They still must provide sufficient evidence that the searches were unreasonable, considering “the scope of the particular intrusion[s], the manner in which [they were] conducted, the justification for initiating [them], and the place in which [they were] conducted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
Citing security concerns and the need for cadet training, Defendants argue that the searches at issue were reasonable. We do not resolve today, however, whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding the reasonableness of the searches. Because the district court concluded the Fourth Amendment did not cover the searches at issue here, it did not perform a reasonableness analysis. Indeed, Defendants, in their motion to strike Plaintiffs’ response to their motion for summary judgment, conceded that “[t]he nature of the searches and whether they were conducted in the manner claimed by Plaintiffs are clearly in dispute.” On this record, we cannot determine whether the searches were, in fact, reasonable. We thus leave that analysis to the district court to perform in the first instance on remand.

*785 B. Qualified Immunity In the alternative, Defendants argue that we should affirm the district court's judgment on the ground that they are entitled to qualified immunity. They contend that, as of March 2011, it was not clearly established that a visual strip and body cavity search of a prisoner could violate the Fourth Amendment.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Whether a right is clearly established hinges on the “objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Id. at 244, 129 S.Ct. 808 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). A clearly established right is one that is “dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’ ” District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). “It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. at 590. The right must be established not as a general proposition but in a particularized manner so its contours are clear to a reasonable official. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012).
As a threshold matter, we must first determine whether this defense is properly before us. Courts generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). “The underlying concern is to ensure that the opposing party is not prejudiced by being denied sufficient notice to respond to an argument.” Hernandez v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived, or at least forfeited, their qualified immunity defense by failing to raise it at summary judgment before the district court. Defendants concede that they failed to raise the defense in their summary judgment briefs, but they contend that they neither waived nor forfeited the defense because they asserted it in their answer and interrogatory responses.
Because Defendants failed to raise their qualified immunity defense in their summary judgment motion before the district court, and instead raised it for the first time in their appellate brief, they have waived it for purposes of this appeal. See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 449 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting defendants waived the argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity by failing to raise it before the district court). This is true even though Defendants asserted qualified immunity in their answer and interrogatory responses. See, e.g., Maul v. Constan, 928 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1991) (raising a qualified immunity

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defense in an answer “is not sufficient to prevent a finding of waiver because the defendants did not preserve the point when they had subsequent opportunity to do so”). We have previously said we will “not affirm a judgment based on an affirmative defense raised for the first time on appeal.” *786 McDonald v. Adamson, 840 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we will not consider the merits of Defendants’ qualified immunity defense at this stage.
Even if we viewed Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity as only forfeited, the outcome is no different. Waiver and forfeiture are distinct legal concepts. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017). Whereas waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” forfeiture is the mere failure to raise a timely argument, due to either inadvertence, neglect, or oversight. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957, 961 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2013). In the criminal context, the distinction between waiver and forfeiture is critical: while waiver precludes review, forfeiture permits a court to correct an error under a plain error standard. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731–35, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). This distinction between waiver and forfeiture and its relevance have been less clear in the civil context. In past decisions, we have not consistently used forfeiture “as a way to signal whether plain error review applies” in civil cases. Williams, 724 F.3d at 961 n.2.
We therefore clarify that “our ability to review for plain error in civil cases is severely constricted,” as “a civil litigant ‘should be bound by his counsel's actions.’ ” SEC v. Yang, 795 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1360 (7th Cir. 1988)). Indeed, in civil cases, “we typically will not entertain an argument raised for the first time on appeal, even for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether a plain error occurred.” CNH Indus. Am. LLC, 882 F.3d at 705. Plain error review is available in civil cases only in the rare situation where a party can demonstrate that: “(1) exceptional circumstances exist; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur if plain error review is not applied.” Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick, 886 F.3d 626, 636 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 839 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med., 800 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2015); Yang, 795 F.3d at 679. The determination of what circumstances fit these criteria is solely within our discretion. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868 (“The matter of what question may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule.”).
Even if Defendants had only forfeited their qualified immunity defense, this case does not present an exceptional circumstance that would warrant its consideration in the first instance on appeal. We do not aim today, however, to provide a comprehensive list of considerations that meet the relevant criteria. It suffices to say that Defendants may still assert the defense in later proceedings on remand, even though they did not properly preserve it in the district court for purposes of this appeal. True, “the most appropriate time to raise the qualified immunity issue is in a motion for summary judgment filed before allowing discovery.” Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 842 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 799–800 n.7 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). But we have previously recognized that, “[a]lthough the benefit of immunity from suit is effectively lost once the parties go *787 to trial, we allow plaintiffs to use ‘qualified immunity’ as a defense to liability at any stage in the litigation.” Alvarado v. Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 451 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308–311, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (allowing appeals resolving the question of entitlement to qualified immunity at multiple stages of litigation). Thus, despite their failure to properly preserve the issue for purposes of this appeal, Defendants may still invoke the defense in a later motion before the district court. See Cygnar, 865 F.2d at 842 n.16; see also Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2017). With the defense still available to Defendants, there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice.

C. Defendants’ Other Arguments Defendants argue that—if not on the scope of the Fourth Amendment or qualified immunity—we should affirm the judgment of the district court on multiple alternate grounds. We do not reach any of these arguments.

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To begin, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of physical injury as the PLRA demands they must in order to receive compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Defendants did not raise this argument below, and therefore have waived it for purposes of this appeal. Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).
In addition, Defendants raise several other arguments that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek, namely, that Plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive relief pursuant to City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), that Plaintiffs are unable to obtain compensatory damages as to Hulett because they brought no individual capacity claims against her, and that Plaintiffs may not receive punitive damages because the jury found for Defendants on their Eighth Amendment claim, which mirrors the standard for punitive damages. Because the district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, it did not assess any of these arguments pertaining to the availability of remedies as to that claim. We thus also leave these issues for the district court's initial determination on remand.
Lastly, Defendants seek decertification of Plaintiffs’ damages classes. Defendants did not file a cross-appeal to challenge the district court's class certification decision. As a general rule, an appellee must file a cross-appeal when he seeks to expand his own rights under the district court's judgment or to diminish the rights of the appellant. United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924); Wellpoint, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 599 F.3d 641, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2010). As Defendants’ challenge to the district court's class certification decision seeks to diminish Plaintiffs’ rights, it is outside the scope of our review absent a cross-appeal. Cf. Weitzenkamp v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 661 F.3d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A cross-appeal is appropriate only if a prevailing party seeks a judgment different from that rendered by the district court. ... [C]ross-appeals are not appropriate in routine cases like ours that raise only alternate grounds for affirmance of the judgment and not an independent issue like the propriety of class certification.” (emphasis added)); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. Emp't Practices Litig., 792 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (indicating decertification of a class was inappropriate where the opposing party dismissed its cross-appeal on that issue); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 88 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to reach the question of class certification without a cross-appeal).
*788 III. Conclusion
“The continuing guarantee of ... substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the essential character of that society.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523–24, 104 S.Ct. 3194. We hold that the Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy is one of those rights that the Constitution guarantees, even though in a significantly diminished way, within the walls of a prison. It does not extinguish upon conviction.
The judgment of the district court is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for the district court to assess in the first instance whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches in question and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, dissenting. My colleagues are right to say that prisoners are entitled to protection from abusive guards. Misbehaving guards can be and are criminally prosecuted, as the guard was in J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc), and many prisoners have tort claims. But our plaintiffs invoke the Constitution rather than other sources of law. Constitutional protection for persons serving sentences following convictions comes from the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.

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The difference between the two is that liability under the Eighth Amendment depends on showing an intent to punish improperly, not simply on taking an action that a court deems unreasonable. Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (mental-state component of Eighth Amendment), with Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (objective standard under Fourth Amendment). Plaintiffs’ claim under the Eighth Amendment was submitted to a jury, which found for the defendants. The jury must have concluded that the defendants did not intend to subject them to unjustified humiliation or otherwise punish them in a way not permitted by the judgments of conviction. The jury's verdict should end the case, not open a new battleground in which judges (and perhaps another jury) determine whether the acts were “reasonable.” The sort of inquiry that my colleagues allow amounts to the objective component of Eighth Amendment analysis without the subjective component—a sort of Eighth Amendment lite. That is not what the Fourth Amendment is about.
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”. It is hard to see how that rule can be applied to convicted prisoners, for the judgment of conviction extinguishes those very rights. Prisoners are removed from their houses, and the jailers obtain custody of their persons; their persons, papers, and effects are under constant supervision. People often describe the Fourth Amendment as a guarantee of privacy, but privacy is incompatible with imprisonment. Guards must be watchful in the cells, in the yards, in the cafeterias, in the showers, and even in the toilets, for violence may be planned or perpetrated in any of those locations. Drugs, weapons, and other contraband may be hidden or distributed there.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), rejected a contention that the Fourth Amendment applies within prison walls after a conviction. What it said is worth repetition:
*789 Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-social criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem. During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions. See Prison Violence, 7 Corrections Compendium (Mar. 1983). Additionally, informal statistics from the United States Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal system during 1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in 1981 and 1982 over 750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison personnel.
Within this volatile “community,” prison administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also visitors. They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental tasks, it is incumbent upon

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these officials at the same time to maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasible, given the difficulties of the circumstances.
The administration of a prison, we have said, is “at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. [539] at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 [1974]; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison objectives identified above if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their cells. Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, thus, is imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferreted out and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained.
468 U.S. at 525–27, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (cleaned up). Although the Justices spoke of privacy *790 in cells, everything they said is equally applicable to privacy elsewhere in a prison. Since Hudson, none of the Court's other decisions has suggested that the Fourth Amendment applies to any aspect of prison life—if the inmate has been convicted.
Pretrial detainees pose a different problem, because persons awaiting trial cannot be punished. Restrictions on their liberty are proper only if essential to custody and institutional order. That is why Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012), applied to pretrial detainees both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Convicted prisoners, however, may be punished; they do not retain the rights of detainees. That's the principal point of Hudson and is why the Justices rejected the prisoners’ Fourth Amendment claim without thinking that they had modified Wolfish.
In recent years the Court has repeatedly addressed the question: How long after arrest does the Fourth Amendment remain applicable? Although some decisions suggested that the Fourth Amendment's protections lapse when an arrested person is presented to a judge, see, e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–92, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), more recent decisions have drawn the line at conviction. A detainee retains rights under the Fourth Amendment until conviction. See Manuel v. Joliet, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 911, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017); McDonough v. Smith, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019). After that, the Eighth Amendment sets the limits on institutional management.
The judgment of conviction extinguishes privacy interests, though other interests (such as avoiding gratuitous punishment) remain. If the Fourth Amendment applies to prisoners after convictions, detainees and convicts end up with the same rights. Yet Wolfish, Hudson, and many other decisions hold that these different categories of prisoners have different rights while in custody.
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), rejects a contention that a prisoner's asserted interest in bodily integrity is covered by a constitutional provision other than the Eighth Amendment. In the course of suppressing a riot, guards shot a prisoner, likely unnecessarily. An excessive-force claim by a free person or a pretrial detainee is assessed under the Fourth Amendment. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015). But that is not how Whitley approached an excessive-force claim. The Justices applied the Eighth Amendment (I'll return to how Whitley understands that provision) and rebuffed an invitation to derive rules from elsewhere, such as the Due Process Clauses. Whitley held that the Eighth Amendment supplies the applicable rules for riot-control operations inside prisons—though it took care to observe that this was so because the inmates were not “pretrial detainees or persons enjoying unrestricted liberty” (475 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078).
I recognize that Whitley considered the Due Process Clauses (deemed inapplicable) and the Eighth Amendment (found controlling) rather than the Fourth Amendment, but that is because even the plaintiff seems to have recognized that, in light of Hudson, the Fourth Amendment was off the table. Whitley applies the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth, to a seizure (bullets

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count as seizures), so the majority's distinction between searches and seizures for intra-prison events is not *791 compatible with precedent—or with constitutional text, for the Amendment covers both alike.
In explaining how the Eighth Amendment applies, Whitley stressed the importance of its mental-state requirement—that is, the need to show that the defendants displayed “obduracy and wantonness” (475 U.S. at 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078). They added:

The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure ... does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.

Ibid. In other words, “reasonableness” is a bad standard for assessing prison management. That rules out the Fourth Amendment. The Court added:

Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. That deference extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of prison discipline. It does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice.

Id. at 321–22 (cleaned up).
A reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment withholds that deference. It transfers the effective decisions from wardens and other prison managers to judges and juries. My colleagues suggest that a measure of deference could be preserved by making suitable adjustments to the definition of reasonableness, but, aside from the objection to the Judicial Branch making up constitutional rules as we go along, the problem remains that judges (and jurors) are not prison administrators. What an administrator may deem desirable, even necessary, a juror may deem unwarranted. Jurors aren't trained in prison management and do not have to live with the consequences of errors. But administrators must live with those errors. Guards and prisoners may die if judicial second-guessing hampers prison security. Interfering in training exercises—especially in training about how to search for contraband—poses that risk.
My colleagues say that training sessions aren't really prison management at all, so we need not defer. I don't understand this. Earlier this year the court held in J.K.J. that training for guards is constitutionally mandatory. Now it turns out that training is so collateral to good management that jurors (acting in the name of reasonableness) can design training programs, and that everything Whitley and many similar cases have said about the need to give wardens leeway can be put to one side.
Judges must be modest about their ability to manage other institutions; we are generalists, after all, while wardens are specialists. And it is risible to suggest that jurors, asked to evaluate reasonableness, are more likely than wardens to produce appropriate resolution of the conflict between personal and institutional interests. If prisons are to enjoy the scope of discretion that is essential to sound administration, while protecting prisoners from sadistic conduct, the Eighth Amendment is the right tool for the job.

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All Citations 969 F.3d 769

Footnotes

* The cases our dissenting colleague cites do not stand for the contrary. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), does not suggest that the Fourth Amendment falls away when an arrestee appears before a magistrate. Rather, Wallace held that the statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment begins to run at the time the plaintiff becomes detained pursuant to such process, because that process renders the imprisonment no longer false. Id. at 389–92, 127 S.Ct. 1091. McDonough v. Smith, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019), which likewise addressed the accrual of a § 1983 claim, has even less to say on the post-conviction status of the Fourth Amendment. And, in Manuel v. City of Joliet, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 911, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017), the Court's only relevant statement—“once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out”—reflected merely that “a person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” rather than the Fourth. Id. at 920 n.8. The Supreme Court has never announced nor implied that conviction destroys the entirety of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights.

End of Document

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