Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/20/13 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN

ANGEL PEREZ,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER JORGE L. LOPEZ )

and the CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. JURY DEMAND

COMPLAINT

JURISDICTION

1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. sections 1983 et seq. and 1988; the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, and 1343(a);

the Constitution of the United States; and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section

1367.

PARTIES

Plaintiff

2. Plaintiff, Angel Perez, is An adult male who, at all relevant times, was a resident

of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County.

Defendants

3. Defendant, Jorge L. Lopez (“Lopez”), was at all relevant times, was working as a

Chicago Police Officer, Star Number 17836, and was a resident of Cook County, Illinois. At all

relevant times, Defendant Lopez was acting in the course of his employment and under color of

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law. Defendant Lopez is being sued in his individual capacity. Defendant, City of Chicago, ( the “CITY”) is and was a municipality and was, at all
relevant times, the employer and principal of Defendant Lopez and all other unidentified police officers that arrested and tortured the plaintiff, and as such, is and was at all relevant times responsible for the supervision, training, policies, practices, and customs of the Chicago Police Department and its officers.
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 4. On October 20, 2012 at approximately 5:00 p.m. plaintiff was working as a delivery driver for Castillo Delivery Service. 5. At the aforementioned date and time, the plaintiff was returning to Desorak Restaurant at 1514 W. Taylor Street, Chicago, Illinois, following a delivery. 6. As the plaintiff traveled eastbound on Taylor Street near the intersection of Taylor and Ashland Streets, the plaintiff was pulled over by an unmarked police car by flashing headlights. 7. Two Chicago Police officers approached the plaintiff’s car, and did not identify themselves, but called each other George (Defendant Lopez) and John. 8. The officer that identified himself as John approached plaintiff’s driver’s side door, opened plaintiff’s car door and pulled the plaintiff out of his car. 9. Defendant Lopez opened the passenger door and began searching plaintiff’s car. 10. Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed into the unmarked police car. Officer John then drove plaintiff’s car to the Harrison Street Police Station. Defendant Lopez followed in the unmarked car with the plaintiff handcuffed in the back seat. While on the way to the police
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station, the plaintiff asked that his lawyer be contacted. 11. Upon arriving at the police station, the plaintiff was searched in the parking lot.
Plaintiff was then brought into the Harrison Street Police Station through a back entrance, brought to a small room and handcuffed to a bar on the wall.
12. Defendant Lopez took the plaintiff’s cellular telephone and left the room leaving Officer John in the room with the plaintiff. Plaintiff was not free to leave the police station as he was handcuffed to the wall the entire time he was in the police station.
13. Defendant Lopez returned to the room and the two officers began assaulting the plaintiff with questions regarding robberies and drug dealers in the Taylor Street area. Plaintiff responded that he did not know anything about robberies or drug dealings in the Taylor Street area and again and repeatedly requested that the officers call his lawyer. Plaintiff’s lawyer was never contacted and the questioning continued. The officers were particularly interested in why the plaintiff had the telephone number of an individual by the name of “Dwayne” in his telephone.
14. The interrogation of the plaintiff continued for approximately one and a half to two hours. At the end of which the officers informed the plaintiff that they were going to harass him everyday on Taylor Street until they got what they wanted from him. Plaintiff was unhandcuffed, given his car keys and told he could leave.
15. On October 21, 2012, Defendant Lopez called plaintiff’s cell phone and told the plaintiff that what took place the night before was a mistake and that he needed the plaintiff to sign some papers so that his car would not be towed. Defendant Lopez instructed the plaintiff to meet him at Al’s Beef on Taylor Street at 3:00 p.m. that day.
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16. The plaintiff went to Al’s Beef at 3:00 p.m. and Defendant Lopez arrived in a police squad with another officer that was tall, with red hair and a beard, whom the plaintiff believes was identified as a Sergeant (this individual is hereafter referred to as “ the Sergeant”).
17. The officers drove to the back of the parking lot and the plaintiff followed them to that location. The Sergeant exited the squad car grabbed the plaintiff and slammed his head on to the trunk of his car, searched plaintiff, handcuffed plaintiff with his hands behind his back and placed him in the squad car.
18. Plaintiff was then taken back to the Harrison Street Police station to a second floor room with chairs and a table. Again, plaintiff was handcuffed to a bar, and this time he was also placed in ankle shackles.
19. Plaintiff was held against his will in the room for several hours handcuffed and shackled, and not free to leave the custody of the defendants. While the in the room several other officers (approximately six officers) entered the room during the next several hours joining Defendant Lopez and the Sergeant threatening the plaintiff with sending him to the Cook County jail to be raped by gang members. Further, that the (the officers) could do whatever they wanted and that they would plant evidence on him and his family members if he continued to refuse to cooperate with them. Still, further that if he did not cooperate they would charge him a conspiracy to obstruct justice.
One of the officers in the room identified himself as the “Commander.” 20. Plaintiff repeatedly requested his lawyer; that request was not acknowledged by the officers. 21. The officers wanted the plaintiff to call or text “Dwayne” and set-up a drug
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purchase, but he refused to call or text Dwayne. 22. After a period of time refusing to call or text Dwayne, the officers began to pull
and contort the plaintiff’s body while he was handcuffed to the wall and shackled at his ankles causing the plaintiff severe pain. At one point, the Sergeant sat on the plaintiff’s chest and placed his palms on the plaintiff’s eye sockets and pushed hard against them causing plaintiff severe pain. The Sergeant also drove his elbows into plaintiff’s back and head causing severe pain. Defendant Lopez was in the room at the time and did not intervene.
23. In an attempt to contact the outside world, plaintiff agreed to make the call and he attempted to call a friend of his to inform him what was transpiring at which time an officer took plaintiff’s telephone and hung-up the call.
24. After several hours of verbal and physical torture, Defendant Lopez and the Sergeant were alone in the room with the plaintiff. The officers told plaintiff that if he refused to cooperate with them that they were going to give him a “little taste” of what he would be getting at the Cook County jail. They put plaintiff over a chair and pulled down his pants, and Defendant Lopez said “I hear that a big black nigger dick feels like a gun up your ass.”
25. Then Defendant Lopez and/or the Sergeant, knowing their actions created a strong likelihood of great bodily harm and mental anguish, inserted a cold metal object, believed to be one of officer’s service revolvers, into the plaintiff’s rectum causing the plaintiff severe pain and humiliation. The two officers laughed hysterically while inserting the object into the plaintiff’s rectum.
26. The Sergeant then said “I almost blew your brains out.” The officers told the plaintiff that they would continue to insert the gun into his rectum until he cooperated with them.
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27. Plaintiff began to cry and agreed to cooperate with the officers. 28. The officers then took the ankle shackles off the plaintiff and took him from the room to a car waiting outside. Plaintiff was still handcuffed at this time. Once in the car, the plaintiff was instructed, by the officers, to call Dwayne and set-up a purchase of either heroin or crack cocaine. Plaintiff called Dwayne but Dwayne did not answer the telephone. Plaintiff was then instructed to text Dwayne, which he did and Dwayne then called the plaintiff. 29. Plaintiff spoke to Dwayne about purchasing one gram of heroin and agreed to meet Dwayne at an agreed location and time. The police then brought plaintiff to his car, provided the plaintiff with money to purchase the heroin, a box believed to be a GPS device and an audio recording device to record the transaction. 30. Plaintiff completed the purchase from Dwayne for the Chicago Police and returned the drugs and equipment to the police. The officers then wanted plaintiff to sell drugs to Dwayne. Plaintiff told the officers that he would not be involved again with them. 31. Plaintiff was released from police custody at approximately 9:30 p.m. on October 21, 2012. Defendant Lopez subsequently repeatedly called plaintiff’s cellular telephone from his cellular telephone requesting additional meetings with the plaintiff. The Lopez calls stopped for a period after the plaintiff contacted the Independent Police Review Authority for the Chicago Police Department and complained about the events of October 20 and October 21, 2012.. 32. Defendant Lopez arrested, without probable cause, restrained and refused to release the plaintiff from custody on both October 20, 2012 and October 21, 2012. 33. At no time on either October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012, prior to plaintiff’s seizure and torture, did the plaintiff commit a crime.
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COUNT I EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 - DEFENDANT LOPEZ
34. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 34.
35. At all relevant times, Defendant Lopez had a legal duty to refrain from using unnecessary and reasonable force under the circumstances.
36. The acts of Defendant Lopez in a) by handcuffing and shackling the plaintiff’s ankles; b) by refusing to contact plaintiff’s attorney; c) refusing to allow the plaintiff to leave the police station/room; d) by physically torturing the plaintiff on October 21, 2012; e) by pulling the plaintiff’s pants down, and by inserting a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum, or by assisting another officer in inserting a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum; and f) by torturing the plaintiff until he agreed to commit a crime to stop the torture, constituted an unreasonable seizure, excessive force and deprived the plaintiff of his right to be free from such conduct as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
37. At all relevant times, Defendant Lopez’s action and/or omissions as they pertained to the plaintiff were done maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety and constitutional rights.
38. The acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer both physical and psychological injuries, pain, suffering, humiliation and fear in the past and in the future, some of the plaintiff’s injuries will be permanent.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages
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against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT II § 1983 DUE PROCESS CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO INTERVENE/PROTECT 39. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 39. 40. Defendant Lopez, failed to intervene and/or protect the plaintiff from the Sergeant and the other unidentified officers acts when they a) handcuffed and shackled the plaintiff’s ankles; b) allowed the Sergeant to physically attack the plaintiff and by twisting and contorting the plaintiff’s body; c) refusing to allow the plaintiff to leave the police station/room, or the control and/or custody of the police; d) by standing by and allowing another officer to insert a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum, and e) by failing to stop any of the above until the plaintiff agreed to commit a crime, knowing said acts and his failure to protect Angel Perez, or intervene to protect him, from these acts created a substantial risk of great bodily harm and mental anguish depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 41. Said acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez caused pain and suffering to the plaintiff of a physical and mental nature.
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42. The acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer both physical and psychological injuries, pain, suffering, humiliation and fear in the past and in the future, some of the plaintiff’s injuries will be permanent.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT III STATE LAW - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
DEFENDANT LOPEZ 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 43. 44. The actions of the Defendant Lopez, as set forth above, placed the plaintiff in fear of his life and safety and in fear of receiving an assault and battery, as well as causing him the emotional distress of fearing for his life and being sodomized again. 45. The actions of Defendant Lopez, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct and were done deliberately and intentionally and in a wilful and wanton manner. 46. Defendant Lopez intended that his conduct to inflict severe emotional distress and/or knew there was a high probability that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress. 47. The conduct of Defendant Lopez did in fact cause Angel Perez to suffer severe
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emotional distress. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages
against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, medical expenses, loss of a normal life, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IV MONELL POLICY PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS VIOLATION
DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 47 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 48. 49. The actions of Defendant Lopez, as alleged above, were done pursuant to one or more de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the Chicago Police Department, and therefore, the City of Chicago. 50. On and before October 20, 2012, Defendant City of Chicago and its Police Department had interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, the failure to properly train, supervise, discipline, counsel and otherwise control its police officers, and thereby allowing them to engage in the excessive use of force, torture and other police abuses, particularly in case where officers were allowed to torture and sodomize the plaintiff within a police station. 51. In particular, Defendant Lopez, as well as several other police officers, were
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allowed to handcuff and shackle an individual that had not committed a crime, and had not been charged with a crime. The officers were also allowed to verbally and physically torture the plaintiff without interruption, for several hours, inside the 11th District Police Station. Moreover, during the hours of torture, supervising officers came into the room to identify themselves as high ranking officers, thereby condoning the continued torture. The acceptance of the torture, sodomy, and the participation by Defendant Lopez, the Sergeant and several other Chicago Police officers, created a de facto policy throughout the 11th District of the Chicago Police Department of allowing and promoting the use of these technics on individuals innocent of any crime, like the plaintiff.
52. As a direct and proximate cause of these policies, Angel Perez’s constitutional protected rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied by 42 U.S.C. section 1983, were violated and the defendant is liable to Angel Perez for his injuries, pain, suffering, mental anguish, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands compensation for his compensatory damages against the City of Chicago, including but not limited to, his physical injuries, pain, suffering, mental anguish, medical expenses, loss of a normal life, and humiliation, and such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT VI RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR - CITY OF CHICAGO 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 43 through 47 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 53. 54. The aforesaid acts and state law violations of the police officers as set forth above,
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were performed in the scope and course of their employment and were done so maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the City of Chicago is therefore liable as principal for the actions of its employees and/or agents, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the state law claims set forth in Count III above.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands compensation for his compensatory damages against the City of Chicago, including but not limited to, his physical injuries, pain, suffering, mental anguish, medical expenses, loss of a normal life, and humiliation, and such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT VI INDEMNIFICATION PURSUANT TO 745 ILCS 10/9-102 55. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 55. 56. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for compensation damages for which its employees are liable for. Defendant Lopez, as well as the other unidentified Chicago Police Officers were, at all relevant times, acting in the scope and course of their employment as members and agents of the Chicago Police Department under the color of law. 57. Defendant City of Chicago is liable as principal for all torts committed by its employees. WHEREFORE, should defendant, Jorge Lopez or any other police officer be found liable on one or more of the claims set forth in above, Plaintiff hereby demands that, pursuant to 745
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ILCS 10/9-102, the defendant City of Chicago be found liable for any judgment or settlement for damages obtained against said police officer defendants as well as for all attorneys' fees and costs awarded or otherwise obtained.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff, Angel Perez, hereby demands a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.
s/ Dennis J. DeCaro DeCaro Illinois Bar Number: 6230675 Kupets & DeCaro, P.C. 77 W. Washington Street, 20 Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Telephone: 312-372-4444 Fax: 312-726-7347 E-mail:ddecaro@kupetsdecaro.com
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 Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 132 Filed: 10/05/15 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:509

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANGEL PEREZ, JOSE MARTINEZ,

)

JUANITA BERRY, CALVIN COFFEY and )

ESTEPHANIE MARTINEZ on behalf of )

themselves and all other persons similarly )

situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO et. al.,

)

Defendants.

)

No. 13 C 4531 Judge Dow JURY DEMANDED

COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION 2nd AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOW COME the Plaintiffs, who bring this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of those similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, and complaining of Defendants Jorge L. Lopez, Edmund Zablocki, Matthew P. Cline, Joseph Wagner, Herbert Betancourt, John P. Dolan, unknown Officers, and the City of Chicago and states as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 et seq. and 1988; the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, and 1343(a); the Constitution of the United States; and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367.
PARTIES 2. Plaintiff, ANGEL PEREZ (“Perez”), is an adult male who, at all relevant times, was a

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resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County. 3. Plaintiff, JOSE MARTINEZ (“Jose”), is an adult male who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County. 4. Plaintiff, JUANITA BERRY (“Berry”), is an adult female who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County. 5. Plaintiff, CALVIN COFFEY (“Coffey”), is an adult male who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County. 6. Plaintiff, ESTEPHANIE MARTINEZ (“Estephanie”), is an adult female who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County. 7. Defendants, Jorge L. Lopez ("Lopez") Star No. 17836, Edmund Zablocki ("Zablocki") Star No. 7505, Matthew P. Cline ("Cline") Star No. 2184, Joseph Wagner ("Wagner'') Star No. 14796, Herbert Betancourt ("Betancourt") Star No. 16976, John P. Dolan ("Dolan") Star No.17722, and unknown Officers (“Defendant Officers”), were at all relevant times, working as Chicago Police Officers, and were residents of Cook County, Illinois. 8. At all relevant times, Defendant Officers, were acting in the course of their employment and under color of law. 9. Defendant Officers are being sued in their individual capacities. 10. Defendant, City of Chicago (the "CITY'') is and was a municipality, at all relevant times, was the employer and principal of Defendant Officers who improperly detained, arrested and tortured the plaintiffs, and as such, is and was at all relevant times responsible for the supervision, training, policies, practices, and customs of the Chicago Police Department and its officers.
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FACTS 11. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and the Class defined herein, to reform an unconstitutional police procedure which allows police offers to hold arrestees “incommunicado” or “off the grid,” without processing the arrestees or making any public record of the arrest, for long periods of time in order to “squeeze” information out of the detainees. This is often accomplished by holding and interrogating the arrestee at a facility other than a normal police station. The arrestees are kept off the official booking databases, frequently beaten by police, shackled for prolonged periods of time, denied access to legal counsel, and are unable to be located by family or attorneys while being held. 12. Many times the arrestees are held and interrogated for long periods of time in order to investigate crimes totally unrelated to the initial detention. The procedure allows police to investigate and interrogate citizens without taking them before a judicial official for a determination of probable cause, in order to justify the seizure or to use the person to form charges against someone else. 13. In addition to causing unlawful detentions, during the time that the detainee is held at the facility, other than a normal police station, the detainee is subject to minimally appropriate conditions of confinement. 14. While being held without being booked at a police station, arrestees are forced to (attempt to) sleep on small metal benches within the interrogation rooms. They are frequently denied food, water and lavatories and forced to defecate themselves while being shackled to the wall. 15. As a result, arrestees detained at these facilities are kept from disinterested judicial officials and are isolated for long periods of time in interrogation rooms and deprived of
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necessary sleep while police continue to interrogate them and build evidence against them or others who they may be associated with; all raising the specter of torture, false confessions, and unlawful convictions. 16. The practice and policy of the City of Chicago, through the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) in holding citizens at these facilities, involuntarily, incommunicado, without processing them, without reading them their Miranda rights, subjecting them to restraint of movement via handcuffs, leg shackles and/or locked rooms or cells, denying them access to attorneys, denying them access to phones, bathrooms to relieve themselves, and keeping their whereabouts secret from friends, family and society at large for several hours to days at a time, is unconsitutional. 17. As opposed to a regular police station, police use facilities like the police warehouse at the intersection of South Homan Street and West Filmore Avenue (“Homan Square”) to detain people without formal acknowledgement of the detention. Detainees at the sites are held incommunicado, with no access to attorneys and no ability to communicate with the outside world. The privacy of these sites is conducive to torture, defined as physical or mental coercion. Detainees are held until they “cooperate” with the corrupt police officers. If a detainee does not cooperate, he will spend a considerable amount of time in a cell and eventually be placed under formal arrest and transferred to regular police stations. The corrupt officers who use these sites will manufacture the necessary probable cause to justify the formal arrests. 18. Sites like Homan Square contain locked “interview” rooms, wretched from human waste and containing bars on which to handcuff citizens. Once cuffed to the bars on the walls, the citizens are forced to stand for hours or even days on end. Detainees are denied access to food, water and the use of bathroom facilities. Forcing detainees to relieve themselves in their cells is tortuous in itself, but the smell serves as compulsion to future detainees.
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19. Though they are not actual police stations, sites like Homan Square contain cells for holding detainees. Because of the difficulty in tracking detainees held at facilities like Homan Square, attorneys have no way of finding their clients while at these sites and there is no way to monitor the activity and interrogation tactics being used at these facilities. 20. Officers from all over Chicago arrest citizens with or without probable cause and bring them to interrogation sites. 21. A similar practice of Chicago Police Department was held unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F. 3d 711 (7th Circ. 2006). There, officers would intentionally hold arrestees “past court call” in order to continue investigating and interrogating arrestees without taking them before a judicial official for a probable cause hearing within 48 hours. The use of the facilities like Homan Square is a continuation of this practice.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Angel Perez 22. On or about October 19, 2012 at approximately 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff Perez was working as a delivery driver for Castillo Delivery Service. 23. At the aforementioned date and time, Plaintiff Perez was returning to Desorak Restaurant at 1514 W. Taylor Street, Chicago, Illinois, following a delivery. 24. As Plaintiff Perez traveled eastbound on Taylor Street near the intersection of Taylor and Ashland Streets, he was pulled over by an unmarked police car with flashing headlights. 25. Two Chicago Police officers approached Plaintiff Perez’s car, and did not identify themselves, but called each other George (Defendant Lopez) and John (Defendant Dolan). 26. The officer who identified himself as John approached Plaintiff Perez’s driver’s side door, opened Plaintiff Perez’s car door and pulled Plaintiff Perez out of his car. 27. Defendant Lopez opened the passenger door and began searching Plaintiff Perez’s car.
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28. Plaintiff Perez was handcuffed and placed into the unmarked police car. 29. Defendant Dolan then drove Plaintiff Perez’s car to Homan Square. 30. Defendant Lopez followed in the unmarked car with Plaintiff Perez handcuffed in the back seat. 31. While on the way to the police station, Plaintiff Perez asked that his lawyer be contacted. 32. Upon arriving at the police station, Plaintiff Perez was searched in the parking lot. Plaintiff Perez was then brought into the Harrison Street Police Station through a back entrance, brought to a small room and handcuffed to a bar on the wall. 33. Defendant Lopez took Plaintiff Perez’s cellular telephone and left the room, leaving Officer Dolan in the room with Plaintiff Perez. 34. Plaintiff Perez was not free to leave the police station as he was handcuffed to the wall the entire time he was in the police station. 35. Defendant Lopez returned to the room and the two officers began bombarding Plaintiff Perez with questions regarding robberies and drug dealers in the Taylor Street area. 36. Plaintiff Perez responded that he did not know anything about robberies or drug dealings in the Taylor Street area and again and repeatedly requested that the officers call his lawyer. 37. Despite requests from Plaintiff Perez, Plaintiff Perez’s lawyer was never contacted and the questioning continued. 38. The officers were particularly interested in why Plaintiff Perez had the telephone number of an individual by the name of “Dwayne” in his telephone. 39. The interrogation of Plaintiff Perez continued for approximately one and a half to two hours. At the end of the interrogation, the officers informed Plaintiff Perez that they were going to harass him every day on Taylor Street until they got what they wanted from him.
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40. Plaintiff Perez was un-handcuffed, given his car keys and told he could leave by Officer Dolan. 41. On or about October 20, 2012, Defendant Lopez called Plaintiff Perez’s cell phone and told Plaintiff Perez that what took place the night before was a mistake and that he needed Plaintiff Perez to sign some papers so that his car would not be towed. 42. Defendant Lopez instructed the Plaintiff Perez to meet him at Al’s Beef on Taylor Street at 3:00 p.m. that day. 43. Plaintiff Perez went to Al’s Beef at 3:00 p.m. and Defendant Lopez arrived in a police squad with Defendant Zablocki, who was tall, with red hair and a beard. 44. The officers drove to the back of the parking lot and Plaintiff Perez followed them to that location. 45. Defendant Edmund Zablocki exited the squad car and began to threaten Plaintiff Perez grabbed him, and slammed his head onto the trunk of his car. Then the officers searched Plaintiff Perez, handcuffed him with his hands behind his back, and placed him in the squad car. 46. Plaintiff Perez was then taken to Homan Square. 47. Plaintiff Perez was led to a second floor room in Homan Square with chairs and a table and handcuffed to a bar in the locked room. Plaintiff Perez was also placed in leg shackles. 48. Plaintiff Perez was held against his will in the locked room for several hours, handcuffed and shackled, and was not free to leave the custody of the Defendant Officers. 49. Several officers (approximately six officers), who were later identified as Defendant Matthew P. Cline, Defendant Edmund Zablocki, Defendant Joseph Wagner, Defendant Herbert Betancourt, and Defendant John Dolan, entered the room. During the next several hours the named Defendants each took turns torturing and threatening Plaintiff Perez
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50. The named Defendants threatened that they would send Plaintiff Perez to Cook County Jail where he would be raped by gang members; that they would charge him in a conspiracy to obstruct justice; that they would plant evidence on Plaintiff Perez and his family members if he continued to refuse to assist them. 51. Plaintiff Perez did not cooperate. 52. One of the officers in the room identified himself as the “Commander.” 53. Defendant Officers ignored repeated requests by Plaintiff Perez to speak with his attorney. 54. At no time did Defendant Officers read Plaintiff Perez his Miranda rights. 55. The officers wanted Plaintiff Perez to call or text “Dwayne” and set-up a drug purchase, but he refused to call or text Dwayne. 56. After a period of time refusing to call or text Dwayne, the officers began to pull and contort Plaintiff Perez’s body while he was handcuffed to the wall and shackled at his ankles causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain. 57. At one point, Defendant Zablocki sat on Plaintiff Perez’s chest and placed his palms on Plaintiff Perez’s eye sockets and pushed hard against them causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain. Defendant Zablocki also drove his elbows into Plaintiff Perez’s back and head causing severe pain. 58. Defendant Lopez was in the room at the time and did not intervene. All the defendant officers went in and out of the interrogation room yelling the named threats causing Plaintiff Perez mental damage. 59. In an attempt to contact the outside world, Plaintiff Perez agreed to make the call and he attempted to call a friend of his to inform him what was transpiring at which time an officer took
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 132 Filed: 10/05/15 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:517
Plaintiff Perez ’s telephone and ended the call. 60. After several hours of verbal and physical torture, Defendant Lopez and an officer who claimed to be a police sergeant were alone in the room with Plaintiff Perez. 61. Defendant Officers told Plaintiff Perez that if he refused to cooperate with them that they were going to give him a “little taste” of what he would be getting at the Cook County Jail. 62. Defendant Officers put Plaintiff Perez over a chair and pulled down his pants, and Defendant Lopez said “I hear that a big black nigger dick feels like a gun up your ass.” 63. Defendant Lopez and/or Defendant Zablocki, knowing their actions created a strong likelihood of great bodily harm and mental anguish, inserted a cold metal object, believed to be one of officer’s service revolvers, into Plaintiff Perez’s rectum causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain and humiliation. The two officers laughed hysterically while inserting the object into Plaintiff Perez’s rectum. 64. Defendant Zablocki then said “I almost blew your brains out.” The officers told Plaintiff Perez that they would continue to insert the gun into his rectum until he cooperated with them. 65. Plaintiff Perez began to cry and agreed to cooperate with the officers. 66. Defendant officers then removed the leg shackles from Plaintiff Perez and took him from the room to a car waiting outside. Plaintiff Perez was still handcuffed at this time. Once in the car, the Plaintiff Perez was instructed, by the officers, to call Dwayne and set-up a purchase of either heroin or crack cocaine. Plaintiff Perez called Dwayne, but Dwayne did not answer the telephone. Plaintiff Perez was then instructed to text Dwayne, which he did and Dwayne then called Plaintiff Perez . 67. Plaintiff Perez spoke to Dwayne about purchasing one gram of heroin and agreed to meet Dwayne at an agreed location and time. The police then brought Plaintiff Perez to his car,
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 132 Filed: 10/05/15 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:518
provided Plaintiff Perez with money to purchase the heroin, a box believed to be a GPS device and an audio recording device to record the transaction. 68. Plaintiff Perez completed the purchase from Dwayne for the Chicago Police and returned the drugs and equipment to the police. The officers then wanted Plaintiff Perez to sell drugs to Dwayne. Plaintiff Perez told the officers that he would not be involved again with them. 69. Plaintiff Perez was released from police custody at approximately 9:30 p.m. on October 20, 2012. 70. Defendant Lopez subsequently repeatedly called Plaintiff Perez’s cellular telephone from his cellular telephone requesting additional meetings with Plaintiff Perez . The Lopez calls stopped for a period after Plaintiff Perez contacted the Independent Police Review Authority for the Chicago Police Department and complained about the events of October 19, 2012 and October 20, 2012, in which the named Defendants arrested Plaintiff Perez, without probable cause, restrained and refused to release him from custody. 71. At no time on either October 19, 2012 or October 20, 2012, prior to Plaintiff Perez’s seizure and torture, did Plaintiff Perez commit a crime. 72. Plaintiff Perez did not violate any law immediately prior to or during the October 19, 2012 or October 20, 2012 stop and arrests. 73. On October 19, 2012 and October 20, 2012, Defendants Lopez and Dolan did not have an arrest warrant to stop or detain Plaintiff Perez. 74. Neither Defendant Lopez nor Defendant Dolan witnessed Plaintiff Perez violate any law within seven days prior to his October 20, 2012 stop and arrest. 75. Defendant Officers did not have any legal justification to stop or detain Plaintiff Perez on either October 19, 2012 or October 20, 2012.
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76. Plaintiff Perez was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 77. Plaintiff Perez was detained for nearly 6 hours without access to his attorney, family or friends. 78. No public record of Plaintiff Perez’ arrest was created within a reasonable time (an hour) of his detainment. 79. Defendant officers did not have a warrant for Plaintiff Perez’ arrest on October 19, 2012 or October 20, 2012.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Calvin Coffey 80. On February 6, 2015, after interrogating Plaintiff Coffey on the streets about narcotic activity, the police took him Homan Square in handcuffs. 81. At Homan Square, Plaintiff Coffey was put in a locked room and handcuffed to a bench on the back wall. Defendant Carlos and a tall thin unknown Caucasian officer came in many times. Defendant officers wanted Coffey to “help” them. 82. Coffey asked for his attorney on more than one occasion, but his requests were ignored. 83. Defendant officers did not read Coffey his Miranda rights while at Homan Square. 84. Coffey refused to cooperate with the officers. After 1.5 to 2 hours of refusing to cooperate with the officers, the officers stopped coming into the room. 85. Plaintiff Coffey had to relieve himself while being handcuffed to the wall. Plaintiff Coffey called out for help for more than two hours to have someone escort him to the bathroom. Plaintiff Coffey’s requests to use the lavatory were ignored. Plaintiff Coffey was forced to relieve himself on the floor of the interrogation room. 86. An unknown overweight police officer, with dark, slicked back hair came into the room,
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saw that Plaintiff Coffey had done a bowel movement and made Plaintiff Coffey clean it up with his skull cap. 87. Because one of his hands was restrained, Plaintiff Coffey struggled to obey the command, and did so inadequately. Plaintiff Coffey was forced to endure the stench in the interview room for the remainder of his stay at Homan. 88. Plaintiff Coffey was held at Homan Square until the next morning, without food, water, access to a lavatory or anywhere to sleep. 89. Plaintiff Coffey was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 90. Defendant Officers did not have a warrant to arrest Plaintiff Coffey on February 6, 2015. 91. No public record of Plaintiff Coffey’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (e.g. an hour) of his arrest or detainment.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Juanita Berry 92. On February 6, 2015, Juanita Berry, was with Plaintiff Calvin Coffey on the streets (5th and Kostner), when police picked up Coffey for delivery of a controlled substance. 93. Plaintiff Berry was handcuffed and taken separately from Plaintiff Coffey to Homan Square. 94. Plaintiff Berry was placed in a locked room, handcuffed to a ring or bar on the wall. 95. Plaintiff Berry was no read her Miranda rights while at Homan Square. 96. Unknown Officers, including Officer Carlos, a medium Hispanic officer, about 5’9” and husky, asked Plaintiff Berry to get them two guns from an acquaintance, or else they would charge her with aiding in the delivery of controlled substance of Calvin Coffey. 97. Plaintiff Berry was not allowed to make a phone call or permitted to contact her
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attorneys, family or friends. 98. Plaintiff Berry was held at Homan Square for 3-4 hours. 99. After several hours, and many threats, Plaintiff Berry agreed to try to retrieve a gun. 100. Defendant officers drove Plaintiff Berry to pick up a gun from an acquaintance. 101. After retrieving the gun, the officers took her to Dunkin Donuts and later let her go. 102. Plaintiff Berry was never formally processed at an area police station or charged with any crimes. 103. Plaintiff Berry was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 104. Plaintiff Berry was detained for several hours without access to her attorney, family or friends. 105. No public record of Plaintiff Berry’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (e.g. an hour) of her arrest or detainment.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Estephanie Martinez 106. On August 9, 2006, officers entered the apartment that Plaintiff Estephanie shared with a roommate. Plaintiff Estephanie’s roommate was arrested. 107. Officers handcuffed Plaintiff Estephanie and took her to Homan Square. 108. Plaintiff Estephanie was placed in a locked room and handcuffed to a bar on the wall. 109. Plaintiff Estaphanie made more than one request to make a phone call to tell her parents she was alright, but Plaintiff Estaphanie’s requests were denied. 110. Later, Plaintiff Estephanie asked a guard to escort her to the bathroom. The guard said she did not have a key to Plaintiff Estephanie’s handcuffs. 111. Plaintiff Estephanie made repeated requests for access to a restroom, but Defendant
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Officers ignored her requests. 112. Finally, Plaintiff Estaphanie was forced to relieve herself on the floor of the locked room. 113. Plaintiff Estaphanie was held at Homan Square for two full days. 114. Plaintiff Estephanie was held incommunicado and “off the grid.” 115. Plaintiff Estaphanie was never processed at a police station or charged with any crimes. 116. No public record of Plaintiff Estaphanie’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (an hour) of her arrest or detainment.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Jose Martinez 117. On September 29, 2011, officers came up to Plaintiff Martinez, told him they knew who he was and that they wanted him to cooperate. When he refused, they took him to Homan Square, placed him in a locked room and shackled his legs. 118. Plaintiff Martinez was cuffed to a bench while at Homan Square. 119. Plaintiff Martinez was held for nine hours (noon to 9pm) without food, water or use of the restroom. The locked room smelled like urine and feces. 120. Plaintiff Martinez’ family and friends were trying to locate him during those nine hours. Plaintiff Martinez’ family and friends called CPD in an attempt to locate Plaintiff Martinez and were told that he was not at the police station. 121. Plaintiff Martinez was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 122. Plaintiff Martinez was tortured because he refused to cooperate. 123. No public record of Plaintiff Martinez’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (an hour) of his arrest or detainment.
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COUNT I – Class Claim 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR SECRET ARRESTS
(CITY OF CHICAGO) 124. Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 and as if fully set forth herein. 125. This Count is asserted against Defendant City of Chicago. 126. As described more fully above, Plaintiffs and the members of Classes have been held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 127. The Constitutional violations described herein in this Complaint were effectuated by Defendant City of Chicago through its customs, practices, and policies (hereinafter referred to as the “City’s Conduct”). The City’s Conduct was the moving force behind the injuries sustained by Plaintiffs and Classes. 128. Chicago police officers for years have arrested civilians without warrants and frequently without any probable cause and brought them to police sites other than police stations for the purpose of privately interrogating, threatening and beating them in order to coerce confessions or insider information. Many times the civilians held at facilities like Homan Square are never booked, processed or charged with any crimes. 129. Those taken to “off the books” locations are detained for long periods of time without food, water, or access to lavatories. 130. Plaintiffs and the class members are denied contact with the attorneys and their family. 131. Defendant City of Chicago’s conduct, through the actions of its policy makers, was to train officers to seize, transport, and secretly detain citizens at facilities other than police stations for extended periods of time while handcuffed to a cell wall and to interrogate them when they
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 132 Filed: 10/05/15 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:524
had not been read their Miranda rights and to deny citizens access to attorneys; attempt to coerce false confessions out of citizens; to deny them the ability to contact their families, to refuse access to restroom, food, or water; and to threaten citizens that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information. 132. These policies and practices are unreasonable under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and proximately caused Plaintiffs and the class members to suffer damages. 133. Alternatively, the City of Chicago, although aware of the misconduct and violations, allowed the misconduct to continue to occur. 134. The conduct alleged herein has gone unchecked and has been allowed to exist in the City of Chicago for a significant period of time, so much so, that police officers for the City of Chicago recognize that they will not be punished for committing said acts and that, in fact, said acts are either permitted or quietly consented to by superior officers for the CPD in order to permit said conduct to re-occur. 135. These customs, as alleged herein, were maintained and implemented unreasonably by official policy makers of the Defendant City of Chicago, with deliberate indifference to an obvious need, and in a manner that shocks the conscience, and were the direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendant Officers and the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs and the Classes.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 136. Plaintiffs bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of the following two proposed classes:
Class I (Detainee and Arrestee Class): All natural persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created
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within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present. Class II (Future Detainees and Arrestees Class): All persons who may in the future be subject to the secret arrests described in Class One.
137. Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry seeks to represent both Class I and Class II of Count I. Plaintiffs Estephanie Martinez and Jose Martinez, seek to represent only Class II of Count I. 138. The individuals in Classes I and II are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiffs, based on the number of arrests made by CPD each year, estimate that the classes are at least in the thousands. Based on the CPD 2010 annual report, there were 167,541 arrests that year. Plaintiffs will obtain the exact number of class members during discovery. 139. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Classes I and II. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the failure to make a public record of the detention and arrest of an individual within a reasonable time violates constitutional rights;
b. Whether CPD policy and use of facilities other than police stations allows CPD to detain citizens for prolonged periods of time, incommunicado, as alleged herein;
c. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD of misusing facilities like Homan Square as alleged herein;
d. Whether the conditions of confinement in detention facilities like Homan Square deprive detainees of acceptable means of detention in an unconstitutional manner; and
e. Whether the failure to make a public record of an arrest is unconstitutional as (i) restricting freedom of speech by preventing detainees from communicating with
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 132 Filed: 10/05/15 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:526
their lawyers and family, (ii) violating the Fourth Amendment, and (iii) Violating the right of habeas corpus. 140. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Plaintiffs do not have any claims which are antagonistic to the class members. Plaintiffs have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action litigation to represent the Classes. 141. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All of the Plaintiffs were detained at a facility other than a police station, without any public record of their detainment or arrest within an hour of the detainment, and prevented from communicating with attorneys, family members or others about their detainment and arrest. 142. A class action is a superior method of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. Given the nature of the claims asserted, many of the class members will fear bringing claims on their own to assert their rights. 143. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Class II, thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages with respect to the class as a whole. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Classes respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant City of Chicago, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and declaratory relief preventing future similar conduct, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUN II- Class Claim 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR DEPRIVATION OF ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATIONS
IN VIOLATION OF 4th AMENDMENT (CITY OF CHICAGO)
144. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estephanie Martinez re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 and as if fully set forth herein.
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145. This Count is asserted by Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie against Defendant City of Chicago. 146. As described more fully above, Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie and the members of the class have been detained in CPD facilities overnight and have not been furnished minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping all in a manner that violated their constitutional rights. 147. Defendant City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ damages, because the city maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations. 148. These policies and practices are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and proximately caused Plaintiffs and the class members to suffer damages. 149. Alternatively, the City of Chicago, although aware of the misconduct and violations, allowed the misconduct to continue to occur. 150. The conduct alleged herein has gone unchecked and has been allowed to exist in the City of Chicago for a significant period of time, so much so, that police officers for the City of Chicago recognize that they will not be punished for committing said acts and that, in fact, said acts are either permitted or quietly consented to by superior officers for the CPD in order to permit said conduct to re-occur. 151. These customs, as alleged herein, were maintained and implemented unreasonably by official policy makers of the Defendant City of Chicago, with deliberate indifference to an obvious need, and in a manner that shocks the conscience, and were the direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendant Officers and the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs and the Classes.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 152. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of the following Class:
Class III (Accommodations Class): All nature persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, and where the person was detained between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present. Class IV (Future Accomodations Class): All persons who may in the future be subject to the overnight accommodations described in Class Three. 153. Plaintiff Coffey seeks to represent both Class I and Class II of Count II. Plaintiff Estephanie Martinez seeks to represent only Class II of Count II. 154. The individuals in Classes III and IV are so numerous that joinder of all members I impractical. Plaintiffs, based on the number of arrests made by CPD each year, estimate that the classes are at least in the thousands. Based on the CPD 2010 annual report, there were 167,541 arrests that year. Plaintiffs will obtain the exact number of class members during discovery. 155. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Classes III and IV. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the failure to make a public record of the detention and arrest of an individual within a reasonable time violates constitutional rights;
b. Whether CPD policy and use of facilities other than police stations allows CPD to detain citizens for prolonged periods of time, incommunicado, as alleged herein;
c. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD of misusing facilities like Homan Square as alleged herein; and
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d. Whether to conditions of confinement in detention facilities like Homan Square deprive detainees of acceptable means of detention in an unconstitutional manner. 156. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie do not have any claims which are antagonistic to the class members. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action litigation to represent the Classes. 157. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie were detained at a facility other than a police station, without any public record of their detainment or arrest within an hour of the detainment, and prevented from communicating with attorneys, family members or others about their detainment and arrest, and forced to sleep in the detention facility with inadequate accommodations. 158. A class action is a superior method of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. Given the nature of the claims asserted, many of the class members will fear bringing claims on their own to assert their rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Coffey and Estaphanie and Class III and IV respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant City of Chicago, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and declaratory relief preventing future similar conduct, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable. COUNT III- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 4th
AMENDMENT (Defendant Officers) 159. Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 as if fully set forth herein.
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160. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez, Coffey, and Berry against Defendant Officers. 161. The actions of Defendant Officers violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT IV- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO INTERVENE IN VIOLATION OF THE 4th
AMENDMENT (Defendant Officers) 162. Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 as if fully set forth herein. 163. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez, Coffey, and Berry against Defendant Officers. 164. Defendant Officers present for the physical abuse of Plaintiffs had the opportunity, but failed to intervene and prevent such abuse. 165. The actions of Defendant Officers violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable. COUNT V- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry STATE LAW - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST (Defendant Officers) 166. Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 as if
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fully set forth herein. 167. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez, Coffey, and Berry against Defendant Officers. 168. The actions of the individual defendants as set forth above placed Plaintiffs in fear of their life, safety and in fear of receiving an assault and battery. 169. The actions of the defendants constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, and were done deliberately and intentionally and in a willful and wanton manner. 170. The Defendants intended that their conduct inflict severe emotional distress and/or knew there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress. 171. The conduct of the defendants did in fact cause Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT VI- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry INDEMNIFICATION CLAIM PURSUANT TO 745 ILCS 10/9-102
(City of Chicago)
172. Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 123 as if fully set forth herein.
173. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey and Berry against Defendant City of Chicago.
174. The acts of the Defendant Officers described herein were willful and wanton, and committed within the scope of their employment.
175. Pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102, Defendant City of Chicago is liable for any
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judgment in this case arising from the actions of the Defendant Officers. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court order Defendant City of
Chicago to indemnify Defendant Officers for any judgment entered in this case arising from the actions of Defendant Officers.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs demand trial by jury.
/s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Law Offices of Scott T. Kamin Law Office of Phillip Brigham Law Office of Jason Epstein 55 E. Jackson Blvd, Suite 1050 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 322-0077 Ill. Attorney No.: 6226855
Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Cassandra P. Miller EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC 20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603-1824 (312) 739-4200 (312) 419-0379 (FAX) Email address for service: courtecl@edcombs.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Cassandra P. Miller, hereby certify that on October 5, 2015, I caused to be filed the foregoing documents via the CM/ECF System which sent notification of such filing to the following parties:
Jorge V. Cazares (jcazares@pjjlaw.com) Lindsay Erin Wilson Gowin (lindsay.gowin@cityofchicago.org) Walter Jones , Jr. (wjones@pjjlaw.com) Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (jcifonelli@pjjlaw.com)
Rachel C. Steiner (rsteiner@pjjlaw.com)

Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Cassandra P. Miller EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC 20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500 Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 739-4200 (312) 419-0379 (FAX)

/s/Cassandra P. Miller Cassandra P. Miller

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 Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:679

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Atheris Mann, Jessie Patrick and Deanda Wilson,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Chicago Police Sergeant Frank Ramaglia, Star # 1775; Chicago Police Sergeant Brian Kane, Star # 5538; Chicago Police Officer Kathleen McCann, Star # 3636; Chicago Police Officer Kevin Connolly, Star # 13184; Chicago Police Officer Alejandro Miranda, Star #8300; Chicago Police Officer John Doe; and the CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants

) ) ) ) ) No. 15-cv-9197 ) ) ) Magistrate Judge Geraldine Brown ) ) ) ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR INTERVENTION, REASSIGNMENT OR CONSOLIDATION OF RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24, 42(a) and Local Rule 40.4, Plaintiffs, by

their undersigned counsel, move this Court to (1) grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Intervene in Perez

et. al. v. City of Chicago, et. al., No 13 C 4531 for purposes of seeking reassignment or

consolidation; (2) find that the above entitled case is related to Perez and should be reassigned to

this Court; or, alternatively, (3) find that these cases should be consolidated before this Court and

Magistrate for purposes of pre-trial proceedings.

Introduction

1. As alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, Homan Square is a Chicago Police

Department facility in which numerous individuals, including Plaintiffs, claim they have been

unconstitutionally detained, searched, and interrogated without probable cause or access to

family or a lawyer. Many of the untold thousands of predominantly black and brown persons

who have been taken to Homan Square over the last decade further allege that Chicago Police

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officers working out of Homan Square have subjected them to physically and psychologically coercive and torturous interrogation tactics and have brought false criminal charges against them when they fail to provide information to the police.
2. On October 19, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging they were illegally arrested and held at Homan Square, and subjected to unconstitutional detention, searches, excessive force and wrongful prosecution for a crime they did not commit. See generally Exhibit A, Mann Complaint. They allege that the moving force behind of these constitutional violations is one or more interrelated de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Chicago. See Exhibit A, ¶¶86-89.
3. Plaintiffs allege that these defacto policies include: Maintaining an “off the books” police detention, interrogation, and intelligence gathering center at Homan Square where the CPD unconstitutionally detained many thousands of predominantly, and disproportionately, African American and Hispanic citizens without probable cause and without access to lawyers and family; Using unconstitutionally coercive and torturous tactics while interrogating detainees at Homan Square including, but not limited to, handcuffing them to the wall in dark, Spartan-like cells without food, water, or access to bathroom facilities; using physical threats, beatings, assaults with a knife, and other forms of physical brutality; conducting illegal strip and violently invasive body cavity searches; subjecting detainees to verbal racial abuse; and using the threat of charging the detainee with bogus criminal offenses if he or she did not provide information.
See Exhibit A, ¶86
4. This case is closely related to Perez, which is currently pending before this Court. The Perez Plaintiffs, on behalf of a class of detainees, also bring allegations that they were held at Homan Square and subjected to illegal detention, overly invasive searches, and excessive
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force resulting from de facto City of Chicago policies and practices. See Exhibit B, Perez Complaint, ¶¶ 124-135.
5. The Plaintiffs in Perez allege inter alia, that: Chicago police officers for years have arrested civilians without warrants and frequently without any probable cause and brought them to police sites other than police stations for the purpose of privately interrogating, threatening and beating them in order to coerce confessions or insider information. Many times the civilians held at facilities like Homan Square are never booked, processed or charged with any crimes. Those taken to “off the books” locations are detained for long periods of time without food, water, or access to lavatories. Plaintiffs and the class members are denied contact with their attorneys and their family.
See Exhibit B, ¶¶ 128-130. 6. Additionally, the Plaintiffs in this case and in Perez allege that these Constitutional violations were proximately caused by the City of Chicago’s policies and practices of failing to train, supervise, discipline, counsel and otherwise control their police officers at Homan Square. See Exhibit A, ¶ 89; Exhibit B, ¶¶ 128, 132.
Argument 7. These Homan Square cases are related and should be handled by a single judge in order to promote judicial efficiency. Because this Court has the earlier-numbered case, the Plaintiffs’ case should be reassigned to this Court. Alternatively, these cases should be consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and potentially inconsistent judicial determinations. 8. Local Rule 40.4(a) states that civil cases may be found to be related if they “involve some of the same issues of fact or law” or if they “grow out of the same occurrence or transaction.” L.R. 40.4(a)(2) and (3). Two cases pending in the Northern District may be
3

Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:682
reassigned to the judge handling the earlier-numbered case if the following conditions are met: (1) the handling of both cases by the same judge is likely to result in substantial saving of judicial time and effort, (2) the earlier case has not progressed to the point where designating a later filed case as related would be likely to delay the proceedings in the earlier case substantially; and (3) the cases are susceptible of disposition in a single proceeding.
9. The Mann and Perez cases are related within the meaning and intent of Local Rule 40.4(a). “Local Rule 40.4(a) does not require exact congruence in facts and issues between two cases in order for them to be related; rather, it simply requires that the two cases share “some of the same issues of facts or law.” L.R. 40.4(a)(2)(emphasis added).” Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 10-cv-04387, 2012 WL 1368193, at * 2; Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Green Bay Packers, Inc., 06 c 4623, 2008 WL 1848142, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2008) (“Two cases need not be absolutely identical to be suitable for reassignment under Rule 40.4.”). Mann and Perez involve many of the same issues of fact and law and both arise from the Plaintiffs’ detention at Homan Square. Much of the litigation in both cases will center around Homan Square, the officers who work there and the treatment of the individuals held there, particularly the Mann Plaintiffs, the Perez plaintiffs, and the Perez class members.
10. Furthermore, all conditions for reassignment are satisfied. Reassignment will save substantial judicial time and effort and will also save the parties significant litigation costs as both cases include substantially the same witnesses and evidence. The cases both require substantial discovery regarding Homan Square. Necessary depositions of detainees and Chicago Police Department employees will overlap. Not only will the discovery of the Monell claims be nearly identical, the Perez class members are potential, and likely, 404b witnesses for Plaintiffs, while the Mann Plaintiffs are likely to be witnesses in the Perez case. Additionally, the
4

Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:683
supervisory and command officers responsible for the activities at Homan Square and the custody and treatment of the Plaintiffs in both cases will also no doubt overlap if not be essentially identical. Moreover, since the named defendants in Mann are identified as officers working out of Homan Square, it is likely that they will also be among those many yet to be identified defendants and witnesses in the Perez class case. Finally, the City and the individual police defendants are represented by the same private law firm in both cases. Without consolidation of these cases, at least for pre-trial purposes, these witness depositions and related discovery would have to take place in both cases, requiring the witnesses, parties, defense lawyers, and judges to duplicate their efforts.
11. Additionally, the corpus of documents - particularly records of arrests and detentions at Homan Square, the relevant police training manuals, general orders and directives, the physical layout of the facilities, and the disciplinary backgrounds of the police operatives are relevant to both cases, and it is likely that the same or similar police experts will be utilized in both cases.
12. Hence, it would be a waste of judicial resources for two judges and two magistrates to learn about and manage the overlapping legal and factual issues in these cases.1 See Helferich 2012 WL 1368193, at * 3; see, e.g., Pochert v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 11 c 440, 2011 WL 4007731, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2011) (in a case with common legal issues and overlapping discovery reassignment avoids “wasteful duplication” and
1. Furthermore, it has been publicly announced that Magistrate Judge Soat Brown, who is currently assigned to the Mann case, plans to retire in the summer of 2016. At that time the parties should be deeply entrenched in discovery. For the sake of continuity and judicial economy, it would be prudent, as a practical matter, to assign this case to a magistrate who is already familiar with the issues in the Homan Square cases and will be able to see it to its end. Otherwise a new magistrate will have to learn the expansive discovery and potentially re-visit rulings made by her predecessor, (and by Magistrate Rowland, who is assigned to the Perez case) which would result in a delay for the parties and a waste of judicial resources.
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:684
results in “substantial savings in judicial time and effort.”). Furthermore, reassignment to the same judge will prevent potentially inconsistent discovery rulings on common issues in both cases. See Helferich, 2012 WL 1368193, at * 3.
13. Reassignment will not result in a significant delay in the Perez case. In Perez, a motion to dismiss is pending and waiting response, and the parties only recently issued written discovery requests. They have not progressed in discovery to the point that any significant delay in the proceedings would result from the reassignment of this case. Similarly, the defendants in Mann have filed a motion to dismiss that has not yet been responded to or ruled upon.
14. Finally, the common underlying facts and legal claims in both cases can be addressed in one dispositive motion, trial or global settlement because some “issues of both law and fact are the same in both cases.” See Pactiv Corp. v. Multisorb Tech., Inc., No 10 c 461, 2011 WL 686813, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2011). This is true even if some additional issues regarding the individual plaintiffs do not overlap. See Freeman v. Bogusiewiz, 2004 WL 1879045 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2004) (police misconduct cases could be handled in one single proceeding even where some allegations of misconduct were unique to each case and one suit brought additional claims); Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.R.D. 228, 262 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Reassignment is appropriate where allegations against supervisory defendants and common issues can be resolved in a single proceeding even if additional facts as to the individual plaintiffs have to be determined.); see also, Ashford et. al. v. City of Milwaukee, et. al., No 13 c 0771 (E.D. Wisc.) (Adleman, J.) (Plaintiffs raising claims with common questions of law and fact are permitted to intervene, even when additional plaintiffs raise new claims against defendants.). Here the overlapping issues include claims of illegal detention, illegal searches, excessive force, and very similar Monell policies and practices.
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:685
15. Alternatively, the cases, at the least, should be consolidated for pre-trial proceedings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 permits a district court to order the consolidation of “actions involving a common question of law or fact” that are “pending before the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., 181 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1999); United States use of Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Brandt Constr. Co., 826 F.2d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 1987). The purpose of joining actions is to promote convenience and judicial economy. Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933). Courts in this district routinely consolidate cases. See, e.g., Pochert, 2011 WL 4007731, at *3; Blocker v. City of Chicago, No. 09 cv 7052, 2011 WL 1004137, at *2, 4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2011); Pactive Corp., 2011 WL 686813, at *1, 5; Palomares v. Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, No. 10 cv 6124, 2010 WL 4672295, at *2-3; Ladenberger v. Nat’l Tech. Transer, Inc., No. 99 cv 5348, 2000 WL 1349247, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2000). Even where reassignment is not granted, the Executive Committee may assign a single judge (and magistrate) to preside over consolidated pre-trial proceedings. See IOP 13(e); Garner v. Country Club Hills, 11 C 5164, 2012 WL 1900020, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2012); Dicam, Inc. vs. U.S. Cellular Corp., 07 c 5472, 2007 WL 2903059, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007).
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, 42(a) and Local Rule 40.4, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court (1) grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Intervene, (2) find that the Mann and Perez cases are related and that reassignment to this Court is appropriate; or alternatively, (3) find that the Mann and Perez cases should be consolidated before this Court and Magistrate for pre-trial proceedings.
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 166 Filed: 02/15/16 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:686

Dated: February 15, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ G. Flint Taylor G. Flint Taylor, Sarah Gelsomino, Shubra Ohri PEOPLE’S LAW OFFICE 1180 N. Milwaukee Ave. Chicago, IL 60642 (773) 235-0070 flint.taylor10@gmail.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

8

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANGEL PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Case No. 13-cv-4531

)

)

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Angel Perez, Jose Martinez, Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, and Estephanie Martinez (“Named Plaintiffs”) filed a six-count class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) against six named Chicago Police officers, unnamed officers, and the City of Chicago (“Defendants”). In their second amended complaint, the named plaintiffs allege that they and members of the proposed class have been subject to unconstitutional police practices including at Homan Square, a facility that was not a normal police station, without any record of their arrest being made in the official booking databases and without access to counsel. Before the Court is Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [145]. In their motion, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss (1) Plaintiff Juanita Berry’s claim for excessive force (Count II), (2) her claim for failure to intervene (Count IV), (3) any corresponding claims for indemnification against the City (Count VI), and (4) the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Estephanie and Jose Martinez on the grounds that the Martinez Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion [145] and dismisses each of the targeted claims without prejudice.

I. Background The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and are
accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. This case arises from the alleged unlawful detainment, interrogation, and treatment of Plaintiffs Angel Perez, Juanita Berry, Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinez, and Calvin Coffey at a police warehouse at the intersection of South Homan Street and West Filmore Avenue in Chicago (“Homan Square”). See [106-1], Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”) at 4. Plaintiff Perez alleges that on October 19, 2012, he was taken to the nearby Harris Street Police Station, handcuffed to a wall, and questioned about robberies and drug transactions in the Taylor Street area of Chicago. See id. at 5–6. Despite his repeated requests, Plaintiff was not permitted to contact a lawyer. Id. Approximately two hours later, Plaintiff was released; as he was leaving, police officers stated that they would continue to harass him until they got the information that they wanted. Id. at 6.
The next day, Plaintiff Perez met Defendant Officers Lopez and Zablocki at an Al’s Beef restaurant on Taylor Street at Lopez’s request. The officers drove to the rear of the parking lot and Perez followed them. Zablocki got out of his car, threatened Perez, slammed his head onto the police vehicle, and handcuffed him. Perez then was taken to Homan Square. See [106-1], SAC at 7. Plaintiff Perez alleges that the Chicago Police Department uses Homan Square to hold citizens “incommunicado”—that is, without the formal processing procedures or acknowledgment of the detention—so that police may interrogate citizens and coerce them to cooperate with investigations. See id. at 4.
According to Perez, at Homan Square he was handcuffed to a bar and placed in leg shackles. Officers then allegedly spent the next several hours torturing and threatening Perez to coerce him to contact an individual named Dwayne, apparently a local drug dealer, to set up a
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drug purchase. [132], SAC at 7–8. After Perez refused, Defendants Zablocki and Lopez allegedly sodomized Perez with what Perez believes to have been one of their service revolvers. Id. at 9. They threatened to continue unless Perez cooperated with them. Perez finally agreed to set up a meeting with Dwayne, and the officers provided him with money and a recording device. Id. at 9–10. After completing the purchase and giving the drugs to the officers, Perez was released.
Plaintiff Perez filed his original complaint [1] against the City of Chicago and Officer Lopez, the only officer whose name he knew at the time, on July 20, 2013. Plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to intervene, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a Monell claim against the City for unconstitutional policies and practices that allowed the alleged excessive force and abuse, and respondeat superior and indemnification claims. See [1], Compl. Magistrate Judge Rowland bifurcated the Monell claim and stayed discovery on it. See [54]. Plaintiff Perez, then proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint that added five Chicago police officers as defendants, as well as a new claim for tampering with a witness under 18 U.S.C. § 1512. See [74]. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the witness tampering claim [76], which was stricken as moot, as Plaintiff Perez omitted that claim from his second amended complaint. See [124].
On September 2, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff Perez’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See [124]. In their second amended complaint, the named plaintiffs bring class claims. The plaintiffs allege that they were held at Homan Square, where they were interrogated and mistreated by Chicago police offices. Coffey and Berry were held in February 2015, Jose Martinez in September 2011, and Estephanie Martinez in August 2006. See [106-1], SAC at 11–14. Count I is styled as a § 1983 “secret arrests” class claim against the City of
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Chicago for alleged policies and practices—including secretly detaining citizens at places like Homan Square, interrogating citizens without advising them of their Miranda rights, attempting to coerce false confessions, denying contact with attorneys or family, and refusing access to food, water, and restrooms—that violate the First and Fourth Amendments. Count I includes two proposed classes: (1) all persons detained by Chicago police where no record of the detainment was created within a reasonable amount of time (Plaintiff suggests one hour from the initial detainment), and (2) all persons who may in the future be subject to the alleged secret arrests.
Count II is brought by plaintiffs Estephanie Martinez and Coffey against the City of Chicago for deprivations of adequate accommodations in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Martinez and Coffey allege that the City has policies and practices of detaining citizens overnight without providing them minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping. Count II also includes two classes: (1) all persons who were detained without public record of the detainment between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., and (2) all persons who may in the future be subject to unconstitutional overnight accommodations. Plaintiffs also seek to bring individual § 1983 claims against the named and unknown Defendant officers for excessive force (Count III) and failure to intervene in excessive force (Count IV), as well as state law claims (Count V) and an indemnification claim against the City pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Count VI).
On December 18, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See [145]. In their motion [145], Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Juanita Berry’s claim for excessive force (Count II), her claim for failure to intervene (Count IV), and any corresponding claims for indemnification against the City (Count VI) because Plaintiff Berry has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
4

Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiffs Estephanie and Jose Martinez on the grounds that their claims are time-barred. II. Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the “speculative level.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (ellipsis in original). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. The Court reads the complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). III. Analysis
In their motion [145], Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Juanita Berry’s claim for excessive force (Count III), her claim for failure to intervene (Count IV), and any corresponding claims for indemnification against the City (Count VI) because Plaintiff Berry has
5

failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiffs Estephanie and Jose Martinez on the grounds that their claims are time-barred.
A. Plaintiff Berry’s Claims Plaintiff Berry does not contest the dismissal of her claims asserted in Counts III, IV, and VI and requests that the Court dismiss those claims without prejudice. See [165] at 1, n. 1. Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the claims with prejudice, but provides no basis for why the Court should do so. The Court sees no reason to depart from the Seventh Circuit’s general rule that when granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should do so without prejudice. See, e.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When a complaint fails to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff should ordinarily be given an opportunity, at least upon request, to amend the complaint to correct the problem if possible.”); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing dismissal with prejudice); Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing dismissal with prejudice where district court did not explain reason for denying leave to amend). Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff Berry’s claims in Counts III and IV, as well as her claim under Count VI to the extent it is based on Counts III or IV, and now proceeds to the contested portion of Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss: whether the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Estephanie and Jose Martinez are time-barred. B. Martinez Plaintiffs’ Claims The Martinez Plaintiffs have alleged class action claims for wrongful “secret arrests” and (Count I) and “deprivation of adequate accommodations” (Count II) both in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants argue that the Martinez Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred
6

because the applicable limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years. See [145] at 2 (citing Woods v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2013)). According to Defendants, Estephanie Martinez’s claims accrued on August 9, 2006, and Jose Martinez’s claims accrued on September 29, 2011, and hence were time-barred by the time that the Martinez Plaintiffs first sought relief on March 31, 2015.
Since federal law does not provide a limitations period for § 1983 claims, courts must look to the forum state’s law. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 49 (1984); Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2011). However, that inquiry inevitably raises the question which state law to apply since states typically have various statutes of limitations for different legal claims. Before Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to apply the state statute of limitations governing the state-law claim that was most analogous to the particular Section 1983 claim. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 49–50. However, this case-by-case approach “spurred time-consuming litigation collateral to the merits of § 1983 claims, which in turn injected a great deal of uncertainty into the law.” Woods, 710 F.3d at 765 (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272–74). In Wilson, the Supreme Court abandoned the case-by-case approach in favor of a more elegant one. The Supreme Court held that § 1988(a) “is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. The Court also held that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury claims and, consequently, that courts should apply the state limitations period governing personal injury claims to all § 1983 claims. Id. at 276–80.
Wilson did not address what a court should do when a state has multiple limitations periods applicable to different categories of personal injury claims. In Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), the Supreme Court was asked to determine which of two state-law limitations
7

periods applied to § 1983 claims: the one-year period applicable to various enumerated intentional torts or the three-year residual statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims not otherwise covered by a specific statute of limitations. Id. at 237–38. The Court held “that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Id. at 249–50. The Court explained that adopting the alternative approach—in which courts would look to the limitations periods applicable to intentional torts—would lead to the same problems that predated Wilson, as courts would be required to determine which one of several intentional torts was most analogous to a particular § 1983 claim. Id. at 243–44 & n. 8. Following Wilson and Owens, the Seventh Circuit “has consistently held that the limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Illinois is the two-year period for general personal injury actions set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13–202.” Woods, 710 F.3d at 766 (citations omitted).
Although the limitations period for § 1983 claims is based on state law, federal law determines when such claims begin to accrue. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006). A § 1983 claim begins to accrue—and the clock on the statute of limitations begins to run—“when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’ that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief,’” and this is true “even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Moore v. Burge, 771 F.3d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Illinois is only two years” and “claims based on out-of-court events * * * accrue as soon as the constitutional violation occurs”) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387).
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In its order on September 2, 2015, the Court pointed the parties to Lucas v. Williams, 1995 WL 758167, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1995), in which a prisoner’s claims for injunctive relief were allowed to stand despite the fact that his damages claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. But Lucas is distinguishable in at least one important respect: the plaintiff in that case had “yearly appearances before the parole board,” id. at 1, whereas here, the Martinez Plaintiffs only plead that they could be arrested and taken to Homan Square again. See [132] at ¶ 137 (“Plaintiffs Estephanie Martinez and Jose Martinez, seek to represent only Class II of Count I [i.e. “[a]ll persons who may in the future be subject to the secret arrests described in Class One”]). In addition, Lucas was decided far before the Seventh Circuit cases cited in this opinion. Finally, Lucas failed to discuss the relevant Supreme Court cases, including Wilson and Owens. The other cases that Plaintiffs cite are the dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir. 2004) and two unpublished district court cases. See [165] at 2, 3, 7. (citing Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 2001 WL 1464757, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2001), and Hill v. Amoco Oil Co., 2001 WL 293628, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2001)). But none of these cases are binding on this Court, nor do any of them persuade the Court to depart from the clear trend of authority cited above.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the Martinez Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and that those claims accrued at the time of their allegedly unlawful seizure and detention. Thus, as for Count I, which are best characterized as unlawful seizure claims, Estephanie Martinez’s claim accrued on August 9, 2006 and Joe Martinez’s claim accrued on September 29, 2011. See Moore, 771 F.3d at 446. The claim in Count II dealing with Estephanie Martinez’s confinement in Homan Square
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also accrued during her time in custody.1 As a result, the Martinez Plaintiffs’ claims expired on August 9, 2008 (for Estephanie’s claim under Count I), August 11, 2008 (for her claim under Count II), and September 29, 2013 (for Jose’s claim under Count I). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Martinez Plaintiffs claims as time-barred.
Although it seems unlikely that the Martinez Plaintiffs could successfully amend their complaints to state a timely claim given that their current allegations suggest that neither has been subjected to further unconstitutional treatment in connection with Homan Square for nine years and four years, respectively, in an abundance of caution the Court dismisses these claims without prejudice to give Plaintiffs a chance to consider whether they could amend their pleadings to specifically allege in their Second Amended Complaint that they are likely to be arrested again in the future and taken to Homan Square. IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss [145] the Martinez Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts I and II and Plaintiff Berry’s claims in Count III and Count IV as well as Count VI as it applies to Plaintiff Berry based on Count III and Count IV. All of the dismissals are without prejudice; if the Martinez Plaintiffs’ believe that they can successfully replead, they may file a motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint on or before September 26, 2016.

Dated: August 26, 2016

____________________________________ Robert M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge

1 Defendants suggest that Jose Martinez has a Count II claim, [145] at 9–10, but the operative complaint only states claims under Count II for Estephanie Martinez and Calvin Coffey. See [132] at ¶¶ 144–46.
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 Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 202 Filed: 02/01/17 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:864

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANGEL PEREZ, individually,

)

JUANITA BERRY and CALVIN COFFEY )

on behalf of themselves and all other

)

persons similarly situated

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

EDMUND ZABLOCKI, Star #7505

)

JOSEPH WAGNER, Star #9812

)

HERBERT BENTANCOURT, Star # 16976 )

MATTHEW CLINE, Star #265

)

JOHN DOLAN, Star #7722

)

JORGE L. LOPEZ, Star #20298

)

SCOTT KRAVITZ, Star # 6554

)

CARLOS IGLESIAS III, Star #7859

)

Defendants.

)

No. 13 C 4531 Judge Dow
JURY DEMANDED

COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION 3rd AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Angel Perez, individually, and Plaintiffs Juanita Berry and Calvin Coffey, who bring this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of those similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, and complaining of Defendants Jorge L. Lopez, Edmund Zablocki, Matthew P. Cline, Joseph Wagner, Herbert Betancourt, John P. Dolan, Scott Kravitz, Carlos Iglesias III, and the City of Chicago and states as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West) et seq. and 1988; the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, and 1343(a) (West); the Constitution of the United States; and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28

1

Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 202 Filed: 02/01/17 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:865
U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West). PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, ANGEL PEREZ (“Perez”), is an adult male who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County.
3. Plaintiff, JUANITA BERRY (“Berry”), is an adult female who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County.
4. Plaintiff, CALVIN COFFEY (“Coffey”), is an adult male who, at all relevant times, was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, Cook County.
5. Defendants, Jorge L. Lopez ("Lopez") Star No. 20298, Edmund Zablocki ("Zablocki") Star No. 7505, Matthew P. Cline ("Cline") Star No. 265, Joseph Wagner ("Wagner'') Star No. 9812, Herbert Betancourt ("Betancourt") Star No. 16976, John P. Dolan ("Dolan") Star No.7722, Scott Kravitz (“Kravitz”) Star No. 6554, Carlos Iglesias III (“Iglesias”) Star No. 7859 (“Defendant Officers”), were at all relevant times, working as Chicago Police Officers, and were residents of Cook County, Illinois.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant Officers, were acting in the course of their employment and under color of law.
7. Defendant Officers are being sued in their individual capacities. 8. Defendant, City of Chicago (the "City'') is and was a municipality, at all relevant times, was the employer and principal of Defendant Officers who improperly detained, arrested and tortured the plaintiffs, and as such, is and was at all relevant times responsible for the supervision, training, policies, practices, and customs of the Chicago Police Department and its officers.
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FACTS 9. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry also bring this action on behalf of the Classes defined herein, to reform an unconstitutional police procedure which allows police offers to hold arrestees “incommunicado” or “off the grid,” without processing the arrestees or making any public record of the arrest, for long periods of time in order to “squeeze” information out of the detainees. This is often accomplished by holding and interrogating the arrestee at a facility other than a normal police station. The arrestees are kept off the official booking databases, frequently beaten by police, shackled for prolonged periods of time, denied access to legal counsel, and are unable to be located by family or attorneys while being held. 10. Many times, the arrestees are held and interrogated for long periods of time in order to investigate crimes totally unrelated to the initial detention. The procedure allows police to investigate and interrogate citizens without taking them before a judicial official for a determination of probable cause, in order to justify the seizure or to use the person to form charges against someone else. 11. In addition to causing unlawful detentions, during the time that the detainee is held at the facility, other than a normal police station, the detainee is subject to minimally appropriate conditions of confinement. 12. While being held without being booked at a police station, arrestees are forced to (attempt to) sleep on small metal benches within the interrogation rooms. They are frequently denied food, water and lavatories and forced to defecate themselves while being shackled to the wall. 13. As a result, arrestees detained at these facilities are kept from disinterested judicial
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officials and are isolated for long periods of time in interrogation rooms and deprived of necessary sleep while police continue to interrogate them and build evidence against them or others who they may be associated with; all raising the specter of torture, false confessions, and unlawful convictions.
14. The practice and policy of the City of Chicago, through the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) in holding citizens at these facilities, involuntarily, incommunicado, without processing them, without reading them their Miranda rights, subjecting them to restraint of movement via handcuffs, leg shackles and/or locked rooms or cells of solitary confinement, denying them access to attorneys, denying them access to phones, bathrooms to relieve themselves, and keeping their whereabouts secret from friends, family and society at large for several hours to days at a time, is unconstitutional.
15. As opposed to a regular police station, police use facilities like the police warehouse at the intersection of South Homan Street and West Fillmore Avenue (“Homan Square”) to detain people without formal acknowledgement of the detention. The privacy of these sites is conducive to physical or mental coercion and abuse. Detainees are held until they “cooperate” with the corrupt police officers. If a detainee does not cooperate, he will spend a considerable amount of time in a solitary confinement cell and eventually be placed under formal arrest and transferred to regular police stations. The corrupt officers who use these sites will manufacture the necessary probable cause to justify the formal arrests.
16. Sites like Homan Square contain locked “interview” rooms, wretched from human waste and containing bars on which to handcuff citizens. Once cuffed to the bars on the walls, the citizens are forced to stand for hours or even days on end. Detainees are denied access to food, water and the use of bathroom facilities. Forcing detainees to relieve themselves in their cells is
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tortuous in itself, but the smell serves as compulsion to future detainees. 17. Though they are not actual police stations, sites like Homan Square contain solitary
confinement cells for holding detainees. Because of the difficulty in tracking detainees held at facilities like Homan Square, attorneys have no way of finding their clients while at these sites and there is no way to monitor the activity and interrogation tactics being used at these facilities.
18. Officers from all over Chicago arrest citizens with or without probable cause and bring them to interrogation sites.
19. A similar practice of Chicago Police Department was held unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). There, officers would intentionally hold arrestees “past court call” in order to continue investigating and interrogating arrestees without taking them before a judicial official for a probable cause hearing within 48 hours. The use of the facilities like Homan Square is a continuation of this practice.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Angel Perez 20. On or about October 20, 2012 at approximately 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff Perez was working as a delivery driver for Castillo Delivery Service. 21. At the aforementioned date and time, Plaintiff Perez was returning to Dosirak Restaurant at 1514 W. Taylor Street, Chicago, Illinois, following a delivery. 22. As Plaintiff Perez traveled eastbound on Taylor Street near the intersection of Taylor and Ashland Streets, he was pulled over by an unmarked police car with flashing headlights. 23. Two Chicago Police officers approached Plaintiff Perez’s car, and did not identify themselves, but called each other George (Defendant Lopez) and John (Defendant Dolan). 24. The officer who identified himself as John approached Plaintiff Perez’s driver’s side door, opened Plaintiff Perez’s car door and pulled Plaintiff Perez out of his car.
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25. Defendant Lopez opened the passenger door and began searching Plaintiff Perez’s car.
26. Plaintiff Perez was handcuffed and placed into the unmarked police car. 27. Defendant Dolan then drove Plaintiff Perez’s car to Homan Square. 28. Defendant Lopez followed in the unmarked car with Plaintiff Perez handcuffed in the back seat. 29. While on the way to the police station, Plaintiff Perez asked that his lawyer be contacted. 30. Upon arriving at the police station, Plaintiff Perez was searched in the parking lot. Plaintiff Perez was then brought into the Harrison Street Police Station through a back entrance, brought to a small room and handcuffed to a bar on the wall. 31. Defendant Lopez took Plaintiff Perez’s cellular telephone and left the room, leaving Officer Dolan in the room with Plaintiff Perez. 32. Plaintiff Perez was not free to leave the police station as he was handcuffed to the wall the entire time he was in the police station. 33. Defendant Lopez returned to the room and the two officers began bombarding Plaintiff Perez with questions regarding robberies and drug dealers in the Taylor Street area. 34. Plaintiff Perez responded that he did not know anything about robberies or drug dealings in the Taylor Street area and again and repeatedly requested that the officers call his lawyer. 35. Despite requests from Plaintiff Perez, Plaintiff Perez’s lawyer was never contacted and the questioning continued. 36. The officers were particularly interested in why Plaintiff Perez had the telephone
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number of an individual by the name of “Dwayne” in his telephone. 37. The interrogation of Plaintiff Perez continued for approximately one and a half to
two hours. At the end of the interrogation, the officers informed Plaintiff Perez that they were going to harass him every day on Taylor Street until they got what they wanted from him.
38. Plaintiff Perez was un-handcuffed, given his car keys and told he could leave by Officer Dolan.
39. On or about October 21, 2012, Defendant Lopez called Plaintiff Perez’s cell phone and told Plaintiff Perez that what took place the night before was a mistake and that he needed Plaintiff Perez to sign some papers so that his car would not be towed.
40. Defendant Lopez instructed the Plaintiff Perez to meet him at Al’s Beef on Taylor Street at 3:00 p.m. that day.
41. Plaintiff Perez went to Al’s Beef at 3:00 p.m. and Defendant Lopez arrived in a police squad with Defendant Zablocki, who was tall, with red hair and a beard.
42. The officers drove to the back of the parking lot and Plaintiff Perez followed them to that location.
43. Defendant Edmund Zablocki exited the squad car and began to threaten Plaintiff Perez. Then the officers searched Plaintiff Perez, handcuffed him with his hands behind his back, and placed him in the squad car.
44. Plaintiff Perez was then taken to Homan Square. 45. Plaintiff Perez was led to a second floor room in Homan Square with chairs and a table and handcuffed to a bar in the locked room. Plaintiff Perez was also placed in leg shackles. 46. Plaintiff Perez was held against his will in the locked room for several hours, handcuffed and shackled, and was not free to leave the custody of the Defendant Officers.
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47. Several officers (approximately six officers), who were later identified as Defendant Matthew P. Cline, Defendant Edmund Zablocki, Defendant Joseph Wagner, Defendant Herbert Betancourt, and Defendant John Dolan, entered the room. During the next several hours the named Defendants each took turns torturing and threatening Plaintiff Perez
48. The named Defendants threatened that they would send Plaintiff Perez to Cook County Jail where he would be raped by gang members; that they would charge him in a conspiracy to obstruct justice; that they would plant evidence on Plaintiff Perez and his family members if he continued to refuse to assist them.
49. Plaintiff Perez did not cooperate. 50. One of the officers in the room identified himself as the “Commander.” 51. Defendant Officers ignored repeated requests by Plaintiff Perez to speak with his attorney. 52. At no time did Defendant Officers read Plaintiff Perez his Miranda rights. 53. The officers wanted Plaintiff Perez to call or text “Dwayne” and set-up a drug purchase, but he refused to call or text Dwayne. 54. After a period of time refusing to call or text Dwayne, the officers began to pull and contort Plaintiff Perez’s body while he was handcuffed to the wall and shackled at his ankles causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain. 55. At one point, Defendant Zablocki sat on Plaintiff Perez’s chest and placed his palms on Plaintiff Perez’s eye sockets and pushed hard against them causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain. Defendant Zablocki also drove his elbows into Plaintiff Perez’s back and head causing severe pain. 56. Defendant Lopez was in the room at the time and did not intervene. All the defendant officers went in and out of the interrogation room yelling the named threats causing
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Plaintiff Perez mental damage. 57. In an attempt to contact the outside world, Plaintiff Perez agreed to make the call
and he attempted to call a friend of his to inform him what was transpiring at which time an officer took Plaintiff Perez ’s telephone and ended the call.
58. After several hours of verbal and physical torture, Defendant Lopez and an officer who claimed to be a police sergeant were alone in the room with Plaintiff Perez.
59. Defendant Officers told Plaintiff Perez that if he refused to cooperate with them that they were going to give him a “little taste” of what he would be getting at the Cook County Jail.
60. Defendant Officers put Plaintiff Perez over a chair and pulled down his pants, and Defendant Lopez said “I hear that a big black nigger dick feels like a gun up your ass.”
61. Defendant Lopez and/or Defendant Zablocki, knowing their actions created a strong likelihood of great bodily harm and mental anguish, inserted a cold metal object, believed to be one of officer’s service revolvers, into Plaintiff Perez’s rectum causing Plaintiff Perez severe pain and humiliation. The two officers laughed hysterically while inserting the object into Plaintiff Perez’s rectum.
62. Defendant Zablocki then said “I almost blew your brains out.” The officers told Plaintiff Perez that they would continue to insert the gun into his rectum until he cooperated with them.
63. Plaintiff Perez began to cry and agreed to cooperate with the officers. 64. Defendant officers then removed the leg shackles from Plaintiff Perez and took him from the room to a car waiting outside. Once in the car, the Plaintiff Perez was instructed, by the officers, to call Dwayne and set-up a purchase of either heroin or crack cocaine. Plaintiff Perez
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called Dwayne, but Dwayne did not answer the telephone. Plaintiff Perez was then instructed to text Dwayne, which he did and Dwayne then called Plaintiff Perez.
65. Plaintiff Perez spoke to Dwayne about purchasing one gram of heroin and agreed to meet Dwayne at an agreed location and time. The police then brought Plaintiff Perez to his car, provided Plaintiff Perez with money to purchase the heroin, a box believed to be a GPS device and an audio recording device to record the transaction.
66. Plaintiff Perez completed the purchase from Dwayne for the Chicago Police and returned the drugs and equipment to the police. The officers then wanted Plaintiff Perez to sell drugs to Dwayne. Plaintiff Perez told the officers that he would not be involved again with them.
67. Plaintiff Perez was released from police custody at approximately 9:30 p.m. on October 21, 2012.
68. Defendant Lopez subsequently repeatedly called Plaintiff Perez’s cellular telephone from his cellular telephone requesting additional meetings with Plaintiff Perez. The Lopez calls stopped for a period after Plaintiff Perez contacted the Independent Police Review Authority for the Chicago Police Department and complained about the events of October 20, 2012 and October 21, 2012, in which the named Defendants arrested Plaintiff Perez, without probable cause, restrained and refused to release him from custody.
69. At no time on either October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012, prior to Plaintiff Perez’s seizure and torture, did Plaintiff Perez commit a felony.
70. Plaintiff Perez did not violate any felony immediately prior to or during the October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012 stop and arrests.
71. On October 20, 2012 and October 21, 2012, Defendants Lopez and Dolan did not have an arrest warrant to stop or detain Plaintiff Perez.
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72. Neither Defendant Lopez nor Defendant Dolan witnessed Plaintiff Perez violate any law within seven days prior to his October 20, 2012 stop and arrest.
73. Defendant Officers did not have any legal justification to stop or detain Plaintiff Perez on either October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012.
74. Plaintiff Perez was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station.
75. Plaintiff Perez was detained for several hours without access to his attorney, family or friends.
76. No public record of Plaintiff Perez’ arrest was created within a reasonable time (an hour) of his detainment.
77. Defendant officers did not have a warrant for Plaintiff Perez’ arrest on October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Calvin Coffey 78. On February 6, 2015, after interrogating Plaintiff Coffey on the streets about narcotic activity, the police took Plaintiff Coffey to Homan Square in handcuffs. 79. Plaintiff Coffey was taken to Homan Square in handcuffs by Defendant Iglesias and Defendant Kravitz. 80. At Homan Square, Plaintiff Coffey was put in a locked room and handcuffed to a bar on the back wall. Defendant Iglesias and Defendant Kravitz wanted Coffey to “help” them. 81. Coffey asked for his attorney on more than one occasion, but his requests were ignored. 82. Defendant officers did not read Coffey his Miranda rights while at Homan Square.
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83. Coffey refused to cooperate with the officers. After several hours of refusing to cooperate with the officers, the officers stopped coming into the room.
84. Plaintiff Coffey had to relieve himself while being handcuffed to the wall. Plaintiff Coffey called out for help for more than two hours to have someone escort him to the bathroom. Plaintiff Coffey’s requests to use the lavatory were ignored. Plaintiff Coffey was forced to relieve himself on the floor of the interrogation room.
85. Defendant Kravitz saw that Plaintiff Coffey had done a bowel movement and made Plaintiff Coffey clean it up with his skull cap.
86. Because one of his hands was restrained, Plaintiff Coffey struggled to obey the command, and did so inadequately. Plaintiff Coffey was forced to endure the stench in the interview room for the remainder of his stay at Homan.
87. Plaintiff Coffey was held at Homan Square for more than seven hours, without food, water, access to a lavatory or anywhere to sleep.
88. Plaintiff Coffey was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station.
89. Defendant Officers did not have a warrant to arrest Plaintiff Coffey on February 6, 2015.
90. No public record of Plaintiff Coffey’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (e.g. an hour) of his arrest or detainment.
Facts Related to Plaintiff Juanita Berry 91. On February 6, 2015, Juanita Berry, was with Plaintiff Calvin Coffey on the streets (5th and Kostner), when police picked up Coffey for delivery of a controlled substance. 92. Plaintiff Berry was handcuffed and taken, separate from Plaintiff Coffey, to Homan
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Square. 93. Plaintiff Berry was placed in a locked room, handcuffed to a ring or bar on the wall. 94. Plaintiff Berry was not read her Miranda rights while at Homan Square. 95. Defendants Kravitz and Iglesias, asked Plaintiff Berry to get them two guns from
an acquaintance, or else they would charge her with aiding in the delivery of controlled substance of Calvin Coffey.
96. Plaintiff Berry was not allowed to make a phone call or permitted to contact her attorneys, family or friends.
97. Plaintiff Berry was held at Homan Square for 3-4 hours. 98. After several hours, and many threats, Plaintiff Berry agreed to try to retrieve a gun. 99. Defendant officers drove Plaintiff Berry to pick up a gun from an acquaintance. 100. After retrieving the gun, the officers took her to Dunkin Donuts and later drove her home. 101. Plaintiff Berry was never formally processed at an area police station or charged with any crimes. 102. Plaintiff Berry was held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 103. Plaintiff Berry was detained for several hours without access to her attorney, family or friends. 104. No public record of Plaintiff Berry’s arrest was created within a reasonable time (e.g. an hour) of her arrest or detainment.
COUNT I – Class Claim 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR SECRET ARRESTS
(CITY OF CHICAGO)
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105. Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 104 and as if fully set forth herein.
106. This Count is asserted by all Plaintiffs against Defendant City of Chicago. 107. As described more fully above, Plaintiffs and the members of Classes have been held incommunicado and “off the grid” before being formally taken and processed at an area police station. 108. The Constitutional violations described herein in this Complaint were effectuated by Defendant City of Chicago through its customs, practices, and policies (hereinafter referred to as the “City’s Conduct”). The City’s Conduct was the moving force behind the injuries sustained by Plaintiffs and Classes. 109. Chicago police officers for years have arrested civilians without warrants and frequently without any probable cause and brought them to police sites other than police stations for the purpose of privately interrogating, threatening and beating them in order to coerce confessions or insider information. Many times the civilians held at facilities like Homan Square are never booked, processed or charged with any crimes. 110. Those taken to “off the books” locations are detained for long periods of time without food, water, or access to lavatories. 111. Plaintiffs and the class members are denied contact with the attorneys and their family. 112. Defendant City of Chicago’s conduct, through the actions of its policy makers, was to train officers to seize, transport, and secretly detain citizens at facilities other than police stations for extended periods of time while handcuffed to a cell wall and to interrogate them when they had not been read their Miranda rights and to deny citizens access to attorneys;
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attempt to coerce false confessions out of citizens; to deny them the ability to contact their families, to refuse access to restroom, food, or water; and to threaten citizens that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information.
113. These policies and practices are unreasonable under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and proximately caused Plaintiffs and the class members to suffer damages.
114. Alternatively, the City of Chicago, although aware of the misconduct and violations, allowed the misconduct to continue to occur.
115. The conduct alleged herein has gone unchecked and has been allowed to exist in the City of Chicago for a significant period of time, so much so, that police officers for the City of Chicago recognize that they will not be punished for committing said acts and that, in fact, said acts are either permitted or quietly consented to by superior officers for the CPD in order to permit said conduct to re-occur.
116. These customs, as alleged herein, were maintained and implemented unreasonably by official policy makers of the Defendant City of Chicago, with deliberate indifference to an obvious need, and in a manner that shocks the conscience, and were the direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendant Officers and the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs and the Classes.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 117. Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of the following two proposed classes: Class I (Detainee and Arrestee Class): All natural persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or
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otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present.
Class II (Future Detainees and Arrestees Class): All persons who may in the future be subject to the secret arrests described in Class One.
118. Plaintiffs Coffey, and Berry seek to represent both Class I and Class II of Count I. 119. The individuals in Classes I and II are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiffs, based on the number of arrests made by CPD each year, estimate that the classes are at least in the thousands. Based on the CPD 2010 annual report, there were 167,541 arrests that year. Plaintiffs will obtain the exact number of class members during discovery. 120. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Classes I and II. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the failure to make a public record of the detention and arrest of an individual within a reasonable time violates constitutional rights;
b. Whether CPD policy and use of facilities other than police stations allows CPD to detain citizens for prolonged periods of time, incommunicado, as alleged herein;
c. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD of misusing facilities like Homan Square as alleged herein;
d. Whether the conditions of confinement in detention facilities like Homan Square deprive detainees of acceptable means of detention in an unconstitutional manner; and
e. Whether the failure to make a public record of an arrest is unconstitutional as (i) restricting freedom of speech by preventing detainees from communicating with their lawyers and family, (ii) violating the Fourth Amendment, and (iii) Violating the right of habeas corpus.
121. Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
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class members. Plaintiffs do not have any claims which are antagonistic to the class members. Plaintiffs have retained skilled counsel with experience in class action litigation to represent the Classes.
122. Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry were detained at a facility other than a police station, without any public record of their detainment or arrest within an hour of the detainment, and prevented from communicating with attorneys, family members or others about their detainment and arrest.
123. A class action is a superior method of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. Given the nature of the claims asserted, many of the class members will fear bringing claims on their own to assert their rights.
124. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Class II, thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages with respect to the class as a whole.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Classes respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant City of Chicago, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and declaratory relief preventing future similar conduct, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II- Class Claim 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR DEPRIVATION OF ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATIONS IN VIOLATION OF 4th AMENDMENT
(CITY OF CHICAGO) 125. Plaintiff Coffey re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1- 104 and as if fully set
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forth herein. 126. This Count is asserted by Plaintiff Coffey against Defendant City of Chicago. 127. As described more fully above, Plaintiff Coffey and the members of the class
have been detained in CPD facilities overnight and have not been furnished minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping and access to lavatories in a manner that violated their constitutional rights.
128. Defendant City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiff’s and the class members’ damages, because the city maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations.
129. These policies and practices are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and proximately caused Plaintiff and the class members to suffer damages.
130. Alternatively, the City of Chicago, although aware of the misconduct and violations, allowed the misconduct to continue to occur.
131. The conduct alleged herein has gone unchecked and has been allowed to exist in the City of Chicago for a significant period of time, so much so, that police officers for the City of Chicago recognize that they will not be punished for committing said acts and that, in fact, said acts are either permitted or quietly consented to by superior officers for the CPD in order to permit said conduct to re-occur.
132. These customs, as alleged herein, were maintained and implemented unreasonably by official policy makers of the Defendant City of Chicago, with deliberate indifference to an obvious need, and in a manner that shocks the conscience, and were the direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendant Officers and the
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injuries suffered by Plaintiff and the Classes. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
133. Plaintiff Coffey brings this action as a Class Action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), (3) on behalf of the following Class:
Class III (Accommodations Class): All nature persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, and where the person was detained between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present.
Class IV (Future Accommodations Class): All persons who may in the future be subject to the overnight accommodations described in Class Three.
134. Plaintiff Coffey seeks to represent both Class III and Class IV of Count II. 135. The individuals in Classes III and IV are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff, based on the number of arrests made by CPD each year, estimates that the classes are at least in the thousands. Based on the CPD 2010 annual report, there were 167,541 arrests that year. Plaintiff will obtain the exact number of class members during discovery. 136. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Classes III and IV. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the failure to make a public record of the detention and arrest of an individual within a reasonable time violates constitutional rights;
b. Whether CPD policy and use of facilities other than police stations allows CPD to detain citizens for prolonged periods of time, incommunicado, and without access to proper accommodations as alleged herein;
c. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD of misusing
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facilities like Homan Square as alleged herein; and d. Whether to conditions of confinement in detention facilities like Homan
Square deprive detainees of acceptable means of detention in an unconstitutional manner. 137. Plaintiff Coffey will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class
members. Plaintiff Coffey does not have any claims which are antagonistic to the class members. Plaintiffs Coffey has retained skilled counsel with experience in class action litigation to represent the Classes.
138. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff Coffey was detained at Homan Square and as a result was denied adequate facilities such as lavatories and sleeping accommodations.
139. A class action is a superior method of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. Given the nature of the claims asserted, many of the class members will fear bringing claims on their own to assert their rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Coffey and Class III and IV respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant City of Chicago, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and declaratory relief preventing future similar conduct, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT III- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 4th
AMENDMENT (Defendant Officers) 140. Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 104 as if fully set forth herein. 141. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez and Coffey,
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and against Defendant Officers. 142. The actions of Defendant Officers violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to
be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey respectfully request that this Court enter
judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT IV- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey 42 U.S.C. §1983 CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO INTERVENE IN VIOLATION OF
THE 4th AMENDMENT (Defendant Officers)
143. Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 104 as if fully set forth herein.
144. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez and Coffey, against Defendant Officers.
145. Defendant Officers present for the physical abuse of Plaintiffs had the opportunity, but failed to intervene and prevent such abuse.
146. The actions of Defendant Officers violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT V- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey STATE LAW - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
AGAINST
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(Defendant Officers) 147. Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 104 as if fully set forth herein. 148. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs, Perez and Coffey, against Defendant Officers. 149. The actions of the individual defendants as set forth above placed Plaintiffs in fear of their life, safety and in fear of receiving an assault and battery. 150. The actions of the defendants constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, and were done deliberately and intentionally and in a willful and wanton manner. 151. The Defendants intended that their conduct inflict severe emotional distress and/or knew there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress. 152. The conduct of the defendants did in fact cause Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendant Officers, and award them compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT VI- Claims of Individual Plaintiffs Perez, Coffey, and Berry INDEMNIFICATION CLAIM PURSUANT TO 745 ILCS 10/9-102
(City of Chicago)
153. Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey re-allege and reincorporate paragraphs 1- 104 as if fully set forth herein.
154. This claim is being brought on behalf of individual Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey
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against Defendant City of Chicago.
155. The acts of the Defendant Officers described herein were willful and wanton, and
committed within the scope of their employment.
156. Pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102, Defendant City of Chicago is liable for any
judgment in this case arising from the actions of the Defendant Officers.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Perez and Coffey respectfully request that this Court order
Defendant City of Chicago to indemnify Defendant Officers for any judgment entered in this
case arising from the actions of Defendant Officers.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand trial by jury.
s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Cassandra P. Miller EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC 20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603-1824 (312) 739-4200 (312) 419-0379 (FAX) Email address for service: courtecl@edcombs.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Coffey and Berry and the Putative Class
Law Offices of Scott T. Kamin 53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 430 Chicago IL 60604 (312) 322-0077 Attorney for All Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 202 Filed: 02/01/17 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:887 Law Office of Jason Epstein 190 S. LaSalle St., Suite 2100 Chicago IL 60604 (312) 869-2603 Attorney for All Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 202 Filed: 02/01/17 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:888

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Cassandra P. Miller, certify that on February 1, 2017, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document was filed via the Court’s CM/ECF system and notification of such filing was sent to the following:
Jorge V. Cazares Jonathan Booker Cifonelli Walter Jones, Jr. Khara Coleman Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. 180 N. LaSalle Street Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601 jcazares@pjjlaw.com jcifonelli@pjjlaw.com wjones@pjjlaw.com kcoleman@pjjlaw.com

Cassandra P. Miller EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC 20 S. Clark St., Ste. 1500 Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 739-4200 (312) 419-0379 (FAX)

s/ Cassandra P. Miller Cassandra P. Miller

25

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 330 Filed: 12/27/19 Page 1 of 36 PageID #:2460

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANGEL PEREZ, et al., Plaintiff,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

Case No. 13-cv-4531

)

)

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification

[270]. This case is set for further status hearing on January 16, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.

I. Background

This longstanding case concerns the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) use of its Homan

Square facility. This opinion presumes familiarity with the Court’s earlier rulings in this case. See

generally, e.g., [124, 186]. Relevant facts regarding the Homan Square facility, named Plaintiffs’

arrests, and the present motion for class certification are provided for context.

A. Homan Square

The Chicago Police Department has more than twenty geographically defined police

districts throughout the city. [271-1, 18:19]. Each district has its own central stationhouse. [Id.,

19:6–11.] Homan Square was a law enforcement facility, but it was not a district stationhouse. [Id.,

24:18–20.] Homan Square was nevertheless an important facility for law enforcement: organized

crime officers worked out of Homan Square [271-6, 24:11–16.]; the Evidence and Recovered

Property Section was housed there [290-2, 221:13–15.]; and federal law enforcement officers also

regularly visited Homan Square [Id., 221:19, 291:6–15].

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Although Homan Square was not a stationhouse, sometimes arrestees were brought there immediately following their arrest to “begin initial processing.” See [290-2, 226:10–11]. The vast majority (perhaps as many as 90%) of arrestees brought to Homan Square were brought in by the narcotics division of the organized crime unit. [271-6, 43:1–10.] Because arresting officers could not complete processing at Homan Square, they would then take the arrestees to the 11th district stationhouse, “which is very close to Homan Square.” [290-2, 267:22–268:7.] The 11th district is “probably the most violent district in the city,” and is therefore “one of the busier districts,” even absent the transferees from Homan Square. [290-4, 235:13–24.]1
An officer’s decision to take a suspect to Homan Square as opposed to a stationhouse is based on several factors. [Id., 207:21–209:15.] Two predominate. First, an arrestee would be brought to Homan Square if the arrest was part of an undercover investigation, because Homan Square has sterile facilities to allow undercover officers to maintain anonymity. E.g., [271-6, 45:3– 10]; [290-2, 224:2–12]. Second, an arresting officer may need to use facilities specific to Homan Square. [271-6, 42:11–20]. For example, officers based out of Homan Square have their offices and computers at that location, and thus can process arrestees more quickly than at a stationhouse, where they do not have ready access to computers and investigation rooms. [290-2, 265:24–266:12 (“If you go into Homan Square, you’re going to be able to process the person faster. There won’t be computers available in the districts because they’ve very busy districts. There is—there is— interview rooms are full and you can’t—you can’t even get on a computer and then do anything. * * * It’s faster sometimes to bring them to Homan Square to do the initial processing and then
1 The CPD has not published aggregate arrest data during the proposed class years of 2013–15, but 2016 data corroborates this statement: The 11th district had thousands more arrests than any other police district in the city. See Chicago Police Department, “Annual Report 2017” at 83, available at https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chicago-Police-Department-Annual-Report2017.pdf.
2

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bring them to a holding facility afterwards. It all depends on the specifics of the case.”)]; see also [id., 279:20–280:16.] That is especially true for arrests made within the CPD’s 11th police district, which has a very busy, “constantly over filled” stationhouse; taking someone to Homan Square may simply be quicker. [290-4, 235:17–24]; see also [id., 318:4–18 (providing additional context as to why Homan Square may be quicker.).] That said, sometimes the decision to bring an arrestee to Homan Square was made by the officers’ supervisors before the arrest. [290-4, 207:21–209:15.]
Homan Square, until recently, had different policies and procedures regarding processing arrestees than district stationhouses. See [271-5 at 2–3 (amending intake procedures to apply to Homan Square)]. When a suspect is brought to a stationhouse, the CPD must abide by the “general procedures and responsibilities” for “detention facilities.” See generally [271-2]. 2 These policies are comprehensive and specific and generally geared toward ensuring arrestee safety and security. [Id.] CPD officers are also responsible for allowing arrestees “to make a reasonable number of telephone calls to an attorney, family member, or friend;” generally “the arrestee will be allowed to make the calls within the first hour of entering the lockup.” [271-2 at 4, ¶ 28.] That said, before an arrestee is placed in lockup, the entire arrest processing must take place—the arrestee is fingerprinted, photographed, and otherwise “booked” in the district stationhouse. See [271-1, 25:14–26:20]. The CPD has an automated arrest system that allows officers to track compliance with the dictates of the general order, including how frequently the arrestee interfaces with external contacts. See, e.g., [271-4 at 4].
By contrast, Homan Square did not have the facilities to complete booking, most notably a fingerprinting machine. [271-1, 116:21–117:2.] Likewise, Homan Square did not have a
2 The policy that Plaintiffs included in their motion for class certification is dated September 24, 2018— years after their respective arrests and the class closed. Defendants have not contested that these policies were in effect, and they are not central to the instant motion. The Court recites them here for context.
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“lockup”; rather, it had a “bullpen.” [290-2, 297:4–298:10.] Arrestees taken to Homan Square did not spend the night, as there was nowhere for them to sleep. [Id.]; see also [271-6, 40:7–11]. Instead, arrestees were handcuffed and placed into spare interrogation rooms. See [271-7, 68:9– 69:9]. After the arrestee was handcuffed in the room, an officer would typically go back to his or her office to complete the initial paperwork before interrogating the arrestee. [271-6, 37:11–17.] As explained above, the organized crime officers at Homan Square had easier access to holding facilities and computers, and beginning processing at Homan Square sometimes expedited the completion of the post-arrest paperwork. E.g., [290-2 at 265:24–266:12]. Officers testified that they attended to the safety, health, and security needs of Homan Square detainees—at least on an ad hoc and as needed basis. [271-7, 216–217]; [290-3, 269:25–270:9]; [290-2, 251:12–20].
Arrestees at Homan Square were given an opportunity to “cooperate” by informing on others. [271-1, 41:7–17.] Those who provided information were sometimes let off without having charges filed (or a formal record of arrest created). [271-7, 56:1–23.] Or, the suspect may be transferred to a district stationhouse and formally booked and processed. See [290-2, 270:4–16]; see also generally [271-3]. Generally speaking, those who agreed to speak to law enforcement were held at Homan Square longer than those who refused to cooperate, to give officers time to complete their interrogation. See [271-6 40:3–6 (“[Arrestees] could be in and out of Homan in a matter of less than an hour, or if they’re cooperating, if they wish to cooperate with the police they could be there for several hours.”)]. Arrestees were also released directly from Homan Square without further processing at a district stationhouse if “probable cause has dissipated” following arrest. [271-6, 50:17–51:6.]
4

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Importantly, at least for the purposes of this litigation, the CPD’s electronic arrest records did not allow officers to input Homan Square as the location of detention.3 See [271-1 at 49:13– 15]; see also [271-5 at 2 (introducing the requirement to record the location of a recent arrestee)]. Thus, when someone was taken into custody at Homan Square, the CPD’s searchable database of arrests would not show that arrest. [271-1, 50:8–11.] Family members and friends who called the police to inquire into an individual’s whereabouts could not get a straight answer as to whether that person had been arrested and where he or she had been taken. See [271-7, 53:2–54:21.] When arrestees were moved from Homan Square to a district stationhouse, the narrative of their arrest reports often indicated that they had been detained at Homan Square. [271-1, 50:13–24]; see also [271-3 at 3 (recording that Coffey was “transported to Homan Square for processing.”)]; see also generally [271-12 (including the names, addresses, and charges of thousands of people who were initially processed at Homan Square)]. But, if an arrestee cooperated or was otherwise released without charges, then no formal arrest record was created. [271-7, 56:1–23.] That said, the CPD does maintain some ancillary files regarding people detained at Homan Square and subsequently released, including a register of every person brought to the facility. See, e.g., generally [290-5]; [290-6].
B. Plaintiffs’ Arrest4 Plaintiffs Curtis Coffey and Juanita Berry were arrested on February 6th, 2015. [271-3 at 2]; [290-6 at 1]. At the time, Coffey and Berry had been living together at Berry’s mother’s house. [290-9 at 9:11–20.] The CPD had been investigating Coffey for weeks, and had observed him
3 It appears that until 2004, the CPD did not use electronic recordkeeping at all. [271-1 at 43:2–4.] 4 Plaintiffs recount different details of their respective arrests than the arresting officers. Because the Court need not broach these factual issues in order to decide the instant motion, both sides of each story are presented for context. As explained below, the fact-intensive and case-by-case nature of each putative class member’s claim (as evinced by these competing narratives) militates strongly against class certification.
5

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selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a school several times before he was arrested. [271-3 at 3.] On February 6, Coffey sold heroin to an undercover CPD officer. [Id.] Berry was with him when he sold the heroin, and both were arrested and transported to Homan Square. [290-6 at 2]; [271-3 at 3.] Following arrest, Coffey was taken first to Homan Square, and then was transferred to the 11th district’s stationhouse for formal processing. His fingerprints and mugshot were taken between 11:42 p.m. and 12:06 a.m. [271-3 at 3, 5.] Berry was also taken to Homan Square, where she was interrogated. After she assisted in the officers’ investigation of Coffey, they “released [her] pending further investigation.” [290-6 at 2.]
Coffey claims that after being taken to Homan Square he was placed into an interrogation room, handcuffed, and immediately interrogated. [290-10, 87:3–17.] When Coffey requested to speak to an attorney, the officers responded that attorneys were not allowed into Homan Square. [Id., 91:15–92:14.] During this initial interrogation, he did not ask to use the restroom. [Id., 95:1.] Then the interrogators left and were replaced by two other officers. [Id., 95:11.] During this second interrogation, Coffey did not ask for food, water, or bathroom access. But he again requested counsel. [Id., 95:12–19.] Then a third set of officers came in to resume the interrogation; by then, hours had passed. [Id., 99:7–18.] Coffey again did not ask for food, water, or bathroom access. [Id., 103:19–23.] Soon after they left, though, Coffey had to use the restroom. He called out to people walking past for up to an hour, but no one would let him use the facilities, so he defecated on the floor. [Id., 105:1–106:3.] An officer finally came in and made Coffey clean up the defecation using a do-rag—all while handcuffed to the wall. [Id., 105:8–24.] After cleaning the room, Coffey fell asleep, and was awakened when he was transferred to another facility. [Id., 110:2–17.]
One of the arresting officers agreed on the general outlines of Coffey’s story, but differed on a few key details. According to Sergeant (then-Officer) Kravitz, he checked in on Coffey to ask
6

Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 330 Filed: 12/27/19 Page 7 of 36 PageID #:2466
“him if he was okay, if he needed anything,” to which Coffey said no. [Id., 125:8–24.] Kravitz apparently checked in on Coffey more than five times throughout the evening. [Id., 127:5–6.] On one of these occasions, Kravitz walked in to find that Coffey had defecated into his do-rag. [Id., 127:18–21.] Coffey told Kravitz that he did not need any help cleaning it up, and then Kravitz took Coffey to the restroom to clean himself off. [Id., 127:24–128:12.] According to Kravitz, Coffey had only been alone in the room for 30 to 45 minutes. [Id., 128:18.] Police records indicate that Coffey was brought into the 11th district stationhouse at 11:37 p.m., where he was quickly fingerprinted, photographed, and placed into lockup. [271-3 at 3].
Berry maintains that she was initially held in a bare interrogation room for two to three hours, during which time the officers stood outside laughing at her.5 [290-9, 57:6–10.] While Berry waited, she was not offered food, water, or the bathroom, but she also did not ask anyone for those facilities or services. [Id., 59:16–60:12]. Berry also concedes that she did not ask to call an attorney, her friends, or family. [Id., 104:5–19.] The officers did, however, allow Berry to make four external phone calls during which she explained she was in custody, but these calls were in service of the investigation—the interrogators wanted her help in tracking down firearms. [Id., 64:8–16, 104:20–105:7.] During one of these calls, Berry arranged with a friend to drop a gun off in an abandoned warehouse. [Id., 84:19–85:7.] Eventually, the officers realized that Coffey had been living at Berry’s house and wanted to search their shared bedroom for further evidence. [Id., 72:2–21, 77:7–22.]. She consented, and the officers uncovered a gym bag full of drugs, which they believed to be Coffey’s. [Id., 77:10–15; 75:10–76:11.] The officers then demanded that she help them find guns, so she led the police to the abandoned warehouse where her friend had deposited
5 Berry arrived at Homan Square at 5:20 p.m., [290-5], and her bedroom was searched at 7:39 p.m. [2908].
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Case: 1:13-cv-04531 Document #: 330 Filed: 12/27/19 Page 8 of 36 PageID #:2467
the firearm. [Id., 76:20–23; 93:19–24.] She was then let go, but the police took her back to Homan Square to retrieve her car. [Id., 97:23–98:3.]
Officer Iglesias has a slightly different story. He claims Berry was carrying 26 baggies of heroin when she was arrested. [290-3, 153:4–9, 260:7–19]; see also generally [290-6]. But after interviewing Berry, he became convinced that she was “a straight and narrow girl” who got “involved with the wrong guy,” and that Coffey was the true owner of the drugs. [290-3, 157:12– 23.] He claims that Berry was more forthcoming about Coffey’s drug dealing, and she volunteered that he kept additional drugs in her bedroom. [290-3, 143:3–21.] She was also asked about “typical homicides and stuff and anything type of illegal activity,” to which she replied that she knew “where gang members would store guns.” [290-3, 148:7–16.] Berry then signed a consent form allowing the officers to search her bedroom, after which they took her home and searched her bedroom for drugs. [290-3, 168:21–23.] The police found a gym bag containing thousands of dollars’ worth of drugs in Berry’s bedroom, and Berry then led the police to a location where they found a gang-related gun. [290-8 at 3; 290-3, 191:12–13.] According to Iglesias, rather than taking Berry back to Homan Square, the officers let her go on the scene. [290-9, 192:3–19.]
C. Motion for Class Certification The present motion is for class certification. In Plaintiff’s third amended complaint [202], Plaintiffs bring several claims, including one set of proposed classes regarding those subject to “secret arrest” [202, ¶¶ 105–24] and one set of proposed classes regarding those subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Homan Square [id., ¶¶ 125–39]. Individual plaintiffs have also brought claims against the City and individual officers regarding their individual experiences. See [id., ¶¶ 140–56.] The present motion for class certification only concerns the
8

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“secret arrest” classes, and not the conditions of confinement classes. See [270 at 2.] Specifically,
Plaintiffs ask to certify two related classes.:
Class I (Detainee and Arrestee Class): All natural persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present.6
Class II (Future Detainees and Arrestees Class): All persons who may in the future be subject to the secret arrests Described in Class One. [202, ¶ 117.]
In their reply, Plaintiffs propose narrowing the backward-looking class as follows:
Amended Class I (Detainee and Arrestee Class): All natural persons detained or transported for initial arrest processing by a Chicago Police Officer to the “nondistrict facility,” identified in General Order 06-01-01, Effective Date 11/12/15, as Homan Square, where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial arrest (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, beginning March 31, 2013 to the present. [305 at 10.]
Plaintiffs bring this secret arrest claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but do not describe
which specific constitutional right was violated. Compare [id., ¶ 105 (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
FOR SECRET ARRESTS”)], with [id., ¶ 125 (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM FOR DEPRIVATION
OF ADEQUATE ACCOMODATIONS IN VIOLATION OF 4TH AMENDMENT”)]. Plaintiffs
concede that almost all the known class members were ultimately booked in a CPD district
stationhouse, meaning that a public record of their arrest was eventually created—just not
immediately. See [271 at 11 (the extant list of known arrestees taken to Homan Square is “under
inclusive as it does not take into account those individuals who were not formally booked after
6 The proposed class definition in the motion for class certification is almost identical, except it included the wrong date. See [270 at 2.] The parties have agreed that the correct date from which to count backward two years is March 31, 2015. See [290 at 11]; [305 at 9].
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being taken to Homan Square because the data warehouse only maintains records for those arrests which generate a CB number, meaning formal charges were ultimately sought against the person and the person was booked at a District station.”) (citation omitted)].
To be clear, the only issue before the Court is whether the celerity with which Homan Square arrests were publicized can be adjudicated on a class-wide basis. Plaintiffs have not moved to certify, and the Court will therefore not consider, its proposed class regarding conditions of confinement at Homan Square. The Court also is not being asked to adjudicate Coffey’s or Berry’s individual allegations that their arrests were publicized too late, or any of the appalling individual allegations of mistreatment included in the complaint. II. Legal Standard
To be certified as a class action, a proposed class must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), as well as one of the three alternative requirements in Rule 23(b). Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). Rule 23(a) provides that a named party may sue on behalf of individuals who are similarly situated if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all putative class members is impracticable (“numerosity”); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the putative class (“commonality”); (3) the claims or defenses of the named party are typical of the claims or defenses of the putative class members (“typicality”); and (4) the named party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “[A] proposed class must always meet the Rule 23(a) requirements.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. “Because Rule 23(a) provides a gate-keeping function for all class actions, ordinarily [courts] begin there and only turn * * * to Rule 23(b) after [the court is] certain that all of Rule 23(a)’s requirements had been met.” Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 374 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Rule 23(b) sets forth four circumstances under which a class action may be maintained, two of which Plaintiffs rely on here: Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Rule 23(b)(3) permits class certification if: (1) questions of law or fact common to the members of the proposed class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members (“predominance”); and (2) a class action is superior to other available methods of resolving the controversy (“superiority”). Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. Moreover, the class must also meet Rule 23’s “implicit requirement of ‘ascertainability,’” meaning that the class is “defined clearly and based on objective criteria.” Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to class certification. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). Although class certification proceedings are not “a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits,” Messner, 669 F.3d at 811, for purposes of deciding the certification question, the Court does not presume that all well-pleaded allegations are true. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, before it allows a case to proceed as a class action, the Court “should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.” Id. at 676. “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). But the showing need not be “to a degree of absolute certainty. It is sufficient if each disputed requirement has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 811 (citation omitted). “[A] class should not
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be certified if it is apparent that it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant.” Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Management Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The Court exercises broad discretion in determining whether class certification is appropriate given the particular facts of the case. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998). III. Analysis
The Court proceeds as follows: First, the Court examines the threshold issue of which constitutional rights are at stake in a § 1983 action for “secret arrest.” Next, the Court considers the four Rule 23(a) factors. Finally, the Court turns to Rule 23(b)’s requirements.
A. Threshold Issues 1. Propriety of Instant Motion
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). As a “threshold inquiry” in any § 1983 suit, the Court must determine which “‘specific constitutional right’ [is] at issue.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Here, however, Plaintiffs have not addressed this threshold question, and instead identify it as a common question to be addressed on a class-wide basis. See [270, ¶4(d)]. They cite no authority suggesting that class certification is appropriate when the putative class sues under a vague cause of action, let alone that this warrants certification.
Thus, based on the briefing to date, the Court cannot even begin its analysis under Rule 23. For example, “[a]nalysis of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3),’ and thus of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), ‘begins * * * with the elements of the underlying cause of action.’” Boundas v.
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Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 413 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Messner, 669 F.3d at 815). Here, Plaintiffs do not spell out one of the elements of a § 1983 action—which civil right was violated. Plaintiffs’ motion thus turns the commonality analysis into a house of mirrors— to them, the key common question that underlies every class member’s case is…whether there is a common question that underlies every class member’s case.7 Likewise, because Plaintiffs do not define the nature of the constitutional injury, it is impossible to discern whether the named class members are typical or would adequately represent the proposed class. That is, the named Plaintiffs allege that their respective experiences at Homan Square were typical of those brought there—but they have not shown that their claims are typical. Thus, rather than shouldering their burden of demonstrating the class certification is warranted, Plaintiffs have saddled the Court with the task of filling in a three-dimensional matrix of constitutional tests, Rule 23 factors, and underlying facts.
2. The Fourth Amendment Is the Relevant Provision Nonetheless, the Court proceeds as if this motion were proper, and thus will attempt to determine which constitutional right is at issue. Indeed, as the “threshold inquiry” in any § 1983 suit, the Court must “‘identify the specific constitutional right’ at issue.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (plurality opinion)). In their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs propose three constitutional sources for the right to have one’s arrest publicized: the Fourth Amendment, freedom of speech, and the writ of habeas corpus. [270, ¶ 4(d).] In their opening brief, they do not cite a single case that directly supports any of those theories and ignore
7 It is not even clear that these questions are common to the class. Different constitutional provisions have different rules, tests, and standards; there is nothing to say that the contours of a habeas corpus claim, for example, will look the same as a Fourth Amendment claim. As such, resolving that there is, for example, a Fourth Amendment right to have one’s arrest publicized would do nothing for the class members who can only make out a habeas corpus claim, and visa versa.
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the First Amendment and habeas arguments altogether. See generally [271]. They do, however, describe the CPD practices at issue here as a “continuation” of a practice that the Seventh Circuit has held unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds. [271 at 2 (citing Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006).] In reply, however, Plaintiffs argue that the Fourth Amendment framework used in Lopez should not be used here. Compare Lopez, 464 F.3d at 722 (citing Fourth Amendment cases that require analyzing the length of detention at issue and the reasonableness of any delay), with [305 at 12 (“Plaintiffs’ issue is with the secrecy that surrounds the detention and interrogations of citizens arrested on warrantless arrests at Homan Square, not the time it took police officers to interrogate them.”)]. They aver that they meant to bring a freedom of association claim, but repeatedly cite freedom of the press cases elsewhere. See [305 at 8, 3–4]. They also seem to argue that there is a freestanding constitutional right to have one’s arrest publicized. [Id. at 2–4.]8
“The Fourth Amendment * * * establishes ‘the standards and procedures’ governing pretrial detention.’” Manuel, 137 S.Ct. at 920 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)). The Supreme Court recently reviewed its § 1983 jurisprudence as it applies to methods of arrest and pretrial detention and concluded that its precedents support using the Fourth Amendment as the constitutional framework in these cases. Id. at 917–19 (discussing Gerstein and the various opinions in Albright). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the established
8 This confusion bleeds into Plaintiffs’ description of when a “secret arrest” becomes a constitutional violation. In some places, Plaintiffs argue that any lapse between arrest and publicization is unconstitutional [305 at 12 (“Any person arrested and taken to Homan Square, not pursuant to a warrant, was subject to the same unconstitutional practice (subject to a secret arrest), no matter the length of detention.”)]. Elsewhere they seemingly concede that some delays in publicization are reasonable [305 at 10 (defining the putative class to exclude those whose arrests were publicized “within a reasonable amount of time from the initial arrest”)]; [270, ¶ 4(a) (scoping the right to be publicization “within a reasonable time”). Finally, they cite dicta in cases that, to the extent that they are relevant, imply that there is no harm if the arrest is publicized eventually—even if it is well after the arrest and detention occurred [305 at 2–4].
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Fourth Amendment framework governing post-arrest procedures is designed to ferret out “secret detention.” See Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009) (discussing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). This case concerns how arrestees are treated immediately following detention. As such, the Court follows the Supreme Court’s guidance and will analyze this putative class action under a Fourth Amendment framework.
The Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. First, they argue that this should be analyzed as a First Amendment or habeas corpus case. But they provide no citations that indicate what these provisions have to say about an arrestee’s rights. Plaintiffs do cite a preGerstein case about convicted prisoners’ (qualified) First Amendment right to associate with counsel and loved ones. See [305 at 9 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974))]. But even assuming that the exact same legal standards applied to recent arrestees and people incarcerated in prison following conviction, and even assuming that Procunier required that prisoners be given instant access to any external contacts, Procunier was overruled and the Supreme Court now mandates using a “reasonableness” framework, which is the precise standard that is used in the Fourth Amendment context. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989).9 In any event, arrestees’ ability to contact the outside world is governed by the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Chortek, 356 F.3d, 740, 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2004) (analyzing whether the police violated the Constitution by holding arrestees incommunicado under a Fourth Amendment framework); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421–22, 425 (1986) (suggesting that
9 As explained below in Section III(B)(1), delays in booking an arrestee are judged considering their reasonableness under the circumstances. Because these are fact intensive, case-by-case determinations, the putative class fails the commonality prong. The same analysis would obtain under Abbott’s reasonableness framework, which required remand to the district court to determine the reasonableness of prison regulations limiting written material imported to the prison “as applied to each of the 46 publications” at issue in the litigation. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 419; see also Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1996)) (upholding jailor’s refusal of pre-trial detainee’s use of telephone).
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arrestees have no right to be informed that their attorneys are trying to contact them). The Court is also at a loss as to what argument Plaintiffs are trying to make about habeas corpus, but so-called Gerstein hearings (which are required by the Fourth Amendment) are thought to provide the first line of judicial review before a writ of habeas corpus. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 115.
Plaintiffs also cite to a variety of cases that they claim establish a freestanding constitutional right to have one’s arrest publicized. Their authorities are not on point, certainly as applied to the rights of individuals within hours of their arrest. First, Plaintiffs cite to several cases brought in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. See [305 at 2–4 (citing Center for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D. D.C. 2002); In re Application of U.S. for Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 364)]. In Nat. Sec. Studies, a district court held that federal statutes required the Department of Justice to furnish the names of people detained indefinitely on the suspicion of terrorist activity. Id. at 100 (discussing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552). Plaintiffs fail to mention that the district court went on to hold that the First Amendment does not require the government to furnish the date of arrest or location of detention. Id. at 111. Even the court’s limited statutory holding, however, was overturned on appeal. Center for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003). And In re Application of U.S. is further afield. In that case, the government detained a suspected 9/11 accomplice for ten days to secure his testimony before a grand jury. Id. at 359. During that time, he falsely confessed, which seemingly justified a longer detention. Id. After the false confession was brought to light, the New York Times and the detainee sought to unseal the grand jury proceedings, which the district court refused to do. Id. at 363–64. Plaintiffs cite to another case regarding the detention of a material witness in which the district court also refused to release the name of that witness. See [305 at 3 (quoting In re Grand Jury Material Witness
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Detention, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (D. Or. 2003)]. Even assuming these cases were relevant, Plaintiffs have not shown how any of these cases should apply to the putative class, which is almost entirely composed of people who ultimately did have a public record of their arrest created. See [271 at 11].
Next, Plaintiffs cite dicta from McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). Although McNabb strongly condemned secret arrests and lengthy, incommunicado interrogations, the Supreme Court did not announce a constitutional rule in that case—rather, it reached its holding (that a confession following a lengthy, incommunicado interrogation must be suppressed) under its “supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts.” McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341; id. at 340 (“In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary to reach the Constitutional issue pressed upon us.”); see also Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449, 451–54 (1957) (explaining how Congress’s adoption of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 clarified the McNabb rule). Congress later statutorily narrowed this doctrine, giving law enforcement officers a 6-hour safe harbor to interrogate suspects incommunicado before presentment to a magistrate—and even then, the trial court may still discretionarily admit a confession extracted more than six hours after arrest. Corley, 556 U.S. at 311, 314–15, 322 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)); see also United States v. Abu Khatallah, 275 F. Supp. 3d 32, 52 (D. D.C. 2017) (discussing the evolution of the McNabbMallory doctrine, and finding that a 13-hour delay in presentment was reasonable). All of this to say that the modern iteration of the McNabb-Mallory doctrine tolerates incommunicado interrogations of the sort at issue in the instant case and never announced a constitutional rule that would have supported a § 1983 tort suit in the first place.
Plaintiffs go on to cite cases about the freedom of the press, arguing that these create a right in having one’s arrest publicized. [305 at 3–4.] Preliminarily, Plaintiffs do not actually advance a
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freedom of the press theory. See, e.g., [270, ¶ 4(d).] The cases they cite concern the press’s freedom to obtain information about the government, not individuals’ rights to have their information publicized. In fact, the parties have not briefed whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring such a claim and, if so, whether class certification is appropriate.
Regardless, the Supreme Court has held that the press’s constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings does not extend to all aspects of criminal justice processing, particularly when the press’s rights abut suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights. E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612–613 (1999). Thus, whatever First Amendment right the press has in obtaining information regarding criminal trials must be balanced against arrestees’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights. See American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 750 F.3d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have regularly concluded that individuals have a strong interest in avoiding disclosure of their involvement in alleged criminal activity.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also generally Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a Right, In Need of a Rule, 64 Md. L. Rev 755 (2005) (reviewing legal and policy considerations and suggesting model legislation to prevent disclosure of arrestees’ identities); cf. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding video-stream of pretrial detainees unconstitutional); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding staged perp walk unconstitutional).
Plaintiffs’ strongest dicta regarding secret arrests comes from Morrow v. D.C., 417 F.2d 728, 741–42 (D.C. Cir 1969). See also [305 at 2 (quoting same)]. The procedural posture of that case is complicated, but, in broad brushstrokes, the D.C. Circuit was asked to assess whether a statute allowed somebody’s arrest record to be expunged. Id. at 730–31. Although the D.C. Circuit did not ultimately decide that question, it opined in dicta about the policy considerations that weigh in favor of and against publicization of arrest information. Id. at 741–43. As Plaintiffs note, statutes
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generally require “that arrest books be open to the public [] to prevent any ‘secret arrests,’ a concept odious to a democratic society.”10 Id. at 741-42; see also [305 at 2–3 (citing same)]. But, suspects typically do not want their respective arrests publicized, because disclosure of this embarrassing information can hurt their employment prospects. Id. at 742. In any event, Morrow did include any holding regarding publicizing arrests and was not even a constitutional case to begin with. Id. at 741.
B. Rule 23(a) Factors Even if the Court were to find the instant motion for class certification cognizable, the motion fails to meet the necessary four factors in a Rule 23 class action: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. The parties do not dispute that the numerosity prong is met. See [290 at 10].
1. Commonality For a class to be certified, questions of law or fact must exist common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Only one common question is necessary to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359 (“We quite agree that for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will do.” (cleaned up)); Walker v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 2007 WL 2903180, *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2007) (“Not all factual or legal questions raised in a lawsuit need be common so long as a single issue is common to all class members.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, superficial common questions—like whether each class member shares a characteristic or “suffered a violation of the same provision of law”—are not
10 The “arrest books” at issue were not the contemporaneously updated, searchable public database for which Plaintiffs advocate. Rather, the District kept a paper records system at a central location that compiled arrest records after they had been completed. Id. at 741.
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enough. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350).
“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). Plaintiffs must show that “their claims can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention * * *. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 350. “‘If, to make a prima facie showing on a given question, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, then it is an individual question. If the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing, then it becomes a common question.’” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (common questions exist where “the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” (citation omitted)).
“‘Analysis of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3),’ and thus of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), ‘begins * * * with the elements of the underlying cause of action.’” Boundas, 280 F.R.D. at 413 (quoting Messner, 669 F.3d at 815). As such, the Court must review Fourth Amendment doctrine. “‘[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of post-arrest detention, a suspect must promptly be brought before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause. Gerstein,
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420 U.S. at 125. But the Supreme Court also acknowledged the difficulties police officers may have in trying to “cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system,” and established a presumption shifting framework, whereby if a suspect is brought before a magistrate within 48 hours, the post-arrest process was presumptively reasonable, whereas if the delay was greater than 48 hours, it was presumptively unreasonable. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53, 56; see also Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that notwithstanding McLaughlin’s presumptions, individual determinations are required in every case). Unreasonable delays in criminal justice processing within that 48-hour window may include “delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.”11 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
In this circuit, delays in individual steps of post-arrest processing may be actionable as a Fourth Amendment violation, but that, in turn, depends on the “reasonableness” of the officer’s actions. E.g., Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747–48 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that delaying processing arrestees’ paperwork and resultingly detaining arrestees incommunicado for up to 14 and a half hours was justifiable, but requiring explanation for delay); Arlotta v. Bradley Center, 349 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that police policy of delaying formal booking for two hours for police convenience was justifiable); Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 437 (clarifying that a delay of “four hours requires explanation”); see also Portis, 613 F.3d at 704 (discussing the interplay between McLaughlin’s 48-hour presumption shifting framework and Chortek and Gramenos’s requirements of “an explanation for extended delay”). Which is to say,
11 Notably, delays for the purpose of gathering evidence of unrelated crimes is not per se unreasonable. 21

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each allegedly unreasonable detention must be evaluated in light of the specifics of what happened and the officer’s justification for delay.
The Seventh Circuit has parsed the intersection between the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard and Rule 23’s commonality requirement in several recent cases. First, the Seventh Circuit examined a putative class comprised of people who had been arrested for fineonly offenses who complained that they were held in police stationhouses for an unreasonably long period of time. See generally Portis, 613 F.3d 702. The district court certified the class and held that a delay of two hours from booking to release constituted a per se unreasonable delay. Id. at 703. The Seventh Circuit decertified the class, explaining that what constitutes a reasonable time to release is necessarily fact intensive; for example, officers may be “tied up with more urgent matters (a riot starts, for example, or a group of youngsters is arrested, and juveniles’ higher processing priority delays the handling of adult cases).” Id. at 705, 704. Moreover, “[t]he premise of [] class certification is that one rule applies to all members,” making bright-line determinations about what is a reasonable amount of time generally inappropriate; reasonableness is a standard that must be considered individually. Id. at 705; see also Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2009).12 Portis left the door open, however, for classes seeking to litigate “a policy of deliberate delay.” Portis, 613 F.3d at 705 (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 59).
Picking up on this thread, the Seventh Circuit recently certified a class of people who asserted that they were subject to such a policy of delay. See generally Driver v. Marion County Sheriff, 859 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2017). The class was “composed of persons for whom legal
12 Admittedly, both Harper and Portis analyzed Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance standard, rather than Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. The Seventh Circuit has subsequently clarified that “both cases made clear that a question about the length of detention could not be common to the class,” and used the logic of those cases to decertify a class as lacking commonality. Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541, 555–56 & n.34 (7th Cir. 2016).
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authority for detention has ceased, whether by acquittal after trial, release on recognizance bond,
completion of jail time in the sentence, or otherwise.” Id. at 491. The county, though, had a policy
of detaining arrestees for an additional 72 hours after any legal basis for detention abated. Id.
Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence showed that processing a detainee for release was
substantially less time-consuming than booking an arrestee in the first place—that is, the 48-hour
presumptive maximum discussed in McLaughlin is exponentially more time than necessary to
process release. Id. at 491–92. The panel concluded that class certification was appropriate because
“[a]t some point well short of the 24-plus hours alleged here, there is no reason to believe that
individual issues would account for that delay.” Id. at 492. In other words, the 72-hour policy
definitionally “caused [class members] to be detained for an unconstitutionally-unreasonable
length of time” and thus constituted “a policy of deliberate delay.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).13 Because all the class-members were subject to the same policy, and that
policy was so far beyond the bounds of reasonableness, their cases would not need to be bogged
down in the specifics of each individual detention.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that there is an issue common to the class. They propose two14 common questions of fact: (1) “Whether CPD policy and use of facilities other
13 Policies that explicitly delay the booking process—including the creation of a public record of arrest— are not necessarily per se Fourth Amendment violations. See Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523 (holding that a policy of detaining arrestees in a police van for one to two hours was not actionable, because the police adequately justified said policy). Perhaps what distinguishes Driver is simply that the policy and practice of detaining people with no legal basis for days on end, when it should take no more than a couple hours to release them, is so outrageous to be unjustifiable. Cf. Otero v. Dart, 301 F.R.D. 276, 281–82 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (Otero I) (suggesting, in a pre-Driver case, that “overdetention-plus” claims may be amenable to class litigation, but expressing skepticism that they can be brought when the law enforcement officer’s reasonableness is at issue). 14 Plaintiffs submit two other supposedly common questions: (1) “Whether the failure to make a public record of the detention and arrest of an individual within a reasonable time violates constitutional rights” and (2) which constitutional right(s) guarantee the right to publicization. [270, ¶ 4(a)&(d).] As explained above, these questions cannot underlie the commonality inquiry. See supra Section III(A)(1). In any event, these proposed questions boil down to whether Plaintiffs suffered the same constitutional injury, but the
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than district Police Stations allows CPD to detain citizens for prolonged periods of time, incommunicado” and (2) “Whether there is a custom of practice within the CPD of misusing facilities like Homan Square.” These questions are not common to the class in that answering them will not “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. Preliminarily, Plaintiffs’ questions would merely resolve that CPD policies were susceptible to manipulation. But whether CPD’s Homan Square policies are more susceptible to surreptitious delay would not resolve whether any given detention was unconstitutional.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have demonstrated neither that there is some point at which delays in publicization are per se unreasonable nor that the CPD had a policy of deliberate delay actionable under Driver. As explained above, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly found that delays in bringing a suspect in for booking (and thus publicizing the arrest) must be subject to inquiries as to the reasonableness of the actions and justifications for delay. Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747; Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523; see also Portis, 613 F.3d at 704; McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55 (explaining that numerous contingencies can delay criminal justice processing). Indeed, Arlotta even upheld a policy of deliberately delaying booking (and thus publicization) for up to two hours because such delays were convenient to arresting officers. Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523. And Chortek clarified that even upon booking, the police could hold arrestees incommunicado for up to 14 and a half hours, so long as their delays in processing were justifiable or reasonable. Chortek, 356 F.3d at 744, 747. These cases provide no basis for determining that delaying publicization for one hour [proposed
common question cannot be whether Plaintiffs “suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350). Moreover, determining whether the Constitution forbids unreasonably delayed publicization does not necessarily resolve a core issue of all the putative class members’ claims. That is, whether the question is actually common to all the class members turns on whether each class member was treated reasonably, which cannot be resolved on a class-wide basis.
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class definition]; two to three hours [Berry’s timeline]; or six hours [Coffey’s timeline] is so
lengthy that it is necessarily unreasonable. This case thus does not fall within the narrow exception
laid out in Driver allowing a class action to go forward when a county had an explicit policy of
holding people without legal basis for days on end. See Driver, 859 F.3d at 492; see also Otero v.
Dart, 306 F.R.D. 197, 203–04 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Otero II) (explaining that following Portis and
Harper, Fourth Amendment classes based on delay generally lack commonality). Indeed, Plaintiffs
have done nothing to rebut the extensive testimony that being initially detained at Homan Square
may expedite various aspects of booking, including the creation of the initial arrest record. [290-2
at 265:24–266:12, 279:20–280:16]; [290-4 at 235:17–24, 318:4–18].15 In other words, Plaintiffs
have not carried their burden in showing that should such a policy exist, it is so unreasonable that
individualized factors need not be considered.16 To the contrary, it appears that the Court may need
15 To be clear, at this stage, the Court need not determine whether these statements are true on a class-wide or individual basis. Rather, Gramenos and Chortek allow law enforcement defendants to justify delays, and this justification would be at issue in many if not all of putative class members’ cases. 16 Plaintiffs attempt to analogize the instant case to Dunn v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 2005) in which a class of people detained in interrogation rooms for too long was certified. [271 at 12–13.] In Dunn, the plaintiffs alleged that the interrogation rooms were “inherently unfit for human occupancy for more than a few hours” because they lacked basic amenities, including a toilet or bed. Dunn, 231 F.R.D. at 373. The class definition was significantly narrower than that, encompassing people who spent most of the day—more than 16 hours—in an interrogation room. Id. at 371. The court reasoned that even if some people were treated better than others during those 16 hours, that baseline of time spent in an unadorned interrogation room is always beyond the pale. Dunn is a far cry from the case at bar: That case was solely about the amenities provided in interrogation rooms, not with how long it takes to generate a public record. Id. Moreover, Dunn is quite similar to Driver: keeping an arrestee in a room that is inherently unfit for human occupancy for upwards of 16 hours a day is so far beyond reasonableness that individual circumstances cannot explain any delay. In any event, to the extent that Dunn is analogous to the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Harper, Portis, and Driver (let alone the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart) have subsequently provided greater clarity into the contours of commonality. See Otero I, 301 F.R.D. at 281 (viewing district court opinions that predated Harper and Portis skeptically); cf. also Dunn, 231 F.R.D. at 372, 376 (approvingly citing the district court’s (subsequently reversed) class certification in Portis v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279 (N.D. Ill. September 8, 2003), for the legal standard for classifying Fourth Amendment classes).
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to examine the details of every Homan Square detention to determine whether taking a particular arrestee to Homan Square was justifiable.
Even if the Court were certify this class and find on the merits that there is a city-wide policy of interrogating people at Homan Square, that does not make out the prima facie case for a deprivation of civil rights under § 1983. Each plaintiff will have to show not only that their detention delayed formal processing and not only that the announcement of their arrest was delayed—but also that all of these delays and any associated decisions were unreasonable. Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523. Based on Plaintiffs’ submission, the Court concludes that none of these questions can be addressed commonly.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary miss the mark. First, Plaintiffs seem to argue that any period of secrecy—no matter how brief—is a per se constitutional violation, and thus class treatment is appropriate. [305 at 12 (“Plaintiffs’ issue is with the secrecy that surrounds the detention and interrogations of citizens arrested on warrantless arrests at Homan Square, not the time it took police officers to interrogate them.”)] But this flies in the face of the explicit holdings of Arlotta and Chortek, which explained, respectively, that detaining an arrestees for hours before bringing them in for booking can be justified, and arrestees can be held incommunicado for hours if the delay in processing is due to an administrative backlog. Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523; Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747. In other words, when faced with a nearly identical legal question, the Seventh Circuit refused to establish a per se rule that booking (and thus publicization) must occur immediately—instead, the constitutionality of any given delay turns on its reasonableness. Thus, under Portis, class certification would be inappropriate. Portis, 613 F.3d at 705.
Next, Plaintiffs advocate “bifurcating liability and damage trials” or otherwise separating liability from damages calculation. [271 at 13 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376
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F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2004)).] This argument is beside the point, as liability will also have to be determined on an individualized basis. See id. That is, before the Court can proceed to individual damages trials, it will have to determine whether any given delay in booking and processing was reasonable, which must also be done on an individualized basis. The “members of [the] proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member,” meaning there is no common question of liability that can be expeditiously bifurcated. Messner, 669 F.3d at 815.
Plaintiffs’ citations to cases regarding blanket policies are inapposite. They claim that “[a]llegations of a policy or a widespread practice affecting members of a putative class are usually sufficient” to satisfy commonality.17 [271 at 12 (citing Keele, 149 F.3d at 594.] But the underlying liability determination in Keele did not require individualized reasonableness inquiries—the putative class was comprised of people who had received a form letter that was allegedly sent in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See Keele, 149 F.3d at 594. And, in any event, Keele required that the class members’ suits all derive from a “common nucleus” of fact, which was obviously satisfied by the content of the form letter. Id. Here, there is no common nucleus of fact, because the Court must examine each detention on a case-by-case basis to determine (1) what happened and (2) whether it was reasonable. The allegation that there is a widespread practice is not enough to show that (1) every class member was affected by it and (2) it was always unreasonable. Compare Portis v. City of Chicago, 621 F.Supp.2d 608, 620 (N.D. Ill 2008) (concluding that CPD had “practice” of unconstitutionally delaying release), with Portis, 613 F.3d at 705 (decertifying class because the practice may be justifiable on a case-by-case basis); see also Otero I, 301 F.R.D. at 282–83 (refusing to certify Fourth Amendment class when all putative class
17 It is worth noting that the widespread practice of the CPD was not to take people to Homan Square. In fact, Plaintiffs concede that CPD officers “typically bring arrestees” to stationhouses. [271 at 2.] Thus, every putative class-member will have to contend with the threshold question of why he or she was treated differently than typical arrestees in the first place—that is, why the usual practice did not apply to them.
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members were subject to the same policy, but the alleged injury caused by the policy was unreasonable delay); cf. Van v. Ford Motor Company, 332 F.R.D. 249, 275–76 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
2. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Claims of class representatives and class members are typical if they arise from the same practice or course of conduct and are based on the same legal theory. Keele, 149 F.3d at 595. Typicality and commonality are closely related. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). “Typical does not mean identical, and the typicality requirement is liberally construed.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Typicality ensures that the claims of the class representatives have the “same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here must be enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011). Representative class members fail the typicality prong when the class “contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant.” Van, 332 F.R.D at 280 (quoting Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677–78). Preliminarily, Plaintiffs fail the typicality prong for the same reason that they fail the commonality prong: They have not defined what constitutes an unreasonable delay in publicizing arrest, and therefore have given the Court little to go on by way of what constitutes a “typical” unreasonable delay. Likewise, the differences in Coffey’s and Berry’s treatment suggests that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the types of processing steps taken at Homan Square. The fact that there are so many individualized contingencies—the identities of the arresting officers, the
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identities of the interrogators, the length of detention, whether the arrestee was allowed to contact anyone on the outside, and the reasons for being taken to Homan Square in the first place—mean that it is almost impossible to establish a baseline of typicality. See Van, 332 F.R.D. 281 (explaining that class fails typicality prong where there is a “wide range of allegations at issue” and “putative class-members’ claims depend on exposure to differing conduct”). Likewise, Plaintiffs advocate a deliberately over-inclusive class definition, including anyone whose arrest was not publicized within an hour, despite the fact that Arlotta held a two-hour delay to be reasonable. Arlotta, 349 F.3d at 523. Based on that proposed class definition, the named Plaintiffs are atypical and the class likely “contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant.” Van, 332 F.R.D. at 281 (quoting Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677–78).
Berry’s experience is also far from the “secret” “incommunicado” interrogation that forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ putative constitutional claim. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification says that Berry’s claim is typical because she was “prevented from communicating with attorneys, family members, or others about [her] detainment and arrest.” [270, ¶ 6.] But Berry conceded that she was allowed to call externally four times, alerting each call recipient of the fact that she had been arrested and detained. [290-9, 64:8–16, 104:20–105:7.] Likewise, Berry was not “prevented” from communicating with anyone; she admitted that she did not ask to speak with an attorney or otherwise call her friends or family. [Id., 104:5–19.] Berry’s experience was therefore highly atypical on the single criterion of typicality that Plaintiffs have laid out.
It is unclear to what extent Coffey’s injury can be said to be typical. At some points, Plaintiffs imply (through their citations) that eventual publication satisfies any law prohibiting secret arrests. See [305 at 2–4 (citing, e.g., Morrow, 417 F.2d at 741 (discussing a central hardcopy police filing system that records the progress of each arrest after it happens); Center for Nat.
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Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (recognizing that FOIA requests call for “a particularized and focused inquiry” before turning over requested information); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis.2d 417, 427 (1979) (explaining that Wisconsin statute that required disclosure of public records allowed data custodian to deliberate about whether to furnish a “Daily Arrest List”)]. If that is Plaintiff’s ultimate theory, then Coffey did not suffer a typical injury in that a public record of his arrest was, in fact, created. See generally [271-3].
3. Adequacy Given that the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately support the commonality or typicality prongs, the Court need not delve too deeply into adequacy. Briefly, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). For the adequacy requirement to be satisfied, the claims and interests of the named Plaintiffs must not conflict with those of the class, the class representatives must have sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, and class counsel must be experienced and competent. Retired Chicago Police Ass’n, 7 F.3d at 598. The class representatives have not demonstrated that they are adequate; in fact, they may have interests that conflict with those of the class. Their Fourth Amendment theory appears to be that their arrests should have been publicized more broadly. But many arrestees do not want a public record of their arrest to live on. Morrow, 417 F.2d at 742; Reza, Privacy at 762 (“Indeed, the privacy interest of a person accused or suspected of crime—her interest in avoiding the social, professional, emotional, and other harms that attend being named as a possible criminal—is arguably most pressing, and the need for protection accordingly greatest, * * * at the moment when police routinely identify alleged wrongdoers to the public: upon arrest, accusation, or initial suspicion.”). With the advent of the Internet, these concerns are even more pronounced. See ACLU,
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F.3d at 941 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“In today’s echo chamber of big data, metadata, and the Internet, the once wholly forgotten memory of some unsavory, minimally broadcast misdeed is resurrected for global consumption.”). A fortiori, those who were taken to Homan Square and never booked—i.e., those for whom probable cause did not exist or who confidentially informed on third parties—have even greater privacy interests. E.g., [271-1, 41:13–20] (describing confidential informants’ greater privacy interests). Plaintiffs even acknowledge that “many of the class members will fear bringing claims on their own to assert their rights.” [270, ¶ 7.] Plaintiffs’ demands that the CPD create and promulgate arrest records clearly conflicts with these class members’ interests.
Also, Coffey has not demonstrated his adequacy as a named Plaintiff. In addition to bringing this claim for “secret arrest,” he also has a bevy of more established state and federal law claims related to his detention, including unconstitutional conditions of confinement, excessive force, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [202, ¶¶125–52.] In his deposition, when asked about the secret arrest claim, he admitted that he did not talk to his family about whether they even tried to locate him. [290-10, 137:9:23.] Instead, he focused his answers on the distress and embarrassment he felt after his appalling alleged ordeal. E.g., [Id., 131:7–132:4]. Coffey’s focus on his individual claims and laissez faire attitude toward the secret arrest claim suggest that he is not sufficiently interested in the outcome of this claim and that he would not adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.
C. 23(b) Classes For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy several of the class prerequisites required by 23(a), and therefore the Court need not determine whether either of Plaintiffs’ proposed classes meet the respective requirements of Rule 23(b). Even if Plaintiffs met
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the 23(a) prerequisites, however, they do not meet the requirements of either a 23(b)(2) (“injunctive”) class or a 23(b)(c) (“damages”) class.
1. 23(b)(2) Injunctive Class A Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Preliminarily, Plaintiffs do not support their injunctive class, Class II, at all in their opening brief and support it only cursorily in their reply. [305 at 15.] But Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing why class treatment is appropriate; in failing to advocate for an injunctive class, they have not met that burden. See Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513. Even if they had properly advocated for an injunctive class, the proposed Class II cannot be certified. “By virtue of its requirement that the plaintiffs seek to redress a common injury properly addressed by a class-wide injunctive or declaratory remedy, Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.” Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 139, AFL-CIO, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the proposed forward-looking class-members have divergent and heterogenous interests. As Plaintiffs concede, those who are arrested and taken to Homan Square may be (1) formally charged with a crime and transferred to a stationhouse (such as Coffey) or (2) released without having their arrest publicized or charges filed (such as Berry). The Plaintiffs proposed class would pit these two potential classes against each other. Plaintiffs seem to believe that timelier initiation of formal arrest procedures, and the publicization thereof, would benefit those who are ultimately formally
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charged. However, those who are not charged may appreciate that their detentions (which do not lead to booking or charging) are not publicized. Morrow, 417 F.2d at 742; Reza, Privacy at 762; cf. ACLU, 750 F.3d at 437–39. Unfortunately, the Court cannot determine ex ante whether any given future suspect would prefer to be formally and publicly processed, or to not have a public record of arrest created at all. Because Class II lacks cohesive interests, it cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
2. 23(b)(3) Class In order for a class to be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), class issues must predominate over individual ones, and the class action mechanism must be superior to alternatives. Although related to the commonality requirement, “the predominance criterion is far more demanding.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997). It requires “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. Plaintiffs satisfy predominance requirement only if they can show that “ ‘common questions represent a significant aspect of [a] case and * * * can be resolved for all members of [a] class in a single adjudication.’ ” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently explained, “[t]he predominance inquiry ‘asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the noncommon, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’ ” Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (citation omitted). “When ‘one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though
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other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Preliminarily, if the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the commonality requirement, then they have likewise failed the “more demanding” standard for predominance. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624. But even if Plaintiffs had properly shown that there is a common question amongst class members, that common question would not predominate. If (1) CPD had a blanket policy of taking people to Homan Square, and (2) that policy had the effect of delaying publicization of arrest and other booking steps, the class mechanism would not be aggregation-enabling in this case, because the Court still would have to delve into the circumstances of each arrest to see how the policy was carried out and whether it was reasonable. Portis, 613 F.3d at 705; Harper, 581 F.3d at 516. The Court would need to examine on an individual basis the timing of each arrest, the pre-booking steps the officers took, the available alternatives at the time, and the justification for using Homan Square as opposed to any available alternative. See id; see also Otero I, 301 F.R.D. at 283. Individual issues will predominate if the Court is forced to hold mini-trials to determine the CPD’s liability with regard to each arrestee. See Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 662; Van, 2019 WL 3976370 at *27 (explaining that individual issues predominate when “hundreds (if not thousands) of individual hearings still would be necessary to resolve the remaining elements” of plaintiffs’ claims, even if a common question is answered class-wide).
Finally, a class action is “the superior method for managing litigation if no realistic alternative exists.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1996). “A central question” for evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement is the issue of “manageability.” Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., Ltd., 204 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (noting that “the likely difficulties in
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managing a class action” are a pertinent consideration). But, a “class action is superior where potential damages may be too insignificant to provide class members with incentive to pursue a claim individually.” Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the class action is superior to individual lawsuits. Here, a realistic alternative exists: To the extent that Plaintiffs want to expose the allegedly unconstitutional practices of Homan Square, see [290-9, 119:1–21], the “desire to prove the existence and illegality of the * * * practice can be satisfied in an individual suit without the management issues of a class action.” Harper, 581 F.3d at 516. For example, Coffey already is litigating the circumstances of his arrest and detention; “[i]t would be better to litigate” his secret arrest claim with his “other individual claims.” See id.; see also [202, ¶¶125–56.] Moreover, litigating the secret arrest claim as a class action would be unmanageable—as explained above, the Court would have to delve into the circumstances surrounding thousands of years-old arrests. See Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F.R.D. 424, 439 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying motion for class certification because the need to conduct thousands of individual determinations “would render [the] case totally unmanageable as a class action”). Indeed, for this reason, class treatment would be inappropriate even if each individual’s damages are slight. Any benefit to aggregation would be negated by the fact-intensive (i.e., expensive-to-litigate) nature of each individual claim. IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [270]. This case is set for further status hearing on January 16, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.
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Dated: December 27, 2019

____________________________ Robert M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge

36

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 1 of 38
CASREF,CUMMINGS,PROTO
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−04531

Perez v. City of Chicago, et al. Assigned to: Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr Referred to: Honorable Jeffrey Cummings Demand: $1,000,000 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/20/2013 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Angel Perez individually

represented by Daniel A. Edelman Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC 20 South Clark Street Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 739−4200 Email: courtecl@edcombs.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY

Dennis John DeCaro Kupets & De Caro, P.C. 77 W. Washington Street 20th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 372−4444 Email: djd0089@aol.com TERMINATED: 12/17/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Jason R. Epstein Law Offices of Jason Epstein 190 S. LaSalle Ste. 2100 Chicago, IL 60603 312 869−2603 Email: krime@kriminaldefense.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon F Erickson Erickson & Oppenheimer, Ltd. 223 W. Jackson Blvd Suite 200 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 327−3370 Email: jon@eolawus.com TERMINATED: 02/14/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott T. Kamin Law Offices of Scott T. Kamin 53 W. Jackson #1057 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 307−8848 Email: scotttkamin@aol.com TERMINATED: 07/18/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY

Anthony William Hill

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 2 of 38
Law Offices of Anthony W. Hill 53 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 660 Chicago, IL 60604 312−882−8004 Email: ahill@crimlawchicago.com TERMINATED: 07/18/2019
Cassandra P. Miller Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC 20 South Clark Street Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 739−4200 Email: cmiller@edcombs.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2017
Cathleen M. Combs Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC 20 South Clark Street Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 739−4200 Email: ccombs@edcombs.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2017
James O. Latturner Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC 20 South Clark Street Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 739−4200 Email: jlatturner@edcombs.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2017
Michael D. Oppenheimer Erickson & Oppenheimer, Ltd. 223 W. Jackson Blvd Suite 200 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 327−3370 Email: michael@eolawus.com TERMINATED: 02/14/2014
Michelle A. Alyea Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, Llc 20 S. Clark St. Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 739−4200 Email: malyea@edcombs.com TERMINATED: 02/01/2017
Phillip Aaron Brigham Law Office Of Phillip Brigham, Llc 53 West Jackson Suite 1128 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 360−1722 Email: pbrigham@phillipbrighamlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 3 of 38

Plaintiff Jose Martinez
Plaintiff Juanita Berry
Plaintiff Calvin Coffey on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated
Plaintiff Estephanie Martinez on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated

Ronak P. Maisuria Erickson & Oppenheimer, Ltd. 223 W. Jackson Blvd Suite 200 Chicago, IL 60606 312−327−3370 Email: ronak@eolawus.com TERMINATED: 02/14/2014
represented by Jose Martinez PRO SE
Scott T. Kamin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/18/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle A. Alyea (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/24/2018
represented by Scott T. Kamin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/18/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle A. Alyea (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/24/2018
Cassandra P. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott T. Kamin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/18/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle A. Alyea (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/24/2018
Cassandra P. Miller (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Estephanie Martinez PRO SE
Scott T. Kamin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/18/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Michelle A. Alyea (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 4 of 38 TERMINATED: 07/24/2018

V. Defendant City of Chicago

represented by Iris Y. Chavira City Of Chicago Department Of Law 30 N. Lasalle Street, Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9602 Email: iris.chavira@cityofchicago.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−1975 Email: Jason.Marx@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 09/30/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Kathryn M. Doi Daley Mohan Groble, P.C. 55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 1600 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 422−5883 Email: kdoi@daleymohan.com TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle St. Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 742−6423 Email: lindsay.gowin@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Bret Anthony Kabacinski City of Chicago Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle St. Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 312−742−1842 Email: bret.kabacinski@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli Jackson Lewis P.C. 150 N. Michigan, Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 787−4949 Email: jonathan.cifonelli@jacksonlewis.com TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jorge V. Cazares Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 155 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 5 of 38

Defendant
Edmund Zablocki Chicago Police Officer, Star #7505

(312) 704−3000 Email: jcazares@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman Office of the Cook County Sheriff 50 W. Washington Street, Room 704 Chicago, IL 60602 312−603−5473 Email: khara.coleman@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 768−7800 Email: rsteiner@pjjlaw.com TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Robin Denise Shoffner Nathan & Kamionski LLP 33 West Monroe, Suite 1830 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 612−1086 Email: rshoffner@nklawllp.com TERMINATED: 12/02/2014
Walter Jones , Jr. Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601−2700 (312) 768−7800 Email: wjones@pjjlaw.com TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Gregory M. Beck City Of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 742−5146 Email: gregory.beck@cityofchicago.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford City Of Chicago 30 N. Lasalle St. Ste. 1040 Chicago, IL 60602

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 6 of 38

Defendant
Joseph Wagner Chicago Police Officer, Star # 9812 TERMINATED: 05/01/2019

(312) 742−5113 Email: elizabeth.hanford@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jordan F Yurchich City Of Chicago, Department Of Law 30 North Lasalle Street Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−1625 Email: jordan.yurchich2@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr.

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 7 of 38

Defendant Herbert Betancourt Chicago Police Officer, Star # 16976 TERMINATED: 05/01/2019
Defendant Matthew Cline Chicago Police Officer, Star # 265

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Gregory M. Beck (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jordan F Yurchich (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 8 of 38

Defendant John Dolan Chicago Police Officer, Star # 7722 TERMINATED: 05/01/2019
Defendant Scott Kravitz Star # 6554

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by Gregory M. Beck (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 9 of 38

Defendant Carlos Iglesias, III Star # 7859
Defendant Jorge L Lopez Chicago Police Officer, Star # 20298

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jordan F Yurchich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gregory M. Beck (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jordan F Yurchich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gregory M. Beck (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Michael Marx (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/30/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Kathryn M. Doi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Lindsay Wilson Gowin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Jordan F Yurchich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 10 of 38

Intervenor Plaintiff Mr. Atheris Mann

TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
Khara Coleman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/04/2018
Matthew P Dixon Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani One N. Franklin Suite 800 Chicago, IL 60606 312−980−6791 Email: mdixon@grsm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2019
represented by G. Flint Taylor , Jr. People's Law Offices 1180 North Milwaukee Avenue Chicago, IL 60622 (773) 235−0070 Email: flint.taylor10@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Defendant Sergeant Frank Ramaglia, Star # 1775
Intervenor Defendant Sergeant Brian Kane, Star # 5538
Intervenor Defendant Officer Kathleen McCann, Star # 3636
Intervenor Defendant Officer Kevin Connolly, Star # 13184
Intervenor Defendant Officer Alejandro Miranda, Star #8300

Date Filed 06/20/2013
06/20/2013 06/20/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Angel Perez; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−8468319.(DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
3 Attorney Appearance by Angel Perez (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 06/20/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 11 of 38

06/20/2013 08/01/2013 08/12/2013 08/12/2013 08/12/2013 08/13/2013
08/13/2013 08/19/2013 08/22/2013 09/06/2013
09/06/2013 09/18/2013 09/18/2013 09/19/2013 09/24/2013
10/03/2013 10/03/2013 12/10/2013 12/11/2013

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Mary M. Rowland. (jn, ) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Jason Michael Marx (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
5 ENTERED IN ERROR (Shoffner, Robin) Modified on 8/13/2013 (gcy, ). (Entered: 08/12/2013)
6 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Jorge L Lopez for extension of time to file answer (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 08/12/2013)
7 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 6 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 8/15/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 08/12/2013)
8 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Before the Court is Defendants' unopposed joint motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead 6 . The motion is granted. Defendants' answer or other response to the complaint is due 9/9/2013. Notice of motion date of 8/15/2013 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 08/13/2013)
9 NOTICE of Correction regarding attorney appearance 5 . (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/13/2013)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Jorge L Lopez by Kathryn M. Doi (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 08/19/2013)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Jorge L Lopez by Matthew P Dixon (Dixon, Matthew) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
12 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Initial Status hearing set for 9/24/2013 at 09:00 AM. and parties are to report the following: (1) Possibility of settlement in the case; (2) If no possibility of settlement exists, the nature and length of discovery necessary to get the case ready for trial. Plaintiff is to advise all other parties of the courts action herein. Lead counsel is directed to appear at this status hearing. Parties to prepare and submit a joint status report at least two days prior to set status. (See Judge's web page for status report). Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 09/06/2013)
13 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by City of Chicago(Marx, Jason) (Entered: 09/06/2013)
14 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Jorge L Lopez(Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
15 NOTICE by Jorge L Lopez re answer to complaint 14 and Certificate of Service (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
16 STATUS Report by Angel Perez (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
17 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held on 9/24/2013. Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures to be exchanged by 10/15/2013. Parties to submit Protective Order and Agreed HIPPA Order by 10/15/2013. All fact discovery to be completed by 3/25/2014. Status hearing set for 3/13/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
18 ENTER AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 10/3/2013. Mailed notice(tbk, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
19 ENTER AGREED QUALIFIED HIPAA PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 10/3/2013. Mailed notice(tbk, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
20 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Angel Perez to withdraw as attorney (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 12/10/2013)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Dennis John DeCaro for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 20 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 12/17/2013 at 09:15 AM. (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 12/11/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 12 of 38

12/17/2013
12/17/2013 12/23/2013 01/22/2014 01/22/2014 01/22/2014 02/05/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/13/2014
02/25/2014 03/13/2014 03/13/2014 03/17/2014

22 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Dennis DeCaro, counsel for Plaintiff Angel Perez, to withdraw as attorney 20 is granted. Plaintiff is given to 1/31/2014 to obtain new counsel or file his pro se appearance. This case is set for further status on 2/6/2014 at 9:00 a.m. at which time either new counsel or Plaintiff himself must appear. Failure to appear may lead to sanctions up to and including dismissal of the case for want of prosecution. As discussed on the record in open court, withdrawing counsel is directed to serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff Perez and place on the docket confirmation that service was effectuated. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
23 Notice to Plaintiff of Minute Order granting Plaintiff's Counsel to Withdraw by Angel Perez (DeCaro, Dennis) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
24 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: On the Court's own motion, Status hearing date of 2/6/2014 is stricken and Status hearing reset for 2/5/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Jon F Erickson (Erickson, Jon) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
26 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Michael D. Oppenheimer (Oppenheimer, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
27 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Ronak P. Maisuria (Maisuria, Ronak) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
28 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held on 2/5/2014. Existing discovery schedule is stricken. Parties to file a joint status report with proposed discovery schedule by 3/10/2014. Further Status hearing set for 3/13/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
29 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Angel Perez to withdraw as attorney (Maisuria, Ronak) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
30 NOTICE of Motion by Ronak P. Maisuria for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 29 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/13/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Maisuria, Ronak) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
31 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION by Plaintiff's attorneys, Ronak Maisuria, Jon Erickson, and Michael Oppenheimer of Erickson & Oppenheimer to withdraw their appearance 29 is granted. Plaintiff is given unitl 3/13/2014 to obtain new counsel or file his pro se appearance. This case is set for further status on 3/13/2014 at 9:00 a.m. at which time either new counsel or Plaintiff himself must appear. Failure to appear may lead to sanctions up to and including dismissal of the case for want of prosecution. As discussed on the record in open court, withdrawing counsel is directed to serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff Perez and place on the docket confirmation that service was effectuated. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
32 CERTIFICATE of Service by Plaintiff Angel Perez regarding order on motion to withdraw as attorney, motion hearing, set/reset hearings, terminate motions,,,,,,,,,,,, 31 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Maisuria, Ronak) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
33 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held on 3/13/2014. Plaintiff Perez appears at status and is directed to file, instanter, his pro se appearance. Case is being referred to Magistrate Judge Rowland for all discovery motions and discovery supervision. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
34 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Mary M. Rowland. Entered by Honorable Ruben Castillo on 3/13/14.(gcy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
35 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Initial status hearing set for 4/1/2014 at 9:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland for discovery status and for the purpose of scheduling a settlement conference. Parties are to bring dates when both clients and counsel will be available for a settlement conference. Judge Rowland generally conducts settlement conferences Mondays through Thursdays at 1:00 p.m. Other dates and times may be available as required by the Court or the

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03/19/2014 03/19/2014 03/20/2014 04/07/2014
05/28/2014 06/02/2014 06/02/2014 06/02/2014 06/02/2014 06/10/2014
06/11/2014

parties. The parties are directed to review and to comply with Judge Rowland's Standing Order regarding Setting Settlement Conferences, which is available on Judge Rowland's web page located on the Court's website at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
36 MOTION by Defendant Jorge L Lopez to reset initial status date (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
37 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to reset 36 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 3/25/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
38 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Defendant's Motion to reset initial status from 4/1/2014 to 4/7/2014 36 is granted. Initial Status hearing reset for 4/7/2014 at 09:00 AM. No appearance necessary on 3/25/2014. Mailed notice (gel, ) Modified on 3/20/2014 (gel, ). (Entered: 03/20/2014)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Status hearing held on 4/7/2014. The individual defendant shall produce to Plaintiff any documents received from Plaintiff's previous counsel as well as individual defendant's document requests by 4/11/2014. The City shall also re−serve Plaintiff its interrogatories and document requests by 4/11/14. Mr. Prerez is ordered to respond to both defendants' discovery requests by May 15, 2014. Plaintiff shall post mark his discovery requests to the Defendants by May 23, 2014. [NOTE DATE CHANGE]. Both defendants are also ordered to re−serve any Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures on Mr. Perez by 4/11/14. Status hearing set for 5/28/2014 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
40 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Status hearing held and continued to 6/26/2014 at 9:00 AM. The court will set a close of discovery date at that time.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
41 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Jorge L Lopez to clarify Plaintiff's witness list (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − C)(Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
42 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Jorge L Lopez to compel answers to discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
43 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to clarify 41 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 6/10/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
44 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to compel 42 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 6/10/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
45 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Motion hearing held. Plaintiff failed to appear. Defendants' Motion to Clarify Plaintiff's Witness List 41 is taken under advisement. The motion will be heard on 7/10/2014 at 9:00 AM. Plaintiff must appear and be prepared to address that motion. The status set for 6/26/14 is stricken.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
46 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses 42 is GRANTED. Exhibit A to the Motion is Plaintiff's response to Defendant Lopez's Request for Documents and First Set of Interrogatories. With respect to Requests for Production 1−3, 6−21, 24−25 and 27−28, Mr. Lopez provides several paragraphs of boilerplate objections. Mr. Perez is permitted to rely on objections. However, he must also respond to the requests by telling Defendant Lopez whether he is in possession of any documents responsive to the request. Furthermore, in response to both defendants' requests (Exhibit A and Exhibit B), Mr. Lopez indicates that he has "responsive documents and things" which include "Computer Files". The Court understands that Mr. Perez recently produced some documents to counsel for the City and is in the process of burning a CD for the City. So that it is clear, Mr. Perez is ordered to produce all of the documents that he defines as "responsive", including those contained on the CD, to defendants. Mr. Perez also indicates that he will rely on: (1) excerpts from his productions company's "whistleblower documentary"; (2) screenshots of a conversation; (3) video evidence

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 14 of 38

07/10/2014 08/04/2014 08/04/2014 08/12/2014
09/16/2014
09/16/2014 09/16/2014 09/23/2014 09/24/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014

gathered so far; (4) evidence recorded by Plaintiff during his encounter; (5) visual images of damages; (6) video of kid transported to gang area; (7) picture of ankle dent left by shackles; (8) April 21, 2013 message from defendant Lopez; and (9) picture of anal injury. Mr. Perez is required to produce copies of all of these documents and images and the recording. Mr. Perez has two weeks, until June 25, 2014, to produce these items to defendants and to supplement his responses to Defendant Lopez's Requests for Documents. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Status hearing held on 7/10/2014 and continued to 9/16/2014 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 07/10/2014)
48 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to compel. (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
49 NOTICE of Motion by Angel Perez for presentment of motion to compel 48 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 8/12/2014 at 09:15 AM. (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Motion hearing held on 8/12/2014. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 48 is denied as moot because defendants recently served discovery responses on plaintiff. Plaintiff's deposition is set for 8/27/2014 at 10:00 AM. Plaintiff is to mail the email string with investigator Corely to defendants today. Status hearing previously set for 9/16/2014 to stand. The parties should make every effort to have taken Officer Lopez's deposition or to have a firm date set for that deposition by the next status. The Court will set a close of fact discovery at the next status. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 08/12/2014)
51 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Status hearing held. Defendant's Motion to Clarify Plaintiff's witness 41 list is granted as follows: Plaintiff indicated on the record that he will not call the following individuals to establish liability against Officer Lopez: Jason Christopher, Ilana Rosenzweig, Commander Eric Washington, Superintendent Garry McCarthy, and "all other members of the '193 Gangs Investigations South'". Plaintiff has properly identified these individuals as potentially having knowledge regarding his Monell claim. Plaintiff is given until 9/24/14 to identify a home street address for Carlos De La Pena, Jon Zhong and Jason (last name unknown) OR to verify that these individuals are still employed at the locations identified in Plaintiff's Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures. See Rule 26(a)(1)(A)("a party must... provide... the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information..."). Plaintiff MUST identify a last name for Jason (last name unknown) by 9/24/14. If not, this witness shall be stricken as a witness at trial. Any motion regarding the bifurcation of Monell discovery from individual liability discovery should be filed with the Magistrate Judge. Fact discovery closes on 1/2/15. Status is set for 12/18/14 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
52 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to bifurcate (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Marx, Jason) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
53 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of motion to bifurcate 52 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 9/23/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
54 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Motion hearing held. Defendant City of Chicago's Motion to Bifurcate Section 1983 Claims and Stay discovery and trial on those claims 52 is GRANTED. There is no need for counsel for the City to attend further Magistrate Judge status hearings. Status set for 12/18/14 at 9:00 AM to stand.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
55 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Jorge L Lopez by Jason Michael Marx (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
56 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to Amended Complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint)(as, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
57 NOTICE of Motion by Angel Perez for presentment of motion to Amended Complaint 56 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 10/21/2014 at 09:15 AM. (as, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)

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10/21/2014 10/21/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/29/2014 10/30/2014
11/07/2014
11/10/2014 11/19/2014 11/19/2014 11/25/2014
11/30/2014 11/30/2014 12/02/2014
12/03/2014 12/18/2014

58 NOTICE of Correction regarding 57 . (as, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Motion hearing set for 10/21/2014 is stricken. Plaintiff is directed to re−notice the motion before Judge Dow. Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
60 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to compel document production and sanction. (as, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Angel Perez for presentment of compel document production and sanction 60 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 11/6/2014 at 09:15 AM. (as, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
62 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to amend complaint. (as, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
63 RE−NOTICE of Motion by Angel Perez for presentment to amend complaint 62 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 11/4/2014 at 09:15 AM. (as, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
64 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion Hearing previously set for 11/6/2014 regarding motion to compel 60 is reset for 11/7/2014 at 09:15 AM.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
65 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiffs motion to amend complaint [56 and 62] are granted. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint for the limited purpose of naming additional defendants within fourteen days of the date of this order. Notice of motion date of 11/4/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
66 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:Motion hearing held on 11/7/2014. Plaintiff's Motion to compel 60 is denied as stated in open court. Defendant is ordered to produce CR files for all named Defendants. Status hearing previously set for 12/18/2014 is reset for 1/21/2015 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (gel, ) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
67 AMENDED complaint by Angel Perez against Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing) (as, ) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
68 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
69 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 68 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 11/25/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
70 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 68 is withdrawn without prejudice. As discussed on the record, Plaintiff is given until 12/3/2014 in which to file a revised amended complaint. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 11/25/2014)
71 MOTION by counsel for Defendant City of Chicago to withdraw as attorney Robin Shoffner (Shoffner, Robin) (Entered: 11/30/2014)
72 NOTICE of Motion by Robin Denise Shoffner for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 71 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 12/4/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Shoffner, Robin) (Entered: 11/30/2014)
73 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion to withdraw the appearance of Robert Shoffner as counsel for Defendant City of Chicago 71 is granted. Notice of Motion date of 12/4/2014 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (tbk, ) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
74 REVISED Amended complaint by Angel Perez against all Defendants; Notice.(as, ) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
75 ANSWER to amended complaint by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki(Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 12/18/2014)

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12/18/2014 12/18/2014 12/19/2014 01/06/2015
01/06/2015 01/21/2015 01/21/2015 01/21/2015 01/22/2015
01/23/2015
02/10/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/03/2015 03/13/2015 03/13/2015

76 MOTION by Defendants John Dolan, City of Chicago, Edmund Zablocki, Jorge L Lopez, Herbert Betancourt, Matthew Cline, Joseph Wagner to dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff's Revised Amended Complaint (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
77 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to dismiss 76 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 1/6/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to dismiss 76 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 1/6/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
79 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion hearing held. The plaintiff submitted to the Court and to the counsel for the defendants, his response to the defendants' motion to dismiss Count VII of plaintiff's revised amended complaint 76 . The plaintiff's response was filed this morning with the Clerk's Office. The defendants may reply by 1/20/2015. The Court will rule by mail and set the case for further status hearing at that time. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
80 RESPONSE by Angel Perez to MOTION by Defendants motion to dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff's Revised Amended Complaint 76 . (as, ) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
81 DOCUMENT ENTERED IN ERROR. (meg, ) (Main Document 81 replaced on 1/22/2015) (meg, ). Modified on 1/22/2015 (meg, ). (Entered: 01/21/2015)
82 REPLY by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki to response to motion 80 (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
83 NOTICE by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki re reply to response to motion 82 (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
84 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Docket entry number 81 dated 1/21/15 is stricken. Status hearing held on 1/21/15 and continued to 3/18/15 at 9:00 AM. Parties' written discovery shall issue before that date. Parties shall submit a joint proposed order regarding the treating physician's production of records to the court's proposed order inbox by 1/26/15. Mailed notice (meg, ) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
85 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: The Court, having reviewed the 1/21/2015 status hearing and the parties' agreed proposed order to enforce a subpoena issued by Defendant to nonparty Fe Velasco, M.D., finds that (1) Dr. Velasco has objected to producing certain documents; and (2) proper notice has not been given to Dr. Velasco seeking compliance with the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i) (If an objection is made by the commanded person, "on notice to the commanded person, the serving party may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection."). Should Defendant wish to enforce the subpoena to Dr. Velasco, it should file a motion to compel, set it for hearing, and give proper notice to Dr. Velasco. Mailed notice (meg, ) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
86 NOTICE by Kathryn M. Doi of Change of Address (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
87 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to compel and sanction defendant City of Chicago et al. (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
88 NOTICE of Motion to Compel and Sanction by Angel Perez. (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
89 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Lindsay Erin Wilson Gowin (Wilson Gowin, Lindsay) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
90 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for leave to file ATTORNEYS' APPEARANCES (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
91 NOTICE of Motion by Scott T. Kamin for presentment of motion for leave to file 90 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 3/18/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Kamin, Scott)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 17 of 38

03/18/2015
03/24/2015 03/30/2015 03/30/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 04/06/2015 04/06/2015 04/06/2015 04/06/2015 04/07/2015
04/21/2015 04/21/2015 04/22/2015
04/24/2015 05/08/2015 05/08/2015

(Entered: 03/13/2015)
92 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Motion for attorney Scott T. Kamin to appear on behalf of defendant 90 is granted. Motion to Compel 87 is withdrawn. Plaintiff is granted leave to file supplemental written discovery. Status hearing set for 5/20/15 at 9:00 AM. The Court would like to set a close of fact discovery at that time. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
93 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Scott T. Kamin (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
94 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Phillip Aaron Brigham (Brigham, Phillip) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
95 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Jason R. Epstein (Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
96 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for leave to file 2nd Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 nd Amended Complaint)(Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
97 NOTICE of Motion by Scott T. Kamin for presentment of motion for leave to file 96 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 4/7/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
98 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Daniel A. Edelman (Edelman, Daniel) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
99 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Cassandra P. Miller (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
100 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Cathleen M. Combs (Combs, Cathleen) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
101 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by James O. Latturner (Latturner, James) (Entered: 04/06/2015)
102 ORDER before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint 96 is withdrawn without prejudice. Plaintiffs' are given until 4/21/2015 to file their amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint; Defendants' response is due 5/5/2015; Plaintiffs reply is due 5/19/2015; and the Court will issue a ruling by mail. Mailed Notice. (gcy, ) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
103 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for extension of time to file Amended Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
104 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 103 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 4/28/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
105 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiff's motion to extend deadline to file amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint (by three days) 103 is granted without objection from the defendants. The extension is as follows: Plaintiff to file his amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint by April 24, 2015; Defendants' response is due by May 8, 2015; Plaintiff may reply by May 22, 2015. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
106 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for leave to file Second Amended Complaint (AMENDED) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
107 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time to file response/reply UNOPPOSED (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
108 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 107 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/13/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 05/08/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 18 of 38

05/11/2015
05/15/2015 05/19/2015 05/29/2015 05/29/2015 06/01/2015 06/08/2015 06/08/2015 06/09/2015 06/11/2015 07/15/2015
08/14/2015 08/14/2015 08/14/2015 08/17/2015

109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to file a response to Plaintiff's amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint 107 is granted and no appearances are necessary on 5/13/2015. Defendants' response is due by 5/15/2015 and Plaintiff may reply by 5/29/2015.Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 05/11/2015)
110 RESPONSE by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablockiin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for leave to file Second Amended Complaint (AMENDED) 106 (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
111 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: On the court's own motion and in light of the motion pending before Judge Dow regarding a possible Second Amended Complaint 106 , the status set for 5/20/15 is stricken and rest to 7/15/15 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
112 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for extension of time to file Reply in support of Amended Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (UNOPPOSED) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
113 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 112 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/3/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
114 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend deadline to file reply in support of amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint 112 is granted and no appearances are necessary on 6/3/2015. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
115 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for extension of time to file Reply in support of Amended Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Second Unopposed) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
116 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 115 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/16/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
117 REPLY by Plaintiff Angel Perez to motion for leave to file 106 (IN SUPPORT OF) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
118 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiffs' second unopposed motion to extend deadline to file reply in support of amended motion for leave to file second amended complaint 115 is granted. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
119 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Discovery on Plaintiff's alleged class claims is stayed until the district court rules on Plaintiff's Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint 106 . While awaiting ruling, the parties should complete all discovery regarding Mr. Perez's individual claims. The parties are directed to contact chambers to set a status when they receive a ruling on the motion to filed the amended complaint. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
120 MOTION by Attorney Kathryn M. Doi to withdraw as attorney for Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. No party information provided (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
121 NOTICE of Motion by Kathryn M. Doi for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 120 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 8/27/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
122 NOTICE by Kathryn M. Doi of Change of Address (Doi, Kathryn) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
123 ORDER: Kathryn M. Doi's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel on behalf of the Defendants 120 is granted. Lindsey Wilson Gowin (for the individual defendants) and Jason Marx (for the City of Chicago), both attorneys in the Federal Civil Rights Litigation Division of the City of Chicago Law Department, are now lead counsel on this matter. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 8/17/2015. MAILED notice(ks, ) (Entered: 08/18/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 19 of 38

09/02/2015
09/08/2015
09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/30/2015 09/30/2015
10/05/2015 10/05/2015 10/05/2015 10/05/2015 10/06/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/15/2015

124 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 09/02/15: Granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint 106 and striking as moot Defendants' motion to dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff's amended complaint 76 , as Plaintiff no longer brings that claim. Mailed notice (mw,) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
125 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Discovery status set for 9/30/15 at 9:00 AM. In light of the district court's ruling allowing the second amended complaint, parties are to confer prior to that date and be prepared (1) to discuss whether Monell discovery should continue to be bifurcated and stayed [Dkt. 54] and (2) to propose a schedule for the completion of fact discovery. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
126 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Walter Jones, Jr (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
127 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
128 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Rachel C. Steiner (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
129 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Jorge V. Cazares (Cazares, Jorge) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
130 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held and continued to 10/15/15 at 9:00AM. Jason Marx' oral motion to withdraw his appearance as counsel for defendant is granted. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
131 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Minute Entry 130 is modified to read: Status hearing held and continued to 10/15/15 at 9:00AM. Parties should be prepared to set discovery schedule. Jason Marx's oral motion to withdraw his appearance as counsel for defendant is granted. Walter Jones, Jonathan Cifonelli, Rachel Steiner and Jorge Cazares granted leave to file their appearances on behalf of the defendants. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
132 2nd AMENDED complaint by Angel Perez against All Defendants (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
133 NOTICE by Angel Perez re amended complaint 132 (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
134 MOTION by Attorney Lindsay Wilson Gowin to withdraw as attorney for Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. No party information provided (Wilson Gowin, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
135 NOTICE of Motion by Lindsay Erin Wilson Gowin for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 134 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 10/13/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Wilson Gowin, Lindsay) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
136 ORDER: Lindsay Wilson Gowin's motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants 134 is granted. No appearances are necessary on 10/13/2015. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. on 10/6/2015. (jh, ) (Entered: 10/07/2015)
137 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time to file answer regarding amended complaint 132 (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
138 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 137 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 10/20/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
139 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held and continued to 1/14/16 at 9:00AM. The parties conferred and agreed that fact discovery

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 20 of 38

10/19/2015 10/23/2015
10/29/2015 12/17/2015 12/17/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015 12/21/2015 12/23/2015
01/06/2016 01/06/2016 01/07/2016

close 10/17/16. Plaintiff to amend the complaint by 1/14/16. The parties should exchange updated Rule 26(a) disclosures by 11/13/15. Defense counsel appeared after the case was called. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
140 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendants' unopposed motion to extend deadline by 60 days, or until 12/18/2015 to answer or otherwise plead to second amended complaint 137 is granted. No appearances are necessary on 10/20/2015. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
141 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: In light of the district court's recent order extending the time to answer or otherwise plead, the court modifies the previous scheduling order 139 as follows: By agreement of the parties fact discovery will close on 10/17/16; the parties should exchange updated Rule 26(a) disclosures by 1/15/16. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
142 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendants' unopposed motion to extend deadline by 60 days, or until 12/18/2015 to answer or otherwise plead to second amended complaint 137 was granted on 10/19/2015 [see 140]. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 10/29/2015)
143 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinez, Angel Perez to compel (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
144 NOTICE of Motion by Jason R. Epstein for presentment of motion to compel 143 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 12/22/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
145 MOTION by Defendants John Dolan, City of Chicago, Edmund Zablocki, Jorge L Lopez, Herbert Betancourt, Matthew Cline, Joseph Wagner to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
146 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion to dismiss 145 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 12/23/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
147 ANSWER to amended complaint by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki(Jones, Walter) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
148 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinez, Angel Perez by Scott T. Kamin (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
149 RE NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion to compel 143 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 1/7/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
150 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion hearing held. Defendants partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 145 is taken under advisement; Plaintiff's response is due 1/20/2016; Defendants reply is due 2/3/2016; the Court will issue a ruling by mail. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 12/31/2015)
151 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for protective order (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
152 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion for protective order 151 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 1/12/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
153 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion hearing held. Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 143 and Defendants' Motion for Protective order 151 are entered and continued to 1/14/16 at 10:00AM. Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Protective Order set for 1/12/16 is stricken. Parties to call (312) 435−5857 by noon on 1/13/16 to confirm if the hearing set for 1/14/16 is necessary. Status

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 21 of 38

01/13/2016 01/14/2016
01/15/2016 01/20/2016 01/20/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016

hearing set for 1/14/16 at 9:00AM is stricken. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
154 RESPONSE by Angel Perezin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for protective order 151 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
155 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion hearings held. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 143 is granted and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order 151 is denied as follows: The City agrees that counsel should be permitted to inspect, photograph and video the areas in the Homan Square facility where civilians are detained. According to the City detainees are housed in the middle of the second floor of the facility. (151 at 4). This area includes detainee cells, bathrooms, bullpen holding cells and interview/interrogation rooms. Plaintiff is also permitted to perform testing in these areas on suspected blood and human excrement. The City objects to Plaintiff being permitted to inspect any other portion of the Homan Square facility because several undercover officers work out of that facility. The Court overrules the City's objection. The essence of the Complaint challenges an alleged practice by the police department to take civilians to Homan Square, instead of to one of the numerous police stations, "to hold arrestees 'incommunicado' or 'off the grid,' without processing the arrestee or making any public record of the arrest for long periods of time." (Dkt. 132 at 11). In light of the allegations of secrecy contained throughout the Amended Complaint, limiting Plaintiff's inspection to "the middle of the second floor" strikes the Court as completely inconsistent with the purpose of discovery allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff will be permitted to inspect all five floors of the building. However, the Court is committed to protecting the identities of undercover officers and operations. Therefore, any portion of the inspection outside of the "middle of the second floor" shall be done without the Plaintiff's photographer. Furthermore, no photographs or videoing will be permitted. The inspection, which is limited to two hours, is to take place by 1/22/16. If the identity of any police personnel is captured on photo or video, it shall be redacted. All photographs and video will be produced by Plaintiff for the City's counsel to review for attorneys' eyes only. Plaintiff is permitted to bring a total of 7 people to the inspection. No actual plaintiffs may attendonly counsel, a photographer, and an investigator who is permitted to bring equipment to test for blood and human excrement throughout the building. Any agreed protective orders shall be submitted to Proposed_Order_Rowland@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Based on a representation by counsel for the City that records of any construction will be maintained, (Dkt. 151 at 6), Plaintiff's request that the Court order the City to cease construction at the location is denied. Defendant's oral motion for a 10 day extension to supplement Rule 26(A)(1)(a) is granted. Plaintiff's unopposed oral motion to have the court attend the inspection is denied. Status hearing set for 3/14/16 at 9:00AM. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
156 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinez, Angel Perez by Michelle A. Alyea (Alyea, Michelle) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
157 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to dismiss 145 (Alyea, Michelle) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
158 NOTICE of Motion by Michelle A. Alyea for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 157 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 1/28/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Alyea, Michelle) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
159 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel PerezMotion to Amend Order for Site Visit (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
160 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 159 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 1/26/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
161 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: The Court modifies the January 14, 2016 order as follows: The inspection of the Homan Square facility shall take place during the week of January 25, 2016 on a date agreed to by the parties. The City is asked to file a short response to Plaintiff's other requested modifications (more time to inspect and one additional person attending the inspection) by close of business

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 22 of 38

01/22/2016 01/22/2016
01/27/2016 02/03/2016 02/15/2016 02/15/2016 02/16/2016 02/16/2016 02/22/2016 02/25/2016 02/26/2016 03/02/2016 03/10/2016

on 1/22/16. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
162 RESPONSE by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki to MOTION by Plaintiff Angel PerezMotion to Amend Order for Site Visit 159 (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
163 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order for Visit 159 is granted in part and denied in part. The Court has reviewed the pleadings. The request for a 5 hour inspection is overly burdensome at this point. Per Defendants' response, if after the inspection "Plaintiffs can present credible evidence that additional detention rooms are in need of further scientific analysis, Defendants" are ordered to engage in good faith discussions regarding a further inspection. The inspection is limited to 2 hours. The Plaintiffs are permitted to bring 8 people instead of 7. The Plaintiff is free to bring only 3 or 4 attorneys and increase the number of investigators to allow for more testing in the pertinent areas. But the total number of persons on the Plaintiff's side is limited to 8. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
164 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for extension of time until 2/3/2016 to respond to Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 157 is granted. Defendants' reply is due by 2/17/2016. No appearances are necessary on 1/28/2016. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
165 RESPONSE by Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinezin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants John Dolan, City of Chicago, Edmund Zablocki, Jorge L Lopez, Herbert Betancourt, Matthew Cline, Joseph Wagner to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 145 (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
166 MOTION by Intervenor Plaintiff Atheris Mann to intervene and reassign or consolidate (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Taylor, G.) (Entered: 02/15/2016)
167 NOTICE of Motion by G. Flint Taylor, Jr for presentment of motion to intervene 166 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/25/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Taylor, G.) (Entered: 02/15/2016)
168 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time , MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to dismiss 145 (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel C. Steiner for presentment of extension of time,, motion for extension of time to file response/reply,, motion for relief, 168 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/23/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
170 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendants' unopposed motion to extend deadline until 2/26/2016 to file reply in support of partial motion to dismiss 168 is granted. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
172 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion hearing held on Plaintiffs' motion for intervention, reassignment or consolidation of related cases 166 ; responses are due 3/10/2016; the motion is taken under advisement; and a status hearing is set for 3/22/2016 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Main Document 172 replaced on 3/2/2016) (tmh, ). (Entered: 02/29/2016)
171 REPLY by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki to response in opposition to motion, 165 (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
173 NOTICE of Correction regarding document number 172 (tmh, ) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
174 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, Frank Ramaglia, Star # 1775, Brian Kane, Star # 5538, Kathleen McCann, Star # 3636, Kevin Connolly, Star # 13184, Alejandro Miranda, Star #8300 to MOTION by Intervenor Plaintiff Atheris Mann to intervene and reassign or consolidate 166 (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/10/2016)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 23 of 38

03/14/2016 03/14/2016 03/24/2016
03/28/2016
05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016
06/09/2016 06/14/2016 06/14/2016

175 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held and continued to 06/14/16 at 9:00 am Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
176 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: By agreement of the parties, the status hearing set for 3/22/2016 is cancelled and reset to 3/24/2016 at 9:00 a.m. No appearances are necessary on 3/22/2016. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 03/14/2016)
177 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held and continued to 6/14/2016 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion for intervention, reassignment or consolidation of related cases 166 is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, as discussed on the record, the Court will request that the Executive Committee enter an order directing that pre−trial proceedings be coordinated in cases 13−cv−4531 and 15−cv−9197 under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Rowland. Judge Rowland will determine the scope of discovery coordination and in her discretion may proceed discovery as to certain matters in the two cases to proceed on separate tracks. This case is set for further status hearing on 6/14/2016 at 9:15 a.m. Counsel should attend the status hearing before Judge Rowland before proceeding to Judge Dow's status hearing. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
178 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that, for reasons of judicial efficiency, coordinated pretrial proceedings in the cases listed below should be presided over by a single district judge as provided for by IOP 13(e) and that a single magistrate judge should be designated for these cases; and It further appearing that the Hon. Robert M. Dow Jr., has agreed to preside over these proceedings; and It further appearing that Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland has agreed to be the designated magistrate judge in these proceedings; therefore It is hereby ordered that Judge Dow shall preside over pretrial proceedings, in the cases listed below; and It is hereby ordered that the cases listed below be referred to Magistrate Judge Rowland for discovery supervision and settlement proceedings when requested. It is further ordered that these cases shall remain pending on the calendars of the judges to whom they are currently assigned, and that an order be entered in each case by Judge Dow at such time as coordinated pretrial proceedings have concluded. Signed by Executive Committee on 3/28/2016.(mr, ) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
179 MOTION by Attorney Rachel C. Steiner to withdraw as attorney for Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. No party information provided (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
180 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel C. Steiner for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 179 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/2/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
181 ORDER: Rachel C. Steiner's motion for leave to withdraw her appearance on behalf of Defendants City of Chicago, Sergeant Matthew Cline, Detective Jorge L. Lopez, Officer Edmund Zablocki, Officer Joseph Wagner, Officer Herbert Betancourt, and Officer John Dolan (collectively, "Defendants") 179 is granted. The notice of motion date of 6/2/2016 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. on 6/1/2016. Mailed notice (jh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
182 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki by Khara Coleman (Coleman, Khara) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
183 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held and continued to 9/13/2016 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
184 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. This case is consolidated with Mann v. Chicago, 15−9197, for purposes of pretrial discovery. The City has begun producing documents in this matter. The parties are directed to confer with the plaintiffs in Mann v. Chicago about the orderly production of documents for both cases. The court strongly prefers one set of documents related to liability be produced for both cases. Fact discovery currently set to close on 10/17/16. Status hearing set for 09/13/16 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 24 of 38

08/26/2016
08/26/2016 08/29/2016 09/01/2016 09/13/2016 09/16/2016 09/16/2016 11/09/2016
12/14/2016 01/06/2017 01/09/2017 01/25/2017 01/25/2017

185 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss 145 the Martinez Plaintiffs' claims in Counts I and II and Plaintiff Berry's claims in Count III and Count IV as well as Count VI as it applies to Plaintiff Berry based on Count III and Count IV. All of the dismissals are without prejudice; if the Martinez Plaintiffs' believe that they can successfully replead, they may file a motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint on or before September 26, 2016. [For further details see the Memorandum Opinion and Order.] Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
186 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. on 8/26/2016. Mailed notice(cdh, ) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
187 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: On the Court's own motion, status hearing set for 9/13/2016 is stricken and reset to 9/19/2016 at 10:30 a.m. No appearances are necessary on 9/13/2016. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
188 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Own the Court's own motion, due to the Court's trial calendar, the status hearing set for 9/19/2016 is stricken and reset to 9/16/2016 at 10:00 a.m. No appearances are necessary on 9/19/2016. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
189 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Parties report discovery is ongoing. Written discovery shall be completed by 01/10/17. Status hearing set for 11/09/16 at 9:00 a.m. to set remaining discovery schedule. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
190 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held and continued to 1/10/2016 at 9:00 a.m. As discussed on the record, parties are to proceed with discovery. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
191 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Minute entry 190 is corrected as follows: Status hearing held and continued to 1/10/2017 at 9:00 a.m. As discussed on the record, parties are to proceed with discovery. (Year change only.) Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
192 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Defendants shall (1) respond to Mann document requests by 11/11/16; (2) respond to Perez document requests by 11/18/16; (3) send a letter to Perez counsel describing all the officers' conduct involved in any of the interrogations of any of the Perez plaintiffs by 11/14/16; and (4) produce to both sets of plaintiffs' counsel all OPS and IPRA documents for each individual Defendant in both cases by 11/30/16. Plaintiffs Angel Perez and Juanita Berry shall respond to interrogatories by 11/30/16, Plaintiff Calvin Coffey shall respond to interrogatories by 12/15/16. Status hearing set for 12/14/16 at 9:00 a.m. to report on discovery. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
193 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Counsel report on discovery. The 1/10/17 cutoff date for written discovery is stricken. Defendants shall respond to interrogatories by 12/23/16. Status hearing set for 02/01/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
194 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 1/10/2017 is stricken and reset to 9:45 a.m. after Magistrate Judge Rowland's status hearing. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
195 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Minute entry 194 is modified as follows: On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 1/10/2017 is stricken and reset to 2/1/2017 at 9:45 a.m. after Magistrate Judge Rowland's status hearing. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
196 MOTION by Attorney Edelman, Combs, Latturner and Goodwin, LLC to withdraw as attorney for Angel Perez. No party information provided (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
197 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 196 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/1/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 25 of 38

01/25/2017 01/25/2017 01/31/2017 02/01/2017 02/01/2017 02/01/2017
02/03/2017 02/03/2017 02/03/2017 03/01/2017 03/01/2017 03/09/2017
04/19/2017 04/19/2017

198 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, Angel Perez for leave to file Third Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
199 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for leave to file 198 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/1/2017 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
200 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motions 196 and 198 noticed up for or 2/1/2017 at 9:15 a.m. are reset to 2/1/2017 at 9:45 a.m. (Time change only.) Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
201 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Counsel report on discovery. Status hearing set for 3/9/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
202 Third AMENDED complaint by Calvin Coffey, Angel Perez, Juanita Berry against Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki, Scott Kravitz, Carlos Iglesias, III (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
203 ORDER: Motion hearing held. Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC's motion to withdraw as counsel for Angel Perez only and for other relief 196 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file third amended complaint 198 is granted. Defendants are given until 3/1/2017 to answer or otherwise plead. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. on 2/1/2017. Mailed notice (jh, ) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz (pg, ) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
204 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Calvin Coffey, Angel Perez, Juanita Berry as to Scott Kravitz on 2/3/2017, answer due 2/24/2017. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
205 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Calvin Coffey, Angel Perez, Juanita Berry as to Carlos Iglesias, III on 2/3/2017, answer due 2/24/2017. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
206 Defendants' ANSWER to amended complaint (THIRD) by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki(Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
207 Defendants' Corrected ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand (THIRD AMENDED) by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki(Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
208 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held on 3/9/17. By Friday 3/17/17: (1) parties are to reach an agreement on the search terms and custodians the City will use to conduct its ESI search; (2) Mann Plaintiffs' counsel shall respond to Defendants' Rule 37 letter; and (3) Defendants shall produce a list of the units working out of Homan Square from 2003−2015. By 3/22/17, Plaintiffs' counsel shall notify Defendants what units they need a list of commanders from. By 4/12/17, Defendants shall produce a list identifying commanders of the units that Plaintiffs' class counsel selected from 2006−2015. Class Counsel in the Perez case shall respond to revised interrogatory requests by 4/7/17. Defendants' previously redacted documents shall be produced to Plaintiffs' class counsel unredacted pursuant to the protective order entered in the Perez case 18 and 19 for "attorney's eyes only". The parties in Mann have agreed that the protective orders entered in Perez are binding in Mann. Status hearing set for 4/20/17 at 9:30 a.m. Individual counsel for Mr. Perez must be present at the next status hearing. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
AGREED ORAL MOTION by Parties to reset status hearing. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/19/2017)
209 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Parties' agreed oral motion to reset status hearing is granted. Status hearing previously set for 4/20/17 is stricken and reset to 5/4/17 at 9:30 a.m. Individual counsel for Mr. Perez must be present at the next

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 26 of 38

05/02/2017 05/02/2017 05/04/2017
06/07/2017 06/22/2017
07/06/2017 07/06/2017 07/06/2017 07/06/2017

status hearing. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/19/2017)
210 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki to amend/correct magistrate judge status hearing,,,,, set/reset hearings,,,, 208 Protective Order (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
211 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion to amend/correct,, motion for relief,,, 210 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 5/9/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
212 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held and continued to 6/7/17 at 9:30 a.m. Defendants' motion to amend protective order 210 is granted in part and denied in part. The Homan Square sign in lists are to be produced from 2008 − 2015. This is 5 years prior to the plaintiffs having been taken to Homan Square. The City is permitted to redact the names of any Confidential Informants who were signed−in to Homan Square and all the police officers' cellular telephone numbers. All other information contained on the sign−in sheets shall be produced. The sign−in lists are to be produced pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the Perez case. The spread sheets created by the City for purposes of separate FOIA litigation shall be produced from 2005 − 2015. These documents will not contain any redactions. The entirety of these documents are being produced FOR ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY. It is imperative that officers' names contained in these spreadsheets be protected from disclosure. The Court has every confidence in plaintiffs' attorneys, as officers of the court, willingness to abide by this limitation. This document product shall be complete by 6/2/17. The parties report being close to an agreement on search terms and custodians and close to identifying commanders for purposes of setting depositions. The City is to begin the email searches and to provide the final list of snap shots of leadership by 5/26/17. At the next status the Court intends to set a close of oral fact discovery. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Parties are continuing to try to resolve disputes regarding search terms and custodians. Status hearing set for 6/22/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
214 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held and continued to 7/27/17 at 9:30 AM. Parties have reached an agreement on all search terms except one (Homan Square). The City is to submit a proposed order to(Proposed_Order_Rowland@ilnd.uscourts.gov) by 6/27/17 indicating wither it wants to include that term in its search terms or whether it wants to verify, by affidavit, the burden of searching that term by 7/27/17. The parties largely agreed on the custodians to be searched but are at odds over non−police force City officials. Plaintiff's motion on this matter is due 6/30/17. Defendants' response is due 7/14/17. Reply is due 7/21/17. Finally, the parties' joint request that the Court conduct an in camera review is granted. By 7/6/17, the City shall provide to the Court the 24 hour "log−in book" with the redacted names highlighted. The Court is tasked with verifying that the highlighted names are identified in the "log−in book" as witnesses or confidential informants, therefore justifying the redactions. If the Court has follow−up questions for the City, the Court will alert the parties at the next status, prior to engaging in any ex parte discussion with defense counsel about the matter. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
VERBAL MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to enter order regarding searching the term "Homan Square". (dm, ) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
215 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Defendant's verbal motion is granted. By July 27, 2017, Defendant City of Chicago will verify by affidavit the burden of searching the standalone term "Homan Square" for all Chicago Police Department email custodians from November 2008 to the present. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
216 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to submit un−redacted 24−hour sign−in book for court inspection (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
217 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of extension of time 216 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 7/13/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/06/2017)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 27 of 38

07/07/2017 07/25/2017 08/03/2017
08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/10/2017 09/08/2017 09/08/2017 09/20/2017 09/28/2017 10/02/2017
11/20/2017

218 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Defendant City of Chicago's unopposed Motion for extension of time to submit un−redacted 24−hour sign−in book for court inspection 216 is granted. By 7/17/17, Defendant shall provide the Court with the 24−hour "log−in book." No appearance necessary on 7/13/2017. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
219 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: On the Court's own motion, status hearing previously set for 7/27/17 at 9:30 a.m. is stricken and reset for 8/3/17 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
220 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. The Court reviewed the unredacted 24−hour "log−in book" that Defendant City of Chicago provided to the Court for in camera inspection. By 8/18/17, Defendant shall produce those documents to Plaintiffs as follows: (1) juvenile names shall be unredacted (with the exception of juveniles who are confidential informants), (2) names of confidential informants may remain redacted including "Jane Doe" or "John Doe", and (3) any identifiers, symbols or numbers indicating confidential informant status shall be unredacted. As the parties already know, if any document containing a juvenile name is filed in the litigation, that name must be redacted. At this time, Defendant is not required to search the standalone term "Homan Square" for all Chicago Police Department email custodians from November 2008 to the present, in light of all of the other searches being done by the City and based on defense counsel's representations at the hearing about the burden. By 8/18/17, the parties shall issue initial deposition notices. At the next status hearing, the Court will set firm deadlines for the completion of written and oral fact discovery. Status hearing set for 9/14/17 at 9:30 am. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
221 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file Sur−Reply Instanter to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the City to Include Certain Custodians from the Mayor's Office in Their Email Search (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
222 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of motion for leave to file, 221 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 8/22/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
223 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Defendant City of Chicago's motion for leave to file Sur−Reply Instanter to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 221 is granted. No appearance necessary on 8/22/17. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
224 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 9/8/2017. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
225 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing previously set for 9/14/17 is stricken and reset for 9/22/17 at 9:15 a.m. At the next status hearing, the Court will set firm deadlines for the completion of written and oral fact discovery. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
226 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing previously set for 9/22/17 is stricken and reset for 9/29/17 at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1743. At the next status hearing, the Court will set firm deadlines for the completion of written and oral fact discovery. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
227 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: At the request of the parties, status hearing set for 9/29/17 is stricken and reset for 10/2/17 at 10:30 a.m. in courtroom 1743. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/28/2017)
228 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. The parties report on the status of discovery including the collection of emails from the Chicago Police Department and the Mayor's Office. Individual defendants are to be deposed by 12/15/17. Status hearing set for 12/7/17 at 9:00 am. At the next status, parties should be prepared to report on the production of emails to Plaintiffs and the amount of time needed to complete plaintiffs' and Monell related depositions. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
229 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez to compel production of Title 3 recordings (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 11/20/2017)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 28 of 38

11/20/2017 11/21/2017 11/28/2017 11/28/2017 11/30/2017 12/13/2017
01/10/2018 01/26/2018
03/15/2018 05/02/2018

230 NOTICE of Motion by Jason R. Epstein for presentment of motion to compel 229 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 11/22/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
231 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Hearing on Plaintiff Perez's motion to compel 229 on 11/22/17 is stricken and reset for 11/29/17 at 9:30 am. Plaintiff is reminded that Judge Rowland requires three business days notice for motions. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
232 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: At Defendants' request and without objection by Plaintiff's counsel, the motion hearing on Plaintiff's motion to compel production 229 set for 11/29/17 is stricken and reset to 11/30/17 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
233 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: At the request of Plaintiffs' counsel and without objection by Defendants' counsel, the status hearing set for 12/7/17 is stricken and reset for 12/13/17 at 9:00 a.m. At the next status, parties should be prepared to report on the production of emails to Plaintiffs and the amount of time needed to complete plaintiffs' and Monell related depositions. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
234 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's motion to compel production 229 is withdrawn. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
235 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Parties reported on the production of emails to Plaintiffs and the amount of time needed to take depositions. Parties are to confer regarding search terms by 12/20/17. Defendants shall produce email samples to plaintiffs by 12/29/17. Defendants shall produce the Mayor's Office emails by 1/26/18. Status hearing set for 1/16/18 at 9:30 a.m. At the status, the Court will revisit the date by which all of the defendants shall be deposed. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 12/13/2017)
236 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing previously set for 1/16/18 is stricken and reset for 1/26/18 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 01/10/2018)
237 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Parties report on production of electronic discovery. Electronic discovery from the Mayor's office is to be produced by February 7, 2018. Electronic discovery from the CPD was to cover the period November 2008−2017. That time period will be shortened to January 2010 − 2017. However, no defendant is permitted to make any argument or inference in briefing or at trial that the City or any individual defendant did not engage in a pattern or practice of conduct as alleged by plaintiffs because plaintiffs do not have evidence of such conduct that predates January 2010. The parties are ordered to commit to such a stipulation in writing by 2/9/18. Production of the CPD electronic discovery shall be done on a rolling basis and shall be concluded by 3/9/18. Party depositions are ongoing and shall be essentially complete by 2/28/18. Status set for 3/15/18 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
238 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Parties reported on the status of discovery including the collection of emails from the Chicago Police Department and the Mayor's Office. Non−Monell depositions and email production shall be completed by 4/20/18. Status hearing set for 5/2/18 at 9:30 a.m. Parties should be prepared to close of fact discovery, including Monell discovery. Mailed notice (dm, ) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
239 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Defense counsel reported significant progress has been made with respect to the Chicago Police Department emails. Defendants shall provide a list of search terms for the emails already produced to Plaintiffs by 5/4/18. Production of the CPD emails shall be completed with exception of the 2,700 spreadsheets by 5/11/18. Email production has been completed with respect to the Mayor's Office emails, with the exception of 15 or 16 emails that will be produced by the end of this week. Close of fact discovery, which includes all party and non−party depositions, is set for 6/15/18. Close of Monell discovery is set for 11/9/18. Status hearing set for 7/17/18 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 05/02/2018)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 29 of 38

07/11/2018 07/11/2018 07/16/2018 07/17/2018
07/19/2018 07/19/2018 07/19/2018 07/24/2018 07/31/2018 08/28/2018
08/29/2018 08/29/2018

240 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to quash (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
241 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of motion to quash 240 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 7/17/2018 at 09:30 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
242 RESPONSE by Angel Perez to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to quash 240 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 1, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Notice of Filing)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
243 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' Coffey, Barry and the class Plaintiffs have submitted a settlement demand to defendants. Defense counsel needs additional time to talk to his client. Status hearing set for 8/14/18 at 9:30 a.m. Defendants shall be prepared to report if a settlement conference would be fruitful. For the reasons stated on the record, motion hearing is continued to 7/19/18 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2018)
244 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion hearing held. For the reasons started on the record, Defendant City of Chicago's motion to quash Plaintiff's subpoena 240 is granted. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
245 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey, Estephanie Martinez, Jose Martinez, Angel Perez to withdraw Michelle A. Alyea as Counsel (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
246 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion to withdraw 245 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/25/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
247 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiff's motion to withdraw Michelle A. Alyea as counsel for Plaintiff 245 is granted. Notice of motion date of 7/25/2018 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 07/24/2018)
248 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: On the Court's own motion, status hearing set for 8/14/18 is stricken and reset for 8/28/18 at 9:30 a.m. Defendants shall be prepared to report if a settlement conference would be fruitful. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/31/2018)
249 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. The class plaintiffs and defendants believe a settlement conference could be productive. The City is reluctant to settle if individual plaintiff does not participant. The Court agrees a settlement without Mr. Perez would be difficult to achieve. Status hearing set for 9/28/18 at 9:30 a.m. Counsel for Mr. Perez shall be prepared to report whether Perez will participate in the settlement conference as an individual. The Court strongly encourages him to participate. Settlement Conference for the class set for 10/23/18 at 1:30 p.m. If Mr. Perez refuses to participate, this date may be stricken. Parties are to exchange position letters prior to the settlement conference. Plaintiffs' Coffey, Barry and the class Plaintiffs have already submitted a settlement demand to defendants. Defendants have 14 days thereafter to respond. Plaintiffs shall submit copies of all letters exchanged by the parties to Settlement_Rowland@ilnd.uscourts.gov by 10/17/18. If any party's position letter consists of more than 10 pages (including exhibits), the party is responsible for submitting a courtesy copy to Judge Rowland's chambers (Room 1334) on or before 10/18/18. Parties should also review and comply with Judge Rowland's standing order regarding settlement conferences which can be found on the Court's website at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
250 MOTION by Attorney Khara Coleman to withdraw as attorney for Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. No party information provided (Coleman, Khara) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
251 NOTICE of Motion by Khara Coleman for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 250 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 9/6/2018 at 09:15 AM. (Coleman, Khara) (Entered: 08/29/2018)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 30 of 38

09/04/2018 09/28/2018
10/11/2018 10/30/2018 11/13/2018 12/13/2018 12/21/2018 01/02/2019 01/09/2019 01/29/2019

252 ORDER: Khara Coleman's motion for leave to withdraw her appearance as one of the attorneys of record for Defendants City of Chicago, Sergeant Matthew Cline, Detective Jorge L. Lopez, Officer Edmund Zablocki, Officer Joseph Wagner, Officer Herbert Betancourt, Officer John Dolan, and Officer Scott Kravitz, and Officer Carlos Iglesias (collectively, "Defendants") in this case 250 is granted. Notice of motion date of 9/6/2018 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 9/4/2018:Mailed notice(aee, ) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
253 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Mr. Perez will participate in the settlement conference. The parties are at odds over whether this is a class−wide or individual settlement.Defendants are to respond to Plaintiffs' settlement demand by 10/17/18. Settlement conference previously set for 10/23/18 is stricken and reset for 11/14/18 at 1:30 p.m. Status hearing is set for 10/30/18 at 9:30 a.m. Prior to the status hearing, parties are to confer and be prepared to report whether the settlement conference will proceed on 11/14/18. If the settlement conference is proceeding, Plaintiffs shall submit copies of all letters exchanged by the parties to Settlement_Rowland@ilnd.uscourts.gov by 11/8/18. If any party's position letter consists of more than 10 pages (including exhibits), the party is responsible for submitting a courtesy copy to Judge Rowland's chambers (Room 1334) on or before 11/9/18. Parties should also review and comply with Judge Rowland's standing order regarding settlement conferences which can be found on the Court's website at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
254 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Angel Perez by Anthony William Hill (Hill, Anthony) (Entered: 10/11/2018)
255 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Defendants will not participate in a settlement conference on a class−wide basis. Therefore, Plaintiffs believe a settlement conference would not be productive. Settlement conference set for 11/14/18 is hereby stricken. Plaintiff Perez shall send a settlement demand to defendants by 11/9/18. Status hearing set for 11/13/18 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
256 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Class Plaintiffs will be filing a motion to certify the class before the district court judge. Discovery on the merits is stayed as to the Class Plaintiffs. Discovery proceeds as to individual Plaintiff Mr. Perez. Close of fact discovery as to Mr. Perez set for 2/28/19. This is a long date on a 2013 case. This date is final and will not be reset. Status hearing as to the Perez matter only set for 1/9/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
257 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Following up on Magistrate Judge Rowland's minute entry noting that Plaintiffs intend to file a motion for class certification, the Court directs counsel to meet and confer and then submit by 12/21/2018 an agreed briefing schedule on the anticipated motion for class certification. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
258 Joint Proposed Briefing Schedule for Motion for Class Certification by Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
259 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: The Court adopts the parties' joint proposed briefing schedule for motion for class certification: Plaintiffs shall file their Motion for Class Certification by January 29, 2019; Defendants shall file their response in opposition to the Motion for Class Certification by March 19, 2019; Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of the Motion for Class Certification by April 11, 2019; the Court will issue a ruling by mail. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/02/2019)
260 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Counsel reported on discovery as to Mr. Perez. Parties are on track to complete fact discovery by 2/28/19. Status hearing set for 2/13/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
261 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey for extension of time to file motion for class certification (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

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01/29/2019 02/05/2019 02/13/2019
02/21/2019
02/25/2019 02/25/2019 02/28/2019
03/05/2019 03/05/2019 03/05/2019

262 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 261 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 2/6/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
263 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion to extend deadline to file motion for class certification 261 is granted. Plaintiffs will file their motion for class certification no later than February 26, 2019, Defendants' response to the motion will be due by April 16, 2019, and Plaintiffs' reply will be due by May 9, 2019. Notice of motion date of February 6, 2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
264 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Plaintiff to update interrogatories by 2/22/19. Discovery is set to close on 2/28/19. Plaintiff may wish to re−depose his own treating physician. Status set for 2/21/19 at 9:45 a.m. If plaintiff wishes to re−depose his physician he must have a date set for that deposition to report to the court. If plaintiff does not have a date set for that deposition that works with the Dr.'s schedule the Court will not allow that deposition to take place. Discovery is otherwise closed. Defendants believe summary judgment is warranted for some individual defendants. Parties are required to confer prior to the next status to determine if summary judgment briefing will be necessary. If so, the Court will set a summary judgment schedule. Mailed notice. (dal, ) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
265 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Counsel for Mr. Perez failed to appear. Given that plaintiff was not present to apprise the court of whether a date to re−depose his treating physician was set, 264 the Court will not allow that deposition to take place. Plaintiff is required to update his interrogatories by 2/22/19. 264 Defendants issued a letter to Plaintiffs regarding summary judgment 2 days ago. Plaintiffs have yet to respond. Status hearing set for 2/28/19 at 9:30 a.m. Parties are required to confer prior to the next status to determine if summary judgment briefing will be necessary. If so, the Court will set a summary judgment schedule. Plaintiff's counsel is required to appear at the next status. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 02/21/2019)
266 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey for extension of time to file their Motion for Class Certification (Second) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/25/2019)
267 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 266 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 3/6/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 02/25/2019)
268 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Plaintiff once again failed to update interrogatories which were due 2/22/19 265 . Plaintiff believes the interrogatories are up to date. Plaintiff's counsel is required to meet and confer with his client to make sure his answers are complete. To the extent that the interrogatories require updating, Plaintiff is ordered to update his interrogatories by 3/4/19. Plaintiff will be retaining an expert. Plaintiff's expert disclosure report is due 3/15/19. Prior to the next status, parties are required to meet and confer regarding a proposed expert discovery schedule. Further, parties are required to confer prior to the next status to determine if summary judgment briefing on 2 officers will be necessary. If so, the Court will set a summary judgment schedule.Status hearing set for 3/7/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
269 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Second motion to extend deadline to file motion for class certification is granted. This should be considered a final extension and there will be no further extensions of this deadline absent good cause shown. Notice of motion date of 3/6/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
270 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey to certify class (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
271 MEMORANDUM by Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey in support of motion to certify class 270 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7− Part 1, # 8 Exhibit 7− Part 2, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13)(Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 32 of 38

03/07/2019
04/08/2019 04/11/2019 04/11/2019 04/16/2019 04/19/2019 04/19/2019 04/19/2019
04/19/2019 04/19/2019 04/19/2019 04/19/2019

272 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Defendants have received Plaintiff's response to interrogatories last night. Fact discovery is closed. Defense counsel has not made a thorough review but does not have any reason to believe the interrogatories contain new information. Parties' agreed expert discovery schedule is as follows: Plaintiff's expert disclosure reports remains due 3/15/19; Defendants' expert disclosure reports due 5/15/19; Defendants' experts will be deposed by 6/15/19. These dates will not be extended. All expert reports must strictly comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro 26. Plaintiff will be filing a motion to dismiss some of the individual defendants before the district court judge. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss should be filed by 3/29/19. Status hearing set for 05/09/19 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 03/07/2019)
273 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: The Court's minute entry of 3/5/2019 269 omitted the briefing schedule set out in the most recent motion for extension of time: Defendants' opposition will be due by April 23, 2019, and Plaintiffs reply will be due by May 16, 2019. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
274 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class 270 (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
275 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, 274 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 4/17/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
276 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Defendant City of Chicago's unopposed motion for additional time to respond to motion for class certification 274 is granted. Notice of motion date of 4/17/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
277 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel PerezAgreed Motion Modify Order (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
278 NOTICE of Motion by Jason R. Epstein for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 277 before Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 4/25/2019 at 01:45 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Plaintiff's Agreed Motion to Modify Order 277 is granted. No appearance on 4/25/19. Plaintiff's counsel is admonished for improperly noticing this motion before the wrong judge. Plaintiff's expert disclosure reports due 5/15/19; Defendants' expert disclosure reports due 7/15/19; Defendants' experts will be deposed by 8/15/19. Plaintiff's counsel is admonished for requesting an extension 5 weeks AFTER Plaintiff's expert disclosure was due. This is a 2013 case. Plaintiff's counsel filed his appearance in 2015. There will be NO MORE EXTENSIONS. Status hearing set for 5/9/19 is stricken and reset for 6/25/19 at 9:30am. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
280 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: The Court has been contacted by defense counsel who indicated that defense counsel did NOT agree to Plaintiff's "Agreed" Motion 277 . The Court vacates its prior order granting Plaintiff's Motion, at Dkt. 279 . Status hearing set for 4/25/19 at 11:00 am before Judge Rowland. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
281 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez to bar Plaintiff from Disclosing Any Expert Witnesses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit)(Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
282 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion to bar, 281 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 5/1/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
283 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Defendants' request to reschedule the status hearing set for 4/25/19 (see Dkt 281) is granted. Status set for 4/25/19 is stricken. Status and hearing on Defendants' Motion to Bar 281 set for 5/1/19 at 9:45 am. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 33 of 38

04/25/2019 04/25/2019 04/25/2019 04/30/2019 05/01/2019
05/01/2019
05/07/2019
05/07/2019 05/07/2019 05/08/2019 05/08/2019
05/10/2019 05/28/2019 05/28/2019

284 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel PerezVoluntary Dismissal of Certain Defendants (Brigham, Phillip) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
285 NOTICE of Motion by Phillip Aaron Brigham for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 284 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/2/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Brigham, Phillip) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
286 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Phillip Aaron Brigham for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 284 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/2/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Brigham, Phillip) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
287 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Angel Perez to motion to bar, 281 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Notice of Filing)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
288 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status and motion hearing held. Defendants' motion to bar Plaintiff from disclosing and expert witnesses 281 is denied. Plaintiff has disclosed his treating physician who has already been deposed as an expert. Defendants are permitted to re−depose that witness. Additionally, over defendants' objection, Plaintiff may disclose one additional expert by 5/15/19. There will be no further extensions. Parties shall submit a proposed expert discovery schedule to the Court's proposed order mailbox (Proposed_Order_Rowland@ilnd.uscourts.gov) by 5/6/19. Plaintiff is warned that expert disclosures must strictly comply with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
289 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Agreed motion to voluntarily dismiss certain Defendants 284 is granted. Joseph Wagner (Chicago Police Officer, Star # 9812), Herbert Betancourt (Chicago Police Officer, Star # 16976), and John Dolan (Chicago Police Officer, Star # 7722) terminated. Notice of motion date of 5/2/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
290 RESPONSE by Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki to MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey to certify class 270 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit)(Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
291 MOTION by Defendants Herbert Betancourt, City of Chicago, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki for leave to file excess pages Instanter (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
292 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 291 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 5/14/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
AGREED VERBAL MOTION by Parties to enter expert discovery schedule. (dm, ) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
293 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Parties' agreed verbal motion to enter expert discovery schedule is granted. Defendants shall disclose any expert witnesses by 7/26/19. All expert discovery shall be completed by 9/26/19. Status hearing previously set for 6/25/19 is stricken. Status hearing set for 7/9/19 at 9:30 am. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
294 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Motion for leave to file excess pages 291 is granted. Notice of motion date of 5/14/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 05/10/2019)
295 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey for extension of time to file response/reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification (Unopposed) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
296 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 295 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/4/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 05/28/2019)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 34 of 38

06/03/2019 06/12/2019 06/12/2019 06/12/2019 06/18/2019
06/20/2019 06/20/2019 06/24/2019 06/28/2019 07/03/2019 07/15/2019 07/15/2019 07/16/2019 07/16/2019
07/17/2019 07/17/2019

297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Unopposed motion to extend deadline to file Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for class certification 295 is granted. Notice of motion date of 6/4/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
298 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to strike Plaintiff's Expert Disclosure of Dr. Monica Argumedo (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter from Dr. Argumedo, # 2 Exhibit Pl. Amended Disclosures)(Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/12/2019)
299 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of motion to strike 298 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/18/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/12/2019)
300 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of motion to strike 298 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 6/18/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/12/2019)
301 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Motion hearing on Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's expert Dr. Monica Argumendo 298 held. Plaintiff requests time to respond in writing. Plaintiff's response is due 6/28/19. No reply is required. The Court will rule by mail. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/18/2019)
302 MOTION by Plaintiffs Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey for extension of time to file response/reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification (Unopposed) (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
303 NOTICE of Motion by Cassandra P. Miller for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 302 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 6/25/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/20/2019)
304 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend deadline to file Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for class certification 302 is granted. Notice of motion date of 6/25/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
305 REPLY by Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey to response to motion, 290 for Class Certification (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 06/28/2019)
306 ORDER : For the reasons stated in the Order, Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's expert disclosure of Dr. Monica Argumedo (Dkt. 298) is granted. Status hearing set for 7/9/19 is stricken and reset for 7/16/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
307 MOTION by Plaintiff Angel Perez for reconsideration regarding order on motion to strike,, terminate hearings,,,, set/reset hearings, 306 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 07/15/2019)
308 NOTICE of Motion by Jason R. Epstein for presentment of motion for reconsideration 307 before Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 7/18/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Epstein, Jason) (Entered: 07/15/2019)
309 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Bret Anthony Kabacinski (Kabacinski, Bret) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
310 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Status hearing held. Jonathan Cifonelli, Jorge Cazares and Walter Jones' oral motion for leave to withdraw their appearances on behalf of defendants is granted. Counsel for defendant City of Chicago and the individual officers will file their appearances today. The Court heard argument on Plaintiff's motion to reconsider 307 . Order to follow. Motion presentment date of 7/18/19 is stricken. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
311 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Matthew Cline, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Edmund Zablocki by Jason Michael Marx (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 07/17/2019)
312 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Matthew Cline, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Edmund Zablocki by Jordan F Yurchich (Yurchich, Jordan) (Entered: 07/17/2019)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 35 of 38

07/17/2019
07/17/2019 07/18/2019 07/18/2019 07/18/2019 07/19/2019 08/14/2019
08/19/2019 08/22/2019
08/23/2019

313 ORDER : For the reasons stated in the Order, Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration 307 of the Court's 7/3/19 Order [Dkt. 306] is granted in part, denied in part. Upon reconsideration, the Court concludes that a more appropriate sanction for Plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 26(a) is the "payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Court amends its prior ruling. Defendants' motion to strike Dr. Argumedo as a potential expert (Dkt. 298) is denied. But Plaintiff is ordered to reimburse Defendants for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in filing the motion to strike (Dkt. 298) and in making two court appearances (Dkt. 301, 310). Defendants shall submit their fee petition on or before 8/7/19. Any objections to the fee petition shall be filed on or before 8/21/19. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 7/17/2019. (See Order for further details.) The Court modifies the expert discovery schedule as follows: Dr. Argumedo shall be deposed by 8/23/19; Defendants' expert disclosure reports are due by 9/20/19; Defendant's experts shall be deposed by 10/11/19. Status set for 10/16/19 at 9:30 a.m. If a status is no longer needed, parties shall inform the Court, and the status will be stricken. Mailed notice. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2019)
314 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Iris Chavira (Chavira, Iris) (Entered: 07/17/2019)
315 MOTION by Attorney Scott T. Kamin to withdraw as attorney for Angel Perez. No party information provided (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
316 NOTICE of Motion by Scott T. Kamin for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 315 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 7/24/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
317 ORDER: Attorneys Scott T. Kamin and Anthony Hill's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel of record for Plaintiff 315 is granted. Notice of motion date of 7/24/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 7/18/2019. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
318 NOTICE by Angel Perez of Lien (Kamin, Scott) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
319 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: The Court notes that Defendants did not submit their fee petition by the 8/7/19 deadline to reimburse Defendants for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees incurred in filing their motion to strike Dkt. 298 and in making two court appearances Dkt. 301 , 310 . If Defendants wish to pursue expenses and attorney's fees, they are to notify the Court by close of business on 8/16/19, and a new briefing schedule will be set. Otherwise, Defendants will be deemed to have waived their right to seek fees and costs under the Court's sanctions order Dkt. 313 . Status remains set for 10/16/19 at 9:30 a.m. If a status is no longer needed, parties shall inform the Court, and the status will be stricken. Mailed notice. (cc, ) (Entered: 08/14/2019)
320 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: Defendants did not notify the Court by close of business on 8/16/19 pursuant to this Court's prior order (Dkt. 319 ). Therefore Defendants have waived their right to seek fees and costs under the Court's sanctions order (Dkt. 313 ). Status remains set for 10/16/19 at 9:30 a.m. If a status is no longer needed, parties shall inform the Court, and the status will be stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 08/19/2019)
321 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: General Order 19−0026: The Honorable Mary M. Rowland has been confirmed as a United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois; therefore It is hereby ordered that all previously pending cases and referrals before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland as a U.S. Magistrate Judge are to be reassigned to the remaining magistrate judges of the Eastern Division as indicated on the attached list; and It is also ordered cases where Honorable Mary M. Rowland was the designated magistrate judge and require further action, the Clerk shall randomly assign the matter to another magistrate judge of the Eastern Division. Case referred to the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings. Signed by Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 8/22/2019.(jjr, ) (Entered: 08/22/2019)
322 MOTION by Defendants Matthew Cline, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Edmund Zablocki for extension of time to complete discovery EXPERT (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 08/23/2019)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 36 of 38

08/23/2019 08/29/2019
08/29/2019 12/03/2019
12/10/2019 12/10/2019 12/10/2019 12/27/2019 01/10/2020 01/16/2020

323 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 322 before Honorable Jeffrey Cummings on 8/29/2019 at 10:00 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
324 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings: Motion hearing held. Defendants' motion for an extension of time to complete discovery 322 is granted with no objections from plaintiff. Plaintiff is to provide defense counsel with dates for Dr. Argumedo's deposition by 9/5/19. Dr. Argumedo is to be deposed by 9/23/19. Defendants' expert disclosures and reports are due by 10/23/19. Defendants' experts are to be deposed by 11/22/19. Status hearing scheduled for 10/16/19 is stricken and reset to 12/3/19 at 10:00 a.m., at which time all expert discovery is to be completed and the parties should be prepared to report on their interest in a settlement conference. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
325 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Matthew Cline, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Edmund Zablocki by Gregory M. Beck (Beck, Gregory) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
326 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings:Status hearing held. The parties report they are not in a position to participate in a settlement conference in advance of a ruling on the pending motion for class certification. Parties shall file a joint status report within seven days of the District Court's ruling on that motion. In order to provide a date for a potential settlement conference on the Court's calendar, settlement conference set for 5/20/20 at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 1350. The parties are directed to review and comply with the Court's Standing Order for Settlement Conferences. The parties are reminded that someone with full settlement authority for each party must be present in−person at the settlement conference. Plaintiff's counsel shall provide a settlement demand letter to defense counsel by 4/8/20. Defense counsel shall provide a settlement offer letter to plaintiff's counsel by 4/22/20. The parties may not change these dates for exchange unless authorized by the Court. Each party shall email a copy of its letter to Judge Cummings' chambers on the same day that it is provided to opposing counsel. Each letter shall identify all of the individuals who will be present at the conference for each party. The email address for submission of settlement letters to the Court is: Settlement_Correspondence_Cummings@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Parties are reminded that this is a firm settlement conference date and no continuance will be allowed absent exigent circumstances. (rbf, ) (Entered: 12/03/2019)
327 MOTION by Attorney Jason Marx to withdraw as attorney for Herbert Betancourt, Matthew Cline, John Dolan, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Joseph Wagner, Edmund Zablocki. No party information provided (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 12/10/2019)
328 NOTICE of Motion by Jason Michael Marx for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 327 before Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr. on 12/17/2019 at 09:15 AM. (Marx, Jason) (Entered: 12/10/2019)
329 ORDER: Attorney Jason Marx's motion to withdraw his appearance as counsel on behalf of Defendants Zablocki, Wagner, Betancourt, Cline, Dolan, Lopez, Kravitz, and Iglesias 327 is granted. n this matter. Notice of motion date of 12/17/2019 is stricken and no appearances are necessary on that date. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 12/10/2019. Mailed notice(gcy, ) (Entered: 12/10/2019)
330 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 12/27/2019. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for class certification 270 . This case is set for further status hearing on January 16, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice(cdh, ) (Entered: 12/30/2019)
331 STATUS Report (Joint Report Regarding Ruling on Motion for Class Certification) by Juanita Berry, Calvin Coffey (Miller, Cassandra) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
332 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Status hearing held and continued to 3/19/2020 at 9:00 a.m. In the interest of efficient case management, the Court requests that counsel file on the docket no less than 3 business days before the next status hearing a brief joint status report. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 01/16/2020)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 37 of 38

01/23/2020 02/11/2020
03/16/2020 03/16/2020 03/30/2020 04/22/2020 04/24/2020 05/04/2020

333 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings:Status hearing set for 2/11/20 at 10:00 a.m. (rbf, ) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
334 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings:Status hearing held. All plaintiffs are interested in participating in the settlement conference. The 5/20/20 settlement conference stands. The parties are reminded to review and comply with the Court's Standing Order for Settlement Conferences. The parties are reminded that someone with full settlement authority for each party must be present in−person at the settlement conference. Plaintiffs' counsel shall provide a settlement demand letter to defense counsel by 4/8/20. Defense counsel shall provide a settlement offer letter to plaintiff's counsel by 4/22/20. The parties may not change these dates for exchange unless authorized by the Court. Each party shall email a copy of its letter to Judge Cummings' chambers on the same day that it is provided to opposing counsel. Each letter shall identify all of the individuals who will be present at the conference for each party. The email address for submission of settlement letters to the Court is: Settlement_Correspondence_Cummings@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Parties are reminded that this is a firm settlement conference date and no continuance will be allowed absent exigent circumstances. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/12/2020)
335 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: In view of the entry on 3/16/2020 of Amended General Order 20−0012 by the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the status hearing set for 3/19/2020 is stricken and will be reset to a later date after 4/3/2020. However, in view of the settlement conference set for 5/20/2020, the status hearing in the district court will not be reset until after that date absent a request by the parties. Mailed notice (cdh, ) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
336 ORDER Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 16, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Amended General Order. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/16/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
337 ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20−0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and General Order 20−0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
338 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Matthew Cline, Carlos Iglesias, III, Scott Kravitz, Jorge L Lopez, Edmund Zablocki by Elizabeth Kathryn Hanford (Hanford, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/22/2020)
339 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
340 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey Cummings: In light of Third Amended General Order 20−0012, dated 4/24/20, the currently scheduled settlement conference set in this matter is postponed. The Court will set a telephonic status hearing in due course to discuss re−scheduling the settlement conference. Plaintiffs are to submit a demand letter in conformance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conferences as soon as practicable but in no event later than 6/1/2020. Defendants are to submit a compliant written offer letter no later than 6/15/2020. To the extent possible, the parties are encouraged to engage in settlement negotiations amongst themselves, by telephone or video conference only. In addition, the parties shall promptly notify the Court if they reach a settlement agreement. Mailed notice (cc, ) (Entered: 05/04/2020)

Case: 1:13-cv-4531 As of: 05/29/2020 11:10 AM CDT 38 of 38

05/26/2020

341 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20−0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID−19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non−emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)