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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ~;!_~[:. ·.· tl~---.D.C

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Miami Division

98 SEP 22 Fi-1 3: 53

AMPARO CAMPOS, HECTOR CORELLA,)

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, JOSEFINA )

LOPEZ, JUANA QUINTERO, SOFIA )

PARDO and AURA CONSUEGRA, on )

behalf of themselves and all )

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION)

SERVICE; DORIS MEISSNER,

)

Commissioner, Immigration and )

Naturalization Service; ROBERT)

WALLIS, District Director,

)

Immigration and Naturalization)

Service, Miami; and ELAINE

)

WATSON, Director, Naturaliza- )

tion Unit, Immigration and )

Naturalization Service, Miami )

)

______D_e__fe_n__d_a_n_t_s_. _______________

) )

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CL[ ~:

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. .·, T. CT.

S.D.c; . :.... -iili\HI

98-2231 Case No.

CIV- GOLD

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TURNOFf

INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs are poor, disabled legal permanent residents of the United States who have applied for and are eligible for naturalization but who are unable, solely due to a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to learn basic English and the fundamentals of United States history and government ( 11 Civics 11 ) so as to pass the English and Civics portion of the naturalization exam. Despite an express Congressional mandate, 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), as well as implementing regulations and interpretations, providing a 11 medical waiver 11 of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization exam for such persons, defendants have maintained

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a systematic and Miami District-wide policy of refusing to evaluate requests for medical waivers as required by statute and their own regulations and guidelines, of evaluating all applications for medical waivers in a standardless, totally arbitrary and idiosyncratically capricious manner and of refusing to inform the members of the plaintiff class of the bases for the denial of their requests or even the standards used to deny them. As a result, the plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class, all of whom are gravely ill and/or severely handicapped, are deprived of their dream of United States citizenship.
2. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, request this Court to issue injunctive relief to compel the defendants to:
(a) evaluate all pending and future requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination as required by 8 U.S.C. § 14 23 (b ) (1 ) , 8 C . F . R. § § 312 . 1 and 312 . 2 , the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(b) reevaluate all requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which have been denied at any time since March 19, 1997, pursuant to the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
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(c) develop standards for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which are consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines;
(d) publish in the Federal Register and make available to the public the standards utilized by the defendants, including such uniform standards as are hereafter developed, for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations;
(e) provide notice of the reasons for the rejection of the medical waiver sufficient to allow the applicant to understand the bases for the rejection and, if possible, to correct them, to all applicants for naturalization whose requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations have been rejected. Plaintiffs also seek corresponding declaratory relief and attorneys' fees and costs as permitted by the Equal Access to Justice Act.
JURISDICTION 3. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by 28 U.S.C. §
1361, 28 u.s.c. § 1331(a) and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
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4. This Court also has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and 65.
VENUE 5. Venue in the Southern District of Florida is proper pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) in that Defendants Robert Wallis and Elaine Watson are residents of the Southern District of Florida, a substantial part of the activities complained of occurred in the Southern District of Florida and all of the named plaintiffs reside in this judicial district.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 6. Plaintiff AMPARO CAMPOS is an eighty-two (82) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from dementia, cognitive disorder, recurrent major depression and generalized anxiety disorder. 7. Plaintiff HECTOR CORELLA is a ninety-five (95) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from senile dementia, organic brain syndrome and arterial hypertension. 8. Plaintiff ANGELA RODRIGUEZ is a seventy-eight (78) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from organic brain syndrome and arterial hypertension. 9. Plaintiff JOSEFINA LOPEZ is an eighty-four (84) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from

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aggressive cardiac arrhythmia, arterial fibrillation and sick sinus syndrome affecting the sinus node of the heart.
10. Plaintiff JUANA QUINTERO is a sixty-two (62) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from dementia, chronic hypertension and recurrent major depression.
11. Plaintiff SOFIA PARDO is a seventy-seven (77) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from dementia.
12. Plaintiff AURA CONSUEGRA is an eighty-six (86) year old legal permanent resident of Dade County, Florida who suffers from cerebral dementia, organic brain syndrome, arteriosclerosis and a brain tumor.
Defendants 13. Defendant IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ("INS") is the agency of the United States government charged with the processing and approval of all naturalization petitions and, as part of its responsibilities, reviews, approves or denies all requests for medical waiver of the English and/or Civics section of the naturalization exam. As such, the agency is responsible for the acts challenged in this action. 14. Defendant DORIS MEISSNER is the Commissioner of the INS and its Chief Executive Officer. As such, she is responsible for the administration of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, including its disability waiver provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), and for the promulgation of regulations, policies, procedures and guidelines concerning the disability waiver.
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15. Defendant ROBERT WALLIS is the District Director of the
Miami, Florida District Office of the INS, and its Chief
Administrative Officer. The Miami, Florida District Office is
responsible for making the determination to grant or deny all
naturalization applications, including the decision to grant or
deny all requests for medical waiver, filed by persons residing
in the State of Florida.
16. Defendant ELAINE WATSON is the Director of the
Naturalization Unit of the Miami, Florida District Office of the
INS. She is responsible for the administration of the
naturalization program in the Miami District office.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
17. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b) (1) and
(b) {2), plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and
all other similarly-situated persons. The plaintiff class
consists of:
All persons within the Miami District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who have properly applied, or will apply in the future, for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1445 who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a request for a waiver of either or both of the naturalization requirements that they demonstrate an understanding of the English language and that they demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment and whose request for waiver is now pending, will be filed in the future, or has been rejected by the INS.
18. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that,
as a result of the defendants illegal policies as alleged
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herein, hundreds of similarly-situated naturalization applicants have had their requests for medical waiver of the English or Civics portion of the naturalization examination illegally denied. In addition, many hundreds of persons who have made similar requests for medical waiver and whose requests are pending, or will be filed in the future, are threatened with being subjected to the same illegal policies.
19. There are questions of law and fact common to the class:
A. Common questions of law include whether Defendants' current practices and policies in the Miami District for evaluating requests for medical waiver of the English language and Civics portion of the naturalization exam violate 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. §553, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
B. Common questions of fact include whether Defendants maintain and have maintained a policy and practice in the Miami District:
1. of rejecting medical waiver requests in violation of the policies and procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines; and
2. of rejecting medical waiver requests arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the
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policies and procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines, utilizing no standards or secret standards, without providing the applicants any notice of the standards employed or of the reason for rejection. 20. The claims of the individual named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class because questions of law and fact exist that are common to all. They seek a determination by this Court of whether the Defendants' current practices and policies in the Miami District for evaluating requests for medical waiver of the English language and Civics portion of the naturalization exam violate 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1}, 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. §553, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs know of no conflict between their interests and those of the class they seek to represent. In defending their own rights, the individual plaintiffs will defend the rights of all proposed class members. 21. The plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because they have been adversely affected by the practices of the defendants which have similarly impacted all members of the class, i.e., defendants' practice of rejecting medical waiver requests in violation of the policies and procedures set forth in
8 u.s.c. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the
implementing guidelines and of rejecting medical waiver requests arbitrarily and capriciously, utilizing no standards· or secret
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standards, without providing the applicants any notice of the standards employed or the reason for rejection.
22. Plaintiffs' attorneys from the Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Inc. and Florida Legal Services, Inc., are experienced attorneys who have the resources to represent the class as a whole. In addition, plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class they seek to represent.
23. Defendants have acted or failed to act on grounds generally applicable to each member of the class, in that they have rejected medical waiver requests in violation of the policies and procedures set forth in B C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines and rejected medical waiver requests arbitrarily and capriciously, utilizing no standards or secret standards, without providing the applicants any notice of the standards employed or the reason for rejection, thus making appropriate the grant of injunctive relief to compel defendants to:
(a) evaluate all pending and future requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 3l2.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(b) reevaluate all requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization
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examinations which have been denied at any time since March 19, 1997, pursuant to the requirements of 8 U. S . C. § 1423 (b) (1 ) , 8 C. F . R . § § 312 . 1 and 312 . 2 , the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(c) develop standards for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which are consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.P.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines;
(d) publish in the Federal Register and make available to the public the standards utilized by the defendants, including such uniform standards as are hereafter developed, for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations;
(e) provide notice of the reasons for the rejection of the medical waiver sufficient to allow the applicant to understand the bases for the rejection and, if possible, to correct them, to all applicants for naturalization whose requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations have been rejected.
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24. The conduct of defendants described above has further made appropriate corresponding declaratory relief regarding the class as a whole. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME OF THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
25. Congress has created a comprehensive statutory scheme which guarantees that eligible applicants will be naturalized in a prompt and dignified fashion while guaranteeing the integrity of the naturalization process. As part of that process Congress has required that an applicant for naturalization must demonstrate 11 an understanding of the English language, including an ability to read, write and speak words in ordinary usage ... 11 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1), and a 11 knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States 11 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (2). In order to lessen the impact of those requirements on otherwise qualified, deserving immigrants, and to avoid discrimination against such persons on the basis of their disabilities, Congress also provided that the 11 English language 11 and 11 history and civics 11 requirements 11 shall not apply to any person who is unable because of physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to comply therewith ... 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1). This exemption from the 11 English language 11 and 11 history and civics 11 requirements is termed the 11 medical waiver exemption 11 •
26. In response to the statutory mandate, defendants have established a comprehensive scheme of "medical waiver exemption 11 regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 312 et seq., and interpretive policies.
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The fundamental policy of these regulations and policies is that the medical determination as to the applicants' inability to comply with the "English language" and "history and civics" requirements be "attested to" by a qualified medical professional and that the role of the defendants' officers is to simply to ensure the veracity of that attestation.
27. The medical professional's determination is communicated to defendants by means of an N-648 form, which serves as both an application for a medical waiver exemption and an attestation by the medical professional to INS as to "the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition."
28. Fundamental to the role of the defendants' officers reviewing the veracity of the medical waiver requests is that they "are not medical professionals, advocates, or social workers and should not place themselves in the position of attempting to second guess the medical evaluation of the qualified medical professional certifying a disability exception on the N-648. Nor should the officers place themselves in the position of being a medical professional and thereby denying the existence of a disability." Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97, p. 7.
29. The regulations provide that, should the defendants' officer doubt the veracity of the N-648 attestation he/she should, except in the case of outright fraud, "refer the applicant to another authorized medical source for a supplemental disability examination." 8 C.F.R. §312.2 (b) (2). The instructions also recognize the significant burden this puts upon
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a poor disabled applicant. Thus, prior to any referral, the defendants' officer is required to undertake to resolve his/her concerns in favor of the applicant without the necessity of a supplemental disability evaluation. Specifically, the officer "should attempt to reach the medical professional who completed the N-648 to answer any questions" the officer may have. If that consultation is unsuccessful, the officer is to consider whether "a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical file would satisfy the concerns." Additionally, "[i]f the applicant has been declared disabled by another state or federal government agency, the [officer] should attempt to make contact with this agency" to clarify any questions which the officer may have. Only if these strategies fail is the officer to then seek authorization from his supervisor to require an additional attestation. Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97.
Officers are instructed to use extreme restraint in exercising these options and should only do so when doubts remain after the steps outlined ... have been completed ... Officers should always remember that they are responsible for determining the eligibility for naturalization not for making or rendering a medical determination. Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97.
THE CHALLENGED PRACTICES 30. The defendants, with respect to applicants for naturalization in the Miami District, maintain a practice and procedure for evaluating requests for N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver, that violate every tenet of the aforementioned comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme. Specifically,
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defendants, with respect to applicants for naturalization in the Miami District, as a matter of practice and policy:
a. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver by "second guessing" the medical determination of the medical professional and substituting their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional, without having the applicant evaluated by an INS medical doctor or clinical psychologist;
b. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver despite a completed attestation by a medical professional as to "the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition as it relates to the disability exceptions";
c. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver based on questions which they have regarding the N-648:
(i) without attempting to reach the medical professional who completed the N-648 to answer any questions the DAO may have regarding the certification;
(ii) for applicants who have been declared disabled by another state or federal government agency, without attempting to make contact with the agency to see if any information can be gained

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to clarify the questions which the officer has about the medical professional's certification;
(iii) without ever requesting from the medical professional who made the original disability certification a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files;
(iv) without ever requesting at any time a second N-648 from an "authorized medical professional other than the medical professional that completed the first certification;"
(v) without ever having the applicant evaluated at any time by an INS medical doctor or clinical psychologist. d. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver utilizing wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which vary from officer to officer, from supervisor to supervisor, and from determination to determination; e. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver based on secret standards which have never been published in the Federal Register and which they refuse to provide to the public; f. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver without ever providing the rejected applicants with a meaningful notice of the
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basis for the rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS a. Facts as to Amparo Campos 31. Amparo Campos is 82 years old and disabled. 32. She and her husband tried to flee Cuba for almost twenty years before they obtained visas in 1991. Since they were not communist and had not participated in the revolution they lived under constant surveillance and fear in Cuba. 33. During those dark years in Cuba awaiting the opportunity to immigrate to the United States, Amparo Campos and her husband were sustained by the dream of becoming citizens of the United States. They sought to apply at the first opportunity, and as soon as they had completed the required five years of legal residency, they proudly applied for United States citizenship in 1996. 34. By that time Amparo Campos was eighty years old and suffered from disabilities which prevented her from learning English and taking the Civics examination. 35. She was also unable to work, without resources and therefore dependent on monthly Supplemental Security Income (~SSI") benefits to survive. She knew that in 1996 Congress changed the law to prevent her from continuing to receive these benefits unless she became a United States citizen. She therefore felt that her application was extremely urgent.
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36. Ms. Campos applied for a medical waiver to excuse her from the English and Civics requirements of the naturalization examination. She based her request on the fact that she suffers from dementia as well as acute hypertension, cardiac arrhythmia and peripheral vascular insufficiency which restrict the flow of blood to her brain, and anxiety disorder and depression. These disabilities prevent her from learning English and Civics.
37. First, Ms. Campos had a form completed by an INSapproved civil surgeon which attested to her diagnoses and the fact that they impaired her ability to learn. However, defendants rejected this form in the fall of 1997 on the basis that it was "outdated."
38. Ms. Campos promptly went to her regular treating medical doctor, and he properly completed an N-648 form attesting to the fact that Ms. Campos was his patient, her diagnoses and the fact that she has impaired memory as a result of her disabilities. Ms. Campos presented this form to the INS at her December, 1997 interview.
39. The INS officer who examined her refused to accept the form and would not tell her why it was rejected.
40. Ms. Campos was scheduled for her final naturalization exam in January, 1998. At that examination, she presented yet another N-648 form. This one was completed by a psychiatrist. on the form the psychiatrist stated:
This patient has a psychiatric history for the past 16 years without any psychiatric hospitalizations. Currently she presents with diagnosis of 1) major depression, recurrent moderate 296.32, 2) generalized
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anxiety 300.02 and 3) cognitive disorder 294.9. With respect to the patient's diagnosis of cognitive disorder, the patient reports increasing forgetfulness, i.e. forgetting appointments and getting lost on the streets if left alone. The patient tested on the Folstein, scoring an 18 from 30 possible points. This score indicates that the patient has dementia. Poor cognition is symptom of dementia. Dementia cannot be cured and only progressively gets worse. Due to this diagnosis she is unable to retain anything studied for any length of time.
41. Despite her well-documented disabilities and the
certification of three different doctors that she could not pass
the English and Civics examination due to her disabilities, the
defendants denied Ms. Campos' medical waiver request. She was
then denied citizenship because she could not speak English.
42. In denying Ms. Campos' request for a waiver, defendants
made no attempt to reach any of the three medical professionals
who had certified that her disabilities prevented her learning
English and Civics. Nor did they ever request from any of the
medical professionals who made the disability certifications a
production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical
files. Neither did they have Ms. Campos examined by any other
medical professional. Rather, the defendants and their officers
simply 11 Second guessed 11 the medical determination of the three
medical professionals and substituted their own medical
determination for the medical determination of the medical
professionals.
43. Ms. Campos' properly completed N-648 Requests for
Medical Waiver were evaluated using wholly arbitrary and
capricious standards which defendants have never published in the
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Federal Register or provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided Amparo Campos or her family with a meaningful notice of the bases for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
44. Ms. Campos still wants to become a United States citizen. However, on her meager income she cannot afford to reapply or appeal. Nor does she know how to satisfy the INS requirements for establishing the fact that her disabilities prevent her from learning English and Civics.
b. Facts as to Hector Corella 45. Hector Corella is presently 95 years old and disabled. He came to the United States from Cuba in 1989. 46. Mr. Corella has wanted very much to become a United States citizen from the moment he arrived. In 1995, as soon as he had completed his required five years of legal residence, both he and his wife applied to become citizens. 47. Mr. Corella's wife applied for a medical waiver of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination from defendants' Miami District Office because she suffered from Alzheimer's disease. She had memory loss and overall deterioration of her mental abilities. In addition, she was confined to bed and dependent upon a feeding tube in her stomach. 48. Her application for a medical waiver was denied in 1996. She did not receive any notification as to the reasons for the denial. She appealed and provided another medical waiver
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form which was completed by another doctor. However, Mr. Corella's wife passed away in July, 1997 without ever receiving a decision regarding her second medical waiver request and without realizing her dream of becoming a citizen of the United States.
49. Mr. Corella also applied for a medical waiver. His request for a medical waiver was based on his suffering from organic brain syndrome and senile dementia as well as arterial hypertension which reduces the blood supply to his brain. His doctor completed the required form stating that "Mr. Corrella's dementia prevents him from demonstrating knowledge of basic English language skills and U.S. history and civics."
50. Despite these disabilities and the doctor's certification, the defendants denied Mr. Corella's medical waiver request. Prior to denying him, the defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professional who completed the N-648 to answer any questions the defendants or their officers may have had regarding the certification, nor did they ever request from the medical professional who made the original disability certification a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files. Rather, the defendants and their officers simply "second guessed" the medical determination of the medical professional and substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional without ever conducting their own medical or psychological examination of Mr. Corella.

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51. Mr. Corella's properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver was evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register or provided to him, his family, his representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided him or his family with a meaningful notice of the bases for his rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
52. Mr. Corella desperately wants to be a United States citizen and he reapplied in February or March, 1998. He has again requested a medical waiver from the defendants. He is fearful that he may die before he gets a chance to realize his wish to be a U.S. citizen.
c. Facts as to Angela Rodriguez 53. Angela Rodriguez is 78 years old and is disabled. She came to the United States from Cuba in 1992 and at that time she became a Legal Permanent Resident. 54. As soon as Ms. Rodriguez completed her five years of legal residency and was able to apply for citizenship, she did so. She submitted her naturalization application to defendants in their Miami District Office in February 1997. She accompanied the application with a request for a medical waiver from the English and Civics portion of the examination and attached a letter from her family doctor describing that she was suffering from organic brain syndrome and arterial hypertension which cause
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memory loss, poor concentration and a decline in her mental
functioning.
55. At her naturalization interview with defendants in
June, 1998, she also presented to defendants' officer an N-648
form completed by her regular treating doctor, Dr. Miguel A.
Mier. Dr. Mier stated on the form that:
The complex combination of ailments above described have resulted in a progressive deterioration of her cognitive functions with a decline in functional level[,] poor memory and poor concentration. Though she is aware of her surroundings and is still able to express herself with limited clarity, she requires constant supervision and is unable to care for herself. Under these conditions, this patient's potential for learning complicated new material such as a new language and/or replying to an interrogatory in a foreign language are practically nil .... Based on the above, it is my professional Medical opinion, that Angela Rodriguez is unable to learn even basic English, let alone U.S. Civics or history, and that it is no fault of her own that she can not comprehend an examination to demonstrate basic knowledge of the English language.
56. The defendants' officer at Ms. Rodriguez' interview
reviewed her papers, including the N-648 form, asked her a few
questions in Spanish and after leaving the office for a few
minutes returned and informed Ms. Rodriguez that her medical
waiver was denied.
57. Prior to denying her medical waiver request, the
defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professional who
completed the N-648 to answer any questions the defendants or
their officers may have had regarding the certification, nor did
they ever request from the medical professional who made the
original disability certification a production of supplemental
records from the applicant's medical files. Rather the
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defendants and their officers simply "second guessed" the medical determination of the medical professional and substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional without ever conducting their own medical or psychological examination of Ms. Rodriguez.
58. Ms. Rodriguez believes that her properly completed N648 Request for Medical Waiver was evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register nor provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided her or her family with a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
59. Ms. Rodriguez received a form letter from defendants dated June 5, 1998 stating that they would not accept her N-648. The form further demonstrated the absurdity of defendants' process. Every deficiency listed on the form letter was checked. Included among the listed deficiencies were: 1) "Identify the applicant on the medical certification," even though Ms. Rodriguez's full name, alien number and social security number were clearly on the certification; 2) "Identify the condition clearly and how it is related to her capacity to learn," even though this information already appeared on the form; and 3) "Establish your qualifications to make this medical certification," even though this information already appeared on the form.
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60. Such notification is absolutely meaningless in providing a basis for the rejection of her medical waiver. Neither Ms. Rodriguez nor her doctor are able to determine from this form the actual deficiencies of her medical waiver request or what was needed to correct it. Nevertheless, her doctor, Dr Mier, prepared yet another N-648 form which Ms. Rodriguez submitted in July, 1998.
61. Ostensibly in response to this form, Ms. Rodriguez received a letter from INS dated August 25, 1998, again denying her medical waiver without explanation. Prior to this second denial, defendants made no attempt to contact the medical professional who submitted the attestation, request additional documents or conduct any further inquiry. Again defendants and their officers simply "second guessed" the medical determination of the medical professional, evaluating it based on wholly arbitrary and capricious secret standards. At no time did Ms. Rodriguez receive any notification as to the basis for the denial or the standards used.
62. Ms. Rodriguez is currently scheduled for a final interview and examination on September 25, 1998. She cannot pass the English and civics examination due to her disabilities.
d. Facts as to Josefina Lopez 63. Plaintiff Josefina Lopez is 84 years old and is disabled. She came to the United States in 1988 when she was 74 years old. Her husband died in Cuba in 1972 where he had been held as a political prisoner for eight years.
24

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG ?ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docr et 09/28/1998 Page 25 of 44
64. Ms. Lopez applied for United States citizenship in March, 1997 at the age of 83. At her INS interview on August 25, 1998 her INS Accredited Representative gave the defendants' officer a properly completed N-648. The form states that Ms. Lopez suffers from a number of complicated cardiac and circulatory insufficiency abnormalities which affect normal blood flow to all parts of the body, including major organs and the brain, and that as a result of the conditions and the medication prescribed for them, Ms. Lopez is prone to lethargy and syncopal episodes with marked diminution of cognitive functions: reasoning ability, judgment and memory. The form also explains that Ms. Lopez' prescribed medication can also produce severe physiological and psychological side effects, including but not limited to: confusion, restlessness, agitation, tiredness and unusual weakness, loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, changes in heart rhythms and changes in vision.
65. This N-648 form was prepared by Ms. Lopez' regular treating doctor, who is board-certified in internal medicine. Her doctor further certified on the form that, in his professional medical opinion Ms. Lopez is not capable of learning and retaining new material at this stage of her ailment and therefore is unable to learn written or spoken English.
66. At Ms. Lopez' interview, defendants' officer took her N-648 form away with him and returned after about ten minutes. He then told Ms. Lopez and her representative that her N-648 had been rejected. Defendants' officer further indicated that if Ms.
25

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG ~ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 26 of 44 (
I
Lopez wanted to obtain a waiver she would have to return with a different N-648 that provided an "accurate assessment" of her disability.
67. Prior to denying her medical waiver request, the defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professional who completed the N-648 to answer any questions the defendants or their officers may have had regarding the certification, nor did they ever request from the medical professional who made the original disability certification a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files. Rather the defendants and their officers simply "second guessed" the medical determination of the medical professional and substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional without ever conducting their own medical or psychological examination of Ms. Lopez.
68. Ms. Lopez' properly completed N-648 Request for Medical Waiver was evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register nor provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided her or her family with a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies, and indeed, Ms. Lopez and her representative are so confused by defendants' request for an N-648 that provides an "accurate assessment" of the disability, that they are unable to comply with the requirement.
26

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG ~ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 27 of 44
I
•,
69. Defendants have now sent Ms. Lopez a notice stating that her "application for naturalization and request for medical exception has been reviewed and the medical exception has not been accepted. You will be required to satisfy the English and Civics requirements of the INA." Her final interview is presently scheduled for September 28. She cannot pass the English and civics examination due to her disabilities and does not know how to provide any more information that will satisfy defendants' arbitrary and idiosyncratic waiver requirements.
e. Facts as to Juana Quintero 70. Plaintiff Juana Quintero is 62 years old and is disabled. She carne to the United States from Cuba in 1990 to be with her son who is a United States citizen. Ms. Quintero suffers from chronic hypertension which restricts her brain's blood supply, recurrent major depression and progressive dementia. She also has severe arthritis and must walk with a cane or walker. 71. Because of her disabilities, Ms. Quintero is unable to work and is qualified for Supplemental Security Income ( "SSI'') on which she depends to be able to live. Ms. Quintero also used to receive federal food stamps, which were necessary for her to have a proper diet, but these were cut off in the summer of 1997 by a new federal law which barred such assistance to non-citizens. Ms. Quintero has had great difficulty buying enough food since then.
27

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 28 of 44

(

(,

72. Ms. Quintero learned in the summer of 1996 that Congress had passed a new law designed to "encourage" people her to become United States citizens by terminating their SSI and food stamps if they did not naturalize. She applied for citizenship in September, 1996.
73. Because of her disabilities, Ms. Quintero knew that she would not be able to pass the English and civics requirements to become a U.S. citizen. With her 1996 application, she submitted a form requesting a waiver of these requirements filled out by an INS-approved civil surgeon. The form stated that she suffers from brain dysfunction with memory impairment related to major depression and use of medication. The civil surgeon's opinion expressed on the form was that Ms. Quintero has major cognitive and memory problems that render her unable to recall new information.
74. Ms. Quintero's first interview for citizenship was not scheduled until April 27, 1998. Because the INS had created the N-648 forms by that time, she also had one of those forms filled out by her treating doctor and she brought that form to the interview.
75. At her interview, defendants' officer reviewed the N648 form and went to see a supervisor. When the officer returned, she informed Ms. Quintero that her illnesses did not qualify for a waiver.
76. At that time, defendants' officer and supervisor informed Ms. Quintero that her doctor had made a slight error in
28

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG qocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 29 of 44

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I

writing one of the diagnosis codes on the N-648. Instead of the form stating "Major Depression, recurrent (ICD 296.3)" it stated "Major Depression, recurrent (ICD 296.23) ." Defendants' supervisor stated that because of this one error, defendants would not accept the form, the other diagnoses (including dementia) or the civil surgeon's waiver form as evidence of Ms. Quintero's disabilities.
77. Defendants' officer then attempted to speak to Ms. Quintero in English but since she could not understand the language, she could not respond. The officer then gave her a form stating that she did not pass for failure to demonstrate knowledge of the English language.
78. Ms. Quintero's second exam was scheduled for June 29, 1998. At that interview, she submitted another N-648, this time each code was perfectly prepared and correct.
79. Nevertheless, defendants' officer rejected the N-648, this time stating that the illnesses were not "valid" and that the codes do not qualify for exemption from testing. Ms. Quintero was again given a form stating that she was denied U.S. citizenship because at the examinations on April 27, 1998 and June 29, 1998 she failed to demonstrate knowledge of the English language.
80. Defendants informed plaintiff Quintero that she could receive no more interviews on her application, and that her only recourse was to appeal the decision or reapply for citizenship and start the entire process over. She could not afford the fees
29

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG gocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 30 of 44
I
to do either, particularly since she has now lost her food stamps because she is not a U.S. citizen.
81. Prior to denying her medical waiver requests, the defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professionals who completed the N-648s or the INS-approved civil surgeon to answer any questions the defendants or their officers may have had regarding the certifications, nor did they ever request from the medical professionals who made the disability certifications a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files. Rather the defendants and their officers simply 11 Second guessed 11 the medical determination of the medical professionals and substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professionals without ever conducting their own medical or psychological examination of Ms. Quintero.
82. Ms. Quintero's properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver and her civil surgeon waiver form were evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register nor provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided her or her family with a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
f. Facts as to Sofia Pardo 83. Plaintiff Sofia Pardo is 77 years old and is disabled.
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Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 31 of 44

I I

I

84. She immigrated from Colombia with her daughter and she became a permanent legal resident in 1988.
85. Like Ms. Quintero, Ms. Pardo applied for citizenship in 1996 because of changes in federal welfare laws. She was afraid of losing the SSI benefits and food stamps on which she depends to survive.
86. Ms. Pardo studied diligently in an effort to learn English, history and civics, but she was unable to retain any of the information or to learn the English language due to her disabilities.
87. In January, 1998 Ms. Pardo turned in a waiver request completed by an INS-approved civil surgeon who was a neurologist. Defendants refused to accept this waiver request, informing Ms. Pardo that it had "expired."
88. In April, 1998 Ms. Pardo returned to the INS for an interview and brought with her a properly completed N-648 form prepared by a psychiatrist. The form stated that Ms. Pardo suffered from impaired cognition, dementia NOS, and that her mental status exam score was 15. Defendants denied this request for a waiver and examined Ms. Pardo in English. When she could not respond, defendants denied her application for citizenship.
89. Prior to denying her medical waiver requests, the defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professionals who completed the N-648 or the INS-approved civil surgeon form to answer any questions the defendants or their officers may have had regarding the certifications, nor did they ever request from
31

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG ~ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 32 of 44
I
the medical professionals who made the disability certifications a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files. Rather the defendants and their officers simply 11 second guessed 11 the medical determination of the medical professionals and substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professionals without ever conducting their own medical examination of Ms. Pardo.
90. Ms. Pardo's properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver and her civil surgeon waiver form were evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register nor provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided her or her family with a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
g. Facts as to Aura Consuegra 91. Ms. Aura Consuegra is 86 years old. She came to the United States from Colombia to live in 1987 and became a permanent legal resident. She first applied to become a citizen in February, 1995. 92. She applied for a waiver of the English and civics examination based on her disabilities. At her initial naturalization interview, she submitted an attestation as to her disability from an INS-approved civil surgeon, Maria E. Milanes, M.D., who stated on the form that she had cerebral dementia, organic brain syndrome, atherosclerosis and memory loss. The
32

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG 9 ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docret 09/28/1998 Page 33 of 44
interviewer told her that since she did not speak English, she could not be examined and denied both her request for medical waiver and her naturalization application.
93. She applied again in March, 1997 and again paid the $95.00 and again requested a medical waiver. In support, she submitted two attestations. Her doctor, Raul Carballosa, who is a board-certified neurologist, certified that she had fixed multiple brain lesions, a brain tumor and severe memory difficulty, and attached several medical reports, including a radiologist report and a hospital discharge summary.
94. In May, 1998 she had a naturalization interview with the defendants and their officers at the Miami District Office. Her N-648 was again rejected and she was again denied citizenship because she could not speak English.
95. Ms. Consuegra's medical waiver was denied by defendants despite her submission of two completed attestations by medical professionals as to 11 the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition as it relates to the disability exceptions 11 • Moreover, prior to denying her, the defendants made no attempt to reach the medical professionals who completed the N-648 to answer any questions the defendants or their officers may have had regarding the certification, nor did they ever request from the medical professionals who made the disability certifications a production of supplemental records from the applicant's medical files. Rather the defendants and their officers simply 11 second guessed 11 the medical determination of the medical professional and
33

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG 9ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 34 of 44 (
substituted their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional without conducting a medical or psychological examination of their own.
96. Ms. Consuegra believes that her properly completed N648 Requests for Medical Waiver were evaluated using wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which defendants have never published in the Federal Register nor provided to her, her family, her representatives or members of the public. Never have the defendants provided her or her family with a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies.
97. Ms. Consuegra has since filed an appeal. However, she has been informed that she cannot expect any consideration of her appeal for at least six months. Furthermore, plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that a more accurate estimate of defendants' processing time for appeals such as Ms. Consuegra's is eighteen to twenty-four months.
IRREPARABLE INJURY 98. As a result of the aforementioned policies and practices of the defendants, plaintiffs and class members have suffered, are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm. Plaintiffs have been deprived of their goal of citizenship. As a result, they have suffered grievously, including the denial of the right to vote and otherwise participate in our democracy; the loss, or threatened loss, of life sustaining federal benefits; the fear and despair engendered
34

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG qocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 35 of 44

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by loss of life-sustaining benefits; inability to file visa petitions for immediate relatives as United States citizens; and the loss of the substantial and unique benefits of naturalization.
NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW 99. As to each named plaintiff described above, and each member of the plaintiff class, no administrative remedies remain to be exhausted that would not be futile or would provide the relief sought in this complaint and plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 100. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, plaintiffs were required to retain counsel and to incurr costs, fees and expenses in prosecuting this case. Plaintiffs intend to seek fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1, 312.2)
101. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive.
102. Defendants have violated and continue to violate the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. § 312.1 and 312.2 and the interpretive guidelines.
103. As a result of Defendants' violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. § 312.1 and 312.2, the plaintiffs and class

35

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG ~ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 36 of 44
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members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Administrative Procedures Act,
5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) 104. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive. 105. Defendants are in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., in that they have unlawfully withheld agency action to which the plaintiff class is entitled and have not acted in accordance with law by maintaining the policies and practices as set forth herein which are in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the defendants' interpretive policies, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 and the rule making provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, et seq. 106. As a result of Defendants' violation of 5 U.S.C.§ 701, et seq., the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553)
107. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive.
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Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Qocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 37 of 44

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(

108. Defendants are in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 in that they have unlawfully utilized secret standards and bases for determination which are substantive rules which have not been adopted in conformity with the notice, publication and comment provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553, et seq.
109. As a result of Defendants' violation of 5 U.S.C. § 553, the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF {Violation of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552)
110. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive.
111. Defendants are in violation of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 in that:
a. they have unlawfully utilized secret standards and bases for determination which are substantive rules and statements of general policy and interpretations of general applicability which have not been published in the Federal Register; and
b. they have unlawfully utilized secret standards and bases for determination which are statements of general policy and interpretations of general applicability and instructions to staff which they have refused to make available for public inspection.
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.Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG 9ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 38 of 44
112. As a result of Defendants' violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552, the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the literacy and civics and history portions of the naturalization examination.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Administrative Procedures Act,
5 U.S.C. § 555{e)) 113. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive. 114. Defendants are in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555{e) in that they have maintained a policy and practice of denying requests for medical waivers without providing any statement of the grounds for denial. 115. As a result of Defendants' violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555{e), the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF {Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution - Procedural Due Process) 116. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive. 117. Defendants are in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that they are depriving plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class of their right to a
38

C~se 1:98-cv-02231-ASG 9ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 39 of 44 I
medical waiver upon the presentation of a properly completed Request for Medical Waiver without due process of law in that they have maintained a policy and practice of denying requests for medical waivers without providing the applicant of any notice of the deficiencies, notice of the standards used or notice of the basis for denial.
118. As a result of Defendants' violation of the procedural due process rights of the plaintiff class, the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution - Substantive Due Process) 119. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 100 inclusive. 120. Defendants are in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that they are depriving plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class of their right to a medical waiver upon the presentation of a properly completed Request for Medical Waiver without substantive due process of law in that they have maintained a conscious policy and practice of denying requests for medical waivers so arbitrarily and capriciously, lacking any standards for determination other than the whims and prejudices of the individual decision makers so as
39

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG qocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 40 of 44

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I

to violate the substantive due process rights of the plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class.
121. As a result of Defendants' violation of the substantive due process rights of the plaintiff class, the plaintiffs and class members have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portions of the naturalization examination.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 1. Accept jurisdiction and maintain continuing jurisdiction of this action. 2. Certify this action as a class action. 3. Declare as unlawful the aforementioned practices and procedures of the defendants and their agents as violative of 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 and 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4. Declare as agency action unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), the violation by defendants and their agents of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 and 555(e} and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) compelling Defendants and their agents, to:

40

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG
•

~ocument 1

Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998
{

Page 41 of 44

(a) evaluate all pending and future requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(b) reevaluate all requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which have been denied at any time since March 19, 1997, pursuant to the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(c) develop standards for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which are consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (b) (1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines;
(d) publish in the Federal Register and make available to the public the standards utilized by the defendants, including such uniform standards as are hereafter developed, for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations;
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C~se 1:98-cv-02231-ASG qocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 42 of 44
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(e) provide notice of the reasons for the rejection of the medical waiver sufficient to allow the applicant to understand the bases for the rejection and, if possible, to correct them, to all applicants for naturalization whose requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations have been rejected. 6. Grant attorneys' fees and costs of this suit under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 7. Grant such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
JoNel Newman, Esq. Randall C. Berg, Jr., Esq. Peter M. Siegel, Esq. Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 2870 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2309 (305) 358-2081 (305) 358-0910 - Fax
Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Esq. Florida Legal Services, Inc. 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 450 Miami, Florida 33137 (305) 573-0092 (305) 576-9664 - FAX
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C~se 1:98-cv-02231-ASG 9ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/28/1998 Page 43 of 44
Cheryl Little, Esq. Joan Friedland, Esq. Lisette Losada, Esq. Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33137 (305) 576-6273 (305) 576-6273 - FAX Attorneys for Plaintiffs
0112320
43

Js 44 ~.®181~98-cv-02231-ASG DocumentNILEGOv!R CSHEIJ!.CtD Docket 09'D I P;~1)4l

The JS44 civil cover sheet and the Information ( lined herein neither replace nor supplement tht!f g and

te!ftlln

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ruL reQuired by law, except as provided by local

.Jf court. This form, approved by the Judicial con\_ .nee of

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states

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required for the use Of the Clerk Of Court for the purpose Of Initiating the CIVIl docket sheet. ISEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.I

I. (3) PLAINTIFFS AMPARO CAMPos, HECTOR CORELLA, ANGELA RODRIGUEZ,

LD DEFENDANTS
IMMIGRATION

AND

NATURALIZATION~f "vfTl JcE:~-Df~i

JOSEFINA LOPEZ, JUANA QUINTERO, SOFIA PARDO, et al.,

(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF Miami-Dade

<EXCEPT IN U.S. INTIFF

51

MEISSNER, etc., et al.,
JUDGE COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDMMf\GlSTRAT£
JIIDNn# liN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLVI
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATIO tW~l'AACT OF

, , . . . LAND INVOLVED

ATIORNEYS IIF KNOWN!
IDI .9BQ£ COUNTY WHERE ACTION AROSE:
~MONROE, BROWARD, PALM BEACH, MARTIN, ST. LUCIE, INDIAN RIVER, OKEECHOBEE, HIGHLANDS

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II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION
o 1 u.s. Government Plaintiff
J( 2 u.s. Government
Defendant

IPLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLVI
o 3 Federal Question <U.S. Government Not a Partvl
o 4 Diversity <Indicate CitizenshiP of Parties In Item 1111

Ill. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES

.

<PLACE

IN ONE BOX

<For Diversity cases Only)

FOR

PLAINnf,.:F·AND

ON£iOX ~

FOR

DEFENDANTI

Citizen of This State

PTF DEF o1 o1

Citizen of Another State o 2 o 2

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lncorpo_rate•d:"- o- ~clIp#~ac~' o 4 o 4

Of BUSiness 11 Iffis Sta~ ~

tncorporatedand Principal Pia o 5 o 5

of Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a o 3 o 3 Foreign Nation

•· o 6 o 6

Foreign countrv

IV. CAUSE OF ACTION ICITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE!
DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY! WhethW clefenclantl' policy and practice In detwmlnlng medical waiYW requests In+
naturalization proceedings YIOiatel plaintiffs' riDIIts under 8 usc 51425, 5 usc 5701 et seq., 5 usc 55552, 551 and 555(el and the FlftbfAmendment to tiMI united states constitution tva. ...1Q.... days estimated <for both sides! to trv entire case.

V. NATURE OF SUIT IPLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLY!

CONTRACT o 110 Insurance o 120 Marine D 130 Miller ACt o 140 Negotiable lnstru·
ment o 150 Recovery of over·
payment & Enforcement of Judgment o 151 Medicare Act o 152 Recovery of Defaulted student Loans lEXCI. Vetsl o 153 Recovery of over· payment of vet· eran's Benefits o 160 stocktlolders· suits o 190 other contract o 195 contract Product Liability RIAL PROPDTY o 210 Land condemnation o 220 Foreclosure o 230 Rent Lease & EJect. o 240 Torts to Land o 245 Tort Product llab. o 290 All Other Real Prop.

PIHONAL INJURY o 310 Airplane o 315 Airplane Product
Liability c 320 ASsault, Libel & Sian·
der o 330 Federal Employers·
Liability c 340 Marine c 345 Marine Product Lla-
blllty c 350 Motor vehicle c 355 Motor vehicle Prod·
uct Liability o 360 Other Personal 1n-
Jury
CIVIL RIGHTS c 441 voting c 442 Employment o 443 HOuslng/Accom·
modatlons o 444Welfare c 440 Other CIVIl Rights

PIIISONAL INJURY o 362 Personal InJury •
Medical Malpractice o 365 Personal InJury .
Product Liability o 368 ASbestos Personal
InJury Product Llablllty
PaiOIJIIAL PIIOPRTY o 370 Other Fraud o 371 Truth In Lending o 380 Other Personal Pro-
perty Damage o 385 Property Damage
Product Liability
PRIIONIR JtniTIONI o 510 Motions to vacate
sentence Habeas corpus: o 530 General o 535 Death Penalty o 540 M:!ndamus & Other o 550 CIVIl Rights

FORI'IITURI/PIIIALTY o 610 Agriculture o 620 Other Food & Drug o 625 Drug Related 5el·
zure of Property 21 usc 881 o 630 LIQuor Laws o 640 R.R. & Truck o 650 Airline Regs o 660 occupational safetymealth o 690 Other
!:!!!!!
o 710 Fair Labor standards Act
o 120 LaborJMgmt. Relatlons
o 730 LaborJMgmt. Reporting & DISclosure Act
o 740 Railway Labor Act o 790 Other Labor lltlga-
tlon o 791 Empl. Ret. 1nc. secu·
rlty Act

BANKRUPTCY o 422 Appeal
28 usc 158 o 423 Withdrawal
28 usc 157 PIIOPBTY RIGHTS o 820 copyrights o 830 Patent o 840 Trademark IOCIAL SICURrrY o B61 HIA l1395fl o 862 Black Lung l923l D 863 DrNCIDIWN l405)(g)
o 864 SSID Tltle XVl o 865 RSI 14051gl
I'IDRAL TAX SUITS o 870 Taxes ru.s. Plaintiff
or oefendano o 871 IRS • Third Party
26 usc 7609 OnB ITATVTU o 400 state Reapportion·
ment o 410 Antitrust

o 430 BaniCS ana Banking o 450 commerclaVICC
Rates/etc. o 460 Deportation o 470 Racketeer lnflu·
enced and corrupt organizations o 810 selectiVe service o 850 securities/Commadltles!Exchange o B75 customer Challenge 12 usc 3410 o 891 Agricultural Acts o 892 Economic stablllza. tlon Act o B93 Environ. Matters o 894 Energy AIIOC. Act o 895 Freedom of Info. o 900 Appeal of Fee De· termination Under EQual Access to Justlce o 950 constitutionality of state statutes )( B90 Other statutory Actions

VI. ORICIN

~ 1 Original

o 2 Removed from

Proceeding

State court

o 3 Remanded from Appellate court

<PLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLVI

Transferred from

o 4 Reinstated or o 5 another district o 6 Multldlstrlct

Reopened

<specify)

Litigation

Appeal to District Judge from o 7 Magistrate Judgment

VII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT:

}(.UNDER F.R.C.P. 23

DEMAND $

Check YES onlY If demanded in complaint

Declaration & Injunctive Relief JURY DEMANDED: o YES ~ NO

VIII. RELATED CASES($) <see Instructions!: IF ANY

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE september 22, 1998

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECO JoNel Newman, E SQ.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SIF 1·2 REV. 6190

 
 Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

AMPARO CAMPOS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

IMMIGRATION AND

)

NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 98-2231 CIV-GOLD Magistrate Judge Turnoff
ORDER APPROVING STW-YLA'fm).--
SETTLEMENT~~~~~~~~

u.a. CAitLOa JI.IFNK!

CL.IItK

OlaT. CT,

I.D. 0, ''""· • MIAMI

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties' filing of their Joint Motion for

Approval of Stipulated Settlement Agreement and proposed Order Approving Stipulated

Settlement Agreement. The Court previously certified this matter as a class action on

February 25, 1999. Pursuant to the Court's Mediation Order in this case, the parties

commenced mediation on March 8, 1999. On June 15, 1999, the parties notified the Court

that, subject to Court approval, they had reached an amicable resolution of the controversy

and presented for Court approval the Stipulated Settlement Agreement presently before the

Court. On June 22, 1999, the Court ordered notice of the proposed settlement to the class,

requiring that any objections to the proposed settlement be filed with the Court by July 30,

1999. The Court further scheduled a Settlement Fairness Hearing to be held on August 6,

1999.

Having carefully examined the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, the record in this

action, the opinion of class counsel, and any comments or objections concerning the proposed

Stipulated Settlement Agreement received, and following the Settlement Fairness Hearing, the

Court fmds as follows:

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 2 of 9
1. The Underlying Litigation The plaintiffs AMPARO CAMPOS, HECTOR CORELLA, ANGELA RODRIGUEZ,
JOSEFINA LOPEZ, JUANA QUINTERO, SOFIA PARDO and AURA CONSUEGRA filed the Class Action Complaint in this matter on September 22, 1998. The complaint alleged that the actions of the defendants in processing medical waiver requests violated plaintiffs' rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations, specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(l), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. §553, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief.
On December 9, 1998 this Court denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. On February 24, 1999, this Court certified a plaintiff class consisting of:
All persons within the Miami District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who have properly applied, or will apply in the future, for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1445 who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a request for a waiver of either or both of the naturalization requirements that they demonstrate an understanding of the English language and that they demonstrate a knowledge and tmderstanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment and whose request for waiver is now pending, will be filed in the future, or has been rejected by the INS, and excluding from the class anyone who has been naturalized. On December 31, 1998 Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint denying the allegations and raising numerous affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs and defendants have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment which were pending at the time the parties informed
2

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 3 of 9
the Court of their Stipulated Settlement Agreement. 2. The Provisions of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement
The Stipulated Settlement Agreement provides for the following: A. Policy Clarification. The Stipulated Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement") recognizes and attaches a Policy Memorandum of defendants, dated April 7, 1999, entitled Section 312 Disability Naturalization Adjudications Policy Memorandum No. 47. The provisions of that Policy Memorandum addressed many of the issues raised in this action. Specifically, the Policy Memorandum clarifies that "an individual with a disease or disability that is related to, associated with, or caused by old age (e.g. Alzheimer's, Parkinson's disease, senile dementia, etc.) can qualify for a disability exception" (Policy Memo., p.6) and further that "depression" should be treated like any other disease or disability and evaluated based on the standard under section 312. In addition, the Policy Memorandum introduced new procedures providing for increased notification to persons whose medical waiver requests were denied as to the bases for their denial. B. Notification and Readjudication. Within certain time periods set out in the ("the Agreement"), defendants have also agreed to reprocess, under the terms of the new Policy Memorandum No. 47, the medical waiver requests of class members whose requests had been considered and rejected by the defendants prior to December 30, 1998.1 The Agreement provides that the reprocessed medical waiver requests will be granted if they are determined sufficient under the new policy memorandum's standards. Moreover, if they are not granted
This summary is for discussion purposes only and recognizes that the Stipulated Settlement Agreement contains conditions and limitations not set forth here.
3

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 4 of 9
the naturalization applicant will be notified by certified mail and will be given an additional two opportunities to submit medical waivers conforming to the new standard. In addition to the certified mail notification, the defendants have agreed to establish a dedicated phone line for 120 days after the final mailing for the purpose of providing a change of address and ascertaining whether the caller is entitled to review under the Agreement.
C. Outreach and Training. The defendants further agree to provide notice of the settlement by publication and also through outreach to community based organizations with which defendants regularly communicate. Defendants will provide copies of the Agreement and training on its implementation to District Adjudications Officers and supervisory personnel with responsibilities for implementing the Agreement.
D. Monitoring and Dispute Resolution. The Agreement provides for regular reporting by defendants to plaintiffs' counsel and a comprehensive system of dispute resolution. 3. The Fairness of the Settlement Agreement
Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 provides no guidance for courts considering proposed settlements, Bennet v. Behring, 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit has established guidelines governing the approval of class actions. The Stipulated Settlement Agreement should be approved if "[the settlement is] fair, adequate, reasonable and not the product of collusion." Leverso v. Southtrust Bank of Alabama, N.A., 18 F.3d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir. 1994).
The Eleventh Circuit has identified a number of factors that the trial court should consider in approving the settlement:
1. The probability of Plaintiffs' success on the merits:
4

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 5 of 9
2. The range of possible recovery; 3. The point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is
fair, adequate and reasonable; 4. The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; 5. The substance and amount of opposition to the settlement; and 6. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. Bennet, supra; Leverso, supra. Most important among these factors are the range of possible recovery, the likelihood of success on the merits and whether the settlement is " reasonable in light of these determinations." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 217 (5th Cir. 1981). See also. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 828 (1982). The likelihood of success at trial, the range of possible recovery, and the point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. On October 16, 1998, in granting plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court previously found that plaintiffs had demonstrated a "substantial likelihood of success" on the merits of at least some of their claims. Moreover, in support of their Motion for Class Certification plaintiffs introduced substantial deposition testimony which suggests that at least some of defendants' personnel in the Miami District Office were rejecting medical waivers on the ground that the alleged disability was depression or a condition related to advanced age. Indeed the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, signed by both parties, recognizes at p.3 § B that "the INS Miami District Office rejected some requests for medical waivers...on the ground that the alleged disability was depression or a condition related to
5

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 6 of 9
advanced age." On the other hand, this Court also recognizes that while plaintiffs may have initially
identified some challengeable practices, defendants subsequently clarified and changed their procedures in the April 7, 1999 memorandum, which defendants have represented to this Court was part of an ongoing nationwide review of the medical waiver process. This memorandum obviated many of the concerns of the plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants had, prior to April 7, 1999, represented to this Court that defendants were in the process of developing a reprocessing procedure, and claimed that the action had become moot, depriving this Court of jurisdiction.
Considering the Court's previously expressed opinion regarding the likelihood of plaintiffs success on the merits and defendants' expressed intentions to reprocess applications for medical waivers, the Court considers it reasonable that the parties would reach an agreed settlement at this point. Moreover the Agreement represents a resolution well within the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair. adequate and reasonable. Plaintiffs have asserted no claim for monetary damages. Their claims were based solely on requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' complaint essentially requested this Court to order defendants to cease using what plaintiffs claimed were "secret" standards, to publish the standards being used, to reprocess the claims of applicants denied under the then existing procedures and to provide increased notice to those applicants denied as to the reasons for their denial. All of those results have been substantially accomplished in this Agreement, either directly or through the attached Policy Memorandum No. 47.
The relief provided by the Stipulated Settlement Agreement is comprehensive and
6

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 7 of 9
specific, largely incorporating the relief originally requested by the plaintiffs in detail, as well as specific requirements for defendants' naturalization processing procedures as to the affected class. The Court may rely on the opinions of class counsel about the agreement's fairness and adequacy. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977). Here, class counsel is of the opinion that the relief provided by the Stipulated Settlement Agreement is fair and adequate. As plaintiffs' counsel notes, the relief provided is more specific and more readily achievable than the type of relief this Court could order after trial, since defendants' personnel who will be responsible for implementing the relief have had input into the practicalities of crafting the remedy.
In light of the scope of the remedy provided to the plaintiff class, as well as the plaintiffs' likelihood of success, the Court finds that the proposed agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
The complexity, expense and duration of the litigation. There is no doubt that this case presents complex legal and factual issues requiring significant time to resolve. The affidavit of class counsel attests to the extraordinarily high costs involved in the litigation. Continuing to litigate this case to judgment on the merits would involve significant expenditures of both time and money by all parties to this litigation. These factors weigh particularly heavily in favor of settlement in this case since defendants have already prospectively modified their policy to accommodate plaintiffs' concerns.
The substance and amount of opposition to the settlement. There has been no significant opposition to the settlement. As set forth above, in approving a settlement agreement the Court may rely on the opinions of class counsel, although such opinions must
7

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 8 of 9
be weighed against any objections which may be received from class members, Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1983). Where, as here, there have been no substantive objections and plaintiffs' counsel strongly endorse the agreement, this Court should give class counsel's opinion considerable weight.
The state of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. In this case, as can be readily ascertained from review of the record and as attested in the affidavit of class counsel, the parties completed an enormous amount of discovery. Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted numerous depositions of key witnesses and received and reviewed extensive documents through the discovery process. Indeed, prior to informing the Court that they had reached an agreement in this case, both sides had sought summary judgment. Thus, in negotiating the Agreement which is now before the Court, each party was well-informed as to the relevant facts. See Behrens v. Wometco Enterprises. Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 544 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (Settlement reached after several months of discovery and motions for summary judgment had been filed indicates that the parties "were in an excellent position to evaluate their chances of success [and] were in the best position to judge the merits of the compromise."). Nor was there fraud or collusion behind the settlement of this lawsuit, as evidenced by both the extensive discovery and motion practice that preceded the Agreement, as well as the extraordinarily lengthy and detailed bargaining sessions held by the parties with the active participation of the Court's mediator prior to reaching agreement. See Affidavit of Class Counsel.
In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the class interest is adequately protected, the proposed Agreement is fair and reasonable, and that the Agreement should be approved.
8

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 9 of 9

It is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Stipulated Settlement Agreement is
APPROVED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this .fe_ day of ~~----=--+-..,...,-::.-L-~--
1999.

cc: JoNel Newman, Esq. Joan Friedland, Esq. Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Esq. Dexter A. Lee, Esq. Linda S. Wemery, Esq.

HON. ALAN u~.u.--·..., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD

9

 
 Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/22/1999 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

AMPARO CAMPOS, et al., Plaintiffs,
VS.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 98-2231 CIV-GOLD

)

Magistrate Judge Turnoff

)

)

)

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

)

AGREEMENT IN CLASS

)

ACTION CASE

6~ 0

)

0

:7:~

)

)

This notice may affect your rights. Please read carefully.

- I, - l-.· ·. .
=-i-
~- ; :tOr·
_-j

TO: All persons currently residing within the Miami District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who applied for naturalization who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a form N-648 request for a medical waiver of either or both of: 1) the English language; and 2) U.S. history and government requirements, and whose request for a waiver has been rejected by the INS and who have not been naturalized.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, you are hereby notified that:

1. This case is pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Court has certified a class of persons who are considered the plaintiffs in the case. The class of plaintiffs consists of: All persons within the Miami District of_ the Immigration and Naturalization Service who have properly applied, or will apply in the future, for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1445 who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a request for a waiver of either or both of the naturalization requirements that they demonstrate an understanding of the English language and that they demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment and whose request for waiver is now pending, will be filed in the future, or has been rejected by the INS, and excluding from the class anyone who has been naturalized.

2. The plaintiffs' Complaint claims that INS's administration of the medical waiver process and denial of plaintiffs' N-648 requests for a medical waiver of the requirement to demonstrate knowledge of basic English and the fundamentals of United States history and government ("Civics") due to a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment violate the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U .S.C.§ 553, the Freedom of

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/22/1999 Page 2 of 3
Information Act, 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(2), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1, 312.2, and implementing guidelines, and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.
3. The Court has not ruled on the merits of plaintiffs' claims or on the denials and other defenses made by the defendants.
4. This notice is given to advise you that a Settlement Agreement has been proposed in this case. If you are a member of the above class, you will be bound by the Settlement Agreement if it is approved by the Court.
5. The proposed Settlement Agreement provides that:
A. The INS will reevaluate the N-648 medical waiver requests of naturalization applicants who submitted N-648 medical waiver requests and had such requests rejected by INS between March 19, 1997 and December 30, 1998, and whose naturalization applications were denied or whose cases were closed based on: (i) failure to demonstrate knowledge of basic English and/or U.S. history and civics; (ii) failure to prosecute the naturalization application after having had at least one N-648 medical waiver request rejected; or (iii) both of the above, provided that the applicants have not filed an action under 8 USC § 142l(c) in District Court or relocated outside the Miami INS District.
B. If the INS determines that the N-648 medical waiver request(s) in the applicant's A-file is/are sufficient, it will reopen the applicant's case if necessary and accept the medical waiver. The applicant will not have to reapply for naturalization and will then proceed to the next step in the naturalization process.
C. If the INS determines that the N-648 medical waiver request(s) in the applicant's A-file is/are not sufficient, or if the applicant's A-file cannot be located, the INS will contact the applicant via certified mail and provide the applicant an opportunity to submit a new N-648 medical waiver request within 120 days. (Persons whose A-files cannot be located may be required to submit additional naturalization documents, such as an N-400 form). If this new N648 request is considered sufficient by the INS, the applicant will then proceed to the next step in the naturalization process. If this new request is not considered sufficient, the applicant will be given another opportunity to submit a second or amended N-648 within 60 days, with a notice telling the applicant what is wrong with the N-648 that was rejected. If the applicant submits another N-648 medical waiver request and the request is accepted, the applicant will then proceed to the next step in the naturalization process. If the request is not sufficient, the applicant will receive a new written decision within 120 days denying the naturalization application, which will include the basis for the rejection of the second or amended N-648.
2

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/22/1999 Page 3 of 3

D. The INS will provide a telephone number that applicants can call to report a change of address and to find out if they are entitled to have their file reviewed under this agreement.

E. The INS may release information regarding an applicant's current address, A-number, and other identifying information to counsel representing class members affected by the Settlement Agreement. Applicants will be provided an opportunity to refuse to approve such release of their identifying information.

6. You may read the pleadings, the proposed Settlement Agreement and other papers filed in this case at the Office of the Clerk, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, 301 N. Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128, between the hours of 9:00a.m. and 4:00p.m. Monday through Friday.

7. If you have questions about this notice you should send the questions in writing to any of the following attorneys, who represent the plaintiffs in this case:

JoNel Newman, Esq. Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 200 S. Biscayne Blvd.
Suite 2870 Miami, FL 33131-2309

Charles Elsesser, Esq. Florida Legal Services, Inc. 3000 Biscayne Blvd.
Suite 450 Miami, FL 33137

Joan Friedland, Esq. Florida Inunigrant Advocacy
Center, Inc. 3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 400 Miami, FL 33137

rx:z__!~ If y~h to object to the Settlement Agreement, you must send your objection by the ~OT/f
p:::> ~Y of~· 1999 to:

Clerk of the Court United States District Court Southern District of Florida 301 N. Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128

You should also send a copy of any objection you send to the Clerk to at least one of the plaintiffs'
counsel listed above. You should put the name of the case (Campos v. INS), and the docket

number (Case No. 98-2231 CIV-GOLD) on all correspondence to plaintiffs' counsel and the Clerk

of the Court. If you do not follow this instruction, your letter may t be placnthe correct

fi~

/~

Dated: this~ day~"'-=----- , 1999.

c1h.J>1

3
1\O_ -de)-lj:/]ty c>: k
----

 
 Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 143 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

AMPARO CAMPOS, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

IMMIGRATION AND

)

NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 98-2231 CIV-GOLD Magistrate Judge Turnoff
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH ~~-' - PREJUDICE

u.s. CARI..OS JUflllll£

CLERK

OIST. CT•

8.0. Of FLA. • MIAMI

THIS MAITER is before the Court on the parties' filing of their Joint Motion for

Dismissal With Prejudice. Having previously approved the Stipulated Settlement Agreement

in this matter, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Joint Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. In

accordance with the Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Joint Motion, it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is dismissed with prejudice, and that this Court

shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for 18 months from the effective date of the

Settlement Agreement over the limited matters specified in Section G of the Stipulated

Settlement Agreement.

This dismissal shall not be claimed to constitute nor be construed as a finding in favor

or against any party nor as a finding of any of the allegations or defenses previously made in

this case. This dismissal terminates this action for all time and all purposes, except that this

Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction for 18 months from the effective date of the

Stipulated Settlement Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A over the limited matters

specified in Section G of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement.

Case 1:98-cv-02231-ASG Document 143 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/1999 Page 2 of 2

1999.
cc: JoNel Newman, Esq. Joan Friedland, Esq. Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Esq. Dexter A. Lee, Esq. Teresa Wallbaum, Esq.

HON. ALAN S. GOLD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

 
 32 F.Supp.2d 1337 (1998)
Amparo CAMPOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
No. 98-2231-CIV.
United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
December 9, 1998.
13348901 *1338 *1339 *1340 *1341 JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Miami, FL, Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Florida Legal Services, Inc., Miami, FL, Cheryl Little, Joan Friedland, Cheryl Little, Rebecca Sharpless, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Miami, FL, for plaintiffs.
Dexter Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, Miami, FL, Frank Hunger, Assistant Attorney General/Civil Division, office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

GOLD, District Judge.
The named plaintiffs are poor, disabled, legal permanent residents who are attempting to become naturalized United States citizens. They claim that all but two of them were denied citizenship because the INS refused their requests for medical waivers and, because of their disabilities, they were unable to pass the English and Civics requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. section 1423. Plaintiffs filed this class action contending that the INS, as a matter of practice and policy, refuses to evaluate requests for medical waivers as required by statute and its own regulations and guidelines; it evaluates all applications for medical waivers in a standardless, totally arbitrary and idiosyncratically capricious manner; and it refuses to inform applicants of the reasons their requests were denied or even the standards used to deny them. According to the plaintiffs, defendants' systematic practice and policy of violating the statute and regulations is unlawful under the INA, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
On October 16, 1998, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from scheduling the final citizenship interviews for two of the plaintiffs, Angela Rodriguez and Josefina Lopez, until the court has ruled on the merits of the class action complaint. This case is now before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The defendants' first argument is that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. But this argument was considered and specifically rejected by this court after the defendants raised it in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order granting preliminary injunction set forth the relevant cases on the jurisdictional issue and explained this court's reasoning.

1342

*1342 The plaintiffs challenge the INS's "current practices and policies in the Miami District for evaluating requests for medical waiver of the English language and Civics portion of the naturalization exam." The complaint alleges that these practices and policies deprive naturalization applicants of their statutory and constitutional rights. No challenge is made with respect to the merits of any individual INS determination. Consequently, the court finds that it has federal question jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory challenges to the

defendants' practices and policies concerning the evaluation of medical waivers. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 896, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (a district court has federal question jurisdiction to hear constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that district courts have jurisdiction to review allegations of systematic abuses by INS officials. In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), the appellate court affirmed a district court's finding that it had jurisdiction to review a complaint which challenged the INS's procedures for processing asylum requests and addressed "matters alleged to be part of a pattern or practice by immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens." Such matters were held to be "independently cognizable in the district court under its federal question jurisdiction." Id. at 1033. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc), where the court explained that to postpone "judicial resolution of a disputed issue that affects an entire class of aliens until an individual petitioner has an opportunity to litigate it" would undermine Congress' intent to eliminate delay and procedural redundancy in immigration matters. Id. at 980.
For the reasons stated in the order granting preliminary injunction, defendants' motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

II. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The defendants' next contention is that even if this court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it should nonetheless dismiss based on the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. But this argument too was fully addressed and rejected in this court's order granting preliminary injunction, in reliance on Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1989).

Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1989) ... involved a challenge to INS policies and practices in connection with applications for temporary residence. There the INS had argued that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by an exhaustion requirement imposed by statute as well as a judicially-created exhaustion requirement. Rejecting the INS's statutory exhaustion argument, the court held that where the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the procedures employed by the INS in processing their applications, rather than seeking substantive review of any individual ruling respecting their status, the exhaustion requirement imposed by section 1105a had no bearing on the district court's jurisdiction. As for the judicially-created exhaustion requirement, the court reasoned that exhaustion is not required if the administrative remedy would not provide relief commensurate with the claim. Id. at 1560. Where the nature of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge of INS procedures is such that relief at the administrative review level is unlikely and the chances are remote that the INS would respond positively to an individual's constitutional challenges to it procedures, the exhaustion doctrine is not a bar to the district court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) and Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1034 (exhaustion of remedies not required because case involved a constitutional challenge to procedures adopted by the INS for the processing of asylum claims).

1343

*1343 In this case, the only administrative remedy available to Lopez and Rodriguez is a request for a hearing (also referred to as an "appeal") of the ultimate denial of citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 336.2. This appeal is heard by another staff officer at the Miami District Office of at least similar grade to the officer who initially denied the claim. Id. That appeal process currently takes one year to eighteen months. Lopez and Rodriguez could only thereafter seek judicial review of the INS officer's decision on appeal. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Furthermore, because the plaintiffs have never received meaningful notice regarding the deficiency of the original claim, the appeals will likely employ the same unknown criteria used in making the initial determination. Based on Eleventh Circuit precedential authority, as stated above, the court finds that the statutory exhaustion requirement is inapplicable in this case.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the order granting preliminary injunction, this case will not be dismissed on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
Dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all the alleged facts as true and find all inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir.1994). The threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss is exceedingly low. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985); Jackam v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir.1986). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir.1994). A pro se complaint is held to standards even less stringent than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
But to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff may not merely "label" his claims. Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423, 425 (M.D.Fla.1996). Courts must liberally construe and accept as true allegations of fact in the complaint and inferences reasonably deductible therefrom, but need not accept factual claims that are internally inconsistent, facts which run counter to facts of which the court can take judicial notice, conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or mere legal conclusions asserted by a party. Ellen S. v. The Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F.Supp. 1489, 1492 (S.D.Fla.1994); Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir.1969). When, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations of a complaint will support the cause of action, dismissal is appropriate. Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.1991); Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir. 1991); Marshall County Bd. Of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993).
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS UNDER THE INA
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), Congress has provided for a medical waiver of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization exam for persons who are ill or severely handicapped. The INS has issued regulations and supplemental policy guidance on the procedural mechanics of the disability waiver exemption. See 8 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(2) (1998); see also INS Supplemental Policy Guidance for Field Offices. In this case, the complaint alleges that the defendants have failed to comply with the express Congressional mandate of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1), or its implementing regulations or interpretations and have acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying medical waivers.
1344 *1344 The defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because neither 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1) nor its implementing regulations give rise to a cause of action for violation of these provisions. Defendants further argue that nothing in the statute or implementing regulations requires the INS to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, the activities that form the gravamen of the complaint. After a review of the relevant case law, however, the Court finds that the defendants' argument is not persuasive.
In 1976, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) to eliminate the specific amount in controversy requirement for bringing a lawsuit against the United States, its agencies, officers, or employees in their official capacities. This amendment was interpreted as an obvious attempt by Congress to expand the scope of federal question jurisdiction over agency decisions. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Consistent with Califano v. Sanders, the Eleventh Circuit has held that when plaintiffs challenge the policies and practices of the INS, alleging that the policies and practices deprive them of their statutory rights, such deprivations constitute wrongs independently cognizable in the district court under federal question

jurisdiction. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1989); see also Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (matters alleged to be part of a pattern or practice by immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens held to be "independently cognizable in the district court under its federal question jurisdiction."). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim that local INS policies and practices deprive them of their statutory rights granted by the INA is a claim that may be maintained independently in the district court under federal question jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first claim for relief is denied.
VI. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM UNDER THE APA
Plaintiffs' second claim is that the defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. sections 701 et seq. Defendants seek dismissal of this claim arguing that the APA does not apply to immigration proceedings because the APA has been superseded by the INA and therefore the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy under the INA. But the defendants have not cited any case which has held that the INA expressly superseded the APA. For the following reasons, this Court declines to find that the INA supersedes the APA.
Courts have consistently held that the INS, under the supervision of the Department of Justice, is an "agency" within the terms of the APA. E.g., Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir.1977); Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928 (D.C.Cir. 1971); see generally 2 Am.Jur2d Administrative Law § 26 (1994). The APA governs "any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions." Koden, 564 F.2d at 232. Its primary function is to regulate the processes of rule making and adjudication. Id. Exemptions from the APA are not to be lightly presumed in light of subsection 12 of the Act which mandates that modifications must be express. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955).
Defendants cite Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955) in support of their argument that the APA was superseded by the INA. But Marcello held only that the APA did not apply to INS deportation proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the unique history of deportation proceedings, which reflects Congress' long-held intent that deportation proceedings not be governed by the APA. Id. at 306-307, 75 S.Ct. 757. The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to reverse itself through passage of the 1952 Immigration Act. To the contrary, through the 1952 legislation, Congress adapted the APA to the needs of the deportation process, creating a complete and distinct set of procedures. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309, 75 S.Ct. 757; Lane v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 120 F.3d 106, 110 (8th Cir.1997). Moreover, the legislative history of the 1952 Immigration Act made clear that the APA was not to apply to deportation 1345 proceedings. Consequently, in light of the historic background of deportation proceedings, the 1952 Immigration *1345 Act's laborious adaptation of the APA to deportation proceedings, the legislative history of the 1952 Immigration Act, and language in the Immigration Act specifying that the methods described therein would be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceedings, the Court held that the Immigration Act expressly superseded the hearing provisions of the APA with respect to deportation decisions.
The defendants make no argument that naturalization proceedings, like deportation proceedings, have traditionally been exempted from the APA. Nor do they argue that the legislative history of the INA reflects an intent by Congress to exempt the APA from naturalization proceedings. Defendants cannot cite to language in the INA stating that the procedure described therein is the sole and exclusive procedure to be used in naturalization proceedings. Consequently, this Court declines to find that the APA has been superseded by the INA in naturalization proceedings. This finding is consistent with the decisions of other courts in this district which have permitted challenges to INS practices and procedures to be brought under the APA. For example, in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984), the plaintiffs' action challenging the practices of local immigration officials was brought under the APA. See also, Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.Fla.1982) (district court ordered the INS to comply with rulemaking procedures of the APA).
Other district courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring claims under the APA to challenge INS practices and procedures with respect to the same medical waiver provisions at issue in this case. See e.g., Chow v. Meissner, 1997 WL 285066 (N.D.Cal.1997) (disabled individuals seeking naturalization brought claim under APA against

INS for its failure to publish rules relating to section 312 waivers). See also, Sze v. INS, 1997 WL 446236 (N.D.Cal.1997) (plaintiffs brought APA claim against INS contending that delays in processing naturalization applications were unreasonable). Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the APA claim is denied.
VII. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM UNDER THE FOIA
The complaint alleges that the defendants have violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, by unlawfully using secret standards that are in actuality substantive rules which have not been published in the Federal Register and have refused to make these rules available for public inspection. The INS contends that this claim must be dismissed because the plaintiffs have not alleged that the agency "improperly withheld agency records." It also asserts that the plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief under the FOIA. The Court disagrees.
The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to open the administrative process to the scrutiny of the press and the general public. Federal Labor Relations Authority v. United States Dep't of Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 547 (11th Cir.1992). By its terms, the FOIA applies to every agency in the federal government, including the INS. Crooker v. Office of Pardon Attorney, 614 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.1980). The purpose of the FOIA is to allow public access to official information unnecessarily shielded from the public view. Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 954 (11th Cir.1985). The statute is broadly conceived, seeking to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempting to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands. Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1178 (5th Cir.1978). The disclosure requirements of the FOIA are to be construed broadly and its exemptions narrowly. Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954.
A federal district court has jurisdiction under the Freedom of Information Act to enjoin an agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The existence of injunctive relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) does not mean that subsection (a)(4)(B) is the exclusive method for enforcing the Act's disclosure requirements, nor does that 1346 provision limit the inherent equitable powers of a district *1346 court to fashion injunctive relief. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 18, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974). The district court is the enforcement arm of the FOIA and the full scope of a district court's injunctive powers has not yet been fully delineated. Id. at 18, 94 S.Ct. 1028. Courts have utilized their injunctive powers to impose an injunction compelling an agency to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the Federal Records Act. See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Committee v. Webster, 485 F.Supp. 222 (D.D.C.1980). Moreover, because a complete remedy for non-publication is publication, a court can compel an agency to publish a regulation under the FOIA. See The Effectiveness of an Unpublished Rule, 95 Ann.Surv.Am.L (1995). In light of the authority stated above, the Court finds that the relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case may be available under the FOIA.
The Court agrees with the defendants, however, that a prerequisite to suit under the FOIA is that the plaintiff must have made a request to the agency. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.1990), reversed on other grounds, 502 U.S. 164, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526. It is not clear from the complaint whether there was a request of any kind made to the agency. It may be that at this early stage in the proceedings the facts on this issue are not yet fully developed. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the FOIA claim is denied as premature. Defendants may again move to dismiss this claim after appropriate discovery has been conducted.
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
Plaintiffs' sixth claim for relief alleges that the defendants have violated plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment right to substantive and procedural due process. The substantive due process claim asserts that the INS has consciously maintained a "policy and practice of denying requests for medical waivers so arbitrarily and capriciously, lacking any standards for determination other than the whims and prejudices of the individual decision makers so as to violate the substantive due process rights of the plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class." The procedural due process claim is grounded on the defendants' alleged failure to follow its own procedures and regulations. It alleges that the defendants "have maintained a practice and policy of denying requests for medical waivers

without providing the applicant of any notice of the deficiencies, notice of the standards used or notice of the basis for denial." Plaintiffs contend that as a result of these due process violations, they have been unlawfully deprived of a medical waiver of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination.
As an initial matter, it is clear that the plaintiffs, as legal permanent residents, have both substantive and procedural due process rights. The Constitution protects the rights of aliens to due process and equal protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). Even illegal aliens enjoy the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). It is now well established that any person present in the United States is entitled to equal justice before the law, including procedural protections in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty, and freedom from invidious discrimination. See C. Antieau, 1 Modern Constitutional Law §§ 9:25-9:27 (1969 & Supp.1991).
Immigration laws have long distinguished between those aliens who have come to the United States seeking admission and those who are within the country after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953)). Aliens who seek admission to the United States ("excludable aliens") have no procedural due process rights regarding admission. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir.1995). Excludable aliens also lack substantive due process rights to be free from detention. Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1450. 1347 Conversely, *1347 legal aliens subject to deportation ("deportable aliens") have procedural and substantive due process rights. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 25-27, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21. The extent of those substantive due process rights extends at least to the rights enunciated in the Fifth Amendment mandating that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (stating that Fifth Amendment due process protections are accorded to all persons within territorial boundaries of United States, not just citizens). Accordingly, the plaintiffs, as legal permanent residents, have both substantive and procedural due process rights.
Substantive Due Process. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const., Amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "due process of law" includes a substantive component, which forbids the government from infringing on certain fundamental liberty interests, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986). "Substantive due process" analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, because the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires courts to exercise the utmost care whenever asked to break new ground in this field. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Collins, 503 U.S. at 125, 112 S.Ct. at 1068; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-539, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-92, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (the first step is to identify a property or liberty interest entitled to due process protections). Recognized fundamental rights include those created by the Constitution, most rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and certain unenumerated rights, such as the right to privacy. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). Liberty interests are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has not attempted to define a liberty interest, the right is not limited to freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty interests include the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally "to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). But courts should exercise great resistance to expanding the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195, 106 S.Ct. at 2846. In this case, the defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that the plaintiffs have failed to allege the violation of a clearly established fundamental right.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants arbitrarily and capriciously deny their medical waiver requests. Perhaps implied in this statement is the contention that they are being deprived of a fundamental right to naturalize. But

the plaintiffs have not cited to, nor has this Court discovered, authority for the proposition that an individual has a fundamental right to become an American citizen. Case law suggests otherwise. "An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress." Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988). Medical waivers are government-created exceptions to the statutory requirements for naturalization. In the Eleventh Circuit, a government or state-created right is not a fundamental right implicating substantive due process. Non-legislative deprivations of state-created rights do not invoke substantive due process protection. DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir.1997); (citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). Government-created rights are protected by procedural, not substantive due 1348 process. Id. In light of DeKalb and McKinney, the defendants correctly argue *1348 that the plaintiffs in this case cannot maintain a substantive due process claim which is based on a deprivation of a fundamental right.
Nonetheless, there is an alternative substantive due process test whereby a violation can be found if the governmental action in question "shocks the conscience" of federal judges. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 n. 7 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952); see also David H. Armistead, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 Ga. L.Rev. 769 (Spring 1995). A review of Supreme Court cases, however, suggests a strong reluctance by the Court to find substantive due process violations for arbitrary and capricious interference with a government-created right, particularly where there is an alternative remedy available. E.g., Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); see also Rosalie B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Due Process, 16 Dayton L.Rev. 313 (1991). Consequently, the court finds that the allegations of the complaint in this case are not sufficiently egregious to implicate substantive due process.
Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' substantive due process claim is granted on the authority of DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir.1997) and McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994).
Procedural due process. Procedural due process is wider in scope than substantive due process. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir.1996). It is well established that it is a denial of due process for any government agency to fail to follow its own regulations providing for procedural safeguards to persons involved in adjudicative processes before it. Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir.1970). INS regulations are adopted pursuant to a federal statute, are binding on the agency, and assure a petitioner a fair hearing. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954) (reversing a deportation order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which was entered in contravention of the agency's regulations governing the deportation hearing); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 1452, 89 L.Ed. 2103, 2114 (1945) ("The rules are designed to protect the interests of the alien and to afford him due process of law.").
Assuming, as it must, the truth of plaintiffs' allegations that the INS failed to comply with its own regulations governing medical waivers, and the prejudicial effect this failure has had on the plaintiffs' naturalization proceedings, the court finds that defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim should be denied. See DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb.
IX. CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint is denied, with the exception that the substantive due claim is dismissed on the authority of DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997), and McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994).
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 70 F.Supp.2d 1296 (1998)
Amparo CAMPOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
No. 98-2231-CIV.
United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
October 16, 1998.
129789 *1297 *1298 *1299 Jonnell Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Florida Legal Services, Inc., Lisette Losada, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Dexter Lee, Office of U.S. Attorney, Miami, FL, Alice E. Loughran, Teresa A. Wallbaum, Linda Sue Werner, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Dept of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Elizabeth Lewis Bevington, Holland & Knight, Tampa, FL, for Amicus.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
GOLD, District Judge.
The seven named plaintiffs in this lawsuit are poor, disabled, legal permanent residents who are attempting to become naturalized United States citizens. All but two of the plaintiffs have already been denied citizenship because their requests for medical waivers were refused and they failed to pass the English and civics requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. section 1423. Plaintiffs are seeking an injunction with respect to those two plaintiffs who have not yet been denied citizenship, Josefina Lopez and Angela Rodriguez. The defendants have notified Lopez and Rodriguez that their applications for medical waiver have been denied and that they will be required to pass the English and civic requirements. Final naturalization examinations and interviews with Rodriguez and Lopez had been scheduled for September 25 and September 28, 1998, respectively. Due to a temporary restraining order entered by this court on September 22, 1998, those interviews were not held. Plaintiffs ask this court to enter a preliminary injunction precluding those two examinations and interviews from going forward until after this court has an opportunity to rule on the relief requested in the class action complaint which challenges the defendants' practices for evaluating medical waivers in naturalization proceedings. Plaintiffs contend that granting this injunctive relief for Rodriguez and Lopez would "preserve the status quo during the course of litigation in order to prevent irreparable injury to the moving party and in order to preserve the ability of the court to render complete relief." The court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction at which time the parties submitted affidavits and other documentary evidence.
I. THE PLAINTIFFS
The Class Action Complaint. The plaintiffs seek injunctive, mandatory, and declaratory relief for a class of persons who are "poor, disabled legal permanent residents of the United States who have applied for and are eligible for naturalization but who are unable, due solely to a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to learn basic English and the fundamentals of United States history and government (Civics) so as to 1300 pass the English *1300 and Civics portion of the naturalization exam."
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), and implementing regulations and interpretations, Congress has provided for a "medical waiver" of the English and civics portion of the naturalization exam for persons who are ill or severely

handicapped. According to the complaint, the defendants have "maintained a systematic and Miami District-wide policy of refusing to evaluate requests for medical waivers as required by statute and their own regulations and guidelines, of evaluating all applications for medical waivers in a standardless, totally arbitrary and idiosyncratically capricious manner and of refusing to inform the members of the plaintiff class of the bases for the denial of their requests or even the standards used to deny them." Consequently, the named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, seek injunctive relief compelling the defendants to:
(a) evaluate all pending and future requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examination as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(b) reevaluate all requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which have been denied at any time since March 19, 1997, pursuant to the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, the implementing guidelines and such uniform standards as are hereafter developed;
(c) develop standards for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations which are consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2 and the implementing guidelines;
(d) publish in the Federal Register and make available to the public the standards utilized by the defendants, including such uniform standards as are hereafter developed, for the evaluation of the sufficiency of requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations;
(e) provide notice of the reasons for the rejection of the medical waiver sufficient to allow the applicant to understand the bases for the rejection and, if possible, to correct them, to all applicants for naturalization whose requests for medical waivers of the English and Civics portion of the naturalization examinations have been rejected.
The Motion for Preliminary Injunction Pertaining to Rodriguez and Lopez. This case is presently before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from proceeding with the naturalization examinations and interviews of Rodriguez and Lopez until after it has ruled on the matters raised in the class action complaint. Discovery has not yet commenced in this case and the matters raised in the class action complaint are not yet ripe for resolution. Thus the sole issue to be decided at this time is whether the plaintiffs have established the requisite elements for a preliminary injunction barring the INS from proceeding with the naturalization interviews scheduled for Rodriguez and Lopez until the court has decided the merits of the class action. In determining whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the requested injunctive relief, the court has reviewed and considered the affidavits submitted by, or on behalf of all of the named plaintiffs. For reasons of brevity, however, it has confined its factual statement to only those facts relating to the naturalization applications filed by Rodriguez and Lopez.
Angela Rodriguez. Rodriguez immigrated to this country from Cuba in 1992 and was granted permanent legal 1301 residency. *1301 She applied to become a U.S. citizen as soon as she completed the required five years of legal
residency, in 1997. Rodriguez's physician, Dr. Miguel A. Mier, completed an application for medical waiver, an INS N-684 form, on the basis that Rodriguez has severe disabilities that make it impossible for her to learn the English language and pass a civics examination. Under penalty of perjury, Dr. Mier swore that Rodriguez has organic brain syndrome and arterial hypertension, which cause her to suffer memory loss, poor concentration and a decline in her mental functioning. Because organic brain syndrome and arterial hypertension are progressive ailments, Rodriguez's condition has grown worse since 1997.
At Rodriguez's June 1998 naturalization interview, she provided the INS N-648 form to the INS officer. On the form, Dr. Mier averred that he was a board-certified family practitioner specializing in geriatrics who had been treating Angela Rodriguez for approximately three years. Dr. Mier explained that Rodriguez was suffering from a combination of difficult ailments, including organic brain syndrome, which require her to be under constant supervision and render her unable to care for herself. After describing his patient's medical condition, Mier

concluded that "[b]ased on the above, it is my professional Medical opinion, that Angela Rodriguez is unable to learn even basic English, let alone U.S. Civics of history, and that it is no fault of her own that she can not comprehend an examination to demonstrate basic knowledge of the English language."[1] Additionally, Dr. Mier gave his medical license number and other required information, including his certification that the conditions described above are permanent and not caused by use of illegal drugs.
Despite all this information, at her June interview, the INS officer gave Rodriguez a form letter stating that defendants would not accept her N-648. Every possible reason for rejecting the N-648 was checked off on that form letter. Included among the listed deficiencies were: 1) "Identify the applicant on the medical certification," 2) "Identify the condition clearly and how it is related to her capacity to learn," and 3) "Establish your qualifications to make this medical certification." In fact, all this information had been provided by Dr. Mier on the N-648 form rejected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The form letter instructed Rodriguez to present a properly prepared N-648 with the missing information to the defendants by August 5, 1998.
Neither Rodriguez nor her doctor was provided with specific information about the actual deficiencies or told what additional information was required by the INS. Nonetheless, Rodriguez returned to Dr. Mier, who completed another N-648 form which was submitted to the INS in July 1998. By letter dated August 25, 1998, the INS again 1302 declined Rodriguez's request for medical exception and advised her that she would be required to satisfy *1302 the English and Civics requirements of the INA. The defendants never attempted to contact Dr. Mier to answer questions about Rodriguez' condition, did not seek to have Rodriguez examined by an INS medical doctor, clinical psychologist, or any other medical professional.
The next interview with INS will be Rodriguez's last chance to have her 1997 application for citizenship approved. Because she cannot pass the English and civics requirements of the INA, she expects to receive a final denial of her application for citizenship at that interview. Rodriguez is very concerned that she may not survive long enough to reapply for citizenship and await the processing of any new application or the processing of any request for appeal on her current application. Both those processes take approximately two years and ultimately are decided by the same INS staff in the Miami District office who have already twice denied Rodriguez's request for a medical waiver.
Josefina Lopez. Lopez is an 84 year old legal permanent resident from Cuba who applied for citizenship in March, 1997. She suffers from a number of complicated cardiac and circulatory insufficiency abnormalities, including aggressive cardiac arrhythmia, arterial fibrillation and a malady known as sick sinus syndrome. The circulatory abnormalities affect normal blood flow to all parts of the body, including major organs and the brain. Due to the restrictions on her brain's blood supply and the daily medications she takes, Lopez is prone to lethargy and syncopal episodes with marked diminution of her cognitive functions, reasoning ability, judgment and memory. These disabilities and treatment render Lopez unable to learn English.
On August 25, 1998, Lopez reported first citizenship interview where she turned in a form N-648 prepared and executed by her treating physician who is board-certified in internal medicine. On the N-648, the physician certified that Lopez suffers from the conditions described above and that they prevent her from learning English. The INS officer took the N-648 form and returned about ten minutes later. He informed Lopez that her N-648 had been rejected and that she would have to return with an additional N-648 that provided an "accurate assessment" of her disability.
Lopez alleges that she is extremely confused by this notice and does not know how to provide additional information that will satisfy defendants' requirements for a disability waiver. Defendants never contacted Lopez's doctor to answer any questions about her condition, nor did they have her examined by an INS medical doctor or clinical psychologist. Defendants never provided Lopez a meaningful notice of the basis for her rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies. Lopez is scheduled for a final interview, but she will be unable to pass the English and civics requirements of the INA. Like Rodriguez, Lopez is worried that because of her advanced age and poor health, she may not survive long enough to reapply for citizenship and await the processing of her new application or survive an appeal of her current application.

II. THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
The naturalization process is generally divided into four stages. First, a naturalization applicant must complete and submit an N-400 citizenship application to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8 U.S.C § 1445(a); 8 C.F.R. § 334.2. Second, the INS conducts a background investigation of the applicant, including review of all pertinent records, police department checks, and, unless waived by the Attorney General, a neighborhood investigation. 8 U.S.C § 1446(a); 8 C.F.R. § 335.1. Third, the applicant is interviewed and examined by an INS officer. As part of that examination process Congress has required that, unless waived, an applicant for 1303 naturalization must demonstrate "an understanding of the English language, including an ability *1303 to read, write and speak words in ordinary usage...", 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1), and a "knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States" 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (a)(2). In order to lessen the impact of these requirements on otherwise qualified immigrants, Congress also provided that the "English language" and "history and civics" requirements "shall not apply to any person who is unable because of physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to comply therewith." 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1).[2] This exemption from the "English language" and "history and civics" requirements is termed the "medical waiver exemption". Fourth, the last stage of processing is the scheduling of an applicant for the oath ceremony. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1448; 8 C.F.R. Parts 310, 337.
III. THE MEDICAL WAIVER EXEMPTION PROCESS
The INS has issued regulations and supplemental policy guidance on the procedural mechanics of the disability waiver exemption. See 8 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(2) (1998); see also INS Supplemental Policy Guidance for Field Offices. The applicant initiates the waiver process by submitting an INS Form N-648, Medical Certification for Disability Exceptions, that must be completed by a licensed medical doctor or licensed clinical psychologist. 8 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(2) (1998). Under the regulations, a naturalization applicant seeking a disability waiver exemption must establish that (1) he or she has an impairment, (2) that it is "medically determinable," (3) that it meets the 12-month duration requirement (i.e., not a temporary condition), and (4) that it is severe enough and results in functioning so impaired as to render him or her unable to demonstrate an understanding of the English language or United States civics, even with reasonable accommodations or modifications. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 (b)(3), 312.2(b)(1) (1998). An impairment is "medically determinable" if it results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological disabilities, and not from an individual's use of illegal drugs. Id. The burden of proving the disability waiver exemption is on the applicant. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1(a), 312.2(a) (1998); see also 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(b) (1998).
The N-648 form serves as both an application for a medical waiver exemption and an attestation by the medical professional to the INS as to the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition. Id. The physician must sign a statement on the Form N-648 certifying that he or she has answered all the questions in a complete and truthful manner. To further allay INS fears of fraud, the physician must attest "that any knowingly false or misleading statements may subject the medical professional to the penalties of perjury pursuant to title 18, United States Code, Section 1546 and to civil penalties under section 274C of the Act." Id.
A central concern of the INS regulations and policies is that medical determinations concerning the applicant's ability to comply with the English language and civics requirements must be made by a qualified medical 1304 professional. Accordingly, INS policy provides that "it is the responsibility of the medical professional to make the *1304 medical determination." Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97, p. 7. "These medical professionals shall be experienced in diagnosing those with physical of mental medically determinable impairments" and shall also be able to "attest to the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition as it relates to the disability exceptions". 8 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(2).
INS officers reviewing the medical waiver requests are reminded by INS policy that they "are not medical professionals, advocates, or social workers and should not place themselves in the position of attempting to second guess the medical evaluation of the qualified medical professional certifying a disability exception on the

N-648. Nor should the officers place themselves in the position of being a medical professional and thereby denying the existence of a disability." Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97, p. 7.
The regulations further provide that "the Service also reserves the right to refer the applicant to another authorized medical source for a supplemental disability examination. This option should be invoked when the Service has credible doubts about the veracity of a medical certification that has been presented by an applicant". 8 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The instructions then set forth a detailed procedure which must be followed prior to the requesting a second medical certification from an applicant. These procedures include attempting to reach the medical professional who completed the N-648 to answer any questions the officer may have regarding the certification. If after consultation with the medical professional, it is determined that supplemental records from the applicants medical file would satisfy the concerns of the officer, the records should be requested. If any of these procedures fail to satisfy the officer as to the accuracy of the determination or the validity of the credentials of the medical professional, the officer must consult with his supervisor and obtain permission to require the applicant to obtain a second disability certification. Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97, p. 11. Finally, the guidelines caution against requesting a second medical certification unless absolutely necessary because of the inconvenience it causes the applicant:
Officers are instructed to use extreme restraint in exercising these options and should only do so when doubts remain after the steps outlined ... have been completed ... DAOs should note that the burden is on the applicant to pay for any second certification, and should take this fact into consideration. Officers should always remember that they are responsible for determining the eligibility for naturalization not for making or rendering a medical determination.
Supplemental Policy Guidance 3/12/97 p. 10 (original emphasis).

IV. THE CHALLENGED PRACTICES

Plaintiffs contend that the defendants, as a matter of practice and policy, violate every tenet of the disability waiver procedure provided for by the INA, 8 U.S.C. section 1423(b)(1), its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. sections 312.1(b)(3), 312.2(b)(1) and (b)(2), and published INS guidance. They argue that defendants' systematic practice and policy of violating the statute and regulations is unlawful under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. section 552, the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. sections 553, 555(e), 701 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engage in the following acts as a matter of practice and policy:

1305

a. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver by "second guessing" the medical determination of the medical professional and substituting their own medical determination for the medical determination of the medical professional, without having the applicant *1305 evaluated by an INS medical doctor or clinical psychologist;

b. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver despite a completed attestation by a medical professional as to the origin, nature and extent of the medical condition as it relates to the disability, without examining the applicants records or referring the applicant to another physician for a second opinion.

c. Reject and deny properly completed N-648 Requests for Medical Waiver despite the physician's attestation that the disability determination is made under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1546 and civil penalties under the Act without attempting to reach the physician to discuss the matter.

Denying the plaintiffs' allegations, defendants assert that the practices and procedures followed in the Miami Naturalization Unit comply with the INA and published regulations. Defendants have set forth the following chronology as their procedure for reviewing waiver requests. Initial determinations are made by Supervisory District Adjudication Officers. The officer's determination is normally reviewed by a Public Health Service

registered nurse temporarily stationed on the premises. If the nurse recommends against approving the waiver, she must refer the case to a Public Health Service physician and obtain the physician's concurrence on the decision.
If the officer determines that the Form N-648 is incomplete or insufficient, the INS issues a deficiency notice and gives the applicant an opportunity to provide the deficient information. If the applicant thereafter does not produce sufficient information for the officer or nurse to make a reasoned determination, or if the claimed disability or impairment does not qualify under the regulatory standard, the INS will notify the applicant that the Form N-648 has not been approved. The applicant is given two separate opportunities to pass the language and civics examinations. If the applicant presents a new Form N-648 at either the scheduled or re-scheduled examination, the officer will consider the new form and make a determination on whether it satisfies the regulatory standard. In those cases where the applicant does not obtain a disability waiver or pass the language and civics examinations, the INS can deny the application for naturalization on this ground.
V. JURISDICTION
The plaintiffs challenge the INS's "current practices and policies in the Miami District for evaluating requests for medical waiver of the English language and Civics portion of the naturalization exam." The complaint alleges that these practices and policies deprive naturalization applicants of their statutory and constitutional rights.[3] No challenge is made with respect to the merits of any individual INS determination. Consequently, the court finds that it has federal question jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory challenges to the defendants' practices and policies concerning the evaluation of medical waivers. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 896, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991)(a district court has federal question jurisdiction to hear constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that district courts have jurisdiction to review allegations of systematic abuses by INS officials. In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), the appellate court affirmed a district 1306 court's finding that it had jurisdiction to review a *1306 complaint which challenged the INS's procedures for processing asylum requests and addressed "matters alleged to be part of a pattern or practice by immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens." Such matters were held to be "independently cognizable in the district court under its federal question jurisdiction." Id. at 1033. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc), where the court explained that to postpone "judicial resolution of a disputed issue that affects an entire class of aliens until an individual petitioner has an opportunity to litigate it" would undermine Congress' intent to eliminate delay and procedural redundancy in immigration matters. Id. at 980.
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims are precluded by their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies because the appeals process allows de novo reconsideration of disability waiver and naturalization applications before both the administrative agency and the district court. See 8 U.S.C. sections 1421(c) and 1447 (a). But this argument was considered and rejected in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1989), which involved a challenge to INS policies and practices in connection with applications for temporary residence. There the INS had argued that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by an exhaustion requirement imposed by statute as well as a judicially-created exhaustion requirement. Rejecting the INS's statutory exhaustion argument, the court held that where the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the procedures employed by the INS in processing their applications, rather than seeking substantive review of any individual ruling respecting their status, the exhaustion requirement imposed by section 1105a had no bearing on the district court's jurisdiction. As for the judicially-created exhaustion requirement, the court reasoned that exhaustion is not required if the administrative remedy would not provide relief commensurate with the claim. Id. at 1560. Where the nature of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge of INS procedures is such that relief at the administrative review level is unlikely and the chances are remote that the INS would respond positively to an individual's constitutional challenges to it procedures, the exhaustion doctrine is not a bar to the district court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)) and Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1034(exhaustion of remedies not required because case involved a constitutional challenge to procedures adopted by the INS for the processing of asylum claims).

In this case, the only administrative remedy available to Lopez and Rodriguez is a request for a hearing (also referred to as an "appeal") of the ultimate denial of citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 336.2. This appeal is heard by another staff officer at the Miami District Office of at least similar grade to the officer who initially denied the claim. Id. That appeal process currently takes one year to eighteen months. Lopez and Rodriguez could only thereafter seek judicial review of the INS officer's decision on appeal. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Furthermore, because the plaintiffs have never received meaningful notice regarding the deficiency of the original claim, the appeals will likely employ the same unknown criteria used in making the initial determination. Based on Eleventh Circuit precedential authority, as stated above, the court finds that the statutory exhaustion requirement is inapplicable in this case.
VI. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff 1307 outweighs *1307 any potential harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Warren Publishing Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir.1997); Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 992-93 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 872 F.2d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1989); Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.1974). The standard is not rigidly applied by assigning a fixed quantitative value to each of the four factors. Rather, the court must use a flexible scale which balances each consideration and arrives at the most equitable result given the particular circumstances.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy which should not be granted absent a clear showing that the moving party has met its burden of proof. Cafe 207 v. St. Johns County, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.1993). Preserving the court's ability to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits is the primary justification for granting a preliminary injunction. Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.1975); Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 623, 633 (S.D.Fla.1997). Findings made on an application for preliminary injunction are not controlling at a later hearing on a permanent injunction. E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1527 n. 1 (11th Cir.1985). With these basic principles in mind, the Court now turns to the merits of the preliminary injunction application in this case.
A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.
A fundamental principle of federal law is that a federal agency must follow its own rules. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 233-235, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) ("[W]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures.").
The failure of an agency to follow its own regulations constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct. Boyd v. Secretary of Agriculture, 459 F.Supp. 418 (D.S.C.1978). The courts must overturn agency actions which do not scrupulously follow the regulations and procedures promulgated by the agency itself. U.S. v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, (4th Cir. 1969)...
Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.1986). These principles apply to INS as much as any other agency. "[I]t is clear ... that agency deviation from its own regulations and procedures may justify judicial relief... [citations omitted]", Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1041 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). See also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 809, (9th Cir.1979), (holding that INS violated its own regulation on processing a noncitizen's request for immigration records); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.Supp. 973 (S.D.Fl.1982); Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 608 (S.D.Fl.1997). A violation by an agency of its own regulations also constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act in that the agency's action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law". 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Where judicial review includes actions taken pursuant to agency regulations, validly promulgated regulations have the force of law. Frisby v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 755 F.2d

1052, 1055 (3d Cir.1985). When an agency fails to act in compliance with its own regulations, such actions are "not in accordance with law." (citations and quotations omitted).
Raymond Proffitt Foundation v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.Supp. 1088, 1104 (E.D.Pa.1996).
The court has reviewed the materials submitted by the parties, including the affidavits of many of the plaintiffs or their family members, several plaintiffs' disability waiver documents, and affidavits filed by INS officers and 1308 medical personnel. *1308 Based on this review, the court finds that the evidence submitted of record as of this date, including the materials submitted by the defendants, demonstrate that the INS is not following its own regulations. For example, defendants' witness, Dr. Rivera, has submitted an affidavit that supports a conclusion that the defendants are second guessing the medical determinations expressed on the N-648 forms by substituting their own medical opinions without first reviewing the applicant's medical records, consulting with the applicant's physician or referring the applicant to another medical source for an additional opinion. Based solely on her review of the N-648 form, Dr. Rivera concluded that Lopez was not disabled. Rivera's stated reason for reaching this conclusion suggests she simply disagreed with the treatment prescribed by Lopez's physician.
Based on my review of the Form N-648, I concluded that the described severity of the illness was inconsistent with the medical treatment she appears to be receiving, i.e., the failure to insert a pacemaker. The insertion of a pacemaker, regardless of age or general conditions, is standard medical practice in cases of such severity in order to permit the patient to function properly. Such a procedure would decrease or eliminate Ms. Lopez's alleged impairment of cognitive functions.
The regulations provide that where the INS has creditable doubts about the veracity of a physician's determination, it can request records or refer the applicant to another medical source. 8 C.F.R. section 312.2(b) (2). The March 12, 1997 interpretations emphasize the need to accept the medical judgment of the medical practitioner absent fraud or some other extraneous factor affecting veracity. They state that reviewing officers "should not place themselves in the position of attempting to second guess the medical evaluation of the qualified medical professional certifying a disability exception on the N-648" and that "Officers should always remember that they are responsible for determining the eligibility for naturalization not for making or rendering a medical determination."
The record also suggests that neither the plaintiffs nor their physicians are informed of the reasons their applications were denied. Nor are they instructed on the standards that are being used to determine eligibility for medical waivers. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, precludes an agency from utilizing any rules, statements of policy, or interpretations that have not been published or indexed and made available to the public.
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if 0907
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
Additionally, a goal of the Administrative Procedures Act and the Freedom of Information Act is to assure that individuals in the administrative process are informed of the reasons for administrative decisions. The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e), requires that any notice of denial "shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial." The record shows that the rejection notices provided by the INS do nothing to assist the applicant in understanding the basis for the denial. For example in the case of Rodriguez, the denial was meaningless because every box on the form had been marked, even though the applicant clearly complied with those requirements.
Not only does the failure to provide meaningful notice violate the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (e), it also deprives the plaintiffs of their procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. It 1309 is axiomatic *1309 that the most minimal "fair procedures" required by due process include a meaningful notice.

The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Or, as stated in Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146 (D.C.Cir.1980):
It is universally agreed that adequate notice lies at the heart of due process. Unless a person is adequately informed of the reasons for denial of a legal interest, a hearing serves no purpose 0907 and resembles more a scene from Kafka than a constitutional process.
Id., at 168.
A determination on a motion for preliminary injunction is usually made at a time when the parties have not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery and the matters to be addressed at trial have not yet been fully developed. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.1994). Accordingly, it is not necessary that plaintiffs be able
in an abbreviated proceeding, to prove with certainty eventual success.... [T]he importance and nature of the [likelihood of success] requirement can vary significantly, depending upon the magnitude of the injury which would be suffered by the movant in the absence of interlocutory relief and the relative balance of the threatened hardship.
State of Texas v. Seatrain International, 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir.1975) (citing Canal Auth. of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.1974)). In light of the aforementioned factors, the court finds that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, particularly with respect to their due process claim.
B. Irreparable Injury.
Plaintiffs Rodriguez and Lopez argue that they will be irreparably injured if the court permits the interviews to proceed as scheduled because they are unable to comply with the English and civics requirements of the INA due to their disabilities and the defendants will deny them citizenship based on their inability to comply with these requirements. Rodriguez and Lopez contend that if they are denied citizenship, they will lose the opportunity to vote, receive benefits, or otherwise fully participate in our democracy as United States citizens.[4] The law is well established that denial of the opportunity to vote is irreparable injury per se. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.1986).
Significantly, the plaintiffs have shown that no meaningful appeal or reapplication process is available to them since all decisions on their appeals or reapplications will ultimately be made by the same INS staff in the Miami District office who have already denied their requests for a medical waiver, under the same "secret" practices, policies and procedures utilized in the defendants' Miami District office. Rodriguez and Lopez contend that since they are indigent and the appeal process and the reapplication process require fees that are beyond their extremely limited means, it is unlikely that they will be unable to obtain review.
1310 Finally, the plaintiffs state that they are concerned that they may not survive long *1310 enough to reapply for citizenship and await the processing of any new application or the processing of any request for appeal on their current applications. Both those processes take approximately two years. The court finds that the plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable injury because they have shown that in light of their advanced age and infirmities, it is likely that the plaintiffs may not survive the lengthy administrative appeals process and they may also be deprived of an opportunity to be heard on the issues presented by the class complaint.
C. Harm to the Defendants.
The third factor to consider when assessing a motion for preliminary injunction is whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs any potential harm to the defendant. The plaintiffs are asking this court to enjoin the defendants from scheduling their final citizenship interviews until after the court has ruled on the issues raised in

the class action complaint. In granting the preliminary injunction, the court would merely be preserving the status quo. The court finds that the defendants will suffer little or no harm if the citizenship interviews for Lopez and Rodriguez are delayed until after this court has ruled on the merits of this lawsuit.
D. Public Interest.
The final factor to consider when assessing the propriety of injunctive relief is the public interest. The plaintiffs have presented evidence showing that the defendants are not following their own regulations when evaluating requests for medical waivers and that their practices have frustrated the attempts of naturalization applicants and physicians to comply with these regulations. Public policy concerns therefore weigh in favor of preliminary injunctive relief in order to insure that government agencies follow their own rules and that the plaintiffs will not be deprived of due process.
VII. POSTING OF SECURITY
Plaintiffs have requested that they not be required to post any cash bond. In spite of the literal language of Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court clearly has the discretion to issue a preliminary injunction without requiring plaintiffs to give security. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Nationwide Equipment, 877 F.Supp. 611, 617 (M.D.Fla.1994); Baldree v. Cargill, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 704 (M.D.Fla.1990).
Because plaintiffs in the instant case are indigent and disabled and seek only to vindicate their federal statutory and constitutional rights, this case implicates the public interest and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of plaintiffs. Therefore this court does not require plaintiffs to give security. See Pharmaceutical Soc'y of N.Y. v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 50 F.3d 1168, 1174 (2d Cir.1995); Crowley v. Local 82 Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, 679 F.2d 978, 999 (1st Cir.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The court further finds that in light of their advanced age, poor physical condition, Rodriguez and Lopez are likely to suffer irreparable harm should the preliminary injunction not be issued and that the threat of injury to the plaintiff outweighs the minimal harm, if any, the injunction may cause the defendant. Finally, the court finds that issuance of the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, it is ordered and adjudged that the defendants are enjoined from scheduling the final citizenship interviews for Angela Rodriguez and Josefina Lopez until the court has ruled on the merits of the class action complaint. The court further orders that because of the plaintiffs' health problems and advanced age, 1311 discovery *1311 in this case will be conducted on an expedited basis. Discovery with respect to the class certification issue must be completed by December 4, 1998. All briefs and dispositive motions concerning the class certification issue must be filed by December 18, 1998. Responses to these briefs and dispositive motions must be filed by December 31, 1998. A hearing on class certification will be set in early January by separate order.
[1] Dr. Mier swore to the following information on the form: Ms. Angela Rodriguez has been my patient for approximately three years. She is an elderly 78 year-old woman who is suffering from a difficult combination of ailments including Organic Brain Syndrome (Diagnosis 310.9), and Arterial Hypertension (401.9). Her conditions are complicated by a recent Right Hip Operation and deteriorating general health associated with the normal aging process..... The complex combination of ailments above described have resulted in a progressive deterioration of her cognitive functions with a decline in functional level[,] poor memory and poor concentration. Although she is aware of her surroundings and is still able to express herself with limited clarity, she requires constant supervision and is unable to care for herself. Under these condition[s], this patient's potential for learning complicated new material such as a new language and/or replying to an interrogatory in a foreign language are practically nil.... Based on the above, it is my professional Medical opinion, that Angela Rodriguez is

unable to learn even basic English, let alone U.S. Civics of history, and that it is no fault of her own that she can not comprehend an examination to demonstrate basic knowledge of the English language.
[2] Congress enacted the disability waiver in its present form in October 1994. See INA section 312(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1) (1994), as amended by the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 ("INTCA"), Pub.L. 103-416 (Oct. 25, 1994). INA section 312(b)(1) provides that an applicant for naturalization is exempted from the English language and civics requirements if he or she is unable to comply with these requirements due to a "physical or developmental disability" or "mental impairment." Congress did not specifically define the terms "physical or developmental disability" or "mental impairment." On March 19, 1997, the INS issued implementing regulations clarifying the meaning and effect of these terms. See "Exceptions To The Educational Requirements for Naturalization for Certain Applicants," 62 Fed.Reg. 12915 (Mar. 19, 1997) (final rule).
[3] Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendants practices and policies violate 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[4] Although not relied on by the court in determining whether this preliminary injunction should be granted, there is evidence in the record that shows that some of the applicants have been be receiving life-sustaining supplemental income benefits which will, or have been discontinued. The court is concerned that the loss of these benefits will place the plaintiffs in jeopardy.
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 Campos v. I.N.S., 188 F.R.D. 656 (1999)
188 F.R.D. 656 United States District Court,
S.D. Florida, Miami Division.
Amparo CAMPOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
No. 98–2231–CIV–GOLD. | Feb. 24, 1999.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*657 JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Florida Legal Services, Inc., Cheryl Little, Joan Friedland, Lisette Losada, Rebecca Sharpless, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Miami FL, for plaintiffs.
Dexter A. Lee, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Miami, FL, David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Linda S. Wernery, Alice Loughran, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Opinion
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
GOLD, District Judge.
The plaintiffs are poor, disabled, legal permanent residents of the United States who allege that they have applied for naturalization but because of a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment, they are unable to learn basic English and the fundamentals of United States history and government so as to pass the English and Civics portion of the naturalization exam.
Plaintiffs claim that the defendants engage in the following district-wide practices: (1) they refuse to evaluate requests for medical waivers as required by statute or INS regulations and guidelines; (2) they evaluate all applications for medical waivers in a standardless, totally arbitrary and capricious manner; and (3) they refuse to inform class members of the basis for the denial of their requests or even the standards used to deny them. The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves *658 and all others similarly situated, ask the court to enjoin the defendants from engaging in the alleged illegal policies and practices and require them to consider the

class members’ requests for waiver pursuant to legal and constitutional standards and procedures.
Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
I. CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
To qualify as a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs must initially satisfy the four thresholds requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) questions of law or fact common to the class must exist (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and (4) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of representation). Plaintiffs seeking to represent the class bear the burden of establishing that all four requirements have been met. Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 721 n. 2 (11th Cir.1987); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir.1984) (A class action may only be certified “if the Court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) are met”). These prerequisites are mandatory and the failure to establish any one is fatal to a motion for class action certification.
In addition to meeting the four preliminary requirements in subdivision (a), the plaintiffs must then satisfy one of the subsections of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) in order for the lawsuit to be maintained as a class action. The plaintiffs assert that they satisfy Rule 23(b)(2). A class action may be maintained under (b)(2) when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
[1] It is axiomatic that in order for a class to be certified, a class must exist. To ensure that the class is neither so amorphous or imprecise that it is difficult to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class, the class description must be adequately specific. See Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.1981). The question of whether a class exists is a question of fact which ought to be determined on the basis of the circumstances of the case. Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 88 F.R.D. 619, 622 (M.D.Fla.1980). In this case, the putative class consists of the following persons:
All persons within the Miami
1

Campos v. I.N.S., 188 F.R.D. 656 (1999)
District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who have properly applied, or will apply in the future, for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1445 who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a request for a waiver of either or both of the naturalization requirements that they demonstrate an understanding of the English language and that they demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment and whose request for waiver is now pending, will be filed in the future, or has been rejected by the INS, and excluding from the class anyone who has been naturalized.
That court finds that this definition is sufficiently precise to make positive identification of its membership at any given moment administratively feasible. See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970).

A. CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(a). The defendants concede that the plaintiffs have met two of the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity and adequacy of representation. The court agrees that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable1 and that the class representatives *659 will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Accordingly, the court will focus on the commonality and typicality requirements.

1

Through discovery, the plaintiffs have estimated that

over 3,000 persons would fall within the class

definition. For example, in response to a request for

production, the INS estimated that since March 1997,

the Miami Office received approximately 6,000 waiver

requests.

1. COMMONALITY [2] [3] The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether, under the particular circumstances, maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs’ claims and the class claims are so

interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, n. 13, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). Commonality requires that there is at least one issue affecting all or a significant number of proposed class members. Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir.1982);2 Kreuzfeld v. Carnehammar, 138 F.R.D. 594, 599 (S.D.Fla.1991). The threshold for commonality is not high. Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir.1993). Factual differences between class members do not preclude a finding of commonality. CV Reit, Inc. v. Levy, 144 F.R.D. 690, 696 (S.D.Fla.1992); see also Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 168 F.R.D. 315, 324 (S.D.Fla.1996) (not all of the questions of law or fact raised by the case have to be common to all the plaintiffs). The law requires only that the claims actually litigated in the lawsuit must be those fairly represented by the named plaintiffs. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1557 (citing C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice & Procedure, § 763 at 603); see also Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir.1978). Where a common scheme is alleged, common questions of law or fact will exist. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2nd Cir.1968); Powers v. Stuart–James Co., Inc., 707 F.Supp. 499, 502 (M.D.Fla.1989); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864, 877 (S.D.Fla.1988).

2

The Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (adopted as

precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered

prior to October 1, 1982).

[4] In this case the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. They do not challenge their individual determinations. Rather, they challenge the policies and practices which the defendants use to analyze, process and determine all medical waiver requests in the Miami District. Class actions seeking injunctive relief against specific INS policies and procedures are not unusual. To the contrary, courts have held that actions for declaratory and injunctive relief which challenge the general administration of an INS program are the very type of lawsuit contemplated by Rule 23(a). When a group of Nicaraguan refugees challenged the legality of the criteria being utilized by the INS in deportation cases, the court found that the commonality requirement for class certification had been met.
The Court is also satisfied that there is a predominantly common interest and the requirements of “commonality” and “typicality” are satisfied. The complaint raises class wide issues that are not directed to
2

Campos v. I.N.S., 188 F.R.D. 656 (1999)

individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also challenge the manner in which the INS is administering its suspension program generally against Nicaraguan refugees, rather than challenging individual INS decisions. The issues raised in the complaint are precisely the type of common issues that Rule 23 envisions as properly subject to class action treatment.

Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 608, 618 (S.D.Fla.1997).
As in Tefel, the complaint in this case challenges specific policies and practices used district wide in the Miami District.3 The *660 class shares common questions of law as to whether these specific practices and policies in the Miami District for evaluating requests for medical waivers violate the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Freedom of Information Act, or the Fifth Amendment. Because all of the plaintiffs have applied for a medical waiver and have had their request rejected based same district-wide practices and procedures, material factual and legal questions are shared by each member of the class. Additionally, before moving for class certification, the plaintiffs conducted discovery and have provided initial supporting evidence showing that the allegedly illegal common policies and practices exist and that they have been applied to all members of the plaintiff class. That these common policies and practices may have affected individual class member’s cases differently does not preclude a finding of commonality. In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864 (S.D.Fla.1988), the court found commonality and typicality based on allegations almost identical to those in the present case.

3

The specific actions challenged by the plaintiffs include

the following INS practices:

a. Reject and deny properly completed N–648

Requests for Medical Waiver by “second guessing”

the medical determination of the medical

professional and substituting their own medical

determination for the medical determination of the

medical professional, without having the applicant

evaluated by an INS medical doctor or clinical

psychologist;

b. Reject and deny properly completed N–648

Requests for Medical Waiver despite a completed

attestation by a medical professional as to “the

origin, nature and extent of the medical condition as

it relates to the disability exceptions”;

c. Reject and deny properly completed N–648

Requests for Medical Waiver based on questions

which they have regarding the N–648:

(i) without attempting to reach the medical

professional who completed the N–648 to answer

any questions the DAO may have regarding the

certification; (ii) for applicants who have been declared disabled by another state or federal government agency, without attempting to make contact with the agency to see if any information can be gained to clarify the questions which the officer has about the medical professional’s certification; (iii) without ever requesting from the medical professional who made the original disability certification a production of supplemental records from the applicant’s medical files; (iv) without ever requesting at any time a second N–648 from an “authorized medical professional other than the medical professional that completed the first certification;” (v) without ever having the applicant evaluated at any time by an INS medical doctor or clinical psychologist. d. Reject and deny properly completed N–648 Requests for Medical Waiver utilizing wholly arbitrary and capricious standards which vary from officer to officer, from supervisor to supervisor, and from determination to determination; e. Reject and deny properly completed N–648 Requests for Medical Waiver based on secret standards which have never been published in the Federal Register and which they refuse to provide to the public; f. Reject and deny properly completed N–648 Requests for Medical Waiver without ever providing the rejected applicants with a meaningful notice of the basis for the rejection, the standards employed or the means to cure the deficiencies. Class Action Complaint, ¶ 30.
It must be noted that [commonality] does not require that all of the questions of law and/or fact be common to all the plaintiffs. Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir.1978)... Class actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief—As in the instant case-by their very nature present common questions of law or fact. [Citation omitted.] Commonality also exists when plaintiffs allege that a defendant has acted or is acting uniformly regarding a class. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1033. The class of plaintiffs in this case allege that they were denied temporary residence status because the defendants imposed an illegal burden of proof that the applicants were unable to meet. Such an allegation is sufficient to meet the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3). See Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir.1986). Id., at 871. See also, Campos v. Nail, 940 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.1991) (class of Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants was permitted to challenge the pattern and practice of one Immigration Law Judge who consistently denied all requests for change of venue
3

Campos v. I.N.S., 188 F.R.D. 656 (1999)
made by asylum seekers); Fernandez–Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D.Ga.1981) (despite factual differences in the individual cases, court certified a class of Cuban nationals who were denied parole and who were challenging system-wide parole procedures of INS); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.1982) (class of more than 4,000 Haitians who had sought political asylum in the United States were permitted to challenge an INS program composed of a series of practices designed “to achieve expedited mass deportation of Haitian nationals irrespective of the merits of an individual *661 Haitian’s asylum application and without regard to the constitutional, treaty, statutory and administrative rights of the plaintiff class.”).
2. TYPICALITY [5] [6] [7] [8] In order to satisfy the “typicality” prerequisite of Rule 23(a), plaintiffs must show that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). The central inquiry in determining whether a proposed class has “typicality” is whether the “class representative [is] part of the class and ‘possess[es] the same interest and suffer[s] the same injury’ as the class members.” East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1896, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2929, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974)). When ascertaining whether typicality exists, the district court is “to focus on whether the named representative’s claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 958 (11th Cir.1985). A sufficient nexus is established if the claims or defenses of the class and the class representatives arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory. Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1984). Moreover, the typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiff and other class members, unless the factual position of the representative markedly differs from that of other members of the class. Id.
[9] The named plaintiffs’ claims against the INS defendants are typical of the claims of all proposed class members in that all plaintiffs applied for a medical waiver of the English and Civics requirements but were subjected to the allegedly illegal practices of INS. Since the named plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, the claims of the named plaintiffs are based on the same legal theory as the class members. All share a common goal in seeking to

have the INS practices declared illegal. Furthermore, the relief sought by the named plaintiffs is compatible with the relief sought by the class. Kernan v. Holiday Universal, Inc., 1990 WL 289505 (1990). The interests of the named plaintiffs are not antagonistic to the interests of the class. For these reasons, the named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the typicality requirement is met. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3rd Cir.1992).
Accordingly, the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a).
B. CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(b)(2). [10] In addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs must show that their action falls within one of the three categories of class suits described in subsection (b). Plaintiffs assert that they have satisfied Rule 23(b)(2) which applies where the parties “opposing the class ha[ve] acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Plaintiffs here are seeking final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief. Consequently, they are seeking the type of relief for which (b)(2) was intended. Moreover, defendants have acted on grounds “generally applicable to the class as a whole” in that all the plaintiffs were denied the waivers based on the same, allegedly illegal, policies and practices. It is solely to challenge these policies and procedures that the plaintiffs have brought this action and are seeking classwide declaratory and injunctive relief. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir.1974). Accordingly, the plaintiffs have also satisfied the requirements subsection (b)(2).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the proposed class meets the requisites of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs motion to certify this case as a class action is granted.
Parallel Citations
12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 263
	  

4

Campos v. I.N.S., 188 F.R.D. 656 (1999) 5

 
 Campos v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)

1999 WL 1044233 United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
Amparo CAMPOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
No. 98–2231 CIV–GOLD. | Aug. 6, 1999.
Attorneys and Law Firms
JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Miami, Florida, Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., Florida Legal Services, Inc., Miami, Florida, Joan Friedland, Lisette Losada, Miami, Florida, for plaintiffs.
Opinion
ORDER APPROVING STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
GOLD, J.
TURNOFF, Magistrate J.
*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties’ filing of their Joint Motion for Approval of Stipulated Settlement Agreement and proposed Order Approving Stipulated Settlement Agreement. The Court previously certified this matter as a class action on February 25, 1999. Pursuant to the Court’s Mediation Order in this case, the parties commenced mediation on March 8, 1999. On June 15, 1999, the parties notified the Court that, subject to Court approval, they had reached an amicable resolution of the controversy and presented for Court approval the Stipulated Settlement Agreement presently before the Court. On June 22, 1999, the Court ordered notice of the proposed settlement to the class, requiring that any objections to the proposed settlement be filed with the Court by July 30, 1999. The Court further scheduled a Settlement Fairness Hearing to be held on August 6, 1999.
Having carefully examined the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, the record in this action, the opinion of class counsel, and any comments or objections concerning the proposed Stipulated Settlement Agreement received, and following the Settlement Fairness Hearing, the Court finds as follows:

1. The Underlying Litigation The plaintiffs AMPARO CAMPOS, HECTOR CORELLA, ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, JOSEFINA LOPEZ, JUANA QUINTERO, SOFIA PARDO and AURA CONSUEGRA filed the Class Action Complaint in this matter on September 22, 1998. The complaint alleged that the actions of the defendants in processing medical waiver requests violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations, specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1 and 312.2, provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief.
On December 9, 1998 this Court denied defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. On February 24, 1999, this Court certified a plaintiff class consisting of:
All persons within the Miami District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who have properly applied, or will apply in the future, for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1445 who have also had pending at any time since March 19, 1997, a request for a waiver of either or both of the naturalization requirements that they demonstrate an understanding of the English language and that they demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment and whose request for waiver is now pending, will be filed in the future, or has been rejected by the INS, and excluding from the class anyone who has been naturalized.
*2 On December 31, 1998 Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint denying the allegations and raising numerous affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs and defendants have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment which were pending at the time the parties informed the Court of
1

Campos v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999) their Stipulated Settlement Agreement.

2. The Provisions of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement The Stipulated Settlement Agreement provides for the following:
A. Policy Clarification. The Stipulated Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”) recognizes and attaches a Policy Memorandum of defendants, dated April 7, 1999, entitled Section 312 Disability Naturalization Adjudications Policy Memorandum No. 47. The provisions of that Policy Memorandum addressed many of the issues raised in this action. Specifically, the Policy Memorandum clarifies that “an individual with a disease or disability that is related to, associated with, or caused by old age (e.g. Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease, senile dementia, etc.) can qualify for a disability exception” (Policy Memo., p. 6) and further that “depression” should be treated like any other disease or disability and evaluated based on the standard under section 312. In addition, the Policy Memorandum introduced new procedures providing for increased notification to persons whose medical waiver requests were denied as to the bases for their denial.

B. Notification and Readjudication. Within certain time periods set out in the (“the Agreement”), defendants have also agreed to reprocess, under the terms of the new Policy Memorandum No. 47, the medical waiver requests of class members whose requests had been considered and rejected by the defendants prior to December 30, 1998.1 The Agreement provides that the reprocessed medical waiver requests will be granted if they are determined sufficient under the new policy memorandum’s standards. Moreover, if they are not granted the naturalization applicant will be notified by certified mail and will be given an additional two opportunities to submit medical waivers conforming to the new standard. In addition to the certified mail notification, the defendants have agreed to establish a dedicated phone line for 120 days after the final mailing for the purpose of providing a change of address and ascertaining whether the caller is entitled to review under the Agreement.

1

This summary is for discussion purposes only and

recognizes that the Stipulated Settlement Agreement

contains conditions and limitations not set forth here.

C. Qutreach and Training. The defendants further agree to provide notice of the settlement by publication and also through outreach to community based organizations with which defendants regularly communicate. Defendants will provide copies of the Agreement and training on its

implementation to District Adjudications Officers and supervisory personnel with responsibilities for implementing the Agreement.
D. Monitoring and Dispute Resolution. The Agreement provides for regular reporting by defendants to plaintiffs’ counsel and a comprehensive system of dispute resolution.
3. The Fairness of the Settlement Agreement *3 Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 provides no guidance for courts considering proposed settlements, Bennet v. Behring, 737 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir.1984), the Eleventh Circuit has established guidelines governing the approval of class actions. The Stipulated Settlement Agreement should be approved if “[the settlement is] fair, adequate, reasonable and not the product of collusion.” Leverso v. Southtrust Bank of Alabama, N.A., 18 F.3d 1527, 1530 (11 th Cir.1994).
The Eleventh Circuit has identified a number of factors that the trial court should consider in approving the settlement:
1. The probability of Plaintiffs’ success on the merits:
2. The range of possible recovery;
3. The point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable;
4. The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation;
5. The substance and amount of opposition to the settlement; and
6. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.
Bennet, supra; Leverso, supra. Most important among these factors are the range of possible recovery, the likelihood of success on the merits and whether the settlement is “reasonable in light of these determinations.” In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 217 (5 th Cir.1981). See also, Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
The likelihood of success at trial, the range of possible recovery, and the point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. On October 16, 1998, in granting plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court previously found that plaintiffs had demonstrated a “substantial
2

Campos v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
likelihood of success” on the merits of at least some of their claims. Moreover, in support of their Motion for Class Certification plaintiffs introduced substantial deposition testimony which suggests that at least some of defendants’ personnel in the Miami District Office were rejecting medical waivers on the ground that the alleged disability was depression or a condition related to advanced age. Indeed the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, signed by both parties, recognizes at p. 3 § B that “the INS Miami District Office rejected some requests for medical waivers ... on the ground that the alleged disability was depression or a condition related to advanced age.”
On the other hand, this Court also recognizes that while plaintiffs may have initially identified some challengeable practices, defendants subsequently clarified and changed their procedures in the April 7, 1999 memorandum, which defendants have represented to this Court was part of an ongoing nationwide review of the medical waiver process. This memorandum obviated many of the concerns of the plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants had, prior to April 7, 1999, represented to this Court that defendants were in the process of developing a reprocessing procedure, and claimed that the action had become moot, depriving this Court of jurisdiction.
*4 Considering the Court’s previously expressed opinion regarding the likelihood of plaintiffs success on the merits and defendants’ expressed intentions to reprocess applications for medical waivers, the Court considers it reasonable that the parties would reach an agreed settlement at this point. Moreover the Agreement represents a resolution well within the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. Plaintiffs have asserted no claim for monetary damages. Their claims were based solely on requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs’ complaint essentially requested this Court to order defendants to cease using what plaintiffs claimed were “secret” standards, to publish the standards being used, to reprocess the claims of applicants denied under the then existing procedures and to provide increased notice to those applicants denied as to the reasons for their denial. All of those results have been substantially accomplished in this Agreement, either directly or through the attached Policy Memorandum No. 47.
The relief provided by the Stipulated Settlement Agreement is comprehensive and specific, largely incorporating the relief originally requested by the plaintiffs in detail, as well as specific requirements for defendants’ naturalization processing procedures as to the affected class. The Court may rely on the opinions of class counsel about the agreement’s fairness and adequacy. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir.1977). Here, class counsel is of the opinion that the relief provided by the Stipulated Settlement Agreement is

fair and adequate. As plaintiffs’ counsel notes, the relief provided is more specific and more readily achievable than the type of relief this Court could order after trial, since defendants’ personnel who will be responsible for implementing the relief have had input into the practicalities of crafting the remedy.
In light of the scope of the remedy provided to the plaintiff class, as well as the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success, the Court finds that the proposed agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
The complexity, expense and duration of the litigation. There is no doubt that this case presents complex legal and factual issues requiring significant time to resolve. The affidavit of class counsel attests to the extraordinarily high costs involved in the litigation. Continuing to litigate this case to judgment on the merits would involve significant expenditures of both time and money by all parties to this litigation. These factors weigh particularly heavily in favor of settlement in this case since defendants have already prospectively modified their policy to accommodate plaintiffs’ concerns.
The substance and amount of opposition to the settlement. There has been no significant opposition to the settlement. As set forth above, in approving a settlement agreement the Court may rely on the opinions of class counsel, although such opinions must be weighed against any objections which may be received from class members, Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir.1983). Where, as here, there have been no substantive objections and plaintiffs’ counsel strongly endorse the agreement, this Court should give class counsel’s opinion considerable weight.
*5 The state of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. In this case, as can be readily ascertained from review of the record and as attested in the affidavit of class counsel, the parties completed an enormous amount of discovery. Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted numerous depositions of key witnesses and received and reviewed extensive documents through the discovery process. Indeed, prior to informing the Court that they had reached an agreement in this case, both sides had sought summary judgment. Thus, in negotiating the Agreement which is now before the Court, each party was well-informed as to the relevant facts. See Behrens v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 544 (S.D.Fla.1988) (Settlement reached after several months of discovery and motions for summary judgment had been filed indicates that the parties “were in an excellent position to evaluate their chances of success [and] were in the best position to judge the merits of the compromise.”). Nor was there fraud or collusion behind the settlement of this lawsuit, as evidenced by both the extensive discovery and motion practice that preceded the Agreement, as well as the extraordinarily lengthy and detailed bargaining
3

Campos v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
sessions held by the parties with the active participation of the Court’s mediator prior to reaching agreement. See Affidavit of Class Counsel.
In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the class interest is adequately protected, the proposed Agreement is fair and reasonable, and that the Agreement should be approved. It is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Stipulated

Settlement Agreement is APPROVED.
Parallel Citations 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 515
	  

4

 
 CM/ECF - Live Database - flsd
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:98-cv-02231-ASG

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
CLOSED

Campos, et al v. U.S. - INS, et al Assigned to: Judge Alan S. Gold Demand: $0 Cause: 08:1446 Petition for Naturalization Hearing

Date Filed: 09/22/1998 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Plaintiff Amparo Campos

represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. Florida Legal Services Inc Miami Advocacy Office 3000 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 450 Miami, FL 33137 305-573-0092 Fax: 576-9664 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JoNel Newman Florida Justice Institute 100 SE 2nd Street 4320 Bank of America Tower Miami, FL 33131-2309 305-358-2081 Fax: 358-0910 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisette Maria Losada Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center 3000 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 400 Miami, FL 33137 305-573-1106X141 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl?995919215892263-L_186_0-1

Page 1 of 20

CM/ECF - Live Database - flsd
Plaintiff Hector Corella
Plaintiff Angela Rodriguez
Plaintiff Josefina Lopez

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman

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Plaintiff Juana Quintero
Plaintiff Sofia Pardo

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Aura Consuegra on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles F. Elsesser, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JoNel Newman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisette Maria Losada (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
United States Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service

represented by Alice Loughran United States Justice Department Immigration Litigation 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 700 S Washington, DC 20530 202-514-8599 Fax: 616-9366 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dexter Lee United States Attorney's Office 99 NE 4 Street Miami, FL 33132 305-961-9320 Fax: 530-7139 Email: dexter.lee@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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06/20/2007 02:46 PM

Defendant
Doris Meissner Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Linda Sue Werner United States Justice Department Immigration Litigation 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 700 S Washington, DC 20530 202-616-4865 Fax: 616-9366 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa A. Wallbaum United States Justice Department Immigration Litigation 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 700 S Washington, DC 20530 202-616-5193 Fax: 616-9366 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Loughran (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dexter Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Sue Werner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa A. Wallbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999

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Defendant Robert Wallis District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami
Defendant Elaine Watson Director, Naturalization Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Loughran (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dexter Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Sue Werner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa A. Wallbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alice Loughran (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dexter Lee (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Sue Werner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Amicus Mayor Alex Penelas Maimi/Dade County
Amicus Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Congresswoman
Amicus Lincoln Diaz-Balart Congressman
Amicus Carrie Meek Congresswoman

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
Teresa A. Wallbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Lewis Bevington Holland & Knight 100 N Tampa Street Suite 4100 PO Box 1288 Tampa, FL 33602-3644 813-227-8500 TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Lewis Bevington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Lewis Bevington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth Lewis Bevington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

09/22/1998 09/22/1998

1 COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE IFP; A-7, WCT (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)

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06/20/2007 02:46 PM

09/22/1998
09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998

2 MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
3 MOTION by Amparo Campos to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
3 AFFIDAVIT by Amparo Campos in support of [3-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
4 MOTION by Angela Rodriguez to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
4 AFFIDAVIT by Angela Rodriguez in support of [4-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
5 MOTION by Hector Corella to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
5 AFFIDAVIT by Hector Corella in support of [5-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
6 MOTION by Aura Consuegra to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
6 AFFIDAVIT by Aura Consuegra in support of [6-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
7 MOTION by Sofia Pardo to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
7 AFFIDAVIT by Sofia Pardo Re: [7-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
8 MOTION by Juana Quintero to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
8 AFFIDAVIT by Juana Quintero in support of [8-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
9 MOTION by Josefina Lopez to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
9 AFFIDAVIT by Josefina Lopez in support of [9-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
10 EMERGENCY MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra for temporary restraining order and/or for preliminary injunction and Request for an Immediate Hearing on on motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)

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09/22/1998
09/22/1998 09/22/1998 09/22/1998
09/23/1998 09/23/1998 09/23/1998 09/23/1998
09/30/1998 09/30/1998 10/05/1998 10/06/1998

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
11 MEMORANDUM by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra in support of [101] motion for temporary restraining order, [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
12 NOTICE of filing exhibits by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Consuegra(attached) (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
13 SUMMONS(ES) issued for U.S. - INS by serving Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, INS Washington, and U.S. Attorney, Thomas Scott (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
18 ORDER set evidentiary hearing for 5:00 10/1/98 granting [10-1] motion for temporary restraining order, granting [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction, granting [10-3] motion for an Immediate Hearing on on motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 9/22/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/29/1998)
14 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Robert Wallis (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
15 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Elaine Watson (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
16 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Doris Meissner (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
17 ORDER granting [9-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [8-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [7-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [6-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [5-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [4-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis, granting [3-1] motion to proceed in forma pauperis ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 9/23/98) CCAP (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
19 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to continue 10/1/98 hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/02/1998)
20 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to [19-1] motion to continue 10/1/98 hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/02/1998)
21 ORDER granting [19-1] motion to continue 10/1/98 hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction set for 10/6/98 at 5:15 (signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 10/1/98) CCAP (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/07/1998)
22 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for leave to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in excess of 20 pages (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/08/1998)

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10/06/1998 10/06/1998
10/07/1998 10/08/1998 10/09/1998 10/09/1998 10/16/1998 10/26/1998 10/26/1998 10/26/1998 10/26/1998 10/29/1998 10/29/1998 10/29/1998

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
23 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson in opposition to [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
24 NOTICE OF FILING ATTACHED EXHIBITS to: [10-1] motion for temporary restraining order, [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
25 ORDER extending temporary restraining order ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 10/7/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
26 ORDER granting [22-1] motion for leave to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in excess of 20 pages ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 10/7/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/08/1998)
27 REPLY by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to response to [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/14/1998)
28 SUPPLEMENT by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to: [23-1] opposition response (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/14/1998)
29 ORDER granting [10-2] motion for preliminary injunction (see order for further details) (signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 10/16/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
30 NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Ricky Hamilton 1:00 11/17/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
31 NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Terry Porter 1:00 11/18/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
32 NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Elaine D. Watson 9:30 11/17/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
33 NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Ada Rivera 9;30 11/18/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
34 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner for leave to file motion to dismiss in excess of twenty pages (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/04/1998)
35 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to dismiss complaint (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/04/1998)
36 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for a stay of discovery (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/04/1998)

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11/03/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998 11/05/1998

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
37 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to expedite consideration of motion for a stay of discovery (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/06/1998)
38 NOTICE of filing defendants' returns of service by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
39 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for U.S. - INS, 425 I Street, NW, Washington, DC 20536 on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for U.S. - INS (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
40 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for U.S. - INS by serving Janet Reno, US Attorney General on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for U.S. - INS (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
41 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for U.S. - INS by serving US Attorney Thomas Scott on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for U.S. - INS (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
42 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Doris Meissner on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Doris Meissner (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
43 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Doris Meissner by serving Janet Reno on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Doris Meissner (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
44 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Doris Meissner by serving Thomas Scott on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Doris Meissner (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
45 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Robert Wallis on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Robert Wallis (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
46 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Robert Wallis by serving Janet Reno on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Robert Wallis (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
47 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Robert Wallis by serving Thomas Scott on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Robert Wallis (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
48 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Elaine Watson on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
49 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Elaine Watson by serving Janet Reno on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
50 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Elaine Watson by serving Thomas Scott on 9/23/98 Answer due on 10/13/98 for Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk)

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11/09/1998 11/09/1998 11/09/1998 11/09/1998 11/09/1998 11/12/1998 11/13/1998 11/17/1998 11/20/1998 11/20/1998 11/20/1998 11/20/1998

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
(Entered: 11/09/1998)
51 EMERGENCY MOTION with memorandum in support by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to compel discovery and certificate of counsel (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/12/1998)
52 EMERGENCY MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to expedite consideration of motion to compel discovery (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/12/1998)
53 RESPONSE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra in opposition to [36-1] motion for a stay of discovery, with attached declaration of counsel (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/12/1998)
Telephonic Motion hearing re: [37-1] motion to expedite consideration of motion for a stay of discovery (hd, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 11/13/1998 (Entered: 11/13/1998)
54 Minutes of telephonic motion hearing re: defendant's motion to expedite consideration of motion for a stay of discovery held before Judge Alan S. Gold on 11/9/98; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: JOSEPH MILLIKAN (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/13/1998)
55 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Terry Porter 10:00 11/23/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/16/1998)
56 ORDER granting [34-1] motion for leave to file motion to dismiss in excess of twenty pages ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 11/10/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
57 RESPONSE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra in opposition to [35-1] motion to dismiss complaint (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/23/1998)
58 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Ada Rivera 12/3/98 at 9:30 (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
59 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Terry Porter 12/1/98 at 9:30 (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
60 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Elaine D. Watson 12/4/98 at 9:30 (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
61 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina

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11/20/1998 11/23/1998
11/24/1998 11/25/1998 12/02/1998
12/04/1998 12/09/1998 12/17/1998
12/17/1998 12/17/1998 12/18/1998 12/18/1998

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Ricky Hamilton 12/2/98 at 9:30 (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
62 STIPULATION AND ORDER concerning produciton of certain documents ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 11/20/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
63 ORDER granting [51-1] motion to compel discovery, granting [37-1] motion to expedite consideration of motion for a stay of discovery, denying [36-1] motion for a stay of discovery ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 11/10/98) CCAP (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/25/1998)
64 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for leave to file reply in excess of ten pages (placed in pod 2) (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/02/1998)
65 NOTICE to take deposition of Tom Jasso 12/4/98 at 2:00 (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/03/1998)
66 Joint Scheduling Report of Scheduling Meeting by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra, U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/07/1998)
67 RE-NOTICE by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to take deposition of Tom Jasso 1:00 12/8/98 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/09/1998)
68 ORDER denying [35-1] motion to dismiss complaint ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 12/8/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/11/1998)
72 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Calendar call set for 1:30 8/11/99 Pretrial Stipulation due on or before 7/11/99 Jury trial set for 9:00 8/16/99 Pretrial conference for 9:00 7/2/99 ; ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 12/17/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
72 ORDER REFERRING DISCOVERY MATTERS to Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 12/17/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
73 ORDER referring case to mediation. 15 days to appoint mediator ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 12/17/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
69 MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to certify the class (hd, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/18/1998 (Entered: 12/18/1998)
70 MEMORANDUM by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra in support of [691] motion to certify the class (hd, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/18/1998

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CM/ECF - Live Database - flsd
12/18/1998 12/21/1998
12/21/1998 12/22/1998 12/31/1998 01/05/1999 01/11/1999 01/15/1999 01/15/1999 01/19/1999 01/21/1999

06/20/2007 02:46 PM
(Entered: 12/18/1998)
71 NOTICE of filing attached documents in support of motion to certify the class by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
74 FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra , (Answer due 12/31/98 for Elaine Watson, for Robert Wallis, for Doris Meissner, for U.S. - INS ) amending [1-1] complaint (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
75 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to extend time to file response to plaintiffs' motion to certify the class (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
76 ORDER Response to motion reset to 1/15/99 for [69-1] motion to certify the class granting [75-1] motion to extend time to file response to plaintiffs' motion to certify the class ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 12/22/98) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/30/1998)
77 Answer and affirmative defenses by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/07/1999)
78 NOTICE of selection of Irwin J. Block as Mediator by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra, U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/08/1999)
79 Plaintiffs' Expert Witness list by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/13/1999)
80 CORRECTED ANSWER and affirmative defenses to Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson : amends [77-1] answer (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
81 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson in opposition to [69-1] motion to certify the class (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
82 ORDER setting motion hearing on [69-1] motion to certify the class by plaintiff for 4:00 2/5/99 ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 1/15/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/20/1999)
83 MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to extend time to reply to defendants' oppostiion to class certification (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/27/1999)

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01/25/1999 02/01/1999 02/01/1999 02/01/1999 02/05/1999
02/05/1999 02/05/1999 02/08/1999 02/08/1999 02/12/1999 02/12/1999 02/12/1999

84 ORDER Reply to Response to Motion reset to 2/1/99 for [69-1] motion to certify the class granting [83-1] motion to extend time to reply to defendants' oppostiion to class certification ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 1/22/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
85 REPLY by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra to response to [69-1] motion to certify the class (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/03/1999)
86 NOTICE, with attached diskette, of filing diskette containing copy of plaintiffs' reply memorandum supporting motion to certify the class by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/03/1999)
87 Expert Witness list by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/03/1999)
88 JOINT MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra, U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to amend pretrial [72-1] referral/referred order, [72-1] Scheduling order (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
Oral argument re: [69-1] motion to certify the class Motion hearing held (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
89 Minutes of oral argument held before Judge Alan S. Gold on 2/5/99; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: ANITA LA ROCCA (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
90 Amended definition of class by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
91 ORDER granting joint motion for modification o pretrial order, granting [88-1] motion to amend pretrial [72-1] referral/referred order, [72-1] Scheduling order ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 2/8/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
92 MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra for summary judgment , with request for permanent injunctive relief (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/1999)
93 MEMORANDUM by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra in support of [921] motion for summary judgment, [92-2] motion for permanent injunctive relief (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/1999)
94 Statement of undisputed material facts in support of summary judgment motion

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02/12/1999
02/12/1999
02/18/1999 02/25/1999 03/01/1999 03/01/1999 03/01/1999 03/01/1999
03/01/1999 03/01/1999
03/04/1999

by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/1999)
95 NOTICE of filing summary judgment motion, statement of undisputed material facts re: same, and memorandum in support re: same by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/1999)
96 NOTICE of filing attached documents in support of summary judgment motion by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/17/1999)
97 NOTICE of filing attached documents to complete the depositions by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/19/1999)
98 ORDER granting [69-1] motion to certify the class ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 2/24/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
99 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to [94-1] plaintiffs' statement of undisputed material facts (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
100 MEMORANDUM by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson in opposition to [92-1] motion for summary judgment, [92-2] motion for permanent injunctive relief (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
100 CROSS MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for summary judgment (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
101 NOTICE of filing attached documents in support of opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
102 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to dismiss complaint as moot , or in the alternative for summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/03/1999)
103 MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for leave to file opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in support of defendants' cross-motion for summary jdugment that exceeds page limitation (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/05/1999)
104 ORDER granting [103-1] motion for leave to file opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in support of defendants' crossmotion for summary jdugment that exceeds page limitation ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/2/99) CCAP (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/1999)

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03/05/1999 03/05/1999 03/09/1999 03/09/1999 03/11/1999 03/11/1999 03/11/1999
03/12/1999 03/16/1999 03/17/1999 03/18/1999 03/22/1999

105 MOTION with memorandum in support by Alex Penelas, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Carrie Meek for leave to appear and file brief as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
106 AMICUS CURIAE/MEMORANDUM by Alex Penelas, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Carrie Meek in support of [92-1] motion for summary judgment, [92-2] motion for permanent injunctive relief (hd, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 03/15/1999 (Entered: 03/11/1999)
107 STIPULATION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra, U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson Concerning Production of Certain Documents (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/1999)
108 MOTION with memorandum in support by All Plaintiffs to extend time to reply to defendants' summary judgment submissions with affidavit of counsel (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/1999)
109 REPORT of Mediator that mediation adjourned for period not to exceed 30 days to permit settlement negotiations to continue; parties will then submit report (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
110 ORDER granting [105-1] motion for leave to appear and file brief as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/10/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
111 ORDER Response to motion reset to 4/19/99 for [102-2] motion for summary judgment, reset to 4/19/99 for [100-1] cross motion for summary judgment granting [108-1] motion to extend time to reply to defendants' summary judgment submissions with affidavit of counsel ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/10/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
112 JOINT MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson, All Plaintiffs for modification of [72-1] pretrial scheduling order (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/1999)
113 ORDER granting [112-1] motion for modification of [72-1] pretrial scheduling order (see order for further details) ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/16/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
114 MOTION by All Plaintiffs to shorten time to reply to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and third request for production of documents (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
115 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson in opposition to [114-1] motion to shorten time to reply to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and third request for production of documents (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
116 REPLY by All Plaintiffs to response to [114-1] motion to shorten time to reply

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03/23/1999
03/25/1999 03/25/1999 03/25/1999 03/26/1999 04/12/1999 04/20/1999 04/20/1999 04/20/1999 04/22/1999
04/26/1999

to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and third request for production of documents (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/24/1999)
117 ORDER setting 4/5/99 deadline for defendants to respond to second interrogatories and third production request, granting [114-1] motion to shorten time to reply to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and third request for production of documents ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/18/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
118 JOINT MOTION by All Plaintiffs, Alex Penelas, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Carrie Meek to hold the case in abeyance until 4/23/99 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/1999)
119 RESPONSE by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson to [106-1] Amicus Curaie brief support memorandum to motion for summary judgment (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/1999)
120 JOINT MOTION by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson, All Plaintiffs to hold case in abeyance until 4/23/99 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/1999)
121 ORDER granting [118-1] joint motion to hold the case in abeyance until 4/23/99 ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 3/26/99) CCAP (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/30/1999)
122 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT dated 3/8/99 of Mediator that:settlement neotiations are onoing and the parties are exchanging drafts of proposed settlement agreements (mc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/19/1999)
123 ORDER that as of 4/1/99 this case has no pending, fully-briefed, referred motions ( signed by Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff on 4/19/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/23/1999)
124 ORDER OF MAGISTRATE REASSIGNMENT TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREA M. SIMONTON ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 4/19/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/1999)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/27/1999)
125 JOINT MOTION by Amparo Campos, Hector Corella, Angela Rodriguez, Josefina Lopez, Juana Quintero, Sofia Pardo, Aura Consuegra, U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson for case to be continued to be held in abeyance for one week, until 4/30/99 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
126 ORDER setting 4/30/99 deadline for case to be held in abeyeance, on which date a report shall be made to the Court, granting [125-1] joint motion for case to be continued to be held in abeyance for one week, until 4/30/99 ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 4/23/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/03/1999)

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04/30/1999
05/03/1999 05/03/1999 05/27/1999 06/14/1999 06/15/1999
06/22/1999
06/22/1999 06/23/1999 07/19/1999
07/19/1999 07/19/1999 08/02/1999

127 JOINT NOTIFICATION REGARDING STATUS OF SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS AND JOINT REQUEST by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson, All Plaintiffs to hold case in abeyance until 4/28/99 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/05/1999)
128 ORDER granting [127-1] motion to hold case in abeyance until 4/28/99 ( signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 5/3/99) CCAP (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/05/1999)
**Set Stayed Flag (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/05/1999)
129 Joint request by U.S. - INS, Doris Meissner, Robert Wallis, Elaine Watson, All Plaintiffs to continue to hold case in abeyance until 6/11/99 (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/01/1999)
131 ORDER granting joint request to continue hold case in abeyance until 6/11/99 (Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 6/7/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/18/99] (gz, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/1999)
130 JOINT MOTION by All Plaintiffs notice to class of proposed settlement; for approval of stipulated settlement agreement , and dismissal with prejudice with stipulated settlement agreement and proposed orders (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
132 ORDER PROVIDING NTOICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO PLAINTIFF CLASS, granting [130-1] motion notice to class of proposed settlement; for approval of stipulated settlement agreement (see order for additional details) ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 6/22/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/22/99] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/1999)
133 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT in class action case (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/22/1999)
134 ORDER setting settlement fairness hearing for 9:00 8/6/99 (see order for additional details) ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 6/23/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/28/99] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/1999)
135 NOTICE of filing joint proposed order approving stipulated settlement agreement with supporting affidavit of class counsel and declaration of INS associate general counsel by All Plaintiffs (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
136 AFFIDAVIT of class counsel by All Plaintiffs supporting [135-1] notice for order approving stipulated settlement agreement (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
137 Declaration by All Plaintiffs supporting [135-1] notice for order approving stipulated settlement agreement (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
138 NOTICE of filing declaration of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen supporting approval of proposed stipulated settlement agreement by All Plaintiffs (hd,

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08/02/1999 08/06/1999 08/06/1999 08/06/1999 08/06/1999
08/06/1999
08/06/1999

Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/05/1999)
139 Declaration of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen supporting approval of fairness of settlement agreement by All Plaintiffs (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/05/1999)
Fairness hearing held (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
140 Minutes of fairness hearing held before Judge Alan S. Gold on 8/6/99; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: PAUL HAFERLING (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
141 PROTECTIVE ORDER re: release of material protected under the Privacy Act ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 8/6/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 8/10/99] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
142 ORDER approving stipulated settlement agreement, granting [130-1] motion notice to class of proposed settlement; for approval of stipulated settlement agreement ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 8/6/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 8/10/99] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
143 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, granting [130-2] motion dismissal with prejudice with stipulated settlement agreement and proposed orders; case closed ( Signed by Judge Alan S. Gold on 8/6/99) CCAP [EOD Date: 8/10/99] (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
CASE CLOSED. Case and Motions no longer referred to Magistrate. (hd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/1999)

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

06/20/2007 15:45:16

PACER Login: wu0079

Client Code: Woodruff

Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 1:98-cv-02231-ASG

Billable Pages: 11

Cost:

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