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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Emani Love, Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, E.B.,1 A.M., & K.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity as the Secretary of State of Michigan,
Defendant.

Case No. Hon. Mag.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs Emani Love, Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, E.B., A.M., and K.S., by and through their undersigned attorneys, complain against Defendant Ruth Johnson, in her official capacity as the Secretary of State of Michigan, as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiffs are all transgender Michiganders who live their lives consistent with their innate understanding of themselves as male or female (their “gender identity”), rather than the sex they were assigned at birth. This lawsuit challenges the State of Michigan’s refusal to recognize and respect the gender of
1 Plaintiffs “E.B.,” “A.M.,” and “K.S.” will be filing a motion to proceed using initials, rather than their full names, to protect their privacy in their transgender status and medical conditions and treatment.

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Plaintiffs and other transgender people by denying them the ability to obtain a driver’s license or state identification card that accurately reflects their gender.
2. In 2011, Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson implemented a restrictive policy for correcting transgender persons’ driver’s licenses and state identification cards to properly reflect their gender (the “Driver’s License Policy” or “Policy”), and she has enforced it ever since.
3. Under the Policy, the State of Michigan will not correct “the gender2 on a driver’s license” or state identification card unless the person requesting the correction produces an amended birth certificate showing the correct gender.
4. State laws in the United States vary in terms of whether and how individuals can amend the gender on their birth certificates: (1) some states refuse to amend the gender on a birth certificate without a court order; (2) some states, like Michigan, refuse to change the gender on a birth certificate unless an individual has undergone gender confirmation surgery; (3) some states allow the gender to be changed on a birth certificate without requiring either surgery or a court order; and (4) some states do not allow the gender on a birth certificate to be corrected under any circumstances. 2 Defendant used the word “gender” to describe her policy, even though Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.305(a) uses the word “sex” for the designation of male or female on a Michigan driver’s license. Like the Defendant, Plaintiffs believe that “gender” and “sex” are often used interchangeably for purposes of identifying a person as male or female on various legal documents.
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5. Because the Driver’s License Policy requires an amended birth certificate with a corrected gender to change a Michigan driver’s license or state identification (or “ID”) card, Plaintiffs and other transgender persons in Michigan are unable to secure driver’s licenses or state ID cards that accurately reflect their gender.
a. Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, and E.B. cannot obtain an accurate driver’s license under any circumstances because their state of birth does not allow them to amend the gender on their birth certificate.
b. Plaintiff K.S. faces the burden of obtaining a court order in order to change the gender on his driver’s license, as his birth state requires a court order to change the gender on his birth certificate.
c. Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. were born in Michigan and thus, cannot secure a driver’s license or state ID card reflecting their correct gender because amending their birth certificate requires them to complete surgery, for which they have no current medical need and which they cannot afford.
6. In contrast, Michigan residents born in states, such as California3 or Washington,4 that do not require surgery or a court order to amend the gender on
3 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103426; Dep’t of Public Health, Obtaining a New Birth Certificate After Gender Reassignment, available at
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birth certificates are able to correct the gender designation on their Michigan driver’s licenses without being forced to have surgery and without securing a court order. Rather, persons from those states need only obtain confirmation of their change of gender from their physician. Moreover, on information and belief, Michigan residents obtaining a driver’s license or state ID for the first time are not required to present a birth certificate at all in order to obtain a driver’s license or state ID listing the correct gender.
7. Due to the Driver’s License Policy, Plaintiffs and other transgender individuals in Michigan are forced to carry a driver’s license or state ID card that reflects the incorrect gender, causing them significant psychological and emotional harm and placing them at risk of bodily harm. They are forced to carry and show to others a basic identity document that fails to reflect an essential aspect of personhood – their gender. Denying Plaintiffs and other transgender people a driver’s license that matches their gender identity and lived gender results in the routine disclosure of their transgender status, as well as their medical condition and treatment, to complete strangers. Indeed, every time Plaintiffs are asked to present
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/birthdeathmar/Documents/GenderReassigmentPA MPHLET-(01-15)-MERGED.pdf (last visited May 15, 2015). 4 See Washington State Dep’t of Health, Gender Change on a Birth Certificate, available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/ BirthDeathMarriageandDivorce/GenderChange (last visited May 15, 2015).
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their Michigan driver’s license or state ID card, they necessarily divulge private information about themselves, which places them at serious risk of physical harm, discrimination, embarrassment, and hostility. Further, denying Plaintiffs a driver’s license or state ID card that properly reflects their gender informs Plaintiffs that the State of Michigan does not acknowledge and respect their core identities.
8. Defendant’s Driver’s License Policy is unconstitutional, as it has either made it impossible or unduly burdensome for Plaintiffs and others like them to have their driver’s licenses or state ID cards reflect their gender in violation of: (1) the right to privacy (U.S. Const. amend. 14, §1); (2) the First Amendment (U.S. Const. amend. 1); (3) the right to equal protection (U.S. Const. amend. 14, §1); (4) the right to interstate travel (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. amend. 14, §1); and (5) the right to independence in making important medical decisions (U.S. Const. amend. 14, §1).
9. Defendant’s unconstitutional Driver’s License Policy has made it more difficult in comparison to previous policies of the Michigan Secretary of State for transgender individuals to change their driver’s license or state ID cards to correctly reflect their gender. As discussed in more detail below, prior to 2011, transgender individuals did not have to show an amended birth certificate to change the gender on their driver’s license or state ID card.
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10. In stark contrast to Michigan, where the Defendant has put in place a more restrictive policy than what existed in the past, the federal government and a number of other states have modernized their policies for correcting the gender on identity documents, such as driver’s licenses and passports. They have done so by eliminating surgical and other burdensome requirements in favor of policies that allow a gender correction based on a sworn statement or letter from a medical provider confirming the transgender individual’s change of gender.
11. By this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendant’s unconstitutional Driver’s License Policy so that they and other transgender Michigan residents can obtain Michigan ID documents that accurately reflect their gender identity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because Plaintiffs seek redress for the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs’ federal claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 13. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and 65, and the legal and equitable powers of this Court.
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14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because this is a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims have occurred.
PARTIES 15. Plaintiff Emani Love was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan, where she currently resides. She wishes to correct her Michigan ID card to accurately reflect her identity as female. 16. Plaintiff A.M. was born and raised in Michigan and currently resides in Livingston County. She wishes to correct her Michigan driver’s license to accurately reflect her identity as female. 17. Plaintiff Tina Seitz was born in Ohio and moved to Michigan in 1999. She currently resides in Macomb County. She wishes to correct her Michigan driver’s license to accurately reflect her identity as female. 18. Plaintiff Codie Stone was born in Ohio and moved to Michigan in 2007. He currently resides in Kalamazoo County. He wishes to correct his Michigan driver’s license to accurately reflect his identity as male. 19. Plaintiff E.B. was born in Twin Falls, Idaho, and moved to Michigan in 2012. He currently resides in Washtenaw County. He wishes to correct his Michigan driver’s license to accurately reflect his identity as male.
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20. Plaintiff K.S. was born in South Carolina and moved with his family to Michigan when he was two years old. He currently resides in Kalamazoo County. He wishes to correct his Michigan driver’s license to reflect his identity as male.
21. Defendant Ruth Johnson is the Secretary of State of Michigan. As the Secretary of State, Defendant directs the state agency with the authority to issue driver’s licenses and state ID cards. Defendant designed, implemented, and controls the Driver’s License Policy. She is being sued in her official capacity.
FACTS Transgender Persons, Gender, and Gender Dysphoria 22. At birth, each person is generally designated as male or female based on the appearance of external genitalia. 23. “Gender identity,” on the other hand, is a person’s innate selfidentification as male or female and does not necessarily match a person’s assigned sex. 24. Gender identity differs from sexual orientation, which refers to a person’s physical and emotional attractions towards persons of the same or a different sex. 25. Transgender people are persons whose gender identity does not conform to the sex they were assigned at birth.
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26. There is a well-established medical consensus that the most important determinant of a person’s sex is a person’s gender identity, not the sex they were assigned at birth. Gender identity develops in early childhood and is believed to be firmly established by the age of four. The medical literature establishes that a person’s gender identity is an immutable characteristic and cannot be changed.
27. Based on contemporary medical knowledge and practice, attempts to change a person’s core gender identity are considered to be futile and unethical.
28. Gender dysphoria is a medically-recognized condition defined by a marked incongruence between a person’s gender identity and the sex they were assigned at birth and clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. Symptoms of gender dysphoria include a strong desire to eliminate primary and secondary physical characteristics associated with a male or female, the belief that an individual was improperly assigned the wrong sex at birth, and the desire to be a male or female, despite what is reflected on a person’s birth certificate. If untreated, gender dysphoria can have serious consequences for transgender people, including depression, anxiety, inability to focus, suicidality, as well as difficulties functioning at work, with family, and in other social roles.
29. Treatment of gender dysphoria is guided by the Standards of Care (“SOC”) set forth by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health
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(“WPATH”), which was initially published in 1979 and is now in its seventh version. These guidelines are widely accepted and respected, and they reflect the professional consensus about the psychological, psychiatric, hormonal, and surgical management of gender dysphoria.
30. It is the recognized standard of care to treat gender dysphoria with gender “reassignment.” Gender reassignment is not the same for every transgender person, but instead is determined by the exercise of individualized medical judgment to achieve the goal of reducing a patient’s gender dysphoria. An individualized treatment plan is developed after an assessment by a mental health professional with expertise in the treatment of gender dysphoria.
31. Gender reassignment does not “change” a person’s gender, which is instead determined by that person’s gender identity. Instead, it brings a person’s appearance and body into alignment with the person’s core gender identity, which helps to alleviate the distress associated with gender dysphoria. Gender reassignment generally consists of one or more of the following three components: (1) social transition; (2) hormone therapy; and/or (3) gender confirmation surgery or surgeries.
32. Social transition involves the adoption of a gender role and gender presentation that is congruent with the person’s gender identity. For example, a female transgender individual will act and present herself as female in all aspects
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of her life. A legal name change to one that is traditionally associated with a person’s gender identity and the subsequent updating of ID documents to reflect the appropriate gender are parts of that process.
33. Hormone therapy involves taking hormones associated with one’s gender identity.
34. Gender confirmation surgeries may include breast augmentation or chest reconstruction surgery, genital reconstruction surgery, and other surgeries to feminize or masculinize a person’s body or appearance. However, gender confirmation surgery is not medically necessary for many transgender individuals or even in their best interests. Additionally, for many, surgery is cost-prohibitive and many insurance policies do not cover gender confirmation surgery. Thus, only about one-third of transgender individuals report having had gender confirmation surgery.5
The Importance of Accurate Identity Documents 35. Changing the name and gender on a person’s identity documents is an important aspect of gender reassignment. ID documents are crucial to a person’s ability to function successfully in the correct gender, and a driver’s license or state 5 Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, National Center For Transgender Equality And National Gay And Lesbian Task Force (2011), at 26, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf (last visited May 15, 2015).
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ID card is a critically important form of ID. A driver’s license serves a crucial function for many individuals in making it possible for them to secure and maintain a job and otherwise care for their needs and the needs of their family. Recognizing the importance of ID documents, the American Medical Association has adopted a policy urging states to eliminate any requirement that transgender individuals have surgery in order to amend their birth certificates.
36. A person repeatedly needs a driver’s license or state ID card to verify his or her identity. A driver’s license that fails to match one’s gender leads to the disclosure of private, intimate information about one’s transgender status, and it often leads to physical harm, harassment, discrimination, or groundless accusations of fraud.
37. Additionally, for persons who have struggled for years to live life in the correct gender identity, the knowledge that one’s identity documents label her or him with the wrong gender can, by itself, cause serious psychological injury.
Michigan’s Driver’s License Policy 38. Michigan law gives Defendant, as the Secretary of State, the authority to decide which documents must be shown in order for the state to supply a driver’s license or state ID card. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.307(1). 39. Pursuant to that authority, Defendant established a Driver’s License Policy that prohibits transgender individuals from correcting their driver’s license
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or state ID card to correctly reflect their gender unless they present an amended birth certificate with the correct gender. Upon information and belief, there is no similar policy applicable to transgender individuals obtaining a Michigan driver’s license or ID card for the first time.
40. No Michigan statute requires individuals to provide an amended birth certificate to change a Michigan driver’s license or state ID card to reflect a person’s correct gender. Nor is there a Michigan statute that requires gender confirmation surgery for this purpose.
41. In 1996, the Michigan legislature passed a law requiring gender confirmation surgery to correct the gender on a person’s Michigan birth certificate, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2831, but that statute does not apply to driver’s licenses and state ID cards. It is likewise inapplicable to persons born outside of the State of Michigan who wish to correct the gender on their birth certificates, even if they now reside in Michigan.
42. The current Driver’s License Policy is the latest version of Michigan’s gender change policies for driver’s licenses and state ID cards, which have become more restrictive over time.
a. Prior to 2003, transgender individuals could correct the gender on their Michigan driver’s licenses or state ID cards without showing an amended birth certificate or undergoing gender confirmation surgery.
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b. Then, in 2003, under previous Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land, the policy to correct gender on a Michigan driver’s license or state ID card was changed to require proof of gender confirmation surgery. For a few weeks in 2005, the surgical policy was ended, but then quickly reinstated.
c. In 2011, Defendant took office and implemented the Driver’s License Policy, which, for the first time, required an amended birth certificate to correct the gender on a person’s driver’s license or state ID card.
43. No legitimate governmental interest is furthered by the Driver’s License Policy. Instead, the history leading up to the Driver’s License Policy indicates that it was motivated by animus towards transgender people.
a. The Defendant announced her position on the issue of changing gender on Michigan driver’s licenses in the midst of her primary campaign for the Republican Party Secretary of State nomination in 2010.6
6 See Michael Hiltzik, The Last Frontier in Sexual Bigotry: Transgender Rights, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/lafi-mh-the-last-frontier-of-sexual-bigotry-20150306-column.html (last visited May 20, 2015); Susan J. Demas, The Republican Wave Hits Jocelyn Benson, MLIVE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://blog.mlive.com/capitolchronicles/2010/10/post_20.html (last visited May 20, 2015).
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b. During the primary election, Defendant Ruth Johnson ran against candidate Paul Scott. Mr. Scott criticized the 2005 policy change under Secretary Land allowing changes without surgery and stated that if he were elected, transgender individuals would not be allowed to change the gender on their Michigan driver’s license under any circumstance.7 He characterized his position on prohibiting gender changes on identification documents as “a social values issue.”8
c. Defendant thereafter stated that she does “not support allowing people to change their gender on their license as a result of surgery or lifestyle.”9
44. Upon becoming the Secretary of State of Michigan, Defendant implemented the Driver’s License Policy, which makes it extremely difficult, if not
7 Troy Reimink, Secretary of State Candidate Paul Scott Campaigns Against Changes on ID for Transgender Individuals (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2010/01/ secretary_of_state_candidate_p.html (last visited May 20, 2015). 8 Iowa State Daily Editorial Board, EDITORIAL: Scott’s Priority Ignores Both Progress, Values (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.iowastatedaily.com/opinion/article_667ace88-d11a-589e-acf11b2565a0c13c.html (last visited May 20, 2015). 9 See Secretary of State Race: Ruth Johnson Joins Rep. Paul Scott in Opposing Sex Change on Driver’s License, (Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://afamichigan.org/pipermail/e-news_afamichigan.org/2010August/000301.html (last visited May 20, 2015).
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impossible, for transgender persons to correct the gender on their driver’s license or state ID document.
45. Defendant’s Driver’s License Policy, by placing onerous, and in some cases insurmountable, obstacles to prevent transgender persons from correcting the gender on driver’s licenses and state ID cards, stands in contrast with the decisions of the federal government and numerous states to ease restrictions on changing gender on identity documents to conform policies to current scientific knowledge and research regarding transgender individuals and the medical standard of care for treating persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
a. The U.S. Department of State requires only that a doctor certify that a person seeking a gender change on a driver’s license “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to the new gender” in order to obtain a passport with the correct gender.10
b. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the Veterans Health Administration, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Social Security Administration have similar requirements for a medical certification of appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition, not surgery.
10 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Gender Reassignment Applicants, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/passports/information/gender.html (last visited May 20, 2015).
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c. At least 25 of the states and the District of Columbia do not require a transgender person to undergo surgery to change the gender on his or her driver’s license or state ID card. In addition, at least 13 states have implemented policies only requiring a medical provider’s certification that “the applicant’s gender identity is . . . [male or female] and can reasonably be expected to continue as such for the foreseeable future”11 in order for individuals to change the gender on ID documents.
The Driver’s License Policy’s Impact on Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Born in Michigan Who Have Not Had Gender Confirmation Surgery Emani Love
46. Plaintiff Emani Love is a 22-year-old transgender woman who was born in and has lived her entire life in Detroit, Michigan. She works as an outreach worker for the Ruth Ellis Center, a social service agency for homeless and disenfranchised LGBT youth. Her responsibilities include facilitating support groups for transgender youth.
11 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Transportation, Form DL-32 (Request for Gender Change on Driver’s License/Identification Card, available at http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/dl_forms/DL-32.pdf (last visited May 20, 2015).
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47. Ms. Love was designated male at birth. However, she has identified as a transgender woman since she was approximately fourteen years of age.
48. Ms. Love socially transitioned to living as female when she was approximately fifteen years of age and has lived and presented full time as a woman since then.
49. Ms. Love has taken steps to correct her identity documents so that they reflect that she is female. She changed her name to one that affirmed her female gender in February 2014, and then obtained a new Social Security card with her legal name on it.
50. In or about March 2014, Ms. Love visited in a Secretary of State branch office in Detroit, where she secured a change of her name on her state ID document. However, she was unable to have the gender changed because of the Driver’s License Policy, as she has not had the gender confirmation surgery required to correct the gender on her Michigan birth certificate.
51. Gender confirmation surgery is not something Ms. Love has any interest in pursuing, nor does she believe that it is medically necessary for her at this point. In addition, Ms. Love does not have health insurance coverage for gender confirmation surgery and cannot afford to pay the substantial out-of-pocket cost of the surgery.
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52. As a result of Defendant’s Policy, Ms. Love’s current Michigan state ID card reflects her traditionally female name and appearance in her photograph, but erroneously states that she is male.
A.M. 53. Plaintiff A.M. is a transgender woman in her thirties who is a lifelong Michigander and currently lives in Livingston County. A.M. earned her bachelor’s degree in 1999 and has worked at a computer consulting company since 2001. She is also the mother of two young daughters and is a leader in her church community. 54. A.M. was designated male at birth. However, her gender identity is female. 55. A.M. has undergone gender reassignment treatment under the care of medical professionals. 56. A.M. is not planning on having gender confirmation surgery at this time because the surgery is not covered by her health insurance and she cannot afford to pay the substantial out-of-pocket cost for it. In addition, A.M.’s medical providers have not determined that surgery is medically necessary for her. 57. Plaintiff A.M. has taken actions to correct her identity documents so that they conform to her female gender identity. Around October 2013, A.M. legally changed her name to a traditionally female one and also changed the name on her driver’s license to reflect her female name.
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58. Around November or December of 2013, A.M. corrected the name and gender on her social security records and her passport so that they are consistent with her female gender identity. Additionally, her automobile insurance, medical records, and health insurance documents all include her legal name and show her gender as female. During this process, A.M. received an amended birth certificate with her correct name on it, but the wrong gender, because she has not had gender confirmation surgery.
59. A.M. visited the Milford Secretary of State’s office in Oakland County and the Howell Secretary of State’s office in Livingston County to ask whether she could change the gender on her driver’s license. She was informed that she could not correct the gender on her license without first amending her birth certificate. However, A.M. cannot amend her birth certificate because she has not had gender confirmation surgery, as is required for individuals born in Michigan.
60. As a result of Defendant’s Policy, A.M.’s Michigan driver’s license reflects her traditionally female name and appearance in her photograph, but erroneously states that she is male.
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Plaintiffs Born in States That Do Not Correct Gender on Birth Certificates
Tina Seitz 61. Plaintiff Tina Seitz is a 56-year-old transgender woman who lives in the Detroit area. Ms. Seitz was born in Ohio, but moved to Michigan in 1999 to work as an engineer for General Motors. 62. Ms. Seitz was designated male when she was born. However, she later came to understand that she is female. 63. Ms. Seitz has undergone gender reassignment treatment for gender dysphoria in consultation with a medical professional. 64. As part of her treatment, Ms. Seitz has taken steps to conform her identity documents to reflect her female identity. In particular, she legally changed her name to Tina and corrected her name on her Michigan driver’s license. She also corrected her name and gender on her passport and Social Security records. 65. In September 2007—before Defendant’s Driver’s License Policy was established—Ms. Seitz was able to change the gender on her driver’s license to female after providing the Michigan Secretary of State with a letter from her physician documenting her change of gender. 66. In or around early 2011, Ms. Seitz’s driver’s license was held by the court pending the outcome of a court proceeding. Ms. Seitz needed a state-issued picture ID in order to apply for a passport, so she went to a branch Secretary of
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State’s office in Chesterfield Township, Macomb County, to apply for a state ID card. Even though Seitz offered medical evidence of her gender transition, the Secretary of State’s office refused to give her a new state ID card correctly reflecting that she is female. When she returned after the disposition of her court case to get her license, the office once again refused to correct the driver’s license to reflect her male gender.
67. The Secretary of State’s office in Chesterfield Township informed Seitz that under the Driver’s License Policy she would have to produce an amended birth certificate in order to once again have a license with the correct gender on it. Ms. Seitz therefore telephoned the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio—where she was born—to ascertain whether her birth certificate could be amended.
68. The Chief Magistrate for the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County informed Ms. Seitz that the court would not change the gender on her birth certificate. Ohio law does not permit the amendment of birth certificates. See In The Matter of The Application For A Marriage License For Jacob B. Nash and Erin A. Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
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69. Because of the Driver’s License Policy and because Seitz was born in a state where she cannot amend the gender on her birth certificate, Seitz can never obtain a driver’s license that reflects that she is female.
70. Therefore, Ms. Seitz’s current Michigan driver’s license reflects her traditionally female name and appearance in her photograph, but erroneously states that she is male.
Codie Stone 71. Plaintiff Codie Stone is a 30-year-old transgender man who was born in Ohio and now lives in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where he is completing his doctorate in sociology at Western Michigan University. 72. Mr. Stone was designated female when he was born. However, his gender identity is male. Since he was a teenager, he has presented in a stereotypically masculine way, and since 2009, he has lived full time as a man. 73. Mr. Stone was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and in consultation with a medical professional, he has had gender reassignment treatment. 74. Mr. Stone has taken steps to conform his identity documents to his male identity. He had his name legally changed in 2011 and then corrected the name on his driver’s license. 75. In 2011, Mr. Stone sought to change his driver’s license to correctly reflect that he is male. However, the Secretary of State’s office told him that he
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would have to change the gender on his Ohio birth certificate if he wanted the gender changed on his Michigan license. Mr. Stone learned, however, that Ohio does not allow persons born there to change the gender on their birth certificates.
76. Because of the Driver’s License Policy and because Stone was born in a state where he cannot amend the gender on his birth certificate, he can never obtain a Michigan driver’s license that accurately documents that he is male.
77. As a result of Defendant’s Policy, Mr. Stone’s Michigan driver’s license reflects his traditionally male name and appearance in his photograph, but erroneously states that he is female.
E.B. 78. Plaintiff E.B. is a 24-year-old transgender man who was born in Idaho and currently lives in Washtenaw County. E.B. has lived in Michigan since he moved to complete his Masters in Social Work at the University of Michigan. E.B. currently works as a social worker with at-risk children, youth, and families. 79. E.B. was designated female when he was born. However, he began to identify as male at a young age. In particular, he remembers knowing that he was male when he was just four or five years old. 80. With the advice of medical professionals, E.B. has pursued gender reassignment treatment.
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81. E.B. has taken steps to correct his identity documents so that they reflect his male identity. For example, he had his name legally changed to a traditionally male name in January 2015 and obtained a Michigan driver’s license reflecting his legal name.
82. E.B. asked the Howell Secretary of State’s office in Livingston County to change the gender on his Michigan driver’s license to show that he is male.
83. The Secretary of State’s office told E.B. that he would have to produce a birth certificate with the gender amended in order to amend his Michigan driver’s license to correctly reflect his gender. However, Idaho is a state that does not allow persons to amend the gender on their birth certificates.
84. Because of the Driver’s License Policy and because E.B. was born in a state where he cannot amend the gender on his birth certificate, E.B. can never obtain a driver’s license that accurately documents that he is male.
85. Therefore, E.B.’s current Michigan driver’s license reflects his traditionally male name and appearance in his photograph, but erroneously states that he is female.
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Plaintiff Born In a State That Requires a Court Order to Change the Gender on a Birth Certificate K.S.
86. Plaintiff K.S. is a transgender man in his twenties who lives in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He was born in South Carolina, and he and his family moved to Michigan when he was two years old. K.S. has never been back to South Carolina.
87. K.S. was designated female when he was born. However, by middle school, K.S. understood that his identity was male.
88. K.S. has undergone gender reassignment treatment in consultation with a medical professional.
89. K.S. has made efforts to conform his identity documents to his gender identity. For example, he changed his name in 2010 to a traditionally male name and then corrected his Michigan driver’s license to reflect his male name.
90. At the same time, K.S. asked an employee at the Secretary of State’s office to correct his driver’s license to state that he is male and provided the employee with a note from his doctor to support the change. The Secretary of State employee told him that he could not make the requested change in his driver’s license.
91. K.S. later learned that the only way to correct the gender on his license was to first correct the gender on his birth certificate. However, South
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Carolina, where K.S. was born, requires a court order before it will change the gender on a person’s birth certificate.
92. As a result of Defendant’s Policy, K.S.’s Michigan driver’s license reflects his traditionally male name and appearance in his photograph, but erroneously states that he is female.
Harm to Plaintiffs Caused by the Driver’s License Policy 93. Defendant’s Driver’s License Policy has seriously harmed and continues to harm Plaintiffs and other transgender people in Michigan. Michigan residents show their driver’s licenses and state ID cards when voting, going through security at an airport, entering a bar or nightclub, buying liquor at a restaurant, or purchasing food at the grocery store with a credit card, and verifying their identity with an employer—just to name a few examples. Thus, under the Driver’s License Policy, Plaintiffs and other transgender individuals are forced to show employers, government officials, grocery store employees, and many others an ID document which conflicts with their gender identity, their appearance and behavior, the gender associated with their name, and the other ways in which they express their gender (their “gender expression”). Doing so reveals their transgender status, their transition, and/or their medical condition to all who see the licenses, including complete strangers.
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94. A 2011 national study of transgender Americans shows the high risks of harassment and discrimination Plaintiffs and other transgender people have faced and continue to face because they are unable to obtain driver’s licenses and state ID documents that accurately identify their gender. Forty percent of the survey respondents who presented ID that did not match their gender identity and expression reported being harassed, while 15% reported being asked to leave the premises.12 Three percent of all respondents and 9% of those who are AfricanAmerican or Latino/a reported being attacked or assaulted when they showed an ID document that failed to match their identity and expression.13 The report also found higher reported rates of employment and housing discrimination among those whose driver’s license failed to match their gender identity and expression.14
95. Additional data regarding the high incidence of hate crimes among transgender individuals shows the serious risks of bodily injury that Plaintiffs and other transgender Michiganders face when their transgender status is revealed.15
12 Injustice at Every Turn, supra note 5, at 153. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 154. 15 Osman Ahmed, et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and HIVAffected Hate Violence in 2013, National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (2014) at 8, available at http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ 2013_ncavp_hvreport_final.pdf (last visited May 15, 2015).
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While transgender individuals only make up a small minority of the population, transgender persons are subjected to extremely high numbers of hate crimes in the United States.16 For that reason alone, Plaintiffs and other transgender individuals rightly fear adverse and dangerous reactions from persons who see a driver’s license or a state ID card listing a gender that fails to match their gender expression. Survey data indicating a high incidence of discrimination and harassment by police officers,17 Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) and other airport staff,18 and retail store employees19 provide additional reasons why Plaintiffs and other transgender persons are rightfully concerned about having an ID document listing the wrong gender on it.
96. Data showing the high incidence of employment and housing discrimination experienced by transgender people show additional risks faced by Plaintiffs and other transgender Michiganders from producing an ID document that
16 See id. 17 Injustice at Every Turn, supra note 5, at 158-59 (29% of transgender individuals reported police harassment or disrespect, and 6% reported being physically assaulted by law enforcement). 18 Id. at 132 (17% of transgender individuals reported being harassed or disrespected by TSA agents or other airport staff, and others even reported being physically assaulted by them). 19 Id. at 129 (37% of transgender individuals reported being subjected to verbal harassment or disrespect; 3% even reported being physical assaulted by retail store employees).
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discloses their transgender status. In the 2011 national report cited above, 90% of respondents reported being harassed at work or taking actions to avoid harassment while 26% reported being fired because they are transgender.20 Forty-seven percent reported some form of employment discrimination because they are transgender, including not being hired, not being promoted, or being fired.21 With respect to housing discrimination, 19% of the survey respondents reported being denied an apartment based upon their transgender status, while 11% reported being evicted.22
97. The Plaintiffs in this case are each aware of the high incidence of violence and harassment directed at transgender persons as well as the high rates of employment and housing discrimination faced by transgender individuals. All fear that possessing a driver’s license that fails to match their gender expression increases their chances that they will be subjected to discrimination, harassment, or violence and most have taken steps to try to reduce those risks. Each Plaintiff has experienced first-hand the embarrassing questions and harassing conduct that transgender persons often live through when forced to produce an ID document that fails to match their lived gender.
20 Id. at 3. 21 Id. 22 Id. at 4.
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98. Codie Stone is frightened about how a police officer would react to seeing his driver’s license with the incorrect gender and, as a result, drives under, not at, the speed limit. Due to the same concerns, Plaintiff A.M. does her best to avoid driving late at night.
99. Some of the Plaintiffs are apprehensive about or avoid flying because their driver’s licenses fail to match their lived gender. Codie Stone drives or takes the train where possible to avoid the embarrassment he has faced in the past when his Michigan driver’s license revealed to TSA employees that he is transgender. In the last few years, K.S. has chosen to drive rather than fly on trips to the east coast because of his fear about how TSA staff will react to his ID. Ms. Seitz has experienced hostile treatment from airport staff after they saw her driver’s license and is extremely anxious, almost to the point of panic, when flying due to her fears about how TSA employees may react to her license, which incorrectly states that she is male.
100. Having the wrong gender on their licenses has heightened some of the Plaintiffs’ concerns about securing a job in the future and limited the choice of jobs for which they are willing to apply. Codie Stone, for example, worries that having the wrong gender on his driver’s license will impact his chances of getting a future job. And although he needs to find a part-time job this summer to supplement his academic funding, Codie Stone has put off applying for jobs with the types of
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employers he believes are likely to react adversely to learning that he is transgender when they see his driver’s license. E.B. works full-time as a social worker, but in the past he has worked on the weekends to supplement his income. However, after the difficult experience he had when he revealed he was transgender to his former employer, he stopped applying for weekend jobs because of his fears about how employers would react to seeing his Michigan driver’s license listing him as female. There have been job opportunities in the last few years that K.S. was interested in applying for because they paid more than his current position. However, he did not apply because he was worried how these employers would react to learning that he is transgender when they saw his license. Instead, K.S. has taken on free-lance work to supplement his income.
101. Because of their inaccurate driver’s licenses, Plaintiffs have concerns about or have faced problems voting, obtaining medical care, visiting restaurants and other social establishments where they will have to show their licenses, and making retail purchases. Emani Love was publicly embarrassed when she went to vote and a precinct worker outed her as transgender after looking at her state I.D. which incorrectly lists her gender as male. Tina Seitz fears that she will be denied the ability to vote because the gender on her license fails to match her appearance. K.S. suffers significant discomfort when he goes to the medical office for blood
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work because of the reactions the front desk staff give him when they see his Michigan driver’s license with the incorrect gender on it.
102. E.B. felt awkward and embarrassed when he was asked for an I.D. to order a drink at a bar and after seeing the ID, the server started calling him “ma’am.”
103. Codie Stone had a hostile experience at a hardware store where the clerk was extremely friendly to him before he produced his license after which the clerk’s tone and demeanor changed completely when he provided his license listing the incorrect gender. Due in part to his concerns about having to show his license, Codie Stone avoids stopping at gas stations and other retail establishments in certain towns and areas in Michigan for fear of embarrassing questions, harassment, or even assault. When Tina Seitz had to show her driver’s license at a retail store to pay with a check, the clerk looked at her license and said, "that's not you.” The clerk eventually dropped it, but the experience took place in front of other customers and was therefore very humiliating for her. K.S. has experienced the distress of having store clerks give him a puzzled look or take an unduly long amount of time reviewing his driver’s license before returning it to him.
104. Being denied a driver’s license or state ID card that matches their gender identity and lived gender is psychologically and emotionally harmful for Plaintiffs, who are faced with a constant reminder that the State of Michigan does
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not respect them for who they are and are kept in fear of what may happen the next time they have to show their license to a stranger.
CAUSES OF ACTION 42 U.S.C. § 1983 COUNT NO. 1:
THE DRIVER’S LICENSE POLICY VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO PRIVACY
105. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1 through 104 as if fully set forth herein.
106. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on state action that deprives individuals of life, liberty, or property.
107. Substantive protections of the Due Process Clause include the right to avoid disclosure of sensitive, personal information.
108. Plaintiffs have a fundamental right of privacy in preventing the release of, and in deciding in what circumstances to release: (1) personal information whose release could subject them to bodily harm; and (2) information of a highly personal and intimate nature.
109. The Driver’s License Policy discloses highly personal information regarding Plaintiffs to each person who sees the license. This disclosure places Plaintiffs at risk of bodily harm.
110. There is no compelling state interest that is furthered by the Driver’s License Policy, nor is the Policy narrowly tailored or the least restrictive
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alternative for promoting a state interest. The Policy is not even rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
111. In addition, Plaintiffs’ privacy interests outweigh any purported interest the Defendant could assert.
COUNT NO. 2: THE DRIVER’S LICENSE POLICY VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 112. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1 through 111 as if fully set forth herein. 113. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. 1, and is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. 14. 114. The First Amendment protects the right to speak and to refrain from speaking. 115. The Driver’s License Policy violates the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs to refrain from speaking by forcing them to disclose to each person who sees their license private information about their transgender status and their medical condition and by forcing them to identify themselves to each person who sees their license by a gender that conflicts with their core identity.
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116. There is no compelling state interest that is furthered by the Driver’s License Policy, nor is the Policy narrowly tailored or the least restrict alternative for promoting a state interest.
COUNT NO. 3: THE DRIVER’S LICENSE POLICY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION 117. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1 through 116 as if fully set forth herein. 118. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1. 119. The Driver’s License Policy is directed solely to transgender individuals and discriminates against them because only transgender persons are required to show an amended birth certificate in order to correct their driver’s license or state ID card so that it accurately reflects their identity. Other identifying characteristics, including height and eye color, on a driver’s license or state ID card can be changed without any sort of proof. 120. There is no compelling or important governmental interest that is furthered by the Driver’s License Policy differential treatment of transgender persons seeking to correct their driver’s license as compared to non-transgender individuals who request a correction, nor is the Policy narrowly tailored or the least
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restrict alternative for promoting a state interest. Nor is there even a rational connection between any legitimate governmental interest and the Driver’s License Policy’s disparate treatment of transgender persons.
121. The Driver’s License Policy is invalid under any form of constitutional scrutiny because it was enacted for the improper purpose of disadvantaging a specific class, is founded in animus toward transgender Michiganders, and serves no legitimate governmental interest.
COUNT NO. 4: THE DRIVER’S LICENSE POLICY VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL 122. Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, E.B., and K.S. re-allege paragraphs 1 through 121 as if fully set forth herein. 123. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals’ right to interstate travel. 124. The Clause protects citizens who choose to become permanent residents of a new state by requiring the new state to treat the new residents the same as existing residents of the state. 125. However, the Driver’s License Policy divides transgender Michiganders into two groups: those who were born in Michigan and those who were not. The Policy substantially interferes with the rights of Plaintiffs who were not born in Michigan, including Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, E.B., and K.S., but were
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born in a state where they are unable to amend the gender on their birth certificate or are required to obtain a court order in order to do so.
126. Michigan residents who were born in Michigan are able to change the gender on the Michigan driver’s license or state ID card after having had surgery and do not have to obtain a court order.
127. Plaintiffs Seitz, Stone, and E.B. were born in states that do not allow amendments to birth certificates and thus are treated differently from those individuals born in Michigan in that they are unable to change the gender on their driver’s licenses under the Driver’s License Policy.
128. Plaintiff K.S. was born in a state that requires a court order to amend the gender on his birth certificate, so he is also treated differently from Michiganborn residents who do not have to obtain a court order to change the gender on a Michigan driver’s license or state ID card under the Driver’s License Policy.
129. The need of Ms. Seitz, Mr. Stone, E.B., and K.S. and other similarly situated transgender individuals to change the gender on their Michigan driver’s licenses or state ID card is unrelated to the length of time that they have resided in Michigan or their place of their birth.
130. The Driver’s License Policy is not narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive alternative to further a compelling state interest and thus violates the Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, E.B., and K.S.’s right to interstate travel.
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COUNT NO. 5: THE DRIVER’S LICENSE POLICY VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ LIBERTY
INTEREST IN REFUSING UNWANTED MEDICAL TREATMENT 131. Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. re-allege paragraphs 1 through 130 as
if fully set forth herein. 132. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects
individuals’ substantive rights to be free to make certain private decisions without unjustified governmental intrusion.
133. The right to make certain private decisions without unjustified governmental intrusion includes the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
134. The Driver’s License Policy forces certain transgender individuals who were born in Michigan to choose between exercising their right to forgo gender confirmation surgery and securing a driver’s license or state ID card reflecting the correct gender on it.
135. Not all transgender individuals undergo gender confirmation surgery. For some, the surgery is not medically necessary, while for others it is unsafe. Surgery may be medically necessary for others who do not have health insurance coverage for it and cannot afford to pay for the surgery out-of-pocket.
136. Ms. Love has not undergone gender confirmation surgery because she is not interested in having surgery, does not believe that it is medically necessary for her at this point, and does not have insurance coverage for the surgery or the
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financial means to pay for it out-of-pocket. Plaintiff A.M. has not had surgery, because the medical professionals who treat her have not indicated that it is medically necessary for her and she has neither health insurance coverage for the surgery nor the financial resources to pay for surgery out-of-pocket.
137. As a result of not having had gender confirmation surgery, Love and A.M. are unable to amend their birth certificate to accurately reflect their gender and are therefore denied a driver’s license or state ID card that accurately reflects their gender identity and expression.
138. The Driver’s License Policy is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive alternative to further a compelling government interest and therefore violates the liberty interests of Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. Nor is it rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
LACK OF LEGAL REMEDY 139. Plaintiffs’ harm is ongoing and cannot be alleviated except by injunctive relief. 140. No other remedy is available at law.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that this Court: a. Issue a judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, declaring the
Driver’s License Policy unconstitutional for the reasons and/or on the
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counts set forth above;

b. Permanently enjoin Defendant from enforcing the Driver’s License

Policy;

c. Award Plaintiffs their costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988; and

d. Grant such other relief as the Court finds just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jay D. Kaplan Jay D. Kaplan (P38197) Daniel S. Korobkin (P72842) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6812 jkaplan@aclumich.org dkorobkin@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org

Steven R. Gilford Michael F. Derksen Jacki L. Anderson PROSKAUER ROSE LLP 70 West Madison, Suite 3800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 962-3550 sgilford@proskauer.com mderksen@proskauer.com jlanderson@proskauer.com

John A. Knight American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation 180 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 201-9740 jaknight@aclu.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated: May 21, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EMANI LOVE, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. RUTH JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 15-11834 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [16] Plaintiffs, a group of transgender individuals, filed this civil rights lawsuit against the Michigan Secretary of State seeking a declaration that the department's policy for changing the sex on a state-issued ID is unconstitutional. According to the complaint, the policy has made it unduly burdensome–and in some cases impossible–for Plaintiffs and others like them to obtain a state ID that accurately reflects their gender. In this way, Plaintiffs are forced to rely on an official ID that does not conform with their physical appearance. This, they maintain, indirectly divulges their transgender status to complete strangers and places them at serious risk of harm. Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). According to Defendant, even accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, Plaintiffs have failed to assert a claim of constitutional dimension. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a cognizable privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The

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Court further declines to address the substantive merit of Plaintiffs remaining claims on the principle of judicial restraint. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are six transgender individuals whose gender identity does not conform to the sex they were assigned at birth.1 “Gender identity” commonly refers to “a person’s internal sense of being male, female or something else[.]” American Psychological Association Publication, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx. “Sex assigned at birth” on the other hand, refers “to one’s biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes . . . .” Id. A transgender person may decide to undergo “gender transition”–the complex process of altering a person’s birthassigned sex–which may involve one or more of the following: “adopting the appearance of the desired sex through changes in clothing and grooming, adopting a new name, changing sex designation on identity documents (if possible), using hormone therapy treatment, and/or undergoing medical procedures . . . .” Id. Plaintiffs’ complaint focuses on the Michigan Secretary of State’s alleged role in impeding the gender transition process by establishing unduly burdensome requirements for transgender individuals to alter the gender designation on their state IDs.
In 2011, Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (“Johnson” or “Defendant”) implemented a new policy (the “Policy”) for “changing sex” on a state ID. The Policy provides as follows:
An applicant may request to change the sex on their driver license or
1 According to the American Psychological Association, "[t]ransgender is an umbrella term for persons whose gender identity, gender expression or behavior does not conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth.” APA Publication, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx

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[personal identification card]. The individual must provide a certified birth certificate showing the sex of the applicant. A birth certificate is the only document accepted as proof to change an individual’s sex. A U.S. passport cannot be accepted as proof of a sex change. (Def.’s Br. Ex. A, Identification Policy) (emphasis in original). Under the Policy, then, transgender individuals must procure an amended birth certificate in order to obtain a new state ID.2 Plaintiffs maintain that this requirement places “onerous and in some cases insurmountable obstacles to prevent transgender persons from correcting the gender on driver’s licenses and state IDs . . . [and] stands in contrast with the decisions of the federal government and numerous states to ease restrictions on changing gender on identity documents . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 45). Indeed, according to Plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of State only requires a doctor’s certification that a person “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” to change the gender on his or her passport. (Id. at ¶ 45(a)). Likewise, “[a]t least 25 of the States and the District of Columbia do not require a transgender person to undergo surgery to change the gender” on their state ID. (Id. ¶ 45(c)). Because state laws differ in terms of whether and how an individual can amend the gender on their birth certificate, the practical effect of the Policy varies. Under Michigan law, Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. are required to undergo sex-reassignment surgery to procure an amended birth certificate. (Id. at ¶5(c)). By contrast, Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, and E.B. “cannot obtain an accurate [Michigan] driver’s license under any circumstances because their state of birth does not allow them to amend the gender on
2 Interestingly, Plaintiffs assert that “Michigan residents obtaining a new driver’s license or state ID for the first time are not required to present a birth certificate at all in order to obtain a driver’s license or state ID listing the correct gender.” (Compl. ¶ 6).
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their birth certificate.” (Compl. ¶ 5(a)). In this way, the Policy creates various subclasses based solely on an individual’s state of birth.
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of an accurate state ID, Plaintiffs contend that the Policy indirectly requires them to reveal “their transgender status, their transition, and/or medical condition to all who see [their] licenses, including complete strangers.” (Id. ¶ 93). Based on their own experiences and “data regarding the high incidence of hate crimes among transgender individuals”, Plaintiffs allege that the forced disclosure of their status places them at great risk of bodily injury. (Compl. ¶ 94-95). This, in addition to the harassment, embarrassment, and “psychological injury by labeling them by the wrong sex”, is the driving force behind Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Plfs.’ Resp. 4). Plaintiffs now seek a declaration that the Policy is unconstitutional on the basis that it impermissibly interferes with their right to free speech, substantive due process, and equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs further allege that the Policy implicates their right to travel and autonomy in medical decision-making. Defendant, for her part, maintains that each of Plaintiffs’ five claims are substantively devoid of merit and should be dismissed on the pleadings. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Sixth Circuit recently noted that under the United States Supreme Court's heightened pleading standard laid out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), “a complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 714 F.3d 920, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court in Estate of Barney goes on to
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state that under Iqbal, “[a] claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hile the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ the plausibility standard does ask for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Finally, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show [n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). If the plaintiffs do “not nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Moreover, “documents attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c)). “A court may also consider matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. at 336. In addition documents not attached to the pleadings may still be considered part of the pleadings when the “document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim.” Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs assert five constitutional claims against Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (“Johnson” or “Defendant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes civil liability on a person acting under color of state law who “deprives another of the ‘rights,
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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ” Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1060 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The preliminary question, therefore, is whether Johnson deprived Plaintiffs of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2691 (1979).
A. Substantive Due Process- Fundamental Right to Privacy According to Plaintiffs, the State’s Identification Policy (the “Policy”) violates their right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it forces them to reveal their transgender status to complete strangers. This disclosure of highly personal and intimate information, Plaintiffs maintain, is both embarrassing and places them at great risk of bodily harm. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause “bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them . . . .” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 (1986). This “substantive component” of the Due Process Clause “includes not only privileges and rights expressly enumerated by the Bill of Rights, but [also] the fundamental rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726 (1973) (quotations omitted)). Two types of interests have been identified as protected “by the right to privacy that is rooted in [] substantive due process”- the interest in “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,” and the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S.Ct 869 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977)). Plaintiffs’ claim implicates
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the latter interest, which the Sixth Circuit has described as the right to “informational privacy.” Id. (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff alleging a violation of her right to informational privacy must demonstrate that the interest at stake relates to a “fundamental liberty interest.” Id. “Only after a fundamental right is identified should the court proceed to the next step of the analysis- the balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating the information against the individual’s interest in keeping the information private.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit has “recognized an informational-privacy interest of constitutional dimension in only two instances: (1) where the release of personal information could lead to bodily harm (Kallstrom), and (2) where the information released was of a sexual, personal, and humiliating nature (Bloch).” Id. Here, Plaintiffs maintain that the Policy endangers “their personal security and bodily integrity . . . .” (Plfs’ Resp. 7). In other words, Plaintiffs assert that the disclosure of their transgender status implicates the liberty interests identified under Kallstrom and Bloch.
In Kallstrom, the plaintiffs were three undercover police officers who were actively involved in a drug conspiracy investigation of the Short North Posse; a violent gang in the Columbus, Ohio area. 136 F.3d at 1059. The Government indicted 41 members of the gang and the plaintiffs testified at the trial of eight of the defendants. Id. During the trial, the city released the personnel records of the undercover officers to defense counsel, who then shared the information with the defendants. Id. The records contained, among other information, the names and addresses of the officers and their immediate family members. Id. Notwithstanding the seemingly obvious security breach associated with this disclosure, the city had previously assured the officers that their personal information would be held
7

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in strict confidence. Id. The officers later filed suit against the city contending that the release of their personnel files infringed upon their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit had little trouble concluding that the officers’ privacy interests were of “constitutional dimension” because they implicated a fundamental interest in “preserving their lives and the lives of . . . their family members, as well as preserving their personal security and bodily integrity.” Id. at 1062. This interest, according to the court, is implicated “where the release of private information places an individual at substantial risk of bodily harm . . . from a perceived likely threat, . . . .” Id. at 1064. Indeed, there is a long line of cases dating back to the nineteenth century recognizing that “individuals have a constitutional right to avoid the kind of physical invasions or abuse that ‘strip[] the very essence of personhood.’ ” Lambert, 517 F.3d 433, 441 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1063.). In essence, then, Kallstrom appears to stand for a relatively broad proposition; namely, that individuals have a fundamental privacy interest in the disclosure of personal information likely to lead to the threat of bodily harm.
The Sixth Circuit has also recognized the constitutional right to informational privacy in the context of “personal sexual matters.” In Bloch v. Ribar, the court considered whether the plaintiff had a fundamental right “to prevent the dissemination of confidential and intimate details of a rape . . . . ” 156 F.3d 673, 686 (6th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff’s claim was triggered by a press conference in which the county sheriff released “highly personal and extremely humiliating details of the rape suffered by Ms. Bloch . . . [including] details of the acts perpetrated against her that were so embarrassing she had not even told her husband.” Id. at 676. The court, relying on the same logic employed in Kallstrom,
8

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 9 of 15 Pg ID 333
explained that “sexuality and choices about sex, in turn, are interests of an intimate nature which define significant portions of our personhood. Publically revealing information regarding these interests exposes an aspect of our lives that we regard as highly personal and private.” Id. at 685. Against this backdrop, the court concluded that “information regarding private sexual matters warrants constitutional protection against public dissemination.” Id.
According to Plaintiffs, “because the Policy requires [them] to carry an ID with a sex that conflicts with their lived sex, Defendant forces them to reveal their transgender status to complete strangers.” (Plfs’ Resp. 6). This disclosure, Plaintiffs maintain,“places them at serious risk of physical harm, endangering their personal security and bodily integrity and thereby rising to constitutional dimensions.” (Id. at 6-7). Defendant, for her part, argues that, "in contrast to the 'very real threat' in Kallstrom posted by a violent gang against the undercover officers who . . . testified against them, Plaintiffs cite to statistics about the risks to transgender individuals in general, and allege hypothetical risks . . . . '" (Def.’s Br. 7).
The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s logic for a number of reasons. First, the Kallstrom court unambiguously identified the right to personal security and bodily integrity “from a perceived likely threat . . . . ” Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1064 (emphasis added). In other words, contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, “hypothetical risk” plays an important role in determining whether Plaintiffs’ privacy claim implicates a fundamental liberty interest. Here, Plaintiffs have offered a plethora of evidence which, accepted as true, suggests that the Policy poses a real threat to their “personal security and bodily integrity.” Id. at 1062. Indeed, in addition to general statistics “regarding the high incidence of hate crimes among transgender individuals . . . when their transgender status is revealed”, (Compl. ¶ 95),
9

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 10 of 15 Pg ID 334
Plaintiffs point to first-hand experience of “harassing conduct that transgender persons often live through when forced to produce an ID document that fails to match their lived gender.” (Compl. ¶ 97); see (Compl. ¶ 101) (“Emani Love was publicly embarrassed when she went to vote and the precinct worker outed her as transgender after looking at her state I.D. which incorrectly lists her gender as male); (Compl. ¶ 102) (“E.B. felt awkward and embarrassed when he was asked for an I.D. to order a a drink at a bar and after seeing the ID, the server started calling him ‘ma’am’ ”); (Compl. ¶ 103) (“When Tina Seitz had to show her driver’s license at a retail store . . . the clerk looked at her license and said ‘that’s not you.’ ”); (Id.) (“Codie Stone had a hostile experience at a hardware store where the clerk was extremely friendly to him before he produced his license after which the clerk’s tone and demeanor changed completely when he provided his license listing the incorrect gender.”). These allegations cut at the “very essence of personhood” protected under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1063.
The Second Circuit, in Powell v. Schriver, specifically recognized the “hostility and intolerance” toward transsexuals in support of its conclusion that “the Constitution does indeed protect the right to maintain the confidentiality of one’s transsexualism.” 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2nd Cir. 1999). In Powell, the plaintiff argued that the defendant violated her constitutional right to privacy by disclosing to other inmates that she was an HIV-positive transsexual. Id. at 109. The court, beginning with the bedrock principle that “there exists in the . . . Constitution a right to privacy protecting ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters[]’ ”, explained that “transsexualism is the unusual condition that is likely to provoke both an intense desire to preserve one’s medical confidentiality, as well as hostility and intolerance from others.” Id. at 111 (citations omitted). This observation,
10

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in conjunction with the “obvious [fact] that an individual who reveals that she is a transsexual ‘potentially exposes herself . . . to discrimination and intolerance[]”, led the court–in fairly summary fashion–to conclude that “transsexuals are among those who possess a constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality.” Id. at 112.
From a high-level perspective, the court’s reasoning in Powell is no different from Kallstrom.3 Both courts placed great emphasis on the risk of physical harm stemming from the disclosure of certain personal information. See Id. at 113 (“in the sexually charged atmosphere of most prison settings, [the disclosure of an inmate’s transsexualism] might lead to inmate-on-inmate violence.”). Here, there is no question that “[t]he excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate.” Id. at 111 (citing Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing transsexualism as “a gender identity disorder, the sufferers of which believe they are ‘cruelly imprisoned within a body incompatible with their real gender identity, . . . . ’ ”). Moreover, Plaintiffs, relying on their own experiences and the findings of several well-documented studies, maintain that there is a great deal of animosity towards the transgender community. Similar to Kallstrom, the Court finds “no reason to doubt that where disclosure of this [highly intimate] information may fall into the hands of persons” harboring such negative feelings, the Policy creates a very real threat to Plaintiffs’ personal security and bodily integrity. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1063. Accordingly, the Court finds that by requiring Plaintiffs to disclose their transgender status, the Policy directly implicates their fundamental right of privacy.
3 In fact, Defendant makes no attempt to distinguish Powell. 11

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 12 of 15 Pg ID 336
Where, as here, state action infringes upon a fundamental right, “such action will be upheld under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment only where the governmental action furthers a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to further that state interest.”4 Id. at 1064. Defendant vaguely identifies two purported interests–albeit not in the context of a fundamental right–in support of the Policy: (1) “maintaining accurate state identification documents” to “promote effective law enforcement” and, (2) ensuring “that the information on the license is consistent with other state records describing the individual.” (Def.'s Br. 23-24). Whether the Policy is narrowly tailored to further these interests “will turn on whether it is the least restrictive and least harmful means of satisfying the government's goal . . . .” United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Policy bears little, if any, connection to Defendant’s purported interests, and even assuming it did, there is no question that requiring an amended birth certificate to change the sex on one’s license is far from the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state’s goals. Indeed, as Plaintiffs point out “[b]ecause of the Policy, the sex listed on [their] licences fails to match their appearance and the sex associated with their names.” (Plfs.’ Resp. 26). In this way, the Policy undermines Defendant’s interest in accurately identifying
4 “Deciding the appropriate standard of review is crucial, because the ultimate decision in a case is often shaped by the standard applied.” United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956 (6th Cir. 1998); (citing Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 Conn. L.Rev. 961, 964 (1998) (positing that strict scrutiny has been applied so that “essentially no governmental interest sufficed to justify infringement, making strict scrutiny . . . ‘fatal in fact,’ and that rational basis review has been applied so that ‘even the flimsiest governmental justification would suffice.’ ”)
12

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 13 of 15 Pg ID 337
Plaintiffs to “promote law enforcement.” As the court reasoned in K.L. v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles,
[b]y not allowing transgendered individuals to change their sex designation, their license will inaccurately describe the discernable appearance of the license holder by not reflecting the holder's lived gender expression of identity. Thus, when such individuals furnish their license to third-persons for purposes of identification, the third-person is likely to conclude that the furnisher is not the person described on the license. No. 3AN-11-05431 CI, 2012 WL 2685183, *7 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012). Moreover, Defendant’s Policy only applies to individuals who are seeking to renew or change an existing license. See Applying for a License or ID? Applicant Checklist, available at http://michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-127-1627_8669_9040_9043-312849--,00.html. In other words, a first-time transgender applicant may present a “[c]ertified birth certificate . . . [or a] valid, unexpired U.S. passport or passport card” for identity verification purposes. Id. This is significant, Plaintiffs maintain, because the U.S. Department of State only requires a doctor’s certification that an individual has “had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to the new gender” to change the gender designation on a passport. See (Compl. ¶ 45(a)) (emphasis added); U.S. Dep’t of State, Gender Reassignment Applicants, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/information/gender.html. Defendant fails to articulate how this two-tiered system promotes the state’s purported interest in ensuring “that the information on the license is consistent with other state records describing the individual . . . .” (Def.’s Br. 24). Finally, the Court need not spill a considerable amount of ink on the narrow tailoring requirement. As Plaintiffs point out “[a]t least 25 of the states and the District of Columbia do not require a transgender person to undergo surgery to change the gender on his or her
13

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 14 of 15 Pg ID 338
driver’s license or state ID card.” (Compl. ¶ 45(c)). The Court seriously doubts that these states have any less interest in ensuring an accurate record-keeping system. Moreover, as discussed, the U.S. Department of State, and, according to Plaintiffs, “at least 13 [other] states[,] have implemented policies only requiring a medical provider’s certification” in order for an individual to change the gender on their state ID. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court is unable to conclude at this juncture that the Policy narrowly serves the state’s interest in maintaining “accurate” identification documents or promoting effective law enforcement.
In light of the Court’s finding that Plaintiffs have raised a cognizable privacy claim under § 1983, the longstanding principle of judicial restraint cautions against adjudicating the remaining four constitutional claims. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 639 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (declined to address the plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim because the case was resolved on due-process grounds). The remainder of Defendant’s motion to dismiss is therefore denied without prejudice. Should future developments require the Court to rule on the viability of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, Defendant may seek leave to renew her motion at that time.
Accordingly, for the reasons thus stated, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss [16].
SO ORDERED.
14

2:15-cv-11834-NGE-EAS Doc # 36 Filed 11/16/15 Pg 15 of 15 Pg ID 339 s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge
Dated: November 16, 2015 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on November 16, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol J. Bethel Case Manager
15

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EMANI LOVE, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. RUTH JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 15-11834 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [40] On November 16, 2015, this Court issued an Order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. In essence, the Court concluded that because Defendant's License Policy jeopardizes the fundamental right to informational privacy, Plaintiffs' stated a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the Court's conclusion, Defendant now bears the burden of establishing that the Policy is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. With respect to Plaintiffs' remaining four claims, the Court, invoking the principle of judicial restraint, opted not to adjudicate any additional constitutional questions at this stage of the case. Defendant now requests the Court to reconsider this decision and issue a full opinion and order on the merits. Pursuant to Rule 7.1(h) of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan, a party may file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days after a court issues an order to which the party objects. Although a court has the discretion to grant such a motion, it generally will not grant a motion for reconsideration that “merely present[s] the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. L. R.

7.1(h). To persuade the court to grant the motion, the movant “must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties . . . have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” Id.
Here, Defendant argues that if the Court does not address the substantive merit of the remaining claims, the parties will be forced "to pursue costly and voluminous discovery as to claims that may not be facially viable." (Def.'s Mot. 3). Even assuming this consideration was relevant to the principle of judicial restraint, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's appeal for a number of reasons. First, there is no question that Plaintiffs' complaint is tethered to one overarching concern, namely: the "State of Michigan's refusal to recognize and respect the gender of Plaintiffs and other transgender people by denying them the ability to obtain a driver's license or state identification card that accurately reflects their gender." (Compl. ¶ 1). For this reason, each of Plaintiffs' five claims seeks precisely the same relief- a declaration that the License Policy is unconstitutional. (Compl. ¶ a). It comes as little surprise, therefore, that Defendant was unable to substantiate any of the purported "discovery problems" created by the Court's decision.
Morever, the bulk of Plaintiffs' remaining constitutional claims present issues of first impression in this Circuit. This further supports the Court's decision to invoke the longstanding principle of judicial restraint. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2031, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (noting rule that courts must avoid resolving constitutional questions unnecessarily). In sum, "[n]o valid reason justifie[s] abandonment of this doctrine in this case. The abandonment of the rule [would] instead thrust this case into a thicket of constitutional issues it [may not be] necessary to enter." Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 511 (1st Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, for the reasons thus stated, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for reconsideration [40].
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge Dated: January 10, 2016 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on January 10, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. s/Carol J. Bethel Case Manager

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EMANI LOVE, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v. RUTH JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 15-11834 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CONVERTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [48]
On May 21, 2015, Plaintiffs, a group of transgender individuals, filed this civil rights action asserting a constitutional challenge to the Michigan Secretary of State’s policy (the “Policy”) for changing the gender on a state-issued ID. According to Plaintiffs, the Policy makes it unduly burdensome–and in some cases impossible–for members of the transgender community to obtain an ID reflecting their lived gender. This is so, they maintain, because the Policy requires applicants to obtain an amended birth certificate; a document many states will not provide under any circumstances.
On November 16, 2015, the Court denied Johnson’s motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the Policy directly implicated Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Love v. Johnson, 146 F.Supp.3d 848 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Shortly after the Court issued its order, Johnson amended the Policy in a significant way. Specifically, a Michigan resident is no longer required to produce an amended birth certificate to change the gender on their state ID. According to Johnson, because the

State voluntarily eliminated this requirement, this case is now moot under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). For the reasons stated more fully below, the Court GRANTS
Johnson’s converted motion for summary judgment.1
I. BACKGROUND
Shortly after Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (“Johnson” or “Defendant”)
was elected to office in 2010, she instituted a policy (the “Policy”) requiring an amended
birth certificate to change the gender on a state-issued ID. (Compl. ¶¶ 42-44). As this
Court previously discussed,
[b]ecause state laws differ in terms of whether and how an individual can amend the gender on their birth certificate, the practical effect of the Policy varie[d]. Under Michigan law, Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. [were] required to undergo sex-reassignment surgery to procure an amended birth certificate. (Id. at ¶5(c)). By contrast, Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, and E.B. ‘[could not] obtain an accurate [Michigan] driver’s license under any circumstances because their state of birth does not allow them to amend the gender on their birth certificate.’ (Compl. ¶ 5(a)).
Love, 146 F.Supp.3d at 851. In this way, the Policy created various subclasses based
solely on an individual’s state of birth. Id. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Policy
posed “a real threat to [Plaintiffs’] personal security and bodily integrity” under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and rejected Johnson’s motion to dismiss
the complaint. Id. at 855.
1 Under Rule 12(c), the Court is prohibited from considering matters outside the pleadings unless they are “referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [the] claim.” Weiner v. Klas & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1998). Where, as here, Johnson’s argument relies on a deposition transcript and an affidavit, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Because Plaintiffs have also incorporated a number of matters outside the pleadings in their supplemental brief, the Court finds that they have been given a “reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to [a Rule 56] motion.” Id. The Court thus converts Johnson’s motion into one for summary judgment.
2

Approximately four months after this Court’s decision, the Secretary of State published “a notice regarding an update to what is required for changing the sex designation on a driver license or personal identification card.” (“new Policy”) (Def.’s Reply Ex. B, Grace Ueberroth Aff. ¶ 2). Under the new Policy, an applicant seeking to change the gender on their state ID “must provide any one of the following documents that show a sex other than currently designated on the drivers license or [personal identification card]: a certified birth certificate, a valid US Passport, valid US Passport Card or court order changing the sex of the individual.” (Id. at Ex. 2, Drivers License Manual). Significantly, the State will now accept a U.S. Passport or Passport Card to validate an applicant’s gender. This development is particularly important to the transgender community–and, by extension, this case–because, according to Plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of State only requires a doctor’s certification that a person “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” to change the gender on his or her passport. (Compl. at ¶ 45(a)). By adopting the new Policy and “voluntarily abandoning the requirement to provide a certified birth certificate as proof to change [] an individual’s sex designation on his or her [ID],” (Def.’s Mot. 5), Johnson maintains that she “has remedied any alleged constitutional violation . . . .” claimed by Plaintiffs. (Id.). On March 10, 2016, the day the new Policy was adopted, Johnson filed the instant motion to dismiss asserting that Plaintiffs’ complaint is now moot. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Johnson’s principal argument requires the Court to consider a deposition transcript and affidavit. See (Def.’s Supp. Br. Ex. A and C). Ordinarily, such “ ‘[m]atters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a 12[c] motion to dismiss,’ and
3

a court that considers such matters must first convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).’” Kovac v. Superior Dairy, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.1997). Plaintiffs, in their supplemental brief, likewise rely upon a number of documents outside the pleadings. See (Dkt. 76). The Court thus converts Johnson’s motion and considers her request under the summary judgment framework set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
It is well established that summary judgment under Rule 56 is proper when the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); S.E.C. v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. Furthermore, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material, and summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When considering the material facts on the record, a court must bear in mind that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. III. ANALYSIS
"Under Article III of the Constitution, [a federal court's] jurisdiction extends only to 4

actual cases and controversies. [A federal court has] no power to adjudicate disputes which are moot." McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quotation omitted). "Claims become moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Ky., 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A federal court “can neither declare unconstitutional nor enjoin the enforcement of a provision that is no longer in effect.” Id.
While there is no question that the Secretary of State has abandoned the Policy giving rise to this litigation, Plaintiffs assert that Johnson has failed to meet her "heavy burden of proving that the challenged conduct will not start up again." (Plfs.' Resp. 8). As the Supreme Court explained in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S. Ct. 693, 708, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000). But context is important; Friends of the Earth, "is the appropriate standard for cases between private parties, but this is not the view [many circuits] have taken toward acts of voluntary cessation by government officials . . . ." Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 675 F.3d 974, 982 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2003). Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, cessation of illegal conduct by "government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than similar action by private parties[;] self-correction provides a secure foundation for a dismissal based on mootness so long as it appears genuine." Id. at 981 (quoting Mosley v. Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1990).
5

For that reason, "[l]egislative repeal or amendment of a challenged statute while a case is pending . . . usually eliminates [the] case-or-controversy because a statute must be analyzed by the . . . court in its present form." Id; see also Brandywine, 359 F.3d at 836 (absent an expressed "intention to re-enact the offending legislation . . . . " the passage of an amendment provides sufficient assurance that the case is moot.) However, as Plaintiffs correctly point out, here "there was no legislative repeal: Defendant exercised her unfettered discretion in unilaterally changing the policy, and she is completely unconstrained from changing it back again." (Plf.'s Br. 10). But accepting Plaintiffs argument would, in effect, render voluntary governmental compliance meaningless outside of the legislative sphere. Surely this is not what the Sixth Circuit intended by specifically distinguishing self-corrective measures adopted by government officials from private parties. See Id. at 982 ("we place greater stock in [government officials] acts of selfcorrection, so long as they appear genuine.") (quoting Fed'n of Adver. Indus., 326 F.3d at 929). On the other hand, recognizing that Johnson's unilateral power does not fit neatly in the Brandywine (legislative action) or Friends of the Earth (private party) line of cases, the better approach, in this Court's view, is to evaluate the sincerity of her voluntary compliance.
Here, "there is no evidence in the record that [Johnson] has announced any intention of, or made any threat to" revert back to the old Policy. Id. at 981 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims were moot in light of the passage of a new ordinance). On the contrary, Johnson has consistently maintained that she has "absolutely no intention of changing the new Policy . . . ." (Def.'s Supp. Br. Ex. A, Johnson Aff. at ¶ 4; Ex. C, Johnson Dep. at 63). This sentiment has likewise been echoed by Michael Wartella, Johnson's so-called "expert"
6

advisor in this area. See Id. (Ex. B, Wartella Dep. at 52-53). And for good reason; the new Policy–which has been in effect for nearly six months–constitutes an entirely new way of doing business at the Secretary of State. See (Def.’s Reply Ex. B, Ueberroth Aff., ¶ 2). Reincarnating the old Policy would be a significant waste of state resources and, as a practical matter, a fool’s errand. As this Court made clear in its order denying Johnson's initial motion to dismiss, because the old Policy directly implicates Plaintiffs’ fundamental right of privacy, it “cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny, [the] most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995). “Strict scrutiny has been applied so that ‘essentially no governmental interest sufficed to justify infringement, making strict scrutiny . . . ‘fatal in fact, . . . .’” United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956 (6th Cir. 1998); (quoting Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 Conn. L.Rev. 961, 964 (1998). There is little doubt that Johnson’s decision was motivated, at least in part, by this realization.
Nor does Plainitffs’ reliance on Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2003) suggest that the result should be any different. There, the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) repealed a series of contested work regulations while the case was still pending. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held that the repeal did not moot the case for two reasons. First, “there was no guarantee that MDOC [would] not change back to its older, stricter [r]ule as soon as [the] action [was] terminate[d].” Id. at 1035. More importantly, however, because “the plaintiffs could be entitled to money damages and the purging of their disciplinary records if the old version of the [r]ule was found to be unconstitutional, . . . it [was] incumbent on [the] court to examine all versions of the [r]ule.”
7

Id. In other words, the amended regulations did not completely eradicate the harm associated with the contested policies.
The concerns raised in Akers are simply not present here. While Johnson could, theoretically, revert back to the old Policy, it would fly in the face of her sworn declaration to this Court and present serious–and seemingly insurmountable–constitutional obstacles.2 Furthermore, it’s unclear how, at this juncture, the Court could “affect the legal relations between the parties.” Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't, 460 F.3d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks “declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendant’s unconstitutional Driver’s License Policy . . . . ”, defined as the policy implemented by Johnson in 2011. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11). But that policy is no longer in effect, and Plaintiffs have not sought leave to amend their complaint to challenge the new Policy. See Bench Billboard Co., 675 F.3d at 982 (unlike other cases declining to apply the mootness doctrine, here the city “imposed an entirely new statutory scheme in place of the repealed ordinance, and there are no allegations that the scheme poses any constitutional issues.”) In fact, Plaintiffs appear to implicitly agree that the new Policy, which essentially mirrors the federal government’s position on amending identity documents, is reasonable. See (Compl. at ¶¶ 10, 45) (“The U.S. Department of State requires only that a doctor certify that a person seeking a gender change on a driver’s license ‘has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to the new gender’ . . . .”); (“In stark contrast to Michigan . . . the federal government . . . [has] modernized [its] policies for correcting the gender on identity documents . . . . ”).
2 The Court notes that any future challenges to the Policy initiated by Plaintiffs would satisfy the “companion” criteria set forth under Local Rule 83.11(b).
8

In sum, the Court finds Johnson’s voluntary cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct to be genuine. Hanging in the balance is a new, less restrictive policy that Plaintiffs agree conforms to “current scientific knowledge and research regarding transgender individuals and the medical standard of care for treating persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria.” (Id. at ¶ 45). Because the old Policy has been abandoned, there is no longer a “live controversy” between the parties, and the Court must, and does GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss under the mootness doctrine.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. (Dkt. 48). This order closes the case in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds Nancy G. Edmunds United States District Judge Dated: August 23, 2016 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on August 23, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. s/Carol J. Bethel Case Manager
9

 
 Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 1 of 10
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:15−cv−11834−NGE−EAS

CLOSED

Love et al v. Johnson Assigned to: District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds Referred to: Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 05/21/2015 Date Terminated: 08/23/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Emani Love

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578−6824 Fax: (313) 578−6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson Perkins Coie LLP 700 Thirteenth St. Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005 202−654−1760 Fax: 202−654−6211 Email: jackianderson@perkinscoie.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight American Civil Liberties Union Foundation LGBT & AIDS Project 180 N. Michigan Ave. Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 312−201−9740 Fax: 312−288−5225 Email: jknight@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen Proskauer Rose LLP 70 West Madison Se. 3800 Chicago, IL 60602 312−962−3562 Fax: 312−962−3551 Email: mderksen@proskauer.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6814 Email: msteinberg@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 2 of 10

Steven R. Gilford Proskauer Rose LLP 70 West Madison Suite 3800 Chicago, IL 60602 312−962−3510 Fax: 312−962−3551 Email: sgilford@proskauer.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6812 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: kaplan@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tina Seitz

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Gilford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Codie Stone

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen (See above for address)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 3 of 10

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Gilford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E.B.

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Gilford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff A.M.

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 4 of 10

Steven R. Gilford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff K.S.

represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacki Lynn Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Frederik Derksen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Gilford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Ruth Johnson

represented by Denise C. Barton MI Dept of Atty Gen Public Employment, Elections and Torts Division P.O. Box 30736 525 W. Ottawa St. Lansing, MI 48909−8236 517−373−6434 Fax: 517−373−2454 Email: bartond@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erik A. Grill Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Srvs P.O. Box 30220 530 W Allegan, 8th Floor Lansing, MI 48909 517−284−8781 Fax: 517−284−8851 Email: grille@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 5 of 10
Jeanmarie Miller State of Michigan Department of Attorney General P.O. Box 30736 525 W. Ottawa St. Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−6434 Fax: 517−373−2454 Email: MillerJ51@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin R. Himebaugh Michigan Department of Attorney General Civil Litigation, Employment & Elections Division P.O. Box 30736 525 W. Ottawa St. Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−6434 Fax: 517−373−2454 Email: AG−PEET@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/21/2015
05/21/2015
05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/21/2015 05/26/2015 06/04/2015 06/11/2015 06/15/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−5171821 − Fee: $ 400. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − County of 1st Defendant: Ingham. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Kaplan, Jay) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (DPer) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
2 SUMMONS Issued for *Ruth Johnson* (DPer) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel S. Korobkin on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by John A. Knight on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Knight, John) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Steven R. Gilford on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Gilford, Steven) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Frederik Derksen on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Steinberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
8 MOTION for Protective Order to Proceed Under Fictitious Names by A.M., E.B., K.S.. (Kaplan, Jay) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Jacki Lynn Anderson on behalf of A.M., E.B., K.S., Emani Love, Tina Seitz, Codie Stone. (Anderson, Jacki) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
10 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. All Defendants. (Kaplan, Jay) (Entered: 06/04/2015)
11 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Denise C. Barton appearing on behalf of Ruth Johnson (Barton, Denise) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
12 ORDER Requiring Defendant's Response to Pltf's 8 Motion for Protective Order. Response due by 6/29/2015 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 6 of 10

06/15/2015 06/15/2015 06/15/2015 07/16/2015 07/16/2015 07/16/2015 07/17/2015 07/17/2015 07/27/2015 07/28/2015 07/28/2015 07/28/2015 07/31/2015 08/05/2015 08/24/2015 09/01/2015 09/16/2015 09/25/2015 10/05/2015

(Entered: 06/15/2015)
13 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time to 7/16/15 for defts to plead and to respond to pltf's motion for protective order. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
14 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford: 8 MOTION for Protective Order to Proceed Under Fictitious Names filed by K.S., E.B., A.M.. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
15 NOTICE OF HEARING on 8 MOTION for Protective Order to Proceed Under Fictitious Names. Motion Hearing set for 8/24/2015 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. (MarW) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
16 MOTION to Dismiss by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. Driver License Manual (DLM), # 3 Exhibit B. Michigan Drivers License Sample) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
17 RESPONSE to 8 MOTION for Protective Order to Proceed Under Fictitious Names filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. Proposed Stipulated Order) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
18 MOTION to Stay Discovery by Ruth Johnson. (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
19 NOTICE OF HEARING on 16 MOTION to Dismiss . Motion Hearing set for 10/7/2015 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CBet) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
20 ORDER Requiring pltf's Response to 18 Motion to Stay. Response due by 7/31/2015 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
21 REPLY to Response re 8 MOTION for Protective Order to Proceed Under Fictitious Names filed by A.M., E.B., K.S.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 07/27/2015)
22 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time for pltf to respond to deft's motion to dismiss by 8/24/15; reply due by 9/9/15. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
23 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. (MarW) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Hearing on 8/24/15 is Cancelled re 15 Notice of Hearing on Motion for Protective Order. (MarW) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
24 RESPONSE to 18 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
25 OPINION & ORDER denying 18 Motion to Stay discovery. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 08/05/2015)
26 RESPONSE to 16 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 08/24/2015)
27 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time to 9/16/15 for deft to file reply with extension of 15 page limit. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
28 REPLY to Response re 16 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Ruth Johnson. (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
29 NOTICE OF HEARING on 16 MOTION to Dismiss . Motion Hearing RESET for 11/4/2015 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CBet) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
30 MOTION for Protective Order by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. August 27, 2015 email from Carol J. Bethel) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 10/05/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 7 of 10

10/09/2015 10/09/2015 10/09/2015 10/09/2015 11/04/2015
11/10/2015
11/16/2015 11/23/2015 11/25/2015 11/30/2015 11/30/2015 12/16/2015 12/16/2015 12/30/2015 01/10/2016 02/11/2016 02/22/2016 02/23/2016 03/01/2016

31 DISCOVERY plan jointly filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
32 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Jeanmarie Miller appearing on behalf of Ruth Johnson (Miller, Jeanmarie) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
33 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Kevin R. Himebaugh appearing on behalf of Ruth Johnson (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
34 STIPULATION AND ORDER w/drawing deft's motion for protective order and extending time to 11/6/15 for deft to respond to pltf's discovery request. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds: Motion Hearing held on 11/4/2015 re 16 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Ruth Johnson Disposition: taken under advisement(Court Reporter Suzanne Jacques) (CBet) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
35 TRANSCRIPT of Motion to Dismiss held on 11/4/2015. (Court Reporter: Suzanne Jacques(email: jacques@transcriptorders.com)) (Number of Pages: 29) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter/Transcriber a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 12/1/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/11/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/8/2016. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Jacques, S.) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
36 OPINION & ORDER denying 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
37 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Scheduling Conference set for 12/16/2015 11:00 AM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CBet) (Entered: 11/23/2015)
38 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses with Certificate of Service by Ruth Johnson. (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
39 Redacted Version of 35 TRANSCRIPT of Motion to Dismiss held on 11/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/8/2016. (Jacques, S.) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
40 MOTION for Reconsideration re 36 Order on Motion to Dismiss by Ruth Johnson. (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds: Telephonic Scheduling Conference held on 12/16/2015 (CBet) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
41 SCHEDULING ORDER: witness list due 2/15/16; Discovery due by 4/15/2016 Dispositive Motion Cut−off set for 5/16/2016 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (Refer to image for additional dates) (CBet) (Entered: 12/16/2015)
42 STIPULATION AND ORDER w/drawing jury demand. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
43 OPINION & ORDER denying 40 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 01/10/2016)
44 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time to 2/22/16 for witness disclosure. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
45 WITNESS LIST by All Plaintiffs (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
46 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Ruth Johnson of Defendant's Witness List (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
47 MOTION to Bar Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 03/01/2016)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 8 of 10

03/10/2016 03/10/2016
03/17/2016
03/22/2016 03/22/2016 03/29/2016 03/31/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016
04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/07/2016 04/19/2016 04/20/2016 04/22/2016
05/03/2016 05/03/2016

48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness by Ruth Johnson. (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
49 MOTION for Protective Order by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. Deposition Notice, # 3 Exhibit B. Mr. Derksen's 2/18/16 email, # 4 Exhibit C. Jackson v. City of Detroit, # 5 Exhibit D. Jameson v. Oakland County) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
50 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending time to 3/31/16 for pltf to respond to motion for protective order with pltf's notice of deposition of deft Johnson held in abeyance pending ruling on motion; deft granted to 4/7/16 to reply; deft granted to 3/22/16 to respond to pltf's motion to bar; reply due 3/29/16. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
51 RESPONSE to 47 MOTION to Bar Expert filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit 1. Email between Counsel) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
52 NOTICE OF HEARING on 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness. Motion Hearing set for 5/4/2016 02:00 PM before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds (CBet) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
53 REPLY to Response re 47 MOTION to Bar Expert filed by All Plaintiffs. (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 03/29/2016)
54 RESPONSE to 49 MOTION for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
55 Joint MOTION TO EXTEND Scheduling Order Dates by Ruth Johnson. (Himebaugh, Kevin) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
56 ORDER granting Extension of SCHEDULING ORDER: by 60 days: ( Discovery extended to 6/16/2016, Dispositive Motion Cut−off extended to 7/15/2016), Motions terminated: 55 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (Refer to image for additional dates) (CBet) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
57 REPLY to Response re 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by All Plaintiffs. (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
58 DECLARATION by Jay Kaplan In Support of Response filed by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Document Continuation, # 3 Document Continuation, # 4 Document Continuation) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
59 REPLY to Response re 49 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibt, # 2 Exhibit A. Wartella deposition transcript pages) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
60 STIPULATION AND ORDER granting pltf leave to supplement the record; deft to file reply brief in support of motion for judgment by 4/22/16. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
61 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 57 Reply to Response to Motion, 60 Stipulation and Order, 54 Response to Motion filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Wartella Transcript Excerpts) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
62 RESPONSE to 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. Michael Wartella deposition transcript pages, # 3 Exhibit B. Affidavit of Grace Ueberroth) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
63 STIPULATION AND ORDER granting parties leave to supplement the record. Supplemental briefs shall be filed not later than 10:00 a.m. on 5/4/16. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
64 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 63 Stipulation and Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 13 to Wartella Dep., # 3 Exhibit 15 to Wartella Dep., # 4 Exhibit 18 to Wartella Dep.) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 05/03/2016)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 9 of 10

05/04/2016
05/06/2016 05/13/2016
05/17/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016
05/29/2016 05/31/2016 06/14/2016 06/15/2016 06/24/2016
06/24/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds: Motion Hearing held on 5/4/2016 re 49 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Ruth Johnson. Motion Denied. Pltf's are permitted to depose Secretary Johnson for a period not to exceed 3 hours. Deposition must be completed by June 3, 2016. Subject matter is limited to: Statements made during Secretary Johnson's campaign related to policy for changing the gender on a state issued ID: and her intentions w/respect to maintain or changing the current policy, 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by Ruth Johnson is held in abeyance following the deposition of Secretary Johnson. Parties may file supplemental briefs on or before June 17, 2016 not to exceed 5 pages. 47 MOTION to Bar Expert filed by K.S., E.B., Tina Seitz, Emani Love, A.M., Codie Stone is denied. Deft must identify experts by name and file amended witness list by June 3, 2016. (Court Reporter: Suzanne Jacques) (CBet) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
66 STIP & ORDER Striking 65 Supplemental Brief and leave granted to refile with redactions. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
67 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1. Discovery responses from E.B., # 3 Exhibit 2. Discovery responses from Tina Seitz, # 4 Exhibit 3. Discovery responses from Codie Stone, # 5 Exhibit 4. Discovery responses from K.S., # 6 Exhibit 5. Discovery responses from A.M., # 7 Exhibit 6. Discovery responses from Emani Love) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 05/13/2016)
68 MOTION for Reconsideration by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A. May 4, 2016 Transcript, p 19, # 3 Exhibit B. Affidavit of Ruth Johnson) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
69 ORDER Requiring Pltf's Response to 68 Motion for Reconsideration. Response due by 5/31/2016 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
70 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on 5/4/2016. (Court Reporter: Suzanne Jacques(email: jacques@transcriptorders.com)) (Number of Pages: 23) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 6/8/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/20/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/16/2016. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Jacques, S.) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
71 STIPULATION AND ORDER extending date to 6/10/16 to depose Sec Johnson per outline; and for extension of time for parties to file supplemental briefs per outline. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 05/29/2016)
72 RESPONSE to 68 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
73 NOTICE by Ruth Johnson of withdrawal of 68 MOTION for Reconsideration . (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
74 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
75 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by Ruth Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit A. Affidavit of Ruth Johnson, # 3 Exhibit B. Deposition excerpts of Michael Wartella, # 4 Exhibit C. Deposition excerpts of Ruth Johnson, # 5 Exhibit D. Deposition excerpts of A.M., # 6 Exhibit E. Deposition excerpts of Tina Seitz) (Grill, Erik) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
76 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 48 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Mootness filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 06/24/2016)

Case: 2:15-cv-11834 As of: 12/20/2018 03:25 PM EST 10 of 10

06/24/2016 06/27/2016 08/23/2016 08/23/2016

77 REQUEST for Permission to Exceed Page Limit by All Plaintiffs. (Derksen, Michael) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER re 77 granting Request of pltf to exceed page limit. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
78 OPINION and ORDER granting deft's 48 converted MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
79 JUDGMENT granting deft's converted motion for summary judgment; case dismissed. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet) (Entered: 08/23/2016)