ADJOA A. AIYETORO STUART H. ADAMS, JR. ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 340 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-0500
ALICE L. BENDHEIM, P.C. Arizona Bar #3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 602-253-2954

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JAN 1 2 1990

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FLETCHER CASEY, JR., STEPHEN JAMES,) •FRANK BARTHOLIC, ARMANDO MUNOZ, KYLE BAPTISTO, DAVID A. MANN, JEFFREY LUSTIG, TERRY DON MCFALLS, RANDY SAMPSON, JOHN TOMLIN, SCOTT TRAMPOSCH, PAMELA MCQUILLEN, CAROLYN FERGUSON, YVONNE MARTIN, DAVID TUCKER, SUSAN COLKER, JOHN MYERS, MARY JO BOOKER, RANDY THOMAS, RUTH JOHNSON, ROMAN STONE, ROBERT BANKSTON, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;

.'O-OOS-'iPHXEHC

PLAINTIFFS,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

v.
SAMUEL A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Robert Goldsmith, Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence; Warden William Rhode, Arizona State Prison Complex, Perryville; Warden George Herman, Arizona State Prison Complex, Douglas; Warden Roger Crist, Arizona State Prison Complex, Tucson; Warden Hal Cardin, Arizona State Prison Complex, Phoenix.

DEFENDANTS.

asev v. Lew s

PC-AZ-004-001

•PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This class action complaint, filed on behalf of all adult prisoners who are or will be incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department of Corrections, alleges that defendants are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' serious medical needs; that prisoners are assigned to and retained in segregation on the basis of uncorroborated, confidential information, including allegations of gang activity, thereby denying prisoners due process; and, that defendants have denied prisoners meaningful access to the courts and counsel. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' failures to provide medical care, meaningful access to the courts and counsel, and due process in segregation assignments subject prisoners to needless and serious suffering.
JURISDICTION 2. This civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief is brought pursuant to §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 et. seq. , as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987; and 42 U.S.C. §1983, in that plaintiffs have been and continue to be deprived of their rights secured by the United States Constitution under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (3), and 2201.
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VENUE 4. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391 (a), in that defendants reside in the State of Arizona, and plaintiffs' claims for relief arise in the State of Arizona.
PARTIES 5. Plaintiffs are prisoners currently assigned to prison facilities in the State of Arizona. 6. Fletcher Casey, Jr. is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He was assigned to segregation within the Special Management Unit based on uncorroborated confidential information alleging gang activity. In addition, since August 1989, he has not received recommended specialized medical attention for a chronic knee ailment. 7. Frank Bartholic is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He waited three months to see a doctor for a painful back ailment. In addition, this functionally illiterate prisoner had no one to assist him with his initial pleadings in a lawsuit he filed, which was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. 8. Armando Munoz is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. In November 1988, he was assigned to segregation within the Special Management Unit based on uncorroborated confidential information alleging gang activity. In addition, this prisoner has been waiting twelve months to see a dentist for a painful gum condition.

9. Kyle Baptisto is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been subjected routinely to interference with access to the courts including interference with his receipt of legal mail.
10. Roman Stone is a blind prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. The defendants have failed to accommodate the special needs required by his blindness.
11. Stephen James is a prisoner currently assigned to Cellblock 6 in Florence, Arizona. Due to the shortages of staff, he has been required to choose between use of the law library and eating meals. He has complained to health care providers about painful lumps on his back but they have not been evaluated by a physician.
12. Terry Don McFalls is a prisoner currently assigned to Cellblock 6 in Florence, Arizona. He suffers from folliculitis. Although prison staff know of his medical condition, he has been repeatedly forcibly shaved and not provided an alternative way of removing facial hair.
13. David Mann is a prisoner currently assigned to the East Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been denied specialized treatment for a potentially life threatening heart ailment.
14. David Tucker is a prisoner currently assigned to the East Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been denied medically necessary follow-up for a serious health condition.
15. Jeffrey Lustig is a prisoner currently assigned to the South Unit in Florence, Arizona. While at Central Facility in

•-- - T T T "

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Florence, he complained to health care providers of chest pains for two months before being seen by a doctor.
16. John Myers is a prisoner currently assigned to the Central Unit in Florence, Arizona. He waited five months to see a dentist for a painful tooth with an exposed nerve.
17. John Tomlin is a prisoner currently assigned to the North Unit in Florence, Arizona. He was transferred to the North Unit from the Mohave Unit in Douglas, Arizona in December 1989. When assigned to the Mohave Unit he waited eight months to be seen by an orthopedist for a painful knee condition.
18. Pamela McQuillen is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She waited five days before being taken to the hospital for treatment of a painful skin condition.
19. Carolyn Ferguson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She has been denied treatment for hypertension.
20. Yvonne Martin is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She has been denied appropriate medication for a serious asthmatic condition.
21. Randy Sampson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Perryville - San Pedro Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. He has been denied sufficient library access to prepare his legal pleadings.
22. Mary Jo Booker is a prisoner currently assigned to the Perryville - Santa Maria Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. She waited four years to see a doctor for a herniated disc. While in

segregation for six months, she was unable to obtain legal materials and to confer with a legal assistant.
23. Randy Thomas is a prisoner currently assigned to the Perryville - Santa Cruz Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. He waited four months to see a dentist for a toothache.
24. Robert Bankston is currently assigned to Gila Unit in Douglas, Arizona. For one month he was denied any medical attention for a stomach ulcer after coughing up blood and complaining of stomach cramps. He was refused legal materials for sixty-two (62) days while housed in disciplinary segregation.
25. Scott Tramposch is a prisoner currently assigned to the Rincon Unit in Tucson, Arizona. In order to use the satellite law library while on lockdown status, he was handcuffed to a waist chain, severely restricting his use of legal materials. He was denied direct access to the main law library.
26. Susan Colker is a prisoner currently assigned to the Arizona Center for Women in Phoenix, Arizona. She represents herself in civil actions and is unable to research the law thoroughly due to inadequate books and legal assistance.
27. Ruth Johnson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Arizona Center for Women in Phoenix, Arizona. She has serious medical needs that have gone untreated, causing her pain and general discomfort.
28. Defendants are agents, officials, or employees of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections.
29. Defendant Sam Lewis is the Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections. In the capacity of director he is responsible for the administration and application of DOC statewide policies, and is ultimately responsible for the operation of all the prison facilities, including decisions concerning staff deployment and training that directly affect plaintiffs' abilities to obtain medical care, access to the courts and counsel, and due process.
30. Warden Robert Goldsmith is responsible for the day-today operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona. In the capacity of warden he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the Women's Prison, East Unit, Special Management Unit, Cellblock 6, and Central Unit.
31. Warden William Rhode is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex - Perryville in Goodyear, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the San Pedro, Santa Cruz, San Juan, and Santa Maria Units.
32. Warden George Herman is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Douglas, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the Gila Unit, Mohave Unit, Maricopa Unit, Cochise Unit, and Papago Unit.
33. Warden Roger Crist is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the Santa Rita, Rincon,

Cimarron, Tent, and Echo Units.

34. Warden Hal Cardin is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Phoenix, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex for women and men.
35. Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities. At all relevant times, defendants have acted under color of State law.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 36. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil-Procedure. 37. Plaintiffs are representative parties of a class composed of all adult persons who are now or who in the future will be in the custody of or under the supervision of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections. 38. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the class is impractical. Current members of the class consist of more than 9,000 prisoners, and the prisoner population in each facility changes frequently. 39. Upon information and belief, conditions described in this complaint, are common to all prisoners within the Arizona State Prison system, the class that plaintiffs represent. The named representatives are subjected daily to the same deprivations of the
class members as a whole.
40. Defendants' deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs, failure to provide prisoners meaningful access to

the courts and counsel, and failure to provide prisoners due process in segregation assignments are questions of law common to the class members as a whole.
41. Claims made by the class representatives involve allegations of denials of constitutional rights that are generally applicable to the class as a whole.
42. Plaintiffs are members of the class and their claims are typical of all class members. Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel who will fairly and accurately represent the interests of the class as a whole.
43. Since the class number is more than 9,000 prisoners, separate actions by individuals would in all likelihood result in inconsistent and varying decisions, which in turn would result in conflicting and incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants.
44. The defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole appropriate.
A. LACK OF MEDICAL CARE 45. Defendants do not provide immediate evaluations or
diagnoses of prisoners' serious medical complaints. Defendants misdiagnose serious medical complaints, resulting in significant and unnecessary suffering and even dea£h. For instance, at the women's facility in Florence, a woman prisoner, complaining of
10

serious chest pains, was initially diagnosed as having indigestion, and later died, purportedly from heart failure.
46. No physician regularly provides medical care at the women's facilities. On weekends and evenings security staff at some of these facilities are involved in the decision to have a woman's medical complaints evaluated by a health care provider.
47. Plaintiffs experience unreasonable delays in receiving medical care. For example, at the Special Management Unit (SMU), prisoners may wait from three to four weeks to be seen by a physician for a serious medical complaint.
48. Prisoners are frequently required to choose between sick call and other rights such as eating jneals, law library access and exercise.
49. Sick call at some facilities is held two times per week or less. For example at Central Unit, sick call is frequently cancelled on one of the two days scheduled. Consequently, prisoners with serious medical needs are not evaluated. Sick call is held for prisoners in lockdown frequently less than once a week.
50. At the South Unit in Florence, prisoners must stand in line outdoors for sick call, regardless of the weather. The health care provider evaluates the prisoners by talking to them while they are standing in this line through a window, in the presence of other prisoners and security staff. The confidentiality attendant to health care delivery is not only seriously breached but the ability to perform an adequate health care assessment is severely compromised.
11

51. Physician's assistants often preempt medical care prescribed by a physician. For example, a hospital physician told a prisoner in CB6 that he had a hole in his ear, but the physician's assistant instead claimed that the hole did not exist, and refused to provide the recommended treatment.
52. The failure to have sufficient staff, both security and health care, has resulted in prisoners' treatment being delayed or terminated. For instance, at the CB6 facility, prisoners have been taken off psychotropic medication without first being seen by a psychiatrist.
53. Prisoners are given diets that do not conform to their minimum nutritional needs.
54. Plaintiffs' mental health needs are frequently ignored. Women with serious mental health needs who cannot function in the general population but do not meet the State's statutory requirements for commitment are placed in isolation cells, frequently for extended periods of time, at the Women's facilities in Perryville and Florence. A prisoner, placed in isolation at Perryville because she was considered a mental health case, constantly complained of cramps. She was refused attention by the CMA, and subsequently, she was discovered to have given birth. At the Douglas facility, prisoners are not provided any mental health services.
55. Pregnant intravenous drug users are routinely isolated at the Women's Perryville facility, and subsequently, all medical attention is seriously delayed.
12

56. Prisoners experience unreasonable delays in receiving dental care. For example, at the Douglas facility, a prisoner with a painful gum condition waited for five months to see a dentist.
57. At the Women's Perryville facility, prisoners have access to other prisoners' confidential medical information.
58. The allegations contained in paragraphs (45) through (57) constitute defendants' deliberate indifference to prisoners serious medical needs.
B. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HANDICAPPED PRISONERS 59. A blind prisoner in the SMU is not provided the necessary
legal assistance, compounding the access problems experienced by prisoners classified as 1-5.
60. Prisoners with HIV disease are discriminated against in some facilities in the provision of programming.
61. The Arizona Department of Corrections receives Federal financial assistance.
62. The allegations contained in paragraphs 59 through 61 constitute defendants' discrimination against handicapped prisoners as otherwise qualified handicapped individuals.
C. LEGAL ACCESS 63. Defendants do not provide persons trained in the law or
attorneys to assist prisoners, even those who are illiterate or non-English speaking, in pursuing legal actions.
13

64. In most facilities, prisoners are not allowed to make legal calls unless a letter is first submitted giving permission for the telephone call from the prisoner. Prisoners therefore must frequently use monitored telephones to make legal calls. Even when privileged legal calls are allowed, 'they are frequently unreasonably delayed.
65. In most facilities, plaintiffs must first provide a case number before being able to talk to a prisoner legal assistant about a legal problem. Prisoners may also be asked to describe the problem for which they want legal assistance. In some facilities, prisoners are not provided privacy for these meetings.
66. In some institutions prisoners are not allowed to copy their own legal materials. They must give these materials to prison staff to photocopy, compromising confidentiality.
67. At the South and East Units, prisoners have direct access to the law library, but are not allowed to browse the shelves. They have no starter volumes to aid them in their research, and no legal assistance. They must request a book from an untrained prisoner or staff person.
68. At CB6 defendants frequently require prisoners to choose either law library, sick call, or outdoor exercise; prisoners1 legal mail is frequently opened outside the presence of prisoners; and, their confidential legal memos from prisoner legal assistants are routinely read by defendants' staff.
69. At the SMU prisoners classified as 1-5 are denied physical access to the law library by being put into cages. These
14

prisoners are required to have untrained officers or other prisoners classified as 1-3 obtain their legal materials.
70. Prisoners in the SMU are denied contact attorney visits, unnecessarily infringing on their rights of access to the courts and counsel and confidentiality of legal materials. These prisoners are unable to review documents simultaneously with their attorneys and documents that consist of more than a few pages must be given to officers to pass between attorney and prisoner. The officers are out of view of the attorney and prisoner when delivering documents from one to the other.
71. Prisoners are harmed by the denial of meaningful access to the courts. For example, at the SMU an illiterate prisoner had his pro se case dismissed because defendants did not provide him with any legal assistance beyond indirect access to law books.
72. Defendants provide some facilities with only a satellite law library. The satellite law library provides insufficient legal materials. Prisoners must request basic legal materials from other law libraries. They frequently experience delays, and occasionally are unable to receive needed legal materials.
73. At the Douglas facility, prisoners who are in administrative segregation or disciplinary segregation have no direct law library access. Prisoners must know the exact full citation of a case in order to receive the law book. A prisoner may be in administrative or disciplinary segregation for as long as three months.
15

74. At the Tucson facility, administrative segregation prisoners are hand-cuffed to a waist chain while using the law library.
75. The allegations contained in paragraphs (63) through (74) constitute a denial of meaningful access to the courts and counsel.
D. FAILURE TO PROVIDE DUE PROCESS 76. Defendants regularly assign prisoners to and retain
prisoners in segregation on the basis of uncorroborated, confidential information, including unsubstantiated claims of prisoner gang activity from other prisoners and staff. Prisoners are unable to question or confront any persons making these claims and, therefore, cannot contest a decision assigning them to segregation once it has been made.
CAUSE(S) OF ACTION 77. With respect to each and every following cause of action, plaintiffs re-allege and re-incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs (1) through (76). 78. Defendants1 acts and omissions at each of their facilities constitute deliberate indifference to plaintiffs' serious medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 79. Defendants, by their acts and omissions, are depriving plaintiffs of their rights of access to the courts and counsel protected by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
16

80. Defendants' arbitrary procedures for assigning prisoners to segregation violate their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
81. The failure of defendants to accommodate handicapped prisoners' special needs discriminates against these prisoners in violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 et. sea., as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.

VIII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

82. Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no adequate

remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set forth in this

complaint. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer

irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful acts, omissions,

policies, and practices of the defendants as alleged herein, unless

plaintiffs are granted the relief they request. The need for

relief is critical because the rights at issue are paramount under

the Constitution of the United States.

83. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the

class they represent, request that this Court grant them the

following relief:

(a) certify the class of all adult prisoners who are now

or who will be in the future under the custody of or under the

supervision of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections;

(b) adjudge and declare that the acts, omissions,

policies, and practices of the defendants violate the First, Sixth,

17

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which grant constitutional protection to plaintiffs and the class that plaintiffs represent;
(c) order defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of State law or otherwise, to provide needed health care for plaintiffs; to provide meaningful access to the courts; and, to cease assigning prisoners to segregation based on uncorroborated, confidential information;
(d) enjoin defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of State law or otherwise, from continuing the unconstitutional acts, conditions, and practices described in this Complaint, and from failing to provide in the future constitutionally adequate medical care, access to the courts and counsel, and due process in segregation assignments;
(e) retain jurisdiction in this case until the unlawful and unconstitutional conditions and practices as alleged herein no longer exist and the Court is satisfied that they will no longer occur;
(f) grant plaintiffs the costs and expenses of maintaining this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and,
(g) grant any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
18

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 12, 1990

Stuart H. Adams, Jr. ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 340 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-0500
ALICE L BENDHCIM
Alice L. Bendheim, P.C. Arizona Bar #3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 253-2954

19
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 v. Lewis

PC-AZ-004-005

1 Edward G. Hochuli, Bar #004566
Kathleen L. Wieneke, Bar #01113 9
2 Daniel P. Struck, Bar #0123 77
JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI
3 2901 North Central Avenue
Suite 800
4 Phoenix, Arizona 85012
(602) 263-1700
5
Attorneys for Defendants
6

7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
FOR THE STATE OP ARIZONA
9

10 FLETCHER CASEY, JR., et al. ,

on behalf of themselves and

all others similarly situated,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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16

SAMUEL A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendant.

NO. CIV 90-54 PHX CAM (Lead)
CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM (Consolidated)
PARTIES' STIPULATED JOINT PROPOSAL FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR MENTAL HEALTH

17 CHARLES L. ARNOLD, guardian ad
litem on behalf of H.B.,
18
Plaintiff,
19

20

v.

SAMUEL LEWIS, director; MARY
21 VERMEER, deputy warden, Santa

Maria-Perryville; DAVID
22 FERNANDEZ, M.D., Arizona

Department of Corrections, in )

23 their official capacities,

)

24

) Defendants. )

25

)

The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) shall
26

implement mental health policies and procedures that provide

1 treatment services, trained and qualified mental health care

2 staff, and facilities and equipment in quantity and quality to

3 maintain adequate mental health care for seriously mentally ill

4 prisoners in keeping with professionally recognized health care

5 standards. Such policies and procedures shall mandate but not

6 be limited to the following:

7

A. Mental Health Care Generally

8

1. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoner

9 grievances about mental health care services delivery are

10

1

11

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reviewed at least monthly by the Mental Health Program Manager, other prisoner correspondence concerning mental health services are reviewed by the Mental Health Program Manager on a randomly selected basis at least monthly, and problems affecting the quality and quantity of mental health care addressed.

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16

2. The ADOC shall ensure that all mental health services provided are documented in a mental health

17 chart maintained by the Division of Health Services and that

18 the mental health chart is made available to the psychiatrist

19 or psychologist whenever he/she sees a prisoner.

20

B. Identification of seriously mentally ill pris-

21

oners

22

1. The ADOC shall develop and implement

23 policies and procedures which ensure that seriously mentally

24 ill prisoners are identified, including review of all available

25

26

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1 records and interviews by a health care professional1 upon

2 admission to the ADOC or transfer from one ADOC facility to

3 another.

4

2. Intake Procedures:

5

a. Medical (including mental health)

6 records shall be reviewed by health staff within twenty-four

7 (24) hours (excluding weekends and legal holidays) of receipt

8 of prisoners at any ADOC institution, and, where appropriate, 9 timely referral made to a mental health professional2 for

10 evaluation.

| J || 12 B

b. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners

whose available records or oral reports reveal a history of

serious mental health problems or who have received mental

Hill 14
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1 16

health treatment in a non-prison health facility are seen and evaluated by an appropriate health care professional within twenty four (24)hours (excluding weekends and legal holidays)

17 of their entry to an ADOC institution and by a mental health

18 professional within seventy two (72) hours (excluding weekends

19 and legal holidays).

20

21

22

23

health care professional includes a registered nurse,

physicians' assistant or physician. 24

25

2Mental health professional includes a psychiatrist, psychiatric physician assistant, licensed clinical psycholo-

26

gist, mental health therapist, psychology associate, psych registered nurse, and clinical social worker (MSW).

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1

c. The ADOC shall provide appropriate

2 psychological testing that may pick up either a major deficien3 cy in intellectual functioning or psychological distress.

4

5

d. When appropriate the ADOC shall employ

6 best efforts to obtain the past psychiatric records of prison-

7 ers.

8

3 . Identification and Treatment of Prisoner's with

9

Mental Health Care Problems

10

a. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners

3

11 requesting mental health services shall have their requests

If 12 reviewed by a mental health professional within twenty four

(.24) hours and appropriate mental health treatment, including

Ed

i'l 14 on-going services, be developed and provided. On weekends and

£|a 15 legal holidays these requests shall be reviewed by at a

16 minimum a licensed practical nurse with telephone consulta-

17 tion with a mental health professional where appropriate. Such

18 requests shall be reviewed by a mental health professional no

19 later than the next working day and appropriate mental health

20 treatment, including on-going services, be developed and

21 provided.

22

b. The ADOC shall ensure that, at a

23 minimum, a health care professional in consultation with a

24 mental health professional conducts a face-to-face evaluation

25 of a prisoner who has a serious psychological symptom or

26 complaint within twenty-four (24) hours and that he/she be

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1 provided appropriate mental health treatment in a timely

2 fashion.

3

C. Programming for Mentally 111 Prisoners

4

l. The ADOC shall develop and implement

5 policies and procedures that ensure that seriously mentally ill

6 prisoners receive appropriate mental health services to address

7 their mental health needs.

8

2. The ADOC shall ensure that, in the event

9 behavioral modification programs for seriously mentally ill

10 prisoners are implemented, they are run by staff trained in

1

11 mental health care and in the specific behavioral modification

a

|s 12 program in use.

§ § 13

3. The ADOC shall provide mental health

2

14 programming at the Special. Programs Unit (SPU) to include

OUJUQJ.

= |S 15 one-on-one counseling and group therapy.

16

4. The ADOC shall not house prisoners who are

17 seriously mentally ill in a facility without appropriate mental

18 health services.

19

D. Treatment of Psychiatric Emergencies

20

1. The ADOC shall implement policies and

21 procedures that ensure the identification and treatment of

22 suicidal prisoners. Internal Management Policy No. 301.25,

23 effective August 23, 1989, attached hereto and incorporated

24 herein, is such a policy. The term "mental health/health care

25 staff" as used in IMP No. 3 01.25 shall include both mental

26 health and health care staff.

1

E. Use of Isolation3

2

1. The ADOC shall ensure that under no

3 circumstances shall isolation be used as an alternative to

4 mental health care.

5

2. The ADOC shall develop and implement

6 policies and procedures to ensure that prisoners who are

7 exhibiting symptoms of serious mental illness are not placed in

8 isolation cells "in a non-treatment facility, unless it is an

9 emergency, there is absolutely no other place to put them and

10 where clinically appropriate procedures for transfer to a

i

11 mental health facility are initiated no later than forty eight

O
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If 12 (48) hours from placement in the isolation cell.

3. The ADOC shall ensure that acutely seriously

ti

mentally ill prisoners placed in isolation are seen by a mental

15 health professional within twenty-four (24) hours (excluding

o

16 weekends or legal holidays) of their placement in isolation

17 and on weekends or legal holidays at a minimum by a licensed

18 practical nurse within twenty four (24) hours in consultation

19 with a mental health professional, with appropriate follow up

20 by a mental health professional on the next working day.

21

4. The ADOC shall ensure that a seriously

22 mentally ill prisoner removed from isolation shall receive

23 timely and appropriate follow-up mental health treatment.

24

25

3This term is being used in place of the term "lockdown"

26

as used in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding Mental Health.

F. Medication

2

l. The ADOC shall develop and implement

3 policies and procedures which ensure that prisoners receiving

4 psychotropic medications are properly monitored:

5

a. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners

6 receive their psychotropic medications within a medically

7 appropriate time frame.

8

•

b. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners

9 receive a face-to-face interview before being prescribed

10 psychotropic medications.

11

c. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners

|s 12 obtaining refills of psychotropic medications receive a

§ | 13 | face-to-face interview with a health or mental health profes-

|| 14 sional.

a ""15

d. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners do

16 not have their psychotropic medications discontinued based on

17 blood levels without a face-to-face evaluation by a psychia-

18 trist.

19

e. The ADOC shall ensure that a prisoner

20 on psychotropic medication shall be interviewed face-to-face by

21 a mental health professional concerning any non-compliance with

22 his medication regimen within a reasonable period of time

23 after the non-compliance is known.

24

2. The ADOC shall ensure that prisoners who are

25 transferred shall continue to receive medications administered

26 at the transferring institution for mental health reasons

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1 pending evaluation and treatment by the appropriate health care

2 professional at the receiving institution.

3

G. Staffing

4

1. The ADOC shall anticipate the need for

5 additional mental health staff based on projected increases in

6 authorized prison beds.

7

2. The ADOC shall develop recruitment incen-

8 tives for mental health staff positions which are difficult to

9 fill.

10

3. The ADOC shall ensure that a licensed

I

11 clinical psychologist supervises the clinical work of the

If 12 non-medical mental health professionals.

Sips'* 14

" I351

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15

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16

4. The ADOC shall ensure a that psychiatrist is responsible for supervising the clinical aspects of the psychiatric component of the mental health program.
5. The ADOC shall ensure that a mental health

17 professional, with sufficient and appropriate education and

18 experience, is responsible for administering the mental health

19 program.

20

6. The ADOC shall maintain at least one half-

21 time psychiatric position at the SMU.

22

7. The ADOC shall maintain at least one

23 full-time psychiatrist position at the Tucson facility.

24

8. The ADOC shall maintain at least one

25 full-time psychiatric nurse position at the Perryville facili-

26 ty.

8

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2
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i

1

9. The ADOC shall maintain at least one

2 full-time psychiatrist position at the Perryville facility.

3

10. The ADOC shall maintain at least two

4 full-time psychiatrist positions at the Florence area complex-

5 es.

6

11. The ADOC shall ensure that psychiatric

7 coverage at the Douglas facility occurs at least monthly when

8 inmates needing psychiatric care are located there, and in any

9 event, a psychiatrist shall consult with the mental health and

10 health care staff at Douglas at least monthly.

11

12. The ADOC shall increase the number of

12 psychological associate and licensed clinical psychologist

13 positions assigned to health services beyond the January 1992

levels and assign them • in a manner which best serves the

15 serious mental health needs of the prisoner population.

16

13. The ADOC shall ensure that an additional

17 two psychological associate positions assigned to health

18 services beyond the number present in January 1992 be designat-

19 ed for ASPC-Florence, ASPC- Eyman, ASPC-Tucson, ASPC-

20 Perryville.

21

H. Housing

22

1. The ADOC shall develop appropriate seclu-

23 sion rooms for the special housing units such as the Special

24 Program Unit (SPU). The new SPU is scheduled to come on line

25 in 1995.

26

T 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

i

11

2 if 12

iff 13
ail i f 14
CO **
""* 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2. The ADOC shall not utilize the socialization chair or behavior pens.
I. Equal Protection 1. The ADOC shall develop and implement
policies and procedures to ensure that mental health programming for female prisoners is specific to their needs and is in parity with the mental health programming provided to the men.
2. The ADOC shall assure that seriously mentally ill female prisoners, pursuant to A.R.S. Sees. 31-226 and 226.01, are transfered to a facility for involuntary commitment commensurate to the level of mental health care provided at Baker Ward for men.
J. Conclusion This joint stipulated proposal is submitted
pursuant to this court's order dated April 14, 1993. By submitting this stipulation, the parties do not concede any matters decided by the trial court, nor do they waive any right to appeal any final order issued in this matter or in any matter consolidated herein.
DATED thisj>?i?day of June, 1994.
JONES, SKELTON &
EdwArd G. Hocjfuli Kathleen L>-wi/neke Daniel P. Struck 2901 North Central Avenue' Suite 800
10

1

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Attorneys for Defendants

2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1°
11

II 12

lI* 1 3
a i igw i£xi 14

2 O UJ
5 Z£

15

COPY of the foregoing

delivered this.^-Jc day

16 •of June, 1994, to:

Ailce L. BenHheim Attorney at Law 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
and Adjoa Aiyetoro, of counsel National Conference of Black Lawyers 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202)723-1662
and Stuart H. Adams, Jr. ACLU National Prison Project 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

17 Honorable Carl A. Muecke UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
18 230 North First Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85025
19 COPY of the fore ing
20 mailed this £ day
of June, 1994, to: 21
Leslie Cohen 22 ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 23 3208 East Fort Lowell, Suite 106
Tucson, Arizona 85716 24 Attorneys for Plaintiff H.B.

25 Sonia D. Overholser
Assistant Attorney General 26 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
U UJ
H i l l Qlli P1123 §iwi'I 14 t<o2 Woiuot2 I ^ 15
o 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

15 South Fifteenth Avenue, 4th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 8500/ '
12

 
 May 2 9 , 1996
VIA FEDERAL EXPRES3
Clerk U.S. District Court 23 0 North First Avenue Phoenix, AZ 85025
Re: Casey v. Lewis C.A. No. 90-0054 C.A. No. 91-1808
Dear Clerk:
Enclosed for filing are the original and one copy of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Modify Referral Orders Regarding Special Masters and accompanying memorandum, along with a certificate of service on opposing counsel.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

'875 Connecvc-i A,en..e Suite 4 ' 0 Wasnmgton. D C 2CC09
(2021 23-1 -1330
Fax * (202) 234 4390
Ehzanetn R A e o " d e r
Stuart H Adar^s J' Eric Baiacan Karen Bower Monamedu F _,C9S Ayesna M K^ai Mark J Locez Mar]One R'km Margaret W^'er
Jenni
Ke'ly Gardner
Jackie Walker
National 132 West -13 Street N e w YorK \Y • : 0 : 6 (212) 944 9600
Nadine Strossen
POESIOENT
Ira Giasser

Sincerely,

Enc:
cc: Daniel Struck Alice Bendheim Leslie Cohen
Janet Bliss

Stuart H. Adams, Jr. Attorney for Plaintiffs

Casey v. Lewis

• ••

•••• • • • • • • ••

PC-AZ-004-007

STUART H. ADAMS, JR. ELIZABETH ALEXANDER ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4830
ALICE L. BENDHEIM Arizona Bar #3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 253-2954
LESLIE J. COHEN ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW 3308 East Fort Lowell Suite 106 Tucson, AZ 85716
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FLETCHER CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SAMUEL A. LEWIS, et al.,
Defendants.

CIV. 90-0054 PHX CAM (Lead)
CIV. 91-1808 PHX CAM (Consolidated)

CHARLES L. ARNOLD, guardian ad litem on behalf of H.B.,
Plaintiff, v. SAMUEL LEWIS, et al.,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO MODIFY REFERRAL ORDERS REGARDING SPECIAL MASTERS Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, oppose Defendants' Motion To Modify Referral Orders Regarding Special Masters, dated May 10, 1996. The grounds for plaintiffs' opposition are set forth in the accompanying memorandum.

Date: May 29, 1996

Stuart H. Adams, Jr. Elizabeth Alexander The National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4830

i r

STUART H. ADAMS, JR. ELIZABETH ALEXANDER ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4830
ALICE L. BENDHEIM Arizona Bar #3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 253-2954
LESLIE J. COHEN ARIZONA CENTER FOR DISABILITY LAW 3 308 East Fort Lowell Suite 106 Tucson, AZ 85716
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FLETCHER CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SAMUEL A. LEWIS, et al.,
Defendants.

CIV. 90-0054 PHX CAM (Lead)
CIV. 91-1808 PHX CAM (Consolidated)

CHARLES L. ARNOLD, guardian ad litem on behalf of H.B.,
Plaintiff, v. SAMUEL LEWIS, et al.,
Defendants.

7 T~

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
MODIFY REFERRAL ORDERS REGARDING SPECIAL MASTERS
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 1995 and December 15, 1995, this Court
appointed Janet A. Bliss, Esq., as Special Master for medical care
and Dr. Cassandra F. Newkirk as Special Master for mental health
care respectively in this class action case pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 53.l The Special Masters were appointed to monitor and
report to the Court on defendants' compliance with the medical and
mental health care remedial orders in this case. The Order of
Reference [hereinafter "Referral Order11] justified the appointment
of Ms. Bliss as follows: There are several reasons that this court considers a limited appointment is necessary. First, this litigation has a lengthy history and the issues regarding the medical and dental care systems are complex. See U.S. v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 901 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1990). Second, due to the long history of noncompliance by this defendant in this case2 and in other similar cases3 this court cannot be assured that the constitutional violations will be eliminated. See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen. 838 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987); Walker v. HUD. 734 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Tx. 1989); Feliciano v. Barcelo. 672 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico
1 Ms. Bliss was appointed for a limited duration of twelve months. Referral Order dated December 12, 1995; Dr. Newkirk was appointed for a limited duration of eighteen months upon the consent of the parties. Referral Order dated December 15, 199 5.
2 "The defendant blatantly refused for six months to comply with the access to the courts injunction." Referral Order at 13-14 n.13.
3 See Hook v. Arizona. CIV 73-97 and Gluth v. Kanaas. CIV 841626. Referral Order at 13-14, n.14.

1986); Hoptowit v. Ray. 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982).
Referral Order dated December 15, 1995 at 13-14.
The Referral Order justified the appointment of an
expert/Special Master for mental health as follows:
The parties . . . have been unable to resolve their differences and have submitted different suggestions for injunctive relief and supplemented those suggestions. It is clear at this time that the parties will be unable to formulate the injunctive relief without the assistance of an expert/Special Master. This Court has given the parties at least two years to formulate their own injunctive relief. However, despite the many warnings of the Court that it would appoint an expert/Special Master if they could not formulate injunctive relief, the parties have failed to come forward with such stipulated relief.
Referral Order dated, January 23, 1995 at p.4-5.*
The referral orders provide that the full costs
associated with the Special Masters are to be borne by the
defendants; the referral orders also authorize the Special Masters
to have ex-parte communications with prisoners and Arizona
Department of Corrections Staff.1
4 Dr. Newkirk is the third of three Special Masters for mental health care in this case. See Referral Order dated December 15, 1996 and Referral Order dated August 2, 1995.
5 Referral Order dated January 23, 1995 at p.11-13 (order appointing special master for mental health); Referral Order, dated December 15, 1995 at pp.4-6 (order appointing special master for mental health); Referral Order dated December 12, 1995 at pp. 16-19 (order appointing special master for medical care).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 [hereinafter,
PLRA]6 was signed into law and took effect on April 26, 1996.
Defendants now move for a modification of those provisions of the
referral orders regarding the payment of the Special Masters and
the scope of their duties regarding ex-parte communications. They
argue that a modification is required because the PLRA is
inconsistent with the current powers of the Special Masters to
engage in ex-parte communications. Motion at 4.
For the reasons presented below, defendants' motion for
modification should be denied.
II. A MODIFICATION OF THE REFERRAL ORDERS IS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE ENACTMENT OF PLRA
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367
(1992), the Supreme Court set forth the requirements that a party
seeking modification of a consent decree must meet, as follows:
Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application," not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree. Accordingly, a party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. If the moving party meets this standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.
A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing
6 The PLRA, enacted as part of the 1996 budget bill as Public Lav No. 104-134, amends the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. f 3626. Section 802 deals specifically with remedies for prison conditions. Throughout this brief, plaintiffs have cited to the relevant PLRA section as § 802, rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3626.

either a significant change in factual conditions or in law. Rufo. 502 U.S. at 383 (footnote omitted). The defendants rely on the second prong of the Rufo standard; that is, they claim they have met their initial burden by showing a significant change in law. Id. Motion at 4. However, defendants have failed to meet this initial burden because the PLRA is not a significant change in law within the meaning of Rufo. In order to obtain modification based on an alleged change in law, the party seeking modification must first establish either that the remedial orders impose an obligation that has been made impermissible under federal law, in which case the remedial orders must be modified; or that a change in law has made legal what the decree was designed to prevent, in which case modification may be warranted. Rufo. 502 U.S. at 388. The defendants rely on the former prong. Motion at 4. Defendants' reliance is inapposite: the PLRA does not render defendants' obligations under the Special Master referral orders in this case impermissible. Indeed, as set forth below, Section 802 of the PLRA does not apply to the referral orders. A. The PLRA Does Not Apply to Special Masters Appointed Prior to the April 26, 1996 Effective Date 1. Introduction Although § 802(b)(l) provides that this section applies to prospective relief granted before its date of enactment, the section is silent as to whether the provisions affecting the appointment of special masters are to be applied retroactively.

Accordingly, the Court is required to determine under general principles of statutory construction whether the section should apply to existing appointments of special masters. Under those principles, retroactive application must be denied.
2. The Appointment of a Special Master Does Not Constitute Relief
Congress sought to apply retroactively only the provisions of PLRA that relate to 'prospective relief.' According to § 802(b)(l), the PLRA "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title." § 802(b)(l). 'Prospective relief is defined in PLRA § 802(g)(7) as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages." This definition, in conjunction with the structure of the PLRA, simply does not encompass the appointment of a special master. The appointment of a special master is not relief at all, let alone prospective relief. Consequently, S 802(b)(l) does not require retroactive application of the special master provisions.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the appointment of a special master does not constitute relief under PLRA.7 The PLRA is organized into sections that address "Requirements of Relief," "Prospective Relief," Preliminary Injunctive Relief," and "Termination of Relief," among others. The section that addresses

7

Construing PLRA to hold that the appointment of a special

master is not a form of prospective relief is consistent with

determinations that appointment of a special master does not

constitute the granting of an injunction. See National Ora. for

Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen. 828 F.2d. 536, 540-41 (9th Cir.

1987); Thompson v. Enomoto. 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1987).

T T"

special masters is labelled separately, and is not subsumed into any of the other sections. § 802(f). Moreover, § 802(f) deliberately distinguishes the term 'special master' from the term 'relief,' using the two concepts as follows:
In no event shall the appointment of a special master extend beyond the termination of the relief... [and a special master] shall be relieved of the appointment upon the termination of the relief. § 802(5); § 802(6)(D). The term of a special master thus is considered separate and apart from the term of the relief. 3. The Language of PLRA § 802(f) on Special Masters Is
Prospective, Not Retroactive Throughout the section of PLRA regarding special masters, the language is clearly prospective. For example, S 802(f)(l)(A) provides that "the court may appoint a special master ..."; S 802(f)(2)(A) provides that "the court shall request" a list of five special master candidates from the parties, from which each party "shall have the opportunity to remove" candidates according to § 802 (2) (B) , and "the court shall select the master from the persons remaining on the list.1* § 802 (2) (C) . The PLRA does not address, and clearly does not mandate, the termination or modification of special masters appointed prior to the passage of the act. Indeed, §802(f)(B) states, "[t]he court shall appoint a special master under this subsection..." which reflects the prospective application of the special master provisions. PLRA § 802(f)(B)(emphasis added). Similarly, §802(f)(4) specifies "the compensation to be allowed to a special
7

master under this section." § 8O2(f)(B) (emphasis added).8 This
distinction is repeated again in §802(f)(5), "[a] special master
appointed under this subsection" has limited powers. §802(f)(5)
(emphasis added). The PLRA definition of the term special master,
designed to encompass all special masters under Rule 53 regardless
of the title, does not conflict with this analysis:
any person appointed by a Federal court pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant to any inherent power of the court to exercise the powers of a master, regardless of the title or description given by the court.
§ 802(g)(8).
Ms. Bliss and Ms. Newkirk were not appointed pursuant to
PLRA S 802(f); their appointment took effect in mid-December 1995,
long before the PLRA was signed, and was formalized under the Order
of Reference on April 24, 1996. Moreover, they were not selected in
the manner prescribed by S 802(f) and their duties and
responsibilities are not circumscribed in line with the PLRA.
Inasmuch as the Special Master was not appointed under this
8 Section 802(f)(4) provides in full as follows:
The compensation to be allowed to a special master under this section shall be based on an hourly rate not greater than the hourly rate established under section 3006A for payment of court-appointed counsel, plus costs reasonably incurred by the special master. Such compensation and costs shall be paid with funds appropriated to the Judiciary.
§ 802(a)(f)(4).
Since Ms. Bliss and Ms. Newkirk were appointed prior to the effective date of the PLRA, this provision does not affect the mandate of the Order of Reference that requires the defendants to pay their compensation and costs.

subsection, her compensation and costs need not be paid by the Court. Instead, the defendants must pay pursuant to the Order of Reference which clearly requires them to deposit funds for this purpose.9 Consequently, the Orders of Reference, requiring the defendants to pay the compensation and costs associated with the Special Masters, are still in effect and the current obligations of the parties are unchanged by the passage of PLRA. Accordingly, whether the PLRA provisions regarding special masters must be applied retroactively must be determined.
4. Congress Did Not Intend to Apply Retroactively the Special Master Provisions of PLRA
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the longstanding principle that "the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic." Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp.. 32 F.3d 768, 771 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); Bishop v. Okidata. 864 F.Supp. 416, 420 (D.N.J. 1994). The Court in Landaraf formulated the "clear statement rule" to guide lower courts in determining whether to apply federal statutes retroactively:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains
9 See Referral Order dated December 12, 1995 (appointing Ms. Newkirk; Referral Order dated January 23, 1995 (appointing Dr. Rundle) at 12-13; Referral Order dated December 15, 1995 (appointing Ms. Bliss) at 17-19.
TTT ' T F

no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e.. whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. if the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Landaraf. 114 S.Ct. at 1505. Because there is no expression of congressional intent that the special master provisions of the PLRA, as distinct from the provisions of the PLRA concerning prospective relief, be applied retroactively, the rules in Landaraf apply. The Referral Orders were designed to ensure the enforcement of the remedial orders. The Special Masters' duties pursuant to the Referral Orders require that they evaluate the defendants' compliance with the terms of the remedial orders; the extent of substantive relief awarded to the plaintiffs is to be informed by the Special Master's findings. Thus if the PLRA provisions on special masters are applied retroactively, the plaintiffs' substantive rights would be impaired by the disruption in enforcement of the comprehensive relief ordered regarding medical and mental health care in this case. The Court should follow the clear statement rule set forth in Landqraf and presume that the special master provisions apply prospectively.
10

III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL MASTER PROVISIONS OF PLRA WOULD RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS According to fundamental principles of statutory
construction,10 the Court should avoid interpreting PLRA so as to raise serious constitutional questions.11 Retroactive application of the PLRA provisions on special masters would also raise serious questions as to the potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules Enabling Act provides a careful procedure involving the Supreme Court and Congress for all changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 53, and specifically provides that "[a] 11 laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." Accordingly, PLRA and the Rules Enabling Act are best harmonized by a determination that the special master provisions of PLRA are not in effect until they have been adopted pursuant to the process set forth in 28 U.S.C. SS 2072-2074. Cf_s. Griffith Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd.. 545 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (federal statutes are superseded by conflicting federal rules
10 St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v. South Dakota. 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981).
11 Plaintiffs submit that the provisions on special masters, if applied retroactively, are unconstitutional on grounds including separation of powers, the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. If the Court finds Congressional intent to invalidate existing masterships under PLRA and believes that it must decide the constitutional issues, plaintiffs request an opportunity for separate briefing on these issues.
11

pursuant to S 2072), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 854.n Particularly because PLRA fails to show a clear intent to effect an implied repeal of the Rules Enabling Act, § 802(f) regarding special masters should not be given effect until the Supreme Court promulgates it pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
Beyond the Rules Enabling Act, retroactive application of PLRA would tread on the Court's inherent power under Article III to appoint special masters and "provide [itself] with appropriate instruments required for the performance of [its] duties," such as "persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties." Ex parte Peterson. 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Eash v. Riaains Trucking Inc.. 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985). By shifting the costs of special masters to the judiciary, S 802(f)(4) would also jeopardize the independence of the courts by giving them a financial stake in the outcome of cases. Such an arrangement would disrupt the separation of powers established in the Constitution, which "commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and provides clear institutional protections for that independence." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.. 458 U.S. 50, 51 (1982)(Brennan, J., with three Justices joining and two Justices concurring).
12 A recent commentator noted the historical importance and centrality of the Rules Enabling Act, reflecting the courts' inherent powers over procedure. See Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 Mercer Law Rev. 733, 747-48 (1995).
12
Tirr - T r

Retroactive application of § 802(f) would disrupt the exercise of the Court's ongoing exercise of its Article III powers in this complex enforcement process. The Special Masters appointed pursuant to the Referral Orders prior to the PLRA should therefore be permitted to carry out their responsibilities under the Orders which are tied to the Orders that have become final entered on March 19, 1993.l3 IV. THE COURT MAY APPOINT EXPERTS PURSUANT TO FED. R. EVID. 706
In the event that the Court determines that § 802 (f) applies retroactively, the Court should preserve the essential functions of the existing Special Masters by reappointing them as experts pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 706. The Court's power to appoint experts is unquestioned. Scott v. Spanier Bros.. Inc.. 298 F,2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Brvant-Buckner Assocs.. Inc.. 333 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Michigan. 680 F. Supp. 928, 987-89 (W.D. Mich. 1987)(courtappointed expert to monitor and report to Court on implementation of a post-judgment plan to treat seriously mentally ill inmates). Furthermore, that power is untouched by PLRA, since PLRA purports to affect only appointments pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 or the inherent power of the Court.
Rule 706 provides the legal basis for assigning the costs of the experts to defendants. Rule 706(b) provides that experts "shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time
13 Indeed, any other interpretation of PLRA would raise serious separation of powers issues under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
13
T r'

as the court directs..." United States Marshals Service v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057-59 (8th Cir. 1984)(en bane). Further, experts appointed pursuant to Rule 706 would be authorized to carry out their fundamental role, i.e.. to monitor and report to the Court on the defendants' compliance with the medical and mental health care remedial orders. They would be subject to deposition by the parties, and to providing testimony in court, and subject to cross examination by the parties. Moreover, the current fee rates for the Rule 706 experts in this case would not be limited by PLRA. Accordingly, PLRA does not preclude this Court from appointing Ms. Bliss and Ms. Newkirk under Rule 706 so that they retain their ability to perform their essential duties to monitor defendants' compliance with the remedial orders in this case and defendants are required to compensate them. V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendants' motion to modify the Special Master referral orders should be denied. In the event, however, that the Court determines that PLRA can be applied retroactively, plaintiffs request this Court appoint Ms. Bliss and Dr. Newkirk as experts pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 706.

Date: May 29, 1996

Stuart H. Adams, Jr. Elizabeth Alexander The National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.w. Suite 410 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4830
14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on May 29, 1996, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Modify Referral Orders Regarding Special Masters and accompanying memorandum was sent via first class mail, postage prepaid, to defendants' attorney Daniel Struck at Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix Plaza, 2901 North Central, Suite 800, Phoenix, Arizona 85012.
Stuart H. Adams, Jr.
rrr - T r

 
 Note: This Permanent Injunction was included as Appendix A to the 9th Circuit Opinion dated 12/27/1994.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
FLETCHER CASEY, JR., et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SAMUEL A. LEWIS, Director Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants. CHARLES L. ARNOLD, guardian ad litem on behalf of H.B., Plaintiff, v.
SAMUEL LEWIS, Director; MARY VERMEER, Deputy Warden, Santa Maria - Perryville; DAVID FERNANDEZ, M.D., Arizona Department of Corrections, in their official capacities,
Defendants.
NO. CIV 90-0054-PHX-CAM (Lead)
NO. CIV 91 1808-PHX-CAM (Consolidated)
PERMANENT INJUNCTION: ACCESS TO THE COURTS ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
The recommended permanent injunction with commentary is enclosed. Plaintiffs and defendants seek a quick decision based on the present inputs. Neither side requests an evidentiary hearing or argument before the Court.
Following extensive fact-finding, a proposed permanent injunction was filed on July 12, 1993. The parties were given opportunity to submit comments on any proposed changes (as compared to the Gluth language), or to re-emphasize previously requested modifications. The comments were due July 30, 1993.
Plaintiffs' response is attached (App. "A"). On July 27, defendants informed the Special Master that ADOC personnel were still circulating the proposed order for comment. After reiterating that the instant response was not intended for new objections to the Gluth language, the Special Master granted an extension to August 13.
Defendants' response is attached (App. "B"). As noted in plaintiffs' motion to dismiss (App's. "C", "E"), and recognized by the Court (App. "F"), most of the specific requests involve matters that should have been investigated and resolved during the appropriate January-to-June period. Additionally, the requests rely on conclusory and unsupported allegations.
After receipt, the Special Master told the parties that proper consideration of these requests required a re-opening of the investigation to enable all involved to adequately assess their validity. Plaintiffs and defendants opposed this delay. They were also aware of the possibility of modifications after implementation based on demonstrated need.

Defendants' counsel contended that given the steps triggered by previous requests, including the numerous trips to ADOC facilities and discussions with personnel, the Special Master should be in position to quickly evaluate the new requests. However, not only is a more complete picture necessary, but the available information indicates that defendants' present conclusions are not supported by the known facts.
For example, the collected data apparently demonstrates that: the majority of facility yards do not close for all prisoner activity by 8:30 p.m.; photocopies cost less than five cents per page; one trained librarian for every three law libraries is inadequate; any vandalism of library books is not primarily attributable to access to the stacks; and it is possible to allow the required weekly meetings with Legal Assistants, the daily exchange of materials for persons denied library access, and brief messages from attorneys.
The Special Master has always responded to demonstrated security problems. However, such labels in defendants' submission are not consistent with ADOC practices. As one example, even at CB6, a maximum security unit that includes death row, prisoners have been given advance notice of their scheduled library visits and permitted to continue to use typewriters with "memory", including those provided in the library.
The Special Master's first-hand knowledge proves that defendants' assertions of impossibility with regard to finding librarians with para-legal degrees are baseless. Even brief contact with local schools, for example, by the Special Master's office produced qualified applicants; defendants chose not to follow up. Given the low salary, it is predictable that persons with a para-legal degree requiring two years after high school are more readily available than those whose library science degree required five or six years.
The Order. The requirements in the enclosed Order repeat or closely track those in the July 12 submission. Questions raised by the parties resulted in some language changes to more accurately reflect the intent. A few additions clarified understandings of the Gluth parties that were not incorporated in that final injunction. These include the limited ability to assign a law librarian to a second facility (recently requested in Gluth by defendants), and the basic prohibition on the use of uniquely onerous conditions to "chill" prisoner access (see, I.A. and commentary).
Finally, language concerning disclosure of information received from a prisoner by a Legal Assistant has been omitted pending review and suggestions from the parties. Recent decisions indicate a potential conflict between the Gluth formulation and fundamental state due process rights. [E.g., State v. Melendez, 172 Ariz. 68, 834 P.2d 154 (1992) (Sup. Ct. of Ariz., en banc)].
ORDER
The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) shall provide meaningful access to the Courts for all present and future prisoners. The practices and procedures set out below will achieve this constitutional mandate. They concern those areas raised by or necessarily implicated in this litigation and incorporate approaches utilized by ADOC administrators.

I. THE LAW LIBRARIES
With the exception of the existing Aspen DWI and Flamenco Units at ASPC - Phoenix, the Papago DWI and Maricopa Units at ASPC - Douglas, and the Picacho Unit at ASPC - Florence, each ADOC facility with a population or capacity of 150 or more shall contain a fully equipped law library. Each library shall have sufficient seating capacity and be open for sufficient periods to enable adequate research and compliance with this Order.
A. ACCESS
ADOC prisoners in all housing areas and custody levels shall be provided regular and comparable visits to the law library. This opportunity may be postponed on an individual basis because of the prisoner's documented inability to use the law library without creating a threat to safety or security, or a physical condition if determined by medical personnel to prevent library use. Upon request, a prisoner will be permitted a minimum of ten hours of actual law library use each week; additional time shall be allowed if necessary to meet a filing or other legal deadline.
Law library access shall not be reduced or discouraged by unnecessarily onerous conditions or retaliatory practices. Prisoner access to the law library shall be on terms equivalent to those for participation in other congregate activities at the facility such as classes, jobs and meals, and shall not occasion unique hardships including, but not limited to, regular strip searches of library users and automatic disciplinary write-ups for missed library visits.
B. SCHEDULE
1. Library Hours
a. Facilities that do not require advance requests for a library turn-out:
The law library shall be open for prisoner use at least 50 hours each week. This schedule shall involve hours between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and include at least four hours each week night between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., and at least five hours between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on Saturday and on Sunday.
b. Facilities that require advance requests for a library turn-out:
The law library shall be open for prisoner use at least 60 hours each week if the facility population and capacity are less than 400, for at least 70 hours each week if either is between 400 and 700 and neither over 700, and at least 80 hours per week if either is over 700. These schedules shall involve hours between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and include at least four hours each week night between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., and at least eight hours between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on Saturday and on Sunday.
2. Prisoner Use

In all facilities, each visit or turnout must provide the prisoner a minimum of two hours of actual library use. Facilities that do not require advance requests shall provide sufficient library periods that are free of conflicts for all prisoners to have this opportunity; these facilities do not have to change the scheduled closing time for late arrivals. Every prisoner will sign the log book at the law library to indicate the time of arrival at and departure from the library; copies of the log book pages shall be maintained for the Special Master.
If more than one reading room is utilized, a prisoner may choose which room to sit in, provided that the rooms are not reserved for different custody levels and no other documented security considerations exist. This choice is subject to the need to maintain comparable numbers in each room, although a prisoner shall be allowed to sit with any prisoner providing legal help even if not a "Legal Assistant".
3. Notice
At least one week prior to the end of each month ADOC shall make known to all prisoners (a) the law library schedule of hours and turnouts for the next month, and (b) the specific schedule of important activities at the facility for the next month, including visiting hours, classes, religious services, and field turnouts for each housing area; this is not required for those items whose schedule (days and hours) remains the same in the upcoming month.
Within two months of entry of this Order, for each facility ADOC shall provide the Special Master (a) the weekly law library schedule and, if applicable, the specific turnouts or sessions for different custody levels or housing areas, (b) the names of the security and civilian employees assigned to the law library with their specific hours, (c) the names of the prisoner law clerks with their specific hours, (d) the names of the prisoner Legal Assistants, and (e) the schedule of ongoing activities that might conflict with law library access, including work assignments, classes, recreation, religious services, commissary, visiting and meals.
C. ADVANCE REQUEST PROCEDURE
When advance requests are used, prisoners shall be responsible for selecting their law library turnouts and for depositing their requests directly in the appropriate receptacle; this requires that ADOC provide timely and adequate information, forms, and access to receptacles.
The first library turnout requested by a prisoner must be at least three days after the day the form is deposited; this shall be less if necessary to meet a legal deadline. The week referred to in I (A) begins the day of the first scheduled turnout, and at least ten hours of library use shall be permitted during this seven-day period.
Defendants shall provide adequate notification to prisoners of the above procedures and timetables, including posting in each cell block. The Special Master, in consultation with plaintiffs and defendants, shall analyze the library and turnout schedules, including those periods regularly revealing below average attendance, and ascertain whether any alterations are required for adequate access.

1. Forms
ADOC shall develop law library turnout and legal assistance request forms and have them regularly available in the housing areas and law library for distribution to prisoners. The law library form should minimally include space for the date submitted and for the selection of specific library turnouts and alternates for up to two weeks, and to detail any filing or other legal deadline Any such deadline should be verified by relevant documentation possessed by the prisoner, or by a description of this information and explanation of why it is not available.
2. Receptacles
ADOC shall maintain secure, tamper-resistant receptacles for law library and other legal assistance requests from prisoners. These receptacles must be easily accessible to prisoners in all housing areas and custody levels on a daily basis.
D. ADVANCE RESPONSE PROCEDURE
Law Library staff or clerks shall collect the prisoner law library and other legal assistance forms from each deposit point at least once every day. ADOC must develop procedures for scheduling law library turnouts that provide adequate notice and access for all eligible prisoners with preference for those with filing or other legal deadlines, and that insure compliance with this Order. This minimally requires that law libraries requiring advance scheduling be equipped with a computer that is regularly and primarily used for this purpose.
Denial of a particular turnout may be based on a lack of available library space for that period, or on a finding that the requesting prisoner and a prisoner previously scheduled for that period cannot be together in the library without creating a serious threat to safety or security. If a denial occurs, the prisoner shall be given preference on the remaining requests or a timely opportunity to make additional requests if necessary to meeting the weekly ten-hour minimum requirement.
A prisoner shall be provided written notification of his or her scheduled law library turnouts and of any denied with the reason for the denial, and given the opportunity to make additional requests if necessary. This notice must reach the prisoner at least 24 hours before the time of the first requested turnout whether this was granted or denied. Copies of the names or total number of prisoners scheduled for each turnout, and of the number or percent of those who attended, will be kept at the law library for collection by the Special Master, as will copies of turnout denials.
E. LAW CLERKS
ADOC shall provide a sufficient number of law library prisoner law clerks to permit adequate assistance for prisoners using the library and for those ineligible for such use, including Spanishspeaking prisoners in both categories. This assistance includes providing elementary information about the content and purpose of the books and materials in the library, and about researching specified issues and locating relevant decisions, statutes, regulations and forms. In order to adequately perform this basic function, law clerks must successfully complete the legal research course, described in II (D) below, either prior to beginning work or the first time it is available.

In contrast to Legal Assistants, law clerks shall provide guidance to all eligible prisoners, although such guidance is limited in scope and does not extend to the preparation of legal documents for others.
For each session or turnout, at least two law clerks per reading room shall be assigned to provide the court-ordered research assistance in the room and, if applicable, book retrieval for that room. Prisoners with research experience and ability shall be solicited and favored for the law clerk positions by the relevant institutional committees and administrators.
F. RESEARCH GUIDE
The Special Master will oversee the preparation of an introductory guide to the use of the law library in Spanish and English, with brief explanations of the contents and use of the available resources and elementary research assistance on the most common legal issues. Plaintiffs and defendants will review the proposed introductory guide and have an opportunity to comment. After final approval by the Special Master, this guide shall be printed by defendants and made available to all requesting prisoners while attending the law library.
G. LIBRARIAN
ADOC shall provide at least one full-time professionally trained librarian at each law library with adequate secretarial support for the librarian and law library. A law librarian may be assigned to a second facility provided that the population in that facility is less than 200. Subject to identified security needs, the librarian will be responsible for the policies and procedures in the law library and for insuring adequate prisoner access to the courts.
The librarian must possess a library science degree, law degree or paralegal degree. Preference shall be given to applicants with a law or paralegal degree, and each ADOC complex shall minimally employ at least one such librarian. The Special Master will work with ADOC on securing applicants, including contacting para-legal and law schools, and professional organizations. If good faith efforts are unsuccessful, the Court or Special Master may permit the hiring of an applicant with the required graduate library science degree.
H. CONDUCT
If bathroom facilities are available, prisoners may be required to remain in the law library for a full turnout period; this may not be done for those attending solely for supplies or for notary or copy services. After being warned when possible, a prisoner may be restrained and removed from the library if he or she continues to create a threat to safety or security or to directly interfere with others' use of the library. Within 48 hours of removal, the prisoner must be provided written notice of the reasons and factual basis for this decision, with a copy held for the Special Master. A prisoner cannot adequately use the law library under restraint, including handcuffs and shackles. While in the library, non-intrusive actions, including reasonable conversations with prisoners or staff, writing, and sitting quietly, are permitted.
I. "CHECK-OUT" SYSTEM

Prisoners in minimum and medium security facilities shall be permitted direct access to the stacks when using the law library. All prisoners in a particular maximum security institution (level 5 and above) may be denied direct access if ADOC documents vandalism or losses resulting from such access in that institution. Prisoners attending the law library shall be provided at their expense copies of limited portions of available legal materials, including cases, laws and forms, for use in the housing area; indigent prisoners shall be provided at defendants' expense any such copies required for submission to a court or agency.
If prisoners are denied direct access to the stacks ADOC must act to allow adequate research. At a minimum, upon a single check-out request for more than one book, a clerk or employee shall retrieve at least two books for the prisoner; this does not affect the practice permitting prisoner use of more than two books at a time while in the reading room.
J. NOISE LEVEL
ADOC shall take all necessary steps, and correct any structural or acoustical problems, to reduce an unacceptably high noise level in any law library. At a minimum, totally enclosed reading rooms shall not be utilized. If necessary, chain or wire material may be installed in windows separating the reading room and stack and control areas, provided that this does not interfere with the sound-flow or sight-line. Such material should not inhibit normal conversation through the window between a prisoner in the reading room and an assisting law clerk or employee, nor make it difficult to read book titles and covers of other materials.
K. PAGING SYSTEM
Individual prisoners who are not able or permitted to visit the law library must be allowed regular and timely access to necessary books and materials. This minimally requires daily exchanges between such prisoners and law library representatives of an adequate amount for research purposes of requested books and materials, or copies, including cases, statutes, annotations, regulations, forms, secondary sources, and research guides. Every prisoner shall be provided a copy of the research guide required by I (F) and request forms, and be visited by a law clerk or Legal Assistant or employee with legal research experience, within 24 hours of being restricted.
L. INVENTORY
ADOC shall adequately maintain up-to-date collections in each law library of the materials and resources required by Wilkinson v. MacDougall, CIV 81-1397 (Jan 5, 1984); Arizona Reporters are optional. With the approval of the Court or Special Master, defendants may use clearly equivalent publications including, but not limited to, the United States Code Service (for United States Code Annotated), Lawyers Editions (for Supreme Court Reporters), Federal Procedure Lawyers Edition (for Federal Practice and Procedure), and American Jurisprudence (for Corpus Juris).
In addition, each library shall adequately maintain (a) a full and up-to-date set of Pacific Reporters and Digests, (b) sufficient latest editions of at least three self-help or litigation manuals

that assist prisoners on relevant substantive and procedural issues, (c) basic, up-to-date materials and forms in the areas of immigration practice and post-conviction remedies, and (d) a recent Arizona Bar Directory. The Special Master shall assist in identifying the specific materials, and approve these before use by ADOC.
II. THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Meaningful access to the courts requires direct assistance for prisoners who, because of language factors or lack of access to the law library, or for other reasons, are unable to perform adequate legal research and writing. In the absence of a program providing such prisoners with lawyers or paralegals, ADOC must maintain a sufficient number of at least minimally trained prisoner Legal Assistants at each facility, and not set institutional limits on such persons.
A. SELECTION
A prisoner shall become a Legal Assistant by agreeing to abide by the procedures governing Legal Assistants, and by taking the legal research course. It shall not be necessary for prisoners to take the course prior to being approved as a Legal Assistant or beginning work. Such persons must have some legal research training, experience, or ability, and, after selection, must successfully complete the full course including the live component when first available. Applicants are eligible for the full course if (a) they have a high school or GED diploma, or (b) pass a basic literacy skills test to the satisfaction of the instructor, or (c) are presently on an institutional Legal Assistant list. Absent relevant new factors, transferred Legal Assistants shall be continued in that status.
An otherwise eligible prisoner may be denied Legal Assistant status, or removed as a Legal Assistant, because of documented prison behavior indicating that he or she would create a threat to safety or security in that position; such action may not be based solely on a particular custody level or housing area, or on irrelevant infractions. A prisoner must be provided written notification of this decision, with the reasons and specific acts involved and permitted an opportunity to appeal; the notice and response shall be provided to the Special Master.
B. NUMBER
ADOC shall act to insure an adequate minimum number of Legal Assistants for each institution and custody level; there is no maximum. Particular steps must be taken to locate and train bilingual prisoners to be Legal Assistants. This minimally requires that schedules and notices relating to all institutional legal services and programs be made available in Spanish and English.
C. RETENTION
A Legal Assistant must demonstrate at least minimal competence after one year, and thereafter upon the receipt of complaints about his or her legal work. This demonstration should be done by submitting sufficient recent legal writings and litigation materials to the legal research instructor for review, and/or by completing assigned exercises for evaluation. A determination by the instructor to remove a prisoner found not minimally competent from the Legal Assistant list must

be made in writing with specific reasons and examples, and the relevant work products attached; this shall be provided to the Special Master. Such a prisoner should be reinstated upon compliance with the requirements of II (A) above.
D. RESEARCH COURSE
ADOC shall offer a videotaped legal research course for all prisoners, with an additional live component for prisoner law clerks and Legal Assistants, and applicants.
1. Video Component
The video will be 30-40 hours long with a primary focus on the fundamentals of legal research and writing, including use of the books and materials available in the law libraries. Doctrinal areas of most concern to prisoners should be covered, including 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and other major civil rights laws; prison practices, including disciplinary and classification measures; relevant tort and civil law, including immigration and family issues, and relevant areas of criminal procedure, including appeals, collateral attacks, and time computations.
The entire video will be available for viewing by prisoners at least once in any six month period. Particular sessions (up to six hours) shall be available for viewing at least once in any three month period for a requesting prisoner. ADOC shall develop mechanisms for the required viewing in each facility, and submit these plans to the Special Master.
The video shall be prepared by persons selected and supervised by the Special Master. It will be funded by ADOC and used in all ADOC facilities. The taped materials shall be reviewed and updated as needed, but at least once every three years.
2. Live Component
Shortly after viewing the taped course, prisoner law clerks and Legal Assistants, and applicants, shall be offered an additional twenty hours of live instruction. This opportunity shall be available at least once in a six month period. The instructors shall be lawyers, law students or trained paralegals with demonstrated experience and ability in teaching and evaluating legal research and writing; the proposed syllabus and schedule, and instructor's experience shall be reviewed by the Special Master for each live offering.
The live portion shall include sessions in a facility law library, with written exercises required and returned with comments. Based on a student's performance in class and on assignments, the instructor shall determine whether the prisoner is minimally competent to assist others. This determination shall be made in writing and provided to the prisoner and to the Special Master.
E. RESPONSIBILITIES
A Legal Assistant should not undertake or continue to assist another prisoner if, because of workload, inexperience, conflict of interest, or any other factor, he or she cannot do so in an effective and timely manner; any such factor may serve as the basis for denying a prisoner's

request for assistance. On occasion, a Legal Assistant should be prepared to respond to an institutional request to assist another prisoner or to assess the viability of a legal claim.
F. OPERATING PROCEDURES
1. Selecting a Legal Assistant
An updated complete list of Legal Assistants must be regularly available in the law library and housing areas, with all relevant instructions about the Legal Assistant Program including the selection process; this process shall not require disclosure of the requesting prisoner's legal concerns. An agreement between a prisoner seeking assistance and a Legal Assistant will be reported to and recorded in the law library. An ADOC denial because of mistake or ineligibility, or upon finding that these two prisoners cannot be together without creating a serious threat to safety or security, and the opportunity for an alternate selection, shall be provided to the prisoner and to the Legal Assistant within 72 hours of the report to the library; a copy will be held for the Special Master.
A prisoner who is unable to reach agreement with a Legal Assistant or requires a replacement, may seek institutional intervention by filing a request form in the appropriate receptacles. Upon receipt, ADOC shall act to secure the requested assistance in a timely fashion. The institution will be relieved of this responsibility in a particular matter if two Legal Assistants independently conclude after adequate review that the prisoner's claim is not viable nor capable of redress by formal legal processes; such responses shall be provided to the Special Master.
2. Meetings
A prisoner shall request a meeting with a Legal Assistant by use of a legal assistance form and receptacle. Legal Assistants may initiate such meetings in the same manner. Provided that other applicable requirements are met, including access equivalent to I (C)(3), ADOC may utilize an alternative method of requesting a meeting when the sole purpose is preparation for a disciplinary hearing. ADOC must arrange a meeting that occurs within 72 hours of a request and notify the prisoner and Legal Assistant in writing of the time and place at least 24 hours prior to the meeting. An imminent legal deadline, including a pending disciplinary hearing, noted on a request requires an expedited meeting occurring within 24 hours of the request by a prisoner or Legal Assistant; II(F)(2) does not otherwise apply to assistance provided solely for a pending disciplinary matter.
ADOC must allow a prisoner to meet at least three hours each week at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions with his or her Legal Assistant; additional time shall be permitted to meet a filing or other legal deadline. Such meetings may occur during law library turnouts; a request by a prisoner or Legal Assistant to have both persons scheduled for a particular turnout shall be given preference. If the library is not requested or available, another location allowing the necessary privacy should be utilized.
A non-contact meeting may be used by ADOC if there is a finding that this is required because of documented security problems attributable to these two prisoners, or if either is in a fully

segregated status. The reasons for the non-contact shall be provided to the prisoners in the required meeting notice, and to the Special Master. Any such non-contact meeting shall permit discussion in normal tones, and allow both participants clear sight of each other and of each others legal papers.
Meetings between a prisoner and his or her Legal Assistant shall not be recorded or listened to. A prisoner shall not be given Legal Assistant status nor assigned to provide legal assistance with the objective of providing information to institutional personnel.
3. Library Time
ADOC shall provide Legal Assistant with additional time in the law library commensurate with their obligations to assist other prisoners. In addition to his or her own hours, a Legal Assistant shall be permitted an additional two hours of library use per week for each prisoner registered as assisting; this may be done at times when the library is not open for general use. The additional hours scheduled for a Legal Assistant may be subtracted from the weekly minimum of the prisoner being assisted.
4. Supplies and Services
A Legal Assistant may possess and utilize the legal supplies and services available to a prisoner he or she is registered as assisting solely for purposes relating to this assistance. If this prisoner is indigent, the Legal Assistant will be permitted those free legal supplies and services that are provided to indigent prisoners. These supplies and services must first be requested by the indigent prisoner for delivery to the Legal Assistant.
G. OTHER PRISONER ASSISTANCE
Nothing contained herein shall reduce a prisoner's opportunity to consult with any accessible prisoner about a legal matter, nor prohibit any prisoner, consistent with institutional requirements, from providing assistance on legal concerns, including court-related matters and institutional proceedings.
H. OUTSIDE LEGAL CONTACTS
Nothing herein reduces defendants' obligation to facilitate confidential and privileged contacts between prisoners and outside lawyers, authorized paralegals, legal organizations, governmental agencies and courts, through regular visits and adequate use of telephone and mails.
I. TELEPHONE CALLS
Prisoners shall be allowed a weekly minimum of three twenty-minute calls to: (1) an attorney, (2) a designated attorney representative, or (3) a legal organization; additional calls will be permitted in an emergency. ADOC shall install a sufficient number of telephones in each facility to enable these calls during usual business hours. The calls will not be recorded or listened to, and the location of the telephones must permit private conversations.

ADOC may install systems to verify the number called and time used but, absent documented abuse, shall not deny a call to any persons in one of the above three categories nor seek any information about the call. A prisoner may choose to pay for a call or make it collect. Calls that are not completed because of technical problems, or a failure to answer or refusal to accept, do not count. Brief incoming telephone messages involving legal deadlines or other necessary information from an attorney or representative shall be timely delivered to a prisoner.
III. LEGAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES
Meaningful access to the courts requires the availability of basic services and supplies needed for research and writing, and for the preparation and delivery of acceptable court papers.
A. NOTARY SERVICE
ADOC must provide notary service for legal papers and court-related documents within 24 hours of a request by a prisoner; this period shall be less if necessary to meet a legal deadline. Absent a legal deadline, this service is not required on weekends or legal holidays. The request may be made in person during a law library turnout or by use of a legal assistance receptacle.
B. PHOTOCOPYING
ADOC must provide the necessary copies of eligible legal papers and court-related documents within 48 hours of a request by a prisoner; this period shall be less if necessary to meet a legal deadline. The request may be made in person during a law library turnout or by use of a legal assistance receptacle. ADOC may charge a reasonable rate for this service, up to five cents per page.
Eligible legal papers and documents include petitions, complaints, answers, motions, affidavits, exhibits, memoranda and briefs, including attachments and appendices, and material needed for discovery and investigation, including interrogatories and freedom of information requests. ADOC shall advise staff that prisoner legal materials are confidential and may not be read; a clearly visible sign indicating this shall be posted on or next to every copy machine used for legal materials. Each facility shall have such a machine.
C. TYPEWRITERS
Prisoners may possess typewriters and necessary accessories; storage memory is permitted but programming capacity may be denied. ADOC shall provide an adequate number of functioning typewriters in each law library for prisoner use in the preparation of legal papers. This minimally requires a one-to-five ratio of electric typewriters-to-law library capacity; such typewriters must be covered by a service contract or other professional repair system used at the facility.
D. SUPPLIES
Every facility shall have sufficient quantities of basic legal supplies regularly available for purchase by prisoners. Such supplies minimally include pens, pencils, legal pads, typing paper,

typewriter ribbons, ko-rec-type or equivalent, file folders, regular size and manila envelopes, postage and brief covers and binders. A reasonable price may be charged for these items, within the departmental guideline of a ten percent above cost maximum mark-up. The prices of all items, legal or otherwise, available for purchase must be publicized prior to ordering by prisoners. Subject to usual security and search procedures, prisoners may receive any basic legal supplies, books, and materials by delivery or mail from outside persons, organizations or businesses.
IV. INDIGENT PRISONERS
A. ELIGIBILITY
Subject to the requirements contained herein, a prisoner shall be provided basic legal supplies and services at ADOC expense if: (a) he or she has less than $46.00 in the prison account on the date of the request, and (b) there have been less than $46.00 in total deposits to this account in the 28-day period ending on the date of the request. A prisoner who meets (a) but not (b) shall be provided those specific supplies and services required to meet an imminent and documented legal deadline, and a written statement of the costs of these. If this occurs, ADOC may, with written notice to the prisoner, debit the prisoner's account whenever and to the extent that the balance exceeds $46.00 until the cost of the emergency item is repaid.
ADOC shall regularly adjust the above cut-off figure in order to adequately insure a prisoner's access to basic legal supplies and services without sacrificing basic hygiene needs. This adjustment shall occur at least every 24 months beginning the date of the entry of this Order. It shall minimally be the percent change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index for the previous 24 months multiplied by the existing cut-off figure. The resulting new cut-off figure shall be rounded to the nearest fifty-cents.
B. SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
1. Supplies
Upon request, the following supplies shall be provided to eligible prisoners; the numbers in parentheses indicate the minimum amount of the item that must be provided for one week: pens (1), pencils (1), typing paper (10 sheets), legal pad (1), file folders (1) and regular envelopes (4). Brief covers and bindings, manila envelopes, and additional amounts of the above supplies shall be provided if necessary to meet a court deadline or requirement. Upon request, an eligible prisoner possessing a typewriter shall also be provided one suitable typewriter ribbon and one ko-rec-type or equivalent each week.
ADOC may require that the requesting prisoner check the specific items needed for legal research or preparation of legal papers during the next week. Pursuant to Section II (F)(4), the prisoner should indicate which, if any, of the supplies should be delivered directly to his or her Legal Assistant.
2. Postage

Postage shall be provided for all legal mail for eligible prisoners. Legal mail includes letters and documents sent to a court, to an attorney, to a legal agency or organization, or to a pro se opposing party.
C. PHOTOCOPYING
Eligible prisoners shall be provided the necessary copies of legal papers and court related documents as described in Section III (B). A prisoner shall minimally be provided with the number of copies of a document required by the Court, plus one copy for the opposing party and one for his or her records.
D. REQUEST PROCEDURE
The request procedures and forms shall comply with the applicable requirements of Section I (C). The request may be delivered in person during a law library turnout or placed in the appropriate receptacle. The prisoner should indicate that to his or her knowledge the eligibility requirements are met and which supplies and services are required.
E. RESPONSE PROCEDURE
Law library staff or clerks shall collect the prisoner request forms from each deposit point at least once each day. ADOC shall deliver the requested supplies or services to an eligible prisoner or designated Legal Assistant within 48 hours of the request; this period shall be less if necessary to meet a legal deadline. A prisoner shall be provided written notification of a denial of all or part of his or her request, with the specific reasons, within 48 hours of the request; a copy will be held for the Special Master. The 48 hour periods do not include weekends or legal holidays.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. NOTICE
Plaintiffs may transmit this Order and Commentary to members of the plaintiff class by mail or bulk delivery of copies to the ADOC and may provide ADOC with additional copies that will be kept on reserve in each law library and made available to prisoners during library turnouts. Plaintiffs or the Special Master may provide ADOC with a summary of this Order which shall be made regularly available in the law library and housing areas.
B. SPECIAL MASTER
All orders concerning the powers, payment and responsibilities of the Special Master, Professor Daniel J. Pochoda, are herein incorporated. Above references to the Special Master include his authorized representatives and Assistant Special Master Jane Bliss.
COMMENTARY
I. THE LAW LIBRARIES

Defendants' proposal that existing institutions without law libraries should not be required to build them is reasonable; the significant costs involved are not justified by need. Although not requested, the Proposed Order ("PO") allows ADOC to operate facilities without law libraries if the population is less than 150. Prisoners in the above prisons must get all of the required opportunities (10 hours per week in a law library, timely copies and supplies, legal assistance, etc.). Pending implementation and additional facts, specific size and seating requirements or ratios have not been included. Defendants agreed to address the clearly inadequate library at Santa Rita, ASPC - Tucson (minimum 22 capacity required).
A. & B. ACCESS & SCHEDULE
The PO adopts Defendants' proposal to reduce the total number of weekly library hours in facilities that do not require advance scheduling for turnouts. Thus, such facilities are only required to maintain a 50 hour per week schedule, as compared to the minimum 84 hours per week at Central Unit; the 50 hours are needed to meet the goal and mandates of the PO.
The PO includes some evening and weekend hours as done now in several facilities (e.g., Gila, Mohave at Douglas). These periods are necessary since most jobs keep prisoners occupied during weekdays (until 3:00 p.m., with dinner at 4:00 p.m.).
The PO also reduces the total time requirements in most facilities that, as Central Unit, require advance scheduling. This was done on the initiative of the Special Master based on an assessment of lesser-capacity institutions (Central Unit housed more than 800).
In every facility -- absent emergencies -- the library must be actually open and available for prisoner use during the "scheduled" hours. Such use cannot depend on the availability of a particular employee or prisoner clerk (any more than scheduled meals or visiting hours are).
As agreed when formulating the Gluth remedy, law library use cannot subject prisoners to unnecessarily onerous or retaliatory practices, including intrusive searches of all visitors or clerks and disciplinary write-ups for any failures to attend; These are occurring in some facilities. Such practices are not used at the maximum security Central Unit or in most facilities. They are generally not required for other congregate activities (classes, jobs, meals, etc.). Unexpected events or suspected threats may require strip searches, and disciplinary action may be necessary if schedules are regularly ignored without explanation. At the Central Unit, reasonable explanations for missed turnouts include scheduling conflict, miscommunication, illness and employee error.
The PO adopts Defendants' proposal to except the SMU -- and on the Special Master's initiative other facilities -- from the Gluth turnout minimums. This is subject to receiving the actual schedules in each prison and determining their adequacies for all custody levels and housing areas.
C. ADVANCE RESPONSE PROCEDURE

The PO adopts Defendants' proposal to only mandate computers in libraries requiring advanced scheduling.
G. LIBRARIAN
This mandate remains the same as Gluth with a "preference" for applicants with a law or paralegal degree. This is necessitated by Defendants' failure to hire any such persons, despite their recognized value. In fact, in its April 1991 Order, the Court specifically noted the need for such expertise and that such persons would reduce total costs to Defendants by their ability to teach the required research courses and to monitor the work of Legal Assistants.
I. "CHECK-OUT" SYSTEM
As was the case in Gluth, the PO permits use of a "check-out" system in maximum security facilities. It adopts Defendants' more practical position that this system can -- with the necessary showing -- be instituted prison-wide, and not only on the person-by-person basis proposed by Plaintiffs. At this time, a check-out system may be used at the Central Unit, CB6 and Special Management Unit facilities.
Direct access to the stacks is required in lesser-security prisons, although reasonable measures may be taken (e.g., limit the numbers in the stacks, assign a clerk to observe and assist). Direct access facilitates adequate research and, given the limited experience of most prisoners, may on occasion be a significant factor. The primary cause of vandalism is addressed by allowing copies of portions of the books and materials available in the library, including cases, laws and forms, for use in the housing area (at the prisoners' expense).
L. INVENTORY
This addition is required by the Court's September 13, 1992 Findings and Conclusions; it closely follows these Findings and Plaintiffs' proposal. Additional costs attributable to Pacific Reporters are offset by making the Arizona Reporters optional and generally by allowing clearly equivalent (competing) publications.
II. THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
D. RESEARCH COURSE
This is an effort to reduce the obligations on and costs to Defendants while still providing the previously adjudicated 60 - hour course (at least for law clerks and Legal Assistants). Thus, the PO provides that most of the 60 hours will consist of video taped sessions and that the great majority of prisoners would be limited to these sessions. While there would necessarily be dollar-costs required to prepare this lengthy and difficult tape, it is primarily a one-time expenditure and represents significant savings from the twice-a-year, 60 hour live Gluth model.
An effective course for clerks and Assistants requires a live component, including hands-on training in a law library and feedback on written exercises. This component is greatly reduced (to

20 hours) and should allow for Complex-wide offerings. As noted, use of full-time librarians with law or paralegal degrees would result in little additional or ongoing costs because of this requirement. ADOC should require that other librarians and library staff take the full course.
F. 1. SELECTING A LEGAL ASSISTANT
The PO incorporates Defendants' proposal that Legal Assistant requests may be denied based on a finding about a security problem.
2. MEETINGS
The PO incorporates Defendants' request that contact visits may be denied because of security problems. As with library visits, unsupported blanket denials are not permitted (e.g., for an entire facility). There was no showing of necessity in all the prisons listed, and contact visits are used at the maximum security Central Unit. There was no explanation of why prisoners can have "contact" for some purposes but not others (prisoners whose actions/status require complete separation meet the specific showing required by the PO). Courts have recognized that proper -and legal -- remedial provisions are often not themselves "constitutional rights".
I. TELEPHONE CALLS
This is required by the Court's Findings and Conclusions. The specifics follow these Findings and Defendants' proposal, with a three call minimum (versus two).
III. LEGAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES
A. NOTARY SERVICE
The Defendants' request regarding weekends and holidays is incorporated.
B. PHOTOCOPYING
The sign is required by the Court's Findings.
IV. INDIGENT PRISONERS
E. RESPONSE PROCEDURE
The PO adopts Defendants' proposal to include legal holidays.
DATED this 8 day of October, 1993.
C.A. Muecke U.S. District Judge

 
 834 F.Supp. 1553 (1992)
Fletcher CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
Nos. CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM, CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
November 13, 1992.
15545 *1554 *1555 Alice Loeb Bendheim, Phoenix, AZ, and Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Stuart Henry Adams, Jr., and David Cyrus Fathi, Nat. Prison Project of America, Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Kathleen L. Weinecke and Daniel Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ACCESS TO THE COURTS
MUECKE, District Judge.
Having considered the evidence presented by the parties in this matter regarding the access to the courts issues, the Court concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Access to the Courts
A. Physical Access without access to legal materials
In a number of facilities, prisoners allowed physical access to the law library are not allowed to browse the shelves. In some facilities, general population prisoners are denied access to the shelves although they are allowed physical access to the law library. Therefore, they must request legal materials from untrained prisoner law clerks or security officers.[1]
Inmates may browse the shelves in the law library at the Rynning unit law library at Florence;[2] the Florence 1556 women's unit;[3]*1556 Tucson;[4] the Mohave unit and the Gila unit at Douglas.[5] None of the inmates have
access to the stacks at any of the law libraries at Perryville[6] or the Kaibab unit at Winslow.[7]
Two lockdown facilities in Florence, SMU and CB-6, have developed "cages" that allow prisoners to sit in the law library area but prevent them from browsing the shelves.[8] Prisoners in the "cages" at CB6 and SMU must request legal materials from an untrained law clerk.[9]
Defendants argue that vandalism problems justify denial of access to the stacks. Defendants establish that vandalism occurred to legal materials in the Perryville complex.[10] However, it is not clear that this vandalism occurred because of access to the shelves. In certain facilities where prisoners have been allowed to browse the shelves, legal materials have not been stolen or damaged.[11] Further, there is no evidence that allowing prisoners to browse the law library shelves is the cause of missing or damaged legal materials.[12] Rather, the evidence suggests that inadequate staffing may be the cause of missing or damaged legal materials.[13]

B. Denial of Physical Access to the Law Libraries
Lockdown prisoners are routinely denied physical access to the law library. Prisoners in lockdown status in most facilities have no physical access to the law library.[14] In order for lockdown prisoners who are denied physical access to the law library to obtain legal materials or a legal assistant, they must send a written request ("kite") to the law library. The legal materials, if available, are sent to the prisoner in his/her lockdown cell.[15] Legal materials are brought to the prisoner in lockdown by ADOC staff, a prisoner legal assistant, or a prisoner law clerk.[16]
Staffing, logistics, and the reluctance to mix general population prisoners with lockdown prisoners are the reasons lockdown prisoners are generally denied physical access to the law library.[17] However, despite these same concerns, prisoners in lockdown in the Rynning unit and the Women's Division in Florence are allowed physical access to the law library and are allowed to browse the shelves.[18]
Prisoners in lockdown experience severe interference with their access to the courts. Unless a lockdown prisoner has a pending ADOC charge or outside ("street") case pending, the prisoner is denied access to a legal assistant. 1557 [19] Prisoners who are in lockdown *1557 status for less than fifteen days may be denied any access to the law library.[20] For example, prisoners who are in lockdown in Perryville are by policy not eligible to request legal materials unless they have been in lockdown for more than fourteen days.[21] In many instances, prisoners in lockdown are denied law books unless they can provide an exact citation.[22]
Prisoners in lockdown routinely experience long delays in receiving legal materials or legal assistance. At Perryville, it can take several days, even weeks, for a request for legal material to get to the law library and be filled.[23] At Tucson, lockdown prisoners may wait as long as three to seven days to receive legal materials from the law library.[24] At Tucson, lockdown prisoners experience delays in receiving legal assistance from legal assistants.[25] Legal assistants are only sent to the lockdown unit on Monday, Wednesday and Friday nights.[26] At Winslow, it can take a week for a request for legal assistance to reach a legal assistant.[27] Legal assistants at Winslow are allowed to visit lockdown prisoners only four days a week.[28] At Douglas, lockdown prisoners are denied access to legal materials and legal assistants on Fridays and Saturdays.[29]
Prisoners in lockdown are restricted in the numbers of books they can receive and the length of time they can keep the material. It has been the practice at Perryville to allow prisoners to receive only one book at a time, to be kept for only twenty-four hours.[30] Lockdown prisoners at Tucson are allowed to keep legal materials for only twenty-four hours. Because of this restriction, they tend to request only one or two books at a time.[31] Even 1558 lockdown prisoners who are intelligent, *1558 literate and legally trained are unable to do legal research under paging system that allows only one or two books at a time every couple of days. In addition, the legal assistants assigned to lockdown prisoners are not sufficiently skilled to assist them.[32]
The vast majority of adult prisoners incarcerated by ADOC have no adequate means to research the law, crystalize their issues, present their papers in a meaningful fashion, and get them filed in court.[33]
C. Illiterate or Non-English Speaking Prisoners
There are prisoners within ADOC custody who are functionally illiterate and who do not have English as their primary language. During a six month period between October 1990 and March 1991, 3,253 prisoners were tested at the reception center. Of these prisoners, 17.2% had a reading level below sixth grade and 14.5% were non-English speaking.[34] A system-wide study conducted in 1989 established that 35% of the adult incarcerated population had a reading level of seventh grade or below.[35] The trial testimony supported the conclusions of the

studies and indicated that there are prisoners who are unable to research the law because of their functional illiteracy or lack of English skills.[36]
As a result of the inability to receive adequate legal assistance, prisoners who are slow readers have had their cases dismissed with prejudice.[37] Other prisoners have been unable to file legal actions.[38]
D. Staffing
Many of the law libraries are staffed by security staff and prisoner law clerks.[39] In Tucson, there are seven legal assistants at the Santa Rita unit;[40] two clerks and thirteen legal assistants at the Cimarron unit; one clerk and one legal assistant at the Echo law library; and five law clerks and five legal assistants at the Rincon law library. [41]
In Florence, the law library at CB-6 has four prisoner law clerks and three legal assistants;[42] the SMU library has three law clerks, eleven legal assistants, and one correctional security officer;[43] the East unit law library is staffed by one correctional security officer and two law clerks and has seven legal assistants;[44] the North unit library is staffed by a correctional security officer, two law clerks and one legal assistant;[45] and the law library at the South unit is staffed by a correctional security officer, three law clerks and nine legal assistants.[46] The law 1559 library at Alhambra is staffed only by two law clerks *1559 and two legal assistants.[47]
The law library at Mohave unit at Douglas is staffed by a civilian librarian and three law clerks.[48]
The law library at the Kaibab unit at Winslow is staffed by a civilian librarian, Sue Ori, and three law clerks.[49] There are five legal assistants but only two are approved to deliver legal materials to lockdown units.[50] The law library at the Coronado unit at Winslow is staffed by civilian librarians and two law clerks. There are four legal assistants.[51]
All the library officers at the law libraries at Perryville are assisted by the librarian at the complex law library.[52] The head law librarian at ASPC-Perryville, Starla Cathcart, has a master of library science from Brigham Young University.[53] The library at the San Juan unit at Perryville is staffed by three law clerks, a correctional security officer and a librarian.[54] The law library at the Santa Cruz unit at Perryville is staffed by a correctional security officer, two law clerks and one bilingual aide.[55] The law library at the Santa Maria unit at Perryville is staffed by three prisoner law clerks and a correctional security officer. There is one approved legal assistant for general population and one for lockdown prisoners.[56] The law library at the San Pedro unit at Perryville is staffed by one correctional security officer and three law clerks. There are two approved legal assistants for disciplinary actions.[57]
The law library at the Arizona Center for Women at Phoenix is staffed by two law clerks and one Department of Corrections employee. There are two approved legal assistants.[58]
In Tucson, Bill Streit is the complex librarian.[59] The law library at the Santa Rita unit is staffed by a law librarian and three inmate clerks.[60] Ann Joyner, the law librarian at the Santa Cruz Unit at Tucson, has a Master's degree in Library Science from the University of Arizona, and a Bachelor's degree from the University of Florida. [61] The Echo Unit and the Rincon Unit law libraries have full-time law librarians.[62]
The prisoner legal assistants, law clerks, and civilian library staff are responsible for providing legal services to all prisoners in the facilities. However, law clerks and library staff can assist prisoners only by giving them the requested material from the law library stacks, whereas legal assistants can help them draft pleadings and do other legal work.[63] There are an insufficient number of legal assistants available to assist prisoners who need legal assistance.[64]
1560

*1560 ADOC recognizes a need for additional librarians, but requests for additional staff have been rejected.[65] There is a specific need for more library staff to assist in providing library services to prisoners in lockdown at the Perryville facility.[66]
ADOC does not ensure that the law libraries or facilities have Spanish-speaking legal assistants or law clerks.[67] In many facilities there are no Spanish-speaking legal assistants or law clerks.[68] The Gila unit at Douglas; Santa Rita Unit at Tucson; CB-6 at Florence; Mohave Unit at Douglas; and the Coronado Unit at Winslow each have one bilingual law clerk.[69]
At the South Unit law library at Florence there is one bilingual law clerk/legal assistant.[70] At the San Juan Unit law library at ASPC-Perryville, two of the law clerks speak Spanish.[71]
Most of the prisoners must rely on Spanish-speaking prisoners who are not law clerks or legal assistants to assist them and their legal assistants.[72] However, frequently these prisoners are unable to comprehend and translate legal terminology.[73]
E. Training of staff and inmates
1. Qualifications for inmate legal assistants
In most facilities prisoners apply to the warden to become legal assistants.[74] These prisoners are not required to meet any specific knowledge or performance requirements pertaining to legal research prior to being approved for the legal assistant position.[75] Perryville and the Santa Rita Unit at Tucson are the only facilities that have developed tests for prisoners seeking to be law clerks.[76] However, the tests are not given to all prisoners who apply to be law clerks[77] and evaluate only the prisoner's knowledge of the library collection but do not test actual research skills, legal analysis and legal writing.[78]
2. Training for inmate legal assistants
The legal assistants and law clerks frequently are not sufficiently skilled to provide prisoners adequate legal services.[79] ADOC has no training program for prisoners or civilians who provide legal services, with the 1561 exception of the court-ordered training in the *1561 Florence Central Unit [Gluth] and a training program that was developed in July 1990 at the Complex law library in Tucson, a program that has not been implemented in all the units in Tucson.[80] Inmate legal assistants at Tucson were provided an eighteen and a half hour training program by the Department of Corrections.[81] Some of the inmate legal assistants at SMU in Florence have gone through the legal training program offered at the Central Unit pursuant to the Gluth decision.[82] After the filing of this lawsuit, ADOC promulgated a plan to provide law clerks and legal assistants training in the law, but later rescinded the policy.[83]
Paralegal courses are available for inmates through correspondence or closed circuit television.[84] Although some law clerks or legal assistants have taken a paralegal correspondence course, there is no system in place to evaluate their work.[85]
Law clerks and legal assistants should be required to take a training course that includes classroom hours in legal research and courses in the substantive law relevant to prisoners' needs, such as the disciplinary process, warrants, detainers, collateral attacks and civil procedure.[86] Thus, the eighteen-and-a-half-hour training program provided certain legal assistants in Tucson is insufficient training.[87]

3. Qualifications and training for staff
In order for library staff to provide prisoners with adequate law library services, all of the library staff must be trained in the law.[88] There is no training provided civilian or security library staff other than that provided in the Central Unit pursuant to Gluth.[89] Although some librarians have training in library science, this is not a requirement. Also, staff is not required to have training in legal research.[90]
F. Contents of the law libraries
The defendants do not assure that library inventories are updated and self-help manuals and other needed legal materials are available to prisoners. There is no one in ADOC who is responsible for monitoring law libraries statewide.[91]
The standard library collection that would comply with the "Muecke List" contains at least the United States Code Annotated; Supreme Court Reporter; Federal Reporter Second; Federal Supplements; Shepards U.S. Citations; Shepards Federal Citations; Local Rules for the Federal District Court; Modern Federal Practice Digests; Federal Practice Digest (Second); Arizona Code Annotated; Arizona Reports; Shepards Arizona Citations; Arizona 1562 Appeals Reports; Arizona Law-of Evidence (Udall); ADC Policy Manual; *1562 108 Institutional Management Procedures; Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright); Corpus Juris Secundum and Arizona Digest. (Defendants' Exhibit 785, p. 1; see also, Wilkinson v. MacDougall, CIV 81-1397, (Jan. 5, 1984)).
Although defendants now have the "Muecke list"[92] in most the law libraries statewide, a number of libraries had volumes that were not updated.[93] In the Alhambra law library, there was no Shephard's United States Citations 1991 supplement.[94] In the CB-6 law library, Corpus Juris Secundum was missing pocket parts in various volumes.[95] In the ACW law library, Federal Practice Digest 3rd and the Arizona Law of Evidence were not current.[96] At the Santa Maria law library, the Modern Federal Practice Digest was unavailable.[97] The defendants opened the Rynning Unit in May 1991, but by December 16, 1991 they still did not have certain books required by the Muecke list.[98]
Prisoners need additional materials to conduct legal research. Specifically, prisoners need self-help manuals that direct them on substantive and procedural issues to help them do legal work.[99] However, not all of the facilities have self-help manuals. Prisoners had occasion to use self-help manuals because they were the personal property of the law clerk.[100] Legal assistants find they need, but often do not have, Pacific Second to review a case discovered through the shepardizing of an Arizona case; immigration material; and post-conviction manuals. [101] Many prisoners are confronted with immigration issues, particularly deportation detainers.[102]
Some of the libraries including Perryville, SMU, CB-6, the East unit, the North unit and the women's unit at Florence; the Santa Rita Unit at Tucson; the Mohave unit and Gila units at Douglas: and the Kaibab unit at Winslow contain self-help litigation manuals including the supplementary pamphlet or the 1983 edition of the Prisoner's Self-Help Litigation Manual.[103] Some of the libraries including Perryville contain the Pacific Second series.[104]
Facility administrators have removed from the law libraries legal materials that are not on the "Muecke list."[105]
G. Legal supplies/Indigency standard
ADOC's indigency standard prevents prisoners from purchasing necessary legal supplies. The ADOC policy regarding indigency, set forth in Policy 302.11, provides that a prisoner is not provided basic legal supplies at 1563 ADOC expense if, at any time during the previous thirty-day period, the prisoner's account *1563 balance

exceeded twenty-two dollars.[106] ADOC makes no individual evaluation of what the prisoner purchased during the previous thirty-day period in order to assess whether or not the prisoner has a valid need for indigency status. [107] The twenty-two dollar standard was not based on a comparison of the actual average monthly consumption of basic general supplies, including hygiene items and legal supplies, and their cost. Rather, the standard was arrived at by applying an inflation factor to the fourteen-year-old twelve-dollar standard.[108]
If the prisoner is granted indigency status and receives legal supplies, the prisoner's account is debited the amount of the legal supplies and the debit is held against the account until funds are available in the prisoner's account to pay off the debt.[109]
If the prisoner is denied indigency status, he or she cannot reapply until thirty days after the date his or her account went above the indigency standard.[110] Further, Prisoners must reapply for indigency status whenever they are transferred to another facility.[111]
Under the twenty-two dollar standard, if a prisoner purchases basic hygiene and general supplies, such as coffee, that prisoner is unable to purchase needed legal supplies.[112] A prisoner could spend twenty dollars on basic supplies.[113] It is not unusual for a prisoner to spend twenty-four dollars at the prison store.[114]
The appropriate indigency standard cannot be determined without evaluating the actual cost of basic necessities and legal supplies.[115] A recent study of the actual cost and prisoner consumption of basic supplies and legal supplies at the Central unit in Florence, resulted in the establishment of a forty-six dollar indigency standard. Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.Supp. 1309, 323 (D.Ariz.1988), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1504 (1991).
H. Photocopy Policy
ADOC's photocopy policy does not ensure that the substance of prisoners' confidential legal materials are not read by other prisoners or staff. Prisoners or library staff photocopy prisoners' confidential legal materials.[116] For example, at SMU at Florence, legal documents are copied by putting them under the cell door. An officer will pick up the document and copies will be received back in two to three days.[117] Alternatively, an inmate at the law library may request copies. An officer scans the material for the contraband, then an inmate clerk copies the materials.[118] In a few units including Perryville, Rynning at Florence and Santa Rita at Tucson, those inmates allowed into the library may watch their copies being made.[119] Prisoners have observed people reading prisoners' legal documents while copying them.[120]
1564 *1564 In addition, the opportunity to breach the confidentiality of legal documents is increased by the delays in receiving photocopies. Prisoners in lockdown in Perryville may wait as long as nine days to have legal materials photocopied. Photocopies in general may take one to two full days.[121] There is a need for posting a policy by the photocopier which states that ADOC civilian or prisoner staff shall not read the substance of a prisoner's confidential legal papers that have been submitted for photocopying.[122]
I. Attorney/client phone calls
Defendants interfere with prisoners' ability to make confidential attorney-client telephone calls. Prisoners are arbitrarily denied confidential attorney-client telephone calls by restrictive ADOC policies and procedures. If prisoners do not have an attorney of record, they must have court papers that verify that they are representing themselves and have filed an action with the court.[123] Prisoners with an attorney of record must substantiate a need for telephonic communication with that attorney or the attorney's agent that cannot be met by utilizing the mail or attorney visitation. Prisoners are advised that calls should be requested and will only be approved in response to legitimate pressing legal issues with short time parameters, such as a court-ordered deadline.[124] If

prisoners have not filed an action pro se, or do not have an attorney of record, they are unable to interview a prospective attorney by telephone.[125]
The Correctional Program Officers (CPO) may deny prisoners confidential attorney-client calls because the staff is too busy or because the staff makes a determination that the prisoner's need for a confidential attorney-client call can be handled by written correspondence or by attorney-client visitation.[126] The CPO is not required to justify in writing a decision to deny a prisoner confidential attorney-client call.[127]
Further, there is no policy requiring a staff person to leave the room while a prisoner is attempting to make a confidential attorney-client call, even when the staff person is able to view the prisoner through a window.[128] CPOs have refused to leave the room and have remained within hearing range while a prisoner is attempting to make confidential attorney-client call, even when the staff person is able to view the prisoner through a window. [129]
ADOC's official policy is based on the belief that the primary means of communication between a prisoner and his attorney should be by written correspondence. Yet, ADOC realizes that prisoners have other issues besides court deadlines necessitating a call to an attorney.[130] The primary reason ADOC requires justification for a 1565 confidential attorney-client *1565 call is because the call takes some staff time and the prisoner is using a state phone.[131]
Because the Central Office policies provide few objective guidelines for determining when a request for a call should be granted or denied,[132] facilities and individual staff have developed different policies or procedures, many of which interfere with the right to have confidential telephone contact with an attorney or the attorney's agent.[133] The CB-6 policy limits the reasons for an attorney-client call to issues related to a prisoner's sentence.[134] At SMU, a prisoner's institutional risk score, not his need, will determine how often he is allowed legal call.[135] At the Central unit in Florence, limitations have been placed on the number of telephone calls prisoners can make per week. Prisoners were allowed one call per week in 1989[136] and two calls per week in 1990.[137] No distinction is made between attorney and non-attorney calls.[138] At the Perryville facility and the Cimarron unit at Tucson, the prisoner must tell the CPO the exact nature of the call before the confidential attorney-client call is granted.[139]
Prisoners who cannot satisfy staff that they have need for a confidential attorney-client phone call are forced to speak to their attorney on monitored telephones.[140] This policy significantly diminishes the ability of prisoners to have access to the courts because they are unable to have confidential attorney-client calls.[141]
II. Post-Filing Changes
The defendants made the following changes relevant to the access to the courts issues after the filing of this lawsuit. A number of the law libraries throughout the state did not have the complete "Muecke list" until after this lawsuit was filed.[142] Further, some facilities had no law library or a limited "resource" library prior to the filing of the lawsuit.[143]
The defendants expanded the law library hours at a number of institutions after the lawsuit was filed.[144] Prior to the expansion of law library hours, prisoners had insufficient time in the law libraries.[145]
The defendants also increased the indigency standard or legal access from $12.00 per 30 days to $22.00 per 30 days effective March 15, 1991.[146]
1566 *1566 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Access to the Courts
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts that is adequate, effective and meaningful. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). This right of access to the courts "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. "It is the state's burden to provide meaningful access and to demonstrate that its chosen method is adequate." Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir.1991), citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981). Prisoners alleging interference with their access to the courts need not allege "actual injury" if one of the core requirements under Bounds is involved. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.1989). Adequacy of legal assistance is such a core requirement. Id.
The prison may preclude physical access to segregated inmates if such access would interfere with institutional security.[147]Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1109 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). See also, Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.1990); Lindquist v. Idaho St. Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir.1985). However, if the state denies physical access to the law library, the state must provide that prisoner with legal assistance. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1110. The Bounds court listed several alternatives to physical access including the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, volunteer attorneys, or staff attorneys working with prisoner legal assistance organizations. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831, 97 S.Ct. at 1499-1500. The legal access program need not include these particular elements but must be evaluated as a whole. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831, 97 S.Ct. at 1499-1500. "Bounds requires, in the absence of adequate law libraries, `some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners.'" Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1511.
A "paging system," in which a prisoner who is denied direct access to the law library is allowed to request that legal materials be brought to his or her cell, does not provide adequate access to the courts. In Toussaint, the Ninth Circuit accepted the prisoners' contention that a paging system that allowed a prisoner to order five books per week was constitutionally deficient:
Simply providing a prisoner with books in his cell, if he requests them, gives the prisoner no meaningful change [sic] to explore the legal remedies that he might have. Legal research often requires browsing through various materials in search of inspiration; tentative theories may have to be abandoned in the course of research in the face of unfamiliar adverse precedent. New theories may occur as a result of a chance discovery or an obscure or forgotten case. Certainly a prisoner, unversed in the law and the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance than the trained lawyer exploring his case. It is unrealistic to expect a prisoner to know in advance exactly what materials he needs to consult.
Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1109-10, quoting Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 276 (1979). See also Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F.Supp. 1006, 1019-25 (N.D.N.Y.1990) (paging system that allows two books a day is inadequate).
Untrained prisoner legal assistants cannot provide constitutionally sufficient access to the courts for prisoners 1567 denied access to a law library. Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1508.[148] "Bounds requires the assistance *1567 of those
`trained' in the law; the appearance of minimal capacity to assist other inmates alone plainly does not suffice." Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1508. Although legal training need not be extensive, Bounds does require that inmates be provided the legal assistance of persons with at least some training in the law." Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1511.
Moreover, even the best law library is of no use to prisoners who are functionally illiterate in English. Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir.1980). Library books, even if adequate in number, cannot provide access to the courts for those persons who do not speak English or who are illiterate. Id. See also, Valentine, 850 F.2d at 957; U.S. ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1105-07 (E.D.Pa.1987), aff'd without opinion, 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987); cert. denied nom. Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, 485 U.S. 993, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988); Cody, 599 F.Supp. at 1061; Canterino, 562 F.Supp. at 110.

Meaningful access to the courts requires direct assistance for prisoners who because of language factors or lack of access to the law library, or for other reasons are unable to perform adequate legal research and writing. In the absence of a program providing such prisoners with lawyers or paralegals, ADOC must maintain a sufficient number of at least minimally trained prisoner legal assistants. Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D.Ariz.1988), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991). In Gluth, this Court ordered [for the Central Unit in Florence] the development of a legal research and writing course that must be successfully completed by all legal assistants. The work of legal assistants was to be supervised on a continuing basis by the legal research instructor. Gluth, 773 F.Supp. at 1319-20. Clearly, the law requires for those prisoners denied physical access to the law libraries [either because they are in lockdown, illiterate or non-English speaking or are denied access to the books within the law libraries] the defendants must provide trained legal assistants. The evidence in this case establishes that the legal assistants provided by the ADOC are not trained sufficiently to meet the Bounds requirements. Locked down, illiterate or non-English speaking inmates must rely on an inadequate number of inmate clerks with no formalized training or supervision by attorneys. Such a system fails to comply with the requirements of Bounds. Valentine, 850 F.2d at 956-57.
II. Law library staffing
To provide adequate access to the courts, a law library must be staffed by a person with adequate legal training; a law library staffed only by security officers untrained in legal research and writing is not sufficient.[149] Therefore, this court in Gluth [Central Unit in Florence] ordered defendants to provide at least one full-time professionally trained librarian at the Central Unit law library, as well as adequate secretarial support. See Gluth, No. CIV 84-1626-PHX-CAM, Order, July 9, 1991, p. 4; See also Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1038 (3rd Cir. 988) (death row prisoners who are denied direct access to law library must have assistance from attorneys for post-conviction and civil rights filings); Valentine, 850 F.2d at 956 (prisoner paralegals who are not provided continuing legal education cannot provide adequate access to prisoners who were denied direct access to law library); Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433, 434 (1st Cir.1986) (meaningful access provided where attorneys were available to prisoners who were denied direct library access). The Court also ordered that prisoner law library clerks, in order to perform their duties adequately, must successfully complete the same legal research course as prisoner legal assistants. Gluth, 773 F.Supp. at 1318.
III. Indigent Standard/Supplies
1568 Indigent prisoners must be provided sufficient legal supplies and services to *1568 ensure meaningful access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824, 97 S.Ct. at 1496. A policy which forces inmates to choose between purchasing hygenic supplies and essential legal supplies is unacceptable. Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1508.
In Gluth, this Court ordered that a prisoner in the Central Unit in Florence is eligible for basic legal supplies and services if he has less than $46.00 in his account at the time of the request. Gluth, 773 F.Supp. at 1324. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that "[t]he uncontroverted facts show that it costs at least $46 to purchase necessary personal items and legal supplies and that inmates must purchase hygiene items to avoid punishment under prison regulations." Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1508.
In this case, the ADOC established the $22 indigency standard by applying an inflation factor to the 14-year old $12 standard.[150] The standard is not based on actual costs of hygiene items. Under this $22 standard, a prisoner cannot purchase both hygiene items and legal supplies. Clearly, the $22 standard is insufficient to insure that indigent prisoners receive sufficient legal supplies.
IV. Contents of the law libraries
After the filing of this action, the defendants expanded their resources in the law libraries. Generally, the facilities appear to have complete libraries.[151] Some of the libraries contain, and all of the libraries should contain,

copies of prisoner self-help manuals. Without self-help manuals, prisoners who are untrained in the law cannot use the legal books in the libraries and the defendants have not provided "meaningful" access to the courts. It also appears that the Pacific Digests and Reporters may be necessary for the inmates to pursue their cases.
V. Photocopy Policy
Because the photocopy policies allow staff or other inmates to photocopy a prisoner's confidential legal information, the confidentiality of legal documents is breached by staff or other inmates. Staff, who may be named defendants in civil rights actions, have access to confidential legal materials of inmates. For these reasons, the prison needs a policy to assure that legal documents to be photocopied remain confidential and are not read by other inmates or staff.
VI. Legal telephone calls
Prisoners must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys for civil as well as criminal matters. Therefore, regulations and practices that unjustifiably restrict the availability of professional representation are invalid. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814-15, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (ban on attorneys' use of paralegals and law students to interview prisoners). Reasonable access to telephones is an important component of a prisoner's right of access to courts and counsel. See, Divers v. Department of Corrections, 921 F.2d 191, 194 (8th Cir.1990) (allegation that prisoners were permitted to telephone an attorney only if they had a court appearance within 30 days stated a claim); Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052 (3th Cir.1989) (allowing prisoners only one attorney call every two weeks, and counting calls as made when the attorney was not reached, is "patently inadequate"). "[T]he ability of counsel to visit the jail cannot always compensate for an inmate's initial inability to ask an attorney to visit. Worse yet, inmates who have not yet retained an attorney are obviously prejudiced if they can only make one call during business hours every two weeks." Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1052.
1569 Moreover, effective access to attorneys in the prison context requires that the *1569 traditional privacy of the attorney/client relationship be protected. See Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir.1990) ("The opportunity to communicate privately with an attorney is an important part of meaningful access to the courts."). "Forcing prisoners to conduct their meetings with their attorneys in the open or to yell over the phone obviously compromises the consultation." Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1052. Thus, in Gluth, this Court reminded defendants of their obligation "to facilitate confidential and privileged contacts between Central Unit prisoners and outside lawyers, authorized paralegals, legal organizations, governmental agencies and courts, through regular visits and adequate use of telephones and mails." 773 F.Supp. at 1321. See also, Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F.Supp. 1252, 1313-14 (S.D.W.Va.1981) (failure to provide sufficient and regular telephone service in the jail operates to deprive prisoners of their right to have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys).
In this case, the prisoners are arbitrarily denied confidential attorney-client phone calls. The lack of a Central office policy allows individual prisons to set arbitrary standards that allow for improper denial of calls to counsel. Prison staff are not required to justify the denial in writing. In addition, prisoners are forced speak to their attorneys on monitored lines or within hearing range of prison staff. Thus, inmates are denied access to the courts.
Injunctive Relief
Because the defendants' system fails to comply with constitutional standards, the Court has determined that injunctive relief is appropriate for the access to the courts issues.
Many of the issues in this case have been resolved for the Central Unit in Florence by the Special Master [Dan Pachoda] and his assistant [Janet Bliss] appointed in the Gluth case. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the resolution of those issues. Therefore, the Court intends to appoint Dan Pachoda as Special Master and

Expert and Janet Bliss as Assistant Special Master to work with the parties and develop the proper injunctive relief. A detailed order will follow setting forth the duties of the Special Master.
For those issues that have been resolved successfully in Gluth, the Court intends to implement the Gluth policies statewide, with any modifications that the parties and Special Master determine are necessary due to the particular circumstances of the prison facility. For the remaining issues not addressed in Gluth, the Special Master and his assistant will work with the parties to develop the proper injunctive relief for plaintiffs.
[1] Stipulation, 11/15/1991 (hereinafter "Stip."), p. 8, 6d (South unit at Florence); p. 9, 7c (Alhambra); p. 11, 9e (Kaibab unit at Winslow); p. 12, 10e (Coronado unit at Winslow); p. 13, 11e (San Juan unit at Perryville); p. 14, 12a (Santa Cruz unit at Perryville); p. 18, B.
[2] Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 253, lines 19-22.
[3] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 133, lines 16-18.
[4] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 111, lines 3-7.
[5] Stip., p. 10, 8e.
[6] 1/7/1992, p. 94, lines 21-23.
[7] Ori testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 144, lines 12-21.
[8] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 144, lines 24-25, p. 145, lines 1-10; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 154, lines 17-24.
[9] Stip., p. 2, 1d, p. 4, e; p. 18, B.
[10] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 94, lines 21-25, p. 95, lines 1-4, p. 95, lines 10-25, p. 96, lines 1-16; Defendants' Exhibit 834, p. 1-3.
[11] Stip., p. 17, 15b; Joyner dep., p. 34, lines 14-21; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 111, lines 3-7; Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 254, lines 1-3.
[12] Keeney dep., p. 80, lines 3-6.
[13] Exh. 217, p. 26.
[14] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 39, lines 2-7; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 122, lines 11-25, p. 23, lines 1-11; see also Stip., p. 6, 4e; p. 10, 8d; p. 11, 9f; p. 14, 12c; p. 15, 13d; p. 16 14e; Joyner dep., p. 7, lines 23-25; Exh. 217, p. 38; Exh. 248ca.
[15] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 39, lines 2-7; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 122, lines 18-25; Exh. 248ca; Exh. 201; Stip., .6, 4e; p. 10, 8d; p. 11, 9f; p. 14, 12c; p. 15, 13d; p. 16, 14e; p. 21, 8b, 9b; Exh. 216, p. 3, 6. 2.4.
[16] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 124, lines 14-18; Stip., p. 14, 12c; p. 18, b; Exh. 201; Exh. 216, p. 2, 6.1.10.
[17] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 39, lines 10-25, p. 40, lines 1-3.
[18] Stip., p. 5, 3d; Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 253, lines 19-20; Powell testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 266, lines 11-13.
[19] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 130, lines 6-11; Booker testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 273, lines 20-25; p. 274, line 1; Exh. 40y.
[20] Exh. 794, p. 2, 5.1.5.
[21] Cathcart dep., p. 31, lines 6-13.

[22] Booker testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 270, lines 12-25, p. 271, lines 1-4; Exh. 249ji, Cathcart memo; Exh. 249kd, Cathcart memo; Joyner dep., p. 38, lines 17-19; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 124, lines 1-6; Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 145, lines 19-25, Bartholic testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 200, lines 11-25, p. 201, lines 1-7; Exh. 19fff; Sloboda dep., p. 33, lines 9-18, but see Sloboda's contradictory testimony at trial: Sloboda testimony, 1/14/92, p. 107, lines 19-25, p. 108, lines 1-3.
[23] Cathcart dep., p. 27, line 25; p. 28, lines 1-5; Exh. 249ja, (waited four days to receive 5 A.R.S.); Exh. 249iz (waited eight days to receive 462 F.Supp.); Exh. 249jc (waited six days to receive 477 F.Supp.); Exh. 249jd (waited five days to receive 94 S.Ct.); Exh. 249jb (waited five days to receive 96 S.Ct.); Exh. 249je (waited nine days to receive 5 A.R.S.); Exh. 249jf (waited nine days to receive one volume of 42 USCA §§ 1983-1984); Exh. 249jj (waited six days to receive 142 Az.2d); Exh. 249jk (waited three days for 15 Az.2d); Exh. 249jl (waited three days for 5 A.R.S.); Exh. 249jm (waited three days to receive 11 A.R.S.); Exh. 249jq (waited three days to receive 5 A.R.S. and a copy of Adm. Rules); Exh. 249jr, (waited nine days to receive material on post-conviction remedies, three days after second request); Exh. 249js (waited ten days for 406 F.2d); Exh. 249ju (waited eleven days for Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules); Exh. 249jw (waited thirteen days for 387 F.Supp. and sixteen days for 655 F.2d 487); Exh. 249jy (waited seven days to receive 104 Ariz.2d); Exh. 249kd (waited thirteen days to receive 154 Ariz.); Exh. 249ki (waited ten days for the Yellow Pages and the Zip Code book); Exh 249kl (waited eleven days to receive volumes 827 and 697 of F.2d); Exh. 249iu (waited three days to receive a response to his request); Exh. 249iv (waited three days to receive 84 Federal Practice Digest 3rd); Exh. 249iw (waited nine days to receive 1989 Supplement to Rights of Prisoners).
[24] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 107, lines 21-25, p. 108, lines 1-6; Exh. 40b (waited four days to receive legal materials); Exh. 40c waited seven days to receive copies of three cases); Exh. 40d (waited three days or longer to receive a disciplinary rule book); Exh. 40s (waited four and six days, respectively, for legal materials); Exh. 40b (waited four days for legal materials).
[25] Exh. 40t (waited seven days for a visit from a legal assistant); Exh. 40v (received no response to his request to see a legal assistant); Exh. 40w (waited four days to receive a visit from a legal assistant); Exh. 40e (waited four days to receive a visit from a legal assistant).
[26] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 108, line 1.
[27] Johns testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 102, lines 125.
[28] Exh. 255cx.
[29] Exh. 205.
[30] Cathcart dep., p. 29, lines 24-25, p. 34, lines 7-16; Exh. 249iw (Rights of Prisoners); Exh. 249jc; Exh. 49jo.
[31] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 109, lines 20-25, p. 110, lines 4-12).
[32] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 124, lines 6-13, 25, p. 125, lines. 1-22; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 131, lines 10-15.
[33] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 109, lines 14-25.
[34] Exh. 835.
[35] Exh. 272.
[36] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 114, lines 12-25, p. 115, lines 1-9, p. 178, lines 1-5, p. 199, lines 3-5; McQuillen testimony, 12/169/1991, p. 115, lines 16-25, p. 116, lines 8-25, p. 133, lines 8-15; p. 128, lines 1-6; Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 117, lines 13-25, p. 118, Lines 1-25, p. 119, lines 1-11; Harris testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 218, lines 19-25, p. 246, lines 1-5; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 169, lines 16-20, p. 170, lines 1-18; Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 76, lines 8-14, p. 79, lines 11-13, lines 21-23.
[37] Bartholic testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 198, lines 16-25, p. 200, lines 11-25, p. 201, lines 1-9; Exh. 956.

[38] Harris testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 218, lines 8-20. [39] Stip., p. 18, B; p. 10, 4a, 5a, 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b; Exh. 217, pp. 25, 43, 49, 65 and 67A; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 68, lines 15-25, p. 69, lines 1-4, p. 26, lines 3-8, lines 12-17, p. 34, lines 9-22. [40] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 100, lines 5-6. [41] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, at p. 101, lines 7-11. [42] Stip., p. 18, B1a and b. [43] Stip., p. 19, B2a,b and c. [44] Stip., p. 20, B4a and b. [45] Stip., p. 20, B5a and b. [46] Stip., p. 20, B6a and b. [47] Stip., p. 20, B7a and b. [48] Stip., p. 21, B8a. [49] Ori testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 142, lines 11-15. [50] Stip., p. 21, B9a and b. [51] Stip., p. 22, B10a and b. [52] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 90, lines 15-24. [53] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 79, lines 16-25, p. 80, lines 1-16. [54] Stip., p. 22, B11a and b. [55] Stip., p. 22, B12a and b. [56] Stip., p. 23, B13a and b. [57] Stip., p. 23, B14a and b. [58] Stip., p. 23, B15a and b. [59] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992 p. 96, lines 7-9. [60] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 99, lines 11-15. [61] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 94, lines 1-8. [62] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 100, lines 17-25, p. 101, lines 1-3). [63] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 152, lines 8-16; Exh. 216 (ADC Internal Management Policy 302.11), p. 1, 5.2, p. 8, 6.12.1.3; Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 115, line 25, p. 116, lines 1-3; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 114, lines 17-20. [64] Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 258, lines 13-25, p. 259, lines 1-10; Stip., p. 20, 5b; Johns testimony, 12/18/1992, p. 103, lines 24-25, p. 104, lines 1-7; Exh. 250c; Exh. 250p; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 123, lines 2-4, p. 124, lines 10-19; Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 111, lines 1-7. [65] Keeney dep., p. 69, lines 15-25, p. 70, line 1; Lewis dep., p. 26, lines 3-8. [66] Cathcart dep., p. 69, lines 16-20; Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 114, lines 7-17.

[67] Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 81, lines 24-25, p. 82, line 1; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 120, lines 1-13.
[68] Johns testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 105, lines 23-25; p. 106, lines 1-11; Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 75, lines 21-22; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 100, lines 5-16; Cathcart dep., p. 13, lines 1-4; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 115, lines 11-12; Stip., p. 19, 3c; p. 21, 9b; p. 22, 11a and 11b; p. 23, 13a, 13b, 14a and 14b; Exh. 250c; Exh. 40t.
[69] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 114, lines 12-16, p. 115, lines 1-10; Sloboda testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 92, lines 3-7, lines 13-15; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 100, lines 7-16; Stip., p. 21, B8a, p. 22, B10a.
[70] Stip., p. 20, B6b.
[71] Stip., p. 22, B11a.
[72] Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 82, lines 5-19; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991 p. 115, lines 16-21; Stip., p. 19, 3c.
[73] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 115, lines 16-25, p. 116, lines 1-3.
[74] Exh. 216, p. 6, 6.9.4.
[75] Exh. 790, Policy Receipt Newsletter, dated 3/14/91, p. 1, 5.3.
[76] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 90, Line 25, p. 91, lines 1-2; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 101, lines 20-25, p. 102, Lines 1-11.
[77] Cathcart dep., p. 21, lines 14-23; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 112, lines 9-11, p. 113, lines 1-4.
[78] Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 113, lines 12-18; Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 94, lines 8-11.
[79] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 128, lines 1-7, p. 129, lines 4-15; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 185, lines 10-20; Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 117, lines 13-25, p. 118, lines 1-25, p. 148, lines 17-19; Johns testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 105, lines 7-22; Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 108, lines 1-11; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991 p. 155, lines 3-9; Exh. 217, p. 50.
[80] Keeney dep., p. 77, lines 12-14, lines 22-214; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 113, lines 7-16, p. 120, lines 21-23; Booker testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 282, lines 11-19; Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 253, lines 2-4, Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 108, lines 1-11; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 101, lines 23-25, p. 102, lines 1-25, p. 103, lines 1-11, p. 112, lines 9-25, p. 113, lines 1-9, p. 120, lines 3-6; Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 79, lines 6-10; Stip., p. 18, B; p. 12, 9.G; Exh. 200.
[81] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 184, lines 4-5, lines 14-18, p. 185, lines 11-12.
[82] Tyszklewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 184, lines 20-25, p. 185, lines 1-4.
[83] Lewis dep., p. 66, lines 19-23; Keeney dep., p. 86, lines 4-19; Exh. 50, Executive Staff Meeting Minutes, 6/25/90, p. 4; 7/16/90, p. 2; Exh. 216, 5.3; Exh. 785 5.5.3. and 6.9.2; Exh. 790, Policy Receipt Newsletter, # 91-16, dated 3/14/91, p. 1.
[84] Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 185, lines 13-14, p. 186, lines 20-21.
[85] Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 79, lines 7-10; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 120, lines 3-6.
[86] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 153, lines 19-25, p. 154, lines 1-9.
[87] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 197, lines 3-11.
[88] Exh. 217, p. 25, pp. 26-27, p. 35 2, p. 50, p. 51, p. 54 2, p. 55, p. 67.
[89] Powell testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 268, lines 17-25, p. 269, lines 1-4; Exh. 217, p. 26-27.

[90] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 33, lines 12-19, p. 68, lines 15-25, p. 69, lines 1-4; Exh. 217, p. 25. [91] Keeney dep., p. 83, lines 13-19; Cathcart dep., p. 11, lines 9-14. [92] The Muecke list is a list of legal books that are required to be in the Central Unit law library. Wilkinson v. McDougal, Civ. 81-1397 PHX CAM; See also Exh. 217 p. 27. [93] Stip., p. 2, Ia. [94] Stip., p. 9, 7.F. [95] Stip., p. 3, Alg. [96] Stip., 17, 15f. [97] Stip., p. 16, g. [98] Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 252, lines 2-8, p. 254, lines 9-25, p. 2, lines 2-3. [99] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 148, lines 1-25; Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 256, lines 22-25, p. 257, lines 1-5; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 116, lines 15-21, p. 117, lines 24-25, p. 118, lines 1-11, p. 128, lines 8-25; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 156, lines 7-12; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 167, lines 8-25; p. 168, lines 1-2. [100] Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 266, lines 16-23. [101] Doe I testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 256, lines 7-13; Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 149, lines 1-21; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991 p. 119, lines 8-18. [102] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 119, lines 5-16. [103] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 98, lines 3-18; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 153, lines 2-7; Joyner testimony, 1/15/92, p. 110, lines 16-18; Stip., p. 3, lines 13-17, p. 5, lines 11-15, p. 7, lines 10-14; p. 10, lines 25-26; p. 11, lines 3-6, p. 11, lines 25-26; p. 12, lines 7-9. [104] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 98, lines 3-18. [105] McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 120, lines 1-11; Friego testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 80, lines 3-20. [106] Exh. 216, ADC policy no. 302.11, § 6.14.1. [107] McFadden testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 137, lines 1-5. [108] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 42, lines 21-25, p. 43, lines 1-21. [109] Exh. 50, Executive staff Meeting Minutes, ASPC-T, 1/20/89. [110] McFadden testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 135, lines 5-13. [111] Exh. 790, p. 2, § 5.4. [112] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 154, lines 4-21. [113] McFadden testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 136, lines 3-14. [114] McFadden testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 135, lines 1-3. [115] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 169, lines 1-9. [116] Joyner dep., p. 29, lines 1-2; Ori testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 145, lines 9-15; Cathcart dep., p. 40, lines 10-11; Exh. 283, attachment 301.11, SMU, p. 5, § 5.7.3; Exh. 295; Stip., p. 21, § 7d.

[117] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 151, lines 8-19.
[118] Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 162, lines 17-25, p. 163, lines 1-25, p. 164, lines 1-9.
[119] Cathcart testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 102, lines 13-25, p. 103, lines 1-3; Powell testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 265, lines 16-25; Joyner testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 108, lines 7-21.
[120] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 151, lines 20-25.
[121] Exh. 249kb, memo dated 9/21/1990; Stip., p. 16, § 14d.
[122] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 170, lines 5-13.
[123] Exh. 212, p. 3, § 4.4; Exh. 202, p. 3, § 4.4; Exh. 262ds; Exh. 214, Nicholas Cortez, 33601, 1/8/91; Exh. 260ff.
[124] Exh. 213, p. 3, § 5.13, 15-13-1; Exh. 214 (form designating attorney of record); Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 40, lines 20-24; Keeney dep., p. 37, lines 1-7; Exh. 799, p. 4, § 5.3, 5.3.1.2; Exh. 283, attachment ADC-ASPC C-F, SMU, IMP 302.11, p. 4, § 5.7.3; Tyszkiewicz testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 171, lines 21-24; Exh. 207, § 5.1.2, 5.1.2.4, 5.1.2.6; Exh. 209, attachment # 1; Exh. 262dr; Exh. 262et; Exh. 214, Jack Barret # 55143, 11/15/90, and James Johnson, 11/20/90.
[125] Booker testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 277, lines 10-15.
[126] Keeney dep., p. 37, lines 1-7; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 41, lines 1-6; Exh. 243adbj; Exh. 66qq.
[127] Keeney dep., p. 37, 13-18.
[128] Keeney dep., p. 85, lines 1-25; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 42, lines 8-12.
[129] Keeney dep., p. 85, lines 1-25; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 41, lines 20-25, p. 42, lines 1-12; Exh. 244aaf; Booker testimony 12/18/1991, p. 278, lines 1-8, p. 279, lines 8-25; Coley testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 104, lines 2-3, p. 105-106, lines 1-7; Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 160, lines 12-15; p. 161, lines 12-15.
[130] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 40, lines 20-24.
[131] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 41, lines 4-8.
[132] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 160, lines 1-6.
[133] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 160, lines 1-6.
[134] Exh. 799, § 4.4.
[135] Exh. 43x, see SMU Orientation Package, p. 2.
[136] Exh. 262dy.
[137] Exh. 262ep.
[138] Exh. 262dx.
[139] Coley testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 109, lines 9-17; Exh. 207, § 5.1.1; Exh. 214, Booker # 42595, 8/6/90, King # 37415, 12/24/90, Burks # 80338, 12/17/90, Parker # 50912, 2/28/90.
In one instance at the North Unit in Florence, a prisoner who provided ADOC staff with all essential information including an attorney telephone number and evidence of a court deadline and who attempted to arrange the call 48 hours in advance was denied the call because he refused to reveal the exact nature of the problem. Exh 260gg.

[140] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 160, lines 1-11; Celaya testimony 12/17/1991, p. 54, lines 22-25, p. 55, lines 9-20, p. 57, lines 13-19, p. 58, lines 1-5.
[141] Wilber testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 163, Lines 4-10.
[142] Exh. 50, Library Inventories, 6/25/90, p. 4; Keeney dep., p. 28, lines 1-25, p. 29, lines 9-19; McQuillen testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 116, lines 8-14.
[143] Exh. 279, ASPC-PV Warden's meeting minutes, 9/11/30; McQuillen test., p. 113, lines 1-3; Cathcart testimony, p. 111, lines 23-25.
[144] Exh. 50, Executive Staff Meeting Minutes, dated 11/13/1990, p. 4, Exh. 216, effective March 15, 1991, p. 3, § 6.2.3; Exh. 231.
[145] Exh. 279, Warden's minutes, ASPC-PHX, August 1, 1989; Exh. 250r; Exh. 252k; Stip., p. 4, 2d, p. 15, 13d.
[146] Exh. 216, p. 9, § 6.14.1, Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 42, lines 13-25, p. 43, lines 1-8.
[147] Generalized security concerns are insufficient to support a denial of physical access to the law library. DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir.1988).
[148] See also, Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951, 956-57 (3rd Cir.1988); DeMallory, 855 F.2d at 447; Walters v. Thompson, 615 F.Supp. 330, 340 (D.C.Ill.1985); Cody v. Hillard, 599 F.Supp. 1025, 1061 (D.S.D.1984); Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F.Supp. 106, 110-111 (W.D.Ky.1983); Wade v. Kane, 448 F.Supp. 678, 683 (E.D.Penn.1978).
[149] Indeed, defendants themselves concede this. For example, in a memo dated October 30, 1989, J.C. Keeney, Assistant Director for Adult Institutions, directed that 0907 "[e]ach library shall have a trained librarian." Exhibit 1 to Keeney dep.
[150] The Court notes that inmates are not given supplies. The cost of the supplies is debited to the inmates' accounts. Thus, if the inmate ever has money deposited to the account, ADOC recovers the cost of the legal supplies.
[151] The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this federal court donates to the Arizona prison system its advance sheets, paperback reporters and older editions of books to help lower costs for the state prison system.
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 834 F.Supp. 1477 (1993)
Fletcher CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
Nos. CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM, CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM. United States District Court, D. Arizona. March 19, 1993.
14789 *1478 *1479 Alice Loeb Bendheim, Phoenix, AZ, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Stuart Henry Adams, Jr., David Cyrus Fathi, Nat. Prison Project of America, Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs. Kathleen L. Weinecke, Daniel Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MEDICAL, DENTAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE
MUECKE, District Judge. Having considered the evidence presented by the parties relevant to the medical, dental and mental health care issues in this case, the Court concludes as follows:
Background
This action was filed on January 12, 1990. The plaintiff class alleges that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to their serious health care needs including medical, dental and mental health care needs. The plaintiff class further alleges that the defendants discriminate against female prisoners in the delivery of mental health services. Defendants respond that their health care system complies with constitutional standards.
Findings of Fact
I. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
At the time of trial in this action, January of 1992, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) consisted of nine prison facilities within the state of Arizona. On January 22, 1992, the total male population was 14,424 and the total female population was 922 inmates.[1] The nine facilities had the following populations on January 22, 1992:[2]

Douglas Gila Unit Mohave Unit Maricopa Unit Cochise Unit Papago DWI Unit
Florence Women's Division

1,957 4,727

Central Unit North Unit South Unit East Unit SPU CB6 SMU Rynning Unit
Fort Grant
Globe
Perryville Santa Cruz Unit San Juan Unit San Pedro Unit Santa Maria Unit
Phoenix Alhambra Flamenco Aspen DWI

632 120 2,210
962

1480 *1480

Picacho[3]

203

Safford

476

Tucson Cimarron Unit Echo Unit Santa Rita Unit

2,398

Winslow Kaibab Unit North Unit South Unit Coronado Unit

1,308

Yuma

243

The facilities are classified for security purposes as level one (minimum security) through five (maximum security).

A. Douglas

The main prison complex at Douglas has: (1) the Gila Unit which is a level two unit with a capacity of 626 inmates; (2) the Mohave Unit which is a level three unit with a capacity of 662 inmates; (3) the Maricopa Unit which is a level two unit with the capacity of 129 inmates; and (4) the Cochise complex detention unit located outside of the Mohave yard with a capacity of 66 inmates. The Douglas Complex also contains the Papago DWI Center located in downtown Douglas with a capacity of 208 inmates.[4]

B. Florence
The Florence complex also contains numerous units. The Picacho Unit is a work camp located 20 miles from the main Florence prison. It has the capacity to house 203 inmates who work in the communities around Picacho. The Women's Division is a level three/medium custody women's unit with a capacity of 186 inmates. The South Unit is a men's level three facility with the capacity of 408 inmates. The South Unit also contains the Special Programs Unit (SPU) with a capacity of 137 inmates. CellBlock 6 (CB6) has the capacity to house 186 inmates. CB6 is comprised partly of death row inmates. The remainder of CB6 is a lockup detention facility for the complex. The Central Unit is a level four/five maximum security unit with a capacity to house 710 inmates. The infirmary is located in the Central Unit and contains 22 inmate beds. The North Unit is a level two/minimum custody unit with a capacity to house 385 inmates. The East Unit is a level two/three facility with the capacity to house 534 inmates. The Rynning Unit is an 800-bed level four unit that was very new at the time of trial. The Special Management Unit (SMU) is a level five/maximum security lockup unit with a capacity of 895 inmates.[5]
C. Fort Grant
The Fort Grant facility is a level two institution with the capacity of 632 inmates.
D. Perryville
The Perryville facility has a capacity of 2,210 inmates. The mens' facilities are level three/two facilities and include the Santa Cruz, San Juan and San Pedro Units. The Santa Cruz Unit is a level three unit with a capacity of 740 inmates. The San Juan Unit, also a level three unit, has a capacity of 740 inmates, including 185 protective custody inmates. The San Pedro Unit is a level two facility with a capacity of 431 inmates. The new complex detention building has a capacity of 40 inmates. The women's unit, Santa Maria, is a level four/five facility with a capacity of 269 inmates.[6]
E. Phoenix
The Phoenix facilities contain the Alhambra reception center, Flamenco. Mental Health Unit, B Ward, the Aspen DWI Center and the New Dawn Release Center. Alhambra is the male reception center and has the capacity to house 192 inmates with 30 resident workers. B Ward is the licensed psychiatric hospital with a capacity of 28 male inmates. G Ward, in the women's unit at Flamenco, has the capacity of 20 inmates.
1481 *1481 The Aspen DWI Center, also in Phoenix, has the capacity for 248 DWI inmates. The New Dawn Release Center is a release center for women who are coming out of the system and need a temporary residence. The Arizona Center for Women (ACW) is a level two/minimum custody women's facility with a capacity of 359 inmates.[7] The Globe facility, located in Globe Arizona, is a level two facility with a capacity of 150 inmates. Although not in Phoenix, ADOC has made the Globe facility part of the Phoenix complex for administrative purposes.[8]
F. Safford
The Safford facility is a level two, dormitory setting facility, with 476 inmates.
G. Tucson
The Tucson complex has the capacity to house 2,398 inmates. The Cimarron Unit houses level four inmates with a capacity of 748 inmates. The Echo Unit houses level two inmates with a capacity to house 249 inmates. The

Santa Rita Unit has the capacity to house 660 level three inmates. The complex detention unit, located in the center of the complex, has the capacity to house 71 inmates.[9]
H. Winslow
The Winslow prison is divided into two units; the Kaibab Unit and Coronado Unit. The Kaibab Unit is further divided into the North and South Units, each having a capacity of 400 inmates. The Kaibab Unit is a level four institution.[10] The Kaibab Unit also has a complex detention unit in the yard with a capacity of 36 inmates.[11] The Coronado Unit has the capacity to house 400 inmates and is a level two/minimum security unit. The majority of the inmates in the Coronado Unit work in the surrounding community.[12]
I. Yuma
The Yuma facility is a 250-bed level two/minimum custody unit.[13]
II. MEDICAL CARE SYSTEM
A. Generally
Thomas Lutz, D.O., is Chief of Health Services for the Arizona Department of Corrections and has held that position since November of 1989.[14] Dr. Lutz participates in continuing medical education, attending conferences and professional seminars a minimum of 25 hours per year. He averages approximately 50 to 75 hours a year in continuing medical education.[15]
In his role as Director of Health Services, Dr. Lutz directly supervises program managers, key central office 1482 management level professionals representing various disciplines of *1482 the medical profession, including
medical, dental, mental health, pharmacy, medical records, administrative, and behavioral health.[16] Twenty percent of Dr. Lutz' time is spent in the field taking care of patients.[17] Dr. Lutz seeks out individual patients who have complaints of medical care, examines them and makes recommendations based on his physical examination. Additionally, he can provide services throughout the state when other physicians are absent or positions are vacant. He visits all of the facilities at least two or three times a year.[18]
B. Statistics Regarding Inmate Use of Health Facilities
1. Medical
The Health Services Bureau prepares a statistical activity report to chart the activities of health service professionals within the Department of Corrections.[19] A nursing encounter by definition is any time a nurse does anything regarding patient care. This could involve hands-on treatment, chart review, medication review, renewal or making appointments.[20] There were 1,073,951 nursing encounters in 1990 and 1,729,068 nursing encounters in 1991.[21]
In 1990, there were 34,664 direct physician-patient encounters, in which inmates were seen directly by the physicians.[22] In 1991, there were 58,483 physician-patient encounters.[23]
In 1990, there were 78,019 physician's assistant or nurse practitioner/patient encounters. In 1991, there were 90,137 physicians' assistant or nurse practitioner/patient encounters.[24]

In 1990, there were a total of 21 inmate deaths in the Arizona Department of Corrections, including, ten deaths by natural causes, two deaths by homicide, two deaths by suicide and seven accidental deaths. In 1991, there were a total of twenty-six inmate deaths. Of these twenty-six, twenty deaths were by natural causes, three deaths were by homicide, one death was by suicide and there were two accidental deaths.[25]
ADOC dispensed 621,393 prescriptions in 1990 and 678,673 prescriptions in 1991.[26]
2. Dental
In fiscal year 1991, there were approximately 29,066 patient visits at the various dental clinics in the system.[27] The cost of dental procedures conducted in the fiscal year 1991 was $3,887,248.[28] In the fiscal year 1991, dentists in ADOC saw an average of 1.86 patients per hour.[29] Each patient had an average of 3.8 procedures performed each visit.[30] There were 19,550 dental encounters in 1990 and 21,966 dental encounters in 1991. [31] In 1991, ADOC performed over 17,000 periodontal treatments, including 6,454 gross scalings, 6,706 oral 1483 hygiene instructions, 142 gingival curettages, 4,292 scaling/root *1483 planings and 18 splintings.[32] In 1991, ADOC dental staff performed 4,572 one surface fillings, 3,128 two surface fillings, and 1,798 three surface fillings, and 926 four or more surface fillings.[33]
3. Mental
In 1990, there were 18,356 psychiatrist/patient encounters and 111,624 mental health encounters by psychologists or other mental health staff; 621,393 prescriptions dispensed and 231,035 psychotropic medications dispensed.[34] In 1991, there were 19,071 psychiatrist/patient encounters; 109,689 mental health encounters;[35] 678,673 prescriptions dispensed;[36] and 70,332 psychotropic medications dispensed.[37] Psychotropic medication usage went down in 1991 when Benadryl and Vistaril were eliminated from the definition of a psychotropic medication because they are used for nonpsychotropic purposes.[38]
C. Experts
Both plaintiffs and defendants presented expert testimony regarding whether the medical care system met the serious medical needs of the inmates. Plaintiffs presented the testimony of two experts. One of plaintiffs' experts was Dr. Kim Thorburn. Dr. Thorburn, reviewed the medical facilities at SMU in Florence, Douglas and Tucson.[39] Dr. Thorburn was guided in her testimony principally by the community standard for the delivery of health services. Additionally, she was guided by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care standards and the American Public Health Association standards.[40] The National Commission on Correctional Health Care Standards consist of 71 goal standards for correctional health care that are "quite high."[41] There are no correctional health standards that are more stringent or more difficult to fulfill than the National Commission on Correctional Health Care Standards.[42] The National Commission on Correctional Health Care has a certification program for institutions that meet the standards.[43] According to Dr. Thorburn, the prison system that meets the National Commission standards has a fairly decent system of health care delivery.[44]
Plaintiffs' other expert, Charles Braslow, evaluated the health services at Phoenix, Perryville and Florence, with the exception of SMU.[45] Dr. Braslow evaluated the health care within ADOC based on the general community standard for acceptable medical practice. This standard is a nationwide standard.[46] Dr. Braslow selected records by going through sick call lists, medication lists and pulling files with color coded markers indicating a particular disease.[47] Dr. Braslow did not do a physical examination on any of the inmates.[48]

1484 Defendants' medical expert was Dr. Michael Warren. Dr. Warren is a physician *1484 who is a faculty member at University of Texas. The University provides consultation and treatment care for inmates in the Texas Department of Corrections and supplies the top personnel to the Texas DOC for medical purposes. Dr. Warren was also the acting deputy director for health services for the Texas Department of Corrections for two year beginning in 1986. [49] To form his opinions, Dr. Warren reviewed policies and procedures and the map to determine the facilities and their locations. Over a period of six days, Dr. Warren visited Alhambra, ACW, Douglas, Tucson, Florence and Perryville. Dr. Warren also met with staff that he considered to be "key staff," including Dr. Lutz. To measure the system, he relied on the standards of the National Commission on Correctional Health Care.[50]
D. Medical Staff
1. Generally
Each prison facility within the Arizona Department of Corrections has a physician.[51] In order to be employed by the Department of Corrections, physicians must be licensed in the state of Arizona and hold a current valid Arizona license.[52]
The Department of Corrections also utilizes certified physician assistants (PA). A certified physician's assistant is an intermediary or secondary care provider that has graduated and been certified as a physician's assistant. A PA assists the physician in the practice of medicine and is directly supervised by a physician.[53] The PAs within the Department of Corrections are supervised at a weekly meeting and through a chart review, either random or by specific patient.[54]
The Department of Corrections also utilizes nurse practitioners (NP), registered nurses (RN), licensed practical nurses (LPN) and nursing assistants (NA).[55] A nurse practitioner is licensed and does not need direct immediate supervision of a physician. A supervision of weekly chart review or patient review is not required for a nurse practitioner.[56] ADOC uses the nursing assistants in a pilot program in Winslow and Florence. A nursing assistant is licensed to perform almost the same duties as a registered nurse, except for giving shots. There is no state licensing requirement for nursing assistants, but ninety percent of the Department of Corrections nursing assistants are certified.[57] The pilot program for using nursing assistants began in 1991 in Winslow and Florence and that program has allowed registered nurses to begin developing preventative medical programs. [58]
There are approximately 196 nurses within the Arizona Department of Corrections. Each institution has its own nursing supervisor.[59] Thirty-two of the nurses are specifically psychiatric (psych) nurses. Although the state qualification for a psych nurse II is that they have at least one year of psych nurse experience, psych nurses are not hired unless they have at least three to five years of psych experience or exposure.[60]
a. Florence Facility
There are a total of thirty-five nursing staff at the Florence facility including twelve full-time RNs, nine LPNs, seven nursing assistants, four psych nurses and three nursing supervisors.[61] CB-6, the Women's Division, 1485 SPU, Central Unit, North Unit and South *1485 Unit share one nursing supervisor, three assistant supervisors and twenty-seven to twenty-nine nurses.[62] The Rynning, East and Special Management Units in Florence share two assistant nursing supervisors, one nursing supervisor and twenty-three staff nurses.[63] There is one physician, one full-time physician's assistant 0907 and one full-time nurse practitioner at the Central Unit in Florence. [64]

b. Phoenix Facility
The Phoenix facility, including Alhambra reception, the women's facility (ACW), New Dawn, and Aspen, has twenty-five psychiatric nurses and a psychiatric nursing supervisor.[65] Additionally, there are approximately seventeen nurses and two supervisors for regular nursing services. All of the units, except for Globe, have twenty-four hour nursing care.[66] At the Arizona Center for Women, there are four RNs, one half-time LPN who covers nights between Alhambra and ACW, a medical records librarian, a physicians' assistant, a nursing supervisor, a psychologist, a psychiatrist and a physician who spends half a day, once a week.[67] Staff is insufficient to conduct sick call more than twice a week and the defendants have been unable to demonstrate to the Legislature the need to have sick call more frequently at ACW.[68]
c. Perryville Facility
There are two full-time physicians and sixteen nursing positions at Perryville with no vacancies.[69] There are three dentists and one pharmacist working at Perryville.[70]
d. Tucson Facility
The Tucson facility has a physician, nursing supervisor, three assistant nursing supervisors and fifteen staff nurses.[71]
e. Winslow Facility
The staff at Winslow includes two psych associates, one psychologist, the facility health administrator, the medical records librarian, ten nurses, one nursing supervisor, two dental assistants, one dentist, one pharmacist, two pharmacy technicians, a mental health psychotherapist, a physician and two nurse practitioners.[72]
f. Safford Facility
Safford has one physician, one nursing supervisor and seven staff nurses.[73]
g. Ft. Grant Facility
The Ft. Grant facility has one physician, one nursing supervisor and six staff nurses.[74]
h. Yuma Facility
At the Yuma facility, there are four staff nurses, one physician and one nursing supervisor.[75]
i. Douglas Facility
The Douglas facility has one nursing supervisor and fifteen staff nurses.[76] Since December of 1991, Douglas has been operating with one physician's assistant and a half-time physician. Prior to that, Douglas had one 1486 physician and two physician's assistants.[77]*1486 To supplement the current shortage, the physician's assistant from Tucson fills in part-time, one day a week.[78] Douglas has two medical records personnel, two full-time

dentists, two full-time dental assistants, thirteen nurses, two full-time pharmacists and a contract pharmacy technician.[79] Additionally, Douglas has two psych associates and one radiology technician.[80]
j. Pharmacies
The ADOC also has staffed pharmacies. The Winslow facility has one pharmacist and two pharmacy technicians. A pharmacy technician assists in the preparation of prescriptions, helps with inventory control, and delivery of medications.[81] The Perryville facility has one pharmacist and two technicians, with a pharmacist vacancy which is in the process of being filled. Phoenix has two pharmacists and one technician. Florence has three pharmacists and two technicians. Eyman has two pharmacists and two technicians. Tucson has three pharmacists and one technician. Ft. Grant has one pharmacist and a contract pharmacy technician. That pharmacy also supports the Safford facility. Douglas has two pharmacists and one contract pharmacy technician. [82]
2. Staffing Problems: Numbers and Vacancies
a. Numbers of Staff
Defendants have requested additional staff to provide health services beyond the staff for whom they are currently budgeted, including physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, psychologists and psychological associates. [83] Many of defendants' requests for funding of these additional positions have been denied by the Legislature. [84]
According to Dr. Thorburn, there are an insufficient number of nurse positions at Douglas and Tucson.[85] In addition, Dr. Warren recommended in his report that the defendants unfreeze nursing positions in Florence and hire more nurses in Perryville.[86]
b. Vacancies of Staff
There are vacancies in a number of health care positions throughout the ADOC, including the Mental Health Program Coordinator, nurses, physicians, physician assistants, psychologists, and psychological associates.[87] The defendants have attempted to fill these vacancies.[88] However, defendants have had difficulty filling these vacancies for various reasons, including difficulty in attracting qualified staff and retaining them in certain outlying areas such as Florence or Douglas; hiring freezes imposed by the governor; and limitations on salaries and benefits.[89]
As of December 2, 1991, the Arizona Department of Corrections Health Services had a 13.9% overall medical staff vacancy rate. This vacancy rate is much improved since December of 1989.[90] At the time of trial, the only vacancies in the primary care physician field in the correctional health care system were at the Douglas facility. 1487 [91] There were *1487 only one or two physician's assistant or nurse practitioner vacancies throughout the state. [92]
Since November of 1989, the vacancy of registered nurses decreased from approximately 24 percent to 8.5 percent.[93] Presently, there is not a significant nursing turnover due to the communication and reorganization of health services.[94] In response to nursing vacancies for permanent positions that ADOC cannot or will not fill, the Department hires private contracting nursing agencies or registry nurses to provide nursing services.[95] If a registry nurse does not perform up to the Department of Corrections' standards, the Department of Corrections will request that the nurse not return to the facility.[96]

Vacancies at Douglas are covered by contracting with the nursing registry service. The nurses from the registry service are former ADOC nursing employees who are used to dealing with inmates and know the policies and procedures of the Department of Corrections.[97] The quality of care provided by the registry nurses in Douglas is more than equal to the quality of care of regular RNs because of their years of experience and exposure to the correctional setting.[98]
The Department of Corrections also utilizes a stipend program for nursing positions in outlying areas, including Safford, Ft. Grant, Winslow, Douglas, Florence and Yuma.[99] There are other medical stipends for health care positions ranging from $2,000 to $4,800 for positions that are hard to fill.[100]
Additionally, to recruit new nurses, the Department of Corrections advertises in newspapers, recruits at junior colleges and has an inter-agency agreement with the University of Arizona to obtain students to work in the facilities for clinical experience.[101] The Department has successfully recruited health care professionals by virtue of aggressively pursuing recruitment through advertising, job fairs and word-of-mouth.[102]
There are seventeen pharmacy positions within the Arizona Department of Corrections and two vacancies which are in the process of being filled.[103] The vacancy rate at the pharmacies is low and it is very rare that a pharmacy has any vacancies.[104]
c. Impact of Staffing Problems
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Braslow testified that there are delays in the assessment and evaluation of serious health needs of the inmates in the facilities and that those delays exist because sick call access is not frequent enough and there are not enough medical practitioners to take care of those needs when the people do come for medical services.[105] Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Thorburn also testified that there are insufficient numbers of staff, exacerbated by vacancies that results in diverting professionals work from their work. For example, nurses perform clerical tasks and dentists perform dental hygiene services that would be better performed by dental hygienists.[106]
Some of the units had adequate staffing at the time of trial. In Dr. Thorburn's opinion, health care staffing at the 1488 Special Management Unit is adequate.[107] Dr. Thorburn also opined that there are an adequate number of
*1488 physicians and physician's assistants at Tucson.[108]
Plaintiffs presented examples of delays in assessment and treatment of medical needs including inmates # 66353,[109] Thompson,[110] Abernathy,[111] Douglas,[112] Saboria,[113] Dennis,[114] Hines,[115] and 1489 Wilkerson.[116] Inmates *1489 Douglas[117] and Hines[118] did not suffer any permanent injuries. Inmate Abernathy obtained 99% of his eye sight back after the detached retina surgery.[119] Inmate Soboria did not suffer any injuries.[120]
Plaintiffs also presented instances of alleged deficient evaluations of inmates including inmates Lasoya,[121] Harriss,[122] # 67720,[123] Romney,[124] Ison,[125] Furr,[126] Bradford,[127] Licano,[128] Culling,[129] and 1490 Mendoza.[130] Inmates *1490 Mendoza[131] and Licano[132] suffered no permanent injuries. Inmates Romney [133] and Bradford[134] suffered no injuries.
Other than Mr. Lasoya, there is no evidence of any injury or serious medical problem resulting from the medical treatment administered to inmates within the Arizona Department of Corrections. Relevant to injury, Dr. Braslow felt improper treatment caused serious medical problems for Mr. Lasoya. However, Dr. Warren testified that treatment received by Mr. Lasoya was appropriate.[135] Thus, Dr. Palmer's treatment of inmate Lasoya was at most a disagreement between Dr. Braslow and the treating physician as far as how to treat a patient with

symptoms exhibited by inmate Lasoya.[136] In addition, there is no evidence of long-term injury resulting from the care received by inmate Lasoya.[137]
Other problems exist because of staff shortages. The shortage of staff has caused sick call to be cancelled[138] and appointments to be cancelled and rescheduled.[139] Further, nurses make errors in medication, including giving the wrong medication or dosage to the inmates.[140] Finally, the Globe unit does not have 24-hour nursing coverage due to a shortage of nursing staff.[141]
E. Medical Care Programs
1. Entry Procedure/Preventative Care
a. Entry Procedure
Upon entry into the system, inmates within the Arizona Department of Corrections undergo a physical examination.[142] Health services run a complete blood count, urinalysis, serology syphilis, TB, measles, mumps and rubella tests on each inmate.[143]
Within twenty-four hours after the inmate is transferred to a permanent housing facility, the nurse performs a chart review. Based upon that nursing assessment, prioritization is made as to when the inmate should be seen by a provider.[144] The provider determines how often an inmate should visit to have his blood pressure checked. The nurse will establish a hypertensive flow sheet which is not initially a permanent record of the inmate's file. The hypertensive flow sheet is kept at the nursing stations where the nurses record the high blood pressure 1491 readings of the individuals when they come in specifically *1491 for the test. The flow sheet eventually becomes a part of the permanent medical records.[145] The PA or physician would have access to this flow sheet by simply asking the nurse for the information.[146]
b. Movement Between Facilities
To ensure continuity of care, health services has established procedural guidelines for inmates that are moved inter-facility. Providers at the receiving facility respect the previous orders until they have an opportunity to review the medical record and the patient. This includes shaving waivers, prescriptions, and special orthotic devices. [147]
c. Chronic Care
The Arizona Department of Corrections has implemented a limited tickler system to categorize and bring to the attention of the physician for review of inmates depending on their diseases. The system is used to schedule individuals that need physicals, TB tests and chronic disease management.[148] This tickler file system is used only at Cimarron Unit in Tucson, the Rynning Unit and the East Unit in Florence.[149] However, the system is in the process of being established at Perryville, Phoenix and Winslow and will eventually be used throughout the system.[150] Along with the system, ADOC holds chronic clinics for inmates with high blood pressure problems, seizure problems, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases or asthma, cardiac problems, diabetes and for any other inmates who need to be monitored to ensure their conditions are under control.[151]
Except for the limited pilot program in Tucson and Florence, defendants have no system to follow chronic conditions including obstructive lung diseases [such as asthma], hypertension, diabetes, elevated cholesterol,

seizure disorders, HIV disease, tuberculosis, and glaucoma.[152] In addition, defendants do not have a uniform system of patient education for diseases.[153]
Dr. Thorburn testified that the medical care provided in the facilities she reviewed, as far as management of chronic illnesses including obstructive lung disease, seizure disorders, HIV virus, and glaucoma, was not an optimal system.[154] Inadequately treated chronic diseases can cause permanent damage to a patient's organs or even death.[155] Because the medical care system is based on demand, Dr. Thorburn testified that defendants have substandard management of screening for tuberculosis which is transferred through breathing the air after an infected person breathes, coughs or sneezes.[156] However, the Center for Disease Control in 1492 Atlanta has certified the procedures and guidelines followed by Arizona Department *1492 of Corrections Health Services for the treatment of tuberculosis.[157]
d. Periodic Physical Exams
With the exception of the limited tickler system noted above in Tucson and Florence, defendants have no system of periodic physical examinations to detect the development of disease. Defendants know of the importance of periodic physical examinations in the delivery of health care.[158] Dr. Lutz believes that prisoners should be called back periodically for a physical examination.[159] Both Drs. Thorburn and Warren testified that inmates should receive regular physical examinations.[160] Periodic physical examinations are particularly important since a patient may be a symptomatic but have diseases developing that are not detected if the medical staff is focusing only on a specific symptom. It is the responsibility of the ADOC health provider to detect the chronic illness before it becomes so advanced that symptoms are known to the patient.[161] Prisoners have gone for a number of years without a physical examination.[162]
However, the ADOC has implemented a tickler system for pap smears and mammograms in the Florence Women's Unit.[163] At the time of trial, health practitioners in the Florence Women's Unit were revising the tickler system and attempting to reduce the backlog of prisoners who had not received their scheduled pap smears. [164]
2. Use of Outside providers
a. System for Outside Providers
The Department of Corrections Health Services utilizes outside health providers including both individual specialists and hospitals to provide specialty care that is not available to the patient population on site. Some specialists come on-site for treatment of inmates. In other situations, the inmates are taken to the specialists for treatment. Optometric services and mammogram services come on site.[165]
Pursuant to policy, outside referrals are prioritized on a one through three system with a maximum of eight weeks between initiation and the patient being seen by the outside provider.[166] ADOC uses on-site institutional outside review committees to evaluate requests for a consultation and determine the priorities.[167] The review committees meet on a weekly basis in the more populated facilities and on a three to four week basis at the less populated facilities.[168] Medical care providers may accept or reject recommendations of an outside specialty consultant.[169]
1493 *1493 b. Problems: Delays in Specialty Care
Because numerous problems exist with the specialty system, inmates experience delays in specialty care. ADOC contracts with some specialists only once every few months or after they have a minimum number of prisoners

on the waiting list.[170] Appointments with specialists have been cancelled at the end of fiscal years because of funding;[171] although, those with serious needs did see specialists.[172] Specialist appointments are sometimes cancelled when inmates are transferred.[173] In addition, ADOC lacks a mechanism to determine if specialty referrals are completed.[174] According to Dr. Braslow, there are "frequently unacceptably long waits for specialist services and specialty clinic appointments for patients with significant medical conditions" including 1494 inmates Robertson;[175] Harriss;[176] Dennis;[177] Powell;[178] Lamson;[179] Chavez;[180] and Davis.[181] *1494 Inmates Davis;[182] Harriss;[183] Chavez;[184] Lamson;[185] and Robertson[186] suffered no injuries. Dr. Warren also stated that such delays exist at Douglas, Perryville and Florence.[187]
3. Use of Sick Call System
a. Sick Call System
Defendants provide medical, dental and mental health care through a sick call system. An inmate can go to sick call and see a nurse at a pre-established day and time. In the event inmates have an illness or problem and it is not on a day with the established sick call, they can notify the correctional service officer that they need to be seen by a provider. The correctional service officer relays the request to nursing. Therefore, based upon the seriousness of the problem, an inmate can be seen seven days a week.[188]
b. Problems with Sick Call System
Numerous problems exist with the sick call system. The system discourages use because inmates may stand in line two to three hours.[189] If inmates leave the line, they may not see the provider. In Douglas, once an inmate checks in he cannot leave the area.[190] In the Perryville Santa Maria Unit, after they sign up for sick call, the inmates must wait outside the units until seen.[191] Once an inmate signs up for sick call, she must stay in the area or she will be considered a refusal.[192]
4. Use of infirmaries
The Department of Corrections utilizes an infirmary system for males located in Florence.[193] The infirmary in Florence is fully operational.[194] There is no women's infirmary within the Arizona Department of Corrections. Rather, women who normally would be placed in an infirmary setting are kept in the hospital longer.[195] Dr. Lutz testified that if an individual cannot return to general population by virtue of the fact there is not an infirmary at that particular facility, the individual inmate will be kept in the hospital until he or she is released.[196]
Because of the lack of infirmaries for women and limited space for men, prisoners stay in a hospital longer than necessary, or fairly sick people are returned to housing units.[197] Defendants' expert, Dr. Warren, has recommended increasing the capacity of the infirmary.[198]
5. Emergency Care
Emergency health care is available to inmates seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, by land or air. If an inmate has a problem after hours and there are no doctors on-site, the nursing personnel would be notified about the problem by security staff. The inmate would then be brought to the health unit for a nursing assessment. If the nurse decides something needs to be discussed with the on-call provider, she will have a telephone consultation 1495 with a physician.[199]*1495 If the inmate has a life threatening problem, he can be referred to the emergency care facility associated with that prison. There are emergency care facilities contracted all over the state at every

facility. Inmates will be transferred by a Department of Corrections' vehicle, private ambulance service or paramedic service.[200]
6. Specific Facilities
a. Florence Facility
(1) Unit Facilities
(a) Central Unit
The Central Health Unit is the primary location for health care at Florence. There are 62 satellite health units at SPU, CB6, the Women's Division, the East Unit and the North Unit.[201] The Central Unit health facility has x-ray capabilities, laboratory facilities, a medical records repository and an infirmary that serves the entire state. The capacity of the infirmary at the Central Unit is fifteen beds and it is fully operational.[202] The infirmary is used in situations where an inmate is discharged from the hospital sooner than he normally would be discharged.[203]
Central Unit also contains Housing Unit 8, which is a long-term bed facility for inmates who are chronically impaired. Housing Unit 8 is an open room with twelve beds and a toilet and shower facility with easy accessibility to medical providers who work at the Central Health Unit, twenty feet away. Nursing assistants help inmates with personal daily care and other medical needs.[204]
The Central unit and the infirmary have twenty-four hour nursing coverage. The nursing assistant and infirmary nurse cover the infirmary and Housing Unit 8.[205] The Central Unit, SMU and the Rynning Unit have twenty-four hour nursing coverage.[206]
Nurses undergo a one month orientation prior to employment at the prison. The orientation consists of three weeks of on-the-job training with a correctional nurse.[207] Further, Nurses undergo educational and service training in cultural diversity, substance abuse, professionalism and ethics. Nurses also receive paid time off to attend outside seminars and the department offers updated assessment information, pharmacology updates and TB testing.[208]
The physician, PA and NP work out of the Central Health Unit Monday through Friday.[209] When no provider is on-site, a medical provider is on call and may be reached through a beeper system.[210] On-site contract services provided inmates at the various units within Florence include a surgeon, podiatrist, radiologist, optometrist, ophthalmologist and psychiatrist.[211] If an inmate is in need of a specialty service which is not provided by on-site or contract physicians, the inmate may be referred to an outside medical facility. These appointments are made at the Maricopa County Hospital outpatient services as well as other specialty services that the Florence facility utilizes in Tucson.[212]
(b) Rynning Unit
1496 Health care providers at the Rynning Unit in Florence are on-call twenty-four hours a *1496 day seven days a week.[213] When a mid-level provider such as a family nurse practitioner or physician's assistant is on-call, there is always an M.D. on back up call.[214]

(c) Picacho Unit
Inmates who are housed at the Picacho Unit obtain medical care through the Central Health Unit at Florence. Generally, the inmates at the Picacho facility have only minor health concerns. For non-emergency services, they are transported to the Central Unit complex medical by van. For emergency services, inmates at the Picacho facility are taken to Casa Grande Regional Medical Facility.[215]
(d) SMU
The SMU health clinic is fully equipped and staffed twenty-four hours a day by the nursing staff with two providers on a full-time basis and a full dental operatory.[216] Sick call is conducted five days a week at SMU.[217]
(e) Women's Unit
Gynecological exams are conducted on female inmates annually at the Women's Division.[218] The Women's Division in Florence has a tickler system for tracking pap smears and mammograms.[219] The tickler system was developed in 1988 or 1989.[220] If the pap smear is abnormal, the patient is referred to Maricopa County Medical Center for a Ob/ Gyn consult.[221] At the Women's Division in Florence, every woman would have a baseline mammogram at age thirty-five, every two years after age forty and annually after age fifty. The mammogram is a mobile unit that comes to the grounds twice a year. An inmate who has a breast lump or discharge would be sent to Maricopa County Medical Center for the mammogram rather than waiting for the routine mammogram.[222]
(2) Intake Procedure
When a new inmate comes into the Florence facility, the medical records librarian forwards the charts to the charge nurse. Either an RN or an LPN will review the chart and forward the chart for appropriate follow-up, including medical, dental or mental health care.[223]
(3) Sick Call
Inmates are scheduled through sick call or a nurse's line to see the doctor at a provider's line. A provider's line is conducted by a physician and a nurse practitioner or physician's assistant. The provider's line is held five days a week in the Central Unit, North Unit, Picacho work camp, South Unit and SPU; three days a week in the women's division; and two days a week at Cell Block 6.[224]
The nurse's line is held five days a week in the Central Unit.[225] At Cell Block-6 in Florence, the nurse has daily rounds for sick call, going from cell to cell.[226] Pill call at CB-6 is twice a day, seven days a week.[227] Picacho 1497 work camp and the North Unit have sick call *1497 twice a week. The RN visits Picacho twice a week for the sick call and pill call.[228] The North Unit has pill call seven days a week.[229] The Women's Division in Florence has sick call twice a week. The nursing assistant assists the provider by taking vital signs.[230] Sick call at the South Unit is two days a week and pill call is five days a week.[231]
The Department of Health Services, in an effort to improve the sick call system, has implemented a self-referral system utilized at the Rynning Unit and Central Unit in Florence. This pilot program is designed to replace traditional sick call with the self-referral system. Before it was implemented, a video was shown over the in-house television system for inmates as to how the self-referral system works. The video continues to be shown for inmates that are new to the Central Unit.[232] The video informs the inmates what forms are available in the cell block and how to request eye clinic, dental appointments, psych appointments, doctor's appointments, over-the-

counter medication or a nursing assessment. The format for the video is an inmate asking the nursing supervisor, Beth Cory, questions about the self-referral system. There is another inmate in the video who interprets the questions and answers in Spanish.[233]
An inmate writes down his problem on a self-referral form and drops the form in the medical box. The self-referral forms are in both English and Spanish.[234] Illiterate inmates may drop an identification card in the medical box and the nurse will go to their cell that morning.[235] The forms are picked up every morning at 6:00, stamped, dated and an RN triages them. She sends the dental referrals to the dentist, the eye clinic referrals to the eye clinic and the mental health referrals to the psych nurse. The prescription refills are sent directly to the pharmacy. The remainder of the forms are triaged by the nurse and either referred to the medical provider or to the nurse's line for a nurse's assessment.[236] The form is then returned to the inmate informing him or her of the disposition of the referral. If the information on the self-referral form is inadequate, medical staff will request that security transport the inmate to medical to determine the problem.[237] This form expedites inmate access to health care for treatment of non-emergencies.[238] Anyone that needs to be seen that day will be brought up to the health unit.[239]
Because of the self-referral system, the health unit of the Central Unit has been able to expand health delivery services. They have been able to start a daily medication delivery at the North Unit and have been able to designate a nurse to go out and give skin tests for TB. The quality assurance audits are now being done on a more regular basis. In-service education is now being offered twice a month instead of once a month. Inmates do not have to wait in line for sick call. They do not have to wait to have an issue addressed until the next sick call happens, which was only twice a week prior to nurse's line.[240]
The inmate population at Florence is currently giving favorable reports on the new self-referral system.[241] 1498 Inmates like it because *1498 they don't have to stand in line; it is easier for them to access health care on a
needs basis; and it opens the line of communication between the inmate and health services.[242]
b. Perryville Facility
(1) Medical Facilities
The main medical unit at the Perryville facility is at the complex area and is comprised of a laboratory, x-ray, doctors' exam rooms, emergency room, pharmacy, medical records and administration.[243] Each unit at Perryville has a satellite health unit that includes a nurses' office and exam room.[244] At the satellite health units, sick call is conducted by a nurse practitioner or physician.[245] An optometrist visits Perryville at least once a month. An orthotics specialist visits Perryville when there are a sufficient number of inmates that have been approved through the outside referral committee for special shoes, braces or prosthesis.[246]
(2) Sick Call
Sick call at Perryville is conducted from 6:30 to 7:15 in the morning. The inmates come to the health unit to sign up and write down the reason why they need to be seen by the provider. The nurse triages the list and takes patients by priority. Sick call is conducted at Santa Maria five days a week and at the San Pedro, Santa Cruz and San Juan units four days a week.[247] If the nurse determines that the inmate needs to be seen that day, she will call the main complex to let the doctors' line nurses know an inmate needs to be seen. The doctors' line nurse will schedule a time for the inmate to be transported to the complex to see the doctor or nurse practitioner.[248]
In addition to sick call, an inmate can obtain medical treatment by notifying the yard officer, who in turn notifies the shift commander who informs the on-duty nurses that there is a problem. After normal working hours, there are three nurses on-site and either a physician or nurse practitioner on call.[249]

In an emergency, the on-duty nurse will make an assessment of the inmate's condition and notify the on-call provider, who will instruct the nurse as to what treatment to provide or whether to transport the inmate to an outside facility.[250] If it is a severe emergency, the inmate is taken to West Valley Emergency Center, which is approximately five miles from the Perryville facility.[251]
(3) Female Reception Center
The Perryville facility is the reception center for female inmates. The medical staff at Perryville performs complete medical examinations, medical history, routine laboratory work, and dental on every female inmate who is processed at Perryville.[252] Gynecological exams are performed on female inmates upon initial intake[253] and at the main complex one day a week.[254]
(4) Intake from Other Facilities
1499 When inmates are transferred to Perryville, an initial intake assessment is performed *1499 and medical records are reviewed to see if there is any ongoing medical treatment that has to be continued and if there are any mental health problems that might require psychotropic medication. The initial assessment is performed by nurses as soon as the inmate arrives at Perryville. If the nurse determines an inmate should be seen by a provider, the medical records are given to the physician or nurse practitioner for review, and the provider will determine if the inmate needs an appointment.[255]
c. Yuma Facility
There is a contract physician who visits the Yuma facility two afternoons a week.[256]
d. Phoenix Facilities
According to plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Braslow, the Alhambra facility provided adequate health services with the exception of the Aspen DWI Unit.[257] Dr. Braslow found the Aspen Unit unacceptable as it has sick call only one day a week.[258]
1. Aspen
The Aspen Unit at Phoenix is a DWI center.[259] The average stay for inmates at the Aspen DWI Unit is six to eighteen months.[260] Medical coverage at Aspen includes a nursing triage line five days a week. The nurse sees all of the inmates who sign up for sick call or who have complaints, treats them with over-the-counter drugs and refers inmates who need further evaluation to the physicians' assistant or physician at Alhambra. Inmates with routine problems are referred to the next physician's assistant line, conducted twice a week.[261] If necessary, an inmate can be seen by a physician or physician assistant at Alhambra within two hours after the nurses assessment.[262] Inmates at Aspen with dental problems are seen by a dentist at the Alhambra Reception Center twice a week.[263]
If a health problem develops with an inmate at the Aspen Unit after hours, there is a nurse on duty twenty-four hours a day at Alhambra. There is a physician or a PA on call twenty-four hours a day. Emergency situations are taken to the emergency room at Maricopa County Medical Center.[264] The Aspen Unit is a block and a half from the emergency room at the Maricopa County Medical Center.[265]

If an inmate at Aspen needs to see an outside consultant, the PA makes a referral to the outside referral committee. The outside referral committee prioritizes the visit to a specialist based on need. This prioritization should take place within the week.[266]
2. ACW
At the Arizona Center for Women, four RNs and one half-time LPN cover nights between Alhambra and ACW and a physician spends half a day, once a week.[267] ACW is approximately six blocks from Alhambra.[268] Sick call is conducted twice a week.[269]
Defendants have an agreement with the administration at the Maricopa County Medical Center that if an inmate has a serious condition, needs to be seen at a particular clinic and the clinic is booked, the Department of 1500 Corrections physician makes a direct call to the physician's supervisor in that clinic *1500 and the inmate receives a timely appointment.[270]
e. Douglas Facility
(1) Facilities
There is a health unit in each of the units within the Douglas facility.[271] The Papago DWI Unit has eight-hour-aday medical coverage on-site five days a week. The Maricopa Unit has on-site coverage twenty-four hours a day seven days a week from the Mohave Unit. The Gila Unit has twenty-four hour coverage seven days a week and the Complex Detention Unit has twenty-four hour coverage seven days a week.[272]
(2) Sick Call System
Sick call at Douglas is held three days a week at all the units, with the exception of Maricopa. At the Maricopa Unit with a capacity of 125 inmates, sick call is held twice a week between 6:30 and 7:30 and is open to any inmate who wants to see a nurse or provider or make an appointment for a provider. The actual encounter with inmates at sick call goes from 6:30 until 11:00 or 11:30 in the morning. Inmates in the Cochise lockdown unit are seen door-to-door seven days a week. There is one nurse who is responsible for the lockdown unit.[273] The nursing supervisor at Douglas is on-call twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.[274] In non-emergency situations, inmates are seen within a week to ten days by a provider.[275]
If an inmate has a severe problem and needs to be seen immediately, he will be seen by a provider. If there is no doctor's line at the yard that day, the inmate will be seen at the unit within a three to four hour period.
In an emergency situation, if the physician is on-site he will immediately examine the inmate and make arrangements for the inmate to be picked up by the City of Douglas Fire Department ambulance and transported to the Southeast Arizona Medical Center, ten miles away in Douglas.[276] If further referral is needed the inmate is sent to Sierra Vista Hospital or St. Mary's Hospital by land or air transport.[277] It takes approximately 40 minutes to get from the Douglas facility to Sierra Vista by car or ambulance.[278] If the physician is not on-site, there is a contact emergency physician at Sierra Vista Hospital who handles the problem. That physician will make a decision as to whether an inmate should be transported to Sierra Vista.[279]

(3) Chronic Care Clinics
Staff run clinics for hypertensive, diabetic and chronically diseased individuals. A board certified orthopedic surgeon holds a clinic twice a month.[280] The clinics for hypertensive and diabetic inmates are scheduled for every week. These inmates are seen individually on those days in addition to the daily medication encounters. [281] Other chronic care clinics are conducted on a bimonthly basis.[282]
(4) Outside Providers
In addition to on-site medical people and contract physicians who come into the facility, Douglas utilizes medical 1501 facilities at Sierra Vista Community Hospital and at St. Mary's Hospital including cardiologists, dermatologists,
*1501 general surgical consultants, radiologists, ophthalmological specialists, urologists, neurosurgeons, cardiovascular surgeons and anesthesiologists.[283] An optometrist comes in twice a month for eye exams and glasses prescriptions. Inmates who need to be seen by an outside consultant on an emergency basis are seen within twenty-four hours.[284] Douglas contracts with a board certified psychiatrist to follow inmates on psychotropic medication.[285]
(5) Expert Opinion
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warren, testified that at the time of trial, the Douglas facility was close to accreditation by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and would only need to work on the sick call and chronic clinics areas to seek and receive accreditation.[286]
f. Winslow Facility
Sick call at Winslow is conducted on Monday, Wednesday and Friday on the Kaibab yard and the Coronado yard. Providers lines are held the same days on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. If a nurse determines that an inmate needs to see a provider and the inmate is seen at sick call, the provider will generally see the inmate that day or at least within forty-eight hours.[287]
Emergencies are handled at Winslow by having the inmate brought to medical and providing treatment or medications if necessary. If the problem is more severe than the level of staffing can handle, the inmate is sent to the emergency room at Winslow Memorial Hospital, approximately five miles away.[288]
g. Tucson Facility
Dr. Warren testified at the time of trial that the Tucson facility could seek accreditation by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and obtain the accreditation with a modest amount of work.[289]
7. Pharmacies
a. Facilities
The Arizona Department of Corrections has eight pharmacies located in Winslow, Perryville, Phoenix, Alhambra, Florence, Tucson, Ft. Grant and Douglas.[290]
Most medications are given to inmates with a one-week supply. Psychotropic medications, controlled substances and pain medications are distributed in a daily package or unit dose watch swallow, in which the nurse delivers

the medication in one dose and waits until the inmate takes the medication. Some medications are given out on more than a seven-day supply because of their packaging, i.e., asthma inhaler or ointment. Vitamins are given out on a thirty-day supply.[291]
b. Delays in receipt of medication
When inmates are moved inter-facility, the providers at the receiving facility respect previous orders until they review the medical record and patient.[292] Non-psychotropic medications are part of the inmates' personal property and if the medications are in a container produced from the pharmacy in the correctional system, they are transferred with the patient, subsequently given to nursing along with the medical record upon arrival.[293]
1502 Inmates experience delays in receiving prescribed medications.[294] However, there is *1502 no evidence of any damages as a result of the delays. Overall, medications within the Arizona Department of Corrections are being distributed in a timely manner, given the staff.[295] The Department could use another three to four technicians to assist in the delivery of medication.[296]
8. Problems with Security Involvement in Health Care
The most serious problems with health care occur because of security involvement in health care. In some cases, lack of security staff causes delays in treatment of medical, dental and mental health care.[297] Lack of security staff and transportation also delay care provided outside of the prison.[298] Defendants are aware of the insufficient security staff and transportation problems.[299]
In some cases, security staff interfere with delivery of health care. For example, security staff sometimes do not allow prisoners from South Unit in Florence to pass through the gate to the Central Health Unit.[300] Inmates are sometimes unable to receive medical care due to security lockdowns of the unit or complex.[301] Security staff sometimes deprive prisoners of their medication.[302] In addition, security staff sometimes fail to cooperate with health staff.[303]
Security officers are also involved with the provision of medical care, including performing periodic health and welfare checks on inmates with physical or mental health problems.[304] Dr. Braslow testified that it is inappropriate for security officers to maintain health and welfare checks if it is suspected a prisoner will lose consciousness or have other medical problems.[305] During non-sick call times, inmates must access care through security staff. Dr. Braslow also testified that it was inappropriate for security staff to control access to medical care.[306]
Finally, security staff are allowed to overrule medical judgments of health staff. For example, a psychiatrist, can recommend that a prisoner be released from lockdown for mental health reasons, but security may overrule that medical order.[307]
9. Medical Records
Medical Records are routinely transferred with the patient upon arrival at the facility.[308] Some problems exist 1503 with medical records. *1503 In some cases, the medical record is not transferred with the inmate.[309] In
addition, medical records are not always available at sick call treatment.[310] Further, medical records do not always have the appropriate or required documentation of treatment or assessment of medical problems.[311]

10. Special Diets
According to Douglas FHA Michael Schwegler, the Douglas facility has had problems providing "some of the esoteric diets" for prisoners.[312] Problems do occur in provision of special diets.[313] However, inmates generally receive the diets that are written for them.[314]
11. Confidentiality
In some cases, inmates have to list their medical problems on sign up sheets or state the problem in front of other inmates.[315]
III. DENTAL CARE SYSTEM
A. Generally
Dental services are available at all facilities in the State of Arizona.[316] Dental clinics in all of the facilities operate ten hours per day, with the exception of Perryville.[317] The Santa Maria Unit at Perryville has a satellite dental unit at which the dentists see the female inmates once or twice a week. The male inmates at Perryville seek dental treatment at the main complex.[318]
The Director of Dentistry for the ADOC is Dr. Scalzo.[319] Dr. Scalzo, meets with the lead dentist of every facility every other Tuesday on a conference call. In addition, the lead dentists and Dr. Scalzo meet quarterly.[320]
1504 *1504 B. Intake Procedure
The Department of Corrections policy requires that each inmate at Alhambra reception be examined by a dentist. [321] This examination includes recording of the soft tissue, recording of oral hygiene, and recording of the pocket depths as an indices of periodontal status in diagnosing the periodontal condition. A panoramic x-ray is taken of each individual.[322] If any problems need attention, the intake dentist will call ahead to the facility to which the inmate is to be transferred to have that inmate called in for treatment.[323] Dentists also give inmates oral hygiene instructions at the reception center. ADOC hands out a pamphlet prepared by Colgate that gives an outline as to oral hygiene.[324] The examining dentist has the discretion to instruct the individual in reference to oral hygiene practices. The chart will note "OHI" for oral hygiene instructions.[325] If the dentist feels it is necessary for the treatment of an individual case, ADOC will provide dental floss to the inmates. Some institutions have dental floss available in inmate stores. ADOC will purchase specialty toothbrushes if the dentist feels a more specific type is necessary in the treatment of a case.[326]
At Perryville, the intake reception center for women, inmates are brought in for a panoramic x-ray and examined by a dentist.[327]
C. Experts
Drs. Thorburn, Braslow and Easley testified for plaintiffs regarding the adequacy of the dental care system. Dr. Easley has a dental degree from Ohio State University and a Masters degree in public health from the University of Michigan. Relevant to prison dental care, Dr. Easley has three years clinical experience with the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons. Dr. Easley measured the ADOC dental system against the basic community standard of care for dentistry. This is a nationwide standard. Dr. Easley based his opinion of the ADOC dental system on

the January 6, 1992 testimony of Dr. Scalzo and two dental and medical records of inmates.[328] Dr. Scalzo, the Director of Dentistry at ADOC, testified for defendants.
D. Staff
1. Generally
Dentists employed by the Department of Corrections provide on-site dental care and are licensed in the State of Arizona.[329] There are sixteen full-time dentists employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections.[330] At Perryville, there are three full-time dentists and staff.[331] These dentists also provide care to the Yuma facility. [332] There are five full-time dentists assigned to the Florence facility;[333] one dentist assigned to the Phoenix 1505 facilities;[334] two full-time dentists at the *1505 Tucson facility;[335] two full-time dentists assigned to the Douglas facility;[336] and one full-time dentist assigned to the Winslow facility.[337] Ft. Grant and Safford share one full-time dentist.[338]
The Department of Corrections has two dental hygienist positions. One of these positions is filled at Phoenix. [339] A dental hygienist is licensed to take a radiograph, to perform subgingival curettage and cleanings, and administer local anesthesia under the direct supervision of a dentist.[340]
There are nineteen full-time dental assistants to assist dentists in the provision of dental services.[341] A dental assistant prepares the patient, assists the dentist in providing care, sterilizes dental equipment and conducts inventory of supplies and schedules appointments.[342]
2. Problems with Staffing
a. The need for additional staff
The evidence establishes that the defendants could provide better care with additional staff. In the Fiscal Year 1991 budget request, Dr. Scalzo requested nine additional positions; one dentist, six or seven dental assistants, and two or three dental hygienists. These positions would have helped the defendants to accomplish the infection control guidelines of OSHA and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) as well as to perform general duties associated with provision of dental services.[343] None of these positions were funded.[344]
The January 1991 Quality Assurance Report for Florence indicated there were no functional dental clinics in SPU and the South Unit, suggesting a need for more dental staff for Florence.[345]
Dr. Weekly, the dentist for the SMU, considers his two dental assistants overworked and ideally could use two full-time dental assistants rather than one and one-half dental assistants.[346] Dr. Weekly also thinks it would be helpful to have another dentist.[347]
Dr. Scalzo has recommended that there be more hygienist positions in the ADOC to perform the preventive and periodontal treatment that currently takes 14% of the dentists' time, thus freeing the dentists to perform services only they can provide.[348] However, dental hygienist positions are very difficult to fill. There are only one thousand seven hundred dental hygienists licensed in the State of Arizona. They are primarily employed by private practitioners.[349] The Department of Corrections advertises extensively for dental hygienists and recruits dental hygienists at job fairs.[350]

b. Impact of lack of staff
The defendants have tailored their dental priority system to accommodate the staffing pattern of the ADOC.[351] 1506 That priority system results in treatment of those needing the *1506 most urgent care.[352] Thus, some prisoners
with dental problems do not receive routine dental treatment such as routine fillings and cleanings.[353] The problem with this policy is that if caries (cavities) are not treated when they are detected, they progress until they involve the nerve, at which point the patient can get an abscess and require either a root canal or an extraction. [354]
Because of a lack of dental staff, nursing staff at sick call are performing dental screening services. For urgent care, nurses are educated by the dental staff to recognize an inmate that presents symptoms that fit under the "urgent" category, such as swelling. The nurses have standing orders to prescribe antibiotics and pain medication for such conditions.[355]
E. Dental Care System
An inmate can request dental care through sick call, by a kite or by informing a correctional services officer.[356] Inmates presenting at sick call in acute dental pain will be seen that day or the next working day based on the severity of the problem.[357]
Dentists within the Arizona Department of Corrections provide general dental care, including examinations, prosthetics and, oral surgical techniques. The Department of Corrections provides treatment for TMJ conditions, including splinting, occlusal adjustments and surgery.[358] Any procedures beyond the scope of the Department of Corrections' dentists are referred to specialists. Generally, inmates are referred out for oral surgery or periodontal treatment.[359]
After the inmates are examined, based on their dental condition, they are placed in various categories. The first classification is "emergency" characterized by extreme swelling, fractured jaw or uncontrollable bleeding. The second category is "urgent" and includes inmates who are in severe pain or have lesions. The third category is "significant" and includes inmates who are exhibiting the worst dental problems such as extensive caries. Fourth is the "routine" category which includes fillings or routine periodontal care.[360]
Pursuant to policy, inmates who are classified as emergency should be seen within twenty-four hours.[361] Those classified as urgent should be seen within fourteen (14) days.[362] However, an inmate who may be classified as "urgent" or "emergency" may have to wait three to four days to allow antibiotic medication treatment prior to initiation of dental treatment.[363] All other dental problems are scheduled "based on the availability of services at each facility."[364]
If an emergency occurs after hours, the dentist comes in or the inmate is sent to a local emergency room based on his condition.[365] Generally, if an inmate is in acute dental pain he will come in either through sick call or 1507 through referral from medical *1507 staff or a correctional services officer.[366] Normally, inmates do not request dental services for acute pain through the kite system, because there is no guarantee as to how long the kite is going to take to get to the dental clinic.[367]
To request dental services at the women's unit in Florence, an inmate can go to sick call or access dentistry through security if it is an emergency. If a dental emergency takes place after hours, the on-call dentist can be reached by beeper. The women's unit in Florence utilizes the self-referral form. If the inmate states in the form that it is an emergency, a dentist will contact the inmate to determine whether its a true emergency.[368]

The Department of Corrections is equipped with ultrasonic scanning instruments at each dental clinic in the Department of Corrections.[369] When inmates within the Arizona Department of Corrections report to the dentist with significant plaque and tartar, the dentist will remove the plaque and tartar.[370] If an inmate presents with an acute periodontal condition, he will be treated. If an inmate presents for other dental care, the dentist will address any periodontal condition while the anesthesia is taking effect.[371] If an inmate is undergoing treatment for periodontal disease and the dentist wants that individual to return, he may be called back for the remainder of his treatment.[372] Seventy percent of the treatment in the early stages of periodontal disease are in the patient's hands, i.e., proper brushing.[373]
An inmate does not have to report he is in pain before he will receive periodontal treatment[374] or treatment of caries (cavities).[375]
Dr. Thorburn testified that the dental services in the Arizona Department of Corrections are substandard because they are delivered on a "come and complain" basis.[376] However, according to Dr. Thorburn, prison health care systems traditionally have been set up very similar to how the Arizona Department of Corrections system is set up, i.e., health services delivered on demand based on a person's complaint.[377] In addition, Dr. Thorburn based her testimony regarding the frequency of sick call on the National Commission on Correctional Health Care standards.[378] However, the National Commission of Health Care standards regarding dental care state that dental care should be provided on a treatment priority basis which is up to the dental provider to determine. [379]
F. Problems with Dental Care System
1. Delays in Dental Treatment
a. Non-painful, routine care
The experts testified that the wait for non-painful (routine) dental services should not be longer than two or three 1508 months.[380] Delays greater than two to three months exist *1508 in the treatment of non-painful routine care.
[381]
In April 1991, there was a sixteen-month waiting list for routine dental care at Winslow.[382] The Facility Health Administrator recommended a moratorium on transfers to Winslow of prisoners with serious dental problems and asked for another dentist for one month to assist in eliminating the backlog. These requests were not approved. [383] As of January of 1992, the waiting list for routine dental care at the Kaibab yard at Winslow was two and one-half to four weeks, and on the Coronado yard it was eight weeks.[384]
In one case, it took more than two years to complete restoration work on cavities that had been identified in March and August of 1989.[385] Plaintiffs' expert presented other instances of delays greater than two to three months including inmates Paul Davis[386] and Lonnell Johnson.[387]
b. Delays for inmates with complaints of pain
According to Dr. Braslow, prisoners who complain of painful dental problems wait inappropriately long periods of time before having the problem evaluated by a dentist.[388] Dr. Thorburn noted that dental pain should be responded to within a matter of days since "[it] can really be quite agonizing."[389]
1509 *1509 Plaintiffs' expert presented the following examples of delays where inmates were complaining of pain:

Michael David was a prisoner at Perryville who had been receiving Tylenol for dental pain for six days prior to being seen by the health provider on June 21, 1990. The health provider noted that his tooth was broken to the gum line and referred the prisoner to dental.[390] The prisoner returned to the health unit the next day, again asking for something for pain, and the provider noted his cheek was swollen and once again referred him to dental. The dental assistant and dentist noted they tried to get him to dental that day, but he could not be transported. The dentist gave him prescription for pain and antibiotics, and saw him three days later.[391]
On July 23, 1990, Joe Harris, while incarcerated at Florence, South Unit, was seen by a nurse with a complaint of tooth pain radiating to his eye. He was placed on the dental sick call list and given no medication.[392] The dentist saw him on August 9, 1990. At this time, he found severe cavities and removed three teeth.[393]
Mr. Licano, a prisoner at CB6, was seen by the nurse on September 23, 1989 complaining of a toothache, draining and past swelling. The nurse observed one tooth with exposed roots that was movable. She noted "some drainage noticed. Gum is read (sic) and edematous (swollen), breath is malodorous. Inmate is insulin dependent diabetic." She concluded "possible infected tooth."[394] The nurse obtained a telephone order for penicillin from the dentist, but Mr. Licano was not seen by the dentist until May 15, 1990. At that time the tooth was extracted.[395] Dr. Braslow testified that this was a very unfortunate delay in a diabetic, for whom any infection is serious.[396]
Mary Centrella complained of tooth pain February 9, 1990. The nurse noted the tooth was broken and chipped and referred the information to the dental department.[397] She was not seen by the dentist until April 19, 1990, when he noted a cavity.[398]
Stephen Herndon, a prisoner at Tucson, wrote a kite dated April 11, 1988 requesting an appointment for tooth pain. The response indicated that he was on the list; would be given an appointment when his name got to the top of the list, and advised him to research the correct way to make a request.[399] He did not receive an appointment between April 1988 and September 1990.[400]
On October 31, 1985, a dentist at the Tucson facility evaluated Vince Bryan, found gingivitis and indicated that he needed orthodontics and maxillofacial surgery. The note further indicated that ADOC does not provide the orthodontics and maxillofacial surgery.[401] He was diagnosed as having severe bilateral crossbite and anterior 1510 open bite.[402] There was no orthodontic consult done in *1510 1985; although, the problem appeared in the medical record to be severe.[403] On December 23, 1987 the dentist indicated study models were needed for "collie maxilla, bulldog mandibular."[404] The dentist's objective findings were "severe skeletal maxillary" but a "note" at bottom of the plan indicated ADOC policy would not allow the surgery.[405] In November of 1988, Mr. Bryan wrote a grievance concerning the problem and the response indicated the problem was congenital and not covered by ADOC.[406] The November 16, 1988 note in the dental record indicated he needed orthognathic surgery, but added "DOC will not cover this."[407] Dr. Easley and Dr. Scalzo testified that because of his tooth alignment, food becomes impacted in his soft tissues.[408] This could cause irritation of the gum[409] and exacerbate any periodontic condition he may have.[410] Mr. Bryan, based on his current dental condition, is able to chew and eat foods.[411] Mr. Bryan's physical form from the outside is perfectly normal.[412]
Dr. Scalzo testified that he personally examined inmate Bryan,[413] who had requested that the constricted congenital deformation be corrected.[414] Dr. Scalzo discussed the situation with staff.[415] Defendants recommended Mr. Bryan be seen by an outside oral surgeon.[416] In August of 1991, Mr. Bryan was seen by Dr. Seglecky, an oral surgeon who stated that to correct the congenital deformity would require extensive dental treatment, including oral surgery consistent of the breaking of bones, orthodontic cosmetic dentistry and specific dentistry.[417] Dr. Seglecky opined that for continuity of care reasons, extensive treatment should not be started by ADOC because the treatment plan would be a minimum of four years and Mr. Bryan had only two years remaining on his sentence.

Based on inmate grievances, plaintiffs presented other examples of delays in evaluation by a dental practitioner when the inmates complained of pain.[418]
1511 *1511 2. System for Continuity of Care/Preventative Care
Defendants have no system to see prisoners who have not requested treatment, unless the intake exam indicates an urgent need.[419] In addition, defendants have not developed a system to follow up on prisoners who do not show for an appointment. Unless it is an emergency or the inmate specifically contacts dental services, the dental department assumes that if a prisoner is a "no show" he or she is refusing the service.[420] In most cases, prisoners must seek another appointment.[421]
The defendants also have no policy for periodic dental examinations.[422] There are conditions, such as periodontal disease, that may be asymptomatic for a time, but routine examinations and hygiene services will detect the problem and possibly prevent tooth loss.[423] Early detection is one of the most important treatment tools for periodontal disease.[424] If periodic dental hygiene services are not provided, periodontal disease will produce pain, infection and eventual loss of teeth.[425]
Plaintiffs presented evidence of such a case of periodontal disease in inmate Nicholson. Inmate Walter Nicholson returned to the ADOC custody in 1983 and an intake x-ray indicated there was bone loss. In 1988, he developed acute periodontitis. Between 1983 and 1988 the inmate was not examined or treated by a dentist.[426] Since 1988, Mr. Nicholson has experienced episodes of pus and painful gums.[427] Dentists in ADOC have recommended to Mr. Nicholson that all his teeth be extracted.[428] Although they did not provide preventative care, as soon as the defendants discovered the condition in 1988, they took appropriate steps to treat the condition.[429]
IV. MENTAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. Generally
1. General Administration
The Department of Corrections formerly divided the psychologist and psychology associates between Health Services and Adult Services. There were psychologists in both Health Services and Adult Services.[430] As of January 1, 1992, all psychologists in the Department of Corrections report to Health Services.[431]
1512 *1512 2. Experts
Plaintiffs' mental health expert, Cassandra Newkirk toured the facilities at Phoenix, Tucson, Perryville, Douglas and Florence.[432] Dr. Newkirk, formulated her opinion in part by reviewing the medical records of certain inmates. Some of the records were chosen at random and others were reviewed after she had obtained signed releases from inmates. Dr. Newkirk reviewed a total of 95 inmate records.[433] Dr. Newkirk interviewed some inmates but did not review their medical records. She interviewed other inmates along with their medical records. [434]
Defendants' expert, Dr. Roberta Stellman, is a board certified psychiatrist and an expert in the mental health delivery system in a correctional setting.[435] Dr. Stellman provided psychiatric services for the New Mexico Department of Corrections for eight years ending September 1991.[436] While working for the New Mexico

Department of Corrections, Dr. Stellman provided clinical services to inmates who were classified as maximum security prisoners.[437]
3. Intake Procedure
a. Male Inmates
The Department of Corrections has a routine procedure for intake of new male inmates. A portion of that procedure focuses on identifying mental health problems. The nursing staff screens the new inmates by asking specific questions about history of mental illness, self injury, substance abuse, and hospitalizations. The inmates receive psychological testing that may pick up either major deficits in intellectual functioning or psychological distress. The inmates have ready access to the psychiatrist and the psychologist at the intake facility [Alhambra]. [438]
b. Female Inmates
The Santa Maria Unit lacks a system to identify and evaluate female inmates with mental illness upon intake. In 1513 addition, ADOC does not obtain past psychiatric records *1513 of inmates.[439] Because the Perryville facility
does not have a full-time psychiatrist, it is left to staff to identify an inmate who is seriously mentally ill. Staff then initiate transfer or treatment based on a verbal order.[440] At Perryville, Dr. Lang found a tendency by security staff to bring inappropriate referrals to mental health. These were prisoners security did not want to handle, so they would "dump them on the mental health person," thus taking time away from those prisoners who genuinely needed services.[441]
c. Identification and Treatment of Inmates with Serious Mental Health Problems
Defendants fail to identify seriously mentally ill prisoners in their custody, so that those prisoners might receive treatment. According to the ADOC Mental Health Services Manual, review of a prisoner's medical record upon arrival at an institution is a main source of mental health referrals.[442] Dr. Busfield believes that evaluating persons who have a recent history of mental illness, even if they are not on medication, is "professionally responsible" and "only prudent."[443]
However, such reviews are not routinely performed. At SMU, not all arriving prisoners are assessed to determine whether they have mental problems.[444] Mr. Hanson, the psychiatric nurse, does not see every prisoner who comes to SMU who is on psychotropic medication or has a history of mental illness.[445] Similarly, at Douglas, Dr. Centric does not know if he routinely sees all prisoners who come to the facility with a history of mental illness or on psychotropic medication, because when he sees a prisoner, he does not know the reason for the appointment, unless he asks the prisoner.[446]
As a result of the lack of systems to identify them, seriously mentally ill prisoners go undetected in the prisons, and do not receive treatment. Plaintiffs presented evidence of the following inmates who did not receive treatment:
Henry Simms, a prisoner at Douglas, was quite psychotic when Dr. Newkirk saw him, and was out of touch with reality during the entire interview.[447] Although he had a history of hospitalization at Baker Ward, the ADOC psychiatric hospital, he had been transferred to Douglas and not followed by mental health staff at that facility. [448] His record contained two notes from psychological associates, in 1987 and 1988, noting his unusual or

psychotic behavior and stating that he needed treatment. However, there was no evidence that he had received treatment by the time Dr. Newkirk saw him in August of 1990.[449]
Defendants' expert, Dr. Stellman, testified that at the time she reviewed Mr. Simms' chart, there was no evidence that he was having any acute problems.[450] Dr. Stellman was "uncomfortable" with Mr. Simms' record. According to Dr. Stellman, Mr. Simms had been at Douglas many years; was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic; and by the nature of his disease, he had refused treatment. He would periodically decompensate, or his mental 1514 condition would worsen, and be called to the attention of staff.[451] Dr. Stellman *1514 was disturbed by the fact that the most recent note in the chart was several years old.[452] There was no indication in the record that anyone had responded to this note, which was a referral to mental health.[453] Dr. Stellman requested that the nursing director have Mr. Simms seen by the physician the following day.[454]
Another such inmate was Mr. Bryce, a prisoner who was on psychotropic medications when he was transferred from SMU to Douglas.[455] He had a history of prior suicidal gestures.[456] According to his medical record, Mr. Bryce was not seen by a psychiatrist at Douglas between June 1989 and April 1990. His record from Adult Services was not available.[457] In Dr. Stellman's opinion, it would be desirable for a prisoner who is on psychotropic medication and is transferred to be evaluated at the receiving facility regarding his or her need or desire to continue the medication; this should be noted in the record.[458] Dr. Stellman testified that in her opinion Mr. Bryce suffered an adjustment reaction to the facility, rather than a mental illness.[459]
When she visited Perryville, Dr. Newkirk found inmate Michael Tyler in a lockdown unit/isolation cell. He was psychotic at the time, and was hearing voices.[460] A review of his record showed that he had a history of psychiatric illness, and had previously been on psychotropic medication while in ADOC, but his medication had been discontinued.[461] Although he was psychotic when Dr. Newkirk saw him, his record revealed that he had only been seen by psych associates when he was in lockdown.[462] He had not been seen by a psychiatrist in several months.[463]
Dr. Newkirk also testified about Ms. Velah, a woman with a 22-year history of depression and other psychiatric problems. Inmate Velah was in lockup at the Perryville-Santa Maria Unit.[464] Although a psychological report done shortly prior to her incarceration showed a history of psychiatric problems and treatment, there was no indication in her record that she had had psychiatric evaluation upon her entry into the prison system.[465]
Another prisoner, Tommy Wilson, was acutely ill and psychotic when he entered the system, and was evaluated at Alhambra and sent to the Perryville facility.[466] While at Perryville, he was not seen by any mental health staff; nor was he given psychotropic medication. After he decompensated, he was transferred to SPU.[467]
Inmate Alex Heil's October 26, 1989 assessment report states that the Perryville prisoner suffers from substantial 1515 depression, dysthymic disorder or neurotic depression, and needs to see a competent provider. *1515 However,
he was not seen by psychiatrist until July 5, 1990.[468]
Inmate Hayes entered the ADOC in 1986. A psychological assessment in August of 1986 diagnosed him as having serious mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, paranoid type, schizoaffective disorder, and schizophrenia, undifferentiated type.[469] The 1986 assessment report indicated that Mr. Hayes "shows severe depression and extreme anxiety."[470] On November 25, 1987, a mental health team review indicated that he had a history of mental illness, especially depression and possible schizophrenia, with three suicide attempts. On December 28, 1987, he was evaluated and the medical records note a direction to "r/o [rule out] atypical depression."[471] The March 5, 1988 note states "r/o major depression, r/o atypical depression."[472] On March 22, 1989, Dr. Gopolan evaluated the prisoner after Mr. Hayes' complaint of depression but again found no mental illness.[473] Mr. Hayes began receiving treatment from mental health on April 28, 1989 when he complained of feeling depressed.[474] He also signed a no intent to harm document, indicating that he was not suicidal.[475] He was given medication for depression.[476] On August 7, 1989, he was put on suicide watch because he was

hoarding his medication.[477] On August 9, 1989, his medication was discontinued by Dr. Pera based on the report of hoarding, but without a face-to-face evaluation.[478]
At the time Dr. Newkirk saw Mr. Hayes in CB6, he had not been seen by mental health in approximately one year. [479] He was psychotic. On questioning, he said he was hearing voices. He was anxious and tense, exhibiting the type of tension often seen in paranoid prisoners.[480] He had a past history of violence against women and was in CB6 at that time for allegedly assaulting a female staff member.[481]
Inmate Cordray was an inmate at the Perryville Santa Maria Unit when Dr. Newkirk interviewed her. The inmate said she was depressed and had been unable to see a psychiatrist.[482] Her medical record revealed a history of untreated depression. On December 26, 1989, she cut her wrists and was referred to mental health by officers to Dr. Lang and the CPOII.[483] She was seen by a nurse on December 27, 1989 who obtained telephone orders for medication from Dr. Palmer and referred her to psychology but not mental health (psychiatry).[484] There was no follow-up of this incident noted in the medical record.[485] On May 7, 1990, she was seen by a nurse who quoted her as saying she "was about to go off."[486] She was not seen by a psychiatrist until August 11, 1990. [487]
1516 *1516 Inmate Lewis was treated for depression while in jail, prior to her incarceration at ADOC, between April 16, 1990 and July 3, 1990. She requested mental health services at Perryville, Santa Maria Unit and was evaluated by Dr. Pera on August 14, 1990. Dr. Pera gave her a prescription and diagnosed her as having an adjustment reaction. On August 21, 1991, without seeing the prisoner, Dr. Pera indicated there was no need for renewal of the prescription. She was subsequently transferred to ASPC-Florence, Women's Division and on November 1, 1990 referred herself to mental health. She was hearing voices, "very paranoid," and "very nervous." She was seen regularly after that by Dr. Busfield for depression.[488]
4. System for Providing Care to Mentally Ill Inmates Who Decompensate
The mental health staff learns about an inmate who decompensates in his housing area through a number of ways. First, the inmate may initiate a request to the medical department requesting to see the psychiatrist or be put on the psych line. Second, an inmate may make the same request to the CPO or the psych associate assigned to his unit. Third, requests for treatment are initiated by security officers or the warden at the facility. Finally, other inmates bring problems to the attention of the staff.[489]
If an inmate begins to decompensate within a facility in the Arizona Department of Corrections, a correctional service officer or nurse will make an assessment and could make a referral to the on-site psychiatrist or psychologist. If there is no on-site psychiatrist or psychologist, the officer or nurse may call the licensed correctional mental health facility in Phoenix.[490] At that point, an individual male may be referred to the Baker Ward for seventy-two hour mental health evaluation.[491]
Pursuant to policy, if a patient fails to pick up a psychotropic medication, the nurse or psychiatric nurse should determine why the individual did not pick up their medication. The nurse will either have the inmate brought to them or go to their cell to find out why the medication was not picked up by the inmate. If the inmate continues to refuse to take the medication and has not decompensated, a right of refusal form is witnessed and signed either by the inmate or by two witnesses.[492]
B. Mental Health Facilities
1. Phoenix

a. Alhambra, Flamenco, and ACW facilities
The mental health component of the Alhambra facility is the maximum security special psychiatric hospital for male inmates known as Baker or B Ward. B Ward is licensed by the Arizona Health Services Division of Licensing as a special psychiatric hospital. Annually, B Ward must meet the same criteria as any other psychiatric hospital to retain its license. The hospital is licensed for forty beds and has a useful capacity of thirty-six beds. [493] Male inmates may be involuntarily committed to B Ward pursuant to state law procedures.[494]
Also at the Alhambra facility is the Flamenco Mental Health Center. Flamenco Mental Health Center is licensed by the State of Arizona as a mental health residential facility. A mental health residential facility has lesser requirements than a special psychiatric hospital and is intended for patients who are more stable.[495] Flamenco 1517 is a medium custody facility with three male wards and *1517 one female ward.[496] G Ward, one of the four wards in Flamenco, is used to house mentally ill female inmates. G Ward was activated in 1990 and has a bed capacity of twenty inmates.[497] Psychiatrists and psychologists provide treatment to inmates incarcerated at Baker Ward, Flamenco, and G Ward.[498]
Plaintiffs admit that the mental health treatment provided at Alhambra and the Arizona Center for Women (ACW) meet the serious mental health needs of inmates.[499]
b. Aspen
Although Dr. Garabedian supervises mental health services at Aspen, neither he nor the psychological associates under his supervision provide mental health services to the Aspen DWI Unit.[500] Rather, inmates requiring mental health treatment are transported about 300 feet from Aspen to Alhambra.[501]
In addition, Aspen provides its own programs through outside providers.[502] Those programs include everything from 12-step programs to life skills and to how to make it on the streets.[503]
2. Florence (excluding SMU)
Mr. Veloz is the mental health coordinator who is responsible for mental health services throughout the Florence complex, with the exception of SMU.[504]
a. SPU in Florence
The Special Programs Unit (SPU) in Florence is a halfway house for mentally ill and retarded male inmates who, under Arizona law, cannot be admitted to any of the mental health treatment facilities. SPU provides services to male inmates who are seriously mentally ill, severely mentally retarded, or who suffer from organic illness.[505] Inmates housed at SPU may receive mental health treatment and programming.[506]
The SPU has a capacity of 139 beds. The SPU facility is a dormitory style facility with an open yard where the inmates can be out most of the time.[507] The SPU is not classified in terms of a level of custody, but rather accepts inmates based on their mental health needs.[508]
The SPU takes a team approach to the delivery of mental health care. Master level therapists, CPOs, and registered nurses[509] offer group therapies in anger management, communication skills, current events, and sexual dysfunction. The groups consist of five to ten patients, and the facility offers six groups per week. The facility also has groups on self-awareness, self-esteem, current events, substance abuse education, choices and

changes, coping with frustration, beyond depression, rational emotive therapy, and Alcohol and Narcotics Anonymous.[510]
The psychologist conducts group therapy and psychological evaluations for the parole board and for developing treatment plans. The psychologist also holds individual therapy or assessments with inmates. The SPU offers 1518 individual counseling and appointments *1518 with the psychologist virtually every day.[511] In addition, the psychiatrist, psych associates, and at times registered nurses at SPU provide individual therapy to the inmates at SPU. About 90% of the inmates requiring treatment are seen by psychiatrists or masters level care providers weekly.[512]
The SPU has a recreation therapy room where the inmates can watch television or videotapes, participate in arts and crafts, play games, or read.[513] Recreational therapy is offered two hours a day.[514] The facility also offers educational support, and 24-hour crisis intervention.[515]
The Department has a policy for assigning inmates to the SPU once they are referred for placement to the facility. When the mental health staff receives a referral, they discuss the referral. The staff then composes a Mental Health Admissions Board made up of two mental health professionals and one corrections officer that goes to the facility where the inmate is assigned and performs a cursory mental status exam. The Admissions Board also reviews the medical and institutional file to determine whether the inmate's behavior is a management problem. [516]
The medical records of all patients coming to the SPU are reviewed by a psychiatrist when the medical records show that the inmate either has or has had emotional difficulties.[517] As part of the mental status exam, the mental health team determines whether the inmate has experienced auditory problems or visual hallucinations. Staff look at the inmate's gait and perform other exams necessary to assess whether the inmate is seriously impaired and belongs in a chronic unit like the SPU or if he is acute enough to be considered for admission to the psychiatric hospital B ward. The mental health team also determines whether the inmate can function in an open yard dormitory setting and whether the inmate has a history of repeated aggressive behavior against either other inmates or corrections employees.[518] If an inmate requires institutional care but is not a candidate for the SPU because of a history of assaultive behavior, the inmate is referred to B Ward at Alhambra.[519]
The majority of the inmates at SPU that receive medications are receiving psychotropic medications. The psychiatric nurse gives out those medications dose by dose.[520]
The Department of Corrections has no SPU for women. Women who require the intermediate mental health care offered to the men at the SPU can be treated at G Ward.[521]
Some of the inmates decompensate at SPU.[522] For example, Dr. Stellman observed Phillip Gonzales in CB6 1519 and noted that he had had frequent moves between *1519 SPU and Baker Ward for decompensation.[523]
Plaintiffs allege that this decompensation is caused by lack of programming or staff. However, the nature of mental illness, which follows a cyclical pattern, may be the cause of such decompensation.[524]
b. Women's Division in Florence
Inmates at the Women's Division obtain care through sick call which is conducted twice a week and a provider line which is conducted three days a week.[525] Inmates at the Women's Division are referred to a psychiatrist through the psychiatric nurse. Counselors and security staff members advise the nurse about women who need assistance. The nurse also has open office hours where female inmates come to speak with her, and she determines whether the inmate requires a psychiatric evaluation.[526]
3. SMU in Florence

a. Referral System
SMU conducts a psych line once a week.[527] Inmates at SMU are scheduled for appointments with the psychiatrist through various ways. First, the psychologist or the psychotherapist can refer the inmate for psychiatric care. A new inmate may be referred for psychiatric care if one of the nurses reviews his chart and finds a significant history of mental health care or determines that the inmate is on medications. The inmates can pick up self-referral forms from the nurse. The inmate also may be referred by a CPO or by other nurses.[528]
When a referral comes in, the psychiatric nurse goes to the inmate's cell and talks with him face-to-face to determine how quickly the inmate needs to be scheduled for an appointment.[529] If the patient is referred because of medications, the psych nurse contacts the pharmacy and ensures that the inmate receives his medications promptly. He or she then advises the inmate when his medications will be arriving and when he will be seeing the psychiatrist. When an inmate is referred because of a significant history of mental illness, the psych nurse visits with the inmate and makes a clinical judgment of the inmate's condition.[530]
b. Medications
The psychiatric patients at the SMU receive their psychiatric medications by unit dosage. Each day the medications are put in individual envelopes and delivered to the inmate at his cell.[531] If an inmate refuses to take his prescribed medication, the person dispensing the medication will work with the inmate, remind him why the medication was ordered, and explain the consequences of his refusing to take the medication. If the inmate continues to refuse to take his medication, the refusal generally is noted on the med sheet. After a period of time, at the next appointment, the med sheets are looked at and sometimes the nurse again tries to negotiate with the patient.[532]
c. Mental Health Programming
SMU has very little programming for seriously mentally ill inmates. At the time of his deposition on January 31, 1991, Dr. Pushkash indicated the mental health programming in the SMU consisted of one therapy group involving four prisoners, a levels system for prisoners with behavioral problems, and individual therapy.[533] At 1520 the time of trial, SMU *1520 provided a group therapy program, the levels system, the pod for self-abusive inmates, and a bibliotherapy program.[534]
The levels system program is a behavioral modification/levels system program in which sixteen inmates are eligible to participate at any given time. The inmates proceed through a four phase system based on their behavior. As the inmates proceed through the phases, they accumulate points and privileges, such as being able to "buy" extra time out of their cells.[535] The levels system was actually implemented by security officers. Some of the officers had received forty hours of training. However, due to turnover, other officers had been assigned to the levels system unit but received no training. In addition, in 1991, defendants were not developing a training program for officers.[536] Dr. Newkirk testified that such training is very important because the levels system deals with behaviors in a treatment modality.[537] Further, Dr. Stellman testified that officers should have some mental health training from a mental health professional, especially in suicide prevention, how to deal with assaultive patients, side effects of psychiatric medications and general training regarding the program being implemented.[538]
At the time of his deposition on January 31, 1991, Dr. Pushkash also indicated that SMU had a problem with suicidal and self-abusing prisoners. He had developed an outline for a housing pod for these prisoners that had been submitted to Warden Crist, but he had not heard whether it had been approved at the time of his deposition.

[539] This self-abuser pod was established in 1991 or early 1992 at SMU to set aside those people who had some kind of emotional disorder, not necessarily a mental illness, while they were at SMU.[540]
4. Tucson
Inmates in the Tucson facility may obtain referrals for psychiatric treatment through a number of ways. First, an inmate can write a kite or an inmate letter if he feels the need for psychiatric care. Second, the nurses or general medical providers can refer an inmate after the inmate expresses a need for care or the medical providers observe a need for care. Third, the psychologist interviewing inmates for other reasons may observe that the inmate is having an emotional problem. Fourth, when inmates are transferred from other prisons, they are evaluated on arrival or shortly thereafter if they have either a current or past history of mental illness.[541]
Inmates with histories of psychiatric illness are seen by a psychiatrist within ten days. If an inmate in the Tucson complex requests early in the week, on Monday or Tuesday, to be seen by a psychiatrist, he will be seen that week.[542] Otherwise, he will be seen the next week.[543] Priority is given to scheduling appointments with inmates who are displaying psychiatric difficulties. At the appointment, the psychiatrist determines whether the inmate has stabilized and whether he needs medical care. If the inmate needs a more comprehensive diagnostic 1521 evaluation than the psychiatrist can perform, the psychiatrist at B Ward is contacted. After *1521 consultation, the inmate most likely will be transferred to Alhambra.[544]
5. Yuma
The Yuma facility has no psychiatric services.[545] It also has no psychologists.[546] This facility is a full duty work camp with a capacity of 250 inmates.[547] Thus, inmates who need mental health services are not assigned to Yuma. If inmates with mental health problems are assigned to Yuma, they are transferred within forty-eight to seventy-two hours.[548]
C. Staffing Problems
1. Numbers and Vacancies of Staff
Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Newkirk, testified that defendants fail to provide sufficient staff to diagnose and treat the serious mental health needs of the prisoners in their custody.[549] With the exception of Alhambra, none of defendants' facilities has a full-time psychiatrist.[550]
Defendants clearly have a shortage of mental health staff. In recent years, the prisoner population has grown, and this has increased the need for psychological services.[551] In January of 1988, ADOC's prisoner population was 10,877. Four years later, in January of 1992, it had grown to 15,346.[552] As a result, the prisoner-to-staff ratio is too high to allow the mental health staff to do thorough work.[553] Caseloads are too heavy, and there is a tendency for mental health staff to "burn out."[554]
Shortages of mental health staff are found throughout the system. At the time of trial [November 1991 0907 February 1992], the position of the mental health program manager, the person responsible for mental health services throughout the Department, had been vacant since July of 1990.[555] Defendants' expert, Dr. Stellman, noted staffing shortages at some of the facilities.[556] She believes that the vacant mental health positions in the SMU, Perryville and Tucson facilities should be filled;[557] that the number of psychological associates in outlying areas should be increased; and that each major prison should have one or two more psychological associates.[558]

a. Florence
As of October, 1990, the Florence complex, excluding SMU, had no psychologists.[559] Mr. Veloz has repeatedly requested additional mental health positions for the Florence complex, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychological associates. However, at the time of trial, he had not received any of these positions.[560] In fact, 1522 since 1986, there have been no new mental health positions at *1522 Florence, except SMU.[561] Because in recent years the legislature has allocated money only for new prisons, Dr. Veloz has found himself "borrowing and stealing" staff from the budgets for new prisons.[562] During Dr. Stellman's tour of Florence, Mr. Veloz told her that the mental health staffing of the facility is "sub-average."[563] Dr. Stellman believes that Florence should have two full-time psychiatrists.[564] However, in October of 1990, the facility had one and one-sixth full time equivalent psychiatrists.[565]
As of October of 1990, there were either two or three psychologist positions vacant, and they had been vacant for over a year.[566] When Dr. Warren visited Florence, all three psychologist positions were vacant.[567] Similarly, at the time of trial, there were two psychologist positions vacant at Florence.[568]
(1) Florence SPU
SPU has a psychiatrist, psychiatric nurses, counselors, and security officers.[569] As of October 1990, there was no psychologist at SPU.[570] The psychological associates at the SPU are supervised by the doctor level psychologist. The psych associates provide orientation to new inmates about the services provided by the Mental Health Department. The psych associates run groups, do individual therapy, and ensure that inmates are not decompensating in the dorm. The psych associates also introduce the inmates to the psychiatric nurse, who does a nursing evaluation; schedules appointments for the psychiatrist; and ensures that the necessary paperwork is done so that the inmate can attend the appointment.[571] SPU also utilizes a recreational therapist at SPU, who is a certified recreation professional, to work with the lowest functioning inmates in the yard.[572]
(2) Florence 0907 SMU
Although SMU has the capacity to house 895 male inmates,[573] at the time of trial, a psychiatric social worker and a psychiatric nurse were the only mental health staff at SMU.[574] There were no psychologists.[575] A psychiatrist [Dr. Gopalan] visits SMU for three days every two weeks. This schedule is such that there are nine consecutive days when he is not at the facility.[576]
Mr. Hanson, the psychiatric nurse, believes SMU needs two psychologists.[577] Turnover is "pretty high" among 1523 mental health staff at SMU.[578] Mr. Hanson is sometimes unable to do formal rounds because of *1523 the
demands on his time.[579] Shortly before trial, the psychiatrist line at SMU was decreased from one and a half days a week to one day a week, as the Rynning unit was demanding more staff time.[580] When Dr. Stellman visited SMU, Dr. Pushkash, a psychologist, told her that the psychiatric coverage at the facility needs to be increased to three days per week.[581] Dr. Gopalan and Dr. Menendez, both psychiatrists, agree that sixteen to twenty hours per week would be a minimum for conscientious coverage.[582]
(3) Women's Unit
The Florence women's facility has one half day a week of psychiatrist time.[583] It is not clear whether the women have access to a psychologist.[584]

b. Tucson
The Tucson facility has four or five institutional psychologists as part of its mental health staff.[585] Tucson also has one half-time psychiatrist, Dr. Busfield.[586] Dr. Busfield visits the Tucson prison Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday of one week and then Tuesday and Friday of the next week.[587] By contrast to the Tucson facility, Dr. Stellman testified that the Penitentiary of New Mexico, with only about 1,000 prisoners, has two half-time psychiatrists.[588] Dr. Stellman believes that a facility the size of Tucson should have a full-time psychiatrist.[589]
Numerous vacancies exist in Tucson. Except for an eight-month period, the Tucson facility has not had a psychiatric nurse since at least October of 1990.[590] There is a Ph.D. psychologist position that has been vacant for over a year.[591] Another psychologist position had been vacant for a year and a half, but was filled in approximately November of 1991.[592]
Dr. Stellman also noted that there were some mental health positions that were frozen; she believes these positions should be unfrozen and filled.[593]
c. Douglas
The Douglas facility, which houses 1,957 inmates,[594] is visited by a psychiatrist, Dr. Centric, approximately one day a month, although sometimes more than a month elapses between his visits.[595] Dr. Centric, gives orders for prescriptions over the telephone.[596] He does no therapy at Douglas, except in the sense of psychopharmacologic management.[597] This arrangement was characterized by the Douglas Facility Health 1524 Administrator as a "band-aid."[598] Prior to *1524 1990, there was no psychiatrist at Douglas at all.[599]
Douglas has no Ph.D. psychologist. There is such a position, but it has never been filled.[600] Psychological associates should not treat patients without the supervision of a Ph.D. psychologist.[601] ADOC policy also requires that psychological associates be supervised by a Ph.D.-level psychologist.[602] Although the psych associates are now supervised by a Ph.D. psychologist,[603] until recently the psychological associates were supervised by Steven Sloboda, who does not have Ph.D. in psychology.[604]
d. Perryville
As of October 23, 1990, Perryville had three psychologists and one psychologist vacancy.[605] At that time, the San Pedro Unit had no psychologist, only a psych associate.[606] Dr. Cassady, a psychologist at Perryville, believes a psychologist should be available to the San Pedro Unit.[607]
In October of 1990, the psychiatrist position at the Perryville facility had been vacant for approximately eighteen months.[608] The position was finally filled effective December 31, 1991, after being vacant for two and a half years.[609] Because Perryville did not have a full-time psychiatrist at the time of her evaluation, Dr. Stellman expressed concern that, if a prisoner were acutely mentally ill, it might be necessary to initiate treatment or a transfer based on a verbal order, or based on the judgment of the general medical physician.[610] Dr. Stellman believes that the Perryville facility needs a psychiatric nurse and a full-time psychiatrist and that a psychiatrist working only two days a week is not adequate.[611] Perryville gained a psychiatric nurse position in the summer of 1991.[612]

When Dr. Lang was a psychologist at Perryville, he was not able to see all the prisoners who asked to see him. [613] It was also difficult to have prisoners evaluated for the mental health ward at Alhambra because of the lack of psychiatric staff.[614]
e. Winslow
The Winslow facility, with a capacity of 1,321 inmates,[615] has no psychiatrist.[616] Rather, a psychiatrist [Dr. Busfield] visits the facility once a quarter. In the interim, prescriptions for psychotropic medications are written by 1525 a nurse practitioner.[617] On *1525 his visit to the facility in January 1991, Dr. Busfield saw 60 prisoners in two days.[618] Before January of 1991, Winslow had no access to a psychiatrist at all. Rather, patients were seen by a nurse practitioner.[619] According to Dr. Newkirk, a psychiatrist should visit on at least a monthly basis, in order to prescribe and monitor psychotropic medications.[620]
Inmates with serious mental illness should not be classified to the Winslow facility.[621] At the time Dr. Stellman toured, Dr. Busfield was touring the state and pulling mentally ill prisoners to the four main prisons of Tucson, Florence, Perryville and Phoenix.[622]
2. Impact of inadequate staffing
Defendants admit that they have requested further staff and could function better with those staff.[623]
As a result of inadequate staffing, defendants fail to meet the serious mental health needs of prisoners. For example, a prisoner at Tucson had his treatment discontinued after seeing a psychologist weekly for two months. The record indicated that the psychologist had to stop seeing him because of a drastic increase in the psychologist's caseload.[624] Another prisoner, who had a long history of mental health problems and treatment, was unable to be followed monthly by a psychologist while he was at the Winslow facility.[625] An inmate at 1526 Santa Maria in Perryville *1526 was unable to see the psychiatrist for some time due to the psychiatrist's caseload.[626]
Dr. Newkirk found inadequate programming at the Special Program Unit because of a lack of staff.[627] Dr. Newkirk believes that SPU needs more staff in order to provide more intensive programming such as one-on-one counseling and group therapy.[628] The mental health staff of the SPU are not separate from that of the rest of the Florence complex. Staff at SPU are responsible for delivering mental health services throughout Florence, with the exception of the SMU.[629] SPU has been short-staffed, in part because SPU staff were diverted to other units in the Florence complex.[630] The treatment team briefings log indicated that staff were performing duties in other units, for example, doing psych (psychiatrist) line in CB6.[631] This limits the ability to have groups and intensive one-on-one therapy.[632] Further, prisoners are excluded from groups because they are full.[633]
Because of high prisoner-to-staff ratios, SPU mental health staff have had to develop a triage (priority) system. [634] Except for a crisis intervention program, there is no 24-hour mental health coverage at SPU.[635] SPU always has a waiting list for admission.[636]
Due to staff shortages at Baker and Flamenco, the ADOC is sometimes unable to have the maximum number of prisoners assigned to those facilities.[637]
The lack of mental health staff at Douglas results in delays in treating prisoners and a lack of follow-up services. [638] Mr. Sloboda has repeatedly requested additional mental health staff.[639] Dr. Stellman believes that the staffing at Douglas is not adequate to deal with the serious needs of mentally ill prisoners.[640] In April of 1991,

Dr. Busfield identified five prisoners at Douglas who were seriously mentally ill and should not be housed at that facility.[641]
D. Delays in Assessment and Treatment
Prisoners with serious mental health problems experience delays in receiving treatment that are potentially dangerous and cause the prisoners to endure unnecessary psychological pain. Dr. Stellman testified that, 1527 optimally, assessments by mental health professionals should be done by the next day *1527 when a prisoner complains of hearing voices or complains of feeling anxious, tense, or about to explode.[642] A person with serious mental health complaints should be seen within a few days of making complaints.[643]
1. Delays in Commitment to a Mental Hospital
Prisoners in need of commitment to a mental hospital have experienced prolonged delays in being transferred to a state hospital. Plaintiffs presented the following examples of delays in commitment to a mental hospital:[644] In 1991, a prisoner at Perryville was in lockdown for two months in a four feet by four feet cell. The prisoner was only allowed out of the cell one hour per day in cuffs and chains. However, the prisoner was not transferred to the state hospital for two months until April of 1991.[645]
In another instance, Dr. Fernandez indicated that a female inmate at Perryville-Santa Maria needed a transfer to a mental hospital on March 1, 1988, but the patient did not receive a transfer until April 12, 1988.[646] Part of the time prior to transfer, the patient was kept in lockdown.[647] At the time the patient was finally admitted to the state hospital, she was reporting paranoia and had active hallucinations and delusions.[648]
In another instance with the same inmate on March 8, 1989, the staff indicated that there was a plan to transfer the patient as an involuntary admission to the Arizona State Hospital.[649] The patient was paranoid, with grandiose illusions and had severely impaired insight into her illness.[650] The patient was not transferred but two months later placed in lockdown for eleven and one-half months.[651] She was not admitted to the hospital until April 27, 1990.[652]
In a third instance with the same inmate, Dr. Pera noted plans on May 28, June 4 and June 11 to commit this patient to the state hospital. On June 5, Dr. Pera signed an affidavit that she was a danger to herself and others, but she was not committed until August 1, 1991.[653] It took up to a week or two for this patient to be seen by a psychiatrist while she was in lockdown.[654]
On July 11, 1990, a male inmate in Central Unit was found to be delusional and staff were attempting to get him to Baker Ward for treatment.[655] On July 27, 1990, he was still in the Central Unit on watch swallow and waiting to be seen by Dr. Busfield on August 9, 1990.[656]
2. Delays in Evaluation and Treatment by a Psychiatrist
At Tucson, it may take several days to a week for a prisoner to be seen by a psychiatrist.[657] This delay does not appear to be unusual. Plaintiffs presented numerous examples of inmates who requested mental health care, but provision of that care was delayed:
In October and November of 1990, an inmate in SMU filed a series of grievances asking to see a doctor. In one 1528 grievance, he indicated that he was hearing voices and that *1528 they were giving him headaches. In three
other grievances, he indicated that he had an immediate need to see staff. Staff responded to all four grievances by telling him to see the nurse at sick call.[658]

In another instance, the records of a prisoner at Winslow show an intake examination noting a history of mood instability.[659] On February 20, 1991, he asked to see a psychiatrist.[660] On March 20, 1991, his records note that a consult from Dr. Springer, a psychologist, was reviewed, and that he was scheduled for Dr. Busfield's next visit.[661] On April 14, 1991, medical staff received a call from security staff that the prisoner was acting strangely; he said there was something in his room, and he was hiding in the corner. The LPN referred the inmate to a provider for a consultation for his paranoid ideation. On the same date, eighty-nine pills were confiscated from the prisoner.[662] On April 15, 1991, the medical unit received a call from a psychological associate, who said Dr. Springer felt that the patient was going to "go off." The staff on the same day received another call from security staff indicating that the prisoner was complaining of anxiety and "going crazy," and was asking to see the psychiatrist. Security staff was advised to contact psychology; it was noted that the prisoner would be seen by a psychologist that day.[663] A note on April 17, 1991 stated that the prisoner was being followed by Dr. Springer. Later the same day, security called to say that the prisoner had threatened to hurt himself. The medical unit advised security staff to monitor the prisoner's behavior and advise the medical staff if there was any change in behavior.[664]
Another inmate at SPU was seen by a psychological associate on approximately July 17, 1990, who indicated that the prisoner wanted to see a psychiatrist. The prisoner denied suicidal intent or ideation. The prisoner had a history of treatment for depression. The prisoner was subsequently transferred to the Central Unit at Florence, where he again requested to see the psychiatrist for depression. He had great difficulty receiving treatment until Dr. Lutz intervened.[665]
In addition, plaintiffs presented the following examples through the inmate grievances:[666]
On January 30, 1991 a female inmate at Perryville Santa Maria Unit was told that too many patients were in the psychiatrist's caseload and the psychiatrist could not see the prisoner for "some time."[667]
In another instance, on September 12, 1990, a prisoner at the Perryville Santa Maria Unit reported that she was experiencing a family crisis and was falling apart, and that she wanted to see someone before the scheduled appointment in three weeks. The staff responded that the patient would remain on Dr. Pera's list. The appointment that had been made was for the "soonest time available."[668]
On March 20, 1991, another prisoner at Perryville, Santa Maria indicated that she wanted to be seen as soon as possible because her medications were not helping her depression and she was in a destructive state of mind. In response, a staff member indicated that Dr. Pera had not been at the facility and he was behind in his caseload, with "many, many" patients who needed to be seen before the prisoner who filed the grievance. The grievance 1529 response further *1529 indicated that Dr. Pera would try to get to the prisoner in two weeks if possible.[669]
On March 31, 1990, another Santa Maria inmate complained of problems sleeping and feeling really stressed and like she was "going off" after her prescription was discontinued. On April 27, 1990, the grievance response directed the prisoner to see the nurse at sick call to be referred to the unit psychologist or psychiatrist.[670]
On July 19, 1990 a prisoner at Perryville-Santa Maria filed a grievance asking for an appointment with a psychiatrist. She filed a second kite on August 6, 1990. On August 8, 1990, she was told she was on Dr. Pera's psych line for an appointment. On August 20, 1990, she was scheduled for an appointment with Dr. Pera.[671]
In another case, on April 9, 1990, a prisoner at Santa Maria requested to see Dr. Fernandez, stating that she was depressed and wanted her prescription renewed. On April 27, 1990, the grievance response indicated that she was scheduled to be re-evaluated in the "near future."[672]
E. Inappropriate Use of Lockdown Facilities

1. Use of Lockdown as an alternative to mental health care
The SMU and CB6 in Florence are not mental health facilities, but rather are maximum security lockup units.[673] Neither SMU nor CB6 are appropriate for the seriously mentally ill because they have insufficient programming for psychotics or those with major depressions.[674] According to Dr. Stellman, it is inappropriate to house an acutely psychotic prisoner in segregation facilities such as CB6, SMU and the women's detention unit at Perryville for more than three days.[675] The only time it is appropriate to put a suicidal or self-abusive prisoner in isolation cells in a non-treatment facility is if it is an emergency, there is absolutely no other place to put them, and they are there for only a short time with a maximum of twenty-four to forty-eight hours.[676] Dr. Pera recognizes that people have objected to the use of lockdown for mental health patients, but states that "economic conditions are such we cannot seem to change the system."[677] Dr. Fernandez, the clinical director for the ADOC Psychiatric Hospital for men (Baker Ward), indicated that lockdown damages people rather than helping them.[678]
Seriously mentally ill prisoners are routinely assigned to SMU and CB6 and placed in detention or isolation cells in non-mental health facilities throughout the ADOC for longer than three days. Isolation is used throughout the ADOC for prisoners with acute mental health problems. Dr. Schwegler, the Facility Health Administrator at Douglas, indicated that prisoners have been put in lockdown and retained there for five to seven days, awaiting transfer to the mental health facility in Phoenix.[679]
a. Female Inmates
Female prisoners exhibiting mental health problems necessitating psychiatric intervention are assigned to 1530 lockdown at the Santa Maria Unit in Perryville and retained for more than three days. Examples of such *1530
lockdown include inmate Legg,[680] Brown,[681] Caltevedt,[682] Bloomfield,[683] and Martinez.[684]See also, Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808. Dr. Pera, the psychiatrist responsible for providing psychiatric services at Perryville testified that he sees approximately seven to eight women in lockdown per week.[685] He only sees people in lockdown who are put there because of mental health problems.[686] Some of these are women with significant mental illnesses who are in need of hospitalization.[687]
b. Male Inmates
(1) CB6
CB6 is frequently used to house acutely mentally ill prisoners for longer than three days. Plaintiffs presented numerous examples of seriously mentally ill inmates housed in CB6 including inmates Munk, Mitchell, Brown, Honeycutt, Johnson, Tucker and Autrey:
On April 11, 1989, in Central Unit, Inmate Munk was placed on ten-minute watch in a holding cell and stripped after threatening to eat light bulbs.[688] On April 12, 1989, Inmate Munk was placed in isolation and stripped. He was "still hostile; smearing feces; and jumped on an officer." He was then sent to CB6.[689] On April 14, 1989, Munk was seen by Dr. Pera in CB6. Dr. Pera determined that he was still a behavior problem and should be seen again.[690] On April 17, 1989, Munk was still in CB6, "in observation" with "no change."[691] On April 18, 1989, Munk was still in CB6 and Dr. Pera placed him in four points and released him when he took his medication.[692] On May 10, 1989, Munk was still in CB6.[693]

On September 21, 1989, Inmate Mitchell was on seclusion watch in an observation cell in CB6. He "denied hallucinations or suicide ideations but [was] still very hyper." The notes indicated that the inmate would remain in CB6 until he calmed down.[694]
In another instance, records for October 10, 1989 indicate that Inmate Brown was in CB6, was given a shot of Prolixin by Dr. Pera, would remain at CB6 until "more stable" and then the Admission Team would reevaluate. [695] On October 13, 1989, Inmate Brown was in CB6 where he remained delusional ["Brown remains 1531 delusional; appears the same and a little less mellow; Dr. Pera *1531 will see today, needs to be seen daily."]. [696] On October 17, 1989, Brown was brought back to SPU from CB6.[697]
On November 22, 1989, Inmate Honeycutt, while in Central Unit, cut himself seriously and was hospitalized at Maricopa Medical Center. However, he was refused admission to Baker Ward (Alhambra) for psychiatric evaluation and returned to Central Unit where he was placed on isolation and transferred to CB6. Inmate Honeycutt remained in CB6 until December 2, 1989 when he was sent to Flamenco for 72 hour evaluation.[698]
In CB6, on March 21, 1990, inmate Johnson was "delusional, out of contact with reality,"; and was being monitored by mental health staff.[699]
In May of 1990, inmate Tucker was decompensating in SPU. He had rambling speech, was disoriented and was wandering around lost. Tucker was sent to CB6, where he remained for five days.[700]
Inmate Mike Autrey was found dead from hanging in a cell in CB6 on December 27, 1989. He had made several suicide attempts in the past while in the custody of the ADOC, but was never admitted to Baker or SPU for more intensive evaluation or treatment.[701] He was placed in CB6 or SMU when he made these suicide attempts rather than receiving more intensive treatment.[702] There were times when he refused treatment; however, no psychiatrist ever recommended he go to any treatment facility.[703] He was followed by mental health and a psychiatric nurse had seen him and requested he be placed on the psychiatrist's line, but he had "adamantly" refused.[704] Although the psychiatric nurse had identified a need for him to see a psychiatrist, this was not forced on him. Perhaps if that had been done, he would not have committed suicide.[705] The general standard in recommending involuntary hospitalization is whether a person is a danger to self or others.[706] The department, under its own policies, could have involuntarily hospitalized him.[707]
(2) SMU
Seriously mentally ill prisoners are also housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU). Examples of such 1532 inmates include inmates Barge;[708] Gooden;[709] Arvizu;[710]*1532 Verheim;[711] Jones[712] and Trotter.[713]
Mr. Veloz indicates that there are people who are not appropriate for Baker and Flamenco and cannot function in SPU because they are too assaultive and present management problems. These inmates probably would be assigned to SMU.[714]
Defendants also house self-abusive prisoners in SMU. From her review of records, Dr. Newkirk, identified the following self-abusive prisoners who were inappropriately housed at SMU:[715]
Ralph Lara had a history of swallowing razor blades. He had been in and out of isolation cells and lockup cells because of his self-abusive behavior.[716]
William Morrows had been at SPU and CB6, and had to be isolated on several occasions because of his selfdestructive behavior, which staff believed to be secondary to his psychiatric history.[717]

Frank Bartholic was a self-abusive prisoner housed at SMU.[718] He was placed in a holding cell and shackled because he threatened to harm himself.[719] Mr. Bartholic was put in lockdown on at least four occasions in 1989.[720] On one occasion, he was kept in lockdown for three and a half days.[721]
On December 7, 1989, Mr. Sanchez swallowed a piece of a razor blade. Medical staff refused to have him brought to the health unit; instead, they told the officer to check for blood.[722] Two weeks later, Mr. Sanchez cut himself on the chest.[723] The following month he tried to cut himself and was moved to the holding cell; he was heard saying that the Devil was talking to him.[724] On July 29, 1990, he cut his neck with a razor.[725]
Another inmate, Mr. Estrada, cut himself four times within a three-month period.[726] He also set fires in his cell. [727] He was seen by mental health after some, but not all, of these incidents.[728]
1533 Other such self-abusive inmates include inmate Hinds, Barge, Villareal, Mendez, *1533 Deutsch, and Jones.[729]
When a prisoner circulates in and out of the holding cell, it indicates that the prisoner has a psychiatric problem that is not being adequately addressed.[730] It is also disruptive to the functioning of the unit, because prisoners in holding cells are often placed on a 10 or 15-, minute watch, and the programming of the prisoner is disrupted. [731] Mr. Bartholic is an example of a prisoner who circulates in and out of the holding cell[732] because his behavioral problem is not being addressed. His record shows that a decision was made that he only needed to be seen by mental health when in a crisis, so the psychiatrist stopped seeing him on a regular basis. Nothing has been done in a treatment modality to decrease the self-destructive behavior.[733] Thus, Mr. Bartholic has attempted suicide four times while in ADOC custody; the last three of these attempts took place while he was housed at SMU.[734]
Defendants know that SMU is not suitable for self-abusive prisoners.[735] In late 1990 or early 1991, a pod for self-abusive prisoners was established at SMU. However, that pod has no mental health staff assigned to it.[736] Moreover, Mr. Hanson, the SMU psychiatric nurse, does not know "whether there is any real specific programming provided for it, other than the fact that it gets more individual attention."[737]
Prisoners who continue to have serious mental health problems are discharged from Baker Ward and sent to SMU. Johnny Johnson, a prisoner who swallowed razor blades, lacerating his esophagus, was returned to SMU with a discharge summary of "very, high risk of suicide."[738] Another prisoner, Hanlon, jumped off a rail on the second floor with a rope around his neck. The suicide attempt was unsuccessful because the rope broke. Dr. Gopalan indicated the inmate had a history of serious suicide attempts, a volatile bipolar disorder, was a chronic suicide risk, and needed placement in licensed mental health facility such as B Ward or Flamenco.[739]
The mental health staff at SMU refer prisoners to Baker, when they "decompensate and become quite disturbed," 1534 and to SPU. However, pursuant to Director Lewis' policy, prisoners living in urine and feces for two or *1534 three
days are no longer allowed to go to Baker Ward.[740] Moreover, not all prisoners referred to SPU and Baker are accepted.[741] When accepted, inmates still may have to wait in SMU for more than three days before transfer. [742] Inmate Simpson is an example of a prisoner who had to wait for his transfer. He was referred for admission to SPU on May 4, 1990. On May 9, 1990, Mr. Hanson called SPU and indicated the prisoner was acting "very strange." On May 17, 1990, Mr. Simpson was still in SMU, with a plan that he be moved to SPU that day.
(3) Other facilities
There are other facilities that improperly house seriously mentally ill prisoners in lockdown. In North Unit, in September of 1989, Inmate Oliveras was "acutely psychotic; responding to auditory and hallucinatory ideations." Dr. Pera decreased medication and sent the inmate to Central Unit isolation on a ten-minute watch.[743] On March 2, 1991, Inmate Weathersby was in Winslow lockdown unit and exhibiting bizarre and self-destructive

behavior including urinating on cell floor, flooding the cell and cutting his wrists. He was not transferred to Alhambra until March 6, 1991.[744]
There are also self-abusive prisoners inappropriately housed at other facilities including inmate Thomas who was housed at Douglas, inmate Honeycutt who was housed at Central Unit and CB6, inmate Smith who was housed at Winslow, inmate Maxwell who was housed at CB6 and inmate Bronkinson who was housed in Tucson detention.[745]
F. Problems Prescribing Medication
1 Monitoring of Medication
Plaintiffs allege that ADOC fails to appropriately monitor the prescription of psychotropic medication. A patient on psychotropic medication should be seen by a psychiatrist on a monthly basis to review the prescription.[746] Dr. Stellman does not know of an ADOC policy that requires patients on psychotropic medications to be monitored. [747] Pursuant to ADOC Policy 704.1, a psychotropic prescription is valid for only sixty days.[748] The HSB Monthly Activity Reports for Safford for 1989 and 1990 indicate that patients are prescribed or continued on psychotropic medications without a face-to-face evaluation by a psychiatrist, because the reports show a larger number of prisoners on psychotropic medication than the number of prisoners seen by a psychiatrist.[749] Similarly, the HBS Monthly Activity Reports for Ft. Grant for 1989 and 1990 indicate that patients at that institution 1535 are also prescribed or continued on psychotropic medications *1535 without a face-to-face evaluation by a psychiatrist.[750]
The same practice exists at Winslow[751] and Douglas.[752] At Winslow, psychological associates, who are master's level mental health providers, call Dr. Menendez to prescribe Thorazine. Dr. Menendez prescribes Thorazine based on these conversations without evaluating the patient in person. Plaintiffs presented the following example: On November 29, 1990, staff responded to a prisoner grievance at Winslow regarding the failure to monitor patients on psychotropics by indicating that "[b]oth ASPC-W Health Services and HSB are aware of this problem. We are both trying to recruit a psychiatrist for ASPC-W and are in touch with a psychiatrist in the Phoenix area institutions for consultation. DOC psychiatrists are presently developing guidelines concerning the prescribing of psychotropic drugs and for evaluating non-drug needs of inmates in the mental health area."[753]
2 Delays in receipt of Medications
Inmates experience delays in the receipt of prescribed psychotropic medication. The following are examples of such delays:
In February of 1990, a patient at the Central Unit had psychotropic medications ordered but did not receive them for a month.[754] On March 27, 1989, prescriptions at SPU for several medications expired but no physician could be located to renew the prescriptions.[755]
A prisoner saw Dr. Fernandez at Perryville-Santa Maria on December 27, 1989. As of January 31, 1990, she had not received a prescription. She was told she would be rescheduled for Dr. Fernandez' next visit to Santa Maria on February 19, 1990.[756]
A patient transferred to Perryville-Santa Maria indicated in a grievance that she had not received her prescription from ACW. In response to the patient's grievance, she was told on November 9 that the medication had been ordered and she was placed on a psych line for an appointment with Dr. Pera.[757]

On August 8, 1990, a prisoner filed a grievance indicating that the medication had been received, but in the wrong dosage. The staff subsequently responded that he was now receiving the correct dosage prescribed by Dr. Pera.[758]
On April 4, 1989, a prisoner at Perryville-Santa Cruz was told, in response to a grievance, that "there is no guarantee that the prescription will be delivered at the time due to varied circumstances in our environment."[759]
Prisoners who were transferred may be without their medications for a period of time. If an inmate is transferred from one facility to another, such as from Alhambra to SMU, and the inmate is on medications, in order to maintain the continuity of care, a psychiatric nurse sees the patient then makes an assessment.[760] For example, if someone comes into SMU on a Friday afternoon, he probably will not receive his medication until Monday.[761]
3 Discontinuing medications without face-to-face interviews
Defendants sometimes discontinue a prisoner's psychotropic medications based on a laboratory report that the level of medication in the prisoner's blood is low, without conducting a face-to-face interview with the prisoner. 1536 [762]*1536 It is important to monitor blood levels for inmates taking psychotropic medications to ascertain whether the dosage is in the therapeutic range or is toxic.[763] The other use of blood level monitoring is to check on compliance with the medication to see if someone is really taking the doses that are prescribed.[764] It is important for the mental health professional to know whether an inmate is really taking his psychotropic medication because it affects the safety of all the people in the population.[765] Blood level monitoring is an acceptable practice both in and out of a correctional setting in the areas of psychiatry.[766] In some situations, it is appropriate to discontinue psychotropic medications based on low blood levels.[767]
Discontinuing medication based solely on blood levels is not appropriate because a number of factors can cause blood levels to vary.[768] For example, other medications the prisoner is taking can distort the blood levels, as can the functioning of the patient's liver.[769] In particular, blood levels for antipsychotic drugs are not reliable. [770]
Before taking a prisoner off psychotropic medication, the mental health staff should look at the prisoner's clinical functioning.[771] If a prisoner's blood level is low, and the practitioner suspects the prisoner may not be taking the medication, there are alternatives to stopping the medication. For example, the prisoner can be watched while taking the medicine, or it can be given in liquid or injection form.[772] In any event, psychotropic medication should not be stopped for noncompliance unless the noncompliance is, documented in the chart, the prisoner's behavior is under control, and the practitioner has had a face-to-face interview with the prisoner.[773] Dr. Stellman agreed that in her own general practice she would not discontinue medication without seeing the prisoner.[774]
The practice of discontinuing psychotropic medications based on blood levels, without a face-to-face interview, has caused mentally ill prisoners to decompensate. Plaintiffs presented the following examples of inmates who decompensated after their medications were discontinued based only on blood levels.
Mr. Ezell was a prisoner at Douglas with a history of swallowing razor blades.[775] He was taking Thorazine, but based on his blood levels, the psychiatrist suspected he was not taking the medication, so it was stopped, without having Mr. Ezell actually seen by a psychiatrist.[776] He was placed on a suicide watch, and was eventually transferred to Douglas.[777] There is no indication that the psychiatrist offered to give Mr. Ezell his medication in 1537 injection form, to alleviate any *1537 concerns about possible hoarding.[778] Mr. Ezell's medication was later reinstated.[779] Dr. Stellman testified that the doctor's actions in this case were warranted based on the fact that Mr. Ezell had a history of swallowing razor blades and on one occasion he overdosed on a psychotropic

medication while at Flamenco.[780] In addition, Mr. Ezell was placed in an observation cell so he could be watched closely by mental health.[781]
Mr. Rossi, a prisoner in CB6, had been seen by mental health for some time, and was taking medication for tension and irritability.[782] He had previously been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic.[783] His prescription was discontinued based on low blood levels. By the time Dr. Newkirk saw him, he was complaining of being quite tense and irritable.[784] After the prescription was discontinued, mental health staff did not evaluate Mr. Rossi to determine if he was able to function without the medication.[785] Ten days after the medication was stopped, a physician noted Mr. Rossi's agitation, and prescribed Benadryl.[786]
Dr. Stellman testified that Mr. Rossi's medical chart indicated that he appeared to be a management problem rather than a mental health illness.[787] According to Dr. Stellman, the treatment plan was to begin to decrease the medication and reevaluate the inmates.[788] Despite full levels of antipsychotic medication, blood levels repeatedly returned as below therapeutic, indicating that Mr. Rossi was not taking his medication.[789] Despite the low blood levels, Mr. Rossi was not evidencing acute mental illness or decompensation. Thus, Dr. Stellman believed that he did not need the drugs.[790] Further, after discontinuation of his medication, Mr. Rossi was seen by a psychiatrist on September 13, 1990.[791] There was no indication in the medical chart to indicate that Mr. Rossi was suffering from a psychotic illness upon discontinuation of his medication.[792]
Dr. Newkirk also reviewed the record of Mr. Villario in CB6. According to his record, he had had psychotic episodes and been out of touch with reality, sometimes to the point of smearing feces on the wall.[793] On one occasion, the physician suspected that he was not taking his medication; a blood level was ordered, and when the result was low, Mr. Villario's prescription for Navane was discontinued.[794] Approximately two weeks later, he began to complain of hearing voices, and appeared to be psychotic. He was then placed on Thorazine.[795]
G. Equal Protection
1538 Defendants do not provide female prisoners with mental health facilities and programming *1538 comparable to those offered to male prisoners.
1 B Ward
There are no facilities for the involuntary committment of women in ADOC such as the Baker Ward for men.[796] While male prisoners can be committed involuntarily to Baker Ward, an ADOC psychiatric hospital, until recently ADOC had no facility to which females could be committed involuntarily.[797] Thus, women would be committed to the Arizona State Hospital (ASH), where they would remain for a very short period before being returned to prison, where they would often be placed in lockup. Dr. Garabedian characterized this as a "vicious cycle." Due to a recent statutory change, female prisoners can now be committed either to ASH or to G-ward.[798] This statutory change took effect in September 1991; both Dr. Garabedian and Executive Assistant Director Stewart lobbied for its passage.[799] Although the female inmates can now be involuntarily committed to Flamenco, it does not provide the higher level of care provided in Baker Ward, which is a licensed psychiatric hospital.
2 Flamenco
Flamenco is designed to provide psychiatric treatment and custody to prisoners who are acutely disturbed and/or psychotic and require voluntary placement in a correctional psychiatric setting.[800] Flamenco has three wards for male prisoners. Each of these wards serves a different purpose; K is the acute unit, J is sub-acute, and I is the "functional" unit.[801] At Flamenco, male prisoners can progress from the J to I ward and then into SPU or

general population. The purpose of this phase program is to provide each prisoner the care appropriate to his needs, and to encourage improvement in the prisoner.[802]
There is only a single ward at Flamenco for female prisoners. G-ward was opened in May or June of 1990.[803] Before that time, there was no facility at Alhambra for women with serious mental illness. Rather, ADOC staff would petition to have such persons committed to the Arizona State Hospital (ASH).[804] G-ward "gets uncomfortable" when its population reaches sixteen or seventeen; its average census is fifteen or sixteen, although it has gone as high as eighteen.[805]
The programming available to women in G-ward is markedly inferior to that available in the male wards at Flamenco. For example, the men have a large occupational therapy area with various kinds of equipment; the women receive occupational therapy in the unit, and a limited amount of supplies can be brought to the unit.[806] Men have many more opportunities for occupational therapy than women.[807] Occupational therapy is important for the mentally ill, as it helps improve socialization with peers.[808] There are other inequalities in the programming offered to men and women at Flamenco. These inequities are clear from the mental health activity reports. For example in April of 1990, men were offered basketball, volleyball, computer training, communication 1539 training, stress management, *1539 anger control, work crew, and current events. Women were offered aerobics. [809] In June of 1990, men were offered computer training, basketball, walking, volleyball, work crew, values training, and basic hygiene. Women were offered board games, movies, and "Women Who Love Too Much".[810]
3 SPU
There is no progressive unit or level system for women as there is for men at Florence SPU.[811] The principle of the level system for men is to house prisoners with similar levels of functioning in the same unit; by contrast, Gward may house a mixture of levels, ranging from those who are actively psychotic to those who are ready to enter general population.[812]
The Special Program Unit (SPU) is a special living unit where mentally ill prisoners are housed, and specially trained staff provide mental health programming. Some prisoners, who would have difficulty living in general population, are placed in SPU long-term; for others, it is an acute, transitional unit.[813] However, SPU is a male unit; there is no similar facility for female prisoners.[814] Women who need SPU-type care may be treated in Gward.[815] Thus, for example, if a male prisoner at Florence had some kind of breakdown, he would be sent to SPU. However, if a female prisoner were in the same situation, there would really be no place to house her pending an evaluation; she would probably be placed in isolation.[816]
Conversely, chronically mentally ill women who are stabilized while on G-ward go back to general population; similarly situated men may go either to population or to SPU. Mr. Garabedian testified that "we have one more option with the men."[817] According to Dr. Newkirk, after being stabilized in a Baker-type unit, it would be important for a prisoner like H.B. to be placed in an SPU-type unit.[818] Dr. Newkirk opined that she needs longterm chronic care, but such care is not available for women in ADOC.[819] There are other examples of female prisoners, including Ms. Cordra and Ms. Velah, who would be appropriate candidates for an intermediate care facility, if one were available.[820]
4 Impact
The consequences of the lack of equivalent mental health facilities for women are illustrated by the case of H.B. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808. Rather than receiving treatment for their mental illness, female inmates are locked down in the Santa Maria Unit in Perryville. Id. For ten years, the defendants have neglected to treat H.B.'s severe mental illness [schizophrenia, chronic, paranoid type]. Rather, her treatment has followed a pattern of lock-down for prolonged periods of time with denial of mental health

treatment during lock-down. As a result, her mental condition deteriorates and she is eventually transferred to Flamenco or ASH. When her condition is under control, she is released to general population and again locked 1540 down, sometimes within 24 to 72 hours.[821] Defendants have placed her in *1540 lock-down to punish her for behavior that was a result of her mental illness; failed to monitor her medications; and failed to transfer her to ASH when mental health staff recommended transfers.[822] The mental health care system at Santa Maria is inadequate to meet her needs because it lacks staff so that she can be seen by a psychiatrist or psychologist, especially in lock-down.[823]
V. POST-FILING CHANGES
This lawsuit was filed on January 12, 1990. Since that time, the defendants have taken numerous steps in an attempt to remedy the following specific problems identified by plaintiffs:
A. General Medical/Dental Care
In the latter half of 1990, a Quality Assurance Medical Committee was established to audit the various facilities. [824]
Before May of 1991, Mr. Norrish, the Health Administrator at Florence, was responsible for the entire complex. In May of 1991, that position was divided, so that two persons now share the work previously performed by Mr. Norrish.[825]
Mr. Charles, Facility Health Administrator at Perryville, began holding bi-weekly meetings with key contact people in early 1991.[826] Monthly meetings between Perryville health staff and security staff began after Dr. Warren's visit to the facility in connection with this litigation.[827]
In approximately December of 1991, Dr. Scalzo, chief of dentistry, began holding bi-weekly telephone conferences with the dentists under his supervision.[828]
(a) Improvements in sick call/medical care
The defendants developed the self-referral sick call system in response to the scarcity of nurses, which threatened to force a further reduction in sick call.[829] The system was developed in late 1990 or early 1991. [830] Defendants implemented the program in the Central and Rynning Units at Florence in approximately April of 1991.[831] The self-referral system was scheduled to be implemented at SMU in January of 1992.[832] Mr. Norrish testified that provisions for illiterate or non-English speaking prisoners to use the self-referral system were established within the two month immediately preceding his testimony in January of 1992. This program is a pilot project that has not been formally developed into policy.[833]
The Tucson facility established 24-hour on-site registered nurse coverage in November of 1991.[834] That facility also began providing a neurology clinic on January 30, 1992.[835]
The ADOC promulgated Division Order 255, effective September 4, 1990, regarding dental classification, and 1541 treatment plans. This document sets forth maximum waiting periods for prisoners with various dental *1541
needs.[836]

(b) Continuity of care guidelines
The defendants developed continuity of care guidelines in early 1991. As a result, when a prisoner is transferred providers at the receiving facility now temporarily follow orders from the sending facility (on such matters as orthodontic devices and shaving waivers) until the chart and the patient are reviewed.[837]
In 1991 or 1992, the ADOC sponsored legislation that would require county facilities to provide the ADOC with a prisoner's medical record when that prisoner is the custody of the ADOC.[838]
(c) Staff
In January of 1991, Jeanette Turner, director of nursing, received permission to hire ten nursing assistants at Florence, and six at Winslow.[839] The nursing assistants perform time-consuming clerical tasks that would otherwise be done by nurses.[840] Nursing assistants were hired at Florence in early 1991.[841] The nursing assistant program is a pilot program.[842] To pay for the nursing assistant positions, Director Lewis ordered that vacant nurse positions be frozen, thus decreasing the effectiveness of this innovation.[843]
Effective November 15, 1991, ADOC nurses are paid time and a half for working overtime, in an effort to encourage the nurses to work when the Department would otherwise be required to hire registry nurses.[844]
In October or November of 1991, the Executive Assistant Director researched the possibility of having ADOC prisons designated as serving an "underserved population" in order to be eligible to participate in a program in which medical providers repay their student loans by working in prisons.[845]
In November of 1990, Dr. Lutz was planning to initiate a staff orientation program in the first half of 1991.[846]
A Facility Health Administrator began work at the Winslow facility in November of 1990.[847] The Winslow facility gained a psychiatrist in January 1991.[848]
The Perryville facility hired an additional dentist in June of 1990, thus increasing dental services.[849]
(d) Preventative care/chronic illness/education
As of November of 1990, a state-wide AIDS education and care program was becoming final.[850]
On June 26, 1990, Dr. Lutz sent the facility Health Administrators a memorandum on prevention and control of tuberculosis.[851]
1542 At the time of trial, health staff at the Florence women's facility were revising the *1542 recall system for pap smears, attempting to "get it a little more caught up to date."[852]
In early 1991, the ADOC began requiring that every prisoner receive a dental examination with intake.[853] In December 1991 or January of 1992, the ADOC began distributing a handout on dental care to all prisoners at the reception center.[854] The ADOC began showing educational videotapes regarding dental care at Tucson in 1990.[855]

B. Mental Health Care
In September and October 1990, defendants promulgated four major documents governing mental health care, including the Alhambra/Flamenco Treatment Program (9/1990), the Mental Health Services Manual (9/1990), the Staff Training Manual (10/1990) and the Training and Development Manual (19/1990).[856]
In late 1990, defendants established the policy requiring mental health staff to follow up when a prisoner fails to pick up his or her unit dose of psychotropic medication.[857]
In approximately April of 1991, Dr. Busfield was identifying mentally ill prisoners throughout the system and having them reclassified and transferred to Florence, Tucson, or Perryville. He found five seriously mentally ill prisoners in Douglas who should not have been at that facility.[858] The purpose of this process was to move mentally ill prisoners to facilities where they would have greater access to trained staff, including psychologists, psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses.[859]
Effective January 1, 1992, all ADOC psychologists have been consolidated under the Health Services Bureau. [860] Previously, psychologists had been assigned to two different divisions in ADOC.[861]
In 1990, SMU implemented the residential program for emotionally disturbed prisoners with a levels system.[862]
Defendants have removed the "socialization chair" from the Special Program Unit (SPU), and discontinued its use.[863] Formerly, prisoners were placed in this chair and sometimes restrained.[864]
Defendants have discontinued use of the behavioral control area or "pens" at SPU. These were outdoor fenced areas adjacent to one of the dormitories, and contained no toilet facilities or equipment of any kind.[865] Prisoners were placed in this area for various reasons.[866] Dr. Newkirk was critical of the pens. She was especially concerned about prisoners being placed there in mid-day because the pens afforded no shelter from the sun and most psychotropic medications increase sensitivity to sunlight.[867] She also stated that prisoners in 1543 the pens should have *1543 access to water and toilet facilities.[868] Indeed, at least one prisoner appeared to suffer adverse health consequences while in the pen.[869] The behavioral control area was eliminated shortly after the deposition of Esteban V. Veloz, Mental Health Coordinator at Florence.[870]
Conclusions of Law
I. 8TH AMENDMENT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAIMS
Plaintiffs allege that the medical, dental and mental health care systems violate the inmates' eighth amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
In order to prevail on a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of inadequate medical care in violation of the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must establish "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.[1]" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291-92, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). The indifference must be substantial to violate the constitution. Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986). Generally, mere claims of "indifference," "negligence," or "medical malpractice" do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980). Nor does a difference in medical opinion amount to deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989); Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.1981) (difference of opinion between patient and medical authorities).

Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). However, a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985). A delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment unless the delay caused substantial harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1335. In cases in which the system's constitutionality is at issue, deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners may also be "evidenced by repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff" or by "proving there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care." Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82 L.Ed.2d 885.

The Ninth Circuit set forth the eighth amendment standards for physical, dental and medical care systems in Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir.1982) as follows:

1544

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care. Prison officials show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs if prisoners are unable to make their medical problems known to medical staff. [Citation omitted] Access to the medical staff has no meaning if the medical staff is not competent to deal with *1544 the prisoners' problems. The medical staff must be competent to examine prisoners and diagnose illnesses. It must be able to treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can. Such referrals may be to other physicians within the prison, or to physicians or facilities outside the prison if there is reasonably speedy access to those other physicians or facilities. In keeping with these requirements, the prison must provide an adequate system for responding to emergencies. If outside facilities are too remote or too inaccessible to handle emergencies promptly and adequately, then the prison must provide adequate facilities and staff to handle emergencies within the prison. These requirements apply to physical, dental and mental health.

Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.

Courts may consider expert opinions to determine the constitutional requirements. However, such opinions do not ordinarily establish constitutional minimums. See, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543-44, n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876, n. 27, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, n. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

Officials can be held liable for their failure to implement a proper mental health care program or failure to adequately train or supervise subordinates. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir.1990).[2]

A. Medical and Dental System

1. Problems with the Medical and Dental Care Systems

Plaintiffs have established that defendants have numerous problems with the medical and dental care systems within the Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs argue that these problems rise to the level of deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical and dental care needs.
a. Staffing

One of the most significant problems with the medical and dental care system is the inadequate number of medical staff, exacerbated by the vacancies in staff positions. Defendants are unable to obtain a sufficient number of staff positions from the Legislature. In addition, defendants are unable to find qualified individuals to fill those positions. Defendants are aware of the shortages of staff, as they have acknowledged such shortages in

budget requests to the Legislature. In one instance, Director Lewis stated in a letter regarding the budget request for 1989-1990 that:

The Bureau of Health Services was funded 13% short in the area of Personal Services. This equates to a $1.4 million deficit from full funding. In order to keep within the funding limitations, 55 full-time health positions will have to remain vacant for the entire fiscal year. Keeping 55 positions vacant may place the department in a legally indefensible position as far as constitutionally and statutorily mandated inmate health care is concerned. As examples:

*Sick call at several institutions has been reduced from five days a week to three days a week as a result of frozen nursing positions.

* * * * * *

*Dental emergency waiting time at Florence has increased to several days due to a frozen dentist position.

*Psychiatric services at Perryville and Florence are performed by three staff psychiatrists who are unable to meet the demand for their services. These institutions have two psychiatric positions that are frozen.

Director Lewis further stated that:

1545

We will not accrue vacancy savings which have been used in the past to offer *1545 salary incentives that are so necessary in hiring health professionals. As an example, in July we were unable to employ a physician and dentist at the Florence complex due to the lack of funding for the positions and the special salary rates that would have been required to pay these professionals.

Relevant to mental health care, Director Lewis stated:

Currently the limitation in staff at Flamenco and the Psychiatric Hospital limits the number of inmates that can be effectively treated. Authorizing funding for three CPO positions at the Psychiatric Hospital, will allow us to increase the census from the current level of 21 to approximately 38. In addition, authorizing funds to fill positions assigned to Flamenco will allow us to increase the census from the current level of 46 to its maximum of 125.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232.

This lack of staff results in delays in the assessment and treatment of inmates medical and dental needs. Generally, such delays must result in substantial harm to rise to the level of an individual constitutional violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1335. Plaintiffs did not establish injury to all of the inmates as a result of those delays. Yet, defendants should be aware that each instance of delay in care due to lack of staffing could rise to the level of a constitutional violation if the inmate suffers serious harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1335. Further, such repeated examples of delays or negligence may result in constitutional violations. Wellman, 715 F.2d at 272.

Since the filing of this action, defendants have acquired additional staff and filled some of the vacant positions. However, the problem of inadequate numbers of staff still exists. Both plaintiffs' and defendants' experts testified at trial that the defendants still needed more medical staff. Defendants admit that they could provide better care with additional medical staff. Further, although they have increased the numbers of staff since the filing of this action, there is no guarantee that those positions will remain funded.

b. Security involvement in Medical/Dental Care

A second very significant problem with the provision of care is the extent of security involvement in the provision of medical care. Security staff have inappropriate roles in the medical care system, including conducting health

and welfare checks on seriously ill inmates without the supervision of medical personnel. In addition, when no medical staff are on duty, security staff are forced to make medical judgments. Security staff also have the authority to overrule medical orders. Finally, in some instances, security staff interfere with access to medical care. Such interference can rise to deliberate indifference so that a constitutional violation occurs. Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537-39 (11th Cir.1990); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir.1986); Lewis v. Cooper, 771 F.2d 334, 336-37 (7th Cir.1985).
c. Sick Call System
Prison officials must provide a system of "ready access to medical care." Deliberate indifference exists if prisoners are unable to make their medical problems known to staff. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. Defendants provide care through a sick call system. The sick call system, except for the pilot programs, has numerous problems. First, it discourages use because inmates must stand in line for long periods of time. If the inmates leave the line, they lose their chance to see the nurse. In some facilities, inmates must reveal their medical problem either within hearing of other inmates or in writing on a list that other inmates may read.
Since the filing of this action, defendants have established a pilot program to remedy many of the problems enumerated by plaintiffs in the sick call system. This revised sick call system is effective in portions of the Tucson and Florence facilities. Defendants state that they intend to expand this pilot program throughout the Department of Corrections. The expanded program allows sick call to be conducted at least five days a week. In addition, 1546 inmates were giving good reports on the pilot program. It appears that expansion of the pilot sick call program *1546 throughout ADOC would resolve many of the problems with the current sick call system.
d. Care Provided Through Outside Providers
The ADOC uses outside providers for specialty care. The constitution requires that such referrals to outside care be "reasonably speedy." Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
At the time of filing of this action and prior to the new policy for referrals, there were "frequently unacceptably long waits for specialty care" for inmates with significant medical conditions. Thus, specialty referrals were not "reasonably speedy." The delays set forth by plaintiffs ranged from a one month delay for a serious gynecological problem to a sixteen month delay in a referral to a dermatologist for an inmate with a history of skin cancer. One inmate lost his eyesight due to diabetic retinopathy because of the lack of follow-up on specialty appointments. These delays resulted in constitutional violations. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
Delays in referrals to outsider providers existed because (1) the department only contracted for specialists when enough inmates were referred; (2) appointments were cancelled because of funding or transfer of inmates to other facilities and (3) defendants lacked a procedure or policy by which they could determine when the referral had been completed.
At the time of trial, pursuant to a new policy, outside referrals were prioritized on a one through three system with a maximum of eight weeks between initiation and the patient being seen by the outside provider. It appears that the new policy will eliminate most of the problems that existed with the prior system for outside referrals.
e. Chronic Care/Preventative Care
Prior to the filing of this action, defendants had no system to manage the chronically ill inmates and provide preventative care. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the defendants' management of chronically ill inmates was not "optimal." Since the filing of this action, defendants have established a limited tickler system for chronic and preventative care in the Cimarron Unit in Tucson, and the Rynning and East Units in Florence. Defendants state that this system will eventually be established throughout the system.

f. Continuity of Care within the System
Prior to the filing of this action, defendants had no guidelines to ensure that inmates' medical care treatment continued when the inmates were transferred to other facilities. Since the filing of this action, defendants established procedural guidelines to ensure that inmates' care is continued when they are moved from facility to facility. Pursuant to this policy, inmates should continue to receive their medical treatment, including shaving waivers, prescriptions and special orthodontic devices, upon transfer to another facility.
g. Infirmaries
Defendants have no infirmaries for women and only one small infirmary at Florence for men. Therefore, inmates either remain in the hospital longer than necessary or fairly sick inmates are returned to general population.
2. Constitutionality of the Medical/Dental Care System
The provision of care generally within the medical/dental care system at the time of trial did not rise to a level of deliberate indifference to the serious medical/dental needs of the inmates. However, at the time of the filing of this lawsuit, defendants were deliberately indifferent to the inmates' serious medical and dental care needs and the medical and dental care systems were unconstitutional. Inmates were unable to make their medical problems known to medical staff because of the lack of staff and insufficient number of sick call days. Further, because of the staff shortages, inmates care was delayed. The majority of the components of the system that make the system constitutional are added staff, policy changes and pilot programs implemented since the filing of this 1547 action.[3] Should defendants *1547 eliminate the pilot policies or not expand those policies state-wide as testified at trial or eliminate or freeze staff positions gained since the filing of this action, defendants would be providing care that is unconstitutional because such care would be deliberately indifferent to the serious medical/dental needs of the inmates. Further, if the prison population continues to increase without increases in the numbers of medical and dental staff, defendants' system will violate the constitutional minimum standards because the defendants will lack the staff to treat inmates.
This Court commends defendants on their revisions of the system since the filing of this lawsuit. However, as a general rule, voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make a case moot. Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1985). The case is only moot if "it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 854; Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir.1991). Based on past experience with the ADOC, this Court cannot be assured that defendants will continue to implement the new programs and staff the facilities after the termination of this case. Further, with the history of the funding situation within the state and the current state of budget cuts, the Legislature is unlikely to appropriate additional funds for the ADOC. For these reasons, this Court cannot say "with assurance" that there is no "reasonable expectation" that the alleged violations will recur. Rather, it is likely that the constitutional violations will reoccur. Thus, the Court has the authority to monitor the medical and dental care systems for a reasonable period of time to assure that the department implements the pilot programs statewide and provides sufficient staff to treat the inmates' serious medical needs. Id.
B. Mental Health Care System
1. Problems with the Mental Care System
Plaintiffs have established numerous problems with the mental health care system provided to inmates by the ADOC. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of these problems, the mental health care system is inadequate to treat the serious mental health care needs of inmates.

a. Intake Procedure
ADOC lacks a system and the psychiatric staff to identify and evaluate female inmates with serious mental illnesses when those inmates come into the system. Thus, at the Perryville Santa Maria Unit, unqualified security staff must identify seriously ill inmates so that they may receive treatment.[4]
Defendants have also implemented a policy that provides for reviews of inmates' medical records upon transfer to other facilities. However, such reviews are not routinely performed due to shortages of staff. Therefore, seriously mentally ill male and female inmates do not receive treatment until they request treatment or regress to the point that security staff recognize the illness or lock them down for the behavior caused by the mental illness. Thus, mentally ill inmates are unable to make their problems known to staff and their constitutional rights are violated. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
b. Staffing Problems
Defendants fail to provide sufficient mental health staff to diagnose and treat the serious mental health needs of inmates. The experts agreed that shortages of mental health staff existed within the facilities. Alhambra is the only facility that has a full-time psychiatrist. The facilities also lack an adequate number of psychologists. SPU lacks sufficient staff to consistently provide all of the programs to the inmates that need such programs. The staff shortage has also resulted in no 24-hour mental health coverage at SPU. Further, there is always a waiting list of 1548 inmates for admission to SPU. *1548 Because of inadequate numbers of staff, the existing staff cannot adequately treat inmates and their constitutional rights are violated. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
The staffing problem exists partly because the Legislature will not fund positions and partly because ADOC has vacancies in positions that have been funded. Defendants admit that they have requested further staff and could function better with those staff. However, lack of funding is not a defense to eighth amendment violations. Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir.1991).
c. Programming for Mentally Ill Inmates
ADOC provides insufficient mental health programming at SMU. At the time of filing of this action, little or no programming existed at SMU. At the time of trial, more programming existed. However, programming for mentally ill inmates at SMU is still insufficient. The levels system behavioral modification program is implemented by security officers who are untrained both in mental health care and in the program they are implementing.
d. Delays in Assessment and Treatment
Inmates with serious mental health needs experience unacceptable delays in assessment and treatment. Assessments by mental health professionals should be made within a few days of an inmate's complaint of hearing voices or feeling anxious, tense or "about to explode." Because of staffing shortages and inadequate policies, such assessments are rarely made by mental health personnel. Rather, inmates' mental health care is consistently delayed. Inmates experience delays assessment, treatment and in commitment to mental hospitals (Baker Ward for men or ASH for women). When inmates act out because of their mental illness, they are locked down. While in lockdown, inmates generally wait months for transfer to the mental hospital. In addition, it may take several days to a week for inmates to see a psychiatrist.
e. Inappropriate Use of Lockdown
Rather than providing timely mental health care to inmates with serious mental illnesses, defendants lock down those inmates in the higher security facilities such as SMU and CB6 for men and Santa Maria detention for

women. Yet, both the plaintiffs' and defendants' experts agreed that it is inappropriate to house acutely psychotic inmates in segregation facilities for more than three days. Further, psychiatrists employed by the ADOC, Drs. Pera and Fernandez[5] admit that lockdown damages, rather than helps, mentally ill inmates. Despite their knowledge of the harm to seriously mentally ill inmates, ADOC routinely assigns or transfers seriously mentally ill inmates to SMU, CB6 and Santa Maria lockdown. The inmates remain in lockdown for more than three days. In most cases, the inmates are locked down because of the behavior resulting from their mental illness. In addition, the inmates are locked down on orders of security rather than medical personnel. According to Dr. Pera, economic conditions prevent this system from being changed.[6] Even when inmates are referred for transfer to mental health facilities, they remain in lockdown for more than three days waiting a transfer. Defendants also discharge inmates with serious mental illnesses from Baker ward and send them to SMU. Because they are assaultive or a behavior problem, they are not eligible for treatment at SPU.
During lockdown, inmates are provided improper mental health care or no mental health care. Inmates with serious mental illnesses who have been locked down should receive almost immediate psychiatric follow-up.[7] Further, inmates that are locked down should be seen daily by a psychiatrist.[8] Daily checks by nurses are 1549 insufficient care and according to Dr. Garcia are "not treatment at *1549 all."[9] Yet, inmates in lock-down for their mental illnesses are not seen by a psychiatrist either immediately for an evaluation or daily. Rather, security staff, or possibly the nurses, perform health and welfare checks. Most of the logs from the facilities indicate that security staff performs the welfare checks on these inmates.
The most egregious example of the inappropriate use of lockdown is H.B., who was locked down for approximately 11 and ½ months in the Perryville Santa Maria Unit.[10] During that time, she was seen only nine times by the psychiatrist. During her ten years of custody, she has been locked down numerous times for her mental health condition. Yet, she has never received immediate psychiatric evaluation. During these times, she was actively psychotic and hallucinating. H.B. is not the only inmate in this condition in Santa Maria. Dr. Pera testified that at any one time there were several seriously mentally ill inmates locked down in Santa Maria.
Defendants also inappropriately house self-abusive inmates in SMU, despite their knowledge that SMU is not suitable for self-abusive inmates. Since the filing of this action, defendants have established the self-abuser pod. However, they have not established that the pod is appropriately staffed or fully operational. At the time of trial, the psychiatric nurse at SMU did not know if there was any specific programming for the unit, other than the fact that the individuals received more attention.
This use of lockdown as an alternative to mental health care for inmates with serious mental illnesses clearly rises to the level of deliberate indifference to the serious mental health needs of the inmates and violates their constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
f. Medication
Defendants do not properly monitor the prescription of psychotropic medication. Despite the expert testimony that inmates on psychotropic medication should be seen on a monthly basis, ADOC prescribes, continues and discontinues psychotropic medication without face-to-face evaluations by the psychiatrists.
Defendants also have no system or method to insure that inmates take medications. The only policy presented at trial requires the nurse to talk to the inmate to convince him or her to take the medications and then note the refusal on the chart. The policy does not require that the inmate be seen by a psychiatrist.
2. Constitutionality of the Mental Care System
The mental health care provided at B Ward, Flamenco and Alhambra meets the serious mental health needs of inmates. If defendants had adequate staff to provide all of the programs at SPU,[11] the mental health care would meet the serious mental health needs of the male inmates incarcerated in that facility. Unfortunately, SPU also lacks staff and the capacity to house all of the inmates that qualify for such care.

However, the overwhelming evidence establishes that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to the serious mental health care needs of the inmates in other institutions throughout the state. Seriously mentally ill inmates are housed in most[12] of the other facilities. Such inmates tend to be concentrated in the lockdown facilities of SMU, CB6 and Santa Maria in Perryville. Those facilities have inadequate mental health staff and programming 1550 for inmates. Rather than providing mental health care for these inmates, *1550 security staff lock inmates down for prolonged periods of time because of the behavior that is the result of their mental illnesses. During lockdown the inmates are provided little or no mental health care by psychiatrists or psychologists.
Because of the lack of staff and programming, inmates do not have "ready access" to mental health care. Severely mentally ill inmates cannot make their needs known to mental health staff. Untrained security staff assess inmates' mental health. Further, referrals to B Ward, Flamenco, and ASH are not "reasonably speedy." Inmates remain in lockdown for days to months waiting for transfer to these facilities. Although psychological staff request transfers, they are not consistently carried out by security staff. All of these problems result in deliberate indifference to inmates serious mental health needs such that the inmates' constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment are violated by the defendants.
The fact that the lack of staff and programming is partially a result of lack of funding from the Legislature is not a defense to these constitutional violations. Jones, 781 F.2d at 771; Harris, 941 F.2d at 1509.
The system for female inmates is even worse than for male inmates because female inmates have no SPU or transitional facility. Rather, female inmates are returned to general population and are generally locked down for behavior caused by their mental illness. Sometimes, the lockdown reoccurs within 24 to 72 hours of return to general population. Seriously mentally ill female inmates are limited to the G Ward with its 15 to 17 beds or transferred outside ADOC to ASH. Even at G Ward, female inmates receive less programming than that provided to males.
The Court finds the treatment of seriously mentally ill inmates to be appalling. Rather than providing treatment for serious mental illnesses, ADOC punishes these inmates by locking them down in small, bare segregation cells for their actions that are the result of their mental illnesses. These inmates are left in segregation without mental health care. Many times the inmates, such as H.B. are in a highly psychotic state, terrified because of hallucinations, such as monsters, gorillas or the devil in her cell.[13] Nor does it appear that H.B. is the exceptional case as seven to eight mentally ill women may be locked down at the Santa Maria Unit in Perryville at any one time and may remain there for months without care. In addition, such treatment is common for male inmates in other lockdown facilities or units in the state including SMU and CB6. The Court considers this treatment of any human being to be inexcusable and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment of the Constitution.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
Plaintiffs also allege that defendants discriminate against female inmates in the delivery of mental health care in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause states that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Thus, all similarly situated persons should be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3253, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Gender based differences require a heightened standard of review. A party seeking to uphold dissimilar treatment based on gender must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification." Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461, 101 S.Ct. 1195, 1199, 67 L.Ed.2d 428 (1981). To withstand constitutional challenges, classifications based on gender must serve as important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457, 50 L.Ed.2d 397; McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 776 F.Supp. 521, 523 (D.Nev.1991). Under this standard of review, female inmates must be treated "in parity" with male inmates. McCoy, 776 F.Supp. at 523.
1551

*1551 Defendants clearly provide, because there are fewer women in the system, fewer mental health services for women than they provide for men within the prison system. In addition, the lack of these mental health services for women result in more egregious cases of deliberate indifference to the women's mental health needs.
For men, defendants provide a psychiatric hospital within the ADOC. Women are given access to the ASH, which is not within ADOC. Inmates cannot remain in ASH during the period of incarceration unless they were found innocent by reason of insanity. Thus, women inmates are discharged after a short period of time, returned to general population and often again locked down. After September of 1991, women inmates can be involuntarily committed to G Ward. However, it is not a psychiatric hospital.
At Flamenco, men are provided more advanced programming and facilities than women. Men can progress in a phase program from the acute unit to the sub-acute unit and then into SPU or general population. Women of all levels are treated in G ward. Men have better access to occupational therapy with more equipment and supplies. In addition, mental health activities logs indicate that men are offered more substantive programs such as computer training, communication training, stress management and anger control. However, at the same time, women are offered aerobics, board games, movies and "Women Who Love Too Much."
ADOC also has the SPU progressive unit for men, but no comparable unit for women. Thus, ADOC houses men with other men of similar levels of functioning. However, women of all levels of functioning are housed together at G Ward. As a result, chronically ill women who are stabilized are returned to general population; act out when then are provided little or no mental health care; are locked down [sometimes within 24 to 72 hours]; remain in lockdown where they decompensate and eventually, after a serious delay, return to Flamenco or ASH. Yet, chronically ill men who are not assaultive are allowed to progress back to general population, through the SPU facility. Dr. Newkirk identified female inmates that needed long-term chronic care that could benefit from an SPUtype of unit for women.
Defendants argue that the additional units, like SPU, are necessary for men because they are more predatory, and more likely to pick on weaker male inmates. However, such considerations do not justify the unequal treatment in the provision of mental health care. The Court does not consider that the different care serves any "important governmental objectives" so that the disparity could be constitutional. Clearly, the unequal treatment results in even more egregious denials of mental health care for seriously ill female inmates violating those inmates' equal protection rights under the constitution in addition to their rights under the eighth amendment.
Defendants also argue that female inmates receive the same number of beds in mental health facilities in proportion to the number of inmates within the system. However, this argument ignores the very clear differences in care and the impact of that unequal treatment.
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
"The basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). Such determination requires a balancing between the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 410, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).
Because of the lack of a constitutional mental health care system, inmates have suffered harm in the past and such harm is likely to reoccur absent injunctive relief. Because of economic conditions, ADOC will continue to lockdown inmates as an alternative to mental health care. As a result inmates' mental conditions will consistently deteriorate and they will suffer from hallucinations that seem very real and terrifying or they will harm themselves 1552 or others. Based on the continuing cycle of lack of treatment, the *1552 harm is likely to reoccur. On the other hand, the only harm to defendants is additional costs to hire staff and implement programs. However, if these inmates are provided proper mental health care, security staff should be relieved of the time consuming problems caused when inmates become violent or assaultive due to mental illness. In addition, security staff should be

relieved of the duty of performing health and welfare checks, which disrupt security duties and require that security personnel perform medical duties which they are not qualified to perform.
Because the harm and potential harm to the inmates for this lack of care clearly outweighs the harm to defendants, the Court has determined that injunctive relief is appropriate.[14]
ORDER
I. MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE SYSTEMS
The Court is aware that Director Lewis has attempted to make the changes required to eliminate constitutional violations as described in this opinion, but the Legislature failed to provide him with the requested, necessary funding to remedy those constitutional violations.[15] Thus, the Court has determined that it should monitor the medical and dental care systems to make sure that the pilot programs and changes are further implemented or remain effective and that there are sufficient numbers of staff to meet the serious medical and dental needs of the inmates.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT No later than September 30, 1993, and every six months thereafter, defendants shall file a status report regarding the implementation of the policies, staff levels and medical and dental care pilot programs state-wide that have cured the constitutional violations. The status report(s) shall explain what policies, staff and programs are currently in effect throughout the state, including the overall plan as well as detailed information relating to each unit for medical and dental care. The status report shall include such matters as numbers of prisoners per unit, numbers of staff currently hired in which positions, numbers of open positions, relevant dates and details concerning the policies and programs, including how they are administered. [16]
Plaintiffs shall have the right to contest the status report. If plaintiffs do contest the status report, defendants may be required to submit evidence to substantiate the facts set forth in the report.
II. MENTAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The court could work out a plan to remedy the deficiencies in the mental health system. However, it would be more appropriate and the Court would prefer that the parties, along with their various experts, work out the procedures and remedies to remedy those deficiencies. The parties, along with their experts and the staff and administration of ADOC know better than the Court what policies and changes will be effective solutions in the particular prisons. The court further notes that defendants cannot make such changes without cooperation from the Legislature and that attempts to provide an adequate system have been thwarted by inadequate appropriations.
The other alternative to this procedure would be for the Court to appoint a special master and/or expert. However, 1553 appointment of a special master and/or expert could *1553 result in delays and additional expenses. Therefore, it
is preferable that the parties work out the remedies.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) No later than May 31, 1993, counsel shall meet and discuss possible proposals to remedy the deficiencies in the mental health care system.
(2) No later than September 30, 1993, the parties shall jointly file a proposed plan to remedy the deficiencies in the mental health care system. The plan shall address the following issues:
A. STAFF: The plan shall provide for sufficient numbers of qualified staff to provide evaluation, diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems of inmates. The plan shall also provide for recruitment and incentives for such staff to assure that defendants are able to fill staff positions with qualified persons.

B. FACILITIES: The plan shall provide for the development of sufficient and adequate mental health housing facilities for male and female inmates who are unable to function in general population facilities to prevent their retention in segregated facilities for medically inappropriate periods of time. The plan should provide for appropriate facilities for those mentally ill inmates that are too assaultive or are behavior problems such that they are not placed in SPU. The plan should also provide for the development of appropriate seclusion rooms for special housing units, such as SPU, to assure that defendants do not revert to utilization of the socialization chair or behavior pens or transfer inmates to isolation cells in non-mental health units such as CB6, SMU or other lockdown or detention units.
C. MEDICATIONS: The plan shall include written policies for the administration and monitoring of psychotropic medications by qualified mental health professionals.
D. EQUAL PROTECTION: The plan shall provide for the development of mental health programming for women, comparable to that provided for men.
[1] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 11-12.
[2] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 11-12; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[3] Picacho is a separate facility near the Florence complex. Because the Picacho facility inmates obtain medical care from the Florence Complex, it will be considered part of the Florence facility for purposes of the medical/ dental/mental health care issues.
[4] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 15-16; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[5] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 17.
[6] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 14; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[7] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 20-21.
[8] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 21, lines 3-10.
[9] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 16; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[10] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 13; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[11] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 14; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[12] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 13; Defendants' Exhibit 950.
[13] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 21-22.
[14] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 4, lines 5-25, p. 5, lines 1-10.
Dr. Lutz received his undergraduate degree from Kent State University and graduated in 1968 from the College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery in Des Moines, Iowa. Dr. Lutz conducted a rotating general internship in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio between 1968 and 1969. For ten months, he worked in emergency room medicine in Ravenna, Ohio. He served two years in the Army and was general medical officer at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. Dr. Lutz conducted a general practice in Ohio for sixteen years and entered into an urgent care business in 1982. In 1970 and 1971, he was commanding officer of the 575th Medical Battalion and commanding officer of the 327th Medical Company, 101st Airborne Division. In 1988, Dr. Lutz became primary care provider at Perryville. Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 5.
Dr. Lutz is a member of the National Correctional Health Care Commission, American Correctional Association, the College of American Physician Executives, a diplomat of the National Boards and is affiliated with Sigma, Sigma, Phi National Honorary, and United States Medical Honorary. Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 8.
[15] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 9, line 15-p. 10, line 3.

[16] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 11, line 21 0907 p. 12, lines 6. [17] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 8, line 25 0907 p. 9, line 1. [18] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 12, line 25 0907 p. 13, lines 1-7. [19] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 43 line 18 0907 p. 44, line 1; Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [20] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 44, lines 15-21, Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [21] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 44, lines 16-17, Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [22] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 46, lines 14-19, Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [23] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [24] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 47, lines 19-22; Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [25] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [26] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [27] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 218, lines 2-7, Defendants' Exhibit 928, p. 1. [28] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 218, lines 15-23. [29] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 219, lines 19-21. [30] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 219, line 22 0907 p. 220, line 3; Defendants' Exhibit 928, p. 1. [31] Defendants' Exhibit 928, p. 1. [32] Defendants' Exhibit 928, p. 1. [33] Defendants' Exhibit 928, p. 1 and 2. [34] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [35] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [36] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [37] Defendants' Exhibit 927, p. 1. [38] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 55, line 15 0907 p. 56, line 9. [39] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 40, lines 12-13. [40] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 43, lines 13-23. [41] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 147, lines 10-11. [42] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 145, lines 19-25. [43] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 144, line 14 0907 p. 145, line 25. [44] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 176, lines 5-8. [45] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 13, lines 8-14. [46] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 14, lines 20-25; 11/26/1991 p. 76, lines 3-13. [47] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 169, lines 7-24.

[48] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 176, lines 19-21. A physician who examines a patient is in a better position to diagnose and treat an illness than a physician who simply reads a record or report. Id. p. 34, lines 6-9. [49] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 133, line 15 0907 p. 139, line 25. [50] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 141, line 13 0907 p. 150, line 18. [51] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9; Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9. [52] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 47, lines 10-16. [53] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 47, line 21 0907 p. 48, line 6. [54] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 50, line 10 0907 p. 51, line 3. [55] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 52, lines 12-16. [56] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 49, lines 2-9. [57] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 51, lines 6-19. [58] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 54, lines 1-25. [59] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 39, lines 4-10. [60] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 48, lines 18-25. [61] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 8, lines 2-5. [62] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 41, lines 3-13. [63] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 41, lines 14-23. [64] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 78, lines 18-23. [65] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 40, lines 22-24. [66] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 40-41. [67] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 147, lines 2-17. [68] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 154, lines 15-18. [69] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 128, lines 15-22. [70] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 131, lines 8-11. [71] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9; p. 461 lines 15-18. [72] Sanders testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 63, lines 5-14, p. 67, lines 8-13. [73] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9; p. 46, line 25 0907 p. 47, line 1. [74] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9; p. 47, lines 2-3. [75] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 38, lines 8-9; p. 47, lines 4-5. [76] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 46, lines 19-21. [77] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 8, lines 18-25. [78] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 9, lines 1-7.

[79] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 10, lines 22-25, p. 11, lines 1-8. [80] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 11, lines 10-15. [81] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 189, lines 10-19. [82] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 189, line 21 0907 p. 190, line 8. [83] PreTrial Statement (PTS), uncontested Fact A4. [84] PTS, uncontested Fact A5. [85] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 176, line 13 0907 p. 180, line 7. [86] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 72, line 24 0907 p. 73, line 16. [87] PTS, uncontested Fact A1. [88] PTS, uncontested Fact A2. [89] PTS, uncontested Fact A3. [90] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 29, line 14 0907 p. 30; Defendants' Exhibit 930. [91] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 24, line 24 0907 p. 25, line 2. [92] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 25, lines 2-4. [93] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 24, lines 15-21. [94] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 44, lines 6-16. [95] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 45, lines 20-24. [96] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 27, lines 14-19. [97] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 13, lines 9-19. [98] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 13, lines 13-25, p. 14, line 1. [99] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 52, lines 22 0907 p. 53, line 16. [100] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 146, lines 12-16. [101] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 42, lines 2-19. [102] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 25, lines 5-10. [103] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 195, lines 13-24. [104] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 196, lines 1-11. [105] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 24, lines 14-19. [106] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 169, lines 11 0907 p. 170, line 16. [107] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 63, lines 4-7. [108] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 63, line 16 0907 p. 64, line 2. [109] In December of 1989, while incarcerated at Winslow, inmate # 66353 began receiving treatment for uncontrollable diarrhea and a skin condition commonly associated with HIV disease. The inmate was treated numerous times. However, HIV was not diagnosed until he was seen by an ophthalmologist for blindness in one

eye. At that time, a test was ordered and the HIV diagnosis was confirmed. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 82, line 5 0907 p. 83, line 10; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264p.
[110] Inmate Thompson had a hernia detected in April of 1990. However, because of transfers to numerous prisons within ADOC, surgery consults were ordered and cancelled. When he was transferred to Winslow, a surgery consult was ordered in October of 1990 and reordered as a priority consult in February of 1991. Surgery was completed in March of 1991. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 184, lines 5-22; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 31, line 18 0907 p. 32, line 5; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287.
[111] Inmate Abernathy, while incarcerated at Florence, did not receive immediate evaluation and treatment of his eye problem; although he gave a description of a detached retina. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 87, line 2 0907 p. 88, line 17; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 202, lines 2-11; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264w.
[112] Inmate Douglas was a diabetic inmate at Perryville. The physician increased his insulin dosage on June 21, 1990. The next day, he was seen by the nurse complaining of an insulin reaction. A fingerstick blood test was done and showed low blood sugar. The nurse indicated that she would get the chart to the doctor for a chart review. However, the doctor did not review the chart for three days and did not reduce the insulin. Mr. Douglas continued to have an insulin reaction each evening and again requested that the dosage be decreased on July 5, 1990. On that day, the dosage was decreased. The dosage was decreased again a week later after continued insulin reactions. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 32, line 12 0907 p. 32, line 14; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 40, line 16 0907 p. 42, line 1; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 575.
[113] Inmate Saboria is an asthmatic patient who was confined in North Unit in Florence. On November 9, 1989, he was seen by an LPN complaining that his asthma was bad. The PA wrote a note on November 10, 1989, indicating that he would be seen in two weeks. When he was seen two weeks later, a prescription was written for him. According to Dr. Braslow, the inmate should have had an immediate evaluation to rule out bronchitis or pneumonia. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 33, line 11 0907 p. 34, line 16.
[114] Inmate Dennis, while at the Florence Women's Division, had a hysterectomy for fibroids of the uterus in March of 1990. On August 2, 1990, she saw a nurse, complaining of pain in the stomach. The nurse noted that her abdomen was large, she was having trouble breathing at night, was having chest pain and should be seen by a provider. When no provider examined her, she returned to the health unit two days later with the same complaint. She was again referred to a provider. Three days later, August 7, 1990, she still had not been seen by the provider and again returned and stated that her condition had worsened. Dr. Braslow saw her on August 8, 1990 and requested that a provider see her that day. After she was seen by a provider that day, medical attempted to make an appointment for the next available GYN clinic.
Dr. Braslow testified that after abdominal surgery a person can develop adhesions which can obstruct the bowel and that inmate Dennis should have been seen immediately and tested to rule out bowel obstruction. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 35, line 6 0907 p. 38, line 22; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264ak.
[115] Inmate Hines was incarcerated in the Central Unit in Florence when he was seen on October 23, 1989 with complaints of ear and throat pain. The nurse indicated that the left side of his face from the eyes to the neck had been hurting for about a week and referred him to the health provider with an appointment for November 1, 1989. A PA saw Mr. Hines on November 1, 1989, diagnosed inflammation of the throat and prescribed medication. Dr. Braslow felt that the inmate should have been seen earlier. Dr. Warren felt Mr. Hines care was appropriate because the November I treatment resolved the problems, but he probably should have been seen sooner than nine days after the initial health unit visit. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 48, lines 1-20; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 180, line 25 p. 0907 181, line 20 and 1/29/1992, p. 39, line 23 0907 p. 40, line 1.
[116] Inmate Wilkerson, an inmate at Central Unit in Florence had a history of heart attack, angina, asthma and chronic pulmonary disease. On April 22, 1989, he was seen by a LPN for problems breathing at night. The nurse gave him an appointment for May 4, 1989. Two days later, the inmate returned complaining of breathing problems. He was seen by a PA who prescribed medication and told him to keep the appointment in two weeks. The inmate returned to medical that day and the next day. At that time, the Nurse received telephone orders for treatment. He was not seen by a physician until May 21, 1989. On May 24, 1989, he was sent to Pinal General

Hospital. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 41, line 2 0907 p. 43, line 18. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 184, lines 1-5.
[117] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 178, lines 12-16; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 174, line 19 0907 p. 175, line 10.
[118] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1992, p. 190, lines 7-8, p. 191, lines 6-8.
[119] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 170, lines 5-7, p. 174, lines 15-19; p. 224, lines 8-13. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 43 (h), inmate kite dated 11/8/90.
[120] Braslow testimony 11/26/1991, p. 180, lines 7-12.
[121] Inmate Lasoya, while incarcerated at Perryville, was seen by the treating physician, who suspected the inmate had liver failure or acute hepatitis but did not hospitalize immediately. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1992; p. 68, line 10 0907 p. 70, line 23; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 32J; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 193, line 13 0907 p. 194, line 13.
[122] Inmate Harriss, at the Women's Division at Florence, had multiple episodes of passing out. Yet, medical did not order a blood count and evaluation by a physician. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 71, line 22 0907 p. 72, line 25; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264yy.
[123] Inmate # 67720 at Central Unit in Florence was a HIV positive inmate who complained of vomiting, aching all over and development of a rash. The inmate was not evaluated by a physician, had evaluations by a physician's assistant, mostly by telephone, and was not sent to the hospital for 48 hours. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 75, line 9 0907 p. 77, line 13; Warren testimony 1/29/1992, p. 132, line 13 0907 p. 133, line 18; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264cr.
[124] Inmate Romney at ACW was seen July 30, 1990 by a NP for abdominal pains. She had a history of operations and endometriosis and urine tests showed bilirubin in her urine. Yet, she was not evaluated by a physician, no x-ray was taken and no follow-up appointment was scheduled. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 182, line 20 0907 p. 83, line 18; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264aa.
[125] Inmate Ison, incarcerated at East Unit in Florence, had incidents of passing kidney stones over an eightmonth period in 1989 and 1990. He was not seen by a physician until March 7, 1990. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 84, line 13 0907 p. 85, line 3. At that time, there was a work-up for the reason that inmate Ison was having kidney stones. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 218, lines 3-11; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 197, line 16 0907 p. 198, line 19.
[126] Inmate Furr, incarcerated at ACW, complained of a sore throat and cough on October 4, 1990. The nurse noted "lung rales bilaterally, red throat, eardrums dull-looking and sinuses stuffed." Dr. Braslow testified that lung rales are usually a sign of pneumonia. The inmate was told to return if necessary, but was not evaluated by the NP and no follow-up was scheduled. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 85, lines 9-25; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 199, line 12 0907 p. 201, line 23.
[127] Inmate Bradford, at Central Unit in Florence is a diabetic with high blood pressure and coronary artery disease. A September 11, 1990 nurse's note indicated he reported chest pain during the night, had blood pressure of 192/108 and was referred to the health provider. He did not see the provider because he was on a job assignment. The NP wrote "no reschedule, sick call as needed." Braslow testimony 11/25/1991, p. 86, line 1 0907 p. 87, line 1; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 126, line 10 0907 p. 127, line 5.
[128] Inmate Licano was a diabetic inmate who suffered from hypertension and was incarcerated at CB6 at Florence. On August 7, 1989, the nurse evaluated him based on a complaint of chest pains. She found his blood pressure elevated and had difficulty assessing his lungs. The nurse referred him to the health provider. He complained two days later at sick call of continuing chest pain in the morning. The nurse again referred him to the provider who reviewed the chart and scheduled an evaluation for August 17, 1989. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 29, line 13 0907 p. 31, line 9.

[129] Dr. Thorburn testified that inmate Culling was at Winslow when he complained of a rash that the PA and physician described as a "textbook version" of pityriasis rosea, an early stage of syphilis. According to Dr. Thorburn, there was no evidence that a blood test for syphilis was ordered. However, Dr. Warren testified that treatment was appropriate for the rash. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 183, line 6 0907 p. 188, line 11; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 32, lines 11-18.
[130] Inmate Mendoza is a 62-year old inmate at ACW who complained of severe back pain on October 9, 1990. The nurse noted that the inmate had fallen down the stairs a couple of days earlier. The next time the NP examined her she noted an "unknown reason" for pain, gave her Advil and told her to return in one month. Six weeks later, the inmate returned and was given wintergreen ointment and Advil by the correctional medical assistant (CMA). The CMA told her to return if the symptoms increased. Dr. Braslow testified that medical should have performed a full evaluation, including an x-ray because the inmates bones could have been brittle due to her increased age. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 43, line 9 0907 p. 44, line 25; Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 178, lines 16-25, p. 38, lines 7-12.
[131] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 186, lines 9-20.
[132] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 180, lines 4-6.
[133] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 215, lines 6-10.
[134] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 220, line 67, p. 222, lines 22-24.
[135] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 193, line 4 0907 p. 195, line 3.
[136] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 203, lines 19-20, p. 204, lines 1-23.
[137] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 205, lines 1-5.
[138] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 67, 86, 129, 251ss, 258ppp, 258bn, 43dd, 50, 139; Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 154, lines 18-25.
[139] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, ef, 8b, 8e, 8g, 50.
[140] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 158.
[141] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 55, line 21 0907 p. 56, line 6.
[142] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 83, lines 11-19.
[143] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 84, lines 5-9.
[144] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 83, lines 22 0907 p. 84, line 4.
[145] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 90, lines 1-19.
[146] Just because the blood pressure is not in the inmate's medical record, does not mean that it is not done or has not been recorded elsewhere. Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 91, lines 5-21.
[147] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 104, lines 3-22.
[148] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 82, lines 8-19.
[149] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 105, lines 15-19, p. 106, lines 1-5.
[150] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 86, lines 12-19.
[151] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 83, lines 5-12.
[152] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 48, lines 25 0907 p. 49, line 3; p. 55. lines 21-24, p. 60 line 22 0907 p. 61, line 3; Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 105, lines 15 0907 p. 106, line 6.

[153] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 56, lines 5-21.
[154] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1992, p. 48, lines 12-16; p. 50, lines 3-7; p. 63, lines 17-24. (treatment of inmates with seizure disorders was substandard because the ADOC does not always utilize the optimal medication), p. 68, lines 5-24.
Dr. Thorburn's testimony regarding treatment of inmates infected with the HIV virus was based on the review of two medical records. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1992, p. 79, lines 18-20. Her opinion regarding glaucoma was based on her review of two records of inmates at Douglas. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1992, p. 104, lines 8-9, p. 109, lines 18-19. Dr. Thorburn's testimony that the Arizona Department of Corrections adequacy of physical examinations of inmates was substandard was based on her review of the records of two inmates at Tucson. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1992, p. 116, lines 2-3, 12-13.
[155] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 34, line 18 0907 p. 35, line 1; p. 52, lines 12-16; p. 64, lines 1-15; Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1992, p. 103, lines 19-23.
[156] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 91, line 22 0907 p. 92, line 10.
[157] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 86, lines 5-19.
[158] Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 75, lines 16-17.
[159] Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 76, lines 10-13.
[160] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 112, lines 3-5; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 85, lines 5-8.
[161] Thorburn testimony, 1/20/1991, p. 112, lines 12-17; 11/21/1991, p. 2, lines 9-13.
[162] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 33p, 8/10/90 progress note (ASPC-Perryville, Santa Maria; no pap smear since 1987); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 570, p. 26, 2/1/90 (last physical exam in 1979, see p. 133, been in ADOC custody since at least 1987, and p. 95, progress notes for 1983).
Dr. Thorburn found examples of unacceptably long delays between physical examinations during her inspection including (1) James Bridges, a 60 year old prisoner at Tucson, who rarely used health services except for a hernia, most recently had a physical in November 1978 and (2) George Rankovich, a 40 year old Tucson prisoner, had no physical in his chart, although he came into the system in 1985. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 116, lines 11-16.
[163] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 85, lines 1-4; Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 67, lines 4-21.
[164] Bolick testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 79, lines 137, p. 81, lines 19-25, p. 82, line 1.
[165] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 63, lines 3-17.
[166] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 64, line 16 0907 p. 65, line 1.
[167] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 65, lines 17-23.
[168] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 65, line 24 0907 p. 66, line 2.
[169] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 66, lines 5-16.
[170] Guy deposition, 10/22/1990, p. 38, lines 3-14; Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 134, lines 4-18.
[171] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 160, line 12 0907 p. 163, line 5; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 160 ACW; 163 Perryville.
[172] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 166, line 21 0907 p. 168, line 1.
[173] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 164, line 9 0907 p. 165, line 2, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 243111, 258ddd, 258cm.
[174] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 96, line 14 0907 p. 97, line 24.

[175] Inmate Robertson was a prisoner at ACW who requested a dermatology appointment upon intake in August of 1990 for a mole that she indicated had changed color. A dermatologist examined her on October 12, 1990 and recommended that she see a surgeon. An appointment was scheduled for October 24, 1990. Dr. Braslow testified that a more rapid evaluation should have occurred. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 5, line 14 0907 p. 6, line 11; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 8, lines 9-12.
[176] Inmate Harriss was a prisoner at Florence Women's Division. Dr. Williams had treated her for what he thought was a pelvic infection. On June 27, 1990, Dr. Williams referred her to Maricopa Medical Center gynecology "ASAP" because of continued bad pain. On August 8, 1990, she had not been seen. Dr. Braslow testified that such delay could have caused injury including sterility. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1992, p. 1, line 24 0907 p. 2, line 15; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 58, line 20 0907 p. 59, line 3.
Dr. Newkirk stated that the pain aggravated inmate Harriss' mental health problems resulting in her becoming psychotic. Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 156, line 11 0907 p. 158, line 7.
[177] For the same gynecological problem referred to earlier, Inmate Dennis was not seen in a hospital until September 25, 1990. The gynecologist did not perform a complete work-up until September 27, 1990, over a month after she was referred. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 40, lines 8-25.
[178] Robert Powell, while incarcerated at Winslow, experienced a sixteen-month delay in seeing a dermatologist, even though he had a history of slow-growing cancerous skin lesions. Dr. Thorburn testified that he should have been seen every six months as such delay could cause disfigurement. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 187, lines 3-6; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287g.
[179] Inmate Lamson, a diabetic in Florence Central Unit, was examined by an ophthalmologist in May of 1989, who indicated early stages of diabetic retinopathy. He was scheduled for a follow-up visit in six months. There is no evidence in the record that he was scheduled for the follow-up appointment. He was not seen until over a year later in October of 1990, when he was sent to the Maricopa Medical Center emergency room for lost vision in the left eye. The medical examination found significant diabetic retinopathy. Dr. Braslow testified that there are treatments to prevent blindness, if detected earlier. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 6, line 20 0907 p. 7, line 13, p. 233, lines 10-15.
[180] Inmate Chavez was incarcerated in Perryville when she waited over eight months to be seen by podiatry for a painful foot. Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 4, line 19 0907 p. 5, line 7.
[181] Inmate Davis was incarcerated in ACW when a pap smear on June 14, 1990 indicated possible cancer. The NP did not see the report until more than a month later, on July 30, 1990. She was referred to the dysplasia clinic on August 10, 1990 and seen October 1, 1990 for a biopsy of the cervix. Dr. Braslow testified that early diagnosis was very important for possible cancer. Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 63, line 16 0907 p. 64, line 16.
[182] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 200 lines 22-25, p. 201, lines 1-4.
[183] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 229, line 15 0907 p. 230, line 0907 24.
[184] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 229, line 15 0907 p. 230, line 0907 24.
[185] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 229, line 15 0907 p. 230, line 0907 24.
[186] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 229, line 15 0907 p. 230, line 0907 24.
[187] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 25, lines 1-10; p. 96, line 1 0907 p. 98, line 4; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 93, lines 12-15.
[188] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 70, lines 1-7.
[189] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 71, lines 4-8.
[190] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 248dd.

[191] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 248dd 8/3, 8/1989. [192] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 248dd 8/3, 8/1989. [193] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 67, lines 15-21. [194] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 68, line 25 0907 p. 69, lines 1-2. [195] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 67, lines 22-24. [196] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 68, lines 10-15. [197] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 105, line 24 0907 p. 106, line 7. [198] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 106, lines 8-10. [199] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 64, lines 5-7, p. 76, lines 6-20. [200] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 77, lines 12-19. [201] Norrish testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 67, line 11 0907 p. 69 line 3. [202] Norrish testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 71, lines 17-19. [203] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 72, lines 4-9. [204] Norrish testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 69, line 21 0907 p. 70, line 22. [205] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 10, lines 2-7. [206] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 77, lines 16-19. [207] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 9, lines 4-10. [208] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 6, lines 17-25, p. 7, lines 1-24. [209] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 78, lines 18-23. [210] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 79, lines 17-21. [211] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 77 line 20 0907 p. 78, line 3. [212] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 79, lines 3-16. [213] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 66, lines 2-6. [214] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 66, lines 6-9. [215] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 66, line 12 0907 p. 67, line 2. [216] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 68, lines 20-24. [217] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 73, lines 14-24. [218] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 80, lines 9-11; Bolick testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 79, lines 13-18. [219] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 67, lines 4-21. [220] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 68, line 25, p. 69, line 1. [221] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 70 lines 9-14. [222] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 60, lines 6-18.

[223] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 23, lines 17-25. [224] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 22, lines 11-18. [225] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 16, lines 2-3. [226] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 12, line 20-25, p. 20, lines 6-12. [227] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 20, line 19 0907 p. 21, line 6. [228] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 13, lines 4-8. [229] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 13, lines 10-13. [230] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 12, lines 1-19. [231] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 21, line 12, line 17 0907 p. 22, line 1. [232] Cory testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 13, lines 14-22. [233] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 14, lines 9-19. [234] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 73 lines 1-5; Cory testimony 1/14/1992, p. 17, lines 14-16. [235] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 73, lines 6-13; Cory testimony 1/14/1992, p. 17, lines 17 0907 p. 18, line 1. [236] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 15, lines 5-25. [237] Holliday testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 72, lines 2-7. [238] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 70, lines 17-25, p. 71, lines 1-3. [239] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 71, lines 18-23; Holliday testimony, 1/13/92, p. 64, lines 2-9. [240] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 16, lines 4-17. [241] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 72, lines 23-25. [242] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 72, line 23 0907 p. 73, line 19. [243] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 123, lines 2-7. [244] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 123, lines 7-8. [245] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 123, lines 12-14. [246] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 133, line 21 0907 p. 134, line 8. [247] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 124, lines 2-16. [248] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 125, line 24 0907 p. 126, line 13. [249] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 127, lines 1-8. [250] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 127, lines 17-25. [251] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 128, lines 5-14. [252] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 132, lines 9-19. [253] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 148, lines 14-16. [254] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 148, lines 21-23.

[255] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 133, lines 2-18. [256] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 147, line 22 0907 p. 148, line 4. [257] Braslow testimony, 11/25/1991, p. 24, lines 7-10. [258] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 128, lines 10-16. [259] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 142, lines 13-14. [260] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 145, lines 12-14. [261] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 143, lines 6-18, lines 22-24, p. 144, lines 1-3. [262] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 144, lines 7-11. [263] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 144, lines 20-25, p. 145, lines 1-2. [264] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 145, lines 15-25. [265] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 143, lines 1-3. [266] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 146, lines 6-19. [267] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 147, lines 2-17. [268] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 147, lines 21-23. [269] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 154, lines 15-18. [270] Guy testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 158, lines 15-24. [271] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 7, lines 22-25. [272] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 8, lines 2-13. [273] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 15, lines 1-5. [274] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 16, lines 23-25. [275] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 16, lines 1-7. [276] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 22, lines 7-17; p. 15, lines 13-25. [277] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 22, lines 18-21. [278] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 22, lines 22-24. [279] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 23, lines 3-13. [280] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 17, lines 1-12. [281] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 17, lines 22-25, p. 18, lines 1-4. [282] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 18, lines 5-7. [283] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 18, lines 17-25, p. 19, lines 1-25, p. 20, lines 1-7. [284] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 20, lines 23-24. [285] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/92, p. 25, lines 16-17, lines 20-22. [286] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 167, lines 22-25.

[287] Sanders testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 62, lines 7-22.
[288] Sanders testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 68, lines 20-25, p. 69, lines 1-2.
[289] Warren testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 168, lines 1-6.
[290] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, at p. 188, lines 19-24.
[291] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 191, lines 1-20.
[292] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 104, lines 3-9.
[293] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 104, lines 15-20.
[294] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 158.
[295] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 200, line 23 0907 p. 201, line 1.
[296] Riggs testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 197-200.
[297] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 33e, note 3/7/1990; Plaintiffs Exhibit 249ppp; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 250xx; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 31k, notes 10/23/1990, 11/8/1990, 11/9/1990, 11/28/1990, 11/30/1990, 12/5/1990; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24k, note 9/14/1990; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30h, note 10/1/1990; Plaintiffs Exhibit 19hh, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 574, p. 52, note 7/2/1990; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 247de; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28n, note, 10/11/1989; Hanson deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 62, line 17 0907 p. 63, line 10; Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 127, lines 6-17.
[298] Plaintiffs' Exhibits 150; 142; 146; 159; 160; 163; and 164.
[299] Plaintiffs Exhibit 117, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 50; Lewis deposition, 2/28/1991, p. 56, lines 13-22; Scalzo deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 38, lines 7-23; Guy testimony 1/8/1992, p. 165, lines 11-17; Norrish deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 75, lines 10-19; Jolley testimony 1/15/1992, p. 45, line 22 0907 p. 46, line 3.
[300] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 256c, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 256d, Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 96, lines 15-21.
[301] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28L, note 9/24/1990; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3e, 9/24/1990; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ff, note 3/18/1988, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 250ttt.
[302] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28r; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 230n; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19aaa.
[303] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 26, line 8 0907 p. 27, line 16; See also, Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 107, lines 1-19.
[304] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 72; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249xx; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 262ggg; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(1); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36j.
[305] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 236, lines 13-19, p. 237, lines 4-10; See also Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36j.
[306] Braslow testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 10, lines 10-14.
[307] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 118, lines 17-25; See also, Findings of Fact in Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1809 (consolidated into this case).
[308] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 105, lines 17-22.
[309] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 578, 199, 284H, 28q.
[310] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28g, 31c, 31h, 32f, 309, p. 73-74, 564, p. 131-132; 574, p. 58.
[311] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29y, 33k, 592, p. 012856, 012855, 012854; 90; 284B, p. 1, 284C, 284D, 284G; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 29, lines 15-21; p. 116, line 15 0907 p. 120, line 22.

[312] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 24, lines 22-25, p. 25, lines 1-10.
[313] See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28h, notes 3/5/91, 3/7/91 (Florence-North prisoner experienced one-month delay between expiration of special diet and renewal); note 11/8/89 (low sodium diet not renewed for three weeks); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 32q, diet form 10/24/90, note 10/24/90 (Perryville prisoner had bland diet ordered in September 1990, but it was not received); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 254ak (Winslow-Coronado prisoner complains that he is not receiving low fat, low cholesterol diet; staff responds that Service America staff have received warnings and been disciplined, and that diets are being reviewed and updated); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 258g (SMU prisoner not receiving soft diet); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 259k (error in special diet of Florence-East prisoner); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 261t (FlorenceCB6 prisoner on bland diet given food items not called for by that diet); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 62mm (Florence-Central prisoner erroneously taken off bland diet list).
[314] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 24, lines 22-25, p. 25, lines 1-10. Plaintiffs presented testimony of Frank Bartholic to support their position. However, the Court found Mr. Bartholic's testimony to be not very credible. In addition, Plaintiffs' Expert Dr. Thorburn testified that the care provided Mr. Bartholic did not fall below the appropriate standard of care. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 204, lines 12-15. Plaintiffs also presented testimony of Donald Johns. Johns testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 77 p. 78, lines 9-15. However, the evidence does not establish that Mr. Johns did not receive his special diet. Thorburn testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 67, line 24 0907 p. 68, line 5; 12/18/1991, p. 96, lines 3-13; Hughes testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 130, line 1 0907 p. 136, line 14.
[315] Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5f and 5g (ACW sick call sign-up sheet requires prisoners to write their specific medical problem, and the prisoners sign in serially); Plaintiffs' Exhibits 10, 11, 12 (Perryville sign-up sheet with column for complaint); Abernathy testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 160, lines 20-25, p. 161, lines 1-25, p. 162, line 1 (at the South Unit in Florence, prisoners would line up for sick call outside in front of a window, and when they got to the window, they would tell the person inside their medical problem. While standing in line, inmate Abernathy was able to hear other prisoners describing their problems).
[316] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 149, lines 9-10.
[317] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 227, lines 15-18.
[318] Scalzo testimony, p. 123, lines 12-18.
[319] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 194, lines 17-25.
[320] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 202, lines 12-17.
[321] Scalzo testimony, 2/28/1992, p. 2, lines 8-10.
[322] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 206, lines 17-20.
[323] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 207, lines 1-8.
[324] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 211, lines 11-24.
[325] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 214, lines 11-15.
[326] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 216, lines 1-8.
[327] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 207, lines 17-21.
[328] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 5, line 19 0907 p. 9, line 20; p. 22, line 17 0907 p. 23, line 1; p. 24, lines 4-20.
[329] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 51, lines 17-24.
[330] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 199, lines 9-11.
[331] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 11-12.
[332] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 13-14.

[333] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 16-17. [334] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 14-15. [335] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 17-18. [336] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 18-19. [337] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 20-21. [338] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 201, lines 19-20. [339] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 202, line 21 0907 p. 203, line 1. [340] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 203, lines 11-17. [341] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 203, lines 3-5. [342] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 203, lines 6-9. [343] Scalzo deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 27, line 25 0907 p. 30, line 7. [344] Scalzo deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 32, lines 21-23. [345] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 284G, ASPC-Florence, [346] Weekly deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 18, lines 13-14, 22-24, p. 35, line 24 0907 p. 36, line 8. [347] Weekly deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 38, lines 5-8. [348] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 204, lines 11-21. [349] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 203, line 22 0907 p. 204, line 2. [350] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 204, lines 5-8. [351] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 207, lines 24-25. [352] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 229, lines 24-25, p. 230, lines 1-5, 7-13. [353] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 229, line 24 0907 p. 230, line 13. [354] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 69, lines 17-25, p. 70, lines 1-3; Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 135, lines 2-4. [355] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 209, lines 7-25. [356] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 211, lines 4-10; See also Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 32, line 12 0907 p. 33, line 19. [357] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 228, lines 13-21. [358] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 241, lines 7-15. [359] Adu-Tutu testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 54, lines 15-23. [360] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 208, lines 1-14. [361] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 209, lines 4-5. [362] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1990, p. 207, lines 11-14; p. 208, lines 7-9. [363] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 209, lines 16-25.

[364] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 208, line 22 0907 p. 209, line 3.
[365] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 227, lines 17-20.
[366] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 227, line 24 0907 p. 228, line 1.
[367] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 228, lines 1-4.
[368] Cory testimony, 1/14/92, p. 17, line 1 0907 p. 19, line 19.
[369] Scalzo testimony, 2/28/1992, p. 3, lines 2-12.
[370] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 119, lines 8-10.
[371] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 229, lines 3-14.
[372] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 230, line 19 0907 p. 231, line 2.
[373] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 47, lines 2-5.
[374] Scalzo testimony, 2/28/1992, p. 3, line 24 0907 p. 4, line 1.
[375] Scalzo testimony, 2/28/1992, p. 52, lines 21-25.
[376] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 25, lines 13-28.
[377] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 112, lines 7-11.
[378] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 163, lines 12-23.
[379] Thorburn testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 26, lines 5-9.
[380] Thorburn testimony, 1/20/1991, p. 134, line 23 0907 p. 135, line 1; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 78, line 10 0907 p. 80, line 8 (two to three months, although in deposition he said two months).
[381] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 587, p. 011485, Supplement 1991, p. 7 (prisoner at CB6 was referred to dental services for treatment of chipped filling in right upper molar on April 27, 1990 and was not seen in dental until April 15, 1991); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 230m (Director Lewis chronicled a four-month delay in being evaluated by a dentist after prisoner requested appointment, and another four-month delay between that appointment and the next appointment. He indicated the long time between appointments was because Papago prisoners were scheduled at Douglas dental clinic once per week, and emergencies take priority over routine appointments); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 247dc (prisoner seen by Dr. Shah for treatment of gum disease on 12/15/89, was on list for cleaning and by March 4, 1990 cleaning still had not been done); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2520b (prisoner requested dental services on February 28, 1990 and March 15, 1990 and appointment was scheduled for June 19, 1990); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 255ba (due to the long list it takes several months to get an appointment for cavities).
[382] Sanders deposition, 4/8/1991, p. 36, lines 4-7.
[383] Sanders testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 72, lines 12-25.
[384] Sanders testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 74, lines 10-12.
[385] Pamela McQuillen was a prisoner at Florence Women's Division, when she was seen by Dr. Beard on March 7, 1989. At that time, he determined she had caries and gingivitis and indicated she should be scheduled as a medical priority for restorations. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 593, p. 13801. On August 4, 1989, Dr. Shah did a scaling, gave oral hygiene instructions, and indicated that during the next visit he would do fillings. On December 29, 1989, Dr. Shah filled two teeth and indicated he would do more fillings the next visit. Shah testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 13, lines 6-8. Dr. Shah called her back in July 1990, filled two more cavities and indicated there would be a third visit scheduled for two more fillings. Shah testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 13, lines 8-18; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 593,

1991 supplement, p. 28, note 7/5/90. The last two fillings were done in November of 1991, when the teeth were causing the inmate pain. Shah testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 20, lines 2-5.
[386] While incarcerated in Tucson in August of 1987, inmate Davis had the first step of a root canal. His next dental appointment was January 13, 1988. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 130, lines 1-5. At the January 13, 1988 appointment, the dentist noted infection in the tooth subjected to root canal therapy, "irreversible pulpitis." Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 130, lines 5-11. Three months later, in April of 1988, the dentist put a post in the tooth. This was the last root canal treatment. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 131, lines 2-6. After the tooth split in March of 1990, the dentist extracted the tooth. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 131, lines 7-8.
[387] Lonnell Johnson, a prisoner at Douglas, had a root canal initiated in August 1987. Six months later, in April of 1988, the dentist noted an abscess in the tooth with the initiated root canal and treated the abscess for a month. In July of 1989, the dentist indicated in the record "incomplete root canal treatment." The root canal was completed in August 1989 0907 two years after it was begun. Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 131, line 3 0907 p. 132, line 9; Johnson testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 19, line 14 0907 p. 20, line 19; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 589 (dental record), p. 12031, notes 10/7/87, 4/11/88, 4/18/88, 4/22/88, 5/22/88, 9/12/88, p. 12032, notes 7/5/89, 8/14/89.
[388] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 38, lines 18-19.
[389] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 134, lines 20-22.
[390] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 38, lines 22-25, p. 39, lines 1-7.
[391] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 39, lines 8-21.
[392] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 43, line 22 0907 p. 44, line 2; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 582, p. 009797 (61), note 7/23/90.
[393] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 44, lines 2-5; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 582, p. 009762(51), note 8/9/90.
[394] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 44, lines 87.
[395] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 44, lines 18-22.
[396] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 44, line 22 0907 p. 45, line 1.
[397] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 45, lines 2-6; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23f.
[398] Braslow testimony, 11/26/1991, p. 45, lines 6-8; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23f, dental chart.
[399] Thorburn testimony, 1/20/1991, p. 133, lines 13-23.
[400] Thorburn testimony, 1/20/1991, p. 133, lines 24-25, p. 134, line 1; Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 130, lines 6-16 (prisoner should have been examined).
[401] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 567, dental record, note 10/31/85 ("O").
[402] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 42, line 24 0907 p. 43, line 2; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 567, note 12/7/85, dental record.
[403] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 53, lines 2-6.
[404] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 567, note 12/23/87, dental records.
[405] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 567, note 4/3/88, dental record.
[406] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ff.
[407] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 567, note 11/16/88, dental record.
[408] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 64, lines 15-20; Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 239, line 3 0907 p. 240, line 12.

[409] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 240, line 24 0907 p. 241, line 2.
[410] Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 64, lines 20-22.
[411] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 238, line 23 0907 p. 239, line 1.
[412] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 239, lines 16-18.
[413] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 236, lines 1-8.
[414] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 236, lines 9-11.
[415] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 236, lines 1-25.
[416] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 237, lines 20-22.
[417] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 238, lines 20-25.
[418] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d (prisoner complained of pain on 10/17/90 and name was put on the dental list; on 12/10/90 the nurse noted she spoke with the dentist who said the prisoner would be seen in a week); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 31i (on 8/19/86 prisoner complained of tooth pain, and a cavity in tooth # 14 was noted; the tooth was extracted on 3/18/87 after developing an abscess); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 38a (prisoner seen in dental on 11/15/90 for complaints of back teeth hurting and treatment started; kited dental on 11/23/90 with complaint of continuing pain and response indicated that he would be scheduled for restorative work and seen again in dental on 1/25/91); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 247ds (three grievances, 4/25/89, 6/14/89, 6/25/89 and the response indicates name is on the "high priority list and will be scheduled in the near future." Director Lewis' response to an appeal indicated prisoner was seen 8/30/89 and further work is scheduled). There was no expert testimony regarding these delays.
Based on the ruling on the motion in limine, these grievances are admissible to establish the defendants' response to the plaintiffs' complaints. They are not admissible for the truth of the inmates' complaints.
[419] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 231, lines 3-14; Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 116, lines 20-23 (findings from the physical examination were not regularly given); p. 127, lines 18-25 (no evidence that dental problems identified at intake were treated). Cf. Shah testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 13, lines 13-25, p. 14, lines 1-2 (even if he knows a prisoner needs fillings, he does not schedule them for a return appointment; the prisoner must request an appointment); Weekly deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 33, lines 7 (no system in place to assure that a prisoner who is receiving dental treatment at one institution and needs additional treatment, but is transferred, gets that treatment at the new facility; prisoner must request dental services at the new facility).
[420] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 128, § 4.3.1.
[421] Shah testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 4, lines 14-19.
[422] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 23, line 24-p. 24, line 6.
[423] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 47, lines 20-24; Thorburn testimony, 1/20/1991, lines 9-13.
[424] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 51, lines 15-17.
[425] Thorburn testimony, 11/20/1991, p. 126, lines 14-16.
[426] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 233, line 15 0907 p. 234, line 15; 1/7/1992, p. 49, lines 8-23; Easley testimony, 2/27/1992, p. 40, line 21 0907 p. 42, line 7; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 599, p. 105446-015450.
[427] Nicholson testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 175, lines 15-21, p. 176, lines 1-3; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 599, p. 015446.
[428] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 599, p. 015450, 3/9/90.

[429] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 234, lines 2-20.
[430] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 175, lines 10-19.
[431] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 219, lines 14-22.
Dr. Stellman found that this fragmentation of the mental health staff was cumbersome and impaired communication. Dr. Newkirk found a lack of communication between the two groups of mental health professionals, as well as some duplication. Dr. Warren similarly perceived this division to be a problem, and recommended that all psychologists be in the Health Services Division. Warren testimony, 11/29/1992, p. 92, line 25 0907 p. 93, line 7. The separation of mental health professionals into two different divisions of the Department also caused significant problems with record-keeping. Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 31, line 25 0907 p. 32, line 23; Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 128, line 24 0907 p. 129, lines 1-8; Sloboda deposition, 10/29/1990, p. 32, lines 3-17; Cassady deposition, p. 60, line 21 0907 p. 61, line 24; Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 42, lines 3-7. Thus, Dr. Stellman found that the division of mental health staff made it difficult to get a complete picture of mental health services. Dr. Stellman believes that the consolidation of mental health staff under Health Services will improve continuity of documentation and increase accountability.
[432] Newkirk testimony, 1/21/1992, p. 83, line 19 0907 p. 84, line 1.
[433] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 44, lines 5-7.
[434] Newkirk testimony 11/22/1991, p. 45, line 25 0907 p. 46, line 8.
[435] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 93, lines 4-12, p. 102, lines 11-15.
[436] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 95, line 10, p. 96, line 3. The American Correctional Association has accredited the delivery of health care, including mental health care, at the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 99, lines 9-19. The New Mexico Department of Corrections has been under a Federal Consent Decree for approximately ten years. The mental health monitor for the special master in the case has recommended that mental health services and medical services be moved up to a lower level of monitoring because of the improvements in those areas. Dr. Stellman is familiar with how the federal court has proceeded with the case and with how the monitors have surveyed and critiqued the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Stellman testimony, 1/28/92, p. 1, line 16 0907 p. 2, line 15. Dr. Stellman was retained as an expert by a special master appointed by the District Court in Jacksonville, Florida for a class action lawsuit against the Florida Department of Corrections. Dr. Stellman served as a team leader for several multi-disciplinary survey teams that reviewed specific prisons in Florida to see if they had come into compliance with guidelines set down by the District Court. Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 103, line 6, p. 104, line 22.
[437] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 114, line 22, p. 115, line 9.
[438] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 141, line 9, p. 143, line 3.
[439] See, Arnold v. Lewis, CIV 91-1808 [Consolidated into this case] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 15.
[440] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 143, lines 4-21.
[441] Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 44, lines 12-21.
[442] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(2), pp. 23-24.
[443] Busfield deposition, 10/26/1990, p. 22, lines 3-16.
[444] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 121, line 25, p. 122, lines 1-3.
[445] Hanson deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 15, line 11 0907 p. 18, line 20.
[446] Centric deposition, p. 27, lines 9-23.

[447] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 100, line 25 0907 p. 101, line 7. [448] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 101, lines 8-13. [449] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 101, lines 13-20. [450] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 24, lines 1-2. [451] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 22, line 25, p. 23, lines 1-8. [452] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 23, lines 12-14. [453] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 71, lines 3-14. [454] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 23, lines 15-18. [455] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 72, lines 5-12. [456] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 74, lines 16-17. [457] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 72, lines 18-19, p. 73, lines 10-16. [458] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 74, lines 8-24. [459] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 119, lines 1-25. [460] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 98, lines 15-19. [461] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 98, line 20-p. 99, lines 1-4. [462] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 54, lines 1-7. [463] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 98, line 20-p. 99, line 4. [464] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 101, line 25 0907 p. 102, line 1. [465] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 102, lines 7-22. [466] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 153, lines 16-24. [467] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 53, lines 23-25. [468] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 35b. [469] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, pp. 94-100. [470] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 95. [471] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, pp. 81, 88. [472] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 79. [473] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 74; Stellman testimony, 2/7/1992, p. 124, lines 8-17. [474] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 72. [475] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 73. [476] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, pp. 70, 71. [477] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 67. [478] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264qq, p. 69.

[479] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 95, line 22 0907 p. 96, line 5. [480] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 95, lines 1-16. [481] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 96, lines 12-16, p. 97, lines 6-10. [482] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 99, lines 9-13. [483] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264vv, pp. 63, 64. [484] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 99, lines 14-20; Stellman testimony, 2/7/1992, p. 140, lines 14-25; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264vv, p. 21. [485] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 99, lines 20-22. [486] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264vv, p. 18. [487] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 264vv, p. 62. [488] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24e. [489] Stellman testimony, p. 33, line 7, p. 35, line 5. [490] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 61, lines 4-18. [491] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 61, line 21 0907 p. 62, line 3. [492] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 59, line 15 0907 p. 60, line 15. [493] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 212, line 16 0907 p. 213, line 14. [494] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 213, lines 17-25. [495] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 213, lines 4-14; p. 215, lines 20-15. [496] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 216, line 1. [497] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 214, line 21 0907 p. 215, line 3. [498] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 217, lines 8-17. [499] PTS, uncontested Facts 12-13; R.T. of 11/21/1991, p. 93, lines 17-21; Plaintiffs' Response to Request for Admissions. [500] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 231, lines 8-16. [501] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 241, lines 1-6. [502] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 231, line 20 0907 p. 232, line 2. [503] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 231, lines 16-26. [504] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 139, lines 18-24. [505] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 24, lines 8-20. [506] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 216, line 17 0907 p. 217, line 2. [507] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 142, lines 4-11. [508] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 141, line 23 0907 p. 142, line 3. [509] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 162, lines 1-15.

[510] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 154, line 20 0907 p. 156, line 22. [511] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 151, line 22 0907 p. 152, line 8. [512] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 162, line 18 0907 p. 163, line 17. [513] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 154, line 20 0907 p. 156, line 22. [514] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 159, line 9 0907 p. 160, line 5. [515] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 159, line 9 0907 p. 160, line 5. [516] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 145, lines 1-24. [517] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 25, line 18 0907 p. 28, line 9. [518] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 146, line 21 0907 p. 147, line 21. [519] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 148, lines 14-25. [520] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 12, lines 1-19. [521] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 218, line 24 0907 p. 219, line 13. [522] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, SPU treatment team briefing, 1/15/90 (prisoner Phelan decompensating, has become more agitated; broke out counselor's office window; placed in Central Unit isolation on 15-minute precaution), 2/7/90 (inmate Boykin decompensating and paranoid), 2/22/90 (inmate Green decompensating; Dr. Pera increased medications), 3/2/90 (inmate Cooksey decompensating badly), 3/30/90 (inmate Mokake decompensating, voicing suicidal ideas), 5/15/90 (Inmate Gholson has decompensated badly; "totally out of it;" sent to B-ward yesterday), 5/16/90 (inmate Tucker "decompensating badly; rambling speech, disoriented," "wandering around lost"). [523] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 107, lines 7-20. [524] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 163, line 1 0907 p. 164, line 9. [525] Cory testimony, 1/14/92, p. 12, lines 1-19. [526] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 14, lines 14-24. [527] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 93, lines 2-7. [528] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 91, line 17 0907 p. 92, line 4. [529] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 92, line 8 0907 p. 93, line 7. [530] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 93, line 17 0907 p. 94, line 25. [531] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 96, line 25 0907 p. 97, line 7. [532] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 98, line 22 0907 p. 99, line 23. [533] Pushkash deposition, 1/31/1991, p. 25, lines 14-22, p. 17, lines 14-25, p. 18, line 1. [534] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 105, line 25 0907 p. 106, line 23. [535] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 104, line 23 0907 p. 105, line 17. [536] Newkirk testimony, 1/21/1991, p. 11, lines 12-22, p. 116, lines 1-5; Pushkash deposition, 1/31/1991, p. 48, line 12 0907 p. 49, line 4. [537] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 116, lines 6-8.

[538] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 28, line 18 0907 p. 29, line 7. [539] Pushkash deposition, 1/31/1991, p. 28, line 1 0907 p. 29, line 15. [540] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 35, line 17 0907 p. 36, line 7. The self-abuser pod was established about a year or a year and one-half prior to Mr. Hanson's testimony in January 9, 1992 and had no mental health staff assigned to it at the time of trial. Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 115, lines 17-24. [541] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 10, line 18 0907 p. 11, line 15. [542] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 32, line 25 0907 p. 33, line 6. [543] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 33, line 6. [544] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 28, line 12, p. 29, line 4. [545] Charles deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 9, lines 13-14. [546] Keeney deposition, 11/14/1990, p. 60, lines 2-12. [547] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 22, lines 16-19. [548] Charles deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 9, lines 15-20. [549] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 160, line 24 0907 p. 161, line 1. [550] PTS, uncontested Fact A9. [551] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 181, lines 15-21, p. 182, lines 5-14 ("we find it very difficult to keep up with the population growth"); Keeney, deposition, 11/14/1990, p. 59, lines 1-7. [552] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 191; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 12, lines 20-22. [553] Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 26, line 6 0907 p. 27, line 13. [554] Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 45, line 5, p. 46, lines 1-3. [555] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 36, lines 5-11, 25, p. 37, lines 1-10. [556] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 61, lines 9-12. [557] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 187, lines 14-18, p. 196, lines 1-5. [558] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 196, lines 5-11; 1/28/92, p. 66, lines 17-21. [559] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 179, line 6. [560] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 180, lines 2-14. [561] Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 5, lines 3-4; p. 21, lines 3-7. [562] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 166, line 18 0907 p. 167, line 15. [563] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 66, lines 1-4. [564] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 67, lines 2-5. [565] Norrish deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 17, lines 13-22. [566] Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 14, line 10 0907 p. 16, line 24. [567] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 93, lines 8-11.

[568] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 165, lines 15-21. [569] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 217, lines 37. [570] Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 68, line 25 0907 p. 69, line 4. [571] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 152, line 9 0907 p. 154, line 19. In maximum security prisons, the psych nurses also do out-patient. The recreational therapist at SPU is a certified recreation-professional who also works with the lowest functioning inmates in the yard. Id. [572] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 152, line 9 0907 p. 154, line 19. [573] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 18, lines 20-23. [574] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 117, lines 10-25. [575] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 116, lines 17-21. [576] Hanson deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 7, lines 4-14. [577] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 118, lines 8-18. [578] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 118, line 19 0907 p. 119, line 1. [579] Plaintiffs' Exhibit. 193, September 1989. [580] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 113, line 21 0907 p. 114, line 9. [581] Stellman testimony, 1/28/92, p. 66, line 22 0907 p. 67, line 1. [582] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 193, October 1989. [583] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 15, lines 1-17. [584] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 35, lines 6-8. [585] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 22, line 17 0907 p. 23, line 10. [586] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 32, lines 14-18. [587] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 32, lines 14-24. [588] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 48, line 15 0907 p. 49, line 4. [589] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 69, lines 5-12. [590] Busfield testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 15, line 24 0907 p. 17, line 16. [591] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 31, lines 7-25. [592] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 39, lines 6-9. [593] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 69, lines 13-23. [594] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 11, line 22-p. 12, line 15. [595] Centric deposition, p. 9, lines 3-13, p. 46, lines 2-18. [596] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 43, lines 1-8. [597] Centric deposition, p. 10, lines 19-25, p. 11, lines 1-3. [598] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 25, line 14-25, p. 26, lines 14-19.

[599] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 25, lines 14-24.
[600] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 42, lines 8-17.
[601] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/91, p. 132, lines 12-22.
[602] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/91, p. 79, lines 24-25, p. 80, lines 1-12. See also Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 209, lines 6-8 (the law requires that a psychological associate be supervised by a Ph.D. psychologist).
[603] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 41, lines 16-17.
[604] Schwegler testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 42, lines 2-7.
[605] Cassady deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 13, lines 173; p. 21, lines 2-18.
[606] Cassady deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 55, lines 18-24.
[607] Cassady deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 55, line 18 0907 p. 57, line 1.
[608] Charles deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 27, line 25, p. 28, lines 1-4.
[609] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 136, line 20 0907 p. 137, line 24.
[610] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 143, lines 8-15.
[611] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 61, lines 13-16, 19-23.
[612] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 136, lines 15-19.
[613] Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 56, lines 16-25.
[614] Lang deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 45, lines 1-6.
[615] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 14.
[616] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 61, lines 4-10.
[617] Sanders deposition, 4/8/1991, p. 41, lines 5-16.
[618] Sanders deposition, 4/8/1992, p. 47, lines 4-8.
[619] Sanders deposition, 4/8/1991, p. 53, lines 13-23.
[620] Newkirk testimony, 1/22/1991, p. 8, lines 2-5, 19-23.
[621] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 190, lines 1-8.
[622] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 190, lines 8-11.
[623] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, SPU treatment team meeting, 8/7/89 (discussion of lifting hiring freeze on psychologist II positions); 8/10/89; 8/24/89; and 9/7/89 (clinical practicum canceled due to lack of staff); 10/11/89 (in two weeks, SPU will have no psychiatrist unless one as been provided by then); Plaintiffs; Exhibit 50, Executive Staff Meeting Minutes, ASPC-Florence, 1/18/89, p. 3 (problems with mental health staffing 0907 "we are struggling with staffing the Psych area. There are no psychologists in the state that can work with the Department and we can't get a cert. list. If we advertise nationwide, it'll take months before we can get someone hired."); ASPC-Winslow, 8/1/89, p. 5 (Alhambra psychiatrist does not want to authorize medications for Winslow prisoners; unclear what psychological associates are to do about prescribing medications. Warden states "it looks like the psychiatrist position will be frozen, so problems like this will continue to occur"); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 196 (memo from SMU deputy warden Upchurch acknowledging severe shortage of mental health staff); Keeney deposition, 11/14/1990, p. 58, lines 19-25 (Associate Director Keeney has expressed the view that more psychologists and psychological associates are needed); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232, 11/6/89 letter from Director Lewis (psychiatric services at

Perryville and Florence are performed by three staff psychiatrists who are unable to meet the demand for their services. These institutions have two frozen psychiatrist positions); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 243bcl (as of 3/29/89, no psychiatrist assigned to Perryville); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 255bq (as of 11/90, Winslow is trying to recruit a psychiatrist); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 279, ASPC-Florence, 4/4/90, p. 5 (lack of trained mental health staff); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 84E, ASPC-Winslow Quality Assurance Audit Summary, 4/17/91, p. 1 (no psychiatrist at this facility; prisoners must be referred to Alhambra. This is not appropriate for those with only behavioral problems); p. 2 (lack of mental health staff, although Winslow has prisoners with serious mental health problems, on psychotropic medication); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 127, line 24 (Dr. Pera sees 100 patients a week, a situation he characterizes as "ludicrous"); Stewart testimony, 1/16/92, p. 62, lines 19-25 (DOC has tried but has not been able to hire administrative staff so that medical health professionals are freed up to provide direct care because the Legislature will not appropriate money). Plaintiffs' Exhibit 116, 3/8/89 memo from Veloz to Facility Health Administrator Norrish (not enough staff for Women's Division, Central, and SPU. Only two psychiatric nurses to cover Women's, South, East, and North Units; no psychologist, psychological associate, or psychotherapist. Central and Women's continue to impose a strain on limited staff resources with increasing requests for services and crisis intervention).
[624] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 161, lines 6, 13-24.
[625] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/91, p. 8, line 24 0907 p. 9, line 13; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28n, notes 3/9/89, 4/20/89 [inmate Banich] (Florence-North prisoner not seen by psychiatrist due to lack of time, but psychiatrist renewed medication).
[626] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249ew (Perryville-Santa Maria prisoner [Michelle McNeil] complains of stress and depression; staff responds that there are too many prisoners on psychiatrist's caseload, and prisoner will not be seen for "some time.")
[627] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 116, lines 9-24.
[628] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 166, line 25 0907 p. 167, line 2.
[629] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 116, line 25, p. 117, lines 1-5.
[630] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 166, lines 3-13.
[631] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 117, lines 10-12, 16-20; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199; Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 160, lines 13-25, p. 161, line 1 (description of psych nurses indicated they had other duties in Florence).
[632] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 117, lines 5-9.
[633] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 161, lines 9-20; Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 44, lines 24-25, p. 45, lines 1-5 (there are lists of prisoners waiting to get into groups that are full).
[634] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 162, line 25 0907 p. 163, line 2.
[635] Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 31, lines 15-18.
[636] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 149, lines 18-23.
[637] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (more staff would allow the department to increase Baker's census from 21 to approximately thirty-eight and Flamenco from its level of 46 to its maximum of 125).
[638] Sloboda deposition, 10/29/1990, p. 31, lines 7-25, p. 32, lines 1-7.
[639] Sloboda deposition, 10/29/1990, p. 39, lines 12-24.
[640] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 69, line 24 0907 p. 70, line 2.
[641] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 70, lines 3-7.

[642] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 89, lines 1-8. [643] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 89, line 1 0907 p. 90, line 22. [644] See also, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808. [645] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 112, lines 7-25. [646] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 267, lines 11-17. [647] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 268, lines 14-17. [648] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 269, lines 6-13. [649] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 269, line 18 0907 p. 270, line 4. [650] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 270, lines 10-17. [651] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 270, lines 22-25. [652] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 270, lines 5-9; See also Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [653] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 311, p. 271, lines 1-8; p. 272, lines 2-8. [654] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 312, p. 42, lines 9-12. [655] "Staff is continuing trying to get inmate to B-Ward for treatment." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 7/11/1990. [656] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 7/11/90 and 7/27/90. [657] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 33, lines 1-6. [658] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19cc, 11/18/90; 11/21/90, 11/24/90, 10/7/90, 10/12/90. [659] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c, note 4/12/90. [660] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c note 2/20/91. [661] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c, note 3/20/91. [662] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c, notes 4/14/91. [663] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c, notes 4/15/91. [664] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287c, note 4/17/91. [665] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 110, lines 6-24; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 7/17/90, p. 3. [666] These are admissible for the defendants' responses to the grievances but not for the truth of the inmates' complaints. [667] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249ew, 1/30/91. [668] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249fg, 9/12/90 (kite); 9/20/90 (response). [669] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249ga, 3/20/91 (kite); 3/22/91 (response). [670] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249gz, 3/31/90 (kite); 4/27/90 (response). [671] Plaintiffs' Exhibits 249ho and 249hp. [672] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249fn, 4/9/90 (kite); 4/27/90 (grievance).

[673] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 111, lines 5, 17-18.
[674] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 111, lines 20-21.
[675] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 80, line 9 0907 p. 81, line 1.
[676] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 168, lines 1-22.
[677] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 127, lines 8-22.
[678] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 129, lines 5-13, p. 153, lines 1-3.
[679] Schwegler deposition, 10/29/1990, p. 56, lines 24-25, p. 57, lines 1-21.
[680] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(7), 9/12/90 (Legg placed on special watch in lockdown by Dr. Pera on 9/12/90 and retained through 9/22/90).
[681] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(7), 12/31/90 (Brown in lockdown per Sergeant from 12/31/90 at least through 1/11/91 until seen by Dr. Pera).
[682] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(7), 3/2/91 (Caltevedt put in lockdown on special 30 minute watch (changed to fifteen minute watch on 3/5/91) until seen by Dr. Pera; on watch until 3/13/91).
[683] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(7), 3/8/90 (Bloomfield on watch until seen by "psych;" maintained to 3/13/91).
[684] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(7), 3/16/91 (Martel Martinez in lockdown on 3/16/1991 until seen by Dr. Pera; still in lockdown as of 3/26/91).
[685] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 5, lines 8-10, p. 67, lines 22-25.
[686] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, p. 68, lines 8-10.
[687] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 309, lines 20-23, p. 6, lines 18 5, p. 7, lines 23-25, p. 8, lines 2, 14-25, p. 9, lines 1-6 (Daisy Brown is a schizophrenic prisoner who was assigned to Santa Maria Unit; placed in lockdown in July 1991 when displaying inappropriate and dangerous behavior such as smearing feces, refusing to talk, refusing to eat); p. 139, lines 22-23, p. 151, lines 16-25, p. 152, lines 1-12 (Guittiere, a woman Dr. Fernandez diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type, was in lockdown in Perryville for more than a month before she was transferred to Flamenco); p. 112, lines -19 (Helen Brown stayed in lockdown two months after Dr. Pera requested she be transferred to the hospital); Garabedian testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 234, lines 10-13 (Helen Brown spent long periods of time in lockup because she would become psychotic).
[688] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/11/89.
[689] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/12/89.
[690] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/14/89.
[691] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/17/89.
[692] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/18/89.
[693] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 4/19-21/89, 4/25/89, 5/10/89.
[694] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 9/21/89.
[695] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 10/10/89.
[696] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 10/13/89.
[697] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 10/18/89.

[698] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 11/22/89, 11/27/89, 2/12/89.
[699] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 3/21/90, 3/23/90, 3/26/90.
[700] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 5/16/90, 5/17/90, 5/18/90, 5/21/90.
[701] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 109, lines 10-20.
[702] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 109, line 21 0907 p. 110, line 3.
[703] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 68, lines 2-9, p. 84, lines 3-11.
[704] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 144, lines 17-22.
[705] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 145, lines 7-10.
[706] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 84, line 21 0907 p. 85, line 6.
[707] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 120.
[708] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/10/89 (Barge in holding cell for six days, "acting crazy at Alhambra, still erratic"), Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/27/89 (Barge in holding cell; standing orders that if he refuses medication three times in a row he be placed automatically in the holding cell), Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/28/89 (Barge in holding cell, taking medication intermittently, doing better but degenerates; will keep in holding cell until stable), Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 3/21/89 (Barge had been sent to Alhambra but refused to talk to anyone there so being returned to SMU for documentation and possible involuntary hospitalization).
[709] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/23/89 (Gooden's eyes were bright; totally unresponsive; talking gibberish; left on tenminute close watch), 2/28/89 (Gooden is doing well but not well enough to put back in cell; medications will be doubled today; remains in restraints).
[710] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/27/89 (Arvizu is "totally out of it;" given shot of Benadryl and four-pointed), 2/28/89 (Arvizu still four-pointed; tried to take a shower but security had to forcibly remove from shower; will try to get him back to Alhambra), 3/2/89 (Arvizu is still in holding cell on close watch; Dr. Menendez started him on medication; in full restraints, arms and ankles are swollen badly), 3/7/89 (Arvizu still in bad shape), 3/31/89 (Arvizu going to Alhambra today).
[711] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 3/15/89 (Verheim is hallucinating; wants to come to SPU; file shows assaultive).
[712] Plaintiff's Exhibit 49, 10/10/89 (Jones placed in observation cell [holding cell] threatening self-abuse), 10/11/89 (Jones appears to be suffering from paranoia), 10/12/89 (Jones still in holding cell; still refusing to sign "no self harm" contract), 10/13/89 (Jones hung himself with sheet; banged head), 10/16/89 (Jones escalated to stage of being terrified, sent to Maricopa Medical Center), 10/17/89 (Jones sent to Baker from Maricopa Medical Center).
[713] Roy Trotter would sometimes become extremely explosive. Because of his psychotic behavior, he was being seen by mental health. But he was constantly in and out of lockup facilities and was housed at SMU. Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 169, lines 10-15.
[714] Veloz deposition, 10/25/1990, p. 72, line 10 0907 p. 73, line 12; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 2/17/1989, p. 2.
[715] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 167, lines 16 0907 p. 169, line 4, p. 170, line 1.
[716] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 169, lines 7-10.
[717] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 169, lines 16-19.
[718] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 170, lines 9-14.
[719] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 170, line 22-p. 171, line 1.

[720] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 199, lines 11-14.
[721] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 6, lines 17-19, p. 7, lines 3-8.
[722] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ooo, incident report 12/7/89.
[723] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ooo, incident report 12/20/89.
[724] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ooo, incident report 1/27/90.
[725] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19ooo, use of force report 7/29/90. Exh. 19uuu, incident report 12/14/90.
[726] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19uu, incident reports 10/29/90, 12/14/90, 12/28/90, 1/2/91.
[727] Plaintiffs Exhibit 19uu, incident reports 5/25/90, 9/18/90.
[728] Plaintiffs Exhibit 19uu, incident reports 5/25/90, 9/18/90.
[729] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, SPU staff briefing, 2/10/89 (Hinds attempted to strangle self, is "real threat to self;" transferred from Perryville to SMU and put in holding cell in restraints); 2/21/89 (Barge throwing self against wall and banging head; refused medication; stripped and four-pointed); 2/23/89 (Villareal pulled out all sutures; treated and put back in holding cell in restraints); 2/23/89 (Mendez taken off close watch last night, then made six-inch slash on his arm); 8/22/89 (Deutsch hit head so hard he opened deep gash and was taken to Maricopa Medical Center for treatment); 10/13/89 (Jones tried to hang himself with a sheet; upon return from hospital, ripped helmet off and rammed head into wall, causing bleeding); 10/16/89 (Jones had huge hematoma on head from ramming into cell wall; sent to Maricopa Medical Center); 10/17/89 (Jones transferred to B-ward from Maricopa Medical Center).
[730] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 173, lines 9-13.
[731] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 173, lines 3-8.
[732] In this section, the terms "holding cell," "lockup," and "lockdown" are used interchangeably. The SMU holding cell is smaller than a regular cell, and is triangular in shape. A bench that serves as a bed is bolted to the wall, and there is a toilet. Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 171, lines 17-23. Dr. Newkirk described it as a "very small, cramped space." Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 171, line 3. A prisoner is usually placed in the cell wearing only his undershorts. He may be given a blanket, but nothing else. Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 72, lines 20-24.
[733] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 173, line 18 0907 p. 174, line 4.
[734] Bartholic testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 176, lines 4-16.
[735] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 176, SMU mental health team minutes, 7/19/90, (remarks of Dr. Gopalan); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 177, SMU mental health team minutes, 8/15/90.
[736] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 115, lines 7-24.
[737] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 106, lines 8-19.
[738] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 176, p. 2.
[739] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 7/12/90 (Hanlon referred to SPU by Tim Hanson on recommendation from Dr. Gopalan).
[740] Plaintiffs' Exhibit. 176, p. 3.
[741] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 86, lines 21-25 (Dr. Pushkash has asked for acutely mentally ill prisoners to be transferred to Baker who have not been accepted); Pushkash deposition, p. 27, lines 10-19, p. 28, lines 8-20.

[742] Pushkash deposition, p. 27, lines 10-19, p. 28, lines 8-20. [743] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, Cochise Detention Unit Log, 9/13/89; Exh. 281(10) (prisoners on suicide watch: 3/2/90-3/5/90 [Olivas]; 3/7/90 to 3/12/90 [Smart]. [744] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 95, 3/2/91-3/6/91. [745] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, SPU staff briefing, 8/22/89 (Thomas at Douglas ordered back to SPU by Dr. Scalzo; Mr. Veloz noted that prisoner had made a serious suicide attempt, and should be sent to Alhambra psychiatric hospital; Dr. Menendez agrees); 11/22/89 (Honeycutt in Central Unit cut himself seriously and sent to hospital); 11/27/89 (Dr. Menendez refuses to accept Honeycutt at Baker; he is returned to Central Unit with a recommendation he go to CB6); 12/11/89 (Honeycutt in CB6 cut himself and sent to hospital); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 52, Winslow weekly summary of outside referrals, 3/25/91-3/31/91 (Smith attempted suicide; sent to hospital to have neck sutured); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, SPU treatment team briefings, 3/19/90 (Maxwell in CB6 attempted overdose; air evacuated to hospital); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 281(9), Tucson Complex Detention Unit Log, 1/20/91, 2033-2130 (medical staff in unit for Bronkinson, who injured himself; he was later sent to Rincon, D-wing). [746] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 7, line 25, p. 8, lines 1-5, 16-23. [747] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 77, line 21 0907 p. 78, line 2. [748] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 60, lines 29-14. [749] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 147, 1/89-12/89, 1/90-12/90. [750] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 148, 7/89-12/89, 1/90-3/90. [751] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 151, 1/89-12/89; 1/90-8/90, 10/90-12/90. [752] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 169, 2/89-11/89, 1/90/90, 4/90-6/90, 12/90. [753] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 255bq, 11/5/90. [754] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 2/1/90. [755] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, 3/22/89. [756] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 244ppp, 1/17/90 (grievance); 1/31/90 (response). [757] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249fc, 11/6/90. [758] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249bk, 8/8/90. [759] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 250ao, 4/4/89. [760] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 25, lines 6-16. [761] Hanson testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 96, lines 1-9. [762] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 124, lines 10-17. [763] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 112, lines 19-25. [764] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 113, lines 1-4. [765] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 113, lines 5-7. [766] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 113, lines 18-21. [767] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 145, line 23 0907 p. 146, line 4. [768] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/91, p. 131, lines 10-14.

[769] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/91, p. 131, lines 15-18. [770] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 132, lines 4-6. [771] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 131, lines 18-20. [772] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 131, lines 21-24; 11/22/91, p. 59, lines 20-25, p. 60, lines 1-4, 7-11; Stellman testimony, 1/27/92, p. 114, line 15 0907 p. 115, line 3. [773] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 59, lines 9-16, p. 63, lines 16-22, p. 79, lines 12-16. [774] Stellman testimony, 1/28/92, p. 51, line 23 0907 p. 52, line 9. [775] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 125, lines 6-7, 9-10. [776] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 125, lines 10-15; Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 146, line 16 0907 p. 147, line 1. [777] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 129, lines 14-16. [778] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 128, lines 9-19. [779] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 147, lines 9-10. [780] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 147, lines 9-15. [781] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 147, lines 15-25. [782] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 129, lines 17-24. [783] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 131, lines 10-16. [784] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 129, line 24 0907 p. 130, line 1. [785] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 130, lines 2-8. [786] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 63, line 22 0907 p. 64, line 8. [787] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 150, lines 14-15. [788] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 150, lines 16-17. [789] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 151, lines 1-25. [790] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 152, lines 7-25. [791] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 153, line 23 0907 p. 154, line 2. [792] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 154, lines 2-15. [793] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 130, lines 12-21. [794] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 130, lines 22-25. [795] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 130, line 25, 0907 p. 131, line 2. [796] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 103, line 6 0907 p. 104, line 23. [797] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 103, lines 19-2; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(2), pp. 37-38, 42. [798] Garabedian testimony, 1/71992, p. 214, lines 9-20. [799] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 224, line 4 0907 p. 225, line 11.

[800] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(3), p. 17. [801] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(3), p. 20. [802] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1(3), p. 21. [803] Guy deposition, 10/22/1990, p. 13, lines 8-25, p. 14, lines 1-7. [804] Charles deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 43, line 19 0907 p. 44, line 2. [805] Garabedian testimony, p. 215, 1/7/1992, lines 1-7, p. 225, lines 13-19. [806] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 103, line 24 0907 p. 104, line 15; Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 219, lines 23-25, p. 220, lines 1-5, 20-3, p. 229, lines 4-10. [807] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 229, lines 8-10. [808] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 104, line 16 0907 p. 105, line 3. [809] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 239, Mental Health Activity Report, Baker/Flamenco, 4/90. [810] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 239, Mental Health Activity Report, Baker/Flamenco, 6/90. [811] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 225, lines 20-25, p. 226, lines 1-9. [812] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 226, lines 10-20. [813] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 105, line 17 0907 p. 106, line 11. [814] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 105, lines 12-16. [815] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 218, line 21 0907 p. 219, lines 6. [816] Norrish deposition, 10/24/1990, p. 63, lines 11-21; p. 64, lines 7-24. [817] Garabedian testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 229, line 11 0907 p. 230, line 13. [818] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 107, lines 4-25. [819] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 98, lines 8-14. [820] Newkirk testimony, 11/21/1991, p. 106, line 22 0907 p. 107, line 1. [821] See Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 4-9. [822] See Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 5-14. [823] See Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 15-19, 25. [824] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 279, Florence, 10/3/90; Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 8. [825] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 62, lines 12-22. [826] Charles testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 131, lines 12-16. [827] Warren testimony, 1/29/1992, p. 151, lines 10-24. [828] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 11, line 15 0907 p. 12, line 1. [829] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 52 line 19 0907 p. 53, line 3. [830] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 53, line 11 0907 p. 54, line 7, p. 88, lines 19-23, p. 89, lines 3-4.

[831] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 70, lines 17-24. [832] Bishop testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 156, line 7 0907 p. 157, line 3. [833] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 54, line 21 0907 p. 55, line 2. [834] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 42, line 18 0907 p. 43, line 3. [835] Jolley testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 36, line 23 0907 p. 37, line 9. [836] Defendants Exhibit 960, §§ 4.4, and 4.5. [837] Lutz testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 104, lines 3-13. [838] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 72, lines 5-12. [839] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 61, line 23 0907 p. 62, line 5. [840] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 67, line 10 0907 p. 68, line 8. [841] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 98, lines 21-23. [842] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 66, line 23 0907 p. 67 line 4. [843] Turner testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 61, line 19 0907 p. 62, line 16. [844] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 51, line 9 0907 p. 52, line 18. [845] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 35, lines 7-20, p. 86, lines 7-25, p. 87, line 1. [846] Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 87, lines 2-12. [847] Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 29, lines 14-16; Sanders deposition, 4/8/1991, p. 6, lines 18-23. [848] Sanders deposition, 4/8/1991, p. 45, lines 3-15. [849] Charles deposition, 10/23/1990, p. 38, lines 15-25. [850] Lutz deposition, 11/13/1990, p. 112, line 23 0907 p. 113, line 18. [851] Defendants' Exhibit 892. [852] Bolick testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 79, lines 13-19. [853] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 232, lines 8-18. [854] Scalzo testimony, 1/6/1992, p. 213, lines 1-6. [855] Scalzo testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 35, lines 19-25. [856] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. [857] Lutz testimony, p. 59, line 15 0907 p. 60, line 1, p. 150, line 9 0907 p. 151, line 6. [858] Stellman testimony, 1/28/1992, p. 70, lines 3-13. [859] Stellman testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 190, lines 13-16. [860] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 68, lines 6-14. [861] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 67, lines 5-12. [862] Defendants Exhibit 184.

[863] Stipulation, p. 35, § IV.
[864] See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, SPU briefing, 3/3/89 (Gonzalez placed in chair and restrained), 9/12/1989 (Barber put in chair).
[865] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 10, line 21 0907 p. 11, line 5.
[866] See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, Florence-SPU treatment team briefing, 2/24/1989 (Davenport put in pen due to "abnoxious [sic] behavior"); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 199, 8/22/1990 (Duniphin placed in pen because he was "extremely paranoid"), 9/11/1990 (Gurr placed in pen after shoving officer), 9/18/90 (Martin in pen after fighting).
[867] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 13, lines 13-22.
[868] Newkirk testimony, 11/22/1991, p. 13, line 23 0907 p. 14, line 1.
[869] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, SPU treatment team briefing, 2/16/1989 (prisoner Lopez found to be non-responsive with a heart rate of 46 while in the pen, and taken to health unit; diagnosis unknown).
[870] Veloz testimony, 1/9/1992, p. 173, line 20 0907 p. 174, line 7.
[1] A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3rd Cir.1987). Similarly, a serious dental need is one that causes "pain, discomfort or threat to good health." Dean v. Coughlin 623 F.Supp. 392, 404 (S.D.N.Y.1985).
[2] Generally, supervisory officials cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, plaintiff must establish that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that a state supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir.1987); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.1988); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir.1985). However, officials may be independently liable under § 1983. Id.
[3] The record clearly supports the inescapable conclusion that these improvements were caused by the plaintiffs' filing of this action. This Court is unwilling to characterize as mere coincidence so many improvements to those issues specifically raised by plaintiffs. It is clear that defendants attempted to resolve almost all of the problems with the system prior to trial.
[4] Defendants have established a routine intake procedure for males at Alhambra. In addition, Alhambra has the mental health staff available for the system.
[5] See, Arnold v. Lewis, 91-1808, p. 3. (consolidated into this action).
[6] Budgetary constraints are not a defense to liability for deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical care needs. Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir.1991).
[7] See Arnold v. Lewis, p. 8.
[8] See Arnold v. Lewis, p. 9.
[9] See Arnold v. Lewis, p. 9.
[10] See, Arnold v. Lewis, CIV 91-1808, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Arnold case, including the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, has been consolidated into this case.
[11] After the filing of this action and Dr. Newkirk's (plaintiffs' expert) review of SPU, that facility eliminated the socialization chair and pens. Use of these treatments rises to the level of deliberate indifference to the serious medical/mental health care needs of inmates. Placing inmates into unshaded pens outside in the Arizona heat

without bathroom facilities and water is clearly cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
[12] Defendants presented evidence that seriously mentally ill inmates are not housed in the work camp type of facilities such as Yuma.
[13] In fact, one psychiatric expert stated he wouldn't treat his dog the way the defendants treated H.B. Arnold v. Lewis, Exhibit A at 125.
[14] Injunctions and other court orders are not so inflexible that they can never be changed without timeconsuming court proceedings. If changes in circumstances justify changes in the injunctions or orders, this Court is agreeable to necessary changes that defendants have discussed with plaintiffs. In fact, should counsel agree by stipulation to changes in the injunction or orders, the Court is willing to amend the injunction or orders without conducting court hearings. The parties are reminded that the appropriate way to seek changes is the method applied by the Ninth Circuit recently in Hook v. State of Arizona, 972 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.1992).
[15] This lack of funding is not a defense to constitutional violations. Jones, 781 F.2d at 771; Harris, 941 F.2d at 1509.
[16] Of course, defendants are encouraged to submit a complete status report. The more information available establishing that the constitutional standard is being met, the less likely it will be that the Court will need to conduct a hearing.
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 834 F.Supp. 1569 (1993)
Fletcher CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
Nos. CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM, CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM. United States District Court, D. Arizona. April 5, 1993.
157012 *1570 *1571 *1572 Alice Loeb Bendheim, Phoenix, AZ, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Stuart Henry Adams, Jr., and David Cyrus Fathi, Nat. Prison Project of America, Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs. Kathleen L. Weinecke and Daniel Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MUECKE, District Judge.
ACCESS FOR THE HANDICAPPED INMATES
Having considered the evidence presented by the parties relevant to the access for the handicapped issues in this case, the Court concludes as follows:
Background
Plaintiffs allege that defendants discriminate against handicapped inmates in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants' failure to provide accommodations for handicapped inmates violates their eighth amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Findings of Fact
I. Mobility Impaired Prisoners
A. ADOC houses mobility impaired inmates.
A number of Arizona prisoners are confined to wheelchairs, have artificial limbs, are partially paralyzed, or are otherwise limited in their mobility.[1] As of March 16, 1990, there were 20 prisoners confined to wheelchairs, 33 who had artificial limbs and 15 who were partially paralyzed. These inmates were housed throughout the system. [2] As of August 19, 1991, there were 25-30 wheelchair-bound prisoners confined in Florence.[3] No ADOC staff person is monitoring facilities for the handicapped on a system-wide basis.[4]
1573 *1573 B. Accessibility of facilities to mobility impaired prisoners.

1. Florence
The health unit and law library are handicap accessible.[5] ADOC has recently completed several modifications in the Florence complex to accommodate mobility-impaired prisoners.[6]
a. SMU
The health unit and law library are handicap accessible. The cells at SMU do not have accommodations for the handicapped inmates. Handicapped prisoners are escorted to the health unit for their baths.[7]
b. Women's Division
The law library and program areas are handicap accessible. One living unit is being renovated to be handicap accessible. The renovations are being made in accordance with the recommendations from the Central Arizona Health Institute. At the time the parties entered the stipulation, there was one woman in the facility who ambulated with a walker.[8]
c. East Unit
The dining hall, law library visitation area and hobby shop were made handicap accessible in 1990. The Health Unit is handicap accessible. As of August 20, 1991, there were no wheelchair-bound prisoners in the facility. Easy cluster is utilized for wheelchair-bound prisoners. The shower in Easy Cluster has a chair with wheels and a handrail, but has no anti-slip flooring. The bathroom also has a handrail. The lockdown unit is not accessible to the handicapped.[9]
d. North Unit
There are some inmates with prostheses in this unit. The law library in North Unit is handicap accessible.[10]
e. South Unit
As of August 19, 1991, there were nine wheelchair-bound prisoners in the South Unit in Florence. At this time, the unit had no handicap access structures such as handrails, ramps, or anti-slip flooring in the shower and bathroom areas. Wheelchair-bound prisoners were required to pull themselves up on a wall and over a ledge to get into the shower and onto a chair, which is placed in the shower. All living and program areas are on the ground floor and accessible to handicapped prisoners.[11] In November of 1991, ADOC modified the dormitory to accommodate 18 handicapped inmates.[12]
f. Central Unit
All of the handicapped inmates residing in Central Unit are now housed in the infirmary or Housing Unit 8.[13] In 1991, defendants developed a plan for handicapped access in Central Unit, specifically to make modifications to Housing Unit 8. Although scheduled to be completed by July of 1991, the work was delayed.[14]

g. CB6
At CB6, the showers and bathrooms are not accessible to the handicapped. The health unit and law library are handicapped accessible.[15]
h. Rynning Unit
The Rynning Unit at Florence is not accessible to handicapped inmates. According to staff, handicapped inmates are transferred to Central Unit.[16]
1574 *1574 2. Phoenix
a. Alhambra
At Alhambra, ADOC staff consulted with the Easter Seals Foundation to determine how to accommodate physically handicapped prisoners. The health unit, law library and occupational therapy areas are handicap accessible. On August 12, 1991, showers are equipped with rails and a rubber tip chair. The Alhambra facility has no anti-slip flooring in the bathrooms and showers. However, defendants have ordered risers for toilet seats.[17] Two rooms in the reception unit in Alhambra are equipped for handicapped inmates.[18]
The upper floors of Baker Ward and Flamenco are not accessible to handicapped inmates. One room for two prisoners in B Ward is equipped for handicapped inmates. Also in B Ward, the shower is handicap accessible and a riser has been ordered for the toilet.[19]
b. ACW
The health unit and program areas, including the law library, are accessible to handicapped inmates. There is one room with two double bunks that has been retrofitted with a handrail and anti-slip strips in the shower and a handrail in the toilet. There is no anti-slip flooring on the floor around the shower area.[20]
3. Douglas
Douglas occasionally houses inmates who are crutch-bound or have prosthesis. All buildings, except for administration, are single level structures. The law libraries are handicap accessible. All shower floors are currently being provided with anti-slip material (rockite). There are no handrails in the showers or toilet areas.[21]
4. Winslow
The Winslow facility does not house inmates with physical handicaps and is generally not accessible to handicapped inmates. All visiting and public areas are handicap accessible. The law library is also handicap accessible. In September of 1990, ADOC installed non-slip floors inside and outside of the showers. When the prison was constructed, ADOC installed handrails in the showers and no-slip floors in the shower areas of the general population units.[22]
5. Tucson

a. Rincon Unit
ADOC has housed wheelchair-bound, crutch-bound, and partially blind inmates in the Rincon Unit. The bathrooms have had anti-slip floors since 1981. But there are no rails in the bathrooms and showers. All program units and living areas on the ground floor are accessible to handicapped prisoners.[23]
b. Echo Unit
The Echo Unit is not intended to house handicapped inmates. Inmates are assigned to a housing unit before the staff know of any special needs. Once those needs are learned, staff attempts to accommodate handicapped inmates. The Unit has ramps to the control unit and commissary that were constructed in 1989. In 1988, ADOC installed anti-slip flooring and a handrail in the shower in Dorm 3. A chair is available in Dorm 3 for handicap showering.[24]
c. Santa Rita Unit
One of the housing units at Santa Rita has a ramp to the cells and handrails in the shower that were installed prior to the filing of this action. The shower has no anti-slip flooring. None of the cells have specialized toilets.[25]
1575 *1575 d. Cimarron Unit
At the Cimarron Unit, the cellblock has two tiers and there is no ramp leading to the upper tier. This unit has housed inmates with prosthetics. However, the staff will transfer inmates to the Rincon Unit if they experience difficulties. The dining area, barber shop, commissary, disciplinary hearing room and school are on the first floor, which is accessible to handicapped prisoners. ADOC staff have purchased anti-slip strips for the shower area. Neither the showers nor toilets have handrails.[26]
6. Perryville
Wheelchair-bound inmates are transferred out of the facility. However, the facility houses inmates with prothesis or who are otherwise physically challenged. The health unit is accessible on the ground level. The law libraries, showers and bathrooms are not accessible to the handicapped inmates. Some of these prisoners are transported by electric cart and assisted into and out of the libraries.[27]
C. Impact of inaccessible facilities.
1. Inaccessible facilities have deprived handicapped inmates of basic human needs including use of the shower, use the toilet, and receipt of medical care.
George Curly is a prisoner with a below-knee leg amputation who uses crutches and has a prothesis.[28] While he was housed in the Echo Unit in Tucson between 1989 and 1990, there were no handrails in the shower and Mr. Curly repeatedly fell in the shower. In addition, while he was at Echo Unit between 1989 and 1990, the dining hall had no facilities to assist prisoners with crutches, such as carts to help them carry their meals to the table. [29] Echo Unit now has rails in the shower. Those rails were installed some time in 1990.[30]

David Murphy is another handicapped inmate who is confined in a wheelchair and has been housed in facilities without handicapped access.[31] While he was housed at Alhambra, Mr. Murphy was unable to bathe for four days because there were no bathing facilities for handicapped inmates.[32] Alhambra is now handicap accessible as the showers are equipped with rails and a rubber-tipped chair.[33]
While Mr. Murphy was housed in CB3 in Central Unit in Florence in 1989, sick call was held upstairs, an area that was inaccessible to prisoners in wheelchairs.[34] At this time, ADOC housed approximately six other inmates in wheelchairs, in addition to Mr. Murphy, in CB3.[35] For approximately a six-month period in 1989 and 1990, staff told inmates in wheelchairs to wait in front of the guard gate at sick call. However, at this time, officers told him several times that they would give him a disciplinary write-up if he remained in front of the guard cage. So, he returned to his cell. As a result, during this period, he was not always seen by medical staff when he went to sick call.[36]
1576 While Mr. Murphy was confined in Central Unit in Florence, his cell door was too narrow *1576 to accommodate his wheelchair.[37] Therefore, to enter his cell he was required to leave his wheelchair outside, pull himself into the cell by the bars and let himself down on the bed.[38] On one occasion, he refused a medical appointment because he was in too much pain to move from his cell to his wheelchair outside the cell door.[39] On this occasion, Mr. Murphy asked an officer to help him to his wheelchair, but the officer refused to help.[40] Because sick call in Central Unit is now conducted by using the self-referral form, this problem probably should not reoccur in Central Unit.[41]
When he was housed in CB3 at Central Unit in Florence, Mr. Murphy could not use the shower. Rather, he traveled approximately one hundred yards outdoors to bathe in Housing Unit 8.[42] His cell had no rails so that he could pull himself on and off of the toilet.[43]
Inmate Murphy did have access to the law library in Central Unit.[44]
Roman Stone is a prisoner who is partially paralyzed, and cannot walk without a leg brace. He is also legally blind.[45] He is no longer capable of showering, but was capable of showering in the past. At that time, he was unable to use the shower at SMU in Florence because there were no chairs, handles or other appliances to assist him. He has fallen while in the shower.[46] When he was housed in CB6 in Florence, he was allowed to use a chair to shower. However, he still fell. Although he requested additional equipment to help him use the shower, his request was denied.[47]
2. Handicapped prisoners have sometimes been unable to obtain special equipment, repairs to that equipment or care necessary for their disabilities.
For example, David Murphy was unable to have all of the necessary repairs and maintenance performed on his wheelchair in Central Unit.[48] Defendants replaced the ball bearings in the wheelchair at some point during his stay in Central Unit.[49] However, by the time he left Central Unit, the chair was almost "inoperable."[50]
Another inmate, Frank Bartholic, had his leg brace confiscated for security reasons when he was transferred from SMU in Florence to Winslow. Because his leg kept "buckling" without the brace, he had difficulty walking and standing.[51]
Joe Harris is a prisoner whose ID card identifies him as an epileptic. However, when he was transferred to 1577 Perryville in 1990, he was assigned to a top bunk at Perryville despite his protests that his condition *1577
required a bottom bunk.[52] While sleeping in the top bunk, he had a seizure and fell out of the bunk, injuring his

head and back.[53] Defendants moved inmate Harris to a lower bunk the same day that the incident occurred. [54] Pursuant to defendants' procedure, inmates who are epileptic are issued an ID card identifying them as epileptic so that they will be assigned to lower bunks.[55]
In another instance, a Perryville-San Pedro prisoner received leg prosthesis and stump socks seven weeks after his initial request.[56] The special prothesis was made by a private contractor, outside of the prison.[57] The defendants provided the inmate with crutches during the seven week period.[58]
D. Changes since the filing of this action.
After the filing of this action in approximately May of 1990, a study was done regarding access for prisoners in wheelchairs at the Florence Complex.[59] As a result, ADOC has planned modifications in South Unit, Women's Unit and Housing Unit 8 in Florence.[60] ADOC plans to make one unit of each custody level accessible to the handicapped and concentrate handicapped prisoners in those units.[61] At the Florence wardens' meeting on October 17, 1990, Facility Health Administrator Norrish stated that making the facilities accessible to the handicapped inmates would require "simple modification in most areas."[62]
Some of the recommendations of the study are not being implemented due to fiscal constraints.[63] At the time of trial, defendants were expanding Housing Unit 8 to two modular units and the women's division renovations were complete.[64] Although the study specifically discussed Central Unit in Florence, ADOC had made no modifications to that unit as of June of 1991.[65] Similarly, in 1991, ADOC had not implemented the changes recommended in the East Unit in Florence.[66] Although the modifications to Housing Unit 8 in Florence were scheduled to be finished in July 1991, those modifications were not completed by the time of Mr. Norrish's trial testimony in January of 1992.[67]
At the time of trial, ADOC had completed some of the renovations. ADOC expended $1,575.79 to make South Unit in Florence accessible. The modifications required 19 hours of staff overtime and 36 hours of prisoner overtime.[68]
II. Visually and Hearing Impaired Prisoners
A. ADOC houses visually and hearing impaired prisoners.
1578 There are visually and hearing impaired inmates in the Arizona Department of Corrections. *1578 As of March 16, 1990, ADOC housed 61 hearing impaired prisoners and 24 blind prisoners at several facilities throughout the state.[69] However, ADOC did not include the needs of these inmates in the general study regarding access for handicapped inmates.[70] The 1990 study of the needs of handicapped prisoners at Florence focused only on prisoners confined to wheelchairs.[71] Any evaluations that have been done related specifically to an individual prisoner.[72]
B. Special needs of visually and hearing impaired inmates.
Plaintiffs allege that because defendants have not developed a systematic program for meeting the special needs of visually impaired prisoners, those prisoners' need are not met.

1. Hearing impaired inmates
Plaintiffs presented numerous examples of inmates who experienced delays in receiving hearing aids. A prisoner at Perryville complained of hearing loss and was referred for an audiogram on November 29, 1990. The outside review committee approved the consult two months later, but it was apparently never done.[73]
A prisoner at Florence complained of hearing loss on August 18, 1990. Medical staff referred him to a provider. However, there was apparently no follow-up on his hearing problem.[74]
Another Florence prisoner complaining of an ear infection was found to have hearing loss in one ear. Staff ordered an ENT (ear nose, and throat) referral in June of 1990.[75] In October, the prisoner returned to medical, requesting hearing aids, claiming he had previously had problems getting hearing aids in from outside the prison for two years.[76] Later that month, his chart was referred to a staff person to attempt to get hearing aids.[77] The ENT consult finally occurred on December 27, six months after it had been ordered. At that time, it was decided that the prisoner did not need hearing aids, but might at some later date.[78]
A prisoner at the Santa Rita Unit in Tucson complained of hearing loss in April of 1990.[79] An audiogram in June confirmed hearing loss, but no treatment was prescribed.[80] In November of 1990, a specialist consult recommended that the prisoner receive a hearing aid. However, the outside review committee did not approve the hearing aid. Rather, the committee ordered that the audiogram be repeated in six months for comparison.[81]
On July 6, 1990, an ADOC physician diagnosed a Tucson prisoner as suffering from "severe high frequency hearing loss" and ordered an audiology consult.[82] The consult did not occur until November 1, 1990, nearly four months later.[83] The consult recommended "binaural amplification ASAP."[84] However, instead of following this 1579 recommendation, the review committee recommended that the prison be tested in three *1579 months "for comparison."[85] Although the inmate's hearing was retested in mid-February of 1991, the test results could not be found in record.[86] As of March 25, 1991, the prisoner still had not received his hearing aids.[87]
A prisoner had an audiogram in Florence on November 22, 1989, which showed "moderate to severe" hearing loss.[88] The inmate was transferred to the Santa Rita Unit in Tucson and an intake assessment was performed on June 30, 1990. However, the hearing problem was not noted.[89] On July 2, 1990, the prisoner requested attention for his hearing problem.[90] An audiology consult was ordered on July 10, 1990, but not performed until November 1, 1990.[91] The audiologist recommended binaural hearing aids.[92] However, the outside review committee recommended another audiogram in six months.[93]
2. Visually impaired inmates
Plaintiffs presented an example of a legally blind inmate in ADOC, Roman Stone at SMU, to establish that legally blind inmates have difficulty in getting their special needs met because of their blindness.[94]
On April 3, 1989, ADOC had inmate Stone evaluated by the Arizona Institute for the Partially Sighted.[95] The consultant recommended (1) recordings for the blind student and GED preparatory tapes; (2) talking books from the State Library for the Blind; and (3) Sun Sounds Radio Reading Service for the Blind.[96] ADOC had provided the GED tapes prior to this recommendation.[97] Defendants also provided inmate Stone with "talking books" from the State Library for the Blind.[98] Defendants have made available to inmate Stone a catalog listing equipment that is available for blind inmates, if they wish to place an order.[99] ADOC also provided inmate Stone with a Sun Sounds radio 0907 a radio for blind persons, over which broadcasters read newspapers and other information. However, approximately one month after he received the radio, security

staff removed the antenna and the radio no longer worked properly. Inmate Stone sent it to the property room to be replaced, but he never received a replacement unit.[100]
A few years ago, defendants had inmate Stone evaluated by an individual with the National Federation of the Blind.[101] Defendants provided all the recommendations, including the tape recorder, cane and instructions on how to assist inmate Stone in cleaning his cell.[102]
In March of 1989, a consultant, Dr. Szuter examined inmate Stone and recommended that he be considered for a 1580 vocational rehabilitation program.[103] However, ADOC has never placed Mr. Stone a formal rehabilitation *1580
program.[104] ADOC has provided assistance in learning braille from Lisa Valdez of the Institute for the Blind in Kansas City, Kansas.[105] Inmate Stone has also been in contact with the Institute for the Blind in Kansas City, Kansas and has received cassette tapes for the blind from Newsweek, Arizona Religious Library and an organization called CMLS in Florida.[106] The Department of Economic Security in Phoenix has also provided him tapes for blind individuals.[107]
Because of his disability, inmate Stone has difficulty moving about his cell. On one occasion, in 1990, he slipped in water and fell in his cell. On another occasion, he stepped on an electrical cord in his cell and received a shock.[108]
Pursuant to policy, inmate Stone has been ordered to clean his cell.[109] ADOC policy prohibits officers from providing physical assistance to prisoners in cleaning their cells.[110] On one occasion, in April of 1990, CSO Rash helped inmate Stone clean his cell by telling him where the dirt was located in the cell.[111] The specialist from the National Federation of the Blind, who examined inmate Stone, stated that it was not unreasonable to require inmate Stone to clean his own cell because the area was small enough that he could memorize the location of items within the cell.[112]
Because of his blindness, inmate Stone is unable to inspect his food thoroughly. In SMU, the highest security facility, inmates are fed in individual cells. Because the trays are not marked, inmates cannot look at a food tray and know which inmate will receive that tray. ADOC has made an effort to prepare and deliver clean food trays to inmate Stone. Food trays were prepared from bulk serving containers onto trays under supervision of correctional officers in the kitchen and loaded onto several transport carts. These carts were pushed by officers in the living areas and the food was taken out and served to the inmates by officer.[113] However, inmate Stone states that he has still found foreign objects, including dirt, lint and a dead mouse, in food approximately 25 to 30 times since he has been at SMU.[114] On June 12, 1991, inmate Stone's breakfast tray included an apple with a razor blade embedded in it, which inmate Stone found only because he nicked his finger.[115] The officer completing the incident report noted that this was not the first incident.[116] Inmate Stone showed the apple to staff, but no one ever spoke with him about the incident.[117] Since that occasion, inmate Stone has found dirt, hair or lint in his 1581 food[118] and has reported these incidents *1581 to the attention of staff.[119]
Inmate Stone has had urine and feces thrown into his cell[120] and has reported these incidents to staff.[121]
Inmate Stone also alleges that he has been unable to participate in educational programs. He testified that he functions at approximately a third-grade level.[122] Although he requested and ADOC provided GED preparatory educational tapes, the material was too advanced for him, and he was unable to understand it.[123]
Inmate Stone requested that he receive law books in braille. In the alternative, ADOC has offered on several occasion a legal assistant to read materials to Mr. Stone. However, he has declined the help of legal assistants. [124]
Conclusions of Law

I. 8th Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Plaintiffs allege that defendants' failure to provide proper accommodations for handicapped inmates violates their eighth amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
To determine whether prison conditions violate the eighth amendment, the court must examine the challenged condition of confinement and determine whether that condition "is compatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1981). Although each condition of confinement does not exist in isolation and the court may consider the effect of the condition in the context of the prison environment, the court may not use the totality of all conditions to justify intervention more extensive than required to correct the eighth amendment violation. Wright, 642 F.2d at 1133. Prison officials may not deprive prisoners of basic necessities of life including adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir.1982). The eighth amendment is violated if a prisoner is deprived of any of these necessities in isolation, segregation or protective custody. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258. Disabled inmates must be provided with physical accommodations necessary because of their disabilities, including adequate toilet and shower facilities. LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392-94 (4th Cir.1987); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1345 (S.D.Tex.1980), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982), opinion amended, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982). Further, mobility impaired inmates must be provided with wheelchairs and other mobility aids. Johnson v. Hardin County, Kentucky, 908 F.2d 1280, 1284 (6th Cir.1990). Disabled inmates are also entitled to rehabilitative therapy. LaFaut, 834 F.2d at 392-94.
The duration of confinement in the alleged condition is relevant in determining whether a constitutional violation exists. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258. "The longer the prisoner is without such benefits, the closer it becomes to being an unwarranted infliction of pain." Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258.
Eighth amendment claims based on official conduct relevant to conditions of confinement require deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326-27, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).
1582 *1582 "The cost or inconvenience of providing adequate facilities is not a defense to the imposition of a cruel punishment." Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 at 200 (1979).
A. Mobility Impaired Inmates
In this case, at the time of the filing of this action, many of the ADOC facilities lacked accessible bathrooms, showers and cells. On March 16, 1990, defendants housed 68 inmates throughout the system who were confined to wheelchairs, had artificial limbs or who were partially paralyzed. As a result of the lack of accessible bathrooms, showers and cells, inmates, including inmates Murphy, Curly and Stone, either fell in the showers or were unable to use those facilities. On one occasion, inmate Murphy was unable to obtain medical care. Because these inmates were not provided with the necessary facilities, including accessible bathrooms, showers and cells, for their disabilities, defendants violated their constitutional rights. See, LaFaut, 834 F.2d at 392-94; Ruiz, 503 F.Supp. at 1345.
After the filing of this action, defendants conducted a study, established a plan and implemented a portion of the plan to provide physical facilities that are accessible to physically handicapped inmates. Although defendants do not plan to make every facility totally accessible, defendants plan to make one unit of each custody level accessible to the handicapped and concentrate the handicapped inmates in those units. If defendants implement these proposed renovations, disabled inmates will be provided with proper accommodations and the eighth amendment violations will be eliminated.
As a general rule, voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make a case moot. Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1985). The case is only moot if "it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 854 ; Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir.1991). Defendants had completed some of the changes, making some of the units handicapped accessible at the time of trial. However, many of the renovations had been delayed for funding reasons and were not completed at the time of trial. Thus, the proposed renovations have not "completely and irrevocable eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Thus, the Court has the authority and deems it proper to monitor the remaining renovations for the short period of time necessary to complete the physical changes to the facilities. Id. This monitoring can be done within the confines of the monitoring of the mental and dental health care systems.
Although plaintiffs also presented instances in which inmates did not receive special equipment, plaintiffs did not establish that each of those examples rise to the levels of constitutional violations. Relevant to inmate Murphy, defendants did provide repairs for his wheelchair. On the date that inmate Harris fell from his bunk, defendants moved him to the bottom bunk. Further, defendants have procedures to prevent such occurrences, including identification cards carried by epileptic inmates and a requirement that such inmates be given bottom bunks. Finally, the inmate at San Pedro received his leg prothesis unit from an outside provider within seven weeks of the initial request. In the interim, defendants provided crutches. There is no evidence that the unit could or should have been obtained more quickly. To the extent that there was a delay, the defendants have implemented new policies to assure that outside referrals are completed in a timely manner. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Medical, Dental and Mental Health Care, pp. 166-67.
In addition, even if those examples established individual violations, they are not sufficient to show a system-wide condition of confinement problem that rises to an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation.
B. Visually and Hearing Impaired Inmates
1. Hearing Impaired Inmates
1583 As of March 16, 1990, defendants housed 61 hearing impaired inmates at several *1583 institutions throughout the state. Plaintiffs presented numerous examples of inmates who experienced delays in obtaining hearing aids through the medical care system. Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). However, a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985). A delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment unless the delay caused substantial harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1335. In cases in which the system's constitutionality is at issue, deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners may also be "evidenced by repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff" or by "proving there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care." Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82 L.Ed.2d 885 (1984).
In this case, plaintiffs did not establish any harm that resulted from the delays. However, plaintiffs established a consistent pattern of delays in receiving hearing aids when tests established hearing losses. These problems existed within the specialty care outside provider system and such delays violated the "reasonably speedy" requirement for outside referrals. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. However, the new policy for outside referrals should resolve these delay problems. See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Medical, Dental and Mental Health Care Issues, pp. 166-67.
2. Visually Impaired Inmates
As of March 1990, defendants housed 24 legally blind inmates at several institutions throughout the state. Plaintiffs presented the testimony of legally blind inmate Roman Stone to establish that ADOC violates blind

inmates' constitutional rights. However, the evidence establishes that defendants have not violated inmate Stone's eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. ADOC treatment of inmate Stone does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference of his needs due to his handicap. Defendants have had inmate Stone evaluated on numerous occasions and have provided the recommended services. Although defendants have not placed inmate Stone in a specific rehabilitation program, they have provided him numerous talking books, catalogs of equipment from which he can order and assistance in learning braille. Although he complains that he cannot properly clean his cell, the outside consultant found that he should be able to clean and move around in his cell. As for the foreign objects in his food, defendants have made every effort to assure that other inmates and guards cannot tamper with his food.
Relevant to his access to the Courts, ADOC is not required to provide braille legal books as he requested. Rather, they have offered legal assistance to inmate Stone, which he has declined. Such offers comply with this Court's findings relevant to the legal access issues in this case.
Even if inmate Stone's constitutional rights had been violated, one instance of a constitutional violation for a blind inmate does not establish that the defendants violate the constitutional rights of all or a majority of the blind inmates.

II. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Plaintiffs allege that defendants discriminate against handicapped inmates in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides:

1584

No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination *1584 under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service ...

29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp.1992).

The Supreme Court has found that Section 504 guarantees "meaningful access" to programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance for otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). "To assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the ... program or benefit [receiving federal financial assistance] may have to be made." Id.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to inmates' access to prison activities, such as disciplinary proceedings and counseling. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir.1988). To demonstrate violations of § 504, the plaintiffs must establish that (1) they are handicapped persons under the Rehabilitation Act; (2) that they are otherwise qualified; (3) that the relevant program receives financial assistance; and (4) that the defendants' refusal to provide the services impermissibly discriminates against the plaintiffs based on their physical handicaps. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63.

Plaintiffs must first establish that they are "handicapped persons" under the Rehabilitation Act. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63. The Act defines "individual with handicaps" as:

any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.

29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp.1992). See also 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(k) (1992).

Federal regulations further define these elements. Federal regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(k)(2)(ii) (1992). Federal regulations further explain that "has a record of such an impairment" means "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities." 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(k)(2)(iii) (1992). Federal regulations also further explain that "is regarded as having an impairment" means:
(A) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation;
(B) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(C) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (k)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by the recipient as having such impairment.
C.F.R. § 42.540(k)(2)(iv) (1992).
It is undisputed that numerous members of the plaintiff class are handicapped within the meaning of the Act. In 1990, ADOC housed 68 mobility impaired inmates, 61 hearing impaired inmates and 24 blind inmates throughout the system. Of those inmates that plaintiffs presented as mobility impaired, plaintiffs established that inmates Murphy, Curly and Stone were handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. However, relevant to the hearing impaired inmates, plaintiffs did not establish that any of the inmates who had delays in receiving hearing aids had hearing impairments which would allow not them to participate in programming at prisons. As for blind inmates, although defendants appear to dispute inmate Stone's blindness, he is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
Second, plaintiffs must establish that they are "otherwise qualified." Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63. The Supreme Court has defined an "otherwise qualified person" as "one who is able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). To be "qualified," the handicapped individual must meet "the essential eligibility requirements 1585 for the receipt of [program] *1585 services." 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(1)(2). The Ninth Circuit has found that prison inmates within the ADOC, are generally "qualified (sometimes required) to participate in activities such as disciplinary proceedings, Honor Dorm Review committee hearings, counseling, rehabilitation, medical services and other prison activities." Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir.1988).
In this case, plaintiffs established that inmate Murphy on at least one occasion was unable to participate in medical services because of his handicap. However, this problem should be resolved by the changed sick call system in Florence and the modifications that are being made to provide accommodations to inmates with mobility impairments. Relevant to the alleged hearing impaired inmates, plaintiffs failed to establish that they were qualified for receipt of program services. As for blind inmates, the only blind inmate that presented testimony was Roman Stone. Despite the fact that defendants provided him with GED tapes, inmate Stone was unable to participate in the GED program because he functions on a third grade level. Thus, he was not qualified for that program and was not denied access to the program because of his handicap.
Third, plaintiffs must establish that the relevant program receives financial assistance. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63. It is undisputed that ADOC receives federal assistance. Further, the Ninth Circuit found in Bonner that the ADOC receives such assistance. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63.
Finally, the plaintiffs must establish that the defendants' refusal to provide the services impermissibly discriminates against the plaintiffs based on their physical handicaps. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562-63. The problem in this case is that plaintiffs did not identify particular programs from which any of the handicapped inmates were excluded because of their handicaps. Other than inmate Murphy's testimony that he could not go to medical on one occasion, plaintiffs did not establish that any mobility impaired inmates, because of their handicaps, were denied access to programs for which ADOC receives federal funding. Similarly, plaintiffs did not establish that any of the hearing or visually impaired inmates were excluded from programs. Thus, plaintiffs failed to establish violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: (1) The Court has determined that written rules or policies should be implemented to remedy the constitutional violations for handicapped inmates. When the parties meet [no later than May 31, 1993] for the mental health care issues, they shall also discuss the possible written rules necessary to remedy the past constitutional violations for handicapped inmates. (2) Defendants shall also include in their periodic status reports for the medical and dental health care systems, the first of which is due September 30, 1993, the status of the implementation of the program to make the particular units within the facilities accessible to handicapped individuals with mobility impairments. The first status report shall identify all of the changes implemented in each unit since the defendants began implementing the program and shall also indicate what other specific changes at specific locations will be undertaken on specific times in the future.
[1] Defendants' Exhibit 670. [2] Stipulation, p. 26. [3] Stipulation, p. 26. [4] Keeney deposition, November 14, 1990, p. 84, lines 23-25. [5] Stipulation, p. 24. [6] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 58, line 22 0907 p. 59, line 3. [7] Stipulation, p. 24, § II.A.2. [8] Stipulation, p. 25, § II.A.3. [9] Stipulation, p. 25, § II.A.5. [10] Stipulation, p. 25, § II.A.5. [11] Stipulation, p. 26, § II.A.7. [12] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 59, lines 12-22. [13] Cory testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 27, line 20 0907 p. 28, line 1. [14] Stipulation, p. 26, § II.A.8. [15] Stipulation, p. 24, § II.A.1. [16] Stipulation, p. 26, § II.A.6. [17] Stipulation, p. 27, § II.B. [18] Stipulation, p. 27, § II.B. [19] Stipulation, p. 27, § II.B. [20] Stipulation, p. 31, § II.G. [21] Stipulation, p. 27, § II.C. [22] Stipulation, p. 28, § II.D.

[23] Stipulation, p. 28, § II.E.1. [24] Stipulation, p. 29, § II.E.2. [25] Stipulation, p. 29, § II.E.3. [26] Stipulation, p. 30, § II.E.4. [27] Stipulation, p. 30, § II.F.; See also Plaintiffs' Exhibit 249 (September 21, 1990 statement by Facility Health Administrator Jim Charles that Perryville is not equipped for prisoners who use a wheelchair or crutches all the time). [28] Bryan testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 96, line 11 0907 p. 97, line 1. [29] Bryan testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 98 0907 p. 100, line 7. [30] Bryan testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 102, line 21 0907 p. 103, line 1. [31] Inmate Murphy is not a named plaintiff and was released from prison on parole in November of 1991. Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 10, lines 9-13. [32] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 35, line 25 0907 p. 36, line 5. [33] Stipulation, p. 27. [34] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 13, lines 10-14. [35] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 13, lines 15-17. [36] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 13, line 22 0907 p. 16, line 2. [37] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 36, lines 6-14. During his stay in Central Unit, he periodically walked with crutches, rather than being wheelchair-bound. Murphy testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 30, lines 8-24. [38] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 36, line 22 0907 p. 37, line 5. [39] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 29, lines 9-17. [40] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 29, line 18 0907 p. 30, line 1. [41] See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Medical, Dental and Mental Health care issues. [42] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 36, lines 15-22. [43] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 37, line 25, p. 38, lines 1-2. [44] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 46, line 20 0907 p. 56, line 3. [45] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 9, line 24 0907 p. 10, line 13; Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017364. [46] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 12, lines 1-21; Defendants' Exhibit 616, 1/3/90. [47] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 12, lines 22-19. [48] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 39, line 25 0907 p. 40, line 17. [49] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 56, lines 4-6. [50] Murphy testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 39, line 25 0907 p. 40, line 17. [51] Bartholic testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 197, line 24 0907 p. 198, line 9. [52] Harris testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 211, line 6 0907 p. 212, line 16.

[53] Harris testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 212, line 17 0907 p. 213, line 5; Defendants' Exhibit 582, p. 009730, note 9/27/90. [54] Harris testimony, 12/18/1991, p. 223, lines 5-7. [55] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 305. [56] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 32t, notes 12/14/1990, 12/18/90, 1/3/91, 2/17/91, and 2/15/91. [57] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 32t, notes 1/3/1991, 2/5/91. [58] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 32t, note 12/14/90. [59] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 102, lines 18-23; p. 103, lines 16-18. [60] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 81, line 6 0907 p. 82, line 9; Stipulation, pp. 25 and 26. [61] Stewart testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 58, lines 12-20; Stipulation, p. 23. [62] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 279, 10/17/90, p. 2. [63] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 103, lines 8-15. [64] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 103, line 19 0907 p. 104, line 1. [65] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 104, lines 2-17. [66] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 104, line 8 0907 p. 105, line 1. [67] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 105, lines 2-4; Stipulation, p. 26. [68] Defendants' Exhibit 916 (memo 10/15/91). [69] Defendants' Exhibit 670. [70] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 102, line 24 0907 p. 103, line 7. [71] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 102, lines 18-23. [72] Norrish testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 102, line 24 0907 p. 103, line 7. [73] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 33i, notes 11/19/90, 11/29/90, 1/25/91. [74] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30q, note 8/18/90. [75] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30v, notes 3/1/90, 4/20/90, 6/18/90. [76] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30v, note 10/15/90. [77] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30v, note 10/23/90. [78] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30v, note 12/27/90. [79] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39e, note 4/10/90. [80] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39e, notes 6/26/90, 7/2/90. [81] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39e, notes 10/30/90, 11/1/90, 11/5/90, 11/13/90. [82] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 7/6/90, consult request 7/6/90. [83] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 11/1/90, consult report 11/1/90.

[84] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 11/1/90. [85] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 11/15/90. [86] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 2/20/91. [87] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36b, note 3/25/91. [88] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d, consult request 7/10/90. [89] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d 6/30/90. [90] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d, note 7/2/90. [91] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d, notes 7/10/90, 11/1/90. [92] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d, note 11/1/90, consult report 11/1/90. [93] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36d, note 11/15/90. [94] Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017271; Stone testimony, 12/12/19/1991, p. 8, line 10 0907 p. 10, line 13. [95] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 17, lines 17-23; Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017498. [96] Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017498. [97] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 18, line 23 0907 p. 19, line 2. [98] Stone testimony, 12/19/1992, p. 17, lines 11-20, p. 18, line 22 0907 p. 19, line 21. [99] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 52, lines 4-7. [100] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 48, line 12 0907 p. 49, line 9. [101] Upchurch testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 114, lines 8-23. [102] Upchurch testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 115, lines 3-9. [103] Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017499. [104] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 21, lines 9-24. [105] Stone Testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 51, lines 6-17. [106] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 51, lines 22-24. [107] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 51, lines 22-24. [108] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 11, line 17 0907 p. 14, line 22; Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017248, note 1/4/90, p. 017052, p. 017050, notes 9/18/90, 9/20/90. [109] Defendants' Exhibit 923 (incident report, 1/10/90); Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 15, line 23 0907 p. 16, line 7. [110] Rash testimony, 1/13/1992, p. 126, line 24 0907 p. 127, line 1. [111] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 128, lines 9-15. [112] Upchurch testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 115, lines 6-15. [113] Aragon testimony, 1/7/1992, p. 204, line 24 0907 p. 205, line 20.

[114] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 35, lines 7-8; p. 36, lines 10-16; p. 40, lines 4-9; p. 41, line 14 0907 p. 42, line 8. [115] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300 (incident report, 6/12/91); Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 35, lines 1-10. [116] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300 (incident report, 6/12/91). [117] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 35, lines 9-17. [118] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 39, line 25 0907 p. 40, line 20. [119] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 39, line 25 0907 p. 40, line 20. [120] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 15, lines 23-25; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300, incident report 6/2/91 (prisoner threatens Stone to prove he is not blind); Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017244 (nurse notes "strong odor of urine" in Mr. Stones cell). [121] Defendants' Exhibit 616, p. 017248, notes 1/3/90, 1/490; Defendants' Exhibit 923. [122] Stone testimony, 12/19/1990, p. 17, lines 6-7. The court notes that Mr. Stone's testimony is relatively articulate for such a limited level. [123] Stone testimony, 12/19/1991, p. 17, lines 8-20. [124] Upchurch testimony, 1/8/1992, p. 115, line 20 0907 p. 116, line 2.
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 837 F.Supp. 1009 (1993)
Fletcher CASEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
Civ. Nos. 90-0054 PHX CAM, 91-1808 PHX CAM.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
April 30, 1993.
10101 *1010 *1011 Alice Loeb Bendheim, Phoenix, AZ, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Stuart Henry Adams, Jr., David Cyrus Fathi, National Prison Project of America, Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Kathleen L. Weinecke, Daniel Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DUE PROCESS
MUECKE, District Judge.
Having considered the evidence presented by the parties relevant to the due process issue, the Court concludes as follows:
Background
The plaintiffs allege that defendants deliberately punish inmates using administrative segregation rather than bringing disciplinary charges, in order to circumvent the due process protection they would have to provide the prisoner if he or she were charged with a disciplinary infraction. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants rely on uncorroborated confidential information to move prisoners to administrative segregation facilities when they do not believe they could obtain a conviction on a disciplinary charge. Defendants respond that plaintiffs have not established that defendants punish inmates by raising their risk scores and transferring them to higher custody segregated facilities rather than conducting disciplinary hearings. Defendants further argue that no liberty interest exists in Arizona to remain in the general prison population, thus procedural due process protection is not required for administrative segregation. Further, defendants argue that they provide any procedural due process protection that would be required if plaintiffs had a liberty interest.
Findings of Fact
A. ADOC Classification System and Policy
1. Present Policy
The Arizona Department of Corrections employs an objective classification system which was initiated in 1986 and had a major revision, relevant to confidential informants, effective January of 1991. The present policy consists of ten specific management factors upon which all inmates are rated. These ten factors represent the 1012 correctional classification profile of that inmate and provide *1012 a basis for recommendations as to which unit or facility the inmate will be placed within the institutional system.[1] The ten factors are divided into two categories representing public risk and institutional risk. The two categories are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5

being the highest need or risk, and 1 representing the lowest need or risk.[2] These two numbers are referred to as the inmate's P/I score.
Every 180 days, at a minimum, the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) schedules each inmate for review of his correctional classification profile or P/I score. There are ICCs at every facility throughout the Department of Corrections.[3] Inmates appear at their classification hearings and have the opportunity to comment in terms of whether they agree or disagree with the recommendations.[4] Prior to the hearing, an inmate receives a classification referral form that advises him of the approaching Reclassification Committee hearing. The classification referral form also advises the inmate that he will have a certain amount of time to prepare unless he wishes to waive that right and appear sooner for reclassification.[5] The inmate has the opportunity to provide a statement or witnesses' statements.[6] In some cases, an inmate may have a low or medium P/I score but be confined to a higher custody facility. For example, the inmate's risk score may be a 3, but he is confined by the ICC, with approval of the Central Classification Committee, in a 4 or 5 facility. This situation is referred to as a facility override. Facility overrides can be utilized on the basis of specific circumstances of an individual case. The Department of Corrections maintains a maximum of 10% overrides for all offender actions in any given year.[7]
After the ICC makes its recommendation, the facility warden or administrator adds his or her recommendation.[8] The Central Classification Committee makes the final recommendation.[9] A Reclassification Committee is not permitted to implement its own recommendation without first obtaining approval from the Bureau of Offender Services.[10] The inmate may appeal the final determination made by Central Classification to the Administrator of the Bureau of Offender Services.[11] The Bureau of Offender Services has the authority to uphold or modify the classification or order a rehearing.[12] Robert Olding, Administrator of the Bureau of Offender Services with the Arizona Department of Corrections, is the final authority of record in determining whether the recommendation of the Reclassification Committee will be upheld or overturned.[13]
During the reclassification process, an inmate's classification may be increased based on the use of confidential information.[14] Current Departmental policy requires that the reliability of a confidential informant be established in an attempt to corroborate the confidential information before any action is taken against the inmates.[15]
1013 *1013 In order for information from a confidential informant to provide the basis for a recommendation that an inmate's classification be increased, several requirements must be met. First, there must be some corroboration to the confidential informant's information.[16] Additionally, the person writing the report (not the informant) must appear at the reclassification hearing and provide testimony to the Committee about information received from the confidential informant.[17] The Department utilizes a Confidential Informant Reliability Assessment Questionnaire to insure the reliability of confidential information.[18] The purpose of the form is to provide information regarding the investigation and the reliability and corroboration of the confidential information.[19] The history of the confidential informant is examined to determine whether (1) he/she has provided reliable or unreliable information in the past, (2) there is any identifiable gain on the part of an informant and (3) corroboration of the information exists through evidence or a staff report.[20] The Confidential Informant Reliability Assessment Questionnaire is typically completed by the reporting investigator or officer who has written a report regarding the existence of confidential information.[21] This is the same officer who is required to appear in person at the Reclassification Committee hearing.[22] If the questionnaire is not adequately completed or does not meet the requirements set forth in the operations manual, the Committee should disregard the information provided from the confidential informant pertaining to the inmate's classification.[23]
To ascertain the reliability of the information contained in the questionnaire, the reporting officer must look specifically at how the information came about, the history of the confidential informant in terms of providing information, and the information's reliability.[24] If the confidential informant had a history of providing reliable information, that history would be a factor for consideration in determining the reliability of the information.[25] If the informant had provided information discovered to be unreliable, this history would also be a factor for the

Committee's consideration.[26] The identity of the confidential informant is not made known to the inmate whose classification is under assessment.[27] Defendants conceal the identity of the confidential informant to avoid endangering either the informant or the individual whose classification is under review and to minimize interinmate conflict.[28]
In approximately January 1991 and April 1991, the facilities were provided with the new policies on the use of confidential information in classification and disciplinary cases, respectively.[29] A classification seminar was held in the spring or early summer 1991 to train staff in use of the forms attached to the policies.[30] The policies 1014 require establishing the reliability of the informant *1014 and attempting to corroborate the information prior to taking any actions.[31] Defendants agree that these policies will continue to remain in effect at all Arizona State Prison Complexes.[32] In some of the facilities, security staff indicated they never relied upon confidential information for classification or disciplinary decisions, but if they ever had occasion to do so they would follow the 1991 policies.[33] Other facilities indicated that they do not use confidential information in the absence of corroborating physical proof.[34] Some units using confidential information indicated that inmates are only locked down on confidential information where another inmate is at risk or where the security of the institution is threatened.[35] The Central Office staff monitors the use of confidential information on those cases that are appealed to them.[36] Only a small percentage of cases are appealed.[37] Specific differences from this policy are noted below:[38]
1. Florence Facilities:
a. SMU.
This unit uses a form called the Contemporaneous Record Form, which is similar to the department's form contained in the 1991 procedure. The Contemporaneous Record Form was introduced in July 1991.[39]
b. East Unit.
Prior to the 1991 policy, this unit used a narrative format for disciplinary reports that was supposed to contain information on the confidential informant. After the 1991 seminar, they began using the form for classification and disciplinary.[40]
c. North Unit.
A form is not used to determine the reliability of confidential information when used in disciplinary cases. ADOC staff was to have included similar information in their incident reports.[41] The reliability and credibility of information is based on the available physical evidence and what is said on the yard.[42]
There were six cases in the eight months prior to the tour relying on confidential information. Four of these cases were related to one assault.[43]
Unit staff will not take action solely on the basis of confidential information; corroborating physical evidence is required.[44] The Deputy Warden stated he would have no problem requiring his staff to complete the Department's confidential information forms.[45]
d. CB6.
The CB6 staff indicated they did not utilize confidential information.[46]

e. Women's Unit.
The Women's Unit staff indicated they did not utilize confidential information.[47]
2. Winslow: Kaibab Unit.
The staff at Kaibab Unit are provided training twice a year in use of confidential information. Security staff have used the reliability forms since January 1991 or December 1990. Security staff will not use confidential information in the absence of corroborating physical evidence.[48]
1015 *1015 3. Perryville.
This facility started using the department form in April 1991. Prisoners are placed in lockdown immediately based on confidential information pending verification of the confidential information if the situation is life threatening or a major breach of security.[49] The form is filled out if the prisoner is facing a disciplinary or classification procedure in which confidential information will be used, even when physical evidence is found.[50] The credibility check on confidential information may take 30 days, but this is rare. When a prisoner is locked down because the incident is life threatening or caused a major security breach, the credibility check takes approximately 11 days.[51]
2. Policy Prior to January of 1991
Prior to the 1991 revision in policy for confidential informants, ADOC did not utilize the confidential information reliability form in order to determine objectively the reliability of confidential information.[52] Prisoners were not informed of the specific details of the alleged activity that would identify the confidential informant.[53] The inmate is provided with enough information to understand what the allegation consists of and enough information for them to understand the logic of why classification action was taken and on what that action was based.[54]
B. Inmate Testimony
To support their claims, plaintiffs presented the testimony of two inmates. The first inmate was Jeffrey Phillips. In August of 1990, inmate Jeffrey Phillips was confined in the Kaibab Unit in Winslow, Arizona.[55] Inmate Phillips' classification score in August of 1990 was 4/1. The two numbers mean that inmate Phillips was classified on a scale of 1 to 5 as a public risk of 4 and an institutional risk of 1.[56] On September 4, 1990, the Chief of Security at the Kaibab North Unit obtained confidential information that Jeffrey Phillips and his cell mate (Axley) were plotting to escape through the barber shop from the Kaibab Unit. The confidential information was corroborated by the following physical evidence and information:[57] As a result of the information, security searched the barber shop within the multi-purpose building in the Kaibab Unit. The search resulted in the discovery of a pry bar. Security also determined that a vent above the barber shop had been opened and all the bolts were loose. [58] Phillips' cell mate Axley worked in the barber shop. In addition, Phillips frequented the barber shop every day, or very often when he was out on the yard.[59] Both inmates were serving long sentences and had previous escape histories.[60]
Inmate Phillips was placed in a lockdown unit in Winslow, Arizona on September 5, 1990.[61] He was not told on September 5, 1990 why he was placed in lockdown.[62] Two days later, on September 7, 1990, inmate Phillips was taken in front of the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) and informed that he was under investigation

1016 for *1016 plotting to escape.[63] Inmate Phillips was present at the hearing and had the opportunity to make a statement.[64] The committee found:[65]
Based on file review, i/m[inmate] interview, institutional record and attached incident reports, ICC recommends P & I scores increase from 4/1 to 4/5 and transfer to ASPC-F SMU. In addition to information from attached incident reports, i/m has history of escape (walk away from CRC in Indiana in 1985) and parole absconding from Indiana DOC in 1987. Has 11 years to earliest parole.
The Deputy Warden approved the override of the I score and placement in SMU [A08].[66] Central Classification in Phoenix overruled the ICC, concluding that the documentation relied on did not support ICC's recommendation to override the I score and ordered that the prisoner's score remain unchanged at I/1.[67]
Subsequently, on October 12, 1990, George Herman, the Deputy Warden at Winslow, submitted a memo to Central Classification with the information relevant to the escape.[68] The memo provided, in pertinent part:
On September 4, 1990, we received information from what is considered a reliable source, that the above two mentioned inmates were planning a (sic) escape from the Kaibab North yard.
This information included the location of a pry bar and possible hack saw blades that were hidden, as well as, the escape route which was to be a drainage tunnel located between the Multi-Purpose building and CB1.
We were able to find the pry bar tool, however, we did not find any hack saw blades.
We were also advised by the C.I. that an escape hatch through a vent located in the Barber shop, where inmates Axley worked, would be used in the escape. The vent in question was then inspected by Warden Ryan and Capt. J. French who discovered all the bolts were loose in the vent accessing the Multi-Purpose building from the Barbershop.
Information was also given that the escape attempt would occur within the next couple of days.
Based on this information, the ICC conducted another hearing on October 25, 1990.[69] The inmate was present and allowed to make a statement.[70] ICC recommended:[71]
Based on file review, inst. rec [institutional record], i/m [inmate] interview, and attached memo [above memo], ICC rec [recommends] P & I scores remain 4/1, and transfer to ASPC-F Central Unit, P-Score o/r [override].
The ICC had evidence that inmate Phillips had an escape history as he had escaped from a facility in Indiana in 1985 and that he was charged with absconding from an Indiana DOC facility in 1987.[72] In recommending the transfer and reclassification of Mr. Phillips, the ICC also had information that inmate Phillips and his cell mate (Axley) were planning to escape from the Kaibab north yard through a drainage tunnel located under a multipurpose building.[73] The confidential informant from whom this information was received had been reliable 1017 in the *1017 past and the physical evidence confirmed the confidential informant's information.[74]
The warden approved the override based on length of sentence, escape threat and history of escape.[75] Central Classification then overruled the ICC's recommendation of a 4/1 score with an override and ordered that his final classification score be raised to 4/5 and that he be transferred to lockdown at SMU.[76] Mr. Phillips was reclassified as a 4/5 and transferred to SMU on January 7, 1991.[77]
The second inmate that presented testimony was Pete Celaya. In January of 1988, inmate Celaya received a disciplinary violation for kicking and fighting, which resulted in his transfer to lockdown status at SMU.[78] On March 14, 1989, the ICC conducted a reclassification score hearing.[79] The inmate was present and allowed to make a statement. The ICC decided that the P & I score should remain at 3/5 and that inmate Celaya should

remain in SMU based on confidential information that he was involved in gang activity [a CIF report dated 3/6/89]. [80] This action was affirmed by the warden and Central Classification on March 14 and March 17, respectively. [81]
On November 6, 1989, the ICC reviewed inmate Celaya's classification and recommended a reduction to a 3/3 score with placement in Perryville.[82] Central Classification approved the reduction.[83] Inmate Celaya was transferred from SMU lockdown, the highest custody facility, to the San Juan Unit at Perryville, a low-medium facility in January of 1990.[84]
Inmate Celaya was locked down at Perryville in March of 1990 based on information from confidential informants. [85] At that time, his classification score was 3/3.[86] Warden Dale Copeland of the Perryville facility was the Deputy Warden of the San Juan Unit at that time. He received numerous anonymous kites that Celaya was involved in organizing Mexican inmates to run drug activities within the San Juan Unit. He also received anonymous kites that Celaya was attempting to extort other inmates within the San Juan unit.[87] Warden Copeland intercepted a letter written in Spanish which indicated there was going to be a hit on another Chicano inmate in the unit. Approximately 48 hours after the letter was intercepted, a confidential informant came forward and told Warden Copeland that Celaya was ordering the hit on the other inmate.[88] The confidential informant had dealt with Warden Copeland on two previous occasions. On both occasions, the information that Warden Copeland had received from the informant was reliable.[89] The second informant, who was to be the victim of the hit, told Warden Copeland that he received information that Celaya had ordered a hit on him as well.[90] 1018 Further, Warden *1018 Copeland believed that Celaya was involved in organizing Mexican inmates on the yard at Perryville because there were several incidents where officers had reported groupings of inmates with Mr. Celaya present. This was an occurrence that had not taken place prior to Celaya's arrival at the unit.[91] A number of the individuals in these groupings included white inmates that were reported to be involved in drug activities.[92]
On March 13, 1990, the ICC conducted a reclassification hearing.[93] Inmate Celaya was present and allowed to make a statement.[94] The ICC recommended that the P & I score remain 3/3 with placement in South Unit in Florence:[95]
Based on file review and confidential information i/m [inmate] involved with New Mexican Mafia. It is also felt that Celaya is attempting to organize younger mexican inmates. It is also felt that i/m [inmate] is attempting to control drug traffic in the unit. Also i/m's [inmate's] brother is on the yard.
Warden Copeland disagreed recommending an increased P/I score of 4/3.[96] Central Classification agreed with the Warden and raised inmate Celaya's score to 4/3 and recommended placement in the Central Unit at Florence.[97] Inmate Celaya was informed that his classification score was raised to 4/3 and that he was to be transferred to a maximum security facility.[98]
A July 17, 1991 memo recommended that inmate Celaya be transferred from Central Unit in Florence to SMU[99] based on information from a confidential informant that inmate Celaya was involved in a deadly assault in the Central Unit.[100] The ICC conducted a hearing on August 23, 1991, but continued the hearing for further information.[101] ICC resumed the hearing on August 27, 1991 recommended a P & I score of 4/1 with an override and placement in SMU.[102] The warden approved.[103] However, Central Classification ordered a rehearing because the required documents relied on by the ICC were not submitted.[104]
Conclusions of Law
The first issue relevant to this issue are whether inmates within the Arizona Department of Corrections have a due process right in remaining in general population. Specifically, the issue is whether the inmates have a

protected liberty interest in not having their public/institutional scores increased and remaining in general population, rather than being housed in higher custody facilities that segregate inmates.
A. Do Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest?
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, see. 1. Therefore, the first step in a due process analysis is the determination of whether plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in being included in the general prison population. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.1986). Without a liberty 1019 interest, the *1019 constitution does not require prison officials to grant inmates any procedural protection before placing those inmates in administrative segregation. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1089 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)).
Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources: (1) the due process clause or (2) the laws of the states. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).
1. Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause itself does not create a liberty interest in remaining within the general prison population or being free from administrative segregation.[105]Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091 (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869). A liberty interest is not created even when administrative segregation involves "severe hardships", i.e. denial of access to educational, recreational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs, confinement to cells for long periods, or restrictions in exercise privileges. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869.
The Supreme Court has also held that there is no liberty interest implicated in a prison's reclassification and transfer decisions. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. Given a valid criminal conviction, a criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the state may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison systems so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. The Constitution does not require that the state have more than one prison for convicted felons, nor does it guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the state to confine him in any of its prisons. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. That life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a fourteenth amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. Thus, the transferring of inmates to a more restrictive facility does not implicate a fourteenth amendment created liberty interest. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. Rather, it is reasonable for inmates to expect to be administratively segregated at some point in their incarceration, as a transfer to more restrictive facilities for nonpunitive reasons is contemplated by the terms of their confinement. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869.
2. State created liberty interest
Statutes and regulations governing daily operations of a prison system do not confer any liberty interest in and of themselves. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 469-471, 103 S.Ct. at 870-71. Rather, a liberty interest is created by "repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871. Thus, the use of language with "unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures `shall,' `will' or `must' be employed and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates0907viz., `the need for control,' or `the threat of a serious disturbance'" will create a liberty interest. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871. Where state law gives prison officials the discretion to transfer prisoners for any number of reasons, not limited to instances of serious misconduct, no liberty interest is created. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 227-28, 96 S.Ct. at 2540.

In 1986, based on the regulations and statute effective at that time, the Ninth Circuit held that the Arizona statutes 1020 and regulations promulgated by the Legislature *1020 and state correctional officials regarding administrative
segregation did not create a liberty interest. McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.1986). The statute, A.R.S. § 41-1604(B)(2)(e), has not changed and grants discretion to the director of the Department of Corrections to transfer inmates.[106] In 1986, defendants' administrative regulations vested the Director with the power to reclassify a prisoner without regard to the suggested criteria or procedures when he determined "in his sole discretion, that adherence to the procedures ... may jeopardize the welfare or security of inmates, Department of Correction staff or the public." A.C.R.R. R5-1-206 (1986). This regulation no longer exists.[107] Rather, A.C.R.R. R5-1-206 provides:
R5-1-206 Security Measures within Prisons
A. All security procedures necessary to enable the Director to hold inmates in custody, as required by A.R.S. § 41-201.01 to ensure the safe, secure and orderly operation of the prison shall remain in effect and enforced without exception.
A.C.R.R. § R5-1-206 (1992).
Because A.R.S. § 41-1604 and administrative regulation R5-1-206 place discretion for transfer of inmates with the Director, they do not create a liberty interest for inmates to remain in general population.[108]
The only remaining issue is whether the current classification and segregation policies create a liberty interest for inmates to remain in general population or in lower custody facilities or not have their classification risk scores increased. The policy for inmate classification is set forth in Defendants' Exhibit 806, which is Internal Management Policy (IMP) 500.1. This policy was effective January 1, 1991. A thorough review of the policy establishes that it does not create a liberty interest for inmates in a particular classification, in having a classification score decreased or in not having a classification score increased. The policy contains no mandatory language to the effect that a P/I score will not be increased unless certain conditions occur. Such language, referred to by the Supreme Court in Hewitt as "substantive predicates," does not exist in the policy. Unlike the regulations at issue in Hewitt, the policy does not require that risk scores will not increase or that inmates will not be moved absent such "substantive predicates" as "the need for control," or "the threat of a serious disturbance." Rather, the institution administrators have wide discretion to change those scores at any time during incarceration for any reason. The policy specifically provides that "a classification hearing may be scheduled at other intervals [in addition to the six month intervals] by the Institutional Warden, deputy Warden or Administrator when a change in Public Risk and/or Institutional Risk Scores may be indicated."[109] Thus, the classification policy does not create a liberty interest in changes in classification scores. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871.
A review of the administrative segregation policy results in the same conclusion. The policy for administrative segregation is set forth at Defendants' Exhibit 807, IMP 304, effective November 3, 1989 and Defendants' Exhibit 808, IMP 600.5, effective January 3, 1989. The protective segregation policy provides that the Institutional Classification Committee also serves as the Protective Segregation Committee in each unit.[110] This policy is a 1021 similar, more simplified version of the reclassification policy. It does not *1021 contain any mandatory language or require that inmates remain in general population "absent specified substantive predicates" such as "the need for control," or "the threat of a serious disturbance." Rather, the institution administrators have wide discretion to place inmates in administrative segregation at any time during incarceration if an inmate is in "danger." Thus, the policy does not create a liberty interest in remaining in general population or not being placed in administrative segregation. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871. Without a liberty interest, the constitution does not require prison officials to grant inmates any procedural protection. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1089.
IMP 600.5 is the policy for administrative segregation of inmates in Perryville. The policy defines administrative segregation as "a form of separation of an inmate from the general population administered by the Administrative Segregation Committee when the continued presence of an inmate in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates or to the secure and orderly operation of the institution in accordance with IMP 304.9."[111] This policy also allows wide discretion to the warden or administrator of the

institution with liberal use of the word "may." For example, the policy provides that the warden "may" place an inmate in immediate administrative detention "when it is deemed necessary to protect the inmate or others, or to preserve the orderly and secure operation of the institution."[112] The Committee "may" also place or release an inmate into administrative detention.[113] Therefore, this policy does not create a liberty interest for inmates in remaining in general population. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871.
3. What Process is Due?
Because inmates do not have a due process clause or state created liberty interest in remaining in general population, not being transferred to higher custody facilities or not having their P/I scores increased, the constitution does not require prison officials to grant inmates any procedural protection. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1089.
However, a review of the policies establish that even assuming the inmates had a liberty interest to be in general population and free from administrative segregation and to not having their classification scores increased, any process that would be due has been provided to the inmates by the defendants.
Due process requirements differ for segregation based on whether the purpose of the decision is an 1022 administrative decision or for disciplinary purposes.[114] The Supreme *1022 Court in Hewitt held that an
informal, and non-adversarial review of the evidence is sufficient to place an inmate who represents a security threat in administrative segregation pending an investigation of the misconduct charges against him or the accuracy of information received from confidential informants. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874. The Hewitt Court further held that an inmate placed in administrative segregation must merely receive "... some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation ..." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874.
The defendants' policy clearly meets any of the due process requirements that could exist if the defendants' policy had created a liberty interest in particular classifications so inmates had the right to be housed in particular facilities or general population. Pursuant to defendants' policy, every six months,[115] the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) conducts classification hearings for each inmate.[116] The inmate must be notified of the hearing[117] and has the opportunity to provide a statement or witnesses' statements.[118] The ICC decision is reviewed by the warden or administrator of the facility and by Central Classification before it is implemented. The inmate is provided written notice of the determination. The inmate may appeal the final determination made by Central Classification to the Administrator of the Bureau of Offender Services.[119] The Bureau of Offender Services has the authority to uphold or modify the classification or order a rehearing.[120]
Further, the record establishes that both plaintiffs Phillips and Celaya were provided such due process protection. [121] Both received notice and were present at their reclassification hearings and were allowed to make a statement. After the hearing and Central Classification approval, they received written notice of the reclassification decision and were allowed to appeal.
Plaintiffs also raise the issue of the use of confidential informants in the administrative segregation and reclassification processes. The Ninth Circuit has only addressed the issue of the use of confidential information in the context of disciplinary proceedings in which a liberty interest and due process rights exist. In Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207, 108 S.Ct. 2851, 101 L.Ed.2d 888 (1988), the Ninth Circuit clarified the circumstances under which a prison disciplinary committee may rely on the statement of a confidential informant:
We hold that a prison disciplinary committee's determination derived from a statement of an unidentified inmate informant satisfies due process when (1) the record contains some factual information from which the committee can reasonably conclude that the information was reliable, and (2) the record contains a prison official's affirmative statement that safety considerations prevent the disclosure of the informant's name.

Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186.

The Ninth Circuit further explained:

1023

*1023 Reliability may be established by: (1) the oath of the investigating officer appearing before the committee as to the truth of his report that contains confidential information, (2) corroborating testimony, (3) a statement on the record by the chairman of the committee that he had firsthand knowledge of sources of information and considered them reliable based on the informant's past record, or (4) an in camera review of the documentation from which credibility was assessed. Proof that an informant previously supplied reliable information is sufficient.

Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186-187 (footnote and citation omitted).

Defendants' present policy regarding the use of confidential informants clearly complies with these requirements. Further, although the segregation of inmates Celaya and Phillips were administrative in nature, and not disciplinary, the Zimmerlee due process requirements were satisfied for both inmates Phillips and Celaya. The confidential informants utilized in the decision to transfer Celaya and Phillips to more restrictive facilities both had a documented history of past reliability. In addition, the information obtained from the confidential informants was corroborated by physical evidence. The information obtained from the confidential informant used in Phillips' segregation decision was corroborated by the discovery of the specific type of physical evidence in the location described by the informant. Specifically, a pry bar was found in the barber shop where inmate Phillips planned to escape and loosened bolts in a vent identified by the informant were discovered. The information obtained from the confidential informant used in Celaya's segregation decision was also corroborated by physical evidence. A letter describing the planned assassination of another inmate was intercepted and relied on in the administrative decision to transfer Celaya to a more restrictive facility. Further, the prison Warden observed Celaya mingling with a group of inmates suspected of organized drug trafficking within the prison. Another confidential informant used in the Celaya administrative segregation decision had first-hand knowledge regarding the planned assassination, as he was the intended victim. Thus, the decision to place Celaya and Phillips in administrative segregation at higher security facilities with less restrictions were warranted and grounded in fact. Furthermore, the safety of the confidential informants would be jeopardized by disclosure of their identities. Due process does not require the disclosure of the identity of the informant to the inmate. Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 568-69, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2980-81, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Thus, the inmates received any due process that would have been required had they had a liberty interest in remaining in general population or placement in particular facilities and defendants did not violate plaintiffs' due process rights.

Conclusion

The plaintiffs do not possess a liberty interest to be free from transfers to more restrictive facilities under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or under a state created liberty interest. Therefore, they are not entitled to procedural due process protection in the placement in administrative segregation or particular facilities or in the assessment of classifications or P/I scores. Even if plaintiffs had established a protected liberty interest, defendants provide plaintiffs with sufficient due process to satisfy the Constitution for administrative segregation and classification procedures. The Court commends defendants for providing due process protection and encourages defendants to continue providing such due process protection. By providing hearings which would satisfy any due process that would be required if a liberty interest existed, the defendants' decisions carry greater authority and a sense of fair play than if the decisions were conducted in an arbitrary manner without any basis in fact and without an opportunity for a hearing.

[1] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 116, lines 12-25; Defendants' Exhibit 806.
[2] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 116, lines 15-21; Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992 at p. 44, lines 7-14; Defendants' Exhibit 806 and 809.

[3] Keeney testimony, 1/27/1992, p. 44, line 22 p. 0907 45, line 1; Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 122, line 22 p. 0907 123, line 10; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [4] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 123, lines 12-15; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [5] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 123, lines 16-24; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [6] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.5.3.5. [7] Defendants' Exhibit 806. [8] Defendants' Exhibit 806. [9] Defendants' Exhibit 806. [10] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 134, lines 7-13. [11] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.8. [12] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.8.3. [13] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 133, line 240907 p. 134, line 6; Stipulation, § III. [14] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 126, lines 14-17; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [15] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 126, lines 14-17; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [16] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 126, lines 18-25; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [17] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 126, lines 18-25; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [18] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 126, line 180907 p. 127, line 6; Defendants' Exhibits 806 and 809. [19] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 128, lines 15-18; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [20] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 133, lines 2-17; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [21] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 128, lines 8-11; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [22] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 128, lines 12-14; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [23] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 128, line 240907 p. 129, line 7; Defendants' Exhibit 806 and 809. [24] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 130, lines 10-20; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [25] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 130, line 210907 p. 131, line 1; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [26] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 131, lines 4-10; Defendants' Exhibit 806. [27] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 134, lines 14-18. [28] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 134, lines 20-22. [29] Stipulation, § III; Defendants' Exhibits 806 and 808. [30] Stipulation, § III. [31] Stipulation, § III. [32] Stipulation, § III; Defendants' Exhibit 808. [33] Stipulation, § III.

[34] Stipulation, § III. [35] Stipulation, § III. [36] Stipulation, § III. [37] Stipulation, § III. [38] Stipulation, § III. [39] Stipulation, § III.A.1. [40] Stipulation, § III.A.2. [41] Stipulation, § III.A.3.a. [42] Stipulation, § III.A.3.b. [43] Stipulation, § III.A.3.c. [44] Stipulation, § III.A.3.d. [45] Stipulation, § III.A.3.e. [46] Stipulation, § III.A.4. [47] Stipulation, § III.A.5. [48] Stipulation, § III.B.1-3. [49] Stipulation, § III.C.1. [50] Stipulation, § III.C.2. [51] Stipulation, § III.C.3. [52] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 98, lines 6-7; p. 112, lines 8-11. [53] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 154, lines 1-7; p. 171, lines 12-18. [54] Olding testimony, 1/14/1992, p. 155, lines 12-18. [55] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 176, lines 13-14. [56] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 177, lines 4-7. [57] Ryan testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 165, lines 1-3. [58] Ryan testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 163, line 24 p. 0907 164, line 14. [59] Ryan testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 175, lines 21-24. [60] Ryan testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 164, lines 20-25. [61] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 177, lines 13-21. [62] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 177, lines 22-24. [63] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 178, lines 5-10; p. 198, lines 12-15. [64] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 290. [65] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 290.

[66] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 165, line 1 p. 0907 166, line 3; p. 179, lines 14-22; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 290. [67] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 290. [68] Defendants' Exhibit 541(a). [69] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 293. [70] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 293. [71] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 293; Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 180, lines 24-25, p. 181, lines 1-24. [72] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 189, lines 3-6, 13-15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 290. [73] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 190, lines 20-23; Defendants' Exhibit 541(a). [74] Ryan testimony, 1/15/1992, p. 178, line 23 p. 0907 179, line 5. [75] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 293. [76] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 293; Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 181, line 25, p. 182, lines 1-25, p. 183, lines 1-14. [77] Phillips testimony, 12/16/1991, p. 187, lines 2-3. [78] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 42, line 25, p. 43, lines 1-10; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b. [79] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b. [80] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 43, lines 11-19, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b. [81] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a. [82] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a. [83] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a. [84] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 95, lines 12-15; Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 46, lines 10-16. [85] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 46, lines 17-23; Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 103, lines 5-23, p. 104, lines 19-22; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b. [86] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 47, lines 1-2. [87] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 95, line 22 p. 0907 96, line 3. [88] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 96, lines 7-23. [89] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 97, lines 3-8. [90] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 99, lines 10-14. [91] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 113, lines 18-24. [92] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 114, lines 4-7. [93] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 299; Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 104, lines 20-22. [94] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b. [95] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a. [96] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a.

[97] Copeland testimony, 1/16/1992, p. 101, lines 17-23; p. 105, lines 18-23; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19a.
[98] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 49, lines 1-4; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19b.
[99] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1991, p. 31, line 220907 p. 32, line 8.
[100] Celaya testimony, 12/17/1992, p. 32, lines 12-24; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 297.
[101] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 297.
[102] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 297.
[103] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 297.
[104] Plaintiffs' Exhibit 297.
[105] Relevant to disciplinary proceedings, that are not involved in this case, the due process clause itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
[106] A.R.S. § 41-1604(B)(2)(e) provides:
B. The director may:
* * * * * *
2. Take any administrative action to improve the efficiency of the department, including but not limited to the following:
* * * * * *
(e) Transfer adult inmates between adult institutions or adult facilities.
A.R.S. § 41-1604(B)(2)(e) (1992) (emphasis added).
[107] The history of the regulations indicates that many of the regulations were repealed upon a determination that such regulations were exempt from the Administrative Procedures Act.
[108] See also Lawrence v. ADOC, 151 Ariz. 599, 729 P.2d 953 (1986).
[109] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.1.2.
[110] Defendants' Exhibit 807, IMP 304.4.2.
[111] Defendants' Exhibit 808, IMP 600.4.2.
[112] Defendants' Exhibit 808, IMP 600.5.1.
[113] Defendants' Exhibit 808, IMP 600.5.209075.3.
[114] In Wolff v. McDonnell, the United States Supreme Court held that [based on the state created liberty interest] due process requires certain procedural safeguards before a prison inmate can be deprived of statutory good time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Where a disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, an inmate must receive written notice of the alleged violation at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the disciplinary hearing. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d at 955. This notice informs the inmate of the charges and enables him to prepare his defense. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d at 95. At the hearing, the inmate may call witnesses and present evidence in defense of the charges when permitting the inmate to do so would not threaten institutional security or correctional goals. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d at 956. The hearing officer must provide a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d at 955.

The Supreme Court further defined the quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy due process in a prison disciplinary decision. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). "The requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d at 365. The Court reasoned that since revocation of good time credits was not comparable to a criminal conviction due process did not require courts to set aside disciplinary decisions that have some basis in fact. Hill, 472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 1774, 86 L.Ed.2d at 365. A court's review under this standard "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d at 365; Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207, 108 S.Ct. 2851, 101 L.Ed.2d 888 (1988).
The evidentiary standard is minimal because the prison atmosphere is considered special, because prison officials often must act swiftly in exigent circumstances, based on minimal information. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. Therefore, the due process clause of the Constitution does not require courts to set aside prison administrative decisions that are based in fact.
[115] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.4.
[116] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.4.
[117] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.5.2.
[118] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.5.3.5.
[119] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.8.
[120] Defendants' Exhibit 806, IMP 500.8.3.
[121] The decisions to transfer inmates Celaya and Phillips were based on administrative decisions relevant to possible escape and gang related activities, both of which relate to institutional security and personal safety concerns of inmates and guards. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874. Although the plaintiffs alleged that they were transferred as punishment, there was no evidence that the purposes of the transfers were other than safety and security of the facilities.
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 773 F.Supp. 1365 (1991)
Fletcher CASEY, Jr., et al., on behalf of themselves & all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
No. CIV 90-0054-PHX-CAM.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
September 6, 1991.
1366 *1366 Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Stuart H. Adams, Jr., David C. Fathi, ACLU Nat. Prison Project, Washington, D.C., Alice L. Bendheim, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff class.
Edward G. Hochuli, Kathleen L. Wieneke, Daniel P. Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MUECKE, District Judge.
Having considered all the pleadings filed with respect to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and the oral argument presented to the Court on August 23, 1991, the Court concludes as follows:
INTRODUCTION
This case was filed on January 12, 1990. On June 26, 1990, this Court certified a class composed of all adult persons who are now or who in the future will be in the custody of or under the supervision of the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The class also consists of a subclass of all prisoners who are handicapped and within the custody of the ADOC. Named plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the class, inclusive of the subclass.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs specifically request that the Court 1367 issue an Order prohibiting a *1367 blanket prohibition against contact attorney visits and that defendants' policy of denying food service jobs to prisoners who test HIV positive be invalidated.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of showing the absence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party must provide to the court a statement of specific uncontroverted facts, separate from its motion for summary judgment, on which it bases its motion. District of Arizona, Local Rule 11(l)(1). The moving party need not present affidavits or other materials negating the opponent's claims, but need only inform the court of the basis of its motion and indicate those portions of the pleadings and any other evidentiary matter listed in Rule

56(c) that support its contention that no genuine issue of fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The moving party must cite specifically the portion of the record where the court can find the particular facts supporting its motion. District of Arizona, Local Rule 11(l)(1).
To defeat the motion, the party opposing summary judgment must establish that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to any element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Industries Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1989). The opposing party may not merely rely on the assertions and allegations of the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Like the moving party, the party opposing the motion must direct the court's attention to where those facts appear in the pleadings, affidavits, and other evidentiary matter used to support the opposition; merely citing the record without designating where the fact is stated is not sufficiently specific. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2548; see Nissho-Iwai American Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.1988). If the opposing party does not respond in the manner specified in Rule 56(e), summary judgment will be granted. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e).
II. Contact Attorney Visits
On May 9, 1991, this Court preliminarily enjoined defendants from implementation of a policy that denied contact attorney visits between prisoners and their attorneys in Cellblock 6 ("CB6") of the Arizona State Prison in Florence. Plaintiffs' motion seeks to have this ruling applied to all the facilities that prohibit contact visits between prisoners and attorneys. These facilities include the Special Management Unit ("SMU"), CB6, the Alhambra Reception Center ("Alhambra"), and all facilities where prisoners are kept in lockdown status. Where it is necessary, the Court will deal with each unit individually.
An inmate is entitled to meaningful access to the courts under the fourteenth amendment. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). A prisoner's right to access to the courts encompasses a right to contact attorney visits. Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1990).
Any infringement by prison administrators upon a prisoner's meaningful access to the courts must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 1368 (1987). Turner identifies four factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a prison regulation: 1) *1368 There must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; 2) Whether there are alternative means for the inmate to exercise his or her constitutional right; 3) What impact the exercise of the constitutional right will have on the guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and 4) the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.
A. Whether there is a Rational Connection between the Prison Regulation and the Legitimate Governmental Interest put Forward to Justify it.
"[A] regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. In Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit concluded that prison officials must provide evidence of the purpose of a regulation and how it furthers a legitimate penological interest. See id. at 388.
Defendants provided no proof of the regulation's purpose or how it furthers a legitimate penological objective. They offered no evidence that contact attorney visits resulted in escapes or assaults in any of the facilities.
In addition, as the Court noted with respect to CB6,

the fact that defendants allow some CB6 prisoners to have contact visits with their families[1] undermines any conclusion that there is a rational connection between the regulations and any legitimate penological interest of preventing escapes and assaults. Defendants offered no evidence that attorneys, as officers of the Court, are more likely than family members to assist in escapes or be assaulted. Indeed, the only evidence of an escape presented by defendants was perpetrated with the assistance of family members.
Court's Order of May 9, 1991, at 5.
Similarly, with respect to SMU, the Court believes that there is no rational connection between the non-contact policy and a legitimate governmental interest. SMU is a high security lockdown unit that houses the most highly disruptive and violent inmates within the Department of Corrections. All visitation at SMU, including attorney visitation, is non-contact. Although the type of inmates housed at SMU and the fact that no contact visitation is allowed is persuasive, that still does not appear to be sufficient to implement a blanket denial of contact attorney visitation. The inmates housed in SMU, as plaintiffs' counsel noted in oral argument, are the same inmates that were housed in CB6 before the opening of SMU. With respect to CB6, there have been no escapes, assaults, or incidents whereby dangerous contraband entered the institution as a result of a contact attorney-client visit. Court's Order of May 9, 1991, at 2. Defendants did not provide any evidence to show that SMU inmates, as a group, posed a security risk such that the entire unit should be denied contact visits with their attorneys.[2] As this Court previously concluded, blanket denial of contact attorney visitation is constitutionally impermissible. See Court's Order of May 9, 1991, at 6.
Finally, defendants' assertion that inmates at Alhambra, who have not yet been classified and therefore must be considered a Level 5 (the highest risk), and not entitled to contact visits, must fail. A prisoner's classification (or non-classification as the matter may be) or housing assignment is not sufficient to deny the prisoner his or her fundamental right to contact attorney visits.
1369 In short, the record in this case precludes the Court from determining whether defendants *1369 asserted justification 0907 prevention of escapes and assaults 0907 was the actual reason for implementing the non-contact visitation policy. Moreover, defendants have not established that there is a rational connection between the prison regulation and any legitimate governmental interest. They provided no evidence of the regulation's purpose or how it furthers a legitimate penological objective. They did not cite a single incident in which escapes and/or assaults occurred as a result of contact visitation between attorneys and prisoners. Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts ("SOF"), at para. 9[3]; Cf. Jackson v. Elrod, 671 F.Supp. 1508 (N.D.Ill.1987) (court rejected affidavit because it did not cite a single incident in which hard-cover books, which were banned by prison, were used to convey contraband).
B. Whether the Alternative Means of Exercising the Right are Inadequate.
According to defendants, the "alternative means for inmates to exercise their right to communicate with counsel include the mail, non-contact visitation and non-monitored telephone calls." Defendants' Response, at 11. While defendants' alternatives are adequate in many instances, there is no doubt that, in an equal number of instances, counsel need contact visits in order to assess a witness' demeanor and credibility. It is more difficult to assess a prisoner's demeanor while he or she is in, for example, a cage such as the one used in CB6. In addition, contact visits are necessary in order to establish a relationship between the attorney and his or her client. Ching, 895 F.2d at 610. Finally, since the Ninth Circuit recognizes contact visits as a part of the constitutional right to access to the courts, any alternative, except contact visits, is inadequate unless defendants make a showing that a particular inmate's right to contact visits must be abridged for valid penological reasons.

C. Whether, and the Extent to which, Contact Visits will Impact Other Inmates, Prison Staff, or Prison Resources in General.
In their response, defendants present argument only with regard to SMU. They assert that "[t]he physical plant at SMU is not designed to accommodate contact visitation.... To allow the high risk inmates at SMU into this nonsecure area would greatly increase the possibility of violence, escapes and/or hostage situations. Additionally, the staffing that would be required in order to conduct such contact visitation is not available at SMU." Defendants' Response, at 11.
Defendants' claim that contact visits at SMU would require the expenditure of additional resources is insufficient since the "cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, 97 S.Ct. at 1496. Further, defendants have, with respect to SMU and all other units, provided virtually no evidence showing an adverse impact on prison resources generally from the provision of contact attorney visits. They provided no evidence to show that contact visits at SMU will have a significant impact on other inmates, guards, or prison resources. Without any evidence that contact visits will have a significant impact on prison resources, this Court is unwilling to abridge an inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts. Defendants cannot avoid their constitutional obligation to provide prisoners with contact attorney visits simply by asserting that the visitation area is non-secure.
D. Whether there is an Absence of Ready Alternatives.
Defendants assert that non-contact visits "are not an exaggerated response due to the class of inmate housed in these facilities." Defendants' Response, at 12. However, the Court believes that defendants' current security 1370 measures are an obvious, *1370 easy alternative to denying contact visits. These measures make escape or the introduction of dangerous contraband unlikely. For example, with respect to SMU, defendants search a prisoner both before and after a non-contact attorney visit. They also search attorneys and other legal visitors for contraband before they enter SMU for a legal visit. Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts ("SOF"), at para. 15. Defendants can observe both the attorney and the prisoner during a legal visit. Id. at para. 20. Similarly, with respect to CB-6, correctional officers can observe the entire visit. No assaults have occurred in the history of CB-6, and family contact visits are allowed in this unit. In short, DOC's search and observation procedures are sufficient to protect prisoners, attorneys and DOC staff. DOC's precautions are reasonable, and a blanket denial of contact visits, under the circumstances of this case, is an exaggerated response.
III. Assignment of HIV Positive Prisoners to Food Service Jobs
DOC policy prohibits the assignment of prisoners who test HIV positive to food service jobs. Defendants' SOF, at para. 15. According to defendants,
This practice was developed in response to situations where inmates had threatened physical harm to inmates who are HIV positive. Additionally, this practice began after a large riot occurred at ASPC-Douglas on March 7, 1987. [O]ne of the primary causes of the riot was inmate dissatisfaction with the reuse of plastic tableware that could have possibly been used by an inmate who was known by the general population to have AIDS.
Defendants' Motion, at 12-13.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants' policy of excluding HIV positive prisoners from food service jobs violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in ... or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...

29 U.S.C. § 794. A handicapped person is any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). A person is "otherwise qualified" for purposes of § 504 if he or she
is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is someone who can perform the essential functions of the job in question.
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Section 504 applies to persons with contagious diseases. Id. at 289, 107 S.Ct. at 1132. The factors a court must consider in determining whether a contagious disease can be considered a handicap under Section 504 are:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
Id. at 288, 107 S.Ct. at 1131. Using these guidelines, courts have held that persons who are HIV positive are handicapped persons to whom § 504 applies. See Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1988); Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir.1988).
Although a significant risk of transmission of the AIDS virus could justify exclusion of the infected person from a job for which he or she is otherwise qualified, Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 16, the Ninth Circuit has found, based on reasonable medical judgments, that there is no significant risk of transmitting HIV 1371 disease except through "(1) intimate *1371 sexual contact with an infected person; (2) invasive exposure to contaminated blood or certain other bodily fluids; or (3) perinatal exposure (i.e., from mother to infant)." Chalk, 840 F.2d at 706. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit cited the conclusions of the Surgeon General of the United States that "[t]here is no evidence of transmission (spread) of AIDS virus even though ... family members shared food, towels, cups, razors, even toothbrushes, and kissed each other." Id.
Defendants assert that their policy restricting HIV positive inmates from working in food services is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. Defendants' Response, at 12. As indicated earlier, this policy was developed in response to situations that threatened the security of the prison, particularly those inmates who are HIV positive. Id.
Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. First, defendants' argument is based on the rational basis test. However, § 504 does not employ the rational basis test; it flatly prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified individual[s] with handicaps." 29 U.S.C. § 794. "[T]he statute provides that a recipient ... may not discriminate on the basis of handicap, regardless of whether there is a rational basis for so discriminating." Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir.1981); Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.1984) (citing with approval Pushkin's rejection of the rational basis test).
Defendants rely on Farmer v. Moritsugu, 742 F.Supp. 525 (1990), for the proposition that policies that prohibit HIV positive inmates from working in food service are constitutionally permissible. The rational relationship test is properly employed when it is alleged that a prison regulation restricts a "constitutional" right. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). However, Farmer, which was based on the equal protection clause, has no relevance to plaintiffs' challenge under § 504.
In addition, defendants' concerns that the policy "serves an important interest in protecting [HIV positive] inmates who are unconvinced of prevailing medical opinion regarding the difficulty of transmission of the AIDS virus," Defendants' Response, at 14, is insufficient under § 504. Defendants further state: "Although unfounded, inmate fear that they may contract the HIV virus from infected inmates through casual conduct is prevalent, despite programming efforts by Defendants." Id. ADOC's policy is not based on a fear of transmission of the disease. Rather, it is based on the unfounded fears and mythologies of the prisoners. Indeed, DOC's Facility Health

Administrator believes that prisoners would continue to have irrational fears even if they were to receive education. Plaintiffs' SOF, at para. 39.
The basis for defendants' policy is inconsistent with § 504. Congress enacted § 504
to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others.... Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about the disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.... The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments....
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-85, 107 S.Ct. at 1129 (emphasis added). Furthermore, while defendants arguably may make an individual determination as to whether a particular HIV positive prisoner seeking a job assignment is "otherwise qualified" to perform the duties of a food service employee, DOC's blanket prohibition against all HIV positive prisoners is clearly inconsistent with § 504:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.
1372 *1372 Id. at 285, 107 S.Ct. at 1129-1130. By prohibiting categorical exclusions, § 504 protects "handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotype, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks." Id. at 287, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 (footnotes omitted).
In short, ADOC's justification (i.e., the irrational fears of the inmates) for its blanket prohibition concerning HIV positive inmates is inconsistent with § 504. Section 504 requires that an individual determination be made as to whether a handicapped person is "otherwise qualified." Id. at 287, 107 S.Ct. at 1130. Defendants' policy cannot withstand summary judgment unless they can prove that each HIV-positive prisoner would present a significant risk of transmitting the virus if he or she worked in food services, and that no reasonable accommodation would reduce the risk to an insignificant level. See id. at 287-88, 107 S.Ct. at 1130-31.
It should be noted that defendants, however, did not argue that HIV-positive inmates present a significant risk of transmitting the virus. Indeed, defendants implicitly concede that there is no risk that such transmission would occur. See Defendants' Response, at 14 (policy protects inmates and staff "from retaliation by inmates who are unconvinced of prevailing medical opinion regarding the difficulty of transmission of the AIDS virus. Although unfounded, inmate fear that they may contract the HIV virus from infected inmates through casual conduct is prevalent, despite programming efforts by Defendants."). Thus, unless defendants make a showing that there is a significant risk of transmission, and that they cannot reasonably accommodate the HIV-positive inmate to reduce the risk to an insignificant level, the court has no choice but to grant summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 504 claim.
It should also be noted that even if the Court were to accept defendants' argument concerning security and the possibility of a riot, summary judgment would still be granted in plaintiffs' favor because defendants did not properly oppose the motion for summary judgment. "[B]ecause an affiant is not subject to cross-examination, the judge deciding the motion must exercise considerable care in assigning weight to the affidavits presented to him." 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738, at 473 (West 1983). "[U]ltimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law, as well as statements made on belief or `on information and belief,' cannot be utilized on a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 486-88 (footnotes omitted). Here, the affidavits relied upon by defendants in opposing plaintiffs' motion appear to be based on speculation, conclusory statements, and allegations not based on personal knowledge. For example, the affidavit of J.C. Keeney states: "It is well known that one of the major causes of riots at correctional institutions in the United States is inmate dissatisfaction with food services." Defendants' Response, Exhibit 1, at para. 7. The affidavit of Mr. Terry Stewart, Assistant Director for Human Resources Development and Training, provides: "[T]his practice [of denying jobs to HIV-positive persons] is necessary in order to maintain security and order of the facilities." Id. at Exhibit 4, at para. 4.

CONCLUSION
The Court will grant plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. First, with respect to attorney contact visitation, defendants did not cite to a single incident that showed escapes and assaults occurred as a result of contact visits. The alternative means (i.e., mail, non-contact visitation and non-monitored telephone calls) asserted by defendants are simply inadequate to justify a blanket denial of this constitutionally protected right. Contact visits are necessary so that the attorney and the prisoner can establish effective attorney-client communication. Contact visits also help the attorney ascertain the inmate's demeanor.
Defendants also did not provide any evidence that contact visits, including those at SMU, will have a significant 1373 impact on inmates, guards or prison resources. Finally, *1373 there are ready alternatives (i.e., searching the
prisoner and attorney before and after the legal visit and observing the attorney and prisoner during the legal visit) that address defendants' security concerns. Under the circumstances, defendants' blanket prohibition is an exaggerated response, especially given that there are no reported incidents of any assaults or violence as a result of a contact attorney visit.
With respect to the assignment of HIV-positive prisoners to food service jobs, it is clear that prisoners who are HIV-positive are "handicapped" within the meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As such, defendants must make an individual determination that each HIV-positive prisoner presents a significant risk of transmitting the virus if he or she worked in food services. Defendants' blanket policy is clearly not sufficient under § 504 because it excludes "all" inmates who test HIV-positive.
Also, it should be noted that defendants did not attempt to justify their policy on the ground that there is a significant risk of transmitting the virus.[4] Rather, they argued, without providing any evidence, that allowing HIVpositive inmates to work in food service threatens security of the prison in that inmates would riot if they knew they were being served by someone who was HIV-positive. Defendants' unsubstantiated and unfocused fears are an insufficient basis to curtail fundamental constitutional rights and rights provided by the Rehabilitation Act.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 230) is granted.
(2) Defendants are hereby enjoined from prohibiting contact visits between inmates and their attorney(s) in all facilities of the Arizona State Prison system. Defendants may deny a contact visit to an individual inmate only for good cause. The reason(s) for such denial shall be in writing and provided to the inmate and his or her attorney prior to the visit. Defendants shall implement, through their current administrative process, procedures whereby the inmate and/or attorney may challenge the denial of contact visits.
(3) Defendants are hereby enjoined from denying food-service employment to inmates found to be HIV-positive absent a written determination that an individual inmate is not "otherwise qualified" to perform the job in that he or she cannot perform the essential functions of the job, and that defendants cannot reasonably accommodate the inmate such that he will be able to perform those functions. This ruling applies to all facilities in the Arizona State Prison system.
[1] Although family contact visits are allowed after a certain period of time, the fact that defendants' policy does not provide for a similar provision for attorneys suggests the arbitrariness of the policy.
[2] This probably would be a rather difficult showing given that many of the SMU inmates were allowed contact visits, apparently without incident, when they were housed in CB6.
[3] Defendants attempt to controvert this fact by stating:
Defendants object to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts for the reason that contraband may possibly have been introduced in this manner without their knowledge.

Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, at 2. [4] Indeed, defendants implicitly concede that there is no significant risk of transmission. See Defendants' Response, at 14.
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 803 F.Supp. 246 (1992)
Charles L. ARNOLD, Guardian ad litem on Behalf of H.B.; Plaintiff, v.
Samuel LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
Nos. CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM, CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
September 3, 1992.
247*247 Tannis L. Fox, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff.
Sonia Overholser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MUECKE, District Judge.
Having considered all of the documents relevant to the plaintiff's motion for permanent 248*248 injunction and all of the evidence presented to the Court in the weeklong hearing, the Court concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Charles L. Arnold, as guardian ad litem for H.B., filed this action on November 14, 1991 on behalf of H.B. and others similarly situated. Defendants are Samuel Lewis, director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC); Mary Vermeer, deputy warden of the Santa Maria Unit at the Perryville Prison; and David Fernandez, M.D., a psychiatrist employed by the DOC. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 seeking (1) a declaration that defendants violated her eighth and fourteenth amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to her mental health needs and (2) an injunction enjoining defendants from transferring her from the Flamenco unit, a DOC mental health facility, and from illegally placing her in lock down because of her mental illness.

This court issued two temporary restraining orders prohibiting the transfer of H.B. from the Flamenco unit to the Santa Maria Unit at Perryville. On November 16, 1991, the parties agreed to a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of H.B. from Flamenco pending a ruling from the Court on this motion for permanent injunction.
B. THE PARTIES
Plaintiff H.B. is a fifty-three year old, black female inmate at the DOC. PTSF 1.[1]Plaintiff has been incarcerated in the Santa Maria Unit at Perryville Prison since 1981, when she was convicted of aggravated assault. PTSF 3.
Defendant Lewis is the director of the DOC. As such, he is responsible for ensuring the medical care of DOC inmates, including mental health treatment. A.R.S. § 31-201.01.D. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-226.A, defendant Lewis must file a petition to transfer a female inmate to the Arizona State Hospital (ASH) upon submission of a written report by the DOC psychiatrist that an inmate needs transfer to "ensure adequate treatment." If the report states that the inmate is a danger to self or others, the defendant Lewis must immediately authorize the transfer.
Defendant Vermeer is the deputy warden of the Santa Maria Unit at Perryville Prison. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 5. She is responsible for authorizing placement of inmates in lock-down and for ensuring that inmates receive access to medical care. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 6, 110.
Dr. Fernandez is a psychiatrist employed by the DOC. He treated the plaintiff from October of 1983 to August of 1988 and from May 1989 to April of 1990. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 157, 159; Exhibit 72. Dr. Fernandez supervises and consults with plaintiff's present DOC treating psychiatrist, Dr. Victor Pera. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 155. Dr. Fernandez has the ultimate authority to recommend transfer to the ASH pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 31-226.A and 31-226.01.A. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 164; R.T. of December 11, 1991 p. 198; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 70.
C. THE FACILITIES
The Santa Maria unit at Perryville is a 312 bed maximum security unit for females. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 18-19. There is a special management area with forty-eight lock down cells. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 18, 150. Flamenco is a new DOC mental health facility located on the state hospital grounds. One ward is available for women. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 154, 196.

D. THE PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL NEEDS AND THE DEFENDANTS' TREATMENT OF THOSE NEEDS
1. Plaintiff has medical needs due to her severe mental illness.
Plaintiff has a severe mental illness. Specifically, she has been diagnosed as having249*249 schizophrenia, chronic, paranoid type. PTSF 2. Plaintiff H.B.'s mental illness presents a serious medical need. PTSF 6. Plaintiff has been treated for schizophrenia since 1955. From 1973 through 1991, plaintiff was admitted to the Arizona State Hospital (ASH) fourteen times, nine of those occasions admitted upon the transfer from the DOC. Exhibit D. Plaintiff's schizophrenia causes her to have delusions and hallucinations and impairs her judgment so that she is not competent to make decisions regarding her care and treatment. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 11, 185, 191, 210. Plaintiff requires antipsychotic medication to treat her schizophrenia. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 6. Plaintiff should be confined in a hospital-like residential treatment facility, like the Flamenco unit, so that medication may be administered against her will if she stops taking her medication and her condition deteriorates. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 156. The plaintiff's mental health needs cannot be met in DOC general population or in lock down. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 25-27; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 184; R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 60.
2. The defendants have neglected to treat plaintiff's mental illness.
The DOC has seriously neglected plaintiff's mental health care needs during her ten years of incarceration. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 150; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 27. During this time-period, the DOC's treatment of plaintiff has followed a distinct pattern of confinement in lock down for prolonged periods of time with denial of mental health treatment during lock down. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 148-149; Exhibit D. As a result of the denial of mental health treatment, plaintiff's condition deteriorates and she is eventually transferred to the Flamenco unit or ASH. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 148149; Exhibit D. She is released again to general population where she is again locked down. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 148-149; Exhibit D. In some cases, plaintiff was locked down within twenty-four to seventy-two hours after transfer from ASH back to DOC. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 34.

a. Defendants have placed plaintiff in lock down to punish her for her hostile, threatening behavior that is the result of her mental illness.
Plaintiff is placed in lock down because of behavior resulting from her mental illness, schizophrenia. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 58, 129-103, 151-152; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 13-20. Exhibits 20, 27, 28, 35, 37, 38, 39, 44, and 49. Specifically, when plaintiff does not receive or take her medication, she can become hostile and threatening. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 150, 156; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 6. When plaintiff is taking her medication and receiving appropriate treatment, she is not hostile or threatening. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 9; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 112, 181-182; R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 170. The behavior for which plaintiff is locked down does not result from a personality disorder. R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 166-171, 181-182; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at 184; Exhibit I. DOC psychiatrists did not authorize placing plaintiff into or releasing her from lock down. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 185; Exhibits 72-77.
Plaintiff has a significant history of being locked down during her incarceration at DOC. From May 12, 1989 to October 2, 1991, when the state court enjoined plaintiff's transfer from ASH to the DOC, plaintiff was in lock down 514 days [approximately 60% of her total time in DOC custody]. Exhibits D and E. During that same period of time, she was in ASH or Flamenco 278 days [32.5% of her total time in DOC custody]. Id. Also during the same period, she was in general population 64 days [7.5% of her total time in DOC custody]. Id. Because of a lack of records, the extent of lock down prior to May 12, 1989 is not completely known. Exhibits D and E. While plaintiff was in lock down, she deteriorated to the point that constitutes a psychiatric emergency. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 16. In most cases, plaintiff should have been taken out of lock down 250*250 based on medical necessity. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 169.
Plaintiff was placed in lock down on May 12, 1989 and remained in lock down for eleven and one-half months. Id. During that period of time, medical records document nine visits by a psychiatrist on May 18, May 23, June 15, July 13, August 18, October 23, November 27, December 29, 1989, March 5, and April 23, 1990. Exhibits D, 72. There is no documentation in the medical records of any visits by a psychiatrist from December 29, 1989 until April 23, 1990, four days prior to her voluntary transfer to Flamenco. Id. During this period of time, defendant Fernandez was plaintiff's treating psychiatrist. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 157; Exhibit 72.
Plaintiff was discharged to the Santa Maria unit on October 24, 1990. Exhibit D. She was placed in lock down on the following day, October 25, 1990. Exhibits D and E. On

November 21, 1990, less than one month later, plaintiff was again placed in lock down. Id. Plaintiff remained in lock down for five weeks until December 26, 1990. Id.During that five-week period, she was seen by a psychiatrist three times. Exhibit D.
Plaintiff was released from lock down on December 26, 1990, but returned to lock down five days later, on December 31, 1990. Exhibits D and E. After approximately two weeks, she was transferred to ASH. Id. During that period of time, she saw a psychiatrist one time. Id. Plaintiff remained in ASH from January 11, 1991 to February 15, 1991, when she was transferred back to the Santa Maria unit. Exhibit D. Three days later, on February 18, 1991, plaintiff was again placed in lock down and remained there for six weeks, until March 28, 1991. Exhibits D and E. During this period, she was seen by a psychiatrist one time. Exhibit D.
Approximately one month after her release from lock down, on May 3, 1991, plaintiff was again locked down. Exhibits D and E. This time, plaintiff was locked down for eleven weeks, until July 18, 1991. Id. She was released from lock down July 18, 1991 but again locked down one week later on July 26, 1991. Id. On August 1, 1991, plaintiff was transferred to ASH and she remained in that facility until November 14, 1991. Exhibit D. During this three and one half month admission at ASH, plaintiff was not placed in seclusion, isolation or restraints of any kind. PTSF 6.
While she is locked down in DOC custody and because of her mental illness, plaintiff frequently refuses to shower. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 7; Exhibit E. For example, during a seven-week period from May 28, 1991 through July 18, 1991, plaintiff took one shower. Exhibit E. Neither DOC security nor psychiatric staff takes sufficient action to see that plaintiff showers or meets her personal hygiene needs. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 7.
b. The defendants have failed to provide psychiatric follow-up for plaintiff while she has been locked down.
The defendants have not provided the psychiatric follow-up that plaintiff should have received while she was in lock down. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 151; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 14-15. There have been repeated occasions when plaintiff's treatment has been delayed because a psychiatrist did not see plaintiff when necessary or when she should have been transferred to a mental health facility but was not transferred. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 149, 151.

Upon placement in lock down, plaintiff should have received almost immediate psychiatric follow-up. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 155; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 16-17. However, when the defendants placed plaintiff in lock down she was never seen by a psychiatrist immediately. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 155, 167; Exhibit D; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 42.
When plaintiff was locked down, she should have been seen daily by a psychiatrist; however, she was not seen daily. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 52, 167; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 5, 8-9; Exhibit D. When plaintiff was in lock down for eleven and one half months, she was seen by a psychiatrist nine or ten times. Dr. Garcia commented that this record 251*251 was "dismal." R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 149, 153; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 5, 13, 19. During the 514 days that plaintiff was in lock down, she was seen by a psychiatrist twenty or twenty-one times. Exhibits D and E. During the long periods in lock down, plaintiff was seen by a psychiatrist with decreasing frequency instead of increasing frequency as would be expected. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 153.
When she was locked down, plaintiff should also have been seen regularly each day by other trained mental health professionals. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 52, 222; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 8. While locked down, no other trained mental health professionals evaluated plaintiff. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 62, 86. During lock down, plaintiff was checked daily by a nurse, as all inmates in lock down are checked daily by a nurse. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 86; Exhibits 72-77. Dr. Garcia concluded that this "is not treatment at all." R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 155.
c. The defendants have failed to monitor plaintiff's medication.
The DOC has failed to monitor plaintiff's medication. Plaintiff occasionally refuses to take her prescribed medication. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 156, 163. When plaintiff has failed to take her medication, DOC psychiatric staff has not taken action to ensure that she take the medication or transferred her to ASH where she could be forcibly medicated. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 59, R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 5-6. Specifically, on January 3, 1990, seven months into the eleven and a half month lock down, security staff reported that plaintiff was combative, aggressive, and refused to take her medication, as she had done for at least the past two weeks. Exhibit 32. A medical evaluation was requested and the incident report sent to Dr. Fernandez. Exhibit 32. Dr. Fernandez failed to respond. Exhibit D. The next visit documented in the medical records by a psychiatrist is three and one half months later on April 23, 1990 by defendant Fernandez. Exhibits D, 72. Plaintiff was voluntarily transferred to Flamenco four days later. Exhibit D. In another instance on

May 28, 1991, Dr. Pera documented in the medical record that plaintiff was noncompliant with her medication. However, she was not transferred to ASH, where she could be forcibly medicated, for another two months. Exhibits H, D, and 74.
On another occasion, DOC psychiatrists allowed plaintiff's medication to lapse for ninety days. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 6. Such a lapse would worsen plaintiff's condition. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 6.
d. The defendants have failed to transfer plaintiff to ASH when necessary to ensure adequate treatment.
On numerous occasions, plaintiff should have been transferred to ASH as necessary to ensure adequate treatment, but was not. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 163; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 19, 23-24. Rather, the DOC has used lock down as an alternative to providing plaintiff with necessary mental health treatment. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 26.
Also, on numerous occasions a DOC psychiatrist recommended transfer of plaintiff to ASH but the transfer was delayed or did not occur. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 24-25; R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 266, 272, 274-275. DOC medical records do not document why plaintiff was not transferred to ASH when recommendations were made. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 24; R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 266, 272, 274-275; Exhibit H. Delay after a recommendation that an inmate be transferred to ASH does not conform to medical standards. R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 61. Emergency transfers pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-226.01 should and can take one day. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 174, 257.
On March 1, 1988, defendant Fernandez documented in plaintiff's medical record that "patient has been kept in lock down because of being irritable and having no insight into her condition." R.T. of December 252*252 11, 1991 at p. 26; Exhibit H. He also stated that "patient needs to be admitted to psychiatric facility to control current symptoms." R.T. of November 11, 1991 at p. 267; Exhibit H. Plaintiff was not transferred to ASH until April 12, 1988, six weeks later. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 268; Exhibit D. Plaintiff was locked down during part of that time. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 268; Exhibits D and E.
On October 19, 1988, a DOC psychiatrist documented that plaintiff "continues to hear voices and reports paranoia" and "has active auditory hallucinations and delusions." R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 269; Exhibit H. Further, plaintiff reported "that she wants to go to the State Hospital and that she wants and needs to get out of lock down. I agreed that

[patient] could request to go to the A.S.H." Exhibit H. Plaintiff was not transferred to ASH. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 269; Exhibit D.
On March 8, 1989, a DOC psychiatrist documented that plaintiff had "paranoia and grandiose delusions" and that her "insight into illness [was] very limited to severely impaired." R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 270; Exhibit H. The psychiatrist noted that plaintiff would be transferred involuntarily to ASH. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 270; Exhibit H. Plaintiff was not transferred. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 270; Exhibit H. Two months later, plaintiff was placed in lock down where she remained for eleven and a half months. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 270; Exhibit D.
On December 14, 1990, Harold Burton, a DOC social worker, wrote a memorandum to the director of health services, Dr. Thomas Lutz, requesting the "immediate" emergency transfer to ASH for plaintiff. Exhibit 65. The memorandum stated that plaintiff was in lock down, refusing psychiatric treatment and medication and was in "constant agitation, coupled with active hallucinations and delusions." Exhibit 65. The memorandum further stated that plaintiff required staff assistance with maintaining her daily living activities and proper nutrition and that she "is now suffering and will continue to sustain further physical and psychological/emotional harm unless immediate action is not [sic] forthcoming to admit and treat her on an involuntary emergency basis at the Arizona State Hospital per Arizona Revised Statutes § 31-226.01." Id.
Four days later, Dr. Pera documented in the medical record that plaintiff was noncompliant with her medication and the plan of treatment was that she be committed to State Hospital. Exhibit H. On that date, Dr. Pera submitted an affidavit stating that plaintiff required emergency transfer to ASH. Exhibit 65. Plaintiff was not transferred until nearly a month after Mr. Burton's memorandum and she remained in lock down for all but five days of that month. Exhibit D.
On May 28, 1991, Dr. Pera documented that plaintiff was not taking her medication and should be transferred to ASH. Exhibit H; R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 271. On June 4, 1991, Dr. Pera documented that plaintiff "has decompensated" and was not taking her medication. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 271. On June 5, 1991, Mr. Burton again wrote a memorandum to the director of health services requesting immediate emergency transfer of plaintiff to ASH. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 275; Exhibit H. Mr. Burton stated that plaintiff was in lock down, refusing to take medication, deteriorating and psychotic. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 275; Exhibit H. Mr. Burton stated that plaintiff "is now suffering and will continue to sustain further physical and psychological harm unless an immediate transfer to an impatient [sic] mental health treatment facility Arizona State Hospital (ASH) is

forthcoming to ensure adequate treatment for her malaise." R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 275; Exhibit H. On the same day, Dr. Pera submitted an affidavit stating that plaintiff required emergency transfer to ASH as a danger to herself or others. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 272; Exhibit H. Plaintiff was not transferred until August 1, 1991, two months later. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 274; Exhibit D. During those two months, plaintiff was in lock 253*253 down most of the time. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 275; Exhibit D.
e. When defendants finally transfer plaintiff to ASH where she can receive adequate treatment, plaintiff responds favorably to the treatment.
When the DOC transfers plaintiff to ASH, she responds to treatment. When plaintiff arrives at ASH from DOC her condition has deteriorated. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 185. While treated at ASH, her condition stabilizes and improves. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 186, 189. She takes her medication voluntarily. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 187, 189. Plaintiff is "pleasant" and "cooperative" and her paranoia is significantly reduced, although she is still delusional. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 29, 190-191. During her last three and a half month stay at ASH prior to the hearing in this case, plaintiff was not placed in seclusion, lock down or restraints. PTSF 9. During her hospital stay there were no incidents of assaultive behavior. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 194-195, 207. When plaintiff is being treated appropriately, any need for isolation or lock down is minimal or nonexistent. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 9.
3. The mental health care system at Santa Maria is inadequate to meet plaintiff's serious medical needs.
The Santa Maria unit lacks sufficient staff so that plaintiff can be seen by a psychiatrist as often as necessary. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 9. There is one full-time psychologist on staff; a psychiatrist visits inmates once a week and no other trained mental health officials work at the Santa Maria unit. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 52. This number of staff is grossly inadequate to meet the mental health needs of the women incarcerated in Santa Maria, especially those women who are in the special management or lock down cells. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 49-52; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 36; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 113-115. Exhibit A at p. 64-67, 127.
The Santa Maria unit lacks an adequate system to identify and evaluate persons with mental illness. Upon admission, there is no intake procedure to identify inmates with mental

illness. Nor does the DOC obtain past psychiatric records of inmates. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 48-50.
The Santa Maria unit lacks an adequate psychiatric referral system so that inmates with mental health problems can be referred to psychiatric staff. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 49, 52; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 130-131. Security staff may file incident reports with defendant Vermeer for bizarre behavior they witness. The reports may be forwarded to psychiatric staff. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 30-31, 114. The Santa Maria unit does not keep track of when incident reports that are forwarded are received by psychiatrists or how long it takes a psychiatrist to respond once an incident report is forwarded. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 33-34.
While plaintiff was in lock down, DOC security staff occasionally filed incident reports with defendant Vermeer that described plaintiff's behavior. Exhibits 21-52, 78. These reports were the only written "referrals" to psychiatric staff from security staff when plaintiff exhibited bizarre behavior. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 30; Exhibit 78. The incident reports were not always forwarded to the psychiatrists by defendant Vermeer. Specifically Exhibits 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 46 and 48 were not forwarded by Defendant Vermeer to psychiatric staff. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 115. Moreover, Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 46 and 48 indicated that plaintiff was having psychiatric problems. When the incident reports were sent to psychiatric staff, DOC psychiatrists did not respond at all, even when the behavior reported indicated obvious psychiatric deterioration. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 23, 39, 130; Exhibits 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50 and D. During lock down, plaintiff was hallucinating. Exhibit 26. Such hallucinations would have seemed real and terrifying to plaintiff. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 12-13, 17. Yet, no DOC psychiatrist responded. Exhibit D.
254*254 The DOC does not have a system to ensure that patients take medication. DOC has the authority to administer medication involuntarily, if medically necessary, but cannot presently do so because defendant Lewis has not promulgated the necessary regulations. See Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 239, 714 P.2d 399, 409 (1986). DOC does not administer medication involuntarily. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 199200; R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 135-136; Exhibit A at p. 100, 120, 147. Nor does DOC promptly treat an inmate that refuses to take medication as it can take two to three weeks before an inmate who refuses medication is seen. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 47, 5556. During that period of time, a mentally ill inmate could be grossly psychotic or deteriorated. Id. An inmate who fails to take prescribed medication should be placed in a psychiatric facility for observation and if the mentally ill inmates is decompensating psychiatrically, that inmate should be transferred to ASH. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p.

57; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 6. In some cases, it may be necessary to administer medication involuntarily. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 57; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 3.
There is no effective communication between DOC security staff and DOC mental health staff about the needs of mentally ill prisoners at Santa Maria. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 53, 54, and 59.
Non-medical staff can override medical decisions of psychiatric staff at Santa Maria and Flamenco. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 53, 129, 169; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 37-38; R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 101. Both Dr. Fernandez and Pera testified that their recommendations to take mentally ill inmates out of lock down were not followed at either Santa Maria or Flamenco because security staff carried out and could override the recommendation. Exhibit A. at 118; R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 53.
Lock down or "the hole" at Santa Maria is a small 7' by 12' cell. R.T. of December 11, 1991 at p. 148. Inmates are confined to these cells twenty-four hours a day and allowed three fifteen minute showers and three one hour periods of exercise per week. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 11-15; Exhibit A. at 8; Exhibit E. Female, mentally ill inmates are placed in lock down for prolonged periods of time as an alternative to providing adequate mental health treatment. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 49, 71-72. These mentally ill women are placed in lock down for periods of up to six months at a time. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 49. At any one time, there are seven or eight mentally ill women locked down in Santa Maria. Exhibit A at 67-68. Lock down generally worsens symptoms of mental illness and can be a "traumatic experience" for the mentally ill inmate. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 17, 26; PTSF 11; Exhibit A at p. 41, 153.
Lock down for mentally ill behavior is only appropriate as a last resort if the individual is a danger to self or others and there are no other effective alternatives. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 220-222; R.T. of December 9, 1991 at 26-27. An individual placed in such lock down, should be evaluated by a psychiatrist immediately. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 221. Lock down is not a treatment for schizophrenia and prolonged lock down is "inexcusable in the management of schizophrenia." R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 184.
The DOC has no written rules, policies or procedures to govern (1) screening, identifying and evaluating persons with mental illness or obtaining past psychiatric records of inmates; (2) referral by security staff to psychiatric problems; (3) transfer of inmates from Santa Maria to ASH or Flamenco pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 31-226 or 31-226.01; (4) circumstances under which an inmate with mental illness can be locked down; and (5) psychiatric follow-up of inmates locked down mentally ill inmates. See Exhibits 79-86.

4. Plaintiff has been harmed by the defendants' failure to treat her mental illness.
Plaintiff has been and will be harmed in the future if her mental health treatment remains the same. Prolonged lock down 255*255 cannot provide the therapeutic setting needed by plaintiff. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 27. Lock down worsened the symptoms of plaintiff's mental illness. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 17, 26. While locked down, plaintiff deteriorated psychiatrically. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 149. This deterioration harmed plaintiff. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 40; Exhibits H, 65.
DOC has ignored plaintiff's medical needs. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 33. Plaintiff has undergone "gross mal- and mistreatment and lack of treatment over years" at DOC. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 58. DOC's placement of plaintiff in lock down was inhumane. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 16, 27; Exhibit A at p. 116, 123, 135. If plaintiff's treating psychiatrist at ASH had known that plaintiff would be placed in lock down upon discharge from the hospital, it would have changed his decision to transfer her back to DOC. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 235-236. According to Dr. Garcia, in his eighteen years of psychiatric practice in correctional facilities, this is the most "poorly managed" case he has ever seen or of which he is aware. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 42.
5. Defendants had knowledge of the harm caused by plaintiff due to their actions in failing to treat her condition.
Both defendants Fernandez and Vermeer had knowledge of the harm caused to plaintiff. DOC psychiatrists understand that prolonged lock down worsens symptoms of mental illness. Exhibit A at 50, 152-153. DOC psychiatric staff and security staff, including defendants Fernandez and Vermeer, knew about plaintiff's deterioration in lock down as such deterioration was documented throughout the medical records and incident reports. R.T. of December 13, 1991 at p. 43-44; Exhibit 72, 74, 75, D. Some of the incident reports that were forwarded to psychiatric staff, including Dr. Fernandez, documented behavior indicating that plaintiff was having psychiatric problems. Exhibits 21-23, 25-30, 32, 33, 3552.
Moreover, defendant Lewis has had notice of the inadequacies of the prison system's mental care since at least January of 1990 when the class action case was filed inCasey v. Lewis, CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM.

6. Absent injunctive relief, there is a great likelihood that plaintiff will continue to be harmed by the defendants' failure to treat her illness.
If plaintiff is transferred back to Santa Maria, there is a great likelihood of irreparable harm to her mental health. Plaintiff should never be transferred to the Santa Maria Unit. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 33. Dr. Potts testified that it would be inhumane to transfer plaintiff back to Santa Maria. R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 60. Based on the pattern of treatment of plaintiff by DOC, it is likely that plaintiff would be transferred to Santa Maria, placed in lock down unnecessarily and deprived of basic mental health treatment. R.T. of December 9, 1991 at p. 34-35, 39-40, 133; R.T. of November 25, 1991 at p. 60-61. If plaintiff is returned to the DOC and refuses to take her medication, she will be locked down. Exhibit A at 115, 123.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claim
In order to prevail on a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of inadequate medical care in violation of the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must establish "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291-92, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976);Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987).
The indifference must be substantial to violate the constitution. Jones v. Johnson,781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986). Mere claims of "indifference," "negligence," or "medical malpractice" do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 256*256 Estelle,429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Nor does a difference in medical opinion amount to deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989).
Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.1990).

The Ninth Circuit set forth the eighth amendment standards for physical, dental and medical care systems in Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir.1982) as follows:
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care. Prison officials show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs if prisoners are unable to make their medical problems known to medical staff. [Citation omitted] Access to the medical staff has no meaning if the medical staff is not competent to deal with the prisoners' problems. The medical staff must be competent to examine prisoners and diagnose illnesses. It must be able to treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can. Such referrals may be to other physicians within the prison, or to physicians or facilities outside the prison if there is reasonably speedy access to those other physicians or facilities. In keeping with these requirements, the prison must provide an adequate system for responding to emergencies. If outside facilities are too remote or too inaccessible to handle emergencies promptly and adequately, then the prison must provide adequate facilities and staff to handle emergencies within the prison. These requirements apply to physical, dental and mental health.
Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior.Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, plaintiff must establish that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that a state supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. King v. Atiyeh,814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir.1987); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.1988); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir.1985). However, officials may be independently liable under § 1983. Id. Officials can be held liable for their failure to implement a proper mental health care program or failure to adequately train or supervise subordinates.Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir.1990).
In this case, the parties have stipulated that plaintiff's mental illness presents a serious medical need. PTSF 6. Thus, plaintiff need only prove that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious mental health needs. Plaintiff has met this burden.
The defendants have violated plaintiff's eighth amendment rights by failing to provide proper mental health treatment. The plaintiff established that because of her mental illness, she needs the therapeutic environment of a mental health treatment facility; however, such environment has not been provided by the DOC for nearly ten years. The defendants provided grossly inadequate mental health care for plaintiff. Rather, defendants placed

plaintiff in lock down as punishment for the symptoms of her mental illness and as an alternative to providing mental health care.[2] The history257*257 of plaintiff's mental illness in prison clearly establishes that plaintiff is unable to function in general population at DOC.[3]
The mental health program at the Santa Maria Unit does not and cannot meet plaintiff's medical needs for several reasons. Santa Maria lacks adequate psychiatric staffing. Communication between security staff and psychiatric staff about patients is almost nonexistent. In addition, security staff overrides medical decisions of DOC psychiatrists. Santa Maria lacks an adequate system for behavior problems to be referred to psychiatric staff. As a result, prisoners are unable to make their medical problems known to medical staff. This demonstrates deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious mental health care needs. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
Moreover, referrals to outside mental health care at ASH are not "reasonably speedy." DOC has no effective system to transfer mentally ill women to ASH when necessary. Transfers from Santa Maria to ASH take months when they could be accomplished in a day or two. Such referrals, if made, are delayed or never carried out by staff. This also demonstrates deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious mental health care needs. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
Defendants Vermeer and Lewis have violated plaintiff's mental health care rights by failing to correct the inadequacies of the mental health care system for women. Defendant Vermeer had knowledge of the inadequate care and harm caused to plaintiff. Medical records and incident reports show that she was aware that plaintiff was locked down and plaintiff's mental condition deteriorated in lock down. Despite her knowledge of plaintiff's psychotic behavior in lock down, Defendant Vermeer did not act to change that system.
Defendant Lewis also has had notice of the inadequacies of the prison system's mental care since at least January of 1990 when the class action case was filed inCasey v. Lewis, CIV 90-0054 PHX CAM. However, he has failed to take corrective action.
Despite such notice, defendants Lewis and Vermeer failed to correct the problem. Such history of abuse and failure to take corrective action results in violation of the eighth amendment by the defendants. Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.1989); Fundiller, 777 F.2d at 1443. By providing such "grossly inadequate" psychiatric care to the plaintiff, defendants have demonstrated deliberate indifference to her serious mental health needs. Greason, 891 F.2d at 835; Waldrop v. Evans,871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1989); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.

The defendants also failed to provide any psychiatric treatment of plaintiff's condition while she was locked down. Although plaintiff should have been seen and evaluated by a psychiatrist immediately after locked down, this was never done. Nor was plaintiff seen by psychiatrists almost daily while in lock down as required for her mental condition.
Defendant Vermeer did not effectively or consistently refer plaintiff to mental health staff when her security staff filed incident reports regarding plaintiff's psychotic behavior. Such failure to notify competent officials of an inmate's psychiatric state constitutes deliberate indifference. Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1036.
258*258 Even when the incident reports were occasionally forwarded by defendant Vermeer to psychiatric staff, including Dr. Fernandez, the psychiatrists did not respond to the reports. Such failure to respond to a known medical problem constitutes deliberate indifference. Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1036. In one instance, Dr. Fernandez did not respond, nor did any other mental health professional, to reports that plaintiff was screaming at monsters to get out of her room and saying that Lucifer told her to cut off her kid's heads.
In addition, the defendants did not respond to plaintiff's failure to take her medication, which results in the hostile, threatening behavior and subsequent lock down. Defendants did not involuntarily medicate plaintiff. Nor did they transfer her to ASH when she failed to take her medication voluntarily. Therefore, both defendants Vermeer and Fernandez violated plaintiff's eighth amendment rights by failing to respond to her known, severe mental condition. Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1036.
II. Injunctive Relief
"The basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). Such determination requires a balancing between the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 410, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).
The plaintiff has suffered harm in the past and such harm is likely to reoccur absent injunctive relief. At Santa Maria, plaintiff's mental condition consistently deteriorated and she suffered from hallucinations that seemed "very real and terrifying" to her. Based on the continuing cycle of lack of treatment, the harm is likely to reoccur as soon as she is transferred back into general population. If she is transferred back and refuses to take her medication, she will be placed into lock down and she may be kept there for months.

Because the conditions have not changed in Santa Maria, only the Flamenco unit or ASH can provide plaintiff with proper care. Although ASH can provide better care, that care is more restrictive. Flamenco is the less severe, restrictive alternative to ASH and the only alternative within the DOC where plaintiff can receive adequate care.
The harm to the Defendants of keeping plaintiff at the Flamenco unit is minimal compared to the harm to plaintiff's mental health if she is denied treatment. The Flamenco Unit is a DOC facility. At most, defendants are harmed as one less space is available in the Flamenco Unit for other women with severe mental problems.
The defendants' treatment of H.B. over the past ten years has been worse than grossly inadequate or inhumane. It has been barbaric. Over this period of time, the defendants have punished plaintiff for her mental illness by throwing her in the "hole" for periods of time up to a year and leaving her there without any mental care in a highly psychotic state, terrified because of hallucinations, such as monsters, gorillas or the devil in her cell. In fact, one psychiatric expert stated he wouldn't treat his dog the way the defendants treated H.B. Exhibit A at 125. Nor does it appear that plaintiff is the exception to the rule as seven to eight mentally ill women may be locked down at Santa Maria at any one time and may remain there for months without care. Such treatment of any human being is inexcusable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendants Lewis, Vermeer and Fernandez are ENJOINED from transferring plaintiff from Flamenco unit to the Santa Maria unit (Perryville) or any other DOC facility. If necessary to ensure adequate treatment, defendants shall transfer plaintiff to the Arizona State Hospital. Defendants shall take all steps necessary pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 31-226 and/or 31-226.01 to ensure adequate mental health treatment. Any such action shall be taken immediately upon a psychiatric determination of necessity of a transfer to ASH so that she may receive adequate treatment.
259*259 (2) Defendants Lewis, Vermeer and Fernandez are ENJOINED from placing plaintiff in lock down as punishment for behavior that is the result of her mental illness. Only DOC psychiatric staff may authorize placement of plaintiff in lock down. Plaintiff may be placed in lock down only if her behavior presents an immediate danger to self or others. If placed in lock down, DOC psychiatric staff shall monitor, evaluate and provide appropriate psychiatric follow-up in accordance with acceptable professional standards. All monitoring, evaluation and follow-up shall be documented in the medical records. If placed in lock down, plaintiff shall be released as soon as she is no longer a danger to herself or others.

(3) Defendants Lewis and/or Fernandez shall notify plaintiff's counsel within twenty-four hours if plaintiff is placed in lock down.
(4) Defendants Lewis and/or Fernandez shall notify plaintiff's counsel within forty-eight hours if plaintiff refuses her prescribed medication.
(5) Defendants Lewis and/or Fernandez shall notify plaintiff's counsel within twenty-four hours of a determination that plaintiff needs to be transferred to ASH to ensure adequate treatment. Upon a determination by ASH that plaintiff should be transferred back to DOC from ASH, Defendants Lewis or Fernandez shall notify plaintiff's counsel at least five working days prior to the transfer.
(6) Defendants Lewis and/or Fernandez shall provide monthly reports to plaintiff's counsel of the status of plaintiff's placement in lock down. If plaintiff has not been placed in lock down during the previous month, the report need only state that plaintiff was not placed in lock down. If plaintiff has been placed in lock down during the previous month, the report shall contain the dates of the lock down and reasons for lock down.
(7) Defendants Lewis and/or Fernandez shall permit plaintiff's counsel and experts reasonable access to interview, evaluate and monitor plaintiff at Flamenco. If plaintiff is placed in lock down, defendants shall permit her experts immediate access.
(8) As the prevailing party, plaintiff is entitled to her reasonable attorneys' fees. Counsel for plaintiff shall file her application for fees no later than September 18, 1992. Defendants shall file their response no later than September 25, 1992. Plaintiff shall file her reply no later than October 2, 1992.
[1] PTSF refers to undisputed facts stipulated to by the parties in the pretrial statement.
[2] The medical experts testified that plaintiff's hostile, threatening behavior for which she is placed in lock down is a symptom of her chronic paranoid schizophrenia. This conclusion is confirmed by the testimony that antipsychotic medication and appropriate treatment results in plaintiff's behavior becoming non-hostile and non-threatening. Defendant Vermeer testified, and the DOC disciplinary records confirm, that plaintiff was locked down as punishment for her behavior. Lock down was not ordered by psychiatric personnel for therapeutic purposes. Psychiatrists did not authorize the lock down, monitor plaintiff while in lock down and could not order her release from lock down. Security staff, specifically defendant Vermeer who makes the final determination regarding lock down at Santa Maria, initiated, carried out and continued lock down of plaintiff.
[3] Shortly after placement in general population, she is placed in lock down, her condition deteriorates and eventually, usually with an unacceptable delay, she is transferred to ASH. While she is in lock down, the DOC lacks adequate psychiatric staff to monitor her illness. When medical personnel recommend transfer to ASH, such transfer is delayed for months or never occurs.

 
 ADJOA A. AIYETORO STUART H. ADAMS, JR. ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1616 P Street, N W , Suite 340 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-0500
ALICE L. BENDHEIM, P.C. Arizona Bar =3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 602-253-2954
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FLETCHER CASEY, JR., STEPHEN JAMES,)

FRANK BARTHOLIC, ARMANDO MUNOZ, )

KYLE BAPTISTO, DAVID A. MANN,

)

JEFFREY LUSTIG, TERRY DON MCFALLS, )

RANDY SAMPSON, JOHN TOMLIN,

)

SCOTT TRAMPOSCH, PAMELA MCQUILLEN, )

CAROLYN FERGUSON, YVONNE MARTIN, )

DAVID TUCKER, SUSAN COLKER,

)

JOHN MYERS, MARY JO BOOKER,

)

RANDY THOMAS, RUTH JOHNSON,

)

ROMAN STONE, ROBERT BANKSTON,

)

et al., on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated, )

PLAINTIFFS,

) AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

v.
SAMUEL A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Robert Goldsmith, Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence; Warden William Rhode, Arizona State Prison Complex, Perryville; Warden George Herman, Arizona State Prison Complex, Douglas; Warden Roger Crist, Arizona State Prison Complex, Tucson; Warden Hal Cardin, Arizona State Prison Complex, Phoenix.

DEFENDANTS.

Casey y. Lew s

PC-AZ-004-002

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This class action complaint, filed on behalf of all adult prisoners who are or will be incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department of Corrections, alleges that defendants are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' serious medical needs; that prisoners are assigned to and retained in segregation1 on the basis of uncorroborated, confidential information, including allegations of gang activity, thereby denying prisoners due process; [and,] that defendants have denied prisoners meaningful access to the courts and counsel; that defendants have failed to accommodate the special needs of handicapped prisoners; and that defendants have denied female prisoners the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiffs allege that these acts and omissions by defendants [defendants' failures to provide r.edical care, meaningful access to the courts and counsel, and due process in segregation assignments] subject prisoners to needless and serious suffering.
JURISDICTION 2. This civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief is brought pursuant to §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 et. seq. , as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987; and 42 U.S.C. §1983, in that plaintiffs have been and continue to be deprived of their rights secured by the United States Constitution under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 2 3 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (3), and 2201.
4. Venue is proper under 23 U.S.C. §1391 (a), in that defendants reside in the State of Arizona, and plaintiffs' clair.s for relief arise in the State of Arizona.
PARTIES 5. Plaintiffs are prisoners currently assigned to prison facilities in the State of Arizona. 6. Fletcher Casey, Jr. is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He was assigned to segregation within the Special Management Unit based on uncorroborated confidential information alleging gang activity. In addition, since August 1989, he has not received recommended specialized medical attention for a chronic knee ailment. 7. Frank Bartholic is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He waited three months to see a doctor for a painful back ailment. In addition, this functionally illiterate prisoner had no one to assist him with his initial pleadings in a lawsuit he filed, which was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. 8. Armando Munoz is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. In November 1988,

he was assigned to segregation within the Special Management: Unit based on uncorroborated confidential information alleging sar.a activity. In addition, this prisoner has been waiting twelve months to see a dentist for a painful gun condition.
9. Kyle Baptisto is a prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been subjected routinely to interference with access to the courts including interference with his receipt of legal nail.
10. Roman Stone is a blind prisoner currently assigned to the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. The defendants have failed to accommodate the special needs required by his blindness.
11. Stephen James is a prisoner currently assigned to Cellblock 6 in Florence, Arizona. Due to the shortages of staff, he has been required to choose between use of the law library and eating meals. He has complained to health care providers about painful lumps on his back but they have not been evaluated by a physician.
12. Terry Don McFalls is a prisoner currently assigned to Cellblock 6 in Florence, Arizona. He suffers from folliculitis. Although prison staff know of his medical condition, he has been repeatedly forcibly shaved and not provided an alternative way of removing facial hair.
13. David Mann is a prisoner currently assigned to the East Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been denied specialized treatment for a potentially life threatening heart ailment.
14. David Tucker is a prisoner currently assigned to the East

Unit in Florence, Arizona. He has been denied medically necessary follow-up for a serious health condition.
15. Jeffrey Lustig is a prisoner currently assigned -.: tr.e South Unit in Florence, Arizona. While at Central Facility IT. Florence, he complained to health care providers of chest pains for two months before being seen by a doctor.
16. John Myers is a prisoner currently assigned to the Central Unit in Florence, Arizona. He waited five months to see a dentist for a painful tooth with an exposed nerve.
17. John Tomlin is a prisoner currently assigned to the North Unit in Florence, Arizona. He was transferred to the North Unit from the Mohave Unit in Douglas, Arizona in December 1989. when assigned to the Mohave Unit he waited eight months to be seen by an orthopedist for a painful knee condition.
18. Pamela McQuillen is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She waited five days before being taken to the hospital for treatment of a painful skin condition.
19. Carolyn Ferguson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She has been denied treatment for hypertension.
20. Yvonne Martin is a prisoner currently assigned to the Women's Prison in Florence, Arizona. She has been denied appropriate medication for a serious asthmatic condition.
21. Randy Sampson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Perryville - San Pedro Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. He has been

denied sufficient library access to prepare his legal pleadings. 22. Mary Jo Booker is a prisoner currently assigned to the
Perryville - Santa Maria Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. she vaited four years to see a doctor tor a herniated disc. While in segregation for six months, she was unable to obtain legal materials and to confer with a legal assistant.
23. Randy Thomas is a prisoner currently assigned to the Perryville - Santa Cruz Unit in Goodyear, Arizona. He waited four months to see a dentist for a toothache.
24. Robert Bankston is currently assigned to Gila Unit in Douglas, Arizona. For one month he was denied any medical attention for a stomach ulcer after coughing up blood and complaining of stomach cramps. He was refused legal materials for sixty-two (62) days while housed in disciplinary segregation.
25. Scott Tramposch is a prisoner currently assigned to the Rincon Unit in Tucson, Arizona. In order to use the satellite law library while on lockdown status, he was handcuffed to a waist chain, severely restricting his use of legal materials. He was denied direct access to the main law library.
26. Susan Colker is a prisoner currently assigned to the Arizona Center for Women in Phoenix, Arizona. She represents herself in civil actions and is unable to research the law thoroughly due to inadequate books and legal assistance.
27. Ruth Johnson is a prisoner currently assigned to the Arizona Center for Women in Phoenix, Arizona. She has serious medical needs that have gone untreated, causing her pain and

general discomfort. 23. Defendants are agents, officials, or employees :: nr.e
State of Arizona Department of Corrections. 29. Defendant Sam Lewis is the Director of the Arizona
Department of Corrections. In the capacity of director he is responsible for the administration and application of DCC statevide policies, and is ultimately responsible, for the operation of all the prison facilities, including decisions concerning staff deployment and training that directly affect plaintiffs1 abilities to obtain medical care, access to the courts and counsel, and due process.
30. Warden Robert Goldsmith is responsible for the day-today operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona. In the capacity of warden he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the Women's Prison, East Unit, Special Management Unit, Cellblock 6, and Central Unit.
31. Warden William Rhode is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex - Perryville in Goodyear, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the San Pedro, Santa Cruz, San Juan, and Santa Maria Units.
32. Warden George Herman is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Douglas, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex, including the Gila Unit, Mohave Unit, Maricopa Unit, Cochise Unit, and Papago Unit.

33. Warden Roger Crist is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson, Anzcr.a. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire co-plex, including the Santa Rita, Rir.rpn, Cirr.arron, Tent, and Echo Units.
34. Warden Hal Cardin is responsible for the day-tc-iav operation of the Arizona State Prison Cor.plex in Phoenix, Arizona. In the capacity of warden, he is responsible for the daily operation of this entire complex for women and men.
35. Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities. At all relevant times, defendants have acted under color of State law.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 36. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 37. Plaintiffs are representative parties of a class composed of all adult persons who are now or who in the future will be in the custody of or under the supervision of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections. 38. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the class is impractical. Current members of the class consist of more than 9,000 prisoners, and the prisoner population in each facility changes frequently. 39. Upon information and belief, conditions described in this complaint, are common to all prisoners within the Arizona State
8

Prison system, the class that plaintiffs represent. The r.a.-.ed representatives are subjected daily to the same deprivations of -_r.± class members as a whole.
40. Defendants1 acts and omissions as set forth herein present [deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs, failure to provide prisoners meaningful access to the courts and counsel, and failure to provide prisoners due process in segregation assignments arej questions of law common to the class members as a whole.
41. Claims made by the class representatives involve allegations of denials of constitutional rights that are generally applicable to the class as a whole.
42. Plaintiffs are members of the class and their claims are typical of all class members. Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel who will fairly and accurately represent the interests of the class as a whole.
43. Since the class number is more than 9,000 prisoners, separate actions by individuals would in all likelihood result in inconsistent and varying decisions, which in turn would result in conflicting and incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants.
44. The defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole appropriate.

A. LACK OF MEDICAL CARE 45. Defendants do not provide immediate evaluations zc
diagnoses of prisoners' serious medical complaints. Cefer.d2r.t3 misdiagnose serious medical complaints, resulting in significant and unnecessary suffering and even death. For instance, at the v:omen's facility in Florence, a woman prisoner, complaining of serious chest pains, was initially diagnosed as having indigestion, and later died, purportedly from heart failure.
46. No physician regularly provides medical care at the women's facilities. On weekends and evenings security staff at some of these facilities are involved in the decision to have a woman's medical complaints evaluated by a health care provider.
47. Plaintiffs experience unreasonable delays in receiving medical care. For example, at the Special Management Unit (SMU), prisoners may wait from three to four weeks to be seen by a physician for a serious medical complaint.
48. Prisoners are frequently required to choose between sick call and other rights such as eating meals, law library access and exercise.
49. Sick call.at some facilities is held two times per week or less. For example at Central Unit, sick call is frequently cancelled on one of the two days scheduled. Consequently, prisoners with serious medical needs are not evaluated. Sick call is held for prisoners in lockdown frequently less than once a week.
50. At the South Unit in Florence, prisoners must stand in line outdoors for sick call, regardless of the weather. The health
10

care provider evaluates the prisoners by talking to them while they are standing in this line through a window, in the preser.re of other prisoners and security staff. The confidentiality attendant to health care delivery is not only seriously breached but the ability to perform an adequate health care assessment is severely compromised.
51. Physician's assistants often preempt medical care prescribed by a physician. For example, a hospital physician told a prisoner in CB6 that he had a hole in his ear, but the physician's assistant instead claimed that the hole did not exist, and refused to provide the recommended treatment.
52. The failure to have sufficient staff, both security and health care, has resulted in prisoners' treatment being delayed or terminated. For instance, at the CB6 facility, prisoners have been taken off psychotropic medication without first being seen by a psychiatrist.
53. Prisoners are given diets that do not conform to their minimum nutritional needs.
54. Plaintiffs' mental health needs are frequently ignored. Women with serious mental health needs who cannot function in the general population but do not meet the State's statutory requirements for commitment are placed in isolation cells, frequently for extended periods of time, at the Women's facilities in Perryville and Florence. A prisoner, placed in isolation at Perryville because she was considered a mental health case, constantly complained of cramps. She was refused attention by the
11

CMA, and subsequently, she was discovered to have given birth. At the Douglas facility, prisoners are not provided any mental health services.
55. Pregnant intravenous drug users are routinely isolated at the Women's Perryville facility, and subsequently, all medical attention is seriously delayed.
56. Prisoners experience unreasonable, delays in receiving dental care. For example, at the Douglas facility, a prisoner with a painful gum condition waited for five months to see a dentist.
57. At the Women's Perryville facility, prisoners have access to other prisoners' confidential medical information.
58. The allegations contained in paragraphs (45) through (57) constitute defendants' deliberate indifference to prisoners serious medical needs.
B. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HANDICAPPED PRISONERS 59. A blind prisoner in the SMU is not provided the necessary
legal assistance, compounding the access problems experienced by prisoners classified as 1-5.
60. Prisoners with HIV disease are discriminated against in some facilities in the provision of programming.
61. In some facilities, handicapped prisoners are denied access to bathrooms/ showers, and other essential facilities due to the absence of handrails, bars, and other mobility aids.
62. The Arizona Department of Corrections receives Federal
12

financial assistance. 63. The allegations contained in paragraphs 59 thrcuqr. " -5: '
(62) constitute defendants' discrimination against har.dicacced prisoners as otherwise qualified handicapped individuals.
C. LEGAL ACCESS 64. Defendants do not provide persons trained in the law or
attorneys to assist prisoners, even those who are illiterate or non-English speaking, in pursuing legal actions.
65. In most facilities, prisoners are not allowed to make legal calls unless a letter is first submitted giving permission for the telephone call from the prisoner. Prisoners therefore must frequently use monitored telephones to make legal calls. Even when privileged legal calls are allowed, they are frequently unreasonably delayed.
66. In most facilities, plaintiffs must first provide a case number before being able to talk to a prisoner legal assistant about a legal problem. Prisoners may also be asked to describe the problem for which they want legal assistance. In some facilities, prisoners are not provided privacy for these meetings.
67. In some institutions prisoners are not allowed to copy their own legal materials. They must give these materials to prison staff to photocopy, compromising confidentiality.
68. At the South and East Units, prisoners have direct access to the law library, but are not allowed to browse the shelves. They have no starter volumes to aid them in their research, and no
13

legal assistance. They must request a book from an untrained prisoner or staff person.
69. At CB6 defendants frequently require prisoners to ;r.::s? either law library, sick call, or outdoor exercise; prisoners' legal mail is frequently opened outside the presence of prisoners; and, their confidential legal memos from prisoner legal assistants are routinely read by defendants' staff.
70. At the SMU prisoners classified as 1-5 are denied physical access to the lav library by being put into cages. These prisoners are required to have untrained officers or other prisoners classified as 1-3 obtain their legal materials.
71. Prisoners in the SMU are denied contact attorney visits, unnecessarily infringing on their rights of access to the courts and counsel and confidentiality of legal materials. These prisoners are unable to review documents simultaneously with their attorneys and documents that consist of more than a few pages must be given to officers to pass between attorney and prisoner. The officers are out of view of the attorney and prisoner when delivering documents from one to the other.
72. Prisoners are harmed by the denial of meaningful access to the courts. For example, at the SMU an illiterate prisoner had his pro se case dismissed because defendants did not provide him with any legal assistance beyond indirect access to law books.
73. Defendants provide some facilities with only a satellite law library. The satellite law library provides insufficient legal materials. Prisoners must request basic legal materials from other
14

law libraries. They frequently experience delays, and occasionally are unable to receive needed legal materials.
74. At the Douglas facility, prisoners who are :.administrative segregation or disciplinary segregation have r.o direct law library access. Prisoners must knew the exact full citation of a case in order to receive the law book. A prisoner may be in administrative or disciplinary segregation for as long as three months.
75. At the Tucson facility, administrative segregation prisoners are hand-cuffed to a waist chain while using the lawlibrary.
76. The allegations contained in paragraphs [(63)] (64) through [(74)] (75) constitute a denial of meaningful access to the courts and counsel.
D. FAILURE TO PROVIDE DUE PROCESS 77. Defendants regularly assign prisoners to and retain
prisoners in segregation on the basis of uncorroborated, confidential information, including unsubstantiated claims of prisoner gang activity from other prisoners and staff. Prisoners are unable to question or confront any persons making these claims and, therefore, cannot contest a decision assigning them to segregation once it has been made.
CAUSE(S) OF ACTION 78. With respect to each and every following cause of action,
15

plaintiffs re-allege and re-incorporate by reference all cf the allegations contained in paragraphs (l) through :("6)] (77).

79. Defendants'. acts and omissions at each of their

facilities constitute deliberate indifference to plaintiffs'

serious medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment.

30. Defendants, by their acts and omissions, are depriving

plaintiffs of their rights of access to the courts and counsel

protected by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

31. Defendants' arbitrary procedures for assigning prisoners

to segregation violate their Due Process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

82. The failure of defendants to accommodate handicapped

prisoners' special needs discriminates against these prisoners in

violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701

et. seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.

83. Defendants' acts and omissions in providing to female

prisoners health care that is inferior to that provided male

prisoners denies female prisoners the equal protection of the laws

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

VIII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

84. Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no adequate

remedy at law to redress the wrongs suffered as set forth in this

complaint. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer

irreparable injury as a result of the unlawful acts, omissions,

policies, and practices of the defendants as alleged herein, unless

16

plaintiffs are granted the relief they request. The need for relief is critical because the rights at issue are para.-.ount ur.ier the Constitution of the United States.
35. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class they represent, request that this Court grant then the following relief:
(a) certify the class of all adult, prisoners who are now or who will be in the future under the custody, of or under the supervision of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections;
(b) adjudge and declare that the acts, omissions, policies, and practices of the defendants violate the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which grant constitutional protection to plaintiffs and the class that plaintiffs represent;
(c) order defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of State law or otherwise, to provide needed health care for plaintiffs; to provide meaningful access to the courts; to accommodate the special needs of handicapped prisoners; [and,) to cease assigning prisoners to segregation based on uncorroborated, confidential information; and to cease denying female prisoners the equal protection of the laws;
(d) enjoin defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, from continuing the unconstitutional acts, conditions, and practices described in this Complaint, and from failing to provide in the future constitutionally adequate
17

medical care, access to the courts and counsel, accommodations for the special needs of handicapped prisoners, [and] due process ir. segregation assignments!;], and equal protection of the laws for female prisoners;
(e) retain jurisdiction in thi3 case until the unlawful and unconstitutional conditions and practices as alleged herein no longer exist and the Court is satisfied that they will no longer occur;
(f) grant plaintiffs the costs and expenses of maintaining this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; and,
(g) grant any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 12, 1990

Adjoa A. Aiyetoro
Stuart H. Adams, Jr. ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 340 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-0500
Alice L. Bendheim, P.C. Arizona Bar #3376 1542 West McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 253-2954
18

 
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APPEAL, LEAD, PROTO, STD, TERMED
U.S. District Court DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (Phoenix Division) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:90-cv-00054-RGS

Casey, et al v. Lewis, et al Assigned to: Judge Roger G Strand Demand: $0 Lead case: 2:90-cv-00054-RGS (View Member Cases) Case in other court: :93- -15039 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 01/12/1990 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Fletcher Charles Casey, Jr et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro National Prison Project of America Civil Liberties Union Foundation 733 15th St NW Ste 620 Washington, DC 20005 (202)393-4930 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alice Loeb Bendheim Alice L Bendheim PC 3626 E Coolidge St Phoenix, AZ 85018 602-955-7561 Fax: 602-241-9555 Email: aclualice@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Cyrus Fathi ACLU National Prison Project 915 15th St NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 202-548-6609 Fax: 202-393-4931 Email: dfathi@npp-aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart Henry Adams, Jr National Prison Project of America Civil Liberties Union Foundation

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Plaintiff Stephen James et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Frank Bartholic et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

733 15th St NW Ste 620 Washington, DC 20005 (202)393-4930 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Frank Bartholic #38933 (3-B-02ASPC-Buckeye-MU Morey Unit PO Box 3300 Buckeye, AZ 85326 PRO SE
Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Armando Munoz et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Kyle Baptisto et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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David Allen Mann et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Jeffrey C Lustig et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Terry Don McFalls et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Randy Steven Sampson et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff John Henry Tomlin et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr

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Plaintiff Scott Tramposch et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Pamela McQuillen et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Carolyn Kaye Ferguson et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Yvonne Martin et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff David Tucker et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi

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Plaintiff Susan Colker et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff John Robert Myers et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Marya Jo Booker et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Randy Lee Thomas et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Ruth Johnson et al, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim

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Plaintiff Roman Stone et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Robert Bankston et al, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Adjoa Adjoa Aiyetoro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Loeb Bendheim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Cyrus Fathi (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie J Cohen Arizona Ctr for Disability Law 100 N Stone Ave Ste 305

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V. Defendant Samuel A Lewis Director, Arizona Department of Corrections

Page 11 of 103
Tucson, AZ 85701 520-327-9547 Fax: 520-884-1992 Email: lcohen@acdl.com TERMINATED: 10/30/1992 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart Henry Adams, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Justin Cooper Cooper Carvin & Rosenthal 1500 K St NW Ste 200 Washington, DC 20005-1264 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward G Hochuli Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC 2901 N Central Ave Ste 800 Phoenix, AZ 85012 602-263-1700 Fax: 602-200-7812 Email: Ehochuli@jshfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow Office of the Attorney General Liability Management Section Liability Management Section 1275 W Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007-2997 602-542-7692 Fax: 602-542-3393 Email: James.Morrow@azag.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen L Wieneke Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC 2901 N Central Ave

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Ste 800 Phoenix, AZ 85012 602-263-1700 Fax: 602-200-7858 Email: Kwieneke@jshfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk Cooper Carvin & Rosenthal 1500 K St NW Ste 200 Washington, DC 20005-1264 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston PLLC Liability Management Section 3300 N Central Ave Ste 2600 Phoenix, AZ 85012-3039 602-532-5248 Fax: 602-200-9114 Email: mwarzynski@jbhhlaw.com TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake Bryan Cave LLP 2 N Central Ave Ste 2200 Phoenix, AZ 85004-4406 (602)364-7000 TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply Office of the Attorney General Liability Management Section 1275 W Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007-2997 (602)542-4951 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis

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Defendant Robert Goldsmith Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence

Page 13 of 103
Office of the Attorney General 1275 W Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007-2926 (602)542-5025 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward G Hochuli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant William Rhode Warden, Arizona State Prison Complex, Perryville
Defendant George Herman Warden, Arizona State Prison Complex, Douglas

represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward G Hochuli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant
Roger W Crist Warden, Arizona State Prison Complex, Tucson

Edward G Hochuli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward G Hochuli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address)

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Defendant
Hal Cardin Warden, Arizona State Prison Complex, Phoenix

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward G Hochuli (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Intervenor Erwin B Cornstuble
Intervenor Kent Return Holcomb TERMINATED: 12/17/1993 Movant Mark Steven Price TERMINATED: 03/23/1995

Page 17 of 103
Michael Warzynski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/1933 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Erwin B Cornstuble 39093 ASPC-Florence-RU Rynning Unit - Eyman PO Box 3100 Florence, AZ 85232 PRO SE
represented by Kent Return Holcomb #091014 ASPC-Tucson-SRU Santa Rita Unit PO Box 24406 Tucson, AZ 85734 PRO SE
represented by Mark Steven Price #34120 ASPC-Florence-SU South Unit PO Box 8400 Florence, AZ 85232 PRO SE

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Intervenor Melvin Munroe Littrell TERMINATED: 03/23/1995
Intervenor Defendant Arizona, State of Arizona Constitutional Defense Counsel TERMINATED: 09/17/1997

represented by Melvin Munroe Littrell 8010 Constitution NE 204/B Albuquerque, NM 87110 PRO SE
represented by Charles Justin Cooper (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russel Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W Kirk (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Warzynski Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston PLLC 3300 N Central Ave Ste 2600 Phoenix, AZ 85012-3039 602-532-5248 Fax: 602-200-9114 Email: mwarzynski@jbhhlaw.com TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil Vincent Wake (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R Elizabeth Teply (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997

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Intervenor Hector Munoz TERMINATED: 03/25/1998
Intervenor Ralph L Franklin, Jr TERMINATED: 03/25/1998

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert W Shely Bryan Cave LLP 2 N Central Ave Ste 2200 Phoenix, AZ 85004-4406 602-364-7000 Fax: 602-364-7070 Email: rwshely@bryancave.com TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas John Dennis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/17/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Hector Munoz PO Box 1564 Oracle, AZ 85623-1564 PRO SE

Date Filed 01/12/1990 01/12/1990 02/13/1990 02/22/1990 02/26/1990 02/26/1990

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT FILED AND SUMMONS ISSUED (APJ) (Entered: 01/17/1990)

2 NOTICE by plaintiffs of Service of Request for Production of Documents (APJ) (Entered: 01/17/1990)

3 ANSWER by Hal Cardin, William Rhode, George Herman, Roger Crist, Samuel A Lewis (CDE) (Entered: 02/15/1990)

4 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Edward G Hochuli (CDE) (Entered: 02/26/1990)

5 ACCEPTANCE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE 4c upon defendant William Rhode on 1/15/90 (CDE) (Entered: 02/26/1990)

6 ACCEPTANCE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE 4c upon defendant Samuel A Lewis on 1/16/90 (CDE) (Entered: 02/26/1990)

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02/26/1990 02/26/1990 03/09/1990 03/12/1990 03/12/1990 03/16/1990 03/19/1990 03/20/1990 03/20/1990 03/26/1990 03/30/1990 04/03/1990
04/04/1990 04/04/1990 04/10/1990 04/11/1990 04/18/1990 04/19/1990
04/19/1990 04/23/1990

7 ACCEPTANCE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE 4c upon defendant Hal Cardin on 1/30/90 (CDE) (Entered: 02/26/1990)
8 ACCEPTANCE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE 4c upon defendant Roger Crist on 1/18/90 (CDE) (Entered: 02/26/1990)
9 MOTION to transfer case to Judge Muecke filed by plaintiff [9-1] (CDE) (Entered: 03/12/1990)
10 AMENDED MOTION to transfer case by plaintiff [10] . (CDE) (Entered: 03/13/1990)
11 NOTICE by plaintiff amd mtn to transfer. (CDE) (Entered: 03/13/1990)
12 NOTICE by defendant of resp to disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/19/1990)
13 RESPONSE by defendants to motion to transfer case by plaintiff [10]. (CDE) (Entered: 03/20/1990)
14 MOTION to certify class filed by plaintiff [14-1] (CDE) (Entered: 03/21/1990)
15 NOTICE by plaintiff of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/21/1990)
16 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to transfer case by plaintiff [10] (CDE) (Entered: 03/26/1990)
17 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to certify class filed by plaintiff [141] (CDE) (Entered: 04/03/1990)
18 JOINDER by defendant to pltf's mot to transfer (to CIV-84-1626-PHXCAM) and withdrawal of opposition to mot to transfer [10-1] (former emp) (Entered: 04/04/1990)
19 ANSWER by Samuel A Lewis (CDE) (Entered: 04/05/1990)
20 DEMAND for jury trial by defendant (CDE) (Entered: 04/05/1990)
21 MOTION for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1990)
22 MOTION to extend time for pltf to reply to mtn for class cert (til 4/18/90) by plaintiff [22-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1990)
24 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to certify class filed by plaintiff [14-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
23 ORDER by Judge Earl H. Carroll granting motion to extend time for pltf to reply to mtn for class cert (til 4/18/90) by plaintiff [22-1] (cc: all counsel) (former emp) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
25 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/20/1990)
26 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to transfer case by plaintiff [10] Case reassigned to Judge C A. Muecke (with notice sent)

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04/23/1990 04/23/1990 04/27/1990 05/01/1990 05/21/1990 06/12/1990 06/12/1990
06/26/1990 06/26/1990 06/27/1990
07/09/1990 07/12/1990
07/18/1990
07/19/1990 07/26/1990 07/26/1990

(cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/23/1990)
27 NOTICE by defendants of srvc of pltfs' interrogs & 2nd req for prdctn of docs. (AMB) (Entered: 04/26/1990)
28 NOTICE by defendants of srvc of non-unfrm interrogs. (AMB) (Entered: 04/26/1990)
29 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs (CDE) (Entered: 04/30/1990)
30 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/02/1990)
31 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke pretrial order ddl set for 10/29/90. (cc: all counsel) (former emp) (Entered: 05/21/1990)
32 MOTION to compel by plaintiffs/class [32-1] (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
33 NOTICE OF HEARING by plaintiff setting motion to compel by plaintiffs/class [32-1] at 10:00 7/6/90, setting motion for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21-1] at 10:00 7/6/90, setting motion to certify class filed by plaintiff [14-1] at 10:00 7/6/90 (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
35 RESPONSE by dfts to motion to compel by plaintiffs/class [32-1] (CDE) (Entered: 06/28/1990)
36 MEMORANDUM by defendants in suprt of dfts' resp to pltfs' mtn to compel disc and dfts' mtn to strike. (CDE) (Entered: 06/28/1990)
34 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting pltfs motion for class ceritfication filed by plaintiff [14-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 06/27/1990)
37 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc. (CDE) (Entered: 07/11/1990)
38 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting in part motion to compel by plaintiffs/class [32][see doc for full details] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 07/12/1990)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: B. Hightower Pltf's mtn to cert class gr in prior order [14]. Denying motion for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21]. Motion to compel by plaintiffs/class w/b ruled upon by formal order to follow [32]. (CDE) (Entered: 07/18/1990)
39 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for protective order by plaintiff & the class [21-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 07/19/1990)
40 MOTION for reconsideration of plas' certification as a class by defendant [40-1] (APJ) (Entered: 07/27/1990)
41 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by defendant motion for reconsideration of plas' certification as a class by defendant [40-1] [40-1]

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07/26/1990
07/31/1990 08/01/1990 08/02/1990 08/08/1990 08/09/1990 08/10/1990 08/10/1990
08/13/1990 08/21/1990 08/21/1990 08/29/1990 09/04/1990 09/05/1990
09/10/1990

(APJ) (Entered: 07/27/1990)
42 NOTICE OF HEARING by plaintiff John - Tomlin , in court hearing set for 8/10/90 @ 10:00 re sponaneous discussions by pltfs' experts w/prison staff and access to random health records of prisoners (purs to 7/12/90 court order). (CDE) (Entered: 08/01/1990)
43 MOTION for authority to secure attendance of inmates at depositions by defendants [43] (CDE) (Entered: 08/01/1990)
44 NOTICE by plaintiffs of filing docs in sprt of addtl disc (ALL) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
Remark: ntc to w/d mtn ret'd, R10(g) cpy 4 Jdge (SRB) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
45 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by defendant of motion for authority to secure attendance of inmates at depositions by defendants [43] [43-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/13/1990)
46 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for reconsideration of plas' certification as a class by defendant [40-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/13/1990)
47 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc responses. (CDE) (Entered: 08/13/1990)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM; Crt Rptr: B. HIGHTOWER, ECR-- cnf re discvry held. Cnsl to wrk out procedures & presnt to crt w/p/posed ord w/in 10 dys re disclosures of prisoners' medical recrds (former emp) (Entered: 08/16/1990)
48 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke:purs to stip of parties, dfts' mtn for security to secure the attendance of inmates at depos is withdrawn. [451], [43] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 08/13/1990)
49 JOINT NOTICE of filing order. (CDE) (Entered: 08/22/1990)
50 MEMORANDUM by defendants re order lodged 8/21/90. (CDE) (Entered: 08/22/1990)
51 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for reconsideration of plas' certification as a class by defendant [40-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 08/29/1990)
52 NOTICE of svc (2nd set of interrog & 3rd req for production of documents) by plaintiff Fletcher Charles Casey Jr. (former emp) (Entered: 09/05/1990)
53 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: dfts shl perm pltfs' attys and health care experrts to review prisoner med/mental health records selected by them for purposes of dev an eval of ADOC health care delivery system w/o necessity of signed med releases [see doc for full details] (re: minute entry [0-0] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 09/05/1990)
54 NOTICE by plaintiff and the class of change of address (Pltfs cnsl).

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09/14/1990 09/18/1990
09/19/1990 09/28/1990 09/28/1990 09/28/1990 10/05/1990 10/05/1990 10/09/1990 10/12/1990
10/15/1990 10/25/1990 10/29/1990 11/05/1990 11/06/1990 11/07/1990 11/08/1990
11/13/1990 11/13/1990

(CDE) (Entered: 09/11/1990)
55 MOTION to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by plaintiff [55-1] (former emp) (Entered: 09/14/1990)
56 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by plaintiff [55-1] pretrial order ddl reset for 11/30/90 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
57 MOTION to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by defendants [57-1] (SRB) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
58 CORRECTED NOTICE by plaintiffs and the class of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
59 NOTICE by pltfs and class of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
60 NOTICE by plaintiffs and class of svc of disc pps. (CDE) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
61 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1990)
62 NOTICE by plaintiffs of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1990)
63 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by defendants [57-1] (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1990)
64 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by defendants [57-1] proposed PTO (42c) ddl cont to 01-31-91. (cc: all counsel) (APJ) (Entered: 10/12/1990)
65 REPLY by defendant to motion to extend time to comply w/LR 42c by defendants [57-1] [57-1] (CDE) (Entered: 10/17/1990)
67 NOTICE by defendant of service (MAP) (Entered: 10/30/1990)
66 NOTICE OF HEARING by plaintiff , pretrial conference set for 11/15/90 @ 1:30 (set by pltfs ntc) (CDE) (Entered: 10/29/1990)
68 NOTICE by plaintiff OF TAKING DEPO OF Ronald W. Centric, D.O. on the following date(s): 11/12/90 (CDE) (Entered: 11/06/1990)
69 NOTICE by defendant svc of disc pprs (CDE) (Entered: 11/08/1990)
70 MOTION to extend time to respond to admissions by plaintiff [70] . (CDE) (Entered: 11/08/1990)
71 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time til 11/12/90 to respond to admissions by plaintiff [70] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 11/08/1990)
72 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing suppl answers to dft's intrrgs & req for prdctn of docs (MAP) (Entered: 11/15/1990)
73 MOTION for leave to take exprts' depos & file req for prdctn for exprts'

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11/13/1990 11/13/1990 11/14/1990 11/15/1990 11/15/1990 11/21/1990 11/26/1990 11/27/1990 11/28/1990
12/06/1990
12/10/1990 12/10/1990 12/12/1990
12/13/1990 12/14/1990 12/14/1990 12/19/1990 12/28/1990
01/07/1991

files by defendant [73-1] (MAP) (Entered: 11/15/1990)
74 PRE-TRIAL CONF MEMORANDUM by defendant re [66-1], [66-2] & [66-3] (MAP) (Entered: 11/15/1990)
75 NOTICE by plaintiff of svc of resp to dft's req for admssns, non-unfrm intrrgs & req for prdctn of docs (MAP) (Entered: 11/16/1990)
76 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff summarizing issues crt will b asked to rslv @ 11/15/90 prelim hrgng re [66-3] (MAP) (Entered: 11/16/1990)
77 NOTICE of service by defendant (MAP) (Entered: 11/16/1990)
78 NOTICE by defendant of service (MAP) (Entered: 11/16/1990)
79 SUPPLEMENTAL memo by defendant in suppt of mtn for lv to take exprts' depos... [73-1] (former emp) (Entered: 11/23/1990)
80 NOTICE by defendant of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 11/27/1990)
81 NOTICE by defendant of service (MAP) Modified on 02/02/1998 (Entered: 11/28/1990)
82 RESPONSE in opp by plaintiff to motion for leave to take exprts' depos & file req for prdctn for exprts' files by defendant [73-1] (MAP) (Entered: 11/28/1990)
83 REPLY by defendants in sprt of motion for leave to take exprts' depos & file req for prdctn for exprts' files by defendant [73-1] (MAP) (Entered: 12/07/1990)
84 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1990)
85 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing suppl to disc. (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1990)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM: Crt Rptr: Marge Harcarik/8661045: granting motion for leave to take exprts' depos & file req for prdctn for exprts' files by defendant [73-1]; counsel to prepare a stipulated form of order for courts signature. (former emp) (Entered: 12/12/1990)
86 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing supl to disc. (CDE) (Entered: 12/18/1990)
87 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 12/18/1990)
88 NOTICE by plaintiff filing pltfs' suppl to disc. (CDE) (Entered: 12/18/1990)
89 MOTION to dismiss dfts' demand for jury trial by plaintiff [89-1] (former emp) (Entered: 12/21/1990)
90 NOTICE by defendants OF TAKING DEPO OF Dr. Cassandra Newkirk on the following date(s): 01-07 & 08-91 at 9:30 am (APJ) (Entered: 12/31/1990)
91 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: proposed PTO (42c) set for 4/24/91 setting disc ddls (re: motion for leave to take exprts' depos & file req for

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01/11/1991 01/15/1991 01/16/1991
01/25/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/08/1991 02/11/1991 02/12/1991 02/14/1991 02/15/1991 02/15/1991 02/20/1991 02/20/1991

prdctn for exprts' files by defendant [73] [see doc for full details (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 01/07/1991)
92 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to dismiss dfts' demand for jury trial by plaintiff [89-1] (MAP) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
93 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF James Wilbur, on the following date(s): 1/22/91. (former emp) (Entered: 01/16/1991)
94 SUBSTITUTION TO RESPONSE by defendant to motion to dismiss dfts' demand for jury trial by plaintiff [89-1] [89-1] (CDE) (Entered: 01/22/1991)
95 REPLY by plaintiff to motion to dismiss dfts' demand for jury trial by plaintiff [89-1] [89-1] (CDE) (Entered: 01/28/1991)
96 MOTION for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96-1] , for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96-2] (MAP) (Entered: 02/08/1991)
97 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in sprt of motion for TRO re [96-1], & prelim inj re [96-2] (MAP) (Entered: 02/08/1991)
98 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Richard Rossi on the following date(s): 3/5/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
99 NOTICE by defendants OF TAKING DEPO OF Michael Sodders on the following date(s): 3/5/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
100 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Kevin Dickinson on the following date(s): 3/5/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
101 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Doreen Romney on the following date(s): 2/28/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
102 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Paula Harris on the following date(s): 2/28/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
103 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Charles Albert Braslow MD on the following date(s): 2/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/13/1991)
104 NOTICE by defendant of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 02/13/1991)
105 NOTICE by plaintiff OF TAKING DEPO OF Samuel A. Lewis on the following date(s): 2/28/91 & 3/1/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/15/1991)
106 MOTION for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [106-1] , for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [106-2] (CDE) (Entered: 02/15/1991)
107 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff re [106-1], re [106-2] (CDE) (Entered: 02/15/1991)
108 AMENDED NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Doreen Ronmey on the following date(s): 3/6/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/21/1991)
109 AMDENDED NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Paula Harris on the following date(s): 3/6/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/21/1991)

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02/20/1991 02/21/1991
02/27/1991 02/27/1991 02/27/1991 02/28/1991 02/28/1991 03/05/1991 03/11/1991 03/15/1991 03/18/1991 03/19/1991 03/21/1991
03/22/1991
03/25/1991 03/26/1991

110 RESPONSE by dfts inopp to ptlfs' mtn for tro & prelim inj. (CDE) (Entered: 02/21/1991)
111 NOTICE OF HEARING by plaintiff setting motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96-1] at 10:00 3/22/91, setting motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96-2] at 10:00 3/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 02/25/1991)
112 ERRATA by defendant to exh A to resp to tro mtn [110-1] (CDE) (Entered: 02/28/1991)
Text not available. (Entered: 02/28/1991)
DOCUMENT REJECTION: dft's ntc of err rej (listed cases as if they were consolidated). (CDE) (Entered: 02/28/1991)
113 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to dismiss dfts' demand for jury trial by plaintiff [89-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 02/28/1991)
114 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96-1], motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96-2] (CDE) (Entered: 03/01/1991)
115 NOTICE by defendant of filing of afdvt of Lito Pisano (SRB) (Entered: 03/07/1991)
116 NOTICE by plaintiff & the class of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/13/1991)
117 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/19/1991)
119 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff re [118-1], re [118-2], re [118-3] (CDE) (Entered: 03/19/1991)
118 MOTION to strike dfts' expert witnesses by plaintiff [118-1] , and to shorten time for response by plaintiff [118] , and to impose sanctions by plaintiff [118-3] (CDE) (Entered: 03/19/1991)
120 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to shorten time for response by plaintiff [118], dft resp due 3/28/91; pltf's reply 4/1/91; setting motion to strike & impose sanctions by plaintiff [118-3] at 10:00 4/5/91 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 03/21/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V. Reger ECR (re: motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96-1] [96-1], (re: motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96-2]) wit sw & exam; exh admtd; Both sides rest, cnsl agree to submt final arg in writing nlt 4/4/91. 3:00 Crt recessed. (no ntc to cnsl) (re: minute entry [0-0] (CDE) (Entered: 04/09/1991)
121 NOTICE by plaintiff of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/26/1991)
122 NOTICE by plaintiff of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 03/26/1991)

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03/26/1991 03/27/1991 03/27/1991 03/28/1991 03/28/1991 03/28/1991 04/03/1991 04/03/1991 04/03/1991 04/03/1991 04/03/1991
04/03/1991 04/03/1991
04/03/1991 04/04/1991 04/05/1991
04/05/1991
04/05/1991

123 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 3/22/91 (TRO mtn hrg) (CDE) (Entered: 03/27/1991)
124 NOTICE by plaintiff OF TAKING DEPO OF Carole Larsen-Harper on the following date(s): 3/27/91 (CDE) (Entered: 03/28/1991)
125 STIPULATION to permit filing of Amd Cmp (CDE) (Entered: 03/28/1991)
126 AMENDED COMPLAINT by plaintiffs (by stip) [1-1] (CDE) Modified on 03/28/1991 (Entered: 03/28/1991)
127 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: per stip, pltfs my file amd cmp which hs been lodged herein. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 03/28/1991)
128 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to strike dfts' expert witnesses by plaintiff [118-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/02/1991)
129 AMENDED ANSWER [19] by Samuel A. Lewis, William Rhode, George Herman, Roger Crist (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
130 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing depo of Carole Larsen-Harper. (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
131 DEMAND for jury trial by defendant (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
132 MOTION to extend time (to file reply mem) by plaintiff [132-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
133 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time (to file reply mem) by plaintiff [132-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
134 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to strike dfts' expert witnesses by plaintiff [118]. (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
135 MEMORANDUM: proposed finings of fact and conclusions of law re: pltfs' mtn for tro and prelim inj on issue of contact atty visitation in cellblock 6. (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
136 LEGAL MEMORANDUM by defendant re [96-1], re [96-2] (CDE) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
137 NOTICE by defendants of svc (of suppl resp to plas' req for prod of docs & interogs) (ALL) (Entered: 04/05/1991)
138 REPLY by dfts to pla's ppros'd findings of fact & concl of law re: pla's motions for TRO & prelim inj [96-1], [96-2] (MAP) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
139 REPLY by plaintiff to dfts' memo in oppsn to motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96-1], motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96-2] (former emp) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
142 STIPULATION re: pltfs' mtn to strike expert witnesses [118]. (CDE) (Entered: 04/09/1991)

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04/05/1991
04/08/1991
04/08/1991
04/08/1991 04/08/1991 04/08/1991 04/08/1991 04/09/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/10/1991

CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V. Reger-ECR Re: [118] mtn to st dfts' expert wt by pltf and mtn for sanctions/atty fees. mtn to strike wd per stip, cnsl orally stip to wd mtn for sanctions and atty fees. (no notic to cnsl) (CDE) (Entered: 04/17/1991)
140 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: grntng stip that respnses to p/posed F/F & C/L extnded to 4/5/91 (cc: all counsel) (re: order [140-1] (former emp) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
141 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: dfts will seek to qualify persns as exprt witnsses (as listed herein)... (see doc for fur details) (cc: all counsel) (re: order [141-1] (former emp) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
143 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Frank Bartholic on the following date(s): 4/23/91. (CDE) (Entered: 04/09/1991)
144 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Mario Marquez on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/09/1991)
145 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Lionel Johnson on the following date(s): 4/23/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/09/1991)
146 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Steve Douglas on the following date(s): 4/19/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/10/1991)
147 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 04/10/1991)
148 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF William Hall on the following date(s): 4/23/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
149 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Robert Stevie on the following date(s): 4/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
150 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Donald Johns on the following date(s): 4/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
151 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Daniel Heitman on the following date(s): 4/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
152 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Armando Estrada on the following date(s): 4/23/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
153 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Richard Rossi on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
154 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Thomas West on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
155 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Jeff Phillips on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
156 NOTICE by defendant Robert Goldsmith OF TAKING DEPO OF John Cuffle on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
157 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Paul Aragon on the following date(s): 4/22/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)

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04/10/1991 04/10/1991 04/11/1991 04/12/1991 04/12/1991 04/12/1991
04/12/1991 04/15/1991 04/15/1991 04/15/1991 04/15/1991 04/23/1991 04/24/1991 04/24/1991 04/25/1991
04/25/1991 04/26/1991 04/26/1991 04/26/1991

158 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Sharon Kelly on the following date(s): 4/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
159 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Maggie Adams on the following date(s): 4/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
160 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by defendant of demand for jury trial [131]. (CDE) (Entered: 04/12/1991)
161 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Carol Franke on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (former emp) (Entered: 04/15/1991)
162 Amended NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Sharon Kelly on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (former emp) (Entered: 04/15/1991)
163 Amended NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Maggie Adams on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (former emp) (Entered: 04/15/1991)
164 NOTICE by defendant of svc of discvry papers (former emp) (Entered: 04/15/1991)
165 2ND AMD NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Sharon Kelly on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/16/1991)
166 2ND AMD NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Maggie Adams on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/16/1991)
167 AMD NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Carol Franke on the following date(s): 4/17/91 (CDE) (Entered: 04/16/1991)
168 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc prs. (CDE) (Entered: 04/16/1991)
169 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 04/25/1991)
170 MOTION to extend time (42C compliance) by plaintiff [170-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/25/1991)
172 PROOF OF SERVICE of ntc of depo(subpoena) upon S. Douglas. (CDE) (Entered: 04/26/1991)
171 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: granting motion to extend time (42C compliance) by plaintiff [170-1] proposed PTO (42c) 4/26/91 @ 5:00 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/25/1991)
173 NOTICE by defendant of svc of discvry papers (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
174 NOTICE by defendant of svc of discvry papers (6th req for prod; 5th set of intrrgs) (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
175 MOTION for partial summary judgment by defendant [175-1] (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
176 MEMORANDUM of P&As IN SUPPORT by defendant motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [175-1] [175-1] (former emp)

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04/26/1991
04/26/1991 04/26/1991 04/29/1991 05/03/1991
05/06/1991 05/07/1991 05/08/1991 05/09/1991
05/09/1991 05/10/1991 05/10/1991 05/10/1991 05/10/1991 05/13/1991
05/13/1991 05/13/1991

(Entered: 05/02/1991)
177 STATEMENT OF FACTS by defendant re motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [175-1] [175-1] (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
178 AFFIDAVIT of Gail A Parin (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
179 AFFIDAVIT of J. C. Keeney (former emp) (Entered: 05/02/1991)
PROPOSED PRE-TRIAL ORDER received (CDE) (Entered: 06/05/1991)
180 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: 1. Dfts' s/j mtn dismissed w/o prj [175]. 2. Dfts' req for hrg on s/j mtn moot. 3. No frthr disc shl be allowed. 4. All disp/subst mtns must b filed nlt 5/13/91. 5. no suppl pleadings... 6. absent excep circ no extension. [see doc for full details] dispositive motions set for 5/13/91 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 05/03/1991)
181 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 05/07/1991)
182 NOTICE OF HEARING by defendant pretrial conference set for 6/21/91 @ 2:30 (CDE) (Entered: 05/08/1991)
183 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 05/09/1991)
184 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: denying as moot motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [96]. granting motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiff [96] [see doc for details] (cc: all (CDE) (Entered: 05/09/1991)
185 MOTION for jury trial by defendant [185-1] (CDE) (Entered: 05/10/1991)
186 MOTION for sanctions by plaintiffs [186] (CDE) (Entered: 05/13/1991)
187 MOTION for expedited hrg and br sched (re sanctions mtn) by plaintiff [187] . (CDE) (Entered: 05/13/1991)
188 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by plaintiff of hand delivery of docs on cnsl (CDE) (Entered: 05/13/1991)
189 NOTICE by plaintiff of svc of docs on cnsl. (CDE) (Entered: 05/13/1991)
190 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: granting motion for expedited hrg and br sched (re sanctions mtn) by plaintiff [187]. Dfts resp due 5/17/91; ptlf's reply 5/21/91. setting hrg on motion for sanctions by plaintiffs [186] at 10:00 5/31/91 [see doc for full details] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 05/13/1991)
191 MOTION for partial summary judgment by defendant [191-1] (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
192 STATEMENT OF FACTS by defendant re motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)

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05/13/1991 05/13/1991
05/13/1991 05/13/1991 05/14/1991 05/14/1991 05/16/1991
05/17/1991
05/21/1991 05/22/1991 05/22/1991 05/22/1991 05/22/1991 05/23/1991
05/23/1991 05/23/1991 05/24/1991 05/30/1991 05/30/1991

193 MEMORANDUM p/a by defendant re [191]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
194 NOTICE OF HEARING by defendant setting motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191-1] at 10:00 6/21/91 (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
195 AFFIDAVIT of J.C. Keeney (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
196 AFFIDAVIT of Gail Parin (CDE) (Entered: 05/15/1991)
197 OPPOSITION by dfts' to pltfs' mtn for exp hrg and br sched. [186]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
198 AFFIDAVIT of Daniel P. Struck (CDE) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
199 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: denying motion for jury trial by defendant purs to 2/28/91 court order [185]. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
200 RESPONSE to motion by dfts and CROSS-MOTION for sanctions on pltfs for filing pleading in violation of FRCP Rule 11 [200-1] (RE: [1861] ) (APJ) (Entered: 05/20/1991)
201 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for sanctions [200]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/23/1991)
203 NOTICE by defendants of filing affidavits of E. Hochuli & K. Wieneke. (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
204 AFFIDAVIT of Edward G. Hochuli (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
205 ERRATA by defendants to response to motion for sanctions & x-motion for sanctions [200-2] (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
206 AFFIDAVIT of Kathleen L. Wieneke (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
202 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: 1. denying dfts crs-motion for sanctions on pltfs for filing pleading in violation of FRCP Rule 11 [200]. 2. br on pltf's mtn for sanctions is now closed, any resp/reply filed purs to dfts' crsmtn w/b stricken. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 05/23/1991)
207 NOTICE by defendants of filing affidavit of M. Warren M.D. (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
208 AFFIDAVIT of Michael M. Warren, M.D. (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
209 DECLARATION of David C. Fathi purs to 28:1746 re motion reply [201-1] (APJ) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
210 RESPONSE by plaintiffs and Class to motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191]. (CDE) (Entered: 05/31/1991)
211 STATEMENT OF FACTS by plaintiff in re to dfts s/j mtn [210-1] (CDE) (Entered: 05/31/1991)

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05/30/1991 05/30/1991 05/31/1991 05/31/1991
06/10/1991 06/12/1991 06/12/1991 06/13/1991 06/13/1991 06/14/1991 06/14/1991 06/19/1991
06/20/1991 06/20/1991 06/21/1991
06/21/1991
06/27/1991

212 NOTICE by defendant of svc of discovery papers (MAP) (Entered: 06/04/1991)
213 NOTICE by defendant's atts of change of firm address (MAP) (Entered: 06/04/1991)
214 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing of exhibit K (MAP) (Entered: 06/04/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V. Reger - ECR denying motion for sanctions by plaintiffs [186] (no notice) (CDE) (Entered: 06/04/1991)
215 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 5/31/91. (CDE) (Entered: 06/12/1991)
216 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Michael Rossi on the following date(s): 6/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1991)
217 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Thomas West on the following date(s): 6/18/91 (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1991)
218 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 8/10/90 (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1991)
219 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 7/6/90 (CDE) (Entered: 06/14/1991)
220 REPLY by defendant to response to motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191-1] (CDE) (Entered: 06/17/1991)
221 STATEMENT OF FACTS defendant insuprt of motion reply [220]. (CDE) (Entered: 06/17/1991)
225 RESPONSE by defendants to req at 5/31/91 hrg to prov court with clarification re dfts' actions in listing witnesses. (CDE) (Entered: 06/27/1991)
222 MOTION to disqualify Honorable Carl Muecke by defendant [222-1] (MAP) (Entered: 06/21/1991)
223 MOTION to continue hearing re: motion for sum jgm by defendant [2231] (MAP) (Entered: 06/21/1991)
224 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to continue hearing re: motion for sum jgm by defendant [223-1] denying motion to disqualify Honorable Carl Muecke by defendant [222-1] (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 06/21/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VR taking under advisement on the motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191-1] (MAP) (Entered: 06/25/1991)
226 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for partial summary judgment by defendant [191-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 06/27/1991)

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06/28/1991 07/11/1991 07/16/1991 07/22/1991 07/22/1991 07/22/1991
08/05/1991 08/06/1991 08/06/1991 08/07/1991
08/07/1991 08/07/1991
08/15/1991
08/21/1991 08/21/1991

227 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: [see doc for full details] s/j mtn ddl 7/22/91; proposed PTO (42c) (Amd) 11/1/91; trial 11/18/91 @ 9:00 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 06/28/1991)
228 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing exh omitted in error from pretrial order. (CDE) (Entered: 07/12/1991)
229 NOTICE by defendant of svc of disc pprs. (CDE) (Entered: 07/17/1991)
230 MOTION for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] (CDE) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
231 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff re [230-1] (CDE) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
232 STATEMENT OF FACTS by plaintiff re motion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] [230-1] (CDE) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
233 MOTION for extn of time to file resp to mtn for sj by defendant [233-1] (former emp) (Entered: 08/06/1991)
234 Certified Copy of 9CCA Order denying petition for writ of mandamus, re: 91-70411 [234-1] (CDE) Modified on 09/10/1997 (Entered: 08/06/1991)
235 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: per mtn for exttm to respnd to s/j mtn [233], Dfts' resp due 8/7/91, FO: pltf's repy 8/15/91. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 08/06/1991)
236 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
237 STATEMENT OF FACTS by defendant re motion response [236-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
238 OBJECTIONS by defendant to pltfs' stmt of facts (re: motion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230]) (CDE) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
239 REPLY memo by plaintiff in supprt ofmotion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] (former emp) (Entered: 08/16/1991)
240 Ntc of filing AFFIDAVITS of J.C. Keeney, James McFadden, Terry Stewart, Duane Vild & Frank Terry (former emp) (Entered: 08/27/1991)
241 Ntc of ERRATA by defendant to stmt of facts [237-1] (former emp) (Entered: 08/27/1991)

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08/23/1991
08/30/1991
09/06/1991
09/16/1991 09/16/1991 09/16/1991 09/16/1991
09/18/1991 09/18/1991 09/18/1991 09/18/1991 09/23/1991 09/23/1991 09/23/1991

CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V Reger (re: motion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] was argued & taken under advisemnt on 8/23/91 (ALL) (Entered: 09/09/1991)
242 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Judge C A. Muecke: 1. granting motion for prtl summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230]. 2. Dfts enj from proh contact visits.... 3. Dfts enj from denying food-svc emplymt....[see doc for full details] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 08/30/1991)
243 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for summary judgment on issures of contact attorney visitation and denial of prison jobs in violation of sec 504 of the rehabilitation act by plaintiffs [230-1] (see doc) (cc: all counsel) (ALL) Modified on 09/10/1997 (Entered: 09/09/1991)
244 MOTION in limine by defendants (to exclude inmate grievances and inmate kites at trial) [244-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/18/1991)
245 MEMORANDUM by defendant re [244-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/18/1991)
246 MOTION in limine by plaintiffs to exlude cert specified evidence [246-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/18/1991)
247 ***STRICKEN *** (SEE 10/1/91 ORDER) NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant from District Court Memorandum & Order [242-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel/CAM/CR Monitor) (TDO w/instructions to appellant cnsl) (NOTE: NO APPEAL FEE PAID) (former emp) Modified on 10/01/1991 (Entered: 09/24/1991)
248 MOTION to stay (order of 8/30/91) by defendant [248-1] (former emp) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
249 MEMORANDUM of P&JAs IN SUPPORT by defendant motion to stay (order of 8/30/91) by defendant [248-1] [248-1] (former emp) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
250 MOTION to clarify order o 8/30/91 by defendant [250-1] (former emp) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
251 MEMORANDUM of P&As IN SUPPORT by defendant motion to clarify order 8/30/91 by defendant [250-1] [250-1] (former emp) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
252 RESPONSE by defendant to motion in limine by plaintiffs to exlude cert specified evidence [246-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
253 MEMORANDUM by defendant re [252-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
254 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion in limine by defendants (to exclude inmate grievances and inmate kites at trial) [244-1] (CDE) (Entered:

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09/24/1991 09/24/1991 09/24/1991 09/24/1991 09/24/1991 09/30/1991 09/30/1991 09/30/1991 09/30/1991 10/01/1991
10/09/1991 10/10/1991 10/11/1991
10/11/1991
10/17/1991

09/24/1991)
255 MOTION to strike dfts' ntc of appeal by plaintiffs [255-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/25/1991)
256 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff insuprt of mtn to strike dfts' ntc of appeal [255]. (CDE) (Entered: 09/25/1991)
257 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to stay (order of 8/30/91) by defendant [248]. (CDE) (Entered: 09/25/1991)
258 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to clarify order o 8/30/91 by defendant [250-1] (CDE) (Entered: 09/25/1991)
Appeal info sent to 9CCA. (re 9/16/91 appeal). (CDE) (Entered: 10/11/1991)
259 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion in limine by plaintiffs to exlude cert specified evidence [246-1] (CDE) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
261 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from District Court order dated 8/30/91 [242] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel) [NO FEE PAID] (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1991)
262 REPLY by defendant to motion to stay (order of 8/30/91) by defendant [248-1] [248-1] (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1991)
263 REPLY by defendant to response to motion in limine by defendants (to exclude inmate grievances and inmate kites at trial) [244-1] (CDE) (Entered: 10/10/1991)
260 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: Denying motion to stay (order of 8/30/91) by defendant [248]. Denying motion to clarify order of 8/30/91 by defendant [250]. Granting motion to strike dfts' ntc of appeal by plaintiffs [255] (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (CDE) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
264 STIPULATION concerning trial schedule. (CDE) (Entered: 10/11/1991)
265 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 8/23/91, (CDE) (Entered: 10/11/1991)
266 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: trial w/commence as prev sched on 11/18/91 and cont through 11/26/91, excluding weekends. Trial w/recess on 11/26/91, reconvene on 12/16/91 and cont through 12/20/91. Trial will again recess on 12/20/91 and reconvene 1/6/92, cont until completed. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 10/11/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger - ECR taking under advisement on the motion in limine by plaintiffs to exlude cert specified evidence [246-1], taking under advisement on the motion in limine by defendants (to exclude inmate grievances and inmate kites at trial) [244-1] (no notice) (CDE) (Entered: 10/18/1991)
Received $105.00 appeal fee. (CDE) (Entered: 10/22/1991)

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10/17/1991 10/18/1991 10/21/1991
10/21/1991 10/22/1991 10/31/1991 11/05/1991
11/05/1991 11/05/1991 11/05/1991 11/08/1991 11/08/1991 11/08/1991 11/14/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991
11/15/1991 11/15/1991

269 DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL subtd by dfts. (CDE) (Entered: 10/29/1991)
270 Transcript Designation and Ordering Form (3/22/91 & 8/23/91 hrgs) (CDE) (Entered: 10/29/1991)
267 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke 1) granting motion in limine by plaintiffs to exlude cert specified evidence [246-1] 2) granting in part and den in part motion in limine by defendants (to exclude inmate grievances and inmate kites at trial) [244-1] [see doc for full details] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 10/21/1991)
268 NOTICE by defendant of voluntary dismissal of 2nd ntc of appeal fld 9/30/91 (former emp) (Entered: 10/25/1991)
Certificate of Record Transmitted to 9CCA [247-1] (former emp) (Entered: 10/25/1991)
271 STIPULATION to continue trial... (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1991)
272 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: per stip, trial cont'd to 11/20/91 proposed PTO (42c) 11/5/91 wit lists/exh field nlt 11/5/91.(cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 11/05/1991)
273 NOTICE by plaintiffs of filing summary exhibits (wit list and 2 vol of exh list attch'd). (CDE) (Entered: 11/06/1991)
274 WITNESS LIST by defendants. (CDE) (Entered: 11/07/1991)
AMENDED PROPOSED PRE-TRIAL ORDER received (sent to file) (CDE) (Entered: 11/08/1991)
275 TRIAL MEMORANDUM by defendants. (CDE) (Entered: 11/13/1991)
276 TRIAL BRIEF FILED by plaintiff (CDE) (Entered: 11/13/1991)
277 NOTICE by defendant by dfts of filing trial memo (CDE) (Entered: 11/13/1991)
278 MOTION to transfer case pursuant to LR 3(e)(1) (re: Arnold V. Lewis 91-1808) [278] . (CDE) (Entered: 11/14/1991)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 91-16683 (DDL) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
279 TIME SCHEDULE ORDER frm 9CCA re Aplnt to notfy Aple of trans to be ord by 10/10/91; Aplee to ntfy Aplnt of any addtl trans to be ord by 10/21/91; Aplnt to file trans ord form w/ Dist rt by 10/30/91; Crt Reprt to file trans by 12/2/91. [279-1] (DDL) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
280 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad testificandum (Joe Harris 34019). (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
281 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad testificandum (Robert Stevie 66667) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)

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11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/15/1991
11/15/1991 11/15/1991 11/20/1991 11/20/1991
11/21/1991

282 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad testificandum (John Roettgen 74639) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
283 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad testificandum (Mary Jo Brook 42595) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
284 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (Jess Perkins 71624). (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
285 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (Walter Nicholson 26183) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
286 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (Doreen Romney 54052) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
287 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (Fletcher Casey 49833) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
288 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (David Murphy 75018) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
289 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of h/c ad test (Mack Walker 55197) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
290 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: per petitions, Clerk of Court issue writs of h/c ad test for the ADOC to bring the following prisoners to courtroom 2 ...: 11/22/91 Fletcher Casey, Mack Walker, David Murphy, Doreen Romney, 11/26/91: Joe Roettgen, Jess Perkins, Joe Harris, Mary Jo Brooker, Walter Nicholson & Robert Steve [writs issued] (re: petition [289-1], (re: petition [288-1], (re: petition [287-1], (re: petition [286-1], (re: petition [285-1], (re: petition [284-1], (re: petition [283-1], (re: petition [282-1], (re: petition [281-1], (re: petition [280-1] (cc: all counsel) (writs and orders hand delivered to the USM) (CDE) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
291 STIPULATION of facts by ptys cnsl as a result of Alhambra, ACW, ASP-Douglas, ASP-Florence, ASP-Tucson, ASP-Perryville & ASPWinslow tour. (CDE) (Entered: 11/19/1991)
292 MOTION to strike pltf's trial brief by defendant [292-1] (CDE) (Entered: 11/19/1991)
293 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: denying motion to strike pltf's trial brief by defendant [292]. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 11/20/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER - ECR: 1st day of bench trial. 9:30 Crt in sess, Pltfs' op stmts. Dfts' reserve their op stmt. wit exam, exh admtd 4:30 court recessed til 11/21/91 @ 9:00. for trial (CDE) (Entered: 12/09/1991)
294 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: Clk iss w of h/c ad test for ADOC to bring Doreen Romney to ctrm 2 on 11/26/91. (cc: all counsel) (writ iss and del (w/cert cpys) to USM on 121/21/91) (re: order [294-1] (CDE) (Entered: 11/21/1991)

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11/21/1991
11/25/1991
12/05/1991
12/05/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/09/1991 12/09/1991 12/09/1991 12/09/1991

CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER - ECR 2ND DAY OF BENCH TRIAL. 9:00 crt sess, wit exam, exh admtd 3:30 Court recessed til 11/22/91 @ 9:00. 3RD DAY OF BENCH TRIAL. 11/22/91 9:am Court in sess, wit exam, exh admtd. 3:45pm Court recessed til 11/25/91 @ 9:am. (re: minute entry [0-0] (CDE) (Entered: 12/09/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER -ECR 4TH DAY OF BENCH TRIAL. 11/25/91 9:00am Court in session, exh admtd, wit exam. 12:pm court recessed til 11/26/91 @ 9:am. 11/26/91 5TH DAY OF BENCH TRIAL 9:am, wit frthr exam, Court recessed til 12/16/91 @ 9:30. (re: minute entry [0-0] (CDE) (Entered: 12/09/1991)
295 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: Clerk issue writs of h/c ad test for the ADOC to bring the following pris to Courtroom 2 to give test in this case: 12/16/91 Fomney, Abernathy, Phillips, Tomlin, Johnson; 12/17/91 Bartholic, Johns, Celaya, James, Bishop, Bryant, Tucker; 12/18/91 Murphy, Perkins, Roettgen, Nicholson, Harris, Booker, 12/19/91 Coley, Estrada, Stone, West & McQuillen (cc: all counsel) (writs iss and sent to USM) (re: order [295-1] (CDE) (Entered: 12/05/1991)
296 MOTION for joinder to case CIV-90-54-PHX-CAM by Erwin Cornstuble [296] . (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
297 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 11/26/91 (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
298 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 11/25/91, (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
299 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 11/22/91, (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
300 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 11/21/91, (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
301 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 11/20/91, (CDE) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
303 REVISED SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES by plaintiff. (CDE) (Entered: 12/09/1991)
302 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for joinder to case CIV90-54-PHX-CAM by Erwin Cornstuble [296] [see doc for details] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 12/09/1991)
304 MEMORANDUM by defendant of law re standard of care. (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1991)
305 NOMINATIONS FOR COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS submtd by plaintiff (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1991)
306 BRIEF FILED by plaintiff re health care standards in 8th amd challenges to prison health care. (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1991)

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12/11/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/16/1991 12/18/1991
12/23/1991 12/23/1991 12/23/1991 12/23/1991 12/30/1991
12/30/1991

WRIT ISSUED re: Keving Abernathy. (updated pris addr) (see perv order to issue writ) (CDE) (Entered: 12/11/1991)
307 MOTION to shorten time and for an expedited hearing by plaintiff [3071] (CDE) (Entered: 12/16/1991)
308 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff re [307].l (CDE) (Entered: 12/16/1991)
309 MOTION to enforce the courts order of 9/6/91 by plaintiff [309-1] (CDE) (Entered: 12/16/1991)
310 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff re [309]. (CDE) (Entered: 12/16/1991)
311 DECLARATION OF POTENTIAL EXPERTS by dfts. (CDE) (Entered: 12/17/1991)
312 DECLARATION by dft of additional potential expert by dfts. (CDE) (Entered: 12/17/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM; Crt Rptr: ANN ELDER-- NJ trial cont'd (6th dy); 12/17/91-- NJ trial cont'd; crt recssd til 12/18/91 (re: minute entry [0-0] (former emp) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM; Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER-- NJ trial cont'd (8th dy); 12/19/91-- NJ trial cont'd (9th dy); crt recess til 1/6/92 @ 9:30 (re: minute entry [0-0] (former emp) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
313 PTN (MOTION) for writ of h/c ad proseqendum (re: Frank Bartholic) by plaintiffs [313-1] (ALL) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
314 PTN (MOTION) for writ of h/c ad proseqendum (re: John Tomlin) by plaintiffs [314-1] (ALL) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
315 PTN (MOTION) for writ of h/c ad proseqendum (re: Pamela McQuillen) by plaintiff [315-1] (ALL) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
316 PTN (MOTION) for writ of habeas corpus ad proseqendum by plaintiffs [316-1] (ALL) (Entered: 12/23/1991)
317 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting mot for writ of habeas corpus ad proseqendum by plas [316-1]; granting mot for writ of h/c ad proseqendum (re: Pamela McQuillen) by plas [315-1]; granting mot for writ h/c ad proseqendum (re: John Tomlin) by plas [314-1]; granting mot for writ h/c ad prosequendum (re: Frank Bartholic) by plas [313-1]. It is O that the Clk of the Ct issue Writs of H/C Ad prosequendum for the AZ Dept of Corrections to bring the following prisoners who are named plas in this case to ctrm 2 to observe the proceedings: Frank Bartholic: 1/7/92, 1/9/92, 1/14/92, 1/6/92, 1/28/92 & 1/30/92; Fletcher Casey: 1/6/92, 1/8/92, 1/13/92, 1/15/92, 1/27/92 & 1/29/92; John Tomlin: 1/7/92, 1/9/92, 1/14/92, 1/16/92, 1/28/92 & 1/30/92; Pamela McQuillen: 1/6/92, 1/8/92, 1/13/92, 1/15/92, 1/27/92 & 1/29/92. (Writs issued.) (cc: all counsel) (LAD) (Entered: 12/30/1991)
318 NOTICE by defendant of filing exhibits (curriculum vitaes of 3 med

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01/02/1992 01/02/1992 01/02/1992 01/03/1992 01/06/1992
01/07/1992
01/08/1992 01/09/1992 01/13/1992 01/14/1992 01/15/1992 01/15/1992 01/15/1992 01/15/1992 01/15/1992

professionals). (see attch'd) (CDE) (Entered: 01/02/1992)
319 Court Reporter's Transcript of Bench Trial Proceedings for the following date(s): 12/17/91 (CDE) (Entered: 01/03/1992)
320 Court Reporter's Transcript of Bench Trial Proceedings for the following date(s): 12/18/91, (CDE) (Entered: 01/03/1992)
321 Court Reporter's Transcript of Bench Trial Proceedings for the following date(s): 12/19/91, (CDE) (Entered: 01/03/1992)
322 SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES by defendant (CDE) (Entered: 01/06/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER-ECR 10th day of bench trial 9:40am all ptys pres frthr non-jury proc held. dfts' case, wit sw/exm, exh admtd. Cnsl stip to adm of ex 47 & 911. 5:20pm recess til 9:30am 1/7/92. (re: minute entry [0-0] (CDE) (Entered: 01/10/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER-ECR 11th Day of Bench Trial 9:40am ptys pres for nonjry proc dfts' case cont, wit exam/sw, exh admtd. 5:25pm order recess til 9:30am on 1/8/92. (re: minute entry [0-0] (CDE) (Entered: 01/10/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger...12th day Bench Trial (re: minute entry [0-0] (MAP) (Entered: 01/13/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger...12th day of Bench Trial (re: minute entry [0-0] (MAP) (Entered: 01/13/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V Reger, ECR: 14th & 15th day of bench trial. Crt will resume 1/15/92. (re: minute entry [0-0] (former emp) (Entered: 01/30/1992)
323 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 10/11/91 (Mtn in limine) (CDE) (Entered: 01/14/1992)
324 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/6/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/16/1992)
325 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/7/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/16/1992)
326 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/8/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/16/1992)
327 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/9/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/16/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM; Crt Rptr: VICKI REGER, ECR- (NJ TRIAL cont'd--16th day): proceedings held. 1/l6/92 (NJ TRIAL cont'd--17th day): proceedings held crt recessed til 1/27/92 @ 9:30 (former emp) (Entered: 01/30/1992)

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01/22/1992 01/22/1992 01/22/1992 01/22/1992 01/27/1992 01/27/1992
01/28/1992 01/29/1992
01/30/1992
02/05/1992 02/07/1992 02/07/1992 02/07/1992 02/07/1992 02/10/1992 02/12/1992

328 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/13/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/27/1992)
329 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/14/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/27/1992)
330 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/15/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/27/1992)
331 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/16/92 (former emp) (Entered: 01/27/1992)
333 STIPULATION to correct record on appeal to include exhibits including 9 photographs and a videotape cassette. (DDL) (Entered: 01/31/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V.Reger (nj trial contd 18th day) proceedings held 1/27/92, (nj trial contd 19th day) proceedings held 1/28/91 - ct recessed til 1/29/92 at 9:30 (re: minute entry [0-0] (former emp) (Entered: 02/03/1992)
332 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by plaintiffs of admission of pltfs' Exhibit 132 (former emp) (Entered: 01/30/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V.Reger (nj trial contd 20th day) proceedings held 1/29/92, ct recessed til 1/30/92 at 2:00 p.m. (re: minute entry [0-0] (former emp) (Entered: 02/03/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger o/a on pla's motion to bring in rebuttal witnesses. Motion TUA; exh 309,311,312 offered & Admitted; Court recessed til 2/27/92 (re: minute entry [0-0] (MAP) (Entered: 02/06/1992)
334 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 12/16/89, (MAP) (Entered: 02/06/1992)
335 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/27/92 (former emp) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
336 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/28/92 (former emp) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
337 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/29/92 (former emp) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
338 Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for the following date(s): 1/30/92 (former emp) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
340 NOTICE by defendant OF TAKING DEPO OF Dr. Michael Easley on the following date(s): 2/12/92. (CDE) (Entered: 02/12/1992)
339 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that exh marked & admitted are to b retuned to cnsl of rec'd. Cnsl are directed to retain custody of exh til case has been completely terminated, incl appeals (cc: all counsel) (re: order [339-1] (MAP) (Entered: 02/12/1992)

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02/27/1992 02/28/1992
03/04/1992
03/05/1992 03/11/1992 03/19/1992 03/19/1992 03/25/1992 03/30/1992 03/30/1992 04/07/1992 04/07/1992 04/17/1992 04/17/1992 04/17/1992

CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki ECR...21st day of bench trial; Easley sworn & exam; cnsl stip to plt's exhbts being admitted (re: minute entry [0-0] (MAP) (Entered: 03/06/1992)
CLERK'S MINUTES Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Vicki ECR...22nd day of bench trial; Scalzo resumes stand; Court ordrs cnsl to simo submit findings of fact & concl of law by 4/10/92 & to simo resp by 5/1/92; clsng argmnts on 5/8/92 (re: minute entry [0-0] (MAP) (Entered: 03/06/1992)
341 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: denying as moot the motion to shorten time and for an expedited hearing by plaintiff [307-1] & motion to enforce the courts order of 9/6/91 by plaintiff [309-1] (cc: all counsel) (former emp) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
342 SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION by defendant of Admission of Exhibits [333-1] (MAP) (Entered: 03/06/1992)
343 NOTICE of filing AFFIDAVIT of M. Warren, M.D. (afdt attch'd) (CDE) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
344 Court Reporter's Transcript of Bench Trl Proceedings for the following date(s): 2/27/92, (MAP) (Entered: 03/24/1992)
345 Court Reporter's Transcript of Bench Trl Proceedings for the following date(s): 2/28/92, (MAP) (Entered: 03/24/1992)
346 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: granting motion to transfer case pursuant to LR 3(e)(1). (re: Arnold V. Lewis 91-1808) [278] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 03/25/1992)
347 STIPULATION to exttm to file FF/Concl of law. (CDE) (Entered: 03/31/1992)
348 NOTICE OF HEARING by defendants re closing arguments on 5/22/92 at 10:00am. (re: hearing notice [348-1] (CDE) (Entered: 03/31/1992)
349 MOTION to strike trial testimony by plaintiff [349-1] ***FILED UNDER SEAL***** (MAP) Modified on 04/08/1992 (Entered: 04/08/1992)
350 MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL motion to strike trial testimony by plaintiff [350-1] (MAP) (Entered: 04/08/1992)
351 MOTION TO SEAL (resp and mem) by defendant [351-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/21/1992)
Proposed documents submitted by defendants (resp to mtn to strk and mem in suprt of resp) submitted w/mtn to seal. (CDE) (Entered: 04/21/1992)
355 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion to strike trial testimony by plaintiff [349-1] [FILED UNDER SEAL] (placed in vault) (CDE) (Entered: 04/24/1992)

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04/17/1992 04/22/1992 04/24/1992
04/24/1992
04/24/1992 05/04/1992 05/08/1992
05/29/1992 05/29/1992 05/29/1992 06/05/1992 07/10/1992 07/15/1992
08/14/1992 08/14/1992 08/20/1992 09/03/1992
09/08/1992

356 MEMORANDUM by defendant re [355-1] [FILED UNDER SEAL] (placed in vault) (CDE) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
352 STIPULATION for exttm to file ff/concl of law. (CDE) (Entered: 04/23/1992)
353 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion TO FILE UNDER SEAL motion to strike trial testimony and suprtng mem by plaintiff [3501] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
354 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion TO SEAL (resp and mem to pltf's mtn to strike) by defendant [351-1] (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
357 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to strike trial testimony by plaintiff [349-1] (CDE) (Entered: 04/27/1992)
358 STIPULATION to extnd time to file FF/Concl Law by pltfs and dfts. (CDE) (Entered: 05/05/1992)
359 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation, ptys shl file FF and Concl of Law on/b4 5/22/92 and responses shl b filed nlt 7/17/92. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 05/08/1992)
360 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law subtd by dfts. (CDE) Modified on 06/02/1992 (Entered: 06/01/1992)
361 MEMORANDUM by dft insuprt of ff/concl of law [360-1] (CDE) (Entered: 06/01/1992)
362 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law submitted by pltfs. (CDE) Modified on 06/02/1992 (Entered: 06/02/1992)
363 Certified Copy of 9CCA Order re dismissing the appeal, re: 91-16683 (cc: all counsel) (DDL) Modified on 02/02/1998 (Entered: 10/02/1992)
364 STIPULATION to extend time to file resp t findings of fact & conclusions of law (MAP) (Entered: 07/13/1992)
365 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the parties shl file their responses to findings of fact on/b-4 8/14/92 (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 07/15/1992)
366 REPLY by pla to dfts findings of fact [360-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/14/1992)
367 RESPONSE by dft to pltf's findings of fact [362-1] (CDE) (Entered: 08/17/1992)
368 NOTICE by dft of filing proposed order. (CDE) (Entered: 08/21/1992)
369 FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law by Judge C A. Muecke (re: 91-1808 Arnold v. Lewis) [Gr mtn forinj filed in 91-1808 and terming 91-1808]. (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 09/03/1992)
370 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the Findings of Fact & Conclusions

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09/18/1992 09/18/1992 09/18/1992 09/18/1992 09/18/1992 09/23/1992 09/23/1992 09/24/1992
09/24/1992 09/25/1992 10/01/1992 10/02/1992
10/02/1992 10/08/1992

of Law issued in "Arnold v. Lewis", CIV-91-1808 are amended at pg 18, line 4...see doc for changes (cc: all counsel) (re: order [370-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/08/1992)
371 OBJECTIONS by dfts to consolidation order of 9/3/92 (MAP) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
372 MOTION for attorney's fees & costs by pla H.B. [372-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
373 OBJECTIONS by dfts Lewis, Fernandez and Vermeer to consol order (MAP) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
373 MOTION to vacate consolidation order by dfts Lewis, Fernandez and Vermeer [373-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
374 MOTION for entry of judgment by dfts Fernandez, Lewis and Vermeer [374-1] or in alt for motion insertion of Rule 54(b) language by dft [3742] (MAP) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
375 MOTION for expedited dtermination of dfts Lewis', Fernandez' & Vermeer's motion for extension of time [375-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/24/1992)
376 MOTION to extend time to resp to petition for atty's fees & costs by dfts Lewis, Fernandez & Vermeer [376-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/24/1992)
377 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to resp to petition for atty's fees & costs by dfts Lewis, Fernandez & Vermeer [3761]...dfts shl hv an add'l week, on or b4 10/2/92, to resp to pla's motion for atty's fees; pla is hereby granted a one week ext of time as well..rply due 10/9/92 (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 09/24/1992)
378 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for expedited dtermination of dfts Lewis', Fernandez' & Vermeer's motion for extension of time [375-1] (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 09/24/1992)
379 RESPONSE by pltfs in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts objection to consol ord (CAD) (Entered: 09/29/1992)
Clerk's record on appeal transmitted to 9CCA, 9 vols, 11 bulky folders, 1 env of sealed Fed Ex to Judge (CAD) (Entered: 10/01/1992)
380 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for entry of judgment [374-1], denying motion for motion insertion of Rule 54(b) language by dft [374-2], denying motion to vacate consolidation order by dfts Lewis, Fernandez and Vermeer [373-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 10/02/1992)
381 dfts Lewis, Fernandez & Vermeer obj & mem in opp to ptnr's app for atty fees [372-1] in 2:90-cv-00054 (CAD) (Entered: 10/06/1992)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 91-16513 (DDL) (Entered: 10/08/1992)

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10/08/1992 11/04/1992
11/16/1992 11/25/1992
12/09/1992
12/17/1992 12/17/1992 12/18/1992 12/30/1992
12/31/1992 01/08/1993 01/12/1993 01/15/1993 01/22/1993 01/26/1993 02/05/1993

382 REPLY Memorandum in sprt of pltf H.B.'s ptn for attorney's fees & costs [372-1] by pltf H.B. (CAD) (Entered: 10/09/1992)
384 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating Sonia Overholser for dfts David Fernandez, Mary Vermeer, John Migliaro & Samuel Lewis in member case CIV 91-1808 PHX CAM and substituting attorneys Edward Hochuli, Kathleen Wieneke & Daniel Struck for same dfts (chg made in member case) (CAD) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
385 FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law-Access to the Courts by Judge C A. Muecke (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
386 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke appointing Daniel J Pochoda as Special Master & Janet Bliss as Asst Special Master, see ord for further details (cc: all counsel) (re: order [386-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/25/1992)
387 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke adding Special Master Dan Pochoda & Asst Special Master Janet Bliss to the mailing list (cc: all counsel) (re: order [387-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/09/1992)
389 NOTICE OF APPEAL by dft from District Court [385-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel) (DDL) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (DDL) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
388 MOTION for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [388-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
390 MOTION for accelerated disposition of motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [388-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/31/1992)
391 SUPPLEMENT to dfts' mtn to stay by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 (CAD) (Entered: 01/04/1993)
392 Pltf's opposition in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [388-1] (CAD) (Entered: 01/08/1993)
393 SUPPLEMENT to dfts' mtn to stay [388-1] in 2:90-cv-00054 (CAD) (Entered: 01/15/1993)
394 NOTICE of filing preliminary draft proposal by pltfs (CAD) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
395 DFTS' OBJECTIONS to implementation of the Gluth injunction in particular facilities in 2:90-cv-00054 (CAD) (Entered: 01/25/1993)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 93-15039 (DDL) (Entered: 01/26/1993)
396 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: Spec Mastr & Asst Spec Mastr monitor case w/i confines of monitorng Casey v Lewis, 90-54; consistnt w/11/20/92 ord in 90-54, Asst Spec Mastr s/b pd $65 p/hr; clk of crt file attchd ltr frm Spec Mastr into CV-84-1626; clk of crt file cy of this ord into CV-90-54 (cc: all counsel) (re: order [396-1] (former emp) (Entered:

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02/05/1993 02/09/1993 02/16/1993
02/19/1993 03/08/1993 03/16/1993
03/18/1993 03/19/1993
03/19/1993 03/22/1993
03/29/1993 04/02/1993 04/05/1993

02/05/1993)
397 SEALED ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 02/05/1993)
398 SECOND MOTION to accelerate disposition of motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts [388-1] (MAP) (Entered: 02/12/1993)
399 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke because the Crt anticipates that a decision on the medical, mental & dental care issues will be filed by the end of this month IT IS ORD denying motions to accelerate disposition of motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts [388-1] & for accelerated disposition of motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [388-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 02/16/1993)
400 Dfts' additional objections/modifications to implementation of the Gluth injunction to particular facilities (CAD) (Entered: 02/22/1993)
401 MOTION to vacate judgment & reopen case by pla Randy Steven Sampson [401-1] (CAD) (Entered: 03/09/1993)
402 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke because pla Sampson is represented by competent counsel IT IS ORD striking motion to vacate judgment & reopen case by pla Randy Steven Sampson [401-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 03/16/1993)
403 MOTION for dfts' cnsl's current address by Randy Steven Sampson [4031] and notice of failure to serve. (str Rule 8(c)) (CDE) Modified on 03/19/1993 (Entered: 03/19/1993)
404 FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law by Judge C A. Muecke: No later than 5/31/93 cnsl shall meet and discuss possible proposals to remedy deficiencies in mental health care system. No later than 9/30/93 ptys shall jointly file a proposed plan to remedy the deficiencies in the mental health care system.... (see doc for full details) (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 03/19/1993)
405 OBJECTIONS by dfts to plas' proposed modifications to Gluth order [386-1] (CAD) (Entered: 03/22/1993)
406 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke striking motion for dfts' cnsl's current address by Randy Steven Sampson [403-1] [403-1] pursuant to Rule 8(c). Clk to strike the instrument from the record, and reject any responses, with notice to counsel. (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 03/22/1993)
407 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Tannis Fox for pla H.B. in CIV 911808 PHX CAM (CAD) (Entered: 04/01/1993)
408 MOTION for new trial by dft [408-1] , or alternately to amend/alter judgment by dft [408-2] (CDE) (Entered: 04/05/1993)
409 FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law by Judge C A. Muecke: (see doc for full details) (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/05/1993)

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04/07/1993
04/09/1993 04/12/1993 04/12/1993 04/16/1993 04/16/1993 04/19/1993 04/19/1993 04/19/1993
04/28/1993 04/29/1993 04/29/1993
04/29/1993 04/30/1993 05/03/1993

410 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke: nlt 4/16/93 cnsl for ptys file a stip sched of dates/times that they intend to discuss the medical, dental, mental health care and handicapped access issues relevant to the inj relief in this case. , case management ddl 4/16/93 (cc: all counsel) (CDE) (Entered: 04/07/1993)
411 STIPULATION for extension of time to respond the dft's mtn for new trial or alternatively mtn to amd/alter jgm; response due 4/19/93 (CAD) (Entered: 04/12/1993)
412 MOTION (request) for joinder by pla Marshall Arnold Ott [412-1] (CAD) (Entered: 04/13/1993)
413 DECLARATION in support of request to proceed in forma pauperis by pla Marshall Arnold Ott (CAD) (Entered: 04/13/1993)
416 Schedule for meetings pursuant to 4/16/93 Court order (order actually filed 4/7/93) [410-3] (CAD) (Entered: 04/19/1993)
418 NOTICE OF APPEAL by dft from District Court [404-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel) (93-15853-per transmittal appeal fee pd 4/16/93) (DDL) Modified on 09/15/1997 (Entered: 04/19/1993)
414 MOTION for relief from jgm on claim of discrimination in violation of section 504 of the rehabilitation act as amended by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [414-1] (CAD) (Entered: 04/19/1993)
415 RESPONSE (opposition) by plas to motion to amend/alter judgment by dft [408-2] (CAD) (Entered: 04/19/1993)
417 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation that plas shall file their response to dfts' motions for new trial [408-1] & to amend/alter judgment [408-2] by 4/19/93 (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 04/19/1993)
419 DFTS' ADD'L OBJECTIONS to plas' proposed modifications (CAD) (Entered: 04/29/1993)
420 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke striking motion (request) for joinder by pla Marshall Arnold Ott [412-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 04/29/1993)
421 STIPULATION for ext of time that dfts file reply to pla opp to dft mtn to amend judgment and rspn to pla mtn for relief from jgmt on claim of discrimination nlt 5/7/93 re [414-1], re [408-1], re [408-2] (former emp) (Entered: 04/30/1993)
422 NOTICE by dfts and plas of parties' amended schedule of meetings purs to 4/16/93 court ord; initial mtg to be held 5/21/93 (former emp) (Entered: 04/30/1993)
423 DFTS' REPLY in support of motion to amend/alter judgment by dft [4082] (CAD) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
424 FINDINGS OF FACT and conclusions of law by Judge C A. Muecke

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05/04/1993 05/05/1993 05/07/1993 05/07/1993 05/10/1993
05/17/1993 05/18/1993
05/24/1993

(cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
425 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of notice of appeal by dft [418-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/05/1993)
426 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation that dfts shall file their reply to plas' opposition to dfts' mtn to amend judgment & response to plas' mtn for relief from judgment on claim of discrimination no later than 5/7/93 (cc: counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/05/1993)
427 RESPONSE by dfts to motion for relief from jgm on claim of discrimination in violation of section 504 of the rehabilitation act as amended by pla [414-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/10/1993)
428 MEMORANDUM in support of response to plas' mtn for relief from judgment on claim of discrimination in violation of section 504 of the rehabilitation act as amended by dfts [427-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/10/1993)
429 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke the Spec Mstr & Asst Spec Mstr sh investigate to determine whether dfts hv directed employees not to speak to the Spec Mstr or Asst Spec Mstr in their investigation of the access to the crts issues in this case and/or the Gluth case & whether dfts hv fired the employee in retaliation for speaking to the Asst Spec Mstr; Spec Mstr & Asst Spec Mstr sh hv all of the authority already ord in addition they sh hv the authority to conduct hrgs & subpoena & question witnesses under oath including employees of the ADOC; they sh also make recommendations as to whether, if allegations are true, dfts hv violated Crt's previous ords, including ords setting forth the authority & duties of Spec Mstr & Asst Spec Mstr; they sh also make recommendations as to whether, if allegations are true, what sanction(s) and/or action(s) are appropriate, including, contempt proceedings & reinstatement of the employee allegedly discharged in retaliation (cc: all cnsl) (re: order [4291] (CAD) (Entered: 05/10/1993)
430 PLAS' REPLY to response to motion for relief from jgm on claim of discrimination in violation of section 504 of the rehabilitation act as amended by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [414-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/18/1993)
431 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke IT IS ORD that the Spec Mstr is directed to report his findings on a) were any of the negative actions involving the Florence law librarian materially attributable to either his cooperating w/the Spec Mstr's ofc or his attempts to comply w/the Gluth final perm injunc, b) have dfts made a good faith effort to comply w/Section I(G) of the Gluth final perm injunc c) have dfts seriously interfered w/the Spec Mstr's direct access to ADOC personnel & prisoners as required by the Gluth & Casey orders; after the Spec Mstr has made these findings, the Crt will consder what, if any, sanctions & actions are required (cc: all counsel) (re: order [431-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/18/1993)
432 PLAS' RESPONSE to dfts' objections dated 4/28/93 (add'l objections to the modification & implementation of the Gluth order) [419-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/24/1993)

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05/24/1993 05/24/1993 05/24/1993 05/26/1993
05/28/1993
05/28/1993 05/28/1993 05/28/1993
06/10/1993 06/10/1993 06/10/1993 06/18/1993 06/25/1993 06/29/1993 07/08/1993

433 MOTION to disqualify special master by dft [433-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/25/1993)
434 DFTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion to disqualify special master [433-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/25/1993)
435 MOTION for expedited disposition by dfts (re: mtn to disqualify) [435-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/25/1993)
436 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for expedited disposition by dfts (re: mtn to disqualify) [435-1], denying motion to disqualify special master by dft [433-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/26/1993)
437 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke RE: I. Procedure for objections to billing of Special Master & II. Clarification of particular objections allowed and the role of the Special Master III. (cc: all counsel) (re: order [437-1] (CAD) (Entered: 05/28/1993)
438 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for new trial by dft [408-1], denying motion to amend/alter judgment by dft [408-2] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/28/1993)
439 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for a stay of its order dated 11/20/92 by dfts [388-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/28/1993)
440 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for relief from jgm on claim of discrimination in violation of section 504 of the rehabilitation act as amended by pla [414-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 05/28/1993)
441 NOTICE by dfts OF TAKING DEPO W/CERTIF OF SVC OF John Sells, #48160 on the following date(s): 6/15/93 at 1:00 (CAD) (Entered: 06/11/1993)
442 NOTICE by dfts OF TAKING DEPO W/CERTIF OF SVC OF Pamela McQuillan Shelton, #51122 on the following date(s): 6/15/93 at 1:00 (CAD) (Entered: 06/11/1993)
443 NOTICE by dfts OF TAKING DEPO W/CERTIF OF SVC OF Maria Gamez, #39223 on the following date(s): 6/15/93 at 1:00 (CAD) (Entered: 06/11/1993)
444 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate re dismissing the appeal (9315853), re: appeal #418 (cc: all counsel) [444-1] (SRB) Modified on 09/15/1997 (Entered: 06/18/1993)
445 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant's from District Court [438-1] (cc: 9CCA/All counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 06/28/1993)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (SRB) (Entered: 06/29/1993)
Appeal packet re-sent; no name on envelope (CAD) (Entered: 07/08/1993)

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07/22/1993 07/27/1993 08/02/1993 08/05/1993
08/05/1993
08/13/1993 09/07/1993 09/07/1993 09/13/1993 09/13/1993 09/22/1993 09/22/1993 09/22/1993 09/27/1993 09/29/1993
09/30/1993

Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 93-16313 (SRB) (Entered: 07/22/1993)
446 Plas' comments to proposed order (CAD) (Entered: 07/27/1993)
447 MOTION to proceed in propria persona by pla Randy Steven Sampson in 2:90-cv-00054 [447-1] (CAD) (Entered: 08/03/1993)
448 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to proceed in propria persona by pla Randy Steven Sampson in 2:90-cv-00054 [447-1]; The Clk of the Crt shall mail a copy of the mtn, along with this order to counsel of record, Special Master Pachoda and Asst Special Master Bliss (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 08/05/1993)
449 NOTICE of exhibits 1-25 and 26-66 (2 volumes) and reporter's transcripts: Vol I 6/15/93, Vol II 6/15/93, Vol III 6/16/93, Vol IV 6/16/93, Vol V 6/17/93, Vol VI 6/18/93 (STR-Rule 3(A)(2) (CAD) (Entered: 08/06/1993)
450 Dfts' objections to the Special Master's proposed order (CAD) (Entered: 08/16/1993)
451 MOTION dismiss dfts' objections dated 8/13/93 by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [451-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/09/1993)
452 MEMORANDUM of points and authorities in support of mtn to dismiss dfts' objections dated 8/13/93 [451-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/09/1993)
453 DFTS' RESPONSE to motion dismiss dfts' objections dated 8/13/93 by pla [451-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/14/1993)
454 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in support of dfts' response to plas' mtn to dismiss dfts' objections to the Special Master's proposed order by dfts [453-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/14/1993)
455 PLAS' REPLY to response to motion dismiss dfts' objections dated 8/13/93 by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [451-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
456 MOTION for status conference by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [456-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
457 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of motion for status conference by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [456-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
458 DFT'S RESPONSE to motion for status conference by pla [456-1] (CAD) (Entered: 09/29/1993)
459 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion dismiss dfts' objections dated 8/13/93 by pla [451-1]; however, in his preparation of the final injunction, the Special Master has the discretion to disregard any objections or claims that were made for the first time in the final objections filed on 8/13/93 and any objections that are not supported by the evidence (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 09/29/1993)
460 NOTICE by dfts of filing mental health plan (CAD) (Entered:

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09/30/1993 10/07/1993 10/13/1993 10/13/1993
10/20/1993 10/29/1993
10/29/1993 11/04/1993
11/05/1993 11/15/1993 11/15/1993 11/16/1993 11/19/1993
11/19/1993

10/04/1993)
461 Notice of filing status report regarding medical, mental and handicap acess by dfts (CAD) (Entered: 10/04/1993)
462 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate re dismissing the appeal, re: 9316313 (cc: all counsel) (SRB) Modified on 02/02/1998 (Entered: 10/07/1993)
463 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the permanent injunction, as proposed by the Special Master, is adopted by the Court (cc: all counsel) (re: order [463-1] (CAD) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
464 PERMANENT INJUNCTION ACCESS TO THE COURTS ISSUES by Judge C A. Muecke re: Law Libraries, Legal Assistance Program, Legal Svcs & Supplies, Indigent Prisoners, Implementation (see 28 pg perm injunction & order appendices for further details) (cc: all counsel) (re: permanent injunction [464-1] (CAD) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
465 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke status hearing set for 12/10/93 at 10:00 (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 10/20/1993)
466 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke dfts shall maintain on file in each law library within the ADOC sufficient copies of the permanent injunction [464-1] to allow the inmates to examine the injunction. Any inmate who requests to see a copy of the injunction shall be allowed to examine the injunction. (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
467 MOTION for contempt of issued injunction order issued 10/13/93 by Judge Muecke by pla Lawrence J Krug & Nelson Edward Record [467-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
468 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke striking motion for contempt of issued injunction order issued 10/13/93 by Judge Muecke by pla Lawrence J Krug & Nelson Edward Record [467-1] (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 11/04/1993)
469 Pla's first supplement pleading to file a new exhibit in support of file "Motion for Contempt of Issued Injunction Order" by Krug & Record (CAD) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
470 NOTICE OF APPEAL by dft from District Court [463-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel) (SRB) Modified on 02/03/1998 (Entered: 11/15/1993)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (SRB) (Entered: 11/15/1993)
471 MOTION for contempt of Court and ntc to the Court by Christina Jay Acker in 2:90-cv-00054 [471-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/16/1993)
472 MOTION to find Sam Lewis, all deputy wardens, wardens guilty of interfering with a judicial proceeding & forthwith enactment of the October 8th Court Order by Dale Frank Maisano [472-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/22/1993)
473 Plas' notice to supplement mtn for status conference (draft revision of

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11/20/1993 11/22/1993 11/22/1993 11/26/1993
11/26/1993 12/01/1993 12/07/1993
12/07/1993 12/08/1993 12/10/1993 12/10/1993
12/14/1993

mental health plan attached) (CAD) (Entered: 11/22/1993)
478 NOTICE by Special Master Daniel Joseph Pochoda & Asst Special Master Janet Bliss of change of address; 3370 N Hayden Rd, #123-259, Scottsdale, AZ 85251 (602) 990-0323 (CAD) (Entered: 12/01/1993)
474 MOTION to stay order of 10/13.93 by dfts [474-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
475 MOTION for accelerated disposition of motion to stay order of 10/13/93 by dfts [474-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
476 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for contempt of Court and ntc to the Court by Christina Jay Acker in 2:90-cv-00054 [471-1]; the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of the document, along with this order, to the Asst Special Master in this action (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 11/26/1993)
477 JOINT MOTION (petition) to call up all pending motions, requesting accelerated hearing, as follows by plas Lawrence J Krug & Nelson Edward Record [477-1] (CAD) (Entered: 11/29/1993)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 93-17169 (SRB) (Entered: 12/01/1993)
479 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke the Clerk of the Court shall file the Report and attachments submitted by the Asst Special Master & send copies of the Report to counsel for the plas and dfts in this action. In addition to the mental health care issue, counsel for the parties should be prepared to discuss the violations of the access to the courts Injunction at the Status Conference scheduled for 12/10/93. Dfts are advised that continued violations will result in contempt of court. (cc: all counsel) (re: order [479-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
480 MEMORANDUM & attachments submitted by Asst Special Master Janet Bliss (ordered filed by Order [479-1] of 12/7/93) (CAD) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
481 RESPONSE by pla to motion to stay order of 10/13/93 by dfts [474-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
482 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that Stuart Adams is permitted to have contact with those prisoners listed in his letter to Kathleen Wieneke dated 12/8/93 at the times and places set forth in that letter (copy attached) (cc: all counsel) (re: order [482-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
483 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: Juanita Wiser ; status conference held regarding mental health care issues; parties to file joint proposal by 2/15/94; dfts shall file a monthly report re: efforts to comply with Court's injunction - 1st report due 1/31/94 , ; status report due 1/31/94 [483-3] (CAD) (Entered: 12/13/1993)
484 MOTION to intervene by Kent Return Holcomb [484-1] , and to amend Court's 10/8/93 Final Injunction, wiht appendix. With pendant

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12/14/1993 12/14/1993 12/14/1993
12/14/1993
12/17/1993 12/17/1993
12/22/1993
12/23/1993
12/27/1993 01/03/1994 01/06/1994

jurisdiction request, of state evidentiary post-conviction hearing by intervenor Kent Return Holcomb [484-2] (CAD) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
485 Appendix to Petition to intervene and amend order by intervenor Kent Return Holcomb [484-1] & [484-2] (CAD) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
486 MOTION (petition) for accelerated ruling of motion to intervene by Kent Return Holcomb [484-1] (CAD) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
487 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the parties shall meet again in January of 1994 to discuss the proposed mental health care injunction; and no later than 2/15/94, parties shall file their joint proposal for mental health care injunctive relief (cc: all counsel) (re: order [487-1] (sealed) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
488 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke (re: permanent injunction [464-1] dfts shall file monthly written reports with the court setting forth what they have done to comply with the permanent injunction; first report due no later than 1/31/94, each subsequent report shall be filed on the last day of the month, copies to be sent to opposing cnsl and office of Special Master status report due 1/31/94 (cc: all counsel) (sealed) (Entered: 12/15/1993)
489 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke (re: notice [478-1] correct the address of Asst Special Master; Janet Bliss, 3370 N Hayden Rd, No. 123-259, Scottsdale, AZ 85251 (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 12/17/1993)
490 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to intervene by Kent Return Holcomb [484-1] & motion to amend Court's 10/8/93 Final Injunction, wiht appendix. With pendant jurisdiction request, of state evidentiary post-conviction hearing by intervenor Kent Return Holcomb [484-2] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 12/17/1993)
491 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion (petition) to call up all pending motions, requesting accelerated hearing, as follows by plas Lawrence J Krug & Nelson Edward Record [477-1], denying motion to find Sam Lewis, all deputy wardens, wardens guilty of interfering with a judicial proceeding & forthwith enactment of the October 8th Court Order by Dale Frank Maisano [472-1]; the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of the document, with this order, to the parties, Special Master & Asst Special Master (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 12/22/1993)
492 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that no later than 1/20/94 parties shall file written memoranda setting forth their position RE: scope of the access to the courts injunction in CASEY relevant to the Central Unit of Florence, which is under the GLUTH injunction (cc: all counsel) (re: order [492-1] (CMM) (Entered: 12/27/1993)
493 MOTION for contempt of court by pla Mikeal Glenn Stine in 2:90-cv00054 [493-1] (CMM) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
494 NOTICE by dfts of filing original affidavits/exhibits (CAD) (Entered: 01/04/1994)
495 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that any intentional failure by dfts to

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01/07/1994 01/14/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/21/1994
01/31/1994 02/08/1994
02/09/1994 02/09/1994 02/09/1994 02/11/1994
02/11/1994

comply with Order concerning the powers of the Office of Special Master will be considered contempt of court & is subject to immediate hearing & possible sanctions. (cc: all counsel) (re: order [495-1] (CAD) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
496 Amnicus Curiea by Jim Fitch (STR) (CAD) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
497 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to stay order of 10/13.93 by dfts [474-1] (cc: all counsel) (CAD) (Entered: 01/14/1994)
499 NOTICE by plas (all) that this court appropriately granted injunctive relief on the issues regarding the law library invt and phone calls not addressed in Gluth, at the central unit (SRB) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
500 MEMORANDUM regarding application of Casey v. Lewis legal access order to the central unit by dfts (all) (SRB) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
498 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke striking motion for contempt of court by pla Mikeal Glenn Stine in 2:90-cv-00054 [493-1]; the Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of the striken document, along with this Order, to the parties, Special Master & Asst Special Master in this action; that the Clerk of the Court accept for filing only pleadings filed by counsel of record, the Special Master & Asst Special Master (cc: all counsel) (LAD) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
501 STATUS REPORT by dft's (all) regarding implementation of legal access injunction (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/1994)
502 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the Special Master shall examine the doc of dfts' survey and investigate all of the units to determine the accuracy; report setting forth the assesment of the Special Master due 2/28/94 ; if hearings are necessary, the Special Master will probably conduct the hearings the week of 3/28/94...see doc for full details (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
503 AMENDED STATUS REPORT by dft regarding implementation of legal access injunction (SRB) (Entered: 02/10/1994)
504 MOTION for reconsideration by dfts [504-1] , for clarification by dfts [504-2] (SRB) (Entered: 02/10/1994)
505 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by dfts of motion for reconsideration by dfts [504-1], motion for clarification by dfts [504-2] (SRB) (Entered: 02/10/1994)
506 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that no later than 2/16/94 this order shall be posted in a clearly visible manner in each ADOC law library. The Special Master shall check on this posting and shall mail or deliver both of these orders to relevant ADOC personnal, including librarians. This order shall remain posted in each ADOC law library within the state (cc: all counsel) (re: order [506-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/11/1994)
507 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that NLT 2/18/94 dfts shall provide the Special Master's Office all of the info and items requested; the 2/28/94

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02/15/1994
02/16/1994 02/25/1994 02/25/1994 02/28/1994 03/03/1994 03/03/1994 03/07/1994
03/10/1994 03/14/1994 03/18/1994

compliance status report shall include copies of the revised DMO's and DMP'S covering all the areas or mandates mentioned in the final permanent inj; NLT 2/18/94 the dfts shall provide the Ass Special Master with current computer listings of the names of inmates confined in each unit covered by the Casey order...see doc for details(cc: all counsel) (re: order [507-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/11/1994)
508 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that dfts shall provide the above DMO's and DMP's for the February report and each future monthly report on computer disk to the Office of Special Master...see doc for full details (cc: all counsel) (re: order [508-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/15/1994)
509 NOTICE by plas of suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues (SRB) (Entered: 02/17/1994)
510 MOTION for order to supplement suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by plas[510-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/28/1994)
511 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by plas of motion for order to supplement suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by plas[510-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/28/1994)
512 STATUS REPORT regarding implementation of legal access injunction by dfts (SRB) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
513 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for order to supplement suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by plas[510-1] (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
514 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the Assistant Special Master deliver the typewriter to the appropriate unit. The ADOC shall not deny inmates typewriters allowed under the permanent injunction (cc: all counsel) (re: order [514-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
515 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that dfts and employees of the dfts appear before the Special Master during the week of 3/28/94 to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to comply with any provisions of the permanent injunction. The Special Master shall submit Findings of Fact to this court NLT 4/20/94 setting forth specifically what the dfts have done to comply with each provision of the permanent injunction...see doc for full details (cc: all counsel) (re: order [515-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
516 MOTION to withdraw of counsel attorney Tannis Fox by pla Charles L Arnold [516-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
517 MOTION to supplement proposal for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by dfts [517-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/15/1994)
518 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to supplement proposal for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by dfts [5171] (cc: all counsel) (LAD) (Entered: 03/18/1994)

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03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/21/1994
03/25/1994
03/25/1994
03/25/1994
03/25/1994 03/30/1994 03/31/1994 04/12/1994 04/13/1994

519 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke (re clarification of Gluth permanent injunction) (cc: all counsel) (re: order [519-1] (LAD) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
520 RESPONSE by pla to motion to supplement proposal for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by dfts [517-1] [517-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
521 COMPLIANCE REPORT by Assistant Special Master (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
522 EXHIBITS to Compliance Report by Assistant Special Master (Re: [5211] 1-34) (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
523 EXHIBITS to Compliance Report by Assistant Special Master (Re: [5211] 35-94) (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
524 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that NLT 4/15/94 the paties each file a recommended list of three candidates for expert/special master to formulate the final injunctive relief for the mental health care issues, or in the alternative the parties may stipulate to an expert/special master who is agreeable to both parties (cc: all counsel) (re: order [524-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
525 ORDER by Judge Muecke granting motion to withdraw of counsel attorney Tannis Fox by pla Charles L Arnold [516]; withdrawing atty Tannis Fox for pla Charles Arnold (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
526 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke clarifiying the authority of the Office of the Special Master to hire additional proffessionals to carry out duties of the Office of the Special Master(cc: all counsel) (re: order [526-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
527 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for reconsideration by dfts [504-1], granting, to the limited extent set forth in the order, motion for clarification by dfts [504-2] (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
528 REPLY by dfts to motion to supplement proposal for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by dfts [517-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/28/1994)
529 NOTICE by dfts of filing status report (SRB) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
530 REPORT by all dfts rearding implementation of leal access injunction (SRB) (Entered: 04/04/1994)
531 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate re vacating, reversing, and remanding the decision of the DC [247-1] (cc: all counsel) (91-16513) (SRB) (Entered: 04/12/1994)
532 LIST of Candidates for Special Master on mental health care by pla (MAP) (Entered: 04/14/1994)

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04/15/1994 04/15/1994 04/21/1994 04/26/1994 04/26/1994 05/02/1994
05/04/1994
05/06/1994
05/13/1994
05/26/1994 05/27/1994 06/03/1994 06/03/1994

533 MOTION (Request) for status conference regarding mental health by dfts [533-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/18/1994)
534 NOTIFICATION OF SPECIAL MASTER CANDIDATES by dfts (SRB) (Entered: 04/18/1994)
535 RESPONSE by plas to motion for status conference regarding mental health by dfts [533-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
536 Transcript Designation and Ordering Form, (SRB) (Entered: 05/02/1994)
Certificate of Record Transmitted to 9CCA [470-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/02/1994)
537 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the plaintiffs' claim challenging the validity of the ADOC food service policy prohibiting HIV positive individuals from obtaing employment in the food service department is dismissed for lack of standing (cc: all counsel) (re: order [537-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/02/1994)
538 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke ; status hearing set for 10:00 5/5/94 ; parties meet personally NLT 5/13/94; parties shall file a joint stipulated proposal for injunctive relief NLT 5/18/94; NLT 5/13/94 the parties shall file a memorandum of law addressing the issue of the Court's authority to order the dft's mental health care system into compliance with the United States Constitution (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 05/04/1994)
539 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that counsel in this case shall meet and begin to work out a stipulation and to set other dates to meet before 5/27/94; parties shall file a joint stipulated proposal for injunctive relief NLT 6/3/94...see doc for full details (cc: all counsel) (re: order [539-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/06/1994)
540 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: CAM Crt Rptr: V. Reger status conference concerning the mental health care issues, the parties stipulated to certain ddl for meeting in attempts to work out a stipulation regarding injunctive relief and to file joint stipulated proposal for injunctive relief status hearing held on 5/5/94 [540-2] (SRB) (Entered: 05/16/1994)
541 MEMORANDUM of law and points of authority regarding the District Court's authority to order funding of mental health care orders by plas (SRB) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
542 MEMORANDUM of law re court's power to order appropriation of funds by dfts (SRB) (Entered: 05/31/1994)
543 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke the Clerk of the Court shall file the attached letters into the record as they are relevant to the contempt proceedings (cc: all counsel) (re: order [543-1] (SRB) (Entered: 06/03/1994)
544 LETTERS filed into the record pursuant to court order dated 6/3/94. (SRB) (Entered: 06/03/1994)

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06/03/1994 06/03/1994 06/03/1994 06/07/1994 06/17/1994 06/17/1994 06/20/1994 07/28/1994 08/10/1994 09/30/1994 10/07/1994 10/14/1994 10/17/1994 11/18/1994
12/05/1994 12/05/1994

545 PARTIES STIPULATED JOINT PROPOSAL FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR MENTAL HEALTH by dft, pla (SRB) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
546 PROPOSAL FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR MENTAL HEALTH by dfts (SRB) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
547 PROPOSALS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ON UNRESOLVED MENTAL HEALTH CARE ISSUES by plas (SRB) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
548 TRANSCRIPT of status hearing by Court Reporter: Vicki Reger for the following date(s): 5/5/94 (SRB) (Entered: 06/07/1994)
549 RESPONSE by all dfts to motion for order to supplement suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by plas [510-1] (APJ) (Entered: 06/20/1994)
550 REPLY by all plas to motion for order to supplement suggestions for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by plas [510-1] (APJ) (Entered: 06/20/1994)
551 SUPPLEMENTAL exhibits by all dfts to their response to plas' separate proposal for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues [549-1] (APJ) (Entered: 06/22/1994)
Clerk's record on appeal transmitted to 9CCA (volumes 10-14, 18 bulkies) (LAD) Modified on 07/28/1994 (Entered: 07/28/1994)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL from 9CCA, Acknowledging receipt of DC record. (SRB) (Entered: 08/10/1994)
552 MOTION to extend time by all dfts [552-1] (SRB) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
553 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time by all dfts [552-1] ; status report due 10/14/94 (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 10/07/1994)
554 STATUS REPORT re medical, dental and handicap access by all dfts (APJ) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
555 ORDER by Judge Muecke granting motion for attorney's fees & costs by pla H.B. [372-1]. Pla is awarded $71,400 in fees and $4,446.47 in costs. (cc: all counsel) (APJ) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
556 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke Frank Rundle, M.D. shall be appointed Special Master to formulate the inj relief, NLT 12/9/94 pla's shall file a written notice with the court indicating whether or not Mr. Rundle is available (cc: all counsel) re: order [556-1] (SRB) (Entered: 11/18/1994)
557 OBJECTIONS by dfts to order of 11/18/94 regrding special master [5561] (SRB) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
558 MEMORANDUM of points and authorities regarding dfts objection to court's order dated 11/17/94 regarding appointment of special master by

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12/09/1994 12/14/1994 12/14/1994 12/20/1994 12/30/1994 01/05/1995 01/24/1995
02/09/1995 02/09/1995 02/13/1995 02/23/1995 03/02/1995
03/03/1995 03/03/1995 03/08/1995

dfts [557-1] (SRB) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
559 MOTION to extend time to file notice by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [559-1] (SRB) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
560 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to file notice by plas; pla's shall have until12/30/94to file their notice regarding Mr. Rundle [559-1] (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
561 RESPONSE by pla to opposition to dfts motion to reconsider this courts order regarding special master [557-1] (SRB) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
562 NOTICE by pla on appointment of Special Master (SRB) (Entered: 12/21/1994)
Original Record Received from 9CCA re [470-1] 9 volumes orig file; 1 sealed envelope; no bulkies returned (LAD) (Entered: 01/05/1995)
Original Record Received from 9CCA re, 3 aditional bulkys were returned without any notice (SRB) (Entered: 01/05/1995)
563 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that Dr. Frank Rundle is appointed Special Master; NLT 7/21/95 the Special Master shall file a proposed injunction to remedy the mental health care violations...see order for full details (cc: all counsel) re: order [563-1] (SRB) (Entered: 01/24/1995)
564 MOTION for order for revocation of reference by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [564-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/13/1995)
566 MOTION for order for expedited disposition by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [566-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/13/1995)
565 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for order for revocation of reference by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [564-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/13/1995)
567 RESPONSE (OPPOSITION) by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for order for revocation of reference by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [564-1] (LAD) (Entered: 02/23/1995)
568 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that because there are now two special masters using the same bank account, no later than 3/8/95 dfts increase the minimum balance of the account to $5,000.00 from $2,500.00 (cc: all counsel) re: order [568-1] (CMM) (Entered: 03/02/1995)
569 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that clerk of the court add Special Master Rundle to the docket sheet as a party to receive all orders in this case (cc: all counsel) re: order [569-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/03/1995)
571 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate re affirming in part, vacating and remanding in part the decision of the District Court, re: 93-17169 (cc: all counsel) (SRB) Modified on 02/02/1998 (Entered: 03/08/1995)
570 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the Special Master appointed to this case is appointed by the Court and represents the Court, not the

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03/08/1995 03/08/1995 03/14/1995 03/14/1995 03/14/1995 03/15/1995 03/16/1995 03/16/1995 03/21/1995
03/27/1995 03/27/1995 03/31/1995

parties...see order for full details (cc: all counsel) re: order [570-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/08/1995)
572 REPLY by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for order for revocation of reference by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [564-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
573 NOTICE by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 of change of firm name (SRB) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
574 NOTICE by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 of change of firm name: Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest is now Arizona Center for Disability Law (SRB) (Entered: 03/15/1995)
575 MOTION for order to show cause why dfts should not be held in contempt of court by movant (petitioner) Mark Steven Price in 2:90-cv00054 [575-1] ***STRICKEN PER ORDER OF 3/21/95*** (LAD) (Entered: 03/20/1995)
576 MOTION (REQUEST) for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by movant Mark Steven Price in 2:90-cv-00054 [576-1] ***STRICKEN PER ORDER OF 3/21/95*** (LAD) (Entered: 03/20/1995)
577 MOTION to intervene by Melvin Munroe Littrell to case(s) 2:90-cv00054 [577-1] (complaint in intervention lodged) ***STRICKEN PER ORDER OF 3/21/95*** (LAD) Modified on 03/20/1995 (Entered: 03/20/1995)
578 MOTION for order to supplement order of reference dated 1/23/95 by pla [578-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1995)
579 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by pla of motion for order to supplement order of reference dated 1/23/95 by pla [578-1] (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1995)
580 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke striking motion to intervene and complaint in intervention by Melvin Munroe Littrell [577-1], striking motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by movant Mark Steven Price [576-1], striking motion for order to show cause why dfts should not be held in contempt of court by movant (petitioner) Mark Steven Price [575-1]; clerk of court shall mail a copy of the stricken document to the parties; clerk shall return all documents to inmates filed in this case, unless the documents are filed by counsel of record (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 03/21/1995)
581 RESPONSE by dfts (all) in opposition to motion for order to supplement order of reference dated 1/23/95 by pla [578-1] (MAP) (Entered: 03/28/1995)
582 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities by dft in support of dfts' opposition to pla's motion to suppl order of reference [581-1] (MAP) (Entered: 03/28/1995)
584 NOTICE by all dfts of filing status report regarding medical, dental and

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04/03/1995
04/04/1995 04/05/1995
04/05/1995 04/06/1995 04/07/1995 04/07/1995 04/11/1995
04/14/1995 04/24/1995

handicap access (REW) (Entered: 04/04/1995)
583 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that nlt 4/12/95 the dfts may challenge any of the fees of the Special Master to this adte based on the standard set forth. For any fees challenged, dfts must file a memo of p/a; as soon as the stay is lifted in this case the Special Master shl investigate and file his findings re: the proper indigence standard; as soon as the stay is lifted in this case the Special Master shl investigate and file his findings re: the cost of photocopies to the dft (cc: all counsel) re: order [583-1] (MAP) (Entered: 04/03/1995)
587 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS ; spoke to Special Master and Ass Special Master by telephone, Dr. Rundle will no longer have fees or expenses [cc: all counsel) [587-1] re: minute entry [587-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/06/1995)
585 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that Dr Rundle, the special master for the mental health relief in this lawsuit, shl not incur any fur fees or expenses in this matter beyond 4/4/95, til fur order of the Court; after this Court has reviewed the rec'd, met with the special master, asst special master, the parties in this lawsuit, the court will issue fur orders as necessary concerning the duties of the special master and asst special master concerning mental health (cc: all counsel) re: order [585-1] (MAP) (Entered: 04/05/1995)
586 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke the mental health issues in this lawsuit are hereby referred to Mag Judge Silverman (cc: all counsel) re: order [586-1] (MAP) (Entered: 04/05/1995)
588 REPLY by plas to opposition of motion for order to supplement order of reference dated 1/23/95 by pla [578-1] (MAP) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
589 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Silverman that cnsl for parties, Special Master Rundle and Asst Special Master Bliss attend a status conf... status hearing set for 1:00 4/11/95 , before Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
590 MOTION to extend time in which to challenge the fees of th Special Master by all dfts [590-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/11/1995)
591 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS; Crt Rptr: none status hearing held in chambers , hearing set for 8:30 5/25/95 re: 5 issues. Dft to submit memorandums by 5/19/95. Witness disclosures ten days prior to hearing. Court affirmed 4/5/95 order except Dr Rundle may incur reasonable expense to return home to CA (see minutes for full details) [cc: all cnsl] [591] (CDE) Modified on 04/11/1995 (Entered: 04/11/1995)
592 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time in which to challenge the fees of th Special Master by all dfts [590-1]; dfts shall have until 4/21/95 to respond (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 04/14/1995)
593 MOTION to continue hearing regarding the formulation of a mental

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04/24/1995 04/24/1995 04/24/1995 04/28/1995 05/02/1995
05/02/1995 05/02/1995 05/03/1995
05/03/1995 05/11/1995 05/11/1995 05/22/1995 05/22/1995 05/22/1995

health remedy by pla [593-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
594 MOTION to clarify by all dfts [594-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
595 OBJECTIONS by all dfts to special master fees (order [583-1]) (SRB) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
596 MEMORANDUM by all dfts in support of objection to Special Master fees [595-1] (SRB) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
597 OPPOSITION and RESPONSE by dft to motion to continue hearing regarding the formulation of a mental health remedy by pla [593-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/01/1995)
598 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman denying motion to continue hearing regarding the formulation of a mental health remedy by pla [5931]: the court will hear oral argument on May 25 and 26 on the limited issues already specified by the court (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
600 OBJECTIONS by all dfts to Court's order of April 3, 1995 referring additional duties to the special master [583-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
601 MEMORANDUM by all dfts in support of dft's objections to Court's April 3, 1995 order referring additional duties to the special master [6001] (SRB) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
599 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to clarify by all dfts [594-1]; Special Master shall have until 6/15/95 to respond to dfts objections; Special Master and Ass Special Master shall be reimbursed for the time spent responding to dfts objections (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
602 REPLY by all plas to motion to continue hearing regarding the formulation of a mental health remedy by pla [593-1] [593-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
603 MOTION for order to add an issue for the May 25, and 26 1995 hearing by plas [603-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/12/1995)
604 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for order to add an issue for the May 25, and 26 1995 hearing by plas [603-1] (SRB) (Entered: 05/12/1995)
605 MEMORANDUM on mental health care pursuant to order dated 4/11/95 by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
606 ATTACHMENTS to memorandum on mental health care pursuant to order dated 4/11/95 by plas (Re: [605-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
607 NOTICE (certificate of delivery of memorandum and attachments) by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) Modified on 05/23/1995 (Entered: 05/22/1995)

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05/22/1995 05/22/1995 05/25/1995 05/30/1995
05/31/1995
06/14/1995 06/27/1995 06/29/1995 06/29/1995
06/30/1995

608 PROPOSAL for injunctive relief for mental health by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 (REW) Modified on 08/29/1995 (Entered: 05/23/1995)
609 MEMORANDUM for injunctive relief on unresolved mental health care issues by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 05/23/1995)
610 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger (ECR) Evidentiary hearing held . [cc: all cnsl] [610-3] (CDE) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
611 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke; although the 9CCA has remanded some issues regarding access to the courts, the Supreme Court has granted review of the access to the courts portion of the case on a writ of certiorari; therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court stay remains effective and this court will not act on those matters remanded by the 9CCA, including the challenge to the Special Master's fees, until the Supreme Court renders its decision or until a higher court directs this court otherwise re: appeal [470-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
612 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman concerning aspects of the mental health care system found unconstitutional by Judge C.A. Muecke and ordered that the permanent injunction address the issues of staff, facilities, medications and equal protection (see document for full details) (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 05/31/1995)
613 OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION regarding mental health dated 5/30/95 [612-1] by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
614 MOTION to extend time to respond to dfts' objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendations dated 5/30/95 by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [614-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
615 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to respond to dfts' objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendations dated 5/30/95 by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [614-1]; plas' response to be filed by 7/10/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
616 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that Judge C.A. Muecke recuses himself from further participation in this case concerning the issue as it may arise concerning the nonpayment of the special master's fees as a result of the passage of A.R.S. 35-152; this matter is transferred to Judge Robert C. Broomfield for reassignment to a judge to be determined; all other matters remain before Judge C.A. Muecke; all future pleadings and papers submitted for filing shall continue to bear the original case number (cc: all counsel/RCB) re: order [616-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
617 MOTION to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [617-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/03/1995)

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06/30/1995 06/30/1995 06/30/1995 07/05/1995 07/10/1995 07/18/1995 07/19/1995 07/20/1995 07/25/1995 07/25/1995
07/28/1995 08/02/1995

618 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [617-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
619 MOTION for order for disposition of dfts' motion for revocation by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [619-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
620 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master fees re: order [599-1] and re: order [583-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
621 TRANSCRIPT of evidentiary hearing by Court Reporter: Vicki Reger for the following date(s): 5/25/95 (REW) (Entered: 07/05/1995)
622 RESPONSE by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to report & recommendation dated 5/30/95 [613-1] re: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [612-1] (REW) Modified on 07/11/1995 (Entered: 07/11/1995)
623 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [617-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
624 MOTION to extend time to respond to dfts' objections to special master's fees by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [624-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/20/1995)
625 MOTION to extend time within which to respond to dfts' request for disposition of dfts' motion for revocation by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [6251] (REW) Modified on 07/25/1995 (Entered: 07/21/1995)
626 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time within which to respond to dfts' request for disposition of dfts' motion for revocation by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [625-1] plas shall file their response on 8/3/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 07/25/1995)
627 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke adopting motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION regarding injunctive relief; permanent injunction, recommended by the Magistrate Judge, is adopted by the court and shall be effective immediately; dfts shall file their proposed written Internal Management Policies nlt 9/29/95 and serve on Special Master; plas shall have until 10/31/95 to review proposed policies and file objections with the court; dfts may respond to plas objection nlt 11/17/95; proposed policies shall not be effective until approved by the court, following any hearings requested by parties (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 07/25/1995)
628 STIPULATION for extension of time in which to file responses and replies to various motions (REW) (Entered: 07/31/1995)
629 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for order to supplement order of reference dated 1/23/95 by pla [578-1]; because the court intends to revise the reference order to reflect that the court has entered the permanent injunction without the office of special master, the authority will be contained in the newly revised reference order (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 08/02/1995)

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08/02/1995
08/02/1995 08/02/1995
08/08/1995 08/08/1995 08/16/1995 08/16/1995 08/21/1995 08/21/1995 08/21/1995 08/22/1995 08/22/1995

630 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for order for disposition of dfts' motion for revocation of reference by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [619-1], denying as moot motion for order for expedited disposition by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [566-1], denying as moot motion for order for revocation of reference by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 [564-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
631 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke vacating reference order [563-1]; Janet Bliss is appointed Special Master pursuant to rule 53 FRCvP; parties shall have 15 days to object... see order for full details (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
632 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation; parties shall file plas' response to dfts' objection to special master fees; plas' response to dfts' motion for disposition regarding motion to revocate; and dfts' reply in support of motion to terminate reporting requirements nlt 8/21/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
633 MOTION for new trial by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-1] , to alter or amend judgment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/09/1995)
634 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for new trial by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-1], motion to alter or amend judgment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/09/1995)
635 MOTION to consolidate issue regarding payment of special masters by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [635-1] re: CIV 73-97, CIV 84-1626 and CIV 90-54 (REW) (Entered: 08/21/1995)
963 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to special master fees [620-1], re: order [599-1], re: order [583-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/02/1998)
636 MOTION to extend time to respond to dfts' motions to consolidate (issue) and for modification by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [638-1] (REW) Modified on 08/25/1995 (Entered: 08/21/1995)
637 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [617-1] (REW) Modified on 08/25/1995 (Entered: 08/22/1995)
638 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [617-1] (REW) Modified on 08/25/1995 (Entered: 08/22/1995)
639 MOTION to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1] (REW) Modified on 08/25/1995 (Entered: 08/23/1995)
640 MOTION (Request) to expedite consideration of motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1] and for oral argument (REW) Modified on 08/26/1996 (Entered:

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08/24/1995 08/24/1995 08/24/1995 08/25/1995
08/25/1995 08/25/1995 08/25/1995 08/29/1995 08/30/1995 08/31/1995
08/31/1995

08/23/1995)
642 NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT of Thomas Lutz, D.O. in support of dfts' reply and memorandum in support of terminating reporting requirements [637-1] (REW) Modified on 08/26/1996 (Entered: 08/28/1995)
643 NOTICE OF ERRATA by dft in 2:90-cv-00054 to affidavit of Thomas Lutz, D.O. [642-1] re: reply and memroandum in support of terminating reporting requirements [637-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/28/1995)
647 NOTICE OF APPEAL by all dfts from District Court order [627-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel/CAM) (REW) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
641 ORDER by Judge Muecke granting motion to consolidate issue regarding payment of special masters (as to CIV-73-97, CIV-84-1626 and CIV-9054) by all dfts [635-1]. The sole issue of nonpayment of special master fees is consolidated into new case number M-95-86 PHX CAM. Denying motion to extend time to respond to dfts' motions to consolidate [638-1]. ([624-1] terminated) (cc: all counsel) (APJ) (Entered: 08/25/1995)
644 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to objection to special master fees [620-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
645 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objection to special master's fees (REW) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
646 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for new trial by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-1], motion to alter or amend judgment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
648 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to expedite consideration of motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
649 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to expedite consideration of motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/31/1995)
650 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the Gluth bank account for special master expenses and costs shall be separated from the bank account in Casey and the balance in the Casey account shall remain at $2,500 in the matter prescribed in prior orders; the special master shall have the authority to hire and supervise any necessary monitors to assist in her duties as set forth in order (cc: all counsel) re: order [650-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/31/1995)
651 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for new trial by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-1], motion to alter or amend judgment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-2] (REW) (Entered: 09/05/1995)

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09/06/1995 09/12/1995 09/14/1995 09/18/1995
09/18/1995
09/18/1995 09/19/1995 09/22/1995
09/26/1995 09/29/1995 09/29/1995 09/29/1995 09/29/1995
10/02/1995 10/02/1995

652 MOTION to extend time within which to respond to dfts' motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [652-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/07/1995)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (REW) (Entered: 09/19/1995)
654 MOTION (Request) for appointment of monitor by Janet Bliss in 2:90cv-00054 [654-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/18/1995)
653 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time within which to respond to dfts' motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [652-1]; plas' shall file their response by 9/18/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/18/1995)
655 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for appointment of monitor by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [654-1]; Craig Stephan is approved as a monitor relevant to mental health (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/18/1995)
656 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/19/1995)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 95-16687 (REW) (Entered: 09/19/1995)
657 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the court clarifies that, because the dfts indicate that they have already made many of the changes to comply with the injunction, the court expects the special master to begin monitoring immediately; such monitoring includes, at a minumum, visits to SPU and Santa Maria (cc: all counsel) re: order [657-1] (REW) Modified on 10/02/1995 (Entered: 09/22/1995)
658 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [641-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/28/1995)
659 MOTION for mental health status conference by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [659-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
660 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to appointment of monitor [655-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
660 MOTION to vacate order appointing monitor by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [660-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
661 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of objection to appointment of monitor and motion to vacate order appointing monitor by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [660-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
662 NOTICE by all dfts of filing internal management policies pursuant to 7/25/95 order (REW) (Entered: 10/04/1995)
663 NOTICE of filing STATUS REPORT regarding medical, dental and

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10/05/1995 10/16/1995
10/26/1995
10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/27/1995 10/30/1995 11/03/1995 11/03/1995 11/06/1995
11/13/1995 11/15/1995

handicap access by all dfts (REW) (Entered: 10/04/1995)
664 STATUS REPORT by Janet Bliss (REW) (Entered: 10/06/1995)
665 RESPONSE in support by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to vacate order appointing monitor by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [660-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/18/1995)
666 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' status reports on medical/dental care and handicap access [663-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
667 MOTION for award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses by plas [667-1] (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
668 AFFIDAVIT of Alice L. Bendheim [667-1] (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
669 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen E. Lee filed by pltfs [667-1] (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
670 BRIEF FILED by plas in suprt of petition for award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses by plas [667]. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
671 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Alexander filed by pltfs. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
672 DECLARATION of Stuart H. Adams, Jr by pltfs. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
673 Itemization of Attorneys' fees and costs filed by pltfs. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
674 Certificate of mailing for pltfs. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
675 OBJECTIONS to internal management policies pursuant to 7/25/95 court order. (CDE) (Entered: 11/01/1995)
677 OBJECTION by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master fees (REW) (Entered: 11/07/1995)
678 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of objection to special master's fees (REW) (Entered: 11/07/1995)
676 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the dfts' shall increase the monthly bank account balance for monitoring the mental health care injunction to $3,500.00 (cc: all counsel) re: order [676-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/06/1995)
679 MOTION to clarify issues by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [679-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/14/1995)
680 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the clerk shall remove Dan Pochoda from the docket sheet in this case and ensure that copies of all future orders be mailed to Janet Bliss at the address already on the docket sheet terminating party Daniel Joseph Pochoda in 2:90-cv-00054 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)

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11/15/1995 11/15/1995 11/15/1995 11/15/1995 11/15/1995 11/16/1995 11/17/1995 11/20/1995
11/20/1995 11/20/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995

681 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the clerk file into the record the original transcripts of the contempt proceedings (volumes I-IV) relevant to the access to the courts injunction (cc: all counsel/9CCA) re: order [681-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
682 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings re: contempt proceedings, access to courts (Volume I) by Court Reporter: Scott N. Gamertsfelder for the following date(s): 3/28/94 (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
683 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings re: contempt proceedings, access to courts (Volume II) by Court Reporter: Polly J. Merz for the following date(s): 3/29/94 (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
684 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings re: contempt proceedings, access to courts (Volume III) by Court Reporter: Scott N. Gamertsfelder for the following date(s): 3/30/94 (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
685 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings re: contempt proceedings, access to courts (Volume IV) by Court Reporter: Polly J. Merz for the following date(s): 3/31/94 (REW) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
686 RESPONSE in opposition by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses by plas [667-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/20/1995)
687 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to objections to internal management policies by all plas [675-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/20/1995)
688 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the court again clarifies that, because the dfts indicate that they have already made many of the changes to comply with the injunction and because the court has stated that the injunction is in effect even though all of the policies have not yet been approved by the court, the court expects the special master to begin monitoring immediately; such monitoring includes, at a minimum, vists to the prison facilites to talk with inmates and staff re: motion to clarify issues by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [679-1] terminated (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/20/1995)
689 JOINT MOTION for temporary stay of special master activity [689-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
690 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to objection to special master fees [677-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
691 AMENDED MOTION for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [691-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/22/1995)
692 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for temporary stay of special master activity [689-1]; until additional orders are entered by the court, the injunction remains in effect and the special master shall continue with her duties as already approved by the court (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/22/1995)

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11/24/1995 11/27/1995 11/28/1995
11/28/1995 11/28/1995 11/28/1995 12/01/1995
12/01/1995 12/04/1995 12/04/1995 12/04/1995 12/04/1995 12/05/1995 12/06/1995

693 MOTION for reconsideration by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [693-1] re: order denying stay of monitoring activities of the special master (REW) (Entered: 11/27/1995)
694 MOTION for leave to file exhibits UNDER SEAL by Janet Bliss in 2:90cv-00054 [694-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
695 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for reconsideration by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [693-1] re: order denying stay of monitoring activities of the special master; the special master's monitoring activities involving mental health aspects of this lawsuit are stayed effective 5:00 pm 11/27/95; the stay remains in effect until 11:59 pm 12/1/95; the stay does not apply to the work associated with and the filing of the special master's status report and relevant exhibits and any other matters relating thereto; that status report involves visits and information gatherered prior to the issuance of the stay (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
696 MOTION for reconsideration by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [696-1] re: order of 11/22/95 (REW) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
697 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for reconsideration by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 [696-1] re: order of 11/22/95 (REW) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
698 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to 11/15/95 order [680-2] (REW) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
699 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for leave to file exhibits UNDER SEAL by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [694-1]; clerk shall file said exhibits under seal and that the same shall remain under seal until further order of the court (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
700 NOTICE by Janet Bliss of filing exhibits to special master's status report filed under seal (REW) (Entered: 12/05/1995)
701 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to objection to special master fees [677-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
702 REPLY MEMORANDUM in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of dfts' objections to special master's fees [677-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
703 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's October fees (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
704 MEMORANDUM in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of objections to special master's October fees by all dfts [703-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
705 STIPULATION for extension of time within which to respond to dfts' objections to plas' request for attorneys' fees (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
706 NOTICE by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 of change of address of counsel Leslie

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12/06/1995 12/08/1995 12/08/1995 12/11/1995
12/12/1995 12/13/1995 12/14/1995
12/14/1995
12/14/1995
12/21/1995 12/27/1995

J. Cohen, Arizona Center for Disability Law, 3131 N. Country Club, Suite 100, Tucson, AZ 85716 (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
707 STATUS REPORT (as of 12/1/95) by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 (2 volumes of exhibits filed under seal) (REW) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
708 JOINT MOTION for modification by all parties [708-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/11/1995)
709 JOINT PROPOSAL ON MENTAL HEALTH INJUNCTION (REW) (Entered: 12/11/1995)
710 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation for an extension of time to reply to dfts' objection to plas' request for attorneys' fees of 7 days, reply shall be filed by 12/12/95, re: motion for award of reasonable attorney's fees and by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [691-1] and [667-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 12/11/1995)
711 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [691-1] and [667-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
712 NOTICE by Charles L Arnold in 2:90-cv-00054 of change of address of counsel; Leslie J. Cohen, AZ Center for Disability Law, 3131 N Country Club, Suite 100, Tucson, AZ 85716 (REW) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
713 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting stipulation, the court adopts the joint proposal on mental health injunction, thereby modifying this court's order of reference appointing the special master re: order [631-1], the mental health permanent injunction re: order [627-1], and vacating the order appointing Craig Stephan as a monitor relevant to mental health re: order [655-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
714 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying as moot motion for new trial by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-1], denying as moot motion to alter or amend judgment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [633-2], denying as moot motion to revoke order revising reference to special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [641-1], denying as moot motion for mental health status conference by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [659-1], denying as moot motion to vacate order appointing monitor by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [660-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
715 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that effective 1/1/96, Janet Bliss shall be appointed special master; term, duties, powers and payment of the special master is set forth in order; plas shall be permitted to schedule a site inspection as set forth in order; denying motion to terminate reporting requirements by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [617-1]...see order for full details (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 12/14/1995)
716 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to objection to special master's October fees by all dfts [703-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/26/1995)
717 MOTION to extend time to wind down special master's office and to complete the transition to Dr. Newkirk by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054

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01/03/1996 01/04/1996
01/08/1996 01/08/1996 01/12/1996 01/12/1996 01/12/1996 01/16/1996 01/16/1996 01/19/1996 01/19/1996
01/23/1996 01/26/1996

[717-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/28/1995)
718 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to extend time to wind down special master's office and to complete the transition to Dr. Newkirk by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [717-1] until 1/31/96 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 01/03/1996)
719 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that this court approves all the policies, except for those policies which plas filed specific objections; parties shall meet nlt 2/9/96 and attempt to stipulate to the remaining policies to which plas filed specific objections; nlt 2/23/96 the parties shall file any stipulated policies with the court; if there are any policies or provisions upon which the parties cannot agree, the court will conduct a hearing to resolve the dispute (cc: all counsel) re: order [719-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
720 RESPONSE in opposition by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to plas' motion for extension of time to wind down special master's office and to complete the transactions of Dr. Newkirk (REW) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
721 MOTION to stay referral order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [721-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
722 MOTION for reconsideration of court's order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [722-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/16/1996)
723 Text not available. (Entered: 01/16/1996)
724 SUPPLEMENT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to October 1995 status reports on medical/dental care and handicapped access [663-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/16/1996)
725 REPLY by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 in support of objection to special master's October fees [703-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
726 REPLY MEMORANDUM by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 in support of dfts' objections to special master's October fees [703-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
727 JOINT MOTION for immediate termination of mental health special master Janet Bliss by all parties [727-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/22/1996)
728 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for reconsideration of court's order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [722-1] re: extending the appointment of mental health special master Bliss (REW) (Entered: 01/22/1996)
729 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke approving stipulation (joint motion) for immediate termination of mental health special master Janet Bliss by all parties [727-1] as set forth in order...see order for full details (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
Clerk's record on appeal transmitted to Supreme Court; 13 volumes

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01/30/1996 02/01/1996 02/01/1996 02/01/1996 02/02/1996 02/02/1996 02/06/1996
02/06/1996
02/07/1996 02/08/1996 02/08/1996 02/12/1996

clerk's record; 5 transcripts (#621, 682, 683, 684, 685); 11 bulkie documents (#79, 211, 273, 360, 362, 362a, 367, exh list, 596, 609, 707) in three expandos (REW) Modified on 01/26/1996 (Entered: 01/26/1996)
730 MOTION to reassign (request for judge substitution) by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 [730-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/31/1996)
731 RESPONSE (in opposition) by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for reconsideration of court's order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [722-1] (REW) Modified on 02/01/1996 (Entered: 02/01/1996)
732 RESPONSE (in opposition) by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to revoke referral order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [723-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
733 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for reconsideration by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [696-1] re: order of 11/22/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
734 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's December fees (REW) (Entered: 02/05/1996)
735 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of objections to special master's December fees (#734) (REW) (Entered: 02/05/1996)
736 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that dfts' requests for reimbursements for fees paid to the special master filed in their objections to the special master's fees are denied re: objections (#677, #703) (cc: all counsel) (REW) Modified on 02/06/1996 (Entered: 02/06/1996)
737 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses by plas [667-1], granting amended motion for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90cv-00054 [691-1]; plas are awarded reasonable fees in the amount of $151,452.25 and expenses in the amount of $4,881.67 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
738 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate re dismissing the appeal upon stipulation of parties, re: 95-16687 (cc: all counsel/CAM) (REW) Modified on 02/02/1998 (Entered: 02/07/1996)
739 NOTICE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 OF TAKING DEPO OF Arizona Dept of Corrections on the following date(s): 2/26/96 at 11:00 am (REW) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
740 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to reassign this case to another judge (request for judge substitution) by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [730-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/08/1996)
741 REPLY by dft in support of d 2:90-cv-00054, pla in 2:90-cv-00054, dft in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to revoke referral order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [723-1] (former emp) (Entered: 02/13/1996)

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02/13/1996 02/16/1996
02/16/1996
02/16/1996 02/21/1996 02/21/1996
02/21/1996
02/21/1996 02/21/1996 02/23/1996 03/04/1996 03/07/1996

742 RESPONSE to defts' objection to special master's December fees by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 (former emp) (Entered: 02/15/1996)
743 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the plas shall not be required to respond to the motion to substitute judge, clerk of the court shall not accept for filing any response or reply relevant to the said motion; dfts are warned that the court will sanction dfts if they file such frivolous motion in the future (cc: all counsel) re: order [743-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/16/1996)
744 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the medical/dental portion of this case is referred to Mag Judge Silverman for the purpose of making a recommendation, after the special master files her report in July of 1996, as to whether the dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the matter (cc: all counsel) re: order [744-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/16/1996)
745 AFFIDAVIT of Daniel P. Struck of acceptance of service re: subpoena and notice of deposition (REW) (Entered: 02/20/1996)
746 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying dfts' request for reimbursement of the special master's fees for December re: objection (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
747 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke vacating order of 2/2/96 [737-1] granting fees, denying as moot motion for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [691-1], denying as moot motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses by plas [667-1] because parties have settled on an amount of fees (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
748 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying as untimely motion for reconsideration of court's order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [722-1], treating motion to revoke referral order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [723-1] as a motion for reconsideration and denying, denying as moot motion to stay referral order dated 12/14/95 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [721-1]; denying dfts' request to certify an appeal of the non-appealable special master appointment order (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
749 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the parties send copies of all pleadings relevant to medical care or access to the courts to the office of special master (cc: all counsel) re: order [749-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
750 JOINT MOTION (Request) for access to records under seal [750-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
751 STIPULATION regarding proposed internal management policies relating to mental health (REW) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
752 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to report of special master filed in Bishop vs. Rhode (CIV 95-1601) (REW) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
755 MOTION to amend order of appointment of Dr. Newkirk by pla in 2:90-

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03/07/1996 03/07/1996 03/08/1996 03/08/1996
03/08/1996 03/14/1996 03/14/1996
03/18/1996 03/20/1996 03/22/1996
03/22/1996 03/28/1996 04/01/1996

cv-00054 [755-1] (CMM) (Entered: 03/08/1996)
756 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to amend order of appointment of Dr. Newkirk by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [755-1] (CMM) (Entered: 03/08/1996)
757 NOTICE OF APPEAL by dft from District Court order [736-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel/CAM) (REW) (Entered: 03/14/1996)
753 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the clerk add Dr. Cassandra Newkirk as the mental health special master to the docket (cc: all counsel) re: order [753-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/08/1996)
754 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting joint motion for access to records under seal [750-1]; clerk shall allow counsel for the parties and their staff access to the sealed mental health records that are part of the Special Master's Mental Health Status Report dated 12/6/95 (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/08/1996)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (REW) (Entered: 03/14/1996)
758 RESPONSE in opposition by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to amend order of appointment of Dr. Newkirk by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [755-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/18/1996)
759 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES in opposition by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to plas' motion to amend order of appt of Dr. Newkirk re: response [758-1], re: motion [755-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/18/1996)
760 MOTION for status conference by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [760-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
761 REPLY by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to amend order of appointment of Dr. Newkirk by plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [755-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/22/1996)
762 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion for status conference by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [760-1]; dfts shall by 4/5/96, either return the medical equipment as requested by special master or file a notarized statement from treating physician as set forth in order (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/22/1996)
763 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the clerk file the attached updated resume of Dr. Newkirk into the file (cc: all counsel) re: order [763-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/22/1996)
764 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that the clerk file the attached status report of special master Dr Newkirk into this case (cc: all counsel) re: order [764-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/28/1996)
765 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that Mr Stephan shall submit his requests for fees in the same manner as he submitted his fees when he was a monitor in mental health; dfts shall pay Mr Stephan, as asst to the

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04/01/1996 04/03/1996 04/03/1996 04/05/1996 04/05/1996 04/10/1996 04/11/1996 04/11/1996
04/12/1996 04/16/1996 04/22/1996 04/29/1996 05/02/1996 05/02/1996

special master, in the same manner as the special master as set forth in the appt order; on 4/1/96 Mr Stephan shall subnmit his request for fees for March for any fees not already paid out of the expense account (cc: all counsel/finance) re: order [765-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
766 NOTICE OF FILING STATUS REPORT by all dfts regarding medical, dental and handicap access in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 04/03/1996)
767 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's February fees (REW) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
768 MEMORANDUM in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 re: objections to special master's February fees [767-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
769 STATUS REPORT by all dfts regarding inmate Stephen Bishop's medical supplies in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 04/08/1996)
770 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 to 4/1/96 status report regarding medical, dental and handicap access [766-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/08/1996)
773 Notice of Transcript Designation; no transcripts will be ordered (REW) Modified on 04/11/1996 (Entered: 04/11/1996)
771 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying motion to amend order of appointment of Dr. Newkirk by pla in 2:90-cv-00054 [755-1] (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
772 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke that dfts shall implement their proposed internal managemtn polices as soon as possible so that the parties and special master may determine whether they efectively implement the permanent injuction; vacating [719-1] order that the parties meet to settle differences in the internal management polices 2:90-cv-00054 (cc: all counsel) (SRB) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
774 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Mark Steven Price [757-1]; marked "Return to Sender, returned for better address" (was forwarded from Florence to Maricopa County Jail) (REW) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
775 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke; clerk directed to change Dr Newkirk's address on the docket to: P.O.Box 3144, West Caldwell, NJ 07007 (cc: all counsel/9CCA) re: order [775-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/16/1996)
776 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to objection to special master's February fees by dfts [767-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/24/1996)
Certificate of Record Transmitted to 9CCA [757-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/30/1996)
777 SUPPLEMENTAL STATUS REPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 regarding inmate Stephen Bishop's medical issues (REW) (Entered: 05/03/1996)
778 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of objections to special

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05/03/1996 05/06/1996 05/09/1996
05/10/1996 05/10/1996 05/10/1996 05/15/1996
05/17/1996
05/22/1996
05/22/1996 05/22/1996 05/30/1996

master's February fees [767-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/03/1996)
779 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke denying dfts' objection to special master's February fees (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 05/03/1996)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 96-15564 (REW) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
784 MOTION (Request) for permission to file a response to dfts' supplemental status report regarding inmate Bishop's medical issues by Stephen Bishop in 2:90-cv-00054 [784-1] , or, in the alternative that pla (Bishop) be allowed to meet with the sepecial master and/or an attorney representing plas so that a more professional and articulated response can be submitted by Stephen Bishop in 2:90-cv-00054 [784-2] (REW) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
780 MOTION to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
781 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to modify referral orders regarding special masters by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [780-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
782 MOTION to accelerate consideration of motion to modify referral orders regarding special masters by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [782-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
783 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion to accelerate consideration [782-1] only to the extent that the court will rule on the motion to modify the special master appointment order as soon as possible after the parties have filed their pleadings, re: motion to modify referral orders regarding special masters by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
785 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke granting motion for permission to file a response to dfts' supplemental status report regarding inmate Bishop's medical issues by Stephen Bishop in 2:90-cv-00054 [784-1], [784-2], re: supplemental status report [777-1]; pla Stephen Bishop shall file a response by 6/14/96 (cc: all counsel/Bishop) (REW) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
786 ORDER by Judge C A. Muecke recusing himself from further participation in this case Case reassigned by random lot to Judge Roger G. Strand (with notice sent) all further pleadings and papers submitted for filing shall bear the case number CIV 90-54-PHX-RGS, CIV 91-1808PHX-RGS (Consolidated) (cc: all counsel/RGS) (REW) Modified on 02/03/1998 (Entered: 05/22/1996)
787 NOTICE OF APPEAL by all dfts from District Court order [779-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel/CAM/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 05/31/1996)
Received $105.00 appeal fee (REW) (Entered: 05/31/1996)
788 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to modify referral

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05/30/1996 06/07/1996 06/13/1996 06/17/1996 06/18/1996 06/21/1996 06/24/1996 06/25/1996
06/26/1996 06/26/1996 06/27/1996 07/01/1996 07/02/1996

orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
789 RESPONSE (Memorandum in Opposition) by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
790 STIPULATION for extension of time until 6/17/96 for dfts to reply to its motion to modify the referral order (REW) (Entered: 06/11/1996)
791 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation, dfts shall have until 6/17/96 to file their reply in support of motion to modify the referral order re: motion [780-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) Modified on 06/13/1996 (Entered: 06/13/1996)
792 MOTION to exceed the page limit by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [792-1] re: reply in support of the motion to modify special master referral orders (REW) Modified on 06/26/1996 (Entered: 06/24/1996)
793 MOTION to extend time by 13 days to file a response by Stephen Bishop in 2:90-cv-00054 [793-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 96-16063 (REW) (Entered: 06/21/1996)
794 Transcript Designation; no transcripts needed (not proper form) (REW) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
795 Copy of 9CCA Order; petition for writ of mandamus raises questions that warrant further review; within 21 days real parties in interest shall file a response to petition; respondent district court may simultaneously file a response, petitioner shall file a reply within 10 days from service of the response; parties shall address in their papers the effect, if any, of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on the issues raised in the petition re: 96-70435 (cc: CAM) [795-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
796 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to exceed the page limit by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [792-1] re: reply in support of the motion to modify special master referral orders; reply is accepted as filed (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 06/26/1996)
797 REPLY by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/26/1996)
798 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time by 13 days to file a response by Stephen Bishop in 2:90-cv-00054 [793-1]; pla's response due 6/26/96 (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
800 MOTION to extend time for one day for filing special master's status report by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [800-1] (REW) Modified on 07/10/1996 (Entered: 07/03/1996)
799 Copy of RESPONSE by USDC (RGS) to petition for writ of mandamus,

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07/02/1996 07/09/1996 07/09/1996 07/10/1996 07/10/1996 07/10/1996 07/10/1996 07/15/1996 07/16/1996
07/17/1996 07/18/1996 07/23/1996
07/24/1996

re: appeal 96-70435 [795-1] (original filed in 9CCA) (REW) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
Certificate of Record Transmitted to 9CCA [787-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
801 MOTION to extend time to object to special master's report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [801-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
802 MOTION to accelerate disposition of motion to extend time to object to special master's report re: 7/2/96 report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [8011] by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [802-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
803 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time for one day for filing special master's status report by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv00054 [800-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
804 SPECIAL MASTER'S STATUS REPORT for July 2, 1996 by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
805 EXHIBITS 1-18 to special master's status report for July 2, 1996 (Re: [804-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
806 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to extend time to object to special master's report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [801-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
807 REPLY by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to extend time to object to special master's report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [801-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
808 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand; parties shall have 10 days after being served with the 9CCA ruling on the writ of mandamus in which to serve written objections to the special master's report dated 7/2/96 re: status report [804-1], re: appeal order 96-70435 [795-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
809 NOTICE OF ERRATA by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's status report dated 7/2/96 [804-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/18/1996)
810 MOTION for expedited hearing and dispostion by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [810-1] re: motion to modify various orders referring issues to special masters (REW) (Entered: 07/22/1996)
811 Copy of 9CCA Order; petitioner's emergency motion for stay of proceedings pending disposition of the petition for writ of mandamus is denied; petition shall be submitted to the next available motions panel following the completion of briefing re: 96-70435 (see dkt #795) (cc: RGS) [811-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/23/1996)
813 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for expedited hearing and dispostion by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [810-1] re: motion to modify various orders referring issues to special masters (REW) (Entered: 07/26/1996)

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07/25/1996 08/05/1996 08/05/1996 08/05/1996 08/09/1996 08/09/1996 08/13/1996 08/13/1996
08/13/1996
08/14/1996 08/14/1996 08/22/1996 08/28/1996

812 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate; appellants' motion to dismiss granted re dismissing the appeal re: 96-15564, dismissing the appeal re: 96-16063 (cc: all counsel/CAM/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 07/25/1996)
814 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for dfts Samuel A. Lewis, dft Robert Goldsmith, dft Hal Cardin, dft William Rhode, dft George Herman, dft Roger Crist by Charles Justin Cooper, Michael W Kirk, Neil Vincent Wake (REW) (Entered: 08/05/1996)
815 MOTION to terminate injunctive relief by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [8151] , and to dismiss case by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [815-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/05/1996)
816 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to terminate injunctive relief by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [815-1], motion to dismiss case by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 [815-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/05/1996)
817 MOTION to stay plas' response to AZ's motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [817-1] , and to accelerate motion by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [817-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/09/1996)
818 MOTION to strike motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [818-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/09/1996)
819 MOTION in the alternative to intervene by AZ, State of to case(s) 2:90cv-00054, [819-1] re: seek termination of all injunctive relief and dismissal of this case (REW) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
820 RESPONSE (Memorandum) by intervenor-defendant AZ, State of in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to stay plas' response to AZ's motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [817-1], motion to accelerate motion by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [817-2] (REW) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
821 RESPONSE (Memorandum) by intervenor-defendant AZ, State of in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to strike motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [818-1], and in support of motion in the alternative to intervene by AZ, State of to case(s) 2:90cv-00054, [819-1] re: seek termination of all injunctive relief and dismissal of this case (REW) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
822 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's report dated 7/2/96 [804-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
823 OBJECTION to appearance of non-party and MOTION to strike by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [823-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
824 MOTION to extend time within which to respond to AZ's motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [824-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
825 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time within

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08/30/1996 08/30/1996 08/30/1996 09/06/1996
09/10/1996 09/12/1996 09/16/1996 09/16/1996 09/27/1996 09/27/1996

which to respond to AZ's motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [824-1], response due 10 days after court's ruling on plas' motion to strike, re: motion to terminate injunctive [815-1], re: motion to dismiss [815-2] [815-2] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 08/28/1996)
826 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE by intervenor-defendant AZ, State of to objection to appearance of non-party and motion to strike by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [823-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/05/1996)
827 REPLY in support by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to strike motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [818-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/05/1996)
827 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion in the alternative to intervene by AZ, State of to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [819-1] re: seek termination of all injunctive relief and dismissal of this case (REW) (Entered: 09/05/1996)
828 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to strike motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [818-1] ; striking motion to terminate injunctive relief by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [815-1], striking motion to dismiss case by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [815-2], denying as moot motion to strike by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [823-1], denying as moot motion to stay plas' response to AZ's motion to terminate injunctive relief and dismiss the case by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [817-1], denying as moot motion to accelerate motion by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054; purusant to agreement of all parties, staying this action until resolution of the special action filed by the AG in the AZ Supreme Court, AG shall notify this court, in writing, once the special action in the AZ Supreme Court is resolved [817-2] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/06/1996)
829 MOTION to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [829-1] re: response to motion to terminate (REW) Modified on 09/16/1996 (Entered: 09/11/1996)
830 MOTION to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 [830-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
831 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [829-1] re: response to motion to terminate (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
832 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 re: termination [830-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
956 Certified Copy of 9CCA Order, petition for writ of mandamus denied, re: 96-70435 (cc: all counsel/CAM/RGS) [956 -1] (REW) Modified on 10/03/1997 (Entered: 10/03/1997)
833 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate vacating and remanding the

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09/30/1996 10/02/1996 10/02/1996
10/09/1996
10/15/1996 10/30/1996 11/07/1996 11/14/1996 11/14/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996 11/18/1996

matter back to District Court, re: 93-17169, re: appeal [470-1]; based upon writ of certiorari of US Supreme Court, re: 94-1511 (cc: all counsel/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 02/03/1998)
834 NOTICE OF FILING STATUS REPORT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 re: medical, dental and handicap access (REW) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
835 MOTION to extend time by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [835-1] re: to file response to motion to vacate (REW) (Entered: 10/04/1996)
836 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Alexander under penalty of perjury by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 re motion to extend time by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [835-1] re: to file response to motion to vacate [835-1] (REW) (Entered: 10/04/1996)
837 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [835-1] re: to file response to motion to vacate, plas' response to dfts' motion shall be due 10/10/96, re: motion to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [830-1] [830-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 10/09/1996)
838 MOTION to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [838-1] re: response to dfts' motion to vacate (lodged document at docket clerk's desk) (REW) (Entered: 10/15/1996)
839 OBJECTIONS by all dfts to special master's fees for 9/96 and expenses forwarded 10/3/96 pursuant to order of 12/14/95 for medical/dental portion of litigation in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 10/31/1996)
840 MOTION for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv00054 [840-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
841 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [838-1] re: response to dfts' motion to vacate (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
842 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [830-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
843 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to objections to special master's fees for 9/96 and expenses forwarded 10/3/96 [839-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
844 AFFIDAVIT of Jennifer Anne Dougherty in support of response to objections [843-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
845 AFFIDAVIT of Lincoln Green, Jr in support of response to objections [843-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
846 AFFIDAVIT of Janet Bliss in support of response to objections [843-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
847 AFFIDAVIT of Craig Stephan in support of response to objections [8431] (REW) (Entered: 11/21/1996)

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11/22/1996 11/22/1996 11/25/1996 11/29/1996
12/02/1996 12/02/1996 12/20/1996 12/20/1996 12/20/1996 12/20/1996 12/23/1996
01/02/1997

848 NOTICE OF ERRATA by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's status report dated 10/28/96 (REW) (Entered: 11/25/1996)
850 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Erwin B Cornstuble [841-1]; sent to Florence, forwarded to Tucson, returned marked: "Return to Sender, moved left no address, unable to forward" (REW) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
849 MOTION to extend time of deadline for responding to special master's motion for appointment of medical expert by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [849-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
Original Record Received from Supreme Court re: appeal Supreme Ct #95-1511; 18 volumes clerk's record; 33 transcripts (#215, 218, 219, 265, 297-301, 319-321, 324-331, 334-338, 344, 345, 548, 621, 682-685); 25 bulkie documents (#79, 211, 273, 360, 362, 362a, 367, 404, 449-6 vol and 2 vol exhibits, 461, 501, 522, 523, 549, 596, 609, 707, exhibit list of 11/20/91); sealed envelope, re: appeals [787-1], [757-1], [647-1], [470-1], [445-1], [418-1], [389-1], [261-1], [247-1] (REW) Modified on 02/03/1998 (Entered: 12/02/1996)
851 RESPONSE (Opposition) by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
852 OBJECTIONS (Opposition) by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's fees and expenses for October 1996 (REW) (Entered: 12/03/1996)
853 POST-REMAND MOTION for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [853-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
854 MOTION for limited relief from stay for purposes of issuing judgment on remand by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [854-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
855 MOTION to extend time to respond to dfts' opposition motion for appointment of medical expert by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [855-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
856 MOTION to extend time for filing response to dfts' opposition motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [856-1] (REW) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
857 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time of deadline for responding to special master's motion for appointment of medical expert by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [849-1], dfts' response shall be filed 3 days after the filing of this order, re: motion [840-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) Modified on 12/23/1996 (Entered: 12/23/1996)
858 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Erwin B Cornstuble [857-1]; forwarded to ASPC-Tucson, marked "Return to Sender, moved left no address unable to forward" (REW) Modified on 02/05/1997 (Entered: 01/02/1997)

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01/03/1997 01/03/1997 01/03/1997 01/03/1997 01/06/1997
01/07/1997
01/07/1997
01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/13/1997

859 STATUS REPORT (HIV/AIDS) by Janet Bliss, special master in 2:90cv-00054 (former emp) Modified on 02/05/1997 (Entered: 01/03/1997)
860 STATUS REPORT for 1/3/97 by Janet Bliss, Special Master in 2:90-cv00054 re: medical issues (2 volumes of exhibits #861 & #862) (former emp) Modified on 04/09/1997 (Entered: 01/03/1997)
861 EXHIBITS to special master status report Vol 1 (Re: [860-1] (dktd as exh to #859 in error) (former emp) Modified on 02/05/1997 (Entered: 01/03/1997)
862 EXHIBITS to special master status report Vol 2 (Re: [860-1] (former emp) (Entered: 01/03/1997)
863 RESPONSE (Opposition) to dfts' motion for limited relief from stay for purposes of issuing judgment on remand by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 and CROSS-MOTION to strike dfts' post-remand motion for limited relief by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [863-1] (RE: [854-1] ) (REW) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
864 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time to respond until 12/31/96 to dfts' opposition motion for appointment of medical expert by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [855-1], re: motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1] [840-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
865 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time until 12/31/96 for filing response to dfts' opposition motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [856-1], re: motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1] [840-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
866 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's billing and expenses for November 1996 for medical/dental portion of litigation (REW) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
867 REPLY by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to response (opposition) to motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv00054 [840-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
868 REPLY by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections (opposition) to special master's fees and expenses for October 1996 [852-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/08/1997)
869 MOTION (Application) for renewal of appointment of special master for medical and dental issues by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [869-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/09/1997)
870 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' opposition motion for appointment of medical expert in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/09/1997)
871 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand ; status hearing set for 9:00 1/27/97 , before Judge Roger G. Strand (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered:

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01/27/1997

01/13/1997)
872 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for limited relief from stay for purposes of issuing judgment on remand by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [854-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
872 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to strike dfts' postremand motion for limited relief by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [863-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
873 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Erwin B Cornstuble [865-1], [864-1]; forwarded to ASPC - Tucson; marked "Return to Sender, moved left no address unable to forward" (REW) (Entered: 01/16/1997)
874 STATUS REPORT (Dental) by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 01/16/1997)
875 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to special master's fees and expenses for November 1996 for medical/dental portion of litigation [866-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/23/1997)
876 MOTION for enlargement of deadline to object to 1/3/97 medical and HIV status reports of the special master pursuant to agreement of the parties by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [876-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/23/1997)
877 AFFIDAVIT of R Elizabeth Teply in support of motion for enlargement of deadline to object to 1/3/97 medical and HIV status reports of the special master pursuant to agreement of the parties by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [876-1] [876-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/23/1997)
878 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ Status hearing held. ORD granting motion for enlargement of deadline to object to 1/3/97 medical and HIV status reports of the special master pursuant to agreement of the parties by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [876]. Dfts have until 2/3/97 to object to the special master status reports. ORD granting motion for limited relief from stay for purposes of issuing judgment on remand by dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [854]. ORD denying for mootness motion for expedited hearing and dispostion by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [810] re: motion to modify various orders referring issues to special masters ; , Motion to intervene [819] is STAYED. Motion for jgmt of dism of pltf's legal access claims [853] needs briefing;stay is lifted today; responses due in accordance with the rules. Request for payment of spec master fees is before the court. Motion to vacate DC's orders [830] is before the Court. IT IS ORDERED that hereafter reports when filed with the Court shall also be copied to the parties. LATER: An issue has been raised as to the status of the special master on the medical/dental issue and the nature of her responsibilities and duties in light of the current posture of this case. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED setting a hearing on Friday, 2/7/97 at 3:00PM to clarify any questions regarding this matter. [cc: all cnsl] [878] (former emp) (Entered: 01/29/1997)
879 CORRECTION by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to dfts'

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02/10/1997 02/10/1997 02/11/1997 02/11/1997 02/13/1997 02/14/1997

opposition motion for appointment of expert [870-1], re: motion [840-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/30/1997)
880 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's billing and expenses for December 1996 for medical/dental portion of litigation (REW) (Entered: 02/04/1997)
881 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's final medical & HIV status reports dated 1/3/97, re: status reports [860-1], [859-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/06/1997)
882 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for renewal of appointment of special master for medical and dental issues by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [869-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/08/1997)
883 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ Status hearing held. Discussion had as to status of payment of spec master. It is the order of the Court that the special master has the same authority to act as it had previously and to interact with the DOC. Court is not indicating at all whether there will be obligation to pay for any such services that may be performed or engaged in after 1/1/97; order effective 2/10/97. FUR ORD setting motion for renewal of appointment of special master for medical and dental issues by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [869-1], motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv00054 [840-1], motion to vacate DC's orders of and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [830-1] and motion to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] at 2:30PM, 3/3/97. , [cc: all cnsl] [883] (former emp) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
884 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to post-remand motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [853-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
885 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE in 2:90-cv-00054, for intervenordefendant State of AZ, dft Goldsmith, dft Lewis, dft Crist, dft Herman, dft Rhode, dft Cardin, by James Russel Morrow, Thomas John Dennis, R Elizabeth Teply, Michael Warzynski (REW) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
886 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand reaffirming court order of 2/16/96 [744-1] referring medical/dental care portion of case to mag judge Silverman for the purpose of making recommendation as to whether dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the master (cc: all counsel/BGS) (REW) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
887 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman ; in court hearing set for 9:00 2/20/97 , before Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman to consider whether dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the master; all cnsl will attend in person (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
888 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special masters' dental status report of 1/15/97 [874-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/18/1997)
889 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS; telephonic conference held [889-1]

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02/18/1997 02/19/1997 02/19/1997 02/20/1997
02/21/1997 02/24/1997
02/25/1997
03/03/1997 03/03/1997 03/03/1997

re: minute entry [889-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
890 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to postremand motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [853-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
891 NOTICE OF HEARING by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 setting post-remand motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [853-1] at 9:30 4/21/97 (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
892 TRANSCRIPT of status hearing by Court Reporter: Merilyn Sanchez for the following date(s): 2/7/97 (REW) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
893 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger ; evidentiary hearing held ; witnesses sworn and examined; exhibits admitted; court in recess until 2/24/97 at 8:00 am (before BGS); re: whether dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the master [893-2] (REW) Modified on 02/26/1997 (Entered: 02/24/1997)
894 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to special master's fees and expenses for December 1996 for medical/dental portion of litigation [880-1] (REW) (Entered: 02/24/1997)
895 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger; evidentiary hearing resumes, witnesses sworn and examined, exhibits admitted ; evidentiary hearing to resume 8:00 2/25/97 , before Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman ; re: whether dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the master [895-3] (REW) Modified on 02/26/1997 (Entered: 02/24/1997)
896 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger ; evidentiary hearing resumed ; witnesses sworn and examined, exhibits admitted; closing arguments; matter taken under advisement re: whether dfts are in compliance on the seven issues referred to the master [896-2] (REW) Modified on 02/26/1997 (Entered: 02/26/1997)
897 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman; court finds that dfts have substantially implemented the seven pilot programs contemplated by Judge Muecke; objections shall be filed within 10 days (cc: all counsel/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 03/03/1997)
Text not available. (Entered: 03/04/1997)
898 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ taking under advisement on 3/3/97 the motion for renewal of appointment of special master for medical and dental issues by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [869-1], taking under advisement on 3/3/97 the motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1], taking under advisement on 3/3/97 the motion to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [830-1], taking under advisement on 3/3/97 the motion to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] With respect to the timing of the filing of the monthly requests, the forebearance to file shall not be deemed a waiver of any rights that

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03/14/1997 03/14/1997
03/14/1997
03/20/1997
03/20/1997 03/20/1997

might flow from whatever orders the court enters. With respect to any further visits at the institution, the court would directed the parties to forbear in that regard except to the extent that they might regard a situation as an emergency;if a communication is received, the spec master should follow up with the instiution health care provider. When the time has expired to respond to the R&R, the court will issue ruling. IT IS ORD referring this matter to Mag/Judge Silverman for review of the accounting data with respect to the special master. [898] (former emp) (Entered: 03/04/1997)
899 WITNESS LIST (all parties) in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 03/05/1997)
900 EXHIBIT LIST (all parties) in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 03/05/1997)
901 OBJECTIONS by dfts to special master's billing and expenses for 1/1997 for medical/dental portion of litigation in 2:90-cv-00054 (former emp) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
902 MOTION for leave to exceed the page limit of over-length brief in support by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [902-1], re: objections to mag judge's report and recommendation (REW) Modified on 03/20/1997 (Entered: 03/13/1997)
903 MINUTE ORDER resetting motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [853-1] at 3:00 4/21/97 (cc: all counsel) [903] (former emp) (Entered: 03/14/1997)
904 MOTION for attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [904-1] * * * DOCUMENT REMOVED AND FILED IN MC 95-86 PER ORDER (#922) DATED 4/10/97 * * * (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered: 03/17/1997)
905 MOTION to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [905-1] re: over-length brief in support of their motion for attys' fees * * * DOCUMENT REMOVED AND FILED IN MC 95-86 PER ORDER (#922) DATED 4/10/97 * * * (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered: 03/17/1997)
906 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion for leave to exceed the page limit of over-length brief in support by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [902-1], re: objections to mag judge's report and recommendation [897-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
907 OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [897-1] by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
908 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to exceed the page limit by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [905-1] re: over-length brief in support of their motion for attys' fees, re: motion [904-1] (cc: all counsel) * * * DOCUMENT REMOVED AND FILED IN MC 95-86 PER ORDER (#922) DATED 4/10/97 * * * (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered:

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03/28/1997 03/31/1997 03/31/1997

03/20/1997)
909 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [904-1] * * * DOCUMENT REMOVED AND FILED IN MC 95-86 PER ORDER (#922) DATED 4/10/97 * * * (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered: 03/20/1997)
910 MOTION for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [9101] (REW) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
911 MOTION for expedited ruling on motion for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [910-1] by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [911-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
912 RESPONSE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to special master's billing and expenses for January 1997 for medical/dental portion of litigation [901-1] (REW) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
913 MINUTE ORDER status hearing re medical and other records is set for 10:00AM, 3/28/97 (cc: all counsel) [913] (former emp) (Entered: 03/25/1997)
916 UNOPPOSED MOTION for transfer of pleadings to appropriate court by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [916-1] re: motion filed on 3/11/97 to be filed in MC 95-86 (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered: 04/02/1997)
915 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ Status hearing re medical records held. Discussion re these medical records conducted and it is determined that counsel shall make an inventory of such degree of definition and specificity as counsel for the Special Master deem appropriate, one group to be filed under seal and one group not under seal, said records to be kept until a date after final judgment has been entered and the appeal time has run. The Court will make rulings on motions Monday 3/31/97. [915] (MI) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
914 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman: argument on deft's objections to special master's fees for the months of 9/96 through 1/97 set for 9:00 am on 4/16/97 (cc: all counsel) (former emp) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
917 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to plas' objections [907-1], to report and recommendation [897-1] after evidentiary hearing (REW) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
918 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to vacate DC's orders of 3/19/93 and 4/5/93 by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [830-1], dfts relieved of previously imposed reporting requirements; denying motion for renewal of appointment of special master for medical and dental issues

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04/07/1997
04/07/1997 04/09/1997
04/10/1997
04/15/1997 04/15/1997 04/15/1997 04/16/1997
04/16/1997 04/18/1997

by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [869-1]; denying motion for appointment of medical expert by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [840-1]; denying motion to modify referral orders by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [780-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
919 RESPONSE (Opposition) by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [910-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/08/1997)
920 OBJECTIONS by all dfts to special master's status report of 1/8/97 regarding mental health services in 2:90-cv-00054 (status report not on docket) (REW) (Entered: 04/09/1997)
921 REPLY in support by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [910-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
922 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion for transfer of pleadings to appropriate court by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [916-1] re: motion filed on 3/11/97 to be filed in MC 95-86; plas' motion for attys' fees and expenses to be transferred to case MC 95-86, to be ruled on by Hon David Ezra (cc: cnsl/MC95-86/Judge Ezra) (motion for attorney's fees [904-1], motion to exceed the page limit [905-1], order granting motion to exceed [908-1], memorandum in support of motion for attys' fees [909-1] - all terminated and removed from this action and filed in MC 95-86) (REW) Modified on 04/15/1997 (Entered: 04/10/1997)
923 MOTION for two hour continuance of hearing set on 4/16/97 at 9:00 am by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [923-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
924 MOTION to extend time to file plas' petition for attys' fees by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [924-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
925 MOTION (Petition) for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [925-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
926 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS status hearing held, re: Dfts' objection to Special Master fee for September, 1996 thru January, 1997 ; Objection denied with respect to billings for September, October, November, 1996 and January, 1997. The billing for December, 1996 is taken under advisement. [cc: all counsel, RGS, BGS] [926-2] (ALL) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
927 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv00054 by David Burnell Smith (REW) (Entered: 04/17/1997)
928 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman granting motion for two hour continuance of hearing set on 4/16/97 at 9:00 am by Janet Bliss in 2:90cv-00054 [923-1], hearing rescheduled for 4/16/97 at 11:00 am, re:

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04/18/1997 04/21/1997 04/21/1997 04/22/1997 04/29/1997
04/30/1997 05/02/1997 05/12/1997 05/12/1997 05/14/1997 05/19/1997 05/19/1997 05/22/1997

minute entry [926-2] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 04/18/1997)
929 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman overruling objections to special master's January, 1997, billing re: objections [901-1], [880-1], [866-1], [852-1], [839-1] (cc: all counsel/BGS/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 04/18/1997)
930 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections to special master's status report of 1/8/97 regarding mental health services [920-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
931 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: MIKE BENITEZ taking under advisement on 4/21/97 the motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [853-1] [931-1] (former emp) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
932 NOTICE by all dfts to court re: items discussed at oral argument on 4/21/97 (REW) (Entered: 04/23/1997)
933 AMENDED MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: BGS Amending the minute entry on the hearing held 4/16/97 [926-2] to reflect that the objections are denied with respect to the billings for September 1996-December 1996. The objections for January, 1997 were taken under advisement. [cc: all counsel, RGS, BGS] [933-1] (ALL) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
934 MOTION for award of attorney's fees by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [934-1] re: atty David Smith (REW) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
935 MOTION to exceed the page limit by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [935-1] re: reply in support of dfts' objections to special master's 1/8/97 status report (REW) Modified on 05/12/1997 (Entered: 05/05/1997)
936 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to exceed the page limit by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [935-1] re: reply in support of dfts' objections to special master's 1/8/97 status report, re: objection [920-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
937 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 of its objections to special master's status report of 1/8/97, regarding mental health services [920-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/12/1997)
938 MOTION (Application) for renewal of appointment of special master for mental health issues by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [938-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
939 NOTICE by Janet Bliss of filing special master's records under seal (16 boxes) per minute entry #915 (REW) Modified on 05/21/1997 (Entered: 05/21/1997)
940 AMENDED NOTICE by Janet Bliss of filing special master's records under seal (16 boxes) per minute entry #915 (REW) Modified on 05/21/1997 (Entered: 05/21/1997)
941 ORDER by Mag Judge Barry G. Silverman; exhibits returned to

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06/02/1997 06/10/1997 06/17/1997 06/23/1997 06/24/1997
07/01/1997 07/16/1997 08/07/1997 08/15/1997 08/18/1997 08/22/1997

cnsl/agents of record; cnsl/agents directed to retain custody of exhibits until case completely terminated, including all appeals (cc: Bendheim, Teply, Stephen) re: order [941-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
942 MOTION to extend time to file response to plas' application for renewal of appointment of special master for mental health issues by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [942-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
943 SUPPLEMENT by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to post remand motion for judgment of dismissal of pla's legal access claims by all dfts [853-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/11/1997)
944 SATISFACTION of dfts' award for costs in Supreme Court and plas' final claim for attys' fees for medical/dental portion of litigation (REW) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
945 UNOPPOSED MOTION to extend time for plas to respond to dfts' supplemental post-remand motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [945-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
946 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend time until 6/16/97 to file response to plas' application for renewal of appointment of special master for mental health issues by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [9421], re: motion for renewal [938-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
947 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting post-remand motion for judgment of dismissal of plas' legal access claims by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [853-1]; plas' legal access claims dismissed with prejudice (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
948 NOTICE OF APPEAL by pla Frank Bartholic from District Court order [947-1] (cc: 9CCA/All Counsel/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 08/08/1997)
949 MOTION to intervene as pla by Hector Munoz to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [949-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/08/1997)
950 RESPONSE (Objection) by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to intervene as pla by Hector Munoz to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [949-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/21/1997)
951 STIPULATION to extend time for appointment of special master, Dr Cassandra Newkirk, through 11/1/97; and plas' motion seeking extension shall be withdrawn without prejudice to renew (REW) Modified on 08/22/1997 (Entered: 08/21/1997)
952 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation; time for apointment of special master, Dr Cassandra Newkirk, extended throuh 11/1/97; nothing in this order precludes either party from seeking extension of special master's appointment beyond 11/1/97, such request shall be made within 30 days of receipt of next special master's report, regardless of whether request is made after 11/1/97, this order does not preclude either party from contesting further extensions of special

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08/25/1997 08/28/1997 09/17/1997
09/29/1997 11/13/1997 11/24/1997 12/01/1997 12/01/1997 12/18/1997 01/05/1998
02/03/1998

master's appointment; plas' motion for renewal of appointment of special master for mental health issues by all plas is withdrawn without prejudice to renew [938-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) Modified on 08/22/1997 (Entered: 08/22/1997)
953 REPLY by Hector Munoz in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to intervene as pla by Hector Munoz to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [949-1] (REW) (Entered: 08/26/1997)
Notification by 9CCA of Appellate Docket Number 97-16530 (REW) (Entered: 08/28/1997)
954 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand denying motion in the alternative to intervene by AZ, State of to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [819-1] re: seek termination of all injunctive relief and dismissal of this case in 2:90-cv00054, denying motion to strike dfts' post-remand motion for limited relief by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [863-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/17/1997)
955 MOTION to intervene by Ralph L Franklin Jr to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [955-1] (lodged complaint in intervention placed on left side of file) (REW) Modified on 03/23/1998 (Entered: 10/02/1997)
957 MOTION to extend appointment of special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054 [957-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/14/1997)
958 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to extend appointment of special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [957-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/25/1997)
959 NOTICE by all plas of satisfaction of plas' final claim for attys' fees and costs for legal access portion of litigation, and satisfaction of plas' claim for attys' fees and costs for the period of 12/1/95 through 10/9/97 for mental health portion of litigation (REW) (Entered: 12/01/1997)
960 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion to extend appointment of special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [9571] (REW) (Entered: 12/03/1997)
962 SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS to motion for order authorizing special master and monitor to submit monthly payment vouchers, etc filed 3/21/97 by special master (Re: [910-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/06/1998)
961 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ Status hearing held;parties appearing by telephone. IT IS ORDERED that Dr. Newkirk have until 3/6/98 within which to file the final report; parties have until 4/l0/98 within which to file such responsive memoranda as they might deem appropriate and which may include a request to extend the special master term. Counsel to get together and advise court as to remaining matters; court will review pending motions. cc: all cnsl[961] (former emp) (Entered: 01/05/1998)
964 CERTIFIED COPY of 9CCA Mandate dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, re: 97-16530 (cc: all counsel/RGS) (REW) (Entered:

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03/09/1998 03/18/1998 03/25/1998
04/02/1998 04/02/1998 04/06/1998 04/06/1998 04/08/1998

02/03/1998)
965 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: RGS Crt Rptr: M.SANCHEZ Telcon held re mental health report received by the court from ADOC. IT IS ORDERED that counsel will redact a copy of the report so as to remove there from such information that needs to be protected; such redacted report to be submitted for filing w/i 5 days. FUR ORD the original report to filed under seal.[cc: all cnsl] [965] re: minute entry [965-1] (former emp) (Entered: 03/10/1998)
966 FINAL REPORT OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES by Cassandra Newkirk (original and redacted) (REW) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
967 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand denying motion for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [910-1]; denying as moot motion for expedited ruling on motion for order authorizing special master and monitor (Craig Stephan) to submit monthly payment vouchers until special master's appointment is terminated by court by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [910-1] by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [911-1]; granting motion to extend time to file plas' petition for attys' fees by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [924-1], petition for award of reasonable attys' fees and expenses shall be deemed timely submitted; denying as moot motion for award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [925-1]; granting motion for award of attorney's fees by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 [934-1] re: atty David Smith; denying motion to intervene as pla by Hector Munoz to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [949-1] in 2:90-cv-00054; denying motion to intervene by Ralph L Franklin Jr to case(s) 2:90-cv-00054, [955-1] in 2:90-cv-00054 (cc: all counsel) (REW) Modified on 03/25/1998 (Entered: 03/25/1998)
968 MOTION for reconsideration regarding fees of special master and monitor by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv-00054 [968-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
969 MOTION for expedited ruling on motion for reconsideration regarding fees of special master and monitor by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv-00054 [968-1] by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv00054 [969-1] (REW) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
970 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Cassandra Newkirk [965-1]; marked "Return to Sender, box closed no forwarding order filed" (REW) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
971 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Cassandra Newkirk [967-1]; marked "Return to Sender, box closed no forwarding order filed" (REW) (Entered: 04/07/1998)
972 STIPULATION for extension of time until 4/24/98 for filing memorandum to special master's final report (REW) (Entered: 04/13/1998)

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04/09/1998 04/13/1998
04/21/1998 04/23/1998 04/30/1998
05/04/1998 05/04/1998 05/04/1998 05/04/1998 05/08/1998
05/13/1998 05/20/1998

974 NOTICE by all dfts to court regarding special master's motion for reconsideration of denying fees (REW) (Entered: 04/14/1998)
973 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation, time for filing responsive memoranda to special master's final report, which may include request to extend special master's appointment, extended to 4/24/98, re: report [966-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 04/13/1998)
975 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Erwin B Cornstuble [973-1] (forwarded to Tucson) marked "Return to Sender, not at ASPCF" (REW) (Entered: 04/22/1998)
976 STIPULATION for extension of time within which to respond to special master's report (REW) (Entered: 04/30/1998)
977 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation, time for filing responsive memoranda to special master's final report which may include request to extend special master's appointment extended until 5/4/98, re: report [966-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 04/30/1998)
978 OBJECTIONS by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's final report of mental health services dated 3/6/98 [966-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/06/1998)
979 MOTION (Request) for hearing by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054, re: dfts' objections to special master's final report of mental health services [9791] (REW) (Entered: 05/06/1998)
980 MOTION (Request) for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [980-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/06/1998)
981 DECLARATION of Donna H Lee by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 re motion for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [980-1] [980-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/06/1998)
982 MINUTE ORDER granting motion for hearing by all dfts in 2:90-cv00054, re: dfts' objections to special master's final report of mental health services [979]. ORD setting hearing for 5/18/98 at 3:30PM. (cc: all counsel) [982] (former emp) (Entered: 05/08/1998)
983 MOTION for clarification by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [983-1], re: minute order of 5/8/98 , and/or continuance of hearing set for 5/18/98 by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [983-2] (REW) (Entered: 05/14/1998)
984 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion for clarification by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [983-1], re: minute order of 5/8/98, granting motion for continuance of hearing set for 5/18/98 by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [983-2] hearing set for 5/18/98 at 3:30 vacated; mental health portion of case shall be assigned by random lot to mag judge for purpose of holding hearing and making recommendation as to whether dfts are in compliance with respect to issues referred to special master (cc: all counsel) (VAM drawn as mag judge - copy of this order forwarded to VAM) (REW) Modified on 05/20/1998 (Entered: 05/20/1998)

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05/20/1998 05/26/1998 05/29/1998 05/29/1998 06/03/1998 06/03/1998 06/04/1998 06/04/1998 06/05/1998
06/10/1998

985 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections [978-1], to special master's report [966-1] (REW) (Entered: 05/21/1998)
986 MOTION (Request) for extension of time to file dfts' response to plas' request for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [986-1] (REW) Modified on 06/04/1998 (Entered: 05/29/1998)
987 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion to extend appointment of special master by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [957-1], appointment of special master for mental health issues extended through 2/16/98 (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) (Entered: 05/29/1998)
988 ORDER by Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis re: order [984-1] ; telephonic scheduling conference set for 9:00 6/5/98 , before Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis ; clerk shall mail copy of this order to Bendheim, Warzynski, Lee and Newkirk only (cc: Bendheim/Warzynski/Lee/Newkirk) (REW) (Entered: 05/29/1998)
991 REPLY MEMORANDUM by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to response to motion for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [980-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
992 MOTION (Request) for leave to submit reply to plas' response to dfts' objection to special master's final report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [992-1] (REW) Modified on 11/17/1998 (Entered: 06/04/1998)
989 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion for extension of time to file dfts' response to plas' request for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [986-1], dfts shall have through 5/26/98 to file a response, re: motion [980-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
990 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for extension of mental health special master's appointment by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [980-1] (document lodged 5/26/98, filed per order of 6/4/98 (#989)) (REW) (Entered: 06/04/1998)
993 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger; telephonic status/scheduling conference conducted on mental health issues referred to mag judge; pla requests continuation of special master through hearing and/or other discovery before hearing; dft opposes continuation of special master through hearing; matter taken under advisement; hearing on mental health issues referred to mag judge will be scheduled after ruling on above ; scheduling conf held [993-2] (cc: RGS/Bendheim/Warzynski/Lee/Alexander/Newkirk by as) (REW) (Entered: 06/10/1998)
994 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand; special master's appointment extended up to and including hearing to be conducted by mag judge on dfts' compliance with mental health portion of injunction; dfts shall compensate special master for her time and expenses at rate previously set in her appointment; special master shall continue with same duties

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06/16/1998 06/16/1998 06/16/1998 06/22/1998
07/06/1998 07/14/1998 07/14/1998 07/17/1998
07/23/1998 07/31/1998
07/31/1998
08/02/1998 08/24/1998

and powers set forth in original agreement, re: stipulation [709-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 06/10/1998)
995 TRANSCRIPT of motions hearing by Court Reporter: Merilyn Sanchez for the following date(s): 3/3/97 (REW) (Entered: 06/17/1998)
996 TRANSCRIPT of motions hearing by Court Reporter: Merilyn Sanchez for the following date(s): 3/28/97 (REW) (Entered: 06/17/1998)
997 MOTION for clarification concerning 6/10/98 order by all dfts in 2:90cv-00054 [997-1] (REW) (Entered: 06/17/1998)
998 MINUTE ORDER ; in court hearing set for 9:00 9/3/98, re: mental health issues , before Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis , if necessary, hearing will continue on 9/4/98 (cc: all counsel/RGS) [998-3] (REW) (Entered: 06/22/1998)
999 RESPONSE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for clarification concerning 6/10/98 order by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [997-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/06/1998)
1001 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for clarification concerning 6/10/98 order by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [997-1] [997-1] (REW) (Entered: 07/21/1998)
1002 NOTICE of service of discovery documents by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054. (REW) (Entered: 07/21/1998)
1000 ORDER by Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis granting motion for clarification concerning 6/10/98 order by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [9971] - only discovery at this time will be conducted by Special Master; Special Master shall file supplemental report on review and findings since 6/10/98, and the report shall be filed with the court by 8/14/98; parties shall exchange witness and exhibit lists by 8/25/98 (cc: all counsel) (CMM) (Entered: 07/17/1998)
1003 NOTICE of service of discovery documents by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054. (REW) (Entered: 07/28/1998)
1004 MOTION for reconsideration of 7/17/98 order denying plas right to conduct discovery now, independent of special master by all plas in 2:90cv-00054 [1004-1] (REW) Modified on 08/05/1998 (Entered: 08/03/1998)
1005 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for reconsideration of 7/17/98 order denying plas right to conduct discovery now, independent of special master by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [1004-1] (REW) Modified on 08/05/1998 (Entered: 08/03/1998)
1022 WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1006 MOTION for expedited disposition of motion to extend time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054

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08/24/1998 08/24/1998 08/24/1998 08/25/1998 08/25/1998 08/26/1998 08/26/1998

[1006-1] , for extension of time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-2] , request for decision on plas' motion for reconsideration (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1007 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for extension of time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-2], motion for expedited disposition of motion to extend time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-1], motion for decision on plas' motion for reconsideration (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1008 DECLARATION of Donna H lee, re: memorandum [1007-1], re: motion for expedited disposition of motion to extend time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [10061], re: motion for extension of time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-2], re: motion for decision on plas' motion for reconsideration [1006-3] (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1009 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion for extension of time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [1006-2], motion for expedited disposition of motion to extend time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-1], motion for decision on plas' motion for reconsideration (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1010 MOTION to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-1] , to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-2] , for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-3] (faxed copy) (REW) Modified on 09/02/1998 (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1011 MEMORANDUM (BRIEF) IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-1], motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [1010-2], motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-3] (faxed copy) (REW) Modified on 09/02/1998 (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1012 MOTION to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-1] , to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-2] , for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-3] (original of dkt #1010) (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1013 MEMORANDUM (BRIEF) IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054

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08/26/1998
08/26/1998 08/26/1998 08/26/1998
08/28/1998 08/28/1998 08/28/1998 08/28/1998

of motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-1], motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 [1012-2], motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-3] (original of dkt #1011) (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1014 DECLARATION of Donna H Lee by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054, re: memorandum [1013-1], re: motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-1], re: motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-2], re: motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-3] (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
1015 NOTICE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of service of motion to modify, motion to compel, motion for expedited consideration, brief in support and declaration of Donna H Lee (REW) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
ORAL MOTION to continue 9/3/98 hearing by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 by Marya Jo Booker, Fletcher Charles Casey Jr [0-0] (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1016 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM; telephonic heaing re: in-court hearing scheduled for 9/3/98; denying without prejudice motion for reconsideration of 7/17/98 order denying plas right to conduct discovery now, independent of special master by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [10041]; denying plas' oral motion to continue 9/3/98 hearing; granting motion for extension of time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas [1006-2], due 8/31/98; parties encouraged to expeditiously exchange documents; terming motion for expedited disposition of motion to extend time (deadline) for exchanging witness and exhibit lists by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1006-1]; terming motion for decision on plas' motion for reconsideration [1016-1] (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1017 MOTION for additional hearing date by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [10171] (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1018 MEMORANDUM (BRIEF) IN SUPPORT by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of motion for additional hearing date by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [10171] (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1019 NOTICE by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 of service of motion for additional hearing date and brief in support (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1020 RESPONSE by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 to motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-1], [1010-1], motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-2], [1010-2], motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and

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08/31/1998 09/03/1998 09/03/1998 09/04/1998 09/04/1998
09/18/1998 11/12/1998 11/16/1998

motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-3], [1010-3] (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1021 STIPULATION for entry of protective order (REW) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
1024 WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
1025 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM Crt Rptr: Merilyn Sanchez ; in court hearing held regardin Mental Health Issues DAY 1; witnesses testify; exhibit admitted; hearing to continue 9/4/98 at 8:00 am [1025-2] (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
1023 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand regarding information provided by dfts to plas in response to special master's 7/28/98 request with respect to dfts' assertion of a peer review privilege, granting stipulation (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 09/04/1998)
1026 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM Crt Rptr: Merilyn Sanchez; hearing re: Mental Health Issues continues; DAY 2; witnesses testify; exhibits admitted; by 9/11/98 Dr Newkirk to submit new list of documents requested from dfts and fax request to both parties; by 9/11/98 plas' records request to be faxed to dft and filed with court; ; telephonic hearing set for 12:00 noon 9/18/98 , before Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis, re: plas' records request and to set another date for continuation of hearing on mental health issues plas' motion to continue hearing withdrawn [1026-3]; recess; hearing to be continued at later date (REW) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
1027 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM; telephonic conference on mental health issues conducted; hearing on mental health issues will resume on 11/16/98 at 9:00 before Magistrate Judge Mathis ; in court hearing set for 9:00 11/16/98 , before Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis [1027-3] (REW) (Entered: 09/24/1998)
1028 NOTICE by Janet Bliss in 2:90-cv-00054 of change of address to 7904 E Chaparral Rd #110-244 Scottsdale, AZ 85250 (DMT) (Entered: 11/13/1998)
1029 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger; hearing regarding mental health issues continued; court finds: granting motion for leave to submit reply to plas' response to dfts' objection to special master's final report by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 [992-1], reply shall be docketed and filed; denying as moot motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-1], denying as moot motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-2], denying as moot motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1010-3]; denying is moot motion to modify previous order of 7/16/98 and allow plas access to documents provided to special master but withheld from plas by all plas

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11/16/1998 11/17/1998 11/17/1998
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in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-1], denying as moot motion to compel production purs to plas' mental health request for production of documents by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-2], denying as moot motion for expedited consideration of motion to modify and motion to compel by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1012-3]; denying as moot motion for additional hearing date by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 [1017-1]; Dr Newkirk, Special Master, sworn and examined, exhibits admitted ; in court hearing continued to 9:00 11/17/98 , before Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis [1029-3] (REW) Modified on 11/17/1998 (Entered: 11/17/1998)
1030 REPLY in support by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054, to objections [978-1], to special master's final report [966-1] (REW) (Entered: 11/19/1998)
ORAL MOTION by all dfts to admit defense exhibit 23 and plas' exhibit 13 in 2:90-cv-00054 by Robert Goldsmith, Samuel A. Lewis [0-0] (REW) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
1032 MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits: VAM Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger/Herb Moran; continued hearing regarding mental health issues; witnesses examined; exhibits admitted; granting oral motion by defense to admit defense exhibit 23 and plas' exhibit 13; ORDERED: parties shall file simultaneaous briefs on facts and law by 12/18/98; dft to supplement medical exhibits by 11/30/98; hearing adjourned ; in court hearing held [1032-2] (cc: counsel) (REW) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
1031 SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST submitted by all plas in 2:90-cv00054 (REW) (Entered: 11/19/1998)
1033 EXHIBIT LIST submitted by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
1034 EXHIBIT LIST submitted by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
1035 WITNESS LIST (REW) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
1036 POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 re [1032-2] (REW) (Entered: 01/04/1999)
1037 CLOSING ARGUMENT MEMORANDUM by all dfts in 2:90-cv-00054 re [1032-2] (REW) (Entered: 01/04/1999)
1038 ORDER by Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis; clerk shall file and docket the response to dfts' objections to special master's final report dated 6/4/98 and addendum to final report on mental health services submitted by Cassandra Newkirk dated 8/13/98 (cc: all counsel/RGS) re: order [10381] (REW) (Entered: 01/14/1999)
1039 RESPONSE dated 6/2/98 by Cassandra Newkirk in 2:90-cv-00054 to dfts' objections [978-1], to special master's final report [966-1] (REW) (Entered: 01/14/1999)
1040 ADDENDUM dated 8/14/98 by Cassandra Newkirk in 2:90-cv-00054 to special master's final report on mental health services [966-1] (REW)

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(Entered: 01/14/1999)
1041 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis recommending the court find dfts to be in "substantial compliance" with the injunction regarding mental health; if court should find "substantial compliance," the magistrate judge recommends that the special master be reappointed for a period of 9 months to monitor whether dfts continue to be in substantial compliance with the terms of the injunction and that the special master be required to file a report at the end of this 9 month period (cc: all counsel/RGS) (REW) (Entered: 02/25/1999)
1042 STIPULATION by all parties to extend time for appeal or objections from magistrate judge's report and recommendation dated 2/25/99 (REW) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
1043 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation allowing parties until 4/5/99 to file any appeal or objection to magistrate judge's report and recommendation, re: [1041-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/11/1999)
1044 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting motion for reconsideration regarding fees of special master and monitor by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv-00054 [968-1], court authorizes $2,600.00 in fees for Janet Bliss, former special master for medical and $1,534.00 in fees for Craig Stephan, former monitor; said amounts shall be satisfied in the same manner as prior accounts were satisfied in accordance with Bliss and Stephan's appointment; denying as moot motion for expedited ruling on motion for reconsideration regarding fees of special master and monitor by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv-00054 [968-1] by Janet Bliss and Craig Stephan in 2:90-cv-00054 [969-1] (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/16/1999)
1045 STIPULATION by all parties for entry of order adopting magistrate Judge's report and recommendation dated 2/25/99 in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 03/26/1999)
1046 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation and adopting the report & recommendation of the magistrate judge that dfts are in substantial compliance with the injunction regarding mental health; adopting recommendation of magistrate judge that special master be reappointed for period of 9 months to monitor whether dfts continue to be in substantial compliance with terms of injunction and the special master file report at conclusion of 9-month period; 9-month period begins upon filing of this order (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 03/26/1999)
1047 MINUTE ORDER Pursuant to joint request and stipulation of the parties, the Clerk shall dispose of the exhibits in this case.(cc: all counsel) [1047] re: order [1047-1] (former emp) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
1048 STIPULATION for extension of time within which plas may file request for attorneys' fees by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054 (REW) (Entered: 04/28/1999)

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1049 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation for extension of time within which plas may file request for attorneys' fees by all plas in 2:90-cv-00054; plas may have until 6/16/99 to file their request (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
1050 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of settlement and receipt of consideration in satisfaction of claims for costs and fees, including reasonable attorneys' fees by all plas (REW) (Entered: 07/12/1999)
1051 STIPULATION for dismissal by all parties, re: termination of injunctive relief and dismissal of this matter (REW) (Entered: 05/19/2000)
1052 ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting stipulation; injunctive relief terminated and this action is dismissed (cc: all counsel) (REW) (Entered: 05/22/2000)

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 91 F.3d 1365 (1996)
Fletcher CASEY, Jr., et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 93-17169.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
August 14, 1996.
Before: LAY,[*] PREGERSON, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
The United States Supreme Court has reversed the decision of this court, reported at 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.1994). We therefore vacate the district court's order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
[*] The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

91 F.3d 1365 (1996)
Fletcher CASEY, Jr., et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 93-17169.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
August 14, 1996.
Before: LAY,[*] PREGERSON, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
The United States Supreme Court has reversed the decision of this court, reported at 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.1994). We therefore vacate the district court's order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
[*] The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

 
 4 F.3d 1516 (1993)
Fletcher CASEY, Jr., et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 91-16513.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted November 5, 1992. Decided September 23, 1993.
1517*1517 Edward G. Hochuli, Kathleen L. Wieneke, Daniel P. Struck, and David C. Lewis, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants-appellants.
Stuart H. Adams, Jr., Elizabeth Alexander, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, and David C. Fathi, ACLU Nat. Prison Project, Washington, DC, Alice L. Bendheim, Phoenix, AZ, for plaintiffsappellees.
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
The Arizona Department of Corrections appeals an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of a certified plaintiff class of Arizona state prisoners and enjoining the Department from (a) prohibiting contact visits 1518*1518 between inmates and their attorneys, and (b) denying food-service jobs to HIV-positive[1] inmates. The inmates brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). We vacate the injunction. On the issue of attorney-inmate contact visitation, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for the inmate class and order summary judgment in favor of the Arizona Department of Corrections. With respect to the section 504 claim, we remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.
JURISDICTION
The district court exercised original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 2201. The Department of Corrections contends that the plaintiff class lacks standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to assert its claims under the Constitution

and under section 504. We address the standing issue for these two claims separately. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
BACKGROUND
This class action was filed by twenty-two named plaintiffs on January 12, 1990. The certified class is composed of all adult persons who are now, or who will be, in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections. A subclass consists of all prisoners who are handicapped individuals within the custody of the ADOC or who will in the future be in ADOC custody. Defendants are agents, officials, or employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections.
The prisoners allege that certain policies and practices of the ADOC violate their fourteenth amendment rights of access to the courts. They also claim that HIV-positive inmates are discriminated against in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The right of access claim is based on the Department's policy prohibiting attorney-client contact visitation to inmates at certain correctional facilities. The section 504 claim is based on the ADOC policy denying food-service employment to seropositive inmates.
On August 31, 1991, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class. On September 6, 1991, the court filed an amended memorandum and order. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Ariz.1991). The order enjoined the Arizona Department of Corrections from prohibiting contact visits between inmates and their attorneys in all facilities of the Arizona State Prison system, except for good cause. It also enjoined the Department from denying food-service employment to HIV-positive inmates, in the absence of a written finding that: (1) the inmate is not "otherwise qualified," and (2) the ADOC cannot reasonably accommodate the inmate's "handicap". On October 1, 1991, we denied the Department's petition for an emergency stay of the district court's order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No. 40 v. Insurance Corp. of Am., 919 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.1990); Bruce v. United States, 759 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir.1985).
Summary judgment also is reviewed de novo. Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.1987). The inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there remain genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992).
DISCUSSION
I. ATTORNEY-INMATE VISITATION

A. The ADOC Policy.
The Arizona Department of Corrections policy forbidding attorney contact visitation 1519*1519 applies to: (1) inmates housed at the Alhambra Reception Center and awaiting classification; (2) inmates at Cell Block 6 of ASPC-Florence; (3) inmates housed in the Special Management Unit at the Florence facility; and (4) inmates in lock-down units at other ADOC facilities. The nature and extent of permitted visitation depends upon the location of the prisoner and his classification.
Many inmates at Alhambra are allowed contact visitation; those who are not are recent arrivals from county jail who have not yet been classified. They temporarily are considered Level 5, the highest possible security risk.
Cell Block 6 houses more than 100 inmates, roughly one-half of whom have been sentenced to death. The other inmates at CB6 are classified at Level 3. Inmates seeking contact visitation at CB6 are placed, unshackled, in a caged area measuring approximately seven feet high, four feet wide, and three feet deep. A mail slot permits the passage of documents between attorney and inmate.
The vast majority of the prisoners housed at the Special Management Unit are classified as Level 5 security risks. An SMU inmate sits on one side of a cinder-block and glass partition, while his attorney sits on the opposite side. Each side of the partition is equipped with a telephone through which the inmate and attorney converse. Documents are transferred between inmate and attorney in accordance with strict procedures to ensure the privacy of those documents.
B. Standing.
Article III limits the judicial power of the federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, "unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). "On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes." Mansfield C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884).
"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to `show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant'...." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). This is the "actual injury" component of the standing doctrine; it requires an injury to be "real and immediate," not merely "conjectural" or "hypothetical." See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1973); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 960-61, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).

At least one named plaintiff must satisfy the actual injury component of standing in order to seek relief on behalf of himself or the class. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95, 94 S.Ct. at 675-76. The inquiry is whether any named plaintiff has demonstrated that he has sustained or is imminently in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of the challenged conduct. Id.
The prisoners allege, and the district court found, that the ADOC policy denying attorneyinmate contact visitation violates the inmates' fourteenth amendment rights of meaningful access to the courts. The prisoners must demonstrate that a named prisoner either sustained or was in imminent danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the policy.
The record convinces us that the prisoners have met this burden.[2] They have established 1520*1520 a sufficient "personal stake" in the outcome of this action to "assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Their injuries, past and threatened, are sufficiently "real and immediate" to confer standing upon the class.
C. Merits.
In granting summary judgment, the district court held unconstitutional the ADOC policy denying attorney-client contact visitation to prisoners housed in Alhambra, CB6, SMU, and other lock-down units.
A prison inmate is entitled to meaningful access to the courts under the fourteenth amendment. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Historically, this right "require[d] prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. The main concern was "`protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint.'" Id. at 828 n. 17, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 n. 17 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)).
In Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1990), we held that the right of access to the courts includes contact attorney visitation. The inclusion of contact visitation within the right to meaningful access, however, is merely the beginning of our present inquiry; whether such visitation has been denied unnecessarily remains to be determined. Ching does not supply the answer to this question.
Any infringement on prisoners' constitutional rights must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). This relaxed standard "is necessary if `prison administrators ..., and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977)).
Turner identifies four factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of prison policies: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison policy and the legitimate

governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact that accommodation of the constitutional right will have on guards, on other inmates, or on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the regulation or policy is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. The burden is on the inmates to show that the challenged regulation is unreasonable under Turner. Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1992); Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992).
1. Rational Connection.
The Department of Corrections asserts several justifications for its non-contact policy. It argues that the policy serves "the important public interest in protecting inmates, prison staff and the general public from the possibility of assault, hostage-taking and escape." It also contends that the policy is designed to reduce the introduction of contraband.
The district court erroneously found that the record precluded it from determining whether the asserted justifications — prevention of escape, assault, hostage-taking, and the introduction of contraband — were the actual reasons behind the implementation of the policy. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365, 1368-69 (D.Ariz.1991).
Prison officials need merely "`put forward'" a legitimate government interest, Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 1521*1521 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62), and provide some evidence that the interest put forward is the actual reason for the regulation. See Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1990). The ADOC provided sufficient evidence under Walker and Smith that the policy was implemented as a prophylactic security measure. The affidavits of Deputy Warden McFadden and Assistant Director Keeney, as well as the deposition testimony of Warden Crist, support this conclusion.
The district court also found no rational connection between the asserted penological interests and the policy. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1368-69. This finding was based primarily on the ADOC's failure to cite any incident of assault, hostage-taking, or escape that occurred as a result of contact visitation between attorneys and prisoners.
The district court placed an unduly onerous burden on the Department of Corrections. A prison official's concern for prison security is entitled to significant deference. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir.1989). In Harper, we held that a prison superintendent's affidavit, which stated that certain regulated material, if not censored, "could lead to violence ...," constituted a sufficient showing of a threat to prison security. Id. We required no proof that such materials ever had been the cause of violence. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1883, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989), the Supreme Court found rational certain regulations designed to avoid situations that "although not necessarily `likely' to lead to violence, [were] determined by the warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder."
We recently decided another case where ADOC officials justified a prison regulation on the basis of anticipated security problems. In Friedman v. State of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 332

(9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 996, 112 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991), we said:
Here, unlike Swift, the ADOC has provided evidence through its expert witness, Kenney, to support its no beard policy. Although Kenney's testimony largely justifies the regulation on the basis of anticipated security problems, we find Kenney's testimony sufficient. Swift might be read as requiring concrete evidence to support the regulation — e.g. in the past, the ADOC had a problem in recapturing a prisoner because he shaved his beard. However, such a reading of Swift would create a conflict with Turner. Turner requires that courts allow prison officials "to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. [at] 2262 (emphasis added).
The testimony of Warden Crist demonstrates his belief that contact visits between inmates and their attorneys creates an intolerable risk of a security breach. That belief is not unreasonable.
The ADOC's failure to specify a past event wherein a contact visit resulted in assault, escape, or hostage-taking, does not render irrational the adoption and implementation of a non-contact policy. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417, 109 S.Ct. at 1883-84; Friedman, 912 F.2d at 332-33. Nor does the fact that the policy allows some inmates to have contact visits with family members undermine the rationality of the ban on attorney-inmate contact visits. The inquiry is whether the justifications "invoked" for the policy are served by the policy, see id. at 332; Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 127 (9th Cir.1991), not whether a policy banning all contact visits would better serve the asserted security interests. We find a rational relationship between the Department of Corrections' policy and its legitimate penological concerns.
2. Alternative Avenues.
"Where other avenues remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262 (citation and internal quotation omitted).[3] The "asserted right" here is the right 1522*1522 of meaningful access to the courts, which includes contact visitation with an attorney. See Ching, 895 F.2d at 609-10.
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2406, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court stated: "In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of communicating with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the inmates were deprived of `all means of expression.'" (Citation omitted). In Friedman, 912 F.2d at 332, we applied the O'Lone reasoning to a prison policy prohibiting inmates from growing beards. The inmates in Friedman had no alternative religious practice to substitute for wearing beards. Nevertheless, we concluded that the inmates were not "denied all means of expression of their religion" because "they could participate in other aspects of their religion," such as eating Kosher food. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Here, the inmates were not denied "all means of expression" of their rights of meaningful access. Those rights are satisfied if prisoners are provided with "adequate law libraries or

adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Meaningful access was not completely denied by the prison policy. As the Court said in Bounds, "a legal access program need not include any particular element ... [but] must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards." 482 U.S. at 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1500. Just as Friedman could express his religion without growing a beard, these inmates can "express" their rights to meaningful access without attorney contact visitation.
At most, a triable issue may remain as to whether the inmates' rights of access were satisfied by adequate libraries or other assistance. We need not remand for trial, however, because resolution of this factor in favor of the inmates would not alter our ultimate legal conclusion — that the Turner test of reasonableness is satisfied.
3. Impact on Others.
The ADOC contends that providing contact visitation in areas affected by its non-contact policy will jeopardize the safety of its staff members and of visitors and will lead to an increase in the amount of contraband in its prisons. The inmates argue that the ADOC has not demonstrated that this is so and that, contrary to the affidavit of Deputy Warden McFadden, there is adequate secure space and personnel for contact visits, at least at SMU.
The district court found that contact visits would not significantly affect other inmates, the prison staff, or prison resources. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369. In doing so, the court resolved a disputed issue of fact with regard to the impact of accommodation at SMU. Even worse, the court ruled in favor of the inmates though they produced no evidence concerning the impact of accommodation on the other areas affected by the policy.
The district court justified its finding on this factor as follows: "Defendants' claim that contact visits at SMU would require the expenditure of additional resources is insufficient since the `cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.'" Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, 97 S.Ct. at 1496-97). The district court mischaracterized the constitutional right at issue: the constitutional right of meaningful access was not necessarily denied in its entirety, even though the inmates were denied contact visitation.
The inmates failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact concerning this factor, except perhaps as regards SMU. We need not remand for trial on the question of the impact of accommodation at SMU, however, because the resolution of this factual dispute in favor of the prisoners would not weigh heavily in our analysis. Cf. Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.1992) ("Neither Turner nor O'Lone, however, require a court to weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors.").
1523*1523 4. Exaggerated Response.
Under Turner, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives to a prison policy restricting constitutional rights may be evidence that the policy is not reasonable, but is an

"exaggerated response" to prison concerns. 482 U.S. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262; Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418, 109 S.Ct. at 1884. "[W]hen prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not an `exaggerated response' under Turner." Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 419, 109 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added).
The inmates suggest that an acceptable alternative to the non-contact policy is for prison guards to: (1) search the prisoner before and after each contact visit, and (2) observe each visit. While this proposal may suffice to stem the flow of contraband, it fails adequately to address the potential problems of hostage-taking and injury to staff and visiting attorneys. Cf. Friend, 923 F.2d at 126 (inmates' proposed alternative inadequate where it satisfied some, but not all, of the prison officials' security concerns).
It is incumbent upon the prisoners to point to an alternative that accommodates their rights at de minimis cost to security interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262-63. They have not done so. The non-contact policy is not an exaggerated response.
5. Conclusion: Reasonableness.
We find that the non-contact regulation is rationally related to legitimate penological interests; that a triable issue may remain as to whether alternative avenues exist for exercising the right to meaningful access and as to the institutional impact of accommodating that right at SMU; and that the regulation is not an exaggerated response to prison concerns.
That said, we must answer the ultimate question: is the regulation reasonably related to the Arizona Department of Corrections' legitimate penological concerns? Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. We hold that it is.
Contact visitation with an attorney is merely one aspect of the broad and fundamental right of meaningful access to the courts. The prisoners have not been denied access to the courts as that right traditionally has been described by the Supreme Court. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Inmates are not denied assistance "in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers" as that phrase is interpreted in Bounds. See id. (holding that such assistance requires only the provision of adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from "persons trained in the law").
The ADOC policy is a reasonable response to the legitimate institutional concerns posed by full contact visitation: prevention of escape, assault, hostage-taking, and the introduction of contraband. This is not to say that expansion of this policy to all facilities within the Arizona State Prison system would be reasonable. The facilities affected by the current policy house primarily prisoners who have been classified as high security risks or who are awaiting classification and therefore prudently assumed high risk. Cf. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir.1988) ("The fact that Unit 7 houses the state's most difficult prisoners gives rise to a legitimate governmental security interest in procedures that might be unreasonable elsewhere.").

Nothing in Ching is to the contrary. We failed to discuss Turner in our decision in Ching. We did, however, emphasize that the defendants in Ching failed to offer any justification whatsoever for their denial of contact visitation, and we referred to their policy as "arbitrary." 895 F.2d at 610. Had we applied the Turner test, we no doubt would have found that the first factor of the analysis, the "rational connection," was missing. Our holding in Ching demonstrates merely that where an arbitrary and irrational prison regulation impinges upon the constitutional rights of prison inmates, it is invalid as a matter of law. In other words, Ching teaches that satisfaction of the rational relationship factor is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, to sustain a prison policy 1524*1524 abridging constitutional rights. Cf. Walker, 917 F.2d at 385 (rational relationship is the "sine qua non" of the Turner test); Scott, 961 F.2d at 81 (second, third, and fourth Turner factors merely help court resolve the controlling question, which is whether the regulation has a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests).
II. FOOD-SERVICE POLICY
A. Standing.
The Arizona Department of Corrections has adopted a policy prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from obtaining employment in its food-service department. The inmates argue they have standing to challenge the validity of this policy because a named inmate is now HIV-positive and because this inmate would have been denied had she applied for such employment.
We reject this argument. The HIV-positive inmate did not demonstrate any injury in fact; she was not identified as HIV-positive until three months after the issuance of the district court's injunctive order, and she neither applied for a food-service position nor demonstrated that she intended to do so.
We must address standing even though the issue was not presented to the district court. Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382, 4 S.Ct. at 511-12. We first determine our own jurisdiction and then whether the district court had jurisdiction when it entered the injunctive order. See id. The fact that an inmate is now HIV-positive is not dispositive. "An asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The complaining party must demonstrate an injury in fact. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473, 102 S.Ct. at 759; Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2052, 114 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). At the time the district court entered its order, the record did not establish that any named plaintiff was seropositive. The class therefore lacked standing, see O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95, 94 S.Ct. at 675-76, and the district court lacked the power to enter the injunction.
Even if a named inmate had been identified HIV-positive as early as the pleading stage, the inmates still failed to demonstrate an actual injury. The inmates rely on a footnote in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124 n. 7, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977), to argue that even though no named seropositive plaintiff ever applied for or otherwise expressed an interest in a food-service job, they nonetheless have standing to challenge the validity of the

ADOC policy. Nyquist does not control. The plaintiff in Nyquist submitted an unrebutted affidavit showing that he might need the benefits denied him under the defendant's policy, and the Nyquist defendants conceded that any application by the plaintiff for those benefits would be denied summarily. Id. Moreover, the plaintiff had already applied for and been denied similar benefits by the defendants under the same policy. Id.
No named plaintiff has ever stated that he or she is interested in a food-service job. None applied for one. There is reason to believe that an HIV-positive inmate would never seek such a position. The unrebutted affidavit of Frank Terry, Chief of Security at the Central Unit in the Florence facility, indicates that whenever inmates discover another inmate is HIVpositive, which according to Terry occurs despite stringent confidentiality efforts by ADOC staff members, threats are made against that inmate's life. According to Terry, an HIVpositive inmate whose seropositive status is discovered by the general inmate population would be in a life threatening situation.
No named plaintiff has been subject personally to the alleged unlawful policy. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction prohibiting the application of the policy.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in entering partial summary judgment for the prisoners and in enjoining the Arizona Department of Corrections from enforcing its non-contact visitation policy and its food-service policy. We VA- 1525*1525 CATE the injunction. With respect to the visitation policy, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment for the inmate class and ORDER summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellants. With respect to the foodservice policy, we REMAND to the district court with instructions to DISMISS for lack of standing. Each side is to bear its own costs.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority's disposition of the Rehabilitation Act claim because the class representatives have not demonstrated that any class member has standing to challenge the food service policy. See Lynch v. Dawson, 820 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1987). However, I dissent from the majority's opinion with respect to the "access to the courts" claim because the majority has, in effect, abandoned the Turner "reasonableness" standard of review in favor of the "toothless" rational basis standard of review. In reversing summary judgment for prisoners on this claim, the majority (1) departs from the well-settled principle that the state bears the burden of justifying a regulation that injures a constitutionally protected interest; (2) disregards our circuit's interpretation of Turner, which requires prison officials to prove that their asserted justification is the "actual basis" for a challenged regulation; (3) violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 by crediting unsupported allegations; and (4) sharply narrows the due process right of access to the courts, as that right has been defined through fifty years of Supreme Court decisions. The majority then compounds these errors by sua sponte entering judgment in favor of prison officials, despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and without remanding the case to permit prisoners to comply with their newly created evidentiary burden.

Because the majority has abdicated its duty to review prisoners' constitutional claims under Turner's reasonableness standard, and in effect has drawn an "iron curtain" between prisoners and the Constitution, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), I dissent.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On January 12, 1990, twenty-two prisoners initiated this class action against Arizona state prison officials, alleging a number of constitutional and statutory claims. In one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prisoners alleged that the prison's absolute ban on contact visits between certain prisoners and their attorneys, based solely on the prisoners' assignment to a particular housing unit, violated their due process right of access to the courts.
On May 9, 1991, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and ordered prison officials to suspend application of the attorney noncontact visitation policy to Cellblock 6 prisoners. The prisoners then moved for summary adjudication of this claim.
The district court found that the prisoners had established an injury to their right of access to the courts, relying in part on Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir.1990) (denial of contact visit with attorney violates right of access to the courts). The court further found that prison officials had failed to submit any evidence to meet their burden of proving that their asserted security interest was the actual basis for the noncontact policy or that the noncontact policy was reasonably related to their asserted penological interest. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365, 1368-69 (D.Ariz.1991). The court then enjoined the Arizona Department of Corrections from prohibiting attorney contact visits in all facilities of the Arizona's state prison system, except for good cause.
B. The Challenged Policy
The challenged policy denies contact visits to all prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit, Cellblock 6, the Alhambra Reception Center, or any lockdown unit. ADOC Div. Mgmt. Proc. No. 89-21-B, § 5.1.6 (restricting all prisoners housed in 1526*1526 one of these units to noncontact visits only).[1] A "noncontact" visit is defined as a "visit between an inmate and his visitor that is conducted without any physical contact and with a physical barrier between them." Ariz.Admin.Code § R5-1-101(10).
As a result of this regulation, all prisoners housed in one of the affected units are permanently barred from meeting with their attorneys except under "noncontact" conditions. This prohibition applies without regard to whether any individual prisoner, or his attorney, poses a security risk. The noncontact visit policy also applies to all prisoners assigned to these units, irrespective of the reason any individual prisoner is assigned to one of the affected units. And although prison officials imply that these units are filled only with the

prison's most violent and uncontrollable prisoners, these four units also house the prison's lowest security risk prisoners, including those segregated for their own protection, and firsttime, non-violent offenders awaiting transfer to a "shock incarceration" program. See ADOC Internal Management Policy 302.11 § 5.4 (an inmate confined to a cell for purposes of protective segregation is in "lockdown status"); Lewis Depo. (2/28/91) at 65:8-10 (some of the prisoners assigned to the Special Management Unit are assigned to the shock incarceration program and are awaiting the formation of a new platoon); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 411604.08(A)(2) (1992) (only prisoners serving first term of incarceration and not determined to be dangerous and repetitive offenders are eligible for shock incarceration program).
In contrast with this policy of automatic and permanent denial of attorney contact visits for prisoners assigned to one of the four affected units, prisoners housed in all other units are permitted contact visits with their attorneys, as well as with social visitors. A prisoner housed in any other unit except those listed in the noncontact regulation will be denied contact visits with his attorney only if the particular prisoner has violated a prison rule regarding visitation, i.e., possession of contraband or illegal drug use. A prisoner who violates visitation rules or is found with contraband may be barred from contact visits, at the discretion of prison officials. ADOC Division Management Procedure 89-21-B §§ 5.1.1, 5.1.5. Prisoners who test positive for illegal drug use are automatically denied noncontact visits, but only for 30 days. Id. § 5.1.4.
C. Conditions of Noncontact Visits with Attorneys
The noncontact conditions imposed on attorney-prisoner visits create substantial obstacles for effective attorney-client communication. Most "noncontact" visits take place in rooms divided by a cinderblock and glass partition. The prisoner and his attorney are seated on opposite sides of the partition. The prisoner can communicate verbally with his attorney only through a telephone attached to the wall farthest away from the glass partition, or by shouting through the glass.
According to uncontroverted evidence in the record, the requirement that prisoners use the telephone to communicate with their attorneys makes any serious exchange a frustrating experience. First, prisoners are required to bend their torsos toward the wall away from their attorneys because the telephone cord is short. Sometimes static and feedback make communication by telephone difficult, and as a result, prisoners are forced to raise their voices. In addition, because prisoners must hold the telephone, it is difficult to review any documents with their attorneys.
The only way an attorney and prisoner can directly exchange documents is through a narrow, wavy slit in the wall opposite the telephone. The size of the opening prevents the exchange of more than one or two pages at a time, and documents sometimes get caught and torn in the transfer process. Although the "wavy" design of the opening is intended to prevent the exchange of contraband, 1527*1527 such design makes passing paper cumbersome and slow. Furthermore, when a prisoner transfers or receives a document from his attorney through the slit, he must leave the telephone on the opposite wall. Consequently, the prisoner and attorney can communicate during this exchange process only by shouting through the glass.

To exchange more than one or two pages at a time, an ADOC guard or other employee must transfer the legal documents under a procedure that requires that the guard be out of the view of both the prisoner and the attorney for a period of 2 to 7 minutes. At times, the process is delayed because no guard is available to effect the transfer.[2] The barrier and position of the telephone make it impossible for attorneys and their prisoner clients to simultaneously review documents.
Two attorneys and an ADOC staff member testified that, from positions outside the visitation rooms, they have overheard prisoner-attorney communications taking place inside the noncontact visitation rooms. Some of the conversations were overheard despite the fact that the prisoners and attorneys were using moderate voice tones.
Attorney visits with prisoners housed at Cellblock 6 also may take place with the prisoner locked into a caged area and the attorney seated outside the cage. The cage is constructed of "perforated steel or screen mesh," R.T. 3/22/91 at 56, and measures approximately 34" deep by 46" wide by 81" tall. Def.Resp. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj., Ex. B (schematic of cage).
The only light in the room is on the attorney's side of the cage. The attorney and prisoner can see each others' facial expressions only by looking simultaneously though an open "food trap" located approximately 40" from the floor. The food trap also permits an exchange of documents, but the steel mesh prevents attorneys and prisoners from simultaneously reviewing the same documents.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Jones v. Union Pacific R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1987). Our inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there remain genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992).
To defeat the prisoners' motion for summary judgment, prison officials must establish that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to any element for which they bear the burden of proof at trial. See British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Industries Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1989). Prison officials may not rely on the assertions and allegations of the pleadings; they must set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Conclusory affidavits that do not affirmatively show personal knowledge of specific facts are insufficient. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Conner v. Sakai, 994 F.2d 1408, 1412 (9th Cir.1993); Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1321 (9th Cir.1981).

III
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Under the Due Process Clause, "[r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation 1528*1528 or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), (citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941)). Accord Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (due process guarantees prisoners access to the courts that is "adequate, effective, and meaningful"). The majority recognizes that the prisoners have established that the noncontact visitation policy injures their right of access to the courts. Of course, this conclusion is required by our decision in Ching, 895 F.2d at 610 (Arizona Department of Corrections policy that arbitrarily denied prisoner contact visits with his attorney violated right of access to the courts).
The majority also recognizes that the district court used the appropriate test for reviewing the noncontact policy. Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), this court must refuse to uphold the noncontact regulations as applied to attorney visits unless prison officials demonstrate that they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
However, the majority erroneously allocates to the prisoners the burden of disproving the prison officials' asserted justifications for the policy. Furthermore, in its rush to defer to prison officials, the majority credits bare allegations as well as evidence that is clearly insufficient to raise a triable issue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Finally, in disregard of fifty years of Supreme Court decisions, the majority holds that prison officials may deny a prisoner access to his own attorney as long as the prison maintains a well-stocked library. I address each of these problems in turn, below.
IV
BURDEN OF PROOF
As an initial matter, the majority errs in allocating to prisoners the burden of disproving prison officials' asserted justification for the blanket ban on noncontact visits. Relying solely on out-of-circuit authority, the majority declares that "[t]he burden is on the inmates to show that the challenged regulation is unreasonable under Turner." Opinion at 1520. As I explain below, allocation of this burden to prisoners violates our court's express holdings to the contrary, as well as the well-established practice of the Supreme Court.
A
We have repeatedly held that we will not uphold a prison regulation that injures a prisoner's constitutional right unless prison officials can demonstrate an adequate justification for the

offending regulation. See, e.g., Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir.1990); Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1990). In Walker, for example, we explained that:
Prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify the specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that those specific interests are the actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the furtherance of the identified interests. An evidentiary showing is required as to each point.
Id. at 386 (emphasis added). See also Swift, 901 F.2d at 731-32 (reversing summary judgment where prison officials "failed to provide any evidence that the interests they have asserted are the actual bases for their grooming policy" or "evidence that any of these interests justifies" the challenged policy); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 325 n. 6 (9th Cir.1988) ("when a prison regulation burdens fundamental rights, the government must show that the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological goal") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2087, 104 L.Ed.2d 650 (1989).
B
The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the issue of whether prison officials bear the burden of justifying a challenged regulation. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1882 n. 12, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (reserving comment on that issue). However, the Court's practice 1529*1529 has been to follow the traditional rule that the government must justify a regulation shown to injure a plaintiff's constitutional interest.[3]
For example, in Turner, the Court invalidated a challenged regulation precisely because officials failed to meet their evidentiary burden — even under Turner's relatively deferential standard. 482 U.S. at 98, 107 S.Ct. at 2266. The Court refused to sustain the regulation because officials "pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that the marriage regulation was viewed as preventing" prison security problems, and because there was "no place in the record where prison officials testified that ... alternatives would not fully satisfy their security concerns." Id.
The Court, in Abbott, also approached the issues raised as if prison officials bear the burden of justifying regulations that injure fundamental constitutional interests. In that case the Court held that:
when prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not an "exaggerated response" under Turner.
490 U.S. at 419, 109 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added). See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405-06, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citing to testimony by prison officials to support findings on each of the Turner factors).

Thus, although there is no Supreme Court case directly on point, decisions of the Supreme Court reflect the Court's practice of requiring prison officials to justify regulations shown to violate prisoners' constitutional interests.
C
Completely ignoring the clear precedent of our circuit, the practice of the Supreme Court, and the traditional rules regarding analysis of constitutional claims, the majority relies on two out-of-circuit cases to justify allocating to prisoners the risk of nonpersuasion. See Opinion at 1520 (citing Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1989)); and Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992). A careful reading of these out-of-circuit cases, however, reveals that they rely on mischaracterizations of Supreme Court decisions and lack any independent justification for such a drastic departure from precedent.
In Covino, for example, the Second Circuit simply relies on its earlier decision in Fromer. See Covino, 967 F.2d at 79 (citing Fromer, 874 F.2d at 74). Fromer, in turn, held that "there was no burden on [prison officials] to persuade the district court that its concerns were justifiable. Rather, the burden was on the plaintiff to show that these concerns were irrational." Fromer, 874 F.2d at 74. In support of this point, Fromer cites 1530*1530 to O'Lone 482 U.S. at 350, 107 S.Ct. at 2405. The cited passage of O'Lone provides that:
We think the Court of Appeals decision in this case was wrong when it established a separate burden on prison officials to prove "that no reasonable method exists by which [prisoners'] religious rights can be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems." 782 F.2d at 420. See also id., at 419 (Prison officials should be required "to produce convincing evidence that they are unable to satisfy their institutional goals in any way that does not infringe inmates' free exercise rights"). Though the availability of accommodations is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, we have rejected the notion that "prison officials ... have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." Turner, [482 U.S.] at 9091 [107 S.Ct. at 2262]. By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators.
O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350, 107 S.Ct. at 2405 (emphasis added). In Fromer, the Second Circuit read this language to absolve the state of any burden of proof. However, a close reading demonstrates that O'Lone merely reiterated Turner's holding that prison officials are not required to pass the separate "least restrictive means" test to justify a regulation. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. And, as noted above, the Court in O'Lone went on to review the evidence submitted by prison officials in light of the factors enunciated in Turner. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 351-53, 107 S.Ct. at 2405-07.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Abdullah, 949 F.2d 1032, rests on even weaker ground. There, the court stated that "[p]laintiff had the burden of proving at trial that the [prison] policy prohibiting inmates from making religious donations was not reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests." Abdullah, 949 F.2d at 1035. Abdullah's only support for this proposition is a citation to Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. However, nothing at that page can be construed as support for allocating to prisoners the burden of disproving the state's justification for a challenged regulation.[4]
Thus, the cases relied on by the majority are themselves without support, and offer no independent justification for diverging from the traditional rule that, in the face of a constitutional challenge, the burden is on the state to justify its regulations.
V
THE TURNER ANALYSIS
As did the district court, the majority properly considers the four factors relevant to determine whether a challenged prison policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact that accommodation of the constitutional right will have on guards, other prisoners, or the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the regulation or policy is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.
However, in considering these factors, the majority defers to prison officials' bare allegations that the blanket noncontact policy was implemented to address the prison's security needs, and is logically related to those security needs. Such an approach to the review of an order granting summary judgment violates both case law concerning prisoner suits and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In addition, the majority badly mischaracterizes the nature of the right of access to the courts, holding essentially that the prison may prevent any attorneyclient communication as long as the prison provides prisoners with access to a well-stocked law library. Finally, the majority erroneously finds in favor of 1531*1531 prison officials on the final two factors, despite defendants' complete failure to adduce any evidence to support those findings.
A. Rational Connection to an Actual Penological Interest
The first of the Turner factors, whether there is a rational connection between the regulation and the actual underlying penological interest, is an indispensable requisite for the defense of the regulation. Walker, 917 F.2d at 385. To satisfy their summary judgment burden, prison officials "must provide evidence that the interest proffered is the reason why the regulation was adopted or enforced." Walker, 917 F.2d at 385. Accord Swift, 901 F.2d at 732. Prison officials must then demonstrate that "the logical connection between the noncontact policy and the asserted goal is [not] so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. An evidentiary showing is required as to each point. Walker, 917 F.2d at 386.

1. The Actual Basis for the Blanket Noncontact Policy
In opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, prison officials asserted that "[t]he main justification for a security procedure limiting contact visitation is to prevent inmates from being in a position where they can assault an attorney, staff member, other inmates or prevent them from escaping or attempting to escape or take hostages." Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 10. However, defendants' record citation in support of this assertion does not exist. See id. (citing Defs.' Statement of Facts, at 1-6, ¶ 23).[5] This is precisely the type of bare allegation in a pleading that this court has repeatedly rejected as insufficient to support a factual finding in favor of prison officials. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 387; Swift, 901 F.2d at 731-32.
Rather than affirm the district court, which properly rejected the bare allegation, the majority scours the record in an effort to salvage the prison officials' case. The majority cites to three documents that it considers to be "sufficient evidence ... that the [noncontact] policy was implemented as a prophylactic security measure": (1) the affidavit of James McFadden; (2) the transcript of Warden Roger Crist's deposition; and (3) the affidavit of J.C. Keeney.[6] Opinion at 1521. In my view, these documents are insufficient because (1) only one of them addressed the question at issue, and only with respect to the Special Management Unit, and (2) none of the documents indicate that the witnesses are testifying from personal knowledge.
First, only the McFadden affidavit addresses the question at issue, i.e., "the reason why the regulation was adopted or enforced." Walker, 917 F.2d at 385 (9th Cir.1990). See McFadden Aff. ¶ 8 ("Controlling the introduction of contraband is a crucial element in the maintenance of a secure and orderly operation within SMU.... In order to prevent the introduction of contraband, all visitation 1532*1532 at SMU is noncontact.") (emphasis added). However, it is critical to recognize that this testimony is expressly limited to the application of the policy at Special Management Unit and asserts only an interest in preventing the "introduction of contraband." This affidavit does not address the reason why the noncontact policy was adopted at the other three housing units, and it does not raise prevention of assaults, escapes, or hostage-taking as a basis for the policy.
Furthermore, nothing in the affidavit itself indicates that McFadden is testifying from personal knowledge. See McFadden Aff. That an affidavit opposing summary judgment be made from personal knowledge is an express requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and that fact must be evident from the affidavit itself. See Conner v. Sakai, 994 F.2d at 1412 (conclusory affidavits that do not affirmatively show personal knowledge of specific facts are insufficient); Long, 646 F.2d at 1321 (same).
In contrast with McFadden's affidavit, the two other documents cited by the majority contain nothing more than general statements related to security. For example, the cited passage of Warden Crist's deposition simply says that holding Cellblock 6 prisoners in a steel cage prevents them from assaulting anyone, attempting to escape, or taking a hostage. Crist Depo. at 19:12-18. Crist does not state that the noncontact policy "was adopted or enforced" for the purpose of preventing assaults, escapes, or hostage-taking. Crist's simple statement that the "caged" attorney visit serves to prevent security problems, does not satisfy defendant's burden of demonstrating the "actual basis" of the regulation. Cf. Tribble,

860 F.2d at 325-27 (although digital rectal search may be justified by security concerns, defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was properly denied where evidence demonstrated that such searches may have been conducted for punitive purposes); Turner, 482 U.S. at 98, 107 S.Ct. at 2266 (noting that the record contained no evidence to suggest that a challenged marriage regulation "was viewed [by prison officials] as preventing" the security concern asserted in their brief).
And like the McFadden affidavit, Warden Crist's affidavit does not indicate that he has personal knowledge of the actual basis for the blanket noncontact policy. In fact, the record affirmatively indicates that Crist could not have had first-hand knowledge of the actual basis for the policy because the policy was in effect before he became warden. R.T. 3/22/91 at 113:7-11. Compare Lewis Dep. at 61:2-8 (Lewis participated in the approval process for the noncontact policy).
Finally, the Keeney affidavit regarding the Alhambra Reception Center contains nothing more than a vague statement to the effect that "[t]o allow an unclassified inmate a contact visit with an attorney or family member would be an unwarranted security risk and not sound correctional practice." Keeney Aff. ¶ 5. This says nothing about the "actual reason" the noncontact policy is applied to Alhambra, but rather expresses the opinion that it would be "sound" to apply the noncontact policy to Alhambra. And it does not explain why the blanket noncontact policy applies to Reception Center inmates who in fact have been classified, but are being held in the Reception Center for medical or space-related reasons.
Thus, the evidence independently unearthed by the majority fails to satisfy defendants' burden of proving that their asserted rationale for the blanket ban on contact visits is the actual reason for imposing the ban on the four affected housing units.
2. Logical Connection to the Asserted Penological Interest
Moreover, as the district court correctly observed, prison officials submitted no evidence from which the district court could conclude that the blanket ban was logically related to the asserted interest. See Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1368-69. In their brief filed in opposition to prisoners' summary judgment motion, prison officials only assert that "[t]he current attorneyclient visitation policy serves an important interest in protecting inmates, prison staff and the general public from the possibility of assault, hostage taking and escape." Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 10:5-8. However, defendants 1533*1533 cite no evidence to support this bare allegation.[7]
Again, this is precisely the situation we faced in both Walker and Swift.[8] Our refusal to sustain summary judgments for prison officials in those cases because officials relied solely on general, conclusory, and unsupported assertions, requires us to affirm the district court's order of summary judgment for prisoners in this case.
Apart from defendants' failure to produce any substantial evidence to support their position, the record contains ample evidence that establishes the arbitrary nature of the challenged policy. First, the challenged regulation, in effect, denies contact visits to the prison's lowest

security risk prisoners, as well as the prison's highest security risk prisoners, because both groups are represented in the affected housing units. In contrast, this policy does not deny contact visits to medium security prisoners housed in any of the prison's other units. Moreover, prison regulations permit some prisoners in the affected units to have contact visits with family members and inmate legal workers at the same time they are denied contact visits with their lawyers. These facts demonstrate that "the logical connection between the [noncontact visit policy] and the asserted [security] goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary [and] irrational." See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.
First, as the evidentiary materials and prison regulations demonstrate, the affected housing units house both "difficult" prisoners (those found to have violated disciplinary rules) as well as the least threatening prisoners in the entire prison system. The lockdown units, for example, house prisoners so vulnerable to the general prison population that they are placed in lockdown for their own protection. See ADOC Internal Management Policy 302.11 § 5.4. Similarly, some prisoners are assigned to Cellblock 6 simply to await transfer to another unit. Pisano Aff. ¶ 4.
Even the Special Management Unit, which houses the "most ... dangerous prisoners in the Arizona system," McFadden Affidavit ¶ 5, also houses the lowest security risk prisoners in the Arizona system: those awaiting an opening in the shock incarceration program. Lewis Dep. 65:8-10. These prisoners are among the least likely to cause any of the concerns cited by prison officials because after a four-month "boot camp" program, they will be returned to the community. Ariz. Rev.Stats. § 41-1604.08(C), (E). To qualify for this program, the prisoner must be in his first term of incarceration and cannot have been determined to be a dangerous and repetitive offender. Ariz.Rev.Stats. § 41-1604.08(A)(2).
The Special Management Unit also houses prisoners who are classified as medium security prisoners ("level 3"). Lewis Dep. at 64:17-24. These prisoners are assigned to the Special Management Unit as residential workers. Id. at 65:2-4. Because these prisoners are permitted to carry out employment duties in that unit, it follows that prison officials do not consider them to pose a significant security risk.
Finally, the Alhambra Reception Center houses all incoming prisoners, ADOC Director's Management Order 90-14, including short-timers convicted of non-violent crimes, as well as more "dangerous" prisoners. Although prison officials assert that no prisoner may be held in the Reception Center beyond ten days, the regulations actually authorize retention of certain prisoners in the Reception Center indefinitely. ADOC Director's Management Order 90-14 § 4.5 (listing reasons that inmates may be held at the Reception 1534*1534 Center beyond ten days). Among those who can be held beyond ten days after their arrival are prisoners who suffer from serious medical conditions, those awaiting transfer to another facility, and those whom criminal justice agencies seek to interview. Id. Nevertheless, simply by virtue of their assignment to the Reception Center, these prisoners are deprived of contact visits with their attorneys.
Throughout this action, prison officials have implied that the blanket noncontact ban is logically related to prison security concerns because the affected units house violent and disruptive prisoners. However, as discussed above, the evidence indicates that housing assignment is a poor surrogate for a determination that a particular prisoner poses a

security risk. Prison officials have not explained, much less demonstrated, the logic of the blanket ban, given the arbitrariness of the classifications of the prisoners housed in the affected units.
A second set of facts drawn from the record also demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the blanket ban. Although prison officials imply that prisoners housed in the affected units pose a security risk if permitted contact visits with their attorneys, some of these same prisoners are permitted to have contact visits with both their families and prisoner legal assistants. R.T. 3/22/91 at 107:24-108:6 (some death-sentenced prisoners housed at Cellblock 6 are permitted to have contact visits with their families); ADOC Internal Management Policy 302.11 § 6.1.10 (prisoners on lockdown status are permitted "personal interviews ... with an approved inmate legal assistant" unless prisoner's "behavior is so bizarre or the inmate's hostility is so extreme that personal contact would pose a threat to the safety of officers or inmates involved").
A policy that permits contact visits with family members and other inmates, but prohibits contact visits with attorneys, is clearly an arbitrary policy with respect to any security interests. Common sense tells us that family members are more likely to pass contraband to a prisoner or aid in a prison escape than are officers of the court. In addition, it is difficult to understand why a prisoner would be any less likely to assault or take hostage a prisoner paralegal, than a court-appointed or privately-retained attorney. These inconsistencies further reflect the arbitrary nature of the challenged policy.
The Supreme Court in Turner invalidated a restriction on prisoner marriages based on similar reasoning. In that case, prison officials asserted that prisoner marriages create "`love triangles' [that] might lead to violent confrontations between inmates." Turner, 482 U.S. at 97, 107 S.Ct. at 2266. The Court refused to uphold the restriction, in part because "[c]ommon sense ... suggests that there is no logical connection between the marriage restriction and the formation of love triangles: surely in prisons housing both male and female prisoners, inmate rivalries are as likely to develop without a formal marriage ceremony as with one." Id. at 98, 107 S.Ct. at 2266.
Likewise in this case, common sense suggests that prisoners assigned to one of the "noncontact" housing units for reasons unrelated to their conduct are no more likely to attempt escape, take a hostage, or receive contraband than similarly situated prisoners housed in other units. Common sense also suggests that prisoners are more likely to be aided in an escape by family or another inmate, than by an attorney; that family members are more likely to pass contraband to prisoners than are attorneys; and that prisoners are more likely to assault or take hostage another inmate than their own attorneys. Because the fit between this blanket ban and asserted (but unproven) security interests is so tenuous, and because prison officials have submitted no evidence to explain the policy's obvious inconsistencies and arbitrary results, I would find that the policy lacks a logical connection to the asserted justification for the ban. The majority's conclusion to the contrary is not supported by the record or by logic.[9]
1535*1535 3. The Role of "Deference" in Constitutional Challenges to Prison Regulations

Despite the arbitrary relationship between the blanket ban and the asserted security interest, and despite the complete lack of evidence that the asserted security interest is in fact the actual basis of the blanket ban, the majority resolves this first factor from Turner in favor of prison officials. The majority justifies ignoring the clear evidentiary requirements of Swift and Walker by creating a new rule. According to the majority, federal courts are required to defer to a prison official's belief that a particular situation creates a security risk, if that belief is not unreasonable. See Opinion at 1521 (concluding that Warden Crist's testimony demonstrates his "not unreasonable" belief that "contact visits between inmates and their attorneys create an intolerable risk of a security breach").
In support of this unduly deferential approach to prisoners' constitutional claims, the majority relies on cases that caution courts to defer to the expertise of prison officials on issues related to prison security. However, in each of the cases cited by the majority, prison officials produced significant, detailed, and competent evidence to support their asserted security interests. And nothing in these cases authorizes us to defer to an officials' conclusory expression of security concerns — especially where the record does not support such an expression.
The cases cited by the majority are not to the contrary. In each of those cases, prison officials produced competent evidence in the form of specific facts, that logically demonstrated the connection between the challenged policy and the prison officials' interest. See, e.g., Abbott, 490 U.S. at 419, 109 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (remanding to the district court a First Amendment challenge to a prison regulation, with instructions to determine whether the warden's rejection of each of the 46 publications introduced at trial was constitutionally permissible); Friedman v. State of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir.1990) (affirming verdict for defendants after a bench trial, where prison officials testified in detail as to the actual basis of the challenged regulation and explained in detail how the regulation served the prison's security interests); Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 729-30 (9th Cir.1989) (summary judgment granted in favor of prison officials only after officials supplemented the record with detailed affidavits from a psychiatrist and a prison superintendent). This court has already resolved the tension between the requirement that prison officials prove their asserted justifications, and the deference due to prison officials' expertise on the subject of prison security. As we explained this resolution in Walker,
deference does not mean abdication. Prison officials must "put forward" a legitimate governmental interest to justify their regulation, and must provide evidence that the interest proffered is the reason why the regulation was adopted or enforced. The Constitution requires that "considerations advanced to support a restrictive policy be directly implicated by the protected activity, and sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful constitutional review." It is only after prison officials have put forth such evidence that courts defer to the officials' judgment.
Walker, 917 F.2d at 385-86 (citations omitted). See also Turner, 482 U.S. at 98, 107 S.Ct. at 2266 (refusing to defer to security concern expressed by prison officials regarding a marriage restriction where the asserted interest was not supported by the record); cf. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 207, 106 S.Ct. 496, 504, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (routine and automatic arguments to the effect that "every step taken to protect constitutional 1536*1536 rights of prisoners will lead to a breakdown in institutional

discipline and security" are inadequate to support restrictive prison regulations or policies).[10]
In this case, defendants have failed to point to any evidence that could establish that their asserted security concerns are the actual basis for the blanket ban. They have also failed to demonstrate that the blanket ban, in the context of other prison practices, is logically related to their asserted interest in security. The evidence independently identified by the majority, a collection of stray, security-related comments, does not satisfy this burden either. Therefore, the district court properly found that defendants had failed to meet their burden in opposing summary judgment.
Demonstrating the logical connection between this challenged regulation and the actual purpose of the regulation is a sine qua non of the prison's defense. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 385. Because defendants failed to sustain their burden as to this factor, the majority should have affirmed the district court without discussing any of the additional Turner factors. See id. However, even if defendants had established a "valid, rational connection" to a legitimate penological interest, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment because defendants fail to adduce any competent evidence on any of the remaining factors.
B. Alternative Means for Prisoners' Access to the Courts
The second factor to consider to determine whether the relationship between a prison regulation and its underlying interest is "reasonable," is whether prisoners have an alternative means of achieving that right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, officials asserted that
Contact visitation is not necessary for inmates to exercise their right to counsel. Other means exist by which their right may be exercised. The alternative means for inmates to exercise their right to communicate with counsel include the mail, non-contact visitation and non-monitored telephone calls.
Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 11:1-6.
The district court rejected this argument. Judge Muecke found that attorneys need contact visits to assess their clients' demeanor and credibility, and to establish a rapport with their clients. I agree. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369. See also Ching, 895 F.2d at 609 (rejecting the Arizona Department of Corrections' contention that noncontact visits, and mail and telephone communication satisfied prisoner's right of access to the courts).
In addition to the district court's findings, and this court's rejection in Ching of precisely this contention, 895 F.2d at 609, the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that noncontact conditions impose a substantial barrier to effective attorney-client communication. For example, as one attorney explained in an affidavit, the steel mesh barrier between the attorney and her client prevents much of the subtle but important nonverbal or confidential interactions that attorneys normally rely on during depositions. The attorney is unable to see her client's expressions through the grate, and therefore does not

know whether his silences are the result of some confusion, lack of memory, or simply because he never heard her questions.
The lack of opportunity for prisoners and their attorneys to simultaneously review legal documents creates another substantial impediment to effective legal representation. Appellate review of a criminal conviction, for 1537*1537 the most part, is limited to the contents of the record created at trial and sentencing hearings. The procedures for exchanging documents, whether page by page or by the boxload with the help of a prison guard, simply is no substitute for simultaneous review of the record by an attorney and her client. An adequate opportunity for reviewing and discussing the record is especially critical in a capital case, where effective lawyering literally can make the difference between life and death.
As a result of these conditions, even the most rudimentary of communications becomes cumbersome and frustrating. Combined with time limitations imposed on attorney visits, these conditions severely abridge prisoners' access to legal representation. The record here makes clear that noncontact attorney visits, much less communication by telephone and mail, are no substitute for contact visits with attorneys.
Libraries and Prisoner Paralegals as Substitutes for Attorneys
In a startling departure from the arguments advanced by the parties, the majority declares that the prisoners here "were not denied `all means of expression' of their rights of meaningful access" because it is possible that they have access to "adequate libraries or other assistance." Opinion at 1522.[11] This declaration seriously distorts the scope of prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts and is unsupported by the record.
First, the majority asserts that prisoners' right of meaningful access to the courts is "satisfied if prisoners are provided with `adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.'" Opinion at 1522 (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498.) Bounds, however, addresses only prisons' affirmative duties under the Due Process Clause to provide some form of legal assistance to incarcerated persons. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 ("We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.") (emphasis added).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, decisions concerning the right of access to the courts only required prison officials to refrain from unjustifiably impeding prisoner access to the courts. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-580, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986-87 (1974) (prison may not prohibit inmates from helping each other to prepare civil rights complaints, where state fails to provide counsel); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417-23, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814-15, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (prison may not bar law students and paraprofessionals employed by lawyers from visiting prisoner clients); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) (prison officials may not prohibit inmates from helping each other prepare habeas petitions, where state fails to provide

counsel); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 641-42, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941) (state may not prevent prisoner from filing habeas petition with the court). After reviewing these cases, the Bounds court expressly stated that the newly announced affirmative duty was an "additional measure[] to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present their own cases." 430 U.S. at 823-24, 97 S.Ct. at 1496. Thus, Bounds did not supplant the historical duty of prison officials to refrain from interfering with prisoners' access to the courts, but rather imposed the additional affirmative duty cited by the majority to provide legal assistance in one form or another.
The majority's opinion ignores the historical parameters of the right of access to the 1538*1538 courts and instead concludes that, under Bounds, a prison may deny a prisoner access to privately-retained, federally-appointed, or state-appointed counsel as long as the prison maintains a well-stocked library. Such a proposition is clearly foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224. In Martinez,
[t]he court invalidated a California regulation barring law students and paraprofessionals employed by lawyers representing prisoners from seeing inmate clients. We did so even though California has prison law libraries and permits inmate legal assistance. Even more significantly, the prisoners in question were actually represented by lawyers. Thus, despite the challenged regulation, the inmates were receiving more legal assistance than prisoners aided only by writ writers. Nevertheless, we found that the regulation "impermissibly burdened the right of access."
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. at 1496 n. 11 (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 421, 94 S.Ct. at 1815 (emphasis added; citations omitted)).
The majority's characterization of the right of access would have far-reaching ramifications that were not briefed in this appeal, and were not expressly considered by the majority. For example, indigent persons convicted of crimes are entitled to appointed counsel on direct appeal under the Sixth Amendment. However, under the majority's interpretation of Bounds, prison officials could completely deny communication between a prisoner and his Sixth Amendment counsel as long as the prison makes law books or prisoner paralegals available to the prisoner. Furthermore, the majority's interpretation of the right of access would permit prison officials to over-ride the determination of the state and federal legislatures and courts that certain prisoners are entitled to the assistance of counsel in their habeas petitioner proceedings. And of course, the majority's declaration would permit prison officials to prohibit prisoner contact even with privately-retained counsel, so long as the prison provided one of the alternatives required in Bounds.
Almost as disturbing as the majority's constriction of prisoners' rights of access to the courts, is the fact that the majority's factual conclusion in this case is unsupported by any evidentiary material in the record. That is, even if the majority's characterization of the right of access were accurate, the record before us contains no evidence to support a finding that the ADOC's current library or inmate legal assistant program is sufficient to meet its affirmative obligation to provide prisoners with assistance.

Consequently, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that prisoners have alternative means of gaining the "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495.
C. Impact That Accommodation of the Right Will Have on Guards, Other Prisoners, or Allocation of Prison Resources
The third Turner factor is "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Prison officials presented the district court with argument and evidence relevant to this factor only with respect to the Special Management Unit. See Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 11:13-25. Thus, prison officials implicitly concede that permitting prisoners in the remaining affected units to have contact visits with their attorneys would have no impact on staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources.
With respect to the Special Management Unit, defendants' bottom line is that full contact attorney-client visitation will require additional staffing and some modification of the prison's physical plant. Their entire argument on this issue is presented in one paragraph:
The physical plant at SMU is not designed to accommodate contact visitation. The attorney side of the visitation room, which was suggested by the Plaintiffs as a viable area for a contact visit, is in a nonsecure area. To allow the high risk inmates at SMU into this nonsecure area would greatly increase the possibility of 1539*1539 violence, escapes and/or hostage situations. Additionally, the staffing that would be required in order to conduct such contact visitation is not available at SMU. (DSOF, p. 4, ¶ 9-10). Therefore, to implement contact visitation at SMU would result in an increased burden on prison resources.
Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 11:13-25 (emphasis added).
Defendants' citations to the record correspond to affidavits that essentially repeat the general assertions contained in defendants' opposition. As the district court noted, such conclusory evidence does not enable the court to determine whether the impact on prison resources would be significant. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369. As the district court wisely concluded, courts should be "unwilling to abridge an inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts" unless prison officials can demonstrate that contact visits would have a significant impact on prison resources. Id. (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, 97 S.Ct. at 1496) ("the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial").
The majority comes to a contrary conclusion, primarily because it erroneously allocates to prisoners the burden of disproving the government's justifications:
The district court found that contact visits would not significantly affect other inmates, the prison staff, or prison resources. In doing so, the court resolved a disputed issue of fact with regard to the impact of accommodation at SMU. Even worse, the court ruled in favor of the

inmates though they produced no evidence concerning the impact of accommodation on the other areas affected by the policy.
Opinion at 1522 (emphasis added).
The allocation of burden of proof clearly controls the outcome of this factor. Because prison officials bear the burden of proving that the blanket ban is justified, and because they have failed to adduce any evidence to satisfy that burden with respect to this factor, the district court properly concluded that this factor should be weighed in favor of prisoners.[12]
D. Alternative Means of Achieving the Underlying Goals
The fourth and final factor we must consider is whether there are alternatives to the noncontact policy that fully accommodate the prisoners' rights at de minimis cost to the prison's asserted security interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262-63. If so, this may be considered as evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but rather represents an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. Id. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.
In their motion for summary judgment, prisoners asserted that the prisons' current security measures are ready alternatives to the noncontact policy. Prisoners point to evidence that (1) officials search the attorney, the prisoner, and the visitation room prior to all visits (including the noncontact visits), and search the prisoner after each visit, as well; (2) prisoners are escorted to and from the visitation rooms with their hands chained to their waists; and (3) officials can observe the contact visits.
In response, prison officials offer nothing to establish that these measures would not fully accommodate their interests. Their response to the summary judgment motion on this issue comprises two sentences, devoid of any citation to evidence or any reference to the alternatives suggested by prisoners:
The reasonable restrictions on attorney-client visitation at the Alhambra reception 1540*1540 center, SMU, CB-6 and the lockdown units are not an exaggerated response due to the class of inmate housed in these facilities. The restrictions are necessary to prevent future problems which could arise if contact visitation was allowed.
Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 12:1-7. This bare assertion is clearly insufficient to satisfy defendants' burden of demonstrating that the blanket ban on contact visits for prisoners housed in certain units is not an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 419, 109 S.Ct. at 1885 ("when prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not an `exaggerated response' under Turner").
In addition to these measures, the prison's remaining regulations governing noncontact visitation would fully serve their interests in prison security. For example, prison officials can suspend contact visitation for any prisoner who violates a visitation rule, is found with

contraband, or tests positive for drug use. ADOC DMP 89-21-B §§ 5.1.1, 5.1.4, 5.1.5. In addition, prison officials could suspend contact visits with attorneys under the same conditions their regulations now suspend contact visits with prisoner paralegals: where the prisoner's "behavior is so bizarre or the inmate's hostility is so extreme that personal contact would pose a threat to the safety of officers or inmates involved." ADOC Internal Management Policy, 302.11 § 6.1.10 (1992). These individualized policies are sufficient to address the security concerns of the prison, and are consistent with the standards set by the American Correctional Association. See American Correctional Association, supra, § C2-4206, at 156.
The majority, speculating in favor of prison officials, holds that "[w]hile [plaintiffs'] proposal may suffice to stem the flow of contraband, it fails adequately to address the potential problems of hostage-taking and injury to staff and visiting attorneys." Opinion at 1523. However nothing in the record supports this conclusion, and prison officials, with presumed expertise in prison administration, have not even asserted this point.
Clearly, this final factor should also have been weighed in favor of prisoners.
VI
SUA SPONTE ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PRISON OFFICIALS
After concluding that the district court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of prisoners on this claim, the majority reverses the district court and then sua sponte orders summary judgment in favor of prison officials. However, even assuming that the majority's allocation of the burden of proof to prisoners is proper, summary judgment for defendants is precluded because prisoners have raised a triable issue as to whether the asserted security interests were the actual bases for the blanket noncontact policy.
On more than one occasion, this court has refused to direct or affirm judgment in favor of officials where prisoners adduce substantial evidence that the interest asserted by prison officials to justify a challenged regulation or practice is not the actual basis for the regulation or practice. For example, in Tribble, 860 F.2d at 327, we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity where prison officials asserted "security" concerns as basis for digital rectal search, but the prisoner submitted evidence to establish the procedures were conducted for punitive purposes unrelated to security concerns. Similarly, in Walker, we reversed summary judgment where prison authorities submitted no evidence to substantiate their assertion that involuntary AIDS tests served "health and safety" interests, and the prisoner pointed to evidence that the testing program was implemented simply to train state health care workers. 917 F.2d at 387.
In their motion for summary judgment, prisoners point to two documents that create a genuine issue of material fact as to the actual basis for the noncontact policy: the deposition of Samuel Lewis, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, and a letter from Assistant Director Keeney.

1541*1541 Lewis participated at the final review level and approved the noncontact policies at Cellblock 6 and the Special Management Unit. Lewis Dep. at 61:1-8. When asked at his deposition to state his reasons for approving attorney noncontact visit policy, Lewis said:
I feel that the United States mail service, the telephone system and non-contact visits provide adequate means for communication between the attorney and his or her client, and that there is no need to have contact visits. Because no one has demonstrated to me the value or need.
When asked whether he reviewed any specific reports of problems arising from attorneyprisoner contact visits, Lewis stated that "there have been reports from time to time, verbal, of problems with attorneys coming into CB-6." Lewis Dep. at 61:20-22. He went on to say:
But I think my decision is based upon good correctional practice. There's no constitutional requirement for contact visits. And I don't, I simply don't believe that you need contact visits in order to do your business as an attorney.
Lewis Dep. at 61:25-62:4. When asked to elaborate on what specific problems he had heard about in connection with attorney-prisoner contact visits, Lewis said:
I would have to go back and refresh my memory.... But I guess I simply would repeat that I think just because attorneys or any other citizen wants to do something doesn't mean that I necessarily have to accommodate what their wants are.
Lewis Dep. at 62:5-17. Thus, Lewis is the only witness whose personal knowledge of the actual basis of the noncontact policy is established affirmatively in the record. And Lewis did not mention prevention of escapes and assaults, or contraband control, as the basis for the policy.
In addition to the Lewis deposition, plaintiffs submitted a letter written to a private attorney by J.C. Keeney, Assistant Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections. In relevant part the letter states:
Regarding your inquiry about contact versus non-contact attorney visits, I offer the following information.
A few months ago, implementation of a Death Row Classification System in CB-6 resulted in additional contact visits for qualifying Death Row inmates. Limited visitation space, anticipated increase in attorney visits, and our obligation to meet attorney visit requests were factors which predicated the decision to change the status to non-contact for all attorney visits unless extenuating circumstances dictate otherwise....
Pls.' Statement of Facts, Ex. 5 (emphasis added).
Both Lewis's deposition and Keeney's letter are direct evidence that the noncontact policy was motivated by non-penological concerns: i.e., the personal preferences of the director of corrections or space limitations. These documents, considered in conjunction with the arbitrary nature of the blanket contact visit ban based on housing assignment, would

support a finding that the actual basis for the challenged policy is simply administrative convenience. Needless to say, administrative convenience is not a "legitimate penological interest" and therefore cannot justify an injury to prisoners constitutional rights of access to the courts.
Even assuming that the majority correctly allocated the burden of disproving defendants' asserted justifications for the noncontact policy, prisoners have identified evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that can be resolved only by a finding of fact. And because the disputed issue (that the actual basis for the noncontact policy be a "legitimate penological interest") is a critical element of the majority's defense, see Walker, 917 F.2d at 385, prisoners are entitled, at the very least, to a hearing before a factfinder to determine the actual purpose of the noncontact policy.
VII
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I cannot join the majority's opinion, which in my view sets back our constitutional jurisprudence 50 years.
1542*1542 APPENDIX
AFFIDAVIT OF J.C. KEENEY
STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Maricopa
I, J.C. Keeney, do hereby testify as follows:
1. I am the Assistant Director of Adult Institutions for the Arizona Department of Corrections.
2. Many of the inmates at the Alhambra facility are allowed contact visits with attorneys. These include the inmates in B Ward as well as the resident inmate workers.
3. Inmates who are not allowed contact visits with attorneys at Alhambra are inmates who are being processed after arriving from the county jail.
4. The inmates who are in processing are not at Alhambra for more than ten days.
5. These inmates are not allowed contact visits because they have not yet been classified. Until they are classified all inmates are considered level 5, the highest security risk. To allow an unclassified inmate a contact visit with an attorney or family member would be an unwarranted security risk and not sound correctional practice.

6. Inmates that are in designated lockdown units at other facilities within the Department of Corrections system are also not allowed any contact visits. These inmates are placed in lockdown units for disciplinary violations or for investigative lock-up. For the most part, these inmates are in the lockdown units for a limited period of time, usually thirty days or less. All of these inmates are allowed non-contact attorney visits.
7. It is well known that one of the major causes of riots at correctional institutions in the United States is inmate dissatisfaction with food services.
FURTHER affiant sayeth not.
(/signed) ___________ J.C. Keeney
* * * * * *
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McFADDEN
STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Maricopa
I, James McFadden, do hereby testify as follows:
1. I am a Deputy Warden for the Special Management Unit at Florence (SMU).
2. As Deputy Warden, I am familiar with the attorney-client visitation policy at SMU as well as the facility's attorney-client visitation area.
3. The special management unit is designed to manage the most violent, disruptive and generally dangerous inmates within the Arizona Department of Corrections.
4. The vast majority of inmates presently housed at SMU are assigned to SMU because of their inability to function pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections.
5. These inmates are classified as I-5, are no longer controllable in the general prison population and are a clear security risk.
6. On more an one occasion, inmates at SMU have smuggled weapons into the facility in their body cavities. For example, inmates have hidden .22 caliber shells in their body cavities only to use the shells later to shoot at staff members and other inmates. Additionally, an officer was recently stabbed by an SMU inmate.
7. The operational scheme of SMU is intentionally restrictive and emphasizes security issues first and foremost, thus preventing a large portion of illicit activity which would normally occur in a more open setting.

8. Controlling the introduction of contraband is a crucial element in the maintenance of a secure and orderly operation within SMU. Contact visitation is the most prominent method used by inmates throughout the correctional systems to promote prison contraband. In order to prevent the introduction of contraband, all visitation at SMU is non-contact.
9. IN 1989, there were 165 inmate assaults on SMU staff by various methods.
10. In 1990, 5,645 disciplinary violations were issued to inmates at SMU for adverse 1543*1543 behavior. A great many of these violations related to violence or threats of violence against staff and/or inmates. The amount of violations is more than double the number of violations that occur at a medium custody unit of similar size.
11. At SMU, it would be physically impossible to have secure contact visitation due to the type of inmate that is housed at SMU, the physical facilities available for visitation and the number of staff available.
12. SMU inmates are not allowed in the attorney side of the visitation area. The attorney side of the non-contact visitation area is not a secure area. It would be against sound correctional policy to allow high custody level inmates into a non-secure area such as the attorney side of the noncontact visitation area.
13. DOC personnel cannot overhear conversations between attorney and inmate.
14. DOC personnel strictly follow policy guidelines when transferring a legal document. Documents are sealed in front of the attorney with a non-tampering protective seal. The document is then transferred to the inmate without breaking the seal.
15. To my knowledge, no one has ever complained or alleged that officers eavesdropped during an attorney non-contact visit.
FURTHER affiant sayeth not.
(/signed) ____________ James McFadden
* * * * * *
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL P. STRUCK
STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Maricopa
I, Daniel P. Struck, do hereby testify as follows:
1. That I am one of the attorneys representing the Defendants in Casey v. Lewis, No. CIV 90-54 PHX CAM.

2. I am familiar with the attorney noncontact visitation room at SMU.
3. On April 22, 1991, I went to SMU to depose inmate Jeffrey Phillips.
4. The deposition took place in the attorney non-contact visitation room at SMU. Inmate Phillips was represented by Alice Bendheim.
5. Ms. Bendheim met with inmate Phillips prior to the deposition in one of the attorney noncontact visitation rooms. During this meeting, I was standing outside of the attorney noncontact visitation room. At not time did I hear any of the conversation with [sic] took place between Ms. Bendheim and Mr. Phillips.
6. During the deposition of Mr. Phillips, all of the individuals participating in that deposition were talking in a normal conversational tone of voice.
7. During the deposition of Mr. Phillips I was able to observe inmate Phillips' demeanor, physical characteristics and credibility without any difficulty.
8. Documents could have been reviewed simultaneously by Mr. Phillips and his counsel if two copies of the document were made.
FURTHER affiant sayeth not.
(/signed) _______________ Daniel P. Struck
[1] HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) is the viral agent that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). We use the adjectives "HIV-positive" and "seropositive" interchangably to describe individuals who have been found to be infected with HIV.
[2] Kyle Baptisto and Frank Bartholic, prisoners at SMU, and Stephen James, a prisoner at CB6, alleged in the complaint inadequate access to the courts. Eight of the twenty-two named plaintiffs alleged some form of interference with their right of meaningful access. None specifically complained about the non-contact policy. Any right to contact visitation is derived, however, from the right of access to the courts. Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1990). Moreover, the record reveals that Stephen James was denied a contact visit with his attorney during the litigation of this action: his deposition was taken, over his objection, under non-contact conditions established by the Department pursuant to its policy for Cell Block 6.
[3] "Where, as here, a state penal institution is involved, `federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.'" Dreher v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir.1980) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413-14, 109 S.Ct. at 1881-82).
[1] In relevant part, ADOC DMP 89-21-B, provides that:
5.1.6 The following inmate population shall have non-contact visits:
5.1.6.1 Special Management Unit
5.1.6.2 Alhambra Reception Center
5.1.6.3 Inmates in lock down status or as designated by the Warden.

[2] When asked in deposition how long the transfer process takes, an ADOC staff member who monitors noncontact attorney visits testified that "[s]ometimes it takes a while to get an officer available because they are busy or whatever. But if I can get an officer and they follow the procedure of how to get to the room ... I would say about five minutes." Gagnon Dep. at 24:25-25:5.
[3] Generally speaking, a regulation that injures an individual's constitutional right will not be sustained unless the government demonstrates that the regulation is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. See e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 501, 509, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (equal protection); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2321-22, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (right to interstate travel); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 77, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2682, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (right to vote); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1305-06, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) (freedom of association). The Supreme Court has held, however, that courts must employ a less exacting standard when reviewing constitutional challenges to prison practices and regulations. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. In Turner, the Court held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
The Court created this less exacting standard as a means of balancing prisoners' rights under the Constitution, with the need to allow prison officials discretion to deal with the complex concerns of prison administration. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 409, 109 S.Ct. at 1879 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62). While lessening the showing officials must make to justify their regulations, the Turner court did not absolve officials from making this showing. Nothing in the language of the Turner opinion can be read to support such a proposition.
[4] The approach of our court is consistent with the approach of the Seventh Circuit. In Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986), the court reversed summary judgment for prison officials because the conclusory affidavits were "an insufficient basis for summary judgment." Id. at 598.
[5] Defendants' Statement of Facts contains no paragraph 23. Paragraph 22 of Defendants' Statement of Facts does address the reason for the noncontact policy, but the citation to the record does not support the asserted fact. Paragraph 22 of Defendants' Statement of Facts provides that:
The primary rationale for the non-contact visitation policy at lockdown unit is to prevent escapes, assaults on attorneys and staff and hostage taking. It was also based upon good correctional practice. (Exhibit 7, deposition of [ADOC Director] Samuel Lewis, p. 61, line 25 and p. 62 lines 1-3).
At the cited portion of the deposition, Lewis testifies as follows:
But I think my decision [to bar attorney contact visits] is based upon good correctional practice. There's no constitutional requirement for contact visits. And I don't, simply don't believe that you need contact visits in order to do your business as an attorney.
Exhibit 7, Lewis Depo, at 61:25-62:3. Nothing else in the excerpt of Lewis's deposition submitted to the district court supports defendants' assertion that security concerns are the "primary rationale" for the blanket ban on contact visits.
[6] In opposition to the prisoners' motion for summary judgment, prison officials submitted five affidavits and no other evidentiary materials. Only three of those affidavits are arguably relevant to the access to the courts claim: those of J.C. Keeney, Assistant Director of Adult Institutions for the Arizona Department of Corrections; James McFadden, Deputy Warden for the Special Management Unit at Florence, Arizona; and Daniel Struck, counsel for defendant prison officials. These affidavits are reproduced in their entirety as an appendix to this dissent.
[7] The only evidence cited in this portion of prison officials' opposition relates to the composition of the affected housing units. See Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 9:11-10:24.
[8] In Walker, for example, the prison's appellate brief asserted that a mandatory AIDs test
clearly has a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests. Such testing bears a logical connection to the health, safety and welfare of all of the inmates in the custody of the Nevada Department of Prisons and in [sic] the

best interests of public health generally. AIDS testing is clearly a legitimate governmental interest and a valid penological objective.
917 F.2d at 387. This court rejected that assertion as "wholly insufficient to sustain either the defendants' burden or the district court's grant of summary judgment" because the record was "devoid of any relevant evidence." Id.
[9] Despite defendants' failure to point to any relevant evidence on this issue, the majority scours the record on their behalf. The majority settles on citations to five pages in Warden Crist's testimony at an earlier hearing on prisoners' application for a temporary restraining order at Cellblock 6. The substance of this testimony is accurately summarized as follows: (1) the cages used for attorney visits at Cellblock 6 prevent assaults, escapes, and hostage-taking (R.T. 3/22/91 at 85); (2) Crist believes death-sentenced prisoners are more likely to assault others or attempt to escape because "they have very little to lose" (id. at 89); (3) prison officials may more easily resolve hostage situations where the prisoner is unarmed (id. at 95); Crist reviewed the noncontact policy with staff and believes it developed to prevent security problems (id. at 97); and the noncontact policy prevents contraband, assaults, escapes, and hostage situations (id. at 115). None of this testimony addresses any of the arbitrary aspects of the challenged policy.
[10] I would be especially reluctant to defer in this case to defendants' "expertise" because defendants' practice of prohibiting contact visits to prisoners based solely on their housing assignment violates the Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions issued by an association of corrections experts. Those Standards require that:
Written policy and procedure provide that inmate visiting facilities permit informal communication, including opportunity for physical contact. Devices that preclude physical contact are not used except in instances of substantiated security risk.
American Correctional Association, in cooperation with the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, Foundation/Core Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions § C2-4206, at 156 (April 1989) (emphasis added).
[11] In its conclusion, the majority converts this speculative musing into an unqualified assertion:
The prisoners have not been denied access to the courts as that right traditionally has been described by the Supreme Court. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Inmates are not denied assistance "in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers" as that phrase is interpreted in Bounds. See id. (holding that such assistance requires only the provision of adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from "persons trained in the law").
Opinion at 1523.
[12] In passing, the majority adopts a rule from the Fifth Circuit to the effect that we need not consider each of the four factors identified as "relevant" by the Turner court. Opinion at 1522 (citing Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.1992) ("Neither Turner nor O'Lone, however, require a court to weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors.")). However, because Turner identifies each of these factors as "relevant," it is incumbent on the court to consider each and every one of them. Of course the weight we assign to each of the factors will necessarily vary depending on the factual context of each case, and the specific showing made as to each factor.
As a result I take issue with the majority's conclusion that findings in favor of prisoners on the second and third factors would "not alter our ultimate legal conclusion," Opinion at 1522, or "would not weigh heavily in our analysis." Opinion at 1522.

 
 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
116 S.Ct. 2174 Supreme Court of the United States
Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department Of ment Of Corrections, et al., Petitioners, v. Fletcher CASEY, Jr., et al.
No. 94–1511. | Argued Nov. 29, 1995. | Decided June 24, 1996.
Inmates brought civil rights action alleging that Arizona prison officials violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Muecke, J., 834 F.Supp. 1553, found constitutional violations and granted injunctive relief. Arizona Department of Corrections appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Pregerson, Circuit Judge, 43 F.3d 1261, affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Scalia, Justice, held that: (1) inmate claiming denial of access to courts cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense; (2) finding that only two inmates, who were illiterate or non-English speakers, suffered actual injury as a result of inability to receive adequate legal assistance did not support systemwide injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in Arizona Department of Corrections’ prison law libraries and its legal assistance program; (3) so long as delays in receiving legal materials or legal assistance to lockdown prisoners, who were most dangerous and violent prisoners in Arizona prison system, were product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, delays of up to 16 days did not violate constitutional right of access to the courts, even if they resulted in actual injury; and (4) order mandating detailed, systemwide changes in Arizona Department of Corrections’ prison law libraries and legal assistance programs was improper as having been developed through a process that failed to give adequate consideration to views of state prison authorities.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas, Justice, filed a concurring opinion.
Souter, Justice, filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in which Ginsburg and Breyer, Justices, joined.
Stevens, Justice, filed a dissenting opinion.
**2176 *343 Syllabus*

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the

Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of

Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United

States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26

S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

Respondents, who are inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against petitioners, ADOC officials, alleging that petitioners were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72. The District Court found petitioners to be in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC’s prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction’s major terms.
Held: The success of respondents’ systemic challenge was dependent on their ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court’s failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury renders its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid. Pp. 2178–2186.
(a) Bounds did not create an abstract, free standing right to a law library or legal assistance; rather, the right that Bounds acknowledged was the right of access to the courts. E.g., 430 U.S., at 817, 821, 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1492–1493, 1494, 1498. Thus, to establish a Bounds violation, the “actual injury” that an inmate must demonstrate is that the alleged shortcomings in the prison library or legal assistance program have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. This requirement derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing. Although Bounds made no mention of an actual injury requirement, it can hardly be thought to have eliminated that constitutional prerequisite. Pp. 2179–2181.
(b) Statements in Bounds suggesting that prison authorities must also enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court, 430 U.S., at 825–826, and n. 14, 97 S.Ct., at 1496–1497 and n. 14, have no antecedent in this Court’s pre-Bounds cases, and are now disclaimed. Moreover, Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to file any and every type of legal claim, but requires only that they be provided with the tools to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Pp. 2181–2182.
*344 c) The District Court identified only two instances
1

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
of actual injury: It found that ADOC’s failures with respect to illiterate prisoners had resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of inmate Bartholic’s lawsuit and the inability of inmate Harris to file a legal action. P. 2182.
(d) These findings as to injury do not support the systemwide injunction ordered by the District Court. The remedy must be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established; that this is a class action changes **2177 nothing, for even named plaintiffs in a class action must show that they personally have been injured, see, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925, n. 20, 48 L.Ed.2d 450. Only one named plaintiff, Bartholic, was found to have suffered actual injury—as a result of ADOC’s failure to provide the special services he would have needed, in light of his particular disability (illiteracy), to avoid dismissal of his case. Eliminated from the proper scope of the injunction, therefore, are provisions directed at special services or facilities required by non-English speakers, by prisoners in lockdown, and by the inmate population at large. Furthermore, the inadequacy that caused actual injury to illiterate inmates Bartholic and Harris was not sufficiently widespread to justify systemwide relief. There is no finding, and no evidence discernible from the record, that in ADOC prisons other than those occupied by Bartholic and Harris illiterate inmates cannot obtain the minimal help necessary to file legal claims. Pp. 2183–2184.
(e) There are further reasons why the order here cannot stand. In concluding that ADOC’s restrictions on lockdown inmates were unjustified, the District Court failed to accord the judgment of prison authorities the substantial deference required by cases such as Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261–2262, 96 L.Ed.2d 64. The court also failed to leave with prison officials the primary responsibility for devising a remedy. Compare Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837–1838, 36 L.Ed.2d 439. The result of this improper procedure was an inordinately intrusive order. Pp. 2185–2186.
43 F.3d 1261, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which SOUTER, GINSBURG, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ, joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 2186. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 2200. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 2206.
Attorneys and Law Firms

*345 Grant Woods, Phoenix, AZ, for petitioners.
Elizabeth Alexander, Washington, DC, for respondents.
Opinion
*346 Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), we held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id., at 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1498. Petitioners, who are officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), contend that the United States District Court for the District of Arizona erred in finding them in violation of Bounds, and that the court’s remedial order exceeded lawful authority.
I
Respondents are 22 inmates of various prisons operated by ADOC. In January 1990, they filed this class action “on behalf of all adult prisoners who are or will be incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department of Corrections,” App. 22, alleging that petitioners were “depriving [respondents] of their rights of access to the courts and counsel protected by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,” id., at 34. Following a 3–month bench trial, the District Court ruled in favor of respondents, finding that “[p]risoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts that is adequate, effective and meaningful,” 834 F.Supp. 1553, 1566 (1992), citing Bounds, supra, at 822, 97 S.Ct., at 1495, and that “[ADOC’s] system fails to comply with constitutional standards,” 834 F.Supp., at 1569. The court identified a variety of shortcomings of the ADOC system, in matters ranging from the training of **2178 library staff, to the updating of legal materials, to the availability of photocopying services. In addition to these generalfindings, *347 the court found that two groups of inmates were particularly affected by the system’s inadequacies: “[l]ockdown prisoners” (inmates segregated from the general prison population for disciplinary or security reasons), who “are routinely denied physical access to the law library” and “experience severe interference with their access to the courts,” id., at 1556; and illiterate or non-English-speaking inmates, who do not receive adequate legal assistance, id., at 1558.
Having thus found liability, the court appointed a Special Master “to investigate and report about” the appropriate
2

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
relief—that is (in the court’s view), “how best to accomplish the goal of constitutionally adequate inmate access to the courts.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. Following eight months of investigation, and some degree of consultation with both parties, the Special Master lodged with the court a proposed permanent injunction, which the court proceeded to adopt, substantially unchanged. The 25–page injunctive order, see id., at 61a–85a, mandated sweeping changes designed to ensure that ADOC would “provide meaningful access to the Courts for all present and future prisoners,” id., at 61a. It specified in minute detail the times that libraries were to be kept open, the number of hours of library use to which each inmate was entitled (10 per week), the minimal educational requirements for prison librarians (a library science degree, law degree, or paralegal degree), the content of a videotaped legal-research course for inmates (to be prepared by persons appointed by the Special Master but funded by ADOC), and similar matters. Id., at 61a, 67a, 71a. The injunction addressed the court’s concern for lockdown prisoners by ordering that “ADOC prisoners in all housing areas and custody levels shall be provided regular and comparable visits to the law library,” except that such visits “may be postponed on an individual basis because of the prisoner’s documented inability to use the law library without creating *348 a threat to safety or security, or a physical condition if determined by medical personnel to prevent library use.” Id., at 61a. With respect to illiterate and non-English-speaking inmates, the injunction declared that they were entitled to “direct assistance” from lawyers, paralegals, or “a sufficient number of at least minimally trained prisoner Legal Assistants”; it enjoined ADOC that “[p]articular steps must be taken to locate and train bilingual prisoners to be Legal Assistants.” Id., at 69a–70a.
Petitioners sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which refused to grant a stay prior to argument. We then stayed the injunction pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari. 511 U.S. 1066, 114 S.Ct. 1638, 128 L.Ed.2d 360 (1994). Several months later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and, with minor exceptions not important here, the terms of the injunction. 43 F.3d 1261 (1994). We granted certiorari, 514 U.S. 1126, 115 S.Ct. 1997, 131 L.Ed.2d 999 (1995).
II
[1] Although petitioners present only one question for review, namely, whether the District Court’s order “exceeds the constitutional requirements set forth in Bounds,” Brief for Petitioners (i), they raise several distinct challenges, including renewed attacks on the

court’s findings of Bounds violations with respect to illiterate, non-English-speaking, and lockdown prisoners, and on the breadth of the injunction. But their most fundamental contention is that the District Court’s findings of injury were inadequate to justify the finding of systemwide injury and hence the granting of systemwide relief. This argument has two related components. First, petitioners claim that in order to establish a violation of Bounds, an inmate must show that the alleged inadequacies of a prison’s library facilities or legal assistance program caused him “actual injury”—that is, “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” *349 Brief for Petitioners 30.1 Second, **2179 they claim that the District Court did not find enough instances of actual injury to warrant systemwide relief. We agree that the success of respondents’ systemic challenge was dependent on their ability to show widespread actual injury, and that the court’s failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury renders its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid.

1

Respondents contend that petitioners failed properly to

present their “actual injury” argument to the Court of

Appeals. Brief for Respondents 25–26. Our review of

petitioners’ briefs before that court leads us to conclude

otherwise, and in any event, as we shall discuss, the

point relates to standing, which is jurisdictional and not

subject to waiver. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S.

737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2434–2435, 132 L.Ed.2d 635

(1995); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,

230–231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607–608, 107 L.Ed.2d 603

(1990). Justice SOUTER recognizes the jurisdictional

nature of this point, post, at 2200, which is difficult to

reconcile with his view that we should not “reach out to

address” it, post, at 2201.

A
[2] [3] The requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324–3325, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471–476, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757–761, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution. In the context
3

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
of the present case: It is for the courts to remedy past or imminent official interference with individual inmates’ presentation of claims to the courts; it is for the political branches of the State and Federal Governments to manage prisons in such fashion that official interference with the presentation of claims will not occur. *350 Of course, the two roles briefly and partially coincide when a court, in granting relief against actual harm that has been suffered, or that will imminently be suffered, by a particular individual or class of individuals, orders the alteration of an institutional organization or procedure that causes the harm. But the distinction between the two roles would be obliterated if, to invoke intervention of the courts, no actual or imminent harm were needed, but merely the status of being subject to a governmental institution that was not organized or managed properly. If—to take another example from prison life—a healthy inmate who had suffered no deprivation of needed medical treatment were able to claim violation of his constitutional right to medical care, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), simply on the ground that the prison medical facilities were inadequate, the essential distinction between judge and executive would have disappeared: it would have become the function of the courts to assure adequate medical care in prisons.
The foregoing analysis would not be pertinent here if, as respondents seem to assume, the right at issue—the right to which the actual or threatened harm must pertain—were the right to a law library or to legal assistance. But Bounds established no such right, any more than Estelle established a right to a prison hospital. The right that Bounds acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of access to the courts. E.g., Bounds, 430 U.S., at 817, 821, 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1492–1493, 1494, 1498. In the cases to which Bounds traced its roots, we had protected that right by prohibiting state prison officials from actively interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare legal documents, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484, 489–490, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748, 750–751, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), or file them, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547–549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 640–642, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941), and by requiring state courts to waive filing fees, e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 1168–1169, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959), or transcript fees, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590–591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), for indigent inmates. Bounds focused on the same entitlement of access to the courts. Although it affirmed a court **2180 order *351 requiring North Carolina to make law library facilities available to inmates, it stressed that that was merely “one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts,” and that “our decision here ... does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal.” 430 U.S., at 830, 97 S.Ct., at 1499. In other words, prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means

for ensuring “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Id., at 825, 97 S.Ct., at 1496.
[4] [5] Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, “meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone,” id., at 823, 97 S.Ct., at 1495 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.
[6] Although Bounds itself made no mention of an actual-injury requirement, it can hardly be thought to have eliminated that constitutional prerequisite. And actual injury is apparent on the face of almost all the opinions in the 35–year line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied, see *352 id., at 821–825, 97 S.Ct., at 1494–1497.2 Moreover, the assumption of an actual-injury requirement seems to us implicit in the opinion’s statement that “we encourage local experimentation” in various methods of assuring access to the courts. Id., at 832, 97 S.Ct., at 1500. One such experiment, for example, might replace libraries with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of court-provided forms such as those that contained the original complaints in two of the more significant inmate-initiated cases in recent years, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)—forms that asked the inmates to provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal analysis. We hardly think that what we meant by “experimenting” with such an alternative was simply announcing it, whereupon suit would immediately lie to declare it theoretically inadequate and bring the experiment to a close. We **2181 think we envisioned, instead, that the new *353 program would remain in place at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a nonfrivolous3 legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.4

2

Justice STEVENS suggests that Ex parte Hull, 312

4

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941), establishes that even a lost frivolous claim establishes standing to complain of a denial of access to courts, see post, at 2208. As an initial matter, that is quite impossible, since standing was neither challenged nor discussed in that case, and we have repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97, 115 S.Ct. 537, 542-543, 130 L.Ed.2d 439 (1994); United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172, 2 L.Ed. 397 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (statement at oral argument). On the merits, however, it is simply not true that the prisoner’s claim in Hull was frivolous. We rejected it because it had been procedurally defaulted by, inter alia, failure to object at trial and failure to include a transcript with the petition, 312 U.S., at 551, 61 S.Ct., at 642–643. If all procedurally defaulted claims were frivolous, Rule 11 business would be brisk indeed. Justice STEVENS’s assertion that “we held that the smuggled petition had insufficient merit even to require an answer from the State,” post, at 2208, is misleading. The attorney general of Michigan appeared in the case, and our opinion discussed the merits of the claim at some length, see 312 U.S., at 549–551, 61 S.Ct., at 641–643. The posture of the case was such, however, that we treated the claim “as a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus,” id., at 550, 61 S.Ct., at 642; after analyzing petitioner’s case, we found it “insufficient to compel an order requiring the warden to answer,” id., at 551, 61 S.Ct., at 642 (emphasis added). That is not remotely equivalent to finding that the underlying claim was frivolous.

3

Justice SOUTER believes that Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977),

guarantees prison inmates the right to present frivolous

claims—the determination of which suffices to confer

standing, he says, because it assumes that the dispute “

‘will be presented in an adversary context and in a form

historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution,’ ”

post, at 2203, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101,

88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). This

would perhaps have seemed like good law at the time

of Flast, but our later opinions have made it explicitly

clear that Flast erred in assuming that assurance of

“serious and adversarial treatment” was the only value

protected by standing. See, e.g., United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–180, 94 S.Ct. 2940,

2946–2948, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); Schlesinger v.

Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,

220–223, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2931–2933, 41 L.Ed.2d 706

(1974). Flast failed to recognize that this doctrine has a

separation-of-powers component, which keeps courts

within certain traditional bounds vis-à-vis the other

branches, concrete adverseness or not. That is where

the “actual injury” requirement comes from. Not

everyone who can point to some “concrete” act and is

“adverse” can call in the courts to examine the

propriety of executive action, but only someone who

has been actually injured. Depriving someone of an

arguable (though not yet established) claim inflicts actual injury because it deprives him of something of value—arguable claims are settled, bought, and sold. Depriving someone of a frivolous claim, on the other hand, deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps the punishment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions.

4

Justice SOUTER suggests that he would waive this

actual-injury requirement in cases “involving

substantial, systemic deprivation of access to

court”—that is, in cases involving “ ‘a direct,

substantial and continuous ... limit on legal materials,’ ”

“total denial of access to a library,” or “ ‘[a]n absolute

deprivation of access to all legal materials,’ ” post, at

2204, and n. 2. That view rests upon the expansive

understanding of Bounds that we have repudiated.

Unless prisoners have a freestanding right to libraries, a

showing of the sort Justice SOUTER describes would

establish no relevant injury in fact, i.e., injury-in-fact

caused by the violation of legal right. See Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324–3325,

82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Denial of access to the courts

could not possibly cause the harm of inadequate

libraries, but only the harm of lost, rejected, or impeded

legal claims.

Of course, Justice SOUTER’s proposed exception is

unlikely to be of much real-world significance in any

event. Where the situation is so extreme as to

constitute “an absolute deprivation of access to all

legal materials,” finding a prisoner with a claim

affected by this extremity will probably be easier

than proving the extremity.

*354 It must be acknowledged that several statements in Bounds went beyond the right of access recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied, which was a right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to present, see, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S., at 547–548, 61 S.Ct., at 640–641; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S., at 13–16, 76 S.Ct., at 588–589; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S., at 489, 89 S.Ct., at 750–751. These statements appear to suggest that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court. See Bounds, 430 U.S., at 825–826, and n. 14, 97 S.Ct., at 1497, and n. 14. These elaborations upon the right of access to the courts have no antecedent in our pre-Bounds cases, and we now disclaim them. To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution requires.
[7] Finally, we must observe that the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim. Nearly all of the access-to-courts cases in the Bounds line involved attempts by inmates to pursue direct appeals
5

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

from the convictions for which they were incarcerated, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354, 83 S.Ct. 814, 815, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S., at 253, 258, 79 S.Ct., at 1166, 1168–1169; Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 13, 18, 76 S.Ct., at 588, 590; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 256, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 1069, 86 L.Ed. 1453 (1942), or habeas petitions, see Johnson v. Avery, supra, at 489, 89 S.Ct., at 750–751; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709–710, 81 S.Ct. 895, 896–897, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961); Ex parte Hull, supra, at 547–548, 61 S.Ct., at 640–641. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), we extended this universe of relevant claims only slightly, to “civil rights actions”—i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate **2182 “basic constitutional rights.” 418 U.S., at 579, 94 S.Ct., at 2986. Significantly, we felt compelled to justify even this slight extension of the right of access to the courts, stressing that “the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas *355 petitions is not always clear,” and that “[i]t is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ.” Ibid. The prison law library imposed in Bounds itself was far from an all-subject facility. In rejecting the contention that the State’s proposed collection was inadequate, the District Court there said:
“This Court does not feel inmates need the entire U.S.Code Annotated. Most of that code deals with federal laws and regulations that would never involve a state prisoner....
“It is also the opinion of this Court that the cost of N.C. Digest and Modern Federal Practice Digest will surpass the usefulness of these research aids. They cover mostly areas not of concern to inmates.”5 Supplemental App. to Pet. for Cert. in Bounds v. Smith, O.T.1976, No. 75–915, p. 18.

5

The District Court order in this case, by contrast,

required ADOC to stock each library with, inter alia,

the Arizona Digest, the Modern Federal Practice

Digest, Corpus Juris Secundum, and a full set of the

United States Code Annotated, and to provide a 30–40

hour videotaped legal research course covering

“relevant tort and civil law, including immigration and

family issues.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a, 71a; 834

F.Supp. 1553, 1561–1562 (Ariz.1992).

In other words, Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one

of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.
*356 B
[8] Here the District Court identified only two instances of actual injury. In describing ADOC’s failures with respect to illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners, it found that “[a]s a result of the inability to receive adequate legal assistance, prisoners who are slow readers have had their cases dismissed with prejudice,” and that “[o]ther prisoners have been unable to file legal actions.” 834 F.Supp., at 1558. Although the use of the plural suggests that several prisoners sustained these actual harms, the court identified only one prisoner in each instance. Id., at 1558, nn. 37 (lawsuit of inmate Bartholic dismissed with prejudice), 38 (inmate Harris unable to file a legal action).
[9] Petitioners contend that “any lack of access experienced by these two inmates is not attributable to unconstitutional State policies,” because ADOC “has met its constitutional obligations.” Brief for Petitioners 32, n. 22. The claim appears to be that all inmates, including the illiterate and non-English speaking, have a right to nothing more than “physical access to excellent libraries, plus help from legal assistants and law clerks.” Id., at 35. This misreads Bounds, which as we have said guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts. When any inmate, even an illiterate or non-English-speaking inmate, shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired to bring has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not been provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish “adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law,” Bounds, 430 U.S., at 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1498 (emphasis added). Of course, we leave it to prison officials to determine how best to ensure that inmates with language problems have a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. But it is *357 that capability, rather than the capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone.
**2183 C
Having rejected petitioners’ argument that the injuries suffered by Bartholic and Harris do not count, we turn to the question whether those injuries, and the other findings
6

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
of the District Court, support the injunction ordered in this case. The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose we have described above—of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches—if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration. The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2049–2050, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995) (“[T]he nature of the ... remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
This is no less true with respect to class actions than with respect to other suits. “That a suit may be a class action ... adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.’ ” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925, n. 20, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2207, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The general allegations of the complaint in the present case may well have sufficed to claim injury by named plaintiffs, and hence standing to demand remediation, with respect to various alleged inadequacies in the prison system, including failure to provide adequate legal assistance to non-English-speaking inmates and lockdown prisoners. That point is irrelevant now, however, for we are beyond the pleading stage.
*358 “Since they are not mere pleading requirements, but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element [of standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136–2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

After the trial in this case, the court found actual injury on the part of only one named plaintiff, Bartholic; and the cause of that injury—the inadequacy which the suit empowered the court to remedy—was failure of the prison to provide the special services that Bartholic would have needed, in light of his illiteracy, to avoid dismissal of his case. At the outset, therefore, we can eliminate from the proper scope of this injunction provisions directed at special services or special facilities required by non-English speakers, by prisoners in lockdown, and by the inmate population at large. If inadequacies of this character exist, they have not been found to have harmed any plaintiff in this lawsuit, and hence were not the proper object of this District Court’s remediation.6

6

Justice STEVENS concludes, in gross, that Bartholic’s

and Harris’s injuries are “sufficient to satisfy any

constitutional [standing] concerns,” post, at 2207–2208.

But standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to

complain of one administrative deficiency

automatically conferred the right to complain of all

administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in

one respect could bring the whole structure of state

administration before the courts for review. That is of

course not the law. As we have said, “[n]or does a

plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of

one kind possess by virtue of that injury the necessary

stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although

similar, to which he has not been subject.” Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2783, 73

L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). As even Justice SOUTER

concedes, the inability of respondents to produce any

evidence of actual injury to other than illiterate inmates

(Bartholic and Harris) “dispose[s] of the challenge to

remedial orders insofar as they touch non-English

speakers and lockdown prisoners.” Post, at 2201.

Contrary to Justice STEVENS’s suggestion, see post,

at 2208, n. 4, our holding that respondents lacked

standing to complain of injuries to non-English

speakers and lockdown prisoners does not amount to

“a conclusion that the class was improper.” The

standing determination is quite separate from

certification of the class. Again, Blum proves the

point: In that case, we held that a class of “ ‘all

residents of skilled nursing and health related nursing

facilities in New York State who are recipients of

Medicaid benefits’ ” lacked standing to challenge

transfers to higher levels of care, even though they

had standing to challenge discharges and transfers to

lower levels; but we did not disturb the class

definition. See 457 U.S., at 997, n. 11, 999–1002,

102 S.Ct., at 2782, n. 11, 2783–2785.

**2184 *359 As to remediation of the inadequacy that caused Bartholic’s injury, a further question remains: Was that inadequacy widespread enough to justify systemwide relief? The only findings supporting the proposition that, in all of ADOC’s facilities, an illiterate inmate wishing to file a claim would be unable to receive the assistance necessary to do so were (1) the finding with respect to
7

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

Bartholic, at the Florence facility, and (2) the finding that Harris, while incarcerated at Perryville, had once been “unable to file [a] legal actio[n].” 834 F.Supp., at 1558. These two instances were a patently inadequate basis for a conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide relief. See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 2774, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977) ( “[I]nstead of tailoring a remedy commensurate with the three specific violations, the Court of Appeals imposed a systemwide remedy going beyond their scope”); id., at 420, 97 S.Ct., at 2776 (“[O]nly if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy”); *360 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“The scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class”).
To be sure, the District Court also noted that “the trial testimony ... indicated that there are prisoners who are unable to research the law because of their functional illiteracy,” 834 F.Supp., at 1558. As we have discussed, however, the Constitution does not require that prisoners (literate or illiterate) be able to conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances to the courts—a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of legal assistance. Apart from the dismissal of Bartholic’s claim with prejudice, and Harris’s inability to file his claim, there is no finding, and as far as we can discern from the record no evidence, that in Arizona prisons illiterate prisoners cannot obtain the minimal help necessary to file particular claims that they wish to bring before the courts. The constitutional violation has not been shown to be systemwide, and granting a remedy beyond what was necessary to provide relief to Harris and Bartholic was therefore improper.7

7

Our holding regarding the inappropriateness of

systemwide relief for illiterate inmates does not rest

upon the application of standing rules, but rather, like

Justice SOUTER’S conclusion, upon “the respondents’

failure to prove that denials of access to illiterate

prisoners pervaded the State’s prison system,” post, at

2002. In one respect, however, Justice SOUTER’S

view of this issue differs from ours. He believes that

systemwide relief would have been appropriate “[h]ad

the findings shown libraries in shambles throughout the

prison system,” ibid,. That is consistent with his view,

which we have rejected, that lack of access to adequate

library facilities qualifies as relevant injury in fact, see

n. 4, supra.

Contrary to Justice SOUTER’S assertion, post, at

2202, the issue of systemwide relief has nothing to

do with the law governing class actions. Whether or

not a class of plaintiffs with frustrated nonfrivolous

claims exists, and no matter how extensive this class

may be, unless it was established that violations with

respect to that class occurred in all institutions of

Arizona’s system, there was no basis for a remedial decree imposed upon all those institutions. However inadequate the library facilities may be as a theoretical matter, various prisons may have other means (active assistance from “jailhouse lawyers,” complaint forms, etc.) that suffice to prevent the legal harm of denial of access to the courts. Courts have no power to presume and remediate harm that has not been established.
**2185 *361 III
There are further reasons why the order here cannot stand. We held in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), that a prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261. Such a deferential standard is necessary, we explained,
“if ‘prison administrators ..., and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’ Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.” Ibid. (citation omitted), quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977).
These are the same concerns that led us to encourage “local experimentation” in Bounds, see supra, at 2180, and we think it quite obvious that Bounds and Turner must be read in pari materia.
[10] The District Court here failed to accord adequate deference to the judgment of the prison authorities in at least three significant respects. First, the court concluded that ADOC’s restrictions on lockdown prisoners’ access to law libraries were unjustified. Turner ‘s principle of deference has special force with regard to that issue, since the inmates in lockdown include “the most dangerous and violent prisoners in the Arizona prison system,” and other inmates presenting special disciplinary and security concerns. Brief for Petitioners 5. The District Court made much of the fact *362 that lockdown prisoners routinely experience delays in receiving legal materials or legal assistance, some as long as 16 days, 834 F.Supp., at 1557, and n. 23, but so long as they are the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such delays are not of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury (which, of course, the District Court did not find here).
8

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
Second, the injunction imposed by the District Court was inordinately—indeed, wildly—intrusive. There is no need to belabor this point. One need only read the order, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a–85a, to appreciate that it is the ne plus ultra of what our opinions have lamented as a court’s “in the name of the Constitution, becom[ing] ... enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
[11] Finally, the order was developed through a process that failed to give adequate consideration to the views of state prison authorities. We have said that “[t]he strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors ... also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837–1838, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). For an illustration of the proper procedure in a case such as this, we need look no further than Bounds itself. There, after granting summary judgment for the inmates, the District Court refrained from “ ‘dictat[ing] precisely what course the State should follow.’ ” Bounds, 430 U.S., at 818, 97 S.Ct., at 1493. Rather, recognizing that “determining the ‘appropriate relief to be ordered ... presents a difficult problem,’ ” the court “ ‘charge[d] the Department of Correction with the task of devising a Constitutionally sound program’ to assure inmate access to the courts.” Id., at 818–819, 97 S.Ct., at 1493. The State responded with a proposal, which the District Court ultimately approved with minor changes, after considering objectionsraised *363 by the inmates. Id., at 819–820, 97 S.Ct., at 1493–1494. We praised this procedure, observing that the court had “scrupulously respected the limits on [its] role,” by “not ... thrust[ing] itself into prison administration” and instead permitting “[p]rison administrators [to] exercis[e] wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements.” Id., at 832–833, 97 S.Ct., at 1500.
As Bounds was an exemplar of what should be done, this case is a model of what **2186 should not. The District Court totally failed to heed the admonition of Preiser. Having found a violation of the right of access to the courts, it conferred upon its special master, a law professor from Flushing, New York, rather than upon ADOC officials, the responsibility for devising a remedial plan. To make matters worse, it severely limited the remedies that the master could choose. Because, in the court’s view, its order in an earlier access-to-courts case (an order that adopted the recommendations of the same special master) had “resolved successfully” most of the issues involved in this litigation, the court instructed that as to those issues it would implement the earlier order statewide, “with any modifications that the parties and Special Master determine are necessary due to the

particular circumstances of the prison facility.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 88a (footnote omitted). This will not do. The State was entitled to far more than an opportunity for rebuttal, and on that ground alone this order would have to be set aside.8

8

Justice STEVENS believes that the State of Arizona “is

most to blame for the objectionable character of the

final [injunctive] order,” post, at 2209, for two reasons:

First, because of its lack of cooperation in prison

litigation three to five years earlier before the same

judge, see Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.Supp. 1309

(Ariz.1988). But the rule that federal courts must

“giv[e] the States the first opportunity to correct the

errors made in the internal administration of their

prisons,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492, 93

S.Ct. 1827, 1837–1838, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), is not

to be set aside when a judge decides that a State was

insufficiently cooperative in a different, earlier case.

There was no indication of obstructive tactics by the

State in the present case, from which one ought to have

concluded that the State had learned its lesson. Second,

Justice STEVENS contends that the State failed

vigorously to oppose application of the Gluth

methodology to the present litigation. But surely there

was no reasonable doubt that the State objected to that

methodology. Justice STEVENS demands from the

State, we think, an unattainable degree of courage and

foolishness in insisting that, having been punished for

its recalcitrance in the earlier case by the imposition of

the Gluth methodology, it antagonize the District Court

further by “zealously” insisting that that methodology,

recently vindicated on appeal, must be abandoned. It

sufficed, we think, for the State to submit for the record

at every turn that “Defendants’ objections and

suggestions for modifications shall not be deemed a

waiver of these Defendants’ right to appeal prior

rulings and orders of this Court or appeal from the

subsequent final Order setting forth the injunctive relief

regarding legal access issues,” see, e.g., App. 221, 225,

231, 239, 243.

*364 * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, concurring.
The Constitution charges federal judges with deciding cases and controversies, not with running state prisons. Yet, too frequently, federal district courts in the name of the Constitution effect wholesale takeovers of state correctional facilities and run them by judicial decree. This case is a textbook example. Dissatisfied with the
9

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
quality of the law libraries and the legal assistance at Arizona’s correctional institutions, the District Court imposed a statewide decree on the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), dictating in excruciatingly minute detail a program to assist inmates in the filing of lawsuits—right down to permissible noise levels in library reading rooms. Such gross overreaching by a federal district court simply cannot be tolerated in our federal system. Principles of federalism and separation of powers dictate that exclusive responsibility for administering state prisons resides with the State and its officials.
*365 Of course, prison officials must maintain their facilities consistent with the restrictions and obligations imposed by the Constitution. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), we recognized as part of the State’s constitutional obligations a duty to provide prison inmates with law libraries or other legal assistance at state expense, an obligation we described as part of a loosely defined “right of access to the courts” enjoyed by prisoners. While the Constitution may guarantee state inmates an opportunity to bring suit to vindicate their federal constitutional rights, I find no basis in the Constitution—and Bounds cited none—for the right to have the government finance the endeavor.
**2187 I join the majority opinion because it places sensible and much-needed limitations on the seemingly limitless right to assistance created in Bounds and because it clarifies the scope of the federal courts’ authority to subject state prisons to remedial decrees. I write separately to make clear my doubts about the validity of Bounds and to reiterate my observation in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995), that the federal judiciary has for the last half century been exercising “equitable” powers and issuing structural decrees entirely out of line with its constitutional mandate.
I
A
This case is not about a right of “access to the courts.” There is no proof that Arizona has prevented even a single inmate from filing a civil rights lawsuit or submitting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, this case is about the extent to which the Constitution requires a State to finance or otherwise assist a prisoner’s efforts to bring suit against the State and its officials.
In Bounds v. Smith, supra, we recognized for the first

time a “fundamental constitutional right” of all inmates to have the State “assist [them] in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers.” Id., at 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1498. We were not explicit *366 as to the forms the State’s assistance must take, but we did hold that, at a minimum, States must furnish prisoners “with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Ibid. Although our cases prior to Bounds occasionally referenced a constitutional right of access to the courts, we had never before recognized a freestanding constitutional right that requires the States to “shoulder affirmative obligations,” id., at 824, 97 S.Ct., at 1496, in order to “insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful,” id., at 822, 97 S.Ct., at 1495.
Recognition of such broad and novel principles of constitutional law are rare enough under our system of law that I would have expected the Bounds Court to explain at length the constitutional basis for the right to state-provided legal materials and legal assistance. But the majority opinion in Bounds failed to identify a single provision of the Constitution to support the right created in that case, a fact that did not go unnoticed in strong dissents by Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice REHNQUIST. See id., at 833–834, 97 S.Ct., at 1501 (opinion of Burger, C. J.) (“The Court leaves us unenlightened as to the source of the ‘right of access to the courts’ which it perceives or of the requirement that States ‘foot the bill’ for assuring such access for prisoners who want to act as legal researchers and brief writers”); id., at 840, 97 S.Ct., at 1504 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.) (“[T]he ‘fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts’ which the Court announces today is created virtually out of whole cloth with little or no reference to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be derived”). The dissents’ calls for an explanation as to which provision of the Constitution guarantees prisoners a right to consult a law library or a legal assistant, however, went unanswered. This is perhaps not surprising: Just three years before Bounds was decided we admitted that the “[t]he precise rationale” for many of the “access to the courts” cases on which Bounds relied had “never been explicitly stated,” and that no Clause that had thus far been advanced “by itself provides *367 an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–609, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2443, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974).
The weakness in the Court’s constitutional analysis in Bounds is punctuated by our inability, in the 20 years since, to agree upon the constitutional source of the supposed right. We have described the right articulated in Bounds as a “consequence” of due process, Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2771, n. 6, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)), as an “aspect” of equal
10

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
protection, 492 U.S., at 11, n. 6, 109 S.Ct., at 2771, n. 6 (citation omitted), or as an “equal protection guarantee,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). In no instance, however, have we **2188 engaged in rigorous constitutional analysis of the basis for the asserted right. Thus, even as we endeavor to address the question presented in this case—whether the District Court’s order “exceeds the constitutional requirements set forth in Bounds,” Pet. for Cert. i—we do so without knowing which Amendment to the Constitution governs our inquiry.
It goes without saying that we ordinarily require more exactitude when evaluating asserted constitutional rights. “As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant” to extend constitutional protection to “un-chartered area[s],” where the “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking ... are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). It is a bedrock principle of judicial restraint that a right be lodged firmly in the text or tradition of a specific constitutional provision before we will recognize it as fundamental. Strict adherence to this approach is essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate of the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political views.
B
In lieu of constitutional text, history, or tradition, Bounds turned primarily to precedent in recognizing the right to state assistance in the researching and filing of prisoner *368 claims. Our cases, however, had never recognized a right of the kind articulated in Bounds, and, in my opinion, could not reasonably have been read to support such a right. Prior to Bounds, two lines of cases dominated our so-called “access to the courts” jurisprudence. One of these lines, rooted largely in principles of equal protection, invalidated state filing and transcript fees and imposed limited affirmative obligations on the States to ensure that their criminal procedures did not discriminate on the basis of poverty. These cases recognized a right to equal access, and any affirmative obligations imposed (e.g., a free transcript or counsel on a first appeal as of right) were strictly limited to ensuring equality of access, not access in its own right. In a second line of cases, we invalidated state prison regulations that restricted or effectively prohibited inmates from filing habeas corpus petitions or civil rights lawsuits in federal court to vindicate federally protected rights. While the cases in this line did guarantee a certain amount of access to the federal courts, they imposed no

affirmative obligations on the States to facilitate access, and held only that States may not “abridge or impair” prisoners’ efforts to petition a federal court for vindication of federal rights. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 641–642, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941). Without pausing to consider either the reasoning behind, or the constitutional basis for, each of these independent lines of case law, the Court in Bounds engaged in a loose and selective reading of our precedents as it created a freestanding and novel right to state-supported legal assistance. Despite the Court’s purported reliance on prior cases, Bounds in fact represented a major departure both from precedent and historical practice.
1
In a series of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), the Court invalidated state rules that required indigent criminal defendants to pay for trial transcripts or to pay other fees necessary to have their appeals *369 or habeas corpus petitions heard. According to the Bounds Court, these decisions “struck down restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.” 430 U.S., at 822, 97 S.Ct., at 1495. This is inaccurate. Notwithstanding the suggestion in Bounds, our transcript and fee cases did not establish a freestanding right of access to the courts, meaningful or otherwise.
In Griffin for instance, we invalidated an Illinois rule that charged criminal defendants a fee for a trial transcript necessary to secure full direct appellate review of a criminal conviction. See 351 U.S., at 13–14, 76 S.Ct., at 588; id., at 22, 76 S.Ct., at 592 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). See also Ross v. Moffitt, supra, at 605–606, 94 S.Ct., at 2441–2442. Though we held the fee to be unconstitutional, our decision did not turn on the effectiveness or adequacy of the access **2189 afforded to criminal defendants generally. We were quite explicit in reaffirming the century-old principle that “a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. ” Griffin, supra, at 18, 76 S.Ct., at 590 (emphasis added) (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–688, 14 S.Ct. 913, 914–915, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894)). Indeed, the Court in Griffin was unanimous on this point. See 351 U.S., at 21, 76 S.Ct., at 591–592 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]t is now settled that due process of law does not require a State to afford review of criminal judgments”); id., at 27, 76 S.Ct., at 594 (Burton, J., dissenting) (“Illinois, as the majority admit, could thus deny an appeal altogether in a criminal case without denying due process of law”); id., at 36, 76 S.Ct., at 599 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The majority of the Court
11

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

concedes that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the States to provide for any kind of appellate review”).1 In light of the Griffin Court’s unanimous *370 pronouncement that a State is not constitutionally required to provide any court access to criminals who wish to challenge their convictions, the Bounds Court’s description of Griffin as ensuring “ ‘adequate and effective appellate review,’ ” 430 U.S., at 822, 97 S.Ct., at 1495 (quoting Griffin, supra, at 20, 76 S.Ct., at 591), is unsustainable.

1

We reaffirmed this principle almost two decades later,

and just three years before Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), in Ross v.

Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341

(1974), where we observed that Griffin v. Illinois, 351

U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and

“[s]ucceeding cases invalidated ... financial barriers to

the appellate process, at the same time reaffirming the

traditional principle that a State is not obliged to

provide any appeal at all for criminal defendants.” 417

U.S., at 606, 94 S.Ct., at 2442 (citing McKane v.

Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867

(1894)). See also 417 U.S., at 611, 94 S.Ct., at 2444.

Instead, Griffin rested on the quite different principle that, while a State is not obliged to provide appeals in criminal cases, the review a State chooses to afford must not be administered in a way that excludes indigents from the appellate process solely on account of their poverty. There is no mistaking the principle that motivated Griffin:
“It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.... [A]t all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect [indigent persons] from invidious discriminations....
“... There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.” 351 U.S., at 18–19, 76 S.Ct., at 591 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
Justice Frankfurter, who provided the fifth vote for the majority, confirmed in a separate writing that it was invidious discrimination, and not the denial of adequate, effective, or meaningful access to the courts, that rendered the Illinois regulation unconstitutional: “[W]hen a State deems it wise *371 and just that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons ... from securing such a

review....” Id., at 23, 76 S.Ct., at 593 (opinion concurring in judgment). Thus, contrary to the characterization in Bounds, Griffin stands not for the proposition that all inmates are entitled to adequate appellate review of their criminal convictions, but for the more modest rule that, if the State chooses to afford appellate review, it “can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.” Griffin, supra, at 17, 76 S.Ct., at 590 (plurality opinion).2

2

This is what Justice Brennan came to call the “Griffin

equality principle,” United States v. MacCollom, 426

U.S. 317, 331, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 2094, 48 L.Ed.2d 666

(1976) (dissenting opinion), and it provided the

rationale for a string of decisions that struck down a

variety of state transcript and filing fees as applied to

indigent prisoners. Bounds cited a number of these

cases in support of the right to “adequate, effective and

meaningful” access to the courts. See 430 U.S., at 822,

and n. 8, 97 S.Ct., at 1495, and n. 8. But none of the

transcript and fee cases on which Bounds relied were

premised on a substantive standard of court access.

Rather, like Griffin, these cases were primarily

concerned with invidious discrimination on the basis of

wealth. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709,

81 S.Ct. 895, 896, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961) (“[T]o interpose

any financial consideration between an indigent

prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to

sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal

protection of the laws”); Gardner v. California, 393

U.S. 367, 370–371, 89 S.Ct. 580, 583, 21 L.Ed.2d 601

(1969) (“[I]n the context of California’s habeas corpus

procedure denial of a transcript to an indigent marks the

same invidious discrimination which we held

impermissible in ... Griffin ”).

**2190 If we left any doubt as to the basis of our decision in Griffin, we eliminated it two decades later in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), where we held for the first time that States must provide assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right for all indigent defendants. Like Griffin, Douglas turned not on a right of access per se, but rather on the right not to be denied, on the basis of poverty, access afforded to others. We did not say in Douglas that indigents have a right to a “meaningful appeal” that could not be realized absent appointed counsel. Cf. Bounds, 430 U.S., at 823, 97 S.Ct., at 1495–1496. *372 What we did say is that, in the absence of state-provided counsel, “[t]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counse [l] ... while the indigent ... is forced to shift for himself.” Douglas, supra, at 357–358, 83 S.Ct., at 817. Just as in Griffin, where “we held that a State may not grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty,” Douglas, 372 U.S., at 355, 83 S.Ct., at 815, the evil motivating our decision in Douglas
12

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

was “discrimination against the indigent,” ibid.3

3

There is some discussion of due process by the plurality

in Griffin, see 351 U.S., at 17–18, 76 S.Ct., at 589–590,

and a passing reference to “fair procedure” in Douglas,

372 U.S., at 357, 83 S.Ct., at 816. These unexplained

references to due process, made in the course of equal

protection analyses, provide an insufficient basis for

concluding that the regulations challenged in Griffin

and Douglas independently violated the Due Process

Clause. And attempts in subsequent cases to salvage a

role for the Due Process Clause in this context and to

explain the difference between the equal protection and

due process analyses in Griffin have, in my opinion,

been unpersuasive. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,

402–405, 105 S.Ct. 830, 839–841, 83 L.Ed.2d 821

(1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665–667,

103 S.Ct. 2064, 2068–2070, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). In

any event, there do not appear to have been five votes

in Griffin in support of a holding under the Due Process

Clause; subsequent transcript and fee cases turned

primarily, if not exclusively, on equal protection

grounds, see, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, supra, at 714, 81

S.Ct., at 898; and the Douglas Court, with its “obvious

emphasis” on equal protection, 372 U.S., at 361, 83

S.Ct., at 818–819 (Harlan, J., dissenting), does not

appear to have reached the due process question,

notwithstanding Justice Harlan’s supposition to the

contrary, see id., at 360–361, 83 S.Ct., at 818–819.

It is difficult to see how due process could be

implicated in these cases, given our consistent

reaffirmation that the States can abolish criminal

appeals altogether consistently with due process. See,

e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S., at 611, 94 S.Ct., at

2444. The fact that a State affords some access “does

not automatically mean that a State then acts

unfairly,” and hence violates due process, by denying

indigents assistance “at every stage of the way.” Ibid.

Under our cases, “[u]nfairness results only if

indigents are singled out by the State and denied

meaningful access to the appellate system because of

their poverty,” a question “more profitably

considered under an equal protection analysis.” Ibid.

*373 Our transcript and fee cases were, therefore, limited holdings rooted in principles of equal protection. In Bounds, these cases were recharacterized almost beyond recognition, as the Court created a new and different right on behalf of prisoners—a right to have the State pay for law libraries or other forms of legal assistance without regard to the equality of access. Only by divorcing our prior holdings from their reasoning, and by elevating dicta over constitutional principle, was the Court able to reach such a result.
The unjustified transformation of the right to nondiscriminatory access to the courts into the broader, untethered right to legal assistance generally would be reason enough for me to conclude that Bounds was wrongly decided. However, even assuming that Bounds

properly relied upon the Griffin line of cases for the proposition for which those **2191 cases actually stood, the Bounds Court failed to address a significant intervening development in our jurisprudence: the fact that the equal protection theory underlying Griffin and its progeny had largely been abandoned prior to Bounds. The provisions invalidated in our transcript and fee cases were all facially neutral administrative regulations that had a disparate impact on the poor; there is no indication in any of those cases that the State imposed the challenged fee with the purpose of deliberately discriminating against indigent defendants. See, e.g., Douglas, supra, at 361, 83 S.Ct., at 819 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for invalidating a state law “of general applicability” solely because it “may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich”). In the years between Douglas and Bounds, however, we rejected a disparate-impact theory of the Equal Protection Clause. That the doctrinal basis for Griffin and its progeny has largely been undermined—and in fact had been before Bounds was decided—confirms the invalidity of the right to law libraries and legal assistance created in Bounds.
We first cast doubt on the proposition that a facially neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause solely because *374 it has a disparate impact on the poor in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). In Rodriguez, the respondents challenged Texas’ traditional system of financing public education under the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that, under that system, “some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people.” Id., at 19, 93 S.Ct., at 1289. In rejecting the claim that this sort of disparate impact amounted to unconstitutional discrimination, we declined the respondents’ invitation to extend the rationale of Griffin, Douglas, and similar cases. We explained that, under those cases, unless a group claiming discrimination on the basis of poverty can show that it is “completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, ... sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit,” 411 U.S., at 20, 93 S.Ct., at 1290 (emphasis added), strict scrutiny of a classification based on wealth does not apply. Because the respondents in Rodriguez had not shown that “the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education,” but rather claimed only that “they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth,” id., at 23, 93 S.Ct., at 1291 (emphasis added), we held that the “Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class,” id., at 28, 93 S.Ct., at 1294. After Rodriguez, it was clear that “wealth discrimination alone [does not] provid[e] an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny,” id., at 29, 93 S.Ct., at 1294, and that, “at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
13

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

advantages,” id., at 24, 93 S.Ct., at 1291. See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2487–2488, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–323, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2690–2691, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2380–2381, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977).4

4

The absence of a prison law library or other

state-provided legal assistance can hardly be said to

deprive inmates absolutely of an opportunity to bring

their claims to the attention of a federal court. Clarence

Earl Gideon, perhaps the most celebrated pro se

prisoner litigant of all time, was able to obtain review

by this Court even though he had no legal training and

was incarcerated in a prison that apparently did not

provide prisoners with law books. See Answer to

Respondent’s Response to Pet. for Cert. in Gideon v.

Wainwright, O.T.1962, No. 155, p. 1 (“[T]he petitioner

is not a [sic] attorney or versed in law nor does not

have the law books to copy down the decisions of this

Court.... Nor would the petitioner be allowed to do so”).

Like anyone else seeking to bring suit without the

assistance of the State, prisoners can seek the advice

of an attorney, whether pro bono or paid, and can

turn to family, friends, other inmates, or public

interest groups. Inmates can also take advantage of

the liberal pleading rules for pro se litigants and the

liberal rules governing appointment of counsel.

Federal fee-shifting statutes and the promise of a

contingency fee should also provide sufficient

incentive for counsel to take meritorious cases.

**2192 *375 We rejected a disparate-impact theory of the Equal Protection Clause altogether in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), decided just one Term before Bounds. There we flatly rejected the idea that “a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.” 426 U.S., at 242, 96 S.Ct., at 2049. We held that, absent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law or official act does not violate the Constitution “solely because it has a ... disproportionate impact.” Id., at 239, 96 S.Ct., at 2047 (emphasis in original). See also id., at 240, 96 S.Ct., at 2048 (acknowledging “the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). At bottom, Davis was a recognition of “the settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979).5

5

Our decisions in San Antonio Independent School Dist.

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16

(1973), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), validated the position taken by Justice Harlan in his dissents in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). As Justice Harlan persuasively argued in Douglas, facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the poor “do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States ‘an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.’ To so construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society. The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can afford.” Id., at 362, 83 S.Ct., at 819 (dissenting opinion). See also Griffin, 351 U.S., at 35–36, 76 S.Ct., at 598–599 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id., at 29, 76 S.Ct., at 595 (Burton, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution requires the equal protection of the law, but it does not require the States to provide equal financial means for all defendants to avail themselves of such laws”).

*376 The Davis Court was motivated in no small part by the potentially radical implications of the Griffin/Douglas rationale. As Justice Harlan recognized in Douglas: “Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent.” 372 U.S., at 361, 83 S.Ct., at 819 (dissenting opinion). Under a disparate-impact theory, Justice Harlan argued, regulatory measures always considered to be constitutionally valid, such as sales taxes, state university tuition, and criminal penalties, would have to be struck down. See id., at 361–362, 83 S.Ct., at 818–819.6 Echoing Justice Harlan, we rejected in Davis the disparate-impact approach in part because of the recognition that “[a] rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless *377 invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.” 426 U.S., at 248, 96 S.Ct., at 2051. **2193 See also id., at 248, n. 14, 96 S.Ct., at 2051, n. 14.

6

Although he concurred in the judgment in Griffin,

Justice Frankfurter expressed similar concerns. He

emphasized that “the equal protection of the laws [does

not] deny a State the right to make classifications in law

when such classifications are rooted in reason,” id., at

21, 76 S.Ct., at 592, and that “a State need not equalize

14

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
economic conditions,” id., at 23, 76 S.Ct., at 592. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that differences in wealth are “contingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to correct or cushion.” Ibid. He also expressed concern that if absolute equality were required, a State would no longer be able to “protect itself so that frivolous appeals are not subsidized and public moneys not needlessly spent.” Id., at 24, 76 S.Ct., at 593. See also United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S., at 330, 96 S.Ct., at 2093–2094 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (the Constitution does not “require that an indigent be furnished every possible legal tool, no matter how speculative its value, and no matter how devoid of assistance it may be, merely because a person of unlimited means might choose to waste his resources in a quest of that kind”).
Given the unsettling ramifications of a disparate-impact theory, it is not surprising that we eventually reached the point where we could no longer extend the reasoning of Griffin and Douglas. For instance, in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), decided just three years before Bounds, we declined to extend Douglas to require States to provide indigents with counsel in discretionary state appeals or in seeking discretionary review in this Court. We explained in Ross that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,’ ” 417 U.S., at 612, 94 S.Ct., at 2444 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 24, 93 S.Ct., at 1291–1292), and that it “does [not] require the State to ‘equalize economic conditions,’ ” 417 U.S., at 612, 94 S.Ct., at 2444 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S., at 23, 76 S.Ct., at 592–593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)). We again declined to extend Douglas in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S., at 555, 107 S.Ct., at 1993, where we rejected a claim that the Constitution requires the States to provide counsel in state postconviction proceedings. And we found Ross and Finley controlling in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), where we held that defendants sentenced to death, like all other defendants, have no right to state-appointed counsel in state collateral proceedings. See also United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976) (federal habeas statute permitting district judge to deny free transcript to indigent petitioner raising frivolous claim does not violate the Constitution).
In sum, the Bounds Court’s reliance on our transcript and fee cases was misplaced in two significant respects. First, *378 those cases did not stand for the proposition for which Bounds cited them: They were about equal access, not access per se. Second, the constitutional basis for Griffin and its progeny had been seriously undermined in the years preceding Bounds. Thus, even to the extent that Bounds intended to rely on those cases for the propositions for which they actually stood, their

underlying rationale had been largely discredited. These cases, rooted in largely obsolete theories of equal protection, do not support the right to law libraries and legal assistance recognized in Bounds. Our repeated holdings declining to extend these decisions only confirm this conclusion.

2
The Bounds Court relied on a second line of cases in announcing the right to state-financed law libraries or legal assistance for prisoners. These cases, beginning with our decision in Ex parte Hull, prevent the States from imposing arbitrary obstacles to attempts by prisoners to file claims asserting federal constitutional rights. Although this line deals with access in its own right, and not equal access as in Griffin and Douglas, these cases do not impose any affirmative obligations on the States to improve the prisoners’ chances of success.

Bounds identified Ex parte Hull as the first case to “recogniz[e]” a “constitutional right of access to the courts.” 430 U.S., at 821–822, 97 S.Ct., at 1494. In Ex parte Hull, we considered a prison regulation that required prisoners to submit their habeas corpus petitions to a prison administrator before filing them with the court. Only if the administrator determined that a petition was “ ‘properly drawn’ ” could the prisoner submit it in a federal court. 312 U.S., at 548–549, 61 S.Ct., at 641–642 (quoting regulation). We invalidated the regulation, but the right we acknowledged in doing so bears no resemblance to the right generated in Bounds.

Our reasoning in Ex parte Hull consists of a straightforward, and rather limited, principle:
*379 “[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone to determine.” 312 U.S., at 549, 61 S.Ct., at 642.
The “right of access” to the courts articulated in Ex parte Hull thus imposed no affirmative obligations on the States; we stated only that a State may not “abridge or impair” a **2194 prisoner’s ability to file a habeas petition in federal court.7 Ex parte Hull thus provides an extraordinarily weak starting point for concluding that the Constitution requires States to fund and otherwise assist prisoner legal research by providing law libraries or legal assistance.

7

The Court’s rationale appears to have been motivated

15

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
more by notions of federalism and the power of the federal courts than with the rights of prisoners. Our citation of three nonhabeas cases which held that a state court’s determination on a matter of federal law is not binding on the Supreme Court supports this conclusion. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S., at 549, 61 S.Ct., at 641–642, citing First Nat. Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 346, 46 S.Ct. 135, 137, 70 L.Ed. 295 (1926) (the power of the Supreme Court to review independently state-court determinations of claims “grounded on the Constitution or a law of the United States” is “general, and is a necessary element of this Court’s power to review judgments of state courts in cases involving the application and enforcement of federal laws”); Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U.S. 148, 152, 22 S.Ct. 605, 607, 46 L.Ed. 847 (1902) (“ ‘[T]he question whether a right or privilege, claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, was distinctly and sufficiently pleaded and brought to the notice of a state court, is itself a Federal question, in the decision of which this court, on writ of error, is not concluded by the view taken by the highest court of the State’ ” (citation omitted)); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447, 20 S.Ct. 687, 689, 44 L.Ed. 839 (1900) (same).
Two subsequent decisions of this Court worked a moderate expansion of Ex parte Hull. The first, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), invalidated a Tennessee prison regulation that prohibited inmates from advising or assisting one another in the preparation of habeas corpus petitions. In striking down the regulation, the Court twice quoted Ex *380 parte Hull ‘s holding that a State may not “abridge or impair” a petitioner’s efforts to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 393 U.S., at 486–487, 488, 89 S.Ct., at 749–750, 750. In contrast to Ex parte Hull, however, Johnson focused not on the respective institutional roles of state prisons and the federal courts but on “the fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme.” 393 U.S., at 485, 89 S.Ct., at 749. Still, the Court did not hold that the Constitution places an affirmative obligation on the States to facilitate the filing of habeas petitions. The Court held only that a State may not “den[y] or obstruc[t]” a prisoner’s ability to file a habeas petition. Ibid. We extended the holding of Johnson in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), where we struck down a similar regulation that prevented inmates from assisting one another in the preparation of civil rights complaints. We held that the “right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id., at 579, 94 S.Ct., at 2986. Again, the right was framed exclusively in the negative. See ibid. (opportunity to file a civil rights action may not be “denied”). Thus,

prior to Bounds, “if a prisoner incarcerated pursuant to a final judgment of conviction [was] not prevented from physical access to the federal courts in order that he may file therein petitions for relief which Congress has authorized those courts to grant, he ha[d] been accorded the only constitutional right of access to the courts that our cases ha[d] articulated in a reasoned way.” Bounds, 430 U.S., at 839–840, 97 S.Ct., at 1504 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Hull ).
That Ex parte Hull, Johnson, and Wolff were decided on different constitutional grounds from Griffin and Douglas is clear enough. According to Bounds, however, “[e]ssentially the same standards of access were applied” in all of these *381 cases. 430 U.S., at 823, 97 S.Ct., at 1495. This observation was wrong, but the equation of these two lines of cases allowed the Bounds Court to preserve the “affirmative obligations” element of the equal access cases, the rationale of which had largely been undermined prior to Bounds, by linking it with Ex parte Hull, which had not been undermined by later cases but which imposed no affirmative obligations. In the process, Bounds forged a right with no basis in precedent or constitutional **2195 text: a right to have the State “shoulder affirmative obligations” in the form of law libraries or legal assistance to ensure that prisoners can file meaningful lawsuits. By detaching Griffin ‘ s right to equal access and Ex parte Hull ‘s right to physical access from the reasoning on which each of these rights was based, the Bounds Court created a virtually limitless right. And though the right was framed in terms of law libraries and legal assistance in that case, the reasoning is much broader, and this Court should have been prepared under the Bounds rationale to require the appointment of capable state-financed counsel for any inmate who wishes to file a lawsuit. See Bounds, supra, at 841, 97 S.Ct., at 1504 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (observing that “the logical destination of the Court’s reasoning” in Bounds is “lawyers appointed at the expense of the State”). See also ante, at 2181. We have not, however, extended Bounds to its logical conclusion. And though we have not overruled Bounds, we have undoubtedly repudiated its reasoning in our consistent rejection of the proposition that the States must provide counsel beyond the trial and first appeal as of right. See Ross, 417 U.S., at 612, 94 S.Ct., at 2444–2445; Finley, 481 U.S., at 555, 107 S.Ct., at 1993; Giarratano, 492 U.S., at 3–4, 109 S.Ct., at 2766–2767 (plurality opinion).
In the end, I agree that the Constitution affords prisoners what can be termed a right of access to the courts. That right, rooted in the Due Process Clause and the principle articulated in Ex parte Hull, is a right not to be arbitrarily prevented from lodging a claimed violation of a federal
16

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
right in a federal court. The State, however, is not constitutionally *382 required to finance or otherwise assist the prisoner’s efforts, either through law libraries or other legal assistance. Whether to expend state resources to facilitate prisoner lawsuits is a question of policy and one that the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the States.
There is no basis in history or tradition for the proposition that the State’s constitutional obligation is any broader. Although the historical record is relatively thin, those who have explored the development of state-sponsored legal assistance for prisoners agree that, until very recently, law libraries in prisons were “nearly nonexistent.” A. Flores, Werner’s Manual for Prison Law Libraries 1 (2d ed.1990). Prior to Bounds, prison library collections (to the extent prisons had libraries) commonly reflected the correctional goals that a State wished to advance, whether religious, educational, or rehabilitative. Although some institutions may have begun to acquire a minimal collection of legal materials in the early part of this century, law-books generally were not included in prison libraries prior to the 1950’s. See W. Coyle, Libraries in Prisons 54–55 (1987). The exclusion of lawbooks was consistent with the recommendation of the American Prison Association, which advised prison administrators nationwide to omit federal and state law-books from prison library collections. See American Prison Association, Objectives and Standards for Libraries in Adult Prisons and Reformatories, in Library Manual for Correctional Institutions 101, 106–107 (1950). The rise of the prison law library and other legal assistance programs is a recent phenomenon, and one generated largely by the federal courts. See Coyle, supra, at 54–55; B. Vogel, Down for the Count: A Prison Library Handbook 87–89 (1995). See also Ihrig, Providing Legal Access, in Libraries Inside: A Practical Guide for Prison Librarians 195 (R. Rubin & D. Suvak eds. 1995) (establishment of law libraries and legal service programs due to “inmate victories in the courts within the last two decades”). Thus, far from recognizing a long tradition *383 of state-sponsored legal assistance for prisoners, Bounds was in fact a major “disruption to traditional prison operation.” Vogel, supra, at 87.
The idea that prisoners have a legal right to the assistance that they were traditionally denied is also of recent vintage. The traditional, pre-Bounds view of the law with regard to the State’s obligation to facilitate prisoner lawsuits by providing law libraries and legal assistance was articulated in Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (CA9), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862, 82 S.Ct. 105, 7 L.Ed.2d 59 (1961):
“State authorities have no obligation under the federal Constitution to provide library **2196 facilities and an opportunity for their use to enable an inmate to search for legal loopholes in the judgment and sentence under

which he is held, or to perform services which only a lawyer is trained to perform. All inmates are presumed to be confined under valid judgments and sentences. If an inmate believes he has a meritorious reason for attacking his, he must be given an opportunity to do so. But he has no due process right to spend his prison time or utilize prison facilities in an effort to discover a ground for overturning a presumptively valid judgment. “Inmates have the constitutional right to waive counsel and act as their own lawyers, but this does not mean that a non-lawyer must be given the opportunity to acquire a legal education. One question which an inmate must decide in determining if he should represent himself is whether in view of his own competency and general prison regulations he can do so adequately. He must make the decision in the light of the circumstances existing. The state has no duty to alter the circumstances to conform with his decision.” 290 F.2d, at 640–641.
Consistent with the traditional view, the lower courts understood the Constitution only to guarantee prisoners a right *384 to be free from state interference in filing papers with the courts:
“[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court proceedings affecting one’s personal liberty, or to assert and sustain a defense therein, and to send and receive communications to and from judges, courts and lawyers concerning such matters.” Id., at 637.
See also Oaks v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 241, 242 (CA5 1970) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s complaint alleging denial of access to library and legal materials on ground that prisoner had not alleged that “he has in any way been denied access to the courts ..., that he has ever lost the right to commence, prosecute or appeal in any court, or that he has been substantially delayed in obtaining a judicial determination in any proceeding”). Thus, while courts held that a prisoner is entitled to attack his sentence without state interference, they also consistently held that “[p]rison regulations are not required to provide prisoners with the time, the correspondence privileges, the materials or other facilities they desire for the special purpose of trying to find some way of making attack upon the presumptively valid judgments against them.” Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 973 (CA8 1965). “If the purpose was not to hamper inmates in gaining reasonable access to the courts with regard to their respective criminal matters, and if the regulations and practices do not interfere with such reasonable access,” the inquiry was at an end. Hatfield, 290 F.2d, at 640. That access could have been facilitated without impairing effective prison administration was considered “immaterial.” Ibid.
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Quite simply, there is no basis in constitutional text, pre-Bounds precedent, history, or tradition for the conclusion that the constitutional right of access imposes affirmative *385 obligations on the States to finance and support prisoner litigation.
II
A
Even when compared to the federal judicial overreaching to which we have now become accustomed, this is truly a remarkable case. The District Court’s order vividly demonstrates the danger of continuing to afford federal judges the virtually unbridled equitable power that we have for too long sanctioned. We have here yet another example of a federal judge attempting to “direc[t] or manag[e] the reconstruction of entire institutions and bureaucracies, with little regard for the inherent limitations on [his] authority.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S., at 126, 115 S.Ct., at 2067–2068 (THOMAS, J., concurring). And we will continue to see cases like this unless we take more serious steps to curtail the use of equitable power by the federal courts.
**2197 Principles of federalism and separation of powers impose stringent limitations on the equitable power of federal courts. When these principles are accorded their proper respect, Article III cannot be understood to authorize the Federal Judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make. See id., at 131–133, 115 S.Ct., at 2070–2071. Broad remedial decrees strip state administrators of their authority to set long-term goals for the institutions they manage and of the flexibility necessary to make reasonable judgments on short notice under difficult circumstances. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482–483, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2299, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). At the state level, such decrees override the “State’s discretionary authority over its own program and budgets and forc[e] state officials to reallocate state resources and funds to the [district court’s] plan at the expense of other citizens, other government programs, and other institutions *386 not represented in court.” Jenkins, 515 U.S., at 131, 115 S.Ct., at 2070 (THOMAS, J., concurring). The federal judiciary is ill equipped to make these types of judgments, and the Framers never imagined that federal judges would displace state executive officials and state legislatures in charting state policy.

Though we have sometimes closed our eyes to federal judicial overreaching, as in the context of school desegregation, see id., at 124–125, 115 S.Ct., at 2066–2067, we have been vigilant in opposing sweeping remedial decrees in the context of prison administration. “It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In this area, perhaps more than any other, we have been faithful to the principles of federalism and separation of powers that limit the Federal Judiciary’s exercise of its equitable powers in all instances.

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), articulated the governing principles:
“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America *387 are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” Id., at 404–405, 94 S.Ct., at 1807 (footnotes omitted).8

8

Martinez was overruled on other grounds in

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–414, 109

S.Ct. 1874, 1881–1882, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). We

have consistently reaffirmed Martinez, however, in all

respects relevant to this case, namely, that “the

judiciary is ‘ill equipped’ to deal with the difficult and

delicate problems of prison management” and that

prison administrators are entitled to “considerable

deference.” 490 U.S., at 407–408, 109 S.Ct., at 1879.

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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (relying on Martinez for the principle that “ ‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform’ ” (citation omitted)).

**2198 State prisons should be run by the state officials with the expertise and the primary authority for running such institutions. Absent the most “extraordinary circumstances,” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2544, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring), federal courts should refrain from meddling in such affairs. Prison administrators have a difficult enough job without federal-court intervention. An overbroad remedial decree can make an already daunting task virtually impossible.9

9

The constitutional and practical concerns identified in

Martinez have also resulted in a more deferential

standard of review for prisoner claims of constitutional

violations. In Turner v. Safley, we held that a prison

regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests,” even when it

“impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” 482 U.S.,

at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261. A deferential standard was

deemed necessary to keep the courts out of the

day-to-day business of prison administration, which

“would seriously hamper [prison officials’] ability to

anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative

solutions to the intractable problems of prison

administration.” Ibid. A more stringent standard of

review “would also distort the decisionmaking process,

for every administrative judgment would be subject to

the possibility that some court somewhere would

conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the

problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the

primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to

every administrative problem, thereby ‘unnecessarily

perpetuat [ing] the involvement of the federal courts in

affairs of prison administration.’ ” Ibid. (quoting

Martinez, 416 U.S., at 407, 94 S.Ct., at 1808).

*388 I realize that judges, “no less than others in our society, have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). But judges occupy a unique and limited role, one that does not allow them to substitute their views for those in the executive and legislative branches of the various States, who have the constitutional authority and institutional expertise to make these uniquely nonjudicial decisions and who are ultimately accountable for these decisions. Though the temptation may be great, we must

not succumb. The Constitution is not a license for federal judges to further social policy goals that prison administrators, in their discretion, have declined to advance.

B
The District Court’s opinion and order demonstrate little respect for the principles of federalism, separation of powers, and judicial restraint that have traditionally governed federal judicial power in this area. In a striking arrogation of power, the District Court sought to micromanage every aspect of Arizona’s “court access program” in all institutions statewide, dictating standard operating procedures and subjecting the state system to ongoing federal supervision. A *389 sweeping remedial order of this nature would be inappropriate in any case. That the violation sought to be remedied was so minimal, to the extent there was any violation at all, makes this case all the more alarming.

The District Court cited only one instance of a prison inmate having a case dismissed due to the State’s alleged failure to provide sufficient assistance, and one instance of another inmate who was unable to file an action. See 834 F.Supp. 1553, 1558, and nn. 37–38 (Ariz.1992). All of the other alleged “violations” found by the District Court related not to court access, but to library facilities and legal assistance. Many of the found violations were trivial, such as a missing pocket part to a small number of volumes in just a few institutions. Id., at 1562. And though every facility in the Arizona system already contained law libraries that greatly exceeded prisoner needs,10 the District Court **2199 found the State to be in violation because some of its prison libraries lacked Pacific Second Reporters. Ibid. The District Court also struck down regulations that clearly pass muster under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), such as restrictions at some facilities on “brows[ing] the shelves,” 834 F.Supp., at 1555, the physical exclusion from the library of “lockdown” inmates, who are the most dangerous and disobedient *390 prisoners in the prison population, id., at 1556, and the allowance of phone calls only for “legitimate pressing legal issues,” id., at 1564.

10

The Arizona prison system had already adopted a

policy of statewide compliance with an injunction that

the same District Judge in this case imposed on a single

institution in an earlier case. In compliance with that

decree, which the District Court termed the “Muecke

list,” 834 F.Supp., at 1561, every facility in the Arizona

correctional system had at least one library containing,

at a minimum, the following volumes: United States

Code Annotated; Supreme Court Reporter; Federal

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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
Reporter Second; Federal Supplement; Shepard’s U.S. Citations; Shepard’s Federal Citations; Local Rules for the Federal District Court; Modern Federal Practice Digests; Federal Practice Digest (Second); Arizona Code Annotated; Arizona Reports; Shepard’s Arizona Citations; Arizona Appeals Reports; Arizona Law of Evidence (Udall); ADC Policy Manual; 108 Institutional Management Procedures; Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright); Corpus Juris Secundum; and Arizona Digest. Id., at 1561–1562.
To remedy these and similar “violations,” the District Court imposed a sweeping, indiscriminate, and systemwide decree. The microscopically detailed order leaves no stone unturned. It covers everything from training in legal research to the ratio of typewriters to prisoners in each facility. It dictates the hours of operation for all prison libraries statewide, without regard to inmate use, staffing, or cost. It guarantees each prisoner a minimum two-hour visit to the library per trip, and allows the prisoner, not prison officials, to determine which reading room he will use. The order tells ADOC the types of forms it must use to take and respond to prisoner requests for materials. It requires all librarians to have an advanced degree in library science, law, or paralegal studies. If the State wishes to remove a prisoner from the law library for disciplinary reasons, the order requires that the prisoner be provided written notice of the reasons and factual basis for the decision within 48 hours of removal. The order goes so far as to dictate permissible noise levels in law library reading rooms and requires the State to “take all necessary steps, and correct any structural or acoustical problems.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a.
The order also creates a “legal assistance program,” imposing rules for the selection and retention of prisoner legal assistants. Id., at 69a. It requires the State to provide all inmates with a 30–40 hour videotaped legal research course, covering everything from habeas corpus and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to torts, immigration, and family law. Prisoner legal assistants are required to have an additional 20 hours of live instruction. Prisoners are also entitled to a minimum of three 20–minute phone calls each week to an attorney or legal organization, without regard to the purpose for the call; the order expressly requires Arizona to install extra phones to accommodate the increased use. Of course, *391 legal supplies are covered under the order, which even provides for “ko-rec-type” to correct typographical errors. A Special Master retains ongoing supervisory power to ensure that the order is followed.
The District Court even usurped authority over the prison administrator’s core responsibility: institutional security and discipline. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 546, 99 S.Ct., at 1878 (“[M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline” are the central

goals of prison administration). Apparently undeterred by this Court’s repeated admonitions that security concerns are to be handled by prison administrators, see, e.g., ibid., the District Court decreed that “ADOC prisoners in all ... custody levels shall be provided regular and comparable visits to the law library.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a (emphasis added). Only if prison administrators can “documen[t]” an individual prisoner’s “inability to use the law library without creating a threat to safety or security” may a potentially dangerous prisoner be kept out of the library, ibid., and even then the decision must be reported to the Special Master. And since, in the District Court’s view, “[a] prisoner cannot adequately use the law library under restraint, including handcuffs and shackles,” id., at 67a, the State is apparently powerless to take steps to ensure that inmates known to be violent do not injure other inmates or prison guards while in the law library “researching” their claims. This “one free bite” approach conflicts both **2200 with our case law, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474, 103 S.Ct. 864, 872–873, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), and with basic common sense. The District Court apparently misunderstood that a prison is neither a law firm nor a legal aid bureau. Prisons are inherently dangerous institutions, and decisions concerning safety, order, and discipline must be, and always have been, left to the sound discretion of prison administrators.
Like the remedial decree in Jenkins, the District Court’s order suffers from flaws characteristic of overly broad remedial decrees. First, “the District Court retained jurisdiction *392 over the implementation and modification of the remedial decree, instead of terminating its involvement after issuing its remedy.” 515 U.S., at 134, 115 S.Ct., at 2071 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Arizona correctional officials must continually report to a Special Master on matters of internal prison administration, and the District Court retained discretion to change the rules of the game if, at some unspecified point in the future, it feels that Arizona has not done enough to facilitate court access. Thus, the District Court has “inject[ed] the judiciary into the day-to-day management of institutions and local policies—a function that lies outside of our Article III competence.” Id., at 135, 115 S.Ct., at 2072. The District Court also “failed to target its equitable remedies in this case specifically to cure the harm suffered by the victims” of unconstitutional conduct. Id., at 136, 115 S.Ct., at 2072. We reaffirmed in Jenkins that “the nature of the [equitable] remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation.” Id., at 88, 115 S.Ct., at 2049 (majority opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, in this case, when the District Court found the law library at a handful of institutions to be deficient, it subjected the entire system to the requirements of the decree and to ongoing federal supervision. And once it found that lockdown inmates experienced delays in receiving law books in some
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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
institutions, the District Court required all facilities statewide to provide physical access to all inmates, regardless of custody level. And again, when it found that some prisoners in some facilities were untrained in legal research, the District Court required the State to provide all inmates in all institutions with a 30–40 hour videotaped course in legal research. The remedy far exceeded the scope of any violation, and the District Court far exceeded the scope of its authority.
The District Court’s order cannot stand under any circumstances. It is a stark example of what a district court should not do when it finds that a state institution has violated the Constitution. Systemwide relief is never appropriate *393 in the absence of a systemwide violation, and even then should be no broader and last no longer than necessary to remedy the discrete constitutional violation.
Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court on certain, fundamental points: the case before us involves an injunction whose scope has not yet been justified by the factual findings of the District Court, ante, at 2184, one that was imposed through a “process that failed to give adequate consideration to the views of state prison authorities,” ante, at 2185, and that does not reflect the deference we accord to state prison officials under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), ante, at 2185. Although I therefore concur in the judgment and in portions of the Court’s opinion, reservations about the Court’s treatment of standing doctrine and about certain points unnecessary to the decision lead me to write separately.
I
The question accepted for review was a broadside challenge to the scope of the District Court’s order of systemic or classwide relief, issued in reliance on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), not whether proof of actual injury is necessary to establish standing to litigate a Bounds claim. The parties’ discussions of actual injury, in their petition for certiorari, in their briefs, and during oral argument, focused upon the ultimate finding of liability and the scope of the injunction. Indeed, **2201 petitioners specifically stated that “[a]lthough the lack of a showing of injury means that Respondents are not entitled to any relief, the State does not contend that the Respondents lacked standing to

raise these claims in the first instance. Respondents clearly met the threshold of an actual case or controversy pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution. They simply failed to prove *394 the existence of a constitutional violation, including causation of injury, that would entitle them to relief.” Brief for Petitioners 33, n. 23.1

1

Moreover, the issue of actual injury, even as framed by

the parties, received relatively short shrift; only small

portions of the parties’ briefs addressed the issue, see

Brief for Petitioners 30–33; Reply Brief for Petitioners

11–13; Brief for Respondents 25–30, and a significant

portion of that discussion concentrated upon whether

the issue should even be addressed by the Court, Reply

Brief for Petitioners 12–13; Brief for Respondents

25–27.

While we are certainly free ourselves to raise an issue of standing as going to Article III jurisdiction, and must do so when we would lack jurisdiction to deal with the merits, see Mount Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 571–572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), there is no apparent question that the standing of at least one of the class-action plaintiffs suffices for our jurisdiction and no dispute that standing doctrine does not address the principal issue in the case. We may thus adequately dispose of the basic issue simply by referring to the evidentiary record. That is what I would do, for my review of the cases from the Courts of Appeals either treating or bearing on the subject of Bounds standing convinces me that there is enough reason for debate about its appropriate elements that we should reach no final conclusions about it. That is especially true since we have not had the “benefit of briefing and argument informed by an appreciation of the potential breadth of the ruling.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 139, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2074, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995) (SOUTER, J., dissenting). Addressing issues of standing may not amount to the significant breakdown in our process of orderly adjudication represented by Missouri v. Jenkins, but the Court does reach out to address a difficult conceptual question that is unnecessary to resolution of this case, was never addressed by the District Court or Court of Appeals, and divides what would otherwise presumably have been a unanimous Court.
*395 That said, I cannot say that I am convinced that the Court has fallen into any error by invoking standing to deal with the District Court’s orders addressing claims by and on behalf of non-English speakers and prisoners in lockdown. While it is true that the demise of these prisoners’ Bounds claims could be expressed as a failure of proof on the merits (and I would so express it), it would be equally correct to see these plaintiffs as losing on standing. “A determination even at the end of trial that the court is not prepared to award any remedy that would
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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
benefit the plaintiff[s] may be expressed as a conclusion that the plaintiff[s] lac[k] standing.” 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.6, p. 478 (2d ed. 1984) (Wright & Miller).
Although application of standing doctrine may for our purposes dispose of the challenge to remedial orders insofar as they touch non-English speakers and lockdown prisoners, standing principles cannot do the same job in reviewing challenges to the orders aimed at providing court access for the illiterate prisoners. One class representative has standing, as the Court concedes, and with the right to sue thus established, standing doctrine has no further part to play in considering the illiterate prisoners’ claims. More specifically, the propriety of awarding classwide relief (in this case, affecting the entire prison system) does not require a demonstration that some or all of the unnamed class could themselves satisfy the standing requirements for named plaintiffs.
“[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any individual showing of standing [in order to obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses on whether the plaintiff is properly before the court, not whether represented parties or absent class members are properly before the court. Whether or not the named plaintiff who meets individual standing requirements may assert the **2202 rights of absent class members is neither a standing issue nor an Article III case or controversy issue but depends *396 rather on meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23 governing class actions.” 1 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 2.07, pp. 2–40 to 2–41 (3d ed.1992).
See also 7B Wright & Miller § 1785.1, at 141 (“As long as the representative parties have a direct and substantial interest, they have standing; the question whether they may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others ... depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation”). This analysis is confirmed by our treatment of standing when the case of a named class-action plaintiff protesting a durational residence requirement becomes moot during litigation because the requirement becomes satisfied; even then the question is not whether suit can proceed on the standing of some unnamed members of the class, but whether “the named representative [can continue] to ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’ ” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403, 95 S.Ct. 553, 559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a)).
Justice SCALIA says that he is not applying a standing rule when he concludes (as I also do) that systemic relief is inappropriate here. Ante, at 2184, n. 7. I accept his assurance. But he also makes it clear, by the same footnote, that he does not rest his conclusion (as I rest mine) solely on the failure to prove that in every Arizona prison, or even in many of them, the State denied court

access to illiterate prisoners, a point on which I take it every Member of the Court agrees. Instead, he explains that a failure to prove that more than two illiterate prisoners suffered prejudice to nonfrivolous claims is (at least in part) the reason for reversal. Since he does not intend to be applying his standing rule in so saying, I assume he is applying a class-action rule (requiring a denial of classwide relief when trial evidence does not show the existence of a class of injured claimants). But that route is just as unnecessary and complicating as the route through standing. (Indeed, the distinction between standing and class-action rules might be practically irrelevant *397 in this case, however important as precedent for other cases.)
While the propriety of the order of systemic relief for illiterate prisoners does not turn on the standing of class members, and certainly need not turn on class-action rules, it clearly does turn on the respondents’ failure to prove that denials of access to illiterate prisoners pervaded the State’s prison system. Leaving aside the question whether that failure of proof might have been dealt with by reconsidering the class certification, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(1); General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982); 7B Wright & Miller, supra, § 1785, at 128–136, the state of the evidence simply left the District Court without an adequate basis for the exercise of its equitable discretion in issuing an order covering the entire system.
The injunction, for example, imposed detailed rules and requirements upon each of the State’s prison libraries, including rules about library hours, supervision of prisoners within the facilities, request forms, educational and training requirements for librarians and their staff members, prisoners’ access to the stacks, and inventory. Had the findings shown libraries in shambles throughout the prison system, this degree of intrusion might have been reasonable. But the findings included the specific acknowledgment that “[g]enerally, the facilities appear to have complete libraries.” 834 F.Supp. 1553, 1568 (Ariz.1992). The District Court found only that certain of the prison libraries did not allow inmates to browse the shelves, only that some of the volumes in some of the libraries lacked pocket parts, only that certain librarians at some of the libraries lacked law or library science degrees, and only that some prison staff members have no training in legal research. Given that adequately stocked libraries go far in satisfying the Bounds requirements, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to aggregate discrete, small-bore problems in individual prisons and to treat them as if **2203 each prevailed throughout the prison system, *398 for the purpose of justifying a broad remedial order covering virtually every aspect of each prison library.
Other elements of the injunction were simply unsupported
22

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
by any factual finding. The District Court, for example, made no factual findings about problems prisoners may have encountered with noise in any library, let alone any findings that noise violations interfered with prisoners’ access to the courts. Yet it imposed a requirement across the board that the State correct all “structural or acoustical problems.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a. It is this overreaching of the evidentiary record, not the application of standing or even class-action rules, that calls for the judgment to be reversed.
Finally, even with regard to the portions of the injunction based upon much stronger evidence of a Bounds violation, I would remand simply because the District Court failed to provide the State with an ample opportunity to participate in the process of fashioning a remedy and because it seems not to have considered the implications that Turner holds for this case. For example, while the District Court was correct to conclude that prisoners who experience delays in receiving books and receive only a limited number of books at the end of that delay have been denied access to the courts, it is unlikely that a proper application of Turner would have justified its decision to order the State to grant lockdown prisoners physical access to the stacks, given the significance of the State’s safety interest in maintaining the lockdown system and the existence of an alternative, an improved paging system, acceptable to the respondents. Brief for Respondents 39.
II
Even if I were to reach the standing question, however, I would not adopt the standard the Court has established. In describing the injury requirement for standing, we have spoken of it as essential to an Article III case or controversy that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as *399 capable of judicial resolution.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). We ask a plaintiff to prove “actual or threatened injury” to ensure that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).
I do not disagree with the Court that in order to meet these standards (in a case that does not involve substantial systemic deprivation of access), a prisoner suing under Bounds must assert something more than an abstract desire to have an adequate library or some other access

mechanism. Nevertheless, while I believe that a prisoner must generally have some underlying claim or grievance for which he seeks judicial relief, I cannot endorse the standing requirement the Court now imposes.
On the Court’s view, a district court may be required to examine the merits of each plaintiff’s underlying claim in order to determine whether he has standing to litigate a Bounds claim. Ante, at 2181, n. 3. The Court would require a determination that the claim is “nonfrivolous,” ante, at 2181, in the legal sense that it states a claim for relief that is at least arguable in law and in fact. I, in contrast, would go no further than to require that a prisoner have some concrete grievance or gripe about the conditions of his confinement, the validity of his conviction, or perhaps some other problem for which he would seek legal redress, see Part III–B, infra (even though a claim based on that grievance might well fail sooner or later in the judicial process).
There are three reasons supporting this as a sufficient standard. First, it is the existence of an underlying grievance, not its ultimate legal merit, that gives a prisoner a concrete interest in the litigation and will thus assure the serious and adversarial treatment of the Bounds claim. *400 Second, Bounds recognized a right of access for those who seek adjudication, not just for sure winners **2204 or likely winners or possible winners. See Bounds, 430 U.S., at 824, 825, 828, 97 S.Ct., at 1496, 1496–1497, 1498 (describing the constitutional right of access without limiting the right to prisoners with meritorious claims); see also ante, at 2181 (describing the right of access even before Bounds as covering “a grievance that the inmate wished to present ...” (citations omitted)). Finally, insistence on a “nonfrivolous claim” rather than a “concrete grievance” as a standing requirement will do no more than guarantee a lot of preliminary litigation over nothing. There is no prison system so blessed as to lack prisoners with nonfrivolous complaints. They will always turn up, or be turned up, and one way or the other the Bounds litigation will occur.
That last point may be, as the Court says, the answer to any suggestion that there need be no underlying claim requirement for a Bounds claim of complete and systemic denial of all means of court access. But in view of the Courts of Appeals that have seen the issue otherwise,2 I would certainly *401 reserve that issue for the day it might actually be addressed by the parties in a case before us.

2

See, e.g., Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268–269

(C.A.7 1992) (waiving the requirement that a prisoner

prove prejudice “where the prisoner alleges a direct,

substantial and continuous, rather than a ‘minor and

indirect,’ limit on legal materials” on the ground that “a

prisoner without any access to materials cannot

23

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
determine the pleading requirements of his case, including the necessity of pleading prejudice”); cf. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1385, n. 16 (C.A.4 1993) (acknowledging the possibility that injury may be presumed in some situations, e.g., total denial of access to a library), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949, 114 S.Ct. 393, 126 L.Ed.2d 341 (1993); Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (C.A.1 1991) (acknowledging that a prisoner may not need to prove prejudice when he alleges “[a]n absolute deprivation of access to all legal materials” (emphases in original)). Dispensing with any underlying claim requirement in such instances would be consistent with the rule of equity dealing with threatened injury. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1983, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (holding that a prisoner need not suffer physical injury before obtaining relief because “ ‘[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief’ ”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663–664, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923))); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (observing that prisoners may obtain relief “even though it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible [harm] might not affect all of those [at risk]”) (discussing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978))). If the State denies prisoners all access to the courts, it is hardly implausible for a prisoner to claim a protected stake in opening some channel of access.

In sum, I would go no further than to hold (in a case not involving substantial, systemic deprivation of access to court) that Article III requirements will normally be satisfied if a prisoner demonstrates that (1) he has a complaint or grievance, meritorious or not,3 about the prison system or the validity of his conviction4 that he would raise if his library research (or advice, or judicial review of a form complaint, or other means of “access” chosen by the State) were to indicate that he had an actionable claim; and (2) the access scheme provided by the prison is so inadequate that he cannot research, consult about, file, or litigate the claim, as the case may be.

3

See Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d 620, 622 (C.A.4 1983)

(“It is unfair to force an inmate to prove that he has a

meritorious claim which will require access until after

he has had an opportunity to see just what his rights

are”); see also Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452

(C.A.4 1987) (suggesting that a prisoner must identify

the “specific problem he wishe[s] to research”); cf.

Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 798 (C.A.9 1994)

(dismissing a Bounds claim in part because the prisoner

“simply failed to show that the restrictions on library

access had any effect on his access to the court relative

to his personal restraint petition” (emphases in

original)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 825, 116 S.Ct. 91, 133

L.Ed.2d 47 (1995); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050,

1056 (C.A.7 1993) (it is enough if the prisoner merely “identif[ies] the constitutional right the defendant allegedly violated and the specific facts constituting the deprivation”); Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1063 (C.A.11 1991) (“[T]here was no allegation in the complaint or in plaintiff’s deposition that he was contemplating a challenge at that time [of the deprivation] to the conditions of his confinement”); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456(CA7) (dismissing a claim in part because the prisoner “does not point to any claim that he was unable to pursue”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 162, 102 L.Ed.2d 133 (1988).

4

I do not foreclose the possibility of certain other

complaints, see text accompanying n. 2, supra, and Part

III–B, infra.

*402 While a more stringent standing requirement would, of course, serve to curb **2205 courts from interference with prison administration, that legitimate object is adequately served by two rules of existing law. Bounds itself makes it clear that the means of providing access is subject to the State’s own choice. If, for example, a State wishes to avoid judicial review of its library standards and the adequacy of library services, it can choose a means of access involving use of the complaint-form procedure mentioned by the Court today. Ante, at 2180. And any judicial remedy, whatever the chosen means of court access, must be consistent with the rule in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), that prison restrictions are valid if reasonably related to valid penological interests. Turner ‘s level of scrutiny surely serves to limit undue intrusions and thus obviates the need for further protection. In the absence of evidence that the Turner framework does not adequately channel the discretion of federal courts, there would be no reason to toughen standing doctrine to provide an additional, and perhaps unnecessary, protection against this danger.
But instead of relying on these reasonable and existing safeguards against interference, the Court’s resolution of this case forces a district court to engage in extensive and, I believe, needless enquiries into the underlying merit of prisoners’ claims during the initial and final stages of a trial, and renders properly certified classes vulnerable to constant challenges throughout the course of litigation. The risk is that district courts will simply conclude that prisoner class actions are unmanageable. What, at the least, the Court overlooks is that a class action lending itself to a systemwide order of relief consistent with Turner avoids the multiplicity of separate suits and remedial orders that undermine the efficiency of a United States district court just as surely as it can exhaust the legal resources of a much-sued state prison system.
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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
*403 III
A
There are, finally, two additional points on which I disagree with the Court. First, I cannot concur in the suggestion that Bounds should be overruled to the extent that it requires States choosing to provide law libraries for court access to make them available for a prisoner’s use in the period between filing a complaint and its final disposition. Ante, at 2181–2182. Bounds stated the obvious reasons for making libraries available for these purposes, 430 U.S., at 825–826, 97 S.Ct., at 1496–1497, and developments since Bounds have confirmed its reasoning. With respect to habeas claims, for example, the need for some form of legal assistance is even more obvious now than it was then, because the restrictions developed since Bounds have created a “substantial risk” that prisoners proceeding without legal assistance will never be able to obtain review of the merits of their claims. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (discussing these developments). Nor should discouragement from the number of frivolous prison suits lead us to doubt the practical justifiability of providing assistance to a pro se prisoner during trial. In the past few years alone, we have considered the petitions of several prisoners who represented themselves at trial and on appeal, and who ultimately prevailed. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
B
Second, I see no reason at this point to accept the Court’s view that the Bounds right of access is necessarily restricted to attacks on sentences or challenges to conditions of confinement. See ante, at 2181–2182. It is not clear to me that a State may force a prisoner to abandon all opportunities to vindicate rights outside these two categories no matter how significant. We have already held that prisoners do not entirely *404 forfeit certain fundamental rights, including the right to marry, Turner v. Safley, supra, at 95, 107 S.Ct., at 2265; the right to free speech, **2206 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1878–1879, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); and the right to free exercise of religion, see O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct.

2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). One can imagine others that would arguably entitle a prisoner to some limited right of access to court. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (parental rights); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (divorce); cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50, 70 S.Ct. 445, 453–454, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950) (deportation). This case does not require us to consider whether, as a matter of constitutional principle, a prisoner’s opportunities to vindicate rights in these spheres may be foreclosed, and I would not address such issues here.
IV
I therefore concur in Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion, dissent from Part II, and concur in the judgment.
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. While at least one 19th-century court characterized the prison inmate as a mere “slave of the State,” Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871), in recent decades this Court has repeatedly held that the convicted felon’s loss of liberty is not total. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). “Prison walls do not ... separat[e] ... inmates from the protections of the Constitution,” Turner, 482 U.S., at 84, 107 S.Ct., at 2259, and even convicted criminals retain some of the liberties enjoyed by all who live outside those walls in communities to which most prisoners will someday return.
Within the residuum of liberty retained by prisoners are freedoms identified in the First Amendment to the Constitution: *405 freedom to worship according to the dictates of their own conscience, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Cruz, 405 U.S., at 321, 92 S.Ct., at 1081, freedom to communicate with the outside world, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411–412, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1880–1881, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989), and the freedom to petition their government for a redress of grievances, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748–749, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). While the exercise of these freedoms may of course be regulated and constrained by their custodians, they may not be
25

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

obliterated either actively or passively. Indeed, our cases make it clear that the States must take certain affirmative steps to protect some of the essential aspects of liberty that might not otherwise survive in the controlled prison environment.
The “well-established” right of access to the courts, ante, at 2179, is one of these aspects of liberty that States must affirmatively protect. Where States provide for appellate review of criminal convictions, for example, they have an affirmative duty to make transcripts available to indigent prisoners free of charge. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590–591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (requiring States to waive transcript fees for indigent inmates); see also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257–258, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 1168–1169, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959) (requiring States to waive filing fees for indigent prisoners). It also protects an inmate’s right to file complaints, whether meritorious or not, see Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941) (affirming right to file habeas petitions even if prison officials deem them meritless, in case in which petition at issue was meritless), and an inmate’s right to have access to fellow inmates who are able to assist an inmate in preparing, “with reasonable adequacy,” such complaints. Johnson, 393 U.S., at 489, 89 S.Ct., at 750–751; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 580, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986–2987, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).1 And for almost two **2207 decades, it has explicitly *406 included the right of prisoners to have access to “adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). As the Court points out, States are free to “experiment” with the types of legal assistance that they provide to inmates, ante, at 2180—as long as the experiment provides adequate access.

1

See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking

Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 612, 30

L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) ( “The right of access to the courts

is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. See

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 [89 S.Ct. 747,

748–749, 21 L.Ed.2d 718]; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.

546, 549 [61 S.Ct. 640, 641–642, 85 L.Ed. 1034]”); Bill

Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,

741, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 2169, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983)

(“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the

First Amendment right to petition the Government for

redress of grievances”); id., at 743, 103 S.Ct., at 2170.

The right to claim a violation of a constitutional

provision in a manner that will be recognized by the

courts is also embedded in those rights recognized by

the Constitution’s text and our interpretations of it.

Without the ability to access the courts and draw

their attention to constitutionally improper behavior,

all of us—prisoners and free citizens alike—would

be deprived of the first—and often the only—“line of

defense” against constitutional violations. Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52

L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S., at 579, 94 S.Ct., at 2986 (recognition of constitutional rights “would be diluted if inmates, often ‘totally or functionally illiterate,’ were unable to articulate their complaints to the courts”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (allowing plaintiff alleging violation of Fourth Amendment rights access to the courts through a cause of action directly under the Constitution).

The constitutional violations alleged in this case are similar to those that the District Court previously found in one of Arizona’s nine prisons. See Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.Supp. 1309 (Ariz.1988), aff’d, 951 F.2d 1504 (C.A.9 1991). The complaint in this case was filed in 1990 by 22 prisoners on behalf of a class including all inmates in the Arizona prison system. The prisoners alleged that the State’s institutions provided inadequate access to legal materials or other assistance, App. 31-33, and that as a result, “[p]risoners are harmed by the denial of meaningful access to the courts.” Id., at 32. The District Court agreed, concluding that the State had failed, throughout its prison system, to provide adequate access to legal materials, particularly for those in administrative segregation, *407 or “lockdown,” and that the State had failed to provide adequate legal assistance to illiterate and non-English speaking inmates. After giving all the parties an opportunity to participate in the process of drafting the remedy, the court entered a detailed (and I agree excessively so, see infra, at 2208) order to correct the State’s violations.
As I understand the record, the State has not argued that the right of effective access to the courts, as articulated in Bounds, should be limited in any way. It has not challenged the standing of the named plaintiffs to represent the class, nor has it questioned the propriety of the District Court’s order allowing the case to proceed as a class action. I am also unaware of any objection having been made in the District Court to the plaintiffs’ constitutional standing in this case, and the State appears to have conceded standing with respect to most claims in the Court of Appeals.2 Yet the majority chooses to address these issues unnecessarily and, in some instances, incorrectly.

2

See Opening Brief for Appellant in No.

93–17169(CA9), pp. 29–30; Reply Brief for

Defendant/Appellants in No. 93–17169(CA9), p. 14, n.

20. The State directly questioned constitutional

standing only with respect to two narrow classes of

claims: the standard for indigency (a claim on which

the State was successful below) and, in its reply brief,

photocopying.

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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

For example, although injury in fact certainly is a jurisdictional issue into which we inquire absent objection from the parties, even the majority finds on the record that at least two of the plaintiffs had standing in this case, ante, at 2182,3 *408 which should be sufficient **2208 to satisfy any constitutional concerns.4 Yet the Court spends 10 pages disagreeing.

3

In all likelihood, the District Court’s failure to

articulate additional specific examples of missing

claims was due more to the fact that the State did not

challenge the constitutional standing of the prisoners in

the District Court than to a lack of actual evidence

relating to such lost claims. Now that the District Court

and prisoners are on notice that standing is a matter of

specific concern, it is free on remand to investigate the

record or other evidence that the parties could make

available regarding other claims that have been lost

because of inadequate facilities.

4

If named class plaintiffs have standing, the standing of

the class members is satisfied by the requirements for

class certification. 1 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg

on Class Actions § 2.01, p. 2–3 (3d ed.1992); ante, at

2201–2202 (SOUTER, J., concurring in part, dissenting

in part, and concurring in judgment). Because the State

did not challenge that certification, it is rather late in

the game to now give it the advantage of a conclusion

that the class was improper (even if it is—although

illiterate inmates, it seems to me, are not positioned

much differently with respect to English language legal

materials than are non-English speaking prisoners).

Even if we had reason to delve into standing requirements in this case, the Court’s view of those requirements is excessively strict. I think it perfectly clear that the prisoners had standing, even absent the specific examples of failed complaints. There is a constitutional right to effective access, and if a prisoner alleges that he personally has been denied that right, he has standing to sue.5 One of our first cases to address directly the right of access to the courts illustrates this principle particularly well. In Ex parte Hull, we reviewed the constitutionality of a state prison’s rule that impeded an inmate’s access to the courts. The rule authorized corrections officers to intercept mail addressed to a court and refer it to the legal investigator for the parole board to determine whether there was sufficient merit in the claim to justify its submission to a court. Meritless claims were simply not delivered. Petitioner Hull succeeded in smuggling papers to his father, who in turn delivered them to this Court. Although we held that the smuggled petition had insufficient merit even to require an answer from the *409 State, 312 U.S., at 551, 61 S.Ct., at 642–643, we nevertheless held that the regulation was invalid for the simple and sufficient reason that “the state and its officers

may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for writ of habeas corpus.” Id., at 549, 61 S.Ct., at 642.

5

Although a prisoner would lose on the merits if he

alleged that the deprivation of that right occurred

because the State, for example, did not provide him

with access to on-line computer databases, he would

also certainly have “standing” to make his claim. The

Court’s argument to the contrary with respect to most

of the prisoners in this case, it seems to me, is not as

much an explication of the principles of standing, but

the creation of a new rule requiring prisoners making

Bounds claims to demonstrate prejudice flowing from

the lack of access.

At first glance, the novel approach adopted by the Court today suggests that only those prisoners who have been refused the opportunity to file claims later found to have arguable merit should be able to challenge a rule as clearly unconstitutional as the one addressed in Hull. Perhaps the standard is somewhat lower than it appears in the first instance; using Hull as an example, the Court suggests that even facially meritless petitions can provide a sufficient basis for standing. See ante, at 2180, n. 2. Nonetheless, because prisoners are uniquely subject to the control of the State, and because unconstitutional restrictions on the right of access to the courts—whether through nearly absolute bars like that in Hull or through inadequate legal resources—frustrate the ability of prisoners to identify, articulate, and present to courts injuries flowing from that control, I believe that any prisoner who claims to be impeded by such barriers has alleged constitutionally sufficient injury in fact.
My disagreement with the Court is not complete: I am persuaded—as respondents’ counsel essentially has conceded—that the relief ordered by the District Court was broader than necessary to redress the constitutional violations identified in the District Court’s findings. I therefore agree that the case should be remanded. I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s decision to use the case as an opportunity to meander through the laws of standing and access to the courts, expanding standing requirements here and limiting rights there,6 when the most obvious **2209 concern in *410 the case is with the simple disjunct between the limited scope of the injuries articulated in the District Court’s findings and the remedy it ordered as a result. Because most or all of petitioners’ concerns regarding the order could be addressed with a simple remand, I see no need to resolve the other constitutional issues that the Court reaches out to address.

6

In addition to the Court’s discussion of “standing,” the

opinion unnecessarily enters into discussion about at

least two other aspects of the scope of the Bounds right.

First, the Court concludes that the Bounds right does

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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
not extend to any claims beyond attacks on sentences and conditions of confinement. Ante, at 2182. But given its subsequent finding that only two plaintiffs have met its newly conjured rule of standing, see ibid., its conclusion regarding the scope of the right is purely dicta. Second, the Court argues that the Bounds right does not extend to the right to “discover” grievances, or to “litigate effectively” once in court. Ante, at 2181 (emphasis deleted). This statement is also largely unnecessary given the Court’s emphasis in Part III on the need for the District Court both to tailor its remedy to the constitutional violations it has discovered and the requirement that it remain respectful of the difficult job faced by state prison administrators.
Moreover, I note that the State has not asked for these limitations on Bounds. While I doubt that Arizona will object to its unexpected windfall, its briefs in the District Court, Court of Appeals, and this Court have argued that the District Court order simply went further than was necessary given the injuries identified in its own opinion. See Brief for Petitioners 13–16. By agreeing with that proposition but nonetheless going on to extend unrequested relief, the Court oversteps the scope of the debate presented in this case. Whenever we take such a step, we venture unnecessarily onto dangerous ground.
The Court is well aware that much of its discussion preceding Part III is unnecessary to the decision. Reflecting on its view that the District Court railroaded the State into accepting its order lock, stock, and barrel, the Court concludes on the last page of its decision that “[t]he State was entitled to far more than an opportunity for rebuttal, and on that ground alone this order would have to be set aside.” Ante, at 2186. To the extent that the majority suggests that the order in this case is flawed because of a breakdown in the process of court-supervised negotiation that should generally precede systemic relief, I agree with it. I also agree that the failure in that process “alone ” would justify a remand *411 in this case. I emphatically disagree, however, with the Court’s characterization of who is most to blame for the objectionable character of the final order. Much of the blame for its breadth, I propose, can be placed squarely in the lap of the State.
A fair evaluation of the procedures followed in this case must begin with a reference to Gluth, the earlier case in which the same District Judge found petitioners guilty of a systemic constitutional violation in one facility. In that case the District Court expressly found that the state officials had demonstrated “a callous unwillingness to face the issues” and had pursued “diversion[ary] tactics” that “forced [the court] to take extraordinary measures.” 773 F.Supp., at 1312, 1314. Despite the Court’s request that they propose an appropriate remedy, the officials refused to do so. It is apparent that these defense tactics played an important role in the court’s decision to appoint

a Special Master to assist in the fashioning of the remedy that was ordered in Gluth. Only after that order had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals did respondents commence this action seeking to obtain similar relief for the entire inmate population.

After a trial that lasted for 11 days over the course of two months, the District Court found that several of petitioners’ policies denied illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners meaningful access to the courts. Given the precedent established in Gluth, the express approval of that plan by the Court of Appeals, and the District Court’s evaluation of the State’s conclusions regarding the likelihood of voluntary remedial schemes, particularly in view of the State’s unwillingness to play a constructive role in the remedy stage of that case, the District Court not unreasonably entered an order appointing the same Special Master and directing him to propose a similar remedy in this case. Although the District Court instructed the parties to submit specific objections to the remedial template derived from Gluth, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a, nothing in the court’s order prevented the *412 State from submitting its own proposals without waiving its right to challenge the findings on the liability issues or its right to object to any remedial proposals by either the Master or the respondents. The District Court also told the parties that it would consider settlement offers, and instructed the Master to provide “such guidance and counsel as either of the parties may **2210 request to effect such a settlement.” Id., at 95a.

In response to these invitations to participate in the remedial process, the State filed only four half-hearted sets of written objections over the course of the six months during which the Special Master was evaluating the court’s proposed order. See App. 218–221, 225–228, 231–238, and 239–240. Although the Master rejected about half of these narrow objections, he accepted about an equal number, noting that the State’s limited formal participation had been “important” and “very helpful.” Proposed Order (Permanent Injunction) in No. CIV 90–0054 (D.Ariz.), p. iii. After the Master released his proposed order, the State offered another round of objections. See App. 243–250. Although the District Court informed the Master that the objections could be considered, they did not have to be; the court reasonably noted that the State had been aware for six months about the potential scope of the order, and that it could have mounted the same objections prior to the deadline that the court had set at the beginning of the process. Id., at 251–253.

One might have imagined that the State, faced with the

potential

of

this

“inordinately—indeed,

wildly—intrusive” remedial scheme, ante, at 2185, would

have taken more care to protect its interests before the

District Court and the Special Master, particularly given

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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
the express willingness of both to consider the State’s objections. Having failed to zealously represent its interests in the District Court, the State’s present complaints seem rather belated; the Court has generally been less than solicitous to claims that have *413 not been adequately pressed below. Cf., e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488–489, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1467–1468, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); compare ante, at 2186, n. 8 (State made boilerplate reservation of rights in each set of objections), with Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2081, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (“[I]t is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the ‘substance’ of such a claim to a state court”).
The State’s lack of interest in representing its interests is clear not only from the sparse objections in the District Court, but from proceedings both here and in the Court of Appeals. In argument before both courts, counsel for the prisoners have conceded that certain aspects of the consent decree exceeded the necessary relief. See, e.g., 43 F.3d 1261, 1271 (C.A.9 1994) (prisoners agree that typewriters are not required); Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (provisions regarding noise in library are unnecessary). This flexibility further suggests that the State could have sought relief from aspects of the plan through negotiation. Indeed, at oral argument in the Ninth Circuit, the parties for both sides suggested that they were willing to settle the case, and the court deferred submission of the case for 30 days to enable a settlement. “However, before the settlement process had even begun, [the State] declined to mediate.” 43 F.3d, at 1265, n. 1. Notably, this is the only comment made by the appellate court regarding the process that led to the fashioning of the remedy in this case.
A fair reading of the record, therefore, reveals that the State had more than six months within which it could have initiated settlement discussions, presented more ambitious objections to the proposed decree reflecting the concerns it has raised before this Court, or offered up its own plan for the review of the plaintiffs and the Special Master. It took none of these steps. Instead, it settled for piecemeal and belated challenges to the scope of the

proposed plan.
The Court implies that the District Court’s decision to use the decree entered in Gluth as the starting point for fashioning *414 the relief to be ordered was unfair to petitioners and should not be repeated in comparable circumstances. The browbeaten State, the Court suggests, was “entitled to far more than an opportunity for rebuttal.” Ante, at 2186. I strongly disagree with this characterization of the process. Whether this Court now approves or disapproves of the contents of the Gluth decree, the Court of Appeals had affirmed it in its entirety when this case was tried, and it was surely appropriate for the District Court to use it as a starting-point for its remedial task in this **2211 case. Petitioners were represented by competent counsel who could have advanced their own proposals for relief if they had thought it expedient to do so. By going further than necessary to correct the excesses of the order, the Court’s decision rewards the State for the uncooperative posture it has assumed throughout the long period of litigating both Gluth and this case. See ante, at 2181–2182; Gluth, 773 F.Supp., at 1312–1316. Although the State’s approach has proven sound as a matter of tactics, allowing it to prevail in a forum that is not as inhibited by precedent as are other federal courts, the Court’s decision undermines the authority and equitable powers of not only this District Court, but District Courts throughout the Nation. It is quite wrong, in my judgment, for this Court to suggest that the District Court denied the State a fair opportunity to be heard, and entirely unnecessary for it to dispose of the smorgasbord of constitutional issues that it consumes in Part II.
Accordingly, while I agree that a remand is appropriate, I cannot join the Court’s opinion.
Parallel Citations
116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606, 64 USLW 4587, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4559, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7362
	  

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