2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 1 of 56 Pg ID 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER BARRY by his next friend ELAINE BARRY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, v.
MAURA CORRIGAN, in her capacity as Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,

Case No. Hon. __________________ U.S. District Judge

Defendant.

_______________________________________________/

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Denial of Due Process Under Federal Constitution and Law –
Counts I and II 1. This action challenges the inadequate and unlawful “criminal justice disqualification” notices issued by Defendant’s Michigan Department of Human Services to applicants for, or recipients of, needs-based benefits under DHSadministered public assistance programs, whose benefits have been or will be

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 2 of 56 Pg ID 2
2
denied, terminated, or reduced based on an alleged criminal justice disqualification.
2. The public assistance benefits at issue are intended to prevent hunger, to ensure a minimum level of economic security for families with children, refugees and the disabled, and to support self-sufficiency and employment by providing safe childcare for low-income parents engaged in employment or education and training activities. These programs are critically important to the wellbeing of the named plaintiff, class members, and their families.
3. Defendant’s notices merely state: “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.” The notices thus fail to provide any specific information about the reasons for or nature of the criminal justice disqualification. Affected individuals have no way to know why their access to assistance is being denied, reduced, or terminated; for how long they are being cut off from assistance; whether they dispute any of the Defendant’s factual findings that support the action; or what steps they could potentially take to have benefits reinstated. 4. Defendant has violated Plaintiff’s and proposed class members’ rights to adequate notice, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as a matter of both

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 3 of 56 Pg ID 3
3
constitutional due process (Count I) and federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) law, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10) (Count II), which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Denial of Food Assistance for Which Plaintiff and Others Similarly Situated Are Eligible Under Federal Standards – Counts III and IV
5. Plaintiff also challenges Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, which disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match,” without requiring Defendant to first find that the person is actively sought by law enforcement, and also is intentionally evading arrest or prosecution.
6. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if Defendant makes a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
7. Defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, M.C.L. 400.10b, impose eligibility requirements for receiving Food Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus violate the rights of Plaintiff and proposed subclass members to receive Food Assistance when they are

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 4 of 56 Pg ID 4
4
eligible under federally-established standards, 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5), which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. (Count III.)
8. Defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, M.C.L. 400.10b, also are preempted by federal law under 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) (prohibiting states from imposing their own eligibility standards), 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) (establishing federal standards for fleeing felon disqualifications), and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, because Congress has established comprehensive federal standards and requirements for Food Assistance eligibility (including standards related to felony warrants), and because M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy impose additional eligibility standards not set forth in federal law, conflict with federal law, and frustrate the achievement of Congress’s full objectives. (Count IV.)
Federal Remedies 9. Plaintiff seeks relief for himself and on behalf of a Due Process Class (for Counts I and II) and an Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass (for Counts III and IV). 10. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce the United States Constitution and federal law, and to ensure that he and others similarly situated receive due process, as well as the Food Assistance for which they are eligible,

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 5 of 56 Pg ID 5
5
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 or, alternatively, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
11. Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring Defendant to issue notice relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and to calculate and issue corrective payments of Food Assistance withheld from Plaintiff and class members in violation of federal law, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and pursuant to Defendant’s policy in BAM 406 of retroactively correcting under-issuances of benefits.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343. Plaintiff is pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce federal rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, or, in the alternative, the Supremacy Clause, and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. 13. This Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202. 14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District, Southern Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).
PARTIES Named Plaintiff Walter Barry 15. Walter Barry is a 42-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 6 of 56 Pg ID 6
6
the City of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. 16. Plaintiff Barry has developmental disabilities, including an intellectual
disability that interferes with his ability to function independently. Because of his intellectual disability, Plaintiff Barry has the mental abilities of a young child and is unable to read or to write, except that he can print his name.
17. Plaintiff Barry was in special education throughout his schooling. He was classified as trainably mentally impaired and received a certificate of completion from the John Lee Training Center when he was 25 years old.
18. Plaintiff Barry tried to work through Michigan Rehabilitation Services in the 1990s, but he has never successfully held a job.
19. Plaintiff Barry’s only income is a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability check of $710 per month.
20. Plaintiff Barry lives with his mother and Next Friend, Elaine Barry, who handles his affairs, and is his authorized representative with DHS and his Representative Payee for the Social Security Administration.
21. In 2012, Plaintiff Barry received $186 per month in Food Assistance. 22. Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance made it possible to meet his basic nutritional needs.
December 2012 Criminal Justice Disqualification 23. In January 2013, Plaintiff Barry and his mother received a notice from the

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 7 of 56 Pg ID 7
7
Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) dated December 31, 2012, which told Walter Barry he was disqualified from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits effective February 2013 because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice also said “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.”
24. Exhibit A is an accurate copy of the Notice, dated December 31, 2012, that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry.
25. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry received the notice from DHS in January 2013 that Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance was going to be cut off because of a “criminal justice disqualification,” Elaine Barry asked for a hearing to contest the decision.
26. Ms. Barry also tried to figure out what the “criminal disqualification” was about and how to prove it did not apply to Plaintiff Barry.
27. Elaine Barry was certain Plaintiff had never had anything to do with the criminal justice system or law enforcement, because of his disabilities and her close supervision of him.
28. In January 2013, Elaine Barry took Plaintiff Barry to the City of Detroit Police Department – their local law enforcement agency, where she showed the police the December 31, 2012 notice and asked for police help in getting Walter Barry’s criminal justice disqualification straightened out.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 8 of 56 Pg ID 8
8
29. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry went to the Detroit Police for help in resolving the criminal justice disqualification in January 2013, the police fingerprinted Plaintiff Barry.
30. Ronaldo L. Turner, a police officer with the Detroit Police Department, submitted a letter stating that “investigation per fingerprint comparison disclosed” that Plaintiff Barry had “no criminal history with the Detroit Police Department.”
31. Exhibit B is an accurate copy of the statement from the Detroit Police. 32. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry were at the police station in January 2013, the City of Detroit Police Department did not take any action to arrest Plaintiff Barry, or to jail him or take him to court. 33. Since Ms. Barry was unsure how to prove that Plaintiff Barry did not have a “criminal justice disqualification,” she also took Plaintiff Barry to his doctor to get a statement about his disabilities. 34. Exhibit C is an accurate copy of the statement Elaine Barry got from Walter Barry’s doctor to submit to DHS. 35. Elaine Barry, as authorized representative for her Plaintiff son, gave the statements from Plaintiff Barry’s doctor and from the Detroit Police Department to the administrative law judge at the Food Assistance hearing in January 2013. 36. Defendant’s administrative law judge, Suzanne Sonneborn, issued a decision that DHS had been wrong in deciding that Plaintiff Barry should be cut

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 9 of 56 Pg ID 9
9
off Food Assistance, and she ordered DHS to reinstate his Food Assistance. 37. Exhibit D is an accurate copy of the February 1, 2013 Hearing Decision in
Plaintiff Barry’s case. 38. Plaintiff Barry did not miss any months of Food Assistance following the
December 31, 2013 termination notice, because the Hearing Decision was issued very quickly.
May and June 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualifications 39. After the Hearing Decision ordered DHS to reinstate Walter Barry’s Food Assistance, DHS sent another notice to Plaintiff Barry saying that he was going to be cut off Food Assistance because of a criminal justice disqualification. 40. The second DHS notice, dated May 16, 2013, said Mr. Barry was disqualified from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits effective June 1, 2013 because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice again stated “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.” 41. The notice did not tell Plaintiff Barry what he had done to be disqualified from Food Assistance. 42. Exhibit E is an accurate copy of the Notice, dated May 16, 2013, that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry. 43. Plaintiff Barry had already contacted his local law enforcement to resolve

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 10 of 56 Pg ID 10
10
the criminal justice disqualification and the notice from DHS did not tell him what else he would need to do to stop DHS from repeatedly terminating his Food Assistance based on an outstanding felony warrant for the arrest of someone else who used his identity.
44. Elaine Barry, as authorized representative for Plaintiff Barry, filed another hearing request with the Department of Human Services on May 18, 2013, appealing the decision to terminate Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance.
45. Plaintiff Barry has had no encounters with law enforcement since he went to the City of Detroit Police station in January 2013.
46. In response to the Hearing Request in Plaintiff Barry’s case, Defendant’s employee, Rachel McMaster, the caseworker who handles Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance case at DHS, issued a Hearing Summary that states “the worker had to follow procedure and close the case again” based on information from Defendant’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) “that there was still an outstanding warrant for this client as of 5/13/13”.
47. Exhibit F is an accurate copy of the May 22, 2013 Hearing Summary in Plaintiff Barry’s case.
48. Robin Thomas, the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) Terminal Agency Coordinator (TAC) for the DHS OIG issued a statement dated May 16, 2013, that said Walter Barry was “subject to an arrest under an

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 11 of 56 Pg ID 11
11
outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge” issued by the Detroit Police Department on September 2, 1989 (23 years ago). She stated that Walter met the “outstanding felony warrant criteria as of May 13, 2013.”
49. Exhibit G in accurate copy of Ms. Thomas’s May 16, 2013 statement. 50. Plaintiff Barry initially was told by DHS that his Food Assistance would continue until a hearing was held on his criminal justice disqualification. 51. In June 2013, Plaintiff Barry received a third DHS notice, dated June 14, 2013, that he was disqualified effective July 1, 2013 from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice again stated “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.” 52. The notice did not tell Plaintiff Barry what he had done to be disqualified from Food Assistance. 53. Exhibit H is an accurate copy of the Notice, dated June 14, 2013, that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry. 54. In the 1980s Plaintiff Barry’s older brother, Darryl L. Barry, got into trouble with law enforcement. 55. Darryl L. Barry used Walter Barry’s identity as an alias when he was in trouble with law enforcement. 56. Elaine Barry intervened at the time to ensure that her son Darryl would go

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 12 of 56 Pg ID 12
12
to court under his own name, and she thought she had resolved any issues surrounding Darryl’s use of Plaintiff Barry’s identity during the 1980s.
57. In January 2013, when Elaine and Walter Barry sought assistance at the City of Detroit Police station, the Detroit Police did not indicate that there was any connection between Darryl Barry’s criminal problems in the 1980s and the criminal justice disqualification notice Walter Barry received from DHS.
58. A hearing has not yet been held on Defendant’s May 2013 decision to terminate Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance based on a criminal justice disqualification.
59. In spite of his timely hearing request, Plaintiff Barry has not received Food Assistance for July 2013.
60. Without Food Assistance, Plaintiff Barry does not have enough money to pay for both his food and his share of household expenses.
The Plaintiff Due Process Class 61. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), on behalf of all others similarly situated. 62. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class consisting of:
all past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s • Food Assistance Program (FAP), • Family Independence Program (FIP),

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 13 of 56 Pg ID 13
13
• State Disability Assistance Program (SDA),
• Child Day Care (CDC), and
• Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), (“public assistance”) programs who have or will suffer actual or threatened denial, reduction, or termination of benefits based on the Michigan Department of Human Services’ (DHS’) determination that the applicant or recipient, or a member of the applicant or recipient’s household, is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who do not receive a written notice, at the time of denial and at least 10 days prior to an actual or threatened reduction or termination, that details: a) the nature and duration of the intended agency action, b) the specific actions the individual can take to lift the disqualification and
fully access benefits, and c) the factual and legal reasons for the action including
i) which of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications is at issue, ii) the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the
disqualification, iii) the date, place and nature of the alleged crime and the resulting
conviction or warrant, iv) the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was
issued, v) the name of the specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis
for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for additional

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 14 of 56 Pg ID 14
14
information, vi) where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified
individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement for a felony, and vii) where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual. 63. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 64. Upon information and belief, at least hundreds and likely thousands of people throughout the State of Michigan are members of the proposed class. 65. The exact size of the class and the names and contact information of the class members are in Defendant’s control. 66. The questions of law and fact at issue here – whether Defendant has violated the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and the implementing federal regulations by denying, reducing, or terminating public assistance to Plaintiff and class members without providing written notice detailing the reasons for the denial, reduction, or termination – are common to all class members. These common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 67. The claims and defenses of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims and defenses of the class.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 15 of 56 Pg ID 15
15
68. The named Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendant’s practice of issuing the same inadequate, computer-generated notices to all class members.
69. The claims of the named Plaintiff arise from the same conduct by Defendant that has been or will be applied to all class members.
70. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
71. There is no foreseeable antagonism or conflict of interest within the class. 72. The named Plaintiff’s attorneys are competent and experienced in the areas of law raised in this litigation. 73. The requested relief is appropriate for this class because Defendant has sent or will in the future send legally insufficient notices to all members of the class, thus denying them both adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Plaintiff Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass 74. Plaintiff seek to represent a subclass consisting of:
all past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, reduction, or termination of Food Assistance Program benefits based on DHS’ policy of disqualifying individuals as fugitive felons, without finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, and

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 16 of 56 Pg ID 16
16
without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement for a crime that is a felony. 75. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 76. Upon information and belief, the subclass contains at least hundreds and perhaps thousands of people throughout the State of Michigan. 77. The exact size of the class and the names and contact information of the subclass members are in Defendant’s control. 78. The questions in this Complaint – whether Defendant’s disqualification of individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the “fugitive felon” definition in her written policy, and the state law upon which it is based, are in violation of individuals’ rights under federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) law, or are preempted by that law – are common to all subclass members. 79. The named Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendant’s practice of actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance to households that contain individuals identified by Defendant as fugitive felons. 80. The claims and defenses of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims and defenses of the subclass. 81. The claims of the named Plaintiff arise from the same conduct by Defendant that has been or will be applied to all subclass members.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 17 of 56 Pg ID 17
17
82. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the subclass.
83. There is no foreseeable antagonism or conflict of interest within the subclass.
84. The named Plaintiff’s attorneys are competent and experienced in the areas of law raised in this litigation.
85. The requested relief is appropriate for this subclass because Defendant has denied, reduced, or terminated Food Assistance to all members of the subclass (or will in the future), based on the challenged fugitive felon policy and practices.
Defendant 86. MAURA CORRIGAN is Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS). 87. DHS is the state agency responsible for administering the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), known in Michigan as FAP (Food Assistance Program), as well as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program known in Michigan as FIP (Family Independence Program), and the State Disability Assistance (SDA), Child Development and Care (CDC) and Refugee Assistance (RAP) programs. 88. As Director of DHS, Defendant is responsible for administering all of the DHS-administered public assistance programs in compliance with the Due Process

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 18 of 56 Pg ID 18
18
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 89. As Director of DHS, Defendant is responsible for administering the Food
Assistance Program in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and federal SNAP law.
90. Defendant is sued in her official capacity. FACTS
Relevant Public Assistance Programs The Food Assistance Program: SNAP and FAP 91. The United States Congress created the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly known as the “Food Stamp Program”) as a means to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in low-income households. 92. Under SNAP, eligible households receive Food Assistance benefits deposited on an electronic card account, which can only be used to buy food, or plants or seeds to grow food, at participating stores or markets. 7 U.S.C. 2012(k)(2), 2016(b), 2026(j)(3)(B). 93. Federal law defines and determines both eligibility for and the amount of SNAP benefits, based on household size, income, certain expenses, and resources or assets, as well as nonfinancial factors such as employment status, age or disability, citizenship or immigration status, etc.. 94. State agencies, including DHS in Michigan, administer SNAP by

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 19 of 56 Pg ID 19
19
processing applications, certifying eligible households, and issuing approved Food Assistance benefits.
95. The federal government pays for all SNAP Food Assistance benefits and shares the administrative expenses of operating SNAP with the states. 7 U.S.C. 2020(a), (d), (e).
96. Michigan calls its SNAP program the Food Assistance Program (FAP), a needs-based, state-administered government assistance program that provides Food Assistance benefits to all individuals who meet published eligibility criteria and requirements for the program.
The Cash Assistance Programs: FIP, SDA and RAP 97. The Family Independence Program (FIP) is Michigan’s needs-based cash assistance program for low-income families with minor children. M.C.L. 400.57 et seq. 98. The family cash assistance program is paid for and administered using both federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funding and state funds. 99. Under federal TANF law, Defendant must have objective criteria for determining FIP eligibility and delivering FIP benefits, as well as for the equitable treatment of FIP applicants and recipients. 42 USC 602(a)(1)(B)(iii).

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 20 of 56 Pg ID 20
20
100. The Michigan Social Welfare Act, M.C.L. 400.57 et seq., Michigan Administrative Code, Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.3101 et seq., and implementing DHS policies set forth the eligibility criteria and requirements for FIP benefits.
101. Individuals are eligible to receive FIP in Michigan if they meet the FIP eligibility standards and requirements – including work requirements, M.C.L. 400.57d - 400.57g, and time limits, id. at 400.57a(4) and 400.57r – set forth in the Michigan Social Welfare Act, Michigan Administrative Code, and implementing policies. M.C.L. 400.57d(4); BEM 209 p. 1, available online at www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/bem/209.pdf.
102. DHS provides small monthly cash assistance payments to very low-income individuals with disabilities under the State Disability Assistance (SDA) program, which is a need-based governmental assistance program funded with state general fund dollars.
103. SDA provides benefits to all individuals who meet the eligibility standards and requirements set forth in the annual Appropriations Act for DHS (currently 2012 P.A. 200 sec. 604), state administrative rules (Mich. Admin. Code. R. 400.3151 et seq.), and implementing policies.
104. The Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) is a needs-based, federally-funded program providing both cash and medical assistance, which is designed to help refugees become self-sufficient after their arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 21 of 56 Pg ID 21
21
1522(e) 105. Refugees who meet eligibility requirements can receive cash or medical
assistance for a temporary period of time after their entry to the United States. See 45 C.F.R. 400.40 et seq. and BEM 630.
Child Care Benefits 106. Michigan’s Child Development and Care (CDC) program is a needs-based public assistance program that pays subsidies to help low-income families pay for child care provided by enrolled or licensed providers, in order for children to have care and supervision while their parents attend work; high school or other approved education/training; or employment-related activities required as a condition of eligibility for FIP or FAP. 107. Childcare benefits support the efforts of low-income parents – including those trying to transition from welfare to work – to qualify for, find, and keep employment. 108. Childcare benefits are paid for by a mixture of state and federal funds, which varies from year to year. 109. Federal funds for childcare benefits include the TANF block grant discussed above and the Child Care and Development Fund block grant. 110. Defendant determines the family’s eligibility for childcare benefits and sets upper income limits, the hourly rates payable to the providers (based on family

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 22 of 56 Pg ID 22
22
income, provider type and credentials, and number of children), and the number of hours for which care will be subsidized.
111. Defendant is authorized to adjust the income limit for childcare assistance eligibility and the number of hours for which care will be paid in order to prevent waiting lists in the childcare assistance program when appropriations would not otherwise be sufficient to provide childcare assistance to all eligible families. Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.5002, 400.5009, 400.5013.
112. Michigan provides childcare assistance to all families who – together with their child care providers – meet the eligibility criteria and requirements set forth in federal and state law, including Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.5001 et seq., and implementing policies, without any waiting list for the program. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Plan for Michigan FFY 0212-2013, section 2.3.7 (page 50 of pdf file), available online at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/2012-2013_State_Plan_Final_365274_7.pdf.
Notice and Hearing Requirements Constitutional Due Process Requirements 113. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, individuals have the right to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard when the state denies, reduces, or terminates public assistance that is

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 23 of 56 Pg ID 23
23
available to all eligible individuals who meet criteria set forth in federal or state statutes, rules, or policies.
114. When needs-based public assistance is reduced or terminated, the right to due process includes the right to timely notice, and a meaningful opportunity for a pre-reduction or pre-termination hearing, because of the extreme harm that may befall those who depend on needs-based assistance programs to meet their basic needs if the assistance for which they are, in fact, eligible is erroneously reduced or terminated.
115. The right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to notice detailing the specific, individualized reasons for the adverse action when the state denies, reduces, or terminates needs-based public assistance.
116. The right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding whether the state properly denied, reduced, or terminated needs-based public assistance.
117. In order for the notice and opportunity to be heard to be meaningful, the notice must provide information that is specific, detailed, and individualized enough for the individual to be able to determine both the basis for the state’s action and whether, or how, to contest it.
118. In order for the notice and opportunity to be heard to be meaningful, the notice must inform individuals about what they must do to fully receive the

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 24 of 56 Pg ID 24
24
benefits to which they are entitled. 119. Named Plaintiff and members of the Due Process Class are entitled to all
of the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when Defendant denies, reduces, or terminates their eligibility or benefits under the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Development and Care Program, and/or Refugee Assistance Program.
Federal Food Assistance Notice and Hearing Requirements 120. As the state agency responsible for administering SNAP, DHS must provide an opportunity for a “fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter” for any person aggrieved by action taken by DHS in administering FAP, including the denial, reduction, or termination of Food Assistance. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10). 121. The Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture has issued regulations to implement the statutory fair hearing requirement of 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), including 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g)(ii) and 273.13(a). 122. When Food Assistance is denied, DHS must “provide the household with written notice explaining the basis for the denial, the household’s right to request a fair hearing, the telephone number of the food stamp office… and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information.” 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g)(ii).

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 25 of 56 Pg ID 25
25
123. When FAP benefits are reduced or terminated, DHS must “provide the household timely and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken.” 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a). The notice must “explain[ ] in easily understandable language: The proposed action; the reason for the proposed action; the household’s right to request a fair hearing; the telephone number of the food stamp office… and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information….” 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a)(2).
124. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), not only serves to implement the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also provides an independent federal law requirement for adequate due process when Food Assistance is denied, reduced, or terminated.
Defendant’s Notice and Hearing Practices When Denying, Reducing, or Terminating Public Assistance Benefits Based on
Criminal Justice Disqualifications 125. The notices from Defendant to Plaintiff and members of the Due Process Class, denying, reducing, or terminating their public assistance benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification (“criminal justice disqualification notices”) give as the sole “reason for intended action” the boilerplate statement that “[y]ou or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 26 of 56 Pg ID 26
26
Manual Item(s): BEM 203, ERM 202.” 126. Prior to January or February 2013, when Defendant imposed a
disqualification based on alleged fugitive felon status, she sent notices that gave as the reason for the disqualification, “You or a member of your group have been identified as a fugitive felon. Fugitive felons are not eligible for assistance.”
127. In or around January or February 2013, Defendant changed the content of the notice sent to individuals who were being disqualified based on alleged fugitive felon status, so that the individuals received the “criminal justice disqualification” message contained in the notices to Plaintiff, instead of the “fugitive felon” message set forth in the paragraph 125 above.
128. Exhibit I is an accurate copy of minutes from a July 6, 2011 meeting attended by DHS representatives, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act, which included discussion of the decision to create notices that would no longer tell alleged fugitive felons that they were being disqualified because of alleged fugitive felon status.
129. Exhibit J is an accurate copy of specifications approved by DHS and issued in or around July 2010 for information technology changes to replace notices that referred to fugitive felon status with notices that referred to criminal justice disqualifications. Exhibit J was released by Defendant under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 27 of 56 Pg ID 27
27
130. From at least October 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013, Defendant’s policy of disqualifying “fugitive felons” based on computer “matches” was contained in Bridges Eligibility Manual (BEM) 203, which has the title “Criminal Justice Disqualifications”.
131. Exhibit K is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect from October 1, 2012 – May 31, 2013.
132. Exhibit L is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect from May 1– May 31, 2013.
133. Effective June 1, 2013, Defendant’s policy regarding disqualification of “fugitive felons” was moved from BEM 203 (Criminal Justice Disqualifications) to a new policy item designated as BEM 204, with the title “Fugitive Felons”.
134. Exhibit M is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect June 1, 2013. 135. Exhibit N is an accurate copy of BEM 204 in effect June 1, 2013. 136. In February 1, 2013, Defendant published policies describing the DHS/the Michigan State Police data match and the automatic disqualification of “fugitive felons”, in BAM 800 and 811. 137. Exhibit O is an accurate copy of the portion of Defendant’s Bridges Policy Bulletin 2013-003 announcing the “new automated match with the Michigan State Police” and the changes in BAM. 138. Exhibit P is an accurate copy of BAM 811 issued effective February 1,

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 28 of 56 Pg ID 28
28
2013 – April 30, 2013. 139. Exhibit Q is an accurate copy of BAM 811 effective May 1, 2013. 140. Exhibit R is an accurate copy of BAM 800 effective February 1, 2013-
May 31, 2013. 141. Exhibit S is an accurate copy of BAM 800 effective June 1, 2013. The Five Types of Criminal Justice Disqualifications 142. Under Defendant’s Criminal Justice Disqualification policy in BEM 203 in
effect from February 1 – May 31, 2013, there were five separate and distinct reasons for criminal justice disqualifications: (1) duplicate receipt of assistance, (2) probation or parole violation, (3) drug-related felonies, (4) Food Assistance trafficking and (5) fugitive felons.
143. The five categories of criminal justice disqualifications derive from different legal sources, including several different federal and state laws and regulations.
144. The type of benefits to which the disqualification applies, the criteria for disqualification, the duration of disqualification, and the possibility of reinstatement of benefits vary between the five categories of criminal justice disqualifications.
145. The criminal justice disqualification for “duplicate receipt of assistance” creates a 10-year bar on receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of family cash

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 29 of 56 Pg ID 29
29
assistance, which runs from the date of the adjudication or acknowledgement of guilt.
146. The criminal justice disqualification of “probation and parole violators” creates a temporary bar on receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of family cash assistance until the individual establishes his or her compliance with conditions of probation or parole.
147. The criminal justice disqualification for “drug-related felonies” is a lifetime bar on the receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of family cash assistance for individuals who have been convicted in two or more cases after August 22, 1996, of felonies for the use, possession, or distribution of a controlled substance. An individual with one drug-related felony conviction is eligible for Food Assistance (provided that he or she is not violating probation or parole), but the individual’s Food Assistance benefits must be issued to an authorized representative. An individual with one drug-related felony conviction is also eligible for family cash assistance (provided that he or she is not violating probation or parole), but the individual’s family cash assistance benefits must be issued in restricted form.
148. The criminal justice disqualification for “FAP trafficking” disqualifies a person from receiving Food Assistance if he or she is found guilty in court, through administrative hearing, or by signing a repayment and disqualification agreement,

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 30 of 56 Pg ID 30
30
of trafficking in Food Assistance benefits. The length of disqualification from Food Assistance for trafficking varies depending on the nature of the trafficking offense and, for some types of trafficking offenses, the number of times the person has been found guilty.
149. The criminal justice disqualification of “fugitive felons” creates a temporary bar on receipt of Food Assistance, child care benefits, and cash assistance for families, people with disabilities, and refugees based on the existence of an outstanding felony warrant, the existence of an outstanding extradition warrant, or the individual’s admission to being a fugitive felon.
150. When a fugitive felon disqualification has been imposed, an individual is no longer disqualified from assistance as soon as the individual has addressed the issues related to the outstanding warrant.
Defendant’s Failure to Provide Adequate Notice and Meaningful Opportunity for a Fair Hearing
151. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices fail to detail the alleged underlying circumstances or action that gave rise to the unspecified type of criminal justice disqualification.
152. Information that is missing from Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices includes: what allegedly occurred, where it occurred, when it occurred, which member of the “group” was involved in the occurrence, the

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 31 of 56 Pg ID 31
31
length of the disqualification being imposed, and/or how it can be lifted. 153. Disqualified recipients cannot determine whether they were improperly
disqualified from benefits, or contest an improper disqualification, without knowing what underlying facts are alleged.
154. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices do not even tell Plaintiff and Due Process Class members which of the five categories of “criminal justice disqualifications” listed in BEM 203 allegedly applies to the individual being disqualified.
155. Because the different types of disqualifications listed in BEM 203 are based on different criteria, apply to different benefit programs, are of varying duration, and have different options for reinstatement, disqualified recipients cannot determine whether they were improperly disqualified from benefits, or effectively contest an improper disqualification, without knowing which type of criminal justice disqualification is at issue in their case.
156. Defendant’s notices to individuals being disqualified as fugitive felons do not state what basis the Defendant has to believe that the individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement, and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony.
157. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices do not explain what “Manual Reference(s): BEM 203, ERM 202” refers to or where the manuals can be

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 32 of 56 Pg ID 32
32
accessed. 158. For “fugitive felon” disqualifications occurring on or after June 1, 2013,
Defendant’s notices fail to specify the Bridges Eligibility Manual (BEM) item that is the legal basis for Defendant’s actions, instead citing BEM 203, which, effective June 1, 2013, no longer contains the fugitive felon disqualification policy.
159. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices do not specify which page(s) of the cited manual items apply to the individual’s disqualification.
160. DHS has or could obtain access to information regarding the type of criminal justice disqualification and underlying basis for the disqualification that is not included in the notice of denial, reduction, or termination of public assistance benefits.
161. The DHS computer eligibility system (known as “Bridges”) is programmed to show which of the five criminal justice disqualifications are applicable to an individual whose benefits have been denied, reduced, or terminated. However, that information is not included in the criminal justice disqualification notice.
162. Exhibit T is an accurate copy of some of the information available to DHS caseworkers on Bridges regarding the basis for an individual’s criminal justice disqualification.
163. DHS, through its computer interface with the Law Enforcement

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 33 of 56 Pg ID 33
33
Information Network or other criminal justice databases, has information on the underlying basis for the disqualification, but does not provide that information in its notices. See Exhibit J, p. 12-13.
164. For disqualifications based on a felony warrant for the person’s arrest, DHS does not disclose information that is available to DHS about the felony warrant when issuing the notice of denial, reduction, or termination of public assistance.
165. In cases involving fugitive felons, DHS has instructed its employees not to provide information about the basis for the disqualification, other than the information that appears in the notice sent to the household.
166. In December 2012, Defendant’s Field Operations Administration issued a Memorandum instructing local DHS offices not to disclose “‘fugitive felon’ status information” to individuals who are disqualified from receiving public assistance based on DHS’ decision that the individual is a fugitive felon.
167. Exhibit U is an accurate copy of the December 2012 DHS Field Operations Administration Memorandum, FOA-2012-50, regarding the Fugitive Felon Match, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
168. DHS has provided DHS staff with training and a Job Aid that specifically directs DHS specialists (caseworkers) “NOT to inform a client of their fugitive felon status.” (Emphasis in original.)

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 34 of 56 Pg ID 34
34
169. Exhibit V is an accurate copy of the Job Aid/training material provided to DHS staff regarding implementation of the fugitive felon computer match between DHS and Michigan State Police, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
170. When Plaintiff and members of the Due Process Class contact their caseworkers for further information, DHS caseworkers are prohibited from providing information that would enable individuals to determine why their public assistance benefits have been denied, reduced, or terminated.
171. DHS’s prohibition against disclosure of basic information about the underlying bases for criminal justice disqualifications makes it more difficult – if not impossible – for individuals to address and resolve any underlying problems or to follow up to determine whether the information is accurate or not.
172. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices refer individuals to local law enforcement to resolve their criminal justice disqualification, but do not explain what the individual should ask law enforcement to do.
173. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualifications do not explain whether or how any action by local law enforcement will “resolve” the person’s eligibility for public assistance.
174. Some types of criminal justice disqualifications – such as those for drugrelated felonies – cannot be “resolved” by law enforcement, as there is no action

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 35 of 56 Pg ID 35
35
that law enforcement can take that would affect the disqualification. In other cases, criminal justice agencies may be able to address an underlying criminal justice issue, but the appropriate agency to contact is not local police, but rather probation or parole, police in another jurisdiction, or the Michigan State Police (whose involvement may, for example, be required to correct erroneous entries in LEIN).
175. Law enforcement officials cannot reverse DHS disqualifications or reinstate benefits to disqualified individuals.
176. Defendant’s computer interface is updated on a daily basis to identify individuals who no longer are identified by the Michigan State Police as meeting Defendant’s definition of a “fugitive felon.”
177. When a person who has been disqualified from receiving assistance as part of a household that is still receiving (reduced) assistance under the specific program from which the individual was disqualified, and when that person again becomes eligible, Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system is programmed to send a “task and reminder” communication to the DHS caseworker, telling the caseworker about the person’s updated status and instructing the caseworker to re-determine eligibility and benefits for the household. See Ex. U, p. 1.
178. Defendant’s Job Aid/training materials instruct caseworkers to update eligibility and reinstate benefits for a person automatically disqualified from assistance as a fugitive felon once that person no longer has an outstanding warrant

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 36 of 56 Pg ID 36
36
for his or her arrest (by running an Eligibility Determination and Benefits Calculation through Bridges and certifying or approving the results), but only if the disqualified person is living in a household that still receives assistance under the specific program(s) from which the individual was disqualified. See Ex. V.
179. If the disqualified individual is not part of a household still receiving assistance, Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system, training materials, and policy do not instruct DHS employees to take any action once an individual who was disqualified no longer has an outstanding warrant.
180. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices fail to inform individuals that resolving any outstanding warrants with law enforcement will not result in automatic reinstatement of public assistance if the individual does not live in a household that continues receiving public assistance for other household members during the time that the individual was disqualified from that assistance. The notices do not tell individuals what they must do to regain public assistance in that situation.
Defendant’s Denial of Food Assistance to Individuals Who Are Eligible for Food Assistance Under Federal Law
Federal Mandate to Provide Food Assistance to All Eligible Households and to Use National Standards for Food Assistance Eligibility
181. DHS must provide Food Assistance to individuals and households in

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 37 of 56 Pg ID 37
37
Michigan that apply for Food Assistance and meet the eligibility criteria and requirements set forth in federal SNAP law. 7 U.S.C. 2014(a).
182. Congress has mandated uniform national standards of eligibility for participation in SNAP. 7 U.S.C. 2014(b).
183. As a condition for participating in SNAP, state agencies responsible for implementing SNAP, including DHS, are prohibited from imposing any standards of eligibility other than those set by the federal government. 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5).
184. DHS must determine eligibility for FAP, which uses federal SNAP funding, in accordance with eligibility standards and requirements set forth in the federal SNAP statute and its implementing regulations.
Federal Eligibility Standards Related to Disqualification of Fleeing Felons 185. Under federal SNAP law, individuals are ineligible to receive Food Assistance for any period in which they are “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which they are fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony...” 7 U.S.C. 2015(k). 186. Federal courts consistently have held that the mere existence of an outstanding warrant is insufficient to establish that an individual is fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, since the term “fleeing” is

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 38 of 56 Pg ID 38
38
understood to mean the intentional evasion of arrest or prosecution, custody, or confinement.
187. Under federal SNAP law, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to define the terms “fleeing” and “actively seeking” for purposes of 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) to ensure that consistent procedures are used by state agencies throughout the United States, and to ensure that state agencies only disqualify “individuals whom law enforcement authorities are actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual.”
188. While the United States Department of Agriculture has yet to issue final regulations on this issue, there are proposed regulations that are consistent with the judicial interpretation of the term “fleeing.”
189. The proposed federal regulations authorize the state agency, here DHS, to disqualify an individual from Food Assistance as a fleeing felon only if either:
a) the state agency verifies that an outstanding felony warrant has been issued for one of three specified escape- or flight-related felonies (escape, flight to avoid prosecution or confinement, or flight-escape, as identified by the Uniform Offense Classification Codes 4901, 4902, and 4999, respectively), and a law enforcement officer has presented the outstanding warrant to the state agency; or

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 39 of 56 Pg ID 39
39
b) the state agency, in the absence of an outstanding felony warrant for escape or flight, verifies and has documented evidence that four other specific factors exist: (i) the existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the individual; (ii) the person is aware of, or should reasonably have been able to expect that, a warrant has or would have been issued; (iii) the individual has taken some action to avoid being arrested or jailed; and (iv) a law enforcement agency is actively seeking the person. 76 Fed. Reg. 51913 (proposed 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n)). 190. Under the proposed regulations, the state agency may verify that law enforcement is actively seeking the person by means of either: a) a law enforcement agency statement that it intends to enforce an outstanding felony warrant against the person within 20 days of submitting a request for location or other information about the specific person; or b) a law enforcement agency statement that it intends to enforce an outstanding felony warrant against the individual within 30 days of a request for information about the warrant from the state agency, together with confirmation by the law enforcement agency that it has taken action to execute, or attempt to execute, the warrant within that 30 day period. 191. Under the proposed regulations, when a felony warrant for escape or flight is presented to the state agency for purposes of locating the person, no further evidence that law enforcement is actively seeking the person is required.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 40 of 56 Pg ID 40
40
192. Under the proposed regulations, unless there is a felony warrant for escape or flight, “the mere existence of a warrant naming an individual who is a SNAP recipient or applicant does not provide sufficient information to determine that the individual is actually a fleeing felon who is being actively sought by a law enforcement agency.” 76 Fed. Reg. 51913 at *6. Before denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance, the state agency must verify that the four other factors exist.
State Law Automatic Disqualification of Alleged Fugitive Felons 193. Michigan passed legislation, effective October 18, 2011, providing that DHS shall not grant public assistance to any individual who is subject to arrest under an outstanding arrest warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in any jurisdiction. 2011 P.A. 198, codified as M.C.L. 400.10b. 194. Under state law, DHS and the Michigan State Police (MSP) are required to develop an automated program to compare data and identify public assistance recipients who have an outstanding warrant arising from a crime designated as a felony or punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an extradition warrant arising from a criminal charge against the individual in another jurisdiction. M.C.L. 400.10c, as amended by 2011 P.A. 198. 195. The automated computer program (“fugitive felon interface”) to disqualify public assistance applicants and recipients based on the existence of outstanding

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 41 of 56 Pg ID 41
41
warrants became operational in January 2013. 196. Pursuant to federal law, the fugitive felon interface also automatically
provides current address information for recipients of DHS-administered programs, including Food Assistance, to be released to the MSP, for purposes of assisting law enforcement officials in locating and arresting individuals with outstanding felony warrants, or probation or parole violations. DHS information on applicants not currently receiving assistance is not released to law enforcement through the interface.
Defendant’s Denial of Food Assistance to Individuals Entitled to Food Assistance Under Federal Eligibility Standards, Who Are Not Fleeing from
Justice and Are Not Actively Being Sought by Law Enforcement 197. Michigan has failed to follow federal law that specifies which individuals may be disqualified as “fleeing felons,” 7 U.S.C. 2015(k), instead setting its own standards for identifying a “fugitive felon.” 198. Defendant’s standards for identifying fugitive felons disqualify individuals from receiving FAP benefits even when they qualify for Food Assistance under all federal standards and requirements. 199. Defendant, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5), has imposed additional eligibility requirements for Food Assistance beyond those established under federal law, thereby denying Food Assistance to individuals who

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 42 of 56 Pg ID 42
42
legally are eligible to receive it. 200. Defendant’s policy on disqualification of alleged felons, operationalized
through the fugitive felon interface and Bridges eligibility system, provides for disqualification from Food Assistance if the individual: (1) is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against the individual, (2) is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising from a criminal charge in the jurisdiction that issued the warrant, or (3) admits to being a fugitive felon. BEM 203, p. 1-2.
201. Under state law and Defendant’s policy, individuals will be disqualified from receiving FAP and other benefits as fugitive felons without any finding that they are actively being sought by law enforcement and that they are actually fleeing.
202. Defendant’s computer matches with the MSP automatically result in Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system printing and mailing computer-generated criminal justice disqualification notices to individuals who are identified as being subject to arrest on a felony warrant, without any effort to determine:
a) whether the individual has received notice or is aware that a warrant has been issued;
b) whether the individual is intentionally seeking to evade prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a felony; or

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 43 of 56 Pg ID 43
43
c) whether the jurisdiction in which the warrant allegedly was issued is actively seeking the individual for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual, or for the purpose of jailing or imprisoning the individual, for a felony.
203. When Defendant’s Bridges computer system generates and mails a criminal justice disqualification notice, it also automatically schedules the reduction or termination of Food Assistance benefits that Defendant has been providing to the disqualified individual and other members (if any) of the disqualified individual’s household.
204. As a result of Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification policy and practices, Defendant is disqualifying individuals from Food Assistance and denying or terminating Food Assistance to those individuals in situations in which:
a) the warrant has been issued in the individual’s name, but does not actually apply to the individual;
b) the individual has not been notified about the existence of the warrant or charges from which the individual allegedly is fleeing;
c) there has been no finding that the individual has taken flight for purposes of intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a felony crime; and
d) law enforcement officials are not actively seeking the person for arrest,

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 44 of 56 Pg ID 44
44
prosecution, or incarceration in connection with a felony, or for extradition. 205. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s Field Operations Administration, DHS local offices are required to contact the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) if an individual who has been disqualified as a fugitive felon comes to the DHS office. See Ex. U. 206. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s OIG, when OIG agents are contacted by local offices because a fugitive felon is at the local DHS office, the OIG agents will contact law enforcement to determine whether the fugitive felon will be arrested. 207. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s OIG, when OIG agents are informed by law enforcement that a “fugitive felon” who has appeared at the DHS office will not be arrested, the individuals nevertheless remain disqualified from receiving assistance and the OIG agents must tell the disqualified fugitive felon to surrender to local law enforcement. 208. Exhibit W is an accurate copy of the written instructions issued by Defendant’s OIG, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act. 209. Under Defendant’s policies, DHS will not contact law enforcement officials in an effort to verify the individual’s fugitive felon status unless and until the individual requests a hearing, at which time only the existence of an

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 45 of 56 Pg ID 45
45
outstanding warrant is verified. 210. Exhibit X is an accurate copy of emails, released under the Michigan
Freedom of Information Act, regarding the verification of information at the time an individual requests a hearing regarding a criminal justice disqualification.
211. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification practices are not authorized by 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) or proposed regulations, and therefore constitute the imposition of an additional eligibility requirement for the receipt of Food Assistance in violation of 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5).
212. Denying, reducing or terminating Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a determination that the recipient is fleeing from justice, results in disqualification of individuals who are eligible for Food Assistance under federal SNAP law and thus violate the rights under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) of Plaintiff and members of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass.
213. The SNAP law provisions that prohibit state agencies from imposing any standards of eligibility other than those set by the federal government – 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) – are preemption provisions pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
214. When state laws or policies regarding FAP conflict with federal laws governing SNAP, the federal laws take precedence over the state laws or policies, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 46 of 56 Pg ID 46
46
215. When state laws or policies regarding FAP pose an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting legislation, the federal laws take precedence over the state laws or policies, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
216. Because federal SNAP law preempts M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy, Defendant may not deny, reduce or terminate Food Assistance to Plaintiff or member of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a determination that the recipient is “fleeing” from justice as that term is defined under federal law.
Irreparable Harm 217. Plaintiff and members of the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass are, by definition, indigent individuals who, due to unemployment, disability, family circumstances, or other factors, depend on public assistance, including Food Assistance, to meet their subsistence needs, and to avoid hunger and obtain basic nutrition. 218. Plaintiff and members of the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass have suffered or are at imminent risk of suffering the loss of benefits under needs-based public assistance programs, including Food Assistance, that they require to meet their subsistence needs, and to avoid hunger and obtain basic nutrition.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 47 of 56 Pg ID 47
47
219. The denial of due process in this case is irreparable harm per se. CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I – Violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
(Plaintiff Barry and Due Process Class) 220. Defendant is violating Plaintiff’s and Due Process Class members’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by denying, reducing, or terminating needs-based public assistance benefits using criminal justice disqualification notices that fail to detail (a) the nature and duration of the intended action; (b) the factual and legal bases for the denial, reduction, or termination; and (c) exactly what individuals must do to lift the disqualification, to restore public assistance eligibility and to have benefits reinstated. 221. Plaintiff’s and class members’ rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Count II – Violation of Federal SNAP Law Requiring Due Process in Notice and Hearing Procedures Before Denying, Reducing,
or Terminating Food Assistance
(Plaintiff Barry and Due Process Class) 222. Defendant is violating the named Plaintiff’s and Due Process Class members’ rights under federal SNAP law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 48 of 56 Pg ID 48
48
implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), by denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance benefits, using criminal justice disqualification notices that fail to detail (a) the nature and duration of the intended action; (b) the factual and legal bases for the denial, reduction, or termination; and (c) exactly what individuals must do to lift the disqualification, to restore public assistance eligibility and to have benefits reinstated.
223. Plaintiff’s and class members’ rights to meaningful due process as required by federal SNAP law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Count III – Michigan State Law and Defendant’s Policy of Automatically Disqualifying People Who Have Outstanding Felony Warrants Violates
Federal SNAP Law
(Plaintiff Barry and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass) 224. M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s implementing fugitive felon policy (previously found in BEM 203 and now published in BEM 204) disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match,” without any finding that the person is actively sought by law enforcement or is consciously evading arrest or prosecution, and therefore impose requirements for Food Assistance eligibility that are not contained in federal law.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 49 of 56 Pg ID 49
49
225. 7 U.S.C. 2014 (b) and 2020(e)(5) prohibit states from imposing eligibility requirements for receiving Food Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus explicitly prohibit additional state eligibility requirements, including the requirement found in M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy that individuals not have an outstanding felony warrant, regardless of whether they are intentionally evading arrest, confinement or prosecution and regardless if whether they are actively sought by law enforcement.
226. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if there has been a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
227. 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) gives Plaintiffs and subclass members the right to receive Food Assistance, provided they have applied for the assistance and are eligible under the national standards required by 7 U.S.C. 2014(b); 2020(e)(5); 2015(k); and 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n).
228. Defendant’s fugitive felon policies and practices, which implement M.C.L. 400.10b, violate Plaintiff’s and subclass members’ right to receive Food Assistance under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a), which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 50 of 56 Pg ID 50
50
Count IV – Preemption: Defendant’s Policy Automatically Disqualifying People Who Have Outstanding Felony Warrants Violates the Supremacy Clause Because Federal SNAP Law Preempts Both M.C.L. 400.10b and
Defendant’s “Fugitive Felon” Policy (Plaintiff Barry and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass) 229. M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s implementing fugitive felon policy (previously found in BEM 203 and now published in BEM 204) conflict with the federal SNAP act because the Michigan law and Defendant’s policy disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match,” without any finding that the person is actively sought by law enforcement or is consciously evading arrest or prosecution. 230. The SNAP act, through 7 U.S.C. 2014 (b) and 2020(e)(5), clearly provides that states may not impose eligibility requirements for receiving Food Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus explicitly preempts additional state eligibility requirements, including M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy (BEM 204) requiring that individuals not have an outstanding felony warrant, regardless of whether they are intentionally evading arrest, confinement or prosecution and regardless of whether they are actively sought by law enforcement. 231. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 51 of 56 Pg ID 51
51
outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if there has been a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
232. Accordingly, M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy (BEM 204) are preempted by federal law under 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) (prohibiting states from imposing their own eligibility standards), 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) (establishing federal standards for fleeing felon disqualifications), and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, because Congress has established comprehensive federal standards and requirements for Food Assistance eligibility (including standards related to felony warrants), and because M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy impose additional eligibility standards not set forth in federal law, conflict with federal law, and frustrate the achievement of Congress’s full objectives.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court: A. Certify this case as a class action on behalf of the Due Process Class and as a class action on behalf of the Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass described in this Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); B. Declare that Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices and

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 52 of 56 Pg ID 52
52
hearing procedures violate Plaintiff’s and Due Process Class members’ rights to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; C. Declare that Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices and hearing procedures violate federal SNAP law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), which both implements the federal constitutional due process requirements and provides an independent legal basis for requiring procedural protections; D. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from continuing to deny, reduce, or terminate public assistance benefits to Plaintiff and Due Process Class members based on criminal justice disqualifications without providing notices that detail: (1) which of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications is at issue; (2) the name of the household member whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification; (3) the date, place, and nature of both the alleged crime and the resulting conviction or warrant; (4) the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued; (5) the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for further information; (6) where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement, and is fleeing to

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 53 of 56 Pg ID 53
53
avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony; and (7) where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual; E. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from continuing to deny, reduce, or terminate public assistance benefits to Plaintiff and Due Process Class members based on criminal justice disqualifications without providing notices that inform them about the length of the disqualification period, whether benefits can be reinstated, and, if so, what steps the disqualified individual must take to obtain reinstatement. F. Order Defendant to: a. prospectively reinstate assistance or benefits to Plaintiff and Due Process
Class members whose needs-based public assistance benefits have been unlawfully reduced or terminated without due process of law; and b. resume processing the applications of Plaintiff and Due Process Class members whose applications were unlawfully denied without due process of law; G. Declare that Defendant’s policy and practice of disqualifying individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a felony warrant, without a finding that the individual is a fleeing felon under 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 54 of 56 Pg ID 54
54
confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony, and for which the person is actively sought by law enforcement, violates Plaintiff’s and subclass members’ rights to Food Assistance under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b), and 2020(e)(5); H. Declare that Defendant’s policy and practice of disqualifying individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a finding that the individual is a fleeing felon under 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony, and for which the person is actively sought by law enforcement, is preempted by federal SNAP law and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; I. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance to named Plaintiff and members of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony or extradition warrant without a finding that the individual is a “fleeing felon,” as that term is defined under federal law, who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony and for which the individual is being actively sought by law enforcement under 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) and implementing regulations;

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 55 of 56 Pg ID 55
55
J. Order Defendant to: a. prospectively reinstate assistance or benefits to Plaintiff and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass members whose Food Assistance has been unlawfully reduced or terminated based on Defendant’s fugitive felon policy; and b. resume processing the applications of Plaintiff and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass members whose applications were unlawfully denied based on Defendant’s fugitive felon policy;
K. Order Defendant to restore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and pursuant to Defendant’s policy in BEM 406 of retroactively correcting under-issuances of benefits, all Food Assistance benefits unlawfully withheld from Plaintiff and members of both the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass, up to 12 months prior to the filing of this lawsuit, as a result of the criminal justice disqualification notices and fugitive felon policy and practice enjoined by the Court;
L. Order Defendant to provide notice to all class and subclass members, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), of any relief granted by the Court in this case and of any additional rights or administrative remedies for obtaining benefits or assistance wrongfully denied, reduced, or terminated without due process of law or in violation the United States Constitution or federal

2:13-cv-13185-BAF-PJK Doc # 1 Filed 07/24/13 Pg 56 of 56 Pg ID 56
56
SNAP law, including but not limited to the right to restoration of Food Assistance benefits under 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and BEM 406; M. Award Plaintiff his costs and reasonable attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988; and N. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jacqueline Doig_________ Jacqueline Doig (P37105) Terri L. Stangl (P35257) Elan S. Nichols (P57463) CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 320 S. Washington Ave – 2nd Floor Saginaw, MI 48607 T: (989)755-3120 jdoig@ccj-mi.org enichols@ccj-mi.org Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dated: July __ 2013

/s/ Miriam J. Aukerman Miriam J. Aukerman (P631615) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN 1514 Wealthy SE, Suite 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 T: (616) 301-0930 maukerman@aclumich.org Attorney for Plaintiff

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 35 Filed 09/25/13 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 818

Barry v. Corrigan (13-13185)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER BARRY, by his next friend, ELAINE BARRY, and HEATHER WOODWARD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, vs.
MAURA CORRIGAN, in her capacity as Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant. ___________________________/

Civil Action No. 13-cv-13185 HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND WOODWARD’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Before the Court are plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [docket entry 5] and
Woodward’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order [docket entry 8]. Defendant filed a response
[docket entry 30] and plaintiffs filed a reply [docket entry 33]. For the reasons stated on the record,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and Woodward’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order are denied.

Dated: September 25, 2013 Detroit, Michigan

_s/ Bernard A. Friedman_______________ BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 1 of 85 Pg ID 986

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER BARRY by his next friend

ELAINE BARRY, HEATHER

WOODWARD, DONITHA COPELAND,

and KENNETH L. ANDERSON,

on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated,

and WESTSIDE MOTHERS,

Case No. 2:13-cv-13185 BAF-PJK

Plaintiffs,

Hon. Bernard A. Friedman

U.S. District Judge

v.

Hon. Paul J. Komives

MAURA CORRIGAN,

U.S. Magistrate Judge

in her capacity as Director, Michigan

Department of Human Services,

Defendant. _______________________________________________/

(PROPOSED) SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Denial of Due Process Under Federal Constitution and Law – Counts I and II
1. This action challenges the inadequate and unlawful “criminal justice disqualification” notices issued by Defendant’s Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) to applicants for, or recipients of, needs-based benefits under DHS-administered public assistance programs, whose benefits have been or will be

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 2 of 85 Pg ID 987 2
denied, terminated, or reduced based on an alleged criminal justice disqualification.
2. The public assistance benefits at issue are intended to prevent hunger; to ensure a minimum level of economic security for families with children, refugees and the disabled; and to support self-sufficiency and employment by providing safe childcare for low-income parents engaged in employment or education and training activities. These programs are critically important to the wellbeing of the named plaintiffs, class members, and their families.
3. Defendant’s notices merely state: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please have the disqualified member of your group contact a law enforcement agency – such as a police department, sheriff’s department, or the Michigan State Police – to resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide picture identification.”
Prior to about July 14, 2013, Defendant’s notices merely stated: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.” Thus, the notices fail to provide any specific information about the reasons for or nature of the criminal justice disqualification. Affected individuals have no way to know why their access to assistance is being denied, reduced, or terminated; for how long they are being cut off from assistance; whether they dispute any of Defendant’s factual findings that support the action; or what steps they could

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 3 of 85 Pg ID 988 3
potentially take to have benefits reinstated. 4. Defendant has violated Plaintiffs’ and proposed class members’ rights to
adequate notice, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as a matter of both constitutional due process (Count I) and federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) law, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10) (Count II), which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Denial of Food Assistance for Which Plaintiffs and Others Similarly Situated
Are Eligible Under Federal Standards – Counts III and IV 5. Plaintiffs also challenge Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, which disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match;” without requiring Defendant to first find both that the person is actively sought by law enforcement for a felony, and also is intentionally evading arrest or prosecution. 6. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if Defendant makes a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k). 7. Defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, M.C.L. 400.10b, impose eligibility requirements for receiving Food

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 4 of 85 Pg ID 989 4
Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus violate the rights of Plaintiffs and proposed subclass members to receive Food Assistance when they are eligible under federally-established standards, 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5), which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. (Count III.)
8. Defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practice, and the state law on which it is based, M.C.L. 400.10b, also are preempted by federal law under 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) (prohibiting states from imposing their own eligibility standards), 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) (establishing federal standards for fleeing felon disqualifications), and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, because Congress has established comprehensive federal standards and requirements for Food Assistance eligibility (including standards related to felony warrants), and because M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy impose additional eligibility standards not set forth in federal law, conflict with federal law, and frustrate the achievement of Congress’s full objectives. (Count IV.)
Federal Remedies 9. Plaintiffs seek relief for themselves and on behalf of a Due Process Class (for Counts I and II) and an Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass (for Counts III and IV).

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 5 of 85 Pg ID 990 5
10. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce the United States Constitution and federal law, and to ensure that they and others similarly situated receive due process, as well as the Food Assistance for which they are eligible, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 or, alternatively, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
11. Plaintiffs also seek an order requiring Defendant to issue notice relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and to calculate and issue corrective payments of Food Assistance withheld from Plaintiffs and class members in violation of federal law, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and pursuant to Defendant’s policy in Bridges Administrative Manual (BAM) 406 of retroactively correcting under-issuances of benefits.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343. Plaintiffs are pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce federal rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, or, in the alternative, the Supremacy Clause, and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. 13. This Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202. 14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District, Southern Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 6 of 85 Pg ID 991 6
PARTIES Named Plaintiff Walter Barry 15. Walter Barry is a 42-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of the City of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. 16. Plaintiff Barry has developmental disabilities, including an intellectual disability that interferes with his ability to function independently. Because of his intellectual disability, Plaintiff Barry has the mental abilities of a young child and is unable to read or to write, except that he can print his name. 17. Plaintiff Barry was in special education throughout his schooling. He was classified as trainably mentally impaired and received a certificate of completion from the John Lee Training Center when he was 25 years old. 18. Plaintiff Barry tried to work through Michigan Rehabilitation Services in the 1990s, but he has never successfully held a job. 19. Plaintiff Barry’s only income is a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability check of $710 per month. 20. Plaintiff Barry lives with his mother and Next Friend, Elaine Barry, who handles his affairs, and is his authorized representative with DHS and his Representative Payee for the Social Security Administration. 21. In 2012, Plaintiff Barry received $186 per month in Food Assistance. 22. Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance made it possible to meet his basic

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 7 of 85 Pg ID 992 7
nutritional needs. December 2012 Criminal Justice Disqualification
23. In January 2013, Plaintiff Barry and his mother, Elaine Barry, received a notice from DHS dated December 31, 2012, which told Walter Barry he was disqualified from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits effective February 2013 because: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice also said: “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.”
24. Exhibit A is an accurate copy of the Notice, dated December 31, 2012, Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry.
25. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry received the notice from DHS in January 2013 that Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance was going to be cut off because of a “criminal justice disqualification,” Elaine Barry asked for a hearing to contest the decision.
26. Ms. Barry also tried to figure out what the “criminal disqualification” was about and how to prove it did not apply to Plaintiff Barry.
27. Elaine Barry was certain Plaintiff had never had anything to do with the criminal justice system or law enforcement, because of his disabilities and her close supervision of him.
28. In January 2013, Elaine Barry took Plaintiff Barry to the City of Detroit

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 8 of 85 Pg ID 993 8
Police Department (their local law enforcement agency), where she showed the police the December 31, 2012 notice and asked for police help in getting Walter Barry’s criminal justice disqualification straightened out.
29. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry went to the Detroit Police for help in resolving the criminal justice disqualification in January 2013, the police fingerprinted Plaintiff Barry.
30. Ronaldo L. Turner, a police officer with the Detroit Police Department, submitted a letter stating that “investigation per fingerprint comparison disclosed” that Plaintiff Barry had “no criminal history with the Detroit Police Department.”
31. Exhibit B is an accurate copy of the statement from the Detroit Police Department.
32. When Plaintiff Barry and Elaine Barry were at the police station in January 2013, the City of Detroit Police Department did not take any action to arrest Plaintiff Barry, or to jail him or take him to court.
33. Because Ms. Barry was unsure how to prove that Plaintiff Barry did not have a “criminal justice disqualification,” she also took Plaintiff Barry to his doctor to get a statement about his disabilities.
34. Exhibit C is an accurate copy of the statement Elaine Barry got from Walter Barry’s doctor to submit to DHS.
35. Elaine Barry, as authorized representative for her Plaintiff son, gave the

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 9 of 85 Pg ID 994 9
statements from Plaintiff Barry’s doctor and from the Detroit Police Department to the administrative law judge at the Food Assistance hearing in January 2013.
36. Defendant’s administrative law judge, Suzanne Sonneborn, issued a decision that DHS had been wrong in deciding that Plaintiff Barry should be cut off Food Assistance, and she ordered DHS to reinstate his Food Assistance.
37. Exhibit D is an accurate copy of the February 1, 2013 Hearing Decision in Plaintiff Barry’s case (the “Hearing Decision”).
38. Plaintiff Barry did not miss any months of Food Assistance following the December 31, 2013 termination notice, because the Hearing Decision was issued very quickly.
May and June 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualifications 39. After the Hearing Decision ordered DHS to reinstate Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance, DHS sent another notice to Plaintiff Barry saying that he was going to be cut off Food Assistance because of a criminal justice disqualification. 40. The second DHS notice, dated May 16, 2013, said Mr. Barry was disqualified from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits effective June 1, 2013 because: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice again stated: “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.” 41. The notice did not tell Plaintiff Barry what he had done to be disqualified

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 10 of 85 Pg ID 995 10
from Food Assistance. 42. Exhibit E is an accurate copy of the Notice dated May 16, 2013 that
Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry. 43. Plaintiff Barry had already contacted his local law enforcement to
resolve the second criminal justice disqualification, and the notice from DHS did not tell him what else he would need to do to stop DHS from repeatedly terminating his Food Assistance based on an outstanding felony warrant for the arrest of someone else who used his identity.
44. Elaine Barry, as authorized representative for Plaintiff Barry, filed another hearing request with the Department of Human Services on May 18, 2013, appealing the decision to terminate Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance.
45. Plaintiff Barry has had no encounters with law enforcement since he went to the City of Detroit Police station in January 2013.
46. In response to the Hearing Request in Plaintiff Barry’s case, Defendant’s employee, Rachel McMaster, the caseworker who handles Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance case at DHS, issued a Hearing Summary that states “the worker had to follow procedure and close the case again,” based on information from Defendant’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), “that there was still an outstanding warrant for this client as of 5/13/13”.
47. Exhibit F is an accurate copy of the May 22, 2013 Hearing Summary in

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 11 of 85 Pg ID 996 11
Plaintiff Barry’s case. 48. Robin Thomas, the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)
Terminal Agency Coordinator (TAC) for the DHS OIG, issued a statement dated May 16, 2013 that said Walter Barry was “subject to an arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge” issued by the Detroit Police Department on September 2, 1989 (23 years ago). She stated that Walter met the “outstanding felony warrant criteria as of May 13, 2013.”
49. Exhibit G in accurate copy of Ms. Thomas’s May 16, 2013 statement. 50. Plaintiff Barry initially was told by DHS that his Food Assistance would continue until a hearing was held on his criminal justice disqualification. 51. In June 2013, Plaintiff Barry received a third DHS notice, dated June 14, 2013, that he was disqualified effective July 1, 2013 from receiving Food Assistance Program benefits because: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice again stated: “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.” 52. The notice did not tell Plaintiff Barry what he had done to be disqualified from Food Assistance. 53. Exhibit H is an accurate copy of the Notice dated June 14, 2013 that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Barry. 54. In the 1980s Plaintiff Barry’s older brother, Darryl L. Barry, got into

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 12 of 85 Pg ID 997 12
trouble with law enforcement. 55. Darryl L. Barry used Walter Barry’s identity as an alias when he was in
trouble with law enforcement. 56. Elaine Barry intervened at the time to ensure that her son Darryl would
go to court under his own name, and she thought she had resolved any issues surrounding Darryl’s use of Plaintiff Barry’s identity during the 1980s.
57. In January 2013, when Elaine and Walter Barry sought assistance at the City of Detroit Police station, the Detroit Police did not indicate that there was any connection between Darryl Barry’s criminal problems in the 1980s and the criminal justice disqualification notice Walter Barry received from DHS.
58. A hearing has not yet been held on Defendant’s May 2013 decision to terminate Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance based on a criminal justice disqualification.
59. In spite of his timely hearing request, Plaintiff Barry did not receive Food Assistance for July 2013 until he filed the original Complaint in this case and his attorneys in the case notified the Attorney General’s office and Defendant’s Office of Legal Services.
60. Without Food Assistance, Plaintiff Barry does not have enough money to pay for both his food and his share of household expenses.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 13 of 85 Pg ID 998 13
July - August 2013 61. On July 25, 2013, Plaintiff Barry filed his Complaint in this case, through his next friend and mother, Elaine Barry. 62. On July 25, 2013, Defendant’s attorneys in the Attorney General’s office advised Plaintiff Barry’s attorneys that his July Food Assistance benefit would be deposited on his Bridge (electronic benefits transfer or EBT) card that night, but they did not concur in the injunctive and classwide relief sought in this case. 63. Around July 26, 2013, DHS put Walter’s Food Assistance for July on his Bridge Card. 64. Around August 1, 2013, Elaine and Walter Barry received a notice dated July 26, 2013, stating that Walter would receive $186 in Food Assistance “7-1-13 – Ongoing”. 65. Exhibit I is an accurate copy of the July 26, 2013 notice regarding Walter Barry’s Food Assistance. 66. On the morning of August 5, 2013, Defendant’s attorney, Assistant Attorney General Kristin Heyse, sent an email to Caroline Jomaa, the Legal Aid attorney representing Plaintiff Barry in connection with his request for an administrative hearing, providing that attorney with a Register of Action in Case No. 89-011157-01 in the Third Circuit Court – a criminal case in which a felony warrant had been issued in Plaintiff Barry’s name and with his birthdate.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 14 of 85 Pg ID 999 14
67. The August 5, 2013 email advised Ms. Jomaa that Mr. Barry should appear at the Criminal Division at the Frank Murphy Hall of Justice where he would be fingerprinted “for a comparison of the records” and also advising that: The Department [of Human Services] is in contact with the MSP to see if there is anything else that can be done. But until the warrant is lifted, the Department is required to deny benefits.
68. Exhibit J is an accurate copy of the August 5, 2013, 11:04 A.M. email and attached Register of Action from Assistant Attorney General Heyse to the attorney representing Plaintiff Barry in his administrative hearing.
69. In the afternoon of August 5, 2013, Assistant Attorney General Heyse again emailed Ms. Jomaa, this time advising her that Mr. Barry should go to the Detroit Police Department office at 7310 Woodward Avenue (rather than to the Frank Murphy Hall of Justice) to be fingerprinted and to bring his fingerprints to Office Turner in the Identification Unit.
70. The August 5, 2013 afternoon email from Assistant Attorney General Heyse also indicated it was necessary to contact Sergeant Spencer in the Narcotics unit of the Detroit Police Department, and to bring a photo ID card when going to 7310 Woodward Avenue.
71. The August 5, 2013 further indicated that Mr. Barry could be given a password “that he can provide in case he is stopped on this warrant in the future.”

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 15 of 85 Pg ID 1000 15
The email thus suggested that even if Mr. Barry provided the warrant did not belong to him, the warrant itself would continue to exist in his name.
72. Exhibit K is an accurate copy of the August 5, 2013, 1:03 p.m. email from Assistant Attorney General Heyse to the attorney representing Plaintiff Barry in his administrative appeal.
73. Plaintiff Barry had already gone to the Detroit Police Department at 7310 Woodward Avenue to be fingerprinted, and to obtain help from Officer Turner in clearing his name, as set forth in paragraphs 28-31, above.
74. After receiving the emails from attorney Heyse, Plaintiff Barry’s attorneys contacted Plaintiff Barry’s mother and next friend, Elaine Barry, who expressed great concern and fear about again exposing Plaintiff Barry to the criminal justice system, given Plaintiff Barry’s cognitive impairments.
75. Plaintiff Barry’s attorneys attempted to contact Office Turner and Sergeant Spencer to determine whether it was necessary for Plaintiff Barry to again visit Officer Turner and be re-fingerprinted, given that he had already been fingerprinted and cleared in January 2013.
76. On August 7, 2013, without contacting Plaintiff Barry’s attorneys, and before she had received the Register of Actions, Elaine Barry took Plaintiff Barry to see Officer Turner again and presented Plaintiff Barry’s photo ID.
77. On August 7, 2013, Officer Turner issued a second written statement

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 16 of 85 Pg ID 1001 16
regarding Plaintiff Barry’s lack of a criminal history with the Detroit Police Department.
78. Exhibit L is an accurate copy of Officer Turner’s August 7, 2013 statement.
79. On August 8, 2013, Plaintiff Barry’s attorney finally reached Officer Turner and explained that DHS’s concerns were with regard to, Case # 89-01115701 in the Third Circuit Court, and that Plaintiff Barry needed a statement specifically regarding that Circuit Court case.
80. Plaintiff Barry’s attorneys gave Officer Turner the phone number and name for Sergeant Spencer and asked that Officer Turner contact him.
81. On August 8, 2013, Officer Turner compared the relevant fingerprints, determined that Plaintiff Barry was not the person with the felony warrant in Case No. 89-011157-01, and issued a statement to that effect.
82. Exhibit M is an accurate copy of Officer Turner’s August 8, 2013 statement.
83. Plaintiff Barry’s Food Assistance has been reinstated by Defendant because he is awaiting a hearing in his case.
84. Under Defendant’s policy and practice, Plaintiff Barry will remain disqualified from receiving Food Assistance as long as there is an outstanding felony warrant in existence with his name and birthdate.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 17 of 85 Pg ID 1002 17
85. Although fingerprint comparison shows that Plaintiff Walter Barry is not associated with Case No. 89-011157-01 in the Third Circuit Court, upon information and belief there continues to be an open felony warrant in that case with his name and birthdate.
Plaintiff Heather Woodward 86. Plaintiff Heather Woodward is a 32-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of Canton, Wayne County, Michigan. 87. Plaintiff Woodward is unable to work, due to depression requiring treatment with medication, as well as medical problems resulting from a 2002 car accident. 88. Plaintiff Woodward is pursuing a claim for disability benefits through the Social Security Administration, but has no income at this time. 89. Plaintiff Woodward and her two daughters (D.G. and C.W., ages 13 and 9, respectively) received food and cash assistance from DHS until around April 2013, when their assistance stopped because they went to live with Plaintiff Woodward’s mother in Ohio. 90. Around April or May 2013, Plaintiff Woodward returned to Michigan to seek treatment for substance abuse stemming from her reliance on pain medications following a serious car accident. 91. Plaintiff Woodward has completed intensive, residential substance abuse

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 18 of 85 Pg ID 1003 18
treatment and currently lives in transitional housing while she continues to participate in substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and other efforts to improve her life.
92. In transitional housing, Plaintiff Woodward does not have to pay rent for the apartment that she shares with other young women, but does not receive any assistance with food, clothing, transportation, or other necessities.
93. Plaintiff Woodward currently relies on donations of food or meals from her church, the Salvation Army and other charitable organizations.
94. At the end of August 2013, Plaintiff Woodward will no longer be eligible for transitional housing and will have to pay rent to stay where she is or find another place to live.
95. When she decided to enter substance abuse treatment, Plaintiff Woodward temporarily gave physical custody of her daughter D.G. to Plaintiff’s mother and physical custody of C.W. to her Plaintiff’s father, so that Plaintiff could obtain the treatment she needed. Plaintiff Woodward hopes to regain physical custody of her daughters before the beginning of the school year, but that will be impossible if she is disqualified from receiving Food Assistance and Family Independence Program (FIP) cash assistance.
May 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualification 96. Around May 23, 2013, Plaintiff Woodward applied for Food Assistance

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 19 of 85 Pg ID 1004 19
and cash assistance and was denied. 97. Ms. Woodward’s DHS caseworker told her she was denied because she
had a felony warrant. 98. Ms. Woodward told her caseworker that she had a misdemeanor case but
no felony warrants and asked the caseworker for additional information about the basis for her disqualification.
99. The caseworker told Ms. Woodward she had no further information. 100. Plaintiff Woodward contacted the District Court in Taylor, Michigan where she knew she had pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor in that court after receiving a ticket for shoplifting in 2011, and that was the only place she could think of where there might be a warrant. 101. The District Court in Taylor informed Plaintiff Woodward that there was a bench warrant in the misdemeanor case because she had not paid her $500 fine as promised. 102. When Plaintiff Woodward inquired why DHS said she had a felony warrant, the court told her she had contact the Taylor Police Department about that. 103. Exhibit N is an accurate copy of the citation Plaintiff Woodward received when she was charged with shoplifting in June 2011. 104. Plaintiff Woodward contacted the Taylor Police Department and they told her she had to come in to get any information.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 20 of 85 Pg ID 1005 20
105. Plaintiff Woodward does not own a vehicle and has no income or savings.
106. Neither the court nor the police department have explained to Plaintiff Woodward why a felony warrant apparently appears on MSP records, nor did they explain what she could do to correct the apparent mistake on her record so that the entry would correctly show a misdemeanor warrant, not a felony warrant.
July 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualification 107. Around July 2013, after verifying that the case against her in Taylor was a misdemeanor case and being unable to find any information about any other criminal case against her, Plaintiff Woodward again applied for Food Assistance, as well as cash assistance and relocation assistance. 108. On August 1, 2013, Plaintiff Woodward was denied Food Assistance and cash assistance because: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.”“ The notice also said: “Please have the disqualified member of your group contact a law enforcement agency – such as a police department, sheriff’s department, or the Michigan State Police – to resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide picture identification.” 109. The August 2013 notice did not tell Plaintiff Woodward what she had done to be disqualified from Food Assistance.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 21 of 85 Pg ID 1006 21
110. Based on her prior conversation with the Taylor Court, Plaintiff Woodward knows there is an outstanding warrant in her misdemeanor case.
111. Plaintiff Woodward is not aware of any other pending criminal cases or warrants for her arrest, and Defendant has not provided her with any information about any other pending criminal cases or warrants that she should seek to resolve.
112. Plaintiff’s counsel obtained and reviewed records from Plaintiff Woodward’s misdemeanor shoplifting case, and determined that although Ms. Woodward was prosecuted under the City of Taylor misdemeanor ordinance 19.141 (general larceny), the case is labeled with Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council Code (PAAC code) “750356-B”. PAAC Code “750356-B” refers to M.C.L. § 750.356b, the felony state-law offense of breaking and entering a coin-operated telephone.
113. Upon information and belief, due to the PAAC code entry on the City of Taylor court records, Ms. Woodward’s misdemeanor warrant for nonpayment of fines and costs on her shoplifting conviction incorrectly shows as a felony warrant in the MSP-DHS data-matching system.
114. Exhibit O is an accurate copy of the Michigan State Police Internet Criminal History Access Tool (ICHAT) report on Plaintiff Woodward, showing that the charges against her in 23rd District Court in Taylor, Michigan, Case No. 11-1717-OM, were for a misdemeanor ordinance violation for simple larceny of

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 22 of 85 Pg ID 1007 22
$100 or less. 115. Exhibit P is an accurate copy of the Register of Actions in 23rd District
Court Case No. 11-1717-OM, showing that Plaintiff Woodward pled no contest to the misdemeanor ordinance violation charge of larceny of less than $100.00 and that a bench warrant was issued on the simple larceny charge because she failed to appear for a show cause hearing after failing to pay her fine.
116. Exhibit Q is an accurate copy of the Notice dated August 1, 2013, that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Woodward.
Named Plaintiff Donitha Copeland 117. Plaintiff Donitha Copeland is a 35-year-old citizen of the United States and resident of Wayne County, Michigan. 118. Plaintiff Donitha Copeland is a member of Westside Mothers, a voluntary membership organization that advocates on behalf of low income individuals, particularly with respect to governmental benefits like the Food Assistance program. 119. Ms. Copeland was a student at Oakland Community College in the summer of 2013, and plans to re-enroll in the winter semester. 120. Ms. Copeland is unemployed and has no regular source of income. 121. When she has the opportunity, Plaintiff Copeland delivers hand bills, for which she earns approximately $25 a day.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 23 of 85 Pg ID 1008 23
122. Plaintiff Copeland does not own a vehicle and has no savings or other assets.
123. In the spring or summer 2012, Plaintiff Copeland temporarily lost her wallet, which contained her Social Security card and other vital information, but Ms. Copeland later found the wallet. She now suspects this incident is related to the theft of her identity.
124. In about August 2012, Plaintiff Copeland received a notice from DHS asking for verification of employment with a company she had never heard of, which was based in West Michigan.
125. Plaintiff Copeland was not working at the time, and therefore, could not provide verification of employment.
126. DHS closed Plaintiff Copeland’s Food Assistance case in August 2012 for failure to provide requested verification.
127. Later in 2012, some months after her wallet had gone missing, Plaintiff Copeland began to receive bills for services that she had neither received nor requested, and realized that someone was using her identity. These services included bills from Sprint Wireless and Consumers Energy.
128. In late 2012 or early 2013, Plaintiff began efforts to get bills that she did not owe taken off her credit report. These efforts included filing complaints with some of the creditors with whom she had not done business, and filing an incident

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 24 of 85 Pg ID 1009 24
report for fraud and impersonation with the Detroit Police Department. 129. Exhibit R is an accurate copy of the Detroit Police Department record of
Plaintiff Copeland’s identity theft report on November 13, 2012. 130. On November 14, 2012, Plaintiff Copeland named Ronesha Williams as a
suspect in the theft of her identity. 131. Ronesha Williams, who is a former friend of Ms. Copeland, is from
Muskegon, Michigan. 132. Exhibit S is an accurate copy of the Detroit Police Department’s record of
Plaintiff Copeland’s report that Ronesha Williams was a suspect in the theft of Plaintiff Copeland’s identity.
133. Plaintiff Copeland has lived in southeast Michigan and the Detroit metropolitan area for her entire life.
134. Ms. Copeland has been homeless at times, including several months in 2012 and 2013, and has moved around between the homes of friends and relatives in southeast Michigan.
135. During the last few years, Ms. Copeland has not had a fixed address for much of the time, and has used mailing addresses in Ferndale and Lake Orion in Oakland County, Michigan, as well as addresses in Detroit, Michigan, all of which have been places where she has stayed for some period of time.
136. Ms. Copeland has never lived in western Michigan.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 25 of 85 Pg ID 1010 25
137. In September 2012, Plaintiff Copeland reapplied for Food Assistance using the Lake Orion, Oakland County address where she stayed sometimes.
138. In September 2012, DHS approved Plaintiff Copeland’s application and began issuing approximately $200 per month in Food Assistance benefits to her Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) account, which she could access using her DHS-issued “Bridge card”.
December 2012 Criminal Justice Disqualification 139. On or around December 31, 2012, Defendant issued a computer-generated Notice of Case Action to Plaintiff Copeland, stating that her Food Assistance would be terminated on February 1, 2013, because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.” 140. The December 31, 2012 notice was sent to Plaintiff Copeland at the Lake Orion, Oakland County mailing address she had used. 141. Exhibit T is an accurate copy of the notice, dated December 31, 2012, which Defendant sent to Plaintiff Copeland.
February 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualification 142. On about February 8, 2013, Plaintiff Copeland reapplied for Food Assistance using her new address in Wayne County. 143. On about February 12, 2013, Defendant sent Plaintiff Copeland a

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 26 of 85 Pg ID 1011 26
computer-generated notice telling her that her application for Food Assistance was denied because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.”
144. Exhibit U is an accurate copy of the Notice – dated February 12, 2013 – that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Copeland.
145. Plaintiff Copeland was unaware of any reason why she would have a “criminal justice disqualification”.
146. After receiving the February 2013 notice, Plaintiff Copeland contacted the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office, which told her that there was a warrant against her for writing bad checks in Kalamazoo.
147. Plaintiff Copeland contacted the Sherriff’s office in Kalamazoo and told them she had never been in Kalamazoo and that she believed someone had stolen her identity, based on bills she received for services she had never requested.
148. Plaintiff Copeland explained that she had no way to travel to Kalamazoo because she has no income and no money.
149. Plaintiff Copeland asked the Kalamazoo Sherriff’s office if she could turn herself in to the City of Detroit police, and the Kalamazoo Sherriff’s office advised her that turning herself in to the City of Detroit Police Department was not a good idea because there was no way of knowing how soon she would be transported to

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 27 of 85 Pg ID 1012 27
Kalamazoo and how long she would end up sitting in jail in Detroit. 150. At the time DHS sent the December 2012 and February 2013 notices to
Plaintiff Copeland, law enforcement officials and court officials had not notified Plaintiff Copeland about any outstanding felony warrants against her.
151. Plaintiff Copeland has not received duplicate FIP or FAP. 152. Plaintiff Copeland has not been convicted of any drug-related felonies on or after August 22, 1996. 153. Plaintiff Copeland has not been convicted of food stamp trafficking. 154. Plaintiff Copeland has not been found guilty of welfare fraud or an intentional program violation. 155. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s automated computer “match” with the Michigan State Police resulted in a determination by Defendant that there was a felony warrant for Plaintiff Copeland’s arrest, even though Plaintiff Copeland had not been arrested and had not been notified by law enforcement or court officials that she has been charged with a felony. 156. Upon information and belief, Defendant terminated benefits to Plaintiff Copeland because of Defendant’s policy of disqualifying individuals defined as “fugitive felons” under Defendant’s Bridges Eligibility Policy (BEM). 157. Under Defendant’s policy of automatically disqualifying individuals from food assistance based on the existence of an outstanding felony warrant in the

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 28 of 85 Pg ID 1013 28
person’s name, Plaintiff Copeland will remain disqualified so long as there is a warrant in her name, even if the felonies at issue were committed by someone who stole her identity.
158. Since being terminated from food assistance, Plaintiff Copeland has had to rely on the generosity of friends, food pantries, and soup kitchens in order to sustain herself.
159. Plaintiff Copeland suffers from sickle cell anemia. Maintaining a healthy diet is essential for people with sickle cell anemia. A poor diet can increase the likelihood that people with sickle cell anemia will suffer from painful complications.
Named Plaintiff Kenneth L. Anderson 160. Kenneth L. Anderson is a 54-year-old citizen of the United States and a resident of the city of Flint, Genesee County, Michigan. 161. Plaintiff Anderson has disabilities including Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and back problems. 162. Plaintiff Anderson’s COPD requires his use of oxygen 24 hours a day, and his physician has informed him that he needs a double lung replacement. 163. Plaintiff Anderson is unable to walk unassisted because of his respiratory and back impairments. He uses a wheelchair or cane. 164. Plaintiff Anderson has received Social Security disability benefits for

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 29 of 85 Pg ID 1014 29
several years, which is his only source of income. 165. Plaintiff Anderson currently receives a little less than $800 per month in
Social Security disability payments, putting him well below the poverty line and making him eligible for needs-based Medicaid coverage.
166. Because of his medical problems, Plaintiff Anderson is unable to take care of his own personal needs, such as bathing himself, and household chores like cooking, cleaning, and shopping. A Home Help provider, paid by the DHSadministered Medicaid program, assists him with those tasks.
167. Plaintiff Anderson received about $200 per month in Food Assistance benefits until mid-2012, when his case was closed because he did not provide paperwork required by DHS.
168. In late December 2012, Plaintiff Anderson reapplied for Food Assistance and Medicaid.
169. DHS reinstated Mr. Anderson’s Medicaid, and approved his application for Food Assistance for part of December and for January, but stopped his Food Assistance effective February 1, 2013.
January 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualification 170. On about January 10, 2013, DHS sent Plaintiff Anderson a notice telling him that he was eligible for $25 in food assistance for December 2012 and $188 in food assistance for January 2013, but that he was denied food assistance

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 30 of 85 Pg ID 1015 30
for February 2013 “ongoing” because, “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” The notice also said: “Please contact your local law enforcement to resolve.”
171. Exhibit V is an accurate copy of the January 10, 2013 Notice, dated June 10, 2013, which Defendant sent to Plaintiff Anderson.
March 2013 Criminal Justice Disqualification 172. In March 2013, Plaintiff Anderson reapplied for Food Assistance. 173. On about March18, 2013, Defendant sent Plaintiff Anderson a computer generated notice telling him that his application for Food Assistance was denied because “you or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.” 174. Exhibit W is an accurate copy of the notice, dated March 18, 2013, which Defendant sent to Plaintiff Anderson. 175. Plaintiff Anderson was unaware of any reason why he would have a “criminal justice disqualification”. 176. Law enforcement officials and court officials have not contacted Plaintiff Anderson about any outstanding felony warrants against him. 177. Law enforcement officials and court officials have not notified Plaintiff Anderson about any extradition warrants issued against him.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 31 of 85 Pg ID 1016 31
178. Plaintiff Anderson has not received duplicate FIP or FAP. 179. Plaintiff Anderson has not been convicted of any drug-related felonies on or after August 22, 1996. 180. Plaintiff Anderson has not been convicted of food stamp trafficking. 181. Plaintiff Anderson has not been found guilty of welfare fraud or an intentional program violation. 182. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s automated computer “match” with the Michigan State Police resulted in a determination by Defendant that there was a felony warrant for Plaintiff Anderson’s arrest even though Plaintiff Anderson had not been arrested and had not been notified by law enforcement or court officials that he has been charged with a felony. 183. Upon information and belief, Defendant terminated and denied benefits to Plaintiff Anderson because of Defendant’s policy of disqualifying individuals defined as “fugitive felons” under Defendant’s Bridges Eligibility Policy (BEM). 184. After his Marsh 2013 application was denied, Plaintiff Anderson spoke with his DHS caseworker who told him he was disqualified because of an outstanding felony warrant and he should contact the police. 185. Plaintiff Anderson contacted the police, who refused to give him any information over the telephone. 186. After receiving the March 2013 notice, Plaintiff Anderson contacted Legal

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 32 of 85 Pg ID 1017 32
Services of Eastern Michigan (LSEM) for help with his eligibility for Food Assistance.
187. LSEM contacted the Michigan State Police (MSP), and LSEM reported to Plaintiff Anderson that MSP’s Flint Area Narcotics Group (FANG) told them a felony warrant was issued for Mr. Anderson in January 2013, for possession of heroin in 2009.
188. Plaintiff Anderson’s nephew Christopher had a drug problem and the police found heroin belonging to him in Plaintiff Anderson’s home a few years back.
189. Plaintiff Anderson was not arrested or charged with felony heroin possession at the time the police came to his home and found Christopher’s drugs.
190. Plaintiff Anderson has not been arrested or notified by law enforcement about any current felony warrant for his arrest.
191. Without Food Assistance, in about June 2013, Plaintiff Anderson was forced to move from the mobile home he had been renting because he could no longer afford the $575 per month rent.
192. If Plaintiff Anderson pays all of his basic housing and utility bills in his current home and prescription copayments, he does not have enough money left over to purchase adequate food.
193. Without food assistance, Plaintiff Anderson is struggling to pay his bills

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 33 of 85 Pg ID 1018 33
and have adequate food to eat. Plaintiff Westside Mothers
194. Westside Mothers is a not-for-profit membership organization with between 450 and 500 dues paying members, which advocates for the interests of public assistance applicants and recipients, particularly in connection with public assistance programs administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services and the Social Security Administration.
195. Membership in Westside Mothers is open to both men and women of all ages, regardless of whether they have children or are parenting.
196. Many Westside Mothers members apply for or receive benefits under public assistance programs administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS), including Food Assistance, cash assistance, refugee assistance, and child care assistance programs affected by the notices and procedures challenged in this case.
197. Donitha Copeland and other Westside Mothers members have been or will be harmed by the Defendant’s notices, policies, and practices challenged in this case.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 34 of 85 Pg ID 1019 34
198. Westside Mothers educates its members and the public about government benefits, including DHS-administered programs. Its educational efforts include information on what to do if assistance is denied, curtailed, or in dispute.
199. In carrying out its mission, Westside Mothers furnishes advocacy services to its members who are in need of help in obtaining public assistance, including representation at administrative hearings and in litigation such as the present case.
200. Members of Westside Mothers pay dues, but many members have difficulty paying dues if they are disqualified from public assistance benefits.
201. The challenged policies of the Defendant impact the ability of Westside Mothers’ members to pay dues. The inability of both current and prospective members of Westside Mothers to pay dues due to being disqualified from public assistance under Defendant’s challenged programs and policies, restricts the growth and functioning of the organization.
202. Westside Mothers brings this action both on behalf of its members and on its own behalf.
The Plaintiff Due Process Class 203. Walter Barry, Heather Woodward, Donitha Copeland, and Kenneth Anderson (“the individual named Plaintiffs”) bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), on behalf of all others similarly situated. 204. The individual named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 35 of 85 Pg ID 1020 35
all past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s
• Food Assistance Program (FAP), • Family Independence Program (FIP), • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA), • Child Day Care (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), (“public assistance”) programs who have suffered or will suffer actual or
threatened denial, reduction, or termination of benefits based on the
Michigan Department of Human Services’ (DHS’) determination that the
applicant or recipient, or a member of the applicant or recipient’s household,
is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who do not
receive a written notice, at the time of denial and at least 10 days prior to an
actual or threatened reduction or termination, that details:
a) the nature and duration of the intended agency action, b) the specific actions the individual can take to lift the disqualification and fully access benefits, and c) the factual and legal reasons for the action including:
i) which of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications is at issue, ii) the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification, iii) the date, place and nature of the alleged crime and the resulting conviction or warrant, iv) the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued,

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 36 of 85 Pg ID 1021 36
v) the name of the specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for additional information, vi) where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement for a felony, and vii) where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual. 205. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
206. Upon information and belief, at least hundreds and likely thousands of
people throughout the State of Michigan are members of the proposed class.
207. The exact size of the class and the names and contact information of
the class members are in Defendant’s control.
208. The questions of law and fact at issue here – whether Defendant has
violated the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and the implementing federal
regulations by denying, reducing, or terminating public assistance to Plaintiffs and
class members without providing written notice detailing the reasons for the
denial, reduction, or termination – are common to all class members. These
common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only
individual class members.
209. The claims and defenses of the individual named Plaintiffs are typical
of the claims and defenses of the class.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 37 of 85 Pg ID 1022 37
210. The individual named Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Defendant’s practice of issuing the same inadequate, computer-generated notices to all class members.
211. The claims of the individual named Plaintiffs arise from the same conduct by Defendant that has been or will be applied to all class members.
212. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
213. There is no foreseeable antagonism or conflict of interest within the class.
214. The individual named Plaintiffs’ attorneys are competent and experienced in the areas of law raised in this litigation.
215. The requested relief is appropriate for this class because Defendant has sent or will in the future send legally insufficient notices to all members of the class, thus denying them both adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Plaintiff Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass 216. The individual named Plaintiffs seek to represent a subclass consisting of all past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, reduction, or termination of Food Assistance Program benefits based on

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 38 of 85 Pg ID 1023 38
DHS’ policy of disqualifying individuals as fugitive felons, without finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, and without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement for a crime that is a felony.
217. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
218. Upon information and belief, the subclass contains at least hundreds and perhaps thousands of people throughout the State of Michigan.
219. The exact size of the class and the names and contact information of the subclass members are in Defendant’s control.
220. The questions in this Complaint – whether Defendant’s disqualification of individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the “fugitive felon” definition in her written policy, and the state law upon which it is based, are in violation of individuals’ rights under federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) law, or are preempted by that law – are common to all subclass members.
221. The individual named Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Defendant’s practice of actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance to households that contain individuals identified by Defendant as fugitive felons.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 39 of 85 Pg ID 1024 39
222. The claims and defenses of the individual named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims and defenses of the subclass.
223. The claims of the individual named Plaintiffs arise from the same conduct by Defendant that has been or will be applied to all subclass members.
224. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the subclass.
225. There is no foreseeable antagonism or conflict of interest within the subclass.
226. The individual named Plaintiffs’ attorneys are competent and experienced in the areas of law raised in this litigation.
227. The requested relief is appropriate for this subclass because Defendant has denied, reduced, or terminated Food Assistance to all members of the subclass (or will in the future), based on the challenged fugitive felon policy and practices.
Defendant 228. MAURA CORRIGAN is Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS). 229. DHS is the state agency responsible for administering the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), known in Michigan as FAP (Food Assistance Program), as well as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program known in Michigan as FIP (Family Independence

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 40 of 85 Pg ID 1025 40
Program), and the State Disability Assistance (SDA), Child Development and Care (CDC) and Refugee Assistance (RAP) programs.
230. As Director of DHS, Defendant is responsible for administering all of the DHS-administered public assistance programs in compliance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
231. As Director of DHS, Defendant is responsible for administering the Food Assistance Program in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and federal SNAP law.
232. Defendant is sued in her official capacity. FACTS
Relevant Public Assistance Programs The Food Assistance Program: SNAP and FAP 233. The United States Congress created the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly known as the “Food Stamp Program”) as a means to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in low-income households. 234. Under SNAP, eligible households receive Food Assistance benefits deposited on an electronic card account, which can only be used to buy food, or plants or seeds to grow food, at participating stores or markets. 7 U.S.C. 2012(k)(2), 2016(b), 2026(j)(3)(B). 235. Federal law defines and determines both eligibility for and the amount

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 41 of 85 Pg ID 1026 41
of SNAP benefits, based on household size, income, certain expenses, and resources or assets, as well as nonfinancial factors such as employment status, age or disability, citizenship or immigration status, etc..
236. State agencies, including DHS in Michigan, administer SNAP by processing applications, certifying eligible households, and issuing approved Food Assistance benefits.
237. The federal government pays for all SNAP Food Assistance benefits and shares the administrative expenses of operating SNAP with the states. 7 U.S.C. 2020(a), (d), (e).
238. Michigan calls its SNAP program the Food Assistance Program (FAP), a needs-based, state-administered government assistance program that provides Food Assistance benefits to all individuals who meet published eligibility criteria and requirements for the program.
The Cash Assistance Programs: FIP, SDA and RAP 239. The Family Independence Program (FIP) is Michigan’s needs-based cash assistance program for low-income families with minor children. M.C.L. 400.57 et seq. 240. The family cash assistance program is paid for and administered using both federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funding and state funds.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 42 of 85 Pg ID 1027 42
241. Under federal TANF law, Defendant must have objective criteria for determining FIP eligibility and delivering FIP benefits, as well as for the equitable treatment of FIP applicants and recipients. 42 USC 602(a)(1)(B)(iii).
242. The Michigan Social Welfare Act, M.C.L. 400.57 et seq., Michigan Administrative Code, Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.3101 et seq., and implementing DHS policies set forth the eligibility criteria and requirements for FIP benefits.
243. Individuals are eligible to receive FIP in Michigan if they meet the FIP eligibility standards and requirements – including work requirements, M.C.L. 400.57d - 400.57g, and time limits, id. at 400.57a(4) and 400.57r – set forth in the Michigan Social Welfare Act, Michigan Administrative Code, and implementing policies. M.C.L. 400.57d(4); BEM 209 p. 1, available online at www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/bem/209.pdf.
244. DHS provides small monthly cash assistance payments to very lowincome individuals with disabilities under the State Disability Assistance (SDA) program, which is a need-based governmental assistance program funded with state general fund dollars.
245. SDA provides benefits to all individuals who meet the eligibility standards and requirements set forth in the annual Appropriations Act for DHS (currently 2012 P.A. 200 sec. 604), state administrative rules (Mich. Admin. Code. R. 400.3151 et seq.), and implementing policies.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 43 of 85 Pg ID 1028 43
246. The Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) is a needs-based, federallyfunded program providing both cash and medical assistance, which is designed to help refugees become self-sufficient after their arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1522(e)
247. Refugees who meet eligibility requirements can receive cash or medical assistance for a temporary period of time after their entry to the United States. See 45 C.F.R. 400.40 et seq. and BEM 630.
Child Care Benefits 248. Michigan’s Child Development and Care (CDC) program is a needsbased public assistance program that pays subsidies to help low-income families pay for child care provided by enrolled or licensed providers, in order for children to have care and supervision while their parents attend work; high school or other approved education/training; or employment-related activities required as a condition of eligibility for FIP or FAP. 249. Childcare benefits support the efforts of low-income parents – including those trying to transition from welfare to work – to qualify for, find, and keep employment. 250. Childcare benefits are paid for by a mixture of state and federal funds, which varies from year to year. 251. Federal funds for childcare benefits include the TANF block grant

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 44 of 85 Pg ID 1029 44
discussed above and the Child Care and Development Fund block grant. 252. Defendant determines the family’s eligibility for childcare benefits
and sets upper income limits, the hourly rates payable to the providers (based on family income, provider type and credentials, and number of children), and the number of hours for which care will be subsidized.
253. Defendant is authorized to adjust the income limit for childcare assistance eligibility and the number of hours for which care will be paid in order to prevent waiting lists in the childcare assistance program when appropriations would not otherwise be sufficient to provide childcare assistance to all eligible families. Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.5002, 400.5009, 400.5013.
254. Michigan provides childcare assistance to all families who – together with their child care providers – meet the eligibility criteria and requirements set forth in federal and state law, including Mich. Admin. Code R. 400.5001 et seq., and implementing policies, without any waiting list for the program. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Plan for Michigan FFY 0212-2013, section 2.3.7 (page 50 of pdf file), available online at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/2012-2013_State_Plan_Final_365274_7.pdf.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 45 of 85 Pg ID 1030 45
Notice and Hearing Requirements Constitutional Due Process Requirements 255. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, individuals have the right to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard when the state denies, reduces, or terminates public assistance that is available to all eligible individuals who meet criteria set forth in federal or state statutes, rules, or policies. 256. When needs-based public assistance is reduced or terminated, the right to due process includes the right to timely notice, and a meaningful opportunity for a pre-reduction or pre-termination hearing, because of the extreme harm that may befall those who depend on needs-based assistance programs to meet their basic needs if the assistance for which they are, in fact, eligible is erroneously reduced or terminated. 257. The right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to notice detailing the specific, individualized reasons for the adverse action when the state denies, reduces, or terminates needs-based public assistance. 258. The right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding whether the state properly denied, reduced, or terminated needs-based public assistance. 259. In order for the notice and opportunity to be heard to be meaningful,

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 46 of 85 Pg ID 1031 46
the notice must provide information that is specific, detailed, and individualized enough for the individual to be able to determine both the basis for the state’s action and whether, or how, to contest it.
260. In order for the notice and opportunity to be heard to be meaningful, the notice must inform individuals about what they must do to fully receive the benefits to which they are entitled.
261. Individual named Plaintiffs, members of Plaintiff Westside Mothers, and members of the Due Process Class are entitled to all of the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when Defendant denies, reduces, or terminates their eligibility or benefits under the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Development and Care Program, and/or Refugee Assistance Program.
Federal Food Assistance Notice and Hearing Requirements 262. As the state agency responsible for administering SNAP, DHS must provide an opportunity for a “fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter” for any person aggrieved by action taken by DHS in administering FAP, including the denial, reduction, or termination of Food Assistance. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10). 263. The Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture has issued regulations to implement the statutory fair hearing

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 47 of 85 Pg ID 1032 47
requirement of 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), including 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g)(ii) and 273.13(a).
264. When Food Assistance is denied, DHS must “provide the household with written notice explaining the basis for the denial, the household’s right to request a fair hearing, the telephone number of the food stamp office… and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information.” 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g)(ii).
265. When FAP benefits are reduced or terminated, DHS must “provide the household timely and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken.” 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a). The notice must “explain[ ] in easily understandable language: The proposed action; the reason for the proposed action; the household’s right to request a fair hearing; the telephone number of the food stamp office… and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information….” 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a)(2).
266. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), not only serves to implement the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also provides an independent federal law requirement for adequate due process when Food Assistance is denied, reduced, or terminated.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 48 of 85 Pg ID 1033 48
Defendant’s Notice and Hearing Practices When Denying, Reducing, or Terminating Public Assistance Benefits Based on
Criminal Justice Disqualifications 267. Beginning around July 14, 2013, the notices from Defendant to members of the Due Process Class, denying, reducing, or terminating their public assistance benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification (“criminal justice disqualification notices”) give as the sole “reason for intended action” the boilerplate statement that “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please have the disqualified member of your group contact a law enforcement agency – such as a police department, sheriff’s department, or the Michigan State Police – to resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide picture identification. Manual Item(s): BEM 204, ERM 202” 268. From about January or February 2013 until about July 14, 2013, the notices from Defendant to Plaintiffs and members of the Due Process Class, denying, reducing, or terminating their public assistance benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification (“criminal justice disqualification notices”) give as the sole “reason for intended action” the boilerplate statement that “[y]ou or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve. Manual Item(s): BEM 203, ERM 202.”

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 49 of 85 Pg ID 1034 49
269. Prior to January or February 2013, when Defendant imposed a disqualification based on alleged fugitive felon status, she sent notices that gave as the reason for the disqualification, “You or a member of your group have been identified as a fugitive felon. Fugitive felons are not eligible for assistance.”
270. In or around January or February 2013, Defendant changed the content of the notice sent to individuals who were being disqualified based on alleged fugitive felon status, so that the individuals received the “criminal justice disqualification” message contained in the notices to Plaintiffs, instead of the “fugitive felon” message set forth in the paragraph 183, above.
271. Exhibit X is an accurate copy of minutes from a July 6, 2011 meeting attended by DHS representatives, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act, which included discussion of the decision to create notices that would no longer tell alleged fugitive felons that they were being disqualified because of alleged fugitive felon status.
272. Exhibit Y is an accurate copy of specifications approved by DHS and issued in or around July 2010 for information technology changes to replace notices that referred to fugitive felon status with notices that referred to criminal justice disqualifications. Exhibit Y was released by Defendant under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
273. From at least October 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013, Defendant’s

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 50 of 85 Pg ID 1035 50
policy of disqualifying “fugitive felons” based on computer “matches” was contained in Bridges Eligibility Manual (BEM) 203, which has the title “Criminal Justice Disqualifications”.
274. Exhibit Z is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect from October 1, 2012 –May 31, 2013.
275. Exhibit AA is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect from May 1– May 31, 2013.
276. Effective June 1, 2013, Defendant’s policy regarding disqualification of “fugitive felons” was moved from BEM 203 (Criminal Justice Disqualifications) to a new policy item designated as BEM 204, with the title “Fugitive Felons”.
277. Exhibit BB is an accurate copy of BEM 203 in effect June 1, 2013. 278. Exhibit CC is an accurate copy of BEM 204 in effect June 1, 2013. 279. In February 1, 2013, Defendant published policies describing the DHS/the Michigan State Police data match and the automatic disqualification of “fugitive felons”, in BAM 800 and 811. 280. Exhibit DD is an accurate copy of the portion of Defendant’s Bridges Policy Bulletin 2013-003 announcing the “new automated match with the Michigan State Police” and the changes in BAM. 281. Exhibit EE is an accurate copy of BAM 811 issued effective February

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 51 of 85 Pg ID 1036 51
1, 2013 – April 30, 2013. 282. Exhibit FF is an accurate copy of BAM 811 effective May 1, 2013. 283. Exhibit GG is an accurate copy of BAM 800 effective February 1,
2013- May 31, 2013. 284. Exhibit HH is an accurate copy of BAM 800 effective June 1, 2013. The Five Types of Criminal Justice Disqualifications 285. Under Defendant’s Criminal Justice Disqualification policy in BEM
203 in effect from February 1 – May 31, 2013, there were five separate and distinct reasons for criminal justice disqualifications: (1) duplicate receipt of assistance, (2) probation or parole violation, (3) drug-related felonies, (4) Food Assistance trafficking and (5) fugitive felons.
286. The five categories of criminal justice disqualifications derive from different legal sources, including several different federal and state laws and regulations.
287. The type of benefits to which the disqualification applies, the criteria for disqualification, the duration of disqualification, and the possibility of reinstatement of benefits vary between the five categories of criminal justice disqualifications.
288. The criminal justice disqualification for “duplicate receipt of assistance” creates a 10-year bar on receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 52 of 85 Pg ID 1037 52
family cash assistance, which runs from the date of the adjudication or acknowledgement of Guilt.
289. The criminal justice disqualification of “probation and parole violators” creates a temporary bar on receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of family cash assistance until the individual establishes his or her compliance with conditions of probation or parole.
290. The criminal justice disqualification for “drug-related felonies” is a lifetime bar on the receipt of Food Assistance and the receipt of family cash assistance for individuals who have been convicted in two or more cases after August 22, 1996, of felonies for the use, possession, or distribution of a controlled substance. An individual with one drug-related felony conviction is eligible for Food Assistance (provided that he or she is not violating probation or parole), but the individual’s Food Assistance benefits must be issued to an authorized representative. An individual with one drug-related felony conviction is also eligible for family cash assistance (provided that he or she is not violating probation or parole), but the individual’s family cash assistance benefits must be issued in restricted form.
291. The criminal justice disqualification for “FAP trafficking” disqualifies a person from receiving Food Assistance if he or she is found guilty in court, through administrative hearing, or by signing a repayment and disqualification

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 53 of 85 Pg ID 1038 53
agreement, of trafficking in Food Assistance benefits. The length of disqualification from Food Assistance for trafficking varies depending on the nature of the trafficking offense and, for some types of trafficking offenses, the number of times the person has been found guilty.
292. The criminal justice disqualification of “fugitive felons” creates a temporary bar on receipt of Food Assistance, child care benefits, and cash assistance for families, people with disabilities, and refugees based on the existence of an outstanding felony warrant, the existence of an outstanding extradition warrant, or the individual’s admission to being a fugitive felon.
293. When a fugitive felon disqualification has been imposed, an individual is no longer disqualified from assistance as soon as the individual has addressed the issues related to the outstanding warrant.
Defendant’s Failure to Provide Adequate Notice and Meaningful Opportunity for a Fair Hearing
294. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices fail to detail the alleged underlying circumstances or action that gave rise to the unspecified type of criminal justice disqualification.
295. Information that is missing from Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices includes: what allegedly occurred, where it occurred, when it occurred, which member of the “group” was involved in the occurrence, the length of the disqualification being imposed, and/or how it can be lifted.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 54 of 85 Pg ID 1039 54
296. Disqualified recipients cannot determine whether they were improperly disqualified from benefits, or contest an improper disqualification, without knowing what underlying facts are alleged.
297. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification do not even tell Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members which of the five categories of “criminal justice disqualifications” originally listed in BEM 203 (and later divided between BEM 203 and BEM 204) allegedly applies to the individual being disqualified.
298. Because the different types of disqualifications originally listed in BEM 203 (and later divided between BEM 203 and BEM 204) are based on different criteria, apply to different benefit programs, are of varying duration, and have different options for reinstatement, disqualified recipients cannot determine whether they were improperly disqualified from benefits, or effectively contest an improper disqualification, without knowing which type of criminal justice disqualification is at issue in their case.
299. Defendant’s notices to individuals being disqualified as fugitive felons do not state what basis the Defendant has to believe that the individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement, and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony.
300. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices do not explain what “Manual Reference(s): BEM 203 [or 204], ERM 202” refers to or where the

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 55 of 85 Pg ID 1040 55
manuals can be accessed. 301. For “fugitive felon” disqualifications occurring between June 1, 2013
and July 14, 2013, Defendant’s notices failed to specify the Bridges Eligibility Manual (BEM) item that is the legal basis for Defendant’s actions, i.e. BEM 204, instead citing BEM 203, which, effective June 1, 2013, no longer contains the fugitive Felon disqualification policy.
302. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices do not specify which page(s) of the cited manual items apply to the individual’s disqualification.
303. DHS has or could obtain access to information regarding the type of criminal justice disqualification and underlying basis for the disqualification that is not included in the notice of denial, reduction, or termination of public assistance benefits.
304. The DHS computer eligibility system (known as “Bridges”) is programmed to show which of the five criminal justice disqualifications are applicable to an individual whose benefits have been denied, reduced, or terminated. However, that information is not included in the criminal justice disqualification notice.
305. Exhibit II is an accurate copy of some of the information available to DHS caseworkers on Bridges regarding the basis for an individual’s criminal justice disqualification.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 56 of 85 Pg ID 1041 56
306. DHS, through its computer interface with the Law Enforcement Information Network or other criminal justice databases, has information on the underlying basis for the disqualification, but does not provide that information in its notices. See Exhibit Y, p. 12-13.
307. For disqualifications based on a felony warrant for the person’s arrest, DHS does not disclose information that is available to DHS about the felony warrant when issuing the notice of denial, reduction, or termination of public assistance. For example, after this case was filed, DHS provided information to Plaintiff Barry about the alleged warrant and the procedure to resolve that warrant. None of that information was contained on any of the notices DHS sent to Plaintiff Barry.
308. In cases involving fugitive felons, DHS has instructed its employees not to provide information about the basis for the disqualification, other than the information that appears in the notice sent to the household.
309. In December 2012, Defendant’s Field Operations Administration issued a Memorandum instructing local DHS offices not to disclose “‘fugitive felon’ status information” to individuals who are disqualified from receiving public assistance based on DHS’ decision that the individual is a fugitive felon.
310. Exhibit JJ is an accurate copy of the December 2012 DHS Field

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 57 of 85 Pg ID 1042 57
Operations Administration Memorandum, FOA-2012-50, regarding the Fugitive Felon Match, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
311. DHS has provided DHS staff with training and a Job Aid that specifically directs DHS specialists (caseworkers) “NOT to inform a client of their fugitive felon status.” (Emphasis in original.)
312. Exhibit KK is an accurate copy of the Job Aid/training material provided to DHS staff regarding implementation of the fugitive felon computer match between DHS and Michigan State Police, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
313. When Plaintiffs and members of the Due Process Class contact their caseworkers for further information, DHS caseworkers are prohibited from providing information that would enable individuals to determine why their public assistance benefits have been denied, reduced, or terminated.
314. DHS’s prohibition against disclosure of basic information about the underlying bases for criminal justice disqualifications makes it more difficult – if not impossible – for individuals to address and resolve any underlying problems or to follow up to determine whether the information is accurate or not.
315. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices refer individuals to local law enforcement to resolve their criminal justice disqualification, but do not explain what the individual should ask law enforcement to do.

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 58 of 85 Pg ID 1043 58
316. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualifications do not explain whether or how any action by local law enforcement will “resolve” the person’s eligibility for public assistance.
317. Some types of criminal justice disqualifications – such as those for drug related felonies – cannot be “resolved” by law enforcement, as there is no action that law enforcement can take that would affect the disqualification. In other cases, criminal justice agencies may be able to address an underlying criminal justice issue, but the appropriate agency to contact is not local police, but rather probation or parole, police in another jurisdiction, or the Michigan State Police (whose involvement may, for example, be required to correct erroneous entries in LEIN).
318. Law enforcement officials cannot reverse DHS disqualifications or reinstate benefits to disqualified individuals.
319. Defendant’s computer interface is updated on a daily basis to identify individuals who no longer are identified by the Michigan State Police as meeting Defendant’s definition of a “fugitive felon.”
320. When a person who has been disqualified from receiving assistance as part of a household that is still receiving (reduced) assistance under the specific program from which the individual was disqualified, and when that person again becomes eligible, Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system is programmed to send a

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 59 of 85 Pg ID 1044 59
“task and reminder” communication to the DHS caseworker, telling the caseworker about the person’s updated status and instructing the caseworker to re-determine eligibility and benefits for the household. See Ex. JJ, p. 1.
321. Defendant’s Job Aid/training materials instruct caseworkers to update eligibility and reinstate benefits for a person automatically disqualified from assistance as a fugitive felon once that person no longer has an outstanding warrant for his or her arrest (by running an Eligibility Determination and Benefits calculation through Bridges and certifying or approving the results), but only if the disqualified person is living in a household that still receives assistance under the specific program(s) from which the individual was disqualified. See Ex. KK.
322. If the disqualified individual is not part of a household still receiving assistance, Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system, training materials, and policy do not instruct DHS employees to take any action once an individual who was disqualified no longer has an outstanding warrant.
323. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices fail to inform individuals that resolving any outstanding warrants with law enforcement will not result in automatic reinstatement of public assistance if the individual does not live in a household that continues receiving public assistance for other household members during the time that the individual was disqualified from that assistance.
324. The notices do not tell individuals what they must do to regain public

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 60 of 85 Pg ID 1045 60
assistance in that situation. Defendant’s Denial of Food Assistance to Individuals Who Are Eligible for Food Assistance Under Federal Law
Federal Mandate to Provide Food Assistance to All Eligible Households and to Use National Standards for Food Assistance Eligibility
325. DHS must provide Food Assistance to individuals and households in Michigan that apply for Food Assistance and meet the eligibility criteria and requirements set forth in federal SNAP law. 7 U.S.C. 2014(a).
326. Congress has mandated uniform national standards of eligibility for participation in SNAP. 7 U.S.C. 2014(b).
327. As a condition for participating in SNAP, state agencies responsible for implementing SNAP, including DHS, are prohibited from imposing any standards of eligibility other than those set by the federal government. 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5).
328. DHS must determine eligibility for FAP, which uses federal SNAP funding, in accordance with eligibility standards and requirements set forth in the federal SNAP statute and its implementing regulations.
Federal Eligibility Standards Related to Disqualification of Fleeing Felons 329. Under federal SNAP law, individuals are ineligible to receive Food Assistance for any period in which they are “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 61 of 85 Pg ID 1046 61
they are fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony...” 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
330. Federal courts consistently have held that the mere existence of an outstanding warrant is insufficient to establish that an individual is fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, since the term “fleeing” is understood to mean the intentional evasion of arrest or prosecution, custody, or confinement.
331. Under federal SNAP law, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to define the terms “fleeing” and “actively seeking” for purposes of 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) to ensure that consistent procedures are used by state agencies throughout the United States, and to ensure that state agencies only disqualify “individuals whom law enforcement authorities are actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual.”
332. While the United States Department of Agriculture has yet to issue final regulations on this issue, there are proposed regulations that are consistent with the judicial interpretation of the term “fleeing.”
333. The proposed federal regulations authorize the state agency, here DHS, to disqualify an individual from Food Assistance as a fleeing felon only if either:
a) the state agency verifies that an outstanding felony warrant has been

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 62 of 85 Pg ID 1047 62
issued for one of three specified escape- or flight-related felonies (escape, flight to avoid prosecution or confinement, or flight-escape, as identified by the Uniform Offense Classification Codes 4901, 4902, and 4999, respectively), and a law enforcement officer has presented the outstanding warrant to the state agency; or b) the state agency, in the absence of an outstanding felony warrant for escape or flight, verifies and has documented evidence that four other specific factors exist: (i) the existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the individual; (ii) the person is aware of, or should reasonably have been able to expect that, a warrant has or would have been issued; (iii) the individual has taken some action to avoid being arrested or jailed; and (iv) a law enforcement agency is actively seeking the person. 76 Fed. Reg. 51913 (proposed 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n)). 334. Under the proposed regulations, the state agency may verify that law enforcement is actively seeking the person by means of either: a) a law enforcement agency statement that it intends to enforce an outstanding felony warrant against the person within 20 days of submitting a request for location or other information about the specific person; or b) a law enforcement agency statement that it intends to enforce an outstanding felony warrant against the individual within 30 days of a request

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 63 of 85 Pg ID 1048 63
for information about the warrant from the state agency, together with confirmation by the law enforcement agency that it has taken action to execute, or attempt to execute, the warrant within that 30 day period. 335. Under the proposed regulations, when a felony warrant for escape or flight is presented to the state agency for purposes of locating the person, no further evidence that law enforcement is actively seeking the person is required. 336. Under the proposed regulations, unless there is a felony warrant for escape or flight, “the mere existence of a warrant naming an individual who is a SNAP recipient or applicant does not provide sufficient information to determine that the individual is actually a fleeing felon who is being actively sought by a law enforcement agency.” 76 Fed. Reg. 51913 at *6. Before denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance, the state agency must verify that the four other factors exist.
State Law Automatic Disqualification of Alleged Fugitive Felons 337. Michigan passed legislation, effective October 18, 2011, providing that DHS shall not grant public assistance to any individual who is subject to arrest under an outstanding arrest warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in any jurisdiction. 2011 P.A. 198, codified as M.C.L. 400.10b. 338. Under state law, DHS and the Michigan State Police (MSP) are required to develop an automated program to compare data and identify public

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 64 of 85 Pg ID 1049 64
assistance recipients who have an outstanding warrant arising from a crime designated as a felony or punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an extradition warrant arising from a criminal charge against the individual in another jurisdiction. M.C.L. 400.10c, as amended by 2011 P.A. 198.
339. The automated computer program (“fugitive felon interface”) to disqualify public assistance applicants and recipients based on the existence of outstanding warrants became operational in January 2013.
340. Pursuant to federal law, the fugitive felon interface also automatically provides current address information for recipients of DHS-administered programs, including Food Assistance, to be released to the MSP, for purposes of assisting law enforcement officials in locating and arresting individuals with outstanding felony warrants, or probation or parole violations. DHS information on applicants not currently receiving assistance is not released to law enforcement through the interface. Defendant’s Denial of Food Assistance to Individuals Entitled to Food
Assistance Under Federal Eligibility Standards, Who Are Not Fleeing from Justice and Are Not Actively Being Sought by Law Enforcement
341. Michigan has failed to follow federal law that specifies which individuals may be disqualified as “fleeing felons,” 7 U.S.C. 2015(k), instead setting its own standards for identifying a “fugitive felon.”
342. Defendant’s standards for identifying fugitive felons disqualify

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 65 of 85 Pg ID 1050 65
individuals from receiving FAP benefits even when they qualify for Food Assistance under all federal standards and requirements.
343. Defendant, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5), has imposed additional eligibility requirements for Food Assistance beyond those established under federal law, thereby denying Food Assistance to individuals who legally are eligible to receive it.
344. Defendant’s policy on disqualification of alleged felons, operationalized through the fugitive felon interface and Bridges eligibility system, provides for disqualification from Food Assistance if the individual: (1) is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against the individual, (2) is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising from a criminal charge in the jurisdiction that issued the warrant, or (3) admits to being a fugitive felon. BEM 203, p. 1-2.
345. Under state law and Defendant’s policy, individuals will be disqualified from receiving FAP and other benefits as fugitive felons without any finding that they are actively being sought by law enforcement and that they are actually fleeing.
346. Defendant’s computer matches with the MSP automatically result in Defendant’s Bridges eligibility system printing and mailing computer-generated criminal justice disqualification notices to individuals who are identified as being

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 66 of 85 Pg ID 1051 66
subject to arrest on a felony warrant, without any effort to determine: a) whether the individual has received notice or is aware that a warrant has been issued; b) whether the individual is intentionally seeking to evade prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a felony; or c) whether the jurisdiction in which the warrant allegedly was issued is actively seeking the individual for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual, or for the purpose of jailing or imprisoning the individual, for a felony. 347. When Defendant’s Bridges computer system generates and mails a
criminal justice disqualification notice, it also automatically schedules the reduction or termination of Food Assistance benefits that Defendant has been providing to the disqualified individual and other members (if any) of the disqualified individual’s household.
348. As a result of Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification policy and practices, Defendant is disqualifying individuals from Food Assistance and denying or terminating Food Assistance to those individuals in situations in which:
a) the warrant has been issued in the individual’s name, but does not actually apply to the individual; b) the individual has not been notified about the existence of the warrant or

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 67 of 85 Pg ID 1052 67
charges from which the individual allegedly is fleeing; c) there has been no finding that the individual has taken flight for purposes of intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a felony crime; and d) law enforcement officials are not actively seeking the person for arrest, prosecution, or incarceration in connection with a felony, or for extradition. 349. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s Field Operations Administration, DHS local offices are required to contact the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) if an individual who has been disqualified as a fugitive felon comes to the DHS office. See Ex. JJ. 350. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s OIG, when OIG agents are contacted by local offices because a fugitive felon is at the local DHS office, the OIG agents will contact law enforcement to determine whether the fugitive felon will be arrested. 351. Under written instructions issued by Defendant’s OIG, when OIG agents are informed by law enforcement that a “fugitive felon” who has appeared at the DHS office will not be arrested, the individuals nevertheless remain disqualified from receiving assistance and the OIG agents must tell the disqualified fugitive felon to surrender to local law enforcement. 352. Exhibit LL is an accurate copy of the written instructions issued by

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 68 of 85 Pg ID 1053 68
Defendant’s OIG, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act. 353. Under Defendant’s policies, DHS will not contact law enforcement
officials in an effort to verify the individual’s fugitive felon status unless and until the individual requests a hearing, at which time only the existence of an outstanding warrant is verified.
354. Exhibit MM is an accurate copy of emails, released under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act, regarding the verification of information at the time an individual requests a hearing regarding a criminal justice disqualification.
355. Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification practices are not authorized by 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) or proposed regulations, and therefore constitute the imposition of an additional eligibility requirement for the receipt of Food Assistance in violation of 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5).
356. Denying, reducing or terminating Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a determination that the recipient is fleeing from justice, results in disqualification of individuals who are eligible for Food Assistance under federal SNAP law and thus violate the rights under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) of Plaintiffs and members of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass.
357. The SNAP law provisions that prohibit state agencies from imposing

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 69 of 85 Pg ID 1054 69
any standards of eligibility other than those set by the federal government – 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) – are preemption provisions pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
358. When state laws or policies regarding FAP conflict with federal laws governing SNAP, the federal laws take precedence over the state laws or policies, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
359. When state laws or policies regarding FAP pose an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting legislation, the federal laws take precedence over the state laws or policies, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
360. Because federal SNAP law preempts M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy, Defendant may not deny, reduce or terminate Food Assistance to Plaintiffs or member of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a determination that the recipient is “fleeing” from justice as that term is defined under federal law.
Irreparable Harm 361. Plaintiffs and members of the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass are, by definition, indigent individuals who, due to unemployment, disability, family circumstances, or other factors, depend on public

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 70 of 85 Pg ID 1055 70
assistance, including Food Assistance, to meet their subsistence needs, and to avoid hunger and obtain basic nutrition.
362. Plaintiffs and members of the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass have suffered or are at imminent risk of suffering the loss of benefits under needs-based public assistance programs, including Food Assistance, which they require to meet their subsistence needs, and to avoid hunger and obtain basic nutrition.
363. The denial of due process in this case is irreparable harm per se. CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I – Violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
(Named Plaintiffs and Due Process Class) 364. Defendant is violating Plaintiffs’ and Due Process Class members’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by denying, reducing, or terminating needs-based public assistance benefits using criminal justice disqualification notices that fail to detail (a) the nature and duration of the intended action; (b) the factual and legal bases for the denial, reduction, or termination; and (c) exactly what individuals must do to lift the disqualification, to restore public assistance eligibility and to have benefits reinstated. 365. Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to due process under the

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 71 of 85 Pg ID 1056 71
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are enforceable under 42 U.S.C.
1983.
Count II – Violation of Federal SNAP Law Requiring Due Process in Notice and Hearing Procedures Before Denying, Reducing,
or Terminating Food Assistance (Named Plaintiffs and Due Process Class)
366. Defendant is violating the individual named Plaintiffs’, Westside
Mothers members’, and Due Process Class members’ rights under federal SNAP
law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and
273.13(a), by denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance benefits, using
criminal justice disqualification notices that fail to detail (a) the nature and
duration of the intended action; (b) the factual and legal bases for the denial,
reduction, or termination; and (c) exactly what individuals must do to lift the
disqualification, to restore public assistance eligibility and to have benefits
reinstated.
367. Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to meaningful due process as
required by federal SNAP law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented
by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Count III – Michigan State Law and Defendant’s Policy of Automatically Disqualifying People Who Have Outstanding Felony Warrants Violates
Federal SNAP Law (Named Plaintiffs and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass)
368. M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s implementing fugitive felon policy

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 72 of 85 Pg ID 1057 72
(previously found in BEM 203 and now published in BEM 204) disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match,” without any finding that the person is actively sought by law enforcement or is consciously evading arrest or prosecution, and therefore impose requirements for Food Assistance eligibility that are not contained in federal law.
369. 7 U.S.C. 2014 (b) and 2020(e)(5) prohibit states from imposing eligibility requirements for receiving Food Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus explicitly prohibit additional state eligibility requirements, including the requirement found in M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy that individuals not have an outstanding felony warrant, regardless of whether they are intentionally evading arrest, confinement or prosecution and regardless if whether they are actively sought by law enforcement.
370. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if there has been a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
371. 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) gives Plaintiffs and subclass members the right to receive Food Assistance, provided they have applied for the assistance and are

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 73 of 85 Pg ID 1058 73
eligible under the national standards required by 7 U.S.C. 2014(b); 2020(e)(5); 2015(k); and 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n).
372. Defendant’s fugitive felon policies and practices, which implement M.C.L. 400.10b, violate Plaintiffs’ and subclass members’ right to receive Food Assistance under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a), which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Count IV – Preemption: Defendant’s Policy Automatically Disqualifying People Who Have Outstanding Felony Warrants Violates the Supremacy Clause Because Federal SNAP Law Preempts Both M.C.L. 400.10b and
Defendant’s “Fugitive Felon” Policy (Named Plaintiffs and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass) 373. M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s implementing fugitive felon policy (previously found in BEM 203 and now published in BEM 204) conflict with the federal SNAP act because the Michigan law and Defendant’s policy disqualify people from Food Assistance based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant for the person’s arrest, as identified through a computerized “match,” without any finding that the person is actively sought by law enforcement or is consciously evading arrest or prosecution. 374. The SNAP act, through 7 U.S.C. 2014 (b) and 2020(e)(5), clearly provides that states may not impose eligibility requirements for receiving Food Assistance that are not established by federal law, and thus explicitly preempts additional state eligibility requirements, including M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s fugitive felon policy (BEM 204) requiring that individuals not have an

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 74 of 85 Pg ID 1059 74
outstanding felony warrant, regardless of whether they are intentionally evading arrest, confinement or prosecution and regardless of whether they are actively sought by law enforcement.
375. Under federal law disqualifying fleeing felons, an individual with an outstanding felony warrant can be disqualified from Food Assistance, but only if there has been a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual, and that the individual knows his or her apprehension is sought and is intentionally fleeing from justice. 7 U.S.C. 2015(k).
376. Accordingly, M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy (BEM 204) are preempted by federal law under 7 U.S.C. 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) prohibiting states from imposing their own eligibility standards), 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) (establishing federal standards for fleeing felon disqualifications), and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, because Congress has established comprehensive federal standards and requirements for Food Assistance eligibility (including standards related to felony warrants), and because M.C.L. 400.10b and Defendant’s “fugitive felon” policy impose additional eligibility standards not set forth in federal law, conflict with federal law, and frustrate the achievement of Congress’s full objectives.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 377. Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 75 of 85 Pg ID 1060 75
A. Certify this case as a class action on behalf of the Due Process Class and as a class action on behalf of the Automatic Food Assistance Disqualification Subclass described in this Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), and name Plaintiffs Walter Barry, Heather Woodward, Donitha Copeland, and Kenneth Anderson as class representatives;
B. Declare that Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices and hearing procedures violate the rights of the individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and Due Process Class members to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
C. Declare that Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices and hearing procedures violate federal SNAP law, including 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), which both implements the federal constitutional due process requirements and provides an independent legal basis for requiring procedural protections;
D. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from continuing to deny, reduce, or terminate public assistance benefits to the individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and Due Process Class members based on criminal justice disqualifications without providing notices that detail: (1) which of the five types of criminal justice

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 76 of 85 Pg ID 1061 76
disqualifications is at issue; (2) the name of the household member whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification; (3) the date, place, and nature of both the alleged crime and the resulting conviction or warrant; (4) the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued; (5) the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for further information; (6) where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement, and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony; and (7) where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual;
E. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from continuing to deny, reduce, or terminate public assistance benefits to individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and Due Process Class members based on criminal justice disqualifications without providing notices that inform them about the length of the disqualification period, whether benefits can be reinstated, and, if so, what steps the disqualified individual must take to obtain reinstatement.
F. Order Defendant to: a. prospectively reinstate assistance or benefits to individual

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 77 of 85 Pg ID 1062 77
named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and Due Process Class members whose needs-based public assistance benefits have been unlawfully reduced or terminated without due process of law; and
b. resume processing the applications of individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers, and Due Process Class members whose applications were unlawfully denied without due process of law; G. Declare that Defendant’s policy and practice of disqualifying individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a felony warrant, without a finding that the individual is a fleeing felon under 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony, and for which the person is actively sought by law enforcement, violates the rights of individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and subclass members’ rights to Food Assistance under 7 U.S.C. 2014(a) and (b), and 2020(e)(5); H. Declare that Defendant’s policy and practice of disqualifying individuals from receiving Food Assistance based on the mere existence of a warrant, without a finding that the individual is a fleeing felon under 7

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 78 of 85 Pg ID 1063 78
U.S.C. 2015(k) who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony, and for which the person is actively sought by law enforcement, is preempted by federal SNAP law and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution;
I. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from denying, reducing, or terminating Food Assistance to named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers, and members of the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass based on the mere existence of an outstanding felony or extradition warrant without a finding that the individual is a “fleeing felon,” as that term is defined under federal law, who is intentionally evading prosecution, arrest, custody, or confinement in connection with a crime that is a felony and for which the individual is being actively sought by law enforcement under 7 U.S.C. 2015(k) and implementing regulations;
J. Order Defendant to: a. prospectively reinstate assistance or benefits to individual
named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass members whose Food Assistance has been unlawfully reduced or terminated based on Defendant’s fugitive felon policy; and
b. resume processing the applications of individual named

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 79 of 85 Pg ID 1064 79
Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers, and Automatic FAP disqualification Subclass members whose applications were unlawfully denied based on Defendant’s fugitive felon policy; K. Order Defendant to restore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and pursuant to Defendant’s policy in BEM 406 of retroactively correcting under-issuances of benefits, all Food Assistance benefits unlawfully withheld from individual named Plaintiffs, members of Westside Mothers, and members of both the Due Process Class and Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass, up to 12 months prior to the filing of this lawsuit, as a result of the criminal justice disqualification notices and fugitive felon policy and practice enjoined by the Court; L. Order Defendant to provide notice to all class and subclass members, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), of any relief granted by the Court in this case and of any additional rights or administrative remedies for obtaining benefits or assistance wrongfully denied, reduced, or terminated without due process of law or in violation the United States Constitution or federal SNAP law, including but not limited to the right to restoration of Food Assistance benefits under 7 U.S.C. 2020(b), 2020(e)(11), and 2023(b), and BEM 406; M. Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorney’s fees under

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 80 of 85 Pg ID 1065 80
42 U.S.C. 1988; and N. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.
Dated: October 28, 2013

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 81 of 85 Pg ID 1066
81
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jacqueline Doig_________ Jacqueline Doig (P37105) Terri L. Stangl (P35257) Elan S. Nichols (P57463) CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 320 S. Washington Ave – 2nd Floor Saginaw, MI 48607 T: (989)755-3120 jdoig@ccj-mi.org enichols@ccj-mi.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/s/ Miriam J. Aukerman______ Miriam J. Aukerman (P631615) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN 1514 Wealthy SE, Suite 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 T: (616) 301-0930 maukerman@aclumich.org Attorney for Plaintiffs

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 82 of 85 Pg ID 1067 82
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 28, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing
paper with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send
notification of such filing to the following: Counsel for Defendant, William R.
Morris, Joshua S. Smith, and Kristin M. Heyse.
/s/Elan S. Nichols_____________ Jacqueline Doig (P37105) Terri L. Stangl (P35257) Elan S. Nichols (P57463) CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 320 South Washington Ave – 2nd Floor Saginaw, MI 48607 (989) 755-3120; Fax: (989) 755-3558 jdoig@ccj-mi.org tstangl@ccj-mi.org enichols@ccj-mi.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 83 of 85 Pg ID 1068

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 84 of 85 Pg ID 1069

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-PJK Doc # 40 Filed 10/28/13 Pg 85 of 85 Pg ID 1070

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v.
Maura Corrigan,
Defendant.
------------------------~'
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S [81] MOTION TO DISMISS AND I OR FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' [39] AMENDED MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS, AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS' [49] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action against defendant
Maura Corrigan, in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan
Department of Human Services (hereinafter "DHS"), challenging
Michigan's law and policy governing disqualification of "fugitive felons"
from various forms of public assistance, including federal food
assistance. Under that law and policy, defendant disqualifies
applicants and recipients of federally-funded public assistance benefits

based on a match between the applicant's I recipient's name and a record of an outstanding felony warrant in the Michigan Law Enforcement Information Network (hereinafter "LEIN''). Defendant informs persons of their disqualification by means of a written notice. Plaintiffs challenge that notice as failing to provide the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as failing to meet the notice requirements of the Food and Nutrition Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C § 2011 et seq. Plaintiffs also contend the Michigan law and DHS policy themselves violate and are preempted by the Act.
Before the Court are defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81), plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39), and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to defendant Woodward only, and deny defendant's motion with respect to the remainder of the relief sought; grant plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class; and grant plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
2

I. Factual background Congress first established a permanent Food Stamp Program in
1964. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964). The purpose of the program was "to promote the general welfare" and "to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." Id. § 2. Congress made significant revisions to the program in 1977. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). In 2008, the Food Stamp Program was renamed the "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program" (hereinafter "SNAP'') and the Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (hereinafter "SNAP Act").I Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 1092 (2008).
SNAP IS administered through state programs, although the benefits are funded by the federal government. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013, 2020(a), (d), (e). The state programs are governed by criteria set forth in the SNAP Act. Those criteria include the standards for qualification for and disqualification from SNAP benefits. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014-2015.
1 The parties have referred throughout this case to the Food and Nutrition Act as the "SNAP Act." The Court will do likewise to avoid confusion.
3

The eligibility standards in state plans must be "in accordance with
sections 2014 and 2015 of [the SNAP Act] and "include no additional
requirements imposed by the State agency." Id. § 2020(e)(5). States are
expressly prohibited from imposing "any other standards of eligibility as
a condition for participating in the program," Id. § 2014(b).
Of relevance here, section 2015(k) provides that:
No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to participate m the supplemental nutrition assistance program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a member of that or any other household during any period during which the individual is--
(A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor under the law of New Jersey; or (B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under a Federal or State law.
7 U.S. C. § 2015(k)(1).
Michigan's SNAP program, titled Food Assistance Program
(hereinafter "FAP''), is administered by DHS. DHS also administers
4

other public assistance programs, including the Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Day Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program.
Since October 8, 2011, Michigan's Social Welfare Act prohibits DHS from granting public assistance benefits to any person who is "subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in this or any other jurisdiction." 2011 P.A. 198, codified at Mich. Comp. Laws§ 400.10b. The Act also requires DHS and Michigan State Police (hereinafter ''MSP'') to develop an automated program that compares DHS' list of public assistance recipients with MSP's information regarding outstanding felony warrants or extradition warrants. Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c. That program, dubbed the "fugitive felon interface," has been operational since January 2013. (Dkt. 49-2 & 49-3, Ex. A & B to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.)
DHS' computer eligibility system is known as "Bridges." Pursuant to the policies set forth in its Bridges Eligibility and Bridges Administrative Manuals [hereinafter "BEM'' and "BAM"], DHS disqualifies persons from food assistance benefits who are (1) subject to
5

arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge, (2) subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising from a criminal charge, or (3) admitted fugitive felons. (Dkt. 49-5 & 496, Exs. D & E to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 204); Dkt. 49-7 & 49-8, Ex. F & G to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 203).) Bridges automatically identifies matches between the DHS benefit list and the MSP warrant information. Bridges then sets the benefit applicant's I recipient's file to close, generates a criminal justice disqualification notice that is sent to the applicant I recipient, and automatically schedules the reduction or termination of benefits. (Dkt. 49-14, Ex. M to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 211113); Dkt. 49-15, Ex. N to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 511113); Dkt. 49-16, Ex. 0 to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 711113); Dkt. 49-17, Ex. P to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 2-3.)
The individual plaintiffs in this case are Walter Barry, Heather Woodward, Donitha Copeland, Kenneth Anderson, and Westside Mothers, a non-profit organization with 450-500 dues-paying members that advocates on behalf of public assistance applicants and recipients. Barry, Woodward, Copeland, and Anderson have all received at least one criminal justice disqualification notice and have been threatened
6

with reduction or termination of food assistance benefits, or have
experienced actual reduction or termination of benefits, based on the
criminal justice disqualification.
Plaintiffs bring four counts in their Second Amended Complaint
(Dkt. 70). Counts I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S. C. §
1983:
• Count I: Denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs allege defendant's criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, before denial I reduction I termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of constitutional law.
• Count II: Denial of due process under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program Act ("SNAP Act"), 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Plaintiffs allege the criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs' rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before denial I reduction I termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of statutory law.
• Count III: Violation of rights to receive food assistance under the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b, as well as defendant's policies enacted pursuant to that law, violate plaintiffs' federal statutory right to food assistance benefits.
7

• Count IV: Preemption of Mich. Comp. Laws§ 400.10b and defendant's fugitive felon policy by the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege the SNAP Act expressly preempts Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b and defendant's fugitive felon policy and practices.
The Court will begin its analysis with the issues of whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and whether their claims are moot. The Court will then address plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the remaining issues in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
II. Standing I mootness Defendant argues for dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims for lack of
standing. Defendant further maintains that the claims of plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland (and therefore, Westside Mothers) are moot, and should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. xi.)
A. Standing It is an "essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III" that a plaintiff must have standing to bring a case in federal court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
8

(1992). Constitutional standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show (1) a "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent'' injury, that is (2) "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct, and is (3) "likely'' to be "redressed by a favorable decision." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61. An association has standing "when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
The relevant time for determining standing is the outset of the litigation. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (defining standing as "the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the elements of standing must be supported throughout the litigation. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. Thus, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant's conduct may suffice." Id. But at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff
9

must "set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts" supporting the existence of an injury in fact. Id.
Defendant argues that the individual plaintiffs cannot show the first element of standing- injury in fact. Westside Mothers thus cannot show the first element of associational standing, as its only member among the individual plaintiffs, Copeland, lacks standing herself.
When, as here, "the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction" and the plaintiff is the "object of the action," then "there is ordinarily little question that the action ... has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing ... the action will redress it." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62. Indeed, the individual plaintiffs here were the objects of the two actions they challenge: notice of disqualification from public assistance benefits, and disqualification from food assistance benefits. All four individual plaintiffs assert the same two injuries: (1) procedural injury, from defendant's allegedly inadequate notices, and (2) economic injury, in the form of actual or threatened loss of food assistance benefits, from defendant's automatic felon disqualification policy. (Dkt. 85, Pls.' Resp. 1.) Plaintiff Westside Mothers asserts standing based on economic
10

injury: namely, that its members' ability to pay dues is directly affected by their loss of food assistance under defendant's challenged policies. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ~~ 200-201.) Westside Mothers also claims associational standing through plaintiff Copeland.
1. Barry
Plaintiff Barry filed the initial class action complaint in this matter on July 25, 2013. (Dkt. 1.) At that time, he had an outstanding felony warrant in his name, and a disqualification from food assistance that went into effect on June 1, 2013. (Dkt. 50-2, Ex. S to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) Barry did not receive his July food assistance until July 26, 2013 - two days after he filed the complaint, and one day after he moved for class certification. (Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended Compl.) At the time he brought his claim, Barry suffered several mJunes in fact: a procedural injury, from the allegedly inadequate notice, and economic injuries, consisting of defendant's withholding of his July 2013 food assistance, the threat of having to repay those benefits, once received, if he lost at the hearing on his disqualification, and the threatened termination of all future benefits. Barry thus had standing to bring the claims in this suit.
11

Defendant maintains Barry lacks standing because he has suffered no injury in fact. (Dkt. 81, Def.'s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1.) Defendant apparently means that because Barry has received food assistance "every month since June 1, 2013," he has suffered no injury. (See Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 1.) But defendant fails to counter evidence that (1) Barry's food assistance had been withheld at the time he filed the complaint, (2) Barry's disqualification had not been resolved at the time he filed the complaint, leaving him exposed to the possibility of having to repay benefits and to termination of future benefits, and (3) Barry suffered a procedural injury from defendant's notice.
2. Woodward
Woodward applied for food assistance in July 2013 and received a denial notice, based on a criminal justice disqualification, on August 1, 2013. (Dkt. 50-8, Ex. Y to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) Woodward joined this action in the Amended Complaint filed on August 13, 2013. (Dkt. 7.) At that time, Woodward remained disqualified from receiving food assistance. She therefore has established an injury in fact (both the
12

procedural injury from the notice and the economic injury from the disqualification) and has standing to bring this suit.
Defendant argues that Woodward lacks standing because (1) she was denied food assistance as an applicant, not a recipient, of benefits, and (2) she currently receives food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 3.) But neither argument bears on standing: the first goes to Woodward's adequacy as a class representative, while the second goes to mootness (see below).
3. Copeland
Copeland applied and was approved for food assistance in September 2012. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ~~ 137-38.) She received a criminal justice disqualification notice dated December 31, 2012, terminating her food assistance effective February 1, 2013. (Dkt. 70-21, Ex. T to Second Amended Compl.) Copeland reapplied and received a notice dated February 12, 2013, denying benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification. (Dkt. 70-22, Ex. U to Second Amended Compl.) Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and motion for class certification on October 28, 2013, adding Copeland to both. (Dkt. 38.)
13

At that time, Copeland still had an outstanding felony warrant and remained disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits. She therefore has established procedural and economic injuries, and has standing to bring her claims.
Defendant argues that Copeland lacks standing because she (1) failed to request an administrative hearing, and (2) has moved out of state. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 3.) The only authority defendant provides for the proposition that Copeland had to exhaust her state administrative remedies in order to have standing to bring this suit is an unpublished order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (See Dkt. 75-4, Ex. 3 to Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) Defendant does not explain, nor can the Court discern, why this case is relevant. In fact, as explained below, there is a strong presumption against requiring a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Copeland's failure to request a state administrative hearing on her disqualification does not preclude her from bringing this suit. As for Copeland's relocation to Alaska, that argument goes to mootness, not standing.
14

4. Anderson
It is undisputed that Anderson still has an outstanding felony warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance benefits. Defendant only argues that Anderson lacks standing based on Anderson's failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 3.) As with Copeland, Anderson's failure to request a state administrative hearing does not affect his standing to bring this action.
5. Westside Mothers
Because Copeland had standing at the time Westside Mothers joined the case, Westside Mothers has associational standing.
The case for Westside Mothers' independent standing, however, is more difficult, and turns on an element of standing not addressed by the parties: redressability. Westside Mothers has met the injury element by asserting economic injury in the form of lost dues payments from members. However, when "a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else . . . causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the
15

response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. In such circumstances, standing "is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish." Id.
Here, a decision in favor of plaintiffs would plausibly lead to some members of Westside Mothers receiving food assistance benefits. As a result, those members could reasonably be expected to have more money to spend on other, non-food expenses. But the alleged economic injury to Westside Mothers can only be remedied if those members decide to spend a portion of that money as dues. That is, the redressability of Westside Mothers' economic injury depends on decisions beyond the Court's control. While the scenario here is not precisely analogous to that in Defenders of Wildlife - where redressability hinged on the decisions of third parties not before the Court - it is close enough to require more from Westside Mothers to show it meets the redressability element of standing. The Court therefore finds that Westside Mothers has associational, but not independent, standing to bring this action.
B. Mootness
16

Courts have often described mootness as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189. On this view, the relationship between standing and mootness is as follows: "The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Id. If the plaintiffs personal interest, or "stake in the outcome of the lawsuit," is eliminated during the litigation, "the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot." Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013).
There are recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including the exception, invoked here by plaintiffs, for claims that are "capable of repetition yet evading review." See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 191. This exception applies "when (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again." Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2004). The party asserting that this exception applies has the burden of establishing both elements. Id. But it is not necessary to show that "recurrence of the
17

dispute [is] more probable than not," only that "the controversy [is] capable of repetition." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (1988).
1. Barry
Defendant argues Barry's claims are moot because "there is no Department action against his food assistance, he no longer has a felony warrant in his name and he is receiving benefits." (Dkt. 81, Def.'s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 6.) While it is undisputed that Barry is receiving benefits, it also appears undisputed that he has a second outstanding felony warrant in his name. (Dkt. 79-8, Ex. G to Pls.' Reply in Support of Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 86, Def.'s Sur-reply to Amended Mot. Cert. Class 4, 6.) At the hearing on these motions, defendant's counsel stated that defendant had been advised by email that all of Barry's warrants had been resolved. Defendant has not, however, proffered the email or any other evidence that Barry's second warrant has, in fact, been resolved. Barry's claims are therefore not moot - there is a reasonable expectation that he will be again subject to defendant's criminal disqualification policy and notice.
2. Woodward
18

Defendant maintains that Woodward's claims have become moot, because she "no longer appears as a fugitive felon'' and receives food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 81, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 6.) In support, defendant points to the affidavit of Dale Shaw, a Cash Assistance Senior Policy Analyst at DHS. (Dkt. 74-2, Ex. 1 to Def.'s Resp. to Pis.' Amended Mot. Cert. Class [hereinafter "Shaw Aff.'') Shaw states that Woodward "is not currently listed as a fugitive felon." (Id.) He further states that Woodward applied for food assistance on August 11, 2014. (Id.) On that same day, "[i]t appears the caseworker changed her FF [sc. fugitive felon] status from yes to no," but "there are no notes ... as to whether the caseworker verified that she had resolved her FF status." Woodward was approved for food assistance benefits on September 4, 2014. (Id.)
Woodward's outstanding felony warrant was apparently related to her alleged theft of exercise equipment from her father's house. While her father has submitted a declaration stating that he does not wish to pursue charges against Woodward, and has advised police accordingly (Dkt. 52, Ex. YY to Pis.' Mot. Sum. J.), it is not clear from the record whether the warrant has, in fact, been resolved.
19

Plaintiffs do not, however, assert that Woodward still has an outstanding warrant. Rather, they maintain Woodward's claims are not moot based on her ongoing interest in receiving declaratory and notice relief that would allow her to recover food assistance benefits she lost while disqualified. (Dkt. 79, Pls.' Reply in Support of Mot. Class. Cert. 9).
Because Woodward is currently receiving food assistance benefits and is not at risk of disqualification based on an outstanding felony warrant, she no longer has a personal stake in the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. Under Green u. Mansour, declaratory relief against a state runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of a continuing or threatened violation of federal law. 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985). And the notice relief sought by plaintiffs cannot stand on its own, but only "escape[s] the Eleventh Amendment bar'' if it is ancillary to another type of relief. Green, 474 U.S. at 71. Given, then, that neither declaratory nor notice relief would be available to Woodward, her alleged interest in such relief cannot keep her claims alive in this case. Woodward's claims are therefore moot.
3. Copeland and Westside Mothers
20

Defendant maintains Copeland's claims are moot because she no longer has an outstanding felony warrant and has moved to Alaska. (Dkt. 81, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 6.) Plaintiffs counter there is a reasonable expectation that Copeland will be agam subject to disqualification (and notice thereof), because (1) her warrant was dismissed without prejudice, (2) that warrant was the result of someone stealing Copeland's identity, and that person could commit further crimes using Copeland's identity, and (3) Copeland will return to Michigan in November 2014.
Whether Copeland's claims are moot is a close question. Copeland has submitted a declaration in which she states that she moved to Alaska for seasonal employment and intends to return to Michigan thereafter. (Dkt. 83, Ex. E to Pls.' Reply in Support of Mot. Summ. J.,
Second Copeland Dec. 1 2 [hereinafter "Second Copeland Dec.''].)
Copeland notified DHS of her move to Alaska and expects to reapply for food assistance benefits upon her return to Michigan, as she does not
have employment arranged in Michigan. (ld. 11 4-5.) On the basis of
Copeland's declaration, the Court finds a reasonable expectation that
21

she will not be disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits on the basis of her residency.
Still, Copeland must show there is a reasonable expectation she will again be subject to defendant's fugitive felon disqualification policy. Again, she need not show it is more likely than not she will be subject to the disqualification policy. Honig, 484 U.S. at 319 n.6. Copeland raises the possibility that her felony warrant could be reinstated, and that her identity could again be used in the commission of a felony. The facts in Barry's case are certainly suggestive of the latter possibility: at least two felony warrants have issued in his name for acts he did not commit. Although it seems less likely that Copeland's warrant will be reinstated, the two possibilities together - of reinstatement of Copeland's felony warrant, and of a new warrant issuing in Copeland's name - are enough to create a reasonable expectation that Copeland "faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the same controversy in the future." United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980). Copeland's claims are therefore not moot. Because Copeland's claims are not moot, Westside Mothers' claims are similarly not moot.
22

4. Anderson
Defendant does not challenge Anderson's claims as moot, and with good reason, as Anderson still has an outstanding felony warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance benefits.
In sum, of the five named plaintiffs, only Woodward's claims are moot. Defendant's motion to dismiss thus cannot succeed on mootness grounds.
Even if the claims of all named plaintiffs were moot, this case would nonetheless survive defendant's motion under the "special mootness rules [that] exist for class actions." Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 1993). It is well-established in this Circuit that mooting the named plaintiffs' claims while a motion for class certification is pending does not moot the case. See Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 399 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2005); Dozier v. Haverman, No. 14-12455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *25-36 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014) (thoroughly surveying relevant cases).
Here, plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland joined in the motion for class certification before being approved for food assistance -
23

the act that defendant maintains mooted their claims. Barry's food assistance benefits were reinstated the day after he filed his motion for class certification. (Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended Compl.) Woodward joined the First Amended Class Action Complaint on August 13, 2013, and the proposed Amended Motion to Certify Class on October 28, 2013. (Dkt. 7, 39.) Her fugitive felon status was changed in DHS' records on August 11, 2014, and she was approved for food assistance benefits on September 4, 2014. (Shaw Mf. ~ 5.) Copeland joined the proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint and the Amended Motion to Certify Class on October 28, 2013. (Dkt. 39, 40.) Her felony warrant was dismissed without prejudice on November 19, 2013. (Dkt. 79-9, Ex. H to Pls.' Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class.) Copeland's food assistance benefits were approved thereafter. (Dkt. 79, Pls.' Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class 10.)
In short, defendant's attempts to moot the individual plaintiffs' claims, if they had been successful, would still not have prevented this case from going forward as a class action.
III. Motion to Certify Class
24

Having found that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims and that the claims of four individual plaintiffs are not moot, the Court must now determine whether class certification is warranted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
A. Standard of Review Plaintiffs bear the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that
their proposed class meets all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and satisfies at least one provision of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Senter v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 1976). Rule 23(a) provides for class certification only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs maintain their proposed class falls within Rule 23(b)(2), which comprises actions in which "the party
25

opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23 further includes an "implicit requirement" that "an ascertainable class of persons to be represented" exists. Dozier, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *37 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Failure to satisfy any of these requirements precludes certification. Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir. 2013).
''Meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a) requires something more than mere repetition of the rule's language; there must be an adequate statement of the basic facts to indicate that each requirement of the rule is fulfilled." Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To that end, the Court must perform a "rigorous analysis," including, if necessary, "prob[ing] behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011).
B. Analysis 1. Ascertainability
26

A threshold question in determining a motion for class
certification is whether the defined class is "sufficiently definite so that
it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a
particular individual is a member of the proposed class." Young, 693
F.3d at 537-38. The Court must be able to make this determination by
reference to objective criteria. Id.
Plaintiffs propose the following class, termed a "Due Process
Class":
[A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the • Food Assistance Program (FAP) • Family Independence Program (FIP) • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA) • Child Day Care (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Programs (RAP) public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS' determination that the applicant I recipient or a member of the applicant I recipient's household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who do not receive a written notice, at the time of denial and at least 10 days prior to an actual or threatened termination or reduction, that details:
27

(i) the nature and duration of the intended agency action,
(ii) the specific actions they can take to lift the disqualification and fully access benefits, and
(iii) the factual and legal reasons for the negative action, including a. which of the given types of criminal justice disqualifications is at issue, b. the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification, c. the date, place, and nature of the alleged crime and the resulting conviction or warrant, d. the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued, e. the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for additional information, f. where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody or confinement for a felony, and g. where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual.
(Dkt. 39, Amended Mot. Class Cert. 2-3.) Plaintiffs also propose the following subclass, termed "Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass":
All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan's Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program
28

benefits based on DRS's policy of disqualifying individuals as "fugitive felons," without a finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, and/or without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement, for a crime that is a felony. (Id. at 3-4.)
On plaintiffs' VIew, the proposed Due Process Class IS ascertainable by reference to membership in a specific group (those having suffered denial, reduction, or termination of benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification), and to a specific harm (receipt of the allegedly inadequate criminal justice disqualification notice). (Dkt. 39, Pls.' Br. in Support of Mot. Class Cert. 3-4.) Likewise, the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass is ascertainable by reference to membership in a specific group (applicants for or recipients of food assistance benefits, who are alleged to have an outstanding felony warrant), and to a specific harm (denial, reduction, or termination of food assistance benefits without a determination that the person IS fleeing or actively sought by law enforcement). (Id. at 13-14.)
Defendants respond that the proposed classes are not welldefined, because they include (1) people who have not been harmed, and
29

(2) both felons and non-felons. (Dkt. 74, Def.'s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 5, 10.) As with all of defendant's counterarguments, this depends on defendant's redefinition of plaintiffs' harm as "their erroneous disqualifications based on LEIN records of outstanding felony warrants.'' (Jd. at 5.)
The Court can find no reason why it should accept defendant's definition of plaintiffs' harm over plaintiffs' own definition. The injuries plaintiffs allege - inadequate notice and disqualification without a determination that they are fleeing to avoid prosecution and are actively sought by law enforcement - are legally cognizable injuries. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding "the denial of procedural due process should be actionable ... without proof of actual injury); Dozier, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *66 (certifying class on basis of claims that (1) notice was inadequate under both Medicaid statute and Fourteenth Amendment and (2) defendant unlawfully terminated plaintiffs' Medicaid coverage without evaluating plaintiffs' eligibility for other Medicaid categories).
Furthermore, as plaintiffs note, what defendant terms the "real" harm - erroneous LEIN records - caused no harm to plaintiffs until
30

defendant used the LEIN records to disqualify plaintiffs from food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 79, Pls.' Reply in Support of Amended Mot. Class Cert. 4 n.6.) In other words, the question of whether the disqualification is lawful is different from the question of whether the LEIN records are accurate. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court rejects defendant's attempted redefinition of plaintiffs' harm and, along with it, defendant's primary argument against class certification.
While plaintiffs' proposed subclass satisfies the ascertainability requirement, their proposed class definition is problematic, in that it arguably implicates the merits on a central issue: the adequacy of defendant's disqualification notice. See Dozier, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *41. By defining the class in terms of what was lacking from the notice, plaintiffs assume what a constitutionally and statutorily adequate notice should contain. The Court will therefore exercise its authority to sua sponte modify plaintiffs' proposed class definition. See id. at *39 (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. De{. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to modify class definitions ...")). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the following class definition under Rule 23:
31

[A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the
• Food Assistance Program (FAP) • Family Independence Program (FIP) • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA) • Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Program (RAP)
public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS' determination that the applicant I recipient or a member of the applicant I recipient's household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who receive or have received a written notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the applicant I recipient of the criminal justice disqualification. 2. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(l) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the proposed
class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. While the number of potential class members is not
dispositive, "the sheer number of potential litigants in a class, especially
if it is more than several hundred, can be the only factor needed to
satisfy [numerosity]." Other factors to consider include "judicial
economy, geographical dispersion of class members, ease of identifying
putative class members, and practicality with which individual class
32

members could sue on their own." Crawley v. Ahmed, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *28-29 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2009).
Plaintiffs point to a Michigan State Police press release reporting 4,562 matches when MSP cross-checked names of persons with outstanding felony warrants against a list of DHS public assistance recipients. (Dkt. 39-2, Ex. A to Pls.' Mot. Class Cert.) These matches were only those made in January and February 2013. On this basis, plaintiffs claim the class and subclass are so numerous that joinder will be impracticable. Plaintiffs also note the likely geographical dispersion of class and subclass members (across Michigan), the difficulty they face in bringing suit on their own (given their likely low-income status), and the ease of identifying them through DHS databases.
Defendant counters by again redefining the harm as erroneous disqualification based on an outstanding felony warrant. Based on that definition, defendant cites evidence that, between February 2013 and August 2014, administrative hearings on criminal justice disqualifications resulted in only 13 reversals. (Dkt. 74, Def.'s Resp. 1112). On that basis, defendant contends plaintiffs have failed to meet the numerosity requirement. Having rejected defendant's redefinition
33

of the harm, the Court finds this argument meritless. Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
3. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires "questions of law or fact common to the class." "[T]here need be only a single issue common to all members of the class." In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir. 1996). Resolution of that issue should "affect all or a significant number of the putative class members," Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir. 1998), and should "advance the litigation." Sprague v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998).
According to plaintiffs, the legal issue common to the Due Process Class is whether the disqualification notices were inadequate as a matter of constitutional and statutory law. The legal issue common to the subclass is whether disqualification based on Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy violated the SNAP Act. Again, defendant counters that the real injury plaintiffs allege is disqualification based on an erroneous LEIN match. Separate adjudications will thus be necessary
34

to determine whether each proposed class member did or did not have a valid outstanding felony warrant.
Again, the Court rejects defendant's redefinition of plaintiffs' injury. Plaintiffs have identified a single legal issue common to all members of the Due Process Class, and one common to all members of the Disqualification Subclass. The alleged inadequacy of the disqualification notices is "central to the validity of each one of the claims" - specifically, Counts I and II- of both the named plaintiffs and the class members. Likewise, whether Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy violates the SNAP Act is central to the validity of the claims of both the named plaintiffs and the class members in Counts III and IV. Resolution of these two issues will not only "advance the litigation," Sprague, 133 F.3d at 397, it will be dispositive of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs have therefore met the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
4. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires the claims of the class representatives to be typical of the claims of the class. The Sixth Circuit has concluded a
35

proposed class representative's claim is typical if "it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory." In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1082. The result is that "the representative's interests will be aligned with those of the represented group, and in pursuing his own claims, the named plaintiff will also advance the interest of the class members." Id. The typicality requirement thus "ensures that the representative party adequately protects the interests of the proposed class." Crawley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *35.
Plaintiffs maintain the class representatives' claims arise from the same conduct of defendant, involve the same harm, and rest on the same legal theories. Yet again, defendant maintains plaintiffs' injuries "derive from the supposed mismatches" between plaintiffs and outstanding felony warrants in the LEIN. (Dkt. 74, Def.'s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 18.)
The named plaintiffs' claims, like those of the class, arise from the same conduct: (1) the allegedly inadequate disqualification notices, and (2) the application of the allegedly invalid fugitive felon law and policy.
36

Furthermore, the named plaintiffs' claims are based on the same legal theory as the class and subclass claims: that defendant's inadequate notice violated plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the SNAP Act, and that defendant's denial, reduction, or termination of food assistance benefits based solely on a felony warrant match, without a determination that the applicant or recipient was fleeing to avoid prosecution or was actively sought by law enforcement, violated plaintiffs' substantive rights under the SNAP Act. See Crawley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *38-39.
5. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires the named plaintiffs to show that they have common interests with the unnamed class members, and will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Young, 693 F.3d at 543. "The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. A class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members." Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2007).
37

Because, as discussed above, the legal claims and injuries of the named plaintiffs are the same as those of the proposed class and subclass members, their interests in the litigation are common. As for the qualifications of proposed class counsel, their resumes demonstrate significant experience in class action suits related to public benefits programs such as Medicaid and SNAP.
Defendant insists that named plaintiffs are inadequate to represent the class, because they lack standing or their claims are moot. Defendant further claims proposed class counsel is inadequate because two of them have retired. (Dkt. 74, Def.'s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 1920.) As discussed above, all named plaintiffs have standing, and the claims of only one plaintiff are moot. As for counsel, Jacqueline Doig, proposed lead class counsel, indicated at oral argument that she would continue to work until this case concludes, and defense counsel indicated defendant had no objection to Doig's qualifications as class counsel. The qualifications of the other proposed class counsel are apparent from their experience handling similar matters. The Court accordingly finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
38

6. Whether defendant acted on grounds generally applicable to the class
Rule 23(b)(2) requires plaintiffs to show that defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. It applies "only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Thus, "[l]awsuits alleging class-wide discrimination are particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to a single injunctive remedy." Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976). Such is the case here: defendant has allegedly provided the same inadequate notice of disqualification to all proposed class members, and has denied, reduced, or terminated food assistance of all proposed subclass members based on the same allegedly invalid law and policy.
Defendant again counters that proposed class members have not suffered the same injuries. She adds that classwide injunctive relief is
39

inappropriate, apparently on the grounds that defendant's arguments about the adequacy of the notices and the validity of the fugitive felon policy are correct. (Dkt. 74, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 22.) But this latter argument concerns the merits of plaintiffs' claims, which are not properly considered in determining a motion for class certification. The Court has already rejected the former argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of 23(b)(2).
C. Conclusion
Plaintiffs have met their burden to show this action satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b). Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39).
IV. Cross-motions for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs' summary judgment arguments overlap with two of
defendant's arguments in favor of dismissal. Those arguments will accordingly be treated together below, as cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant's mootness argument has been dispensed with above. The absence of a private right of action under the SNAP Act would preclude Counts II, III, and IV. The Court will therefore treat
40

that issue before reaching the parties' arguments on the substantive claims.
A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court "views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App'x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir.2002)).
B. Private right of action The SNAP Act does not explicitly confer a private right of action to
enforce its provisions. The test for determining whether a federal statute confers an implied right enforceable under 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 was articulated by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329
41

(1997), and clarified in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Under Blessing, a plaintiff seeking to enforce a statutory provision by private suit must show that (1) Congress "intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff'; (2) "the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence"; and (3) "the statute . . . unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the States." Blessing, 520 U.S. at 34041. The Gonzaga Court clarified the first element of the test: only an ''unambiguously conferred right ... not the broader or vaguer benefits or interests" can support an action brought under§ 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added).
The Court's analysis should focus not on the SNAP Act as a whole, but on "individual provisions of the statute to determine whether a private right of action exists under each portion." John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding individual provisions in Medicaid Act enforceable under § 1983); accord Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 538-44 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding some provisions of Medicaid Act supported private right of action, while others did not).
1. The provisions at issue
42

Two SNAP Act provisions are at issue. Section 2014(a) underpins plaintiffs' claim in Count III. It provides that "[a]ssistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation." Section 2020(e)(10) applies to plaintiffs' claim in Count II. It requires a state plan of operation to provide notice, fair hearing, and a "prompt determination" to "any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision" of the state plan.
2. Whether the provision creates an "unambiguously conferred right"
This element is the focus of defendant's challenge. The goal of the court's inquiry regarding this element is to determine congressional intent. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285. To that end, the Court's analysis should focus on the text of the statutory provision at issue, and on the structure of the overall statute. See id. at 286 ("where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action."). For the provision to create a private right, the text must be "phrased in terms of
43

the persons benefited," id. at 284, and must have an individual, rather than an "aggregate," focus. See id. at 288.
Defendant makes three arguments for finding no private right of action in the SNAP statute: (1) the statute contains no rights-creating language; (2) the statute's focus is aggregate rather than individual; and (3) courts have found the statute creates no private right of action.
a. Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii)
As an initial matter, plaintiffs point out that section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) contains the following language: "Records described in subparagraph A [namely, records necessary to determine the state program's compliance with federal law] shall ... be available for review in any action filed by a household to enforce any provision of this chapter (including regulations issued under this chapter) ..." (emphasis added). As plaintiffs maintain, this provision would make little sense if Congress did not intend for the SNAP Act to be enforceable by private action. The language here contemplates private actions to enforce any provision of Chapter 51 (the SNAP program), as well as any related regulations.
44

At the hearing on these motions, defendant argued for the first

time that section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) refers not to private actions to enforce

the SNAP Act, but to state administrative review of benefits

determinations.

This argument IS unpersuas1ve.

Section

2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) concerns an "action" that is "filed" to "enforce any

provision" of the SNAP Act. Section 2020(e)(10), which obliges states to

provide for review of agency actions, requires a "hearing'' and a

"determination," not an "action." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). It is a "normal

rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different

parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). A corollary rule is

that "when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the

statute and different language in another, the court assumes different

meanings were intended." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711

n.9 (2004) (citation omitted). Here, the Court presumes Congress used

the term "action'' in section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) to mean something

different from ''hearing'' in section 2020(e)(10). If Congress meant

otherwise, it could easily have said so - by using the same word in both

sections.

45

Defendant's argument is also at odds with the common usage of the terms "action" and ''hearing." "Action" and "filed'' are terms associated with bringing a lawsuit in court, not with seeking administrative review of an agency decision. Plus, a "hearing'' is more restricted in scope than an "action," which may comprise multiple hearings and, ultimately results in a judgment rather than a "determination."
Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) alone is arguably enough to show that Congress intended for a private right of action to be available under the SNAP Act. Application of the Blessing I Gonzaga test to the provisions at issue here leads to the same conclusion.
b. Language of the provisions
Defendant points to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (both cited by the Gonzaga Court) as examples of "rights-creating'' language. Those statutes provide that "No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination ..." By contrast, in defendant's view, section 2020 of the SNAP Act speaks in terms of state responsibility - e.g., "The State
46

agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing ..." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Defendant does not address the language of section 2014(a).
Section 2014(a) is "phrased in terms of the persons benefited." The focus throughout this provision is on which households are eligible to participate in SNAP. The final sentence of the section states, "Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation."
Section 2020(e)(10) is also "phrased in terms of the persons benefited." Although the section begins with the phrase ''The State agency shall provide," the substance of what the agency must provide is focused on the individual households receiving benefits. First, the agency must provide "for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects the participation of such household in the supplemental nutrition assistance program or by a claim against the household for an overissuance." (emphasis added). Second, "any household which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of
47

agency action reducing or terminating its benefits ... shall continue to participate and receive benefits ... until such time as the fair hearing is completed ..." (emphasis added). In the first sentence above, the focus is entirely on the right of an individual household to have a fair hearing and a prompt determination. In the second sentence, "any household" is the grammatical subject of the sentence, which concerns the household's right to continuation of benefits pending adjudication of its complaint.
As plaintiffs note, courts in this Circuit have found similar language in the Medicaid Act to create private rights. (See Dkt. 80-11, Ex. J to Pls.' Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J.)
Section 1396a(a) of the Medicaid Act is parallel to section 2020(e) of the SNAP Act. Section 1396a(a) is titled "State plans for medical assistance: Contents." The Sixth Circuit has held that language directing that "[a] State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide that [ ] any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance" establishes a private right of action. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2006) (analyzing Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)) (emphasis added). The
48

Court reasoned that "in giVIng 'any individual eligible for medical assistance' a free choice over the provider of that assistance, the statute uses the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously confers an individual entitlement under the law." Id. And rather than interpret the clause beginning "A State plan" as showing the provision lacked an individual focus, the Court reasoned that ''by saying '[a] State plan ... must ... provide' this choice, the statute uses the kind of rights-creating, mandatory language that the Supreme Court and our court have held establishes a private right of action." Id. at 461-62 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 1396a(a)(3) states that "A State plan for medical assistance must provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (emphasis added). That provision was held enforceable under§ 1983 in Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003). Substituting ''household" for "individual," the language of§ 2020(e)(10) is closely parallel: "The State agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt
49

determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (emphasis added).
Similarly, section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act states that "A State plan for medical assistance must provide that ... such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals ..." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). That provision was held enforceable by private action in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 368 F. Supp. 2d 740, 761-62 (E.D. Mich. 2005). Section 2014(a) of the SNAP Act states in similar language that "Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a).
The plain language of sections 2020(e)(10) and 2014(a) is primarily "phrased in terms of the persons benefited" - namely, eligible households. Case law interpreting parallel language in the Medicaid Act confirms this conclusion.
c. Aggregate vs. individual focus
50

The parties' arguments here largely mirror those concerning the language of the provisions. As discussed above, the Court finds the focus of the relevant SNAP provisions to be on the individual households, not on the "aggregate services provided by the state" or a "generalized duty'' of the state. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281-82.
d. Case law
The only case defendant discusses in any depth is Almendares v. Palmer, No. 00-7524, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258 (N.D. Ohio 2003). In Almendares, the court held that section 2020(e)(l)(B) did not create an implied right. But as plaintiffs point out, that section is not at issue in this case - an important distinction, as the Court must examine the particular provision at issue to determine whether an implied right of action exists. See Goetz, 626 F.3d at 362. Moreover, in contrast to the provisions at issue here, the focus of section 2020(e)(l)(B) is expressly aggregate. Section 2020(e)(l)(B) pertains to the "use of appropriate bilingual personnel and printed material . . . in those portions of political subdivisions in the State" in which a "substantial number of members of low-income households speak a language other than English." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(l)(B) (emphasis added). The provision's
51

focus is on political subdivisions and groups of households, not individual households. Section 2020(e)(1)(B) and the analysis in Almendares thus have little relevance to the statutory provisions at issue here.
A number of other courts have found provisions of the SNAP Act to have created private rights of action. E.g., Briggs v. Bremby, No. 12324, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012) (holding sections 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9) create private rights of action); Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding sections 2020(e)(2)(B), (e)(3), and (e)(9) create private rights of action); One case, although decided before Gonzaga, applied the Blessing test in holding that one provision at issue here, § 2020(e)(10), created a private right of action. Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court in Meachem found that section 2020(e)(10) created an individual right to a fair hearing, reasoning that "whether or not a fair hearing has been conducted properly depends solely on whether one particular recipient's benefits have been modified or terminated without the process that is required." Id. at 439. The Court finds this reasoning persuasive.
52

The other two cases cited by defendant deserve little weight.2 The court in Willis v. Ahmed, No. 10-10504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2010) stated at a hearing on a motion to dismiss that "[n]o private action was intended by Congress for violation of the Food Stamp Act ... the Gonzaga case has made that clear." (Dkt. 30-9, Ex. I to Def.'s Resp. to Mot. TRO.) The court did not analyze the specific provision at issue, see Goetz, 626 F.3d at 362, nor did it offer anything further on the issue. The analysis in Howard v. Hawkins, No. A-09-CA-577-SS (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2009) is cursory and relies heavily on the use of the phrase ''The State agency shall" in sections 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9) to find no private right of action. As already discussed, the Court finds that reasoning unpersuas1ve.
3. Whether the rights asserted are too vague or amorphous to be enforceable
Defendant does not appear in her briefing to dispute the second element of the Blessing test. At the hearing, however, defendant argued that judicial competence to enforce rights under the SNAP Act would be
2 Plaintiffs correctly point out that defendant erroneously cites the decision in Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2007) as holding provisions of the SNAP Act unenforceable. See id. at 190 (finding theory of liability premised on private right of action in SNAP Act "not preserved on appeal" and therefore "abandoned").
53

"strained," in the sense that judicial enforcement would hamper the Secretary of Agriculture's ability to create uniform standards governing SNAP and to enforce those standards consistently. Plaintiffs responded at the hearing that this element refers to a court's technical competence to enforce a particular right, not to the possibility of conflicting court decisions or standards. The Court agrees with plaintiffs. As originally articulated in Blessing, judicial competence is strained when the relevant statutory standard gives little or no guidance on how it should be enforced. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345. For example, a regulation reqmnng the state to have "sufficient staff' to carry out certain functions under the Social Security Act would "strain judicial competence" to enforce, because it provided no guidance as to what "sufficient" meant. Id. at 346.
At any rate, the rights at issue - to a fair hearing, and to assistance upon application by an eligible household - are not "vague" or "amorphous," nor would it "strain judicial competence" to enforce them. Courts routinely determine the adequacy of notice and hearing procedures, and the SNAP Act's "fleeing felon" standard is clear and objective.
54

4. Whether the provisions are mandatory
The third element is not in dispute here: the language of the SNAP provisions is "mandatory, not precatory." In particular, the provision at issue in Count II states that "The State plan of operation .. . shall provide ... for the granting of a fair hearing ..." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (emphasis added). The provision at issue in Count III states that "Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (emphasis added).
Having analyzed sections 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) in the manner Gonzaga requires, the Court concludes that those provisions of the SNAP Act create individual rights.
5. Whether Congress intended to create a private remedy "Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284. It is defendant's burden to rebut that presumption by showing that Congress either expressly, or "impliedly, by creating an enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement
55

under § 1983," intended to preclude private suits to enforce the right. Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
Defendant has made no such showing. Defendant suggests that the enforcement powers granted by the SNAP Act to the Secretary of Agriculture preclude § 1983 claims. Those powers comprise the mandatory withholding of administrative funding, in an amount determined "appropriate" by the Secretary, and the discretion to ask the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against the relevant state agency. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). The Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have held these powers are not indicative of congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims in other statutory contexts. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22 (1990) (finding Medicaid Act's authorization of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold funds and approval of state plans was not "sufficiently comprehensive" to indicate Congress' intent to preclude § 1983 claims); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 428 (1987) (holding U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's powers to audit and cut off federal funds insufficient to indicate congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims to enforce
56

Housing Act); Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (state administrative review procedures and authority of Attorney General to enforce Help America Vote Act not indicative of congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims). Understandably so, as those powers are not directed at obtaining relief for aggrieved individuals. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90 (distinguishing Wright and Wilder on the ground that in those cases, unlike in Gonzaga, "an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review mechanism"); Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12 (finding aggrieved individuals lack federal review mechanism under SNAP Act and holding SNAP Act sections enforceable under§ 1983).
Defendant suggests that the Secretary's withdrawal of funding or referral of the matter to the Attorney General could pressure a state to address individual SNAP Act claims. But too many contingencies are involved - the Secretary must find a "pattern of lack of compliance," exercise his or her discretion to refer the matter to the Attorney General, and must withhold enough funding to prompt state action, to name just three - to conclude that the statute's enforcement scheme would redress individual grievances and would thereby be
57

"incompatible" with § 1983 actions. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g); see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285 n.4.
Defendant further suggests that the hearing requirement in § 2020(e)(10) evidences an intent to preclude § 1983 claims. However, "the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to§ 1983." Wright, 479 U.S. at 427-28 (1987).
Even the court in the case primarily relied upon by defendant, Almendares, found that "[t]he administrative scheme in the Food Stamp Act is not the type of remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant a § 1983 claim." 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258, at *16 n.4. Other courts addressing this issue have held likewise. Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 723 (5th Cir. 1987); Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987); Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12; Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 577-78.
6. Conclusion 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) create individual, private rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
C. Procedural due process (Counts I and II)
58

Plaintiffs maintain they are entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II, which allege violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the SNAP Act, respectively. They argue that defendant's criminal justice disqualification notices were inadequate as a matter of constitutional and statutory law.
Defendant counters that she is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II, because the notices were adequate as a matter of both constitutional and statutory law, and because plaintiffs failed to show that state administrative remedies were inadequate. Defendant also appears to argue that she is entitled to summary judgment on these counts because plaintiffs failed to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing this suit.
1. Inadequacy and exhaustion of state remedies
As an initial matter, defendant argues that, in order to sustain their due process claim under Count I, plaintiffs must show their state administrative remedies failed to provide due process, citing Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. System, 360 F.3d 583, 585 (6th Cir. 2004). According to defendant, three individual plaintiffs - Woodward,
59

Copeland, and Anderson - failed to pursue state administrative remedies and are thereby estopped from challenging the adequacy of those remedies. (Dkt. 81, Def.'s Br. 11.) And plaintiff Barry secured relief through the state administrative process, proving that defendant provided due process oflaw. (Id. at 10-11.)
Defendant urges the Court to extend the application of Jefferson to Counts II-IV. Defendant further asks the Court to apply an exhaustion of state remedies requirement and dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to pursue their claims in state proceedings.
a. Inadequacy of state remedies
Jefferson does not apply in this case. Shortly after deciding Jefferson, the Sixth Circuit held that Jefferson only applies to procedural due process claims brought under § 1983 when the property deprivation results from a "random or unauthorized act." Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 484 (6th Cir. 2004). When, as here, the alleged deprivation results from "established state procedures," however, a plaintiff is "required neither to plead nor prove the inadequacy of ... state-law remedies in order to prevail." Id. at 483-84.
60

Count I is therefore not barred by plaintiffs' failure to show administrative remedies were inadequate. It follows that Counts II and III, which are also brought pursuant to § 1983, are not barred. Jefferson has no application to Count IV, as that count is not brought pursuant to § 1983.
b. Exhaustion of state remedies
As already discussed in section II.B supra, the Supreme Court has held that "exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983." Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Courts have nonetheless recognized that a federal statute may contain an explicit or implicit requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim. Id. at 502 n.4. "The mere provision of state administrative remedies, however, is not enough to demonstrate an implicit Congressional intent to impose an exhaustion requirement on a plaintiff seeking to bring a § 1983 action." Talbot v. Lucy Carr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 1997). "Ifthere is doubt as to whether an exception applies, courts should refrain from requiring exhaustion in§ 1983 suits because Patsy leaves no doubt that
61

the presumption in strongly in favor of no exception." Id. (quoting Alacare, Inc.-North v. Baggiano, 785 F.2d 963, 967 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, there is no explicit exhaustion requirement in the SNAP Act. While § 2020(e)(10) imposes notice and fair hearing requirements upon states, defendant points to no indication of an implicit congressional intent to require § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit, nor can the Court discern any such intent. See Commonwealth of Mass. v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424, 427 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[T]he scheme of the food stamp statute does not require exhaustion"); Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70 (same, citing other S.D.N.Y. cases).
2. Constitutional due process a. Standard
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), the Supreme Court established that recipients of public benefits must receive an evidentiary hearing before suspension or termination of benefits. For such a hearing to be conducted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," id. at 267, a recipient must also receive "timely
62

and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." Id. at 268.
Adequate notice, for purposes of due process, must "inform a recipient of the precise questions raised about his continued eligibility" and state "the legal and factual bases" for the state's action. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268. The notice must comprise "(1) a detailed statement of the intended action . . . (2) the reason for the change in status . . . 3) citation to the specific statutory section requiring reduction or termination; and (4) specific notice of the recipient's right to appeal. Garrett v. Pruett, 707 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1983).
The central point emerging from the relevant Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases is that the explanation of the proposed action and of the reasons for the action must be detailed enough to allow for a meaningful hearing. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) ("The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) ("Notice, to
63

comply with due process requirements ... must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity''); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 561 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding notice of rejection of application for benefits violated due process where applicants were "not adequately informed as to how to fully receive the benefits to which they were entitled . . . nor were they fully apprised of the reasons for denial").
b. Application
The notice received by Barry on 12/31/12 (Dkt. 70-2, Ex. A to Second Amended Compl.) is titled "Notice of Case Action." It is representative of all the notices at issue in this case, although later notices include a minor change, discussed below. The notice lists Barry's name and address, his case number, and provides the name of a DHS specialist, the program office address, and telephone and fax numbers. The notice states in relevant part:
Food Assistance Program Summary Period: 02/01/2013- Ongoing Action: Closed Your ongoing benefit has been cancelled but you will continue to receive benefits through the day before the period listed above.
64

Reason for Intended Action Walter D Barry- Not Eligible You or a member of your group IS not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve. Manual Item(s): BEM 203, ERM 202
The notice then states that "you do have a right to a hearing to contest the Department's calculation that you or a member of your group are no longer eligible for program assistance." An attached form titled "Request for a Hearing'' provides the date by which DHS must receive a hearing request in order "to continue your assistance at the former level or to have your current assistance continued or reinstated." The form also gives the last date by which DHS must receive the hearing request. Instructions are provided for requesting an administrative hearing. The notice recipient is advised that "[a]t the hearing, you can explain why you think this action is wrong, and give evidence." The form also states that the person may contact a local DHS office to get more information about how the hearing works. A web address is provided "[t]o find out if free legal help is available in your area."
65

A later version of the notice changes the language in the "Reason for Intended Action" section as follows: "Please have the disqualified member of your group contact a local law enforcement agency- such as a police department, sheriffs department or the Michigan State Policeto resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide picture identification." (Dkt. 50-8, Ex. Y to Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.)
It is undisputed that the notices meet the fourth Garrett factor, as they include notice of an applicant's I recipient's appeal rights. As to the third factor, the notices do not cite to the specific statutory section requiring reduction or termination of benefits. Rather, the notices refer to the relevant section of the BEM. (E.g., Dkt. 70-18, Ex. Q to Pls.' Second Amend. Compl.) The BEM, in turn, lists the state and federal statutory sections purportedly supporting the reduction or termination of benefits. (E.g., Dkt. 70-30, Ex. CC to Pls.' Second Amend. Compl.) Defendant maintains this satisfies the third Garrett factor, but cites no authority in support. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 9.)
The crux of the issue, however, is whether the notices adequately explain the reduction or termination, and the reasons for it - the first and second Garrett factors.
66

The notices state the intended action - denial or reduction of benefits. For example, the May 16, 2013 notice sent to Barry provides, under the heading "Intended Action," a summary of benefits - in this instance, listing "Food Assistance Program." (Dkt. 70-6, Ex. E to Pls.' Second Amend. Compl.) The notice shows the relevant action as "closed" and states, "[y]our ongoing benefit has been cancelled but you will continue to receive benefits through the day before the period listed above.'' (Id.)
The reason given for the action is simply ''You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.'' (Dkt. 70-2, Ex. A to Second Amended Compl.) This fails to indicate whose conduct is at issue. It also fails to indicate which of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications applied by DHS is being invoked. (See Dkt. 49-8, Ex. G to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) From at least 2012 to mid-2013, the notices referred to section 203 of the BEM, where five types of criminal justice disqualifications from public assistance benefits were listed. (See id.) In June 2013, DHS placed the fugitive felon disqualification in its own section of the BEM (204). (Dkt. 49-5, Ex. D to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) But the notices thereafter continue
67

to use the general phrase "criminal justice disqualification." Thus, a notice recipient must still be able to (1) determine that "BEM 204" refers to the Bridges Eligibility Manual, section 204, (2) determine that the relevant type of criminal justice disqualification can be found there, and (3) get access to the BEM. (See Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ~ 300.) Even if a notice recipient locates a copy of the BEM and determines the type of disqualification, he or she still does not know anything about the outstanding warrant- not the underlying charge, nor which law enforcement agency issued the warrant. The recipient thus has no basis for making an informed decision whether to contest the disqualification, nor what issues need to be addressed at a hearing.
Defendant maintains that notice recipients could call the DHS contact person and number listed on the notice to receive further information regarding their disqualification. But defendant cannot satisfy due process by requiring notice recipients to call elsewhere. See Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, in this instance such a call would be fruitless: DHS staff are instructed "not to disclose 'Fugitive Felon' status information to the individual." (Dkt. 49-2, Ex. A to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.; see also Dkt. 49-17, Ex. P to
68

Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 3 (''DHS specialists are NOT to inform a client of their fugitive felon status.'').)
Defendant further maintains that notice recipients can obtain the necessary information by contacting law enforcement. This is potentially as ineffective as contacting DHS, as the named plaintiffs' experiences shows. Law enforcement may not be able to determine which warrant is causing the disqualification, as happened in Barry's case. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ~~ 28-30; Dkt. 70-3, Ex. B to Second Amended Compl.) He discovered the existence of the first outstanding warrant only through defendant's intervention. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ~ 66; Dkt. 70-11, Ex. J to Second Amended Compl.) Woodward experienced similar difficulty, despite following the notice's instructions and contacting law enforcement: she contacted the Taylor police department about a misdemeanor case, but was unaware of an outstanding felony warrant in Livingston County. (Dkt. 51-9, Ex.
QQ to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. ~~ 17-19; Dkt. 52-1, Ex. ZZ to Pls.' Mot.
Summ. J.) She only discovered the existence of the felony warrant through defendant's intervention.
69

At least two courts in other districts have analyzed notices of termination of federal food assistance benefits that are as brief and lacking in detail as the notice at issue here. Febus v. Gallant, 866 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1994); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Del. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
Massachusetts' notice of termination of public benefits, including federal food assistance benefits, gave as a reason for disqualification that "you and/or a household member are living outside of Massachusetts and do not intend to return soon." Febus, 866 F. Supp. at 46. The court held that notice constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 47. Delaware's notices contained one-sentence explanations for termination of benefits, including federal food assistance benefits, such as, "children's wages exceed eligibility limit," or "you are over the gross income eligibility limit," or "you did not provide a protective payee as requested." Ortiz, 616 F. Supp. at 1061. The court held those notices constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 1063.
Other courts have held similar boilerplate, nonspecific statements constitutionally inadequate. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31 (holding statement "said minor is a delinquent minor" constitutionally inadequate notice of
70

charge); Hamby, 368 F.3d at 560 (holding notice stating applicants for state health insurance had failed to apply during open enrollment period constitutionally inadequate for failing to specify that applicants were uninsurable); Moffit v. Austin, 600 F. Supp. 295, 297 (W.D. Ky. 1984) (holding Medicaid notices stating ''Your care needs no longer meet the criteria for intermediate care" or "according to information in your medical record you no longer require the care provided" constitutionally inadequate).
Defendant relies primarily on Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 930-31 (6th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that due process does not require notices to include specific, individualized reasons for benefit denial, reduction, or termination. (Dkt. 81, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 8.) But defendant's reliance is misplaced: the Rosen court held the notices in that case adequate because "the very facts the plaintiffs claim are missing [sc. from the termination notices] are supplied by the State through a second letter that follows the Termination Notice and that the Termination Notice itself references and brings to the attention of recipients." 410 F.3d at 931. While defendant is technically correct that the notice itself does not need to include specific, individualized
71

reasons for the agency action, those details must nonetheless be provided in some form. See id. (''Due process does not require 'reasonably calculated' notice to come in just one letter, as opposed to two."). Unlike in Rosen, they were not provided here.
Defendant's notice is inadequate in another respect: it fails to inform recipients "as to how to fully receive the benefits to which they were entitled." Hamby, 368 F.3d at 561. The claims in Hamby focused on health benefit denial notices sent by the Tennessee Department of Health. The notices in Hamby were constitutionally inadequate because they did not inform benefit applicants that they had to appeal the denial, rather than reapply, to receive full retroactive benefits, and
what the consequences of filing new applications would be. Id. at 560.
The notice here similarly fails to inform recipients what they must do to lift the disqualification. If a recipient "resolves" the disqualification, benefits are automatically reinstated only if other household members are "active" - i.e., continue to receive the type of assistance from which the notice recipient has been disqualified. (Dkt. 49-16, Ex. 0 to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., BAM 811.) Otherwise, a disqualified individual must not only "resolve" the criminal justice
72

disqualification with law enforcement, but must also reapply for benefits. The notice fails to communicate this information. The notice also fails to make clear whether a hearing request is necessary to resolve disqualifications, even if the issue is resolved with law enforcement.
In sum, the disqualification notice fails to provide the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. SNAP Act and regulations a. Notice requirements
Section 2020(e)(10) obligates state agencies to provide "for the granting of a fair hearing" to households whose food assistance 1s reduced or terminated. While not explicitly requiring notice, it IS presumed that a household will "receiv[e] individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits."
The regulations implementing section 2020 reqmre that, if an application for food assistance is denied,
the State agency shall provide the household with written notice explaining the basis for the denial, the household's right to request a fair hearing, the telephone number of the
73

food stamp office (a toll-free number or a number where collect calls will be accepted for households outside the local calling area), and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information. If there is an individual or organization available that provides free legal representation, the notice shall also advise the household of the availability of the service.
7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(ii) (emphasis added). When the state agency
reduces or terminates benefits, it must "provide the household timely
and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken." 7
C.F.R. § 273.13(a). The regulation further provides that
The notice of adverse action shall be considered adequate if it explains in easily understandable language: The proposed action; the reason for the proposed action; the household's right to request a fair hearing; the telephone number of the food stamp office (toll-free number or a number where collect calls will be accepted for households outside the local calling area) and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information; the availability of continued benefits; and the liability of the household for any overissuances received while awaiting a fair hearing if the hearing official's decision is adverse to the household. If there is an individual or organization available that provides free legal representation, the notice shall also advise the household of the availability of the service.
7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(2) (emphasis added).
74

Other courts have interpreted adequacy, for purposes of this regulation, to require an individualized, specific explanation of the adverse action and the reasons for it. For example, the court in Febus, 866 F. Supp. at 47, held that Massachusetts' notice stating that "you and/or a household member are living outside of Massachusetts and do not intend to return soon" not only failed to provide constitutional due process, but also failed to meet the requirements of§ 273.13(a)(2).
b. Application Defendant's disqualification notice fails to meet the requirements of the SNAP Act and its supporting regulations for the same reasons that it is constitutionally inadequate. As discussed above, the notices do not "explain" the reasons for denial or termination, and it would be fruitless for recipients to use the contact information provided to seek further information. 4. Conclusion
Defendant's disqualification notice is inadequate under both the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and under section 2020(e)(10) of the SNAP Act, and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R.
75

§§ 273.10(g) and 273.13(a). Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II.
To meet the requirements of constitutional due process and of the SNAP Act, defendant's notice must explain, in detail:
(1) the nature of the intended action and its duration; (2) the factual and legal bases for the action, including:
(a)which type of criminal justice disqualification (e.g., fugitive felon status) is at issue,
(b)the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification,
(c) the date of the relevant warrant or conviction, as well as any other identifying information, including but not limited to a warrant number, case number, or National Crime Information Center number,
(d)the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued,
76

(e) the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for additional information,
(f) where applicable, a statement that, in accordance with the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k), defendant has determined that (i) the disqualified individual is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody or confinement for a felony, and (ii) law enforcement is actively seeking the individual; and
(3) the specific actions a disqualified individual can take to obtain resolution of the disqualification and full access to benefits.
Defendant already has access to at least some of this information through the fugitive felon interface. (See Dkt. 49-10, Ex. I to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) Moreover, defendant already follows at least some of these requirements in the context of child protection, foster care, and juvenile justice cases. (See Dkt. 52-6, Ex. EEE to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 52-7, Ex. FFF to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 52-8, Ex. GGG to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) For example, defendant requires Child Protective Services (CPS) staff to verify LEIN information before including it in narratives in
77

reports, petitions, and other documents. (Dkt. 52-6, Ex. EEE to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 5.) Information is verified by CPS -for example, by contacting law enforcement or the relevant prosecuting attorney's office. (Jd.) Staff are "encouraged" to consult with the prosecuting attorney or DHS counsel to assess the evidentiary value of corroborating information. (Jd. at 2.) The Court can discern no reason why defendant cannot similarly verify LEIN information before disqualifying applicants for and recipients of public assistance benefits, and communicate that information in the disqualification notice.
Moreover, DHS staff already contact Michigan's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) when a recipient of a disqualification notice comes into a local DHS office requesting information. (Dkt. 49-2, Ex. A to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 49-3, Ex. B to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) An OIG agent then verifies the warrant, determines if the warrant is still active, and then contacts the relevant law enforcement agency to determine if they will send someone to the DHS office to arrest the person. (Dkt. 493, Ex. B to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.) In other words, at least in some circumstances, defendant verifies the warrant and determines whether law enforcement is "actively seeking" the notice recipient. See 7 U.S.C.
78

§ 2015(k)(2) (requiring law enforcement to be "actively seeking'' a person for that person to be disqualified from SNAP benefits). There is no obvious reason why defendant cannot make the "actively seeking'' determination before issuing a disqualification notice, and include the basis for that determination in the notice. With respect to at least some of the notice requirements listed above, then, the burden on defendant appears to be minimal.
D. Substantive violation of the SNAP Act (Counts III and IV)
Plaintiffs claim entitlement to summary judgment on Counts III and IV based on defendant's alleged failure to conform to the requirements of the SNAP Act. Counts III and IV represent alternative paths to the same result (namely, enjoining enforcement of Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy): (1) defendant violated plaintiffs' substantive right to benefits under the SNAP Act, by imposing invalid eligibility requirements on plaintiffs (Count III), and (2) defendant's fugitive felon law and policy are preempted by the SNAP Act (Count IV).
1. Text of the SNAP Act
79

7 U.S.C. § 2015 is titled "Eligibility disqualifications." Section
2015(k) is titled ''Disqualification of fleeing felons" and provides as
follows:
(1) In general
No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to participate m the supplemental nutrition assistance program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a member of that or any other household during any period during which the individual is--
(A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor under the law of New Jersey; or
(B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under a Federal or State law.
(2) Procedures
The Secretary shall--
(A) define the terms "fleeing'' and "actively seeking'' for purposes of this subsection; and
(B) ensure that State agencies use consistent procedures established by the Secretary that disqualify individuals whom law enforcement authorities are actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual.
80

7 U.S.C. § 2015(k). The SNAP Act prohibits states from imposing "any other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the program," 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b), and requires the eligibility standards in state plans to be "in accordance with sections 2014 and 2015 of [the SNAP Act] and to "include no additional requirements imposed by the State agency." Id. § 2020(e)(5).
The Michigan law at issue is Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b, a provision enacted in 1996 as part of Michigan's Social Welfare Act, and then amended in 2011. 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 190; 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 2011. Section 400.10b provides that "the department [sc. of Human Services] shall not grant public assistance under this act to an individual if the department receives information . . . that the individual is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in this or any other jurisdiction." The Michigan law does not mention fleeing or fugitive status, nor does it distinguish persons whom law enforcement is actively seeking.
2. Whether state law controls the definition of "fleeing''
81

At oral argument, defendant suggested for the first time that state law controls the definition of "fleeing'' in section 2015(k). In defendant's view, the clause "under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing'' modifies all that comes before it. Thus, whether a person is "fleeing to avoid prosecution" is determined by reference to Michigan law in this case.
While grammatically possible, defendant's position is legally implausible. It is well-established that "in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, ... Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). This is especially true where, as with the SNAP Act, the federal law is intended to have "uniform nationwide application." See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43-44. There is no "plain indication" in section 2015(k) that Congress intended for states to define "fleeing." In fact, there is an obvious indication to the contrary: the express provision that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall define" both "fleeing'' and "actively seeking." 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(2)(A).
82

Alternatively, defendant suggests the Court should decline to interpret section 2015(k) in deference to the proposed rule that would, among other things, define the terms "fleeing'' and "actively seeking." (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 21); see Clarification of Eligibility of Fleeing Felons, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,907 (proposed Aug. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 272-73). To be sure, where Congress has expressly delegated to the agency authority to define a statutory term, the agency's definition is "entitled to more than mere deference or weight," but rather "is entitled to legislative effect." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). But the courts "do not abdicate review'' in such circumstances.a Id. Here, of course, there is no agency definition to review, as the relevant rule has not yet been finalized. Defendant points to no authority for the proposition that the Court cannot determine the meaning of the statute in the interim, nor has the Court itself found any such authority. Indeed, the Court's determination of the meaning of "fleeing to avoid prosecution" would be subject to displacement by any conflicting definition later promulgated by the Secretary. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
a Any definition promulgated by the agency would still be subject to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. See Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 44.
83

Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005). But absent any authority to the contrary, the Court discerns no compelling reason why plaintiffs' claims should be left in legal limbo.4
3. Plain language of the statute
Turning then to section 2015(k), the Court begins with "[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that when interpreting statutes, the language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain meaning of that language is clear." United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 858 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the Michigan law and defendant's policy violate the plain language of§ 2015(k), because they do not require a determination that an individual is both fleeing to avoid prosecution or custody and is actively sought by law enforcement.
The language of the SNAP Act plainly requires that the person be "fleeing to avoid prosecution" in order to be disqualified. "Fleeing'' necessarily entails movement away from a place. See The American
4 At the time of the issuing of this opinion, the proposed rule defining "fleeing'' and "actively seeking'' have been pending for over three years.
84

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2014) (defining "flee" as "[t]o run away, as from trouble or danger''); Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (1993) (defining "flee" as "to run away''). The other appearance of the word "fleeing'' in section 2015(k)(1)(A) confirms this reading: the relevant crime must be a felony "under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing'' (emphasis added). A person cannot be fleeing from a place (such as the state of Michigan) if he or she remains in that place. Furthermore, by specifying that the person must be fleeing to avoid prosecution, the SNAP Act incorporates an element of intent.
Neither of these elements- actual physical flight, or the intent to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement - is present in the Social Welfare Act. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b(1). Disqualification is triggered simply by the existence of an outstanding warrant. Id. The existence of an outstanding warrant does not necessarily imply flight or intent. (See Dkt. 79-4, Ex. C to Pls.' Reply in Support of Amended Mot. Class Cert., Shea Aff.) Under Michigan law, an arrest warrant directs law enforcement to apprehend a person; it does not order the person to turn him- or herself in. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.1b. DHS policy
85

implementing section 400.10b likewise fails to require a determination that a person is "fleeing to avoid prosecution." See BEM 203, 204.
The SNAP Act also clearly requires law enforcement to be "actively seeking'' a person for that person to be disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(2). It is equally clear that the Social Welfare Act lacks this requirement. See Mich. Compl. Laws § 400.10b. At oral argument, defendant suggested the mere existence of an outstanding warrant means that law enforcement is, in fact, actively seeking the person. This is not a plausible argument. Defendant's interpretation would write the word "actively" out of the SNAP Act: if issuing a warrant equates to "actively seeking," then "actively seeking'' would be no different from plain "seeking." See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (''Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous."). DHS policy implementing section 400.10b likewise fails to require determinations that a person is actively sought by law enforcement. See BEM 203, 204.
86

In fact, DHS staff are instructed to proceed with disqualification even when law enforcement, upon being informed that a benefits applicant or recipient with an outstanding warrant is present at a DHS office, declines to arrest the person. (Dkt. 49-3, Ex. B to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.)
The Court's reading of the plain language of the SNAP Act finds support in the nearly identical language of the Social Security Act and the related case law. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A)(i) disqualifies a person from receiving Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) if the person is "fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place from which the person flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees.'' Both this provision and section 2015(k) of the SNAP Act were enacted as sections 202(a)(5) and 821(k) of the same law: the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. There is accordingly a strong presumption that Congress meant the same thing by "flee" in both provisions. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
Courts interpreting the Social Security Act have found the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant insufficient to show that a
87

person is fleeing and therefore disqualified from receiving SSI benefits. Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The statute does not permit the Commissioner to conclude simply from the fact that there is an outstanding warrant for a person's arrest that he is fleeing to avoid prosecution."); Cambero v. Commissioner, No. 06-00551 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2007); Blakely v. Commissioner, 330 F. Supp. 2d 910 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Hull v. Barnhart, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Or. 2004); Garnes v. Barnhart, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 1529280 (D. Me. June 24, 2004).
Based on the plain language of section 2015(k) of the SNAP Act and the parallel language in § 1382(e)(4)(A)(i) of the Social Security Act, the Court finds that Michigan's Social Welfare Act, Mich. Comp. Laws§ 400.10b and DHS' fugitive felon policy, as currently embodied in BEM 204, impose requirements upon applicants for and recipients of food assistance benefits that exceed the requirements imposed by the SNAP Act. Because 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) expressly prohibit states from imposing additional eligibility requirements, Michigan cannot disqualify a person based solely on the existence of an outstanding felony warrant. That amounts to requiring a person not to
88

have any outstanding felony warrants to be eligible for SNAP benefits, a requirement that goes beyond the requirements of the SNAP Act. The Court accordingly finds that Mich. Comp. Laws§ 400.10b and BEM 204 deprive plaintiffs of their right to food assistance benefits in violation of the SNAP Act.
4. Preemption
Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy are invalid on a second, independent basis: they are preempted by the SNAP Act.
"Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, "state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution are invalid." Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L. Ed. 23 {1824) (Marshall, C.J.)). Preemption "turns principally on congressional intent." Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir. 2002). Such intent may be manifest in an express preemption clause in the relevant statute. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011).
89

Sections 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) of the SNAP Act expressly preempt state eligibility requirements that exceed the federal eligibility requirements. See Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222-23 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding provision of Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that prohibited states from imposing requirements "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements was express preemption clause). Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and DHS' fugitive felon policy are therefore expressly preempted by federal law.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs' preemption argument fails because it relies on a proposed regulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,907. But the proposed regulation is unnecessary to the Court's analysis: as discussed above, the plain language of the SNAP Act alone requires the determinations that (1) the person is fleeing law enforcement, and is doing so with the intent of avoiding prosecution, custody, or confinement, and (2) law enforcement is actively seeking the person. Because Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy do not require these determinations, they effectively impose a requirement beyond what
90

federal law prescribes. Michigan's fugitive felon law and policy are therefore preempted by the SNAP Act.
5. Conclusion Under both approaches to the issue- deprivation of rights under the SNAP Act (Count III), or preemption (Count IV) - plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. V. Conclusion Accordingly, (1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss I Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to plaintiff Heather Woodward only. Woodward's claims are moot and are DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant's motion is DENIED with respect to the remainder of the relief sought; (2) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39) is GRANTED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the Court certifies the following class and subclass in this action: Class:
91

All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the
• Food Assistance Program (FAP) • Family Independence Program (FIP) • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA) • Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Program (RAP)
public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS' determination that the applicant I recipient or a member of the applicant I recipient's household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who receive or have received a written notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the applicant I recipient of the criminal justice disqualification.
Subclass:
All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan's Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program benefits based on DRS's policy of disqualifying individuals as "fugitive felons," without a finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, and/or without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement, for a crime that is a felony.
92

The Court names plaintiffs Walter Barry, Donitha Copeland, Westside Mothers, and Kenneth Anderson as class representatives. The Court further appoints Elan Nichols, Jacqueline Doig, Miriam Aukerman, and Sofia Nelson as class counsel.
Plaintiffs are directed to exchange with defendant a proposed notice that will be served upon all members of the class. If the parties agree upon the content and form of the notice, plaintiffs shall submit the notice to the Court no later than February 9, 2015. Otherwise, the parties shall notify the Court and the Court will set a conference for resolution of the dispute;
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49) is GRANTED;
(4) It is DECLARED that (a) Defendant's criminal justice disqualification notices used from December 31, 2012 to present, violate the rights of the individual named plaintiffs and the class members to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
93

(b) Defendant's criminal justice disqualification notices violate the rights of the individual named plaintiffs and the subclass members to notice under 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.10(g) and 273.13(a), (c) Defendant's fugitive felon policy, and the portions of Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 400.10b and lOc on which the policy is based, violate plaintiffs' and subclass members' rights to food assistance benefits under 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a), by imposing eligibility requirements that exceed those under federal law, in violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5), (d) Pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, defendant's fugitive felon policy, and the portions of Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 400.10b and lOc on which the policy is based, are preempted by 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5), and implementing regulations; (5) Defendant is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from: (a) Denying, reducing, or terminating public assistance, including assistance under the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance
94

Program, Child Development and Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program, without first providing notice that explains, in detail:
1. The nature of the intended action and its duration;
2. The factual and legal bases for the action, including:
a. which type of criminal justice disqualification (e.g., fugitive felon status) is at issue,
b. the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification,
c. the date of the relevant warrant or conviction, as well as any other identifying information, including but not limited to a warrant number, case number, or National Crime Information Center number,
d. the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued,
e. the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification
95

whom the individual can contact for additional information, f. where applicable, a statement that, in accordance with the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k), defendant has determined that (i) the disqualified individual IS fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody or confinement for a felony, and (ii) law enforcement is actively seeking the individual; and
3. the specific actions a disqualified individual can to obtain resolution of the disqualification and full access to benefits,
(b) Automatically disqualifying plaintiffs and subclass members from receiving food assistance benefits based solely on an outstanding felony warrant, without determining that the person is intentionally fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement after conviction, and that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the person; and
96

(6) It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs are directed to follow the requirements in E.D. Mich. L.R. 54.1 and 54.1.2 for obtaining costs and attorney's fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2015 Ann Arbor, Michigan

Is/Judith E. Levy JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 9, 2015.

Is/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager

97

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v.
Nick Lyon, in his capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING AND PARTIALLY DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ [95] MOTION TO STRIKE,
DENYING DEFENDANT’S [93] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S [94]
MOTION FOR STAY
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Dkt. 93) of this Court’s January 9, 2015 Opinion and
Order (Dkt. 91), defendant’s Motion to Stay Judgment (Dkt. 94) pending
resolution of his motion for reconsideration, and plaintiffs’ Motion to
Strike (Dkt. 95) exhibits from defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
1

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will partially grant plaintiffs’ motion and deny defendant’s motions. I. Background
The factual background to this case is recounted in the Court’s January 9, 2015 Opinion and Order (Dkt. 91) and is adopted here. By that order, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defendant now seeks reconsideration of that order, as well as a stay of judgment. Defendant attached four exhibits to his motion for reconsideration; plaintiffs have moved to strike all four exhibits. II. Standard
Defendant’s motion is brought as a motion for reconsideration under E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h) and as a motion to amend or alter judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). While the standard is articulated differently for each type of motion, the Sixth Circuit and courts in this district have held the standards are effectively the same. See Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006); Hence v. Smith, 49 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
2

Defendant’s motion cites the standard as articulated in Local Rule 7.1(h); the Court will do so as well. Under that standard, a movant must “not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3); Hence, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 550. “A palpable defect is a defect that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Witzke v. Hiller, 972 F. Supp. 426, 427 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
A motion for reconsideration, however, “is not a vehicle to re-hash old arguments, or to proffer new arguments or evidence that the movant could have presented earlier.” Gowens v. Tidwell, No. 10-10518, 2012 WL 4475352, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2012) (citing Sault St. Marie v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)); accord Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir.2007) (noting “[i]t is well-settled that parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was issued”); Owner–Operator Indep. Drivers v. Arctic Express, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (stating that
3

“[m]otions for reconsideration do not allow the losing party ... to raise new legal theories that should have been raised earlier.”).
Accordingly, “a party may not introduce evidence for the first time in a motion for reconsideration where that evidence could have been presented earlier.” Shah v. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc., 507 F. App'x 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of motion for reconsideration brought under local rules of Eastern District of Michigan); accord Bank of Ann Arbor v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 563 F. App’x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding party may not introduce evidence for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion that could have been presented earlier). “If district judges were required to consider evidence newly presented but not newly discovered after judgment, there would be two rounds of evidence in a great many cases.” Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1997).
Whether to strike new evidence or only to disregard it is within the district court’s discretion.1 See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto.,
1 Defendant suggests that even if new evidence could be stricken under Rule 59(e), it should still be part of the record under Local Rule 7.1, because plaintiffs’ motion was “filed only as to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).” (Dkt. 99, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Strike.) However, the standard is the same for motions under Rule 59(e) and Local Rule 7.1. E.g., Shah, 507 F. App’x at 495. Moreover, plaintiffs’ motion is to “Strike Exhibits
4

Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Aguirre, 410 F.3d 297, 304 (6th Cir. 2005) (reviewing district court’s striking of affidavit under abuse-of-discretion standard). III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike The challenged exhibits are an affidavit of Dale Shaw, a policy analyst at the Department of Human Services (Dkt. 93-2, Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. Recon.); an affidavit of David Russell, acting director of DHS’ Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) (Dkt. 93-3, Ex. 2); a chart with the text of 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4) (Dkt. 93-4, Ex. 3); and an email dated November 5, 2014, from Robin Thomas in OIG to defense counsel Joshua Smith and others. (Dkt. 93-5, Ex. 4.) Plaintiffs contend all four exhibits could have been submitted before entry of the Court’s January 9, 2015 order and should therefore be stricken. Defendant’s response is that they could not have been submitted earlier, and the Court is to blame. In making this argument, defendant relies on misrepresentations of law and fact and upon
Attached to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment.” (Dkt. 95, Pls.’ Br. 1.) Its very title addresses both forms in which defendant brought his motion.
5

baseless suggestions of impropriety on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel and of bias on the part of this Court.
1. The Court’s treatment of plaintiffs’ pre-judgment submissions
Defendant’s first argument does not address whether the exhibits could have been presented earlier. Instead, defendant claims plaintiffs, without leave of Court, filed supplemental authority after the close of briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and “this Court accepted” that authority. (Dkt. 99, Def.’s Br. 2.) Then, plaintiffs “improperly offer[ed] evidence at the hearing” on November 14, 2014, but the impropriety “did [not] stop this Court from accepting that evidence over Defendant’s objection.” (Id. at 3 n.1.) Refusing to accept defendant’s exhibits would thus be unfair.
There is more petulance than substance here. True, plaintiffs did file supplemental authority after the briefing closed, and without leave of Court. (Dkt. 89.) The supplemental authority consisted of two opinions from a similar case in this district, issued after the close of briefing and two weeks before oral argument in this case. It is far from uncommon for parties to point to supplemental authority outside of scheduled briefing, even at a hearing on a motion. Here, defendant had
6

ample opportunity to address that authority at the hearing, or to move to strike the filing. At any rate, what plaintiffs did is qualitatively and significantly different from what defendant attempts to do here – namely, to submit new evidence, after judgment.
Defendant’s allegation that the Court improperly accepted evidence at the November hearing is simply false. Plaintiffs proffered copies of two Social Security benefit disqualification notices that were part of the pleadings in another lawsuit. The Court stated on the record that it was not taking evidence at the hearing, that it noted defendant’s objection to the notices, and that the notices would not be docketed as part of the record in this case. Indeed, the notices are not part of the record in this case. Nor are the notices cited or relied upon anywhere in the Court’s January 9, 2015 order. (See Dkt. 91.)
In sum, defendant’s charge of unequal treatment by the Court is meritless and does not support admission or consideration of defendant’s exhibits.
2. The Court’s alleged rejection of supplemental briefing Defendant next argues that he tried to present the challenged evidence at the hearing, but was rebuffed by the Court. Specifically,
7

defendant claims that “[a]t several junctures during the hearing, Defendant offered to provide supplemental briefs to the Court. For instance, as this Court notes in its Decision and Order, Defendant referenced the rescission of Plaintiff Walter Barry’s second felony warrant at oral argument. Each time, the Court rejected those offers.” (Dkt. 99, Def.’s Resp. 3 & n.2.)
The claim that the Court rejected evidence regarding Barry’s second warrant is false. In fact, defendant did not offer to provide a supplemental brief, or to submit additional evidence, on the alleged rescission of Barry’s second felony warrant. Nor did defendant offer supplemental briefing or evidence on any of the issues related to the exhibits to his motion for reconsideration.
Rather, defendant’s counsel offered supplemental briefing on two tangential issues: (1) the qualifications of proposed class counsel and (2) whether Michigan can indirectly require photo identification as part of the benefit reinstatement process. The Court declined supplemental briefing on the second issue, but defendant’s counsel admitted that issue was tangential – effectively acknowledging that supplemental briefing was unnecessary. As for the first issue, defendant’s counsel
8

stated he had no reason to dispute the qualifications of proposed lead class counsel. Again, defendant’s counsel effectively acknowledged that supplemental briefing was unnecessary. Moreover, the Court did not reject briefing on this issue, but expressly left open the possibility that supplemental briefing could be requested.
3. Timing of the Court’s opinion and order Defendant’s third argument also rests on a factual misrepresentation; namely, that “the Court stated that it would issue a decision with relative speed.” (Dkt. 99, Def.’s Resp. 3.) In fact, the Court stated that it would “work as fast as I can” but “can’t give you an exact date.” The Court also emphasized – repeatedly – that it wished to take a close look at the numerous issues in this case and give them careful attention. Even assuming that the Court had indicated an opinion was imminently forthcoming, defendant could have immediately moved to introduce new evidence, either at the hearing or by written motion that same day or the next. Instead, defendant inexplicably decided it would be pointless to do so, and now blames the Court for his own misjudgment.
9

4. Completeness of the record Finally, defendant proclaims that “the essential issue remains whether this Court’s decision should be based on complete and accurate facts.” (Dkt. 99, Def.’s Resp. 4.) Counsel’s job is, in part, to ensure the Court has complete and accurate facts before making a decision. Any incompleteness or inaccuracy – and the Court finds neither here – is entirely due to defendant’s unexplained failure to submit evidence in a timely manner. Even if the Court were to consider defendant’s new evidence, the outcome of this case would be no different. Acceptance of the Russell affidavit would not remedy the legal errors and evidentiary problems with its contents, as discussed below. As explained in the Court’s Opinion and Order, defendant’s best efforts to pick off the individual named plaintiffs – efforts that continued until the eve of the November hearing – came too late to moot the class claims in this case. Those efforts were also not enough to moot the individual claims of four of the five named plaintiffs.
5. Conclusion
10

Defendant has failed to show his exhibits could not have been presented before judgment in this case. Exhibit 3, however, consists solely of the text of two statutory provisions already presented to and analyzed by the Court: 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e). As such, Exhibit 3 is not “new evidence,” and will not be stricken from the record.
Exhibits 1, 2, and 4 are new evidence and could have been presented to the Court earlier. All three exhibits will be stricken for this reason, as well as for additional reasons. Admitting the affidavits in Exhibits 1 and 2 would prejudice plaintiffs, as they would have no opportunity to present counter-evidence or to depose affiant Russell. Russell’s affidavit does not indicate his competence to testify as to (1) matters of constitutional law, including adequacy of notice under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) matters of statutory law, including the meaning and scope of Michigan law governing LEIN use and of federal law governing disqualification from SNAP benefits; and (3) matters of criminal procedure, including how warrants function. Russell’s affidavit also appears to be inadmissible opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702. For these reasons, his affidavit cannot be considered in
11

deciding the motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (stating that “evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible”). The statements in the email offered as Exhibit 4 constitute hearsay and, as such, could not be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802; Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1994).
B. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 93) Defendant raises four grounds for reconsideration. One of them is presented here for the first time; the other three have already been presented to and analyzed by the Court. As such, none is a proper ground for reconsideration. Reliance Mediaworks (USA) Inc. v. Giarmarco, 549 F. App’x 458 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding party cannot raise issue on motion for reconsideration that it had raised in earlier filings but declined to brief thereafter); Sault St. Marie, 146 F.3d at 374; Gowens, 2012 WL 4475352, at *1; E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). The Court will nonetheless explain why each argument fails to establish a “palpable defect,” the correction of which would result in a different outcome.
12

1. Burford abstention does not apply
Defendant resurrects an old argument, last made a year and a
half ago in his response (Dkt. 30) to plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction, that this Court “must decline” to exercise jurisdiction over
this matter, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943).
Under the so-called “Burford doctrine,”
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 361 (1989) [hereinafter “NOPSI”]. The balance between
federal and state interests “only rarely favors abstention, and the power
to dismiss recognized in Burford represents an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it.” Adrian Energy Assocs. v. Michigan Pub.
13

Serv. Comm’n, 481 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996)).
There are no “difficult questions of state law” here, only questions of federal law. And where the claim is, as here, that federal law has preempted the state’s regulatory authority, “federal adjudication . . . would not disrupt the State’s attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 362 (citing Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)). Burford abstention is unwarranted here.
2. Comparison of the SNAP Act with the Social Security Act
Defendant rehashes his previous argument that significant textual differences counsel against looking to 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e) as an aid to interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k). The Court has already explained that “in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.” Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). Defendant again cites no authority to
14

the contrary. And there is no “plain indication” in § 2015(k) that Congress intended for states to define “fleeing.”
Defendant likewise cites no authority for his new argument that the “actively seeking” requirement is not operative until the Secretary of Agriculture promulgates a final regulation. Section 2015(k)(2)(B) clearly indicates Congress’ intent that only persons actively sought by law enforcement may be disqualified from food assistance.2
Finally, the verb “is fleeing” is not “passive,” as defendant contends, presumably meaning the passive voice. “Is fleeing” is the present continuous or present progressive, a form of the present tense used to indicate action that is ongoing in present time. Verb Tenses, Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/verbtenses#continuous (last visited March 23, 2015).
3. The claims of plaintiffs Barry and Copeland are not moot
2 Defendant misapplies the interpretive canon expressio unius, exclusio alterius. As reflected in its Latin name, the canon applies when, of two terms, only one, and not the other, appears in the statutory provision. Here, both “fleeing” and “actively seeking” appear in section 2015. The argument that “actively seeking” must be defined before becoming operative is not the same as the argument that “actively seeking” does not appear in the provision at all, and therefore was intentionally left out.
15

Defendant’s mootness arguments have already been addressed in the Court’s January Opinion and Order. If the Court were to consider defendant’s Exhibits 1 and 4, a different outcome would not result. Nor would a different outcome result even if the Court found Copeland’s and Barry’s claims moot. That is because plaintiff Anderson’s claims would remain, and, more importantly, mooting the named plaintiffs’ claims while a motion for class certification is pending does not moot the case. See Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 399 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2005); Dozier v. Haverman, No. 14-12455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *25-36 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014). Reconsideration on this issue would thus be inappropriate, because a movant must “not only demonstrate a palpable defect . . . but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3) (emphasis added).
4. This Court’s order does not require defendant to violate state law
16

Finally, defendant argues, for the first time, that the Court’s January 9, 2015 order requires DHS employees to violate Michigan law – specifically, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.214(3) and (5).3
There is no colorable argument that subsection (3) could be violated here. Subsection (3) provides that “[a] person shall not access, use, or disclose nonpublic information governed under this act for personal use or gain.” Defendant has not indicated where this Court ordered disclosure of LEIN information for the personal use or gain of DHS employees.
Subsection (5) provides that “[a] person shall not disclose information governed under this act in a manner that is not authorized by law or rule.” Defendant also cites Mich. Admin. Code R. 28.5208(4), which provides that “[e]xcept as permitted in these rules or if authorized by statute, information from LEIN, AFIS, or other
3 Defendant maintains that “implicit in the Court’s holding is the finding that the Department does not inform clients of the nature of the intended action and its duration. But this implied finding is inaccurate.” The Court ordered defendant to “provid[e] notice that explains, in detail: (1) The nature of the intended action and its duration.” (Dkt. 91, Opinion and Order 95) (emphasis added). The implication is not that defendant “does not inform” clients at all, but that defendant does not explain the disqualification with the level of detail required by both the SNAP Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17

information systems shall not be disseminated to an unauthorized agency, entity, or person.”
The Court did not order defendant to disclose LEIN information. Rather, the Court ordered defendant to disclose certain information about a disqualifying warrant to an applicant for or recipient of food assistance benefits. While DHS might initially obtain that information from LEIN, it can (and must) then verify that information – as DHS already does in other contexts – by, for example, contacting law enforcement or the relevant prosecuting attorney’s office. Information obtained from those sources is not covered by Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.214(5) or Mich. Admin. Code R. 28.5208(4).
Furthermore, state law may, in fact, authorize the disclosure of LEIN information in these circumstances. Subsection (5) prohibits disclosure “in a manner that is not authorized by law or rule.” Subsection (1)(a)(iii) requires the Policy Council to “[e]nsure access by the Department of Human Services to information necessary to implement section 10c of the Social Welfare Act.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.214(1)(a)(iii). In turn, section 10c provides that, upon receiving information of an outstanding felony warrant, DHS “shall notify the
18

local office handling the recipient’s public assistance case of that

outstanding felony warrant or extradition warrant.” Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 400.10c(1). The local office then “shall take appropriate action

regarding cases that local office receives notification of under this

subsection.” In short, LEIN information must be provided to DHS to

implement section 10c, and section 10c authorizes DHS, through its

local office, to “take appropriate action” regarding outstanding felony

warrants.

Surely, “appropriate action” includes providing

constitutionally adequate notice of disqualification from benefits.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Stay Judgment pending resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 94)
Because defendant’s motion for reconsideration has been resolved, her motion to stay will be denied as moot. III. Conclusion
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Dkt. 95) is GRANTED as to Exhibits 1, 2, and 4 to defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration;
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is DENIED as to Exhibit 3 to defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration;
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 93) is DENIED; and
19

Defendant’s Motion to Stay Judgment is DENIED as moot. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2015 Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 24, 2015.

s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager

20

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 110 Filed 03/30/15 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 3122
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v. Nick Lyon, in his capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant. ________________________________/
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S JANUARY 9, 2015 ORDER
On March 24, 2015, the Court held a status conference with the parties regarding defendant’s compliance with the Court’s January 9, 2015 permanent injunction, and plaintiffs’ proposed notice to be sent to class members. At the conference, defendant admitted to taking no steps to comply with the Court’s injunction until February 26, 2015, nearly seven weeks after the injunction issued.
Pursuant to the discussions between the Court and the parties at the conference, it is ORDERED that:
1

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 110 Filed 03/30/15 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 3123
(1) No later than April 14, 2015, defendant shall reinstate public assistance benefits, including benefits under the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Development and Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program, for households whose benefit applications were denied, or whose benefits were terminated, based on a criminal justice disqualification, on or after January 9, 2015. Defendant shall also pay benefits due as a result of reinstatement to those households for the period beginning on January 9, 2015.
(2) No later than April 14, 2015, defendant shall discontinue all reductions in public assistance benefits, including benefits under the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Development and Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program, to households whose benefits were reduced based on a criminal justice disqualification. This includes households whose benefits were initially reduced before January 9, 2015. Defendant shall also pay benefits due to those households as a result of the discontinuation of benefit reductions for the period beginning on January 9, 2015.
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 110 Filed 03/30/15 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 3124

(3) No later than April 21, 2015, defendant shall provide plaintiffs and the Court with copies of all communications to DHS field staff regarding implementation of this Court’s January 9, 2015 Order. Defendant shall also provide plaintiffs and the Court with a representative copy of any notice related to implementation of the Court’s January 9, 2015 Order, including notices regarding reinstatement or payment of benefits, sent to benefit applicants or recipients.

(4) No later than April 21, 2015, defendant shall submit to the Court a written report detailing defendant’s progress in complying with the Court’s January 9, 2015 Order.

A separate order approving plaintiffs’ Amended Proposed Notice to Class will be forthcoming.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2015 Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 110 Filed 03/30/15 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 3125
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 30, 2015.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager
4

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v.
Nick Lyon, in his capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER REGARDING AMENDED CLASS NOTICE [107] AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURT’S JANUARY 9, 2015 ORDER [91] This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ Amended Proposed
Notice (Dkt. 107) to the class certified in the Court’s January 9, 2015
Opinion and Order (Dkt. 91). The Court held a status conference with
the parties on March 24, 2015, at which the contents of plaintiffs’
original proposed notice (Dkt. 98) and defendant’s objections to the
notice (Dkt. 102) were discussed. Plaintiffs were permitted to file an
amended proposed notice based on those discussions. Having
1

thoroughly reviewed the parties’ submissions on the proposed notice and the amended proposed notice, and having carefully considered defendant’s objections to the proposed notice, as articulated both in his response brief and through counsel at the status conference, the Court ORDERS that:
(1) Plaintiffs’ Amended Proposed Notice to Class (Dkt. 107-1), Claim Form for FAP (Dkt. 98-3), Hearing Form (Dkt. 98-4), and Poster (Dkt. 98-5) are APPROVED as to form and content1;
(2) Within 28 days of entry of this Order, defendant shall mail the Notice (Dkt. 107-1), Claim Form (Dkt. 98-3), Hearing Request Form (Dkt. 98-4), an application for food assistance benefits, and a postage paid envelope addressed to Department of Human Services, Barry Lawsuit Processing Unit, [address to be determined], to all class members, by first class mail addressed to the last address known to the Department of Human Services (DHS);
1 Defendant objects that the Notice must inform class members that they may opt out of the litigation and that they may enter an appearance through their own attorney, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). (Dkt. 102 at 5.) But Rule 23(c)(2)(B) only applies to classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The class in this case was certified under Rule 23(b)(2). (Dkt. 91, Opinion and Order 91.) Rule 23(c)(2)(A) thus applies to the Notice, which is only required to be “appropriate.”
2

(a) DHS shall fill in information specific to each class member on the Notice, Claim Form, and Hearing Request Form, to the extent such information is contained in DHS records; (b) The return address on the envelopes shall indicate the notice was sent from the Michigan Department of Human Services, and the front of the envelope shall contain the statement, “IMPORTANT NOTICE ABOUT DHS BENEFITS” in bold, capital letters; (c) DHS shall send the Notice, Claim Form, and Hearing Request Form in Spanish to any class member on record with DHS as being Spanish-speaking or who later comes to defendant’s attention as needing information in Spanish; (d) DHS shall send the Notice, Claim Form, and Hearing Request Form in Arabic to any class member on record with DHS as being Arabic-speaking or who later comes to defendant’s attention as needing information in Arabic;
3

(3) For any notices sent under (1) above that are returned as undeliverable, defendant shall use a people locator service to find the current address for the relevant class member, and shall resend the notice with the new mailing date and new deadline date to the corrected address within 21 days of receiving the returned notice;
(4) Within 28 days of entry of this Order, defendant shall print and distribute 24 inch by 36 inch copies of the Notice Poster (Dkt. 98-5). Defendant shall distribute a number of posters to each DHS office sufficient to ensure that one poster will be posted in each lobby, reception, and waiting area, along with directions that these posters must be prominently displayed in all lobby, reception, and waiting areas. DHS shall post the notice on its website at a location to be agreed upon by the parties, which location will be available via links on locations to be agreed upon by the parties. DHS shall also provide at least one poster to all legal services offices in Michigan listed in Dkt. 98-6, and at least one poster to each Community Action Agency in Michigan and to each Michigan Works! Agency office, with a request that these
4

posters be prominently displayed until at least 180 days after entry of this Order. DHS shall also provide up to 500 posters to not-for-profit, community-based organizations or human services providers that request them by emailing DHS at an email address to be determined, or by calling DHS at a phone number to be determined, on a first-come, first-served basis;
(5) Food Assistance Program (FAP) benefits due on or after January 1, 2013 shall be restored to class members under 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b). The Court will postpone determination of how defendant will restore FAP benefits (see Dkt. 98, pp. 6-12 and Dkt. 102, pp. 10-13) until discussions between DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service regarding a streamlined process for restoration of FAP benefits have concluded, or until notified by the parties that further action from the Court is necessary;
(6) Defendant shall compile and provide to plaintiffs’ attorneys a searchable and sortable spreadsheet or data file (such as an Excel or Access file) that contains for all class members the information specified below;
5

(a) Within 21 days of entry of this Order, defendant shall provide a spreadsheet or data file that contains, for each class member, the information listed in numbers 1-6 below; (b) Within 42 days of entry of this Order, defendant shall provide an updated spreadsheet or data file that contains, for each class member, the information listed in numbers 112 below. The information in numbers 7-12 shall be provided to the extent that defendant has that information; (c) Every 14 days thereafter, defendant shall provide an updated spreadsheet or data file that contains, for each class member, the information listed in numbers 1-12 below; (d) Defendant shall continue to provide such updates until 12 months have elapsed from the date of provision of the first spreadsheet or data file, per (6)(a) above. After the 12 months have elapsed, if the spreadsheet or data file shows that there are pending applications, claims, or hearing requests, defendant shall continue to provide the biweekly
6

updates in (6)(c) until all pending applications, claims, or hearing requests have been resolved; (e) Updates shall consist of a completely updated spreadsheet or data file; (f) The spreadsheet or data file shall contain, for each class member, the following information:
All class members: 1. Name; 2. Last address known to DHS; 3. Case number; 4. The date the criminal justice disqualification notice was sent to the class member, both initially and, if returned, when re-mailed; 5. The type of benefits (FAP, FIP, CDC, SDA, or RAP) affected by the denial, termination, or reduction of benefits, and, for each type of benefit affected, whether it was denied, terminated, or reduced, and the
7

effective date(s) of the termination, denial, or reduction of benefits; 6. The date, if any, on which the class member requested a hearing regarding benefits denied, reduced, or terminated because of a criminal justice disqualification, as well as the disposition of the hearing request or that it is pending; 7. The date, if any, on which the class member applied for benefits after DHS sent the class member a Notice of Decision (Dkt. 107-1),
a. Which benefits (FIP, FAP, CDC, SDA, RAP) the class member applied for, and whether the application is still pending, b. If approved, the monthly benefit amount approved, c. If denied, the reason for the denial; Subclass members
8

8. Contingent on the outcome of discussions between DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, whether DHS has classified the class member as being in Group 1, Group 2, or Group 3, or as not a member of those groups (See Dkt. 98, pp. 6-12);
9. The date(s), if any, of all applications for FAP submitted by the class member or household subsequent to the criminal justice disqualification, other than those disclosed in number 7 above, and whether the application(s) was approved, denied, or is still pending,
a. If approved, the monthly FAP allotment for the first full month for which FAP was prospectively approved for the class member and his / her household after the criminal justice disqualification notice,
b. If denied, the reason for denial;
9

10. The date, if any, on which the class member submitted a Claim Form;
11. Whether the class member or class member’s household received a FAP supplement (restored back benefits) for benefits denied, terminated, or reduced based on a criminal justice disqualification,
a. The total amount of the FAP supplement / back benefits,
b. The months for which the FAP supplement / back benefits were approved,
c. For any class member for whom benefits are not restored, the specific problem that prevented restoration of benefits (e.g., income, assets, residence, verification, work sanction, not in Groups 1, 2, or 3, etc.),
d. Whether the class member filed a Hearing Request in response to notice regarding the denial or amount of the FAP supplement, and the
10

disposition of any such hearing request. Disposition means whether the request was dismissed without a hearing, the appeal was settled without a hearing, defendant’s decision was reversed by a decision and order, or defendant’s decision was affirmed by a decision and order;

12. The number of notices mailed out under (2) above that are returned as undeliverable, the number of individuals not located under (3) above, and the number of notices returned after remailing under (3) above;

(7) For the period defined in (6)(d) above, defendant shall provide the Court and plaintiffs with monthly written reports detailing DHS’ progress in implementing the Court’s January 9, 2015 Order.

IT SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2015

s/Judith E. Levy

11

Ann Arbor, Michigan

JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 31, 2015.

s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager

12

 
 5:13-cv-C13a1s8e5: -1J5E-L1-3D9R0G DDooccum# e1n1t7: 20F-il1ed 0F4i/l0e7d/:1054/0P7g/2101o5f 5 PPaggeID: 13245

(1 of 5)

No. 15-1390
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WALTER BARRY, by his next friend, Elaine

)

Barry, on behalf of himself and all others similarly )

situated; DONITHA COPELAND; KENNETH L. )

ANDERSON; WESTSIDE MOTHERS,

)

)

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

)

)

v.

)

)

NICK LYON, in his official capacity as Acting

)

Director, Michigan Department of Human Services, )

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

FILED
Apr 07, 2015 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
O R D E R

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GILMAN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
The Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services (“MDHS”), appeals the final judgment in this class action challenging the state law and policies governing the disqualification of fugitive felons from receiving various forms of public assistance, including benefits under the federal food stamp program—the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”). MDHS moved for a stay pending appeal in the district court, and that court scheduled a hearing on the stay motion for May 6, 2015. Because MDHS is required to provide benefits to some individuals by April 14, 2015, and to notify class members of the action by April 28, 2015, it seeks an emergency stay pending appeal from this court. The plaintiffs oppose the motion for a stay.

5:13-cv-C13a1s8e5: -1J5E-L1-3D9R0G DDooccum# e1n1t7: 20F-il1ed 0F4i/l0e7d/:1054/0P7g/2201o5f 5 PPaggeID: 23246
No. 15-1390 -2-

(2 of 5)

MDHS “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify” the exercise of

discretion to grant a stay pending appeal. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009). Four

factors guide our decision: (1) whether MDHS has a strong or substantial likelihood of success

on the merits; (2) whether it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay; (3) whether the

requested injunctive relief will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) where the

public interest lies. Id. at 434; see also Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341,

343 (6th Cir. 2012). The first two factors are “the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. “These

factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated considerations that must be

balanced together.” Husted, 698 F.3d at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court found that MDHS’s automated criminal justice disqualification notices

violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the provisions of SNAP.

And MDHS imposed invalid eligibility requirements on plaintiffs and the class members by

disqualifying them from the receipt of benefits based solely on the existence of an outstanding

warrant against them. Upon review, we conclude that MDHS has not demonstrated a sufficient

likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm to support a stay pending appeal. As for

MDHS’s reliance on Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, Inc., No. 14-15, 2015 WL

1419423 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2015), nothing in the record shows that MDHS gave the district court

the opportunity to assess its impact on this case. Because we are a court of “review and not first

view,” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted), we leave it to the district court to consider the impact of Armstrong, in the first

instance.

5:13-cv-C13a1s8e5: -1J5E-L1-3D9R0G DDooccum# e1n1t7: 20F-il1ed 0F4i/l0e7d/:1054/0P7g/2301o5f 5 PPaggeID: 33247
No. 15-1390 -3-

(3 of 5)

Accordingly, the motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED. The clerk is directed to

expedite the appeal for submission to the court.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

5:13-cv-C13a1s8e5: -1J5E-L1-3D9R0G DDooccum# e1n1t7: 20F-il2ed 0F4i/l0e7d/:1054/0P7g/2401o5f 5 PPaggeID: 13248

(4 of 5)

Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: April 07, 2015

Ms. Miriam J. Aukerman American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan West Regional Office 1514 Wealthy, S.E Suite 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506
Ms. Jacqueline Doig Center for Civil Justice 320 S. Washington Second Floor Saginaw, MI 48607-0000
Sofia V. Nelson ACLU Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201
Ms. Elan S. Nichols Cemter for Civil Justice 436 S. Saginaw Street Suite 400 Flint, MI 48502
Mr. Joshua Sean Smith Office of the Attorney General of Michigan P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909
Re: Case No. 15-1390, Walter Barry, et al v. Nick Lyon Originating Case No. : 5:13-cv-13185

5:13-cv-C13a1s8e5: -1J5E-L1-3D9R0G DDooccum# e1n1t7: 20F-il2ed 0F4i/l0e7d/:1054/0P7g/2501o5f 5 PPaggeID: 23249

(5 of 5)

Dear Counsel, The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case. Sincerely yours,

cc: Mr. David J. Weaver Enclosure

s/Michelle M. Davis Case Manager Direct Dial No. 513-564-7025

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 1 of 12 Pg ID 3713
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v. Nick Lyon, in his capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant. ________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR STAY OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL [109]
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s Nick Lyon’s Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal, filed on March 27, 2015. (Dkt. 109.) After the motion was set for hearing, defendant filed a notice of appeal and moved the Court of Appeals for an emergency stay of all proceedings resulting from this Court’s January 9, 2015 Opinion and Order and March 26, 2015 Judgment. (Case No. 15-1390, Dkt. 14.) The Court of Appeals denied the motion for an emergency stay, finding that
1

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 2 of 12 Pg ID 3714
defendant “has not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm to support a stay pending appeal.” (Dkt. 117.)
The Court of Appeals also noted it would not consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) on this case until this Court has done so. (Id. at 2.) To that end, the parties submitted supplemental briefs to this Court on the effect of Armstrong on defendant’s likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal. (See Dkt. 118, 121, 122.) A hearing was held on May 5, 2015, at which the Court heard oral argument on the effect of Armstrong. As indicated at the hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to stay will be denied. I. Standard
The determination of whether to grant a stay pending appeal is governed by the same factors as a motion for a preliminary injunction: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 3 of 12 Pg ID 3715
harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.” Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991). “In essence, a party seeking a stay must ordinarily demonstrate to a reviewing court that there is a likelihood of reversal.” Id. If the movant “demonstrates irreparable harm that decidedly outweighs any potential harm to the [non-movant] if a stay is granted, he is still required to show, at a minimum, serious questions going to the merits.” Id. at 153-54. II. Analysis
As mentioned above, the Court of Appeals has already determined that defendant “has not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm to support a stay pending appeal.” (Dkt. 117.) The analysis here will therefore focus solely on the effect, if any, of Armstrong on defendant’s likelihood of success on the merits.
A. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Armstrong The issue in Armstrong was whether the respondents – Medicaid providers – had a right of action under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, to enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), against the state of Idaho. The providers claimed
3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 4 of 12 Pg ID 3716
Idaho violated §(30)(A) by reimbursing them for in-home medical services – “habilitation services” – at rates lower than those required by the statute. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1382. The district court entered summary judgment for the providers, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the providers “had an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause to seek injunctive relief against the enforcement or implementation of state legislation.” Id. at 1383.
The Supreme Court reversed, first holding, in Part II of its Opinion, that the Supremacy Clause does not create an implied private right of action. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384. The Court then addressed, in Part III of its Opinion, the question of whether the respondents could nonetheless seek equitable relief against Idaho. Id. at 1385. Equitable relief from the unconstitutional actions of state officers does not depend upon an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 1384. Rather, such relief “is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action.” Id.
Congress may, however, “displace the equitable relief that is traditionally available to enforce federal law.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at
4

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 5 of 12 Pg ID 3717
1385-86. The Court held that Congress had done just that, based on two aspects of § 30(A). Id. at 1385. First, Congress provided a single remedy for a state’s violation of Medicaid’s requirements: the withholding of funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c). Second, the “judicially unadministrable nature of § 30(A)’s text” – namely, the requirement that a state plan provide for reimbursements “consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care,” while “safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of . . . care and services” – indicates Congress’ intent for the agency, not the courts, to enforce § 30(A). Id. To be clear, the Court held that both of these aspects combined to foreclose equitable relief. Id. (“The provision for the Secretary’s enforcement by withholding funds might not, by itself, preclude the availability of equitable relief . . . But it does so when combined with the judicially unadministrable nature of § 30(A)’s text.”).
Justice Breyer concurred with four other justices in Parts I-III of the majority opinion. In his concurrence to Part III, Justice Breyer emphasized that the availability of equitable relief depends on the characteristics of the particular federal statute at issue. Armstrong,
5

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 6 of 12 Pg ID 3718
135 S. Ct. at 1388. Justice Breyer agreed that the reimbursement standard in § 30(A) is “broad and nonspecific.” Id. But he focused more narrowly on the fact that the standard applied to the setting of rates, a complex task for which administrative agencies are better suited than courts. Id. at 1388-89.
Part IV of the Opinion concerns the availability of a private right of action under § 30(A) itself. This issue was not before the Court, and only four justices joined Part IV. Part IV is thus dicta and is not binding precedent. In Part IV, four justices concluded that § 30(A) “lacks the sort of rights-creating language needed to imply a private right of action.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)). Rather, § 30(A) “is phrased as a directive to the federal agency charged with approving state Medicaid plans.” Id.
B. Application of Armstrong to this case Defendant argues that Armstrong precludes relief for plaintiffs on Counts II, III, and IV of their complaint.1 Specifically, defendant maintains (1) Armstrong precludes this Court’s holding that sections
1 Count I is brought to enforce plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, not under a statute. Defendant’s arguments about a private right of action therefore do not apply to Count I.
6

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 7 of 12 Pg ID 3719
2020(e)(10) and 2014(a) of the SNAP Act create private rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II and III) and (2) relief on Count IV is precluded by Armstrong’s holding that the Supremacy Clause does not create an implied right of action. Defendant stated at the hearing on this motion that his argument does not rely on Part IV of Armstrong – with good reason, since Part IV, as discussed above, is dicta and only garnered four votes.
1. Counts II and III To begin with, defendant misreads Armstrong, citing the holding in Part III as support for his argument that the SNAP Act does not create a private right of action. (See Dkt. 121, Def.’s Supp. Br. 5-6.) As discussed above, Part III of Armstrong concerns the availability of equitable relief in the absence of a private right of action – not whether a private right of action is available in the first place. Part III simply has no bearing on whether the SNAP Act creates a private right of action. Part IV of Armstrong does address whether § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act creates a private right of action. But again, Part IV is not binding law, and even if it were, it would not change this Court’s
7

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 8 of 12 Pg ID 3720
analysis. Part IV consists of a straightforward, although brief, analysis under Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) and Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Defendant is wrong to suggest that Armstrong narrows, or changes in any other way, the “availability of private rights of action to enforce statutes.”
In the view of four justices, the language in § 30(A) – central to the private right of action analysis – “is phrased as a directive to the federal agency charged with approving state Medicaid plans.” Slip Op. at 10. But § 30(A)’s language differs significantly from the relevant SNAP Act language, which is not phrased as a directive to an agency. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a), 2020(e)(10). Rather, as explained in the Court’s January 9, 2015 Opinion and Order, the relevant SNAP Act provisions are “phrased in terms of the persons benefited.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284.
In sum, Armstrong has no bearing on defendant’s likelihood of success on Counts II and III.
2. Count IV Armstrong thus only bears on Count IV, in which plaintiffs allege the SNAP Act expressly preempts Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and
8

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 9 of 12 Pg ID 3721
defendant’s fugitive felon policy as set forth in Bridges Eligibility Manual 204 [hereinafter BEM 204]. (Dkt. 70, Second Amend. Compl. ¶ 373.)
Even if Armstrong precluded relief on Count IV, plaintiffs would still obtain the same relief through Count III – an injunction prohibiting enforcement of Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and BEM 204. (See Dkt. 91, Opinion and Order 79.) Armstrong thus has no effect on defendant’s likelihood of success on appeal.
Armstrong does not, however, preclude relief on Count IV. True, under Armstrong, plaintiffs do not have an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the SNAP Act. But they do not need one. As mentioned above, the relevant provisions of the SNAP Act create private rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 91, Opinion and Order 58.) And, unlike in Armstrong, the plaintiffs here are entitled to relief under the Court’s equitable power, independent of a private right of action.
The two aspects of § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act that precluded equitable relief in Armstrong are not present in the SNAP Act. First, the SNAP Act expressly contemplates private action to enforce its
9

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 10 of 12 Pg ID 3722
provisions. Section 2020 (a)(3)(B)(ii) requires that any records necessary to determine a state program’s compliance with the SNAP Act “shall . . . be available for review in any action filed by a household to enforce any provision of this chapter (including regulations issued under this chapter) . . .” (emphasis added). Section 2023 (b) provides for restoration of wrongfully withheld SNAP benefits “in any judicial action arising under this chapter.”
Second, the relevant SNAP Act provisions are not “judicially unadministrable.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385. Section 2015(k) sets forth the relevant eligibility disqualification in clear, objective language: the household member must be (1) “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction” for a felony, and (2) law enforcement must be “actively seeking” that person “for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings” against him or her.2 7 U.S.C.
2 Defendant has previously maintained that the clause “under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing” means that state law, not federal law, determines the definition of fleeing. The Court has already explained why this interpretation is incorrect (Dkt. 91, Opinion and Order 81-83), but adds here that section 2020(e)(8) requires states to make available to law enforcement officers certain information about household members who are “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, for a crime (or attempt to commit a crime) that, under the law of the place the member is fleeing, is a felony.” 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(8). This makes clear that state law determines only whether the relevant crime is a felony, not the meaning of “fleeing,” in § 2015(k).
10

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 11 of 12 Pg ID 3723

2015(k). The respective meanings of “fleeing” and “actively seeking” are relatively easy to determine – is the person trying to avoid arrest? Are police trying to find the person? The same cannot be said of “consistency,” “efficiency,” “economy,” “quality,” and “unnecessary,” especially when they must all be considered in combination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). Moreover, as Justice Breyer emphasized, § 30(A) concerns rate-setting, a complex task that requires administrative expertise.

Defendant is no likelier to obtain relief on Count IV as a result of Armstrong, as plaintiffs can enforce the relevant SNAP Act provisions by private action or, alternatively, through this Court’s traditional equitable powers.

III. Conclusion

Defendant has failed to show that Armstrong increases his

likelihood of success on appeal with respect to any of plaintiffs’ claims.

Accordingly, defendant’s Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal

(Dkt. 109) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2015

s/Judith E. Levy 11

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 130 Filed 06/05/15 Pg 12 of 12 Pg ID 3724

Ann Arbor, Michigan

JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 5, 2015.

s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager

12

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 1 of 25 Pg ID 4437
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy
v.
Nick Lyon, in his capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE [125], AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR EXPEDITED POSTJUDGMENT DISCOVERY [138]
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order
to Show Cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for
violation of previous orders in this case (Dkt. 125), and plaintiffs’
Motion for Ex Parte Order Regarding 7/17/2015 Hearing, for Expedited
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery, and for Expedited,
Postjudgment Discovery (Dkt. 138). The Court previously granted in
part and denied in part docket no. 138, leaving pending the part of

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 2 of 25 Pg ID 4438
plaintiffs’ motion seeking expedited post-judgment discovery. A hearing was held on July 24, 2015, at which the Court indicated the remainder of docket no. 138 would be granted; that docket no. 125 would be granted in part; and that a written order would follow, based on a proposed order submitted by plaintiffs and defendant’s response to that proposed order. The parties agreed that the Court should hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the second step of its determination whether defendant is in contempt of the Court’s January 9, March 30, and March 31, 2015 orders.
The Court finds that plaintiffs have established, by clear and convincing evidence, a prima facie case that defendant has violated definite and specific orders of this Court. The defendant has not stopped the conduct declared unlawful and enjoined by the Court on January 9, 2015. (Dkt. 91.) The evidence submitted establishes that defendant has repeatedly denied, reduced or terminated benefits under the “fugitive felon” policy and has repeatedly sent out the legally inadequate criminal justice disqualification notices for the purpose of terminating, reducing, or denying benefits to cash, food, or child care applicants or recipients, after being clearly and specifically ordered not
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 3 of 25 Pg ID 4439
to do so. The defendant also has not provided the information required to be reported under the Court’s March 31, 2015 Order (Dkt. 114), including information about hearing requests, claims for back benefits under the Food Assistance program, and applications submitted following the mailing of class notice as required by that Order.
The Court preliminarily finds that defendant has not taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with the Court’s orders during the months that have passed since the Court’s ruling on the merits and the Court’s order requiring defendant to report information to plaintiffs. Defendant concedes that he did not immediately take steps to comply after the January 9, 2015 order was entered and that, as of the July 24, 2015 hearing, he had not removed the enjoined policy from the manuals used by case workers to determine benefit eligibility.1 He did not create a “red edit” telling caseworkers not to proceed with criminal justice disqualifications and did not insert a note that the enjoined policy was “suspended” until after plaintiffs brought their motion to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
1 BAM 811 and BEM 204 were removed effective August 1, 2015. (Dkt. 154-3.)
3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 4 of 25 Pg ID 4440
Defendant has provided no explanation as to why the steps taken could not have been taken earlier.
Defendant argues that it is impossible to modify his computer systems to prevent caseworkers from imposing criminal justice disqualifications (resulting in the denial, termination, or reduction of assistance), or to prevent caseworkers from issuing criminal justice disqualification notices that violate the January 9, 2015 Order. However, the Court is not convinced that the modifications necessary to prevent the erroneous and unlawful terminations and mailings, which violate the January 9, 2015 Order, cannot be made. Likewise, the Court is not convinced that defendant has taken all reasonable steps to compile and report the information required under the March 31, 2015 Order.
In order to ensure full compliance with the Court’s orders is achieved as promptly as possible, pending final resolution of plaintiffs’ contempt motion, while at the same time also ensuring that (a) defendant has an opportunity to meet his burden of proof, (b) plaintiffs have the information needed to cross-examine defendant’s witnesses and to present rebuttal evidence, and (c) the Court has the benefit of a
4

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 5 of 25 Pg ID 4441
neutral witness with the information technology database, programming, and systems expertise necessary to identify “all reasonable steps within defendant’s power” for the purposes of evaluating defendant’s defense to the motion to show cause and identifying remedial action that must be taken to comply with the Court’s orders, the Court ORDERS the following:
Defendant Lyon to Appear 1. Defendant Nick Lyon shall appear in chambers for a status conference on September 11, 2015, at 3:00 P.M. to discuss the following issues:
a. His understanding of the fact that he may be found in contempt of court, and any specific steps he has taken to avoid that contempt and ensure compliance with the Court’s orders;
b. The specific steps he has taken to communicate to all Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) employees the imperative to comply with the Court’s orders, the urgency of that task, and the priority that must be placed on the work necessary to achieve compliance;
5

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 6 of 25 Pg ID 4442
c. The specific steps he has taken to communicate that same imperative, urgency, and priority to the directors of the Michigan Department of Management, Technology and Budget (DTMB), the Michigan Administrative Hearings System (MAHS), and the highest level officials in any other state department or agency whose services or cooperation are needed to achieve compliance with the Court’s orders;
d. His commitment to ensure the cooperation of his employees, contractors, agents and representatives, including employees of other state departments, agencies, and offices, with the Court and plaintiffs’ attorneys, in achieving compliance with the Court’s orders; and
e. Any other questions that the Court or plaintiffs’ counsel may have regarding his compliance with the Orders in this case. 2. This status conference shall focus on defendant Lyon’s efforts and actions to achieve DHHS compliance with the Court’s orders. Testimony from other witnesses may be presented at the evidentiary hearing to be held at a later date, as set forth below.
6

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 7 of 25 Pg ID 4443
3. At least one full business day before the status conference, defendant Lyon shall provide the Court and plaintiffs’ attorneys with copies of (a) any interdepartmental agreements, protocols or priorities, memoranda of understanding, or similar documents that limit or affect DHHS’ ability to comply with the Court’s orders because of DHHS’ reliance on other departments, contractors, or vendors, and (b) any nonprivileged documents that defendant reviewed to prepare for the status conference.
Defendant to Provide Detailed Answers to Initial Questions Regarding Asserted Barriers to Compliance
4. To assist the Court in understanding the current status of the defendant’s efforts to come into compliance with the Court’s orders, within seven days of the entry of this Order, defendant shall file written answers setting forth in detail the answers to the following questions. To the extent that defendant has already answered these questions in his August 21, 2015 compliance report (Dkt. 154-4), he may refile those answers in accordance with paragraph 5 below.
a. Why DHHS did not disable the systems that allow caseworkers to terminate, deny, or reduce benefits based on the existence of an outstanding warrant? 7

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 8 of 25 Pg ID 4444
b. Why defendant did not enter a “red edit” to try to stop its employees from erroneously terminating benefits until June 1, 2015?
c. Why workers in the more than 125 post-3/22/2015 disqualifications were tracking warrants (i.e. why computer fields for this information remain), and how those workers learned of outstanding warrants if, as defendant has represented, the automated felony match has been turned off?
d. Why DHHS did not eliminate the template for the enjoined “criminal justice disqualification” notices and the EL1013/criminal justice disqualification message from the boilerplate messages that can be sent by caseworkers?
e. Why DHHS, knowing that it had not made system changes to prevent worker error, did not seek to identify worker errors before plaintiffs’ contempt motion was filed?
f. Why, when DHHS staff relies on the Bridges manuals for information about benefit eligibility, defendant continued to post BEM 204 (enjoined fugitive felon policy) and BAM
8

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 9 of 25 Pg ID 4445
811 (enjoined automated match) as official policy for almost five months after the injunction issued, and did not remove them from published manuals until August 1, 2015? g. Why DHHS is unable to provide information about class members who applied for benefits with DHHS after receiving notice that they may now be eligible? h. Why, when DHHS has received at least 1,592 hearing request forms, it cannot report on all those requests or on any resolution of those requests by DHHS prior to a MAHS hearing? i. Why, when DHHS has received at least 3,373 claim forms, it cannot report on those claims? j. Why dates that criminal justice disqualification notices were sent are missing for over 7,000 class members? k. Why data that defendant belatedly reported on the 6/9/15 and 6/23/15 spreadsheets could not have been produced earlier?
9

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 10 of 25 Pg ID 4446
l. Whether defendant has simply failed to inspect the spreadsheets before providing them, or whether defendant has reviewed them but has failed to notify either the Court or class counsel about the information missing from the reports and the steps being taken to provide that information?
m. Why it is not possible to maintain the historical information and the systems, programs, or functionality needed in order to restore benefits or issue corrective payments to individuals or groups subjected to “fugitive felon” or “criminal justice” disqualifications prior to January 9, 2015, while at the same time modifying the systems so that, going forward, a data match between MSP and DHHS that identifies a person as having an outstanding felony warrant will no longer result in an eligibility determination and benefit calculation that treats that individual as ineligible for/disqualified from receiving benefits.
10

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 11 of 25 Pg ID 4447
n. Why “the screen [that] must remain active and available for workers to update [in order to restore past benefits]” (Dkt. 133 at PgID 3746) cannot be modified, hidden, or partially protected in a manner that would prevent DHHS workers from coding / flagging an individual as a “fugitive felon,” or otherwise prevent workers from (a) causing the person to be disqualified based on alleged “fugitive felon” status, and (b) sending criminal justice disqualification notices? In other words, why is it not possible to maintain the historical information needed to restore back benefits while simultaneously ensuring that the systems used to maintain the historical information cannot be used to disqualify individuals from benefits going forward?
5. The answers provided shall be signed under penalty of perjury by the persons providing the answers, who shall be qualified to testify as to the information provided in the answers. Each person signing the answers shall disclose their title and job description and designate the specific questions they answered. Defendant Lyon and
11

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 12 of 25 Pg ID 4448
his attorney shall attest that they have reviewed the answers submitted.
6. At the same time that defendant provides answers to these questions, defendant shall provide to the Court and to plaintiffs’ counsel copies of all non-privileged documents that were consulted in preparing those answers or that form the basis for those answers, and shall label the documents in a logical manner that indicates the question(s) to which the document relates.
Appointment of Expert Witness 7. Based upon the parties’ representations at the July 24, 2015 hearing and in subsequent filings, the Court will appoint an expert witness, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 706, to assist the Court with:
a. Understanding and assessing the reasonableness of the steps that defendant has and has not taken to use or revise information technology (IT) and computer systems to comply with the Court’s order;
b. Understanding, and identifying solutions to, any computer programming or other systems problems that are delaying or preventing defendant from coming into compliance with
12

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 13 of 25 Pg ID 4449
the Court’s January 9, 2015 and March 30, 2015 Orders, while maintaining the systems functionality needed to proceed with the issuance of corrective payments or restoration of benefits for periods prior to January 9, 2015; c. Understanding, and identifying solutions to, any computer programming or other systems problems that are delaying or preventing defendant from coming into compliance with the data reporting requirements of the Court’s March 31, 2015 Order; d. Identifying how the solutions in 7(b) and 7(c) can be implemented most expeditiously; and e. Identifying any barriers to the solutions in 7(b) and 7(c) and how those barriers may be overcome. 8. The parties shall consult regarding the identification of an appropriate expert, and may jointly propose one or more experts for consideration by the Court. In the event that the parties cannot agree upon an expert to propose the Court, the parties may separately each submit the names of two proposed experts. The name(s) of the proposed expert(s), together with information about their qualifications, shall be
13

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 14 of 25 Pg ID 4450

submitted to the Court no later than seven days after this order is

entered.

9. Defendant shall provide to the court-appointed expert a copy

of the detailed written answers and documents filed pursuant to this

Order.

10. Defendant shall fully cooperate with the appointed expert

and shall provide the appointed expert with access to documents,

information, interfaces, and personnel as needed to investigate what

steps can be taken to bring the defendant into compliance, including:

a. An opportunity to examine all systems and interfaces that

affect, reflect, or are relevant to the “fugitive

felon”/“criminal justice” matches, disqualifications,

screens, or notices at issue in this case;

b. All specifications, source coding, or other information or

documents requested by the expert to understand and

assess the fugitive felon/criminal justice interface,

demographic

screens,

and

eligibility

determinations/benefits calculations used to implement

14

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 15 of 25 Pg ID 4451
the fugitive felon policy or to issue the criminal justice disqualification notices; c. All coding for any changes, patches, programs, or systems used to implement M.C.L.A. § 400.10b and 10c, upon request of the expert; d. All manuals or instructions for any changes, patches, programs, or systems used to implement M.C.L.A. 400.10b and 10c; e. All other specifications, source coding, or other information or documents requested by the expert to understand and assess the systems needed by defendant to calculate and issue corrective payments or to restore benefits that were denied, terminated, or reduced as a result of the “fugitive felon” policy and “criminal justice disqualification” notices for periods prior to January 9, 2015; f. All specifications, source coding, or other information or documents requested by the expert for purposes of understanding and assessing the usefulness of the “red edit” referred to in defendant’s responses and briefs, and
15

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 16 of 25 Pg ID 4452
all subsequent messages or “fixes” instituted in an effort to comply with the orders in this case; and g. All queries, spreadsheets, databases, source code, or other information or documents requested by the expert for purposes of understanding the systems used to identify and report data regarding class members as required by the March 31, 2015 Order. 11. In the event that defendant believes the information requested by the expert is covered by attorney-client privilege, defendant may file a motion for a protective order with the Court. 12. Defendant shall promptly make appropriate staff or contractors available to the court-appointed expert to answer questions about the relevant computer systems and any barriers to implementation of the orders in this case. 13. Defendant shall promptly take all reasonable steps to secure the cooperation of other departments or agencies of state government that assist defendant in carrying out his obligations to administer the Food Assistance Program, Family Independence Program, Refugee Assistance Program, State Disability Assistance Program and Child
16

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 17 of 25 Pg ID 4453
Development and Care program, to ensure that the court-appointed expert has prompt access to the personnel and information he or she needs.
14. Plaintiffs’ attorneys shall be entitled to be present at the inspections conducted by the expert.
15. Defendant shall provide to plaintiffs’ attorneys, in electronic form, copies of all information that is provided to the court-appointed expert.
16. Defendant shall, within seven days of this Order, file (a) proposed language regarding the disclosure of proprietary or confidential information to be included in any agreement or court order setting forth the duties of the expert witness, if defendant believes such language should be included; (b) the specifics of any other protections defendant deems necessary to protect applicants and recipients of public assistance; and (c) the specifics of any other protections needed to comply with contracts or agreements with defendant’s vendors or contractors (along with copies of any relevant contractual provisions). Plaintiffs shall have three days to inform the Court whether they wish to object and seven days thereafter to file objections.
17

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 18 of 25 Pg ID 4454
17. The court-appointed expert shall submit an initial report to the Court with preliminary findings within 28 days of appointment, and a final report to the Court at least seven days prior to the evidentiary “show cause” hearing ordered below, outlining her or his findings on the matters set forth above. The report shall include recommendations as to the best course of action to achieve compliance.
18. If the expert’s opinion is that the identified solutions cannot be promptly implemented by State of Michigan personnel or contractors, she or he shall so inform the Court, shall provide the basis for that opinion, and shall propose what other steps should be taken to implement the identified solutions.
19. If it is not possible to submit a final report within the timeframe set in this order, the expert shall inform the court and the attorneys as soon as the need for additional time is identified, and shall set forth the reasons why more time is needed and the amount of additional time needed.
20. The court-appointed expert shall be available to meet with the attorneys for the parties individually and shall meet, on the record, with the Court and the attorneys following submission of the report.
18

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 19 of 25 Pg ID 4455
21. The expert shall attend and be prepared to testify at the evidentiary show cause hearing ordered below. The Court shall set the terms of payment of reasonable fees for the expert.
22. The Court finds it appropriate for defendant to pay the full cost of the expert, pending a final decision on plaintiffs’ Motion to Show Cause (Dkt. 125), because (a) defendant has repeatedly failed to comply with the Court’s orders; (b) it is defendant’s responsibility to remedy any issues with his computer systems that prevent DHHS from coming into compliance; (c) defendant has represented to the Court that Michigan governmental staff have not been able to remedy the alleged computer system issues preventing compliance, which suggests that outside technical expertise is needed; (d) defendant’s piecemeal approach to compliance, whereby he has repeatedly identified additional steps he can take towards compliance after plaintiffs have filed motions, suggests that defendant has failed to seek a comprehensive solution to the alleged computer system problems; and (e) plaintiffs are indigent. The expert shall submit invoice(s) for reasonable fees and costs directly to the defendant for reimbursement, with copies provided to the Court and to plaintiffs’ attorneys.
19

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 20 of 25 Pg ID 4456
23. The court-appointed expert may communicate freely with any or all attorneys or parties without such communications being considered ex parte communications.
Rescission of Policies that Violate the Orders in this Case 24. Within seven days of this Order, defendant shall file with
the Court an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge, regarding the date of removal of the BEM 204 and BAM 811 policies from both internet and intranet sites.
Modification of EL 1013 Message 25. Within seven days of this Order, defendant shall modify the content of the EL 1013 message, so that if defendant’s systems still generate such a message in FAP, FIP, SDA, RCA, and CDC cases, it shall say: “IF YOU RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE YOU ARE BEING UNLAWFULLY DENIED OR TERMINATED FROM RECEIVING BENEFITS DUE TO A COMPUTER OR CASEWORKER ERROR IN VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER. CONTACT YOUR CASEWORKER OR THE BARRY V. CORRIGAN HELP LINE AT 313-578-6826. MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT ACLUMICH.ORG/PUBLICBENEFITS.”
20

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 21 of 25 Pg ID 4457
Discovery 26. To the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys believe it necessary to conduct discovery to supplement the work of the court-appointed expert, plaintiffs shall be entitled to conduct expedited discovery related to the issues of whether defendant and DHHS have taken all reasonable steps within their power to comply with the Court’s orders, and the reasonable steps necessary for defendant to come into compliance with the Court’s orders. 27. If plaintiffs’ attorneys pursue discovery, defendant shall respond to any interrogatories, requests for inspection or production, or requests to admit within 21 days, and depositions shall be scheduled within 21 days after the production of written discovery.
Evidentiary Hearing 28. An evidentiary hearing shall be held at a date and time to be set by the Court, at which defendant must show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his violations of this Court’s orders that plaintiffs have proven by clear and convincing evidence, by producing evidence showing that he has promptly taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with those orders.
21

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 22 of 25 Pg ID 4458

29. Defendant shall file a witness list at least fourteen days

before the date of the evidentiary hearing. If plaintiffs intend to call

witnesses, plaintiffs shall file a witness list at least seven days before

the hearing date.

Reasonable Attorney Fees and Costs

30.

If the Court finds after the evidentiary show cause

hearing that defendant has not met his burden of proving that he

promptly took all reasonable steps to comply with the Court’s orders,

defendant shall pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs’

attorneys for their time and expenses on the Motion for Order to Show

Cause (Dkt. 125) and Motion for Ex Parte Order Regarding 7/17/2015

Hearing on Motion to Show Cause, and for Expedited Response to

Plaintiffs’ Motion For Discovery, and for Expedited, Postjudgment

Discovery (Dkt. 138), including time spent assessing defendant’s

compliance, such as interviewing and responding to questions of class

members, reviewing spreadsheets, reports, and mailing lists, and

conferring and corresponding with defendant’s attorneys regarding

defendant’s compliance.

22

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 23 of 25 Pg ID 4459
31. If the Court finds after the evidentiary show cause hearing that defendant has not met his burden of proving that he promptly took all reasonable steps to comply with the Court’s orders, defendant shall also pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs’ attorneys for their time and expenses related to defendant’s post-judgment noncompliance and remedies for such non-compliance. This includes time and expenses for conducting discovery related to defendant’s noncompliance; drafting a proposed order for the Court as directed at the July 24, 2015 hearing; preparing the motions for attorney fees and costs, including the motion in paragraph 32 below; identifying and working with an expert to be appointed by the Court; preparing for and attending the status conference with defendant Lyon; attending inspections conducted by the court-appointed expert; reviewing documents or electronically-stored information provided by defendant under this Order; reviewing the detailed answers provided by defendant pursuant to this Order; preparing for and attending the evidentiary hearing; and other time spent assessing Defendant’s compliance.
32. If the Court finds, after the evidentiary show cause hearing, that defendant has not met his burden of proving that he promptly took
23

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 24 of 25 Pg ID 4460

all reasonable steps to comply with the Court’s orders, plaintiffs shall

submit a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs within 30 days after entry

of a final order disposing of plaintiffs’ Motion for Order to Show Cause,

setting forth the time reasonably spent, appropriate hourly rate for

attorneys involved, and costs incurred.

33. Defendant shall file a Response no later than 21 days after

the motion in paragraph 32 is filed. Plaintiffs’ reply shall be due 7 days

thereafter.

34. Plaintiffs’ attorneys shall be entitled to file a supplemental

motion for attorney fees for work performed after the motion in

paragraph 32 is filed.

35. The award of fees and costs for these motions and discovery

shall be separate and apart from any award of attorney fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2015 Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

24

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 157 Filed 09/01/15 Pg 25 of 25 Pg ID 4461
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 1, 2015.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager
25

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 1 of 6 Pg ID 5354

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER BARRY by his next friend

ELAINE BARRY, DONITHA COPELAND,

and KENNETH L. ANDERSON,

on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated, and

WESTSIDE MOTHERS,

Case No. 5:13-cv-13185 BAF-DRG

Plaintiffs,

Hon. Judith Levy

v.

U.S. District Judge

Hon. David R. Grand

NICK LYON,

U.S. Magistrate Judge

in his capacity as Director, Michigan

Department of Health and Human Services,

Defendant.
------------------------------------------~/
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
REMOTION TO SHOW CAUSE, DKT 125
The Plaintiffs' pending Motion to Show Cause shall be dismissed with prejudice as to any contempt occurring prior to the date of this settlement once all of the following steps have been taken:
1. Defendant provides two consecutive biweekly spreadsheet reports that show no new criminal justice disqualifications.

2. Defendant provides two consecutive biweekly spreadsheet reports that contain accurate, up-to-date, and consistent information for all class members, as required by Dkt. 114.

3. Defendant provides Plaintiffs' attorneys (Jacqueline Doig and Miriam Aukerman) and a computer expert (of Plaintiffs' choice and at Plaintiffs' expense) with an in-person demonstration of:

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 2 of 6 Pg ID 5355
a. The following mechanisms in place to ensure that criminal justice disqualifications are not imposed in violation of the 1/9/15 Order (Dkt 91):
1. the current "red edit", ii. how criminal justice information is received by DHHS and used
by DHHS in processing eligibility, iii. how DHHS staff are able to code applicants/recipients as
"fugitive felons", and how DHHS staff/Bridges can issue EL 1013 notices.
In the event that information cannot be demonstrated, DHHS or DTMB will explain the above mechanisms. To the extent possible, DHHS or DTMB will demonstrate or explain how disqualifications occurred after 3/31/2015 and after the first June "red edit" via one example for each period, or such additional examples as are needed to explain how the disqualifications occurred.
b. How Defendant's computer systems are used to restore benefits to an individual or family that experienced a criminal justice disqualification, including use of the demographics screen that includes the "fugitive felon" question or information.
c. The DHHS user interfaces and queries used to compile information provided on court-ordered spreadsheets.
The in-person demonstration shall be conducted by DHHS or DTMB employees competent to explain the software and interfaces being demonstrated. Defendant's counsel shall be present at the demonstration. The parties will work together to agree on any appropriate confidentiality protections. Plaintiffs' expert shall not disclose any information obtained
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 3 of 6 Pg ID 5356
through the in-person demonstration except for purposes of ensuring compliance with this settlement and the court's orders in this case.
Disputes regarding the in-person demonstration shall be referred to the magistrate.
4. An order is entered requiring:
a. Defendant to notify Plaintiffs' attorneys within three business days of discovery by Field Operations Administration when any new criminal justice disqualification is identified. Defendant shall within five business days of such notification:
1. Provide the name, address and phone number of the disqualified person.
11. Provide a copy of the criminal justice disqualification notice(s) sent.
111. Provide a complete explanation of the circumstances which resulted in the disqualification, including whether worker error was involved and, if so, how such worker error could occur.
1v. Provide copies of any written non-privileged communication to, from or within DHHS regarding the disqualification or its correction.
v. Arrange a meeting to be held within seven days between Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendant's counsel, and representatives from the Department of Health and Human Services who are competent to explain how the disqualification occurred. If Plaintiffs' counsel believe such a meeting is unnecessary, they will promptly inform Defendant that no meeting need be scheduled. Meetings can be held by telephone if the parties so agree.
Defendants shall notify Plaintiffs' attorney when DHHS has sent a corrected notice and issued benefits due to the wrongly disqualified individual or household.
3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 4 of 6 Pg ID 5357
b. Plaintiffs' counsel shall likewise notify Defendant within three business days if they discover any new criminal justice disqualification not reported by Defendant. After Plaintiffs notify Defendant of any new criminal justice disqualification, Defendant shall, within five business days:
1. Provide a copy of the criminal justice disqualification notice(s) sent.
n. Provide a complete explanation of the circumstances which resulted in the disqualification, including whether worker error was involved and, if so, how such worker error could occur.
111. Provide copies of any written non-privileged communication to, from or within DHHS regarding the disqualification or its correction.
IV. Arrange a meeting to be held within seven days between Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendant's counsel, and representatives from the Department of Health and Human Services who are competent to explain how the disqualification occurred. If Plaintiffs' counsel believe such a meeting is unnecessary, they will promptly inform Defendant that no meeting need be scheduled. Meetings can be held by telephone if the parties so agree.
Defendants shall notify Plaintiffs' attorney when DHHS has sent a corrected notice and issued benefits due to the wrongly disqualified individual or household.
5. Defendant pays $105,000 in costs and attorneys fees for time spent on the motion to show cause, the motion for expedited post-judgment discovery, and monitoring compliance during the pendency of those motions. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, Plaintiffs may seek recovery of costs and attorneys fees for any other expenses and activities compensable under that statute. Plaintiffs will not seek recovery in the future for costs and/or time spent on the motion to show cause, the motion for expedited post-judgment discovery, and monitoring compliance during the pendency of those motions.
4

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 5 of 6 Pg ID 5358
6. All discussions during the settlement conference are subject to FRE 408. If the parties agree that the steps outlined have been taken, they shall submit a stipulated order for the pending Motion to Show Cause to be dismissed with prejudice as to any contempt occurring prior to the date of this settlement. If the parties cannot agree whether the steps outlined above have been taken, Defendant may ask the court to resolve the dispute ... u_,..,~~LL~~....

J cqueiine Doig (P3 71 05Y ·. NTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
4 6 S. Saginaw St., Suite 400 Flint, MI 48502 (81 0) 244-8044 jdoig@cci-mi.org

///- _____ / Atto9hey for Plair;!if{s

,.;;;/

\\.....___

1/

.J

Miriam J. Aukerman (P63165) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN 1514 Wealthy SE, Suite 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 (616) 301-0930 maukerman@aclumich.org Attorney for Plaintiffs

J~ ua S. Smith (P6334. issistant Attorney General )health, Education and Family Services Division P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373-7700 smithj46@michigan.-gov
Attorn~1Jef...-;e:;: nda
on Department ofHealth and Human Services Field Operations Administration

5

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 169 Filed 09/23/15 Pg 6 of 6 Pg ID 5359
Certificate of Service I certify that on September 23, 2015 I filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of Court using the ECF system which will send notice of such filing to all counsel of record.
Is/Jacqueline Doig Jacqueline Doig (P371 05)

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 182 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 5498

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER BARRY, by his next
friend, Elaine Barry, and Heather Woodward, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. 13-cv-13185 Hon. Judith E. Levy

Plaintiff, v

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO DISMISS SHOW CAUSE

NICK LYON, in his official capacity as Director, Michigan Department of
Health and Human Services,

Defendant.

Jacqueline Doig (P37105) Attorney for Plaintiff
Center for Civil Justice 436 S. Saginaw St., Ste 400
Flint, MI 48502 (810) 244-8044

Miriam Aukerman (P63165) Attorney for Plaintiff
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan
1514 Wealthy SE, Ste 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506
(616) 301-0930

Joshua S. Smith (P63349) Kristin M. Heyse (P64353)
William R. Morris (P31957) Attorneys for Defendant
Health, Education & Family Services Division
P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 373-7700 /

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 182 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 5499
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO DISMISS SHOW CAUSE The parties, through their undersigned counsel, stipulate: 1. On September 23, 2015, the parties filed a Settlement
Agreement, D/E 169, entered into at the settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Grand on September 22, 2015.
2. The Settlement Agreement specifies that the “pending Motion to Show Cause shall be dismissed with prejudice as to any contempt occurring prior to the date of this settlement once all of the following steps have been taken,” and then specifies five actions that must be taken in order for the dismissal to occur. (D/E 169, at Pg. ID 5354.)
3. The parties agree that the steps outlined in the Settlement Agreement Re Motion to Show Cause, Dkt 125 (D/E 169, at Pg. ID 53545358) have been taken.
4. Plaintiffs’ class counsel is confident that Defendant will continue to provide missing information and to correct inaccurate or incomplete information if problems are identified in the future.
5. Accordingly, the pending Motion to Show Cause should be dismissed with prejudice.
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 182 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 5500

Stipulated to by: Date: March 29, 2016
Date: March 29, 2016 Date: March 29, 2016

/s/Joshua S. Smith Joshua S. Smith (P63349) Attorney for Defendants
Michigan Department of Attorney General
Health, Education & Family
Services Division P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 Phone: (517) 373-7700 smithj46@michigan.gov
/s/Jacqueline Doig Jacqueline Doig (P37105) Attorney for Plaintiffs Center for Civil Justice 436 S. Saginaw St., Suite 400 Flint, MI 48502 (810) 244-8044 jdoig@ccj-mi.org
/s/Miriam Aukerman
Miriam Aukerman (P63165) Attorney for Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 514 Wealthy SE, Ste 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 (616) 301-0930 maukerman@aclumich.org

3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 182 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 5501

ORDER TO DISMISS SHOW CAUSE

The steps outlined in the Settlement Agreement Re Motion to

Show Cause, Dkt 125 (D/E 169, at Pg. ID 5354-5358) have been taken.

Accordingly, the pending Motion to Show Cause is dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2016 Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 30, 2016.

s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES
Case Manager

4

 
 5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le1d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/210o1f623 PPageI:D15652 (1 of 23)

Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: August 25, 2016

Ms. Miriam J. Aukerman American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan West Regional Office 1514 Wealthy, S.E, Suite 242 Grand Rapids, MI 49506
Ms. Jacqueline Doig Center for Civil Justice 320 S. Washington, Second Floor Saginaw, MI 48607-0000
Ms. Kristin M Heyse Mr. William R. Morris Mr. Joshua Sean Smith Office of the Attorney General of Michigan P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909
Ms. Valerie Ruth Newman State Appellate Defender Office 645 Griswold, Suite 3300 Detroit, MI 48226
Ms. Martha Jane Perkins National Health Law Program 200 N. Greensboro Street, Suite D-13 Carrboro, NC 27510
Nathan Martin Rehn Munger, Tolles & Olson 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le1d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/20o1f623 PPageI:D25653 (2 of 23)

Mr. Michael Jay Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201
Re: Case No. 15-1390, Walter Barry, et al v. Nick Lyon Originating Case No. : 5:13-cv-13185
Dear Counsel,
The court today announced its decision in the above-styled case.
Enclosed is a copy of the court's opinion together with the judgment which has been entered in conformity with Rule 36, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Yours very truly,
Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

cc: Mr. David J. Weaver Enclosures Mandate to issue.

Cathryn Lovely Deputy Clerk

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/230o1f623 PPageI:D15654 (3 of 23)

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 16a0208p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

WALTER BARRY, by his next friend Elaine Barry, on ┐

behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; │

DONITHA COPELAND; KENNETH L. ANDERSON; │

WESTSIDE MOTHERS,

│
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ││>

v.

│ │

│

NICK LYON, in his official capacity as Acting │

Director, Michigan Department of Human Services, │

Defendant-Appellant.

│ ┘

No. 15-1390

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor. No. 5:13-cv-13185—Judith E. Levy, District Judge.

Argued: October 6, 2015

Decided and Filed: August 25, 2016

Before:COLE, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL
ARGUED: Joshua S. Smith, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Jacqueline Doig, CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, Flint, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joshua S. Smith, William R. Morris, Kristin M. Heyse, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Jacqueline Doig, Katie Linehan, CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, Flint, Michigan, Miriam Aukerman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellees. Martha Jane Perkins, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, INC., Carrboro, North Carolina, Valerie R. Newman, STATE PLANNING BODY, Detroit Michigan, Thane M. Rehn, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae.

1

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/240o1f623 PPageI:D25655 (4 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 2

_________________
OPINION _________________
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. This class action challenges Michigan’s fugitive-felon law and policy, under which any person with an outstanding felony warrant is disqualified automatically from receiving food assistance under the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This federal program is overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and administered by the states. The plaintiffs contend that Michigan’s implementation procedure is invalid and that the notices regarding termination of benefits sent by the authorized Michigan administrator, the defendant here, violate the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036c, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that Michigan’s fugitive-felon policy violated the Act and that the state’s notification procedure denied the recipients due process.
On appeal, the state renews its claims that the plaintiffs lack standing, that mootness should have deprived the district court of authority to hear the case, and that there is no private right of action under the SNAP Act. The state also argues that the Michigan law disqualifying fugitive felons is valid under SNAP and that its method of notifying applicants of their disqualification is procedurally valid. We find no merit to these arguments, or to several other lesser claims raised on appeal, and we therefore affirm the district court's opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
SNAP and Fleeing Felons
Under SNAP, an individual is ineligible to receive benefits if he or she is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing. . . .” 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1)(A). Section 2015(k)(2) requires the Secretary of Agriculture to define “fleeing” and “actively seeking” to “ensure that State agencies use consistent procedures established by the Secretary that disqualify individuals whom law enforcement

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/250o1f623 PPageI:D35656 (5 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 3

authorities are actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings against the individual.” Id. § 2015(k)(2). On September 10, 2015, the Secretary finalized the rule that was first proposed in 2011 to define these terms.1 Clarification of Eligibility of Fleeing Felons Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,410 (Sept. 10, 2015). It became effective on November 9, 2015. Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(n) (2015).
Previously, the states had been left to implement the “fleeing felon” disqualification on their own. Michigan’s provision barred public assistance to any individual “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b.2 To effectuate this provision, Michigan developed an automated program, the “fugitive felon interface,” that compares the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police in the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c. When the program identifies a match, it automatically closes the SNAP recipient’s file and generates a “notice of case action” informing the recipient of the termination of benefits.
The notice reads: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.”3 A Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) memo directs employees not to disclose information about a recipient’s fugitive-felon status when asked about a criminal-

1The rule provides four criteria for identifying a fleeing felon:
1. There is a felony warrant for the individual. 2. The individual is aware of the warrant or should reasonably have expected it to
issue. 3. The individual has taken some action to avoid being arrested or jailed. 4. Law enforcement is actively seeking the individual.
80 Fed. Reg. at 54,411. A state agency may adopt this test or, alternatively, may adopt the criteria set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement in Martinez v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-04735-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2009), which provides that an individual is disqualified only if a law enforcement officer presents an outstanding felony warrant for escape, flight to avoid, or flight-escape. 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(n)(1)(ii). “Actively seeking” means that a law-enforcement agency intends to enforce the warrant within 20 to 30 days. 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(n)(3).
2Despite the change in the federal rule defining eligibility, § 400.10b remains unchanged, as does § 400.10c regarding automatic disqualification.
3The text of this portion of the notice was later changed to “Please have the disqualified member of your group contact a local law enforcement agency – such as a police department, sheriff’s department or the Michigan State Police – to resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide picture identification.”

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/260o1f623 PPageI:D45657 (6 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 4

justice disqualification but, instead, to direct the recipient to contact local law enforcement to resolve the warrant. In the meantime, the would-be recipient remains ineligible for assistance “as long as he or she is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant.”
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Walter Barry is a mentally-disabled man who lives in Detroit with his mother, Elaine Barry. His history with the SNAP program well illustrates the difficulties that the barebones Michigan system can produce, and we therefore set it out here in some detail. In 2012, Walter was awarded $186 per month in food assistance, but in December of that year he received notice that beginning February 1, 2013, his benefits would be terminated due to a “criminal justice disqualification.” The notice instructed him to contact his local law enforcement agency to resolve the issue and informed him that he had the right to a hearing. Elaine submitted the form to request a hearing on Walter’s behalf and, in an effort to resolve the criminal-justice disqualification, she took Walter to the Detroit Police Department. There, Officer Turner fingerprinted him and provided a written statement confirming that Walter had no criminal history with that department. At Walter’s MDHHS hearing on January 31, 2013, an administrative law judge found that MDHHS could not establish the basis for Walter’s criminaljustice disqualification and ordered Walter’s benefits reinstated immediately. The matter appeared to be resolved, and because his benefits were to have been terminated starting on February 1, but his hearing and reinstatement occurred on January 31, Walter did not miss any food assistance payments.
However, on May 16, 2013, MDHHS Office of Inspector General employee Robin Thomas submitted a statement indicating that she personally had verified through LEIN that Walter was subject to a felony warrant issued on September 2, 1989, by the Detroit Police Department. In a hearing summary dated May 22, 2013, Walter’s MDHHS caseworker wrote that “there was still an outstanding warrant for this client as of 5/13/13 and the worker had to follow procedure and close the case again.” As a result, Walter once again received a notice that his benefits would be terminated—this time effective June 1, 2013—due to a criminal-justice disqualification. Elaine again requested a hearing, noting in her request that an ALJ had already found MDHHS in error. Before a hearing could occur, Walter received yet another notice on

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/270o1f623 PPageI:D55658 (7 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 5

June 14, 2013, informing him that his benefits would be terminated on July 1 due to a criminaljustice disqualification. Walter filed the instant case in federal court on July 24, 2013, at which time he had not yet received a hearing on his May 2013 request and had not received his food benefits for July 2013.
The day after Walter filed his complaint in federal court, attorneys from the Michigan Attorney General’s office advised him that he would receive his July food assistance benefits that day, and he did. The Attorney General’s office also provided Walter’s attorney with information about the warrant in his name and instructed her that Walter should go to the Detroit Police Department to be fingerprinted. Walter was told that he could receive a password to provide in case he was stopped on this warrant in the future. On August 7, 2013, Elaine again took Walter to the Detroit Police Department, and once again Officer Turner issued a statement regarding Walter’s lack of criminal history. The next day, Officer Turner discovered the case number related to the warrant in question and issued another statement declaring specifically that Walter was not the person wanted in that case. It turned out that Walter’s felony warrant resulted from his brother Darryl’s use of Walter’s name as an alias when Darryl was arrested some 25 years earlier. When Elaine learned that Darryl had used Walter’s name, she intervened to ensure that Darryl went to court under his own name.
Prior to Walter’s second hearing, scheduled for September 16, 2013, an attorney for the state sent notice to the ALJ assigned to his case, indicating that a hearing was unnecessary and that the case could be dismissed because MDHHS was cancelling the termination of benefits based on information received that the warrant was not valid. Walter’s attorney objected to the dismissal because there was no indication that the underlying problem had been resolved or that MDHHS had changed its policy. The hearing took place as scheduled on September 16, 2013, and the attorney for the state argued on behalf of MDHHS that the ALJ had no jurisdiction because there was no longer an adverse action against Walter, given that the agency had placed an override in its system to rescind the notices terminating Walter’s assistance. But the judge noted that the override was not a resolution compliant with MDHHS policy and reversed the state’s termination decision because MDHHS did not prove the existence of a felony warrant against Walter.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/280o1f623 PPageI:D65659 (8 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 6

Nevertheless, as of September 16, 2013, there still was a warrant in Walter’s name. In early October 2013, an email from a Wayne County email address indicated that the case against Walter was dismissed in 1989, that there was no outstanding warrant, and that the warrant information would be removed from LEIN. But, on September 3, 2014, Elaine received a call from the MDHHS Office of Inspector General who told her that Walter had outstanding warrants that disqualified him from receiving assistance. Elaine took Walter back to the Detroit Police Department for the third time. Officer Turner checked LEIN and found that Walter’s name still was in the system. Officer Turner provided a fourth statement regarding Walter’s lack of criminal history. Defense counsel represented at a hearing in district court on November 14, 2014, that all of Walter’s warrants had been resolved, but there is no evidence in the record supporting or refuting that assertion.
Plaintiff Donitha Copeland experienced nearly as much difficulty in establishing her eligibility for food assistance as did Walter Barry. In September 2012, Copeland had applied and was approved for $200 of food assistance per month. In November 2012, she filed a report with the Detroit Police Department indicating that she had been the victim of identity theft. The next month she received a notice that her benefits would be terminated on February 1, 2013, due to a criminal-justice disqualification. She reapplied in February 2013 but was denied.
Copeland contacted the local sheriff’s office and learned there was a warrant for her arrest in Kalamazoo for writing bad checks, even though she had never been to Kalamazoo. She then contacted the Kalamazoo sheriff’s office to advise that her identity had been stolen and to ask whether she could turn herself in to the Detroit police because she did not have the means to travel to Kalamazoo to resolve the situation. The sheriff advised her not to turn herself in to Detroit authorities because she could end up sitting in jail for a long time before she was transported to Kalamazoo. Eventually, Copeland obtained a pro bono criminal attorney and was able to travel to Kalamazoo so that she could turn herself in. After spending eight hours in jail, she was released on bond and was scheduled for a pretrial hearing. She returned to Kalamazoo for the hearing, again with the assistance of her attorney, and the charges were dismissed after photographic evidence established that she was not the person who had written the bad checks. Copeland moved to Alaska in 2014 for seasonal employment but intended to return to Michigan

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/290o1f623 PPageI:D75660 (9 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 7

in November 2014 and expected to apply for food assistance again when she did so. It is not clear whether she actually has returned or reapplied.
Plaintiff Kenneth Anderson, who requires oxygen 24 hours a day for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and is unable to walk unassisted, had been questioned in 2009 about drugs found in his home that belonged to his nephew. He was not arrested at that time, nor was he told that there was a warrant for his arrest. Anderson subsequently received approximately $200 per month in food assistance, but his case was closed in mid-2012 for failure to provide required paperwork. When he reapplied for food assistance in December 2012, his application was denied due to a purported criminal-justice disqualification. He spoke with his MDHHS caseworker, who told him that he had an outstanding felony warrant, issued in January 2013 for possession of heroin in 2009. Despite repeated attempts to reinstate his benefits, Anderson apparently still has an outstanding criminal warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance.
Plaintiff Westside Mothers is a non-profit organization that advocates for the interests of public assistance applicants and recipients in connection with public assistance programs administered by MDHHS and the Social Security Administration. It educates its members and the public about government benefits and what to do if assistance is denied, and it furnishes advocacy and representation services for its members. Westside Mothers has 450 to 500 duespaying members, including Donitha Copeland. Here, the group challenges Michigan’s policies, alleging that they inhibit the growth and functioning of the organization.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As previously noted, in the amended complaint that became the operative pleading in this case, the plaintiffs challenged the automatic fugitive-felon disqualification in Michigan Compiled Laws § 400.10b as a violation of their statutory rights under the federal SNAP Act and alleged that the disqualification notices violated both the Act and the Due Process Clause. After hearing oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the plaintiffs, certifying the class and holding that the state’s policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution. The court also issued an injunction requiring the state to refrain

5:13-cv-1C31a8s5e-:J1E5L--1D3R90G DDooccu#m2e0n0t: 6F2ile-2d 08F/2il5e/d1:608P/2g5/12001o6f 23 PaPgge:ID8 5661 (10 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 8

from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices in the event of valid disqualification. Both the district court and this court denied the state’s motions for a stay, and the district court has continued to enforce the injunction, although the record before us does not contain information regarding the state’s compliance. Nor does the record on appeal or the docket in the district court indicate any action by the MDHHS to implement the new rule in 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(n), which clarifies disqualification of fugitive felons under the SNAP Act and has been in effect since November 2015.
DISCUSSION
Threshold Issues: Standing and Mootness
The state argues that the plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to bring suit and contends that the named plaintiffs’ claims are moot. To uphold the constitutional requirement that federal courts hear only active cases or controversies, as required by Article III, section 2 of the federal constitution, a plaintiff must have a personal interest at the commencement of the litigation (standing) that continues throughout the litigation (lack of mootness). See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Standing is a threshold question in every federal case, and we review jurisdictional challenges based on standing de novo. Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs have standing if they suffer a “concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual” or “imminent” injury that is caused by a defendant’s conduct and is likely to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
If the plaintiff ceases to have standing such that a live case or controversy no longer exists, the case becomes moot. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). This exception applies if the challenged action is too brief to be litigated fully before it concludes and if “there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Id. at 462. The party asserting the exception bears the burden of proof. Lawrence v. Blackwell,

5:13-cv-1C31a8s5e-:J1E5L--1D3R90G DDooccu#m2e0n0t: 6F2ile-2d 08F/2il5e/d1:608P/2g5/12101o6f 23 PaPgge:ID9 5662 (11 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 9

430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005). Recurrence of the issue need not be more probable than not; instead, the controversy must be capable of repetition. Id. (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (1988)).
In this case, counsel for the state conceded at oral argument on the summary-judgment motion that plaintiff Walter Barry had standing at the commencement of the suit, which is the relevant time period for determining standing. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (defining standing as “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation”). Although the state now attempts to breathe life back into this issue, the effort at resuscitation plainly fails. The state has a somewhat stronger argument in regard to mootness, pointing out that at the time of oral argument in the district court, Barry was receiving food assistance. But the district court found that Barry could reasonably expect to encounter additional difficulties with his benefits, based on the repeated problems he had faced in the past, including unjustified terminations or threats of termination. The record fully supports this conclusion and is a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the violation involved was capable of repetition but evading review.
The state argues on appeal, as it did below, that Kenneth Anderson lacks standing because his harm resulted from the erroneous LEIN information and his failure to request an administrative hearing to challenge the LEIN information or to take other steps to correct the erroneous warrant in his name, rather than from the state’s action in disqualifying him. We find the state’s attempt to abdicate responsibility unpersuasive, however. The plaintiffs were injured at the time the agency denied or terminated their food benefits and provided inadequate notice. Hence, the plaintiffs’ injuries are fairly traceable to the defendant’s fugitive-felon law and policies. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The state offers no argument to support a claim of mootness as to this plaintiff.
The district court correctly found that Donitha Copeland had standing at the commencement of this action but that the question of mootness in connection with her claims was a closer one, given her relocation to Alaska during the pendency of the case. Additionally, she no longer was listed as a fugitive felon as of September 2014. But the district court also noted that Copeland’s absence at the time was potentially temporary and that she could be

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21021o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D05663 (12 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 10

subject to a fugitive-felon disqualification on her return to Michigan because the felony warrant lodged against her had been dismissed without prejudice and could be reinstated or because her identity has been stolen and could be used again to commit a felony, resulting in issuance of another warrant in her name.
Although the district court was faced with a good deal of uncertainty surrounding Copeland’s circumstances, the chain of potential events does not have to be air-tight or even probable to support the court’s finding of non-mootness. Instead, it is sufficient that Copeland possibly could have found herself once again in the same situation she faced when this suit was filed. Honig, 484 U.S. at 319 n.6; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (holding that end of pregnancy did not moot the case because the plaintiff was capable of becoming pregnant again).
The district court held that Westside Mothers lacked independent standing but had associational standing, which exists if an association’s members have standing; if the interests at stake are relevant to the organization’s purpose; and if the claims and relief do not require the participation of individual members. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. Westside Mothers meets the second requirement because it advocates for public assistance and protests its unjustified denial. And it meets the third requirement because the declaratory and injunctive relief sought pertains to the state’s policy as a whole and does not require the participation of individual members to resolve. The possible missing link is Copeland, the only named plaintiff shown by the record to hold membership in the association. Based on our decision that she has standing, we hold that the organization has standing also.
The Plaintiffs’ Right of Action under SNAP
The state argues on appeal, as it did below, that neither the SNAP Act nor the Supremacy Clause creates a private right of action for the plaintiffs to enforce. This contention raises issues of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2004).
To show that a statutory provision creates a federal right for a particular class of persons, enforceable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that Congress intended the provision

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21031o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D15664 (13 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 11

to benefit the plaintiff, (2) that the protected right is sufficiently definite for courts to enforce, and (3) that the statute imposes a binding obligation on the states using mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997); Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2006). “Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (footnote omitted). However, the defendant may rebut this presumption by showing that Congress did not intend private enforcement of that right; such intent may be found in the language of the statute or inferred from Congress’s creation of an incompatible comprehensive enforcement scheme. Harris, 442 F.3d at 461.
We are directed by case law to analyze the specific statutory provisions at issue. See John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the private-right-of-action analysis focuses on the individual provision of the statute at issue, not the statute as a whole); see also Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342–45 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s rights-creation analyses have focused on a specific statutory provision or right, not on whether an entire statute creates rights, in general). The relevant SNAP provisions at issue here are 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10), both of which grant certain rights of assistance to eligible “households” participating in the Act’s “supplemental nutrition program.”
The first provision, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a), grants a right to food assistance to households that meet federally-established eligibility criteria: “Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” The district court correctly found that this language reflects legislative intent to create a privately enforceable right of action, rejecting the state’s argument that use of the term “household” indicates that Congress did not intend to confer a private right on an “individual.” As the district court noted, in the context of the SNAP Act, a household is, in effect, the “individual” with enforceable rights because SNAP benefits are issued to households, not to individuals. Moreover, the statutory term “eligible households” identifies a “class of beneficiaries” with “individual entitlements” to food assistance, which entitlements are “amenable to judicial remedy”—intrinsic attributes of a

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21041o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D25665 (14 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 12

privately enforceable statutory right as recognized in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2006).4
The other statutory provision relied on by plaintiffs, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10), substantially buttresses our analysis of § 2014(a). It creates certain due-process rights to SNAP beneficiaries: “The State plan . . . shall provide . . . for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects the participation of such household in the supplemental nutrition assistance program . . . .” We need only note that we have held that a virtually identical provision in the Medicaid Act creates a privately enforceable right. In Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003), we reviewed 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), which reads: “A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness.” Focusing on the state’s obligation to provide a “fair hearing,” we noted that “the judiciary regularly determines whether an individual has been afforded procedural due process rights,” and we concluded that “a right to a fair hearing is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement is beyond the abilities of a competent judiciary.” Gean, 330 F.3d at 773. As a result, we held, “it is proper for plaintiffs to bring their claim for enforcement of their Medicaid rights under § 1983.” Id. The same analysis of the SNAP statutes in this case obviously leads to the same result, i.e., that the plaintiffs and similarly situated SNAP beneficiaries possess the right of private enforcement, as the district court held.
The Right to Receive Benefits
The SNAP Act disqualifies “fleeing felons” from food assistance if they are “fleeing to avoid prosecution or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing,” or are “violating a condition of probation or parole,” and if they are “individuals whom law enforcement
4In Westside Mothers, we distinguished the “broad and nonspecific language” of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30), which describes the Medicaid program to be implemented by the states, from the provision regarding specific notifications to be provided to Medicaid recipients under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A). The former provision creates no right of private enforcement, but merely sets up “‘a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State’s [Medicaid] program.’” 454 F.3d at 543 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 330). The latter creates a privately enforceable right, subject to redress under § 1983.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21051o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D35666 (15 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 13

authorities are actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal proceedings” against them. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1) and (2). But despite the fact that the statute also forbids the state agencies implementing the Act from “impos[ing] any other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the program,” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b), Michigan denies food assistance to an otherwise eligible household merely upon receiving information that a member of the household “is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b(1). Under § 400.10(c), the state uses an automated program to compare the list of public assistance recipients with information regarding outstanding felony warrants in the hands of Michigan law enforcement agencies. And, although the state statute directs MDHHS to “take all reasonable and necessary measures using the available technology to ensure the accuracy of this comparison before notifying a local office of an outstanding felony warrant or extradition warrant,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c(1), there is no directive to determine whether the putative felon is being “actively sought” for prosecution before his or her name is deleted automatically from the list of eligible recipients.
The district court correctly found that Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and the policy implementing it violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) by adding requirements for disqualification not found in § 2015(k), i.e., the existence of an outstanding felony warrant, without more, and entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court recognized, by analogy to identical provisions in the Social Security Act, that “fleeing to avoid prosecution” incorporates an element of intent, noting, for example, that “[c]ourts . . . have found the mere existence of an outstanding felony warrant insufficient to show that a person is fleeing and therefore disqualified from receiving SSI benefits.” Barry v. Corrigan, 79 F.Supp.3d 712, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F.3d 90, 96 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“The statute does not permit the Commissioner to conclude simply from the fact that there is an outstanding warrant for a person’s arrest that he is fleeing to avoid prosecution.”)).
The court was equally correct in finding that the state had deprived the plaintiffs of their right to assistance under the SNAP Act based on what was missing from Michigan law, i.e., the conditions precedent to valid disqualification under federal law: the felon in question must be (1) actively “fleeing” (2) to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony “under the law of the

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21061o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D45667 (16 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 14

place from which the individual is fleeing,” and the authorities must be (3) “actively seeking” to prosecute him or her for the offense.5 The district court correctly declared invalid the Michigan fugitive-felon policy and the portions of Michigan statutes on which the policy was based, entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and enjoined the state from automatically disqualifying plaintiffs and other class members from receiving SNAP benefits based solely on an outstanding felony warrant.
The Right to Notice and a Hearing
The district court also determined that the form of the disqualification notice sent by the state was inadequate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2020(e)(10) of the SNAP Act and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.10(g) and 273.13(a). All the plaintiffs in this case received the same notice, giving as the reason for their disqualification: “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification. Please contact your local law enforcement agency to resolve.” The state argues on appeal, as it did below, that the notices were adequate to comply with due process. The district court’s grant of summary judgment and its resolution of legal questions are reviewed de novo, and the district court’s factual findings are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. TransAmerica Assurance Corp. v. Settlement Capital Corp., 489 F.3d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 2007).
The state does not challenge the district court’s statement of the constitutional dueprocess standard applicable here: “The notice must comprise ‘(1) a detailed statement of the intended action . . . (2) the reason for the change in status . . . (3) citation to the specific statutory section requiring reduction or termination; and (4) specific notice of the recipient’s right to appeal.’” Barry, 79 F.Supp.3d at 741 (citing Garrett v. Puett, 707 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1983)). The court found that the fourth factor had been met but that the first and second were the

5The district court also found that preemption principles provided a second, independent basis for finding
Michigan’s law and policy invalid. Because we conclude that the court’s initial determination was correct, we pretermit discussion of the alternative ground.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21071o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D55668 (17 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 15

crux of the issue and were lacking. It did not reach a conclusion regarding the third factor, but
that one, too, appears to be missing.6
The district court’s analysis of the first and second Garrett factors is persuasive and
thorough:
The notices state the intended action—denial or reduction of benefits. For example, the May 16, 2013 notice sent to Barry provides, under the heading “Intended Action,” a summary of benefits—in this instance, listing “Food Assistance Program.” The notice shows the relevant action as “closed” and states, “[y]our ongoing benefit has been cancelled but you will continue to receive benefits through the day before the period listed above.”
The reason given for the action is simply “You or a member of your group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.” This fails to indicate whose conduct is at issue. It also fails to indicate which of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications applied by [MDHHS] is being invoked. From at least 2012 to mid-2013, the notices referred to section 203 of the BEM, where five types of criminal justice disqualifications from public assistance benefits were listed. In June 2013, [MDHHS] placed the fugitive felon disqualification in its own section of the BEM (204). But the notices thereafter continue to use the general phrase “criminal justice disqualification.” Thus, a notice recipient must still be able to (1) determine that “BEM 204” refers to the Bridges Eligibility Manual, section 204, (2) determine that the relevant type of criminal justice disqualification can be found there, and (3) get access to the BEM. Even if a notice recipient locates a copy of the BEM and determines the type of disqualification, he or she still does not know anything about the outstanding warrant—not the underlying charge, nor which law enforcement agency issued the warrant. The recipient thus has no basis for making an informed decision whether to contest the disqualification, nor what issues need to be addressed at a hearing.
Defendant maintains that notice recipients could call the [MDHHS] contact person and number listed on the notice to receive further information regarding their disqualification. But defendant cannot satisfy due process by requiring notice recipients to call elsewhere. See Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, in this instance such a call would be fruitless: [MDHHS] staff are instructed “not to disclose ‘Fugitive Felon’ status information to the individual.”

6The third factor does not appear to be met here because the notice cited only to the “BEM,” not to the
specific statutory section. Although this document does contain citations to the statute, successfully tracking down this information would, as the district court noted, require the recipient of a notice to figure out that BEM means Bridges Eligibility Manual and then to acquire a copy of the relevant section.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21081o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D65669 (18 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 16

Defendant further maintains that notice recipients can obtain the necessary information by contacting law enforcement. This is potentially as ineffective as contacting [MDHHS], as the named plaintiffs’ experiences shows. Law enforcement may not be able to determine which warrant is causing the disqualification, as happened in Barry’s case. He discovered the existence of the first outstanding warrant only through defendant’s intervention.
* * * * *
Defendant relies primarily on Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 930-31 (6th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that due process does not require notices to include specific, individualized reasons for benefit denial, reduction, or termination. But defendant’s reliance is misplaced: the Rosen court held the notices in that case adequate because “the very facts the plaintiffs claim are missing [sc. from the termination notices] are supplied by the State through a second letter that follows the Termination Notice and that the Termination Notice itself references and brings to the attention of recipients.” 410 F.3d at 931. While defendant is technically correct that the notice itself does not need to include specific, individualized reasons for the agency action, those details must nonetheless be provided in some form. See id. (“Due process does not require ‘reasonably calculated’ notice to come in just one letter, as opposed to two.”). Unlike in Rosen, they were not provided here.
* * * * *
The notice here similarly fails to inform recipients what they must do to lift the disqualification. If a recipient “resolves” the disqualification, benefits are automatically reinstated only if other household members are “active” — i.e., continue to receive the type of assistance from which the notice recipient has been disqualified. Otherwise, a disqualified individual must not only “resolve” the criminal justice disqualification with law enforcement, but must also reapply for benefits. The notice fails to communicate this information. The notice also fails to make clear whether a hearing request is necessary to resolve disqualifications, even if the issue is resolved with law enforcement.
Barry, 79 F.Supp.3d at 742-44 (citations to the district court record omitted). It is sufficient to
note that none of the state’s arguments on appeal call into question any part of the district court's
well-analyzed decision. Because we agree that the notices sent by the state violated the
recipient’s constitutional right of due process, we need not address their invalidity under the
SNAP Act, although we note that the analysis would be the same.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/21091o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D75670 (19 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 17

Injunctive Relief
The state next complains that the district court erred by granting a permanent injunction without addressing the “well-established” four-factor test that requires a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to establish: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The result, the state argues, is that upon review, we may do no more than “speculate about the basis for the district court's decision.” To the contrary, however, we think speculation is wholly unwarranted, given the district court's thorough and detailed 97-page explanation of why the injunction was appropriate—indeed, why it was necessary—and precisely what action the state was required to undertake. The opinion may not have set out the equitable factors explicitly but, more importantly, the district court fully complied with the non-equitable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1), pursuant to which “[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” The opinion likewise complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1) and (2), which provides that “[i]n an action tried on the facts without a jury,” including the grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction, the district court “must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Rather than complain that the four factors of the traditional equitable test were not explicitly articulated, the state should have set out which of the four areas purportedly were not covered in the court’s opinion, so that we might review any deficiency. In the absence of a specific argument that would establish error on the part of the district court, we find none.
Class Certification
A district court’s decision to certify a class is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2007). “The district court maintains substantial discretion in determining whether to certify a class, as it possesses the inherent power to manage

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/201o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D85671 (20 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 18

and control its own pending litigation.” Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639,
643 (6th Cir. 2006). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on erroneous findings of
fact, applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a
conclusion, or makes a clear error of judgment.” Beattie, 511 F.3d at 560 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the district court certified both a class7 and a subclass8 and, the record
reflects, applied the correct legal standards when it analyzed whether the proposed classes were
ascertainable, whether the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) were met, and whether the defendant “acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole,” as required by Rule 23(b)(2).
The state does not contend otherwise. Instead, the state’s arguments against class
certification rely principally on its perception that the inaccurate LEIN information and the
plaintiffs’ failure to challenge it were the sources of the plaintiffs’ harm, not any state action.
The district court correctly rejected this argument, ruling that “[t]he injuries plaintiffs allege—
inadequate notice and disqualification without a determination that they are fleeing to avoid
prosecution and are actively sought by law enforcement—are legally cognizable injuries,” and
that “what defendant terms the ‘real’ harm—erroneous LEIN records—caused no harm to
7[A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the
 Food Assistance Program (FAP)  Family Independence Program (FIP)  State Disability Assistance Program (SDA)  Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and  Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant / recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who receive or have received a written notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the applicant / recipient of the criminal justice disqualification. 8All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program benefits based on DHS’s policy of disqualifying individuals as “fugitive felons,” without a finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, and/or without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement, for a crime that is a felony.

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/2011o6f 23PaPgeg:I1D95672 (21 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 19

plaintiffs until defendant used the LEIN records to disqualify plaintiffs from food assistance benefits . . . . In other words, the question of whether the disqualification is lawful is different from the question of whether the LEIN records are accurate.” Barry, 79 F.Supp.3d at 730.
On appeal, the state presses the same contentions that the district court rejected, including many arguments previously addressed in our analyses of standing and mootness, above. We decline to reiterate our legal conclusions in this regard. To the extent that the subclass includes persons who are actually felons who are intentionally fleeing and are actively being sought for prosecution, they might now lack substantive claims but could still advance a due process argument. That possibility does nothing to undermine the district court's class certification.
Procedural Motions
Finally, the state assails several rulings by the district court in connection with the state’s motion to reconsider the court’s grant of summary judgment and with the plaintiffs’ motions to strike exhibits attached to the motion to reconsider. The district court struck three of the four exhibits, finding, first, that they constituted new evidence that could have been presented before the court announced judgment and, additionally, that they would not affected the outcome even if they had been timely proffered. There was no abuse of discretion involved in any of these procedural rulings. See Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We review the decision to grant or deny a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion, and decisions that are reasonable, that is, not arbitrary, will not be overturned.”)
The state also complains that the district court relied on a “novel hearsay theory” when it concluded that one of the affidavits the state submitted in support of the motion for reconsideration constituted hearsay and could not be considered. Apparently the defendant reasons that because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) requires a motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by affidavits, the affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment cannot be deemed to be hearsay. However, we have recognized that if such affidavits contain hearsay, they may not be considered unless the hearsay evidence could be presented in an admissible form at trial. See N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Myers, 111 F.3d 1273, 1283 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking evidence it deemed to

5:13-cv-1C3a1s8e5:-J1E5-L1-3D9R0G Docu#m2e0n0t: 6F2i-le2d 08F/i2le5d/1: 608/P25g/2021o6f 23PaPgeg:I2D05673 (22 of 23)

No. 15-1390

Barry v. Lyon

Page 20

be inadmissible hearsay. The state also complains for the first time on appeal that the district court did not also find the plaintiffs’ affidavits to contain hearsay, but the state raises this argument much too late to be considered here. See Bailey v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ. By and Through Towler, 106 F.3d 135, 143 (6th Cir. 1997) (“It is well-settled that this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal unless our failure to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarriage of justice.”).
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the state’s motion for reconsideration. The court determined that none of the issues was properly before it but nevertheless addressed each of the issues raised and rejected them on the merits. The procedural and substantive reasons given by the district court for denying reconsideration were valid, and the state has failed to provide any argument supporting its bare assertion that the district court’s refusal to grant reconsideration was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above we AFFIRM the district court's judgment. We also REMAND the case to allow the district court to continue to enforce the permanent injunction and to consider any relevant action by the state in light of the Secretary’s Clarification of Eligibility of Fleeing Felons Final Rule, 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(n), which took effect on November 9, 2015. For the district court’s benefit, we note that the new rule will not render this case moot, because it is still possible that a recipient of SNAP benefits might have those benefits wrongfully terminated.

5:13-cv-1C31a8s5e-:J1E5L--1D3R90G DDooccu#m2e0n0t: 6F2ile-3d 08F/2il5e/d1:608P/2g5/22301o6f 23 PaPgge:ID1 5674 (23 of 23)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1390

WALTER BARRY, by his next friend Elaine Barry, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; DONITHA COPELAND; KENNETH L. ANDERSON; WESTSIDE MOTHERS,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,

FILED
Aug 25, 2016
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

v.

NICK LYON, in his official capacity as Acting Director, Michigan Department of Human Services,
Defendant - Appellant.

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was argued by counsel.

IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for continued enforcement of the permanent injunction and for consideration of any relevant action by the State in light of the Secretary’s Clarification of Eligibility of Fleeing Felons Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,410, which took effect on November 9, 2015.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

 
 5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 1 of 10 Pg ID 6182

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Walter Barry et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-13185

v. Nick Lyon,

Defendant.

Judith E. Levy United States District Judge
Mag. Judge David R. Grand

________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS [215]

The Court previously determined that counsel for plaintiffs in this

class action are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under 42

U.S.C. § 1988, and permitted the parties time to negotiate and come to

a mutually agreed-on amount. (Dkts. 91, 212, 213.) On February 24,

2017, the parties filed a joint motion for attorney’s fees and costs,

requesting that the Court award class counsel a total of $910,908.83 for

costs and services from 2013 through January 18, 2017, with further

payments to be made on a periodic basis for additional activities as set

forth in the motion. (See Dkt. 215.)

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 2 of 10 Pg ID 6183

This number included awards to the specific attorneys and their

organizations as follows:

Attorney/ Law Student
J. Doig
M. Aukerman
E. Nichols K. Linehan S. Nelson D. Ziegler A. Freed Total

Hourly

Hours

Hours

Total

Rate

Sought By Negotiated Negotiated

Negotiated Plaintiff

$425

1441.3

1347.6

$

572,730.00

$425

688.25

658.99

$

280,070.75

$276

114.1

103.68

$ 28,615.68

$205

8.7

8.7

$ 1783.50

$189

21

19.53

$ 3691.17

$125

68.5

62.52

$ 7815.00

$125

104.5

94.05

$ 11,756.25

2446.35

2295.07

$

906,462.35

(Dkt. 215 at 2.) The following includes plaintiffs’ costs:

CCJ ACLU Total

Fees $ 603,129.18 $ 303,333.17 $ 906,462.35

Costs $ 1567.25 $ 2879.23 $ 4446.48

Total $ 604,696.43 $ 306,212.40 $ 910,908.83

(Dkt. 215 at 3.) The Court previously granted the parties’ joint motion for notice to the class members regarding the attorney’s fees and costs request (Dkt. 217), and no class members filed any objection. (See Dkts. 219, 220.)
2

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 3 of 10 Pg ID 6184
In a certified class action, the Court has discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs that are authorized by the parties’ agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). And under § 1988, the prevailing party “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Such an award must be fair and “reasonable under the circumstances.” See Moulton v. United States Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). To make this determination, the Court generally considers a number of factors, id., and the Court must make a determination as to reasonableness even “in the absence of objections.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (advisory committee notes to 2003 amendments regarding subdivision (h)).
The “most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. . . . Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686,703 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “A court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome.” Hescott v. City of Saginaw, 757 F.3d 518, 526 (6th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
3

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 4 of 10 Pg ID 6185
Here, as the parties agree, the results achieved for the class “were excellent.” (See Dkt. 215 at 11.) Plaintiffs’ counsel certified the class and subclass, found that defendant’s “criminal justice disqualification” and “fleeing felon” policy and practices violated the Constitution and federal law, and permanently enjoined those policies and practices. (Id. at 11-12.) Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel, defendant’s counsel, and the federal government all worked together to provide class members with $60 million in retroactive food assistance benefits; that number continues to grow as of this date. (Id. at 12.) And this is only a highlight of the numerous benefits the class received. (See id.)
To determine whether the agreed on fee is reasonable, the Court uses the “lodestar” method—multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the proven number of hours reasonably expended on the case by counsel. Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986)). First, the lodestar must be calculated for each attorney involved. See Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 563. Second, the Court may, “within limits, adjust the ‘lodestar’
4

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 5 of 10 Pg ID 6186
to reflect relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” See Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Reed, 179 F.3d at 471-72).
A reasonable hourly rate is generally calculated according to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The “relevant community” here is the Eastern District of Michigan. See Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 350 (relevant community is the legal community within the court’s territorial jurisdiction). And the “‘prevailing market rate’ is that rate which lawyers of comparable skill and experience can expect to command” in the relevant community. See id. “The appropriate rate . . . is not necessarily the exact value sought by a particular firm, but is rather the market rate in the venue sufficient to encourage competent representation.” Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir. 2007).
The parties agree that attorneys Doig and Aukerman should be compensated at a rate of $425-per-hour, which is reasonable and thus adopted. Doig, who recently retired, had been practicing law since 1981 and worked at the Center for Civil Justice at the time of this litigation.
5

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 6 of 10 Pg ID 6187

(Dkt. 215-2 at 6.) During that time, she won many meaningful

judgments and settlements as class counsel on behalf of individuals

wrongfully denied subsistence benefits. (Id. at 5-6.) Aukerman

graduated summa cum laude from New York University School of Law

in 2000, clerked for a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, then began practicing for Legal Aid of Western Michigan. (Dkt.

215-3 at 2-3.) She worked at the ACLU during the time of this

litigation, and has also won many meaningful judgments and

settlements for her clients. (Id. at 3-5.) The agreed-on rate of $425-per-

hour is below the 95th percentile for attorneys of similar experience,

and attorneys such as these two could undoubtedly command such rates

given their skills and experience. See STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN,

ECONOMICS

OF

LAW

PRACTICE

6-7

(2014),

http://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/0000151.pdf.

The parties agree that attorney Nichols, who currently works as a

Fair Housing Attorney for Legal Services of Eastern Michigan, should

be compensated at a rate of $276-per-hour, which is reasonable and

thus adopted. Nichols has been licensed to practice law since 2000, and

worked as a staff attorney on this matter at the Center for Civil Justice.

6

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 7 of 10 Pg ID 6188
(Dkt. 215-4 at 23.) The agreed-on rate of $276-per-hour is below the mean for attorneys with at least sixteen years of experience in this district. See STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE 6 (2014), http://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/0000151.pdf.
The parties agree that attorney Linehan, who currently works at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, should be compensated at a rate of $205-per-hour, which is reasonable and thus adopted. Linehan has been licensed to practice law since 2012, and worked as a staff attorney on this matter at the Center for Civil Justice. (Dkt. 215-5 at 23.) The agreed-on rate of $205-per-hour is the mean for attorneys with three to five years of experience in this district, which is reasonable here. See STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE 6 (2014), http://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/ 0000151.pdf.
The parties agree that attorney Nelson, who is currently an assistant defender at the State Appellate Defender Office, should be compensated at a rate of $189-per-hour, which is reasonable and thus adopted. Nelson has been licensed to practice law since 2013, and was a Skadden Fellowship recipient working at the ACLU at the time of this
7

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 8 of 10 Pg ID 6189

litigation. (Dkt. 215-6 at 23.) The agreed-on rate of $189-per-hour is

the mean for attorneys with one to two years of experience in this

district, which is reasonable here. See STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN,

ECONOMICS

OF

LAW

PRACTICE

6

(2014),

http://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/

0000151.pdf.

The parties agree that attorneys Ziegler and Freed, who were law

students working as summer law clerks at the ACLU at the time of they

contributed to this litigation, should be compensated at a rate of $125-

per-hour, which is reasonable and thus adopted. The agreed-on rate of

$125-per-hour is a reasonable rate for work performed by paralegals

and law clerks in this district. See, e.g., Schleben v. Carpenters Pension

Tr. Fund-Detroit & Vicinity, No. 13-cv-14464, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

25907, at *28 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2016) (“Finally, the Court finds that a

rate of $125 per hour is reasonable for the paralegal’s work.”).

And as the parties’ expert opined, the number of hours expended

by each attorney and law clerk “is reasonable in light of the complexity

of the case and the fact that the Michigan Attorney General’s office

presented a vigorous defense.” (Dkt. 215 at 15-16 (citing Dkt. 215-9).)

8

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 9 of 10 Pg ID 6190
The Court reviewed the thousands of pages of briefing in this case, and presided over numerous hearings, status conferences, and telephonic calls. This class action raised complex issues of constitutional, statutory, and class-certification law. And the parties litigated this case through appeal on a variety of issues. The Court is satisfied by the briefing and affidavits that appropriate steps were taken to exclude hours expended on clerical tasks. (See id.; see, e.g.¸ Dkt. 215-9 at 12.) The number of hours expended by each attorney and law clerk is reasonable, and of the type of work that fee-paying clients would normally be charged.
It is also worth highlighting, as noted by the parties, that the award represents less than 2% of the benefits that plaintiffs’ counsel was able to obtain in back benefits already paid out to the class alone, which does not itself encompass the full relief obtained. (See Dkt. 215 at 13.) A reasonable fee in a case such as this likely could have been much higher. But the Court is satisfied that the amount, which is the result of good faith negotiations among the many attorneys that invested time in this case, is a fair and reasonable award of attorney’s
9

5:13-cv-13185-JEL-DRG Doc # 224 Filed 05/31/17 Pg 10 of 10 Pg ID 6191

fees and costs. Accordingly, the parties’ joint motion (Dkt. 215) is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2017 Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 31, 2017.
s/Felicia M. Moses FELICIA M. MOSES Case Manager

10

 
 Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 1 of 22
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Ann Arbor) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:13−cv−13185−JEL−DRG

reassigned

Barry v. Corrigan

Assigned to: District Judge Judith E. Levy

Referred to: Magistrate Judge David R. Grand

Case in other court:

U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth

Circuit, 15−01390

Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit, 15−01390

Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights

Plaintiff

Walter Barry by his next friend Elaine Barry, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Elan S Nichols Legal Services of Eastern Michigan 320 South Washington Avenue Third Floor Saginaw, MI 48607 800−322−4512 Email: enichols@lsem−mi.org TERMINATED: 05/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline Doig Center For Civil Justice 436 S. Saginaw Suite 400 Flint, MI 48502 810−244−8044 Fax: 810−244−5550 Email: jdoig@ccj−mi.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie N. Linehan Center for Civil Justice 436 S. Saginaw Street Suite 400 Flint, MI 48502 810−244−8044 Fax: 810−244−5550 Email: klinehan@ccj−mi.org TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam J. Aukerman American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan West Michigan Regional Office 1514 Wealth St., SE Grand Rapids, MI 49506 616−301−0930 Email: maukerman@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sofia V. Nelson ACLU of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6806 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: snelson@aclumich.org

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 2 of 22

TERMINATED: 08/20/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Heather Woodward

represented by Elan S Nichols (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie N. Linehan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam J. Aukerman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sofia V. Nelson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline Doig Center For Civil Justice 320 S. Washington 2nd Floor Saginaw, MI 48607−1115 989−755−3120 Fax: 989−755−3558 Email: jdoig@ccj−mi.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Donitha Copeland

represented by Elan S Nichols (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie N. Linehan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam J. Aukerman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline Doig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kenneth L. Anderson

represented by Elan S Nichols (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie N. Linehan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 3 of 22

Miriam J. Aukerman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline Doig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Westside Mothers

represented by Elan S Nichols (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/12/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katie N. Linehan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/06/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam J. Aukerman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jacqueline Doig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Maura Corrigan in her capacity as Director, Michigan Department of Human Services

represented by Joshua S. Smith MI Department of Attorney General Health Education and Family Services P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 517−335−1238 Email: smithj46@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin M. Heyse Michigan Department of the Attorney General 525 W Ottawa St. 3rd Floor P.O. Box 30758 48909 517−373−7700 Fax: 517−335−1152 Email: heysek@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William R. Morris Michigan Department of Attorney General Health, Education and Family Services Division P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−7700 Email: morrisw@michigan.gov TERMINATED: 05/16/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 4 of 22

07/24/2013
07/24/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 08/13/2013

1 COMPLAINT filed by Walter Barry against Maura Corrigan. Plaintiff requests summons issued. IFP Application to Follow. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − County of 1st Defendant: Ingham. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A: Notice of Case Action 1, # 3 Exhibit B: Detroit Police Statement, # 4 Exhibit C: Medical Needs Statement, # 5 Exhibit D: Hearing Decision, # 6 Exhibit E: Notice of Case Action 2, # 7 Exhibit F: Hearing Summary, # 8 Exhibit G: Statement of Robin Thomas, # 9 Exhibit H: Notice of Case Action 3, # 10 Exhibit I: Minutes, # 11 Exhibit J: Fugitive Felon Specifications, # 12 Exhibit K: BEM 203 1, # 13 Exhibit L: BEM 203 2, # 14 Exhibit M: BEM 203 3, # 15 Exhibit N: BEM 204, # 16 Exhibit O: BPB 2013−003, # 17 Exhibit P: BAM 811 1, # 18 Exhibit Q: BAM 811 2, # 19 Exhibit R: BAM 800 1, # 20 Exhibit S: BAM 800 2, # 21 Exhibit T: Bridges Individual Demographic Screens, # 22 Exhibit U: FOA 2012−50, # 23 Exhibit V: Fugitive Felon Interface Job Aid, # 24 Exhibit W: OIG Memo, # 25 Exhibit X: Emails from Robin Thomas) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
2 APPLICATION In Forma Pauperis by Walter Barry. (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 07/24/2013)
3 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Miriam J. Aukerman appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
4 MOTION to Certify Class by Walter Barry. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit State Police Press Release, # 3 Exhibit Resume J. Doig, # 4 Exhibit Resume T. Stangl, # 5 Exhibit Resume M. Aukerman, # 6 Exhibit DHS Trend Table Report) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Walter Barry. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A: Declaration of E. Barry, # 3 Exhibit B: Sample Fugitive Felon Notice, # 4 Exhibit C: Martinez v. Astrue Settlement) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (PMil) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Jacqueline Doig on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
7 AMENDED COMPLAINT Class Action filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants. NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A − 12/31/12 Notice to W. Barry, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B − 1/8/13 Statement from DPD Officer Turner, # 4 Exhibit Ex. C − 1/15/13 Medical Needs Statement re W. Barry, # 5 Exhibit Ex. D − 2/1/13 Hearing Decision reversing W. Barry disqualification, # 6 Exhibit Ex. E − 5/16/13 Notice to W. Barry, # 7 Exhibit Ex. F − 5/22/13 Hearing Summary re W. Barry, # 8 Exhibit Ex. G − 5/16/13 Statement from DHS OIG R Thomas, # 9 Exhibit Ex. H − 6/14/13 Notice to W. Barry, # 10 Exhibit Ex I − 7/26/13 Notice to W. Barry, # 11 Exhibit Ex. J − 8/5/13 11 a.m. Email from K Heyse to C Jomaa, # 12 Exhibit Ex. K − 8/5/13 1 p.m. Email from K Heyse to C Jomaa, # 13 Exhibit Ex. L − 8/7/13 Stement from DPD Officer Turner, # 14 Exhibit Ex. M − 8/8/13 Statement from DPD Officer Turner, # [STRICKEN RE 42 (15) Exhibit Ex. N − 6/11 Citation to H Woodward for Misdemeanor Ordinance Violation, # 16 Exhibit Ex. O − MSP ICHAT for H Woodward, # 17 Exhibit Ex. P − Register of Actions 23rd DIstrict Court Case No. 11−1717−OM, # [STRICKEN RE 42 (18) Exhibit Ex. Q − 8/1/13 Notice to H Woodward, # 19 Exhibit Ex. R − Minutes of 7/6/13 meeting re Fugitive Felon Interface, # 20 Exhibit Ex. S − SOM Fugitive Felon Requirements Specifications, # 21 Exhibit Ex. T − BEM 203 eff. 2/1/13 − 4/30/13, # 22 Exhibit Ex. U − BEM 203 eff. 5/1/13 − 5/31/13, # 23 Exhibit Ex. V − BEM 203 eff 6/1/13, # 24 Exhibit Ex. W − BEM 204 eff 6/1/13, # 25 Exhibit Ex. X − BPB 2−13−003 (2/1/13), # 26 Exhibit Ex. Y − BAM 811 eff 2/1/13− 4/30/13, # 27 Exhibit Ex. Z − BAM 811 eff 5/1/13, # 28 Exhibit Ex. AA − BAM 800 eff 2/1/13 − 5/31/13, # 29 Exhibit Ex. BB − BAM 800 eff 6/1/13, # 30 Exhibit Ex. CC − Bridges Screen with "Conviction Information", # 31 Exhibit Ex. DD − FOA 2012−50, # 32 Exhibit Ex. EE − DHS OWDT Fugitive Felon Job Aid/Training Material (3/20/13), # 33 Exhibit Ex. FF − DHS OIG Memo re Fugitive Felon Match Initiative (12/20/12), # 34 Exhibit Ex. GG − 2/28/13 emails from R Thomas, DHS OIG LEIN/TAC analyst to Hearings Coordinators etc.) (Doig,

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 5 of 22

08/14/2013
08/14/2013 08/16/2013 08/20/2013 08/21/2013 08/21/2013 08/21/2013 08/21/2013 08/22/2013 08/23/2013 08/27/2013 08/27/2013 08/27/2013 08/27/2013 08/28/2013
08/29/2013 08/30/2013

Jacqueline) Modified on 8/27/2013 (KKra). [EXHIBITS B, L, AND M SEALED PER COURT ORDER DATES 8/27/13] Modified on 11/7/2013 (DWor). (Entered: 08/13/2013)
8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order & Notice re Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification by Heather Woodward. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A − Declaration of Heather Woodward) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
9 DECLARATION by Elaine Barry re 4 MOTION to Certify Class , 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Second Declaration) filed by All Plaintiffs (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/14/2013)
10 ORDER granting 2 Application to proceed in forma pauperis filed by Walter Barry Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 08/16/2013)
11 SUMMONS Issued for *Maura Corrigan* (DAll) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua S. Smith on behalf of Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 12 Notice of Appearance by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Kristin M. Heyse on behalf of Maura Corrigan. (Heyse, Kristin) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Maura Corrigan (Heyse, Kristin) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
16 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Maura Corrigan served on 8/21/2013, answer due 9/11/2013. (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 08/22/2013)
17 NOTICE OF HEARING on 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order Motion Hearing set for 9/18/2013 02:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman (CMul) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by William R. Morris on behalf of All Defendants. (Morris, William) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by All Defendants (Morris, William) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
20 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Substitute Properly Redacted Exhibits for Filed Exhibits. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (KKra) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
21 EXHIBIT re 7 Amended Complaint,,,,,,,,, by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Exhibit B, # 2 Exhibit Redacted Exhibit L, # 3 Exhibit Redacted Exhibit M) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order & Notice re Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification, 7 Amended Complaint,,,,,,,,, 4 MOTION to Certify Class , 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 9 Declaration by All Plaintiffs via email prior to personal service (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/28/2013)
23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
24 RESPONSE to 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − 1/24/13 letter from Lincoln/CCJ to VIisconti/DHS, # 3 Exhibit B − 2/5/13 email from Heyse/AAG for DHS to Stangl/CCJ, # 4 Exhibit C − 7/24/13 3:14 email from Doig/CCJ to Def, AAG, etc., # 5 Exhibit D − 7/24/13 4:35 email from Doig/CCJ to AAG Heyse, # 6 Exhibit E − 7/26/13 emails between Doig/CCJ and AAG Heyse) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 6 of 22

08/30/2013 09/03/2013 09/03/2013 09/09/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/11/2013
09/11/2013 09/16/2013
09/16/2013
09/17/2013 09/17/2013 09/17/2013 09/18/2013 09/25/2013

25 REPLY to Response re 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Morris, William) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
26 SUR−REPLY re 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
27 REPLY to Response re 23 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Supplemental Reply filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
28 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 9/10/2013 01:00 PM before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman Plaintiff to initiate call. (CMul) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
29 ORDER granting 23 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Responses due by 10/11/2013. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/10/2013 Disposition: Regarding hearing on 9/18/13 at 2:00 p.m.(Court Reporter Joan Morgan) (CMul) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
30 RESPONSE to 8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order & Notice re Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification, 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Document Continuation, # 9 Exhibit) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
31 RESPONSE to 4 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
32 REPLY to Response re 4 MOTION to Certify Class filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Smith Email 9/4/2013, # 3 Exhibit Shea Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Heyse Letter 9/13/2013, # 5 Exhibit Doig Letter 9/12/2013, # 6 Exhibit Doig Letter 9/13/2013, # 7 Exhibit 2nd Declaration of Heather Wodward, # 8 Exhibit Declaration of Warren Calkins, # 9 Exhibit Heyse Email 7/16/2013) (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
33 REPLY to Response re 8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order & Notice re Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification, 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exh A − Side−By−Side Statute Comparison, # 3 Exhibit Exh B − Briggs v. Bremby, # 4 Exhibit Exh C − Walker v. Eggleston) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
34 [STRICKEN] CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Maura Corrigan Subpoena to Appear and Testify to Heather Woodward (Smith, Joshua) Modified on 9/17/2013 (KKra). (Entered: 09/17/2013)
NOTICE of Error directed to: Joshua S. Smith re 34 Certificate of Service. Document is prohibited discovery, disclosure or a certificate of service thereof. Document was stricken. [No Image Associated with this docket entry] (KKra) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (KKra) (Entered: 09/17/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Bernard A. Friedman: Motion Hearing held on 9/18/2013 re 8 Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Heather Woodward, and 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Walter Barry (Court Reporter Joan Morgan) (CMul) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
35 ORDER denying 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and denying 8 Motion for TRO. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 09/25/2013)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 7 of 22

10/11/2013 10/16/2013 10/28/2013 10/28/2013 10/28/2013
11/01/2013
11/07/2013 11/07/2013 11/07/2013 11/12/2013

36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 9, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 10, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 11, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 12, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 13) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
37 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief (CMul) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A − Kiessel, # 3 Exhibit Ex B − Transcript) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A − MSP Press Release, # 3 Exhibit Ex B − Doig Resume, # 4 Exhibit Ex C − Stangl Resume, # 5 Exhibit Ex D − Aukerman Resume, # 6 Exhibit Ex E − DHS Trend Report) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
40 AMENDED COMPLAINT − Second (Proposed) filed by All Plaintiffs against Maura Corrigan. NO NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A − 12/31/12 Notice, # 3 Exhibit Ex B − 1/8/13 Statement, # 4 Exhibit Ex C − 1/15/13 Medical Statement, # 5 Exhibit Ex D − 2/1/13 Hearing Decision, # 6 Exhibit Ex E − 5/16/13 Notice, # 7 Exhibit Ex F − 5/22/13 Hearing Summary, # 8 Exhibit Ex G − 5/16/13 Thomas Statement, # 9 Exhibit Ex H − 6/14/13 Notice, # 10 Exhibit Ex I − 7/26/13 Notice, # 11 Exhibit Ex J − 8/5/13 a.m. Email, # 12 Exhibit Ex K − 8/5/13 p.m. Email, # 13 Exhibit Ex L − 8/7/13 Statement, # 14 Exhibit Ex M − 8/8/13 Statement, # [STRICKEN RE 42 (15) Exhibit Ex N − June 2011 Citation, # 16 Exhibit Ex O − MSP ICHAT, # 17 Exhibit Ex P − Register of Actions, # 18 Exhibit Ex Q − 8/1/13 Notice, # 19 Exhibit Ex R − 11/13/12 Police Report, # 20 Exhibit Ex S − 11/14/13 Police Report, # 21 Exhibit Ex T − 12/31/12 Notice, # 22 Exhibit Ex U − 2/12/13 Notice, # 23 Exhibit Ex V − 1/10/13 Notice, # 24 Exhibit Ex W − 3/18/13 Notice, # 25 Exhibit Ex X − Minutes, # 26 Exhibit Ex Y − State of Michigan Fugitive Felon, # 27 Exhibit Ex Z − BEM 203 10/1/12, # 28 Exhibit Ex AA − BEM 203 5/1/13, # 29 Exhibit Ex BB − BEM 203 6/1/13, # 30 Exhibit Ex CC − BEM 204 6/1/13, # 31 Exhibit Ex DD − Bulletin 2013−003, # 32 Exhibit Ex EE − BAM 811 2/1/13, # 33 Exhibit Ex FF − BAM 811 5/1/13, # 34 Exhibit Ex GG − BAM 800 2/1/13, # 35 Exhibit Ex HH − BAM 800 6/1/13, # 36 Exhibit Ex II − Bridges Individual Demographic, # 37 Exhibit Ex JJ − FOA 2012−50, # 38 Exhibit Ex KK − DHS OWDT, # 39 Exhibit Ex LL − DHS Office of Inspector General Memo, # 40 Exhibit Ex MM − 2/28/13 emails) (Nichols, Elan) Modified on 11/7/2013 (DWor). (Entered: 10/28/2013)
41 RESPONSE to 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Admin Hrg Tr 9/16/13, # 3 Exhibit B − Hrg Decision 9/25/13, # 4 Exhibit C − First Decl of E Barry, # 5 Exhibit D − AAG Heyse Email 7/26/13, # 6 Exhibit E − AAG Heyse Emails 8/5/15, # 7 Exhibit F − Office of Inspector General Letter 8/2/13, # 8 Exhibit G − AAG Heyse Letter 9/13/13, # 9 Exhibit H − Briggs v. Bremby, # 10 Exhibit I − Walker v. Eggleston, # 11 Exhibit J − Reynolds v. Giuliani, # 12 Exhibit K − Side by Side of Statutory Provisions, # 13 Exhibit L − Sample SSA Fugitive Felon Notice, # 14 Exhibit M − Thomas v. Barnhart, # 15 Exhibit N − Cambero v. Commissioner) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
42 SECOND STIPULATION AND ORDER to Substitute properly redacted exhibits for filed exhibits. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (DWor) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
43 EXHIBIT re 7 Amended Complaint,,,,,,,,, by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Exh N, # 2 Exhibit Redacted Exh Q) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
44 EXHIBIT re 40 Amended Complaint,,,,,,, by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Exh N) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
45 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2013)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 8 of 22

11/14/2013 11/18/2013 11/19/2013 11/21/2013
11/21/2013
11/21/2013
11/21/2013
11/25/2013 11/26/2013 11/26/2013 11/27/2013

46 RESPONSE to 45 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
47 RESPONSE to 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
48 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 36 MOTION to Dismiss Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− FOA Memo 12/21/12, # 3 Exhibit B− DHS OIG Memo 12/20/12, # 4 Exhibit C− BPB 2013−003, # 5 Exhibit D− BEM 204 eff. 6/1/13, # 6 Exhibit E− BEM 204 eff. 7/1/13, # 7 Exhibit F− BEM 203 eff. 10/1/12, # 8 Exhibit G− BEM 203 eff. 5/1/13, # 9 Exhibit H− Meeting Minutes 7/6/11, # 10 Exhibit I− Fuguitive Felon Interface Specs 7/26/11, # 11 Exhibit J− BAM 800 eff. 2/1/13, # 12 Exhibit K− BAM 800 eff. 6/1/13, # 13 Exhibit L− BAM 800 eff. 7/1/13, # 14 Exhibit M− BAM 811 eff. 2/1/13, # 15 Exhibit N− BAM 811 eff. 5/1/13, # 16 Exhibit O− BAM 811 eff. 7/1/13, # 17 Exhibit P− Training Materials 3/20/13) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
50 EXHIBIT Q− R. Thomas emails 2/28/13 re 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit R− 12/31/12 Notice to W. Barry, # 2 Exhibit S− 5/16/13 Notice to W. Barry, # 3 Exhibit T− 6/14/13 Notice to W. Barry, # 4 Exhibit U 12/31/12 Notice to D. Copeland, # 5 Exhibit V− 2/12/13 Notice to D. Copeland, # 6 Exhibit W− 1/10/13 Notice to K. Anderson, # 7 Exhibit X− 3/18/13 Notice to K. Anderson, # 8 Exhibit Y− 8/1/13 Notice to H. Woodward, # 9 Exhibit Z− 7/23/13 Declaration of E. Barry, # 10 Exhibit AA− 1/8/13 Detroit PD Statement, # 11 Exhibit BB− 1/15/13 Medical Needs form, # 12 Exhibit CC− 2/1/13 Hearing Decision, # 13 Exhibit DD− 5/22/13 Hearing Summary, # 14 Exhibit EE− 5/16/13 R. Thomas Statement, # 15 Exhibit FF− 8/13/13 Second Declaration of E. Barry, # 16 Exhibit GG− 7/26/13 Notice to W. Barry) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
51 EXHIBIT HH− 8/5/13 11:04 Heyse Email by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit II− 8/5/13 1:03 AM K. Heyse Email, # 2 Exhibit JJ− 8/7/13 Detroit PD Statement, # 3 Exhibit KK− 8/8/13 Detroit PD Statement, # 4 Exhibit LL− 8/2/13 OIG letter to MSP, # 5 Exhibit MM− 9/13/13 Heyse Email to ALJ, # 6 Exhibit NN− 9/13/13 Doig letter to ALJ, # 7 Exhibit OO− Transcript of 9/16/13 Hearing, # 8 Exhibit PP− 9/25/13 Hearing Decision, # 9 Exhibit QQ− 8/13/13 Declaration of H. Woodward, # 10 Exhibit RR− June 2011 Misdemeanor Citation, # 11 Exhibit SS− Register of Actions 23rd DCt Case 11−1717−OM, # 12 Exhibit TT− ICHAT on H. Woodward 8/6/13, # 13 Exhibit UU− 1/13/13 Complaint, # 14 Exhibit VV− Judcial Warehouse Report printed 8/14/13, # 15 Exhibit WW− Register of Actions printed 9/4/13, # 16 Exhibit XX− 12/7/12 Incident Report) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
52 EXHIBIT YY− Declaration of Warren Calkins by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ZZ− 9/13/13 Second Declaration of H. Woodward, # 2 Exhibit AAA− 11/13/12 Detroit PD Crime Report, # 3 Exhibit BBB− 11/14/12 Detroit PD Crime Report, # 4 Exhibit CCC− 11/19/13 Declaration of D. Copeland, # 5 Exhibit DDD− Sample SSA Fleeing Felon Notice, # 6 Exhibit EEE− PSM 713−2, # 7 Exhibit FFF− FOM 722−6A, # 8 Exhibit GGG− JJ2 280, # 9 Exhibit HHH− Statement of Uncontested Facts) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/21/2013)
53 RESPONSE to 45 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by Maura Corrigan. (Heyse, Kristin) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
55 MOTION to Strike 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit) (Heyse, Kristin) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
56 RESPONSE to 54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 9 of 22

11/27/2013 11/27/2013 12/02/2013 12/02/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/19/2013 02/04/2014 02/18/2014 05/13/2014 06/17/2014
06/17/2014
08/14/2014
08/14/2014
08/27/2014

57 RESPONSE to 55 MOTION to Strike 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
58 EXHIBIT A (Partial Tr. of 9/18/13 Hearing) re 56 Response to Motion by All Plaintiffs (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
59 [FILING ERROR − Document is a MOTION] SUR−REPLY re 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief Motion to File Surreply filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A − Proposed Surreply) (Nichols, Elan) Modified on 12/2/2013 (DWor). (Entered: 12/02/2013)
60 ADDENDUM re 59 Sur−Reply (Motion to File Sur−Reply − Statement of Nonconcurrence) by All Plaintiffs (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
61 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 55 MOTION to Strike 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
62 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
63 RESPONSE to 59 MOTION for Leave to File response in opposition to Plaintififs' motion for permission to file sur−reply brief filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
64 NOTICE of Appearance by Sofia V. Nelson on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Nelson, Sofia) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
65 ORDER finding as moot 4 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
66 NOTICE of reassignment from District Judge Bernard A. Friedman to District Judge Judith E. Levy in Ann Arbor pursuant to Administrative Order 14−AO−030. (SSch) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
67 NOTICE OF HEARING on 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed), 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment , 59 MOTION for Leave to File, 38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion, 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief, 55 MOTION to Strike 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment . Motion Hearing set for 8/22/2014 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
68 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 45 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 38 MOTION for Leave to File to Amend Complaint and Class Motion , 54 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment (FMos) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
69 ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' 38 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Amended Motion for Class Certification, Granting Plaintiffs' 59 Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply, Denying Defendan's 45 , 54 Motions for Enlargement of Time to Respond, Denying Defendant's 55 Motion to Strike, and Setting Briefing Schedule for Defendant's 36 Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs' 39 Amended Motion for Class Certification, and Plaintiffs' 49 Motion for Class Certification, and Plaintiffs' 49 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
RESET Deadlines as to 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed), 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment , 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief. Motion Hearing RESET for 10/23/2014 AT 10:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI − SEE ORDER 67 (FMos) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
70 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second) filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants. NO NEW PARTIES ADDED. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− 12/31/12 Notice to Barry, # 3 Exhibit B− 1/8/13 Statement Detroit Police, # 4 Exhibit C− 1/15/13 medical Needs Statement re Barry, # 5 Exhibit D− 2/1/13 Hearing Decision in re Barry, # 6 Exhibit E− 5/16/13 Notice to Barry, # 7 Exhibit F− 5/22/13

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 10 of 22

09/08/2014 09/08/2014 09/09/2014 09/10/2014 09/12/2014 09/15/2014
09/15/2014 09/26/2014 09/26/2014 09/26/2014

Hearing Summary, # 8 Exhibit G− 5/16/13 Statement from DHS OIG, # 9 Exhibit H− 6/14/13 Notice to Barry, # 10 Exhibit I− 7/26/13 Client Benefit Notice to Barry, # 11 Exhibit J− 8/5/13 11:04 AM Email from Heyse w/ ROA, # 12 Exhibit K− 8/5/13 1:03 PM email from Heyse, # 13 Exhibit L− 8/7/13 Detroit Police Officer Turner Statement, # 14 Exhibit M− 8/8/13 Detroit Police Officer Turner Statement, # 15 Exhibit N− June 2011 Ordinance Violation Citation to Woodward, # 16 Exhibit O− MSP ICHAT for Woodward, # 17 Exhibit P− Register of Actions − 23rd D Ct 11−1717−OM, # 18 Exhibit Q− 8/1/13 SER Decision to Woodward, # 19 Exhibit R− 11/13/12 Police Report of Stolen Identity, # 20 Exhibit S− 11/14/12 Police Report naming Ronesha Williams, # 21 Exhibit T− 12/31/12 Notice to Copeland, # 22 Exhibit U− 2/12/13 Notice to Copeland, # 23 Exhibit V− 1/10/13 Notice to Anderson, # 24 Exhibit W− 3/18/13 Notice to Anderson, # 25 Exhibit X− Minutes from 7/6/11 Meeting re Fugitive Felon Interface, # 26 Exhibit Y− MI Fugitive Felon BRGUS00266483 Specs (Rev 07/10), # 27 Exhibit Z− BEM 203 in effect 10/1/12 − 5/31/13, # 28 Exhibit AA− BEM 203 in effect 5/1/13 − 5/31/13, # 29 Exhibit BB− BEM 203 in effect 6/1/13, # 30 Exhibit CC− BEM 204 in effect 6/1/13, # 31 Exhibit DD− Bridges Policy Bulletin 2013−003, # 32 Exhibit EE− BAM 811 in effect 2/1/13 − 4/30/13, # 33 Exhibit FF− BAM 811 in effect 5/1/13, # 34 Exhibit GG− BAM 800 in effect 2/1/13 − 5/31/13, # 35 Exhibit HH− BAM 800 in effect 6/1/13, # 36 Exhibit II− Bridges Indiv Demographic Screen "Conviction Information", # 37 Exhibit JJ− FOA 2012−50, # 38 Exhibit KK− DHS OWDT "Fugitive Felon Interface" Job Aid/Training, # 39 Exhibit LL− 12/20/12 DHS OIG Memo re Fugitive Felon Match Initiative, # 40 Exhibit MM− 2/28/13 emails from DHS OIG to DHS staff) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Allowing the filing of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint TO BE FILED BY 9/30/2014, Plaintiff's response is due by 10/14/14, and defendant's reply is due by 10/28/14. Issued by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed), 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment . Motion Hearing RESET for 11/14/2014 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
71 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply (Modify Scheduling Order) by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
72 ORDER Granting Plaintiff's 71 Motion for Modification of Scheduling Order. (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be filed no later than 9/30/14. Plaintif's response must be filed by no later than 10/24/14, with defendant's reply due by 11/3/14) − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
73 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Extend the Page Limit for Defendant's Responses − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
74 OBJECTION to 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2) (Smith, Joshua) Modified on 9/16/2014 (DTyl) [BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO AMENDED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION] (Entered: 09/15/2014)
75 RESPONSE to 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 4 Index of Exhibits Exhibit 3) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
76 SUR−REPLY re 36 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
77 STIPULATION AND ORDER to File Necessary Declaration at a Later Date (Response due by 10/8/2014) Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
78 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending Page Limit. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 09/26/2014)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 11 of 22

09/29/2014
09/29/2014
09/30/2014 10/03/2014 10/06/2014 10/24/2014 10/24/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014 11/03/2014 11/07/2014 11/13/2014 11/14/2014
01/09/2015

79 REPLY to Response re 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− Eaton v. Emmett Co., # 3 Exhibit B− Crawley v. Ahmed, # 4 Exhibit C− Declaration of John Shea, # 5 Exhibit D− BAM 406, # 6 Exhibit E− Declaration of Kenneth Anderson, # 7 Exhibit F− MSP Division 1 email, # 8 Exhibit G− Third Decl of E. Barry, # 9 Exhibit H− Orders of Dismissal re Copeland, # 10 Exhibit I− (unsigned) Declaration of D. Copeland, # 11 Exhibit J− Doig emails) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
80 REPLY to Response re 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Declaration of K. Anderson, # 3 Exhibit B − Third Declaration of E. Barry, # 4 Exhibit C − Orders Dismissing State v Copeland, # 5 Exhibit D − State v Woodward Register of Actions, # 6 Exhibit E − Second Declaration of D. Copeland, unsigned, # 7 Exhibit F − BAM 406, # 8 Exhibit G − Fleeing Felon Sections from PRWORA 1996, # 9 Exhibit H − Legis History PRWORA, # 10 Exhibit I − 2008 Technical Clarifying Amendment and Legis Hist., # 11 Exhibit J − Side by Side of SNAP, MEdicaid, and SSI provisions) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
81 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
82 NOTICE OF HEARING on 81 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief. Motion Hearing set for 11/14/2014 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
83 EXHIBIT E filed pursuant to Court Order re 80 Reply to Response to Motion,, by All Plaintiffs (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
84 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO EXTEND THE PAGE LIMIT FOR PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE, TO ALLOW SUR−REPLIES AND TO EXTEND THE PAGE LIMIT FOR DEFENDANTS REPLY. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
85 RESPONSE to 81 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
86 SUR−REPLY re 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) Brief in Opposition to Amended Motion for Class Certification filed by All Defendants. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
87 SUR−REPLY re 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by All Defendants. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
88 REPLY to Response re 81 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by All Defendants. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
89 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A − Dozier decision I, # 3 Exhibit Ex B − Dozier decision II) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
90 NOTICE Regarding Oral Arugment. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy (FMos) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Motion Hearing held on 11/14/2014 re 39 Amended MOTION to Certify Class (Proposed) filed by Heather Woodward, Walter Barry, 49 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Heather Woodward, Walter Barry, 81 MOTION to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief filed by Maura Corrigan (Court Reporter Janice Coleman) Disposition: Taken Under Advisement (Bankston, T) 11/14/2014 (Entered: 11/14/2014)
91 OPINION and ORDER Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's 81 Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, Granting Plaintiffs' 39 Amended Motion to Certify Class, and Granting Plaintiffs' 49 Motion for Summary Judgment − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 01/09/2015)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 12 of 22

01/16/2015 01/23/2015 01/23/2015 01/28/2015 01/30/2015
02/05/2015
02/05/2015
02/06/2015 02/17/2015 02/17/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/27/2015 03/06/2015

92 STIPULATION AND ORDER for Extension of Time for Plaintiff's to Move for Attorney's Fees and Costs − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4) (Smith, Joshua) Modified on 3/31/2015 (FMos). (Exhibits 1, 2, 4 are SEALED pursuant to Court's Order 106 ) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
94 MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Outcome of Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
95 MOTION to Strike 93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment (Strike Exhibits) by All Plaintiffs. (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
96 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 94 MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Outcome of Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment, 93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment, 95 MOTION to Strike 93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment (Strike Exhibits) (FMos) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
97 RESPONSE to 94 MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Outcome of Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Reliance Mediaworks v. Giarmarco, # 3 Exhibit B − DHS FAP Trend Info FY 2013−15, # 4 Exhibit C − DHS Reference Table Manual 250, # 5 Exhibit D − (excerpt) Exec Budget FY 2015 & 2016, # 6 Exhibit E − USDA Benefits of Increasing SNAP Participation) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/5/2015 with Jacqui Doin and Miriam Aukerman for plaintiffs', Joshua Smith for defendant. Disposition: IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' will file the proposed notice re class certification on 2/6/2015, and defendant will file objections by 2/20/2015. Plaintiff will file a reply to objections by 3/6/2015. Objections and reply are limited to 20 pages each. (FMos) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
98 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Regarding Class Notice (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A − Notice, # 3 Exhibit Ex B − Claim Form, # 4 Exhibit Ex C − Hearing Request, # 5 Exhibit Ex D − Poster, # 6 Exhibit Ex E − Legal Serv Programs) (Nichols, Elan) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
99 RESPONSE to 95 MOTION to Strike 93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment (Strike Exhibits) Response Brief to Motion to Strike filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
100 RESPONSE to 94 MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Outcome of Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment Response Brief to Motion filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
101 RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Proposal Regarding Notice to Class by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
102 RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Proposal Regarding Notice to Class by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
103 REPLY to Response re 95 MOTION to Strike 93 MOTION for Reconsideration or to Alter Judgment (Strike Exhibits) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
104 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 102 Response (Free) Plaintiffs' Reply Regarding Notice to Class (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− Doig Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit A−1 1/27/15 Anderson Notice, # 4 Exhibit A−2 2/9/15 A.P. Notice, # 5 Exhibit A−3 BPB Log p.1, # 6 Exhibit A−4 BPB 2015−005 Bridges April Project, # 7 Exhibit A−5 BEM 204 Fugitive Felons, # 8 Exhibit A−6 BAM 811 Fugitive Felon Match, # 9 Exhibit B − BEM 554, # 10 Exhibit C − Reynolds v Giuliani Stipulation, # 11 Exhibit D − Richard C. v. Proud Stipulation & Order, # 12 Exhibit E − 2/26/15 Doig−English emails, # 13 Exhibit F − J&J Sports Prods V. LB Entmt, # 14 Exhibit G

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 13 of 22

03/13/2015
03/24/2015 03/24/2015
03/25/2015 03/26/2015 03/27/2015 03/30/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015 03/31/2015
04/07/2015
04/07/2015 04/10/2015 04/14/2015 04/14/2015 04/21/2015

− Dorr v. Ford Motor Co., # 15 Exhibit H − Shaffer v. Giove Law Office) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
105 STIPULATION AND ORDER for Status Conference Regarding Implementation of January 9, 2015 − ( In−Person Status Conference set for 3/24/2015 at 10:30 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI) − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: In−Person Status Conference held on 3/24/2015 (Court Reporter Jeseca Jacobs) (FMos) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
106 OPINION and ORDER Partially Granting and Partially Denying Plaintiffs' 95 Motion to Strike, Denying Defendant's 93 Motion for Reconsideration, and Denying Defendant's 94 Motion to Stay − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
107 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 98 Notice (Other), of Filing Amended Proposed Notice to Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Decision in Lawsuit − rev. 3−25−15) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
108 JUDGMENT. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
110 ORDER Regarding Defendant's Compliance with the Court's January 9, 2015 Order. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/30/2015)
111 NOTICE OF HEARING on 109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support. Motion Hearing set for 5/6/2015 at 1:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
112 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Maura Corrigan. Receipt No: 0645−5096697 − Fee: $ 505 − Fee Status: Fee Paid. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
113 Certificate of Service re 112 Notice of Appeal. (SOso) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
114 ORDER REGARDING AMENDED CLASS NOTICE 107 AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURTS JANUARY 9, 2015 ORDER 91 Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (Bankston, T) (Main Document 114 replaced on 4/14/2015) (FMos). (Entered: 03/31/2015)
115 TRANSCRIPT of Status Conference held on 3/24/2015. (Court Reporter Jeseca C. Jacobs) (Number of Pages: 96) (Appeal Purposes) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 4/28/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/8/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/6/2015. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Jacobs, J) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
117 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 112 Notice of Appeal filed by Maura Corrigan [Appeal Case Number 15−1390] (KCla) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
116 RESPONSE to 109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A − 4/7/15 6th Circuit Order Denying Stay) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
Remark Re 114 Order Regarding Amended Class was replaced today to correct paragraph 5 of the order. See Order 114 . (FMos) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
118 ORDER Requiring Supplemental Briefing − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
Court Reporter Acknowledgment of Transcript Order Form received on April 1, 2015. Transcript for court proceeding held on: November 14, 2014. Estimated transcript completion date: April 21, 2015. Estimated number of pages: 103. Payment

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 14 of 22

04/21/2015
04/21/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/28/2015 05/01/2015 05/05/2015 05/12/2015
05/12/2015 05/18/2015
05/18/2015 05/19/2015

arrangements were made on April 20, 2015. (Coleman, J.) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
119 TRANSCRIPT of Motion for Class Certification/Motion to Dismiss/Motions for Summary Judgment held on 11−14−14. (Court Reporter/Transcriber: Janice Coleman) (Number of Pages: 103) (Appeal Purposes) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter/Transcriber a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 5/12/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/22/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/20/2015. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber at www.transcriptorders.com before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Coleman, J.) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
120 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit A−T) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
121 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 118 Order filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
122 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
Court Reporter Acknowledgment of Transcript Order Form received on 4/1/2015. Transcript for court proceeding held on: 3/24/2015. Estimated transcript completion date: 4/7/2015. Estimated number of pages: 96. Payment arrangements were made on 4/1/2015. (Jacobs, J) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support. Motion Hearing set for 5/5/2015 at 1:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 05/01/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Motion Hearing held on 5/5/2015 re 109 MOTION to Stay & Brief in Support filed by Maura Corrigan. Disposition: Denied, opinion and order to be issued.(Court Reporter Joan Morgan) (EBut) (Entered: 05/06/2015)
123 TRANSCRIPT of Motion To Stay Pending Appeal held on May 5th, 2015. (Court Reporter/Transcriber: Joan L. Morgan) (Number of Pages: 22) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter/Transcriber a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 6/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/10/2015. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Morgan, J) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
124 STIPULATION AND ORDER for the withdrawal of Attorney Elan S Nichols as counsel. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (DPer) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− Timeline provided 3−24−15, # 3 Exhibit B − Declaration of S Wade, # 4 Exhibit C− 5−6−15 Notice of Case Action, # 5 Exhibit D − BEM 204, # 6 Exhibit E − BAM 811, # 7 Exhibit F − Fugitive felon matches since January 2013, # 8 Exhibit G − 5−12−15 and 5−18−15 emails, # 9 Exhibit H − 5/1/15 Letter, # 10 Exhibit I − GMC v Ultra Golf Carts, # 11 Exhibit J − 5/15/15 Email with DHHS Response to 5/1/ Letter, # 12 Exhibit K − Anderson Notice) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
126 NOTICE of Appearance by Katie N. Linehan on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Linehan, Katie) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
127 STIPULATION AND PROPOSED ORDER Re Notice to Previously Unidentified Class Members − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 05/19/2015)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 15 of 22

05/21/2015 05/29/2015 06/05/2015 06/10/2015 06/11/2015 06/12/2015 06/18/2015
06/19/2015 06/22/2015 06/23/2015 07/01/2015
07/01/2015 07/02/2015 07/09/2015 07/16/2015

128 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachments A − D) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
129 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Extend Time for Filing Response to Plaintiff's 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) − ( Response due by 6/18/2015, Reply due by 7/2/2015) − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
130 OPINION and ORDER Denying Defendant's 109 Motion to Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 06/05/2015)
131 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/11/2015 at 9:15 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy − THE COURT WILL INITIATE THE CALL TO THE PARTIES (FMos) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Telephonic Status Conference held on 6/11/2015 − ( Motion Hearing on 125 Motion for Order to Show Cause set for 7/17/2015 at 2:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy) (FMos) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
132 June 12, 2015 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit of Sheryl Thompson) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/12/2015)
133 RESPONSE to 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) & Brief in Response in Opposition to Motion to Show Cause filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/18/2015)
134 AMENDED by Maura Corrigan Exhibit 4 − Affidavit of Sheryl Thompson (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/19/2015)
135 Compliance REPORT by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Returned Mail Master Spreadsheet) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/22/2015)
136 AMENDED 135 Report (Free) by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment A) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
137 REPLY to Response re 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A− Def's 6/23/15 Spreadsheet − original format, # 3 Exhibit B − Def's 6/23/15 Spreadsheet − reformatted and sorted Columns K, L, A, # 4 Exhibit C − BAM 600 − Hearings excerpt p. 1−11, # 5 Exhibit D− Def's 6/23/15 Spreadsheet − reformatted and sorted Columns T, U, A, # 6 Exhibit E − Def's 6/23/15 Spreadsheet − reformatted and sorted, Columns AH − AZ, and A, # 7 Exhibit F − Def's 6/23/15 Spreadsheet − reformatted and sorted, Column G, A, # 8 Exhibit G − BEM 204 Fugitive Felons eff. 6/1/15, # 9 Exhibit H − BAM 811 Fugitive Felon Match eff. 6/1/15) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
139 OBJECTION to 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
140 ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' 138 Motion for Ex Parte Order and for Post Judgment Discovery and Resetting Hearing − ( Motion Hearing reset for 7/24/2015 at 4:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy on 125 , 138 − ) Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
141 Ex Parte MOTION Permission to File Additional Documents re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery, 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Declaration of J Broecker, # 3 Exhibit A−1 − 6/29/15 Healthcare Coverage Determination, # 4 Exhibit A−2 − 7/2/15 Criminal

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 16 of 22

07/17/2015 07/17/2015 07/20/2015 07/21/2015 07/23/2015
07/24/2015
07/28/2015
07/31/2015

Justice Disqualification notice w/ envelope, # 5 Exhibit A−3 − 7/6/15 Quick Note w/ envelope, # 6 Exhibit A−4 − Barry Class member "packet" w/ envelope, # 7 Exhibit A−5 − 7/8/15 Criminal Justice Disqualification notice w/ envelope) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER GRANTING 141 Ex Parte MOTION Permission to File Additional Documents re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery, 125 filed by Donitha Copeland, Heather Woodward, Westside Mothers, Kenneth L. Anderson, Walter Barry. Entered by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
142 DECLARATION by Jeremy Broecker re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery, 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) filed by All Plaintiffs (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/17/2015)
143 RESPONSE to 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
144 Compliance REPORT by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
145 REPLY to Response re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Def's 7/20/15 Spreadsheet, # 3 Exhibit B − Def's 7/20/15 Spreadsheet sorted by Hearing Request Date, # 4 Exhibit C − Def's 7/20/15 Spreadsheet sorted by Claim Form Date, # 5 Exhibit D − Def's 7/20/15 Spreadsheet sorted by Date Criminal Justice Disqualification Notice Sent, # 6 Exhibit E − Def's 7/2/15 Spreadsheet sorted by Negative Action Date, # 7 Exhibit F − Def's 7/20/15 Spreadsheet sorted by Negative Action Date) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Motion Hearing held on 7/24/2015 re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery filed by Donitha Copeland, Heather Woodward, Westside Mothers, Kenneth L. Anderson, Walter Barry, 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) filed by Donitha Copeland, Heather Woodward, Westside Mothers, Kenneth L. Anderson, Walter Barry Disposition: Motion for Contempt 125 Granted; Motion for expedited discovery 138 Granted in part; Written Order to Follow.(Court Reporter Andrea Wabeke) (TBan) (Entered: 07/24/2015)
146 TRANSCRIPT of Motion held on July 24, 2015. (Court Reporter: Andrea Wabeke) (Number of Pages: 49) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 8/18/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/28/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/26/2015. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporterbefore the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Wabeke, A) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
147 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery, 141 Ex Parte MOTION Permission to File Additional Documents re 138 MOTION for Order (Ex Parte) Regarding 7/17/15 Hearing and for Expedited Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery; and for Expedited Postjudgment Discovery, 125 , 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) Submission of Proposed Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Order) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/31/2015)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 17 of 22

08/07/2015
08/12/2015 08/13/2015
08/14/2015 08/14/2015 08/17/2015 08/20/2015 08/21/2015 08/21/2015 08/28/2015 09/01/2015 09/03/2015 09/08/2015
09/09/2015 09/09/2015

148 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE and Granting in Part Motion for Expedited Post Judgment Discovery by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
149 MOTION Unopposed motion to file reply to Defendant's response to proposed contempt order re 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, 147 Notice (Other),, by All Plaintiffs. (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Granting until August 17, 2015 to file a reply brief to 148 Response to Order to Show Cause re 149 MOTION Unopposed motion to file reply to Defendant's response to proposed contempt order − Issued by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
150 MEMORANDUM re 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response to Proposed Order by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Revised Proposed Order) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
151 MOTION to Strike 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, (Section III Request for Stay Pending Appeal) by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
152 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Allow Defendant to File a Sur−Reply to Dkt 50 − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
153 STIPULATION and ORDER of Sofia V. Nelson to Withdraw. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
154 August 21, 2015 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B, # 4 Exhibit Attachment C) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
155 SUR−REPLY re 150 Memorandum re 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, filed by Maura Corrigan. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Smith, Joshua) Modified on 8/24/2015 (LHos). (Entered: 08/21/2015)
156 RESPONSE to 151 MOTION to Strike 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, (Section III Request for Stay Pending Appeal) filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/28/2015)
157 ORDER Granting in Part Plaintiff's 125 Motion to Show Cause, and Granting in Part Plaintiff's 138 Motion for Expedited Post Judgment Discovery. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
158 REPLY to Response re 151 MOTION to Strike 148 Response to Order to Show Cause, (Section III Request for Stay Pending Appeal) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
159 NOTICE by Maura Corrigan re 157 Order Defendant's September 8, 2015 Filings (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Answers, # 2 Exhibit 2 Verifications, # 3 Exhibit 3 Attestations, # 4 Exhibit 4 Attachments, # 5 Exhibit 5 Galant Affidavit, # 6 Exhibit 6 Email regarding EL 1013 revision, # 7 Exhibit 8 Proposed Language) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
160 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 159 Notice (Other), of Intent to File Objections (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
161 NOTICE by Maura Corrigan re 157 Order of Defendants September 10, 2015 Filings Pursuant to D/E 157 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − MCL § 18.1203, # 2 Exhibit 2 − MCL § 18.1261, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Mich. Exec Order No. 2001−3, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Mich. Exec. Order No. 2009−55, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Mich. Comp. Laws § 18.441, # 6 Exhibit 6 − DCH−DTMB Partnership Agreement, # 7 Exhibit 7 − DHS−DTMB Partnership Agreement, # 8 Exhibit 8 − DTMB Contract with Deloitte Consulting, # 9 Exhibit 9 − State of Mich. ICT Strategic Plan, 2010−2014, # 10 Exhibit 10 − September 1 Order, # 11 Exhibit 11 − August Barry Compliance Report, # 12 Exhibit 12 − June 16, 2015 Reply Brief, # 13 Exhibit 13 − May 20, 2015 Brief, # 14 Exhibit 14 − September 30, 2015 Motion to Dismiss, # 15 Exhibit 15 − Michigan Statutes, # 16 Exhibit 16 − Proposed Federal Regulation, # 17 Exhibit 17 − Reason Code and Reason Message Lists) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/09/2015)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 18 of 22

09/10/2015 09/10/2015
09/11/2015 09/14/2015 09/14/2015 09/14/2015
09/16/2015 09/16/2015 09/21/2015
09/23/2015 09/24/2015
09/28/2015 10/06/2015 10/13/2015 10/21/2015
11/20/2015 11/20/2015

162 ORDER Denying Defendant's 148 Request for Stay Pending Appeal and Denying Plaintiffs' 151 Motion to Strike. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
163 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 159 Notice (Other), Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant's Proposed Protective Order/Non−disclosure Provision (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A: Red−Lined Proposed Protective Order) (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: In−Person Status Conference held on 9/11/2015 with Nick Lyons. (Court Reporter Andrea Wabeke) (FMos) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
Text−Only Order of reassignment from Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand pursuant to Administrative Order. (SSch) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
164 ORDER REFERRING OTHER MATTERS to Magistrate Judge Grand : Settlement Conference set on September 22, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
165 ORDER REFERRING MOTION to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand: 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause) filed by Donitha Copeland, Heather Woodward, Westside Mothers, Kenneth L. Anderson, Walter Barry (MOTION WILL BE HEARD ON 9/22/2015 at 9:30 AM before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand in Ann Arbor, MI) − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 09/14/2015)
166 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 9/22/2015 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand (EBut) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
167 NOTICE OF HEARING on 125 MOTION for Contempt (Motion for Order to Show Cause). Motion Hearing set for 9/22/2015 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand (EBut) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
168 September 21, 2015 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B, # 4 Exhibit Attachment C, # 5 Exhibit Attachment D) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
169 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Re Motion to Show Cause Dkt. 125 by All Plaintiffs (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 09/23/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand: Settlement Conference held on 9/22/2015. Disposition: Case settled. Stipulation and order to be submitted by November 24, 2015 (EBut) Modified on 11/20/2015 (FMos). [ENTRY MODIFED TO REFLECT THAT MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE IS RESCINDED] (Entered: 09/24/2015)
170 STIPULATION AND ORDER PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT RE MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE, DKT. 125. Signed by Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. (EBut) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
171 STIPULATION and ORDER to Allow Counsel Katie N. Linehan to Withdraw − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
172 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO REVISE MAGISTRATES ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. (EBut) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
173 STATEMENT of October 21, 2015 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B, # 4 Exhibit Attachment C, # 5 Exhibit Attachment D) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/21/2015)
174 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Modify September 24, 2015 Minute Entry − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
175 STATEMENT of November 20, 2015 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A) (Smith, Joshua)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 19 of 22

12/21/2015 01/21/2016 02/19/2016 02/19/2016 02/22/2016 03/21/2016 03/30/2016 04/21/2016 05/20/2016 05/22/2016
05/25/2016 06/15/2016
06/21/2016 06/23/2016 06/27/2016
06/28/2016 07/05/2016

(Entered: 11/20/2015)
176 STATEMENT of December 21, 2015 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
177 January 21, 2016 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER STRIKING 178 Complaint − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
179 Letter to Philip Lightfoot from the Court (FMos) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
180 February 22, 2016 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B, # 4 Exhibit Attachment C) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/22/2016)
181 STATEMENT of March 21, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A, # 3 Exhibit Attachment B) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
182 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Dismiss 169 relating to 125 MOTION for Contempt − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
183 STATEMENT of April 21, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Attachment A) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
184 STATEMENT of May 20, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
185 STIPULATION AND ORDER Regarding Spreadsheets Provided Pursuant to the March 31, 2015 Order Regarding Amended Class Notice and Implementation of the Court's January 9, 2015 Order 114 − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 05/22/2016)
186 NOTICE TO APPEAR: In−Person Status Conference set for 6/15/2016 at 11:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy in ANN ARBOR, MI (FMos) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
187 Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: In−Person Status Conference held on 6/15/2016 regarding two letters present to the Court. (Court Reporter: Jeseca Eddington) (TMcg) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/16/2016: # 1 Letter) (TMcg). (Entered: 06/16/2016)
188 STATEMENT of June 21, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
189 MOTION Clarification of Effects of Order Denying a Stay re 130 Order on Motion to Stay by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
190 MEMORANDUM re Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Issues by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit A − Restoration Proposal Submitted by MDHHS to FNS on November 23, 2015, # 3 Exhibit B − Lump Sum/Opt Out Notice and Form (for Eligible Class Members), # 4 Exhibit C− Notice of Denial of Payment and Hearing Request Form (for Plus 1 Class Members), # 5 Exhibit D − Olden v. Gardner, 294 Fed. Appx. 210, 219 (6th Cir. 2008), # 6 Exhibit E − Cole v ArvinMeritor, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28281 (E.D. Mich. April 17, 2007), # 7 Exhibit F − Cotton v. Mansour, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 4798 (6th Cir. March 20, 1989), # 8 Exhibit G− Selby v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co.,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21138 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003)) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
191 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 189 MOTION Clarification of Effects of Order Denying a Stay re 130 Order on Motion to Stay (FMos) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
192 NOTICE TO APPEAR: In−Person Status Conference set for 7/18/2016 at 11:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy. (TMcg) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 20 of 22

07/05/2016 07/08/2016 07/08/2016 07/12/2016 07/18/2016 07/19/2016 07/21/2016 08/22/2016 08/24/2016 08/25/2016 09/19/2016 09/21/2016 10/21/2016 11/04/2016 11/21/2016 11/28/2016 12/02/2016 12/14/2016 12/15/2016

Set Deadlines/Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/18/2016 at 2:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy. (TIME CHANGE ONLY) (TMcg) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
193 NOTICE Regarding Status Conference set for ( 7/18/2016 at 2:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy) − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
194 RESPONSE to 189 MOTION Clarification of Effects of Order Denying a Stay re 130 Order on Motion to Stay filed by Maura Corrigan. (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
195 REPLY to Response re 189 MOTION Clarification of Effects of Order Denying a Stay re 130 Order on Motion to Stay filed by All Plaintiffs. (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Status Conference held on 7/18/2016. (KJac) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
196 OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's 189 Motion for Clarification of Effects of Order Denying Stay. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (KJac) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
197 STATEMENT of July 21, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
198 STATEMENT of August 22, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
199 STATEMENT of Amended August 22, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/24/2016)
200 OPINION and JUDGMENT from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 112 Notice of Appeal filed by Maura Corrigan [Appeal Case Number 15−1390] (Ahmed, N) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
201 MANDATE from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit as to 200 Appeal Order/Opinion/Judgment, 112 Notice of Appeal filed by Maura Corrigan [Appeal Case Number 15−1390] (Ahmed, N) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
202 Compliance Report REPORT by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
203 STATEMENT of October 21, 2016 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
204 Letter from from Class Member Scott Andrew Witzke (FMos) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
205 November 21, 2016 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
206 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Telephonic Status Conference Call set for 12/2/2016 at 2:00 PM before District Judge Judith E. Levy − The parties are instructed to call into 734.887.4700 (FMos) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/2/2016 with Jacqueline Doing, William Morris, and Joshua Smith (FMos) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
207 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Telephonic Status Conference set for 1/9/2017 at 9:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy − The parties are encouraged to call in to 734.887.4700 (FMos) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
208 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Please see attached notice for details. (FMos) (Entered: 12/15/2016)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 21 of 22

12/20/2016 12/21/2016 12/28/2016 01/20/2017 01/23/2017 01/30/2017 02/21/2017 02/24/2017
02/24/2017 03/07/2017 03/21/2017 04/18/2017 04/20/2017 04/21/2017 05/16/2017 05/22/2017 05/31/2017 06/21/2017 07/21/2017 08/21/2017

TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Telephonic Status Conference Call on January 9, 2017 is Cancelled (FMos) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
209 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3) (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
210 STIPULATED ORDER to Modify Reporting Requirements in March 31, 2015 Order 114 and Restore Food Assistance Pursuant to a Streamline Process. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 12/28/2016)
211 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by All Defendants (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
212 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Time for Filing Motion and Briefs Regarding Feeds and Costs Under 42 USC § 1988 − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
213 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Time for Filing Motion and Briefs Regarding Fees and Costs Under 42 USC § 1988 − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
214 STATEMENT of February 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
215 Joint MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs Approval by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex A Decl of J Doig, # 3 Exhibit Ex B Decl of M Aukerman, # 4 Exhibit Ex C Decl of E Nichols, # 5 Exhibit Ex D Decl of K Linehan, # 6 Exhibit Ex E Decl of S Nelsom, # 7 Exhibit Ex F Decl of A Freed, # 8 Exhibit Ex G Decl of D Ziegler, # 9 Exhibit Ex H Decl of G McIntyre, # 10 Exhibit Ex I State Bar 2014 Economics of Law Practice) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/24/2017)
216 Joint MOTION for Notice to the Class re Motion for Fees re 215 Joint MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs Approval by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A Proposed Notice) (Doig, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/24/2017)
217 ORDER for Notice to the Class on Joint Motion for Approval of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
218 STATEMENT of March 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
219 DECLARATION by Miriam J. Aukerman re 217 Order re Posting of Notice to Class of Joint Motion for Approval of Attorney's Fees and Costs filed by All Plaintiffs (Aukerman, Miriam) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
220 DECLARATION by Amy Hundley re 217 Order for Notice to the Class filed by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
221 STATEMENT of April 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
222 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Allow William R. Morris to Withdraw − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 05/16/2017)
223 STATEMENT of Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
224 OPINION and ORDER Granting 215 Joint MOTION for Attorney Fees − Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos) (Entered: 05/31/2017)
225 STATEMENT of June 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
226 STATEMENT of July 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 07/21/2017)
227 STATEMENT of Amended July 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/21/2017)

Case: 5:13-cv-13185 As of: 07/22/2018 10:10 PM EDT 22 of 22

08/21/2017 09/20/2017 10/16/2017 10/23/2017 11/21/2017 11/30/2017 12/21/2017 01/18/2018
01/22/2018 01/25/2018 02/06/2018 02/21/2018 03/21/2018 04/23/2018 05/21/2018 06/21/2018

228 STATEMENT of August 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
229 STATEMENT of September 20, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
230 NOTICE of Appearance by Mario Bechara Azzi on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Azzi, Mario) (Entered: 10/16/2017)
231 STATEMENT of October 23, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
232 STATEMENT of November 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
233 STIPULATED ORDER Modifying Reporting Requirements. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (SBur) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
234 STATEMENT of December 21, 2017 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
235 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Telephonic Status Conference set for 2/6/2018 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Judith E. Levy. Please use the following call−in information: 888.363.4734; Access Code: 2541474. (SBur) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
236 STATEMENT of January 22, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
237 STATEMENT of January 25, 2018 Revised Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Judith E. Levy: Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/6/2018. (SBur) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
238 STATEMENT of February 21, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
239 STATEMENT of March 21, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
240 STATEMENT of April 23, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
241 STATEMENT of May 21, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
242 STATEMENT of June 21, 2018 Compliance Report by Maura Corrigan (Smith, Joshua) (Entered: 06/21/2018)