U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama (Northeastern) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:17-cv-00270-MHH

Schultz et al v. State of Alabama Assigned to: Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala Case in other court: USCA, 18-13894-H
USCA, 18-13894-H Cause: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

Date Filed: 02/21/2017 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Ray Charles Schultz TERMINATED: 03/27/2018

represented by J Melvin Hasting LAW OFFICE OF MELVIN HASTING LLC P O Box 517 Cullman, AL 35058 256-736-2230 Fax: 256-775-0223 Email: mhasting@hiwaay.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E Drake , II THE DRAKE LAW FIRM 419 Second Avenue SW, Suite B Cullman, AL 35055 256-739-9445 Fax: 256-734-7121 Email: tomdrake@bellsouth.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Davon Treshawn Beebe TERMINATED: 03/27/2018

represented by J Melvin Hasting (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Tyrone Daishawn Beebe TERMINATED: 03/27/2018
Plaintiff James Hugo Sterling TERMINATED: 03/27/2018
Plaintiff Randall Lee Parris
V. Intervenor Plaintiff Randall Parris on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals TERMINATED: 03/27/2018 Intervenor Plaintiff Terry Lelan Turney
Intervenor Plaintiff Jonathan Stark
Intervenor Plaintiff

represented by J Melvin Hasting (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by J Melvin Hasting (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristi Burks TERMINATED: 07/17/2017
Intervenor Plaintiff Kyron Yarbrough
Intervenor Plaintiff Rose Meeks TERMINATED: 03/27/2018
Intervenor Plaintiff Gorman Max Culwell, Jr TERMINATED: 03/27/2018
Intervenor Plaintiff Misti Anderson TERMINATED: 03/27/2018
Intervenor Plaintiff Joshua Ryan Shelton
Intervenor Plaintiff Bradley Hester

represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas E Drake , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Karakatsanis CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 202-681-2409 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Woods AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Criminal Law Reform Project 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212-549-2528 Email: awoods@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brandon Buskey AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 212-284-7364 Email: bbuskey@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Claire Hubbard CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 202-930-3835 Email: katherine@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil K Sawhney 201 St Charles Avenue Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 504-526-1523 Fax: 504-486-8947 Email: neil.sawhney@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall C Marshall AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION, INC P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 334-420-1741 Fax: 334-269-5666 Email: rmarshall@aclualabama.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke 1262 S Lawrence Street Montgomery, AL 36104 334-296-0741 Email: samuel.brooke@gmail.com TERMINATED: 09/15/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra Marie Jordan SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334-531-4447 Fax: 334-956-8481 Email: alexandra.jordan@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brock Boone ACLU FOUNDATION OF ALABAMA P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106 334-420-1747 Fax: 334-269-5666 Email: bboone@aclualabama.org TERMINATED: 02/04/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micah West SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104

V. Defendant State of Alabama
Defendant

334-956-8200 Fax: 334-956-8481 Email: micah.west@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James W Davis OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130-0152 334-242-7300 Fax: 334-353-8400 Email: jim.davis@alabamaag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334-242-7300 Fax: 334-353-8440 Email: laura.howell@alabamaag.gov TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven Troy Marshall OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334-242-7300 Fax: 334-242-4891 Email: smarshall@ago.state.al.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry Matson Executive Director(s) of the Office of Prosecutor Services for the State of Alabama, in office and individual capacity TERMINATED: 06/08/2017
Defendant Randy Helms Administrative Director(s) of hte Alabama Administrative Office of Courts, in official and individual capacity TERMINATED: 06/08/2017
Defendant Matthew Gentry Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama, in official and individual capacity

represented by James W Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James W Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd WEBB & ELEY PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive P O Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334-262-1850 Fax: 334-262-1772 Email: JKidd@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kendrick E Webb WEBB & ELEY PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive PO Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334-262-1850 Fax: 334-262-1889 Email: kwebb@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Steven Marshall Attorney General of the State of Alabama, in official and individual capacity TERMINATED: 06/08/2017

J Randall McNeill WEBB & ELEY PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive PO Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334-262-1850 Fax: 334-262-1889 Email: rmcneill@webbeley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James W Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Defendant
Judge Martha Williams in her official capacity as a Circuit Court Judge for the 32nd Judicial Circuit State of Alabama

represented by Brad A. Chynoweth STATE OF ALABAMA Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Post Office Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334.242.7997 Fax: 334.353.8440 Email: brad.chynoweth@alabamaag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker BALCH & BINGHAM LLP P O Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334-834-6500 Fax: 334-269-3115

Intervenor Defendant
Joan White in her official capacity as a Magistrate

Email: dwalker@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 104 Tallapoosa Street, Suite 200 P O Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334-269-3144 Fax: 866-760-5361 Email: jnaramore@balch.com TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brenton Merrill Smith OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA P.O. Box 300152 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 334-353-4336 Fax: 334-353-8400 Email: Brenton.Smith@AlabamaAG.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant Amy Black in her official capacity as a Magistrate
Intervenor Defendant

James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brenton Merrill Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa McSwain in her official capacity as the Circuit Clerk of Cullman County
Intervenor Defendant Cullman County Commission Intervenor Defendant Kenneth Walker Intervenor Defendant Kerry Watson Intervenor Defendant

represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brenton Merrill Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Garry Marchman Intervenor Defendant Cullman County Sheriffs Office TERMINATED: 06/23/2017 Intervenor Defendant Sheriff Matt Gentry Intervenor Defendant Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC)
Intervenor Defendant Randy Helms in his official capacity as the Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of the Court

represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamie Helen Kidd (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Defendant Judge Kim Chaney
Intervenor Defendant Judge Rusty Turner

J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/28/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Dorman Walker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Wesley Naramore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brenton Merrill Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/21/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/21/2017
02/21/2017 02/21/2017 02/21/2017 02/21/2017 02/23/2017 02/24/2017 03/27/2017 04/03/2017 04/04/2017

# Docket Text

COMPLAINT against State of Alabama filed by Ray Charles

1

Schultz, Davon Treshawn Beebe, James Hugo Sterling, and Tyrone

Daishawn Beebe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1-5, # 2 Exhibits 6-10,

# 3 Exhibits 11-12, # 4 Exhibits 13-15, # 5 Exhibits 16-20,

# 6 Exhibits 21-25, # 7 Exhibits 26-30)(SPT ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

2 MOTION (Application) for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Tyrone Daishawn Beebe. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

3 MOTION (Application) for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by James Hugo Sterling. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

4 MOTION (Application) for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Ray Charles Schultz. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

5 MOTION (Application) for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Davon Treshawn Beebe. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/21/2017)

6 ORDER granting [2,3,4,5] Motions for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by Magistrate Judge Harwell G Davis, III on 2/23/17. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

7 Summons Issued as to State of Alabama by Clerk and delivered to US Marshal (Birmingham) for service. (SPT ) (Entered: 02/24/2017)

8 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Davon Treshawn Beebe. State of Alabama served on 3/27/2017, answer due 4/17/2017. (SPT ) (Entered: 03/28/2017)

9 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by State of Alabama. (Davis, James) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

10 ORDER that the Plaintiffs shall file a response to 9 MOTION to Dismiss within 14 days from the date of entry of this order; Defendant shall file any reply within 7 days thereafter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Harwell G Davis, III on 04/04/17. (SPT ) (Entered: 04/04/2017)

04/04/2017

11 ORDER that the parties are hereby notified that, unless they unanimously consent to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge by no later than May 18, 2017, the case will be reassigned to a randomly-drawn district judge for all purposes. Signed by Magistrate Judge Harwell G Davis, III on 04/04/17. (SPT ) (Entered: 04/04/2017)

04/18/2017

12 RESPONSE in Opposition re 9 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Davon Treshawn Beebe, Tyrone Daishawn Beebe, Ray Charles Schultz. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit exhibit 1-5, # 2 Exhibit exhibit 6-10, # 3 Exhibit exhibit 11-15, # 4 Exhibit exhibit 13-15, # 5 Exhibit exhibit 16-20, # 6 Exhibit exhibit 21-25, # 7 Exhibit 26-30, # 8 Exhibit exhibit 31)(Hasting, J) (Entered: 04/18/2017)

04/18/2017

13 RESPONSE in Opposition re 9 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Davon Treshawn Beebe, Tyrone Daishawn Beebe, Ray Charles Schultz. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 04/18/2017)

04/18/2017 14

AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Ray Charles Schultz, Davon Treshawn Beebe, James Hugo Sterling,

Tyrone Daishawn Beebe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-5, # 2

Exhibit 6-10, # 3 Exhibit 11-12, # 4 Exhibit 13-15,

# 5 Exhibit 16-20, # 6 Exhibit 21-25, # 7 Exhibit 26-

30, # 8 Exhibit 31)(Hasting, J) (Entered: 04/18/2017)

04/19/2017

15 TEXT ORDER finding as moot 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. See ComputerEase Software, Inc. v. Hemisphere Corp., 2007 WL 852103, at *1 (S.D.Ohio Mar.19, 2007) (Since the amended complaint replaces the original complaint, the motion to dismiss the original complaint is moot.... ); Scuba v. Wilkinson, 2006 WL 2794939, at *2 (S.D.Ohio Sept.27, 2006) (Since the amended complaint replaces the original complaint, the motions to dismiss the original complaint are moot. ); Weiss v. Astella Pharma US, Inc., 2006 WL 1285406, at *1 n.1 (E.D.Ky. May 10, 2006) (following amendment of complaint, motions to dismiss the original complaint were moot); Kentucky Press Assn, Inc. v. Kentucky, 355 F.Supp.2d 853, 857 (E.D.Ky. 2005) (Plaintiffs amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, thus making the motion to dismiss the original complaint moot.). Signed by Magistrate Judge Harwell G Davis, III on 4/19/17. (LBG, ) (Entered: 04/19/2017)

05/02/2017 05/02/2017
05/16/2017 05/19/2017
05/30/2017 06/02/2017 06/05/2017 06/05/2017 06/06/2017
06/07/2017

16 MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint by State of Alabama. (Davis, James) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
17 ORDER that Plaintiffs shall file a response to the 16 MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint within 14 days from the date of entry of this order; Defendant shall file any reply within 7 days thereafter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Harwell G Davis, III on 05/02/17. (SPT ) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
18 RESPONSE to Motion re 16 MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Davon Treshawn Beebe, Tyrone Daishawn Beebe. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
19 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT: The parties having not unanimously consented to the dispositive jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge, the above styled civil action has been randomly reassigned to the Honorable Madeline Hughes Haikala. Please use case number 5:17-CV-270-MHH on all subsequent pleadings(AHI) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
20 INITIAL ORDER. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 5/30/2017. (KEK) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
21 MOTION to Amend/Correct by Ray Charles Schultz. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
22 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Deadlines. (Doc. 21 ). Plaintiffs shall file their motion for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2017. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 6/5/2016. (YMB) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
23 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Ray Charles Schultz. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Cooper v. City of Dothan, # 2 Exhibit State of Alabama v. Blake, # 3 Exhibit Statement of Interest Dept of Justice Varden V. City of Clanton)(Hasting, J) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
24 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 23 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order : Motion Hearing set for 6/8/2017 11:00 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 6/6/2017. (KMG) (Entered: 06/06/2017)
25 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE Executed as to 12 Response in Opposition to Motion, Acknowledgement filed by Ray Charles Schultz. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 06/07/2017)

06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/08/2017
06/08/2017
06/08/2017
06/08/2017

26 First MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad testificandum by Ray Charles Schultz. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
27 Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum Issued as to Ray Charles Schultz for 6/8/2017. (KEK) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
28 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE Executed Sheriff Matt Gentry Acknowledgement filed by Ray Charles Schultz. (Hasting, J) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
29 MOTION to Dismiss by Randy Helms, Steven Marshall, Barry Matson. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
30 RESPONSE in Opposition re 23 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Randy Helms, Steven Marshall, Barry Matson, State of Alabama. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
31 MOTION to Intervene by Randall Lee Parris. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
32 NOTICE of Appearance by Jamie Helen Kidd on behalf of Matthew Gentry (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
33 MOTION to Dismiss by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Motion Hearing held on 6/8/2017 re 23 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Ray Charles Schultz. Written order to follow. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
34 ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the remarks made on the record during the June 8, 2017 hearing in this matter, the Court dismisses the plaintiffs' claims against the State of Alabama without prejudice. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on June 8, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
35 ORDER denying 23 Motion for TRO. Consistent with the remarks made during the June 8, 2017 hearing in this matter, on the record currently before the Court, the Court denies the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on June 8, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
36 ORDER granting 29 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the remarks made on the record during the June 8, 2017 hearing in this matter, the Court dismisses the plaintiffs' claims against defendants Marshall,

06/08/2017
06/08/2017 06/12/2017 06/13/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017

Helms, and Matson without prejudice. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on June 8, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
37 ORDER granting 31 Motion to Intervene. Consistent with the remarks made on the record during the June 8, 2017 hearing in this matter, the Court grants Mr. Parris's motion to intervene. Mr. Parris shall file his class action complaint on or before June 12, 2017. Mr. Parris shall obtain waivers of service from the defendants or shall serve his class action complaint on the defendants named in the complaint, and Mr. Parris shall serve the Court's initial order (Doc. 20) on the defendants named in the class action complaint. (See Doc. 20, p. 2). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on June 8, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
38 ORDER denying 33 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the remarks made on the record during the June 8, 2017 hearing in this matter, the Court denies Sheriff Gentry's motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on June 8, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
39 Intervenor COMPLAINT , filed by Randall Lee Parris.(Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
40 INTERVENOR COMPLAINT SUMMONS Issued as to Amy Black, Cullman County Commission, Cullman County Sheriffs Office, Matt Gentry, Randy Helms, Garry Marchman, Lisa McSwain, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson, Joan White, Martha Williams. (KEK) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
41 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Cullman County Sheriffs Office served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
42 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Matt Gentry served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
43 ALIAS INTERVENOR COMPLAINT SUMMONS Issued as to Lisa McSwain. Returned to Plaintiff for service. (KEK) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
44 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Martha Williams served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)

06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/15/2017
06/21/2017 06/21/2017 06/22/2017

45 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Amy Black served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
46 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Joan White served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
47 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Garry Marchman served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
48 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Lee Parris. Kerry Watson served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
49 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Kenneth Walker served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
50 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Cullman County Commission served on 6/13/2017, answer due 7/4/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
51 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Lisa McSwain served on 6/14/2017, answer due 7/5/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
52 AMENDED INTERVENOR COMPLAINT against Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Cullman County Commission, Cullman County Sheriffs Office, Matt Gentry, Randy Helms, Garry Marchman, Lisa McSwain, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson, Joan White, Martha Williams, filed by Randall Parris.(Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
53 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC) served on 6/19/2017, answer due 7/10/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
54 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Randall Parris. Randy Helms served on 6/19/2017, answer due 7/10/2017. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
55 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Randall Parris. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/22/2017

56 NOTICE of Appearance by Jamie Helen Kidd on behalf of Cullman County Commission, Cullman County Sheriffs Office, Matt Gentry, Garry Marchman, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/22/2017

57 MOTION to Strike , OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION to Dismiss by Cullman County Sheriffs Office. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/22/2017

58 ANSWER to 14 Amended Complaint, by Matthew
Gentry.(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

06/23/2017

59 RESPONSE to Motion re 57 MOTION to Strike , OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION to Dismiss filed by Randall Parris. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/23/2017

60 TEXT ORDER: The Cullman County Sheriff's Office filed a motion to strike, or alternatively, a motion to dismiss plaintiff-intervenor Randall Parris's claims against it. (Doc. 57). There being no opposition (see Doc. 59), and for good cause shown, the Court dismisses the Cullman County Sheriff's Office as a party defendant. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 6/23/2017. (KEK) (Entered: 06/23/2017)

06/30/2017 61

AMENDED COMPLAINT against Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Cullman County Commission, Cullman County Sheriffs Office, Matt Gentry, Randy Helms, Garry Marchman, Lisa McSwain, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson, Joan White, Martha Williams, filed by Randall Parris. (Attachments: # 1

Exhibit Letter)(Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 06/30/2017)

07/13/2017

62 TEXT ORDER: The Court SETS this matter for a telephone conference at 3:30 p.m. on July 17, 2017. Counsel shall please dial 877-873-8018 and enter access code 5313999 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 7/13/2017. (KEK) (Entered: 07/13/2017)

07/14/2017

63 MOTION to Strike 61 Amended Complaint, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION to Dismiss by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 07/14/2017)

07/14/2017 07/14/2017 07/14/2017 07/14/2017 07/17/2017 07/17/2017 07/17/2017
07/17/2017

64 Brief re 63 MOTION to Strike 61 Amended Complaint, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION to Dismiss filed by Matthew Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
65 MOTION to Strike 61 Amended Complaint, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION to Dismiss by Cullman County Commission, Garry Marchman, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
66 Brief re 65 MOTION to Strike 61 Amended Complaint, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION to Dismiss filed by Cullman County Commission, Garry Marchman, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
67 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 61) by Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams. (Davis, James) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
68 MOTION to Dismiss by Randall Parris. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 7/17/2017. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
69 ORDER granting 68 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the discussion during the July 17, 2017 telephone conference in this matter, the Court dismisses the following parties from this action: plaintiffs Shawn Smelser, Colin Scott, Christy Burks, and Nicholas Moody, and defendants Kenneth Walker, Garry Marchman, Kerry Watson, and the Cullman County Commission. The Court directs the Clerk to please TERMINATE those parties from this action. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on July 17, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
70 ORDER finding as moot 63 Motion to Strike; finding as moot 63 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the discussion during the July 17, 2017 telephone conference in this matter, the Court finds the defendants' motion to strike and motion to dismiss moot because Mr. Parris, the intervening plaintiff, has withdrawn the amended complaint that he filed on June 30, 2017. Within ten (10) days, Mr. Parris shall file a motion for leave to amend his complaint and shall attach to his motion as an exhibit a copy of his proposed amended

07/17/2017
07/17/2017
07/19/2017 07/20/2017 07/26/2017 08/01/2017

complaint in intervention. Within seven (7) days of the date on which Mr. Parris files his motion to amend his complaint, the defendants may reply to the motion. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on July 17, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
71 ORDER finding as moot 65 Motion to Strike; finding as moot 65 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the discussion during the July 17, 2017 telephone conference in this matter, the Court finds the defendants' motion to strike and motion to dismiss moot because Mr. Parris, the intervening plaintiff, has withdrawn the amended complaint that he filed on June 30, 2017. Within ten (10) days, Mr. Parris shall file a motion for leave to amend his complaint and shall attach to his motion as an exhibit a copy of his proposed amended complaint in intervention. Within seven (7) days of the date on which Mr. Parris files his motion to amend his complaint, the defendants may reply to the motion. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on July 17, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
72 ORDER finding as moot 67 Motion to Dismiss. Consistent with the discussion during the July 17, 2017 telephone conference in this matter, the Court finds the defendants' motion to dismiss moot because Mr. Parris, the intervening plaintiff, has withdrawn the amended complaint that he filed on June 30, 2017. Within ten (10) days, Mr. Parris shall file a motion for leave to amend his complaint and shall attach to his motion as an exhibit a copy of his proposed amended complaint in intervention. Within seven (7) days of the date on which Mr. Parris files his motion to amend his complaint, the defendants may reply to the motion. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on July 17, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
73 NOTICE of Appearance by J Dorman Walker on behalf of Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams (Walker, J) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
74 RULE 26 DISCLOSURES by Randall Parris. (Drake, Thomas) Modified on 7/21/2017 (KEK). (Entered: 07/20/2017)
75 MOTION for Leave to File by Randall Parris. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 07/26/2017)
76 MOTION to Intervene by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1
Exhibit 1: Draft Intervenor Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 2: Draft Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 3 Exhibit 3: Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 4 Exhibit 4: Draft

08/01/2017 08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/02/2017
08/15/2017 08/16/2017 08/16/2017 08/16/2017 08/16/2017

Motion for Class Certification, # 5 Exhibit 5: Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification, # 6 Exhibit 6: Declaration of Bradley Hester)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
77 AFFIDAVIT re 76 MOTION to Intervene - Refiled Attachment 6: Declaration by Bradley Hester. filed by Bradley Hester (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/01/2017)
78 MOTION for Extension of Time by Cullman County Commission, Matt Gentry, Garry Marchman, Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
79 MOTION for Extension of Time by Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
80 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS defendants' Motions for Extension of Time. (Docs. 78 and 79 ). Defendants shall respond to plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (doc. 75 ) and Motion to Intervene (doc. 76 ) on or before August 16, 2017. Plaintiffs may file a reply on or before August 23, 2017. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/2/2017. (YMB) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
81 NOTICE of Appearance by Brad A. Chynoweth on behalf of Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
82 RESPONSE in Opposition re 75 MOTION for Leave to File (a Second Amended Complaint) filed by Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
83 RESPONSE to Motion re 76 MOTION to Intervene (of Bradley Hester) filed by Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
84 RESPONSE to Motion re 76 MOTION to Intervene filed by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
85 RESPONSE to Motion re 75 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Matthew Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/16/2017)

08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017 08/18/2017
09/28/2017 02/21/2018

86 MOTION for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice for Alec George Karakatsanis by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit in Support, # 2 Exhibit - Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
87 MOTION for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice for Katherine Hubbard by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit In Support, # 2 Exhibit - Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
88 MOTION for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice for Brandon Buskey by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit In Support)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
89 MOTION for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice for Andrea Woods by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit In Support, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2913046 (ALND B4601082510). (Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 8/18/2017 (KEK). (Entered: 08/18/2017)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2913070 (ALND B4601082511). (Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 8/18/2017 (KEK). (Entered: 08/18/2017)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2913080 (ALND B4601082512). (Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 8/18/2017 (KEK). (Entered: 08/18/2017)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2913086 (ALND B4601082513). (Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 8/18/2017 (KEK). (Entered: 08/18/2017)
90 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS plaintiff-intervenor Bradley Hester's motions for admission pro hac vice of Alec George Karakatsanis, Katherine Hubbard, Brandon Buskey, and Andrea Woods. (Docs. 86, 87, 88, 89). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/18/2017. (KEK) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
91 MOTION to Certify Class by Randall Parris. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
92 NOTICE by Matthew Gentry re 85 Response to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 02/21/2018)

03/06/2018

93 MOTION to Set Status Conference (UNOPPOSED), MOTION for Leave to File Response to Notice of Supplemental Authority (UNOPPOSED) by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Response to Sheriff Gentry's Notice of Supplemental Authority)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/06/2018)

03/08/2018

94 TEXT ORDER - Plaintiff Bradley Hester has filed an unopposed motion to intervene in this action and attached a proposed intervenor complaint, a proposed motion for a preliminary injunction, and a proposed motion to certify a class. (Doc. 76). The Court GRANTS Mr. Hester's motion to intervene. (Doc. 76). Mr. Hester shall please file his intervenor complaint, his motion for a preliminary injunction, and his motion to certify a class on or before March 12, 2018. The Court GRANTS Mr. Hester's unopposed motion requesting leave to file a response to defendant Sheriff Gentry's notice of supplemental authority (Doc. 93). Mr. Hester shall please file his response on or before March 12, 2018. The Court will hear arguments regarding the plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunction on March 21, 2018 at 10:30 AM, in Courtroom 7B, Hugo L. Black U.S. Courthouse, 1729 5th Ave. N., Birmingham, AL 35203. The defendants may submit written opposition to the requests for preliminary injunction on or before March 14, 2018. The plaintiffs may reply on or before March 19, 2018. At the hearing, the parties shall be prepared to discuss scheduling regarding the plaintiffs' motions for class certification. The Court denies Doc. 55 as MOOT. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/8/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 03/08/2018)

03/09/2018 95

Intervenor COMPLAINT against Sheriff Gentry, Clerk McSwain, Magistrate Black, Magistrate White, Judge Chaney, and Judge Turner, filed by Bradley Hester.(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/09/2018

96 Opposition to re 92 Sheriff Gentry's Notice of Supplemental Authority filed by Bradley Hester. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/09/2018

97 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Brief Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/09/2018

98 NOTICE of Appearance by Micah West on behalf of Bradley Hester (West, Micah) (Entered: 03/09/2018)

03/10/2018

99 ORDER. Intervenor Plaintiff Bradley Hester and Intervenor Defendants Lisa McSwain, Amy Black, Joan White, Kim Chaney, and Rusty Turner have filed a joint motion for extension of time to respond to Mr. Hester's motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc.

03/12/2018 03/12/2018
03/12/2018 03/12/2018 03/12/2018 03/12/2018 03/12/2018

97). The Court SETS this motion for a telephone conference on March 13, 2018, at 3:00 PM. Counsel of record for all parties shall please dial 877-848-7030 and enter access code 4974062 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on March 10, 2018. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 03/10/2018)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Motion Hearing set for 3/13/2018 03:00 PM before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. (KEK) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
100 TEXT ORDER - The Court has reviewed the plaintiffs' complaints and recognizes that there is substantial overlap among the complaints. During the March 13, 2018 telephone conference in this matter, the parties shall be prepared to discuss not only the pending motion for extension of time but also the possibility of a consolidated complaint. The Court anticipates that if the plaintiffs were to proceed pursuant to a consolidated complaint, then distinctions among the scope of the various proposed plaintiff classes potentially could be addressed via subclasses if the plaintiffs are successful in their class certification efforts. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/12/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
101 MOTION to Certify Class by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Affidavit of Brooke in Support, # 4 Affidavit of Karakatsanis in Support, # 5 Affidavit of Buskey in Support)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Bradley Hester. (West, Micah) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
103 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Overlength Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff-Intervenor Hester's Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(West, Micah) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
104 AFFIDAVIT re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 101 MOTION to Certify Class by Sara Wood by Bradley Hester. filed by Bradley Hester (West, Micah) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
105 AFFIDAVIT re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 101 MOTION to Certify Class by Micah West by Bradley Hester. filed by Bradley Hester (Attachments: # 1 Table of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit H, # 7 Exhibit I, # 8 Exhibit J, # 9 Exhibit K, # 10 Exhibit L, # 11 Exhibit M, # 12 Exhibit N, # 13 Exhibit O, # 14 Exhibit V, # 15 Exhibit W, # 16 Exhibit X, # 17 Exhibit AA, # 18 Exhibit BB,

03/13/2018
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03/13/2018
03/14/2018

# 19 Exhibit CC, # 20 Exhibit DD, # 21 Exhibit EE, # 22 Exhibit GG, # 23 Exhibit PP, # 24 Exhibit QQ, # 25 Exhibit RR, # 26 Exhibit SS, # 27 Exhibit TT, # 28 Exhibit UU)(West, Micah) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
106 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff-Intervenor Hester's Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limitation. (Doc. 103 ). PlaintiffIntervenor Hester shall file his memorandum in support of his motion for preliminary injunction as a separate document. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/13/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
107 NOTICE of Appearance by John Wesley Naramore on behalf of Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams (Naramore, John) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
108 Brief re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Bradley Hester. (West, Micah) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 3/13/2018. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
109 TEXT ORDER: The Court SETS this matter for a follow-up Telephone Conference at 3:00 PM CDT on Thursday, 5/5/2018. Counsel of record shall please dial 877-873-8018 and enter access code 5313999 to participate in the conference. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/13/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
110 TEXT ORDER CORRECTING DATE OF TELECONFERENCE: The Court SETS this matter for a Telephone Conference at 3:00 PM on Thursday, 4/5/2018. Counsel of record shall please dial 877873-8018 and enter access code 5313999 to participate in the conference. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/13/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
111 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff Bradley Hester has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 102 ). The Intervenor Defendants shall file their written opposition on or before March 28, 2018. Plaintiff Hester may file a reply on or before April 9, 2018.The Court SETS the Motion for Hearing on Thursday, April 12, 2018, at 10:00 AM, CR 7B, Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/14/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/14/2018)

03/19/2018
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112 Transcript of Proceedings held on 6/8/2017, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 4/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/19/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/17/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
113 NOTICE of Appearance by Brock Boone on behalf of Bradley Hester (Boone, Brock) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
114 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (Unopposed) by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
115 STATUS REPORT Regarding Multiple Complaints and Motion for Class Certification (JOINT) filed by Bradley Hester. filed by Bradley Hester (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
116 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS the Intervenor Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limitation. (Doc. 114 ). Intervenor Defendants' brief in opposition to Intervenor Plaintiff Hester's motion for preliminary injunction shall not exceed 35 pages. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/22/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
117 First MOTION to Dismiss by Misti Anderson, Davon Treshawn Beebe, Tyrone Daishawn Beebe, Kristi Burks, Gorman Max Culwell, Jr, Rose Meeks, Randall Parris, Randall Lee Parris, Ray Charles Schultz, Joshua Ryan Shelton, Jonathan Stark, James Hugo Sterling, Terry Lelan Turney, Kyron Yarbrough. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
118 NOTICE of Appearance by J Randall McNeill on behalf of Matthew Gentry (McNeill, J) (Entered: 03/26/2018)
119 ORDER - The Court, having considered Plaintiff Schultzs and Intervenor-Plaintiff Parriss Motion to Dismiss Complaints, and noting that the other parties to this action do not oppose the motion,

03/28/2018 03/28/2018
03/28/2018
03/28/2018 03/28/2018 03/28/2018 04/05/2018

hereby GRANTS the motion. The Amended Complaint filed by Ray Charles Schultz, Davon Beebe, Tyrone Beebe, and James Hugo Sterling, Doc. 14, is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Schultz, Davon Beebe, Tyrone Beebe, and Sterling are hereby terminated as Plaintiffs in this action. The Amended Complaint filed by Intervenor-Plaintiffs Randall Parris, Gorman Max Cullwell, Jr., Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, and Misti Anderson, Doc. 52, is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Parris, Cullwell, Meeks, Scott, Moody, Burks, and Anderson are hereby terminated as Intervenor-Plaintiffs in this action. Those parties motion to file an amended pleading, Doc. 75, and motion to certify a class, Doc. 91, are DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/27/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
120 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Kim Chaney. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
121 TEXT ORDER: Attorney General Steve Marshall, Deputy Attorney General James W. Davis, and Assistant Attorneys General Laura E. Howell and Brad A. Chynoweth have filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel for Intervenor Defendant Judge Kim Chaney. (Doc. 120 ). The Court GRANTS the Motion. Attorneys Dorman Walker and John Naramore will continue to represent Judge Chaney in this action. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/28/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
122 RESPONSE in Opposition re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss All Claims as Moot (JOINT) filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
123 MOTION to Dismiss by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
124 Brief re 123 MOTION to Dismiss . (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
125 RESPONSE in Opposition re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 4/5/2018. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing currently set for Thursday, 4/12/2018 at 10:00 AM will go forward at 9:00 AM, on that same date, CR 7B,

04/05/2018 04/09/2018 04/09/2018 04/09/2018
04/10/2018 04/10/2018 04/11/2018

Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
126 ORDER. Mr. Hester has filed a motion in which he asks the Court to certify a plaintiff class in this action. (Doc. 1010). The defendants may file a response in opposition to the motion for class certification within 14 days of the completion of the preliminary injunction hearing in this case. Mr. Hester may file a reply 7 days later. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on April 5, 2018. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
127 RESPONSE in Opposition re 123 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Bradley Hester. (Buskey, Brandon) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
128 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (UNOPPOSED) by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Reply Memorandum)(West, Micah) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
129 Evidentiary Material re: 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42, # 43 Exhibit 43, # 44 Exhibit 44, # 45 Exhibit 45, # 46 Exhibit 46, # 47 Exhibit 47, # 48 Exhibit 48, # 49 Exhibit 49, # 50 Exhibit 50, # 51 Exhibit 51, # 52 Exhibit 52, # 53 Exhibit 53, # 54 Exhibit 54, # 55 Exhibit 55, # 56 Exhibit 56)(West, Micah) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
130 TEXT ORDER - The Court GRANTS the plaintiff's motion for leave to file excess pages. (Doc. 128). The plaintiff may file a reply not to exceed 31 pages. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 4/10/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
131 REPLY Brief filed by Intervenor Bradley Hester re: 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Bradley Hester. (West, Micah) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
132 STIPULATION re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Bradley Hester. filed by Bradley Hester (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 04/11/2018)

04/12/2018 04/13/2018 04/13/2018
04/16/2018 04/17/2018 04/18/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Preliminary Injunction Hearing began on 4/12/2018. Intervenor Plff Hester's testimony. Intervenor Dft Sheriff Gentry's testimony. DX1 admitted into evidence. Daily adj. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) Modified on 4/13/2018 (YMB). (Entered: 04/13/2018)
133 Evidentiary Material re: 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Supplemental). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 57)(West, Micah) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Preliminary Injunction Hearing resumed on 4/13/2018. Intervenor Dft Sheriff Gentry's testimony resumed. DX2 admitted into evidence. Intervenor Plff Hester rests. Intervenor Dft Sheriff Gentry rests. PX1 admitted into evidence. Hearing to resume at a later date. Daily adj. (Court Reporter Teresa Roberson.) (YMB) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
134 Evidentiary Material re: 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Supplemental). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 58)(West, Micah) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
135 Evidentiary Material re: 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction NOTICE OF AMENDED EVIDENCE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9 (Amended) - Part 1 (Originally filed at Doc. 129-9), # 2 Exhibit 9 (Amended) - Part 2 (Originally filed at Doc. 129-9), # 3 Exhibit 57 (Amended) (Originally filed at Doc. 133-1))(West, Micah) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
136 Transcript of Proceedings held on 4/12/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 5/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/19/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/17/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 04/18/2018)

04/18/2018 04/18/2018 04/18/2018 04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/20/2018 04/22/2018
04/24/2018

137 TEXT ORDER: The Preliminary Injunction Hearing will resume at 1:30 PM on Thursday, 4/19/2018, CR 7B, Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 4/18/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
138 Exhibit List re 4/12/2018 Preliminary Injunction hearing by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 PX1)(YMB) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
139 Exhibit List re 4/12/2018 Preliminary Injunction Hearing by Matt Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 DX1, # 2 DX2)(YMB) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
140 Opposition to re 135 Notice of Amended Evidence filed by Matt Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Alacourt Terms and Conditions, # 2 Exhibit B - Updated Records)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Preliminary Injunction Hearing concluded on 4/19/2018. Oral arguments of counsel. Adj. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
141 NOTICE by Kim Chaney The The Parties Have Conferred (Walker, J) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
142 ORDER. On or before April 26, 2018, any party may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on April 22, 2018. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 04/22/2018)
143 Transcript of Proceedings held on 4/13/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Teresa Roberson. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 5/15/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/25/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/23/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Certification) (KEK) (Entered: 04/24/2018)

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144 RESPONSE to Motion re 101 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
145 RESPONSE to Motion re 101 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Matt Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
146 NOTICE by Bradley Hester re 127 Response in Opposition to Motion, 124 Brief, 92 Notice (Other), 96 Opposition (other) of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement ODonnell v. Harris Cty (5th Cir. June 1, 2018))(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/14/2018)
147 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexandra Marie Jordan on behalf of Bradley Hester (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/14/2018)
148 NOTICE by Bradley Hester re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement ODonnell Memorandum and Opinion 6/18/18, # 2 Supplement ODonnell Memorandum and Opinion 6/29/18, # 3 Supplement ODonnell Am Ord of Preliminary Injunction)(West, Micah) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
149 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/01/2018)
150 SCHEDULING ORDER - INTERVENOR PARTIES: Status Conference set for Monday, 3/11/2019, at 2:00 PM, CR 7B, Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL. Out of state counsel may participate in the conference by dialing 877-873-8018 and entering access code 5313999. Discovery due by 3/15/2019. Dispositive motions due by 4/15/2019. See Order for other deadlines and directives. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/2/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
151 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Protective Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
152 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR THE PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/6/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
153 NOTICE by Bradley Hester re 108 Brief of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement - Caliste v. Cantrell

08/24/2018 08/27/2018
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Summary Judgment Order 8-6-18)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
154 MOTION to Set Status Conference (Unopposed) by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
155 TEXT ORDER granting 154 Motion: Intervenor defendants Lisa McSwain, Amy Black, Joan White, Kim Chaney, and Wells R. Turner, III have filed an unopposed motion for a status conference. (Doc. 154). The Court SETS this matter for a telephone conference at 4:00 PM on August 28, 2018. Counsel of record shall please dial 877-873-8018 and enter access code 5313999 to participate in the call. If counsel for the parties would prefer to appear in person, they are welcome to do so. Counsel shall please email the Court by 12:00 p.m. tomorrow if they wish to appear in court. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/27/2018. (JSH). (Entered: 08/27/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 8/28/2018 04:00 PM before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. (KEK) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 8/28/2018. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
156 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Regarding Provision of Counsel at the Detention Hearing by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Supplemental Brief)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
157 RESPONSE to Motion re 156 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Regarding Provision of Counsel at the Detention Hearing filed by Matt Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
158 RESPONSE to Motion re 156 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Regarding Provision of Counsel at the Detention Hearing filed by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 08/30/2018)
159 MEMORANDUM OPINION granting 102 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed on March 12, 2018. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/04/2018. (JSH) Modified on 9/12/2018 (KEK). (Entered: 09/04/2018)

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160 TEXT ORDER - The Court SETS this matter for a telephone conference at 4:30 PM on September 6, 2018. Counsel of record shall please dial 877-873-8018 and enter access code 5313999 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/5/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
161 ORDER denying 123 Sheriff Gentry's Motion to Dismiss filed on March 28, 2018. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/5/2018. (JSH). (Entered: 09/05/2018)
162 NOTICE of Appearance by Kendrick E Webb on behalf of Matthew Gentry (Webb, Kendrick) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 9/6/2018. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
163 NOTICE by Bradley Hester re 159 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction of Withdrawal of Right to Counsel Claim (West, Micah) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
164 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - Absent modification by the Court, this order shall remain in effect until the Court decides the merits of this action or the parties otherwise resolve their claims. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/13/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
165 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 164 Preliminary Injunction, 161
Order on Motion to Dismiss, 159 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Matthew Gentry. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 1126-3172521 (ALND B4601091987). Appeal Record due by 9/27/2018. (Kidd, Jamie) Modified on 9/13/2018 (KEK). (Entered: 09/13/2018)
166 NOTICE of Transmittal to Eleventh Circuit. (KEK) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
167 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 165 Notice of Appeal. (KEK) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
168 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 164 Preliminary Injunction, 159
Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

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169 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amended Complaint)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
170 NOTICE of Transmittal to Eleventh Circuit. (KEK) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
171 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 168 Notice of Appeal. (KEK) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
172 TEXT ORDER; The Court GRANTS Mr. Hester's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 169). On or before Monday, September 17, 2018, Mr. Hester shall please file the amended complaint (Doc. 169-1) as a separate document. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/14/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
173 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Matt Gentry, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White, filed by Bradley Hester.(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
174 Transcript of Proceedings held on August 28, 2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie A. Martin, Telephone number (205) 278-2066. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 10/5/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/15/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/13/2018. (MRR, ) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
USCA Appeal Fees received $505.00 receipt number B4601092024 re 168 Notice of Appeal filed by Kim Chaney, Amy Black, Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain. (JLC) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
175 Joint MOTION to Stay re 164 Preliminary Injunction, 159 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction and All Other Proceedings Pending Appeal by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 09/17/2018)

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176 MOTION to Stay by Matthew Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
177 NOTICE by Matthew Gentry re 164 Preliminary Injunction, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/19/2018)
178 RESPONSE in Opposition re 176 MOTION to Stay , 175 Joint
MOTION to Stay re 164 Preliminary Injunction, 159 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction and All Other Proceedings Pending Appeal filed by Bradley Hester. (West, Micah) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
179 USCA Case Number 18-13894-H for 165 Notice of Appeal, filed by Matthew Gentry. (KEK) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
180 USCA Case Number 18-13894-H for 168 Notice of Appeal filed by Kim Chaney, Amy Black, Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain. (KEK) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
181 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Steven Marshall, Lisa McSwain, State of Alabama, Rusty Turner, Joan White (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
182 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Matthew Gentry for proceedings held on 7/17/17, 3/13/18, 4/5/18, 4/19/18, 8/28/18, 9/6/18 before Judge Hon. Madeline Hughes Haikala, (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/27/2018)
183 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
184 Joint MOTION for More Definite Statement by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
185 TEXT ORDER - Pending before the Court are the defendants' motions to stay (Docs. 175, 176), defendant Sheriff Gentry's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 183), and the judicial defendants' motion for a more definite statement (Doc. 184). The Court SETS these pending motions for a hearing on Wednesday, October 10, 2018, at 4:30 PM, in Courtroom 7B, Hugo L. Black U.S. Courthouse, 1729 5th Ave. N., Birmingham, AL 35203. Counsel are welcome to appear by telephone, in which case counsel of record shall please dial 877-810-9415 and enter access code 536215 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/5/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

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186 TEXT ORDER: The Court CANCELS the Motions Hearing (re docs. 175 , 176 , 183 , and 184 ) currently set for 10/10/2018 and RESETS the Hearing for Monday, 10/15/2018, at 11:00 AM, CR 7B, Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL. Any counsel who wish to appear by telephone may do so by dialing 877810-9415 and entering access code 536215. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/5/2018. (YMB) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Motion Hearing held on 10/15/2018 re docs. 101 , 156 , 159
, 164 , 175 , 176 , 183 , and 184 . (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (YMB) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
187 COURT REPORTER ACKNOWLEDGMENT for Request 182 .(KEK) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
188 ORDER of USCA - Before the Court are the Joint Time-Sensitive Motion to Stay Injunction and All Other Proceedings Pending Appeal and Sheriff Matt Gentrys Time Sensitive Motion to Stay. It appears that the Appellants filed motions seeking similar relief in the district court (Doc. 175, Doc. 176) and that the district court held a hearing on those motions on October 15, 2018. To date, the district court has not ruled. Accordingly, the motions filed in this Court are HELD IN ABEYANCE pending a decision from the district court on the motions filed there. The Appellants are DIRECTED to notify the Court when the district court decides the motions. (KEK) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
189 TEXT ORDER - On September 4, 2018, the Court entered a memorandum opinion granting plaintiff Mr. Hester's motion for a
preliminary injunction (Doc. 159 ), and on September 13, 2018, the Court entered the terms of the preliminary injunction (Doc. 164 ). Accordingly, the Court DENIES as MOOT Mr. Hester's motion for leave to file a supplemental brief to his motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 156 ). The Court asks the Clerk to please TERM Doc. 156. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/29/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
190 Transcript of Proceedings held on 4/19/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file

10/30/2018 11/01/2018 11/01/2018

with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/19/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/29/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/27/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
191 ORDER - On September 17, 2018, the judicial defendants Judge Kim Chaney, Judge Wells R. Turner, III, Circuit Clerk Lisa McSwain, Magistrate Amy Black, and Magistrate Joan White filed a joint motion to stay the preliminary injunction in this matter. (Doc. 175). The judicial defendants attached to their motion declarations from Presiding Judge Greg Nicholas, Judge Turner, and Ms. McSwain. (Docs. 175-1 to 175-3). For the reasons stated below, the Court strikes the declarations from the record. The Court will consider the new evidence that judicial defendants attempt prematurely to place in the record at the hearing on a motion for a permanent injunction. The Court will issue an order modifying its preliminary injunction order to clarify that the order applies to arrestees whose arrests are supported by a magistrates finding of probable cause for the arrest. The Court will issue a separate order concerning the defendants motions to stay. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/30/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
192 Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/17/2017, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
193 Transcript of Proceedings held on 3/13/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the

11/01/2018 11/01/2018

Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
194 Transcript of Proceedings held on 4/5/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
195 Transcript of Proceedings held on 9/6/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 11/01/2018)

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196 Transcript of Proceedings held on 10/15/2018, before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie Martin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Trans cript% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
197 AMENDED ORDER re 164 Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 11/01/2018. (JSH) (Entered: 11/01/2018)
198 MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 175 the judicial defendants' motion to stay and 176 Sheriff Gentry's motion to stay. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 11/08/2018. (JSH) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
199 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Bradley Hester. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
200 RESPONSE to Motion re 199 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Joint filed by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
201 ORDER of USCA - ENTRY OF DISMISSAL: Pursuant to the 11th Cir.R. 42-2(c), this appeal is DISMISSED as to Appellant Matthew Gentry only, for want of prosecution because the appellant Matthew Gentry failed to file an appendix within the time fixed by the rules. (KEK) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
202 TEXT ORDER - Plaintiff Mr. Hester has moved to extend the discovery deadlines in this matter by two months. (Doc. 199 ). Subject to their previously stated arguments concerning their motions to dismiss and to stay, Sheriff Gentry and the judicial defendants do not oppose an extension. (Doc. 200 ). The Court GRANTS Mr. Hester's motion and extends the deadlines in the operative scheduling order by two months. Consistent with the memorandum opinion and
order denying the defendants' motions to stay, (Doc. 197 , p.

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38), if a discovery issue arises relating to Sheriff Gentry, and the parties are unable to resolve the issue, the parties may request a telephone conference with the Court to discuss the issue. The Court asks the Clerk to please TERM Doc. 199 . Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 1/10/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
203 First MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by Ray Charles Schultz. (Drake, Thomas) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
204 TEXT ORDER: In light of its Text Order, docket entry 202 dated 1/20/2019, the Court CANCELS the Status Conference currently set for 3/11/2019. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/1/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
205 JOINT Motion for Telephone Conference or, in the Alternative, Motion for Briefing Order by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Chynoweth, Brad) Modified on 2/4/2019 (KEK). (Entered: 02/04/2019)
206 TEXT ORDER - The parties have been unable to resolve a discovery dispute and have requested a telephone conference. (Doc. 205 ). The Court SETS this matter for a telephone conference at 4:00 PM on February 7, 2019. Counsel of record shall please dial 877-810-9415 and enter access code 5036215 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/5/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 2/7/2019. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (YMB) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 168 Notice of Appeal, 165 Notice of Appeal,, Appeal No. 18-13894. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. (KEK) (Entered: 02/08/2019)
207 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Howell, Laura) (Entered: 02/08/2019)
208 RESPONSE to Motion re 207 Joint MOTION for Protective Order filed by Bradley Hester. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 02/12/2019)

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209 MOTION to Strike 203 First MOTION for Declaratory Judgment by Matthew Gentry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 02/12/2019)
PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-3281221 (ALND B4601095482). (Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 2/19/2019 (KEK). (Entered: 02/18/2019)
210 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Neil K. Sawhney, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 02/18/2019)
211 TEXT ORDER: Attorney Samuel Brooke has moved to admit Neil K. Sawhney pro hac vice in this action. (Doc. 210 ). The Court GRANTS the Motion. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/19/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 02/19/2019)
212 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
213 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS plaintiff's Second Motion for Extension of Discovery Deadlines. (Doc. 212 ). Reset deadlines: Expert reports due by 3/21/2019; rebuttal expert reports due by 4/22/2019. Discovery due by 5/29/2019. Dispositive motions due by 7/1/2019. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/28/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
214 MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony from Judicial Defendants by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Appendix B, # 3 Appendix C, # 4 Appendix D, # 5 Appendix E, # 6 Appendix F, # 7 Appendix G, # 8 Appendix H)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
215 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
216 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Hester's Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limitation. (Doc. 215 ). Mr. Hester's memorandum in support of his motion to compel shall not exceed 33 pages. Mr. Hester is directed to file his memorandum as a separate docket entry. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/15/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

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217 Brief re 214 MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony from Judicial Defendants Memorandum in Support filed by Bradley Hester. (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
218 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Disclose Professor Stephen Demuth's Expert Report Only by Bradley Hester. (Sawhney, Neil) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
219 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Hester's Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline for Professor Stephen Demuth's Expert Report Only. (Doc. 218 ). Reset deadlines: Mr. Hester shall disclose Professor Demuth's expert report by 4/4/2019; any rebuttal expert reports in this regard are due by 5/6/2019. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/20/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
220 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attached Response Brief)(Howell, Laura) (Entered: 04/05/2019)
221 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS the Judicial Defendants' and Judge Nicholas's Unopposed Joint Motion to Exceed Page Limits. (Doc. 220 ). Defendants' brief shall not exceed 36 pages. Defendants are directed to please file their brief as a separate docket entry. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 4/9/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 04/09/2019)
222 RESPONSE in Opposition re 214 MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony from Judicial Defendants and Judge Nicholas filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 04/09/2019)
223 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Overlength Brief)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/22/2019)
224 TEXT ORDER: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Hester's Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limitation. (Doc. 223 ). Mr. Hester is directed to file his reply brief as a separate docket entry. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 4/23/2019. (YMB) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
225 REPLY to Response to Motion re 214 MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony from Judicial Defendants filed by Bradley Hester. (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/23/2019)

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07/02/2019 07/03/2019 07/03/2019 07/10/2019 08/07/2019
08/07/2019

226 TEXT ORDER - The Court has before it a number of motions including a motion to compel testimony from state court judges and magistrates. (Doc. 214 ). The motion is under submission. The Court suspends the May 15, 2019 discovery deadline and the deadline for dispositive motions in this matter. (Docs. 150 , 202 ). The Court will reset the deadlines after it rules on the motion to compel. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on May 10, 2019. (Haikala, Madeline) Modified on 5/13/2019 (KEK). (Entered: 05/10/2019)
227 MOTION Disclose Additional Expert Report - Opposed by Bradley Hester. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Expert Report of Doug Colbert)(West, Micah) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
228 RESPONSE in Opposition re 227 MOTION Disclose Additional Expert Report - Opposed filed by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
229 RESPONSE in Opposition re 227 MOTION Disclose Additional Expert Report - Opposed filed by Matthew Gentry. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
230 REPLY to Response to Motion re 227 MOTION Disclose Additional Expert Report - Opposed filed by Bradley Hester. (West, Micah) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
231 TEXT ORDER; Sheriff Gentry has moved to dismiss Mr. Hester's amended complaint on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction. (Doc. 183 ). For the reasons stated in the Court's memorandum opinion denying Sheriff Gentry's motion to stay the enforcement of the preliminary injunction order, (Doc. 198 ), the Court DENIES Sheriff Gentry's motion to dismiss. The Court asks the Clerk to please TERM Doc. 183 . Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/7/2019. (JLC) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
232 TEXT ORDER; The judicial defendants have moved the Court to enter a protective order preventing Mr. Hester's counsel from asking them about matters they argue are covered by judicial and legislative privileges. (Doc. 207 ). The issues that the judicial defendants raise in this motion concern the same issues that Mr. Hester raised in his motion to compel judicial testimony. (Doc. 214 ). The Court will consider the substance of the judicial defendants' arguments in this motion when it resolves Mr. Hester's motion to compel. Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the judicial defendants' motion. The Court asks the Clerk to please TERM Doc. 207 . Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 8/7/2019. (JLC) (Entered: 08/07/2019)

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09/30/2019 10/15/2019 10/16/2019
10/23/2019 10/24/2019

233 ANSWER to 173 Amended Complaint by Matthew Gentry.(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
234 ORDER denying 184 Motion for More Definite Statement. The judicial defendants have moved the Court to require Mr. Hester to file a more definite statement. (Doc. 184 ). The Court denies without prejudice the judicial defendants' motion. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on September 30, 2019. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
235 ORDER granting 209 Motion to Strike. Mr. Drake has filed a petition on behalf of Ms. Matanane, an individual who is not a party to this action. (Doc. 209 ). Sheriff Gentry has moved to strike Ms. Matanane's petition and moved for sanctions against Mr. Drake. (Doc. 209 ). The Court strikes Ms. Matanane's petition because the petition is improper procedurally. The Court denies Sheriff Gentry's motion for sanctions. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on September 30, 2019. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
236 ORDER finding as moot 203 Motion for Declaratory Judgment in light of Doc. 235 . Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on September 30, 2019. (Haikala, Madeline) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
237 ANSWER to 173 Amended Complaint by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White.(Howell, Laura) (Entered: 10/15/2019)
238 TEXT ORDER; The Court sets this matter for a telephone conference on Wednesday, October 23, 2019 at 1:00 p.m. The parties should be prepared to discuss the status of the implementation on the new bail procedures as required by the Court's order (Doc. 164 ) and the parties' outstanding discovery disputes. (Doc. 214 ; Doc. 227 ). Counsel of record shall please dial (877) 873-8018 and enter 5313999 to participate in the call. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/16/2019. (JLC) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala: Telephone Conference held on 10/23/2019 (Court Reporter Leah Turner) (ASL) (Entered: 10/23/2019)
239 TEXT ORDER - Consistent with discussion on the record during the October 23, 2019 telephone conference in this matter, the Court denies without prejudice Mr. Hester's motion to disclose an additional expert report. (Doc. 227 ). If, after conducting depositions of the judicial deponents, Mr. Hester wishes to renew his motion

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02/03/2020 02/03/2020 02/04/2020 02/04/2020 02/26/2020 02/28/2020

based on the evidence developed in the depositions, he may do so. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 10/24/2019. (KEK) (Entered: 10/24/2019)
240 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 01/21/2020)
241 TEXT ORDER: The Court grants Attorney Laura Howell's motion to withdraw as counsel of record in this action. (Doc. 240 ). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 1/22/2020. (YMB) (Entered: 01/22/2020)
242 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alabama Administrative Office of the Court (AOC), Amy Black, Randy Helms, Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Martha Williams. (Walker, J) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
243 TEXT ORDER: The Court grants Attorney John Wesley Naramore's motion to withdraw as counsel of record for Defendants Judge Martha Williams, Joan White, Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Randy Helms, and the Administrative Office of Courts. (Doc. 242 ). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 1/27/2020. (YMB) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
244 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Bradley Hester. (Sawhney, Neil) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
245 TEXT ORDER: The Court grants Attorney Neil K. Sawhney's motion to withdraw as counsel of record in this action. (Doc. 244 ). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/3/2020. (YMB) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
246 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Bradley Hester. (Boone, Brock) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
247 TEXT ORDER: The Court grants Attorney Brock Boone's motion to withdraw as counsel of record in this action. (Doc. 246 ). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/4/2020. (YMB) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
248 NOTICE by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Matt Gentry, Bradley Hester, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White Regarding Alabama Bail Legislation (West, Micah) (Entered: 02/26/2020)
249 NOTICE of Appearance by Brenton Merrill Smith on behalf of Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White (Smith, Brenton) (Entered: 02/28/2020)

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03/25/2020 05/05/2020 05/07/2020 05/11/2020 09/14/2020 09/15/2020

250 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record as to Joan White by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Joan White Obituary)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/02/2020)
251 STANDING ORDER FOR CIVIL CASES PENDING BEFORE JUDGE HAIKALA Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 03/25/2020. (AKD) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
252 STANDING ORDER FOR CIVIL CASES PENDING BEFORE JUDGE HAIKALA. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 5/4/2020. (KEK) (Entered: 05/05/2020)
253 RESPONSE to re 252 filed by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Matt Gentry, Matthew Gentry, Bradley Hester, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White. (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/07/2020)
254 NOTICE by Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, Joan White of Official Capacity Substitution (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Judge J. Chad Floyd Oath of Office)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
255 Consent MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Samuel Brooke by Bradley Hester. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/14/2020)
256 TEXT ORDER: The Court grants Attorney Samuel J. Brooke's motion to withdraw as counsel of record in this action. (Doc. 255 ). Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 9/15/2020. (YMB) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

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 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 1 of 24

FILED
2017 Feb-21 AM 10:29 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ,

*

DAVON TRESHAWN BEEBE,

*

TYRONE DAISHAWN BEEBE and

*

JAMES HUGO STERLING,

*

Individually and on behalf of all other *

similarly situated defendants

*

PLAINTIFF(s),

*

*

v.

*

*

STATE OF ALABAMA,

*

DEFENDANT

*

CASE No PROPOSED CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff(s), Ray Schultz, James Hugo Sterling, Davon Beebe and Tyrone Beebe, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated defendants, by class action alleged herein, by and through their attorney Melvin Hasting, and avers the following:

INTRODUCTION
1) This case is about the State of Alabama and specifically, the 32nd Judicial Circuit imposing excessive bail in the form of cash bail in a significant amount of money so as to keep indigents incarcerated in pre-trial detention awaiting a hearing and disposition of their charges as well as post-conviction proceedings to enforce payments of court costs and fines.
2) The plaintiff(s) are indigents and incarcerated in the Cullman County Detention Center under the supervision of the Sheriff of Cullman County, Matt Gentry.
3) Defendant, Matt Gentry is the duly elected Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama.
4) Defendant State of Alabama has a bail schedule and bail statute which is routinely applied to indigent defendants in an unconstitutional manner.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 2 of 24
5) Cullman County District Court is a court of jurisprudence in the 32nd Judicial Circuit of the State of Alabama.
6) This is an action for declaratory relief and a preliminary/permanent injunction to settle important constitutional questions of the Alabama bail schedule and bail statute and its application by the Sheriff of Cullman County, the State of Alabama and the 32nd Judicial Circuit in pretrial detention of indigent defendants charged with crime(s) within the State of Alabama, and about the imposition of cash bail as a means to enforce payment of court costs, fines and restitution against indigent defendants in post-conviction proceedings.
7) Section 13 of Title 15 sets out the kinds of bail for persons arrested and taken into custody. (15-13-111 Alabama Code). One such permissible bail under Alabama law is cash bail.
8) Rule 7 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the setting of bail in criminal cases.
9) Article 1 subsection 16 of the Alabama Constitution states: All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and…. excessive bail shall not in any case be required.
10) The 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that Excessive bail shall not be required……
11) Alabama Code 12-17-251(c)(2) limits the powers of a magistrate to: Granting of bail in minor misdemeanor prosecutions;
PARTIES 12) Petitioner Ray Schultz is being detained in the Cullman County Detention
Center under a $2500 cash bond for the misdemeanor charge of Unlawful Distribution of material harmful to minors. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest) 13) Petitioners Davon Beebe and Tyrone Beebe are each being unlawfully detained in the Cullman County Detention Center under a felony charge of Burglary 3rd Degree. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest) and each

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 3 of 24
have bail currently set at $15,000 Cash. (see attached Order on initial appearance). Their bail was set by a magistrate in the court clerk’s office. 14) Petitioner James Hugo Sterling is charged with the felony offense of possession of a forged instrument and has bail currently set at $10,000 cash. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest). His bail was set by a magistrate in the court clerk’s office. 15) Defendant State of Alabama is represented by the Attorney General of Alabama, currently the Honorable Steve Marshall. 16) The petitioners and all examples of defendants listed below are examples of defendants in criminal proceedings before the 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama located in Cullman County, Alabama. 17) The petitioner(s) have each executed an affidavit of financial hardship and all been determined to be indigent by the court and the undersigned attorney has been appointed to represent the plaintiff Ray Schultz and Davon Beebe and the Honorable Robert A. Sapp has been appointed to represent the plaintiff Tyrone Beebe in their respective District Court cases. Plaintiff James Hugo Sterling is being represented by the undersigned attorney, pro-bono.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18) This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 28 U.S.C. §2201,
et seq., the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 19) The appellate courts in the State of Alabama have held that cash bail is a permissible form of bail for pretrial detention (Ex parte Singleton, 902 So.2d 132 (ALCCrA 2004) and (Ex parte Brown, 792 So.2d 441 (ALCCrA 2001)) and that the Constitution of Alabama does not prohibit cash bail, postconviction (see Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So.2d 515 (ALCCvA 1999). This is a federal question action seeking a declaration of the rights of indigent defendants to cash only bail being imposed against them both in pretrial detention and after conviction and in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 4 of 24
20) Venue is proper in the Northern District of Alabama as the petitioners are all located in Cullman County, Alabama which is located with the jurisdictional boundaries of the Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama. STATEMENT OF FACTS
21) The petitioners allege that they cannot post cash bail. This is evident by the fact that they have been incarcerated in the Cullman County since their arrest on February 2, 2017 for Davon and Tyrone Beebe; since February 15, 2017 for Sterling and since December 6, 2016 for Ray Schultz.
22) The petitioner Ray Schultz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Alabama and a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2017 wherein the magistrates and Circuit Clerk were called as witnesses to testify. The testimony in this hearing was that the purpose of the cash bail was for the defendant to not be released from jail upon his arrest, but to keep him in jail. The Circuit Court of Cullman County denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (see attached exhibit).
23) All of the Defendants with the exception of Ray Charles Schultz had cash bonds set by magistrates in the court clerk’s office for felony offenses.
24) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants charged with non-capital crimes, many of whom are indigent and have no means of posting bail. The magistrates in the court clerk’s office set these cash bonds to include bonds for felony charges.
25) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants whom fail to appear for court appearances, many of whom are indigent and are unable to post bail.
26) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants who are arrested on failure to pay court costs and fines after conviction and many of those defendants are indigent.
27) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants on alias warrants of arrest on cases to which they have lost jurisdiction.
28) For example, Melissa Tello is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 20142672) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to permitting dogs to run at large

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 5 of 24
and she received a three (3) day suspended sentence on January 13, 2015 and was given 12 months of probation. Ms. Tello had no attorney. On August 5, 2016, (7 months after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $667.90 fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $600 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. She was arrested on the warrant on January 14, 2017, and released on January 18, 2017 upon her payment of $150 to the clerk of the court. (note: she served 4 days on a 3 day sentence.) (see exhibit 6) 29) On October 11, 2016, the 32nd Judicial Circuit District Judge Kim Chaney had a show cause docket. Listed below are examples of cases and warrants issued on that date in addition to Ms. Tello’s case listed above: 30) James Price is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2002-1238) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of harassment and he received a thirty (30) day suspended sentence on November 25, 2002 and was given 12 months of probation. Mr. Price had no attorney. On September 18, 2007, a warrant was issued for his arrest by the Clerk of the Court and the bond was set at NO BOND. Price was arrested on April 7, 2014 and on May 8, 2014, Price was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in 2003). In July 2016, (13 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $221.20 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 7) 31) Kimberly Drinkard is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2005-365) wherein she her case was dismissed on September 4, 2007 with conditions of payment of court costs and fines. Drinkard had an appointed attorney in this case. In August 2016, (9 YEARS after her case was dismissed) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 6 of 24
fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Drinkard owed the sum of $1659.50 of which she has paid $1600, leaving a balance of $59.20 owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has not been arrested on this warrant. This was not the first time that Drinkard was arrested on an alias warrant for this case. She was arrested in January 2015 on a cash bond which was posted on her behalf. (see exhibit 8). 32) Joseph Barnett is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-156) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and he received a three (3) year sentence to prison on January 25, 2011. Barnette had an appointed attorney. He was paroled on November 21, 2011. In July 6, 2016, (5 ½ YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $6040 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $6000 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 9) 33) Sandy Eddy is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-367) wherein the case was to be dismissed on November 29, 2011 with conditions of payment of court costs and fines. Eddy had an appointed attorney in this case. On August 16, 2011 Judge Kim Chaney entered an Order that Eddy had completed all requirements of the Drug Court program except payment of 1040 in drug court fees. In August 2016, (5 YEARS after his case was to be dismissed) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Eddy owed the sum of $ 2767 of which he has paid $445, leaving a balance of $2321.92 owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $2200 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 10).

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 7 of 24
34) Cody Strickland is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-307) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He pled into Drug Court on April 6, 2010. He received a three (3) year sentence to prison on August 6, 2013 for failure to complete Drug Court. Strickland was credited with 132 days of jail credit at the time of his sentencing. Strickland had an appointed attorney. He was released from prison on August 19, 2014. In May 25, 2016, (3 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $6152.50 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $6000 cash bond, set by the magistrate, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has been arrested on this warrant On October 19, 2016 and the $6,000 cash bond still remains.(see exhibit 11)
35) Brian Gamble is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-267) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He pled to this charge on September 7, 2010 and received a three (3) year sentence to prison. Gamble had an appointed attorney during the whole process. He was released from prison on October 23, 2011 by the expiration of his sentence. In June 28, 2016, (6 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $5665.70 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $5000 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 12)
36) Brenda Collins is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-1578) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of negotiating a worthless instrument and he received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on April 20, 2009 and was given 24 months of probation. Collins had no attorney. On April 16, 2014, Collins was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 8 of 24
2011). In July 27, 2016, (5 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $160.16 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 13) 37) Frank Grotschel, Jr. is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-1798) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to negotiating a worthless instrument on June 21 2010. He received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on that date. Grotschel had no attorney. He was ordered probation for twenty four (24) months. In July 13, 2016, (4 YEARS after the expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1088.43 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $1000 cash bond, set by the magistrate, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant (see exhibit 14) 38) Cerena Wynn is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-330) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She pled into Drug Court in 2010. She received a four (4) year sentence to prison on April 26, 2011 for failure to complete Drug Court. Wynn was credited with 188 days of jail credit at the time of her sentencing. Wynn had an appointed attorney. She was released from prison on parole in 2012. In July 26, 2016, (5 YEARS after being sentenced to 4 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $3051.80 of the fine plus court costs owed. Prior to this motion being filed, the State of Alabama had already filed two previous motions for writ of arrest in 2015 and on February 10, 2015, an alias warrant with a $3,000 cash bond was entered and again on June 8, 2015 another alias warrant with a $3,000 cash bond was entered. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and another $3000 cash bond, was imposed on the

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 9 of 24
defendant for an alias warrant. Prior to this warrant, in June 12, 2015, Wynn filed an affidavit of financial hardship stating that her income was $700 per month from SSI. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has been arrested on this warrant On October 25, 2016 and was released upon return of payments of $20 per month.(see exhibit 15) 39) Michael Lambert is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-539) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of receiving stolen property 3rd Degree and he received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on November 29, 2011 and was given 24 months of probation. Lambert had an appointed attorney. On April 17, 2014, Lambert was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in 2013). In August 19, 2016, (3 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $4776.20 of the fine plus court costs owed. Lambert had paid a total of $3523 and had previously been issued an alias warrant on August 27, 2015 with a $1,400 cash bond. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 for the August 2016 Motion in which he failed to appear and a $1200 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 16) 40) Katherine Conn is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-120) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She pled to this charge on June 19, 2012 and received a three (3) year sentence to prison for failure to complete Drug Court. Conn had an appointed attorney during the whole process. She was released from prison on December 31, 2012 on parole. In August 5, 2016, (4 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1145.30 of the fine plus court costs owed to which she had already paid $950 . A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $250 cash bond, was imposed on the

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 10 of 24
defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 17) 41) Justin Michael Smith is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-783) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charges of receiving stolen property 3rd Degree and Theft of Property 3rd Degree and he received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on January 31, 2012 and was given 24 months of probation. Smith had an appointed attorney. On June 12, 2012, an alias warrant was issued by the clerk and there was no bond set. On August 26, 2015 an alias warrant was issued and a $1500 cash bond was imposed. In August 9, 2016, (2 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1808.33 of the fine plus court costs owed. Lambert had paid a total of $734. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 for the August 2016 Motion in which he failed to appear and a $1000 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has been arrested on this warrant on February 13, 2017. On February 15, 2017, Judge Kim Chaney appointed Alex Chaney to represent Smith and ordered that Smith may be released upon payment of $300 to the clerk. (note: Smith is not entitled to appointment of counsel after completion of sentence and probation as is the case) (see exhibit 18)
42) Sharon Hand is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2012-73) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She received a fifteen (15) year sentence to prison on October 28, 2013. Hand had an appointed attorney. She was released from prison on parole in April 7, 2014. In August 5, 2016, (2 YEARS after being paroled) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $831.30 of the fine plus court costs which was owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $800 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has been arrested on this warrant on November 7, 2016 and it is unknown if she was released. (see exhibit 19)

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 11 of 24
43) Other Defendants with recent cases on that same October 11, 2016 docket include: Jonah Witherspoon (25 DC 2014 631) whom pled to misdemeanor Assault 3rd Degree on March 25, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months’ probation. Witherspoon had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1247.30 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,200 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 20)
44) Robert Stewart (25 DC 2014 186) whom pled to misdemeanor Theft of Property 3rd Degree on January 26, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Stewart had an appointed attorney. On August 11, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1414.90 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,600 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 21)
45) Steven Drew (25 DC 2015 703) whom pled to misdemeanor possession of forged instrument 3rd Degree on December 21, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Drew had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1217.40 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,000 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 22)
46) Sonya Chappell (25 DC 2015 313) whom pled to misdemeanor illegal possession of prescription drugs on August 10, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Chappell had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 12 of 24
writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1350 on her fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,300 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 23)
47) Philesha Price is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2015-444) was charged with unlawful possession of controlled substance wherein the case was to be dismissed on August 10, 2015 with conditions of payment of court costs and fines. Price had an appointed attorney in this case. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Eddy owes the sum of $572.30. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $500 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 24).
48) Ronald Stephenson (25 DC 2015 639) whom pled to misdemeanor unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia on December 7, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Stephenson had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1919.40 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,800 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 25).
49) On October 7, 2016 a “payment docket” was held by the Honorable Greg Nicholas, Circuit Judge for the 32nd Judicial Circuit. On that date, the following arrest warrants were issued for failure to pay:
50) Michael James, (25CC-2001-215) where the defendant pled to Sexual Abuse 1st Degree and sentenced to prison on May 9, 2001 for four (4) years. James was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. On October 7, 2016, (11 YEARS after his sentence) an alias warrant

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 13 of 24
was issued for failure to pay and a $929.06 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 26) 51) Christopher Williams, (25CC-2003-263) where the defendant pled to theft of property 2nd Degree and sentenced to prison on May 19, 2003 for fifteen (15) years. Williams was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. He was paroled on March 30, 2009. On October 7, 2016, (7 YEARS after his sentence) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay the $1683 balance owed on his fines and costs and a $1636 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 27) 52) Westly Screws, (25CC-2007-236) where the defendant pled to Possession of a forged instrument 2nd Degree and sentenced to two years suspended sentence with two years of probation on August 18, 2007. Screws was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea On October 7, 2016, (7 YEARS after his probation ended) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a $500 cash bond was imposed. Prior to the imposition of this cash bond, the court notice of the October 7, 2016 was returned to the clerk’s office with the post office stating that there was no such number (address) and that they were unable to forward the mail. Apparently Screws did not receive notice of the October 7, 2016 hearing. Regardless, he did receive a $500 cash bond on that date. (see exhibit 28) 53) Daniel Speegle, (25CC-2008-263) where the defendant pled to Burglary 3rd Degree and was sentenced to 30 months suspended with 3 years of probation on September 10, 2008. Speegle was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. On October 7, 2016, (5 YEARS after his probation ended) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a 3808.30 cash bond was imposed. Speegle had already paid $1310 of the $5118.30 court costs leaving a balance of $3808.30. Even more egregious is the fact that on April 16, 2015, the State of Alabama filed an unverified motion for a civil judgment for the amount of restitution owed on this case and requested that any outstanding writ of arrests be recalled so that they may pursue collection of the restitution by civil proceeding. The

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 14 of 24
court granted the motion for a civil judgment on April 17, 2015. Apparently the State of Alabama was unable to collect the judgment through garnishments and requested that a show cause hearing be set. The defendant failed to appear and a cash bond for the civil judgment amount was entered on October 7, 2016. (see exhibit 29) 54) Kristi Burks, (25CC-2009-122) where the defendant pled to Unlawful Possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to prison on May 19, 2009 for fifteen (15) years. Burks was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. She was paroled on May 3, 2010 and since that parole date has been in and out of jail for failure to pay on numerous occasions, each time with a cash bond. On October 7, 2016, the defendant filed a pro-se letter to Judge Nicholas explaining her inability to pay her fines because she was awaiting approval for her social security disability application and that she had a child to care for. She also explained that she had experience a seizure on the morning that she was to attend court and was unable to locate someone to help her care for her child. On October 7, 2016, (6 YEARS after her parole) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a $4,382 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 30) 55) Article 1 subsection 16 of the Alabama Constitution states:
All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and…. excessive bail shall not in any case be required. 56) The 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that Excessive bail shall not be required…… 57) In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the SCOTUS held that depriving an individual of “conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay… would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment @672-673. In this case the trial court revoked the probation of Bearden for failure to pay a fine due to his indigency. The Supreme Court held that a court cannot simply imprison a

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 15 of 24
defendant for failure to pay a fine without first making and inquiry into the circumstances of failing to pay the fine. 58) The Supreme Court has also held that the government cannot have policies or procedures that have the effect of punishing a person for his poverty: Griffin v. Illinois; Smith v. Bennett; Tate v. Short; and Williams v. Illinois; 59) In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) the SCOTUS held that the “traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction” citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895). “The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty”………. “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment” …… “Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. 60) The Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.11 sets out the procedure for enforcement of payment of fines and restitution. Rule 26.11(i)(2) states:
In no case shall an indigent defendant be incarcerated for inability to pay a fine or court costs or restitution. 61) “Imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (1970); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
ARGUMENT 62) The petitioners are each being detained solely because of their indigent
status. If they were not impoverished and able to post cash bail, they would not be incarcerated awaiting their trial.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 16 of 24
63) The District Court of Cullman County in each of the petitioner’s cases have violated their right to pre-trial release by imposing cash-only bail because of their indigent status and inability to post cash bail.
64) The petitioners, because of their indigent status and inability to post cash bail, are each being deprived of their presumption of innocence and are in fact being punished by imprisonment prior to any conviction or presentation of their case to a finder of fact.
65) The petitioners are each being deprived of Due Process of Law solely because of their indigent status. Similarly charged defendants whom are not indigent are able to post bail and able to assist in the preparation of their defense. The petitioners are limited to their access of persons, documentary evidence, and the review of the relevant law for each of their cases because of their pre-trial detention.
66) Three of the named petitioners are each being deprived of Due Process of Law because they have bail set by magistrates in felony cases, contrary to Alabama law.
67) The 32nd Judicial Circuit abuses process and violates constitutional guarantees and protections, as well as state court rules/law, by imposing cash bail on defendants whom are no longer under the jurisdiction of the court.
68) The 32nd Judicial Circuit abuses process and violates constitutional guarantees and protections, such as Due Process of Law by imposing cash bail on defendants in criminal cases whom have not been adequately notified of the cases against them. In each of the cases cited in paragraphs 28-54 above, the proceeding which lead to the imposition of the cash only bail were initiated by motions filed by the District Attorney for the 32nd Judicial Circuit. The same standard non-verified motion was filed by the District Attorney, most not even stating any sufficient facts about the defendant. None of the motions included a summons to court and the allegations contained within the motion was unverified.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 17 of 24
69) Alabama Code 15-22-54(c) states: At any time during the period of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested. Nothing in the statute allows the court to issue a warrant of arrest after the term of probation has expired.
70) For an indigent defendant, cash bail on its face is excessive bail, which is constitutionally impermissible.
71) It is facially unconstitutional to impose a cash bail on a non-capital case, to which an indigent cannot post.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 72) The petitioners bring this action on behalf of themselves individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this complaint on a common basis. 73) Although there are only four petitioners listed as plaintiffs, there are numerous other defendants in the Cullman County Detention Center whom are incarcerated in pre-trial detention because of their inability to post cash only bail. These petitioners are the current cash only detainees that the undersigned has been appointed to represent in criminal proceedings. Other attorneys in the 32nd Judicial Circuit also report defendants whom they have been appointed to represent whom are subjected to pretrial detention because of cash only bail. 74) The imposition of cash only bail by both magistrates and the judges of the 32nd Judicial Circuit is a routine practice. 75) A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the petitioners and other class members can challenge the State of Alabama’s and specifically the 32nd Judicial Circuit’s unconstitutional and unlawful detention scheme. 76) There are also numerous defendants held by cash only bail in the municipal court systems across the State of Alabama. 77) The defendants listed in the examples of paragraphs 28-54 above are only from two dockets held in October 2016 in the 32nd Judicial Circuit. Numerous

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 18 of 24
other defendants have cash only bonds from numerous other payment review dockets held in other months. 78) The defendants listed in examples of paragraphs 28-54 are only from the 32nd Judicial Circuit. There are numerous Judicial Circuits across the State of Alabama which hold these FRAC (fines, restitution and costs) recovery dockets also known as the Restitution Recovery Initiative for Victims in Alabama and “pay dockets”. (see attached exhibit 31). 79) These dockets have been established by the Office of Prosecution Services in cooperation with the Administrative Office of Courts as a way to collects unpaid fines, costs and restitution to help fund the court system and district attorney offices across the State of Alabama whom are experience a financial crisis (see article attached as exhibit 31). 80) This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 81) This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions in Rule 23. 82) Petitioners proposes a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Class is defined as; All defendants and arrestees unable to pay for their release who are or who will be in the custody of the Sheriffs of each county in the State of Alabama as a result of an arrest on a warrant for cash only bail. 83) The class satisfies the numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) as every arrestee or defendant has the option of posting cash bail in the amount set by the court or will suffer incarceration in a county jail for varying lengths of time until they either make the court ordered payment or post the cash only bail. 84) In the event that the arrestee or defendant is indigent, they will remain incarcerated. 85) In the event that the arrestee or defendant is not indigent, they will be permitted to post cash bail and be immediately released. 86) Paragraphs 28-54 above, list the names of 26 defendants whom have been determined to be indigent in the criminal proceedings within one judicial

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 19 of 24
circuit and whom failed to appear at these two specific FRAC dockets and now have or had arrest warrants issued with cash only bail. 87) There are numerous other defendants across the State of Alabama whom are subjected to the same cash only bail provisions. 88) The class satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) as the relief sought is common to all members of the class. The petitioners seek a declaration from the court that cash only bail for indigents is constitutionally impermissible. The petitioners seek relief from the court to preliminarily and permanently restrain the State of Alabama from imposing cash only bail against defendants whom are determined to be indigent. 89) In granting the requested relief, all class members as well as the petitioners will have their constitutional rights protected presently and in the future. 90) The common legal and factual question arises from the judicial circuits across the State of Alabama implementing a system of cash only bail for defendants failing to appear at these cost recovery dockets and the 32nd Judicial Circuit violating the Due Process protections under the Constitutions of the United States and Alabama by imposing cash only bail in the cases of indigent criminal defendants. This is in addition to the violation of the Alabama Statutes by magistrates setting bail in felony cases. 91) The resolution of the common legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the relief that they seek. 92) The class satisfies the Typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). 93) The petitioner’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class and the petitioner have the same interest in this case as all member of the class they represent. Each of the members of the class are indigent defendants of criminal cases and each of them are subjected to cash only bail. Each member of the class will be confined to jail because of their inability to post cash only bail. 94) The resolution of the constitutionality of cash only bail for indigents will determine the claims for relief sought by the petitioners individually and as representatives of the members of the class of indigent defendants.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 20 of 24

95) 96) 97)
98) 99) 100) 101)
102) 103) 104) 105)

If the petitioners are successful in their claim as to the unconstitutionality of cash only bail for indigents, the rulings by the Court will benefit all members of the class. The class satisfies the adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4). The Petitioners are adequate representatives of the class because they have the same interests in the determination of the legal claims and their claims are aligned with the interests of the other class members, whom each have the same constitutional claims. The petitioners are members of the class and their interests are not in conflict or antagonistic to those interests of the other members. There are no known conflicts of interests among the members of the proposed class. They all have the same interest in having the court to rule that cash only bail for indigents is per se unconstitutional. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected and represented by the petitioners and their attorney. The class action certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2). Class action status is appropriate and warranted as the State of Alabama has imposed cash only bail to indigent criminal defendants across the State. The State of Alabama has acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members which are defined as indigent defendants in criminal cases whom are subjected to cash only bail. Those defendants whom can post cash only bail, are arrested on the warrant and are subsequently released upon posting the cash only bail. The indigent class members contained herein are unable to post cash only bail and remain incarcerated. The class seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the State of Alabama from imposing cash only bail. Because the class challenges the constitutionality of cash only bail through this declaratory and injunctive relief, the granted relief would apply to and benefit each member of the class. Therefore, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and necessary.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 21 of 24

106) 107)
108) 109) 110)

CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF The petitioners alleges, adopts and incorporates by reference all previous allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 106. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause have long prohibited the imprisonment of a person because of the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. The SCOTUS has long held in numerous decisions that imprison as a result of poverty is constitutionally impermissible. An indigents incarceration solely because of his inability to post cash bail is constitutionally impermissible. The State of Alabama violates the rights of the petitioners and all other class members by incarcerating them because they cannot post cash bail.

111)

REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF The petitioners, individually and on behalf of the other class members request the Court to Order the following relief: A) The Defendant(s) be made a party to this action, to require them to plead
or answer otherwise the allegations set out in this Complaint, and after a hearing on the merits, enter an ORDER: B) Declaring that the bail statute, Section 13 of Title 15 of the Code of Alabama is unconstitutional as it pertains to cash only bail. C) Declaring that the State of Alabama is in violation of the Constitution of Alabama and the Constitution of the United States prohibition against excessive bail when the court imposes cash bail on a defendant that has been declared to be indigent by the court. D) Declare that the magistrates within the State of Alabama are limited by Alabama Code 12-17-251 to granting bail only in minor misdemeanor prosecutions and are not permitted to grant bail, especially cash bail, in felony cases.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 22 of 24

E) Declare that the magistrates within the State of Alabama are in violation of Alabama Code 12-17-251 when granting bail in felony cases, specifically cash bail for defendants that are determined to be indigent.
F) Declare that the courts of the State of Alabama are in violation of the Constitution of the United States when imposing cash only bail in the case of defendants whom are determined to be indigent.
G) Make any other declarations and orders and such other relief as this Court deems proper and just under the circumstances.

112) 113) 114) 115)
116) 117) 118)
119)

COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY and FINAL INJUNCTION The petitioners alleges, adopts and incorporates by reference all previous allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111. Alabama Code 15-13-111 allows for various forms of bail for a defendant pending a trial on criminal charges, which includes cash only bail. This bail statute allows cash bail to be imposed by the Courts against defendants at their discretion. The magistrates across the State of Alabama routinely fix bail for felony charges, in violation of the Alabama Code. This bail is routinely in the form of cash bail. As a result, indigent defendants are left to suffer in jail and await their trial. Defendants charged with crimes whom are not indigent can post bail, be released from pretrial detention and await their trial. Indigent Defendants such as the petitioners, because they cannot post cash bail, eventually lose their job, their personal possessions and their freedom solely because of their indigency status and inability to post cash bail. The Courts of the 32nd Judicial Circuit routinely imposes a cash bail on defendants, many indigent, for failure to appear at hearings and for failure to pay court ordered fines and restitution which is also unlawful (see ARCrP 26.11).

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 23 of 24

120)
121) 122) 123)
124)

These indigent defendants remain incarcerated until they have a trial or hearing for days or weeks or months. Defendants whom are not indigent are able to post cash bail and are released to await their trial or hearing. The Constitutions of Alabama and the United States prohibit excessive bail. Cash bail for an indigent is excessive bail because he is unable to pay for his release. “Imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (1970). Without the intervention of this court, indigent criminal defendants will continue to be detained in jails because of their inability to post cash bail.

125)

REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The petitioners, individually and on behalf of the other class members request the Court to Order the following relief:
A) The Defendant(s) be made a party to this action, to require them to plead or answer otherwise the allegations set out in this Complaint, and after a hearing on the merits, enter an ORDER
B) This complaint be treated as an affidavit in support of the motions and pleadings contained therein and this complaint be treated as Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
C) Defendant(s) be temporarily restrained from imposing cash bail upon defendants in criminal cases whom they determined to be indigent under the applicable statutes to determine indigency.
D) Defendant(s), be permanently restrained from imposing cash bail upon defendants in criminal cases whom they determined to be indigent under the applicable statutes to determine indigency.
E) Awards Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and the costs of this action and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 24 of 24
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 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 1 of 28

FILED
2017 Apr-18 PM 11:17 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ,

*

DAVON TRESHAWN BEEBE,

*

TYRONE DAISHAWN BEEBE and

*

JAMES HUGO STERLING,

*

Individually and on behalf of all other *

similarly situated defendants

*

PLAINTIFF(s),

*

*

v.

*

*

STATE OF ALABAMA,

*

DEFENDANT

*

CASE No PROPOSED CLASS ACTION

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff(s), Ray Schultz, James Hugo Sterling, Davon Beebe and Tyrone Beebe, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated defendants, by class action alleged herein, by and through their attorney Melvin Hasting, and amends the complaint previously filed and avers the following:

1) The original complaint filed in this matter alleges specific constitutional violations and civil rights violations against the plaintiff’s as well as other similarly situated individuals by the State of Alabama. The complaint further requests injunctive and declaratory relief against the State of Alabama.
2) By error, the complaint failed to allege the state officials, in their individual capacity as well as their official capacity, whom are responsible for these violations.
3) The plaintiff’s amend their complaint to add the following defendants: a) Barry Matson, his predecessors and successors whom were the executive director(s) of the Office of Prosecution Services for the State of Alabama. Barry Matson is named as a defendant in both his official and individual capacity.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 2 of 28

b) Randy Helms, his predecessors and successors whom were the Administrative Director(s) of the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts. Mr. Helms is named as a defendant in both his official and individual capacity.

c) Sheriff Matthew Gentry, his predecessor and successors whom were elected as the Sheriff of Cullman County Alabama. Sheriff Gentry is named as a defendant in both his official and individual capacity.

d) Attorney General Steven Marshall, his predecessor and successor whom were elected or appointed as the Attorney General for the State of Alabama. Attorney General Marshall is also named as a defendant in both his official and individual capacity.

4) The plaintiff(s) bring this action against the State of Alabama and the defendants named in paragraph three above for their unlawful and unconstitutional actions as outlined in the original complaint.
5) The plaintiff(s) incorporate and reference all preceding paragraphs contained within the original complaint as set out herein, word for word.
6) The style of the case shall now be as follows:

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ,

*

DAVON TRESHAWN BEEBE,

*

TYRONE DAISHAWN BEEBE and

*

JAMES HUGO STERLING,

*

Individually and on behalf of all other *

similarly situated defendants

*

PLAINTIFF(s),

*

*

v.

*

BARRY MATSON, individually and in *

his official capacity as executive

*

director of the Office of Prosecution *

Services for the State of Alabama; and *

RANDY HELMS individually and in

*

his official capacity as administrative *

CASE No 5:17-cv-00270 PROPOSED CLASS ACTION

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 3 of 28

director of the Administrative Office of *

Courts for the State of Alabama; and *

SHERIFF MATT GENTRY, individually *

and in his official capacity as Sheriff of *

Cullman County, Alabama; and

*

ATTORNEY GENERAL STEVEN

*

MARSHALL, individually and in

*

his official capacity as Attorney General *

for the State of Alabama; and

*

STATE OF ALABAMA,

*

DEFENDANT

*

7) The amended complaint shall now read as follows with the incorporation of the previously filed exhibits:

INTRODUCTION
1) This case is about the State of Alabama and specifically, the 32nd Judicial Circuit imposing excessive bail in the form of cash bail in a significant amount of money so as to keep indigents incarcerated in pre-trial detention awaiting a hearing and disposition of their charges as well as post-conviction proceedings to enforce payments of court costs and fines.
2) The plaintiff(s) are indigents and incarcerated in the Cullman County Detention Center under the supervision of the Sheriff of Cullman County, Matt Gentry.
3) Defendant, Matt Gentry is the duly elected Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama.
4) Defendant State of Alabama has a bail schedule and bail statute which is routinely applied to indigent defendants in an unconstitutional manner.
5) Cullman County District Court is a court of jurisprudence in the 32nd Judicial Circuit of the State of Alabama.
6) Barry Matson is the Executive Director of Office of Prosecution Services for the State of Alabama, located in Montgomery, Alabama. It is alleged and averred by the plaintiff(s) that the Office of Prosecution Services has joined

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 4 of 28
the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts to set up a program called the Restitution Recovery Initiative for Victims in Alabama in which the AOC in conjunction with the State of Alabama Attorney General’s Office and the Office of Prosecution Services hold docket calls for criminal defendants to appear and show cause why they should not be incarcerated for failure to pay court costs and fines. As stated in a Birmingham new article dated October 17, 2014, (exhibit 31), this program is “being pushed by state legislators and prosecutors to help cash-strapped court clerk and district attorney offices collect money for victims and those offices.” 7) The Defendant(s) Matson, Helms and Marshall coordinate these dockets with retired judges and retired district attorneys to collect fees. It is the belief and knowledge of the plaintiffs that this occurs statewide and that numerous persons are jailed for failure to appear at these dockets on cash bonds, even though they have been declared indigent or are indigent, without the court enquiring into their status. 8) The 32nd judicial circuit of Alabama routinely issues cash only bonds against these defendants for these RRIVA dockets. 9) The defendant Sheriff Gentry routinely sets cash only bail for indigent criminally charged defendants after their arrest and prior to any initial appearance before a judge or magistrate. 10) Numerous indigent, criminally charged defendants across the State of Alabama are caused to suffer and languish in jail on cash only bonds which are set by a sheriff or magistrate throughout the judicial circuits in the State of Alabama. 11) Sheriff Gentry routinely requests cash only bonds for criminally charged defendants in both felony and misdemeanor cases. The magistrates in the 32nd Judicial Circuit routinely set cash only bail for these defendants, even though the defendants are obviously indigent. 12) The State of Alabama through its officials at all levels of government routinely violate the constitutional rights of indigents by allowing cash only bail.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 5 of 28
13) The State of Alabama through its officials at all levels of government routinely jail indigent defendants on cash only bail and abuses its governmental power by violating constitutional rights of persons whom are indigent in an effort to collect money for state function.
14) These violations are in opposition and contradiction to the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause as well as the Eighth Amendment privilege against excessive bail of the Constitution of the United States.
15) Cash only bail as applied and abused in Alabama and allowed by the laws of the State of Alabama and cash only bail which has been declared constitutional by the appellate courts of Alabama is a per se excessive bail for indigent criminally charged defendants.
16) The plaintiffs request this Court to intervene and prohibit the State of Alabama and the defendants from setting excessive bail in the form of cash bail which is a violation of the Constitution of the United States.
17) This is an action for declaratory relief and a preliminary/permanent injunction to settle important constitutional questions of the Alabama bail schedule and bail statute and its application by the Sheriff of Cullman County, the State of Alabama and the 32nd Judicial Circuit in pretrial detention of indigent defendants charged with crime(s) within the State of Alabama, and about the imposition of cash bail as a means to enforce payment of court costs, fines and restitution against indigent defendants in post-conviction proceedings.
18) Section 13 of Title 15 sets out the kinds of bail for persons arrested and taken into custody. (15-13-111 Alabama Code). One such permissible bail under Alabama law is cash bail.
19) Rule 7 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the setting of bail in criminal cases.
20) Article 1 subsection 16 of the Alabama Constitution states: All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and…. excessive bail shall not in any case be required.
21) The 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 6 of 28
Excessive bail shall not be required…… 22) Alabama Code 12-17-251(c)(2) limits the powers of a magistrate to:
Granting of bail in minor misdemeanor prosecutions;
PARTIES 23) Petitioner Ray Schultz is being detained in the Cullman County Detention
Center under a $2500 cash bond for the misdemeanor charge of Unlawful Distribution of material harmful to minors. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest) 24) Petitioners Davon Beebe and Tyrone Beebe are each being unlawfully detained in the Cullman County Detention Center under a felony charge of Burglary 3rd Degree. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest) and each have bail currently set at $15,000 Cash. (see attached Order on initial appearance). Their bail was set by a magistrate in the court clerk’s office. 25) Petitioner James Hugo Sterling is charged with the felony offense of possession of a forged instrument and has bail currently set at $10,000 cash. (see attached complaint and warrant of arrest). His bail was set by a magistrate in the court clerk’s office. 26) Defendant State of Alabama is represented by the Attorney General of Alabama, currently the Honorable Steve Marshall. 27) Defendant Barry Matson is the executive director for the Office of Prosecution Services for the State of Alabama. 28) Defendant Randy Helms is the Administrative Director for the Administrative Office of Courts for the State of Alabama. 29) Defendant Sheriff Matt Gentry is the elected Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama. 30) Defendant Steven Marshall is the appointed Attorney General for the State of Alabame. 31) The petitioners and all examples of defendants listed below are examples of defendants in criminal proceedings before the 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama located in Cullman County, Alabama.

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32) The petitioner(s) have each executed an affidavit of financial hardship and all been determined to be indigent by the court and the undersigned attorney has been appointed to represent the plaintiff Ray Schultz and Davon Beebe and the Honorable Robert A. Sapp has been appointed to represent the plaintiff Tyrone Beebe in their respective District Court cases. Plaintiff James Hugo Sterling is being represented by the undersigned attorney, pro-bono.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 33) This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 28 U.S.C. §2201,
et seq., the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 34) The appellate courts in the State of Alabama have held that cash bail is a permissible form of bail for pretrial detention (Ex parte Singleton, 902 So.2d 132 (ALCCrA 2004) and (Ex parte Brown, 792 So.2d 441 (ALCCrA 2001)) and that the Constitution of Alabama does not prohibit cash bail, postconviction (see Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So.2d 515 (ALCCvA 1999). This is a federal question action seeking a declaration of the rights of indigent defendants to cash only bail being imposed against them both in pretrial detention and after conviction and in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 35) Venue is proper in the Northern District of Alabama as the petitioners are all located in Cullman County, Alabama which is located with the jurisdictional boundaries of the Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 36) The petitioners allege that they cannot post cash bail. This is evident by the
fact that they have been incarcerated in the Cullman County since their arrest on February 2, 2017 for Davon and Tyrone Beebe; since February 15, 2017 for Sterling and since December 6, 2016 for Ray Schultz. 37) The petitioner Ray Schultz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Alabama and a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2017 wherein the magistrates and Circuit Clerk were called as

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witnesses to testify. The testimony in this hearing was that the purpose of the cash bail was for the defendant to not be released from jail upon his arrest, but to keep him in jail. The Circuit Court of Cullman County denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (see attached exhibit). 38) All of the Defendants with the exception of Ray Charles Schultz had cash bonds set by magistrates in the court clerk’s office for felony offenses. 39) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants charged with non-capital crimes, many of whom are indigent and have no means of posting bail. The magistrates in the court clerk’s office set these cash bonds to include bonds for felony charges. 40) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants whom fail to appear for court appearances, many of whom are indigent and are unable to post bail. 41) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants who are arrested on failure to pay court costs and fines after conviction and many of those defendants are indigent. 42) The 32nd Judicial Circuit of Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants on alias warrants of arrest on cases to which they have lost jurisdiction. 43) For example, Melissa Tello is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 20142672) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to permitting dogs to run at large and she received a three (3) day suspended sentence on January 13, 2015 and was given 12 months of probation. Ms. Tello had no attorney. On August 5, 2016, (7 months after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $667.90 fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $600 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. She was arrested on the warrant on January 14, 2017, and released on January 18, 2017 upon her payment of $150 to the clerk of the court. (note: she served 4 days on a 3 day sentence.) (see exhibit 6)

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44) On October 11, 2016, the 32nd Judicial Circuit District Judge Kim Chaney had a show cause docket. Listed below are examples of cases and warrants issued on that date in addition to Ms. Tello’s case listed above:
45) James Price is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2002-1238) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of harassment and he received a thirty (30) day suspended sentence on November 25, 2002 and was given 12 months of probation. Mr. Price had no attorney. On September 18, 2007, a warrant was issued for his arrest by the Clerk of the Court and the bond was set at NO BOND. Price was arrested on April 7, 2014 and on May 8, 2014, Price was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in 2003). In July 2016, (13 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $221.20 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 7)
46) Kimberly Drinkard is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2005-365) wherein she her case was dismissed on September 4, 2007 with conditions of payment of court costs and fines. Drinkard had an appointed attorney in this case. In August 2016, (9 YEARS after her case was dismissed) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Drinkard owed the sum of $1659.50 of which she has paid $1600, leaving a balance of $59.20 owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has not been arrested on this warrant. This was not the first time that Drinkard was arrested on an alias warrant for this case. She was arrested in January 2015 on a cash bond which was posted on her behalf. (see exhibit 8).

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47) Joseph Barnett is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-156) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and he received a three (3) year sentence to prison on January 25, 2011. Barnette had an appointed attorney. He was paroled on November 21, 2011. In July 6, 2016, (5 ½ YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $6040 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $6000 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 9)
48) Sandy Eddy is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-367) wherein the case was to be dismissed on November 29, 2011 with conditions of payment of court costs and fines. Eddy had an appointed attorney in this case. On August 16, 2011 Judge Kim Chaney entered an Order that Eddy had completed all requirements of the Drug Court program except payment of 1040 in drug court fees. In August 2016, (5 YEARS after his case was to be dismissed) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Eddy owed the sum of $ 2767 of which he has paid $445, leaving a balance of $2321.92 owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $2200 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 10).
49) Cody Strickland is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-307) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He pled into Drug Court on April 6, 2010. He received a three (3) year sentence to prison on August 6, 2013 for failure to complete Drug Court. Strickland was credited with 132 days of jail credit at the time of his sentencing. Strickland had an appointed attorney. He was released from prison on August 19, 2014. In May 25, 2016, (3 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for

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failure to pay the balance of $6152.50 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $6000 cash bond, set by the magistrate, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has been arrested on this warrant On October 19, 2016 and the $6,000 cash bond still remains.(see exhibit 11) 50) Brian Gamble is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-267) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He pled to this charge on September 7, 2010 and received a three (3) year sentence to prison. Gamble had an appointed attorney during the whole process. He was released from prison on October 23, 2011 by the expiration of his sentence. In June 28, 2016, (6 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $5665.70 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $5000 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 12) 51) Brenda Collins is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2009-1578) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of negotiating a worthless instrument and he received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on April 20, 2009 and was given 24 months of probation. Collins had no attorney. On April 16, 2014, Collins was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in 2011). In July 27, 2016, (5 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $160.16 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $250 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 13) 52) Frank Grotschel, Jr. is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-1798) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to negotiating a worthless instrument on

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June 21 2010. He received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on that date. Grotschel had no attorney. He was ordered probation for twenty four (24) months. In July 13, 2016, (4 YEARS after the expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1088.43 of the fine plus court costs owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which he failed to appear and a $1000 cash bond, set by the magistrate, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant (see exhibit 14) 53) Cerena Wynn is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2010-330) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She pled into Drug Court in 2010. She received a four (4) year sentence to prison on April 26, 2011 for failure to complete Drug Court. Wynn was credited with 188 days of jail credit at the time of her sentencing. Wynn had an appointed attorney. She was released from prison on parole in 2012. In July 26, 2016, (5 YEARS after being sentenced to 4 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $3051.80 of the fine plus court costs owed. Prior to this motion being filed, the State of Alabama had already filed two previous motions for writ of arrest in 2015 and on February 10, 2015, an alias warrant with a $3,000 cash bond was entered and again on June 8, 2015 another alias warrant with a $3,000 cash bond was entered. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and another $3000 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. Prior to this warrant, in June 12, 2015, Wynn filed an affidavit of financial hardship stating that her income was $700 per month from SSI. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has been arrested on this warrant On October 25, 2016 and was released upon return of payments of $20 per month.(see exhibit 15) 54) Michael Lambert is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-539) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of receiving stolen property 3rd Degree and he received a twelve (12) month suspended

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sentence on November 29, 2011 and was given 24 months of probation. Lambert had an appointed attorney. On April 17, 2014, Lambert was released from county probation by Order of Judge Chaney (even though his probation expired in 2013). In August 19, 2016, (3 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $4776.20 of the fine plus court costs owed. Lambert had paid a total of $3523 and had previously been issued an alias warrant on August 27, 2015 with a $1,400 cash bond. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 for the August 2016 Motion in which he failed to appear and a $1200 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant.(see exhibit 16) 55) Katherine Conn is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-120) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She pled to this charge on June 19, 2012 and received a three (3) year sentence to prison for failure to complete Drug Court. Conn had an appointed attorney during the whole process. She was released from prison on December 31, 2012 on parole. In August 5, 2016, (4 YEARS after being sentenced to 3 yrs) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1145.30 of the fine plus court costs owed to which she had already paid $950 . A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $250 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 17) 56) Justin Michael Smith is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2011-783) wherein he entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charges of receiving stolen property 3rd Degree and Theft of Property 3rd Degree and he received a twelve (12) month suspended sentence on January 31, 2012 and was given 24 months of probation. Smith had an appointed attorney. On June 12, 2012, an alias warrant was issued by the clerk and there was no bond set. On August 26, 2015 an alias warrant was issued and a $1500 cash bond

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was imposed. In August 9, 2016, (2 YEARS after expiration of probation) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1808.33 of the fine plus court costs owed. Lambert had paid a total of $734. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 for the August 2016 Motion in which he failed to appear and a $1000 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has been arrested on this warrant on February 13, 2017. On February 15, 2017, Judge Kim Chaney appointed Alex Chaney to represent Smith and ordered that Smith may be released upon payment of $300 to the clerk. (note: Smith is not entitled to appointment of counsel after completion of sentence and probation as is the case) (see exhibit 18)
57) Sharon Hand is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2012-73) wherein she entered a plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. She received a fifteen (15) year sentence to prison on October 28, 2013. Hand had an appointed attorney. She was released from prison on parole in April 7, 2014. In August 5, 2016, (2 YEARS after being paroled) the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $831.30 of the fine plus court costs which was owed. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $800 cash bond, was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that she has been arrested on this warrant on November 7, 2016 and it is unknown if she was released. (see exhibit 19)
58) Other Defendants with recent cases on that same October 11, 2016 docket include: Jonah Witherspoon (25 DC 2014 631) whom pled to misdemeanor Assault 3rd Degree on March 25, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months’ probation. Witherspoon had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1247.30 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear.

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A $1,200 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 20)
59) Robert Stewart (25 DC 2014 186) whom pled to misdemeanor Theft of Property 3rd Degree on January 26, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Stewart had an appointed attorney. On August 11, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1414.90 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,600 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 21)
60) Steven Drew (25 DC 2015 703) whom pled to misdemeanor possession of forged instrument 3rd Degree on December 21, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Drew had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1217.40 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,000 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 22)
61) Sonya Chappell (25 DC 2015 313) whom pled to misdemeanor illegal possession of prescription drugs on August 10, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Chappell had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1350 on her fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,300 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 23)
62) Philesha Price is a defendant in a criminal case (25DC 2015-444) was charged with unlawful possession of controlled substance wherein the case was to be dismissed on August 10, 2015 with conditions of payment of court

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costs and fines. Price had an appointed attorney in this case. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of the fine plus court costs owed. According to the court records, Eddy owes the sum of $572.30. A hearing was set on October 11, 2016 in which she failed to appear and a $500 cash bond was imposed on the defendant for an alias warrant. It is the belief of the petitioners that he has not been arrested on this warrant. (see exhibit 24).
63) Ronald Stephenson (25 DC 2015 639) whom pled to misdemeanor unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia on December 7, 2015 and had a 12 month suspended sentence with 24 months of probation. Stephenson had an appointed attorney. On July 26, 2016, the State of Alabama filed a motion for writ of arrest for failure to pay the balance of $1919.40 on his fine and court costs, and a hearing was set on October 11, 2016 to which the defendant failed to appear. A $1,800 cash bond was set on October 18, 2016 to which it is believed the Defendant has not been arrested on. (see exhibit 25).
64) On October 7, 2016 a “payment docket” was held by the Honorable Greg Nicholas, Circuit Judge for the 32nd Judicial Circuit. On that date, the following arrest warrants were issued for failure to pay:
65) Michael James, (25CC-2001-215) where the defendant pled to Sexual Abuse 1st Degree and sentenced to prison on May 9, 2001 for four (4) years. James was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. On October 7, 2016, (11 YEARS after his sentence) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a $929.06 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 26)
66) Christopher Williams, (25CC-2003-263) where the defendant pled to theft of property 2nd Degree and sentenced to prison on May 19, 2003 for fifteen (15) years. Williams was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. He was paroled on March 30, 2009. On October 7, 2016, (7 YEARS after his sentence) an alias warrant was issued for failure to

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pay the $1683 balance owed on his fines and costs and a $1636 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 27) 67) Westly Screws, (25CC-2007-236) where the defendant pled to Possession of a forged instrument 2nd Degree and sentenced to two years suspended sentence with two years of probation on August 18, 2007. Screws was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea On October 7, 2016, (7 YEARS after his probation ended) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a $500 cash bond was imposed. Prior to the imposition of this cash bond, the court notice of the October 7, 2016 was returned to the clerk’s office with the post office stating that there was no such number (address) and that they were unable to forward the mail. Apparently Screws did not receive notice of the October 7, 2016 hearing. Regardless, he did receive a $500 cash bond on that date. (see exhibit 28) 68) Daniel Speegle, (25CC-2008-263) where the defendant pled to Burglary 3rd Degree and was sentenced to 30 months suspended with 3 years of probation on September 10, 2008. Speegle was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. On October 7, 2016, (5 YEARS after his probation ended) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a 3808.30 cash bond was imposed. Speegle had already paid $1310 of the $5118.30 court costs leaving a balance of $3808.30. Even more egregious is the fact that on April 16, 2015, the State of Alabama filed an unverified motion for a civil judgment for the amount of restitution owed on this case and requested that any outstanding writ of arrests be recalled so that they may pursue collection of the restitution by civil proceeding. The court granted the motion for a civil judgment on April 17, 2015. Apparently the State of Alabama was unable to collect the judgment through garnishments and requested that a show cause hearing be set. The defendant failed to appear and a cash bond for the civil judgment amount was entered on October 7, 2016. (see exhibit 29) 69) Kristi Burks, (25CC-2009-122) where the defendant pled to Unlawful Possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to prison on May 19,

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2009 for fifteen (15) years. Burks was represented by appointed counsel when charged and entering a guilty plea. She was paroled on May 3, 2010 and since that parole date has been in and out of jail for failure to pay on numerous occasions, each time with a cash bond. On October 7, 2016, the defendant filed a pro-se letter to Judge Nicholas explaining her inability to pay her fines because she was awaiting approval for her social security disability application and that she had a child to care for. She also explained that she had experience a seizure on the morning that she was to attend court and was unable to locate someone to help her care for her child. On October 7, 2016, (6 YEARS after her parole) an alias warrant was issued for failure to pay and a $4,382 cash bond was imposed. (see exhibit 30) 70) Article 1 subsection 16 of the Alabama Constitution states:
All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and…. excessive bail shall not in any case be required. 71) The 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that Excessive bail shall not be required…… 72) In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the SCOTUS held that depriving an individual of “conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay… would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment @672-673. In this case the trial court revoked the probation of Bearden for failure to pay a fine due to his indigency. The Supreme Court held that a court cannot simply imprison a defendant for failure to pay a fine without first making and inquiry into the circumstances of failing to pay the fine. 73) The Supreme Court has also held that the government cannot have policies or procedures that have the effect of punishing a person for his poverty: Griffin v. Illinois; Smith v. Bennett; Tate v. Short; and Williams v. Illinois; 74) In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) the SCOTUS held that the “traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to

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conviction” citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895). “The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty”………. “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment” …… “Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. 75) The Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.11 sets out the procedure for enforcement of payment of fines and restitution. Rule 26.11(i)(2) states:
In no case shall an indigent defendant be incarcerated for inability to pay a fine or court costs or restitution. 76) “Imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (1970); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
ARGUMENT 77) The petitioners are each being detained solely because of their indigent
status. If they were not impoverished and able to post cash bail, they would not be incarcerated awaiting their trial. 78) The District Court of Cullman County in each of the petitioner’s cases have violated their right to pre-trial release by imposing cash-only bail because of their indigent status and inability to post cash bail. 79) The petitioners, because of their indigent status and inability to post cash bail, are each being deprived of their presumption of innocence and are in fact being punished by imprisonment prior to any conviction or presentation of their case to a finder of fact. 80) The petitioners are each being deprived of Due Process of Law solely because of their indigent status. Similarly charged defendants whom are not indigent are able to post bail and able to assist in the preparation of their

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defense. The petitioners are limited to their access of persons, documentary evidence, and the review of the relevant law for each of their cases because of their pre-trial detention. 81) Three of the named petitioners are each being deprived of Due Process of Law because they have bail set by magistrates in felony cases, contrary to Alabama law. 82) The 32nd Judicial Circuit abuses process and violates constitutional guarantees and protections, as well as state court rules/law, by imposing cash bail on defendants whom are no longer under the jurisdiction of the court. 83) The 32nd Judicial Circuit abuses process and violates constitutional guarantees and protections, such as Due Process of Law by imposing cash bail on defendants in criminal cases whom have not been adequately notified of the cases against them. In each of the cases cited in paragraphs 28-54 above, the proceeding which lead to the imposition of the cash only bail were initiated by motions filed by the District Attorney for the 32nd Judicial Circuit. The same standard non-verified motion was filed by the District Attorney, most not even stating any sufficient facts about the defendant. None of the motions included a summons to court and the allegations contained within the motion was unverified. 84) Alabama Code 15-22-54(c) states: At any time during the period of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested. Nothing in the statute allows the court to issue a warrant of arrest after the term of probation has expired. 85) For an indigent defendant, cash bail on its face is excessive bail, which is constitutionally impermissible. 86) It is facially unconstitutional to impose a cash bail on a non-capital case, to which an indigent cannot post.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

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87) The petitioners bring this action on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this complaint on a common basis.
88) Although there are only four petitioners listed as plaintiffs, there are numerous other defendants in the Cullman County Detention Center whom are incarcerated in pre-trial detention because of their inability to post cash only bail. These petitioners are the current cash only detainees that the undersigned has been appointed to represent in criminal proceedings. Other attorneys in the 32nd Judicial Circuit also report defendants whom they have been appointed to represent whom are subjected to pretrial detention because of cash only bail.
89) The imposition of cash only bail by both magistrates and the judges of the 32nd Judicial Circuit is a routine practice.
90) A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the petitioners and other class members can challenge the State of Alabama’s and specifically the 32nd Judicial Circuit’s unconstitutional and unlawful detention scheme.
91) There are also numerous defendants held by cash only bail in the municipal court systems across the State of Alabama.
92) The defendants listed in the examples of paragraphs 28-54 above are only from two dockets held in October 2016 in the 32nd Judicial Circuit. Numerous other defendants have cash only bonds from numerous other payment review dockets held in other months.
93) The defendants listed in examples of paragraphs 28-54 are only from the 32nd Judicial Circuit. There are numerous Judicial Circuits across the State of Alabama which hold these FRAC (fines, restitution and costs) recovery dockets also known as the Restitution Recovery Initiative for Victims in Alabama and “pay dockets”. (see attached exhibit 31).
94) These dockets have been established by the Office of Prosecution Services in cooperation with the Administrative Office of Courts as a way to collects unpaid fines, costs and restitution to help fund the court system and district

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95) 96) 97)
98)
99) 100) 101)
102) 103)

attorney offices across the State of Alabama whom are experience a financial crisis (see article attached as exhibit 31). This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions in Rule 23. Petitioners proposes a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Class is defined as; All defendants and arrestees unable to pay for their release who are or who will be in the custody of the Sheriffs of each county in the State of Alabama as a result of an arrest on a warrant for cash only bail. The class satisfies the numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) as every arrestee or defendant has the option of posting cash bail in the amount set by the court or will suffer incarceration in a county jail for varying lengths of time until they either make the court ordered payment or post the cash only bail. In the event that the arrestee or defendant is indigent, they will remain incarcerated. In the event that the arrestee or defendant is not indigent, they will be permitted to post cash bail and be immediately released. Paragraphs 28-54 above, list the names of 26 defendants whom have been determined to be indigent in the criminal proceedings within one judicial circuit and whom failed to appear at these two specific FRAC dockets and now have or had arrest warrants issued with cash only bail. There are numerous other defendants across the State of Alabama whom are subjected to the same cash only bail provisions. The class satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) as the relief sought is common to all members of the class. The petitioners seek a declaration from the court that cash only bail for indigents is constitutionally impermissible. The petitioners seek relief from the court to preliminarily and permanently restrain the State of Alabama from imposing cash only bail against defendants whom are determined to be indigent.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 23 of 28

104) 105)
106) 107) 108)
109) 110) 111) 112)

In granting the requested relief, all class members as well as the petitioners will have their constitutional rights protected presently and in the future. The common legal and factual question arises from the judicial circuits across the State of Alabama implementing a system of cash only bail for defendants failing to appear at these cost recovery dockets and the 32nd Judicial Circuit violating the Due Process protections under the Constitutions of the United States and Alabama by imposing cash only bail in the cases of indigent criminal defendants. This is in addition to the violation of the Alabama Statutes by magistrates setting bail in felony cases. The resolution of the common legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the relief that they seek. The class satisfies the Typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). The petitioner’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class and the petitioner have the same interest in this case as all member of the class they represent. Each of the members of the class are indigent defendants of criminal cases and each of them are subjected to cash only bail. Each member of the class will be confined to jail because of their inability to post cash only bail. The resolution of the constitutionality of cash only bail for indigents will determine the claims for relief sought by the petitioners individually and as representatives of the members of the class of indigent defendants. If the petitioners are successful in their claim as to the unconstitutionality of cash only bail for indigents, the rulings by the Court will benefit all members of the class. The class satisfies the adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4). The Petitioners are adequate representatives of the class because they have the same interests in the determination of the legal claims and their claims are aligned with the interests of the other class members, whom each have the same constitutional claims. The petitioners are members of the class and their interests are not in conflict or antagonistic to those interests of the other members.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 24 of 28

113) 114) 115) 116)
117) 118) 119) 120)
121) 122) 123) 124)

There are no known conflicts of interests among the members of the proposed class. They all have the same interest in having the court to rule that cash only bail for indigents is per se unconstitutional. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected and represented by the petitioners and their attorney. The class action certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2). Class action status is appropriate and warranted as the State of Alabama has imposed cash only bail to indigent criminal defendants across the State. The State of Alabama has acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members which are defined as indigent defendants in criminal cases whom are subjected to cash only bail. Those defendants whom can post cash only bail, are arrested on the warrant and are subsequently released upon posting the cash only bail. The indigent class members contained herein are unable to post cash only bail and remain incarcerated. The class seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the State of Alabama from imposing cash only bail. Because the class challenges the constitutionality of cash only bail through this declaratory and injunctive relief, the granted relief would apply to and benefit each member of the class. Therefore, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and necessary.
CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF The petitioners alleges, adopts and incorporates by reference all previous allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 106. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause have long prohibited the imprisonment of a person because of the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. The SCOTUS has long held in numerous decisions that imprison as a result of poverty is constitutionally impermissible. An indigents incarceration solely because of his inability to post cash bail is constitutionally impermissible.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 25 of 28

125) The State of Alabama violates the rights of the petitioners and all other class members by incarcerating them because they cannot post cash bail.

126)

REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF The petitioners, individually and on behalf of the other class members request the Court to Order the following relief: A) The Defendant(s) be made a party to this action, to require them to plead
or answer otherwise the allegations set out in this Complaint, and after a hearing on the merits, enter an ORDER: B) Declaring that the bail statute, Section 13 of Title 15 of the Code of Alabama is unconstitutional as it pertains to cash only bail. C) Declaring that the State of Alabama is in violation of the Constitution of Alabama and the Constitution of the United States prohibition against excessive bail when the court imposes cash bail on a defendant that has been declared to be indigent by the court. D) Declare that the magistrates within the State of Alabama are limited by Alabama Code 12-17-251 to granting bail only in minor misdemeanor prosecutions and are not permitted to grant bail, especially cash bail, in felony cases. E) Declare that the magistrates within the State of Alabama are in violation of Alabama Code 12-17-251 when granting bail in felony cases, specifically cash bail for defendants that are determined to be indigent. F) Declare that the courts of the State of Alabama are in violation of the Constitution of the United States when imposing cash only bail in the case of defendants whom are determined to be indigent. G) Make any other declarations and orders and such other relief as this Court deems proper and just under the circumstances.

127)

COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY and FINAL INJUNCTION The petitioners alleges, adopts and incorporates by reference all previous allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 26 of 28

128) 129) 130)
131) 132) 133)
134)
135)
136) 137) 138)
139)

Alabama Code 15-13-111 allows for various forms of bail for a defendant pending a trial on criminal charges, which includes cash only bail. This bail statute allows cash bail to be imposed by the Courts against defendants at their discretion. The magistrates across the State of Alabama routinely fix bail for felony charges, in violation of the Alabama Code. This bail is routinely in the form of cash bail. As a result, indigent defendants are left to suffer in jail and await their trial. Defendants charged with crimes whom are not indigent can post bail, be released from pretrial detention and await their trial. Indigent Defendants such as the petitioners, because they cannot post cash bail, eventually lose their job, their personal possessions and their freedom solely because of their indigency status and inability to post cash bail. The Courts of the 32nd Judicial Circuit routinely imposes a cash bail on defendants, many indigent, for failure to appear at hearings and for failure to pay court ordered fines and restitution which is also unlawful (see ARCrP 26.11). These indigent defendants remain incarcerated until they have a trial or hearing for days or weeks or months. Defendants whom are not indigent are able to post cash bail and are released to await their trial or hearing. The Constitutions of Alabama and the United States prohibit excessive bail. Cash bail for an indigent is excessive bail because he is unable to pay for his release. “Imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (1970). Without the intervention of this court, indigent criminal defendants will continue to be detained in jails because of their inability to post cash bail.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 27 of 28

140)

REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The petitioners, individually and on behalf of the other class members request the Court to Order the following relief:
A) The Defendant(s) be made a party to this action, to require them to plead or answer otherwise the allegations set out in this Complaint, and after a hearing on the merits, enter an ORDER
B) This complaint be treated as an affidavit in support of the motions and pleadings contained therein and this complaint be treated as Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
C) Defendant(s) be temporarily restrained from imposing cash bail upon defendants in criminal cases whom they determined to be indigent under the applicable statutes to determine indigency.
D) Defendant(s), be permanently restrained from imposing cash bail upon defendants in criminal cases whom they determined to be indigent under the applicable statutes to determine indigency.
E) Awards Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and the costs of this action and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 14 Filed 04/18/17 Page 28 of 28

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 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 1 of 24

FILED
2018 Mar-09 AM 11:03 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

)

BRADLEY HESTER, on behalf of himself )

and those similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff;

)

)

v.

)

)

MATT GENTRY, in his official capacity )

as Cullman County Sheriff,

)

)

LISA MCSWAIN, in her official

)

capacity as Circuit Clerk,

)

)

AMY BLACK, in her official capacity )

as Magistrate of the Cullman County

)

District Court,

)

)

JOAN WHITE, in her official capacity )

as Magistrate of the Cullman County

)

District Court,

)

)

KIM CHANEY, in his official capacity )

as the District Court Judge of the Cullman )

County District Court, and

)

)

RUSTY TURNER, in his official capacity )

as the District Court Judge of the Cullman )

County District Court,

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH (Class Action)

INTERVENOR COMPLAINT

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.

Defendants Cullman County Sheriff Matt Gentry (“Gentry”), Circuit Court Clerk

Lisa McSwain (“McSwain”), Magistrates Amy Black (“Black”) and Joan White (“White”), and

District Court Judges Kim Chaney (“Chaney”) and Rusty Turner (“Turner”) are operating a two-

1

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 2 of 24
tiered pretrial justice system. Secured financial conditions of release are required for misdemeanor and felony offenses pursuant to a predetermined bail schedule that specifies a monetary range based only on the charge. A person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense who can afford the monetary amount is released from jail immediately upon payment. Those arrestees who cannot afford the monetary amount may remain in jail for weeks before they are afforded a hearing to argue for their release. How quickly—or whether—a person is released from jail depends entirely on her access to money.
2. Pursuant to this discriminatory scheme, individuals remain detained for varying lengths of time. How long presumptively innocent arrestees remain in jail after arrest depends on whether they or their families are able to pay, to borrow sufficient resources, or to arrange for a third-party surety. Others, like Mr. Hester, who are too poor to pay and unable to find anyone to pay the secured money bond for them, remain in jail for the entire duration of their case.
3. Mr. Hester was arrested on July 27, 2017, and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and is currently incarcerated because he cannot afford to pay the $1,000 bond required by the bail schedule. If he could pay the amount, he would be released from jail immediately.
4. On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Mr. Hester seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief. Mr. Hester seeks an injunction against Sheriff Gentry from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail without an individualized hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive
2

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 3 of 24

conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance. He seeks declaratory relief

against Defendants McSwain, Black, White, Chaney, and Turner.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201,

et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court has

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

5.

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district.

III. PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

6. Plaintiff Bradley Dewayne Hester is a resident of Cullman, Alabama.

B. Defendants

7. Defendant Matt Gentry is the Cullman County Sheriff. He is sued in his official

capacity.

8. Defendant Lisa McSwain is the Circuit Court Clerk for Alabama’s 32nd Judicial

Circuit Court. She is sued in her official capacity.

9. Defendant Amy Black is the Magistrate for the Cullman County District Court.

She is sued in her official capacity.

10. Defendant Joan White is the Magistrate for the Cullman County District Court.

She is sued in her official capacity.

11. Defendant Kim Chaney is a Cullman County District Court Judge. He is sued in

his official capacity.

3

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 4 of 24
12. Defendant Rusty Turner is a Cullman County District Court Judge. He is sued in his official capacity.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Defendants’ Money Bail Practices Detain People Based on Their Wealth Rather
Than Their Suitability for Release. i. Defendants Unconstitutionally Detain People Unable to Pay Secured Money Bail
Set Pursuant to the Predetermined Bail Schedule. 13. One out of every five people in Cullman County lives in poverty.1 14. Only 4 percent of the population over the age of sixteen worked full-time yearround in 2015, the last year for which data is available.2 15. Nearly one out of four people did not work at all in 2015.3 16. The Sheriff requires any person arrested and charged with a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a secured amount of money bail (i.e. cash, commercial surety, or property) to be released from jail following arrest. 17. The amount of money that an arrestee must pay is pre-determined by a bail schedule. 18. The bail schedule specifies a monetary range based only on the charge. It does not contemplate consideration of a person’s financial resources or whether any alternative nonfinancial conditions of release may mitigate any relevant risk.
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, available at https://goo.gl/CrVQ66.
2 Id. 3 Id.
4

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 5 of 24

19. Immediate access to money alone determines whether a person remains in jail

following arrest. If a person can pay the amount required, the individual is released from jail

immediately. If the person is unable to pay, she remains incarcerated.

ii.

Defendant Gentry Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay the Predetermined

Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay.

20. When a person is arrested in Cullman County, she is booked into the Cullman

County Jail, which is operated by the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Matt Gentry is responsible

for the operation of the Cullman County jail and the release and detention of arrestees.

21. After booking, arrestees are informed by Sheriff’s Department employees of their

bail amount.

22. The Sheriff determines the required amount of money by referring to the bail

schedule.

23. As Sheriff Gentry explained, “When someone comes into the jail, we have a chart

we go by to set the bonds. You can’t go outside the scope of the range; you have to be within the

bond range. We bring in 30 people a day; those 30 won’t go see the judge that day. But we

already know what the bond amount’s going to be when they come in. When you come in on possession of a controlled substance, $5,000; trafficking, $1 million.”4

24. Arrestees who do not have other restrictions on their eligibility for release can pay

this amount themselves, make a phone call to ask a friend or family to pay this amount on their

behalf, or contact a bonding agent to assist in posting bail. If an arrestee can afford to pay the

predetermined bail, the Sheriff’s Department accepts the money and releases her.

4 W.C. Mann, Bail Bonds, Part 2: The Law Enforcement Perspective, The Cullman Tribune (Feb., 2017), https://goo.gl/okgWP8.
5

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 6 of 24

25. Although a person with financial resources will be released almost immediately

after posting bail, the Sheriff’s Department will continue to detain a person who cannot afford to

pay the pre-set secured bail amount.

26. Defendant Gentry maintains this policy and practice even though he receives no

notice that there has been an inquiry into a person’s ability to pay the amount set, findings that

the person can afford to meet the financial conditions of release, and consideration of alternative

non-financial conditions of release.

27. Defendant Gentry’s policy and practice of detaining people who cannot meet their

financial conditions of release results in systematic wealth-based detention in Cullman County.

28. Indeed, Defendant Gentry sees his role as using the money bail system “to keep criminals off the street”5 and has promised to do “everything within that bond schedule to keep [people] in jail.”6

iii.

Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner Do Not Review the

Predetermined Financial Conditions of Release for Weeks or Months.

29. Defendants Chaney and Turner are responsible for setting policies governing

release conditions, see Ala. Code § 15-13-103.

30. Magistrates Black and White enforce these policies and conduct an initial

appearance for any person who cannot afford the monetary amount required by the bail schedule.

The arrestee remains in jail for the initial appearance and is not brought to the courthouse.

Instead, the first appearance is conducted electronically via FaceTime on an iPad from the

Cullman County District Court.

5 Benjamin Bullard, Sheriff explains bond system as lawsuit looms, The Cullman Times
(July 16, 2017), https://goo.gl/F3ZxSd. 6 W.C. Mann, Drug Trafficking Defendants Sue County Officials: Sheriff Responds, The
Cullman Tribune (July, 2017), https://goo.gl/gQXYPx.

6

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 7 of 24
31. Under Alabama law, a judge or magistrate is required to conduct the initial appearance within 48-hours following a warrantless arrest or 72-hours following a warrant arrest. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(1)(iii), (b)(2)(i). The purposes of the initial appearance under state law are to (1) ascertain the defendant’s true name and address, (2) inform the defendant of the charges against him, and (3) notify the defendant of the right to counsel. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4. A judicial officer is also required to determine a defendant’s conditions of release. Id.; Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4 (“If a defendant has not been released from custody and is brought before a court for initial appearance, a determination of the conditions of release shall be made.”).
32. However, it is Defendants Black’s, White’s, Chaney’s, and Turner’s general practice to not allow arrestees to make arguments about their ability to pay or their suitability for release at the initial appearance. Pursuant to Defendants Black’s and White’s policy and practice, arrestees are not permitted to challenge their financial conditions of release or to request non-monetary conditions of release. Indeed, in her ten years as a magistrate, Defendant Black cannot recall a time when she reviewed the bail amount at the initial appearance.7
33. Defendants are unrepresented by counsel at the initial appearance. 34. At the initial appearance, Defendants Black and White do not make any findings that a person can afford the pre-set amount required or that secured money bail is the least restrictive condition of release available. 35. At the initial appearance, Defendants Black and White also do not consider whether an arrestee may be safely released on affordable financial or non-financial release
7 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20:10-15, Lee v. Gentry, No. CV-2017-900027 (Feb. 1, 2017). Doc. 31-2.
7

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 8 of 24

conditions, nor do they make any affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning arrestees’

ability to pay the amount of secured money bail required.

36. Because of these practices, the initial court appearance provides no opportunity

for a person to raise ability to pay, to be heard on alternative conditions of release, or to raise any

constitutional issues with ongoing post-arrest detention.

37. An arrestee’s financial conditions of release are not reviewed at all if the person

cannot afford money bail. Indeed, an arrestee’s financial conditions of release are only reviewed

if a person files a motion for a bond reduction, which is generally scheduled for a hearing no

earlier than two weeks after a person’s arrest and as long as two months later.

38. Thus, an individual who cannot afford the predetermined secured money bail

amount usually will be detained for weeks or months without any opportunity for an

individualized release hearing or to otherwise raise any issues concerning her ability to pay or

her suitability for release under alternative conditions.

39. By contrast, an arrestee who can pay the monetary amount required by the bail

schedule is released immediately from jail.

40. Defendants’ reliance on predetermined secured money bail has resulted in

unnecessary wealth-based detention that is devastating for the poorest people in Cullman

County. Many people in the Cullman County jail have not been convicted of a crime and are

only in jail because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail.

B. Plaintiff Hester Cannot Afford the Monetary Amount Required by the Bail Schedule.

41.

Mr. Hester is a 35-year-old man who lives in Cullman, Alabama.

42.

On August 27, 2017, Mr. Hester was arrested for possession of drug

paraphernalia, a misdemeanor.

8

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 9 of 24

43.

Mr. Hester was taken to the Cullman County Jail and told that he would be

released from jail only if he paid a $1,000 bond.

44.

A day or two after his arrest, Mr. Hester had his initial appearance via video link

between the jail and the courtroom. He was unrepresented by counsel at this hearing, which

lasted for one to two minutes in total. The magistrate informed Mr. Hester of the charge against

him and his bond amount. At no point during this brief hearing did the magistrate inquire into

Mr. Hester’s ability to pay the secured financial condition of release that she had imposed or give

him the opportunity to say he could not pay it. The magistrate did not ask him any questions at

all or tell him when his next court appearance would be. Although the magistrate told him that he

could apply for an attorney, a correctional officer told him that he did not need an attorney

because he was only charged with a misdemeanor.

45.

Mr. Hester is indigent and cannot afford to buy his release from jail. He has no

assets, no real property, and no stable income. For the last two years, he has supported himself

by working odd jobs.

46.

Mr. Hester currently has an open wound from a spider bite on his hand. The

wound is very painful and is dripping blood. Mr. Hester cannot obtain medical care for his

wound because he cannot afford it.

47.

Mr. Hester is sleeping on the floor of his jail cell because there are three people in

the cell but only two beds.

48.

Mr. Hester has not been told when his next court appearance will be, but he

believes it will be in about a month.

9

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 10 of 24
C. Non-Financial Conditions of Release Alone or in Combination with Unsecured Money Bail Are As Effective As or More Effective than Secured Money Bail.
49. Detention on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. Controlling for
other factors, a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained.8
50. Studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offense.9 Controlling for other factors, those detained pretrial will be given longer jail sentences.10 Detained
defendants are more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent.11 They have a harder time preparing a defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and
meeting with their lawyers. A person’s ability to pay money bail thus has an irreparable impact
on the outcome of a criminal case.
8 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (May 2, 2016) (finding that a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained), available at https://goo.gl/riaoKD; see also Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 15, 19 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (finding a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data).
9 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, Laura and John Arnold Foundation 4 (November 2013), available at https://goo.gl/FLjVZP (those detained for the entire pretrial period are more likely to be sentenced to jail and prison—and receive longer sentences—than those who are released at some point before trial or case disposition).
10 Id. 11 Stevenson, supra note 1 at 18 (“Pretrial detention leads to an expected increase of 124 days in the maximum days of the incarceration sentence, a 42% increase over the mean.”); see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 1, at 18–19 (“Criminal defendants assessed bail amounts appear frequently unable to produce the required bail amounts, and receive guilty outcomes as a result. Entered guilty pleas by defendants unwilling to wait months prior to trial and unable to finance bail likely contribute to this result.”).
10

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 11 of 24
51. Wealth-based pretrial detention also makes the community less safe. First, wealth-based detention unnecessarily jails those who could be released safely into the community. Several studies have shown that just two or three days in pretrial detention increases the likelihood of future crimes, as well as the future risk level of even low-risk defendants.12 In other words, detention based on poverty for just a few days increases recidivism. Second, wealth-based pretrial systems release individuals based only on their ability to pay and without any assessment of their risk of flight or dangerousness. Consequently, individuals who need monitoring or supervision to mitigate their risk of flight or dangerousness receive neither.
52. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for children and other dependent relatives. It hurts families, leads to unemployment, and can make people homeless. Even a couple of days in pretrial detention can cause a person to lose housing, be removed from a shelter list, be terminated from a job, be exposed to unsafe and unsanitary conditions at the jail, and may result in serious trauma to dependent children.
12 See Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail, 1516 (2014), available at https://goo.gl/jr7sMg (“[D]efendants rated low risk and detained pretrial for longer than one day before their pretrial release are more likely to commit a new crime once they are released, demonstrating that length of time until pretrial release has a direct impact on public safety.”); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 3 (November 2013) GQGNiY (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2–3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 768 (2017), available at https://goo.gl/Waj3ty (“While pretrial detention clearly exerts a protective effect in the short run, for misdemeanor defendants it may ultimately service to compromise public safety,” and finding that in a representative group of 10,000 misdemeanor offenders, pretrial detention would cause an additional 600 misdemeanors and 400 felonies compared to if the same group had been released pretrial).
11

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 12 of 24
53. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no significant relationship between requiring money bail as a condition of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.13
54. Other jurisdictions throughout the country do not keep people in jail based on their wealth. Instead of relying on money, these jurisdictions release arrestees with unsecured financial conditions, non-financial conditions, and pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
55. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive, non-monetary conditions of release to maximize public safety and court appearances. Such non-monetary conditions of release include, but are not limited to: unsecured bond, reporting obligations, phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation or a stable address, substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, alcohol monitoring devices, or, in extreme cases of particular risk, electronic monitoring and home confinement.
56. Jurisdictions that rely on pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release do not sacrifice public safety or court attendance. For example, Washington, D.C. releases more than 94% of all defendants without financial conditions of release and no one is detained on secured money bail that they cannot afford.14 Empirical evidence shows that nearly 90% of
13 See, e.g., Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 21 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (“Our results suggest that money bail has a negligible effect or, if anything, increases failures to appear.”); Michael R. Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 11 (October 2013) available at https://goo.gl/UENBKJ (“Whether released defendants are higher or lower risk or in-between, unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as do secured bonds”).
14 See D.C. Code § 23-1321; see also Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Release Rates for Pretrial Defendants within Washington, DC available at https://goo.gl/VSDeDk (“In Washington, DC, we consistently find over 90% of defendants are
12

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 13 of 24

released defendants in Washington, D.C. make all court appearances, nearly 90% complete the

pretrial release period without any new arrests, and 98-99% consistently avoid re-arrest for violent crime.15

57. The federal judiciary also eschews wealth-based detention, requiring any

detention order to be based on a finding of dangerousness or flight risk, and the practice has not harmed court appearance rates or public safety.16

58.

Pretrial detention based solely on wealth is consistently more expensive than

effective pretrial supervision programs.17 Without relying on a person’s ability to afford cash

bail, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer expense while maintaining high public

safety and court appearance rates.

released pretrial without using a financial bond”). 15 See Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Outcomes for Last Four
Years, available at https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/558; Pretrial Just. Inst., The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth 2 (2009), available at https://goo.gl/6wgPM8 (“The high non-financial release rate has been accomplished without sacrificing the safety of the public or the appearance of defendants in court. Agency data shows that 88% of released defendants make all court appearances, and 88% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests.”).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”); see also Thomas H, Cohen, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 13 (Nov. 2012), available at https://goo.gl/hN99E7 (finding from 2008 to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make court appearances and 4% were arrested for new offenses).
17 See, e.g., Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost? (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/0lLtLM (“It has been estimated that implementing validated, evidence-based risk assessment to guide pretrial release decisions could yield $78 billion in savings and benefits, nationally.”); United States Court, Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (July 18, 2013), available at https://goo.gl/dJpDrn (In 2012, “[p]retrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal system”).
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V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 59. Mr. Hester proposes one class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). This Class is defined as: All arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Cullman County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release. 60. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Mr. Hester and unknown Class members can challenge Defendants’ unlawful use of wealth-based detention. 61. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted, or failed and/or refused to act, on grounds that apply generally to the proposed Class, such that final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to each Class member as a whole. 62. As set forth more fully below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the class counsel requirements of Rule 23(g). Numerosity 63. The precise size of the Class is unknown by Plaintiff because it is forwardlooking, but it is substantial, given that hundreds of felony and misdemeanor cases are adjudicated each year in the Cullman County District Court. Joinder of these unknown future members is impracticable. 64. Many of the class members are low-income individuals who will likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the class would be impracticable.
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Commonality 65. The relief sought is common to all members of Mr. Hester seeks relief from
Defendants’ money bail policies, practices, and procedures, which violate the rights of the Class members. Mr. Hester also seeks relief mandating Defendants to change their policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
66. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are: a. Whether the Cullman County District Court and Defendant Gentry uses a predetermined secured money bail schedule; b. Whether Defendant Gentry releases arrestees from jail who pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule and detains those who cannot; c. Whether Defendant Gentry detains all individuals who are unable to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule regardless of whether inquiry into their ability to pay has been made; d. Whether and when Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner conduct individualized release hearings and what procedural protections, if any, Defendants Black, White, Chaney and Turner provide to arrestees at those hearings; and e. What standard post-arrest procedures Defendants perform on misdemeanor and felony arrestees; for example, whether Defendants use any alternate procedures for promptly releasing people determined otherwise eligible for release but who are unable to afford a monetary payment.
67. Among the most important common question of law are:
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a. Whether requiring a financial condition of pretrial release without inquiry into and findings concerning a person’s ability to pay and without consideration of alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;
b. Whether Defendants’ actions in detaining arrestees solely based on their inability to pay a predetermined amount of money violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;
c. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees using predetermined amounts of money without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment; and
d. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Typicality 68. Mr. Hester’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class,
and he has the same interests in this case as all other Class members that he represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of Defendants to comply with the Constitution: they are each confined in jail because they could not afford to pay their secured monetary bond amount. The answer to whether Defendants’ money bail practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of Mr. Hester and every other Class member.
69. If Mr. Hester succeeds in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices concerning wealth-based detention violate his constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class.
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Adequacy 70. Mr. Hester will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class
he seeks to represent. 71. Mr. Hester has no interests separate from or in conflict with those of the proposed
Class he seeks to represent as a whole and seeks no relief other than the declaratory and injunctive relief, which is sought on behalf of the entire proposed Class he seeks to represent. Class Counsel
72. Mr. Hester is represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Alabama, the American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Rights Corps, and Thomas E. Drake, II, who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. A. Rule 23(b)(2)
73. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members: Defendants require all arrestees to pay for their release in a range pre-determined by a bail schedule. Those who can pay are released and those who cannot pay are detained.
74. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that Defendants violate the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without a prompt and individualized release hearing with adequate procedural protections that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful considerations of alternative conditions of release. Because the putative Class
17

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challenges Defendants’ money bail practices as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, McSwain, Chaney, Turner,
and Gentry 75. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits jailing a person solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment. 77. Mr. Hester and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty under state and federal law. 78. Requiring a person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a monetary bail amount pre-determined by a bail schedule is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interests in securing a defendant’s appearance in court or public safety. 79. There are less restrictive means to reasonably assure the government’s interests. 80. Defendants violate Plaintiff’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing against them a post-arrest system of wealth-based detention in which they are kept in jail because they cannot afford a monetary amount of bail pre-determined by a bail schedule without inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative non-monetary conditions of release.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Substantive and Procedural Due Process – Individualized Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, Chaney, Turner, and
Gentry 81. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 83. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty. 84. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that pretrial arrestees receive an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards to determine the least restrictive conditions on their pretrial liberty. 85. Defendants do not provide counsel; give arrestees an opportunity to testify or present evidence; restrict detention to extremely serious offenses; or require a finding that no affordable financial or non-financial condition of release will ensure appearance or public safety before jailing pretrial arrestees on monetary bail amounts that they cannot afford. Because Defendants create de facto detention orders by using predetermined monetary amounts, they also fail to apply any legal or evidentiary standards to determine whether a person should be detained prior to trial based on some immitigable risk. 86. Defendants violate Mr. Hester’s and the Proposed Class’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing them without providing an individualized release hearing with the procedural protections described above.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
(Due Process – Prompt Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, Chaney, Turner, and
Gentry 87. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
88. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
89. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty, which outweighs any governmental interest in pretrial detention.
90. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a prompt release hearing following detention.
91. Defendants violate Mr. Hester’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights to pretrial liberty and due process by jailing them without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing.
VII. Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: a. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Certification of a class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, represented by Mr. Hester; c. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, McSwain, Chaney, and Turner
violate the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without inquiry into
20

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or findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful consideration of

alternative non-financial conditions of release;

d. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner violate Mr.

Hester’s and Class members’ due process rights by jailing them without

conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural

safeguards;

e. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner violate Mr.

Hester’s and Class members’ due process rights by jailing them without

conducting a sufficiently prompt release hearing;

f. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant

Gentry from prospectively detaining arrestees for failing to pay the monetary

amount required by the bail schedule without a prompt individualized release

hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and

findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial

conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release

are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court

appearance;

g. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and

h. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: August 1, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiff

Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) Micah West (ASB-1842-J82F)∆

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SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 P: (334) 956-8200 F: (334) 956-8481 E: samuel.brooke@splcenter.org E: micah.west@splcenter.org
Alec Karakatsanis (DC Bar No. 999294)* Katherine Hubbard (Cal. Bar No. 302729)* CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 P: (202) 930-3835 E: alec@civilrightscorps.org E: katherine@civilrightscorps.org
Randall C. Marshall (ASB-3023-A56M) Brock Boone (ASB-2864-L11E) ∆ ACLU FOUNDATION OF ALABAMA, INC. P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 P: (334) 420-1741 E: rmarshall@aclualabama.org E: bboone@aclualabama.org
Brandon Buskey (ASB-2753-A50B)* Andrea Woods (Wash. Bar No. 48265)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: (212) 549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org E: awoods@aclu.org
∆ application for admission forthcoming *motion for admission pro hac vice forthcoming Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 95 Filed 03/09/18 Page 23 of 24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date the foregoing was filed through the Court’s CM/ECF
filing system, and by virtue of this filing notice will be sent electronically to all counsel of
record, including:
J. Melvin Hasting LAW OFFICE OF MELVIN HASTING LLC P.O. Box 517, Cullman, AL 35058 mhasting@hiwaay.net Counsel for Plaintiffs R.C. Schultz, D.T. Beebe, T.D. Beebe, J.H. Sterling
Thomas E. Drake, II THE DRAKE LAW FIRM 419 Second Avenue SW, Suite B, Cullman, AL 35055 tomdrake@bellsouth.net Counsel for Plaintiffs R.L. Parris, T.L. Turney, J. Stark, K. Yarbrough, R. Meeks, G.M. Culwell Jr., M. Anderson, J.R. Shelton
Brad A. Chynoweth James W. Davis Laura E. Howell Steven Troy Marshall OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue, Montgomery, AL 36130 bchynoweth@ago.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us lhowell@ago.state.al.us smarshall@ago.state.al.us Counsel for Defs. State, Judge Williams, Magistrate White, Magistrate Black, Circuit Clerk McSwain, Helms, Alabama Administrative Office of the Courts
J. Dorman Walker Wells R. Turner, III BALCH & BINGHAM LLP P.O. Box 78, Montgomery, AL 36101 dwalker@balch.com Counsel for Defs. Judge Williams, Helms, Alabama Administrative Office of the Courts
Jamie Helen Kidd WEBB & ELEY PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive, Montgomery, AL 36124 jkidd@webbeley.com Counsel for Defs. Sheriff Gentry, Walker, Watson, Marchman, Cullman Cty. Comm’n
23

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on this March 9, 2018.

/s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

24

 
 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 159 Filed 09/04/18 Page 1 of 64

FILED
2018 Sep-04 PM 06:09 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

RANDALL PARRIS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

Case No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH

v.

MARTHA WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

BRADLEY HESTER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
MATT GENTRY, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Bradley Hester was arrested and jailed in Cullman County. He was, and

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 159 Filed 09/04/18 Page 2 of 64
others similarly situated are, detained in the Cullman County jail following arrest
because they cannot afford to post a surety bond or a property bond as a condition
of pretrial release. Mr. Hester asks the Court to preliminarily enjoin the Cullman
County Sheriff from detaining indigent defendants who cannot afford to post a
property bond or a surety bond as a condition of pretrial release. Mr. Hester argues
that Cullman County’s procedures for setting a secured bond as a condition of
pretrial release are constitutionally flawed, and he argues that the way in which Cullman County implements those procedures is inequitable. (Doc. 102).1 For the
following reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Hester is entitled to a preliminary
injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On March 8, 2018, Mr. Hester intervened in this action. (Doc. 94). The
following day, Mr. Hester filed his intervenor complaint against Cullman County
Sheriff Matt Gentry, Circuit Clerk Lisa McSwain, Magistrate Amy Black,
Magistrate Joan White, District Court Judge Kim Chaney, and District Court Judge
1 As will be discussed in greater detail below, when Mr. Hester filed his motion for preliminary injunction, Cullman County followed pretrial procedures different from the procedures in place as of the date of this opinion. Therefore, the language of Mr. Hester’s motion pertains to the old version of Cullman County’s pretrial procedures. Two weeks after Mr. Hester filed his motion for preliminary injunction, Cullman County revised its pretrial procedures. The parties have conformed their evidence, and the Court conforms its analysis, to Cullman County’s new pretrial procedures. The Court considers whether Mr. Hester and the proposed plaintiff class have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their constitutional claims as those claims pertain to Cullman County’s new pretrial procedures.
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Wells R. Turner III. (Doc. 95). In his first claim for relief, citing the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Hester alleges that the defendants violate the “fundamental rights” of indigent criminal defendants arrested in Cullman County “by enforcing against them a post-arrest system of wealth-based detention” pursuant to which indigent defendants “are kept in jail because they cannot afford a monetary amount of bail.” (Doc. 95, p. 18, ¶ 80). In his second claim for relief, Mr. Hester alleges that the defendants do not provide counsel for bail hearings, give arrestees an adequate opportunity to testify or present evidence at bail hearings, apply a uniform evidentiary standard to determine whether a person should be detained prior to trial, or “require a [judicial] finding that no affordable financial or nonfinancial condition of release will ensure appearance or public safety before jailing pretrial arrestees on monetary bail amounts that they cannot afford.” (Doc. 95, p. 19, ¶ 85).2 Mr. Hester asserts that the defendants create de facto detention orders that apply to only indigent criminal defendants in Cullman County. Mr. Hester seeks declaratory relief from the judicial defendants -- Circuit Clerk McSwain, Magistrate Black, Magistrate White, Judge Chaney, and Judge Turner -- and injunctive relief from Sheriff Gentry. (Doc. 95, pp. 20-21, ¶¶ c-f).
Mr. Hester has asked the Court to certify this lawsuit as a class action and “certify a class consisting of all state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed
2 Mr. Hester brings a third claim concerning the promptness of the release hearing. (Doc. 95, p. 20). Mr. Hester does not pursue early relief for that claim.
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in Cullman County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. 101, p. 2). The defendants do not oppose class certification should this case proceed. (Doc. 144, p. 8; Doc. 145, p. 1). Mr. Hester also has asked the Court to preliminarily enjoin Sheriff Gentry “from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail.” (Doc. 102, p. 2).
The judicial defendants filed opposition to Mr. Hester’s motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 122). In addition to arguing that Mr. Hester has not satisfied the standard for a preliminary injunction, the judicial defendants contend that Cullman County’s recent adoption of new bail procedures moots Mr. Hester’s claims for injunctive relief. (Doc. 122, p. 32). Sheriff Gentry has asked the Court to dismiss Mr. Hester’s claims for injunctive relief. (Doc. 123).3
On April 12 and 13, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. (Docs. 136, 143). Dr. Stephen Demuth, whom the Court admitted as an expert in statistical analysis and quantitative research methods related to pretrial detention and release processes, testified for Mr. Hester. (Doc. 136, pp. 36-40). Judge Truman Morrison of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, whom the Court admitted as an expert in bail setting procedures, also testified for Mr. Hester. (Doc. 136, pp. 118-21). Sheriff Gentry and Judge Turner testified for the defendants. (Doc. 136, pp. 187, 268). The parties provided
3 The Court will resolve Sheriff Gentry’s motion to dismiss by separate order. 4

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 159 Filed 09/04/18 Page 5 of 64
additional evidence via affidavit and stipulated to certain facts relevant to Mr.
Hester’s motion for preliminary injunction. (Docs. 132-135, 138-140, 146, 148,
153). On this record, the Court considers Mr. Hester’s request for a preliminary
injunction.
B. Factual Background
In Cullman County, individuals charged with crimes are taken into custody
either pursuant to a probable cause warrantless arrest or pursuant to an arrest
warrant issued by one of the county’s magistrates. Most arrests in Cullman County are warrantless probable cause arrests. (Doc. 136, pp. 235-36; Doc. 143, p. 194).4
Under Alabama law, absent a capital murder charge, arrestees have a
statutory right to bail. (Doc. 136, p. 285; see generally Ala. Code §§ 15-13-106, 108).5 In Cullman County, bail initially is set as a condition of pretrial release for
every arrestee. The staff of Cullman County’s Sheriff’s Office selects the initial
bail amount for individuals jailed for warrantless probable cause arrests;
4 By way of example, in February 2018, Cullman County took 159 individuals into custody pursuant to warrantless arrests, and the county took 61 individuals into custody pursuant to arrest warrants. (Doc. 143, p. 191). 5 Alabama Code § 15-13-106 states: “Except in capital cases where there is no right to release on bail, no person or defendant shall be committed to any jail in the State of Alabama on a warrant unless there is an amount of bail affixed to the warrant. No person or defendant shall remain in jail anywhere in this state for more than 24 hours for any felony or misdemeanor case without an order of bail, unless bail is not authorized by law.” Alabama Code § 15-13-108 states: “In all cases of misdemeanors and felonies, unless otherwise specified, the defendant is, before conviction, entitled to bail as a matter of right. All sheriffs and police chiefs of this state shall ensure that one of their officers or themselves are available to approve and accept bail 24 hours each day, seven days a week, except during the hours the clerks of the courts provide personnel for bail acceptance and approval.”
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magistrates select the initial bail amount in arrest warrants. (Doc. 136, pp. 206, 275).6 Because most of the arrests in Cullman County are warrantless arrests, the
Sheriff’s Office sets most of the initial bail amounts in the county. Both the sheriff
and the magistrates use a bail schedule to determine the bail amount. On an
average day, there are ten arrests in Cullman County, and six of those arrestees are immediately bail eligible. (Doc. 136, p. 193).7
Cullman County primarily uses property bonds and surety bonds to meet the
bail condition for pretrial release of arrestees. In the case of a property bond, a
criminal defendant’s relative or neighbor may post property (typically real
property, but occasionally a vehicle) to secure the defendant’s release. (Doc. 136,
pp. 190-92, 224). By state statute, Cullman County must assess a $35 bond fee for property bonds. (Doc. 136, p. 192).8 Bonding companies provide surety bonds.
6 In Cullman County, magistrates are court specialists, but they are not lawyers. They are not members of the Alabama State Bar. (Doc. 136, p. 270). Magistrates make probable cause determinations on warrantless arrests within 48 hours of arrest. A criminal defendant typically does not attend a probable cause determination; only the arresting officer attends that proceeding. (Doc. 136, pp. 269-71). 7 Even if they can afford to post bond, the sheriff cannot immediately release the following categories of defendants: defendants arrested for failure to appear or on charges that, by statute, require detention for a period of time; defendants who are intoxicated; defendants who are in need of medical attention; or defendants who have holds on their detention from other jurisdictions. (Doc. 129-36, p. 3; Doc. 136, p. 276). 8 Sheriff Gentry testified that he encourages family members of arrestees to post property bonds because his office can quickly assess the value of the property using the county’s tax records, and a property bond can be obtained with the payment of a $35 fee. (Doc. 136, pp. 224-226). Sheriff Gentry explained that his office can use the contact information provided with a property bond to contact family members if a defendant fails to appear for a hearing. He acknowledged
6

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Cullman County advertises the telephone numbers for bonding companies in its jail cells. An arrestee may call a bonding company, “work out an agreement . . . on a set price for that bonding company” to post bond, and secure her release from jail. (Doc. 136, p. 191).9
Sheriff Gentry testified that he has two primary interests in the pretrial process: getting defendants to appear for court proceedings and ensuring the safety of the community. (Doc. 136, pp. 235-36). Those interests are consistent with Alabama law. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, conditions of pretrial release are imposed to “reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance” at court proceedings and to protect “the public at large” from “real and present danger.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2.
1. Pre-March 26, 2018 Until March 26, 2018, Cullman County used a bail schedule that identified a range of bail for various state criminal offenses. (Doc. 129-34; Doc. 132, p.1, ¶ 1). For each individual arrested, Sheriff Gentry set bail based on the crime charged and then released criminal defendants who could post a secured bond for the bail
that he would have the same ability if a defendant identified a third-party custodian in conjunction with an unsecured bond. (Doc. 136, pp. 225-28). 9 Cullman County also uses cash bonds and ROR (release on recognizance) bonds. By law, the sheriff cannot accept cash bonds; only the clerk of court may accept cash bonds. There is no financial obligation for ROR bonds. The arrestee “just promise[s]” that she will return for court dates. If she does not appear as promised, then a judge will issue an arrest warrant for the individual. (Doc. 136, pp. 189-90).
7

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amount and detained criminal defendants who could not afford to post bond. (Doc. 132, p. 2, ¶¶ 7-8).
Cullman County magistrates conducted initial appearances for arrestees who could not afford to post bond. (Doc. 132, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 10, 12). The initial appearance was conducted by video conference, and the state did not offer counsel for the appearance. (Doc. 132, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 10, 13). At the initial appearances, the magistrates informed the arrestees of their bail amount but did not evaluate the bail amount to determine whether the bail amount exceeded the amount necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of bail. (Doc. 132, p. 3, ¶ 14). Arrestees who could not afford to post a secured bond had to remain in jail and file a motion to reconsider their bail amount. (Doc. 132, p. 2, ¶ 9). Typically, a district judge would not consider such a motion until several weeks after arrest. (Doc. 132, p. 2, ¶ 9).
The parties dispute the number of arrestees who were detained each month solely because they could not afford to post bail under this system. According to Alacourt records, Alabama’s electronic trial management system, during the month of February 2018, 85 of 235 arrestees (i.e. 34%) who were eligible to secure their release by posting a secured bond were unable to post bond within 72 hours after arrest. (Doc. 129-9, p. 3, ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 136, pp. 262-63). Of those 85 arrestees, 36 (i.e. 42%) never received an initial appearance. (Doc. 129-9, pp. 3-4, ¶ 5). Two
8

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arrestees received an initial appearance more than 72 hours after arrest. (Doc. 1299, p. 4, ¶ 5). The remaining 47 arrestees received an initial appearance within 72 hours of arrest. (Doc. 129-9, p. 3, ¶ 5).
The defendants contend that Alacourt records are not necessarily reliable because the records do not contain all relevant information, and the Alacourt system experiences lag time between entering and displaying data. (Doc. 136, p. 262; Doc. 143, p. 65). According to a Cullman County detention data sheet that Sheriff Gentry submitted, of the 220 new arrests made in February 2018, 167 arrestees (i.e. 76%) were released without need for an initial appearance within 72 hours of arrest. (Doc. 139-2; see Doc. 143, pp. 190-93; 210-13). Of those 220 new arrests, 159 arrests were made without a warrant, all but 14 of which (i.e. 91%) posted bond within 48 hours after arrest without having to wait for an initial appearance. (Doc. 139-2; see Doc. 143, pp. 194-95). Sheriff Gentry testified that the 14 arrestees who did not post bond may have been detained because they had a new probable cause arrest or a warrant for failure to appear during the month. (Doc. 143, pp. 194-95).
2. March 26, 2018 Revisions to Bail Procedures On March 26, 2018, the presiding circuit judge in Cullman County signed a “Standing Order Regarding Pre-Trial Appearance and the Setting of Bond” which established new pretrial detention and bail policies for the Cullman County. (Doc.
9

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129-36). The Court first describes the procedures that the new Standing Order dictates. The Court then describes the evidence concerning the way in which Cullman County has implemented the new Standing Order.
a. March 26, 2018 Standing Order and Initial Appearance Procedures
Pursuant to the March 26, 2018 Standing Order, the Cullman County Sheriff still uses a bail schedule, but the new bail schedule provides specific amounts of bail for specific criminal charges. (Doc. 129-36, p. 3; Doc. 129-37; compare Doc. 129-34, p. 2). Some of the bail amounts listed in the new schedule are lower than the bail amounts in the previous schedule. (Compare Doc. 129-34 with Doc. 12937). As with the former bail procedures, absent a capital murder charge, eligible defendants arrested without a warrant are released when they post a secured bond in the amount that Sheriff Gentry’s staff sets per the bail schedule, regardless of the nature of the crime charged, the arrestee’s criminal history, or the arrestee’s prior record of failures to appear. (Doc. 129-36, p. 3; Doc. 136, p. 206). When the sheriff sets a bond amount for a warrantless arrest, “there’s no leeway in . . . what your bond is going to be.” (Doc. 136, p. 206; see also Doc. 136, pp. 221-22).
The Sheriff’s Office releases a defendant arrested pursuant to a warrant when the defendant posts bond in the amount set in the warrant. (Doc. 129-36, p. 4; Doc. 143, p. 141). Magistrates set bond in arrest warrants in the amount listed in the bail schedule. (Doc. 129-36, p. 4; Doc. 136, p. 199; Doc. 143, p. 142).
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For those who can afford to post a secured bond, ordinarily between 45 and 90 minutes elapse from the time an arrestee is booked in the Cullman County jail until the time she is released from jail on a secured bond. (Doc. 136, p. 206).
According to the Standing Order, if a law enforcement officer believes that a defendant poses “an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the public,” then the officer may complete a bail request form and ask that bond be set in an amount different from the amount listed in the bail schedule. (Doc. 129-36, pp. 3-4). Under the terms of the Standing Order, if an officer completes a bail request form for a defendant, then a magistrate may either grant the request and order the sheriff to detain the defendant until a district judge, within 72 hours of arrest, conducts an initial appearance and makes “an individualized determination of conditions of release, including the setting of bond,” or deny the bail request “in which case the defendant shall be immediately released upon posting a bond on the terms contained in the schedule.” (Doc. 129-36, pp. 3-4).
The Standing Order provides that defendants who are unable to post a secured bond in the amount listed in the bail schedule are entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of their release by a district judge held no later than 72 hours after arrest. (Doc. 129-36, p. 5, n. 3; Doc. 143, pp. 48, 63). A circuit judge must determine the conditions for release for a defendant who is arrested pursuant to a warrant issued upon an indictment. (Doc. 129-36, p. 5, n.3). The
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judicial determination of conditions for release takes place at an initial appearance. If a defendant cannot pay the bond amount set by Sheriff Gentry or a magistrate, and the defendant does not receive an initial appearance within 72 hours of arrest, then Sheriff Gentry must release the defendant on an unsecured appearance bond in the amount set in the bail schedule. (Doc. 129-36, p. 8).10
Before an initial appearance, a member of the Sheriff’s Office meets with a defendant in jail and offers two forms to the defendant.11 A defendant may complete a “Release Questionnaire,” and a defendant who indicates that she needs an attorney also may complete an “Affidavit of Substantial Hardship.” (Doc. 12939; Doc. 129-41; Doc. 143, pp. 176-77; see also Doc. 136, pp. 216, 272, 277-78). Defendants may refuse the forms. (Doc. 139-1, p. 1).
The release questionnaire states: “FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING CONDITIONS OF PRE-TRIAL RELEASE IN THIS CASE, THE COURT MAY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING.” (Doc. 12941, p. 2). The release questionnaire asks the defendant to supply information about her residence, employment, family situation, health, and criminal history, including
10 Defendants who post bond at the time of their arrest later have to attend an initial appearance. At that proceeding, a judge informs a defendant of his court date, and the judge may appoint counsel to represent the defendant if the defendant demonstrates financial need. (Doc. 136, pp. 300-01). 11 Sheriff Gentry testified that he has two court liaisons on his staff. These staff members offer a release questionnaire and an affidavit of financial hardship to an indigent defendant and, when necessary, the staff members will help a defendant complete the forms. (Doc. 143, p. 177).
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prior failures to appear. (Doc. 129-41, pp. 2-3; Doc. 136, p. 279). The questionnaire also asks the defendant to identify and provide contact information for nearest living relatives not living with the defendant and for as many as four individuals who can vouch for the defendant’s “character, reputation and reliability.” (Doc. 129-41, pp. 2-3; Doc. 136, p. 279). The affidavit of substantial hardship asks the defendant to identify her employment, assistance benefits, monthly gross income, monthly expenses, and liquid assets. (Doc. 129-39, pp. 23). The sheriff’s court liaison deputy delivers the completed forms to court, so that the forms are available to the judge at the initial appearance. (Doc. 122-1, p. 3, ¶ 7; Doc. 136, p. 281).
Cullman County does not have a pretrial services department, so there is no one who independently gathers information for an initial appearance. (Doc. 136, p. 288). The information that arrestees provide on the bail forms is not always accurate, often because arrestees may have difficulty understanding the forms. (Doc. 136, pp. 288-89). As Judge Turner explained, the majority of the people who “come in contact with [] the criminal justice system” in Cullman County do not have “even a high school education.” (Doc. 136, p. 289). “A lot of them are going to have learning disabilities. A lot of them are going to have inability to read and comprehend.” (Doc. 136, p. 289). Therefore, the examination of defendants during an initial appearance is an important source of information for the
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determination of the conditions of bond. (Doc. 136, p. 289). The initial appearance typically is held remotely by video conference. (Doc.
136, pp. 272-73). At the initial appearance, the judge ensures that the defendant is aware of the charges against her, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to remain silent. (Doc. 129-40, p. 2; Doc. 136, p. 282). The judge reviews the affidavit of substantial hardship, if the defendant has submitted one, to determine whether the defendant is indigent. (Doc. 136, pp. 277-78). If the judge determines that the defendant is indigent, then the court appoints counsel for the defendant, but under the Standing Order, appointed counsel is not available to a defendant during an initial appearance. (Doc. 122-1, p. 5, ¶ 11; Doc. 129-36, pp. 2-8; Doc. 129-40, p. 2).
During an initial appearance, the judge determines the conditions of the defendant’s release. (Doc. 122-1, pp. 3-4, ¶ 8). Pursuant to Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge must consider releasing the defendant on the defendant’s own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond unless the judge “determines that such a release will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required, or the defendant’s being at large will pose a real and present danger to the public at large.” (Doc. 122-1, p. 4, ¶ 9; Doc. 136, pp. 282-83m 286). Rule 7.2(a) states:
(a) BEFORE CONVICTION. Any defendant charged with an offense bailable as a matter of right may be released pending or during trial on
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his or her personal recognizance or on an appearance bond unless the court or magistrate determines that such a release will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required, or that the defendant’s being at large will pose a real and present danger to others or to the public at large. If such a determination is made, the court may impose the least onerous condition or conditions contained in Rule 7.3(b) that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to others or to the public at large. In making such a determination, the court may take into account the following:
1. The age, background and family ties, relationships and circumstances of the defendant.
2. The defendant’s reputation, character, and health.
3. The defendant’s prior criminal record, including prior releases on recognizance or on secured appearance bonds, and other pending cases.
4. The identity of responsible members of the community who will vouch for the defendant’s reliability.
5. Violence or lack of violence in the alleged commission of the offense.
6. The nature of the offense charged, the apparent probability of conviction, and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance.
7. The type of weapon used, e.g., knife, pistol, shotgun, sawedoff shotgun.
8. Threats made against victims and/or witnesses.
9. The value of property taken during the alleged commission of the offense.
10. Whether the property allegedly taken was recovered or not; damage or lack of damage to property allegedly taken.
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11. Residence of the defendant, including consideration of real property ownership, and length of residence in his or her place of domicile. 12. In cases where the defendant is charged with a drug offense, evidence of selling or pusher activity should indicate a substantial increase in the amount of bond. 13. Consideration of the defendant’s employment status and history, the location of defendant’s employment, e.g., whether employed in the county where the alleged offense occurred, and the defendant’s financial condition. 14. Any enhancement statutes related to the charged offense. Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2. The Standing Order requires the judge to consider the fourteen factors in Rule 7.2(a). (Doc. 129-36, pp. 5-7). In weighing the factors that bear on a defendant’s eligibility for release, the judge considers the information that the defendant provided in the release questionnaire and in the affidavit of substantial hardship, if the defendant submitted one. (Doc. 136, pp. 277-81). Judge Turner testified that when he is “considering factors to consider to release” a defendant, it is helpful for him to know whether a defendant “[is] employed or if they’re not employed” and whether the defendant is “living where they say they are at that address or is that just where they get their mail.” (Doc. 136, p. 280). With respect to the address information, Judge Turner stated: “We have a lot of people that move from place to place wherever they can find to lay their head. And [] keeping track of them can be
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difficult at times.” (Doc. 136, p. 281). Judge Turner also considers “the circumstances” of “the most recent arrest.” (Doc. 136, p. 285). For example, in setting the conditions for a 26-year-old male defendant charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Judge Turner considered the fact that the defendant previously served time in prison, and he considered the fact that the defendant was found hiding in a closet with a 14-year-old girl, “a factor to go with contributing to the delinquency of a minor.” (Doc. 136, p. 287). Had that 26-yearold arrestee been able to afford bond, he would have been released as soon as he posted bond without regard to his criminal history or his association with a 14year-old girl.
In addition to the questionnaire and the affidavit of substantial hardship, in the case of a warrantless arrest, the judge may consider the form that contains the arresting officer’s statement of why the officer believed that she had probable cause to arrest the defendant. (Doc. 136, p. 281). According to the Standing Order, the judge “may elicit testimony about the defendant’s financial condition,” (Doc. 129-36, p. 7), but according to the Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing form, the form that the judge completes during or following an initial appearance, the judge must “[give] the Defendant the opportunity to make a statement regarding his/her ability to post the bond currently set in this matter.” (Doc. 129-40, p. 2).
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The Standing Order provides that after considering the fourteen factors, the defendant’s ability to post a secured bond, testimony from the defendant, and forms submitted to the Court, the Court “may release a defendant on his or her own recognizance, require the defendant to post an unsecured appearance bond, or require the posting of a secured appearance bond if that is the least onerous condition that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to others or the public at large.” (Doc. 12936, p. 7). If there is “no less onerous condition for securing the defendant’s appearance or protecting the public, then the Court may require a secured appearance bond in an amount less than, equal to, or greater than that contained in the bond schedule,” even if the defendant cannot afford to post bond. (Doc. 12936, p. 7). If the Court requires a secured bond, then the Standing Order states that “[t]he Court will make a written finding as to why the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s presence at trial in such a case” in “Section 6 of Form C-80 (Local), Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing, and in Form C-52(g), Release Order.” (Doc. 129-36, pp. 7-8).
Under the Standing Order, if a judge appoints counsel for an arrestee at an initial appearance, appointed counsel must meet with a defendant within seven days. (Doc. 136, pp. 290-91). It is not uncommon for a judge to set a bond in an amount he knows the defendant cannot afford. (Doc. 136, pp. 291-294).
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Following her initial appearance, if a defendant still cannot afford to post bond, then the defendant may file a motion for bond reduction, and her appointed attorney may assist her. (Doc. 122-1, p. 5, ¶ 11; Doc. 136, pp. 293, 295). A judge typically hears the motion within a month. (Doc. 136, pp. 297-98; Doc. 143, p. 97).
b. Implementation of the March 26, 2018 Standing Order The presiding judge of the Cullman County Circuit Court entered the new Standing Order two weeks after Mr. Hester filed his motion for preliminary injunction in this case. (Docs. 102, 129-36). Therefore, at the hearing on Mr. Hester’s motion, the defendants were able to offer little evidence concerning the implementation of the new policy, but the limited evidence that the defendants did offer indicates that officials in Cullman County do not always comply with the written requirements in the new Standing Order. For example, officials in Cullman County do not handle bail requests in a manner consistent with the new standing order.12 Law enforcement officers rarely use this tool. Sheriff Gentry testified that bail requests from law enforcement officers “are very few and far between.” (Doc. 136, p. 207). Judge Turner testified that he has never seen a bail request from a law enforcement officer in
12 As will be discussed later in this opinion, law enforcement officers had the option of submitting bail request forms before Cullman County adopted the March 2018 Standing Order. The bail request tool is not new, but the Standing Order mandates new procedures concerning bail request forms.
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conjunction with a warrantless arrest. Judge Turner and Judge Chaney handle all bail requests tied to warrant arrests. (Doc. 136, pp. 275-76). In practice, a magistrate will not deny a bail request submitted with an application for an arrest warrant; magistrates refer all bail requests to a district judge. (Doc. 143, p. 143).
In addition, although Cullman County has instituted a system purportedly designed to ensure that all arrestees who require an initial appearance see a judge within 48 hours, the system does not always work. For example, on April 8, 2018, PEB was arrested on a charge of domestic violence third degree, harassment. (Doc. 136, pp. 217, 219; Doc. 139-1, p. 1). The sheriff’s staff set PEB’s bond at $1,500 per Cullman County’s bail schedule. (Doc. 122-1, p. 16; Doc. 136, p. 219). PEB completed a release questionnaire and received an initial appearance on April 9, 2018. (Doc. 136, pp. 217, 220; Doc. 139-1, p. 1). The sheriff testified that this initial appearance took place before a magistrate; the Standing Order calls for an appearance before a judge. As of April 11, 2018, PEB was still in jail, and he had not received a bail hearing within 48 hours. (Doc. 136, p. 220). PEB was released on a property bond on April 13, 2018. (Doc. 136, p. 221).13
With respect to written findings concerning a de facto detention order, when a judge, based on the information that he reviewed in an initial appearance, decides to require secured bond as a condition for release, the Standing Order says that the
13 The arrestee’s initials are PEB. 20

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judge must make “a written finding as to why the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary,” but neither the Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing nor the Release Order provides space for a written finding with respect to secured bond. (See Doc. 129-40, p. 3; Doc. 129-42, p. 2). Instead, the Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing requires a judge to check boxes beside 15 factors to identify the factors the judge took into “consideration” in requiring a secured bond. (Doc. 129-40, p. 3). Fourteen of the factors listed come from Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the fifteenth factor is “Other,” which the judge may specify in writing. (Doc. 129-40, p. 3).14 The Release Order simply requires the judge to check a box if the court requires a secured bond. (Doc. 12940, p. 2). II. ANALYSIS
A. The March 26, 2018 Standing Order does not moot Mr. Hester’s motion for preliminary injunction.
The defendants argue that the March 26, 2018 Standing Order ends the procedures that Mr. Hester challenges and therefore moots his claims. (Doc. 122, p. 32). The Court disagrees.
The legal principle on which the defendants’ mootness argument rests is sound: events that occur after a plaintiff files a lawsuit may “deprive the court of
14 The bottom of the Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing contains a few blank lines beside the statement “9. Other:”. (Doc. 129-40, p. 3). If he chose, a judge presumably could write findings concerning a secured bond in that section of the order.
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the ability to give the plaintiff . . . meaningful relief,” so that the plaintiff’s claims become moot and the case “must be dismissed.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “When government laws or policies have been challenged, the Supreme Court has held almost uniformly that cessation of the challenged behavior moots the suit.” Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Here, the mootness doctrine does not foreclose Mr. Hester’s efforts to obtain relief because although the Cullman County Circuit Court has revised its written criminal pretrial procedures, the record demonstrates that the defendants do not fully comply with the new written procedures. And even if the defendants did comply, as discussed in greater detail below, the new procedures, though an improvement over the old, still are constitutionally deficient.
On the record before the Court at this early stage of the proceedings, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Hester will be able to prove that Cullman County’s new criminal pretrial procedures violate putative class members’ constitutional rights. Therefore, this case remains a live controversy in which the Court may give meaningful relief.
B. Preliminary Injunction “A party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing
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entitlement to relief.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010). “To obtain such relief, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs possible harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not disserve the public interest.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Burk v. Augusta–Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries its burden of persuasion on each of these prerequisites.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Hester has satisfied all four elements.
1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits a. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Pretrial Liberty and Freedom from
Wealth-Based Detention Mr. Hester argues that “[t]his case implicates two overlapping but distinct constitutional rights: the right against wealth-based detention and the right to pretrial liberty.” (Doc. 108, p. 3). Mr. Hester contends that Cullman County’s bail system cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny because it creates one standard of pretrial release for wealthy defendants and another for indigent defendants. The Court agrees.
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Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to pretrial liberty. The law presumes that defendants are innocent until the State proves otherwise. Absent extenuating circumstances like flight risks or dangers to the community, the State may not incarcerate a defendant pretrial. As the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the “interest in liberty” is “fundamental.” 481 U.S. at 749-50.
Liberty is prohibitively expensive for indigent criminal defendants in a jurisdiction where secured bond is a condition of liberty, and judges set unattainable bond amounts that serve as de facto detention orders for the indigent. Pretrial “imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)). “The demands of equal protection of the laws and of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial detainees of the rights of other citizens to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail.” Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)) (internal marks omitted). When a jurisdiction like Cullman County creates a criminal process pursuant to which “those with means avoid imprisonment” and “the indigent cannot escape imprisonment,” the jurisdiction violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 726, 728
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(5th Cir. 1972).15
The majority in Walker v. City of Calhoun described the confluence of equal
protection and due process concepts in the constitutional analysis of pretrial release
procedures:
The Supreme Court synthesized that law in Bearden v. Georgia, which considered ‘whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution.” 461 U.S. 660, 661, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). The Court explained that ‘[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis’ of cases where defendants are treated differently by wealth, observing that ‘we generally analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 665, 103 S.Ct. 2064.
Walker v. City of Calhoun, -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 4000252, *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 22,
2018). The Walker majority explained: “The sine qua non of a Bearden- or
Rainwater-style claim, then, is that the State is treating the indigent and the non-
indigent categorically differently.” Walker, 2018 WL 4000252 at *8. The
majority in Walker held that an indigent criminal defendant “who can show that the
indigent are being treated systematically worse ‘solely because of [their] lack of
financial resources,’—and not for some legitimate State interest—will be able to
15 Per Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), decisions that the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued before October 1, 1981 are binding authority for courts in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1209.
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make out” a claim of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Walker, 2018 WL 4000252 at *8 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661).16
The majority in Walker held that the plaintiff in that case did not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on his claim of wealth-based discrimination in the setting of municipal bail because the Standing Bail Order that the City of Houston adopted delayed but did not deprive indigent criminal defendants of pretrial release. In fact, as the Walker majority held, the City of Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order “guarantees release to indigents within 48 hours.” 2018 WL 4000252 at *14, n. 12. Indigent defendants in Cullman County receive no such guaranty; Cullman County affords that guaranty only to criminal defendants who have the financial means to post a bond at the time of arrest in an amount set in the county’s bail schedule.
Unlike Cullman County, the release process in the City of Calhoun is fairly simple. First, defendants arrested for a violation of a municipal law are released immediately on an unsecured bond. 2018 WL 4000252 at *1. Those defendants are assessed the amount in the bail schedule only if they failed to appear for a court proceeding. Id. at *2. For defendants charged with a violation of a state law, the bail schedule lists bail in an amount equal to the fine that defendant later would
16 The rights examined in Pugh and Bearden are quantitatively different because a defendant’s pretrial rights -- a presumption of innocence and a fundamental right to pretrial liberty -- are broader that a defendant’s rights following conviction.
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have to pay if she were adjudged guilty of the crime charged. The defendant may satisfy the bail obligation by paying cash, posting a property or surety bond, or using a driver’s license as collateral. Id. at *1. At the time of arrest, if a defendant cannot provide any of these types of security, then a defendant must receive a hearing before a municipal judge within 48 hours. That hearing has a single purpose: using a uniform standard of indigency to evaluate evidence of indigency supplied to the court by a court-appointed attorney, a judge determines whether a defendant is, in fact, indigent. A defendant who “has other resources that might reasonably be used” to secure release must provide the security that a judge orders to obtain release. All defendants adjudged indigent under the city’s uniform standard are released on a recognizance bond, “meaning no bail amount is set, either secured or unsecured.” Id. at *1-*2.
Thus, as the Walker majority found, the City of Calhoun releases all indigent defendants, just as the city releases all defendants who can afford to pay a cash bond, post a surety or property bond, provide a driver’s license as collateral, or provide some other form of collateral. The Walker majority found that delay of up to 48 hours in securing release for indigent defendants was presumptively constitutional. Id. at *14. The Walker majority held that the indigent in the City of Calhoun “must merely wait some appropriate amount of time to receive the same benefit as the more affluent” and that an appropriate period of delay, without more,
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does not offend the Constitution. Cullman County’s bail process differs significantly from the process in the
City of Calhoun because indigent defendants cannot secure their release merely by proving that they are indigent according to a uniform standard of indigency. Instead, within 72 hours of arrest, to obtain pretrial release in Cullman County, an indigent criminal defendant, without the assistance of counsel, must prove not only that he is indigent but also that he is not a flight risk or a threat to himself or the community. If a judge, applying no particular legal standard, decides that a defendant is indigent but that the defendant is a danger to himself or his community or a flight risk, then the judge may set bail at a level that the defendant cannot afford, creating a de facto detention order. (See Doc. 129-36, p. 37).
In the section that follows, the Court discusses the procedural deficiencies in Cullman County’s bail system, but the Court first examines the inequitable treatment of arrestees on basis of wealth. Under Cullman County’s pretrial procedures, a dangerous arrestee who can post bond immediately returns to the community to which she is a threat, suffering only the inconvenience of detention of no more than two hours. For example, Judge Turner confirmed that if a deputy sheriff were to arrest an individual on a charge of first degree rape, the Sheriff’s Office would release the individual as soon as he could post a $20,000 property or surety bond. (Doc. 143, p. 143). If that same arrestee could not post bond, then he
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would have to participate in an initial appearance before a district judge, and the judge would consider the conditions for release including the bond amount. (Doc. 143, p. 144). The bail order that a judge would enter likely would include a bond amount that the indigent defendant could not satisfy, completely depriving the defendant of the benefit of pretrial liberty that would have been available to him hours after his arrest, had he been able to afford a bond immediately. The Standing Order permits this result, and the record shows that it is not unusual for a judge to set bond for an indigent defendant in an amount the defendant cannot afford. (Doc. 129-36, p. 7; Doc. 136, pp. 291-294).
Judge Turner acknowledged that if every arrestee in Cullman County had to go through the pretrial process that indigent defendants must follow, “drastically” higher numbers of defendants would be detained pretrial. (Doc. 143, p. 67). Judge Turner estimated that the number of pretrial detainees would quadruple. (Doc. 143, pp. 67-68). Judge Turner agreed with counsel for the judicial defendants that detaining non-indigent arrestees would not be a good thing because doing so would mean that many more people would suffer the deleterious consequences of pretrial detention. (Doc. 143, pp. 67-68).17
17 Judge Turner expressed his desire to learn about bail systems in other jurisdictions and to replicate systems that work well. Judge Turner is receptive to alternative systems in Cullman County. (Doc. 143, pp. 148-50).
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Those harmful consequences are significant. Mr. Hester’s unrebutted evidence shows that deprivation of pretrial liberty takes a high toll on a criminal defendant, and the negative effects of pretrial incarceration compound each day that a defendant is detained. Dr. Demuth explained that research literature increasingly “shows quite robustly that pretrial detention has deleterious consequences for the detained, the community at large, and the criminal justice system itself.” (Doc. 129-1, pp. 9-10). As discussed in greater detail below, pretrial detention hampers a defendant’s ability to participate in his defense. Prolonged pretrial detention increases the likelihood that the pretrial detainee will enter a guilty plea, receive a harsher sentence, and recidivate. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 1112; Doc. 129-19, p. 8; Doc. 129-20, pp. 2, 4; Doc. 136, pp. 73-74). And detention for even 24 hours can cause a defendant to lose a job, a consequence an indigent defendant cannot afford. In Cullman County, these harmful consequences appear to be unacceptable for all but the indigent.
Mr. Hester is substantially likely to prove that Cullman County’s discriminatory bail practices deprive indigent criminal defendants in Cullman County of equal protection of the law because the challenged distinction does not rationally further a legitimate state purpose. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). Instead, Cullman County’s stated interests are illusory and conspicuously arbitrary.
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The defendants argue that three compelling interests warrant secured bonds in Cullman County: providing pretrial release as quickly as possible for all who can afford it (Doc. 143, pp. 125, 168), ensuring that criminal defendants appear for trial (Doc. 122-1, p. 6, ¶ 14; Doc. 143, pp. 171, 173), and protecting the community from dangerous criminal defendants (Doc. 143, pp. 413-14, 521). Mr. Hester is likely to demonstrate that the defendants’ secured money bail procedures are not necessary to serve any of these interests.
With respect to efficient pretrial release of criminal defendants, the defendants have demonstrated that the bail schedule enables the defendants to quickly release criminal defendants who can afford a bond. Sheriff Gentry testified that at the pretrial stage of a criminal proceeding, it is important to release individuals from as jail early as possible because pretrial release reduces the demands on the county’s jail and returns people to their families as soon as possible. (Doc. 143, p. 168). The sheriff generally releases defendants who can afford a secured bond within two hours of booking. The sheriff must detain defendants who cannot afford a secured bond but are otherwise eligible for release at least until those defendants have an initial appearance. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 8-9, ¶¶ 14-15). An unsecured bond system would allow wealthy and indigent defendants to be released at the same rate and on the same basis, thereby increasing the efficiency of pretrial release in the county by freeing additional jail space and
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returning all defendants, not just the wealthy, to their families as quickly as possible. Cullman County has not examined or tested an unsecured bond system. (Doc. 136, p. 210).
With respect to the issue of pretrial appearance, the plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that Cullman County likely would not see an increase in failures to appear with unsecured bonds. Mr. Hester offered expert testimony and empirical studies to demonstrate that secured money bail is not more effective than unsecured bail or non-monetary conditions of release in reducing the risk of flight from prosecution. For example, Dr. Demuth testified that “several recent empirical studies that compare the effectiveness of different kinds of bonds in assuring appearance in court . . . [found] no difference in the effectiveness of secured and unsecured bonds.” (Doc. 129-1, p. 5, ¶ 11).18 One of those studies concluded that regardless of a criminal defendant’s pretrial risk category, “unsecured bonds offer decision-makers the same likelihood of court appearance as do secured bonds.”
18 Dr. Demuth testified that another study “provides mixed findings” and another “problematic study finds that secured bonds are more effective.” (Doc. 129-1, p. 5, ¶ 11). According to Dr. Demuth, the “mixed findings” study did not consider unsecured money bail or non-financial release with restrictions and therefore does not provide a meaningful analysis of whether nonfinancial conditions or unsecured money bail are as effective as secured money bail. (Doc. 1291, p. 6). According to Dr. Demuth, the “problematic study” analyzed “insufficient underlying data,” used questionable and unreliable shortcuts to approximate data, and employed a statistical technique that did not overcome bias in the dataset. Therefore, the problematic study fails “to inform our understanding of the relative effectiveness of secured and unsecured bonds.” (Doc. 129-1, pp. 6-7).
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(Doc. 129-10, p. 13).19 Dr. Michael Jones, the study’s author, considers this finding unsurprising “given that both bond types carry the potential for the defendant to lose money for failing to appear.” (Doc. 129-10, p. 13). A study conducted by Claire M. B. Brooker, Dr. Jones, and Timothy R. Schnacke found that the average court appearance rate for criminal defendants in Jefferson County, Colorado did not differ significantly between judges who set more secured bonds and judges who set more unsecured bonds. (Doc. 129-11, p. 9).20
Mr. Hester’s evidence shows that secured money bail actually may undermine the government’s interest in court appearance because secured money bail results in longer periods of pretrial detention for those who cannot easily afford bail, which, in turn, is associated with higher failure to appear rates. (See Doc. 129-1, pp. 5, 11-12, ¶¶ 11, 18-19; Doc. 129-4, p. 5, ¶ 17). For example, a study conducted by Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand, and Alexander Holsinger found that criminal defendants who eventually are released after arrest are more likely to fail to appear for court the longer they are detained
19 Dr. Jones analyzed the appearance rates of 1,309 criminal defendants in Colorado and assigned to each criminal defendant one of four categories of risk for failure to appear. (Doc. 129-10, p. 8). 20 Ms. Booker, Dr. Jones, and Mr. Schnacke assigned 1,122 criminal defendants to one of two groups: those whose bonds were set by a judge who ordered many unsecured bonds and those whose bonds were set by judges who ordered many secured bonds. (Doc. 129-11, pp. 6-7). The researchers compared the pretrial appearance rates of both groups and found no meaningful statistical difference. (Doc. 129-11, p. 8).
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pretrial. (Doc. 129-12, pp. 11-12).21 And evidence suggests that most defendants released without financial
incentives to appear in court still appear at a very high rate. For example, Judge Morrison testified that in 2017, in Washington, D.C., where “financial conditions are almost never used” for pretrial release, 88% of criminal defendants released pretrial made all scheduled court appearances. (Doc. 129-2, p. 5, ¶¶ 22, 25). Dr. Jones stated that many research studies show that court date reminders, “which can be delivered through in-person meetings, letters, postcards, live callers, robocalls, text messages, and/or email,” are the “single most effective pretrial risk management intervention for reducing failures to appear;” they improve court appearance by approximately 30% to 50%. (Doc. 129-4, p. 14, ¶ 43). Jacob Sills, the co-founder and CEO of a company that uses technology and behavioral research to help criminal defendants appear for court, testified that the failure to appear rate of public defender clients in Richmond, California decreased from 20% to under 4% after implementing text-message court date reminders. (Doc. 129-7, p. 4, ¶ 11). The failure to appear rate of low-income defendants in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania decreased from 15% to under 6% after implementing textmessage court date reminders. (Doc. 129-7, p. 4, ¶ 12). Insha Rahman, a senior planner at a non-profit criminal justice organization that develops pretrial services,
21 Dr. Lowenkamp, Dr. VanNostrand, and Dr. Holsinger analyzed data on 153,407 defendants booked into a jail in Kentucky during one year. (Doc. 129-12, p. 7).
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testified that in New York City, 95% of nearly 2,300 criminal defendants whose bail was paid by charitable organizations, i.e. who had no “skin in the game,” made all court appearances. (Doc. 135-3, p. 4, ¶¶ 14-15).
The defendants have not offered empirical evidence or research studies to rebut Mr. Hester’s considerable evidence. Judge Turner testified that he has no empirical evidence concerning or experience with unsecured bail to demonstrate that unsecured bail would increase failure to appear rates. (Doc. 143, pp. 116, 12829). Instead, the defendants argue, without an evidentiary basis, that by requiring a criminal defendant or a third party to put “skin in the game,” the criminal defendant is more likely to appear in court. (See, e.g., Doc. 143, pp. 62, 69-70). Sheriff Gentry and Judge Turner testified that because family members or a commercial bondsman often pay a criminal defendant’s bond, a secured money bail system encourages those third parties to hold a criminal defendant accountable for appearing in court. (Doc. 136, pp. 225-27; Doc. 143, pp. 367-68).
Other testimony from Sheriff Gentry and Judge Turner undermines the defendants’ argument that secured money bail is necessary for court appearance. Sheriff Gentry acknowledged that a court-appointed third-party custodian would hold an individual just as accountable to appear in court as a family member who posted secured bond. (Doc. 136, p. 226). And Judge Turner acknowledged that an individual would have just as much “skin in the game” with an unsecured bond.
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(Doc. 143, pp. 69-70). Thus, the evidence demonstrates that secured bail is no more effective than other conditions to assure a criminal defendant’s appearance at court proceedings, and secured bail is not necessary to secure a criminal defendant’s appearance.
The defendants’ third stated interest, the safety of the community, illustrates that Cullman County’s bail procedure is entirely arbitrary. Empirical studies demonstrate that there is no statistically significant difference between the rates at which criminal defendants released on secured and unsecured bail are charged with new crimes. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 12-13). Dr. Jones’s study found that regardless of a criminal defendant’s pretrial risk, “unsecured bonds offer the same public safety benefit as do secured bonds.” (Doc. 129-10, p. 12). Dr. Jones noted that his findings are consistent with at least two other research studies. (Doc. 12910, p. 12). In addition, the study conducted by Ms. Brooker, Dr. Jones, and Mr. Schnacke found that “there was no significant difference in the overall public safety rate between” criminal defendants released by judges who set many secured bonds and criminal defendants released by judges who set many unsecured bonds. (Doc. 129-11, p. 9).
Significantly, Mr. Hester offered expert testimony and research studies which demonstrate that prolonged pretrial detention is associated with a greater likelihood of re-arrest upon release, meaning that pretrial detention may increase
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the risk of harm to the community. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 7-8, ¶ 13). Citing the study conducted by Dr. Lowenkamp, Dr. VanNostrand, and Dr. Holsinger, Dr. Jones testified that criminal defendants who are released in two to three days are 39% more likely, five to seven days 50% more likely, and 8 to 14 days 56% more likely to re-offend than those who are released within one day. (Doc. 129-4, p. 5, ¶ 16; see Doc. 129-12, pp. 11-12, 20). In addition, reviews of pretrial release practices in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, and Kentucky show that defendants released on unsecured bond or non-financial conditions are not more likely to re-offend than defendants released on secured bond. (Doc. 129-2, p. 5, ¶ 25; Doc. 129-16, p. 5; Doc. 129-18, p. 18).
The defendants did not offer evidence to show that criminal defendants who cannot afford to pay secured money bond are more dangerous to the public than criminal defendants who can. Judge Turner testified that he was not aware of empirical data showing that secured money bail ensures public safety more than other forms of pretrial release. (Doc. 143, p. 131). Sheriff Gentry testified that the threat of losing money creates the incentive to not commit new crimes after release. (Doc. 143, p. 168). But release on unsecured bond provides the same incentive because a judge may require a criminal defendant who commits a new crime while on pretrial release to pay the face value of the bond.
As currently implemented, Cullman County’s bail schedule does nothing to
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secure public safety. A defendant with financial means who is charged with assault can go home within two hours of his arrest if he can post a $10,000 bond, while an indigent defendant charged with fourth degree possession of a forged instrument who cannot afford to post a $3,000 secured bond remains in custody awaiting a hearing. (Doc. 122-1, p. 16). More importantly, dangerous defendants charged with identical crimes are treated differently based on their financial status. The Sheriff’s Office releases a dangerous defendant with financial means within two hours of arrest, but the Sheriff’s Office detains an indigent defendant who must await an opportunity to convince a judge, who is not required to apply a particular evidentiary standard, that his or her past criminal history and/or current alleged conduct do not warrant an unattainable bond amount that will serve for that defendant as a de facto detention order. The system is discriminatory: not all criminal defendants who pose a real and present danger to the public are indigent, but Cullman County detains only indigent criminal defendants who pose a real and present danger to the public. Dangerous defendants with means enjoy pretrial liberty.
In February 2018, Cullman County had 220 new arrests. Of the 220 individuals arrested, 47 individuals had to await initial appearances, and 167 individuals were able to secure their release immediately. (Doc. 143, pp. 192, 212). None of those 167 individuals had to prove that they were not a danger to
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the community or a flight risk. With respect to those 167 individuals, Cullman
County did nothing to determine whether conditions other than bond were
necessary to protect the public or to ensure the defendant’s appearance at court
proceedings. Cullman County professes concern for the safety of the citizens in
the community, but the record demonstrates that that concern is illusory or at least
half-hearted in implementation. As Judge Turner stated, if Cullman County were
to assess all arrestees for danger to the community, there would be many more
individuals held pretrial in the Cullman County jail, just as there would be many additional detentions if Cullman County assessed all arrestees for flight risks.22
The defendants mention that they are open to making additional changes to
their pretrial bail system, but they contend that “it’s got to come from a state level.
Whatever works for Cullman has got to be the same thing that works for Jefferson
County, for Mobile County, for Escambia County.” (Doc. 143, p. 69). The
proposition is not persuasive. Cullman County did not have to wait for the rest of
the State of Alabama when it revised its pretrial bail procedures two weeks after
Mr. Hester filed his motion for preliminary injunction. And this Court does not
22 If the record suggested that Cullman County had a robust practice of using bail requests forms pursuant to which law enforcement officers would ask judges to increase the amount of bail for defendants who the officers believe may be a threat to the community, the record might better support Cullman County’s professed concern for the safety of the community. The record contains no such suggestion. Judge Turner explained that the bail request forms were part of Cullman County’s pretrial system before the county’s chief judge signed the March 2018 Standing Order, and Judge Turner testified that he has never seen a bail request form for a warrantless arrest. (Doc. 136, p. 275; Doc. 143, p. 143). The defendants offered no evidence to establish how often law enforcement officers submit bail request forms for warrant arrests.
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have a record before it that would allow it to determine whether the bail systems in
other counties in Alabama suffer from constitutional flaws, such that state-wide
reform is necessary. For purposes of this litigation, the Court is concerned only
with the record concerning Cullman County.
None of the interests that the defendants have identified relating to
Cullman’s County’s secured bail procedures finds support in the current record.
Therefore, Mr. Hester has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
of his claim that Cullman County’s bail procedures violate his right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to equal treatment under the law.23
b. Substantive and Procedural Due Process - Individualized Release Hearing
There is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Hester will prove that Cullman
County’s bail procedures violate his constitutional right to substantive and
23 In her dissenting opinion in Walker, Judge Martin explained that she would apply heightened scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of a bail system that discriminates on the basis of wealth. 2018 WL 4000252 at * 24 (Martin, J. dissenting). Because pretrial liberty is a fundamental right to which heightened scrutiny applies, were this Court writing on a clean slate, it would apply heightened scrutiny to assess Cullman County’s bail system under the equal protection/due process rubric for wealth-based classifications. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987)(because the “interest in liberty” is “fundamental,” it is a “‘general rule’ of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (substantive due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (describing the narrowly tailored and least restrictive conditions on pretrial liberty imposed by the Bail Reform Act as analyzed in Salerno). Because Cullman County’s bail system does not survive rational basis analysis, it necessarily would not survive heightened scrutiny.
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procedural due process. The substantive right to pretrial liberty may not be infringed without “constitutionally adequate procedures.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). A state’s rule of criminal procedure violates the Due Process Clause when “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (“Medina provides the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules that are part of the criminal process.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Mr. Hester’s substantive and procedural due process claims are related. (Doc. 108, p. 19). Mr. Hester contends that the defendants do not employ constitutionally adequate procedures at the initial appearance to protect putative class members’ substantive right to pretrial liberty in violation of substantive and procedural due process. (Doc. 95, p. 19, ¶ 84; Doc. 108, p. 19). Specifically, Mr. Hester argues that the defendants, in violation of the Due Process Clause, do not provide clear notice to criminal defendants about the purpose of an initial appearance; give criminal defendants a full opportunity to speak and present
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evidence; require express findings and a statement of reasons for detention; or follow an evidentiary standard for detention. (Doc. 108, pp. 22-26; Doc. 131, pp. 17-23).24
Cullman County’s secured money bail procedures are strikingly similar to the bail procedures at issue in the Fifth Circuit’s recent opinion in ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). As explained by the district court in that case, following a citizen’s arrest for a misdemeanor offense in Harris County, Texas, the district attorney would set a secured money bail amount according to a bail schedule. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1088 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), and aff’d as modified sub nom. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).25 Like the Cullman County bail schedule, the Harris County bail schedule listed bail amounts for each potential offense. Id. The county released criminal defendants who paid the bond amount. Id. The county detained criminal defendants who could not pay the bond amount. Id.
24 In his complaint, Mr. Hester contends also that the defendants do not “restrict detention to extremely serious offenses.” (Doc. 95, p. 19, ¶ 85). Mr. Hester has not raised this allegation in his motion for preliminary injunction. In his motion for preliminary injunction, Mr. Hester has argued that due process requires defendants to have the assistance of counsel at an initial appearance under Cullman County’s criminal pretrial procedures. (Doc. 108, pp. 25-26). Recently, Mr. Hester has asked for the opportunity to present additional briefing on this issue. (Doc. 156). Because the Court finds that Mr. Hester is entitled to a preliminary injunction for other reasons, the Court will delay its consideration of Mr. Hester’s right to counsel argument. 25 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s factual findings. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 166.
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According to the “Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Rules of Court,” akin to the Standing Order in this case, criminal defendants who could not pay the bond amount were supposed to receive a probable cause hearing before a hearing officer within 24 hours of arrest. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1086-87. A hearing officer was supposed to determine a criminal defendant’s bail at the probable cause hearing. Id. at 1092. Like the judges in Cullman County, hearing officers at the probable cause hearing had the discretion to release criminal defendants on personal or unsecured bonds, to impose additional conditions of release, or to raise or lower the secured bond amount listed in the bail schedule. Id. According to Texas state law, hearing officers had to conduct an individualized review when setting bail using enumerated factors, including the defendant’s ability to make bail. Id. at 1086.
Harris County’s actual practices deviated considerably from these rules. The Fifth Circuit stated:
Despite these formal requirements, the district court found that, in practice, County procedures were dictated by an unwritten custom and practice that was marred by gross inefficiencies, did not achieve any individualized assessment in setting bail, and was incompetent to do so. The district court noted that the statutorily-mandated probable cause hearing (where bail is usually set) frequently does not occur within 24 hours of arrest. The hearings often last seconds, and rarely more than a few minutes. Arrestees are instructed not to speak, and are not offered any opportunity to submit evidence of relative ability to post bond at the scheduled amount.
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The [district] court found that the results of this flawed procedural framework demonstrate the lack of individualized assessments when officials set bail. County officials “impose the scheduled bail amounts on a secured basis about 90 percent of the time. When [they] do change the bail amount, it is often to conform the amount to what is in the bail schedule.” The court further found that, when Pretrial Services recommends release on personal bond, Hearing Officers reject the suggestion 66% of the time. Because less than 10% of misdemeanor arrestees are assigned an unsecured personal bond, some amount of upfront payment is required for release in the vast majority of cases.
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 153-54. Moreover, criminal defendants almost never had
counsel at the probable cause hearings, and the county did not provide counsel to
indigent defendants. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. Hearing officers did not
make written findings or explain why they set the bail in the type and amount
imposed. Id. Hearing officers occasionally made abbreviated notes on forms such
as “criminal history,” “safety of community,” or “safety” to indicate the rationale
for pretrial bail, but the forms did not otherwise indicate that the hearing officers
weighed relevant factors in setting bail. Id.
Like Cullman County, Harris County argued that its bail system was
necessary to ensure a criminal defendant’s appearance at court and to protect the
community. The district court rejected Harris County’s argument, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 154, 166. The
Fifth Circuit explained:
[t]he [district] court rejected the argument that imposing secured bonds served the County’s interest in ensuring the arrestee appeared at
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the future court date and committed no further crime. The court’s review of reams of empirical data suggested the opposite: that “release on secured financial conditions does not assure better rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct before trial compared to release on unsecured bonds or nonfinancial conditions of supervision.” Instead, the County’s true purpose was “to achieve pretrial detention of misdemeanor defendants who are too poor to pay, when those defendants would promptly be released if they could pay.” In short, “secured money bail function[ed] as a pretrial detention order” against the indigent misdemeanor arrestees.
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 154.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Harris County
violated indigent criminal defendants’ due process rights by infringing on the
fundamental right to pretrial liberty without constitutionally adequate procedures.
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 159. The Fifth Circuit stated:
As the district court found, the current procedures are inadequate—even when applied to our narrower understanding of the liberty interest at stake. The court’s factual findings (which are not clearly erroneous) demonstrate that secured bail orders are imposed almost automatically on indigent arrestees. Far from demonstrating sensitivity to the indigent misdemeanor defendants’ ability to pay, Hearing Officers and County Judges almost always set a bail amount that detains the indigent. In other words, the current procedure does not sufficiently protect detainees from magistrates imposing bail as an “instrument of oppression.”
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 159.
The Fifth Circuit found that the “fundamental source of constitutional
deficiency in the due process and equal protection analyses is the same: [Harris]
County’s mechanical application of the secured bail schedule without regard for
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the individual arrestee’s personal circumstances.” ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163. To cure the due process and equal protection violations, the county had to “implement the constitutionally-necessary procedures to engage in a case-by-case evaluation of a given arrestee’s circumstances, taking into account the various factors required by Texas state law (only one of which is ability to pay).” Id. The Fifth Circuit held that “constitutionally-necessary procedures” specifically included “notice, an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48 hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decisionmaker.” Id.
Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Harris County’s bail procedures violated the Due Process Clause, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court’s preliminary injunction was overly broad. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 166. The Fifth Circuit held that hearing officers did not have “to issue a written statement of their reasons.” Id. at 160. The Fifth Circuit “decline[d] to hold that the Constitution requires the County to produce 50,000 written opinions per year to satisfy due process.” Id. Instead, because “the constitutional defect in the process afforded was the automatic imposition of pretrial detention on indigent misdemeanor arrestees, requiring [hearing officers] to specifically enunciate their individualized, case-specific reasons for so doing is a sufficient remedy.” Id. (emphasis in original). And the Fifth Circuit “conclude[d] that the federal due process right entitles detainees to a hearing within 48 hours” as opposed to the 24
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hour window that the district court required in its injunction. Id.
The Fifth Circuit provided the district court with a draft injunction that
“represent[ed] the sort of modification that would be appropriate” and left the
details to the district court’s discretion. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 164. Provisions in
the draft injunction most relevant to this case are:
• Harris County is enjoined from imposing prescheduled bail amounts as a condition of release on arrestees who attest that they cannot afford such amounts without providing an adequate process for ensuring that there is individual consideration for each arrestee of whether another amount or condition provides sufficient sureties.
• Pretrial Services officers, as County employees and subject to its policies, must verify an arrestee’s ability to pay a prescheduled financial condition of release by an affidavit, and must explain to arrestees the nature and significance of the verification process.
• The purpose of the explanation is to provide the notice due process requires that a misdemeanor defendant’s state constitutional right to be bailable by sufficient sureties is at stake in the proceedings. . .
• The affidavit must give the misdemeanor arrestee sufficient opportunity to declare under penalty of perjury, after the significance of the information has been explained, the maximum amount of financial security the arrestee would be able to post or pay up front within 24 hours of arrest. The affidavit should ask the arrestee to provide details about their financial situation . . . . The question is neither the arrestee’s immediate ability to pay with cash on hand, nor what assets the arrestee could eventually produce after a period of pretrial detention. The question is what amount the arrestee could reasonably pay within 24 hours of his or her arrest, from any source, including the contributions of family and friends.
. . .
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• Misdemeanor defendants who are [eligible to secure their release by paying secured bond are] entitled to a hearing within 48 hours of arrest in which an impartial decision-maker conducts an individual assessment of whether another amount of bail or other condition provides sufficient sureties. At the hearing, the arrestee must have an opportunity to describe evidence in his or her favor, and to respond to evidence described or presented by law enforcement. If the decision-maker declines to lower bail from the prescheduled amount to an amount the arrestee is able to pay, then the decisionmaker must provide written factual findings or factual findings on the record explaining the reason for the decision, and the County must provide the arrestee with a formal adversarial bail review hearing before a County Judge. The Harris County Sheriff is therefore authorized to decline to enforce orders requiring payment of prescheduled bail amounts as a condition of release for said defendants if the orders are not accompanied by a record showing that the required individual assessment was made and an opportunity for formal review was provided. . . .
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 164-66.
There is no meaningful difference between the bail procedures in this case
and the procedures in ODonnell; both are equally arbitrary. Like Harris County
pre-ODonnell, Cullman County mechanically applies a secured money bail
schedule to detain the poor and release the wealthy. Like Harris County, Cullman
County argues that its written “individualized” release procedures protect indigent
defendants’ due process rights. And like Harris County, Cullman County’s actual
procedures are significantly less individualized and protective than due process
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requires.26
The following procedural deficiencies in Cullman County’s bail procedures
create a substantial likelihood of success for the plaintiffs on their due process
claim.
• Absence of adequate notice
The defendants do not provide constitutionally adequate notice to indigent
criminal defendants before an initial appearance. “[N]otice is essential to afford
the prisoner an opportunity to challenge the contemplated action and to understand
26 Recent developments in other jurisdictions support Mr. Hester’s due process claim. Notably, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recently found that each of the procedural deficiencies alleged by Mr. Hester violates due process at an initial appearance where a defendant is at risk of a de facto detention order because of her indigency. Caliste v. Cantrell, -- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2018 WL 3727768, at *12 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018). In addition, the governor of California recently signed into law the California Money Bail Reform Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 244 (S.B. 10) (effective date October 1, 2019). The Act appears to eliminate money bail and provide all of the procedural safeguards that Mr. Hester argues the Due Process Clause demands Cullman County to provide at an initial appearance. Generally, pursuant to the California Money Bail Reform Act, pretrial risk assessment services determine whether an individual booked on a charge other than a misdemeanor is “low risk,” “medium risk,” or “high risk” of failure to appear or danger to the public. S.B. 10, §§ 1320.7(a)(c), 1320.9. Pretrial risk assessment services release low risk defendants on their own recognizance without a hearing. S.B. 10, § 1320.10(b). Pretrial risk assessment services may release medium risk defendants on their own recognizance without a hearing or recommend an arraignment hearing. S.B. 10, § 1320.10(c). The court conducts an arraignment hearing for any detained defendant. S.B. 10, § 1320.15. “At arraignment, the court shall order a defendant released on his or her own recognizance or supervised own recognizance with the least restrictive nonmonetary condition . . . that will reasonably assure public safety and the defendant’s return to court unless the prosecution files a motion for preventive detention.” S.B. 10, § 1320.17. The court must conduct a hearing on the motion for preventive detention at which the defendant has the right to court-appointed counsel. S.B. 10, § 1320.19(d). The defendant must have the opportunity to be heard and present evidence. S.B. 10, § 1320.20(c). The court may order detention only if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that no nonmonetary condition of release will reasonably assure public safety and court appearance and must state its reasons on the record. S.B. 10, § 1320.20(d)(1). Otherwise, the court must release the defendant on her own or supervised recognizance. S.B. 10, § 1320.20(e)(1).
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the nature of what is happening to him.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974)). The notice must be tailored, “in light of the decision to be made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)).
Here, there is no evidence in the record that the defendants inform arrestees of what is at stake at an initial appearance or that the sheriff’s court liaison officers explain the initial hearing process to detainees. Those officers offer detainees a release questionnaire, which detainees may refuse. The notice statement in the release questionnaire, “FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING CONDITIONS OF PRE-TRIAL RELEASE IN THIS CASE, THE COURT MAY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING,” is vague and substantively inadequate. (Doc. 129-41, p. 2). The release questionnaire does not communicate the most crucial piece of information, namely, that a judge may enter a de facto detention order by setting unaffordable secured money bail even after considering the information provided by the defendant. See Caliste v. Cantrell, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2018 WL 3727768, at *11 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff in part because secured money bail procedures did not “provide[] notice of the importance of the issue of the criminal defendant’s ability to pay”).
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The language in the release questionnaire suggests to a defendant that she is entitled to some form of “release,” when she really is not because the court may exercise its discretion to enter what amounts to an order of detention. Judge Turner acknowledged that at an initial appearance, a stage at which indigent defendants do not have counsel, he does not inform criminal defendants of the fourteen factors he considers when setting secured bail, so a defendant cannot know what information may be important to share for an assessment of conditions of release. (Doc. 143, p. 91). Judge Turner stated that he asks few questions during an initial appearance, most of the defendants who appear before him lack formal education, and many defendants are illiterate or have learning disabilities. (Doc. 136, p. 289). Having these defendants rely on the information in the release questionnaire for notice is tantamount to no notice at all. These defendants do not receive adequate notice of their constitutional right to pretrial liberty or the evidence they must provide to prove that there are non-monetary conditions of pretrial release that will satisfy the purposes of bail. (Doc. 143, pp. 92-93).
• Absence of an opportunity to be heard Under the March 2018 Standing Order, at an initial appearance, a Cullman County judge does not have to give a criminal defendant an opportunity to be heard or present evidence. According to the Standing Order, the judge “may” give the defendant an opportunity to speak. (Doc. 129-36, p. 7) (“The Court . . . may
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elicit testimony about the defendant’s financial condition.”) (emphasis added). Judge Turner testified that he asks the defendant some questions at the initial appearance, but he “tr[ies] not to ask too many questions.” (Doc. 136, pp. 288-89). The record does not indicate whether other judges in Cullman County elicit information from defendants during an initial appearance. Although a check-box on the Order on Initial Appearance and Bond Hearing states, “Bail: Gave the Defendant the opportunity to make a statement regarding his/her ability to post the bond currently set in this matter,” there is no evidence that a judge must check this box or that judges give criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to speak. (Doc. 129-40, p. 2). Under the Standing Order, a judge does not have to provide the defendant an opportunity to present evidence. Accordingly, the defendants impermissibly leave a criminal defendant’s opportunity to be heard, a “fundamental requirement of due process,” up to the judge’s discretion. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.; see Caliste, 2018 WL 3727768, at *9-10 (finding an opportunity to be heard to be an essential requirement of due process at a hearing where a defendant faces pretrial detention because of indigency) (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011), Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983), and Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 652 (E.D. La. 2017)).
• Absence of an evidentiary standard Under the March 2018 Standing Order, neither the Cullman County Sheriff
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nor a Cullman County judge must satisfy an evidentiary standard before entering an unaffordable secured bond that serves as a de facto detention order. “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has consistently “mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (1979)). The Supreme Court “has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26). Pursuant to these concerns, the Supreme Court has established a clear and convincing evidence standard for civil commitment for mental illness, Addington, 441 U.S. at 433, deportation of a resident alien, Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966), denaturalization, Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353-55 (1960), and parental rights termination proceedings,
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Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-69. See Caliste, 2018 WL 3727768, at *10 (“[T]he Court agrees . . . ‘the government must prove the facts supporting a finding of flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985) (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
The level of certainty that the clear and convincing evidence standard provides is necessary to ensure fundamental fairness in bail proceedings. The detention of a criminal defendant in Cullman County without a specific degree of confidence that detention is necessary offends a fundamental principle of justice. At an initial appearance, an indigent defendant faces a substantial “loss of personal liberty through imprisonment,” a penalty which “lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Turner, 564 U.S. at 445. Accordingly, before ordering an unaffordable secured bond, a judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that pretrial detention is necessary to secure the defendant’s appearance at trial or to protect the public.
• Absence of factual findings Although the Standing Order states that “[t]he Court will make a written finding as to why the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary . . .” (Doc. 129-36, p. 7), Cullman County judges do not actually make “findings.” Instead, a judge merely checks a box for any of fourteen factors he “considered.” (Doc. 129-36,
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pp. 6-7; Doc. 129-40, p. 3). This is insufficient. Checking boxes for factors “considered” is just as inadequate as jotting
abbreviated factors such as “safety” or “criminal history,” per the hearing officers in ODonnell. Cullman County’s check-boxes simply restate the factors in Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of state law, every judge presumably considers these factors when setting a bond amount or imposing other conditions for pretrial release. Aside from the “Other” check-box and the corresponding two blank lines, which a judge does not have to use, no check-box provides individualized information or suggests that the judge actually made a finding with respect to a particular factor. For example, when a judge sets secured bail and checks “[t]he age, background and family ties, relationships and circumstances of the defendant” or “the defendant’s reputation, character, and health,” the check communicates no individualized reason for the judge’s decision, and a checked box does not indicate whether a factor worked in the defendant’s favor or worked against her.
To obtain her freedom after an initial appearance, an indigent defendant must move the state court to reduce her bond. At this stage of Cullman County’s bail proceedings, an indigent defendant finally obtains the assistance of appointed counsel, but the record affords appointed counsel no information regarding the rationale for her client’s bond, making the task of identifying error and challenging
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the bail amount unreasonably -- and potentially insurmountably -- difficult. Checking boxes for factors “considered” is tantamount to providing counsel with a copy of Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure; checkboxes for factors “considered” provide no meaningful information to indigent defendants or their appointed counsel.
To cure these deficiencies, at a minimum, a judge must state on the record why the court determined that setting secured money bond above a defendant’s financial means was necessary to secure the defendant’s appearance at trial or protect the community. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (due process generally requires the decision maker to “state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law”); Holley v. Seminole Cty. Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (“It serves as a bulwark to our procedural due process review, in that a decision without basis in fact would tend to indicate that the procedures, no matter how scrupulously followed, had been a mockery of their intended purpose—rational decisionmaking.”); Caliste, 2018 WL 3727768, at *9 (finding that Salerno, Bearden, and Turner demonstrate “the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the due process requirements of an informed inquiry into the ability to pay and findings on the record regarding that ability prior to detention based on failure to pay”).
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In all of these areas -- absence of notice, absence of an opportunity to be heard, absence of an evidentiary standard, and absence of factual findings -- Mr. Hester has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success in proving that the defendants violate due process.
The Walker opinion does not affect the due process analysis in this case. As discussed above, Cullman County’s bail procedures differ significantly from those of the City of Calhoun. Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order provided, “‘those individuals who do not obtain release pursuant to the secured bail schedule . . . shall . . . be brought before the [Municipal] Court’ within 48 hours from their arrest, shall ‘be represented by court appointed counsel,’ and ‘will be given the opportunity to object to the bail amount . . . , including any claim of indigency.’” Walker, 2018 WL 4000252, at *1. Calhoun guaranteed counsel and the opportunity to be heard. The availability of counsel made the opportunity to be heard meaningful. Cullman County offers no such opportunity to indigent defendants at an initial appearance.
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit did not address notice, findings, or an evidentiary standard in Walker. Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order may have provided those safeguards, but even if the Calhoun Standing Bail Order lacked certain safeguards, Calhoun’s requirement of counsel at an initial bail hearing -- perhaps the most significant safeguard -- mitigates other constitutional concerns. For
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example, if a judge did not give a defendant an opportunity to be heard, counsel could request such an opportunity. If a judge did not inform a defendant of the importance of her ability to post bond, counsel could do so. In contrast, the lack of counsel in Cullman County exacerbates each procedural defect in Cullman’s bail system. Lack of adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, findings on the record, and an evidentiary standard raise significantly more concern when an indigent defendant must confront those obstacles by herself. And at the end of the day, in Calhoun, a detainee simply had to prove that she was indigent to secure release within 48 hours. Walker, 2018 WL 4000252, at *14 n.12 (“[T]he Standing Bail Order guarantees release to indigents within 48 hours. It therefore accords entirely with ODonnell’s holding that what the Constitution requires is ‘an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48 hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decisionmaker.’ [ODonnell, 892 F.3d] at 163.”). Cullman County detainees must satisfy fourteen factors for release, all without the assistance of counsel.
Because the Eleventh Circuit in Walker “decide[d] what process the Constitution requires in setting bail for indigent arrestees,” 2018 WL 4000252, at *1, the Walker opinion is undoubtedly relevant to this case, but based on the considerable differences between Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order and Cullman County’s procedures, Walker does not change the fact that Mr. Hester has
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demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claim.
2. Irreparable Injury to the Putative Class The Supreme Court has recognized that the “time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). Imprisonment hinders a defendant’s ability to prepare her defense, forces her to live “under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility,” and is “simply dead time” that the defendant can never get back. Id. at 532-33. The evidence in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court’s observations in Barker. Mr. Hester’s evidence demonstrates that pretrial detention for three days or less negatively influences a person’s employment, financial circumstances, housing, and the wellbeing of dependent family members. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 9-11, ¶¶ 16-17; Doc. 129-4, pp. 6-7, ¶ 23). These detrimental impacts are exacerbated when pretrial incarceration exceeds three days. (See Doc. 129-1, pp. 9-11, ¶¶ 16-17; Doc. 136, pp. 64-65, 112-14). Four studies in the record show that pretrial detention is associated with a higher rate of conviction because detention hampers a defendant’s ability to prepare a defense and induces people to plead guilty to get out of jail. A study from Harris County, Texas found that “defendants who are detained on a
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misdemeanor charge are much more likely than similarly situated [defendants who are released pretrial] to plead guilty and serve jail time. Compared to similarly situated [released defendants], detained defendants are 25% more likely to be convicted . . . .” (Doc. 129-19, p. 8). A study from Pittsburgh found that “pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase in the likelihood of being convicted, an effect largely explained by an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have been acquitted or had their charges dropped.” (Doc. 129-20, p. 2). A study from Philadelphia and Pittsburg found that “criminal defendants who are assessed money bail are 12% [] more likely to be convicted.” (Doc. 129-21, p. 4). And data from New York City shows that 92% of people detained pretrial pleaded guilty, while only 24% and 32% of the cases in which the defendant’s bail was paid by the Bronx Freedom and Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, respectively, resulted in a criminal conviction. (Doc. 135-3, pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 11, 14-15).
Two studies in the record show that pretrial detention is associated with harsher sentences upon conviction. The Harris County, Texas study found that detained individuals were 43% more likely than similarly situated released individuals to be sentenced to a term of incarceration. (Doc. 129-19, p. 8). The Philadelphia study found that defendants detained pretrial generally end up owing $129 more in non-bail court fees and are sentenced to an additional 124 days on average upon conviction. (Doc. 129-20, p. 4).
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In addition, detention for more than 24 hours before release appears to increase the risk of recidivism. (Doc. 129-1, pp. 11-12, ¶¶ 18-19; Doc. 136, pp. 73-74). The risk compounds as the length of detention increases. (Doc. 129-1, p. 12, ¶ 19; Doc. 129-12, pp. 5, 12). For example, the Philadelphia/Pittsburgh study found that secured money bail is “a significant, independent cause of . . . recidivism. . . . [T]he assessment of money bail increases recidivism in our sample period by 6-9% yearly [].” (Doc. 129-21, p. 4). The study conducted by Dr. Lowenkamp, Dr. VanNostrand, and Dr. Holsinger found that “[b]eing detained pretrial for two days or more is related to the likelihood of post-disposition recidivism. Generally, as the length of time in pretrial detention increases, so does the likelihood of recidivism at both the 12-month and 24-month points.” (Doc. 129-12, p. 5). The study also found that “[t]he longer low-risk defendants are detained, the more likely they are to have new criminal activity pretrial (1.39 times more likely when held 2 to 3 days, increasing to 1.74 when held 31 days or more).” (Doc. 129-12, p. 12).
Therefore, individuals who, by law, are presumed innocent suffer irreparable injury when they are detained because they cannot afford to pay secured bond and are deprived of constitutionally adequate procedures for examining potential nonmonetary conditions of release.
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3. Injury to the Defendants The threatened harms to the putative class outweigh the harms the preliminary injunction may cause to the defendants. The defendants argue that no alternative systems are workable in Cullman County. The defendants contend that detaining every arrestee until an initial appearance would put considerable strain on the county’s resources. (Doc. 136, pp. 230-31; Doc. 143, pp. 66-68).27 Judge Turner stated that the circuit court’s resources already are taxed to handle the 72hour initial appearances, the county has no government-funded pretrial services staff, and the county needs one more judge just to keep up with the circuit court’s current case load. (Doc. 143, pp. 51-53). According to Sheriff Gentry, funding for the sheriff’s department has not increased since 2009. (Doc. 136, p. 254). But alternative pretrial detention policies are cost effective. Three options are readily available to Cullman County at little or no cost. First, Cullman County could release all defendants on unsecured bond. In a case in which a defendant may pose a significant flight risk or a danger to the community, a judge could hold an initial hearing within 48 hours of arrest and, if necessary based on the evidence collected at the hearing, impose additional conditions for release such as a court-
27 Mr. Hester has not urged the defendants to detain every arrestee until an initial appearance. Cullman County has offered no reason why it could not, at a minimum, use unsecured bond for non-violent arrestees. As noted, individuals released on unsecured bond would have “skin in the game,” and unsecured bond would enable Sheriff Gentry to release all non-violent arrestees, not just wealthy arrestees, more quickly.
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appointed third-party custodian or a requirement that the defendant periodically call one of the sheriff’s court liaisons. The defendants acknowledge that an unsecured bail schedule would serve their interests. (Doc. 136, p. 211; Doc. 143, pp. 69-70, 133-34).
Alternatively, Cullman County could adopt the Calhoun model and, within 48 hours of arrest, release on recognizance bonds all indigent defendants who prove their indigency on the basis of an objective standard.
Finally, Cullman County could have all arrestees complete a release questionnaire, updated to conform to the procedural requirements discussed above. The Sheriff’s Office could review those questionnaires and release on unsecured bond all low-risk arrestees. The Sheriff’s Office would detain all high risk arrestees, wealthy and indigent alike, for an initial appearance at which a judge would assess the necessary conditions for pretrial release.
Holding procedurally sufficient initial appearances consistent with this memorandum opinion would not be overly burdensome. The defendants may be able to provide sufficient notice to arrestees by, for example, editing the affidavit of substantial hardship and release questionnaire and making sure that arrestees who have difficulty understanding the forms receive assistance. Satisfying an evidentiary standard before setting bail should add no extra cost, and making actual findings when requiring a bond may require very little extra time, if any.
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4. Public Interest A preliminary injunction would prevent continuing deprivation of core constitutional rights by prohibiting detention based solely on predetermined secured money bail amounts without sufficient substantive findings and adequate procedural protections. It would not impair the efficacy of the justice system or endanger the public. Therefore, a preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest.
5. Security Because Mr. Hester and members of the putative class are, by definition, indigent, the Court exercises its discretion to waive the security required by Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Sanders v. Sellers-Earnest, 768 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188 (M.D. Fla. 2010). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Mr. Hester has demonstrated that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction consistent with the analysis in this opinion. The Court will set a telephone conference to discuss the terms of a preliminary injunction. DONE and ORDERED this September 4, 2018.
_________________________________ MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 161 Filed 09/05/18 Page 1 of 9

FILED
2018 Sep-05 PM 06:34 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.
RANDALL PARRIS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

Case No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Class Action

v.

MARTHA WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

BRADLEY HESTER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
MATT GENTRY, et al., Defendants.

ORDER Plaintiff-Intervenor Bradley Hester alleges that Cullman County Sheriff

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Matt Gentry, Circuit Clerk Lisa McSwain, Magistrate Amy Black, Magistrate Joan White, District Court Judge Kim Chaney, and District Court Judge Wells R. Turner III operate a “two-tiered pretrial justice system” that discriminates among criminal defendants on the basis of wealth. (Doc. 95, pp. 1-2, ¶ 1). Mr. Hester asks the Court to preliminarily enjoin Sheriff Gentry from detaining indigent defendants who cannot afford to post a property bond or a surety bond as a condition of pretrial release from jail. Mr. Hester argues that Cullman County’s procedures for setting a secured bond as a condition of pretrial release are constitutionally flawed, and he argues that the way in which Cullman County implements those procedures is inequitable. (Doc. 102).1 Mr. Hester has asked the Court to certify a class “consisting of all state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Cullman County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. 101, p. 2). The defendants do not oppose Mr. Hester’s request for class certification. (Doc. 144, p. 8; Doc. 145, p. 1).
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sheriff Gentry asks the Court to dismiss Mr. Hester’s intervenor
1 As discussed in the Court’s September 4, 2018 memorandum opinion in this case, when Mr. Hester filed his intervenor complaint and his motion for preliminary injunction, Cullman County followed pretrial procedures different from the procedures in place as of the date of this order. Therefore, the language of Mr. Hester’s intervenor complaint and preliminary injunction motion pertains to the old version of Cullman County’s pretrial procedures. Two weeks after Mr. Hester filed his motion for preliminary injunction, Cullman County revised its pretrial procedures. For the reasons described in the September 4, 2018 memorandum opinion in this case, the new version of Cullman County’s pretrial procedures does not moot Mr. Hester’s claims.
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complaint. (Doc. 123, p. 1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Sheriff Gentry’s motion to dismiss. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(1) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are based solely on the allegations in the complaint.” Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). “When considering such challenges, the court must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, take the complaint’s allegations as true.” Id. (citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the “liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 Sheriff Gentry “is responsible for the operation of the Cullman County Jail
and the release and detention of arrestees.” (Doc. 95, p. 5, ¶ 20). He “requires any person arrested” to post a secured bond as a condition of “release[] from jail following arrest.” (Doc. 95, p. 4, ¶ 16). Sheriff Gentry uses a bail schedule to determine the initial amount of bail required for each arrestee. (Doc. 95, p. 5, ¶ 22). Within hours of an arrest, if an arrestee can post a bond, then the Sheriff’s Office releases her. (Doc. 95, p. 5, ¶ 24). If an arrestee cannot post a bond, then the Sherriff’s Office will detain her. (Doc. 95, p. 6, ¶ 25).
Mr. Hester was arrested on July 27, 2017 and detained in Cullman County Jail. (Doc. 95, p. 2, ¶ 3).3 Mr. Hester was, and others similarly situated are, detained in Cullman County Jail solely because they cannot afford to pay the bail amount set as a condition of pretrial release. (Doc. 95, p. 2, ¶¶ 3-4). III. ANALYSIS
In his motion to dismiss, Sheriff Gentry contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Hester’s claims against him because Mr. Hester lacks standing, and Sheriff Gentry enjoys sovereign immunity. (Doc. 123, p. 2, ¶¶ 2-3).
2 For purposes of this order, the Court presents only facts pertinent to Sheriff Gentry’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) arguments. 3 Mr. Hester was detained when he intervened in this case but has since been released. (Doc. 108, p. 4 n.1). The parties acknowledge that Mr. Hester’s release does not moot this case. (See Doc. 144, p. 3).
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In the alternative, Sheriff Gentry contends that Mr. Hester has failed to state a claim for relief against him. (Doc. 123, p. 2, ¶ 4).
As Sheriff Gentry states, “[t]here is significant overlap” between his Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) arguments “because both depend on the connection between Sheriff Gentry and the harms alleged by [Mr. Hester] on behalf of the putative class.” (Doc. 124, p. 5). Sheriff Gentry argues that because he has no authority to set bail or disobey policies established by the judicial defendants and state law, there is no connection between his official actions and the plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional injuries. (See Doc. 124, pp. 3-4). Essentially, Sheriff Gentry contends that he is merely following the rules and is without discretion to act otherwise. For this reason, Sheriff Gentry argues that Mr. Hester cannot establish causation or redressability and therefore lacks standing (Doc. 123, p. 2, ¶ 2; Doc. 124, pp. 5-7), that Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) does not abrogate Sheriff Gentry’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity (Doc. 123, p. 2, ¶ 3; Doc. 124, pp. 7-10), and that Mr. Hester failed to allege the required causal connection element for a § 1983 claim (Doc. 123, p. 2, ¶ 4; Doc. 124, pp. 10-14).
Sheriff Gentry’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) arguments fail because pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) and its progeny, the Court may enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional state law. “The landmark case of [Young] created an exception to [state sovereign immunity] by asserting
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that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60). According to Young, “an unconstitutional enactment is ‘void’ and therefore does not ‘impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 160).
A state cannot authorize an unconstitutional action, and an officer who enforces such action is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.” Young, 209 U.S. at 160. Put simply, a federal court may grant “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.” Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56, 59).
Personal action by defendants individually is not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged action. As the Young court held, it is sufficient that the state officer sued must, ‘by virtue of his office, ha[ve] some connection’ with the unconstitutional act or conduct complained of. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 157). According to Mr. Hester, Sheriff Gentry enforces an allegedly unconstitutional state law when the sheriff detains arrestees pretrial solely because
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the arrestees cannot afford to pay the bail set as a condition for their release. Therefore, pursuant to Young, Mr. Hester may attempt to prospectively enjoin Sheriff Gentry to prevent a violation of federal law.4
Relying on ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), Sheriff Gentry argues that there is no causal connection between his official actions and the injuries alleged. (See Doc. 124, pp. 11-14). Sheriff Gentry’s reliance on ODonnell is misplaced. In ODonnell, the Fifth Circuit did not consider whether a county sheriff could be enjoined as a state official pursuant to Young. Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that a county sheriff could not be sued as a municipal policymaker under § 1983 because Texas law gave the sheriff no authority “to avoid executing judicial orders imposing secured bail by unilaterally declaring them unconstitutional.” ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 538. Nevertheless, in a draft injunction order that the court of appeals provided to the district court on remand, the Fifth Circuit stated, “[t]he Harris County Sheriff is therefore authorized to decline to enforce orders requiring payment of prescheduled bail amounts as a condition of release for said defendants if the orders are not accompanied by a
4 During the preliminary injunction proceedings, Mr. Hester established that the Sheriff’s Office does more than simply set the initial amount of bail for an arrestee. Sheriff Gentry testified that he advises relatives of arrestees to post property bonds as opposed to surety bonds. The Sheriff’s Office provides contact information for bail bondsmen to arrestees. Court liaisons from the Sheriff’s Office provide to arrestees who cannot afford the initial amount of bail set for their pretrial release a release questionnaire and an affidavit of financial hardship, and the liaisons provide the completed forms to the clerk of court. Arrestees participate in initial appearances from the jail via videoconference. (Doc. 159).
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record showing that the required individual assessment was made and an opportunity for formal review was provided.” Id. at 548. Accordingly, ODonnell authorizes the very relief that Sheriff Gentry claims it precludes.
The other cases that Sheriff Gentry offers to support his arguments are inapposite. In Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003), Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999), Doe v. Holcomb, 883 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2018), Duit Const. Co. Inc. v. Bennett, 796 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2015), Boglin v. Bd. of Trustees of Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2018), Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama, 2017 WL 782776 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2017), and Abdullah v. Alabama Sentencing Comm’n, 2009 WL 3063346 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2009), the plaintiffs improperly brought suit against state officials who were not responsible for enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws. Here, by virtue of his office, Sheriff Gentry has a connection with and is responsible for enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law, and Young thus permits Mr. Hester to seek an injunction against Sheriff Gentry. IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Sheriff Gentry’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 123).
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DONE and ORDERED this September 5, 2018. _________________________________ MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 1 of 31

FILED
2018 Sep-14 PM 01:23 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants.
BRADLEY HESTER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
v.
MATT GENTRY, in his official capacity as Cullman County Sheriff,
LISA MCSWAIN, in her official capacity as Clerk of the 32nd Judicial Circuit Court,
AMY BLACK, in her official capacity as Magistrate of the Cullman County District Court,
JOAN WHITE, in her official capacity as Magistrate of the Cullman County District Court,
KIM CHANEY, in his official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Cullman County District Court, and
WELLS R. TURNER, III, in his official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Cullman County District Court,
Intervenor-Defendants

Case No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH (Class Action)

INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF HESTER’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Defendants Cullman County Sheriff Matt Gentry (“Gentry”), Circuit Court Clerk Lisa McSwain (“McSwain”), District Court Magistrates Amy Black (“Black”) and Joan White (“White”), and District Court Judges Kim Chaney (“Chaney”) and Wells R. “Rusty” Turner, III (“Turner”) are operating a two-tiered pretrial justice system. Secured financial conditions of release are required for misdemeanor and felony offenses pursuant to a predetermined bail schedule that specifies a monetary range based only on the charge. A person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense who can afford the monetary amount is released from jail immediately upon payment. Those arrestees who cannot afford the monetary amount may remain in jail for weeks before they are afforded a hearing to argue for their release. How quickly—or whether—a person is released from jail depends entirely on her access to money. 2. Pursuant to this discriminatory scheme, individuals remain detained for varying lengths of time. How long presumptively innocent arrestees remain in jail after arrest depends on whether they or their families are able to pay, to borrow sufficient resources, or to arrange for a third-party surety. Others, like Mr. Hester, who are too poor to pay and unable to find anyone to pay the secured money bond for them, remain in jail for the entire duration of their case.
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3. Mr. Hester was arrested on July 27, 2017, and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. He was incarcerated until August 3, 2017, because he could not afford to pay the $1,000 bond required by the bail schedule. If he could have paid that amount, he would have been released from jail immediately following his arrest.
4. On August 1, 2017, Mr. Hester filed a Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff, naming Defendants Gentry, McSwain, Black, White, Chaney, and Turner. Defendants released Mr. Hester from the Cullman County Jail on August 3, 2017.
5. On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Mr. Hester seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief. Mr. Hester seeks an injunction against Sheriff Gentry from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail without an individualized hearing at which the arrestee has counsel and adequate procedural safeguards, including an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance. He seeks declaratory relief against Defendants McSwain, Black, White, Chaney, and Turner.
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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). 7. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district.
III. PARTIES A. Plaintiff
8. Plaintiff Bradley Dewayne Hester is a resident of Cullman, Alabama. B. Defendants
9. Defendant Matt Gentry is the Cullman County Sheriff. He is sued in his official capacity.
10. Defendant Lisa McSwain is the Circuit Court Clerk for Alabama’s 32nd Judicial Circuit Court. She is sued in her official capacity.
11. Defendant Amy Black is the Magistrate for the Cullman County District Court. She is sued in her official capacity.
12. Defendant Joan White is the Magistrate for the Cullman County District Court. She is sued in her official capacity.
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13. Defendant Kim Chaney is a Cullman County District Court Judge. He is sued in his official capacity.
14. Defendant Wells R. “Rusty” Turner, III is a Cullman County District Court Judge. He is sued in his official capacity.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Defendants’ Money Bail Practices Detain People Based on Their Wealth
Rather Than Their Suitability for Release. i. Defendants Unconstitutionally Detain People Unable to Pay Secured Money Bail Set Pursuant to the Predetermined Bail Schedule. 15. One out of every five people in Cullman County lives in poverty.1 16. Only 4 percent of the population over the age of sixteen worked full-
time year-round in 2015, the last year for which data is available.2 17. Nearly one out of four people did not work at all in 2015.3 18. The Sheriff requires any person arrested and charged with a
misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a secured amount of money bail (i.e. cash, commercial surety, or property) to be released from jail following arrest.
19. The amount of money that an arrestee must pay is pre-determined by a bail schedule.
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, available at https://goo.gl/CrVQ66.
2 Id. 3 Id.
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20. The bail schedule specifies a monetary range based only on the charge. It does not contemplate consideration of a person’s financial resources or whether any alternative non-financial conditions of release may mitigate any relevant risk.
21. Immediate access to money alone determines whether a person remains in jail following arrest. If a person can pay the amount required, the individual is released from jail immediately. If the person is unable to pay, she remains incarcerated.
ii. Defendant Gentry Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay the Predetermined Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay.
22. When a person is arrested in Cullman County, she is booked into the Cullman County Jail, which is operated by the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Matt Gentry is responsible for the operation of the Cullman County jail and the release and detention of arrestees.
23. After booking, arrestees are informed by Sheriff’s Department employees of their bail amount.
24. The Sheriff determines the required amount of money by referring to the bail schedule.
25. As Sheriff Gentry explained, “When someone comes into the jail, we have a chart we go by to set the bonds. You can’t go outside the scope of the
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range; you have to be within the bond range. We bring in 30 people a day; those 30 won’t go see the judge that day. But we already know what the bond amount’s going to be when they come in. When you come in on possession of a controlled substance, $5,000; trafficking, $1 million.”4
26. Arrestees who do not have other restrictions on their eligibility for release can pay this amount themselves, make a phone call to ask a friend or family to pay this amount on their behalf, or contact a bonding agent to assist in posting bail. If an arrestee can afford to pay the predetermined bail, the Sheriff’s Department accepts the money and releases her.
27. Although a person with financial resources will be released almost immediately after posting bail, the Sheriff’s Department will continue to detain a person who cannot afford to pay the pre-set secured bail amount.
28. Defendant Gentry maintains this policy and practice even though he receives no notice that there has been an inquiry into a person’s ability to pay the amount set, findings that the person can afford to meet the financial conditions of release, and consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release.
4 W.C. Mann, Bail Bonds, Part 2: The Law Enforcement Perspective, The Cullman Tribune (Feb., 2017), https://goo.gl/okgWP8.
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29. Defendant Gentry’s policy and practice of detaining people who cannot meet their financial conditions of release results in systematic wealth-based detention in Cullman County.
30. Indeed, Defendant Gentry sees his role as using the money bail system “to keep criminals off the street”5 and has promised to do “everything within that bond schedule to keep [people] in jail.”6
iii. Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner Do Not Review the Predetermined Financial Conditions of Release for Weeks or Months.
31. Defendants Chaney and Turner are responsible for setting policies governing release conditions, see Ala. Code § 15-13-103.
32. Magistrates Black and White enforce these policies and conduct an initial appearance for any person who cannot afford the monetary amount required by the bail schedule. The arrestee remains in jail for the initial appearance and is not brought to the courthouse. Instead, the first appearance is conducted electronically via FaceTime on an iPad from the Cullman County District Court.
33. Under Alabama law, a judge or magistrate is required to conduct the initial appearance within 48-hours following a warrantless arrest or 72-hours following a warrant arrest. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(1)(iii), (b)(2)(i). The purposes
5 Benjamin Bullard, Sheriff explains bond system as lawsuit looms, The Cullman Times (July 16, 2017), https://goo.gl/F3ZxSd.
6 W.C. Mann, Drug Trafficking Defendants Sue County Officials: Sheriff Responds, The Cullman Tribune (July, 2017), https://goo.gl/gQXYPx.
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of the initial appearance under state law are to (1) ascertain the defendant’s true name and address, (2) inform the defendant of the charges against him, and (3) notify the defendant of the right to counsel. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4. A judicial officer is also required to determine a defendant’s conditions of release. Id.; Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4 (“If a defendant has not been released from custody and is brought before a court for initial appearance, a determination of the conditions of release shall be made.”).
34. However, it is Defendants Black’s, White’s, Chaney’s, and Turner’s general practice to not allow arrestees to make arguments about their ability to pay or their suitability for release at the initial appearance. Pursuant to Defendants Black’s and White’s policy and practice, arrestees are not permitted to challenge their financial conditions of release or to request non-monetary conditions of release. Indeed, in her ten years as a magistrate, Defendant Black cannot recall a time when she reviewed the bail amount at the initial appearance.7
35. Defendants are unrepresented by counsel at the initial appearance. 36. At the initial appearance, Defendants Black and White do not make any findings that a person can afford the pre-set amount required or that secured money bail is the least restrictive condition of release available.
7 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20:10-15, Lee v. Gentry, No. CV-2017-900027 (Feb. 1, 2017). Doc. 31-2.
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37. At the initial appearance, Defendants Black and White also do not consider whether an arrestee may be safely released on affordable financial or nonfinancial release conditions, nor do they make any affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning arrestees’ ability to pay the amount of secured money bail required.
38. Because of these practices, the initial court appearance provides no opportunity for a person to raise ability to pay, to be heard on alternative conditions of release, or to raise any constitutional issues with ongoing post-arrest detention.
39. An arrestee’s financial conditions of release are not reviewed at all if the person cannot afford money bail. Indeed, an arrestee’s financial conditions of release are only reviewed if a person files a motion for a bond reduction, which is generally scheduled for a hearing no earlier than two weeks after a person’s arrest and as long as two months later.
40. Thus, an individual who cannot afford the predetermined secured money bail amount usually will be detained for weeks or months without any opportunity for an individualized release hearing or to otherwise raise any issues concerning her ability to pay or her suitability for release under alternative conditions.
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41. By contrast, an arrestee who can pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule is released immediately from jail.
42. Defendants’ reliance on predetermined secured money bail has resulted in unnecessary wealth-based detention that is devastating for the poorest people in Cullman County. Many people in the Cullman County jail have not been convicted of a crime and are only in jail because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail. B. Plaintiff Hester Could Not Afford the Monetary Amount Required by the
Bail Schedule. 43. At the time of filing his original intervenor Complaint, Mr. Hester was
a 35-year-old Man who lives in Cullman, Alabama. He is now 36 years old. 44. On August 27, 2017, Mr. Hester was arrested for possession of drug
paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. 45. Mr. Hester was taken to the Cullman County Jail and told that he
would be released from jail only if he paid a $1,000 bond. 46. A day or two after his arrest, Mr. Hester had his initial appearance via
video link between the jail and the courtroom. He was unrepresented by counsel at this hearing, which lasted for one to two minutes in total. The magistrate informed Mr. Hester of the charge against him and his bond amount. At no point during this brief hearing did the magistrate inquire into Mr. Hester’s ability to pay the secured financial condition of release that she had imposed or give him the opportunity to
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say he could not pay it. The magistrate did not ask him any questions at all or tell him when his next court appearance would be. Although the magistrate told him that he could apply for an attorney, a correctional officer told him that he did not need an attorney because he was only charged with a misdemeanor.
47. Mr. Hester is indigent and could not afford to buy his release from jail. He has no assets, no real property, and no stable income. For the last two years, he has supported himself by working odd jobs.
48. Mr. Hester sustained an open wound from a spider bite on his hand while detained in the Cullman County jail. The wound was very painful and dripping blood. Mr. Hester could not obtain medical care for his wound because he could not afford it.
49. While detained in the Cullman County Jail, Mr. Hester slept on the floor of his jail cell because there were three people in the cell but only two beds.
50. Defendants released Mr. Hester from the Cullman County Jail on his own recognizance two days after his Motion to Intervene in this case was filed. C. Non-Financial Conditions of Release Alone or in Combination with
Unsecured Money Bail Are As Effective As or More Effective than Secured Money Bail.
51. Detention on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. Controlling for other factors, a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely
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to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not
detained.8
52. Studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial
and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same
offense.9 Controlling for other factors, those detained pretrial will be given longer
jail sentences.10 Detained defendants are more likely to plead guilty just to shorten
their jail time, even if they are innocent.11 They have a harder time preparing a
defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and meeting with their lawyers. A
person’s ability to pay money bail thus has an irreparable impact on the outcome of
a criminal case.
8 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (May 2, 2016) (finding that a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained), available at https://goo.gl/riaoKD; see also Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 15, 19 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (finding a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data).
9 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, Laura and John Arnold Foundation 4 (November 2013), available at https://goo.gl/FLjVZP (those detained for the entire pretrial period are more likely to be sentenced to jail and prison—and receive longer sentences—than those who are released at some point before trial or case disposition).
10 Id. 11 Stevenson, supra note 1 at 18 (“Pretrial detention leads to an expected increase of 124 days in the maximum days of the incarceration sentence, a 42% increase over the mean.”); see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 1, at 18–19 (“Criminal defendants assessed bail amounts appear frequently unable to produce the required bail amounts, and receive guilty outcomes as a result. Entered guilty pleas by defendants unwilling to wait months prior to trial and unable to finance bail likely contribute to this result.”).
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53. Wealth-based pretrial detention also makes the community less safe.
First, wealth-based detention unnecessarily jails those who could be released safely
into the community. Several studies have shown that just two or three days in
pretrial detention increases the likelihood of future crimes, as well as the future risk level of even low-risk defendants.12 In other words, detention based on
poverty for just a few days increases recidivism. Second, wealth-based pretrial
systems release individuals based only on their ability to pay and without any
assessment of their risk of flight or dangerousness. Consequently, individuals who
need monitoring or supervision to mitigate their risk of flight or dangerousness
receive neither.
54. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care
for children and other dependent relatives. It hurts families, leads to
unemployment, and can make people homeless. Even a couple of days in pretrial
12 See Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail, 1516 (2014), available at https://goo.gl/jr7sMg (“[D]efendants rated low risk and detained pretrial for longer than one day before their pretrial release are more likely to commit a new crime once they are released, demonstrating that length of time until pretrial release has a direct impact on public safety.”); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 3 (November 2013), available at https://goo.gl/GQGNiY (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2–3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 768 (2017), available at https://goo.gl/Waj3ty (“While pretrial detention clearly exerts a protective effect in the short run, for misdemeanor defendants it may ultimately service to compromise public safety,” and finding that in a representative group of 10,000 misdemeanor offenders, pretrial detention would cause an additional 600 misdemeanors and 400 felonies compared to if the same group had been released pretrial).
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detention can cause a person to lose housing, be removed from a shelter list, be terminated from a job, be exposed to unsafe and unsanitary conditions at the jail, and may result in serious trauma to dependent children.
55. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no significant relationship between posting money bail as a condition of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.13
56. Other jurisdictions throughout the country do not keep people in jail based on their wealth. Instead of relying on money, these jurisdictions release arrestees with unsecured financial conditions, non-financial conditions, and pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
57. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive, non-monetary conditions of release to maximize public safety and court appearances. Such nonmonetary conditions of release include, but are not limited to: unsecured bond, reporting obligations, phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation or a stable address, substance abuse
13 See, e.g., Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 21 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (“Our results suggest that money bail has a negligible effect or, if anything, increases failures to appear.”); Michael R. Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 11 (October 2013) available at https://goo.gl/UENBKJ (“Whether released defendants are higher or lower risk or in-between, unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as do secured bonds”).
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treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, alcohol monitoring devices, or, in
extreme cases of particular risk, electronic monitoring and home confinement.
58. Jurisdictions that rely on pretrial services and non-monetary
conditions of release do not sacrifice public safety or court attendance. For
example, Washington, D.C. releases more than 94% of all defendants without
financial conditions of release and no one is detained on secured money bail that they cannot afford.14 Empirical evidence shows that nearly 90% of released
defendants in Washington, D.C. make all court appearances, nearly 90% complete
the pretrial release period without any new arrests, and 98-99% consistently avoid re-arrest for violent crime.15
59. The federal judiciary also eschews wealth-based detention, requiring
any detention order to be based on a finding of dangerousness or flight risk, and the practice has not harmed court appearance rates or public safety.16
14 See D.C. Code § 23-1321; see also Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Release Rates for Pretrial Defendants within Washington, DC available at https://goo.gl/VSDeDk (“In Washington, DC, we consistently find over 90% of defendants are released pretrial without using a financial bond”).
15 See Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Outcomes for Last Four Years, available at https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/558; Pretrial Just. Inst., The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth 2 (2009), available at https://goo.gl/6wgPM8 (“The high non-financial release rate has been accomplished without sacrificing the safety of the public or the appearance of defendants in court. Agency data shows that 88% of released defendants make all court appearances, and 88% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests.”).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”); see also Thomas H, Cohen, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
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60. Pretrial detention based solely on wealth is consistently more expensive than effective pretrial supervision programs.17 Without relying on a person’s ability to afford cash bail, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer expense while maintaining high public safety and court appearance rates.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 61. Mr. Hester proposes one class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). This Class is defined as: All arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Cullman County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release. 62. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Mr. Hester and unknown Class members can challenge Defendants’ unlawful use of wealth-based detention. 63. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted, or failed and/or refused to act, on grounds that apply generally to the proposed Class,
Report 13 (Nov. 2012), available at https://goo.gl/hN99E7 (finding from 2008 to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make court appearances and 4% were arrested for new offenses).
17 See, e.g., Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost? (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/0lLtLM (“It has been estimated that implementing validated, evidence-based risk assessment to guide pretrial release decisions could yield $78 billion in savings and benefits, nationally.”); United States Court, Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (July 18, 2013), available at https://goo.gl/dJpDrn (In 2012, “[p]retrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal system”).
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such that final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to each Class member as a whole.
64. As set forth more fully below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the class counsel requirements of Rule 23(g). A. Numerosity
65. The precise size of the Class is unknown by Plaintiff because it is forward-looking, but it is substantial, given that hundreds of felony and misdemeanor cases are adjudicated each year in the Cullman County District Court. Joinder of these unknown future members is impracticable.
66. Many of the class members are low-income individuals who will likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the class would be impracticable. B. Commonality
67. The relief sought is common to all members of Mr. Hester seeks relief from Defendants’ money bail policies, practices, and procedures, which violate the rights of the Class members. Mr. Hester also seeks relief mandating Defendants to change their policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
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68. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
a. Whether the Cullman County District Court and Defendant Gentry uses a predetermined secured money bail schedule;
b. Whether Defendant Gentry releases arrestees from jail who pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule and detains those who cannot;
c. Whether Defendant Gentry detains all individuals who are unable to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule regardless of whether inquiry into their ability to pay has been made;
d. Whether and when Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner conduct individualized release hearings and what procedural protections, if any, Defendants Black, White, Chaney and Turner provide to arrestees at those hearings; and
e. What standard post-arrest procedures Defendants perform on misdemeanor and felony arrestees; for example, whether Defendants use any alternate procedures for promptly releasing people determined otherwise eligible for release but who are unable to afford a monetary payment.
69. Among the most important common question of law are:
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a. Whether requiring a financial condition of pretrial release without inquiry into and findings concerning a person’s ability to pay and without consideration of alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;
b. Whether Defendants’ actions in detaining arrestees solely based on their inability to pay a predetermined amount of money violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;
c. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees using predetermined amounts of money without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment;
d. Whether Defendants’ failure to provide arrestees with assistance of counsel at the initial appearance hearing violates the Sixth Amendment; and
e. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Typicality 70. Mr. Hester’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of
the Class, and he has the same interests in this case as all other Class members that he represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of Defendants to
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comply with the Constitution: they are each confined in jail because they could not afford to pay their secured monetary bond amount. The answer to whether Defendants’ money bail practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of Mr. Hester and every other Class member.
71. If Mr. Hester succeeds in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices concerning wealth-based detention violate his constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class. D. Adequacy
72. Mr. Hester will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class he seeks to represent.
73. Mr. Hester has no interests separate from or in conflict with those of the proposed Class he seeks to represent as a whole and seeks no relief other than the declaratory and injunctive relief, which is sought on behalf of the entire proposed Class he seeks to represent. E. Class Counsel
74. Mr. Hester is represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Alabama, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Civil Rights Corps, who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the
21

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 22 of 31
details of Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. F. Rule 23(b)(2)
75. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members: Defendants require all arrestees to pay for their release in a range pre-determined by a bail schedule. Those who can pay are released and those who cannot pay are detained.
76. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that Defendants violate the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without a prompt and individualized release hearing with adequate procedural protections, including assistance of counsel, an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful considerations of alternative conditions of release. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants’ money bail practices as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
22

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 23 of 31
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, McSwain,
Chaney, Turner, and Gentry 77. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 78. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits jailing a person solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment. 79. Mr. Hester and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty under state and federal law. 80. Requiring a person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a monetary bail amount pre-determined by a bail schedule is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interests in securing a defendant’s appearance in court or public safety. 81. There are less restrictive means to reasonably assure the government’s interests. 82. Defendants violate Plaintiff’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing against them a post-arrest system of wealth-based detention in which they are kept in jail because they cannot afford a monetary amount of bail pre-determined by a bail schedule without
23

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 24 of 31
inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative non-monetary conditions of release.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Substantive and Procedural Due Process – Individualized Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, Chaney,
Turner, and Gentry 83. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 85. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty. 86. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that pretrial arrestees receive an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards to determine the least restrictive conditions on their pretrial liberty. 87. Defendants do not provide counsel; give arrestees an opportunity to testify or present evidence; restrict detention to extremely serious offenses; or require a finding that no affordable financial or non-financial condition of release will ensure appearance or public safety before jailing pretrial arrestees on monetary
24

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 25 of 31
bail amounts that they cannot afford. Because Defendants create de facto detention orders by using predetermined monetary amounts, they also fail to apply any legal or evidentiary standards to determine whether a person should be detained prior to trial based on some immitigable risk.
88. Defendants violate Mr. Hester’s and the Proposed Class’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing them without providing an individualized release hearing with the procedural protections described above.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
(Due Process – Prompt Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, Chaney,
Turner, and Gentry 89. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 91. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty, which outweighs any governmental interest in pretrial detention. 92. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a prompt release hearing following detention.
25

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 26 of 31
93. Defendants violate Mr. Hester’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights to pretrial liberty and due process by jailing them without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
(Right to Counsel) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Black, White, Chaney,
Turner, and Gentry 94. Mr. Hester incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the assistance of counsel at each critical stage of a criminal prosecution. 96. An indigent defendant has an absolute right to court-appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 97. A critical stage is a proceeding between an individual and agents of the State, whether formal or informal, in which the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. 98. The initial appearance hearings in Cullman County are a critical stage of the pretrial criminal prosecution at which defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel. The deprivation of the arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty has consequences that can prejudice the outcome of the defendant’s criminal case. Defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to be
26

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 27 of 31
convicted and more likely to plead guilty, receive longer prison sentences, and are less prepared at trial because of their inability to gather evidence, find witnesses, and meet with their lawyers.
99. Counsel is therefore necessary to make the opportunity for pretrial release meaningful. The initial appearance hearing is the first opportunity at which a defendant who cannot afford to post her secured bail bond may argue for her pretrial release, which is her fundamental right. Without the assistance of counsel to help the defendant navigate the legal standards applicable to the pretrial detention decision, the opportunity to obtain pretrial release is not meaningful. Furthermore, counsel guards against other procedural inadequacies, such as failure of the court to provide the defendant with notice of the factors relevant to pretrial release.
100. Defendants violate Mr. Hester’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to provide assistance of counsel at the initial appearance hearing, at which a criminal defendant may be jailed based on an inability to meet a financial condition of release.
VII. Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: a. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action;
27

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 28 of 31
b. Certification of a class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, represented by Mr. Hester;
c. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, McSwain, Chaney, and Turner violate the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release;
d. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner violate Mr. Hester’s and Class members’ due process and Sixth Amendment rights by jailing them without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards;
e. A declaration that Defendants Black, White, Chaney, and Turner violate Mr. Hester’s and Class members’ due process rights by jailing them without conducting a sufficiently prompt release hearing;
f. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant Gentry from prospectively detaining arrestees for failing to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule without a prompt individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes counsel, an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to
28

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 29 of 31

pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance; g. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and h. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: September 14, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
s/Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiff
Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) Micah West (ASB-1842-J82F) Alexandra Jordan (ASB-4624-X00X) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 P: (334) 956-8200 F: (334) 956-8481 E: samuel.brooke@splcenter.org E: micah.west@splcenter.org E: alexandra.jordan@splcenter.org
Alec Karakatsanis (DC Bar No. 999294)* Katherine Hubbard (Cal. Bar No. 302729)* CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 P: (202) 930-3835 E: alec@civilrightscorps.org E: katherine@civilrightscorps.org

29

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 30 of 31
Randall C. Marshall (ASB-3023-A56M) Brock Boone (ASB-2864-L11E) ACLU FOUNDATION OF ALABAMA, INC. P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 P: (334) 420-1741 E: rmarshall@aclualabama.org E: bboone@aclualabama.org Brandon Buskey (ASB-2753-A50B)* Andrea Woods (Wash. Bar No. 48265)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: (212) 549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org E: awoods@aclu.org * admitted pro hac vice Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 173 Filed 09/14/18 Page 31 of 31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date the foregoing was filed through the Court’s

CM/ECF filing system, and by virtue of this filing notice will be sent electronically

to all counsel of record, including:

Steven Troy Marshall James W. Davis Laura E. Howell Brad A. Chynoweth OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue, Montgomery, AL 36130 smarshall@ago.state.al.us; jimdavis@ago.state.al.us; lhowell@ago.state.al.us; bchynoweth@ago.state.al.us Counsel for Defs. Judge Turner, Magistrate White, Magistrate Black, Circuit Clerk McSwain

J. Dorman Walker John W. Naramore BALCH & BINGHAM LLP P.O. Box 78, Montgomery, AL 36101 dwalker@balch.com; jnaramore@balch.com Counsel for Defs. Judge Chaney, Judge Turner, Magistrate White, Magistrate Black, Circuit Clerk McSwain

J. Randall McNeill Jamie Helen Kidd Kendrick E. Webb WEBB & ELEY PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive, Montgomery, AL 36124 rmcneill@webbeley.com; jkidd@webbeley.com; kwebb@webbeley.com Counsel for Def. Gentry

on this 14th day of September, 2018.

s/Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke

31

 
 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 197 Filed 11/01/18 Page 1 of 6

FILED
2018 Nov-01 PM 05:21 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.
RANDALL PARRIS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

Case No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH

v.

MARTHA WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

BRADLEY HESTER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
MATT GENTRY, et al., Defendants.

ORDER CLARIFYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 197 Filed 11/01/18 Page 2 of 6
On September 13, 2018, the Court issued an order preliminarily enjoining certain conduct by the Cullman County Sheriff. The order, among other things, requires the Sheriff to detain for up to 48 hours an arrestee for whom a law enforcement officer has submitted a bail request form. (Doc. 164, p. 3, ¶ 3). Paragraph 3 of the order states:
3. If an arresting officer submits a bail request form for a defendant, then the Sheriff must detain the defendant for up to 48 hours until the defendant receives an initial appearance before a district judge or a circuit judge. The Sheriff must release on an unsecured appearance bond any such defendant who does not receive an initial appearance within 48 hours of arrest. (Doc. 164, p. 3, ¶ 3). The judicial defendants have argued that the preliminary injunction compels the Cullman County Sheriff “to disregard, override, or modify” the Circuit Court’s March 2018 Standing Order regarding pretrial detention and bail. (Doc. 175, p. 3). By way of example, Presiding Judge Nicholas indicated in his recent declaration that paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction causes the Cullman County Sheriff to detain arrestees for whom a magistrate has “found that no probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the charged offense.” (Doc. 175-1, pp. 5-6, ¶12).1 The Court issues this order to clarify paragraph 3 of the preliminary
1 By separate order, for the reasons stated in that order, the Court struck Judge Nicholas’s declaration from the record. (Doc. 191). Because the information in Judge Nicholas’s declaration concerning paragraph 3 of the injunction raises due process concerns, the Court clarifies paragraph 3.
2

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 197 Filed 11/01/18 Page 3 of 6
injunction.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
In Cullman County, a law enforcement officer may arrest an individual
pursuant to an arrest warrant, or an officer may conduct a warrantless arrest. Most
arrests in Cullman County are warrantless arrests. (Doc. 136, pp. 235-36; Doc.
143, p. 194). Following a warrantless arrest, a magistrate holds a probable cause
proceeding with the arresting officer to determine whether probable cause supports
the arrest. (Doc. 136, pp. 269-71).
Using the Cullman County bail schedule, a magistrate sets the initial bail
amount in an arrest warrant after finding probable cause for an arrest, and the
Cullman County Sheriff, using Cullman County’s bail schedule, determines the
initial bail amount for a warrantless arrest. A bail request form is a tool that a law
enforcement officer in Cullman County may use to ask a judge to set bail in an amount higher than the bail amount provided in the county’s bail schedule.2
2 As discussed in the order striking the judicial defendants’ declarations in support of those defendants’ motion to stay, the judicial defendants argue that under the terms of the March 2018 Standing Order, a magistrate may rule on a bail request form, but the evidence in the preliminary injunction record demonstrates that Cullman County district judges and circuit judges, not magistrates, rule on bail request forms. (Doc. 191, p. 2). The Court has not considered the constitutionality of allowing magistrates (who, in Cullman County, are employees of the Clerk’s Office who do not hold law degrees, are not members of the bar, and are not state judicial officers (Doc. 136, p. 270)), based solely on an officer’s request, to increase bail to an amount that will serve as a de facto detention order. Under Cullman County’s current practice, when a judge considers a bail request form and decides to increase a defendant’s bail, he or she does so at an initial hearing at which the judge has not only the bail request form but other forms that provide information that may inform bail decisions.
3

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 197 Filed 11/01/18 Page 4 of 6
When the Court issued the preliminary injunction in this case, the evidence in the record established that law enforcement officers in Cullman County use bail request forms infrequently and only in conjunction with warrant arrests. Judge Turner testified that before Cullman County adopted its March 2018 Standing Order, law enforcement officers could request a change in the bond amount for an individual, a “practice” that “is very similar to what” Cullman County “do[es] now as far as a bail request. And that’s typically going to be on a warrant type of arrest, not a probable cause warrantless arrest. I can’t recall an instance, and I can’t speak for other judges in our circuit, where we changed the bond on a probable cause warrantless arrest.” (Doc. 143, p. 72; see also Doc. 132, Stipulations of Fact, p. 2, ¶ 2 (stating that prior to the filing of this lawsuit. “[i]n a minority of cases, the bail amount would deviate from the schedule based on a request from the arresting agency to change the bail amount.”)). Judge Turner testified that he has never received a bail request form in conjunction with a warrantless arrest. (Doc. 136, p. 275). II. DISCUSSION
When the Court issued its order that requires the Cullman County Sheriff to hold for up to 48 hours an arrestee for whom a law enforcement officer has submitted a bail request form, the evidence in the record established that a probable cause finding for that arrestee was made prior to arrest. This is so
4

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 197 Filed 11/01/18 Page 5 of 6
because the record established that Cullman County law enforcement officers used bail request forms only in conjunction with warrant arrests, and for all warrant arrests, a magistrate makes a finding of probable cause before approving a warrant.
If, as Judge Nicholas indicated in his declaration, the Cullman County Sheriff, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction, is detaining for up to 48 hours individuals arrested pursuant to a warrantless arrest which a magistrate has found lacking in probable cause, then one of two things seems to have happened. Either law enforcement officers in Cullman County have changed their practices since the Court issued the preliminary injunction last month, and law enforcement officers now submit bail request forms in conjunction with both warrantless arrests and warrant requests, or Cullman County law enforcement officers always have used bail request forms in conjunction with warrantless arrests, and the evidence that the defendants presented at the preliminary injunction hearing was either wrong or incomplete, a matter that the defendants may address at a hearing concerning Mr. Hester’s request for declaratory relief concerning the judicial defendants or his request for a permanent injunction against Sheriff Gentry (see Doc. 95, pp. 20-21).
No matter the reason for the inconsistency between the preliminary injunction evidence and the current practices in Cullman County, the Court clarifies that paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction does not apply to an
5

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individual detained pursuant to a warrantless arrest when a magistrate, in a postarrest probable cause proceeding, determines that the arresting officer lacked probable cause for the arrest. If a magistrate determines that there is no probable cause for a warrantless arrest, then the sheriff must release the arrestee. (Doc. 136, p. 271). Paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction order directs the Sheriff’s conduct with respect to individuals arrested pursuant to a warrant and individuals subject to a warrantless arrest where the arrest is supported by a magistrate’s finding of probable cause.3
DONE and ORDERED this November 1, 2018.
_________________________________ MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 “As a general rule, ‘[t]he filing of a notice of appeal … divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’” Pacific Insurance Co. v. General Development Corp., 28 F.3d 1093, 1097 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates an exception to this general rule, permitting a district court “to suspend, modify, restore or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). The Court exercises that power to clarify paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction.
6

 
 Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 1 of 14

FILED
2017 Jun-15 PM 04:16 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

RANDALL PARRIS, ON BEHALF

)

OF HIMSELF AND A CLASS OF

SIMILARLY SITUATED

)

INDIVIDUALS,

)

PLAINTIFFS,

)

VS.

)

JUDGE MARTHA WILLIAMS, IN

HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

)

A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

FOR THE 32ND JUDICIAL

)

CIRCUIT STATE OF ALABAMA;

(NON-MONETORY; DECLARATORY )

JUDGMENT ONLY),

JOAN WHITE, IN HER OFFICIAL

)

CAPACITY AS A MAGISTRATE;

AMY BLACK, IN HER OFFICIAL

)

CAPACITY AS A MAGISTRATE;

AND LISA MCSWAIN, IN HER

)

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

CIRCUIT CLERK OF CULLMAN

)

COUNTY, CULLMAN COUNTY

COMMISSION, KENNETH WALKER, )

KERRY WATSON, AND GARRY

MARCHMAN; CULLMAN COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHERIFF MATT

GENTRY, ALABAMA

)

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

COURT (A.O.C.), RANDY HELMS, IN )

HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

DIRECTOR OF THE ALABAMA

)

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

COURT,

)

CASE NO.: 5:17-CV-000270-MHH

DEFENDANTS.

)

AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, RANDALL LEE PARRIS, by and through his attorney of service, Thomas E. Drake, II; and, pursuant to Rule 15, F.R.C.P., amended his Complaint heretofore filed as follows:
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 2 of 14
A. By adding the names of other Plaintiffs; viz: Shawn Smelser, Gorman Max Cullwell, Jr., Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, Misti Anderson,
B. By adding other averments and allegations which follow:
5. Plaintiff’s Shawn Smelser, Gorman Max Culwell, Jr, Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, and Misti Anderson are resident citizens of Alabama who reside in the Northern District of Alabama.
33. Plaintiff’s Shawn Smelser, Gorman Max Culwell, Jr, Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, and Misti Anderson had bail initially set at $1,000,000.00 (one million dollars).
34. Plaintiffs bail was set without any regard, whatsoever, to constitutional law nor the prior precedent of the United States Supreme Court.
35. The Defendant Magistrates, Joan White and Amy Black, set bail at one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in all drug trafficking and manufacturing first degree cases without any regard to the financial ability of the accused.
36. That the Defendant Magistrates set maximum bail in order to assure that the accused remain in jail.
37. That the Defendant Magistrates set bail in direct violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (U.S.C.A.) and the presumption of Innocence.
38. That the Defendant, Alabama Administrative Offices of the Court (A.O.C.) has directed all state magistrates to set bail within the “Bail Schedule” without any regard to the accused financial status/ability.
39. That the A.O.C. and it’s director, Randy Helms, have implemented policies and procedures which violate the mandates of the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Presumption of Innocence.
40. That the Defendants, within the judicial branch of Cullman County set bails without regard to whether the bail, as set, insures the appearance of the accused for hearing or trial.
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 3 of 14

41. That the violations of prior court precedent; the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, the Presumption of Innocence are systematic and embedded in the Cullman judicial apparatus.
42. That the violations, herein alleged, are of a continuing nature.
43. That the judicial officers named herein, set CASH ONLY bail in cases knowing that this type of bail is a sham and illusory.
44. That the judicial officials and officers, herein named, set CASH ONLY bail to imprison citizens prior to trial in violation of prior precedent and constitutional protections.
45. That the aforementioned judicial officers/officials regularly set CASH ONLY bail to insure the continued imprisonment of alleged offenders in violations of the Presumption of Innocence, Due Process of Law, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and prior precedent as enunciated by the federal courts.
46. That the Plaintiffs are/were denied DUE PROCESS OF LAW; unable to self-investigate their cases and assist in their defense due to the unlawful and unconstitutional machinations and excessive bail set by the aforementioned.
47. That the A.O.C. has wholely failed to properly train, oversee and supervise the Courts and it’s Court officials resulting in the deprivations referred to herein.
48. That the Defendant Sheriff, Clerk, Magistrates and Judge have conspired, combined and confederated to establish a system without regard to rights of the Plaintiffs; and, one which is politically expedient.
49. That the system of bail in Cullman County is the result of unconstitutional and reprehensible POLICIES to advance political interests and detain citizens prior to trial contrary to those constitutional rights enumerated above and herein.
C. Now that the Plaintiff’s and these additional allegations have been amended; the Plaintiffs Complaint will henceforth be read as follows:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the
Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 4 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

RANDALL PARRIS, GORMAN MAX )

CULWELL, JR., ROSE MEEKS,

COLIN SCOTT, NICHOLAS MOODY, )

CHRISTY BURKS AND MISTI

ANDERSON, ON BEHALF OF

)

THEMSELVES AND A CLASS OF

SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS, )

PLAINTIFFS,

)

VS.

)

CASE NO.: 5:15-CV-00270-MHH

JUDGE MARTHA WILLIAMS, IN

)

HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

)

FOR THE 32ND JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT STATE OF ALABAMA;

)

(NON-MONETORY; DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT ONLY),

)

JOAN WHITE, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS A MAGISTRATE;

)

AMY BLACK, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS A MAGISTRATE;

)

AND LISA MCSWAIN, IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

)

CIRCUIT CLERK OF CULLMAN

COUNTY, CULLMAN COUNTY

)

COMMISSION, KENNETH WALKER,

KERRY WATSON, AND GARRY

)

MARCHMAN; CULLMAN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHERIFF MATT )

GENTRY, ALABAMA

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE )

COURT (A.O.C.), RANDY HELMS, IN

HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE )

DIRECTOR OF THE ALABAMA

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE )

COURT,

)

DEFENDANTS.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the
Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 5 of 14
INTRODUCTION
This case is about the 32nd Judicial Systems post-arrest detention scheme to imprison some of Cullman Counties poorest residents without the benefit of reasonable bail. The Plaintiff, through undersigned counsel, and a class of all persons who are or will be incarcerated in the Cullman County Detention facility and who have been determined to be eligible for release, pursuant to Alabama law, are detained solely because they cannot afford to post the required amount of bail.
In Cullman County, arrestees face two possible outcomes depending on their wealth status. Wealthy arrestees purchase their freedom by paying an arbitrary amount set by a magistrate relying upon a bail schedule and a policy adopted by the office of the Clerk. Poor arrestees simply remain stuck behind bars because they cannot afford to pay the Clerk/Magistrates pre-determined sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00), set in every drug trafficking case. If a person is charged with more than one offense, the fixed amount for each offense is added together to determine the total amount of bail required for release. Those arrestees who are too poor to afford to pay excessive bail remain in jail because of their poverty. In Defendant’s wealth based detention scheme, the sole criteria determining whether a pretrial arrestee walks free or sits in jail is the amount of money he or she has.
On behalf of the many other arrestees subject to the Counties unlawful and ongoing wealth-based detention scheme, the Plaintiff in this cause challenges the use of an unlawful generic “bail schedule” (one size fits all) that operates to detain poor arrestees while letting rich arrestees free. In addition, Plaintiff and those similarly affected complain that the Defendants policy to set (or uphold) bail at one million dollars in every drug trafficking case has no place in a system that promises equal justice under the law, and violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.
By and through his attorney and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the named Plaintiff seeks in this civil action the vindication of his fundamental rights, injunctive relief assuring that his rights and the rights of other class members will not continue to be violated, compensatory damages for the injuries suffered, attorney fees, and a declaration that the Counties wealth-based detention practices are unlawful.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. It is the standard policy and practice of the Cullman County judicial system to refuse to release arrestees from jail unless they pay a generic and arbitrary “bond” amount. In all drug trafficking cases, bail is set at one million dollars ($1,000,000.00). Since this sum is set generically by reference to the alleged offense of arrest, no individualized factors are considered, and anyone who cannot afford to pay is held in jail. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 6 of 14
2. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. section 2201, et. seq., and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution of America (U.S.C.A.). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and 1343.
3. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1391.
PARTIES
4. Named Plaintiff Randall Parris is a bona fide resident of Cullman County, Ala., and, over the age of 19 years. He represents himself as an individual and represents a Class of similarly situated people all subject to the Counties wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme.
5. Plaintiff’s Shawn Smelser, Gorman Max Culwell, Jr, Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, and Misti Anderson are resident citizens of Alabama who reside in the Northern District of Alabama. They represent themselves and represent a Class of all other similarly situated people subject to Cullman’s wealth-based system.
6. Defendant, Martha Williams is a circuit court judge charged with overseeing criminal cases in the (32nd Judicial) Circuit Court of Cullman County, AL.
7. Defendant, Lisa McSwain, is the duly elected Circuit Clerk of Cullman County who supervises and oversees the operation of Office of the Clerk.
8. Defendant, Alabama Administrative Office of the Court, (A.O.C.) oversees the administration of justice in Alabama; and, is responsible for the supervision and training of court personnel.
9. Randy Helms is the director of the A.O.C.
10. Joan White is a Magistrate in the Circuit Clerk’s Office who sets bail in both misdemeanor and felony cases.
11. Amy Black is a Magistrate in the Circuit Clerk’s Office who sets bail in both misdemeanor and felony cases.
12. Defendant, Cullman County, is a political subdivision of the State of Alabama which is governed by it’s Commissioners: Defendants Kenneth Walker, Kerry Watson, and Garry Marchman.
13. Defendant, Cullman County Sheriff’s Department, is an agency within
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 7 of 14
Cullman County which is supervised and directly by the Cullman County Commission and Sheriff, Defendant, Matt Gentry.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Named Plaintiff’s Arrest.
14. On January 18, 2017; Deputy/Investigator Terry Smith swore to and signed a Complaint against the Plaintiff, Randall Lee Parris, alleging the commission of three crimes; namely, Trafficking in Methamphetamine (a Class “A” felony), Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (a misdemeanor), and, Possession of Marijuana Second Degree (a misdemeanor).
15. Pursuant to Smith’s Complaint, Magistrate Joan White issued a Warrant of Arrest setting bail at one million dollars ($1,000,000.00).
16. On January 19, 2017; Mr. Parris was arrested and taken to the Cullman County Detention Center (jail).
17. The next day, Magistrate Amy Black engaged in a “facetime” hearing with the Plaintiff over a computer monitoring system. Black read an Advice of Rights On Initial Appearance form to Mr. Parris which stated that he could be released upon the execution of a $1,000,000.00 appearance bond.
18. Mr. Parris is indigent. At the time of his arrest he was unemployed, had no bank account, was living in his mother’s home, and had no assets (and no vehicle) exceeding the value of one hundred dollars ($100.00).
19. A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed and assigned to Judge Martha Williams. Even though no evidence was adduced by the State to rebut the Defendant’s indigency; the petition was DENIED and the Defendant’s bail remained at one million dollars.¹
20. None of Mr. Parris’s friends or family had the financial means to purchase his release. Mr. Parris remains in jail.
21. If Mr. Parris and/or his family and friends could have posted bail, he would have been immediately released.
22. The treatment of the named Plaintiff and other Class members is caused by and is representative of the Counties² wealth-based post-arrest detention policies and practiced.
23. As a matter of practice and policy, when a person is arrested for a trafficking charge, deputies inform the arrestee at booking that they are
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 8 of 14
entitled to immediate release upon the posting of bail. Those unable to make bail remain in jail indefinitely.
24. The Counties bail system is not meant nor designed to insure the arrestees appearance in court, but rather, to insure that the accused is not released.
25. Neither the Magistrate nor the jailers ever deviate from the “bail schedule” which generically sets bail without any individualized consideration of the arrestees ability to pay.
26. The Counties wealthier arrestees are released immediately upon the posting of bail, while the indigent remain.
27. That the aforementioned policy of setting one million dollars bail has been used in every drug trafficking case for upwards 20 years without any consideration, whatsoever, of the arrestees prior record, affiliations, or financial circumstances.
28. That neither Cullman County nor the A.O.C. have adequately supervised of trained court personnel to comply with the strictures of the law and protections enumerated under the Bill of Rights. (Specifically the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S.C.A.)
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
29. The named Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis.
30. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiff and unknown Class members can challenge the Counties unlawful wealth-based detention scheme.
31. This action is brought and may properly be maintained to Rule 23 (a)(1)(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
32. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions. (Magistrate Joan White testified in a state proceeding that she has been setting one million dollars bonds on every drug trafficking case for upwards 20 years.
33. The Plaintiff propose one Class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: all arrestees unable to pay for their releases pursuant to Cullman Counties one million dollar bail
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 9 of 14
policy in drug trafficking cases who are or will become in the custody of the County.
34. Plaintiff’s Shawn Smelser, Gorman Max Culwell, Jr, Rose Meeks, Colin Scott, Nicholas Moody, Christy Burks, and Misti Anderson had bail initially set at $1,000,000.00 (one million dollars).
35. Plaintiffs bail was set without any regard, whatsoever, to constitutional law nor the prior precedent of the United States Supreme Court.
36. The Defendant Magistrates, Joan White and Amy Black, set bail at one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in all drug trafficking and manufacturing first degree cases without any regard to the financial ability of the accused.
37. That the Defendant Magistrates set maximum bail in order to assure that the accused remain in jail.
38. That the Defendant Magistrates set bail in direct violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (U.S.C.A.); and, the presumption of Innocence.
39. That the Defendant, Alabama Administrative Offices of the Court (A.O.C.) has directed all state magistrates to set bail within the “Bail Schedule” without any regard to the accused financial status/ability.
40. That the A.O.C. and it’s director, Randy Helms, have implemented policies and procedures which violate the mandates of the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Presumption of Innocence.
41. That the Defendants, within the judicial branch of Cullman County set bails without regard to whether the bail set insures the appearance of the accused for hearing or trial.
42. That the violations of prior court precedent; the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, the Presumption of Innocence are systematic and embedded in the Cullman judicial apparatus.
43. That the violations, herein alleged, are of a continuing nature.
44. That the judicial officers named herein, set CASH ONLY bail in cases knowing that this type of bail is a sham and illusory.
45. That the judicial officials and officers, herein named, set CASH ONLY bail to imprison citizens prior to trial in violation of prior precedent and constitutional protections.
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 10 of 14
46. That the aforementioned judicial officers/officials regularly set CASH ONLY bail to insure the continued imprisonment of alleged offenders in violations of the Presumption of Innocence, Due Process of Law, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and prior precedent as enunciated by the federal courts.
47. That the Plaintiff are/were denied DUE PROCESS OF LAW unable to selfinvestigate their cases and assist in their defense due to the unlawful and unconstitutional machinations and excessive bail set by the aforementioned.
48. That the A.O.C. has wholely failed to properly train, oversee and supervise the Courts and it’s Court officials resulting in the deprivations referred to herein.
49. That the Defendant Sheriff, Clerk, Magistrates and Judge have conspired, combined and confederated to establish a system without regard to rights of the Plaintiffs; and, one which is politically expedient.
50. That the system of bail in Cullman County is the result of unconstitutional and reprehensible POLICIES to advance political interests and detain citizens prior to trial contrary to those constitutional rights enumerated above and herein.
A. NUMEROSITY- Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
51. The number of drug trafficking arrests is unknown; however, Magistrate Joan White testified in a state proceeding that all persons charged with trafficking cases have received a one million dollar bond for the last twenty years.
52. Rich arrestees pay money and walk free immediately, while poor arrestees remain in jail indefinitely.
53. The number of current and future arrestees subject to this policy, if it is not enjoined, is well into the hundreds.
B. COMMONALITY- Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)
54. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The named Plaintiff seeks relief concerning whether the Counties policies, practice and procedures violate the rights of the Class members and relief mandating that the County and the Defendants change their policies,
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 11 of 14
practices and procedures so that the constitutional rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
55. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices: the Counties wealth-based detention policy. The County operates this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day. The material components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
A. Whether the County has a policy and practice of using a fixed “bail schedule” to determine the amount of bail a person must pay to secure post-arrest release;
B. Whether the County has a policy and practice of setting a one million dollar bond in every drug trafficking case; and,
C. Whether the County inquires into the financial circumstance of arrestee when setting bail.
56. Among the most important common questions of law are:
A. Whether a fixed “bail schedule” setting standard amounts of bail violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
B. Whether the Counties action in detaining its poorest arrestees solely based on their inability to pay an arbitrary amount of money violates the Eighth Amendments admonition against excessive bail, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
C. TYPICALITY- Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)
57. The named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, and he has the same interests in this case as all other members of the Class that he represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of the County to comply with the basic constitutional provisions: they are confined in jail because they could not afford to pay the Counties fixed bail amount. The answer to whether the Counties scheme of policies and practices is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other Class member.
58. If the named Plaintiff succeeds in the claim that the Counties policies and practices concerning wealth-based detention violates his constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class.
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 12 of 14
D. ADEQUACY- Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)
59. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests in the vindication of the legal claims that he raises are entirely aligned with the interests of other Class members, who each have the same basic constitutional claims. He is a member of the Class, and his interests concide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other Class members.
60. There are no known conflicts of interests among members of the proposed Class, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of their unlawful treatment by their local government.
61. Plaintiff are represented by Thomas E. Drake, II who has extensive knowledge of both the details of the Counties scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel’s qualifications are more fully set forth in the accompanying Motion For Class Certification.
62. Plaintiff’s counsel has devoted enormous time and resources to become intimately familiar with the Counties scheme and with all the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorney.
E. RULE 23(b)(2)
63. Class action status is appropriate because the County, through the policy, practices and procedures that make up its wealth-based detention scheme has acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members. Cullman County has created and applied a simple scheme of wealth-based detention and release: by setting bail at one million dollars in every drug trafficking case allowing only for rich arrestees to obtain their release. The County releases those who can pay and detains those who cannot.
64. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain and enjoin the County from continuing in the future to detain impoverished arrestees who cannot afford excessive, one million dollar bonds. Because the putative Class challenges the Counties scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
65. Injunctive relief compelling the County to comply with these constitutional rights will similarly protect each member of the Class from being subjected to the Counties unlawful policies and practices. A declaration and
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 13 of 14
injunction stating that the County cannot use a fixed cash or property “bail schedule” and policy that jails indigents arrestees but free arrestees with financial means would provide relief to every member of the Class. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
66. Plaintiff seeks the following relief and hereby demands a jury in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 43.
68. The Fourteenth Amendments Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses have long prohibited imprisoning a person because of the person’s inability to make a monetary payment. Defendants violate Plaintiff’s right by placing and keeping him in jail solely because he cannot afford to pay the amount of bail as set by the generic fixed “bail schedule” and policy used by the County.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the other Class members request that this Court issue the following relief.
A. A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violate the named Plaintiff’s and Class member’s constitutional rights by jailing them and keeping them in jail solely because they cannot pay a set amount of money to secure relief release after arrest;
B. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoing the Defendants from enforcing unconstitutional wealth-based detention policies and practices against the named Plaintiff and the Class of similarly situated people he represents;
C. A judgment individually compensating the individually named Plaintiff for the damages that he has suffered as a result of Defendant’s unconstitutional and unlawful wealth-based detention scheme, including damages resulting from his confinement in jail; and,
D. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

Case 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Document 52 Filed 06/15/17 Page 14 of 14
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/Thomas E. Drake, II Thomas E. Drake II DRA 012 Attorney for Defendant 419 Second Avenue SW, Suite B Cullman, AL 35056-0457 (256) 739-9445
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the above and foregoing Complaint upon the Attorney General of Alabama, Steve Marshall, via certified mail, return receipt requested.
This the 12th day of June, 2017.
/s/Thomas E. Drake, II Thomas E. Drake, II
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/Thomas E. Drake, II Thomas E. Drake II DRA 012 Attorney for Defendant 419 Second Avenue SW, Suite B Cullman, AL 35056-0457 (256) 739-9445
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the above and foregoing Complaint upon all parties via CM/ECF electronic filing.
This the 15th day of June, 2017.
/s/Thomas E. Drake, II Thomas E. Drake, II
1. Violating the Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reasonable bail and equal protection. 2. County or Counties meaning the 32nd Judicial Circuit and/or the Cullman County Circuit Clerk and/or the Magistrate of the Circuit Court and/or any Judge named in this Complaint; individually or in combination.

 
 General Docket United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals Docket #: 18-13894 Nature of Suit: 3950 Constitutionality of State Statutes Bradley Hester v. Matthew Gentry Appeal From: Northern District of Alabama Fee Status: Fee Paid

Docketed: 09/13/2018

Case Type Information: 1) Private Civil 2) Federal Question 3) -

Originating Court Information: District: 1126-5 : 5:17-cv-00270-MHH Court Reporter: Julie A. Martin Civil Proceeding: Madeline H. Haikala, U.S. District Judge Date Filed: 02/21/2017 Date NOA Filed: 09/13/2018

Prior Cases: None

Current Cases: Lead
Multi-Appeal 18-13894

Member 18-13898

Start

End

09/13/2018

BRADLEY HESTER

Plaintiff - Appellee

Samuel Jacob Brooke [COR LD NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104

Brandon Jerel Buskey Direct: 212-284-7364 [COR NTC Retained] American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

Firm: 212-549-2633 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004
Katherine Claire Hubbard [NTC Retained] Civil Rights Corps Firm: 202-505-2058 910 17TH ST NW FL 2 WASHINGTON, DC 20002
Alexandra Marie Jordan Direct: 334-956-8257 [COR NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104
Alec George Karakatsanis Direct: 202-681-2409 [NTC Retained] Civil Rights Corps 1601 CONNECTICUT AVE NW STE 800 WASHINGTON, DC 20009
Randall C. Marshall Direct: 334-420-1741 [COR NTC Retained] American Civil Liberties Union Firm: 334-265-2754 PO BOX 6179

MONTGOMERY, AL 36106

Micah West Direct: 334-956-8205 [COR NTC Retained] Southern Poverty Law Center Firm: 334-956-8200 400 WASHINGTON AVE MONTGOMERY, AL 36104

versus

Andrea Rose Woods Direct: 212-549-2528 [COR NTC Retained] American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Firm: 212-549-2633 125 BROAD ST FL 18 NEW YORK, NY 10004

MATTHEW GENTRY, Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama, in

Jamie H. Kidd

official and individual capacity

Direct: 334-262-1850

Defendant - Appellant [COR LD NTC

Retained]

Webb & Eley, PC

Firm: 334-262-1850

7475 HALCYON

POINT DR

PO BOX 240909

MONTGOMERY,

AL 36117

James Randall McNeill [COR NTC Retained] Webb & Eley, PC Firm: 334-262-1850 7475 HALCYON

POINT DR PO BOX 240909 MONTGOMERY, AL 36117

Kendrick Emerson Webb Direct: 334-262-1850 [COR NTC Retained] Webb & Eley, PC Firm: 334-262-1850 7475 HALCYON POINT DR PO BOX 240909 MONTGOMERY, AL 36117

AMY BLACK, in her official capacity as a Magistrate

Brad A. Chynoweth

Defendant - Appellant Direct: 334-242-7997

[NTC Government]

Alabama Attorney

General's Office

Firm: 334-242-7300

501 WASHINGTON

AVE

PO BOX 300152

MONTGOMERY,

AL 36130

James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300 501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130

Steven Marshall [NTC Government] Alabama Attorney General's Office Firm: 334-242-7300

501 WASHINGTON AVE PO BOX 300152 MONTGOMERY, AL 36130

Jordan Dorman Walker Direct: 334-269-3138 [COR NTC Retained] Balch & Bingham, LLP Firm: 334-834-6500 105 TALLAPOOSA ST STE 200 PO BOX 78 MONTGOMERY, AL 36101

JOAN WHITE, in her official capacity as a Magistrate

Brad A. Chynoweth

Defendant - Appellant Direct: 334-242-7997

[COR LD NTC

Government]

(see above)

James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [COR NTC Government] (see above)

Steven Marshall [NTC Government] (see above)

Jordan Dorman Walker Direct: 334-269-3138 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

LISA MCSWAIN, in her official capacity as the Circuit Clerk of

Brad A. Chynoweth

Cullman County

Direct: 334-242-7997

Defendant - Appellant [NTC Government]

(see above)

James W. Davis

RUSTY TURNER
KIM CHANEY -----------------------------AMERICAN BAIL COALITION

Direct: 334-353-1356 [NTC Government] (see above)
Steven Marshall [NTC Government] (see above)
Jordan Dorman Walker Direct: 334-269-3138 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Brad A. Chynoweth Defendant - Appellant Direct: 334-242-7997
[NTC Government] (see above)
James W. Davis Direct: 334-353-1356 [NTC Government] (see above)
Steven Marshall [NTC Government] (see above)
Jordan Dorman Walker Direct: 334-269-3138 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Jordan Dorman Defendant - Appellant Walker
Direct: 334-269-3138 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)

Amicus Curiae

Paul D. Clement [COR LD NTC Retained] Kirkland & Ellis, LLP Firm: 202-879-5000

GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL BONDSMEN Amicus Curiae
ALABAMA MUNICIPAL INSURANCE CORPORATION Amicus Curiae

1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW WASHINGTON, DC 20004
Andrew C. Lawrence Direct: 202-389-5000 [COR NTC Retained] Kirkland & Ellis, LLP Firm: 202-879-5000 1301 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW WASHINGTON, DC 20004
Paul D. Clement [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Andrew C. Lawrence Direct: 202-389-5000 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Ed R. Haden Direct: 205-226-8795 [COR LD NTC Retained] Balch & Bingham, LLP Firm: 205-251-8100 1901 6TH AVE N STE 1500 BIRMINGHAM, AL 35201
Chase T. Espy Direct: 205-310-9014 [COR NTC Retained] Law Office of Chase T. Espy 2757 MILLBROOK RD

VESTAVIA HILLS, AL 35243

SOCIAL SCIENTIST

Amicus Curiae

George Brian Spears Direct: 404-872-7086 [COR NTC Retained] G. Brian Spears, PC Firm: 404-872-7086 1126 PONCE DE LEON AVE NE ATLANTA, GA 30306-4517

NATIONAL LAW PROFESSORS OF CRIMINAL, PROCEDURAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Amicus Curiae

Kellen R. Funk Direct: 505-609-3854 [COR LD NTC Retained] Columbia Law School Jerome Green Hall 515 Room 901 435 W 116TH ST NEW YORK, NY 10027

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE Amicus Curiae

James Bradley Robertson Direct: 205-521-8188 [COR LD NTC Retained] Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP Firm: 205-521-8000 1819 5TH AVE N BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203

Rachel Ann Conry Direct: 205-521-8892 [COR NTC Retained] Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP Firm: 205-521-8000 1819 5TH AVE N BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203

CURRENT AND FORMER PROSECUTORS Amicus Curiae
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL AGENCIES Amicus Curiae

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS

Amicus Curiae

Candice Leigh Rucker Direct: 601-359-3871 [COR NTC Retained] Attorney General's Office Firm: (601) 359-4250 550 HIGH ST FL 13 PO BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205
Mary B. McCord Direct: 202-661-6607 [COR LD NTC Retained] Georgetown Law Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic 314 Gewirz Firm: 202-662-9078 600 NEW JERSEY AVE NW STE 312 WASHINGTON, DC 20001
James Bradley Robertson Direct: 205-521-8188 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Rachel Ann Conry Direct: 205-521-8892 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Candice Leigh Rucker Direct: 601-359-3871 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary B. McCord Direct: 202-661-6607

PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS JUDGES PROFESSOR FRED O SMITH, JR.
RAY CHARLES SCHULTZ, et al., BRADLEY HESTER,

Amicus Curiae
Amicus Curiae Amicus Curiae Amicus Curiae
Plaintiffs,

[COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
James Bradley Robertson Direct: 205-521-8188 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Rachel Ann Conry Direct: 205-521-8892 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Candice Leigh Rucker Direct: 601-359-3871 [COR NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary B. McCord Direct: 202-661-6607 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Mary B. McCord Direct: 202-661-6607 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)
Jonathan Ellis Taylor Direct: 202-888-7566 [COR LD NTC Retained] Gupta Wessler, PLLC 1900 L ST NW STE 312 WASHINGTON, DC 20036

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,

Defendants,

MATTHEW GENTRY, Sheriff of Cullman County, Alabama, in official and individual capacity, AMY BLACK, in her official capacity as a Magistrate, JOAN WHITE, in her official capacity as a Magistrate, LISA MCSWAIN, in her official capacity as a Magistrate, JUDGE KIM CHANEY, JUDGE RUSTY TURNER,

Defendants - Appellants.

09/13/2018
83 pg, 555.41 KB

CIVIL APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry on 09/13/2018. Fee Status: Fee Paid. USDC motion pending: Motion to Stay DE #176. Awaiting Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 09/27/2018 as to Appellant Matthew Gentry. Awaiting Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 10/11/2018 as to Appellee Bradley Hester [Entered: 09/25/2018 08:43 AM]

09/13/2018
75 pg, 554.54 KB

CIVIL APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White on 09/13/2018. Fee Status: Fee Paid. USDC motion pending: Motion to Stay DE #175 & 176. Awaiting Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 09/27/2018 as to Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. Awaiting Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 10/11/2018 as to Appellee Bradley Hester [Entered: 09/26/2018 11:19 AM]

09/25/2018
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APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Randall C. Marshall for Bradley Hester [18-13894] (ECF: Randall Marshall) [Entered: 09/25/2018 10:21 AM]

09/25/2018
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APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Samuel Jacob Brooke for Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 09/25/2018 05:13 PM]

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09/26/2018
7 pg, 172.31 KB

Appellate fee was paid on 09/14/2018 as to Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [Entered: 09/26/2018 11:35 AM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Brad A. Chynoweth for Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [1813894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 09/26/2018 12:43 PM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Laura E. Howell for Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [1813894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 09/26/2018 12:46 PM]
TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM SUBMITTED by Attorney Brad A. Chynoweth for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. Transcript(s) ordered. [1813894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 09/26/2018 12:48 PM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Dorman Walker for Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Jordan Walker) [Entered: 09/26/2018 02:29 PM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Jamie H. Kidd for Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 09/26/2018 04:55 PM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by James Randall McNeill for Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: James McNeill) [Entered: 09/26/2018 04:57 PM]
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Kendrick Emerson Webb for Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: Kendrick Webb) [Entered: 09/26/2018 04:58 PM]
Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry. On the same day the CIP is served, the party filing it must also complete the court's web-based stock ticker symbol certificate at the link here http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/web-based-cip or on the court's website. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2(b). [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 09/26/2018 05:21 PM]
Civil Appeal Statement filed by Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 09/26/2018 05:22 PM]
Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Attorney Laura E. Howell for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. On the same day the CIP is served, the party filing it must also complete the court's web-based stock ticker symbol certificate at the link here http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/web-based-cip or on the court's

website. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2(b). [18-13894] (ECF: Laura Howell) [Entered: 09/26/2018 05:36 PM]

09/26/2018
1 pg, 50.81 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Brock Boone for Bradley Hester [18-13894] (ECF: Brock Boone) [Entered: 09/26/2018 05:37 PM]

09/26/2018
2 pg, 1.03 MB

Civil Appeal Statement filed by Attorney Laura E. Howell for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Laura Howell) [Entered: 09/26/2018 05:39 PM]

09/26/2018

TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION form filed by Attorney Brad A.

1 pg, 180.66 KB Chynoweth for Appellants Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain

and Rusty Turner. No hearings. [Entered: 09/28/2018 03:46 PM]

09/27/2018
1 pg, 79.21 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by John W. Naramore for Kim Chaney. [18-13894] (ECF: John Naramore) [Entered: 09/27/2018 10:20 AM]

09/27/2018
1 pg, 79.27 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Dorman Walker for Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Jordan Walker) [Entered: 09/27/2018 10:22 AM]

09/27/2018
1 pg, 78.42 KB

TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM SUBMITTED by Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry. Transcript(s) ordered. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 09/27/2018 10:32 AM]

09/27/2018
1 pg, 19.11 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by James W. Davis for Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: James Davis) [Entered: 09/27/2018 03:58 PM]

09/27/2018
37 pg, 274 KB

TIME SENSITIVE MOTION for stay of injunction filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. Motion is Opposed. [8576368-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 09/27/2018 06:07 PM]

09/27/2018

TIME SENSITIVE MOTION to stay lower court proceedings, for

1601 pg, 31.96 MB stay of injunction, to stay pending appeal filed by Matthew Gentry.

Motion is Opposed. [8576372-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd)

[Entered: 09/27/2018 07:11 PM]

09/27/2018
1 pg, 69.57 KB

TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM PROCESSED. Transcript Order: Filer: Matthew Gentry, Court Reporter: Julie A. Martin, Proceeding Type and Date: Pre-Trial Proceedings 07/17/2017 , PreTrial Proceedings 03/13/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/15/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/05/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/19/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 08/28/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 09/06/2018. [Entered: 09/28/2018 03:55 PM]

10/01/2018
2 pg, 170.32 KB

Appearance of counsel form has not been processed. According to our records, Dorman Walker for Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain, Kim Chaney and Rusty Turner is not a member of the Eleventh Circuit bar. The appearance of counsel form has not been processed allowing fourteen days to complete and return the required application for admission. [Entered: 10/01/2018 04:32 PM]

10/03/2018

Removed from case: Attorney Dorman Walker for Appellants Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain, Kim Chaney and Amy Black in 18-13894. [Entered: 10/03/2018 11:15 AM]

10/09/2018
31 pg, 132.36 KB

RESPONSE to Motion for stay of injunction filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White [8576368-2] filed by Attorney Samuel Jacob Brooke for Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 10/08/2018 03:58 PM]

10/09/2018
33 pg, 133.31 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to stay lower court proceedings filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry [8576372-2], Motion for stay of injunction filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry [8576372-3], Motion to stay pending appeal filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry [8576372-4] filed by Attorney Samuel Jacob Brooke for Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 10/08/2018 03:59 PM]

10/26/2018
3 pg, 22.39 KB

ORDER: Motion to stay lower court proceedings filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry is HELD in abeyance. [8576372-2]; Motion for stay of injunction filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry is HELD in abeyance. [8576372-3], Motion for stay of injunction filed by Appellants Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain and Rusty Turner is HELD in abeyance. [8576368-2]; Motion to stay pending appeal filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry is HELD in abeyance. [8576372-4] JP [Entered: 10/26/2018 11:07 AM]

10/30/2018
1 pg, 21.04 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Andrea Rose Woods for Bradley Hester [18-13894] (ECF: Andrea Woods) [Entered: 10/30/2018 11:09 AM]

10/30/2018
1 pg, 22.88 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Brandon Buskey for Bradley Hester [18-13894] (ECF: Brandon Buskey) [Entered: 10/30/2018 02:41 PM]

10/30/2018
1 pg, 38.09 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Alexandra Marie Jordan for Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Alexandra Jordan) [Entered: 10/30/2018 04:05 PM]

11/01/2018

TRANSCRIPTS FILED. Transcript Order: Court Reporter: Julie A. Martin, Filer: Matthew Gentry, Dt. all Trans. Filed: 11/01/2018, Proceeding Type and Date: Pre-Trial Proceedings 07/17/2017 , PreTrial Proceedings 03/13/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/15/2018 ,

Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/05/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 04/19/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 08/28/2018 , Pre-Trial Proceedings 09/06/2018. [Entered: 11/06/2018 09:58 AM]

11/06/2018
1 pg, 16.37 KB

Briefing Notice issued to Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Matthew Gentry, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. The appellant's brief is due on or before 12/11/2018. The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of the appellant's brief. [Entered: 11/06/2018 11:16 AM]

11/08/2018
39 pg, 137.55 KB

USDC order: Memorandum Opinion and Order as to Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Matthew Gentry, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White was filed on 11/08/2018. Docket Entry 198. [Entered: 11/13/2018 02:02 PM]

11/09/2018

Notice of denial of motions to stay pursuant to 10/26 Order filed by

124 pg, 605.01 KB Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-13894]

(ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 11/09/2018 05:55 PM]

11/14/2018
1 pg, 37.68 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Micah West for Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered: 11/14/2018 03:53 PM]

12/07/2018

Over the phone extension granted by clerk as to Attorney Jordan Dorman Walker for Appellant Amy Black. Appellants' briefs are due on 12/18/2018. Appellants' appendices are due on 12/26/2018. -[Edited 12/13/2018 by CB to clarify docket entry] [Entered: 12/07/2018 11:50 AM]

12/07/2018
1 pg, 413.99 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Jordan Dorman Walker, Jr. for Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner, and Joan White [18-13894] (ECF: Jordan Walker) [Entered: 12/07/2018 12:05 PM]

12/18/2018

Appellant's brief filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner

67 pg, 717.76 KB and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered:

12/18/2018 04:11 PM]

12/18/2018

Appellant's brief filed by Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie

63 pg, 384 KB Kidd) [Entered: 12/18/2018 11:58 PM]

12/19/2018

Over the phone extension granted by clerk as to Attorney Samuel Jacob Brooke for Appellee Bradley Hester. Appellee's Brief due on 1/17/19; 14 day extension granted to 01/31/2019 as to Appellee Bradley Hester.. [Entered: 12/19/2018 12:24 PM]

12/19/2018

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [Entered: 12/21/2018 09:55 AM]

12/20/2018

Appendix filed [6 VOLUMES] by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa

1276 pg, 18.89 MB McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Brad

Chynoweth) [Entered: 12/20/2018 04:19 PM]

12/21/2018
1 pg, 58.6 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Paul D. Clement for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition and Georgia Association of Professional Bondsmen [18-13894] (ECF: Paul Clement) [Entered: 12/21/2018 10:46 AM]

12/21/2018
1 pg, 57.92 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Andrew C. Lawrence for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition and Georgia Association of Professional Bondsmen [18-13894] (ECF: Andrew Lawrence) [Entered: 12/21/2018 11:02 AM]

12/21/2018
40 pg, 166.63 KB

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Paul Clement for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition and Georgia Association of Professional Bondsmen. [18-13894] (ECF: Paul Clement) [Entered: 12/21/2018 06:23 PM]

12/21/2018
7 pg, 30.75 KB

Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Paul Clement for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition and Georgia Association of Professional Bondsmen. On the same day the CIP is served, the party filing it must also complete the court's web-based stock ticker symbol certificate at the link here http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/web-based-cip or on the court's website. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2(b). [18-13894] (ECF: Paul Clement) [Entered: 12/21/2018 06:25 PM]

12/24/2018

Received paper copies of EAppendix filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. 6 VOLUMES - 2 COPIES [Entered: 12/26/2018 11:15 AM]

12/24/2018

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [Entered: 01/02/2019 09:25 AM]

12/26/2018
1 pg, 58.86 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Chase T. Espy for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation [18-13894] (ECF: Chase Espy) [Entered: 12/26/2018 11:47 AM]

12/26/2018
4 pg, 131.16 KB

MOTION for extension to file amicus brief filed by Chase Espy for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation. [8653066-1] [1813894]--[Edited 12/31/2018 by CB to add correct relief] (ECF: Chase Espy) [Entered: 12/26/2018 01:39 PM]

12/31/2018

Notice of deficient Motion filed by Chase T. Espy for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation. Document does not contain a Certificate of Compliance, see FRAP 32(g)(1). Counsel must file a corrected motion using the Amend, Correct or Supplement Motion event within 3 days. [Entered: 12/31/2018 10:25 AM]

01/02/2019
5 pg, 51.53 KB

CORRECTED MOTION for extension to file amicus brief filed by Chase Espy for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation. [8657620-1] [18-13894]--[Edited 01/02/2019 by JFC to indicate it is a corrected motion] (ECF: Chase Espy) [Entered: 01/02/2019 02:09 PM]

01/02/2019
3 pg, 142.75 KB

ORDER: Not-party Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation's motion for an extension of time to file its amicus brief is GRANTED. Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation's amicus brief is due on January 9, 2019. [8653066-2] BBM [Entered: 01/02/2019 02:34 PM]

01/07/2019
3 pg, 18.27 KB

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL: Pursuant to the 11th Cir.R. 42-2(c), this appeal is DISMISSED as to Appellant Matthew Gentry only, for want of prosecution because the appellant Matthew Gentry failed to file an appendix within the time fixed by the rules. [Entered: 01/07/2019 12:33 PM]

01/07/2019

MOTION to reinstate appeal filed by Matthew Gentry. Opposition

21 pg, 300.47 KB to Motion is Unknown. [8661786-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd)

[Entered: 01/07/2019 01:47 PM]

01/07/2019

MOTION to adopt appendix filed by Matthew Gentry. Opposition to

10 pg, 148.62 KB Motion is Unknown. [8661790-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd)

[Entered: 01/07/2019 01:48 PM]

01/09/2019
1 pg, 71.46 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Ed R. Haden for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation [18-13894] (ECF: Ed Haden) [Entered: 01/09/2019 03:28 PM]

01/09/2019
35 pg, 178 KB

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Ed R. Haden for Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation. [18-13894] (ECF: Ed Haden) [Entered: 01/09/2019 03:49 PM]

01/10/2019
8 pg, 100.15 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to adopt appendix filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry [8661790-2], Motion to reinstate appeal filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry [8661786-2] filed by Attorney Samuel Jacob Brooke for Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/10/2019 05:35 PM]

01/10/2019

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Not Party Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation. [Entered: 01/28/2019 10:18 AM]

01/16/2019
1 pg, 34.08 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Neil Sawhney for Appellee [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/16/2019 03:50 PM]

01/18/2019

MOTION to stay the briefing schedule filed by Bradley Hester.

10 pg, 21.86 KB Opposition to Motion is Unknown. [8674310-1] [18-13894] (ECF:

Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/18/2019 04:03 PM]

01/22/2019

Notice of deficient Motion to Stay Briefing filed by Samuel Jacob Brooke for Bradley Hester. Incorrect header in motion. Header reads: "Appellee's Response to Appellant Gentry's Motions to Reinstate Appeal and to Adopt Appendix". Please file a corrected motion with the corrected header within three days. [Entered: 01/22/2019 11:11 AM]

01/22/2019
10 pg, 21.84 KB

CORRECTED MOTION to stay the briefing schedule filed by Bradley Hester. Opposition to Motion is Unknown. [86748641] [18-13894]--[Edited 01/22/2019 by CB] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/22/2019 11:31 AM]

01/30/2019

MOTION to dismiss appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction filed

246 pg, 1011.4 KB by Bradley Hester. Opposition to Motion is Unknown. [8681756-

1] [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/30/2019 03:18

PM]

01/31/2019

***STRICKEN. SEE ORDER ISSUED ON 1/8/2019***Appellee's Brief filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-13894]--[Edited 02/08/2019 by CB] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered: 01/31/2019 05:23 PM]

02/04/2019
1 pg, 58.38 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Mary B. McCord for Amici Curiae Current and Former Prosecutors, Department of Justice Officials, Law Enforcement Officials, and Judges [1813894] (ECF: Mary McCord) [Entered: 02/04/2019 03:30 PM]

02/06/2019
1 pg, 110.49 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by J. Bradley Robertson for National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial Justice Institute, and National Association for Public Defense [18-13894] (ECF: James Robertson) [Entered: 02/06/2019 11:35 AM]

02/06/2019
1 pg, 26.9 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Rachel A. Conry for National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial Justice Institute and National Association for Public Defense [18-13894] (ECF: Rachel Conry) [Entered: 02/06/2019 11:42 AM]

02/06/2019
1 pg, 26.85 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Candice L. Rucker for National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial Justice Institute and National Association for Public Defense [18-13894] (ECF: Candice Rucker) [Entered: 02/06/2019 01:03 PM]

02/07/2019
1 pg, 32.48 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by G. BRIAN SPEARS, Attorney for Amici Curiae [18-13894] (ECF: George Spears) [Entered: 02/07/2019 09:16 AM]

02/07/2019
42 pg, 3.3 MB

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by J. Bradley Robertson for National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial Justice Institute, and National Association for

Public Defense, in Support of Appellee. [18-13894] (ECF: James Robertson) [Entered: 02/07/2019 09:17 AM]

02/07/2019

***DOCKETED IN ERROR***MOTION to file amicus brief pursuant to FRAP 29(a) filed by G. BRIAN SPEARS, ATTORNEY FOR AMICI CURIAE. [8689252-1] [18-13894]--[Edited 02/07/2019 by TLS] Per counsel, all parties consent. No motion necessary. (ECF: George Spears) [Entered: 02/07/2019 09:18 AM]

02/07/2019

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by G.

42 pg, 358.48 KB BRIAN SPEARS, ATTORNEY FOR AMICI CURIAE. [18-13894]

(ECF: George Spears) [Entered: 02/07/2019 09:36 AM]

02/07/2019
1 pg, 312.58 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Kellen Funk for Amici Curiae National Law Professors of Criminal, Procedural, and Constitutional Law [18-13894] (ECF: Kellen Funk) [Entered: 02/07/2019 10:49 AM]

02/07/2019
47 pg, 380.44 KB

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Kellen Funk for Amici Curiae National Law Professors of Criminal, Procedural, and Constitutional Law. [18-13894] (ECF: Kellen Funk) [Entered: 02/07/2019 10:53 AM]

02/07/2019

Supplemental Appendix [10 VOLUMES] filed by Appellee Bradley

1957 pg, 72.85 MB Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered: 02/07/2019 11:30

AM]

02/07/2019
48 pg, 854.03 KB

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Mary B. McCord for Amici Curiae Current and Former Prosecutors, Department of Justice Officials, Law Enforcement Officials, and Judges. [18-13894] (ECF: Mary McCord) [Entered: 02/07/2019 12:00 PM]

02/08/2019

Received paper copies of EAppendix filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. 10 VOLUMES - 2 COPIES [Entered: 02/08/2019 02:54 PM]

02/08/2019
3 pg, 63.67 KB

ORDER: ... “Sheriff Matt Gentry’s Motion to Reinstate Appeal” is GRANTED. “Sheriff Matt Gentry’s Motion to Adopt Appendix” is GRANTED. “Appellee’s Corrected Motion to Stay Briefing Deadlines,” is GRANTED, IN PART, to the extent that the Court STRIKES the Appellee’s Brief filed on January 31, 2019 to provide Appellee with the opportunity to amend his brief to include any arguments concerning Sheriff Matt Gentry’s reinstated appeal that may not have been previously addressed while that appeal was dismissed. Appellee is DIRECTED to file a replacement response brief within 21 days of the date of this order. (See order for complete text). [8661786-2]; [8661790-2]; [8674310-2] AJ and JP [Entered: 02/08/2019 03:30 PM]

02/08/2019
3 pg, 64.37 KB

ORDER: Before the Court are (1) “Sheriff Matt Gentry’s Time Sensitive Motion to Stay;” and (2) “Joint Time-Sensitive Motion to Stay Injunction and All Other Proceedings Pending Appeal by Appellants Lisa McSwain, Joan White, Amy Black, Wells R. Turner, III, and Kim Chaney.” The motions are DENIED, as Appellants have not made the requisite showing to stay the injunction, see Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009), or to stay the proceedings. The Clerk is directed to treat any motion for reconsideration of this order as a nonemergency matter.[8576372-4]; [8576372-3]; [8576372-2] CRW, RSR and JP [Entered: 02/08/2019 03:40 PM]

02/11/2019
19 pg, 201.11 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction filed by Appellee Bradley Hester [8681756-2] filed by Attorney Brad A. Chynoweth for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 02/11/2019 06:03 PM]

02/12/2019

MOTION for excess words/pages filed by Bradley Hester. Motion is

11 pg, 23.65 KB Unopposed. [8693225-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered:

02/12/2019 01:02 PM]

02/15/2019

ORDER: Appellee’s “Motion to File Excess Words (Unopposed)”

2 pg, 58.92 KB is GRANTED. [8693225-2] EEC [Entered: 02/15/2019 01:23 PM]

03/01/2019

A replacement brief has been filed for Appellee Bradley Hester.

96 pg, 221.49 KB [18-13894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered: 03/01/2019 03:32 PM]

03/05/2019

Received replacement paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [Entered: 03/06/2019 10:58 AM]

03/08/2019

Supplemental Appendix [1 VOLUMES] filed by Appellee Bradley

13 pg, 209.51 KB Hester. [18-13894] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 03/08/2019

11:54 AM]

03/08/2019
1 pg, 55.84 KB

APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Jonathan E. Taylor for Professor Fred O. Smith Jr. [18-13894] (ECF: Jonathan Taylor) [Entered: 03/08/2019 07:11 PM]

03/08/2019

***SEE CORRECTED BRIEF FILED 3/13/19***Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Jonathan E. Taylor for Professor Fred O. Smith Jr.. [18-13894] (ECF: Jonathan Taylor) [Entered: 03/08/2019 07:30 PM]

03/11/2019

***FILED WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT***Corrected Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae Fred O Smith, Jr.. [1813894]--[Edited 03/12/2019 by CB] (ECF: Jonathan Taylor) [Entered: 03/11/2019 03:51 PM]

03/11/2019

Received paper copies of EAppendix filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. 1 VOLUMES - 2 COPIES [Entered: 03/12/2019 03:16 PM]

03/12/2019
1 pg, 12.66 KB

Notice of deficient corrected Amicus brief filed by Attorney Jonathan Ellis Taylor for Amicus Curiae Fred O Smith, Jr..Deficiencies: Filed without leave of the court.. [Entered: 03/12/2019 02:58 PM]

03/12/2019
4 pg, 59.72 KB

MOTION to correct or amend brief filed by Fred O Smith, Jr.. Motion is Unopposed. [8717705-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jonathan Taylor) [Entered: 03/12/2019 04:53 PM]

03/13/2019
1 pg, 12.75 KB

ORDER: Motion to correct or amend brief filed by Amicus Curiae Fred O Smith, Jr. is GRANTED by clerk. [8717705-2] [Entered: 03/13/2019 03:36 PM]

03/13/2019

Corrected Amicus Brief filed by Amicus Curiae Fred O Smith, Jr..

21 pg, 160.01 KB Service date: 03/13/2019 [Entered: 03/13/2019 03:39 PM]

03/22/2019

***SEE AMENDED REPLY BRIEF FILED 3/29/19***Reply Brief filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894]--[Edited 03/29/2019 by CB] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 03/22/2019 06:07 PM]

03/22/2019

MOTION to correct appendix filed by Matthew Gentry. Opposition

14 pg, 163.46 KB to Motion is Unknown. [8726653-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd)

[Entered: 03/22/2019 08:19 PM]

03/22/2019

Reply Brief filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF:

42 pg, 291.37 KB Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 03/22/2019 08:21 PM]

03/25/2019
34 pg, 358.27 KB

MOTION to amend document filed by Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. Opposing Counsel takes no Position. [8727194-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Laura Howell) [Entered: 03/25/2019 11:47 AM]

03/25/2019

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [Entered: 03/25/2019 02:43 PM]

03/25/2019
1 pg, 15.34 KB

Notice of deficient Appellant brief filed by Attorney Brad A. Chynoweth for Appellants Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain and Rusty Turner.Deficiencies: missing certificate of interested persons. [Entered: 03/25/2019 02:51 PM]

03/29/2019
1 pg, 12.84 KB

ORDER: Motion to amend document filed by Appellants Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain and Rusty Turner is GRANTED by clerk. [8727194-2] [Entered: 03/29/2019 08:30 AM]

03/29/2019

Amended Reply Brief filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa

25 pg, 238.5 KB McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [Entered: 03/29/2019

09:09 AM]

03/29/2019

Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [Entered: 03/29/2019 03:31 PM]

04/05/2019

MOTION Leave to File Surreply filed by Bradley Hester. Motion is

29 pg, 67.18 KB Opposed. [8738473-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered:

04/05/2019 02:20 PM]

04/22/2019

Notice of deficient Motion to Correct Appendix filed by Jamie H. Kidd for Matthew Gentry. The Court has not received the paper copies of the corrected appendix and has not received an EFC corrected appendix. Please file a corrected motion with the corrected appendix attached as an exhibit and send the paper copies of the correct appendix, within three days. Failure to comply will result in the motion being returned unfiled. [Entered: 04/22/2019 09:10 AM]

04/22/2019
56 pg, 2.72 MB

Corrected Motion [8726653-2] filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 04/22/2019 03:54 PM]

04/23/2019

ORDER: Appellee’s motion for leave to file a surreply is

3 pg, 55.03 KB GRANTED. [8738473-2] WHP [Entered: 04/23/2019 01:24 PM]

04/23/2019

Appellee's Surreply Brief filed by Appellee Bradley Hester.

16 pg, 33.58 KB [Entered: 04/23/2019 01:34 PM]

05/08/2019

Received paper copies of EBrief (surreply) filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [Entered: 05/16/2019 08:53 AM]

05/13/2019
3 pg, 56.14 KB

ORDER: “Sheriff Matt Gentry’s Corrected Motion to Supplement Appendix” is GRANTED. [8726653-2] AJ and JP [Entered: 05/13/2019 03:07 PM]

05/13/2019
42 pg, 2.52 MB

Supplemental Appendix [1 VOLUMES - 2 sets] filed by Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry. [Entered: 05/13/2019 03:11 PM]

01/08/2020

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-

2 pg, 1.35 MB 13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 01/08/2020 02:42 PM]

01/08/2020

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-

11 pg, 211.73 KB 13894] (ECF: Alexandra Jordan) [Entered: 01/08/2020 06:01 PM]

01/10/2020

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellant Matthew Gentry. [18-

17 pg, 418.22 KB 13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 01/10/2020 12:01 PM]

01/10/2020

Response to Supplemental Authority (28J) filed by Appellants Amy

2 pg, 1009.1 KB Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894]

(ECF: Laura Howell) [Entered: 01/10/2020 05:00 PM]

01/10/2020

Supplemental Authority filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [18-

2 pg, 56.75 KB 13894] (ECF: Alexandra Jordan) [Entered: 01/10/2020 05:23 PM]

01/14/2020

MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Laura E. Howell

8 pg, 51.5 KB for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan

01/21/2020
1 pg, 14.29 KB
01/24/2020
9 pg, 93.95 KB
01/24/2020
8 pg, 14.24 KB
01/27/2020
1 pg, 14.34 KB
01/27/2020
1 pg, 14.32 KB
01/28/2020
01/28/2020
1 pg, 15.24 KB
01/31/2020
3 pg, 72.39 KB
02/04/2020
9 pg, 118.87 KB
02/06/2020
1 pg, 14.33 KB

White. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [8982372-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Laura Howell) [Entered: 01/14/2020 04:49 PM]
ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Laura E. Howell is GRANTED by clerk. [8982372-2] Attorney terminated: Attorney Laura E. Howell for Appellants Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain and Amy Black in 18-13894. [Entered: 01/21/2020 02:28 PM]
MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Neil K. Sawhney for Appellee Bradley Hester. Motion is Unopposed [89909971] [18-13894]--[Edited 01/24/2020 by BWH] (ECF: Samuel Brooke) [Entered: 01/24/2020 12:37 PM]
MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Jordan Dorman Walker for Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [8991575-1] [18-13894] (ECF: Jordan Walker) [Entered: 01/24/2020 05:34 PM]
ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Samuel Jacob Brooke is GRANTED by clerk. [8990997-2] Attorney terminated: Attorney Neil K. Sawhney for Appellee Bradley Hester in 1813894. [Entered: 01/27/2020 08:06 AM]
ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Jordan Dorman Walker is GRANTED by clerk. [8991575-2] Attorney terminated: Attorney John Naramore for Appellants Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain, Kim Chaney and Amy Black in 18-13894.--[Edited 01/28/2020 by CB] [Entered: 01/27/2020 02:55 PM]
Removed from case: Attorney John W. Naramore for Appellants Joan White, Rusty Turner, Lisa McSwain, Kim Chaney and Amy Black in 18-13894. [Entered: 01/28/2020 10:05 AM]
Letter regarding inactive status and bar membership renewal issued to attorney Attorney Jordan Dorman Walker for Appellants Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain, Kim Chaney and Rusty Turner. [Entered: 01/28/2020 10:27 AM]
ORDER: Bradley Hester’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the appeal by Amy Black, Joan White, Lisa McSwain, Judge Kim Chaney, and Judge Rusty Turner is CARRIED WITH THE CASE. [8681756-2] BCG [Entered: 01/31/2020 01:45 PM]
MOTION to withdraw as counsel filed by Attorney Brock Boone for Appellee Bradley Hester. Motion is Unopposed [9000453-1] [1813894] (ECF: Brock Boone) [Entered: 02/04/2020 04:07 PM]
ORDER: Motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Brock Boone is GRANTED by clerk. [9000453-2] Attorney terminated: Attorney

02/28/2020
28 pg, 582.4 KB
03/03/2020
2 pg, 996.71 KB
05/07/2020
1 pg, 13.54 KB
05/18/2020 05/19/2020
1 pg, 13.35 KB
05/20/2020 08/18/2020
1 pg, 13.24 KB
10/14/2020
2 pg, 119.32 KB
10/14/2020
10/14/2020 10/19/2020
10/20/2020

Brock Boone for Appellee Bradley Hester in 18-13894. [Entered: 02/06/2020 09:39 AM]
Supplemental Authority filed by Appellee Bradley Hester. [1813894] (ECF: Micah West) [Entered: 02/28/2020 03:22 PM]
Response to Supplemental Authority (28J) filed by Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White. [18-13894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 03/03/2020 05:03 PM]
Assigned to tentative calendar number 27 in Montgomery during the week of August 24, 2020. [Entered: 05/07/2020 02:49 PM]
This appeal has been removed from tentative calendar # 27 and will be reassigned at a later date. [Entered: 05/18/2020 02:18 PM]
Assigned to tentative calendar number 28 in Atlanta during the week of September 21, 2020. [Entered: 05/19/2020 03:38 PM]
This appeal has been removed from tentative calendar # 28 and will be reassigned at a later date. [Entered: 05/20/2020 12:55 PM]
Assigned to tentative calendar number 5 in Atlanta during the week of December 14, 2020. [Entered: 08/18/2020 03:17 PM]
Calendar issued as to cases to be orally argued the week of 12/14/2020 in Atlanta, Georgia. Counsel are directed to electronically acknowledge receipt of this calendar by docketing the Calendar Receipt Acknowledged event in ECF. [Entered: 10/14/2020 10:01 AM]
Attorney Jamie H. Kidd for Appellant Matthew Gentry hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of the printed calendar for 12/16/2020. Jamie H. Kidd; (334) 262-1850 will present argument. [18-13894] (ECF: Jamie Kidd) [Entered: 10/14/2020 12:14 PM]
Oral argument scheduled. Argument Date: Wednesday, 12/16/2020 Argument Location: Atlanta. [Entered: 10/14/2020 02:46 PM]
Attorney Brad A. Chynoweth for Appellants Amy Black, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of the printed calendar for 12/16/2020. Brad Chynoweth (334) 242-7997 will present argument. [18-13894] (ECF: Brad Chynoweth) [Entered: 10/19/2020 09:08 AM]
Attorney Jordan Dorman Walker for Appellants Amy Black, Kim Chaney, Lisa McSwain, Rusty Turner and Joan White hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of the printed calendar for 12/16/2020. Dorman Walker, (334) 269-3138 will present argument. [18-13894] (ECF: Jordan Walker) [Entered: 10/20/2020 03:12 PM]

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Hill 18-13894 1.00