Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 1 of 17
U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Opelika) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17−cv−00321−WKW−SMD

STAYED

Edwards v. Cofield et al Assigned to: Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins Referred to: Honorable Judge Stephen Michael Doyle Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 05/18/2017 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Kandace Kay Edwards on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

represented by Alec Karakatsanis Equal Justice Under Law Executive Director 916 G St NW − Ste 701 Washington, DC 20001 202−681−2409 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrea Woods ACLU 125 Broad St − 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2528 Email: awoods@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon Jerel Buskey American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St.; 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−284−7364 Email: bbuskey@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Hubbard Civil Rights Corps 910 17th St NW − Ste 500 Washington, DC 20006 202−930−3835 Email: katherine@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Micah West Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: micah.west@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall Charles Marshall ACLU of Alabama Foundation, Inc. P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106−0179

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334−420−1741 Fax: 334−269−5666 Email: rmarshall@aclualabama.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Jacob Brooke Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: samuel.brooke@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra Marie Jordan Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−531−4447 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: alexandra.jordan@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brock Boone Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956−8468 Fax: (334) 956−8481 Email: brock.boone@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 02/10/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
David Cofield in his official capacity as Randolph County Sheriff

represented by James Randall McNeill Webb & Eley, P.C. P.O. Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334−262−1850 Fax: 334−262−1772 Email: rmcneill@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie Helen Kidd Webb & Eley, P.C. P.O. Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334−262−1850 Fax: 334−262−1772 Email: jkidd@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kendrick Emerson Webb Webb & Eley PO Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124−0909 334−262−1850 Fax: 334−262−1889

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Email: kwebb@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Elizabeth Howell Office of the Alabama Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334−353−1018 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: laura.howell@alabamaag.gov TERMINATED: 01/14/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Christopher May in his official capacity as Circuit Clerk

represented by Benjamin Howard Albritton Alabama Attorney General's Office 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 334−353−4484 Fax: 334−353−8400 Email: Ben.Albritton@AlabamaAG.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brad A. Chynoweth State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Post Office Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334.242.7997 Fax: 334.353.8440 Email: Brad.Chynoweth@AlabamaAG.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James William Davis State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−353−1356 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: Jim.Davis@AlabamaAG.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jordan Dorman Walker , Jr. Balch & Bingham LLP P O Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334−269−3138 Fax: 334−269−3115 Email: dwalker@balch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Elizabeth Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 4 of 17

Defendant Jill Puckett in her official capacity as Magistrate of the Randolph County District Court
Defendant Clay Tinney in his official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Randolph County District Court TERMINATED: 08/28/2018

John W. Naramore Balch & Bingham LLP 105 Tallapoosa Street (36104) Post Office Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 334−269−3144 Fax: 334−269−3115 Email: jnaramore@balch.com TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Howard Albritton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James William Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Dorman Walker , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Elizabeth Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John W. Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Howard Albritton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James William Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Dorman Walker , Jr.

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(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Elizabeth Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W. Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/28/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Amy Newsome in her official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Randolph County District Court

represented by Benjamin Howard Albritton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brad A. Chynoweth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James William Davis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W. Naramore (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jordan Dorman Walker , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Elizabeth Howell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/14/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/18/2017
05/18/2017 05/18/2017 05/18/2017

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT against David Cofield, Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney (Filing fee $ 400.00 receipt number 4602045352.), filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Receipt)(wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
4 MEMORANDUM in Support re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Edwards, # 2 Declaration of Wood, # 3 Declaration of West, # 4

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05/18/2017 05/18/2017
05/18/2017 05/18/2017 05/18/2017
05/19/2017 05/19/2017 05/19/2017 05/19/2017 05/19/2017

Table of Exhibits, # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H, # 13 Exhibit I, # 14 Exhibit J, # 15 Exhibit K, # 16 Exhibit L, # 17 Exhibit M, # 18 Exhibit N, # 19 Exhibit O, # 20 Exhibit P, # 21 Exhibit Q, # 22 Exhibit R, # 23 Exhibit S, # 24 Exhibit T, # 25 Exhibit U, # 26 Exhibit V, # 27 Exhibit W, # 28 Exhibit X, # 29 Exhibit Y, # 30 Exhibit Z, # 31 Exhibit AA, # 32 Exhibit BB, # 33 Exhibit CC, # 34 Exhibit DD, # 35 Exhibit EE, # 36 Exhibit FF, # 37 Exhibit GG, # 38 Exhibit HH, # 39 Exhibit II, # 40 Exhibit JJ, # 41 Exhibit KK, # 42 Exhibit LL, # 43 Exhibit MM, # 44 Exhibit NN, # 45 Exhibit OO, # 46 Exhibit PP, # 47 Exhibit QQ, # 48 Exhibit RR, # 49 Exhibit SS) (wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
5 MOTION for Class Certification by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
6 MEMORANDUM in Support re 5 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Edwards, # 2 Declaration of Wood, # 3 Declaration of West, # 4 Table of Exhibits, # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H, # 13 Exhibit I, # 14 Exhibit J, # 15 Exhibit K, # 16 Exhibit L, # 17 Exhibit M, # 18 Exhibit N, # 19 Exhibit O, # 20 Exhibit P, # 21 Exhibit Q, # 22 Exhibit R, # 23 Exhibit S, # 24 Exhibit T, # 25 Exhibit U, # 26 Exhibit V, # 27 Exhibit W, # 28 Exhibit X, # 29 Exhibit Y, # 30 Exhibit Z, # 31 Exhibit AA, # 32 Exhibit BB, # 33 Exhibit CC, # 34 Exhibit DD, # 35 Exhibit EE, # 36 Exhibit FF, # 37 Exhibit GG, # 38 Exhibit HH, # 39 Exhibit II, # 40 Exhibit JJ, # 41 Exhibit KK, # 42 Exhibit LL, # 43 Exhibit MM, # 44 Exhibit NN, # 45 Exhibit OO, # 46 Exhibit PP, # 47 Exhibit QQ, # 48 Exhibit RR, # 49 Exhibit SS, # 50 Declaration of Brooke, # 51 Declaration of Karakatsanis, # 52 Declaration of Buskey)(wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
7 Summons Issued as to David Cofield, Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney and returned to counsel for personal service by process server. (wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
8 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Kandace Kay Edwards; Corporate Disclosures due by 5/29/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Attachment)(wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
9 ORDER: it is ORDERED that: 1) The 2 motion for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED; 2) Dfts are ENJOINED from continuing to jail Plf based solely on her inability to pay a secured monetary amount as a condition of release; 3) A telephonic hearing to determine whether to convert this temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction, so long as it is still necessary, is SET for 5/26/2017, at 1:00 PM. Plf is DIRECTED to set up the conference call and shall contact chambers by 10:00 AM that morning for further instructions; 4) Dfts are ORDERED to file a response to the arguments contained in Plf's motions on or before 5/25/2017, at 12:00 PM; and 5) Plf is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order on Dfts instanter. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 5/18/2017. (furn: calendar, ar) (wcl, ) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
10 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint and Summons and other initial filings served on David Cofield on May 18, 2017, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
11 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint and Summons and other initial filings served on Christopher May on May 18, 2017, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
12 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint and Summons and other initial filings served on Jill Puckett on May 18, 2017, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
13 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint and Summons and other initial filings served on Clay Tinney on May 18, 2017, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
14 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Kandace Kay Edwards re 8 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)

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05/19/2017 05/19/2017 05/19/2017
05/19/2017
05/19/2017
05/19/2017
05/22/2017 05/23/2017 05/23/2017 05/24/2017 05/24/2017 05/25/2017 05/25/2017 05/25/2017 05/25/2017 05/25/2017
05/25/2017

15 Motion for Katherine Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 5/25/2017 to add the attorney's name (kh, ). (Entered: 05/19/2017)
16 Motion for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 5/25/2017 to add the attorney's name (kh, ). (Entered: 05/19/2017)
SUMMONS Returned Executed by Kandace Kay Edwards. David Cofield served on 5/18/2017, answer due 6/8/2017. Attorney used the incorrect event code. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 10 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
SUMMONS Returned Executed by Kandace Kay Edwards. Christopher May served on 5/18/2017, answer due 6/8/2017. Attorney used the incorrect event code. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 11 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
SUMMONS Returned Executed by Kandace Kay Edwards. Jill Puckett served on 5/18/2017, answer due 6/8/2017. Attorney used the incorrect event code. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 12 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
SUMMONS Returned Executed by Kandace Kay Edwards. Clay Tinney served on 5/18/2017, answer due 6/8/2017. Attorney used the incorrect event code. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 13 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
17 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 9 Temporary Restraining Order, Terminate Motions, Order Setting Hearing on Motion,,,,,,,,, Notice of Service of TRO (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/22/2017)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Jamie Helen Kidd on behalf of David Cofield (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
19 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
20 Pro Hac Vice Filing fee received re: 15 Motion for Katherine Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice $ 50.00, receipt number 4602045407 (kh, ) . (Entered: 05/25/2017)
21 Pro Hac Vice Filing fee received re: 16 Motion for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice $ 50.00, receipt number 4602045408 (kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
22 RESPONSE to Motion re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Judge Tinney's 5/24/2017 Order)(Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
23 NOTICE of Appearance by Benjamin Howard Albritton on behalf of Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney (Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
24 RESPONSE to Motion re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
25 REPLY BRIEF re 22 Response to Motion, 24 Response to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
26 ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docs. # 22 , 24 ) and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. # 25 ), it is ORDERED that the hearing, set for May 26, 2017, at 1:00 p.m., is CANCELED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 5/25/2017. (furn: calendar, ar)(kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
27 TEXT ORDER granting 15 Motion for Katherine Hubbard to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 16 Motion for Alec Karakatsanis to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 5/25/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 05/25/2017)

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06/01/2017
06/08/2017
06/08/2017 06/13/2017 06/16/2017 06/19/2017 06/20/2017 06/21/2017
06/21/2017 06/22/2017
06/22/2017 06/22/2017

28 ORDERED as follows: 1. The parties shall participate in a face−to−face mediation on or before June 30, 2017, and notify the court telephonically on or before July 7, 2017, as to the result of the mediation. 2. The motion will be submitted without oral argument on June 23, 2017. It is further ORDERED that Defendants file a response to Plaintiffs motion, which shall include a brief supporting their position, on or before June 16, 2017. Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or before June 23, 2017, as further set out on order. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 6/1/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 06/01/2017)
29 ORDER setting a Mediation hearing on 6/26/2017 @ 02:00 PM before Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker, in Courtroom 5−B, FMJ US Courthouse Complex, Montgomery, AL; further ORDERING that counsel and the parties or a representative with full authority to settle the case, shall appear at and attend the mediation hearing, as further set out in order; On or before the close of business on Monday, 6/19/2017, each party shall provide the undersigned magistrate judge with a confidential mediation statement. The statement should not be filed with the clerk's office and should not be served on the other parties, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 6/8/17. Furnished to calendar group & JT.(djy, ) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
30 MOTION to Dismiss by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
31 ORDER directing that defendants' deadline to file their response to the 3 motion for preliminary injunction is extended from 6/16/2017, to and including 6/30/2017; plfs amy file a Reply Brief on or before 7/7/2017, at which time the motion will be submitted, as further set out in order. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 6/13/17. (djy, ) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
32 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Confidential Mediation Statements (Unopposed) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
33 TEXT ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to File Confidential Mediation Statements. Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 6/19/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
34 MOTION for Counsel to Appear Telephonically and for Plaintiff to be Excused from Attending Mediation Hearing (UNOPPOSED) by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
35 TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for counsel to appear telephonically and for plaintiff to be excused from attending mediation hearing (Doc. 34 ) is hereby set for a hearing by telephone before the undersigned at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, June 22, 2017. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to initiate the call and contact chambers at 334.954.3670 once all participating counsel are present on the line. Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 6/21/2017. (furn: JT, Calendar) (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
36 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Briefing Deadlines and to Contnue Mediation by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
37 TEXT ORDER: In light of defendants' pending motion to continue the mediation conference (Doc. 36 ), the court's order setting a hearing by telephone on plaintiff's motion to participate in mediation by telephone (Doc. 35 ) is hereby VACATED. The hearing will be reset by separate order. Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 6/22/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
38 NOTICE of Appearance by Brock Boone on behalf of Kandace Kay Edwards (Boone, Brock) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
39 MOTION to Expedite Briefing Schedule and, MOTION for Hearing re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 5 MOTION to Certify Class , MOTION Response in Opposition to re 36 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Briefing Deadlines and to Contnue Mediation , MOTION for Order Requiring Defendants to Respond to Complaint by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/22/2017)

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06/23/2017 06/28/2017
06/29/2017 06/29/2017
06/30/2017 07/07/2017 07/11/2017 07/11/2017 07/12/2017 07/12/2017 07/14/2017
07/14/2017

40 ORDER: For good cause, it is ORDERED that the mediation scheduled for Monday, June 26, 2017, and the parties' deadline for filing mediation statements, are continued generally pending resolution of the parties' motions (Doc. 36 and Doc. 39 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 6/23/2017. (furn: JT, Calendar)(kh, ) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
41 ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants' Motion to Continue Briefing Deadlines (Doc. # 36 ) is DENIED. The briefing schedule set by the court in its June 13, 2017 Order (Doc. # 31 ) remains in effect; 2. Defendants' Motion to Continue Mediation for 60 days (Doc. # 36 ) is GRANTED in part, and the previously ordered mediation is CONTINUED indefinitely until further order of the court; 3. Plaintiff's Motion to Order Defendants Tinney, May, and Puckett to Respond to the Complaint (Doc. # 39 ) is GRANTED, and Defendants Tinney, May and Puckett are ORDERED to file a responsive pleading on or before July 11, 2017; and 4. Plaintiff's Motion to Set an Expedited Briefing Schedule and Hearing on Plaintiff's pending motions for a preliminary injunction and for class certification (Doc. # 39 ) is DENIED. The court will set the briefing schedule for both motions after the parties have briefed the mootness issue. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 6/28/2017.(kh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
42 RESPONSE in Opposition re 30 MOTION to Dismiss of Defendant David Cofield filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
43 RESPONSE to Motion re 39 MOTION to Expedite Briefing Schedule and MOTION for Hearing re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 5 MOTION to Certify Class MOTION Response in Opposition to re 36 MOTION for Extension of Deadline Briefing Deadlines and to Contnue Mediation MOTION for Order Requiring Defendants to Respond to Complaint filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
44 Response to Order re 31 Order, Set Deadlines,, Judicial Defendants' Response to Court's Order Addressing Issues on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 06/30/2017)
45 REPLY BRIEF re 31 Order, Set Deadlines,, for briefing on motion for preliminary injunction filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit − Declaration of Kandace Edwards, # 2 Affidavit − Declaration of Micah West)(West, Micah) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
46 MOTION to Dismiss ( Motion to Dismiss and Answer) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Albritton, Benjamin) (Entered: 07/11/2017)
ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney.(no pdf document attached to this entry − docket entry 46 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2017)
47 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement sent to Christopher May, Jill Puckett and Clay Tinney Corporate Disclosures due by 7/24/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Corporate/Conflict Attachment)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/12/2017)
48 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney re 47 Notice of Deficiency requiring filing of Corporate Disclosure/Conflict Statement. (Albritton, Benjamin) Modified on 7/13/2017to correct the docket entry relationship(kh, ). (Entered: 07/12/2017)
49 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Cofield's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 30 ) is DENIED, and that Defendant Cofield shall file an answer to the complaint on or before July 28, 2017. It is further ORDERED that the other Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 46 ) is also DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 7/14/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
50 ORDER: In view of the court's recent resolution of Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. # 30 , 46 ), which decided that Plaintiffs claims are not moot, it is ORDERED that, on or before July 28, 2017, Defendants shall file a supplemental brief explaining whether their positions have changed as to Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or before August 4,

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07/19/2017 07/20/2017 07/26/2017 07/27/2017 07/27/2017 07/28/2017
07/31/2017
08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/03/2017 08/09/2017
08/11/2017 08/15/2017
08/18/2017

2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 7/14/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/14/2017)
51 NOTICE of Appearance by Jordan Dorman Walker, Jr on behalf of Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
Case reassigned to Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer as referral judge. Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker no longer assigned to the case as referral judge (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2017)
52 Motion for Andrea Woods to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 7/26/2017 to add the atty's name (kh, ). (Entered: 07/26/2017)
53 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response (Unopposed) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
***Attorney Andrea Woods for Kandace Kay Edwards added pursuant to the 52 motion. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
54 ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendants' 53 Unopposed Motion for a One−Week Extension, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that the Defendants shall file their supplemental brief, as detailed in the court's previous 50 Order, on or before 8/4/2017. Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or before 8/11/2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 7/28/2017. (dmn, ) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
55 ORDER: Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Counsel to Appear Telephonically and for Plaintiff to be Excused from Attending Mediation Hearing (Doc. 34 , filed 6/20/17). In light of the cancelled mediation hearing and the reassignment of referral magistrate judge, it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff may renew the request if needed at a later time. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 7/31/2017. (kh, ) . (Entered: 07/31/2017)
56 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
57 Pro Hac Vice Filing fee received re: 52 Motion for Andrea Woods to Appear Pro Hac Vice: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602046215 (kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
58 TEXT ORDER granting 52 Motion for Andrea Woods to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/2/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
59 RESPONSE to Motion re 56 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
60 ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that Defendants shall file their supplemental briefs, as detailed in the court's previous Order (Doc. # 50 ), on or before August 11, 2017. Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or before August 18, 2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/9/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
61 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
62 TEXT ORDER granting 61 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response. The deadline in the court's August 9 order (Doc. # 60 ) for Defendants to file supplemental briefs is extended to August 18, 2017. The deadline for Plaintiff's reply brief is extended to August 25, 2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/15/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
63 MOTION for Extension of Deadline (Unopposed) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 08/18/2017)

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 11 of 17

08/18/2017 08/21/2017
08/25/2017 08/28/2017
09/08/2017
09/08/2017 09/08/2017 09/08/2017 09/08/2017 09/13/2017 09/13/2017 09/14/2017
09/14/2017
09/22/2017 09/26/2017 09/29/2017 10/02/2017

***Attorney James William Davis, Laura Elizabeth Howell, and Brad A. Chynoweth for Christopher May, Jill Puckett, and Clay Tinney added pursuant to the 63 motion. (No pdf attached to this entry) (wcl, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
64 TET ORDER granting 63 Motion for Extension of Deadline. The deadline in the court's August 15 order (Doc. # 62 ) for Defendants to file supplemental briefs is extended to August 25, 2017. The deadline for Plaintiff's reply brief is extended to September 1, 2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/21/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
65 MOTION for Extension of Deadline File Response (Unopposed) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
66 TEXT ORDER granting 65 Motion for Extension of Deadline. The deadline in the court's August 21 order (Doc. # 64 ) for Defendants to file supplemental briefs is extended to September 8, 2017. The deadline for Plaintiff's reply brief is extended to September 15, 2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/28/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
67 RESPONSE in Opposition re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Tinney Declaration)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
68 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by David Cofield.(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
69 MOTION to Dismiss by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
70 RESPONSE to Motion re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 67 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
71 MOTION to Withdraw 69 MOTION to Dismiss by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
72 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 70 Response to Motion, 67 Response in Opposition to Motion, (UNOPPOSED) by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
73 TEXT ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendant David Cofield's Unopposed Motion to Withdraw (Doc. # 71 ), it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that Cofield's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 69 ) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/14/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
74 TEXT ORDER granting 72 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. The deadline in the court's August 28 order (Doc. # 66 ) for Plaintiff to file a reply brief is extended to September 22, 2017. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/14/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
75 REPLY to Response to Motion re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Micah West, # 2 Exhibit TT, # 3 Exhibit UU, # 4 Exhibit VV)(West, Micah) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
76 MOTION to Substitute re 4 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support,,,, (UNOPPOSED) by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Proposed Substitute Brief)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/26/2017)
77 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (UNOPPOSED) by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Notice of Supplemental Authority)(West, Micah) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
78 TEXT ORDER granting 77 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/2/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/02/2017)

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 12 of 17

10/02/2017 10/02/2017 10/02/2017
12/05/2017
12/14/2017 12/15/2017 12/15/2017 01/30/2018 02/06/2018
02/13/2018 02/20/2018 02/21/2018 02/22/2018 03/06/2018 03/07/2018 03/13/2018 03/20/2018

79 TEXT ORDER granting 76 Motion to Substitute 4 Brief. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/2/2017. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
80 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Notice of Supplemental Authority filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
81 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 4 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support,,,, Substitute Memorandum in Support Replacing Docket Entry 4 filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 10/02/2017)
82 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: The parties are ordered to show cause on or before December 15, 2017, why this action should not be stayed pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's resolution of Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 17−13139. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 12/5/2017. (kh, ) (Entered: 12/05/2017)
83 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by David Cofield re 82 Order to Show Cause,. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
84 REPLY BRIEF re 82 Order to Show Cause, filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 12/15/2017)
85 REPLY BRIEF re 82 Order to Show Cause, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Wood, # 2 Exhibit B − Declaration of Shake, # 3 Exhibit C − Declaration of Smith)(West, Micah) (Entered: 12/15/2017)
86 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement − In re Kenneth Humphrey)(West, Micah) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
87 RESPONSE in Opposition re 86 Notice (Other) of Supplemental Authority by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Attachments: # 1 Arrest Warrant and Criminal Complaint, # 2 Affidavit of Substantial Hardship and Order, # 3 Order on Initial Appearance, # 4 Bond Hearing Order)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Attachment 1 replaced on 2/7/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 2 replaced on 2/7/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 2/7/2018) (kh, ). (Attachment 4 replaced on 2/7/2018) (kh, ). (Entered: 02/06/2018)
88 REPLY BRIEF re 87 Response in Opposition,, 86 Notice (Other) filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
89 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Second Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement − ODonnell v Harris County)(West, Micah) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
90 Notice of Supplemental Authority by David Cofield re 70 Response to Motion, 83 Response to Order to Show Cause (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kidd, Jamie) Modified on 2/22/2018 to clarify the docket text(kh, ). (Entered: 02/21/2018)
91 RESPONSE in Opposition re 90 Notice (Other) of Supplemental Authority by Defendant Cofield by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
92 BRIEFING ORDER. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 3/6/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
93 RESPONSE in Opposition re 89 Notice (Other) (Plaintiff's Second Notice of Supplemental Authority) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
94 NOTICE of Appearance by John W. Naramore on behalf of Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney (Naramore, John) (Entered: 03/13/2018)
95 RESPONSE to Motion re 5 MOTION to Certify Class (of Defendants Amy Newsome, Christopher May, & Jill Puckett) filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 03/20/2018)

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 13 of 17

03/20/2018 03/21/2018
03/27/2018 03/29/2018 03/29/2018 04/06/2018
04/19/2018 04/19/2018
04/27/2018 04/27/2018 05/04/2018 06/14/2018 06/14/2018 07/12/2018
07/19/2018 07/19/2018

96 RESPONSE to Motion re 5 MOTION to Certify Class filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
97 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject−matter jurisdiction (Doc. # 67 ) is DENIED; and 2. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 3 ) is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 3/21/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
98 REPLY BRIEF re 5 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/27/2018)
99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(West, Micah) (Entered: 03/29/2018)
MEMORANDUM in Support re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See attachment to Docket entry 99 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
100 TEXT ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 99 ), it is ORDERED that Defendants file a brief in response to Plaintiff's motion on or before April 20, 2018. Plaintiff may file a reply brief on or before April 27, 2018. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 4/6/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
101 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline by David Cofield, Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney and Kandace Kay Edwards. (Kidd, Jamie) Modified on 4/19/2018 to add as filed on behalf of additional parties (kh, ). (Entered: 04/19/2018)
102 TEXT ORDER granting 101 Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadline and the deadline for Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 99 ) be extended to April 27, 2018. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 4/19/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
103 RESPONSE in Opposition re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
104 RESPONSE to Motion re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed by David Cofield. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
105 REPLY BRIEF re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
106 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 104 Response to Motion, 91 Response in Opposition, 105 Reply Brief, 90 Notice (Other) of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement ODonnell v. Harris Cty (5th Cir. June 1, 2018))(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 06/14/2018)
107 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexandra Marie Jordan on behalf of Kandace Kay Edwards (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/14/2018)
108 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement − ODonnell Memo and Opinion 6/18/18, # 2 Supplement − ODonnell Memo and Opinion 6/29/18, # 3 Supplement − ODonnell Am Order of Preliminary Injunction)(West, Micah) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
109 NOTICE by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney (Notice of Substitution of Party) (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
MOTION to Substitute Party Names re 109 Notice by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (attorney used the incorrect event. no pdf document attached to this entry − see docket entry 109 for pdf)(kh, ) (Entered: 07/20/2018)

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 14 of 17

07/24/2018 08/03/2018 08/06/2018 08/07/2018
08/09/2018 08/23/2018 08/28/2018
08/29/2018
09/06/2018 09/10/2018
09/13/2018 09/14/2018 09/14/2018 10/05/2018

110 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 07/24/2018)
111 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/3/2018: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (djy, ). (Entered: 08/03/2018)
112 NOTICE of Correction re 111 Joint MOTION for Protective Order to add attachment proposed order PDF document omitted by E−Filer (Attachments: # 1 added proposed order to docket entry 111 )(djy, ) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
113 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR THE PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: Pending before the Court is the Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulation and Order for the Production and Exchange of Confidential Information (Doc. 111 , filed 8/3/18). For good cause shown, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, as further set out. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 8/7/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
114 NOTICE by Kandace Kay Edwards re 99 MOTION for Reconsideration re 97 Memorandum Opinion and Order, of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Supplement − Caliste v. Cantrell Summary Judgment Order 8−6−18)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
115 MOTION to Set Status Conference (Unopposed) by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 08/23/2018)
116 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 99 ) is DENIED. On another note, it is further ORDERED that the motion to substitute party (Doc. # 109 ) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to substitute Amy Newsome for Clay Tinney as Defendant pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/28/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
117 ORDER denying 115 Motion to Set Status Conference (Unopposed); Accordingly, the parties shall confer and file an amended Rule 26(f) report by September 14, 2018. If a status conference is needed, that report will be the proper vehicle to request one. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/29/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 08/29/2018)
118 NOTICE of Appearance by Kendrick Emerson Webb on behalf of David Cofield (Webb, Kendrick) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
119 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 5 ) is GRANTED; 2. The following class is CERTIFIED pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2): all state−court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release; 3. Attorneys Alex Karakatsanis, Esq., Samuel Brooke, Esp., Randall C. Marshall, Esq., and Brandon Buskey, Esq., are DESIGNATED as class counsel; and 4. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is DESIGNATED as the representative of the class. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/10/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
Case Reassigned to Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden. Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer no longer assigned to the case as referral judge. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
120 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amended Complaint)(Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
121 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
122 ORDERED that: 1. Defendants shall show cause on or before October 15, 2018, why the court should not give Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2); 2. Plaintiff shall show cause on or before October 15, 2018, why the court should not stay discovery while still permitting dispositive motions; and 3. An on the record telephonic status

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 15 of 17

10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/15/2018 10/23/2018 10/26/2018
10/26/2018
10/26/2018 11/05/2018 11/07/2018
11/07/2018 11/07/2018
11/08/2018
11/14/2018

conference is set for October 23, 2018 at 3:00 p.m. Counsel are DIRECTED to call into the court's conference call line at the appropriate time using the directions provided below: a. Call the toll−free number, (877) 336−1831; b. Enter the access code 1407656; c. To join the call as a participant, press #; and d. At the tone, speak your name. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/5/2018. (kh, )(furn: wr, calendar) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
123 REPLY BRIEF re 122 Order to Show Cause,,,, Set Hearings,,, filed by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
124 REPLY BRIEF re 122 Order to Show Cause,,,, Set Hearings,,, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
125 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by David Cofield re 122 Order to Show Cause,,,, Set Hearings,,,. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
126 Minute Entry for Status Conference by Telephone held before Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/23/2018 (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (cb, ) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
127 ORDER: It is therefore ORDERED that: 1) On or before 11/7/2018, Dfts May, Puckett, and Newsome shall file a brief, as further set out in order; Plf's response is due no more than fourteen days after Dfts May, Puckett, and Newsome file their brief; 2) On or before 11/7/2018, Dft Cofield shall file a brief, as further set out in order; Plf's response is due no more than fourteen days after Dft Cofield files his brief. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/26/2018. (alm, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
128 ORDER granting 120 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint; Plf shall electronically file a duplicate of the amended complaint attached to its 120 motion, but with a current filing date, in accordance with the Middle District of Alabama's Civil Administrative Procedures. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/26/2018. (alm, ) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
129 AMENDED COMPLAINT against David Cofield, Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett, filed by Kandace Kay Edwards.(Brooke, Samuel) Modified on 10/26/2018 to remove as filed against terminated Dft Clay Tinney (alm, ). (Entered: 10/26/2018)
130 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 129 Amended Complaint, (UNOPPOSED) by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
131 ORDERED that: 1. Judicial Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Amended Complaint (Doc. # 130 ) is GRANTED. 2. Any required response to the Amended Complaint must be filed on or before November 16, 2018. 3. All other deadlines including those in the courts October 26 briefing order (Doc. # 127 ) remain in effect. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 11/7/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
132 MOTION for Extension of Deadline by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
133 REPLY BRIEF re 127 Order,, filed by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Judicial Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, # 2 Exhibit Judicial Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission, # 3 Exhibit Judicial Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Requests for Production)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
134 ORDERED that: 1. Defendant Cofield's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. # 132 ) is GRANTED. 2. Defendant Cofield's brief regarding whether this case should be stayed pending the Eleventh Circuits decision in Schultz v. State must be filed on or before November 14, 2018. 3. Defendant Cofield's response to the Amended Complaint must be filed on or before November 16, 2018. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 11/8/2018. (kh, ) (Entered: 11/08/2018)
135 MOTION to Stay by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/15/2018 to attach Exhibit previously omitted by E−Filer: # 1 Exhibit A) (qc/djy, ).

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 16 of 17

11/14/2018 11/15/2018 11/16/2018 11/16/2018 11/16/2018 11/16/2018 11/20/2018
11/20/2018 11/29/2018 12/03/2018
12/17/2018 12/17/2018
01/07/2019 01/07/2019 01/09/2019

(Entered: 11/14/2018)
***Attorney James Randall McNeill for David Cofield added pursuant to 135 motion (NO PDF document attached to this notice). (djy, ) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
136 NOTICE of Correction re 135 MOTION to Stay to attach Exhibit A previously omitted by E−Filer (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to docket entry 135 )(djy, ) (Entered: 11/15/2018)
137 MOTION to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
138 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 137 MOTION to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment filed by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
139 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM or for Summary Judgment by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
140 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support re 139 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM or for Summary Judgment filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
141 ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. # 137 , 139 ), it is ORDERED that Plaintiff shall respond to the motions to dismiss on or before December 7, 2018. Defendants may file reply briefs on or before December 14, 2018. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 11/20/2018. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
142 RESPONSE in Opposition re 135 MOTION to Stay and Response to Judicial Defendants' Brief re Walker v. City of Calhoun filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (West, Micah) (Entered: 11/20/2018)
143 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 141 Order, by Kandace Kay Edwards, David Cofield, Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett, . (Jordan, Alexandra) Modified on 12/3/2018 to add as filed on behalf of the defendants. (kh, ). (Entered: 11/29/2018)
144 ORDERED that the 143 motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs response to Defendants Motions to Dismiss is due on or before December 17, 2018; and 2. Defendants reply briefs, if any, are due on or before January 7, 2019. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 12/3/2018.(kh, ) (Entered: 12/03/2018)
145 RESPONSE in Opposition re 139 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM or for Summary Judgment filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Jordan, Alexandra) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
146 RESPONSE in Opposition re 137 MOTION to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment filed by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Micah West, # 2 Exhibit TT, # 3 Exhibit UU, # 4 Exhibit VV, # 5 Exhibit WW, # 6 Exhibit XX, # 7 Exhibit YY, # 8 Affidavit of Sara Wood, # 9 Affidavit of Insha Rahman, # 10 Affidavit of Jacob Sills, # 11 Affidavit of Roseanne Scotti, # 12 Affidavit of Spurgeon Kennedy, # 13 Supplement Morrison Expert Report, # 14 Supplement Jones Expert Report, # 15 Supplement Demuth Expert Report)(West, Micah) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
147 REPLY BRIEF re 146 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Chynoweth, Brad) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
148 REPLY BRIEF re 145 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
Case Reassigned to Honorable Judge Stephen Michael Doyle as Referral Judge; Honorable Judge Gray M. Borden no longer assigned to the case. (No pdf attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/09/2019)

Case: 3:17-cv-321 As of: 06/07/2020 11:02 AM CDT 17 of 17

01/16/2019 07/26/2019
01/13/2020 01/14/2020 01/14/2020 01/24/2020 01/27/2020 01/27/2020 02/04/2020 02/10/2020 02/10/2020 04/21/2020

149 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Opposition to Judicial Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Proposed Sur−Reply)(West, Micah) (Entered: 01/16/2019)
150 ORDERED that: 1. Sheriff Cofield's motion to stay (Doc. # 135 ) is GRANTED. 2. This action is STAYED in its entirety pending the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hester v. Gentry, No. 18−13894. 3. The remaining pending motions (Docs. # 137 , 139 , 149 ) are DENIED without prejudice. After the Eleventh Circuit issues its decision in Hester v. Gentry, the court will enter a briefing order. At that time, the parties may refile their motions, supplemented as needed. 4. Sheriff Cofield must notify the court within ten days of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hester v. Gentry. Until then, Sheriff Cofield must file a status report every ninety days from the date of this Order. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 7/26/2019. (kh, ) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
151 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by David Cofield, Christopher May, Amy Newsome, Jill Puckett. (Howell, Laura) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/14/2020: # 1 Corrected Certificate of Service) (kh, ). (Entered: 01/13/2020)
152 TEXT ORDER granting 151 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 1/14/2020. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
*** Attorney Laura Elizabeth Howell terminated pursuant to the court's 152 order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/14/2020)
153 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Christopher May, Jill Puckett, Clay Tinney. (Walker, Jordan) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
154 TEXT ORDER granting 153 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 1/27/2020. (no pdf document attached to this entry)(kh, ) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
*** Attorney John W. Naramore terminated pursuant to the court's 154 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
155 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Kandace Kay Edwards. (Boone, Brock) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
156 TEXT ORDER granting 155 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Honorable Judge William Keith Watkins on 2/10/2020. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
*** Attorney Brock Boone terminated pursuant to the court's 156 text order. (no pdf document attached to this entry) (kh, ) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
157 STATUS REPORT by David Cofield. (Kidd, Jamie) (Entered: 04/21/2020)

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 05/18/17 Page 1 of 23

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

RECEIVED

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
V.
DAVID COFIELD, in his official capacity as Randolph County Sheriff,
CHRISTOPHER MAY, in his official capacityas Circuit Clerk,
JILL PUCKETT, in her official capacity as Magistrate of the Randolph County District Court, and
CLAY TINNEY, in his official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Randolph County District Court,
Defendants.

No. (Class Action)

1611 MAY 18 A11:4[f0lJ
DEBRA P. DISTRICT I ALA

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Defendants Randolph County Sheriff David Cofield ("Cofield"), Circuit Court Clerk Christopher May ("May"), Magistrate Jill Puckett ("Puckett"), and District Court Judge Clay Tinney ("Tinney") are operating a two-tiered pretrial justice system. Secured financial conditions of release are required for misdemeanor and felony offenses pursuant to a predetermined bail schedule that specifies a monetary amount based only on the charge. A person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense who can afford the monetary amount is released from jail immediately upon payment. Those anestees Who cannot afford the mOnetary

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amount may remain in jail for nearly four weeks before they are afforded a hearing to argue for their release. How quickly—or whether—a person is released from jail depends entirely on her access to money
2 Pursuit to this discriminatory scheme, individuals remain, detained for varying lengths of time. How long presumptively innocent arrestees remain in jail after arrest depends on whether they or their families are able to pay, to borrow sufficient resources, or to arrange for a third-party surety. Others, like Ms. Edwards, who are too poor to pay and unable to find anyone to pay the secured money bond for them, remain in jail for the entire duration of their case.
3. Ms. Edwards was arrested on May 17, 2017 and is currently incarcerated because she cannot afford to pay the secured monetary amount required by the predetermined bail schedule. If she could pay the amount, she would be released from jail immediately.
4. On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Ms. Edwards seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief. Ms. Edwards also seeks a temporary restraining order on behalf of herself. Ms. Edwards seeks an injunction against Sheriff Cofield from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail without an individualized hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance. She seeks declaratory relief against Defendants May, Puckett, and Tinney.
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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201,

et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court has

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

5.

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this district.

III. PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

6. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is a resident Of Roanoke, Alabama.

B. Defendant

7. Defendant David Cofield is the Randolph County Sheriff. He is sued in his

official capacity.

8. Defendant Christopher May is the Circuit Court Clerk for Alabama's Fifth

Judicial Circuit Court. He is sued in his official capacity.

9. Defendant Jill Puckett is the Magistrate for the Randolph County District Court.

She is sued in her official capacity.

10. Defendant Clay Tinney is the Randolph County District Court Judge. He is sued

in his official capacity.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Defendants' Money Bail Practices Detain People Based on Their Wealth Rather Than Their Suitability for Release.

L Defendants Unconstitutionally Detain People Unable to Pay Secured Money Bail Set Pursuant to the Predetermined Bail Schedule.

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11. One out of every five people in Randolph County lives in poverty.' One-third of the labor force is unemployed, and nearly half of the population over the age of sixteen did not work at all in 2015, the last year for which data is available.2
12. Although nearly half of the county residents do not have a job, the Sheriff requires any person arrested and charged with a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a. secured amount of money bail (i.e. cash, commercial surety, or property) to be released from jail following arrest. The amount of money that an arrestee must pay is pre-determined by a bail schedule based on the charge. See Bail Schedule, attached as Ex. A to West Decl.
13. Defendants do not consider a person's flight risk or danger to the community, whether a person can afford the predetermined amount of money, or whether any alternative non-financial conditions of release may mitigate any relevant risk before requiring the predetermined money bail amount. Instead, immediate access to money alone determines whether a person remains in jail following arrest. If a person can afford to pay the amount required, the individual is released from jail immediately. If the person is unable to pay, she remains incarcerated.
14. Prior to a first appearance in court, no official, conducts an inquiry into the arrestee's ability to pay the amount required by the bail schedule, makes any findings concerning the arrestee's ability to pay, or considers forms of release other than secured money bail. Although the bail schedule states that a bail amount may be increased or reduced "on a case by case basis," in practice Defendants do not deviate from the bail schedule.
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, available at https://goô.gIluUZ3gb . 2id.
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15. District Court Judge Clay Tinney and Circuit Court Clerk Christopher May

created the bail schedule that governs release from the Randolph County jail. The bail schedule

is printed on Defendant Mays's letterhead and instructs anyone with questions to contact him.

Defendant May and Defendant Tinney must approve any changes to the post-arrest procedures

set forth in their bail schedule.

16. Defendant Tinney is responsible for setting policies governing release conditions

and conducts the initial appearance for any ai-restees unable to pay the monetary amount required

by the bail schedule. Magistrate Jill Puckett enforces these policies and conducts initial

appearances when Defendant. Tinney is unavailable.

17. Sheriff David Cofield is responsible for the operation of the Randolph County jail

and the release and detention of arrestees. See Ala.. Code §14"6-1. As a matter Of policy and

practice, Defendant Cofield keeps arrestees in jail if they cannot pay the monetary amount

required by the bail schedule and releases immediately those who can pay. Defendant Cofield maintains this policy and practice even though he receives no notice that there has been an

inquiry into a person's ability to pay the amount set, findings that the person can afford to meet

the financial conditions of release, and consideration of alternative non-financial conditions Of

release.

ii.

Defendant Cofield Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay the Predetermined

Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay.

18. When a person is arrested in Randolph County, she is booked into the Randolph

County Jail, which is operated by the Sheriffs Department. After booking, arrestees are

informed by Sheriff's Department employees that they are eligible for immediate release, but only if they, pay a predetermined amount of money. The Sheriff determines the required amount

of money by referring to the bail schedule promulgated by Defendants Tinney and May. At no

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point does any Defendant or other person perform any inquiry into the arrestee's ability to pay

the money bail amount required by the schedule.

19. Arrestees who do not have other restrictions on their eligibility for release can

post bail themselves, make a phone call to ask a friend or family to post bail on their behalf, or

contact a bonding agent to assist in posting bail. If an arrestee can afford to pay the

predetermined bail, the Sheriffs Department accepts the money and releases her.

20. A person with financial resources will be released almost immediately after

posting bail, but the Sheriffs Department will continue to detain a person who cannot afford the

preset, secured bail amount. This policy and practice results in systematic wealth-based

detention in Randolph County.

Hi.

Defendants Puckett and Tinney Do Not Review the Predetermined Financial

Conditions of Release for Up to Four Weeks.

21. Any person who cannot afford the monetary amount required by the bail schedule

is taken before Defendant Tinney or Puckett for an initial appearance. Under Alabama law, a

judge or magistrate is required to conduct the initial appearance within 48-hours following a

warrantless arrest or 72-hours following a warrant arrest. Ala. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(1)(iii),

(b)(2)(i).

21 The purposes of the initial appearance under state law are to (1) ascertain the

defendant's true name and address, (2) inform the defendant of the charges against him, and (3)

notify the defendant of the right to counsel. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4. A judicial officer is also

required to determine a defendant's conditions of release. Id.; Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4 ("If a

defendant has not been released from- custody and is brought before a court for initial

appearance, a determination of the conditions of release shall be made.").

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3. However, it is Defendants Tiimey's and Puckett's general practice to refuse to determine an arrestee's conditions of release at the initial appearance. Defendants instead usually defer this determination for up to four weeks, when a preliminary hearing is conducted in a felony case for those arrestees who exercised their right to such a hearing. See Sample Order on Initial Appearance, attached as Ex. B to West Decl; see also Ala. R. Crim. P. 5. In a misdemeanor case, Defendants generally defer any review of an arrestee's conditions of release for up to two weeks until Defendant Tinney conduéts a status hearing and only if an arrestee first filed a motion for a bond reduction. Because of these practices, the initial court appearance generally provides no opportunity for a person to raise ability to pay, to conduct a hearing on alternative conditions of release, or to raise any constitutional issues with ongoing post-at-rest detention. Defendants are unrepresented by counsel at the initial appearance.
24. Defendants Tinney and Puckett generally do not allow arrestees to make arguments about their ability to pay or , their suitability for release at the initial appearance. Pursuant to Defendants Tinney's and Puckett',s policy and practice, arrestees are not permitted to challenge their financial conditions of release or to request non-monetary conditions of release.
25. At the initial appearance, Defendants Tinney and Puckett do not make any findings that a person can afford the pre-set amount required or that secured money bail is the least restrictive condition of release available. Defendants Tinney and Puckett also do not consider whether an arrestee may be safely released on affordable financial or non-financial release conditions, nor do they make any affirmative inquiry into Or findings concerning arrstees' ability to pay the amount Of secured money bail required.
26. Defendants Tinney and Puckett generally will not consider an arrestee's suitability for release or ability to pay until a later preliminary hearing in a felony case or a bond
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reduction hearing in a misdemeanor case. As a matter of policy and practice, preliminary

hearings are held once every four weeks in felony cases and hearings on motions for a bond

reduction in misdemeanor cases are held twice per month in Randolph County. Thus, an

individual who cannot afford the predetermined secured money bail amount usually will be

detained for up to four weeks without any opportunity for an individualized release hearing or to

otherwise raise any issues concerning her ability to pay or her suitability for release under

alternative conditions.

27. By contrast, an arrestee who can pay the monetary amount required by the bail

schedule is released immediately from jail.

28. Defendants' reliance on predetermined secured money bail has resulted in

unnecessary wealth-based detention that is devastating for the poorest people in Randolph

County. Many people in the Randolph County jail have not been convicted of a crime and are

only in jail because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail.

29. Because the grand jury sits—and trials are held—only twice per year in Randolph

County, a person unable to afford monetary bail may spend longer in jail before trial than under

the sentence they would receive if they pleaded guilty or were found guilty following trial.

B. Plaintiff Edwards Cannot Afford the Monetary Amount Required by the Bail Schedule.

30.

Ms. Edwards is a 29-year old woman, who lives in Roanoke, Alabama.

31.

Ms. Edwards is 7.5 months pregnant and a mother of two other children, who are

one and two years old. She served in the Army National Guard from 2006 to 2010 and was

stationed in Gadsden, Alabama.

32.

On May 17, 2017, Ms. Edwards was arrested for forging a check in the amount of

$75 and charged with possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, a class C felony.

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33. Ms. Edwards was taken to the Randolph County Jail and told that she would be

released from jail only if she paid a $7,500 bond. A corrections officer told her that she has a

court date on June 6, 2017 and that she will remain incarcerated until that date unless she can

afford to pay her bond,

34.

Ms. Edwards is indigent and cannot afford to buy her release from jail. She has

no assets and recently lost her job at Huddle House because her pregnancy made it difficult for

her to work. Her only source of income is food stamps and WIC. Ms. Edwards also suffers from

serious mental illness and is relying on Medicaid to support her through her pregnancy.

35.

Ms. Edwards was evicted from her home in December 2016 after losing her job.

She has been homeless since the eviction and has been staying between friends' homes. Many of

those homes do not have power or running water.

36.

The cell she was originally assigned to had six women, but there were only four

beds. The jail also does not have any shampoo or wash cloths because of severe 'jail

overcrowding.

37.

She is concerned about her health because her pregnancy is high-risk. Since

being incarcerated, she has been sleeping on a mat on the floor of the jail.

C. Non-Financial Conditions of Release Alone or iii Combination with Unsecured Money Bail Are As Effective As or More Effective than Secured Money Bail

38. Detention on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. Controlling for

other factors, a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more

likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained.3

Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice.' How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (May 2, 2016) (finding that a person who is detamed pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained), available at https //goo glJnaoKD, see also Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansrnan, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 15,19 (May 2,

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39.

Studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial and

sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offense. 4 Controlling

for other factors, those detained pretrial will be given longer jail sentences. 5 Detained defendants

are more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent. 6 They

have a harder time preparing a defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and meeting with their

lawyers. A person's ability to pay money bail thus has an irreparable impact on the outcome of a

criminal case.

40. Wealth-based pretrial detention also makes the community less safe. First,

wealth-based detention unnecessarily jails those who could be released safely into the

community. Several studies have shown that just two or three days in pretrial detention increases

the likelihood of future crimes, as well as the future risk level of even low-risk defendants. 7 In

2016), available at https://goo.gL'OW5OzL (finding a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data).
Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, Laura and John Arnold Foundation 4 (November 2013), available at https://goO.gVFLjVZP (those detained for the entire pretrial period are more likely to be sentenced to jail and prison—and receive longer sentences—than those who are released at some point before trial or case disposition).
5
6 Stevenson, supra note 1 at 18 ("Pretrial detention leads to an expected increase of 124 days in the maximum days of the incarceration sentence, a 42% increase over the mean."); see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 1, at 18-19 ("Criminal defendants assessed bail amounts appear frequently unable to produce the required bail amounts, and receive guilty outcomes as a result Entered guilty pleas by defendants unwilling to wait months prior to trial and unable to finance bail likely contribute to this result.").
See Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail,. 15-16 (2014), available at https //goo gL'jr7sMg ("[D]efendants rated low risk and detained pretrial for longer than one day before their pretrial release are more likely to commit a new crime once they are released demonstrating that length of time until pretrial release has a direct impact on public safety."); Christopher T. Loweikamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 3 (November 2013) GQGN1Y (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that when held 2-3 days low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes befOre trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours"); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 768 (2017), available at https //goo gI!Waj3ty ("While pretrial detention clearly exerts a protective effect in the short run for misdemeanor defendants it may ultimately service to compromise public safety," and finding that in a representative group of
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other words, detention based on poverty for just a few days increases recidivism. Second, wealth-based pretrial systems release individuals based only on their ability to pay and without any assessment of their risk of flight or dangerousness. Consequently, individuals who need monitoring or supervision to mitigate their risk of flight or dangerousness receive neither.
41. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for children and other dependent relatives. It hurts families, leads to unemployment, and can make people homeless. Even a couple of days in pretrial detention can cause a person to lose housing, be removed from a shelter list, be terminated from a job, be exposed to unsafe and unsanitary conditions at the jail, and may result in serious trauma to dependent children.
42. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no significant relationship between requiring money bail as a condition of release and arrestees' rates of appearance in court.8
43. Other jurisdictions throughout the country do not keep people in jail based on their wealth. Instead of relying on money, these jurisdictions release arrestees with unsecured financial conditions, non-financial conditions, and pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
44. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive, non-monetary conditions of release to maximize public safety and court appearances. Such non-monetary conditions of
10,000 misdemeanor offenders, pretrial detention would cause an additional 600 misdemeanors and 400 felonies compared to if the same group had been released pretrial). 8 See, e.g., Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 21 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gL/OW5OzL ("Our results suggest that money bail has a negligible effect or, if anything, increases failures to appear ) Michael R Jones Unsecured Bonds The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 11 (October 2013) available at https //goo gIIUENBKJ ("Whether released defendants are higher or lower risk or in-between, unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as do secured bonds").
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release include, but are not limited to: unsecured bond, reporting obligations, phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation or a stable address, substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, alcohol monitoring devices, or, in extreme cases of particular risk, electronic monitoring and home confinement.
4. Jurisdictions that rely on pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release do not sacrifice, public safety or court attendance. For example, Washington, D.C. releases more than 94% of all defendants without financial conditions of release and no one is detained on secured money bail that they cannot afford. 9 Empirical evidence shows that nearly 90% of released defendants in Washington, D.C. make all court appearances, nearly 90% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests, and 98-99% consistently avoid re-arrest for violent crime. 10
46. The federal judiciary also eschews wealth-based detention, requiring any detention order to be based on a finding of dangerousness or flight risk, and the practice has not harmed court appearance rates or public safety."
See D.C. Code § 23-1321; see also Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Release Rates for Pretrial Defendants within Washington, DC available at https:Ilgoo.gl/VSDeDk ("In Washington, DC, we consistently find over 90% of defendants are released pretrial without using a financial bond"). 10 See Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Outcomes for Last Four Years, available at bpsIIww.psa.gpvI?q=riodeI558; Pretrial Just. Inst., The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth 2 (2009), available at https://goo.gL'6wgPM8 ("The high non-financial release rate has been accomplished without sacrificing the safety of the public or the appearance of defendants in court. Agency data shows that 88% of released defendants make all court appearances, and 88% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests.").
See 18 U.S.C. § 31 42(c)(2) ("The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person."); see also Thomas H, Cohen, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 13 (Nov. 2012), available at https:Ilgoo.gL'hN99E7 (finding from 2008 to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make court appearances and 4% were arrested for new offenses).
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47.

Pretrial detention based solely on Wealth is consistently more expensive than

effective pretrial supervision programs. 12 Without relying on a person's ability to afford cash

bail, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer expense while maintaining high public

safety and court appearance rates.

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

48. Ms. Edwards proposes one class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). This Class is defined as: All arrestees who are or

who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount

required for their release.

49. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Ms.

Edwards and unknown Class members can challenge Defendants' unlawful use ofwèalth-based

detention.

50. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted, or failed and/or

refused to act, on grounds that apply generally to the proposed Class, such that final injunctive

and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to each Class member as a whole.

51. As set forth more fully below, this action satisfies the nurnerosity, commonality,

typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the class counsel requirements of Rule

23(g).

Nurnerosity

12 See, e.g. Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost? (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://goo.gII01LtLM ("It has been estimated that implementing validated, evidence-based risk assessment to guide pretrial release decisions could yield $78 billion in savings and benefits, nationally."); United States Court, Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (July 18, 2013), available at https://goo.glIdJpDm (In 2012, "[p]retrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal system").
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52. The precise size of the Class is unknown by Plaintiff because it is forwardlooking, but it is substantial, given the hundreds of felony and misdemeanor cases adjudicated each year in the Randolph County District Court. Joinder of these unknown future members is impracticable.
53. Many of the class members are lowincome individuals who will likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to . be joined in this action. Joinder ofevery member of the class would be impracticable. Cônznzonality
54. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. Ms. Edwards seeks relief from Defendants' money bail policies, practices, and procedures, which violate the rights of the Class members. Ms. Edwards also seeks relief mandating Defendants to change their policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
55. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are: a. Whether the Randolph County District Court and Defendant Cofield uses a predetermined secured money bail schedule created by ,Defendants May and Tinney; b. Whether Defendant Cofield releases arrestees from jail who pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule and detains those who cot; c. Whether Defendant Cofield detains all individuals who are unable to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule regardless of whether inquiry into their ability to pay has been made; d. Whether and when Defendants Tinney and Puckett conduct individualized release
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hearings and what procedural protections, if any, Defendants Tiney and Puckett provide to arrestees at those hearings; and e. What Standard post-arrest procedures Defendants perform on misdemeanor arrestees; for example, whether Defendants use any alternate procedures for promptly releasing people determined otherwise eligible for release butwho are unable to afford a monetary payment. 56. Among the most importantcommon question of law are: a. Whether requiring a financial condition of pretrial release without inquiry into and findings concerning a person's ability to pay, and without consideration of alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; b. Whether Defendants' actions in detaining arrestees solely based on their inability to pay a predetermined amount of money violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; ç Whether Defendants' detention of poor anestees using predetermined amounts of money without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment; and d. Whether Defendants' detention of poor arrestees without conducting an individualized release bearing with adequate procedural safeguards violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Typicality 57. Ms. Edwards's claims are typical of the claims Of the other members of the 'Class, and she has the same interests in this case as all other Class members that she represents. Each
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of them suffers injuries from the failure of Defendants to comply with the Constitution: they are each confined in jail because they could not afford to pay their secured monetary bond amount. The answer to whether Defendants' money bail practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of Ms. Edwards and every other Class member.
58. If Ms. Edwards Succeeds in the claim that Defendants' policies and practices concerning wealth-based detention violate her constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class. Adequacy
59. Ms. Edwards will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class she seeks to represent.
60. Ms. Edwards has no interests separate from or in conflict, with those of the proposed Class she seeks to represent as a whole and seeks no relief other than the declaratory and injunctive relief, which is sought on behalf of the entire proposed Class she seeks to represent. Class Counsel
61. Ms. Edwards is represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Southern Poverty Law Center who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants' practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. A. Rule 23(b)(2)
62. Class action Status is appropriate because Defendants have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members: Defendants require all arrestees to
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pay for their release in an amount pre-determined by a bail schedule. Those who can pay Iare released and those who cannot pay are detained.
63. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive, relief that Defendants violate the Plaintiffs and Class members' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without a prompt and individualized release hearing with adequate procedural protections that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful considerations of alternative conditions of release. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants' money bail practices as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would, apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution (Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants May, Puckett, Tinney, and 2ofield 64. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. ' The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits jailing a person solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment. 66. Ms. Edwards and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty under state and federal law. 67. Requiring a person arrested for a misdemeanOr or felony .offense to pay a monetary bail amount pre-determiried by a bail schedule is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interests in securing a defendant's appearance in court or public safety. 68. There are less restrictive means to reasonably assure the government's interests.
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69. Defendants violate Plaintiff's and the Proposed Class's fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing against them a post-arrest system of wealth-based detention in which they are kept in jail because they cannot afford a monetary amount of bail pre-determined by a bail schedule without inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative non-monetary conditions of release.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Substantive and Procedural Due Process - Individualized Release Rearing Plaintiff and the Proposed class versus Defendants Puckett, Tiiiney, and cofield 70. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 72. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty. 73. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that pretrial arrestees receive an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards to determine the least restrictive conditions on their pretrial liberty 74. Defendants do not provide counsel; give arrestees an opportunity to testify or present evidence; restrict detention to extremely serious offenses; or require a finding that no affordable financial or non-financial condition of release will ensure appearance or public safety before jailing pretrial arrestees on monetary bail amounts that they cannot afford. Because Defendants create de facto detention orders by using predetermined monetary amounts, they also fail to apply any legal or evidentiary standards to determine whether a person should be detained prior to trial based on some immitigable risk.
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75. Defendants violate Ms. Edwards's and the Proposed Class's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing them without providing an individualized release hearing with the procedural protections described above.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to. the Constitution
(Due Process - Prompt Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Puckett, Tinney, and cofield 76. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 78. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty, which outweighs any governmental interest in pretrial detention. 79. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a. prompt release hearing following detention. 80. Defendants violate Ms. Edwards's and the Proposed Class's fundamental rights to pretrial liberty and due process by jailing them without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing.
VII. Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: a. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Certification of a class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, represented by Ms. Edwards; c. A declaration that Defendants May, Puckett, and Tinney violate the Plaintiff's and
Class members' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured
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financial conditions of release without inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningfiul consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release; d. A declaration that Defendants Puckett and Tinney violate Ms. Edwards's and Class members' due process rights by jailing them without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards; e. A declaration that Defendants Puckett and Tinney violate Ms. Edwards's and Class members' due process rights by jailing them without conducting a sufficiently prompt release hearing; f. A temporary restraining order enjoining Defendant Cofield from prospectively detaining Ms. Edwards for failing to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule without a prompt individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance; g. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant Cofield from prospectively detaining arrestees for failing to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule without a prompt individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release
20

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are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance; h. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and i. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: May 18, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

Samuel Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiff
Samuel Brooke (ASB-1 172-L60B) Micah West (ASB1842J82F)t SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 P: (334) 956-8200
F: (334)956-8481
E: samuel.brookesplcenter.org E: micah.westsplcenter.org
Alec Karakatsanis (DC Bar No. 999294)* Katherine Hubbard (Cal. Bar No. 302729)* CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 P: (202) 930-3835 E: aleccivilrightscorps.org E: katherinecivilrightscorps.org
Randall C. Marshall (ASB-3023-A56M) ACLU FOUNDATION OF ALABAMA, INC. P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 P:(334)420-1741 E: rmarshallaclualabama.org
Brandon Buskey (ASW2753A50B) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT
21

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 05/18/17 Page 22 of 23 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: (212) 549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org Admission pending *Admission pro hac vice pending Attorneys for Plaintiffs
22

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 1 Filed 05/18/17 Page 23 of 23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that arrangements have been made to, on this date, deliver a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by hand delivery to the following at the below addresses:

David Cofield, Sheriff Randolph County Sheriffs' Office 1 N Main Street Wedowee, AL 36278

Hon. Jill Puckett, Magistrate Randolph County District Court 1 N Main Street Wedowee, AL 36278

Christopher May, Circuit Clerk Randolph County Circuit Court
1 N Main Street Wedowee, AL 36278

Hon. Clay Tinney, Judge Randolph County District Court 1 N Main Street Wedowee, AL 36278

Formal proof of service will be filed with the Court when completed.

I further certify that arrangements have been made to, on this date, deliver a true and

correct courtesy copy of the foregoing by hand delivery and by electronic mail to the following:

James W. "Jim" Davis, Section Chief Constitutional Defense Section Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 E: jimdavis@ago.state.al.us
John Alvin Tinney Randolph County Attorney. P.O. Box 1430 Roanoke, AL 36274-9121 E: johntinneyattorney@gmail.coni

Jamie H. Kidd J. Randall McNeill WEBB & ELEY, P.C. P.O. Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 E: jkidd@webbeley.com E: micneill@webbeley.com

on this May 18, 2017.

Samuel Broo

23

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 9 Filed 05/18/17 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAVID COFIELD, in his official

)

capacity as Randolph County Sheriff, )

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-WKW

ORDER

Plaintiff is an indigent Randolph County arrestee who since yesterday has

been jailed, without a hearing, because she is unable to make the $7,500 bail. Before

the court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. # 2), which

asks the court to enjoin four Randolph County officials (Defendants) from

continuing to hold Plaintiff. Her complaint alleges that Defendants have violated

her Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights by jailing her

solely on the basis of her indigence. Upon careful consideration of the record,

Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order is due to be granted.

“A temporary restraining order protects against irreparable harm and

preserves the status quo until a meaningful decision on the merits can be made.”

Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Where

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 9 Filed 05/18/17 Page 2 of 4
notice is given, a temporary restraining order requires the same four elements as a preliminary injunction. These four elements are “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury absent an injunction; (3) the injury outweighs whatever damage an injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) an injunction is not adverse to the public interest.” Citizens for Police Accountability Political Comm. v. Browning, 572 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). The movant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to a temporary restraining order. See Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff has demonstrated the four elements required for a temporary restraining order to issue. First, there is a substantial likelihood that Defendant’s bail schedule violates Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The longstanding law in this Circuit establishes the unconstitutionality of the sort of pretrial detention scheme of which Defendants are accused—one in which indigent arrestees are jailed because of their inability to make bond, while well-to-do arrestees are able to quickly purchase their release. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978)1 (holding that while the “[u]tilization of a master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements,” “[t]he incarceration of those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other
1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
2

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possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements”).
Second, Plaintiff has demonstrated that her continued detention constitutes the kind of irreparable injury justifying immediate relief. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”); United States v. Bogle, 855 F.2d 707, 710–11 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that “unnecessary deprivation of liberty clearly constitutes irreparable harm”).
Third, the alleged injury to Plaintiff outweighs any injury to Randolph County; and, fourth, the public interest will not be disserved by granting Plaintiff’s requested relief.
Generally, security is required when a temporary restraining order issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). This is not the typical case, however, in that the present action is grounded upon Plaintiff’s lack of financial resources. In light of this fact, and the court’s determination that Defendants will incur no costs or damages during the pendency of the temporary restraining order, no security bond will be required.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 1. The motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. # 2) is GRANTED;
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2. Defendants are ENJOINED from continuing to jail Plaintiff based solely2 on her inability to pay a secured monetary amount as a condition of release;
3. A telephonic hearing to determine whether to convert this temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction, so long as it is still necessary, is SET for May 26, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to set up the conference call and shall contact chambers by 10:00 a.m. that morning for further instructions;
4. Defendants are ORDERED to file a response to the arguments contained in Plaintiff’s motions on or before May 25, 2017, at 12:00 p.m.; and
5. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order on Defendants instanter.
DONE this 18th day of May, 2017, at 5:45 p.m. /s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 At a bond hearing, Defendants may find other valid reasons to hold arrestees, such as public safety, the risk of flight, or a history of failure to appear.
4

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 49 Filed 07/14/17 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAVID COFIELD, in his official

)

capacity as Randolph County Sheriff, )

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-WKW

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against four state officials who each play a role

in Randolph County’s alleged unconstitutional pretrial detention scheme—“one in

which indigent arrestees are jailed because of their inability to make bond, while

well-to-do arrestees are able to quickly purchase their release.” (Doc. # 9, at 2.) One

of the four officials, Defendant Sheriff David Cofield, filed a Motion to Dismiss on

the ground that he “has no authority over setting bond as a matter of law.” (Doc. #

30, at 1.) In other words, Defendant argues he is immune from suit because he had

no discretion to change the policy—he was simply enforcing the law as charged to

him by his superiors. The other three officials—Circuit Clerk Christopher May,

Magistrate Jill Puckett, and District Judge Clay Tinney—filed a Motion to Dismiss

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-TFM Document 49 Filed 07/14/17 Page 2 of 7
(Doc. # 46) on the ground that this action is moot because Plaintiff is no longer jailed in Randolph County. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are due to be denied.
II. DISCUSSION A. Defendant Cofield
Defendant’s only argument ignores hornbook law that has been around for over 100 years. “The landmark case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), created an exception to [state sovereign immunity] by asserting that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State.”1 Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (emphasis added). “The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is ‘void’ and therefore does not ‘impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 160). Because the State is unable to authorize an unconstitutional action, its actor is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected to the consequences of his official conduct.” Young, 209 U.S. at 160. Thus, “the Eleventh Amendment does not
1 Sheriff Cofield is a state actor, even though he works for Randolph County. Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Alabama sheriffs act as state officers when supervising inmates and otherwise operating the county jails.”).
2

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prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief [against a state actor] to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.” Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
This is exactly what Plaintiffs seek against Defendant (Doc. # 1, at 19–21), and Defendant does not enjoy immunity merely because he was following orders. Indeed, the holding of Ex parte Young assumes that the state actor has done nothing more than enforce the law as promulgated by the State. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102 (“[In Young], a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction.”).
Defendant seems to think it matters that Plaintiffs fail to allege “any independent action . . . [taken by him in] setting the terms and conditions by which Plaintiff (or any other person) may be released on bond.” (Doc. # 30, at 3 (emphasis added).) It does not. The cases Defendant offers to support his argument to the contrary are inapposite because they deal with the bounds of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329– 30 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying the test introduced in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708 (1978), which is used to determine “whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that are the direct result of its official policies”). This claim is for prospective injunctive relief against Defendant in his official capacity
3

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and thus Ex Parte Young controls. Accordingly, Cofield’s motion to dismiss is due to be denied. B. Defendants May, Puckett, and Tinney
Defendants May, Pucket, and Tinney (“Defendants”) argue that traditional standing rules require Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed as moot. After all, Plaintiff has already been released from jail, and the claim she brings centers on her wrongful detention. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (noting that “federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them”). Defendants point out that Plaintiff is no longer a member of the class of pretrial detainees kept in jail because of Randolph County’s bail schedule and emphasize that “a plaintiff cannot represent a class of which he is not a member” (Doc. # 44, at 3). See Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In a class action, the claim of the named plaintiff, who seeks to represent the class, must be live both at the time he brings suit and when the district court determines whether to certify the putative class. If the plaintiff’s claim is not live, the court lacks a justiciable controversy and must dismiss the claim as moot.”).
The question is whether an exception applies to the traditional standing rules. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a class action is not “always moot just because the named plaintiff’s claim is moot.” Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 772 F.3d 698, 706 (11th Cir. 2014). It may be, for example,
4

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that a claim brought via class action is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399, 402. Even prior to certification, the action may be allowed to proceed if the named plaintiff’s case becomes moot “before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion.” Id. at 402 n.11.
Defendants recognize this exception. In fact, they even acknowledge that the exception has been used in previous cases involving “pretrial detention matters.” (Doc. # 44, at 5.) For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court reviewed a challenge to a Florida pretrial detention procedure even though the named plaintiffs were no longer detained. Explaining its holding, the court observed the unlikelihood that “any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. The same difficulty, it would seem, arises in a case like this one.
But Defendants balk at the comparison. “[I]t would be improper to use this princip[le] in this matter,” they say, because “there has never [been] an instance where a named plaintiff’s claims became mooted within 24 hours of issuance of the case and even prior to the issuance of a TRO.” (Doc. # 44, at 5.) The “short timeframe,” by Defendants’ estimation, calls into question whether Plaintiff “should be considered a member of the class,” whether she “would diligently pursue the class claims, and whether [she] has stated a true case in controversy.” (Doc. # 44, at 5.)
5

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This distinction is immaterial. Defendants do not point to a single case holding that the length of a plaintiff’s live controversy, prior to its becoming moot, should bear on whether a mootness exception will later apply. And if the length of the live controversy did bear on that question, it seems a shorter controversy would work in Plaintiff’s favor, not the other way around. The more quickly a controversy is mooted, the more likely it is to evade review. Nevertheless, after highlighting the brevity of the controversy, Defendants go on to assert that “the issues likely will not evade review.” The court can think of no reason why that would be true, and Defendants do not explain. All in all, the distinctions Defendants attempt to draw between this case and the ordinary pretrial detention case are irrelevant, and the arguments they make in support of those distinctions are vacuous. Courts routinely apply the Sosna exception in pretrial detention cases because pretrial detentions are the very sort of transitory subject matter for which the exception was created. See Dunn v. Dunn, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“Claims that derive from potentially imminent release from custody are ‘a classic example of a transitory claim.’”). Defendants have provided no convincing reason why this case is any different from all the other cases that involve challenges to various pretrial detention schemes. Because the controversy at the center of this case is transitory in nature, the Sosna exception applies, and the court will not dismiss it for mootness.
6

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III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Cofield’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 30) is DENIED, and that Defendant Cofield shall file an answer to the complaint on or before July 28, 2017. It is further ORDERED that the other Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 46) is also DENIED. DONE this 14th day of July, 2017.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 97 Filed 03/21/18 Page 1 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS, Plaintiff.
v. DAVID COFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

) CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-WKW

)

[WO]

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is just one of many constitutional challenges to a bond system that

may require indigent arrestees to post secured money bond in an amount set in a

bond schedule to avoid pretrial detention. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County

(ODonnell I), 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017), affirmed as modified, 882 F.3d

528 (5th Cir. 2018); Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2017 WL

2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-13139 (11th Cir. July

13, 2017); Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D.

Ala. Sept. 14, 2015). The Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have addressed such

a challenge in recent years. That may soon change, as a challenge to a Georgia city’s

bond system, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 17-13139 (11th Cir. docketed July 13,

2017), is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit. The court will not stay this

action pending the Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of Walker, as contemplated in the

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 97 Filed 03/21/18 Page 2 of 26
December 5th, 2017 show cause order (Doc. # 82), although the court will continue to monitor Walker.
At issue here is the bond system in effect in Randolph County, Alabama. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards, on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals (see Doc. # 5), brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the district court judge (Judge Clay Tinney), the magistrate (Jill Puckett), the circuit court clerk (Christopher May), and the sheriff (David Cofield) responsible for promulgating and carrying out that bond system. (Doc. # 1.)
As a result of some legal maneuvering after this action was filed, Defendants revised Randolph County’s bond procedures. (Doc. # 67-1.) The gist of the revisions is that every person arrested in Randolph County who cannot afford to pay the secured bond amount in the bond schedule established by the Alabama Supreme Court is entitled to a bond hearing within seventy-two hours of arrest. Defendants argue that those revisions moot this case and thus deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. But Plaintiff contends that the new system is still constitutionally infirm — both because the procedural protections at that hearing are insufficient and because seventy-two hours is still too long to detain arrestees unable to post secured money bond before a bond hearing (Doc. # 75).
Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3) and Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc.
2

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 97 Filed 03/21/18 Page 3 of 26
# 67). Because the mid-litigation revision of Randolph County’s bond procedures has not mooted this case, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc. # 67) is due to be denied. But because the new procedures arguably provide the same result as the injunction Plaintiff seeks, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3) is also due to be denied.
I. JURISDICTION This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, although the question whether this action is moot will be addressed below. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who is indigent, brought this action after she was subjected to pretrial detention without a hearing due to her inability to post a secured money bond. This court granted her motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. # 9), and Plaintiff was released. Plaintiff’s release did not moot this case (Doc. # 49) because she brought it on behalf of a putative class “consisting of all arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release” (Doc. # 5, at 1). Apparently after the court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. # 49), Judge Tinney, Mr. May, and Ms. Puckett began “working to develop bail procedures that, if adopted for Randolph County, would obviate the need for a preliminary
3

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injunction.” (Doc. # 53, at 1.) That work involved negotiations with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. # 59, at 2.) Those negotiations eventually broke down (see Doc. # 65, at 1–2), but they were not entirely without fruit.
The same day Judge Tinney, Mr. May, and Ms. Puckett filed their response to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 67), Judge Tinney issued a new standing bond order (Doc. # 67-1, at 10–16). Under the new standing bond order, arrestees who are unable to post bond in the amount set according to a bond schedule (Doc. # 67-1, at 18–21) “shall be entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of their release promptly after arrest, but in any event no later than 72 hours after arrest.” (Doc. # 67-1, at 12.) Before that hearing, arrestees “shall complete an affidavit of substantial hardship” (Doc. # 67-1, at 12), the same form used to obtain appointed counsel (Doc. # 67-1, at 23–24).
At the hearing, the court “may take into account” the factors listed in Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. # 67-1, at 12–14.) The court is required to “consider a defendant’s ability to post a bond in determining the defendant’s conditions of release” and “the defendant’s affidavit of substantial hardship.” (Doc. # 67-1, at 14.) The court may also “elicit testimony about the defendant’s financial condition.” (Doc. # 67-1, at 14.)
After considering the defendant’s ability to post a bond, as well as the other factors set out in Rule 7.2(a), the Court may release a defendant on his or her own recognize [sic], require the defendant to post an unsecured appearance bond, or require the posting of a secured
4

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appearance bond if that is the least onerous condition that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to others or to the public at large. The Court will not require a defendant to post a secure appearance bond that the defendant cannot afford to post, or a secure appearance bond in an amount less than that contained in the bond schedule that the defendant can afford to post, if there is a less onerous condition that would assure the defendant’s appearance or minimize risk to the public. However, if the Court determines that there is no less onerous condition for securing the defendant’s appearance or protecting the public, the Court may require a secure appearance bond in an amount less than, equal to, or greater than that contained in the bond schedule. The Court will make written finding [sic] as to why the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s presence at trial in such a case.
(Doc. # 67-1, at 14 (citations omitted).) If the hearing does not take place within
seventy-two hours of arrest, the arrestee “will be released on an unsecured
appearance bond . . . at the expiration of the 72-hour period.” (Doc. # 67-1, at 14–
15.) Those procedures apply both to individuals arrested pursuant to a warrant (Doc.
# 67-1, at 16–17) and to those arrested without a warrant (Doc. # 67-1, at 12–16).
Defendants argue that the new standing bond order moots this case (Doc.
# 67), but Plaintiff argues that it does not provide sufficient procedural safeguards.
Plaintiff thus continues to seek a preliminary injunction.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s requested preliminary injunction includes four components. The
injunction would (1) require Defendants to hold “an individualized hearing with
adequate procedural safeguards” for arrestees unable to pay secured money bail.
(Doc. # 3, at 1.) Such a hearing would include: (2) “an inquiry into and findings
5

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concerning [the arrestee’s] ability to pay” (Doc. # 3, at 1); (3) “an inquiry into and findings concerning . . . the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release” (Doc. # 3, at 1); and (4) “a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance.” (Doc. # 3, at 1–2.)
The new standing bond order appears to cover each of the four components of Plaintiff’s proposed injunction to at least some degree. Under the new standing bond order, (1) every arrestee unable to pay secured money bail is entitled to an individualized bond hearing within seventy-two hours of arrest. (Doc. # 67-1, at 12, 15–16.) At that hearing, the court will consider (2) the arrestee’s financial condition and ability to post a bond, as well as (3) the possibility of alternative conditions of release (including personal recognizance bond and an unsecured appearance bond) and each of the factors listed in Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. # 67-1, at 12–15, 15–16.) And in the event the court imposes a secured bond that the arrestee cannot pay, (4) the court will make written findings explaining why a secured bond is the least onerous condition required to achieve public safety and assure the arrestee will appear for later court proceedings. (Doc. # 67-1, at 14, 15–16.)
Because the new standing bond order arguably gives Plaintiff the relief she seeks, Defendants argue that this case is moot. (Doc. # 67, at 30–34.)
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Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff disagrees. She argues both that the new standing bond order’s procedures are still constitutionally infirm (Doc. # 75, at 8–20) and that the new standing bond order does not moot this case even if the new procedures pass constitutional muster (Doc. # 75, at 28–31).
Because mootness is a jurisdictional issue, the court will address Defendants’ motion to dismiss on that basis before addressing Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Both motions are due to be denied. A. The new standing bond order does not moot this case.
If Plaintiff is correct that Randolph County’s bond procedures under the new standing bond order run afoul of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the new standing bond order clearly does not moot the case. While there is not enough to find a likelihood that Plaintiff will succeed on those arguments, infra at pp. 13–26, neither is there enough to dismiss them out of hand. Most importantly, Plaintiff strongly disputes that seventy-two hours is the appropriate window for resolution of financial and criminological issues in the bond determination. She instead argues for a window of no longer than a few hours. Defendants have settled on seventy-two hours, but their reasoning has not been tested factually or legally. Plaintiff also argues for additional procedural safeguards, including court-appointed counsel; an opportunity to testify, present evidence, and cross examine witnesses; notice of the purpose of the bond hearing; and a clear-and-
7

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convincing evidentiary standard. In short, there is more to be done on remedial issues, so this case is not moot.
But the new standing bond order does not moot this case even if the new procedures are constitutionally sufficient. Ordinarily, “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct . . . does not make [a] case moot.” Flanigan’s Enters., Inc., of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)), petition for cert. docketed sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 17-869 (Dec. 15, 2017). But a voluntary cessation can render a case moot if “subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). “The key inquiry in this mootness analysis . . . is whether the evidence leads . . . to a reasonable expectation that [Defendants] will reverse course” and reinstitute their challenged practices “should this Court grant [their] motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1256. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof here, see id. (citing Coral Springs St. Sys, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2004)), and she “must present more than ‘[m]ere speculation that [Defendants] may return to [their] previous ways.’” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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In its en banc decision in Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc., of Georgia v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, the Eleventh Circuit provided “three broad factors to which courts should look for guidance in conducting” the mootness inquiry in this context. Id. at 1257. The first two factors weigh against a mootness finding, and the third factor does little to change the balance.
1. The First Flanigan’s Enterprises Factor The first factor is “whether the change in conduct resulted from substantial deliberation or is merely an attempt to manipulate [a federal court’s] jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)). The Eleventh Circuit has also phrased this inquiry as asking whether a mid-litigation change was “an attempt to avoid the issuance of an injunction.” Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy, 633 F.3d at 1312. Under this factor, the court “will examine the timing” of the new standing bond order, “the procedures used in enacting it, and any explanations independent of this litigation which may have motivated it.” Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1257. The new standing bond order was issued on the same day Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss on the basis of mootness. The method used to enact those procedures was the unilateral issuance of the new standing bond order by Judge Tinney, a relatively easy step. And there do not appear to be any explanations independent of this litigation
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that may have motivated the new standing bond order. It is also apparent from Defendants’ filings preceding their response that those procedures were adopted to — in Defendants’ own words — “obviate the need for a preliminary injunction.” (Doc. # 53, at 1; accord Doc. # 61, at 1; Doc. # 63, at 1; see also Doc. # 65.)
Given all the circumstances, this factor weighs against a mootness finding. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary (Doc. # 67, at 31–32) are simply unpersuasive.
2. The Second Flanigan’s Enterprises Factor The second factor is “whether the government’s decision to terminate the challenged conduct was ‘unambiguous.’” Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1257 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy, 633 F.3d at 1310). Under this factor, the court must “consider whether the actions that have been taken to allegedly moot the case reflect a rejection of the challenged conduct that is both permanent and complete.” Id. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants have not unambiguously abandoned their unconstitutional behavior because they “affirmatively disavow any wrongdoing and claim that their old and new procedures are lawful.” (Doc. # 75, at 31.) According to Plaintiff, that “raise[s] serious concern that they will resume the unconstitutional practices if this litigation is resolved in their favor.” (Doc. # 75, at 31.)
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The Flanigan’s Enterprises court rejected a similar argument, noting that it “provide[d] only weak evidence, if any,” that the defendant’s rejection of its challenged ordinance in that case was ambiguous and that the defendant would reenact the ordinance. 868 F.3d at 1262. But the defendant in Flanigan’s Enterprises had “unanimously enacted a full and public repeal of the challenged provision; its counsel ha[d] — on two separate occasions — warranted its commitment to the repeal; and it ha[d] unanimously and publicly adopted a resolution affirming those representations.” Id. “Th[ose] actions,” the court held, “suggest precisely the type of unambiguous termination from which we are unable to draw a reasonable expectation that the City will reenact the challenged legislation.” Id.
By contrast, the only actions Defendants have taken that suggest “unambiguous termination” of the conduct Plaintiff challenges are Judge Tinney’s unilateral issuance of the new standing bond order during this litigation and his assertion in a sworn affidavit that Defendants have abandoned their prior practices. Against that backdrop, Defendants’ refusal to admit any wrongdoing or concede that their prior practices were unconstitutional raises at least some concern that Defendants or their successors will revert to those prior practices after the conclusion of this litigation.
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Moreover, there is little reason to think the new standing bond order is permanent. Defendants’ only argument to that effect is that Judge Tinney said so. (Doc. # 67, at 33.) But as Plaintiff observes:
[T]he new procedures of a single judicial official have no guarantee of permanence. [The new standing bond order] can be changed or withdrawn at the judge’s whim. Just as it was entered the day that the preliminary injunction briefing was due, it could be revoked the day the case was dismissed. The inherent impermanence of the new procedures distinguishes this case from those where a legislative body formally enacts or repeals a law. (Doc. # 75, at 30.) This factor thus also weighs against a mootness finding. 3. The Third Flanigan’s Enterprises Factor The third factor is “whether the government has consistently maintained its commitment to the new policy or legislative scheme.” Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1257 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy, 633 F.3d at 1310). Defendants concede that “there is no track record for the Court to review” their commitment to the new standing bond order (Doc. # 67, at 33), but they ask the court to “find comfort in the fact that the standing order was published to the public, and in Judge Tinney’s sworn statement that the repealed bail schedule and former practices will not be enforced in the future” (Doc. # 67, at 34). Defendants here reference a line in Flanigan’s Enterprises: [A]lthough we are unable to adequately judge its commitment to the new scheme given the late stage at which it has been adopted, we are comforted by the City’s persuasive and public commitment not to
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reenact the repealed provision, as well as its demonstrated lack of commitment to enforcing the old scheme. Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1262. Defendants’ remedial steps — which consist entirely of Judge Tinney’s unilateral actions and statements — pale in comparison to the steps taken by the defendant in Flanigan’s Enterprises. See id. at 1260–62. And while the lack of a track record does not weigh against a finding of mootness in this case, it also does not weigh in favor of such a finding.
* * * In sum, the balance of the three Flanigan’s Enterprises factors weighs against a finding of mootness, and the parties have not identified anything beyond those factors that should be considered. Plaintiff has thus established a sufficiently reasonable expectation — for the sake of the mootness question — that Defendants will revert to their earlier challenged conduct if their motion to dismiss is granted. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. # 67) is due to be denied. B. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is due to be denied because she has not shown that the additional procedural safeguards she demands are constitutionally required. Although the new standing bond order does not warrant granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, it does warrant denying Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. As the party seeking a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) she has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
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irreparable injury will be suffered until the injunction issues; (3) the threatened harm to her or the putative class (or both) outweighs any damage the injunction might cause Defendants; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. E.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Because a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” it should not be granted unless “the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). Because any “facts in dispute are not material to the preliminary injunction sought,” the court “need not hold an evidentiary hearing.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction based only on the first two claims in her complaint. (Doc. # 4, at 2.) The violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment she alleges in those claims (Doc. # 1, at 17–19) would presumably be remedied by the procedures she seeks in her motion for a preliminary injunction. As mentioned above, those procedures arguably match the procedures established by the new standing bond order.
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But Plaintiff argues that the Fourteenth Amendment requires additional procedures — or, to use the language from her motion, that the new standing bond order does not provide “adequate procedural safeguards” (Doc. # 3, at 1). Specifically, she argues that arrestees unable to pay a secured money bond are entitled to appointed counsel (Doc. # 75, at 16–17); “notice about the purpose of the” bond hearing (Doc. # 75, at 18); and “an opportunity to be heard[,] . . . to present evidence” (Doc. # 75, at 19 (quoting ODonnell I, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1145 (S.D. Tex. 2017)), and to cross examine witnesses (Doc. # 4, at 26). She further argues that the court must use a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard when determining whether pretrial detention is necessary. (Doc. # 75, at 15–16.) Plaintiff also argues that seventy-two hours is too long to make arrestees wait for a bond hearing, although she has not clearly suggested an alternative time frame. (Doc. # 75, at 11–13, 19–20.)
In demanding these additional procedural safeguards, Plaintiff primarily relies upon United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), but that reliance is misplaced. Plaintiff also relies on ODonnell I, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, in which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction modifying a county’s bond system, as well as the opinion the Fifth Circuit issued last month modifying that injunction in ODonnell v. Harris County (ODonnell II), 882 F.3d 528
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(5th Cir. 2018). Although those courts reached the result Plaintiff now seeks, their reasoning is not persuasive enough to compel that result here.
The court will discuss Salerno and the ODonnell decisions generally before addressing each of the additional procedural safeguards Plaintiff demands.
1. Salerno In Salerno, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected facial constitutional challenges to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 to 3150. That act provides most of the procedural safeguards Plaintiff demands: Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. He may request the presence of counsel at the detention hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in writing, and support his conclusion with “clear and convincing evidence.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f), (i)). Plaintiff suggests that the Salerno Court held that those procedural protections are required for any pretrial detention hearing. (Doc. # 4, at 23; Doc. # 75, at 29.) But the Court did no such thing. For one, the Court in Salerno addressed only “the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel.” 481 U.S. at 755. More importantly, the Court did not hold that the procedural safeguards provided by the
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Bail Reform Act of 1984 are constitutionally required; rather, it held that they were constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 752. Indeed, the Court easily rejected the constitutional challenge to those procedural safeguards in a three-paragraph discussion that indicates that those procedures go beyond what the Constitution actually requires. See id. at 751–52 (“[W]e may dispose briefly of respondents’ facial challenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act.” Id. at 751.).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s representations, the Court did not hold that those procedures “must attend” a pretrial detention order to satisfy due process. (Doc. # 4, at 23 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755); accord Doc. # 75, at 29 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755).) Because Plaintiff selectively quotes the words “must attend” without providing the context in which the Salerno Court used them, here is some of that context:
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that primary concern of every government — a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens — on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the
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Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added). Based on the above-quoted paragraph and the rest of the Salerno opinion, the requirement referenced by the words “must attend” is better understood to be a requirement imposed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984, not one imposed by the Constitution. Nowhere in the Salerno opinion did the Court say that those procedures were constitutionally required. In fact, the Court described them as “extensive” and “more exacting than those we found sufficient in the juvenile context.” Id. at 752. It further noted that those procedural safeguards “far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited postarrest detention.” Id. (emphasis added). In short, the Salerno Court held that those procedural safeguards were constitutionally sufficient, id. (“We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial [due process] challenge.”), but it did not hold that they were constitutionally required. Plaintiff’s misreading of Salerno serves as the primary basis for her arguments in support of her demand for additional procedural safeguards, and those arguments are fundamentally flawed to that extent. But Plaintiff did not rely exclusively on Salerno. 2. ODonnell I and ODonnell II Plaintiff also cited the Southern District of Texas’s opinion in ODonnell I and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in ODonnell II, which affirmed ODonnell I in part. Of
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course, this court is not bound by either ODonnell I or ODonnell II, so those opinions are relevant here only to the extent that they are persuasive.
The district court in ODonnell I found that, “in order to detain misdemeanor defendants unable to pay a secured financial condition of pretrial release,” 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1145, the Fourteenth Amendment requires:
(1) notice that the financial and other resource information . . . collect[ed] [from a misdemeanor arrestee] is for the purpose of determining a misdemeanor arrestee’s eligibility for release or detention; (2) a hearing at which the arrestee has an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence; (3) an impartial decisionmaker; (4) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on to find that a secured financial condition is the only reasonable way to assure the arrestee’s appearance at hearings and law-abiding behavior before trial; and (5) timely proceedings within 24 hours of arrest. Id. at 1153. The Fifth Circuit affirmed those findings after making two modifications. First, it held that written statements were not necessary (at least for the defendants in that litigation) because oral statements on the record would suffice. ODonnell II, 882 F.3d at 542. Second, it held that due process required a hearing within forty-eight hours as opposed to twenty-four hours. Id. at 542–43. Turning back to the instant case, Plaintiff appears to concede that the new standing bond order clearly provides the third and fourth ODonnell safeguards, as it provides an impartial decision-maker (Doc. # 67-1, at 12) and written findings (Doc. # 67-1, at 14). Plaintiff asserts that each of the remaining ODonnell safeguards — notice, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence at the hearing, and a hearing
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within forty-eight hours — are required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The other procedural safeguards Plaintiff demands — appointed counsel for the bond hearing and a clear-and-convincing standard of review — are noticeably absent from the ODonnell opinions.
3. The Additional Procedural Safeguards Plaintiff Seeks Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claims that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require each of the additional procedural safeguards Plaintiff demands. Plaintiff’s arguments concerning each of those procedural safeguards are addressed in turn.
a. Appointed Counsel The first authority Plaintiff cites in support of her assertion that indigent arrestees are entitled to appointed counsel for their bond hearing is Salerno. (Doc. # 75, at 16.) But as discussed above, Salerno offers little if any support for that proposition. Beyond that, Plaintiff essentially argues that counsel would be beneficial at a bond hearing (Doc. # 75, at 16–17 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 12.1(c) (4th Ed. 2016); Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1719, 1720, 1773 (2002))) and that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel in other
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contexts (Doc. # 75, at 17 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357– 58 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963))). Even assuming without deciding that counsel would be beneficial at a bond hearing, the cases Plaintiff cites were each based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Due Process Clause more generally or the Equal Protection Clause.
Perhaps Plaintiff would have a colorable Sixth Amendment claim, but she has not brought one. Instead, she relied only on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without acknowledging the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. # 1, at 17–19.) Plaintiff has not shown that those clauses would be an appropriate vehicle for her assertion of a right to appointed counsel. Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 452–53 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Due Process Clause created a right to appointed counsel in all proceedings with the potential for detention, then the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel would be unnecessary. . . . The fact that one constitutional provision expressly provides a right to appointed counsel in specific circumstances indicates that the Constitution does not also sub silentio provide that right far more broadly in another, more general, provision.” (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality
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opinion); id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))). She has thus failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on this point.
b. Notice About the Purpose of the Bond Hearing To support her assertion that indigent arrestees are entitled to notice about the purpose of a bond hearing — an assertion that does not appear in either her motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. # 3) or her supporting memorandum (Doc. # 4) — Plaintiff relies exclusively on ODonnell I and ODonnell II. (Doc. # 75, at 18; Doc. # 89, at 2, 5.) The district court in ODonnell I did not offer much discussion of the notice requirement it imposed. It seemed to import that requirement from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Turner v. Rogers, 546 U.S. 431, which the district court described as “a helpful starting point for examining the plaintiffs’ likelihood of succeeding on their due process claim.” ODonnell I, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. Turner also appeared to be an ending point for the ODonnell I court, as the district court declined to provide any explanation for the notice requirement it imposed other than that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a similar requirement in Turner, id. at 1140–41, and that the Fifth Circuit imposed a notice requirement in a different context, id. at 1145 (citing Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). It also declined to explain why that Fifth Circuit case — or Turner, for that matter — was relevant in the pretrial-detention context.
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The district court’s reasoning for imposing a notice requirement apparently satisfied the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the portion of the district court’s injunction requiring such notice without providing any independent analysis. ODonnell II, 882 F.3d at 541–43, 546, 549. In a similar vein, Plaintiff has not offered any argument in support of her demand for a notice requirement beyond citations to ODonnell I and ODonnell II.
Again, those opinions are relevant here only to the extent that they are persuasive. Frankly, they are not persuasive on this issue. Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry her burden with respect to the notice requirement she demands.
c. Opportunity to Be Heard, to Present Evidence, and to Cross Examine Witnesses
Even more so than her notice argument, Plaintiff’s argument that arrestees are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and cross examine witnesses begins and ends with citations to ODonnell I and ODonnell II. (Doc. # 75, at 18– 19; Doc. # 89, at 2.) Once again, neither ODonnell I nor ODonnell II offers a persuasive explanation for imposing such a requirement. Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry her burden with respect to these procedural safeguards.
d. Clear-and-Convincing-Evidence Standard Plaintiff’s argument in support of requiring a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard fares no better. She asserts that “Salerno and the due process principles upon which it relies require a clear and convincing evidentiary standard prior to
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detention for any reason.” (Doc. # 75, at 15.) That is not the case, as discussed above. She also selectively quotes phrases from Salerno out of context (Doc. # 75, at 15) and mischaracterizes Defendants’ arguments in response to her motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 75, at 14–15 (citing Doc. # 67, at 19–20)), two lessthan-persuasive tactics.
Plaintiff has also cited In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), a recent California intermediate appellate court decision requiring a clearand-convincing-evidence standard for bail hearings. (Doc. # 86.) But that court relied at least in part on California law, including a provision of the California Constitution that explicitly requires a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for some bail determinations. Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (citing Cal. Const. art. I, § 12; Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210 (Cal. 1980)). It also heavily relied on Salerno. And it is unclear to what extent its holdings were based on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the California Constitution. See id. at 523 (noting that the petitioner brought claims “under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution”). Humphrey thus is not sufficiently persuasive to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s assertion that a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is required.
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Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry her burden with respect to the applicable evidentiary standard.
e. A Maximum Delay of Less than Seventy-Two Hours That leaves Plaintiff’s argument that a maximum delay of seventy-two hours before a bond hearing is still too long. It is unclear exactly what time frame Plaintiff seeks. She says she “does not contest that due process can tolerate some period of detention” (Doc. # 75, at 12) and concedes that a “de minimus period” of detention — meaning no “longer than a few hours” — would be permissible (Doc. # 75, at 16 n.10). But if that is truly the case, her argument proves too much. Indeed, she describes “the constitutional prohibition” she asserts as “categorical” and argues that “[s]hortening the constitutional injury does not end it.” (Doc. # 75, at 11.) In any event, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that a maximum delay of seventy-two hours before a bond hearing is unconstitutional. Indeed, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 — which, according to Plaintiff’s arguments based on Salerno, provides only the bare minimum safeguards required by the Constitution — allows for at least a seventytwo-hour delay before a bail hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). And with respect to enforcing that requirement, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides less protection for arrestees than the new standing bond order: The former does not require an arrestee to be released if a bail hearing is not held within the time limits it imposes, United
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States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717 (1990), but the latter does (Doc. # 671, at 14–15). It is thus at least possible that the timing provisions of the new standing bond order provide greater protections than the Fourteenth Amendment actually requires.
* * * The new standing bond order arguably provides all of the relief Plaintiff seeks in her motion for a preliminary injunction. The devil may be in the details, but Plaintiff has not made the requisite showings to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claims that the Fourteenth Amendment requires procedural safeguards beyond those provided by the new standing bond order. Her motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore due to be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
(Doc. # 67) is DENIED; and 2. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. # 3) is DENIED. DONE this 21st day of March, 2018.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 119 Filed 09/10/18 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS, Plaintiff.
v. DAVID COFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

) CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-WKW

)

[WO]

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the motion for class certification filed by Plaintiff Kandace

Kay Edwards (Doc. # 5), which has been fully briefed (Docs. # 6, 95, 96, 98).

Plaintiff seeks to certify a class consisting of “[a]ll state-court arrestees who are or

who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money

bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. # 98, at 2.) Because she has carried

her burden under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, her motion is due

to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the parties

do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). To avail herself of this exception, a plaintiff seeking class certification bears the burden of proving that she has satisfied the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) — often shorthanded as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy — and that the class action will meet one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b); see Brown v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016) (“All else being equal, the presumption is against class certification because class actions are an exception to our constitutional tradition of individual litigation.”). The Named Plaintiff seeks certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2). As a result, along with the 23(a) prerequisites, she must also prove that Defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). All of this proof must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v. Triad of Ala., LLC., No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW, 2017 WL 1044692, at *1 & n.1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017).
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III. DISCUSSION The parties agree that Plaintiff has met the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), although there is some dispute about the definition and number of classes. Plaintiff defined her proposed class in her motion for class certification (Doc. # 5) and supporting memorandum (Doc. # 6) as consisting of “all arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. # 5, at 1; Doc. # 6, at 2.) In her reply brief, Plaintiff suggested modifying that definition to include “[a]ll state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. # 98, at 2.) That modification was intended to exclude municipal-court arrestees as well as individuals “detained solely due to a hold request from another jurisdiction.” (Doc. # 98, at 2.) But it was meant to include arrestees for whom a hold request is made when “bail is set by the Randolph County District or Circuit Court, for purposes of addressing the proprietary bail set by the Randolph County court.” (Doc. # 98, at 2.) Plaintiff’s proposed modification was apparently the product of discussions with Defendant David Cofield, the Sheriff of Randolph County. Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s proposed class should be broken into two separate classes. They assert that “the current bail procedures divide class members into two distinct classes with two distinct constitutional claims and distinct forms of
3

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 119 Filed 09/10/18 Page 4 of 5
potential relief.” (Doc. # 95, at 2; see Doc. # 96, at 1–2 (“Sheriff Cofield hereby
joins into, adopts, and incorporates by reference the Judicial Defendants’ Response,
Document 95, as if fully stated herein.” (Doc. # 96, at 2).).) Those classes are:
Class 1: All state-court arrestees who are or will be in custody in the Randolph County jail who are otherwise eligible for release but who cannot afford the secured bond in the bond schedule and who must remain in custody for a maximum of 72 hours to receive an initial appearance with a judge.
Class 2: All state-court arrestees who are or will be in custody in the Randolph County jail because they are required to post a secured bond they cannot afford after an initial appearance at which they receive the procedural process contained in Section II of the September 8, 2017 Standing Order.
(Doc. # 95, at 8.) Plaintiff objects to breaking her proposed class into two separate
classes for a variety reasons. (Doc. # 98, at 2–5.)
Upon consideration of the arguments and the law on class certification, the
court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2) and that breaking that proposed class into two separate classes is unnecessary
at this time. Plaintiff’s proposed class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all
members would be impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the
proposed class; Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class; and
Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the proposed class, which would make final
declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate respecting the proposed class as a
4

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whole. Finally, this type of suit is the quintessential stuff of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.
To the extent it should become necessary to revise the class definition as a result of discovery or other events, the court can revisit the issue pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”).
IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 5) is GRANTED; 2. The following class is CERTIFIED pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2):
all state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release; 3. Attorneys Alex Karakatsanis, Esq., Samuel Brooke, Esp., Randall C. Marshall, Esq., and Brandon Buskey, Esq., are DESIGNATED as class counsel; and 4. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is DESIGNATED as the representative of the class. DONE this 10th day of September, 2018.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 1 of 24
EXHIBIT 1 TINNEY DECLARATION

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcuMmENeTntIl6l7-1

Filed 09/08/17 Page 2 of 24
ELECTRONICALLY FILED 9/8/2017 8:16AM
56-CV-2017-999999.99 CIRCUIT COURT OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, ALABAMA CHRIS MAY, CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE l\'IIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABA1'\1A

KANDACE KAY ED\VARDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID COFIELD, in his official capacity as Randolph County Sheriff, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-\VKW-TFM

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DECLARATION OF JUDGE CLAY TINNEY
1. My name is Clay Tinney. I am over the age of 19, and the statements contained in

this declaration are based on personal knowledge.

2. I am and have been at all times relevant to the complaint in this case the District

Court Judge for Randolph County in the Fifth JllClicial Circuit of the State of Alabama.

3. The Fifth Judicial Circuit for the State of Alabama comprises Randolph,

Tallapoosa, Chambers, and Macon counties. See Ala. Code § 12-11-2(5).

4. Under Alabama law, circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions in

which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and over felony prosecutions. See Ala. Code § 12~11~30(1), (2).

5. Under Alabama law, district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts

in civil cases in which the amount in controversy does not exceed $10}000 and exclusive

jurisdiction over cases in which the amount in contn.wersy does not exceed $6,000. See Ala. Code § 12~12-30, 31. District courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanor

prosecutions and may receive guilty pleas in non~capital felony cases. See Ala. Code§ 12~ 12-32.

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcMumENeTnIt l6l 7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 3 of 24
6. District courts have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts over preliminary hearings and other pre-trial proceedings in felony prosecutions. See Ala. Code§ l2-12-32(b); Ala. R. Crim. P. 2.2(a); State v. Brown, CR-14-1076, 2017 WL 3821851, at *2-3 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2017). As a result, I regularly conduct pre-trial proceedings in misdemeanor and felony cases prosecuted in Randolph County, including conducting initial appearances, determining the conditions of pre-trial release, and holding preliminary hearings. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4(a),
7.2(a), 5.1.
7. I am the only district court judge in Randolph County. The Fifth Judicial Circuit has three circuit court judges, but none of them resides in RandoIph County.
8. Jill Puckett serves as the Magistrate tor Randolph Co~mty, and Chris May serves as
the Randolph County Circuit Court Clerk for the Fifth Judicial Circuit for the State of Alabama. 9. Randolph County is a sparsely-populated n1ral county with a widely-diffused
population. Consequently, it is important to ensure that criminal defendm1ts are granted pre-trial release on conditions that are reasonably calculated to ensure their appearance at trial.
10. In my experience, the requirement that a defendtmt post a secured appearance bond is a useful means of ensuring the defendant's appearance at trial. The possibility of paying a significant amount of money in the event of a failure to appear provides a powerful incentive for a defendant to appear for all required co~1rt dates.
ll. In my experience, the issuance of a warrant for a failme to appear for a defendant who does not appear for tria1 or other scheduled hearing is not an effective means of compelling a defendant's attendance in a county like Randolph County where the population is sparse and widely-diffused. Unlike a municipality with a condensed population and a municipal police
2

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcMumENeTntIl6l7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 4 of 24
department, a warrant for failure to appear is far more unlikely to be executed in a mral county like Randolph County.
12. On September 8, 2017, I adopted a standing order regarding pretrial appearance, establishment of bonds in advance of initial appearance, and individualized detenninations of the necessity and ability to post bond. A tnte and correct copy of this standing order is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A.
13. The standing order has three main components: firs1, it provides that defendants \vho can post a bond in an amount set by a bond schedule may obtain speedy release upon posting the bond subject to certain exceptions where it appears that posting the scheduled bond will not reasonably
assure the defendant's appearance at trial or will pose a threat to p1iblic safety.
Second, it provides that those who cannot obtain release by posting the bond contained in the schedule are entitled to an individualized determination of their
conditions of release, including a consideration of their financial condition, within 72 hours of arrest.
Third, it provides that a Magistrate setting the amount of bond in an atrest warrant may set the bond at a higher or lower amount than that contained in the schedule, depending on the nature and circumstances of the offense, so long as the bond is set within the range contained in Rule 7.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. 14. In collaboration with Circuit Clerk May, I adopted a bond schedule for Randolph County that sets an established bond amount for a f,riven offense. ln general, a person who can post the bond contained in the bond schedule is released from jail shortly after booking. 15. There are several reasons for adopting an established bond schedule. The Alabama Supreme Court has adopted a presumptively reasonable bond range f(n· various classifications of offenses in Rule 7.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The bond schedule adopted for Randolph County sets the established bond amount within the ranges set by Rule 7.2(b).
3

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcuMmENeTntIl6l7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 5 of 24
16. The adoption of a bond schedule "provides speedy and convenient release for those
who have no difficulty jn meeting its requirements." Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th
Cir. 1978). The amounts set in the bond schedule are reasonably calculated to ensure the defendant's appearance at tlial because they are within the presumptively reasonable range set by the Alabama Supreme Court and require the payment ofa significant amount ofmoney in the event the defendant fails to appear for trial. The use of a unifom1 bond schedule also sets bond equally for similar offenses.
17. In general, defendants who can post the bond contained in the schedule are released shortly after booking. However, it is not the case that every defendant is entitled to speedy release
It: just because the defendant can post the bond in the schedule. in the judgment of a supervisory
employee of the Randolph County Sheriff's Department, it appears that releasing a defendant upon
posting the bond contained in the schedule would present an wrreasonable risk of flight or danger to the public, the supervisory employee must contact the Court or the Magistrate and state the grounds for such a belief. If the Court or the Ma~.rlstrate independently detennines that releasing the defendant on the scheduled bond would present an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the
public, the Court or the Magistrate must order the defendant to remain in jail. At the defendanfs initial appearance, which must occur no later than 72 hours after arrest~ the Court will consider the
defendant's conditions of release by weighing the fourteen factors set out in Rule 7.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18. For those defendants who do not obtain release after booking because they crumot post the bond contained in U1e sche.dule, the defendant is entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of release within 72 hours at the latest at the defendant's initial appearance. Prior to
the initial appearance, the defendant will complete an affidavit of substantial hardship to inform
4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcMumE eTnItl6l 7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 6 of 24
the Court of the defendant's financia1 condition. The Court will then consider the defendant's conditions of release by considering the factors set out in Rule 7.2(a), including the defendant's financial condition.
19. In determining the defendant' s conditions of release, the Court will impose the least onerous conditions of release that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to the public. Under the standing order, the Court will not
require a defendant to post a secure bond that the defendant cannot afford to post, or require the posting of a secured appearance bond that the defendant can afford if there is a less onerous
condition that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance or that will minimize the risk of
hann to the public. However, if the Court determines that there is no less onerous condition for securing the defendant's appearance or protecting the public, the Court may require a secure appearance bond in an amount less than, equal to, or greater than that contained in the bond
schedule. In such an event, the Court must make a written finding for the requirement that the
defendant post bail. 20. In the unlikely event that a defendant arrested for a bailable otTense cam1ot obtain
release by posting the bond contained in the bond schedule and cannot be given a hearing to determine conditions of release within 72 hours after arrest, such a defendant \Vill be released on an unsecured appearance bond in the minimum amount set out in Rule 7.2(b).
21. In actuality, the vast majority of defendants arrested for a bailable offense obtain release relatively quickly after booking by posting bond in the amount contained in the schedule. For those who cannot, I hold an initial appearance before the 72-hour deadline contained in Rules 4.3(a)(l )(iii) and 4.3(b)(3). However, because 1 am the only district judge in Randolph County, and because only a judge can detennine the conditions of release under the factors set out in Rule
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcuMmE eTnIt l6l7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 7 of 24

7.2(a), I cannot guarantee that I can hold an initial appearance for every def't.-ndant in less than 72

hours. 22.

Finally, the standing order states that the Magistrate, in setting the bond amount in

the course of issuing an arrest warrant, need not set the bond in the amount contained in the bond schedule, but may set the bond in an amount contained within the range set out in Rule 7.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate is to set the bond in an amount that is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant's appearance at trial given the nature of the offense alleged in the indictment or complaint and any other circumstances relating to the alleged offense

that are k.'"D.own to the Magistrate. 23. 1be standing order supersedes all previous policies and procedures regarding the
posting of bail, and I have instructed aU relevant personnel regarding its implementation.
24. Plaintiff seeks an injun'-iion preventing Sheriff Cofield "from enforcing post-arrest
procedures that require arrestees to pay a secured monetary amount as a condition ofrelease unless
the Defendant [Cofield] is notified in writing that there bas been an inquiry into the person ' s ability

to pay the monetary amount, consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a t1nding on the record, where counsel was made available to represent the arrestee and the arrestee was able to present evidence, that any condition of release was the least restrictive condition

necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance." (Doc. 3-1). 25. The requested injunction prevents Sheriff Cofield from requiring anyone to post
secured bail, even if an individual is able and willing to do so, pending written proof of an individualized assessment of the defendant's ability to pay, and after there has been a finding by the Court after a hearing in which counsel is provided to the defendant.

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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOCoUcuMmENeTntI I6I7-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 8 of 24
26. Complying with this injunction would require me to keep every defendant arrested for a bailable offense in jail until an initia] appearance is held within 72 hours of arrest, even though the vast majority of defendants can obtain speedy release by posting bond in the amount contained in the schedule. Although I am willing to comply with such an injunction ifthe Court so orders, I do not believe that the interests of those who must wait no more than 72 homs to have their conditions of release determined because they cannot post the bond contained in the schedule outweighs the interests of the vast majority of those who can obtain speedy release pursmmt to the bond schedule.
27. I declare under penalty ofpetjury under the laws of the United States of Ametica that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on ~- g',J/)D
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 9 of 24
EXHIBIT A TO
DECLARATION OF JUDGE CLAY TINNEY

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTtI6077-1

Filed 09/08/17 Page 10 of 24
"""'·, ELECTRONICALLY FILED 9/8/2017 8:1l AM
"~~~ 56-CV-2017-999999.99 CIRCUIT COURT OF
RANDOLPH COUNTY, ALABAMA CHRIS MAY, CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, ALABAMA

STANDING ORDER REGARDING PRE-TRIAL APPEARANCE, ESTABLISHMENT OF BONDS IN ADVANCE OF INIITIAL APPEARANCE, AND INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATIONS OF THE NECESSI1Y AND ABILITY TO POST BOND

By the authority granted to the District Court pursuant to§§ 12-1-2, 12-1-7, 12-12-1, and

12-12-4 of the Alabama Code, the Court hereby enters the following standing order regarding a

pre-established schedule for bond, the initial appearance for persons arrested for violations of state

statutory criminal charges, and the determination of the necessity or amount of bond for those

unable to post bond based on the pre-established secured bond schedule:

I. Every person arrested for a bailable offense without a warrant shall be released upon the posting of a bond in an amount and type determined by an established bond schedule, subject to certain exceptiom.

Under Alabama law, an individual arrested for a crime has a right to bail except for capital

offenses. Ala. Const. art. I, sec. 16; Ala. Code§§ 15-13-2, 15-13-3. The Court is mindful that

"[t]he basic test for excessive bail is whether the amount is higher than reasonably necessary to

assure the accused's presence at triaL" and that, "[als long as the primary reason in setting bond is

to produce the defendant's presence, the final amount, type, and other conditions of release are

within the sound discretion of the releasing authority ...." United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886,

891 (11th Cir. 1982). The Court finds that, in adopting the bait schedule set forth in Rule 7.2(b)

of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Alabama Supreme Court has set forth a

presumptively re.:1sonable set of bail ranges for criminal offenses to guide the trial court's

discretjon in determining the appropriate amount ofbail in a given case. See Murphy v. State, 807

So. 2d 603, 605 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). Since "[u]tilization of a master bond schedule provides

speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements,') Pugh

v. Raimvater, 572 F.2d l 053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court hereby adopts an established schedule

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTtI6077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 11 of 24
setting bond for specific offenses v.ithin the presumptively reasonable ranges contained in Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(b). A true and correct copy ofthis bond schedule is attached as ·Exhibit A.
With the exception of defendants arrested for driving under the influence, domestic violence, or other charges that by statute require detention for a certain period oftime, defendants charged with a bailable offense who can post the bond provided in the bond schedule shall generally be entitled to release upon completion of booking and posting of the bond. However, if, in the judgment of a supervisory employee of the Rm1dolph County Sheriff's Department, it appears that releasing a defendant upon posting of the bond contained in the bond schedule would present an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the public, the supervisory employee shall contact the Court or the Magistrate and state the grounds for such belief on the part of the supervisory employee. 1
If the Court or the Magistrate upon the receipt of this information make the independent determination that releasing the defendant upon posting ofthe bond contained in the bond schedule would present an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the public, the Court or the Magistrate shall order that the defendant remain in jail. The detendant shall remain in jail pending a judicial determination of the conditions of release under Rules 7.2 and 7.3 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. This judicial determination shall occur no later than 72 hours after arrest. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(l)(iii); Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(b)(3). See also Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2012) ("There is no constitutional right to speedy bail."); Collins v. Ainsworth , 382 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2004) ("There is no right to post bail within 24 hours of
1 Situations in which a supervisory employee may detetmine a defendant who can post the set secured appearance bond present an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the public include, but are not limited to, defendants with an outstanding warrant for failure to appear, defendants who are intoxicated, or defendants who have committed a '-Time of violence.
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt I6077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 12 of 24
an·est.''). At tl1is hearing, the Court may conduct an initial appearance as required by Rule 4.4 as well as detennlne the defendant's conditions of release under Rules 7.2 and 7.3 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. II. Procedures for those who are unable to post bond in the amount contained in the
bond schedule. For defendants who are unable to post the bond contained in the bond schedule, such defendants shall be entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of their release promptly atler arrest, but in any event no later than 72 hours after arrest. See Ala. R. Ctim. P. 4.3(a)(l)(iii); Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(b)(3). See also Fields, 701 F.3d at 185 C'There is no constitutional right to speedy bail."); Collins , 382 F.3d at 545 ("There is no right to post bail within 24 hours of arrest."). At this hearing, the Court may conduct an initial appearance as required by Rule 4.4 as well as cletennine the defendant's conditions of release under Rules 7.2 and 7.3 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior to the hearing, defendants shall complete an affidavit of substantial hardship, Form C-1 OA, a true and con·ect copy of which is attached as Exhibit B. At the hearing the Court will determine whether the defendant shall be released on personal recognizance or on a secured or tmsecured appearance bond unless the Court detennines that such a release will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required, or that the defendant's being at large will pose a real and present danger to others or to the public at large. Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(a). In making this determination, the Court may impose the least onerous condition or conditions contained in Rule 7.3(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to others or to the public at large. Id. In making such a dt:tennination, the Courl may take into account the following:
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTtl6077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 13 of 24

1. The age, background and family ties, relationships and circumstances of the defendant.

2. The defendant's reputation, character, and health.

3. The defendant's prior criminal record, including prior releases on recognizance or on secw·ed appearance bonds, and
other pending cases.

4. The identity of responsible members of the community who will vouch for the defendant's reliability.

5. Violence or lack of violence in the alleged commission of the offense.

6. The nature of the offense charged, the apparent probability of conviction, and the likely sentence, insofar as these
factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance.

7. 1he type ofweapon used, e.g., knife, pistol, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun.

8. Threats made against victims and/or witnesses.

9. The vatue of property taken during the alleged commission of the offense.

10. Whether the property allegedly taken was recovered or not; damage or lack of damage to property allegedly taken.

11. Residence of the defendant, including consideration
of real property ownership, and length of residence in his or her
place of domicile.

12. In cases where the defendant is charged with a drug
offense, evidence of selling or pusher activity should indicate a
substantial increase in the amount ofbond.

13. Consideration of the defendant's employment status and history, the location of defendant's employment, e.g., whether employed in the county where the alleged offense occurred, and the
defendant's financial condition.

14. offense.

Any enhancement statutes related to the charged

4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt16077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 14 of 24
!d. As contemplated by Rule 7.2(a)(! 3), the Court will consider a defendant's ability to post a
bond in detennining the defendant's conditions ofrelea'3e. The Court will consider the defendant' s affidavit of substantial hardship ar1d may elicit testimony about the defendant's financial condition. After considering the defendant's ability to post a bond, as well as the other factors set out in Rule 7.2(a), the Court may release a defendant on his or her own recognize, require the defendant to post an unsecured appearance bond, or require the posting of a secured appearance bond if that is the least onerous condition that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk ofharm to others or to the public at large. The Court will not require a defendant to post a secure appearance bond that the defendant crumot aftbrd to post, or a secure appearance bond in an amount less than that contained in the bond schedule that the defendant can afford to post, if there is a less onerous condition that would assure the defendant's appearance or minimize risk to the public. However, if the Court determines that there is no less onerous condition for securing the defendant's appearance or protecting the public, the Court may require a secure appearance bond in an amount less than, equal to, or greater than that contained in the bond schedule. See United States v. i'vlcConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] bail setting is not constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is .financially unable to satisfy the requirement.") (citing Pugh, James). TI1e Court will make a written finding as to why the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary to ass1.1re the defendant ' s presence at trial in such a case.
In the unlikely event that a defendant arrested for a bailable offense cannot obtain release by posting the bond contained in the bond schedule and cannot be given a hearing to detennine conditions ofrelease within 72 hours after an·est, such a defendant will be released on an unsecured
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt16077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 15 of 24
appearance bond in the amount of the minimum bond set in Rule 7.2 at the expiration of the 72how· period. III. Bail procedures for those arrested pursuant to a warrant.
When issuing an arrest warrant for an offense that is bailable as a matter of right, the
Magistrate will state in the warrant the conditions of the defendant's release on the defendant' s own recognizance under Rule 7.2 or an amount of an appearance bond or a secured appearance bond predetermined by the Magistrate.2 See Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.2(a); Ala. Code§ 12-17-251(c)(l); Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(1.)(A)(2)(a), (b). TI1e Magistrate may set the bond stated in the warrant in an amount within the bond schedule contained in Rule 7.2(b) ofthe Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ala . R. Juct. Admin. 18(I.)(A)(2)(b). The Magistrate will set the bond in an amm.mt that is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant' s presence at trial given the nature of the offense alleged in the indictment or complaint and any other circumstances relating to the alleged offense that are known to the Magistrate. See Beddow v. State, 68 So. 2d 503, 503 (Ala. 1953) ("Bail is exa(..'ted for the sole purpose of securing the attendance of the defendant in court at all times when his presence may be lawfully required and his surrender in execution of any legal judgment that may be pronounced against him.").
Upon an arrest for a bailable offense pursuant to a warrant, the defendant shall be generally entitled to release upon the posting of the bond stated in the warrant subject to the same exception contained in Section I, supra. For defendants who are unabte to post the bond contained in the warrant, such defendants shall be entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of their
2 Nothing in this section precludes the Magistrate from issuing a summons rather than an arrest warrant in the Magistrate's sole discretion. See Ala. R . C1im. P. 3.1 (b).
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt16077-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 16 of 24 release promptly after arrest, but in any event no later than 72 hours after arrest under the same procedure set out in Section II, supra.
Titis standing order hereby supersedes any previous policies or procedures that were in place regarding the posting of bail and any such previous procedures shall no longer be enforced. DONE this the _i'!day of September, 2017.
7

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 17 of 24
EXHIBIT A TO
STANDING ORDER

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTtI6097-1

m•, Filed 09/08/17 Page 18 of 24

hw ~ ~

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 9/8/2017 8:14AM

~.•~-~~ 56-CV-2017-999999.99

CIRCUIT COURT OF

RANDOLPH COUNTY, ALABAMA

CHRIS MAY, CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, ALABAMA

STANDING ORDER

It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed as follows:

1. Every person arrested for a bailable oflense without a warrant shall be released upon the posting of a bond in the amow1t and type provided below;

2.

If in the judgment of a supervisory employee of the Randolph County Sheriff's

Department, it appears that the release of a defendant upon posttng of the bond

contained in the following schedule would present an unreasonable risk of flight or

danger to the public, the S'lLpetvisory employee shall contact the Magistrate or the

Court and state the grotmds for such belief;

3. If a defendant is arrested for a bailable offense that is not included in the following
bond schedule the Magistrate or the Court shall be notified;

Domestic Violence 1 st~ Class A Felony Domestic Violence 2nd- Class B Felony Domestic Violence 3nt_ Class A Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Strangulation~ Class B Felony
Violation of a Protection Order
Harassment~ Class C Misdemeanor Harassing Communications- Class C Misdemeanor
Assault 1st_Class B Felony Assault 2 nd - Class C Felony Assault 3rd* Class A Misdemeanor
Menacing- Class B Misdemeanor
Reckless Endangerment- Class A Misdemeanor
Tampering with Evidence Obstructing Justice False Id~Felony Obstruction of a Govt. Operation-Class A M isd. Disorderly Conduct-Class C Misdemeanor Public Intoxication- Violation NWNI DUI- Class A Misdemeanor

$15,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $10,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $10,000 - Secured Appearance Bond
$2,500 - Secured Appearance Aond
$500 - Unsecured Appearance Bond $500 ~Unsecured Appearance Bond
$10,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $5 ,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond
$1,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond
$1 ,000 - Unsecured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $1,000 - Unsecured Appearance Bond $500 ~Unsecured Appearance Bond $500- Unsecured Appearance (.00 BAC) $500- Unsec;ured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance (.00 BAC)

Page 1 of4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt16097-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 19 of 24

Giving False Name toLE-Class A Misd. Minor in Possession of Alcohol False Reporting to Law Enforcement Loitering

$1,000- Secured Appearance Bond $500 ~ Unsecured Appearance (.00 BAC) $1,000- Secured Appearance Bond $500 - Unsecured Appearance Bond

Leaving the Scene of an Accident Attempting to Elude-Misdemeanor Attempting to Elude-Felony Resisting Arrest- Class B Misdemeanor

$2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $10,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $1 ,000 - Secured Appearance Bond

Poss. of Marihuana 1st.other Personal Use Class C Felony $3,000- Secured Appearam:e Bond

Poss. of Marihuana 1st - Prior Conviction Class D Felony $2,000 - Secured Appearance Bond

Possession of Marihuana 2nd_ Class A Misdemeanor

$1,000 - Sec:uredAppearance Bond

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia-Class A Misd.

$1,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Possession of.Drug Paraphernalia-Class C Felony

$3,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Possession of a Controlled Substance-Cla'3s D Felony

$2,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Illegal Possession ofPresctiption Dmg

$1,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Manufacturing of a Controlled Sub 1st. Class A Felony $15,000 - Secured Appearance Bond

Manufacturing of a Controlled Sub 2nd-Class B Felony $l0,000 - Secured Appearance Bond

Trafficking of a Controlled Substance

$15,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Sub-Class B Felony $10,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Possession of Precursor Chemkals
Illegal Purchase ofPseudoephedrine-Class A Misd. Illegal Purchase of Pseudoephedrine-Class C Pelony

$2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $1 ,000- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond

Chemical Endangerment of a Child

$2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond

Possession of Brass Knuckles Carrying a Pistol w/o a Petmit Certain Persons Forbidden to Carry a Fireatm Shooting into an Occupied/Unoccupied Vehicle or Dwelling

$500.00- Unsecured Appearance Bond $500.00- Unsecured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond
$10,000- Secured Appearance Bond

Criminal Trespass 1>i~Class A Misdemeanor
(C,rni·mmim·naal1·Tr·rreessppaassss "_2.,rndd--vC·1l0a1sastwC· nMisdemeanor

$1 ,000 ~ Unsecured Appearance Bond $750- Unsecured Appearance Bond $500- Unsecured Appearance Bond

Criminal Mischief 1st_Class C Felony Criminal Mischief 2nd-Class A Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief3rd- Class B Misdemeanor

$2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $1 ,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $500- Secured Appearance Bond

Page 2 of4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmENenTtI0697-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 20 of 24

Burglary pt -Class A Felony Burglary 200-Class B Felony Burglary 31d~ Class C Felony Break!F:nter Motor Vehicle-Class C Felony Possession of Burglar Tools-Class C Felony
Theft 1st. Class B Felony Theft 2nd_ Class C Felony Theft 3rd -Class D Felony Theft 4th_ Class A Misd. Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle-Class A Misd.
RSP l st_ Class B Felony RSP 2nd-Class C Felony RSP 3rc1-Class D Felony RSP 41h·Class A Misd.
FORG pt_Class B Felony FORO 200-Class C Felony FORG 3m_ Class D Felony FORO 4th-Class A Misd
PFI 1st -Class B Felony PFI 2nd-Class C Felony PFI 3rd- Class D Felony PFI 4th-Class A Misd
Fraudulent Use of a Credit/Debit Card-Class D Felony
Rape 1sc_ Class A Felony Rape 2nd_ Class B Felony
Sodomy 1st_Class A Felony Sodomy 2nd~Class B Felony
Sexual Abuse 1st --Class C Felony Sexual Abuse 200- Class A Misdemeanor Sexual Abuse of Child less than 12- Class B Felony
Enticing a Child for Immoral Purpose- Class C Felony Soliciting Child by Computer-Class B Felony Transmitting Obscene Material to a Child by Computer Class B Felony
Violation of Sex Offender Registration-Class C Felony

$10,000- Secured Appearance Bond $5,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond
$5,000- Secunxl Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $1,000- Secured Appearance Bond $500- Unsecured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond
$5,000- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $1,000- Secured Appearance Bond $500- Unsecured Appearance Bond
$5,000 - Secured Appearance Bond S2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond Sl,OOO - Secured Appearance Bond $500 ~Unsecured Appearance Bond
$5,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $1 ,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $500- Unsecured Appearance Bond
$1,000 - Secured Appearance Bond
$30,000- Secured Appearance Bond $15,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$30,000- Secured Appearance Bond $15,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$1 0,000- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond $15,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$10,000- Secured Appearance Bond $15,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$15,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$5,000 - Secured Appearance Bond

Page 3 of4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB DDOoCcUuMmEeNnTt16097-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 21 of 24

Arson 1st -Class A Felony Arson 2nd. Class B Felony Arson 3rd_ Class A Misdemeanor
Robbery 151-Class A Felony Robbery 2nd-Class B Felony Robbery 3rd-Class C Felony
Escape 1st_Class B Felony Escape 2nd-Class C Felony Escape 3rd -Class C Felony
Promoting Prison Cont. 1st_Class C Felony Promoting Prison Cont. 2nd --Class C Felony Promoting Prison Cont. 3rd- Class B Misdemeanor
Conservation Offenses

$30,000- Secured Appearance Bond $15,000--- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500 - Secured Appearance Bond
$30,000- Secured Appearance Bond $15,000- Secured Appearance Bond $5,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$15,000- Secured Appearance Bond $5,000 - Secured Appearance Bond $5,000- Secured Appearance Bond
$2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $2,500- Secured Appearance Bond $500 - Unsecured Appearance Bond
$1,000- Unsecured Appearance Bond

f'-" DONE AND ORDERED on this the

day of September, 2017.

DIS~~=G~r~-+---------

Page4 of4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 22 of 24
EXHIBITB TO
STANDING ORDER

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 23 of 24

State of Alabama Unified Judicial System

FormC-IOA Pa2e I of2

Rev.Z/95

Case Number
AFFIDAVIT OF SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP

IN THE

(Circuit, District, or Municipal)

COURT OF

{Name of County or Municipality)

, ALABAMA

STYLE OF CASE:

Plaintiff(s)

v. Defendant(s)

TYPE OF PROCEEDING:

CHARGE(s) (if applicable):

D CIVIL CASE-- I, because of substantial hardship, am unable to pay the docket fee and service fees in this case . I request
that payment of these fees be waived initially and taxed as costs at the conclusion of the case.

D CIVIL CASE-- (such as paternity, support, termination of parental rights, dependency) - I am financially unable to hire an

attorney and I request that the court appoint one for me .

D CRIMINAL CASE-- I am financially unable to hire an attorney and request that the court appoint one for me .

D DELINQUENCY/NEED OF SUPERVISION- I am financially unable to hire an attorney and request that the court appoint

one for my child/me

SECTION 1.

1.

IDENTIFICATION

Full name

Spouse's full name (if married)

Complete home address

AFFIDAVIT

Date of Birth

Number of people living in household

Home telephone number

Occupation/Job

Length of employment

.~'

Driver's license number

*Social Security Number

Employer

Employer's telephone number

Employer's address

2.

ASSISTANCE BENEFITS

Do you or anyone residing in your household rece ive benefits from any of the following sources? (if so, please check those which

apply) 0AFDC

D Food Stamps

Dss1

0Medicaid

Oother

3.

INCOME/EXPENSE STATEMENT

Monthly Gross Income:

Monthly Gross Income

$

Spouse's Monthly Gross Income (unless a martial offense)

Other Earnings: Commissions , Bonuses, Interest Income, etc,

Contributions from Other People Living in Household

Unemployment/Workmen's Compensation ,

Social Security, Retirements , etc,

Other Income (be specific)

TOTAL MONTHLY GROSS INCOME

$

Monthly Expenses:

A. Living Expenses

$

Rent/Mortgage

Total Utilities: Gas, Electricity, Water, etc

Food

Cloth ing

Health Care/Medical

Insurance

Car Payment(s)/Transportation Expenses

Loan Payment(s)

*OPTIONAL

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-GMB Document 67-1 Filed 09/08/17 Page 24 of 24

I Form C-IOA P•ge 2 of2 Rcv.2195
Monthly Expenses:(cont'd page1) Credit Card Payment(s) Educational/Employment Expenses Other Expenses (be specific)

AFFIDAVIT OF SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP

Sub-Total

B. Child Support Payment(s)/Aiimony

$

Sub-Total

C. Exceptional Expenses

$

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES (add subtotals from A & B monthly only)

Total Gross Monthly Income Less total monthly expenses:
DISPOSABLE MONTHLY INCOME

A $ B $
$ $

4. LIQUID ASSETS:

Cash on Hand/Bank (or otherwise available such as stocks,

bonds, certificates ofdeposit)

$

Equity in Real Estate (value of properly less what you owe)

Equity in Personal Property, etc. (such as the value of

motor vehicles , stereo, VCR, furnishing , jewelry, tools,

guns, less what you owe)

Other (be specific)
Do you own any1hing else of value? DYes D No

(land, house, boat, TV, stereo, jewelry)

If so, describe

TOTAL LIQUID ASSETS

$

5. AffidaviURequest
I swear or affirm that the answers are true and reflect my current financial status. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in the affidavit may subject me to the penalties of perjury, I authorize the court or its authorized representative to obtain records of information pertaining to my financial status from any source in order to verify information provide by me. I further understand and acknowledge that. if the court appoints an attorney to represent me, the court may require me to pay all or part of
the fees and expenses of my court-appointed counsel,

Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of

Affiant's Signature

Judge/Clerk/Notary

Print or Type Name

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 1 of 24

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

KANDACE KAY EDWARDS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID COFIELD, in his official capacity as Randolph County Sheriff,

Case No. 3:17-cv-321-WKW-TFM Class Action

CHRISTOPHER MAY, in his official capacity as Circuit Clerk,

JILL PUCKETT, in her official capacity as Magistrate of the Randolph County District Court, and

AMY NEWSOME, in her official capacity as the District Court Judge of the Randolph County District Court,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. Defendants Randolph County Sheriff David Cofield (“Cofield”), Circuit Court Clerk Christopher May (“May”), Magistrate Jill Puckett (“Puckett”), and District Court Judge Amy Newsome (“Newsome”) are operating a two-tiered pretrial justice system. Secured financial conditions of release are required for misdemeanor and felony offenses pursuant to a predetermined bail schedule that specifies a monetary amount based only on the charge. A person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense who can afford the monetary amount is released from jail immediately upon payment. Those arrestees who cannot afford the monetary amount may remain in jail for nearly four weeks before they are afforded a hearing to argue for
1

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 2 of 24
their release. How quickly—or whether—a person is released from jail depends entirely on her access to money.
2. Pursuant to this discriminatory scheme, individuals remain detained for varying lengths of time. How long presumptively innocent arrestees remain in jail after arrest depends on whether they or their families are able to pay, to borrow sufficient resources, or to arrange for a third-party surety. Others, like Ms. Edwards, who are too poor to pay and unable to find anyone to pay the secured money bond for them, remain in jail for the entire duration of their case.
3. Ms. Edwards was arrested on May 17, 2017, and was incarcerated because she could not afford to pay the secured monetary amount required by the predetermined bail schedule. If she could have paid the amount, she would have been released from jail immediately. Defendants released Ms. Edwards on May 18, 2017, after she filed this lawsuit.
4. On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Ms. Edwards seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief. Ms. Edwards also seeks a temporary restraining order on behalf of herself. Ms. Edwards seeks an injunction against Sheriff Cofield from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail without an individualized hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative non-financial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance. She seeks declaratory relief against Defendants May, Puckett, and Newsome.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court has
2

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 3 of 24
jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). 6. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district. III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs 7. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is a resident of Roanoke, Alabama.
B. Defendant 8. Defendant David Cofield is the Randolph County Sheriff. He is sued in his
official capacity. 9. Defendant Christopher May is the Circuit Court Clerk for Alabama’s Fifth
Judicial Circuit Court. He is sued in his official capacity. 10. Defendant Jill Puckett is the Magistrate for the Randolph County District Court.
She is sued in her official capacity. 11. Defendant Amy Newsome is the Randolph County District Court Judge. She is
sued in her official capacity. IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Defendants’ Money Bail Practices Detain People Based on Their Wealth Rather Than Their Suitability for Release. i. Defendants Unconstitutionally Detain People Unable to Pay Secured Money Bail Set Pursuant to the Predetermined Bail Schedule. 12. One out of every five people in Randolph County lives in poverty.1 One-third of
the labor force is unemployed, and nearly half of the population over the age of sixteen did not
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, available at https://goo.gl/uUZ3gb.
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 4 of 24
work at all in 2015, the last year for which data is available.2 13. Although nearly half of the county residents do not have a job, the Sheriff
requires any person arrested and charged with a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a secured amount of money bail (i.e., cash, commercial surety, or property) to be released from jail following arrest. The amount of money that an arrestee must pay is pre-determined by a bail schedule based on the charge. See Doc. 6-5 (Randolph County Bail Schedule).
14. Defendants do not consider a person’s flight risk or danger to the community, whether a person can afford the predetermined amount of money, or whether any alternative non-financial conditions of release may mitigate any relevant risk before requiring the predetermined money bail amount. Instead, immediate access to money alone determines whether a person remains in jail following arrest. If a person can afford to pay the amount required, the individual is released from jail immediately. If the person is unable to pay, she remains incarcerated.
15. Prior to a first appearance in court, no official conducts an inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay the amount required by the bail schedule, makes any findings concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay, or considers forms of release other than secured money bail. Although the bail schedule states that a bail amount may be increased or reduced “on a case by case basis,” in practice Defendants do not deviate from the bail schedule.
16. District Court Judge Clay Tinney3 and Circuit Court Clerk Christopher May created the bail schedule that governs release from the Randolph County jail. The bail schedule
2 Id. 3 District Court Judge Clay Tinney resigned as Randolph County District judge effective December 8, 2017. See Doc. 84 at 1 n.1. Defendant Judge Amy Newsome replaced Judge Tinney on the bench on December 15, 2017, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) was automatically substituted as a defendant in this case.
4

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 5 of 24
is printed on Defendant May’s letterhead and instructs anyone with questions to contact him. Defendant May and Defendant Newsome must approve any changes to the post-arrest procedures set forth in their bail schedule.
17. Defendant Newsome is responsible for setting policies governing release conditions and conducts the initial appearance for any arrestees unable to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule. Magistrate Jill Puckett enforces these policies and conducts initial appearances when Defendant Newsome is unavailable.
18. Sheriff David Cofield is responsible for the operation of the Randolph County jail and the release and detention of arrestees. See Ala. Code § 14-6-1. As a matter of policy and practice, Defendant Cofield keeps arrestees in jail if they cannot pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule and releases immediately those who can pay. Defendant Cofield maintains this policy and practice even though he receives no notice that there has been an inquiry into a person’s ability to pay the amount set, findings that the person can afford to meet the financial conditions of release, and consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release.
ii. Defendant Cofield Detains Arrestees Who Cannot Pay the Predetermined Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay.
19. When a person is arrested in Randolph County, she is booked into the Randolph County Jail, which is operated by the Sheriff’s Department. After booking, arrestees are informed by Sheriff’s Department employees that they are eligible for immediate release, but only if they pay a predetermined amount of money. The Sheriff determines the required amount of money by referring to the bail schedule promulgated by Judge Tinney and Defendant May. At no point does any Defendant or other person perform any inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay the money bail amount required by the schedule.
5

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 6 of 24
20. Arrestees who do not have other restrictions on their eligibility for release can post bail themselves, make a phone call to ask a friend or family to post bail on their behalf, or contact a bonding agent to assist in posting bail. If an arrestee can afford to pay the predetermined bail, the Sheriff’s Department accepts the money and releases her.
21. A person with financial resources will be released almost immediately after posting bail, but the Sheriff’s Department will continue to detain a person who cannot afford the preset, secured bail amount. This policy and practice results in systematic wealth-based detention in Randolph County.
iii. Defendants Puckett and Newsome Do Not Review the Predetermined Financial Conditions of Release for Up to Four Weeks.
22. Any person who cannot afford the monetary amount required by the bail schedule is taken before Defendant Newsome or Puckett for an initial appearance. Under Alabama law, a judge or magistrate is required to conduct the initial appearance within 48-hours following a warrantless arrest or 72-hours following a warrant arrest. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(1)(iii), (b)(2)(i).
23. The purposes of the initial appearance under state law are to (1) ascertain the defendant’s true name and address, (2) inform the defendant of the charges against him, and (3) notify the defendant of the right to counsel. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4. A judicial officer is also required to determine a defendant’s conditions of release. Id.; Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4 (“If a defendant has not been released from custody and is brought before a court for initial appearance, a determination of the conditions of release shall be made.”).
24. However, it is Defendants Newsome’s and Puckett’s general practice to refuse to determine an arrestee’s conditions of release at the initial appearance. Defendants instead usually defer this determination for up to four weeks, when a preliminary hearing is conducted in
6

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 7 of 24
a felony case for those arrestees who exercised their right to such a hearing. See Doc. 6-6 (Sample Order on Initial Appearance); see also Ala. R. Crim. P. 5. In a misdemeanor case, Defendants generally defer any review of an arrestee’s conditions of release for up to two weeks until Defendant Newsome conducts a status hearing and only if an arrestee first filed a motion for a bond reduction. Because of these practices, the initial court appearance generally provides no opportunity for a person to raise ability to pay, to conduct a hearing on alternative conditions of release, or to raise any constitutional issues with ongoing post-arrest detention. Defendants are unrepresented by counsel at the initial appearance.
25. Defendants Newsome and Puckett generally do not allow arrestees to make arguments about their ability to pay or their suitability for release at the initial appearance. Pursuant to Defendants Newsome’s and Puckett’s policy and practice, arrestees are not permitted to challenge their financial conditions of release or to request non-monetary conditions of release.
26. At the initial appearance, Defendants Newsome and Puckett do not make any findings that a person can afford the pre-set amount required or that secured money bail is the least restrictive condition of release available. Defendants Newsome and Puckett also do not consider whether an arrestee may be safely released on affordable financial or non-financial release conditions, nor do they make any affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning arrestees’ ability to pay the amount of secured money bail required.
27. Defendants Newsome and Puckett generally will not consider an arrestee’s suitability for release or ability to pay until a later preliminary hearing in a felony case or a bond reduction hearing in a misdemeanor case. As a matter of policy and practice, preliminary hearings are held once every four weeks in felony cases and hearings on motions for a bond reduction in misdemeanor cases are held twice per month in Randolph County. Thus, an
7

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 8 of 24
individual who cannot afford the predetermined secured money bail amount usually will be detained for up to four weeks without any opportunity for an individualized release hearing or to otherwise raise any issues concerning her ability to pay or her suitability for release under alternative conditions.
28. By contrast, an arrestee who can pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule is released immediately from jail.
29. Defendants’ reliance on predetermined secured money bail has resulted in unnecessary wealth-based detention that is devastating for the poorest people in Randolph County. Many people in the Randolph County jail have not been convicted of a crime and are only in jail because they cannot afford to pay secured money bail.
30. Because the grand jury sits—and trials are held—only twice per year in Randolph County, a person unable to afford monetary bail may spend longer in jail before trial than under the sentence they would receive if they pleaded guilty or were found guilty following trial. B. Plaintiff Edwards Could Not Afford the Monetary Amount Required by the Bail
Schedule. 31. At the time she filed her original Complaint, see Doc. 1, Ms. Edwards was a 29year-old woman who lived in Roanoke, Alabama. She is now 30 years old. 32. Ms. Edwards was 7.5 months pregnant at the time of her arrest in Randolph County. She is presently a mother of three children, all of whom are under the age of four. Ms. Edwards served in the Army National Guard from 2006 to 2010 and was stationed in Gadsden, Alabama. 33. On May 17, 2017, Ms. Edwards was arrested for forging a check in the amount of $75 and charged with possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, a class C felony.
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Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 9 of 24
34. Ms. Edwards was taken to the Randolph County Jail and told that she would be released from jail only if she paid a $7,500 bond. A corrections officer told her that she had a court date on June 6, 2017 and that she would remain incarcerated until that date unless she could afford to pay her bond.
35. At the time of her arrest, Ms. Edwards was indigent and could not afford to buy her release from jail. She had no assets and had recently lost her job at Huddle House because her pregnancy made it difficult for her to work. Her only source of income was food stamps and WIC. Ms. Edwards also suffers from serious mental illness and was relying on Medicaid to support her through her pregnancy.
36. Ms. Edwards was evicted from her home in December 2016 after losing her job. Between that time and her arrest in May 2017, Ms. Edwards was homeless and had been staying between friends’ homes. Many of those homes did not have power or running water.
37. The cell she was originally assigned to had six women, but there were only four beds. The jail also did not have any shampoo or wash cloths because of severe jail overcrowding.
38. She was concerned about her health because her pregnancy was high-risk. While incarcerated, she slept on a mat on the floor of the jail.
39. Defendants released Ms. Edwards from jail on May 18, 2017, after this lawsuit was filed. C. Non-Financial Conditions of Release Alone or in Combination with Unsecured
Money Bail Are As Effective As or More Effective than Secured Money Bail. 40. Detention on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. Controlling for other factors, a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more
9

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 10 of 24
likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained.4
41. Studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial and
sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offense.5 Controlling
for other factors, those detained pretrial will be given longer jail sentences.6 Detained defendants
are more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent.7 They
have a harder time preparing a defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and meeting with their
lawyers. A person’s ability to pay money bail thus has an irreparable impact on the outcome of a
criminal case.
42. Wealth-based pretrial detention also makes the community less safe. First,
wealth-based detention unnecessarily jails those who could be released safely into the
community. Several studies have shown that just two or three days in pretrial detention increases
the likelihood of future crimes, as well as the future risk level of even low-risk defendants.8 In
4 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (May 2, 2016) (finding that a person who is detained pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty than a person who is not detained), available at https://goo.gl/riaoKD; see also Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 15, 19 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (finding a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of conviction using the same data).
5 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, Laura and John Arnold Foundation 4 (November 2013), available at https://goo.gl/FLjVZP (those detained for the entire pretrial period are more likely to be sentenced to jail and prison—and receive longer sentences—than those who are released at some point before trial or case disposition).
6 Id. 7 Stevenson, supra note 1 at 18 (“Pretrial detention leads to an expected increase of 124 days in the maximum days of the incarceration sentence, a 42% increase over the mean.”); see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 1, at 18–19 (“Criminal defendants assessed bail amounts appear frequently unable to produce the required bail amounts, and receive guilty outcomes as a result. Entered guilty pleas by defendants unwilling to wait months prior to trial and unable to finance bail likely contribute to this result.”). 8 See Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail, 1516 (2014), available at https://goo.gl/jr7sMg (“[D]efendants rated low risk and detained pretrial
10

Case 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD Document 129 Filed 10/26/18 Page 11 of 24
other words, detention based on poverty for just a few days increases recidivism. Second,
wealth-based pretrial systems release individuals based only on their ability to pay and without
any assessment of their risk of flight or dangerousness. Consequently, individuals who need
monitoring or supervision to mitigate their risk of flight or dangerousness receive neither.
43. Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for children
and other dependent relatives. It hurts families, leads to unemployment, and can make people
homeless. Even a couple of days in pretrial detention can cause a person to lose housing, be
removed from a shelter list, be terminated from a job, be exposed to unsafe and unsanitary
conditions at the jail, and may result in serious trauma to dependent children.
44. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no significant relationship
between requiring money bail as a condition of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.9
for longer than one day before their pretrial release are more likely to commit a new crime once they are released, demonstrating that length of time until pretrial release has a direct impact on public safety.”); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 3 (November 2013), available at https://goo.gl/GQGNiY (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2–3 days, low risk defendants are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours”); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 768 (2017), available at https://goo.gl/Waj3ty (“While pretrial detention clearly exerts a protective effect in the short run, for misdemeanor defendants it may ultimately service to compromise public safety,” and finding that in a representative group of 10,000 misdemeanor offenders, pretrial detention would cause an additional 600 misdemeanors and 400 felonies compared to if the same group had been released pretrial).
9 See, e.g., Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 21 (May 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/OW5OzL (“Our results suggest that money bail has a negligible effect or, if anything, increases failures to appear.”); Michael R. Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option 11 (October 2013), available at https://goo.gl/UENBKJ (“Whether released defendants are higher or lower risk or in-between, unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as do secured bonds”).
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45. Other jurisdictions throughout the country do not keep people in jail based on their wealth. Instead of relying on money, these jurisdictions release arrestees with unsecured financial conditions, non-financial conditions, and pretrial supervision practices and procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
46. Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive, non-monetary conditions of release to maximize public safety and court appearances. Such non-monetary conditions of release include, but are not limited to: unsecured bond, reporting obligations, phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation or a stable address, substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, alcohol monitoring devices, or, in extreme cases of particular risk, electronic monitoring and home confinement.
47. Jurisdictions that rely on pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release do not sacrifice public safety or court attendance. For example, Washington, D.C. releases more than 94% of all defendants without financial conditions of release and no one is detained on secured money bail that they cannot afford.10 Empirical evidence shows that nearly 90% of released defendants in Washington, D.C. make all court appearances, nearly 90% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests, and 98-99% consistently avoid re-arrest for violent crime.11
10 See D.C. Code § 23-1321; see also Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Release Rates for Pretrial Defendants within Washington, DC available at https://goo.gl/VSDeDk (“In Washington, DC, we consistently find over 90% of defendants are released pretrial without using a financial bond”).
11 See Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Outcomes for Last Four Years, available at https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/558; Pretrial Just. Inst., The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth 2 (2009), available at https://goo.gl/6wgPM8 (“The high non-financial release rate has been accomplished without sacrificing the safety of the public or the appearance of defendants in court. Agency data shows that 88% of released defendants make all court appearances, and 88% complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests.”).
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48. The federal judiciary also eschews wealth-based detention, requiring any detention order to be based on a finding of dangerousness or flight risk, and the practice has not harmed court appearance rates or public safety.12
49. Pretrial detention based solely on wealth is consistently more expensive than effective pretrial supervision programs.13 Without relying on a person’s ability to afford cash bail, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer expense while maintaining high public safety and court appearance rates.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 50. Ms. Edwards proposes one class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). This Class is defined as: All arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release. 51. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Ms. Edwards and unknown Class members can challenge Defendants’ unlawful use of wealth-based detention.
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”); see also Thomas H, Cohen, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 13 (Nov. 2012), available at https://goo.gl/hN99E7 (finding from 2008 to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make court appearances and 4% were arrested for new offenses).
13 See, e.g., Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost? (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/0lLtLM (“It has been estimated that implementing validated, evidence-based risk assessment to guide pretrial release decisions could yield $78 billion in savings and benefits, nationally.”); United States Court, Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (July 18, 2013), available at https://goo.gl/dJpDrn (In 2012, “[p]retrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal system”).
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52. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted, or failed and/or refused to act, on grounds that apply generally to the proposed Class, such that final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to each Class member as a whole.
53. As set forth more fully below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the class counsel requirements of Rule 23(g). A. Numerosity
54. The precise size of the Class is unknown by Plaintiff because it is forwardlooking, but it is substantial, given the hundreds of felony and misdemeanor cases adjudicated each year in the Randolph County District Court. Joinder of these unknown future members is impracticable.
55. Many of the class members are low-income individuals who will likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the class would be impracticable. B. Commonality
56. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. Ms. Edwards seeks relief from Defendants’ money bail policies, practices, and procedures, which violate the rights of the Class members. Ms. Edwards also seeks relief mandating Defendants to change their policies, practices, and procedures so that the constitutional rights of the Class members will be protected in the future.
57. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are: a. Whether the Randolph County District Court and Defendant Cofield use a predetermined secured money bail schedule created by Defendants May and Tinney;
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b. Whether Defendant Cofield releases arrestees from jail who pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule and detains those who cannot;
c. Whether Defendant Cofield detains all individuals who are unable to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule regardless of whether inquiry into their ability to pay has been made;
d. Whether and when Defendants Tinney and Puckett conduct individualized release hearings and what procedural protections, if any, Defendants Tinney and Puckett provide to arrestees at those hearings; and
e. What standard post-arrest procedures Defendants perform on misdemeanor arrestees; for example, whether Defendants use any alternate procedures for promptly releasing people determined otherwise eligible for release but who are unable to afford a monetary payment.
58. Among the most important common question of law are: a. Whether requiring a financial condition of pretrial release without inquiry into and findings concerning a person’s ability to pay, and without consideration of alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; b. Whether Defendants’ actions in detaining arrestees solely based on their inability to pay a predetermined amount of money violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; c. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees using predetermined amounts of money without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment; and
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d. Whether Defendants’ detention of poor arrestees without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
C. Typicality 59. Ms. Edwards’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class,
and she has the same interests in this case as all other Class members that she represents. Each of them suffers injuries from the failure of Defendants to comply with the Constitution: they are each confined in jail because they could not afford to pay their secured monetary bond amount. The answer to whether Defendants’ money bail practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of Ms. Edwards and every other Class member.
60. If Ms. Edwards succeeds in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices concerning wealth-based detention violate her constitutional rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class. D. Adequacy
61. Ms. Edwards will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class she seeks to represent.
62. Ms. Edwards has no interests separate from or in conflict with those of the proposed Class she seeks to represent as a whole and seeks no relief other than the declaratory and injunctive relief, which is sought on behalf of the entire proposed Class she seeks to represent. E. Class Counsel
63. Ms. Edwards is represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Southern Poverty Law Center who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of
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Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. F. Rule 23(b)(2)
64. Class action status is appropriate because Defendants have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members: Defendants require all arrestees to pay for their release in an amount pre-determined by a bail schedule. Those who can pay are released and those who cannot pay are detained.
65. The Class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that Defendants violate the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without a prompt and individualized release hearing with adequate procedural protections that includes an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful considerations of alternative conditions of release. Because the putative Class challenges Defendants’ money bail practices as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the Class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate and necessary.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants May, Puckett, Newsome, and Cofield 66. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits jailing a person solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment.
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68. Ms. Edwards and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty under state and federal law.
69. Requiring a person arrested for a misdemeanor or felony offense to pay a monetary bail amount pre-determined by a bail schedule is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interests in securing a defendant’s appearance in court or public safety.
70. There are less restrictive means to reasonably assure the government’s interests. 71. Defendants violate Plaintiff’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing against them a post-arrest system of wealth-based detention in which they are kept in jail because they cannot afford a monetary amount of bail pre-determined by a bail schedule without inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative non-monetary conditions of release.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Substantive and Procedural Due Process – Individualized Release Hearing)
Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Puckett, Newsome, and Cofield 72. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 74. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty. 75. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that pretrial arrestees receive an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards to determine the least restrictive conditions on their pretrial liberty. 76. Defendants do not provide counsel; give arrestees an opportunity to testify or present evidence; restrict detention to extremely serious offenses; or require a finding that no
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affordable financial or non-financial condition of release will ensure appearance or public safety before jailing pretrial arrestees on monetary bail amounts that they cannot afford. Because Defendants create de facto detention orders by using predetermined monetary amounts, they also fail to apply any legal or evidentiary standards to determine whether a person should be detained prior to trial based on some immitigable risk.
77. Defendants violate Ms. Edwards’s and the Proposed Class’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing them without providing an individualized release hearing with the procedural protections described above.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
(Due Process – Prompt Release Hearing) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus
Defendants Puckett, Newsome, and Cofield 78. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Defendants from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 80. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class have a fundamental interest in their pretrial liberty, which outweighs any governmental interest in pretrial detention. 81. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a prompt release hearing following detention. 82. Defendants violate Ms. Edwards’s and the Proposed Class’s fundamental rights to pretrial liberty and due process by jailing them without providing a sufficiently prompt release hearing.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
(Right to Counsel) Plaintiff and the Proposed Class versus Defendants Puckett, Newsome, and Cofield 83. Ms. Edwards incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the assistance of counsel at each critical stage of a criminal prosecution. 85. An indigent defendant has an absolute right to court-appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 86. A critical stage is a proceeding between an individual and agents of the State, whether formal or informal, in which the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. 87. The initial appearance hearings in Randolph County are a critical stage of the pretrial criminal prosecution at which defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel. The deprivation of the arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty has consequences that can prejudice the outcome of the defendant’s criminal case. Defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to be convicted and more likely to plead guilty, receive longer prison sentences, and are less prepared at trial because of their inability to gather evidence, find witnesses, and meet with their lawyers. 88. Counsel is therefore necessary to make the opportunity for pretrial release meaningful. The initial appearance hearing is the first opportunity at which a defendant who cannot afford to post her secured bail bond may argue for her pretrial release, which is her fundamental right. Without the assistance of counsel to help the defendant navigate the legal standards applicable to the pretrial detention decision, the opportunity to obtain pretrial release is
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not meaningful. Furthermore, counsel guards against other procedural inadequacies, such as failure of the court to provide the defendant with notice of the factors relevant to pretrial release.
89. Defendants violate Ms. Edwards’ and the Proposed Class’s fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to provide assistance of counsel at the initial appearance hearing, at which a criminal defendant may be jailed based on an inability to meet a financial condition of release.
VII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: a. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; b. Certification of a class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, represented by Ms. Edwards; c. A declaration that Defendants May, Puckett, and Newsome violate the Plaintiff’s
and Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by setting secured financial conditions of release without inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay, or meaningful consideration of alternative non-financial conditions of release; d. A declaration that Defendants Puckett and Newsome violate Ms. Edwards’s and Class members’ due process and Sixth Amendment rights by jailing them without conducting an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards; e. A declaration that Defendants Puckett and Newsome violate Ms. Edwards’s and Class members’ due process rights by jailing them without conducting a sufficiently prompt release hearing;
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f. An order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendant Cofield from prospectively detaining arrestees for failing to pay the monetary amount required by the bail schedule without a prompt individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards that includes counsel, an inquiry into and findings concerning their ability to pay, the suitability of alternative nonfinancial conditions of release, and a finding on the record that any conditions of release are the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve public safety and court appearance;
g. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and h. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated this October 26, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke On behalf of Attorneys for Plaintiff
Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) Micah West (ASB-1842-J82F) Alexandra Jordan (ASB-4624-X00X) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 P: (334) 956-8200 F: (334) 956-8481 E: samuel.brooke@splcenter.org E: micah.west@splcenter.org E: alexandra.jordan@splcenter.org
Alec Karakatsanis (DC Bar No. 999294)* Katherine Hubbard (Cal. Bar No. 302729)* CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006 P: (202) 930-3835 E: alec@civilrightscorps.org E: katherine@civilrightscorps.org
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Randall C. Marshall (ASB-3023-A56M) Brock Boone (ASB-2864-L11E) ACLU FOUNDATION OF ALABAMA, INC. P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 P: (334) 420-1741 E: rmarshall@aclualabama.org E: bboone@aclualabama.org Brandon Buskey (ASB-2753-A50B) Andrea Woods (Wash. Bar No. 48265)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: (212) 549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org *admitted pro hac vice Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date the foregoing was filed through the Court’s CM/ECF
filing system, and by virtue of this filing notice will be sent electronically to all counsel of
record, including:
Jamie H. Kidd Kendrick E. Webb WEBB & ELEY, P.C. P.O. Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 jkidd@webbeley.com; kwebb@webbeley.com Counsel for Defendant Cofield
Laura E. Howell Brad A. Chynoweth Benjamin H. Albritton OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130-0152 lhowell@ago.state.al.us; bchynoweth@ago.state.al.us; balbritton@ago.state.al.us Counsel for Defs. Puckett, May, and Newsome
Dorman Walker John W. Naramore BALCH & BINGHAM LLP P.O. Box 78 Montgomery, AL 36101 dwalker@balch.com; jnaramore@balch.com Counsel for Defs. Puckett, May, and Newsome on this 26th day of October, 2018.
s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke
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