QMGINAL~~

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA u

ATLANTA DIVISION

E

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Civil Action No.

SAY 21 166 ~'uc c°~le~rk

Plaintiff,
Vs.

03

1 494

INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant .

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the bases of retaliation and record-keeping (failure to file EEO-1 reports), and to provide appropriate relief to the charging party, Ms . Diane Cantu, who was adversely affected by such practices . Ms. Cantu was subjected to adverse employment actions, culminating in discharge, for opposing racial discrimination against African-Americans and for participating in a proceeding

i'~

. f_

1

under Title VII . Prior to her discharge, Ms. Cantu had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the Defendant.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1 . Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S .C . §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345 . This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(fl(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S .C . § 2000e-5(x(1) and (3) (Title VII), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S .C . § 1981a. 2 . The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division.
PARTIES 3 . Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the
2

administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(fl(1) and (3) of Title VII, 28 U.S .C . § 2000e-5(fl(1)and (3).
4 . At all relevant times, Defendant InTown Suites Management, Inc., a Georgia corporation ("Defendant"), has continuously been a corporation doing business in the State of Georgia and the city of Atlanta (among other cities), and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
5 . At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6 . More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Ms . Cantu filed her charges with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant . All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled .
3

7. Since at least September 2001, Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Atlanta, Georgia, facility, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S .C. §§ 2000e-3(a), by subjecting Ms. Cantu to adverse employment actions, culminating in discharge, in retaliation for opposing practices made unlawful by Title VII and for participating in a proceeding under Title VII .
8. The effects of the practices complained of in paragraph 7 above have been to deprive Ms. Cantu of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because she engaged in protected activity .
9. Since at least 2000, Defendant has failed, in violation of Section 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S .C . § 2000e-8(c), to make and preserve records relevant to the determination of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7
4

above were intentional and were carried out with malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Ms . Cantu.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in employment practices which discriminates on the basis of involvement in activity protected by Title VII . B . Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees who engage in activity protected by Title VII, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C . Order Defendant to make whole Ms. Canto, who was adversely affected by Defendant's discriminatory conduct, by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other
5

affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Ms. Cantu and/or front pay .
D. Order Defendant to make whole Ms. Cantu by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described above, including job search expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial .
E. Order Defendant to make and preserve all records, in accordance with the provisions of Section 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S .C . § 2000e-8(c), relevant to the determination of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed .
F . Order Defendant to make whole Ms. Cantu by providing compensation for non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described above, including emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, anxiety, stress, depression, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial .
6

G. Order Defendant to pay to Ms. Canto punitive damages for

Defendant's malicious and reckless conduct described above, in amounts to be

determined at trial .

H. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper .

I. Award the Commission its costs in this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its

Complaint .

Respectfully submitted,

Gwendolyn Young Reams

Ass ciate

r Cou I

4 S . ob rt Royal (Georg~aAar No. 617505) Regional Attorney Steven M. Tapper (Georgia Bar No . 698018) Senior Trial Attorney U. S . Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Atlanta District Office 100 Alabama St., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone : (404) 562-6820 Facsimile: (404) 562-6905

7

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 5.113, NDGa
Plaintiff hereby certifies that, pursuant to LR S .1B, NDGa, this pleading was
prepared with 14 point Times New Roman font.
Respectfully submitted,
l Steven M. Tapper Senior Trial Attorney Georgia Bar No. 698018
U. S . Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Atlanta District Office 100 Alabama St ., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone : (404) 562-6820 Facsimile: (404) 562-6905

 
 t
F,--!,R,~a~AL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUL I l' 19~) ~ ~

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEO~(,rlA

S, Clerk

ATLANTA DIVISION

V y, :

duty Cierk

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUMTY "

COMMISSION and

DIANE CANTU, Intervenor,

Plaintiffs, v. INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC .
Defendant

* CIVIL ACTION FILE
s * NO. 103 CV 1494 RLV
* JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
s s s

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Diane Canto ("Ms . Canto") brings the within complaint against

the above-named Defendant, showing that Defendant Intown Suites

Management, Inc . ("Intown Suites") has engaged in a systemic pattern of

nationwide racial discrimination against people of color on the following

grounds :

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

This action is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Ri Ac; rt,p of

1964,42 U.S .C . §2000 et seq . (hereinafter Title VII), and 42.

M,e ;~: rac g ~~

2. The claims herein present a federal question, and the jurisdiction of this Court is predicated upon 28 U.S .C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U .S .C. §2000(e)-5(f)(3) .
3. All parties to this action reside in or are located within the boundaries of this judicial district, and venue is appropriate under 28 U.S .C . § 1391(b) and 42 U.S .C. §2000e-5(x(3). Moreover, the unlawful employment practices alleged below were committed within the Northern District of the State of Georgia.
4. Ms . Cantu has complied with all conditions precedent to the filing of this action, including filing timely charges of Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and has filed a motion to exercise her right to intervene into the lawsuit brought by the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S .C . § 2000 (e-5) (fl(1) .
-z-

t
PARTIES 5.
Ms . Canto is a Caucasian resident of the State of Georgia. 6.
Defendant Intown Suites is and was at all times relevant hereto a corporation with offices located in this judicial district and doing substantial business in this judicial district and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 7.
Ms. Canto was hired by Intown Suites as a district manager - trainer and corporate development person in Dallas, Texas in April 1999 . Ms. Canto trained Intown Suites employees to be store managers and district managers. Ms . Canto later received promotions that caused her to be transferred to Intown Suites's headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Ms . Canto moved her husband (a person of Hispanic descent) and their daughter to Atlanta in December 1999 as part of the promotion(s).
-3-

f
8.
During the next eighteen (18) months, Ms. Canto was an exemplary employee who never received any written reprimand for any reason .
9. Upon reaching the Atlanta office, Ms . Canto was instructed not to hue people of color into management positions . She was told that Intown Suites needed to upgrade its "image." Ms . Canto noticed that there were no people of color in management at Intown Suites. Ms. Canto objected to this policy, but feared retaliation if she spoke up.
10 . In late August, 2001, Ms . Canto was instructed to replace a Caucasian management employee named Danny Mosely. She dreaded going through another hiring phase in which she could not hire people of color. She was concerned that her daughter was a person of color, and felt like continuing to break the law in hiring practices would be tantamount to betraying her daughter .
11 . Therefore, on September 1, 2001, Ms . Canto wrote an email to a member of management objecting to Intown Suites describing her concerns
-4-

and urging Intown Suites to cease its systematic racial discrimination in hiring. This email is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
12 . At various times from September 6 - 12, 2001, Ms. Canto was subject to disciplinary emails and harassment at Intown Suites. This conduct from Intown Suites was unprecedented in Ms . Canto's employement with Intown Suites .
13 . As a result, Ms . Canto filed a claim of retaliation wide the EEOC on September 13, 2001 .
14 . In a meeting with Intown Suites management on the next day, Ms . Canto presented a copy of her EEOC complaint to die Intown Suites management. Ms. Canto was terminated on the spot by Intown Suites management .
COUNT I -RETALIATION 15 .
Ms Canto incorporates the facts asserted in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if alleged fully herein.
-5-

16 . Ms . Cantu opposed employment practices made an unlawful by Title VII, and he has made a charge under Title VII . Ms . Cantu was fired as a result of those activities . Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), Ms. Canto may recover damages for this termination.
17 . Due to defendant's unlawful actions, plaintiff was injured and plaintiff is entitled to damages and further relief in an amount to be determined at trial.
COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. 1981 18 .
Ms. Canto incorporates the facts asserted in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if alleged fully herein.
19 . Intown Suites has engaged in a systemic pattern of nationwide racial discrimination against people of color.
-6-

l
20 . Ms. Cantu has been retaliated against as result of her opposition to these practices . This conduct is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .
21 . Due to defendant's unlawful actions, plaintiff was injured and plaintiff is entitled to damages and further relief in an amount to be determined at trial . a) adjudge defendant to have engaged in unlawful employment
practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including the revised Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1991, by discriminating against people of color on the basis of race and retaliating against Plaintiff, and adjudge the defendant Canada Life to have discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her race in violation of 42 U.S .C . § 1981 . b) enjoin Defendant from engaging in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U .S .C. § 1981 ; c) award Plaintiff appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, and front pay ;
-7-

d) award Plaintiff general damages to compensate her for the mental and emotional distress occasioned by Defendant's misconduct;
e) award Plaintiff punitive damages to deter and punish the defendant; assess all costs against Defendant, including Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees ;
g) grant a trial by jury ; h) grant such other and further relief as the court deems just and
proper . Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 2003 .
Respectfully submitted,

HILL, KERTSCHER & PIXLEY LLP 3350 Riverwood Parkway Suite 800 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 770-953-0995 770-953-1358 Fax

Dou as . I e scher Georgia Bar No. 416265
Attorneys For Plaintiff Diane Canto

-8-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served opposing counsel with a copy of the above Complaint, via U .S. Mail, with proper postage thereon, addressed as follows :
Suzanne J. Mulliken, Esq. Smith, Currie & Hancock 2600 Harris Twr., Peachtree Center 233 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30303-1530
Steven M. Tapper Senior Trial Attorney U .S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Atlanta District Office 100 Alabama Street, SW
Suite 4830 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Dated this 17th day of July, 2003 .
Douglas R. Kertscher Attorney for Plaintiff Diane Cantu
-9-

EXHIBIT
A

pert: To: CO : Subject :
i[lpGrianGO :

.rc :.iy~c
Saa.iriay ; SFOtcnih2r 07, 42001 9:33 FM C_'heryN Region-) Hiring practi ces at Irnittaw. Suites i-ii :7il '

rck and Cheryl .

Reaiirirm Cia[ nrr=P Aaain we are going to h2 needing to hire ~viH': die termination a' Danny, 1 have rO' Voice my opinion

wren though I gave been somewhat removed from interview process. I cisagree 'wiih the hiring practices u;ai I have

seen in the past here 3±' I .^,tar-, i S::i'ws. We h`wm tota!h; efm;^a:_:i zfia , .,.nori;, --3rd',dat_s ~01r, haw;rg .: .'.~.~:..:~ ri . t_-

rvor;c :n management !or this company in Tie rums of "Image". This is riot only unlawful . it lorces us :o choose ircrr a

pool of candidates that in some cases ire less qualilled.
I F %~-,a_ ~. ".:r. .v+. rl. rc *,rg'1_n;g _rpi ~u ~Fusrhmn I nA.nJo~i.s. i.n. our 63~,ro~ }-I-.. .o .n. t :r,rn~_Id ha in our F;a~ i~l~roci _n rn;~5jd~r 7~ir,o~acy,
This gas huther=_ri me, especially knoriing that my daughter_- being hispznic ruouid no: be considered for a jab here .

I `Fva aiso -aSczd the current trend of the finale managers ,aisapzaring . Lock a: Georgia,

Deborah is only in place

because Cory did not accent 11 :e ;o6. That would mean that all female managers have been r=placid by a white male .

Tnas ii, i just wanted you to know there i stand on Ns and hope you realize row umcsmi-oriabie ii gas teen Tee.ing like

I needed to szy so  -ey:i^g n.en r.^.+.r, y;_ current explanation being "It because our backers -are -r-6,Alic-"I am

confident we oar resolve H-;;s situation because I like my job at Irtonm Suits. 1 just dart Eke the atmosphere that-.

V;_,ted awui SituaNons l i ke Ns area is . have been working on the wsskly report and it yyll, ho sent in with all x'72 other infOtT?3fi01'1 1'3t RiLk has requested this

evening . Thanks, Diana

^Br.a 'j
f

From : $B"" 1;] :
G~ L`j~^} :
importance :

Sdf.Li ."'t;ctf . ,5-Ni=TFEf Via : 2001 0 'i",^, FFA OEAPgIB
RrnC . V'r:^n Yrc~b*_^Z~5 3 : irb:tiR7 S::tL.5
H i gh

,' 7!!r n, :lc_ga

Ir .
Lc : Subject : sent:

Gsl
Renion2 'coring pradcas _i irrLoxfm Suites :a1101 8:33 :D0 ?"i

"vie=5ds3e W'a_5 itad Oil : W1/G i 5 :46 :u0 ='~Jl

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No . 1 :03-CV-1494-RLV

and DIANE CANTU,
v.

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

flLED IN us

.CoL":E.RK.'nSs~0~

ocr 2 s ~0, 03

D.

, Clerk

INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC ., Defendant .

eputy CIe1k

CONSENT PROTECTIVE ORDER This matter is before the Court pursuant to the agreement of the parties as evidenced by the signatures of their respective counsel below for entry of a Protective Order to preserve the disclosure of confidential, private, financial, personal and business information of Defendant InTown Suites Management, Inc . (hereinafter "InTown"), and Defendant's employees and agents. In order to facilitate discovery and to protect confidential information, pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED : I . All documents contained in personnel or supervisory files maintained by Defendant on past or current employees, produced following the execution of this Protective Order, shall be maintained and protected by the parties in strict confidence and shall be utilized solely in connection with the pretrial proceedings, preparation for trial, trial, appeal and/or settlement of this case and for no other purpose, and shall not be disseminated, published, shown or otherwise used or disclosed to or by any person or entity except as provided herein . 2 . Access to any such discovery information identified in Paragraph 1 above shall be limited to attorneys of record and their staff, office associates of the attorneys of record and their staff, the parties to this case including directors, officers and employees thereof, the Court and the Court staff, court reporters in connection with this action, potential witnesses, and independent experts or consultants employed to assist any attorneys of record in the course of trial or pretrial preparation or appeal of any matter or settlement . 3 . Before counsel for the parties disclose any discovery information covered by this Order or the contents thereof to their clients or other individuals referred to in Paragraph 2, the clients or other individuals receiving such disclosure, must first execute the following agreement:
2

AGREEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY
I hereby certify that I have read the Protective Order entered by the Court (the "Order") in the action now pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, entitled Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Diane Cantu v. IrlTown Suites Management, Inc., Civil Action No. 1 :03-CV-1494-RLV (the "Action") and am fully familiar with its terms . I understand that in the course of my activities in connection with the Action I may have occasion to examine, inspect or be exposed to the discovery information covered by the Protective Order or the contents thereof. I therefore agree to be bound by and comply with all of the terms and prohibitions of the Protective Order and not to do any act or thing in violation of the Protective Order. 4. All persons to whom confidential discovery information covered by
this Order is disclosed pursuant to this Order shall :
a. be responsible for keeping such custody or control over said
information so as to assure that said information is not lost,
misplaced or inadvertently disclosed or otherwise used in
violation of the provisions of this Order;
b. not reveal the contents of any said information to any person
not already subject to the terms of this Order;
c . not reveal or use the contents of any said information except for
the purposes set forth in Paragraph 1 above; and
d . promptly destroy or return to counsel for Defendant any copy
of any such information entrusted to him or her when no longer
3

required by him or her for the purposes set forth in Paragraph 1

above.

5 . At the request of any party, any documents or other papers filed with

the Court containing such confidential information shall be filed and maintained

under seal to protect the confidentiality and non-disclosure of such information . In

addition, if there is a disagreement, each party agrees to consult with the other

party, and if necessary the Court, regarding the manner in which any document

containing confidential information covered by Paragraph 1 of this Order shall be

filed with the Court.

6 . The execution and entry of this Order shall in no way affect or impair

the right of the Plaintiffs or Defendant to seek relief therefrom, or to raise or assert

any objection or defense to the use, relevance or admissibility at trial or discovery

information made available under this Order.

7 . After this Action is terminated by the entry of a final and not-further-

appealable order, the discovery information covered by this Order, any copies

thereof, shall be returned to Defendant or destroyed by counsel for Plaintiffs . If

counsel for Plaintiffs chose to destroy such discovery information, they shall

certify to counsel for Defendant that such information has been destroyed .

Dated thiaQ*day of

I -12003 .

BY/7HE COURT :.

4

AGREED TO:

SMITH,

& HANCOCK LLP

10 a, 1 I b~
Dated Georgia Bar Suzanne J. Mulliken Georgia Bar No . 403581 2600 Hams Tower - Peachtree Center 233 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1530 Telephone: (404) 521-3800 Facsimile : (404) 688-0671 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Steven M. Tapper ~ a ' "

Dated

Georgia Bar No. 698018

Atlanta District Office - Legal Unit

100 Alabama Street, S. W., Suite 4830

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: (404) 562-6800

Facsimile: (404) 562-6905

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

HILL, KERTSCHER & PIXLEY LLP

-I r1 L%/r

DougldsR. Kertscher

X111 Dated

Georgia Bar No. 416265

3350 Riverwood Parkway, Suite 800

Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Telephone : (770) 953-0995

Facsimile : (770) 953-1358

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR DIANE CANTU

 
 FILED IN CLERKS C U.S.D.C. - Agerda
FEB 1 1 Ma I "-
LUTHER,P . THOMA_ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ey: ~, o;p,y FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
and
DIANE CANTU,
PI aintiff-Intervenor, v. INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant .

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1 :03-CV-1494-RLV

OMNIBUS ORDER I. Background
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereafter the "EEOC") filed this action on May 27, 2003, alleging that defendant, InTown Suites Management, Inc . (hereafter "InTown") discharged Ms . Diane Cantu because she had (1) opposed its unlawful employment practices and (2) filed a charge of discrimination . EEOC Compl . [1] at 4. The EEOC contends that InTown's action violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

AO 72A (Rev .8i82)

as amended, 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-3(a) . The EEOC also alleges that InTown failed to file EEO-1 reports in violation of Title VII . EEOC CompL [1] at 4 (citing 42 U.S .C . § 2000e-8(c)) .
Ms . Canto filed an unopposed Motion to Intervene on June 2, 2003 [2], which was granted by this Court in an Order entered July 11, 2003 [6] . Ms . Canto's Complaint in Intervention [7] alleges that she was fired for opposing InTown's unlawful employment practices and for filing a charge of discrimination. Canto CompL [7] at 5-6. Ms . Canto's alleged opposition to defendant's unlawful employment practices was expressed in a September 1, 2001, e-mail to InTown management . Id. at 4-5 . Ms . Canto filed her EEOC charge on September 14, 2001 . She alleges that she was terminated that same day, immediately after she presented InTown management with a copy of her charge . Id. at 5 . In harmony with the EEOC's allegations, Ms. Canto alleges that InTown's actions violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Id . However, Ms . Canto adds two items not alleged in the EEOC's Complaint: (1) a retaliation claim under 42 U.S .C . § 1981, see id . at 6-7, and (2) the allegation that InTown has engaged in a "systemic pattern of nationwide racial discrimination against people of color." Id . at 1, 6 . However, Ms. Canto is Caucasian and does not allege that she was the victim of racial discrimination .
2
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

The parties engaged in discovery but encountered a dispute that generated the instant Motions to Compel from both Ms . Canto [24] and the EEOC [25] . Because of the delay occasioned by resolution of these Motions, plaintiffs seek an extension of the discovery period [24, 25], while InTown seeks an extension of the deadline to file dispositive motions [36] . II. The Instant Dispute and the Parties' Contentions
InTown refused to answer some or all of five interrogatories and three requests for production that sought the following information and/or documents :
(1) complaints or reports defendant received of racial discrimination (EEOC's Interrog . Nos . 1-2 & EEOC's Doc. Req . No. 1) ;
(2) defendant's investigation of any complaints or reports of racial discrimination it received (EEOC's Doc . Req. No . 2);
(3) complaints defendant received about any aspect of its hiring practices (Canto's Doc. Req . No. 4) ;
(4) racial information on applicants for managerial positions with defendant (Canto's Interrog . No . 12) ; and
(5) racial information about defendant's managerial workforce (EEOC's Interrog . No . 10 and Canto's Interrog. No. 5).
3
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

The above-listed discovery was limited temporally to Ms. Cantu's period of employment (April 1, 1999, through September 15,200 1), with the exception of one (Canto Req. for Prod. No. 4), which has no temporal limitation . Moreover, half of the disputed discovery was limited geographically to InTown's Georgia facilities (EEOC's Interrog . No. 10, Canto's Interrog . Nos. 5 and 12, and Canto's Req . for Prod . No . 4), with the other half seeking nationwide data .
Although defendant asserted geographic and temporal objections, defendant's primary objection to answering the disputed discovery is its purported lack of relevance. Because retaliation is the only substantive claim alleged, InTown asserts that information and documents concerning race, whether reflected in complaints of racial discrimination or their investigation, complaints about its hiring practices, the race of its applicants, or the race of its managerial workforce, are not relevant and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Def.'s Opp'n to EEOC's Mot . to Compel [31 ] at 3-16 ; De£'s Opp'n to Canto's Mot. to Compel [30] at 3-15 . Defendant seeks an Order from this Court requiring plaintiffs to pay its reasonable expenses incurred in defending against the instant Motions. Def.'s Opp'n to EEOC's Mot. to Compel [31] at 17 ; Def.'s Opp'n to Canto's Mot . to Compel [30] at 16.
4
AO 72A (Rev &82)

The EEOC moves to compel because it contends that information about complaints or reports of racial discrimination received by defendant (and related documents) are relevant to show that Ms . Cantu engaged in statutorily protected expression and that her opposition to defendant's alleged illegal practices was objectively reasonable . EEOC's Mot. to Compel [25] at 6-7, 13-15 (addressing EEOC's Interrog . Nos . 1-2 & EEOC's Doc . Req. Nos . 1-2); see also Cantu's Mot. to Compel [24] at 12-14 (addressing EEOC's Doc. Req . Nos. 1-2) . The EEOC also asserts that it requires information about the race of defendant's managers for the above-mentioned reasons, and because defendant failed to file EEO-1 reports. The EEOC contends that the requested information will help it evaluate the accuracy of defendant's EEO-1 data if it is ever filed . EEOC's Mot. to Compel [25] at 1 I-12 (addressing EEOC's Interrog. No . 10). The EEOC also seeks sanctions under Fed . R. Civ . P. 37(a)(4) . Id. at 16-17 .
Ms. Cantu moves to compel production of information about the racial composition of defendant's managerial workforce; she contends that defendant's objection deprives her of the opportunity to prove that minority applicants were discriminated against. Cantu's Mot. to Compel [24] at 8-9 (addressing Cantu's
5
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

Interrog . No . 5) .' She also moves to compel information about minority applicants for managerial positions; she contends that this information is needed to show that
she had a reasonable belief that InTown was discriminating in hiring on the basis of race nationwide, and to impeach the Company's sworn testimony that it did not discriminate . Cantu's Mot. to Compel [24] at 6, 10-12 (addressing, inter alia, Canto's Interrog . No . 12). Finally, Ms. Canto moves to compel documents relating to complaints defendant received about its hiring policies ; she contends that such discovery may reveal probative evidence regarding the company-wide discrimination she alleges to exist . Canto's Mot. to Compel [24] at 15-17
(addressing Canto's Doc . Req . No. 4). Unlike the EEOC, Ms. Canto does not seek
sanctions . The EEOC also moves to compel defendant to produce a privilege log,
pointing to both the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P . 26(b)(5) and the text of EEOC's
'Ms. Canto claims that she formed her beliefabout InTown's alleged racially discriminatory hiring practices from her work in Dallas, Texas, with Regional Manager Leif Hartkopf (who was responsible for the eastern portion of the United States), from talking with Property Manager Libby Walker (who worked in Florida and Kentucky), and from conversations with InTown's ChiefOperating Officer, Ms. Cheryl Vickers (who was responsible for operations nationwide) . Canto's Mot . to Compel [24] at 10-11 . However, Ms . Canto does not identify a particular minority applicant that she claims was rejected by InTown for unlawful reasons.
6
AO 72A (Rev .8/82)

Interrogatory No. 14, which asked InTown to provide specific information about "every document withheld from Plaintiffin this case ." EEOC's Mot. to Compel [25] at 12-13 .Z In response, defendant asserts that it did not have to produce a privilege log because no responsive documents were withheld (although defendant states that witness statements constituting attorney work product have recently been obtained and will be listed on a privilege log) . III. Analysis of Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery into "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense ofany party." Fed. R. Civ . P . 26(b)(1) . Until December 2000, Fed . R. Civ . P. 26(b)(1) provided for discovery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." The Rule was amended to focus the parties and the court "on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action." See 2000 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ . P . 26(b)(1) ; see also Savo Laser Prods. . Inc . v . Arista Records . Inc . , 214 F .R.D. 496, 498 (S.D . Ind . 2003) ("The purported purpose of the amendment was . . . to narrow the scope of
z Although Ms. Cantu also moved to compel production ofa privilege log, she has withdrawn that part of her Motion . Cantu's Reply Br. [37] at 9.
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discovery . . . . ..) . But see Graham v. Casey's Gen . Stores, 206 F.R.D . 251, 253 (S .D. Ind . 2002) ("Even after the recent amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, courts employ a liberal discovery standard.").
After the 2000 amendment, Rule 26 contains the following statement: "For
good cause shown, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action ." Fed . R. Civ . P. 26(b)(1). Thus, according to a respected treatise,
The amendment did not change the overall scope of the court's authority to order discovery, but it did alter the scope of discovery available as a matter of right to attorneys without court authorization . Thus, attorney-managed discovery is now limited to matters "relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Discovery that is not relevant to any claim or defense in the action but does relate to the subject matter of the case can be had, but only on court order based on a showing of good cause. 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2008 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) . Although standards for discovery in Title VII cases are no different than in
other federal cases, courts have noted that "liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs [in civil rights cases] broad access to employers' records in an effort to document their claims ." Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio, 490 U.S . 642, 657
8
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(1989), superseded by statute on other ogr unds , Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 105 Stat. 1074-1075, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e-2(k) . However, the scope of discovery in Title VII cases is not without limits. See Parliament House Motor Hotel v . EEOC , 444 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff cannot engage in "wholesale fishing expedition") . Discovery must be tailored to the issues involved in the particular case, Washington v . Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 959 F .2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1992), and limited to the employment practices at issue . Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N .J . 1985) (plaintiff alleging race and age discrimination not allowed discovery of information relating to sex, religion, or national origin discrimination), cited favorably in Washington, 959 F.2d at 1570 . Finally, current Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the discovery be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.
Rule 26(b)(1) thus necessitates an inquiry into the concept of relevancy and an understanding of the parties' claims and defenses. Relevancy is not defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Supreme Court has held that relevancy is "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Onnenheimer Fund, Inc . v. Sanders , 437 U.S . 340, 351 (1978) .
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AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

Moreover, relevancy is defined in evidentiary terms by the Federal Rules of Evidence. "`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ." Fed. R. Evid. 40l . "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible ." Fed. R. Evid. 402 . Even though relevant evidence sought through discovery does not itself have to be admissible at trial, "the information must be such as would lead to admissible evidence ." Jenkins v. Campbell, 200 F .R.D. 498,501 (M .D. Ga. 2001); see also Fed. R . Civ. P . 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.") . Thus, the standard for discovery is more liberal than the standard for admissibility. Fin . Bldg. Consultants. Inc. v. Am. Druggists Ins. Co. , 91 F .R.D. 59, 61 (N .D. Ga. 1981) ("[I]t is the court's view that what is relevant during pretrial discovery and what is admissible during trial are two different things, the former being broader than the latter .").
Against the backdrop of the preceding discussion, the Court examines the disputed discovery to determine whether it is relevant to the claims or defenses of any party. The Court begins with plaintiffs' claims. Although Ms. Cantu's
10

Complaint alleges that defendant engaged in a nationwide pattern of discrimination against racial minorities, the only claim actually asserted by Ms. Canto and the EEOC is one for retaliation . Title VII's anti-retaliation provision recognizes two types of statutorily protected conduct:
An employee is protected from discrimination if (1) "he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter" (the opposition clause) or (2) "he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" (the participation clause) . Clover v . Total Sys. Servs., Inc ., 176 F .3d 1346, 1350 (11 th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U .S .C. § 2000e-3(a)) . According to the Complaints, Ms. Canto was discharged in retaliation for opposing defendant's alleged unlawful employment practices (i .e ., its refusal to hire minorities for management jobs) and for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC . Thus, she asserts claims under both the opposition and participation clauses . However, the instant dispute relates only to plaintiff's opposition clause claim. "[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the opposition clause of Title VII if he shows that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices ." Little v . United Techs . . Carrier
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Transicold Div., 103 F .3d 956, 960 (11 th Cir. 1997). According to Little, this prima
facie case has both subjective and objective components :
A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented. It is thus not enough for a plaintiff to allege that his belief in this regard was honest and bona fide; the allegations and record must also indicate that the belief, perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable.
A plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the underlying discriminatory conduct that he opposed was actually unlawful in order to establish a prima facie case and overcome a motion for summary judgment ; such a requirement "[w]ould chill the legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but would tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek conciliation of informal adjustment of grievances ."
Id. (alteration in original).
The Eleventh Circuit has also explained that the "objective reasonableness of
an employee's belief that her employer has engaged in an unlawful employment
practice must be measured against existing substantive law ." Clover, 176 F.3d at
1351 (citing Harper v . Blockbuster Entm't C.or,p 139 Fad 1385, 1388 n.2 (11 th Cir.
1998)) . The conduct opposed need not actually constitute an unlawful employment
practice, "but it must be close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief
that it is ." Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit draws the following distinction :
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For opposition clause purposes, the relevant conduct does not include conduct that actually occurred . . . but was unknown to the person claiming protection under the clause . Instead, what counts is only the conduct that person opposed, which cannot be more than what she was aware of. Additional conductor allegations or allegations unknown to the opposing person are not relevant to the opposition clause inquiry. Id. at 1352. Given the opposition-clause cases reviewed to this point, defendant's argument that the discovery sought is irrelevant to plaintiffs' claims has some facial appeal. Plaintiffs are not suing for race discrimination but for retaliation ; therefore, discovery about complaints of racial discrimination, complaints about defendant's hiring practices, and the racial composition of its managerial applicants and employees should not be allowed, given that plaintiffneed not prove the underlying race discrimination claim. See Holston v. Sports Auth ., Inc.., 136 F . Supp. 2d 1319, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ("It is irrelevant to the retaliation claim whether the plaintiff can prove an underlying claim of [racial] discrimination ."), affd mem . , 251 F .3d 164 (11th Cir. 2001) ; Lockaby v. United Testing Group, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 1400, 1403 n .3 (N .D. Ga. 1997) ("The validity of plaintiff's accusation [that racial and national discrimination occurred in defendant's hiring and employment practices] is of little importance to this [retaliation] action.") (citing Little , 103 F .3d at 960) .
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Defendant's position is strengthened by the fact that Ms . Cantu was unaware of the evidence she now seeks when she opposed defendant's allegedly unlawful employment practices . See Hudson v. Norfolk S . Rv. Co., 209 F . Supp. 2d 1301, 1314 (N.D . Ga. 2001) ("In reviewing a retaliation claim, the Court must consider the evidence available to plaintiff at the time she expressed her opposition and not consider new facts developed in discovery.").'
However, Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. Thus, the Court must also determine whether InTown's defenses make the requested discovery relevant. Moreover, the Court must determine whether the requested discovery is relevant given plaintiffs' other possible uses for it, such as for impeachment. See Wright, supra, § 2008 ("[I]nformation that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable.") (quoting Advisory Committee Notes) .
' The Court is also not persuaded that the disputed discovery is relevant to the EEOC's claim that defendant failed to file EEO-1 reports. Because the data sought on managerial applicants and employees is different from the data reflected on an EEO-l, the disputed discovery could not verify or disprove defendant's EEO-1 reports .
14
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In its Answer to the EEOC's Complaint, InTown denies the allegations of retaliation and asserts the affirmative defense that Ms. Cantu did not oppose the allegedly unlawful practices of defendant in such a manner as to be entitled to protection from alleged retaliation. Answer to EEOC's Compl. [4] at 2-3 . InTown also asserts the affirmative defense that its termination of plaintiff was based on legitimate, reasonable, good-faith, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons . Id . at 3 .
In its Answer to Ms. Cantu's Complaint, InTown denies the allegation that it instructed plaintiff not to hire people of color into management . Answer to Cantu's CompL [14] at 3 . InTown admits that plaintiff wrote an e-mail to a member of management on September 1, 2001 . Id. at 3 . After denying the remainder of Ms . Cantu's allegations about her opposition to unlawful practices expressed in that email, InTown adds the following assertion : "Furthermore, when Plain tiff-Intervenor Cantu made her claims of discrimination, Defendant conducted an immediate investigation which resulted in the conclusion that Plaintiff-Intervenor Cantu's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless ." Id.
InTown repeats many of the same affirmative defenses to Ms . Cantu's Complaint that it asserted to the EEOC's Complaint, but adds the following:
15
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"Plaintiff-Intervenor Cantu was a member of management who was responsible for hiring and who was expected to administer and enforce Defendant's policies on equal employment opportunity. Any alleged discrimination was caused by or contributed to by Plaintiff-Intervenor Cantu." Answer to Cantu's Compl . [ 14] at 5 .
In its portion of the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan [12], InTown outlines its factual defense to plaintiffs' claim. InTown repeats its assertion that it began an investigation of plaintiff's allegation that it was engaged in unlawful hiring practices on September 1, 2001, after receiving Ms . Cantu's e-mail, id. at 5, and states that on September 6, 2001, it responded to plaintiff's allegations about the hiring of minority managers . Id. Further, defendant contends that on September 5, 2001, an InTown manager reported that Ms. Cantu had asked her to recruit unqualified minorities to apply for managerial positions with defendant so that Ms . Cantu could use their rejections as evidence in a suit against InTown. Id. at 6 . Defendant contends that plaintiff was subsequently fired for disloyalty . Id. at 7 .
Finally, at the Fed. R. Civ. P . 30(b)(6) deposition of InTown's corporate representative on October 23, 2003, defendant asserted that none of Ms. Cantu's allegations regarding defendant's unlawful hiring practices was true and maintained
16
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AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

that it did not discriminate against minorities in hiring . Cantu's Mot. to Compel [24] at 5 (citing Vickers Dep. at 181-210).
As reflected in the above-cited sources, InTown's defense is that it investigated Ms . Cantu's allegations into its hiring practices, found them to be untrue, and terminated her for continued disloyalty, which included falsely reporting allegations of racially discriminatory hiring and manipulating applicant flow to create the appearance of impropriety.
InTown's defense makes the information and documents that plaintiffs seek relevant and thus discoverable. A good-faith belief by defendant in the falsity of Ms . Cantu's allegations is essential to defendant's legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her discharge . Cf. Elrod v. Sears. Roebuck & Co . , 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11 th Cir. 1991) (inquiry is not whether employee is guilty of misconduct, but whether employer in good faith believed employee had done wrong and whether this belief was the reason for the termination) . Defendant's good faith may be judged in part by the investigation it conducted." The requested discovery is similar to the universe
a The Court is unaware of whether a written report ofthis investigation exists. If it does exist, then the Court assumes that InTown has disclosed it. See L .R. 26 .1, N.D . Ga . ; see also Fed . R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) . However, such a document has not been listed in Defendant's Initial Disclosures [10], Attach . C . The Court notes that defendant lists Cheryl Vickers, Rick Fee, and David Killebrew as persons with
17

of information and documents a reasonable in-house investigator would have reviewed to determine if minorities were being excluded from management for unlawful reasons . The information and documents plaintiffs have requested may allow them to determine whether defendant's investigation discovered facts from which an employer could form a good-faith belief that Ms . Canto was lying or manipulating applicant flow for her own ulterior motives . Or, the information and documents requested may also allow plaintiffs to show that defendant's investigation was a sham and a pretextual excuse to terminate her. In sum, the requested discovery will provide plaintiffs with an independent source to judge the accuracy and/or completeness of defendant's investigation.
Finally, the requested information and documents are relevant for impeachment purposes. Plaintiffs can use it to test contentions by defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) witness that the internal investigation showed that plaintiffs allegations were false and that it did not engage in systemic racial discrimination in hiring .
Therefore, plaintiffs' Motions to Compel [24, 25] are GRANTED . Within fifteen days of the date of this Order, defendant is ordered to produce
knowledge of "the Company's investigation of Ms. Canto's allegations ." Id. Attach . B . Presumably, plaintiffs have deposed these individuals about that investigation .
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(1) race-related information and documents responsive to the EEOC's Interrogatories (Nos . 1-2, and 10) and the EEOC's Request for Production of Documents (Doc . Req. Nos . 1-2) and
(2) race-related information and documents responsive to Ms. Cantu's Interrogatories (Nos . 5 and 12) and Ms. Cantu's Request for Production of Documents (Doc . Req. No . 4).
The Court sustains defendant's temporal objection to Ms . Cantu's Document Request No. 4 . Defendant may limit its response to plaintiffs dates of employment at InTown . However, given the allegation that defendant engaged in nationwide systemic hiring discrimination, see su ra note 1, and InTown's failure to show that nationwide production of information and/or documents would be unduly burdensome, the Court overrules the geographic-scope objection that defendant asserted to the EEOC's Interrogatory No. 10, and to Ms . Cantu's Interrogatory Nos . 5 and 12 and Document Request No. 4 .
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The Court accepts defendant's contention that, at the time the plaintiffs filed their Motions, and given their objections, it was not obligated to produce a privilege log. Therefore, the Court does not compel production of a privilege logs IV. Remaining Motions
Given the Court's decision to order production of additional information and
documents, the EEOC's Motion to Extend the Discovery Period for Forty-Five Days
Beyond This Court's Entry of an Order Resolving This Discovery Dispute [25] and
Ms. Cantu's Request for an Extension ofthe Discovery Period [24] are GRANTED; discovery is extended up through and including March 31, 2004 .
As for the EEOC's Request for Sanctions [25], Rule 37(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for an order compelling discovery if a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33 or fails
to produce documents requested under Rule 34. Rule 37(a)(4)(A) provides :
If the motion [to compel] is granted . . . . the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
5 Defendant submitted a privilege log [56] on February 2, 2004 . Should privileged documents be among those that are responsive to the discovery ordered herein, defendant shall amend its privilege log within fifteen days of the date of this Order.
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incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that . . . the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust . Despite defendant's failure to answer the disputed interrogatories and document requests, the Court finds, as previously noted, that defendant's objections were substantially justified. See Devaney v. Cont'1 Am . Ins . Co . , 989 F .2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (substantial justification found if in response to genuine dispute or if reasonable people could differ as to propriety of contested action). Finally, given that the Court has extended the discovery period, InTown's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline [36] is GRANTED ; dispositive motions will be due twenty days after the close of the extended discovery period . V. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS as follows : Ms . Cantu's Motion to Compel [24] is GRANTED; the EEOC's Motion to Compel [25] is GRANTED ; the EEOC's Motion to Extend the Discovery Period for Forty-Five Days Beyond This Court's Entry of an Order Resolving This Discovery Dispute [25] and
?1
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Ms. Cantu's Request for an Extension ofthe Discovery Period [24] are GRANTED; discovery is extended up through and including March 31, 2004 ;
the EEOC's Request for Sanctions [25] is DENIED ; InTown's Motions for Expenses [30, 31] are DENIED ; and InTown's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline [36] is GRANTED; dispositive motions shall be due twenty days after the close of the extended discovery period . SO ORDERED, this 9th day of February, 2004 .
WALTER E . J SON UNITED STS MAGISTRATE JUDGE
T :\Civil\Tidz V II\AAanta\2003\1494 (EEOC v . Into%Nn Suites Mgmt . . Inc .)\Ord on Pls' Mots to Compel .wpd
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 iJ"n:y"=04
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTXPv7 ~"~~ FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ~ D"ubClsr!
ATLANTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
and
DIANE CANTU,
PI aintiff-Intervenor, v. INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC .,
Defendant .

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1 : 03-CV-1494-RL V

ORDER Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order & Sanctions [26] . For the reasons explained below, said Motion is GRANTED . I. Background Counsel for defendant, InTown Suites Management, Inc . ("InTown"), apparently learned in October 2003 that counsel for plaintiff-intervenor Diane Cantu, Douglas R . Kertscher, had contacted current InTown management employees directly . In an October 28, 2003, letter from Suzanne J . Mulliken, Esq ., to Mr.

AO 72A

(Rev.B/82)

V'

Kertscher, defense counsel wrote : "Please do not contact any management employees directly in the future. Please contact me or Dan Shea to set up any meetings or depositions of current InTown Suites management employees ." De£'s Mot. [26] Ex. 1 .
According to defense counsel, Mr. Kertscher did not respond to that letter. Mem . Supp . De£'s Mot. [26] at 2. Therefore, when Ms . Mulliken raised the issue in person with Mr . Kertscher at the November 3, 2003, deposition of Mr . Rick Fee, he asserted that he had the right to make ex pane contacts and provided authority which he claimed supported that right . Id .
On November 5, 2003, defense counsel Daniel Shea, Esq ., sent a letter to Mr. Kertscher enclosing a draft of the instant Motion . De£'s Mot. [26] Ex . 2. In that letter defense counsel stated that he had studied the authority that Mr. Kertscher had provided and determined that it did not allow ex parte communications with management employees. Mr. Shea asked Mr. Kertscher to contact the State Bar of Georgia if he had doubts as to the interpretation of the law. Mr . Shea represented that he had contacted the State Bar, which had reaffirmed that ex parte contact was prohibited . Id. The letter closed with the request that Mr. Kertscher advise defense
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counsel immediately of his position so that the Motion could be filed if it was his intention to continue contacting current InTown managers . Id. at 2 .'
In a November 6, 2003, e-mail sent in response to one sent by Mr. Shea, Mr. Kertscher defended himself and asserted that he knew when a managerial employee could and could not be contacted on an ex pane basis, but then wrote the following statement : "Regardless, its [sic] a moot point[;] we are not and have no need to contact your client's managers ." Def.'s Mot . [26] Ex. 4 .
The above-quoted statement speaks both to past and future ex parte contacts . One can reasonably interpret Mr. Kertscher as asserting that any dispute over past ex pane contacts was moot because he was "not . . . contact[ing] your client's managers ."- Additionally, one can reasonably interpret Mr. Kertscher as asserting that any future dispute would be moot because ex parte contacts with current InTown managers would not occur.
On that same date, Mr. Shea notified Mr. Kertscher by e-mail of the information stated above and advised that the draft Motion was being mailed . De£'s Mot. [26] Ex. 3 .
` Any such assertion would have been false because, as discussed infra, by November 6, 2003, Mr. Kertscher had already spoken with current InTown managerial employee Joyce C . Wright and had unsuccessfully attempted to contact current InTown managerial employees Scott Homer and Maria Eldred .
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On November 13, 2003, Mr. Kertscherdeposed InTown managerial employee Scott Homer. The transcript ofMr. Homer's deposition shows that Mr. Kertscher's questioning mentioned former manager Rick Fee and current manager Bill Mark. He also questioned Mr. Homer whether he had heard any InTown manager refer to blacks as "French Canadians ." De£'s Reply [50] Ex . 1 . Defense counsel represents that, following Mr. Homer's deposition, Mr. Kertscher orally admitted an attempted ex parse contact with the deponent, but "assured Defendant's counsel that he would not contact Defendant's managers in the future ." Def.'s Reply [50] at 5.
Despite the above-listed written and oral assurances that he would not contact InTown's current managerial employees on an ex parte basis, Mr. Kertscher did so . On November 20, 2003, he telephoned Mr. David G. Maurer, who works as a property manager for InTown . Def.'s Mot. [26] Ex. 5 (Maurer Aff.) at 2 . According to Mr. Maurer's Affidavit, Mr. Kertscher informed him that he represented "somebody" against InTown and asked him if he was a manager for InTown . When Mr. Maurer replied that he was, Mr. Kertscher did not terminate the call . According to Mr. Maurer, the ensuing conversation was as follows :
He then said that my brother [who is a lawyer at Mr. Kertscher's firm] had given him my number. He told me that he had talked to Jason Jarrar and Rick Fee (former managers at the company) and that Rick
4
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Fee had made damning statements against InTown Suites. He then asked me if Bill Mark was my Area Manager. I said "Yes ." He then asked me if Jason Jarrar had been my District Manager. Again, I indicated "Yes." He then asked me if I had ever heard the term "French Canadian" used to describe minorities; I told him I had heard that term . He then asked me if I had ever heard Bill Mark use that term in the presence of Jason and I [sic] at Roswell[,] which I replied, "No, I had not ."
Id . at 2-3 . In response to defendant's Motion [26], Mr. Kertscher filed a Declaration
admitting that he had talked to Mr. Maurer, but claiming that he had contacted him on behalf of another client who was not yet in litigation with defendant. He asserted that he had asked nothing about Ms. Cantu's case. Pl .'s Resp. [39] at Ex. A. Mr. Kertscher also stated : "Mr. Maurer is the only current Intown Suites employee that the undersigned counsel (or anyone from his office) has spoken with ." Id . T 6.
In Reply, defendant contests Mr. Kertscher's explanation of his conversation
with Mr. Maurer, and asserts that he did question Mr. Maurer about Ms . Cantu's case. Moreover, in contradiction of the above-quoted assertion from Mr. Kertscher's Declaration that he had spoken only with Mr. Maurer, defendant attached to its Reply the Affidavits ofJoyce C. Wright, Angela P. Homer, and Maria
C . Eldred . Def.'s Reply [50] at Exs . 2-4 .
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Ms . Wright is a managerial employee of defendant . Her affidavit states in relevant pan as follows :
In approximately early October 2003, Douglas R. Kertschertelephoned me . He called me after work hours on either my home telephone or my cell phone . He told me that he represented Diane Cantu in a lawsuit that she has filed against InTown Suites . Ms . Cantu is aware that I am currently a Property Manager for InTown Suites . Mr. Kertscher questioned me, among other things, about Ms . Cantu's performance and asked me if she had ever been demoted from her position of Area Manager or State Manager while she was employed by InTown Suites . My conversation with Mr. Kertscher lasted approximately ten minutes . De£'s Reply [50] at Ex . 2 . Ms . Homer is the wife of InTown Suites managerial employee Scott Homer. She avers that Mr. Kertscher called their home, discussed the litigation, and asked to speak to Mr. Homer. He left his telephone number and asked that Mr. Homer return his call (which he did not do) . Def.'s Reply [50] at Ex . 3 .3 Mrs. Eldred, who is an InTown manager, avers that she found a note and business card from Mr. Kertscher (attached to her Affidavit as Ex. A) in her mailbox. The note asked that
she call Mr. Kertscher about his investigation of InTown Suites. Id. at Ex . 4 .
3 This ex pane communication was the one disclosed by Mr. Kertscher following the Homer deposition . See supra p . 4 .
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After reviewing those Affidavits, this Court entered an Order on January 29, 2004 [55], noting that Mr. Kertscher's assertion that Mr. Maurer was the only current InTown Suites employee to whom he had spoken might be false. That Order directed Mr. Kertscher to file a response advising whether he admitted or denied the assertions made in the Affidavits attached to defendant's Reply. Id.
Mr. Kertscher filed a "Response to Court Order of January 28, 2004, Regarding Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order and Sanctions" [58] . In that Response and supporting Declaration, Mr . Kertscher states that he has interviewed or spoken with at least twenty people who were former InTown employees or unsuccessful applicants for employment . Pl .'s Resp . to Ct. Order [58] at 2 . With regard to his attempts to contact Mr . Homer (through his wife) and Ms . Eldred, Mr. Kertscher states that he was informed that they had both left InTown's employment and might have relevant information . He admits to the accuracy of the statements made by Ms. Homer and Ms. Eldred in their Affidavits . However, because he never actually talked to Ms . Homer's husband (who was the InTown manager) or to Ms . Eldred, he argues that no communication occurred . Id . Shortly thereafter, he learned from conversations with defense counsel that these individuals were still
7
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employed by InTown ; thus, their depositions were scheduled and no further ex pane contacts were attempted. Id .
With regard to Joyce Wright, Mr. Kertscher admits that he spoke with her on August 14, 2003, but he claims that their conversation was not related to Ms. Cantu's case . Pl .'s Resp . to Ct. Order [58] at 3 . Mr. Kertscher asserts that he learned nothing relevant to Ms. Cantu's claims . Id . He thus considered the interview with her inconsequential and uninformative . Given the number of interviews he had conducted since August 2003 concerning InTown, Mr. Kertscher states that he "simply forgot" his interview with Ms. Wright had occurred when he prepared his December 24, 2003, Declaration . Id . at 4 (citing Kertscher Decl .). He concludes as follows : "Thus, the undersigned's Declaration that he had no other conversations with employed individuals other than Mr. Maurer was in error, though not intentionally so, and certainly not knowingly or willingly so ." Id . II. Analysis
A . Mr. Kertscher's December 24, 2003 . Declaration The first issue concerns the assertion in Mr . Kertscher's Declaration that "Mr. Maurer is the only current Intown Suites employee that the undersigned counsel (or anyone from his office) has spoken with." Pl .'s Resp. [39] Ex. A T 6 . It is
8
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undisputed that this is a false statement. When he submitted his Declaration on December 24, 2003, Mr. Kertscher had also spoken with Ms. Wright . The issue is whether he made that false statement intentionally. Mr. Kertscher asserts that he simply forgot about the interview with Ms. Wright because no information of any consequence had been garnered. Thus, he claims that it was an unintentional oversight, not a knowing or wilful one .
The Court would be inclined to accept that claim without question and move on but for Mr. Kertscher's failure to abide by the written and oral assurances he gave to defendant's counsel .' As noted above, although Mr . Kertscher represented that he would not engage in ex parte communications with current InTown managerial employees, he did so . A lawyer has an obligation to be truthful in statements made to others . Ga . Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 4.1 .5 Unfortunately, Mr. Kertscher was not truthful . He said one thing and did something else . Mr. Kertscher's failure to abide by assurances he gave to defense counsel makes it more difficult for the Court
a Although he has had ample opportunities to do so, Mr. Kertscher has not denied that he gave these assurances to defendant's counsel .
5 Attorneys practicing before this Court must comply with the Local Rules, with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct contained in the rules and regulations of the State Bar of Georgia, and with the decisions of this Court interpreting those rules and standards. L.R. 83 .1C (N .D. Ga.) .
9
AO 72A (Rev .B182)

to accept his assertion that the false statement he made in his December 24, 2003, Declaration was an oversight.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to accept Mr. Kertscher's explanation. He may have simply forgotten about his earlier interview with Ms. Wright . Without ordering the deposition of Mr. Kertscher and/or holding a hearing on the issue, neither of which the Court is inclined to do, little can be gained by continued inquiry into this matter. The Court does not wish to besmirch Mr. Kertscher's reputation . He avers that he has never had a bar complaint lodged against him or been sanctioned by any court. Pl .'s Resp . to Ct. Order [58] Ex. B (Kertscher Decl .) at 1 . However, his admitted failure to include an important fact in his December 24, 2003, Declaration, coupled with an obvious failure to abide by representations that he made to opposing counsel, invited the foregoing discussion.
B. Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Defendant contends that Mr. Kertscher should be sanctioned for his prior ex parte communications with its current managerial employees and seeks, inter alia, a protective order to bar future communications . An analysis ofdefendant's Motion begins with Rule 4 .2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled
10
AO 72A (Rev .8/82)

"Communication with Person Represented by Counsel," which provides in relevant
part as follows:
(a) A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by constitutional law or statute.
The "Comment" explains how that Rule applies to organizations :
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for another person or entity concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization , and with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part ofthe organization .
Ga. Rules of Prof'I Conduct R . 4 .2 cmt. 4A (emphasis added) .
The Georgia Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct
effective January 1, 2001, to replace Part IV, Discipline, of the Rules of the State
Bar of Georgia. Well before that time, however, that Court issued the following
Formal Advisory Opinion on the issue raised here :
Ethical Propriety of a Lawyer Interviewing the Officers and Employees of an Organization When That Organization is The Opposing Party in Litigation Without Consent of Organization
11
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

An attorney may not ethically interview an employee of a corporation which is an opposing party in pending litigation without the consent of the corporation or the corporation's counsel where the employee is either :
(1) an officer or director or other employee with authority to bind the corporation ; or
(2) an employee whose acts or omissions may be imputed to the corporation in relation to the subject matter of the case .
Correspondent asks when it is ethically proper for a lawyer to interview the officers and employees of an organization, when that organization is the opposing party in litigation, without the consent of the organization's counsel.
This question involves, among other things, an interpretation of Standard 47 of Rule 4-102 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia [Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1)], and the State Bar of Georgia Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4 .2 .
Standard 47 of Rule 4-102 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia provides as follows :
During the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.
12

The American Bar Association has implied that the foregoing prohibition applies only to certain employees of the organization. ABA Informal Opinion 1410 (1978) concluded that no communication with an officer or employee of a corporation with the power to commit the corporation in the particular situation may be made by opposing counsel unless he has the prior consent of the designated counsel of the corporation or unless he is authorized by law to do so .
The consensus view in other jurisdictions seems to be that an attorney may interview an employee of a corporate defendant without the consent of either the corporation or its counsel if the employee is not the person for whose acts or omissions the corporation is being sued and if the person is not an officer or director or other employee with authority to bind the corporation . On the other hand, an attorney may not ethically interview an employee of a corporation which is an opposing party in pending litigation without the consent of the corporation or the corporation's counsel where the employee is either:
(1) An officer or director or other employee with authority to bind the corporation ;
(2) An employee whose acts or omissions may be imputed to the corporation in relation to subject matter of the case .
If the employee does not fall into either of the foregoing categories, an attorney may contact and interview the employee without the prior consent of the corporation or its counsel .
Formal Advisory Opinion No . 87-6 (87-R2), issued July 12, 1989 (footnotes
omitted) ; see also Sanifill of Ga. . Inc . v. Roberts, 502 S .E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) ("In State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6 (1989), the Supreme
13
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

Court ofGeorgia, adopting the consensus view ofotherjurisdictions, concluded that when a corporation is an opposing party in pending litigation, Standard 47 applies to an employee whose acts or omissions may be imputed to the corporation in relation to the subject matter of the case, as well as to an officer or director or other employee with authority to bind the corporation .") (emphasis added).
At issue here are the ex pane contacts that Mr. Kertscher made with current InTown managers Joyce Wright and David Maurer. Mr. Kertscher argues at length that the "developing law" in this area allows his ex pane communication with Ms . Wright because she had no authority to bind the corporation . Resp . to Ct. Order [58] at 4-14. Mr. Kertscher argues that his ex parte communications with Mr. Maurer were acceptable because he was discussing matters outside of his representation of Ms. Cantu, i .e., his investigation of possible discrimination claims by former InTown manager Earl Shelton . Pl .'s Resp . to Def.'s Mot. for Protec . Order [39] at 2-3 .
With regard to Mr. Kertscher's ex pane corrununications with Ms. Wright, the Court is not at liberty to apply the law supposedly developing in other jurisdictions when the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and the Georgia Supreme Court have clearly spoken about the ethics of ex parte communications with current
14
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

managerial employees of a corporate party. This Court will thus apply Rule 4.2 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the similar, predecessor Rule .6
Rule 4 .2 and its Comment clearly prohibit communications by a lawyer for another person concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization . Mr. Kertscher made an ex parse communication concerning the Cantu matter with Ms . Wright, who had a managerial responsibility on behalf of InTown. The Supreme Court's Advisory Opinion prohibits ex parte communications with a corporate employee who, inter alia, has authority to bind the corporation . Ms . Wright had such authority . Although Mr. Kertscher represents that he forgot about his conversation with Ms. Wright because he learned nothing of substance from her, "[t]he content or result of the communication is irrelevant to determining whether plaintiff's counsel violated the rule that bans such communication altogether." Wiggins v. Waffle House, Inc . , No . 1 :01-CV-0035-MHS, slip op . at 7 (N.D. Ga. filed Mar. 25, 2003).
With regard to Mr. Kertscher's ex pane communications with Mr. Maurer, the Court rejects the argument that the questioning was about an unrelated matter. Mr.
6 On the issue of ex pane communications with former employees of a party, see Roberts , 502 S .E.2d at 345 .
15
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

Kertscher's questions of Mr. Maurer one week after the Homer deposition taken in Ms . Cantu's case concerned the same persons (Messrs. Mark and Fee) discussed in that deposition, and repeated the same question, i .e ., whether managers called minorities French Canadians. Mr. Mark was Mr. Maurer's boss . Moreover, if Mr. Kertscher had not discussed Ms . Cantu's case with Mr. Maurer, he could not have know that Mr. Fee had allegedly made "damning" statements against InTown .
The remaining question is one of the appropriate remedy .' According to the Georgia Court of Appeals, Rule 4 .2 "is designed to protect a represented party's right to effective representation of counsel by preventing adverse counsel from taking advantage ofsuch party through undisclosed contact. The rule also promotes ethical behavior on the part of attorneys ." Roberts , 502 S .E .2d at 344 (footnote omitted) . Mr. Kertscher's ex parte communications interfered with InTown's right to effective representation of counsel because he took advantage of undisclosed contacts. The Court is committed to preserving the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and to ethical behavior on the part of attorneys practicing before it .
Defendant sought, inter alia, the depositions of Mr. Kertscher and those he contacted at Mr . Kertscher's expense, as well the dismissal of plaintiff-intervenor's claims . De£'s Reply [50] at 7 . The Court finds that the prejudice to defendant is not sufficiently great to require such extraordinary remedies.
16
AO 72A (Rev .8/82)

After weighing the seriousness of Mr. Kertscher's ethical violation and the extent to which that violation prejudiced defendant, the Court ORDERS plaintiff's counsel to reimburse defendant for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in filing the instant Motion to Compel [26] . Counsel for defendant are DIRECTED to submit to the Court within fifteen days of the date of entry of this Order an Affidavit outlining the reasonable costs incurred in bringing this Motion. Mr. Kertscher has ten days from the date that Affidavit is filed to respond if he so desires. The Clerk is DIRECTED to re-submit this matter when Mr. Kertscher's opportunity to respond has expired .
Further, entry of a PROTECTIVE ORDER is appropriate in these circumstances. Counsel for Ms . Cantu, Douglas R. Kertscher, Esq ., and any other representative of Ms. Cantu, are prohibited from contacting current managerial employees of Intown regarding the instant litigation or other potential discrimination claims against InTown, unless they first receive written consent from InTown's counsel, or unless such contact is made in the presence of InTown's counsel . This Protective Order does not, however, prohibit Mr. Kertscher from speaking on an ex pane basis with any current InTown manager who contacts him first for advice and/or counsel .
17
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order &
Sanctions [26] is GRANTED as provided herein. SO ORDERED, this 18th day of February, 2004 . WALTER F/-PO14NSON UNITED S/fk1TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
T :\Civil\TiUe VIMtlanta\?003\Id94 (EEOC v . Intown Suites Mgmt ., Inc .)\Order re Defs Mo for Prat Order wpd
18
AO 72A (Rev .B/82)

 
 FILED IN ;~ , :
, S N !.,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

FEIB i L
C ark LLM11, J-"~ BY : 1~r -- Irk

and DIANE CANTU,
Plaintiff - Inter 'venox' ,

CIVIL ACTION NO . 1 :03-CV-1494-RLV

v.
INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC .,
Defendant .

O R D E R This is an action for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e, and under 42 U .S .C . § 1981 . The plaintiff-intervenor, Diane Cantu, is a former employee of InTown Suites Management, Inc . ("InTown Suites") . Following the termination of one of her subordinates, Ms . Cantu sent an e-mail on September 1, 2001, to her boss and to the company's Chief Operating Officer, Ms . Cheryl Vickers, asserting that InTown Suites discriminated on the basis of race in hiring . Believing that Ms . Cantu's allegations were false and an attempt to divert attention from her failure to supervise the subordinate, Ms . Vickers met wi th Ms . Can, tu and then sent her an e-ma i l document i ng for the

first time her alleged performance problems and threatening termination if improvements were not made . Ms . Cantu denied any performance issues but thereafter engaged in conduct that her supervisors believed to be disloyal, including secretly taperecording a meeting with them and having inappropriate conversations with co-workers . On September 14, 2001, at a meeting called to discuss the plaintiff-intervenor's performance improvement plan, after Ms . Canto presented Ms . Vickers with a copy of a charge of discrimination she had filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), she was discharged for continued disloyal behavior .
The EEOC and Ms . Canto allege that her termination from InTown Suites was in retaliation for the September 1 e-mail about alleged discrimination in hiring and for her filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC . They seek damages and injunctive relief for InTown Suites's alleged violations of Title VII (both plaintiffs) and 42 U .S .C . § 1981 (Ms . Canto only) . InTown Suites contends that Ms . Vickers's criticisms of Ms . Cantu's job performance were legitimate and not in retaliation for her e-mail ; the company also contends that Ms . Vickers made the discharge decision before she saw the EEOC charge and that she did not look at it after the plaintiff-intervenor presented it to her . Thus,
2

she could not have discharged Ms . Cantu in retaliation for filing the charge .
InTown Suites moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate judge has submitted a report and recommendation recommending that the motion be denied . InTown Suites has filed objections to that report and recommendation . InTown Suites does not challenge the magistrate judge's determination that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to the plaintiffs' Title VII claims ; however, InTown Suites argues that the magistrate judge erroneously denied summary judgment with respect to the plaintif f -intervenor's section 1981 claim .
InTown Suites argues that a person may not bring a retaliation claim unless the retaliatory action is based on the plaintiff 's own race . It is InTown Suites's position that since the plaintiffintervenor complained that InTown Suites was discriminating against minorities and since she is white, she cannot bring a section 1981 claim for retaliation . The court agrees that InTown Suites is not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff -in.t ervenor's secti on 1981 claim but not for the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation .
In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge stated, "Although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken on this issue, those circuits that have hold that the race of the plaintiff is not
3

relevant, if the alleged retaliation was racially based ." Nonfinal Report and Recommendation at 67-68 . This is incorrect . The Eleventh Circuit has spoken, just not very clearly . InTown Suites argues, "[T]he Eleventh Circuit has prohibited § 1981 claims where the retaliation alleged is not based on the race of the complainant ." Defendant's objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3 . That statement, however, is also incorrect, since none of the cases cited by InTown Suites so holds . Later in its brief, InTown Suites states, "The Eleventh Circuit has decided the issue at hand, and four decisions from that Court define the parameters of viable § 1981 retaliation claims in this Circuit ." Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 . However, a careful analysis of those cases show that the Eleventh Circuit has never held that a section 198 retaliation claim must be based on the race of the complainant .
The first case cited by InTown Suites is Little v . United Technologies, 103 F .3d 956 (I1th Cir . .1997), and this court agrees that that case, at first blush, supports InTown Suites's position . The court held that the plaintiff, who was white, failed to state a cause of action under Title VII because he "did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he was opposing an unlawful
4

employment practice ." 103 F .3d at 960 . Therefore, the court concluded .that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case under Title VII . The court went on to say, in language that supports Intown Suites's argument, "Here, there is no evidence in the record--and [the pla intiff] - does not suggest or allege--that the discrimination or retaliation allegedly leveled against him was due to his race ; that is, [the plaintiff] does not contend that [the defendant] discriminated against him because he was white ." 103 F .3d at 96 1 . Of course, since the Eleventh Circuit had held that the plaintiff had failed to prove - a pr ima facie case, th i s language concerning the plaintiff's race was dicta .
If Little were the Eleventh Circuit's only decision regarding section 1981 retaliation claims, this court would be inclined to grant InTown Suites's motion for summary judgment . However, the next case cited by InTown Suites shows the lack of precedent al authority that should be afforded the Little decision,
In Olmsted v . Taco Bell Carp . , 141 F .3d 1457 (11th Cir . 1998), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district judge's ruling that the plaintiff had abandoned his section 1981 retaliation claim in a pretrial stipulation . The court went on to state, although again in dicta, that the plaintiff might not have prevailed on his section 1981 retaliation claim even if he had not abandoned it, since he was white and had complained about racially motivated
5

conduct at the defendant's restaurants . After making this
observation, the court went on to state that the language in Little
refusing to recognize such a claim was itself dicta . In a long
footnote, the court explained :
Notably, our prior decis i onal law leaves unclear whether Olmsted cou l d have prevailed on his § 1981 claim even if we were to find that the cla i m had not been abandoned in the pretr i a]l statement . Taco Bell points out that our decis i on i n L i ttle v . United Technologies, 103 F .3d 956 (11th Cir .1997), seems to i nd i cate that the concerns underly i ng a retal i at i on action brought pursuant to T i t l e VII and § 1981 m i ght, in some c i rcumstances, be different . We acknowledge that L i ttle can be read to proh i bit suits under § 1981 where the retaliat i on alleged i s not based on the race of the compla i nant ; we further note, however, that prior to our discussion o f the plaint i ff's § 1981 cla i m i n that case, we d i scussed at length--in the context of T i tle VII---our determination that the plaint i ff had not shown that he had engaged in statutor i ly protected conduct that would give rise to a retal i ation claim . See i d . at 9959-60 [sic] . Little, therefore, does not stand unambiguously for the proposit i on argued by defendants, part i cularly in light of the facts presented in that case, i .e ., that there had been no showing o f retaliation on the basis of the race of e i ther the pla i ntiff or of the subject matter about wh i ch the pla i ntiff had compla i ned . Indeed, the scope of relief available under § 1981 with respect to retal i at i on cla i ms appears to remain largely an open quest i on i n this c i rcuit . See, e .g ., Jackson v . Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc ., . 130 F .3d 999, 1007 (11 t h Cir .1997) (where white employees allegedly were retaliated aga i nst for complain i ng of discrimination aga i nst black employees, white pla i ntiffs had s t and i ng to proceed under § 1981) ; Reynolds v . CSX Transportation, Inc ., 115 F .3d 860, 868 n . 10 (11th C i r .1997) ("In its entry of judgment, the d i str i ct court noted that the damages awardedd for
1 Interestingly, the same judge authored both the Little decision and the Olmstead decision .
6

retaliation could be based on either Title VII or § 1981 . This court has not yet addressed the types of retaliation claims cognizable under § 1981 in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .") . In light of our conclusion with respect to Olmsted's abandonment of his § 1981 claim in this case, we need not resolve the precise contours of § 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act, with respect to retaliation claims . 4lmsted, 141 F .3d at 1463 n .4 . The dicta in both Little and Olmsted may be persuasive, but it is not controlling . The last case cited by InTown Suites, Andrews v . Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital, 140 F .3d 1405 (11th Cir . 1998), likewise does not help its argument . InTown Suites acknowledges that the plaintiff in that case was a black female ; therefore, the court's statement that "not all retaliation claims are necessarily cognizable" is dicta . That statement is accorded even less weight, since the court cites Little as support for that proposition and then acknowledges that Little concerned the failure to prove a prima facie case, not the inability of a white person to bring a retaliation claim . Fatal to InTown Suites's position is Jackson v . Motel 6 Multipurpose, -Inc ., 130 F .3d 999 (11th C i r . 1997) . In that case, the defendant moved for a writ of mandamus, asking the court of appeals to vacate a district court order which had authorized the plaintiffs in two consolidated race discrimination cases to
7

advertise their allegations to the public at large and to communicate with current and former Motel 6 employees through mass mailings . In the Jackson case five Motel 6 patrons alleged that they had been discriminated against because of their race . In the Petaccia2 case five white former Motel 6 employees alleged that they had been required to discriminate against blacks and other non-whites and that Motel 6 retaliated against them when they refused to do so .3 The court held that the Jackson plaintiffs "clearly could not be certified as class representatives, " 1 .30 F .3d at 1004, and, therefore, directed the district court to decertify that class . With respect to the Petaccia plaintiffs, the court held that they had no standing to seek injunctive relief under 42 U .S .C . § 2000a-2 because they were no longer employed by Motel 6 . However, the courtt allowed their claim for damages under section 1981 to proceed . "The Petaccia plaintiffs' claim for retaliation
2 The district court had consolidated Jackson v . Motel 6 Multipurpases, Inc ., Civil Action No . 96-72-CIV-FTM-17D, with Petaccia v . Motel 6, G .P ., Inc ., Civil Action No . 96-115-CV-FTM17D .
3 The race of the Petaccia plaintiffs i s never specifically men t ion ed in the Jackson op i n i on, although the c l ear inference i s that they were white . In the 0lmsted footnote, Judge B i rch referred to the Jackson op i nion and noted that the Petacc i a plaint i ffs were white . Judge B i rch also sat on the panel that decided Jackson ; therefore, this court relies upon Judge Birch's statement w i th respect t o the race of the . Petaccia plaintiffs .
8

may, however, proceed under section 1981(b), which provides for money damages ." 130 F .3d at 1007 .
Because of the holding in Jackson, this court concludes that the plaintif f -intervenor' s section 1981 claim for retaliation in the instant case may proceed .
In summary, the court adopts the magistrate judge's report and recommendat i on w i th respect to the plai ntiffs' Title V i•I claims ; the court substitutes its discussion of the plaintif f -intervenor I s section 1981 claim in place of the magistrate judge's discussion of that claim . Thus, InTown Suites's motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety .
SO ORDERED, this ~ day of February, 2005 .

~

,

rf~/L~~~""r r ~ L
oB~RT U , vzzvIG,

Senior United S alsDistrict Judge

9

 
 SLED IN CHAMBERS U.S,DeC. Atlanta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA .
ATLANTA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

APR 2 6 2005
W'ThiE D . THON~AS G ~~

Plaintiff, and

CIVIL ACTION NO . 1 :03-CV-1494--RLV

DIANE CANTU,

Plaintiff-Intervenor, V. INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC .,
Defendant .

Memorandum Opinion On April 21, 2005, this court entered an order postponing the parties' Pretrial Conference because of a number of unresolved issues between the parties . The most press i ng of these issues is the lack of any test imony concerning either of the part i es' expert witnesses . A Pretrial Conference would serve l i ttle purpose lat th i s point without the plaintiff-intervenor's submiss ion of', a completed expert report in accordance w i th Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (a) (2) . In order to move this action along, the plaintiff is directed to provide Dr . Saad's expert report within 30 days from the docketing of this order . Dr . Saad shall be deposed within 30 dais of submission of his report . The defendant must thereaft~r identify its experts within 45 days after the completion of Dir . Saad's deposition and the defendant's experts, if any, are directed

i

to submit their reports to the plaint i ff and plaintiff-interve ft or

within 90 days of Dr . Saad's deposit i on . The pla i ntiff and

plaint i ff- i nterv e nor will then have 30 days after the submiss i .on l of

the defendant's expert reports to depose the defendant's experts . Furthermore, the Pretrial Order is hereby mod i fied to prov i de
that all motions in limine must be filed at least 30 days prior l to trial .

SO ORDERED, this

day f April, 2005 .

',

1
r
OBERT VINI , 4 R .
eniar Uni ted a es District Ju dge

 
 FILED IN CHAMBMS U.S.i . a Atlanta
NOV 2 1 2005

IN THE UNITE D STATES DISTRICT C OURT By: FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

P l aintiff,

and DIANE CANTU,

C ivil Action No . 1 .03-CV-1 494-RLV

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

V.
INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, INC .,
D efen d a nt.

~ .p Uk

CONSENT DECREE This action was instituted on May 27, 2003, by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, the "Commission" or "EEOC") against the Defendant Intown Suites, Inc., (hereinafter, the "Defendant") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U .S .C . 2000e et .se(qhereinafter "Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U .S.C . 1981a, to remedy the

alleged wrongful employment practices identified in the Complaint filed in this action.
This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the
parties to this action .
The Commission alleged in the foregoing civil action that the Defendant acted unlawfull y by subjecting D iane Cantu ("hereinafter "Plaintiff-Intervenor" or "Cantu") to discrimination based upon retaliation, in violation of Title VII .
In its Complaint, the EEOC sought to make whole relief including, but not limited to, back pay relief, with interest, compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive and other affirmative relief. The Defendant filed its Answer on June 19, 2003, denying the allegations made by the EEOC in its Complaint . This agreement is not to be deemed or construed to be an admission of liability or wrongdoing by the Defendant but constitutes the good faith settlement of a disputed claim .
All of the parties to this action desire to avoid the additional expense, delay and uncertainty which would result from the continuance of this litigation and desire to formulate a plan to be embodied in a Consent Decree which will promote and effectuate the purposes of Title VII .
This Court has reviewed the terms of the proposed Consent Decree in light of the pleadings and the applicable law and regulations, and has approved this
-2-

Consent Decree as one which will promote and effectuate the purposes of Title VII .
Now, therefore, this Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED :
I. DISCLAIMER OF VIOLATION It is understood and agreed that the negotiation, execution, and entry of this Consent Decree, and the undertakings made by the Defendant hereunder, are in settlement and compromise of disputed claims, the validity of which the Defendant denies . Neither the negotiation, execution, nor entry of this Consent Decree shall constitute an acknowledgment or admission of any kind by the Defendant. This agreement is not to be deemed or construed to be an admission by the Defendant that its officers, agent, or employees have violated or have not been in compliance with Title VII or any rules and regulations issued under or pursuant to Title VII or any other applicable law, regulation, or order but constitutes the good faith settlement of a disputed claim . Neither the Consent Decree nor anything in the Consent Decree shall be admissible in any other judicial or administrative proceeding for any purpose except to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree .
-3-

II. NON-RETALIATION PROVISION The Defendant shall not retaliate against any person because that person is a beneficiary of the Consent Decree, or has provided information or assistance, or has participated in any other manner in any investigation or proceeding relating to this lawsuit, the underlying charge of discrimination, or the Consent Decree . The Defendant shall not retaliate or take any adverse action against Plaintiff-Intervenor in the future because she opposed practices that she believed were in violation of Title VII or filed charges of discrimination or otherwise participated in the equal employment opportunity process . The Defendant, to ensure equal opportunity in the employment process, shall comply with all requirements of Title VII .
IIL INSTRUCTION TO MANAGEMENT Within 45 days from the entry of this Consent Decree, the Defendant shall certify, in writing, to the EEOC that all management and supervisory personnel who are currently employed at any of its Georgia facilities have been instructed as to the terms of this Consent Decree (other than the monetary amount of the settlement), and the full meaning of the provisions of the Notice to be posted, and that the Defendant has reaffirmed with these employees that employment decisions are not to be made on any basis that is prohibited by Title VII .
-4-

IV. TRAINING The Defendant shall at least once a year during the term of this Consent Decree, in appropriate location(s), hold training session(s) for all officers, managers, and supervisors, who are employed at any one of Defendant's Georgia facilities . Said training session(s) shall address the Defendant's and its employees' equal employment opportunity obligations pursuant to Title VII, including, but not limited to, the Defendant's anti-retaliation obligations . In connection with this training, the Defendant agrees to create a nonretaliation policy and to advise all employees that they will not be retaliated against for complaining about discriminatory conduct. The Defendant agrees to establish and implement a disciplinary policy with penalties up to and including discharge for personnel, including supervisors, managers, and other officials, who are found to have engaged in retaliation in violation of the Defendant's policy . The abovereferenced policy provisions shall be instituted within 45 days of the entry of this Consent Decree . On or before that date, the Defendant shall certify to the Regional Attorney of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office that such policy provisions have been instituted for, at a minimum, all of its Georgia facilities . The Defendant shall notify the EEOC at least 30 days in advance of the training regarding the date(s) and time(s) that the training contemplated by this
-5-

Section IV will be accomplished by the Defendant . The Defendant shall provide written certification to the EEOC of training completed pursuant to this Section IV within 30 days following completion of training . The certification shall include the names and qualifications of the person(s) providing instruction, names and job titles of attendees, length of training, training topics, and any other pertinent information about the training . If written training materials are utilized, the Commission shall be supplied with a copy of the materials within 10 business days prior to the training and will keep such materials strictly confidential .
All written certification required by this Section IV of the Consent Decree shall be addressed and forwarded to S . Robert Royal ("Regional Attorney") of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office, 100 Alabama Street, Suite 4R30, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 .
V. REPORTING REQUIREMENT Every six months during the duration of this Consent Decree, the Defendant shall certify in writing to the Regional Attorney specifying whether an employee has complained about retaliation for opposing practices that the employee believed were in violation of Title VII or filed charges of discrimination or otherwise participated in the equal employment opportunity process . If an employee has so complained, then the summary report shall state in writing the following :
-6-

(a) The date of the complaint or report, (b) The name of the person making the complaint or report, (c) The name and title of the person against whom the complaint or report
was made, (d) The nature of the complaint or report, (e) The name and title of the Defendant's official who learned of the
complaint or report, M What, if any, action was taken by the Defendant in response to the
complaint or report (e .g., employee discipline), and (g) A detailed narrative of how the complaint or report was resolved by
the Defendant . The required report shall be addressed and forwarded to the Regional Attorney of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office at the above-referenced address . Such a summary report shall be kept confidential and will not be released absent a court order .
VI . NOTICES TO BE POSTED The Defendant shall post at each of its Georgia facilities the Notice attached hereto as Exhibit A for 24 calendar months immediately following the Court's entry of this Consent Decree . The posting required by this paragraph shall be conspicuously made in common or work area(s) at each of its Georgia facilities, so that each employee of a facility will observe at least one such posting when at the facility . The Defendant shall certify the completion of the posting within 45 days
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from the entry of this Consent Decree . All written certification required by this Consent Decree shall be addressed and forwarded to the Regional Attorney of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office at the above-referenced address .
The Defendant shall not withhold the right of the Commission to enter upon the Defendant's premises to monitor compliance with this Section VI of the Consent Decree, so long as written notice is provided to the Defendant's Compliance Official at least five days in advance of the proposed monitoring visit . The Defendant's Compliance Official shall accompany the Commission during any monitoring visit . Should the Notice become defaced, marred, or otherwise unreadable, the Defendant shall ensure that a new, readable copy of the Notice is posted in the same manner as heretofore specified within five business days .
VII. CHARGING PARTY'S INDIVIDUAL RELIEF : A. Monetary Relief
The Defendant, in settlement of all alleged claims of financial loss due to alleged discriminatory employment practices, shall provide the Plaintiff Intervenor a total of Three Hundred Seventeen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($317,000 .00), within ten days of the entry of this Consent Decree . The parties recognize that withholding by the Defendant of federal, state, and local taxes
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required by law, if any, is made without admission of liability on the part of the Defendant .
B. Neutral References The Defendant agrees that, if it receives inquiries from persons or prospective employers seeking a reference or other employment related information regarding Plaintiff-Intervenor, it shall provide no less than a neutral reference, citing the dates of employment and the position(s) held, and will make no mention of the fact that Ms . Cantu filed charges of discrimination or that the instant lawsuit was filed . Ms. Cantu agrees to direct all employment reference inquiries to Defendant's Director-Human Resources and Associate Counsel
VIII. COMPLIANCE OFFICIAL The Defendant has designated Mike Weinstein, Director-Human Resources and Associate Counsel, as the Defendant's Compliance Official who shall be responsible for the Defendant's compliance with the Consent Decree . The Compliance Official is to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing the Defendants' compliance with the specific terms of the Consent Decree during the term of the Consent Decree .
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IX. PRO CEDURE FOR ENFORCING COMPL IANCE The Commission will attempt to resolve any dispute regarding the enforcement of this Consent Decree by informal mediation and consultation before seeking enforcement through the judicial process . If the Commission has any reason to believe that any action or omission by the Defendant is in violation of the Consent Decree, it will notify, by first class mail and facsimile, Mike Weinstein, Director-Human Resources and Associate Counsel, at 2727 Paces Ferry Road, Suite 2-1200, Atlanta, Georgia 30339 . The Defendant shall have 30 days after the receipt of such notification to cure any such alleged deficiency, and to notify the Commission, by written report addressed to the Regional Attorney of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office, of the measures taken to cure the alleged deficiencies . If upon receipt of the Defendant's report, the Commission concludes that the deficiency has not been satisfactorily cured by the Defendant, the Commission shall seek to resolve the alleged deficiency through good faith conciliation or mediation . If the alleged deficiency is not resolved within 30 days after the initiation of such good faith conciliation or mediation process, then the Commission may seek enforcement of this Consent Decree through the judicial process . Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, nothing in this agreement shall be deemed to prohibit any matter which occurred during the term of this Consent
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Decree, and which constitutes a dispute as contemplated by this Section IX, from being fully and completely processed in the manner described in Section IX, even though the dispute is not resolved within 30 days of the termination of this Consent Decree .
X. TERMS OF DECREE - PERIOD OF JURISDICTION This Consent Decree shall continue to be effective and binding upon the parties to this action for a period of 24 calendar months immediately following the entry of the Consent Decree, provided that all remedial benefits required hereby have been received or offered prior to its expiration, and provided that all required reports and certifications are submitted at least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the Consent Decree . If the remedial benefits are not received or offered as agreed in the Consent Decree, or if the required reports are not submitted within 30 days of the expiration date of the Consent Decree, the duration of the Consent Decree will be automatically extended until these provisions are completed . Upon the Court's execution and entry of this Consent Decree, this case shall be dismissed with prejudice . However, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action for the purposes of clarifying and enforcing this Consent Decree, and for any other appropriate or equitable purposes, for 24 calendar months from the date of entry of this Consent Decree, unless the Court acts, or the Commission has,
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prior to the expiration of said 24 month period, moved to enforce compliance with the Consent Decree . If this Court acts, or the Commission has moved to enforce compliance with this Consent Decree within this period, this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action until all issues relating to all such motions which are made during the 24 month period have been resolved .
XL OTHER ACTIONS The Commission shall not commence or prosecute against the Defendant any action or other proceeding based upon any claims, demands, causes of action, obligations, damages or liabilities which arose out of Plaintiff-Intervenar's claims that she was retaliated against by the Defendant in violation of Title VII, as embodied in EEOC Charge Numbers 110A14796 and 110A14811, which were filed with, and investigated by, the EEOC's Atlanta District Office . This Consent Decree in no way affects the Commission's right to process any pending or future charges that may be filed against the Defendant in accordance with standard Commission procedures, and to commence civil actions pursuant to Section 706(f) of Title VII on any such charge . Nothing herein shall preclude the Commission from bringing an action to enforce the provisions of this Consent Decree .
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XYY. COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees for this action . This Consent Decree and its terms are not confidential and are subject to public
disclosure. The parties hereto and the undersigned attorneys of record for the
parties hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Consent Decree . XIII. JOINT PRESS RELEASE
The EEOC and Defendant agree to use their best efforts to prepare and issue
a joint press release announcing the settlement of this case and the entry of this Consent Decree . If the EEOC and Defendant agree upon and issue a joint press release, the Commission will not issue a separate press release concerning this case
or the entry of this Consent Decree . Nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the EEOC from complying with and/or meeting its reporting obligations . BY CONSENT :
For Plaintiff:
S . ROBERT ROYAL Georgia Bar No . 617505 Regional Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ATLANTA DISTRICT OFFICE - LEGAL UNIT 100 Alabama Street, SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 562-6818
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For Defendant : John F. Meyers, Esquire Georgia Bar No . 503692 Alex S . Drummond, Esquire Georgia Bar No . 231 116 Seyfarth Shaw LLP One Peachtree Pointe, Suite 700 1545 Peachtree St ., N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30309-2401 (404) 88 5-1500 Antony B . Klapper, Esquire Kirkland & Ellis LLP 655 15th Street, N .W. Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005
$'rAPPROVED, DONE, and SIGNED this «f ay of November, 2005 .
I' ERT L. VINING, J ORUNITED STA S ZSTRICT JUDGE
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[Either EEOC or Defendant letterhead] N OTI CE
L This notice to all employees of Intown Suites Management Inc . (hereinafter the "Defendant") is being posted as part of a Settlement between the Defendant and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in a Consent Decree filed in the United States Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division (Civil Action No . 1 :03-CVW 1494-RI. V) .
2 . Federal Law requires, in general, that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment because of the person's race, color, religion, sex, pregnant condition, national origin, disability or age with respect to hiring, firing, compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment .
3 . Federal Law also requires, in general, that an employer not retaliate or take any adverse action against an individual because s/he opposed practices that s/he believed were in violation of Title VII or filed charges of discrimination or otherwise participated in the equal employment opportunity process .

4. The Defendant supports and will comply with such Federal Law in all

respects and will not take any action against employees because of their sex,

pregnant condition, race, color, religion, national origin, disability or age or

because they have exercised their rights under the law .

5 . The Defendant has taken and will continue such action as is required by the

Consent Order entered by the United States District Court, including the

posting of this notice .

6 . This notice will remain posted for twenty-four (24) months, until November

21, 2007 .

Signed this day of

12005 .

Intown Suites Management, Inc .

DO NOT REMOVE THIS NOTICE UNTIL November 21, 2007 .

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

)

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

and

)

)

DIANE CANTU,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

INTOWN SUITES MANAGEMENT, )

INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

-----------------------------)

Civil Action File No. 1:03-CV-1494-RLV

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

COME NOW, Plaintiff the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (the "EEOC") , Plaintiff-Intervenor Diane Cantu ("Cantu"), and

Defendant InTown Suites Management, Inc. ("InTown Suites"), and, pursuant to

the provisions of Rule 41 (a)(1 )(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby

dismiss the above-styled civil action WITH PREJUDICE, each party to pay its

own fees and costs.

Respectfully submitted this 30~day of November, 2005.

By: .s0t~b~1iZo ~ ~ )r-b
Plaintiff the EE3e

~ By: Pla~~enor Cantu

S. Robert Royal Georgia Bar No.: 617505 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Atlanta District Office-Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street, S.W. 4R3 0 Atlanta Federal Center Atlanta, e gi 3030J.:-~-r---

Douglas R. Kertscher Georgia Bar No.: 416265 Hill, Kertscher & Wharton,
LLP 3350 Riverwood Parkway Suite 800 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

By:
Alex S. Drummond Georgia Bar No.: 231116 Seyfarth Shaw LLP 1545 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia 30309
fl ~ »\Q..')( 'Drumt'n~ I
O~~Ql~~~~~

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ATl 32294055.1

 
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4months, CLOSED, PROTO, TitleVII
U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03-cv-01494-RLV

Equal Employment v. Intown Suites Assigned to: Judge Robert L. Vining, Jr Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race) Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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Date Filed: 05/27/2003 Date Terminated: 11/21/2005 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Amy Victoria Johnson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama Street, S.W. 4R30 Atlanta Federal Center Atlanta, GA 30303-8704 404-562-6818 Email: vicki.johnson@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 09/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Amy Elizabeth Loggins Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Atlanta District Office-Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street, S.W. 4R30 Atlanta Federal Center Atlanta, GA 30303-8704 404-562-6932 TERMINATED: 02/13/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carson L. Owen Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Suite 621 1407 Union Avenue Memphis, TN 38104-3629 901-544-0133 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lakisha C. Duckett Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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Intervenor Plaintiff Diane Cantu V. Defendant Intown Suites Management, Inc.
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Atlanta District Office-Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street, S.W. 4R30 Atlanta Federal Center Atlanta, GA 30303-8704 404-562-6932 Email: lakisha.duckett@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
S. Robert Royal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Atlanta District Office-Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street, S.W. 4R30 Atlanta Federal Center Atlanta, GA 30303-8704 404-562-6820 Email: stan.royal@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven Mark Tapper U.S. Department of Homeland Security 1230 Peachtree Street. Suite 1900 Atlanta, GA 30309 404-942-2566 Email: steve.tapper@dhs.gov TERMINATED: 10/29/2003
represented by Douglas R. Kertscher Hill Kertscher & Wharton 3350 Riverwood Parkway Suite 800 Atlanta, GA 30339 770-953-0995 Email: drk@hkw-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alex S. Drummond Seyfarth Shaw-Atlanta 1545 Peachtree Street, N.E. One Peachtree Pointe, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309-2401
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CM/ECF LIVE v3 - U.S. District Court - Docket Report 3 of 19

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404-881-5467 Email: adrummond@seyfarth.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Antony Bradley Klapper Kirkland & Ellis 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005 202-414-9302 Email: aklapper@reedsmith.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher S. Enloe Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough-ATL 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. First Union Plaza, Suite 1400 Atlanta, GA 30309-3964 404-817-6000 Email: chris.enloe@nelsonmullins.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel M. Shea Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough-ATL 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. First Union Plaza, Suite 1400 Atlanta, GA 30309-3964 404-521-3800 Email: daniel.shea@nelsonmullins.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory T. Heyman Kirkland & Ellis 153 East 53rd Street Citicorp Center New York, NY 10022-4675 212-446-4676 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Selendy Kirkland & Ellis 153 East 53rd Street Citicorp Center New York, NY 10022-4675 212-446-4958
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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John F. Meyers Seyfarth Shaw 1545 Peachtree Street, N.E. One Peachtree Pointe, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309-2401 404-892-6412 Fax: 404-892-7056 Email: jmeyers@seyfarth.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael D. Jones Kirkland & Ellis 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005 202-879-5294 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven Michael Staes Seyfarth Shaw 1545 Peachtree Street, N.E. One Peachtree Pointe, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309-2401 404-885-1500 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sudwiti Chanda Kirkland & Ellis 153 East 53rd Street Citicorp Center New York, NY 10022-4675 212-446-4989 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne Jones Mulliken Smith Currie & Hancock 233 Peachtree Street, N.E. 2600 Harris Tower Atlanta, GA 30303-1530 404-521-3800 TERMINATED: 08/02/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY
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Intervenor Rick Fee

William P. Miles, Jr. Seyfarth Shaw-Atlanta 1545 Peachtree Street, N.E. One Peachtree Pointe, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309-2401 404-888-1876 Fax: 404-892-7056 Email: wmiles@seyfarth.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Penn Payne Penn Payne 999 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2610 Atlanta, GA 30309 404-897-7622 Email: ppayne@pennpayne.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judith Renee Taber O'Kelley Penn Payne 999 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 2610 Atlanta, GA 30309 404-897-7622 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/27/2003 05/27/2003 06/02/2003 06/06/2003 06/19/2003 06/26/2003

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed. Consent form to proceed before U.S. magistrate and pretrial instructions given to attorney; jury demand (daf) (Entered: 06/02/2003)
CASE REFERRED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson (Calendar sheets forwarded) (daf) (Entered: 06/02/2003)
2 MOTION by Proposed Intervenor to intervene with brief in support with prop order. (cdg) (Entered: 06/04/2003)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Intown Suites mailed 5/27/03 Answer due by 7/26/03 for Intown Suites (cdg) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
4 ANSWER by defendant to complaint [1-1] Discovery ends 11/16/03 (cdg) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
SUBMITTED to Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on [2-1] motion to intervene (cdg) (Entered: 06/26/2003)

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07/02/2003 07/02/2003 07/11/2003
07/17/2003 07/17/2003 07/21/2003
08/04/2003 08/04/2003 08/04/2003 08/04/2003 08/08/2003 08/11/2003 09/25/2003 09/25/2003
10/09/2003
10/10/2003
10/17/2003 10/29/2003

5 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson GRANTING [2-1] motion to intervene (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
Terminated submissions. (cdg) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
6 ORDER by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. GRANTING [2-1] motion to intervene. Ms. Cantu is directed to serve and file her intervenor complaint within 10 days from the date of the docketing of this order [6-1] order to be submitted on 7/25/03 (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 07/14/2003)
7 Intervenor's complaint against defendant Intown Suites (cdg) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
8 Summons issued for defendant (cdg) (Entered: 07/21/2003)
9 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, extending time thru 12/1/03 for discovery and for parties to file their responses to initial disclosures and the Joint preliminary report and discovery plan (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 07/24/2003)
10 ANSWERS TO INITIAL DISCLOSURES by defendant (cdg) (Entered: 08/05/2003)
11 Plaintiff-intervenor and dft's Certificate of interested persons. (to mag and judge) (cdg) (Entered: 08/05/2003)
12 Preliminary Report and Discovery Schedule. (to WEJ) (dfb) (Entered: 08/06/2003)
13 ANSWERS TO INITIAL DISCLOSURES by plaintiff Equal Employment. (dfb) (Entered: 08/06/2003)
14 ANSWER by defendant to complaint [7-1] Discovery ends 1/5/04 (cdg) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
15 SCHEDULING ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson APPROVING [12-1] preliminary statement (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
16 MOTION by intervenor for expedited ruling (cdg) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
17 MOTION by intervenor for protective order , and for permission to file under seal ***BRIEF IN SUPPORT FILED UNDER SEAL*** (cdg) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
Agreement letter mailed to clerks office to withdraw [17-1] motion for protective order. The motion has been termed per [18-1] order from Judge Johnson. Letter will be placed in the file. (cdg) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
18 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson DENYING AS MOOT the [16-1] motion for expedited ruling by Rick Fee, DENYING AS MOOT the [17-1] motion for protective order by Rick Fee, GRANTING [17-2] motion for permission to file under seal (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 10/15/2003)
19 SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO INITIAL DISCLOSURES by intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 10/20/2003)
20 PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED. (cdg) (Entered: 10/31/2003)

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10/29/2003
10/29/2003 11/06/2003 11/06/2003
11/21/2003 11/21/2003
11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/26/2003 12/05/2003 12/05/2003 12/08/2003 12/08/2003 12/08/2003 12/10/2003 12/11/2003 12/11/2003

21 Certification of Consent to Substitution of Counsel for Equal Employment . Amy Elizabeth Loggins replacing attorney Steven Mark Tapper for Equal Employment (cdg) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
22 Notice of filing withdrawal of atty Steven M. Tapper for plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
23 TELE-CONFERENCE HELD before Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on 11/5/03 at 11:00am in Rome. (cdg) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
VERBAL ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson. Plaintiff-Intervenor produce requested documents (tape, tape transcript journals & daytimers) IMMEDIATELY. It is futher ORDERED that defendant shall reopen the deposition of plaintiff-intervenor fro an additional two hours for the limited purpose of examining her regarding these documents. Discovery is extended through 12/31/03. (cdg) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
24 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff to compel discovery responses and request fro discovery with brief in support. (cdg) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
25 MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery responses for sanctions , and to extend time for an additional 45 days beyond the date of its entry of the order deciding the motion to compel with brief in support. (cdg) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
24 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu to extend time for discovery with brief in support. (Inc. in motion to compel) (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
25 MOTION by plaintiff to extend time for discovery , and for sanctions with brief in support. (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
26 MOTION by defendant for protective order , and for sanctions with brief in support. (cdg) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
27 Notice of issuance of subpoena for deposition of Richard Rydin by plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
28 Attorney appearance for plaintiff by Lakisha C. Duckett. (cdg) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
29 Notice of filing subpoena for the production of documents to Brinker International by intervenor-plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
30 Response by defendant in opposition to [24-1] motion to compel discovery responses and request fro discovery (cdg) (Entered: 12/10/2003)
30 MOTION by defendant for expenses with brief in support. (Inc. in opposition to Motion to compel.) (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
33 Notice of filing issuance of subpoena for deposition of Connie Pate by plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
31 Response by defendant in opposition to [25-1] motion to compel discovery responses for sanctions (cdg) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
34 Notice of filing issuance of subpoena for deposition of Leif Hartkopf by Proposed Intervenor. (cdg) (Entered: 12/16/2003)

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12/11/2003 12/12/2003 12/17/2003 12/17/2003 12/19/2003 12/23/2003 12/24/2003 12/24/2003 12/30/2003
12/31/2003 12/31/2003 01/05/2004 01/06/2004 01/06/2004 01/08/2004 01/08/2004 01/12/2004 01/12/2004

31 MOTION by defendant for reasonable expenses with brief in support. (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
32 Certificate of service of notice of intervenor's deposition as to defendant (cdg) (Entered: 12/15/2003)
Proposed Consent order by parties extendign time thru 12/24/03 for intervenor/plaintiff to a response brief. (to WEJ) (cdg) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
35 Certificate of service for taking depositions as to defendant (cdg) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
36 MOTION by defendant Intown Suites to extend the dispositive motion deadline with brief in support. (dfb) (Entered: 12/24/2003)
37 Reply brief to [24-1] motion to compel discovery responses and request for discovery by intervenor-plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
38 AMENDED Certificate of service of notice of taking deposition as to intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu (cdg) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
39 Response by intervenor-plaintiff to [26-1] motion for protective order, [26-2] motion for sanctions (cdg) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [24-1] motion to compel discovery responses and request fro discovery, [25-1] motion to compel discovery responses for sanctions, [25-2] motion to extend time for an additional 45 days beyond the date of its entry of the order deciding the motion to compel, [26-1] motion for protective order, [26-2] motion for sanctions (cdg) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
40 Certificate of service of discovery as to plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 01/05/2004)
Proposed consent order extending plaintiff's time to file its reply to dft's response to pla's motion to compel. (to WEJ) (cdg) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
42 Reply by plaintiff to dft's opposition to pla's [25-1] motion to compel discovery responses. (kt) (Entered: 01/07/2004)
41 Certificate of service as to Intown Suites' response to pla Diane Cantu's 2nd req for prod of docs by defendant. (kt) (Entered: 01/07/2004)
43 MOTION by plaintiff for filing of original discovery (cdg) (Entered: 01/08/2004)
44 Response by plaintiff to [36-1] motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline (cdg) (Entered: 01/09/2004)
45 Certificate of service of amended notice of taking deposition as to defendant (cdg) (Entered: 01/09/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [36-1] motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline (file in chambers) (cdg) (Entered: 01/12/2004)
Proposed consent order extending time thru 1/21/04 for the filing of a rply to the dft's motion for protective order. (to WEJ) (cdg) (Entered: 01/13/2004)

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01/12/2004 01/15/2004 01/16/2004 01/16/2004 01/16/2004 01/16/2004 01/16/2004
01/20/2004 01/23/2004 01/23/2004 01/29/2004
02/02/2004 02/06/2004 02/09/2004 02/09/2004 02/11/2004

46 Certificate of service for amended notice of taking deposition as to defendant (cdg) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [36-1] motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline (file in chambers) (cdg) (Entered: 01/15/2004)
47 Notice of filing original deposition by defendant. (cdg) (Entered: 01/20/2004)
48 Deposition of DIANE CANTU taken for defendant (cdg) (Entered: 01/20/2004)
49 Certificate of service for third amended notice of taking deposition of William Gosha as to defendant (cdg) (Entered: 01/22/2004)
51 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson extending time to file its reply to dft's response to pla's motion to compel (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
52 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, extending time thru 1/21/04 for dft to file its rply to [26-1] motion for protective order, [26-2] motion for sanctions (cc) (cdg) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
50 REPLY by defendant to response to [26-1] motion for protective order, [26-2] motion for sanctions (cdg) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
53 Notice of filing original discovery by defendant. (cdg) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
54 Deposition of Continued depo of DIANE CANTU taken for defendant (cdg) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
55 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, Mr. Kertscher is DIRECTED to file a written response to this Order w/i 10 days of its entry; Mr. Kertscher shall advise the Court whether he admits or denies the assertions made in the Affidavits attached to dft's replybr. (cc) (kt) (Entered: 01/30/2004)
56 Log of withheld documents by defendant. (jph) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
57 Certificate of service as to notice of subpoena for the prod of docs by intervenor-plaintiff. (kt) (Entered: 02/10/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [43-1] motion for filing of original discovery (file in chambers) (cdg) (Entered: 02/09/2004)
58 Response by intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu (Douglas R. Kertscher, Esq.) to [55-1] order. (to SSC) (tcc) (Entered: 02/10/2004)
60 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson GRANTING [24-1] motion to compel discovery responses and request fro discovery, GRANTING [25-1] motion to compel discovery responses for sanctions, GRANTING [25-2] motion to extend time for an additional 45 days beyond the date of its entry of the order deciding the motion to compel, GRANTING [25-1] motion to extend time for discovery, GRANTING [24-1] motion to extend time for discovery, DENYING [25-2] motion for sanctions by Equal Employment, DENYING [30-1] motion for expenses by Intown Suites, DENYING [31-1] motion for reasonable expenses by Intown Suites, GRANTING [36-1] motion to extend the dispositive motion deadline (cc by CRD) (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)

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02/13/2004 02/17/2004 02/20/2004 02/23/2004 02/27/2004 03/04/2004 03/05/2004 03/05/2004
03/05/2004 03/25/2004 03/26/2004 03/26/2004 03/26/2004 03/30/2004 03/31/2004 04/06/2004 04/07/2004

59 Notice of withdrawal of counsel for plaintiff by Amy Elizabeth Loggins. (jph) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
61 Reply by defendant to [58-1] response to [55-1] order (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
62 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson GRANTING [26-1] motion for protective order, GRANTING [26-2] motion for sanctions (cc) (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
63 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATING [43-1] motion for filing of original discovery by Equal Employment (cc) (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
64 Certificate of service as to intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu's 3rd request for production of documents to defendant Intown Suites Mgt, Inc. (adg) (Entered: 03/01/2004)
65 Affidavit of Suzanne J. Mulliken. (tcc) (Entered: 03/08/2004)
66 Certificate of service of Defendant's Supplemental Response to Plaintiff Diane Cantu's Request For Production of Documents as to plaintiff Equal Employment and intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu (tcc) (Entered: 03/08/2004)
67 Certificate of service of Defendant's Response to Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Request For Production of Documents as to plaintiff Equal Employment and intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu (tcc) (Entered: 03/08/2004)
68 Certificate of service as to Supplemental Response to Interrogatories and Supplemental Response to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interrogatories by defendant (jph) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
69 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, directing Douglas Kertscher, Esq to pay dft the amount of $3,990 in attorney's fees within 30 days of this order (cc) (jph) (Entered: 03/26/2004)
70 Certificate of service of Notice for 30(B)(6) Deposition as to plaintiff Equal Employment and defendant Intown Suites (tcc) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
71 Certificate of service of Notice of Deposition of Rex Killebrow as to plaintiff Equal Employment and defendant Intown Suites (tcc) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
72 MOTION by defendant Intown Suites for enlargement of Protective Order with brief in support. (tcc) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
73 Certificate of service as to Notice of subpoena for the production of documents to National Personnel Records Center by defendants. (jph) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
74 Certificate of service as to Response to third request for production of documents by defendant (jph) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
75 MOTION by defendant to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad with brief in support. (jph) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
76 MOTION by defendant to extend time thru 5/4/04 to file summary judgment with brief in support. (jph) (Entered: 04/12/2004)

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04/08/2004 04/13/2004
04/14/2004 04/19/2004
04/21/2004 04/21/2004
04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/27/2004
04/27/2004 04/27/2004 04/27/2004 04/27/2004 04/27/2004 04/27/2004
05/04/2004
05/06/2004

77 Notice of Counsel's change of affiliation and address by Counsel for Proposed Intervenor Rick Fee. (jph) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
78 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson GRANTING [76-1] motion to extend time thru 5/4/04 to file summary judgment (cc by Mag) (jph) Modified on 04/14/2004 (Entered: 04/14/2004)
79 Response by intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu to [72-1] motion for enlargement of Protective Order. (jph) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
80 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson DENYING [72-1] motion for enlargement of Protective Order by Intown Suites (cc by Mag) (jph) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [72-1] motion for enlargement of Protective Order (jph) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
Proposed Consent Order extending time until 4/26/04 for Intervenor/Plaintiff to file her response brief to dft's motion to strike and any motion for sumjgm. (to WEJ) (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [75-1] motion to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad (jph) (Entered: 04/26/2004)
81 Memorandum by Diane Cantu in opposition to [75-1] motion to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad. (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
82 MOTION by Diane Cantu for partial summary judgment with memorandum in support and stmt. of material facts. (cc: to all counsel of record) (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
83 Notice of filing original transcripts by Diane Cantu. (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
84 Deposition of RICKIE ALEN FEE taken for Diane Cantu. (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
85 Deposition of CHERYL VICKERS (taken 12/23/2003) taken for Diane Cantu. (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
86 Deposition of CHERYL VICKERS (vol III) taken for Diane Cantu (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
87 Deposition of CHERYL VICKERS taken for Diane Cantu. (kt) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
88 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, extending time thru 4/26/04 to file a response brief to [75-1] motion to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad and to file any motion for summary judgment (cc by Mag) (jph) (Entered: 04/30/2004)
89 MOTION by defendant for summary judgment with brief in support, notice of filing, and statement of material facts. (Notice sent to Counsel) (jph) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
90 Request for filing of original by intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu. (jph) (Entered: 05/12/2004)

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05/12/2004 05/12/2004 05/13/2004 05/14/2004 05/17/2004
05/21/2004
05/25/2004 05/26/2004
05/26/2004
05/26/2004 06/02/2004
06/03/2004 06/03/2004 06/03/2004 06/03/2004 06/03/2004 06/03/2004

92 Notice of filing of original discovery by plaintiff. (jph) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
93 Deposition of CHERYL VICKERS taken for plaintiff. (jph) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
94 REPLY by defendant to response to [75-1] motion to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad (cdg) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
91 Response by defendant to [82-1] motion for partial summary judgment (cdg) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
95 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson DENYING [75-1] motion to strike pla intervenor's expert Dr. Ali I. Saad by Intown Suites (cc) (jph) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
96 MOTION by plaintiff to extend time thru 6/07/04 to response to dft's [89-1] motion for summary judgment with brief in support and prop order. (cdg) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
97 MOTION by defendant for protective order , and for sanctions with brief in support. (cdg) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
98 NON-FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson RECOMMEND GRANTING [82-1] motion for partial summary judgment by Diane Cantu with order for service ( of RR due 6/12/04 ) (cc by Mag) (jph) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
99 ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson GRANTING [96-1] motion to extend time thru 6/07/04 to response to dft's [89-1] motion for summary judgment (cc by Mag) (jph) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
Proposed consent order to extend time to file reply brief. (to WEJ) (cdg) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
100 Memorandum of Law by intervenor-plaintiff Diane Cantu in opposition to [89-1] motion for summary judgment with statement of material facts. (adg) (Entered: 06/04/2004)
102 Notice of filing original transcripts by intervenor-plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
103 Deposition of HERRY PURSER-HUGHES taken for intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
104 Videotaped Deposition of RICHARD W. RYDIN taken for intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
105 Deposition of SCOTT M. HORNER taken for intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
106 Deposition of MARIA ELDRED taken for intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
107 Deposition of ROBERT G. BICKFORD taken for intervenor-plaintiff (cdg) (Entered: 06/09/2004)

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06/07/2004 06/14/2004 06/14/2004 06/15/2004 06/16/2004 06/18/2004 06/21/2004 06/24/2004 06/25/2004 07/07/2004 07/19/2004 07/26/2004 08/02/2004 08/02/2004 08/02/2004 11/01/2004

101 Response by plaintiff to dfts statement of material facts contained within [89-1] motion for summary judgment with brief in support. (cdg) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
108 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson, extending time thru 6/2/04 to file response to [89-1] motion for summary judgment and thru 6/17/04 to file reply brief. (cc) (jph) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
109 Response by intervenor-plaintiff to [97-1] motion for protective order, [97-2] motion for sanctions (cdg) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
110 Notice of filing request for filing of original transcript by intervenor-plaintiff. (cdg) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
SUBMITTED to Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson on [97-1] motion for protective order, [97-2] motion for sanctions, [89-1] motion for summary judgment, [82-1] motion for partial summary judgment (cdg) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
Proposed Consent Order by parties extending time thru 6/24/04 to file a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. (to WEJ) (cdg) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
111 CONSENT ORDER by Mag Judge Walter E. Johnson extending time to file Reply Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment thru 6/24/04 (cc) (jph) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
113 Reply brief to [89-1] motion for summary judgment by defendant. (cdg) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
112 Reply memorandum in support of [97-1] motion for protective order and [97-2] motion for sanctions by defendant. (adg) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
SUBMITTED to Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on [98-1] report & recommendation *FILE IN JUDGE JOHNSON'S CHAMBERS* (cdg) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
114 ORDER denying 97 Motion for Protective Order, denying 97 Motion for Sanctions . Signed by Judge Walter E. Johnson on 7/16/04. (jph) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
115 ORDER ADOPTING the 98 Report and Recommendation, GRANTING 82 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment . Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 7/26/04. (jph) (Entered: 08/05/2004)
116 NOTICE Of Filing Original Discovery material by Intown Suites Management, Inc. (cdg) (Entered: 08/11/2004)
117 NOTICE of attorney withdrawal of Suzanne J. Mulliken and Notice of Change of Address for Daniel M. Shea, counsel for Intown Suites Management, Inc. (cdg) (Entered: 08/13/2004)
118 DEPOSITION of Alexander C. Howard taken on 1/8/2004 by Intown Suites Management, Inc..(cdg) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
119 NON-FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Recommending denying 89 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Signed by Judge Walter E. Johnson on 11/1/04. (klb) (Entered: 11/01/2004)

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11/18/2004 11/23/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 12/06/2004 12/07/2004 12/07/2004 12/09/2004 12/15/2004 12/17/2004 12/29/2004 01/03/2005

120 CONSENT ORDER reseting the deadline of the submission on 119 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 89 Motion for Summary Judgment to 11/23/04 filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 11/18/04. (jph) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
122 OBJECTION to 119 Report and Recommendation filed by defendant Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (cdg) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
123 APPLICATION for Admission of Jennifer Selendy Pro Hac Viceby Intown Suites Management, Inc..Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #530248. (cdg) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
124 APPLICATION for Admission of Sudwiti Chanda Pro Hac Viceby Intown Suites Management, Inc..Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #530248. (cdg) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
125 APPLICATION for Admission of Gregory T. Heyman Pro Hac Viceby Intown Suites Management, Inc..Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #530248. (cdg) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
121 OBJECTION to 119 Report and Recommendation Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation filed by Diane Cantu. (Attachments: # 1)(Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
Submission of 89 Motion for Summary Judgment, 119 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 89 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc., submitted to District Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. (jph) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
Submission of 125 APPLICATION for Admission of Gregory T. Heyman Pro Hac Vice, 123 APPLICATION for Admission of Jennifer Selendy Pro Hac Vice, 124 APPLICATION for Admission of Sudwiti Chanda Pro Hac Vice, submitted to District Judge Robert L. Vining Jr.. (cdg) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
126 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Jennifer Selendy, Gregory T. Heyman and Sudwiti Chanda, MOTION to Withdraw Sallie G. Smylie and Lauren O. Casazza as Attorneyby defendant Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(cdg) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
127 CONSENT ORDER extending time through 12/17/04 to file the reply brief in support of 122 Objection to 119 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 89 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 12/15/04. (jph) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
130 REPLY BRIEF in support of Objection to Report and Recommendation re 122 Objection to Report and Recommendation filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (cdg) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
129 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher S. Enloe on behalf of Intown Suites Management, Inc. (vs) (Entered: 01/05/2005)
128 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of notice of expert deposition of Dr. Ali I. Saad by Intown Suites Management, Inc. (vs) (Entered: 01/04/2005)

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01/05/2005
01/06/2005
01/12/2005 01/12/2005 01/12/2005 02/18/2005 02/22/2005 02/22/2005 02/24/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/28/2005 02/28/2005

Submission of 126 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Jennifer Selendy, Gregory T. Heyman and Sudwiti Chanda MOTION to Withdraw Daniel M. Shea as Attorney, submitted to District Judge Robert L. Vining. (cdg) (Entered: 01/05/2005)
134 ORDER granting 126 Motion to withdraw and Substitute Attorney. Added attorney Jennifer Selendy for Intown Suites Management, Inc., Gregory T. Heyman for Intown Suites Management, Inc. and Sudwiti Chanda for Intown Suites Management, Inc. Attorney Sallie G. Smylie and Lauren O. Casazza are withdrawn as counsel of record for defendant.. Signed by Judge Walter E. Johnson on 1/6/05. (klb) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
131 ORDER granting 123 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Jennifer Selendy. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 1/12/05. (jph) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
132 ORDER granting 124 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Sudwiti Chanda. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 1/12/05. (jph) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
133 ORDER granting 125 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice Gregory T. Heyman. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 1/12/05. (jph) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
135 NOTICE of Appearance by Alex S. Drummond, William P. Miles, Jr, John F. Meyers, Steven Michael Staes on behalf of Intown Suites Management, Inc. (sjk) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
137 NOTICE of Appearance of Antony Bradly Klapper (phv pending) by Intown Suites Management, Inc. (sjk) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
142 APPLICATION for Admission of Antony Bradley Klapper Pro Hac Viceby Intown Suites Management, Inc..Filing Fee received $150.00, Receipt #533773. (Received from Admin on 3/18/05) (cdg) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
136 ORDER adopting 119Report and Recommendations and denying 89 Motion for Summary Judgment . Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 2/24/05. (jph) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
140 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Amy Victoria Johnson on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (cdg) (Entered: 03/02/2005)
Remark: Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Antony Bradley Klapper received from Intake. The application is currently incomplete and has been returned to Petitioner pending completion. (jeh) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
138 APPLICATION for Admission of Michael D. Jones Pro Hac Viceby Intown Suites Management, Inc.Filing Fee received $$150.00, Receipt #533474. (jph) (Entered: 03/02/2005)
139 ORDER granting 138 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Michael D. Jones . Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 2/28/05. (jph) (Entered: 03/02/2005)

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03/15/2005
03/28/2005
03/29/2005
03/30/2005 03/30/2005 03/30/2005 04/01/2005 04/14/2005 04/21/2005 04/21/2005 04/26/2005

141 ORDER Consolidated Pretrial Order due by 3/28/2005. Within 10 days of the date of this order the parties shall notify the undersigned's chambers of mutually agreeable dates to conduct a pretrial conference and whether the parties will consent to a trial of this case by the undersigned. Should either party decline to consent the parties shall notify the undersigned's chambers of mutually agreeable dates to conduct a trial of this matter before the undersigned as a special master. Signed by Judge Walter E. Johnson on 3/15/05. (klb) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
143 Proposed Pretrial Order Consolidated PreTrial Order by Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A# 2 Attachment B1# 3 Attachment B2# 4 Attachment B3# 5 Attachment C# 6 Attachment C1# 7 Attachment D# 8 Attachment E# 9 Attachment F1# 10 Attachment F2# 11 Attachment F3# 12 Attachment G1# 13 Attachment G2# 14 Attachment G3# 15 Attachment I1# 16 Attachment I2)(Miles, William) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
144 NOTICE Of Filing NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENT TO CONSOLIDATED PRETRIAL ORDER AND MOTION THAT SAME BE MADE PART OF by Diane Cantu NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENT TO CONSOLIDATED PRETRIAL ORDER AND MOTION THAT SAME BE MADE PART OF (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
145 ORDER granting 142 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Antony Bradley Klapper . Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 3/30/05. (jph) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
146 ORDER withdrawing the reference of this case to the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 3/30/05. (jph) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
Case no longer referred to Walter E. Johnson. (jph) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
147 ORDER Pretrial Conference set for 4/25/2005 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 353 before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 4/1/05. (jph) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
148 PRETRIAL ORDER filed. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 4/14/05. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A-C# 2 Attachment D-I)(jph) (Entered: 04/15/2005)
149 ORDER cancelling the hearing set for April 25, 2005 at 1:30pm. A memorandum opinion will follow this order detailing what issues the parties must resolve before this court will conduct a Pretrial Conference in this matter. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 4/21/05. (jph) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
150 NOTICE by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena for the Production of Documents (Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
151 MEMORANDUM OPINION directing the plaintiff to provide Dr. Saad's expert report within 30 days. Dr. Saad shall be deposed within 30 days of submission of his report. The defendant must thereafter identify its experts within 45 days after the completion of Dr. Saad's depo and the defendant's experts are to submit their reports within 90 days. There will then be 30 days to depose defendant's experts. The pretrial order is modified to provide that all motions in limine must be filed 30 days prior to trial. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 4/26/05. (jph) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

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04/29/2005 06/02/2005
06/03/2005 06/15/2005 06/20/2005 06/24/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/28/2005 06/29/2005 07/14/2005 07/14/2005 08/08/2005 09/08/2005 09/08/2005

152 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Dr. Ali Saad filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. (Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
153 MOTION in Limine Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices with Brief In Support by Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Brief # 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B-1# 4 Exhibit B-2)(Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 06/02/2005)
154 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Notice of Objection to Subpoena Pursuant to Rule 45(C)(2)(B) (Miles, William) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
155 PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER Extending Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices. (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
156 ORDER extending time through 6/27/05 to respond to 153 Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 6/20/05. (jph) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
157 NOTICE by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Expert Disclosures (Miles, William) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
158 RESPONSE in Opposition re 153 MOTION in Limine Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices filed by Diane Cantu. (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
159 RESPONSE to 153 MOTION in Limine Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices. filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (dcs) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
160 NOTICE by Diane Cantu of Substitution of Exhibit (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
161 NOTICE by Intown Suites Management, Inc. Of Filing Defendants' Rule 26 Expert Disclosures Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Miles, William) (Entered: 06/29/2005)
Submission of 153 MOTION in Limine Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices, submitted to District Judge Robert L. Vining. (dcs) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
162 REPLY to Response to Motion re 153 MOTION in Limine Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Related to its Hiring Practices filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
163 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Intown Suites Management, Inc. of Serving Expert Reports (Miles, William) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
164 NOTICE of Hearing: Pretrial Conference set for 9/20/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 353 before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. (jph) (Entered: 09/08/2005)
165 NOTICE setting Trial: Jury Trial set for 10/17/2005 at 10:00 AM before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. (jph) (Entered: 09/08/2005)

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09/14/2005
09/14/2005 09/22/2005 09/22/2005
10/06/2005 10/06/2005
10/06/2005
10/12/2005 10/14/2005
10/27/2005 11/21/2005 11/21/2005 11/21/2005 11/30/2005 12/06/2005

166 AMENDED NOTICE of Hearing: Pretrial Conference reset for 10/6/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 353 before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr.(jph) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
167 NOTICE resetting Trial: Jury Trial reset for 12/12/2005 at 10:00 AM before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. (jph) (Entered: 09/14/2005)
168 NOTICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Withdrawal of Counsel for Plaintiff (Duckett, Lakisha) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
169 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel for Plaintiff (Duckett, Lakisha) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
170 APPLICATION for Admission of Carson L. Owen Pro Hac Viceby Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (jph) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
171 ORDER granting 170 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Carson L. Owen. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 10/6/05. (jph) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
172 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert L. Vining Jr.: Pretrial Conference held on 10/6/2005. 153 Motion argued. Written Order to follow. (Court Reporter Kimberly C. Bramlett.)(jph) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
173 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Diane Cantu Notice of Deposition of Ginger McCrae (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 10/12/2005)
174 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of Pretrial Conference held on October 6, 2005 before Judge Robert L. Vining, Jr. Court Reporter: Kimberly C. Bramlett. (als) (Entered: 10/17/2005)
175 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by Diane Cantu Notice of Deposition of Dan Shea (Kertscher, Douglas) (Entered: 10/27/2005)
176 PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER Consent Decree. (Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
177 CONSENT DECREE dismissing the case. Signed by Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. on 11/21/05. (jph) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
Civil Case Terminated. (jph) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
178 STIPULATION of Dismissal With Prejudice by Intown Suites Management, Inc.. (Drummond, Alex) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
Clerk's Entry of Dismissal re: 178 Stipulation of Dismissal (als) (Entered: 12/06/2005)

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CM/ECF LIVE v3 - U.S. District Court - Docket Report

https://ecf.gand.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?417054445447241-L_3...

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Docket Report

Billable Pages: 10

Client Code: eeoc

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1:03-cv-01494-RLV 0.80

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 EEOC LITIGATION SETTLEMENT REPORT - November 2005

http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/settlement11-05.html

EEOC v. InTown Suites Management, Inc. No. 1:03-CV-1494-RLV (N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2005)
The Atlanta District Office filed this Title VII case alleging that defendant, an extended stay hotel business, discharged and otherwise retaliated against charging party (a district manager for six properties in Georgia, Alabama, and Virginia) because she complained about discrimination. Charging party, a white female, e-mailed defendant's Chief Operating Officer in September 2001 expressing her concerns about the exclusion of minorities from management positions. Until then, charging party had been considered a stellar performer. In the 2 weeks following her e- mail, defendant reprimanded charging party, criticized her performance, threatened to place her on a PIP, accused her of disloyalty to the company, and then terminated her.
Under the 24-month consent decree resolving this case, charging party will receive $317,000 in monetary relief. The decree's affirmative provisions, which apply to all of defendant's facilities in Georgia, include the following. Defendant is required to post notices concerning resolution of the decree. Defendant must create and institute a nonretaliation policy and advise all employees that it will not retaliate against them for complaining about discrimination. Defendant will instruct all management and supervisory personnel about the terms of the decree and the meaning of the notice and provide them with annual training on Title VII's equal employment obligations, including nonretaliation.

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