IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CORNELL BOLDEN, KEITH JACKSON,

)

MICHAEL AMATO, AND CHARLES MORGAN, )

each individually and on behalf of all others,

)

similarly situated

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JOHN STROGER, President, Cook County Board, )

in his official capacity; THE COUNTY OF COOK; )

MICHAEL SHEAHAN, Sheriff of Cook County,

)

in his official capacity; RUTH ROTHSTEIN, Director, )

Cook County Department of Health Services, in her )

official capacity,

)

)

Defendants.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 1. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12133 and 42 U.S.C. §1983, on behalf of two classes of persons with mental illness confined in the Cook County Jail while awaiting trial on pending criminal charges. In Count I of this Complaint, plaintiffs challenge, as violative of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq., defendants' policy and practice of barring individuals with mental illness from participation in community and treatment programs, even when these individuals are otherwise qualified to participate in the programs and would benefit from them. In Count II, plaintiffs challenge, as violative of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the ADA, defendants' policy and practice of discharging individuals with mental illness into the community without the medication and referrals they require to manage their illness.

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2. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343. 3. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §2201 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 57.
PARTIES Named Plaintiffs 4. Cornell Bolden has been diagnosed with depression. He has been incarcerated in the Cook County Jail1 since his arrest on June 8, 2003, for delivery of a controlled substance. Aged 38, he is from Chicago and has been in jail numerous times. He is housed in Division VIII ofthe Jail, a medical unit designated for, among others, individuals with chronic mental illness. 5. Keith Jackson has been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. He has been incarcerated in the Cook County Jail since his arrest on June 23, 2003, for possession of a controlled substance. Aged 38, he moved to Illinois a year ago and lived in Chicago prior to his arrest. This is his first incarceration in Illinois, although he has been incarcerated in other states. He has been housed in Division VIII ofthe Jail, except for a briefstay in Division II and a stay in the Jail's Cermak Hospital. 6. Michael Amato has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He has been incarcerated in the Cook County Jail since his arrest on November 27, 2002, for drug-related charges. Aged 45, he lives in Oak Lawn, Illinois, with his mother prior to his most recent arrest. He is housed in Division VIII ofthe Jail. 7. Charles Morgan has been diagnosed with manic depressive illness. He has been incarcerated in the Cook County Jail since his arrest on June 27, 2003, for possession ofa controlled
1 The Cook County Jail is known officially as the Cook County Department of Corrections. It is referred to herein as the "Cook County Jail" or "the Jail."
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substance. Aged 43, he is from Chicago where he has resided with his mother. He is housed in Division VIII of the Jail.
The Plaintiff Class 8. The named plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(2) on behalf of two classes of individuals with mental illness detained pending trial at the Cook County Jail. The two classes have overlapping members. Some individuals with mental illness detained at the Jail are members of both classes, while others are members of one class only. 9. The first class (the "Count I class") is comprised of: All persons with mental illness who are or will be detained prior to trial in the Cook County Jail (excluding persons who have been and remain committed, or will be committed, to the Illinois Department of Corrections upon conviction of a crime) and who meet the bond and charge criteria for release programs or the "pre-release" center administered by the Sheriff. 10. This class meets all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). (a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are approximately 1,000-1,500 individuals with mental illness in the Jail. At any given time, an estimated 300 men and 60 women with chronic mental illness are incarcerated in the Jail in Divisions III and VIII alone. A significant number of these individuals would be eligible for release programs or substance abuse treatment programs but for defendants' exclusionary policies and practices. (b) There are questions of law or fact common to the named plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class. Common questions include: whether defendants maintain policies and practices of excluding individuals with mental illness from release and treatment programs, whether defendants' exclusion of individuals from release and treatment programs on the basis of their mental illness violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, and whether defendants must make
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reasonable modifications to their policies and practices to avoid excluding individuals with mental illness from release and treatment programs on the basis of disability.
(c) The claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the plaintiff class as a whole.
(d) The plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of class members. Plaintiffs have no interests adverse to or in conflict with class members. Their counsel have extensive experience in the areas of class action litigation and civil rights litigation on behalf of individuals with disabilities.
(e) Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. Defendants have denied the class access to release and treatment programs based on mental illness. The class has a need for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants' exclusionary policies and practices.
11. The second class (the "Count II class") is comprised of : all persons: (a) with mental illness who are or will be detained in the Cook County Jail prior to trial (excluding persons who have been and remain committed, or are committed, to the Illinois Department of corrections upon conviction of a crime); and (b) who are or will be discharged into the community; and (c) who have or will have been taking psychiatric medication immediately prior to such discharge. 12. This class meets all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). (a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. More than 200 class members are discharged into the community each month without the medications and referrals they require to manage their mental illness. (b) There are questions of law or fact common to the named plaintiffs and the members
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of the plaintiff class. Common questions include: whether defendants provide detainees upon discharge with the medication and referrals they need to manage their mental illness and function in the community, and whether defendants have a legal duty to provide medications and linkages to treatment services and supports needed for plaintiffs and class members to manage their illness and function in the community.
(c) The claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the plaintiff class as a whole.
(d) The plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of class members. Plaintiffs have no interests adverse to or in conflict with class members. Their counsel have extensive experience in the areas of class action litigation and civil rights litigation on behalf of individuals with disabilities.
(e) The defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs and class members have been prescribed medication to control their mental illness. If released without medication and without linkages to needed treatment services and supports, they will likely be unable to manage their mental illness or function successfully in the community. All plaintiffs have a need for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants' policies and practices pursuant to which they are discharged without necessary medication and without linkages to necessary treatment and support services.
Defendants 13. John Stroger is the President of the Cook County Board, which administers the
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County of Cook. As such, John Stroger has a legal responsibility to ensure that the policies and practices of the County of Cook, and its administrative departments, comply with the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He is sued in his official capacity.
14. The County of Cook operates the Cook County Jail and the release and treatment programs to which plaintiff and the class are denied access. It is ultimately responsible for discharge practices at the Jail. The County of Cook has a legal responsibility to administer its programs and services in conformity with the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
15. Michael Sheahan is the Sheriff of Cook County. As such, he administers the Cook County Jail and the release and treatment programs to which plaintiffs and the class are denied access. He has a legal responsibility to ensure that the Jail and these release and treatment programs are administered in conformity with the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He is sued in his official capacity.
16. Ruth Rothstein is the Director of the Department Health Services within the County of Cook. As such, she administers Cermak Health Services (CHS), the health care service provider for detainees in the jail. She has a legal responsibility to ensure that CHS is administered in conformity with the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She is sued in her official capacity.
DEFENDANTS' DETENTION, RELEASE AND DISCHARGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 17. Persons who are charged with crimes in Cook County and are unable to make bond (including those charged for crimes for which there is no bond) are detained at the Cook County Jail while awaiting trial. Detainees are screened for medical needs, including mental disorders. 18. The average daily population of the jail in 2002 was 11,019 persons; the daily
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population in May 2003 was 10,349 persons. Consistent with national studies of the rates of mental illness within jail populations, it is estimated that at least 10% of the over 10,000 individuals incarcerated in the jail at any given time--at least 1,000 persons--are individuals with mental illness.
19. There are 10 divisions housing inmates within the Jail, serving different population subgroups and having differently configured living quarters. At any given time, some 400 inmates with mental illness are housed in facilities specifically designated for indivictuals with mental illness - Division III, Division VIII, and the acute care unit, Cermak Hospital.
(a) Division III, the women's special needs division, houses women with mental illness and women with other medical needs. It contains an estimated 353 beds, of which approximately 60 are specifically designated for women with psychiatric conditions.
(b) Division VIII, residential treatment unit (RU) for men, houses males with mental or physical illness. It has 768 beds, of which approximately 300-350 beds are designated for individuals with mental illness. The living arrangements are dormitory-style. The majority of individuals in Division VIII have medium or minimum security classifications.
(c) Cermak Hospital is an acute care unit that serves both men and women with mental illness.
20. Male inmates with mental illness who have maximum security classifications or are otherwise judged to be unable to reside in dormitory-style housing may be assigned to a specialized mental health or medical unit within one of the other divisions.
21. Many inmates with mental illness, including those receiving psychiatric medications, are assigned to general population living quarters.
22. Since at least 1982, the Jail has been overcrowded. During most of the time since
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1982, the "overflow" population (the number of people in the Jail exceeding its bed capacity) has numbered in the hundreds, often exceeding 1,000 persons. As recently as January 2003, overflow population was 1,478 persons. Overcrowding affects every division in the Jail, including the RU and Division Ill. Inmates in the overflow population are given mattresses and sleep on floors either in a cell or in the day room of their assigned tier.
Release Programs 23. Because the Jail has been overcrowded, the County has developed several release programs under which persons who would otherwise be incarcerated in the jail are released into the community while awaiting trial. These are: the Administrative Mandatory Furlough program, which issues "I-Bonds" (I-Bond program); the Electronic Monitoring (EM) program; and the Day Reporting program. (a) Under the "!-Bonds" program, administered by the Sheriff, persons with low bonds may be released from the Jail on their own recognizance. !-Bonds are issued before assignment of inmates to a division. Since 1986 over 213,991 persons have been released from the Jail under this program. In 2001, for example, 6,536 persons were released under the program. (b) The Electronic Monitoring (EM) program, which currently serves approximately 1,550 inmates at any given time, permits inmates to be released to a residence as long as the inmate wears ankle bracelets, containing transmitters to the Department of Community Supervision and Intervention (DCSI) within the Sheriffs Office, and as long as he or she notifies DCSI of his or her whereabouts at all times. Persons eligible for EM may maintain employment or attend school. Individuals enter the program after going through the receiving unit of the Jail or thereafter when determined to meet the qualifications for the program, which are based principally on the nature of their pending charges but may also include consideration of their conduct during incarceration and
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prior record. From April1, 2001, through March 31, 2002, a total of 10,079 persons who would otherwise have remained incarcerated in the Jail successfully completed the Electronic Monitoring Program.
(c) The Day Reporting program, also administered by the Sheriffs Office, is for men only. To be eligible for the Day Reporting program, individuals must first participate in the EM program. In the Day Reporting program, individuals come and go in the community without reporting their whereabouts at all times and they do not wear bracelets. They are required to attend a variety of day programs at the Jail, including substance abuse, health education and vocational training programs. The Day Reporting program currently serves over 600 persons at any given time.
24. Participation in release programs provides substantial benefits. Participation facilitates working, attending education and training programs, and contact with family. In addition, successful participation leads to favorable reports from the Sheriff's Office (through DCSI) that influence the disposition of individuals' criminal cases. Successful participation reduces the likelihood of being sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections even if found guilty of the offenses charged.
Substance Abuse Treatment 25. Many inmates in the Jail have a history of substance abuse. Accordingly, in addition to release programs, the Sheriff also administers (through DCSI) a "pre-release" center at the Jail that provides intensive substance abuse treatment. The "pre-release" center, for male inmates only, serves nearly 300 at any given time. 26. Like participation in release programs, participation in the "pre-release" center provides substantial benefits. It can help inmates resolve their substance abuse problems. It also can favorably influence the disposition of their criminal case, for example, by reducing the
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likelihood of being sentenced to further incarceration if found guilty. Discrimination Based on Mental illness 27. Despite these programs' substantial benefits, and although they are otherwise eligible
for them, individuals with mental illness are excluded from participation in release programs and the "pre-release" center.
(a) Individuals with mental illness are ineligible for the "I-Bond" program. Some individuals with mental illness are inadvertently accepted into the program when the screening assessment at the Jail fails to reveal a mental illness and the individuals do not self-identify.
(b) Individuals assigned to Division VIII, the residential treatment unit, are ineligible to participate in the Electronic Monitoring program and the Day Reporting program if the basis for their assignment to the division is a mental illness. Those assigned to Division VIII for other medical reasons may, however, be considered eligible to participate in the EM or Day Reporting programs.
(c) Individuals with mental illness are deemed ineligible for the "pre-release" center, and there is no equivalent program for male inmates with mental illness in the Jail.
28. The exclusionary policies and practices described above are the product of prejudice against, and unfounded fears and stereotype concerning, individuals with mental illness.
Discharge Practices 29. Throughout the Jail, there are estimated to be 1,000-1,500 persons who have a mental illness. Most of these individuals are prescribed medication for their illnesses by psychiatrists or other doctors with Cermak Health Services, which provides medical care at the Jail. Medication is delivered by nursing staff to each division daily. Virtually all inmates with mental illness in Division VIII, the residential treatment unit, and in Division III, the women's special needs unit,
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have prescribed medication for their mental illness and take such medication while they are in the Jail.
30. Individuals taking psychiatric medications while at the Jail rarely receive a supply of medication at discharge2 and are rarely linked to needed treatment services and supports upon discharge. Accordingly, over 1,000 individuals with mental illness are discharged each year from the Jail without the medications and the linkages to treatment services and supports that they need to manage their mental illness and function in the community.
31. From Divisions III and VIII alone, 150 individuals with mental illness are discharged each month into the community. Discharge plans, arranging for the continuation of necessary medications, are developed for approximately 30 of the 150 individuals with mental illness discharged each month from Divisions III and VIII. These plans anticipate that the Jail and/or Cermak Health Services will provide of a supply of medication upon discharge that will last until the inmate is able to obtain a prescription in the community. However, only an estimated half of the inmates in Divisions III and VIII with discharge plans are actually provided medications when they leave the Jail.
32. Discharge plans, arranging for the continuation of necessary medications upon discharge, are rarely developed for inmates with mental illness in divisions other than Divisions III and VIII.
33. When released without necessary medication and without linkages to needed
2 "Discharge" occurs when a criminal court determines that there is no longer a basis for continuing an individual's confinement at the Jail. Reasons for discharge include: (a) being found not guilty at trial; (b) being determined to have fulfilled the maximum sentence for an offense; (c) having a case dismissed for want of prosecution; (d) being sentenced to probation and (e) making bail.
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treatment services and supports, inmates with mental illness are often unable to manage their mental illness or function successfully in the community. They may abuse drugs or alcohol, be arrested andre-incarcerated in the Jail, and/or be hospitalized in emergency rooms or institutionalized in state hospitals, all at great cost to themselves, the public, and the County.
34. On information and belief, individuals with medical conditions other than mental illness who require medication upon discharge are provided such medication and are provided linkages to needed medical and supportive services in the community.
35. Programs exist in Cook County, as well as nationally, that have excellent records in helping individuals with mental illness who have been discharged from jail secure the medication and treatment services and supports they need to manage their illness, function successfully, and be reintegrated into the community. These programs are cost-effective when compared to the cost of incarceration in jail and/or to the costs incurred when discharged inmates, lacking needed medications and linkages, are unable to manage their illness and function successfully in the community.
THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS' POLICIES AND PRACTICES TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS 36. Plaintiff Cornell Bolden has depression. He is housed in Division Vill. He has been prescribed and receives anti-depressants while at the Jail. He has been found eligible for and in the past has received federal disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI'') program. 37. Plaintiff Bolden has been incarcerated for non-violent crimes, including delivery of controlled substances, retail theft, and auto burglary. His criminal history is related to his substance abuse problem. 38. Plaintiff Bolden has a $60,000 bond, which means he would be released from the jail
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while awaiting trial on charges of delivery of a controlled substance if he could pay $6,000. 39. Plaintiff Bolden has been excluded from release programs and the "pre-release"
center because he has been diagnosed with a mental illness and has been assigned to Division VIII based on that diagnosis. He is otherwise eligible for these programs. His mental disability can be reasonably accommodated in a release program or the "pre-release" center. Inmates with similar criminal histories and similar substance abuse problems participate in these programs.
40. Plaintiff Bolden has a residence available to him if found eligible for release pending trial. His sister Angela Godfrey wants Mr. Bolden to reside with her if he is released into the Electronic Monitoring or Day Reporting programs.
41. There is no discharge plan for Plaintiff Bolden that describes arrangements for the continuation ofnecessary medications upon his discharge or for linking him to needed treatment and supportive services upon discharge. Mr. Bolden has in the past been discharged from jail without access to necessary medications and needed treatment and supportive services, and has relapsed and returned to jail. It is likely that Mr. Bolden will again be discharged from jail without necessary medications and linkages to needed treatment and supportive services, and will again relapse.
42. Plaintiff Keith Jackson has an anxiety disorder. He has been housed in Division VIII of the Jail. He has been prescribed and receives anti-depressants at the Jail. He has been found eligible for and in the past has received federal disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program.
43. Plaintiff Jackson has been previously charged with Disorderly Conduct and Shoplifting in Illinois, but he was not incarcerated for those offenses. Mr. Jackson has a history of homelessness and substance abuse. His criminal history is related to these problems.
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44. Plaintiff Jackson has a $40,000 bond, which means that if he would be released from the Jail while awaiting trial on the charge of possession of a controlled substance if he paid $4,000.
45. Plaintiff Jackson has been excluded from release programs and the "pre-release" center because he has been diagnosed with a mental illness and has been assigned to Division VIII based on that diagnosis. He is otherwise eligible for these programs. His mental disability can be reasonably accommodated in a release program or the "pre-release" center. Inmates with similar histories and similar substance abuse problems participate in these programs.
46. PlaintiffJackson has a residence available to him iffound eligible for release pending trial. Thresholds, a program experienced in serving individuals with mental illness like Mr. Jackson will provide him housing, supervision, and mental health and substance abuse treatment if he is released to them.
47. Plaintiff Michael Amato has schizophrenia and, when he is not taking prescribed medication, hears voices. He is housed in Division VIII. At the Jail, he receives medication he needs for his condition.
48. Plaintiff Amato has been incarcerated numerous times for substance abuse related offenses. He is engaged in a repetitive cycle of incarceration because he never has had access to an effective treatment program.
49. Plaintiff Amato has $200,000 bond. He would be released from Jail while awaiting trial on eluding arrest, possession of a controlled substance, aggravated assault, and reckless driving. if he could pay $20,000.
50. Plaintiff Amato has been excluded from the "pre-release" centerbecause he has been diagnosed with a mental illness and has been assigned to Division VIII based on that diagnosis. He
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is otherwise eligible for the program. His mental disability can be reasonably accommodated in the "pre-release" center. Inmates with similar criminal histories and similar substance abuse problems participate in the center.
51. If released from Jail in the Electronic Monitoring Program, Plaintiff Amato would live with his mother. Mr. Amato's family supports him and seeks help for him. Mr. Amato is known to be a very hard worker when he has employment. His family has not been apprised of his mental illness and his treatment needs.
52. Plaintiff Amato desperately wishes to have effective substance abuse treatment. He is 46 years old and wants to change his life.
53. Plaintiff Amato has not received any intensive substance abuse treatment while at the Jail, although he has been incarcerated there since November 2002.
54. There is no discharge plan for Plaintiff Amato that describes arrangements for the continuation ofnecessary medications upon his discharge or for linking him to needed treatment and supportive services upon discharge. Mr. Amato in the past has been discharged from jail without access to necessary medications and needed treatment and supportive services, and has relapsed and returned to jail. It is likely that Mr. Amato will again be discharged from jail without necessary medications and linkages to needed treatment and supportive services, and will again relapse.
55. Plaintiff Charles Morgan has manic depression. He is housed in Division VIII. He has been prescribed and receives anti-depressants while at the Jail. He has been found eligible for and in the past has received federal disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program.
56. PlaintiffMorgan has been incarcerated in the past fornon-violent crimes: for delivery
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and possession of controlled substances, offenses related to Mr. Morgan's substance abuse

problem.

57. Plaintiff Morgan has a $75,000 bond. He would be released from jail while

awaiting trial on charges of possession of a controlled substance if he could pay $7,500.

58. Plaintiff Morgan has been excluded from release programs and the "pre-release"

center because he has been diagnosed with a mental illness and has been assigned to Division VIII

based on that diagnosis. He is otherwise eligible for these programs. His mental disability can be

reasonably accommodated in a release program or the "pre-release" center. Inmates with similar

criminal histories and similar substance abuse problems participate in these programs.

59. PlaintiffMorgan has a residence available to him iffound eligible for release pending

trial. His mother, Margie Stewart, wants Mr. Morgan to reside with her if he is found eligible for

the Electronic Monitoring or Day Reporting programs.

60. There is no discharge plan for Plaintiff Morgan that describes arrangements for the

continuation ofnecessary medications upon his discharge or for linking him to needed treatment and

supportive services upon discharge. Mr. Morgan in the past has been discharged from jail without

access to necessary medications and needed treatment and supportive services, and has relapsed and

returned to jail. It is likely that Mr. Morgan will again be discharged from jail without necessary

medications and linkages to needed treatment and supportive services, and will again relapse.
CLAlldSANDPRAYERSFORRELffiF

COUNT I
(Against All Defendants Except Defendant Rothstein)

61. The policies and practices described in paragraphs 23-28, as applied to the named

plaintiffs and the plaintiff class (hereinafter collectively "plaintiffs"), violate the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S. C. §12132.

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(a) Plaintiffs are individuals with disabilities; (b) Plaintiffs are qualified to participate in the "I-Bond" program, Electronic Monitoring program, Day Reporting program, and/or the "pre-release" center. (c) These are programs, services, and activities of a "public entity" subject to the ADA; (d) Defendants have excluded and continue to exclude plaintiffs, on the basis of their mental illness, from participation in the "1-Bond" program, Electronic Monitoring program, Day Reporting program, and the "pre-release" center. (e) Defendants have imposed and continue to Impose upon plaintiffs eligibility requirements that are not reasonably necessary to the adininistration of these services, programs and activities. (f) Defendants have failed and continue to fail to reasonably accommodate plaintiffs' disabilities in these programs, services, and activities. 62. Through their conduct described above, defendants have violated and continue to violate regulations enacted pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, including: (a) 28 C.P.R. §35.130(a), which provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discriinination by any public entity." (b) 28 C.P.R. §35 .130(b)(i), which prohibits a public entity from "deny[inyg] a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service [of the public entity]." (c) 28 C.P.R. §35.130(b)(iii), which prohibits a public entity from providing a "qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal
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opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others;"
(d) 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(vii) which prohibits a public entity from "otherwise limit[ing] a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit or service;"
(e) 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(3)(i), by using "criteria or methods ofadministration" that have "the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability;"
(f) 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(3)(ii), by using "criteria or methods of administration" that "have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with disabilities;"
(g) 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(7), by failing to make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability," where such modification would not fundamentally alter the nature of the programs being offered;
(h) 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(8), which prohibits a public entity from "impos[ing] or apply[ing] eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disability from fully and equally enjoying any service, program or activity," based on criteria that are not necessary for the provision of the services, programs or activities being offered.
63. Plaintiffs pray that this Court award them relief as follows: (a) Declare that the policies and practices of defendants Stroger, County of Cook, and Sheahan violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, and its implementing
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regulations at 28 C.P.R. §§35.130(a), (b)(i), (b)(iii), (b)(vii); (b)(3)(i), (b)3(ii), (b)(7), and (b)(8); (b) Enjoin defendants from maintaining and enforcing the policies and practices; (c) Award such other relief as the Court deems appropriate; (d) Award plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S .C. §12205 or such
other fee shifting statute as the court finds applicable to this case , and award plaintiffs their costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1920 and 42 U.S.C. §12205.
COUNT II (Against All Defendants) 64. The policies and practices described in paragraphs 29-34, as applied to named plaintiffs Cornell Bolden, Michael Amato, and Charles Morgan, and the plaintiff class, violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 65. These policies and practices also violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, and the regulations cited in paragraph 62 above, because defendants provide needed medications and linkages to individuals without a mental illness upon discharge but deny such medications and linkages to individuals with a mental disability. 66. Plaintiffs pray that this Court award them relief as follows: (a) Declare that the policies and practices of defendants Stroger, County of Cook, and Sheahan and Rothstein violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, and its implementing regulations; (b) Enjoin defendants from maintaining and enforcing these policies; (c) Award such other relief as the Court deems appropriate; (d) Award plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and/or
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42 U.S.C. §12205 or such other fee shifting statute as the court may find applicable to this case and award them their costs pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1920 and 42 U.S.C. §12205.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ira A. Burnim Tammy Seltzer Jennifer Mathis (All seeking leave to appear Pro Hace Vice) BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1101 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 467-5730 Byron Mason Barry Taylor Laura Miller EQUIP FOR EQUALITY, INC. 11 E. Adams Street, Suite 1200 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 341-0022
Diane L. Redleaf LEHRER & REDLEAF 36 S. Wabash Avenue, Suite 600 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 332-2121
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 Mimn~ Order Form (06fC~7)ase: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 32 Filed: 03/02/04 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:437

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

L
t) Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge

Elaine E. Bucklo

Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER

03 c 5617

DATE

3/2/2004

CASE TITLE
MOTION:

Bolden, et al. vs. Stroger, et al.
[In the tollowmg box (a) md1care the pmty 1.11.111g the molJon, e.g .. plmnt1tT. defendant, Jrd party plamt1n: and (b) state bncfly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(I)

D

Filed motion of [use listing in "Motion" box above.]

(2)

D

Brief in support of motion due~-·

(3) D

Answer brief to motion due___ Reply to answer brief due___.

(4)

D

Ruling/Hearing on ___ set for ___ at _ __

(5)

D

Status hearing[held/continued to] [set tor"ire-set for] on··-- set tor ___ at ·--·--

(6)

D

Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set tor/re-sellor] on ...- - set tor ___ at _ __

(7)

D

Trial[set for/re-set tor] on ___ at---·--·

(8) D

[Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___ at ___.

(9)

D

This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreementlpursuant to] D FRCP4(m) 0 Local Rule 41.1 D FRCP41 (a)( I) D FRCP41 (a)(2).

(10) •

[Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendants' motions to

dismiss. This case is therefore dismissed without prejudice and plaintiffs may rcfile their claims before

the appropriate presiding judges. Motions for class certification (2-1 and 6-1) arc denied as moot. Any

other pending motion in this case is also denied as moot.

• (11)

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.J

No notices. required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's statT_

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom

MPJ

deputy's

initials

Date/time received in central CJ.crk's Office

_~.;-
number of notices

pp_C~ID,;~nt
, Number

dmc mailed nmicc

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 32 Filed: 03/02/04 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:438

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CORNELL BOLDEN, KEITH JACKSON, MICHAEL AMATO, and CHARLES MORGAN, each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN STROGER, President, Cook County Board, in his official capacity, COOK COUNTY, MICHAEL SHEAHAN, Cook County Sheriff, in his official capacity, and RUTH ROTHSTEIN, Director, Cook County Department of Health Services, in her official capacity,
Defenc!anLs.

No. 03 C 5617

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Cornell Bolden, Keith Jackson, Michael Amato, and Charles Morgan ("plaintiffsu) bring this suit on behalf of themselves and a class of persons who suffer from mental illness and are confined in the Cook County Jail while awaiting trial. Plaintiffs claim that John Stroger, President of the Cook County Board; Cook County; Michael Sheahan, Cook County Sheriff; and Ruth Rothstein, Director of the Cook County Department of Health Services (collectively, defendants) have violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADAu), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 32 Filed: 03/02/04 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:439

Specifically, plaintiffs challenge the defendants' policy and

practice of barring individuals with mental illness from various

pre-release programs (Count I) and the defendants' policy and

practice of discharging individuals with mental illness without

providing them with the medication and referrals they require to

manage that illness (Count II). Defendants move to dismiss both

counts. 1 I grant the defendants' motion.

I.

Count I alleges that defendants have a policy and practice of

barring individuals with mental illness from participation in

various pre-release programs.

Defendants argue that these

allegations should be handled under the Consent Decree in Duran v.

Elrod, 74-C2949 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1982) ("Duran Decree"), as they

involve the same class of individuals and raise issues that are

inextricably intertwined with that Decree. The current plaintiffs

are part of the class covered by the Duran Decree. See, e. g.,

Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 1990). Part of the

Duran Decree addressed the issue of overcrowding in the Cook County

jails. Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984). After a year of unsuccessful

attempts to abate this overcrowding, Judge Shadur issued an order

John Stroger, Cook County, and Ruth Rothstein moved to dismiss or transfer these claims, and Michael Sheahan later joined that motion. I deal with both motions as one, as the issues are uniform.
2

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authorizing pre-release programs that would alleviate the problem. Id. Plaintiffs now challenge the application of those programs to individuals with mental illness. A challenge to programs that arose solely because of the Duran Decree is, by definition, inextricably intertwined with that Decree. Plaintiffs argue that neither the programs nor the ADA existed at the time of the Duran Decree, but that argument is unavailing. That the programs did not exist at that time is no surprise, as they were judicially created to implement the terms of the Duran Decree. Nor is the fact that the Duran Decree pre-dates the ADA fatal, as continuing consent decrees must be able to adapt to changing conditions. United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). The court monitoring the Duran Decree, not this court, is the proper forum to entertain a proposed modification of that decree. Count I is dismissed.
II. Count II alleges that defendants have a policy and practice of discharging individuals with mental illness without providing the medication and referrals necessary to manage their illness. Defendants argue that these allegations should be handled under the Consent Decree in Harrington v. DiVito, 74-C3290 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1976) ("Harrington Decree"), as they also involve the same class of individuals and raise issues that are inextricably intertwined with that Decree. The Harrington Decree class included all present and future pre-trial detainees in need of mental
3

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treatment ln the Cook County Department of Corrections. The class in the present case are pre-trial detainees in need of mental treatment in the Cook County Department of Corrections who are or will be discharged and who have or will have been taking psychiatric medication prior to discharge, a subclass of the Harrington Decree class. The Harrington Decree seeks to provide adequate mental screening and treatment for pre-trial detainees. The question of whether that treatment should include a discharge treatment and referral plan is inextricably intertwined with the issued covered by the Harrington Decree. As this court is not the proper forum for exploration of this question, nor of the potential effect of the ADA on the enforcement of the decree, Count II is also dismissed. Both counts are dismissed without prejudice; the plaintiffs may refile their claims before the appropriate presiding judges. 2
ENTER ORDER:

Dated:

March L' 2004

United States District Judge

2 The Duran Decree is overseen by Judge Marovich and the Harrington Decree is overseen by Judge Zagel.
4

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:556

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CORNELL BOLDEN, KEITH JACKSON, MICHAEL AMATO, and CHARLES MORGAN, each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN STROGER, President, Cook County Board, in his official capacity, COOK COUNTY, MICHAEL SHEAHAN, Cook County Sheriff, in his official capacity, and RUTH ROTHSTEIN, Director, Cook County Department of Health Services , in her official capacity,

No. 03 C 5617

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Cornell Bolden, Keith Jackson, Michael Amato, and Charles Morgan (collectively, plaintiffs) brought suit on behalf of themselves and a class of persons who suffer from mental illness and are confined in the Cook County Jail ("Jail") while awaiting trial. All four named plaintiffs were housed in Division VII of the Jail, and have been released since the complaint was filed. Mr. Bolden has been diagnosed with depression; Mr. Jackson with an anxiety disorder; Mr. Amato with schizophrenia; and Mr. Morgan with manic depressive illness. Plaintiffs claim that John Stroger, President of the Cook County Board; Cook County; Michael Sheahan, Cook County Sheriff; and Ruth Rothstein, Director of the Cook

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:557
County Department of Health Services (collectively, defendants) have violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief from the defendants' policy and practice of barring individuals with mental illness from various pre-release programs (Count I) and from the defendants' policy and practice of discharging individuals with mental illness without providing them with the medication and referrals they require to manage that illness (Count II). Defendants move to dismiss both counts, arguing that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; that Mr. Stroger, Ms. Rothstein, and Cook County do not meet the definition of public entity under the ADA; and that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims. I grant that motion, for the reasons explained below.
I.
On a motion to dismiss, I accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1319 (7th Cir. 1997), and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Strasburger v. Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 351, 359 (7th Cir. 1998). I grant the motion only if the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts to support the allegations in their claim. Id.
2

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:558
Defendants argue that both Counts I and II must be dismissed, as plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. While plaintiffs are generally not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing claims under the ADA, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[n] o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001). Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, pursuant to the PLRA, and therefore their claims must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs first argue that their claims do not concern "prison conditions" and therefore are not subject to the PLRA. Count I alleges that detainees with mental illness in the Jail are prevented from participating in release or pre-release programs because of their mental illness. Count II alleges that detainees with mental illness are denied access to needed medication and treatment links upon release, while similar services are provided to detainees without mental illness upon their release. With respect to Count II, I agree with plaintiffs: the treatment (or lack thereof) of detainees after their release from the Jail is not a prison condition.
3

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However, I disagree with respect to Count I. Count I alleges that Jail detainees with mental illness are excluded from participation in various release and substance abuse treatment programs. "Prison conditions" in relation to the PLRA has been broadly defined to include "the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison." Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2004) (adopting definition of prison conditions from 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g) (2), another section of the PLRA) . Whether detainees are eligible for participation in the various release programs or the substance abuse program is a decision made by various Jail officials, which has a direct effect on the lives of the detainees, and falls within the broad definition of prison conditions.
The cases cited by plaintiffs in an attempt to set this claim outside that definition can be distinguished. The case that initially seems most on point with the current situation is Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2003), where a plaintiff challenged a rule revision that deprived the Bureau of Prisons of "discretion to designate certain offenders to community confinement facilities." Id. at 204. However, that claim arose from a habeas petition, which is specifically excluded from the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e. The other cases are also distinguishable,
4

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involving injuries incurred at an outside hospital, 1 parole revocation procedures, 2 or an alleged conspiracy between prosecutors and criminal investigators. 3 In contrast, courts have found that a policy restricting a prisoner's ability to receive visitors' does constitute prison conditions, requiring exhaustion before a federal claim challenging that policy could proceed. Construing Count I as involving "prison conditions" is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and furthers Congress' goals in enacting the PLRA, namely "to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002 I .
Even if Count I is construed as involving prison conditions, plaintiffs argue that they had no administrative remedy available to them to exhaust. Plaintiffs attach to their brief a Cook County Department of Corrections General Order ("Order") detailing the
1 Borges v. Admin. for Strong Mem. Hosp., No. 99-C-6351FE, 2002 WL 31194558, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002).
2 Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (parolee situation different from that of those incarcerated).
3 Johnson v. Quinn, No. 96-C-6598, 1999 WL 116222, *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1999) (not a prison conditions claim because majority of the defendants were not affiliated with the Department of Corrections and could not be affected by the prison grievance procedures I .
4 Krilich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 346 F.3d 157, 159 (6'" Cir. 2003).
5

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:561
grievance process for detainees. Plaintiffs argue that the Order is inapplicable because it does not apply to the type of grievance embodied in their claims. The Order, however, specifically states that a grievance may be initiated for "alleged violations of civil, constitutional or statutory rights," such as the rights under the ADA plaintiffs claim were violated. Plaintiffs also argue that the release programs they refer to are governed solely by the Sheriff and therefore the Jail grievance policy would have been useless to them, although the plaintiffs later argue that these same programs are, collectively, defendants' "programs, services or activities." The exhaustion requirement of § l997e cannot be avoided simply by claiming that the desired remedy is not available through the existing grievance process. Perez v. Wise. Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999) (must use process even though requested money damages not an available remedy) . Even without complete relief, use of the grievance process may "help narrow a dispute or avoid the need for litigation." I d. Count I is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
II. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claim in Count II, requiring dismissal of that claim. In Count II, plaintiffs allege that the majority of Jail detainees with mental illness are released into the community without medication or discharge plans to manage their illness. Plaintiffs allege that
6

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:562

those released in to the community without such plans and

medication may abuse drugs and/or alcohol, may be arrested and

incarcerated,

or may be hospitalized or otherwise

institutionalized. Defendants argue that these alleged injuries

are too speculative to provide plaintiffs with standing to bring

their claims.

The federal courts are empowered to settle cases and

controversies. U.S. CaNST. art. III. For a particular matter to be within the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff must have standing to sue; that is, he must be able to show that he has suffered or will suffer an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Where, as here, the plaintiffs seek injunctive or declaratory relief from

future government action, the controlling case is City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) In Lyons, the plaintiff was subjected to an unconstitutional chokehold when arrested by the Los

Angeles police and sued to enjoin police from using such chokeholds

in the future. Id. The court found that the plaintiff had no

standing to pursue such an injunction because it was "no more than

speculation to assert" that he would ever be arrested and illegally

choked again. Id. at 108.

Applying Lyons in a more recent case, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who sought to enjoin a physician from testing for

7

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HIV without patient consent lacked standing. Sierakowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff suffered from a medical disorder that required blood testing every three months. Id. at 442. The plaintiff was, at one point, admitted to a hospital for treatment and, despite his repeated refusals to consent, was tested for HIV. I d. Illinois law provided that physicians could test for HIV without consent if they felt the test was medically necessary for diagnosis or treatment, but plaintiff argued that the law allowing such testing was unconstitutional. Id. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing, as his prospects of injury were purely speculative, despite the fact that the plaintiff had previously been tested without his consent and that he required new blood tests every three months. Id. at 444.
Plaintiffs' alleged potential injuries here are equally speculative. Plaintiffs allege that if they are released without discharge plans and medication, they may abuse alcohol or drugs, they may commit new crimes and be arrested and incarcerated, or they may become hospitalized or otherwise institutionalized. These alleged injuries are hypothetical and speculative, not "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent." Plaintiffs have no standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory judgment against defendants. Count II is dismissed.c
5 As both counts of the complaint have been dismissed, I do not reach the defendants' argument that Mr. Stroger, Ms. Rothstein, and Cook County are not proper defendants under the ADA.
8

Case: 1:03-cv-05617 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/01/05 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:564 ENTER ORDER:

Dated:

February _I__ , 2005

Elaine E. Bucklo United States District Judge

9

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-5617 As of: 09/18/2016 10:51 AM CDT 1 of 8
DENLOW,REOPEN
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03−cv−05617

Bolden, et al v. Stroger, et al Assigned to: Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Cornell Bolden

Date Filed: 08/12/2003 Date Terminated: 02/01/2005 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Byron L. Mason Byron L. Mason, Atty. at Law 1525 E. 53rd Street Suite 400 Chicago, IL 61615 773 955 7457 Email: masonlaw31@sbcglobal.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barry Charlton Taylor Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 341−0022 Email: barryt@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane L. Redleaf Family Defense Center 70 E. Lake St. #1100 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 251−9800x11 Fax: 312−251−9801 Email: dianeredleaf@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ira Abraham Burnim Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1101 15th Street NW Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 (202)467−5730 ext 129 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Mathis Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1101 15th Street NW Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 (202)467−5730 ext 122 Email: jenniferm@bazelon.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura J. Miller Equip for Equality 20 North Michigan Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60602

Case: 1:03-cv-5617 As of: 09/18/2016 10:51 AM CDT 2 of 8

(312) 341−0022 Email: laura@equipforequality.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tamara Lynn Seltzer Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law 1101 15th Street NW Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005 (202)467−5730

Plaintiff Michael Amato

represented by Byron L. Mason (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diane L. Redleaf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ira Abraham Burnim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Mathis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tamara Lynn Seltzer (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Charles Morgan each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Byron L. Mason (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diane L. Redleaf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ira Abraham Burnim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Mathis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura J. Miller

Case: 1:03-cv-5617 As of: 09/18/2016 10:51 AM CDT 3 of 8

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tamara Lynn Seltzer (See above for address)

Plaintiff Keith Jackson

represented by Byron L. Mason (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barry Charlton Taylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diane L. Redleaf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura J. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant John Stroger President, Cook County Board, in his official capacity
Defendant County of Cook
Defendant Michael Sheahan Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity

represented by Louis R. Hegeman Cook County State's Attorney's Office 500 Richard J. Daley Center 50 West Washington Street Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−6124 Email: lhegema@cookcountygov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen L. Garcia Cook County State's Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5475 Email: stephen.garcia@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Louis R. Hegeman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen L. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. Freeborn & Peters 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312)360−6000

Case: 1:03-cv-5617 As of: 09/18/2016 10:51 AM CDT 4 of 8

Email: rsikes@freebornpeters.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Edward Brown Freeborn & Peters 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312)360−6000

Joseph P. Roddy Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C. 330 N. Wabash Avenue, 22nd Floor Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 840−7000 Email: jroddy@burkelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ruth Rothstein Director, Cook County Department of Health Services, in her official capacity

represented by Louis R. Hegeman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen L. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/12/2003
08/12/2003 08/12/2003 08/28/2003 08/28/2003 09/10/2003 09/10/2003 09/14/2003 09/17/2003 09/17/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of Byron L. Mason, Laura J. Miller, Diane L. Redleaf, Barry Charlton Taylor as attorney(s) for plaintiff (No summons(es) issued.) (Documents: 1−1 through 1−3) (rmm) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 8/12/03 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 106 26149. (rmm) (Entered: 08/12/2003)
2 MOTION by plaintiff for certification of two plaintiff classes (rmm) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
SUMMONS issued (3 originals and 3 copies) as to Ruth Rothstein, John Stroger, Michael Sheahan (rmm) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
6 MOTION by plaintiffs for certification of two plaintiff classes ; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 09/18/2003)
3 APPLICATION for leave to appear pro hac vice for plaintiffs by Ira Abraham Burnim; Order entered granting leave by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo (eav) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
4 APPLICATION for leave to appear pro hac vice for plaintiffs by Jennifer Mathis ; Order entered granting leave by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo (eav) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
5 APPLICATION for leave to appear pro hac vice for plaintiffs by Tamara Lynn Seltzer ; Order entered granting leave by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo (eav) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
MAILED Rule 83.16 letter and appearance form to Ira Abraham Burnim, Jennifer Mathis and Tamara Lynn Seltzer (eav) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
7 MINUTE ORDER of 9/17/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Response to motion for certification of two plaintiff classes [2−1] [6−1] is due by October 17, 2003; and any reply by October 31, 2003. Ruling on motion for certification of two plaintiff classes [2−1] [6−1] set for December 5, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 09/18/2003)

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09/23/2003
09/29/2003 09/29/2003 10/01/2003 10/16/2003 10/21/2003 10/23/2003 10/27/2003
11/06/2003 11/07/2003 11/07/2003 11/07/2003 11/10/2003 11/13/2003

8 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Pursuant to parties' joint request, plaintiffs have until October 24, 2003 to file a memorandum in support of the motion for class certification [2−1] [6−1]. Response is extended to November 24, 2003; and any reply to December 8, 2003. Ruling set for December 5, 2003 is reset to January 9, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. Defendants' proposed motion to dismiss will be due September 29, 2003; response by October 20, 2003; and any reply by October 27, 2003. Ruling set for December 5, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. Discovery is ordered closed on August 30, 2004. Pretrial order will be due by September 30, 2004; and response to any motions in limine by October 14, 2004. Pretrial conference set for October 22, 2004 at 3:00 p.m. and trial set for November 8, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
9 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants John Stroger, County of Cook, Ruth Rothstein by Louis R. Hegeman and Stephen L. Garcia; Notice (Attachment) (rmm) (Entered: 09/30/2003)
10 MOTION by defendants John Stroger, County of Cook and Ruth Rothstein to transfer case , to dismiss; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice (rmm) Modified on 01/08/2004 (Entered: 10/02/2003)
11 MINUTE ORDER of 10/1/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: The briefing schedule set in the order dated September 23, 2003 with respect to defendant's motion to dismiss will be applied to defendant's motion to transfer or dismiss. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
14 MOTION by plaintiffs for default judgment against Sheriff Sheahan or, in the alternative, to set prompt deadline by which Sheriff shall answer or otherwise plead , and to amend pending briefing schedule on other defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
12 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Michael Sheahan by Richard Thomas Sikes Jr., Joseph P. Roddy, Daniel Edward Brown (rmm) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
13 OPENING MEMORANDUM of law by plaintiffs in support of certification of two plaintiff classes [2−1], [6−1] (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
15 MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against Sheriff Sheahan is withdrawn [14−1]. Plaintiffs' motion to set prompt deadline to file answer or otherwise plead [14−2] and to amend pending briefing schedule on other defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer is granted [14−3]. Accordingly, defendant Sheahan has until 11/7/03 to answer or otherwise plead. If a motion to dismiss is filed, plaintiffs' responses to motions to dismiss will be extended to 11/17/03; and any replies to 11/24/03. Ruling set for 12/5/03 is reset for 12/18/03 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
16 NOTICE by plaintiffs' attorney, Ira Abraham Burnim of change of address (rmm) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
17 MOTION by Sheriff Michael Sheahan to dismiss Counts I and II of plaintiffs' complaint against him , or transfer to the court overseeing the existing consent decree ; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
20 MOTION by defendants County of Cook, John H. Stroger, Jr., and Ruth Rothstein to stay briefing of plaintiffs' motion for class certification pending this court's adjudication of their amended motion to transfer or dismiss ; Notice (Attachment) (rmm) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
21 MOTION by defendants John Stroger, County of Cook and Ruth Rothstein for leave to file defendants' amended motion to transfer or dismiss and supporting memorandum ; Notice (Attachment) (rmm) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
18 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Ira Burnim, Tamara Lynn Seltzer and Jennifer Mathis (rmm) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
22 MOTION by defendant Sheriff Michael Sheahan for leave to join County defendants' motion to stay briefing on class certification issues ; Notice (Attachment) (rmm) (Entered: 11/19/2003)

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11/14/2003 11/14/2003
11/21/2003 12/12/2003 12/12/2003 12/15/2003 12/29/2003 12/30/2003 01/07/2004 01/07/2004 03/02/2004
03/02/2004 03/15/2004 03/24/2004 04/16/2004 04/28/2004

19 AMENDED MOTION by defendants John Stroger, County of Cook, Ruth Rothstein to dismiss or [10−1] transfer [10−2]; Memoradum in support (Attachmens); Notice (hp) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
23 MINUTE ORDER of 11/14/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion for leave to file amended motion to transfer or dismiss is granted [21−1]. Sheriff's motion for leave to join County defendants' motion to stay briefing on class certification issues is granted [22−1]. Defendants' motion to stay briefing of plaintiffs' motion for class certification pending this court's adjudication of their amended motion transfer or dismiss is also granted [20−1]. Sheriff has until 11/21/03 to file memorandum in support of the amended motion to transfer or dismiss. Response to the amended motion will be due by 12/12/03; and any reply by 12/29/03. Ruling set for 12/18/03 is reset for 1/30/04 at 10:00 a.m. Ruling set for 12/5/03 is vacated. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
24 MOTION by defendant Sheriff Michael Sheahan to join in parts of County defendants amended motion to dismiss or tansfer (Attachments); Notice (rmm) Modified on 05/24/2004 (Entered: 11/24/2003)
25 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file an oversized brief ; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
26 OPPOSITION by plaintiffs to defendants amended motion to dismiss or transfer [19−1] (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
27 MINUTE ORDER of 12/15/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an oversized brief is granted [25−1]. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
28 JOINT MOTION by defendants Michael Sheahan, John Stroger, and Ruth Rothstein for an extension of time to file their reply to plaintiffs oversized brief ; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
29 MINUTE ORDER of 12/30/03 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendants' joint motion for extension of time [28−1] until 1/7/04 to file their reply on motion to dismiss [10−2] [17−1] or transfer [10−1] [17−2] is granted. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
30 REPLY by Sheriff Michael Sheahan to plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' amended motion to dismiss or transfer [26−1] (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 01/08/2004)
31 REPLY by defendants John Stroger County of Cook and Ruth Rothstein to in support of their amended motion to dismiss or transfer (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 01/08/2004)
32 MINUTE ORDER of 3/2/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. This case is therefore dismissed without prejudice and plaintiffs may refile their claims before the appropriate presiding judges. Motions for certification of two plaintiff classes [2−1] [6−1] are denied as moot. Any other pending motion in this case is also denied as moot. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. , terminating case Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
33 ENTERED JUDGMENT (rmm) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
34 MOTION by plaintiffs to alter and amend judgment of 3/2/04 ; Notices (rmm) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
35 MINUTE ORDER of 3/24/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Plaintiffs' motion to alter and amend judgment is denied [34−1]. It is, of coure, up to the judge or judges in the other case to determine how to proceed. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 03/25/2004)
36 MOTION by plaintiffs for extension of time to file notice of appeal ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/29/2004)
37 MINUTE ORDER of 4/28/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time until 05/24/04 to file notice of appeal [36−1], is granted. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/29/2004)

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05/17/2004 05/21/2004 05/24/2004 05/25/2004 05/26/2004 06/04/2004 06/04/2004 06/14/2004 06/18/2004 10/26/2004 12/10/2004 12/20/2004 01/10/2005 01/13/2005
02/01/2005

38 MOTION by plaintiffs for relief from order of March 24, 2004 (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
39 MINUTE ORDER of 5/21/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Response to plaintiffs' motion for relief from order of 03/24/2004 [38−1] is due 6/4/2004; and any reply by 6/18/ 2004. Ruling on motion for relief from order of March 24, 2004 [38−1] will be made by mail by 7/2/2004. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
40 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plainitffs Cornell Bolden, Michael Amato, Charles Morgan, and Keith Jackson motion minute order [32−3], Scheduling order terminating case [32−2], Scheduling order Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. [32−1], judgment entered [33−1], motion minute order [35−1] ( Fee Paid) (dj) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal [40−1] . Mailed notice to all counsel. (dj) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
41 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [40−1] USCA 04−2341 (rmm) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
42 RESPONSE by Sheriff, Michael Sheahan, to plaintiffs' motion for relief from order of March 24, 2004 [38−1] (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
43 RESPONSE by defendants John Stroger, County of Cook and Ruth Rothstein in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for relief from order of March 24, 2004 [38−1] (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. 04−2341 consisting of 1 volume of pleadings and 2 loose pleadings. [40−1] Mailed notice to all counsel. (dj) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
44 REPLY by plaintiffs in support of motion for relief from order of March 24, 2004 [38−1] (Attachment); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
45 MINUTE ORDER of 10/26/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Plaintiffs' motion for relief from order of March 24, 2004 is granted [38−1], subject to dismissal of their appeal by the Seventh Circuit. Status hearing set for 12/10/04 at 10:00 a.m. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (ntf) Modified on 10/27/2004 (Entered: 10/27/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 12/10/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Status hearing held. No notice (mpj) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
46 MINUTE ORDER of 12/20/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: The docket clerk is directed to re−open the case. The court will rule on the previously filed motion to dismiss by 02/21/05. Case reopened Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/21/2004)
47 SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY by defendant Sheriff Michael Sheahan to plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' amended motion to dismiss or transfer; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
48 CERTIFIED copy of Order dated 6/9/04 from the 7th Circuit. ( 04−2341) Upon consideration of the motion for limited remand, filed on June 4, 2004, by counsel for the appellants, It is ordered that the motion is denied as unnecessary. The district court has "the power to employ appropriate procedures for clarifying the issues raised by" a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Boyko v. Anderson, 185 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 1999). It is further ordered that proceedings in this Court are temporarily stayed pending resolution of the Rule 60(b) motion by the district court. If the district court is inclined to grant the motion, then the district court should indicate its willingness to do so and this case will then be remanded for the purpose of modifying the judgment. Cir. R. 57. The parties are directed to file statements of position with this Court within seven days of the disposition of the Rule 60(b) motion by the district court. (rmm) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
49 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' amended motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims is granted. Accordingly, this action is dismissed and judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot. Any schedule set in this case is now vacated. Defendants' motion to transfer is denied as moot. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Case terminated. Mailed notice (vmj, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)

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02/01/2005 02/01/2005 03/03/2005
03/03/2005

50 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/1/2005. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
51 ENTERED JUDGMENT Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/1/2005. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
52 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 04−2341 consisting of one (1) volume of pleadings and two (2) loose pleadings. (jmp, ) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
53 MANDATE of USCA dated 2/9/2005 regarding notice of appeal, 40 ; USCA No. 04−2341. It is ordered that the motion to dismiss appeal filed on 2/4/2005 is granted. The appeal is hereby dismissed. (jmp, ) (Entered: 03/08/2005)