Case 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 1 filed 04/15/19 PageID.1 Page 1 of 52

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA BUCK; CHAD BUCK; SHAMBER FLORE; ST. VINCENT CATHOLIC CHARITIES,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. _________ COMPLAINT

ROBERT GORDON, in his official capacity as the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services; HERMAN MCCALL, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Michigan Children’s Services Agency; DANA NESSEL, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Michigan; ALEX AZAR, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION 1. St. Vincent Catholic Charities (St. Vincent) is one of the oldest and most effective foster care and adoption agencies in Michigan. St. Vincent exists to serve those in need, and it wants to continue serving foster and adoptive children in Michigan through its public adoption and foster care programs. But despite a clear need for more foster and adoptive homes, the State of Michigan has decided to force St. Vincent and numerous other faith-based agencies like it—serving hundreds of children across the State—to choose between following their faith and closing down a vital ministry. 2. St. Vincent provides training, supervision, and on-going support to each foster care and adoptive family with which it partners. For adoptive parents like Chad and Melissa Buck, who have worked with St. Vincent to foster and then adopt five children with challenging medical needs and trauma from past abuse, St. Vincent has been a Godsend. To this day, St. Vincent continues to be a crucial source of support for the Bucks. St. Vincent is also the only agency with institutional knowledge of the Buck’s family situation, the challenges faced by their special-needs children, and the difficult dynamics with their birth
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parents. The Bucks give back to St. Vincent by helping to recruit, serve, and support other foster and adoptive parents. Without St. Vincent, the Bucks are likely to miss out on the opportunity to foster and adopt a sibling of their five adopted children were he or she to enter the State’s care.
3. St. Vincent helped Shamber Flore find a home and a loving family after escaping a past filled with trauma and abuse. St. Vincent has continued to help and support Shamber and her adoptive parents, and now Shamber serves St. Vincent and its families by providing mentoring and support for children and families recovering from past trauma.
4. Despite St. Vincent’s demonstrated record of excellent service to the community, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and the Michigan Attorney General have threatened to take action against St. Vincent solely because the agency abides by its Catholic beliefs regarding marriage. The State has made clear that it will no longer permit adoption and foster agencies to operate in accord with their religious beliefs (as they have done successfully for decades), and will penalize them if they refuse to provide written evaluations that conflict with their religious beliefs. If the State ends these relationships,
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St. Vincent and many other religious child welfare agencies will be unable to continue providing foster care and adoption services in Michigan. This means that adoptive parents will have fewer choices and foster children will face longer waits to find permanent homes.
5. The State’s actions violate the First and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Enforcement of federal regulations supporting the State’s actions likewise violates the Constitution and federal law. For this reason, the Court should issue a judgment declaring these actions unlawful and enjoining the State and the federal government from violating Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 6. Plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities is a Michigan nonprofit corporation with charitable and religious purposes; St. Vincent is party to foster and adoptive services contracts with MDHHS. 7. St. Vincent was originally incorporated by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lansing and remains affiliated with the Catholic Diocese of Lansing and subject to the authority of the Bishop of Lansing, who maintains certain reserved powers over St. Vincent. Because of its
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affiliation to the Catholic Diocese of Lansing, St. Vincent is listed in the Official Catholic Directory under the Catholic Diocese of Lansing.
8. St. Vincent Catholic Charities’ vision is to have “faith in God and love for all,” as it “aspire[s] to create a healthier community.” St. Vincent is dedicated to serving others in a spirit of humility and shares a genuine concern for the well-being of its neighbors, affirming the God-given dignity and worth of every human person. The mission of St. Vincent Catholic Charities is the work of the Catholic Church, to share the love of Christ by performing the corporal and spiritual works of mercy. In this way, those served by the Church and her members (including her charitable agencies) encounter Christ, and the Church encounters Christ in those served:
Then the King will say to those at his right hand, “Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited me, I was in prison and you came to me. . . Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.” Matthew 25:40. St. Vincent exercises its faith and carries out this religious mission to “the least of these” through its foster care and adoption ministries. Care for needy children and the provision of these
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services is an integral, fundamental, and central part of St. Vincent’s religious exercise. Providing these services in a manner consistent with Catholic teaching is part of its religious character and affiliation.
9. Many of the children in St. Vincent’s care are minority children (African American, Hispanic, or Native American), and St. Vincent excels in providing extra support for families with special needs children.
10. Chad and Melissa Buck are adoptive parents and former foster parents currently living in Holt, Michigan. The Bucks adopted five special-needs children through St. Vincent. The Bucks see foster care and adoption as a religious calling, and as a part of their sincere religious exercise they serve and support other foster and adoptive parents.
11. The Bucks would struggle to provide the extensive care that their children require without the support they receive from St. Vincent. St. Vincent has provided the Bucks with training, resources, support, and professional guidance as to how to best care for their children with special needs. The Bucks have been able to call social workers at any hour and receive an answer from someone they know and trust. These social workers have become like family and have shown great love and care for their children. The Bucks continue to rely on St. Vincent for support,
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including through attending St. Vincent’s support group and maintaining relationships with the agency workers who know their family and their children. The Bucks also have a religious mission to serve other foster families, and they do so by working with St. Vincent to support foster and adoptive parents, including through a foster parent support group that St. Vincent facilitates, which also enables them to help support and recruit more foster parents. This group is the only foster parent support group offered in the tri-county area and it is open to all foster families, including same-sex couples.
12. Plaintiff Shamber Flore is a former foster child whose family fostered and adopted her through St. Vincent. Ms. Flore exercises her faith by encouraging and mentoring foster children and sharing her own story of overcoming hardship and abuse to find love and joy. She relies upon the relationships and trust she has built with St. Vincent to serve other families working with St. Vincent.
13. Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of MDHHS, the state agency responsible for foster care and adoption services for children in state custody. MDHHS contracts with private child placing agencies,
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including St. Vincent Catholic Charities, to provide public foster care and adoption services. Defendant Gordon is sued in his official capacity only.
14. Defendant Dr. Herman McCall is Executive Director of the Children’s Services Agency (CSA), a sub-agency of MDHHS that, in addition to having oversight over the work of all private child placing agencies, is mandated by law to “[r]eview, investigate, evaluate, and assess all programs within [MDHHS] related to services and programs for children,” including by advising on policy related to “children’s services and programs including, but not limited to, services for foster children, juvenile justice, and homeless youth.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.227 (2015). Defendant McCall is sued in his official capacity only.
15. Defendant Dana Nessel, the Attorney General of the State of Michigan, is charged with representing state agencies and enforcing state law. Defendant Nessel has been instrumental in framing MDHHS’s current policy regarding the enforcement of MDHHS contracts and state law governing religious child welfare providers. Attorney General Nessel is sued in her official capacity only.
16. Defendant Alex M. Azar is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In this capacity, he
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has responsibility for the operation and management of HHS and is the appointed official responsible for issuing and enforcing the challenged federal regulations. Secretary Azar is sued in his official capacity only.
17. Defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services is an executive agency of the United States government and is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the challenged federal regulations.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 19. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because all Defendants are located, domiciled, or otherwise are present and conducting a continuous and systematic part of their general business within the State. 20. The Court has authority to issue the declaratory and injunctive relief sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
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21. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). All Plaintiffs reside in this district, as do Defendants Gordon, McCall, and Nessel (“State Defendants”). Additionally, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district. Plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities is headquartered and operates in this district, and Plaintiffs Shamber Flore, Chad Buck, and Melissa Buck live in this district and all would be harmed both by the State’s actions and by application of the HHS regulations to its religious ministry. The State Defendants reside in the state capital, also in this District.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Michigan’s Foster Care System The State contracts with private child placing agencies
22. Over 12,000 children are currently in Michigan’s foster care system, and the need for new foster parents far outstrips the number of families seeking to care for these children. Indeed, approximately 3,000 Michigan foster children are available for adoption at any given time. Of those children, nearly 300 do not have an identified adoptive family.1
1 Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Adoption (2019) https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73971 7116---,00.html
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Because there are not enough families, more than 600 of these children “age out” of foster care every year.2 They exit the foster system at age 18 without any permanent family, and many lack the resources and skills to successfully transition into adulthood.3 These children are much less likely to graduate high school, let alone college, and far more likely to end up in poverty.4 Furthermore, Michigan therefore relies upon statelicensed foster care and adoption agencies (“child placing agencies”) to recruit, train, certify, and supervise foster families that will care for children in the State’s custody.
23. The State therefore has contracts with over 90 different private child placing agencies that operate throughout the State. By contracting with the State, these agencies agree to provide foster and adoptive services to children in need.

2 Child Trends, Transition-Age Youth in Foster Care in Michigan, https://www.childtr

ends.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Transition-Age-Youth Michigan.pdf; Kristi

Tanner, More than 900 Michigan foster care youth age out, Detroit Free Press (Jan.

31,

2015)

https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/raw-

data/2015/01/31/michigan-foster-care-youth/22621127/.

3 Children’s Rights, Aging Out, http://www.childrensrights.org/ newsroom/fact-

sheets/aging-out/.

4 Mark E. Courtney, Amy Dworsky, Adam Brown, Colleen Cary, Kara Love &

Vanessa Vorhies, Midwest evaluation of the adult functioning of former foster youth:

Outcomes at age 26 (2011); Erick Eckholm, Offering Help for Former Foster Care

Youths, The New York Times (Jan. 27, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2

007/01/27/us/27foster.html.

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24. The State encourages potential foster and adoptive parents to reach out to multiple agencies and to find an agency that will be a good fit for them, telling prospective parents that it is “important that you feel comfortable sharing personal and private information” with the agency you choose.5 The State has also created numerous support services by which prospective foster or adoptive parents can meet with experienced “Navigators” who will help guide them through the process of finding an agency that is a good fit.6
25. The State benefits from, and permits, private child placing agencies to develop specializations and to focus on serving certain populations—like children with disabilities or children with a specific ethnic background. And agencies will often seek to specifically recruit foster parents that can serve those unique needs.7 When a child placing agency is unable to work with a prospective foster or adoptive family, that agency will refer the prospective family to another agency that might
5 Ex. A, page 3. 6 Michigan Adoption Resource Exchange, Adoption Navigators, https://mare.org/ForFamilies/Adoption-Navigators. 7 The Wayne Center, a state contracted child placing agency, advertises that it is specifically seeking “foster parents with previous experience with persons who have a developmental disability and/or expertise in related areas, e.g., medical, educational, social work, psychological, etc.” Wayne Center, Written Needs Statement, http://www.waynecenter.org/services/foster-care.
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better suit their needs. This happens routinely for numerous reasons. For example, agencies can refer applicants elsewhere if a family lives too far away from the agency, making home visits impractical, if the agency has a wait list, if the family has not been satisfied with the agency’s services, or if the family is looking for a specific type of child not currently in the agency’s care, just to name a few.
26. As Steve Yager, Executive Direct of the Children’s Services Agency within MDHHS, previously stated: “[W]e work with agencies based on a contract, not on their belief system, stated or otherwise. We do not compel agencies to accept referrals—never have; rather, we create through contracts a vast array of providers to meet the very diverse needs of the children and families we serve.”8
27. In Michigan, foster care placements and public adoptions can only be performed by agencies that contract with MDHHS to perform these services. St. Vincent would not be able to provide its foster care or adoption ministry without a license and contract from the State, as the State is the sole source of public foster care and adoption referrals. Without new referrals, St. Vincent would quickly lose the ability to
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continue providing foster care and adoptive services and would have to shut down both programs. The Home Studies and Certification Process
28. There is no shortage of opportunities for same-sex couples to foster or adopt in Michigan.
29. DHHS welcomes and encourages same-sex couples to foster and adopt, and no same-sex couple has been prevented from fostering or adopting a child by St. Vincent.
30. If St. Vincent is unable to work with a couple due to its religious beliefs, it provides the couple with a list of other area agencies who do not share St. Vincent’s religious beliefs and could assist them in becoming foster or adoptive parents.
31. In fact, through the Michigan Adoption Resource Exchange (M.A.R.E) (the State’s central adoption portal), any foster family, including a same-sex or unmarried couple, can be connected to a private child placing agency, become a certified pre-adoptive home, and then adopt a child that is currently placed in a foster home serviced by a different agency, including St. Vincent.
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32. In other words, parents interested in adopting a child in St. Vincent’s care need not work directly with St. Vincent to adopt that child, but may work with another agency.
33. In this way, LGBTQ individuals have been able to adopt a child in St. Vincent’s care.
34. As part of the certification process, a prospective foster or adoptive parent must work with either MDHHS or a private agency to complete a “home study” before they can be approved by the State to adopt or foster a child.
35. As part of the home study, a social worker will visit the applicant’s home in person and meet with all of the individuals living in that home.
36. This in-person meeting is a necessary component of the home study because it allows the social worker to asses both the home and the individuals living in it.
37. During this in person meeting, the social worker will ask the applicant very specific, personal, and difficult questions to gauge whether it would be appropriate to place a foster child in need in their home.
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38. These questions are necessary to allow the agency to assess whether the applicant’s home is appropriate and suitable for the placement of foster or adoptive children.
39. Often, these children have been subject to past abuse or other traumatic events, so careful evaluation of the family’s living situation is necessary to avoid unnecessary and potentially harmful conflicts.
40. In addition, MDHHS’s foster/adoption home evaluation form specifically requires agencies to assess the “[s]trengths and weaknesses” of the parents and the “[s]trengths of the relationship” between the couple, including “level of satisfaction” and “stability” of the relationship.
41. Regarding home studies for LGBTQ individuals, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) has recognized that a social worker may ask “all kinds of questions about [the applicant’s] childhood and upbringing, including questions about puberty, sex and sexuality.”9 HRC stated that the “homestudy serves as an evaluation tool that allows you to determine if a prospective resource parent has that capability to provide a child with
9 Perry, J.R., Promising Practices for Serving Transgender & Non-Binary Foster and Adoptive Parents, Human Rights Campaign Foundation 41-42 (2017), https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC ACAF Promising Practices Se rving Transgender Non-Binary Parents.pdf
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a safe and nurturing home” and should be based on a “thorough
evaluation.”10 A home study also requires an agency to ask very personal
questions regarding an LGBT individual’s past and sensitive questions
about their relationships, family, and love life.11 In short, a home study
is not a mere box to be checked.
42. Home studies are very invasive, thorough, and in-depth
investigations that take into account every aspect of an applicant’s family
life and are part of the process by which an agency and the applicant
determine if they are the right fit for each other. As Michigan recognizes,
it is crucial that applicants “trust [their] instincts” and “[c]hoose an
agency [they] are compatible with.”12
10 Id. at 44. 11 HRC created a list of sample questions for social workers to ask during an LGBT home study. This sample list includes numerous questions that are deeply personal and even intimate: “In the past, have you ever been “outed” by someone? How did you handle it?”; “What has been the attitude of your extended family to your partner?”; “How have homo/bi/transphobia and/or heterosexism or cissexism affected your life and how have you dealt with this?”; and “Where are you in the process of grieving any feelings of loss you may have around not having biological children?” Sample LGBTQ Affirming Homestudy Questions & Rationale, Human Rights Campaign Foundation, https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC ACAF LGBTQ Aff irming Homestudy Questions And Rationale.pdf. 12 Foster Care Agency Checklist, Department of Human Services, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/FosterCareAgencyChecklist Comm412 381389 7.pdf.
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43. Only after a home study and assessment by a social worker is
complete will the agency refer the application to the State with a
recommendation that the State provide final approval and licensing.
44. As part of this licensing recommendation, an agency must prepare
a report and licensing recommendation for MDHHS. That report
analyzes the relationships in the home and provides a recommendation
regarding placing children in that home. That report is—and St. Vincent
understands that report to be—a written approval of the relationships in
the home and confirmation that the agency has determined the home is
suitable for the placement of children.
45. HRC and other LGBTQ-advocacy organizations believe that
agencies should not place children with families that would not be
affirming of LGBTQ children, including for religious reasons.13 HRC
13 HRC, All Children All Families and Non-Affirming Potential Foster Families (Oct. 3, 2018), https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/4180979117481006082 (free registration required to view) (describing a foster family’s reaction to a child’s identification as a member of the LGBTQ community as the “all-important discussion” that if not handled correctly can “harm” the child). HRC also describes New York City’s approach as a “best practice.” New York City policies state, “If the parent displays negative attitudes about LGBTQ people, even when deeply rooted in religious beliefs and cultural values, and the alleged abused and/or maltreatment are related to the youth’s perceived or actual sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression, the staff must determine whether those attitudes are impacting the youth’s immediate safety as well as whether those attitudes may put the youth at risk for future physical or emotional harm.” New York City Government,
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provides a “Seal of Recognition” to agencies that are leaders in serving
LGBTQ foster families and children.14 In Michigan, the following
agencies have received the Seal of Recognition: Fostering Futures, Hands
Across the Water, and Judson Center - Foster Care & Adoption.
46. Upon information and belief, the State does not take the position
that it would be a violation of state law or policy for an agency to refuse
to place a child with a religious foster family if the agency determined
that the family would not be affirming of LGBTQ children.
47. Upon information and belief, the State does not take the position
that it would be a violation of state law or policy for an agency to refuse
to recommend for certification a foster family if the agency determined
that the family would not be affirming of LGBTQ children.
48. Upon information and belief, the State has never investigated or
penalized an agency for refusing to recommend for certification a foster
Respectfully Asking Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) Questions, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/lgbtq/Respectfully Asking SOGI Questions.pdf ; see also Child Welfare League of America & Lambda Legal, Getting Down to Basics: Tools to Support LGBTQ Youth in Care, 25-26 (2012), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/gdtb 2013 complete.pdf (“If these personal religious beliefs might prevent offering nonjudgmental care to an LGBTQ young person, the practitioner or foster parent should seek outside support and make alternative care arrangements. They must put the needs of young people above their own personal beliefs.”). 14 All Children - All Families: Tiers of Recognition, HRC, https://www.hrc.org/resources/all-children-all-families-tiers-of-recognition.
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family if the agency determined that the family would not be affirming of LGBTQ children.
49. Upon information and belief, the State has never investigated or penalized the Sault Tribe Binogii Placement Agency, a State-licensed child placing agency, for only placing children with Native American foster or adoptive parents.
50. Upon information and belief, the State has never investigated or penalized the Wayne Center, a State-licensed child placing agency, for seeking only parents with prior experience caring for developmentally disabled children.
51. Upon information and belief, the State has never investigated or penalized Homes for Black Children, a former State-licensed child placing agency, for specializing in providing care for Black children. Placing a child in a certified foster or adoptive home
52. When a child must be removed from their home and placed in a foster home, DHHS’s goal is to place that child in a home within 24 hours. In order to do this, the State will reach out to one or more of the child placing agencies with which it has contracted to see if that agency has a family ready and willing to take in that child. The child placing agency
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will then be given one hour by MDHHS to contact one or more families and see if it can find a placement for that child. If the first agency MDHHS contacts cannot find an available family, MDHHS contacts additional agencies. Sometimes, MDHHS will contact multiple agencies at the same time when the situation is urgent.
53. Once a certified family is “matched” with the child in need, MDHHS will transfer that child into the foster family and the private child placing agency with whom that family was certified will oversee the placement, providing ongoing support and training to the foster family.
54. As discussed above, families certified through one foster agencies may still adopt children under the supervision of a different agency through M.A.R.E.
55. Michigan relies upon state and federal funds, including federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grants, to administer its foster care and adoption programs. As a condition of receiving these funds, the Department of Health and Human Services is required by 45 CFR § 75.300(a) to “communicate to the non-Federal entity [here, MDHHS] all relevant public policy requirements . . . and incorporate them either directly or by reference in the terms and
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conditions of the Federal award.” Id. One such public policy requirement imposed by these same regulation is that “no person otherwise eligible will be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in the administration of HHS programs and services based on non-merit factors such as age, disability, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.” 45 CFR § 75.300(c). Through contracts with private child placing agencies, Michigan provides foster parents and the agencies that supervise them per diem payments from a combination of federal and state funds. That funding is provided to child placing agencies only after an agency has accepted the referral of a child and is supervising that placement with a certified foster family.
56. Through contracts with private child placing agencies, Michigan also provides specified funding to adoptive parents and the agencies that supervise them from a combination of federal and state funds.
57. Upon information and belief, MDHHS and Attorney General Nessel have interpreted 45 CFR § 75.300(a) to apply to St. Vincent Catholic Charities and operate to require the State to force St. Vincent to
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violate its sincere religious beliefs by providing home studies for samesex relationships.
58. Were St. Vincent to fail to comply with this regulation, MDHHS will cut St. Vincent’s funding and refuse to continue contracting with the agency. State law protects the religious exercise of child placing agencies
59. State law expressly protects the ability of child placing agencies to decline to perform a home study or make a licensing recommendation. See Mich. Comp. Laws 722.124e(h) (2015). This law, passed in 2015, prohibits the State from declining to contract, declining to renew a contract, or taking any other adverse action against a child placing agency based on its decision to refer same-sex or unmarried couples to other agencies for religious reasons. Id.
60. When this law was passed, Michigan explained that “[h]aving as many possible qualified adoption and foster parent agencies in this state is a substantial benefit to the children of this state who are in need of these placement services.” Mich. Comp. Laws 722.124e(c) (2015). Michigan also found that it crucial to “ensur[e] that faith-based child placing agencies can continue to provide adoption and foster care
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services” because their work “benefit[s] the children and families who receive publicly funded services.” Mich. Comp. Laws 722.124e(g) (2015). Accordingly, Michigan chose to protect faith-based agencies by permitting them to refer prospective applicants to another agency if serving that applicant would conflict with the agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Michigan concluded that this was in the public interest and in the interest of serving the most families and children in need. Id.
61. Soon after the law was passed, MDHHS interpreted the statute to mean that it could not penalize or terminate contracts with religious child welfare agencies if those agencies declined to perform home studies for same-sex or unmarried couples.
62. MDHHS determined that the state law might not apply in some cases involving child-specific adoption contracts, but even in those cases, MDHHS granted case-by-case exemptions which permitted child welfare agencies to continue operating according to their religious beliefs.
63. In response to this new law, MDHHS also updated its individual child adoption forms and contracts.
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St. Vincent’s Adoption and Foster Care Program 64. St. Vincent shares Michigan’s goal of working to fill the shortage
of safe foster homes for these vulnerable kids. St. Vincent is able to recruit prospective families who would not otherwise feel able to foster or adopt children based on its religious character and mission.
65. St. Vincent provides public foster care and adoption services. It performs home studies and makes licensing recommendations to the state, oversees foster and adoptive placements, and also provides ongoing training and support for the foster or adoptive family and works with case workers to coordinate services to the foster family, birth family and child in order to achieve a positive outcome.
66. St. Vincent serves and places children regardless of their race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, disability, source of income, familial status, genetic information, or sexual violence victim status.
67. St. Vincent shares the religious beliefs and teachings of the Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. But St. Vincent would never stop a family who wants to foster or adopt from having the opportunity to complete the application and home study process. If
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St. Vincent were ever unable to perform in-depth home assessments and make reports and written certifications to the State for any reason, including based on St. Vincent’s own religious beliefs, then it would refer the applicants to another agency that could better serve their needs.
68. According to M.A.R.E., there are 16 other agencies that also serve Ingham County, which is where St. Vincent is located.15
69. For over 50 years, St. Vincent has provided foster care and adoption services in Michigan pursuant to regularly renewed contracts. In reliance upon these contracts, St. Vincent currently employs 18 staff members who work exclusively on these contracts, has budgeted and raised funds designed to supplement state funding on that contract, and has taken other concrete steps in expectation that it will continue to receive referrals and be able to perform its duties under these contracts.
70. St. Vincent provides training, supervision, and on-going support to each foster care and adoptive family with which it partners. For adoptive parents like Chad and Melissa Buck, who have worked with St. Vincent to foster and then adopt five children with challenging
15 Michigan Adoption Resource Exchange, Agency Map, https://mare.org/Agency-Map (under “Filter by County” select “Ingham” for map and list of all 17 agencies).
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medical needs and trauma from past abuse, St. Vincent has been a Godsend. To this day, St. Vincent continues to be a crucial source of support for the Bucks, and they in turn provide support and assistance to other families fostering and adopting through St. Vincent. For the Bucks, serving as adoptive parents and serving other adoptive parents is a religious calling. St. Vincent facilitates ongoing services to families that have adopted, like a monthly support group—the only such group open to any foster or adoptive parents in the region.
71. St. Vincent helped Shamber Flore to find a home and a loving family after past filled with trauma and abuse. St. Vincent has continued to help and support Shamber and her adoptive parents, and now Shamber serves St. Vincent and its families by providing mentoring and support for children and families recovering from past trauma.
72. In the foster care context, the home study assessment process allows St. Vincent to prepare families to accept a child into their home; only after a child is placed in the certified family’s home do St. Vincent and the family begin to receive funding from the State.
73. In some exceptional cases, the State might use a different payment structure pursuant to a separate, child-specific contract to
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directly pay for home study services for foster children being placed with relatives. St. Vincent has never been a party to such a contract for the provision of home study services for an LGBTQ couple.
74. Unless the State specifically contracts for a home study assessment in this exceptional circumstance, home studies are not paid for with state funds under St. Vincent’s ordinary foster care or adoption contracts with the State.
75. Outside of this exceptional circumstance for placement with relatives, foster care and adoption home studies are not specifically listed as a “service” under St. Vincent’s contracts with the State.
76. Outside of this exceptional circumstance, St. Vincent pays for home studies, assessments, and its general recruitment with private funds in a cost center that is kept separate from the funding provided by the State for other child welfare activities.
77. St. Vincent offers a significant subsidy to Michigan by recruiting new foster parents using its own private funds and supplementing State funds with private donations and volunteer hours to cover costs that state funding cannot.
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78. For example, last fiscal year both St. Vincent’s foster program and adoption programs operated at a significant loss based on the state funding alone, and these programs would not have been able to operate without St. Vincent’s private subsidies.
79. Michigan has been aware of St. Vincent’ religious beliefs for years. MDHHS Targets St. Vincent The ACLU’s Lawsuit
80. On September 20, 2017, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against MDHHS on behalf of two LGBT couples. The lawsuit alleged that these couples had approached Bethany Christian Services and St. Vincent Catholic Charities seeking to adopt a child, but were referred to another agency based on their sexual orientation. The ACLU claimed that the state’s decision to continue contracting with these private agencies violated the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. Complaint at ¶¶ 75-81, Dumont v. Lyon, No. 17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 1.
81. Plaintiffs St. Vincent Catholic Charities, Melissa Buck, Chad Buck, and Shamber Flore moved to intervene in the lawsuit filed by the ACLU, arguing that the State’s decision to contract with St. Vincent and
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other faith-based agencies did not violate the Constitution and was protected under state and federal law. Motion to Intervene at 19-21, Dumont v. Lyon, No. 17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2017), ECF No. 18.
82. On October 1, 2017, and in light of the ACLU’s lawsuit filed against the State of Michigan, Stacie Bladen, the Deputy Director of the Children’s Services Agency within MDHHS, submitted three official “contract compliance complaints” with MDHHS licensing staff against St. Vincent Catholic Charities, Bethany of East Lansing, and Bethany of Madison Heights for allegedly referring a same-sex couple to another child placing agency.16 Ms. Bladen claimed that the actions of these agencies violated their contracts by referring same-sex couples to other adoption agencies based on their sincerely held religious beliefs.
83. Soon after Ms. Bladen lodged her complaint, MDHHS opened investigations into all three of these agencies solely because they exercised their rights under state law and the First Amendment.17
84. These investigations were inconsistent with MDHHS’s prior statements and policies regarding compliance with state law.
16 Ex. C. 17 State Defendant’s Response to Intervenor Defendant’s Amended First Set of Interrogatories at 6–7, Dumont v. Lyon, No. 17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2018), Ex. D.
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85. As Stacie Bladen, speaking on behalf of MDHHS, stated earlier on September 23, 2016, “[i]f the child placing agency declines to accept a referral, whether for foster care case management or adoption services, based on sincerely held religious beliefs, the Department cannot take ‘adverse action’ (as defined in the act) against the agency.”18
86. Bladen’s earlier position was also consistent with MDHHS guidance outlined in a policy document regarding “foster and adoptive parent recruitment, licensing, and retention.”19
87. In this document, the agency made clear that faith-based agencies could continue contracting with the State and making referrals in accord with their religious beliefs: “[b]efore accepting a referral, the childplacing agency has the sole discretion to decide whether to engage in activities and perform services related to that referral.”20
88. The document further notes that “[i]f MDHHS makes a referral to a child-placing agency for foster care case management or adoption services pursuant to a contract, the child-placing agency must accept or decline the referral.”21
18 Ex. E. 19 Ex. F. 20 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 21 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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89. Then, after months of discovery—and just days before depositions were set to begin—the State of Michigan and the ACLU announced on January 23, 2019 that they had entered into settlement talks, giving intervening defendants one hour’s notice to determine whether they would agree to or oppose a stay and refusing to share any details of the settlement discussions. On March 22, 2019, the State and the ACLU then announced that they had entered into a settlement and agreed to the dismissal of the ACLU’s claims.
90. The intervenors did not join that settlement. The settlement was not shown to them prior to filing. In its motion to dismiss the case, the ACLU and State Defendants jointly moved for a stipulated dismissal of the case, noting that “Intervenor Defendants, who have asserted no claims and against whom no claims have been asserted, are not party to the Settlement Agreement.” Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 3–4, Dumont v. Lyon, No. 17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2019), ECF No. 82. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss the case, but declining to address or incorporate the terms of the settlement in its order.
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91. In a statement accompanying the settlement, Defendant Nessel announced that after reviewing the ACLU’s claims, she “determined that MDHHS may be subject to liability on Plaintiffs’ claims,” and thus directed MDHHS to change its internal policy regarding permitting private child placing agencies to refer couples to other agencies.22 Nessel claimed that this new policy was actually “consistent with the law and existing agency contracts,” and would now be enforced against agencies like St. Vincent.
92. In prior public statements, Defendant Nessel has explained to the press that she believes “there’s ‘no viable defense’ to the 2015 law,” and that the law’s “only purpose is discriminatory animus.”23
93. Defendant Nessel had previously made similar disparaging statements regarding those who share St. Vincent’s religious beliefs, and had publicly stated that she would not enforce the state law protecting religious child welfare agencies.

22 State Settles Same-Sex Adoption Case, Department of Attorney General, https:

//www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-82927-492743--,00.html;

Summary

of

Settlement, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/03.22.19 FINAL Dumont set

tlement summary 650097 7.pdf.

23 Ed White, Dem AG candidate: Adoption law discriminates against gays, Associated

Press News (Sept. 27, 2018) https://apnews.com/a1fc021e8e2e4b3b829586ba56ad

s9c07.

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94. In justifying this decision, Nessel relied on both State policies and federal regulations which she interpreted to require the State to deny agencies like St. Vincent religious exemptions from allegedly applicable anti-discrimination laws.
95. As Nessel explained, Michigan receives “a significant portion” of its funding under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, a child welfare grant program administered through the HHS.
96. In fact, MDHHS alone receives over 3.8 billion dollars annually from the federal government through Title IV-E, TANF, and other similar programs.24
97. According to Nessel, “[a]s a condition of receiving these federal funds, the United States Department of Health and Human Services requires that states’ Title IV-E-funded programs prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.”
98. The State is also bound by other federal regulations, which require it to respect the religious character of social service providers who receive federal funds. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 87.3(a) (“Neither the HHS
24 Budget Briefing: HHS Human Services, House Fiscal Agency, https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/PDF/Briefings/HHS HS BudgetBriefing fy18-19.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
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awarding agency, nor any State or local government and other passthrough entity receiving funds under any HHS awarding agency program shall, in the selection of service providers, discriminate for or against an organization on the basis of the organization’s religious character or affiliation.”).
99. Nessel therefore directed MDHHS to, “[i]n compliance with this federal requirement,” prevent faith-based agencies from, among other things:
a. “[R]eferring to another contracted agency an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or same-sex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the agency for contracted services,” and
b. “[R]efusing to perform a home study or process a foster care licensing application or an adoption application for an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or samesex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the CPA for contracted services.” 25
100. Per the Attorney General’s statement and the terms of the settlement, any private agency which refuses to comply with these requirements “within a reasonable time after notification by the
25 Summary of Settlement, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag /03.22.19 FINAL Dumont settlement summary 650097 7.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
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Department of a Contract Violation” will have its contracts “terminate[d].”26
101. MDHHS also stated it will “initiate an investigation when made of aware of an alleged Contract Violation,” and will terminate the agency’s contracts if it “fails to demonstrate compliance after a reasonable opportunity to implement the approved corrective action plan.”27
102. The State has already begun taking steps to enforce this policy, including requiring that child welfare agencies complete training on this new policy.
103. Upon information and belief, the State has also communicated to state employees that they must desist a prior practice of sending referrals of same-sex couples to other agencies instead of agencies like St. Vincent.
104. St. Vincent continues to provide services to foster and adoptive families under its state contracts.
26 Settlement Agreement, Dumont et al. v. Gordon et al., USDC EDMI Case No. 2:17-cv-13080-PDB-EAS, https://www.michigan. gov/documents/ag/Settlement Agre ement with Sig Pages - FINAL 650100 7.pdf. 27 Id.
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105. St. Vincent’s adoption contract is up for renewal in October 2019, and St. Vincent reasonably fears that the State will refuse to renew the contract on the basis of St. Vincent’s religious beliefs and practices. Based upon the newly announced policy that would prohibit St. Vincent from providing adoption services consistent with its religious beliefs, St. Vincent believes that adverse action from the State Defendants is certainly impending. Referrals to accommodate sincere religious beliefs denied
106. Michigan has also treated St. Vincent’s request for referrals based on its sincere religious beliefs differently from referrals for other reason. The State has admitted that “child placing agencies may refer a prospective foster or adoptive family to another child placing agency” under certain circumstances, but they have decided to deny St. Vincent the ability to make referrals for religious reasons.
107. The State has admitted that child placing agencies in Michigan are allowed to refer families to other agencies for geographic reasons, if they have a long wait list, or if they are unable to accommodate the families’ preferences.28 State law also permits, and indeed requires,
28 Ex. G, page 7. 37

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agencies to decline to work with parents for various reasons, including Native American ancestry.
108. And agencies can still seek to specifically recruit foster parents that can serve specific needs of children, including children with disabilities or mental health issues.29
109. Under the State’s new policy, however, the only justification for a referral that is now impermissible is a religious objection to samesex marriage.
110. On information and belief, MDHHS also treated St. Vincent differently from other religious foster care agencies in 2017 and 2018.
111. Following two prior incidents in which a private child placing agency had to transfer a case for religious reasons, MDHHS told another faith-based foster care agency that child placing agencies are permitted to decline to accept a referral for foster care case management or adoption services based on sincerely held religious beliefs, and that MDHHS cannot take adverse action against the agency based on this decision.
29 The Wayne Center, a state contracted child placing agency, advertises that it is specifically seeking “foster parents with previous experience with persons who have a developmental disability and/or expertise in related areas, e.g., medical, educational, social work, psychological, etc.” Wayne Center, Written Needs Statement, http://www.waynecenter.org/services/foster-care (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
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112. On information and belief, MDHHS has taken positions contrary to its current position that once an agency accepts a child for case from MDHHS it is no longer protected by state law. This is inconsistent with prior interpretations by the State in which it explained that the law permitted faith-based child placing agencies to accept or decline a DHHS referral at any time based on their sincerely held religious beliefs.
113. MDHHS has changed its position on this issue solely to target agencies like St. Vincent Catholic Charities for their religious beliefs that do not allow them to endorse same-sex relationships. Michigan’s Unlawful Actions Harm St. Vincent and the Children of Michigan
114. Michigan’s unlawful actions harm St. Vincent and the children and families it serves. If St. Vincent is unable to receive referrals from or contract with the State, it will be forced to close its foster care and adoption programs, ending a decades-old religious ministry and reducing the number of agencies available to serve families and children in need.
115. Across Michigan, the State’s actions affect untold thousands of families and children in need, and would force numerous agencies—
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and all of the Catholic Charities agencies across the State—to close their foster and adoption programs. This would impact hundreds of children statewide, as these agencies are some of the most successful in the State at finding loving homes for children in need.
116. If the State refuses to work with St. Vincent, then the families currently licensed by St. Vincent would face the difficult choice of either trying to find a new agency that will work with and endorse them as foster parents—and having to start back at square one with a new agency that doesn’t know anything about the specific needs of their families or the kids they are serving—or choosing to stop providing foster care services. Upon information and belief, many of St. Vincent’s licensed foster parents would stop providing foster care if forced into that choice.
117. If the State refuses to work with St. Vincent, then the families currently in the home study process, or awaiting adoption placements, would be forced to either begin the process anew with a different agency or go through the process of transferring their licenses to a new agency, losing the relationships they have built in the process. This change would lead to delays in the adoption process for both the parents and for
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children might be matched with them and are currently awaiting loving homes.
118. If the State refuses to work with St. Vincent, the Bucks will lose the relationships and support they have depended upon to serve their children and their ongoing needs. The Bucks would also be restricted and burdened in their religious exercise of providing support to other foster and adoptive parents. Should another biological sibling of their adopted children enter the child welfare system, the Bucks would likely miss the opportunity to foster and adopt that child and keep the siblings together.
119. If the State refuses to work with St. Vincent, Ms. Flore would be unable to volunteer at the agency to support and mentor foster and adoptive children, and would be restricted and burdened in her religious exercise of serving children who share the same struggles she experienced.
120. The State’s actions substantially burden, denigrate, and discriminate against St. Vincent, the Bucks, Shamber Flore, and others who share their religious beliefs.
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121. St. Vincent remains willing and able to continue its ministry serving children in Michigan. It wants to help alleviate the foster care crisis in Michigan, and it has not and will not prevent any qualified family from becoming a foster parent, be it through St. Vincent or a referral to another agency. But because of Michigan’s actions, St. Vincent’s over 70-year-old ministry to at-risk children is in jeopardy.
CLAIMS Count I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Exercise Clause Not Neutral 122. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 123. “[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.4 (2017) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). 124. By adopting a policy requiring the State to discriminate against child placing agencies with religious objections to same-sex marriage, Defendants have targeted St. Vincent’s religious beliefs and practices.
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125. The statements of Defendants and their officials demonstrate that hostility toward Plaintiffs and their religious beliefs was a motivation for Defendants’ actions.
126. Defendants’ laws and policies have not been evenly enforced, demonstrating that the current attempt at enforcement is designed to target particular religious beliefs and practices.
127. Defendants do not have a compelling reason for their actions, and Defendants have not selected the means least restrictive of religious exercise in order to further their interests.
128. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants, Plaintiffs will suffer imminent and irreparable harm.
Count II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Exercise Clause Not Generally Applicable 129. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 130. “[L]aws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
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131. Defendants’ laws and policies have not been evenly enforced, demonstrating that the current attempt at enforcement is designed to target particular religious beliefs and practices.
132. Defendants have never enforced their laws, policies, and contract provisions in the manner they are currently being enforced against Plaintiffs.
133. The public statements of Defendants and their officials demonstrate that hostility toward Plaintiffs and their religious beliefs was a motivation for Defendants’ actions.
134. Defendants have made exceptions to their policies in some instances.
135. Defendants do not have a compelling reason for their actions, and Defendants have not selected the means least restrictive of religious exercise in order to further their interests.
136. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed.
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Count III 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Exercise Clause System of Individualized Exemptions 137. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 138. An “exception-ridden policy,” or one that permits discretionary “individualized exemptions” is “the antithesis of a neutral and generally applicable policy” and therefore “must run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny.” Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012). 139. Michigan engages in the individualized assessment of alleged contract violations by agencies and exercised a great deal of discretion in creating corrective action plans and permitting exceptions. Defendants are therefore engaging in individualized, discretionary assessments of St. Vincent’s conduct. 140. State law and MDHHS contracts permits individualized exemptions from child placing agency requirements. 141. Pursuant to the referral provisions of the foster care and adoption contracts entered into between St. Vincent Catholic Charities and MDHHS, MDHHS is permitted to grant individualized exemptions
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from its policy of prohibiting contractors from transferring cases back to MDHHS.
142. The Defendants’ actions against Plaintiffs are the product of a system of individualized exemptions and burden Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.
143. Defendants do not have a compelling reason for their actions, and Defendants have not selected the means least restrictive of religious exercise in order to further their interests.
144. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants, Plaintiffs are and will continue to be irreparably harmed.
Count IV 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Speech Clause Compelled Speech 145. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 146. Defendants are seeking to compel St. Vincent to make affirmative statements that contradict St. Vincent’s religious beliefs. 147. Michigan is conditioning St. Vincent’s license, its contracts with MDHHS, and the ongoing ability to engage in the religious exercise
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of helping children in need, on Plaintiffs’ willingness to make such statements.
148. Such compulsion amounts to compelled speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
149. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants, St. Vincent is and will continue to be irreparably harmed.
Count V 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses Retaliation for Protected Speech and Religious Exercise 150. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 151. Statements made by and on behalf of Plaintiffs about their religious beliefs and practices are both religious exercise and protected speech. 152. Defendants’ contract investigation and impending termination, and their threats of additional adverse action, would be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights.
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153. A causal link exists between Plaintiffs’ religious exercise and protected speech and Defendants’ adverse actions against Plaintiffs.
154. Such actions are retaliation for religious exercise and protected speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
155. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants, Plaintiffs are and will continue to be irreparably harmed.
Count VI 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses Denominational Preference and Discrimination 156. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 157. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses prohibit government from officially preferring one denomination over another or discriminating against a religious group for its religious beliefs and practices. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”). 158. Defendants are applying their laws in a manner which penalizes St. Vincent for its religious beliefs. Defendants’ actions also
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alienate, communicate disapproval to, and impose concrete harms on foster families such as the Bucks and volunteers such as Ms. Flore, who share St. Vincent’s Christian religious beliefs.
159. Defendants have not penalized other religious groups for their religious beliefs.
160. Defendants’ preference for some religious beliefs and practices and discrimination against Plaintiffs’ beliefs and practices violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
161. Defendants do not have a compelling reason for their actions, and Defendants have not selected the means least restrictive of religious exercise in order to further their interests.
162. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be irreparably harmed.
Count VII 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Equal Protection 163. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 164. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.
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165. Defendants’ likely impending contract termination and other adverse actions penalizes Plaintiffs because of their religious beliefs.
166. Contractors that espouse religious beliefs contrary to those espoused by Plaintiffs are allowed to maintain their contractual relationships with the State.
167. Defendants’ preference for one set of religious beliefs and against Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
168. Absent injunctive and declaratory relief, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be irreparably harmed.
Count VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 169. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs. 170. RFRA prohibits the enforcement of federal law when such enforcement substantially burdens religious exercise. 171. The State Defendants have claimed that enforcement of federal law will require them to take adverse action against St. Vincent.
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172. Terminating the States’ contracts with St. Vincent or taking other adverse action against St. Vincent would impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ sincere religious exercise.
173. That burden would not be justified by any compelling government interest, and contract termination or adverse action against St. Vincent would not be the least restrictive means of furthering such interests.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that the Court:
a. Declare that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require Defendants to cease discriminating against Plaintiffs and to cease their ongoing investigation and impending adverse actions on the basis of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, speech, and practices;
b. Declare that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act prohibits Defendants from using federal regulations or the enforcement of federal law to substantially burden Plaintiffs’ religious exercise;
c. Order Defendants to continue performance of the Contract; d. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Defendants from taking retaliatory action against Plaintiffs, including
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cancellation or non-renewal of the foster care and/or adoption contracts,

or from otherwise penalizing Plaintiffs for their religious belief, speech,

and practices regarding marriage;

e. Award Plaintiffs nominal damages for the loss of their rights as

protected by law;

g. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action and reasonable attorney’s

fees; and

h. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable

and just.

Dated: April 15, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
William R. Bloomfield (P68515) Catholic Diocese of Lansing Lansing, Michigan 48933-1122 (517) 342-2522 wbloomfield@dioceseoflansing.org

Mark Rienzi* Lori Windham Nicholas Reaves* The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 955-0095 Facsimile: (202) 955-0090

Counsel for Plaintiff *Admission pending

52

 
 Case 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 69 filed 09/26/19 PageID.2498 Page 1 of 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA BUCK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT GORDON, in his official Capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, et al.,

CASE NO. 1:19-CV-286 HON. ROBERT J. JONKER

Defendants. __________________________________/

OPINION

INTRODUCTION

This case is not about whether same-sex couples can be great parents. They can. No one in

the case contests that. To the contrary, St. Vincent has placed children for adoption with same-sex

couples certified by the State.

What this case is about is whether St. Vincent may continue to do this work and still profess

and promote the traditional Catholic belief that marriage as ordained by God is for one man and

one woman. In 2015, Michigan’s state legislature passed a law designed to ensure it could do just

that. And when the State was first sued on the issue, the State defended the right of St. Vincent to

maintain its religious belief while it placed children on a non-discriminatory basis in any home

approved by the State.

But that changed in the wake of the 2018 general election. While a candidate for Michigan

Attorney General, Dana Nessel called the law indefensible. She indicated that she would not

defend the State’s position in the litigation challenging the law, because she “could not justify

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using the state’s money” to defend “a law whose only purpose is discriminatory animus.” Leading up to the campaign, she described proponents of the law as “hate-mongers” who disliked gay people more than they cared about children. Candidate Nessel won the election, and shortly after taking office, she changed the State’s position toward St. Vincent. Under the Attorney General’s current interpretation of Michigan law and the parties’ contracts, St. Vincent must choose between its traditional religious belief, and the privilege of continuing to place children with foster and adoptive parents of all types.
Because the record demonstrates that the State’s new position targets St. Vincent’s religious beliefs, strict scrutiny applies, and St. Vincent has established a basis for preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo while the validity of the State’s new position is tested in plenary litigation.
BACKGROUND A. The Parties St. Vincent Catholic Charities (“St. Vincent”) is a non-profit, faith-based organization based in Lansing, Michigan. (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.228-229.) Its mission is “to share the love of Christ by performing the corporal and spiritual works of mercy.” (Id., PageID.229.) St. Vincent focuses on serving children and families and provides a range of services, including, without limitation, adoption and foster placement; professional mental health and substance abuse counseling; marriage and family counseling; and refugee resettlement. (Id., PageID.228-229.) This case centers on St. Vincent’s adoption and foster placement services. Plaintiffs Chad and Melissa Buck have adopted four siblings through St. Vincent. (M. Buck aff., ECF No. 6-2, PageID.262.) The Bucks “see fostering and adopting not just as a choice we made, but as a ministry and as a calling” based on their Christian beliefs. (Id.) They chose to work
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with St. Vincent “because we were comfortable working with an agency with a religious mission to serve children.” (Id.) Melissa Buck notes that St. Vincent “provides ongoing services to our family[,]” including by facilitating a monthly parent support group that is the “only parent support group for foster parents anywhere in the tri-county area.” (Id., PageID.265.) The group is open to any parents, including same-sex couples, and same-sex couples have attended from time to time. (Id.) The Bucks have worked with St. Vincent to recruit foster and adoptive families, and they sometimes help lead the parent support group. (Id.) Melissa Buck is “aware of many [adoptive and foster] families who would not be willing or able to transfer their license to another agency and continue adopting or fostering children if St. Vincent were forced to close its foster and adoption programs.” (Id., PageID.266-67.)
Plaintiff Shamber Flore was removed from her birth home when she was five years old after years of abuse, neglect, and exposure to drugs, gangs, and prostitution. (Flore aff., ECF No. 6-3, PageID.272.) St. Vincent placed her and her two siblings with an adoptive family, the Flores. (Id.) The Flores “had previously tried to adopt with a state adoptive agency and had a very negative experience.” (Id.) They “would not have been able to continue with the adoption process if they had not found in St. Vincent a trusted partner and ally.” (Id.) The Flores have adopted sixteen children over the past fourteen years. (Id.) Ms. Flore “mentor[s] other foster kids and youth at St. Vincent who have dealt with trauma and abuse.” (Id., PageID.273.) She shares her experience and “encourage[s] them that they, too, can overcome great hardship and find happiness.” (Id.) If St. Vincent had to cease its adoption and foster services, Ms. Flore “would lose the opportunity to mentor many of these youth as a volunteer at St. Vincent.” (Id.)
Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (“MDHHS” or “the Department”), which is the state agency responsible for foster care
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and adoption services. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Defendant Herman McCall is the Executive Director of Michigan’s Children’s Services Agency (“CSA”), which is a sub-agency of MDHHS that oversees the work of all private child placing agencies. (Id., PageID.8.) Defendant Dana Nessel is the Attorney General of the State of Michigan. (Id.) These three Defendants (collectively, the “State Defendants” are sued in their official capacities only. Defendant Alex M. Azar is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and is sued in his official capacity only. (Id., PageID.8-9.) Defendant HHS is responsible for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of federal regulations challenged in this case. (Id., PageID.9.)
B. Michigan’s Foster and Adoption System “Michigan has a chronic shortage of foster and adoptive homes.” (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.286.) In Michigan, there are “approximately 13,000 children in foster care, about 2,000 of whom have a permanency goal of adoption.” (Neitman aff. ECF No. 34-5, PageID.971.) MDHHS administers the State of Michigan’s Foster Care and Adoption Services programs as the Title IV-E agency in Michigan. (Goad aff., ECF No. 34-2. PageID.966.) MDHHS “holds 137 contracts with 57 private child placing agencies, or CPAs, to provide foster care or adoption services throughout Michigan.” (Id.)1 MDHHS not only contracts with CPAs to provide foster and adoption services but also is itself a CPA that may provide foster care services. (Id., PageID.967.) Most adoption services in Michigan are privatized. (Id.) St. Vincent provides both foster and adoption services in Michigan under contracts with the State. “[I]n the last four fiscal years, St. Vincent has served an average of 74 children in its foster care program every year, and through its work over 100 adoptions for foster children were finalized.” (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.228.)
1 Elsewhere the record states that the State contracts with over 90 private agencies to provide foster and adoptive support. (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.232.) This potential factual inconsistency does not affect the preliminary injunction analysis, and the Court is making no findings of fact in this Opinion.
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To become a foster or adoptive parent in Michigan, a person or couple must first obtain a license from the State. Private CPAs not only place children in licensed foster and adoptive homes, but also assist prospective foster or adoptive parents in applying to the State for licensure. As part of the application process, a CPA performs a home evaluation of the prospective parent or parents that includes a written assessment and a recommendation that a license be granted or denied. Based partly on the CPA’s recommendation, the State itself decides whether to license the prospective foster or adoptive parent.
MDHHS establishes the criteria to consider in performing a home evaluation. (Neitman aff., ECF No. 34-3, PageID.973.) Factors for consideration include, without limitation, the “’[s]trengths and weaknesses’ of the parents and the ‘[s]trengths of the relationship’ between the couple[;] …. marital and family status and history, including current and past level of family functioning and relationships, parenting skills and childrearing techniques, values and the role of religion in the family.” (Id.) A home evaluation entails “an exhaustive review of the family’s eligibility” that includes an assessment of “the relationships between all the adults living in the home[.]” (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.229-30.) The State’s required home evaluation form spans twelve pages. (Id., Ex. A, PageID.241-253.) The form calls for subjective as well as objective determinations. For example, the evaluating CPA must describe for each adult member of the household “strengths and weaknesses, worker’s assessment in addition to what the applicant tells you.” (Id., PageID.245.) Similarly, the form asks the evaluating CPA to describe “marital and family status and history” and to include as to the current relationship “strengths of relationship, areas of work or attention …. level of satisfaction, stability.” (Id., PageID.246.) For each child living in the home, the form asks the evaluating CPA to interview the child and describe the “[w]orker’s assessment of the child’s adjustment, development, special needs, relationships with
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parents and their significant others, and other strengths and weaknesses.” (Id.) The evaluating CPA must note whether “anyone in the household [has] a physical or mental health diagnosis or condition that would make care of the child difficult” and, if so, “describe how it may affect the care of a child.” (Id., PageID.247.) The form asks the evaluating CPA to make a recommendation regarding licensure and to detail “[i]ssues to be considered in making placements.” (Id., PageID.251.)
St. Vincent states that “as a Catholic organization, [it] cannot provide a written recommendation to the State evaluating and endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs.” (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.231.) “St. Vincent cannot provide written recommendations and endorsements of unmarried or LGBTQ couples consistent with its Catholic mission. Nor does St. Vincent want to send the State written recommendations that all unmarried or LGBTQ couples who come to it are unsuitable for adoption.” (Id.) When an unmarried or LGBTQ couple approaches St. Vincent to assist in the foster or adoption certification process, St. Vincent simply refers the couple to other agencies that can help. St. Vincent provides the prospective unmarried or LGBTQ couple with “written information on the State’s website and contact information for a list of other local adoption or foster care service providers” willing and able to assist the family. (Id., PageID.235.) Thus, “St. Vincent stands aside and allows other qualified agencies to make recommendations on behalf of unmarried or LGBTQ couples.” (Id.) Historically, the State of Michigan has permitted St. Vincent to refer prospective parents to other agencies if St. Vincent’s sincerely held religious beliefs prevented it from assisting with the certification and licensing recommendation process.2
2 Ms. Snoeyink avers that “[p]rivate agencies in Michigan have always been able to refer families to other agencies (or return a referral to DHHS) for a variety of other reasons,” such as “(1) the family may live further away than the agency would like to drive for home visits, so they refer them to a closer agency, (2) the agency already has a waiting
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St. Vincent does not prevent any couples, same-sex or otherwise, from fostering or adopting. (Id., Page ID.235.) To the contrary, same-sex couples “certified through different agencies have been able to adopt children in St. Vincent’s care in the past” using the Michigan Adoption Resource Exchange (“MARE”) process. (Id., PageID.235-36.) MARE’s website “includes information about all children currently seeking adoption in the State[,] … [and] families certified by any of the numerous private child placing agencies in Michigan are allowed to adopt every child on MARE’s website – no family is disqualified from adopting a child based solely on the agency with which they work.” (Id., PageID.236.) Through this process, any certified adoptive family, whether a same-sex couple or otherwise, may adopt children in St. Vincent’s care. (Id., PageID.235-36.)3 St. Vincent “immediately places all children within its care on MARE.” (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 42-4, PageID.1662.)
C. Contracts and Funding The present contract for adoption services (the “adoption contract” or “contract”) between the State of Michigan and St. Vincent became effective on October 1, 2016 and has a termination date of September 30, 2019.4 Under the heading “Compliance Requirements,” the adoption contract states: c. The Contractor shall comply with the MDHHS non-discrimination statement:
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) will not discriminate against any individual or group because of race, sex, religion,
list, (3) the family has not been satisfied with the agency’s services, and (4) the family is looking for a specific type of child not currently in that agency’s care.” (Id., PageID.238.) 3 St. Vincent notes that it “happily serves both LGBTQ individuals and children” in a variety of ways. (Id., PageID.231.) For example, St. Vincent serves LGBTQ children in its foster program and group home, and St. Vincent welcomes LGBTQ couples at the parent support group it facilitates. (Id.) 4 The adoption services contract between the State and St. Vincent, as amended, may be viewed in its entirety as part of the public record in Dumont v. Gordon, Case No. 2:17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017) (ECF Nos. 16-2, 16-10).
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age, national origin, color, height, weight, marital status, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, political beliefs or disability.
The above statement applies to all MDHHS supervised children, and to all applications filed for adoptions of MDHHS supervised children, including MDHHS supervised children assigned to a contracted agency.
(ECF No. 6-12, PageID.352.)5
Under the same heading, “Compliance Requirements,” the adoption services contract
states:
e. Under 1973 PA 116, as amended by 2015 PA 53, the Contractor has the sole discretion to decide whether or not to accept a referral from MDHHS. Nothing in this Agreement limits or expands the application of the Public Act.
Adoption referrals are initiated by MDHHS. Contractors may not transfer adoption cases to another child placing agency. After acceptance of an adoption referral, the Contractor may not transfer the case back to the Department, except upon the written approval of the County Director, the Children’s Services Agency Director, or the Deputy Director.
(ECF No. 6-12, PageID.352.)
The present contract for foster services (the “foster contract” or the “contract”) between
the State of Michigan and St. Vincent became effective on October 1, 2018 and terminates on
September 30, 2021. (ECF No. 6-9, PageID.323.) The foster contract states that
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (h), the Contractor shall comply with the following requirements: …. The Contractor shall comply with the MDHHS non-discrimination statement:
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) will not discriminate against any individual or group because of race, sex, religion, age, national origin, color, height, weight, marital status, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, political beliefs, or disability.
The above statement applies to all licensed and unlicensed caregivers and families and/or relatives that could potentially provide care or are currently providing care for MDHHS supervised children, including MDHHS supervised children assigned to a contracted agency.
5 The language quoted here is modified to reflect Amendment No. 1, which appears in Dumont at ECF No. 16-10, PageID.338-39.
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(ECF No. 34-7, PageID.1047-48.)6 Subsection (h) provides Under 1973, PA116, as amended by 2015 PA53, the Contractor has the sole discretion to decide whether to accept or not accept a referral from MDHHS. Nothing in this Agreement limits or expands the application of this Public Act.
(Id., PageID.1049.) The foster contract also states that [i]f MDHHS makes a referral to a child placing agency for foster care case management services pursuant to a contract with the child placing agency, the child placing agency must accept or decline the referral within one hour of receipt of the referral….After acceptance of a foster care referral, the Contractor may not refer the case back to the Department except for the reasons outlined in the Children’s Foster Care Manual (“FOM”) or upon the written approval of the County Director, the Children’s Services Agency Director, or the Deputy Director.
(ECF No. 6-9, PageID.323.) Michigan pays private CPAs, including St. Vincent, for providing foster and adoptive
placements “using a mix of state and federal funds, including funds from Title IV-E and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grants.” (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.232.) Michigan generally pays a per diem to the agency overseeing a foster placement only after the CPA places the child with a licensed family. (Id.) For most adoptions from foster care, “the State makes payments to the agency as part of the foster care system in pre-adoptive placements, and makes a lump-sum payment to the agency after the adoption is complete.” (Id., PageID.232-33) According to St. Vincent, “[p]rivate agencies generally do not bill the State, nor are they compensated, for performing home studies for prospective foster or adoptive parents.” (Id., PageID.233.) Subject to
6 The foster contract in the record (ECF No. 34-7) is an amended version of the foster contract that became effective in 2014 and expired on September 30, 2017. No one has disputed that the same language appears in the foster contract having an effective period from October 1, 2018 – September 30, 2021.
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a narrow exception,7 St. Vincent itself “pays for home studies, assessments, and its general recruitment with private funds in a cost center that is kept separate from the funding provided by the State for other child welfare activities.” (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.233)

D. Michigan Legislation

Both the adoption and foster contracts refer explicitly to “1973, PA 116, as amended by

2015 PA 53,” codified as MICH. COMP. L. § 722.124e and § 722.124f (the “2015 statute or “2015

law”). In enacting the 2015 law, the Michigan legislature noted, “It is the intent of the legislature

to protect child placing agencies’ free exercise of religion protected by the United States

constitution and the state constitution of 1963. This amendatory act is not intended to limit or deny

any person’s right to adopt a child or participate in foster care.” MICH. COMP. L. § 722.124e,

Historical and Statutory Note. The 2015 statute itself states,

(1) The legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a)

When it is necessary for a child in this state to be placed with

an adoptive or foster family, placing the child in a safe, loving, and

supportive home is a paramount goal of this state.

….

(c) Having as many possible qualified adoption and foster parent agencies in this state is a substantial benefit to the children of this state who are in need of these placement services and to all of the citizens of this state because the more qualified agencies taking part in this process, the greater the likelihood that permanent child placement can be achieved.

(d) As of the effective date of the [legislation], the adoption and foster care licensees of this state represent a broad spectrum of organizations and groups, some of which are faith based and some of which are not faith based.

(e) Private child placing agencies, including faith-based child placing agencies, have the right to free exercise of religion under both the state and federal constitutions. Under well-settled principles of

7 “In exceptional circumstances, the state has unique contracts it provides where it does pay agencies specifically for licensing a relative for a kincare placement.” (Id., PageID.233, PageID.254-59.)
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constitutional law, this right includes the freedom to abstain from conduct that conflicts with an agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs.
….
(g) Children and families benefit greatly from the adoption and foster care services provided by faith-based and non-faith-based child placing agencies. Ensuring that faith-based child placing agencies can continue to provide adoption and foster care services will benefit the children and families who receive publicly funded services.
(h) Under well-established department contracting practices, a private child placing agency does not receive public funding with respect to a particular child or particular individuals referred by the department unless that agency affirmatively accepts the referral.
(2) To the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law, a child placing agency shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with, the child placing agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs contained in a written policy, statement of faith, or other document adhered to by the child placing agency.
(3) To the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law, the state or local unit of government shall not take an adverse action against a child placing agency on the basis that the child placing agency has declined or will decline to provide any services that conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with, the child placing agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs contained in a written policy, statement of faith, or other document adhered to by the child placing agency.
(4) If a child placing agency declines to provide any services under subsection (2), the child placing agency shall provide in writing information advising the applicant of the department’s website, the Michigan adoption resource exchange or similar subsequently utilized websites, and a listing of adoption or foster care service providers with contact information and shall do at least 1 of the following:
(a) Promptly refer the applicant to another child placing agency that is willing and able to provide the declined services.
(b) Promptly refer the applicant to the webpage on the department’s website that identifies other licensed child placement agencies. ….
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(6) If a child placing agency declines to provide any services under subsection (2), the child placing agency’s decision does not limit the ability of another child placing agency to provide those services.
(7) For the purpose of this section:
(a) “Adverse action” includes, but is not limited to, denying a child placing agency’s application for funding, refusing to renew the child placing agency’s funding, canceling the child placing agency’s funding, declining to enter into a contract with the child placing agency, refusing to renew a contract with the child placing agency, canceling a contract with the child placing agency, declining to issue a license to the child placing agency, refusing to renew the child placing agency’s license, canceling the child placing agency’s license, taking an enforcement action against a child placing agency, discriminating against the child placing agency in regard to participation in a government program, and taking any action that materially alters the terms or conditions of the child placing agency’s funding, contract, or license.
(b) “Services” include any service that a child placing agency provides, except foster care case management and adoption services provided under a contract with the department.
MICH. COMP. L. § 722.124e.
St. Vincent’s executive director testified before the legislature in support of the legislation.
After the enactment of the 2015 statute, MDHHS updated its adoption services master contracts
“to reflect changes to state law that permit a private agency to decline to serve an individual based
on the agency’s religious beliefs.” (Bladen memorandum, ECF No. 6-14, PageID.372.)
E. Dumont Litigation
In 2017, the ACLU on behalf of two same-sex couples sued MDHHS for allowing
St. Vincent to refer prospective parents to other agencies for assistance if St. Vincent’s sincerely
held religious beliefs prevented it from assisting with the certification and licensing
recommendation process. Dumont v. Gordon, Case No. 2:17-cv-13080 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20,
2017). Amici curiae in this case were plaintiffs in the Dumont case. The State initially defended
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the suit, invoking the 2015 statute in support of its position.8 But that changed after the general election in November of 2018, when new leaders assumed power in Michigan. During her campaign for Attorney General, Defendant Nessel asserted that there was “no viable defense” for the statutes enacted under 2015 PA53 and that the 2015 statutes’ “only purpose is discriminatory animus.” Ed White, Dem AG candidate: Adoption law discriminates against gays, Associated Press (Sept. 27, 2018), https://apnews.com/a1fc021e8e2e4b3b829586ba56ad9c07 (last visited September 4, 2019). According to the same article, Defendant Nessel indicated that she would not be inclined to defend the Dumont lawsuit against MDHHS, because she “could not justify using the state’s money defending a law whose only purpose is discriminatory animus.” (Id.)9
The ACLU and the State announced a settlement in the Dumont litigation in March 2019, and the Court granted a motion for stipulated dismissal. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the State “with prejudice pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.” The Court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement under Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), and its progeny. (ECF No. 31-6, PageID.74647.) The Court was not asked to approve or disapprove the terms of settlement. Nor did the Court reach a final merits determination one way or the other on the issues.
Among other things, the Settlement Agreement provides: Unless prohibited by law or court order:
8 Plaintiffs St. Vincent, Chad and Melissa Buck, and Shamber Flore were granted leave to intervene in the Dumont case on the side of the State defendants in that case. 9 In 2015, before her election, Defendant Nessel reportedly said of PA 53 “[t]hese types of laws are a victory for the hate mongers but again a disaster for the children and the state.” Fox 2 Detroit, Opponents say adoption bill discriminates against gays and lesbians (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:34 p.m.), http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/opponents-sayadoption-bill-discriminates-against-gays-and-lesbians (last visited September 4, 2019). Another article describes her as stating, “If you are a proponent of this type of bill, you honestly have to concede that you just dislike gay people more than you care about the needs of foster kids.” Rick Pluta, Faith-based adoption bills headed to House floor, Michigan Radio NPR (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/faith-based-adoption-bills-headed-housefloor (last visited September 4, 2019).
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a. The Department shall continue including in Contracts, and shall continue requiring all Contractors to include in Subcontracts, the NonDiscrimination provision, or a materially and substantially similar provision….
b. For the avoidance of doubt, policies and practices prohibited under the Non-Discrimination Provision include, without limitation,
i. turning away or referring to another contracted CPA an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or same-sex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the CPA for services under a Contract or a Subcontract;
…. iii. refusing to perform a home study or process a foster
care licensing application or an adoption application for an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or same-sex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the CPA for services under a Contract or a Subcontract; and
….
d. The Department shall require all Contractors to enforce the Non-Discrimination provision or Similar Provision against a CPA that the Contractor or the Department determines is in violation of, or is unwilling to comply with, such provisions … up to and including termination of the Subcontracts … including without limitation:
i. In the event a CPA refuses to comply with the NonDiscrimination Provision or Similar Provision within a reasonable time after notification by the Contractor or the Department of a Subcontract Violation, the Department will require the Contractor to terminate the CPA’s Subcontracts.”
(ECF No. 31-5, PageID.719-720.)
In a public statement (the “Summary Statement”) summarizing the Settlement Agreement,
the State explains that “a significant portion of funding” for the State’s foster care case
management and adoption services comes from the federal Title IV-E program. Michigan
Government, Summary Statement of Dumont v. Gordon Settlement Agreement,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/03.22.19_FINAL_Dumont_settlement_summary_6500
97_7.pdf. Citing 45 C.F.R. 75.300(c), the Summary Statement notes that “as a condition of
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receiving these federal funds, the United States Department of Health and Human Services requires that states’ Title IV-E-funded programs prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.” (Id.) The Summary Statement explains that “in compliance with this federal requirement, MDHHS contracts mandate that, except for an agency’s sole discretion to decide whether to accept a referral from MDHHS, all agencies must comply with MDHHS’s non-discrimination statement when providing state-contracted services.” (Id.)10 The Summary Statement posits that if an agency accepts an MDHHS referral of a child for foster or adoption services, the agency relinquishes the “discretion to refuse to provide the accepted child or individual with state-contracted foster care case management or adoption services that conflict with its sincerely held religious beliefs” and remains subject to “the terms of the agency’s contract with the State expressly prohibit[ing] discrimination in the provision of these contracted services.” (Id.) According to the Summary Statement, prohibited discriminatory conduct includes, without limitation, “refusing to perform a home study or process a foster care licensing application or an adoption application for an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or same-sex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the agency for contracted services.” (Id.)
The Department of Attorney General “determined that MDHHS may be subject to liability on [the Dumont] Plaintiffs’ claims” and “strongly recommended resolving the case on terms that are consistent with the law and existing agency contracts[.]” (Id.) The Summary Statement points out that on the dates that St. Vincent referred the Dumont plaintiffs elsewhere for certification and recommendation services, St. Vincent “was providing foster care case management services or
10 The exception is based the statutory provision in MICH. COMP. L. 722.124e(h) that “an agency does not receive public funding with respect to a particular child or particular individual referred by MDHHS unless the agency affirmatively accepts the referral.” (Id.)
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adoption services for one or more children for whom the agency had accepted an MDHHS referral.” (Id.) No exception applied, because “Plaintiffs were not seeking direct-placement or private adoption services, and they did not approach the agencies through an MDHHS referral that the agencies could accept or reject under existing state law.” (Id.) The Summary Statement concludes that “consequently, [St. Vincent] was contractually prohibited from discriminating against Plaintiffs as potential qualified foster care or adoptive families for any child for whom the agencies were providing services under contract with MDHHS.” (Id.) Under the State’s new position, St. Vincent was no longer permitted based on its religious beliefs to refer unmarried and same-sex couples to other agencies for certification review and assistance, even though it was continuing to make non-discriminatory placements for all the children for whom it had accepted referrals.
The Summary Statement emphasizes that the Settlement Agreement provides that MDHHS will “maintain federally required non-discrimination provisions in its foster care and adoption agency contracts” and that “settling the Dumont litigation on the terms of the settlement agreement “allows MDHHS to avoid liability on Plaintiffs’ claims and remain compliant with federal and state law.” (Id.)
F. MDHHS Enforcement An MDHHS Communication Issuance regarding the Dumont settlement notifies recipients, including St. Vincent, of requirements under the Settlement Agreement. (ECF No. 42-2.) The Communication Issuance advises that the Settlement Agreement requires the MDHHS to “investigate reports of alleged non-compliance with the non-discrimination provision” and to “[i]nitiate contract action when violations occur or when an agency expresses unwillingness to comply.” (Id., PageID.1574.) The Communications Issuance reiterates that “policies and practices
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prohibited under the non-discrimination provision include, among others: … [r]efusing to perform a home study or process a foster care licensing application or an adoption application for an otherwise potentially qualified LGBTQ individual or same-sex couple that may be a suitable foster or adoptive family for any child accepted by the CPA for services under a contract or a subcontract.” (Id.)
After the filing of the Dumont litigation, the MDHHS opened an investigation into allegations that St. Vincent was not complying with the non-discrimination provision. (Neitman aff., ECF No. 34-3, PageID.976.) MDHHS has not finalized its investigation of St. Vincent due to the present lawsuit. (Id., PageID.978.) The State says that after completing the investigation, if a violation is found, “St. Vincent would have the opportunity to complete a corrective action plan demonstrating how it would achieve compliance.” (Id.) If St. Vincent elects not to comply, “the Department could take licensing and/or contract action.” (Id.) St. Vincent anticipates that the MDHHS will terminate or decline to renew the foster and adoption contracts unless St. Vincent agrees to perform home studies and provide written evaluations and recommendations for samesex couples who wish to apply for certification. If unable to partner with the State, “St. Vincent would not be able to continue its adoption and foster programs … either legally or financially.” (Snoeyink aff., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.237.)
G. Current Proceedings St. Vincent, the Bucks, and Ms. Flore filed this lawsuit on April 15, 2019. Plaintiffs claim that: (1) Defendants have violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by “adopting a policy requiring the State to discriminate against child placing agencies with religious objections to same-sex marriage” and granting individualized exemptions from child placing agency requirements selectively (Complaint, ECF No. 1, PageID.42-46 ); (2) Defendants have violated
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the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by “conditioning St. Vincent’s license, its contracts with MDHHS, and the ongoing ability to engage in the religious exercise of helping children in need, on St. Vincent’s willingness to make [affirmative statements that contradict St. Vincent’s religious beliefs];” (3) Defendants have retaliated against Plaintiffs for protected speech and religious exercise, in violation of the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment; (4) Defendants have violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment by applying laws in a manner that selectively penalizes Plaintiffs for their religious beliefs; (5) Defendants have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by penalizing Plaintiffs because of their religious beliefs while allowing contractors espousing contrary religious beliefs to maintain contractual relationships with the State; and (6) Defendants have violated the RFRA by enforcing federal law in a manner that substantially burdens Plaintiffs’ sincere religious exercise without a compelling government interest and through a means more restrictive than necessary to achieve the stated interest.
Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction that would (1) enjoin State Defendants from terminating or suspending performance of their contracts with St. Vincent, or declining to renew the contracts or taking other adverse action against St. Vincent “for engaging in protected speech and religious exercise, including continuing to refer couples to other agencies when St. Vincent cannot assist those couples due to its religious beliefs”; and (2) enjoin Defendant Azar from “taking any enforcement action under 45 CFR 75.300(c) based upon St. Vincent’s protected speech and religious exercise or upon Michigan’s actions to accommodate such protected speech and religious exercise.” The Federal and State Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court has heard oral argument on the motions. The Court addresses the motions in turn.
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LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION 1. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is simply to preserve the status quo” until a trial on the merits can be held. United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, “findings of facts and conclusions of law made by a district court in granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at a trial on the merits.” Id. (citing University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). To determine whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, a district court considers: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.” Hall v. Edgewood Partners Ins. Center, Inc., 878 F.3d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). “As long as there is some likelihood of success on the merits, these factors are to be balanced, rather than tallied.” Id.
A. Likelihood of Success Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits. The record supports a determination that strict scrutiny applies to the Free Exercise claim. Supreme Court cases “establish the general principle that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). But this general rule “comes with an exception. If the law appears to be neutral and generally applicable on its face, but in practice is riddled with exemptions or worse is a veiled cover for targeting a belief or a faith-based practice, the law satisfies the First Amendment only if
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it ‘advance[s] interests of the highest order and [is] narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.’” Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546). Evidence to consider in determining whether a law or regulation is neutral and of general applicability include, among others, “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. The exception applies here because the historical background, specific series of events, and statements of Defendant Nessel all point toward religious targeting.
The history of this case, the Dumont litigation, the Michigan Legislature’s enactment of 2015 PA53, the 2018 campaign for Michigan Attorney General and General Nessel’s statements create a strong inference that the State’s real target is the religious beliefs and confessions of St. Vincent, and not discriminatory conduct. St. Vincent has never prevented a same-sex couple from fostering or adopting a child. St. Vincent has actually placed children through the MARE system with same-sex adoptive parents. And St. Vincent provides parenting support groups at which same-sex parents are welcome and, in fact, attend. This is non-discriminatory conduct consistent with everything the State says it is trying to promote.
The State is willing to prevent St. Vincent from doing all this in the future simply because St. Vincent adheres to its sincerely held religious belief that marriage is an institution created by God to join a single man to a single woman. Because of that religious belief, St. Vincent says it cannot in good conscience review and certify an unmarried or same-sex parental application. St. Vincent would either have to recommend denial of all such applications, no matter how much value they could provide to foster and adoptive children; or St. Vincent would have to subordinate its religious beliefs to the State-mandated orthodoxy, even though the State is not compensating
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them for the review services anyway. To avoid the conflict, St. Vincent refers any such applicants and declines the referral, as the contract language permits.11 The State legislature protected this choice by enacting the 2015 statute. Consistent with the contract and the 2015 law, St. Vincent had a longstanding practice of referring to other agencies same-sex and unmarried couples seeking assistance with the certification process. Once the State certifies these couples based on home visits by other agencies, St. Vincent will place children with them, or with any other parents certified by the State, on a non-discriminatory basis. Until January 2019, the State accepted and defended this practice in the Dumont litigation as complying fully with the 2015 statute and other applicable law.
Defendant Nessel made St. Vincent’s belief and practice a campaign issue by calling it hate. She made the 2015 statute a campaign issue by contending that the only purpose of the statute is discriminatory animus. After Defendant Nessel took office, the State pivoted 180 degrees, reversing its position in the Dumont litigation. The State also threatened to terminate its contracts with St. Vincent. The Summary Statement’s conclusion – that if an agency accepts even one MDHHS child referral for case management or adoption services, the agency forfeits completely the right to refer new parental applicants to other agencies based on its sincerely held religious beliefs – is at odds with the language of the contracts, with the 2015 law, and with established State practice. Moreover, it actually undermines the State’s stated goals of preventing discriminatory conduct and maximizing available placements for children. This further supports a
11 The contractual language focuses on referrals of the children themselves for foster or adoptive services, not the home visits for new parental applicants. That is natural enough because St. Vincent is paid under the contracts for services provided to the children, not home visits for new parental applicants. Because the contract gives a CPA “sole discretion” to accept or decline referrals of children – whether for religious or any other reason – then a fortiori, the parties to the contracts contemplate unfettered discretion when it comes to referrals involving new parental applicants. The record fully supports this established practice. (See footnote 2, supra.)
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finding of pretext for religious targeting. Strict scrutiny applies to the State’s position and dictates a likelihood of success on the merits.
The State’s position is not likely to survive strict scrutiny on this record. There are two potentially compelling state interests at stake, neither of which supports a State orthodoxy test. The first compelling interest the Court sees is preventing discriminatory conduct in services for which the State pays. Here, the State pays CPAs based on the children they place. And St. Vincent places its children with any certified parent – unmarried couples, same-sex couples, or otherwise. This is precisely the non-discriminatory conduct the State desires. But despite that, the State now wants to cancel St. Vincent’s contract if St. Vincent uses its religious beliefs when it comes to referring new parental applicants. That strongly suggests the State’s real goal is not to promote non-discriminatory child placements, but to stamp out St. Vincent’s religious belief and replace it with the State’s own. The State’s new position would make the stated “sole discretion” of the private agency to decline a referral illusory. It would also flout the letter and stated intention of the Michigan Legislature in 2015 PA53. It would disrupt a carefully balanced and established practice that ensures non-discrimination in child placements while still accommodating traditional Catholic religious beliefs on marriage. It would replace this with a State-orthodoxy test that prevents Catholic believers from participating.
A second potentially compelling State interest is making available as many properly certified homes for the placement of foster and adopted children as possible. But the State’s proposed action here actually undermines that goal. There is nothing in this record that supports a finding that the power of CPAs to decline referrals limits the pool of applicants. To the contrary, any CPA referring an applicant to a different CPA for any reason must provide information on other agencies. Nothing in the referral practice prevents anyone from seeking assistance with the
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application process. Instead, it facilitates certification. The record here reflects that St. Vincent affirmatively refers same-sex and unmarried couples seeking that assistance to other agencies available to provide it. And when the applicant is certified, nothing stands in the way of placement of children in certified households of same-sex and unmarried couples. To the contrary, the record reflects that St. Vincent through the MARE system actually places children with same-sex couples certified as foster or adoptive parents. Paradoxically, the State’s course of action here would constrict the supply of CPAs and undermine the State’s intent of getting certified placements for kids. Again, this strongly suggests that something else – namely, religious targeting – is the State’s real purpose.
The recent decision from the Third Circuit in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (2019), does not require a different conclusion. Fulton differs in key respects factually and analytically. In Fulton, the City of Philadelphia declined to renew a contract with a faith-based child placing agency after becoming aware that the agency declined to certify same-sex or unmarried couples as foster parents based on religious objections. Fulton, 922 F.3d, 147-48. The city argued that the agency’s practice violated a provision in the contract incorporating the city’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodation. Id. at 147. But in Fulton, the challenged practice was an actual refusal to certify, not a referral to some other agency for an impartial evaluation. The City acted as soon as it became aware of the agency’s practice. There was no sudden change in the City’s position after new officials who had expressed anti-religious views took office. Nor was there any duly enacted public policy of the State or municipality that aimed to protect the agency’s choice to the maximum extent provided by law.12 Moreover, in Fulton, unlike here, there was no record of the agency involved
12 The Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Act, 70 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2401 et seq. is a general religious freedom law modeled on RFRA that does not focus specifically on child placing agencies as the Michigan 2015 statute does.
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actually placing children on a non-discriminatory basis with same-sex parents certified by others. Nor was there any record in Fulton of the agency facilitating certification with referrals to other agencies.
The Fulton court found no evidence that the city “was motivated by ill will toward a specific religious group or otherwise impermissibly targeted religious conduct.” Fulton, 922 F.3d at 153-54. Accordingly, the more deferential analytical framework of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and not strict scrutiny, applied. Id. at 152-54. Similarly, the court in New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole, 387 F. Supp. 3d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2019), explicitly found the record devoid of evidence of religious animus or targeting and applied the more deferential scrutiny of Smith. New Hope Family Services, 387 F. Supp. 3d 213-216. Unlike Fulton and New Hope, the record before the Court in this case supports an inference of religious targeting, which means that strict scrutiny applies. The degree of scrutiny drives the analysis in a Free Exercise case. And the application of strict scrutiny in this case makes it likely that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Claim.13
The federal government has not made any direct statements or threats to St. Vincent about funding or otherwise. But as the case is currently positioned, the Federal Defendants are inextricably in the mix, at least for preliminary injunction purposes. RFRA precludes the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the federal government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.”
13 The Court’s ruling on the probability of success on the Free Exercise claim makes it unnecessary to evaluate separately the probability of success of the compelled speech, retaliation, and equal protection theories. Suffice to say the Court is satisfied that St. Vincent has stated plausible claims sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) review.
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42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b). The RFRA test is easier for a plaintiff to satisfy than the constitutional test already applied.
The State argues that it must proceed against St. Vincent here to prevent the federal government from cutting off all funds it provides to the State for the purpose of funding foster care and adoption programs. According to the State, $171 million in federal funding to the State is at risk, and the federal government’s obligation to enforce a federal regulation “is not optional.” (State Defendants’ Resp. to Federal Defendants’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 53, PageID.1875.) Indeed, according to the State, “there is a credible threat that the Federal Defendants will enforce the regulation against MDHHS….” (Id.) (emphasis in original).
In response, the federal government has not promised to keep funds in place, and has not said that the State is misinterpreting federal law. Moreover, the Federal Defendants themselves have affirmatively noted that the government “can almost always change its position on whether to enforce a law or regulation,” (ECF No. 61, PageID.2159), which is exactly what St. Vincent is trying to prevent, especially after experiencing the State’s change of position. The Federal Defendants point out that States can seek an exemption from the federal regulation at issue, but that is hardly reassuring to St. Vincent, because the State Defendants currently have no interest in that for reasons already addressed. Moreover, as the case demonstrates, government officials can change their minds, re-interpret laws already on the books, and disrupt established practices. Because the Federal Defendants have refused to refute the State’s own assertion that there is a credible threat the federal regulation will be triggered against the State if St. Vincent’s position prevails, St. Vincent has established a need to enjoin the Federal Defendants from applying the federal regulation to punish the State generally, or St. Vincent in particular, for permitting the continuation of St. Vincent’s religiously-based referral practice during the pendency of this case.
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B. Balance of Harms There is a strong likelihood of irreparable harm to St. Vincent absent the preliminary injunction it requests. The loss of rights under the First Amendment is inherently harmful. “The Supreme Court has unequivocally admonished that even minimal infringement upon First Amendment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief.” Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.3d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)). St. Vincent has shown that it is likely to prevail on its constitutional and RFRA claims. Concomitantly, it has shown a likelihood of irreparable harm that warrants injunctive relief. In addition to the harm inherent in the loss of constitutional rights, St. Vincent risks losing its license to provide foster and adoption services. Without a license, St. Vincent will not be able to provide foster and adoption services lawfully. It would have to cease providing those services. This would harm not only Plaintiffs, but also third parties. Shuttering St. Vincent would create significant disruption for the children in its care, who already face an unpredictable home life and benefit from stability. It would also hurt the foster and adoptive parents who rely on St. Vincent for support and would have to find new resources. And it would harm the employees of St. Vincent who work in the foster and adoption area, who would lose their employment. The risk of harm to the State, in contrast, is not substantial, especially with concomitant relief against the Federal Defendants. A preliminary injunction would maintain the religious accommodation the State supported for years and defended in the Dumont litigation until the 2018 election. Nor is there a risk of harm to prospective adoptive couples, same-sex or otherwise. There are multiple pathways to obtaining certification apart from St. Vincent’s assistance. Allowing St. Vincent to continue its practice does not prevent any licensed same-sex couple from becoming
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certified, fostering, or adopting. Nor does it prevent any unmarried or same-sex couple from completing the certification process in the first place with an agency with different religious beliefs or no such beliefs at all.
The balance of harms favors preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo. C. Public Interest The public interest factors also favor a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. Preventing constitutional violations is always in the public interest. G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Ensuring that as many properly certified homes are available for prospective foster and adoptive children as possible, and that children in the system are placed quickly, is also in the public interest. Allowing St. Vincent to continue its work furthers that interest. The decision of the legislature to enact 2015 PA53 itself reflects a public interest in protecting the ability of faith-based CPAs such as St. Vincent to place children in certified foster and adoptive homes, whether same-sex households or otherwise, while maintaining the ability to exercise their religious beliefs freely by facilitating referrals to other agencies when religious beliefs are implicated. The public interest factors support a preliminary injunction. For these reasons, all the preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction Plaintiffs seek. 2. Motions to Dismiss A. Standing The State challenges the individual Plaintiffs’ standing, and the Federal Defendants challenge the standing of all the Plaintiffs’, as well as the ripeness of Plaintiffs’ claims. “Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual
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or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). In pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges, the doctrines of Article III standing and ripeness, which “originate from the same Article III limitation[,]” merge and are analyzed together. Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 n.5 (2014)). In this context, “the line between Article III standing and ripeness … has evaporated.” Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff St. Vincent has standing to sue both the State and Federal Defendants. The religious injury St. Vincent alleges is fairly traceable to the State and the Federal Defendants. The State’s change of position is the direct and most immediate source of the religious targeting injury alleged. But as already discussed, the federal government is inextricably part of it at this stage based on its refusal to take the $171 million federal funding issue off the table. The State premises its position toward St. Vincent on concern that the State will lose all federal funding for foster and adoption services if the federal government enforces § 45 C.F.R. 75.300(c). The federal government has not denied that risk. An injunction against enforcing the federal regulation during the pendency of this lawsuit would redress the harm St. Vincent alleges, and protect the State along the way.14 St. Vincent has standing as to all Defendants.
In contrast, the Court finds that the allegations of the Bucks and Ms. Flore do not satisfy the elements of Article III standing. They have no contracts with the State, and the State has made no threats against them based on their religious profession or practice, or otherwise. The alleged
14 To the extent the Federal Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim, the argument fails. Plaintiffs have stated a plausible RFRA claim. Plaintiffs allege that the Federal Defendants are requiring Michigan to comply with § 45 C.F.R. 75.300(c); that the regulation is unlawful; and that the regulation forces St. Vincent to violate its sincere religious beliefs in order to comply with the State and federal requirements. They have alleged that the federal government has imposed a substantial burden on their sincere religious exercise, and that the burden is neither justified by a compelling state interest nor the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate.
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harm to the individual Plaintiffs derives entirely from the alleged harm that will befall St. Vincent. The three individual Plaintiffs have benefitted from St. Vincent, and have engaged in their own adoptive and foster ministries through St. Vincent. But none of these individuals indicates a present intention to foster or adopt through St. Vincent. Nor do they make any convincing showing that they will be unable to continue their engagement on foster and adoptive matters with other agencies, even if St. Vincent were to lose its contracts – something that could happen for many reasons wholly unrelated to this case. Indeed, St. Vincent itself has argued and demonstrated that many other agencies are available for the new potential applicants that it chooses to refer. By the same token, many other outlets – including other faith-based outlets – would remain available to the individual Plaintiffs. Moreover, the alignment of claimed injury and the alleged wrong is also skewed for the individual Plaintiffs. The CPA practice at issue is referring new applicants for religious reasons, and the challenged State action is religious targeting aimed at stopping it. But the individual Plaintiffs are not involved in the referrals and are not being targeted for direct action by the State. Not every beneficiary, supporter, or prospective client of St. Vincent has standing to challenge adverse action the State has focused on St. Vincent itself. The alleged harm to the individual Plaintiffs is too attenuated to support standing.15
B. Defendant Nessel The State Defendants seek dismissal of Defendant Nessel from the case. They contend that she is simply the State’s chief legal counsel, is not responsible for Michigan’s change in policy, and does not belong in the case. The record undercuts the claim. Based on the record to date, Defendant Nessel is at the very heart of the case. She referred to proponents of the 2015 law as
15 The individual Plaintiffs are welcome to proceed as amici curiae.
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“hate-mongers” and said the only purpose of the 2015 law was “discriminatory animus.” She described the 2015 law as “indefensible” during her campaign. These statements raise a strong inference of a hostility toward a religious viewpoint. Based on the present record, she was also a pivotal player in the State’s total reversal of position in the Dumont litigation. It was her assessment of risk that led the State to move from defending St. Vincent’s position to abandoning it in the first month of her term – and this despite the 2015 law, the language of the contracts, and wellestablished practice. All of this supports a strong inference that St. Vincent was targeted based on its religious belief, and that it was Defendant Nessel who targeted it. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729-31 (2018) (detailing disparaging statements of government decision-makers regarding particular religious beliefs and emphasizing the “State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint”). On this record, dismissal of Defendant Nessel from the case is not warranted.
C. Res Judicata The State Defendants contend that dismissal of the case is proper based on res judicata arising out of the Dumont litigation. Contrary to the State’s arguments, res judicata provides no basis for dismissal here. Res judicata requires: “(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.” Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995). Potential application falters on the very first element: there was never a final decision on the merits in the Dumont litigation. The case was resolved by private settlement between the State and the plaintiffs in the case. The Court did not approve the settlement and was
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never asked to do so. Nor did the Court in Dumont make any final decision on the merits. There is simply no judgment in Dumont to which res judicata can attach.
Moreover, it is important to note that St. Vincent and the State were originally on the same side in Dumont, defending St. Vincent’s religiously-based referral practice. When St. Vincent intervened, it did so as a defendant, aligning with the State. In such a posture, St. Vincent had no obligation to assert any claims against the State, let alone the ones they are now bringing. They were co-parties, and under Rule 13(g), crossclaims are entirely permissive. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (“A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a coparty….”) (emphasis added); United States Confederate Acres Sanitary Sewage and Drainage System, Inc., 935 F.2d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1991). Nor did St. Vincent have any claims it could have asserted against the State anyway because at the time, the State agreed with St. Vincent.
The State Defendants also suggest that the Settlement Agreement bars Plaintiffs’ claims. This is an entirely specious claim. Plaintiffs were not parties to the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, even though the State Defendants call the Settlement Agreement a “consent decree,” it was no such thing. It was a private contract between the State and the plaintiffs in the case. No one asked St. Vincent what it thought of the settlement. And no one asked the Court what it thought either. The Court simply entered a routine stipulated dismissal and retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement between the parties to that agreement. There is no basis to conclude that the Settlement Agreement is a consent decree, or that it binds any non-party to the Settlement Agreement, including St. Vincent.
CONCLUSION The State pays St. Vincent to place children with foster or adoptive parents certified as suitable by the State. St. Vincent has done that faithfully, regardless of whether the certified parents
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were opposite sex, same-sex, or unmarried couples. St. Vincent would like to continue doing so under existing and renewed contracts with the State.
What St. Vincent has not done and will not do is give up its traditional Catholic belief that marriage as instituted by God is for one man and one woman. Based on that belief, St. Vincent has exercised its discretion to ensure that it is not in the position of having to review and recommend to the State whether to certify a same-sex or unmarried couple, and to refer those cases to agencies that do not have a religious confession preventing an honest evaluation and recommendation. In 2015, the Michigan legislature enacted legislation designed to protect that choice, and until January of 2019, the State defended the right of the State and St. Vincent to make that choice.
That changed when Defendant Attorney General Nessel took office. Leading up to and during the 2018 general election campaign, she made it clear that she considered beliefs like St. Vincent’s to be the product of hate. She stated that the 2015 law seeking to protect St. Vincent’s practice was indefensible and had discriminatory animus as its sole purpose. After her election, she reversed course in the Dumont litigation; re-interpreted the 2015 law; and put St. Vincent in the position of either giving up its belief or giving up its contract with the State. That kind of targeted attack on a sincerely held religious belief is what calls for strict scrutiny in this case and supports entry of a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo while the case is fully litigated.

Dated: September 26, 2019

/s/ Robert J. Jonker ROBERT J. JONKER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 84 filed 10/22/19 PageID.2751 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA BUCK, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. DANA NESSEL, et al.,

CASE NO. 1:19-CV-286 HON. ROBERT J. JONKER

Defendants. __________________________________/

ORDER

By Opinion and Order dated September 26, 2019, this Court entered a preliminary

injunction preventing the State Defendants from taking action against St. Vincent based on

St. Vincent’s religious beliefs and practices, and ensuring that the federal Defendant did not take

action against the State because of it. The Court found that strict scrutiny applied to the case after

analyzing “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events

leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,

including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body,” as

discussed by the Supreme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508

U.S. 520, 540 (1993). The Court now denies the State Defendants’ motion for stay because the

State has offered nothing new and has failed to come to grips with the factual basis on the

preliminary injunction record that supports the inference of religious targeting in this case.

The factors the Court must consider on a motion for stay are exactly the same factors the

Court had to consider in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction in the first place. See,

e.g., Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2006). The

Case 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 84 filed 10/22/19 PageID.2752 Page 2 of 3
Court will not repeat its original analysis here, but will respectfully refer the reader to the Court’s original Opinion, which the Court incorporates here. The same reasons that led the Court to enter the original preliminary injunction lead it to deny the motion for stay. The Court will only add comments about three matters that the State Defendants highlight in the wake of this Court’s targeting conclusion.
First, the State Defendants suggest that the Court harbors personal animosity toward Attorney General Nessel, or her views. See, e.g. State Brief in Support of Motion for Stay, ECF No. 73 at PageID.2546. This is not true, and there is nothing in the record to support it. The Court cited and relied upon public statements the Attorney General made before and after she became Attorney General as part of the targeting analysis. Those statements were part of the overall Lukumi mix of information that supports the religious targeting inference. In particular, these public statements helped explain why the State abruptly changed its public litigation position from defending St. Vincent to opposing St. Vincent after the Attorney General took office. The Attorney General does not deny the statements or challenge the historical record of the State’s change of position. The Court has articulated why it believes the inference supports religious targeting and corresponding strict scrutiny. But nothing in the Court’s analysis suggests personal animosity toward the Attorney General or her views.
Second, the State Defendants suggest that the public statements of the Attorney General are not fair game for weighing in the Lukumi analysis because Trump v. Hawaii precludes it. But Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), does not categorically preclude consideration of the public statements that officeholders make on their way to winning an election. To the contrary, even though the Supreme Court was unsure the national security matter was properly subject to judicial review at all, Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2407, the Supreme Court considered the campaign
2

Case 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 84 filed 10/22/19 PageID.2753 Page 3 of 3
statements of President Trump in the course of its Establishment Clause analysis. Id. at 2417-18. The Court ultimately concluded those statements were insufficient to support a preliminary injunction against the Presidential Proclamation at issue; it did not categorically preclude consideration of them. Id. at 2417-23. Moreover, when it comes to assessing potential religious targeting in a Free Exercise case, Lukumi puts no artificial limits on the factors a Court may consider. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Finally, the State Defendants suggest that the Court must, at a minimum, modify the terms of the preliminary injunction. The original argument cites no authority for this and simply asserts the proposition in single paragraph. ECF No. 73 at PageID.2561. In seeking leave to file a Reply Brief (ECF No. 81), the State Defendants amplify their position somewhat but in so doing change the focus from the Court’s goal of preserving the status quo during the litigation of this case, to anticipating contractual interpretation issues that may remain a part of the case going forward. There is no need for a reply brief on the motion to stay, and so the Court DENIES the State’s motion for leave to file one. The Court’s preliminary injunction ensures that the contracting parties continue operating during the pendency of this case as they have since at least 2015, and that no action is taken against St. Vincent in the meantime based on its religious beliefs and practices, or against the State for honoring the terms of the preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the motion for stay (ECF No. 72) is DENIED.

Dated: October 22, 2019

/s/ Robert J. Jonker ROBERT J. JONKER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3

 
 Western District of Michigan (Southern Division (1)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-00286-RJJ-PJG

Buck et al v. Gordon et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker Referred to: Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green Related Case: 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG Case in other court: the Sixth Circuit, 19-01959
the Sixth Circuit, 19-02185 Cause: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

Date Filed: 04/15/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

plaintiff
Melissa Buck TERMINATED: 09/26/2019

represented by Jacob Coate The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW., Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0090 Email: jcoate@becketlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark Leonard Rienzi The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW., Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 349-7208 Email: mrienzi@becketlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicholas Robert Reaves The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW., Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 349-7212 Email: nreaves@becketlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William R. Bloomfield

plaintiff
Chad Buck TERMINATED: 09/26/2019

Catholic Diocese of Lansing 28 N. Walnut St. Lansing, MI 48933 (517) 342-2522 Email: wbloomfield@dioceseoflansing.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Haun The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW., Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 349-7220 Email: whaun@becketlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori Windham The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire, NW, Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0095 Email: lwindham@becketlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jacob Coate (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Leonard Rienzi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicholas Robert Reaves (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Bloomfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Haun (See above for address)

plaintiff Shamber Flore TERMINATED: 09/26/2019
plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori Windham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jacob Coate (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Leonard Rienzi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicholas Robert Reaves (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Bloomfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Haun (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori Windham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jacob Coate (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Leonard Rienzi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicholas Robert Reaves (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Bloomfield

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Haun (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori Windham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
defendant
Robert Gordon in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services

represented by Anthony Joseph Sukkar MI Dept of Attorney General (Health, Education & Family) 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Fl. P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 517-335-7603 Fax: 517-335-1152 Email: sukkara@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 05/15/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth R. Husa Briggs MI Dept of Attorney General (Health, Education & Family) 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Fl. P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7603 Fax: 517-335-1152 Email: briggse1@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Sean Smith MI Dept Attorney General (Health/Education/Family Srvcs) Education & Social Services Division P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7603

defendant
Herman McCall in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Michigan Children's Services Agency

Fax: (517) 335-1152 Email: smithj46@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 09/17/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Precious Synott Boone Michigan Department of Attorney General G. Mennen Williams Bldg. 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Fl. Lansing, MI 48933 (517) 335-7603 Fax: (517) 335-1152 Email: boonep@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toni L. Harris MI Dept of Attorney General (Health, Education & Family) 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Fl. P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7603 Fax: (517) 335-1152 Email: harrist19@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anthony Joseph Sukkar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth R. Husa Briggs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Sean Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Precious Synott Boone (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

defendant Dana Nessel in her official capacity as Attorney General of Michigan
defendant Alex Azar in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services

Toni L. Harris (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anthony Joseph Sukkar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth R. Husa Briggs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Sean Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Precious Synott Boone (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Toni L. Harris (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher Alan Bates U.S. Department of Justice (Civil DC) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514-3307 Email: christopher.a.bates@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne Frances Long U.S. Attorney (Grand Rapids) The Law Bldg. 330 Ionia Ave., NW P.O. Box 208 Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0208 (616) 456-2404

defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services
amicus Kristy Dumont

Email: Jeanne.Long@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher Alan Bates (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne Frances Long (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leslie Jill Cooper American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St., 18th Fl. New York, NY 10004 (212) 549-2672 Email: lcooper@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ann-Elizabeth Ostrager Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004-2498 (212) 558-7357 Email: ostragerae@sullcrom.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Korobkin ACLU Fund of Michigan (Detroit) 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201-3035 (313) 578-6824 Fax: (313) 578-6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hannah M. Lonky Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004-2498 (212) 558-3643 Email: lonkyh@sullcrom.com

amicus Dana Dumont

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason W. Schnier Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004-2498 (212) 558-3769 Email: schnierj@sullcrom.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay David Kaplan American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6812 Email: kaplan@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leila R. Siddiky Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004-2498 (212) 558-3805 Email: Siddikyl@sullcrom.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Leslie Jill Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ann-Elizabeth Ostrager (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hannah M. Lonky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason W. Schnier

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay David Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leila R. Siddiky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/15/2019
04/15/2019 04/15/2019 04/16/2019 04/16/2019
04/16/2019 04/16/2019

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Alex Azar, Dana Nessel, United States Department of Health and Human Services filed by Shamber Flore, Melissa Buck, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, Chad Buck (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G) (Windham, Lori) Modified text on 4/16/2019 (ems). (Entered: 04/15/2019)
2 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
FILING FEE PAID re 1 by plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities in the amount of $400, receipt number 0646-4413741 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
3 NOTICE that this case has been assigned Robert J. Jonker ; with NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY re corporate disclosure statement (ems) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
4 SUMMONS ISSUED as to defendants Alex Azar, Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel, United States Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General (ems) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
5 MOTION for preliminary injunction by plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities; (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
6 MEMORANDUM in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction 5 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit

13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18) (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/16/2019)

04/17/2019 7 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/17/2019)

04/23/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Toni L. Harris on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 04/23/2019)

04/24/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Jeanne Frances Long on behalf of defendants Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Long, Jeanne) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Anthony Joseph Sukkar on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Sukkar, Anthony) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Precious Synott Boone on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Boone, Precious) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/24/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joshua Sean Smith on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/24/2019)

04/25/2019

8 ORDER regarding response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction 5 responses due by 5/15/2019; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 04/25/2019)

04/26/2019 9 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/26/2019)

04/29/2019

SUMMONS NOT ISSUED re 9 as to Jennifer Wrayno due to not being a party to the case (attorney notified) (ems) (Entered: 04/29/2019)

04/30/2019

10 SUMMONS returned executed on Alex Azar, US Attorney and US Attorney General; service upon defendant, Alex Azar complete on 4/23/2019, answer due 6/24/2019 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019

11 SUMMONS returned executed on United States Department of Health and Human Services, US Attorney and US Attorney General; service upon defendant, United States Department of Health and Human Services complete on 4/23/2019, answer due 6/24/2019 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 12 SUMMONS returned executed; Robert Gordon served on 4/19/2019, answer due 5/10/2019 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 13 SUMMONS returned executed; Herman McCall served on 4/29/2019, answer due 5/20/2019 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019 14 SUMMONS returned executed; Dana Nessel served on 4/19/2019, answer due 5/10/2019 (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Christopher Alan Bates on behalf of defendant Alex Azar (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

04/30/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Christopher Alan Bates on behalf of defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 04/30/2019)

05/02/2019 15 PROPOSED STIPULATION and ORDER to Extend Deadlines by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 05/02/2019)

05/03/2019 16 ORDER granting STIPULATION 15 ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, sdb) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/15/2019 17 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION adding attorney Elizabeth R. Husa Briggs in the place of Anthony J. Sukkar (Husa Briggs, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/15/2019)

05/16/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Nicholas Robert Reaves on behalf of plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Reaves, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/16/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Mark Leonard Rienzi on behalf of plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Rienzi, Mark) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/16/2019

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of William R. Bloomfield on behalf of plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Bloomfield, William) (Entered: 05/16/2019)

05/21/2019

18 MOTION to intervene (expedited consideration requested) by movants Kristy Dumont, Dana Dumont; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Proposed Answer) (Korobkin, Daniel) Modified text on 5/22/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 19 BRIEF in support of MOTION to intervene (expedited consideration requested) 18 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Korobkin, Daniel) Modified text on 5/22/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019

20 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION to intervene (expedited consideration requested) 18 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Korobkin, Daniel) Modified text on 5/22/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 21 PROPOSED MOTION to transfer case by movants Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont; (Korobkin, Daniel) Modified text on 5/22/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 22 BRIEF in support of PROPOSED MOTION to transfer case 21 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/21/2019 23 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re PROPOSED MOTION to transfer case 21 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/22/2019 24 MOTION to stay by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel; (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019 25 BRIEF in support of MOTION to stay 24 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019 26 PROPOSED ORDER regarding Motion to Stay Deadlines by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/22/2019 27 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION to stay 24 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 05/22/2019)

05/23/2019

28 ORDER denying 24 motion to stay; terminating PROPOSED ORDER 26 ; the intervention and transfer motions can proceed on the Court's normal schedule without the need for expediting ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 05/23/2019)

05/29/2019 29 FIRST MOTION to transfer case by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel; (Boone, Precious) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019 30 MEMORANDUM in support of Motion to Transfer Case 29 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Boone, Precious) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

31 EXHIBITS re 29 and 30 by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Mot to Intervene, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Complaint, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Order, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Def -Intv Mot to Dismiss, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Stipulation, # 6 Exhibit 6 - Order, # 7 Exhibit 7 Gordon v Caruso, # 8 Exhibit 8 - Zide Sport Shop, # 9 Exhibit 9 - Tu Nguyen, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Brown v State, # 11 Exhibit 11 - Palmer v Schuette) (Boone, Precious) Modified text on 5/30/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019 32 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re FIRST MOTION to transfer case 29 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Boone, Precious) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

33 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION for preliminary injunction 5 filed by Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5) (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

34 RESPONSE TO MOTION for preliminary injunction 5 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K) (Smith, Joshua) Modified text on 5/30/2019 (ems). (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

35 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION for preliminary injunction 5 [Proposed] filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G) (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 05/30/2019)

05/30/2019

36 ORDER setting Rule 16 scheduling conference: Rule 16 scheduling conference is set for 6/26/2019 at 03:30 PM at 699 Federal Building, Grand Rapids, MI before Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker; status report due by 6/19/2019 ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 05/30/2019)

06/04/2019

37 RESPONSE TO MOTION to intervene (expedited consideration requested) intervenor-defendants Kristy Dumont, Dana Dumont 18 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10) (Windham, Lori) Modified text on 6/5/2019 (ems). (Entered: 06/04/2019)

06/10/2019 38 NOTICE of Related Case by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Boone, Precious) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/10/2019

39 MOTION for leave to file Reply Brief in Support of Motion To Intervene by movants Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - [Proposed] Reply Brief in Support of Motion To Intervene, # 2 Exhibit A-1 - Declaration of Kristy Dumont, # 3 Exhibit A-2 - Declaration of Dana Dumont) (Lonky, Hannah) Modified text on 6/11/2019 (ems). (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/10/2019

40 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION for leave to file Reply Brief in Support of Motion To Intervene 39 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Lonky, Hannah) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/12/2019 41 ORDER denying 39 motion for leave to file reply brief ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 06/12/2019)

06/12/2019

42 REPLY to response to motion 5 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Roach Report, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Seyka Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 3 Strachan Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Snoeyink Declaration) (Windham, Lori) Modified text on 6/13/2019 (ems). (Entered: 06/12/2019)

06/19/2019 43 JOINT STATUS REPORT (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/19/2019 44 MOTION to dismiss by defendants Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services; (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/19/2019 45 BRIEF in support of MOTION to dismiss 44 filed by Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/24/2019 46 RESPONSE in opposition to FIRST MOTION to transfer case 29 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 06/24/2019)

06/26/2019 47 MINUTES of Rule 16 scheduling conference held before Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Court Reporter: Glenda Trexler) (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, sdb) (Entered: 06/26/2019)

06/27/2019

48 (DISREGARD) LETTER from Clerk to attorney Leslie D. Cooper regarding mandatory electronic filing (ems) Modified text on 6/27/2019; letter was not sent (Leslie Jill Cooper, not Leslie D. Cooper, appeared at the 6/26 hearing) (ems). (Entered: 06/27/2019)

07/03/2019 49 PROPOSED STIPULATION and ORDER Extending Deadline to Respond to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 44 by defendants

Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Smith, Joshua) Modified text on 7/3/2019 (ems). (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/09/2019

50 ORDER granting STIPULATION 49 to extend Plaintiffs' and State Defendants' deadline to respond to Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 07/09/2019)

07/16/2019

51 TRANSCRIPT of Rule 16 Scheduling Conference held 06/26/2019 before Honorable Robert J. Jonker, Chief Judge; NOTE: this transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the release of transcript restriction date; after that date it may be obtained through PACER; under the Policy Regarding Transcripts the parties have 14 days within which to file a Notice of Intent to redact, and 21 days within which to file a Redaction Request; if no Transcript Redaction Request is filed, the court will assume redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and this transcript will be made available via PACER after the release of transcript restriction set for 10/14/2019 ; redaction request due 8/6/2019 (Court Reporter: Trexler, Glenda (517)819-0396) (Entered: 07/16/2019)

07/31/2019

52 ORDER denying 18 motion to intervene without prejudice to the ability to renew the motion at a later point in the case; denying as moot 21 motion to transfer case; denying 29 motion to transfer case; Movants Kristy and Dana Dumont may participate as amici curiae; hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction set for 8/22/19 at 2:00 PM; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, sdb) (Entered: 07/31/2019)

08/09/2019 53 RESPONSE TO MOTION to dismiss 44 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/09/2019 54 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION to dismiss 44 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/09/2019 55 MOTION for reconsideration re 52 Denial of Motion to Intervene by amicus parties Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Siddiky, Leila) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/09/2019 56 BRIEF in support of MOTION for reconsideration re 52 Denial of Motion to Intervene 55 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Siddiky, Leila) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/09/2019 57 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION for reconsideration re 52 Denial of Motion to Intervene 55 filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Siddiky, Leila) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/12/2019 58 ORDER denying 55 motion for reconsideration; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, sdb) (Entered: 08/12/2019)

08/19/2019 59 NOTICE of Intent to Cite Document by plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1) (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 08/19/2019)

08/20/2019

60 NOTICE of Intent to Cite Supplemental Documents by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/20/2019 61 REPLY to response to motion 44 to dismiss filed by Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/20/2019

62 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION for preliminary injunction 5 (Brief Amici Curiae) filed by Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G) (Ostrager, Ann-Elizabeth) Modified text on 8/21/2019 (ems). (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/22/2019

63 MINUTES of motion hearing re 5 MOTION for preliminary injunction filed by Chad Buck, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, Shamber Flore, Melissa Buck, 44 MOTION to dismiss filed by Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services held before Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Court Reporter: Glenda Trexler) (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 08/22/2019)

08/23/2019

64 TRANSCRIPT of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction held 08/22/2019 before Honorable Robert J. Jonker, Chief Judge; NOTE: this transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the release of transcript restriction date; after that date it may be obtained through PACER; under the Policy Regarding Transcripts the parties have 14 days within which to file a Notice of Intent to redact, and 21 days within which to file a Redaction Request; if no Transcript Redaction Request is filed, the court will assume redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and this transcript will be made available via PACER after the release of transcript restriction set for 11/21/2019 ; redaction request due 9/13/2019 (Court Reporter: Trexler, Glenda (517)819-0396) (Entered: 08/23/2019)

08/26/2019 65 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL re 52 by amicus parties Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont [Attorney Jason M. Schnier added to party Dana Dumont(pty:am), Attorney Jason M. Schnier added to party

Kristy Dumont(pty:am)] (Schnier, Jason) Modified text on 8/26/2019 (ems). (Entered: 08/26/2019)

08/28/2019

CASE NUMBER 19-1959 assigned by the Sixth Circuit to appeal 65 (mkc) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

08/28/2019 66 LETTER FROM CCA regarding appeal 65 indicating appeal has been docketed as USCA case number 19-1959 (ems) (Entered: 08/28/2019)

08/29/2019 67 LETTER from attorney Ann-Elizabeth Ostrager for amicus parties Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont regarding ECF No. 62 (Ostrager, AnnElizabeth) (Entered: 08/29/2019)

09/04/2019

APPEAL FEE PAID re 65 by amicus parties Dana Dumont, Kristy Dumont in the amount of $505, receipt number AMIWDC-4527475 (Schnier, Jason) (Entered: 09/04/2019)

09/17/2019 68 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Attorney Joshua S. Smith by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/17/2019)

09/26/2019 69 OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

09/26/2019

70 ORDER granting 29 to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, and Shamber Flore under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and is DENIED in all other respects. Granting 44 to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs Melissa Buck, Chad Buck, and Shamber Flore under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and is DENIED in all other respects. Plaintiffs Melissa Buck, Chad Buck, and Shamber Flore may proceed as amici curiae in the case. Granting 5 motion for preliminary injunction ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

10/07/2019 71 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL re 69 , 70 by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) Modified text on 10/7/2019 (ems). (Entered: 10/07/2019)

10/08/2019

APPEAL FEE PAID re 71 by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel in the amount of $505, receipt number AMIWDC4560060 (Harris, Toni) Modified text on 10/8/2019 (ems). (Entered: 10/08/2019)

10/10/2019 72 MOTION to stay re 69 , 70 by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel; (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/10/2019)

10/10/2019 73 BRIEF in support of MOTION to stay re 69 , 70 72 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/10/2019)

10/10/2019 74 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION to stay re 69 , 70 72 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/10/2019)

10/10/2019 75 ANSWER to complaint, 1 with defenses by Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Bates, Christopher) Modified text on 10/11/2019 (ems). (Entered: 10/10/2019)

10/11/2019 76 ORDER regarding response to motion to stay 72 ; Plaintiffs may file their opposition not later than 10/21/2019 ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 10/11/2019)

10/11/2019 77 ANSWER to complaint, 1 with affirmative defenses by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/11/2019)

10/15/2019

CASE NUMBER 19-2185 assigned by the Sixth Circuit to appeal 71 (mkc) Modified text on 10/15/2019 (ems). (Entered: 10/15/2019)

10/15/2019 78 LETTER FROM CCA regarding appeal 71 indicating appeal has been docketed as USCA case number 19-2185 (ems) (Entered: 10/15/2019)

10/15/2019

79 LETTER FROM CCA regarding appeal 71 indicating appeal has been docketed as USCA case number 19-2185 and holding case in abeyance pending ruling on motion for say or modification of Court's preliminary injunction filed 10/07/19 (ems) (Entered: 10/16/2019)

10/18/2019 80 RESPONSE TO MOTION to stay re 69 , 70 72 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 10/18/2019)

10/20/2019 81 MOTION for leave to file Reply Brief by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel; (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/20/2019)

10/20/2019 82 BRIEF in support of MOTION for leave to file Reply Brief 81 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/20/2019)

10/20/2019 83 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION for leave to file Reply Brief 81 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 10/20/2019)

10/22/2019 84 ORDER denying 72 motion to stay; denying 81 motion for leave to file reply brief ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc) (Entered: 10/22/2019)

10/23/2019 85 LETTER FROM CCA regarding appeal 71 indicating Disitrict Court has denied motion for stay (ems) (Entered: 10/24/2019)

11/01/2019

86 NOTICE Regarding Notice of Nonenforcement of Challenged Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Revise Challenged Regulation by defendants Alex Azar, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Nonenforcement, # 2 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (Bates, Christopher) (Entered: 11/01/2019)

01/06/2020 87 MOTION for order For Certification to the Michigan Supreme Court by defendants Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel; (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 01/06/2020)

01/06/2020

88 BRIEF in support of MOTION for order For Certification to the Michigan Supreme Court 87 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 01/06/2020)

01/06/2020

89 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION for order For Certification to the Michigan Supreme Court 87 filed by Robert Gordon, Herman McCall, Dana Nessel (Harris, Toni) (Entered: 01/06/2020)

01/09/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of William Haun on behalf of plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Haun, William) (Entered: 01/09/2020)

01/09/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Jacob Coate on behalf of plaintiffs Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Coate, Jacob) (Entered: 01/09/2020)

01/13/2020 90 RESPONSE TO MOTION for order For Certification to the Michigan Supreme Court 87 filed by Chad Buck, Melissa Buck, Shamber Flore, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (Windham, Lori) (Entered: 01/13/2020)