flt:EO~

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

MAY i~ 'I, 200?
LARRY W. PROPES, CL~RK U. S. DISTRICT COUR!;

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

FREEMAN MECHANICAL, INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

------------------------------)

CIVIL ACTION NO.:
~1 "Dd- 11'6'3 -l;25f)K
COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to COlTect unlawful employment practices on the basis of race and retaliation,

and to provide appropriate relief to Don Abrams who was adversely affected by such practices.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleges that Don Abrams, an

African-American man, was racially harassed by coworkers, supervisors and managers of

Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Freeman Mechanical"). Freeman Mechanical subsequently

discharged Mr. Abrams because of his comp laints about the racial harassment.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 451,1331,1337,

1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(t)(1) and (3) of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title

VIlli) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. ~ 1981 a.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706( f)( I) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Defendant Employer"), has continuously been a South Carolina corporation doing business in the State of South Carolina and the City of Greenville. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Don Abrams filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 7. From approximately May 8, 2000 through October 16, 2000, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Greenville and Anderson work sites, in violation of Section 703(a)(l) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1), by subjecting Don Abrams to a racially hostile working environment including racial epithets (such as repeated use of the word "nigger"), insults, humiliation, intimidation, physically threatening behavior, and cursing.
2

8. On or about October 16,2000, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment

practices at its Greenville and Anderson, South Carolina, work sites in violation of Section

704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a), by discharging Mr. Abrams because he opposed race

discrimination by his coworkers and supervisors, and because he otherwise engaged in protected

activity.

9.

The effect of the practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8 above has been to

deprive Mr. Abrams of equal employment opportunities and has otherwise adversely affected his

status as an employee because of his race, and because of his opposition to race discrimination

by Defendant Employer.

10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8 above

were intentional.

11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8 above

were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Mr.

Abrams.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers,

successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in

race discrimination and retaliation and any other employment practice which discriminates on the

basis of race.

B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and

programs which provide equal employment opportunities for African-Americans, and which

eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.

3

C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be detem1ined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Mr. Abrams.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting fi·om the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, including compensation for his emotional pain, personal injury, pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of civil rights, and humiliation in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Mr. Abrams punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraphs 7 and 8 above in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the EEOC its costs of this action.
4

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

The EEOC requests ajury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Dated this J;~r,:). day Of_;_i-=-).-,~,c.::..,'-'r~'____ , 2002 .
.'
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

MINDY E. WEINSTEIN

, Regio.. na'l-

Attorney ..

~-r''L)S--'\/......

~."\
.)., f

.

.

,

"\
'--4",-_"

-~\

l...-

EDWIN L. TURNAGE" Trial Attorney Federal ID# 5189 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION 301 N. Main Street Landmark Building, Suite 1402 Greenville, SC 29601 (864) 241-4406

5

 
 • •
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

ZOO~ FI LED!
JUL 2 2
LARRY W. PROPES, CLERK
U. S. DISTRICT COURT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

FREEMAN MECHANICAL, INC.,

)

FREEMAN MECHANICAL, LLC,

)

FMC OF GREENVILLE, INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

-------------------------------)

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6-81--3871-25
~ : 02- -I q~~3 - 2.'5" AK
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race and retaliation,

and to provide appropriate relief to Don Abrams who was adversely affected by such practices.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleges that Don Abrams, an

African-American man, was racially harassed by coworkers, supervisors and managers of an

entity doing business as Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Freeman Mechanical"). Freeman

Mechanical subsequently discharged Mr. Abrams because of his complaints about the racial

harassment.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

l. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 451,1331,1337,1343 and

1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(l) and (3) of Title VII

ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3)("Title VIlli) and

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

• •

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction

of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is the agency ofthe United

States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII,

and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706( f)( 1) and (3) of Title VII, 42

U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3).

4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Defendant FMI"), was a

South Carolina corporation doing business in the State of South Carolina and the City of

Greenville. At all relevant times, Defendant FMI had at least 15 employees.

5. At all relevant times, Defendant, Freeman Mechanical. LLC, ("Defendant FMLLC"), was

a Georgia corporation business in the State of South Carolina and the City of Greenville. At all

relevant times, Defendant FMLLC had at least 15 employees. During the relevant period, FMI

merged into FMLLC.

6.

At all relevant times, Defendant, FMC of Greenville, Inc., ("Defendant FMC"), has been

a South Carolina corporation doing business in the State of South Carolina and the City of

Greenville as Freeman Mechanical, Inc. At all relevant times, Defendant FMC has continuously

had at least 15 employees. Defendant FMC has continued the business ofFMI and FMLLC.

FMC acquired the assets ofFMI and FMLLC, with knowledge ofMr. Abrams' discrimination

claims, and it became a successor in interest to the predecessor entities. FMC is now jointly and

severally liable for the wrongful acts of the predecessor entities for the actions described

hereinbelow.

7. On the basis of successor liability or corporate merger, Defendants FMI, FMLLC, and

2

• •

FMC are jointly and severally liable for the discriminatory acts described below. The three

entities are referred to herein collectively as Defendant Employer. At all relevant times,

Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting

commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§

2000e(b), (g) and (h).

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

8.

More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Don Abrams filed a charge

with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions

precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

9.

From approximately May 8, 2000 through October 16,2000, Defendant Employer

engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Greenville and Anderson work sites, in

violation of Section 703(a)(l) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l), by subjecting Don Abrams

to a racially hostile working environment including racial epithets (such as repeated use of the

word "nigger"), insults, humiliation, intimidation, physically threatening behavior, and cursing.

10. On or about October 16, 2000, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment

practices at its Greenville and Anderson, South Carolina, work sites in violation of Section

704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a), by discharging Mr. Abrams because he opposed race

discrimination by his coworkers and supervisors, and because he otherwise engaged in protected

activity.

11. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above has been to

deprive Mr. Abrams of equal employment opportunities and has otherwise adversely affected his

status as an employee because of his race, and because of his opposition to race discrimination

by Defendant Employer.

3

• •
12. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above were intentional. 13. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Mr. Abrams.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in race discrimination and retaliation and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of race. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for African-Americans, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Mr. Abrams. D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 9 and 10 above. E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, including compensation for his emotional pain,
4

•

personal injury, pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of civil rights,

and humiliation in amounts to be determined at trial.

F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Mr. Abrams punitive damages for its malicious

and reckless conduct described in paragraphs 9 and 10 above in amounts to be determined at

trial.

G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public

interest.

H. Award the EEOC its costs of this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

The EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

Dated this l'3th day of-""'4J=¥=-l+c< - - - - - , 2002.
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

MINDY E. WEINSTEIN

Regional Attorney

_. "'\, .>·~<-x--~- '\
k:L·/··))-,

~\ ~..L--.

TURNA~ EDWIN L.

_.. / {

Trial Attorney

Federal ID# 5189

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

301 N. Main Street

Landmark Building, Suite 1402

Greenville, SC 29601

(864) 241-4406

5

 
 •
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

6\ ;EI lED <I
OCT 1 7 ZOOZ
.LARRY W. PROPES, CLERK
.U~ S, DISTRICT COURT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

FREEMAN MECHANICAL, INC.,

)

FMC OF ATLANTA, LLC,

)

FMC OF GREENVILLE, INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6-02-1783-25
JURY TRIAL DEMAND

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race and retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Don Abrams who was adversely affected by such practices. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleges that Don Abrams, an African-American man, was racially harassed by coworkers, supervisors and managers of an entity doing business as Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Freeman Mechanical"). Freeman Mechanical subsequently discharged Mr. Abrams because of his complaints about the racial harassment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(:0(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

• •
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Conmlission, is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(£)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(£)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Freeman Mechanical, Inc. ("Defendant PMI"), was a South Carolina corporation doing business in the State of South Carolina and the City of Greenville. At all relevant times, Defendant FMI had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant, FMC of Atlanta, fonnerly known as Freeman Mechanical, LLC, ("Defendant FMC of Atlanta"), was a Georgia corporation business in the State of South Carolina and the City of Greenville. At all relevant times, Defendant FMC of Atlanta had at least 15 employees. During the relevant period, FMI merged into FMC of Atlanta, then called Freeman Mechanical, LLC. 6. At all relevant times, Defendant, FMC of Greenville, Inc., ("Defendant FMC"), has been a South Carolina corporation doing business in the State of South Carolina and the City of Greenville as Freeman Mechanical, Inc. At all relevant times, Defendant FMC has continuously had at least 15 employees. Defendant FMC has continued the business ofFMI and FMC of Atlanta. FMC acquired the assets ofFMI and FMC of Atlanta, with knowledge of Mr. Abrams' discrimination claims, and it became a successor in interest to the predecessor entities. FMC is now jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts of the predecessor entities for the actions desclibed hereinbelow.
2

•
7. On the basis of successor liability or corporate merger, Defendants FMI, FMC of Atlanta, and FMC are jointly and severally liable for the discriminatory acts described below. The three entities are refelTed to herein collectively as Defendant Employer. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 8. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Don Abrams filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution ofthis lawsuit have been fulfilled. 9. From approximately May 8, 2000 tlu·ough October 16,2000, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Greenville and Anderson work sites, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), by subjecting Don Abrams to a racially hostile working environment including racial epithets (such as repeated use ofthe word "nigger"), insults, humiliation, intimidation, physically threatening behavior, and cursing. 10. On or about October 16, 2000, Defendant Employer engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Greenville and Anderson, South Carolina, work sites in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), by discharging Mr. Abrams because he opposed race discrimination by his coworkers and supervisors, and because he otherWIse engaged in protected activity. 11. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above has been to deprive Mr. Abrams of equal employment opportunities and has otherwise adversely affected his status as an employee because of his and because of his opposition to race discrimination
3

•
by Defendant Employer. 12. The lU1lawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above were intentional. 13. The unlawfiJi employment practices complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally prc~tectect rights ofMr. Abrams.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injU11ction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in race discrimination and retaliation and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis ofrace. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities tbr African-Americans, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement ofMr. Abrams. D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses n~sulting :limn the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 9 and 10 above.
Order Defendant Employer to make whole Mr. Abrams by providing compensation for past and futme nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices
4

• •
complained of in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, including compensation for his emotional pain;
personal injury, pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of civi.l rights, and humiliation in amounts to be detemlined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Mr. Abrams punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraphs 9 and 10 above in amounts to be detemlined at trial.
G. Grant such fmiher relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
interest. H. Award the EEOC its costs of this action.
JURY TRlAL DEMAND The EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
J. Dated this 1 day of 0 c.:tc \, e..C ,2002.
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel MINDY E. WEINSTEIN ~tomey
; = 7 l f EDWIN L.
Trial Attomey Federal ID# 5189 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTIJN1TY
.COMMISSION 301 N. Main Street Landmark Building, Suite 1402 Greenville, SC 29601
(864) 241-4406
5

• •
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of EEOC's Second Amended Complaint and proposed Amended Summons, were served upon the following persons by and through counsel
listed below via First Class, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~ day of October, 2002
addressed as follows:
William Andrew Amold 712 East Washington Street
Greenville, SC 29601
~¥/~, ,ST"' HANIE L:BRADBURY
Legal Technician Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 301 North Main Street, Suite 1402 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
(864) 241-4425

 
 flLE~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

LARRY W. PROPES, CLER U, S, DISTRICT COURT

Equal Employment Opportunity

)

Commission,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs.

)

)

Freeman Mechanical, Inc.,

)

FMC of Atlanta, LLC,

)

and FMC of Greenville, Inc.,

)

)

Defendants. )

-----------------------)

Civil Action No. 6:02-1783-25AK REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on motion of defendant FMC of Greenville, Inc., d/b/a Freeman Mechanical, Inc., to dismiss or alternatively to strike. On June 24, 2002, plaintiff Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") filed this action alleging employment discrimination and retaliation. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1 )(A), and Local Rule 73.02(8)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.

FACTS The EEOC filed this action against all three defendants alleging racial discrimination and retaliation on behalf of a former employee of Freeman Mechanical, Inc.,("FMI"), Don Abrams. The EEOC is seeking injunctive, punitive, and compensatory relief. After the alleged discrimination and retaliation occurred and after Abrams filed a complaint with the EEOC, the assets of FMI were sold to defendant FMC of Greenville

("FMC"). The EEOC's contends that FMC is liable as a successor employer and has moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of successor liability.1 FMC has moved to dismiss the claims of the EEOC on the ground that it is not liable as a successor corporation under Title VII for injunctive or punitive relief. Alternatively, FMC contends that since the court has already granted Abrams' motion to intervene,2 the EEOC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the EEOC's claims should be dismissed entirely and only compensatory relief should be allowed to be sought by Abrams. The EEOC contends its claims are statutorily independent from Abrams' claims.
APPLICABLE LAW Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief. In considering a motion to dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)(citations omitted). Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
1When a claim involves federal rights such as those enumerated by Title VII, the federal common law doctrine of successor liability governs. See, e.g., EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740,747-48 (7th Cir.1994); Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1235-36 (7th Cir.1986) (citing cases). Although there is a nine factor test frequently used by the courts (see n. 3, supra), the test essentially boils downs to the following: a plaintiff may sue a purchaser of the assets of the violator-business if (1) the successor had notice of the plaintiff's claim before acquisition, and (2) there was a substantial continuity in the operation of the business before and after the sale. See G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d at 748.
2The court notes that although it granted the motion to add Abrams as a plaintiff, an amended complaint adding him has not been filed. Thus, currently the only plaintiff is the EEOC.
2

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate
that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Uberly Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in her pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Accordingly, when Rule 56(e) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must
3

produce existence of every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of
adducing at a trial on the merits.
ANALYSIS
FMC seeks partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for
compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that such damages may not be
awarded against an successor corporation. FMC does not argue that it has no liability for
any claim on a theory of successor liability, only that the plaintiff may not recover
compensatory or punitive damages against it on this theory.3 FMC cites to Musikiwamba
v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.1985). In Musikiwamba, the Seventh Circuit held that
successorship liability may be applied in employment discrimination claims brought under §1981. Id. at 744,748-49.4 However, in dicta, the court noted that successor liability for
punitive and compensatory damages in §1981 cases "go far beyond" the purpose of
granting remedial relief to an employee.5 However, the Musikiwamba court considered this
3Courts that have considered the successorship question in a labor context have found the following factors to be relevant: 1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, 2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief, 3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business operations, 4) whether the new employer uses the same plant, 5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same work force, 6) whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel, 7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the same working conditions, 8) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of production and 9) whether he produces the same product. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249,256-258 (1974). The court notes that the second factor is of importance as it is obviously unjust to punish a successor corporation when the predecessor is fully capable of providing
adequate relief. Here, all parties acknowledge FMI is a defunct corporation. See Wheeler v. Snyder Buick,
Inc., 794 F.2d 1228 (7 th Cir. 1986). This issue, however, differs from the issue of whether the predecessor could have paid a judgment discussed in more depth in this report on page 5.
4The court noted that an employee may sue an employer under section 1981 for intentional discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment in much the same manner that he may sue for such discrimination under Title VII, although there are certain procedural differences between the two statutes. Id. at 748.
5The EEOC cites City of Richmond, Va. V. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that under successor liability a corporation is liable for all the damages, including punitive damages. The court notes, however, that Richmond is not a Title VII case but rather an ordinary torts case.
4

issue at a time when there were no compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII at
all. Until 1991, Title VII "afforded only 'equitable' remedies ...[and t]he primary form of monetary relief available was backpay." Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 252 (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to authorize additional recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of "intentional employment discrimination." Id. at 253. 6 Thus, the addition of these potential damages in an employment discrimination case creates a "make-whole" purpose which did not exist when the Seventh Circuit decided Musikiwamba. See Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 748. Accordingly, the court declines to follow this decision. The court concludes that it is entirely appropriate to impose liability on the defendants for all categories of damages being sought by the plaintiffs, including compensatory as well as injunctive and punitive damages. Having concluded that injunctive and punitive damages may be sought, the EEOC should remain as a plaintiff. Accordingly, the defendant FMC's motion to dismiss the punitive and injunctive claims, or alternatively strike the EEOC as a plaintiff, should be denied.
FMC then contends that successor liability is inappropriate where, priorto the succession, the predecessor lost its ability to pay a judgment, so that as alleged in this case, but for the succession, the plaintiffs would not have been able to collect on any judgment. In Musikiwamba and Wheelerv. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d at 1236, the courts held that successor liability is inappropriate under such circumstances. Whether the plaintiffs would have been unable to collect against FMC's predecessor, FMI, is a question of fact which cannot be determined at this point in the litigation. Thus, the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue should be denied.
6The 1991 Civil Rights Act applied to "cases arising" after November 21, 1991.
5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the defendant FMC's motion to dismiss be denied. It is further recommended that the plaintiff EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment be denied.

December ~/,?2002 Greenville, South Carolina

t/,I(A;9~
William M. C~ ,
United States Magistrate Judge

6

 
 FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DfSTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH C' AROUNA

~MAR - 5 2003

GREENVILLE DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

LARRY W. PROPES, C E;"(i(
U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO.:

COMMISSION, and DON ABRAMS,

)

6-02-1783-25AK

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

CONSENT DECREE

FREEMAN MECHANICAL, INC., FMC OF ATLANTA, LLC, FMC OF GREENVILLE, INC.,
Defendants.

) )
)
)
) )
) \.
'(

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") instituted this action

pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII oflhe Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.c. ~ 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3) ("Title VfI") and Section 102 orthe Civil Rights Act or 1991,42

U.S.c. ~ 1981a. On October 25,2002, the Comi granted Don Abrams' motion to join the case as

a plaintiff. Defendants Freeman Mechanical, Inc. and FMC of Atlanta, LLC, were served with

the EEOC's pleading and are in default. Defendant FMC of Greenville, Inc. (FMC) filed an

Answer denying liability. The EEOC, Don Abrams and Defendant FMC. agree that the subject

matter of this action is proper and hereby stipu!<'te to .iL!!"lSdicriol1 oi the Court over the parties.

The parties have advised this Court that they desire to resolve the allegations in the

Complaint without the burden, expense, and delay of further litigation.

It is therefore the finding of this Court, made on the pleadings and the record as a whole,

that: (1) the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action; (2) the

purpose and provisions of Title VII will be promoted ;\I1d effectuated by the entry or the Consent

Decree; and (3) this Decree resolves all matters in controversy between the parties as provided in

------------------- ---------

paragraphs 1 through 12 below.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADmDGED AND DECREED as follows: 1. FMC shall not discriminate against employees on the basis of race by denying equal

employment opportunities to persons because of their race.

2.

FMC shall not discriminate or retaliate against any person because of opposition to any

practice made unlawful under Title vn, or because of the fi ling of a charge, the giving of

testimony or assistance, or the participation in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under

Title VII.

3. FMC shall pay Don Abrams the sum ofTen Thousand Dollars ($10,000) in settlement of

the claims raised in this action. FMC shall make payment by issuing a check payable to Don

Abrams and Attorney James Phillip Brislane, Esq. FMC shall mail the check to Mr. Brislane at

the following address: Standeffer Brislane Griffith & Harbin; P.O. Box 35; Anderson, SC 29622.

Payment of $1 0,000 shall be made within ten days after the Court approves this Consent Decree.

Within ten days of issuing payment, FMC shall mail to Mindy E. Weinstein, Regional Attorney,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 129 West Trade Street, Suite 400, Charlotte, NC

28202, a copy of the check and proof of their delivery to Mr. Brislane.

4. During the tenn of this Consent Decree, beginning no later than one hundred and twenty

(120) days after entry of the decree by the Court, FMC shall provide company-wide annual

training programs to all of its non-probationary employees. However, the training shall also

include probationary employees if they are assigned to work as Foremen, Department

Superintendents, and Managers. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the training programs, FMC

shall provide the EEOC with an agenda for them. The training programs shall include an

explanation of the requirements of the federal equal employment opportunity laws, including 2

-'---"---

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and its prohibition against race discrimination in the

workplace, and particularly racial harassment. The training programs shall also include an explanation ofthe Title VII prohibition against retaliation in the workplace. Within ten (l0) days

after completion of the training programs, FMC shall ce11ify to the EEOC the specific training

program which was undertaken and shall provide the EEOC with a roster of all employees in

attendance.

s.

During the term of this Decree, FMC shall consplcuously post the attached Employee

Notice, marked Appendix A, hereby made a part of this Decree, in a place where it is visible to

employees assigned to work sites in Anderson and Greenville Counties, South Carolina. If the

Notice becomes defaced or unreadable, FMC shall replace it by posting another copy of the

Notice.

6. FMC agrees to provide the EEOC with semi-annual reports during the teml of this

Decree. The first report is due no later than 120 days after the date this Consent Decree is filed.

FMC will provide repOlis every six months thereafter during the term of this Decree. The reports

shall include the following information: (a) the identities of all individuals who have complained

of or reported race discrimination at any of FMC's facilities, including by way of identification

each person's name, home address. home telephone numher, social security number, and race; (b)

a brief statement regarding the nature of the individual's complaint; and (c) a description of what

action FMC took in response to the individual's complaint.

7. FMC will provide Mr. Abrams a neutral reference, which would include position held,

rates of pay, and dates of employment, in response to any inquiries regarding his work for FMC.

Moreover, in response to any inquiries about Mr. Abrams, FMC will rcil"ain from any negative

remarks of any nature whatsoever.

3

8.

FMC agrees that the EEOC may review compliance with this Consent Decree. As part of

such review, the EEOC may inspect the premises, interview employees and examine and copy

documents. Any inspection for the purpose of satisfying the review component of this provision

shall occur after providing FMC with at least three (3) working days of advance notice. The

Notice contemplates that the EEOC write to the named representative of FMC, William Andrew

Arnold, Esq.; 712 E. Washington St.; Greenville, SC 29601-3035.

9.

If anytime during the term of this Consent Decree the EEOC believes FMC is in violation

of this Decree, the EEOC shall give written notice of the alleged violation to William Andrew

Arnold, Esq., 712 E. Washington St.; Greenville, SC 2960 \-3035. FMC shall have twenty (20)

days in which to investigate and respond to the allegations. Thereafter, the parties shall have a

period ofthi11y (30) days, or such additional period as may be agreed upon by them, in which to

engage in negotiation and conciliation regarding such allegations, before the EEOC pursues any

remedy provided by law.

10. The tenn of this Decree shall be for two (2) years from its entry by the Com1.

11. The parties shall bear their own attorneys' lees and costs.

12. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case for purpose ofresolving controversies

arising under this Decree and for entry of any orders as may be necessary or appropriate.

F~J ~c..
Dated: ~ ... eL 3, ~

Terry L. Wooten United States District Judge

Florence, South Carolina Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.1.08, this order is being sent to local counsel only.

[Signature pages follow]

4

WE CONSENT
Dated this _~'1"',Jay orJ.~r~7' 2lH1'
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate C.-:l1craJ Counsel
MIT\); j Y E. WEINSTEIN
m.. -- Region:.! Attorney
EDvVI1\; L. -1 URNACiE Triai ,'\!'L'mey .;edt:n-l-l I Di; 5 I g<) EQUAL E.MPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSIO:'\I
15 S. Main Street, Suite 530
Greenville, South Carolina 29601 (864) 24l-4406
WE CONSENT
~ Dated this.J.!L day of

WE CONSENT
feb. Dated this ,(j!l day of

,. S PHiLUP BRISLANE. ESQ.
ed 'ral lD N<J.: S-:r9 ~
Attorney for intervenor-Plaintiff Don Abrams STA0JDEFFER BRISLANE
URIFFITH & HARBIN P.O. Bo\. 35 Andersvn_ SC 29622 (3M) ()(.4-U:J:J3

WILL·, M /\N REW ARNOLD, ESQ.
Federal 10 No.: !:f£(7
Attornc~' 1'01' FMC of Greenville, Inc.
712 E. Washington St. Grcenviilc, ~;C 20601-3035
(1\h-. I 2·t2-4i)i)\)

5

 
 CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Greenville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 6:02-cv-01783-TLW-WMC

CLOSED

EEOC, et al v. Freeman Mechanical, et al Assigned to: Judge Terry L Wooten Referred to: Magistrate Judge William M Catoe Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)
Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Date Filed: 05/22/2002 Date Terminated: 03/05/2003 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Edwin Lake Turnage Harris and Graves PO Box 6263 Greenville, SC 29606 864-235-1331 Fax: 864-235-1741 Email: elt@harrisgraves.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Don Abrams

represented by Charles Clark, III 365 St Mary's Lane Marietta, GA 30064 770-218-5542 Fax: 770-818-4301 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Don Abrams

represented by Charles Clark, III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James P Brislane Standeffer Harbin and Griffith PO Box 35 Anderson, SC 29622-0035 864-964-0333 Fax: 864-964-0930 Email: jbrislane@shglawyers.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

1 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM

CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

V. Defendant Freeman Mechanical Inc
Defendant Freeman Mechanical LLC TERMINATED: 10/17/2002 Defendant FMC of Greenville Inc
Defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC

represented by W Andrew Arnold Arnold and Arnold 712 E Washington Street Greenville, SC 29601 864-242-4800 Fax: 864-242-4885 Email: aarnold@aalawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by W Andrew Arnold (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/22/2002 05/22/2002 06/17/2002 07/08/2002
07/22/2002
07/25/2002

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT; Scheduling order due by 8/30/02 Service due by 9/19/02 for Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 05/23/2002)
2 SUMMONS issued for defendant Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 05/23/2002)
3 ANSWER to Local Rule 26 Interrogatories by plaintiff EEOC; jury demand (dnap) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
4 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons and complaint executed as to defendant Freeman Mechanical 6/18/02 Assignment Interrogatories due on 7/18/02 for Freeman Mechanical ; Answer due on 7/8/02 for Freeman Mechanical. (jtho) (Entered: 07/09/2002)
5 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiff EEOC , (Answer due 8/1/02 for Freeman Mechanical ) Service due by 11/19/02 for Freeman Mechanical amending [1-1] complaint against defendant Freeman Mech LLC, FMC of Greenville; jury demand (jtho) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
6 ANSWER to Complaint by defendant Freeman Mechanical, defendant FMC of Greenville (Attorney W. Andrew Arnold), Assignment Interrogatories due on

2 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM

CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

07/25/2002 07/30/2002
08/01/2002
08/13/2002 08/14/2002
08/16/2002 08/23/2002 09/03/2002 09/03/2002 09/03/2002 09/03/2002 09/09/2002

8/5/02 for FMC of Greenville, for Freeman Mechanical ; (jtho) (Entered: 07/29/2002)
7 ANSWER to Local Rule 26 Interrogatories by defendant Freeman Mechanical, defendant FMC of Greenville (jtho) (Entered: 07/29/2002)
8 CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting 26(f) Conference no later than 8/19/02 ; 26(a) Initial Disclosures served by 9/3/02 ; 26(f) Report filed by 9/3/02 ; Joining of parties,amending of pleadings on 9/23/02 ; Plaintiff's ID of Experts set for 10/23/02 ; Defendant's ID of Experts set for 11/22/02 ; Records Custodian Affidavit filed by 5/2/03 ; Discovery cutoff 4/18/03 ; Motion In Limine filed by 5/26/02 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 4/3/03 ; 26(a)3 Pretrial Disclosures filed by 5/2/03 ; Pretrial Brief filed by 5/26/03 ; Jury Selection deadline set for 6/2/03 ; ADR Statement/Cert due by 4/3/03 Mediation deadline for 5/19/03 ( signed by Judge Terry L. Wooten ) eod 7/30/02, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 07/30/2002)
9 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons and complaint executed as to defendant Freeman Mechanical 7/24/02 Assignment Interrogatories due on 8/23/02 for Freeman Mechanical ; Answer due on 8/13/02 for Freeman Mechanical executed by certified mail (jtho) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
10 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical, Inc. (jtho) (Entered: 08/13/2002)
11 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons and complaint executed as to defendant Freeman Mechanical 8/5/02 Assignment Interrogatories due on 9/4/02 for Freeman Mechanical ; Answer due on 8/26/02 for Freeman Mechanical executed by certified mail (jtho) (Entered: 08/15/2002)
12 AMENDED MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
13 RESPONSE by defendant FMC of Greenville to [12-1] motion for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 08/27/2002)
14 AMENDED ANSWER to Local Rule 26 Interrogatories by defendant Freeman Mechanical Inc., defendant FMC of Greenville (jtho) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
15 26(f) Report by EEOC, Freeman Mechanical, FMC of Greenville . Parties disagree to Conference and Scheduling Order. (jtho) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
16 26(f) Answers to Local Rule 26 Interrogatories by Freeman Mechanical, FMC of Greenville . (jtho) Modified on 03/07/2003 (Entered: 09/04/2002)
17 26(f) Answers to Local Rule 26 Interrogatories by EEOC . (jtho) (Entered: 09/04/2002)
18 CONSENT AMENDED CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of parties,amending of pleadings on 10/21/02 ; Plaintiff's ID of Experts set for 12/16/02 ; Defendant's ID of Experts set for 1/13/03 ; Records Custodian Affidavit filed by 4/14/03 ; Discovery cutoff 5/16/03 ; Motion In Limine filed by 7/28/03 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 6/2/03 ; 26(a)3 Pretrial Disclosures filed by 7/14/03 ; Pretrial Brief filed by <date not set> ; Jury Selection deadline set for 8/4/03 ; ADR Statement/Cert due by 3/5/03 Mediation deadline for 4/3/03

3 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM

CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

09/12/2002 09/16/2002 09/16/2002 09/23/2002 09/24/2002 10/07/2002 10/10/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002
10/17/2002 10/23/2002
10/23/2002
10/25/2002 11/07/2002

( signed by Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe ) eod 9/9/02, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
19 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
Minute entry: mooting [12-1] motion for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical - second amended motion for entry of default filed 9/12/02. (jtho) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
20 CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to defendant Freeman Mechanical granting [19-1] motion for entry of default as to Freeman Mechanical (jtho) (Entered: 09/16/2002)
24 MOTION by movant Don Abrams to join (fbos) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
21 ANSWER to Complaint by defendant FMC of Greenville (Attorney W. Andrew Arnold ) (jtho) (Entered: 09/24/2002)
22 MOTION with exhibits A and B by plaintiff EEOC to amend [1-1] complaint , for issuance of an amended summons (jtho) Modified on 10/07/2002 (Entered: 10/07/2002)
23 ORDER granting [22-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint, granting [22-2] motion for issuance of an amended summons ( signed by Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe ) eod 10/10/02, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiff EEOC , (Answer due 10/28/02 for FMC of Greenville, for Freeman Mechanical ) amending [1-1] complaint against defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC; jury demand (jtho) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
25 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiff EEOC , (Answer due 10/28/02 for FMC of Atlanta LLC, for FMC of Greenville, for Freeman Mechanical ) amending [1-1] complaint - adding party FMC of Atlanta LLC, terminating party FMC LLC; jury demand (jtho) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
26 SUMMONS issued for defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC (jtho) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
27 MOTION by defendant FMC of Greenville to dismiss , or in the alternative to strike all demands and prayers for relief seeking punitive damages, injunctive relief, and all other relief not necessary to make Don Abrans whole from the Second Amended Complaint (jtho) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
28 MEMORANDUM by defendant FMC of Greenville in support of [27-1] motion to dismiss, [27-2] motion to strike all demands and prayers for relief seeking punitive damages, injunctive relief, and all other relief not necessary to make Don Abrans whole from the Second Amended Complaint (jtho) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
29 ORDER granting [24-1] motion to join Don Abrams to join this action as a party plaintiff ( signed by Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe ) eod 10/25/02, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
30 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC to [27-1] motion to dismiss, [27-2] motion to strike all demands and prayers for relief seeking punitive damages, injunctive

4 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM

CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

11/20/2002 11/20/2002 11/25/2002
11/25/2002 11/25/2002 12/11/2002
12/13/2002 12/30/2002 01/13/2003
02/03/2003 02/03/2003

relief, and all other relief not necessary to make Don Abrans whole from the Second Amended Complaint (jtho) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
31 NOTICE of Hearing before Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe set Motion Hearing to 11:00 12/11/02 for [27-1] motion to dismiss (jtho) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
32 NOTICE of Hearing before Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe reset Motion Hearing to 10:00 12/11/02 for [27-1] motion to dismiss (jtho) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
33 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons and complaint executed as to defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC 11/15/02 Assignment Interrogatories due on 12/16/02 for FMC of Atlanta LLC ; Answer due on 12/5/02 for FMC of Atlanta LLC executed by certified mail. Acknowledgement of Receipt attached. (jtho) Modified on 11/25/2002 (Entered: 11/25/2002)
34 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC for partial summary judgment (jtho) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
35 MEMORANDUM with exhibits A-F by plaintiff EEOC in support of [34-1] motion for partial summary judgment (jtho) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
36 MOTION HEARING [34-1] motion for partial summary judgment, [27-1] motion to dismiss held ORAL ORDER [34-1] motion for partial summary judgment taken under advisement, [27-1] motion to dismiss taken under advisement (before Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe ) Court Reporter: Kirkley. (kric) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
37 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe Re: [34-1] motion for partial summary judgment be denied, [27-1] motion to dismiss be denied ; Motion no longer referred Objections to R and R due by 1/3/03. eod 12/13/02, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 12/13/2002)
38 OBJECTION by plaintiff EEOC to [37-1] report and recommendations (acas) (Entered: 12/31/2002)
39 AMENDED CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of parties,amending of pleadings on 10/21/02 ; Plaintiff's ID of Experts set for 4/1/03 ; Defendant's ID of Experts set for 4/14/03 ; Records Custodian Affidavit filed by 4/14/03 ; Discovery cutoff 5/16/03 ; Motion In Limine filed by 7/28/03 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 6/2/03 ; Mediation deadline for 4/3/03 Mediation Statement filed by 3/5/03 ; 26(a)3 Pretrial Disclosures filed by 7/14/03 ; Pretrial Brief filed by 7/28/03 ; Jury Selection deadline set for 8/4/03 ; ( signed by Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe )eod 1/13/03, svd. (jtho) (Entered: 01/13/2003)
40 AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT by plaintiff EEOC as to defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC . Party not an infant, not incompetent, nor in the military, has been served on November 25, 2002. (jtho) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
40 CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to defendant FMC of Atlanta LLC (jtho) (Entered: 02/03/2003)

5 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM

CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report

https://ecf.scd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?348313658244557-L_35...

02/19/2003 03/05/2003 03/05/2003

41 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING filed for dates of December 11, 2002 before Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe held in Greenville, SC Court Reporter: Geri Kirkley (jtho) (Entered: 02/19/2003)
42 ORDER approving Consent Decree of settlement. Parties shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs. ( signed by Judge Terry L. Wooten ) eod 3/6/03, svd. (acas) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
Case closed (acas) (Entered: 03/06/2003)

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

05/30/2007 14:24:06

PACER Login:

hs0328

Client Code:

eeoc

Description:

Docket Report

Search Criteria:

6:02-cv-01783-TLW-WMC

Billable Pages:

3

Cost:

0.24

6 of 6

5/30/2007 1:24 PM