Case 3:12-cv-02317-ST Document 1 Filed 12/21/12 Page 1 of 5 Page ID#: 1

David Henretty, OSB 03187 dhenretty@oregonlawcenter.org Tel: (503) 473-8684 Spencer M. Neal, OSB 77286 spencerneal@justice.com Tel: (503) 473-8325 OREGON LAW CENTER 921 SW Washington Street, Suite 516 Portland, OR 97205 Fax: (503) 295-0676
Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

MARIA MIRANDA- OLIVARES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CLACKAMAS COUNTY, and CRAIG ROBERTS, sheriff of Clackamas County, in his official capacity,
Defendants.

Civil No.
COMPLAINT (Civil Rights: Unlawful Seizure, Due Process, False Imprisonment)
42 U.S.C. § 1983

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I. JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343, and Article III of the United States Constitution, as plaintiff seeks redress of deprivations to her civil rights secured by the United States Constitution. 2. Pursuant to 28 USC § 1367, this court has supplemental jurisdiction of the claims based on Oregon law, as they are so related to claims within the Court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
II. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff is a resident of Oregon. 4. Defendant Clackamas County (“Defendant County”) is a municipality and political subdivision of the State of Oregon. 5. Defendant Craig Roberts is the sheriff of Clackamas County (“Defendant Sheriff”).
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 6. Defendant County operates the Clackamas County Jail in Clackamas County, Oregon. 7. Defendant Sheriff has custody and control of all persons confined in the Clackamas County and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Clackamas County Jail. 8. On or about March 14, 2012, plaintiff was lodged in the Clackamas County Jail based on a probable cause arrest. 9. On or about March 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lodged an immigration detainer (Form I-247) relating to plaintiff with the Clackamas County Jail. 10. The immigration detainer indicated that DHS had initiated an investigation to determine whether plaintiff was subject to removal from the United States and requested that the Clackamas County Jail maintain custody of plaintiff “for a period not to exceed 48 hours,
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excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the [plaintiff] would have otherwise been released from your custody” to allow DHS to take custody of plaintiff.
11. On or about March 15, 2012, plaintiff was charged with two counts of Contempt of Court (Or. Rev. Stat. § 33.065) and the court set plaintiff’s bail at $5,000.
12. While in defendants’ custody, plaintiff inquired on more than one occasion about pre-trial release by posting bail, as set by the trial court. She was told by Clackamas County Jail authorities that, even if she did post bail, she would not be released because of the immigration detainer.
13. On or about March 29, 2012, plaintiff resolved her criminal matter. 14. Defendants continued to maintain custody of plaintiff solely based on the immigration detainer until March 30, 2012. 15. Defendants confined plaintiff from March 14, 2012 to March 30, 2012. 16. Defendants intended to confine plaintiff during her incarceration at the Clackamas County Jail in March 2012. 17. Plaintiff was aware of her confinement at the Clackamas County Jail in March 2012. 18. During the course of her incarceration, defendants did not provide plaintiff any opportunity to challenge her continued detention based solely on the immigration detainer. 19. Defendants have a policy, practice, or custom of denying inmates the opportunity to be released by posting bail solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer, notwithstanding that bail had been set by the state trial court. 20. Defendants have a policy, practice, or custom of detaining inmates, solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer, who would otherwise be released because their criminal matter has been resolved and they are entitled to release.
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21. Because of defendants’ unlawful actions, plaintiff has suffered loss of liberty, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, mental suffering, emotional distress, stress, and other noneconomic losses in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.
IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Claim – Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process): 42 U.S.C. §1983 22. Without any basis in state law defendants denied plaintiff the opportunity to be released by posting bail, thus depriving plaintiff of her liberty without the due process of law. Second Claim -- Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Seizure): 42 U.S.C. §1983 23. Defendants continued to detain plaintiff without any basis in state law after her criminal matter had been resolved and solely on the basis of the immigration detainer, thus depriving her of her liberty.
Third Claim – False Imprisonment (Oregon common law) 24. Defendants imprisoned plaintiff without legal authority and in violation of Oregon law.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her the following relief: 1. On her first claim, her compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 2. On her second claim, her compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 3. On her third claim, her non-economic losses in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 4. Her costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
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5. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 21st day of December, 2012.

OREGON LAW CENTER
s/ David Henretty David Henretty, OSB 03187 (503) 473-8684 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

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 Case 3:12-cv-02317-ST Document 6 Filed 03/01/13 Page 1 of 5 Page ID#: 26
David Henretty, OSB 03187 dhenretty@oregonlawcenter.org Tel: (503) 473-8684 Spencer M. Neal, OSB 77286 spencerneal@justice.com Tel: (503) 473-8325 OREGON LAW CENTER 921 SW Washington Street, Suite 516 Portland, OR 97205 Fax: (503) 295-0676
Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

MARIA MIRANDA- OLIVARES, Plaintiff,
vs. CLACKAMAS COUNTY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 3:12−cv−02317−ST
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Civil Rights: Unlawful Seizure,
Due Process, False Imprisonment) 42 U.S.C. § 1983

I. JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343, and Article III of the United States Constitution, as plaintiff seeks redress of deprivations to her civil rights secured by the United States Constitution.
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2. Pursuant to 28 USC § 1367, this court has supplemental jurisdiction of the claims based on Oregon law, as they are so related to claims within the Court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
II. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff is a resident of Oregon. 4. Defendant Clackamas County is a municipality and political subdivision of the State of Oregon.
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 5. Defendant operates the Clackamas County Jail in Clackamas County, Oregon. 6. Defendant has custody and control of all persons confined in the Clackamas County Jail and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Clackamas County Jail. 7. On or about March 14, 2012, plaintiff was lodged in the Clackamas County Jail based on a probable cause arrest. 8. On or about March 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lodged an immigration detainer (Form I-247) relating to plaintiff with the Clackamas County Jail. 9. The immigration detainer indicated that DHS had initiated an investigation to determine whether plaintiff was subject to removal from the United States and requested that the Clackamas County Jail maintain custody of plaintiff “for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the [plaintiff] would have otherwise been released from your custody” to allow DHS to take custody of plaintiff. 10. On or about March 15, 2012, plaintiff was charged with two counts of Contempt of Court (Or. Rev. Stat. § 33.065) and the court set plaintiff’s bail at $5,000. 11. While in defendant’s custody, plaintiff inquired on more than one occasion about pre-trial
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release by posting bail, as set by the trial court. She was told by Clackamas County Jail authorities that, even if she did post bail, she would not be released because of the immigration detainer.
12. On or about March 29, 2012, plaintiff resolved her criminal matter. 13. Defendant continued to maintain custody of plaintiff solely based on the immigration detainer until March 30, 2012. 14. Defendant confined plaintiff from March 14, 2012 to March 30, 2012. 15. Defendant intended to confine plaintiff during her incarceration at the Clackamas County Jail in March 2012. 16. Plaintiff was aware of her confinement at the Clackamas County Jail in March 2012. 17. During the course of her incarceration, defendant did not provide plaintiff any opportunity to challenge her continued detention based solely on the immigration detainer. 18. Defendant has a policy, practice, or custom of denying inmates the opportunity to be released by posting bail solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer, notwithstanding that bail had been set by the state trial court. 19. Defendant has a policy, practice, or custom of detaining inmates, solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer, who would otherwise be released because their criminal matter has been resolved and they are entitled to release. 20. Because of defendant’s unlawful actions, plaintiff has suffered loss of liberty, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, mental suffering, emotional distress, stress, and other noneconomic losses in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.
IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF First Claim – Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process): 42 U.S.C. §1983
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21. Without any basis in state law defendant denied plaintiff the opportunity to be released by posting bail solely due to the existence of an immigration detainer, thus depriving plaintiff of her liberty without the due process of law.
Second Claim -- Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Seizure): 42 U.S.C. §1983 22. Defendant continued to detain plaintiff without any basis in state law after her criminal matter had been resolved and solely on the basis of the immigration detainer, thus depriving her of her liberty.
Third Claim – False Imprisonment (Oregon common law) 23. Defendant imprisoned plaintiff without legal authority and in violation of Oregon law.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her the following relief: 1. On her first claim, her compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 2. On her second claim, her compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 3. On her third claim, her non-economic losses in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 4. Her costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
/ / / /
/ / / /
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5. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2013.

OREGON LAW CENTER
s/David Henretty________ David Henretty, OSB 03187 (503) 473-8684 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

MARIA MIRANDA-OLIVARES, Plaintiff,
v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY,1
Defendant.

Case No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST OPINION AND ORDER

STEWART, Magistrate Judge: INTRODUCTION
This case involves the detention of plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares (“MirandaOlivares”), in the Clackamas County Jail (“Jail”) based solely on a federal immigration detainer (Form I-247) issued by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). The detainer indicated that ICE had initiated an investigation to determine whether Miranda-Olivares was subject to removal from the United States. Miranda-Olivares alleges that by keeping her in custody based on that ICE detainer, Clackamas County (“County”) violated 42 USC § 1983 by depriving her of liberty with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (First Claim) and her right to be free from

1 Another defendant, Craig Roberts, Sheriff of Clackamas County, was named as a defendant in the initial Complaint, but deleted in the First Amended Complaint (docket #6).
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unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Second Claim), and also falsely imprisoned her in violation of Oregon law (Third Claim).
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1331. All parties have consented to allow a Magistrate Judge to enter final orders and judgment in this case in accordance with FRCP 73 and 28 USC § 636(c) (docket #10).
Because the material facts are undisputed, the County has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (docket #17) on liability for all claims, and Miranda-Olivares has filed a cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (docket #23) on her § 1983 claims. For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted to Miranda-Olivares as to liability on the Second Claim and granted to the County on the First and Third Claims.
UNDISPUTED FACTS On March 14, 2012, Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a domestic violence restraining order and booked into the Jail. Eby Decl. (docket #19), ¶ 2 & Ex. 101. MirandaOlivares does not challenge the lawfulness of that arrest. The County generally does not know a person’s immigration status and did not know Miranda-Olivares’s immigration status any at time during her incarceration. Henretty Decl. (docket #27), Ex. 6 (“Eby Depo.”), pp. 41-42, & Ex. 8, p. 2. However, it has a policy of notifying ICE when a foreign–born person is brought to the Jail on a warrant or probable cause charge. Id, Ex. 3, p. 2, & Ex. 5, p. 2. The County does not request that ICE issue an immigration detainer against a person. Id, Ex. 4, p. 6. Early the next morning on March 15, 2012, the Jail received an immigration detainer (Form I-247) issued by ICE for Miranda-Olivares. Id, Ex. 2; Eby Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. The top of that ICE detainer contains the following caption: “MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A
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PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS.” Eby Decl., Ex. 102. After naming and describing
Miranda-Olivares, it states that DHS “has taken the following action related to” her with an “X” marked in the first of four boxes 2 indicating that DHS had “initiated an investigation to
determine whether [Miranda-Olivares] is subject to removal from the United States.” Id. It
states no basis for the investigation and was not accompanied by an arrest warrant or any other
charging document. Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 2. The middle of that ICE detainer states “IT IS
REQUESTED THAT YOU,” followed by six boxes with an “X” marked in the two following
boxes:
Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the subject. This request flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law enforcement agency “shall maintain custody of an alien” once a detainer has been issued by DHS. You are not authorized to hold the subject beyond these 48 hours. As early as possible prior to the time you otherwise would release the subject, please notify the Department . . . . . . . Provide a copy to the subject of this detainer . . . .
Eby Decl., Ex. 102 (emphasis in original).
When the Jail receives an ICE detainer, it holds the person subject to the detainer for up
to 48 hours, not including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the person
would otherwise be released, even if the person posts bail. Henretty Decl., Ex. 7 (“Roberts
Depo.”), p. 10; Eby Depo., pp. 22-23. The Jail’s practice is the same whether or not the ICE
detainer is accompanied by an arrest warrant, statement of probable cause, or removal or
deportation order. Eby Depo., pp. 17-18.
2 The other three unchecked boxes indicate that DHS has “[i]nitiated removal proceedings and served a Notice to Appear or other charging document,” “[s]erved a warrant of arrest for removal proceedings,” or “[o]btained an order of deportation or removal from the United States for this person.” Eby Decl., Ex. 102.
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Although Miranda-Olivares became aware of the ICE detainer the day it was issued, she was not provided a copy of it while she was incarcerated. Miranda-Olivares Decl. (docket #25), ¶ 8; Ceicko Decl. (docket #20), Ex. 105 (“Miranda-Olivares Depo.”), pp. 25, 29.
That same day, Miranda-Olivares was arraigned and charged with two counts of contempt of court (ORS 33.065),3 and the judge set bail at $5,000.00. Answer (docket #7), ¶ 10; Eby Decl., ¶ 7; Henretty Decl., Ex. 9. In order to post bail, Miranda-Olivares was required to pay $500.00. Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 5. However, the Jail holds an individual who is subject to an ICE detainer in custody, even if the underlying state criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted. Eby Depo., pp. 22-23, 41. Between March 16 and March 30, 2012, the Jail told Miranda-Olivares’s sister, Laura Miranda, approximately four or five times that even if bail was posted, Miranda-Olivares would not be released due to the ICE detainer. Laura Miranda Decl. (docket #26), ¶¶ 4, 6; Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 4. On March 16, 2012, Laura Miranda informed Miranda-Olivares by telephone that she would not be released if she posted bail because of the ICE detainer. Miranda-Olivares Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Laura Miranda Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5; Henretty Decl., Ex. 10 (Progress Notes, March 16, 2012). On or about March 28, 2012, a sheriff’s deputy told Miranda-Olivares directly that she would not be released if she posted bail because of the Jail policy relating to ICE detainers. Miranda-Olivares Decl., ¶ 7; Henretty Decl., Ex. 4, p. 3 & Ex. 10, p. 2. Miranda-Olivares’s family was willing and able to pay the $500.00 bail, but did not do so because of the statements by Jail officials. Laura Miranda Decl., ¶ 8.
Miranda-Olivares remained in custody at the Jail on the state charges until March 29, 2012, when she pled guilty to one of the charges and was sentenced to 48 hours in jail with credit
3 Restraining orders under the Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 107.700 et seq, are enforced through contempt proceedings under ORS Chapter 33. See State ex rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231, 236-37 (1985). Contempt of court is not a “crime” in Oregon. State v. Reynolds, 239 Or App 313, 315-16 (2010). No longer referred to as a civil or criminal charge, contempt is “categorized by the sanction sought, either remedial or punitive.” Bachman v. Bachman, 171 Or App 665, 673 n8 (2000); see ORS 33.045. Charges brought under ORS 33.065 involve punitive sanctions.
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for time served and probation. Eby Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 & Ex. 103. Consequently, at about 1:30 pm
on March 29, 2012, Miranda-Olivares would have been released from the Jail but for the ICE
detainer. Id, ¶ 12. Instead, the County held Miranda-Olivares in custody for another 19 hours
until about 8:30 am on March 30, 2012, when she was released from the Jail to the custody of
DHS agents. Id, ¶ 13.
While in custody at the Jail, Miranda-Olivares did not file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, file a Jail administrative grievance, or contact DHS regarding the issuance of the ICE
detainer. Id, ¶ 16; Miranda-Olivares Depo., pp. 29-30.
DISCUSSION
Miranda-Olivares challenges her confinement by the County from March 15 through
March 30, 2012, and specifically the County’s custom and practice of incarcerating persons who
are subject to ICE detainers after the lawful custody on state charges has ended. The County
responds that federal law requires this custom and practice because ICE detainers (Form I-247)
are issued pursuant to 28 CFR § 287.7 which, it its view, mandates the detention of a suspected
alien by a local law enforcement agency for up to 48 hours. That regulation contains the
following two relevant subsections:
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. . . . ///
///
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(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department. However, as discussed below, neither 28 CFR § 287.7 nor the form of ICE detainer at issue here are mandatory. As a result, the County violated Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment rights. I. § 1983 Claims A. Legal Standard Government conduct under the color of law that deprives a person of a constitutionallyprotected interest violates 42 USC § 1983. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir 1985). Municipalities are “persons” subject to damages liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 US 658 (1978); Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir 1992). A municipality’s liability under § 1983 is established if the constitutional violation was committed pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a “long standing practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” Gillette, 979 F2d at 1346-47. Miranda-Olivares does not challenge an express policy adopted by the County. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 US 808, 823 (1985) (“the word ‘policy’ generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives”). Instead, she challenges the County’s undisputed practice or custom of detaining a person based entirely on an ICE detainer even after that person is entitled to release from custody by posting bail or resolving the criminal charges. Based on its interpretation of the language in the ICE detainer and 8 CFR § 287.7, the County argues that its practice or custom does not violate either the Fourth or
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Fourteenth Amendments because it is mandated by federal law. However, as discussed below, the County misinterprets the nature of the ICE detainer at issue here.
B. ICE Detainer is Not Mandatory The County’s case relies heavily on the theory that a municipality cannot be liable under Monell based on a custom and practice of complying with a mandatory federal law. In support, it points to several decisions from the federal circuits holding that a municipality is not subject to Monell liability as a result of enforcing mandatory state law. See, e.g., Vives v. City of N.Y., 524 F3d 346, 351-52 (2nd Cir 2008) (summarizing the circuit decisions). These courts reason that a municipality’s decision to honor the obligation to enforce a mandatory state law is not a conscious choice. See id at 352-53, citing Tuttle, 471 US at 823 (“a policy will ordinarily be the result of a conscious choice”). This conclusion reflects Supreme Court precedent that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 483 (1986), citing Tuttle, 471 US at 823. Although these cases address only state law, their reasoning appears to apply if a municipality had an analogous obligation to follow federal law. Assuming, as the County argues, that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 USC §§ 1101, et seq, occupies and preempts the field of detaining and removing illegal aliens,4 then the INA would bar the County from exercising any discretion on the subject. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 US 72, 79
4 The County argues that its response to the ICE detainer is constitutionally preempted, citing Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F3d 1006 (9th Cir 2013). Whitting is not applicable because it involved conflict preemption of an Arizona state statute that stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose of federal immigration law. Id at 1026. In contrast, the County relies on field preemption based on the implied “federal power to determine immigration policy.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2498 (2012). Had ICE issued an order of removal or deportation for Miranda-Olivares, then a refusal by the County to comply could be constitutionally preempted. That is not the situation here, however, where the ICE detainer states only that DHS has “[i]nitiated an investigation to determine whether this person is subject to removal from the United States.” Eby Decl., Ex. 102.
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(1990) (citation omitted) (under field preemption a “scheme of federal regulation [may be] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”). Under that scenario, enforcing a federal immigration policy that mandates cooperation from local law enforcement would require no more conscious decision-making than would be involved in enforcing a mandatory state law. However, as explained below, the federal regulation in question, 8 CFR § 287.7, does not mandate detention by local law enforcement, but only requests compliance in detaining suspected aliens. As the Second Circuit posited, albeit without deciding, “if a municipality decides to enforce a statute that it is authorized, but not required, to enforce, it may have created a municipal policy,” subjecting it to Monell liability. Vives, 524 F3d at 353.5
In this case, any injury Miranda-Olivares suffered was the direct result of the County exercising its custom and practice to hold her beyond the date she was eligible for release based solely on the ICE detainer. The County argues that it had no choice because the ICE detainer mandated her detention pursuant to 8 CFR § 287.7. In particular, it points to the directive in the caption (“MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS”) and the body of the “request” stating that it “flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law enforcement agency ‘shall maintain custody of an alien’ once a detainer has been issued by DHS.” The County interprets the use of “shall” as extinguishing any discretion by a local law enforcement agency once ICE issues the detainer.
The County finds support for its interpretation of the ICE detainer and regulation in several district court cases. However, those cases are not persuasive. First, some of those cases
5 Of course, even if a municipality enforces a mandatory, but unconstitutional, state or federal law, Monell liability may attach even though the municipality does not know that the statute is unconstitutional. Id at 350, citing Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 US 622, 650, 657 (1980) (denying municipalities the good-faith defense).
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fail to conduct any textual analysis. See Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F Supp2d 1177, 1206 (ND Cal 2009); Sorcia v. Smith, C/A No. 9:10-2827-JFABM, 2011 WL 5877026, at *1 (DSC Nov. 22, 2011).
Second, the majority of the cases cited by the County rely on the statutory interpretation of Galarza v. Szalczyk, 10-CV-06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *19 (ED Pa Mar. 30, 2012). See Davila v. N. Reg’l Joint Police Bd., 2013 WL 5724939, at **12-13 (WD Pa 2013) (finding the regulation to be a “directive” and then stating that “[t]he Court is not aware of, nor is the plaintiff able to cite to, a case that has held a local government entity’s decision to rely on and comply with this federal regulation to be unconstitutional on its face”); Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (MD Tenn Sept. 10, 2012) (“The subsection says ‘shall maintain,’ which indicates an obligation to maintain custody. For this reason, the Court finds that the regulation is mandatory.”); Ramirez-Mendoza v. Maury Cnty., Tenn., 1:12-CV00014, 2013 WL 298124, at *8 (MD Tenn Jan. 25, 2013) (relying on the Rios-Quiroz analysis to hold “the Defendant was not required to make an independent probable cause determination of Plaintiff’s immigration status”). However, the Third Circuit recently reversed Galarza and interpreted the regulation as not imposing a mandatory obligation on local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to an INS detainer. Galarza v. Szalczyk, et al, No. 123991, 2014 WL 815127 (3rd Cir Mar. 4, 2014). The regulation contains two subsections. Subsection (a) of 8 CFR § 287.7 describes the purpose of a detainer “to advise another law enforcement agency” that DHS seeks custody and provides that it is “a request” to advise DHS “prior to release of the alien.” The phrase “shall maintain custody of an alien” is found only in subsection (d) regarding the length of detention. The Third Circuit concluded that “it is hard to
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read the use of the word ‘shall’ in the timing section [(d)] to change the nature of the entire regulation.” Id at *4.
Despite the Third Circuit’s analysis, the County argues that any interpretation that provides local law enforcement with discretion to refuse detention upon receipt of an ICE detainer violates the maxim requiring the court to give meaning to all provisions of the statute. However, in the present context, this maxim cuts both ways. Interpreting “shall” in subsection (d) to require local law enforcement to detain a suspected alien would render the repeated use of the word “request” meaningless, while interpreting “request” in subsection (a) to apply to all the instructions given to local law enforcement would eviscerate the common meaning of “shall.” When read as a whole, only one interpretation of the statute is reasonable. If both “shall” and “request” are given meaning, then a detainer issued by ICE under subsection (b) is a “request” that local law enforcement voluntarily hold suspected aliens up to 48 hours. At least two courts have similarly reconciled subsections (a) and (d). See Morales v. Chadbourne, et al, C.A. No. 12-301-M, 2014 WL 554478, at *17 (D RI Feb. 12, 2014) (“Subsection (d) . . . titled ‘Temporary detention at Department request,’ comes only after subsection (a)’s ‘general’ detainer definition as a ‘request.’”); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 1:11-CV-00708-SEB, 2013 WL 1332158, at *3 (SD Ind Mar. 28, 2013) (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request” that “automatically expires at the end of the 48-hour period.”).
An even more fundamental principle of statutory interpretation favors Miranda-Olivares. “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fl. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988) (citation omitted). As recognized by the
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Third Circuit, the Tenth Amendment requires that 8 CFR § 287.7 be deemed a request. Galarza, 2014 WL 815127, at *7. It is settled that any federal action that commandeers “the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program ‘upsets the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.’” New York v. United States, 505 US 144, 170 (1992), citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 US 264, 288 (1981). Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has described the only specific reference to detainers in the INA, 8 USC § 1367(d), as “requests for information about when an alien will be released from their custody” and as one way state officials may “assist” the federal government in the detention and removal of aliens. Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2507, citing 8 USC § 1357(d). Thus, a conclusion that Congress intended detainers as orders for municipalities to enforce a federal regulatory scheme on behalf of INS would raise potential violations of the anti-commandeering principle.
A non-mandatory interpretation is also consistent with the general interpretation of the character of INS detainers in other contexts. No federal circuit court “has ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests.” Galarza, 2014 WL 815127, at *5 (summarizing the treatment of INS detainers in the majority of circuits). For habeas corpus purposes, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he detainer letter itself merely advises that an investigation has been commenced and that an order to show cause and warrant will be issued when available.” Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F3d 299, 303 (9th Cir 1994), superseded on other grounds by 8 USC § 1252(i). Specifically, it held that the INS detainer letter “does not limit [Bureau of Prisons] discretion.” Id. Therefore, even a fellow federal agency “does not hold the prisoner for the INS.” Id at 304 (emphasis in original). Regardless of the context, the Ninth Circuit considers the language of the detainer letter to be unambiguous:
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We do not see how the detainer document can be read in any other way. It simply expresses interest and says that the INS will (we suppose, if it honestly can) obtain charging documents in due course. We see nothing in the detainer letter that would allow, much less compel, the warden to do anything but release [a detainee] at the end of his term of imprisonment.
Id.
The County seeks to distinguish Garcia because it interprets an unidentified detainer
letter (not necessarily Form I-247) and not 8 CFR § 287.7. However, the language of the
relevant regulation giving INS authority to issue detainer letters has not substantively changed
since the Ninth Circuit decided Garcia. See 53 Fed Reg 9281 (Mar 22, 1988) (containing 8 CFR
§ 242.2(a)(4) and § 287.7(a)(4)).6 Moreover, pre-2010 ICE detainers contained the word
“require” that does not appear anywhere in the current version. Galarza, 2014 WL 815127, at
*7. In any event, Garcia represents the only Ninth Circuit interpretation of congressional intent
underlying the authorization of immigration detainers.
The County also posits that consulting nonjudicial interpretations of 8 CFR § 287.7 is
unnecessary because the text is unambiguous. That assertion is clearly repudiated by the
contradictory judicial interpretations of the text. To resolve the ambiguity in the text, it is
prudent to follow the lead of Galarza and consider policy and litigation statements made by ICE,
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on behalf of DHS, and state Attorney Generals.
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (“the rulings, interpretations and opinions
of [the federal agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
6 § 287.7 Detainer Provisions under section 287(d)(3) of the Act. (a) Detainers in general. (1) Only an immigration officer as defined in section 101(a)(18) of the Act, or § 103.1(q) of this chapter is authorized to issue a detainer. Detainers may only be issued in the case of an alien who is amenable to exclusion or deportation proceedings under any provision of law; however, no detainer shall be issued in the case of an alien who is in the United States without legal authority and is eligible to apply, or has applied, for legalization or special agricultural worker status under the provisions of section 245A or 210 of the Act, unless the Service has denied, or has issued a notice of intent to deny, the benefit applied for. . . . (4) Temporary detention at Service request. Upon a determination by the Service to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours, in order to permit assumption of custody by the Service.
12 – OPINION AND ORDER

constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”).
Both internally and publically, ICE defines Form I-247 as “a notice that ICE issues to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to inform the LEA that ICE intends to assume custody of an individual in the LEA’s custody,” thereby serving the purpose of “request[ing] that the LEA maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released for a period not to exceed 48 hours.” Henretty Decl., Ex. 1 (ICE website) & Ex. 14 (ICE Enforcement Interim Policy Number 10074.1). Similarly, in response to a lawsuit, the DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation denied the allegations “that the regulations cited on the I-247 form, which is a legally authorized request upon which a state or local law enforcement agency permissibly may rely, imposes a requirement upon the LEA to detain the individual on ICE’s behalf.” Id, Ex. 15, p. 3. Later in that same suit, the DOJ argued that that an ICE detainer does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it is a “legally authorized request upon which a state or local law enforcement agency may rely. It does not conscript state or local law enforcement to take any action or administer any program.” Id, Ex. 16, p. 2 (Moreno v. Napolitano, 11-cv-5452 (ND Ill Aug. 11, 2011) (date of case filing)).
In addition, both the Attorney Generals of Maryland and California have issued policy statements interpreting 8 CFR§ 287.7 and defining state and local law enforcement’s duty under Form I-247. On December 4, 2012, the California Attorney General published his opinion that ICE detainers were “merely requests enforceable at the discretion of the agency holding the individual arrestee” based on the non-mandatory language used in the Form I-247 and the Tenth Amendment. Reply (docket #30), Ex. 3, p. 2. On October 31, 2013, again relying on the Tenth Amendment, the Maryland Attorney General stated “it is my view, that the mandatory meaning
13 – OPINION AND ORDER

of the term ‘shall’ should be limited to the length of the stay” and “that the best reading of the regulation, supported by the position of ICE, allows state and local jurisdictions to exercise discretion when determining how to respond to individual detainers.” Id, Ex. 2, pp. 2-3.
For these reasons, this court concludes that 8 CFR § 287.7 does not require LEAs to detain suspected aliens upon receipt of a Form I-247 from ICE and that the Jail was at liberty to refuse ICE’s request to detain Miranda-Olivares if that detention violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the County cannot avail itself of the defense that its practice and custom did not cause the allegedly unlawful detention.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim (First Claim) As clarified at the hearing on the motions, the First Claim alleges a violation of MirandaOlivares’s substantive, not procedural, due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Substantive due process refers to certain actions that the government may not engage in, no matter how many procedural safeguards it employs.” Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir 1988) (citation omitted). Miranda-Olivares easily satisfies the threshold burden of showing “a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F3d 982, 991 (9th Cir 2006). Under her allegations of extended detainment after resolution of her state charges and without a determination of probable cause to hold her under the detainer, Miranda-Olivares held a liberty interest in being free from incarceration. See Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir 1992), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 US 137, 144 (1979) (finding Oregon statutes created a protected liberty interest in freedom from incarceration without speedy pretrial procedures). However, to establish a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must also prove that the challenged government action was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
14 – OPINION AND ORDER

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 395 (1926); Patel v. Penman, 103 F3d 868, 874 (9th Cir 1996) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir 2007). The standard is whether the challenged conduct “shocks the conscience,” under which “only the most egregious executive action can be said to be ‘arbitrary’ in the constitutional sense.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 US 833, 846 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz, 533 US 194 (2001); see also Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir 2013) (citation omitted).
In the Ninth Circuit, government action taken as the result of “reasonable, though possible erroneous, legal interpretation” does not rise to the level of egregious conduct. Brittain, 451 F3d at 996. “We do not require police officers to act as legal experts to avoid violating the Constitution.” Id. Although this court concludes that the ICE detainer is not mandatory, the County could have reasonably reached a different conclusion. As Miranda-Olivares points out, the County apparently did not seek legal advice from counsel or guidance from ICE before routinely detaining persons upon receiving an ICE detainer. Had it done so, however, it still may have concluded that the ICE detainer is mandatory, as have some district courts. Even though the County’s interpretation is wrong, it is not necessarily unreasonable. Because the County’s compliance with a facially valid ICE detainer issued for the Miranda-Olivares does not shock the conscience, summary judgment is granted for the County on the First Claim.
D. Fourth Amendment Claim (Second Claim) Miranda-Olivares contends that the County violated her Fourth Amendment rights both by the refusing to release her during the two weeks when she could have posted bail and by continuing to incarcerate her for 19 hours after her release from the state charges.
15 – OPINION AND ORDER

The County argues that Miranda-Olivares’s protection under the Fourth Amendment ended after her arraignment. According to the County, the Fourth Amendment analysis only applies to allegations that an individual was deprived of liberty prior to the government’s determination of legal custody. In support, it cites the statement by the Ninth Circuit in Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., 76 F3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir 1996), that “the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest.” Pierce, 76 F3d at 1043.
The County misinterprets Miranda-Olivares’s claim. The seizures that allegedly violated her Fourth Amendment rights were not a continuation of her initial arrest, but new seizures independent of the initial finding of probable cause for violating state law. By continuation of her detention based on the ICE detainer embarked Miranda-Olivares on a subsequent and new “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody.” See Pierce, 76 F3d at 1042-43, citing Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F2d 1155, 1158-60 (10th Cir 1991) (noting that “the custodial continuum run[s] through initial arrest or seizure, post-arrest but pre-charge or pre-hearing custody, pretrial detention, and post-conviction incarceration”). In this context, the term “reseizure” is a misnomer. The alleged violations are more aptly titled “subsequent seizures” of a former detainee.
This case is similar to Vanke v. Block, Case No. CV 98-4111 DDP (SHx), 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23488 (CD Cal 1998), in which the Los Angeles County Jail extended a detainee’s confinement after the court had ordered his release. The court divided the reasons for extended confinement into two categories of delays caused by: (1) administrative steps incident to release (“administrative delays”); and (2) the County’s practice of “deferring the commencement of
16 – OPINION AND ORDER

those steps until the [County had] updated its database of wants and holds” (“investigative delays”). Id at *3. The court determined that the detention due to investigative delays constituted a seizure and was governed by the Fourth Amendment. Id at **32-33. It explained that these investigative delays:
restrict the liberty of individuals after a court has either ordered their release or concluded that the lawful authority to hold them on the case before the court no longer exists. After receiving such an order, the [county] may no longer treat the individual as a pretrial detainee, but as a former detainee, over whom the [county’s] authority extends no further than necessary to execute the court’s order directing release. The force of a court order negating the lawful authority to hold an individual requires that any continued detention beyond the period necessary to execute the order be analyzed as a new arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Id at **50-51. Likewise here, the judge ordered the pre-trial release of Miranda-Olivares at the arraignment upon posting of bail. It is undisputed that she could and would have posted bail but for the County’s custom and practice of continued detention upon receipt of the ICE detainer. Both at the arraignment (had bail been posted) and upon resolution of her state charges, the County no longer had probable cause to justify her detention. As in Vanke, the continued detention exceeded the scope of the Jail’s lawful authority over the released detainee, constituted a new arrest, and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Even Pierce, on which the County relies, recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s protection is triggered by a subsequent seizure by characterizing it as a new “initial” seizure within the traditional bounds of Fourth Amendment protections. Pierce, 76 F3d at 1043. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s directed verdict for the defendant based on the fact that the jail had seized her during the process of her release. “[A] reasonable jury could find that although Pierce was still physically inside the detention center, she had been ‘released’ because
17 – OPINION AND ORDER

[the jail] had indicated that Pierce was free to go and by implication that the officer lacked any further authority to detain her.” Id.
The County also argues that the Jail never effectively “released” Miranda-Olivares because a seizure can only occur after a person is physically released from custody and taken back into custody. In support, it cites Green v. Baca, 306 F Supp2d 903, 909 n35 (CD Cal 2004), which rejected the theory of a “constructive re-seizure” when the plaintiff’s release was delayed due to the county not receiving the release order. This argument again reflects the County’s misreading of Miranda-Olivares’s claim as based on a theory of prolonged detention based on the initial seizure instead of detention based on a new seizure. Green falls into the group of cases described in Vanke as “administrative delays” because the plaintiff alleged a violation based on his “overdetention” or “excessive custody” springing from an existing probable cause determination. Unlike the County’s reliance on the issuance of the ICE detainer, there were no new grounds for arrest in Green. See id (the jail held Green under California Penal Code § 3056: “Prisoners on parole shall remain under the legal custody of the department and shall be subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure [sic] of the prison.”). Moreover, had Miranda-Olivares posted bail and attempted to walk out of the Jail, it is undisputed that the County would have followed its custom and practice of complying with the ICE detainer and taken her back into custody. To adopt the County’s position is to elevate form over substance.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to County’s detention of Miranda-Olivares after she was entitled to pre-trial release on bail and again after she was entitled to release after resolution of her state charges. In order for the County to hold a person beyond the period necessary to execute an order of legal authority to continue detention, it must meet the clearly defined
18 – OPINION AND ORDER

reasonable seizure standards of the Fourth Amendment. See Vanke, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23488, at *51. The Fourth Amendment requires that seizures be objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386, 397 (1989) (citation omitted). Prolonged detention after a seizure, such as full custodial confinement without a warrant, must be based on probable cause. United States v. Ayarza, 874 F2d 647, 650 (9th Cir 1989), citing Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491, 503 (1983). Absent probable cause, that detention was unlawful.
Miranda-Olivares was not charged with a federal crime and was not subject to a warrant for arrest or order of removal or deportation by ICE. The County admits that Miranda-Olivares was held past the time she could have posted bail and after her state charges were resolved based exclusively on the ICE detainer. But the ICE detainer alone did not demonstrate probable cause to hold Miranda-Olivares. It stated only that an investigation “has been initiated” to determine whether she was subject to removal from the United States. See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2509 (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns.”). The ICE detainer’s stated purpose of requesting the Jail to hold Miranda-Olivares custody was “to provide adequate time for [ICE] to assume custody” of her. Therefore, it was not reasonable for the Jail to believe it had probable cause to detain Miranda-Olivares based on the box checked on the ICE detainer.
There is no genuine dispute of material fact that the County maintains a custom or practice in violation of the Fourth Amendment to detain individuals over whom the County no longer has legal authority based only on an ICE detainer which provides no probable cause for detention. That custom and practice violated Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her without probable cause both after she was eligible for pre-trial release upon posting
19 – OPINION AND ORDER

bail and after her release from state charges. Thus, Miranda-Olivares is granted summary judgment as to liability on the Second Claim. II. False Imprisonment Claim (Third Claim)
The County seeks summary judgment against the Third Claim for false imprisonment. Under Oregon law, a claim of false imprisonment requires proof of four elements: (1) the defendant confined the plaintiff; (2) the defendant intended the act that caused the confinement; (3) the plaintiff was aware of the confinement; and (4) the confinement was unlawful. Ross v. City of Eugene, 151 Or App 656, 663, 950 P2d 372, 375 (1997). The County does not dispute that Miranda-Olivares satisfied the first three elements, but contends that she cannot prevail because her confinement was lawful under 8 CFR § 287.7.
It is the defendant’s burden to prove that the plaintiff’s imprisonment was lawful. Id; Carr v. City of Hillsboro, 497 F Supp2d 1197, 1211 (D Or 2007). As explained above, the County cannot meet that burden because its detention of Miranda-Olivares was not authorized by the Fourth Amendment. However, the Oregon Tort Claims Act provides immunity for public bodies and their officers from state law claims:
arising out of an act done or omitted under the apparent authority of law, resolution, rule or regulation that is unconstitutional, invalid or inapplicable except to the extent that they would have been liable had the law, resolution, rule or regulation been constitutional, valid, and applicable, unless such act was done or omitted in bad faith or malice. ORS 30.265(6)(f). Here the County was acting pursuant to an ICE detainer and federal regulation under an erroneous belief that they provided the apparent authority to detain Miranda-Olivares. There is no contention or evidence that the County was acting in bad faith or with malice. See Elvrum v. Fish Comm’n, 14 Or App 1, 6, 510 P2d 593, 596 (1973) (finding that the Oregon Fish Commission was immune from suit when taking action after seeking a legal opinion).
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Addressing this same issue, the Multnomah County Circuit Court recently dismissed a false imprisonment claim based on defendant’s compliance with an ICE detainer issued pursuant to 8 CFR § 287.7. Cruz v. Multnomah Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Multnomah County Circuit Court Case. No. 1209-11181 (Aug. 1, 2013) (Ciecko Decl., Ex. A). After discussing the validity of the regulation, the court ultimately concluded that it did not need to construe the regulation because the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to ORS 30.265(6)(f). “Regardless of how a court might construe the regulation, it is clear that when defendants held plaintiff in custody after his arraignment, they did so under the authority of what appeared to be a mandatory directive from federal authorities.” Id at *8. For the same reason, the County is entitled to summary judgment on the Third Claim.
ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket #17) is granted as to the First and Third Claims and denied as to the Second Claim, and MirandaOlivares’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (docket #23) is granted as to liability on the Second Claim and denied as to the First Claim. As a result, the only issue remaining for trial is the amount of damages Miranda-Olivares is entitled to receive for the County’s violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. DATED April 11, 2014.
s/ Janice M. Stewart Janice M. Stewart United States Magistrate Judge
21 – OPINION AND ORDER

 
 Case 3:12-cv-02317-ST Document 124 Filed 05/05/15 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

MARIA MIRANDA-OLIVARES, Plaintiff,
v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY,
Defendant.

Case No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST JUDGMENT

Based on the Plaintiff’s Notice of Acceptance of Second Offer to Allow Judgment

(docket #122), it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of

plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares, and against defendant, Clackamas County, in the sum of thirty

thousand and one hundred dollars ($30,100.00). In addition, Clackamas County shall pay

plaintiff’s reasonable costs and attorney fees accrued as of April 20, 2015, that are recoverable

pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 in an amount to be negotiated by the parties or, if negotiations are

unsuccessful, by the procedure provided by FRCP 54.

Plaintiff agrees that Clackamas County expressly and explicitly reserves the right to

appeal this Court’s Opinion and Order entered April 11, 2014 (docket #42), resolving the parties’

summary judgment motions. DATED this 5th day of May, 2015.

s/ Janice M. Stewart

__

Janice M. Stewart

United States Magistrate Judge

1 – JUDGMENT

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

MARIA MIRANDA-OLIVARES, Plaintiff,
v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY,
Defendant.

Case No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST OPINION AND ORDER

STEWART, Magistrate Judge: INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares, filed this action against defendant, Clackamas County (“County”), to challenge her confinement by the County from March 15 through March 30, 2012, based solely on a federal immigration detainer (Form I-247) issued by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency under the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Based on her allegedly unlawful detention, plaintiff alleged that the County unlawfully deprived her of liberty without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (First Claim) and her right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Second Claim) and also falsely imprisoned her in violation of Oregon law (Third Claim). On crossmotions for summary judgment, this court determined that plaintiff’s imprisonment with

1 – OPINION AND ORDER

probable cause based on “investigatory” ICE detainers violated the Fourth Amendment (docket #42).
Two weeks prior to the date for trial on the remaining issue of plaintiff’s damages, the County made an Offer of Judgment of $30,100.00 plus reasonable attorney fees accrued as of April 20, 2015. After plaintiff accepted that offer on May 4 (docket #122), the Court entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor on May 5, 2015 (docket #124). Pursuant to the terms of the Offer of Judgment and as the prevailing party under 42 USC § 1983, plaintiff has filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs in the sum of $124,944.04 (docket #133). In addition, plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendant’s Filings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege (docket #158). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike or seal is denied, and plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the reduced sum of $94,531.70 and costs in the sum of $2,841.44, for a total of $97,373.14.
DISCUSSION I. Motion to Strike/Seal
In response to plaintiff’s motion, the County has disclosed a verbal offer of settlement made to plaintiff during a judicial settlement conference on October 1, 2014, as well as subsequent communications relating to that offer. Contending that these communications are inadmissible under FRE 4081 and LR 16-4(g),2 plaintiff seeks to either strike them or place them under seal.
The County offers the communications to show that plaintiff rejected a settlement offer in October 2014 that was essentially identical to the offer she accepted in April 2015, thus
1 FRE 408 states that evidence of settlement offers is “not admissible – on behalf of any party – either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” 2 LR 16-4(g) states that communications made during ADR proceedings are privileged “unless otherwise authorized by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
2 – OPINION AND ORDER

demonstrating that her attorneys failed to improve her position in any meaningful way. For that purpose, neither FRE 408 nor LR 16-4(g) renders the communications inadmissible.
In the Ninth Circuit, a trial judge is permitted to consider settlement negotiations in determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees. In Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F3d 925 (9th Cir 2011), the trial court reduced the plaintiff’s requested attorney fees based largely on the plaintiff’s limited success in light of the settlement offers made by the defendant and rejected by the plaintiff. In affirming that reduction, the Ninth Circuit followed the approach taken by the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits (as well as the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits) and held that “the district court did not err by considering settlement negotiations for the purpose of deciding a reasonable attorney fee award in this case.” Id at 927.
Moreover, a trial court commits plain and reversible error by concluding that it cannot consider settlement offers in making such a determination. In In re Kekauoha-Alisa v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 674 F3d 1083 (9th Cir 2012), the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court ruling “that it was prohibited from admitting evidence of the settlement offer by Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 408” when considering a request for attorney fees. Id at 1094. Citing Ingram, the court stated that for the purposes of determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees, “it is now clear that this evidence [of settlement negotiations] is admissible.” Id. It again reversed a trial court for that same reason in A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 F3d 446 (9th Cir 2013), explaining:
The reasonableness of the [attorney] fee is determined primarily by reference to the level of success achieved by the plaintiff. In evaluating the plaintiffs’ level of success, district courts should consider two questions: First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?
3 – OPINION AND ORDER

Id at 460 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In analyzing the second question, the court confirmed that “[u]nder the law now in effect,
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 does not bar district courts in the Ninth Circuit from considering amounts discussed in settlement negotiations as evidence of the extent of the plaintiff’s success.” Id at 460-61, citing In re Kekauoha-Alisa, 674 F3d at 1093-94, and Ingram, 647 F3d at 927.
Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to strike or seal the County’s references to the settlement negotiations is denied. II. Attorney Fees
A. Legal Standard Attorney fees for the prevailing party in fee-shifting claims are calculated using the lodestar figure which is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Miller v. Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F2d 617, 621 (9th Cir 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir 1987). In calculating the lodestar, the court must consider those factors identified in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F2d 67 (9th Cir 1975), which have now been subsumed within the initial calculation. Cunningham v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 879 F2d 481, 487 (9th Cir 1988). Subsumed factors include: (1) novelty and complexity of the issues; (2) special skill and experience of counsel; (3) quality of the representation; (4) the results obtained; and (5) the superior performance of counsel. After calculating the lodestar, the fee may be adjusted by any nonsubsumed factors identified in Kerr. David Henretty, assisted by Arthur Schmidt, represented plaintiff from July 11, 2012, until his motion to withdraw was granted on June 9, 2014, about two months after obtaining
4 – OPINION AND ORDER

summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff then represented herself until Benjamin

Haile of the Portland Law Collective (“PLC”) appeared as her counsel on November 12, 2014,

with Francis Nevill joining as co-counsel on February 24, 2015. Plaintiff seeks to recover

attorney fees for these attorneys calculated as follows:

David Henretty Arthur Schmidt Benjamin Haile Francie Nevill Staff Support Costs and Non-Taxable Expenses TOTAL

RATE
$300 $350 $304 $201 $90

HOURS
184.5 17.4 104.3 127.4 37.2

470.8

TOTAL $55,350 $6,090 $31,707.20 $25,607.40 $3,348 $2,841.44
$124,944.04

The County does not contest the hourly rates sought by plaintiff’s legal team, but objects to the number of hours incurred for various reasons, each of which is discussed below.
B. Reasonable Number of Hours Plaintiff argues that the number of hours expended on this case is reasonable given the tasks each attorney was required to complete; plaintiff’s limited English proficiency; the novelty and difficulty of the area of law; the complex legal arguments raised by the County’s pretrial filings; the unavoidable process of getting plaintiff’s new counsel up to speed on the case; and the County’s opposition to a short continuance of the trial, which led to a long continuance and required the PLC attorneys to review some portions of trial preparation more than once. Plaintiff also points to her excellent result, despite the undesirability of her case due to an unsettled area of law and a substantial risk of jury prejudice. The County disagrees and makes a number of specific objections based on the billing records of plaintiff’s attorneys. In considering these objections, the court has not relied on Exhibit 102, a draft of the time records submitted by the PLC attorneys during settlement

5 – OPINION AND ORDER

negotiations which contain minor, but significant, inaccuracies. Haile Reply Decl. (docket #155), ¶¶ 1-2; Nevill Reply Decl. (docket #156), ¶ 1.
1. Henretty Mr. Henretty performed more than 235 hours of legal services over 23 months, but deducted over 50 hours to arrive at his figure of 184.5 hours. Mr. Henretty consulted with Arthur Schmidt who incurred another 17.5 hours. The County agrees that Mr. Henretty performed valuable work for plaintiff by drafting pleadings, conducting discovery, and obtaining a very good result on summary judgment in an evolving and highly specialized area of the law. However, the County does challenge specific billing entries. First, the County challenges as excessive 29.9 hours from December 9, 2013, to February 10, 2014, spent by Mr. Henretty practicing and preparing for the two hour oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Amended Ciecko Decl. (docket #152), Ex. 101. This time also includes two separate moot courts. In support, the County points to the declaration of Beth Creighton submitted by plaintiff stating, “Normally, if one were to practice for oral argument, I would expect no more than 3 hours of practice time for a summary judgment oral argument that lasted 2 hours.” Creighton Decl. (docket #138), ¶ 34. It also notes that the County’s attorney spent approximately five hours preparing for the same oral argument. Ciecko Amended Decl. (docket #152), ¶ 4. Plaintiff submits that the County misreads Ms. Creighton’s declaration. Although noting “that Mr. Henretty spent a total of 29.1 hours3 preparing for summary judgment and oral argument,” Ms. Creighton also stated that he spent 7.6 hours “‘practicing for oral argument’ or doing the ‘moot courts.’” Creighton Decl., ¶ 34. Therefore, when she referred to “practice
3 No explanation has been given for the difference between the County’s total of 29.9 hours and Ms. Creighton’s total of 29.1 hours.
6 – OPINION AND ORDER

time,” she meant the 7.6 hours of practice for the argument, not the entire 29.1 hours which include reviewing the case law and researching issues. Thus, at best, Ms. Creighton proposes a reduction of only 4.6 hours (7.6 – 3 = 4.6). Plaintiff’s interpretation of Ms. Creighton’s opinion appears to be correct. Nonetheless, Ms. Creighton does not state that all 29.1 hours to prepare for the oral argument was reasonable, and this court concludes that it was not reasonable. After spending 62.3 hours to research and write the cross-motions for summary judgment (Creighton Decl., ¶ 32), it should not have taken Mr. Henretty another 29.1 (or 29.9) hours to prepare for the oral argument. To the contrary, the five hours spent by opposing counsel is more reasonable. Accordingly, Mr. Henretty’s time is reduced by 24.1 hours.
The County next challenges 20.7 hours in 88 billing entries as lacking sufficient detail to be assessed for reasonableness. However, these entries are primarily of a short duration of .1 or .2 hour for telephone calls or emails to or from plaintiff or opposing counsel “re: case” over a period of nearly two years.4 Under the circumstances, the total number of hours spent by Mr. Henretty communicating with his client and opposing counsel is not unreasonable.
The County also characterizes 1.9 hours spent by Mr. Henretty as clerical tasks. “Costs associated with clerical tasks are typically considered overhead expenses reflected in an attorney’s hourly billing rate, and are not properly reimbursable.” Salinas v. Beef Nw. Feeders, LLC, No. CV-08-1514-PK, 2010 WL 1027529, at *4 (D Or Mar. 1, 2010), citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 US 274, 288 n10 (1989) (“purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal [or lawyer’s] rate, regardless of who performs them . . . [the] dollar value [of a clerical task] is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it”) (citation omitted). The 1.9 hours includes entries for work on an acceptance of service of the Complaint, telephone calls to court
4 Mr. Henretty’s billing entries in this regard are no more lacking in detail than similar entries by the County’s counsel. Haile Reply Decl., ¶ 12 & Ex. 1.
7 – OPINION AND ORDER

staff regarding a scheduling conference, a cover letter to opposing counsel, and requesting records from a third party. This court agrees that these are clerical tasks that should not be charged at the hourly rate of an attorney.
Finally, the County challenges 9.9 hours spent by Mr. Henretty to “review” the County’s initial motion for summary judgment as excessive. The County’s memorandum was about 32 pages long. In contrast, the County points out that Mr. Henretty spent only 1.2 hours reviewing the County’s response/reply despite the fact that it was about three pages longer. However, a closer scrutiny of these time entries reveals that they are not simply to read the motion, but also included research regarding the various issues raised by the motion. For example, the 10/16/2013 entry for 2.5 hour includes 2.0 hours to “research cases cited,” and the 10/22/2013 entry for 2.5 hours includes 2.0 hours for “4th Amend. applicability.” According to Ms. Creighton, the total time of 62.3 hours spent by Mr. Henretty to research and brief the crosssummary judgment motions is “squarely within” the usual time spent on summary judgment in a civil rights case of 40-80 hours. Creighton Decl, ¶ 33. Given that the 62.3 hours includes the 9.9 hours challenged by the County, no reduction is required for that reason.
Accordingly, the number of hours charged by Mr. Henretty is reduced by 26 (24.1 + 1.9) hours from 184.5 hours to 158.5 hours.
2. Schmidt The County also objects to the 17.4 hours sought by Mr. Schmidt because he never appeared in this case or filed any pleadings. Mr. Schmidt states that he was “one of the attorneys who represented plaintiff in this action up to June 7, 2014,” but does not otherwise explain or clarify his role. Schmidt Decl., ¶ 1. It is noteworthy that in his declaration, Mr. Henretty does not mention Mr. Schmidt, stating only that he “spent time discussing [the] parties’ arguments
8 – OPINION AND ORDER

with co-counsel Steve Walters” and referring to attorney Ed Johnson in one of his billing entries. Henretty Decl., ¶ 11 & Ex. 1, p. 6 (12/9/13 billing entry). The County also complains that his billing entries on his log are largely duplicative of the work performed by Mr. Henretty, including 6.5 hours to draft and edit plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 8.7 hours to prepare for and participate in moot courts, and contain no description of why his work was reasonable or necessary.
In contrast to Mr. Henretty who graduated from law school in 1999 and has devoted his career to representing low-income clients in a variety of civil cases, Mr. Schmidt graduated from law school in 1980 and has substantial experience in litigating civil rights cases. Attorneys who lack expertise in a certain areas often seek the advice of more experienced attorneys, and it appears from Mr. Schmidt’s billing entries that Mr. Henretty consulted him in that capacity. As this court has explained, a “party is certainly free to hire and pay as many lawyers as it wishes, but cannot expect to shift the cost of any redundancies to its opponent.” Pollard v. City of Portland, No. CV-01-114-ST, 2001 WL 34042624, at *5 (D Or Aug. 7, 2001). No matter how helpful Mr. Schmidt may have been to Mr. Henretty, it is far from clear that plaintiff actually hired Mr. Schmidt. The County is not required to pay for Mr. Henretty to obtain advice from another attorney who did not formally appear on behalf of plaintiff, represent her in any communications with the County, or even bill her for his time. In any event, this court agrees with the County that Mr. Schmidt’s time is largely duplicative of Mr. Henretty’s work. Therefore, the 17.4 hours sought by Mr. Schmidt is deducted. /// /// ///
9 – OPINION AND ORDER

3. PLC Attorneys a. Degree of Success
The County objects to 231.7 hours billed by the PLC attorneys (totaling nearly $60,000) over a six month period as excessive. Unlike Mr. Henretty, they did not conduct discovery, participate in the lengthy and complex summary judgment motions, take the case to trial, or ultimately improve their client’s position. Instead, the PLC attorneys took over a case where the complex issues of liability were already resolved in plaintiff’s favor and only needed to prove the amount of her damages at trial. Accordingly, the County seeks a reduction of over 100 hours down to 130 hours split between Mr. Haile and Ms. Nevill.
In particular, the County argues that the eighth Kerr factor, which requires the court to consider the amounts involved and the results obtained, weighs against an award of significant attorney fees to the PLC attorneys who could have settled this case without billing over 200 hours over six months. On May 6, 2014, the County presented a written offer pursuant to FRCP 68 to plaintiff to settle the case for $20,100 plus reasonable attorney fees. Ciecko Amended Decl., ¶ 6. Plaintiff rejected that offer. Id. Mr. Henretty then withdrew. While plaintiff was representing herself, Judge John Jelderks held a settlement conference on October 1, 2014 (docket #65). At that time, the County apparently made a settlement offer to plaintiff of $30,000 plus reasonable attorney fees which she rejected. Id, ¶ 7.
On or about October 16, 2014, after the first pretrial conference (docket #71) and a telephone conference to reset the trial date at plaintiff’s request (docket #75), the County made that same offer again to plaintiff. Id, ¶ 8. The PLC began representing plaintiff in November 2014 (docket #80), and the trial date was again reset at plaintiff’s request (docket #85). On April 20, 2015, a few days after the second pretrial conference (docket #120), the County made a
10 – OPINION AND ORDER

written offer to allow judgment pursuant to FRCP 68 for $30,100 plus reasonable attorney fees up to that date. Id, ¶ 10. After demanding $90,000 in damages plus attorney fees (id, ¶ 13), plaintiff accepted that offer on May 4, 2015 (docket #122). Id Because $30,000 was available to plaintiff at all times after October 1, 2014, to settle this case, the County contends that the PLC attorneys failed to succeed in any measurable way and are simply attempting to share the credit with Mr. Henretty for plaintiff’s success.
However, the measure of success is what the plaintiff achieved in the case as a whole, not what her individual attorneys achieved in separate stages of the case. Although liability was determined by summary judgment before the PLC attorneys became involved, the damages phase of the case remained. The issue is whether the time spent by the PLC attorneys was necessary and reasonable to prepare for a jury trial on damages and ultimately to persuade plaintiff to settle for the amount of the County’s offer. In the end, plaintiff obtained an award of $30,100.00 which, contrary to the County’s characterization, is not a nominal damages award.
With respect to settlement, the PLC attorneys did not significantly improve the amount offered to plaintiff between October 2014 and April 2015. On the other hand, based on this court’s interaction with plaintiff while she was representing herself, it was apparent that plaintiff had difficulty communicating in English, did not fully understand the legal system, was very emotional, and had no interest in settling her case. As she now explains, discussing settlement “was difficult” for her because her “top priority has always been to prevent other people from being incarcerated illegally the way [she] was” and she “was hesitant to let the case be settled for any amount of money out of concern about undermining the effects of the case.” MirandaOlivares Decl. (docket #162), ¶ 3. Although both Judge Jelderks and Mr. Henretty failed to persuade plaintiff to settle, the PLC attorneys succeeded, much to their credit. Had plaintiff
11 – OPINION AND ORDER

taken this case to trial without the assistance of the PLC attorneys, she likely would have been awarded much less than the amount of the settlement she finally accepted.
In addition, the PLC attorneys accepted a significant risk by agreeing to represent an unrepresented client very close to the scheduled trial date. Although they immediately requested a continuance of the trial date, they had to quickly familiarize themselves with the case and the remaining issues for trial in the event that request was denied. In addition, in order to prepare for the jury trial, the PLC attorneys were required to investigate factual issues concerning plaintiff’s alleged damages, including her inability to see her own doctor, the conditions of suicide watch, and the circumstances of her sister’s telephone call regarding bail. Moreover, the PLC attorneys were required to respond to several legal arguments made by the County as to causation and the duration of plaintiff’s unlawful imprisonment. They also sought to exclude or include certain evidence, including plaintiff immigration status, whether plaintiff was taken into ICE custody, various child custody issues, plaintiff’s inability to see her own doctor, and the conditions of suicide watch. By prevailing on many of these issues at the second pretrial conference, the PLC attorneys significantly improved plaintiff’s position as compared to her position after the initial pretrial conference.
As another basis to challenge the overall number of hours as excessive, the County submits the opinion of an experienced trial attorney, Darian Stanford, that the award of $57,315 sought by the PLC attorneys “seems excessive when compared to a requested award of $61,620 by attorneys Henretty and Schmidt, given the respective amount and nature of the work performed by each” and “when compared to the 82.4 hours of work billed by County counsel Ciecko for the same period.” Stanford Amended Decl. (docket #151), ¶¶ 10(a) & (b), 19. Based
12 – OPINION AND ORDER

on his review and experience, he believes that any award should not exceed 110 hours by the PLC attorneys, totaling $27,260.
However, Mr. Stanford’s opinion is based on his review of only the fee petition filings and the case docket report and on his communications with the County’s attorney “about the nature and nuances of the case.” Id, ¶ 9. He did not review any other documents and appears to be under the erroneous impression that all of the complex issues were resolved at summary judgment. Id, ¶ 13. As discussed above, the preparation for trial on damages involved more factual and legal issues than he may have been led to believe. In contrast, before rendering her opinion, Ms. Creighton reviewed not only the fee petition filings, but all of the summary judgment and pretrial filings. Creighton Decl., ¶¶ 25-26, 29, 31.
In addition, a comparison between the hours spent by the PLC attorneys and by the County’s counsel during the same time period is misleading. It fails to account for the extra work required to represent plaintiff, as opposed to the County. Not only did the PLC attorneys have to do extensive legal research to respond to the legal arguments raised by the County, they also had more witnesses to prepare for trial, some of whom spoke little English. That being said, Mr. Stanford does present a useful comparison between the 150 hours he spent to prepare a complex case that he accepted approximately a month prior to trial. Stanford Amended Decl., ¶¶ 16-17. He recognizes “the inherent complexity and difficulties associated with attempting to compare cases,” but present “enough similarities to make the comparison probative” and to support his opinion. Id, ¶ 18. Therefore, this court gives Mr. Stanford’s opinion some, but not controlling, weight.
13 – OPINION AND ORDER

Although this court declines to reduce the amount sought by the PLC attorneys based solely on the degree of success obtained, a reduction for other reasons is warranted, as discussed below.
a. Prefiling Hours The County objects to the 11.8 hours spent by Mr. Haile between October 10 and November 12, 2014, when he filed an appearance. During that month, Mr. Haile became familiar with the case by reviewing various filings and other documents and deciding whether to accept the case. The County contends that this work duplicated Mr. Henretty’s work and was necessary only because plaintiff discharged Mr. Henretty (docket #48). That is true. Plaintiff cannot shift attorney fees to the County for the extra work required as a result of her decision to change attorneys. Therefore, the attorney fee award is reduced by 11.8 hours for Mr. Haile.
b. Duplicative Billing The County has identified approximately 80 duplicative billing entries for multiple attorneys and staff performing the same task, totaling 58.4 hours for Mr. Haile and Ms. Nevill and 13.9 hours for staff. A prevailing party must “make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 434 (1983). This is especially true when more than one attorney provides legal services to a client.
When attorneys hold a telephone or personal conference, good “billing judgment” mandates that only one attorney should bill that conference to the client, not both attorneys. The same good “billing judgment” requires attorneys not to bill for more than two attorneys to review pleadings or to attend oral argument. Nat’l Warranty Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, No. CV-97-1654-ST, 2001 WL 34045734, at *5 (D Or Feb. 8, 2001).
14 – OPINION AND ORDER

Based on a careful review of the billing entries at issue, deductions for unnecessarily duplicative time for intra-office meetings is required. However, the County has not correctly calculated the number of duplicative hours. Instead, the total time billed by both attorneys for communications between them, as correctly calculated by Ms. Nevill, is 22.8 hours.5 Nevill Reply Decl., ¶¶ 9-10 & Ex. 1. To correct for this duplication by two attorneys, the higher billing rate of the two attorneys should be allowed. Precision Seed Cleaners v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 976 F Supp2d 1228, 1253 (D Or 2013). Thus, the time is awarded to Mr. Haile, but 22.8 hours is deducted for Ms. Nevill.
The PLC attorneys neither address nor provide any similar explanations for the multiple conferences with staff. Since it appears that all of the conferences were also attended by Mr. Haile and/or Ms. Nevill and that an award of time for each of these conferences is allowed either for Mr. Haile or Ms. Nevill. However, of the 13.9 hours listed by the County as duplicative, 3.0 hours billed by “SL” on March 20, 2015, consists of other work properly billed by staff. Therefore, the proper reduction for duplicative hours by staff is 10.9 hours.
c. Unrelated Hours The County seeks a further reduction for both Mr. Haile and Ms. Nevill to bill 2.0 hours on April 7, 2015, to observe the County’s attorney in a separate and related trial. No explanation is offered as to why this observation was reasonable or necessary to prosecute this case. In addition to being duplicative, it is not reasonable to shift this cost to the County. Therefore, these hours are deducted. /// ///
5 Although Ms. Nevill states that the total is 21.7 hours, the actual total is 22.8 hours after correcting for three typographical errors in the last column. In the last column, the 2/12/15 and 2/24/15 billing entries should each be .3, not .2, and the 3/19/15 billing entry should be 1.0, not .1.
15 – OPINION AND ORDER

d. Impermissibly Vague Entries The County objects to many billing entries as too vague to assess their reasonableness due to a lack of explanation as to why the time was reasonable or necessary or due to redactions. In response, both Mr. Haile and Ms. Nevill have submitted their declarations which provide adequate explanations for each of the allegedly vague billing entries and also submitted their unredacted billing entries to the court for in camera review. Haile Reply. Decl., ¶ 10; Nevill Reply Decl., ¶ 8. Based on this court’s review of those explanations and redactions, none of the billing entries is impermissibly vague. In addition to vagueness, the County complains that Ms. Nevill’s 5.0 hours incurred on March, 30, 2015, to prepare for the pretrial conference was unreasonable since she was not the attorney handling the pretrial conference. It is not unreasonable for Ms. Nevill to assist Mr. Haile in preparing for the pretrial conference. On the other hand, in addition to Mr. Nevill’s time, Mr. Haile spent another 11.1 hours on April 15-17, 2015, preparing for the pretrial conference. Spending a total of over 16 hours to prepare for a short pretrial conference is clearly excessive. Therefore, both attorneys’ time is reduced by half (from 5.0 to 2.5 hours for Ms. Nevill and 11.1 to 5.6 hours for Mr. Haile). The County further takes issue with Mr. Haile billing 3.5 hours to correct the translation of plaintiff’s handwritten jail dairy, especially since the PLC attorneys also seek to recover $711.40 paid for an Oregon Certified Interpreter who translated the same diary. Haile Decl. (docket #134), Ex. 103. In response, Mr. Haile explains that he sought a new translation when the original translation of plaintiff’s diary was unavailable for trial and the County declined to stipulate to the use of a translation as an exhibit without a foundation by the translator. Haile Reply Decl., ¶ 13. Based on his proficiency in Spanish and “understanding of the facts of the
16 – OPINION AND ORDER

case and the issues the jury would be asked to decide,” his review of the new translation revealed extensive errors on almost every page of the court-certified translation, resulting in a total of 30 corrections approved by the translator. Id. Although Mr. Haile’s translation work was useful, the issue is whether it was necessary for him to charge an attorney’s hourly rate of $304 to do it. Few of his corrections actually changed the meaning of plaintiff’s words, and none required any intimate knowledge of the facts of this case. The County should only have to pay for one translation. To charge the County an extra $1,064.00 for Mr. Haile to correct the court-certified translation is simply not reasonable. Therefore, Mr. Haile’s time of 3.5 hours incurred to correct the translation of plaintiff’s diary is deducted.
e. Excessive Hours The County asserts that the PLC attorneys spent an unreasonable and excessive amount of time drafting their trial memorandum and witness statements that would never be seen by the jury and required no decisions by the court. According to the County, that time totals 26.6 hours (9.9 hours by Mr. Haile and 16.7 hours by Ms. Nevill) and should be reduced to 5.0 hours for the trial memorandum (Stanford Amended Decl., ¶ 24) and 3.0 hours for the witness statements. Plaintiff’s trial memorandum was 16 pages long and covered six items of damages not specifically described prior to the Joint Statement of Trial issues, as well as eight legal issues that remained unresolved following the summary judgment motions and required resolution at the pretrial conference. Given the complexity of the damages issues, the time spent by the PLC attorneys to prepare the trial memorandum was within a reasonable range. Plaintiff’s witness statements were 13 pages long, covering nine witnesses. The bulk (8 pages) covered plaintiff’s testimony. Although witness statements may be brief, the Jury Trial Management Order (docket #45, ¶ 7) requires that they “include sufficient information to give
17 – OPINION AND ORDER

the opposing party and the Court a clear understanding of the content of the testimony,” with shorter statements “allowed for witnesses whose depositions have been taken.” Since the County had taken plaintiff’s deposition on July 9, 2013, the witness statement for plaintiff could have been less thorough. However, it appears that few questions concerning damages had been asked at her deposition. Given that the County benefitted from the detailed witness statements, containing new information, the time spent by the PLC attorneys to prepare them was not unreasonable.
f. Clerical Work The County characterizes 2.3 hours by Mr. Haile and 17.7 hours by Ms. Nevill as clerical tasks that should have been performed by administrative staff. Ms. Nevill concedes that 1.4 hours6 of her time should be removed from the fee petition as clerical. Nevill Reply Decl., ¶ 8. Based on Ms. Nevill’s explanations for the remaining entries, this court agrees and deducts 1.4 hours. Mr. Haile also has provided explanations for each of his challenged billing entries. Based on those explanations, none of his 2.3 hours is clerical.
g. Summary Based on the above, the number of hours is reduced for the PLC attorneys and staff as follows: Mr. Haile: 104.3 – 22.8 (11.8 prefiling + 2.0 unrelated + 5.5 pretrial conference + 3.5 translation) = 81.5 hours Ms. Nevill: 127.4 – 28.7 (22.8 duplicative + 2.0 unrelated + 2.5 vague + 1.4 clerical) = 98.7 hours Staff: 37.2 – 10.9 (duplicative) = 26.3 hours
6 Although Ms. Nevill refers to 1.3 hours, her concessions in the accompanying table add up to 1.4 hours.
18 – OPINION AND ORDER

4. Total Reductions

Based on the above reductions, the attorney fee award is calculated as follows:

David Henretty Arthur Schmidt Benjamin Haile Francie Nevill Staff Support

RATE
$300 $350 $304 $201 $90

HOURS
158.5 0
81.5 98.7 26.3

TOTAL
$47,550.00 $0
$24,776.00 $19,838.70 $2,367.00

TOTAL

$94,531.70

III. Costs Both sets of plaintiff’s attorneys seek reimbursement for costs. Mr. Henretty has
submitted a Bill of Costs for $350.00 for the filing fee which is recoverable under 28 USC § 1920. Henretty Decl., Ex. 2. Mr. Henretty also seeks costs as part of the attorney fee award in the sum of $1,325.15, consisting of $20.00 for court and county records, $1,305.15 for four deposition transcripts and reporting fees. Id, ¶ 17. Although Mr. Henretty has not submitted any receipts, the County has submitted no objection to any of those costs.
The PLC attorneys seek reimbursement for additional costs as part of the attorney fee award in the sum of $1,166.29, consisting of $411.40 for an expedited transcript of the first pretrial conference, $13.50 for certified copies, $711.40 for the translation of plaintiff’s diary, and $29.99 for an index. Haile Decl., ¶ 49 & Ex. 3. The County has submitted no objection to any of these costs.
Since all of these costs appear to be reasonable and necessary, they are allowed. Accordingly, plaintiff is awarded total costs in the sum of $2,841.44. /// ///

19 – OPINION AND ORDER

ORDER For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendant’s Flings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege (docket #158) is DENIED and plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED (docket #133) in the reduced sum of $97,373.14. DATED August 28, 2015.
s/ Janice M. Stewart Janice M. Stewart United States Magistrate Judge
20 – OPINION AND ORDER

 
 CONSENT,TERMINATED
U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Portland (3)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12−cv−02317−ST

Miranda−Olivares v. Clackamas County et al Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart Case in other court: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 15−35439
9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 15−35501 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/21/2012 Date Terminated: 05/05/2015 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Maria Miranda−Olivares

represented by Benjamin Wright Haile P.O. Box 2581 Portland, OR 97208 503−212−4434 Fax: 801−650−2299 Email: attorneyhaile@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David R. Henretty Oregon Law Center 522 SW Fifth Avenue Suite 812 Portland, OR 97204 503−473−8684 Fax: 503−295−0676 Email: dhenretty@oregonlawcenter.org TERMINATED: 06/09/2014

Francie J. Nevill Portland Law Collective 1130 SW Morrison St. Suite 407 Portland, OR 97205 503−228−1889 Fax: 503−223−4518 Email: francie@portlandlawcollective.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Spencer M. Neal Oregon Law Center State Support Unit 921 S.W. Washington Street Suite 516 Portland, OR 97205 503−473−8325 Fax: 503−295−0676 Email: spencerneal@justice.com TERMINATED: 06/09/2014

V. Defendant Clackamas County

represented by Stephen Lewis Madkour Clackamas County Counsel 2051 Kaen Road Oregon City, OR 97045 503−655−8362 Fax: 503−742−5397 Email: smadkour@co.clackamas.or.us

Defendant
Craig Roberts in his official capacity as sheriff of Clackamas County TERMINATED: 03/01/2013
Material Witness
U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott C. Ciecko Clackamas County Counsel Public Services Bldg 2051 Kaen Road Oregon City, OR 97045 (503) 742−5390 Fax: (503) 742−5397 Email: sciecko@co.clackamas.or.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott C. Ciecko (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Cox , Jr. U.S. Attorney's Office District of Oregon 1000 SW Third Ave. Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204 503−727−1026 Fax: 503−727−1117 Email: caseview.ecf@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/21/2012
12/21/2012
12/21/2012
02/13/2013 03/01/2013 03/01/2013 03/14/2013

# Docket Text
1 Complaint. Filing fee in the amount of $350 collected. Agency Tracking ID: 0979−3135139 Jury Trial Requested: No. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares against All Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet JS 44, # 2 Proposed Summons for county, # 3 Proposed Summons for sheriff). (Henretty, David) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
2 Notice of Case Assignment to Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart and Discovery and Pretrial Scheduling Order. NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve the summonses and all documents issued by the Clerk at the time of filing upon all named parties in accordance with Local Rule 3−5. Discovery is to be completed by 4/22/2013. Joint Alternate Dispute Resolution Report is due by 5/20/2013. Pretrial Order is due by 5/20/2013. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (sm) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
3 Summons Issued Electronically as to All Defendants. NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve the summonses and all documents issued by the Clerk at the time of filing upon all named parties in accordance with Local Rule 3−5. (sm) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Agreement . Filed by Clackamas County, Craig Roberts. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 02/13/2013)
5 Acceptance/Acknowledgement of Service on All Defendants Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
6 First Amended Complaint . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares against Clackamas County. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
7 Answer to 6 Amended Complaint with Jury Demand and Affirmative Defenses. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/14/2013)

03/25/2013
04/10/2013
04/10/2013 06/10/2013 07/03/2013 07/03/2013 07/08/2013 09/26/2013 10/01/2013 10/15/2013 10/15/2013 10/15/2013 10/15/2013

8 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELPEHONE Rule 16 Conference for Wednesday 4/10/2013 at 02:00PM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Local Rules 16−2 and 26−1 require that counsel confer prior to the conference. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to discuss the status of the case, relevant dates and deadlines, and any other significant issues. Plaintiff shall advise the court at the conference whether or not there will be full consent from all parties to proceed before the magistrate judge in the case. Until full consents are filed, no trial date will be set. (jlr) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
9 MINUTES of Proceedings: Telephone Rule 16 Conference and Notice Regarding Civil Case Procedures. ORDER Setting the Following Case Schedule: Joint ADR Report is due by 6/20/2013. Discovery is to be completed and written consents to proceed before a Magistrate Judge, if any, are to be filed by 7/15/2013. Defendant's Dispositive Motion is due by 8/14/2013. Plaintiff's Cross−Motion is due with its Response to Defendant's Dispositive Motion. Exchange of Expert Disclosure Statements is to be completed and the Pretrial Order is due 30 days after a final ruling on dispositive motions. Please see the attached Notice regarding additional procedures in cases before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. David R. Henretty present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Court Reporter: None. Tape No: None. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. (ssm) (Entered: 04/10/2013)
10 Full Consent by all Parties to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge. (sss) (Entered: 04/10/2013)
11 Joint ADR Report . Filed by All Plaintiffs.(Henretty, David) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
12 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Discovery & PTO Deadlines . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
13 Declaration of David Henretty in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery and Pretrial Deadlines. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Discovery & PTO Deadlines 12 .) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
14 ORDER: Granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Discovery and Pretrial Deadlines 12 . Discovery is to be completed by 9/13/2013. Dispositive Motions are due by 10/15/2013. Plaintiff's Cross−Motion is due with its Response to Defendant's Dispositive Motion. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 07/08/2013)
15 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference for Tuesday, 10/1/2013 at 01:30PM to set a trial date before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
16 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Due to a court conflict, Order RESETTING the TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference from 10/1/13 to Tuesday, 10/15/2013 at 10:30AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart to set a trial date. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
17 Motion for Summary Judgment . oral argument requested. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
18 Memorandum in Support of motion for summary judgment. Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 17 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
19 Declaration of Lt. Lee Eby in support of motion for summary judgment. Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 17 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit 102, # 3 Exhibit 103) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
20 Declaration of Scott Ciecko in support of motion for summary judgment. Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Motion for Summary Judgment 17 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 104, # 2 Exhibit 105) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

10/15/2013
11/08/2013 11/08/2013 11/08/2013 11/08/2013 11/08/2013 11/08/2013
11/08/2013 12/02/2013 12/12/2013 02/11/2014

21 MINUTES of Proceedings: Status Conference. Plaintiff's cross−motion and response to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 17 are due by 11/8/2013. Defendant's reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment 17 and response to plaintiff's cross−motion are due by 12/2/2013. Plaintiff's reply to the cross−motion is due by 12/19/2013. The PTO is waived. Oral Argument is set for 1/16/2014 at 09:30AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. If plaintiff files the last reply before 12/12/2013, the court will reset oral argument to 12/19/2013 at 9:30 AM. The court defers scheduling any jury trial on damages until after resolution of the dispositive motions. David R. Henretty present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. Modified number (21) to docket entry on 10/16/2013 (eo). (Entered: 10/15/2013)
22 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: Pursuant to defendant's email request without objection by plaintiff, ORDER RESETTING Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment 17 from 1/16/14 to Tuesday, 2/11/2014 at 09:30AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
23 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral Argument requested. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
24 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
25 Declaration of Maria Miranda−Olivares in Support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
26 Declaration of Laura Miranda in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
27 Declaration of David Henretty in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ICE FAQ from website, # 2 Exhibit Form I−247, # 3 Exhibit Jail criminal alien report, # 4 Exhibit Responses to First RFA, # 5 Exhibit Responses to First Interrogatories, # 6 Exhibit Lt. Eby deposition testimony, # 7 Exhibit Sheriff deposition testimony, # 8 Exhibit Responses to Second RFA, # 9 Exhibit Arraignment transcript, # 10 Exhibit County health records, # 11 Exhibit Respnoses to Second Interrogatories, # 12 Exhibit Jail policy and procedures, # 13 Exhibit 8 CFR 287.7, # 14 Exhibit ICE policy, # 15 Exhibit ICE Answer, # 16 Exhibit ICE Motion) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
28 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 23 for Oral Argument along with Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 17 for 2/11/2014 at 9:30AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
29 Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 23 oral argument requested. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
30 Reply to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 23 Oral Argument requested. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 53 Fed. Register 9281, # 2 Exhibit Maryland Opinion, # 3 Exhibit California Opinion) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 12/12/2013)
31 MINUTES of Proceedings: before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Motion Hearing held regarding Motion for Summary Judgment 17 and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 . Motions are taken under advisement as of 2/11/2014. David Henretty present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott Ciecko present as counsel for

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defendant(s). Court Reporter: Bonita Shumway. (jlr) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
32 Notice re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 Plaintiff's Notice of Supplemental Authority Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D.R.I. Memo and Order (2/12/2014)) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
33 Motion to Supplement Reply on Summary Judgment. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
34 Memorandum in Support . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Motion to Supplement 33 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
35 ORDER: Granting Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Allow Filing of Supplemental Reply 33 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
36 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Defendant's supplemental reply is due by 2/27/2014. Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment 17 , 23 . (jlr) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
37 Supplemental Reply on Summary Judgment 17 , 23 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) Modified text and link on 2/28/2014 (sss). (Entered: 02/27/2014)
38 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Response to Defendant's Supplemental Reply. Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Response) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
39 ORDER: Granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Response to Defendant's Supplemental Reply 38 . Response is due by 3/10/14. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
40 Response to Defendant's Supplemental Reply 37 . Filed by All Plaintiffs. (Related document(s): Motion for Leave 38 .) (Henretty, David) Modified text and added link on 3/5/2014 (sss). (Entered: 03/04/2014)
41 Notice re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 of Additional Supplemental Authority Filed by All Plaintiffs (Related document(s): Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 .) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47023, No. 12−3991, slip op. (3d Cir. March 4, 2014)) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
42 OPINION AND ORDER: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 17 ; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 ). Signed on 4/11/2014 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (ST) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
43 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference for Thursday, 5/8/2014 at 09:30AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
44 MINUTES of Proceedings: TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. ORDER: Striking all case deadlines and setting the following new case schedule. Pretrial Order waived. Pretrial Documents are due by 9/24/2014; objections are due by 10/1/2014. Pretrial Conference is set for 10/8/2014 at 09:30AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. A 2−day Jury Trial is set for 10/15/2014 at 09:00AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Jury Trial Management Order to follow. David R. Henretty present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Tape No: N/A. (st3) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
45 Jury Trial Management Order. Signed on 5/8/14 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 05/08/2014)
46 Notice of Change of Address. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares (Henretty, David) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
47 Motion to Withdraw As Counsel for Plaintiff. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 05/21/2014)

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48 Declaration of David Henretty in Support of Motion to Withdraw As Counsel for Plaintiff. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion to Withdraw 47 .) (Henretty, David) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
49 Certificate of Service by Maria Miranda−Olivares of Motion to Withdraw As Counsel for Plaintiff 47 Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Henretty, David) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
50 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING Motion to Withdraw As Counsel for Plaintiff 47 to be taken under advisement on 6/9/2014. (jlr) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
51 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Scheduling Order 50 . (jlr) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
52 ORDER: Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw a Counsel for Plaintiff 47 . Signed on 6/9/14 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (ST) Modified on 6/10/2014 to indicate this is a paperless order. (jlr). (Entered: 06/09/2014)
53 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares of Order on Motion to Withdraw 52 . (jlr) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
54 Notice To Self−Represented Litigants. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
55 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares of Notice 54 . (jlr) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
56 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE for Wednesday, 9/10/2014 at 2:00PM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart regarding the 10/8/14 Pretrial Conference and the Trial which is currently set 10/15/14. Court staff will initiate the call to the parties. (jlr) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
57 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Scheduling Order, 56 . (jlr) (Entered: 08/29/2014)
58 MINUTES of Proceedings: TELEPHONE Status Conference. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. ORDER: Jury Trial Management Order 45 is WITHDRAWN and the following new case deadlines are set. Proposed voir dire, jury instructions, verdict form, and other pretrial submissions are due by 10/3/2014. The dates for the Pretrial Conference (10/8/14) and Jury Trial (10/15/14) remain unchanged. Maria Miranda−Olivares (pro se) present. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendants. Tape No: N/A. (st3) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
59 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Status Conference, Set/Reset Schedules 58 . (jlr) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
60 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge John Jelderks. A Settlement Conference is set for Wednesday, 10/1/2014 at 10:00AM in Portland Courtroom 12B before Magistrate Judge John Jelderks. Further instructions and requirements of Judge Jelderks regarding the conducting of this settlement conference will be sent by separate letter. (jlr) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
61 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Scheduling Order, 60 . (jlr) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
62 Motion Pretrial Motions. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 09/25/2014)
63 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING Defendant's Motion Pretrial Motions 62 to be taken under advisement on 10/3/2014. (jlr) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
64 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Scheduling Order 63 . (jlr) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
65 MINUTES of Proceedings: Settlement Conference held. Maria Miranda−Olivares, pro se, present as plaintiff(s). Scott Ciecko present as counsel for defendant(s). Magistrate Judge John Jelderks presiding. (sm) (Entered: 10/01/2014)

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66 Witness List and Exhibit List. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
67 Proposed Jury Instructions . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
68 Proposed Jury Verdict Form. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
69 Proposed Voir Dire Questions. Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
70 Clerk's Notice of Mailing Minutes of Settlement Conference 65 to Maria Miranda−Olivares. (pvh) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
71 MINUTES of Proceedings: Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. Pretrial Conference held. ORDER: Granting Pretrial Motions 62 . See attachment for full text of minutes. Maria Miranda−Olivares (pro se) present. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Court Reporter: Jill Erwin. (st3) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
72 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Order on Motion 71 , Pretrial Conference. (jlr) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
73 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELEPHONE Conference for Tuesday, 10/14/2014 at 02:00PM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart to discuss plaintiff's email request for postponement of the 10/15/14 jury trial. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
74 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Scheduling Order 73 . (jlr) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
75 MINUTES of Proceedings: TELEPHONE Status Conference. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. ORDER: A 2−day Jury Trial is reset for 11/24/2014 at 09:00AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Maria Miranda−Olivares (pro se) present. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Tape No: N/A. (st3) Modified on 10/14/2014 to reflect this was a TELEPHONE conference. (jlr). (Entered: 10/14/2014)
76 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Telephone Status Conference 75 . (jlr) (Entered: 10/14/2014)
77 Motion to Modify Subpoena. Filed by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (Cox, James) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
78 ORDER: Granting in Part Denying in Part United States ICE's Motion to Modify Trial Subpoena 77 . The ICE witness must appear and testify at trial, but the scope of testimony is limited (on both direct and cross−examination) to the acts upon which Defendant has agreed to limit testimony. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (ST) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
79 Clerk's Notice of Mailing to Maria Miranda−Olivares regarding Order on Motion − Miscellaneous, 78 . (jlr) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
80 Notice of Appearance of Benjamin Wright Haile appearing on behalf of Maria Miranda−Olivares Filed by on behalf of Maria Miranda−Olivares (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
81 Motion for Extension of Time . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
82 Declaration of Benjamin Haile . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Extension of Time 81 .) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 11/12/2014)
83 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart regarding Motion for Extension of Time 81 . A TELEPHONE Conference is set for Monday, 11/17/2014 at 11:00AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 11/13/2014)

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84 Response to Motion for Extension of Time 81 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
85 MINUTES of Proceedings: TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference regarding Motion for Extension of Time 81 . Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time 81 and striking the 11/24/2014 trial. A 2−3 day Jury Trial is set for 5/5/2015 at 09:30AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Pretrial Documents are due by 3/20/2015; objections are due by 3/27/2015. Pretrial Conference is set for 3/31/2015 at 09:30AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. An amended Jury Trial Management Order to follow. Benjamin Wright Haile present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. (Tape #N/A.) (st3) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
86 OFFICIAL COURT TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS FILED Pretrial Conference held on October 8, 2014, before Judge Janice M. Stewart, Court Reporter Jill L. Erwin, telephone number (503)326−8191. Transcript may be viewed at Court's public terminal or purchased from the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. Afterwards it may be obtained through the court reporter or PACER−See Policy at ord.uscourts.gov. Notice of Intent to Redact Transcript is due by 12/1/2014. Redaction Request due 12/11/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/22/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/20/2015. (Erwin, Jill) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
87 Trial Management Order. As defendant has already filed pretrial documents, defendant need only submit supplemental documents by the deadlines indicated in the attached order. Signed on 11/17/14 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
88 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Joint Statement of Trial Issues in lieu of a Pretrial Order is due by 3/20/2015. (jlr) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
89 Notice of Appearance of Francie J. Nevill appearing on behalf of Maria Miranda−Olivares Filed by on behalf of Maria Miranda−Olivares (Nevill, Francie) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
90 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart: SETTING a TELEPHONE Conference regarding the Pretrial Conference date for Wednesday, 3/25/2015 at 11:00AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Court staff will initiate the call to counsel. (jlr) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
91 Joint Proposed Pretrial Order Lodged (Joint Statement of Triable Issues filed in lieu). Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
92 Trial Memorandum . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
93 Supplemental Motion in limine . Filed by Clackamas County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
94 Declaration of Scott Ciecko . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Motion in Limine 93 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
95 Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
96 Witness List . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
97 Voir Dire . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
98 Motion in limine . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
99 Proposed Jury Instructions . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
100 Proposed Jury Verdict Form. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

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101 Exhibit List . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
102 Trial Memorandum . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
103 Supplemental Witness List . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
104 MINUTES of Proceedings: TELEPHONE Scheduling Conference. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart presiding. ORDER: The 3/31/2015 Pretrial Conference at 09:30AM is rescheduled for 4/17/2015 at 09:30AM before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. The 5/5/2015 Jury Trial at 09:30AM is rescheduled for 5/5/2015 at 09:00AM in Portland Courtroom 11A before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart, as previously listed in the Trial Management Order 87 . Benjamin Wright Haile and Francie Nevill present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant. Tape No: N/A.(st3) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
105 Response to Motion in limine 98 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
106 Objection(s) to 99 Jury instructions − Proposed . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
107 Objection(s) to 100 Jury Verdict Form − Proposed . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
108 Objection(s) to 96 Witness List, 101 Exhibit List . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
109 Objection(s) to 97 Proposed Voir Dire . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
110 Objection to Trial Exhibit 66 Witness List . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
111 Objection(s) to 93 Motion in Limine, 62 Motion − Miscellaneous . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
112 Declaration of Francie Nevill . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Witness List 103 , Witness List 66 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
113 Objection(s) to 95 Jury instructions − Proposed, 67 Jury instructions − Proposed . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
114 Objection(s) to 68 Jury Verdict Form − Proposed . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
115 Objection(s) to 69 Proposed Voir Dire . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
116 Objection(s) to 103 Witness List, 66 Witness List . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
117 Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
118 Amended Exhibit List . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
119 Supplemental Trial Memorandum . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
120 MINUTES of Proceedings: Record of Continuation of Pretrial Conference before Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. ORDER: Granting in Part Denying in Part Defendant's Supplemental Pretrial Motions 93 ; Granting Plaintiff's Motions in Limine 98 . See attachment for full text of minutes. Benjamin Wright Haile and Francie Nevill present as counsel for plaintiff. Scott C. Ciecko present as counsel for defendant.

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(Court Reporter Jill Erwin.) (st3) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
121 ORDER: Amending Record of Continuation of Pretrial Conference 120 . Deferring defendant's Exhibit No. 104 without redaction or highlighting, instead of with redaction. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (st3) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
122 Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Offer of Judgment) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
123 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. Order STRIKING the jury trial currently scheduled for 5/5/15 through 5/7/15 as a Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment 122 has been filed. (jlr) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
124 JUDGMENT entered in favor of plaintiff, Maria Miranda−Olivares, and against defendant, Clackamas County. Signed on 5/5/15 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
125 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
126 ORDER: Granting Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 125 To File Motion for Attorney Fees and Cost Bill. Motion is due by 6/2/15. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 05/15/2015)
127 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/28/2015)
128 ORDER: Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time 127 to 6/16/15 to file Motion For Attorney Fees and Cost Bill. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
129 Notice of Appeal to the 9th Circuit Filing fee $505 collected; Agency Tracking ID 0979−4147415: . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
USCA Case Number and Notice confirming Docketing Record on Appeal re Notice of Appeal 129 . Case Appealed to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Case Number 15−35439 assigned. (dsg) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
130 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
131 ORDER: Granting Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 130 . Attorney Fees Motion deadline extended to 6/23/2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (st1) (Entered: 06/16/2015)
132 Notice of Appeal to the 9th Circuit from Judgment 124 Filing fee $505 collected; Agency Tracking ID 0979−4164799: . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
USCA Case Number and Notice confirming Docketing Record on Appeal re Notice of Appeal 132 . Case Appealed to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Case Number 15−35501 assigned. (dsg) (Entered: 06/19/2015)
133 Motion for Attorney Fees . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
134 Declaration of Benjamin Haile . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 133 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Libby & Knudtsen Billing Records, # 2 Exhibit Haile Billing Records, # 3 Exhibit PLC Costs) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
135 Declaration of Francie Nevill . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 133 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Nevill Billing Records) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
136 Declaration of David Henretty . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 133 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Henretty Billing Records and Costs) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)

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137 Declaration of Arthur Schmidt . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 133 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Schmidt Billing Records) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
138 Declaration of Beth Creighton . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion for Attorney Fees 133 .) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
139 Scheduling Order by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart regarding Motion for Attorney Fees 133 . Motion will be taken under advisement on 7/27/2015. (jlr) (Entered: 06/24/2015)
140 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response/Reply to Motion for Attorney Fees 133 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/07/2015)
141 ORDER: Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Motion for Attorney Fees 133 filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. Response is due by 7/20/2014. Motion will be taken under advisement on 8/6/2015. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 07/08/2015)
142 Joint Motion to File Excess Pages . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
143 Response in Opposition to Motion for Attorney Fees 133 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
144 Declaration of Kevin Layng . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response in Opposition to Motion 143 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
145 Declaration of Darian Stanford . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response in Opposition to Motion 143 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
146 Declaration of Scott Ciecko . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response in Opposition to Motion 143 .) (Ciecko, Scott) Modified on 7/21/2015. STRICKEN per Order 148 (jlr). (Entered: 07/20/2015)
147 Declaration of Scott Ciecko with Exhibits attached. Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response in Opposition to Motion 143 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
148 Order STRIKING Declaration 146 as it has been refiled as document 147 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
149 ORDER: Granting Joint Motion to File Excess Pages 142 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
150 Amended Response to Motion for Attorney Fees 133 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
151 Amended Declaration of Darian Stanford . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response to Motion 150 .) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
152 Amended Declaration of Scott Ciecko . Filed by Clackamas County. (Related document(s): Response to Motion 150 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 102, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 103) (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
153 Motion to File Excess Pages for Plaintiff's Reply. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Nevill, Francie) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
154 Reply to Motion for Attorney Fees 133 . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
155 Declaration of Benjamin Haile . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Reply to Motion 154 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Billing Records of Scott Ciecko) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
156 Declaration of Francie Nevill . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Reply to Motion 154 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attorney Communication) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/06/2015)

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09/15/2015

157 ORDER: Granting Unopposed Motion to File Excess Pages for Plaintiff's Reply 153 . Ordered by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (jlr) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
158 Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendant's Filings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege. Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/08/2015)
159 Declaration of Benjamin Haile . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Motion − Miscellaneous 158 .) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Conferral by Email) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/08/2015)
160 Response to Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendant's Filings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege 158 . Filed by Clackamas County. (Ciecko, Scott) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
161 Reply to Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendant's Filings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege 158 . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
162 Declaration of Maria Miranda−Olivares . Filed by Maria Miranda−Olivares. (Related document(s): Reply to Motion 161 .) (Haile, Benjamin) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
163 OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of and to Place Under Seal Defendants Filings that Breach Settlement Conference Privilege 158 is DENIED and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED 133 in the reduced sum of $97,373.14. Signed on 8/28/15 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (ST) Modified on 8/31/2015 to correct typo. NEF regenerated(jlr). (Entered: 08/28/2015)
164 MANDATE of USCA for the 9th Circuit, USCA # 15−35439 and 15−35501, re Notice of Appeal 132 and Notice of Appeal 129 . The court is informed that this matter has been resolved. Unless objection is filed within seven calendar days of the date of this order, these appeals will be deemed dismissed voluntarily pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). (dsg) (Entered: 09/15/2015)