Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 1 of 27

1 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

2

Peter A. Schey (Cal. State Bar #58232)

pschey@centerforhumanrights.org

3 Carlos Holguin (Cal. State Bar #90754)

crholguin@centerforhumanrights.org

4

256 S. Occidental Blvd.

5

Los Angeles, CA 90057

Telephone: (213) 388-8693 ext. 304

6 Facsimile: (213) 386-9484

7

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICA CITIZENS

8 Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. (Texas State Bar No. 20546740) 1325 Riverview Towers, 111 Soledad
9 San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260

10

Telephone: (210) 225-3300 Facsimile: (210) 225-2060

11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
12

13 (Plaintiffs' Attorneys continued on page 2)

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

16

17 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICA CITIZENS;

18 ANNA OCHOA O’LEARY;

19

CORDELIA CHAVEZ CANDELARIA BEVERIDGE;

20 JOHN DOES 1-5 AND JANE DOES 1-5,

Case No. 2:10-cv-1453-SRB FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[CLASS ACTION]

21 Plaintiffs,
22 - vs –
23

24 JANICE BREWER, GOVERNOR OF
ARIZONA; MARICOPA COUNTY; WILLIAM 25 G. MONTGOMERY, MARICOPA COUNTY

26

ATTORNEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

JOSEPH ARPAIO, MARICOPA COUNTY

27 SHERIFF IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; PIMA

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 2 of 27

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COUNTY; BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA

2

COUNTY ATTORNEY, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY; CLARENCE W. DUPNIK, PIMA

3

COUNTY SHERIFF IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY; ROBERT HALLIDAY,

4

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARIZONA

5

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

6
Defendants. 7

8 Plaintiffs’ Counsel Continued:

9 RAY VELARDE, ESQ. (Texas Bar No. 20539950)
10 1216 Montana

11

El Paso, TX 79902 Telephone: (915) 373-6003

12

13 T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO (Bar No. AZ021500) Law Office of T. Anthony Guajardo
14 2001 E. Campbell, Suite #202 15 Phoenix, AZ 85016
Telephone (602) 544-0607 16 Facsimile: (602) 957-0801 17 tag1444@tonyguajardo.com

18 / / /
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1 Plaintiffs allege as follows:

2

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

3

1. In this action, the individual and organizational plaintiffs seek to declare

4 invalid and preliminarily and permanently enjoin the enforcement of S.B. 1070, or

5 portions thereof, as amended and enacted by the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs allege

6 that S.B. 1070 is preempted by federal law and therefore violates the Supremacy

7 Clause of the United States Constitution.

8

2. Both the United States Constitution and numerous acts of Congress grant

9 the federal government preeminent authority to regulate immigration matters.

10 Congress has assigned highly specific tasks relating to the enforcement of the
nation’s immigration laws and regulations to various federal agencies, including the 11
United States Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the 12
Department of State. In the process of implementing these laws and regulations, the 13
federal agencies assigned enforcement responsibilities consider, weigh, and balance
14 multifaceted and sometimes competing objectives that Congress seeks to achieve

15 through enactment of a complex system of federal laws.

16

3. While Arizona may exercise its police power in a manner that has an

17 incidental effect on aliens, if may not constitutionally enact and enforce its own

18 immigration laws in a manner that interferes with the federal immigration laws or

19 policies.

20

4. Nor may Arizona enact laws to control the flow of migrants into the state or

21 force their departure from the state. Such competing state laws will simply drive

22 immigrants from one state to the next, leaving national policies in shambles. The
drafters of the Constitution and the scheme of federal immigration laws Congress 23
has enacted envision and rely upon a national uniform policy in the area of 24
international migration, not a patchwork of competing state and local immigration 25
policies throughout the country.
26

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1 5. The State of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 includes a broad set of provisions that are

2

designed to “work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence

3 of aliens” by making “attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and

4 local government agencies in Arizona.” See S.B. 1070 (as amended by H.B. 2162).

5

6. S.B. 1070’s provisions focus exclusively on forcing suspected

6 undocumented immigrants to leave the state through a policy of “attrition,” while

7 ignoring numerous other objectives established by Congress for migrants who may

8 have entered the country without inspection and have no current lawful status,
9 including, for example, legalization opportunities for family reunification, victims of 10 serious crimes who cooperate with law enforcement to put violent criminals behind
bars, minors who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected, survivors of domestic 11
violence, and those who reasonably fear return to their home countries on account of 12
persecution. 13
7. S.B. 1070 also ignores the necessary priorities established by and resources 14 of federal agencies enforcing the immigration laws. While these federal agencies 15 logically focus their limited resources on identifying and detaining immigrants not
16 eligible for legalization of status, those who have committed criminal offenses, or

17 those who recently arrived, S.B. 1070 makes no such distinctions. As the Complaint

18 in United States v. The State of Arizona, Case 2:10-cv-01413-SRB, filed July 6, 2010 (“

19 U.S. v. Arizona”), states, S.B. 1070 “disrupts federal enforcement priorities and

20 resources that focus on aliens who pose a threat to national security or public

21 safety.” Id. at ¶ 4. Enforcement of S.B. 1070 “will impose significant and

22 counterproductive burdens on the federal agencies charged with enforcing the
national immigration scheme, diverting resources and attention from the dangerous 23
aliens who the federal government targets as its top enforcement priority.” Id. 24
8. Implementation of S.B. 1070 will also interfere with the United States 25
Government’s foreign policy and national security interests by disturbing the United
26 States’ relationship with other countries.

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1 9. The State of Arizona’s training materials developed and distributed to

2

Arizona law enforcement agencies to implement S.B. 1070 exacerbate the conflicts

3 between the United States Constitution and federal laws on the one hand, and

4 Arizona law on the other hand, by inter alia failing to recognize adequately that

5 numerous categories of immigrants who did not enter the United States lawfully

6 nevertheless are eligible for legalization of status, and by permitting law enforcement

7 officers to rely upon vague and ill-defined factors such as a person’s “dress,”

8 “difficulty communicating in English,” “demeanor,” and “claim of not knowing

9 others … at [the] same location,” as providing justification for a detention based on

10 suspected undocumented status.
10. Accordingly, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 is void and should be struck down under 11
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 12
JURISDICTION 13
11. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345,
14 (federal question jurisdiction) and 1343(3)-(4); plaintiffs seek remedies

15 authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201 and 2202.

16

12. Venue is properly in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and

17 (e)(1), (2), and (4), because the acts complained of occurred in this district, several

18 of the plaintiffs and defendants reside in this district, and no real property is

19 involved in this action.

20

PARTIES

21

13. Plaintiff the LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) is the

22 largest and oldest Hispanic organization in the United States. LULAC has fourteen
(14) Councils throughout Arizona. LULAC is a civil rights organization with 23
councils and members located throughout the country including in Arizona. 24
LULAC’s primary mission and goals include the promotion and protection of the 25
legal and political rights of Latino people living in the United States, including
26 immigrants both documented and undocumented. With regards to undocumented

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1 immigrant residents of Arizona, LULAC’s goals include providing this community

2

with training and information regarding their legal rights, assisting such

3 immigrants to locate legal representation when their rights have been violated,

4 evaluating whether immigrant community members are eligible to legalize their

5 immigration status, providing assistance to eligible immigrants in the preparation of

6 applications and petitions to legalize their status in the United States or referring

7 such immigrants to free or low cost legal services, providing direct assistance to

8 immediate family members eligible for naturalization, referring immigrant

9 community members to appropriate law enforcement agencies when they are the

10 victims of crime, assisting immigrant community members regarding eligibility for
and access to medical services, and assisting to locate appropriate resources or legal 11
representation when immigrant community members’ labor or occupational health 12
and safety rights have been violated. The enforcement and operation of S.B. 1070 will 13
severely impair LULAC’s ability to pursue its organizational mission and goals
14 described above.

15

14. LULAC provides comprehensive services to undocumented Latino

16 immigrants residing in Arizona, including assistance to evaluate the eligibility of

17 undocumented Arizona immigrant residents for statutory benefits to legalize status,

18 assistance in seeking legalization benefits through the preparation of applications

19 and petitions, home care volunteer services, assisting community members who are

20 detained for immigration checks, referring undocumented immigrants to appropriate

21 law enforcement agencies when they are the victims of crime, assisting such

22 immigrants regarding eligibility for medical services when in need of emergency or
non-emergent care, assisting immigrant community members to obtain Internal 23
Revenue Service Taxpayer Identification Numbers, assisting to locate appropriate 24
resources when immigrant community members’ labor or occupational health and 25
safety rights have been violated, assisting such immigrants with problems relating to
26 the education of children and youth, assisting the undocumented parents of U.S.

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1 citizen children to apply for United States passports for the U.S. citizen children,

2

collaborating in the operation of twelve charter schools, assisting immigrant

3 community members to obtain high school equivalency certificates, assisting low-

4 income immigrant community members obtain low-cost housing, providing

5 education scholarships to Arizona immigrant students, assisting immigrant

6 community members with landlord/tenant problems or referring them to

7 appropriate resources or legal aid programs, and assisting with transportation in all

8 of the matters described above and others as needed. LULAC also engages in
9 community education and training on the rights of immigrants. It also organizes 10 public education campaigns on issues relating to the rights of immigrants, and
initiates litigation on behalf of undocumented immigrants whose rights have been 11
violated in Arizona. LULAC also works to promote human rights in the U.S.-Mexico 12
border region. 13
15. SB 1070 will force LULAC to divert scarce resources from critical programs 14 in order to educate and assist individuals affected by SB 1070. LULAC will have a 15 far more difficult time encouraging undocumented immigrants to seek services in its
16 various program areas to the extent that they involve interacting with government

17 agencies and police. The undocumented immigrants who LULAC assists and seeks

18 to assist in the future will be deterred from seeking immigration relief because local

19 law enforcement will continue to stop and detain them, notwithstanding their

20 application for relief, on the basis that they do not have any registration documents

21 that are acceptable under SB 1070.

22

16. Some of LULAC’s Latino members or their families and LULAC clients in

the State of Arizona have already been subjected to stops by local law enforcement 23

and have been asked to produce proof of immigration status. LULAC is concerned 24
that its US citizen and immigrant members and those who LULAC is assisting as

25 described above in Paragraph 14 will be even more likely to be stopped, detained,

26 arrested, and questioned by state and local police if SB 1070 goes into effect.

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1 17. LULAC is further concerned that members and potential members will be

2

reasonably fearful to attend training sessions, community meetings, rallies, or

3 demonstrations, or to engage in leafleting or other traditional organizational

4 activities because of the possibility of being stopped by the police under SB 1070.

5 This will significantly impact the ability of LULAC to protect its existing members

6 and to organize new members.

7

18. LULAC officers, members, and volunteers helping or transporting

8 community members as described above in Paragraph 14 are at risk of criminal
9 prosecution under SB 1070’s transporting provisions. LULAC will have to re10 allocate its very limited resources to ensure that its officers, members, volunteers, and
community members LULAC helps feel safe while transporting or being transported 11
by LULAC officers, members, or volunteers. LULAC also believes that 12
undocumented immigrants that LULAC seeks to serve will not attend its community 13
meetings for fear of being stopped, interrogated, and arrested under SB 1070. 14 LULAC believes its members and undocumented community members serve dby 15 LULAC will be afraid to approach law enforcement to report crimes or interact with
16 government officials because their appearance, limited English ability, and accents

17 could be used by the police to question their authorization to be in the United States.

18

19. LULAC has already been forced to suspend much of its work relating to

19 the range of services described above in Paragraph 14 in order to respond to

20 inquiries from LULAC members and community members about SB 1070, educate

21 community members affected by S.B. 1070, and address fear and confusion created

22 by S.B. 1070. The fear and confusion created by SB 1070 has also deterred LULAC
members and community members from participating in LULAC’s programs out of 23
fear of being stopped and arrested under S.B. 1070 and has resulted in a substantial 24
drop in attendance by immigrants at community workshops and events, and in the 25
willingness of undocumented community members to seek or utilize the services
26 needed to address the problems they encounter as set forth in Paragraph 14.

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1 20. LULAC is also forced to divert its limited resources because of the

2

confusion caused by and inadequacy of Arizona’s training materials’ defining

3 reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest persons for allegedly

4 having committed a public offense making them deportable from the United States or

5 not having timely registered with the federal Government, and S.B. 1070’s and

6 Arizona’s training materials’ failure to adequately address how to address

7 situations in which Arizona law enforcement officials detain or arrest an individual

8 pursuant to S.B. 1070 when federal officials do not timely take such detained or

9 arrested persons into federal custody or verify their immigration status.

10

21. Plaintiff Anna Ochoa O’Leary is lawfully residing in the State of Arizona

in the City of Tucson, Pima County, is employed, and is a local taxpayer. She joins 11

this action to challenge the illegal expenditure of funds by Pima County through 12
implementation of S.B. 1070. Plaintiff O’Learly alleges that Pima County has

13 illegally expended funds in the creation of training materials related to S.B. 1070,

14 through S.B. 1070-related trainings and briefings of its law-enforcement officals, and

15 its implementation of S.B. 1070 to the extent implementation has been or will in the

16 future be required.

17

22. Plaintiff Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge is lawfully residing in the

18 State of Arizona in the City of Tempe, Maricopa County, and is a County taxpayer.

19 She joins this action to challenge the illegal expenditure of funds by Maricopa

20 County through implementation of S.B. 1070. Plaintiff O’Learly alleges that

21 Maricopa County has illegally expended funds in the creation of training materials

22 related to S.B. 1070, through S.B. 1070-related trainings and briefings of its law-
enforcement officals, and its implementation of S.B. 1070 to the extent 23
implementation has been or will in the future be required.. 24
23. Defendant Janice Brewer is the Governor of the State of Arizona and an 25
individual charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. She is sued in her
26 official capacity.

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1 24. Defendant Maricopa County is a duly constituted municipal entity in the

2

State of Arizona and as such it and its officers and agents are required to comply

3 with and implement the terms of S.B. 1070 including by using county taxes collected

4 from county tax payers to pay in whole or in part for such implementation.

5

25. Defendant Bill Montgomery is the Maricopa County Attorney and an

6 individual charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. He is sued in his

7 official capacity.

8

26. Defendant Joseph Arpaio is the Maricopy County Sheriff and an

9 individual charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. He is sued in his

10 official capacity.

27. Defendant Pima County is a duly constituted municipal entity in the State 11

of Arizona and as such it and its officers and agents are required to comply with and 12
implement the terms of S.B. 1070 including by using county taxes collected from

13 county tax payers to pay in whole or in part for such implementation.

14

28. Defendant Barbara LaWall is the Pima County Attorney and an individual

15 charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. She is sued in her official

16 capacity.

17

29. Defendant Clarence W. Dupnik is the Pima County Sheriff and an

18 individual charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. He is sued in his

19 official capacity.

20

30. Defendant Robert Halliday is the Executive Director of the Arizona

21 Department of Public Safety and an individual charged with executing the

22 provisions of SB 1070. He is sued in his official capacity.
31. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on such basis allege, that 23
defendants, their agents, and their employees customarily and as a matter of practice 24
or usage, engage in the acts here complained of. Plaintiffs are further informed and 25
believe, and on such basis allege, that defendants, and each of them, are aware of
26 and acquiesce in or encourage their agents and employees in doing the acts here

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1 complained of. In doing the acts alleged herein, defendants, and each of them, have

2

acted and will continue to act, under color of state law.

3

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

4

32. Pursuant to Rules 23(a)(1)-(4) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

5 Procedure, plaintiffs bring this action as a class action on behalf of the following

6 proposed class:

7

All persons present in the Counties of Pima and Maricopa who are county

8

taxpayers and whose tax payments have been or will in the future be used

9

to implement S.B. 1070.

10

The size of the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable. 11

33. The claims of plaintiffs and those of the proposed class members raise 12
common questions of law and fact concerning, inter alia, whether S.B. 1070 and

13 Arizona’s training materials to implement S.B. 1070 are constitutional. These

14 questions are common to the named parties and to the members of the proposed

15 class because defendants have acted or will act on grounds generally applicable

16 to both the named parties and proposed class members. Plaintiffs’ claims are

17 also typical of the class claims.

18

34. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class

19 would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications establishing

20 incompatible standards of conduct for defendants. Prosecution of separate

21 actions would also create the risk that individual class members will secure

22 court orders that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the claims of other
class members not named parties to this litigation, thereby substantially 23
impeding the ability of unrepresented class members to protect their interests. 24
35. Defendants, their agents, employees, and predecessors and successors in 25
office have acted or refused to act, or will act or refuse to act, on grounds generally
26 applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief or

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1 corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs will

2

vigorously represent the interests of unnamed class members. All members of the

3 proposed class will benefit by the action brought by plaintiffs. The interests of the

4 named plaintiffs and those of the proposed class members are identical. Plaintiffs’

5 counsel include attorneys experienced in federal class action litigation involving the

6 rights of foreign nationals and refugees within the United States.

7

STATEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

8 A. Federal Authority Over the Status of Immigrants and Immigration Laws

9

36. The United States Constitution provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the

10 Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 11
the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 12
37. The Constitution further extends only to the federal government the power 13
to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const., art. I § 8, cl. 4, and to
14 “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const., art. I § 8, cl. 3.

15

38. The federal courts have long held that immigration regulation, policies,

16 and enforcement priorities have direct and indirect impacts on the nation’s foreign

17 policy and should be exercised by federal not local authorities.

18

39. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., and

19 regulations duly promulgated by various federal agencies assigned responsibilities

20 under the INA, have established a complex and exclusive scheme regarding the

21 admission of immigrants to the United States, the circumstances under which such

22 immigrants may remain in the United States, the terms of their presence in the
United States, and the penalties on persons who violate the procedures established 23
for entry, conditions of residence, and employment of immigrants in the United 24
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. 25
40. As the federal Government states in United States v. Arizona, “In exercising
26 its significant enforcement discretion, the federal government prioritizes for arrest,

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1 detention, prosecution, and removal those aliens who pose danger to national

2

security or risk to public safety. Consistent with these enforcement priorities, the a

3 federal government principally targets aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or

4 espionage; aliens convicted of crimes, with particular emphasis on violent criminals,

5 felons, and repeat offenders; certain gang members; aliens subject to outstanding

6 criminal warrants; and fugitive aliens, especially those with criminal records.” Id. at

7 ¶ 18.

8

41. DHS may initiate removal (deportation) proceedings against an Immigrant

9 by the issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), and may ultimately remove an alien

10 who entered the United States unlawfully or violated the conditions of his or her
admission to the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225, 1227, 1228(b), 1229, 11
1229a, 1231. 12
42. The Department of Justice through the Executive Office for Immigration 13
Review (“EOIR”) may order an immigrant removed from the United States for
14 numerous reasons, including if the immigrant violated the terms of his or her visa,

15 engaged in certain forms of misconduct in the United States, or remained longer than

16 authorized. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1229a. In addition, the INA authorizes DHS and

17 DOJ to implement civil and criminal sanctions against an immigrant for immigration

18 violations, including, for example, entry without inspection, entry by fraud, and

19 failing to timely register with the federal government. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1306,

20 1324c.

21

43. However, as the federal Government makes clear in United States v. Arizona,

22 in the exercise of discretion, “the administering agencies may decide not to apply a
specific sanction and may, among other steps, permit the alien to depart the country 23
voluntarily at his or her own expense and may even decide not to pursue removal of 24
the alien if deferred federal enforcement will help pursue some other goal of the 25
immigration system.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 20, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.
26

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1 44. Furthermore, the INA itself and regulations promulgated thereunder

2

provide numerous grounds upon which an immigrant who entered the United

3 States without inspection, or by fraud, or who overstayed his or her visa, may still

4 qualify for legalization of status. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing asylum

5 eligibility for aliens who have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

6 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, if

7 removed); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (providing temporary protected status for otherwise

8 eligible nationals of a foreign state that the Secretary of Homeland Security has
9 specially designated as undergoing ongoing armed conflict, a natural disaster, or 10 another extraordinary circumstance); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (providing
discretion to waive ground of deportability “for humanitarian purposes, to assure 11
family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest” for aliens who are 12
otherwise deportable for encouraging unlawful entry of an immediate family 13
member); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (granting the Attorney General discretion to cancel 14 removal for certain aliens). DHS also has the authority to permit aliens, including 15 those who would be inadmissible, to enter the United States temporarily for “urgent
16 humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). DHS

17 may also refrain from enforcement actions, in appropriate circumstances, against

18 persons unlawfully present in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)

19 (discussing deferred action).

20

45. Under the INA, unlawful presence without more does not subject an

21 immigrant to federal criminal penalties.

22

46. Any immigrant who is 14 year of age or over, who has not been registered

and fingerprinted under the INA, and who is present in the United States for 30 days 23

or longer, must apply to be registered by DHS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a). The INA 24
provides that any immigrant required to register who willfully fails to do so may be

25 fined and imprisoned not more than six months. See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a); 18 U.S.C. §

26 3571.

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1 47. However, as the United States Government concedes, there are many

2

circumstances in which an alien would “not be provided with evidence of

3 registration notwithstanding the federal government’s knowledge of the alien’s

4 presence.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 26. Federal law provides a variety of

5 humanitarian options for aliens – including unlawfully present aliens – who have

6 been victimized or fear persecution or violence, including but not limited to asylum,

7 special visas for victims of trafficking, visas for abused or neglected minors, visas for

8 survivors of domestic violence, and special visas for victims of serious crimes.
9 During the pendency of the application process, an immigrant in most cases will not 10 have any evidence of registration even though the federal government is fully aware
of the immigrant’s presence, has decided against removing the immigrant, and 11
has no interest in prosecuting the immigrant for a crime on the basis of his or her 12
immigration status. 13
48. Congress has enacted several statutes that set forth ways in which states 14 may assist the federal government in the enforcement of the nation’s immigration 15 laws. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (authorizing DHS to empower state or local law
16 enforcement with immigration enforcement authority when an “actual or imminent

17 mass influx of aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate

18 Federal response”); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)–(9) (authorizing DHS to enter into

19 agreements to provide appropriately trained and supervised state and local officers

20 with the authority to perform functions related to the investigation, apprehension,
21 and detention of aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b) (preempting state and local laws that
22 prohibit information-sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities and proscribing such a prohibition); 8 U.S.C. § 1252c
23 (authorizing state and local law enforcement to arrest aliens who are unlawfully
24 present in the United States and were previously removed after being convicted of a
25 felony in the United States).
26

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1 49. In United States v. Arizona, the federal Government describes a variety of

2

programs that the DHS has established to work cooperatively with local

3 governments to enforce the federal immigration laws. United States v. Arizona ¶ 31.

4 Among these efforts is the Law Enforcement Agency Response program (“LEAR”),

5 an Arizona-specific program that is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for

6 responding to calls from state and local law enforcement officers seeking assistance

7 from ICE regarding suspected unlawfully present immigrants. ICE also administers

8 the Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”), also operational 24 hours a day, 7

9 days a week, which serves as a national enforcement operations center and

10 promptly provides immigration status and identity information to local, state, and
federal law enforcement agencies regarding aliens suspected of, arrested for, or 11
convicted of criminal activity ICE and CBP officers also respond to requests from 12
local law enforcement officers on a variety of immigration matters, including 13
assisting with translation, determining alienage, and evaluating immigration
14 documentation. Id.

15 B. The terms of Arizona’s S.B. 1070

16

50. On April 23, 2010, defendant Governor Brewer signed into law S.B. 1070

17 the stated purpose of which is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and

18 presence of aliens” in Arizona by a process of “attrition through enforcement” of the

19 new law. S.B. 1070 at §1, p. 1.

20

51. Shortly after S.B. 1070 became law, the Arizona Legislature passed, and

21 defendant Governor Brewer signed, H.B. 2162, which amended S.B. 1070. H.B. 2162

22 made minor modifications to S.B. 1070 for the purpose of responding to those who
“expressed fears that the original law would somehow allow or lead to racial 23
profiling.” Statement by Governor Jan Brewer (Apr. 30, 2010), available at 24
http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_043010_ StatementGovBrewer.pdf. 25
52. The law provides that “[n]o official or agency of this state of a county, city
26 town or other political subdividision of the state may adopt a policy that limits or

27

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 17 of 27

1 restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent

2

permitted by Federal Law.” S.B. 1070 at § 2.A, p.1; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051A.

3 However what is “permitted by Federal law” is now unclear given that the United

4 States Government itself holds that the law itself is unconstitutional. See Unites States

5 v. Arizona.

6

53. S.B. 1070 includes a provision that requires, in the context of a lawful stop,

7 detention, or arrest, the verification of an individual’s immigration status when

8 practicable where there is “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is unlawfully
9 present in the United States (Section 2). The law is unclear as to how defendants’ 10 law enforcement agents are supposed to arrive at a “reasonable suspicion,” and
defendants S.B. 1070 training materials permit the use of several vague and 11
imprecise factors including a person’s dress, demeanor, lack of English-speaking 12
skills, and ot being familiar with other people in the vicinity. 13
54. S.B. 1070 also creates or amends several state law criminal provisions, 14 which impose criminal penalties for an immigrant’s alleged failure to federally 15 register or carry his or her federal registration documents including minors over the
16 age of 14 (Section 3), for the so-called smuggling, transporting, or harboring of an

17 unlawfully present immigrant (Sections 4 and 5), for encouraging an unlawfully

18 present immigrant to move to Arizona (Section 5), and for an unauthorized

19 immigrant’s attempt to seek work (Section 5).

20

55. The new statute, as amended by HB 2162, also requires that “[a]ny person

21 who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the

22 person is released.” A.R.S. § 11-1051(B). This section requires the indefinite

detention of an individual even if the sole reason for detention is status verification. 23

56. As the United States Government states: 24
By pursuing attrition and ignoring every other objective embodied in the

25 federal immigration system (including the federal government’s

26

prioritization of the removal of dangerous aliens), S.B. 1070 conflicts

27

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 18 of 27

1 with and otherwise stands as an obstacle to Congress’s demand that

2

federal immigration policy accommodate the competing interests of

3

immigration control, national security and public safety, humanitarian

4

concerns, and foreign relations – a balance implemented through the

5

policies of the President and various executive officers with the

6

discretion to enforce the federal immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et

7

seq. Enforcement of S.B. 1070 would also effectively create state crimes

8

and sanctions for unlawful presence despite Congress’s considered

9

judgment to not criminalize such status. S.B. 1070 would thus interfere

10

with federal policy and prerogatives in the enforcement of the U.S.

immigration laws. 11

United States v. Arizona, ¶ 37. 12
57. S.B. 1070’s mandatory immigration status inspection scheme and federal

13 verification requirements will “impair and burden the federal resources and

14 activities of DHS.” United States v. Arizona ¶ 44. S.B. 1070’s mandate for

15 verification of immigrant status will clearly result in a major increase in the number

16 of verification requests being issued to DHS by Arizona law enforcement officers,

17 “necessitating reallocation of DHS resources away from its policy priorities.” Id. As

18 such, the federal government will be required to divert resources from carefully

19 considered enforcement priorities – dangerous aliens who pose a threat to national

20 security and public safety – to address the work that Arizona will now create for it.

21 In the view of the Government of the United States, “[s]uch interference with federal

22 priorities … constitutes a violation of the Supremacy Clause.” Id.
58. Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which requires the arrest and prosecution of all 23
immigrants who do not possess certain enumerated registration documents, is 24
preempted by the comprehensive federal immigration registration laws –8 U.S.C. §§ 25
1201, 1301-1306, and 8 C.F.R. Part 264 – which provide a federal scheme for alien
26 registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system. Section 3 fails to take

27

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 19 of 27

1 into account that several classes of immigrants who are eligible and apply for

2

legalization of status are not provided with “registration” documents while their

3 status is being adjudicated by the federal government, notwithstanding the federal

4 government’s knowledge that these immigrants are present in the United States.

5 Because S.B. 1070 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 training materials seek to criminalize

6 immigrants whose presence may be known to and accepted by the federal

7 government while it adjudicates their legalization applications, the Government of

8 the United States concludes that Section 3 thus “conflicts with and otherwise stands

9 as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in providing certain

10 forms of humanitarian relief.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 48.
59. SB 1070’s transportation and harboring provisions require Arizona’s 11
courts, as a prerequisite to finding a violation, to determine whether an alien “has 12
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of the law” or whether 13
an alien’s entry “will be in violation of law” as those terms are used in 8 U.S.C. §
14 1324(a).

15

60. Section 4 of S.B. 1070 amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2319 (“smuggling

16 prohibition”) makes it a felony for “a person to intentionally engage in the

17 smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-

18 2319. The smuggling prohibition is preempted by federal law, including 8 U.S.C. §

19 1324. There are material differences between the federal and Arizona alien

20 smuggling. Arizona’s smuggling law, unlike federal anti-smuggling laws, is not

21 limited to transportation that is provided “in furtherance” of unlawful immigration,

22 but rather prohibits the knowing provision of any commercial transportation
services to an alien unlawfully present in the United States. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1323
2319(A). 24
61. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2928 makes it a crime for any immigrant who is 25
“unauthorized” and “unlawfully present” in the United States to solicit, apply for,
26 or perform work. S.B. 1070, Section 5(C)-(E). This prohibition on unauthorized

27

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 20 of 27

1 immigrants seeking or performing work is preempted by the federal scheme of

2

sanctions related to the employment of unauthorized aliens –8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–

3 1324c. As stated by the Government of the United States, this provision “conflicts

4 with Congress’s decision not to criminalize such conduct for humanitarian and

5 other reasons.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 54.

6

62. S.B. 1070 Section 6 provides law enforcement officers with authority to

7 make warrantless arrests of any person whom they have probable cause to believe

8 has committed a “public offense,” without explaining what this term means, that
9 would make the person “removable,” regardless of where the offense was 10 committed. Defendants’ training materials fail to adequately explain what a “public
offense” means, or what classes of immigrants are in fact “removable” under federal 11
law, or what classes of immigrants are not “removable” under federal law. Section 6 12
makes no exception for aliens whose removability has already been resolved by 13
federal authorities, despite the fact that only the federal government can actually 14 issue removal decisions. Section 6 will therefore necessarily result in the arrest of 15 aliens based on out-of-state crimes, even if the criminal and immigration
16 consequences of the out-of-state crime have already been definitively resolved. For

17 that reason, “Section 6 of S.B. 1070 interferes with the federal government’s

18 enforcement prerogatives and will necessarily impose burdens on lawful aliens in

19 manner that conflicts with the purposes and practices of the federal immigration

20 laws.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 59. Additionally, Section 6 will result in the arrest

21 of immigrants whose out-of-state crimes “would not give rise to removal proceedings

22 at all.” Id.
IRREPARABLE INJURY 23
63. For the foregoing reasons, SB 1070 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 training 24
materials have caused and will contnue to cause substantail and irreparable harm to 25
the plaintiffs for which the plaintiffs have no adequate remedies at law. Plaintiffs do
26 not, however, seek to enjoin or interfere with state proceedings that were underway

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 21 of 27

1 before initiation of this case or otherwise would require abstention under Younger v.

2

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

3

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

4

VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

5

64. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

6 paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully set forth here.

7

65. SB 1070, Sections 1-6, as amended is an impermissible attempt by state

8 actors to regulate immigration, conflicts with federal law and foreign policy,

9 disregards well-established federal policies, interferes with federal enforcement

10 priorities in areas committed to the discretion of the United States, and otherwise
impedes the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 11
federal law and foreign policy. 12
66. As such Sections 1-6 of SB 1070 violates the Supremacy Clause and is 13
invalid under the United States Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (the federal power to
14 establish a uniform rule of naturalization), Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the federal power to

15 regulate commerce with foreign nations), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

16

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

17

PREEMPTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

18

67. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

19 paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

20

68. Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law, including 8 U.S.C. §

21 1101, et seq., and further violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

22

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION; 23

VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 24
69. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

25 paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

26

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 22 of 27

1 70. Sections 1-6 of SB 1070 deny plaintiffs and their class members due

2

process of law and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth

3 Amendment to the United States Constitution, by —

4

(a) failing to provide fair warning of the acts which are made punishable as

5

a crime;

6

(b) failing to explain or define when a person has committed a “public

7

offense”;

8

(c) permitting detentions and arrests based upon vague and ill-defined

9

facts such as dress, demenaor, and limited English-speaking ability;

10

(d) permitting detention and arrests of persons for purported immigration

law violations whose presence is known to the federal government 11

which has not required their registration or detention; 12
(e) failing to establish procedures for the release of detained or arrested

13 persons whose lawful presence the federal is unable or unwilling to

14

verify.

15

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

16

FIRST AMENDMENT; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

17

71. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

18 paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

19

72. Both Sections 2 and 5 of SB 1070 are unconstitutional restrictions of the

20 rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of free speech and to peaceably assemble.

21

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

22

FOURTH AMENDMENT; 42 U.S.C. § 1983

73. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in 23

paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here. 24
74. The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees are applied to the States through the

25 Fourteenth Amendment.

26

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 23 of 27

1 75. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “unreasonable

2

searches and seizures.”

3

76. Section 2 of SB 1070, as amended by Section 3 of HB 2162, requires that

4 officers conduct unreasonable seizures of individuals in violation of the Fourth

5 Amendment.

6

77. Sections 2 and 6 of SB 1070 provide for warrantless seizures of individuals

7 in the absence of probable cause that they have committed crimes, in violation of the

8 Fourth Amendment.

9

78. Section 2 of SB 1070 authorizes officers to detain individuals without

10 lawful authority and transport individuals into federal custody, in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. 11
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 12
42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13
79. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

14 paragraphs 1 through 63, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

15

80. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code guarantees that “[a]ll

16 persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in

17 every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings

18 for the security of persons and property.” Section 1981 also provides that all persons

19 “shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions

20 of every kind, and to no other.” Section 1981 prohibits discrimination under color of

21 state law on the basis of alienage, national origin, and race.

22

81. SB 1070 impermissibly discriminates against persons within the State of

Arizona on the basis of alienage and national origin and race. 23
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 24

25 WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court —

26

1. Assume jurisdiction over this action;

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 24 of 27

1 2. Order that plaintiffs may maintain this action as a class action pursuant to

2

Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

3

3. Only to the extent relief does not interfere with state proceedings that were

4 underway before initiation of this case or otherwise require abstention under

5 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), issue declaratory judgment that Sections 1-6 of

6 S.B. 1070 are invalid, null, and void;

7

4. Only to the extent relief does not interfere with state proceedings that were

8 underway before initiation of this case or otherwise require abstention under

9 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), issue preliminary and permanent injunctions

10 restraining defendants, their agents, employees, and successors in office from further
implementing Sections 1-6 of SB 1070; 11
5. Issue a declataory judgment that LULAC members may not be detained, 12
arrested, or prosecuted by defendants or their agents for not having or for 13
transporting people who are not registered pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1302, not carrying
14 registration receipt cards pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1306, or for seeking or accepting

15 employment in Arizona.

16

6. Award plaintiffs their costs of suit and attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

17 § 1988(b); and

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 25 of 27

1 7. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just.
2

3 Dated: January 24, 2011
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

PETER A. SCHEY CARLOS HOLGUIN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS
RAY VELARDE, ESQ.
T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO LAW OFFICE OF T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO

12

13

/s/ ________________________________

14

Peter A. Schey

15 16 17 18 / / / 19

/s/ ________________________________ T. Anthony Guajardo
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 26 of 27

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 I hereby certify that I am over the age of 18, not a party to this action, and on

3

January 24, 2011, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the Clerk’s

4 Office using the CM/ECF System to be filed and a transmittal of a Notice of

5 Electronic Filing to be sent the following CM/ECF registrants on record and also

6 emailed them directly at their email addresses below.

7

John J. Bouma

8

Robert A. Henry

Joseph G. Adams

9

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

One Arizona Center 400 E. Van Buren

10

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202 Phone: (602) 382-6000

11

Fax: (602) 382-6070

jbouma@swlaw.com

12

bhenry@swlaw.com

13

Joseph A. Kanefield

14

Office of Governor Janice K. Brewer

1700 W. Washington, 9th Floor

15

Phoenix, AZ 85007

16

Fax: (602) 542-7602 jkanefield@az.gov

17

Maria R Brandon

18

Maricopa County

19

Official of Special Litigation Services

234 N Central Ave

20

Ste 4400

Phoenix, Az 85004

21

602-372-3852

22

602-506-1416 (fax)

brandonm@mail.maricopa.gov

23

24

Anne Cecile Longo MCAO Division of County Counsel

25

222 N Central Ave

Ste 1100

26

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2926

27

602-506-5269

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 37 Filed 01/24/11 Page 27 of 27

1

602-506-6083 (fax)

2

longoa@mcao.maricopa.gov

3

Bruce P White

Maricopa County Attorney's Office

4

222 N Central Ave

5

Ste 1100

Phoenix, AZ 85004

6

602-506-6173

602-506-8567 (fax)

7

whiteb@mcao.maricopa.gov

8 Thomas P Liddy

9

Maricopa County

10

Office of Special Litigation Services 234 N Central Ave

11

Ste 4400

Phoenix, AZ 85004

12

602-506-1733

13

tliddy@mail.maricopa.gov

14

Daniel S Jurkowitz

Pima County Attorneys Office

15

32 N Stone Ave

16

Ste 2100

Tucson, AZ 85701

17

520-740-5750

18

520-740-5600 (fax) Daniel.Jurkowitz@pcao.pima.gov

19

20

21

________________S_______________

22

Christopher Scherer

23 / / /

24

25

26

27

28

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 Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 1 of 11

1

2

3

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

6

7 League of United Latin Am erican) No. CV 10-1453-PHX-SRB

Citizens; Anna Ochoa O’Leary; Cordelia )

8 Chavez Candelaria Beveridge; Magdalena)

Schwartz; Jose David Sandoval; Jane Doe), ORDER

9 named as Jane C.H.P. Doe; Jane Doe ,)

named as Jane E.C.-J. Doe; Jane Doe, )

10 named as Jane E.O. Doe; John and Ja ne)

Does 1-5,

)

11

)

)

12

Plaintiffs,

)

)

13 vs.

)

)

14

)

State of Arizona; Janice K. Brewer, )

15 Governor of Arizona; William G.)

Montgomery; Joseph M. Arpaio; Barbara)

16 Lawall; Clarence W. Dupnik; Robert )

Halliday; Maricopa County; Pima County,)

17

)

Defendants.

)

18

)

)

19

20 Before the Court is Defendant Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Motion to Dism iss for
21 Failure to Comply with Discovery Order (“MTD”) (Doc. 78) 1 and Defendant Janice K.
22 Brewer’s Motion to Consolidate Actions (“Mot. to Consolidate) (Doc. 74.)2
23

24

25

1 Defendants Joseph Arpaio and WilliamG. Montgomery joined Defendant Brewer’s

26 Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. 81, Maricopa Defs.’ Joinder in MTD.)

27

2 The sam e Motion was also filed in Friendly House v. Whiting by Inte rvenor

Defendants Janice K. Brewer and the State of Arizona. (See CV 10-1453-PHX-SRB, Doc. 28 593.)

Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 2 of 11

1 I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2

Plaintiff League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”) and other Plaintiffs

3 filed their original Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”) on July

4 9, 2010. (Doc. 1, Com pl. at 23.) On Decem ber 15, 2010, the Court dism issed Plaintiffs’

5 claims against the State of Arizona with prejudice and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against

6 Defendant Brewer without prejudice based on lack of standing. (Doc. 34, Dec. 15, 2010,

7 Order at 11.) The Court directed Plaintiffs “to file any amendments to their pleading within

8 30 calendar days.” (Id.) On January 18, 2011, after more than 30 days had passed, Plaintiffs

9 filed an Unoppose d Application for an Extension of Tim e to File a First Am ended

10 Complaint, which the Court granted. (Doc. 35, Unopposed Application for an Extension of

11 Time to File a 1st Am . Compl. (“Mot. to Extend”); Doc. 36, Order.) Plaintiffs file d an

12 Amended Complaint on January 24, 2011, portions of which survived a motion to dismiss.

13 (See Doc. 37, 1st Am. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; Doc. 40, Def. Janice K.

14 Brewer’s Mot. to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Pls.’1st Am. Com pl.; Doc. 56, Aug. 26,

15 2011, Order.)

16

On September 27, 2011, the Court issued an Order setting a scheduling conference

17 for November 28, 2011, and ordered that counsel “shall jointly file their Proposed Case

18 Management Plan . . . not less than SEVEN (7) DAYS before the Pretrial Scheduling

19 Conference.” (Doc. 57, Order Setting Rule 16 Scheduling Conference (“Rule 16 Sched.

20 Order”) at 1, 7-8.) The Order specified that “[ n]o extensions of time will be granted” and

21 “that it is the responsibility of counsel for the Plaintiff(s) to initiate the com munications

22 necessary to prepare the joint Proposed Case Management Plan.” (Id. at 8.) The Court also

23 explicitly warned that “FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH EVERY PROVISION OF THIS

24 ORDER MAY LEAD TO SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

25 PROCEDURE 16(F).” (Id. at 9.)

26

On November 21, 2011, seven days be fore the scheduled Pretrial Scheduling

27 Conference, Defendants Brewer, Montgom ery, and Arpaio filed a Proposed Ca se

28 Management Plan and stated that “[c]ounsel for Governor Brewer attempted to confer with

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 3 of 11

1 Plaintiffs so the parties could submit a joint proposal, but Plaintiffs’ counsel did not return

2 the telephone call or otherwise reach out to Governor Brewer to meet and confer.” (Doc. 60,

3 Proposed Case Management Plan of Defs. Brewer, Montgomery, and Arpaio at 1 n.1, 11.)

4 On November 22, 2011, the Court vacated the Scheduling Conference set for November 28,

5 2011, and ordered Plaintiffs’ counsel to “show cause in writing within 7 days . . . why this

6 case should not be dismissed for Plaintiffs[’] failure to comply with this Court’s September

7 27, 2011 Order.” (Doc. 61, Nov. 22, 2011, Order at 1-2.) On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff

8 LULAC filed a Response to Order to Show Cause, stating that “through m istake and

9 inadvertence [P]laintiff’s counsel did not timely schedule a Rule 26 conference with

10 [D]efendants’ counsel.” (Doc. 62, Pl.’s Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 33.)Two days later,

11 counsel for LULAC stated, “LULAC[’s]counsel takes responsibility for his inadvertence or

12 mistake and understands that sanctions m ay be im posed pursuant to the terms of the

13 Scheduling Order.” (Doc. 65, Pl.’s Reply to Def. Brewer’s Resp. Re Order to Show Cause

14 at 5.) The Court found that “Plaintiffs’ counsel’sfailure to timely file a Joint Proposed Case

15 Management Plan d[id] not justify dism issal” and rescheduled the Rule 16 Scheduling

16 Conference. (Doc. 66, Dec. 7, 2011, Order.)

17

At the scheduling conference the Court ordered that the parties exchange initial

18 disclosures no later than February 13, 2012, that they terminate discovery by April 27, 2012,

19 and that they file dispos itive motions no later th an June 22, 2012, related to issues of

20 standing. (See Doc. 68, Minute Entry.) Plaintiff LULAC failed to m eet the February 13

21

22

3 Plaintiff LULAC’s counsel also submitted a Declaration with the Response to Order

23 to Show Cause stating, “Through inadvertence and m istake, contributed to by illness and

severe pain caused by diverticulitis, and m y daughter undergoing decanulation of a 24 tracheostomy and other serious m edical issues, I failed to becom e aware of the Court’s

25 September 27, 2011, Order.” (Doc. 62-1, Decl. of Peter Schey ¶ 4.) LULAC’s counsel also stated he was unaware that Defendants’ counsel had attempted to contact himand that a new
26 employee assigned to the position of tracking, calendaring, and reminding legal staff about

27

deadlines was unaware of the Court’s September 27, 2011, Order because that employee had not yet made the arrangements necessary to receive electronic case filing notices in this case.

28 (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 4 of 11

1 deadline. After three emails from Defendant Brewer’s counsel inquiring about the status of

2 LULAC’s initial disclosures, LULAC’s counsel, Mr. Schey, responded on February 16,

3 2012, “I’m out of town but will look into this and get back to you. I hope it was sent out

4 already.” (MTD, Ex. A.) On the sam e day LULAC filed a notice of service of its initial

5 disclosure statement regarding standing, which counsel for Defendant Brewer reportedly

6 received on February 22, 2012. ( See MTD at 3; Doc. 77, P ls.’ Notice of S ervice of

7 Discovery.) In its initial disclosure statem ent, Plaintiff LULAC stated, “Plaintiff is in the

8 process of identifying individuals likely to psosess discoverable information and will provide

9 such documentation as obtained from LULAC’s Councils in Arizona and in response to

10 [D]efendant’s interrogatories.” (MTD, Ex. B, Pl.’s Rule 26 Initial Disclosure Statement Re:

11 Standing Issues at 3.) Likewise, LULAC did not identify any specific docum ents used to

12 support its claim of standing, but rather stated, “Plaintiff is in the process of ga thering

13 documentation relevant to its standing and will provide such docuemntation as obtained from

14 LULAC’s Councils in Arizona and in response to [D] efendant’s request for production of

15 documents.” (Id.)

16

On February 23, 2012, counsel for Defendant Brewer emailed all attorneys of record

17 for LULAC regarding the initial disclosure statement and requested that LULAC provide a

18 substantive initial disclosure statement no later than February 28, 2012. (MTD at 4;id., Ex.

19 C (email asking that LULAC provide a substantive initial disclosure statement by Monday,

20 February 27 and indicating that Defendants might seek dismissal or a stay if LULAC failed

21 to do so).) In response to Defendant Brewer’s Motion to Disimss, LULAC stated, “Plaintiff’s

22 initial disclosure statement was sent to [D]efendants February 16, 2012, because [P]laintiff

23 LULAC does not have paid staff employed in Arizona, has several hundred members, and

24 determining who possessed the type of information required by the initial disclosures was

25 difficult.” (Doc. 80, Pl.’s Opp’n to MTD (“Resp.”) at 3.) Along with LULAC’s Response,

26 which was filed on March 19, 2012, LULAC filedand served a supplemental Rule 26 initial

27 disclosure statement identifying three officers or m embers of LULAC likely to have

28 discoverable information and referring Defendants to the documents provided in response

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 5 of 11

1 to Defendant Brewer’s request for production of docum ents. (Id. at 4; id., Ex. 3, Pl.’s

2 Supplemental Rule 26 Initial Disclosure Statement at 3-5.) Plaintiff LULAC also admitted

3 being late in responding to Defendant Brewer’s interrogatories and request for documents.

4 (Resp. at 3.)4

5 II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

6

Defendant Brewer seeks dismissal under Rule 37(b) based on Plaintiff LULAC failing

7 to exchange initial disclosures by February 13, 2012, repeatedly m issing deadlines, not

8 complying with scheduling and discovery orders, and not taking “action to prosecute a case

9 that makes the same substantive claims and allegations that are being m ade in other S.B.

10 1070 lawsuits pending before this Court.” (MTD at 1-2.) 5 In the alternative, Defendant

11 Brewer argues that the Court should stay the proceedings in this case pending resolution of

12 the claims in the other pending S.B. 1070 lawsuits, prohibit LULAC from introducing

13

14

4 Plaintiff LULAC had a deadline of March 14, 2012, to respond to Governor Brewer’s written discovery requests. (See Doc. 75 (Def. Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Notice

15 of Service of Discovery (stating that she servedher first set of interrogatories and first set of

requests for production of docum ents on Febr uary 13, 2012)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 16 34(b)(2)(A) (providing that pa rties must respond to interrogatories and requests for

17 production within thirty days after being served); s(ee also Resp. at 3; Reply at 2 (stating that the deadline was March 16, 2012).) Plaintiff LULAC submitted its responses along with its

18 Response to Defendant Brewer’s Motion toDismiss on March 19, 2012, and filed a corrected

19

version of its Responses to Defendant Brewer’s Requests for Documents on April 6, 2012. (See Resp. at 4; id., Exs. 1-2; Doc. 84, Pl.’s Notice of Filing of Exs. 4-7 in Opp’n to MTD,

20 Ex. 4; see also Doc. 82, Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Reply in Supp. of MTD (“Reply”) at

7 n.7; Pl.’s Notice of Filing of Exs. 4-7 in Opp’n to MTD at 3.) Plaintiff LULAC dedicated 21 about half of its Response to Defendant Brewer’s Motion to Dismiss explaining why it was

22 late in responding to Defendant Brewer’s interrogatories and requests for production, though this was not the basis of Defendant Brewer’s Motion; Plaintiff LULAC attributed its

23 additional late responses to health problems of Mr. Schey’s daughter and co-counsel Carlos

24 Holguin being abroad on annual leave. (Resp. at 3-4; see also Reply at 3.)

25

5 Several lawsuits ha ve been filed in this Court challenging a set of statutes and

statutory amendments enacted by the Arizona Legislature in the form of Senate Bill 1070,

26 the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” 2010 Arizona Session

27

Laws, Chapter 113, which Governor Brewer signed into law on April 23, 2010. The Court refers to Senate Bill 1070 and House Bill 2162 collectively as “S.B. 1070” to describe the

28 April 23, 2010, enactment as modified by amendments passed on April 30, 2010.

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1 evidence regarding standing issues, or “order LULAC to serve a definitive and final list of

2 witnesses and exhibits within a certain, expedited tim e period . . . , e xtend the period for

3 Governor Brewer to conduct discovery regarding standing issues, and order LULAC to

4 reimburse Governor Brewer for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this issue.” (MTD

5 at 8-9.)

6

A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 37(b)

7

Federal Rule of Procedure 37(b) provides that if a party “fails to obe y an order to

8 provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f),” a court “may issue further

9 just orders,” which m ay include “prohibiting the disobe dient party from supporting or

10 opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence,”

11 “staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed,” and “dism issing the action or

12 proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P . 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), (v). If dism issal is

13 imposed, the district court must find that the losing party’s noncompliance resulted from its

14 “willfulness, fault, or bad faith.” Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1997)

15 (quotation omitted). “Disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant

16 is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.”Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d

17 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1994); see also In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.,

18 460 F.3d 1217, 1233 (9th Cir. 2006).

19

In determining whether dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2) is appropriate, courts weigh the

20 following five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the

21 court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [party seeking sanctions;]

22 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of caseson their merits; and (5) the availability of

23 less drastic sanctions.” Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.

24 1998) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). Where a

25 court order has been violated, normally the first and second factors support sanctions, while

26 the fourth factor weighs against dismissal; therefore, prejudice to the party seeking sanctions

27 and the availability of less drastic sanctions are typically determ inative. Id.; Henry v. Gill

28 Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993). “A defendant suffe rs prejudice if the

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 7 of 11

1 plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the

2 rightful decision of the case.”Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.

3 1990). In considering the availability of less dr astic sanctions, reviewing courts consider

4 whether the district court “explicitly discussed alternative sanctions, whether it tried them,

5 and whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of disimssal.” Valley Eng’rs

6 Inc., 158 F.3d at 1057.

7

B. Analysis

8

Here, it is clear that Plaintiff LULAC disobeyed direct orders fromthis Court and that

9 sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2) are warranted. LULAC failed to comply with both this Court’s

10 Rule 16 Scheduling Orde r and the deadlines set during the rescheduled scheduling

11 conference. (See Rule 16 Sched. Orderat 7-8; Doc. 68, Minute Entry.) In addition, Plaintiffs

12 were late in filing their Am ended Complaint and in responding to De fendant Brewer’s

13 written discovery requests. (See Mot. to Extend; Resp. at 3.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs’

14 violations were not outside their control and therefore that dismissal is an available sanction.

15 See In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1233; see also W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897

16 F.2d 1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1990) (“the faults and defaults of the attorney may be imputed to,

17 and their consequences visited upon, his or her client”).

18

Turning to the five factors used to weigh whether dismissal is appropriate, as in most

19 cases, the public’s interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation and the court’s need to

20 manage its docket point in favor of dismissal. See Valley Eng’rs Inc., 158 F.3d at 1057. In

21 terms of prejudice, Defendant Brewer argues that “LULAC’s delay is causing prejudice . .

22 . given that the parties were ordered to c omplete all discovery regarding standing issues

23 within ten weeks of . . . February 13, 2012 . . . . Three weeks into this ten-week discovery

24 period, LULAC has yet to identify a single witness or exhibit pertinent to its own standing

25 allegations . . . .” (MTD at 4.) Evenhtough LULAC subsequently provided Defendants with

26 three names and some documents, the Court finds that Defendants have been prejudiced by

27 LULAC continually failing to m eet deadlines, shortening the time period in which

28 Defendants must conduct relevant discovery, and increasing Defendants’ costs by obligating

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1 them to expend resources in seeking to enforce the deadlines already set by this Court. Cf.

2 Thoeren, 913 F.2d at 1412 (finding that prejudice was established where party repeatedly

3 failed to appear at scheduled depositions a nd continually refused to com ply with court-

4 ordered production of documents); see also In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1236 (“Failure to produce

5 documents as ordered is sufficient prejudice, whether or not there is belated compliance.”);

6 Payne, 121 F.3d at 508 (“Belated compliance with discovery orders does not preclude the

7 imposition of sanctions. Last-m inute tender of docum ents does not cure the prejudice to

8 opponents nor does it restore to other litigants on a crowded docket the opportunity to use

9 the courts.” (quotation omitted)); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986)

10 (“a lack of prejudice to defendants is [not] determinative” where “counsel continues to

11 disregard deadlines, warnings, and schedules set by the district court”).6

12

In addition, “[w]hether prejudice is sufficientto support an order of dismissal is in part

13 judged with reference to the strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.”Malone, 833

14 F.2d at 131; see also In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1237 (“a plaintiff’s excuse for default or delay

15 is relevant”). Here, while LULAC failed to com ply with various deadlines, Defendant

16 Brewer based her Motion to Dism iss mainly on LULAC’s failure to exchange initial

17 disclosures by Fe bruary 13, 2012. ( See MTD at1-2; Reply at 1-2.) LULAC’s proffered

18 excuse for being late in sending its initial disclosures was that “LULAC does not have paid

19 staff employed in Arizona, has several hundred members, and determining who possessed

20 the type of information required by the initial disclosures was difficult.” (Resp. at 3.) The

21 Court finds this excuse woefully inadequate. Plaintiff LULAC knew of these circumstances

22 when the Court set the disclosure and discovery deadlines, yet it never voiced any concerns

23 or asked for a timely extension. In addition, LULAC was able to com e up with only three

24 names of persons with discoverable information and fifty-five documents by March 19. (See

25 6 While Henderson and some other cases deal with dism issal under Rule 41(b) for
26 failure to prosecute, essentially the sam e factors are applied whe n considering dismissal

27

under Rule 41(b) and Rule 37(b).See Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423 (listing same five factors in Rule 41(b) case); see also Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 (“The standards governing dismissal

28 for failure to obey a court order are basically the same under either of these rules.”).

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 9 of 11

1 Resp. at 4; 80-2, 80-3, 84-1, 84-2, 84-3.) The fact that com plying with disclosure and

2 discovery obligations may be “difficult” does not give any party a right not to com ply.

3 Furthermore, in respect to other deadlines m issed by Plaintiffs, while the Court sincerely

regrets any health problem s experienced by Mr. Schey or his daughter, there are five 4

attorneys of record for Plaintiffs in this case, and the fact that one amy be dealing with illness 5

6 or family issues does not excuse the others from complying with their obligations in this

7 lawsuit. LULAC’s failure to produce any substantive initial disclosures until March 19–over

8 a month after the deadline set by the Court–as well as LULAC’s failure to copmly with other

9 deadlines in this case and to com municate with Defendants’ counsel as to the status of its

10 disclosures all support a finding of prejudice weighing in favor of dismissal.

Turning to the fourth factor, while the policy favoring disposition of cases on their 11

merits normally weighs against dismissal, the Court notes that this case is unique in that there 12

13 are other actions challenging S.B. 1070 on sim ilar grounds. The legal challenges are not

14 identical, but the Court finds that this factordoes not weigh heavily against dismissal in this

15 case because challenges to S.B. 1070 will be addressed on the m erits, whether in this

16 particular suit or another.

17

Finally, the Court c onsiders the availability of less drastic sanctions. Defendant

Brewer has suggested, as alternatives to dismissal, (i) a stay until the resolution of the other 18

S.B. 1070 lawsuits, (ii) prohibiting LULAC from introducing evidence regarding standing 19

20 issues, and (iii) ordering LULAC to serve a definitive list of witnesses and exhibits within

21 an expedited time period, extend the period for Defendant Brewer to conduct disc overy

22 regarding standing issues, and order Plaintiffs to reimburse Defendant Brewer for attorneys’

23 fees and costs associated with Plaintiffs’ non-compliance. (MTD at 8-9.) While the Court has

24 warned Plaintiffs of the possibility of dismissal, it has not tried implementing any of the less

drastic sanctions suggested by Defendants. (See Rule 16 Sched. Order at 9 (“FAILURE TO 25

COMPLY WITH EVERY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER MAY LEAD TO 26

27

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 10 of 11

SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 16(F.)”);7 1

2 see also Nov. 22, 2011, Order at 2 (ordering Plaintiffs’ counsel to “ show cause in writing

3 within 7 days of the date of this Order why this case should not be dismissed for Plaintiffs[’]

failure to comply with this Court’s September 27, 2011 Order”)); Valley Eng’rs Inc., 158 4

F.3d at 1056-57 (“[E]veryone has notice from the text of Rule 37(b)(2) that dism issal is a 5

6 possible sanction for failure to obey discovery orders.”). The Court finds that while LULAC

7 has been warned of possible dismissal, both the policy favoring deciding cases on the merits

8 and the desirability of finding a less drastic sanction weigh in favor of staying this case rather

9 than dismissing it. This c ase will be stayed until the other pending S.B. 1070 cases are

10 resolved, and then, if “there is still som e claim or issue asserted by LULAC that m erits

adjudication by this Court, LULAC can adjudicate that claimand issue then.” (See MTD at 11

8.) 12

13 III. CONCLUSION

14

The Court finds that Plaintiff LULAC has repeatedly failed to m eet deadlines and

15 comply with this Court’s orders regarding discovery. LULAC’s failure to actively prosecute

16 this case and com ply with the Court’s deadlines is causing prejudice to Defendants and

17 wasting judicial resources. Given the harshness of dism issal as a sanction as well as the

policy favoring deciding a case on the merits, the Court orders that this case be stayed rather 18

than dismissed. It will be stayed until this Court issues final rulings in Friendly House v. 19

20 Whiting, Case No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, and United States v. Arizona, Case No. CV 10-

21 1413-PHX-SRB. In light of the Court’s decision to stay this case, it denies as m oot the

22 Motion to Consolidate.

23

IT IS ORDERED granting in part Defendant Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Motion

24 to Dismiss for Failure to Com ply with Discovery Order (Doc. 78). The Court grants

25 Defendant Brewer’s alternative request to stay this case until the Court issues final rulings

26

27

7 Rule 16(f) provides inter alia that if a pa rty fails to obey a scheduling or other

pretrial order, “the court m ay issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule

28 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C).

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 88 Filed 05/31/12 Page 11 of 11

1 in Friendly House v. Whiting , Case No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, and United States v .

2 Arizona, Case No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB.

3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendant Janice K. Brewer’s

Motion to Consolidate Actions (Doc. 74). 4

5 DATED this 31st day of May, 2012.
6

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 Case 2:10-cv-01453-NVW Document 1 Filed 07/09/10 Page 1 of 24

1

2

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

3

Peter A. Schey (Cal. State Bar #58232)

pschey@centerforhumanrights.org

4

Carlos Holguin (Cal. State Bar #90754)

crholguin@centerforhumanrights.org

5

256 S. Occidental Blvd.

Los Angeles, CA 90057

6

Telephone: (213) 388-8693 ext. 304

Facsimile: (213) 386-9484 7

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICA CITIZENS

8

Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. (Texas State Bar No. 20546740)

9

1325 Riverview Towers, 111 Soledad San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260

10 Telephone: (210) 225-3300 Facsimile: (210) 225-2060

11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
12 (Plaintiffs' Attorneys continued on page 2)
13

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

16 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICA

17 CITIZENS; ANNA OCHOA O’LEARY;

18 CORDELIA CHAVEZ CANDELARIA

BEVERIDGE;

19

MAGDALENA SCHWARTZ;

JOSE DAVID SANDOVAL; 20 JANE C.H.P. DOE; JANE E.C-J. DOE; JANE

21 E.O. DOE,

Case No. 2:10-cv-1453 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[CLASS ACTION]

22

Plaintiffs,

23
- vs – 24

25

STATE OF ARIZONA; JANICE BREWER,

GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA, 26

Defendants. 27

28

Case 2:10-cv-01453-NVW Document 1 Filed 07/09/10 Page 2 of 24

1

2

3

Plaintiffs’ Counsel Continued:

4 RAY VELARDE, ESQ. (Texas Bar No. 20539950)

5

1216 Montana

El Paso, TX 79902

6 Telephone: (915) 373-6003

7

T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO (Bar No. AZ021500)

Law Office of T. Anthony Guajardo

8 2001 E. Campbell, Suite #202

Phoenix, AZ 85016

9

Telephone (602) 544-0607

10

Facsimile: (602) 957-0801 tag1444@tonyguajardo.com

11

12 / / /

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-NVW Document 1 Filed 07/09/10 Page 3 of 24

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Plaintiffs allege as follows:

3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

4

1. In this action, the individual and organizational plaintiffs seek to declare invalid

5

and preliminarily and permanently enjoin the enforcement of S.B. 1070, or portions thereof,

6

as amended and enacted by the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs allege that S.B. 1070 is preempted

7 by federal law and therefore violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States

8 Constitution.

9

2. Both the United States Constitution and numerous acts of Congress grant the

10 federal government preeminent authority to regulate immigration matters. Congress has

11 assigned highly specific tasks relating to the enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws
and regulations to various federal agencies, including the United States Department of 12
Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the Department of State. In the process of 13
implementing these laws and regulations, the federal agencies assigned enforcement 14
responsibilities consider, weigh, and balance multifaceted and sometimes competing 15
objectives that Congress seeks to achieve through enactment of a complex system of
16 federal laws.

17

3. While Arizona may exercise its police power in a manner that has an incidental

18 effect on aliens, if may not constitutionally enact and enforce its own immigration laws in a

19 manner that interferes with the federal immigration laws or policies.

20

4. Nor may Arizona enact laws to control the flow of migrants into the state or force

21 their departure from the state. Such competing state laws will simply drive immigrants

22 from one state to the next, leaving national policies in shambles. The drafters of the

23 Constitution and the scheme of federal immigration laws Congress has enacted envision

and rely upon a national uniform policy in the area of international migration, not a 24
patchwork of competing state and local immigration policies throughout the country. 25
5. The State of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 includes a broad set of provisions that are designed 26
to “work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” by
27

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1

2

making “attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government 3
agencies in Arizona.” See S.B. 1070 (as amended by H.B. 2162). 4
6. S.B. 1070’s provisions focus exclusively on forcing suspected undocumented 5
immigrants to leave the state through a policy of “attrition,” while ignoring numerous
6 other objectives established by Congress for migrants who may have entered the country

7

without inspection and have no current lawful status, including, for example, legalization

8

opportunities for family reunification, victims of serious crimes who cooperate with law

9

enforcement to put violent criminals behind bars, minors who have been abused,

10 abandoned, or neglected, survivors of domestic violence, and those who reasonably fear

11 return to their home countries on account of persecution.

12

7. S.B. 1070 also ignores the necessary priorities established by and resources of

13 federal agencies enforcing the immigration laws. While these federal agencies logically focus
14 their limited resources on identifying and detaining immigrants not eligible for legalization of status, those who have committed criminal offenses, or those who recently arrived, S.B.
15 1070 makes no such distinctions. As the Complaint in United States v. The State of Arizona,
16 Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW, filed July 6, 2010 (“ U.S. v. Arizona”), states, S.B. 1070 “disrupts
17 federal enforcement priorities and resources that focus on aliens who pose a threat to
18 national security or public safety.” Id. at ¶ 4. Enforcement of S.B. 1070 “will impose
19 significant and counterproductive burdens on the federal agencies charged with enforcing
20 the national immigration scheme, diverting resources and attention from the dangerous
21 aliens who the federal government targets as its top enforcement priority.” Id.

22

8. Implementation of S.B. 1070 will also interfere with the United States

23 Government’s foreign policy and national security interests by disturbing the United States’

24 relationship with other countries.

25

9. The State of Arizona’s training materials developed and distributed to Arizona law

26 enforcement agencies to implement S.B. 1070 exacerbate the conflicts between the United

States Constitution and federal laws on the one hand, and Arizona law on the other hand, 27

28

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1

2

by inter alia failing to recognize adequately that numerous categories of immigrants who 3
did not enter the United States lawfully nevertheless are eligible for legalization of status, 4
and by permitting law enforcement officers to rely upon vague and ill-defined factors such 5
as a person’s “dress,” “difficulty communicating in English,” “demeanor,” and “claim of not
6 knowing others … at [the] same location,” as providing justification for a detention based

7

on suspected undocumented status.

8

10. Accordingly, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 is void and should be struck down under the

9

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

10

JURISDICTION

11

11. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, (federal

12 question jurisdiction) and 1343(3)-(4); plaintiffs seek remedies authorized by 28 U.S.C.

13 §§ 1651, 2201 and 2202.

14

12. Venue is properly in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (e)(1), (2),

and (4), because the acts complained of occurred in this district, several of the plaintiffs 15
and defendants reside in this district, and no real property is involved in this action. 16
PARTIES 17
13. Plaintiff the LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) is the largest 18
and oldest Hispanic organization in the United States. It is a civil rights organization with 19
chapters and members located throughout the country including in Arizona. LULAC’s
20 primary goals include the promotion and protection of the legal, political, social, and

21 cultural interests of Latino people living in the United States. Members of plaintiff LULAC

22 are being and will continue to be injured by the imminent or actual implementation of S.B.

23 1070 and the training materials prepared and distributed by the State of Arizona inasmuch

24 as Hispanic members of LULAC face interrogation, temporary detention, or arrest because

25 of the vague and ill-defined terms in S.B. 1070 and in Arizona’s training materials relating to

26 the formation of reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest persons

27 suspected of being deportable for having committed a public offense, or suspected of

28

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1

2

having failed to register with the federal Government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302, S.B. 3
1070’s and Arizona’s training materials’ failure to define adequately reasonable suspicion to 4
detain or probable cause to arrest persons for allegedly having committed a public offense 5
making them deportable from the United States or not having timely registered with the
6 federal Government, and S.B. 1070’s and Arizona’s training materials’ failure to adequately

7

address how to address situations in which Arizona law enforcement officials detain or

8

arrest an individual pursuant to S.B. 1070 when federal officials do not timely take such

9

detained or arrested persons into federal custody or verify their immigration status. S.B.

10 1070 has also reasonably caused Plaintiff LULAC to divert its limited resources to address

11 the injuries faced by Hispanic residents of Arizona as a result of the imminent

12 implementation of S.B. 1070.

13

14. Plaintiff Anna Ochoa O’Leary is lawfully residing in the State of Arizona in the

14 City of Tucson, is employed, and is a state and local taxpayer. She joins this action to
challenge the illegal expenditure of funds by defendants and their agents through 15
implementation of S.B. 1070 and Arizona’s training materials relating to the implementation 16
of S.B. 1070. 17
15. Plaintiff Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge is lawfully residing in the State of 18
Arizona in the City of Tempe, and is a state and local taxpayer. Plaintiff Beveridge joins this
19 action to challenge the illegal expenditure of funds by defendants and their agents through

20 implementation of S.B. 1070 and Arizona’s training materials relating to the implementation

21 of S.B. 1070.

22

16. Plaintiff Magdalena Schwartz is a resident of Mesa, Arizona. She is a citizen and

23 national of Chile who has been residing in the United States for over twenty years. She is a

24 respondent in removal proceedings initiated by the former Immigration and Naturalization

25 Service (INS) before the Executive Board of Immigration review (EOIR). These proceedings
26 have been pending for approximately twenty years. She has been released on her own
27

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recognizance during the pendency of the removal proceedings. She has not been required

3 to register with the DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302 and has not done so. She therefore
4 does not have in her possession proof of registration under 8 U.S.C. § 1302. She has not
5 been issued employment authorization by the federal authorities. She has not been issued
6 any documentary evidence by the DHS or DOJ showing that she is authorized to be in the
7
United States or authorized to be employed. Plaintiff Magdalena Schwartz is not in federal 8

9

custody and therefore faces interrogation, detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070

10 despite the fact that her presence is authorized by federal law pending the outcome of her

11 administrative removal proceedings. Plaintiff Schwartz seeks injunctive relief to prevent

12 her unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070, and a declaratory judgment

13 that she may not be prosecuted for seeking employment or engaging in employment in

14 Arizona.

15

17. Plaintiff Jose David Sandoval is a resident of Phoenix, Arizona, and a national and

16 citizen of El Salvador. Plaintiff Sandoval has applied to an Immigration Judge of the

17 Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
18 political asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158. His application for asylum was denied on or
19 about March 19, 2008. In February 2010 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
20 Circuit reversed his removal order and remanded for further administrative proceedings
21
22 before the EOIR pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of

23 2005. While his presence is known to the federal authorities, Plaintiff Sandoval has not been

24 required by the DHS to “register” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302, and has not done so. He

25 does not possess any documentary evidence issued by the DHS establishing his right to

26 seek employment or to be employed, or showing that he is lawfully present in the United

27 States. Plaintiff Sandoval is not in federal custody and therefore faces interrogation,

28

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1

2

detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070 despite the fact that his presence is

3 authorized by federal law pending the outcome of his administrative proceedings. Plaintiff
4 Sandoval seeks injunctive relief to prevent his unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution
5 under SB 1070, and a declaratory judgment that he may not be prosecuted under SB 1070
6 for seeking employment or engaging in employment in Arizona.
7
18. Plaintiff Jane C. H-P. Doe is a resident of Phoenix, Arizona and a citizen and 8

9

national of Mexico. On or about May 12, 2010, pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and

10 Violence Protection Act of 2000, she presented an application for a U visa to the United

11 States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), of the DHS as the victim of a violent

12 crime who cooperated with local law enforcement officials in the investigation or

13 prosecution of the crime. While her presence is known to the federal authorities, Plaintiff

14 Jane C. H-P. Doe has not been required by the DHS to “register” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

15 1302, and has not done so. She does not possess any documentary evidence issued by the
16 DHS establishing his right to seek employment or to be employed, or showing that she is
17 lawfully present in the United States. Plaintiff Jane C. H-P. Doe is not in federal custody and
18 therefore faces interrogation, detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070 despite the
19 fact that her presence is authorized by federal law pending the outcome of any
20 administrative proceedings that the federal authorities may initiate against her. Plaintiff Jane
21 22 C. H-P. Doe seeks injunctive relief to prevent her unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution
23 under SB 1070, and a declaratory judgment that she may not be prosecuted under SB 1070

24 for seeking employment or engaging in employment in Arizona.

25

19. Plaintiff Jane E.C-J Doe is a resident of Mesa, Arizona and a citizen and national of

26 Mexico. On or about March 4, 2009, pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence

27 Protection Act of 2000, she presented an application for a U visa to the United States

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2

Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), of the DHS as the victim of a violent crime

3 who cooperated with local law enforcement officials in the investigation or prosecution of
4 the crime. While her presence is known to the federal authorities, Plaintiff Jane E.C-J. Doe
5 has not been required by the DHS to “register” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302, and has not
6 done so. She does not possess any documentary evidence issued by the DHS establishing
7
his right to seek employment or to be employed, or showing that she is lawfully present in 8

9

the United States. Plaintiff Jane E.C-J Doe 1 is not in federal custody and therefore faces

10 interrogation, detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070 despite the fact that her

11 presence is authorized by federal law pending the outcome of any administrative

12 proceedings that the federal authorities may initiate against her. Plaintiff Jane E.C-J Doe 1

13 seeks injunctive relief to prevent her unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB

14 1070, and a declaratory judgment that she may not be prosecuted under SB 1070 for seeking

15 employment or engaging in employment in Arizona.

16

20. Plaintiff Jane E.O. Doe is a resident of Arizona and a foreign national. Plaintiff Jane

17 E.O. has applied for and been granted a visa pursuant to the Violence Against Woman Act
18 (VAWA) as a result of being battered by her United States citizen husband, however is
19 ineligible to adjust her status to a lawful permanent resident because of an alleged prior
20 false claim to U.S. citizenship. Plaintiff Jane E.O. Doe is eligible to apply for a U visa
21
22 pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, but must first

23 obtain a certification from the Tempe Police Department confirming that she cooperated in

24 the investigation or prosecution of her United States citizen husband. Such a certification is

25 required to apply for a U visa. The Tempe Police Department has adopted a policy or

26 practice of refusing to issue U certifications because of the enactment of SB 1070. While her

27 presence is known to the federal authorities, Plaintiff Jane E. O. Doe has not been required

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by the DHS to “register” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302, and has not done so. She does not

3 possess any documentary evidence issued by the DHS establishing his right to seek

4 employment or to be employed, or showing that she is lawfully present in the United
5 States. Plaintiff Jane E.O. Doe is not in federal custody and therefore faces interrogation,
6
detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070 despite the fact that her presence is 7

authorized by federal law pending the outcome of any administrative proceedings that the 8

9

federal authorities may initiate against her. Plaintiff Jane E.O. Doe seeks injunctive relief to

10 prevent her unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution under SB 1070, and a declaratory

11 judgment that she may not be prosecuted under SB 1070 for seeking employment or

12 engaging in employment in Arizona.

13

21. Defendant JANICE BREWER is the Governor of the State of Arizona and the

14 individual charged with executing the provisions of SB 1070. She is sued in her official

15 capacity.
16
22. Defendant, the State of Arizona, is a state of the United States that entered the 17
Union as the 48th State in 1912. 18
23. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on such basis allege, that defendants, their 19
agents, and their employees customarily and as a matter of practice or usage, engage in the 20
acts here complained of. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and on such basis 21 allege, that defendants, and each of them, are aware of and acquiesce in or encourage their
22 agents and employees in doing the acts here complained of. In doing the acts alleged herein,

23 defendants, and each of them, have acted and will continue to act, under color of state law.

24

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

25

24. Pursuant to Rules 23(a)(1)-(4) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

26 plaintiffs bring this action as a class action on behalf of the following proposed class:

27

All persons present in the State of Arizona who are not the subject of final non-

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2

appealable orders of removal issued by the United States Government and who 3
have in the past or may in the future be detained or arrested by Arizona law 4
enforcement authorities for allegedly not being in possession of an alien 5
registration receipt, or for allegedly having violated 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), or for
6 allegedly having commited a public offense that makes them removable from

7

the United States.

8

The size of the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

9

25. The claims of plaintiffs and those of the proposed class members raise

10 common questions of law and fact concerning, inter alia, whether S.B. 1070 and

11 Arizona’s training materials to implement S.B. 1070 are constitutional. These questions

12 are common to the named parties and to the members of the proposed class because

13 defendants have acted or will act on grounds generally applicable to both the named

14 parties and proposed class members. Plaintiffs’ claims are also typical of the class claims.
26. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would 15
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications establishing incompatible 16
standards of conduct for defendants. Prosecution of separate actions would also create 17
the risk that individual class members will secure court orders that would as a practical 18
matter be dispositive of the claims of other class members not named parties to this
19 litigation, thereby substantially impeding the ability of unrepresented class members to

20 protect their interests.

21

27. Defendants, their agents, employees, and predecessors and successors in office

22 have acted or refused to act, or will act or refuse to act, on grounds generally applicable to

23 the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief

24 with respect to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs will vigorously represent the interests of

25 unnamed class members. All members of the proposed class will benefit by the action

26 brought by plaintiffs. The interests of the named plaintiffs and those of the proposed class

members are identical. Plaintiffs’ counsel include attorneys experienced in federal class 27

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action litigation involving the rights of foreign nationals and refugees within the United 3
States. 4
STATEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 5
A. Federal Authority Over the Status of Immigrants and Immigration Laws
6 28. The United States Constitution provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of

7

the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of

8

the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

9

notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.

10

29. The Constitution further extends only to the federal government the power to

11 “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const., art. I § 8, cl. 4, and to “regulate

12 Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const., art. I § 8, cl. 3.

13

30. The federal courts have long held that immigration regulation, policies, and

14 enforcement priorities have direct and indirect impacts on the nation’s foreign policy and
should be exercised by federal not local authorities. 15
31. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., and 16
regulations duly promulgated by various federal agencies assigned responsibilities under 17
the INA, have established a complex and exclusive scheme regarding the admission of 18
immigrants to the United States, the circumstances under which such immigrants may
19 remain in the United States, the terms of their presence in the United States, and the

20 penalties on persons who violate the procedures established for entry, conditions of

21 residence, and employment of immigrants in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.

22

32. As the federal Government states in United States v. Arizona, “In exercising its

23 significant enforcement discretion, the federal government prioritizes for arrest, detention,

24 prosecution, and removal those aliens who pose danger to national security or risk to public

25 safety. Consistent with these enforcement priorities, the a federal government principally

26 targets aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage; aliens convicted of crimes,

with particular emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders; certain gang 27

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members; aliens subject to outstanding criminal warrants; and fugitive aliens, especially 3
those with criminal records.” Id. at ¶ 18. 4
33. DHS may initiate removal (deportation) proceedings against an Immigrant by the 5
issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), and may ultimately remove an alien who entered
6 the United States unlawfully or violated the conditions of his or her admission to the United

7

States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225, 1227, 1228(b), 1229, 1229a, 1231.

8

34. The Department of Justice through the Executive Office for Immigration Review

9

(“EOIR”) may order an immigrant removed from the United States for numerous reasons,

10 including if the immigrant violated the terms of his or her visa, engaged in certain forms of

11 misconduct in the United States, or remained longer than authorized. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227,

12 1229a. In addition, the INA authorizes DHS and DOJ to implement civil and criminal

13 sanctions against an immigrant for immigration violations, including, for example, entry

14 without inspection, entry by fraud, and failing to timely register with the federal
government. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1306, 1324c. 15
35. However, as the federal Government makes clear in United States v. Arizona, in 16
the exercise of discretion, “the administering agencies may decide not to apply a specific 17
sanction and may, among other steps, permit the alien to depart the country voluntarily at 18
his or her own expense and may even decide not to pursue removal of the alien if deferred
19 federal enforcement will help pursue some other goal of the immigration system.” United

20 States v. Arizona, ¶ 20, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.

21

36. Furthermore, the INA itself and regulations promulgated thereunder provide

22 numerous grounds upon which an immigrant who entered the United States without

23 inspection, or by fraud, or who overstayed his or her visa, may still qualify for legalization

24 of status. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing asylum eligibility for aliens who have a well-

25 founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

26 particular social group, or political opinion, if removed); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (providing

temporary protected status for otherwise eligible nationals of a foreign state that the 27

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Secretary of Homeland Security has specially designated as undergoing ongoing armed 3
conflict, a natural disaster, or another extraordinary circumstance); 8 U.S.C. § 4
1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (providing discretion to waive ground of deportability “for humanitarian 5
purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest” for aliens
6 who are otherwise deportable for encouraging unlawful entry of an immediate family

7

member); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (granting the Attorney General discretion to cancel removal for

8

certain aliens). DHS also has the authority to permit aliens, including those who would be

9

inadmissible, to enter the United States temporarily for “urgent humanitarian reasons” or

10 “significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). DHS may also refrain from enforcement

11 actions, in appropriate circumstances, against persons unlawfully present in the United

12 States. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (discussing deferred action).

13

37. Under the INA, unlawful presence without more does not subject an immigrant

14 to federal criminal penalties.

38. Any immigrant who is 14 year of age or over, who has not been registered and 15
fingerprinted under the INA, and who is present in the United States for 30 days or longer, 16
must apply to be registered by DHS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a). The INA provides that any 17
immigrant required to register who willfully fails to do so may be fined and imprisoned not
18 more than six months. See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3571.

19

39. However, as the United States Government concedes, there are many

20 circumstances in which an alien would “not be provided with evidence of registration

21 notwithstanding the federal government’s knowledge of the alien’s presence.” United States

22 v. Arizona, ¶ 26. Federal law provides a variety of humanitarian options for aliens –

23 including unlawfully present aliens – who have been victimized or fear persecution or

24 violence, including but not limited to asylum, special visas for victims of trafficking, visas for

25 abused or neglected minors, visas for survivors of domestic violence, and special visas for

26 victims of serious crimes. During the pendency of the application process, an immigrant

in most cases will not have any evidence of registration even though the federal government 27

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is fully aware of the immigrant’s presence, has decided against removing the 3
immigrant, and has no interest in prosecuting the immigrant for a crime on the basis of his 4
or her immigration status. 5
40. Congress has enacted several statutes that set forth ways in which states may
6 assist the federal government in the enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. See, e.g.,

7

8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (authorizing DHS to empower state or local law enforcement with

8

immigration enforcement authority when an “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens . . .

9

presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response”); 8 U.S.C. §

10 1357(g)(1)–(9) (authorizing DHS to enter into agreements to provide appropriately trained

11 and supervised state and local officers with the authority to perform functions related to the
12 investigation, apprehension, and detention of aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b) (preempting
13 state and local laws that prohibit information-sharing between local law enforcement and 14 federal immigration authorities and proscribing such a prohibition); 8 U.S.C. § 1252c
(authorizing state and local law enforcement to arrest aliens who are unlawfully present in 15
the United States and were previously removed after being convicted of a felony in the 16
United States). 17
41. In United States v. Arizona, the federal Government describes a variety of 18
programs that the DHS has established to work cooperatively with local governments to 19 enforce the federal immigration laws. United States v. Arizona ¶ 31. Among these efforts is 20 the Law Enforcement Agency Response program (“LEAR”), an Arizona-specific program
21 that is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for responding to calls from state and
22 local law enforcement officers seeking assistance from ICE regarding suspected unlawfully

23 present immigrants. ICE also administers the Law Enforcement Support Center (“LESC”),

24 also operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which serves as a national enforcement

25 operations center and promptly provides immigration status and identity information to

26 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies regarding aliens suspected of, arrested

for, or convicted of criminal activity ICE and CBP officers also respond to requests from 27

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local law enforcement officers on a variety of immigration matters, including assisting with 3
translation, determining alienage, and evaluating immigration documentation. Id. 4
B. The terms of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 5
42. On April 23, 2010, defendant Governor Brewer signed into law S.B. 1070 the
6 stated purpose of which is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of

7

aliens” in Arizona by a process of “attrition through enforcement” of the new law. S.B.

8

1070 at §1, p. 1.

9

43. Shortly after S.B. 1070 became law, the Arizona Legislature passed, and defendant

10 Governor Brewer signed, H.B. 2162, which amended S.B. 1070. H.B. 2162 made minor

11 modifications to S.B. 1070 for the purpose of responding to those who “expressed fears that

12 the original law would somehow allow or lead to racial profiling.” Statement by Governor

13 Jan Brewer (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_043010_

14 StatementGovBrewer.pdf.
44. The law provides that “[n]o official or agency of this state of a county, city town 15
or other political subdividision of the state may adopt a policy that limits or restricts the 16
enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by Federal 17
Law.” S.B. 1070 at § 2.A, p.1; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051A. However what is “permitted by 18
Federal law” is now unclear given that the United States Government itself holds that the
19 law itself is unconstitutional. See Unites States v. Arizona.

20

45. S.B. 1070 includes a provision that requires, in the context of a lawful stop,

21 detention, or arrest, the verification of an individual’s immigration status when practicable

22 where there is “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is unlawfully present in the United

23 States (Section 2). The law is unclear as to how defendants’ law enforcement agents are 24 supposed to arrive at a “reasonable suspicion,” and defendants S.B. 1070 training materials 25 permit the use of several vague and imprecise factors including a person’s dress, demeanor, 26 lack of English-speaking skills, and ot being familiar with other people in the vicinity.

27

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46. S.B. 1070 also creates or amends several state law criminal provisions, which 3
impose criminal penalties for an immigrant’s alleged failure to federally register or carry his 4
or her federal registration documents including minors over the age of 14 (Section 3), for 5
the so-called smuggling, transporting, or harboring of an unlawfully present immigrant
6 (Sections 4 and 5), for encouraging an unlawfully present immigrant to move to Arizona

7

(Section 5), and for an unauthorized immigrant’s attempt to seek work (Section 5).

8

47. The new statute, as amended by HB 2162, also requires that “[a]ny person who is

9

arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is

10 released.” A.R.S. § 11-1051(B). This section requires the indefinite detention of an individual

11 even if the sole reason for detention is status verification.

12

48. As the United States Government states:

13

By pursuing attrition and ignoring every other objective embodied in the

14

federal immigration system (including the federal government’s prioritization

of the removal of dangerous aliens), S.B. 1070 conflicts with and otherwise 15
stands as an obstacle to Congress’s demand that federal immigration policy 16
accommodate the competing interests of immigration control, national 17
security and public safety, humanitarian concerns, and foreign relations – a
18 balance implemented through the policies of the President and various

19

executive officers with the discretion to enforce the federal immigration laws.

20

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. Enforcement of S.B. 1070 would also effectively

21

create state crimes and sanctions for unlawful presence despite Congress’s

22

considered judgment to not criminalize such status. S.B. 1070 would thus

23

interfere with federal policy and prerogatives in the enforcement of the U.S.

24

immigration laws.

25 United States v. Arizona, ¶ 37.

26

49. S.B. 1070’s mandatory immigration status inspection scheme and federal

verification requirements will “impair and burden the federal resources and activities of 27

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DHS.” United States v. Arizona ¶ 44. S.B. 1070’s mandate for verification of immigrant 3
status will clearly result in a major increase in the number of verification requests being 4
issued to DHS by Arizona law enforcement officers, “necessitating reallocation of DHS 5
resources away from its policy priorities.” Id. As such, the federal government will be
6 required to divert resources from carefully considered enforcement priorities – dangerous

7

aliens who pose a threat to national security and public safety – to address the work that

8

Arizona will now create for it. In the view of the Government of the United States, “[s]uch

9

interference with federal priorities … constitutes a violation of the Supremacy Clause.” Id.

10

50. Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which requires the arrest and prosecution of all immigrants

11 who do not possess certain enumerated registration documents, is preempted by the
12 comprehensive federal immigration registration laws –8 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1301-1306, and 8
13 C.F.R. Part 264 – which provide a federal scheme for alien registration in a single integrated 14 and all-embracing system. Section 3 fails to take into account that several classes of
immigrants who are eligible and apply for legalization of status are not provided with 15
“registration” documents while their status is being adjudicated by the federal government, 16
notwithstanding the federal government’s knowledge that these immigrants are present in 17
the United States. Because S.B. 1070 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 training materials seek to 18
criminalize immigrants whose presence may be known to and accepted by the federal 19 government while it adjudicates their legalization applications, the Government of the 20 United States concludes that Section 3 thus “conflicts with and otherwise stands as an
21 obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in providing certain forms of
22 humanitarian relief.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 48.

23

51. Section 4 of S.B. 1070 amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2319 (“smuggling prohibition”)

24 makes it a felony for “a person to intentionally engage in the smuggling of human beings

25 for profit or commercial purpose.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2319. The smuggling prohibition is

26 preempted by federal law, including 8 U.S.C. § 1324. There are material differences between

the federal and Arizona alien smuggling. Arizona’s smuggling law, unlike federal anti27

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smuggling laws, is not limited to transportation that is provided “in furtherance” of 3
unlawful immigration, but rather prohibits the knowing provision of any commercial 4
transportation services to an alien unlawfully present in the United States. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 5
13-2319(A).
6 52. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2928 makes it a crime for any immigrant who is

7

“unauthorized” and “unlawfully present” in the United States to solicit, apply for, or

8

perform work. S.B. 1070, Section 5(C)-(E). This prohibition on unauthorized immigrants

9

seeking or performing work is preempted by the federal scheme of sanctions related to the

10 employment of unauthorized aliens –8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c. As stated by the

11 Government of the United States, this provision “conflicts with Congress’s decision not to

12 criminalize such conduct for humanitarian and other reasons.” United States v. Arizona, ¶ 54.

13

53. S.B. 1070 Section 6 provides law enforcement officers with authority to make

14 warrantless arrests of any person whom they have probable cause to believe has
committed a “public offense,” without explaining what this term means, that would make 15
the person “removable,” regardless of where the offense was committed. Defendants’ 16
training materials fail to adequately explain what a “public offense” means, or what classes 17
of immigrants are in fact “removable” under federal law, or what classes of immigrants are 18
not “removable” under federal law. Section 6 makes no exception for aliens whose
19 removability has already been resolved by federal authorities, despite the fact that only the

20 federal government can actually issue removal decisions. Section 6 will therefore necessarily

21 result in the arrest of aliens based on out-of-state crimes, even if the criminal and

22 immigration consequences of the out-of-state crime have already been definitively

23 resolved. For that reason, “Section 6 of S.B. 1070 interferes with the federal government’s

24 enforcement prerogatives and will necessarily impose burdens on lawful aliens in manner

25 that conflicts with the purposes and practices of the federal immigration laws.” United

26 States v. Arizona, ¶ 59. Additionally, Section 6 will result in the arrest of immigrants whose

out-of-state crimes “would not give rise to removal proceedings at all.” Id. 27

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IRREPARABLE INJURY 3
54. For the foregoing reasons, SB 1070 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 training materials 4
have caused and will contnue to cause substantail and irreparable harm to the plaintiffs for 5
which the plaintiffs have no adequate remedies at law. Plaintiffs do not, however, seek to
6 enjoin or interfere with state proceedings that were underway before initiation of this case

7

or otherwise would require abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

8

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

9

VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

10

55. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

11 paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully set forth here.

12

56. SB 1070, Sections 1-6, as amended is an impermissible attempt by state actors to

13 regulate immigration, conflicts with federal law and foreign policy, disregards well-

14 established federal policies, interferes with federal enforcement priorities in areas
committed to the discretion of the United States, and otherwise impedes the 15
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of federal law and foreign 16
policy. 17
57. As such Sections 1-6 of SB 1070 violates the Supremacy Clause and is invalid 18
under the United States Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (the federal power to establish a
19 uniform rule of naturalization) and Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the federal power to regulate commerce

20 with foreign nations).

21

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

22

PREEMPTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW

23

58. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

24 paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

25

59. Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law, including 8 U.S.C. § 1101,

26 et seq., and by U.S. foreign policy

27

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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 3
VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 4
60. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in 5
paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.
6 61. Section 5 of S.B. 1070 (adding Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2929) restricts the interstate

7

movement of immigrants in a manner that is prohibited by Article One, Section Eight of the

8

Constitution and violates the Commerce Clause.

9

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

10

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION;

11

VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983

12

62. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set out in

13 paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth here.

14

63. Sections 1-6 of SB 1070 deny plaintiffs and their class members due process of law

and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 15
United States Constitution, by — 16
(a) failing to provide fair warning of the acts which are made punishable as a 17
crime;
18 (b) failing to explain or define when a person has committed a “public offense”;

19

(c) permitting detentions and arrests based upon vague and ill-defined facts such

20

as dress, demenaor, and limited English-speaking ability;

21

(d) permitting detention and arrests of persons for purported immigration law

22

violations whose presence is known to the federal government which has not

23

required their registration or detention;

24

(e) failing to establish procedures for the release of detained or arrested persons

25

whose lawful presence the federal is unable or unwilling to verify.

26

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court — 27

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2

1. Assume jurisdiction over this action; 3
2. Order that plaintiffs may maintain this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23, 4
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 5
3. Only to the extent relief does not interfere with state proceedings that were
6 underway before initiation of this case or otherwise require abstention under Younger v.

7

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), issue declaratory judgment that Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 are

8

invalid, null, and void;

9

4. Only to the extent relief does not interfere with state proceedings that were

10 underway before initiation of this case or otherwise require abstention under Younger v.

11 Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining

12 defendants, their agents, employees, and successors in office from further implementing

13 Sections 1-6 of SB 1070;

14

5. Issue a declataory judgment that the named individual immigrant plaintiffs may

not be detained, arrested, or prosecuted by defendants or their agents for not having 15

registered pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1302, not carrying registration receipt cards pursuant to 8 16
U.S.C. § 1306, or for seeking or accepting employment in Arizona. 17
6. Award plaintiffs their costs of suit and attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

18 1988(b); and

19

/ / /

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

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3 7. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just.
4

5 Dated: July 9, 2010
6
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12

PETER A. SCHEY CARLOS HOLGUIN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS
RAY VELARDE, ESQ.
T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO LAW OFFICE OF T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO

13 14 15 16 17 18
/ / / 19

/s/ ___________________________________ Peter A. Schey
/s/ ___________________________________ T. Anthony Guajardo
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-NVW Document 1 Filed 07/09/10 Page 24 of 24

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2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3
I hereby certify that I am over the age of 18, not a party to this action, and on July 9, 4
2010, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the Clerk’s Office using the 5
CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following
6 CM/ECF registrants on record and also emailed them directly at their email addresses

7

below.

8

John J. Bouma

9

Robert A. Henry

Joseph G. Adams

10

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

One Arizona Center 400 E. Van Buren

11

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202 Phone: (602) 382-6000

Fax: (602) 382-6070 jbouma@swlaw.com

12

bhenry@swlaw.com

13

Joseph A. Kanefield

Office of Governor Janice K. Brewer

14

1700 W. Washington, 9th Floor

15

Phoenix, AZ 85007 Fax: (602) 542-7602

16

jkanefield@az.gov

17
18
19 / / /
20

________________S_______________ Christopher Scherer

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 Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 1 of 11

1

2

3

4

5

6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8

9 League of United Latin American)

Citizens; et al.,

)

10

)

Plaintiffs,

)

11

)

vs.

)

12

)

)

13 State of Arizona; Janice K. Brewer, in her)

Official Capacity as Governor of the State)

14 of Arizona,

)

)

15

Defendants.

)

)

16

)

No. CV 10-1453-PHX-SRB ORDER

17 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Janice K.
18 Brewer and the State of Arizona (“MTD”) (Doc. 27).
19 I. BACKGROUND
20 In April 2010, the Arizona Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1070, later modified by
21 House Bill 2162 (collectively “S.B. 1070”), a set of new statutes and statutory amendments
22 with an effective date of July 29, 2010. Following the enactment of S.B. 1070, seven
23 separate lawsuits were filed challenging its constitutionality. (See Escobar v. Brewer, CV
24 10-249-PHX-SRB; Frisancho v. Brewer, CV 10-926-PHX-SRB; Nat’l Coal. of Latino
25 Clergy & Christian Leaders v. Arizona, CV 10-943-PHX-SRB; Salgado v. Brewer, CV 10-
26 951-PHX-SRB; Friendly House v. Whiting, CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB; United States v.
27 Arizona, CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB; and League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Arizona, CV
28

Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 2 of 11

1 10-1453-PHX-SRB.) On July 28, 2010, the Court preliminarily enjoined certain provisions

2 of S.B. 1070 on federal preemption grounds in United States v. Arizona. (CV 10-1413-PHX-

3 SRB, Doc. 87, Order at 4.)

4

S.B. 1070 consists of a number of sections that create or amend statutes, and its stated

5 intent is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic

6 activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” S.B. 1070 § 1. Within S.B.

7 1070, Subsection 2(B) requires peace officers to make a reasonable attempt, when

8 practicable, to determine an individual’s immigration status during any lawful stop,

9 detention, or arrest where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully present

10 in the United States, and it provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s

11 immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §

12 11-1051(B). Subsection 2(A) prohibits Arizona officials, agencies and political subdivisions

13 from limiting or restricting the enforcement of federal immigration laws, and Subsection

14 2(H) permits legal residents of Arizona to bring civil actions challenging “any official or

15 agency of [Arizona] that adopts or implements a policy that limits or restricts the

16 enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . to less than the full extent permitted by federal

17 law.” Id. § 11-1051(A), (H). Section 3 creates a crime for the failure of an alien to apply for

18 or carry registration papers, id. § 13-1509, Section 4 amends the crime for the smuggling of

19 human beings, id. § 13-2319, and Section 5 creates crimes for the performance of work by

20 unauthorized aliens and the transport or harboring of unlawfully present aliens, id. §§ 13-

21 2928, 13-2929. Section 6 permits a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the

22 officer has probable cause to believe that “the person to be arrested has committed any public

23 offense that makes the person removable from the United States.” Id. § 13-3883(A)(5).

24

On July 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the instant class action against Defendants Governor

25 Brewer and the State of Arizona challenging the validity of S.B. 1070 on its face. (Doc. 1,

26 Compl.) The named Plaintiffs include one organization, the League of United Latin

27 American Citizens (“LULAC”), and seven individuals. (Id. ¶¶ 13-20.) Plaintiffs raise the

28 following Counts: (1) Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 violate the Supremacy Clause of the United

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 3 of 11

1 States Constitution; (2) Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law, including

2 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.; (3) the portion of

3 Section 5 of S.B. 1070 adding A.R.S. § 13-2929 violates the Commerce Clause of the United

4 States Constitution; (4) Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 violate the Due Process and Equal

5 Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶

6 55-63.)

7

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff LULAC is a national civil rights organization,

8 and one of its goals is “the promotion and protection of the legal, political, social, and

9 cultural interests of Latino people living in the United States.” (Id. ¶ 13.) The Complaint

10 further alleges:

11

Members of [P]laintiff LULAC are being and will continue to be injured by

the imminent or actual implementation of S.B. 1070 and the training materials

12

prepared and distributed by the State of Arizona inasmuch as Hispanic

members of LULAC face interrogation, temporary detention, or arrest because

13

of the vague and ill-defined terms of S.B. 1070 and in Arizona’s training

materials relating to the formation of reasonable suspicion to detain or

14

probable cause to arrest . . . . S.B. 1070 also reasonably caused Plaintiff

LULAC to divert its limited resources to address the injuries faced by Hispanic

15

residents of Arizona as a result of the imminent implementation of S.B. 1070.

16 (Id.)1

17

Individual Plaintiffs Anna Ochoa O’Leary and Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge

18 are “state and local taxpayer[s]” in Arizona. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) They “challenge the illegal

19 expenditure of funds by [D]efendants and their agents through implementation of S.B. 1070.”

20 (Id.)

21

Individual Plaintiffs Magdalena Schwartz, Jose David Sandoval, Jane C. H-P. Doe,

22

23

1 The Court notes that the Complaint alleges that LULAC’s mission concerns the

interests of “Latino” people but that S.B. 1070 has resulted in injury to LULAC’s “Hispanic” 24 members. (Id.) With regard to the definition of these terms, the Court takes judicial notice

25 of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which comments that the terms are “often used interchangeably in American English,” particularly when referring to
26 residents of the United States who are of Latin American origin. American Heritage

27 Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000). The Court further notes that both terms refer only to a region of origin (Latin America), not a race, and that neither term indicates

28 a place of birth, nationality, or native language.

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 4 of 11

1 Jane E.C-J Doe and Jane E.O. Doe are foreign nationals residing in Arizona. (Id. ¶¶ 16-20.)

2 All of these Plaintiffs allege that issues exist with their United States immigration status, but

3 none of these Plaintiffs is subject to a final non-appealable order of removal issued by the

4 United States. (Id.) They allege that, on account of their particular immigration issues,

5 federal law does not require them to register with the Department of Homeland Security

6 (“DHS”). (Id.) As a result, they allege that they do not “possess any documentary evidence

7 issued by DHS establishing [their] right to seek employment or to be employed, or showing

8 that [they are] lawfully present in the United States,” even though they are authorized to be

9 present in the United States. (Id.) These Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent their

10 “unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution under S.B. 1070” and a declaratory judgment that

11 they “may not be prosecuted under S.B. 1070 for seeking employment or engaging in

12 employment in Arizona.” (Id.)

13

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

14 Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (MTD at 1.) Defendants argue that the State of Arizona is

15 immune from prosecution under the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.) Defendants also challenge

16 Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their claims regarding the constitutionality of S.B. 1070. (Id.)

17 Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can

18 be granted. (Id.)

19 II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

20

A. Sovereign Immunity

21

The Eleventh Amendment provides the states with immunity from suit by private

22 parties in federal court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Unless a state has

23 waived its sovereign immunity, it cannot be subject to suit in federal court. P.R. Aqueduct

24 & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (citing Welch v. Tex. Dep’t

25 of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987)). Here, the State of Arizona has

26 not waived its sovereign immunity, and, in their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,

27 Plaintiffs agree. (Opp’n to MTD at 19 n.22.) The Court therefore dismisses all claims

28 against the State of Arizona in this case.

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 5 of 11

1

B. Dismissal for Lack of Standing Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

2

“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court

3 decide the merits of the dispute . . . .” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citation

4 omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing and must “‘allege[] such a

5 personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant [the] invocation of

6 federal-court jurisdiction and . . . justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers.” Id. at 499

7 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). “‘[A] plaintiff must demonstrate

8 standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for each form of relief’ that is sought.” Davis

9 v. F.E.C., 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769 (2008) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.

10 332, 352 (2006)); see also Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

11 Where claims are raised by one plaintiff who has standing, the court need not determine

12 whether other plaintiffs asserting the same claims also have standing. See, e.g., Watt v.

13 Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo

14 Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating

15 standing, courts must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe the

16 complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998)

17 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).

18

Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff does not have standing unless he can

19 show (1) an “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (not

20 conjectural or hypothetical); (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of

21 the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will

22 be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

23 (1992); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). Even when

24 the constitutional minima of standing are present, prudential concerns may impose additional

25 limitations. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). Prudential

26 standing limitations embody “‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal

27 jurisdiction.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Prudential

28 standing limitations include “‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 6 of 11

1 legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately

2 addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall

3 within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at

4 750); see also Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 848-49

5 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983)).

6

An organization has standing “to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to

7 vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.” Warth, 422 U.S.

8 at 511. “An organization may establish a sufficient injury in fact if . . . a challenged statute

9 or policy frustrates the organization’s goals and requires the organization ‘to expend

10 resources in representing clients they otherwise would spend in other ways.’” Redondo

11 Beach, 607 F.3d at 1183 (quoting El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration

12 Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455

13 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Where a statute “perceptibly impair[s]” an organization’s ability to

14 provide the services the organization was formed to provide, “there can be no question that

15 the organization has suffered [an] injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to

16 the organization’s activities–with the consequent drain on the organization’s

17 resources–constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social

18 interests.” Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379. An organization also has “associational

19 standing” to bring suit on behalf of its members “when its members would otherwise have

20 standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s

21 purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of

22 individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

23 (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432

24 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

25

Plaintiffs assert various injuries arising from the future operation and enforcement of

26 S.B. 1070. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-20, 54.) “A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate

27 a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or

28 enforcement.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 7 of 11

1 (citation omitted). However, “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened

2 injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.” Id.

3 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Similarly, “‘it is not necessary that [a plaintiff] first

4 expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [a criminal] statute

5 that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Steffel v.

6 Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)). In order to have standing to challenge a criminal

7 statute prior to the statute’s enforcement, a plaintiff must allege “an intention to engage in

8 a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a

9 statute,” and that a “credible threat” of prosecution exists. Id.; see also San Diego Gun

10 Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1996).

11

C. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge S.B. 1070

12

1. LULAC

13

On behalf of itself, LULAC alleges that the enactment of S.B. 1070 has “reasonably

14 caused Plaintiff LULAC to divert its limited resources to address the injuries faced by

15 Hispanic residents of Arizona as a result of the imminent implementation of S.B. 1070.”

16 (Compl. ¶ 13.) Defendants argue that LULAC fails to identify the “particular resources” that

17 have been diverted on account of S.B. 1070 or “any specific manner in which its mission

18 would be impaired by enforcement of the statute” as required by Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at

19 379. (MTD at 7.) The Court agrees.

20

In Havens Realty, the organizational plaintiff identified a “concrete and demonstrable

21 injury” by alleging that its particular mission “to assist equal access to housing through

22 counseling and other referral services” was frustrated. 455 U.S. at 379. In the instant case,

23 LULAC alleges only what its mission is–“the promotion and protection of the legal, political,

24 social, and cultural interests of Latino People living in the United States”–and not what

25 specific effort is frustrated by S.B. 1070. (See Compl. ¶ 13.) Unlike the plaintiffs in Havens

26 Realty, as well as Redondo Beach and Friendly House, LULAC’s allegations are not

27 sufficiently specific with regard to a connection between LULAC’s alleged mission and the

28 enforcement of S.B. 1070. See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379; Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 8 of 11

1 at 1183; Friendly House, 10-CV-1061-PHX-SRB, Doc. 447, Order at 8-9.

2

Furthermore, LULAC fails to allege that it was forced to divert resources, let alone

3 what specific resources were diverted, on account of the enactment of S.B. 1070. An

4 organization suing on its own behalf establishes injury when it shows it has suffered “‘both

5 a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its mission.’” La Asociacion de Trabajadores

6 de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, Nos. 08-56564, 09-55215, 2010 WL 4146114, at *4

7 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010) (quoting Fair Hous.of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 202 (9th Cir.

8 2002)). The organization must be forced to divert resources to avoid suffering injury

9 resulting from the challenged policy. Id. (noting that, in Havens Realty, “housing

10 discrimination threatened to make it more difficult for [the organizational plaintiff] to counsel

11 people on where they might live if the organization didn’t spend money fighting it,” so the

12 organization “could not avoid suffering one injury or the other”). LULAC alleges only that

13 S.B. 1070 “reasonably caused” it to divert resources to “address the injuries faced by

14 Hispanic residents of Arizona” resulting from S.B. 1070. (Compl. ¶ 13.) This allegation

15 lacks the required specificity and does not rise to the level required in Havens Realty and

16 Lake Forest of an organizational injury resulting from enforcement of S.B. 1070. See

17 Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379; Lake Forest, 2010 WL 4146114, at *4.

18

LULAC also raises claims on behalf of its members. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Associational

19 standing requires, among other things, that the organization’s members “would otherwise

20 have standing to sue in their own right.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. LULAC

21 alleges that its members “are being and will continue to be injured by the imminent or actual

22 implementation of S.B. 1070” because “Hispanic members of LULAC face interrogation,

23 temporary detention, or arrest because of the vague and ill-defined terms in S.B. 1070.”

24 (Compl. ¶ 13.) Such generalized and speculative statements do not demonstrate that

25 LULAC’s individual members would have standing to challenge S.B. 1070. To have

26 standing, LULAC’s members must face a “realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a

27 result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. But LULAC does

28 not allege that its members have an “intention to engage in a course of conduct” that would

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 9 of 11

1 trigger S.B. 1070 much less result in injury from S.B. 1070’s enforcement. See id. For

2 example, for an individual to be injured by the enforcement of the “reasonable suspicion”

3 provision of Subsection 2(B) of S.B. 1070, the following would have to happen in

4 succession: (1) the individual would have to be lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested; and

5 (2) the peace officer would have to develop reasonable suspicion that the individual was both

6 an alien and unlawfully present in the United States. See A.R.S. § 11-1051(B). LULAC

7 does not allege facts to show that such a succession of events is imminent for its individual

8 members, and LULAC’s allegations on behalf of its members do not rise to the level of

9 concrete, particularized, actual, imminent injury as required to find standing. Therefore,

10 based on the allegations in the Complaint, LULAC does not have organizational standing to

11 bring this lawsuit at this time.

12

2. Individual Taxpayer Plaintiffs

13

Individual Plaintiffs Ms. O’Leary and Ms. Beveridge allege that they are “state and

14 local taxpayer[s],” and they “challenge the illegal expenditure of funds by defendants and

15 their agents through implementation of S.B. 1070.” (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) As both Plaintiffs

16 and Defendants agree, with the exception of Establishment Clause cases, federal or state

17 taxpayers have no standing to challenge federal or state tax or spending decisions just

18 because they are taxpayers. (MTD at 4-5; Opp’n to MTD at 2-3 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of

19 Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952) (federal taxes); DaimlerChrysler,

20 547 U.S. at 346 (state taxes)).) In their brief, Plaintiffs explain that they are asserting claims

21 as local taxpayers because they “pay taxes into the county treasury” and “Arizona’s counties

22 must expend taxpayer funds to enforce S.B. 1070.” (Opp’n to MTD at 2-3.) The Supreme

23 Court has stated that “resident taxpayers may sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys of

24 a municipal corporation.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).

25

To begin with, Plaintiffs did not name any local Defendants to challenge the alleged

26 local expenditure of tax funds on the enforcement of S.B. 1070. Instead, Plaintiffs assert

27 their claims against “defendants and their agents.” (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Governor Brewer is

28 the only remaining Defendant, and Arizona’s counties and municipal corporations are not

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 10 of 11

1 agents of Governor Brewer for this purpose. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege no facts to show that

2 their counties have expended any money on S.B. 1070. As Defendants point out, “[t]he mere

3 fact that counties may enforce [S.B. 1070] does not mean that any additional local taxes are

4 expended.” (Reply to MTD at 2 (citing Dist. of Columbia Common Cause v. Dist. of

5 Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“As the teachers in Doremus would be paid their

6 salaries whether or not they read from the Bible, the challenged practice did not injure the

7 taxpayers.”)).) Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient for the Court to confer local

8 taxpayer standing on Ms. O’Leary and Ms. Beveridge.

9

3. Individual Foreign National Plaintiffs

10

Individual Plaintiffs Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Sandoval, Ms. C. H-P. Doe, Ms. E.C-J Doe

11 and Ms. E.O. Doe allege that they are foreign nationals residing in Arizona who are not

12 subject to a final non-appealable order of removal issued by the United States. (Compl. ¶¶

13 16-20.) However, they allege that they do not “possess any documentary evidence issued by

14 DHS establishing [their] right to seek employment or to be employed, or showing that [they

15 are] lawfully present in the United States,” even though they are authorized to be present in

16 the United States. (Id.) These Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent their “unlawful

17 detention, arrest, or prosecution under S.B. 1070” and a declaratory judgment that they “may

18 not be prosecuted under S.B. 1070 for seeking employment or engaging in employment in

19 Arizona.” (Id.)

20

Like the members of LULAC, these Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts showing that the

21 risk of injury to them resulting from S.B. 1070 is particularized or imminent. See Babbitt,

22 442 U.S. at 298; San Diego Gun Rights Comm., 98 F.3d at 1126-27. These Plaintiffs allege

23 no facts regarding their intent to engage in conduct that may trigger S.B. 1070. (See Compl.

24 ¶¶ 16-20.) Moreover, an injury in fact cannot be based on a “chain of speculative

25 contingencies.” Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1388 (1997). With regard to their fear of

26 prosecution for seeking employment, the Complaint contains no allegations as to whether the

27 Plaintiffs have the right to seek employment or intend to seek employment, much less how

28 the enforcement of S.B. 1070 will injure them if they do. (See Compl. ¶¶ 16-20.) Because

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 34 Filed 12/15/10 Page 11 of 11

1 these Plaintiffs’ allegations of injury are merely hypothetical and conjectural and not

2 sufficiently “concrete and particularized . . . [or] . . . actual or imminent,” they are

3 insufficient for standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

4

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action at this

5 time, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim

6 upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

7

IT IS ORDERED granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Janice K.

8 Brewer and the State of Arizona (Doc. 27). Plaintiffs’ claims against the State of Arizona

9 are dismissed with prejudice because the State of Arizona is immune from prosecution in this

10 case. Plaintiffs’ claims against Governor Brewer are dismissed without prejudice for a lack

11 of standing. Plaintiffs are directed to file any amendments to their pleading within 30

12 calendar days of the date of this Order.

13

14

DATED this 15th day of December, 2010.

15

16

17

18

19

20

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 Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 1 of 15

1

2

3

4

5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

7

8 League of United Latin America Citizens;)

Anna Ochoa O’Leary; Cordelia Chavez)

9 Candelaria Beveridge; Magdalena)

Schwartz; Jose David Sandoval; Jane)

10 C.H.P. Doe; Jane E. C.-J. Doe; Jane E.O.)

Doe; John and Jane Does 1-5,

)

11

)

Plaintiffs,

)

12

)

vs.

)

13

)

)

14 State of Arizona; Janice K. Brewer,)

Governor of Arizona; William G.)

15 Montgomery; Joseph M. Arpaio; Barbara)

LaWall; Clarence W. Dupnik; Robert)

16 Halliday; Maricopa County; Pima County,)

)

17

Defendants.

)

)

18

)

No. CV 10-1453-PHX-SRB ORDER

19

20 Pending before the Court is Defendant Janice K. Brewer’s Motion to Dismiss or,
21 Alternatively, Stay Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) (“MTD”). Defendant
22 Brewer’s Motion has been joined by Defendants Montgomery and Arpaio (Docs. 43-44).
23 I. BACKGROUND
24 In April 2010, the Arizona Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1070, later modified by
25 House Bill 2162 (collectively “S.B. 1070”), a set of new statutes and statutory amendments
26 with an effective date of July 29, 2010. Following the enactment of S.B. 1070, seven separate
27 lawsuits were filed challenging its constitutionality. (See Escobar v. Brewer, CV 10-249-
28

Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 2 of 15

1 PHX-SRB; Frisancho v. Brewer, CV 10-926-PHX-SRB; Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy &

2 Christian Leaders v. Arizona, CV 10-943-PHX-SRB; Salgado v. Brewer, CV 10-951-PHX-

3 SRB; Friendly House v. Whiting, CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB (“Friendly House”); United States

4 v. Arizona, CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB (“United States”); and League of United Latin Am.

5 Citizens v. Arizona, CV 10-1453-PHX-SRB.) On July 28, 2010, the Court preliminarily

6 enjoined certain provisions of S.B. 1070 on federal preemption grounds in United States.

7 (CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, Doc. 87, Order at 4.) As of this writing, four lawsuits have been

8 dismissed, leaving three remaining: the present matter, Friendly House, and United States.

9 In this case, in an Order dated December 15, 2010, the Court granted Defendants’ first

10 Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Complaint for lack of standing, but permitted Plaintiffs

11 to amend the Complaint to correct the defects. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint

12 (“FAC”) on January 24, 2011. (Doc. 37.)

13

S.B. 1070 consists of a number of sections that create or amend statutes, and its stated

14 intent is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic

15 activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” S.B. 1070 § 1. Within S.B.

16 1070, Subsection 2(B) requires peace officers to make a reasonable attempt, when

17 practicable, to determine an individual’s immigration status during any lawful stop,

18 detention, or arrest where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully present

19 in the United States, and it provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s

20 immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B).

21 Subsection 2(A) prohibits Arizona officials, agencies and political subdivisions from limiting

22 or restricting the enforcement of federal immigration laws, and Subsection 2(H) permits legal

23 residents of Arizona to bring civil actions challenging “any official or agency of [Arizona]

24 that adopts or implements a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal

25 immigration laws . . . to less than the full extent permitted by federal law.” Id. § 11-1051(A),

26 (H). Section 3 creates a crime for the failure of an alien to apply for or carry registration

27 papers, id. § 13-1509, Section 4 amends the crime for the smuggling of human beings, id. §

28 13-2319, and Section 5 creates crimes for the performance of work by unauthorized aliens

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1 and the transport or harboring of unlawfully present aliens, id. §§ 13-2928, 13-2929. Section

2 6 permits a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause

3 to believe that “the person to be arrested has committed any public offense that makes the

4 person removable from the United States.” Id. § 13-3883(A)(5).

5

The FAC contains the following claims, brought on behalf of named Plaintiffs and a

6 class: (1) violation of the Supremacy Clause; (2) preemption; (3) denial of due process and

7 equal protection and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) violation of the First Amendment; (5)

8 violation of the Fourth Amendment; (6)1 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (FAC ¶¶ 64-81.) The

9 FAC alleges that Plaintiff League of United Latin America Citizens (“LULAC”) is a civil

10 rights organization with the goal of promoting and protecting “the legal and political rights

11 of Latino people living in the United States, including immigrants both documented and

12 undocumented.” (Id. ¶ 13.) According to the FAC, LULAC provides undocumented residents

13 of Arizona with training and information regarding their legal rights, advice about their

14 ability to obtain legal status, and referrals for free or low cost legal assistance in seeking to

15 legalize their immigration status. (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that LULAC provides its

16 members and potential members with a variety of types of assistance including referrals for

17 benefits, home care services, direct legal services, and other forms of advocacy. (Id. ¶¶ 13-

18 14.) The FAC alleges that LULAC has been and will be forced to divert scarce resources

19 from its core programs in order to respond to its members’ concerns about the effects of S.B.

20 1070. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 19.) The FAC further alleges that individual Plaintiffs Anna Ochoa O’Leary

21 and Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge are taxpayers in Maricopa and Pima Counties.

22 (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiffs O’Leary and Beveridge seek to challenge expenditures of municipal

23 funds allegedly spent on “S.B. 1070-related trainings and briefings of its law-enforcement

24 officials, and [on] implementation of S.B. 1070 to the extent implementation has been or will

25 in the future be required.” (Id.)

26 II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

27

28

1 The FAC contains two claims labeled “Fifth Claim for Relief.” (See id. ¶¶ 73-81.)

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1

A. First Amendment Claim: Standing

2

Defendant Brewer argues that LULAC does not have standing to pursue the First

3 Amendment claim in the FAC, nor do individual Plaintiffs O’Leary and Beveridge have

4 standing to challenge S.B. 1070 as taxpayers. (MTD at 4-7.) “Article III of the Constitution

5 limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of [c]ases and [c]ontroversies,

6 and Article III standing . . . enforces the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.”

7 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597-98 (2007) (internal

8 quotations and citations omitted). An analysis of standing requires an examination of

9 “whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims

10 asserted.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). “‘[A] plaintiff must demonstrate

11 standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for each form of relief’ that is sought.” Davis

12 v. F.E.C., 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,

13 352 (2006)); see also Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

14 Where claims are raised by one plaintiff who has standing, the court need not determine

15 whether other plaintiffs asserting the same claims also have standing. See, e.g., Watt v.

16 Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo

17 Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Bates v. UPS,

18 Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one

19 named plaintiff meets the requirements.”).

20

In evaluating standing, courts must accept all material allegations in the complaint as

21 true and construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997,

22 1001 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). The plaintiff has the

23 burden of establishing standing and must “‘allege[] such a personal stake in the outcome of

24 the controversy’ as to warrant [the] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and . . . justify

25 exercise of the court’s remedial powers.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (quoting Baker v. Carr,

26 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

27

In order to have standing pursuant to Article III, a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury

28 in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (not conjectural or

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1 hypothetical); (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;

2 and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by

3 a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also

4 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). Even when the constitutional

5 minima of standing are present, prudential concerns may impose additional limitations. Elk

6 Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). Prudential standing

7 limitations embody “‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction’”

8 and include “‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the

9 rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the

10 representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone

11 of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51); see

12 also Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 848-49 (9th Cir.

13 2007).

14

1. Organizational Standing

15

An organization has standing “to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to

16 vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.” Warth, 422 U.S.

17 at 511. “An organization may establish a sufficient injury in fact if . . . a challenged statute

18 or policy frustrates the organization’s goals and requires the organization ‘to expend

19 resources in representing clients they otherwise would spend in other ways.’” Redondo

20 Beach, 607 F.3d at 1183 (quoting El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration

21 Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455

22 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Where a statute “perceptibly impair[s]” an organization’s ability to

23 provide the services the organization was formed to provide, “there can be no question that

24 the organization has suffered [an] injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to

25 the organization’s activities–with the consequent drain on the organization’s

26 resources–constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social

27 interests.” Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.

28

The FAC alleges that LULAC “provides comprehensive services to undocumented

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1 Latino immigrants residing in Arizona.” (FAC ¶ 14.) LULAC’s services include assistance

2 with benefits, legal assistance with adjustment of status, home services, and numerous other

3 forms of community outreach and advocacy. (Id.) LULAC also provides community

4 education and training on immigrants’ rights issues. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that, on account

5 of S.B. 1070, LULAC will be forced “to divert scarce resources from critical programs in

6 order to educate and assist individuals affected by [the law.]” (Id. ¶ 15.) The FAC further

7 alleges that “LULAC will have a far more difficult time encouraging undocumented

8 immigrants to seek services in its various program areas to the extent that they involve

9 interacting with government agencies and police.” (Id.) Moreover, the FAC alleges that

10 LULAC is concerned that members and potential members will be fearful of attending

11 events, which “will significantly impact the ability of LULAC to protect its existing members

12 and to organize new members.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Finally, the FAC states, “LULAC has already

13 been forced to suspend much of its work relating to the range of services described above .

14 . . in order to respond to inquiries from LULAC members and community members about

15 S[.]B[.] 1070[] and address fear and confusion created by S.B. 1070.” (Id. ¶ 19.)

16

Defendant Brewer states that Plaintiffs here rely on the same type of standing

17 allegations that this Court found insufficient in Friendly House. (MTD at 4.) However,

18 Defendants misstate the Court’s conclusion regarding standing for the First Amendment

19 claims in Friendly House. There, the Court explained that the Friendly House plaintiffs

20 asserted two different theories of standing for First Amendment purposes. (See No. CV 10-

21 1061-PHX-SRB, Doc. 447, Order at 10.) The Court found that the Friendly House plaintiffs

22 had made sufficient allegations to show an injury in fact to an organizational plaintiff whose

23 mission was “perceptibly impaired by a statute criminalizing or chilling the clients’ activity.”

24 (Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).) The Court further found that individual

25 plaintiffs and other organizational plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged an injury for standing

26 purposes, where those plaintiffs asserted that fear of “speak[ing] a foreign language or

27 accented English around law enforcement officers” chilled their exercise of their First

28 Amendment rights. (See id. at 10-11.)

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 7 of 15

1

The FAC does not allege precisely either of the injuries alleged in Friendly House.

2 Instead, Plaintiffs allege that LULAC’s ability to carry out its mission has been and will be

3 impacted by the effect of S.B. 1070. The FAC also alleges that LULAC has been forced to

4 redirect certain resources into public education related to S.B. 1070 that it would otherwise

5 expend differently. These allegations substantiate an injury in fact to LULAC and support

6 organizational standing to sue. An organization suing on its own behalf establishes injury

7 when it shows it has suffered “‘both a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its

8 mission.’” La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, Nos.

9 08-56564, 09-55215, 2010 WL 4146114, at *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010) (quoting Fair Hous.

10 of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 202 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 379;

11 Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d at 1183. Plaintiffs have alleged that LULAC’s resources have been

12 or will be diverted and that its mission has been or will be frustrated. This satisfies the

13 requirement that Plaintiffs demonstrate an injury in fact in order to establish standing.

14 Defendant Brewer does not challenge causation or redressability with regard to standing for

15 the First Amendment claim. The Court finds that the allegations in the FAC support those

16 two elements as well. Therefore, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges that

17 LULAC has organizational standing to challenge Section 2 of S.B. 1070 on First Amendment

18 grounds.

19

2. Taxpayer Standing

20

Plaintiffs O’Leary and Beveridge seek to challenge as taxpayers “the illegal

21 expenditure of funds” by Pima and Maricopa Counties “through implementation of S.B.

22 1070.” (FAC ¶¶ 21-22.) Federal or state taxpayers have no standing to challenge federal or

23 state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of being taxpayers, with the single exception

24 of Establishment Clause challenges. See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 609 (“We have declined to

25 lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging violations of any constitutional provision

26 apart from the Establishment Clause.” (citations omitted)). Plaintiffs O’Leary and Beveridge

27 argue that they have standing because they “pay taxes into the county treasury,” and

28 “Arizona’s counties will expend local taxpayer funds to enforce S.B. 1070.” (Doc. 51, Pls.’

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1 Opp’n to MTD (“Opp’n”) at 3.) The Supreme Court has stated that “resident taxpayers may

2 sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys of a municipal corporation.” Massachusetts v.

3 Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).

4

Plaintiffs’ theory of taxpayer standing is flawed because they seek to challenge a state

5 law and county expenditures based on their status as municipal taxpayers. As Defendants

6 point out, the Arizona Constitution distinguishes between counties and municipal

7 corporations. (See Defs.’ Reply at 2 (citing Ariz. Const. art. XII (governing counties) & art.

8 XIII (governing municipal corporations)).) Simply put, Maricopa and Pima Counties are not

9 municipal corporations, as defined by Arizona law, nor are the counties agents of Governor

10 Brewer or any other Defendant. In addition to the distinctions set out in the Arizona

11 Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that “ordinary municipal

12 corporations” are defined as towns and cities, as distinguished from counties. Associated

13 Dairy Prods. Co. v. Page, 206 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Ariz. 1949). “Arizona’s counties and cities

14 are separate legal entities, whose power is derived from different articles of the Arizona

15 Constitution and from different statutes.” Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of

16 Maricopa, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). Municipal

17 corporations are organized for “special and local purposes independent of the general

18 governmental activities of the state,” while counties are created by the state legislature “for

19 the purpose of exercising a certain portion of the general powers of the [state] government

20 in specified localities.” Associated Dairy Prods., 206 P.2d at 1043 (citation omitted).

21

Furthermore, the remedy Plaintiffs seek–an injunction restraining “[D]efendants, their

22 agents, employees, and successors in office from further implementing [Section 2 of S.B.

23 1070]”–does not correspond with their alleged basis for standing, undermining redressability.

24 (FAC, Prayer ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs would need to tie their request for relief to “a definite

25 expenditure of municipal funds” in order to have standing as municipal taxpayers. Barnes-

26 Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2008). In the FAC, Plaintiffs

27 O’Leary and Beveridge specifically challenge Pima and Maricopa Counties’ alleged

28 expenditure of funds used “in the creation of training materials related to S.B. 1070, through

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 9 of 15

1 S.B. 1070-related trainings and briefings of its law-enforcement officials.” (FAC ¶¶ 21-22.)

2 Therefore, the only relief they would have standing to seek would be an injunction of

3 expenditure of funds for those specific purposes. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1060

4 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that municipal taxpayer plaintiffs would be able to seek “an

5 injunction against spending state tax revenues”). For these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to

6 allege facts plausibly establishing local taxpayer standing for Plaintiffs O’Leary and

7 Beveridge.

8

B. Equal Protection and Section 1981 Claims

9

Governor Brewer moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection and § 1981 claims for

10 failure to state a claim. (MTD at 7-8.) Governor Brewer argues that Plaintiffs do not include

11 sufficient specific factual allegations related to these claims, assuming that the FAC asserts

12 a claim similar to those in Friendly House that alleged that S.B. 1070 was motivated by

13 improper racial animus. (MTD at 7-8.) In response, Plaintiffs assert that they are not

14 proceeding under that theory, but rather are claiming that S.B. 1070 violates the Equal

15 Protection Clause and § 1981 because

16

S.B. 1070 irrationally distinguishes between two classes of immigrants: (1)

[i]mmigrants whose applications for lawful status are pending before the

17

federal government, whose presence in the United States is known to the

federal government, who[m] the federal government is not trying to deport,

18

and who have not been required to nor have they ‘registered’ with the federal

authorities pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a); and (2) immigrants who have been

19

granted lawful status by the federal authorities.

20 (Opp’n at 9.) As such, Plaintiffs argue that they do not need to make any allegations

21 regarding “a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in the enactment of S.B. 1070.” (Id. at

22 10.) In her Reply, Governor Brewer responds that this claim was previously dismissed from

23 the first Complaint for lack of standing, and those standing defects have not been remedied

24 in the FAC. (Doc. 52, Def. Brewer’s Reply in Supp. of MTD (“Reply”) at 5.) In addition,

25 Governor Brewer points out that the FAC eliminated the Plaintiffs from the original

26 Complaint who were present in the United States without documentation and would be

27 injured by this alleged violation. (Id.)

28

Although the standing argument was raised for the first time in the Reply, the Court

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1 must address it before examining the merits of the claims, as it is a question of jurisdiction

2 and can be considered at any time, even on the Court’s own motion. See Chapman v. Pier

3 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[F]ederal courts are required sua

4 sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.’” (quoting Bernhardt v. County of

5 L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002))). The requirement of Article III standing cannot be

6 waived, and “[i]t must be demonstrated at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. (internal

7 quotation and citations omitted). If a court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter

8 jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

9

The only individual Plaintiffs in this action are the taxpayer Plaintiffs, O’Leary and

10 Beveridge. (See FAC ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiffs O’Leary and Beveridge are both identified as

11 “lawfully residing in the State of Arizona.” (Id.) Neither of these Plaintiffs is in the group

12 Plaintiffs allege is injured in the manner outlined above by S.B. 1070 because they have legal

13 status in this country. However, the FAC alleges that LULAC’s members include

14 “immigrants both documented and undocumented” and that LULAC provides guidance and

15 assistance to its members in obtaining legal status in this country, including “free or low cost

16 legal services.” (FAC ¶¶ 13-14.) An organization has “associational standing” to bring suit

17 on behalf of its members “when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

18 own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the

19 claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the

20 lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181

21 (2000) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

22

Here, since LULAC advocates on behalf of its members with and without legal status,

23 some of those members fall into the groups Plaintiffs have identified as being irrationally

24 discriminated between by S.B. 1070 and would have standing to sue in their own right. (See

25 Opp’n at 7; FAC ¶ 70(d).) The interests at stake are germane to LULAC’s purpose, which

26 is to advocate on behalf of “Latino people living in the United States.” (FAC ¶ 13.) Finally,

27 the participation of individual members is not necessary in this case either to prove the claims

28 asserted or to fashion the relief requested because Plaintiffs’ equal protection and § 1981

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1 claims raise purely legal, facial challenges to S.B. 1070. Plaintiffs have also sufficiently

2 alleged that the injury allegedly suffered by some of LULAC’s members is fairly traceable

3 to the conduct of Defendants and that the relief they request is likely to redress the injury. See

4 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; (see also FAC ¶¶ 13-22, Prayer.) The Court finds that LULAC

5 has associational standing to bring the equal protection and § 1981 claims contained within

6 the FAC.

7

Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ equal protection and § 1981 claims, the Federal

8 Rules of Civil Procedure require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

9 the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .

10 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

11 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

12 Thus, dismissal for insufficiency of a complaint is proper if the complaint fails to state a

13 claim on its face. Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1980). “While a

14 complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a

15 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more

16 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

17 will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

18

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the

19 lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim.

20 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Dean

21 Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In determining whether an asserted

22 claim can be sustained, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the

23 light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

24 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy

25 judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that ‘recovery is very remote and

26 unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

27 However, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual

28 content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

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1 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009)). In other words, the complaint must

3 contain enough factual content “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

4 evidence” of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

5

Governor Brewer argues, with respect to Plaintiffs’ theory that S.B. 1070 irrationally

6 discriminates between groups of similarly situated individuals, that the groups Plaintiffs

7 describe (namely, people who are awaiting determination of applications to adjust their legal

8 status and people who have legal status in the United States) are not similarly situated.

9 (Reply at 6.) Governor Brewer contends that “Sections 1-6 of S.B.1070 distinguish between

10 aliens who have complied with federal law or otherwise obtained authorization from the

11 federal government to remain in the United States and those who have not.” (Id.) Governor

12 Brewer asserts that S.B. 1070 does not require people to obtain any documentation of their

13 immigration status that they are not otherwise required to obtain under federal law. (Id.

14 (citing Section 3 of S.B. 1070).)

15

The Supreme Court has defined the Equal Protection Clause as meaning “that no State

16 shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is

17 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

18 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal quotation and

19 citation omitted). Generally, courts apply rational basis review to distinctions drawn by

20 statutes such as S.B. 1070. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 213, 318-19 (1993).

21 Classifications that do not involve fundamental rights or “proceed[] along suspect lines” are

22 “accorded a strong presumption of validity.” Id. at 319 (citations omitted). So long as there

23 is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a legitimate governmental

24 purpose, such a classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 320

25 (citations omitted).

26

A plaintiff alleging a differential treatment theory under the Equal Protection Clause

27 must first identify the allegedly improper government classification, which Plaintiffs here

28 have done. (See FAC ¶¶ 47, 54, 58, 70(d); Opp’n at 9); see also Freeman v. City of Santa

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 13 of 15

1 Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). Next, the plaintiff must point to a “similarly

2 situated” class against which the plaintiff’s group can be compared. Freeman, 68 F.3d at

3 1187 (citations omitted). Here, the “control group”–immigrants who have legal status in the

4 United States–is not similarly situated to the group allegedly disadvantaged by S.B.

5 1070–immigrants who are eligible and have applied for legal status but have not yet received

6 a determination from the federal government on their status. The issue of whether a person

7 has documentation of his or her legal status in the United States is central to Plaintiffs’ claims

8 regarding Section 3 of S.B. 1070, and people who have already had their legal status

9 adjudicated in one way or another simply are not similarly situated to people who are

10 awaiting that determination. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim plausibly

11 entitling them to relief on this theory because the groups they have identified are not

12 similarly situated. However, this dismissal is made without prejudice because Plaintiffs could

13 amend the FAC to redefine the groups and plausibly state a claim along these lines.

14

C. Unnamed Plaintiffs

15

Governor Brewer moves to dismiss Plaintiffs John Does 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5

16 because “the FAC contains no allegations regarding these unidentified parties.” (MTD at 3.)

17 Upon review, the Court concludes that, as there are no allegations mentioning any unnamed

18 Plaintiff, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim plausibly entitling them to relief for any John

19 or Jane Doe Plaintiff. See Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952). The

20 unnamed Plaintiffs in the FAC are dismissed without prejudice.

21

D. Duplication of Claims from Other Lawsuits

22

Governor Brewer argues that because “the remaining claims [P]laintiffs assert in the

23 FAC duplicate claims asserted in Friendly House and United States,” the Court should

24 dismiss or stay the remaining claims until the other cases are resolved. (MTD at 8-10.)

25 District courts are permitted to “decline jurisdiction over an action where a complaint

26 involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another district.” Barapind

27 v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). No precise rules govern this

28 exercise of discretion, but “the general principle is avoid duplicative litigation and to promote

- 13 -

Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 14 of 15

1 judicial efficiency.” Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). The Court declines to

2 exercise its discretion to dismiss or stay the instant matter because of the pendency of

3 Friendly House and United States. For one thing, those two cases are also pending in this

4 district and, in fact, before this judge. For another, the parties and issues raised in the three

5 lawsuits may overlap to some degree, but there are distinctions among them. It is common

6 for multiple lawsuits related to the same general issue and involving some of the same parties

7 to proceed in tandem. This portion of Defendant Brewer’s Motion is denied.

8 III. CONCLUSION

9

The Court grants in part and denies in part the portion of Governor Brewer’s Motion

10 seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. The Court finds that LULAC has

11 organizational standing to challenge S.B. 1070 on First Amendment grounds, but that the

12 individual Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their taxpayer claims. The Court concludes that

13 LULAC has associational standing to bring an equal protection or § 1981 claim related to

14 differential treatment of different groups of immigrants, but finds that Plaintiffs’ claims under

15 the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981 fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

16 The Court dismisses the unnamed Plaintiffs because the FAC contains no allegations

17 referencing these Plaintiffs. Finally, the Court declines to dismiss or stay any remaining

18 claim in this case on the grounds that it is similar to or duplicative of claims in Friendly

19 House or United States.

20

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend a

21 pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” These dismissals are made without

22 prejudice, and if Plaintiffs choose, they may file one further amended Complaint. Any further

23 amended Complaint must be in compliance with the legal standards outlined above and

24 address the defects identified in this Order.

25

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant

26 Janice K. Brewer’s Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Plaintiffs’ First Amended

27 Complaint (Doc. 40).

28

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Case 2:10-cv-01453-SRB Document 56 Filed 08/26/11 Page 15 of 15

1

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiffs 30 days, including the date of entry

2 of this Order, to file any further amended Complaint.

3

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DATED this 26th day of August, 2011.

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 Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 1 of 13
U.S. District Court DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (Phoenix Division) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10−cv−01453−SRB

CLOSED,STD

League of United Latin American Citizens, et al v. Arizona, State of, et al Assigned to: Senior Judge Susan R Bolton Related Cases: 2:10−cv−00926−SRB
4:10−cv−00249−SRB
2:10−cv−00943−SRB
2:10−cv−00951−SRB
2:10−cv−01061−SRB
2:10−cv−01413−SRB Cause: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/09/2010 Date Terminated: 09/30/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Other Statutes: Constitutionality of State Statutes Jurisdiction: Federal Question

League of United Latin America Citizens

represented by Luis Roberto Vera , Jr. League of United Latin American Citizens 1325 Riverview Towers 111 Soledad, Ste. 1325 San Antonio, TX 78205−2260 210−225−3300 Fax: 210−225−2060 Email: lrvlaw@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Anthony Schey Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057 213−388−8693 Fax: 213−386−9484 Email: pschey@centerforhumanrights.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ray Velarde Law Office Of Ray Velarde 1216 Montana Ave El Paso, TX 79902 915−532−6003 Fax: 915−542−2341 Email: velardelaw2005@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T Anthony Guajardo Law Offices of T Anthony Guajardo/Owen & Associates 1001 N Central Ave Ste 600 Phoenix, AZ 85004−1947 602−254−0901 Fax: 602−264−3399 Email: tag1444@tonyguajardo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Holguin Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 2 of 13

213−388−8693 Fax: 213−386−9484 Email: crholguin@centerforhumanrights.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anna Ochoa O'Leary

represented by Luis Roberto Vera , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge

represented by Luis Roberto Vera , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Magdalena Schwartz TERMINATED: 01/24/2011

represented by Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 3 of 13

Plaintiff Jose David Sandoval TERMINATED: 01/24/2011
Plaintiff Jane Doe named as Jane C.H.P. Doe TERMINATED: 01/24/2011
Plaintiff Jane Doe named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe TERMINATED: 01/24/2011
Plaintiff Jane Doe named as Jane E.O. Doe TERMINATED: 01/24/2011

represented by Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 4 of 13

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Unknown Parties named as John and Jane Does 1−5

represented by Carlos Holguin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Luis Roberto Vera , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter Anthony Schey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ray Velarde (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T Anthony Guajardo (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Arizona, State of TERMINATED: 12/15/2010

represented by John J Bouma Snell & Wilmer LLP 1 Arizona Center 400 E Van Buren Phoenix, AZ 85004−0001 602−382−6000 Fax: 602−382−6070 Email: jbouma@swlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph G Adams Snell & Wilmer LLP 1 Arizona Center 400 E Van Buren Phoenix, AZ 85004−2202 602−382−6207 Fax: 602−382−6070 Email: jgadams@swlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Andrew Kanefield Office of Governor Janice K Brewer 1700 W Washington St., 9th Fl. Phoenix, AZ 85007 602−542−1586 Fax: 602−542−7602 Email: jkanefield@az.gov TERMINATED: 12/24/2014
Robert Arthur Henry Snell & Wilmer LLP − Phoenix, AZ 1 Arizona Center 400 E Van Buren

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 5 of 13

Phoenix, AZ 85004−2202 602−382−6259 Fax: 602−382−6070 Email: bhenry@swlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Janice K Brewer Governor of Arizona TERMINATED: 09/30/2015

represented by Kelly Ann Kszywienski Snell & Wilmer LLP − Phoenix, AZ 1 Arizona Center 400 E Van Buren Phoenix, AZ 85004−2202 602−382−6384 Email: kkszywienski@swlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John J Bouma (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph G Adams (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Andrew Kanefield (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/25/2011

Joseph Sciarrotta , Jr. Office of the Governor 1700 W Washignton St., 9th Fl. Phoenix, AZ 85007 602−542−1586 Email: jsciarrotta@az.gov TERMINATED: 12/22/2014

Robert Arthur Henry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William G Montgomery

represented by Anne Cecile Longo Maricopa County Attorneys Office − Phoenix (Central Ave.) 222 N Central Ave., Ste 1100 Phoenix, AZ 85004−2206 602−506−5269 Fax: 602−506−6083 Email: longoa@mcao.maricopa.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas P Liddy Maricopa County Attorneys Office − Civil Services Division 222 N Central Ave., Ste. 1100 Phoenix, AZ 85004 602−506−8541 Fax: 602−506−8567 Email: liddyt@mcao.maricopa.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 6 of 13

Bruce P White Maricopa County Attorney's Office Division of County Counsel 222 N Central Ave Ste 1100 Phoenix, AZ 85004 602−506−6173 Fax: 602−506−8567 Email: whiteb@mcao.maricopa.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Joseph M Arpaio

represented by Anne Cecile Longo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce P White (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas P Liddy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Barbara Lawall

represented by Daniel S Jurkowitz Pima County Attorneys Office 32 N Stone Ave., Ste. 2100 Tucson, AZ 85701 520−740−5750 Fax: 520−740−5600 Email: Daniel.Jurkowitz@pcao.pima.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Clarence W Dupnik

represented by Daniel S Jurkowitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Halliday TERMINATED: 02/01/2012

Defendant
Maricopa, County of TERMINATED: 02/01/2012

Defendant
Pima, County of TERMINATED: 02/01/2012

Date Filed 07/09/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT. Filing fee received: $ 350.00, receipt number 0970−4106921, filed by Jane C.H.P. Doe, Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Magdalena E Schwartz, Jose David Sandoval. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 7 of 13

07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/09/2010
07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/09/2010 07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/13/2010 07/13/2010

2 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
3 Notice re Motion to Transfer by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz (Attachments: # 1 Copy of Motion to Transfer, # 2 Copy of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
4 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Preliminary Injunction by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
5 LODGED Proposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction re: 4 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Preliminary Injunction. Document to be filed by Clerk if Motion to Leave to File or Amend is granted. Filed by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
6 MOTION to Expedite Briefing Schedule for Preliminary Injunction by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
7 MOTION for Leave to Proceed under Pseudonyms by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration in Support, # 2 Time Schedule Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
8 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice as to attorney Peter A. Schey by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane C.H.P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, Jane E.O. Doe, League of United Latin American Citizens Arizona, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/09/2010)
9 This case has been assigned to the Honorable Neil V. Wake. All future pleadings or documents should bear the correct case number: CV 10−1453−PHX−NVW. This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no PDF document associated with this entry. (BAS) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
10 Notice of availability of Magistrate Judge (BAS) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
11 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice as to attorney Carlos R. Holguin by Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
12 Supplemental MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice as to attorney Peter A. Schey by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
PRO HAC VICE FEE PAID. $ 100, receipt number PHX098875 as to Peter Anthony Schey, Carlos Holguin. (BAS) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
13 ORDER pursuant to General Order 05−25 terminating 8 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice; granting 11 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice; granting 12 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice.Per the Court's Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, applicant has five (5) days in which to register as a user of the Electronic

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 8 of 13

07/13/2010 07/13/2010 07/13/2010 07/19/2010
07/19/2010 07/19/2010 07/19/2010 07/19/2010 08/11/2010
08/25/2010 08/26/2010
09/03/2010 09/03/2010

Filing System. Registration to be accomplished via the court's website at www.azd.uscourts.gov. (BAS)(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
14 SUMMONS Submitted by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
15 SUMMONS Submitted by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena E Schwartz (Attachments: # 1 Summons to Governor)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
16 Summons Issued as to Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Janice Brewer)(BAS). *** IMPORTANT: When printing the summons, select "Document and stamps" or "Document and comments" for the seal to appear on the document. (Entered: 07/13/2010)
17 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Magdalena Schwartz, Jose David Sandoval. Arizona, State of waiver sent on 7/13/2010; Janice K Brewer waiver sent on 7/13/2010. (Attachments: # 1 Executed Waiver as to Janice K. Brewer)(Holguin, Carlos) Modified on 7/20/2010 to correct the date waiver was sent.(ESL). (Entered: 07/19/2010)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert Arthur Henry on behalf of Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer (Henry, Robert) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by John J Bouma on behalf of Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer (Bouma, John) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph Andrew Kanefield on behalf of Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer (Kanefield, Joseph) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph G Adams on behalf of Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer (Adams, Joseph) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
22 ORDER granting Plas' Motion to Transfer (Doc 3 in CV10−1453. Doc. 46 in CV10−0926); that all further pleadings should now list the following complete case number: CV10−1453−PHX−SRB; that counsel shall submit courtesy copies of all pending motions to this Court with 5 days of the date of this order; that counsel shall also e−mail all motions and orders in compliance with the Administrative Policies and Procedure Manual for Electronic Filing. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 08/11/10. (ESL) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
Remark as to attorney Luis Vera Jr − removed for noncompliance with admission procedures; party or parties represented by other admitted counsel. This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no PDF document associated with this entry. (BAS) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
23 NOTICE re Non−Opposition by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz re 7 MOTION for Leave to Proceed under Pseudonyms. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
24 ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 6 Motion For Issuance of an Expedited Briefing Schedule Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction as moot. Plaintiff's motion requested expedited briefing and oral argument by July 23, 2010. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 09/03/10.(ESL) (Entered: 09/03/2010)
25 ORDER that Plaintiffs' 7 motion for leave is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Jane C. H−P. Doe, Jane E. C−J. Doe, and Jane E.O. Doe may proceed under pseudonyms. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 09/03/10.(ESL) (Entered: 09/03/2010)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 9 of 13

09/07/2010 09/13/2010 09/24/2010
09/27/2010 10/11/2010 10/14/2010 10/18/2010 11/12/2010 12/15/2010
01/18/2011
01/24/2011 01/24/2011
02/03/2011

26 ORDER denying Plaintiff's 4 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; Plaintiffs' proposed motion may have become moot, in whole or in part; in any event Plaintiffs should be able to present their arguments within 17 pages. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 9/7/10.(REW) (Entered: 09/07/2010)
27 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Bouma, John) Modified on 9/15/2010 (ESL). (Entered: 09/13/2010)
28 STIPULATION re 27 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; Extension of Time to File Response by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
29 ORDER pursuant to the 28 Stipulation between the parties, any response filed by the Plaintiffs to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) shall be filed on or before 10/11/10. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 09/27/10. (ESL) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
30 RESPONSE to Motion re 27 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 10/11/2010)
31 STIPULATION by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
32 ORDER pursuant to the 31 Stipulation between the parties, the reply brief in support of defendants' 27 Motion to Dismiss shall be filed by 11/12/10. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 10/18/10. (ESL) (Entered: 10/18/2010)
33 Reply re 30 Response to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, by Defendants Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Bouma, John) (Entered: 11/12/2010)
34 ORDER granting the 27 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Janice K. Brewer and the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs' claims against the State of Arizona are dismissed with prejudice because the State of Arizona is immune from prosecution in this case. Plaintiffs' claims against Governor Brewer are dismissed without prejudice for a lack of standing. Plaintiffs are directed to file any amendments to their pleading within 30 calendar days of the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 12/15/10. (ESL) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
35 MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) Modified on 1/19/2011 (JEMB**CORRECTION−Incorrect event selected; modified to non−exparte**). (Entered: 01/18/2011)
36 ORDER granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed 35 Motion (application) for Extension of Time to File a First Amended Complaint; Plaintiffs shall file any amendments to their pleading on or before 01/24/11. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 01/24/11.(ESL) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
37 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Janice K Brewer, William G Montgomery, Joseph Arpaio, Barbara Lawall, Clarence W Dupnik, Robert Halliday, filed by Jane Doe(named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jane Doe(named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens.(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 01/24/2011)
38 STIPULATION to Extend Time to File a Response to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 02/03/2011)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 10 of 13

02/07/2011
02/25/2011 02/25/2011 03/07/2011 03/10/2011 03/10/2011 03/11/2011
03/14/2011 03/14/2011
03/16/2011
03/18/2011 03/18/2011 03/25/2011
04/04/2011 04/06/2011
05/10/2011 05/25/2011

39 ORDER pursuant to the 38 Stipulation between the parties, it is ordered that the response of defendant Janice K Brewer, Governor of Arizona, to plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint shall be filed by 2/25/2011. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 02/07/11. (ESL) (Entered: 02/07/2011)
40 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bouma, John) Modified on 2/28/2011 (ESL). (Entered: 02/25/2011)
41 REQUEST for Judicial Notice re 40 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Bouma, John) Modified on 2/28/2011 from (motion) to (request). (ESL). (Entered: 02/25/2011)
42 MOTION to Dismiss Party Joseph Arpaio by Joseph M Arpaio. (Liddy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
43 *JOINDER re 40 MOTION to Dismiss Case by William G Montgomery. (White, Bruce)*Entry modified to correct event on 3/10/2011 (ESL). (Entered: 03/10/2011)
44 MOTION to Withdraw , Amended Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Joinder in Defendant Brewer's Motion to Dismiss by Joseph M Arpaio. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Liddy, Thomas) (Entered: 03/10/2011)
45 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to Motion to Dismiss by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz, Unknown Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 03/11/2011)
46 ORDER granting Defendant Sheriff Arpaio's 44 Motion to Withdraw, and Motion for Joinder in Defendant Brewer's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 03/14/11. (ESL) (Entered: 03/14/2011)
47 ORDER that the 45 Stipulation will be denied within 3 days of the date of this order if counsel does not comply with the ECF Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, Section II(G), specifically, subparagraph 1b. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 3/14/11. (ESL) (Entered: 03/14/2011)
48 ORDER Pursuant to the 45 stipulation between the parties: Any response filed by plaintiffs to defendant Janice K. Brewer's 40 Motion to Dismiss shall be filed on or before 03/25/11. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 03/16/11. (ESL) (Entered: 03/16/2011)
49 ANSWER to 37 Amended Complaint, by Barbara Lawall.(Jurkowitz, Daniel) (Entered: 03/18/2011)
50 ANSWER to 37 Amended Complaint, by Clarence W Dupnik.(Jurkowitz, Daniel) (Entered: 03/18/2011)
51 RESPONSE to Motion re 40 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane E. C.−J. Doe), Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane C.H.P. Doe), Jane Doe(Named as Jane Doe − named as Jane E.O. Doe), League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Jose David Sandoval, Magdalena Schwartz, Unknown Parties. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
52 REPLY to Response to Motion re 40 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Janice K Brewer. (Kszywienski, Kelly) (Entered: 04/04/2011)
53 *JOINDER in Defendant Brewer's 52 Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Stay Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint by Joseph M Arpaio. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Liddy, Thomas) *Entry modified to include document number. Modified on 4/6/2011 (ESL). (Entered: 04/06/2011)
54 NOTICE of Change of Address by Thomas P Liddy (Liddy, Thomas) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
55 NOTICE of Attorney Substitution by John J Bouma (Bouma, John) (Entered: 05/25/2011)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 11 of 13

08/26/2011
09/27/2011
11/11/2011 11/14/2011 11/21/2011 11/22/2011
11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/29/2011 11/30/2011 12/07/2011 01/17/2012 01/23/2012
01/25/2012 01/25/2012

56 ORDER, granting in part and denying in part Defendant Janice K Brewer's 40 Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, Stay Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint; granting Plaintiffs 30 days, including the date of entry of this Order, to file any further Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 8/26/11.(REW) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
57 ORDER SETTING RULE 16 SCHEDULING ORDER Pursuant to Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a Pretrial Scheduling Conference is set for November 28, 2011 at 1:30 p.m., Courtroom #502, Fifth Floor, Federal Building, 401 W. Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 09/27/11. (see attached pdf for complete details) (ESL) (Entered: 09/27/2011)
58 ANSWER to 37 Amended Complaint, for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief by Janice K Brewer.(Bouma, John) (Entered: 11/11/2011)
59 ANSWER to 37 Amended Complaint, by Joseph M Arpaio, William G Montgomery.(White, Bruce) (Entered: 11/14/2011)
60 *REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Janice K Brewer, William G. Montgomery, Joseph M Arpaio. (Bouma, John) Modified on 11/22/2011 to add additional filers. (ESL). (Entered: 11/21/2011)
61 ORDER: Plaintiff having failed to file a Joint Proposed Case Management Plan; IT IS ORDERED vacating the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference set on November 28, 2011. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Plaintiffs show cause in writing within 7 days of the date of this Order why this case should not be dismissed for Plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's September 27, 2011 Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case will be dismissed without further notice within 7 days of the date of this Order if counsel fails to show cause in writing [see Order for full details]. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 11/22/11. (MAW) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
62 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by League of United Latin America Citizens. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration re: response to OSC, # 2 Exhibit Draft Joint Rule 26 Report)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
63 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by League of United Latin America Citizens. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
64 Reply re 62 Response to Order to Show Cause by Defendant Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 11/29/2011)
65 SUPPLEMENT of to response to Order to Show Cause re 64 Reply, 62 Response to Order to Show Cause, 61 Order, Set Deadlines, Terminate Hearings,,,,,, by Plaintiff League of United Latin America Citizens. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
66 ORDER resetting the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference for Monday, January 23, 2012 at 3:30 p.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joint Proposed Case Management Plan is due seven (7) days prior to the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 12/07/11. (ESL) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
67 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Unknown Parties. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 01/17/2012)
68 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Susan R Bolton: Scheduling Conference held on 1/23/2012. ORDER directing Plaintiffs' counsel to submit a proposed order by 5:00 p.m. 01/25/12, dismissing all non−served and non−appearing Defendants. Discovery due by 4/27/2012. Dispositive motions due by 6/22/2012. Counsel are directed to file a motion to consolidate. (Court Reporter Liz Lemke.)(ESL) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
69 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer for proceedings held on 1/23/2012 before Judge Susan Bolton.. (Kszywienski, Kelly) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
70 MOTION to Dismiss Party Robert Halliday, Maricopa County and Pima County by Cordelia Chavez Candelaria Beveridge, League of United Latin America Citizens, Anna Ochoa O'Leary, Unknown Parties. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 01/25/2012)

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 12 of 13

02/01/2012
02/06/2012 02/08/2012
02/09/2012 02/13/2012 02/15/2012 02/16/2012 03/02/2012 03/08/2012 03/19/2012
03/22/2012 03/29/2012 04/03/2012 04/06/2012 04/11/2012 05/02/2012 05/10/2012 05/31/2012

71 ORDER Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2), plaintiffs have requested that this court dismiss unserved defendants Robert Halliday, Maricopa County, and Pima County, with prejudice. For good cause shown, it is SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 02/01/12.(ESL) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
72 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST of Plaintiff Friendly House, et al., by Unknown Parties for proceedings held on 01/23/2012 before Judge Susan Bolton.. (Joaquin, Linton) (Entered: 02/06/2012)
73 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Scheduling Conference Proceedings held on 1/23/2012, before Judge Susan R. Bolton. Court Reporter Elizabeth A. Lemke. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 2/29/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/8/2012. (VAR) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
74 MOTION to Consolidate Cases by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
75 NOTICE re Service of Discovery by Janice K Brewer . (Bouma, John) (Entered: 02/13/2012)
76 RESPONSE to Motion re 74 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by League of United Latin America Citizens. (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
77 NOTICE re Service of Discovery by League of United Latin America Citizens . (Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
78 MOTION to Dismiss Case for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 03/02/2012)
79 REPLY to Response to Motion re 74 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Bouma, John) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
80 *RESPONSE to Motion re 78 MOTION to Dismiss Case Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by League of United Latin America Citizens. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 Opp to Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Ex. 2 Opp to Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Ex. 3 Opp to Motion to Dismiss)(Holguin, Carlos) *Modified to correct event type on 3/20/2012 (ESL). (Entered: 03/19/2012)
81 Joinder in Governor Janice K. Brewer's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order by Defendants Joseph M Arpaio, William G Montgomery. (White, Bruce) (Entered: 03/22/2012)
82 REPLY to Response to Motion re 78 MOTION to Dismiss Case for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order filed by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
83 NOTICE re Notice of Service by Janice K Brewer . (Kszywienski, Kelly) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
84 NOTICE re Filing of Additional Exhibits by League of United Latin America Citizens . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 4, # 2 Exhibit 5−1, # 3 Exhibit 5−2, # 4 Exhibit 6, # 5 Exhibit 7)(Holguin, Carlos) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
85 NOTICE re Service of Amended Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition of LULAC by Janice K Brewer . (Kszywienski, Kelly) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
86 NOTICE re Service of Continued 30(b)(6) Deposition by Janice K Brewer . (Bouma, John) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
87 NOTICE re of Service of Second Amended 30(b)(6) Deposition by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer . (Henry, Robert) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
88 ORDER granting in part Defendant Governor Janice K. Brewer's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order (Doc. 78 ). The Court grants Defendant Brewer's alternative request to stay this case until the Court issues final rulings in Friendly House v. Whiting, Case No. CV 10−1061− PHX−SRB, and United States v.

Case: 2:10-cv-1453 As of: 03/16/2018 11:12 AM MST 13 of 13

12/22/2014 12/22/2014
12/23/2014 12/24/2014
09/04/2015
09/16/2015 09/30/2015 09/30/2015

Arizona, Case No. CV 10−1413−PHX−SRB. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendant Janice K. Brewer's Motion to Consolidate Actions (Doc. 74 ). Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 5/31/2012.(KMG) (Entered: 05/31/2012)
89 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
90 ORDER granting 89 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney − that attorney Joseph Sciarrotta, Jr. shall be withdrawn as counsel for Defendant Janice K. Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona in this action. Mr. Sciarrotta's name shall be removed from the Court's docket as counsel for Defendant Janice K. Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 12/22/2014.(KMG) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
91 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Bouma, John) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
92 ORDER re 91 that attorney Joseph Kanefield shall be withdrawn as counsel for Defendant Janice K. Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona in this action. Mr. Kanefield's name shall be removed from the Court's docket as counsel for Defendant Janice K. Brewer, Governor of the State of Arizona. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 12/24/2014.(KMG) (Entered: 12/24/2014)
93 ORDER: Final ruling having been issued in both CV−10−1061−PHX−SRB and CV−10−1413−PHX−SRB (See Doc. 88 in CV−10−1453−PHX−SRB, p. 10); IT IS ORDERED lifting the stay entered on May 31, 2012 88 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties confer and file Joint Report not later than September 30, 2015 advising the Court how they wish to proceed. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 9/4/15. (MAW) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
94 NOTICE re: Appearance by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer . (Tryon, G) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
95 STIPULATION of Dismissal with Prejudice by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Tryon, G) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
96 ORDER pursuant to 95 Stipulation with Prejudice between the Plaintiff, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, and Defendants State of Arizona and Doug Ducey, Governor of Arizona, and no other Plaintiff filing a report with this Court as Ordered, and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter be Dismissed with Prejudice; each party to bear their own fees and costs. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 9/30/15. (LAD) (Entered: 09/30/2015)