U.S. DISTRICT coUR

" IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS o U T H D~IS~TR~ICT OFTEx;

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

1. F:

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, FRANCISCO LOPEZ, and ELOY SANCHEZ, at the Cameron County Jail
vs.
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

§ §
S
§ CIVIL ACTION

Michael N. Mi!by, C I ~ &

§

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 United States Code, Sections 1343, 2201, 2202 and 2283 and Rules 23 and 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 42 United States Code, Sections 1982, 1983, 1988, and the Constitution of the United States, specifically, but not limited to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This Court is authorized to render declaratory and injunction relief. This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. All of the actions, omissions and events complained of herein took or take place in the County of Cameron, State of Texas, and with the venue of this Court
2. Plaintiffs Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, and Eloy Sanchez are prisoners of the State of Texas, who are presently incarcerated at the Cameron County Jail. Plaintiffs are residents of Cameron County and sue in their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of prisoners who have been subjected to and injured or who are or will be subjected to and injured by the totality of conditions and practices resulting from overcrowding of the Cameron County jail facility,
- COMPLAINT 1

3. Cameron County is a body politic and corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas, and pursuant to law is capable of being sued in this Court. Defendant Cameron County controls funding and is therefore responsible for the operation, policies, practices and totality of conditions of its jail facility. Cameron County is a person subject to suit under 42 United States Code, Section 1983. Because this claim is brought for declaratory and injunctive relief, only, Cameron County is answerable for the acts of its agents, servants, and employees under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
CLASS ACTION
4. Plaintiffs bring this action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all other persons who are now or will be incarcerated in the Cameron County Jail. The persons comprising this class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are questions of fact and law common to the class, the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class and representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Adjudication with respect to individual members of the class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication. The actions of defendant are generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief to the class as a whole. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications and would establish incompatible standards for the defendants and their agents; in
- COMPLAINT 2
C-

addition, it would result in multiplicitous litigation with a consequent overburdening of judicial resources.
FACTS
The population of the jail should not be greater than 85% of maximum capacity of 5501 or 467 prisoners, Within these restrictions there should be a separation of prisoners based on sex, severity of offense, whether they are first time offenders and whether they suffer illnesses. These requirements are mandated by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards and are the minimum required by the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The jail population has been consistently far in excess of this maximum. November 1993 the population was 808; October 1993, 757; September 1993, 741. The population has not been less then 700 since April 1993. Throughout 1992 and 1993, the population has been in excess of 600. At this time holding cells with room for two have eight prisoners, six asleep on the floor and two bunks and two standing with no place to sit. Cells designed for 12, have 24 prisoners. Cells designed for 24 have 37. The overcrowding exacerbates all other areas of jail life. Health conditions are worsened; tuberculosis has been a problem in the jail and a risk of epidemic is constant. Due process, prisoner's access to the Courts and counsel, the privilege of attorney and client confidentiality and adequate exercise are all taken from the prisoners because overcrowding makes resources too scarce to protect these fundamental rights. Fights and attacks have made the facilities unsafe as a result of close quarters and the inability adequately segregate the prisoners.
CAUSES OF ACTION
5. Overcrowding of the population of the jail is so severe that the prisoners who must endure the conditions are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the rights guaranteed
- COMPLAINT 3

them by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. This overcrowding further represents a taking of rights under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C., Section 1983.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff pray this Honorable Court to:

a) issue a preliminary and final injunction prohibiting, restraining and enjoining Defendants, their successors in office and agents from incarcerating more than 467 in the facility at any time by further ordering that no prisoner shall be admitted unless the current jail population is beneath this number.

b) enter a declaratory judgment declaring that the crowded conditions of the Cameron County Jail are violative of Plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United United States Constitution and must therefore be changed.

d) such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

COSTILLA & STAPLETON, P.C. 1325 Palm Boulevard P.O. Drawer 4417 Brmsville, Texas 78520 210/541-4981
210/544-3132 (FAX)

- COMPLAINT 4

, - I1
Ed tapl let off
State Bar No. 19058400 Federal I.D. No. 1501
Juan Jose Martinez State Bar No.13142480 Attorney at Law P.O. Box 8099 Brownsville, Texas 78520 210/350-5591

Robert Mendoza State Bar No. 13937670 Federal I.D. No. 11418 Attorney at Law 3505 Boca Chica Blvd., Suite 153 Brownsville, Texas 78520 210/541-8421 210/541-7504 Carter C. White State Bar No. 21290300 Federal I.D. No. Attorney at Law 252 Juanita Way San Francisco, CA 94127 415/665-4173 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
- COMPLAINT 5

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

.:::%N 1 2 1994,
f , ~ j ~ c :!<~,: l~b4~ii,i:p>'+~. iZ!:'ih:

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO,

5

FRANCISCO LOPEZ, AND

§

ELOY SANCHEZ at the Cameron

5

County Jail

5

Plaintiff,

5

VS .

5 S

5

CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

§

Defendant and

5

Third Party Plaintiff,

5

VS .

5 5

5

ANN RICHARDS; JAMES RILEY; CAROL S.5

VANCE; JERRY H. HODGE; JOSHUA W. 5

ALLEN, SR.; THOMAS DUNNING; JUDGE 5

GILBERT0 HINOJOSA; ALLAN B.

5

POLUNSKI; R.H, DUNCAN, SR; ELLEN J.5

HALBERT AND JOHN R. WARD (each in 5

his or her official capacity).

S

Third Party Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION CASE NUMBER: B-93-260

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Cameron County, Texas (hereinafter I1Countyn)Defendant

and Third Party Plaintiff herein, complaining of Ann

Richards, Governor of the State of Texas; James Riley,

Interim Executive Director of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice, and Carol S. Vance, Jerry H. Hodge, Joshua

W. Allen, Sr., Thomas M. Dunning, Judge Gilberto Hinojosa,

Allan B. Polunski, R. H. Duncan, Sr., Ellen J. Halbert and

John R. Ward, members of the Board of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice, hereinafter referred to as "TDCJ", each in

his or her official capacity, respectfully allege as follows:

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 1

I. PARTIES 1. Cameron County, Texas, is a body politic and corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas, and a Defendant in the underlying action filed pursuant to 28 USCA Sections 1343, 2201, 2202 and 2283 and 42 USCA Sections 1982, 1983, and 1988.
2. Ann Richards is the Governor of the State of Texas, and may be served by mail at Post Office Box 12428 State Capitol, Austin, Texas 78711.
3. James Riley is the Interim Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 13084 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711.
4. Carol S. Vance is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 13084 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711.
5. Jerry H. Hodge is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 25 Medical Drive, Amarillo, Texas 79106.
6. Joshua W. Alien, Sr. is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 1076 Caldez Avenue, Beaumont, Texas 77701.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 2

7. Thomas M. Dunning is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 717 N. Harwood Suite 2530, Dallas, Texas 74201.
8. Judge Gilberto Hinojosa is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at Nueces County Court, 901 Leopard loth, Corpus Christi, Texas 78401.
9. Allen B. Polunski is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 1 Forum 16th Floor, 800 IH 10 West, San Antonio, Texas 78230-3874.
10. R.H. Duncan, Sr. is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 503 S. Hohn Reddit, Lufkin, Texas 75901.
11. Ellen J. Halbert is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 164046, Austin, Texas 78716.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 3

12. John R. Ward is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 179, Gatesville, Texas 78528.
JURISDICTION 13. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USCA Section
1343 (a)(3)and (4).
14. Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction of the claims against the Third Party Defendants in that the Third Party Complaint arises out of the matters alleged in the Original Complaint filed in this cause.
CAUSE OF ACTION 15. On December 10, 1993, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, Cameron County, contending, inter alia that the overcrowding of the population of the Cameron County Jail is so severe that the prisoners who must endure the conditions are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the rights guaranteed them by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that such overcrowding further represents a taking of rights under color of law in violation of 42 USC, Section 1983. See Exhibit A attached hereto. On January 3rd, 1994, Defendant
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 4

filed its Original Answer. On January 5th, 1994, the Court issued an Order certifying and designating as a class: "All prisoners of the Cameron County Jail as of 1/3/94."
16. This Court has designated as a class which Plaintiff's represent all prisoners of the Cameron County Jail as of January 3rd, 1994. That prior to January 3rd, 1994 the Texas Commission on Jail Standards had rated the Cameron County Jail as a 546 bed facility; the inmate population on January 3, 1994 was 738, of which 237 were certified as "paper ready" for transfer to the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
17. In the recent years, the total number of inmates in the Cameron County Jail has escalated primarily due to TDCJ1s failure to transfer "paper ready" inmates from the Cameron County Jail to its institutional division.
18. For times relevant to this Third Party Complaint prior to December of 1993 the Cameron County Jail was rated as a 550 bed facility by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards.
19. For all times relevant to this proceeding, but for the "paper readyn convicted felons, the County could have maintained the inmate population below, at, or near its bed capacity; the County recognizing its minimal inmate population overcrowding, independent of the States "paper
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 5

readyN inmates, acted in good faith in funding what is hoped to be a 200 bed facility; the County has contracted with engineers to design such facility and taken the initial steps to have such new facility approved by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. The same demonstrates the County is not deliberately indifferent to the conditions of confinement of its inmates.
20. Texas law, specifically V.T.C.A., Government Code Section 493.001 (1) sets forth that TDCJ has the primary
responsibility for the " . . . the confinement, supervision, and
rehabilitation of felons." The County is obligated to provide a safe and suitable jail for the County, see, V.T.C.A. Local Government Code Section 351.001 (a); it is not the County but TDCJJs responsibility to confine its "paper readyH convicted
felons .
21. As of the month ending report to the Texas Commission on Jail Standards in January of 1992 there were 83 "paper ready" convicted felons in the Cameron County Jail; that from January 1992 until the filing of this Third Party Complaint the number of "paper ready" convicted felons has steadily increased, though fluctuating up and down, to a point where from and after October of 1993 there have been continually over 200 "paper readyN convicted felons in the Cameron County Jail awaiting transfer to the TDCJ institutional division.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 6

22. TDCJJs system for reducing inmate population in the State ' s Institutional Division, while leaving "paper ready1! convicted felons in the County's Jail at a consistently increasing but fluctuating number of inmates demonstrated deliberate indifference to the conditions of confinement of the Cameron County inmates which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
23. State law, specifically V.T.C.A. Government Code Section 493.001 (2) makes the TDCJ primarily responsible for ' I . . .the development of a system of State and local punishment, supervision, and rehabilitation programs and facilities." The leaving of State felons in County's Jail is not the development of facilities.
24. By reason of Third Party DefendantJs failure to accept their prisoners Third Party Defendants are liable to Third Party Plaintiffs; because of such failure to accept prisoners Third Party Plaintiff cannot maintain its jail in accordance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional standards and protect the Plaintiffs herein. The Third Party Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if the relief requested is not granted.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 7

2 2 . TDCJ's system for reducing inmate population in the State's Institutional Division, while leaving "paper ready" convicted felons in the County's Jail at a consistently increasing but fluctuating number of inmates demonstrated deliberate indifference to the conditions of confinement of the Cameron County inmates which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
2 3 . State law, specifically V.T.C.A. Government Code Section 4 9 3 . 0 0 1 ( 2 ) makes the TDCJ primarily responsible for It...the development of a system of State and local punishment, supervision, and rehabilitation programs and facilities." The leaving of State felons in County's Jail is not the development of facilities.
24. By reason of Third Party Defendant ' s failure to accept their prisoners Third Party Defendants are liable to Third Party Plaintiffs; because of such failure to accept prisoners Third Party Plaintiff cannot maintain its jail in accordance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional standards and protect the Plaintiffs herein. The Third Party Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if the relief requested is not granted.
IV.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 7

IV. RELIEF
Wherefore, premises considered, Third Party Plaintiff demand judgment against Third Party Defendants each in his or her official capacity and their agents, employees and those acting in active concert with them, ordering them to immediately remove from the Cameron County Jail all persons who are currently convicted felons ready for transfer to the TDCJ institutional division, and to continue thereafter to remove from the Cameron County Jail all persons who become convicted felons ready for transfer to the TDCJ institutional division. Third Party Plaintiff further seek such other and further relief to which they may show themselves entitled under both law and equity, including but not limited to attorneys fees and cost of this action.
Respectfully submitted, LUIS V. SAENZ CAMERON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 974 E. HARRISON STREET
BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS 78 52 0
(210) 544-0849
Texas k t e Bar # 0 0 7 8 5 5 8 6 Attorney for Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing original Answer of Cameron County has been mailed return receipt requested to Ed Stapelton, Attorney in charge at Costilla & Stapelton, P.C. 1325 Palm Blvd., P.O. Drawer 4417 Brownsville, Texas 78520, and to Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas, P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2548, on this 12th day of January, 1994.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT PAGE 9

 
 IN THg UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TEE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO,

§

FRANCISCO LOPBZ, and

S

ELOY SANCHEZ, at the

S

Cameron County Jail, and

S

all those similarly situated §

S

vs.

S

§

CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS,

S

THE STATE OF TEXAS AND

S

ANN RICHARDS; JAMBS RILEY; S

CAROL S. VANCE; JERRY H.

S

HODGE; JOSHUA W. ALLEN, SR.; §

THOMAS DUNNING; JUDGE

§

GILBERT0 HINOJOSA; ALLAN B. S

POLUNSKI; R. H. DUIOCAN, SR; S

ELLEN J . HALBERT AND

S

JOHN R. WARD (each in his S

or her official capacity). $3

JAN 2 1994 lMichaelN.Milby, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION
NO. B-93-260

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF BROWNSVILLE TEXAS:
COME NOW Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, and Eloy Sanchez, at the Cameron County Jail, Plaintiffs herein, complaining of Cameron County, Texas, The State of Texas; and Ann Richards; James Riley; Carol S. Vance; Jerry H. Hodge; Joshua W.
. Allen, Sr.; Thomas Dunning; Judge Gilberto Hinojosa; Allan B
Polunski; R. H. Duncan, Sr; Ellen J. Halbert and John R. Ward (each in his or her official capacity) respectfully allege as follows :
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 United States Code, Sections 1343, 2201, 2202 and 2283 and Rules 23 and 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 42 United States Code, Sections 1982, 1983, 1988, and the Constitution of the United States,
- FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 1

specifically, but not limited to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This Court is authorized to render declaratory and injunction relief. This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, All of the actions, omissions and events complained of herein took or take place in the County of Cameron, State of Texas, and with the venue of this Court
2. Plaintiffs Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, and Eloy Sanchez are prisoners of the State of Texas, who are presently incarcerated at the Cameron County Jail. Plaintiffs are residents of Cameron County and sue in their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of prisoners who have been subjected to and injured or who are or will be subjected to and injured by the totality of conditions and practices resulting from overcrowding of the Cameron County jail facility.
3. Cameron County is a body politic and corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas, and pursuant to law is capable of being sued in this Court. Defendant Cameron County controls funding and is therefore responsible for the operation, policies, practices and totality of conditions of its jail facility. Cameron County is a person subject to suit under 42 United States Code, Section 1983. Because this claim is brought for declaratory and injunctive relief, only, Cameron County is answerable for the acts of its agents, servants, and employees under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
4. The State of Texas is a State of the United States of America. Because this claim is brought for declaratory and injunctive relief, only, The State of Texas is answerable for the acts of its agents, servants, and employees under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
- FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 2

5. Ann Richards is the Governor of the State of Texas, and may be served by mail at Post Office Box 12428 State Capitol, Austin, Texas 78711.

6. James Riley is the Interim Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.0, Box 13084 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711.

7. Carol S. Vance is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 13084 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711.

8. Jerry H. Hodge is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 25 Medical Drive, Amarillo, Texas 79106.

9. Joshua W, Allen, Sr. is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 1076 Caldez Avenue, Beaumont, Texas 77701,

10. Thomas M. Dunning is a Board member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 717 N. Harwood Suite 2530, Dallas, Texas 74201.

11. Judge Gilberto Hinojosa is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at Nueces County Court, 901 Leopard loth, Corpus Christi, Texas 78401.

12. Allen B. Polunski is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 1 Forum 16th Floor, 800 IH 10 West, San Antonio, Texas 78230-3874.

13. R. H. Duncan, Sr. is a Board Member of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at 503 S.
Hohn Reddit, Lufkin, T-ex_as- 75901.

- F I R S T AMENDED COMPLAINT

3

14. Ellen J. Halbert is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail at P.O. Box 164046, Austin, Texas 78716.
15. John R. Ward is a Board Member of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and may be served by mail to P.O. Box 179, Gatesville, Texas 78528.
CLASS ACTION 16. Plaintiffs bring this action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all other persons who are now or will be incarcerated in the Cameron County Jail. The persons comprising this class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are questions of fact and law common to the class, the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class and representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. Adjudication with respect to individual members of the class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication. The actions of defendant are generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief to the class as a whole. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications and would establish incompatible standards for the defendants and their agents; in addition, it would result in multiplicitous litigation with a consequent overburdening of judicial resources.
- FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 4

FACTS The population of the jail should not be greater than 85% of maximum capacity of 550, or 467 prisoners. Within these restrictions there should be a separation of prisoners based on sex, severity of offense, whether they are first time offenders and whether they suffer illnesses. These requirements are mandated by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards and are the minimum required by the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The jail population has been consistently far in excess of this maximum. November 1993 the population was 808; October 1993, 757; September 1993, 741. The population has not been less than 700 since April 1993. Throughout 1992 and 1993, the population has been in excess of 600. At this time holding cells with room for two have eight prisoners, six asleep on the floor and two bunks and two standing with no place to sit. Cells designed for 12, have 24 prisoners. Cells designed for 24 have 37. The overcrowding exacerbates all other areas of jail life. Health conditions are worsened; tuberculosis has been a problem in the jail and a risk of epidemic is constant. Due process, prisoner's access to the Courts and counsel, the privilege of attorney and client confidentiality and adequate exercise are all taken from the prisoners because overcrowding makes resources too scarce to protect these fundamental rights. Fights and attacks have made the facilities unsafe as a result of close quarters and the inability adequately segregate the prisoners.
CAUSES OF ACTION 17. Overcrowding of the population of the jail is so severe that the prisoners who must endure the conditions are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the rights guaranteed them by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United State Constitution. This overcrowding further represents a taking of rights under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C., Section 1983.
- FIRST AMZNDED COMPLAINT 5

WHEREFQRE, plaintiff pray this Honorable-Courtto:
a) issue a preliminary and final injunction prohibiting, restraining and enjoining Defendants, their successors in office and agents from incarcerating more than 467 in the facility at any time by further ordering that no prisoner shall be admitted unless the current jail population is beneath this number.
b) enter a declaratory judgment declaring that the crowded conditions of the Cameron County Jail are violative of Plaintiffs; rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and must there fore be changed forthwith.
c) such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
. . COSTILLA &. STAPLETON, P C
1325 Palm Boulevard P.O. Drawer 4417 Brmsville, Texas 78520 210/541-4981 210/544-3152 (FAX)
r
-
Ed Staplet State ~ a rgo. 19058400 Federal I.D. No. 1501
Juan Jose Mendoza Attorney at Law P.O. Box 8099 Brmsville, Texas 78520 210/350-5591
- --
- FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 6

Robert Mendoza State Bar No, 13937670 Federal I.D. No. 11418 Attorney at Law 3505 Boca Chica Blvd., Suite 153 B r m s v i l l e , Texas 78520 210/541-8421 210/541-7504 Carter C. White State Bar No. 21290300 Federal I.D. No, 6989 Attorney at Law 252 Juanita Way San Francisco, CA 94127 415/665-4173 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing First Amended Complaint has been mailed return receipt requested to Richard 0. Burst, Assistant County Attorney, Attorney in Charge, CAMERON COURTHOUSE, 974 E. Harrison Street,
Brownsville, Texas on this the 7,,! day of January, 1994.
a,&Ed Sta eton
- --
- FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 7

 
 JNITEO STATES DISTRICT COli,.,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

SEP 1 5 1994

IN THEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT FORTHESOUTHERDNISTRICTOF TEXAS

Unitad States D i i t c-
Southern DisMct d TZFILED
SEP 1 4

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, ET AL.

0

0

VS.

§

§
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL. 5

CIVIL ACTION NO. B-93-260

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

The certified Plaintiff class of present and future detainees in Cameron County, Texas
(Plaintiffs) applied for preliminary injunctive relief from unconstitutional jail overcrowding
against Defendant Cameron County, Texas (County Defendant) and various Texas officials
. and Texas itself (State Defendants). The parties briefed the preliminary injunction issues for
this Court both before and after this Court heard three days' evidence on Plaintiffs' application
and conducted an announced tour of the facilities at issue. By the analysis below, this Court
finds that preliminary injunctive relief is immediately warranted against both the County and
State Defendants, though not in the form proposed by Plaintiffs.
I. PLAINTIFFS' BURDEN
A preliminary injunction may be granted only if the moving party proves '(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) that [the] threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the injunction may do to d ~ eopponent; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.' The preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, however, and the movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion on each factor.
United Oflshore Co. v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline, 899 F.2d 405, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).

A. Success on the Merits 1. Requisite Standards of Confinement
By their First Amended Petition, Plaintiffs allege that both the County and State Defendants have deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights by holding them in overcrowded facilities; they seek injunctive relief from these violations under 42 U.S.C. Ej 1983.
The Plaintiff class consists of both pre-trial detainees and convicted inmates held by Cameron County officials. The Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating Fifth Amendment Due Process standards for pre-trial detainees and Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment standards for convicted inmates, guarantees these sub-classes different conditions of confinement. Pre-trial detainees may not be subjected to punishment. Be22 v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Overcrowding becomes punishment when it "subjects a detainee over an extended period to genuine privations and hardship not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective." Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1981). Whether overcrowding inflicts punishment on pre-trial detainees depends on the totality of the circumstances in the jail. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 959, cert. amended, 453 U.S. 911, cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 951 (1981).
By contrast, convicted inmates may be punished, but not cruelly. Confinement is unconstitutionally cruel when prison officials exhibit "deliberate indifference" to "conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" to the inmate. Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. --,128 L.Ed.2d 811, 823 (1994). Though the totality of jail conditions can visit a constitutional deprivation on a convicted inmate, conditions may do so only to the extent that their

combined effect deprives an identifiable human need. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 115 L.Ed.2d 271, 283 (1991). But "[wlhere both convicted inmates and pretrial detainees are housed together[,] the higher standard applicable under the due process clause should govern their common condition." Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 874 F.2d 147, 153 (36 Cir. 1989). 2. Jail Condition Findings
The Court makes the following findings based on the testimony presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, the documents admitted into evidence, and the Court's tour of the detention facilities.
Cameron County's jail facilities were designed to hold 546 people. An additional facility designed to hold 192 detainees was within weeks of completion at hearing time. Under jail standards and management practices, counties typically limit occupancy to 85% of design capacity (467 for Cameron County) to allow for proper classification of detainees according to dangerousness. Overcrowding began in the County Defendant's detention facilities approximately three years ago. In April 1993, the facilities held approximately 700 people daily, and the population has steadily increased since then, At hearing time, Cameron County's facilities held 862 people.
Approximately 289 of these detainees were convicted felons awaiting transfer to state
prisons operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ),whose board members
comprise most of the State Defendants. Since 1987, the State Defendants adhered to their scheduled admissions policy, under which they limit intakes of state-ready felons from county jails to a specific number, they do not consider jail overcrowding as a factor in setting this

number, and they refuse to consider jail overcrowding as a reason for waiving this intake
limit. See Tex. Gov. Code Ann. 4 8 499.071, 499.072. TDCJ's scheduled admissions policy
caused the backlog of convicted felons to accumulate in Cameron County's detention facilities. Felons have waited over one year in Cameron County's facilities for transfer to TDCJ custody because TDCJ officials have only allotted Cameron County an average of 12 spaces per month, and the County accumulates convicted felons much more rapidly.
State Defendants paid Cameron County $30 per day for housing each "state-ready" inmate, but County officials needed to complete certain paperwork to make each convict
state-ready. See Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 42.09 8 8(a). The proper County officials did not
appreciate this fact until the hearing. At hearing time, County officials had prepared the necessary paperwork for only approximately 189 of the 289 convicted felons in their facilities. Completion of the necessary paperwork takes no more than a few hours per detainee. Hence, the County forfeited significant amounts of available state funds.
The significant overcrowding adversely affects every aspect of detainee life in Cameron County. With 862 detainees, over 30% sleep on mattresses on the floor each night. This places all bunks and mattresses at a premium. Fighting requiring medical attention has increased with the steady increase in jail population. Disturbances by detainees protesting overcrowded conditions occurred in 1993.
Medical care in the facilities is alarming. The County bases its medical-care budget on a 500-person average occupancy, despite its knowledge that the actual occupancy is much higher. Even this budget provides for four nurses, but the County had only three hired. Thus, diabetics are treated with diet. Necessary drugs are unavailable. The County routinely

counts HIV-positive people among its detainees, but does not allocate resources for medical screening. At least one state-ready detainee died awaiting transfer to TDCJ. The State and County Defendants dispute whether TDCJ has been willing to accept custody of seriously infirm state-ready detainees from Cameron County. The County's medical professional, Dr. Stern, testified that a substantial risk of a tuberculosis epidemic existed at hearing time because of the poor ventilation in the County's oldest (and largest) facility, and because overcrowding prevents officials from effectively isolating the ever-present tuberculosis patients from the general population.
County officials still attempt to classify detainees according to dangerousness, but the overcrowding severely limits their success. Officials cannot adequately segregate mentally ill detainees due to overcrowding. Nor can they separate detained witnesses from the rest of the jail population. Pretrial detainees are not separated from convicted inmates due to overcrowding. Officials receive approximately eight written requests each day for reclassification. The classification that has been possible has lead to severe overcrowding in some cells. For example, 30 detainees have been forced into a cell designed for 10 and held there three months, where the cell did not have water, a toilet, or a shower. Six detainees have been forced into a holding ceIl designed for two, leaving at least two of these people with no choice but to stand all day.
Pre-trial detainees comprise the overwhelming majority of the jail population, and many stay in jail for significant periods of time. For example, of the 862 detainees present at hearing time, approximately 120 had waited in jail for over 60 days without having been indicted.

The parties have established that the State Defendants have funded a 192-bed addition to Cameron County's detention facilities, which was to have been completed within weeks of the preliminary injunction hearing in this case. Also, the State Defendants have commenced a program to significantly expand TDCJ's capacity to accept state-ready felons from county jails within the next year. 3. Apportionment of Liability
By the foregoing, Plaintiffs have provided this Court ample evidence to establish a substantial likelihood that they have been routinely subjected to genuine hardships and privations for significant time periods, and indeed, that they have endured substantial risk of serious physical harm from their conditions of confinement. They have proved the objective components of their constitutional claims. Still, the County and State Defendants contend that they cannot be held liable for any constitutional violations absent a clear showing that they exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' confinement conditions. This Court assumes without deciding that deliberate indifference must be shown before pre-trial detainees are subjected to unconstitutional punishment.
a State Defendants Plaintiffs proved that the State Defendants, through their agents, were aware for over a year that Cameron County's detention facilities were overcrowded far beyond capacity, that the overcrowding was due to a backlog of state-ready felons, and that the jail held both stateready felons and pre-trial detainees. Despite this knowledge, the State Defendants adhered to their scheduled admissions policy, which only permitted Cameron County to transfer
approximately 12 detainees per month to TDCJ custody. Meanwhile, the backlog

accumulated and Plaintiffs were forced to endure objectively intolerable conditions.
The State Defendants argue that they could not have been deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiffs' plight because: 1) they were given insufficient notice of unconstitutional conditions;
2) they took adequate actions to alleviate those conditions; or 3) they believed in good faith
that they owed Plaintiffs no duty.
i. Notice
The Supreme Court recently addressed the notice required to support a finding of
deliberate indifference:
Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inferences from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was 'longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus 'must have known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient [to support a finding of deliberate indifference].
... While the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a
prison official may show that the obvious escaped him, he would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verifjr underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist....
Farmer, 511 U.S. at --,128 L.Ed.2d at 828-29 & n.8 (citations omitted).
Since the State Defendants (or their predecessors in office) executed the consent
decree in Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (1987), which established population caps on state
prisons many years ago, they "expressly contemplated" that backlogs of state-ready felons

would accumulate in county jails. Alberti v. ShenflofHanis County, 937 F.2d 984, 1001 (1991) (Alberti I). Cameron County officials testified that they have repeatedly urged Texas officials to alleviate overcrowding in their facilities over the past three years. See also Tex.
Gov. Code Ann. 5 499.122 (requiring Texas Commission on Jail Standards to "analyze
monthly the population of each jail in this state ..."). Significantly, the State Defendants presented no evidence to indicate that they investigated whether conditions in Cameron County's detention facilities met acceptable standards.
The State Defendants distinguish this case from Alberti, where they received detailed reports concerning jail conditions from jail monitors. See 937 F.2d at 998. Under Alberti I and Farmer, this Court finds that the State Defendants received sufficient information that should have led them to investigate Cameron County's jail conditions, and their failure to do so supports a finding of deliberate indifference against them. Alberti I establishes that the issues presented in this case are not news to the State Defendants; here, the State Defendants continue to demonstrate the recalcitrance that they maintained throughout the Alberti litigation. See Alberti v. Shen-of Harris County, 978 F.2d 893, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1992)
(Alberti XI) (State Defendants' knowledge that their refusal to accept state-ready felons caused
severe overcrowding sufficiently supports a finding of deliberate indifference against them.). While they may well not have had detailed knowledge of conditions in Cameron County's jails, this is because the State Defendants chose to avoid learning about these conditions. Indeed, their lack of detailed knowledge supports rather than undermines a finding of deliberate indifference against them.
ii. Response

Next, the State Defendants argue that they cannot be found deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs' hardships because they adequately responded to alleviate Cameron County's overcrowding problems upon learning of them even before initiation of this lawsuit. "[Plrison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Fanner, 511 U.S. at --,128 L.Ed.2d at 830. The State Defendants' response to Cameron County's overcrowding has consisted of: 1) embarking on a state-prison expansion program designed to increase TDCJ intake of county-held state prisoners; 2) funding a 192bed expansion for Cameron County's jail; 3) paying Cameron County $30 per day to hold each state-ready inmate; and 4) notifling counties that TDCJ will accept seriously infirm state-ready prisoners outside its scheduled admissions policy.
The first two of the State Defendants' responses are perfectly targeted to alleviate county-jail overcrowding while meting out fair punishment to convicted criminals, and are thus applauded and encouraged by this Court. These responses do not reasonably address Plaintiffs' constitutional complaints, however, because they obviously take too long to implement. While the State Defendants' building programs may well reasonably respond to the general problem of jail overcrowding at a future time, these programs do not represent reasonable responses to the constitutional deprivations suffered by Plaintiffs. The State Defendants simply cannot avoid liability for causing some detainees to suffer objectively intolerable conditions by arranging to improve conditions for future detainees.
This is especially true when the State Defendants had options available to them under Texas law according to which they could have quickly reduced Cameron County's jail

population to constitutionally tolerable numbers. First, the State Defendants could have accorded jail overcrowding significant weight in formulating their scheduled admissions
policy. See Tex. Gov. Code Ann. 5 499.071 (though Tex. Gov. Code Ann. 8 499.072 forbids
waiver of the allocation formula for county-jail overcrowding, 5 499.071 expressly does not
limit the factors that the State Defendants may consider in developing the formula itself). Second, the State Defendants could have taken custody of Cameron County's state-ready felons, and placed these people not in the state prisons governed by the Ruiz decree and the scheduled admission policy, but in county jails that are not overcrowded. See Tex. Gov.
Code Ann. 5 495.001 (authorizing the State Defendants to contract with counties and private
vendors for extra prison space). The lack of evidence that the State Defendants investigated, let alone implemented, these options weighs toward deliberate indifference.
The State Defendants next point to their $30 per diem payments to the County Defendant as evidence of their concern for the immediate needs of detainees in Cameron County. Hearing evidence indicated that the County profits as much as $10 per inmate day from each state-ready felon. The State Defendants allege that if County officials had timely processed the paperwork for convicted felons, the County could have "earned" over $1 million, which would have enabled the county to fund ample space for all detainees.
For myriad reasons, the State Defendants' per diem payments do not reasonably respond to the risk of harm that faces Cameron County detainees. The payments are designed to compensate counties for providing adequate care and protection to state-ready prisoners, and this Court has uncontroverted evidence that the funds are sufficient for this purpose. But the overcrowding caused by the State Defendants' actions or inactions affects the County's

pre-trial detainees as well as the state-ready felons, and the State Defendants must bear responsibility for deprivations wrought on the pre-trial detainees because of overcrowding that they caused. The state's per diem amount was not calculated to ensure adequate protection for all detainees, and it accordingly cannot absolve the State Defendants of liability for all constitutional deprivations in the detention facilities.
Also, while the County Defendant did profit from the per diem payments and could have used this money to improve jail conditions (especially medical care and jail-guard protection), the profits were not proved ~ ~ c i eton ctonstitute a reasonable response from the State Defendants. While the State Defendants presented evidence that the County profited approximately $10 per day from the state-ready detainees, this profit would have been far less had the County furnished adequate medical care and guard protection to the state-ready detainees themselves. And the State Defendants' suggestion that the County could have gotten a million dollars more in per diem payments and applied it all to jail construction fails to recognize that the State's contribution of at least two-thirds of this million dollars would have been applied toward the cost of maintaining the State's prisoners under substandard conditions. To approach a reasonable response to county jail overcrowding caused by a backlog of state-ready felons, the State Defendants must prove that they provided funds that were sufficiently in excess of that necessary to adequately care for state-ready detainees to provide for the extra medical care and guard protection due the County's pre-trial detainees as a result of the state-ready felons' presence. The record lacks such evidence.
If the State Defendants intended the per diem funds to address anything other than the normal cost of housing a detainee in an under-capacity jail, evidence of this fact in addition to

the raw per diem amount should not have been difficult to obtain. The Court does not have evidence as to how the $30 figure was calculated. Nor does the Court have evidence that the State Defendants conducted any monitoring as to how the County spent the funds that it received to improve overall conditions. The Court accordingly finds that the State Defendants' evidence concerning their per diem payments is insufficient to refute Plaintiffs' evidence of the State Defendants' deliberate indifference.
Finally, the State Defendants allege that they accepted seriously infirm state-ready detainees outside their scheduled admissions policy. Though the County Defendant submitted contradictory evidence, the Court need not resolve the dispute, for this response again fails to be reasonably calculated to address the immediate needs of the vast majority of the County's detainees, who are not seriously infirm.
iii. Duty Throughout this litigation, the State Defendants steadfastly denied both the duty and the ability to alleviate overcrowding in Cameron County's detention facilities by transferring state-ready detainees to other facilities. The State Defendants relied on virtually identical arguments in the 1991 Alberri litigation to deny constitutional responsibility and to avert a finding of deliberate indifference. See AZberti I, 937 F.2d at 994-97, 999-1000. Of course, the Fifth Circuit controls this Court's view of the law. The State Defendants are responsible for constitutional violations caused by their backlog of state felons in county jails. Alberti 1, 937 F.2d at 997. The legislative declarations stressed by the State Defendants do not change this fact. See Tex. Gov. Code Ann. $ 499.121 (Vernon Supp. 1994) ("The legislature dechres that until September 1, 1995, the institutional division shall

continue to perform its duty to accept inmates only as provided by the [§ 499.0711 allocation formula [and] a county shall continue to perform its duty to confine and maintain under safe conditions and at the county's own expense each inmate eligible for transfer [to the State Defendants].") (emphasis added). As stated above, Texas law enables the State Defendants to immediately relieve county-jail overcrowding by removing state-ready felons from overcrowded jails and placing them in state prisons, uncrowded county jails, or privately-run
prisons. Tex. Gov. Code Ann. $5 495.001, 499.071; Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 999. In fact,
Texas law requires Texas officials to remove state-ready felons from unconstitutionally overcrowded county facilities, but only after "a state or federal court determines that conditions in a county jail are unconstitutional." Tex. Gov. Code Ann. 499.125.
The State Defendants counter that while Alberti I may impose responsibilities on them, it does not require that they always respond to overcrowding by removing detainees from county facilities. True enough, but the Alberti I court also indicated that removal of stateready felons from overcrowded county jails is an available and adequate response from the State Defendants. 937 F.2d at 999. Absent another response that is at least proved to have been designed to effectively address the overcrowding problems caused by a state backlog, the State Defendants will be found deliberately indifferent because, by refusing to transfer detainees, they have obviously foregone an available option to remedy the problems.
Finally, the State Defendants argue that In Re Clements, 881 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1989) absolves them of responsibility for taking Cameron County's state-ready detainees, and prevents this Court from ordering them to do so. Clements does no such thing; the Fifth Circuit only transferred partial remedial jurisdiction in the Alberti litigation (which addressed

the relative responsibilities of the Texas and Harris County to detainees in overcrowded
county facilities) to the court overseeing the Ruiz litigation (which addressed overcrowding in state facilities). 881 F.2d at 154. The Clements court recognized that prison overcrowding
cases would arise in other counties like this one, but expressly limited its decision to the
Harris County facts before it. Id. at 152. The court specified the applicable standard: "[olur
only purpose is to avoid having a non-Ruiz court entertain the issuance of a decree that might
directly and substantially affect happenings within the Texas prison system." Id. at 154.
After recognizing that Harris County held 3600 state-ready felons, the court concluded:
Here, it is clear that granting the relief sought in Alberti against [the State] might affect the Texas prison system. We do not suggest that minor or indirect eflects are [disallowed]. But here we are dealing with the county having the largest population in Texas, apparently accounting for 25 percent of [the State's] intake. Ordering that thousands of county inmates be promptly taken into [State] prisons is certainly something which would have a direct and substantial effect on the Texas prison system.
Id. at 153 & n. 16 (emphasis added, quotation marks omitted). The Alberti I court recently
relied on the Clements court's permissive reference to "minor or indirect effects" on the Texas
prison system to allow the State Defendants to be forced to deposit $750,000 for use by
Harris County to house its backlog of state-ready felons in the uncrowded jails of other
counties. Alberti 1,937 F.2d at 1003. Clements does not preclude this Court from ordering
any relief against the State Defendants that only affects the Texas prison system in a minor or
indirect way, nor does it excuse the State Defendants from taking any state-ready felons from
Cameron County's custody. Defendant and TDCJ board member Gilberto Hinojosa testified
that substantially increased state intake from Cameron County would have no substantial
impact on Texas's prison system, and this Court so finds. Clements certainly does not absolve

the State Defendants of their deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' jail conditions, especially after the Alberti I court rejected their Clements arguments in 1991.
b. County Defendant Cameron County officials were always aware of their responsibility to provide "safe and suitable jails" for all those it detained, but they claim that the backlog of state-ready felons prevented them from doing so. Cf:Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 994; Alberti 11,978 F.2d at 895-96. The evidence contradicts the County's position, in that the County allocated funds for guards and medical care based on the design capacity of its facilities, though its officials were daily reminded that the actual population far exceeded the design capacity. The Court finds the County Defendant deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs' confinement conditions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood that they will succeed on the merits of their claim that the County and State Defendants have violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. B. Irreparable Injury The future deprivation of constitutional rights is irreparable harm per se, Albro v. County of Onondaga, 627 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), though this Court's preliminary remedy must be tailored to do no more than avert future constitutional deprivations. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982). C. Balance of Hardships The Court finds that the hardships suffered by Plaintiffs, and those which will be suffered in the future absent relief, hugely outweigh any administrative and financial burden that this Court could legally impose on the County and State Defendants in this lawsuit.

D. Public Interest Preliminary relief will serve the public interest by averting public health risks and
reducing the potential for violent confrontation.
n. COURT'S DISCRETION
Both the County and State Defendants urge this Court to exercise its discretion to withhold preliminary relief pending the opening of the new 192-bed county facility and the State Defendants' implementation of their prison expansion program. Plaintiffs, for their part, ask that this Court cap Cameron County's jail population to 85% of design capacity as required by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards.
In fashioning relief, this Court must allow state and county officials all possible latitude in operating their prison and jail systems. This latitude is only limited by this Court's responsibility to avert future violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have proved that the County and State Defendants ignored Plaintiffs' rights in the recent past, and they are now entitled to this Court's protection from continuing or future similar violations without having to mobilize a new lawsuit. However, their proof of past violations does not entitle them to super-constitutional jail conditions except as necessary to avert future violations.
The Court's order respects these principles. 111. REMEDY
Within five days after receiving this order, the State Defendants must either: a) adopt and implement the policies necessary to remove the number of stateready felons from the custody of Cameron County officials that is necessary to

ensure that Cameron County's detention facilities are not populated above design capacity; or b) prove to this Court a reasonable probability that constitutional conditions will be preserved at Cameron County's detention facilities if those facilities are populated at a specific number greater than design capacity. If the State Defendants elect to remove the requisite number of detainees, they are entitled at any time to present the requisite evidence to this Court that Cameron County's detention facilities may hold more than their design capacity of detainees under constitutional conditions. Similarly, Plaintiffs may present evidence at any time that a population cap of design capacity still subjects them to unconstitutional conditions. This Court will modify its injunction to conform with additional evidence presented on this point. Within twenty days of receiving this order, counsel for the County Defendant must call a meeting with Plaintiffs' counsel and the County officials necessary to adopt and implement an operation plan for Cameron County's detention facilities. Within thirty days of receiving this order, the County Defendant must have adopted for it written plans for how it will provide for its detention-facility needs six months in the future and two years in the future. Without limitation, these plans will contain estimates for the number and type of detainees who will be held in custody, the resources necessary to hold them under constitutional conditions, and the revenue sources necessary to maintain a detention facility that meets all federal and state constitutional, statutory, and regulatory standards. Plaintiffs and their counsel will be permitted to comment to this Court on the plans. At minimum, the County officials will evaluate and revise these plans annually and submit them to this Court.

Nothing in this Order is to be construed as modifying the Order of August 15, 1994 addressing the County procedures for insuring the expeditious processing of pretrial detainees.
SO ORDERED this 14th day of September, 1994 at Brownsville, Texas.
/ United States Magistrate Judge

 
 I
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASUgonuitthdoSrnWOois,Dtdicmt oieftTC@ouWrt

BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

FILED

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, FRANCISCO LOPEZ, ELOY SANCHEZ, and all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant and Thrd-Party Plaintiff,

JUL 2 9 1999

uchael N. Milby

)

CIwk of Court

1
) CIVIL ACTION NO. B-93-260 )
1
)
1
) Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action

THE STATE OF TEXAS and GEORGE

1

BUSH; JAMES RILEY; CAROL

)

S. VANCE; JERRY H. HODGE;

JOSHUA W. ALLEN, SR.; THOMAS

DUNNING; ALLAN B. POLUNSKI:

1

R. H. DUNCAN, SR.; ELLEN J.

1

HALBERT AND JOHN R. WARD

)

(each in his or her official

capacity only),

Defendants and

1

Third-Party Defendants.

)

STATE OF TEXAS

)

COUNTY OF CAMERON )

STIPULATION OF FACTS

The remaining parties to this suit, Plaintiffs and Defendant Cameron County, stipulate to the

following:

1 . The facts in the Atlidavit of Luis Esparza filed of even date herewith.

Signed on July 29, 1999, in Brownsville, Texas.

Michael R. cowen Attorney for Plaintiffs 1325 Palm Blvd. Brownsville, Texas 78520 9561541-498 1 Texas Bar No. 00795306

eon
/ Brownsville, Texas 785 '.-.,. 9561550-1345 . ,
Texas Bar No. 0685586

M THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UnltldStstas Dlrtrict,Court
8puth~mO#fictf Tax'

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

JUI. 291999

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, FRANCISCO LOPEZ, ELOY SANCHEZ, and all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

-~w.aaofppn
) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. B-93-260

CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,

) ) Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action

THE STATE OF TEXAS and GEORGE

BUSH; JAMES RILEY; CAROL

S. VANCE; JERRY H. HODGE;

1

JOSHUA W. ALLEN, SR.; THOMAS

DUNNING; ALLAN B. POLUNSKI:

R. H. DUNCAN, SR.; ELLEN J.

)

HALBERT AND JOHN R. WARD

)

(each in his or her official

1

capacity only),

)

Defendants and

Third-Party Defendants.

STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF CAMERON )
AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN LUIS ESPARZA

On this day, Luis Esparza appeared before me, the undersigned notary public. After I administered an oath to him, upon his oath, he said:
1. "My name is Luis Esparza. Since April 15, 1999, I have been Captain of the Cameron County Jail. For about three years before April 15, 1999, I was a classification officer for the Cameron County Jail. I am competent to make this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
2. The capacity of the Cameron County jail (total of three facilities) is 738 inmates. As of July 28, 1999, the jail population was 662 inmates including 17 blue warrants and 8 white warrants. There

were 5 15 state inmates and 147 federal inmates. "Blue warrant inmates" are inmates being held for the state pardon and parole board awaiting revocation hearings. "White warrant inmates" are inmates who are being held for transfer to the Texas prison system because their parole has been revoked. The attached Exhibit "A" are "blue warrant inmates being held as of July 28, 1999. The attached Exlubit "B" are "white warrant inmates being held as of July 28, 1999.

3 . Exhlbit "C" are Texas Commission On Jail Standards Jail Population Reports for April, May and June, 1999, for the Cameron County Jail. Exhibit "D" are Cameron County Sheriffs Department Daily Count Reports for the Cameron County Jail; they cover from April 1, 1999, through July 20, 1999.

4. Exhibits "A", "B", "C" and "D" are all public records, reports, statements, or data compilations setting forth the activities of the Cameron County Jail. They are true and correct copies of the originals and I am the custodian of the jail records.

5 . For more than two years we have had to use Magistrate Judge Black's Amended Temporary Order to keep the jail population from overcrowding. The prior Temporary Order issued by Judge Black helped control the jail population by reducing the time period inmates were waiting to be charged. But by some time in 1996 or 1997 we begin having problems keeping the jail population below capacity. A copy of both the Temporary Order and the Amended Temporary Order are attached as Exhibits "En and "F".

6.

We have been at or about at 90% of capacity for the past couple of years. Capacity for the

jail is 738; 90% of capacity is 664. I believe that the Texas Commission on Jail Standards requires

15% vacancy to allow for proper classification of inmates; the Court's order allows us to use 10%

vacancy for classification of inmates. Without the ability to refuse new non violent inmates when we

are approaching or at 90% of capacity we would exceed capacity within one week and would have

over one thousand inmates within one month.

Further Miant sayeth not.

,
# Luis Espar

0" SWORN TO and SUBSCRIBED before me by Luis Esparza on t h i s 2 q day of July, 1999.

. - .-
MONTALVO NOTARY PUBLIC
State of Terns
My commission expires:

the state of Texas

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

United States District Court Southern District of Texas
EMTFRED

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

JUN 2 9 t?001

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, ET AL. Plaintiffs,
V. CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

/..LA?ael N.!:r j y

5

EY Deputy Cisrk

§

§

s & 1

Civil Action No. B-93-260

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,

§ §
Rule 23 (b)(2) Class Action

THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.

§

Defendants and Third-

§

Party Defendants

§

FINAL TUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INTUNCTION

The Court enters this Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction in this case. The

Court finds that the preliminary injunction currently in place should be made into a

permanent injunction. The Court also enters final judgment against Defendants, jointly

and severally, for attorneys fees.

PERMANENT INTUNCTION IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Amended Temporary Interlocutory Order, dated October 2, 1997, as amended to strike paragraphs (I) and (J) of the population reduction provisions, is hereby made into a permanent injunction. This injunction shall expire when the new county jail opens. Specifically, the Court makes the following ORDERS, which shall expire when the new county jail is opened:

PERSONS ACCUSED OF MISDEMEANORS FROM OTHER AGENCIES 1. The Cameron County Sheriffs Office (jail) is not to accept detainees

accused of from other non-federal agencies (city, county or state) unless:
A. For warrantless arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate include an order finding probable cause in substantially the format of Exhibit " A attached hereto.
B. For warrant arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
PERSONS ACCUSED OF FELONIES FROM OTHER AGENCIES
2. The Cameron County Sheriffs Office (jail) is not to accept pretrial
detainees accused of felonies from other non-federal agencies (city, county or state)
unless:
A. For warrantless felony arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate include an order finding probable cause in substantially the format of Exhibit "A" attached hereto, or each detainee arrives at the Cameron County Jail in time to allow a probable cause determination before a magistrate no later than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest
B. For warranty felony arrests, each pretrial detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
If, in the opinion of the jail personnel (under policies of the Chief Jail
Administrator to be adopted within ten (10) days of the signing of this Order), a pretrial
detainee accused of a felony arrives too late to receive a probable cause hearing within
forty-eight (48) hours, such detainee will not be accepted in the county jail and the
agency personnel will be advised that such detainee will be accepted in the county jail
only after such pretrial detainee has been taken to a magistrate and an order finding
probable cause has been issued by such magistrate.
The Cameron County Court at Law, Number One, shall oversee county probable
cause hearings and shall schedule probable cause heating dates and times so as to

comply with the holding of County of Riverside v. McLalighlin,, 500 U.S. 44/46; 114 L. Ed. 2d 49; 111S. Ct. 1661 (1991), ' I . . .that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Such
Schedule shall be furnished to the Cameron County Jail and to the District Attorney's
Office so that jail personnel can decline commitment of pretrial felony detainees in compliance with this order.
PERSONS ARRESTED BY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
3. All warrantless arrest pretrial detainees (felony and misdemeanor) where
the arrest is by the sheriffs office or by non-federal agencies which bring their arrestees
directly to the county jail, shall be brought before the County probable cause magistrate
for a probable cause hearing at the earliest possible time, but in no case later than forty-
eight (48)hours after arrest. 4. The Cameron County (Criminal District) Attorneys Office shall file a
dismissal in all cases where: A. For misdemeanor warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state), the offense report is not submitted to the district attorneys office within two (2)business days after the arrest. B. For felony warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state) the eport is not submitted to the district attorneys office with Ofivf ef (e n rbusiness days after the arrest, except for homicide and aggravated sexual cases which shall be submitted to the district attorneys office with ten (10)business days after the arrest.
The district attorney's office may grant reasonable extensions of time for filing the offense reports referenced in subparagraphs A and B of Paragraph 4 above, but only for an arrest accused of a capital or first or second degree violent felony, or any

felony offense involving a child victim or family violence, and only for good cause
which is beyond the control of the arresting agency. The Cameron County District
Attorney's Office shall establish written intake policies and procedures to promote
and facilitate this order, which shall be filed with this Court.
POPULATION REDUCTION PROVISIONS
If at any time the population of the Cameron County Jail exceeds ninety per
cent of the design capacity (currently design capacity is 738) for such jail, the Sheriff
of Cameron County is ORDERED to, and shall, in addition to any other actions he
may deem appropriate, take such of the following actions he may see fit in order to
reduce jail population:
A. Arrange for alternative housing for any person or persons then confined within the Cameron County Jail under protective custody;
B. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" for any person or persons confined or to be confined for civil contempt as a result of a civil action, including but not limited to divorce, custody and support cases;
C. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" of any person or persons to be confined as a result of a criminal contempt;
"Scheduled reporting" as used herein, for any person referenced in Paragraphs C and D above: Shall mean that the Sheriff map schedule specific dates and times for contempt inmates to report to and serve any sentence for contempt; and shall mean that the Sheriff may schedule contempt inmates to serve his or her sentence by reporting on specific dates and times to be placed on community work program in accordance with V.T.C.A., Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 43.10; it is intended that contempt inmates working eight hour days in the community work program shall be on home release except while working.
D. The Sheriff may arrange for the use of alternative facilities for the housing of inmates including the use of half way houses, monitoring, or other alternative housing methods;

E. The Sheriff refuse to receive for pre-trial confinement from any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent misdemeanor;
F. The Sheriff may refuse to receive for pre-trial confinement, from any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent felony;
G. The Sheriff shall adopt and implement procedures to release on personal bond persons committed to his custody who are charged exclusively with misdemeanor offenses. These procedures shall provide for the immediate release of detainees charged with misdemeanors in the order in which they were booked into the County Jail, but only as necessary to keep the jail population below ninety percent of design capacity;
H. Upon application to a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Sheriff may release from custody, any pretrial detainees charged with non-violent felonies.
The above "population reduction provisions", A through H, shall only be used
by the Sheriff to the extent necessary to bring the jail population under ninety per cent
of design capacity
The foregoing order shall remain in force and effect until the new county jail is
opened.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" and are therefore entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Court
awards Juan Jose Martinez $8,953.75 in attorneys' fees, and awards the law firm of
Michael R. Cowen, P.C. $55,353.05 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The law firm of
Michael R. Cowen, P.C. is ordered to distribute the $55,353.05 amongst Ed Stapleton,
Keith Livesay and Michael R. Cowen according to the prior agreements they have made
amongst themselves. The Court finds that both Cameron County, Texas and the State

of Texas were culpable causing the overcrowding. Therefore, both Cameron County, Texas and the State of Texas are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the attorney's fees. For contribution purposes, the Court finds that each Defendant has 50% of the comparative fault.
The Court also finds that Third-Party Plaintiff Cameron County, Texas is also a "prevailing party" in its third-party action against the State of Texas. The Court notes that Cameron County's attorney presented evidence that he worked 9.3 hours after April 26, 1996, the date of the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and 75.6 hours prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Court finds that an appropriate hourly rate for Mr. Burst is the same as that for Mr. Stapleton: $250.00 per hour. Therefore, the Court awards Cameron County $19,667.25.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Juan Jose Martinez have judgment against Defendants Cameron County, Texas and the State of Texas, jointly and severally, in the amount of $8,953.75.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Michael R. Cowen, P.C. have judgment against Defendants Cameron County, Texas and the State of Texas, jointly and severally, in the amount of $55,353.05. The law firm of Michael R. Cowen, P.C. is ORDERED to distribute the $55,353.05 amongst Ed Stapleton, Keith Livesay and Michael R. Cowen, P.C. according to the prior agreements they have made amongst themselves.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Cameron County, Texas have judgment against Defendant the State of Texas in the amount of $19,667.25.
This is a final judgment. Any relief not granted herein is denied.

z=-- SIGNED this Z? day June,2001.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.

CAUSE NO.

ING PR-

CAUSE

The Court having fully completedthe examination mthis cause is of the opinionthat

probable cause does exist to bind the defendant over to await the action of the grandjury for the

felony offense of

- Said offense being a bailable one, a reasonable bond in the amount of $

is set,

and it is ordered that upon posting a bond for said amount, in the manner and form required by law,

he be released fiom custody; but in default of suchbond that the defendantbe committedto thejail

of Cameron County, Texas and there to be safelykept to answer for said offense.

Signed for entry this -day of

,19-.

Magistrate

EXHIBIT A 7

 
 I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

Ihited S t a ~ Ds istrict Gctirt SOII~~~@WIRi!;::.ict of Tex,,j
Ef$TI'.,7!]
AUG 1 7 2001

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, ET AL. Plaintiffs,
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL. Defendants and ThirdParty Defendants

8
§
§ §
0 Civil Action No. B-93-260 0
§
§
§
0 Rule 23 (b) (2) Class Action
§
§
§
3
§

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC

The Court enters this Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction in this case. The Court finds

that the preliminary injunction currently in place should be made into a permanent injunction. The

Court also enters final judgment against Defendants,jointly and severally, for attorneys fees.

PERMANENT 1N.TUNCTION

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Amended Temporary

Interlocutory Order, dated October 2, 1997, as amended to strike paragraphs (I) and (J) of the

population reduction provisions, is hereby made into a permanent injunction. This injunction shall

expire when the new county jail opens. Specifically, the Court makes the following ORDERS,

which shall expire when the new county jail is opened:

PERSONS ACCUSED OF MISDEMEANORS FROM OTHER AGENCIES

1. The CameronCounty Sheriffs Office (jail) is not to accept detainees accused of from

other non-federal agencies (city, county or state) unless:

A. For warrantless arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrateinclude an order findingprobablecause in substantiallythe format of Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
B. For warrant arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
PERSONS ACCUSED OF FELONIES FROM OTHER AGENCIES
2. The Cameron County Sheriffs Office (jail) is not to accept pretrial detainees accused
of felonies from other non-federal agencies (city, county or state) unless:
A. For warrantless felony arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrateinclude an orderfindingprobable cause in substantiallythe format of Exhibit " A attached hereto, or each detainee arrives at the Cameron County Jail in time to allow a probable cause determination before a magistrate no later than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest
B. For warranty felony arrests,each pretrial detainee's commitmentpapers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
If, in the opinion of the jail personnel (under policies of the Chief Jail Administrator to be
adopted within ten (10) days of the signing of this Order), a pretrial detainee accused of a felony
arrives too late to receive a probable cause hearing within forty-eight (48) hours, such detainee will
not be accepted in the county jail and the agency personnel will be advised that such detainee will
be accepted in the county jail only after such pretrial detainee has been taken to a magistrate and an
order finding probable cause has been issued by such magistrate.
The Cameron County Court at Law, Number One, shall oversee county probable cause
hearings and shall scheduleprobablecause heating dates and times so as to comply with the holding
of County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin,, 500 U.S. 44,46; 114 L. Ed. 2d 49; 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991),
". ..that ajurisdiction that providesjudicial determinationof probablecause within 48 hours of arrest
will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.." Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975). Such Schedule shall be furnished to the Cameron County Jail and to the

District Attorney's Office so thatjail personnelcan decline commitmentof pretrial felony detainees

in compliance with this order. PERSONS ARRESTED BY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

3.

All warrantless arrest pretrial detainees (felony and misdemeanor) where the arrest

is by the sheriffs office or by non-federal agencies which bring their arrestees directly to the county

jail, shall be brought before the County probable cause magistrate for a probable cause hearing at

the earliest possible time, but in no case later than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest.

4. The Cameron County (Criminal District) Attorneys Office shall file a dismissal in

all cases where: A.

For misdemeanor warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state), the offense report is not submittedto the district attorneysoffice within two (2)business days after the arrest.

B. felony warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state) the offense report is not submitted to the district attorneys office with five(5) business days after the arrest, except for homicide and aggravated sexual cases which shall be submitted to the district attorneys office with ten (10) business days after the arrest.

The district attorney's office may grant reasonable extensions of time for filing the offense

reports referenced in subparagraphsA and B of Paragraph 4 above,but only for an arrest accused

of a capital or first or second degree violent felony, or any felony offense involving a child victim

or family violence, and only for good cause which is beyond the control of the arresting agency.

The Cameron County District Attorney's Office shall establish written intake policies and

procedures to promote and facilitate this order, which shall be filed with this Court.

POPULATION REDUCTION PROVISIONS

If at any time the population of the Cameron County Jail exceeds ninety per cent of the

design capacity (currently design capacity is 738) for suchjail, the Sheriff of Cameron County
is ORDEREDto, and shall, in addition to any other actions he may deem appropriate, take such
of the following actions he may see fit in order to reduce jail population:
A. Arrange for alternative housing for any person or persons then confined within the Cameron County Jail under protective custody;
B. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" for any person or persons confined or to be confined for civil contempt as a result of a civil action, including but not limited to divorce, custody and support cases;
C. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" of any person or persons to be confined as a result of a criminal contempt;
"Scheduled reporting" as used herein, for any person referenced in Paragraphs C and D above: Shall mean that the Sheriff may schedule specific dates and times for contempt inmates to report to and serve any sentence for contempt; and shall mean that the Sheriff may schedule contempt inmates to serve his or her sentenceby reporting on specificdates and times to be placed on community work program in accordance with V.T.C.A., Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 43.10; it is intended that contempt inmates worhng eight hour days in the community work program shall be on home release except while working.
D. The Sheriff may arrange for the use of alternative facilities for the housing of inmates including the use of half way houses, monitoring, or other alternative housing methods;
E. The Sheriff refuse to receive for pre-trial confinement from any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent misdemeanor;
F. The Sheriff may refuse to receive for pre-trial confinement, from any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent felony; (This section does not apply to "Blue Warrant Process".)
G. The Sheriff shall adopt and implement procedures to release on personal bond persons committed to his custody who are charged exclusively with misdemeanor offenses. These procedures shall provide for the immediate release of detainees charged with misdemeanors in the order in which they were booked into the County Jail, but only as necessary to keep the jail population below ninety percent of design capacity; (This section does not apply to "Blue Warrant Process".)

H. Upon application to a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Sheriff may release from custody, any pretrial detainees charged with non-violent felonies.
The above "population reduction provisions", A through H, shall only be used by the Sheriff to the extent necessary to bring the jail population under ninety per cent of design capacity.
The foregoing order shall remain in force and effect until the new county jail is opened. ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" and are therefore entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Court awards Juan Jose Martinez $8,953.75 in attorneys' fees, and awards the law firm of Michael R. Cowen, P.C. $55,353.05 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The law fm of Michael R. Cowen, P.C. is ordered to distribute the $55,353.05 amongst Ed Stapleton, Keith Livesay and Michael R. Cowen according to the prior agreements they have made amongst themselves. The Court finds that both Cameron County, Texas and Janie Cockrell, in her capacity as the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division were culpable causing the overcrowding. Therefore, both Cameron County, Texas and Janie Cockrell, in her official capacity as the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the attorney's fees. For contribution purposes, the Court finds that each Defendant has 50% of the comparative fault.
The Court also finds that Third-Party Plaintiff Cameron County, Texas is also a "prevailing party" in its third-party action against Janie Cockrell, in her capacity as the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. The Court notes that Cameron County's attorneypresented evidence that he worked 9.3hours after April 26,1996, the date of the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and 75.6 hours prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. The Court finds that an appropriatehourly rate for Mr. Burst is the same as that for Mr.

Stapleton: $250.00 per hour. Therefore, the Court awards Cameron County $19,667.25.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Juan Jose Martinez

have judgment against Defendants Cameron County, Texas and Janie Cockrell, in her capacity as

the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division, jointly and

severally, in the amount of $8,953.75.

IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Michael R. Cowen,

P.C. havejudgment against DefendantsCameron County,Texas and Janie Cockrell, in her capacity

as the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division, jointly and

severally, in the amount of $55,353.05. The law firm of Michael R. Cowen, P.C. is ORDERED to

distribute the $55,353.05 amongst Ed Stapleton, Keith Livesay and Michael R. Cowen, P.C.

according to the prior agreements they have made amongst themselves.

IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED,ADJUDGED, AND DECREEDthat DefendantIThird-Party

Plaintiff Cameron County, Texas have judgment against Defendant Janie Cockrell, in her capacity

as the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division in the amount
- of $19,667.25. This is a final judgment. Any relief not granted herein is denied.

fl SIGNED this /G day of

(36 us*

,2001.

 
 .

. . J6lt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Defendant,
and
GEORGE W. BUSH, et aL, Third-Party Defendants and Defendants

§

§

§

§

NO. B-93-260

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

COMPLETE RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

STATE OF TEXAS

§

ec..ftM\ §

COUNTY OF

r §

UnIted States District Court Southern District of Texas
FILED
APR 2 6 2002
flachaarekJoNf .CMoiulbrtV

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day came Michael R. Cowen and, who duly sworn on his oath, stated and deposed as follows:
My name is Michael R. Cowen, I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Texas and in the Southern District of the United States District Court. I was one of the :Ittornt.ys representing the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled Jose Raul Castillo, et AI., v. Cameron County, Texas, et AI., Civil Action No. B-93-260, pending in the United States District Court, Southern District, Brownsville Division. I have made a request for attorney's fees in this cause.
In order to amicably settle my claim or request for attorney's fees, the parties have agreed upon a full and final settlement and compromise based on the judgment in this cause of action of this my claim and request for attorney's fees and of all the causes of action, damages, liabilities, expenses, and costs in

connection with my representation of the Plaintiffs in this action. for attorney's fees arising therefrom

whether heretofore or hereafter accruing and whether now known or not known to the parties hereto.

Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX DOLLARS AND 53/100S) payable to: "Michael R. Cowen, Attorney at

Law, Taxpayer Identification No. 17429308590000 ,"-I, hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge

all State Defendants, their heirs, successors and assigns, officers, agents and employees, from all causes

of action, damages, liabilities, expenses, costs and attorney's fees arising by reason of the said

occurrences set forth in this suit whether heretofore 01' hereafter accruing and whether now known or not

known to the parties hereto.
-
I warrant that I clearly understand the terms, conditions and legal effect of my execution of this

document. No promises, inducement, or anything ofvalue other than the consideration described has been

offered to me to induce me to enter into this Release. I understand that the consideration herein provided

to be paid is all of the money that will ever be paid to Michael R. Cowen, as attorney's fees by the State

Defendants, their heirs, successors and assigns, their officers, agents and employees as a result of the

occurrences from which this request or claim for attorney's fees arose.
G£I/t?--"/J~:J.

MICHAEL R. COWEN

Date Signed

Attorney at Law

}I..

IS JUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me by Michael R. Cowen on this the

day of

......

,2002.
0JOSlEo.LUClO

•

• Notary Ptdc,

SlallUfT_

..~ ~Comm. &p. 0II0I.N004

,C" --::t. ,'. .,

•

I

,z.{QAO

My commission expires: oS'--).f}-iOo'f·

Notary's Printed Name

 
 04/17/02 13:56
.. .. ..

STX At:t:y Gen

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BR.OWNSVILLE DIVISION

.JOSE RAUL CASTILLO, et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS Defendant aDd Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Defendan~
and
GEORGE W. BUSH, et alt Third-Party Defendants and Defendants

§

§

§

§

NO. B-93-260

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

COMPLETE RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

STATE OF TEXAS

§

COUNTYOF~ :

United States District Court Southam District of TIXII
FILED
APR 2 6 ZOOl
...-N.MiIb Clark of fAUlt'

BEFORE ME, the undetsiiIled authority, on this day came JOHN JOSE MARTINEZ and., who duly sworn on his oa.th, stated and deposed as follows:
My name is John Jose Martinez, I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Texas and in the Southern District of the United States District Court. I was one of the attorneys representing the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled Jose Raul Castillo. etAI., v. Cameron County. Te;cas. et AI., Civil Action No. B-93-260, . pending in the United States District Court. Southern District, Brownsville Division. I have made a request for attorney's fees in this cause.
In order to amicably settle my claim or request for attorney's fees, the parties have agreed up~m a full and final settlement and compromise based on the judgment in this cause of action ofthis my claim and request for attorney's fees and of all the causes of action, damages, liabilities, expenses, and costs in

04/17/02 '.

13: 56

STX Any Gen

IaJ 003/005

connection with my representation of the Plaintiffs in this action, for attomey's fees arising therefrom whether heretofore or hereafter accruing and whether now known or not known to the parties hereto.
Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR TIiOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SIX AND 88/100 ($4,476.88) payable to: "Jolm Jose Martinez, Attorney at Law, Taxpayer
Identification No. 24496638842000," I, hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge all State Defendants, their heirs, successors and assi;ns, officers, agents and employees, from all causes of action. damages, liabilities, expenses, costs and attorney's fees arising by reason of the said occurrences set forth in this suit
whether heretofore or hereafter accruing and whether now mown or not known to the parties hereto. I warrant that I clearly understand the terms, conditions and legal effect of my execution of this
document. No promises, inducement, or anything of value other than.the consideration described has been offered to me to induce me to enter into this Release. I understand that the consideration herein provided to be paid is all of the money that will ever be paid to Jolm Jose Martinez, as attorney's fees by the State Defendants, their heirs, successors and assigns, their officers, agents and employees as a result of the
occWTences from which this request or claim for attorney's fees arose.

~SCRIBED ~ and SWORN to before mO by 101m Jo•• Martinez on tIri. the

of

..~ ........:;;<..;;.-=~2002.

7,10¥ /0/~ My commission expires:

"'~~~~:~~";~~'" Irene G. Gonzalez

(:i~\C'~'; Notarv P'Jblic. Stale 01 Texas

.. \~/.. ;

'AyCommlSSIonExprres

,..~.·;·:·.;u;;_;·.·~~.." OCTOBER 27. 2004

NOTARY PUBLIC, in and fi the
STATE OF TEXAS
Irene r!z.&oozaez
Notary's Printed Name

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COZRT
SOUTHERN DISTR!CT OF TEXAS
EfJTEfiE!:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

gichdN, Milbv,,.a,.>?

- "&'

BROWNSVILLE DIVISION

JOSE RAUL CASTILLO,

)

FRANCISCO LOPEZ,

1

ELOY SANCHEZ, and

all those similarly situated,

1

Plaint&

)

-

) CIVIL ACTION NO. B-93-260

)

CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS,

)

Defendant and

)

Thrd-Party Plaint@

)

)

VS.

) Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action

) THE STATE OF TEXAS and GEORGE

BUSH; JAMES RILEY; CAROL

1

S. VANCE; JERRY H. HODGE;

)

JOSHUA W. ALLEN, SR.; THOMAS )

DUNNING; ALLAN B. POLUNSKI: )

R. H. DUNCAN, SR.; ELLEN J.

)

HALBERT AND JOHN R. WARD

(each in h s or her official

capacity only),

1

Defendants and

1

Thu-d-Party Defendants.

AMENDED

On August 15, 1994, the Court issued a Temporary Interlocutory Order in this cause. On application of Cameron County and by agreement of the parties the Court amends the Temporary

Interlocutory Order and ORDERS the following:
PERSONS ACCUSED OF MISDEMEANORS FROM OTHER AGENCIES
1. The Cameron County SherifTs Office (jail) is not to accept detainees accused of
misdemeanors fiom other non-federal agencies (city, county or state) unless:
A. For warrantless arrests, each detainee's commitment papers fiom the magistrate include an order finding probable cause in substantiallythe format of Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
B. For warrant arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
PERSONS ACCUSED OF FEJ .ONES FROM OTHER AGENCIES
2. The Cameron County SherBs Office (jail) is not to accept pretrial detainees
accused of felonies from other non-federal agencies (city, county or state) unless:
A. For warrantless felony arrests, each detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate include an order finding probable cause in substantdy the format of Exhibit "A" attached hereto, or each detainee arrives at the Cameron County Jail in time to allow a probable cause determination before a magistrate no later than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest.
B. For warranty felony arrests, each pretrial detainee's commitment papers from the magistrate or agency include a copy of the executed arrest warrant.
If in the opinion of the jail personnel (under policies of the Chief Jail Administrator to be
adopted within ten (10) days of the signing of this Order), a pretrial detainee accused of a felony
arrives too late to receive a probable cause hearing within forty-eight (48) hours, such detainee will
not be accepted in the countyjail and the agency personnel will be advised that such detainee will
be accepted in the countyjail only after such pretrial detainee has been taken to a magistrate and an
order finding probable cause has been issued by such magistrate.
The Cameron County Court at Law, Number One, shall oversee county probable cause

hearings and shall scheduleprobable cause hearing dates and times so as to comply with the holding
of County ofRzverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,56; 114L.Ed 2d 49; 111 S.Ct. 1661(1991).
"...that ajurisdiction that providesjudicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of
arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein." Gerstezn v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Such Schedule shall be M s h e d to the Cameron County Jail and to
the District Attorney's Office so that jail personnel can decline commitment of pretrial felony
detainees in compliance with this order.
PERSONS ARRESTED BY SHERIFFS OFFICE
3. All warrantless arrest pretrial detainees (felony and misdemeanor) where the arrest is
by the sherifPs office or by non-federal agencieswhich bring their arrestees directly to the county
jail, shall be brought before the County probable cause magistrate for a probable cause hearing at
the earliest possible time, but in no case later than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest.
OFFENSE REPORTS TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE
4. The Cameron County (Criminal District) Attorney's Office shall file a dismissal in all
cases where:
A. For misdemeanor warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state), the offense report is not submitted to the district attorney's office within two (2) business days after the arrest.
B. For felony warrant and warrantless arrests involving pretrial detainees, by all non-federal agencies (city, county or state) the offense report is not submitted to the district attorney's office with five (5) business days after the arrest, except for homicide and aggravated sexual cases which shall be submitted to the district attorney's office with ten (10) business days after the arrest.
The district attorney's office may grant reasonable extensions of time for filing the offense

reports referenced in subparagraphsA and B of Paragraph 4 above, but only for an arrestee
accused of a capital or first or second degree violent felony, or any felony offense involving a child
victim or family violence, and only for good cause which is beyond the control of the arresting
agency. The Cameron County District Attorney's Office shall establish written intake policies and
procedures to promote and facilitate this order, which shall be filed with this Court.
POPULATION REDUCTION PROVISIONS
If at any time the population of the Cameron County Jail exceeds ninety per cent of the
design capacity (currently design capacity is 738) for such jail, the Sheriff of Cameron County is
ORDERED to, and shall, in addition to any other actionshe may deem appropriate, take such of
the following actions he may see fit in order to reducejail population:
A. Arrange for alternative housing for any person or persons then confined within the Cameron County Jail under protective custody;
B. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" for any person or persons confined or to be confined for civil contempt as a result of a civil action, including but not limited to divorce, custody and support cases;
C. Arrange for "scheduled reporting" of any person or persons to be confined as a result of a criminal contempt;
"Scheduled reporting" as used herein, for any person referenced in Paragraphs C and D above: Shall mean that the SherifFmay schedule specific dates and times for contempt inmates to report to and serve any sentence for contempt; and shall mean that the Sheriffmay schedule contempt inmates to serve his or her sentenceby reporting on specific dates and times to be placed on community work program in accordance with V.T.C.A., Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 43.10; it is intended that contempt inmates working eight hour days in the community work program shall be on home release except while working.
D. The S h e smay arrange for the use of alternative facilities for the housing of inmates including the use of half-way houses, monitoring, or other alternative housing methods;

E. The Sheriff may refuse to receive for pre-trial confinement fiom any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent misdemeanor;
F. The Sheriffmayrefuse to receive for pre-trial confinement, fiom any law enforcement officer, any person charged with a non-violent felony;
G. The Sheriff shall adopt and implement proceduresto release on personal bond persons committed to his custody who are charged exclusively with misdemeanor offenses. These procedures shall provide for the immediate release of detainees charged with misdemeanors in the order in which they were booked into the County Jail, but only as necessary to keep the jail population below ninety per cent of design capacity;
H. Upon application to a judge of a court of competentjurisdiction, the SherifFmay release fiom custody, any pretrial detainees charged with non-violent felonies.
I. The Sheriff may refuse to receive for pre-hearing confinement fiom state pardon and parole officers, any "blue warrant" person. charged with a parole violation.
J. The Sheriffmaynotifil the Department of Pardons and Parole that the "blue warrant" inmates w i l l be released after they have been held for forty-five days unless a white warrant" has issued.
"Blue Warrant" as used herein, for any person referenced in paragraph I and J above, means a person arrested for a parole violation who is to be detained pending adrninstrativeprocess and revocation hearing. The color of the state warrant issued to arrest a person accused of a parole violation is "blue"; thus, "blue warrant".
"White Warrant" as used herein, for any person referenced in paragraph I and J above, means a person detained after revocation of parole. The color of the state warrant used aRer a person's parole has been revoked is "white"; thus, "white warrant'I..
The above "population reduction provisions", A through J, shall only be used by the Sheriff
to the extent necessary to bring the jail population under ninety per cent of design capacity.
The foregoing order shall remain in force and effect until the h a 1 order in this cause unless
modified upon application of the parties or otherwise by order.
DONE in Brownsville, Texas, this c A a y of off 70&E 4 1 9 9

United States Magistrate Judge

THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.

CAUSE NO.

ORDER FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE The Court having fiilly completed the examination in this cause is of the opinion that probable cause does exist to bind the defendant over to await the action of the grandjury for the felony offense of

Said offense being a bailable one, a reasonable bond in the amount of $

is set,

and it is ordered that upon posting a bond for said amount, in the manner and form required by law,

he be released fiom custody; but in dehult of such bond that the defendant be committed to the jail

of Cameron County, Texas and there to be safely kept to answer for said offense.

Signed for entry this -day of

., 19-.

Magistrate

THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.

CAUSE NO.

ORDER DISCHARGING DEFENDANT

The Court having I l l y completed the examination in this cause is of the opinion that no

probable cause exists to bind the defendant over to await the action of the grandjury and that the

defendant should be discharged fiom fbrther proceedings herein.

It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the defendant be discharged fiom

m h e r proceedingsherein and that he be released fiom custody, ifin custody, and that he be

discharged fiom the obligations of his bond, if on bond.

Signed for entry this -day of

19-.

Magistrate

 
 DC CMtECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

Page 1 of 24

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Texas (Brownsville)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:93-cv-00260

CLOSED, PRIS

Castillo, et a1 v. Cameron County, Texa, et a1 Assigned to: Magistrate Judge John William Black Demand: $0 Case in other court: Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

Date Filed: 1211011993 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil
Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Jose Raul Castillo

represented by Michael Raphael Cowen Attorney at Law 520 E Levee St Brownsville, TX 78520 956-54 1-498 1 Fax: 956-504-3674 fax Email: mcowen@cowenlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Francisco Lopez

represented by Michael Raphael Cowen (See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E Eloy Sanchez

represented by Michael Raphael Cowen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roberto Hernandez Mendoza Attorney at Law 1440 East 7th St Brownsville, TX 78520 956-541-5494 Fax: 956-54 1-9444 TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jon Alan Ashcraft

represented by Jon Alan Ashcraft PRO SE

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Plaintiff Jose Raul Castillo
v.
Petitioner Gustavo Almaguer
v.
Defendant Cameron County, Texas
- Defendant State of Texas TERMINATED: 07/2 7 4999

Jon Alan Ashcraft TDCJ-ID #638807 Rt 4 Box 1500 Beaumont, Tx 77705-8817 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael Raphael Cowen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gustavo Almaguer #673522 Rt 2 Box 4400 Gatesville, Tx 76597-4400 PRO SE
represented by Dylbia L Jefferies Cameron County Courthouse 964 E Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520 956-550-1345 Fax: 956-550- 1348 fax LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Otto Burst Magallanes Hinojosa PC 1713 Boca Chica Blvd Brownsville, TX 78520 956-544-657 1 Fax: 956-544-4290 fax LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso Assistant Atty General Capitol Station P 0 Box 12548 Austin, TX 7871 1-2548

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Defendant Governor George W Bush Governor of Texas
Defendant Allan B Polunsky Member of the Board TDCJ

5 12-463-2080 Fax: 512-495-9139 fax TERMINATED: 07/27/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger Brown McCarroll LLP 111 Congress Ave Ste 1400 Austin, TX 78701 5 12-472-5456 TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe Office of Attorney General PO Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711 5 12-463-2080 Fax: 512-495-9139 fax LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

Page 4 of 24

Defendant Carole S Young Member of the Board TDCJ
Defendant John David Franz Member of the Board TDCJ
Defendant Patricia A Day Member of the Board TDCJ

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Defendant William "Hank" Moody Member of the Board TDCJ
Defendant Alfred C Moran Member of the Board TDCJ
Defendant Nancy Patton Member of the Board TDCJ

Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

Page 6 of 24

Defendant A M "Mac" Stringfellow Member of the Board TDCJ
Defendant Carol S Vance Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant State of Texas

Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Third Party Defendant Governor George W Bush Governor of Texas
- Third Party Defendant Allan B Polunsky Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant Carole S Young Member of The Board TDCJ

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

DC CM/ECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Third Party Defendant John David Franz Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant Patricia A Day Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant William "Hank" Moody Member of the Board TDCJ

Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Third Party Defendant Alfred C Moran Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendaa Nancy Patton Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant A M "Mac" Stringfellow Member of the Board TDCJ

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

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Third Party Defendant Carol S Vance Member of the Board TDCJ
Third Party Defendant Judge Gilberto Hinojosa
Thirdparty Plaintiff Cameron County, Texas

represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip A Lionberger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/25/2001 LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sharon Felfe (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel E Maeso (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Otto Burst (See above for address) LEAD A TTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/10/1993 12/10/1993
12/10/1993 12/13/1993
0 1/03/1994 01/05/1994

#

Docket Text

-1 COMPLAINT filed; FILING FEE $ 120.00 RECEIPT # 106350 (mgarza) (Entered: 1211711993)

-2 MOTION to certify class action by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, E Sanchez, Motion Docket Date 12/30/93 [2-11 motion, filed. (mgarza)
(Entered: 1211711993)

SUMMONS issued for Cameron County, Texas. (mgarza) (Entered: 12/17/1993)

-3 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Cameron County, Texa 12/13/93 filed Answer due on 1/2/94 for Cameron County, Texa (mgarza)
(Entered: 1211711993)

4 ANSWER to Complaint by Cameron County, Texa (Added attorney ), filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/05/1994)

- 5 ORDER granting [2-11 motion to certify class action, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Judge Filemon B. Vela) (ogutierrez) (Entered:
01/07/1994)

DC CMIECF LIVE- US District Court-Texas Southern - Docket Report

Page I 1 of 24

01/12/1994
01/12/1994
01/21/1994
01/26/1994 0 1/26/1994 0 1/26/1994 01/26/1994 01/26/1994 01/26/1994 0 112611994 0 1/26/1994 0 1/26/1994 0 1/26/1994 0 112611994
I I

- 6 THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT by Cameron County, Texa against Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/12/1994)
SUMMONS issued for Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/12/1994)
- 7 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, E
Sanchez ,(Answer due 1131/94 for State of Texas, for John R Ward, for
Gilberto Hinojosa, for Ellen J Halbert, for Ann Richards, for Joshua W Allen Sr, for Allen B Polunski, for Carol S Vance, for R H Duncan Sr,
for James Riley, for Thomas M Dunning, for Jerry H Hodge ) amending ,
filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0112411994)
-8 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Ann Richards 1/19/94filed Answer due on 2/8/94 for Ann Richards (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
- 9 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to R H Duncan Sr 1118/94 filed Answer due on 2/7/94 for R H Duncan Sr (mgarza) (Entered: 0 112711994)
-1-0 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to John R Ward 1/15/94 filed Answer due on 2/4/94 for John R Ward (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
1J RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Jerry H Hodge 1/15/94 filed
Answer due on 2/4/94 for Jerry H Hodge (mgarza) (Entered: 0 112711994)
12 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Allen B Polunski 1/18/94 filed
Answer due on 2/7/94 for Allen B Polunski (mgarza) (Entered: 0 1/27/1994)
13 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to James Riley 1119/94 filed
Answer due on 2/8/94 for James Riley (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
- 14 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Carol S Vance 1/19/94 filed Answer due on 2/8/94 for Carol S Vance (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
- 15 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Gilberto Hinojosa 1/14/94filed Answer due on 2/3/94 for Gilberto Hinojosa (mgarza) (Entered: 0 1/27/1994)
- 16 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Ellen J Halbert 1/19/94filed Answer due on 2/8/94 for Ellen J Halbert (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
12 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Joshua W Allen Sr 1/24/94 filed
Answer due on 2/13/94 for Joshua W Allen Sr (mgarza) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
18 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Thomas M Dunning 1/18/94
I I filed Answer due on 2/7/94 for Thomas M Dunning (mgarza) (Entered:

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Page 12 of 24

02/02/ 1994 02/09/1994 02/09/1994

02/09/1994

02/22/1994 0212311 994 03/03/1994 03/04/1994 03/09/1994

0311 511994

0311 511994

03/15/1994

0311 511994

I

I

0112711994)
19 MOTION to dismiss by Ann Richards, Motion Docket Date 2/22/94 [19-
I] motion ,filed. (ogutierrez)(Entered: 02/08/1994)
20 NOTICE of Hearing: set pretrial conference for 2:00 3/17/94 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black before Magistrate Judge John W. Black, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0211111994)
21 MOTION to dismiss for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction by State of
Texas John Brent Worley for third-party defendant Ann Richards,
Motion Docket Date 3/1/94 [21-11 motion ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered:
02/14/1994)
22 MOTION to dismiss Plaintiffs' action for failure to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted by Ann Richards John Brent Worley for third-party defendant Ann Richards, Motion Docket Date 3/1/94 [22-11 motion ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
23 AGREED MOTION to extend time to file response by Cameron County, Texa ,filed. (ogutierrez)(Entered: 0310111994)
-2-4 NOTICE of Hearing: reset pretrial conference for 2:00 3/24/94 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black before Magistrate Judge John W. Black, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
25 RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa to [22-11 third-party defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' action for failure to state a claim which relief
maybe granted ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 03/08/1994)
26 MOTION for Robert H. Mendoza to withdraw as attorney Roberto
Hernandez Mendoza for plaintiff E Sanchez, Motion Docket Date
3/24/94 [26-11 motion ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 03/08/1994)
39 ORDER granting [26-11motion for Robert H. Mendoza to withdraw as attorney (Terminated attorney Roberto Hernandez Mendoza for Jose Raul Castillo , entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez)(Entered: 0311711994)
- 27 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Jerry H Hodge 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2115/94 for Jerry H Hodge (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
- 28 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Thomas M Dunning 1/28/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2117/94 for Thomas M Dunning (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
- 29 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to James Riley 1/27/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2/16/94 for James Riley (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
-3-0 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to R H Duncan Sr 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2115/94 for R H Duncan Sr (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)

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0311511994 03/15/1994 03/15/1994 0311 511994 0311 511994 0311 511994 0311511994 03/15/1994 0311 811994
03/24/1994
03/24/1994

31 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Carol S Vance 1/27/94 by
certified mail filed Answer due on 2/16/94 for Carol S Vance (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
- 32 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Allen B Polunski 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2115/94 for Allen B Polunski (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
33 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Joshua W Allen Sr 1/26/94 by
certified mail filed Answer due on 2/15/94 for Joshua W Allen Sr (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
- 34 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Ann Richards 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2/15/94 for Ann Richards (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
35 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Ellen J Halbert 1/28/94 by
certified mail filed Answer due on 2117/94 for Ellen J Halbert (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
-
- 3- 6 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Gilberto Hinojosa 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2115/94 for Gilbert~Hinojosa (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
37 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to John R Ward 1131/94 by certified
mail filed Answer due on 2120194 for John R Ward (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
- 38 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to State of Texas 1/26/94 by certified mail filed Answer due on 2/15/94 for State of Texas (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311611994)
40 REPLY by Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H
Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward, State of Texas to response to [22-11 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' action for failure
to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted ,filed (ogutierrez)
(Entered: 03/21/1994)
41 Initial pre-trial conference held before Magistrate Judge John W. Black.
Attorneys Ed Stapleton, Richard Burst appeared, John Worley appeared telephonically. Discovery is due by July 1,1994. Extension filed by June 17,1994, All other motions filed no later than 10 days after discovery. Joint pretrial order filed by July 29, 1994. Final pretrial & settlement conference set for July 29, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. Trial is set for September 1994. File Motions for Injunctive Relief, Hearing set for May 26, 1994at 9:00 a.m., File Dispositive motions by May 20, 1994.. Order signed, filed and certified copies mailed to all parties. (mgarza) (Entered: 0313 111994)
fC2 ORDER set discovery due for 7/1/94 ,and set pretrial order due for 7/29/94 ,and set pretrial conference for 2:00 7/29/94 before Magistrate
Judge John W. Black, and Motion for Injunctive Relief is set for May 26,1994 at 9:00 a.m. and File Dispositive Motions by May 20, 1994 ,

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03/28/1994 04/13/1994
05/10/1994
05/12/1994
05/20/1994 0513111994 06/08/1994 06/09/1994 06/10/1994

entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (mgarza) (Entered: 0313111994)
43 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint by Cameron County, Texa :
amends [4-11 answer, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 04/06/1994)
44 MOTION for clarification and amendment of scheduling order by James
Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward, State of Texas John Brent Worley for third-party defendant Ann Richards, Motion Docket Date 5/3/94 [44-11 motion, filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 04/14/ 1994)
- 45 CONSENT to trial by Magistrate by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, E Sanchez, Cameron County, Texa, Cameron County, Texa, Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward, State of Texas and ORDER REFERRING CASE ( Signed by Judge Filemon B. Vela ) to Magistrate
Judge John W. Black ,entered. Parties ntfd. (ogutierrez) (Entered:
05/10/1994)
46 ORDER granting [44-11 motion for clarification and amendment of
scheduling order, entered; All motions for preliminary injunctive relief are to be filed by May 10, 1994 with responses to those motions due by May 31, 1994. The hearing set for May 26, 1994 is reset to June 9, 1994 at 10:30 a.m. Parties notified. signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (mgarza) (Entered: 0511911994)
47 MOTION with brief in support for preliminary injunction by E Sanchez, Motion Docket Date 6/9/94 motion ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered:
05/23/1994)
- 48 RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa, Cameron County, Texa, Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward, State of Texas to [47-11 motion
for preliminary injunction ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
49 RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa to [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
-5-0 Motion hearing re: [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction Ct Reporter: Gabriel Mendieta. Ed Stapleton and J.J.Martinez flpltf; Richard Burst, John Brently Worley, Sharon Felfe and Robin Sanders f/dfts. Testimony from witness heard. Recessed at 4:57 for the day. Court adjourned until tomorrow morning. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
- 51 Motion hearing re: [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction continued. Ct Reporter: Gabriel MendietaIERO. All parties present and testimony continued. Recessed until Tuesday, June 14,1994 at 1PM. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)

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06/14/1994
06/15/1994
06/16/1994
06/16/1994 06/16/1994 0611611994 0612711994 0612911 994 0711811994 0712911994
0811511994 08/15/1994 0811811994 0911411994

52 Motion hearing re: [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction continued.
Ct Reporter: Gabriel MendietaERO. All parties present. Testimony continues. Recessed at 5pm for the day. Court adjourned until tomorrow morning. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
- 53 Motion hearing re: [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction continued. Ct Reporter: Gabriel MendietaERO. All parties present. Testimony continued. Recessed for the day, to resume at 8:30am. on 6/16/94. (ogutierrez) Modified on 0710811994 (Entered: 07/08/1994)
54 Motion hearing re: [47-11 motion for preliminary injunction continued.
Ct Reporter: Gabriel MendietdERO. All parties present. Testimony continued, at 9:45 Judge Black made a trip to the jail with all attorneys accompanying him.At 11:20 testimony resumed. Both sides rest. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
55 Exhibit list by Jose Raul Castillo ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered:
07/08/1994)
56 Exhibit list by Cameron County, Texa ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered:
07/08/1994)
- 57 Exhibit list by State of Texas ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
58 TRIAL MEMORANDUM on Preliminary Injunction hearing by Cameron County, Texas , filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
59 Letter from Magistrate Black to Mr. Christopher Escobar prisoner
#73012, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
60 POST-HEARING BRIEF by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, E Sanchez ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 0711911994)
61 JOINT MOTION to extend time by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez,
E Sanchez, Cameron County, Texa, Cameron County, Texa, Jerry H Hodge, Thomas M Dunning, James Riley, R H Duncan Sr, Carol S Vance, Allen B Polunski, Joshua W Allen Sr, Ann Richards, Ellen J
Halbert, Gilberto Hinojosa, John R Ward, State of Texas ,filed
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 0810311994)
62 Temporary Interlocutory ORDER granting [47-11 motion for preliminary
injunction , entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge W.
Black ) (mgarza) (Entered: 0811711994)
Exhibits from plaintiffs and defendants have been placed in a small box marked "Exhibits". (mgarza) (Entered: 0811711994)
63-- RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texas, et a1 ,to [60-11 Plaintiffs' Post-
Hearing Brief on Preliminary Injunction, filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 08/19/1994)
- 64 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, entered. Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0911 511994)

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0912 111994 0912611994 0912611994 0912711994
1011911994 1112311994 0311511995 05/10/1995 01/23/1996
01/23/1996 02/01/1996 02/05/1996 02/06/1996 0211 211996 02/14/1996

65 MOTION for leave to file amended complaint by John Ashcraft John
Ashcraft for plaintiff, Motion Docket Date 10111/94 [65-11 motion ,
filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
66 AMENDED COMPLAINT by John Ashcraft, amending [I-11 complaint , filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
67 Defendant State of Texas' and Defendants and Third Party Defendants
Ann Richards, et al's ADVISORY TO THE COURT, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
68 MOTION to vacate ,or to amend the preliminary injunction order and
request for trial setting by State of Texas, John R Ward, Gilberto Hinojosa, Ellen J Halbert, Ann Richards, Joshua W Allen Sr, Allen B Polunski, Carol S Vance, R H Duncan Sr, James Riley, Thomas M Dunning, Jerry H Hodge Brent Worley for third-party defendant Ann
Richards, Docket Date 10117/94 [68-11motion, 10117/94 [68-21 motion ,
filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 09/29/1994)
- 69 Cameron County's Submission of Two Year Jail Management Plan, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 1111711994)
70 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS of Hearing-Testimony of Dr.Stern for dates of 6/9/94 before Judge Magistrate John W Black ,filed. ( Court
Rptr: Gabriel MendietaJERO)(ogutierrez) (Entered: 11/30/1994)
71 MOTION to substitute attorney Robin Sanders by State of Texas John
Brent Worley for third-party defendant Ann Richards, Docket Date
4/4/95 [71-11motion ,filed. (mgarza) (Entered: 04/06/1995)
72 ORDER granting [71-11 motion to substitute attorney Robin Sanders Added Sharon Felfe , entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (mgarza) (Entered: 0511811995)
73 ORDER granting [65-11motion for leave to file amended complaint consolidating cases B-94-328 with this case ,entered; Parties notified.
( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/26/1996)
Consolidated Lead Case (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/26/1996)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Robert Mendoza re: [7321 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
74 NOTICE of Hearing: set status conference for 2:30 4/12/96 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered:
02/06/1996)
25 Letter from Mr. Almaguer for request of production of medical records.
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
82 AFFIDAVIT Re: Oscar Almaguer Avila , filed (mgarza) (Entered:
05/15/1996)
I? Letter from Mr. Almaguer requesting Continuance of second request for

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02/22/1996 03/19/1996
04/22/1996 0412311996 04/23/1996 10/10/1996 0 1/02/1997 01/10/1997 10/02/1997 10/02/1997 11/05/1997
1 1/19/1997 07/14/1998

production of documents (vital records) to dft Cameron County. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0311811996)
76 AGREED MOTION to extend time to reset status conference by Cameron County, Texa ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/23/1996)
- 78 ORDER granting [76-11 agreed motion to extend time to reset status conference reset status conference for 2:30 4/26/96 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
79 APPLICATION FOR WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum by John Ashcraft ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 04/22/1996)
80 MOTION for leave to file supplemental complaint by John Ashcraft,
Motion Docket Date 5113/96 [SO-11motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered:
04/23/1996)
81 SUPPLEMENT to amended complaint by John Ashcraft, filed.
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 04/23/1996)
83 ORDER severing John Ashcraft from this action and be styled B-93-260-
A , entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 1011611996)
84 AGREED MOTION to substitute attorney by Cameron County, Texa ,
filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
85 ORDER granting [84-11 agreed motion to substitute attorney Added, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0 1/14/1997)
86 MOTION to amend [62-11 order by Cameron County, Texa, Motion Docket Date 10122197 [86-11 motion , filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 10/02/ 1997)
- 87 AMENDED TEMPORARY INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 11/05/1997)
88 MOTION for Daniel E Maeso to appear as counsel by State of Texas,
John R Ward, Gilberto Hinojosa, Ellen J Halbert, Ann Richards, Joshua W Allen Sr, Allen B Polunski, Carol S Vance, R H Duncan Sr John Brent
Worley for defendants ,Motion Docket Date 11/25/97 [88-11 motion ,
filed. (ogutierrez) Modified on 11/06/1997 (Entered: 11/05/1997)
89 ORDER granting [88-11 motion for Daniel E Maeso to appear as counsel in place of John B Worley ,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 12/02/1997)
Deadline updated; mooting [68-21 motion to amend the preliminary injunction order and request for trial setting mooting [68-11 motion to vacate mooting [86-11 motion to amend [62-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/14/1998)

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02/16/1999 0211 711 999 03/08/1999 03/09/1999 0313111999
0313111999 05/03/1999 05/04/1999 0511 811999 05/21/1999 05/21/1999
05/26/1999

90 ORDER set status conference for 10:OO 313 1/99 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/16/1999)
91 MOTION for attorney fees by Jose Raul Castillo, Motion Docket Date
3/9/99 [91- 11motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0211711999)
92 RESPONSE by State of Texas to [91-11 motion for attorney fees ,filed.
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/09/1999)
93 RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa to [91-11 motion for attorney
fees, filed. (fmremp) (Entered: 03/10/1999)
94 Minute entry: Status conference held b/Judge Black. Keith Livesay in
lieu of Michael Cowen, Robert Mendoza, Richard Burst and Daniel Maeso appeared in chambers. All parties to file a proposed final judgment by 5/3/99. set status conference for 10:OO 5/21/99 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black, terminated deadlines (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0313 111999)
95 ORDER set status conference for 10:OO 5/21/99 before Magistrate Judge
John W. Black, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0313111999)
96 MOTION to terminate and vacate [64-11 order (preliminary injunction) by State of Texas, Ann Richards, Motion Docket Date 5/23/99 [96-11 motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/04/1999)
97 MOTION to substitute party under Rule 25(d)(l)FRCP by State of
Texas, et a1 Motion Docket Date 5/24/99 [97-11 motion , filed.
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/05/1999)
98 RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa, Jose Raul Castillo to [96-11 motion to terminate and vacate [64-11 order (preliminary injunction) ,
filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
99 ORDER granting [97-11motion to substitute parties names in the third party complaint under Rule 25(d)(l)FRCP ,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/21/1999)
100 Minute entry: Status conference b/Judge Black; Attys Michael Cowen,
Richard Burst and Daniel Maeso appeared. The following rulings were made: Pltf is to report to Judge Black by 5/26/99 regarding orders on injunctive. Attys fees issue: a. Plts to file final motion by 6/1/99. Reponse by State & Cameron County by 7/2/99. terminated deadlines Ct Reporter: ERO (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0512 111999)
101 ORDER extending the automatic stay of the preliminary injunction by 60
days Motion hearing set for 10:OO 7/23/99 for [96-11 motion to terminate
and vacate [64-11 order (preliminary injunction) ,entered; Parties
notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/27/1999)

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0513011999 0610311999 0610311999 0611611999 0612811999 0712 111999 0712611999 0712611999 0712711999
0712711999 0712911999 0712911999 0910111999 0910111999
1 0911311999 I

102 OBJECTION to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation by Jon
Alan Ashcraft to ,filed (lalaniz) (Entered: 0610411999)

103 BRIEF by Jon Alan Ashcraft, E Sanchez, Francisco Lopez, Jose Raul
Castillo in support of [91-11motion for attorney fees ,filed. (fmremp)
(Entered: 0611011999)

114 RESPONSE by State of Texas in opposition to to Cameron County
proposed order extending the automatic stay of the preliminary injunction
by 60 days ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/07/1999)

104 MOTION for Edward Stapleton I11to withdraw as attorney filed by pltfs
E Sanchez, Francisco Lopez, and Jose Raul Castillo; Motion Docket Date
7/6/99 [104-11motion (finremp) (Entered: 0612111999)

105 ADVISORY TO THE COURT filed by defts State of Texas et al.
(finremp) (Entered: 0613011999)

106 ORDER set status conference for 9:00 7/27/99 before Magistrate Judge
John W. Black, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/22/1999)
107 First Amended RESPONSE by Cameron County, Texa to [91- 11 motion
for attorney fees ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/27/1999)

107 MOTION for attorney fees by Cameron County, Texa, Motion Docket Date 8115199 [107-11motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/27/1999)

- 1-08 Minute entry: Attys Michael Cowen,Richard Burst, Daniel Maeso and Jeff Milistone appeared. The following rulings were made. Order dismissing state dfts signed. Pltf will submit an order preserving status on or before 7/29/99. Request will be made for the appointment of a three judge panel pursuant to PLRA. terminated deadlines Ct Reporter: ERO Irma Soto (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0713011999)

109 ORDER dismissing dfts and third party dfts The State of Texas, et al. ,
entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black )
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 0713011999)

110 STIPULATION re: facts by Cameron County, Texa, Jose Raul Castillo ,
filed. (ogutierrez) Modified on 0713011999 (Entered: 0713011999)

11 ORDER continuing temporary injunction until further order from the
Court, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W.
Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0713011999)

112 MOTION to extend time for filing notice of appeal by State of Texas,
Motion Docket Date 9/21/99 [112-11 motion ,filed. (ogutierrez)
(Entered: 0910711999)

113 NOTICE OF APPEAL of [Ill-21 order by State of Texas ,filed. Fee
Status: 105.OO Receipt #: 113010 Appeal record due on 9116/99
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 0910711999)

INotice of appeal and Copy of docket transmitted to USCA: [113-11

I

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09/13/1999 0912011999 1010411999 10/04/1999 10/14/1999
11/02/1999
11/08/1999 11/15/1999 11/29/1999 01/1 1/2000 01/13/2000 0 1/24/2000
0210112000

appeal (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
115 ORDER granting [112-11 motion to extend time for filing notice of
appeal ,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W.
Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/14/1999)
116 MOTION for non-consolidated relief by Gustavo Almaguer, Motion
Docket Date [116-11motion ,filed. (lalaniz) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
117 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS of status conference for dates of 5/21/99 before Judge John William Black, filed. ( Court Rptr: Gabriel MendietaERO) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
118 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS of Status Conference for dates of
7/27/99 before Judge John William Black ,filed. ( Court Rptr: Gabriel
MendietaERO) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
119 DESIGNATION by State of Texas, John R Ward, Ellen J Halbert, Ann
Richards, Joshua W Allen Sr, Allen B Polunski, Carol S Vance, R H Duncan Sr, James Riley, Thomas M Dunning, Jerry H Hodge of record on appeal, filed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 10/1811999)
Certified and transmitted record on appeal consisting of 1 vol.of record
and 1 transcript to U.S. Court of Appeals: [113-11 appeal .Circuit No.
99-41217 Parties ntfd. certified copies only. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
120 MOTION for summaryjudgment by Gustavo Almaguer, Motion Docket
Date 11/28/99 [120-11 motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 11/09/1999)
121 REQUEST by Jose Raul Castillo for a three judge panel , filed.
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 1111611999)
Deadline updated; mooting [116-11motion for non-consolidated relief granting [104-11motion for Edward Stapleton I11 to withdraw as attorney (ogutierrez) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
122 ORDER granting [121-11 pltfs (agreed) request for a three judge panel is
hereby GRANTED, entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/14/2000)
Transmitted supplemental record on appeal: [113-11 appeal consisting of 1 vol. of record. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/13/2000)
123 ORDER mooting [107-11 motion for attorney fees mooting [96-11 motion
to terminate and vacate [64-11 order (preliminary injunction) mooting
[91-11 motion for attorney fees ,entered; The motion for atty fess by both
the pltf and Cameron County may be reurged following the ruling by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/25/2000)
124 ORDER granting [121-11 request for a Three Judge Court, entered;
Parties notified. (Carolyn Dineen King, Chief Judge for the Fifth Circuit) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/01/2000)

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02/08/2000 02/08/2000
F
02110/2000 02/22/2000 03/08/2000 071 1 312000 08/08/2000 01/10/2001 01/24/2001
0 1/24/2001 02/01/2001 02/01/200 1
02/01/200 1 02/02/2001

125 ORDER vacating [73-21 order of consolidation ,entered; Parties notified.
( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0211 0/2000)
126 REQUEST by Jose Raul Castillo for evidentiary hearing to determine whether this Court should approve the proposed settlement between the pltf class and dft Cameron County Texas, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02110/2000)
127 MOTION to intervene by State of texas ,to stay by State of Texas,
Motion Docket Date 3/1/00 [127-11motion, 3/1/00 [127-21 motion, filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/14/2000)
128 RESPONSE by State of Texas in opposition to [126-1] request for an
evidentiary hearing ,filed (ogutierrez)(Entered: 02/23/2000)
Deadline updated; denying [120-11 motion for summaryjudgment (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/09/2000)
129 MOTION for hearing before three judge panel by Jose Raul Castillo, Motion Docket Date 8/2/00 [129-11 motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered:
07/20/2000)
130 ORDER granting [127-11 motion to intervene by State of texas granting
[127-21 motion to stay ,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate
Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 08/09/2000)
Letter from Judge Black to all counsel, filed. Copy of letter mailed to all counsel of record. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01111/2001)
132 Minute entry: Telephonic Status Conference b/Judge Black held. Apps:
Michael Cowen,Richard Burst,Daniel Maeso and Sharon Felfe appeared telephonic.Status conference to be reset. Sharon Felfe is to be substituted for Philip Lionberger as co-counsel for the Attorney General's Office. Clerk will make docket entry to correct substituion. Terminate Robert Mendoza as attorney for Eloy Sanchez. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
133 ORDER set telephonic status conference for 1:30 2/23/01 before
Magistrate Judge John W. Black ,entered; Parties ( signed by Magistrate
Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
& Certified copy of USCA OPINION, filed. CCA No. 99-41217
(ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
135 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) 1/05/01 issued as mandate on
1/29/01 vacating and remanding to the District Court for further proceedings, filed. CCA No. 99-41217 (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
Record and exhibits to be returned at a later date. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
MOTION to amend definition by Jose Raul Castillo, et a1 Motion Docket

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02/07/2001 02/08/2001 02/09/2001 02/14/2001 0211 61200 1 02/23/2001
02/23/2001 02/23/200 1
03/05/200 1 03/05/2001 03/08/2001 03/09/200 1 05/08/200 1 0513 11200 1

Date 2/22/01 [136-11 motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
Record on appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals consisting of 2 volumes of record. 2 volumes of supplemental record. 3 volumes of transcript. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/08/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [133-21order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/08/2001)
137 RESPONSE by State of Texas and defendants and third party defendants
Annn Richards, et a1 in opposition to [136-11motion to amend
definition ,filed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
118 ORDER denying [136-11motion to amend definition ,entered; Parties
notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0211512001)
139 UNOPPOSED MOTION to strike language from temporary order by
Cameron County, Texa, Motion Docket Date 3/8/01 [139-11 motion ,
filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0212112001)
J44J Minute entry: telephonic status conference held b/Judge Black. Apps: Michael Cowen and Richard Burst appeared in chambers. Daniel Maeso appeared telephonically. Hearing on attorney's fees will be held in June 200 1. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
141 ORDER set Attorney fees hearing 1:30 6/6/01 before Magistrate Judge
John W. Black ,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
142 ORDER granting [139-11 motion to strike language from Paragraph I and
J of the Amended temporary order signed by this Court on 10/2/97 ,
entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [138-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/05/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Jon Alan Ashcraft re: [138-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/05/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [141-21 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [142-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
143 NOTICE of Vacation by Attorney Michael R Cowen ,filed. May 5 -
thru23-2001 and June 9thry June 17,2001. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 05/08/200 1)
Deadline updated; reset hearing on Attorney's Fees at 2:00 on 6/20/01 before Magistrate Judge John W. Black as per Copy of letter placed on correspondence side. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0513 1/2001)

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06/20/2001

06/20/200 1 06/20/2001 06/27/200 1

06/27/200 1
06/28/2001 06/28/2001

0711 61200 1 07/19/2001 07/20/200 1 08/16/2001

0811 61200 1

08/16/2001

09/04/200 1

09/04/200 1

I

I

144 Minute entry: Hearing on Attorney's fees held. Apps: Michael Cowen
f7pltf; Richard Burst, Daniel Maeso and Susan Werner appeared. Pltfs' hourly rate discussed with the State. Cameron County seeking attorneys fees from State. No objection to Affidavit filed by Pltfs. Ct Reporter:
Gabriel MendietaIERO . (ogutierrez) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
145 ADDENDUM to [107-11 motion for attorney fees by Cameron County,
Texa , filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
146 MOTION for award of attorneys' fees by Jose Raul Castillo, Motion
Docket Date 7/10/01 [146-11motion ,filed. (ogutierrez) (Entered:
06/29/2001)
147 ORDER granting [146-11 motion for award of attorneys' fees granting
[145-11 supplement addendum of Cameron County to attorneys fees ,
entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
148 FINAL JUDGMENT and Permanent Injunction against State of Texas,
Cameron County, Texa for Attorneys fees. ,entered. Parties ntfd. ( signed
by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
Case closed (ogutierrez) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
149 Letter mailed to Honorable Fortunato P Benavidez, and Honorable Hilda
G Tagle from Judge John William Black. Copies also forwarded to Michael Milby and Chief Judge Carolyn King. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [148-11order, [I47-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0711612001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Jon Alan Ashcraft re: [148-11order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0711912001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Jon Alan Ashcraft re: [148-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 07/23/2001)
-
150 AGREED MOTION for judgment nunc pro tunc by Cameron County,
Texa, State of Texas, Jose Raul Castillo ,et al filed. (ogutierrez)
(Entered: 0811712001)
- 15-1 ORDER granting [150-11 agreed motion for judgment nunc pro tunc ,
entered; Parties notified. ( signed by Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0811712001)
152 JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC ;,entered; Parties notified. ( signed by
Magistrate Judge John W. Black ) (ogutierrez) (Entered: 08/17/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re:
[I 51-11 order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Gustavo Almaguer re: [152-11judgment order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/04/200 1)

I

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09/07/200 1 09119/2001 12/31/2001 04/26/2002 04/26/2002 04/26/2002

MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Jon Alan Ashcraft re: [I 5 1-11order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 09/07/200 1)
MAIL RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE as to Jon Alan Ashcraft re: [I 52-11judgment order (ogutierrez) (Entered: 0911912001)
-1- 53 NOTICE of Vacation of Michael Cowen ,filed. January 3,2002 thru
1/8/02. (ogutierrez) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
154 Complete Release of All Claims by Michael R. Cowen, filed. (lgarcia)
(Entered: 04/26/2002)
155 Complete Release of All Claims by John Jose Martinez, filed. (lgarcia)
(Entered: 04/26/2002)
156 Complete Release of All Claims by Richard Burst, filed. (Igarcia)
(Entered: 04/26/2002)

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 238 F.3d 339 (2001)
Jose Raul Castillo; Francisco Lopez; E Eloy Sanchez; Jon Alan Ashcraft; Gustavo Almaguer, Plaintiffs-Appellees v.
Cameron County, Texas, Defendant-Third Party, Plaintiff-Appellee v.
State of Texas; George W Bush, Governor of Texas; Allan B Polunsky, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Carole S Young, Member of the Board Texas
Department of Criminal Justice; John David Franz, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Patricia a Day, Member of the Board Texas Department of
Criminal Justice; William "Hank" Moody, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Alfred C Moran, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Nancy Patton, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; a M "Mac" Stringfellow, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Carol S Vance, Member of the Board Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendants-Third
Party, Defendants-Appellants
No. 99-41217.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
January 5, 2001. Revised February 7, 2001.
34012 *340 *341 *342 Keith Clark Livesay, Livesay & Cowen, Pharr, TX, Michael Raphael Cowen (argued), Brownsville, TX, for Castillo, Lopez and Sanchez.
Jon Alan Ashcraft, Angleton, TX, pro se.
Gustavo Almahuer, Maywood, CA, pro se.
Richard O. Burst (argued), Cameron County Commissioners Court, Civil Legal Dept., Dylbia Jefferies Vega, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brownsville, TX, for Cameron Cty., TX.
343 *343 Philip Andrew Lionberger (argued), Gregory Scott Coleman, Daniel E. Maeso, Austin, TX, for DefendantsThird Party Defendants-Appellants.
Before KING, Chief Judge, PARKER, Circuit Judge, and FURGESON, District Judge.[*]
KING, Chief Judge:
Appellants, the State of Texas, et al., appeal from the district court's order continuing injunctive relief in favor of Appellees Jose Raul Castillo, et al. For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court's July 20, 1999 order and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought in 1993 by Plaintiffs-Appellees (the "plaintiffs"), a certified class[1] of detainees in the Cameron County, Texas jail (the "Jail") against Cameron County (the "County") and the State of Texas, the governor of Texas, and various members of the Board of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the "State").[2] The plaintiffs alleged that overcrowding at the Jail produced

conditions that constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
The plaintiffs originally filed suit against only the County. The County brought a third-party complaint seeking injunctive relief against the State, alleging that the State failed to expeditiously transfer nearly 300 "paper ready" inmates[3] to state correctional facilities and, therefore, was responsible for the constitutional violations. On January 21, 1994, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding the State as a defendant, and on May 20, 1994, they filed an application for a preliminary injunction, in an attempt to remedy the overcrowding by enjoining the County and the State from incarcerating more prisoners in the Jail than allowed by the Texas Jail Standards.
On August 15, 1994, the district court entered a temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs to reduce the jail population (the "August 1994 injunction").[4] Then, on September 14, 1994, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order, which included a preliminary injunction against the State and the County (the "September 1994 injunction").
In its September 1994 injunction, the court made a number of findings, based on testimony presented at the 344 preliminary injunction hearing, the documents admitted *344 into evidence, and the court's tour of the detention
facilities. The court found that the Jail was overcrowded and that 289 of the detainees were convicted felons awaiting transfer to state prisons operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). The court also found that, at that point in time, TDCJ had a scheduled admissions policy that had caused a backlog of convicted inmates to accumulate in the Jail.[5] As a result of this significant overcrowding, over thirty percent of the detainees slept on mattresses on the floor each night. Additionally, fighting requiring medical attention increased. The court also found the medical care received by the inmates to be "alarming" as the County based its medicalcare budget on a 500-person average occupancy, rather than the actual occupancy.[6] Furthermore, overcrowding limited the attempts by county officials to classify detainees according to dangerousness and to adequately segregate mentally ill detainees, witnesses, and pretrial detainees.
The classification that has been possible has lead [sic] to severe overcrowding in some cells. For example, 30 detainees have been forced into a cell designed for 10 and held there three months, where the cell did not have water, a toilet, or a shower. Six detainees have been forced into a holding cell designed for two, leaving at least two of these people with no choice but to stand all day.[7]
Under the terms of the September 1994 injunction, the State was required to "remove the number of state-ready felons from the custody of Cameron County officials" necessary to bring the Jail's population within design capacity or prove that constitutional conditions would be preserved if the Jail contained more prisoners than it was designed to hold.[8] The September 1994 injunction also required the County to adopt an operation plan describing how the County would provide for the Jail's needs six months in the future and two years in the future, to evaluate and revise those plans on an annual basis, and to submit them to the district court.
345 On October 2, 1997, the district court amended the August 1994 injunction *345 ("1997 injunction"). The 1997 injunction lists, inter alia, a number of actions intended to reduce the jail population[9] and a number of Population Reduction Provisions that the Cameron County sheriff can make to keep the prison population from surpassing ninety percent of its design capacity. Specifically, the injunction dictates that "if at any time the population of the Cameron County Jail exceeds ninety per cent of the design capacity ... for such jail, the Sheriff of Cameron County is ORDERED to, and shall, in addition to any other actions he may deem appropriate, take such of the following [Population Reduction Provisions] he may see fit in order to reduce jail population...." For example, one of the Population Reduction Provisions permits the sheriff to "refuse to receive for pre-hearing confinement from state pardon and parole officers any `blue warrant' person charged with a parole violation.[10] Similarly, "the Sheriff may notify the Department of Pardons and Parole that the `blue warrant' inmates will be released after they have been held for forty-five days unless a [']white warrant' has issued."[11] Although the 1997 injunction was issued while the State was still a party to the proceedings, it did not require the State to take

any particular action, only the County. Pursuant to the 1997 injunction, the Cameron County sheriff refused to incarcerate a number of "blue warrant" parole violators.[12]
On April 26, 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), which "establishes standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions," went into effect. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 2250, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); see also Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996). On May 3, 1999, pursuant to the PLRA, the State filed a motion to terminate the September 1994 injunction. The State argued that immediate termination of the preliminary injunction was warranted because the PLRA requires termination of prospective relief entered without making certain specific findings, which the district court had not made when it issued the September 1994 injunction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Alternatively, the State asserted that the September 1994 injunction must be terminated because the PLRA mandates termination of prospective relief upon the motion of any party or intervener two years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief or two years after the enactment date of the PLRA. See id. § 3626(b)(1).
On May 21, 1999, the district court held a status conference. The parties agreed that the September 1994 injunction against the State was no longer necessary, as the State had transferred the "paper ready" prisoners to state facilities. Because the State had complied with the September 1994 injunction, the parties also discussed 346 dismissing the State as a party. Moreover, the district court indicated that it *346 was inclined to turn the 1997 temporary injunction against the County into a permanent injunction. The County proposed an order so doing, to which the State objected. Specifically, the State objected to a provision in the order that permitted the Cameron County sheriff to continue to refuse to incarcerate alleged parole violators in order to limit the number of prisoners in the Jail. The State contended that this provision violated the PLRA, which prohibits federal courts from ordering prospective relief that violates state law.
On May 27, 1999, the district court entered an order extending the September 1994 injunction for another sixty days so that the plaintiffs and the County could finalize a consent decree. During those sixty days, on June 28, 1999, the State filed an "advisory," reiterating its objection to continuing the temporary injunctive relief embodied in the 1997 injunction as violative of the PLRA. The State argued, inter alia, that the 1997 injunction constituted a prisoner release order, which, under the PLRA, can only be entered by a three-judge panel that is required to make specific findings, see id. § 3626(a)(3), and that order authorized the Cameron County sheriff to violate state law, action which is also governed by the PLRA. See id. § 3626(a)(1)(B).
On July 27, 1999, the district court held another status conference ("July 27 hearing") that addressed the September 1994 injunction, the 1997 injunction, and the dismissal of the State as a party to the proceedings. The State argued that the district court should terminate the September 1994 injunction because it did not contain the findings required by the PLRA for the granting of prospective relief, a requirement that was to be applied retroactively. The County agreed that the September 1994 injunction should be terminated, but the plaintiffs argued that the injunction should be continued to prevent the State from again overcrowding the Jail.
In regard to the 1997 injunction, the State objected that it also violated the PLRA, in that the court had not made the proper findings when granting the relief and, also, that it constituted a prisoner release order, which, under the PLRA, may only be issued by a three-judge panel. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B). The County and the plaintiffs contended that the 1997 injunction should be continued and that the court had made the requisite findings.
Finally, all three parties agreed that the State should be dismissed as a party. However, the State wanted a proviso that it was still concerned about the sheriff's ability to refuse to incarcerate blue warrant violators.
The district court entered a minute order on July 27, 1999, dismissing the State from the lawsuit. On July 30, 1999, the district court entered an order (the "1999 order") denying the State's motion to terminate and continuing both the September 1994 injunction and "all other preliminary injunctive relief granted by this Court." In making its determination, the court considered all of the arguments made at the July 27 hearing, the stipulation made by all parties that there were at least 289 blue warrants in the County and that the Jail would be well over 100% capacity if those 289 persons were incarcerated, an affidavit filed by Captain Luis Esparza,[13] and the stipulation

347 filed by the County and the *347 plaintiffs on July 29, 1999.[14] Additionally, the district court took judicial notice "of all evidence previously presented in this case."
At the time the district court issued the 1999 order, it also purported to make the findings required by the PLRA to limit the termination of relief otherwise subject to termination. The order provided:
In making this decision, the Court specifically finds that, without the continuation of the temporary injunction, the Cameron County Jail population would almost immediately exceed 100% and thereby created [sic] Constitutionally prohibited jail conditions. The Court specifically finds that prospective relief, including the continuation of the temporary injunction, remains necessary to correct and prevent a current and ongoing violation of the Class Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional rights, that the temporary injunction extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Class Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights, and that the temporary injunction is narrowly drawn and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
The State timely appeals the 1999 order.[15]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standing is reviewed under a de novo standard. See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 419 n. 34 (5th Cir.1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). Although the district court's decision to continue the injunctions is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, see Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir.1999), because the district court's decision to terminate or continue the injunctions turns on the application of § 3626(b) of the PLRA, that interpretation is reviewed de novo. See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir.1999).
The application of the relevant sections of the PLRA requires the district court to make a finding of an ongoing constitutional violation, which is a mixed question of law and fact. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 661 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951, 118 S.Ct. 2366, 141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998). We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 333 n. 13 (5th Cir.1999) .
III. STANDING
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the State has standing to pursue this appeal. The plaintiffs argue that the State lacks standing to appeal the 1999 order because it is no longer a party to the action and, therefore, is no longer bound by or required to take any action in regard to the injunctions. Recognizing that, in some cases, a nonparty has standing to appeal an injunction that affects it, the plaintiffs contend that the injunction did not require the State to take any particular action or cause the State to suffer any injury, and, therefore, did not affect the State. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that, even if the State is bound by the injunction, the State has no standing to appeal to set aside the injunctive provisions against the County, a coparty that did not appeal.
The State argues that it has standing because the PLRA expressly gives it standing to challenge this type of prospective relief. Additionally, it contends that, even as a nonparty, it has standing to appeal an injunction that adversely affects it. We agree.
A. Standing Under the PLRA
348 The PLRA expressly provides for standing for certain officials and units of *348 government. As § 3626(a)(3)(F) of the PLRA provides:
Any State or local official including a legislator or unit of government whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison

facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not admitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall have standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding relating to such relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) (2000) (emphasis added). The PLRA then defines a "prisoner release order" to "include[] any order, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison." Id. § 3626(g)(4). Therefore, if the 1999 order (which, as noted above, expressly continues the September 1994 injunction and "all other temporary injunctive relief currently in effect") fits within the definition of a prisoner release order, the statute gives the State both standing and the right to seek its termination or oppose its continuation.
The first question we must answer, then, is whether the injunctions contained or continued in the 1999 order are prisoner release orders. We find that they are. The September 1994 injunction requires the State to "adopt and implement the policies necessary to remove the number of state-ready felons from the custody of Cameron County officials that is necessary to ensure that Cameron County's detention facilities are not populated above design capacity." Similarly, the October 1997 injunction orders the Sheriff of Cameron County, "if at any time the population of Cameron County Jail exceeds ninety per cent of the design capacity," to "take such of the following actions he may see fit in order to reduce jail population." Both of these injunctions cap the prison population at a particular number of detainees, which has the "purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population."
These types of "population caps" have consistently been found to meet the definition of a prisoner release order. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 825-27 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding final judgment that set specific population limits on number of prisoners allowed to be housed in various prisons to be a prisoner release order), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1158, 119 S.Ct. 2046, 144 L.Ed.2d 213 (1999); see also Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that twenty-person cap on probation detainees in a particular prison was a prisoner release order). In fact, a review of the legislative history of the PLRA reveals that it was precisely these types of caps that the statute was created to address. See 141 CONG. REC. S14413-14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)("Perhaps the most pernicious form of judicial micromanagement is the so-called prison population cap.").
The September 1994 injunction requires the State to adopt policies that will keep the population of the Jail at design capacity. The October 1997 injunction requires the sheriff to keep the prison at or below ninety-percent capacity. We therefore find that these injunctions are prisoner release orders as defined by the PLRA, and therefore, under the PLRA, the State has the right "to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such relief." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F).
B. Nonparty Standing to Appeal
In addition to this express statutory grant of standing, we also find that the State possesses sufficient interest in the litigation to qualify for nonparty standing to appeal. The plaintiffs argue that the State, as a nonparty, lacks 349 standing to appeal the 1999 order because the State is no longer a party to the lawsuit and because *349 the State was not bound or otherwise injured by the injunctions continued in the 1999 order. The State contends that, even as a nonparty, it has standing to appeal the order because it adversely affects its interests. We agree.
Plaintiffs correctly assert the general rule that nonparties cannot appeal the court's judgment. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well-settled."). However, that rule has not been rigidly adhered to; a nonparty may be allowed to appeal if the decree affects his interests. As we stated in United States v. Chagra:
"[I]f the decree affects [a third party's] interests, he is often allowed to appeal." ... Thus, a nonparty may appeal orders for discovery if he has no other effective means of obtaining review. Similarly non-parties have been allowed to appeal orders granting or denying further disclosure of

documents already in the possession of a court or grand jury. Non-party creditors who assert rights in receivership proceedings may appeal orders affecting their legitimate interests. If an injunction extends to non-parties, they may appeal from it.
701 F.2d 354, 358-59 (5th Cir.1983) (alterations in original) (footnotes and citation omitted); see also United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[N]on-parties who are bound by a court's equitable decrees have a right to move to have the order dissolved, ... and other circuits have held that where a non-party is purportedly bound by an injunction, the non-party may bring an appeal rather than face the possibility of a contempt proceeding."); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir.1996) (finding standing for nonparty where injunction confronted nonparty "with the choice of either conforming its conduct to the dictates of the injunction or ignoring the injunction and risking contempt proceedings"); In re Piper Funds, Inc., Institutional Gov't Income Portfolio Litig., 71 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir.1995) ("A nonparty normally has standing to appeal when it is adversely affected by an injunction."). However, allowing nonparties to appeal a court's judgment is still a rare exception to the general rule.
In order to determine if a nonparty may properly appeal, this court has adopted a three-part test,[16] analyzing "whether `the non-parties actually participated in the proceedings below, the equities weigh in favor of hearing the appeal, and the non-parties have a personal stake in the outcome.'" Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1442-43 (5th Cir.1995); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Topworth Int'l, Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that a 350 nonparty to the litigation on the merits will have standing to appeal the decision when *350 the party participated in the proceedings and the equities favor hearing the appeal); Davis v. Scott, 176 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir.1999); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir.1998); Binker v. Commonwealth of Pa., 977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir.1992).
We find that under this standard, the State is permitted to appeal the continuance of the injunctions. First, there can be no question in this instance that the State has been an active participant in the proceedings. From the time the plaintiffs first amended their complaint to just two days before the continuance of the injunctions, the State was a named party to the proceedings. In fact, the State brought the very motion that was denied in the order that is being appealed.
Second, the equities weigh in favor of allowing the State to appeal. Given that the PLRA itself gives the State the right to seek the termination of injunctive relief, it seems unjust to deny them standing to appeal the denial of that termination.[17] Similarly, as the State filed the original motion to terminate the injunctions, and maintained that position at the July 30 hearing, we find it unfair to continue the injunctions without permitting the State to appeal the continuation. Therefore, we conclude that the equities of the situation weigh in favor of allowing the State to appeal.
Under the third prong, the State must show it has a personal stake in the outcome.[18] We find that it does. First, the State's economic interests are implicated. Although the State had been dismissed as a party, prior to the 1999 order continuing the injunctions, no changes were made to the September 1994 injunction itself, which requires the State to remove paper-ready prisoners within forty-five days. In Loyd v. Alabama Department of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1061, 120 S.Ct. 613, 145 L.Ed.2d 509 (1999), the Eleventh Circuit held that requiring the state to transfer prisoners from county to state jails within a specified period of time impacts the economic interests of the state because it must have facilities available for the transfer. We agree. Second, should the State violate the September 1994 injunction it risks being found in civil contempt. "`A party commits contempt when he violates a definite and specific order of the court requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the court's order.'" Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir.1995) (citing SEC v. First Fin. Group of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 669 (5th Cir.1981)). As the State was a party to the proceedings when the September 1994 injunction was originally issued, it could reasonably believe itself at risk of civil contempt if it violated the injunction, regardless of whether it has since been dismissed as a party. Therefore, the State has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to challenge the continuation of the September 1994 injunction.

In regard to the October 1997 injunction, even though the State is not required to perform or refrain from performing any particular acts by the its terms, we find the State's sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests to be 351 implicated. First, the October 1997 injunction allows the sheriff, in violation of state law, to refuse to incarcerate *351 state parole violators for whom blue warrants have been issued. The State has a sovereign interest in enforcing its laws. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) ("Two sovereign interests are easily identified: First, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction0907this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal."); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir.1999) ("[S]tates have a sovereign interest in `the power to create and enforce a legal code.'") (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260). Because the State has a sovereign interest in enforcing its laws, it has a personal stake in appealing the October 1997 injunction that gives the County discretion to violate those laws.
Second, all of the parties stipulated that there were 289 blue warrant violators who, but for the injunction, would be required under state law to be housed in the Jail. This implicates the State's quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from criminal activity. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ("Quasi-sovereign interests stand apart from [sovereign interests, proprietary interests, or private interests pursued by the State as a nominal party].... They consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace."). While we recognize that the concept of quasi-sovereign standing "risks being too vague to survive the standing requirements of Article III," id. at 602, 102 S.Ct. 3260, we find the State's interest at issue here falls within the category of "a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being 0907both physical and economic of 0907 its residents in general." Id. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260. As a result of this injunction, parole violators who should be incarcerated remain free, potentially increasing the level of criminal activity. The State has a legitimate interest in "protect[ing] its citizens from criminal elements." Nat'l People's Action v. Village of Wilmette, 914 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976)). This quasi-sovereign interest also gives the State a personal stake in the outcome of the appeal.
For the reasons stated above, we find the State satisfies the three-part standard set out in Searcy and, therefore, has standing to appeal the 1999 order.

IV. TERMINATION OF RELIEF UNDER § 3626(b)

The PLRA "establishes standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions." Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 2250, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000). The PLRA both "narrowly limits the relief a court may order in prisoner suits," Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 817 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1158, 119 S.Ct. 2046, 144 L.Ed.2d 213 (1999), and "authorizes the termination of existing prospective relief that does not comply with these limits." Id.

Regarding termination of prospective relief,[19] the PLRA distinguishes between immediately terminable relief and relief that is terminable after a specified period of time has passed. The requirements for the former are set out in § 3626(b)(2):

In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to

the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the

absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

352

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the *352 least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.

Id. § 3626(b)(2). The requirements for the latter are set out in § 3626(b)(1):

(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener 0907

(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief;

(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment.
Id. § 3626(b)(1). However, both of these termination provisions are subject to the limitation of § 3626(b)(3), which provides that
Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
To determine whether the district court erred in its decision to continue the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction, we must first ascertain if the injunctions were terminable under either § 3626(b)(1) or § 3626(b) (2) and, if so, decide whether the requirements to continue the relief mandated by § 3626(b)(3) were met.
A. The Injunctions Are Terminable Under § 3626(b)(1)
The State contends that both the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction were entered without the findings required by § 3626(b)(2) and that, therefore, it is entitled to immediate termination of the prospective relief. Additionally, it argues that it is entitled to termination under § 3626(b)(1), because more than two years have elapsed since the district court granted the prospective relief. Therefore, the State asserts that the district court erred in refusing to terminate the injunctions because it was required to do so, unless the court made the written findings based on the record required by § 3626(b)(3), which it did not do. Specifically, the State claims that the record does not support the court's finding that the injunctions (1) were necessary to remedy a "current and ongoing" violation of a federal right, (2) were narrowly drawn, and (3) were the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal right (the "§ 3626(b)(3) findings"). The plaintiffs assert that not only were the § 3626(b)(2) findings made when the district court granted the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction, but that, even if they were not, the district court, in its 1999 order, made the § 3626(b)(3) findings that allow the court to continue the relief.
We need not determine whether it was necessary for the district court to expressly make the § 3626(b)(2) findings or if the findings may be implied from the court's judgment because we find that both the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction fall squarely within the termination provision of § 3626(b)(1)(iii) as more than two years have passed since the enactment of the PLRA. Even though the injunctions at issue were granted prior to the enactment of the PLRA, the termination provisions of § 3626(b)(1) still apply. When enacting the PLRA, Congress specifically provided that "'[Section 3626] shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.'" 353 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355, 119 *353 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting § 802(b)(1), note following 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 ed., Supp. III)). Additionally, the provision itself provides that "in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, [such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener] 2 years after such date of enactment." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(iii). The PLRA was enacted on April 26, 1996, and the State, at the time a party to the proceeding, filed its motion for termination on May 3, 1999, more than three years later. Therefore, the relief is terminable unless the findings set out in § 3626(b)(3) are made.

B. The Record Inadequately Supports the District Court's NeedNarrowness Findings
Section 3626(b)(3) provides that prospective relief will not terminate if the court "makes written findings based on the record" that (1) "prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right," (2) "extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," and (3) "that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (3).
We first note that a "current and ongoing" violation is one that "exists at the time the district court conducts the § 3626(b)(3) inquiry." Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 784 (11th Cir.2000); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662 (6th Cir.2000)(stating that "the PLRA directs a district court to look to current conditions"); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir.1999) ("Evidence presented at a prior time, however, could not show a violation that is `current and ongoing.' Hence, the `record' referred to cannot mean the prior record but must mean a record reflecting conditions at the time termination is sought."); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir.1999) ("Mere speculation that Defendants might refuse to honor alleged contractual obligations is insufficient to support a finding of `current and ongoing violations of [a] Federal right.'" (alteration in original)).[20]
Therefore, in order to make the required finding of a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right required by § 3626(b)(3) a court must look at the conditions in the jail at the time termination is sought, not at conditions that existed in the past or at conditions that may possibly occur in the future, to determine if there is a violation of a 354 federal right. Additionally, *354 the court must also, based on the record, make the other findings required by § 3626(b)(3). "The court must make new findings about whether the relief currently complies with the neednarrowness-intrusiveness requirements, given the nature of the current violations. It is not enough under § 3626 (b)(3) that the orders, when entered, were sufficiently narrow considering the violations that existed at that time." Cason, 231 F.3d at 784-85. This
requir[es] particularized findings, on a provision-by-provision basis, that each requirement imposed by the consent decrees satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria, given the nature of the current and ongoing violation. It is not enough to simply state in conclusory fashion that the requirements of the consent decrees satisfy those criteria. Particularized findings, analysis, and explanations should be made as to the application of each criteria to each requirement imposed by the consent decrees.
Id. We agree with this analysis.
In its 1999 order continuing relief, the district court found
that prospective relief ... remains necessary to correct and prevent a current and ongoing violation of the Class Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional Rights, that the temporary injunction extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Class Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional Rights, and that the temporary injunction is narrowly drawn and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
As a basis for these findings, the court
considered the arguments made by all counsel at the hearing on July 27, 1999, the stipulation made by all parties, including the [sic] Daniel Maeso who represents the State of Texas, that there [sic] at least 289 Blue Warrant persons in Cameron County and that the Cameron County Jail would be well over 100% capacity of [sic] these 289 Blue Warrant persons were incarcerated in that jail, the stipulation filed by Cameron County and Plaintiffs on July 29, 1999 and the Affidavit of Captain Luis Esparza. The Court also takes judicial notice of all evidence previously presented in this case.

Although the language in the 1999 order tracks the requirements of § 3626(b)(3), it does not reach the needed level of particularized findings based on the conditions in the jail at the time termination was requested that is required by § 3626(b)(3). Additionally, there is simply not enough evidence in the record to support the requisite findings.
The only evidence in the record relevant to whether a "current and ongoing" violation of a federal right exists, is that there are 289 Blue Warrant persons outstanding who would put the Jail over design capacity if they were arrested. There are two reasons that this is insufficient to support the finding of a "current and ongoing" constitutional violation. First, although overcrowding may give rise to unconstitutional conditions, overcrowding itself is not per se unconstitutional. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Second, this threat of overcrowding was based on a prediction of future activity. See, e.g., Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir.1999) ("[A]ppellant could only point to `the looming threat of potential overcrowding' but did not produce any evidence to support a finding that this threat constitutes a `current and ongoing violation' under the PLRA.").
Moreover, there was no evidence in the 1999 order or in the record of any analysis or explanation as to the other findings required by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). For example, we would expect the court to consider other alternatives before reaching the conclusion that these injunctions "extend[] no further than necessary to correct 355 the violation of the Federal right," 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3), and are "narrowly *355 drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." Id.
However, as we note that the record before us contains almost no evidence regarding current conditions in the Jail and that all parties offered to present additional evidence on these issues at the July 27 hearing, we conclude that the best course of action is to remand this case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the relief meets the requirements of § 3626(b)(3).
V. ENTRY OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF UNDER § 3626(a)
In addition to arguing that the injunctions should be terminated pursuant to the §§ 3626(b)(1) and (b)(2) termination provisions of the PLRA, the State also argues that the September 1994 injunction, the 1997 injunction, and the 1999 order should be terminated because they violate the requirements of § 3626(a)(3), which sets out the criteria for the entry of prisoner release orders (including the requirement for a three-judge court), and § 3626(a)(1)(B), which sets out the conditions under which a court can enter prospective relief that allows a government official to violate state law.[21]
In regard to the entry of prisoner release orders, the relevant provisions of § 3626(a)(3) provide:
(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, no court shall enter a prisoner release order unless 0907
(i) a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order; and
(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.
(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have been met.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A), (B) (emphasis added). As discussed above, we have already found the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction to fit within the PLRA's definition of prisoner release orders. Therefore, we must determine how this provision of the PLRA affects the September 1994 injunction, the 1997 injunction, and the 1999 order.

The State also argues that the September 1994 injunction, the 1997 injunction, and the 1999 order should be terminated because they permit the sheriff of Cameron County to refuse to accept parole violators, in violation of § 3626(a)(1)(B). Section 3626(a)(1)(B) provides:
The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates State or local law, unless
0907
(i) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in violation of State or local law;
(ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; and
(iii) no other relief will correct the violation of a federal right.
Id. § 3626(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The parties do not dispute that permitting the Cameron County sheriff to 356 decline to accept "blue warrant" parole violators into *356 the jail constitutes a violation of state law. Therefore,
we must determine how this provision of the PLRA impacts the existing injunctions and the 1999 order.
While we agree that the PLRA was intended to apply to injunctions existing at the time the PLRA was enacted, we do not agree that the PLRA requires termination of pre-PLRA injunctions that did not meet the requirements of §§ 3626(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). As discussed above, when enacting the PLRA, Congress specifically provided that "` [Section 3626] shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.'" Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting § 802(b)(1), note following 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 ed., Supp. III)).
"`In interpreting a statute, our objective is to give effect to the intent of Congress. As always, we begin with the language of the statute itself.'" Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 819 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting Stiles v. GTE Southwest Inc., 128 F.3d 904, 907 (5th Cir.1997)). Here, the language of the provisions at issue indicates that they apply only when the court is entering relief. Section 3626(a)(1)(B) begins: "The court shall not order any prospective relief." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B). Similarly, the language in § 3626(a)(3) provides: "No court shall enter a prisoner release order unless...." Id. (a)(3). Relying on the language of the statutes, we conclude that they do not apply when relief was entered prior to the enactment of the PLRA. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agrees. See Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir.1999) ("To the extent this request was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3), which establishes special requirements for prisoner release orders, it was unfounded. The orders in question long predate § 3626 .... The district court did not `enter' any order in violation of the PLRA.").
In sum, although the PLRA applies to injunctions existing at the time of its enactment, §§ 3626(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) apply when relief is entered, whether that occurs by entering new relief or by modifying existing relief. Therefore, the September 1994 injunction and the 1997 injunction cannot be terminated for failure to comply with §§ 3626(a) (1)(B) and (a)(3) because they predated the PLRA and do not constitute the entering of relief. Similarly, the district court, in entering the 1999 order, did not enter new relief, but simply denied the State's motion to terminate the existing relief. Although the court did expressly state that it was continuing the relief, that language is a mere truism 0907 it did no more than state what would happen by operation of law once the motion to terminate the relief was denied. No changes or modifications to the injunctions in place were made.
Additionally, we note that "[i]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another." BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Congress did not explicitly state that failure to comply with these particular provisions is a ground for termination of relief. In contrast, in § 3626(b), Congress did provide that failure comply with other provisions of the PLRA would be grounds for termination of relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). In fact, § 3626(b)(2), which provides for immediate termination of relief if particular findings were not made when the prospective relief at issue was entered, contains almost the exact same findings criteria as § 3626(a)(1), which sets out the requirements for the granting of prospective relief. If Congress had intended that injunctions issued before the 357 enactment of the PLRA were to be terminated for failure to comply with the requirements of *357 §§ 3626(a)(1)

(B) and (a)(3), it would have so provided. Therefore, we find that the September 1994 injunction, the 1997 injunction, and the 1999 order are not terminable for failure to comply with those sections.
VI. CONCLUSION
On remand the district court must first determine if a continuing and ongoing constitutional violation exists, and, if so, whether the remaining requirements of § 3626(b)(3) are met. However, we note that any modification of the existing relief that constituted the entry of new relief would need to meet the requirements set out in § 3626(a). Additionally, should the existing relief be terminated for failure to meet the requirements of § 3626(b)(3), the plaintiffs are entitled to seek new prospective relief, but that relief must also meet the standards set forth in § 3626(a). The district court should conduct the required hearing and rule on termination as promptly as possible.
Therefore, we VACATE the 1999 order and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[*] District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
[1] The suit was originally filed by Jose Raul Castillo, Francisco Lopez, and Eloy Sanchez. Their motion for class certification for the class consisting of "All prisoners of the Cameron County Jail as of 1/3/94" was granted on January 5, 1994. That class includes both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates. However, we note that if all prisoners as of January 3, 1994 have since left the jail, that would mean there is no class member who is entitled to seek injunctive relief. On remand, the district court should look into the matter of whether, because of this fact, this case is moot, see Davis v. Ball Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n., Inc., 753 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir.1985) ("When the claims of all the class members are moot, the action is moot."). See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.9, at 401 (2d ed. 1984) ("[I]f the claim of the entire class is moot, the case is finished.").
[2] The State was not brought in to the suit until January 1994.
[3] "Paper ready" inmates are those that are certified for transfer to the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, but who have yet to be transferred.
[4] The August 1994 injunction was amended on October 2, 1997, and it is that amended version that is at issue in this proceeding.
[5] The Jail, at the time of the issuance of the September 1994 injunction, was designed to hold 546 people. However, under jail standards and management practices, counties typically limit occupancy to 85% of design capacity, which, the court stated, in this case, would have been 467 detainees, significantly less than the 862 detainees housed in the Jail at the time.
We note that an additional facility designed to hold 192 detainees was within weeks of completion at the time of the hearing on the September 1994 injunction, and, during oral argument on this appeal, the County announced that construction had begun on a new facility designed to hold an additional 641 people.
[6] The court found that, since medicine was unavailable, diabetics were treated with diet, other necessary drugs were also unavailable, and no funds for medical screening for HIV-positive people were allocated. One expert testified that there existed a substantial risk of a tuberculosis epidemic at the time of the hearing.
[7] These findings established to the district court's satisfaction the substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs could prove a constitutional violation. The court also found sufficient evidence to show a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs could prove the required "deliberate indifference" on the part of the State and the County. The court found that overall, these elements established a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their claim.
The court also found that the three other elements necessary to grant a preliminary injunction had been satisfied, namely a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury, that the threatened injury outweighs any

damage the injunction may cause the opponent, and that the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See United Offshore Co. v. Southern Deepwater Pipeline Co., 899 F.2d 405, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1990).
[8] The court also indicated its willingness to modify the injunction should the State present evidence that the Jail might hold more than its design capacity of detainees under constitutional conditions or should the plaintiffs present evidence that a population cap of design capacity still subjected them to unconstitutional conditions.
[9] For example, the injunction prohibits the Jail from accepting individuals charged with misdemeanors from other nonfederal agencies, unless, for warrantless arrests, the detainee's commitment papers include an order in a specified form finding probable cause or, for warrant arrests, the detainee's commitment papers include a copy of the executed arrest warrant. The injunction also covers treatment of persons accused of felonies from other nonfederal agencies and persons arrested by the sheriff's office.
[10] A "blue warrant" person "means a person arrested for a parole violation who is to be detained pending administrative process and revocation hearing." Other Population Reduction Provisions include arrangements for alternative housing or for "scheduled reporting," refusal to take from any law enforcement officers any person charged with a non-violent misdemeanor or felony, release of misdemeanor detainees on bond, and release of non-violent pretrial detainees upon application to a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction.
[11] A "white warrant" person means a person detained after revocation of parole.
[12] The parties stipulated that by July 27, 1999, there were at least 289 individuals who had outstanding blue warrants.
[13] In his affidavit, Esparza, who has been the Captain of the Jail since April 15, 1999, states the following facts: (1)the capacity of the Jail is 738 inmates; (2) as of July 28, 1999 the population of the Jail was 662 inmates, which included 17 blue warrants and 8 white warrants; (3) the 662 inmates includes 515 state inmates and 147 federal inmates; (4) the [October 1997 injunction] has been necessary to keep jail population from overcrowding; and (5) the Jail has been at or about 90% of capacity for the past couple of years and that "[w]ithout the ability to refuse new non violent [sic] inmates when we are approaching or at 90% of capacity we would exceed capacity within one week and would have over one thousand inmates within one month."
[14] The plaintiffs and the County stipulated to the facts in the affidavit of Luis Esparza. We note that the State did not so stipulate.
[15] The County does not appeal the 1999 order.
[16] This test addresses the prudential concerns relevant to a standing analysis, as opposed to the constitutional considerations of Article III. See United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 334 n. 7 (10th Cir.1997) ("Article III authority is a prerequisite to judicial review, however sought. In contrast, a prudential concern, such as nonparty status, counseling uniquely or primarily against the propriety of appeal, need not bar a petition for mandamus review."). It is unclear if the plaintiffs have argued that the State lacks Article III standing; however objections to standing may be raised by an appellate court sua sponte. See Lang v. French, 154 F.3d 217, 222 n. 28 (5th Cir.1998). "To have standing a plaintiff must establish three elements: '[T]he plaintiff must show that it has suffered an injury in fact, the plaintiff must establish causation[, and] there must be redressability.'" Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5th Cir.2000). We find the injury in fact requirement to be satisfied in this instance by the same facts that demonstrate the State has a "personal stake in the outcome," analyzed below. Additionally, we find the causation and redressability requirements to be satisfied because the injunctions precipitated the violations and their termination will end them.
[17] This is similar to a result we reached in Searcy. In Searcy, the court found that because Congress granted the government the right to withhold consent to voluntary settlements, "it would be odd to preclude appellate remedies based on the government's failure to intervene." Searcy, 117 F.3d at 157.
[18] As an example, in Searcy, this court found this prong satisfied by a settlement stretching to "`all claims and counterclaims asserted in any pleading or other filing in this action ... arising out of the transactions and occurrences that are the subject matter of this action.'" Searcy, 117 F.3d at 157. The court determined that the

order could arguably be interpreted to include the government for claim preclusion purposes, which gave the government a stake in the outcome. Id. at 158.
[19] The PLRA defines "prospective relief" as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). The relief contained in the injunctions is, therefore, considered prospective relief.
[20] Although the Eleventh Circuit in Parrish v. Alabama Department of Corrections, 156 F.3d 1128, 1129 (11th Cir.1998) questioned whether an interpretation that "because no constitutional violations exist at the jail right now, no `current and ongoing' violation can exist" was incorrect because "it could blind courts to violations of federal rights that a court might reasonably expect to recur soon if the injunction is dissolved," it too recently concluded that "current and ongoing" means "a presently existing violation, not a potential, or even likely, future violation." Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 784 (11th Cir.2000). The Eleventh Circuit found determinative, as we do, the legislative history of the enactment. The phrase "current and ongoing" was originally enacted as "current or ongoing"; it was amended in 1997. As the conference report explaining the significance of the change states:
These dual requirements [of a current and an ongoing violation] are necessary to ensure that court orders do not remain in place on the basis of a claim that a current condition that does not violate prisoners' Federal rights nevertheless requires a court decree to address it, because the condition is somehow traceable to a prior policy that did violate Federal rights, or that government officials are "poised" to resume a prior violation of Federal rights. If an unlawful practice resumes or if a prisoner is in imminent danger of a constitutional violation, the prisoner has prompt and complete remedies through a new action filed in State or Federal court and preliminary injunctive relief.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405, at § 123 (1997), 1997 WL 712946 (Leg. Hist.), at *301.
[21] The plaintiffs contend that because these arguments were not made in the State's initial motion to terminate the September 1994 injunction, consideration of the issues is precluded. We disagree. "No `bright-line rule' exists for determining whether a matter was raised below." N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 n. 14 (5th Cir.1996). The State made these arguments in its "Advisory to the Court" filed on June 28, 1999, and these issues were debated at the July 27 hearing, without objection by any party. Therefore, we hold that these issues were adequately raised in the district court and we may consider them on appeal.
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