Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA

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2242 Ali’i Street

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Faga’alu, AS 96799;

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VA’ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI

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4428 Sierra Drive

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Honolulu, HI 96816;

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FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, )

on his own behalf and on behalf of his

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minor children, M.F.M., L.C.M., and E.T.M. )

Mamea Residence (no street address)

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P.O. Box 3010

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Tafuna, AS 96799;

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TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE

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10455 Des Moines Memorial Drive, Suite 301 )

Seattle, WA 98168;

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EMY FIATALA AFALAVA

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6909 Ottoville Street

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Pago Pago, AS 96799; and

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SAMOAN FEDERATION

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OF AMERICA, INC.

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404 E. Carson Street

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Carson, CA 90745,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Serve to:

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U.S. Attorney General

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950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

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Washington, DC 20530;

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U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia )

555 4th Street NW

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Washington, DC 20530;

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Civil Action No. 12-1143

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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2201 C Street NW

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Washington, DC 20520;

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HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,

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in her official capacity as

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Secretary of the U.S. Department of State )

2201 C Street NW

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Washington, DC 20520; and

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JANICE L. JACOBS,

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in her official capacity as

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U.S. Assistant Secretary of State

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for Consular Affairs

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2201 C Street NW

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Washington, DC 20520,

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Defendants.

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs Leneuoti Fiafia Tuaua, Va’aleama Tovia Fosi, Fanuatanu Fauesala Lifa Mamea and his minor children M.F.M., L.C.M., and E.T.M, Taffy-lei T. Maene, Emy Fiatala Afalava (“the Individual Plaintiffs”), and Samoan Federation of America, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), for their Complaint against the United States, the U.S. Department of State (“State Department”), U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Janice L. Jacobs (collectively, “Defendants”), allege as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. In this action, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies throughout the United States, including the U.S. territory of American Samoa. 2. The Citizenship Clause provides: “All persons born . . . in the United States, and

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subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
3. The Samoan islands are an archipelago located in the South Pacific, midway between Hawaii and New Zealand. The eastern islands comprise the U.S. territory of American Samoa, which the United States first claimed in 1900; the western islands comprise the independent nation of Samoa.
4. The U.S. territory of American Samoa is within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States.
5. The Individual Plaintiffs were born in American Samoa. Therefore, they are U.S. citizens by virtue of the Citizenship Clause.
6. The Defendants recognize that the Individual Plaintiffs are Americans, but deny that they are U.S. citizens. Instead, the Defendants classify the Individual Plaintiffs as so-called “non-citizen nationals” of the United States, as reflected in Section 308(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1)) and the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”) at 7 FAM § 1125.1(b)-(c).
7. The State Department has given effect to the “non-citizen national” classification by imprinting a disclaimer of citizenship known as “Endorsement Code 09” in the U.S. passports issued to persons born in American Samoa, including the Individual Plaintiffs. Endorsement Code 09 states: “THE BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN.” See, e.g., Ex. A at 2 (endorsement page of Plaintiff Tuaua’s passport).
8. Persons born in American Samoa who are classified as “non-citizen nationals” of the United States do not have the same rights and privileges as do persons classified as “citizens” of the United States. Among other things, many federal, state, and municipal laws require that a
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person be a U.S. citizen in order to enjoy certain civil, political, and economic liberties, such as the right to vote, serve on a jury, bear arms, and hold certain forms of public sector employment.
9. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that persons born in American Samoa are citizens of the United States by virtue of the Citizenship Clause, and that INA § 308(1) and the State Department’s policy and practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in such persons’ passports are unconstitutional. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction restraining the State Department from imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa and requiring that it issue new passports to the Individual Plaintiffs that do not otherwise disclaim that they are citizens of the United States, in order to ensure that their citizenship is acknowledged by those who look to the State Department’s issuance of a U.S. passport as conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship.
PARTIES 10. a. Plaintiff Leneuoti FiaFia Tuaua was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa in 1951; he currently resides in Faga’alu, American Samoa.
b. The Defendants do not recognize Mr. Tuaua as a citizen of the United States. To the contrary, the Defendants have issued a U.S. passport to Mr. Tuaua that is imprinted with Endorsement Code 09, which states that he is not a citizen of the United States. See Ex. A.
c. From 1969 to 1976, Mr. Tuaua lived in Daly City, California. While attending Skyline College in California, Mr. Tuaua registered for the military draft. At the same time, Mr. Tuaua was ineligible to vote under California law because he was not recognized as a citizen of the United States. Mr. Tuaua was interested in pursuing a career in law enforcement in California, and he scored well on entrance examinations at the California Highway Patrol and the
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San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office. However, only U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens who have applied for citizenship are eligible to serve as peace officers in California. See Cal Gov. Code. § 1031. Mr. Tuaua moved back to American Samoa and pursued a law enforcement career there, retiring in 2007 after 30 years of distinguished service, including many years of service as Marshal for the High Court of American Samoa.
d. Mr. Tuaua would like to obtain a U.S. passport recognizing that he is a citizen, so that he can enjoy the same rights and benefits and be eligible for the same opportunities as all other persons born in the United States. In addition, Mr. Tuaua has two young children, ages 10 and 15, and he would like them to grow up having all of the opportunities of U.S. citizens and not suffer the burdens and harms of being classified as “noncitizen nationals.”
11. a. Plaintiff Va’aleama Tovia Fosi was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa in 1965; he currently lives in Honolulu, Hawaii.
b. The Defendants do not recognize Mr. Fosi as a citizen of the United States. To the contrary, the Defendants have issued a U.S. passport to Mr. Fosi imprinted with Endorsement Code 09, which states that he is not a citizen of the United States.
c. When he was a high school senior in American Samoa, Mr. Fosi was recruited by the U.S. Army to join its early entry program. In 1983, Mr. Fosi enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserves on active duty status while attending American Samoa Community College. In 1985, Mr. Fosi took inactive status in the Reserves when he transferred to the University of Hawaii at Manoa. While in college, Mr. Fosi sought part-time employment, but discovered that because the Defendants classified him as a “non-citizen national,” he was ineligible for federal work study programs and certain other federal employment opportunities. In 1987, Mr. Fosi was
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commissioned as an officer in the Hawaii Army National Guard. In 1993, he transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve in Hawaii. In 1994, he was honorably discharged as a First Lieutenant.
d. Because U.S. citizenship is a requirement for service as an officer in the Hawaii National Guard, Mr. Fosi believed that he had been naturalized in 1987 in connection with his military service. However, when Mr. Fosi renewed his U.S. passport in 1999, he discovered that the Defendants had imprinted his passport with Endorsement Code 09, which states that he is not a U.S. citizen. When he expressed surprise and disappointment to the passport officer who gave him his passport, Mr. Fosi was informed that regardless of his military service, the State Department does not recognize him as a U.S. citizen.
e. Because the Defendants do not recognize Mr. Fosi as a U.S. citizen, and because he cannot obtain a U.S. passport proving that he is, Mr. Fosi is denied the right to vote and the right to bear arms under Hawaii law. See, e.g., Haw. Const. art. II, § 1 (right to vote); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-2(d) (restricting issuance of firearms permits to U.S. citizens and select aliens).
f. Mr. Fosi would like to obtain a U.S. passport recognizing that he is a citizen so that he can enjoy the same rights and benefits and be eligible for the same opportunities as all other persons born in the United States, including the rights to vote and to bear arms.
12. a. Plaintiff Fanuatanu F. L. Mamea was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa in 1941. He brings this action on behalf of himself and his three minor children, M.F.M., age 5; L.C.M., age 4; and E.T.M., age 2, all of whom were born in American Samoa and who reside with Mr. Mamea in Tafuna, American Samoa.
b. The Defendants do not recognize Mr. Mamea or his minor children as
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citizens of the United States. To the contrary, the Defendants have issued U.S. passports to Mr. Mamea and his minor children imprinted with Endorsement Code 09, which state that they are not citizens of the United States.
c. In 1964, Mr. Mamea enlisted in the U.S. Army while living in Hawaii. In 1965, he applied to join the U.S. Special Forces, but, according to his supervisors, his application was denied because the United States did not recognize him as a citizen. Mr. Mamea later served in Vietnam, where he sustained serious injuries during combat for which he was awarded two Purple Hearts. Mr. Mamea was honorably discharged in 1984.
d. Prior to returning to American Samoa in 1984, Mr. Mamea resided in the states of Hawaii, California, Washington, and South Carolina for approximately 20 years. During this time, Mr. Mamea was unable to vote in state and federal elections because the Defendants did not, and still do not, recognize him as a U.S. citizen.
e. Mr. Mamea has a combined disability rating of 80% based on complications from his combat injuries. In the past, Mr. Mamea has had to travel to Hawaii to receive medical care at the Veterans Affairs hospital. He expects that he will have to undertake similar travel in the future. Because Mr. Mamea’s wife is a Tongan national, she is unable to join him in Hawaii to help with his care unless she first obtains a visa. To obtain an immigration visa, Mrs. Mamea would have to wait several years for her priority number to be called, whereas if Mr. Mamea were recognized as a citizen, his wife would be eligible for a K-3 non-immigrant visa during the processing of her immigration application, and she could travel to Hawaii immediately to assist Mr. Mamea when he seeks medical care there. In addition, upon approval of her immigration visa application, there would be no waiting period for her to be able to receive her visa.
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f. Mr. Mamea would like to obtain a U.S. passport recognizing that he is a U.S. citizen so that he can receive the same rights and benefits and be eligible for the same opportunities as all other persons born in the United States, including the ability to obtain immigration priority for his spouse. Mr. Mamea also wants his children to grow up having all of the opportunities of U.S. citizens and not suffer the burdens and harms of being classified as “non-citizen nationals.”
13. a. Plaintiff Taffy-lei T. Maene was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa in 1978; she currently lives in Seattle, Washington.
b. The Defendants do not recognize Ms. Maene as a citizen of the United States. To the contrary, when the Defendants issued Ms. Maene a U.S. passport in 1995 under her former name, her passport was imprinted with Endorsement Code 09, which states that she is not a citizen of the United States.
c. In February 2011, Ms. Maene was hired as a Licensing Services Representative by the Washington State Department of Licensing. In January 2012, two weeks before the end of her one-year probationary period, Ms. Maene was required to produce a U.S. passport or other evidence demonstrating her citizenship as a condition of being retained as a permanent employee. Ms. Maene was unable to do so because the Defendants do not recognize her as a citizen. Ms. Maene was released from her job and informed by her employer that the only reason she was being denied permanent employment was because she could not demonstrate that she was a U.S. citizen. The loss of her job deprived Ms. Maene of her salary and her health insurance. Subsequently, Ms. Maene has been deterred from applying for federal positions whose job postings state that U.S. citizenship is a prerequisite for consideration.
d. Although Ms. Maene has been a resident of Washington State since 2006,
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she is ineligible to vote under Washington law because the Defendants do not recognize her as a U.S. citizen and will not provide her with a passport proving that she is. In 2010, Ms. Maene sought to obtain an Enhanced Driver’s License to facilitate travel to Canada, but was informed by Washington State officials that she is ineligible to obtain such a license because she is not recognized as a U.S. citizen.
e. Ms. Maene would like to sponsor her mother, who is a national of the independent nation of Samoa, for immigration so she can join Ms. Maene in Washington State, but is unable to do so because the Defendants do not recognize Ms. Maene as a citizen.
f. Ms. Maene would like to obtain a U.S. passport recognizing she is a citizen so that she can enjoy the same rights and benefits and be eligible for the same opportunities as all other persons born in the United States, such as voting, seeking and maintaining employment for which citizenship is a requirement, and sponsoring her mother for immigration purposes.
14. a. Plaintiff Emy Fiatala Afalava was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa in 1964, and currently resides in Tafuna, American Samoa.
b. The Defendants do not recognize Mr. Afalava as a citizen of the United States. To the contrary, the Defendants issued Mr. Afalava a U.S. passport in 2012 imprinted with Endorsement Code 09, stating that he is not a citizen of the United States.
c. When Mr. Afalava was a high school senior in American Samoa, he was recruited by the U.S. Army to join the U.S. Army Reserves, enlisting on reserve status in 1981. In 1985, Mr. Afalava transferred into the active duty U.S. Army and was stationed in Fort Hood, Texas. In 1990, Mr. Afalava was deployed as part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, serving in the infantry during the Liberation of Kuwait. Mr. Afalava also served overseas
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in Germany and Korea before being honorably discharged in 1996. In 2010, Mr. Afalava was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder related to his experiences during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
d. Before returning to American Samoa in 1999, Mr. Afalava resided in the continental United States for approximately 13 years, including in Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and San Diego, California. Because the Defendants do not recognize Mr. Afalava as a U.S. citizen, he could not obtain a U.S. passport proving his citizenship and was unable to vote during this time. For example, he could not join his infantry colleagues, with whom he had served during the 1991 Liberation of Kuwait, in going to the polls to vote in the 1992 presidential election. The fact that the Defendants do not recognize Mr. Afalava’s citizenship was, and continues to be, emotionally distressing to him.
e. Mr. Afalava would like to obtain a U.S. passport recognizing that he is a citizen so that he can enjoy the same rights and benefits and be eligible for the same opportunities as all other persons born in the United States.
15. a. Plaintiff Samoan Federation of America, Inc. (hereafter, “Samoan Federation”) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Carson, California. The Samoan Federation is a social services organization that serves the Samoan community in the greater Los Angeles area. Founded in 1965, it is one of the oldest Samoan organizations in the continental United States.
b. The Samoan Federation’s activities include helping promote the political empowerment of the Samoan community in California. The Samoan Federation holds regular voter registration drives during election years and is already planning its drives for the 2012 election. Recognition by the United States that all persons born in American Samoa are U.S.
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citizens would significantly advance the Samoan Federation’s efforts to increase the political voice of the Samoan community.
c. The Samoan Federation also expends some of its limited resources helping members of the Samoan community with the complex naturalization process and family immigration issues. For example, the Samoan Federation runs a weekly English-as-a-SecondLanguage class for senior citizens that is intended, in part, to prepare Samoan speakers for the naturalization exam and interview. The Samoan Federation also runs a referral service for individuals who are classified as “non-citizen nationals” and who require naturalization or other assistance. If the Defendants were to recognize that all persons born in American Samoa are U.S. citizens, the Samoan Federation would not have to divert its limited resources to helping persons classified as “non-citizen nationals” to naturalize, and it could better assist them with other needs.
16. The United States, which exercises sovereignty over the U.S. territory of American Samoa, is a Defendant based on the actions and conduct of its agents, which include but are not limited to the U.S. Department of State, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs.
17. Defendant U.S. Department of State (“State Department”) is an executive department of the United States. The State Department, through its Bureau of Consular Affairs, is responsible for the issuance of United States passports. The State Department’s headquarters is located in Washington, D.C.
18. Defendant Hillary Rodham Clinton is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of State. Under federal law, Secretary Clinton or her designee is directly responsible for the execution and administration of the statutes and regulations governing the issuance of
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U.S. passports. See 22 U.S.C. § 211A. Secretary Clinton “accomplishes this function through the Bureau of Consular Affairs . . . .” 7 FAM § 1311(e).
19. Defendant Janice Jacobs is being sued in her official capacity as the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs. In that capacity, Ambassador Jacobs is responsible for the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the creation of policies and procedures relating to the issuance of passports. See 1 FAM § 251.1(d). Accordingly, she is Secretary Clinton’s designee as to the execution and administration of the statues and regulations governing the issuance of U.S. passports.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 20. This action seeks declaratory relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. 21. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise under the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, because the State Department’s practice of placing Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa is contrary to their constitutional rights, and is also arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 22. Sovereign immunity has been waived by 5 U.S.C. § 702. 23. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS American Samoa’s History as Part of the United States 24. The United States claimed American Samoa pursuant to the Tripartite Convention of 1899 among the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. See 31 Stat. 1878 (ratified Feb. 16, 1900). 25. The American flag was raised over American Samoa on April 17, 1900, during a ceremony in which the traditional leaders of the islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u signed Deeds of Cession formally ceding sovereignty of their islands to the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 1661. Similar Deeds of Cession were signed by the traditional leaders of the Manu’a islands in 1904. See id. In 1925, federal law recognized the atoll of Swains Island as part of American Samoa. See id. § 1662. 26. Over the past 112 years, American Samoa’s ties to the rest of the United States have strengthened significantly as American Samoa has been integrated into the nation’s political, economic, and cultural identity. 27. During American Samoa’s first 51 years as part of the United States, it was administered by the U.S. Navy, with limited self-governance. In 1951, authority was transferred to the Department of the Interior, which retains general administrative supervision to this day. In 1967, the Secretary of the Interior approved the Constitution of American Samoa, establishing a tripartite government with a popularly elected bicameral legislature, an appointed governor, and an independent judiciary appointed by the Secretary. In 1977, the Secretary of the Interior provided for a popularly elected Governor. In 1978, Congress enacted legislation providing for a non-voting Delegate to represent American Samoa in the U.S. House of Representatives. 28. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, when American Samoa became part of the
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United States in 1900, its population was just over 5,600. Since then, its resident population has grown nearly tenfold to more than 55,500. Many generations of American Samoans also now live throughout the rest of the United States.
29. When American Samoa first became a part of the United States, there was no public education system to speak of. Today, American Samoa has twenty-two primary schools, six secondary schools, and a community college in the public education system, with a curriculum reflecting U.S. educational standards.
30. In 1900, the only meaningful way to travel or otherwise communicate between American Samoa and the rest of the United States was by ship. Today, the Internet and other technological advances allow instantaneous communication between American Samoa and the rest of the United States. Regular flights between American Samoa’s capital of Pago Pago and Honolulu have furthered American Samoa’s integration into the United States.
31. American Samoans have served in the U.S. Armed Forces since the islands first became part of the United States. As early as July 1900, the Navy Commandant stationed in American Samoa was authorized to enlist 58 Samoans as “Landsmen” in the U.S. Navy to form the Fita Fita Guard, which supported the U.S. Navy during 51 years of naval administration in American Samoa. American Samoans have served the nation during every major war of the 20th and 21st Centuries. Today, American Samoa’s enlistment rate is among the highest in the nation and, on a per capita basis, American Samoa has made a greater sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan than has any other U.S. territory or state. The U.S. Army has a full-time recruiting station in American Samoa, and recruiters from other military branches also make regular recruiting visits. Supporting these efforts, American Samoa’s six public high schools host U.S. Army Junior Reserve Officer Training Corp (“ROTC”) programs, and the American Samoa
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Community College hosts a U.S. Army ROTC program. The U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy each reserve space for two students from American Samoa to be appointed and enrolled.
32. American Samoa is home to a multimillion dollar U.S. Army Reserve Center named in honor of the late Sergeant First Class Konelio Pele, an American Samoan who was awarded a Silver Star during the Vietnam War for his heroic efforts saving the lives of fellow Americans. American Samoa also supports a Community-Based Outpatient Clinic as part of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Pacific Islands Health Care System. The U.S. Coast Guard has a Marine Safety Detachment Unit based in American Samoa.
33. The federal government has a strong civilian presence in American Samoa, with numerous federal agency offices in the territory. Like other Americans, American Samoans participate in and benefit from many federal programs.
34. Congress has established the National Park of American Samoa as part of the National Park System. Twenty-three locations in American Samoa are also listed on the National Register of Historic Places, two of which – Government House and the World War II Blunts Point Battery – have received the official designation of National Historic Landmark. American Samoa’s Fagatele Bay is recognized as a National Marine Sanctuary.
35. The United States has taken a number of actions reflecting and celebrating American Samoa’s integration into the nation. For example, on April 17, 2000, the United States Postal Service issued a stamp commemorating the centennial of American Samoa becoming a part of the United States. In 2008, the Postal Service released a stamp recognizing the flag of American Samoa as part of the “Flags of Our Nation” series honoring the flags of the 50 states, the five territories, and the District of Columbia. In July 2009, the United States Mint released
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the American Samoa Quarter as part of its D.C. & U.S. Territories Quarters Program, following the popular 50 State Quarters Program. The Mint is also scheduled to release a quarter depicting the National Park of American Samoa in 2020 as part of its America the Beautiful Quarters Program.
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 36. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 37. Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the term “the United States,” as used elsewhere in the Constitution, “designate[s] the whole, or any particular portion of the American empire.” Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 319 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.). In its decision, the Court stated: “Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of States and territories. The [D]istrict of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania . . . .” Id. (emphases added). 38. In 1866, when the U.S. Senate was debating the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Jacob Howard introduced the text of the Citizenship Clause and stated his belief that the Clause “settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890, 2890 (1866). According to Senator Howard, he and other proponents of the Citizenship Clause “desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens . . . beyond the legislative power . . . .” Id. at 2896.
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39. During this same Senate debate, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “second section [i.e., the Apportionment Clause] refers to no persons except those in the States of the union; but the first section refers to persons everywhere, whether in the States or in the Territories or in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 2894 (emphases added).
40. In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[t]he [Fourteenth] [A]mendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, . . . of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (emphasis added). The Court also stated that “[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . has conferred no authority upon [C]ongress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the [C]onstitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.” Id. at 703.
The Defendants Refuse to Recognize That Persons Born in American Samoa Are U.S. Citizens under the Citizenship Clause,
Classifying Them Instead as “Non-Citizen Nationals” 41. Despite the text and history of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Defendants have refused to recognize that persons born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa are guaranteed U.S. citizenship by virtue of their birth within the United States. 42. The Defendants have treated the citizenship status of persons born in the U.S. territories of American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands as subject to political determinations by the elected branches of the federal government. 43. In 1917, Congress enacted a statute recognizing the citizenship of persons living in Puerto Rico at the time it was acquired by the United States, and persons born there
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subsequently. Congress did the same for the inhabitants of the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1927 and for the inhabitants of Guam in 1950. In 1986, Congress enacted a law recognizing the inhabitants of the Northern Mariana Islands as U.S. citizens from the moment the United States established sovereignty over the islands.
44. Congress has never enacted a statute recognizing the citizenship of American Samoans. Instead, Congress enacted Section 204(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provided that persons born in American Samoa “shall be recognized as nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth.” This provision was reenacted in 1952 as INA § 308(1) and subsequently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
45. Persons born in American Samoa are the only individuals whom the Defendants classify as “non-citizen nationals.”
46. Under federal law, unless persons born in American Samoa obtain citizenship through parents who are already recognized as citizens, the only way they can be recognized as U.S. citizens is through naturalization.
47. Until 1952, so-called “non-citizen nationals” of Samoan descent were not even permitted to naturalize under federal immigration law. Today, the lengthy, costly, and burdensome nature of the naturalization process deters and prevents many eligible adults from pursuing the naturalization process; moreover, minors are not permitted to apply for naturalization. The naturalization process can take a year or more to complete, with no guarantee of success, as the ultimate citizenship determination is made on a case-by-case basis by an officer of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
48. Although persons born in American Samoa who are classified by Defendants as
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“non-citizen nationals” are Americans, they are treated the same as foreign nationals for most aspects of the naturalization process:
a. “Non-citizen nationals,” like foreign nationals, must first establish residency for a period of three months in a USCIS district before applying to naturalize. There are no such districts in American Samoa, which means that a resident of American Samoa who wishes to apply to naturalize must bear the substantial costs and disruption of relocating to, and establishing residency in, another part of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1436.
b. “Non-citizen nationals,” like foreign nationals, must take and pass the USCIS English and civics test, even though the public education curriculum in American Samoa is taught in English and reflects U.S. educational standards for English and language arts, American history, and American government.
c. “Non-citizen nationals,” like foreign nationals, must submit to fingerprinting and a determination of their good moral character, including an in-person interview.
d. “Non-citizen nationals” must take the same Oath of Allegiance that is required of foreign nationals, which includes an affirmation that they “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which [they] have heretofore been a subject or citizen . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1337.1. Yet by definition, all “non-citizen nationals” necessarily “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22), and many have already sworn an oath to defend the Constitution through military or other federal government service.
e. “Non-citizen nationals” of the United States, like foreign nationals, must pay government fees currently totaling $680, in addition to any other expenses associated with
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Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 20 of 27
the naturalization process. The State Department Will Not Provide the Individual Plaintiffs with U.S. Passports Recognizing That They Are U.S. Citizens
49. As reflected in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual, it is the State Department’s policy that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not apply to persons born in American Samoa. See 7 FAM § 1125.1(b) (“[T]he citizenship provisions of the Constitution do not apply to persons born there [i.e., American Samoa].”).
50. It is also the State Department’s policy to recognize only “non-citizen U.S. nationality for the people born . . . in American Samoa.” 7 FAM § 1125.1(d). This policy relies upon INA § 308(1), which provides that persons born in American Samoa “shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1); see 7 FAM § 1125.1(d)-(e).
51. A U.S. passport is the only federal document for which a member of the general public may apply in order to obtain official recognition that he or she is a U.S. citizen by virtue of birth in the United States.
52. U.S. passports may only be issued by the State Department. 53. According to the State Department, “U.S. citizens and U.S. non-citizen nationals who have satisfactorily established their identity and citizenship/nationality . . . are entitled to U.S. passports.” 7 FAM § 1313(a). However, “nationals of the United States who are not citizens” are only entitled to “U.S. passports with appropriate endorsements.” Id. § 1111(b)(1). 54. It is the State Department’s policy and practice to imprint Endorsement Code 09 in the U.S. passports of persons born in American Samoa who are classified as “non-citizen nationals.” See 7 FAM § 1130 App’x H ¶ (c). Endorsement Code 09 states: “THE BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN.” Id. 55. The State Department has imprinted Endorsement Code 09 on the U.S. passports
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Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 21 of 27
of the Individual Plaintiffs. 56. The Individual Plaintiffs are unable to obtain U.S. passports that are not imprinted
with Endorsement Code 09 unless they successfully undertake the naturalization process. 57. Persons born in American Samoa are the only individuals who are issued United
States passports stating that they are not citizens of the United States. The Defendants’ Refusal to Recognize the U.S. Citizenship of the Individual Plaintiffs Causes Material Harms
58. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 57. 59. The Defendants’ refusal to recognize the Individual Plaintiffs as U.S. citizens by virtue of the Citizenship Clause is a deprivation of their constitutional rights and is therefore a material injury. 60. The Defendants’ classification of the Individual Plaintiffs as “non-citizen nationals” instead of as “citizens” also imposes material dignitary and emotional harms upon the Individual Plaintiffs. The formal legal classification of “non-citizen national,” which is limited to persons born in American Samoa, stigmatizes the Individual Plaintiffs as inferior and subordinate to their fellow Americans. 61. The Defendants’ classification of the Individual Plaintiffs as “non-citizen nationals” instead of as “citizens” also imposes economic and legal harms upon the Individual Plaintiffs. Because of Defendants’ actions, the Individual Plaintiffs are denied recognition as U.S. citizens by federal, state, and local governments, foreign governments, private employers, and other entities. Because the Defendants have classified them as “non-citizen nationals,” the Individual Plaintiffs are required to navigate a confusing patchwork of federal and state laws that often treat them less favorably than citizens, and sometimes even less favorably than permanent resident aliens. Laws that limit the civil, political, and economic liberties of “non-citizen
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Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 22 of 27
nationals” affect the life choices of Individual Plaintiffs, including decisions regarding where to live and what careers to pursue. This is particularly true for the minor Plaintiffs, who do not have the same opportunities available to them as do children born in other parts of the United States.
62. The laws of many U.S. states deny “non-citizen nationals” the right to vote in federal, state, and local elections, the right to hold public office, and the right to serve on a jury. Plaintiffs Fosi and Maene, for example, are unable to exercise these rights because they currently reside in the states of Hawaii and Washington, respectively. See, e.g., Haw. Const. art. II, § 1 (right to vote); Wash. Const. art. III, § 25 (right to hold office); Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070 (right to serve as juror).
63. State and federal laws also limit the employment opportunities of “non-citizen nationals.” Many states and municipalities have citizenship requirements for law enforcement officers, firefighters, and other public service positions. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 1031 (public safety officers); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 41.08.060 & 41.08.070 (firefighters and civil service); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 121-14 (Hawaii National Guard officers); 24 Pa. Stat. § 11-1109 (public school teachers). At the federal level, citizenship is required for service as an officer in the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Special Forces. These and other employment restrictions limit the career opportunities for Individual Plaintiffs. For example, as stated in Paragraph 13(c) above, Plaintiff Maene recently lost her job as a Licensing Services Representative at the Washington State Department of Licensing because the United States classifies her as a “non-citizen national.” Similarly, as stated in Paragraph 10(c) above, when Plaintiff Tuaua resided in California, he was ineligible to apply for law enforcement positions despite having performed well on qualifying tests.
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64. “Non-citizen nationals” are treated less favorably than citizens when it comes to “sponsoring” foreign-national relatives for immigration visas because “non-citizen nationals” are generally considered equivalent to “lawful permanent residents” for purposes of immigration preference. As relevant here, USCIS permits U.S. citizens to sponsor foreign national spouses, parents, and siblings to obtain an immigration visa, and there is no waiting requirement for a U.S. citizen’s spouse or parent after the immigration visa application has been approved. In contrast, “non-citizen nationals” may only sponsor spouses, but not parents or siblings. Moreover, the spouses of “non-citizen nationals” cannot receive a visa, even after their immigration application has been approved, until they reach their immigration priority date; according to the June 2012 Visa Bulletin, the current wait is more than two years. These restrictions have burdened Individual Plaintiffs whose immediate family members are foreign nationals. For example, Plaintiff Maene, as stated in Paragraph 13(e) above, is unable to sponsor her foreign-national mother to obtain an immigration visa. And although Plaintiff Mamea, as stated in Paragraph 12(e) above, may sponsor his foreign-national wife, she would likely have to wait several years to receive an immigration visa.
65. The laws of some U.S. states deny “non-citizen nationals” the right to bear arms. For example, as stated in Paragraph 11(e) above, Hawaii law does not permit Plaintiff Fosi to obtain or possess a firearm, even though he served as an officer in the Hawaii National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-2(d).
66. “Non-citizen nationals” who travel internationally must rely on U.S. passports that expressly state, via Endorsement Code 09, that they are not U.S. citizens. In some cases, this creates special burdens; for example, independent Samoa requires that “non-citizen nationals” purchase a special visitor’s permit that is not required for visiting U.S. citizens. In all
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cases, Endorsement Code 09 creates uncertainty about how foreign officials will react when presented with an anomalous U.S. passport stating that the bearer is not a U.S. citizen. Thus, for example, Plaintiff Fosi is deterred from exercising his right to travel abroad because his U.S. passport states that he is not a U.S. citizen, and he fears the confusion that Endorsement 09 might create for foreign officials.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
(INA § 308(1) Violates the Fourteenth Amendment) 67. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 66. 68. By classifying persons born in American Samoa as nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, INA § 308(1) violates the Fourteenth Amendment, both on its face and as applied to the Individual Plaintiffs through the State Department’s policy and practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in the passports issued to persons born in American Samoa. 69. Plaintiffs therefore seek entry of a judgment declaring that INA § 308(1) violates the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and as applied to the Individual Plaintiffs, and enjoining Defendants from placing Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa.
COUNT II (The State Department’s Policy and Practice of Refusing to Recognize the Birthright Citizenship of Persons Born in American Samoa Violates the Fourteenth Amendment)
70. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 69. 71. By classifying persons born in American Samoa as nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, the State Department’s policy that “the citizenship provisions of the Constitution do not apply to persons born [in American Samoa],” as reflected in 7 FAM
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Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 25 of 27
§ 1125.1(b) and (d), violates the Fourteenth Amendment, both on its face and as applied through the Department’s policy and practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in passports issued to persons born in American Samoa.
72. Plaintiffs therefore seek entry of a judgment declaring that the State Department’s policy, as reflected in 7 FAM § 1125.1(b) and (d), violates the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and as applied to the Individual Plaintiffs, and enjoining Defendants from placing Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa.
COUNT III (The State Department’s Practice of Placing Endorsement Code 09 in the Passports of
Persons Born in American Samoa Violates the Administrative Procedure Act) 73. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 72. 74. The State Department’s policy and practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa, including the Individual Plaintiffs, is “contrary to constitutional right” and is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B). 75. Plaintiffs seek entry of a judgment declaring Defendants’ practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa to be in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, enjoining Defendants from placing Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa, and ordering Defendants to issue new passports to the Individual Plaintiffs that do not contain Endorsement Code 09 and that do not otherwise disclaim that they are citizens of the United States.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: A. Declare that persons born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa are born “in
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Case 1:12-cv-01143-RJL Document 1 Filed 07/10/12 Page 26 of 27
the United States” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and are therefore U.S. citizens by birth; B. Declare that INA § 308(1) violates the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and as applied to classify persons born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa as nationals, but not citizens, of the United States; C. Declare that the State Department’s policy as reflected in 7 FAM § 1125.1(b) and (d) violates the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and as applied to classify persons born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa as nationals, but not citizens, of the United States; D. Declare that the State Department’s policy and practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in the passports of persons born in American Samoa violates the Administrative Procedure Act; E. Enter a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from taking any action to enforce INA § 308(1) or the State Department’s policy as reflected in 7 FAM § 1125.1(b) and (d), including through Defendants’ practice of imprinting Endorsement Code 09 in passports issued to persons born in American Samoa; F. Order Defendants to issue new passports to the Individual Plaintiffs that do not contain Endorsement Code 09 and that do not otherwise disclaim that they are citizens of the United States; G. Award such costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to which the Plaintiffs might be entitled by law; and H. Award such other relief as this Court may deem just and appropriate.
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, v.

)
)
) Civil Case No. 12-01143 (RJL)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )

)

Dekndanh.

)

MEMORA~OPINION

June2h_, 2013 [# 9]

Plaintiffs are five non-citizen U.S. nationals born in American Samoa and the

Samoan Federation of America, a nonprofit organization serving the Samoan community in Los Angeles. Compl. ~~ I0-15. 1 They seek declaratory and injunctive relief against

defendants, the United States and the related parties that execute its citizenship laws. /d. ~~ 16-19.2 They assert that the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause extends to

American Samoa and that people born in American Samoa are therefore U.S. citizens at

birth. !d. at 25-26. Plaintiffs also argue that Immigration and Naturalization Act §

308(1) is unconstitutional because it provides that American Samoans are noncitizen U.S.

nationals. See id. at 26. Further, they ask the Court to hold that a State Department

policy and practice are unconstitutional and invalid under the Administrative Procedure

1 The five individual plaintiffs are Leneuoti Fiafia Tuaua ("Tuaua"), Va'aleama Tovia Fosi ("FosP'), Fanuatanu Fauesala Lifa Mamea ("Mamea"), Taffy-Lei T. Maene ("Maene"), and Emy Fiatala Afaleva ("Afaleva"). Mamea also brings his claims on behalf of his three minor children. !d. ~ 12(a). 2 Defendants are the United States, the State Department, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs.
1

Act ("APA"). See Compl. at 26. Underlying all of these claims is the same legal argument: the Citizenship Clause applies to American Samoa, so contrary law and policy must be invalidated. The United States and related parties move to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem. ") [Dkt. # 9] at 1. Because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court GRANTS defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
American Samoa is located on the eastern islands of an archipelago in the South Pacific. Compl., 3. The United States claimed this territory in a 1900 treaty with Great Britain and Germany, 31 Stat. 1878, and Samoan leaders formally ceded sovereignty to the United States in 1900 and 1904,45 Stat. 1253. American Samoa was administered by the Secretary ofthe Navy until1951, when President Truman transferred administrative responsibility to American Samoa's current supervisor, the Secretary of the Interior. Exec. Order No. 10,264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6,417 (July 3, 1951).
Over the past half-century, American Samoa has strengthened its ties to the United States. The Constitution of American Samoa was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1967 and provides for an elected bicameral legislature, an appointed governor, and an independent judiciary. Compl., 27. In 1977, the Secretary permitted the governor to be selected by popular vote. !d. One year later, Congress voted to give
2

American Samoa a nonvoting delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives. !d. 3
American Samoans have served in the U.S. military since 1900 and, most recently, in the
wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. !d. ~ 31. In signing the 1978 legislation granting
American Samoa a delegate in Congress, President Carter acknowledged the islands'
contributions to American sports and culture and their role as "a permanent part of
American political life." Jimmy Carter, Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 13 702
into Law (Oct. 31, 1978), cited in Pis.' Mem. ofP. & A. in Opp'n to Gov't's Mot.
Dismiss ("Pis.' Opp'n") [Dkt. # 18] at 5 n. 7.
At the same time, however, American Samoa has endeavored to preserve its
traditional way of life known as fa 'a Samoa. Indeed, its constitution protects the Samoan
tradition of communal ownership of ancestral lands by large, extended families:
It shall be the policy of the Government of American Samoa to protect persons of Samoan ancestry against alienation of their lands and the destruction of the Samoan way of life and language, contrary to their best interests. Such legislation as may be necessary may be enacted to protect the lands, customs, culture, and traditional Samoan family organization of persons of Samoan ancestry, and to encourage business enterprises by such persons. No change in the law respecting the alienation or transfer of land or any interest therein, shall be effective unless the same be approved by two successive legislatures by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of each house and by the Governor.
Rev. Const. of Am. Samoa art. I, § 3; see also Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 Am.
Samoa 2d 11, 12 (1980); Amicus Br. at 4-5. American Samoans take pride in their
unique political and cultural practices, and they celebrate its history free from conquest or
involuntary annexation by foreign powers. Amicus Br. at 3.
3 The current delegate, Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, appears as Amicus Curiae in this case opposing the plaintiffs' suit. See generally Br. of the Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega as Amicus Curiae in Supp. ofDefs. ("Amicus Br.") [Dkt. # 12].
3

Federal law classifies American Samoa as an "outlying possession" of the United States. Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA")§ 101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29). As such, people born in American Samoa are U.S. nationals but not U.S. citizens at birth. INA§ 308(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). The State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual ("FAM") accordingly categorizes American Samoa as an unincorporated territory and states that "the citizenship provisions of the Constitution do not apply to persons born there." 7 FAM § 1125.l(b). In accordance with INA and FAM, the State Department stamps the passports of people born in American Samoa with "Endorsement Code 09," which declares that the holder of the passport is a U.S. national but not a U.S. citizen. See Compl. ~ 7; Defs.' Mem. at 6-7. American Samoans have been permitted to become naturalized U.S. citizens since 1952, but plaintiffs describe that process as "lengthy, costly, and burdensome." Compl. ~~ 47-48. American Samoans must relocate to another part of the United States to begin the naturalization process, and the citizenship application requires a $680 fee, a moral character assessment, fingerprinting, and an English and civics examination. Pis.' Opp'n at 11.
All ofthe individual plaintiffs were issued passports by the State Department bearing Endorsement Code 09. See id. ~~ 10-14. Plaintiffs allege a variety of harms that have befallen them due to their non-citizen national status. Several plaintiffs, despite long careers in the military or law enforcement, remain unable to vote or to work in jobs that require citizenship status. !d.~ 10(c), 11(c)-(e), 14(c)-(d). Other harms include: ineligibility for federal work-study programs in college, id. ~ 11 (c); ineligibility for
4

firearm permits, id. ~ 11(e); and inability to obtain travel and immigration visas, id. ~ 12(e), 13(d-e).
STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(l) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pis.' Compl. ("Defs.' Mot.") [Dkt. # 9] at 1. For a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l), "the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the factual predicates ofjurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Erby v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). "[P]laintiffs factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(l) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." US. ex rei. Digital Healthcare, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," assuming that the facts alleged are true. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "While a complaint should not be dismissed unless the court determines that the allegations do not support relief on any legal theory, the complaint nonetheless must set forth sufficient information to suggest that there is some recognized legal theory upon which relief may be granted." District ofColumbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
5

In considering motions under both Rule 12(b)( 1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in a light favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true plaintiffs reasonable factual inferences. See Howard v. Fenty, 580 F. Supp. 2d 86, 8990 (D.D.C. 2008); Smith v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction
Before the Court can reach the merits of this case, it must, of course, ensure that the dispute falls within its jurisdiction. Uti!. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 320 F.3d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Defendants put forth three arguments contesting this Court's jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims: 1) two of plaintiffs' APA claims are jurisdictionally time-barred, 2) the Samoan Federation of America lacks standing, and 3) plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the political question doctrine. See Defs.' Mem. at 17-18, 19-23. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction.
First, defendants allege that two ofthe five individual plaintiffs' APA claims are time-barred because their passports, bearing Endorsement Code 09, were issued outside the six year limitations period. See Defs.' Mem. at 20-21.4 Putting aside the merits of defendants' argument, however, the fact remains that the three other plaintiffs have, in essence, raised the identical APA claim. Thus, having jurisdiction to hear those claims
4 The APA time bar issue is best understood as a jurisdictional matter. Our Circuit has held that the general section 2401(a) statute of limitations applies to APA claims unless another statute provides otherwise, see Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and that, "[u]nlike an ordinary statute of limitations,§ 2401(a) is a jurisdictional condition," Spannaus v. US. Dep't ofJustice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
6

effectively provides this Court with the very jurisdiction necessary to evaluate the merits
of these claims.
Similarly, defendants' assertion that the Samoan Federation of America lacks
standing to sue either on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, see Defs.' Mem. at
21-23, is an argument that is of no real consequence.5 It is well-established that a court
need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs when at least one plaintiff has
standing. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Tozzi v.
US. Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301,310 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Watt
v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The bottom line here is clear:
defendants do not allege that the individual plaintiffs lack standing, nor is there any
reason for this Court to believe that they do. As such, the Court need not address the
standing of the Samoan Federation of America in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.
Finally, defendants advance the novel and somewhat exotic jurisdictional
argument that plaintiffs' suit raises a nonjusticiable political question.6 See Defs.' Mem.
at 17-18. The Government argues that, "at bottom," plaintiffs are arguing for a grant of
5 "A ... motion to dismiss for lack of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction ... ." Edwards v. Aurora Loan Serv., 791 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2011). 6 The political question doctrine is a jurisdictional matter. "[T]he concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed on federal courts by the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III, embodies ... the ... political question doctrine[] .... [T]he presence of a political question [thus] suffices to prevent the power ofthe federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party." Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,215 (1974) (quoted in Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
7

statehood to American Samoa, and that such a determination is a political question
committed by the Constitution to Congress. See id. at 18. Plaintiffs respond that their
complaint does not argue for statehood, but instead argues for the application of a
particular constitutional provision to a territory, a claim "eminently fit for judicial
resolution." Pis.' Opp'n at 33.
To the extent they view plaintiffs as petitioning for statehood, however,
defendants misread the complaint. The complaint clearly urges the application of the
Citizenship Clause to American Samoa, but it never "demands" recognition of American
Samoa as a state or even mentions the word "statehood." See generally Compl. The
actual task before the Court-determining whether the Citizenship Clause applies to
American Samoa-is, indeed, a proper judicial inquiry.7
II. Failure to State a Claim
Having jurisdiction, the Court turns to defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs' claims all hinge upon one legal assertion:
7 The Supreme Court has decided similar questions throughout its history. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (finding Suspension Clause applicable to U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment jury trial right inapplicable to unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico). Most recently, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Constitution's extraterritorial application presents a political question. 553 U.S. at 754-55. In fact, defendants themselves rely on several cases in which courts exercised their jurisdiction to determine whether the Citizenship Clause extended to the Philippines while it was an unincorporated territory of the United States. See Defs.' Mem. at 12-15 (citing, inter alia, Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010); Lacap v. INS, 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998); Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Sanidad v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 515 U.S. 1130 (1995); Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2009)).
8

the Citizenship Clause guarantees the citizenship of people born in American Samoa. Defendants argue that this assertion must be rejected in light of the Constitution's plain language, rulings from the Supreme Court and other federal courts, longstanding historical practice, and pragmatic considerations. See generally Defs.' Mem.; Gov't's Reply in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply") [Dkt. # 20]; Amicus Br. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, I agree. The Citizenship Clause does not guarantee birthright citizenship to American Samoans. As such, for the following reasons, I must dismiss the remainder of plaintiffs' claims.
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and ofthe State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, section 1. Both parties seem to agree that American Samoa is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States, and other courts have concluded as much. See Pis.' Opp'n at 2; Defs.' Mem. at 14 (citing Rabang as noting that the territories are "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States). But to be covered by the Citizenship Clause, a person must be born or naturalized "in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." Thus, the key question becomes whether American Samoa qualifies as a part of the "United States" as that is used within the Citizenship Clause.8
8 The Court is also guided by the familiar principle that '" [p]roper respect for a coordinate branch of the government' requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if 'the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.'" Nat'! Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2579 (2012) (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)). Unless it can be clearly
9

The Supreme Court famously addressed the extent to which the Constitution
applies in territories in a series of cases known as the Insular Cases.9 In these cases, the
Supreme Court contrasted "incorporated" territories-those lands expressly made part of
the United States by an act of Congress-with "unincorporated territories" that had not
yet become part of the United States and were not on a path toward statehood. See, e.g.,
Downes, 182 U.S. at 312; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904); see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d
1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012) (citingBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,757-58 (2008)). 10
In an unincorporated territory, the Insular Cases held that only certain "fundamental"
constitutional rights are extended to its inhabitants. Dorr, 195 U.S. 148-49; Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); see also Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268.
While none of the Insular Cases directly addressed the Citizenship Clause, they suggested
that citizenship was not a "fundamental" right that applied to unincorporated territories. 11
shown that the Citizenship Clause extends to American Samoa, plaintiffs' legal theory should be rejected. 9 The Insular Cases include De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. I (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (190 1); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (190 1); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and Huus v. NY. and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). 10 Plaintiffs do not contest whether American Samoa is an "incorporated" or "unincorporated" territory; rather they reject this dichotomy altogether. See Pis.' Opp'n at 25-33. For the purposes of this characterization, the Court assumes that American Samoa is an "unincorporated" territory, as no act of incorporation has been identified. 11 Plaintiffs cite two cases to support the conclusion that citizenship is a fundamental right: Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality op.) (mentioning the "fundamental right of citizenship") and Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967) (citizenship is "no light trifle"). Each of these cases discusses the fundamentality of citizenship in dicta, and neither case has anything to do with territorial citizenship. Such precedent is unpersuasive in light of the voluminous federal case law discussed herein
10

For example, in the Insular Case of Downes v. Bidwell, the Court addressed, via multiple opinions, whether the Revenue Clause of the Constitution applied in the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico. In an opinion for the majority, Justice Brown intimated in dicta that citizenship was not guaranteed to unincorporated territories. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 (suggesting that citizenship and suffrage are not "natural rights enforced in the Constitution" but rather rights that are "unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals."). He added that "it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions, and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States." !d. at 279-80. He also contrasted the Citizenship Clause with the language of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery "within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction." !d. at 251 (emphasis added). He stated:
[T]he 14th Amendment, upon the subject of citizenship, declares only that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside." Here there is a limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United States, which is not extended to persons born in any place "subject to their jurisdiction." !d. (emphasis added). In a concurrence, Justice White echoed this sentiment, arguing that the practice of acquiring territories "could not be practically exercised if the result would be to endow the inhabitants with citizenship of the United States." !d. at 306.
that concludes that citizenship is not guaranteed to people born in unincorporated territories.
11

Plaintiffs rightly note that Downes did not possess a singular majority opinion and addressed the right to citizenship only in dicta. Pls.' Opp'n at 25-27. But in the century since Downes and the Insular Cases were decided, no federal court has recognized birthright citizenship as a guarantee in unincorporated territories. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has continued to suggest that citizenship is not guaranteed to people born in unincorporated territories. For example, in a case addressing the legal status of an individual born in the Philippines while it was a territory, the Court noted-without objection or concern-that "persons born in the Philippines during [its territorial period] were American nationals" and "until 1946, [could not] become United States citizens. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 639 n.l (1954). Again, in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998), Justice Ginsberg noted in her dissent that "the only remaining noncitizen nationals are residents of American Samoa and Swains Island" and failed to note anything objectionable about their noncitizen national status. More recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court reexamined the Insular Cases in holding that the Constitution's Suspension Clause applies in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 553 U.S. 723, 75759 (2008). The Court noted that the Insular Cases "devised ... a doctrine that allowed [the Court] to use its power sparingly and where it would most be needed. This centuryold doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter." /d. at 759.
Plaintiffs argue that Boumediene did not reaffirm-but instead narrowed-the Insular Cases. Pls.' Opp'n at 28-29. They point to the Court's statement that "[i]t may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its. unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance." Boumediene, 553
12

U.S. at 758 (citing Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475--476 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("Whatever the validity of the [Insular Cases] in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment-or any other provision of the Bill of Rights-to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970's.")). !d. This vague statement crafted in a vastly different context, however, does not license this Court to tum its back on the more direct and more persuasive precedent and the legal framework that has predominated over the unincorporated territories for more than a century.
Indeed, other federal courts have adhered to the precedents of the Insular Cases in similar cases involving unincorporated territories. For example, the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the term "United States" in the Citizenship Clause did not include the Philippines during its time as an unincorporated territory. See generally Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998); Lacap v. INS, 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998); Rabang, 35 F.3d 1449. These courts relied extensively upon Downes to assist with their interpretation of the Citizenship Clause. SeeNolos,611 F.3dat282-84; Valmonte, 136F.3dat918-21;Rabang,35F.3d at 1452-53. Indeed, one of my own distinguished colleagues in an earlier decision cited these precedents to reaffirm that the Citizenship Clause did not include the Philippines during its territorial period. See Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-34 (D.D.C. 2009) (Robinson, J.). 12
12 The Philippines cases also reject the applicability of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), in which the Supreme Court addressed whether a child born to alien
13

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these cases by noting that the Philippines, unlike
American Samoa, was a territory only "temporarily." Pls.' Opp'n at 31. But none of
these cases based their decision on the fact that the Philippines was a temporary territory.
Even if this distinction made a difference, plaintiffs fail to rebut the Ninth Circuit's recent
holding that the Northern Mariana Islands-a current and longstanding territory-is not
included within the bounds ofthe Citizenship Clause. Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026,
1027-28 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 In short, federal courts have held over and over again that
unincorporated territories are not included within the Citizenship Clause, and this Court
sees no reason to do otherwise! 14
In both their brief and in oral argument, plaintiffs placed great weight on our
Circuit's decision in King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In that case, the
Court addressed whether an American citizen was guaranteed the right to trial by jury in
parents in the United States was a citizen. See Nolos, 611 F.3d at 284; Valmonte, 136 F.3d at 920; Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1454; see also Pls.' Opp'n at 13, 24 (citing Wong Kim Ark). Because the child was born in San Francisco, the Court did not need to address the territorial scope of the Citizenship Clause in that case. 13 Plaintiffs address Eche in a footnote, stating simply that it "relies on the same flawed arguments as the other cases cited by Defendants." Pls.' Opp'n at 31 n.25. 14 Unpersuasively, plaintiffs attempt to use legislative history to support the territorial reach of the Citizenship Clause. See Pls.' Opp'n at 13-18. Plaintiffs cite, inter alia, a senator's comment that the Citizenship Clause declares that "every person born within the limits of the United States [is] a citizen." !d. at 13. This comment fails to shed any light on whether the "United States" includes its territories. Plaintiffs also rely upon contemporaneous language from another senator, President Jackson, and other legislation that include people in the "Territories" within the bounds of the Citizenship Clause. !d. at 13-15. However, it is unclear from this language whether the "Territories" included only incorporated territories on the path to statehood or also unincorporated territoriesparticularly unincorporated territories such as American Samoa that had not yet come into existence. Even if this legislative history were clear, these stray comments are not sufficient to upend years of contrary legal precedent.
14

American Samoa. !d. at 1146. Rejecting the reliance on "key words such as 'fundamental' or 'unincorporated territory"' in the Insular Cases and other cases, the court instead employed the test from Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring): asking whether the right to trial by jury would be "'impractical and anomalous."' King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75). As defendants rightly note, this case addressed the rights of an existing citizen in American Samoa-not the right of persons born in American Samoa to citizenship itself. Defs.' Reply at 9. This distinction was critical in Reid, the case upon which King relied. As the Supreme Court noted in Boumediene, "That the petitioners in Reid were American citizens was a key factor in the case and was central to the plurality's conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to American civilians tried outside the United States." 553 U.S. at 760. Further, neither King nor Reid discussed the right to citizenship-a right that other federal courts have addressed directly and, in doing so, have refused to extend to unincorporated territories.
Morever, our Circuit appeared to reaffirm its commitment to Insular Cases-in terms of extending only "fundamental" rights to unincorporated territories-in a case following King that involved a due process claim in American Samoa. Corp. of Presiding Bishop ofChurch ofJesus Christ ofthe Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In that case, the Circuit stated that "the Supreme Court long ago determined that in the 'unincorporated' territories, such as American Samoa, the guarantees of the Constitution apply only insofar as its 'fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights' express 'principles which are the basis of all free government which
15

cannot be with impunity transcended."' !d. (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 146-47). The court held that access to a court independent of the executive branch is not a "fundamental" right extending to American Samoa. !d. at 386. In light of this later case and King's distinct context, this Court does not find King to be an appropriate guidepost for this
case. 15 Finally, this Court is mindful of the years of past practice in which territorial
citizenship has been treated as a statutory, and not a constitutional, right. In the
unincorporated territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands, birthright citizenship was conferred upon their inhabitants by
various statutes many years after the United States acquired them. See Amicus Br. at 10-
11. If the Citizenship Clause guaranteed birthright citizenship in unincorporated
territories, these statutes would have been unnecessary. While longstanding practice is
not sufficient to demonstrate constitutionality, such a practice requires special scrutiny
before being set aside. See, e.g., Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it[.]"); Walz v. Tax Comm 'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested
15 In a brief, per curiam opinion, our Circuit declined to address the question of whether the Citizenship Clause applied to the Philippines in Mendoza v. Soc. Security Comm 'r, 92 F. App'x 3, 3 (2004). In claiming that Mendoza suggests that birthright citizenship in the territories is "an open question in the Circuit," plaintiffs attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill. The Mendoza court sidestepped the issue not because it was necessarily "an open question"-but rather because the issue was simply unnecessary to the disposition of the case. See id. ("We need not decide any of the constitutional questions presented by Amicus ....").
16

or protected right in violation ofthe Constitution by long use .... Yet an unbroken practice ... is not something to be lightly cast aside."). And while Congress cannot take away the citizenship of individuals covered by the Citizenship Clause, it can bestow citizenship upon those not within the Constitution's breadth. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United States."); id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress may "establish an uniform Rule ofNaturalization ...."). To date, Congress has not seen fit to bestow birthright citizenship upon American Samoa, and in accordance with the law, this Court must and will respect that choice. 16
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' Motion to Dismiss. An order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
16 Because the Court finds statutory interpretation and legal precedent sufficient to grant defendants' motion to dismiss, it need not address the Amicus's arguments about the potentially deleterious effects of mandating birthright citizenship on American Samoa's traditional culture. See Amicus Br. at 12-18.
17

 
 USCA Case #13-5272 Document #1555940

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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 9, 2015

Decided June 5, 2015

No. 13-5272

LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPELLEES

AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT AND AUMUA AMATA, INTERVENORS

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:12-cv-01143)

Neil C. Weare argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert J. Katerberg, Murad S. Hussain, Elliott C. Mogul, and Dawn Y. Yamane Hewett.
Jessica Ring Amunson and Erica L. Ross were on the brief for amicus curiae David B. Cohen in support of appellants.
David J. Debold and Molly M. Claflin were on the brief for amici curiae Citizenship Scholars in support of appellants.

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Eugene D. Gulland was on the brief for amici curiae Certain Members of Congress and Former Government Officials in support of appellants.
Krim M. Ballentine, filed the brief as amicus curiae in support of appellant.
Wynne P. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Michael F. Williams argued the cause and filed the brief for intervenors for appellee American Samoa Government and Congresswoman Aumua Amata.
Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Dina B. Mishra, and Adam I. Klein were on the brief for amici curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law and Legal History in support of neither party.
Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.
BROWN, Circuit Judge: In our constitutional republic, Justice Brandeis observed, the title of citizen is superior to the title of President. Thus, the questions “[w]ho is the citizen[?]” and “what is the meaning of the term?” Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 61 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938), are no less than the questions of “who constitutes the sovereign state?” and “what is the meaning of statehood as an association?” We are called upon to resolve one narrow circumstance implicating these weighty inquiries. Appellants are individuals born in the United States territory of American

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Samoa. Statutorily deemed “non-citizen nationals” at birth, they argue the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause affords them citizenship by dint of birthright. They are opposed not merely by the United States but by the democratically elected government of the American Samoan people. We sympathize with Appellants’ individual plights, apparently more freighted with duty and sacrifice than benefits and privilege, but the Citizenship Clause is textually ambiguous as to whether “in the United States” encompasses America’s unincorporated territories and we hold it “impractical and anomalous,” see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957), to impose citizenship by judicial fiat—where doing so requires us to override the democratic prerogatives of the American Samoan people themselves. The judgment of the district court is affirmed; the Citizenship Clause does not extend birthright citizenship to those born in American Samoa.
I
The South Pacific islands of American Samoa have been a United States territory since 1900, when the traditional leaders of the Samoan Islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u voluntarily ceded their sovereign authority to the United States Government. See Instrument of Cession by the Chiefs of Tutuila Islands to United States Government, U.S.-Tutuila, Apr. 17, 1900. Today the American Samoan territory is partially self-governed, possessing a popularly elected bicameral legislature and similarly elected governor.1 Complaint at 13 ¶ 27, Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d
1 Although it possesses significant institutions of local selfgovernance American Samoa is classified as a “non-self-governing territory” by the United Nations General Assembly. See generally U.N. Charter ch. XI.

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88 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01143). The territory, however, remains under the ultimate supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. See Exec. Order No. 10,264 (June 29, 1951) (transferring supervisory authority from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior).
Unlike those born in the United States’ other current territorial possessions—who are statutorily deemed American citizens at birth—section 308(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 designates persons born in American Samoa as non-citizen nationals.2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). Below, Appellants challenged section 308(1), as well as State Department policies and practices implementing the statute, see, e.g., 7 FAM § 1125.1(b), on Citizenship Clause grounds and under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court rejected Appellants’ arguments and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal Appellants reassert only their constitutional claim. Our review is de novo. Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
II
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. Both Appellants and the
2 Persons born in the Philippines during the territorial period, which ended in 1946, were likewise statutorily designated non-citizen nationals.

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United States government3 agree the text and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously leads to a single inexorable conclusion as to whether American Samoa is within the United States for purposes of the clause. They materially disagree only as to whether the inescapable conclusion to be drawn is whether American Samoa “is” or “is not” a part of the United States. See generally JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (17th ed. 2002) (“The devil is in the detail[s].”).
A
Appellants rely on a comparison of the first and second clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—the Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses, respectively. They argue the former is framed expansively through use of the overarching term “in the United States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1, while the latter speaks narrowly in terms of apportionment of representatives “among the several States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In contrast, the Appellees look to differences between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment.4 Partly relying on dictum from
3 Unlike the United States Government, Intervenors—the American Samoan Government and Congressman Faleomavaega— exclusively argue Appellants’ interpretation is foreclosed by precedents from the Insular case line. 4 The United States Government also argues, “even if Plaintiffs were correct that . . . the Fourteenth Amendment should generally confer birthright citizenship[,] . . . Congress’s direct modification of that status by statute trumps that interpretation.” Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 26, No. 13-5272 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) (relying on Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971)). This argument is novel, if curious. Yet it erroneously conflates Congress’s broad powers over naturalization with authority to statutorily abrogate the scope of birthright citizenship available

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Justice Brown’s judgment for the Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the United States Government argues the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery “within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” id. at 251 (emphasis added), while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause applies to persons “born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” id. (emphasis added). According to the Government the Thirteenth Amendment’s phraseology contemplates areas “not a part of the Union, [which] [a]re still subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” while the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a “limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United States, which is not extended to persons born in any place ‘subject to their jurisdiction.’” Id.
Neither argument is fully persuasive, nor does it squarely resolve the meaning of the ambiguous phrase “in the United States.” The text and structure alone are insufficient to divine the Citizenship Clause’s geographic scope. The difference between the Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses could suggest the former has a broader reach than the latter. See United States v. Diaz-Guerrero, 132 F. App’x 739, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates . . . [intent] to convey a different meaning for those words . . . .”). But, even if this is the case, Appellants’ argument does not resolve the question at issue because both text and structure are silent as to the precise contours of the “United States” under the Citizenship Clause.
under the Constitution itself. Congress’s authority for the latter is wanting. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“[T]he constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature.”).

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Even if “United States” is broader than “among the several States,” it remains ambiguous whether territories situated like American Samoa are “within” the United States for purposes of the clause. The Government’s argument is similarly incomplete. While the language of the Thirteenth Amendment may be broader than that found in the Citizenship Clause, this comparison yields no dispositive insight as to whether the Citizenship Clause’s use of the term “United States” includes American Samoa or similarly situated territories.
Appellants rely on scattered statements from the legislative history to bolster their textual argument. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890, 2894 (1866) (“[The Citizenship Clause] refers to persons everywhere, whether in the States, or in the Territories or in the District of Columbia.”) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). “[T]he legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . like most other legislative history, contains many statements from which conflicting inferences can be drawn . . . .” Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). Here, and as a general matter, “[i]solated statements . . . are not impressive legislative history.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 78 (1984).
B
Appellants and Amici Curiae further contend the Citizenship Clause must—under Supreme Court precedent— be read in light of the common law tradition of jus soli or “the right of the soil.” See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (“The constitution nowhere defines the meaning of . . . [the word “citizen”], either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by the affirmative declaration that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

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thereof, are citizens of the United States.’ In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution.”) (internal citation omitted).
The doctrine of jus soli is an inheritance from the English common law. Those born “within the King’s domain” and “within the obedience or ligeance of the King” were subjects of the King, or “citizens” in modern parlance. See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (1608). The domain of the King was defined broadly. It extended beyond the British Isles to include, for example, persons born in the American colonies. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 120–21 (1830).
After independence the former colonies continued to look to the English common law rule. See, e.g., id. at 164–65. Following the Constitution’s ratification the principal exception to jus soli was for African Americans born in the United States, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857); an exception necessarily repudiated with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, Appellants and Amici Curiae accordingly argue the geographic scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause should be read expansively as the
5 During the pre-constitutional period of confederation, “[p]aupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice” were excepted from the “privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (emphasis added). It was only after “the adoption of the Constitution [that] it became necessary in many cases to determine whether an individual in a given case was a citizen of the United States.” Peter Hand Co. v. United States, 2 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1924) (emphasis added).

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“domain” of the sovereign under background jus soli principles.
We are unconvinced, however, that Wong Kim Ark reflects the constitutional codification of the common law rule as applied to outlying territories. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Rabang v. INS, the expansive language of Wong Kim Ark must be read with the understanding that the case “involved a person born in San Francisco, California. The fact that he had been born ‘within the territory’ of the United States was undisputed, and made it unnecessary to define ‘territory’ rigorously or decide whether ‘territory’ in its broader sense meant ‘in the United States’ under the Citizenship Clause.” 35 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 2010); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1998).6 “It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 679.
6 Because it may also bear upon the impractical and anomalousness inquiry, we note the vast practical consequences of departing from our sister circuits’ decisions. Despite Appellants’ contentions to the contrary, there is no material distinction between nationals born in American Samoa and those born in the Philippines prior to its independence in 1946. Contra Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 42– 43 (attempting to distinguish the Philippines context because that territory was acquired via conquest and because it was always the purpose of the United States to eventually withdraw its sovereignty). The extension of citizenship to the American Samoan people would necessarily implicate the United States citizenship status of persons born in the Philippines during the territorial period—and potentially their children through operation of statute.

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And even assuming the framers intended the Citizenship Clause to constitutionally codify jus soli principles, birthright citizenship does not simply follow the flag. Since its conception jus soli has incorporated a requirement of allegiance to the sovereign. To the extent jus soli is adopted into the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of allegiance is manifested by the Citizenship Clause’s mandate that birthright citizens not merely be born within the territorial boundaries of the United States but also “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; see Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655 (“The principle embraced all persons born within the king’s allegiance, and subject to his protection. . . . Children, born in England, of [] aliens, were [] natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king’s dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the king.”).
Appellants would find any allegiance requirement of no moment because, as non-citizen nationals, American Samoans already “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); see also Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. at 155 (“[A]llegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is; and allegiance by birth, is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign.”). Yet, within the context of the Citizenship Clause, “[t]he evident meaning of the[] . . . words [“subject to the jurisdiction thereof”] is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political

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jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.” Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (emphasis added). It was on this basis that the Supreme Court declined to extend constitutional birthright citizenship to Native American tribes. See id. at 99 (“The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not, strictly speaking, foreign states; but they were alien nations, distinct political communities . . . .”). As even the dissent to Elk recognized, “it would be obviously inconsistent with the semi-independent character of such a tribe, and with the obedience they are expected to render to their tribal head, that they should be vested with the complete rights—or, on the other, subjected to the full responsibilities—of American citizens. It would not for a moment be contended that such was the effect of this amendment.” Id. at 119–20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even assuming a background context grounded in principles of jus soli, we are skeptical the framers plainly intended to extend birthright citizenship to distinct, significantly self-governing political territories within the United States’s sphere of sovereignty—even where, as is the case with American Samoa, ultimate governance remains statutorily vested with the United States Government. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 305 (White, J., concurring) (doubting citizenship naturally and inevitably extends to an acquired territory regardless of context).
III
Analysis of the Citizenship Clause’s application to American Samoa would be incomplete absent invocation of the sometimes contentious Insular Cases, where the Supreme Court “addressed whether the Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a State.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See also King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The Insular Cases, in the

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manner in which the results were reached, the incongruity of the results, and the variety of inconsistent views expressed by the different members of the court, are, I believe, without parallel in our judicial history.”).
“The doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ announced in the Insular Cases distinguishes between incorporated territories, which are intended for statehood from the time of acquisition and in which the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and unincorporated territories [such as American Samoa], which are not intended for statehood and in which only [certain] fundamental constitutional rights apply by their own force.” Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1984).
Appellants and Amici contend the Insular Cases have no application because the Citizenship Clause textually defines its own scope. See Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 590 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904) . . . [held] that the Constitution, except insofar as required by its own terms, did not extend to the Philippines.”) (emphasis added). We conclude the scope of the Citizenship Clause, as applied to territories, may not be readily discerned from the plain text or other indicia of the framers’ intent, absent resort to the Insular Cases’ analytical framework. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726 (While the “Constitution has independent force in the territories that [is] not contingent upon acts of legislative grace[,] . . . because of the difficulties and disruptions inherent in transforming . . . [unincorporated territories] into an Anglo-American system, the Court adopted the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution applies . . . only in part in unincorporated territories”).

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Amici Curiae suggest territorial incorporation doctrine should not be expanded to the Citizenship Clause because the doctrine rests on anachronistic views of race and imperialism. But the Court has continued to invoke the Insular framework when dealing with questions of territorial and extraterritorial application. See id. at 756–64. Although some aspects of the Insular Cases’ analysis may now be deemed politically incorrect, the framework remains both applicable and of pragmatic use in assessing the applicability of rights to unincorporated territories. See id. at 758–59 (“[T]he Court devised in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly and where it would be most needed” in recognition of the “inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional provisions always and everywhere.”). See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The Constitution . . . contains grants of power, and limitations which in the nature of things are not always and everywhere applicable and the real issue in the Insular Cases [is] . . . which [] of [the Constitution’s] provisions [a]re applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new conditions and requirements” arising in the territorial context).
As the Supreme Court in Boumediene emphasized, the “common thread uniting the Insular Cases . . . [is that] questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” 553 U.S. at 764. While “fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights” remain guaranteed to persons born in the unincorporated territories, id. at 758 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890)), the Insular framework recognizes the difficulties that frequently inure when “determin[ing] [whether a] particular provision of the Constitution is applicable,” absent inquiry into the impractical or anomalous. See id.; see also Downes, 182 U.S.

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at 292 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations to the United States.”).
A
American citizenship “is one of the most valuable rights in the world today.” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). “The freedoms and opportunities secured by United States citizenship long have been treasured by persons fortunate enough to be born with them, and are yearned for by countless less fortunate.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 522 (1981). Accordingly, even if the Insular framework is applicable, Appellants cite to a bevy of cases to argue citizenship is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 103 (1958) (plurality op.). But those cases do not arise in the territorial context. Such decisions do not reflect the Court’s considered judgment as to the existence of a fundamental right to citizenship for persons born in the United States’ unincorporated territories. Cf. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 679.7
7 This Court, like the lower court, “is [also] mindful of the years of past practice in which territorial citizenship has been treated as a statutory, and not a constitutional right.” Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 98. “[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use . . . . Yet an unbroken practice . . . openly [conducted] . . . by affirmative state action . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).

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“Fundamental” has a distinct and narrow meaning in the context of territorial rights. It is not sufficient that a right be considered fundamentally important in a colloquial sense or even that a right be “necessary to [the] []American regime of ordered liberty.” Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). Under the Insular framework the designation of fundamental extends only to the narrow category of rights and “principles which are the basis of all free government.” Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904) (emphasis added); Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 (“Whatever may be finally decided by the American people as to the status of these islands and their inhabitants . . . they are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and property . . . even [if they are] not possessed of the political rights of citizens of the United States.”).
In this manner the Insular Cases distinguish as universally fundamental those rights so basic as to be integral to free and fair society. In contrast, we consider nonfundamental those artificial, procedural, or remedial rights that—justly revered though they may be—are nonetheless idiosyncratic to the American social compact or to the AngloAmerican tradition of jurisprudence. E.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to unincorporated territories as a fundamental right); see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 (“We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a distinction between certain natural rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence.”).

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We are unconvinced a right to be designated a citizen at birth under the jus soli tradition, rather than a non-citizen national, is a “sine qua non for ‘free government’” or otherwise fundamental under the Insular Cases’ constricted understanding of the term. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 386 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Regardless of its independently controlling force, we therefore adopt the conclusion of Justice Brown’s dictum in his judgment for the Court in Downes. See 182 U.S. at 282–83. “Citizenship by birth within the sovereign’s domain [may be] a cornerstone of [the Anglo-American] common law tradition,” Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 48, Tuaua v. United States, No. 135272 (D.C. Cir. April 25, 2014), but numerous free and democratic societies principally follow jus sanguinis—“right of the blood”—where birthright citizenship is based upon nationality of a child’s parents.8 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 477 (1998) (citing various authority “noting the ‘widespread extent of the rule of jus sanguinis.’”); Graziella Bertocchi & Chiara Strozzi, The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants, 53 J.L. & ECON. 95, 99–100 (2010) (jus sanguinis has traditionally predominated in civil law countries, whereas jus soli has historically been the norm in common law countries).
In states following a jus sanguinis tradition birth in the sovereign’s domain—whether in an outlying territory, colony, or the country proper—is simply irrelevant to the question of citizenship. Nor is the asserted right so natural and intrinsic to the human condition as could not warrant transgression in civil society. See generally Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147.
8 “In the United States, nationality may be predicated either on jus soli . . . or on jus sanguinis . . . .” Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (the latter is conferred statutorily).

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“[C]itizenship has no meaning in the absence of difference.” Peter J. Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1509 (2003). The means by which free and fair societies may elect to ascribe the classification of citizen must accommodate variation where consistent with respect for other, inherent and inalienable, rights of persons. To find a natural right to jus soli birthright citizenship would give umbrage to the liberty of free people to govern the terms of association within the social compact underlying formation of a sovereign state. Cf. Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 87 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938) (“The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state[.]”).9
B
The absence of a fundamental territorial right to jus soli birthright citizenship does not end our inquiry. “The decision in the present case does not depend on key words such as ‘fundamental’ or ‘unincorporated territory[,]’ . . . but can be reached only by applying the principles of the [Insular] [C]ases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the situation as it exists in American Samoa today.” King, 520 F.2d at 1147. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (“It may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance.”). “[T]he question is which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the
9 The case before us pertains only to the permissibility of designating American Samoans as nationals, rather than citizens. We need not decide whether constitutional impropriety would arise if persons born in an unincorporated territory were also denied national status.

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possible alternatives which Congress had before it.” Reid, 354 U.S at 75. In sum, we must ask whether the circumstances are such that recognition of the right to birthright citizenship would prove “impracticable and anomalous,” as applied to contemporary American Samoa. Id. at 74.
Despite American Samoa’s lengthy relationship with the United States, the American Samoan people have not formed a collective consensus in favor of United States citizenship. In part this reluctance stems from unique kinship practices and social structures inherent to the traditional Samoan way of life, including those related to the Samoan system of communal land ownership. Traditionally aiga (extended families) “communally own virtually all Samoan land, [and] the matais [chiefs] have authority over which family members work what family land and where the nuclear families within the extended family will live.” King, 520 F.2d at 1159. Extended families under the authority of matais remain a fundamentally important social unit in modern Samoan society.
Representatives of the American Samoan people have long expressed concern that the extension of United States citizenship to the territory could potentially undermine these aspects of the Samoan way of life. For example Congressman Faleomavaega and the American Samoan Government posit the extension of citizenship could result in greater scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imperiling American Samoa’s traditional, racially-based land alienation rules. Appellants contest the probable danger citizenship poses to American Samoa’s customs and cultural mores.

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The resolution of this dispute would likely require delving into the particulars of American Samoa’s present legal and cultural structures to an extent ill-suited to the limited factual record before us. See King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (“The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a decision in this case rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts.”). We need not rest on such issues or otherwise speculate on the relative merits of the American Samoan Government’s Equal Protection concerns. The imposition of citizenship on the American Samoan territory is impractical and anomalous at a more fundamental level.
We hold it anomalous to impose citizenship over the objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed through their democratically elected representatives.10 See Brief for Intervenors, or in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 23–35, Tuaua v. United States, No. 13-5272 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2014) (opposing constitutional birthright citizenship). A republic of people “is not every group of men, associated in any manner, [it] is the coming together of . . . men who are united by common agreement . . . .” MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA bk. I, ch. 25, 26–35 (George H. Sabine & Stanley B.
10 We address only whether the Citizenship Clause mandates the imposition of birthright citizenship where doing so overrides the wishes of an unincorporated territory’s people. We do not doubt Congress’s general authority to, in its discretion, naturalize persons living in the United States’s unincorporated territories nor do we question the expansive scope of birthright citizenship in the incorporated territories or opine on the general scope of Congress’s powers under the Territorial Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

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Smith trans., Prentice Hall 1929). In this manner, we distinguish a republican association from the autocratic subjugation of free people. And from this, it is consequently understood that democratic “governments . . . deriv[e] their [] powers from the consent of the governed,” Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 41 (1852); under any just system of governance the fount of state power rests on the participation of citizens in civil society—that is, through the free and full association of individuals with, and as a part of, society and the state.11
“Citizenship is the effect of [a] compact[;] . . . [it] is a political tie.” Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 141 (1795) (distinguishing citizenship from the feudal doctrine of perpetual allegiance). “[E]very [] question of citizenship[] . . . [thus] depends on the terms and spirit of [the] social compact.” Id. at 142. The benefits of American citizenship are not understood in isolation; reciprocal to the rights of citizenship are, and should be, the obligations carried by all citizens of the United States. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) (“The duties of citizenship are numerous, and the discharge of many of these obligations is essential to the security and well-being of the Nation.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
11 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the People. . . Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. . . . The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”) (emphasis omitted).

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14 (James Madison) (“[T]he kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union.”).
Citizenship is not the sum of its benefits. It is no less than the adoption or ascription of an identity, that of “citizen” to a particular sovereign state, and a ratification of those mores necessary and intrinsic to association as a full functioning component of that sovereignty. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165–66 (1874) (“There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association.”). At base Appellants ask that we forcibly impose a compact of citizenship—with its concomitant rights, obligations, and implications for cultural identity12—on a distinct and unincorporated territory of people, in the absence of evidence that a majority of the territory’s inhabitants endorse such a tie and where the territory’s democratically elected representatives actively oppose such a compact.
We can envision little that is more anomalous, under modern standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship
12 See also, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 169 (1999) (arguing that statutorily “[f]orcing American citizenship upon Indigenous [Native American] people [destructively] transformed [their] political identity”).

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against the majoritarian will.13 See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73 (recognizing self-determination of people as a guiding principle and obliging members to “take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples” inhabiting non-selfgoverning territories under a member’s responsibility);14 Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941 (endorsing “respect [for] the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”); Woodrow Wilson, President, United States, Fourteen Points, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (“[I]n determining all [] questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”) (Point V). See also Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (“American Samoans take pride in their unique political and cultural practices, and they celebrate its history free from conquest or involuntary annexation by foreign powers.”). To hold the contrary would be to mandate an irregular intrusion into the autonomy of Samoan democratic decision-making; an exercise of paternalism—if not overt cultural imperialism— offensive to the shared democratic traditions of the United States and modern American Samoa. See King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1977) (“The institutions of the present government of American Samoa reflect . . . the democratic tradition . . . .”).
13 Complex questions arise where territorial inhabitants democratically determine either to pursue citizenship or withdraw from union with a state. Such scenarios may implicate the reciprocal associational rights of the state’s current citizens or the right to integrity of the sovereign itself. 14 But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).

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23 IV For the foregoing reasons the district court is
Affirmed.

 
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District of Columbia live database
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12-cv-01143-RJL

CLOSED,TYPE-L

TUAUA et al v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al Assigned to: Judge Richard J. Leon Case in other court: 13-05272 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question

Date Filed: 07/10/2012 Date Terminated: 06/26/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Plaintiff LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA

represented by Murad Hussain ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 942-6143 Fax: (202) 942-5999 Email: murad.hussain@apks.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Katerberg ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 942-5000 Fax: (202) 942-5999 Email: robert.katerberg@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER 1200 18th Street, NW Suite 501 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-6889 Email: elizabeth@theusconstitution.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?111903198488507-L_1_0-1

Judith Ellen Schaeffer CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER 1200 18th Street, NW Suite 501 Washington, DC 20036 (571) 243-0747
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Email: jeschaeffer@msn.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI

Neil C. Weare TRISTER, ROSS, SCHADLER & GOLD, PLLC 1666 Connecticut Ave, NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 202-839-4484 Email: nweare@tristerross.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Murad Hussain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Katerberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judith Ellen Schaeffer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor children, M.F.M.,L.C.M., and E.T.M.

Neil C. Weare (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Murad Hussain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Katerberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?111903198488507-L_1_0-1

Judith Ellen Schaeffer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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District of Columbia live dataAbaTseTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE

Neil C. Weare (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Murad Hussain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Katerberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judith Ellen Schaeffer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff EMY FIATALA AFALAVA

Neil C. Weare (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Murad Hussain (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Katerberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judith Ellen Schaeffer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff SAMOAN FEDERATION OF

Neil C. Weare (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Murad Hussain

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AMERICA, INC.

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(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert J. Katerberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judith Ellen Schaeffer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil C. Weare (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Defendant HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON in her ofﬁcial capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of State
Defendant JANICE JACOBS in her ofﬁcial capacity as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs

represented by Wynne Patrick Kelly U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 252-2545 Fax: (202) 252-2599 Email: wynne.kelly@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Wynne Patrick Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Wynne Patrick Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Wynne Patrick Kelly (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Movant AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT
Amicus ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

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represented by Frank S. Swain FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP 1050 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 312-7416 Fax: (202) 312-7460 Email: frank.swain@faegrebd.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth M Locke CLARE LOCKE, LLP 902 Prince Street Alexandria, VA 22314 (202) 628-7402 Email: libby@clarelocke.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael F. Williams KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 655 15th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 879-5123 Email: michael.williams@kirkland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

07/10/2012

1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0090-2997713) ﬁled by SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFYLEI T. MAENE, LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, EMY FIATALA AFALAVA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EXHIBIT A, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons)(Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 07/10/2012)

07/10/2012

2 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Afﬁliations and Financial Interests by SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC. (Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 07/10/2012)

07/10/2012

Case Assigned to Judge Richard J. Leon. (mmh) (Entered: 07/11/2012)

07/11/2012

3 Electronic Summons (4) Issued as to HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Consent Notices)(ls, ) (Entered: 07/11/2012)

07/17/2012

4 STANDING ORDER. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 7/17/2012. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 07/17/2012)

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08/01/2012
09/14/2012 09/17/2012 10/16/2012 10/19/2012
10/22/2012 10/31/2012 11/07/2012 11/07/2012 11/08/2012 11/13/2012

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5 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON served on 7/19/2012; JANICE JACOBS served on 7/19/2012; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE served on 7/19/2012; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA served on 7/19/2012, RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 07/19/2012., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 7/19/2012. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 9/17/2012.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 08/01/2012)
6 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kelly, Wynne) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting 6 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. It is hereby ORDERED that defendants shall have up to and including October 17, 2012 to respond to plaintiffs' complaint. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 9/17/12. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
7 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kelly, Wynne) (Entered: 10/16/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 7 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED nunc pro tunc and that defendants shall have up to and including October 31, 2012 to respond to plaintiffs' complaint. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 10/19/12. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines: defendants response/answer to complaint due by 10/31/2012. (kc ) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
8 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, Due to Hurricane Sandy by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kelly, Wynne) (Entered: 10/31/2012)
MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 8 Motion for Extension of Time. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED nunc pro tunc and that defendants shall have up to and including November 7, 2012 to respond to plaintiffs' complaint. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 11/7/12. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
9 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kelly, Wynne) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
10 MOTION for Leave to File AMICUS CURIAE by ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(rdj) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
11 NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE by EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC.,

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LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA re 10 MOTION for Leave to File (Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

11/15/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 10 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that the Brief of the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants is accepted as ﬁled with the Court. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 11/15/12. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 11/15/2012)

11/15/2012 12 AMICUS BRIEF by ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA. (znmw, ) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/19/2012

13 Joint MOTION for Brieﬁng Schedule (Joint Motion to Revise Existing Filing Deadlines and Set a Brieﬁng Schedule) by EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA (Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/20/2012

MINUTE ORDER : Setting a Status Conference set for 11/30/2012 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. SO ORDERED. (tb, ) (Entered: 11/20/2012)

11/28/2012

14 NOTICE of Appearance by Judith Ellen Schaeffer on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Schaeffer, Judith) (Entered: 11/28/2012)

11/29/2012

15 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert J. Katerberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Katerberg, Robert) (Entered: 11/29/2012)

11/29/2012

16 NOTICE of Appearance by Neil C. Weare on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Weare, Neil) (Entered: 11/29/2012)

11/29/2012

17 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth Bonnie Wydra on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Wydra, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/29/2012)

11/30/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard J. Leon. Status Conference held on 11/30/2012. Joint MOTION for Brieﬁng Schedule 13 - DENIED. Plaintiff's Brief due by 12/7/2012. Defendant's Reply due by 12/12/2012. Status Conference set for 12/17/2012 02:30 PM in Courtroom 18 before Judge Richard J. Leon. (Court Reporter Patty Gels.) (kc ) Modiﬁed on 12/4/2012 (kc ). (Entered: 11/30/2012)

12/07/2012

18 Memorandum in opposition to re 9 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint ﬁled by EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/07/2012

19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA re 18 Memorandum in Opposition, on Counsel for Amicus Curiae. (Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 12/07/2012)

12/12/2012

20 REPLY to opposition to motion re 9 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint ﬁled by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, JANICE JACOBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Kelly, Wynne) (Entered: 12/12/2012)

12/12/2012 21 REPLY to opposition to motion re 9 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint by Amicus Curiae ﬁled by ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA. (Williams, Michael) (Entered: 12/12/2012)

12/13/2012

22 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael F. Williams on behalf of ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA (Williams, Michael) (Main Document 22 replaced on 12/14/2012) (znmw, ). (Entered: 12/13/2012)

12/17/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard J. Leon: Oral Argument Hearing

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held on 12/17/2012. The Court takes matter under advisement. (Court Reporter Patty Gels.) (kc) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
23 MOTION to Intervene as a Defendant by AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(znmw, ) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
24 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 6/26/2013. (kc ) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
25 ORDER, For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 9 is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 6/26/2013. (see order) (kc ) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
MINUTE ORDER denying as moot 23 Motion to Intervene as a Defendant. In light of the 25 Order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Intervene as a Defendant is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Richard J. Leon on 6/26/13. (lcrjl1) (Entered: 06/26/2013)
26 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 25 Order on Motion to Dismiss, by EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0090-3442951. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Parties have been notiﬁed. (Hussain, Murad) (Entered: 08/23/2013)
27 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals fee was paid this date re 26 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court,. (znmw, ) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
USCA Case Number 13-5272 for 26 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, ﬁled by FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC.. (jf, ) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
28 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Richard J. Leon held on 12/17/12; Date of Issuance:4/22/14. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patty Gels, Telephone number 202-3543236, Court Reporter Email Address : Patty_Gels@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the ﬁrst 90 days after this ﬁling date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to ﬁle with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identiﬁers from this transcript. If no such requests are ﬁled, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the ﬁve personal identiﬁers speciﬁcally covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 5/14/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/24/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/22/2014.(Gels, Patty) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
29 MANDATE of USCA (certiﬁed copy) as to 26 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court, ﬁled by FANUATANU FAUESALA LIFA MAMEA, VA'ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC. ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court appealed from in this cause is hereby afﬁrmed. USCA Case Number 135272. (vt) (Entered: 10/16/2015)

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