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I L E D UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

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LA~CEE.THONWSON

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Plaintut:

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Vs.

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The COUNTY OF COOK; MICHAEL )

SHEAJL\N,Sh~ofCookCoumy,m

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his official capacity; CALLIE BEARD, )

Director, COOK COUNTY

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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, m )

her official capacity; Rum ROTHSTEIN, )

Director, COOK COUNTY

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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, )

m her official capacity; LEONARD R.

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BERSKY, ChiefOperating Officer,

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CERMAK HEALTH SERVICES OF

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COOK COUNTY, m his official capacity, )

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Defendants.

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MAR 18 2004

JUDGE
UNITED

SMTAATTTEHSEDWIFSrR~~~~i

No.l:03-cv-07172

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
NOW COMES the PIamtut: LAWRENCE E. THONWSON, pro se, and states the
following as his Second Amended Complamt: NATURE OF THE ACTION IN BRIEF
1. This action arises under Section 1983 and Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1988. Plaintiff is an attorney who on October 8, 2002 was required by a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County to sign a document waivmg and relmquishing his rights to valuable marital assets m Plaintiff's dissolution proceeding. Plaintiffrefused to sign the document m order to avoid committing perjury. Even ifthe duress imposed upon Plamtiffcould have legally justified, though not excused, the commission of the crime, his ethical transgression likely would have subjected Plamtiff to disciplme by the Arizona and Georgia Bars and his application for the Illinois Bar could have been jeopardized. As a result ofhis refusal to sign the

document, and regardless ofhis defense upon an effort to avoid committing peIjury, PJaintiffwas incarcerated upon a finding of contempt in the Cook County Department of Corrections on October 9,2002. On that date, an agent ofthe Cook County Department of Corrections placed a rod in Plaintiff's urethra. Plaintiff was forced to provide blood. And, Plaintiffwas subjected to a full body cavity search.
2. The actions of the Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches, to enjoy due process, and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and other relief to remedy the Defendants' unconstitutional policies.
NATURE OF THE ACTION 3. Plaintiff is a patent attorney who is currently registered in Arizona, Georgia and Illinois. As of October 9,2002 Plaintiffhad passed the Illinois Bar exam and was awaiting his admission to the Illinois Bar. 4. Plaintiff is the respondent in a dissolution of marriage proceeding before The Honorable Judge William Stewart Boyd of the Cook County Circuit Court (filed in October 2001). 5. On October 8, 2002, Plaintiffwas ordered to sign a waiver. The waiver required Plaintiff to provide sworn testimony that he was not signing the waiver under coercion. Coercion was present in that Plaintiff was under threat of incarceration if he failed to sign the waiver. 6. On October 9, 2002, upon his refusal to sign the waiver, officers acting under the authority ofdefendant Michael Sheahan, as SheriffofCook County, arrested Plaintiff. 7. On October 9, 2002, Plaintiff was transported to the Cook County Department of Corrections facility at approximately 26th and California. 8. On October 9, 2002, Plaintiff was forced to submit to intake procedures at the Cook County Department of Corrections facility at approximately 26th and California. 9. Pursuant to policies imposed by Defendants, arrestees processed through the Cook County Department of Corrections intake area receive medical and menta! health screening. During intake, defendant County of Cook, acting through the Cook County Department of Corrections, the Cook County Department of Public Health, and Cermak Health
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Services of Cook County, collect medical samples purportedly for the purpose of syphilis and gonorrhea testing. Upon information and belief; intake procedures at the Department of Corrections include urine-based gonorrhea and chlamydia testing for women arrestees. The intake procedures are drastically different for male arrestees.
10. On October 9, 2002, an agent of the Defendants placed a metal rod into Plaintiff's urethra. Derendants' actions caused Plaintiff to suffer great pain, humiliation and emotional distress. The agent who placed the metal rod into Plaintiff's urethra introduced himself to the half-naked arrestees by telling them to remain in line against the wall, to remain silent, and to refrain from taking any other actions because "you don't want to piss-off the Dick Doctor" and
you don't want to "fuck with the Dick Doctor." While smoking a cigarette, the self-described
"Dick Doctor" selected one arrestee for special treatment. Through verbal abuse, that arrestee
was individually informed that he would be making a huge mistake ifhe were to anger the "Dick
Doctor." 11. After Plaintiff passed through a door, the "Dick Doctor" ordered Plaintiff to
expose his penis and to hold his penis so that it was hanging over a large plastic waste container. The "Dick Doctor" then inserted a metal rod into Plaintiff's urethra. Plaintiff was then forced to provide blood. Plaintiff was then subjected to a full-body cavity search.
12. On October 11, 2002 Plaintiff was again brought before Judge Boyd. Plaintiff again refused to sign the waiver. Plaintiffwas then released from incarcemtion.
JURISDICTION 13. This action arises under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343. This Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's request for declamtory and injunctive reliefpursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202. 14. This action also arises under state claims identified below. The state claims arise from a common nucleus of opemtive facts as the rederal constitutional and statutory claims. This Court has discretion to assert jurisdiction over all claims arising from the common nucleus of common facts. 28 U.S.C. §1367. 15. Derendant demands that this case be tried before a jury.
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PARTIES
16. The County of Cook is the corporate name through which the State ofIllinois has determined it may be sued pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/5-l00L Defendant County of Cook was acting under color of law. The County of Cook operates the Cook County Department of Corrections and is responsible for the medical procedures practiced on arrestees brought to that facility. The County of Cook has a legal responsibility to administer its programs and services in conformity with the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and state standards. The County ofCook has a legal responsibility to ensure that the policies and practices ofthe County ofCook, and its administrative departments, comply with the United States Constitution and federal and state standards
17. Defendant Michael Sheahan is the Sheriff of the County of Cook. Pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/3-6016, Sheriff Michael Sheehan is liable for any violations of Plaintiff's rights when
occasioned by a deputy or auxiliary deputy, in the same manner as for his or her own personal violations. Pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/5-1002, the County of Cook shall indemnify SheriffSheaban for his violations of Plaintiff's rights. Sheriff Sheahan has a legal responsibility to administer his
department in conformity with the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and state standards. Defendant Sheahan is sued in his official capacity.
18. Defendant Callie Beard is the Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections. As Director, she is responsible for the development and oversight of all Cook County Department of Corrections policies and practices, including arrestee intake procedures
and oversight of health care services that may have been contracted out to private providers.
Defendant Beard is responsible for ensuring that the Cook County Department of Corrections operates in a manner that is consistent with the United States Constitution, federal statutes and state standards. Defendant Beard was acting under color oflaw. Defendant Beard is sued in her official capacity.
19. Defendant Ruth Rothstein is the Director of the Cook County Department of Public Health. As Director, she is responsible for the development and oversight of all Cook County Department of Corrections medical screening policies and practices including those practiced through Cermak Health Survives and those that may have been contracted out to private providers. Defendant Rothstein is responsible for ensuring that the Cook County Department of Corrections medical intake procedures are operated in a manner that is consistent
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with the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and state standards. Defendant Rothstein was acting under color of law. Defendant Rothstein is sued in her official capacity.
20. Defendant Leonard R Bersky is the Chief Operating Officer of Cermak Health Semces of Cook County. As ChiefOperating Officer, he is responsible for the development and oversight of Cook County Department of Corrections medical intake policies and practices. Defendant Bersky is responsible for ensuring that the Cook County Department of Corrections medical intake procedures are operated in a manner that is consistent with the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and state standards. Defendant Bersky was acting under color of law. Defendant Bersky is sued in his official capacity.
21. Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States of America and is a resident of Cook County Illinois. Plaintiff has resided at 111760 Brook Hill Drive at all relevant times but for the time he was incarcerated in the Cook County Department ofCorrections.
Count I - The Strip Search - Fourth Amendment 22. Plaintiff was subjected to a strip search. Plaintiff saw no attempt to segregate certain persons who would be subject to strip searches from those who would not be subject to strip searches. Searches ofpretrial detainees in jail must be reasonable within the meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment. To evaluate the reasonableness of a challenged search, the court or jury must balance the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. The county may have a weighty interest in preventing the introduction of weapons or other contraband into the jail However, a strip search, particularly a full body cavity search as practiced by defendants, are demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified and humiliating. 23. Policies calling for blanket strip searches are invalid. Strip searches generally require individualized suspicion that an arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband. Placement in a general prison population cannot alone justifY a strip search. An offense must be sufficiently associated with violence to justify a visual strip search. 24. Plaintiffwas arrested fur civil contempt for an alleged improper refusal to provide his signature on a document. The county had no reasonable individualized suspicion that Plaintiff was carrying or concealing contraband. The offense for which Plaintiff was subject to arrest was not associated in any way with violence.
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25. Upon information and beliet; the full body cavity search is an official county
policy or custom of subjecting non-violent contempt arrestees to unconstitutional strip searches.
The information and belief including that Plaintiff did not observe any efforts to segregate those who would be subject to a full-cavity search from those who would be subject to a less invasive search and the fact that Plaintiff was subject to a full cavity search though he was not a
incarcerated based upon any allegations related to violence. 26. The defendants medical procedures are also practiced in an unconstitutional
manner. Any claim that the county's medical screening policy is justified based upon the counties interest in diagnosing severe medical problems to prevent transmission of serious
disease among the general jail population must fail in light of the county's failure to test for the
mv virus which poses a far greater risk to the prison population and could be, but is not,
screened for using the same invasive procedures that are already employed. Upon information and beliet; the insertion of a metal rod into the urethra is of male prisons is an official county policy or custom. Searches that in theory might be constitutional, run afoul of the Fourth Amendment ifconducted in an unnecessarily cruel, painful or dangerous manner.
27. Defendants have violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was subject to unconstitutional prison procedures and conditions.
Count II - The Deprivation of Liberty without Due Process - Fourteenth Amendments 28. Defendants subjected Plaintiff to incarceration and physical harm. Defendants'
actions caused Plaintiff the loss of his liberty interest including his interfering with his
employment opportunities, his interest in remaining free of unlawful searches, and free of excessive force, and free of unlawful invasions of his privacy. Defendants deprived Plaintiff of
his due process right to be free of unjustified intrusions into his body. Plaintiff's due process
right includes the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the right to information
sufficient to exercise an intelligent choice. Retaliation for the exercise of the right to refuse treatment is itself a violation ofPlaintiff's rights.
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Count m -The Cruel and Unusual Punishment - Fourteenth Amendment
29. Defendants intentionally inflicted upon Plaintiff needless suffering. Defendants deliberately gave him a kind of medical treatment knowing that it was more invasive than necessary. The conditions under which Plaintiff was confined pose a substantial risk of serious harm and defendants were acting with a deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.
30. The Department of Corrections screening procedure is a custom or policy and has been described as "universal gonorrhea testiog." The reasonableness of Defendants' actions must also take into consideration that the U.S. Department of Justice indicates that few correctional systems routinely screen inmates for STDs. It is very rare for correctional facilities to incorporate routine urethral swabbing screening for gonorrhea. It is possible to perfurm urine gonorrhea screening - as is used fur women detainees. In the absence of such screening in the vast majority of correctional institutions the states interest in performiog urethral swabbing must be considered slight.
31. Upon information and belief, including that lDV is not tested for despite the extremely invasive screening procedures and the self-proclaimed Dick Doctor's warning that he should not be "fucked" with, defendants deliberately provide overly invasive and less efficacious screening procedures in order to intimidate arrestees rather that for permissible purposes.
32. The presence and actions ofthe self-described "Dick Doctor" indicate the actions of placing a rod into the urethra of male prisoners is done with an intent to punish pretrial detainees. The Defendants' policies and practices violate Plaintiff's rights under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Count IV - Assault 33. The defendants and their agents intentionally created a reasonable apprehension in Plaintiff of immediate harmful or offensive contact to Plaintiff's person. Defendants' actions caused injury to Plaintiff.
Count V - Battery 34. The defendants intentionally and without legal justification caused a harmful and offensive contact with Plaintiff's person. The defendants' actions caused injury to Plaintiff. The
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defendants committed an act of sexual penetration by the use ofthreat of force. The defendants committed an act of sexual penetration and the defendants knew that Plaintiff was unable to give knowing consent.
Count VI - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
35. The defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous. The defendants intended their conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or knew there was at least a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress and were reckless as to the effect of their
conduct. The defendants caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a judgment against the Defendants as well as the Unknown Officers and the ''Dick Doctor" providing as follows:
A Declare the acts and omissions of the Defendants violates the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
B. Enjoining the Defendants, as well as their officers, from conducting strip searches
without warrant and without probable cause;
C. Enjoining the Defendants, as well as their officers, from urethral swabbing without full and informed consent;
D. Mandatorily imposing upon the Defendants training, education and other requirements with the goal of enhancing the knowledge ofdiscrimination matters and relations and enhancing the skills of officers within Cook County law enforcement relating to prisoner rights and handling;
E. Compensatory damages, paid to Plaintiff, by the Defendants in a reasonable amount which the trier of fact deems sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for his injuries;
F. Punitive damages paid to Plaintiff by Defendants in a reasonable amount which
the trier offact deems sufficient to deter future illegal conduct; and G. Payment by the Defendants of Plaintiffs attorneys' fees, witness fees and costs of
this action, in an amount to be set forth in an affidavit from the attorney(s) for Plaintiffat the conclusion ofthis matter.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this ~day ofMarch 2004.
V
Lawrence E. Thompson Lawrence E. Thompson 11760 Brook Hill Drive Orland Park, IL 60467 708-479-6671
CERTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION I, Lawrence E. 1bompson, certifY that the statements set forth herein are true and correct,
except as to matters therein stated to be on information and beliefand as to such matters I certifY
that I verily believe the same to be true.
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LAWRENCE THOMPSON,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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THE COUNTY OF COOK and MICHAEL )

SHEAHAN, Sheriff of Cook County, in his

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official capacity,

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Defendants.

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Case No. 03 C 7172

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Lawrence Thompson sued Cook County and Sheriff Michael Sheahan for

allegedly violating his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated in the Cook County Jail for

civil contempt. He claims that jail officials subjected him to an unreasonable strip search in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Count 1) and performed an invasive urethral

swabbing procedure without his consent in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights (Counts 2 and 3). On February 7, 2006, a jury found in favor of the defendants on all

counts. Thompson has moved for a new trial. For the following reasons, the Court orders a new

trial on Count 1 but otherwise denies Thompson’s motion.

Facts

On October 9, 2002, a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County found Thompson in

civil contempt and ordered him held in custody after Thompson refused to sign certain

documents related to his pending divorce proceedings. Cook County Sheriff’s deputies took

Thompson into custody and transported him to the Cook County Jail along with other individuals, some of whom were already wearing jail-issued clothing.
Upon arrival at the jail, Thompson was processed along with approximately 250 other new inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, Thompson and the others were photographed and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak Health Services, the agency responsible for administering medical treatment to detainees at the Cook County Jail, then asked Thompson a number of medical screening questions. During the interview, Thompson responded to questions on a standard form concerning his medical history and signed the following “consent for treatment” portion of the form:
I consent to a medical and mental health history and physical including screening for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the Cook County Jail. I also consent to ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff for problems identified during this process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing other medical treatments. I understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my medical problems confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at Cook County Jail. At trial, the defendants presented evidence that during the interview, a Cook County Jail employee informed Thompson of his right to refuse the medical screening. Thompson denied that anyone informed him of his right to refuse consent. Following the medical screening interview, Thompson’s personal property was inventoried. He and other inmates then underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. Thompson testified that a man who referred to himself as the “dick doctor” addressed the group, making various threats, such as “you don’t want to piss-off the dick doctor.” The inmates went into a room, one at a time, to undergo the procedure. Thompson testified that when it was his turn, the individual performing the procedure directed him to take out his penis and hang it over a garbage
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can and then inserted into Thompson’s urethra a metal rod with a swab on the end. Thompson claims that he felt pain both during and after the procedure.
The defendants conceded that in 2002, it was the policy of Cermak Health Services, in conjunction with the Cook County Department of Health and the City of Chicago Department of Health, to conduct urethral swabbing on male detainees entering Cook County Jail to screen for syphilis and chlamydia. The defendants aver that this joint project was developed for purposes of promoting the health of inmates. Melvin Judkins, a paramedic who has worked for Cermak Health Services for seventeen years, testified that the test involves inserting a thin swab a short distance into the urethra and gently rotating it to collect any organisms or inflammatory cells.
After the urethral swabbing procedure, Department of Corrections officers escorted Thompson and other inmates into a receiving tunnel in groups of forty to fifty at a time. The officers lined them up on both sides of the hallway and ordered them to take off their clothes and place them on the ground in front of them. The officers then instructed Thompson and the others to face the wall, run their fingers through their hair, and then bend or squat and cough. After ordering the inmates to hold up each item of clothing for inspection, the officers allowed them to get dressed.
During closing argument, Thompson’s attorney contended that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches. He also maintained that because Thompson did not consent to the urethral swabbing, the defendants violated Thompson’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights to be free from unjustified intrusions into his body and to refuse unwanted medical treatment. In response, the defendants’ attorney argued that Thompson knew what he was doing when he signed the medical consent form and that the strip
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search was reasonable because defendants reasonably suspected that Thompson was concealing contraband on his person.
After a four day trial, the jury returned a verdict in the defendants’ favor on all counts. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) permits a court to grant a motion for a new trial if the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence or the trial was unfair to the moving party. Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992). Thompson makes three principal arguments in support of his motion for a new trial: a Cook County employee was erroneously allowed to remain on the jury; the defendants’ attorney improperly and inaccurately referred to Thompson as a “rich lawyer” during closing argument; and the clear weight of the evidence indicated that jail officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the strip search.
1. Failure to excuse juror for cause At trial, one of the prospective jurors was a medical doctor who chairs the neuroanesthesiology department at Stroger Hospital, which is managed by the Cook County Bureau of Health Services, the same administrative agency that manages Cermak Health Services. Thompson challenged this juror for cause, arguing that a Cook County employee responsible for administering medical treatment would unfairly favor the defendants. The Court overruled Thompson’s challenge after the juror insisted that he could be impartial, and the juror was seated after Thompson declined to use a peremptory challenge to remove him. This juror was eventually elected the jury’s foreperson. Thompson argues that he was denied a fair trial because the Court allowed the juror to remain on the jury.
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The Seventh Circuit has held that district courts should excuse certain jurors who have a particularly close relationship to the litigants. See United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A court must excuse a juror for cause if the juror is related to one of the parties in the case[] or if the juror has even a tiny financial interest in the case.”). Id. Though such a juror may be objective in fact, the law errs on the side of caution and requires the juror’s dismissal. Id. In Polichemi, the district court declined to disqualify a juror who was employed by the same United States Attorney’s office that was prosecuting the case before the court. Id. at 705. The court of appeals said that it agreed with the United States that “government employment alone is not, and should not be, enough to trigger the [common law] rule under which an employee is disqualified from serving as a juror in a case involving her employer.” Id. at 704. The court concluded, however, that an employee of the same prosecutor’s office was too closely related to the lawsuit and should have been struck for cause. Id. at 705.
The Seventh Circuit has not directly considered – so far as the Court can ascertain – whether employees are prohibited from serving on juries involving their employers, notwithstanding the common law’s contrary rule. The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that it is not an abuse of discretion to allow such an employee to serve. See Nathan v. Boeing Co., 116 F.3d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1997). In Nathan, two potential jurors were employees of the defendant corporation, but nothing else in the record indicated that they could not render impartial verdicts. The court said there was no per se rule prohibiting an employee of a party from serving on a jury and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jurors to serve.
As noted earlier, the juror at issue in the present case is an employee and department chair of Stroger Hospital. Stroger Hospital and Cermak Health Services, the agency whose employees
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performed the urethral swabbing procedure on Thompson, are both part of the Cook County Bureau of Health Services, a government agency that employs thousands of individuals. The juror stated during voir dire that he had administered anesthesia to jail inmates in the past, and he is casual friends with Ruth Rothstein, the director of the Cook County Department of Public Health, and Callie Baird, the Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections. Both Rothstein and Baird were originally parties to the lawsuit but were no longer parties at the time of trial.
Though the question is a close one, the Court concludes that it did not err by refusing to strike the juror for cause. The Seventh Circuit’s comments in Polichemi suggest that it would not disapprove of a government employee sitting on a jury involving his or her employer. Indeed, unlike the juror who was an employee of the United States Attorney’s office, the juror in this case did not work with any of the witnesses or attorneys involved in the trial. Rather, the relationship of the juror to the defendants in this case is no closer than the relationship at issue in Nathan, where the prospective jurors were employees of a large corporate defendant. Our juror is also casual friends with Baird and Rothstein, but neither of them were parties or witnesses in the lawsuit, and for that reason, the relationship does not suggest potential bias. See United States v. Beasley, 48 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing juror, whose brother was Madison chief of police, to serve in case involving crime that occurred in Madison). For these reasons, the Court concludes that in light of the juror’s insistence, upon careful questioning, that he could remain impartial, his relationship with the defendants alone was not enough to indicate bias.
The two cases cited by Thompson on this issue do not support his argument. In Crawford 6

v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909), the Court held that a United States Post Office employee could not sit as a juror in a prosecution of an individual charged with conspiracy to defraud the post office, but that case was overruled by statute in 1935. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 132 (1936). In Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1468 (10th Cir. 1994), a potential juror’s employer had a consulting contract with the defendant, and the juror had interviewed and hired a number of the defendant’s former employees. Id. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the juror to serve. Vasey, like Nathan, actually supports defendants’ contention that an employee of one of the parties may serve on the jury.
2. Defendants’ closing argument Thompson next argues that he did not receive a fair trial because the defendants’ attorney made improper comments during his closing argument. Specifically, Thompson claims it was improper for defendants’ attorney to refer to Thompson as a “rich lawyer” when the defendants’ attorney had copies of Thompson’s tax returns (which indicated that he was not rich) and attended the foreclosure hearing involving Thompson’s home. Thompson also claims it was improper for the defendants’ attorney to suggest that Thompson had changed his appearance to prevent witnesses from recognizing him. These isolated comments were not enough to render the trial unfair. The Court instructed the jury more than once that closing arguments are not evidence and that the jury’s verdict should be based on the evidence alone. Given this instruction, coupled with the insignificant nature of the comments in the context of the closing arguments, the Court is confident that the jury
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considered only evidence that was presented at trial. See Ramsey v. American Air Filter, Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1303, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A] party’s improper comments during closing arguments rarely rise to the level of reversible error.”)
The cases that Thompson cites do not demand a different result. In Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244, 1247 (7th Cir. 1984), defense counsel inappropriately took advantage of a ruling barring plaintiff’s counsel from mentioning that the defendants would be indemnified if found liable by extensively arguing that a judgment would financially ruin his clients. Joseph does not control the outcome of this case, because there was no in limine ruling preventing defendants from discussing Thompson’s wealth, and the “rich lawyer” comment was far more isolated than the comments at issue in Joseph. Cases recognizing the impropriety of remarks concerning the relative wealth of the parties also do not control this case. See Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 364 (3d Cir. 1999); Adams Labs., Inc. v. Jacobs Eng’g, 761 F.2d 1218, 1226 (7th Cir. 1985). Defendants’ counsel made no such remarks during closing argument.
Thompson also maintains that the defendants’ attorney’s comments concerning Thompson’s changed appearance violated the rule against referring to missing witnesses. “That rule permits an inference of unfavorable testimony from the missing witness, but only if that witness is peculiarly within the opposing party’s power to produce.” Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1346 (7th Cir. 1992). Thompson did not object to evidence concerning his changed appearance, and though the argument might have sought an unsupported inferential leap, the comments were insignificant, even when considered together with the comment describing Thompson as a “rich lawyer.”
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3. Weight of evidence on strip search claim
Finally, Thompson argues that the jury’s verdict on Count 1, in which he alleged that the defendants subjected him to an unreasonable body cavity search, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A court considering a motion for new trial may not set aside the jury’s verdict “if a reasonable basis exists in the record to support the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and leaving issues of credibility and weight of the evidence to the jury.” Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 520 (7th Cir. 2004). “As long as there is a reasonable basis in the record to support it, we will not overturn a jury’s verdict.” Robinson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 131 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 1997).
On Count 1, the jury was instructed as follows:
To succeed on this claim, Thompson must prove that there was no reasonable suspicion that he was concealing a weapon or contraband on his person. ‘Reasonable suspicion’ exists when a reasonably prudent person would be warranted, based on specific and articulable facts, in believing that the person being searched was concealing a weapon or contraband. In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, you are to consider all of the circumstances that existed at the time.
See Jury Instructions at 16.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), the Supreme Court held that jail officials do not violate the Fourth Amendment by strip searching pretrial detainees after contact visits. In the wake of Bell, however, a number of circuit courts, including the Seventh, have held that not all strip searches on pretrial detainees pass constitutional muster. Specifically, courts have held that strip searches at the time of intake of a detainee accused of a minor offense violate the Fourth Amendment unless correctional officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that the detainee is
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concealing contraband. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983). These courts have recognized the particularly invasive nature of a strip search and have distinguished Bell by noting that Bell involved detainees charged with serious federal crimes and not individuals charged with misdemeanor or traffic offenses and that Bell involved strip searches after contact visits and not at intake. See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272.
Thompson contends that there was no evidence at trial indicating that the defendants had reasonable suspicion to perform a strip search upon him. In response, defendants offer twentyfour supposed pieces of evidence which they contend support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Defendants’ submission, however, subdivides the evidence into such microscopic portions as to render it nearly unrecognizable. Each of the multifarious bits of evidence cited by defendants can be classified in one of five categories: evidence that detainees have been observed in the holding areas holding contraband, passing contraband, and leaving contraband behind; evidence that Thompson knew the day before he was taken into custody that he would likely be going to jail; evidence that Thompson did not turn in his tie and wallet to booking officers; evidence that Sheriff’s deputies had no way of knowing anything about Thompson’s criminal background; and evidence indicating that, prior to the strip search, Thompson had contact with other detainees, including individuals accused of violent and/or drug offenses.1
1 For instance, defendants’ evidentiary points numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 18 all amount to a contention that Thompson was intermingled with other detainees while in custody prior to the strip search.
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Defendants first argue that the jury could have found reasonable suspicion based on testimony that “[m]any detainees engage in conversations in all the holding cells and have been observed huddling together, squatting near each other, holding contraband, passing contraband, [and] leaving contraband in holding cells.” See Def. Resp. at 11. In Mary Beth G., the defendant offered similar non-specific testimony that a few items had been recovered from the body cavities of women arrested on minor charges as well as more specific testimony that in one study conducted over a thirty-five day period, contraband was found on women charged with offenses such as prostitution, assault, and drug possession. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73. The court held that the non-specific testimony, even in combination with the specific testimony, did not create a reasonable suspicion that minor offenders were concealing contraband. Id. at 1273. In this case, defendants offered only non-specific evidence that Sheriff’s deputies have seen unspecified detainees exchanging contraband and that the deputies have recovered contraband in the holding cells. Defendants offered no historical evidence indicating that contraband was brought to the holding cells by anyone charged with minor offenses, let alone persons detained for civil contempt, which is not a crime at all. Consequently, as in Mary Beth G., this evidence does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Defendants next argue that Sheriff’s deputies had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search because Thompson knew the day before he was taken into custody that he would likely be going to jail and because he did not turn in his tie and wallet to booking officers. Defendants offered no evidence, however, indicating that the Sheriff’s deputies who conducted the strip search or any other sheriff’s deputy or jail employee had any clue about this at the time Thompson was strip searched. Indeed, the evidence was essentially undisputed that defendants
11

performed the strip search on all incoming detainees, without regard to their individual circumstances, backgrounds, or the reasons why each was being detained and without consideration of whether there was any information particular to the detainee indicating a suspicion he might possess contraband. For this reason, these facts cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion. See Kaniff v. United States, 351 F.3d 780, 785 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that district court properly determined whether reasonable suspicion was present by examining the facts known to the officer at the time of the search). See generally Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (holding that constitutionality of search must be judged “in light of the information available to [the officers] at the time they acted.”).2
Defendants next argue that they showed reasonable suspicion existed by offering evidence that they had no record of Thompson’s prior criminal history at the time of the search. Defendants have not explained nor cited cases for the somewhat remarkable proposition that the lack of information can create reasonable suspicion. The general rule promulgated by the Supreme Court is that to establish reasonable suspicion, police officers must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Absent case law to the contrary, the Court declines to find that the absence of criminal history information – information that likely was available to the Sheriff and the County if they had taken the time to look for it –
2 Defendants presented no evidence that at the time of the strip search any jail official had knowledge that Thompson knew he might be incarcerated the day before he was taken into custody or that Thompson failed to turn in his tie or wallet to booking officers. For this reason, defendants cannot rely on the collective knowledge doctrine to establish reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) (holding that knowledge of one officer can be imputed to arresting officer when determining whether probable cause existed to arrest).
12

supports the finding of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a strip search. Such a rule would encourage law enforcement officers and jailers to deliberately refrain from accessing detainees’ criminal histories to justify strip searches in situations where they have been denounced as unconstitutional.
Defendants also contend that Sheriff’s deputies had reasonable suspicion because Thompson was intermingled with the general jail population. The First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have rejected intermingling as a sole basis for finding the reasonable suspicion that supports strip searches on pretrial detainees. See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113; Chapman, 989 F.2d at 396; Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989); Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendants have not cited, and the Court has not found, any case holding otherwise.
Four of those five circuits – all but the Second – have stated that intermingling may be one non-determinative factor used to evaluate whether reasonable suspicion is present. The courts recognizing intermingling as a factor have not described what makes intermingling relevant in determining whether reasonable suspicion is present. One court has said that in evaluating reasonable suspicion, heavy reliance on intermingling is misplaced where such intermingling is both “limited and avoidable.” See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1984). These courts also treat other factors, such as the offense charged, as much more significant in assessing whether reasonable suspicion is present. See Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1447 (finding reasonable suspicion where detainee charged with grand theft auto offense was intermingled with general population); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984)
13

(finding no reasonable suspicion where detainee charged with traffic offenses was intermingled with general population).
This Court likewise does not believe that the Sheriff’s decision to intermingle detainees held on serious criminal charges together with those who, like Thompson, are held not on any sort of criminal charge but rather as a coercive sanction for civil contempt can appropriately be a significant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, assuming that it is properly considered at all. Though we are cognizant that courts must accord prison and jail administrators deference in adopting and executing policies and practices needed to preserve order, discipline, and security, see, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48, defendants point to no evidence regarding the reasons for the Sheriff’s decision to intermingle all detainees, criminal and civil, irrespective of the reasons why they are brought to the jail for intake. Thus there is no basis to support a determination that intermingling is based on anything more than considerations of administrative convenience. For these reasons, and because the decision to intermingle is entirely within the Sheriff’s control, it would be inappropriate to give this factor significant, let alone controlling weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Were the law otherwise, a jailer could essentially create, at his discretion, a basis for blanket strip searches of detainees irrespective of the presence of individualized reasonable suspicion.
In sum, the evidence of intermingling in this case did not support the “particularized suspicion” required to support such an invasive search. See Chapman, 989 F.2d at 398; Walsh, 849 F.2d at 69. Thompson was not charged with any crime, let alone one generally associated with violence or contraband, and there was no evidence that Sheriff’s deputies noticed anything suspicious about him which would have otherwise justified the search.
14

The only other evidence that defendants cite to support the jury’s determination of reasonable suspicion was the non-specific and unquantified testimony that contraband has been found in the jail’s holding cells. This adds nothing to the intermingling argument – indeed, it is logically part of that same contention – and it does not support the jury’s verdict.
The Court recognizes that it must consider the evidence cited by the defendants in support of a finding of reasonable suspicion as a whole, not as separate and unconnected bits of evidence. See United States. v. Brown, 232 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2000) (court should look to the record as a whole to determine whether reasonable suspicion is present). But even when we do so, the manifest weight of the evidence was contrary to the jury’s verdict. See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112 (holding that non-specific evidence that the jail had problems with contraband together with evidence of intermingling was not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion).
Finally, defendants maintain that a jury could have concluded that a search never occurred because there was some evidence that Sheriff’s deputies never actually looked into Thompson’s rectum. But defendants do not dispute that Thompson was strip searched. The fact that Sheriff’s deputies may not have examined Thompson’s rectum does not alter the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. See Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 1995) (requiring reasonable suspicion for strip search); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273 (requiring reasonable suspicion for visual body cavity search).
Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Thompson’s motion for a new trial as it concerns Count 1 but denies the motion as it concerns Counts 2 and 3 [docket no. 113]. The case
15

is set for a status hearing on April 27, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a date for the retrial of Count 1. Trial counsel are directed to appear.

Date: April 18, 2006 (corrected July 6, 2006)

____________________________________ MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge

16

 
 412 F.Supp.2d 881 (2005)
Lawrence THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v.
THE COUNTY OF COOK; Michael Sheahan, Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity; Callie Baird, Director, Cook County Department of Corrections, in her official capacity; Ruth Rothstein, Director, Cook County Department of Public Health, in her official capacity; and Leonard R. Bersky, Chief Operating Officer, Cermak Health Services of Cook County, in his official capacity, Defendants.
No. 03 C 7172.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
August 8, 2005.
882 *882 Lawrence E. Thompson, Orland Park, IL, pro se.
Francis J. Catania, John A. Ouska, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KENNELLY, District Judge.
In this lawsuit, Lawrence Thompson, an attorney proceeding pro se, contends that upon being incarcerated after being found in civil contempt by a Cook County judge, he was forced by Cook County personnel to submit to a visual cavity strip search and to undergo a urethral swabbing test which involved insertion of a metal rod with a swab on the end into his penis. Thompson claims that these procedures violated his Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the 883 reasons outlined *883 below, the Court denies the defendants' motion.
Facts
On October 9, 2002, a Circuit Court of Cook County judge found Thompson in civil contempt when he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending divorce proceedings and ordered him held in custody until he signed the documents. See Pl's Ex. B. A Cook County Sheriff's deputy took Thompson into custody and searched him at the courthouse. Thompson was later transported to the Cook County Jail. Upon his arrival at the jail, Thompson was processed along with approximately 250 other new inmates. It is likely that most, if not all, of the others were pretrial detainees, that is, persons charged with crimes awaiting trial.
After spending some time in a holding pen, Thompson and the others were given identification cards and were photographed. Thompson was then interviewed by a Cermak Health Services employee, who asked him medical screening questions. The defendants maintain that during this interview, Thompson responded to questions on a standard form concerning his medical history and current problems and signed the following "consent for treatment" portion of the form:
I consent to a medical and mental health history and physical including screening for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the Cook County Jail. I also consent to ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff for problems identified during this process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing other medical treatments. I understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my medical problems confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at Cook County Jail.

Thompson Dep. Ex. 1. Thompson acknowledges that the medical intake form produced by the defendants accurately reflects his medical history and current conditions. Though he has no independent recollection of the exact questions he was asked, he testified that the questions on the form appear to be the type of questions he was asked during intake. He likewise agrees that the signature on the medical intake form looks like his signature. Thompson denies, however, that it is his signature and says he had never seen the medical intake form before it was produced during discovery in this matter.
The defendants claim that during the interview, Charles Kinnerk, the employee they say conducted the interview, [1] informed Thompson of his right to refuse the medical screening. Kinnerk testified that he believed the medical intake form informed inmates of their right to refuse consent and that he informs inmates of the existence of a refusal to consent form. Kinnerk Dep. at 22-23. According to Kinnerk, if an inmate refuses to consent, he notes "patient refused" on the signature line, and the inmate fills out a refusal of medical treatment form. Id. at 12, 52. Thompson denies that anyone ever informed him of his right to refuse consent.
Following this brief interview, Thompson's personal property was inventoried. Next, he and the inmates underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. According to Thompson, a man who was smoking a cigarette and referred to himself as the "dick doctor" addressed the group, making various threats, such as "you don't want to 884 piss-off the dick doctor." Thompson Supp. Aff. ¶ 14. The inmates, who were in a *884 single file line, went into the room one at a time for the procedure. The prisoner next in line waited at the threshold of the open door while the test was administered to the prisoner in front of him. Thompson testified that when it was his turn, the individual performing the procedure directed him to take out his penis and hang it over a garbage can and then inserted a metal rod into his urethra. He claims he felt pain both during and after the procedure.
The defendants assert that in 2002, it was the policy of Cermak Health Services, in conjunction with the Cook County Department of Health and the City of Chicago Department of Health, to conduct urethral swabbing on male detainees entering Cook County Jail to screen for syphilis and chlamydia. The defendants aver that this joint project was developed for purposes of promoting the health of inmates even after they are discharged from the Department of Corrections. Dr. John Raba, the Chief Operating Officer of Cermak Health Services, testified that the test involves inserting a thin swab a short distance into the urethra and gently rotating it to collect any organisms or inflammatory cells. Raba Aff. ¶ 3. Dr. Raba described this as a minimally invasive medical procedure that is very safe and rarely causes even minimal injury to the human body. Id. However, he acknowledged that the procedure may cause some discomfort during and for a short time after the test. Id.
Dr. Raba also stated that it was the policy of Cermak Health Services to obtain medical consent for the procedure in the form of the medical intake forms. Id. at ¶ 5. Though the defendants did not produce any completed refusal to consent forms, they maintain that fewer than ten inmates a year refuse the urethral swabbing procedure. Def's 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 28. Thompson acknowledges that he did not verbally refuse to undergo the procedure. But he contends that prior to the urethral swabbing procedure, he was unaware of what medical tests would be performed as part of the intake process and thus could not have provided informed consent. The defendants claim that there is a sign in the room where the urethral swabbing procedure occurs that describes the procedure. See Kinnerk Dep. at 13-14.
After the urethral swabbing, Thompson and the other inmates received a chest x-ray and had blood drawn. Though Thompson maintains that he did not consent to these procedures, they do not form part of his complaint in this case.
Finally, the inmates were escorted into a receiving tunnel a 0907 hallway that is approximately ten feet wide and 100 yards long0907 in groups of forty to fifty at a time. The parties appear to be in agreement concerning the details of the subsequent strip/visual body cavity search.[2] Thompson and the others were lined up on both sides of the hallway with their backs against the wall and ordered by Department of Corrections officers to take off all their 885 clothes and *885 place them on the ground in front of them. As a number of officers watched, Thompson and the others were told to face the wall, reach high up on the wall, and run their fingers through their hair. They were then instructed to bend over and spread their buttocks a 0907 position they had to maintain until an officer was able to

observe each inmate. Thompson Dep. at 57-58. No prisoners were physically touched during this process. After being ordered to hold up each item of clothing for inspection, the inmates were allowed to get dressed.
Thompson contends that the visual cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. He also maintains that because he did not consent to the urethral swabbing, the defendants subjected him to that test in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, his due process right to be free from unjustified intrusions into his body and to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Thompson sues Cook County and four Cook County administrators in their official capacities. The defendants are Michael Sheahan, the Sheriff of Cook County; Callie Baird, the Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections; Ruth Rothstein, the Director of the Cook County Department of Public Health; and Leonard Bersky, the Chief Operating Officer of Cermak Health Services.
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of Thompson, the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The defendants' motion presents two issues for consideration: first, whether Thompson has brought suit against the appropriate defendants, and second, whether the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of Thompson's claims.
1. The named defendants' liability
The defendants contend that Thompson has failed to show personal involvement by any of the defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations and thus may not prevail in a § 1983 claim against any of the individuals named. The defendants correctly point out that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate's violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.2001). Thompson, however, has not sued the defendants in their individual capacities. Instead, he seeks to hold each defendant liable in his or her official capacity. Official capacity suits are, "in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. . . . for the real party in interest is the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). A governmental entity is subject to § 1983 liability only if a policy or custom of the entity caused the constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
886 The record does not reflect the existence of a written policy requiring incoming detainees, *886 including those imprisoned for contempt, to undergo a visual cavity search as part of the intake process. But the defendants admit that a security strip search was conducted on all incoming detainees and prisoners at the Cook County Jail. Def's 56.1 Resp. ¶ 1. Similarly, Daniel Brown, Superintendent of the Cook County Department of Corrections, testified that all inmates going through intake receive the same type of search. Brown Dep. at 32. Moreover, each side appears to agree on the scope of the search conducted. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to permit Thompson to proceed on his official capacity claims regarding the visual cavity search; the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
With respect to the urethral swabbing procedure, it is not crystal clear that a policy existed in October 2002 mandating urethral swabbing for all males entering the Cook County Jail. Cermak Health Services Policy No. 01-08B-01, effective January 2000, states that "Screening for sexually transmitted diseases (STD) is available upon incarceration." Cermak Health Services, Infection Control Program, Policy No. 01-08B-01 (emphasis added). The defendants also produced a March 2003 version of a written policy titled "Sexually Transmitted Disease Program" which provides that "All individuals entering CCDOC will be screened for sexually transmitted

diseases. The procedure for testing is to be explained to each individual undergoing testing." Cermak Health Services, Sexually Transmitted Disease Program, Policy No. 01-08E-41. One of the procedures listed in this policy is urethral swabbing. Though the version of the policy produced by the defendants was a revision that post-dates Thompson's processing, it lists the policy's date of origin as July 1984. Though the defendants have not supplied the Court with the version of this policy in place at the time of Thompson's incarceration, for present purposes we believe it reasonable to infer that a similar policy existed at that time. And even were this not the case, the circumstances surrounding Thompson's own processing permit a reasonable inference that the Cook County personnel were acting pursuant to an established policy with regard to the urethral swabbing.
Thompson claims that the swabbing was conducted without his knowing or voluntary consent. As indicated earlier, Dr. Raba testified that Cermak Health Services' policy was to obtain consent from new inmates via the medical intake form. Raba Aff. ¶ 5. The consent portion of this form, however, does not mention that what it calls "screening" for sexually transmitted diseases would include an invasive test. The defendants also contend that a sign in the room where the swabbing procedure occurred provided inmates with information about the procedure. However, none of the signs produced by the defendants provide any such information. Pl's Supp. Aff. Ex. D. In any event, inmates would not have had access to this sign until they were actually in the room awaiting the procedure, after they had already signed the consent form. In addition, Charles Kinnerk testified that if Cermak Health Services is short-staffed, inmates sometimes undergo the urethral swabbing before signing the consent form. Kinnerk Dep. at 37.
Given all the circumstances, a jury reasonably could find that the County had an established custom or practice of conducting urethral swabbing tests on detainees without obtaining voluntary consent. As with the visual body cavity scan, there is sufficient evidence for Thompson to pursue an official capacity claim against the defendants regarding the claim of unconsented urethral swabbing.
887 *887 2. The applicable constitutional provisions
Thompson asserts claims under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies only to prisoners incarcerated after an adjudication of guilt regarding a criminal offense. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Persons convicted of a crime, including those found in criminal contempt, may be punished by the state, id. at 535 n. 16 & 535 n. 17, 99 S.Ct. 1861, so long as the punishment has some penological justification and does riot amount to the gratuitous infliction of physical or psychological suffering. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); see also, e.g., Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.2003).
Because he was not a convicted prisoner, Thompson cannot maintain an Eighth Amendment claim. But that does not impair in the least his chances of success in this action. Detainees who have not been convicted of a crime are entitled to greater protection than convicted prisoners, not less. See, e.g., Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.2005); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.2005). Specifically, a pretrial detainee enjoys the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and may not be punished at all (except for infractions committed while in custody). See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Hart, 396 F.3d at 893; Board, 394 F.3d at 477; Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir.1998). Thus if a particular condition of pretrial detention amounts to punishment, it is unconstitutional.
Thompson was held in civil contempt; he was not convicted of any sort of a crime. Though he cannot complain that his imprisonment for civil contempt was an act of punishment, see, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952, 953 (7th Cir.2005), that does not mean that he could be subjected to detention conditions that were punitive in nature. Thompson was incarcerated not to be punished, but so that he might be induced to comply with the state court judge's directive. The Court sees no basis to assess his treatment by a more relaxed standard than one that applies to pretrial detainees.
Given these considerations, if Thompson could show that the particular practices he challenges were punitive in nature, he would prevail. But although Thompson might be able to sustain an individual-capacity claim against the individual who actually administered the urethral swabbing procedure to him 0907the self-described "dick doctor"0907he has not made any claims against any of the defendants in their individual capacities. Looking at the

policies he challenges in his official-capacity claims against the defendants, the Court sees no evidence that would support a claim that the County's practices constituted punishment. To prove that a particular condition or practice was punitive, Thompson must establish both that the practice was objectively punitive and that the responsible officials acted with a culpable mental state. See Tesch, 157 F.3d at 473. If a particular condition or practice is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment; conversely, if the practice is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may infer that it is punitive. Id. at 474 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861). Thompson has no evidence that the County acted with deliberate indifference, the mental state required to sustain a claim of improperly punitive conditions. See id. at 475 & n. 3 888 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, *888 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)); see also, Board, 394 F.3d at 478.
In Hart, the Seventh Circuit suggested that proof of a punitive purpose ought not be necessary to establish a claim under the Due Process Clause that a particular condition of pretrial detention is punitive. Hart, 396 F.3d at 891-92. It proposed a standard under which a gratuitously harsh or severe condition would be considered punitive even in the absence of proof of punitive intent. Id. at 892-93. Assuming that is the appropriate standard, Thompson still fails to provide evidence from which one reasonably could infer that the practices he challenges were punitive. There is no question that the urethral swab procedure produces pain or at least discomfort, as well as, perhaps, embarrassment and that the visual body cavity inspection is likewise intrusive and embarrassing. But calling these practices gratuitously harsh or severe and therefore punitive is too big a stretch.
Thompson's case, however, does not rise or fall on the question of whether the procedures he challenges were punitive. He also challenges both the urethral swab testing and the body cavity inspection as violative of the Fourth Amendment and also attacks the former procedure as contrary to his right under the Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment. We turn next to those challenges.
3. The visual body cavity search
We begin with the body cavity inspection. What is presented for the Court's review in this case is the propriety of blanket body cavity inspections of all incoming detainees at the jail, without reasonable suspicion that they might be concealing contraband, and no matter what they are charged with a 0907 felony of any type, a misdemeanor, or, like Thompson, civil contempt. The defendants make no claim, and offer no evidence, of any basis to believe that Thompson could have been concealing contraband. Nor have they offered evidence that civil contemnors as a group are at all likely to be concealing contraband on their persons.
Both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners0907and thus, by analogy, civil contemnors 0907retain constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Bell 441 U.S. at 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Those rights, however, are subject to limitations based on the fact of confinement, the legitimate goals of the penal institution, and the institution's need to maintain security and order. Id. at 545-46, 99 S.Ct. 1861. An institutional practice claimed to infringe a constitutional guarantee must be evaluated in light of the central objective of jail administration, that is, keeping the institution secure. Id. at 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Courts must make this evaluation deferentially, giving due regard to the professional expertise of correctional officials. Id. at 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
In Bell, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of body cavity searches of pretrial detainees as well as convicted prisoners under a Fourth Amendment standard, though it appeared to assume, rather than decide, that this was the proper standard. Id. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Several years after the Supreme Court decided Bell, it held that a prison inmate lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell and thus cannot sustain a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a search of his cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). But Hudson did not disturb Bell's application of the Fourth Amendment to searches of a detainee's or inmate's person, and courts have continued to apply the Fourth Amendment when assessing the 889 propriety of strip searches and body cavity searches of arrestees, pretrial *889 detainees, and convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 28-30 (1st Cir.2003) (arrestee); Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 63-64 (2d Cir.2001) (pretrial detainee); Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1342-43 (11th Cir.2001) (arrestee); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir.2001) (pretrial detainee); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.1998) (convicted prisoner); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 712-13 (9th Cir.1989) (arrestee). Cf. Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1039 n. 5 (7th Cir.1994)

(convicted prisoner; holding appellant had waived Fourth Amendment challenge, but citing other cases applying Fourth Amendment).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, a standard "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. A court considers the scope of the intrusion, the manner in which it was conducted, the justification for the intrusion, and the place where it was conducted. Id.
It is beyond argument that the search involved is extremely intrusive. As the Seventh Circuit stated in a case involving misdemeanor arrestees, "we can think of few exercises of authority by the state that intrude on the citizen's privacy and dignity as severely as the visual and anal genital searches practiced here." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983). And rather than being conducted in private as 0907 was the case in Mary Beth G.0907Thompson was searched in full view of dozens of other detainees, not to mention a significant number of jail guards.
The real issue in this case, however, concerns the justification for the visual cavity search. The defendants contend that the routine visual cavity search is required to prevent inmates from smuggling contraband0907weapons, drugs, and so on0907into the jail. Maintaining institutional security is "perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003) . As we have indicated, the determinations of correctional officials in this regard are entitled to deference, absent evidence they have overreacted to concerns inherent in the prison or jail context. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also, Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir.2003). But this does not immunize jail officials' decisions from scrutiny. Stanley, 337 F.3d at 966. Officials do not have carte blanche to institute any policy they please under the justification of institutional security. "An indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied . . . [cannot] be justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations." Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113 (ellipsis in original; quoting Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.1981)).
As Thompson argues, defendants have failed to provide any evidence supporting the need to conduct body cavity searches on all new detainees, much less on those like Thompson imprisoned for civil contempt. The only evidence offered by defendants consists of the following unexplained statement by superintendent Brown at his deposition:
We have, yes, in the jail, where detainees have hidden homemade knives, I can't think of a specific instance where I could go back and0907you know, but I do know that personally being the case, that that has0907when they try to0907detainees will try to smuggle things in. A lighter, for instance, which could be considered a weapon, definitely I've seen that in the receiving room. I've seen 0907 you know, you asked about weapons.
890 Brown Dep. at 20-21. As Thompson suggests, it is unclear whether this testimony *890 concerns items found on newly-arriving detainees, as opposed to detainees who were already at the jail. Without more, this evidence 0907the only evidence defendants point to as justifying their blanket cavity search policy is 0907 insufficient to entitle them to summary judgment.
In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a detention facility's policy of conducting a strip search, including a visual inspection of body cavities, of both sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees, after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60, 99 S.Ct. 1861. But unlike the inmates in Bell, Thompson and the other detainees in this case were not being searched following contact with outsiders. Rather, they were subject to an "intake" search following their arrest by law enforcement officials. "Unlike persons already in jail who receive contact visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an opportunity to hide something." Shain, 273 F.3d at 63. And it is a relatively safe assumption at 0907 least in the absence of evidence to the contrary0907that only a negligible portion of arrestees have concealed contraband in body cavities prior to their encounter with law enforcement.
Defendants have cited no cases that per se validate blanket strip searches for non-felony detainees in detention centers. In fact, courts have generally held that persons detained for minor offenses not involving weapons or drugs may not be subjected to a strip search or visual cavity search absent reasonable suspicion that the

particular arrestee or detainee is concealing such items. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112; Shain, 273 F.3d at 62-66; Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.2000); Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1996); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1997); Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 712-13; Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1986); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir.1984); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273. In Roberts, the First Circuit indicated that searching all inmates is more reasonable in cases in which the record reflects a history of problems with prisoners smuggling items into the institution. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112. But as indicated earlier, the defendants have offered only scant evidence that Cook County Jail has such a history 0907certainly insufficient evidence to entitle them to summary judgment. In short, genuine issues of material fact exist precluding entry of summary judgment on Thompson's claim regarding the visual body cavity search.
4. The urethral swabbing
We deal next with the urethral swab test. The first question is what provision of the Constitution supplies the standard by which the Court assesses the propriety of the test. Thompson relies on the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but as the Court has already ruled, the Eighth Amendment does not apply.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Court used the Fourth Amendment to determine the propriety of imposing an invasive medical procedure on an arrestee in 0907 that case, the drawing of blood. Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the Court concluded that a compelled drawing and testing of blood, administration of a Breathalyzer test, "which generally requires the production of alveolar or `deep lung' breath," and collection and testing of urine, each constituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. These cases indicate that the 891 administration of the urethral *891 swabbing is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
Consent may justify a search under the Fourth Amendment, so long as it is "freely and voluntarily given." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see also, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). The defendants argue that Thompson consented to the search by signing the medical intake form. As noted earlier, Thompson denies signing the form. But even if Thompson had admitted signing the form, the defendants would not be entitled to summary judgment on this point. The consent form merely advises that the detainee will be screened for sexually transmitted diseases. It says nothing about the testing procedures or bodily intrusions involved. It is difficult to see how a form that does not even mention that a search will occur can be deemed to constitute consent for a search. The defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the permissibility of a search "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). In the context of a criminal case or a search for evidence, the balance generally tilts in favor of the procedures described in the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. Id. But searches that, like this one, are conducted for purposes other than to gather evidence are analyzed under the so-called "special needs" standard. Id. (citing cases). Under this standard, effectively the same one articulated in Bell, courts consider the nature of the privacy interest at stake, the character of the intrusion, and the nature of the government's interest and the efficacy of its practice in meeting that interest. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-32, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002).
The parties also seem to agree that the urethral swab test should be analyzed under the standards that apply to administration of unwanted medical procedures. Indeed, the defendants seek to justify the test on the ground that it advances the institution's interest in protecting the health of inmates. An inmate has an interest, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in refusing unwanted medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990).[3] A regulation that impinges on this interest is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Russell v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)). The factors to be considered include whether there is a valid and rational connection between the regulation and the

governmental interest put forward to justify it; the impact that accommodation of the inmate's right would have on guards, other inmates, and jail resources; and whether there is a ready alternative that would fully accommodate the prisoner's right to refuse treatment at a minimal cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 447-49.
892 *892 Though the Fourth Amendment and due process standards are not identical, there is sufficient overlap to permit the Court to discuss the relevant factors together.
First of all, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the privacy interest at stake is significant, and the intrusion involved cannot fairly be described as minimal. In Skinner, the Court, though noting that the collection of urine was not an invasive procedure, expressed reluctance to "characterize . . . as minimal" the privacy concerns arising from the intimacy of the bodily function involved in the intrusion, and relied on the existence of regulations that "endeavor [ed] to reduce the intrusiveness of the collection process," including the absence of observation and conduct of the procedure in a medical environment by independent personnel. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The urethral swabbing procedure, by contrast, involves invasion of one of the most intimate and sensitive parts of the male body, and the evidence submitted by the parties suggests that the procedures used may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the procedure's inherent intrusiveness. As a result, the Court can only conclude that the intrusion involved is a significant one that is not mitigated by the processes adopted by the defendants.
Assessment of the governmental interest involved and the "fit" between that interest and the procedure at issue is an aspect of both the Fourth Amendment and due process standards. Though the due process standard requires a rational fit, as opposed to a perfect fit, between Cook County's legitimate interests and the policy in question, there must still exist a logical connection between the urethral swabbing and the interests defendants offer as justification. See Russell, 384 F.3d at 448.
The defendants claim that their STD testing is conducted "for purposes of promoting health of inmates even after they are discharged from the Cook County Department of Corrections." Defs' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 16. They also contend that "Cermak Health Services is concerned about the maintenance and improvement of the health of its inmate population, especially since the medical screening is in some instances the only medical care many inmates have received." Id. at ¶ 49. Noticeably absent from this seemingly benevolent purpose is any indication that the defendants developed this policy to eradicate an existing problem with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) in the Cook County Jail.
The defendants cite national studies affirming that STDs continue to be a major health threat in the United States and provide evidence that "multiple studies and surveillance projects have demonstrated a high prevalence of STDs in persons entering jails and correctional facilities." Raba Aff. ¶ 15. But they have provided no evidence that the Cook County Jail has experienced similar problems. Jean Kiriazes, the director of continuous quality improvement and risk management at Cermak Health Services, who says she is the person in the best position to answer questions related to the intake policies, see Kiriazes Dep. at 5, was unaware of venereal diseases having ever been spread in the Cook County Jail. Id. at 29. Similarly, jail superintendent Brown testified that he is unaware of any sexually transmitted disease having been spread in the facility and that nobody has ever expressed a concern to him along these lines. Brown Dep. at 37-38.
Perhaps more importantly, the defendants have provided no evidence that their program is geared toward curbing the spread of STDs or eliminating such infections in inmates. The laboratory reports do not differentiate 893 among inmates who *893 test negative and those who refused to consent to the urethral swabbing a 0907 distinction that would seem important if the goal were to prevent the spread of STDs in the jail. See Wicheanvonagoon Aft ¶ 9. The defendants have also provided no description of the course of action they take if a prisoner tests positive for an STD, such as segregating that prisoner from non-infected inmates until he is treated. The defendants' key personnel do not even seem to know how long it takes to obtain results from the urethral swabbing and whether results are obtained during the relatively short average stay of a detainee (according to Kiriazes, between fourteen and twenty-one days). See Kiriazes Dep. at 29; Brown Dep. at 44. In addition, superintendent Brown was unaware of any inmate who has ever been treated for a venereal disease based on the results of the screening. Brown Dep. at 88. On the present record, the connection between the defendants' justifications and the challenged policy is too tenuous to entitle the defendants to summary judgment.

Furthermore, this case concerns an invasive and uncomfortable procedure that is carried out not in a private setting, but rather under the watchful eyes of at least one other detainee who has a view from the open doorway. Even considering the jail setting, this is a significant intrusion on privacy. And there may be an available alternative that would be far less invasive and might actually reduce the jail's expenses. Dr. Raba testified that the estimated cost of a urine collection technique is the same or slightly less than the cost of the urethral swabbing. Id. He opined, however, that urine screening would be logistically unfeasible in the intake facility as it now exists0907only one toilet is allegedly available0907and that some inmates might, due to anxiety, be unable to produce a sample. The record as it now stands does not permit the Court to assess adequately the effectiveness of an alternative procedure.
Finally, as part of the due process analysis, the Court considers the effect that barring unconsented urethral swabbing would have on other prisoners and the staff. There is no question that a jail has a duty to ensure the safety and well-being of its inmates and staff. See Russell, 384 F.3d at 448. But as indicated earlier, the defendants have provided no evidence that it uses the policy to carry out that duty. On the present record, one cannot find that prisoners or jail staff would be detrimentally affected if this procedure were eliminated. Cf. id. at 448-49 ("The fact that the jail has endured a number of lice outbreaks in the past demonstrates that this is more than an abstract possibility."). Moreover, the jail stopped conducting urethral swabbing tests during intake in May 2003 "due to reprioritization of the medical intake process." Def's 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 42. This arguably suggests that the County itself attached little importance to its use of this procedure.
In sum, there are genuine factual issues regarding whether the urethral swabbing policy violated Thompson's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights, thus precluding entry of summary judgment.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment [docket no. 34]. The case is set for a status hearing on August 16, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a trial date and discussing the possibility of settlement.
[1] Thompson denies that Kinnerk conducted the interview. He says the person who interviewed him was AfricanAmerican. Kinnerk is Caucasian.
[2] The parties disagree on the relevant terminology. Defendants maintain that inmates are strip searched as part of intake procedure, but that they do not receive a cavity search, which defendants say involves touching. Courts, however, distinguish between visual cavity searches, which involve visually inspecting body cavities, and the more invasive procedure, sometimes referred to as a digital cavity search, that involves touching or physically searching an individual's body cavities. See Thompson v. Souza, Ill F.3d 694, 700-701 (9th Cir.1997); see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir.1983) (referring to similar procedure as "visual cavity search"). As the parties agree that no touching was involved, we will refer to the intake procedure as a visual cavity search.
[3] Cruzan and Harper involved convicted prisoners, but pretrial detainees0907and thus presumably civil contemnors0907have at least tho rights guaranteed to convicted prisoners. See Russell v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444, 447 n. 1 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992)).
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 CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?520136716623589-L_35...
MASON, PROTO, REOPEN, TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03-cv-07172

Thompson v. Cook Co DOC, et al Assigned to: Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly Demand: $1,000,000 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson
V.

Date Filed: 10/09/2003 Date Terminated: 03/29/2007 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by John P DeRose John P. Derose and Associates 15 Spinning Wheel Road Hinsdale, IL 60521 (630)920-1111 Email: jdrlaw@sbcglobal.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Notices to Prisoner Correspondence . Email: Prison1_ILND@ilnd.uscourts.gov TERMINATED: 10/07/2005
Jessica Rae Hill John P. DeRose & Assoicates 15 Spinning Wheel Road 428 Hinsdale, IL 60521 (630)920-1111 Email: jhill-jdrlaw@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Alan Ibarra The Law Offices of Craig A. Tomassi 20 North Clark Street Suite 2550 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 658-0111 Email: jibarra@tomassilaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Cook County Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 03/18/2004 Defendant County of Cook, The
Defendant Michael Sheahan Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity,

represented by Francis J. Catania Cook County State's Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-6572 Email: fcatania@cookcountygov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominick L Lanzito Querrey & Harrow, Ltd. 175 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 1600 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 540-7592 Email: dlanzito@querrey.com TERMINATED: 09/20/2006
Donald J. Pechous Cook County State's Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-6461 Email: dpechou@cookcountygov.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Ouska Cook County State's Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-6461 Email: jouska@cookcountygov.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/2006

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Defendant Callie Beard Director, Cook County Department of Corrections, in her official capacity,
Defendant Ruth Rothstein Director, Cook County Department of Public Health, in her official capacity,
Defendant Leonard R Bersky Chief Operating Office, Cermak Health Services of Cook County, in his official capacity,
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Donald J. Pechous (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Ouska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/2006
Donald J. Pechous (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Ouska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/2006
Donald J. Pechous (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Ouska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Francis J. Catania (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
6/26/2007 11:46 AM

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?520136716623589-L_35...

Respondent Attorney Thomas Gerard Morrissey

Dominick L Lanzito (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/2006
Donald J. Pechous (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Ouska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey 10249 S. Western Ave Chicago, Il 60643 773-233-7900 Fax: 773-239-0387 Email: tgmlaw@ameritech.net PRO SE

Date Filed 10/09/2003 10/09/2003 10/10/2003 10/28/2003
11/10/2003

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT and one copy; jury demand - Civil cover sheet - Pro Se appearance of Lawrence E Thompson ( No summons(es) issued.) ( Documents: 1-1 through 1-3) (ar) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 10/9/03 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 10320912. (ar) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
FORWARDED complete case file to Prisoner Correspondence (ar) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
2 MINUTE ORDER of 10/28/03 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Plaintiff is ordered to appear at the next status hearing set for 9:30 a.m. on 11/10/03 in Judge Kennelly's courtroom, Room 2103. If plaintiff fails to appear, the case may be dismissed for want of prosecution. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 10/30/2003)
3 MINUTE ORDER of 11/10/03 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : The plaintiff in this case sued the Cook County Department of Corrections, a non-suable entity. See Castillo v. Cook County Dept. Mail Room, 990 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court set the case for a status hearing, and ordered the plaintiff to appear in person, so that we could inquire of him regarding who can properly be named as a defendant in this case. The order setting the status hearing warned plaintiff that if he did not appear, his case might be dismissed, and it was mailed to plaintiff at the address he listed in his complaint. Plaintiff failed to appear. The case is dismissed for want of prosecution and for failure to state a claim. Terminating case. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 11/14/2003 (Entered: 11/14/2003)

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12/10/2003 12/17/2003 01/15/2004 01/23/2004 01/29/2004
02/17/2004 02/19/2004 02/20/2004 02/24/2004 02/26/2004
03/02/2004 03/15/2004 03/18/2004
03/23/2004 04/01/2004

4 MOTION by plaintiff for reinstatement and leave to file amended complaint (Attachment); Notice (ar) (Entered: 12/10/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 12/17/03 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : hearing set for 9:30 1/15/04 . No notice (or) (Entered: 12/29/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 1/15/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : hearing continued to 9:30 a.m. on 1/29/04 . No notice (or) (Entered: 01/18/2004)
5 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff regarding motion to reinstate; Notice [4-1] (ar) (Entered: 01/29/2004)
6 MINUTE ORDER of 1/29/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Plaintiff's motion to reinstate is granted [4-1]. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint is granted in part [4-2]. Proposed second amended complaint is due 02/12/04. Status hearing set to 9:30 a.m. on 02/18/04. Case reopened. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
7 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff regarding proposed second amended complaint; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 2/19/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing reset to 9:30 2/23/04 . No notice (or) (Entered: 02/19/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 2/20/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing reset to 9:30 2/26/04 . No notice (or) (Entered: 02/20/2004)
8 ERRATA RE February 12, 2004 filing by plaintiff (Attachments); Notice. (gcy) Modified on 02/25/2004 (Entered: 02/25/2004)
9 MINUTE ORDER of 2/26/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held and continued to 5/5/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff is given leave to file second amended complaint, with summons to issue. Mailed notice (jmm) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
SUMMONSES, five originals and five copies issued as to County of Cook, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, and Leonard Bersly (ar) (Entered: 03/03/2004)
10 RETURNS OF SERVICE (5) of summons executed on 03/04/04 as to Leonard R Bersky, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, John Stroger, and Michael Sheahan (ar) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
11 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [1-1] by plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson, terminating defendant Cook Co DOC; adding defendants County of Cook, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, and Leonard R Bersky (ar) (Entered: 03/23/2004)
12 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for John Stroger and defendants Cook County, Leonard R Bersky, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Michael Sheahan by Francis J. Catania, John A. Ouska (ar) (Entered: 03/24/2004)
13 MOTION by defendants for enlargement of time to answer or otherwise plead ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/05/2004)

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04/01/2004
04/12/2004 04/15/2004 04/20/2004 04/20/2004 04/20/2004
04/20/2004 05/05/2004
05/26/2004 05/28/2004 06/08/2004
06/18/2004 08/17/2004 08/19/2004

14 MINUTE ORDER of 4/1/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Defendants' motion for enlcargment of time [13-1], is granted. Defendants' response to the complaint is to be filed by 04/16/04. Case remains set for initial status hearing on 05/05/04 at 9:00 a.m. The parties are directed to comply with Judge Kennelly's standing initial order, available on his web page, before that date. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
17 MOTION by plaintiff for temporary injunction (Attachments); Memorandum in support; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 04/23/2004)
15 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 04/16/2004)
16 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiff to motion for temporary injunction, with reply (Attachments); Notice. (gma) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
16 REPLY by plaintiff to defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, with supplement (Attachments); Notice. (gma) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
18 MINUTE ORDER of 4/20/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiff's motion for temporary injunction is denied for the reasons stated in open court [17-1]. Plaintiff's response to defendants' motion to dismiss is to be filed by 5/11/04; reply is to be filed by 5/21/04. Ruling on motion is set to 6/1/04 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 04/23/2004)
19 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction [17-1]. (gma) (Entered: 04/23/2004)
20 MINUTE ORDER of 5/5/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Rule 16(b) conference held with pro se plaintiff and defendant's counsel appearing. All discovery ordered closed on 8/31/04. Date for filing response to motion to dismiss extended to 5/21/04; reply is to be filed by 5/28/04. Ruling date of 6/1/04 is vacated and reset to 6/8/04 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
21 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion to dismiss; Memorandum in support; Notice. (gma) Modified on 05/27/2004 (Entered: 05/27/2004)
22 REPLY by defendants to plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
23 MINUTE ORDER of 6/8/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion to dismiss is granted as to claim for injunctive relief and the motion is otherwise denied. Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 a.m. on 09/09/04. No notice (ar) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
24 ANSWER by defendants to plaintiff's second amended complaint [11-1]; jury demand; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
25 AGREED MOTION by plaintiff to extend discovery deadline ; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
26 MINUTE ORDER of 8/19/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Agreed motion to extend discovery deadline is granted [25-1]. Discovery cut-off date is extended to 9/13/04. Status hearing of 9/9/04 is vacated and reset to 9/15/04 at 9:30 a.m.

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09/10/2004 09/15/2004 09/15/2004 10/14/2004 10/26/2004 11/15/2004
11/24/2004
12/08/2004 12/13/2004 12/16/2004

Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 08/23/2004)
27 SECOND AGREED MOTION by plaintiff to extend discovery deadline ; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/15/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30a.m. on 10/14/04 . Mailed notice (or) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
28 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Agreed motion to extend discovery deadline is granted to 10/8/04 [27-1]. Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/14/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing held and continued to 10/26/04 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/26/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30a.m. on 12/16/04 . Motion for summary judgment is due 12/14/04 . Mailed notice (or) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
29 MINUTE ORDER of 11/15/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : The Court has reviewed the personnel files of J. Gray, C. Bullard, and A. Volpe which were submitted for in camera review. As to Mr. Gray, nothing in his file is properly discoverable. As to Mr. Bullard, the court cannot make a determination without first obtaining particulars regarding the disciplinary allegation referenced in the 5/22/02 letter by L. Wisniewski. As to Mr. Volpe, the court cannot make a determination without particulars regarding the disciplinary allegation of 6/5/99 that resulted in a verbal warning (see list "previous disciplinary action" in the file, and regarding the allegation referenced in the 9/15/00 letter to Mr. Volpe.) Defendants are requested to provide this information for in camera review by 11/24/04. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 11/17/2004)
30 MINUTE ORDER of 11/24/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: The court has reviewed the additional materials provided by defendants for in camera review pursuant to the order of 11/15/04. The court finds that certain of the documents, listed on the reverse side of this order, are within the proper scope of discovery and must be produced within 3 business days of this order. The court reserves ruling on whether the matters disclosed in these documents will be admissible in evidence. The remainder of the materials reviewed in camera are outside the proper scope of discovery and need not be poduced. Defendants' counsel is directed to preserve a set of the materials submitted for in camera review for submission in the event of an appeal in this case. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 12/8/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing of 12/16/04 is vacated and reset to 9:30a.m. on 12/15/04 . No notice (or) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
31 MOTION by defendants for enlargement of time to file dispositive motions ; Notice. (gma) Modified on 12/23/2004 (Entered: 12/17/2004)
32 MINUTE ORDER of 12/16/04 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly: Defendant's motion for enlargement of time to file dispositive motions is granted [31-1]. Dispositive motion cut off date is extended to 1/14/05. Status hearing of 12/15/04

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01/07/2005 01/13/2005 01/13/2005
01/18/2005 01/18/2005
01/18/2005 01/31/2005 02/14/2005 03/03/2005 03/03/2005
03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/10/2005

is vacated and reset to 1/18/05 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
33 MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery (Attachments); Notice (ar) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
34 MOTION by defendants for summary judgment ; Memorandum in support ; Notice (las) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
35 STATEMENT by defendants County of Cook, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky of material uncontested facts pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) (Attachments); Notice. (gma) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
36 NOTICE by defendants to pro se litigant opposing motion for summary judgment. (gma, ) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
37 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to compel 33 is entered and continued to 1/31/05 at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff's response to the motion for summary judgment34 is due 3/1/05. Reply is due 3/18/05. For further detail see attached order. No notices, advised in open court. (gma, ) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
38 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/18/2005: (gma, ) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
39 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Hearing on motion to compel held and continued to 2/14/2005 at 9:30 a.m. No notice. (Entered: 02/02/2005)
40 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion hearing vacated. Plaintiff fails to appear. Motion to compel 33 is terminated as moot. Mailed notice (ntf, ) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
41 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for expansion of time to file response to motion for summary judgment. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
42 NOTICE of Motion by Lawrence E Thompson for presentment of motion for expansion of time to file response to motion for summary judgment 41 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
43 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion for summary judgment 34: Notice. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
44 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in Support of response to motion for summary judgment 43. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
45 OPPOSITION by plaintiff to defendant's statement of facts in support of response to motion for summary judgment 43. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
46 OPPOSING STATEMENT by plainitff of facts and affidavit in support of response to motion for summary judgment 43. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
47 NOTICE of filing by Lawrence E Thompson re opposition to defendants' statement of facts in support of respose to motion for summary judgment, and

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03/15/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/31/2005 03/31/2005
03/31/2005 04/05/2005 04/11/2005 04/11/2005 04/12/2005

plaintiff's opposing statement of facts and affidavit in support of response to motion for summary judgment 45, 46 (vmj, ) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
48 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Plaintiff's motion for expansion of time is granted 41. Defendant reply brief is to be filed by 3/21/2005. Mailed notice (vmj, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
49 MOTION by Defendants for leave to file late reply memorandum and supporting documents(gma, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
50 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of MOTION by Defendants for leave to file late reply memorandum and supporting documents 49 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/5/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
51 REPLY by defendants' to plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary judgment34 with memorandum and Rule 56.1 reply to plaintiff's statement of additional facts (las, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
52 LOCAL RULE 56.1 reply to "plaintiff's opposing statement of fact and affidavit in support of response to motion for summary judgment" (las, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
53 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for leave to file supplemental affidavit and statement of facts in support of response to motion for summary judgment (Attachments: # 1 Supplemental Statement of Facts# 2 Supplemental Affidavit)(gma, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
54 NOTICE of Motion by Lawrence E Thompson for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for leave to file supplemental affidavit and statement of facts in support of response to motion for summary judgment 53 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/5/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
55 RESPONSE by plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson to defendants' motion for leave to file late reply 49 ; Notice. (mjc). (Entered: 04/04/2005)
56 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion for leave to file 49 is granted, Motion for leave to file 53 is granted. Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for summary judgment34 : Reply due by 4/26/2005. No notice (or, ) (Entered: 04/10/2005)
57 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson to compel defendants to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations (gma, ) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
58 NOTICE of Motion by Lawrence E Thompson for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson to compel defendants to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations 57 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/14/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/11/2005)
59 REPLY by defendants to plaintiff's motion to compel57 and motion for additional time to respond to new discovery requests ; Notice. (mjc, ) Modified on 11/14/2006 (mjc, ). (Entered: 04/14/2005)

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04/14/2005 04/21/2005 04/25/2005 04/26/2005 04/27/2005 08/08/2005
08/08/2005 08/16/2005 08/29/2005
08/30/2005 08/30/2005 09/06/2005
09/15/2005

60 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Set deadlines/hearing as to motion to compel57 : Supplemental response due 4/21/2005. Motion is continued to 4/27/2005 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (or, ) (Entered: 04/19/2005)
61 SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY by defendants to plaintiff's motion to compel 57 ; Notice. (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/25/2005)
63 REPLY by defendants to plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for summary judgment - memorandum and Rule 56.1 reply to plaintiff's statement of additionals facts ; Notice. (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
64 REPLY by plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson to defendants' response to motion to compel 57 ; Notice. (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
62 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion to compel 57 is entered and continued generally. No notice (or, ) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
65 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : For the reasons set forth on the attached memorandum opinion and order, the Court denies defendants motion for summary judgment 34. The case is set for status hearing on 8/16/05 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a trial date and discussing the possibility of settlement. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
66 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 8/8/2005.(mjc, ) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
67 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held on 8/16/2005 and continued to 8/29/2005 at 09:00 AM. No notice (or, ) (Entered: 08/19/2005)
68 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing pursuant to Rule 16(b) held with pro se plaintiff and attorny for defendants. The case is set for jury trial on 1/30/2006 at 9:45 a.m. The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Mason to conduct a settlement conference. The Court will rule by mail in plaintiff's outstanding motion to compel. Mailed notice (or, ) (Entered: 08/31/2005)
69 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Plaintiff's motion to compel 57 is granted in part and denied in part as stated below. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
70 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason to conduct settlement conference. Signed by Executive Committee on 08/30/05. (lcw, ) (Entered: 09/02/2005)
71 MINUTE entry before Judge Michael T. Mason : Settlement Conference set for 9/15/2005 at 09:30 AM in courtroom 2214. Parties are to strictly abide by this Court's Standing Order for Settlement Conference. Defendant's counsel to submit copies of both plaintiff's settlement demand letter AND defendant's response letter to the courtroom deputy, room 2220, by 9/12/05. Judicial staff mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
72 MINUTE entry before Judge Michael T. Mason : Settlement conference held on 9/15/2005. Parties were not able to reach an agreement to settle the case at this time. All matters relating to the referral of this case having been resolved, the

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10/07/2005 10/07/2005
10/13/2005 10/13/2005 10/26/2005 11/09/2005 11/09/2005 12/05/2005 12/05/2005 12/20/2005 12/20/2005 12/20/2005
12/20/2005 12/20/2005

referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Michael T. Mason no longer referred to the case. Judicial staff mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)
73 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for leave to file appearance of counsel (Attachments: # 1 Attorney Appearance)(gma, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
74 NOTICE of Motion by Lawrence E Thompson for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for leave to file appearance of counsel 73 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/13/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
75 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion for leave to file appearance 73 is granted. Attorney John P DeRose and Jessica Rae Hill for Lawrence E Thompson added. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
76 ATTORNEY Appearance for plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson by John P DeRose, Jessica Rae Hill. (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
77 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held. Pretrial Order due by 12/20/2005. Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/19/2006 at 04:00 PM. No notice (or, ) (Entered: 10/31/2005)
78 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky for protective order (Attachments: # 1)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
79 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for protective order78 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/17/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
80 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Nun pro tunc 11/17/05: Motion for protective order 78 is granted. Enter protective order as approved by the Court. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
81 AGREED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/5/2005.(mjc, ) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
82 PRETRIAL Memorandum by Lawrence E Thompson (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
83 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson Pretrial Memorandum (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
84 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Cook County Department of Corrections, County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky by Donald J. Pechous (Pechous, Donald) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
85 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky to strike Final Pretrial Order (Pechous, Donald) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
86 NOTICE of Motion by Donald J. Pechous for presentment of motion to strike85 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/3/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Pechous, Donald) (Entered: 12/20/2005)

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12/21/2005 12/21/2005 12/22/2005 12/22/2005 01/03/2006 01/03/2006 01/17/2006 01/17/2006
01/17/2006 01/17/2006 01/17/2006 01/17/2006 01/19/2006 01/19/2006

87 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson in limine (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/21/2005)
88 NOTICE of Motion by John P DeRose for presentment of motion in limine87 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/3/2006 at 09:00 AM. (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/21/2005)
89 RESPONSE by Lawrence E Thompson to MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky to strike Final Pretrial Order85 (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
90 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike Pretrial Order (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
91 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion to strike final pretrial order 85 is granted. Deadline for submitting amended pretrial order is set to 1/17/2006. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
102 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion to strike final pretrial order is granted. Deadline for submitting amended pretrial order is set to 1/17/2006. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
92 MOTION by Defendants Cook County Department of Corrections, County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky in limine (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
93 NOTICE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky re MOTION by Defendants Cook County Department of Corrections, County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky in limine92 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
94 RESPONSE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky to MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson in limine87 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
95 NOTICE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky re response to motion94 in limine (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
96 PROPOSED Pretrial Order by Lawrence E Thompson (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(DeRose, John) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
97 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson (DeRose, John) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
98 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky by Dominick L Lanzito (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
99 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Final pretrial conference held and continued to 1/26/2006 at 9:30 a.m. Defendant's memorandum in support of objection under Medical Studies Act is to be filed by 1/24/2006. Parties are directed to confer regarding whether plaintiff wil be pursuing his state law claims, objections to exhibits, and other matters discussed at the conference. Trial date of 1/30/2006 is reset to 1/31/2006 at 9:45 a.m. (or, ) (Entered:

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01/19/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006
01/26/2006 01/31/2006 02/01/2006 02/02/2006 02/03/2006 02/07/2006
02/07/2006 02/07/2006 02/07/2006 02/07/2006

01/20/2006)
103 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/19/2006.(mjc, ) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
100 PRETRIAL Memorandum by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
101 NOTICE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky re pretrial memorandum100 in Support to Defendants' Objection to Use of Privileged Documents in the Trial of this Case (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
104 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson by Jonathan Alan Ibarra. (mjc, ) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
105 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Voir dire held. Trial begins-Jury. Jury trial continued to 2/1/06 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
106 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Jury trial held on 2/1/2006. Jury Trial continued to 2/2/2006 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice. (tlp, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
107 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Jury trial held on 2/2/2006. Jury Trial continued to 2/3/2006 at 9:45 AM. Mailed notice. (tlp, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
108 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Jury trial held on 2/3/2006. Jury Trial continued to 2/6/2006 at 9:45 AM. Mailed notice. (tlp, ) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
109 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Defendants' motion to dismiss claims pursuant to Rule 50 is granted in part and denied in part. Judgment pursuant to Rule 50 is entered for defendant County of Cook as to Count 1, and for defendant Sheriff of Cook County as to Counts 2 and 3. The second amended complaint is deemed to be amended, to conform to the proofs, to include a claim for indemnification against the County of Cook as to the claims against the Sheriff in Counts 2 and 3. Plaintiff previously withdrew Counts 4,5, and 6. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
110 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Trial held-jury. Jury verdict for defendant as to first, second and third claim. Trial ends-jury. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
111 MOTION by Defendants to dismiss claims pursuant to Rule 50 (eav, ) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
112 JURY Verdict entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all claims. (mb, ) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
124 JURY Verdict entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. (mb, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)

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02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/27/2006 02/27/2006 02/28/2006 03/14/2006 03/14/2006 03/14/2006 03/14/2006 03/21/2006 03/29/2006 04/18/2006
04/18/2006 04/27/2006 05/10/2006 05/10/2006

113 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for new trial (Attachments: # 1)(DeRose, John) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
114 NOTICE of Motion by John P DeRose for presentment of motion for new trial113 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 2/28/2006 at 09:30 AM. (DeRose, John) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
115 RESPONSE Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
116 NOTICE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan, Callie Beard, Ruth Rothstein, Leonard R Bersky Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
117 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Reply to motion for new trial 113 is due 3/13/06. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
118 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson to file instanter Reply Brief (Attachments: # 1)(DeRose, John) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
119 NOTICE of Motion by John P DeRose for presentment of motion to file instanter118 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/21/2006 at 09:30 AM. (DeRose, John) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
120 REPLY by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson For a New Trial (DeRose, John) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
121 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson (DeRose, John) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
122 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly: Plaintiff's motion to excuse late filing and to allow filing instanter is granted 118. Mailed notice (jmm, ) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
123 INSTRUCTIONS Given To The JURY.(mjc, ) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
125 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion and order, the Court grants Thompson's motion for a new trial as it concerns Court 1 but denies the motion as it concerns Count 2 and 3 (docket no. 113 ). The case is set for a status hearing on 4/27/06 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a date for the retrial of Count 1. Trial counsel are directed to appear. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
126 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/18/2006.(mjc, ) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
127 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing held on 4/27/2006 and continued to 5/16/2006 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
128 MOTION by Defendant Michael SheahanMotion for Certification Pursuant to 28 USC Sec 1292(b) (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
129 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief128 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 5/16/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/10/2006)

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05/16/2006
06/06/2006 06/06/2006 06/20/2006 06/20/2006
06/28/2006 07/06/2006 07/06/2006
07/06/2006 07/06/2006 07/17/2006 08/02/2006 08/07/2006
09/15/2006 09/15/2006

130 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for miscellaneous class certification 128 : Response due by 6/6/2006; Reply due by 6/20/2006. Ruling set to 6/29/2006 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
131 RESPONSE by Lawrence E Thompson in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Michael SheahanMotion for Certification Pursuant to 28 USC Sec 1292(b)128 (DeRose, John) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
132 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson re response in opposition to motion131 (DeRose, John) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
133 REPLY by Defendant Michael Sheahan to response in opposition to motion131 by Defendant Sheahan FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. ? 1292(B) (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
134 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan OF FILING OF DEFENDANT SHEAHAN?S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF?S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT?S PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. ? 1292(B) (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
135 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Ruling on motion for certification reset to 7/6/2006 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
136 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : The court denies defendant's motion for certification for the reasons stated below 128. Mailed (vmj, ) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
137 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :For the reasons set forth in the attached Corrected Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants Thompson's motion for a new trial as it concerns Count 1 but denies the motion as it concerns Counts 2 and 3 (113). Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
138 CORRECTED MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/18/06 (corrected 7/6/2006).(mjc, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
139 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Jury Trial set for 8/29/2006 at 09:45 AM. Status hearing set for 8/15/2006 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
140 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Clerk of Court is directed to reinstate this case. Case reopened. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
141 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing set for 8/7/2006 at 09:00 AM., with attorneys by telephone. (or, ) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
142 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Telephone conference held with attorneys for both sides. Trial date of 8/29/2006 is vacated. The case is set for jury trial on 11/29/2006 at 9:45 a.m. Status hearing of 8/14/2006 is vacated and reset for 11/15/2006 at 09:30 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
143 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan to withdraw as attorney (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
144 NOTICE by County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan re MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael Sheahan to withdraw as attorney143 (Lanzito,

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09/20/2006 09/21/2006 10/02/2006 10/06/2006 11/03/2006
11/22/2006 11/22/2006 11/22/2006 11/27/2006 11/27/2006 11/28/2006 11/28/2006 11/30/2006 12/08/2006

Dominick) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
145 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion to withdraw is granted. Dominick Lanzito is granted leave to withdraw his appearance for defendants. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
146 NOTICE of Motion by Dominick L Lanzito for presentment of before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/10/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Lanzito, Dominick) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
147 NOTIFICATION by Dominick Lanzito of Change of Address for defendants. (mjc, ) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
148 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion for leave to withdraw appearance of Dominic Lanzito as attorney for defendants is granted. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
149 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Telephoned conference held with attorneys for both sides. The jury trial date of 11/29/2006 is vacated and reset to 4/2/2007 at 09:45 AM. The status hearing of 11/15/2006 is vacated and reset to 3/12/2007 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (gej, ) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
150 MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael SheahanMotion for Sanctions for Violation of Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ORDER Doc 103# 2 Exhibit 1)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
151 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief150 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/30/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
152 Corrected NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief150 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/30/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
153 RESPONSE by Lawrence E Thompson in Opposition to MOTION by Defendants County of Cook, The, Michael SheahanMotion for Sanctions for Violation of Protective Order150 (DeRose, John) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
154 NOTICE by Lawrence E Thompson of Filing (DeRose, John) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
155 RESPONSE Joint Motion for sanctions for Violating this Court's Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
156 NOTICE by Thomas Gerard Morrissey Response Joint Motion for sanctions for violating this Court's Protective Order (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
157 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Motion for sanctions against John DeRose for violation of this Court's protective order, is granted. A sanction of $500.00 is imposed. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
158 MOTION by Plaintiff Lawrence E Thompson for reconsideration (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/08/2006)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?520136716623589-L_35...

12/08/2006
12/19/2006 03/12/2007 03/14/2007 03/27/2007 03/27/2007 03/29/2007
03/30/2007

159 NOTICE of Motion by John P DeRose for presentment of motion for reconsideration158 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/19/2006 at 09:30 AM. (DeRose, John) (Entered: 12/08/2006)
160 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Motion for reconsideration 158 is denied. (or, ) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
161 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Jury Trial of 4/2/2007 is vacated and reset for 4/3/2007 at 09:45 AM. (or, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
162 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly :Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/2/2007 at 02:00 PM. (or, ) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
163 INCORRECT ENTRY (DeRose, John) Modified on 3/28/2007 (gcy, ). (Entered: 03/27/2007)
164 INCORRECT ENTRY (DeRose, John) Modified on 3/28/2007 (gcy, ). (Entered: 03/27/2007)
165 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Case is dismissed pursuant to stipulation. All pending schedules are terminated, including jury trial date of 4/3/2007. Civil case terminated. (or, ) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
166 MINUTE entry before Judge Matthew F. Kennelly : Schedules and deadlines vacated. (or, ) (Entered: 03/30/2007)

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