Case: 3:17-cv-820 As of: 05/31/2020 07:37 PM EDT 1 of 16
ADMCLOSED
U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17−cv−00820−MMH−PDB

Davis et al v. Inch, et al Assigned to: Judge Marcia Morales Howard Referred to: Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/19/2017 Date Terminated: 06/12/2019 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Mark Davis on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler Venable LLP 575 7th Street NW Washington, DC 20004 202/344−4227 Fax: 202/344−8300 Email: KCDearing@Venable.com TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea Venable, LLP* Suite 900 750 E Pratt St Baltimore, MD 21202 410/244−7400 Fax: 410/244−7742 Email: etshea@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott Assistant Federal Defender Office of the Federal Defender 227 N. Bronough St., Suite 4200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 850/942−8818 Email: linda_mcdermott@fd.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace Venable, LLP Suite 900 750 E Pratt St. Baltimore, MD 21202 410/244−7400 Fax: 410/244−7742 Email: Mtgrace@venable.com TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain McClain & McDermott, PA 141 NE 30th St

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Wilton Manors, FL 33334 305/984−8344 Fax: 954−564−5412 Email: martymcclain@earthlink.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea Venable, LLP Suite 900 750 E Pratt St. Baltimore, MD 21202 410/244−5212 Fax: 410/244−7742 Email: Mtshea@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal Venable LLP 575 7th Street NW Washington, DC 20004 202/653−3750 Fax: 202/344−8300 Email: Sarosenthal@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mark Geralds on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jesse Guardado on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Joseph Jordan on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Khalid Pasha on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/23/2018

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address)

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LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Rimmer on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Troy on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/23/2018

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Steven Stein on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea

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(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gary Whitton on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jason Stephens

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address)

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LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maggie T. Grace (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Julie Jones in her official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections

represented by Monica Galindo Stinson Office of the Attorney General Suite 1200 110 SE 6th St Ft Lauderdale, FL 33301 Email: Monica.Stinson@myfloridalegal.com TERMINATED: 04/02/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Andrew Johnson Office of the Attorney General PL−01 − The Capitol 400 S Monroe St Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850−414−3300 Fax: 850−488−4872 Email: Daniel.Johnson@myfloridalegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Welch Florida Office of the Attorney General The Capital, PL−01 400 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399 850/414−3647 Fax: 850/488−4872 Email: david.welch@myfloridalegal.com

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Kevin Jordan in his official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections

represented by Monica Galindo Stinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Andrew Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Welch (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Barry Reddish in his official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections

represented by Joe Belitzky Office of the Attorney General PL−01 − The Capitol 400 S Monroe St Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850/414−3300 Fax: 856/488−4872 Email: Joe.Belitzky@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Monica Galindo Stinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/02/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Andrew Johnson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Welch (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/19/2017
07/19/2017 07/24/2017 08/02/2017
08/02/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish with Jury Demand (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number JAX24698) filed by Robert Rimmer, Jesse Guardado, John Troy, Gary Whitton, Mark Geralds, Steven Stein, Mark Davis, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(BD) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
2 SUMMONS issued as to Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (BD) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
3 NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 − track 1. Signed by Deputy Clerk on 7/24/2017. (JW) (Entered: 07/24/2017)
4 MOTION for Seth Rosenthal to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Appendix)(McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 08/02/2017)
5 MOTION for Mathhew Shea to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Appendix)(McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 08/02/2017)

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08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/03/2017 08/03/2017
08/03/2017
08/03/2017
08/03/2017
08/07/2017
08/16/2017 08/22/2017 08/22/2017 08/23/2017 08/23/2017 09/06/2017 09/15/2017

6 MOTION for Claire Wheeler to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 08/02/2017)
7 MOTION for Maggie Grace to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 08/02/2017)
8 AMENDED NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 − track 3. Signed by Deputy Clerk on 8/3/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Case Management Report Form, # 2 Consent Letter and Form)(JW) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
***PRO HAC VICE FEES paid and Special Admission Attorney Certification Form filed by attorney Seth A. Rosenthal, appearing on behalf of Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton (Filing fee $150 receipt number JAX024827.) Related document: 4 MOTION for Seth Rosenthal to appear pro hac vice. (AFC) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
***PRO HAC VICE FEES paid and Special Admission Attorney Certification Form filed by attorney Claire M. Wheeler, appearing on behalf of Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton (Filing fee $150 receipt number JAX024828.) Related document: 6 MOTION for Claire Wheeler to appear pro hac vice. (AFC) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
***PRO HAC VICE FEES paid and Special Admission Attorney Certification Form filed by attorney Matthew T. Shea, appearing on behalf of Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton (Filing fee $150 receipt number JAX024829.) Related document: 5 MOTION for Mathhew Shea to appear pro hac vice. (AFC) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
***PRO HAC VICE FEES paid and Special Admission Attorney Certification Form filed by attorney Maggie T. Grace, appearing on behalf of Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton (Filing fee $150 receipt number JAX024830.) Related document: 7 MOTION for Maggie Grace to appear pro hac vice. (AFC) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
9 ORDER granting 4, 5, 6, 7, the plaintiffs' motions to allow Maggie Grace, Seth Rosenthal, Matthew Shea, and Claire Wheeler to specially appear to represent them in this case, with Linda McDermott serving as local counsel, and directing them to expeditiously register with the Court's electronic case filing (ECF) system. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 8/7/2017. (ASL) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
10 CERTIFICATE of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement by Mark Davis. (McDermott, Linda) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Monica Galindo Stinson on behalf of Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
12 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply (Unopposed) by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 08/22/2017)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Andrew Johnson on behalf of Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish (Johnson, Daniel) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
14 ENDORSED ORDER granting 12 the defendants' unopposed motion for more time to respond to 1 the complaint. The defendants must respond to the complaint by October 6, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 8/23/2017. (CAW) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
15 ORDER scheduling a preliminary pretrial conference for 10/19/2017 at 10:00 AM in Jacksonville Courtroom B before Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. Counsel may appear by telephone. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/6/2017. (ASL) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
16 NOTICE by Mark Davis of Service to Julie L. Jones (McDermott, Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2017)

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09/15/2017 09/15/2017 09/28/2017 10/06/2017 10/10/2017 10/12/2017 10/17/2017 10/17/2017 10/18/2017 10/19/2017 10/23/2017
10/25/2017
10/25/2017 10/27/2017

17 NOTICE by Mark Davis of Service to Kevin Jordan (McDermott, Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2017)
18 NOTICE by Mark Davis of Service to Barry Reddish (McDermott, Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2017)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by David Welch on behalf of Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish (Welch, David) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
20 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 1) , MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim , MOTION to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Betty Money (Exhibit A))(Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
21 CERTIFICATE of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
22 CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT. (Grace, Maggie) (Entered: 10/12/2017)
23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 1) MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim MOTION to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction by All Plaintiffs. (Grace, Maggie) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
24 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum in Support of by All Plaintiffs. (Grace, Maggie) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 24 MOTION to Certify Class and Memorandum in Support of by All Defendants. (Johnson, Daniel) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
26 MINUTE entry for the preliminary pretrial conference held on 10/19/2017 before Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale: Judge Barksdale granted 23 the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend the time to respond to the motion to dismiss and set 10/27/2017 as the new deadline. (DIGITAL) (ASL) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
27 ORDER granting 25 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; deferring ruling on 24 Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Defendants shall have twenty−one (21) days after a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss to file a response. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 10/23/2017. (JW) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
28 CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER AND REFERRAL TO MEDIATION: The deadline for providing mandatory intial disclosures is 11/17/2017; the deadline for filing any motion to add parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 and Local Rule 4.03 or amend the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and Local Rule 4.01 is 3/28/2018; the deadline for disclosing plaintiff's and defendant's experts and expert reports is 8/31/2018; the deadline for disclosing rebuttal experts and expert report is 10/02/2018; the deadline for completing all discovery and filing any motion to compel discovery is 11/02/2018; the deadline for filing any dispositive and Daubert motions is 12/14/2018; the deadline for informing the Court of the selected mediator and mediation date is 12/15/2018; the deadline for participating in mediation is 03/15/2019; the deadline for filing all other motion including motions in limine is 04/01/2019; the deadline for filing responses to other motions including motions in limine is 04/15/2019; the deadline for filing the joint final pretrial statement is 04/15/2019; the final pretrial conference is scheduled for 04/22/2019 at 10:00 a.m.; the deadline for filing trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is 04/30/2019; the non−jury trial is scheduled for the term commencing on 05/06/2019 at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Marcia Morales Howard. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on October 24, 2017.(ASL) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
29 CASE REFERRED to Mediation. (RH) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
30 RESPONSE in Opposition re 20 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 1) MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim MOTION to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction filed by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Grace, Maggie) (Entered:

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11/17/2017 12/05/2017 03/08/2018 03/13/2018 03/20/2018 03/22/2018 03/28/2018 03/28/2018 03/28/2018
04/09/2018 04/23/2018
04/26/2018 05/01/2018

10/27/2017)
31 NOTICE by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish of Filing Initial Rule 26 Disclosures (Johnson, Daniel) Modified on 12/5/2017 (REMOVED Per ORDER doc 32)(RH). (Entered: 11/17/2017)
32 ORDER directing the clerk to remove 31 defendants' disclosures. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 12/5/2017. (CAW) (Entered: 12/05/2017)
33 NOTICE of supplemental authority by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Grace, Maggie) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
34 MOTION for Evan T. Shea to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 03/13/2018)
35 ORDER denying without prejudice to filing a motion that includes an appropriate Local Rule 3.01(g) certification 34 the plaintiff's motion asking the Court to allow Evan Shea, Esquire, to specially appear to represent them in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 3/20/2018. (ASL) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
36 MOTION for Maggie T. Grace to withdraw as attorney by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Grace, Maggie) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. Modified on 4/25/2018 (STRICKEN Per Order doc [40)(RH). (Entered: 03/22/2018)
37 MOTION for leave to file Amended Complaint by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amended Complaint)(Wheeler, Claire) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
38 NOTICE of voluntary dismissal by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, John Troy, Gary Whitton (Wheeler, Claire) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
41 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish with Jury Demand. filed by Robert Rimmer, Jesse Guardado, Gary Whitton, Mark Geralds, Steven Stein, Mark Davis, Joseph Jordan, Jason Stephens. Related document: 1 Complaint filed by Gary Whitton, Joseph Jordan, John Troy, Khalid Pasha, Jesse Guardado, Mark Geralds, Mark Davis, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein.(RH) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
39 SUPPLEMENT re 37 MOTION for leave to file Amended Complaint by Mark Davis. (McDermott, Linda) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
40 ORDER striking 36 Plaintiffs' Notice to allow Maggie T. Grace to withdraw her appearance for failure to comply with Local Rule 2.03; granting 37 Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint; accepting as the operative complaint the proposed amended complaint filed as an Exhibit to the Motion; directing the Clerk to file Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the Court's docket; denying as moot 20 Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint; denying as moot 24 Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class; dismissing without prejudice, per Plaintiffs' Notice 38, John Troy and Khalid Pasha as named Plaintiffs; directing the Clerk to terminate John Troy and Khalid Pasha as parties; Defendants must respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint by May 18, 2018. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 4/23/2018. (KLC) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
42 MOTION for Evan T. Shea to appear pro hac vice by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Special Admission Attorney Certification)(McDermott, Linda) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 04/26/2018)
43 ORDER granting 42 the plaintiffs' motion asking the Court to allow Evan Shea, Esquire, to specially appear to represent them in this case and directing him to

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05/07/2018 05/18/2018 05/18/2018 05/23/2018 05/23/2018 06/01/2018 06/01/2018 06/18/2018 06/20/2018
06/20/2018 06/20/2018
07/26/2018 08/29/2018

expeditiously pay the required fee and register with the Court's electronic case filing (ECF) system by completing the E−Filer Registration Form. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 4/30/2018. (ASL) (ASL) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
44 Unopposed MOTION for Maggie T. Grace to withdraw as attorney by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Wheeler, Claire) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 05/07/2018)
45 MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Johnson, Daniel) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
46 MOTION to stay discovery by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Johnson, Daniel) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 05/18/2018)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, Gary Whitton. (Wheeler, Claire) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
48 Amended MOTION to Certify Class with Memorandum in Support by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, Gary Whitton. (Wheeler, Claire) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
49 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 48 Amended MOTION to Certify Class with Memorandum in Support by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Johnson, Daniel) (Entered: 06/01/2018)
50 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION to stay discovery filed by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Wheeler, Claire) (Entered: 06/01/2018)
51 Unopposed MOTION to extend time to (certain deadlines in Scheduling Order) by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
52 ORDER granting 49 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification; deferring ruling on 48 Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification. Defendants shall have 21 days after a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss to file a response to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/20/2018. (JW) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
53 ORDER granting 51 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Certain Scheduling Order Deadlines. An Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order shall enter. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/20/2018. (JW) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
54 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER: Dispositive motions due by 2/15/2019. Conduct mediation hearing by 3/15/2019. Pretrial statement due by 6/10/2019. Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/17/2019 at 10:00 AM in Jacksonville Courtroom 10 B before Judge Marcia Morales Howard. Bench Trial set for 7/1/2019 at 09:30 AM in Jacksonville Courtroom 10 B before Judge Marcia Morales Howard. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/20/2018. (JW) Modified text on 12/18/2018. ***VACATED pursuant to Order 68 (BD). (Entered: 06/20/2018)
55 Joint MOTION for miscellaneous relief, specifically Entry of HIPAA Protective Order and Stipulated Confidentiality Order (Agreed to by All Parties) by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
56 ORDER granting 44 Maggie T. Grace, Esquire's, motion to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs; permitting Ms. Grace to withdraw from representing the plaintiffs in the case; and directing the clerk to amend the docket accordingly. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 8/29/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

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09/10/2018 09/10/2018
09/10/2018 09/10/2018 09/12/2018 09/25/2018 11/05/2018 11/26/2018 11/29/2018 12/05/2018 12/05/2018

57 ORDER setting a telephone conference on 46 the defendants' motion to stay discovery on September 12, 2018, at 3:30 p.m. Please see order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/10/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
58 ORDER granting 55 the parties' motion for entry of a protective order and a confidentiality order. The Court will separately enter the stipulated orders. In the confidentiality order, the Court strikes paragraph 4(f) governing the use of confidential information at trial and jury instructions. Regarding the filing of sealed documents, the Court clarifies that no party may file a sealed document without filing a motion to seal that complies with Local Rule 1.09 and addresses the factors regarding the presumption of public access or good cause. Please see order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/10/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
59 STIPULATED HIPAA PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/10/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
60 STIPULATED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/10/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
61 MINUTE entry the motion hearing held on 9/12/2018 before Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale: Counsel for the parties were on the telephone and presented arguments on 46 the defendants' motion to stay discovery. Judge Barksdale denied the motion and will enter a written order. (DIGITAL) (ASL) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
62 ORDER denying 46 the defendants' motion to stay discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 9/25/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
***PRO HAC VICE FEES paid by attorney Evan Shea, appearing on behalf of (Filing fee $150.00 receipt number JAX029466.) Related document: 42 MOTION for Evan T. Shea to appear pro hac vice. (TSW) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
63 MOTION to examine Psychiatric Mental Health Examinations of Plaintiffs Pursuant to Rule 35 by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
64 ORDER setting a discovery conference on December 6, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., at the Bryan Simpson United States Courthouse, Courtroom 5B. Anyone may appear by telephone. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 11/29/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
65 MEMORANDUM in support re 63 Examine (Rule 35 Examination) filed by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 12/05/2018)
66 MOTION to Bifurcate Discovery by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − P's RFP to Jones, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B − P's RFP to Jordan, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C − P's RFP to Reddish, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D − D's Expert Witness Interrogs, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E − P's Interrogs to Jones, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit F − P's Interrogs to Jordan, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit G − P's Interrogs to Reddish, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit H − D's Interrogs to Davis, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit I − D's Interrogs to Geralds, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit J − D's Interrogs to Guardado, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit K − D's Interrogs to Jordan, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit L − D's Interrogs to Rimmer, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit M − D's Interrogs to Stein, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit N − D's Interrogs to Whitton, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit O − D's Interrog to Stephens, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit P − D's RFP to Davis, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit Q − D's RFP to Geralds, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit R − D's RFP to Guardado, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit S − D's RFP to Jordan, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit T − D's RFP to Rimmer, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit U − D's RFP to Stein, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit V − D's RFP to Whitton, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit W − D's RFP to Stephens, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit X − D's Second RFP to Davis, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit Y − D's Second RFP to Geralds, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit Z − D's Second RFP to Guardado, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit AA − D's Second RFP to Jordan, # 28 Exhibit Exhibit BB − D's Second RFP to Rimmer, # 29 Exhibit Exhibit CC − D's Second RFP to Stein, # 30 Exhibit Exhibit DD − D's Second RFP to Whitton, # 31 Exhibit Exhibit EE − D's Second RFP to Stephens, # 32 Exhibit Exhibit FF − Review Time Calculations)(Stinson, Monica) (Entered: 12/05/2018)

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12/06/2018 12/17/2018
01/15/2019
01/15/2019
03/01/2019 03/28/2019 04/02/2019 04/05/2019 04/05/2019 05/06/2019 05/14/2019 05/17/2019

67 MINUTE entry for the discovery hearing held on 12/6/2018 before Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale: Judge Barksdale denied in part 66 the defendants' motion to bifurcate and denied 63 the defendants' Rule 35 motion without prejudice to filing another Rule 35 motion after the parties agree on dates, times, and places for the examinations. (DIGITAL) (ASL) (Entered: 12/10/2018)
68 ORDER denying as moot 63 the motion asking the Court to order psychiatric exams; denying in part and granting in part 66 the motion to bifurcate discovery; vacating the deadlines in 54 the amended case management and scheduling order pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss; directing the parties to continue discovery; and encouraging the parties to continue to explore methods of resolving the case other than through traditional mediation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 12/17/2018. (KNR) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
69 TRANSCRIPT of Discovery Hearing held on 12−6−18 before Judge Patricia Barksdale. Court Reporter/Transcriber Cindy Packevicz Jarriel,Telephone number 904−301−6843; cindyrprfcrr@gmail.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER or purchased through the Court Reporter.. Redaction Request due 2/5/2019, Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/15/2019, Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/15/2019. (CLP) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
70 NOTICE to counsel of filing of OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. Any party needing a copy of the transcript to review for redaction purposes may purchase a copy from the court reporter or view the document at the clerk's office public terminal. Court Reporter: Cindy Packevicz Jarriel. cindyrprfcrr@gmail.com (CLP) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
71 Unopposed MOTION for Monica Galindo Stinson to withdraw as attorney by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Stinson, Monica) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. (Entered: 03/01/2019)
72 ORDER denying 45 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Answer due April 22, 2019. Preliminary Pretrial Conference set for April 30, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/28/2019. (JW) (Entered: 03/28/2019)
73 ORDER granting 71 Monica Galindo Stinson's motion to withdraw as counsel; directions to the clerk. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 4/1/2019. (CAW) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
74 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Certain Scheduling Order Deadlines re 41 Amended Complaint, 72 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Welch, David) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. Modified text on 4/5/2019 (BD). (Entered: 04/05/2019)
75 ORDER granting 74 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Certain Scheduling Order Deadlines. Answer due May 6, 2019. Preliminary pretrial conference continued to May 14, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 4/5/2019. (JW) (Entered: 04/05/2019)
76 ANSWER and affirmative defenses with Jury Demand to 41 Amended Complaint by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish.(Welch, David) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
77 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Marcia Morales Howard: PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 5/14/2019. Joint notice regarding settlement conference due May 28, 2019. Court Reporter: Cindy Packevicz Jarriel (JW) (Entered: 05/15/2019)
78 ORDER for parties to confer and advise the Court by May 28, 2019, as to whether they intend to proceed to a non−jury or jury trial. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 5/17/2019. (BL) (Entered: 05/17/2019)

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05/28/2019 06/12/2019
06/18/2019 06/19/2019 06/27/2019
07/10/2019 10/30/2019 01/07/2020
01/15/2020
01/15/2020 03/02/2020

79 STATUS report Regarding Mediation and Jury Demand by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, Gary Whitton. (Shea, Evan) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
80 ORDER regarding settlement proceedings before the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger; directing administrative closure of case; and directing the Clerk to open a miscellaneous case. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/12/2019. (JW) (Entered: 06/12/2019)
81 RESPONSE in Opposition re 48 Amended MOTION to Certify Class with Memorandum in Support filed by Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish. (Welch, David) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
82 NOTICE of Appearance by Joe Belitzky on behalf of Barry Reddish (Belitzky, Joe) (Entered: 06/19/2019)
83 Unopposed MOTION for leave to file Reply, Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 81 Response in Opposition to Motion by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shea, Evan) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
84 ORDER denying as moot 83 Motion for Leave to File Reply and Extend Deadline. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 7/10/2019. (BL) (Entered: 07/10/2019)
85 NOTICE REGARDING MEDIATION. Signed by Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger on 10/29/2019. (MGG) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
86 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULING HEARING (AS TO COURTROOM ONLY): The Mediation scheduled for Thursday, January 16, 2020 at 9:00 AM before Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger has been moved to Jacksonville Courtroom 12 D. (MGG) (Entered: 01/07/2020)
87 MOTION for Claire M. Wheeler to withdraw as attorney by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, John Troy, Gary Whitton. (Shea, Evan) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. Modified on 1/15/2020 (PAM). Counsel directed to refile. No signature reflected. (Entered: 01/15/2020)
88 Amended MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion to Withdrawal Claire M. Wheeler by All Plaintiffs. (Shea, Evan) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
89 ORDER granting 88 Plaintiffs' Notice of Withdrawal of Claire M. Wheeler; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/2/2020. (CAW) (Entered: 03/02/2020)

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 1 Filed 07/19/17 Page 1 of 32 PageID 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MARK DAVIS, MARK GERALDS, JESSE GUARDADO, JOSEPH JORDAN, KHALID PASHA, ROBERT RIMMER, JOHN TROY, STEVEN STEIN, and GARY WHITTON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JULIE JONES, KEVIN JORDAN, and BARRY REDDISH, in their official capacities as employees ofthe Florida Department of Corrections,
Defendants. '

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) Civil Action No.: 3:n-w- '8JtrJ"- 3Lf ft:JB

)

.

)

) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

) AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, John Troy, Steven Stein, and Gary Whitton are inmates on Florida's death row. On behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, they bring this lawsuit to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from a patently unconstitutional Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") policy that automatically places Florida prisoners sentenced to death in permanent solitary confinement, regardless of their behavior while incarcerated. 2. The FDOC has held Plaintiffs in permanent solitary confinement, called "singlecell special housing," for between 4 and 30 years, an unconscionably long period oftime. Under

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 1 Filed 07/19/17 Page 2 of 32 PageID 2
FDOC policy, each Plaintiff and class member will remain in single-cell special housing until he receives relief from his death sentence or is executed, a process that will take many years, potentially decades.
3. The FDOC's policy of automatic, indefinite solitary confinement for death row inmates is extreme, debilitating, and inhumane, violates contemporary standards of decency, and poses an unreasonable risk of serious harm to the health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants continuously deprive Plaintiffs and class members of the basic human contact required to maintain their mental and physical health. Plaintiffs and class members languish alone in cramped, concrete, windowless cells, often for twenty-four hours a day, for years on end. Defendants severely restrict their phone calls, afford them extremely limited contact with other inmates and prison staff, provide them minimal opportunity for exercise, and deprive them of all vocational, recreational, and educational programming.
4. Predictably, the conditions on Florida's death row have not only created a serious risk of harm to the health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members, but have in fact caused harm, both psychological and physical, to Plaintiffs and class members.
5. Defendants have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to the psychological and physical trauma that the FDOC's policy of permanent solitary confinement threatens to inflict, and in fact inflicts, on Plaintiffs and class members. The scientific literature exposing the deleterious health effects of prolonged solitary confinement is well-known to Defendants. A number ofjudicial decisions have recognized this scientific research when condemning the practice of prolonged solitary confmement; the international human rights community has embraced this scientific research by categorizing prolonged solitary confinement as torture; and other prison systems in the United States and around the world have abandoned
2

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the use of prolonged solitary confinement because ofthis scientific research. The actual adverse health effects that the FDOC's policy of permanent solitary confinement has had on Plaintiffs and class members is equally well-known to Defendants, as Plaintiffs and class members have been and remain in Defendants' own custody and care. Defendants nonetheless adhere to the FDOC's rigid policy.
6. The conditions on Florida's death row, coupled with Defendants' deliberate indifference to the trauma that such conditions can and do inflict on Plaintiffs and class members, violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
7. In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment, the conditions on Florida's death row violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When compared to the conditions of confinement for Florida prisoners not sentenced to death, the conditions on Florida's death row impose an atypical and significant hardship, and Defendants provide Plaintiffs and class members no meaningful opportunity to obtain relief from that hardship.
8. Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to (a) a declaration that Defendants' policy of automatically placing them in permanent solitary confinement violates their constitutional rights, and (b) an injunction compelling Defendants to cease holding Plaintiffs and class members in solitary confinement, except for limited periods and only when based on an individualized determination that a valid penological purpose for such confinement exists.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all class members, bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
3

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10. This Court has jurisdiction for claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
11. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all class members, have occurred in this District.
PARTIES 12. Plaintiff Mark Davis is a resident of Union Correctional Institution, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026 ("UCI"). He awaits his execution in the event pending postconviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent over 30 years on Florida's death row. 13. Plaintiff Mark Geralds is a resident ofUCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 24 years on Florida's death row. 14. Plaintiff Jesse Guardado is a resident ofUCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 12 years on Florida's death row. 15. Plaintiff Joseph Jordan is a resident of Florida State Prison, 23916 NW 83rd Street, Raiford, Florida 32026 ("FSP"). He awaits his execution in the event pending postconviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 4 years on Florida's death row.
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16. PlaintiffKhalid Pasha is a resident ofFSP, 23916 NW 83rd Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent over 4 years on Florida's death row.
17. Robert Rimmer is a resident of UCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 18 years on Florida's death row.
18. John Troy is a resident ofUCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 13 years on Florida's death row.
19. Steven Stein is a resident ofUCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 26 years on Florida's death row.
20. Gary Whitton is a resident of UCI, 7819 NW 228th Street, Raiford, Florida 32026. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 25 years on Florida's death row.
21. Defendant Julie Jones is the Secretary of the FDOC. She provides final approval of rules applicable to death row inmates. As an employee of the FDOC, she acts under color of state law. She is sued in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
22. Defendant Kevin Jordan is the warden ofUCI. He is in charge of implementing rules and procedures for the death row unit in that facility. As an employee of the FDOC, he acts under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
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23. Defendant Barry Reddish is the warden ofFSP. He is in charge of implementing rules and procedures for the death row unit in that facility. As an employee of the FDOC, he acts under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. CONDITIONS ON FLORIDA'S DEATH ROW
A. Plaintiffs' Automatic, Permanent Assignment to "Single-Cell Special Housing"
24. The FDOC requires "single-cell special housing"-i.e., solitary confinement-for any person sentenced to death. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830(a). Correspondingly, the FDOC mandates that "[d]eath row housing cells shall be separate from general population housing." See id. Therefore, as soon as an individual is sentenced to death and transported to death row at either UCI or FSP, he is placed permanently and indefinitely in solitary confinement.
25. The FDOC rules theoretically require that "[a]t least annually, a death row inmate shall be reviewed by his classification officer to determine overall institutional adjustment based on the inmate's disciplinary history, participation in programming, and cooperation ¥.rith staff." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830. However, Defendants have never moved any death row inmate from "single-cell special housing" to general population or any other form ofless restrictive housing as a result of any annual review or otherwise.
26. FDOC inmates who are not sentenced to death are initially classified and assigned to facilities and housing units "based upon such factors as nature and severity of offense, characteristics of sentence, criminal history, age, health status, and any other factor relating to the security and order of the institution or the security and safety of the general public." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.21 0(1)(a). However, in contrast to FDOC inmates sentenced to death, FDOC inmates who are not sentenced to death-even those assigned to maximum security facilities-
6

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are not initially placed in conditions anywhere near as restrictive and severe as "single-cell special housing." FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are placed in harsh conditions similar to
the conditions on death row-e.g., "disciplinary confinement," "administrative confinement," or "close management"--only after they have demonstrated non-compliant behavior while in prison, or have demonstrated while in prison that their safety in general population is at serious risk, that they warrant placement in such conditions. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.800,33-
602.220, 33-602.222. Further, FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are placed in such
conditions only after being given an opportunity to challenge that placement. See, e.g., Fla.
Admin R. 33-601.304- 308, 33-601.800(3). And, as described in more detail below, FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are never placed in such conditions permanently; to the contrary, they are placed in such conditions for a limited, prescribed period or receive mandatory, routine reviews to determine whether there continues to be a penological justification for keeping them
in such conditions. See, e.g., Fla. Admin R. 33-601.314, 33-601.800(16); 33-602.220(1), (3), 33-
602.222(8). B. Conditions on Death Row at Union Correctional Institution 27. Upon information and belief, the death row at UCI is composed of twelve wings,
each containing twenty-eight cells. UCI's death row houses over 330 prisoners, including Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton.
28. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the class members at UCI are housed individually, without a cellmate, in a cell that is approximately sixty square feet, or approximately nine feet by seven feet.
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29. Cells on UCI's death row contain a bed, a combination sink/toilet, a locker for belongings, and a small writing table. Because there is no stool, inmates typically sit on the locker when using·the writing table.
30. In the summer months, cell walls are hot to the touch. There is minimal ventilation, and the water in the cells does not get cold.
31. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton cannot see any other inmate from their respective cells. Nor can any other inmate
on death row at UCI see other inmates from his cell.
32. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr.
Whitton, and the class members at UCI do not eat their meals in a cafeteria or any other group setting. Each meal they receive is delivered to and consumed in their individual cells.
33. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, and
Mr. Whitton are given the opportunity to leave their cells three times per week to take a shower, each by himself, for between five and ten minutes. The same is true of all other inmates on death row at UCI.
34. Prison officials will sometimes discourage showering, and in such instances will "toss" --or dismantle the contents of-inmates' cells if they opt to take showers.
35. In theory, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other inmates on death row at UCI are given the opportunity to leave their cells two times per week for three hours to go to an exercise yard. In practice, these threehour blocks are often cancelled and/or shortened due to guard shortages, events in other parts of the prison, or other circumstances. Further, these three-hour blocks begin when the first inmate
is taken from his cell, and end when the last inmate is returned to his cell. Thus, Mr. Davis, Mr.
8

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Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other inmates on death row at UCI frequently spend far less than three hours outside of their cell during the periods allotted for exercise.
36. Individual inmates whom corrections officers dislike or view as problematic are deprived of even these blocks of yard-time.
37. In some cases, inmates deemed to have disciplinary issues are barred from the exercise yard and instead placed by themselves in cages-smaller areas, slightly larger than the size of their cells and enclosed on all sides by fencing. In other cases, UCI death row inmates who have been placed in disciplinary confinement are denied exercise altogether-a guard will walk by the inmate's cell with a clipboard for the benefit of the security camera and will mark down that the inmate refused exercise regardless of whether the inmate wanted to exercise or not.
38. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other death row inmates at UCI have the opportunity to spend time outside of their cells at the prison law library once a week. Death row inmates are permitted to visit the law library only one at a time, however, so they do not have contact with fellow death row inmates when they go.
39. With the exception of"emergency situations, such as notifications of family
deaths, and when necessary to ensure the inmate's access to attorneys or the courts," see Fla.
Admin. R. 33-601.830(7)(k), Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other death row inmates at UCI are given the opportunity to make only one 15 minute phone call per month to a person preapproved by prison officials.
40. Although death row regulations explicitly permit death row inmates to participate
in self-improvement programs absent a security threat, see Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830(7)(n), the
9

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FDOC does not offer Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, or other death row inmates at UCI any opportunities to participate in educational or
self-improvement programs.
41. In sum, on most days, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr.
Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and other death row inmates at UCI spend twenty-four hours confined to their cells, with virtually no human contact. On other days, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and other class members at UCI spend extremely limited periods outside of their cells, with correspondingly limited human contact.
42. As explained in greater detail below, because Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the class members at UCI have
been subjected to indefinite solitary confinement, they are at serious risk of suffering, and have suffered, serious harm to their mental and physical health, including but not limited to depression, psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and degeneration of eyes, teeth, muscles, and joints.
43. As explained in greater detail below, Defendants Jones and Jordan have been, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the obvious and well-known risks that indefinite solitary confinement poses, as well as the obvious harm that such confinement has caused, to the mental and physical health of class members at UCI.
C. Conditions on Death Row at Florida State Prison 44. Death row at FSP is composed of one wing ("G Wing"), containing 68 cells. FSP's death row houses approximately 63 prisoners, including Mr. Pasha and Mr. Jordan.
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45. Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and the class members at FSP are housed individually, without a cellmate, in a cell that is approximately 54 square feet, or approximately nine and a half feet by six feet.
46. Cells contain a bed, a combination sink/toilet, a locker for belongings, and a small writing table.
47. In the summer months, cell walls are hot to the touch. There is minimal ventilation and fans placed in corridors are pointed toward guards, not inmates' cells. Inmates on the second floor of the corridor are subject to even hotter conditions.
48. Neither Mr. Pasha nor Mr. Jordan can see any other inmate from his cell. Nor can any other inmate on death row at FSP see other inmates from his cell.
49. Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP do not eat their meals in a cafeteria or any other group setting. Each meal they receive is delivered to and consumed in their individual cells.
50. Mr. Pasha and Mr. Jordan are given the opportunity to leave their cells three times per week to take a shower, each by himself, for between five and ten minutes. The same is true of all other inmates on death row at FSP.
51. In some cases, and at the total discretion of guards, inmates are only allowed a shower that is less than five minutes long.
52. Prison officials will sometimes discourage showering, and will often "toss"-or dismantle the contents of-inmates' cells if they opt to take showers. Inmates occasionally return to their cells after showing to find their belongings strewn about.
53. In theory, Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP are given the opportunity to leave their cells two times per week for three hours to go to an exercise
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yard. In practice, these three-hour blocks are often cancelled and/or shortened due to guard shortages, events in other parts of the prison, or other circumstances. Further, these three-hour blocks begin when the first inmate is taken from his cell, and end when the last inmate is returned to his cell. Thus, Mr. Davis, Mr. Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP frequently spend far less than three hours outside of their cell during the periods allotted for exerctse.
54. Individual inmates whom corrections officers dislike or view as problematic are deprived of even these short blocks of exercise time.
55. The exercise yard offers no barriers or shade from the sun, and thus poses health risks to inmates. Accordingly, some inmates decline the opportunity to participate in "yard time."
56. Inmates deemed to have disciplinary issues are barred from the exercise yard altogether and instead placed alone in cages-smaller areas, slightly larger than the size of their cells and enclosed on all sides by fencing.
57. Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP have the opportunity to spend time outside of their cells at the prison law library. Death row inmates are permitted to visit the law library only one at a time, however, so they do not have contact with fellow death row inmates when they go. While at the library, inmates are required to sit inside a small cell/room to read.
58. Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP can only make one 15 minute phone call per month to a person preapproved by prison officials. Otherwise, death row inmates are prohibited from making or receiving calls outside of"emergency situations, such as
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notifications of family deaths, and when necessary to ensure the inmate's access to attorneys or
the courts." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830(7)(k).
59. Although death row regulations explicitly permit death row inmates to participate
in self-improvement programs absent a security threat, see Fla. Admin. R. 33-60 1.830(7)(n), the
FDOC does not offer Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, or other death row inmates at FSP any opportunities to participate in educational or self-improvement programs.
60. In sum, on most days, Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP spend twenty-four hours confined to their cells, with virtually no human contact. On other days, Mr. Pasha and other death row inmates at FSP spend extremely limited periods outside of their cells, with correspondingly limited human contact.
61. Mr. Pasha was treated for prostate cancer in 2012 and, due to his placement in indefinite solitary confinement, has not received adequate medical care to deal with the complications from his prostate cancer surgery.
62. As explained in greater detail below, because Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan and the class members at FSP have been subjected to indefinite solitary confinement, they are at serious risk of suffering, and have suffered, serious harm to their mental and physical health, including but not limited to depression, psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and degeneration of eyes, teeth, and muscles.
63. As explained in greater detail below, Defendants Jones and Jordan have been, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the obvious and well-known risks that indefinite solitary confinement poses, as well as the obvious harm that such confinement has caused, to the
mental and physical health of Mr. Pasha, Mr. Jordan and the class members at FSP. D. Conditions in FDOC Prisons Outside Death Row
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64. Individuals who are in the custody of the FDOC and are not placed in the "singlecell special housing" reserved for death row inmates have the opportunity to, inter alia, socialize with other prisoners, eat with other prisoners, hold jobs, make phone calls, and participate in educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs.
65. Inmates not on death row eat their meals, outside of their cells, with other
inmates. Cj Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.101(2)(b) (referring to clothing inmates must wear while "at
food service"). 66. Inmates not on death row are permitted to have jobs within the correctional
facilities to which are assigned. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.201 ("It is the continuous goal of the department that inmates in work assignments work at least 40 hours per week."); see also Admin. R. 33-501.301 (providing for the job of"inmate law clerk"); Admin. R. 33-204.003 (providing for the job of"inmate food handler").
67. Inmates not on death row are permitted to participate in out-of-cell educational and vocational training.
68. Inmates not on death row are permitted to maintain a list of up to "10 names and numbers of persons he or she wishes" to call, and are permitted to make calls to those people. Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.205(2)(a); id. at (1) (describing the "minimum telephone privileges that shall be granted to inmates").
69. Even when non-death row inmates in FDOC facilities are placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons, they are not permanently assigned to solitary confinement and are expected to return to general population.
70. In "disciplinary confmement," which is "a form of punishment in which inmates found guilty of committing violations of the department rules are confined for specified periods
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of time to individual cells based upon authorized penalties for prohibited conduct," an inmate's placement must be reviewed "every week," with the goal being to return the "inmate to the open population as soon as the facts of the case indicate that this can be done safely." Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.222(8). The maximum administrative punishment for the most serious institutional infractions is 60 days in disciplinary confmement. See Fla. Admin R. 33-601.314.
71. In "administrative confmement," which is for inmates who need to be temporarily removed from "the general inmate population in order to provide for security and safety until such time as more permanent inmate management processes can be concluded," an inmate's placement must be reviewed within three days of placement, and procedures to transfer the inmate out of administrative confinement shall be commenced within 20 days unless it is the inmate himself who requested such confinement. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.220(1),(3).
72. In "protective management," which is for inmates who need to be temporarily removed from the general population "in order to provide for security and safety until such time as a more permanent inmate management decision can be concluded" (Fla. Admin. R. 33602.221(1)(a)), an inmate's placement must be reviewed every thirty days, and the "goal shall be toward returning the inmate to general population as soon as the facts of the case indicate that this can be done safely." Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.221(8).
73. In "close management," which is the "the confinement of an inmate apart from the general population, for reasons of security or the order and effective management of the institution, where the inmate, through his or her behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of others," an inmate's placement must be reviewed "at least once every week for the first 60 days and once every 30 days thereafter." Admin. R. 33-601.800(16).
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74. Therefore, unlike death row inmates at UCI and FSP, non-death row inmates who are placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons do not remain in solitary confinement permanently and indefinitely, are generally prohibited from remaining in solitary confinement for extended periods, and are thus able to resume socializing with other prisoners, eating with other prisoners, holding jobs, making phone calls, and participating in educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs. II. THE RISK OF SERIOUS HARM TO HEALTH AND SAFETY POSED BY
DEFENDANTS' POLICY OF PERMANENT SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR DEATH ROW INMATES 75. Social scientists have long observed the devastating psychological and physical effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Research has shown that prolonged solitary confmement causes a persistent and heightened state of anxiety and nervousness, headaches, insomnia, lethargy or chronic fatigue (including lack of energy and lack of initiative to accomplish tasks), nightmares, heart palpitations, and fear of impending nervous breakdowns. Other documented effects include obsessive ruminations, confused thought processes, an oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational anger, social withdrawal, hallucinations, violent fantasies, emotional flatness, mood swings, chronic depression, feelings of overall deterioration, and suicidal ideation. Individuals in prolonged solitary confinement frequently fear they will lose control of their anger and thereby be punished further. 76. Courts have recognized and incorporated this scientific literature in their decisionmaking. A number of federal judges have expressly acknowledged the extraordinarily harmful psychological effects of prolonged solitary confinement. 77. In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Ruiz v. Texas, No. 16-7792 (March 7, 2017), Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer opined that Petitioner Ruiz had a "strong" claim
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that serving 22 years in "permanent solitary confinement" on Texas's death row violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Breyer observed that the Supreme Court "recognized long-standing 'serious objections' to extended solitary confinement" as long ago as 1890, and noted that Petitioner Ruiz "has developed symptoms long associated with solitary confinement, namely severe anxiety and depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep difficulty."
78. In his concurrence in Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (20 15), Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that research confirms that "[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price," and condemned the "human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation." /d. at 2210.
79. In her concurrence in Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 2012), Judge Rosemary Barkett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit condemned the practice of prolonged solitary confinement for death row inmates. She observed, among other things, that "the psychological effects of spending extended periods in solitary confinementcommonly known as SHU syndrome-may impair an inmate's mental capabilities to the extent that his active participation in litigation becomes impossible." /d. at 1002. In one of the studies Judge Barkett cited, Psychiatric Effocts ofSolitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 325 (2006), Dr. Stuart Grassian, a board certified psychiatrist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School for more than 25 years, concluded that "even those inmates who are more psychologically resilient inevitably suffer severe psychological pain as a result of[solitary] confinement, especially when the confinement is prolonged, and especially when the individual experiences this confinement as being the product of an arbitrary exercise of power and intimidation. Moreover, the harm caused by such confinement may result in prolonged or
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permanent psychiatric disability, including impairments which may seriously reduce the inmate•s capacity to reintegrate into the broader community upon release from prison." ld. at 355.
80. Other courts similarly have recognized the deleterious impact of extended periods of solitary confinement. See, e.g., Shepard v. Quillen, No. 13-15554,2016 WL 6246873, at *5 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2016) (noting "the horrors of solitary confinement"); Shoatz v. Wetzel, No. 2:13-CV-0657, 2016 WL 595337, at *12 (W.O. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016) (noting the "recognized risks and harms of solitary confinement"); Miller ex. rei. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir.2000) ("[I]t is well accepted that conditions such as those present in SMU II [Special Management Unit II] ... can cause psychological decompensation to the point that individuals may become incompetent."). Madridv. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that "when human beings are subjected to social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation, they may deteriorate mentally and in some cases develop psychiatric disturbances," and that there is "ample and growing body of evidence that this phenomenon may occur among persons in solitary or segregated confinement").
81. In light of the scientific evidence described above, there is now an international consensus that the type of permanent solitary confinement that the FDOC imposes on death row inmates at UCI and FSP violates international human rights standards.
82. International human rights organizations, including the United Nations, have condemned indefinite or prolonged solitary confinement as a human rights abuse equivalent to torture. For example, in August 2011, the United Nations' Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment concluded that prolonged solitary confinement constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and is, therefore, prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur determined that solitary confinement is acceptable only in exceptional circumstances and that its duration must be as short as possible. Even 15 days in solitary confinement, according to the Special Rapporteur, constitutes a human rights violation.
83. Having continuously confined Plaintiffs and class members to "single-cell special housing" for years, Defendants and their predecessors have subjected Plaintiffs and Class members to conditions that are tantamount to torture. Living indefinitely in stark and restrictive conditions without routine human interaction has created the serious and immediate risk that Plaintiffs and class members will suffer the same psychological and physical infirmities that social scientists have long associated with prolonged solitary confinement, including:
• "[A]ppetite and sleep disturbances" (Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in LongTerm Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 130 (2003));
• "Anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, and selfmutilations" (id. at 130);
• "[P]rogressive inability to tolerate ordinary stimuli" and "overt paranoia" (Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects ofSolitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 325, 335-36 (2006));
• "Depression, anxiety, [and] stomach and muscle pains" (Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects ofSolitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A BriefHistory and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUSTICE 441, 477 {2006));
• "Suicidal thoughts," "depression," and "hallucinations" (id. at 488);
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• "Lethargy," "constant headaches," and "a complete breakdown or disintegration of the identity of the isolated individual" (id. at 492).
84. In fact, Plaintiffs and class members, including Mr. Troy, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton have already suffered some, if not all, of these infirmities and others.
85. Because they have developed these conditions, some Plaintiffs and class members, including Mr. Davis, Mr. Guardado, and Mr. Jordan have struggled to acclimate to settings in which other people are present, such as exercise time.
86. Certain class members who are already mentally ill are particularly susceptible to these adverse effects. As the National Commission on Correctional Health Care ("NCCHC") stated in an April 10, 2016 Position Statement, "[i]t is well established that persons with mental illness are particularly vulnerable to the harms of solitary confinement." See http://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement.
87. To cope with their living conditions, certain class members, including Mr. Guardado and Mr. Whitton, have developed defense mechanisms that deaden feelings and emotions, which exacts its own psychological toll.
88. The lengthy duration of Plaintiffs' and class members' imprisonment has only exacerbated the adverse effects oftheir isolative living conditions.
89. As one class member puts it, single-cell special housing is "designed to break you psychologically" and is like "keeping an animal in a cage." Another class member says "[I feel] "I am being physically squeezed... and mentally enclosed, too." Other class members say single-cell special housing is meant to "break your spirit" and "disconnect you from other people, from yourself, and from reality" and that it is "hopeless," a "living death," and "merely existing-not living." One death row inmate committed suicide after his visitation privileges
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were taken away, prompting another to observe, "I think everyone gets to that point. How much more can you take?"
90. In addition to psychological harm, Plaintiffs and class members have suffered physical problems as a result of their conditions of confmement, including knee pain, back pain, neck pain, and muscle degeneration. III. DEFENDANTS' DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO THE RISK OF SERIOUS
HARM POSED BY DEFENDANTS' POLICY OF PERMANENT SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR DEATH ROW INMATES. 91. The above-described social science regarding the deleterious impact of prolonged solitary confinement on psychological and physical health is long-standing and well-known. Indeed, based on that social science, a number of prison systems, both in the United States and around the world, have eliminated the practice of prolonged solitary confinement and have implemented meaningful, robust procedures for routinely reviewing the status of inmates placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons. 92. The psychological and physical infirmities that Plaintiffs and class members themselves have developed as a result of being kept in permanent solitary confinement are also obvious. Plaintiffs and class members are in Defendants' custody and care. Defendants either have recognized or turned a willful blind eye toward the "terrible price" that permanent solitary confinement has exacted on the psychological and physical health of Plaintiffs and class members. In fact, Plaintiffs and class members have filed administrative grievances concerning their placement in indefinite solitary confinement. Defendants have denied each one. 93. Defendants have ignored the social science regarding the adverse, debilitating health effects of prolonged solitary confinement. They have ignored the penal practices adopted in other prison systems that have eliminated prolonged solitary confinement because of these
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well-known health effects. And they have ignored the obvious adverse health effects of the FDOC's pennanent·solitary confinement policy on prisoners in their own custody and care, i.e., Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants, therefore, have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to both the significant risk of harm and the actual harm caused by placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement. That is, Defendants have been and continue to be aware of all of the adverse health effects ofplacing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, yet they continue to keep Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, notwithstanding their knowledge of such adverse health effects.
94. FDOC rules governing other forms of restrictive confmement, such as "disciplinary confinement," "administrative confinement," and "close management," underscore Defendants' deliberate indifference to the adverse health effects of keeping Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement. In these rules, which apply to non-death row inmates, Defendants acknowledge the adverse health effects of prolonged solitary confinement by allowing confinement in conditions equivalent to single-cell special housing for only limited periods, by furnishing the opportunity to obtain review of and relief from those conditions, and by ensuring that inmates required to live in those conditions for more than a couple of months undergo routine psychological assessments to determine their continued mental fitness to live in those conditions. Defendants' simultaneous failure to furnish Plaintiffs and class members similar protections demonstrates that, as to Plaintiffs and class members, Defendants ignore the serious risks of psychological and physical harm posed by prolonged solitary confinement.
95. For instance, each FDOC inmate placed in disciplinary confmement, among other things, must have his case reviewed every week with the goal of being returned to general population; must be given a psychological screening assessment if confmed for more than 30
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days and must undergo such screening at least every 90 days; and if housed in disciplinary confinement for more than 60 days, is entitled to a formal evaluation that must include a valid
justification for continuing to hold him in disciplinary confinement. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-
602.222(8). Each FDOC inmate placed in administrative confinement is given similar protections and, in addition, must have his placement reviewed by an institutional classification
team within the first 72 hours to ensure it is justified. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.220(2), (8).
Defendants provide Plaintiffs and class members no such protections, despite their knowledge that such protections are necessary to guard against the well-known, adverse effects of prolonged solitary confinement.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 96. Plaintiffs and the class have exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the State of Florida. 97. Mr. Davis filed an informal grievance relating to his indefinite solitary confinement on February 15, 2016. It was denied on February 15,2016. Mr. Davis then filed a formal grievance on February 26,2016. It was denied on February 28,2016. Mr. Davis then filed an appeal ofthe denial of that formal grievance on March I, 2016. His appeal was denied on March 9, 2016. 98. Mr. Jordan filed an informal grievance relating to his indefinite solitary confinement on May 19,2016. It was denied on May 24,2016. Mr. Jordan then filed a formal grievance on May 25, 2016. It was denied on June 9, 2016. Mr. Jordan then filed an appeal of the denial of that formal grievance on June 14,2016. His appeal was denied on June 22, 2016. 99. Mr. Pasha filed an informal grievance relating to his indefinite solitary confinement on March 18,2016. It was denied on March 22,2016. Mr. Pasha then filed a
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formal grievance on March 23, 2016. It was denied on April 5, 2016. Mr. Pasha then filed an appeal of the denial of that formal grievance on April 16, 2016. His appeal was denied on May 10, 2016.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 100. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 101. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all Florida inmates who are sentenced to death, in the custody of the FDOC, and held at UCI or FSP. 102. The requirements for maintaining a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are satisfied for the following reasons:
a. Numerosity: The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of class members will likely change throughout this litigation, the class at this time has hundreds of members.
b. Commonality: Defendants subject all class members to the same conditions of confinement: all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are automatically and permanently placed in "single-cell special housing"-i.e., solitary confinementwithout review; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are housed individually, without cellmates; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are housed in similarlysized, cramped cells; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are given-at mostthe same, negligible amount of time outside their cells each week: two threehour blocks of recreation time and three, five-to-ten minute blocks of shower time; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are severely restricted from making
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phone calls. Therefore, there are questions of law and fact that are common to the class and that predominate over individual questions, including:
o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment;
o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement results in constitutionally cognizable harm or presents a constitutionally unacceptable risk of harm;
o Whether Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of mental and physical suffering of class members;
o Whether a legitimate penological reason exists for Defendants to place class members in indefinite solitary confinement, sometimes lasting decades, simply because class members have been sentenced to death; and
o Whether the conditions of confinement for death row inmates at UCI and FSP constitute an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
c. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class members because Plaintiffs have suffered the same injury as the class members. In particular, Plaintiffs have been placed in indefinite solitary confinement based on their death sentences alone.
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d. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs do not have any interests that are adverse to those of the class members. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation and intend to prosecute this action vigorously.
103. The prerequisites for maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) are met because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to each class member. In particular, Defendants have placed each Class member in indefinite solitary confmement. Therefore, final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
Imposition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
I04. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in paragraphs I through 103, above, as though fully set forth herein.
105. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement is the custom, policy, and practice of the State of Florida.
106. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement has been and continues to be done under color of state law.
I07. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, Defendants deprive Plaintiffs and class members of basic human needs, including but not limited to the need for routine social interaction, environmental and sensory stimulation, regular physical exercise, sleep, and other essential activity.
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108. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, Defendants have created an unreasonable risk of serious harm to the psychological and physical health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members and have in fact done harm to the psychological and physical health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members.
109. Defendants' policy of automatically placing Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement is not rationally related to legitimate security needs.
110. Defendants' policy of automatically placing Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement is extreme and violates contemporary standards of decency.
Ill. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefmite solitary confinement, Defendants have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference to the psychological and physical harm that such confinement threatens to inflict, and in fact inflicts, on Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants keep Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, without adequate penological justification, despite the well-known social science establishing the serious psychological and physical harm wrought by prolonged solitary confinement, despite the court decisions and the consensus ofthe international human rights community recognizing such harm, despite the increasing abandonment of prolonged solitary confinement in prison systems within the United States and around the world based on the recognition of such harm, and despite evidence that Plaintiffs and class members themselves have suffered such harm while in Defendants' custody and care.
112. Defendants' rigid policy of permanent solitary confmement for Plaintiffs and class members, together with Defendants' deliberate indifference to the significant psychological and physical harm that their policy threatens to inflict and in fact inflicts on Plaintiffs and class
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members, violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
COUNT II Denial of State-Created Liberty Interests in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 113. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 112, above, as though fully set forth herein. 114. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement is the custom, policy, and practice of the State of Florida. 115. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement has been and continues to be done under color of state law. 116. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement inflicts on Plaintiffs and class members an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life in FDOC facilities. 117. The conditions in "single-cell special housing" on death row at UCI and FSP are unduly harsh and restrictive. They are much more harsh and restrictive than the general conditions in other units in UCI and FSP or the conditions in other FDOC facilities. 118. Defendants are permanently confining Plaintiffs and class members in these atypically brutal conditions without legitimate penological justification. 119. Because indefinite placement in "single-cell special housing" constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, Plaintiffs and class members-like all other inmates in FDOC facilities-are entitled to: live in less restrictive conditions unless it is determined, after notice and hearing, that they are required to be placed in solitary confinement; receive a meaningful explanation of how they can establish their fitness to live in or return to less restrictive housing
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conditions; and obtain meaningful and timely periodic administrative reviews to determine .whether they continue to be required to be kept in solitary confinement.
120. Defendants hold Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement without giving them any of these opportunities. In fact, Defendants have forced a number of class members to live in solitary confinement for a decade or more without giving them any chance to establish their fitness to live in less restrictive conditions.
121. Having to live continuously in solitary confinement for such lengthy periods, without being given any opportunity to establish the propriety of being imprisoned in less restrictive conditions, is also atypical in the FDOC. Even inmates placed in disciplinary or administrative confinement or close management in Florida are not housed in those units for anywhere near as long as Plaintiffs and class members and, as set forth above, all ofthem are given an opportunity to challenge their placement at the outset and routine opportunities throughout their placement to establish that they should rejoin general population and live in less restrictive conditions.
122. Because Defendants' fixed policy of permanent solitary confinement imposes on Plaintiffs and class members an atypical and significant hardship not imposed on other FDOC inmates, and because Defendants further deny Plaintiffs and class members the same opportunity that other FDOC inmates have to seek review of and relief from their restrictive living conditions, Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs and the Class members ofa protected liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalfofthemselves and all others similarly situated, seek
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the follo"'ing relief: A. An order certifying the class; B. Judgment in their favor and against Defendants; C. A declaration fmding that Defendants' policy of permanently placing death row
inmates in "single-cell special housing," or solitary confinement, to be in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
D. An injunction requiring Defendants to comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution by, inter alia:
• abolishing their policy of automatically and permanently housing death row inmates in solitary confinement;
• developing and faithfully applying constitutionally adequate procedures and standards for assigning death row inmates to, periodically reviewing the assignment of death row inmates to, and permitting death row inmates to obtain relief from assignment to "single cell special housing" or similarly restrictive housing in which death row inmates could be placed; and
• any other measure required to bring Defendants into compliance with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
E. An order retaining jurisdiction over this case to ensure Defendants' full compliance with the foregoing injunction;
F. An order awarding Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
G. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: Jacksonville, Florida July 19, 2017

Li~ott Respectfully sub~tte~

0--ln._:

(SBN 102857)

TRIAL COUNSEL

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Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 1 Filed 07/19/17 Page 32 of 32 PageID 32 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Khalid Pasha, Robert Rimmer, John Troy, Steven Stein, and Gary Whitton
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 Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 41 Filed 03/28/18 Page 1 of 31 PageID 284

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MARK DAVIS, MARK GERALDS, JESSE GUARDADO, JOSEPH JORDAN, ROBERT RIMMER, STEVEN STEIN, JASON STEPHENS and GARY WHITTON, on behalfofthemselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JULIE JONES, KEVIN JORDAN, and BARRY REDDISH, in their official capacities as employees of the Florida Department of Corrections,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civil Action No.: 3:17-cv-820-J) 34PBD ) ) ) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT ) AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ) ) ) ) ) ) )

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF INTRODUCTION
I. Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, and Gary Whitton are inmates on Florida's death row. On behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, they bring this lawsuit to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from a patently unconstitutional Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") policy that automatically places Florida prisoners sentenced to death in permanent solitary confinement, regardless of their behavior while incarcerated.
2. The FDOC has held Plaintiffs in permanent solitary confinement, called "singlecell special housing," for between 4 and 30 years, an unconscionably long period of time. Under FDOC policy, each Plaintiff and class member will remain in single-cell special housing until he

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receives relief from his death sentence or is executed, a process that will take many years, potentially decades.
3. The FDOC's policy of automatic, indefinite solitary confinement for death row inmates is extreme, debilitating, and inhumane, violates contemporary standards of decency, and poses an unreasonable risk of serious harm to the health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants continuously deprive Plaintiffs and class members of the basic human contact required to maintain their mental and physical health. Plaintiffs and class members languish alone in cramped, concrete, windowless cells, often for twenty-four hours a day, for years on end. Defendants severely restrict their phone calls, afford them extremely limited contact with other inmates and prison staff, provide them minimal opportunity for exercise, and deprive them of all vocational, recreational, and educational programming.
4. Predictably, the conditions on Florida's death row have not only created a serious risk of harm to the health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members, but have in fact caused harm, both psychological and physical, to Plaintiffs and class members.
5. Defendants have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to the psychological and physical trauma that the FDOC' s policy of permanent solitary confinement threatens to inflict, and in fact inflicts, on Plaintiffs and class members. The scientific literature exposing the deleterious health effects of prolonged solitary confinement is well-known to Defendants. A number ofjudicial decisions have recognized this scientific research when condemning the practice of prolonged solitary confinement; the international human rights community has embraced this scientific research by categorizing prolonged solitary confinement as torture; and other prison systems in the United States and around the world have abandoned the use of prolonged solitary confinement because of this scientific research. The actual adverse
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health effects that the FDOC's policy of permanent solitary confinement has had on Plaintiffs and class members is equally well-known to Defendants, as Plaintiffs and class members have been and remain in Defendants' own custody and care. Defendants nonetheless adhere to the FDOC's rigid policy.
6. The conditions on Florida's death row, coupled with Defendants' deliberate indifference to the trauma that such conditions can and do inflict on Plaintiffs and class members, violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
7. In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment, the conditions on Florida's death row violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When compared to the conditions ofconfinement for Florida prisoners not sentenced to death, the conditions on Florida's death row impose an atypical and significant hardship, and Defendants provide Plaintiffs and class members no meaningful opportunity to obtain relief from that hardship.
8. Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to (a) a declaration that Defendants' policy of automatically placing them in permanent solitary confinement violates their constitutional rights, and (b) an injunction compelling Defendants to cease holding Plaintiffs and class members in solitary confinement, except for limited periods and only when based on an individualized determination that a valid penological purpose for such confinement exists.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all class members, bring claims under42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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I0. This Court has jurisdiction for claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
11. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all class members, have occurred in this District.
PARTIES 12. Plaintiff Mark Davis is a resident of Union Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 1000, Raiford, Florida 32083 ("UCI"). He awaits his execution in the event pending postconviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent over 30 years on Florida's death row. 13. PlaintiffMark Geralds is a resident ofUCI, P.O. Box 1000, Raiford, Florida 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 24 years on Florida's death row. 14. Plaintiff Jesse Guardado is a resident ofUCI, P.O. Box 1000, Raiford, Florida 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 12 years on Florida's death row. 15. Plaintiff Joseph Jordan is a resident of Florida State Prison, P.O. Box 800, Raiford, Florida 32083 ("FSP"). He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 4 years on Florida's death row. 16. Robert Rimmer is a resident of UCI, P.O. Box 1000, Raiford, Florida 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 18 years on Florida's death row.
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17. Steven Stein is a resident ofUCI, P.O. Box 1000, Raiford, Florida 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 26 years on Florida's death row.
18. Jason Stephens is a resident ofFSP, P.O. Box 800, Raiford, FL 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 19 years on Florida's death row.
19. Gary Whitton is a resident ofUCI, P.O. Box l 000, Raiford, Florida 32083. He awaits his execution in the event pending post-conviction proceedings do not succeed in avoiding that result. He has spent 25 years on Florida's death row.
20. Defendant Julie Jones is the Secretary of the FDOC. She provides final approval of rules applicable to death row inmates. As an employee of the FDOC, she acts under color of state law. She is sued in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
21. Defendant Kevin Jordan is the warden of UCI. He is in charge of implementing rules and procedures for the death row unit in that facility. As an employee of the FDOC, he acts under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
22. Defendant Barry Reddish is the warden of FSP. He is in charge of implementing rules and procedures for the death row unit in that facility. As an employee of the FDOC, he acts under color of state law. He is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. CONDITIONS ON FLORIDA'S DEATH ROW
A. Plaintiffs' Automatic, Permanent Assignment to "Single-Cell Special Housing"
23. The FDOC requires "single-cell special housing"-i.e., sqlitary confinement-for any person sentenced to death. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830(a). Correspondingly, the FDOC
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mandates that "[d]eath row housing cells shall be separate from general population housing." See id. Therefore, as soon as an individual is sentenced to death and transported to death row at either UCI or FSP, he is placed permanently and indefinitely in solitary confinement.
24. The FDOC rules theoretically require that "[a]t least annually, a death row inmate shall be reviewed by his classification officer to determine overall institutional adjustment based on the inmate's disciplinary history, participation in programming, and cooperation with staff." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830. However, Defendants have never moved any death row inmate from "single-cell special housing" to general population or any other form of less restrictive housing as a result of any annual review or otherwise.
25. FDOC inmates who are not sentenced to death are initially classified and assigned to facilities and housing units "based upon such factors as nature and severity of offense, characteristics ofsentence, criminal history, age, health status, and any other factor relating to the security and order of the institution or the security and safety of the general public." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.21 0(1 )(a). However, in contrast to FDOC inmates sentenced to death, FDOC inmates who are not sentenced to death-even those assigned to maximum security facilitiesare not initially placed in conditions anywhere near as restrictive and severe as "single-cell special housing." FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are placed in harsh conditions similar to the conditions on death row-e.g., "disciplinary confinement," "administrative confinement," or "close management"-only after they have demonstrated non-compliant behavior while in prison, or have demonstrated while in prison that their safety in general population is at serious risk, that they warrant placement in such conditions. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.800, 33602.220, 33-602.222. Further, FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are placed in such conditions only after being given an opportunity to challenge that placement. See, e.g., Fla.
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Admin R. 33-601.304- 308, 33-601.800(3). And, as described in more detail below, FDOC inmates not sentenced to death are never placed in such conditions permanently; to the contrary, they are placed in such conditions for a limited, prescribed period or receive mandatory, routine reviews to determine whether there continues to be a penological justification for keeping them in such conditions. See, e.g., Fla. Admin R. 33-601.314, 33-601.800(16); 33-602.220(1), (3), 33602.222(8).
B. Conditions on Death Row at Union Correctional Institution 26. Upon information and belief, the death row at UCI is composed of twelve wings, each containing twenty-eight cells. UCI's death row houses over 330 prisoners, including Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton. 27. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the class members at UCI are housed individually, without a cellmate, in a cell that is approximately sixty square feet, or approximately nine feet by seven feet. 28. Cells on UCI's death row contain a bed, a combination sink/toilet, a locker for belongings, and a small writing table. Because there is no stool, inmates typically sit on the locker when using the writing table. 29. In the summer months, cell walls are hot to the touch. There is minimal ventilation, and the water in the cells does not get cold. 30. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton cannot see any other inmate from their respective cells. Nor can any other inmate on death row at UCI see other inmates from his cell.
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31. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the class members at UCI do not eat their meals in a cafeteria or any other group setting. Each meal they receive is delivered to and consumed in their individual cells.
32. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, and Mr. Whitton are given the opportunity to leave their cells three times per week to take a shower, each by himself, for between five and ten minutes. The same is true of all other inmates on death row at UCI.
33. Prison officials will sometimes discourage showering, and in such instances will "toss" -or dismantle the contents of-inmates' cells if they opt to take showers.
34. In theory, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other inmates on death row at UCI are given the opportunity to leave their cells two times per week for three hours to go to an exercise yard. In practice, these three-hour blocks are often cancelled and/or shortened due to guard shortages, events in other parts of the prison, or other circumstances. Further, these three-hour blocks begin when the first inmate is taken from his cell, and end when the last inmate is returned to his cell. Thus, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other inmates on death row at UCI frequently spend far less than three hours outside of their cell during the periods allotted for exercise.
35. Individual inmates whom corrections officers dislike or view as problematic are deprived of even these blocks of yard-time.
36. In some cases, inmates deemed to have disciplinary issues are barred from the exercise yard and instead placed by themselves in cages-smaller areas, slightly larger than the size of their cells and enclosed on all sides by fencing. In other cases, UCI death row inmates
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who have been placed in disciplinary confinement are denied exercise altogether-a guard will walk by the inmate's cell with a clipboard for the benefit of the security camera and will mark down that the inmate refused exercise regardless of whether the inmate wanted to exercise or not.
37. Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other death row inmates at UCI have the opportunity to spend time outside of their cells at the prison law library once a week. Death row inmates are permitted to visit the law library only one at a time, however, so they do not have contact with fellow death row inmates when they go.
38. With the exception of"emergency situations, such as notifications of family
deaths, and when necessary to ensure the inmate's access to attorneys or the courts," see Fla.
Admin. R. 33-601.830(7)(k), Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the other death row inmates at UCI are given the opportunity to make only one 15 minute phone call per month to a person preapproved by prison officials.
39. Although death row regulations explicitly permit death row inmates to participate
in self-improvement programs absent a security threat, see Fla. Admin. R. 33-60 1.830(7)(n), the
FDOC does not offer Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, or other death row inmates at UCI any opportunities to participate in educational or self-improvement programs.
40. In sum, on most days, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and other death row inmates at UCI spend twenty-four hours confined to their cells, with virtually no human contact. On other days, Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and other class members at UCI spend extremely limited periods outside of their cells, with correspondingly limited human contact.
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41. As explained in greater detail below, because Mr. Davis, Mr. Geralds, Mr. Guardado, Mr. Rimmer, Mr. Stein, Mr. Whitton, and the class members at UCI have been subjected to indefinite solitary confinement, they are at serious risk of suffering, and have suffered, serious harm to their mental and physical health, including but not limited to depression, psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and degeneration of eyes, teeth, muscles, and joints.
42. As explained in greater detail below, Defendants Jones and Jordan have been, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the obvious and well-known risks that indefinite solitary confinement poses, as well as the obvious harm that such confinement has caused, to the mental and physical health of class members at UCI.
C. Conditions on Death Row at Florida State Prison
43. Death row at FSP is composed of one wing ("G Wing"), containing 68 cells. FSP's death row houses approximately 63 prisoners, including Mr. Stephens and Mr. Jordan.
44. Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and the class members at FSP are housed individually, without a cellmate, in a cell that is approximately 54 square feet, or approximately nine and a half feet by six feet.
45. Cells contain a bed, a combination sink/toilet, a locker for belongings, and a small writing table.
46. In the summer months, cell walls are hot to the touch. There is minimal ventilation and fans placed in corridors are pointed toward guards, not inmates' cells. Inmates on the second floor of the corridor are subject to even hotter conditions.
47. Neither Mr. Stephens nor Mr. Jordan can see any other inmate from his cell. Nor can any other inmate on death row at FSP see other inmates from his cell.
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48. Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP do not eat their meals in a cafeteria or any other group setting. Each meal they receive is delivered to and consumed in their individual cells.
49. Mr. Stephens and Mr. Jordan are given the opportunity to leave their cells three times per week to take a shower, each by himself, for between five and ten minutes. The same is true of all other inmates on death row at FSP.
50. In some cases, and at the total discretion of guards, inmates are only allowed a shower that is less than five minutes long.
51. Prison officials will sometimes discourage showering, and will often "toss"-or dismantle the contents of.-inmates' cells if they opt to take showers. Inmates occasionally return to their cells after showing to find their belongings strewn about.
52. In theory, Mr. Stephens, Mr~ Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP are given the opportunity to leave their cells two times per week for three hours to go to an exercise yard. In practice, these three-hour blocks are often cancelled and/or shortened due to guard shortages, events in other parts of the prison, or other circumstances. Further, these threehour blocks begin when the first inmate is taken from his cell, and end when the last inmate is returned to his cell. Thus, Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and the other inmates on death row at FSP frequently spend far less than three hours outside of their cell during the periods allotted for exercise.
53. Individual inmates whom corrections officers dislike or view as problematic are deprived of even these short blocks of exercise time.
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54. The exercise yard offers no barriers or shade from the sun, and thus poses health risks to inmates. Accordingly, some inmates decline the opportunity to participate in "yard time."
55. Inmates deemed to have disciplinary issues are barred from the exercise yard altogether and instead placed alone in cages-smaller areas, slightly larger than the size of their cells and enclosed on all sides by fencing.
56. Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP have the opportunity to spend time outside of their cells at the prison law library. Death row inmates are permitted to visit the law library only one at a time, however, so they do not have contact with fellow death row inmates when they go. While at the library, inmates are required to sit inside a small cell/room to read.
57. Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP can only make one IS minute phone call per month to a person preapproved by prison officials. Otherwise, death row inmates are prohibited from making or receiving calls outside of "emergency situations, such as notifications of family deaths, and when necessary to ensure the inmate's access to
attorneys or the courts." See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.830(7)(k).
58. Although death row regulations explicitly permit death row inmates to participate
in self-improvement programs absent a security threat, see Fla. Admin. R. 33-60 l.830(7)(n), the
FDOC does not offer Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, or other death row inmates at FSP any opportunities to participate in educational or self-improvement programs.
59. In sum, on most days, Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan, and other death row inmates at FSP spend twenty-four hours confined to their cells, with virtually no human contact. On other
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days, Mr. Stephens and other death row inmates at FSP spend extremely limited periods outside of their cells, with correspondingly limited human contact.
60. As explained in greater detail below, because Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan and the class members at FSP have been subjected to indefinite solitary confinement, they are at serious risk of suffering, and have suffered, serious harm to their mental and physical health, including but not limited to depression, psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and degeneration of eyes, teeth, and muscles.
61. As explained in greater detail below, Defendants Jones and Jordan have been, and continue to be, deliberately indifferent to the obvious and well-known risks that indefinite solitary confinement poses, as well as the obvious harm that such confinement has caused, to the mental and physical health of Mr. Stephens, Mr. Jordan and the class members at FSP.
D. Conditions in FDOC Prisons Outside Death Row 62. Individuals who are in the custody of the FDOC and are not placed in the "singlecell special housing" reserved for death row inmates have the opportunity to, inter alia, socialize with other prisoners, eat with other prisoners, hold jobs, make phone calls, and participate in educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs. 63. Inmates not on death row eat their meals, outside of their cells, with other inmates. Cf. Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.1 01 (2)(b) (referring to clothing inmates must wear while "at food service"). 64. Inmates not on death row are permitted to have jobs within the correctional facilities to which are assigned. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-601.201 ("It is the continuous goal of the department that inmates in work assignments work at least 40 hours per week."); see also
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Admin. R. 33-501.301 (providing for the job of "inmate law clerk"); Admin. R. 33-204.003 (providing for the job of "inmate food handler,,).
65. Inmates not on death row are permitted to participate in out-of-cell educational and vocational training.
66. Inmates not on death row are permitted to maintain a list of up to "10 names and numbers of persons he or she wishes" to call, and are permitted to make calls to those people. Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.205(2)(a); id. at {I) (describing the "minimum telephone privileges that shall be granted to inmates',).
67. Even when non-death row inmates in FDOC facilities are placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons, they are not permanently assigned to solitary confinement and are expected to return to general population.
68. In "disciplinary confinement," which is "a form of punishment in which inmates found guilty of committing violations of the department rules are confined for specified periods of time to individual cells based upon authorized penalties for prohibited conduct," an inmate,s placement must be reviewed "every week/' with the goal being to return the "inmate to the open population as soon as the facts of the case indicate that this can be done safely.', Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.222(8). The maximum administrative punishment for the most serious institutional infractions is 60 days in disciplinary confinement. See Fla. Admin R. 33-601.314.
69. In "administrative confinement,', which is for inmates who need to be temporarily removed from "the general inmate population in order to provide for security and safety until such time as more permanent inmate management processes can be concluded/, an inmate's placement must be reviewed within three days of placement, and procedures to transfer the
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inmate out of administrative confinement shall be commenced within 20 days unless it is the
inmate himselfwho requested such confinement. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.220(1),(3).
70. In "protective management," which is for inmates who need to be temporarily removed from the general population "in order to provide for security and safety until such time as a more permanent inmate management decision can be concluded" (Fla. Admin. R. 33602.221(l)(a)), an inmate's placement must be reviewed every thirty days, and the "goal shall be toward returning the inmate to general population as soon as the facts of the case indicate that this can be done safely." Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.221 (8).
71. In "close management," which is the "the confinement of an inmate apart from the general population, for reasons of security or the order and effective management of the institution, where the inmate, through his or her behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of others," an inmate's placement must be reviewed "at least once every week for the first 60 days and once every 30 days thereafter." Admin. R. 33-601.800(16).
72. Therefore, unlike death row inmates at UCI and FSP, non-death row inmates who are placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons do not remain in solitary confinement permanently and indefinitely, are generally prohibited from remaining in solitary confinement for extended periods, and are thus able to resume socializing with other prisoners, eating with other prisoners, holding jobs, making phone calls, and participating in educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs.
II. THE RISK OF SERIOUS HARM TO HEALTH AND SAFETY POSED BY DEFENDANTS' POLICY OF PERMANENT SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR DEATH ROW INMATES
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73. Social scientists have long observed the devastating psychological and physical effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Research has shown that prolonged solitary confinement causes a persistent and heightened state of anxiety and nervousness, headaches, insomnia, lethargy or chronic fatigue (including lack of energy and lack of initiative to accomplish tasks), nightmares, heart palpitations, and fear of impending nervous breakdowns. Other documented effects include obsessive ruminations, confused thought processes, an oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational anger, social withdrawal, hallucinations, violent fantasies, emotional flatness, mood swings, chronic depression, feelings ofoverall deterioration, and suicidal ideation. Individuals in prolonged solitary confinement frequently fear they will lose control of their anger and thereby be punished further.
74. Courts have recognized and incorporated this scientific literature in their decisionmaking. A number of federal judges have expressly acknowledged the extraordinarily harmful psychological effects of prolonged solitary confinement.
75. In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Ruiz v. Texas, No. 16-7792 (March 7, 2017), Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer opined that Petitioner Ruiz had a "strong" claim that serving 22 years in "permanent solitary confinement" on Texas's death row violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Breyer observed that the Supreme Court "recognized long-standing 'serious objections' to extended solitary confinement" as long ago as 1890, and noted that Petitioner Ruiz "has developed symptoms long associated with solitary confinement, namely severe anxiety and depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep difficulty."
76. In his concurrence in Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015), Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that research confirms that "[y]ears on end of near-total
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isolation exact a terrible price," and condemned the "human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation." Id. at 2210.
77. In her concurrence in Hutchinson v. Florida, 671 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 2012),
Judge Rosemary Barkett ofthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit condemned the practice of prolonged solitary confinement for death row inmates. She observed, among other things, that '.'the psychological effects of spending extended periods in solitary confinementcommonly known as SHU syndrome-may impair an inmate's mental capabilities to the extent that his active participation in litigation becomes impossible." /d. at 1002. In one of the studies
Judge Barkett cited, Psychiatric Effects ofSolitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 325
(2006), Dr. Stuart Grassian, a board certified psychiatrist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School for more than 25 years, concluded that "even those inmates who are more psychologically resilient inevitably suffer severe psychological pain as a result of[solitary] confinement, especially when the confinement is prolonged, and especially when the individual experiences this confinement as being the product of an arbitrary exercise of power and intimidation. Moreover, the harm caused by such confinement may result in prolonged or permanent psychiatric disability, including impairments which may seriously reduce the inmate's capacity to reintegrate into the broader community upon release from prison." /d. at 355.
78. Other courts similarly have recognized the deleterious impact of extended periods
of solitary confinement. See, e.g., Shepard v. Quillen, No. 13-15554, 2016 WL 6246873, at *5 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 20 16) (noting "the horrors of solitary confinement"); Shoatz v. Wetzel, No.
2:13-CV-0657, 2016 WL 595337, at *12 (W.O. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016) (noting the "recognized risks
and harms of solitary confinement"); Miller ex. rei. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th
Cir.2000) ("[I]t is well accepted that conditions such as those present in SMU II [Special
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Management Unit II) ... can cause psychological decompensation to the point that individuals
may become incompetent."). Madridv. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(finding that "when human beings are subjected to social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation, they may deteriorate mentally and in some cases develop psychiatric disturbances," and that there is "ample and growing body of evidence that this phenomenon may occur among persons in solitary or segregated confinement").
79. In light of the scientific evidence described above, there is now an international consensus that the type of permanent solitary confinement that the FDOC imposes on death row inmates at UCI and FSP violates international human rights standards.
80. International human rights organizations, including the United Nations, have condemned indefinite or prolonged solitary confinement as a human rights abuse equivalent to torture. For example, in August 2011, the United Nations' Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment concluded that prolonged solitary confinement constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and is, therefore, prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur determined that solitary confinement is acceptable only in exceptional circumstances and that its duration must be as short as possible. Even 15 days in solitary confinement, according to the Special Rapporteur, constitutes a human rights violation.
81. Having continuously confined Plaintiffs and class members to "single-cell special housing" for years, Defendants and their predecessors have subjected Plaintiffs and Class members to conditions that are tantamount to torture. Living indefinitely in stark and restrictive conditions without routine human interaction has created. the serious and immediate risk that
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Plaintiffs and class members will suffer the same psychological and physical infirmities that social scientists have long associated with prolonged solitary confinement, including:
• "[A]ppetite and sleep disturbances" (Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in LongTerm Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124,
130 (2003)); • "Anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, and self-
mutilations" (id. at 130);
• "[P]rogressive inability to tolerate ordinary stimuli" and "overt paranoia" (Stuart
Grassian, Psychiatric Effects ofSolitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y
325, 335-36 (2006));
• "Depression, anxiety, [and] stomach and muscle pains" (Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects ofSolitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A BriefHistory and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUSTICE 441, 477 (2006));
• "Suicidal thoughts," "depression," and "hallucinations" (id. at 488);
• "Lethargy," "constant headaches," and "a complete breakdown or disintegration
of the identity of the isolated individual" (id. at 492).
82. In fact, Plaintiffs and class members, including Mr. Stein and Mr. Whitton have already suffered some, if not all, ofthese infirmities and others.
83. Because they have developed these conditions, some Plaintiffs and class members, including Mr. Davis, Mr. Guardado, and Mr. Jordan have struggled to acclimate to settings in which other people are present, such as exercise time.
84. Certain class members who are already mentally ill are particularly susceptible to these adverse effects. As the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (''NCCHC")
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stated in an April 10,2016 Position Statement, "[i]t is well established that persons with mental
illness are particularly vulnerable to the harms of solitary confinement." See
http://www.ncchc.org/sol itarv-confinement. 85. To cope with their living conditions, certain class members, including Mr.
Guardado and Mr. Whitton, have developed defense mechanisms that deaden feelings and emotions, which exacts its own psychological toll.
86. The lengthy duration of Plaintiffs' and class members' imprisonment has only exacerbated the adverse effects of their isolative living conditions.
87. As one class member puts it, single-cell special housing is "designed to break you psychologically" and is like "keeping an animal in a cage." Another class member says "[I feel] "I am being physically squeezed... and mentally enclosed, too." Other class members say single-cell special housing is meant to "break your spirit" and "disconnect you from other people, from yourself, and from reality" and that it is "hopeless," a "living death," and "merely existing-not living." One death row inmate committed suicide after his visitation privileges were taken away, prompting another to observe, "I think everyone gets to that point. How much more can you take?"
88. In addition to psychological harm, Plaintiffs and class members have suffered physical problems as a result of their conditions of confinement, including knee pain, back pain, neck pain, and muscle degeneration. III. DEFENDANTS' DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO THE RISK OF SERIOUS
HARM POSED BY DEFENDANTS' POLICY OF PERMANENT SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR DEATH ROW INMATES. 89. The above-described social science regarding the deleterious impact of prolonged solitary confinement on psychological and physical health is long-standing and well-known.
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Indeed, based on that social science, a number of prison systems, both in the United States and around the world, have eliminated the practice of prolonged solitary confinement and have implemented meaningful, robust procedures for routinely reviewing the status of inmates placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons.
90. The psychological and physical infirmities that Plaintiffs and class members themselves have developed as a result of being kept in permanent solitary confinement are also obvious. Plaintiffs and class members are in Defendants' custody and care. Defendants either have recognized or turned a willful blind eye toward the "terrible price" that permanent solitary confinement has exacted on the psychological and physical health of Plaintiffs and class members. In fact, Plaintiffs and class members have filed administrative grievances concerning their placement in indefinite solitary confinement. Defendants have denied each one.
91. Defendants have ignored the social science regarding the adverse, debilitating health effects of prolonged solitary confinement. They have ignored the penal practices adopted in other prison systems that have eliminated prolonged solitary confinement because of these well-known health effects. And they have ignored the obvious adverse health effects of the FDOC's permanent solitary confinement policy on prisoners in their own custody and care, i.e., Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants, therefore, have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to both the significant risk of harm and the actual harm caused by placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement. That is, Defendants have been and continue to be aware of all of the adverse health effects of placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, yet they continue to keep Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, notwithstanding their knowledge of such adverscy health effects.
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92. FDOC rules governing other forms of restrictive confinement, such as "disciplinary confinement," "administrative confinement," and "close management," underscore Defendants' deliberate indifference to the adverse health effects of keeping Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement. In these rules, which apply to non-death row inmates, Defendants acknowledge the adverse health effects of prolonged solitary confinement by allowing confinement in conditions equivalent to single-cell special housing for only limited periods, by furnishing the opportunity to obtain review of and relief from those conditions, and by ensuring that inmates required to live in those conditions for more than a couple of months undergo routine psychological assessments to determine their continued mental fitness to live in those conditions. Defendants' simultaneous failure to furnish Plaintiffs and class members similar protections demonstrates that, as to Plaintiffs and class members, Defendants ignore the serious risks of psychological and physical harm posed by prolonged solitary confinement.
93. For instance, each FDOC inmate placed in disciplinary confinement, among other things, must have his case reviewed every week with the goal of being returned to general population; must be given a psychological screening assessment if confined for more than 30 days and must undergo such screening at least every 90 days; and if housed in disciplinary confinement for more than 60 days, is entitled to a formal evaluation that must include a valid justification for continuing to hold him in disciplinary confinement. See Fla. Admin. R. 33602.222(8). Each FDOC inmate placed in administrative confinement is given similar protections and, in addition, must have his placement reviewed by an institutional classification team within the first 72 hours to ensure it is justified. See Fla. Admin. R. 33-602.220(2), (8). Defendants provide Plaintiffs and class members no such protections, despite their knowledge
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that such protections are necessary to guard against the well-known, adverse effects of prolonged solitary confinement.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 94. Plaintiffs and the class have exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the State of Florida. 95. Mr. Davis filed an informal grievance relating to his indefinite solitary confinement on February 15,2016. It was denied on February 15,2016. Mr. Davis then filed a formal grievance on February 26,2016. It was denied on February 28, 2016. Mr. Davis then filed an appeal of the denial of that formal grievance on March I, 2016. His appeal was denied on March 9, 2016. 96. Mr. Jordan filed an informal grievance relating to his indefinite solitary confinement on May 19,2016. It was denied on May 24, 2016. Mr. Jordan then filed a formal grievance on May 25,2016. It was denied on June 9, 2016. Mr. Jordan then filed an appeal of the denial of that formal grievance on June 14, 2016. His appeal was denied on June 22, 2016.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 97. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 98. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all Florida inmates who are sentenced to death, in the custody of the FDOC, and held at UCI or FSP. 99. The requirements for maintaining a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are satisfied for the following reasons:
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a. Numerosity: The members of the class are so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of class members will likely change throughout this litigation, the class at this time has hundreds of members.
b. Commonality: Defendants subject all class members to the same conditions of confinement: all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are automatically and permanently placed in "single-cell special housing"-i.e., solitary confinementwithout review; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are housed individually, without cellmates; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are housed in similarlysized, cramped cells; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are given-at mostthe same, negligible amount of time outside their cells each week: two threehour blocks of recreation time and three, five-to-ten minute blocks of shower time; all death row inmates at UCI and FSP are severely restricted from making phone calls. Therefore, there are questions of law and fact that are common to the class and that predominate over individual questions, including: o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; o Whether Defendants' placement of class members in indefinite solitary confinement results in constitutionally cognizable harm or presents a constitutionally unacceptable risk of harm;
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o Whether Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of mental and physical suffering of class members;
o Whether a legitimate penological reason exists for Defendants to place class members in indefinite solitary confinement, sometimes lasting decades, simply because class members have been sentenced to death; and
o Whether the conditions of confinement for death row inmates at UCI and FSP constitute an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
c. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class members because Plaintiffs have suffered the same injury as the class members. In particular, Plaintiffs have been placed in indefinite solitary confinement based on their death sentences alone.
d. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs do not have any interests that are adverse to those of the class members. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation and intend to prosecute this action vigorously.
I00. The prerequisites for maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) are met because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to each class member. In particular, Defendants have placed each Class member in indefinite solitary confinement. Therefore, final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
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Imposition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments {42 U.S.C. § 1983)
I0 I. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in paragraphs 1 through I03, above, as though fully set forth herein.
I02. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement is the custom, policy, and practice of the State of Florida.
I03. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary· confinement has been and continues to be done under color of state law.
I04. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, Defendants deprive Plaintiffs and class members of basic human needs, including but not limited to the need for routine social interaction, environmental and sensory stimulation, regular physical exercise, sleep, and other essential activity.
I05. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, Defendants have created an unreasonable risk of serious harm to the psychological and physical health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members and have in fact done harm to the psychological and physical health and safety of Plaintiffs and class members.
I06. Defendants' policy of automatically placing Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement is not rationally related to legitimate security needs.
I07. Defendants' policy of automatically placing Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement is extreme and violates contemporary standards of decency.
108. By placing Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement, Defendants have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference to the psychological and physical harm that such confinement threatens to inflict, and in fact inflicts, on Plaintiffs and class members. Defendants keep Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement,
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without adequate penological justification, despite the well-known social science establishing the serious psychological and physical harm wrought by prolonged solitary confinement, despite the court decisions and the consensus of the international human rights community recognizing such harm, despite the increasing abandonment of prolonged solitary confinement in prison systems within the United States and around the world based on the recognition of such harm, and despite evidence that Plaintiffs and class members themselves have suffered such harm while in Defendants' custody and care.
109. Defendants' rigid policy of permanent solitary confinement for Plaintiffs and class members, together with Defendants' deliberate indifference to the significant psychological and physical harm that their policy threatens to inflict and in fact inflicts on Plaintiffs and class members, violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
COUNT II Denial of State-Created Liberty Interests in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983) II 0. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in paragraphs I through 112, above, as though fully set forth herein. 111. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement is the custom, policy, and practice of the State of Florida. 112. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in indefinite solitary confinement has been and continues to be done under color of state law. 113. Defendants' placement of Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement inflicts on Plaintiffs and class members an atypical and significant hardship as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life in FDOC facilities.
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I 14. The conditions in "single-cell special housing" on death row at UCI and FSP are unduly harsh and restrictive. They are much more harsh and restrictive than the general conditions in other units in UCI and FSP or the conditions in other FDOC facilities.
115. Defendants are permanently confining Plaintiffs and class members in these atypically brutal conditions without legitimate penological justification.
I I 6. Because indefinite placement in "single-cell special housing" constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, Plaintiffs and class members-like all other inmates in FDOC facilities-are entitled to: live in less restrictive conditions unless it is determined, after notice and hearing, that they are required to be placed in solitary confinement; receive a meaningful explanation of how they can establish their fitness to live in or return to less restrictive housing conditions; and obtain meaningful and timely periodic administrative reviews to determine whether they continue to be required to be kept in solitary confinement.
117. Defendants hold Plaintiffs and class members in permanent solitary confinement without giving them any ofthese opportunities. In fact, Defendants have forced a number of class members to live in solitary confinement for a decade or more without giving them any chance to establish their fitness to live in less restrictive conditions.
118. Having to live continuously in solitary confinement for such lengthy periods, without being given any opportunity to establish the propriety of being imprisoned in less restrictive conditions, is also atypical in the FDOC. Even inmates placed in disciplinary or administrative confinement or close management in Florida are not housed in those units for anywhere near as long as Plaintiffs and class members and, as set forth above, all of them are given an opportunity to challenge their placement at the outset and routine opportunities
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throughout their placement to establish that they should rejoin general population and live in less restrictive conditions.
119. Because Defendants' fixed policy of permanent solitary confinement imposes on Plaintiffs and class members an atypical and significant hardship not imposed on other FDOC inmates, and because Defendants further deny Plaintiffs and class members the same opportunity that other FDOC inmates have to seek review of and relief from their restrictive living conditions, Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs and the Class members of a protected liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalfofthemselves and all others similarly situated, seek the following relief: A. An order certifying the class; B. Judgment in their favor and against Defendants; C. A declaration finding that Defendants' policy of permanently placing death row inmates in "single-cell special housing," or solitary confinement, to be in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; D. An injunction requiring Defendants to comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by, inter alia: • abolishing their policy of automatically and permanently housing death row
inmates in solitary confinement; • developing and faithfully applying constitutionally adequate procedures and
standards for assigning death row inmates to, periodically reviewing the assignment
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of death row inmates to, and pennitting death row inmates to obtain relief from assignment to "single cell special housing" or similarly restrictive housing in which death row inmates could be placed; and • any other measure required to bring Defendants into compliance with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; E. An order retaining jurisdiction over this case to ensure Defendants' full compliance with the foregoing injunction; F. An order awarding Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and G. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: Jacksonville, Florida March 28, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

Linda McDennott (SBN 102857) TRIAL COUNSEL Martin J. McClain (SBN 754773) McCLAIN & MCDERMOTT P.A. 141 NE 30th Street Wilton Manors, FL 33334-1064 Tel. (850) 322-2172 Fax. (954) 564-5412 Lindamcdennott@msn.com

Seth A. Rosenthal Claire M. Wheeler
30

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 41 Filed 03/28/18 Page 31 of 31 PageID 314
VENABLELLP 600 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 Tel. (202) 344-4000 Fax. (202) 344-8300 Sarosenthal@venable.com Cmwheeler@venable.com Matthew T. Shea VENABLELLP 750 E. Pratt Street, Suite 900 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel. (410) 244-7400 Fax. (410) 244-7742 Mtshea@venable.com Attorneysfor Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, and Gary Whitton
31

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 79 Filed 05/28/19 Page 1 of 3 PageID 824

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

-----------------------------------------------------------------X

MARK DAVIS, MARK GERALDS, JESSE

:

GUARDADO, JOSEPH JORDAN, ROBERT

:

RIMMER, STEVEN STEIN, JASON STEPHENS, :

and GARY WHITTON, on behalf of themselves :

and all others similarly situated,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

: Civil Action No.: 3:17-cv-820-J-34PDB

:

v.

:

: JOINT STATUS REPORT

MARK INCH, TONY JORDAN, and BARRY

: REGARDING MEDIATION AND

REDDISH, in their official capacities as employees : JURY DEMAND

of the Florida Department of Corrections,

:

:

Defendants.

:

:

JOINT STATUS REPORT REGARDING MEDIATION AND JURY DEMAND The parties jointly submit this status report in response to the Court’s orders on May 14,
2019 (See Doc. 77) and May 17, 2019 (See Doc. 78): 1. On May 14, 2019, the Court held a preliminary pretrial conference at which it
directed the parties to confer as the appropriate point in the litigation at which to hold a mediation before Senior United States District Judge Harvey Schlesinger. The parties have done so, and agree that it would be beneficial to conduct mediation immediately. The parties agree that early to middle July 2019 would be an appropriate time in which to schedule the mediation, but will defer to Judge Schlesinger to coordinate the precise date and other related procedures.
2. Additionally, on May 17, 2019, the Court requested that the parties advise the Court as to whether they agree to a non-jury trial as reflected in the original case management report. The parties confirm that they have agreed to a non-jury trial in this matter.
1

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 79 Filed 05/28/19 Page 2 of 3 PageID 825

Respectfully submitted,
Date: May 28, 2019
/s/Linda McDermott Linda McDermott (SBN 102857) TRIAL COUNSEL McClain & McDermott P.A. 141 NE 30th Street Wilton Manors, FL 33334-1064 Tel. (850) 322-2172 Fax. (954) 564-5412q Lindamcdermott@msn.com

ASHLEY MOODY ATTORNEY GENERAL
/s/David Welch (signed with permission) DAVID WELCH TRIAL COUNSEL Florida Bar No.: 57911 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Telephone: (850) 414-3300 Fax: (850) 488-4872 David.Welch@myfloridalegal.com

Evan Shea Matthew Shea VENABLE LLP 750 E. Pratt Street, Suite 900 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel. (410) 244-7400 Fax. (410) 244-7742 etshea@venable.com mtshea@venable.com
Seth Rosenthal Claire Wheeler VENABLE LLP 600 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 Tel. (202) 653-3750 Fax. (202) 344-8300 SARosenthal@Venable.com Cmwheeler@venable.com

DANIEL JOHNSON Assistant Attorney General Florida Bar No.: 0091175 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Telephone: (850) 414-3300 Fax: (850) 488-4872 Daniel.Johnson@myfloridalegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein Jason Stephens, and Gary Whitton
2

___________________________
Attorneys for Defendants Mark Inch, Secretary FDC, Tony Anderson, Warden, and Barry Reddish, Warden

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 79 Filed 05/28/19 Page 3 of 3 PageID 826 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 28, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel or parties of record by CM/ECF.
/s/ Evan T. Shea Evan T. Shea (pro hac vice)
3

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 72 Filed 03/28/19 Page 1 of 43 PageID 757

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARK DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. MARK S. INCH,1 et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-820-J-34PDB

ORDER I. Status Plaintiffs, death-sentenced inmates of the Florida penal system, initiated this action with the benefit of counsel on July 19, 2017, by filing a "Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" (Complaint; Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They filed an "Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" (AC; Doc. 41) on March 28, 2018. In the AC, Plaintiffs Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, and Gary Whitton name the following Defendants: (1) the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC); (2) Kevin Jordan, the Warden of

1 Plaintiffs bring only official capacity claims against the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. See "Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" (Doc. 41) at 5. Therefore, Mark S. Inch (the current Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections) is substituted for Julie L. Jones (the former Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 72 Filed 03/28/19 Page 2 of 43 PageID 758
Union Correctional Institution (UCI); and (3) Barry Reddish, the Warden of Florida State Prison (FSP). They assert that the Defendants have violated and continue to violate their federal constitutional rights when they enforce a "rigid" FDOC policy that automatically places Plaintiffs in permanent "single-cell special housing" (solitary confinement) without any opportunities for review and/or relief from the harsh, restrictive, long-term death row conditions. See AC at 3, 5, 26-29. As relief, they seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Motion; Doc. 45) with exhibits (Def. Ex.). Plaintiffs responded. See Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Response; Doc. 47). Defendants' Motion is ripe for review.
II. Plaintiffs' Allegations Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants have violated and continue to violate their Eighth Amendment rights when they enforce the FDOC's policy of automatic, indefinite solitary confinement for death-sentenced inmates because the inhumane conditions impose an unreasonable risk of serious harm to their health and safety. See AC at 3, 5, 26-27. They also contend that the Defendants have violated and continue to violate their Fourteenth Amendment right when they: (1) subject them to death row conditions that impose an atypical and significant hardship that other FDOC inmates are not
2

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subjected to, and (2) deny them the same opportunity that other FDOC inmates have for review and/or relief from restrictive conditions. See id. at 3, 27-29. As relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory finding that Defendants' policy of assigning and housing death-sentenced inmates in permanent solitary confinement is a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 29. They also request that the Court direct the Defendants to (1) abolish the policy of automatic, indefinite solitary confinement for death-sentenced inmates, and (2) develop and implement constitutionally adequate procedures to (a) assign death-sentenced inmates to housing, (b) periodically review the housing assignments, and (c) permit death-sentenced inmates to obtain review and relief from such housing assignments. See id. at 29-30.
More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that FDOC Rule 33601.830(1)(a) requires that death-sentenced inmates be housed in "single-cell special housing status" that is "separate from general population housing." See id. at 5-6. They aver that a deathsentenced inmate is automatically assigned to death row at UCI or FSP and "permanently and indefinitely" placed in solitary confinement. See id. at 6. They describe the sub-par death row conditions at UCI and FSP,2 and compare them with the less restrictive conditions for non-death-sentenced (NDS) inmates as
2 According to Plaintiffs, Davis, Geralds, Guardado, Rimmer, Stein, and Whitton are housed on UCI's death row, see AC at 7, and Stephens and Jordan reside on FSP's death row, see id. at 10.
3

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well as the non-permanent conditions that inmates assigned to administrative confinement (AC), disciplinary confinement (DC), protective management (PM), and close management (CM) experience. See id. at 2, 6-14.
According to Plaintiffs, the FDOC's policy of "automatic, indefinite solitary confinement" for death-sentenced inmates is "extreme, debilitating, and inhumane." Id. at 2. They assert that Defendants deprive Plaintiffs of "basic human contact" in a confined space where they "languish alone in cramped, concrete, windowless cells, often for twenty-four hours a day, for years on end." Id. They describe similar sub-par, restrictive conditions at UCI and FSP where death-sentenced inmates are confined twenty-four hours a day without routine human interaction, id. at 9, 12, 18, and endure the following: (1) cramped one-person cells, see id. at 7, 10; (2) no ability to see other inmates from their cells, see id.; (3) minimal cell ventilation with no cold water and hot-tothe-touch walls, see id.; (4) meals consumed in the cells rather than a group setting, see id. at 8, 11; (5) limited out-of-cell showers (three times a week) that officers sometimes lessen to less than five minutes and/or discourage by rummaging through the inmates' property, see id.; (6) restricted out-of-cell yard exercise (twice a week for three hours) that may be nonexistent due to guard shortages and/or inmate discipline issues, see id.; (7) an unshaded exercise yard at FSP, see id. at 12; (8) limited access to
4

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the prison law library (once a week) with only one inmate permitted in the library at a time, see id. at 9, 12; (9) one fifteen-minute telephone call per month to a pre-approved person unless there is an emergency situation, such as to notify the inmate about a family death and/or ensure the inmate's access to attorneys and/or the courts, see id.; and (10) no participation in self-improvement programs, although permitted by the rules, see id.
Plaintiffs aver that they have suffered and/or are at risk of suffering serious harm to their mental and physical health, including, but not limited to, depression, psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and degeneration of their eyes, teeth, muscles, and joints. See id. at 10, 13, 19. They maintain that Davis, Guardado, and Jordan have "struggled" with exercise yard interaction due to mental and physical "infirmities" associated with prolonged solitary confinement. Id. at 19. Additionally, they state that Guardado and Whitton "have developed defense mechanisms that deaden feelings and emotions . . . ." Id. at 20.
Plaintiffs maintain that NDS inmates who are placed in solitary confinement for administrative or disciplinary reasons are not permanently assigned to such confinement and are expected to return to general population to socialize and eat with other prisoners, hold jobs, make phone calls, and participate in out-ofcell educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs. See id. at 13-15. They explain that any assignments to AC, CM, DC, and
5

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PM are for limited time periods, and the FDOC rules provide opportunities for review and relief from the restrictive confinement as well as psychological assessments. See id. at 14-15, 22.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standard In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
6

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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV. Summary of the Arguments In the Motion, Defendants request dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against them because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), before filing the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. See Motion at 2-9. They also assert that the Court should
7

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dismiss Plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, see id. at 9-21, and claims for injunctive relief, see id. at 22-23. In response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiffs assert that they "faithfully exhausted their administrative remedies" before filing the lawsuit. Response at 2, 6-9. Additionally, they maintain that they state plausible Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Defendants, see id. at 9-19, and claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Jordan and Reddish, see id. at 19-20.
V. Discussion A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. Exhaustion under the PLRA Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required before a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with respect to prison conditions may be initiated by a prisoner. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Nevertheless, prisoners such as Plaintiffs are not required to plead exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United States Supreme Court has recognized "failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]" Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is "a precondition to an adjudication on the merits" and is mandatory under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008); Jones, 549 U.S. at 211; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.") (citation omitted). A prisoner must exhaust each claim
8

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that he seeks to present in court. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219-20
("All agree that no unexhausted claim may be considered."). Not
only is there an exhaustion requirement, "the PLRA exhaustion
requirement requires proper exhaustion." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.
Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust, administrative law creates an incentive for these parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which "means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)." Pozo,[3] 286 F.3d, at 1024. . . .
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, "[p]roper exhaustion demands
compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural
rules . . . ." Id. As such, the United States Supreme Court has
emphasized:
Courts may not engraft an unwritten "special circumstances" exception onto the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)'s mandate is the one baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are "available."
Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1862 (2016).
Although proper exhaustion is generally required, a remedy
must be "available" before a prisoner is required to exhaust it.
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008); Goebert
3 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).
9

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 72 Filed 03/28/19 Page 10 of 43 PageID 766
v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007). An
administrative remedy may be unavailable when prison officials
interfere with a prisoner's pursuit of relief. See Ross, 136 S.Ct.
at 1860. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that an
administrative remedy that "is unknown and unknowable is
unavailable" in that it is "not 'capable of use for the
accomplishment of a purpose.'" Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1323 (quoting
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).
The determination of whether an inmate properly exhausted his
available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal
court is a matter of abatement and should be raised in a motion to
dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a summary judgment
motion. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374-75 (citation omitted). The
Eleventh Circuit has explained the two-step process that a court
must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner's failure to exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we established a two-step process for resolving motions to dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the prisoner's response and accept the prisoner's view of the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.
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Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner's view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust. Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining that defendants bear the burden of showing a failure to exhaust). Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App'x 819, 823-24 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).4 2. Exhaustion under Florida's Prison Inmate Grievance Procedures The FDOC is responsible for establishing inmate grievance procedures that satisfy the purposes of the PLRA. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 944.09(1)(d), 944.331). Fulfilling that obligation, the FDOC has promulgated the Inmate Grievance Procedures set forth in Chapter 33-103 of the Florida Administrative Code. See id. at 1288. Pursuant to Chapter 33-103, an inmate in Florida "must (1) file an informal grievance with a designated prison staff member; (2) file a formal grievance with the institution's warden; and then (3)
4 "Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive authority." United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.").
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submit an appeal to the Secretary of the FDOC." Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).5
The Inmate Grievance Procedures provide time frames for submission of grievances, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.011, as well as rules regarding the form and content of an individual grievance or appeal, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.005(1)(b), 33103.006(1)(b)(2), 33-103.007(2)-(4). According to Rule 33-103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or grievance appeal "may be returned to the inmate without further processing if, following a review of the grievance, one or more ... conditions are found to exist." FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.014(1). Some of the reasons for returning a grievance are: the grievance "addresses more than one issue or complaint" or "is so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly investigated, evaluated, and responded to" or "is not written legibly and cannot be clearly understood" or is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance that has been accepted for review; and the inmate "did not provide a valid reason for by-passing the previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not acceptable," or "used more than two (2) additional narrative pages." See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.014(1)(a), (b), (c), (f), (q), (t). Nothing in the Inmate Grievance Procedures set forth in Chapter 33-103
5 Exceptions to this three-step procedure are set forth in Chapter 33, but they are not relevant to this action. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33.103.005(1), 33.103.006(3), 33.103.007(3).
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Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 72 Filed 03/28/19 Page 13 of 43 PageID 769
suggests that an inmate must take any additional steps once he has timely completed all three steps outlined there.
3. Plaintiffs' Exhaustion Efforts
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA, before filing this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. See Motion at 2-9. They acknowledge that Plaintiff Davis completed the FDOC's internal grievance procedure, and that by virtue of the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion, if the Court grants class certification, his exhaustion efforts would apply to the class as a whole. See id. at 8 n.4 (citing Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287-88).6 Nevertheless, Defendants assert that the "normal prisoner grievance process alone" is "insufficient" to properly notify the FDOC about a rule challenge. Id. at 5. They maintain that Davis and, by extension all Plaintiffs, failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them because they failed to file a petition to initiate
6 Defendants state that they intend to preserve the exhaustion defense as to the "other plaintiffs" in the event that the Court denies Defendants' Motion or Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. See Motion at 8 n.4. In an Order entered on June 20, 2018, the Court deferred ruling on Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 48) until after resolution of the instant Motion to Dismiss. See Order (Doc. 52). While Plaintiffs Whitton, Stein, Rimmer, Guardado, Geralds, and Stephens, as well as unnamed members of the putative class, appear to be relying on the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion, Plaintiff Jordan does not. In the AC, Plaintiffs specifically assert that Jordan completed all three steps of the Inmate Grievance Procedures. See AC at 23. Defendants do not dispute or otherwise address this allegation in the Motion.
13

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rulemaking (PIR) pursuant to Florida Statutes section 120.54(7) prior to filing the Complaint in this case. See id. at 7. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs are seeking to amend FDOC Rule 33.601.830, which regulates death row housing, and therefore, they were required not only to exhaust their claims using the prison's Inmate Grievance Procedures, but also were required to file a PIR under Florida Statutes section 120.54(7) prior to filing the Complaint. Id. In support of their position, Defendants submit the declarations of Betty Money, the FDOC records custodian for PIRs. See Def. Ex. A at 1-8. She declares that the FDOC has not received PIRs from any of the Plaintiffs. See id.
In response, Plaintiffs assert that they have exhausted all required administrative remedies because Davis exhausted his administrative remedies through the FDOC's Inmate Grievance Procedures, and therefore satisfied the exhaustion requirement for the putative class. See Response at 6, 9. They maintain that Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs were also required to file a PIR before filing the lawsuit "is wholly unsupported." Id. at 6. Plaintiffs therefore ask that the Court "reject Defendants' invitation to add another step to the exhaustion requirement." Id. at 9. They assert that they are challenging Defendants' practices, and are not requesting that the Court direct the Defendants to amend FDOC rules, but instead, "if anything," are seeking to "invalidate" rules regulating death row. Id. at 9 (emphasis
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deleted). Moreover, they maintain that, as prisoners, they are not eligible to file a petition seeking to invalidate a rule under Florida Statutes section 120.56. Id. at 8-9.
In support of their contention that filing a PIR is necessary to accomplish proper exhaustion, Defendants cite Smith v. Conner, No. 8:12-CV-52-T-30AEP, 2014 WL 299099 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2014), aff’d sub nom, Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027 (11th Cir. 2015).7 Motion at 6. Defendants contend that the court there concluded that the inmate "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in regard to his rule challenge because he had not filed a Petition to Initiate Rulemaking pursuant to § 120.54(7) Fla. Stat." Id. (citing Smith, 2014 WL 299099, at *7 n.6).8 While it is true that in Smith the court determined that the plaintiff-inmate could not pursue a rule change without filing a PIR, what Defendants fail to recognize is that the court nevertheless permitted the plaintiff-inmate to pursue his Eighth Amendment claim regarding the effect of the property rule at issue. The court explained:
7 Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ultimate outcome of the Smith case, the issue of exhaustion was not raised or in any way considered on appeal.
8 To the extent Defendants refer to the Smith decision as "binding precedent," see Motion at 6 n.3, they are mistaken. Decisions of other district courts are not binding. See McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the "general rule that a district judge’s decision neither binds another district judge nor binds him. . . .").
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To the extent Plaintiff requests the Court order Defendants to make "the necessary additions to the inmate property list to allow necessary items [,]" the Court agrees that Plaintiff is attempting to alter a Department rule, specifically Rule 33-602.201, and therefore was required to initiate rulemaking under 120.54(7). To the extent, however, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have failed to provide him with adequate protection from the cold and wet weather, and adequate storage space, the Court finds that Plaintiff has fully exhausted his available administrative remedies through the prison grievance procedure. Smith, 2014 WL 299099, at *4 n.6. Thus, in Smith, the court explicitly limited its reference to, and reliance on, the PIR process to the plaintiff-inmate’s request to make changes to the prison property rule. The court did not conclude that resort to the PIR process was necessary for the plaintiff-inmate to pursue his claims regarding the effect of the rule - i.e. the effect that the property limitations had on the conditions of his confinement. Here, Plaintiffs’ AC contains no request that the Court order any specific changes to the policies regulating confinement of deathsentenced inmates. Instead, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that FDOC’s death row confinement policies violate their federal constitutional rights and that Defendants be required to adopt
16

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constitutionally adequate policies.9 As such, the limited holding in Smith is inapplicable.
To the extent Defendants suggest that Smith should be read broadly as requiring resort to the PIR process to accomplish exhaustion based on the Plaintiffs’ request to "abolish" current FDOC policies, the Court is not persuaded. In Jones, the Supreme Court addressed what must be done to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. The Court explained:
In Woodford, we held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must "complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules," rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Id. (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88) (emphasis added). As such, the Court determined that all that is required to "properly exhaust" under the PLRA is "compliance with prison grievance procedures." Id. In light of this determination, and after reviewing the applicable prison grievance procedures, the Court reversed dismissals for failure to exhaust based on the inmates’ failure to identify by name the specific person later named as a defendant. Id. at 217-18. Rejecting the necessity of such information for purposes of exhaustion, the Court held:
9 In contrast, the Smith plaintiff sought entry of a judgment requiring the amendment of the prison property rules to permit certain items he alleged were necessary such as a raincoat, rain hat, waterproof boots and "rubbers." Smith, No. 8:12-cv-52-T-30AEP, Doc. 11 at 25.
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The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. As MDOC’s procedures make no mention of naming particular officials, the Sixth Circuit’s rule imposing such a prerequisite to proper exhaustion is unwarranted.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
The Eleventh Circuit has similarly focused on the requirements
of the applicable prison grievance procedures to determine whether
an inmate has accomplished proper exhaustion. See Miller v. Tanner,
196 F.3d 1190 (1999). In Miller, the court explained:
An inmate incarcerated in a state prison, thus, must first comply with the grievance procedures established by the state department of corrections before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983.
In deciding if Miller exhausted his administrative remedies, we do not review the effectiveness of those remedies, but rather whether remedies were available and exhausted. See Alexander [v. Hawk,] 159 F.3d [1321,] 1326 [1998]. There is no dispute that the GDC made administrative remedies available to prisoners. Before deciding whether Miller followed the proper procedures to exhaust those remedies, we must first determine what the procedures were that he had to follow.
Id. at 1193 (emphasis added). Upon review of the applicable
procedures, the court found no requirement that an inmate "sign and
date" a grievance before submitting it to prison officials. Id. As
such, the prison’s rejection of the inmate’s grievance for failure
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to "sign and date" was improper, and the court reversed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust.
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that the requirements of the applicable prison grievance system govern the issue of exhaustion. See Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211 ("[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.") (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218); see also Gipson v. Renninger, 750 F. App’x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) ("To determine ‘proper exhaustion’ in prisoner civil rights actions, courts look to the requirements of the ‘prison grievance system.’ A prisoner must comply with rules ‘defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.’") (internal citations omitted); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that prisoners must comply with the grievance procedures adopted by the state department of corrections before filing a § 1983 action); Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 412 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "when a state provides a grievance procedure for its prisoners, as Georgia does here, an inmate . . . must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure.") (emphasis added). Here, the PIR provision that Defendants seek to engraft into the PLRA exhaustion process is not part of the Inmate Grievance Procedures adopted by the state department of corrections, rather it is part of Florida’s statutory
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Administrative Procedures Act. See generally Fla. Stat. Chapter
120. The Inmate Grievance Procedures adopted by Florida’s
department of corrections are set forth in Chapter 33 of the
Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the Inmate Grievance
Procedures is required to be "available for access by inmates at a
minimum in the inmate law library and from the housing officer. .
. ." FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.015(10). The Inmate Grievance
Procedures, r. 33-103, contain no mention of filing a PIR nor do
they in any way reference Florida’s Administrative Procedures Act.
Not surprisingly, the Inmate Grievance Procedures require an
"Inmate Orientation" through which inmates must be given training
on the grievance procedures and must acknowledge their receipt of
such training. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.003(2). The FDOC Inmate
Orientation Handbook instructs:
Grievances The Department has a grievance process available for you to resolve issues you may have. You are encouraged to make every effort to resolve your issue prior to filing a grievance. There are two types of grievances, informal and formal. Grievance types and procedures will be explained to you during orientation and can be found in Rule 33-103, Florida Administrative Code.
Form N11-091, Inmate Orientation Handbook, Reception Center Processing (revised 12/2/16) at 16 (emphasis added).10 Again, there

10 The Inmate Orientation Handbook is available on the FDOC

website

at

www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/files/Inmate

OrientationHandbook.pdf (last visited March 26, 2019).

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is no reference whatsoever to the filing of a PIR or Florida’s Administrative Procedures Act in the Inmate Orientation Handbook or anywhere in Rule 33-103 of the Florida Administrative Code. The PIR provision of the Florida Administrative Procedures Act upon which Defendants rely simply is not part of the Inmate Grievance Procedures adopted by Florida’s department of corrections. As such, Plaintiffs were not required to file a PIR before challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement pursuant to rules or policies applicable to death-sentenced inmates.
Jurists in the Northern District of Florida similarly have concluded that the filing of a PIR is not necessary to accomplish proper exhaustion. Martinez v. Jones, Case No. 4:17cv210-MW/CAS, 2018 WL 3215737 (N.D. Fla. June 12, 2018) (finding that a separate APA rule challenge which would be heard by an administrative law judge would not further the purposes of exhaustion and was not required by the procedures adopted by the FDOC) Report and Recommendation adopted sub nom Gavillan-Martinez v. Jones, 2018 WL 4265216 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2018); Sims v. Jones, Case No. 4:16cv49-WS/CAS, 2018 WL 3242701, at *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018) ("Because filing a [PIR] is not outlined in the [FDOC’s] procedures to challenge a rule, Plaintiff cannot be said to have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. That statutory remedy is separate and apart from the [FDOC’s] internal grievance procedures.") Report and Recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2018 WL 1535483, at *1
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(N.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2018); Torres v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 4:15cv464-RH/CAS, 2017 WL 9439165 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2017) Report and Recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4031462, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2017) (rejecting contention that inmate was required to file a separate action under Florida’s Administrative Procedures Act to properly exhaust).11 Defendants acknowledge the existence of two of these decisions, Torres and Sims, but dismiss them as "incorrect and not persuasive." See Motion at 6 n.3. However, in doing so, they fail to address the rationale of those courts, a rationale that this Court finds to be quite persuasive.
Additionally, Defendants’ citation to O’Connor v. Carnahan, No. 3:09cv224-WS/EMT, 2016 WL 8669909, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2016) Report and Recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1240749 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2017), is unavailing. See Motion at 6-7 n.3. While in the O’Connor Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge did observe that filing a PIR seemed to be "the most appropriate route for exhausting remedies to challenge a rule," that observation was not the basis of the court’s finding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See O’Connor, 2016 WL
11 While decisions of other district courts are not binding, they can be persuasive. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, "[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.").
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8669909, at *4.12 Instead, the Magistrate Judge recommended, and the District Judge agreed, that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies of the inmate grievance system before filing his § 1983 action challenging the rule. See id. at *4-6. In doing so, the court observed that an argument that the plaintiff "must have used the [PIR] procedure to achieve exhaustion" was likely "unsound" and that the court viewed the PIR "procedure as simply one avenue plaintiff might have taken, another avenue being the regular inmate grievance procedure described above." Id. at *4 n.1. There, plaintiff did neither. As such, O’Connor provides no support for Defendants’ contention that resort to the independent PIR process set forth in Florida’s Administrative Procedures Act was required in order for Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies for the claims brought in this action.
In sum, the PLRA requires "proper exhaustion." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. Proper exhaustion requires compliance with "the prison grievance process itself," Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, which for state inmates means compliance "with grievance procedures adopted by the state department of corrections," Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. The state of Florida’s department of corrections has promulgated its
12 In the Motion, Defendants suggest that the FDOC did not argue in O’Connor that plaintiff should have filed a PIR to exhaust his challenge to the prison mail rule. See Motion at 7 n.3. This suggestion is factually inaccurate as that very argument, including reliance on the Smith decision, is presented on pages 10-12 of the motion for summary judgment, see O’Connor, No. 3:09cv224-WS/EMT, Doc. 372, addressed in the Report and Recommendation.
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Inmate Grievance Procedures which generally require that an inmate
"must (1) file an informal grievance with a designated prison staff
member; (2) file a formal grievance with the institution's warden;
and then (3) submit an appeal to the Secretary of the FDOC."
Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2015).13 The
Inmate Grievance Procedures further specifically state that they
may be used to challenge "[t]he substance, interpretation and
application of rules and procedures of the department that affect
[inmates] personally[.]" FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.001(4)(a).14 It
is undisputed that Davis completed each of the steps of the FDOC’s
Inmate Grievance Procedures and did so in a timely manner. Nothing
13 Again, the Court acknowledges that these general requirements are subject to exceptions which are not relevant to the discussion here. See supra n.5.
14 Even if the filing of a PIR could be considered to be an administrative remedy which Plaintiffs could have been required to exhaust, the undersigned would find it to be an unavailable remedy. This is so because the failure to include any reference to the Administrative Procedures Act in the written Inmate Grievance Procedures provided to inmates or the Inmate Orientation Handbook would render such a remedy "unknown and unknowable." See Sims, 2018 WL 3242701, at *3-4. Moreover, the undersigned is persuaded that because the Florida Administrative Procedures Act prohibits inmates from challenging the validity of a rule, which is what Plaintiffs do in this action, the PIR remedy under Florida Statute section 120.54 is equally unavailable to these Plaintiffs seeking to abolish the current rules governing confinement of death-sentenced inmates. See Torres v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 4:15cv464RH/CAS, 2015 WL 9854803, at *3-4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2015) (quoting Quigley v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 745 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)) Report and Recommendation adopted on January 18, 2016, ECF No. 21; Sims v. Jones, 4:16cv49-WS/CAS, 2016 WL 7826807, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2016) (citing Quigley, 745 So.2d at 1030 and Caldwell v. State, 821 So.2d 374-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)).
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more is required by the Inmate Grievance Procedures adopted by the state of Florida’s department of corrections and nothing more was required for Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies for the claims set forth in the AC. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Bingham, 654 F.3d at 175; Miller, 196 F.3d at 1193.
Here, Plaintiffs, as a putative class, challenge their death row conditions at UCI and FSP. The parties agree that Plaintiff Davis properly completed the FDOC Inmate Grievance Procedures. See Motion at 8 n.4; Response at 6, 9; AC at 23. Because the Court finds that having done so Davis satisfied the PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement, he has also satisfied the exhaustion requirement for the putative class. See Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287 ("We hold that a class of prisoner-plaintiffs certified under Rule 23(b)(2) satisfies the PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement through 'vicarious exhaustion,' i.e., when 'one or more class members ha[s] exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to each claim raised by the class.'") (citations omitted). Thus, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied without prejudice to their right to raise an exhaustion defense as to Plaintiffs Whitton, Stein, Rimmer, Guardado, Geralds, and Stephens after the Court rules on Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 48), if class certification is denied.15
15 See Motion at 8 n.4. ("However, Defendants have not attached documentation to demonstrate that other plaintiffs may not have fully exhausted the Department's grievance process; accordingly, in
25

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B. Eighth Amendment Death Row Conditions To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit requires "'an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right attributable to a defendant, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation.
the event the class is not certified or this motion not granted, Defendants respectfully reserve the exhaustion defense in this regard to be preserved for the other plaintiffs."). Nevertheless, the Court notes that Plaintiff Jordan alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies by completing the three step grievance process and Defendants did not challenge his assertion. Thus, it appears that his claims are exhausted.
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"The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones . . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal quotation and citation omitted).[16] Thus, in its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide humane conditions of confinement. Id. However, as noted above, only those conditions which objectively amount to an "extreme deprivation" violating contemporary standards of decency are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000.[17] Furthermore, it is only a prison official's subjective deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. at 2327.[18]
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). The
Eighth Amendment also requires prison officials to "take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer, 511 U.S.
832) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).
However, not every injury that a prisoner suffers as a result of a
prison condition necessarily equates to a constitutional violation.
See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1333. Only injuries that occur as a result
of a prison official's deliberate indifference rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
16 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
17 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
18 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
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The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm as follows:
Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal more than does proof of negligence: "To be deliberately indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard 'an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319–20 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).[19]
In other words, a plaintiff in [Plaintiffs’] position must show not only that there was a substantial risk of serious harm, but also that [Defendants] "subjectively knew of the substantial risk of serious harm and that [they] knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk." Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).[20] Whether prison officials had the requisite awareness of the risk "is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981 (citation omitted). At the same time, the deliberate indifference standard — and the subjective awareness required by it — is far more onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct sounding in negligence: "Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under [§] 1983." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
19 Purcell v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005).
20 Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis deleted). Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment
claims against them, arguing that Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts that would entitle them to relief. See Motion at 12-16. They maintain that Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient facts as to either the objective prong, see id. at 12-15, or the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment, see id. at 15-16. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court must, the Court is not so convinced.
Upon review of the AC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state plausible claims under the Eighth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observes that Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants violated, and continue to violate, their Eighth Amendment rights when Defendants automatically place Plaintiffs in prolonged solitary confinement on death row for almost twenty-four hours a day with extremely limited human interaction and sporadic out-of-cell activity. According to Plaintiffs, the FDOC has housed them in solitary confinement year after year after year without any opportunity for review and/or relief from the severely harsh long-term conditions. Some of the Plaintiffs have experienced the alleged sub-par conditions on death row at FSP and UCI for over twenty years. See AC at 4-5; see also http://www.dc.state.fl.us/offenderSearch (Corrections Offender Network). The Court declines to find that these allegations if
29

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proven would fail to state a plausible claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment. As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as to Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims against them, and the parties will be given an opportunity to further develop the facts.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. Life and property are not at issue in the instant case, and therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to due process only if they are being deprived of a liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts "examine procedural due process questions in two steps; the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State[;] the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005). Liberty interests may arise from either the Due Process Clause or state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225–27 (1976). In reviewing whether state law creates a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has directed that courts must focus on the nature of the deprivation at issue rather than a "search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483
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(1995).21 Looking at the nature of the deprivation, the Sandin Court explained that state-created liberty interests rising to the level of requiring Due Process protection generally will be limited to "freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484 (internal citations omitted).
Notably, in the wake of Sandin, courts have reached inconsistent conclusions regarding what constitutes an "atypical and significant hardship" or how to determine the baseline of the "ordinary incidents of prison life." Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (describing the difficulty in comparing different Circuits' approaches in Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997), and Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), with Hatch v. Dist. of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1999); also citing Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1997)). In 2005, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of a prisoner's liberty interest in the context of a change in custodial conditions. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209. Although the Supreme Court had previously held that the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest
21 In Sandin, the Supreme Court abrogated its prior methodology, in part, because federal courts had become too involved in the day-to-day management of prisons. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83.
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in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement, see
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225, the Wilkinson Court held that a transfer
to a supermax facility did implicate a liberty interest under state
law. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24. The Supreme Court reasoned that, taken together, the conditions at the supermax facility22 were
so extreme that, regardless of how the baseline was defined, the
restrictions imposed "an atypical and significant hardship within
the correctional context." Id. (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483).
Thus, a liberty interest was implicated. Id. at 224. The Court
explained:
[The] harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners. . . . That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance.
Id. (citation omitted).
Consistent with Sandin and Wilkinson, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that a prisoner can be deprived of his liberty in
violation of due process in two ways:
The first is when a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by
22 The Court described the "harsh conditions" as "almost all human contact is prohibited" for the duration of the sentence, no conversation is permitted among cells, the cell lights may be dimmed, but remain on for twenty-four hours, exercise is limited to one hour per day in a small indoor room, only annual reviews occur, and otherwise eligible inmates are disqualified for parole consideration. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24.
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the court. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492–93, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263–64, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a mental hospital). The second is when the state has consistently given a certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that benefit "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (prisoners may not be deprived of statutory "good-time credits" without due process); cf. Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1497–98 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining how the state creates liberty interests). In the first situation, the liberty interest exists apart from the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by the state.
Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) (footnote
omitted); see also Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2004) (recognizing "the new Sandin standard," under which
there is "no liberty interest and no constitutional violation ...
if the Sandin 'atypical and significant hardship' standard [is] not
met").
Applying this standard, in Bass, the Eleventh Circuit
considered a provision of the Florida Administrative Code which
provided for two hours of "yard time" for prisoners in close
management absent clear and compelling reasons to do otherwise. 170
F.3d at 1318. Finding that prisoners had a state-created interest
in yard time, the court concluded that the deprivation of yard time
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imposed "enough of a hardship to qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Id. Although the prisoners were deprived of only two hours of yard time, the court found "the marginal value of those two hours" to be "substantial" to someone housed in close management. Id. As such, the deprivation of those two hours constituted an atypical and significant hardship warranting due process protection. See id. Notably, the ultimate determination of whether a liberty interest is implicated requires a fact-intensive inquiry as to what constitutes an "atypical and significant hardship" and where to look to determine the baseline of the "ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1284 (vacating the district court's dismissal as to plaintiff's due process claims for further development of the record); Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318; Spaulding v. Woodall, 551 F. App'x 984, 987 (11th Cir. 2014); Wallace v. Hamrick, 229 F. App'x 827, 830 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The record before us does not contain adequate facts with respect to the conditions of Wallace's confinement as compared with the conditions of confinement of his fellow inmates to determine whether Wallace's confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship 'in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'") (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated and continue to violate their Fourteenth Amendment right
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when they (1) subject them to death row conditions that impose an atypical and significant hardship that other FDOC inmates are not subjected to, and (2) deny them the same opportunity that other FDOC inmates have for review and/or relief from restrictive conditions. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, arguing that Plaintiffs "do not have a liberty interest in avoiding the conditions of Florida's death row," Motion at 16, and Florida's death row is not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, see id. at 20-22. In response, Plaintiffs assert that the prolonged and permanent solitary confinement on Florida's death row imposes atypical and significant hardships on Plaintiffs in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life in "every other setting" (general population, AC, DC, CM, and PM). Response at 16, 19. Thus, Plaintiffs maintain that their allegations are sufficient to establish a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment because their prolonged and permanent solitary confinement meets the Sandin standard, and Defendants "furnish [them] no procedural safeguards for avoiding deprivation of that liberty interest." Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
As explained in Sandin, a liberty interest may exist either under the Due Process Clause or as created by a state, however, the focus should be on the nature of the deprivation itself rather than wrestling "with the language of intricate, often rather routine,
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prison guidelines to determine whether mandatory language and substantive predicates created an enforceable expectation that the State would produce a particular outcome with respect to the prisoner's conditions of confinement." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480–81. Thus, whether the FDOC properly applied its rules, or any other implementing procedures, is less important than the nature of the deprivation and its effect on the conditions of Plaintiffs' confinement. Instead, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged that their death row confinement and conditions deprive them of a liberty interest protected either by the Due Process Clause of its own force, or by some other state-created liberty interest that entitles them to procedural safeguards, such as periodic reviews and/or ultimate relief from the conditions.
Initially, the Court notes that the Supreme Court has determined that administrative confinement for short periods of time does not implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485–87 (thirty days); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (two months). Also, a transfer to a more restrictive prison with less rehabilitative programs does not typically implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223–25; Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (holding there is no constitutional entitlement to prison rehabilitative programs or to particular custody classifications under the Due Process
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Clause); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Viewing Plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to them, as the Court must, Plaintiffs fail to allege restraint that exceeds their death sentences in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force. Nevertheless, they allege violations of liberty interests connected with their prolonged and permanent solitary confinement, which may instead arise under state law.
"[T]he touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves 'in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). The Court notes that, in Sandin, where the Court held that a thirty-day disciplinary segregation did not present an atypical and significant deprivation by the state, the Court did so on a motion for summary judgment. 515 U.S. at 486. The Court first compared evidence of the treatment of inmates in disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and the general population to find that (1) the administrative segregation "mirrored those conditions" in disciplinary segregation, and (2) the thirty day confinement "did not work a major disruption in [the inmate's] environment[,]" before determining that no liberty interest was implicated. Id.
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Indeed, much of the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court decisions determining the existence of state-created liberty interests compare such evidence on summary judgment or at trial, rather than at the pleading stage. See id.; Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209; Wolff, 418 U.S. 539; Bass, 170 F.3d 1312; Rodgers, 142 F.3d 1252; Al–Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App'x 733 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Moreover, in close cases, courts are less willing to dismiss claims for failure to allege a state-created liberty interest at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. See Spaulding, 551 F. App'x 984; Wallace, 229 F. App'x at 832; Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282–83; but see Morales v. Chertoff, 212 F. App'x 888, 889–90 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that neither the Due Process Clause nor Florida statutes bestowed a liberty interest in prisoner's position as a law clerk); Smith v. Regional Dir. of Fla. Dep't of Corr., 368 F. App'x 9, 13 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (dismissing prisoner's claims because he failed to allege an atypical and significant hardship).
Upon review of the AC, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the combinations of hardship that Plaintiffs allege, particularly when imposed automatically and indefinitely, are not atypical and significant when compared to "the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized the length of an inmate's confinement or segregation to be significant in the determination of whether a
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liberty interest is implicated. See Al-Amin, 165 F. App'x at 738;
Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996)
("Because Williams's sanctions-especially the full year of solitary
confinement-represent substantially more 'atypical and significant
hardship[s] ... [than the thirty days of segregated confinement
addressed in Sandin] in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life,' we assume that [Williams] suffered a liberty
deprivation and was entitled to due process."). In this regard, the
court has explained:
"The length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978). For example, 30 days in solitary confinement was not such a hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. Neither was two months in administrative confinement. Rodgers, 142 F.3d at 1253. However, a full year in solitary confinement can constitute such hardship. Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996).
In cases where atypical hardship has been found, the confinement conditions were "extremely harsh." Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282 (determining that atypical and severe hardship existed where the prisoner was in solitary confinement, "locked in an extremely small, closet-sized space [ ] with minimal contact with other human beings for a prolonged time exceeding 500 days"); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) (concluding that atypical and significant hardship existed where inmates were confined indefinitely, deprived of almost all human contact, cells were lit 24 hours per day, exercise was severely limited in an indoor room, and placement in such confinement led to parole consideration disqualification).
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Simpkins v. Gulf CI Warden, No. 16-17386-E, 2017 WL 6034508, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2017); Smith v. Deemer, 641 F. App'x 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating "atypical and significant hardships must exist for a significant period of time" and "must also be severe relative to regular prison").
Here, Plaintiffs' indefinite solitary confinement with the attendant restrictions, including limited out-of-cell activity and socialization, may be both atypical and significant when compared to the conditions of confinement experienced by NDS inmates. Thus, at the pleading stage, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' confinement does not impose an atypical and significant hardship "in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' indefinite solitary confinement and attendant restrictions, all taken together, may implicate a state-created liberty interest. Thus, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied to permit the parties to develop the facts relating to Plaintiffs' death row conditions of confinement, the baseline of the ordinary incidents of prison life, and any process afforded to Plaintiffs for review and/or relief from the restrictive conditions. With a more extensive set of facts, the Court may determine that no liberty interest is implicated or that due process was afforded. However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
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Plaintiffs, as the Court must, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' AC meets the Iqbal plausibility test.
D. Defendants Reddish and Jordan Defendants Reddish and Jordan seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against them because only the FDOC Secretary has the authority to change policy relating to death row housing and custody. See Motion at 22. They state that neither Reddish nor Jordan, in their official capacities as Wardens of UCI and FSP, has the authority to enact or change FDOC policy. See id. They maintain that the FDOC Secretary "can provide the declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiff[s] seek[] and additional official capacity parties are not needed." Id. In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the Court should not dismiss Defendants Reddish and Jordan from this action because "relief against [the Secretary], who approves the rules, Fla. Stat. § 944.09(1), would not necessarily provide relief against Jordan and Reddish, who implement the rules and administer the conditions on death row, id. §§ 944.09(1), 944.14." Response at 21. Given Plaintiffs' assertions relating to Defendants Reddish and Jordan, see AC at 5, 10, 13, the Court is not convinced that the dismissal of Defendants Reddish and Jordan is appropriate at this stage of the litigation. Therefore, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied.
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VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that the Motion is due to be denied. As noted above, see supra n.6, the Court previously deferred ruling on Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 48) until resolution of the instant Motion. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge vacated the deadlines set forth in the Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 54) and advised that if the Motion was denied, the Court would direct the parties to file a new case management report. Upon consideration of the claims in this action and the procedural posture of the case, the Court determines that before requiring a response to Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification23 or directing the parties to file another case management report, the Court should hold an in person preliminary pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the Court will order Defendants to answer the AC and schedule a preliminary pretrial conference. Based on the foregoing, it is now ORDERED:
23 See Order (Doc. 52)(stating Defendants shall have twenty-one days after a ruling on the motion to dismiss to file a response to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification).
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1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 45) is DENIED.24
2. Defendants, no later than April 22, 2019, must file an Answer to the AC.
3. Counsel of record are directed to appear for a Rule 16 Preliminary Pretrial Conference on Tuesday, April 30, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. before the undersigned at the United States Courthouse, 300 North Hogan Street, Courtroom No. 10B, Tenth Floor, Jacksonville, Florida.25
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 28th day of March, 2019.
sc 3/26 c: Counsel of Record
24 The denial is without prejudice to Defendants asserting a failure to exhaust defense with regard to specific Plaintiffs in the event the Amended Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 48) is denied.
25 All persons entering the Courthouse must present photo identification to Court Security Officers. Although cell phones, laptop computers, and similar electronic devices generally are not permitted in the building, attorneys may bring those items with them upon presentation to Court Security Officers of a Florida Bar card (presentation of the Duval County Courthouse lawyer identification card will suffice) or Order of special admission pro hac vice. However, all cell phones must be turned off while in the courtroom.
43

 
 Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 1 of 7
U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:19−mc−00017−HES−JBT

Davis et al v. Jones et al

Date Filed: 06/12/2019

Assigned to: Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Joel B. Toomey

Case in other court: FLMD Civil Case, 3:17−cv−820−J−34PDB

Plaintiff

Mark Davis on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler Venable LLP 575 7th Street NW Washington, DC 20004 202/344−4227 Fax: 202/344−8300 Email: KCDearing@Venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea Venable, LLP* Suite 900 750 E Pratt St Baltimore, MD 21202 410/244−7400 Fax: 410/244−7742 Email: etshea@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott Assistant Federal Defender Office of the Federal Defender 227 N. Bronough St., Suite 4200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 850/942−8818 Email: linda_mcdermott@fd.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain McClain & McDermott, PA 141 NE 30th St Wilton Manors, FL 33334 305/984−8344 Fax: 954−564−5412 Email: martymcclain@earthlink.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea Venable, LLP Suite 900 750 E Pratt St. Baltimore, MD 21202 410/244−5212 Fax: 410/244−7742 Email: Mtshea@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 2 of 7

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal Venable LLP 575 7th Street NW Washington, DC 20004 202/653−3750 Fax: 202/344−8300 Email: Sarosenthal@venable.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mark Geralds on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jesse Guardado on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 3 of 7

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Joseph Jordan on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Rimmer on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 4 of 7

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Steven Stein on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gary Whitton on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 5 of 7

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jason Stephens

represented by Claire M. Wheeler (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Evan T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda McDermott (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martin J. McClain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew T. Shea (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Seth A. Rosenthal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 6 of 7 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Julie Jones in her official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections
Defendant Kevin Jordan in his official capacity as an employee o the Florida Department of Corrections
Defendant Barry Reddish in his official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections

represented by Daniel Andrew Johnson Office of the Attorney General PL−01 − The Capitol 400 S Monroe St Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850−414−3300 Fax: 850−488−4872 Email: Daniel.Johnson@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Welch Florida Office of the Attorney General The Capital, PL−01 400 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399 850/414−3647 Fax: 850/488−4872 Email: david.welch@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joe Belitzky Office of the Attorney General PL−01 − The Capitol 400 S Monroe St Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850/414−3300 Fax: 856/488−4872 Email: Joe.Belitzky@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Andrew Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Welch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joe Belitzky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Andrew Johnson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Welch (See above for address)

Case: 3:19-mc-00017-HES-JBT As of: 05/31/2020 07:45 PM EDT 7 of 7
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joe Belitzky (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/12/2019 06/20/2019
06/20/2019 06/21/2019 06/26/2019
06/28/2019

# Docket Text
1 ORDER re: settlement conference with Judge Schlesinger as set forth in the Order. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/12/2019. (TSW) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
2 ORDER scheduling settlement conference with Judge Schlesinger as set forth in the Order; SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS AND INSTRUCTIONS. Signed by Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger on 6/19/2019. (MGG) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
3 NOTICE of hearing: Settlement Conference set for 7/31/2019 at 9:30 AM in Jacksonville Courtroom 10 C before Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger (MGG) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Joe Belitzky on behalf of Julie Jones, Kevin Jordan, Barry Reddish (Belitzky, Joe) (Entered: 06/21/2019)
5 JOINT REQUEST for Alternative Date for Settlement Conference by Mark Davis, Mark Geralds, Jesse Guardado, Joseph Jordan, Robert Rimmer, Steven Stein, Jason Stephens, Gary Whitton. (Shea, Evan) Modified text and event type on 6/27/2019 (KKH). (Entered: 06/26/2019)
6 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULING HEARING: The Settlement Conference hearing previously scheduled for Wednesday, July 31, 2019 at 9:30 AM is rescheduled. New scheduling date and time: Settlement Conference set for 7/25/2019 at 9:30 AM in Jacksonville Courtroom 10 C before Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger; The "OPEN" and "CLOSED" Memorandums are due no later than NOON, July 12, 2019.(MGG) Modified on 7/1/2019 (MGG). (Entered: 06/28/2019)

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 80 Filed 06/12/19 Page 1 of 3 PageID 827

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARK DAVIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARK S. INCH, in his official capacity as an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-820-J-34PDB

ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Following up on the discussion at the May 14, 2019 hearing, and with the consent of all involved, the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, Senior United States District Judge, has agreed to act as a mediator in settlement discussions among the parties aimed at resolving this case. To facilitate those efforts, the following terms shall apply to the settlement proceedings: 1. Judge Schlesinger may call upon our United States Magistrate Judges or
outside attorneys for assistance as he deems the situation to warrant. 2. The format of the settlement conference or conferences (whether separate
private meetings between Judge Schlesinger and the parties, joint sessions at which all parties are asked to attend, telephone conferences, or a combination thereof) will be at the discretion of Judge Schlesinger.

Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 80 Filed 06/12/19 Page 2 of 3 PageID 828
3. If, during the course of the settlement proceedings, Judge Schlesinger decides that other persons or organizations should be invited to participate, Judge Schlesinger may so designate.
4. All proceedings, including any statements made orally or in writing by any party, attorney, or participant in furtherance of these settlement efforts will be privileged in all respects. Thus, the proceedings may not be reported, recorded, placed into evidence, made known to the trial court, or to any other person or entity who is not a participant in the settlement efforts, without Judge Schlesinger’s permission; neither shall any such statement or reference to the proceedings be construed for any purpose as an admission against interest in this case or any other case. No participant will be bound by anything said or done during any discussion or conference conducted as part of these proceedings unless a settlement is reached.
5. Judge Schlesinger may direct payment of any reasonable costs of outside assistance used by him in the exercise of these duties, to be apportioned by him among the parties in his discretion.
6. On or before October 31, 2019, Judge Schlesinger is respectfully requested to report to the undersigned whether the efforts of the parties have concluded (favorably or otherwise) or whether the efforts remain ongoing.
7. To encourage the parties to devote their entire resources to the settlement conference, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court to administratively close this case, to be reopened when the settlement efforts have concluded.
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Case 3:17-cv-00820-MMH-PDB Document 80 Filed 06/12/19 Page 3 of 3 PageID 829 8. Judge Schlesinger will advise the parties by separate Order as to the next step in this process, which Order will be entered in a new case, In re: Davis v. Inch Settlement Conference, Case No. 3:19-mc-17, a miscellaneous case the Clerk shall open and assign to the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, adding as counsel of record all active counsel listed on the docket from this case and any others as directed by Judge Schlesinger. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 12th day of June, 2019.
ja Copies to: Hon. Harvey E. Schlesinger Counsel of Record
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