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2 CALIFORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

3460 Wilshire Blvd"A Suite 1102

.

3

Los Angeles CA 9u010 Telephone: (213) 637-9900

4 Facsimile: (213) 637-9909

5

Patricia Shiu SBN 104894 Claudia Center SBN 158255

6

Elizabeth Kristen SBN 218227 THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY-

7

EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER 600 Harrison Street?.Suite 120

San Francisco CA ,4107

8 Telephone: (4i5) 864-8848

Facsimile: (415) B64-8199 .

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UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11
12 13

I U\ CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LAUREN.M' CRUZ, by her next friend Case Nfti. CV04"' 14 60
Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by

~
(M X

14 her next friend Carolina Herrera;

15 JENNIFERN. CERROS; CAitIERTh'E

GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

16 Grempel, individually and on behalf of FOR INJUNCTIVE AND

17 all those similarly situated,

DECLARATORY RELIEF

18
19 vs.

Plaintiffs,

20 ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT;
21 THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEE-SUNG, VICTOR
22 SANDOVAL, LOU TORRES, .
23 WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS, JOHN H. NUNEZ, ROBERT L. GIN, RUTII E.
24 CASTRO, and BARBARA A.
25 MESSINA, in their official capacities,

26

Defendants.

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I

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2

1. Plaintiffs bring this suit under Title IX of the Education

3 Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. and its interpreting regulations,

4 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

5 Constitution as enforced through 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, the California Constitution,

6 Article 1, § 7, California Education Code § 230 et seq., and California

7 Government Code § 11135. Ibis Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal

8 law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (a)(3) and 1343(a)(4). Ibis

·9 Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims pursuant to

10 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiffs' state law claims are related, as all of Plaintiffs'

11 claims share common operative facts. Resolving all state and federal claims in

12 a single action serves the interests ofjudicial economy, convenience and

13 fairness to the parties.

14

2. Declaratory and other re1iefis authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

IS 2201 and 28 U.S.C. § 2202 for the purpose of determining a question offactual

16 controversy that exists between the parties. A declaration of the correct

17 interpretation of the legal requirements described in this complaint is necessary

18 and appropriate to determine the respective rights and duties of the parties to

19 this action.

20

3. Venue is proper in the Central District of California pursuant to 28

21 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred

22 in this District. All Plaintiffs reside in this District, as do the Defendants

23 Alhambra School District and the City of Alhambra. Plaintiffs are informed

24 and believe and based thereon allege that the individual Defendants reside in

25 this District. In any event, all the individual Defendants engaged in the illegal

26 acts described herein in the Central District.

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1

INTRODUCTION

2

4. Plaintiffs bring this action to remedy the unlawful sex

3 discrimination of Alhambra School District("the District"), City of Alhambra

4 ("the City"), District employees Russell Lee-Sung, Victor Sandoval, and Lou

5 Torres (the "individual District Defendants"), and Alhambra School Board

6 members William A. Vallejos, John H. Nunez, Robert L. Gin, Ruth E. Castro,

7 and Barbara A. Messina, (the "individual School Board Defendants") against

8 female student athletes at Alhambra High School ("AHS"). Defendants'

9 unlawful sex discrimination violates female students' rights under Title IX of

10 the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), the United States and the

11 California Constitutions, and state anti-discrimination laws.

12

5. Defendants have unlawfully failed to provide female student

13 athletes equal treatment and benefits as compared to male athletes in a myriad

14 of ways, including but not limited to:

15

(a) Assigning female student athletes to inferior, substandard, poorly

16 maintained, and dangerous playing facilities while assigning male student

17 athletes to the best facilities which are superior, well maintained and safe;

18

(b) Hiring less experienced and walk-on coaches for female student

19 athletes;

20

(c) Assigning female student athletes to an inferior and dilapidated

21 locker room with broken showers and restrooms while providing male student

22 athletes three locker rooms, thus giving them access to additional locker space,

23 working showers and restrooms, and lockers that are larger and more

24 appropriate for athletes;

25

(d) Securing the most popular "prime time" slots for male student

26 athletes' practice and competition times while relegating the female student

27

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1 athletes to the earlier, less desirable times;

2

(e) Excluding female student athletes entirely from two of AHS's

3 weight roOIIlB, and effectively excluding female student athletes from the use of

4 a third weight room;

5

(f) Consistently providing less publicity and support for female

6 athletic teams than for male athletic teams, including not providing

7 cheerleaders, pep band, public address system, scoreboards, and Videotaping;

8 and

9

(g) Failing to ensure appropriate funding to support female student

10 athletes.

11

6. Defendants have intentionally discriminated against the female

12 student athletes by funding, authorizing, constructing, renovating, and

13 maintaining Moor Field, a state-of-the-art facility designed and intended

14 primarily for male student athletes. The facility includes fields for the male

15 students' baseball teams; however, the Defendants refused to create any field

16 appropriate for softball use, despite the frequent and explicit pleas by parents

17 and coaches.

18

7. The District and the individual District defendants have

19 discriminated against the female students at AHS by failing to provide them

20 with an equal opportunity to participate in athletic programs. Notwithstanding

21 the significant numbers of female students who have the interests and abilities

22 to participate in athletics, the District and the individual District Defendants

23 have failed to offer the female students at AHS athletic opportunities

24 proportionate to their numbers. As a result, female students have been unable

25 to participate in team sports, have been deterred from participating, and have

26 been excluded from AHS's athletic programs.

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1

8. The District cannot demonstrate that its programs nevertheless

2 comply with Title IX despite the failure to provide proportionate numbers of

3 athletic opportunities to the female students at AHS. The District does not have

4 a history and continuing practice of expanding its athletic programs in response

5 to the developing interests and abilities of female students. Accordingly, the

6 failure to provide female students with an equal opportunity to participate has

7 occurred without justification or defense by the District and in total disregard

8 for the female students who have the interest and ability to participate in sports.

9

9. The Defendants' repeated, purposeful differential treatment of

10 female students at AHS and female AHS athletes reveals an utter disregard for

11 laws protecting against such invidious sex discrimination. The Defendants have

12 continued to unfairly discriminate against females despite persistent complaints

13 by students, parents, coaches, and others. Plaintiffs and the class they propose

14 to represent have been provided with no other alternative but to hold the

15 Defendants accountable for their persistent discrimination by instituting this

16 lawsuit.

17

10. In bringing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to require that Defendants

18 comply with Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

19 Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of

20 the Califomia Constitution, and California state laws by ending their

21 discriminatory actions towards the female students at AHS and by taking

22 remedial steps to address discrimination in the athletic program.

23

PARTIES - PLAINTIFFS

24

11. PlaintiffLauren M. Cruz ("CRUZ") is a 15-year-old minor female

25 who attends AHS. CRUZ has played and continues to play softball at AHS.

26 CRUZ intends to play softball in college and hopes to receive an athletic

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1 college scholarship. Defendants have discriminated against CRUZ on the basis

2 ofher sex by denying her equal athletic treatment and benefits. CRUZ, a

3 minor, is proceeding in this action by her next friend, her mother, Jean Cruz.

4 CRUZ and Jean Cruz are residents of Alhambra, California, which is within the

5 jurisdiction of the Central District of California.

6

12. Plaintiff Valerie Herrera ("HERRERA") is a 17-year-old minor

7 female who attends AHS. HERRERA has played and continues to play softball

8 at AHS. Defendants have discriminated against HERRERA on the basis of her

9 sex by denying her equal athletic treatment and benefits. HERRERA, a minor,

10 is proceeding in this action by her next friend, her mother, Carolina Herrera

11 HERRERA and Carolina Herrera are residents ofAlhambra, California, which

12 is within the Central District of California.

13

13. Plaintiff Jennifer N. Cerros ("CERROS") is an 18-year-old female

14 student who attends AHS. CERROS plays basketball at AHS. Defendants

15 have discriminated against CERROS on the basis of her sex by denying her

16 equal athletic treatment and benefits. CERROS resides in Alhambra,

17 California, which is within the Central District of California.

18

14. Plaintiff Catherine Grempel ("GREMPEL") is a 14-year-old minor

19 female who attends Emory Park School in Alhambra, California. GREMPEL

20 will be attending AHS starting in Fa112004. GREMPEL intends to play softball

21 and track and field at AHS. GREMPEL has played softball since she was seven

22 years old. Unless the Defendants cease their discriminatory actions and take

23 remedial action, GREMPEL will be subjected to discrimination and unequal

24 athletic treatment and benefits. GREJ\.1PEL intends to pursue an athletic

25 scholarship when she applies to college and is relying on her athletic abilities as

26 a means to help finance her college education. GREMPEL, a minor, is

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1 proceeding in this action by her next friend, her mother, Tina Grempel.

2 GREIvlPEL and Tina Grempel are residents of Alhambra, California, which is

3 within the Central District of California.

4

PARTIES - DEFENDANTS

5

15. Defendant Alhambra School District is a public school district.

6 The District is a state actor subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal

7 Protection Clause as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the

8 District receives federal funding and, therefore, all of its programs and activities

9 are governed by the requirements of Title IX pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1687. The

10 District is authorized to operate, and does operate, AHS, and is responsible for

11 AHS' s conduct. The District is located in Alhambra, California, which is

12 within the Central District of California

13

16. Defendant City of Alhambra is a state actor subject to the Equal

14 Protection Clauses of the United States and the California Constitutions.

15 Additionally, Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that

16 the City of Alhambra receives fInancial assistance from the State of Califomia

17 and is thus regulated by California Government Code section 11135(a).

18 Together with the District, the City has funded, authorized, constructed,

19 renovated, and maintained Moor Field, a state-of-the-art facility designed

20 primarily for male athletes.

21

17. Defendant Russell Lee-Sung (LEE-SUNG) is the principal of

22 AHS. Defendant LEE-SUNG has authority and control over the day-to-day

23 . operations of AHS, including its policies, practices, procedures, facilities,

24 maintenance, programs, activities, services, and employees in AHS' s athletic

25 department. Defendant LEE-SUNG is responsible for ensuring that AHS

26 complies with anti-discrimination laws. Defendant LEE-SUNG is a resident of

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1 .the State of California. Plaintiffs are infonned and believe and based thereon

2 allege that Defendant LEE-SUNG resides within the Central District of

3 California. Defendant LEE-SUNG is sued in his official capacity.

4

18. Defendant Lou Torres ("TORRES") is the athletic director at AHS.

5 Defendant Torres has authority and control over the day-to-dayoperations of

6 AHS's athletic department, including its policies, practices, procedures,

7 programs, activities, services, coaches, and teams. Defendant TORRES is a

g resident of the State of California. Plaintiffs are infonned and believe and

9 based thereon allege that Defendant TORRES resides within the Central

10 District of California. Defendant TORRES is sued in his official capacity.

11

19. Defendant Victor Sandoval ("SANDOVAL") is the vice principal

12 of business and activities at AHS. Defendant SANDOVAL supervises

13 Defendant TORRES and has authority and control over AHS's athletic

14 department, including its policies, practices, procedures, programs, activities,

15 services, coaches, and teams. Defendant SANDOVAL is a resident of the State

16 ofCalifornia. Plaintiffs are infonned and believe and based thereon allege that

17 Defendant SANDOVAL resides within the Central District of California.

18 Defendant SANDOVAL is sued in his official capacity.

19

20. William A. Vallejos ("VALLEJOS") is the Board President of the

20 Alhambra School District Board of Education. As Board President, Defendant

21 VALLEJOS is responsible for the actions of the Alhambra School District and

22 is responsible for ensuring that the District complies with all state and federal

23 laws prohibiting sex discrimination. Defendant VALLEJOS is a resident of the

24 State of California Plaintiffs are infonned and believe and based thereon allege

25 that Defendant VALLEJOS resides within the Central District of California.

26 Defendant VALLEJOS is sued in his official capacity.

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1

21. John H. Nufiez (''NUNEZ'') is the Board Vice-President of the

2 Alhambra School District Board of Education. As Board Vice-President,

3 Defendant NUNEZ is responsible for the actions of the Alhambra School

4 District and is responsible for ensuring that the District complies with all state

5 and federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination. Defendant NUNEZ is a

6 resident of the State of California. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and

7 based thereon allege that Defendant NUNEZ resides within the Central District

8 of California. Defendant NUNEZ is sued in his official capacity.

9

22. Robert L. Gin ("GIN") is the Clerk of the Alhambra School

10 District Board of Education. As Clerk, Defendant GIN is responsible for the

11 actions of the Alhambra School District and is responsible for ensuring that the

12 District complies with all state and federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination.

13 Defendant GIN is a resident ofthe State of California. Plaintiffs are informed

14 and believe and based thereon allege that Defendant GIN resides within the

15 CentralDistrict of California. Defendant GIN is sued in his official capacity.

16

23. Ruth E. Castro ("CASTRO") is a Member of the Alhambra School

17 District Board of Education. As a Board Member, Defendant CASTRO is

18 responsible for the actions of the Alhambra School District and is responsible

19 for ensuring that the District complies with all state and federal laws prohibiting

20 sex discrimination. Defendant CASTRO is a resident of the State of California.

21 Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendant

22 CASTRO resides within the Central District of California. Defendant

23 CASTRO is sued in her official capacity.

24

24. Barbara A. Messina ("MESSINA") is a Member of the Alhambra

25 School District Board ofEducation. As a Board Member, Defendant

26 MESSINA is responsible for the actions of the Alhambra School District and is

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1 responsible for ensuring that the District complies with all state and federal

2 laws prohibiting sex discrimination. Defendant MESSINA is a resident of the

3 State of California. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege

4 that Defendant MESSINA resides within the Central District of California.

5 Defendant MESSINA is sued in her official capacity.

6

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

7

25. The named individual Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of

8 themselves and on behalf of a class of all those similarly situated pursuant to

9 Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

10

Definition.

11

26. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all present and future AHS

12 female students and potential students who participate, seek to participate,

13 and/or are deterred from participating in athletics at AHS.

14

Numerosity.

15

27. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.

16 There are more than 1,400 female students in grades 9 - 12 at AHS, including

17 more than about 300 who participate in interscholastic athletics. It is unknown

18 how many of these current female students or how many future female students

19 would seek to participate in interscholastic athletics if additional opportunities

20 were available. Moreover, members of the class who may suffer future injury

21 are not capable of being identified at this time,as the class includes future AHS

22 female athletes and the class is constantly in flux, with students graduating and

23 new students attending AHS each year.

24

Common Questions of Law and Fact.

25

28. Common questions oflaw and fact predominate, and include: (a)

26 whether female student athletes at AHS are receiving unequal treatment and

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1 benefits in comparison to the male student athletes; and (b) whether female

2 students at AHS are being deprived of equal opportunities to participate in

3 sports.

4

Typicality.

5

29. The types of sex discrimination the named Plaintiffs have suffered

6 are typical of the sex discrimination which members of the class have suffered,

7 are suffering, and, unless this Court grants relief, will continue to suffer.

8

30. CRUZ is a member of the proposed class in that she is a current

9 female student athlete at AHS who is subjected to the discriminatory unequal

10 treatment and benefits that the District provides to female student athletes.

11 CRUZ has been subjected to sex-based discrimination by all Defendants.

12

31. HERRERA is a member of the proposed class in that she is a

13 cu..rrent female student athlete at AHS who is subjected to the discriminatory

14 unequal treatment and benefits that the District provides to female student

15 athletes. HERRERA has been subjected to sex-based discrimination by all

16 Defendants.

17

32. CERROS is a member ofthe proposed class in that she is a current

18 female student athlete at AHS who is subjected to the discriminatory unequal

19 treatment and benefits that the District provides to female student athletes.

20 CERROS has been subjected to sex-based discrimination by all Defendants.

21

33. GREMPEL is a member of the proposed class in that she will be a

22 female student athlete at AHS for the 2004-2005 school year and will be

23 subjected to the District's failure to accommodate the athletic interest and

24 abilities of AHS's female students, and to the unequal treatment and benefits

25 that Defendants provide to female student athletes at AHS, if Defendants are

26 not ordered to cease immediately their discriminatory actions and to remedy

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1 their past discriminatory conduct.

2

Adequacy of Representation.

3

34. The named Plaintiffs are members of the proposed class and will

4 fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs

5 intend to prosecute this action rigorously in order to secure remedies for the

6 entire class. Counsel of record for Plaintiffs are experienced in state and federal

7 civil rights litigation and class actions, including Title IX litigation.

8

Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

9

35. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally

10 applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and

11 injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole under Federal Rule of Civil

12 Procedure 23(b)(2). , ~
1:)

STATE.MRNT OF FACTS

14

36. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have been and are discriminating

15 against female students at AHS in violation of Title IX, the United States

16 Constitution, the California Constitution, and California state law.

17 SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETIC TREATMENT AND BENEFITS.

18

37. The District and the individual District Defendants have

19 unlawfully discriminated against female student athletes with respect to athletic

20 treatment and benefits in areas including, but not limited to: practice and

21 competitive facilities; training facilities; locker rooms; coaches and coaching

22 facilities; scheduling of games and practice times; publicity; and funding. All

23 of the Defendants have discriminated against the female student athletes with

24 respect to the facilities at Moor Field.

25

26

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Practice and Competitive Facilities

2

38. The Defendants provide inequitable practice and competitive

3 facilities to female student athletes. In addition. the District and the individual

4 Defendants discriminate against female student athletes in that they fail to

5 properly maintain the facilities provided to female students athletes.

6

The Moor Field Renovation.

7

39. Around June 2002, the District and the City began upgrading Moor

8 Field, a piece ofland located about two miles from AHS and owned by the

9 District. The upgrade was a joint project, with the City providing $900,000 to

10 upgrade the school-owned field and the District contributing to its upgrade and

11 maintenance. The City and the District jointly decided how funds would be

12 spent to upgrade Moor Field, andjointly decided to renovate the three fields at

13 Moor Field by building tV{O baseball diamonds exclusively for male student

14 athletes and one multi-use field, which does not meet softball specifications.

15 They decided not to build a softball field.

16

40. The City's decision not to build a softball field at Moor Field is

17 consistent with its discriminatory conduct generally. No park within the City of

18 Alhambra has an appropriate softball field, while the City maintains five

19 baseball fields for boys. This deficiency continues, despite a dramatic increase

20 in the past few years in the number of girls playing softball and despite repeated

21 requests by residents to build softball fields. The City recently upgraded the

22 baseball fields in one park, again failing to build girls a place to play softball.

23

41. The Moor Field site now contains one large field and two smaller

24 fields, none of which is a softball field. The fields are state-of-the-art, with new

25 fencing, new bleachers, enclosed batting cages, pitching bullpens, cement

26 dugouts, two electronic scoreboards, a concession stand, and equipment storage

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1 sheds. There are also foul poles around one field. One of the fields is

2 designated as a multi-use field, but it is not adequate for softball use, and is the

3 least refurbished of the three fields, lacking proper fencing and an electronic

4 scoreboard.

5

42. Although the City and District closely consulted AHS's head

6 baseball coach about the Moor Field renovation, they did not even inform AHS

7 head softball coach of the proposed upgrade, much less approach him for his

8 input and recommendations.

9

43. The Defendants have refused to build a ball diamond dedicated to

10 softball use despite repeated requests. The Defendants, including Defendant

11 TORRES, have refused to allow the one multi-use field to be used for softball.

12 The Moor Field renovation project was completed in February 2003.

13

44. The nistrict and the City were put on notice that renovating Moor

14 Field for the exclusive use and benefit of boys constitutes illegal discrimination

15 against girls. In or around January 2003, AHS'shead softball coach informed

16 District officials, including Defendant TORRES, that they were violating Title

17 IX by not providing AHS' s softball team with equitable practice and

18 competitive facilities. During planning meetings for the Moor Field renovation,

19 which included District and City officials, attendees discussed but disregarded

20 nondiscrimination mandates.

21

The Third Street Field.

22

45. While the AHS boys baseball teams play at a state-of-the-art

23 facility, the girls play softball on a substantially inferior and dangerous field

24 located at AHS (hereinafter "the Third Street Field"). The Third Street Field is

25 a small, dirt field with tom-up grass, weeds, and holes that some athletes refer

26 to as "gopher holes" because they are so deep. The female athletes at AHS

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1 have stated that falling on the field is like "sliding on concrete," because it is

2 rocky, dry ground. The District's maintenance department has refused to lay

3 dirt on the softball field on a regular basis. The field is also not level, causing

4 many students to trip as they try to run on it, and, because it is uneven, it does

5 not drain properly so that the junior varsity home plate is flooded during rainy

6 season so the girls cannot play on this field.

7

46. The condition of the Third Street Field is exacerbated by the fact

8 that AHS allows freshman football, PE, and soccer teams to use and further

9 destroy the field during the year. These students tear up the field with their

10 cleats and leave the field littered with their equipment, such as football sleds,

11 and garbage like candy wrappers and soda bottles. Moreover, because the 12 District fails to maintain the field properly, female softball players must pick up

13 trash, drag the field, and water and trim the grass as needed. But teenage girls

14 cannot perform all the upkeep responsibility of a sports field. The softball

15 teams have had to cancel games because the District has failed to prepare the

16 field. These maintenance problems have been brought to the attention of

17 District personnel, who have intentionally failed to remedy them. The baseball

18 teams' fields have been and continue to be properly and consistently

19 maintained.

20

47. Female softball players have experienced physical injuries as a

21 result ofthe conditions at the Third Street Field. Softball players have sprained

22 ankles and one player broke a blood vessel in her eye from a ball popping up 23 off one of the holes in the field. Also, other female players who use the field, 24 such as soccer players, have had sprained ankles from falling on the tom-up dirt 25 field. Injuries to female student athletes have not caused Defendants to repair 26 the Third Street Field or to take any other corrective measures.

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48. The Third Street Field has none of the amenities of the three Moor

2 Field ball diamonds. It has no batting cages, electronic scoreboards, pitching
3 bullpens, or cement dugouts. In fact, the area in which softball pitchers warm

4 up has no pitching rubber, home plate, or protective fence, as the Moor Field

5 baseball diamonds have. Rather, softball pitchers warm up by throwing the ball

6 while standing behind a bench that substitutes for a dugout. Defendants the

7 District and SANDOVAL have denied money to the softball program needed to

8 build appropriate safety fencing. The Third Street Field has no electrical outlets

9 on the field, making it difficult to use a pitching machine to train players. The

10 Third Street Field has no concession stand facilities, thus denying softball

11 players the ability to raise much needed funds from attendees. It also has no

12 cemented areas for bleachers.

13

49. The Third Street Field is far too small to accommodate the girls'

14 play.. The two girls' softball teams often play on the field at the same time;

15 during games, the girls are forced to interrupt the regulation play when a fielder

16 from the other team misses a ball because their outfields overlap.

17

The "Small" Gym.

18

50. As with softball, AHS discriminates against female student

19 basketball players in its provision ofpractice and competitive facilities. The

20 girls' basketball team is assigned the "small gym" for practice, even though this

21 gym is not regulation size and the girls' basketball team actually plays games in

22 the "big gym," where the boys are allowed to practice. To compensate for

23 using a non-regulation basketball court, the girls' basketball players "play

24 outside the lines" in the small gym. The female basketball players can use the

25 big gym only if they practice before the boys, practice late in the evening when

26 the boys are done, or when the boys do not have practice.

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Training Facilities.

2

51. Male student athletes have far greater access to weight training

3 facilities and weight training coaches than do the female student athle'tes. AHS

4 has three weight rooms, including one at Moor Field and two at the school 5 facility. The weight room at Moor Field is available to the football and boys 6 baseball teams; girls are not permitted to use it and therefore have no access. 7 One of the two weight rooms at the school is allocated exclusively to 1:he 8 football team; girls are not permitted to use it and therefore have no access. 9 The last weight room is ostensibly open to girls; however, in fact, girls are 10 denied access while boys' wrestling, basketball, and track teams use the room. 11 Moreover, on the few occasions when female athletes have been able to access 12 the third weight room, they have been directed to leave when male athletes

i3

14

Locker Rooms.

15

52. The girls' locker facilities are dramatically inferior to the boys'

16 locker facilities. While male student athletes are provided three separate locker

17 rooms, female student athletes are provided only one, the physical education

18 (PE) locker room. Further, the boys' PE locker room is larger than the girls'

19 only locker room, providing boys with more and larger lockers to store their

20 athletic equipment and uniforms. Inside this locker room is also a separate,

21 segregated locker area exclusively for the football players.

22

53. The conditions of the girls' locker facilities are abysmal. The

23 showers in the girls' locker room have not worked for several years and the

24 toilets are frequently non-functioning and/or overflowing. Because the toilets

25 frequently leak, the locker room often resembles a sewer and girls cannot place

26 their equipment and clothes on the floor. While male student athletes have

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1 access to functioning showers and amenities in the additional male locker

2 rooms, female student athletes have frequently attended class without having

3 showered after practice.

4

54. The majority of lockers provided to female student athletes in the

5 girls' PE locker room are not large enough to store uniforms or equipment.

6 Additionally, the girls are not allowed to use and lock the lockers overnight.

7 Female softball players are forced to carry their equipment with them all day,

8 and to change into their uniforms in a tin shed on the field. Female basketball

9 players have had to carry their athletic bags and equipment onto the game floor

10 during home games and have been mistaken for the visiting team. Moreover,

11 having their gym bags on the floor presents a hazard to the girls, as they quickly

12 maneuver on and offthe court.

13

55. Not only has the District and the individual District Defendants

14 provided girls with less locker space, they have also refused to allow girls to

15 have access to the superior male facilities. For example, during home games,

16 visiting male basketball teams are allowed to use the boys' locker room located

17 off ofthe big gym, but the District's own girls' basketball players have been

18 denied access to this locker room.

19

Coaches and Coaching Facilities.

20

56. The District and the individual District Defendants discriminate

21 against female student athletes by hiring walk-on coaches to head female teams,

22 while providing male teams with coaches who are also full-time teachers at

23 AHS. As a result, male athletes have greater access to their coaches who are

24 located on campus, whereas the coaches of female teams are frequently

25 inaccessible to the female student athletes during non-scheduled practice and

26 game times.

27

17

1

57. Student athletes at AHS can sign up for 6th period classes to play

2 their particular sport during the Fall. However, the District does not secure

3 softball coaches during this time. While some softball coaches have chosen to

4 work for free to help ameliorate the effects ofthe District's discriminatory

5 actions, frequently the girls have no coach to supervise them during 6th period.

6 They are instead left unsupervised and have often been sent to the cafeteria to

7 study. In contrast, the head baseball coach is a full-time teacher and is assigned

8 to supervise the male baseball players during 6th period.

9

58. Similarly, the girls' basketball team receives less coaching time

10 because neither the head coach nor the three assistant coaches are full-time

11 teachers. The District has not paid basketball coaches to supervise 6th period

12 girls' basketball play. Ifthe girls' basketball coach is unable or unwilling to

i3 work for free dUI'ing 6t..1J. period, the girls play unsupervised or are sent to the

14 cafeteria to study. In addition, at times, the girls' basketball team has had to

15 practice late at night because their walk-on coach was not available during the

16 day to coach them. The current girls' basketball head coach is a security guard

17 at AHS who is scheduled to work during 6th period. Consequently, he has not

18 been available to supervise the girls during 6th period. In contrast, the boys'

19 basketball players receive coaching during 6th period because their head coach

20 is full-time faculty, as are three ofthe four assistant coaches.

21

59. The coaches of the female student athletic teams at AHS have less

22 experience than the coaches of the male athletic teams. For example, the head

23 softball coach for the past five years had less experience than the head baseball

24 coach. The head baseball coach has significant coaching and professional

25 baseball experience, including playing for a Minor League baseball team.

26

27

18

1

60. The head coach of the boys' basketball team is likewise more

2 experienced than the girls' basketball team head coach, including college level

3 coaching experience. The District recently replaced the girls' head basketball

4 coach. The District's delay in interviewing and selecting a candidate caused

5 several highly-qualified candidates to accept other positions. The District

6 ultimately hired the school's security guard, who has insufficient experience for

7 the position. As a result of the District's neglect, the girls' basketball program

8 suffered. Girls missed significant playing opportunities and incoming eighth

9 grade girls were not adequately recruited for this current season.

10

61. The District does not provide its walk-on coaches offemale sports

11 teams with proper office facilities. After repeated requests for an office, the

12 former girls' basketball coach was eventually given a space - what was

13 formerly a closet. This closet-office had no window and no electrical outlet.

14 To warm the closet, girls dragged a cord from an adjoining room to bring in a

15 heater. Although the girls' basketball team had requested a place to go during

16 game half-times and an office to meet with their coach, this tiny room was too

17 small to accommodate the team, as there was not enough room to sit. In

18 contrast, the boys' basketball coach has an office large enough to accommodate

19 students who want to meet with him, and the office is equipped with electrical

20 outlets, couches, storage closets, and a television and a video recorder. This

21 office is provided to the boys' basketball team, in addition to the separate boys'

22 basketball locker room in the gym, where they team frequently meets.

23

Scheduling of Games and Practice Times.

24

62. The District and the individual District Defendants discriminate

25 against female student athletes in the scheduling of games. While males are

26 assigned to the most popular, "prime time" slots - i.e., after 7:00 p.m. and on

27

19

1 non-school nights- girls are assigned to the earlier, less desirable afternoon

2 spots. Many parents of female basketball players have been unable to watch

3 their daughters play because they cannot leave work in time to attend their

4 games. As a result of the unequal scheduling, the gym is only about one-third

5 full for girls' basketball games, depriving the girls of an audience as well as the

6 opportunity to raise much needed funds through the sales of programs and

7 concessions.

8

Publicity.

9

63. The District and the individual District Defendants consistently

10 provide less pUblicity and support for their female student athletic teams than

11 for their male student athletic teams, including cheerleaders, pep band, public

12 address system, scoreboards, and videotaping. Such unequal distribution of

13 publicity and support includes; but is not limited to, the fact that cheerleaders

14 and pep band perform at varsity boys' basketball games, but not at girls' varsity

15 basketball games.

16

Funding.

17

64. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that

18 the District and the individual District Defendants fail to provide necessary

19 funds for female teams, and provide less money to support female athletes than

20 to support male athletes.

21

65. The District and the individual District Defendants interfere with

22 and fail to properly support fund raising for female athletes and their teams.

23 FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY ACCOMMODATE FEMALE STUDENTS' INTEREST 24 AND ABILITIES IN ATHLETICS.

25

66. The District and the individual District Defendants have

26 discriminated, and continue to discriminate, against female students by failing

27

20

1 to provide them with equal athletic participation opportunities, despite their

2 demonstrated athletic interest and abilities to participate in sports.

3

67. For the 2002-03 school year, girls were about 49 percent of the

4 population at AHS; however, they received only 38 percent of the sports

5 opportunities, despite having the interest and abilities to participate in greater

6 numbers.

7

68. The failure to provide girls with participation opportunities

8 substantially proportionate to their representation in AHS's student body,

9 despite their interest and abilities to participate, has occurred without

10 justification or defense by the District or the individual Defendants. The

11 District has no history and continuing practice of expanding its athletic

12 programs in response to the developing interests and abilities offemale

13 stl.ldents.

14

69. Defendants' failure to provide adequate participation opportunities

15 and the full range of teams for girls' sports severely limits girls' participation in

16 sports and discourages interested girls from going out for sports.

17

Girls' Softball,

18

70. The District sponsors only two softball teams for female students

19 at AHS Gunior varsity and varsity), while it sponsors three baseball teams for

20 boys (freshmen, junior varsity, and varsity). As a result, the District offers

21 significantly more participation opportunities to boys than to girls.

22

71. Without a first-year softball team, 13 and 14-year-old freshmen

23 and sophomore girls must compete for spots on the junior varsity and varsity

24 teams against upper-class girls. Girls who need more seasoning before they are

25 capable ofperforming at the junior varsity or varsity level are denied the

26 opportunity to play. Upper-class girls are also affected by lack of adequate

27

21

1 participation opportunities. Younger girls with the skills and potential to be

2 accepted into the upper level teams displace upper class girls.

3

72. These disparities have persisted at AHS despite the fact that in the

4 past five years, the interest and abilities of girls trying out for softball has

5 increased dramatically. For the 2002-2003 season, approximately 50 girls tried

6 out for softball, but the coach had only 12 vacant available slots.

7

Girls' Basketball.

8

73. The District sponsors only three basketball teams for female

9 students at AHS (frosh, junior varsity and varsity), but sponsors four boys'

10 basketball teams (freshman, sophomore, junior varsity and varsity). Despite the

11 demonstrated interest and abilities of AHS female students to play basketball,

12 girls are denied the opportunity to play basketball for lack of participation

14 are denied the chance to develop their skills and, often, are discouraged from

15 trying out in later years. Upper-class girls also have to be displaced to make

16 opportunities available for talented freshman and sophomore female athletes.

17

Additional Girls' Sports.

18

74. The Plaintiffs are infonned and believe and based thereon allege

19 that the District denies female student athletes equal athletic participation

20 opportunities by failing to provide opportunities in additional girls' sports.

21

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

22

Unequal Treatment and Benefits in Athletic Programs

in ViolatIOn of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

23

Against Defendant Alhambra School District

24

75. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though fully set

25 forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

26

27

22

1

76. Title IX, enacted in 1972, provides in relevant part: "No person in

2 the United States shall, on the basis of sex. be excluded from participation in, be

3 denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education

4 program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ..." 20 U.S.C. §

5 1681(a).

6

77. Since the passage of Title IX, the District has received and

7 continues to receive federal financial assistance and the benefits therefrom.

8 Therefore, all programs in the Alhambra School District, including the athletic

9 programs, are subject to the requirements of Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1687.

10

78. Title IX's implementing regulations provide that ''No person shall,

11 on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,

12 be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against

13 in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a

14 recipient, and the recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such

15 basis." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a).

16

79. Under Title IX, schools must provide "equal treatment and

17 benefits" to members of both sexes in their athletic programs. 44 Federal

18 Register 71,413 (1979), the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights'

19 1979 Policy Interpretation (the "Policy Interpretation").

20

80. Equal treatment and benefits is assessed based on an overall

21 comparison of the male and female student athletic programs, including an

22 analysis of the following factors, among other considerations: "The provision

23 of equipment and supplies; Scheduling of games and practice time; Opportunity

24 to receive coaching ...; Assignment and compensation of coaches ...;

25 Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; Provision of ... 26 training facilities; Publicity" and a school's "failure to provide necessary funds

27

23

1 for teams for one sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2) - (10).

2

81. The regulations required that sponsors of interscholastic athletics

3 comply with the regulations within three years of their effective date, or by July

4 21, 1978. The regulations further require that sponsors of interscholastic

5 athletics take such remedial actions as are necessary to overcome the effects of

6 sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. 34 C.F.R. §106.3(a).

7

82. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that

8 the District has not taken any recent remedial actions and that any remedial

9 actions which the District has taken in the past thirty (30) years have been

10 insufficient to satisfy the District's obligations under Title IX.

11

83. The District has intentionally violated Title IXby knowingly and

12 deliberately discriminating against female students, including Plaintiffs, by,

13 atnong other things, failing to provide female student athletes at AHS with

14 treatment and benefits that are comparable to the treatment and benefits

15 provided to male student athletes in areas including, but not limited to: practice

16 and competitive facilities, training facilities, locker rooms, coaches and

17 coaching facilities, scheduling of games and practice times, publicity, and

18 funding.

19

84. The inequitable treatment of female and male student athletes at

20 AHS, as detailed above, demonstrates the District's intentional and conscious

21 failure to comply with Title IX. The District's conduct has persisted despite the

22 information provided by and the requests made by Plaintiffs and other

23 individuals, and despite the mandates ofthe relevant Title IX regulations,

24 particularly 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3 and 106.41, and the Policy Interpretation.

25

85. Plaintiffs and other individuals have informed the District that its

26 actions constitute violations of Plaintiffs' Title IX rights. The District has failed

27

24

1 to remedy or address its violations.

2

86. As a proximate result ofthese unlawful acts, the Plaintiffs and

3 others similarly situated have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable injury.

4

87. The Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to relief,

5 including declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

6

88. Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the proposed class of similarly

7 situated individuals are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

8

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

9

Unequal Participation Opportunities in Athletic Programs

in Violation of Title IX of file Education Amendments of 1972

10

Against Defendant Alhambra School District

11

89. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though fully set

12 forth herein, .the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

i3

90. Under Title IX, schools must provide both sexes "equivalent

14 participation opportunities (including both the number of opportunities and

15 whether the selection of sports and the level of competition effectively

16 accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes)." 44 Federal

17 Register 71,413, the Policy Interpretation.

18

91. Compliance in the area of equivalent participation opportunities

19 must be determined by a three-part test:

20

(1) whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and

21

female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to

22

their respective enrollments;

23

(2) where the members of one sex have been and are under-represented

24

among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history

25

and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably

26

responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members ofthat

27

25

1

sex; or

2

(3) where the members of one sex are under-represented among

3

intercollegiate athletes and the institution cannot show a continuing

4

practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be

5

demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex

6

have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.

7 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418, the Policy Interpretation. (Although the Policy

8 Interpretation refers to "intercollegiate"sports, it is applicable to all recipients

9 of federal education funds, including high sch()ols and is thus, applicable to

10 interscholastic high school sports as well as intercollegiate sports. 34 C.F.R. §

11 106.11.)

12

92. The District has failed to comply with each of the three (3) parts of

13 the test for determining the eqmll opportunity to participate in athletics under

14 Title IX. Specifically, Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon

15 allege that the ratio of female to male athletes at AHS is not substantially

16 proportionate to the overall ratio of enrolled female and male students at AHS

17 and that the interests and abilities ofthe female students at AHS have not been

18 fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. Further, the

19 District cannot show "a history and continuing practice of program expansion 20 which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities" of

21 AHS's female students.

22

93. Rather, female students have historically been and continue to be

23 under-represented in AHS's athletics program. Despite this under-

24 representation and despite the interest and abilities of the female students to

25 participate on additional teams, the District has not adequately expanded its

26 girls' athletics program as female students' interests and abilities have

27

26

1 demanded.

2

94. Plaintiffs, coaches, and parents have on numerous occasions

3 informed the District that its actions discriminate against female students and

4 that these actions constitute violations of Plaintiffs' Title IX rights to have their

5 interest and abilities effectively accommodated. Despite the fact that these

6 inequities have been drawn to the attention of the District, it has knowingly and

7 consciously continued to fail and refuse to take any of the necessary actions to

8 remediate existing violations, even though Title IX mandates that it do so. The 9 fact that the District persists in refusing to provide these athletic participation

10 opportunities demonstrates the District's intentional and conscious failure to

11 comply with Title IX

12

95. The District's conduct has persisted despite the information

13 provided by and the requests made by Plaintiffs and other individuals and

14 despite the mandates offederal anti-discrimination law.

15

96. As a proximate result of these unlawful acts, the Plaintiffs and

16 others similarly situated have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable injury.

17

97. The Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to relief,

18 including declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

19

98. Such injunctive relief may include, but is not limited to, the

20 provision of the full range ofteams and participation slots in existing sports,

21 with teams for freshmen. sophomore, junior varsity, and varsity-level female

22 student athletes.

23

99. Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the proposed class of similarly

24 situated individuals are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

25

26

27

27

1

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of

2

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

42 U.S.C. § 1983; Against the City of Alhambra and All

3

IndividUal Derendants in Their Official Capacities

4

100. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though

5 fully set forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

6

101. The Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment

7 to the United States Constitution prohibits state actors from discriminating on

8 the basis of sex.

9

102. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, certain Defendants may be held

10 liable for their actions in violating Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth

11 Amendment.

12

103. By deciding to renovate Moor Field virtually exclusively for

13 male athletes, the City and all individual Defendants have intentionally

14 discriminated against the Plaintiffs, and against a class of female students at

15 AHS, on the basis of sex and.have intentionally deprived them of their rights to

16 equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

17

104. By failing to provide female student athletes with the same

18 treatment and benefits as the male student athletes (as detailed above) and by

19 failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities for female students,

20 the individual District Defendants have intentionally discriminated against

21 female students, including the named Plaintiffs, on the basis of sex and have

22 intentionally deprived them of their rights to equal protection secured by the

23 Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

24

105. Defendant LEE-SUNG, as the principal at AHS, has

25 consistently failed and refused to add athletic participation opportunities for

26 female students or to remedy the unequal treatment and benefits received by

27

28

I AHS's female student athletes - despite the numerous complaints made to him

2 about these inequities. Therefore, Defendant LEE-SUNG's actions constitute a

3 knowing disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

4

106. Defendants SANDOVAL, as Vice Principal, Business and

5 Activities, has consistently failed and refused to add athletic participation

6 opportunities for female students or to remedy the unequal treatment and

7 benefits received byARS's female student athletes - despite the numerous

8 complaints made to him about these inequities. Defendant SANDOVAL's

9 actions constitute a knowing disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

10

107. Defendant TORRES, as Athletic Director at AHS, has failed

II and refused to add athletic participation opportunities for female students or to

12 remedy the unequal treatment and benefits received by AHS's female student

13 athletes - despite the numerous complaints made to him about these inequities.

14 Defendant TORRES' actions constitute a knowing disregard for Plaintiffs'

IS constitutional rights.

16

108. When the herein named Defendants engaged in the improper

17 actions described above, they were acting as state actors and under color of law

18 for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and were acting in violation of the Equal

19 Protection Clause.

20

109. As a proximate result of these unlawful acts, the Plaintiffs

21 and others similarly situated have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable

22 injury.

23

1l0. The Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to

24 relief, including declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

25

111. Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the proposed class of similarly

26 situated individuals are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

27

29

1

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of

2

Article I, Section 7 of the California State Constitution

Against the Defendant City of Alhambra

3

4

112. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though

5 fully set forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

6

113. Article I, Section 7 of the California State Constitution

7 prohibits public entities from engaging in sex-based discrimination.

8

114. By deciding to renovate Moor Field virtually exclusively for

9 male athletes, the Defendant City of Alhambra has intentionally discriminated

10 against the Plaintiffs, and against a class of female students at AHS, on the

11 basis of sex and has intentionally deprived them of their rights to equal

12 protection secured by Article 1, Section 7 of the California State Constitution.

13

115. The City'S actions are arbitrary and cannot be justified.

14

116. As a proximate result of these unlawful acts, the Plaintiffs

15 and others similarly situated have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable

16 injury.

17

117. The Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to

18 relief, including declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

19

118. Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the proposed class of similarly

20 situated individuals are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

21

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

22

Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of

California Government Code Section 11135

23

Against the Defendant City of Alhambra

24

119. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though

25 fully set forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

26

27

30

1

120. California Government Code § 11135(a) prohibits sex-based

2 discrimination in "any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or

3 administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state,

4 or receives any financial assistance from the state," and requires "full an equal

5 access to the benefits" of any such program or activity.

6

121. By deciding to renovate Moor Field virtually exclusively for

7 male athletes, the Defendant City of Alhambra has discriminated against the

8 Plaintiffs, and against a class of female students at AHS, on the basis of sex and

9 has thereby deprived them ofthe rights provided by Government Code § 11135.

10

122. As a proximate result of these unlawful acts, the Plaintiffs

11 have suffered injury.

12

123. The Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, including declaratory

13 relief and injunctive relief.

14

124. Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the proposed class of similarly

15 situated individuals are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

16

DECLARATORY RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

17

125. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though

18 fully set forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

19

126. A present and actual controversy exists between Plaintiffs

20 and Defendants concerning their rights and respective duties. The Plaintiffs

21 contend that the Defendants have violated their rights, and the rights of those

22 similarly situated, under federal and state anti-discrimination. laws. The

23 Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that the Defendants

24 deny these allegations. Declaratory relief is therefore necessary and

25 appropriate.

26

27

31

1

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

2

127. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference, as though

3 fully set forth herein, the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

4

128. No plain. adequate, or complete remedy at law is available

5 to the Plaintiffs to redress the wrongs addressed herein.

6

129. If the Court does not grant the injunctive relief sought

7 herein, the Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, will be irreparably harmed.

8

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

9 WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:

10

(1) Certify the proposed class of plaintiffs.

11

(2) Enter an order declaring that the District has discriminated against

12 female students on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX and the regulations

13 promulgated thereunder (including both unequal treatment and benefits and

14 unequal participation opportunities);

15

(3) Enter an order declaring that the Defendant City and the individual

16 Defendants have discriminated against female students on the basis of sex in

17 violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

18 United States Constitution as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

19

(4) Enter an order declaring that Defendant City has discriminated

20 against female students on the basis of sex in violation of Article I, section 7 of

21 the California State Constitution and in violation of California Government

22 Code § 11135;

23

(5) Issue a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants and their

24 officers, agents, employees, successors, and any other persons acting in concert

25 with them, from discriminating against female students on the basis of sex;

26

27

32

1

(6) Issue a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to remediate

2 their violations of state and federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination by,

3 among other required actions, providing female student athletes with treatment

4 and benefits comparable to those provided to male athletes, and affording

5 female students the equal opportunity to participate in school-sponsored sports;

6

(7) Award counsel for Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,

7 pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988, Cal. Civil Proc. Code § 1021.5, and any other

8 applicable provisions offederal and state law; and

9

(8) Order such other and further reliefas the Court deems appropriate.

10 Dated: March 4, 2004 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Respectfully submitted, Nancy Solomon Vicky L. Barker CALIFORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER Patricia Shiu Claudia Center Elizabeth Kristen LEGAL AID SOCIETYEMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER
./\A_... _ ~
By: __v__~ ___~~__________ Nancy Solomon
33

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:8
FILED CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT

2 3

.'I~;;" ' , ~1\'TE~El' ';',,.c' tEllK. u,s" DISTRJ(;l COURT .'," ', , , OCT - 6 2004

IOcr - Ll 2004 I~
IU
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:!t

BY

DEPU~'y ,I (

1.....'1

4

5

' ..

6

7

Priority Send Enter Closed JS-5/JS-6 _
J5-2/JS-3 _ Scan Only_

8

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 LAUREN M. CRUZ", j:,):' her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERIb HERRERA by her
12 next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNiFER N. CERROS' CATHERINE GREMPEL,
13 by her next friend Tina GrelT!pel, individually and on behalf oCall those
14 similarly situated,

CASE NO. CV 04-1460 DT (Mcx) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

15

Plaintiffs,

16 vs.

17

ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT' THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL

18

LEE-SUN~VICTOR SANDOVAL, LOU TO S WILLIAMA

19

VALLEJOS, JOHN H. NUNEZ, ROBERT 1. GINARUTH E. CASTRO,

20

and BARBARA . MESSINA, in their official capacities,

21

Defendants.

22

23 III 24 III 25 III 26 III 27 III 28 III '

SI

-3 .

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 2 of 23 Page ID #:9

1 I. BACKGROUND

r:)

2

A. Factual Summary

III

3

Plaintiffs Lauren M. Cruz ("Cruz"), Valerie Herrera ("Herrera"), ;'~,

V',

4 Jennifer N. Cerros ("Cerros"), Catherine Grempel ("Grempel"), and all others

5 similarly situated (collectively "Plaintiffs"Y bring this class action pursuant to

6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(a) and (b)(2) for injunctive relief

7 against Defendants Alhambra School District (the "District"), the City of

8 Alhambra (the "City"), and District employees Russell Lee-Sung ("Lee-Sung"),

9 Victor Sandoval ("Sandoval"), Lou Torres ("Torres"), William A. Vallejos

10 ("Vallejos"), John H. Nunez (''Nunez''), Robert L. Gin ("Gin"), Ruth E. Castro

11 ("Castro"), and Barbara A. Messina ("Messina") (collectively, "Individual District

12 Defendants") (all defendants collectively known as "Defendants") for unlawful

13 sex discrimination against female student athletes at Alhambra High School

14 ("AHS") pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the United

15 States Constitution, and California state law?

16

17

I As of the date the Complaint was filed on March 4, 2004: Plaintiff Cruz

was a 15-year-old female who played softball as an Alhambra High School

18 ("AHS") student, and proceeds in this action by her next friend, her mother, Jean

19 Cruz; Plaintiff Herrera was a 17-year-old female who played softball as an AHS

student, and proceeds in this aetion by her next friend, her mother, Carolina

20 Herrera; Plaintiff Cerros was an 18-year-old female who played basketball as an

21 AHS student; and Plaintiff Grempel was a 14-year-old female who proeeeds in this

22 action by her next friend, her mother, Tina Grempel. Complaint, ~~ 11-14. At the

time the Complaint was filed, Grempel attended Emory Park School in Alhambra,

23 California; however, she was to attend AHS starting Fall 2004, and intended to

24 play softball and track and field as an AHS student. Id. at ~ 14. According to

Plaintiffs, Grempel now attends AHS.

. _~~~_;...:_:.:...._.~~~~

25
2 Plaintiffs rely on the following statutes: Title IX oftlie Education

26 Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. and its interpreting regulations;

27 the EqualProteetion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

28

2

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 3 of 23 Page ID #:10

The following facts are alleged in the Complaint:

,.,

l.~i

2

Defendants unlawfully fail to provide female student athletes equal !~

3 treatment and benefits as compared to male athletes in a myriad of ways, includitfg
V':r
4 but not limited to:

5

(a) Assigning female student athletes to inferior, substandard,

6

poorly maintained and dangerous playing facilities while

7

assigning male student athletes to the best facilities which are

8

superior, well maintained and safe;

9

(b) Hiring less experienced and walk-on coaches for female

10

student athletes;

11

(c) Assigning female student athletes to an inferior and dilapidated

12

locker room with broken showers and restrooms while

13

providing male student athletes three locker rooms, thus giving

14

male student athletes access to additional locker space, working

15

showers and reStrOoms;

16

(d) Securing the most popular "prime time" slots for male student

17

athletes' practice and competition times while relegating the

18

female student athletes to the earlier, less desirable time slots;

19

(e) Excluding female student athletes entirely from two of AHS's

20

weight rooms, and effectively excluding female student athletes

21

from the use of a third weight room;

22

(f) Consistently providing less publicity and support for female

23

athletic teams than for male athletic teams, including not

24
".·~:~~i{~ =eo'ii~iIf;-itj~ir~i--~ni~rc6d thTough"42:V.:S.c:"§ 1983; theC~iif~~i~'bo;~ti~ti~~~ =-c." ~"-~ §§ Article 1, § 7; California Education Code 230 et seq.; and California
26 Government Code § 11135. Plaintiffs request Declaratory and all other relief
27 authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and § 2202.

28

3

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 4 of 23 Page ID #:11

providing cheerleaders, pep band, public address system,

2

3

(g)

4
5 Complaint, "i\ 5.

scoreboards and videotaping; and Failing to ensure appropriate funding to support female stude~1 athletes.

6

Defendants have intentionally discriminated against female student

7 athletes by funding, authorizing, constructing, renovating and maintaining Moor

8 Field, which is a state-of-the-art facility designed and intended primarily for male

9 student athletes. Id. at"i\ 6. The District and Individual District Defendants have

10 discriminated against female students at AHS by failing to provide the female

11 students with equal opportunity to participate in athletic programs. Id. at"i\ 7. As a

12 result, female students have been unable to participate in AHS team sports, have

13 been deterred from participating, or have been excluded from AHS's athletic

14 programs altogether. Id.

15

Defendant Lee-Sung is the principal of AHS. Id. at"i\ 17. Lee-Sung

16 has authority and control over the day-to-day operations of AHS, including its

17 policies, practices, procedures, facilities, maintenance, programs, activities,

18 services and employees in AHS's athletic department. Id.

19

Defendant Torres is the athletic director at AHS. Id. at ~ 18.

20 Defendant Sandoval is the vice principal of business and activities at AHS. rd. at

21 "i\ 19. Both Torres and Sandoval have authority and control over the day-to-day

22 operations of AHS, including its policies, practices, procedures, programs,

23 activities, s~rvices, coaches and teams. Id. at "i\"il 18, 19.

24

Defen~ant Vallejos is th~ President of the Alhambra School District

:"····:i~: "·:i3<iatii<ifEdiitaii6ri~(tlib:'~B6ara,,). 'I~r·it·~·20.D~ferid~rNJj{e~\£iKe~i?ru:{·· .

. - --~ ~-.-.

-'---

-

"

26 Vice-President. Id. at "il 21. Defendant Gin is the Clerk of the Board. Id. at"il 22.

27 Defendants Castro and Messina are Board Members. Id. at "il"il 23, 24. In their

28

4

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 5 of 23 Page ID #:12

official capacities as members on the Board, Vellejos, Nunez, Gin, Castro and ",
I,.J,
2 Messina are responsible for the actions of the District and for ensuring that the !~I
:5;
3 District complies with all state and federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination. Id, i,.r,
4 at ~~ 20-24.

5 The Proposed Class

6

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all present and future AHS

7 female students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or

8 are deterred from participating in athletics at AHS. ld. at ~ 26.

9 Sex-Based Discrimination In Athletic Treatment And Benefits

10

The District and Individual Defendants have unlawfully discriminated

11 against female athletes with respect to athletic treatment and benefits in areas

12 including, but not limited to: practice and competitive facilities; training facilities;

13 locker rooms; coaches and coaching facilities; scheduling of games and practice

14 times; publicity; and funding. ld. at ~ 37. All Defendants have discriminated

15 against AHS female student athletes by failing to provide equal access to the

16 facilities at Moor Field. ld. at ~ 37.

17

Moor Field Renovation

18

Around June 2002, the District and the City began upgrading Moor

19 Field, a piece ofland located about two miles from AHS and owned by the

20 District. ld. at ~ 39. The upgrade was a joint project, with the City providing

21 $900,000.00 to upgrade the school-owned field and the District contributing to its

22 upgrade and maintenance. Id. The City and the District jointly decided to

23 renovate the three fields~t Moor'Field by building two baseball diamonds .

24 exclusively for male student athletes and one multi-use field, which does not meet

_- =_~25~ _~~ft15al1 spe_cificationT".'Id._. ____ .._.________._______~,,___~___

26

The City's decision to not build a softball field at Moor Field is

27 consistent with its discriminatory conduct. ld. at ~ 40. No field within the City of

28

5

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 6 of 23 Page ID #:13

1 Alhambra has an appropriate softball field, while the City maintains five basebal~::,
2 fields for boys. Id. The City recently upgraded the baseball fields in one park, !~
,.':::.
3 again failing to build a place to play softball. Id.

4

Although the City and the District closely consulted AHS's head

5 baseball coach about the Moor Field renovation, they did not approach or inform

6 AHS head softball coach of the proposed upgrade. ld. at ~ 42. During planning

7 meetings for the Moor Filed renovation, which included District and City officials,

8 attendees discussed but intentionally disregarded discrimination issues. Id. at ~

9 44.

10

The Third Street Field

11

While AHS boys' baseball teams play at the state-of-the-art facility at

12 Moor Field, the girls play softball on a substantially inferior and dangerous field

13 located at AHS (hereinafter, the "Third Street Field"). !d... at ~ 45. The Third

14 Street Field is an unlevel, small dirt field with deep holes. Id. The ground is so

15 dry that falling on the field is like "sliding on concrete." Id. Because the field is

16 not level, many students trip as they attempt to run. ld. Also due to the

17 unevenness of the Third Street Field, the junior varsity home plate is flooded

18 during the rainy season. ld. The District's maintenance department refuses to lay

19 dirt on the softball field on a regular basis. Id. The condition of the field causes

20 injuries to female softball players. ld. at ~ 47.

21

Unlike the Moor Field, the Third Street Field does not have batting

22 cages, electronic scoreboards, pitching bullpens or cement dugouts. !d... at ~ 48.

23 Moreover, unlike the Moor Field diamonds, the Third Street Field has no pitching

24 rubber, home plate or protective fence where the pitcher warms up. Id. The
---== =-~-'-25~ =!?is§ct:~.~:Sandovarliavei.ie~ied~ll16ileyto~t~~ .sof!o.alr:pr~8!~riito-15uild. :---:--:--.

26 appropriate safety fencing. Id: The Third Street Field also has no electrical outlets

27 on the field, making it difficult to use a pitching machine to train players, it also

28

6

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 7 of 23 Page ID #:14

has no concession stand facilities, thus denying softball players the ability to rais~

I~.~I

2 much needed funds, and there is no cemented area for bleachers.3 lli

!;\i

3

ia. The Third Street Field is too small to accommodate girls' softbal1.

1/'

4 at ~ 49. The two girls' softball teams often play on the field at the same time and,

5 during games, the girls are forced to interrupt the regulation play when a fielder

6 from the other team misses a ball because the outfields overlap. Id.

7

The Small Gvm

8

The girls' basketball team is assigned the "small gym" for practice

9 while the boys' basketball team is allowed to practice in the "big gym." Id. at 50.

10 The girls basketball gym is not regulation size. Id. Therefore, the girls' basketball

11 team actually plays games in the "big gym." Id. The female basketball players

12 can use the big gym only if they practice before the boys, practice late in the

13 evening when the boys are done, or when the boys do not have practice. Id.

14

Training Facilities

15

Male student athletes have far greater access to weight training

16 facilities and weight training coaches than the female student athletes. Id. at ~ 51.

17 AHS has three weight rooms, including one at Moor Field and two at the school

18 facility. Id. The weight room at Moor Field is available to the football and boys'

19 baseball teams; girls are not permitted to use it. Id. One of the two weight rooms

20 at the school is assigned exclusively to the football team, and girls are prohibited

21 from accessing it. Id. The last weight room is open to girls; however, girls are

22 denied access while boys' wrestling, basketball and track teams use the room.

23 Moreover, on a few occasions when female athletes have been able to access the

24

___ ~_25.~ ~ __ :~: _______ .__. _____ ._ .__ ~___ ._____ . _ _

-

3 It is unclear from the allegations in the Complaint whether the Moor Field

26 has electrical outlets on the field, concession stand facilities or cemented areas for

27 blechers.

28

7

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 8 of 23 Page ID #:15

1 third weight room, they have been directed to leave when male athletes chose to CJ

2 use it, as male athletes are given priority. Id.

11J

3

Locker Rooms

4

The girls' locker facilities are dramatically inferior to the boys' locker

5 facilities. rd. at ~ 52. While male student athletes are provided three separate

6 locker rooms, female student athletes are provided only one-the physical

7 education ("PE") locker room. Id. The boys' locker room is larger than the girls,

8 providing boys with bigger and more lockers to store their athletic equipment. Id.

9

The condition of the girls' locker facilities are abysmal. rd. at ~ 53.

10 The showers in the girls' locker room have not worked for several years and the

11 toilets are frequently non-functioning andlor overflowing. Id. Because the toilets

12 frequently leak, the locker room often resembles a sewer and the girls cannot place

13 their equipment and clothes on the floor. Id. While male student athletes have

14 access to functioning showers and amenities in the additional male locker rooms,

15 female student athletes do not. Id. Moreover, the majority of lockers provided to

16 female student athletes in the girls' PE locker room are not large enough to store

17 uniforms or equipment, and the girls are not allowed to use and lock the lockers 18 overnight.4 Id. at ~ 54. Also, during home games, visiting male basketball teams

19 are allowed to use the boys' locker room located off the big gym while the AHS's 20 own girls' basketball players have been denied access. Id. at ~ 55.

21

Coaches and Coaching Facilities

22

The District and Individual District Defendants discriminate against

23 female student athletes by hiring walk-on coaches to head female teams while

24 providing male teams with coaches who are full-time teachers at AHS. Id. at ~ 56.

.......... ~~=-..;-="-"==

~"="~=~~-""

----------------

------------

~_ _ 25·_1I--"----:_--~-

4 It is unclear whether male student athletes at AHS are provided lockers

26 that are large enough to store their uniforms and equipment, and whether only

27 male student athletes may use the lockers overnight.

28

8

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 9 of 23 Page ID #:16

As a result, male athletes have greater access to their coaches who are located on, 1.-,
2 campus, whereas the coaches of female teams are frequently inaccessible to the :;~f
3 female student athletes during non-scheduled practice and game times. Id. at ~ ~k

j~t,

4

In addition, student athletes at AHS can sign up for 6th period classes

5 to play their particular sport during the Fall. Id. at ~ 57. Although the District has

6 a full-time teacher assigned to supervise the male baseball players during this

7 period, unless a softball coach works without pay, there is no girls' softball coach

8 available. Id.

9

The girls' basketball team also receives less coaching time. Id. at 58.

10 This is because neither the head coach nor the three assistant coaches are full-time

11 teachers. Id. at ~ 58. The District has not paid basketball coaches to supervise 6th

12 period. Id. At times, the girls' basketball team must practice late at night because

13 the walk-on coach was not available during the day. Id. The current girls' head

14 basketball coach is an ASH security guard who is unavailable to supervise the

15 girls during 6th period. Id. In contrast, the boys' basketball coach is a full-time

16 faculty member who is available during 6th period. Id. Moreover, three ofthe

17 four assistant coaches for the boys' basketball team are full-time employees at

18 AHS. ld.,

19

The coaches for the female student athletic teams at AHS have less

20 experience than the coaches of the male athletic teams. Id. at ~ 59. Moreover, the

21 District does not provide its walk-on coaches offemale sports teams with proper

22 office facilities. Id. at ~ 61. The tiny room given to the girls' basketball coach has

23 no electrical o.utlets and is too small to accommodate the team during half-time

24 and team meetings. Id. In contrast, the boys' basketball coach has an office large

- - - : 'leain-; -:--~-:2X ~~Iloi,lghto-aCCbffi!11pdJlttn.ndjQys

1fafreg:ctficarmmets~ -c6u~~s~stcirage=_~~:~;~ . .~-::--:-

~-~---~.---~---~~~--"

~'" ----~ - -

26 closets, a television and video recorder.

27

Scheduling Games and Practice Times

28

9

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 10 of 23 Page ID #:17

1

The District and Individual District Defendants discriminate against

.

0

2 female student athletes in the scheduling of games by assigning the most populai~

:;~:.

3 "prime time" slots (i.e., non-school nights or any day after 7:00 p.m.), girls are ;~

1/',

4 assigned to the earlier, less desirable afternoon time slots. Id. at ~ 62. As a result

5 of the unequal scheduling, less people attend the girls' games and the girls are

6 deprived of the opportunity to raise much needed funds through the sale of

7 programs and concessions. Id.

S

Publicity

9

The District and Individual District Defendants provide less publicity

10 and support for their female student athletic teams than for their male student

11 athletic teams, including cheerleaders, pep band, public address system,

12 scoreboards, and videotaping. Id. at ~ 63.

13

Funding

14

The District and Individual District Defendants provide less money to

15 support female athletes than male athletes. Id. at ~ 64. The District and Individual

16 District Defendants also interfere with and fail to properly support fund raising for

17 female athletes and their teams. I i

18 Failure To Effectively Accommodate Female Students' Interest And Abilities

19 In Athletics

20

The District and Individual District Defendants unlawfully

21 discriminate by failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities in all

22 girls' sports. Id. at ~ 66.

23

Girls' Softball

24

The District sponsors only two softball teams for female students at

25 AHS Gunior varsity and varsity), while it sponsors three baseball teams for boys

26 (freshman, junior varsity and varsity). Id. at ~ 70. As a result, the District offers

27 .significantly more participation opportunities to boys than to girls. Id.

- . -..

--.---.- - - - - - - .. ------- ... •.... ~---~-.------

... 10

...

....... ~..........

...

_.....

- ._-_ _-- .....

....

...... -~.--~-.--

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 11 of 23 Page ID #:18

1

Without a freshman team, 13 and 14-year-old freshman and r;'::'

:g 2 sophomore girls must compete for spots on the junior varsity and varsity teams

,~:~
3 against upper-class girls. Id. at ~ 71. For the 2002-03 season, approximately 50 :'5

V)

4 girls tried out for only 12 vacant slots on the softball team. Id.

S

Girls Basketball

6

The District sponsors four boys' basketball teams (freshman,

7 sophomore, junior varsity and varsity). Id. at ~ 71. In contrast, despite strong

8 interest from AHS girls who want to play basketball, the District only sponsors

9 three basketball teams for female students at AHS (freshman, junior varsity and

10 varsity). Id.

11

B. Procedural Summary

12

On March 4, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint for

13 injunctive relief.

14

On March 31, 2004, the District and Individual District Defendants

15 filed their Answer.

16

On April 21, 2004, the City filed its Answer.

17

On June 1,2004, the Court set the following deadline dates at the

18 Scheduling Conference: Motion for Class Certification - August 30,2004;

19 Discovery Cutoff - January 28,2005; Pretrial Conference and Trial - May 2,2005.

20

On July 19,2004, the Court approved the parties' Stipulation to

21 reschedule Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification to be filed no later than

22 September 13,2004.

23

On September 13, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class

24 Certification, which is currently before the Court.

25

26

27

28

11

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 12 of 23 Page ID #:19

1 II. DISCUSSION' r:J

2

A. Standard for Class Certification

:L2U..:'

, ,.~ .:::..

3

"Class actions have two primary purposes: (1) to accomplish judiciab

v'·

4 economy by avoiding multiple suits, and (2) to protect rights ofpersons who might

5 not be able to present claims on an individual basis." Haley v. Medtronic, Inc.,

6 169 F.R.D. 643 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Crown. Cork & Seal Co. v. Parking, 462

7 U.S. 345 (1983». Rule 23 governs class actions. A class action "may be certified

8 if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule

9 23(a) have been satisfied." Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.

10 147, 161 (1982).

11

"To certifY a class action, Plaintiff must set forth prima facie facts

12 that support the four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity (a class [so large]

13 that joinder of all members is impracticable); (2) commonality (questions oflaw or

14 fact common to class); (3) typicality (named parties' claims or defenses are typical

15 ... of the class); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives will fairly

16 and adequately protect the interests of the class)." Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig. v

17 Nadler, 213 FJd 454,462 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). These

18 requirements effectively "limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the

19 named plaintiff's claims." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of

20 Northwest v EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330. Because of the early and thus necessarily

21 speculative stage at which the certification hearing is held, an extensive

22 evidentiary showing is not required; rather, all that is required is enough for the

23

24

25

. 5 The Court notes the parties' noncompiiance with LocaIRules with respect

to typeface size and spacing requirements. The parties are reminded to strictly ,

26 follow Court rules. Future failure to comply with Court rules may result in

27 sanctions.

28

12

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 13 of 23 Page ID #:20

1 COurt to fonn a "reasonable judgment" on each requirement. See Blackie v.

I::J

2 Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,901 (9th Cir. 1975).

!;~!

,~,..

3

B. Plaintiffs' Have Met The Prima Facie Showing To Satisfy;3 '.......,

4

Rule 23(at

5

As stated above, Plaintiffs carry the burden to establish a prima facie

6 showing of Rule 23(a) prerequisites for certification by demonstrating that a

7 sufficient basis exists for forming a reasonable judgment on each requirement.

8 Plaintiffs maintain that each of the Rule 23(a)'s four criteria-numerosity,

9 commonality, typicality and adequate representation-is satisfied in the instant

10 case. For the reasons set forth below, this Court agrees.

11

1. Numerosity

12

To establish numerosity, a plaintiff must show that the class he seeks

13 to represent is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(I). "Plaintiffs do not need to state the exact number of

15 potential class members, nor is a specific number of class members required for

16 numerosity. Rather, whether joinder is impracticable depends on the facts and

17 circumstances of each case." Bates v. United Parcel Servs, 204 F.R.D. 440, 444

18 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The numerosity requirement imposes no numerical floor on

19 class size, but instead requires the court to examine each proposed class on its own

20 facts. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (lIth Cir. 1986).

21 When the class numbers at least forty, joinder is usually considered impracticable.

22 Conso!. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2nd Cir. 1995).

23

24

6 The Court is in receipt of two Oppositions filed on September 20, 2004.

25 One was filed by the City, and the other Opposition was filed by the District and

Individll.cal District Defendants. Both Oppositions present similar if not identical 26 arguments for denying class certification. As such, the Court does differentiate as

27 to which defendant(s) advance a particular argument.

28

13

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 14 of 23 Page ID #:21

1

In the instant matter, Plaintiffs seek an order certifYing a proposed

1=1

2 class consisting of all present and future AHS female students and potential !~;1

'~;,
3 students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participati~~

V"I
4 in athletics at AHS. Plaintiffs maintain, and Defendants do not dispute, that the

5 number of girls who participated in the athletic program at AHS totaled more and

6 254 during the 2003-2004 school year, more than 264 during the 2002-2003

7 school year, more than 207 during the 2001-2002 school year, and more than 292

8 during the 2000-2001 school year. (Declaration of Claudia Center ("Center

9 Decl."), Exh C). Furthermore, submissions made by the AHS to the California

10 Interscholastic Foundation list 345 female participants in athletic programs for the

11 2002-2003 school year. (Center Decl., Exh. G). Although the exact number of

12 members in Plaintiffs' proposed class is not specifically plead, Plaintiffs' motion

13 and Complaint make reasonably clear that they believe over two hundred female

14 athletes attending AHS annually are subjected to the alleged constitutional

15 violations. As such, the number ofproposed class members appears sufficiently

16 numerous to make joinder of all class members impracticable.

17

In opposition, Defendants argue that the existence of hundreds of

18 potential class members is based purely on speculation. However, in full view of

19 the aforementioned statistics with respect to the number offemales participating in

20 athletes per school year at AHS, Defendants argument is unavailing. Moreover,

21 the case law Defendants offer to support its position is inapplicable to the case at

22 bar. Specifically, Defendants offer Schwartz v. Upper Deck, 183 F.R.D. 672 (S.D.

23 Cal. 1999) and Siles v. ILGWU Nat'l Ret. Fund, 783 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1986) for

24 support.

25

In Schwartz, the trial court denied class certification because, among

26 other things, the plaintiff could not establish numerosity. See generally, Schwartz.

27 v. Upper Deck, 183 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The plaintiff in Schwartz

28

14

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 15 of 23 Page ID #:22

attempted to fashion a proposed class consisting of members who purchased ,::J
2 certain baseball cards. Id. at 681. To approximate the number of potential class!g
,t::<..
3 members, the plaintiff relied exclusively on the annual sales of certain baseball ;~)
1/"1
4 cards. Id. The trial court found the plaintiff's methodology wholly insufficient

5 because the class size "could range from as few as the class representatives, and

6 possibly some family and friends, to millions." Id. The trial court held that such

7 speculation defeats a finding of numerosity. Id. However, such speculation is not

8 present here, where the number of female AHS athletes can be reasonably

9 calculated by observing number of girls who have participated in AHS sports in

10 recent years.

11

Moreover, Siles is equally inapplicable. In Siles, like Schwartz, the

12 trial court denied class certification because, among other things, the plaintiff

13 could not establish numerosity. Siles v. ILGWU Nat'l Ret. Fund, 783 F.2d 923,

14 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1986). For reasons not relevant in the present matter, the trial

15 court determined that the plaintiff could not reasonably approximate or calculate

16 the number of putative class members. Id. at 930. The present case is vastly

17 different in that the number of class members is reasonably certain for reasons

18 stated above such that joinder would be impractible.

19

Furthermore, the Court notes that the present case involves a special

20 matter where the Court may consider the consider the number of future and

21 unknown students in the class. Jordan v. County o[Los Angeles, 669 F.2d l311,

22 1320 (finding that where the proposed class included "unnamed and unknown

23 future black applicants who may be discriminated against by the County's

. 24 employment practices," joinder was "inherently impracticable"); Pederson v.

25 Louisiana State Univ., 213 FJd 858, 868 n.ll (5th eir. 2000) (inclusion of future

26 students in class makes joinder impracticable); Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164

27 F.3d 113, 11 9 n.11 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Joinder of all relevant parties - when the class

28

15

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 16 of 23 Page ID #:23

1 includes current female high school students weighing the decision to attend I::.J
IlJ
2 Syracuse [University] based on its athletic offerings - is clearly impracticable.")~~

3 Therefore, under applicable case law the Court finds the numerosity requirementS
1/"1
4 of23(a)(1) satisfied.

5

2. Commonality

6

Rule 23(a)(2) requires there be questions oflaw and fact common to

7 the class. "The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than

8 the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Indeed, Rule 23(a)(2) has been

9 construed permissively." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 FJd 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

10 1998). The standard is particularly liberal where the plaintiffs "seek final

11 injunctive relief ... with respect to the class as a whole" under Rule 23(b)(2).

12 Walters v. Reno, 145 FJd 1032, 1045-46 (9th CiT. 1998).

13

To establish commonality, it is not necessary that every issue of law

14 or fact be identical for all class members or that all injuries be the same. "All

15 questions offact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of

16 shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as a common

17 core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class."

18 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 FJd 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998); Walters v. Reno,

. 19 145 FJd 1032, 1044 (9th CiT. 1998) ("Differences among the class members with

20 respect to the merits of their actual ... cases ... are simply insufficient to defeat

21 the propriety of class certification."); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017

22 (7th CiT. 1992) ("The fact that there is some factual variation among the class

23 grievances will not defeat a class action .... A common nucleus of operative facts

24 is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)."); Doe

25 v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1241-42 (C.D. Cal.

26 ·1999) ("[U)nder Rule 23(b)(2), commonality exists if plaintiffs share a common

27 harm or violation of their rights, even if individualized facts supporting the alleged

28

16

.., -.- . '.

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 17 of 23 Page ID #:24

harm or violation diverge.... In short, when addressing commonality of class 1::,

2 members proposed under Rule 23(b)(2), a court may employ a liberal definition 6f
z

3 commonality."). Despite the presence of individual factual questions, the

;:::;

tj"'l

4 commonality criterion of rule 23(a) is satisfied by the connllon questions oflaw.

5 Id.

6

Plaintiffs argue, and Defendants do not dispute, that the proposed

7 class members share common questions of law and fact. According to Plaintiffs,

8 these include, but are not limited to, whether Defendants have unlawfully

9 discriminated and continue to discriminate against the class members by:

10

1) Providing female AHS athletes with fewer and poorer quality

11

practice and competing facilities;

12

2) Renovating Moor Field for the primary benefit of male athletes,

13

thereby effectively excluding girl athletes from the state-of-the-

14

art facility;

15

3) Allocating hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Moor Field

16

renovation, and making no comparable allocation to facilities

17

used by girl athletes;

18

4) Failing to provide equal funding to girls' athletics as opposed

19

to boys' athletics;

20

5) Providing no or poorer quality lockers and locker rooms;

21

6) Providing no or poorer quality shower facilities;

22

7) Providing no or little access to weight rooms, while providing

23

boy athletes with access to three weight rooms;

24

8) Providing less access to consistent and quality coaching;

25

9) Denying the class members benefits of the sixth period practice

26

program;

27

28

17

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 18 of 23 Page ID #:25

"

1

10) Scheduling the class members' games at less desirable times D

IJJ

2

for spectators;

3

11) 'Providing less publicity and less cheerleading for female

4

competitions;

5

12) Providing class members' coaches with less compensation and

6

no or poor office space; and

7

13) Failing to provide the class members with equal athletic

8

participation opportunities.

9

Defendants do not dispute that these common issues satisfy the liberal

10 requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Although individual class members will have

11 distinct experiences with particular sports and/or coaches, such differences do not

12 extinguish the existence of common questions oflaw or fact. Indeed, the Ninth

13 Circuit has held that the existence of such divergent facts is not alone sufficient to

14 defeat a finding of commonality where shared legal issues are present. Jordan v.

15 Los Angeles County, 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The commonality

16 requirement is satisfied 'where the question oflaw linking the class members is

17 substantially related to the resolution of the litigation even though the individuals

18 are not identically situated."). Therefore, this Court finds sufficient common

19 questions oflaw and/or fact among the class members to meet the commonality

20 requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).

21

3. Typicality

22

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants also do not

23 dispute the existence of typicality among class members. Typicality requires that

24 the claims or ,defenses of the proposed class representatives be typical of the

25 . claims or defenses of the class as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Where

26 commonality looks to the relationship between the class members, typicality seeks

27 to ensure that the class representatives' claims are sufficiently similar to the

28

18

.,:'-

• <.,

. .'

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 19 of 23 Page ID #:26

,

1

interests of the absent class members. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159. While the named. u

2

representatives'

injuries

must

be

similar

to

the

class'

injuries

and

must

result

frorri~
:z:

3 the same injurious contact, the injuries need not be the same. Armstrong v. Davis::,
'f'
4 275 FJd 849, 68-69 (9th Cir. 2001). Where injuries are factually dissimilar, a

5 similarity in the supporting legal theory may control. In re United Energy Corp.

6 Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter mv.'s Secs. Wig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 256-57

7 (C.D. Cal. 1983). In the Ninth Circuit, "under ... Rule[ 23(a)'s] permissible

8 standards, representative claims are 'typical' if they are reasonably co-extensive

9 with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical."

10 Hanlon, 150 FJd at 1120. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 FJd 1011, 1020 (9th

11 Cir. 1998); California Rural Legal Assistance v. Legal Servs. Co., 917 F.2d 1171,

12 1175 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 23 does not require the named plaintiffs to

13 be identically situated with all other class members).

14

In this instance, the named Plaintiffs have alleged specific violations

15 under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the United States

16 Constitution, and California state law. No characteristics of the named

17 representatives appear to set them apart from the unnamed class members such as

18 to render their claims adverse to those they will represent. Here, Plaintiff Cerros

19 played basketbalI at AHS from 2000-2004. (Declaration of Jennifer Cerros, ~~

20 2,4). Plaintiff Cruz has played on the AHS softbalI team since 2003. (Declaration 21 of Lauren Cruz, ~ 2). Plaintiff Herrera played softball at AHS from 2000-2004.

22 (Declaration of Valerie Herrera, ~ 2). PlantiffGrempel started at AHS in Fall of

23 2004 and intends to play softball. (Declaration of Catherine Grempel). Presently

24 two of the plaintiffs, namely Cruz and Grempe1, are current female athletes at

25 AHS.

26

Plaintiffs, like the members of the proposed class, are alleged to have

27 been subjected to, or will be subjected to, an athletic program and school

28

19

..

. ,

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 20 of 23 Page ID #:27

1 administration that does not ensure Title IX compliance, and does not ensure equal I:J
2 participation opportunities for girl athletes. Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that :~

3 discrimination against class members occurs through, for example: (1) the

;5

4 assignment to less desirable practice times and inferior competition facilities; (2)

5 the assignment to inferior locker and shower facilities; (3) the unavailability of

6 particular coaches; and (4) the unequal allocation of funds. Because Plaintiffs'

7 claims rely on the same legal theory as the other class members' claims, Rule

8 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement is satisfied.

9

4. Adequate Representation

10

The final prerequisite posed by Rule 23(a) is that the representative

11 parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12 23(a)(4). "A named plaintiff will adequately represent the absent class members

13 if: (1) the attorney representing the class is qualified and competent; and (2) the

14 class representative does not have interests antagonistic to the remainder of the

15 class." Rodriguez v. Gates, 2002 WL 1162675, at *1, *8 (C.D. Cal. May 30,

16 2002) (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.

17 1978); See Hanlon, 150 FJd at 1120. "To determine if the attorney representing

18 the class is qualified, the court must consider his or her professional qualifications, 19 skills, experience, and resources." Rodriguez, 2002 WL 1162676, at *8.7 In the

20 present matter, Counsel makes a prima facie demonstration of its competence and

21 qualifications by showing prior experience litigating complex class actions.

22

To the extent that only a prima facie showing is required that the

, 23 =named Plaintiffs iidequate1il'epresent theinteresf of the putative'class;"Rule

24 23(a)(4),will n()t be grounds for denial of certification. In the present case, there is,

,

,

';'6_25, ~"",:~;' \. .~,:., ',1 ':: ' • '",:-,L/ :' ,,' , "',

.'_

","7'Becauseplliiiitiffsrhllst 'oril)iiliiike'a pririiaTacieshowing of adequacy of '

.counsel at this stage, the Court accepts'counsel's declaration of competency and

27 experience at face value.

28

20

: .,
- • c, " "

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 21 of 23 Page ID #:28

no indication that the named Plaintiffs have colIusive interests antagonistic to

2 those of the remainder of the putative class. Rather, the Court fmds the class
3 representatives' interests are comparable to the interests of absent class members~5
1,..-,
4 Specifically, the class representatives are similarly situated with the proposed class

5 in that each AHS female athlete has recently been, is currently, or will be,

6 subjected to gender discrimination as described in the Complaint, and each is

7 similarly interested in obtaining a court order forcing Defendants to stop the

8 alleged discriminatory treatment.

9

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs are represented by competent and

10 qualified counsel. Plaintiffs are represented by the California Woman's Law

11 Center, which Plaintiffs assert has experience in enforcing Title IX and other laws

12 barring sex discrimination in public schools and universities. Plaintiffs are also

13 represented by the Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center, which Plaintiffs

14 maintain has extensive experience in litigating complex class action lawsuits on

15 behalf of women, minority groups, and persons with disabilities. Defendants do

16 not dispute the competence or adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel in representing the

17 proposed class. Rather, Defendants argue that "it is unreasonable to expect a

18 public entity, such as a school district, to pay attorneys fees for five separate

19 attorneys where one competent attorney would suffice. Plaintiffs' position can

20 only be perceived as a means of accruing unreasonable attorneys' fees."

21 (Alhambra School District's Opposition 10:20-22). Defendants' contention is

22 nonresponsive to the issue of adequate representation and therefore rejected.

23

For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that the "adequate

.. --';;-'

~.

_-,:_.:..c:24",representation" requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.

25

B. The Requirements for Final I,njunctive Relief

. _,.,

26

In additi~n to satistyingthe pre;eq~isites-ofRule 23(a), an acti\m may'

27 be maintained as a class action only if one of Rule 23(b)'s subdivisions are

, 28

21

...... . '.

----~-----
Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 22 of 23 Page ID #:29

1 satisfied. Here, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief only, and therefore properly mo~;

2 to certifY the class under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) permits an action to !;¥

.

:2

3 proceed as a class action if "the party opposing the class has acted or refuse~ to (gt

1/"1
4 on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final

5 injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

6 whole."

7

I. Defendants Acted on Grounds Generally Applicable to All

8

Members ofthe Proposed Class Making Final Injunctive Relief

9

Proper Pursuant to Rule 23(0)(2)

10

As discussed above, Defendants allegedly have engaged, and

11 continue to participate, in gender discrimination in violation of Title IX, the

12 United States Constitution, and California state law by failing and/or refusing to

13 provide girl athletes at AHS with equal or substantiaIIy similar opportunities and

14 amenities as afforded to male athletes. Therefore, it appears that Defendants, as

15 the party opposing .class certification, have "acted or refused to act on grounds

16 generaIly applicable to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). As such, this Court

17 finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied their requirements for final injunctive relief

18 pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).

19 III

20 III

21 III

22 III

23 III

-24 ·111· __ w~

"~

2..5-

III
. ---

26 III

27 III

28

22

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 51 Filed 10/04/04 Page 23 of 23 Page ID #:30

1 III. CONCLUSION

CI

2 3

In light of the foregoing, this Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification for prospective injunctive relief. The Court certifies the

~~
::25:

1/")
4 plaintiff class as all present and future Alhambra High School female students and

5 potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from

6 participating in athletics at AHS.

7

8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9

t 10/4/ 10 DATED:

o

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DICKRAN TEVRIZIAN DickTan Tevrlzian, Judge United States District Court
23

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 149 Filed 02/27/06 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:92

1

Vickv L. Barker SBN 119520 CAL1FORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

2

6300 Wilshire Blvd" Suite 980 Los Angeles CA 9v048

3

Telephone: (323) 951-9276 FacsImile: (323) 951-9870

4 Patricia Shiu SBN 104894

5

Claudia Center SBN 158255
ETHlizEabLeEtGh AKLrisAteIDn SsBoNcm2i1822-,'

6 EMPLOYMENT LAW [ER '.

600 Harrison Street,S \

7 San Francisco, CA

1,$;'~ / \ ' ,~~

8

Teleph~m~: (415 ~6'~" 8, ' Facsllmle. (415 6g.-1>;l9 ,

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Attorneys

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'CENTI~0f' $~;RI~T OF CALIFORNIA

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13 LAUREN M. CRUZ, 'tJ,y;~ "ext friend Case No. CV 04-1460 -

Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by

14 her next friend Carolina Herrera; 15 JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINE ~] Order Granting Plaintiffs'

GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina

Motion for Award of Reasonable

16 Grempel, individually and on behalf of Attorneys' Fees and Costs

17 all those similarly situated,

18
19 vs.

Plaintiffs,

Date: January 31, 2006 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom of the Honorable Dickran
Tevrizian

20 ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

21 THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEE-SUNG, VICTOR

22 SANDOVAL, LOU TORRES,

23

WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS, JOHN H. NUNEZ, ROBERT L. GIN, RUTH E.

24 CASTRO, and BARBARA A.

25 MESSINA, in their official capacities,

CLASS ACTION
"" ...." 1".1",1. ('\~.,\

26

Defendants.

27

28

C"ase 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 149 Filed 02/27/06 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:93

,'""
Plaintiffs', Motion for an Award of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Cost~j :,»
2 came on for hearing on January 31, 2006. Having reviewed the papers and ,';
v
3 evidence in support of and opposing this motion, and having carefully

4 considered the arguments of counsel and the parties, the Court hereby

5 GRANTS plaintiffs' motion awarding fees in the amount of$ '335. S3t. 4-3 and

J
6 costs in the amount of $ 1'1 Cj 6:>B.~(..

)

!

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8
Dated: 2/2..'1 ) l.? (".

,- \"t· DICKRAH TEVRIZIAH

9

THE HONORABLE DICKRAN TEyRlZIAN

United States District Court

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
28 Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities in Support of Class Certification

Page 1

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 1 of 22 Page ID #:94
"

filED
CLEnl:, US DISTRICT COURT

2

FEB 272006

r::l
IJJ

3

,,,,-
.:~~~~

CENTRAL DOIlSTRIC1 OF ciii:iF6i1iii~

BY

DEPUf\'

.,.,.

Vl

4 5 6

',' "
i~ ",,;', FEB 2S2006

, "
; I:"J;C"I''''''''''~L' .

' F CAt.lf)OPI'lNuI/n'\ , ;..-

XX ;P~r~iOo~riittyy
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1S5-5/JS-6 _

7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1S5Sc--a22n1I1OS5-3nl-y_

8

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 LAUREN M. CRUZ,!, by her next friend 10 Jean Cruz; VALERI.t HERRERA by her
next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER 11 N. CERROS' CATHERINE GREMPEL,
by her next friend Tina Grempel, 12 individually and on behalf ofall those
similarly situated,

13

Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

CASE NO. CV 04-1460 DT (Mcx) ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

15 ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT 16 THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL
LEE-SUNG, VICTOR SANDOVAL, LOU TORRES WILLIAM.,A. 17 VALLEJOS, JOHN H. NUNEZ,
18 aRnOdBBEARRTBLA. RGAINA.RMUETSHSEIN. ACA, iSnTtRheOir,
19 official capacities,

20

Defendants.

21 I. BACKGROUND

22

A. Factual Summary

23

Because the parties are generally familiar with the factual and

24 procedural history of this case, the Court does not recount them here except as

25 necessary to explain its decision in response to the issues raised herein. Plaintiffs

26 Lauren M. Cruz ("Cruz"), Valerie Herrera ("Herrera"), Jennifer N. Cerros

27 ("Cerros"), Catherine Grempel ("GrempeJl"), and all others similarly situated
28
15{)

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 2 of 22 Page ID #:95

,
1 (collectively "Plaintiffs")! brought this class action pursuant to Federal Rule of

2 Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(a) and (b)(2) for injunctive relief against defendants

3 Alhambra School District (the "School District"), School District employees

4 Russell Lee-Sung ("Lee-Sung"), Victor Sandoval ("Sandoval"), Lou Torres

1/)

5 ("Torres"), William A. Vallejos ("Vallejos"), John H. Nunez ("Nunez"), Robert L.

6 Gin ("Gin"), Ruth E. Castro ("Castro"), and Barbara A. Messina ("Messina")

7 (collectively, "School District Defendants"), and the City of Alhambra (the "City")

8 (all defendants collectively known as "Defendants") for unlawful sex

9 discrimination against female student athletes at Alhambra High School ("AHS")

10 pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the United States

11 Constitution, the California Constitution, and California state anti-discrimination 12 laws.2

13

14

!As of the date the Complaint was filed on March 4,2004: Plaintiff Cruz

15 was a 15-year-old female who played softball as an Alhambra High School

("AHS") student, and proceeds in this action by her next friend, her mother, Jean

16 Cruz; Plaintiff Herrera was a 17-year-old female who played softball as an AHS

17 student, and proceeds in this action by her next friend, her mother, Carolina

Herrera; Plaintiff Cerros was an 18-year-old female who played basketball as an

18 AHS student; and Plaintiff Grempel was a 14-year-old female who proceeds in this

19 action by her next friend, her mother, Tina Grempel. Complaint, ~~ 11-14. At the

time the Complaint was filed, Grempel attended Emory Park School in Alhambra,

20 California; however, she was to attend AHS starting Fall 2004, and intended to

21 play softball and track and field as an AHS student. rd. at ~ 14. According to

Plaintiffs, Grempel now attends AHS. The First Amended Complaint reflects the 22 identical information with respect to these plaintiffs.

23
2 Plaintiffs rely on the following statutes: Title IX of the Education

24 Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. and its interpreting regulations;

25 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the California Constitution,

26 Article 1, § 7; California Education Code §§ 230 et seq.; and California

27 Government Code §§ 11135 and 53080. Plaintiffs request Declaratory and all

28

2

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 3 of 22 Page ID #:96

The class was certified on October 4, 2004. After more than I year

2

of mediation and negotiation with the assistance of the Court, the parties reached a

Cj
LU

3 resolution of all claims, which is memorialized in two settlement agreements an .::=,~i:~:.

(~.'I

4 agreement between Plaintiffs and School District Defendants entitled Joint

1/',1

5 Resolution Agreement and Order for Continuing Court Jurisdiction (hereinafter 6 "Joint Resolution Agreement"), and an agreement between Plaintiffs and the City 7 entitled Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs and defendant City of

8 Alhambra.

9

On December 19,2005, the Court preliminarily approved these

10 settlements, including the form of notice. Notice was achieved by December 23,

11 2005, including a distribution of more than 3,000 copies to AHS students on 12 December 21, 2005. On January 9, 2006, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and 13 the certified Class, together with School District Defendants and defendant City, 14 jointly sought from this Court the entry of an Order pursuant to Federal Rule of 15 Civil Procedure 23 for final approval of the settlements as fair, reasonable, and 16 adequate. On January 31,2006, this Court granted the parties' Joint Motion For 17 Final Approval Of Class Action Settlements.3

18

Presently before this Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reasonable

19 Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

20 II.
21
22

DISCUSSION
A. Standard For Attornevs' Fees
1. The "American Rule"

23

24
other relief authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
25
3As a result of the Agreements secured by Plaintiffs counsel, School 26 District will spend at least $3.5 million on facilities for the class. Defendant City
27 will spend $500,000 for a total of at least $4 million.

28

3

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 4 of 22 Page ID #:97

1

The well-established "American Rule" followed by the United States

2 Supreme Court" provides that a prevailing party may not collect attorney's fees

3 absent some statutory or contractual authorization. Fleischmann Distilling Corp.

4 v. Majer Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).

5

2. Attorney's Fees For A Prevailing Defendant Under 42 U,s.c.

6

§1988

7

Ordinarily, a prevailing party may not collect attorney's fees. See Dogherra

8 v. Safeway Stores Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th CiT. 1982) (citing Alyeska

9 Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). However, 42

10 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in relevant part that "in any action or proceeding to

11 enforce a provision of sections ... 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986 ... the

12 court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United

13 States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1988

14 (2003). When determining whether attorney fees are warranted, some factors for

15 the court to consider are: "(1) the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3)

16 motivation; (4) reasonableness of the losing party's factual and legal arguments;,

17 and (5) the need, in particular circumstances, to advance consideration of

18 compensation and deterrence." Ent. Res. Group. Inc. V. Genesis Creative Group,

19 Inc., 122 F. 3d 1211, 1229 (9th Cir. 1997).

20

B. Analysis4

21

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' request for prevailing party

22 attorney's fees in the total sum of $839,579.08. This amount reflects a lodestar of

23

24

4School District Defendants and defendant City filed separate Oppositions

25 to Plaintiffs' Motion. Because the substance of both Oppositions are substantially

similar, the Court does not differentiate between these defendants' Oppositions in

26 this Order unless necessary to pinpoint a particular argument or statement by the

27 respective defendant.

28

4

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 5 of 22 Page ID #:98

$671,663.27 with a requested 1.25 enhancement. Plaintiffs contend that they are

2 entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses pursuant to

3 Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons

4 discussed below, this Court grants in part Plaintiffs Motion.

5

I. Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorneys . fees and

6

costs

7

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under

8 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.5 Section 1988's purpose is to ensure "effective access to

9 the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v.

10 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

11 Thus, prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless

12 special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id.

13

a. Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties

14

It is indisputable that the favorable settlements obtained by Plaintiffs

15 qualify plaintiffs as the "prevailing" or "successful" parties in this litigation.

16 Plaintiffs qualify as "prevailing parties" when they have achieved judicially

17 enforceable relief that "materially alters the legal relationship between the parties

18 by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the

19 plaintiff." Richard S. v. Dep't ofDev. Servs., 317 FJd 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)

20 (quoting Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 FJd 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.

21 2002)). That judicially enforceable relief may be obtained by settlement: "A

22 plaintiff 'prevails,' and thus is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, when he or she

23
5Section 1988 reads, in relevant part, "[i]n any action or proceeding to 24 enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1977A, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the 25 Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983,1985,1986], title IX of Public Law 92-
318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the 26 prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...." 42 27 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

28

5

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 6 of 22 Page ID #:99

enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement with the defendant."

2 Richard S., 317 F.3d at 1086 (citing Barrios, 277 FJd at 1134).

3

. This statutory scheme does not require a finding that plaintiffs would ::f.

Ll

4 have prevailed on the merits had the case continued: "'Nothing in the language of v'

5 § 1988 conditions the District Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the

6 issues or on a judicial determinatiori that the plaintiffs' rights have been violated.'"

7 Sablan v. Dep't ofFin. of the Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d

8 1317, 1324 (9th Cir. 1988)(quoting Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980».

9 Rather, plaintiffs are entitled to fees if their action was "not frivolous,

10 unreasonable or groundless." See,~, Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1327 (internal

11 quotations and citation omitted).

12

Plaintiffs' claims were far from "frivolous, unreasonable or

13 groundless." The parties have entered into Agreements that provide the very relief

14 Plaintiffs sought. These Agreements are legally enforceable by this Court-which

15 retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the terms of the Agreements.

16 Therefore, plaintiffs are the prevailing parties and are entitled to reasonable

17 attorneys' fees.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 7 of 22 Page ID #:100

b. No Special Circumstances Make the Award of Fees

2

and Costs Unjust

3

Consistent with the purposes of civil rights fee-shifting statutes, the

4 court's discretion to deny a fee award is narrow. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.

5 Carey, 447 U.S. 54,68 (1980). Courts have a great deal of discretion in granting

6 attorney fees; however, if fees are denied in full, reasons for said denial must be

7 articulated. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1989);

8 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). "Absent 'special circumstances,' fees

9 should be awarded." New York Gaslight Club, at 68 (internal quotation and

10 citations omitted). "The defendant has the burden of showing special

11 circumstances warrant a denial offees, (citation omitted), and the defendant's

12 showing must be a strong one, (citation omitted)." Herrington, 883 F,2d at 744.

13

Here, there are no "special circumstances" that would render an

14 award "unjust." Plaintiffs have obtained significant reforms to the policies,

15 facilities and athletic opportunities available to the class. As such, their action

16 squarely fits the purpose the fee-shifting statute and there is nothing "unjust"

17 about compensating plaintiffs' counsel for their work. See,~, Bauer v.

18 Sampson, 261 FJd 775,786 (9th Cir. 2001).

19

Although Defendants argue that it is unjust to award fees in a case

20 involving a public school because such fees may send the public entity into

21 bankruptcy, their argument is unavailing. See,~, Hall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs,

22 707 F.2d 464, 465 (11 th Cir. 1983); Lopez v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
23 Case No. CV 99-03260 sr, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. August 16,2005) (Order

24 Awarding Fees and Costs ("Lopez Order"). Defendants do not offer case law to

25 demonstrate otherwise. "The traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting"

26 remains necessary to advance our national interest in civil rights enforcement in

27 school settings. McPherson v. Sch. Dist. No. 186, Springfield, Ill., 465 F. Supp.

28

7

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 8 of 22 Page ID #:101

749,755 (C.D. Ill. 1978) (quoting from Senate Report No. 94-1011 on section

2 1988) ("The greater resources available to governments provide an ample base

D IJJ

3 from which fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against

4 governmental officials or entities." (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

5

Furthermore, financial circumstances are not a "special circumstance"

6 justifying a denial or reduction of an otherwise reasonable fee. Schwartz &

7 Kirklin, 1983 Litigation, § 6.8, p. 348; see also. ~, Inmates of Allegheny County

8 Jail v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 177, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[t]he losing party's financial

9 ability to pay is not a 'special circumstance,' whether that party is a public or a

10 private agency." (internal citations omitted)).

11

In providing for statutory fees with no exception for public entity

12 defendants, Congress prioritized Section 1983's enforcement and deterrence

13 purposes. See,~, Burt v. Hennessey. 929 F.2d 457, 458 (9th Cir. 1991) ("In

14 authorizing attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights suits, the Senate

15 stated that '[i]fprivate citizens are able to assert their civil rights, and if those who

16 violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then

17 citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these

18 rights in court. "').

19

Upon review of the case law and the arguments presented, there are

20 no special circumstances to make an award of attorneys' fees unjust. As such

21 Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees.6

22

23

24

25

6Defendants make a passing argument that Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and

costs are somehow "punitive" in nature. However, Defendants provide no legal

26 support for their assertion, and as such, this Court finds Defendants' contention

27 unpersuaslve.

28

8

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 9 of 22 Page ID #:102

c. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs require a

2

downward adjustment1

3

The determination of the reasonableness of plaintiffs' claim for

u"'";F

4 attorneys' fees begins with a determination of the lodestar, which is calculated by (f)

5 multiplying the reasonable hourly rates by the number of hours reasonably spent.

6 See, b,g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The lodestar method for determining

7 reasonable fees in civil rights cases was established in three Supreme Court

8 decisions, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

9 424 (1983), and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,

10 478 U.S. 546 (1986).

11

In the instant case, Plaintiffs contend that the total lodestar is

12 $671,663.27. See Shiu Dec!. '[~42-43 & Exhs. C & E. This amount is based on

13 1,439.43 hours claimed by The Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center

14 ("LAS-ELC") and 626.80 hours claimed by California Woman's Law Center

15 ("CWLC"). Shiu Dec!. ~~40-41. According to Plaintiffs, the lodestar does not

16 include over 381 hours of compensable time deleted in the exercise of billing

17 judgment, an almost 16 percent reduction. See Shiu Decl. ~~40-44. In addition,

18 Plaintiffs request a 1.25 lodestar enhancement. Plaintiffs therefore seek a total

19 amount for fee-related services to date, with the requested 1.25 multiplier

20 enhancement,of$839,579.08.

21

22

23

7To support a downward adjustment of attorneys' fees, Defendants offer the

Declaration of Kenneth M. Moscaret ("Moscaret"), who Defendants maintain is an

24 expert in the field of attorneys' fees. In response, Plaintiffs filed Objections To

25 The Declaration of Kenneth M. Moscaret. seeking to disallow Moscaret's

opinions. Because this Court did not require Moscaret's declaration to justify

26 reducing Plaintiff's attorneys' fee award, this Court need not rule on Defendants'

27 objections at this time.

28

9

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 10 of 22 Page ID #:103

1. Plaintiffs' lodestar amount is excessive

2

a. The number ofhours claimed are

1::1
UJ

3

unreasonable

4

Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for every hour reasonably

5 spent to vindicate their clients' interests: "Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent

6 results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally, this will

7 encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation ...." Hensley, 461

8 U.S. at 435. "[A] fee petitioner carries the burden of establishing entitlement to

9 the compensation claimed by showing that the numbers claimed were expended

10 reasonably." Real v. The ConCI Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 736, 740 (N.D. Cal.

11 1987). Once the plaintiff has presented a fully-documented claim, the burden

12 shifts to the defendants to show by specific evidence that the number of hours

13 claimed is not reasonable. See Gates v. Gomez, 60 FJd 525,534 (9th Cir. 1995).

14

In the instant case, several factors show that the number of hours

15 claimed is unreasonable. This Court has carefully analyzed the legitimate, actual,

16 and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in this matter versus what Plaintiffs

17 contend they accrued. Upon this Court's comprehensive and intimate

18 understanding of this case through the course of litigation, and the extensi ve

19 settlement conferences conducted before this Court as between the parties, this

20 Court finds that a 50% reduction in fees iswarranted.8

21

22

8This Court, in arriving at a 50 percent reduction in attorneys' fees, has

23 considered and rejected Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' fees must be

reduced because Plaintiffs did not bring their concerns to the attention of the

24 School District prior to filing this action. A review of the record strongly suggests

25 that the School District knew of the Title IX violations long before the Complaint

in this matter was filed on March 4, 2004,' yet School District failed to adequately

26 address or remedy the violations. According to Defendants, "had Plaintiffs [sic]

27 counsel come to the School District and attempted to resolve the matter, the

28

10

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 11 of 22 Page ID #:104

As a preliminary matter, this Court acknowledges that this case was

2 not a complex matter. Plaintiffs counsel attempt to designate this matter as a

3 complex class action, and use this as a basis for multiple attorneys and numerous

4 staff members to bill. This is not the case here. During the course of this action,

5 the only motion heard was a Motion for Class Certification. Moreover, only three

6 (3) depositions took place. This litigation does not demonstrate the markings of a

7 complex one, whereby the Court may engage in any or all of the following:

8 designate duties to appointed lead and liaison counsel; define designated counsel's

9 functions early in the litigation; make a determination for the method of

10 compensation; order that specified records be kept (including, in some cases,

II periodic reports in anticipation of an attorney fee award); made and establish

12 arrangements for compensation; and establish guidelines covering staffing, hourly

13 rates, and estimated charges. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, §§

14 14.214 and 14.215 (2004). The record does not support Plaintiffs' representation

15 that this case was complex. This determination bears directly on the hours

16 purportedly involved in litigating this case and favors a downward adjustment of

17 the lodestar figure.

18

Federal district courts in California are permitted to make "across-the-

19 board" percentage reductions in the claimed billings in fee-shifting cases, so long

20 as they explain the reasons why the billings are being reduced and how they

21 arrived at those reductions. Gates v. Deukmeiian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir.

22
23 'School District would have attempted to resolve the issues. See Declaration of Harold Standerfer, ~ 3." (School District Opposition, 4:26-27). Defendants'
24 conj ecture does not justify a reduction of attorneys' fees. This Court disagrees 25 with Defendants that Plaintiffs engaged in an unorthodox "tactic in not attempting
to resolve the matter prior to initiating Federal Court litigation [which] speaks 26 bounds of bad faith tactics and warrants a complete denial of an award of 27 attorneys' fees." (School District Opposition, 5:8-11).

28

11

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 12 of 22 Page ID #:105

1992). As the Ninth Circuit has held, "Despite the 'concise but clear' requirement,

2 in cases where a voluminous fee application is filed in exercising its billing

;~

:1 3 judgment the district court is not required to set forth an hour-by-hour analysis of

L~i

4 the fee request." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)

1/1

5 (citing Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559,562 (1st Cir. 1987), In re "Agent

6 Orange" Product Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1987) ("no item-by-

7 item accounting of the hours disallowed is necessary or desirable"), and Ohio-

8 Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1985)).

9 "When faced with a massive fee application the district court has the authority to

10 make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in

11 the final lodestar figure' as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee

12 application.'" Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

13 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey., 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d

14 Cir. 1983»; Dagget v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793797-98 (3rd Cir. 1987);

15 Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 97-98 (7th Cir. 1986); Mares v. Credit Bureau

16 of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1986) (77% reduction in hours».

17

An across-the-board percentage reduction is justified. First, this

18 litigation involved unnecessary duplication of efforts. Duplication of effort

19 between attorneys is inappropriate and not compensable. See Harrington v.

20 County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 1989). All class counsel billed

21 time to draft, review and revise various pleadings and documents submitted in

22 connection with this matter. Multiple attorneys appeared at the various hearings,

23 including mediation and court appearances. For instance, at the January 31, 2005

24 mediation, five (5) attorneys appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, three (3) of whom

25 were from San Francisco. The following day, four (4) attorneys (three (3) from

26 San Francisco) appeared at a site inspection at Alhambra High School. In the span

27 of three days, from January 30, 2005 to February 1,2005, Plaintiffs' counsel

28

12

I ! Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 13 of 22 Page ID #:106

1 claimed fees in excess of$33,748.50, plus costs of$4,892.82. See Declaration of

2 Gary Gibeaut, ~'r 8-11, and Exh. J. Plaintiffs offer no sufficient explanation as to

,."J
I"Ll

3 why multiple attorneys were necessary. Plaintiffs merely contend, without

4 adequate discussion, that this case involved "a range of difficult legal and factual

5 issues ... [and t]o meet these demands, a team of counsel was required, as was an

6 efficient and effective division of responsibilities." (Reply to School District's

7 Opposition, 18: 11-13). However, in light of the low complexity of this case, this

8 Court finds Plaintiff's representation that they "made every effort to avoid

9 unnecessary fees" disingenuous and finds that an unnecessary duplication of

10 resources strongly favors a reduction of fees. Democratic Party of Washington

11 State v. Reed, 388 FJd 1281, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 2004).

12

The following are only some examples of unreasonable duplication of

\3 efforts by Plaintiffs' counsel:

14

Exhibit

Number of Total Hours Billed

15
16 H-l: Complaint
17 H-2 Discovery H-3: Class Certif.
18
Stipulation
19
H-4: Depositions
20
H-5: Class Certif. Motion 21 H-6: Reply re: Class 22 Certif. Motion 23 H-7 Mediation

Billers 5 5 5
6 5 5
3

31 hours, 52 mins. 30 hours, 45 mins. 10 hours, 32 mins.
115 hours, 18 mins. 99 hours, 24 mins. 24 hours, 30 mins.
24 hours, 30 mins.

24 Stmt/Brief 25 H-8 School District

4

115 hours, 37 mins.

26 Settlement Agreement

27

28

13

Total Fees
$10,168.43 $8,455.26 $2,207.00
$30,702.00 $32,285.00 $10,740.50
$7,387.50
$41,153.40

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 14 of 22 Page ID #:107

Upon careful review of the evidence of record, this Court finds an

2 unnecessary duplication of resources. Plaintiffs do not justify how such

t::l
IJJ

3 duplicative efforts can legitimately be passed onto Defendants. Hensley v.

4 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) ("In the private sector, 'billing judgment' is

5 an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are

6 not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary

7 pursuant to statutory authority.") (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S. App.

8 D.C., 390,401 (1980) (en bane) (emphasis in original)). As such, a percentage

9 reduction is reasonable under the facts of this case.

10

Second, especially in light of the fact that this case is not considered a

11 complex matter, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel engaged in excessive

12 inter- and intra-office conferencing. In In re Olsen, 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir.

13 1989), the Court stated:

14

The attorneys also engaged in a plethora of

15

conferences, most often denoted simply as 'strategy'

16

conferences, consuming the time of several attorneys

17

who billed at very high rates. The hourly rates

18

charged are of such magnitude as to indicate that the

19

attorneys should have been able to decide on the

20

proper strategy without the great number of strategy

21

conferences attended by numerous firm lawyers.

22 Olsen, 884 F.2d at 1429.

23

Plaintiffs contend that their "conferencing time was eminently

24 reasonable for a case of this magnitude and scope. In a case with voluminous

25 paper discovery, a number of depositions, motions practice, and intense settlement

26 discussions, conferencing is essential to achieve organization and coordination."

27 (Reply to School District's Opposition, 20:12-15). Plaintiffs overstate the

28

14

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 15 of 22 Page ID #:108

magnitude and scope of this litigation. As noted above, during the course of this

2 action, only a motion for class certification was decided and only three depositions !B

.::::.

3 were taken. Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that the majority of hours incurred in ::[

u

4 this matter were in drafting and negotiating settlement terms.

Ij~

5

Plaintiffs' counsel's inter- and intra-office conferences represent

6 nearly 264 hours at a total requested amount of$84,770.22. Plaintiffs' counsel

7 provides no adequate explanation to justifY the hours spent. This Court finds that

8 Plaintiffs' counsel's inter- and intra-office conferences are excessive, further

9 justifying a reduction ofthe lodestar amount.

10

Third, a review of Plaintiffs' counsel's invoices reveal that Plaintiffs

11 improperly request fees for certain non-billable clerical and administrative tasks

12 performed by law students and paralegals. Such tasks include filing documents,

13 making and printing, bate labels, retrieving documents for attorneys, copying

14 documents, calling copy services to arrange for documents to be photocopied,

15 calendaring matters, setting up databases for "document control," delivering

16 documents, arranging conference calls, transcribing documents, and organizing

17 files. Courts have held that time spend on such tasks is not compensable.

18 Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1,6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim for overhead

19 and secretarial expenses because it is encompassed by attorney's fee); Missouri v.

20 Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274,288 n.lO (1989) ("clerical or secretarial tasks

21 should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of whom performs them"); see

22 also Keithe v. Volpe, 644 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1986).

23

Plaintiffs' counsel has failed to eliminate non-compensable time

24 entries as well as failed to properly reduce their fees for partially billable tasks.

25 Examples of such entries are as follows:

26

27

28

15

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 16 of 22 Page ID #:109

1 Exhibit 2 E-! : Non-Billable Tasks:

Total Hours Billed (approx.) Total Fees

10 112 hours

$1,275.00

3 LAS-ELC

4 E-2: Non-Billable Tasks

35 112 hours

$4,779.50

E-3: Partially Billable Tasks: 170 hours
5

$19,698.95

LAS-ELC
6
E-4: Partially Billable Tasks: 4 hours
7
CWLC
8

$526.00

The evidence of such time entries strongly weighs in favor of
9

10 reducing Plaintiffs' counsel's requested fees.

Fourth, as discussed immediately below, the hourly rates Plaintiffs'
11
12 counsel requests for time expended in this case are not shown to be reasonable.

b. Plaintiffs' counsel's rates are not proven to
13
be reasonable
14
Plairitiffs' counsel is entitlcd to the hourly rates that are proven to be
15
16 "in line with" the rates charged by attorneys of comparable experience, expertise,

17 and skill for comparable work. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,895 n.11

18 (1984). The fair market value of the work is generally determined by rates

charged by commercial firms for comparable complex federal litigation. Davis v.
19
20 City & County of San Francisco, 972 F.2d 1536, 1548 (9th Cir. 1992); see also

21 City & County of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. at 1431 (plaintiffs' attorneys

22 entitled to rates charged by "corporate attorneys of equal caliber"); Jordan v.

23 Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The prevailing market

24 rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate.").

The Supreme Court spoke on the subject of rates in Blum v. Stenson,
25
26 465 U.S. 886 (1984):

In seeking some basis for a standard, courts have
27

28

16

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 17 of 22 Page ID #:110

1

required prevailing attorneys to justify the

2

reasonableness of the requested rate or rates. To

3

inform and assist the court in the exercise of its

4

discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to

5

produce satisfactory evidence - in addition to

6

those attorney's own affidavits - that the requested

7

rates are in line with those prevailing in the

8

community for similar services by lawyers of

9

reasonably comparable skill, experience and

10

reputation. A rate determined in this way is

11

normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred

12

to - for convenience - as the prevailing market rate.

13 Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, n.ll. A party's failure to provide evidence of prevailing

14 legal rates in the community "leaves a court with an insufficient basis from which

15 to conclude that the rates requested are 'reasonable.'" Southerland v. Intern.

16 Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's Union. Local 8, 845 F.2d 796,801 (9th

17 Cir. 1987).

18

In Albion Pac. Property Res., LLC v. Seligman, 329 F. Supp.2d 1163

19 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the court stated:

20

In sum, a reasonable attorney fee is the fee that would

21

be charged by reasonably competent counsel, not

22

counsel of unusual skill and experience. Reasonably

23

competent counsel bill a reasonable number of hours

24

at a reasonable hourly rate. A reasonably hourly rate

25

is based on rates charged in the local community as a

26

whole, not particular segments of the bar.

27 Albion, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. In determining an appropriate hourly rate for a

28

17

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 18 of 22 Page ID #:111

1 fee application, "a particular attorney's billing rate is relevant, but not dispositive,
c)
2 evidence of a reasonable hourly rate." Id. Reliance on "hourly charges claimed by :J~
3 large, well known highly regarded law firms" to establish the hourly rate is not ;T u
4 appropriate because the court must use the prevailing market rate which, as stated "'

5 above, "is based on rates charged in the local legal community as whole, not

6 particular segments of the bar." rd. at 1170. As the Albion Court further

7 explained,

8

the average market rate in the local legal community

9

as a whole is a better approximation of the hourly rate

10

that would be charged by reasonably competent

11

counsel than the actual billing rate charged by a

12

single attorney. Like the hypothetical "reasonably

13

competent attorney," attorneys billing at the average

14

rate will not be unusually skilled or expcrienccd but

15

[will be] attorneys typically capable of rendering the

16

required services.

17 Id. An above-average hourly rate is appropriate if the "fee applicant can

18 demonstrate that its attorneys billed fewer hours than reasonable competent

19 counsel would have billed." Id.; Blum at 898.

20

An award of above-average rates in this matter would not be justified

21 in light of the excessive time billed by counsel as demonstrated in the discussion

22 above. In fact, in light of the apparently inefficient manner in which this case was

23 conducted, a reduction of in Plaintiffs' claimed billing rates is appropriate.

24 Perkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 738-39 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("where

25 the court believes that the matter has not been handled efficiently, the court may

26 reflect that fact by decreasing the hourly rate charged by the lawyers of less skills

27 and experience.").

28

18

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 19 of 22 Page ID #:112

In this case, Plaintiffs' counsel maintains that the hourly rates

2 requested "are quite modest in light of their significant experience, expertise, and li:l

3 skill." (Motion, 20:26-27). However, this Court finds insufficient evidence that
1•..1
4 the rates are, in fact, as Plaintiffs suggest. Although Plaintiffs present the sworn 1,1")

5 testimony of attorneys who handle complex federal litigation for support - Ellen

6 Berkowitz Dec!. ~~ 5-9; Martha Jordan Dec!. ~~ 4-8; and Richard W. Odgers Dec!.

7 ~~ 4-10 - said attorneys' opinions do not justify or substantiate Plaintiffs'

8 counsel's claim that the rates sought are "in line with those prevailing in the

9 community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

10 experience and reputation," especially in light of the fact that there is no showing

11 that this case i~ complex. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,895 n.ll (1984).

12 Moreover, the data on current average rates charged by other Los Angeles area

13 law firms such as Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, and Loeb & Loeb, taken from The

14 National Law Journal's 2005 Survey of the Nation's 250 Largest Firms, is not

15 persuasive proof that the rates charged by Plaintiffs' counsel are reasonable. Such

16 evidence does not demonstrate that the rates sought by Plaintiffs' counsel are

17 comparable to those offered by other attorneys of reasonably comparable skill,

18 experience and reputation. Finally, contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, the fact that

19 Plaintiffs' counsel's rates have previously been found reasonable by a district

20 court in the Northern District of California in Lopez is not binding on this Court.

21 In view of the evidence of record, this Court finds that the rates are not proven to

22 be reasonable, and coupled with the fact that the hours purportedly expended by

23 Plaintiffs' counsel in this case are demonstrable excessive, a reduction of the

24 lodestar amount by 50 percent is warranted.

25

d. Plaintiffs' requested 1.25 enhancement of the lodestar

26

amount is not warranted

27

As stated by the Supreme Court, "modifications" or "enhancements"

28

19

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 20 of 22 Page ID #:113

to the lodestar "are proper only in certain 'rare' and 'exceptional' cases."

2 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,

t:.J LU

3 565 (1986). Any modification must be "supported by both specific evidence on

4 the record and detailed findings by the lower courts that the lodestar amount is

5 unreasonably low or unreasonably high." Van Germwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life

6 Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).

7

Plaintiffs do not provide sufficient evidence that an enhancement is

8 necessary to provide fair and reasonable compensation, or that this case represents

9 one that is rare or exceptional. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 901-02 (1984).

10 Moreover, this Court has already determined that Plaintiffs' counsel's proffered

11 lodestar amount is unreasonably high, and thus, enhancing this lodestar amount

12 would be inappropriate on this ground. As such, a lodestar enhancement is not

13 warranted.

14

e. Plaintiffs' Costs and Expenses are Reasonable

15

Section 1988 provides for an award of costs and out-of-pocket

16 expenses to prevailing plaintiffs. See United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407;

17 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1216 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986)("out-

18 of-pocket expenses incurred by an attorney which would normally be charged to a

19 fee paying client are recoverable as attorney's fees under section 1988.").

20 Plaintiffs' costs and out-of pocket expenses are fully recoverable. See,~, Lucas

21 v. White, 63 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("It is well-established that

22 [out-of-pocket] costs are recoverable as part of a fee award"). These costs and

23 expenses from April 2004 through January 3, 2006 total $24,960.08. Shiu Decl.~~

24 36-37,45 & Exhs. E-F.

25

Plaintiffs' initial disclosures detail the $24,960.08 in costs and out-of-

26 pocket expenses incurred in this case. Shiu Decl. ~ 37. A review of such costs

27 indicate that "they are typically charged to paying clients by private attorneys."

28

20

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 21 of 22 Page ID #:114

• .5

..

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 972 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir. 1992);

2 ("attorneys fees awards can include reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses

o
IJJ

3 including ... courier and copying costs ...."); Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16,

4 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (approving award of "postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel v) 5 bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction."). However,

6 Defendants contend, and this Court agrees, that this amount should be reduced for

7 unnecessary costs. As discussed above, Plaintiffs counsel incurred travel costs

8 and expenses by having multiple attorneys appear at various hearings, mediations

9 and matters directly related to this litigation. All such attorneys billed meals,

10 lodging and other costs that cannot reasonably be reimbursed. Upon review of

11 such expenditures, this Court finds that a 20 percent reduction in Plaintiffs'

12 counsel's requested costs is warranted. Therefore, Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to

13 costs in the total amount of$19,968.06.9

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9Plaintiffs' counsel's costs are reduced by $4,992.02, calculated as 20

27 percent of $24,960.08.

28

21

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 150 Filed 02/27/06 Page 22 of 22 Page ID #:115

,/

1 III. CONCLUSION

2

In light of the foregoing, this Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs'

3 Motion For Reasonable Attorneys' Fees And Costs. This Court's ruling reflects a

4 50 percent downward adjustment of Plaintiffs' counsel's requested attorneys' fees V)

5 of$671,663.27,10 and a 20 percent downward adjustment of Plaintiffs' counsel's

6 costs of $24,960.08. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys'

7 fees in the total sum of $335,831.63 and costs of $19,968.06:

8

9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10
11 DATED: feB 21, ZOO(P
12
13

DfCKRAH TEVRIZIAN
Dickran Tevrizian, Judge United States District Court

14

15

16
'OThis Court's determination to reduce Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees is 17 necessary even in light of the excellent results that Plaintiffs' counsel has obtained 18 for the class. The Agreements provide far-reaching and substantial benefits to the 19 class. Through the changes mandated by the Resolution Agreement, hundreds of
present and future class members will secure equal access to the important athletic 20 programs offered at AHS. The Moor Field complex is a flagship athletic facility 21 serving the entire Alhambra community. The building of two state-of-the-art
softball fields at Moor Field will send a vital message to the community regarding 22 the equal importance of girls' athletics. Once built, the softball fields will serve 23 girls at AHS and throughout the community for generations to come. Moreover,
School District Defendants' counsel have stated that they will or have already 24 implemented many of the policy changes mandated by the Resolution Agreement 25 district-wide. In other words, as a result of this litigation, girls attending other
high schools will benefit from greater access to interscholastic athletics. Thus, the 26 results obtained are remarkable. Notwithstanding, a 50 percent reduction in 27 attorneys' fees is warranted for the reasons discussed in this Order.

28

22

 
 . :~

• • Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:126

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT ( B~ClJY"YI~-Irl"1Jo1;I...J~";~"i'.;~rj[~J!.~."m"t;!'m151I'It~1C1~·TC6~:T:6:~.>"F>-Fc~;c.;-.~L.I)L.EEl.F.P~JPOFlROlJ·RJ"1~I"i'l'f<·

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 LAUREN M. CRUZ,-by)er friend Jean Cruz; VALERIA HERRERA byher next
13 friend, Carolina Herrera,;, JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINt GREMPEL, by
14 her next friend Tina Grempel, individually 15 and on behalf of all those similarly
situated,

16

Plaintiffs,

17 v.

18 ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT 19 THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL
LEE-SUNG, VICTOR SANDOVAL, LOU TORRES WILLIAM A. 20 VALLEJOS, JOHN H. NUNEZ, 21 aRnOdBBEARRTB1A.RGAINAz.RMUETSHSEIN. ACA, iSnTtRheOir,
22 official capacities,

Case No. CV 04-1460 DT (Mcx)

rPR6POOSS"'EDl ORDER OF J)ISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION

DATE: TIME: PLACE:

February 27, 2006 10:00 a.m. Courtroom of the Hon. Dickran Tevrizian

CLASS ACTION

23

Defendants.

24

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on March 4, 2004,
25

aIleging sex-based discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education 26

Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), the United States and the California
27

Constitutions, and state anti-discrimination laws;
28

/7/

[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION

• Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:127

1

WHEREAS, the class was certified on October 4, 2004;

2

WHEREAS, after extensive mediation and negotiation, the parties have ,if:

:p~~'

3 reached a resolution of all claims, which is memorialized in two settlement :W

4 agreements:

',t:::~,.'

5

(1) An agreement between the Plaintiffs and the District Defendants entitled

6 Joint Resolution Agreement and Order for Continuing Court Jurisdiction, and filed

7 with this Court on December 19,2005 as Exhibit A to Civil Docket Number 96 in

8 this case, which is the parties' Joint Ex Parte Application for Order for Preliminary

9 Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class; and

10

(2) An agreement between the Plaintiffs and the City entitled Settlement

11 Agreement Between Plaintiffs and Defendant City of Alhambra, and filed with this

12 Court on December 19, 2005 as Exhibit B to Civil Docket Number 96 in this case,

13 which is the parties' Joint Ex Parte Application for Order for Preliminary Approval 14 of Settlements and Notice to the Class,

15

WHEREAS, the terms of the two settlement agreements resolving the

16 litigation provide substantial benefits to the entire Class;

17

WHEREAS, pursuant to the express terms of the above-described settlement

18 agreements, the parties have agreed that the Court will determine an award of

19 reasonable attorneys fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel;

20

WHEREAS, pursuant to the express terms of the above-described settlement

21 agreements, the parties have agreed that the Court will exercise its continuing

22 jurisdiction over the Defendant City of Alhambra until 30 days after it has made a 23 certain payment of money, as specified in the Settlement Agreement Between

24 Plaintiffs and Defendant City of Alhambra, and over the District Defendants until

25 the end of the compliance period, as specified in the Joint Resolution Agreement

26 and Order for Continuing Court Jurisdiction;

27

WHEREAS, on December 19, 2005, the Court preliminarily approved the

28 settlements, including the form of notice;

2
[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION

• • Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:128

1

WHEREAS, notice was achieved by December 23,2005, including a

.j ~:: 't
2 distribution of more than 3,000 copies to Alhambra High School students on ;i.I::.::'Ili":.~,::1;

3 December 21, 2 2 0 00 05 5;;:::t1 i :

\\Il'f:·f,1)

4

WHEREAS, on January 31, 2006, the Court entered an Order pursuant t6'

5 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure finally approving the settlements

6 as fair, reasonable, and adequate;

7

WHEREAS, the parties have submitted pleadings and evidence to the Court

8 regarding its determination of an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the

9 plaintiffs' counsel;

10

THEREFORE, this Court ORDERS as follows:

11

(1) The Agreement between the Plaintiffs and the District Defendants

12 entitled Joint Resolution Agreement and Order for Continuing Court Jurisdiction is

13 hereby endorsed in its entirety, and incorporated into this Order by reference;

14

(2) The Agreement between the Plaintiffs and the City entitled Settlement

15 Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant, City of Alhambra, is hereby endorsed

16 in its entirety, and incorporated into this Order by reference;

17

(3) As described in the above-incorporated Agreements, this Court shall

18 determine an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs' counsel;

19

(4) Consistent with the above-incorporated Agreements, and without

20 affecting the finality of this Order of Dismissal, this Court shall retain continuing

21 and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the ternlS of said Agreements, and the

22 authority to make whatever Orders are necessary to enforce compliance with said

23 terms;

24 / / /

25 / / /

26 / / /

27 / / /
28

3
[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION

.

• • Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:129

(5) As to all other matters not described in paragraph numbers (1) through

2 (4), above, this Order constitutes an Order of Dismissal in this case..

3

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

6
Dated: 7
8
9

'M.,,\ \ ,1,(X?\>

DICKRAH TEVRIZIAH
THE HONORABLE DI CKRAN TEVRIZIAN United States District Court

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

• 28

4
[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION

• • Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:130

1

PROOF OF SERVICE

2

3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)

j

) SS.

4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

5

I am employed in the aforesaid county; I am over the age of eighteen years

and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is: 5701 Center

6 Drive West, Suite 611, Los Angeles, California 90045.

On March 22, 2006, I served the within [PROPOSED] ORDER OF

7
8

DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING said action, by placing [ ] the original

J[UXR1IaSttrnuCe TcoIpOyNthoenretohfeeinncteloresestde,dinpaartsieeasleind

envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaia, to be deposited in the United States

9 mail at Los Angeles, California, adaressed as follows:

10 [] 11

By facsimile machine I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the named person(s) to telecopier number(s) listed above.
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

12 [Xl By mail, I am "readily familiar" with the finn's practice of collection and

13

Rrocessing corresRondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be aeposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully

14

prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. Jam aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal

15

cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affiaavit.

16

Executed on March 22, 2006, at Los Angeles, Califomia.

17 [X 1CF,ederal) I declare t~at I.am employyd in the office of a member of the bar of

18

tflins. c,"o,urt at whose dllrfeeccl>twOn the scmce was made. ~ ~

19

Sham Par er

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
PROOF OF SERVICE RE: [PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH CONTINUING JURISDICTION
5

• • C.as,e 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Documen•t 171 Filed 05/01/06 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:131

Case Name:Cruz v. Alhambra School District 2 Action No.: USDC Case No. CV04-1460 DT (Mcx)

3

4

MAILING LIST

5

6

7

8 v ar er cw C.or

CAL

IA OMEN'S LAW

9 CENTER

3460 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1102

10 Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (213) 637-·9900;

I11I FacsImile: (213) 637-·9909

Attorney Jfoar Plaintiffs, LA UREN M.

12 CRUZ, etc., et a!.,

13

Joseph M. Montes, Esq.

Elizabeth R. Feffer, Esq.

14 Elizabeth Kristen, Esq.

erff(f~ones-.mayer.com

ekristen las.elec.or

10 S & MAYER

15 Ity ttorney, Ity of Alhambra

3777 North Harbor Boulevard

BURKE WILLIAMS & SORENSEN Fullerton, CA 92835

16 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400 TEL: (62~441-3428

Los An~eles, CA 90071-·2953

FAX: (626 441-3408

17 TEL: 13) 236-·0600

Attorneys or DeJfeendant, CITY OF

18

t FAX: ( It232366.2-277000
Attorne)ls or DeJfeendant, CITY OF ALHAMB

ALHAMB

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

PROOF OF SERVICE RE: IPROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

CONTINUING JURISDICTION

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 194 Filed 07/23/08 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:214

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED
JUL 23 2008
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

LAUREN M. CRUZ, by her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by her next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINE GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina Grempel individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEESUNG; VICTOR SANDOVAL; LOU TORRES; WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS; JOHN H. NUNEZ; ROBERT L. GIN; RUTH E. CASTRO; BARBARA A. MESSINA in their official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 06-55811
D.C. No. CV-04-01460-DT Central District of California, Los Angeles

ORDER

~

RECEIVED

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

JUL 2 3 2008

~ C~LlfORNI~ CENTRAL
J BBYY

DDIISSTTRRI l.Tq

'

CI\LlFORNlf\ /. DEPlJlTTY

\ \

' \

Before: PREGERSON and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and LEIGHTON,* District Judge.
We grant Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees and costs on
appeal. Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.9, the determination of an appropriate

The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 194 Filed 07/23/08 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:215
amount of fees on appeal is referred to the court's special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter Shaw. The Appellate Commissioner shall conduct whatever proceedings he deems appropriate, and shall have the authority to enter an order awarding fees. See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.9.
A certified copy of this order sent to the district court shall serve to amend this court's mandate.

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:176

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED
JUL 07 2008

LAUREN M. CRUZ, by her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by her next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINE GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina Grempel individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants, V. ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEESUNG; VICTOR SANDOVAL; LOU TORRES; WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS; JOHN H. NUNEZ; ROBERT L. GIN; RUTH E. CASTRO; BARBARA A. MESSINA in their official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 06-55811

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK OF COURT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

D.C. No. CV-04-01460-DT

Central District of California, Los

Angeles

MANDATE

The judgment of this Court, entered 06/12/08, takes effect this date. This constitutes the formal mandate of this Court issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Cost awarded to Appellants in the amount of$597.50.

FOR THE COURT:
Molly C. Dwyer Clerk of Court
By: Rhonda Roberts Deputy Clerk

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 2 of 9 Page ID #:177
FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

JUN 122008
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK u.s. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAUREN M. CRUZ, by her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by her next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINE GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina Grempel, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,

No. 06-55811 D.C. No. CV-04-01460-DT
MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEESUNG; VICTOR SANDOVAL; LOU TORRES; WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS; JOHN H. NUNEZ; ROBERT L. GIN; RUTH E. CASTRO; BARBARA A. MESSINA, in their official capacities,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Dickran M. Tevrizian, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 6, 2008
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #:178
Pasadena, California Before: PREGERSON and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, andLEIGHTON**, District Judge.
Plaintiffs are current and future female students at Alhambra High School. They brought this successful Title IX class action against various individuals, the Alhambra Unified School District, and the City of Alhambra for their failure to provide female students with an equal opportunity to participate in school athletics.
After several years of litigation, the parties entered into settlement agreements that granted Plaintiffs their requested relief. The settlement agreements provided that the district court would retain jurisdiction over the case to determine attorneys' fees. Accordingly, on January 10,2006, Plaintiffs moved for $975,599.61 1 in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court recognized that Plaintiffs had prevailed and that they had obtained "excellent results." Nevertheless, the district court awarded Plaintiffs only approximately one-third of their requested fees. The district court also denied Plaintiffs'
** The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
1 This amount includes (1) Plaintiffs' request to be compensated for the "merits" work completed after their January 10,2006 fee motion was filednamely, drafting the joint motion for final approval of the settlement agreements and (2) Plaintiffs' request for a 25% enhancement for excellent results.
2

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 4 of 9 Page ID #:179
subsequent motion to amend or alter the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 59(e)").
Plaintiffs now appeal both of the district court's orders.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3 We vacate the fee order, reverse the Rule 59(e) order, and remand for further proceedings. 1. Standard of Review
We review the factual determinations underlying an award of attorneys' fees for clear error, and the legal premises a district court uses to determine an award de novo. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted). "If we conclude that the district court applied the proper legal principles and did not clearly err in any factual determination, then we review the award of attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion." Id. As part of our abuse of discretion review, we consider whether the district court met its obligation "to articulate ... the reasons for its findings regarding the propriety of the hours claimed or for any adjustments it makes either to the prevailing party's claimed
2 The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, and we repeat them only to the extent necessary to understand our disposition.
3 We reject Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' waived the right to appeal the district court's fee award.
3

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 5 of 9 Page ID #:180
hours or to the lodestar." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
We review the denial of a motion under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). 2. Lodestar Calculation
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may, in its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under 42 U.S.c. § 1983. To determine the appropriate fee award under § 1988, district courts must use the lodestar method, which involves multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See Camacho v. Bridgeport, 523 F.3d 973,978 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit requires district courts to perform the lodestar calculation).
'" Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it. '" Id. (quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149 nA). For example, in limited circumstances, a district court may apply an across-the-board percentage to the lodestar figure "as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee application." Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399 (citation omitted). However, "decisions of district courts employing percentages in cases
4

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 6 of 9 Page ID #:181
involving large fee requests are subject to heightened scrutiny." Id. at 1400. Moreover, "the use of percentages, in any case, neither discharges the district court from its responsibility to set forth a 'concise but clear' explanation of its reasons for choosing a given percentage reduction nor from its duty to independently review the applicant's fee request." Id.
In this case, the district court erred twice. First, it failed to use the lodestar method as a starting point for determining Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees. Instead, the district court took Plaintiffs' proposed lodestar, cited several reasons why it believed that figure was excessive, and reduced it by more than 60%. Second, the district court failed to explain how the purported deficiencies in Plaintiffs' fee application correlated to a 60% lodestar reduction.4 Absent a concise but clear explanation of the district court's reasons for choosing a 60% reduction, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the district court's order. See, e.g., Gates, 987 F.2d at 1401-02 (vacating and remanding where the district
4 For example, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had billed for (1) an unreasonable duplication of efforts, (2) excessive inter- and intra-office conferencing, and (3) non-billable clerical and administrative tasks. The district court also concluded that Plaintiffs' requested hourly rates were too high. Finally, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs' work on this important Title IX class action was not "rare or exceptional." Assuming that the district court's conclusions were well-founded - which we have reason to doubt - the district court was nonetheless obligated to explain why the problems it had identified accounted for 60% of the alleged over-billing.
5

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 7 of 9 Page ID #:182
court failed to explain why Plaintiffs' proposed lodestar was subject to a 10% reduction); Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City ofHailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding a fee order "because the district court failed to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of how it reached its award"). We therefore vacate the fee order and remand so that the district court may conduct the required lodestar analysis and specify what portions of Plaintiffs' request - if anywarrant a lodestar reduction.5 3. Additional Fees
We also hold that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' request for the fees they incurred after filing their January 10, 2006 motion. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Sec'y ofHealth & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895,909 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a district court's "fees on fees" award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). It is well established that time spent preparing a fee application is compensable. Clark v. City ofLos Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, if a request for fees on fees includes any non-compensable
5 In conducting the lodestar analysis, the district court should carefully consider Plaintiffs' request in light of (1) the number of years they spent litigating this successful class action, (2) the number of drafts of the settlement agreements that Plaintiffs prepared and reviewed, (3) the considerable skill and expertise of Plaintiffs' counsel, and (4) the undeniably excellent results Plaintiffs obtained for the young women of Alhambra High School.
6

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 8 of 9 Page ID #:183
time, the district court should reduce the requested award rather than deny it altogether. Anderson v. Dir. Office a/Workers' Camp. Program, 91 F.3d l322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996).
In their January 10, 2006 fee motion, Plaintiffs specifically mentioned that their proposed lodestar only included compensation for fee-related services "to date." Plaintiffs then cited to the accompanying declaration of attorney Patricia A. Shiu, which (1) explained that the proposed lodestar only represented Plaintiffs' fees to date, (2) provided estimates of future fees, and (3) indicated that Plaintiffs would provide updated amounts and documentation in their reply papers. In its initial fee order, however, the district court failed to acknowledge Plaintiffs' request for additional fees. Then, in its Rule 59(e) order, the district court refused to award those fees on waiver grounds, stating that "Plaintiffs gave no indication in their moving papers that they would be amending their request." Because we find that Plaintiffs provided sufficient notice of their intent to request additional fees, we reverse the district court's waiver holding.
We also reverse the district court's alternative holding that Plaintiffs submitted insufficient evidence in support of their Rule 59(e) motion. The district court did not discuss the substance of Plaintiffs' evidence; instead, it merely criticized Plaintiffs for attaching their billing records as supplemental exhibits, then
7

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 187 Filed 07/07/08 Page 9 of 9 Page ID #:184
summarily concluded that "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation." Given this cursory analysis, we cannot determine whether the district court actually reviewed Plaintiffs' evidence or simply discounted it.
We conclude that Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the merits work they completed after they filed their January 10, 2006 fee application. Plaintiffs are also entitled to their reasonable fees on fees. We reverse the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion and remand so that the district court may review Plaintiffs' evidence and use the lodestar method to determine Plaintiffs' additional fees. 4. Conclusion
The district court erred by failing to explain why Plaintiffs' proposed lodestar should be reduced by 60%, and it abused its discretion by rejecting Plaintiffs' request for fees incurred after January 10,2006. Accordingly, we vacate the fee order, reverse the Rule 59(e) order, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.6
6 Plaintiffs have indicated that they intend to file a motion for the attorneys' fees and costs that they incurred on this appeal.
8

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 1 of 30 Page ID #:676

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 LAUREN M. CRUZ, by her next )

friend Jean Cruz; VALERIE

)

12 HERRERA, by her next friend )

Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER N. )

13 CERROS; CATHERINE GREMPEL, by )

her next friend Tina Grempel, )

14 individually and on behalf of )

all those similarly situated, )

15

)

Plaintiffs, )

16

)

v.

)

17

)

ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT; THE )

18 CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEE- )

SUNG, VICTOR SANDOVAL, LOU

)

19 TORRES, WILLIAM A VALLEJOS, )

JOHN H. NUÑEZ, ROBERT L. GIN, )

20 RUTH E. CASTRO, and BARBARA A. )

MESSINA, in their official

)

21 capacities,

)

)

22

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

23

CASE NO.: CV 04-1460 ABC (Mcx) ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

24

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s hope that attorneys’ fees motions

25 not become a “second major litigation,” this matter presents precisely

26 such a situation. The parties have filed thousands of pages of papers

27 in battling over the appropriate fees to be awarded to Plaintiffs

28 after they successfully concluded this Title IX matter through

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 2 of 30 Page ID #:677

1 settlement. The fighting has ranged from the reasonableness of

2 Plaintiffs’ overall claimed hours down to the ability to recover $1.34

3 for a bottle of water purchased during travel to a status conference.

4

In addition to the initial motion for fees, Plaintiffs filed a

5 Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration and ultimately appealed the

6 Court’s determination of fees. The Ninth Circuit then vacated and

7 remanded for recalculation. Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s mandate,

8 this Court has pending before it Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’

9 fees incurred in litigating this matter prior to the filing of the

10 Rule 59(e) motion. Also pending before this Court is Plaintiffs’

11 motion for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on remand.

12

Upon consideration of the parties’ papers and the case file, the

13 Court hereby rules as follows.

14 I. BACKGROUND

15

On March 4, 2004, Plaintiffs Lauren M. Cruz, Valerie Herrera,

16 Jennifer N. Cerros, and Catherine Grempel (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

17 filed this class action lawsuit against Defendants Alhambra School

18 District (the “District”) and the City of Alhambra (the “City”)

19 (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants

20 engaged in unlawful sex discrimination against female student athletes

21 at Alhambra High School pursuant to Title IX of the Education

22 Amendments of 1972, the United States Constitution, the California

23 Constitution, and California’s anti-discrimination laws. The Court 24 certified the class on October 4, 2004.1

25

Following the order certifying the class, the parties spent

26

27

1 This matter was previously assigned to Judge Tevrizian, but

was reassigned to Chief Judge Collins on remand because Judge 28 Tevrizian retired while the appeal was pending.

2

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 3 of 30 Page ID #:678

1 approximately a year mediating and negotiating before reaching

2 resolution of all of the pending claims. The settlements provide for

3 wide-ranging changes, giving substantial benefits to many young women

4 student-athletes. The settlements include: the creation of two new

5 softball fields; the dedication of new locker room facilities for

6 female students; providing equal access to weight rooms and other

7 facilities, as well as for desirable practice and game times;

8 equitable funding and fund-raising opportunities; equitable publicity;

9 and enhanced coaching. See, e.g., Center Initial Decl. ¶¶ 80-91. The

10 settlements further provide for a grievance policy, Title IX training,

11 and future monitoring. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 92-95.

12

A. DETERMINATION OF INITIAL FEE REQUEST

13

Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on

14 January 10, 2006 (the “Initial Fee Motion”). That motion requested

15 fees and costs incurred both in litigating the merits of the case and

16 for work done on the Initial Fee Motion and reply brief. In

17 connection with their Initial Fee Motion, Plaintiffs seek $767,944.69 18 in fees,2 plus a 25% enhancement. On February 27, 2006, the Court

19 granted the Initial Fee Motion in part (“Initial Fee Order”). As a

20 threshold matter, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs are prevailing

21 parties entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Initial

22 Fee Order at 5-6. But the Court ruled that the hours claimed were

23 unreasonable given the non-complex nature of the matter, unnecessary

24 duplication of effort, excessive inter- and intra-office conferencing,

25

26

2 Plaintiffs have amended the amount requested on numerous

occasions. The above amount reflects the amount previously awarded by

27 the Court (the “undisputed amount”) and the additional, revised amount

sought on remand in connection with the Initial Fee Motion. See 28 Kristen Remand Reply Decl. ¶ 17.

3

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 4 of 30 Page ID #:679

1 and billing for clerical and administrative tasks. Id. at 10-16. The

2 Court also ruled that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the rates

3 requested are reasonable because they were improperly based on “hourly

4 charges claimed by large, well known highly regarded law firms” rather

5 than the local legal community as a whole, and were otherwise too high

6 given the “inefficient manner in which this case was conducted.” Id.

7 at 16-19. Based on these findings, the Court reduced Plaintiffs’

8 proposed lodestar amount by 50%. Id. at 19. The Court also denied

9 Plaintiffs’ request for a lodestar enhancement. Id. at 20.

10

B. DETERMINATION OF RULE 59(E) MOTION

11

Plaintiffs then filed a motion to reconsider the Initial Fee

12 Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the Court

13 improperly failed to include fees incurred after filing the Initial

14 Fee Motion (i.e., fees related to the reply brief and the final

15 settlement approval hearing). On May 1, 2006, the Court denied the

16 motion (“Rule 59(e) Order”). The Court expressed concern that

17 Plaintiffs failed to adequately indicate that they would be adjusting

18 their fees on reply and failed to provide specific documentation

19 detailing the new fees. Rule 59(e) Order at 5-8. The Court also

20 found that the additional fees reflected “continued inefficiencies and

21 unreasonable duplication of effort.” Id. at 8.

22

C. NINTH CIRCUIT MANDATE

23

Plaintiffs timely appealed both the Initial Fee Order and the

24 Rule 59(e) Order. The Ninth Circuit vacated the Initial Fee Order and

25 remanded it to this Court for recalculation. Ninth Circuit Memo. at

26 6. The Ninth Circuit held that the Court erred in the Initial Fee

27 Order by failing to use the lodestar method and failing to explain how

28 the purported deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ fee application correlated

4

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 5 of 30 Page ID #:680

1 to the percentage of the fee reduction. Id. at 5. The Ninth Circuit

2 instructed that, in conducting the lodestar analysis on remand, the

3 Court should carefully consider (1) the number of years spent

4 litigating the case, (2) the number of drafts of the settlement

5 agreements prepared and reviewed, (3) the considerable skill and

6 expertise of Plaintiffs’ counsel, and (4) the excellent results

7 obtained. Id. at 6 n.5.

8

The Ninth Circuit reversed outright the determination in the Rule

9 59(e) Order that Plaintiffs could not recover the fees incurred after

10 filing their Initial Fee Motion. Id. at 7. The Ninth Circuit

11 rejected the contention that insufficient notice was provided in the

12 Initial Fee Motion that additional fees would be sought and also

13 rejected the contention that Plaintiffs had submitted insufficient

14 evidence to support the additional award. Id. at 7-8.

15

D. ADDITIONAL FEES AND COSTS SOUGHT ON REMAND

16

In addition to the issues raised by the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate,

17 Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking further attorneys’ fees and costs

18 associated with pursuing this matter on remand. Plaintiffs also

19 assert that they are entitled to recover post-judgment interest on the

20 fees related to the Initial Fee Motion.

21 II. DISCUSSION

22

Before the Court are several issues for determination. First,

23 the Court must determine the amount of fees to be awarded in

24 connection with the Initial Fee Motion. Second, the Court must

25 determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover post-judgment

26 interest on that amount. Lastly, the Court must determine whether

27 Plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs on remand and, if so, the

28 amount thereof.

5

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 6 of 30 Page ID #:681

1

A. INITIAL FEE REQUEST

2

Litigants in the United States generally pay their own attorneys’

3 fees, regardless of the outcome of a case, although Congress may

4 provide otherwise by statute. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523

5 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a party has demonstrated that it

6 is entitled to some award of fees, the Ninth Circuit requires a

7 district court to determine the amount of such an award by first

8 calculating the “lodestar” figure. Id. “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated

9 by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably

10 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting

11 Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir.

12 2001)). The lodestar is presumed to provide reasonable fees, but “the

13 district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar

14 amount to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.”

15 Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4).

16

1. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMED LODESTAR AMOUNT

17

Plaintiffs claim a lodestar of $767,944.69 for fees sought in

18 connection with the Initial Fee Motion:

19 //

20 //

21 //

22 //

23 //

24 //

25 //

26 //

27 //

28 //

6

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 7 of 30 Page ID #:682

1

2

Biller

3 William
McNeil
4
Patricia
5 Shiu

Hours Claimed Hours Claimed Hours After

in Initial in Initial Filing Initial

Motion

Reply

Reply3

Total Hours

4.45

0

0

4.45

326.86

62.12

7.0

395.98

Rate $490 $470

Total Amount
$2,180.5
$186,110.6

6 Vicky
Barker

216.1

36.3

0

7 Claudia 8 Center

484.95

9.78

0

Nancy
9 Solomon

308.2

0

0

252.4

$410

494.73 $400

308.2

$325

$103,484 $197,892 $100,165

10

Elizabeth Kristen

285.87

11

Cacilia
12 Kim

0

13

Sharon Terman

0

14 Anya
Lakner

0

15

16

LAS-ELC Paralegals

262.71

69.0 14.7 57.67 9.7 0.69064

10.6 0 0 0 0

365.47 $275

14.7

$275

57.67

$225

9.7

$200

263.4006 $150

$100,504.25 $4,042.5 $12,975.75 $1,940 $39,510.09

17

CWLC Paralegals

11.0

0

0

18

LAS-ELC Law Clerks

90.5

0

0

19

CWLC Law
20 Clerks

89.9

0

0

11.0 90.5 89.9

$100 $100 $100

$1,100 $9,050 $8,990

21 See Shiu Initial Reply Decl. Exs. A, I; Kristen Remand Reply Decl. Ex. 22

23

3 Plaintiffs initially included anticipated hours for work to be

24 done the day of filing the Initial Reply and thereafter. See Shiu Initial Reply Decl. Ex. I. On remand, Plaintiffs replaced those

25 anticipated hours with the actual hours worked. Kristen Remand Reply

Decl. Ex. H.

26

4 Plaintiffs claimed 9.69 hours in paralegal work in the Initial

27 Reply but calculated a lodestar for that work of only $103.59. See

Shiu Initial Reply Decl. Ex. I. The Court reduces the number of hours 28 claimed accordingly.

7

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 8 of 30 Page ID #:683

1 H. Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ claimed lodestar, asserting that

2 the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are not reasonable.

3

In calculating the lodestar, the Court takes into account the

4 factors outlined in the Ninth Circuit Mandate: (1) the number of years

5 Plaintiffs litigated the case; (2) the number of drafts of the

6 settlement agreements; (3) the skill and expertise of Plaintiffs’

7 counsel; and (4) the excellent results obtained. Ninth Circuit Memo.

8 at 6 n.5. These four factors militate in favor of the reasonableness

9 of Plaintiffs’ claimed lodestar.

10

a. The Number of Years Spent Litigating

11

Plaintiffs began investigating this matter in January 2003 and

12 filed their complaint in March 2004. See, e.g., Barker Initial Decl. ¶

13 16. The case was litigated until final approval of the settlements in

14 January 2006. Thus, Plaintiffs litigated this matter for roughly three

15 years.

16

b. The Number of Draft Settlement Agreements

17

Drafting and finalizing the settlement agreement with the District

18 was a significant undertaking. Plaintiffs drafted the initial

19 settlement agreement. See Center Initial Decl. ¶ 45. They met with

20 the District at least six times by phone, with those conferences

21 sometimes lasting two or more hours. Id. at ¶ 46. During the course

22 of the negotiations, Plaintiffs and the District exchanged roughly 30

23 drafts of the agreement, each of which was more than 50 pages long.

24 Id. at ¶ 48.

25

The City did not participate in these settlement negotiations, but

26 instead separately negotiated a draft settlement agreement with

27 Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶¶ 49, 61.

28 //

8

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 9 of 30 Page ID #:684

1

c. The Skill and Expertise of Plaintiffs’ Counsel

2

It is clear that Plaintiffs’ counsel has considerable skill and

3 expertise. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are affiliated with two non-profit

4 organizations: the Legal Aid Society – Employment Law Center (“LAS-

5 ELC”) and the California Women’s Law Center (“CWLC”). LAS-ELC is

6 nationally-recognized for its expertise in challenging discriminatory

7 or otherwise impermissible employment and educational access practices.

8 See, e.g., Shiu Initial Decl. ¶ 4. Similarly, CWLC has extensive

9 expertise in sex discrimination and Title IX, in particular. See,

10 e.g., Barker Initial Decl. ¶ 5. And the individual attorneys

11 demonstrated significant skill and expertise in handling the

12 litigation.

13

d. The Excellent Results Obtained

14

“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney

15 should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

16 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). This will normally encompass all hours

17 reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. In cases of “exceptional

18 success,” an enhancement above the lodestar may be warranted. Id.

19 Here, the results obtained were “undeniably excellent.” Ninth Circuit

20 Memo. at 6 n.5. Indeed, Plaintiffs successfully utilized Title IX to

21 obtain far-reaching changes that significantly benefit many young

22 women.

23

2. REASONABLENESS OF HOURS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS

24

Mindful of the four factors analyzed above, the Court now turns to

25 calculating the lodestar. In order to calculate the lodestar, the

26 Court must determine the number of hours “reasonably expended on the

27 litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. Hence, the Court must

28 eliminate from the lodestar time that was unreasonably, unnecessarily,

9

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 10 of 30 Page ID #:685

1 or inefficiently devoted to the case. Id. at 434. Plaintiffs here are

2 claiming 2,358.1 hours spent on this litigation. Defendants contend

3 that Plaintiffs’ claimed hours should be reduced significantly, for the 4 reasons discussed below. See, e.g., District’s Initial Opp’n at 13.5

5

a. Duplication of Effort and Excessive Billing

6

Billed time that includes unnecessary duplication of effort should

7 be excluded from the lodestar. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883

8 F.2d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 1989). “[C]ourts ought to examine with

9 skepticism claims that several lawyers were needed to perform a task,

10 and should deny compensation for such needless duplication as when

11 three lawyers appear for a hearing when one would do.” Democratic

12 Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2004)

13 (internal citations omitted). Of course, there is some degree of

14 duplication that is necessary in any case. Moreno v. City of

15 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendants identified

16 nearly 600 hours that they claim involve unnecessarily duplicative

17 billing by Plaintiffs’ counsel. District Initial Opp’n at 20-21.

18

The Court’s review of the record indicates that some of the hours

19 claimed did result from unnecessary duplication. For example, Shiu,

20 Barker, Center and Kristen each billed to inspect the relevant athletic

21 facilities. See Gibeaut Initial Decl. Ex. J. Plaintiffs explained

22 that Kristen filmed the inspection, while Shiu, Center, and Barker took

23 notes and measurements. Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Among other

24 things, they also counted lockers and checked the cleanliness and

25 functioning of the bathrooms. Id. at ¶ 7. Although an understanding

26

27

5 The arguments by the District and City do not always overlap

exactly, but they are significantly similar. Thus, the Court will 28 generally refer to them as “Defendants” without differentiation.

10

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 11 of 30 Page ID #:686

1 of the disparities in the facilities is important, that does not

2 justify having four attorneys (three of whom request fees of $400 or

3 more per hour) personally conduct the actual inspection.

4

Plaintiffs also billed to have Shiu, Center, Barker and Solomon

5 appear at the January 31, 2005 mediation. See Gibeaut Initial Decl.

6 Ex. J; Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C. Participation of more than

7 one attorney at a mediation does not automatically constitute an

8 unnecessary duplication of effort. See Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427,

9 1435 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989). But Plaintiffs do not provide an adequate

10 explanation as to why it was necessary to have four attorneys (with

11 requested rates of $470, $410, $400 and $325 per hour) attend the

12 mediation. Plaintiffs assert generally that they only billed for the

13 time of attorneys that participated in, “or might be needed” at, a

14 hearing or conference, and that multiple attorneys attended hearings or

15 conferences because “several attorneys had specific knowledge about

16 discrete sub issues.” Initial Reply to District’s Opp’n at 19. It is

17 clear that Plaintiffs’ counsel decided to take a “team” approach to

18 handling this matter. Nonetheless, that explanation is insufficient to

19 show that it was necessary to have four attorneys attend the mediation.

20 See, e.g., Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transp. Auth., 388 F.

21 Supp. 2d 159, 164-65 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

22

Similarly, Shiu, Center, Barker, Solomon, and Kristen spent a

23 total of 194 hours in connection with Plaintiffs’ class certification 24 motion. Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶¶ 14, 51.6 While having five

25 attorneys work on class certification may not be unnecessarily

26

27

6 The 194 hours include work done on the initial motion, reply

brief, declarations, preparing for and attending the hearing, and 28 conferring with Plaintiffs. Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶ 14.

11

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 12 of 30 Page ID #:687

1 duplicative in all instances, it was here. At an earlier status

2 conference, the Court indicated that it would certify a class in this

3 case. See, e.g., Shiu Initial Decl. ¶ 70. Moreover, Plaintiffs

4 acknowledge that Defendants had “no particular legal argument for why

5 certification was not appropriate.” Id. at ¶ 71. Indeed, the Court’s

6 order granting class certification makes clear that Defendants did not

7 dispute much of Plaintiffs’ motion. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’

8 Motion for Class Certification for Injunctive Relief (Oct. 6, 2004).

9 Plaintiffs did not need to have five attorneys spend nearly 200 hours

10 preparing straightforward class certification briefing.

11

Nor does the Court’s review of the record reveal that these were

12 isolated occurrences. Accordingly, the Court finds it necessary to

13 calculate the lodestar based on a modest reduction to the hours claimed

14 by Plaintiffs, as discussed below.

15

b. Excessive Conferencing

16

Time billed for internal conferencing is recoverable to the extent

17 it is reasonably necessary to conducting the litigation. See Davis v.

18 City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992).

19 Defendants identified roughly 264 hours of inter- and intra-office

20 communications within and between LAS-ELC and CWLC, representing

21 roughly 13% of the total hours claimed in the Initial Fee Motion. See 22 District’s Initial Opp’n at 18.7 This is the equivalent of spending

23 approximately one hour conferencing for every eight hours billed.

24 Unfortunately, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants provides significant

25 detail as to whether the time spent on these communications is

26 7 Plaintiffs subsequently amended that requested fee amount in
27 their reply brief to include additional hours worked after the Initial
Fee Motion was filed. The above figure does not include conferencing 28 time added through amendment.

12

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 13 of 30 Page ID #:688

1 reasonable. Plaintiffs assert in blanket terms that the hours were

2 reasonable in light of the “issues and challenges that plaintiffs faced

3 in investigating, filing, litigating and resolving this matter.” See,

4 e.g., Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs also assert that much

5 of the conferencing was necessitated by the settlement negotiations.

6 See id. ¶ 42. Unfortunately, Defendants do not provide specificity in

7 challenging these hours. Rather, they appear to rely solely on

8 generalized assertions that the total fees for conferencing appears to

9 be too high. See, e.g., District’s Initial Opp’n at 18.

10

Based on the Court’s review of the billing records and Plaintiffs’

11 explanations for the hours billed conferencing, the Court finds that

12 the hours claimed are on the higher end of what it would expect as

13 reasonably necessary for litigating this matter. The Court finds that

14 a modest reduction to Plaintiffs’ claimed hours will compensate for any

15 excessive conferencing.

16

c. Non-Billable Clerical Work

17

Parties cannot recover fees for conducting clerical matters. See

18 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989); Davis, 976 F.2d at

19 1543. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claimed hours should be

20 reduced because they billed for clerical work, pointing to entries in

21 which Plaintiffs billed for inter alia printing labels and copying

22 documents. While it is clear that some clerical work was improperly

23 billed by Plaintiffs, the Court’s review of the record indicates that

24 these hours are relatively few in number in relation to the total fee

25 award. Accordingly, the Court finds that improperly billed clerical

26 work can be properly accounted for through a modest reduction to

27 Plaintiffs’ claimed hours.

28 //

13

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 14 of 30 Page ID #:689

1

d. Total Reasonable Hours

2

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claimed hours are at

3 least somewhat excessive. Especially in light of the factors

4 identified in the Mandate, however, the Court does not believe that the

5 reasonable number of hours is nearly as low as suggested by Defendants.

6 Instead, balancing these factors with the above instances of

7 excessiveness, the Court determines in its discretion that a small

8 reduction is warranted. The Court finds that a 5% reduction is 9 appropriate here.8 Thus, the lodestar will be calculated at 95% of the

10 hours claimed by Plaintiffs.

11

3. REASONABLENESS OF RATES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS

12

Defendants also argue that the rates claimed by Plaintiffs are

13 unreasonable. The hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar must be

14 “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

15 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

16 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “Affidavits of the

17 plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in

18 the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly

19 those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory

20 evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v.

21 Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Chalmers

22 v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 1986)). In

23 analyzing the prevailing market rate, the Court is also mindful that

24 these attorneys have considerable skill and expertise, and of the

25 excellent results obtained. See Ninth Circuit Memo. at 6 n.5.

26 8 The Court finds this amount sufficient to cure any over-
27 billing, especially given that Plaintiffs have already exercised their
billing judgment before submitting their hours to the Court. See, 28 e.g., Shiu Initial Reply Decl. ¶¶ 24-27.

14

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 15 of 30 Page ID #:690

1

a. Attorneys’ Rates

2

Plaintiffs request the following rates for attorneys:

3 William McNeil 4 Patricia Shiu

35 years experience 23 years experience

$490 $470

5 Vicky Barker

21 years experience

$410

6 Claudia Center
7 Nancy Solomon Elizabeth Kristen
8 Cacilia Kim
9 Sharon Terman
10 Anya Lakner

13 years experience 9 years experience 5 years experience 3 years experience 2 years experience 1 year experience

$400 $325 $275 $275 $225 $200

11 See, e.g., Shiu Initial Reply Decl. Exs. A, I. In support of their
12 request, Plaintiffs submitted testimony of private attorneys who handle
13 federal litigation; data on then-current rates charged by Los Angeles
14 area law firms; and rates determined to be reasonable by other courts.
15 As to the appropriateness of the rates sought the LAS-ELC
16 attorneys, Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from a former LAS-ELC
17 board member and current partner at the law firm of Pillsbury Winthrop
18 Shaw Pittman LLP. See Odgers Initial Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. He explained that
19 the LAS-ELC board sets hourly rates by collecting billing rate
20 information from the board members and their firms, as well as from
21 other attorneys working for San Francisco law firms. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.
22 He further declared that the rates sought for Shiu, Center and Kristen
23 in particular are in-line with those charged by attorneys of comparable
24 experience at his firm, and other San Francisco and Los Angeles law
25 firms. Id. at ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiffs made a similar showing for the rates
26 requested for Barker and Solomon by way of declarations from two
27 current CWLC board members and current partners at Los Angeles area law
28

15

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 16 of 30 Page ID #:691

1 firms. See Berkowitz Initial Decl.; Jordan Initial Decl. Plaintiffs

2 also submitted survey evidence of Los Angeles law firm rates in line

3 with those requested here. See Shiu Initial Decl. ¶ 56 & Ex. H.

4

The requested rates are also in line with those awarded to

5 McNeill, Shiu, Center and Kristen in Lopez v. San Francisco Unified

6 School Dist., 385 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2005). In Lopez,

7 Plaintiffs brought suit for alleged violations under the Americans with

8 Disabilities Act and parallel state laws. Following settlement,

9 Plaintiffs sought fees for McNeill, Shiu, Center and Kristen based on

10 rates of $490, $460, $395, and $250, respectively. Id. at 987. The

11 court found all of those rates to be reasonable. Id. at 991-92. The

12 Court finds Lopez constitutes significant support for these attorneys’

13 requested rates. See United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407.

14

None of the parties devoted substantial attention to the specific

15 rates of Kim, Terman and Lakner. The Court has reviewed those

16 attorneys’ qualifications and their claimed rates appear reasonable

17 based on case law from this district. See, e.g., Comite de Jornaleros

18 de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, No. CV 04-9396 CBM (JTLx),

19 2006 WL 4081215, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2006).

20

Defendants raise a variety of arguments to counter Plaintiffs’

21 showing, none of which are persuasive.9 For example, Defendants

22 contend that it is inappropriate to determine rates for Plaintiffs’

23

24

9 Defendants rely heavily on an opinion holding that the

lodestar should be calculated using the “hourly rate that would be

25 charged by reasonably competent counsel.” See Albion Pacific Property

Resources, LLC v. Seligman, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1170 (N.D. Cal.

26 2004) (reducing requested rates in determining fees for improper

removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). That standard does not take

27 into account the skill and expertise of these particular attorneys.

As such, the Court declines to follow Albion. See Fleming v. Kemper 28 Nat’l Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

16

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 17 of 30 Page ID #:692

1 attorneys using data from large law firms because such firms generally

2 do work in areas of federal litigation that garner higher rates than

3 those charged for civil rights litigation. See, e.g., City’s Opp’n to 4 Initial Fee Motion at 17.10 But Defendants did not come forward with

5 persuasive evidence that Title IX litigation is not comparable with the

6 types of litigation undertaken by large law firms. Plaintiffs’

7 declarants stated that the rates claimed are similar to those charged

8 by attorneys of similar skill and experience “for comparable work.”

9 See, e.g., Odgers Initial Decl. ¶ 6; Jordan Decl. Initial ¶ 6. While

10 Defendants dispute that this case was “complex,” other courts have

11 found that “Title IX is a complex area of the law and contains

12 relatively few reported decisions to guide practitioners.” Communities

13 for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-cv-479,

14 2008 WL 906031, at *15 (W.D. Mich. March 31, 2008) (citing Cohen v.

15 Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 1996)). That the type of work

16 done in this case is comparable to the federal litigation conducted by

17 major law firms is borne out by the fact that other courts have relied

18 on data from large firms in determining rates for Title IX litigation.

19 See Hess v. Ramona Unified School Dist., No. 07-cv-0049 W(CAB), 2008 WL

20 5381243, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2008) (setting rates for successful

21 Title IX plaintiffs based on declaration from Latham & Watkins 22 partner).11

23

24

10 It bears noting that Plaintiffs are requesting rates at or

below those charged by these firms. See, e.g., Berkowitz Initial

25 Decl. ¶ 8 (“If [Vicky Barker] worked at my firm, her time would be

billed at, and our clients would be asked to pay, a minimum of $410 an

26 hour and more likely $560 per hour.”)

27

11 Defendants’ contention that the rates for Plaintiffs’

attorneys should be in accord with rates charged by the attorneys

28

(continued...)

17

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 18 of 30 Page ID #:693

1

Defendants also contend that it is inappropriate for Plaintiffs to

2 be awarded all fees based on the rates prevailing at the time of the

3 fee motion, rather than at the time the work was completed. Defendants

4 fail to take into account that “compensation received several years

5 after the services were rendered . . . is not equivalent to the same

6 dollar amount received reasonably promptly as the legal services are

7 performed.” Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 283. The Court finds it appropriate

8 to award the prevailing market rate at the time of the Initial Fee

9 Motion to compensate Plaintiffs for the delay in receiving fees. See,

10 e.g., id. at 283-84.

11

Based on all of the evidence regarding the prevailing rate in the

12 community for counsel of similar experience for similar services, the

13 Court finds that the requested rates for all of Plaintiffs’ attorneys

14 are reasonable and will calculate the lodestar at their requested

15 rates.

16

b. Law Clerks’ and Paralegals’ Rates

17

Plaintiffs also seek to recover fees for law clerk and paralegal

18 work. LAS-ELC seeks to recover at rates of $100 for law clerks and

19 $150 for senior paralegals. CWLC seeks to recover at rates of $100 for

20 law clerks and $100 for paralegals. The parties provide very little

21 evidence as to the reasonableness of these rates. While the Court

22 finds that the rates for the law clerks and CWLC’s paralegals are in-

23 line with the prevailing market rate, the requested rate of $150 per

24 hour for LAS-ELC’s senior paralegals is not. See Comite de Jornaleros,

25 2006 WL 4081215, at *3-4; see also Lopez, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 992.

26

27

11(...continued)

working for the government is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit law. 28 See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 1996).

18

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 19 of 30 Page ID #:694

1 Instead, the Court finds that a rate of $125 to be in-line with the

2 prevailing market rate and will adjust the rate accordingly in

3 calculating the lodestar.

4

4. LODESTAR AMOUNT FOR INITIAL FEE REQUEST

5

The Court determines that the lodestar amount for the Initial Fee

6 Motion is $723,296.10. This amount is calculated based on the

7 reasonable hours spent litigating this matter, which is 95% of the

8 hours claimed. The hours are multiplied by the claimed hourly rates,

9 which the Court finds to be reasonable except for LAS-ELC’s senior

10 paralegals. Thus, the lodestar amount is as follows:

11

Biller

12 William McNeil

13 Patricia Shiu

Total Hours 4.23 376.18

$490 $470

Rate

Total Amount $2,072.70 $176,804.60

14 Vicky Barker

239.78

$410

$98,309.80

15 Claudia Center

469.99

16 Nancy Solomon

292.79

17 Elizabeth Kristen 347.20

Cacilia Kim
18

13.97

Sharon Terman
19
Anya Lakner

54.79 9.22

20
LAS-ELC Paralegals 250.23

21 CWLC Paralegals

10.45

22 LAS-ELC Law Clerks 85.98

23 CWLC Law Clerks

85.41

$400 $325 $275 $275 $225 $200 $125 $100 $100 $100

$187,996 $95,156.75 $95,480 $3,841.75 $12,327.75 $1,844 $31,278.75 $1,045 $8,598 $8,541

24

5. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED LODESTAR ENHANCEMENT

25

The calculation of the lodestar does not end the Court’s inquiry.

26 Instead, the lodestar may be adjusted in light of additional

27 considerations, including the important factor of the results obtained.

28 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Nonetheless, a “strong presumption” exists

19

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 20 of 30 Page ID #:695

1 that the lodestar figure represents a “reasonable fee” and should be

2 enhanced only in “rare and exceptional cases.” Pennsylvania v.

3 Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565

4 (1986). To overcome the strong presumption that the basic fee is

5 reasonable, the fee applicant bears the burden of coming forward with

6 “specific evidence” that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low. See

7 Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

8 2000) (citing Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565). This showing must be

9 based on factors not already subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Id.

10

Plaintiffs assert that the Court should award a 25% enhancement

11 because the results achieved were excellent. See, e.g., Kristen Remand 12 Reply Decl. Exs. B at 60, C at 27-28.12 Exceptional results generally

13 do not provide a basis for enhancing the lodestar because the results

14 obtained are generally subsumed within the initial lodestar

15 calculation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 900; see also Ninth Circuit Memo. at 6

16 n.5 (excellence of results should be included in lodestar calculation).

17 Moreover, not only must the results be excellent to warrant a lodestar

18 enhancement, but an upward adjustment is justified “only in the rare

19 case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show that the

20 quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should

21 expect in light of the hourly rates charged.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 899;

22

23

12 Plaintiffs made a variety of other arguments in the Initial

Fee Motion for enhancement, often devoting only one sentence to each.

24 See Initial Fee Motion at 23-24. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued only that an enhancement is warranted by the results obtained. See, e.g.,

25 Kristen Remand Reply Decl. Exs. B at 60, C at 27-28. Thus, those

arguments have been waived to the extent they were not purposefully

26 abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 882 (9th

Cir. 1998); see also Remand Reply at 1 n.1 (asserting that Plaintiffs

27 rely on their appellate briefing as to the recalculation of fees in

the Initial Fee Order). In any event, the Court has reviewed the 28 other arguments and finds that they do not warrant an enhancement.

20

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 21 of 30 Page ID #:696

1 see also Lopez, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99.

2

Plaintiffs attempt to meet their burden by offering declarations

3 from their counsel describing the results of the settlement as better

4 than settlements obtained in other cases. See, e.g., Shiu Initial

5 Decl. ¶ 26; Barker Initial Decl. ¶ 38. While the results of the

6 settlement are excellent, blanket assertions that the results here are

7 better than results in other cases is not “specific evidence” showing

8 that the results achieved in this case would not have been achieved by

9 other similarly paid attorneys. Indeed, case law cited in other

10 sections of Plaintiffs’ briefing suggests that the results here are not

11 so extraordinary. See Communities for Equity, 2008 WL 906031, at *2, 5

12 n.8 (awarding no lodestar modification in Title IX case involving

13 significant statewide changes to high school athletics).

14

Plaintiffs also submitted several declarations articulating the

15 important benefits of sports to young women and the broader athletic

16 opportunities they will have as a result of the settlements. See,

17 e.g., Center Initial Decl. ¶¶ 80-96; Barker Initial Decl. ¶¶ 39-44. The

18 Court has no reason to disagree that the settlement will provide great

19 benefits to many young women; however, that does not make the case

20 “exceptional.” See Blum, 465 U.S. at 900 n.16; Lopez, 385 F. Supp. 2d

21 at 998.

22

Accordingly, the Court denies the request for a 25% enhancement.

23

B. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

24

Plaintiffs also seek to collect post-judgment interest on the fees

25 awarded in connection with the Initial Fee Motion. They seek interest

26 on two sets of fee amounts: (1) the fees and costs awarded in the

27 Initial Fee Order (the “Undisputed Amount” of $335,831.63 in fees and

28 $19,968.06 in costs) and (2) the fees awarded by the Court on remand

21

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 22 of 30 Page ID #:697

1 above the undisputed amount of fees (the “Additional Amount” of

2 $387,464.47). The Court finds that post-judgment interest is available

3 on both amounts.

4

1. INTEREST ON THE “ADDITIONAL AMOUNT”

5

Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to post-judgment interest

6 accruing from the date of the Initial Fee Order for the Additional

7 Amount of fees awarded in this order. Thus, they seek to recover

8 interest accruing from February 28, 2006 to the date of this Order on

9 the $387,464.47 awarded above. A party may recover interest on

10 attorneys’ fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Spain v. Mountanos,

11 690 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1961).

12 “Interest runs from the date that entitlement to fees is secured,

13 rather than from the date that the exact quantity of the fees is set.”

14 Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1995). This

15 Court held that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover fees in the Initial

16 Fee Order, entered on February 28, 2006. Thus, post-judgment interest

17 would ordinarily accrue from that date.

18

Nonetheless, Defendants assert that post-judgment interest cannot

19 be awarded at all here because the Ninth Circuit mandate did not

20 include specific instructions to allow it. For this proposition,

21 Defendants rely on Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc.

22 v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 518 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir.

23 2008) (discussing Fed. R. App. P. 37). Defendants’ argument is

24 unavailing, as made clear by Planned Parenthood itself:

25

Rule 37(b) governs only when our mandate “modifies or

26

reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be

27

entered in the district court.” When the court of appeals

28

remands to the district court to determine the amount of a

22

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 23 of 30 Page ID #:698

1

damages award, then the mandate does not direct the entry of

2

a money judgment. The Briggs [v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334

3

U.S. 304 (1948)] and Rule 37(b) limitations on district court

4

authority are therefore not implicated . . .

5 518 F.3d at 1018-19 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit mandate

6 in this case vacated the Initial Fee Order with instructions to

7 recalculate the fees. See Ninth Circuit Memo. at 6. Thus, the award

8 of post-judgment interest is not barred.

9

Post-judgment interest began accruing on February 28, 2006 for the

10 $387,464.47 awarded by this Court today. Defendants do not dispute

11 that the appropriate interest rate is 4.72%. See Kristen Remand Reply

12 Decl. ¶ 17. It has now been 1099 days since the issuance of the

13 Initial Fee Order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to $55,059.90

14 in interest for the Additional Amount, plus $50.10 for each day until

15 Defendants make payment.

16

2. INTEREST ON THE “UNDISPUTED AMOUNT”

17

As noted above, the Initial Fee Order awarded Plaintiffs

18 attorneys’ fees of $335,831.63 and costs of $19,968.06. Initial Fee

19 Order at 22. The City paid 20% of the underlying amount due pursuant

20 to the Initial Fee Order (or $71,159.94) on August 10, 2006. See,

21 e.g., Kristen Remand Decl. ¶ 22. The District paid the remaining 80%

22 of the underlying amount due (or $284,639.75) on January 25, 2007.

23 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 33. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to

24 recover interest on the Undisputed Amounts accruing from February 28,

25 2006 to the date of payment by each of the Defendants. The amount of

26 interest requested is $13,674.25. Id. at ¶ 39.

27

Given that Defendants did not appeal Plaintiffs’ entitlement to

28 fees, there is no reason why payment of the Undisputed Amount should

23

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 24 of 30 Page ID #:699

1 have been delayed. See Fradhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 804

2 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1986). As noted above, an award of fees

3 begins accruing interest on the date of the initial order establishing

4 an entitlement to them. Friend, 72 F.3d at 1391-92. Thus, post-

5 judgment interest began accruing on February 28, 2006.

6

Defendants again contest the availability of post-judgment

7 interest, however. The City argues that it should not be required to

8 pay interest on the Undisputed Amount because it expressed to

9 Plaintiffs a “willingness to immediately pay its portion of the award”

10 shortly after the Initial Fee Order and, at any rate, that it paid

11 Plaintiffs in a “reasonable” amount of time. The District argues that

12 any delay in its payment to Plaintiffs for the Undisputed Amount was

13 caused by the fact that the funds had to be issued by the Los Angeles

14 County Office of Education. Neither Defendant cites to any authority

15 in support of their positions and their arguments are not convincing.

16

First, the City’s claim that it offered to pay immediately is

17 disingenuous given that its offer was contingent on Plaintiffs not

18 appealing the Initial Fee Order. See Kristen Remand Reply Decl. Ex. A

19 (“We hope that you will agree that accepting the Defendants’ offer to

20 pay the full award now, rather than appealing the District Court’s

21 order, is in the best interest of the current and future students at

22 Alhambra High School.” (emphasis added)). In any event, were the City

23 truly ready to make payment at that time and Plaintiffs were

24 unreceptive, the City should have deposited the money with the court

25 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 67(a) to halt the accrual of interest. See

26 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 487 F.2d 672, 675 n.7 (9th Cir.

27 1973); Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1990).

28

Second, the Court need not consider whether the delays in this

24

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 25 of 30 Page ID #:700

1 case were reasonable and/or caused by third-parties because Defendants

2 should bear the cost of delay regardless. The award of post-judgment

3 interest in civil rights cases is allowed to ensure that the policy

4 underlying the award of attorneys’ fees (i.e., encouraging counsel to

5 bring private civil rights actions) is not undermined by delay in

6 payment. See Spain, 690 F.2d at 748. With that policy in mind, the

7 cost incurred by delay in payment should be borne by the defendants

8 whose initial wrongful conduct invoked the judicial process. See, 9 e.g., Perkins, 487 F.2d at 676.13

10

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to post-judgment interest of

11 $13,674.25 on the Undisputed Amount awarded in the Initial Fees Order.

12

C. PLAINTIFFS’ REMAND FEE MOTION

13

In addition to fees from the Initial Fee Motion, Plaintiffs also

14 seek to recover fees and costs for work done after the Initial Fee

15 Motion but not covered in their separate fee request to the Ninth

16 Circuit (“Remand Fee Motion”). This request focuses primarily on fees

17 associated with motion work on remand and efforts to collect the

18 Undisputed Amount from Defendants pending appeal. Plaintiffs’ Remand

19 Fee Motion seeks $14,112.50 in fees and $569.40 in costs. See Kristen

20 Remand Reply Decl. ¶ 16.

21

There is no dispute that a prevailing plaintiff may recover fees

22 for work done in litigating attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Thompson v.

23 Gomez, 45 F.3d 1365, 1366 (9th Cir. 1995). So the only dispute on the

24 Remand Fee Motion is the proper amount to award. Plaintiffs claim the

25 following lodestar amount:

26 13 The Court rejects the contention that Plaintiffs cannot
27 recover post-judgment interest on the Undisputed Amount because the
Initial Fee Order did not specifically provide for it. See, e.g., 28 Tinsley v. Sea-Land Corp., 979 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992).

25

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 26 of 30 Page ID #:701

1 Attorney
2 Patricia Shiu
3 Elizabeth
4 Kristen
5 Sharon Terman
6
7

Experience 26 years 7 years 4 years

Rate $530 $340 $275

Hours 1.55 35.5 4.44
Total:

Lodestar $821.50 $12,070 $1,221
$14,112.50.

8 See Remand Fee Reply at 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

9 finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the amount requested.

10

1. REASONABLENESS OF HOURS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS.

11

As they did with the hours claimed for in the Initial Fee Motion,

12 Defendants contend that the hours billed are excessive and

13 unreasonable. While the Court found some deduction necessary for the

14 hours in the Initial Fee Motion, the hours claimed in the Remand Fee

15 Motion are reasonable.

16

Defendants assert that roughly seven hours for which Plaintiffs

17 request fees in the Remand Fee Motion were “cut” from the Ninth Circuit

18 fee request and, as a result, that Plaintiffs should not be able to

19 recover for that time here. See District’s Remand Opp’n at 5. The

20 papers presented to the Ninth Circuit indicate that some of the “cuts”

21 were made because the time claimed was “time spent on case-related

22 issues not relating to the appeal.” See Kristen Ninth Circuit Fee

23 Decl. ¶ 16 (attached to Mullane Remand Decl. Ex. 2); see also Kristen

24 Ninth Circuit Fee Reply Decl. ¶ 12(e) (attached to Kristen Remand Reply

25 Decl. Ex. D). While it is not clear that Plaintiffs were intending to

26 seek those fees on remand, it does not appear that Plaintiffs were

27

28

26

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 27 of 30 Page ID #:702

1 representing that the cut hours would not be claimed on remand.14 Thus,

2 the disputed time that had been excised from the Ninth Circuit fee

3 claim is recoverable here.

4

Plaintiffs request 7.3 hours for Kristen’s travel time from San

5 Francisco to Los Angeles in conjunction with the August 4, 2008 status

6 conference. Defendants claim that those hours are unreasonable because

7 Plaintiffs’ local counsel, Barker, attended the status conference.

8 Given Kristen’s familiarity with the case and the issues on appeal, see

9 Kristen Remand Reply Decl. ¶ 8, it was proper for her to attend the

10 status conference. And the hours that she billed are especially

11 reasonable given that Barker did not bill her time attending the status

12 conference. Id. Thus, the hours claimed are reasonable.

13

Plaintiffs requested 9.4 hours for Kristen’s preparation of the

14 Remand Fees Motion. Defendants contend that such fees are excessive

15 because the motion is “at least partially duplicative” of work

16 previously done by Plaintiffs’ counsel. City’s Remand Opp’n at 8.

17 This argument is also unavailing. Even if prior briefs were written

18 with significantly overlapping issues, preparing the Remand Fees Motion

19 in less than 10 hours is inherently reasonable. As to Plaintiffs’

20 assertion that research had been conducted on post-judgment interest by

21 a colleague of Kristen’s in 2006, the Court finds it entirely proper

22 (and expected) that Kristen would not have relied solely on outdated

23

24 14 The Court is not unsympathetic to Defendants’ frustration,
25 however. Plaintiffs often submitted voluminous papers that did not highlight important information. Thus, it can be difficult to
26 ascertain precisely what is being claimed. That certainly appears to be the case with the time “cut” in the Ninth Circuit fee request.
27 Plaintiffs are well off the mark in proclaiming that the papers before
the Ninth Circuit “plainly show” that Plaintiffs would seek to recover 28 some of the excised time on remand. See Remand Reply at 9.

27

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 28 of 30 Page ID #:703

1 research. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.

2

Defendants lastly contend that the time spent conferencing is not

3 recoverable, objecting specifically to 1.5 hours of billed time.

4 City’s Remand Suppl. Opp’n at 8. But, as the City notes, the time

5 sought for conferencing in the Remand Fees Motion is “minute” compared

6 to the overall fees sought. City’s Remand Suppl. Opp’n at 8. The

7 Court does not find the conferencing here to be unnecessary or

8 unreasonable.

9

2. REASONABLENESS OF RATES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS

10

Plaintiffs assert that the remand fee lodestar should be

11 calculated using the following rates: (1) $530 for Shiu; (2) $340 for

12 Kristen; and (3) $275 for Terman. In support of these rates,

13 Plaintiffs submitted another declaration from Richard Odgers. See 14 Kristen Remand Decl. Ex. V.15 The rates requested on remand are

15 slightly higher than the rates that the Court found reasonable above

16 for these attorneys. The Court finds that these rates are reasonable

17 in light of the additional years of experience that each has acquired

18 in the interim and the Odgers Declaration.

19

3. LODESTAR AMOUNT FOR POST-REMAND FEE REQUEST

20

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are awarded their requested lodestar

21

22

15 Defendants object to these rates, largely reiterating the

23

arguments addressed above. For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ arguments are not persuasive. Defendants also assert on

24 remand that rates should be set according to the matrix in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983). See Mullane

25 Remand Decl. Ex. 4 (attaching Declaration of Gerald Knapton). The

Court will not apply the Laffey matrix because inter alia it is

26 inconsistent with the standards applicable here requiring that the

Court consider the skill and expertise of these particular attorneys

27 in setting their rate. See, e.g., Perez v. Cozen & O’Connor Group

Long Term Disability Coverage, No. 05cv0440 DMS AJB, 2007 WL 2142292, 28 at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 2007).

28

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 29 of 30 Page ID #:704

1 amount for their Remand Fee Motion of $14,112.50.16

2

4. COSTS FOR POST-REMAND WORK

3

Lastly, Plaintiffs seek to recover costs of $569.40 in their

4 Remand Fee Motion. See Remand Reply at 18. Not surprisingly,

5 Defendants dispute the reasonableness of those costs. The Court finds

6 that Plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of costs requested.

7

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs incorrectly seek double

8 recovery for Federal Express delivery of the copies of the prior

9 briefing to this Court. District’s Remand Opp’n at 10. But Kristen

10 noted that two separate shipments were required because the briefing

11 was voluminous. Kristen Remand Reply Decl. at ¶ 14. This is a

12 plausible explanation and the Court finds the delivery fees

13 recoverable. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407 (allowing

14 recovery for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses).

15

Defendants next argue that Kristen’s travel costs are not

16 recoverable because they would ordinarily not be billed to a paying

17 $customer. District’s Remand Opp’n at 10. The Court disagrees. See

18 Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 163 F.R.D. 308, 327 (N.D. Cal.

19 1995).

20

21

16 The City also requests that the Court hold it responsible for

“no more than twenty percent of [the awarded] fees, given its limited 22 involvement in the alleged violations, the overall litigation and the

23

limited relief obtained by Plaintiffs as to Defendant City specifically.” City’s Remand Suppl. Opp’n at 13. The Court declines

24 to make such a determination. First, the request appears to be moot as the Defendants seemingly have already worked out an agreement on

25 apportioning fees in this case. See, e.g., Kristen Remand Decl. ¶ 22,

33 (the City paid 20% of undisputed fee amount and the District paid

26 the remaining 80%). Second, the issue was not sufficiently briefed

for this Court to make any such determination. The City provides a

27 few examples of instances in which fees purportedly relate to the

District rather than the City. See, e.g., City’s Remand Suppl. Opp’n 28 at 2-3. The District for its part is silent on the issue.

29

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 205 Filed 03/03/09 Page 30 of 30 Page ID #:705

1

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full amount of

2 costs sought in their Remand Fees Motion.

3 III. CONCLUSION

4

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby AWARDS

5 Plaintiffs the following:

6 7 Fees for Initial Fee Motion:

$723,296.10 17

8 Interest on Additional Amount:

$55,059.90, plus $50.10 per day

9

until paid

10 Interest on Undisputed Amount:

$13,674.25

11 Fees Awarded for Remand Fee Motion:

$14,112.50

12 Costs Awarded for Remand Fee Motion: $569.40

13

14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15

16 DATED: March 3, 2009

17

18

________________________________

19

AUDREY B. COLLINS

20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CHIEF JUDGE

21

22

23

24

25

26

27 17 As noted above, a portion of this fee amount has already been
28 paid by Defendants.

30

 
 Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 1 of 21 Page ID #:710
FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAN 28 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

LAUREN M. CRUZ, by her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERIE HERRERA, by her next friend Carolina Herrera; JENNIFER N. CERROS; CATHERINE GREMPEL, by her next friend Tina Grempel, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF ALHAMBRA; RUSSELL LEESUNG; VICTOR SANDOVAL; LOU TORRES; WILLIAM A. VALLEJOS; JOHN H. NUNEZ; ROBERT L. GIN; RUTH E. CASTRO; BARBARA A. MESSINA, in their official capacities,

No. 06-55811
D.C. No. CV-04-1460- ABC Central California (Los Angeles)

ORDER

RECEIV D

:"c,.

Clall(,

u.s.

DISTRICT

COURT
'

JAN 2~ 2010

C6tIITRAL. OIST
iW

CAll FORHIA
DEPUTY

Defendants - Appellees.

Before: Peter L. Shaw, Appellate Commissioner I
Background Appellants Lauren M. Cruz, Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N. Cerros, and Catherine Grempel (collectively, "Cruz") brought a Title IX class action against

GM LIAppellate Commissioner

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 2 of 21 Page ID #:711
No. 06-55811 the Alhambra Unified School District, the City of Alhambra, and other individuals (collectively, "Alhambra") alleging Alhambra's failure to provide female students with an equal opportunity to participate in school athletics. The parties entered into a settlement agreement providing that the district court would retain jurisdiction over the determination of attorneys' fees. Cruz filed a motion for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court granted in part the motion for attorneys' fees. Cruz filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to amend or alter the judgment, which the district court denied.
Cruz filed a notice of appeal of both district court orders. This court vacated the order granting attorneys' fees in part, and reversed the order denying the Rule 59(e) motion.
Cruz filed a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses on appeal, Alhambra filed an opposition, and Cruz filed a reply. The court granted the motion for attorneys' fees and expenses, and referred the determination of an appropriate amount of fees to the Appellate Commissioner.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

2

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 3 of 21 Page ID #:712

No. 06-55811

II Attorneys' Fees

A. Applicable Law

The starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is the calculation of the lodestar. See City ofBurlington v.

Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended

by a reasonable hourly rate, taking into consideration the relevant factors in Kerr v.

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67,70 (9th Cir. 1975). See Fischer v. SJB-

P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,1119 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Van Gerwen v. Guarantee

Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining the factors

relevant to the lodestar calculation). I There is a strong presumption that the

lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, and therefore it should be enhanced or

I The so-called Kerr factors bearing on the determination of a reasonable fee are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (7) the amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (9) the "undesirability" of the case; (10) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (11) awards in similar cases. See Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 n.2 (citing Dague, 505 U.S. at 561-67); see also Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

3

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 4 of 21 Page ID #:713
No. 06-55811 reduced only in rare and exceptional cases. See Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045; Morales v. City a/San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8-9 (9th Cir. 1996).
A fee applicant has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in the appeal and must submit evidence in support of the claimed hours and of the claimed hourly rate. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1993). "The party opposing the fee application has the burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence" to the court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted in the fee applicant's affidavits. Id. at 1397-98. B. Fee Request
Cruz seeks $186,620.30 in attorneys' fees on appeal for their attorneys and other timekeepers at hourly rates of $530 for Patricia Shiu, Esq., $490 for Vicky L. Barker, Esq., $340 for Elizabeth Kristen, Esq., $275 for Sharon Terman, Esq., $550 for Richard M. Pearl, and $100 for law clerks. Cruz also seeks $1,765.93 in expenses, thus requesting a total award of$188,386.23. The hours were expended by the timekeepers as follows:

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

4

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 5 of 21 Page ID #:714

No. 06-55811

Task Interviews & Conferences Obtaining & Reviewing Records Legal Research Preparing Briefs Prepare for, Attend Oral Argument
Other: Mediation Rule 59(e) Motion Fee Reply Totals

Shiu Kristen Terman Barker 9.50 24.43 12.81 4.70 0.30 0.70 5.04 0.00 0.10 14.40 22.79 0.00 33.96 76.50 73.59 6.80 19.65 48.50 0.00 0.00

Pearl Clerks Totals

3.35 0.00 54.79

2.55

0.00 8.59

1.35 13.14 51.78

41.80 6.70 239.35

4.80 0.00 72.95

1.65

1.80

1.30

3.95 11.40 30.82

0.00 20.05

0.00

69.11 197.78 146.35

0.10 1.00 1.00 13.60

1.30 1.35 5.05 61.55

0.00 6.15 0.00 48.52 0.00 26.10
19.84 1 508.23

During the appeal, Cruz filed a notice of appeal and associated documents; a

61-page opening brief and four volumes of excerpts of record; a 30-page reply

brief; two letters of additional citations pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28U); two letters to the court; a bill of costs; a request for publication; an

attorneys' fees motion; a motion for an extension of time to file a reply to

appellees' opposition to the motion for attorneys' fees; and a reply to the

opposition to the motion for attorneys' fees.

Cruz participated in mediation both before briefing and after submission of

the appeal, and attended oral argument.

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 6 of 21 Page ID #:715

No. 06-55811 Kristen states in her declaration that, in the exercise of billing judgment, she
eliminated unproductive, duplicative, and excessive hours expended by herself and attorneys Shiu, Terman, and law clerks at her law firm, the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center ("LAS-ELC"). In a further exercise of billing judgment, she reduced the total hours expended by those attorneys by approximately 26 percent to arrive at the number of hours claimed in the fee motion. Pearl states in his declaration that he carefully reviewed the fee request and that all claimed hours were "reasonably devoted to pursuing [his] clients' interests and would have been billed to a fee-paying client." C. Compensation for Pearl's Time
Alhambra contends that Cruz is not entitled to compensation for Richard Pearl's time because he was an expert on appeal, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not authorize compensation for expert fees in a Title IX case. Pearl submitted a declaration with the fee motion stating that he was retained by Cruz and her attorneys to assist in the litigation. His time records show that he expended his time on the Rule 59(e) motion, the appeal and related correspondence, and the fee motion. Although Pearl concedes that he specializes in attorneys' fees and has been retained as an expert in fee matters, he states that he submitted the declaration

GMLIAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 7 of 21 Page ID #:716

No. 06-55811 with the fee motion as an advocate, not as an expert in this matter. The evidence and documentation shows that he was not an expert in this appeal, and instead was retained as counsel. Alhambra's contention therefore lacks merit. D. Documentation Deficiencies
Alhambra contends in a footnote and without elaboration that Pearl's time records are block-billed. Alhambra's contention lacks merit.
"Block billing" is the failure to itemize each task individually in the billing records. The time requested should be reduced if block billing makes it impossible to evaluate the reasonableness of the time. See Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942,948 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Mendez v. County ofSan Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008).
Some of the time Pearl recorded in his billing records consists of more than one task listed together in one time entry. Pearl's general practice was to record all of the tasks accomplished in one day in one billing entry, with no itemization of the time required for the discrete tasks. In general, however, Pearl performed only one or two different tasks in a day. Pearl also recorded his time in intervals of 1I20th of an hour, or 3 minutes. Furthermore, Pearl provided information about

GM LIAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 8 of 21 Page ID #:717

No. 06-55811 the division of his time in a document substantially similar to Form 9 of the Ninth Circuit Rules.
Given the limited number of tasks performed in each entry, the precision of the time recorded, and the categorization of his time provided in the document equivalent to Form 9, Pearl's documentation is adequate to evaluate the reasonableness of his time. See United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Ret. Income Plan, ASARCO, 512 F.3d 555, 565 (9th Cir. 2008); Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1121. Pearl satisfied his burden of submitting evidence supporting the hours claimed by listing the hours and "identify[ing] the general subject matter of [the] time expenditures." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12.
Alhambra contends that the fee motion is deficient because a declaration was not submitted from each timekeeper, citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,896 n.ll (1984). The Supreme Court in Blum stated that a fee applicant should produce evidence in addition to the affidavit of the fee applicant's attorney to justify the requested hourly rate. See id. The Court did not mandate a requirement that each attorney representing a party must file an affidavit. Here, Cruz submitted declarations from Kristen and Pearl, in addition to declarations from other attorneys, that provided sufficient information regarding the hours claimed and the

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 9 of 21 Page ID #:718

No. 06-55811 hourly rates, thus satisfying Blum. Kristen's and Pearl's declarations satisfy Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6(b) that the fee motion be supported by a declaration attesting to the accuracy of the information regarding hourly rates and time expenditures. Alhambra's contention lacks merit. E. Reasonable Hours
1. Pearl Alhambra contends that Pearl's work was unnecessary and duplicated work performed by other attorneys. This contention lacks merit. Alhambra does not point to any specific time entries as being excessive or present independent evidence showing that Pearl's time was excessive. Pearl and Kristen states in their declarations that Pearl's expertise in attorney's fees and appellate litigation was important to the appeal because Cruz's other attorneys had very little experience with fee motions or fee appeals. Pearl also consulted about the Rule 59(e) motion, provided appellate strategy, provided research on selected topics within his expertise, provided sample briefs, edited drafts of briefs, and helped Kristen prepare for oral argument. Given Alhambra's lack of specificity regarding what it considers Pearl's unnecessary or excessive tasks and Cruz's explanation of Pearl's role, Alhambra's

GM LIAppellate Commissioner

9

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 10 of 21 Page ID #:719

No. 06-55811 contention lacks merit. See Moreno v. City ofSacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Findings of duplicative work should not become a shortcut for reducing an award without identifying just why the requested fee was excessive and by how much.")
2. Barker Alhambra contends that Cruz should not be compensated for Barker's 13.6 hours because the work was unnecessary and duplicated other attorneys' time. This contention has merit. According to the fee documentation and the record on appeal, Shiu was lead counsel and had overall responsibility for the appeal, and reviewed the other attorneys' work and advised them. Kristen drafted most of the substantive briefing and conducted oral argument. Terman and the law clerks provided legal research and brief writing assistance. Terman also drafted the Rule 59(e) motion. Pearl's role is described above. Although the fee motion and accompanying documentation explain the roles the other timekeepers played in the appeal, Barker's contribution is unclear. Cruz's fee motion and reply state that Barker "provided necessary assistance and review regarding briefing" and acted in supervisory capacity. Kristen's

GMLIAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 11 of 21 Page ID #:720

No. 06-55811 declarations state that Barker, along with Pearl, provided "assistance" and she reviewed "work prepared by less experienced counsel with a lower hourly rate." Baker's time records show numerous short conferences with other counsel and some review of briefs and fee pleadings. Her role and work duplicates that of Pearl and Shiu. The fee materials fail to demonstrate the necessity of her contributions to the success of the appeal. Given the contributions of the other attorneys involved and their experience, and the absence of any particularized justification in the fee motion for the employment of Barker, her work appears to be duplicative. See Welch, 480 F.3d at 949. Cruz will not be compensated for Barker's time.
3. Conferences Alhambra objects that the 50.09 hours claimed for conferences (disregarding the hours claimed for conferences by Barker) are excessive and unjustified. It also contends that a number of entries designated as "preparing briefs and fee application" in the time records were actually conferences that were also excessive. Alhambra's objection lacks merit. Given the complexity of the appeal and the discrete roles played by the several attorneys representing Cruz, a significant amount of time was warranted for conferences among the attorneys to coordinate tasks, strategize, and communicate

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 12 of 21 Page ID #:721

No. 06-55811 revisions to briefs and motions. Over the course of more than two years in this appeal, Cruz claims approximately 10 percent of the total time in the category of conferences between counsel and others. The amount of time is comparable to that claimed in appeals of similar complexity and will be awarded.
Alhambra's generalized complaint that additional conference time was mislabeled as preparing the briefs or fee motion fails because Alhambra does not identify the entries that it believes are inaccurate, nor has it submitted evidence demonstrating that the time claimed is unreasonable. See Deukmejian, 987 F.2d at 1397-98 (party opposing fee application has burden of submitting evidence challenging accuracy or reasonableness of the hours charged). Moreover, Cruz submitted a declaration in reply to Alhambra's contention stating that Kristen carefully reviewed the entries and the Form 9 information to ensure that the time claimed for conferences was accurate. Alhambra's contention lacks merit.
4. Unnecessary Duplication or Overstaffing Alhambra contends that Cruz's attorneys all claim time for reviewing and preparing the Rule 59 motion, the appellant's brief, the reply brief, and the fee motion. Alhambra therefore contends that the hours claimed for obtaining records, legal research, preparing briefs, preparing the fee application, and preparing the

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

12

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 13 of 21 Page ID #:722
No. 06-55811 motion to amend judgment should be reduced by 25 percent to account for duplication of effort.
For the most part, Alhambra again fails to identify any particular entries or tasks that it contends resulted in overstaffing or unnecessary duplication of effort. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1113 (duplication of effort, unless it involves unnecessary duplication, is not a legitimate reason to deny compensation). Cruz presented evidence showing that the different attorneys performed different tasks and were responsible for different parts of the appeal. Alhambra's assertion that the court should reduce particular categories of hours by 25 percent is without merit.
Alhambra contends that it was unreasonable for three attorneys to prepare outlines for the opening brief. Cruz responded to the contention with a declaration from Kristen, in which she states that the time identified totaled 4.99 hours and that the outlines were beneficial in planning and preparing the opening brief. Cruz's evidence demonstrates that the time claimed was reasonably expended and not duplicative. See id. Furthermore, contrary to Alhambra's contention, Cruz's attorneys' time entries are not too vague to permit review. See Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1121. Alhambra's contention lacks merit.

GMLIAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 14 of 21 Page ID #:723
No. 06-55811 5. Oral Argument Alhambra contends that the 72.95 hours claimed for oral argument is
excessive. Alhambra's contention has merit. Alhambra argues first that the time claimed for three attorneys to participate
in moot court was unnecessary and excessive. Pearl and Shiu participated in moot court with Kristen to prepare her for oral argument. Careful preparation is necessary for a Ninth Circuit appeal of this complexity, and moot court is a reasonable expenditure of time to prepare for oral argument. See Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2004).
Alhambra also contends that Cruz should not be compensated for travel time for two attorneys to and from oral argument, and instead Barker, who is in Los Angeles, should have attended oral argument in Pasadena. Alhambra cites no authority in support of this contention and, as noted earlier, Barker's time has been disallowed. This court has held that attorney travel time for which local attorneys customarily bill their clients is compensable. See Davis v. City & County ofSan Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536,1543 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993); see also E.H. Clarke Lumber Co. v. Kurth, 152 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 15 of 21 Page ID #:724

No. 06-55811 1946) (awarding attorneys' fees for attorney's travel to and from oral argument). Travel time to and from oral argument will be awarded.
Alhambra is nonetheless correct that the total amount of time requested for oral argument is excessive. Given the experience of appellate counsel, the significant amount of time billed for brief and excerpt preparation, and the Appellate Commissioner's review of fee applications in appeals of similar complexity, the attorneys should have prepared for oral argument in 44 hours or less. For oral argument, Cruz is awarded 16 hours at Shiu's hourly rate, 4 hours at Pearl's hourly rate, and 24 hours at Kristen's hourly rate. F. Hourly Rates
Alhambra next contends that Cruz submitted no evidence that any of the attorneys or other timekeepers actually received the hourly rate requested. This contention lacks merit.
Although evidence of an attorney's customary hourly rate may be considered by a court in setting a reasonable hourly rate, a reasonable or prevailing hourly rate is determined by the market rate. Chalmers v. City ofLos Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986); see Carson v. Billings Police Dept., 470 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2006) (attorney's usual hourly rate is relevant, but not determinative,

GMLIAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 16 of 21 Page ID #:725
No. 06-55811 evidence of the prevailing market rate). Thus, the proper reference for determining a prevailing rate in a community is the rate charged by attorneys with similar skill, experience, and reputation as the prevailing party's attorneys. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2008). Alhambra's argument lacks merit.
In support of her requested hourly rates, Cruz submitted declarations from Kristen and Pearl, and from Richard W. Odgers, Esq.
Kristen relates in her declaration the education and experience of attorneys Shiu, Terman, and herself, and the two law clerks who worked on the appeal. Kristen also stated that the requested hourly rates were derived from surveys conducted periodically by LAS-ELC, taking into account billing rates charged by for-profit San Francisco law firms for attorneys of comparable experience doing comparable work, as well as rates charged by comparable nonprofit public interest organizations. Kristen based the rates also on information provided by private attorneys relating to rates charged by other San Francisco law firms for comparable litigation. Kristen's declaration states hourly rates awarded to Shiu, Kristen, and law clerks by courts in other cases.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

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Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 17 of 21 Page ID #:726

No. 06-55811 In Pearl's declaration, he states his legal education and experience, and
discusses numerous cases in which the courts awarded attorney's fees at his requested hourly rate. His current hourly rate is $550. Pearl specializes in attorneys' fees matters and has been retained as an expert on attorneys' fees issues. He presented substantial evidence that the requested hourly rates in this appeal are reasonable.
Odgers states in his declaration that he has been an attorney and practiced in California since 1961. He presently practices at a large San Francisco law firm, and he is the past Chair of the board of LAW-ELC. He states that he is thoroughly acquainted with the work of the attorneys in the Cruz case and has reviewed the resumes ofShiu, Kristen, and Terman. Odgers is also familiar with Pearl's experience and reputation. He opines that the hourly rates requested by the attorneys in this appeal are consistent with the prevailing market rates for attorneys practicing in San Francisco with comparable experience. His opinion is informed by his knowledge of the method by which LAS-ELC sets its hourly rates and his knowledge of rates charged by other San Francisco law firms for their attorneys.
Cruz has provided evidence of the rates charged by her attorneys and the rates charged by attorneys with similar skill, experience, and reputation as her

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

17

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 18 of 21 Page ID #:727

No. 06-55811 attorneys to support the requested hourly rates. See Carson, 470 F.3d at 892; Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980-81. In addition, she has provided evidence of other court-ordered attorney's fee awards, including those involving the attorneys in this appeal. See Welch, 480 F.3d at 947 (evidence of rate determinations by other courts is relevant to determining the prevailing market rate); United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403,406 (9th Cir. 1990) ("rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate").
Moreover, on remand in this case, the district court awarded the hourly rates requested in this application of $530 for Shiu, $340 for Kristen, $275 for Terman, and $100 for law clerks for work not directly associated with this appeal that was performed during the pendency of the appeal and remand. Cruz v. Alhambra School Dist., No. CV 04-1460 ABC (Mcx) (C.D. Cal. March 3, 2009) (order).
Alhambra contends that the requested hourly rates are excessive, and relies on the declaration of Gerald G. Knapton, Esq. Knapton was admitted to practice in California in 1977, and is employed by a multi-service law firm. Knapton has reviewed more than 200 applications for attorney's fees in many types of cases, and testified as an expert witness in fee dispute matters. Knapton reviewed the fee

GMLIAppellate Commissioner

18

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 19 of 21 Page ID #:728

No. 06-55811 application in this case and opines that the prevailing market rate for Shiu and Pearl is $466, for Terman is $228, for Kristen is $334, and for the law clerks is $100. Knapton bases his opinion on the Laffey matrix, which is a table of hourly rates corresponding to the number of years attorneys have practiced in the Washington D.C. area. The matrix is prepared and updated each year by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, based on and named for the case that first generated the index. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Knapton's opinion is undermined by the fact that this circuit does not follow the legal standard set forth in Laffey. See Maldonado v. Lehman, 811 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). Knapton does not purport to give an opinion under this circuit's law whether the requested hourly rate is "in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Blum, 465 U.S. at 895; see also Carson, 470 F.3d at 892. Cruz, on the other hand, has presented adequate evidence of the prevailing rates in the San Francisco area for similar services by attorneys of comparable credentials. Cruz is awarded attorneys' fees at the requested hourly rates.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

19

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 20 of 21 Page ID #:729

No. 06-55811

III Expenses

Alhambra contends that the expenses for traveling to and from oral argument

should not be awarded, because such expenses are normally not charged to clients.

This court has held that such out-of-pocket expenses may be reimbursed. See

Davis, 976 F.2d at 1556. Furthermore, Pearl states in his declaration that such

expenses are ordinarily charged to fee-paying clients. Reasonable travel expenses

will be awarded to Cruz.

Alhambra contends that the travel expenses are excessive because Cruz's

attorneys charged for four airline tickets instead of two and spent too much on

food. Cruz concedes in her reply that these expenses were inappropriate and

submitted an adjusted expense request. The revised request for an award of

expenses in the amount of$1,765.93 is reasonable and is awarded.

IV Conclusion

Cruz is awarded attorneys' fees based on the following hours at the claimed

hourly rates:

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

20

Case 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc Document 207 Filed 01/28/10 Page 21 of 21 Page ID #:730

No. 06-55811

Task Interviews & Conferences Obtaining & Reviewing Records Legal Research Preparing Briefs Prepare for, Attend Oral Argument
Other: Mediation Rule 59(e) Motion Fee Reply Totals

Shiu Kristen Terman Barker 9.50 24.43 12.81 0.00 0.30 0.70 5.04 0.00 0.10 14.40 22.79 0.00 33.96 76.50 73.59 0.00 16.00 24.00 0.00 0.00

Pearl Clerks Totals

3.35

0.00 50.09

2.55

0.00 8.59

1.35 13.14 51.78

41.80 6.70 232.55

4.00 0.00 44.00

1.65

1.80

1.30

3.95 11.40 30.82

0.00 20.05

0.00

65.46 173.28 146.35

0.00

1.30 0.00 6.05

0.00

1.35

0.00 47.52

0.00

5.05

0.00 25.10

0.00 60.75 19.84 1 465.68

Attorneys' fees of$169,251.75 and expenses of$I,765.93, for a total of

$171,017.68, are awarded in favor of Cruz and against Alhambra. This order sent

to the district court shall amend this court's mandate.

GMLlAppellate Commissioner

21

 
 Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 1 of 24 (Mcx),CLOSED,DISCOVERY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:04−cv−01460−ABC−Mc

Lauren M Cruz et al v. Alhambra School District et al Assigned to: Judge Audrey B. Collins Referred to: Magistrate Judge James W. McMahon Case in other court: 9th CCA, 06−55811 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/04/2004 Date Terminated: 03/03/2009 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Lauren M Cruz by her next friend Jean Cruz

represented by Claudia Center Legal Aid Society−Employment Law Ctr 600 Harrison St, Ste 120 San Francisco, CA 94107 415−864−8848 Email: ccenter@las−elc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Kristen Legal Aid Society−Employment Law Ctr 180 Montgomery Street Suite 600 San Francisco, CA 94104 415−864−8848 Fax: 415−593−0096 Email: ekristen@las−elc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy M Solomon California Women Law Center 3460 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1102 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−637−9900 TERMINATED: 07/17/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A Shiu Legal Aid Society−Employment Law Center 600 Harrison St, Ste 120 San Francisco, CA 94107 415−864−8848 Email: pshiu@las−elc.org TERMINATED: 09/01/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vicky L Barker California Women Law Center 5670 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 460 Los Angeles, CA 90036 323−951−9276 Fax: 323−951−9870 Email: vicky.barker@cwlc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 2 of 24

Valerie Herrera by her next friend Carolina Herrera

represented by Claudia Center (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Kristen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy M Solomon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vicky L Barker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jennifer N Cerros

represented by Claudia Center (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Kristen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy M Solomon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vicky L Barker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Catherine Grempel by her next friend Tina Grempel, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated

represented by Claudia Center (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth Kristen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 3 of 24
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy M Solomon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/17/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vicky L Barker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Alhambra School District
Defendant Alhambra City of

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut Gibeaut Mahan and Briscoe 6701 Center Drive West Suite 611 Los Angeles, CA 90045 310−410−2020 Fax: 310−410−2010 Email: grgibeaut@gmb−law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John W Allen Gibeaut Mahan and Briscoe 6701 Center Dr ive West, Suite 611 Los Angeles, CA 90045 310−410−2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb Gibeaut Mahan &Briscoe 6701 Center Drive West Suite 611 Los Angeles, CA 90045 310−410−2020 Fax: 310−410−2010 Email: nmahan−lamb@gmb−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth R Feffer Jones and Mayer 3777 North Harbor Boulevard Fullerton, CA 92835 714−446−1400 Email: erf@jones−mayer.com TERMINATED: 09/11/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Harold W Potter , Jr. Jones &Mayer 3777 N Harbor Blvd

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 4 of 24

Fullerton, CA 92835 714−446−1400 Fax: 714−446−1448 Email: hwp@jones−mayer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph M Montes Burke Williams &Sorensen 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90071−2953 213−236−0600 Email: jmontes@bwslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimberly Hall Barlow Jones and Mayer 3777 North Harbor Boulevard Fullerton, CA 92835 714−446−1400 Email: khb@jones−mayer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael R Capizzi Jones &Mayer 3777 North Harbor Boulevard Fullerton, CA 92835 714−446−1400 Fax: 714−446−1448 Email: mrc@jones−mayer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Russell Lee−Sung

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Victor Sandoval

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 5 of 24

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Lou Torres

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William A Vallejos

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John H Nunez

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert L Gin

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 6 of 24

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Ruth E Castro

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Barbara A Messina in their official capacities

represented by Gary Robert Gibeaut (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John W Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nancy Ann Mahan−Lamb (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/04/2004
03/04/2004 03/04/2004 03/04/2004
03/04/2004 03/05/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against defendants (Filing fee $150.) filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera.(jag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
FAX number for Attorney Vicky L Barker, Nancy M Solomon is 213−637−9909. (jag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
FAX number for Attorney Claudia Center, Elizabeth Kristen, Patricia A Shiu is 415−864−8199. (jag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
20−Day Summons Issued re Complaint − (Discovery) 1 as to Alhambra City of, Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
2 CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiffs (jag, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
3 STANDING ORDER WITH REGARD TO NEWLY ASSIGNED CASES. This action has been assigned to the calendar of Judge Dickran Tevrizian. The

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 7 of 24

03/31/2004 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 04/01/2004 04/08/2004
04/08/2004 04/08/2004
04/08/2004
04/08/2004
04/08/2004

responsibility for the progress of litigation in the Federal Courts falls not only upon the attorneys in this action, but upon the Court as well. "To secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, all counsel are hereby ordered to familiarize themselves with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26 and the Local Rules of the Central District of California by Judge Dickran Tevrizian, (See order for further details)(shb, ) (Entered: 03/10/2004)
4 ANSWER to Complaint − (Discovery) 1 filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos.(jp, ) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
5 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
FAX number for Attorney John W Allen is 310−410−2010. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
6 ORDER SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE by Judge Dickran Tevrizian that this matter is set for a Scheduling Conference on 6/1/2004 10:00 AM before Honorable Dickran Tevrizian.(jp, ) (Entered: 04/02/2004)
7 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Robert L Gin served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to Accep Service of proces. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
8 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Lou Torres served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to Accept Service of Process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
9 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Victor Sandoval served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to Accept Service of Process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
10 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Alhambra School District served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Personal service, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
11 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Russell Lee−Sung served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
12 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant City of Alhambra served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Personal service, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 8 of 24

04/08/2004
04/08/2004
04/08/2004
04/08/2004
04/21/2004 04/21/2004 04/21/2004 05/03/2004 06/01/2004
06/01/2004

Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
13 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant William A Vallejos served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
14 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant John H Nunez served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
15 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Barbara A Messina served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
16 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, upon defendant Ruth E Castro served on 3/11/2004, answer due 3/31/2004. The Summons and Complaint were served by Substituted service and by mail on 3/11/2004, by Federal statute, upon Vicky Yum, Risk Management Department, Authorized to accept service of process. Due Dilligence declaration attached. Original Summons not returned. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2004)
17 NOTICE of Stipulation of extension of time to respond or otherwise answer complaint filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
18 ANSWER to Complaint − (Discovery) 1 filed by defendant Alhambra City of.(jp, ) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
19 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Defendant Alhambra City of. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/22/2004)
20 JOINT REPORT OF EARLY MEETING OF COUNSEL regarding Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan filed; estimated length of trial by parties 15 days. (esa, ) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
21 MINUTES before Judge Dickran Tevrizian: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is held. The Court sets the following dates: Discovery cut−off 1/28/2005. Motion for class certification 8/30/2004 10:00 AM. Pretrial Conference and Court Trial setting (Estimate 10 days) set for 5/2/2005 01:30 PM. Counsel given copy of Court scheduling conference order regarding court trials. Counsel are adivsed of Local Rule 16−14. Court Reporter: Lori Muraoka. (jp, ) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
22 ORDER FOR COURT TRIAL by Judge Dickran Tevrizian that the Establishing a Discovery cut−off 1/28/2005. Setting the Final Pretrial Conference and Court Trial for 5/2/2005 01:30 PM. Re: Preparation for Court Trial: Findings of Fact and Exhibits. All motions to join other parties or to amend the pleadings shall be filed and served within Sixty (60) days of the date of this Order and noticed for hearing within Ninety (90). Motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment may be filed later than fifteen (15) days after the discovery cut−off date. All depositions shall be scheduled at least five (5) working days prior to the discovery cutoff date. All requests for production, admissions, etc., shall be served at least forty−five (45) days prior to the discovery cutoff date (see document for further details).(jp, ) (Entered: 06/08/2004)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 9 of 24

07/19/2004
09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/13/2004
09/20/2004
09/20/2004

23 STIPULATION AND ORDER that the schedule for plaintiffs motion for class certification be revised: Last day for plaintiffs to file and personally serve notice of motion 9/13/04; last day for defendants to file and personally serve opposition 9/20/04; Last day for plaintiffs to file and personally serve reply 9/27/04; Hearing on motion 10/4/04 by Judge Dickran Tevrizian :(pj, ) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
24 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Class Certification filed by plaintiffs. Motion set for hearing on 10/4/2004 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Dickran Tevrizian. Lodged Proposed Order. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
25 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
26 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
27 DECLARATION of Virginia Molina in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
28 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Kristen in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
29 DECLARATION of Vicky L. Barker in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
30 DECLARATION of Nancy Solomon in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
31 DECLARATION of Patricia A Shiu in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
32 DECLARATION of Lauren Cruz in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
33 DECLARATION of Tom O'Dell in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
34 DECLARATION of Tina Grempel in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
35 DECLARATION of Valerie Herrera in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
36 DECLARATION of Catherine Grempel in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
37 DECLARATION of Christopher Grempel in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
38 DECLARATION of Jennifer Cerros in support of Motion for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs. (nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
39 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs. The following documents along with other documents were served on 9/13/04: Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification 24 ; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of motion 25 ; Declaration of Claudia Center in support of Motion for Class Certification 26 . See documents for further details.(nhac, ) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
40 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Class Certification 24 filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
41 DECLARATION of NANCY MAHAN−LAMB in support of defendants Opposition to plaintiff MOTION for Class Certification 24 filed by defendant Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2004)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 10 of 24

09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004 09/27/2004
10/04/2004 10/04/2004 12/20/2004 12/21/2004

42 DECLARATION of GARY ROBERT GIBEAUT in support of defendant Opposition to plaintiff MOTION for Class Certification 24 filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
43 OBJECTIONS to Declarations of plaintiff in support of MOTION for Class Certification 24 filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
44 OPPOSITION to plaintiffs MOTION for Class Certification 24 ; JOINDER to Alhambra School District et al. Opposition to Motion for Class Certification filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
45 REPLY to defendants untimely submission Opposition for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
46 RESPONSE to defendant Untimely Objection to Declaration of Plaintiffs in support of MOTION for Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
47 DECLARATION of CLAUDIA CENTER in support of Reply to defendants untimely submission opposing Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
48 DECLARATION of PATRICIA A. SHIU in support of plaintiffs Reply to defendants untimely submissions opposing Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
49 DECLARATION of NANCY SOLOMON in support of plaintiffs Reply to defendants untimely submissions opposing Class Certification 24 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
50 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera re 47 Declaration of CLAUDIA CENTER in support of Reply to defendants untimely submission opposing Class Certification, 48 Declaration of PATRICIA A. SHIU in support of plaintiffs Reply to defendants untimely submissions opposing Class Certification, 49 Declaration of NANCY SOLOMON in support of plaintiffs Reply to defendants untimely submissions opposing Class Certification, 45 REPLY to defendants untimely submission Opposition for Class Certification, 46 Response to defendant Untimely Objection to Declaration of Plaintiffs in support of MOTION for Class Certification, was served on 9/27/2004. (jp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2004)
51 ORDER: This court hereby grants plaintiffs' motion for class certification for prospective injunctive relief. The court certifies the plaintiff class as all present and future Alhambra High School female students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in athletics at AHS. Judge Dickran Tevrizian 24 (bp, ) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
52 MINUTES: Plaintiff's motion for class certification. Hearing held on the above−referenced matter. The court orders the motion, granted. Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: Lori Muraoka. (bp, ) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
53 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera stipulation and proposed order for extension of time was served on 12/17/2004. (pj, ) (Entered: 12/22/2004)
54 JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING EXTENSION OF TIME FOR CLOSE OF DISCOVERY by Judge Dickran Tevrizian that the Court hereby extends the Discovery Cutoff date to 5/15/2005, and the Pretrial Conference date to 9/19/2005 at 01:30 PM. (jp, ) (Entered: 12/22/2004)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 11 of 24

12/27/2004 02/11/2005
02/16/2005
02/16/2005 02/16/2005 02/16/2005
02/24/2005 02/28/2005 03/07/2005 03/07/2005 03/07/2005 03/07/2005 03/10/2005 04/01/2005 04/04/2005
04/04/2005

55 NOTICE of Association of Counsel associating attorney Elizabeth R Feffer on behalf of Defendant Alhambra City of. Filed by defendant City of Alhambra (bp, ) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
56 STIPULATION AND ORDER that formal discovery in this matter is hereby stayed until 3/19/05. The court hereby extends the discovery cut off date to 11/15/05, and the pre−trial and trial setting conference date to 3/20/06 by Judge Dickran Tevrizian.(bp, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
57 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint pursuant to FRCP 15(a) filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. Motion set for hearing on 3/14/2005 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Dickran Tevrizian. Lodged Proposed Order and Amended Complaint. (jp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
58 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES in Support of MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 57 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
59 DECLARATION of CLAUDIA CENTER in support of MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 57 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
60 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera re MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 57 , Memorandum in Support of MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 58 , Declaration of CLAUDIA CENTER in support of MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 59 , was served on 2/15/2005. (jp, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
61 NOTICE OF NON−OPPOSITION to MOTION for Leave to File 57 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
62 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Leave to File 57 filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
63 REPLY to defendant opposition to MOTION for Leave to File 57 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
64 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of MOTION for Leave to File 57 filed by plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
65 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Kristen in support of motion for Leave to File 57 filed by plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
66 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. re Reply (Motion related) 63 , Declaration (Motion related) 64 , Declaration (Motion related) 65 , was served on 3/4/05. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
67 STIPULATION AND ORDER that the hearing on plaintffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint is hereby set for 4/4/05 at 10:00 a.m. by Judge Dickran Tevrizian.(bp, ) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
68 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of MOTION for Leave to File 57 filed by plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
69 MINUTES before Judge Dickran Tevrizian: MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 57 is Granted. Defendants are ordered to file their response to the First Amended Complaint within 20 days from the date of this Order. Court Reporter: Lori Muraoka. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
70 ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian granting 57 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. The Proposed First Amended Complaint previously lodged with this Court on February 16, 2005 is deemed filed and served as to all appearing parties as of the date of this Order. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 12 of 24

04/04/2005 04/04/2005
06/01/2005 09/01/2005 09/07/2005 09/07/2005 09/16/2005
09/16/2005 09/21/2005 09/23/2005
10/06/2005 10/13/2005
10/14/2005 10/28/2005 10/31/2005

71 ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 70 . FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Proposed First Amended Complaint be filed with the clerk of this Court. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
72 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendants Alhambra School District, Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina amending Complaint − (Discovery) 1 , filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Robert L Gin, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
73 ANSWER to First Amended Complaint, 72 filed by defendant Alhambra City of.(bp, ) (Entered: 06/01/2005)
74 STIPULATION to Continue discovery cutoff date and pre−trial conference filed by defendants' Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (bp, ) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
75 ORDER that the discovery cutoff date of 11/15/05 is continued to 1/16/05 by Judge Dickran Tevrizian.(bp, ) (Entered: 09/08/2005)
76 NOTICE of change of firma address as follows: Burke, Wiliams &Sorensen, LLP, 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400, Los Angeles, CA 90071−2953 filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
78 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative for Summary Adjudication filed by defendant Alhambra City of. Motion set for hearing on 10/11/2005 at 10:00 AM before Honorable Dickran Tevrizian. Lodged proposed statement, order and judgment. (bp, ) (Entered: 09/26/2005)
79 EXHIBITS AND DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION for Summary Adjudication MOTION for Summary Adjudication 78 filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 09/26/2005)
77 STIPULATION AND ORDER that the discovery cutoff date of 11/15/05, shall be continued to 1/10/06 by Judge Dickran Tevrizian.(bp, ) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
80 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian that the hearing on defendant City of Alhambra MOTION for Summary Judgment 78 is CONTINUED to 11/7/2005 at 10:00 AM. The last day for parties to submit Opposition papers to the City of Alhambra Motion for Summary Judgment is 10/24/2005. The last day for defendant City of Alhambra to submit Reply papers in response to any Opposition to the Summary Judgment is 10/31/2005. (jp, ) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
81 MINUTES: Settlement Conference. Case does not settle. In process of settling. Motion for summary judgment (filed 9/16/05) taken off calendar. No appearance necessary on 11/7/05. Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
82 JOINT STIPULATION to Continue the date for submitted the final joint settlement agreement and consent decree filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. Lodged proposed order. (pj, ) (Entered: 10/17/2005)
83 ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian Granting Stipulation to Continue the date for submitting the final draft of the joint settlement agreement and consent decree is continued to 10/28/05 82 . (ca, ) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
84 NOTICE of Filing Final "Draft" Joint Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Alhambra City of. (jp, ) (Entered: 10/31/2005)
85 MINUTES OF Settlement Conference held before Judge Dickran Tevrizian : Case does not settle.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/02/2005)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 13 of 24

11/07/2005 11/07/2005 11/07/2005 11/08/2005 11/09/2005
11/22/2005 11/22/2005 11/29/2005 12/12/2005 12/13/2005 12/16/2005 12/16/2005 12/19/2005
12/19/2005
12/19/2005

86 NOTICE of filing the second final draft joint settlement agreement and consent decree filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
87 NOTICE of filing proposed settlement agreement between plaintiffs and defendant City of Alhambra filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
88 [PROPOSED] NOTICE of settlement agreement filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
90 MINUTES: Settlement Conference. Case settles held before Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
89 NOTICE OF DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES AND ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian ORDERING notice of filing proposed settlement agreement submitted by Defendant Alhambra City of received on 11/7/05 to be filed and processed; filed date to be the date the document was stamped Received but not Filed with the Clerk.(bp, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
91 NOTICE of filing draft joint resolution agreement and order for continuing court supervision filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
92 MINUTES: Telephonic Settlement Conference. Case settles. Court sets further settlement conference on 11/29/05 at 4:15 p.m. Judge Dickran Tevrizian.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
93 MINUTES:Settlement Conference held before Judge Dickran Tevrizian : Case settles. All parties are drafting settlement agreement.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
95 MINUTES: Settlement Conference. Case does not settle. Negotiations continuing. Court sets further settlement conference on 12/13/. Judge Dickran Tevrizian : Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
94 MINUTES: Telephonic Settlement Conference. Case settles. Documents are being drafter−will require preliminary class approval and final class approval. Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: none present. (bp, ) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
99 JOINT MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
100 MEMORANDUM in Support of Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class 99 filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
96 JOINT EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class; Memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof and proposed order filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. Lodged proposed order. (shb, ) Modified on 12/20/2005 (shb, ). (Entered: 12/20/2005)
97 DECLARATION of Nancy Mahan−Lamb in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class 96 ; Memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof; proposed order filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
98 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina, re EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class 96 , Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 97 , was served on 12/19/05. (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 14 of 24

12/19/2005
12/19/2005
12/20/2005 01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006

101 ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian : granting 99 JOINT MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class: The dates of performance of the order are as follows: (a) The Notice of Proposed Settlements shall be published in accordance with the Settlements. Such publications shall be completed by December 23, 2005. (b) Deadline for filing any objections is January 24, 2006. (c) Deadline for filing of Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlements is January 10, 2006. (d) Deadline for Plaintiffs to file with the Court their motion for award of attorneys' fees and cost is January 10, 2006. (e) The final approval hearing shall be held on January 31, 2006 at 10:00 am in courtroom 880. IT IS SO ORDERED. (See order for further details) (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
102 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina, re JOINT MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class 99 , Memorandum in Support of JOINT MOTION for Preliminary Approval of Settlements and Notice to the Class, 100 , was served on 12/16/05. (shb, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
PLACED IN FILE − NOT USED re proposed order preliminarily approving the proposed settlements and notice to the class submitted by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
117 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for final approval of class action settlement filed by plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. Motion set for hearing on 1/31/2006 at 10:00 AM before Judge Dickran Tevrizian. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
118 DECLARATION of Vicky L. Barker in support of MOTION for Order for final approval of class action settlement 117 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
119 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of joint MOTION for final approval of class action settlement 117 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
120 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz, re MOTION for Order for final approval of class action settlement 117 , Declaration (Motion related) 118 , Declaration (Motion related) 119 , was served on 1/6/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
103 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. Motion set for hearing on 1/31/2006 at 10:00 AM before Judge Dickran Tevrizian. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
104 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
105 DECLARATION of Martha Jordan in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
106 DECLARATION of Ellen Berkowitz in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
107 DECLARATION of Vicky L. Barker in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
108 DECLARATION of Richard W. Odgers in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 15 of 24

01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006
01/11/2006 01/11/2006 01/11/2006 01/11/2006 01/11/2006
01/12/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006

109 DECLARATION of Patricia A. Shiu in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
110 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
111 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera, re Declaration (Motion related) 110 , MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 , Memorandum in Support of Motion 104 , Declaration (Motion related) 108 , Declaration (Motion related) 109 , Declaration (Motion related) 105 , Declaration (Motion related) 106 , Declaration (Motion related) 107 , was served on 1/9/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
112 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and continuing the hearing of plaintiffs' motion filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
113 DECLARATION of Nancy Mahan−Lamb in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and continuing the hearing of plaintiffs' motion 112 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
114 DECLARATION of Kenneth Moscaret in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and continuing the hearing of plaintiffs' motion 112 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
115 DECLARATION of Emilia C. Huntley in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and continuing the hearing of plaintiffs' motion 112 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
116 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by defendants' Alhambra School District, re Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 114 , Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 115 , EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and continuing the hearing of plaintiffs' motion 112 , Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 113 , was served on 1/11/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
121 NOTICE OF DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES AND ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian ORDERING motion for final approval submitted by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz received on 1/9/06 to be filed and processed; filed date to be the date the document was stamped Received but not Filed with the Clerk.(bp, ) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
122 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information: changing address to 6300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 980, Los Angeles, CA 90048; Telephone number: 323−951−9276; Fax number: 323−951−9870 for attorney Vicky L. Barker. Filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
123 OPPOSITION to EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 112 filed by plaintiff Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
124 DECLARATION of ELIZABETH KRISTEN in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 112 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 16 of 24

01/13/2006 01/13/2006
01/17/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006

Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
125 DECLARATION of VICKY L. BARKER in support of plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 112 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
126 PROOF OF SERVICE of Opposition to Defendants EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 123 , Declaration of ELIZABETH KRISTEN in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 124 , Declaration of VICKY L. BARKER in support of plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order for extending the time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 125 , was served on 1/13/2006 filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
127 ORDER by Judge Dickran Tevrizian that the time for filing an Opposition to plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees shall pursuant to Local Rule 7.9, based upont he new hearing date 112 . FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on a MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 is CONTINUED to 2/27/2006 at 10:00 AM. (jp, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)
128 MINUTES: Plaintiffs joint motion for final approval of class action statements. Plaintiffs' counsel moves the court for modification of the briefing schedule on plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees; defense counsel has no objections. Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: Ramona Chappelle. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
129 ORDER: This court GRANTS the parties' joint motion for final settlement approval of class action settlements. The hearing on plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees will be held on 2/27/06 at 10:00 a.m. by Judge Dickran Tevrizian,, (Made JS−6. Case Terminated.)(bp, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Costs MOTION for attorney Fees 103 . Motion set for hearing on 2/27/2006 at 10:00 AM before Judge Dickran Tevrizian. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
130 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
131 DECLARATION of Gary Robert Gibeaut in support of opposition to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendants' Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Barbara A Messina. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
132 DECLARATION of Harold Standerfer in support of defendants' opposition to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendants' Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
133 DECLARATION of Nancy Mahan−Lamb in support of opposition to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
134 DECLARATION of Kenneth Moscaret in support of opposition to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendants' Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
135 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by defendants' Alhambra School District, re Declaration (Motion related) 133 , Declaration (Motion related) 134 , Declaration (Motion related), Declaration (Motion related) 131 , Declaration (Motion related) 132 , Response in Opposition to Motion, 130 , was served on 2/13/06. (bp, )

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 17 of 24

02/14/2006 02/16/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006 02/21/2006
02/21/2006 02/23/2006
02/27/2006 02/27/2006

(Entered: 02/15/2006)
136 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
137 ORIGINAL SIGNATURE PAGE re Declaration (Motion related) 134 , filed by Defendant Alhambra School District. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
138 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in support of reply to the Alhambra Unified School District's opposition to plaintiffs' MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
139 OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF KENNETH M. MOSCARET IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
140 DECLARATION of J. Cacilia Kim in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
141 DECLARATION of Claudia Center in support of plaintiffs' reply brief re MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
142 DECLARATION of Vicky L. Barker in support of plaintiff's MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
143 REPLY DECLARATION of Patricia A. Shiu in support of plaintiffs' MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
144 REPLY DECLARATION of Elizabeth Kristen in support of MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
145 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz, re MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Motion, 138 , Declaration (Motion related) 143 , Motion Related Document 139 , Declaration (Motion related) 144 , Declaration (Motion related) 140 , Declaration (Motion related) 141 , Declaration (Motion related) 142 , was served on 2/20/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
148 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in support of reply to the City of Alhambra's opposition to plaintiffs' MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees MOTION for Costs MOTION for Attorney Fees 103 filed by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
146 MINUTES: Plaintiff's motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The court orders the above referenced motion TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION upon the expiration of time for filing briefs. No appearance by counsel /parties will be necessary. Counsel shall be notified of the court's ruling by facsimile, mail, or email when the matter is decided. Judge Dickran Tevrizian : Court Reporter: None. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
149 ORDER granting plaintiffs' motion for award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs by Judge Dickran Tevrizian,(bp, ) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
150 ORDER: This court GRANTS IN PART plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. This court's ruling reflects a 50 percent downward adjudstment of plaintiffs' counsel's requested attorneys' fees of $671,663.27, and a 20 percent downward adjustment of plaintiffs' counsel's costs of $24,960.08. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in the total sum of $335,831.63 and costs of $19,968.06 by Judge Dickran Tevrizian, (bp, ) (Entered: 02/28/2006)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 18 of 24

03/14/2006
03/14/2006 03/14/2006 03/14/2006 03/15/2006 03/15/2006 03/22/2006 04/17/2006 04/17/2006 04/17/2006 04/17/2006 04/19/2006
04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006

151 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Alter or Amend Order Granting in part plaintiffs' motion for reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 150 . filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. Motion set for hearing on 5/1/2006 at 10:00 AM before Judge Dickran Tevrizian. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
152 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
153 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Kristen in support of MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
154 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Lauren M Cruz, re Declaration (Motion related) 153 , MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 , Memorandum in Support of Motion 152 , was served on 3/13/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
155 NOTICE OF ERRATA in settlement agreement filed by Defendant Alhambra City of. correcting (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
156 NOTICE of deposition of settlement funds by City of Alhambra filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
157 OBJECTIONS to plaintiff's [proposed] final order of dismissal with continuing jurisdiction 129 filed by Defendants Alhambra City of, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, William A Vallejos, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
159 NOTICE OF JOINDER TO DEFENDANT ALHAMBRA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT' RE MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by defendant Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
160 OBJECTION OF DISTRICT DEFENDANTS TO DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH KRISTIN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by defendants' Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
161 OPPOSITION to MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by defendants' Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
162 DECLARATION of Julie A. Mullane in support of district defendants' opposition to MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by defendants' Alhambra City of. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
158 MINUTES: Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend order granting in part plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The court orders the above referenced motion TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION upon the expiration of time for filing briefs. No appearance by counsel/parties will be necessary. Counsel shall be notified fo the court's ruling by facsimile, mail, or email when the matter is decided. Judge Dickran Tevrizian :Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
163 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
164 OBJECTION TO THE DECLARATION OF JULIE A. MULLANE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
165 REPLY DECLARATION of Patricia A. Shiu in support of plaintiffs' re MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
166 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO THE DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH KRISTEN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION to Alter Judgment re Order,, 150 . 151 filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 19 of 24

04/24/2006
04/25/2006 04/25/2006 05/01/2006 05/01/2006
05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/26/2006
05/26/2006 05/26/2006 05/26/2006
06/02/2006 06/26/2006
06/26/2006 07/11/2006 08/09/2006

Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
167 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera, re Memorandum in Support of Motion, 163 , Motion Related Document 164 , Declaration (Motion related) 165 , Response to Motion 166 , was served on 4/21/06. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
168 RECEIPT OF REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 01/31/06 Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services (cbr, ) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
169 TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 01/31/06. Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services. (cbr, ) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
170 ORDER DENYING plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend order granting in party plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attonreys' fees and costs by Judge Dickran Tevrizian, 150 . 151 (bp, ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
171 ORDER: This court Orders as follows: The agreement between the plaitiffs and the District defendants entitled joint resolution agreement and order for continuing court jurisdiction is hereby endorsed in its entirety, and incorporated into this order by reference by Judge Dickran Tevrizian,(bp, ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
PLACED IN FILE − NOT USED re proposed order granting plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend order submitted by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
PLACED IN FILE − NOT USED re proposed final order of dismissal with continuing jurisdiction submitted by plaintiffs' Lauren M Cruz. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
172 NOTICE OF APPEAL to 9th CCA filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. Appeal of Order 170 Filed On: 05/1/06, Entered On: 05/02/06; Order 150 Filed On: 02/27/06; Entered On: 02/28/06. Filing fee $455, Paid, receipt number 85698. cc: Sharon Terman; Vicky L. Barker; Elizabeth Rose Feffer; Nancy Mahan−Lamb. (cbr, ) Modified on 6/2/2006 (cbr, ). (Entered: 06/02/2006)
173 REPRESENTATION STATEMENT re Appeal to Circuit Court 172 . (cbr, ) Modified on 6/2/2006 (cbr, ). (Entered: 06/02/2006)
Civil Appeals Docketing Statement received from forwarded to 9th CCA. RE: Appeal to Circuit Court 172 . (cbr, ) Modified on 6/2/2006 (cbr, ). (Entered: 06/02/2006)
174 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera, re Appeals Docketing Statement (A−11a), Appeal to Circuit Court 172 , Representation Statement 173 , was served on 05/25/06. (cbr, ) Modified on 6/2/2006 (cbr, ). (Entered: 06/02/2006)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: Appeal to Circuit Court 172 . (cbr, ) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
175 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 6/01/04, 10/04/04, 4/04/05; Court Reporter: Lori Muraoka; 1/31/06; Court Reporter: Ramona Chappelle; Court of Appeals Case Number: 06−55811; Re: Appeal to Circuit Court 172 (lr, ) Modified on 8/23/2006 (lr, ). (Entered: 06/29/2006)
177 Proof of Service filed by plaintiff Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel, Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera. (car, ) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
176 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 06−55811, 9th CCA regarding Appeal to Circuit Court, 172 filed by Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel,. (ghap, ) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
178 RECEIPT OF REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 6/1/04, 10/4/04 and 4/4/05 Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc − Electronic Sound Recording. (kks ) (Entered: 08/18/2006)

Case: 2:04-cv-01460-ABC-Mc As of: 01/31/2014 01:22 PM PST 20 of 24

08/09/2006 08/09/2006 08/09/2006 08/28/2006 09/11/2007 02/01/2008 05/05/2008 05/15/2008
07/07/2008 07/09/2008
07/10/2008
07/23/2008

179 TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 6/1/2004. Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc − Electronic Sound Recording. (kks ) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
180 TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 10/4/2004. Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc − Electronic Sound Recording. (kks ) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
181 TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings held on 4/4/05. Court Reporter: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc − Electronic Sound Recording. (kks ) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
182 CERTIFICATE OF RECORD Transmitted to USCA re Appeal to Circuit Court, 172 filed by Lauren M Cruz, Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N Cerros, Catherine Grempel; Court of Appeals Case Number: 06−55811. (ghap, ) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
183 NOTICE of Appearance filed by attorney Michael R Capizzi of Jones &Mayer on behalf of Defendant City of Alhambra. (pcl) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
184 RECORD ON APPEAL sent to Circuit Court re: Appeal number, 06−55811; Record consists of 10 volumes, 4 transcripts; 3 Brown Folders: 109, 110,136. re Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 172 (lr) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
185 APPEAL RECORD RETURNED from 9th CCA Received: Volume(s): 1 through 10; Transcripts(s): 4; 3 Bulky documents: 109, 110 and 136 RE: Appeal Record Sent to USCA (A−26) 184 (car) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
186 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Kimberly Hall Barlow counsel for Defendant Alhambra City of. Adding Kimberly Hall Barlow as attorney as counsel of record for The City of Alhambra for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Filed by Defendant The City of Alhambra (Barlow, Kimberly) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
187 MANDATE of 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 172 , CCA # 06−55811. The Order of the District Court is VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. Mandate received in this district on 7/7/2008. (dmap) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
188 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT OF CASE upon Receipt of Mandate filed. This case having been returned on a mandate from the 9th CCA, Vacated in part, Reversed in part and Remanded the decision of Judge Dickran Tevrizian and requiring judicial action, this case has been reassigned to Judge Audrey B. Collins for all further proceedings. Case number will now read CV 04−1460 ABC (Mcx). (rn) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
189 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge Audrey B. Collins: Following remand by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the matter is reassigned to the calendar ofTHE HONORABLE AUDREY B. COLLINS, U.S. District Judge. Status Conference set for 8/4/2008 10:00 AM. A joint status report shall be submitted no later than July28, 2008. (sbu) (Entered: 07/11/2008)
193 MINUTES: RE: ELECTRONIC FILING, SUBMISSION OF COURTESY COPIES, AND EMAILING PROPOSED DOCUMENTS (In Chambers): The Court reminds the parties that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(3), Local Rule 5−4, and General Order 08−02 (G.O. 08−02 ), all criminal and civil filings must be electronicallyfiled. Exceptions are noted in G.O. 08−02. The parties are expected to familiarize themselves with all applicable rules. The Court brings the following two requirements to the parties attention: First, pursuant to G.O. 08−02, parties must supply chambers with two courtesy copies of allfiled documents by noon the day after the documents are filed. See G.O. 08−02(IV)(D) (stating, Unless otherwise ordered by the assigned judge, courtesy paper copies of all electronically filed documents must be delivered to the chambers of the assigned judge no later than 12:00 noon the following business day. The courtesy copies must comply with Local Rule 11−3, i.e., blue backed, font size, page numbering, tabbed exhibits, etc., or as otherwise directed by the assigned judge.) Courtesy copies for Judge Collins need not be blue blacked, but must comply with all other requirements of LocalRule 11−3. Second, pursuant to G.O. 08−02,

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electronically−filed proposed orders and judgments, and their applications, must be emailed to the assigned judges generic chambers email address. See G.O. 08−02(VI)(A), (B). Judge Collinss generic chambers email address is: abc_chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov.Proposed orders, judgments, and other signature items must be in WordPerfect or Microsoft Word format. Applications may be in PDF. Proposed orders, judgments, and other signature items WILL NOT be processed until these items are emailed to the generic chambers email address. PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS MAY DELAY YOUR MATTER AND MAY RESULT IN SANCTIONS by Judge Audrey B. Collins (ir) (Entered: 07/23/2008)
194 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 172 filed by Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, CCA # 06−55811. We grant Plaintiffs−Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39−1.9, the determination of an appropriate amount of fees on appeal is refereed to the court's special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter Shaw. (cbr) (Entered: 07/24/2008)
195 STATUS REPORT filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/28/2008)
196 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 172 filed by Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, CCA # 06−55811. The court granted appellants' motion for attorneys fees on appeal and refered to the Appellate Commisioner the determination of an appropriate amount of fees. Appellants' motion for an extension of time until 8/11/2008 to file a reply to appellees' opposition to the fee motion is granted. The question of an appropriate amount of fees is referred to the Circuit Mediator, who will contact the parties. The Circuit Mediator is requested to inform the Appellate commissioner of the conclusion of the mediation. Order received in this district on 8/4/2008. (dmap) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
197 MINUTES OF Status Conference held before Judge Audrey B. Collins: Counsel shall resubmit courtesy copies of motion briefs directly to chambers: Plaintiff's brief is due September 8, 2008; Defendants's opposition is due September 29, 2008; Plaintiff's reply is due October 10, 2008. Court Reporter: Sandra Becerra. (bm) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
198 NOTICE OF LODGING Prior Briefing regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs in Court chambers filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Russell Lee−Sung, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, John H Nunez, Robert L Gin, Ruth E Castro, Barbara A Messina (ir) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
199 NOTICE OF LODGING filed PRIOR BRIEFING re Status Conference, 197 (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
200 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, # 2 Declaration Declaration of Elizabeth Kristen and Exhibits A−W, # 3 Proposed Order Proposed Order, # 4 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
201 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents. The following error(s) was found: hearing information missing RE: MOTION for Attorney Fees 200 . In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. (ab) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
202 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Attorney Fees 200 and Costs on Remand filed by Defendant Alhambra City of. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Nancy Mahan−Lamb in Support of District Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Remand, # 2 Declaration Declaration of Julie Mullane in Support of District Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Remand)(Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 09/29/2008)

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203 OPPOSITION re: MOTION for Attorney Fees 200 filed by Defendant Alhambra City of. (Barlow, Kimberly) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
204 REPLY Support MOTION for Attorney Fees 200 filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Reply Declaration of Elizabeth Kristen, # 2 Exhibit Exhibits A−B to Kristen Reply Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Exhibits C−H, # 4 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/10/2008)
205 ORDER by Judge Audrey B. Collins regarding Attorney Fees and Costs 200 . The Court hereby AWARDS Plaintiffs the following: Fees for Initial Fee Motion: $723,296.10 17; Interest on Additional Amount: $55,059.90, plus $50.10 per dayuntil paid; Interest on Undisputed Amount: $13,674.25; Fees Awarded for Remand Fee Motion: $14,112.50; Costs Awarded for Remand Fee Motion: $569.40 (Made JS−6. Case Terminated.) (ir) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
206 NOTICE filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel of Record regarding Pat Shiu (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
207 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 172 filed by Valerie Herrera, Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, CCA # 06−55811. Order received in this district on 1/28/10. The revised request for an award of expenses in the amount of $1,765.93 is reasonable and is awarded. Cruz is awarded attornyes' fees based on the following hours at the claimed hourly rates: See order for details. Attorneys' fees of $169,251.75 and expenses of $1,765.93, for a total of $171,017.68 are awarded in favor of Cruz and against Alhambra. This order sent to the district court shall amend this court's mandate. (cbr) (Entered: 01/28/2010)
208 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re Order, 171 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Terminating Court's Jurisdiction Over District Defendants)(Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
209 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, re Notice of Lodging 208 of [Proposed] Order Terminating Court's Jurisdiction Over District Defendants served on 01/20/2012. (Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
210 Notice of Withdrawal of Notice of Lodging 208 filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 01/23/2012)
211 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Settlement Approval of Compliance with Terms of Agreement to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants; Memorandum of Points &Authorities filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. Motion set for hearing on 7/9/2012 at 10:00 AM before Judge Audrey B. Collins. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Nancy Mahan−Lamb ISO Motion to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants; Exhibits A−F, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit D − Tabs A−F, # 7 Exhibit D − Tab G Part 1, # 8 Exhibit D − Tab G Part 2, # 9 Exhibit D − Tab H, # 10 Exhibit D − Tab I Part 1, # 11 Exhibit D − Tab I Part 2, # 12 Exhibit D − Tabs J−M, # 13 Exhibit E, # 14 Exhibit F, # 15 Declaration of Keith Matsuo ISO of Motion to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants; Exhibit A, # 16 Exhibit A, # 17 Proposed Order Terminating Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants)(Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 05/18/2012)
212 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos, re MOTION for Settlement Approval of Compliance with Terms of Agreement to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants; Memorandum of Points &Authorities 211 served on 05/18/2102. (Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 05/18/2012)

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213 NOTICE of Change of address by Elizabeth Kristen attorney for Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. Filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
214 OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz, re Notice of Change of Address 213 served on June 18, 2012. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
215 OPPOSITION to MOTION for Settlement Approval of Compliance with Terms of Agreement to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction Over District Defendants; Memorandum of Points &Authorities 211 filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Elizabeth Kristen, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Memorandum Evidentiary Objections, # 27 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
216 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Proof of Service 214 . The following error(s) was found: Title page is missing. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (bm) (Entered: 06/19/2012)
217 REPLY Support of Defendant's Motion to Terminate Court's Continuing Jurisdiction filed by Defendants Alhambra School District, Ruth E Castro, Robert L Gin, Russell Lee−Sung, Barbara A Messina, John H Nunez, Victor Sandoval, Lou Torres, William A Vallejos. (Attachments: # 1 Defendant's Evidentary Objections to Portions of the Declaration of Elizabeth Kristen, # 2 Declaration of Jeremy Infranca in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Termintate Jursidiction, # 3 Declaration of Keith Matsuo in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Termintate Jursidiction, # 4 Declaration of Nancy Mahan−Lamb in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Termintate Jursidiction, # 5 Affidavit of Service)(Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
218 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS − ORDER by Clerk of Court: Document is hereby STRICKEN; counsel to adhere to the rules and procedures of the Court when e−filing. RE: Proof of Service (subsequent documents) 214 (lw) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
219 Proof OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz, re Notice of Change of Address 213 Corrected Proof of Service served on June 18, 2012. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
220 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TAKING MOTION UNDER SUBMISSION by Judge Audrey B. Collins taking under submission 211 Motion for Settlement: Pending before the Court is Defendants Motion to Terminate Courts Continuing Jurisdiction. (Docket no. 211.) Briefing on the Motion is complete. The Court finds the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing set for July 9, 2012. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and Local Rule 7−15. The Motion is now UNDER SUBMISSION. (bm) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
221 ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TERMINATE CONTINUING JURISDICTION by Judge Audrey B. Collins granting in part and denying in part 211 Motion for Settlement: For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to terminate the Court's continuing jurisdiction. The Court hereby terminates jurisdiction over the Defendants except as to Section III.A. of the Agreement, which requires Defendants to provide equal athletic participation opportunities to girls. The Court shall maintain jurisdiction over Defendants until Section III.A. is satisfied. (see document for further details) (bm) (Entered: 08/03/2012)

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11/22/2013 11/22/2013 12/10/2013
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222 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Plaintiffs Lauren M Cruz. Motion set for hearing on 10/1/2012 at 10:00 AM before Judge Audrey B. Collins. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum, # 2 Declaration Elizabeth Kristen, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Proposed Order, # 8 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
223 OPPOSITION re: MOTION for Reconsideration 222 of the Court's Order of August 3, 2012 filed by Defendant Alhambra School District. (Mahan−Lamb, Nancy) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
224 REPLY Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion MOTION for Reconsideration 222 filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Elizabeth Kristen, # 2 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
225 NOTICE Notice of Errata for Correct Proof of Service filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
226 OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz, re Notice (Other) 225 , Reply (Motion related) 224 Correct Proof of Service served on 09/17/2012. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
227 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice of Errata 225 . The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Errata. Other error(s) with document(s): Using the event "Errata," UNDER Miscellaneous Filings (Non−Motion), will let you link to the document that is in error. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (lw) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
228 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Vicky L Barker counsel for Plaintiffs Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera. Changing e−mail to vicky.barker@cwlc.org. Filed by Plaintiff Lauren M. Cruz et al (Barker, Vicky) (Entered: 09/19/2012)
229 MINUTES: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (In Chambers): The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration 222 and modifies its August 3, 2012 Order as follows: the Court retains jurisdiction over Section III.A, and overSection VI, Section IX, Section XII, and Section XIV as necessary to track Defendants compliance with Section III.A IT IS SO ORDERED by Judge Audrey B. Collins. (ir) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
230 STIPULATION to Dismiss Case pursuant to stipulation of the parties filed by Plaintiff Lauren M Cruz.(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
231 OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiff Jennifer N Cerros, Lauren M Cruz, Catherine Grempel, Valerie Herrera, re Stipulation to Dismiss Case 230 served on 11/22/2013. (Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
232 Counsel should have submitted a proposed order along with the stipulation as a separate attachment, since this was not done with done with the stipulation document 230, counsel must submit a notice of lodging with a separate proposed order as an attachment for the Judge to sign. A. Bridges, Court Clerk to Judge Collins. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (ab) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 12/10/2013)
233 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re Stipulation to Dismiss Case 230 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proof of Service)(Kristen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/10/2013)
234 ORDER OF DISMISSAL by Judge Audrey B. Collins: Based on the Joint Stipulation and representations from Defendants and Plaintiffs, Defendants have performed all outstanding obligations under the Joint Resolution Agreement. Upon review of those papers, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above−caption action is dismissed with prejudice. (bm) (Entered: 12/13/2013)

 
 Patricia A. Shiu SBN 104894

1 Claudia Center SBN 158255

Elizabeth Kristen SBN 218227

2 THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY-

EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER

3 600 Harrison Street, Suite 120

San Francisco, CA 94107

4

Telephone: (415) 864-8848 FacsImile: (415) 864-8199

5 Vicky_L. Barker SBN 119520

6

CALlJiORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

7 3L4o6s0AWngileslheisreCBAlvd960S1u0ite 1102

Telephone: (323) 951- 9869

8 FacsImile: (323) 951- 9870

9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Gary Robert Gibeaut SBN 70951

Nancy Mahan-Lamb SBN 117997

GIBEA.UT, MAHAN & BRISCOE

6701 Center Drive West

Suite 611

TLoesleAphnogneele: s~(3C10A)

90045 410-2020

FacsImile: (310) 410-2010

Attorney,s for Alhambra School District, Russell Lee-Sl!n~ Victor Sandoval, Lou Torre~ William
~o?e~f~~~JZ1ruIJi E.C;s1ro
and Barbara 1\.. Messina

Ioseph M. Montes City Attorney, City of Alhambra; and Elizabeth R. Feffer SBN 166001 TONES & MAYER 3777 North Harbor Boulevard Fullerton, CA 92835 Telephone: (714) 446-1400 FacsImile: (714) 446-1448

Attorneys for City of Alhambra

Patricia A. Shiu SBN 104894

1 Claudia Center SBN 158255

Elizabeth Kristen SBN 218227

2 THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY-

EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER

3 600 Harrison Street, Suite 120

San Francisco, CA 94107

4

Telephone: (415) 864-8848 FacsImile: (415) 864-8199

5 Vicky L. Barker SBN 119520

6

CALlFORNlA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

7

3460 Wilshire Blvd"!. Suite 1102 Los Angeles CA 9u010

Telephone: (323) 951- 9869

8 FacsImile: (323) 951- 9870

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Gary Robert Gibeaut SBN 70951

Nan~ Mahan-Lamb SBN 117997

GIBEAUT, MAHAN & BRISCOE

6701 Center Drive West

Suite 611

LToelseAphnogneele: s~(3C10A)

90045 410-2020

FacsImile: (310) 410-2010

Attorney:s for Alhambra School

District, Russell Lee-SllnK, Victor

Sandoval, Lou Torre~f William

A. Vallejo~John H. Iwnez,

Rob and

eBrat rtb.aurail1ll\.R. Mutehs

E. Ca sina

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Ioseph M. Montes Citv' Attorney, City of Alhambra; and Elizabeth R. Feffer SBN 166001 TONES & MAYER 3777 North Harbor Boulevard Fullerton, CA 92835 Telephone: (714) 446-1400 Facsllnile: (714) 446-1448

Attorneys for City of Alhambra

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3

4

LAUREN M. CRUZE~ her next friend Jean Cruz; VALERI ERRERA, by

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her next friend Carolina Herrerii JENNIFER N. CERROS' CAT ERINE

GREMPEL, by her next frIend Tina 6 Grempel, individually and on behalf of

all those similarly situated,

7

Plaintiffs,

8 vs.

9 ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

THE CITY OF ALHAMBRA'

10 RUSSELL LEE-SUNG, VICTOR

SANDOVAL, LOU TORRES

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WIllIAM A. VALLEJOS JOHN H. NUNEZOROBERT L. GIN, RUTH E.

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CASTR and BARBARA A. MESSINA, in their official capacities,

Case No. CV 04-1460
JOINT RESOLUTION
AGREEMENT AND ORDER FOR
CONTINUING COURT SUPERVISION [Class Action]

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Defendants.

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1 I. RECITALS

2

1. On March 4, 2004, Plaintiffs Lauren M. Cruz, by her next friend

3 Jean Cruz, Valerie Herrera, by her next friend Carolina Herrera, Jennifer

4 Cerros, and Catherine Grempel, by her next friend Tina Grempel commenced a

5 class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of

6 California, Case No. CV04-l460 DT (Mcx) (the "Lawsuit") against Defendant,

7 Alhambra Unified School District ("AUSD") and individual District Board

8 members and employees (collectively "District Defendants unless otherwise

9 noted herein") and the City of Alhambra (hereinafter referred to as "the City"

10 and/or "Alhambra") alleging inter alia, sex discrimination under Title IX of the

11 Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), the United States and the

12 California Constitutions, and state anti-discrimination laws. The lawsuit alleges

13 that the District Defendants have unlawfully failed to provide female student

14 athletes equal participation opportunities and equal treatment and benefits as

15 compared to male student athletes at Alhambra High School ("AHS"). The

16 lawsuit further alleges that the City violated anti-discrimination laws. The

17 lawsuit seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to redress these alleged

18 inequalities.

19

On March 31, 2004, the District Defendants and District Board members

20 and employees filed their answer to the complaint denying allegations of sex

21 discrimination under Title IX, the United States and the California

22 Constitutions, and state anti-discriminations laws. The District Defendants also

23 denied allegations that they have unlawfully failed to provide female student

24 athletes equal treatment and benefits as compared to male student athletes at

25 AHS. On April 21, 2004, Defendant City of Alhambra filed its answer to the

26 complaint. On March 4, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint,

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Page 2

1 alleging that the City of Alhambra was in violation of California Government

2 Code Sections 53080 and 11135. Plaintiffs allege that by deciding to renovate 3 Moor Field virtually exclusively for male athletes, the City of Alhambra has

4 discriminated against plaintiffs.

5

On June 1,2005, the City of Alhambra filed its answer to the First

6 Amended Complaint. Alhambra denies the allegations of plaintiffs, First

7 Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"), that it has engaged in unlawful

8 sex-based discrimination.

9

2. The Defendants are the Alhambra Unified School District,

10 employees and members ofthe School Board ofthe Alhambra UnifiedSchool . 11 District in their official capacities, and the City of Alhambra.

12

3. On October 4, 2004, the Court entered an Order certifying the

13 following plaintiff class for prospective injunctive relief:

14

All present and future Alhambra High School female students and

15

potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are

16

deterred from participating in athletics at AHS.

17

4. The lawsuit has been vigorously prosecuted and defended. The

18 discovery cut-off date is January 16, 2006, and the pre-trial conference is

19 scheduled for March 20, 2006.

20 II. DEFINITIONS

21

As used in this Joint Resolution Agreement and Order for Continuing

22 Court Supervision (hereinafter the "Agreement") the following terms shall have 23 the meaning ascribed to them in this Section and in the Recitals.

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1

A. Academic School Year.

2

"Academic School Year" means and refers to the period from the first

3 day of the new school year (in approximately September) through the last day

4 of the school year (in approximately June).

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B. Boys' Athletic Teams at AHS or Athletics - Boys.

6

"Boys' Athletic Teams at AHS" or "Athletics - Boys" means and refers

7 to athletic teams on which boys exclusively or primarily play, including but not

8 limited to: Football; Boys' Cross Country; Boys' Volleyball; Boys' Water Polo;

9 Boys' Basketball; Boys' Soccer; Wrestling; Baseball; Boys' Tennis; Boys'

10 Swimming; Boys' Track; and Boys' Golf.

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C. Class Counsel.

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"Class counsel" means and refers to the Legal Aid Society-Employment

13 Law Center and the California Women's Law Center, including the attorneys

14 therein.

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D. "CIF".

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"CIF"refers to the California Interscholastic Federation, which is the

17 governing body for high school sports in California.

18

E. "Class" or "Class of Female Athletes".

19

The "Class" or "Class of Female Athletes" means and refers to the class

20 that was certified pursuant to Judge Tevrizian's October 4, 2004 order.

21

F. "Co-ed Athletic Teams atAHS" or "Athletics - Coed".

22

"Co-ed Athletic Teams at AHS" or "Athletics - Coed" means and refers

23 to athletic teams on which boys and girls play together in proportionate

24 numbers, and which the elF designates as co-ed and offers co-ed competition

25 and championships. The only sport at AHS that currently meets this definition

26 is Badminton.

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1

G. Commencement of Official Sport Season at AHS.

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"Commencement of Official Sports Season at AHS" means and refers to

3 the first day on which CIF rules allow the sports team in question to begin

4 practicing in preparation for its season of athletic competition. CIF rules

5 govern the start and end dates for each sports season.

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H. Compliance Period.

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"Compliance Period" means and refers to the period from the effective

8 date of this Agreement until February 1, 2011..

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I. Effective Date of This Agreement.

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"Effective Date of This Agreement" shall be December 1,2005.

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J. Equal Access to Compete.

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"Equal Access to Compete" means and refers to girls' athletic teams

13 havil1g the same or equal opportunities to compete at the most desirable game

14 times and in the most desirable athletic facilities, as well as equal maintenance

15 of all athletic facilities, including proper facilities preparation for games.

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K. Equal Access to Practice.

17

"Equal Access to Practice" means and refers to girls' athletic teams

18 having the same or equal opportunities to practice at the most desirable practice

19 times in and on the most desirable athletic facilities as boys' athletic teams, as

20 well as equal maintenance of all athletic facilities, including proper facilities

21 preparation for practice.

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L. Girls' Athletic Teams at AHS or Athletics - Girls.

23

"Girls' Athletic Teams at AHS" or "Athletics - Girls" means and refers

24 to athletic teams on which girls exclusively or primarily play, including but not

25 limited to: Girls' Tennis; Girls' Cross Country; Girls' Volleyball; Girls'

26

27

28
PageS

1 Basketball; Girls' Soccer; Girls' Water Polo; Softball; Girls' Swimming; Girls'

2 Track; and Girls' Golf.

3

M. Large Gym at AHS.

4

"Large Gym at AHS" means and refers to the larger gymnasium at AHS

5 which contains a regulation-sized basketball court. A regulation-sized

6 basketball court for high school play is one with the minimum dimension of 84

7 feet by 50 feet, and striping as described by the National Federation of State

8 High School Associations at

9 http://www.nfhs.org/staticContentlPDFslbbcourt.pdf.As of the effective date

10 of this Agreement, there is only one regulation-sized basketball court at AHS,

11 which is in the large gym. Should additional regulation courts be constructed

12 during the Compliance Period, provisions in this Agreement referring to "Large

13 Gym at AHS" shall also include any new regulation-sized court.

14

N. Maintenance.

15

"Maintenance" means and refers to having facility staff members

16 regularly examine the athletic facilities and direct or otherwise ensure that the

17 facility is clean and safe for practice and competitive play. Girls' athletics

18 teams will not be required to perform any type or quantity of maintenance tasks

19 greater than those performed by boys' athletics teams.

20

O. Preferred Facilities.

21

"Preferred Facilities" means and refers to those athletic facilities that are

22 well maintained and meet the given sport's specific criteria for regulation

23 practice and competition.

24

P. Regulation Size Softball Fields at Moor Field.

25

"Regulation Size Softball Fields at Moor Field" means and refers to the

26 softball fields and amenities at Moor Field that will be constructed pursuant to

27

28
Page 6

1 this Agreement that comply with the regulations for high school softball

2 competition including but not limited to, a shaved infield, 60 foot base-paths

3 and a center field distance of at least 200· feet from home plate, and, for the

4 Varsity Field, an outfield fence.

5

Q. Same Game.

6

For purposes of this Agreement, the following nine pairs of Boys' and

7 Girls' sports play the "same game":

8

1. Girls' Cross Country and Boys' Cross-Country;

9

2. Girls' Volleyball and Boys' Volleyball;

10

3. Girls' Water Polo and Boys' Water Polo;

11

4. Girls' Basketball and Boys' Basketball;

12

5. Girls' Soccer and Boys' Soccer;

13

6. Girls' Tennis and Boys' Tennis;

14

7. Girls' Swimming and Boys' SwinmUng;

15

8. Girls' Track and Boys' Track; and

16

9. Girls' Golf and Boys' Golf.

17

R. Shared Athletic Facilities.

18

"Shared Athletic Facilities" means and refers to athletic facilities that are

19 utilized by both girls' and boys' athletic teams.

20

S. Small Gym at AHS.

21

"Small Gym at AHS" means and refers to the smaller gym with the non-

22 regulation sized basketball court located next to the Large Gym at AHS.

23

T. Team Locker Rooms.

24

"Team Locker Rooms" means and refers to rooms or space within

25 rooms that are dedicated to the use of athletic team members for storage of

26

27

28 Page 7

1 uniforms, sports equipment and as changing and meeting facilities. Team

2 locker rooms may also include restrooms and showers.

3

U. Title IX Compliance Officer.

4

"Title IX Compliance Officer" means and refers to a District employee

5 who, pursuant to the terms ofthis Agreement, is qualified and appointed to

6 serve as the individual who monitors compliance with the terms of this

7 Agreement; approves practice and game schedules prior to the commencement

8 of the sports season in compliance with the terms ofthis Agreement, receives

9 complaints with regard to Title IX issues, and participates in the investigation

10 and resolution of complaints pursuant to the grievance mechanism set forth

11 herein.

12 III. EQUITABLE RELIEF - AUSD

13

The parties hereby agree that the Defendant, AUSD shall do the

14 following in order to ensure that the Class is provided equal athletic

15 participation opportunities and full and equal treatment and benefits under Title

16 IX, the United States and California Constitutions and state anti-discrimination

17 laws.

18

A. Equal Athletic Opportunity - Participation

19

AUSD shall ensure that the class is provided equal athletic participation

20 opportunities.

21

1. Title IX Participation Opportunities Compliance

Standards

22

According to the Office of Civil Rights, an educational institution, such

23 as AUSD, may comply with Title IX provisions regarding participation

24 opportunities in athletics by meeting one of three separate and distinct tests or

25 standards. For purpose of this Agreement, the terms "tests" and "standards" are

26 to be used interchangeably.

27

28
Page 8

1

These tests apply to the Title IX requirements related to "equal

2 participation opportunities" and do not apply to the Title IX requirements

3 related to "equal treatment and benefits." These standards are as follows:

4

(1) An institution may provide participation opportunities for girls and boys

5

that are substantially proportionate to their respective rates of enrollment

6

as full-time high school students; or

7

(2) An institution mayfully and effectively accommodate the interests and

8

abilities of the underrepresented sex; or

9

(3) An institution may demonstrate a history and continuing practice of

10

program expansion for the underrepresented sex.

11

2. AVSD Compliance Standards

12

For purposes ofthis Agreement, the underrepresented sex is girls. For

13 purpose of this Agreement, compliance with the obligation to provide equal

14 athletic participation opportunities shall be determined based on the following

15 standards: (1) the provision of participation opportunities for girls and boys at

16 AHS that are substantially proportionate to their respective rates of enrollment

17 as full-time high school students at AHS; or (2) the full and effective

18 accommodation of the interests and abilities of girls at AHS; or (3) during the

19 last two years ofthis Agreement, the provision of a continuing practice of

20 program expansion for the underrepresented sex as defined under Title IX.

21 Reduction of any boys' sports team at AHS will not affect the duty of the

22 District to comply with its obligations under this Agreement, Title IX and

23 applicable state and federal law as stated herein. Nothing in this section shall

24 violate established Title IX regulations.

25

26

27

28 Page 9

1

a. Standard One - Substantially Proportionate

Participation Opportunities

2 The participation opportunities afforded to girls shall be measured by

3
totaling the number of female athletes participating on all sports teams. The

4
participation opportunities afforded to boys shall be measured by totaling the

5
number of male athletes participating on all sports teams. The total number or

6
participation opportunities afforded shall be measured by adding the total

7
number of female athletes participating on all sports teams and the total number

8
of male athletes participating on all sports teams.

9
For purposes of this Agreement, "substantially proportionate" shall mean

10
that the percentage of participation opportunities on all sports teams afforded to

11
girls at AHS shall be within 2 percentage points of the percentage of total

12
enrollment comprised of female students at AHS. For example, for a variance

13
of two percent, if girls make up 48% of the student body and boys make up

14
52% ofthe student body, then at least 46% of the athletic participation

15
opportunities at AHS shall be afforded to girls and at most 54% of the

16
participation opportunities shall be afforded to boys. Plaintiffs acknowledge

17
that Standard One may not be met until the 2008-2009 school year, and that

18
AUSD maycomply in any year of the Compliance Period using Standard Two.

19
Prior to the commencement of each academic school year, AUSD shall

20 quantifY the participation opportunities afforded to all of its sports teams,

21
determine whether and to what extent the participation opportunities provided

22 to girls are not substantially proportionate to the participation opportunities

23
provided to boys, and report its analysis and results to Class Counsel, including

24
all relevant enrollment and participation figures. Where the participation

25
.opportunities provided to girls are not substantially proportionate to the

26
participation opportunities provided to boys, as defined by Standard One, and

27

28
Page 10

1 prior to the commencement of each academic school year, AUSD shall set forth

2 in a report to class counsel a detailed plan, with goals and timetables to rectify

3 any inequity in girls' participation opportunities by providing, inter alia, (1)

4 more participation opportunities for girls in existing sports fielded at AHS; (2)

5 additional girls' sports fielded by elF and not currently offered at AHS; and/or

6 (3) additional girls' club sports team(s), such that Standard Two is met.

7

b. Standard Two - Full and Effective Accommodation

8

To demonstrate the full and effective accommodation of the interests and

9 abilities of girls at AHS, AUSD shall demonstrate that existing programs fully

10 satisfy such interest and ability; some satisfaction is not sufficient. In assessing

11 whether AHS is fully and effectively accommodating the interests of girls, it is

12 not permissible to compare the extent to which AHS is responding to the

13 interests of girls with the extent to which AHS is responding to the interests of

14 boys.

15

'.'Full and effective accommodation" requires providing interscholastic

16 opportunities by fielding a team whenever there is sufficient interest and ability

17 among girls to sustain a viable team, and a reasonable expectation for

18 competition. However, under this Agreement, compliance with this standard

19 does not require the fielding of a team for which AUSD carmot secure liability

20 insurance, as is the case with gymnastics at the time of this Agreement.

21

In no event shall the participation opportunities afforded to class

22 members be subject to or limited by any requirement that the class or any

23 member ofthe class establish any prior or historical interest and participation in

24 any sport.

25

Within thirty days ofthe beginning oftheir respective season or team

26 tryouts, AUSD shall add a freshman-sophomore softball team and one

27

28
Page 11

1 additional girls' basketball team to meet the current interest and demand for

2 these sports at AHS.

3

AUSD shall also determine whether there is interest and demand for

4 additional girls' sports teams. AUSD shall take all affirmative steps possible to

5 secure competition for these additional numbers of girls' athletic teams and

6 variety of girls' athletics including, but not limited to, encouraging other

7 schools in its leagues to sponsor additional girls' teams and girls' athletics. In

8 order to encourage other schools in its league to sponsor additional girls' teams

9 and girls' athletics, AUSD and its representatives shall vote in favor of

10 increasing the number of girls' athletic teams at the CIF league meetings.

11

AUSD may also survey students at AHS to identify current interest and

12 abilities in interscholastic athletics. AUSD shall submit any proposed survey to

13 class counsel at least 60 days prior to its intended distribution date. Class

14 counsel shall provide comments to AUSD regarding the survey. Counsel for

15 the parties shall promptly meet and confer about any outstanding disputed

16 issues and the court shall be the final arbiter of any disputes. The survey shall

17 not be distributed until all disputed issues have been resolved. Defendant

18 AUSD shall bear all costs for preparing and administering the survey and

19 analyzing its results.

20

c. Standard Three - Continuing Practice of Program

Expansion

21
During the period of February 1,2009 through February 1, 2011, the

22
AUSD may comply with this Agreement by showing a continuing practice of

23
program expansion, as defined under Title IX, that is demonstrably responsive

24 .to the developing interest of girls. "A continuing practice of program

25 expansion" means the ongoing addition of girls' teams and/or an ongoing

26 significant increase in quality opportunities for girls to compete on existing

27

28
Page 12

1 girls' teams sufficient to meet theathletic interests of girls at AHS. In order to

2 show a continuing practice of program expansion, AUSD shall keep records of

3 additional teams, the increase in numbers of participants, and the District's \~ . ~

4 affirmative response to requests for additional teams. AUSD shall design a

\/-~----

5 plan or program and document its efforts to monitor and accommodate

6 developing interests of girls during the Compliance Period. Nothing in this

7 section shall violate Title IX regulations.

8

B. Equal Athletic Opportunity - Treatment and Benefits.

9

AUSD shall ensure that the Class offemale student athletes is provided

10 equal treatment and benefits in each athletic sport, program, service and facility

11 atAHS.

12

1. Title IX Factors

13

In determining whether equal athletic treatment and benefits are

14 provided, the following factors shall be considered, among other factors: (1)

15 provision of equipment and supplies; (2) scheduling of games and practice

16 times; (3) transportation; (4) opportunity to receive coaching and academic

17 tutoring; (5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (6) provision

18 of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (7) provision of medical

19 and training facilities and services; and (8) publicity.

20

2. AUSD Compliance Plan

21

In addition, to ensure that the class of girl athletes is provided with equal

22 treatment and benefits, AUSD shall comply with the following:

23

a. Creation, Use and Maintenance of Two Regulation-Size Softball Fields at Moor Field

24
Consistent with the milestone dates provided below, AUSD shall effect

25
the construction of, two regulation-size softball fields, at Moor Field; one

26 Varsity field and one Junior Varsity field. Both softball fields at Moor Field

27

28 Page 13

1 shall be of comparable quality to the existing Varsity and Junior Varsity

2 baseball fields at Moor Field and shall have all of the comparable amenities that

3 are currently provided to the existing boys' baseball fields at Moor Field. These

4 amenities include, but are not limited to, comparable quantity and quality of: (1)

5 enclosed batting cages, (2) electronic scoreboards, (3) pitching bullpens, (4)

6 cement dugouts, (5) fencing, including perimeter fencing to surround both

7 softball fields, outfield fencing for the Varsity field, and fencing to protect the

8 Varsity field for the exclusive use of softball teams, (6) bleachers, (7) bat racks,

9 (8) hat racks, (9) warning track on the Varsity Field, (10) tarps to cover pitching

10 area and home plate area, (11) electrical outlets, (12) functional water fountains,

11 including water fountains in the dugouts, (13) equipment and storage bins, (14)

12 area for concession activities, and (15) functional irrigation and drainage

13 systems. [Refer to Exhibit A attached hereto.]

14

AUSD shall ensure that the girls' Junior Varsity and Varsity regulation-

15 size softball fields are fully maintained at a corresponding level equal to the

16 boys' Junior Varsity and varsity baseball fields at Moor Field, including their

17 proper and timely preparation for games and in no event shall either the girls'

18 Junior Varsity or Varsity softball fields be maintained at a level less than the

19 condition of the Junior Varsity and Varsity baseball fields as of December 1, .

20 2005.

21

As to AUSD, the varsity girls' softball field at Moor Field shall be

22 dedicated to the girls' softball team. The junior varsity girls' softball field at

23 Moor Field shall be dedicated to softball. The boys' baseball teams at Moor

24 Field shall not practice or compete on any girls' softball field at Moor Field.

25

26

27

28 Page 14

1

b. Interim Relief for Girls' Softball for the 2005-06 and

2006-07 School Years

2 Until the junior varsity and varsity softball fields at Moor Field are

3
completed, the varsity softball field at Third Street shall be dedicated to the

4
girls' softball team, and the junior varsity softball field at Third Street shall be

5
dedicated to softball. Notwithstanding, AUSD's Physical Education classes

6
may use the Third Street softball fields during school hours as long as they do

7
not damage the integrity of the Field's surface.

8
Until the construction of the Moor Field softball fields is completed and

9
made available to the Girls' Softball teams at AHS, the following interim

10
measures shall be taken:

11
During the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, the Girls' Softball teams

12 shall use the existing Third Street softball fields for practice and competition.

13
Additionally, AUSD will provide the following at the Third Street fields:

14
1. A temporary batting cage and pitching machine;

15
2. Working drinking fountains;

16

3. Rehabilitation, cleaning and painting of the dugout benches and

17
spectator bleachers;

18
4. Seeding and leveling the softball fields;

19
5. A portable restroom facility accessible to persons with disabilities;

20
6. Appropriate maintenance of the Third Street Fields.

21
c. Joint Use of Moor Field

22 At Moor Field, all baseball, softball and multi-use fields shall be made

23
available to both the boys' baseball teams and the girls' softball teams, at AHS

24
on an equitable basis as appropriate to their sport.

25
The City of Alhambra shall have use of the baseball, softball and multi-

26
use fields at Moor Field when not in use by the School District subject to the

27

28
Page 15

1 terms and conditions of the applicable Joint Use Agreement between the City

2 and the District for the use of Moor Field attached as Exhibit B.

3

As to the City of Alhambra, and organizations sanctioned by the City of

4 Alhambra such as LittleLeague, the varsity girls' softball field and the junior

5 varsity girls' softball field may be used appropriately and in a manner

6 consistent with the Joint Use Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit B.·

7 Appropriate use of the varsity girls' softball field and of the junior varsity girls'

8 softball field by the City of Alhambra or by an organization sanctioned by the

9 City of Alhambra means use by a softball team or use by a Little League team.

10

d. Use of Shared Facilities By AHS Athletic Teams

11

i. General Procedure

12

All girl's athletic teams at AHS shall have an equal opportunity as have

13 the boys' athletic teams at AHS to practice and compete on the athletic facilities

14 at AHS and off-site that are appropriate to their sport. Equal opportunity

15 includes scheduling of practice and game times as well as equal maintenance of

16 all facilities, including proper and timely facilities preparation for games.

17

ii. Practice Procedure and Schedules

18

Practice schedules shall be established by all of the athletic sports

19 coaches in collaboration with the Athletic Director during each academic

20 school year, and no later than four to six weeks before the official season for

21 each sport begins. The above-described General Procedure shall control in .

22 establishing the practice schedules for each team throughout the academic

23 year.

24

When the girls' and boys' athletic teams require the use of the same or a

25 preferred facility, and carmot practice at the same or preferred facility

26 simultaneously, then practice schedules shall be rotated so that the girls' athletic

27

28
Page 16

1 teams can practice on the preferred facility on an equal basis as the boys'

2 athletic teams.

3

The Large Gym is the preferred practice facility for the sport of

4 basketball.

5

The boys' baseball teams at AHS shall liot practice on any girls' softball

6 fields at AHS and/or Moor Field.

7

In setting the practice schedules ofthe girls' and boys' athletic teams,

8 teams of the same level will be compared to each other (i.e. varsity girls to

9 varsity boys, junior varsity girls to junior varsity boys, etc.).

10

A boys' athletic team with no equivalent level girls' athletic team shall

11 be compared to the next lower athletic girls' team. Teams may rotate practice

12 times on a daily or weekly basis.

13

All athletic teams shall vacate the practice facility no later than the end of

14 their scheduled practice time. Each scheduled practice time shall end at least

15 ten minutes prior to the next scheduled practice time in order to ensure the

16 timely commencement ofthe next athletic team's practice time.

17

Failure of any athletic team to vacate a practice facility in a timely

18 manner such that there is an encroachment upon the practice time of any

19 athletic team is a violation ofthis procedure. Coaches, and/or student athletes

20 may report an infraction of the practice time procedure pursuant to the

21 grievance procedure outlined herein. Where it is determined that there has been

22 a violation of this subdivision, such that a boys' athletic team has encroached

23 upon the practice time of a girls' athletic team, AUSD shall require the

24 offending team to limit a practice or practices for an amount of time equal to the

25 amount of the encroachment time. At the commencement of each season, all

26

27

28 Page 17

1 coaches and student athletes will be notified in writing oftheir right to present a

2 complaint in this regard.

3

Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to prohibit, regulate, or

4 affect the imposition of disciplinary actions upon coaches. Nothing in this

5 subdivision shall be construed to prohibit AUSD from subjecting all athletic

6 teams, whether girls' teams or boys' teams, to the same practice policies, so

7 long as the provisions of this subdivision are met.

8

iii. Game Schedules

9

The game schedules shall be established by all of the athletic sports

10 coaches in collaboration with the Athletic Director during each academic

11 school year, and no later than four to six weeks before the official season for

12 each sport begins. The above-described General Policy shall control in

13 establishing the game schedules for each team throughout the academic year.

14

When the girls' and boys' athletic teams require the use of the same or

15 a preferred facility, and cannot compete at the same or preferred facility

16 simultaneously, then competition schedules shall be rotated so that the girls'

17 athletic teams compete on the preferred facility and at the preferred

18 competition day and time on an equal basis as the boys' athletic teams. In

19 setting the game schedules ofthe girls' and boys' athletic teams, teams of the

20 same level will be compared to each other (i.e. varsity girls to varsity boys,

21 junior varsity girls to junior varsity boys, etc.).

22

A boys' athletic team with no equivalent level girls' athletic team shall

23 be compared to the next lower athletic girls' team. Teams may rotate game

24 times on a daily or weekly basis.

25

During the regular season, the girls' athletic teams shall play an equal

26 number ofgames, including home games as the boys' athletic teams of the

27

28 Page 18

1 same level. This provision does not apply when an AHS athletic team does

2 not have corresponding level teams to compete against within the CIF league.

3 In that event, AUSD shall use every effort to secme an equal nurnber of

4 games,inc1uding home games, as it has seemed for the AHS boys' athletic

5 team of the same level. This provision does not apply to tournaments or CIF

6 post-season competition where the number of games is set by the tournament

7 host or CIF. However, the girls' teams shall have access to compete in an

8 equal number of tournaments during the pre- and regular season as the boys'

9 teams.

10

The Large Gym is the preferred competition facility for the sport of

11 basketball.

12

Friday is the preferred competition day for the sport of basketball. At

13 or around 7:00 p.rn. is the preferred competition time for the sport of

14 basketball.

15

The boys' baseball teams at AHS shall not compete on any girls' softball

16 fields at AHS or Moor Field.

17

In the event that, during the Compliance Period, the composition of the

18 Almont League changes such that AUSD schools comprise less than one-half of

19 the Almont League membership and, as a result, AUSD can no longer control

20 the scheduling of Almont League games, then AUSD shall not be in violation

21 of this Agreement ifthe Almont League deviates from the game scheduling

22 provision of this Agreement provided that AUSD has used every effort to

23 persuade the members of the Almont League to continue the scheduling of

24 athletic events in accordance with this provision. 25

26

27

28
Page 19

1

iv. Approval and Posting ofPractice and Game

2

Schedules

3

The final practice and game schedules shall be reviewed and approved

4 by the Assistant Principal of Business and Activities four to six weeks prior to

5 the official starting date of each sport season, and shall be approved by the

6 Title IX Compliance Officer at least four weeks before the official

7 commencement of each season. In the event that the schedule has not been

8 finalized within four to six weeks prior to the start of the season, the coaches

9 shall reserve practice and game times and facilities for teams in accordance

10 with the policies stated herein and slot in the opposing tearriS as they are

11 scheduled.

12

The final practice and game schedules shall be distributed to all

13 coaches no later than three weeks prior to the official commencement of each

14 athletic sport season. The coaches will deliver to the players the practice and

15 game schedule no later than the first day try outs are completed, and the team

16 members have been selected. Any disputes regarding the [mal practice and

17 game schedules shall be subject to the grievance procedure as described

18 herein.

19

The final practice and game schedules for each athletic sport at AHS

20 shall be maintained by the Assistant Principal of Business and Activities at

21 AHS and shall be posted on the athletic bulletin board outside ofthe Physical

22 Education Department at AHS and provided to students, so as to provide

23 students, parents, coaches, administrators and other AHS personnel with

24 effective and timely noti~e of the dates, times and locations for each team

25 practice and game.

26

27

28
Page 20

1

During the Compliance Period, AHS shall maintain these schedules.

2 These schedules shall be provided along with the biannual report to plaintiffs'

3 counsel.

4

e. Team Locker Rooms for Girls' Athletic Teams

5

Upon the commencement ofthe 2005-2006 academic school year, the

6 smaller of the two locker rooms adjacent to the large gym shall be converted

7 and dedicated to the exclusive use of female athletes at AHS to provide girl

8 athletes with a team locker room directly adjacent to the site of practice and

9 competition. [See Reference map attached as Exhibit C] Aside from room

10 size, this room shall have the same amenities as those available in the larger of

11 the two team locker rooms adjacent to the large gym, including a restroom.

12

In addition, consistent with the milestone of December 2008, AUSD shall

13 construct at AHS a new girls' team locker room off of the existing physical

14 education girls' locker room. The new room shall contain athletic lockers of

15 sufficient size to fit softball equipment and shall contain the same amenities

16 including windows, as those in locker rooms and meeting areas available to the

17 boys' athletic teams, and shall include at a minimum operable restrooms

18 facilities, a shower, electrical outlets, sufficient lighting, ventilation, and

19 benches. [Refer to Exhibit C attached hereto.]

20

AUSD shall increase the ambient light in the new girls' team locker room

21 and the existing physical education girls' locker room to the same level and

22 quality as is available in the boys' locker room.

23

The bathroom facilities within any girls' locker room shall have operable

24 and maintained toilets, showers and sinks.

25

In addition, consistent with the milestone of December 2008, AUSD shall

26 create one gated team room at AHS within the existing physical education girls'

27

28
Page 21

1 locker room to accommodate girl athletes. [Refer to Exhibit C attached

2 hereto.)

3

In the event that any additional team locker room is created for boys'

4 athletic teams at AHS during the Compliance Period, an additional team locker

5 room of the same size and amenities shall be created for girls' athletic teams at

6 AHS.

7

f. Offices for Team Coaches

8

Within three months of the effective date ofthis Agreement, AUSD shall

9 assign at AHS coaching office space to every on-site sport, regardless of

10 whether the coach is an AHS staff member or a walk-on coach. Coaches who

11 coach girls' athletics shall have office space and amenities comparable to those

12 provided to coaches who coach boys' athletics. [Refer to Exhibit D attached

13 hereto.)

14

In the event that during the Compliance Period, office space at AHS is

15 provided to coaches who coach off-site boys' athletic teams, space that is equal

16 in size and amenities shall be provided to coaches who coach off-site girls'

17 athletic teams.

18

g. Weight Rooms

19

i. Equitable Access and Equipment

20

By December 1, 2005, a sign shall be placed at the entrance of any

21 weight room at AHS and it shall state: "Co-ed Weight Room." Moreover, by

22 the first day ofthe 2005-06 academic school year, weights and other equipment

23 shall be re-allocated to each existing AHS weight room to ensure that similar

24 quality and quantity of equipment and weights are provided to each weight

25 room.

26

27

28
Page 22

1

ii. Weight Room Schedule and Procedure

2

Upon the commencement of the 2005-2006 academic school year, AHS

3 shall ensure that girls' athletic teams may reserve any weight room on an equal

4 basis as boys' athletic team. Conversely, AHS shall ensure that boys' athletic

5 teams may reserve any weight room on an equal basis as girls' athletic teams.

6 AHS shall ensure that reserved weight room time slots are equally distributed,

7 and may not simply allocate the slots on a "first-come, first-serve" basis. No

8 athletic team may "block reserve" a weight room for an entire week, month, or

9 season. During the Compliance Period, AHS shall post the weight room

10 reservation schedule for each season and shall maintain these schedules for the

11 duration of this Agreement. These schedules shall be provided along with the

12 biannual report to plaintiffs' counsel.

13

All athletic teams shall vacate the weight room no later than the end of

14 their scheduled conditioning time. Each scheduled conditioning time shall end

15 at least ten minutes prior to the next scheduled conditioning time in order to

16 ensure the timely commencement of the next athletic team's conditioning time.

17 Failure of any boys' athletic team to vacate a weight room in a timely manner

18 such that there is an encroachment upon the weight room time of any girls'

19 athletic team is a violation of this procedure set forth in this Agreement.

20 Conversely, failure of any girls' athletic team to vacate a weight room in a

21 timely manner such that there is an encroachment upon the weight room time of

22 any boy's athletic team is a violation of this procedure set forth in this

23 Agreement.

24

AUSD intends to implement this section by adopting a gender-neutral

25 procedure for scheduling and using the weight rooms, and the plaintiffs

26 acknowledge this intent. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to

27

28
Page 23

1 prohibit AUSD from subjecting all athletic teams to the same weight room

2 procedures, so long as the requirements ofthis section are met.

3

Coaches, and/or student athletes may report an infraction of weight room

4 use time pursuant to the grievance procedure outlined herein. Where it is

5 determined that there has been a violation of this subdivision, AUSD shall

6 require the offending team to reduce their weight room use to the amount of

7 time equal to the encroachment time.

8

At the commencement of each season all coaches and student athletes

9 will be notified in writing oftheir right to present a complaint in this regard.

10 Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to prohibit, regulate, or affect the

11 imposition of disciplinary action upon coaches.

12

iii. Three Co-Ed Weight Rooms

13

Consistent with the milestone of December 2008, AUSD shall provide

14 and maintain at AHS three separate, co-ed weight rooms that may be used by all

15 PE classes and student athletes. Each weight room shall be designed for a

16 specific type of conditioning: (1) light conditioning; (2) heavy conditioning;

17 and (3) general conditioning. The weight room designed for heavy

18 conditioning shall not be dedicated to the use of the football teams at AHS, but

19 shall be made available to all athletes at AHS who wish to engage in heavy

20 conditioning.

21

Each weight room shall be stocked with weights and equipment

22 appropriate for the designated use. The allocation of weights and other

23 equipment shall be provided on an equitable basis to each designated weight

24 room, ensuring that similar quality and quantity of such equipment and weights

25 are provided to each weight room.

26

27

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1

Until the third co-ed weight room is completed, the interim measures

2 shall be as follows: (1) the large and small weight rooms presently located at

3 AHS will be designated co-ed facilities; (2) these two existing weight rooms

4 will be equally accessible, equally available and properly equipped for all

5 Physical Education (PE) classes and girls' and boys' athletics teams; and (3) the

6 schedule of use by each athletic team will be developed in accordance with the

7 provisions of section 2(g)(ii) herein.

8

h. Gender Equity in Symbols and Imagery

9

Within thirty (30) days from the effective date ofthis Agreement, AUSD

10 shall ensure that any athletic facility used by any student at AHS, including

11 locker rooms or weight rooms, shall not feature, display or exhibit male- .

12 dominated symbols and imagery. However, trophies, banners and photos

13 featuring all school sports at AHS may be displayed, representing both male

14 and female athletes and their achievements in an equitable fashion.

15 Additionally, educational or instructional materials representing both male and

16 female bodies in an equitable fashion may be posted, except for those materials

17 that display sexualized images and symbols.

18

i. Equivalent Coaching

19

i. General Procedure

20

While recognizing that AUSD teachers and staff must be hired and

21 retained based on their academic qualifications, teaching abilities, and other

22 professional qualifications, coaches of girls' athletic teams shall be of an equal

23 quality to coaches of boys ' athletic teams in tenns of experience, skill, and

24 availability both during the on and off seasons.

25

26

27

28
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1

Female athletes at AHS shall enjoy the same opportunities for coaching,

2 teaching, training, and conditioning as those provided for male athletes at AHS,

3 including the opportunities provided in the instructional Sixth Period.

4

ii. Audit of Coaches

5

During the Compliance Period, AHS shall annually conduct an audit of

6 the qualifications of all coaches at AHS for boys' and girls' athletic teams to

7 determine which athletic teams, if any, are being coached by coaches that ru:e

8

9 to evaluate or comment on the qualifications of AUSD staff in their role as

10 teachers or other professionals; the audit presumes that staff who are also

11 coaches meet the qualifications for employment at AUSD. Items to be

12 examined include, but are not limited to, the following:

13

1. Educational Background: degrees, certifications, emphasis in

14

athletics, physical education, etc;

15

2. Athletic experience and level of competition;

16

3. Coaching Experience: previous coaching experience, level of

17

teams coached, gender of teams coached, participation in coaching

18

associations;

19

4. Certification in first-aid techniques, including CPR and emergency

20

medical procedures;

21

5. Availability to coach during season;

22

6. Availability to assist during the instructional Sixth Period;

23

7. Fundraising experience; and

24

8. Coaching Designation: AUSD certificated or classified employee

25 or walk-on coach.

26

27

28 Page 26

1

Within thirty (30) days after the timely completion ofthe audit, and at

2 least annually thereafter during the Compliance Period, AHS shall identify the

3 girls' athletic teams for which the coach(es) are less qualified and develop a

4 plan to promptly rectify any coaching disparities. In auditing its coaches, AHS

5 shall compare girls' and boys' coaches by sport and level of play (i.e. girls'

6 varsity basketball coach with boys' varsity basketball coach, girls' junior

7 varsity softball with boys' junior varsity baseball). AHS shall provide the audit

8 and proposed plan, if any, to plaintiffs' counsel within forty-five (45) days after

9 timely completion of the audit, and annually thereafter during the Compliance

10 Period.

11

Plaintiffs' counsel will notify AUSD within thirty (30) days after

12 receiving the audit and proposed plan of any objections thereto and shall meet

13 and confer with AUSD to resolve any dispute pursuant to the "Resolution of

14 Any Disputes" provision as stated herein.

15

iii. Recruitment and Hiring

16 To increase the number of personnel who are qualified to coach girls' athletic

17 sports, AUSD shall take all possible steps to recruit employment candidates,

18 including certificated teachers, with the qualifications and desire to coach girls'

19 athletic teams, including advertising for girls' coaches on AUSD's website, as

20 well as on the EdJoin.org and CIF -Southern Section websites. AUSD's policy

21 regarding academic excellence mandates that academic and professional

22 qualifications shall be a priority over athletics. AUSD shall ensure that coaches

23 for girls' athletics teams are selected in the same manner as they are selected for

24 boys' athletics teams.

25

26

27

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1

iv. Compensation

2

The provisions in the collective bargaining agreements governing the

3 compensation of staff and walk-on coaches are gender-neutral, and comply with

4 Title IX. These gender-neutral provisions have appeared in past collective

5 bargaining agreements, and it is AUSD's policy to continue to ensure such

6 gender-neutral compensation provisions in the future.

7

v. Evaluation- Coaches

8

The performance of all coaches of athletic teams shall be evaluated by

9 the Principal or hislher designee at AHS after the close of each applicable sport

10 season and the evaluation shall be considered when making hiring and retention

11 decisions. Factors to be analyzed may include:

12

l. Organization and preparation for games;

13

2. Organization and preparation for practices;

14

3. Communication with players;

15

4. Communication with parents;

16

5. Exhibited proper leadership on and off the field; and

17

6. Accessibility to players and staff.

18

j. Transportation

19

The provisions in AUSD's transportation policy are gender-neutral and

20 comply with Title IX as they provide the same quantity and quality of necessary

21 transportation services to girls' athletic teams as they provide to boys' athletic

22 teams, in accordance with AUSD's Board Policies. AUSD will continue to

23 ensure such gender-neutral transportation policies in the future.

24

25

26

27

28

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1

k. Finances

2

i. District Allocation - Athletics Support Account

3

Any expenditure made on interscholastic athletics from the District

4 Allocation - Athletic Support Account shall be necessary to the practice,

5 competition, or safety of interscholastic athletics. Examples of necessary

6 expenditures may include athletic uniforms, athletic protective gear, athletic

7 equipment, athletic supplies and transportation.

8

Any expenditure made on interscholastic athletics from the District

9 Allocation - Athletics Support Account, including but not limited to uniforms,

10 equipment, supplies, and transportation shall be monitored and coded as

11 "Athletics - Boys," "Athletics - Girls," or "Athletics - Coed." Expenditures on

12 items or services for any team defined as "Athletics - Boys" shall be coded as

·13 "Athletics - Boys." Expenditures on items or services for any team defined as

14 "Athletics - Girls" shall be coded as "Athletics - Girls." Expenditures on items

15 or services for any team defined as "Athletics - Coed" shall be coded as

16 "Athletics - Coed." Expenditures made to jointly and equally benefit same

17 game sport shall be allocated equally to Athletics - Boys and Athletics - Girls.

18 (See Definitions.) AHS shall code all the expenditures described above.

19

On a periodic basis not less than four times peryear during the

20 Compliance Period, AHS shall make publicly available financial statements

21 reporting the subtotal of expenditures from the District Allocation - Athletics

22 Support Account on "Athletics - Boys," "Athletics - Girls," and "Athletics -

23 Coed." These financial statements shall be provided to all counsel of record in

24 this matter.

25

26

27

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1

In every fiscal year during the Compliance Period, expenditures from the

2 District Allocation - Athletics Support Account on "Athletics - Boys" shall not

3 exceed expenditures on "Athletics - Girls."

4

ii. ASH General Athletics Trust Account

5

One general trust fund account shall be created and maintained for

6 holding funds raised for interscholastic athletics. This account shall be labeled

7 the ASB General Athletics Trust Account. A portion of monies raised by any

8 team or group of teams to benefit interscholastic athletics or any athletic team

9 shall also be deposited into this account, in accordance with subsection iv

10 (Fundraising and ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Accounts), infra.

11

Any coach may apply to the ASB General Athletics Trust Account for

12 payment of an expenditure that is directly necessary to the practice,

13 competition, or safety of interscholastic athletics. The Assistant Principal of

14 Business and Activities shall approve necessary expenditures in compliance

15 wjth this Agreement. In addition to directly necessary expenditures, a coach

16 may also apply for monies for awards given and banquets held in compliance

17 with section m (Awards and Banquets) and for seed money for fundraisers held

18 in compliance with section iv. All seed money will be fully returned to the

19 ASB General Athletics Trust Account prior to the distribution of funds raised

20 pursuant to section iv(3) below.

21

Any expenditure made on interscholastic athletics from the ASB General

22 Athletics Trust Account, including but not limited to uniforms, equipment, and

23 supplies, shall be monitored and coded as "Athletics - Boys," "Athletics-

24 Girls," or "Athletics - Coed." Expenditures on items or services for any team

25 defined as "Athletics - Boys" shall be coded as "Athletics - Boys."

26 Expenditures on items or services for any team defined as "Athletics - Girls"

27

28 Page 30

1 shall be coded as "Athletics - Girls." Expenditures on items or services for any

2 team defined as "Athletics - Coed" shall be coded as "Athletics - Coed."

3 Expenditures made to jointly and equally benefit same game sport shall be

4 allocated equally to Athletics - Boys and Athletics - Girls. (See Definitions.)

5 AHS shall code the expenditures described above.

6

Financial statements regarding expenditures from the ASB General

7 Athletics Trust Account shall include subtotals for "Athletics -Boys,"

8 "Athletics - Girls," and "Athletics - Coed."

9

On a periodic basis not less than four times per year during the

10 Compliance Period, AHS shall make publicly available financial statements

11 reporting the subtotal of expenditures from the ASB General Athletics Trust

12 Account on "Athletics - Boys," "Athletics - Girls," and "Athletics - Coed."

13 These financial statements shall be provided to all counsel of record in this

14 matter.

15

In every fiscal year during the Compliance Period, expenditures from the

16 ASB General Athletics Trust Account on "Athletics - Boys," "Athletics-

17 Girls," and "Athletics- Coed," shall meet the standards set forth in subsection

18 iv. (S.tandards for Demonstrating Equitable Expenditures), below. The

19 District's Title IX Compliance Officer, Assistant Principal of Business and

20 Activities, and Principal, shall monitor the budget and expenditures from the

21 ASB General Athletics Trust Account to ensure compliance with subsection iv

22 (Standards for Demonstrating Equitable Expenditures), below.

23

iii. Vending Machines and Gate Revenue

24

On a periodic basis not less than four times per year during the

25 Compliance Period, AHS shall make available to class counsel reporting of

26 expenditures on interscholastic athletics made from monies raised by vending

27

28
Page 31

1 machines and gate revenues. These monies will be used for payment of officials

2 for athletic events, toumament and/or CIF entry fees and dues and no other

3 extracurricular sports purpose.

4

Expenditure line item shall detail the nature of the expenditure, and a

5 description of the item or items purchased and shall be coded as "Athletics-

6 Boys," "Athletics-Girls" and "Athletics-Coed." Income line items shall specify

7 the source ofthe revenue (e.g., vending machine or gate).

8,

Such expenditures shall meet the standards set forth in subsection

9 iv(Standards for Demonstrating Equitable Expenditures), below. The District's

10 Title IX Compliance Officer, Assistant Principal of Business and Activities, and

11 Principal, shall monitor these expenditures to ensure compliance with

12 subsection iv (Standards for Demonstrating Equitable Expenditures), below.

13

iv. Block Grants

14

In the event that site block grants are awarded for athletics, such monies

15 will be equally distributed among girls' and boys' athletic teams.

16

v. Fundraising and ASB Individual Athletic Trust

17

Fund Accounts

18

1. ASB Fundraisers

19

Within three months of the effective date ofthis Agreement, AHS shall

20 compile a list of all fundraisers conducted in the last three years to benefit

21 interscholastic athletics or any athletic team. This list shall include a

22 description of the fundraiser. The list shall be provided to all counsel of record

23 in this matter, who will be given an opportunity to comment and to provide

24 information about additional fundraisers, if any.

25

Thereafter, this list shall be distributed to the coaches of each

26 interscholastic athletic team fielded by AHS. Any team or group of teams that

27

28
Page 32

1 wishes to lead a particular fundraiser shall be given an equal opportunity to do

2 so. I f there are more groups seeking to lead a particular fundraiser than there

3 are opportunities, AHS shall rotate the opportunities.

4

All fundraising activities supporting interscholastic athletics shall be

5 compiled into a report made available on a periodic basis not less than two

6 times per year during the Compliance Period. The report shall include a

7 description of the fundraiser and the team or teams leading the fundraiser. The

8 report shall be provided to all counsel of record in this matter, and to the

9 coaches of each interscholastic athletic team fielded by AHS.

10

2. ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Accounts

11

The following individual athletic trust fund accounts shall be created for

12 holding funds raised for interscholastic athletics consistent with the rules stated

13 herein:

14

(1)

Boys' Cross Country;

15

(2)

Girls' Cross Country;

16

(3)

Boys' Water polo;

17

(4)

Girls' Water polo;

18 (5)

Boys' Basketball;

19

(6)

Girls' Basketball;

20

(7)

Boys' Soccer;

21

(8)

Girls' Soccer;

22 (9)

Baseball;

23

(10) Softball;

24 (11) Boys' Tennis;

25

(12) Girls' Tennis;

26 (13) Boys' Swimming;

27

28 Page 33

1

(14) Girls'Swimming;

2

(15) Boys' Track;

3

(16) Girls'Track;

4

(17) Boys' Golf;

5

(18) Girls' Golf;

6

(19) Football;

7

(20) Wrestling;

8

(21) Boys'Volleyball;

9

(22) Girls'Volleyball; and

10 (23) Badminton.

11

Any other existing athletic trust fund account which exists to support

12 interscholastic athletics, interscholastic athletes, or any AHS athletic team in

13 any fashion shall be closed, with any balance transferred to the ASB General

14 Athletics Trust Account, described above in section ii.

15

Should additional interscholastic sports be fielded at AHS during the

16 Compliance Period, that are not listed among the teams described within (1)

17 .through (23) above, additional trust fund accounts will be created.

18

3. Distribution of Funds Raised

19

All monies raised for interscholastic athletics at AHS through fundraising

20 shall be deposited as follows:

21

All seed money will be fully returned to the ASB General Athletics Trust

22 Account prior to the distribution of funds raised pursuant to section iV(3) below.

23

One third of the monies raised shall be deposited into the ASB General

24 Athletics Trust Account. This account will be monitored by the District's Title

25 IX Compliance Officer, the Assistant Principal of Business and Activities and

26

27

28
Page 34

1 the Principal consistent with the standards stated herein. (See section k(i),

2 above).

3

Two thirds of the monies raised shall be deposited into the ASB

4 Individual Athletic Trust Fund Account that corresponds to the team or teams

5 that conducted the fundraising.

6

Monies from ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Accounts may be spent

7 on awards and banquets.

8

4. Financial Statements for the ASB Individual

9

Athletic Trust Fund Accounts

10

On a periodic basis not less than four times per year during the

11 Compliance Period, AHS shall make publicly available financial statements

12 reporting the activities of each ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Account.

13 Expenditure line items shall detail the nature of the expenditure, and a

14 description of the item or items purchased. Income line items shall specify the

15 source of the revenue (e.g., the particular fundraiser ardonor). The financial

16 statements shall include subtotals for each ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund

17 Account. These financial statements shall be provided to all counsel of record

18 in this matter.

19

In every fiscal year during the Compliance Period, expenditures from

20 each ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Account shall meet the standards set

21 forth in subsection vi (Standards for Demonstrating Equitable Expenditures),

22 below. The District's Title IX Compliance Officer, Assistant Principal of

23 Business and Activities, and Principal, shall monitor the budget and

24 expenditures from the ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund Accounts to ensure

25 compliance with subsection vi (Standards for Demonstrating Equitable

26 Expenditures), below.

27

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1

vi. Standards for Demonstrating Equitable

2

Expenditures

3

At the end of each fiscal year during the Compliance Period, AUSD shall

4 submit a report to all counsel of record in this matter demonstrating that

5 expenditures made from any source on interscholastic athletics, including but

6 not limited to the District Allocation - Athletic Support Account, the ASB

7 General Athletics Trust Account and the ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund

8 Accounts, meet the standards of equity described herein.

9

The required report shall be signed by the District's Title IX Compliance

10 Officer and shall demonstrate one of the following:

11

(1) During the fiscal year at issue, dollars expended on "Athletics-Boys"

12 did not exceed dollars expended on "Athletic-Girls", or

13

(2) During the fiscal year at issue, expenditures on "Athletics-Girls"

14 were equitable to expenditures on "Athletics-Boys" in the following respects:

15

(a) The uniforms, if purchased and provided to the athletes on the

16

teams comprising "Athletics-Girls" were of the same quality and

17

comparable quantity to the uniforms provided to the athletes on the

18

teams comprising "Athletics - Boys."

19

(b) For those sports in which protective gear is necessary and is

20

provided, the protective gear provided to the athletes on the teams

21

comprising "Athletics-Girls" was of the same quality and

22

comparable quantity to the protective gear provided to the athletes

23

on the teams comprising "Athletics - Boys."

24

(c) The relevant and necessary athletic equipment, if purchased and

25

provided to the teams comprising "Athletics - Girls?' was ofthe

26

same quality and comparable quantity to the relevant and

27

28 Page 36

1

necessary athletic equipment provided to the teams comprising

2

"Athletics - Boys."

3

(d) The relevant and necessary athletic supplies if purchased and

4

provided to the teams comprising "Athletics - Girls" was of the

5

same quality and comparable quantity to the relevant and

6

necessary athletic supplies provided to the teams comprising

7

"Athletics - Boys."

8

(e) An equitable schedule for replacing uniforms, protective gear,

9

equipment, and supplies was followed, such that the teams

10

comprising "Athletics -Girls" received such replacement items

11

following the same interval as did the teams comprising "Athletics

12

- Boys."

13

(f) Any athletic item, service, or amenity if purchased and provided to

14

the teams comprising "Athletics - Boys" was provided at the same

15

level, quality, and quantity to the teams comprising "Athletics -

16

Girls." Such items include, but are not limited to: athletic bags,

17

athletic jackets, bottled water, laundry service, or any other athletic

18

. amenity.

19

(g) Any difference in expenditures on "Athletics - Girls" as compared

20

to "Athletics - Boys" was the result of differences in the

21

expenditures necessary to the practice, competition, and safety of

22

the particular sports, and did not interfere with the requirement that

23

the athletes on the teams comprising "Athletics - Girls" have

24

received the same level, quality, and quantity of necessary

25

unifo=s, protective gear, equipment, supplies, and any other

26

27

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Page 37

1

athletic amenity provided as did the athletes on the teams

2

comprising "Athletics - Boys."

3

l. Publicity

4

"Publicity" means and refers to cheerleaders, band, public address system

5 announcements, scoreboards, scorekeepers, the gathering of athletic statistics,

6 student-media, school newspaper, yearbook, printed schedules, and websites.

7 AUSD shall ensure that girls' and boys' athletics receive substantially the same

8 amount of publicity. Nothing in this section shall be construed to violate the

9 students' rights to freedom of speech and the First Amendment to the U.S.

10 Constitution and/or California state constitution.

11

Specifically, to the extent that AUSD provides any printed schedules or

12 guides regarding athletic teams, it shall do so for both boys' and girls' athletic

l3 teams in the same format and the same size. If athletic schedules for boys'

14 athletics are displayed, girls' athletics schedules shall be displayed in the same

15 manner (including any displays on the internet). To the extent that public

16 address systems are used to announce information regarding athletic events,

17 then they shall be used to equally provide such information for both boys' and

18 girls' athletic teams.

19

AUSD shall equally provide information regarding the results of any

20 athletic competition for both boys' and girls' athletic teams and encourage any

21 student media to equally cover boys' and girls' athletics.

22

To the extent that AHS provides athletic teams scoreboards,

23 scorekeepers, athletic statistics gathering and videotaping, said provision shall

24 be provided equally to both boys' and girls' athletic teams. To the extent that

25 the band performs at football games and boys ' and girls' varsity basketball

26 games, the performances shall be equally scheduled among said competitions

27

28 Page 38

1 for both boys' and girls' teams. To the extent that cheerleaders perform at AHS

2 competitions, they shall be equally scheduled among said girls and boys

3 competitions. To the extent that events at AHS are held where there is

4 recognition of any athletic team or event, the recognition shall be equal as to

5 girls' and boys' athletic teams.

6

AUSD shall arrange and, if necessary, rearrange, the awards in the

7 athletic award display cases so that the girls' awards are exhibited as

8 prominently as are the boys' awards.

9

m.Award and Banquets

10

AUSD shall ensure that awards that are provided by AHS to athletes are

11 standardized by sport and level of competition such that awards are of a

12 comparable type, quality, and quantity. AUSD shall ensure that funding

13 provided by AHS for award banquets is equitable for all sports. In addition,

14 fundraising proceeds deposited into ASB Individual Athletic Trust Fund

15 Accounts and monies from the ASB General Athletic Trust Account.may be

16 expended on awards and/or banquets.

17

3. Title IX Compliance Officer

18

Within three months of the effective date ofthis Agreement, AUSD shall

19 ensure that the Title IX Compliance Officer is knowledgeable about and trained

20 in the requirements of Title IX as applied to interscholastic athletics and shall

21 provide to class counsel information regarding the qualifications ofthe Title IX

22 Compliance Officer. Should the need arise to replace the Title IX Compliance

23 Officer during the Compliance Period, any person named in replacement shall

24 be similarly knowledgeable and trained. The Title IX Compliance Officer shall

25 be responsible for monitoring the terms of this Agreement, as described herein.

26

27

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1

4. Training

2

Within three months from the effective date of this Agreement, and

3 annually thereafter during the Compliance Period, AUSD shall provide training

4 to the Principal, Assistant Principal of Business and Activities, Athletics

5 Director, coaches, and the Title IX Compliance Officer about the District's Title

6 IX obligations, grievance procedure, role of the Title IX Compliance Officer as

7 well as a summary of the terms of this Agreement. This training shall be

8 conducted by trainers who are knowledgeable about the requirements of Title

9 IX.

10

AUSD shall submit to Class Counsel information on the proposed Title

11 IX trainer. Class counsel shall provide comments to AUSD regarding the

12 trainer. Defendant AUSD shall bear all costs for administering the training.

13 IV. NO RETALIATION AGAINST OR ADVERSE TREATMENT OF

14

CLASS MEMBERS

15

The District Defendants are prohibited from retaliating in any way

16 against any member of the Class. No class members, including

17 representatives, nor any declarants, shall suffer adverse treatment by the

18 District Defendants, their agents, and employees. In the event that the Class

19 members, including representatives or declarants, claim that this provision has

20 been violated by the District Defendants, they shall have the right to file a

21 complaint pursuant to AUSD' s Grievance Procedure described herein.

22 V. AUSD's GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE .

23

A. General Procedure

24

The following procedure shall be used to address all complaints which

25 allege that AUSD has violated federal or state law or regulations governing

26 athletics programs at AHS, or this Agreement. The Title IX Compliance

27

28 Page 40

1 Officer shall maintain a record of each complaint and subsequent related

2 actions, including all information required for compliance with Title 5 of the

3 California Code of Regulations Section 4632. All parties involved in the

4 grievance and class counsel shall be notified when a complaint pursuant to

5 provisions of this Agreement is filed, when a complaint meeting or hearing is

6 scheduled and when a decision or ruling is made.

7

The grievance procedure and relevant contact information applicable to

8 this provision shall be publicized to the AHS community.

9

B. Procedure for Filing a Complaint

10

1. First Step - School Site

11

Grievances from coaches, and/or students at AHS, including the Class

12 Members, regarding athletic participation opportunities or athletic treatment and

13 benefits may be submitted to the Principal or designee of AHS via letter, email,

14 or in person. Students shall be encouraged to submit a complaint within 30

15 days from the date of the incident. Any complaint received by the Assistant

16 Principal of Business and Activities, any other school official, or the District's

17 Title IX Compliance Officer shall be relayed to the Principal and Class

18 Counsel. A copy of any complaint received from or on behalf of a class

19 member shall be promptly provided to class counsel.

20

The Principal or designee shall try toresolve the complaint by

21 conducting a prompt and impartial investigation and determination. Wherever

22 practicable, such investigation and determination shall be completed within 14

23 days. If a given investigation cannot be completed within 14 days, the Principal

24 or designee shall notifY the complainant and the Title IX Compliance Officer

25 and provide an explanation for why the investigation cannot be completed

26 within the l4-day,time frame and an estimate of the length of time needed.

27

28
Page 41

1 Where there is evidence of a valid complaint, the Principal or designee shall try

2 to rectify the situation. The complainant and class counsel shall be notified in

3 writing of the Principal or designee's determination as well as the option of and

4 procedure for submitting a written appeal to the Title IX Compliance Officer.

5 If the Principal or designee is able to resolve the complaint to the satisfaction of

6 all parties, the matter will be considered closed.

7

2. Second Step - Appeal

8

If the complaint cannot be resolved by the Principal or designee to the

9 satisfaction of all parties thereto, then the party bringing the complaint, herein

10 after "grievant" may appeal to the Title IX Compliance Officer. This written

11 appeal must be received by the Title IX Compliance Officer within 21 days of

12 the grievant's receipt of the school-site decision madeby the Principal or

13 designee. A copy of any appeal received from or on behalf of a class member

14 shall be promptly provided to class counsel. The Title IX Compliance Officer

15 shall review the matter and arrange to meet with the grievant, the Principal or

16 designee, and any other necessary party or witness within 14 days from the date

17 of receipt of the written appeal. If a given investigation cannot be completed

18 within 14 days, the Title IX Compliance Officer shall notify the Principal or

19 designee and the grievant and provide an explanation for why the investigation

20 cannot be completed within the 14-day time frame and an estimate of the length

21 of time needed. The grievant may choose to meet with the Title IX

22 Compliance Officer outside of the presence of the Principal or other school site

23 administrator.

24

The Title IX Compliance Officer shall issue a written final decision

25 concerning the grievant within 21 days of the receipt of the written appeal. A

26 copy of any written final decision addressing an appeal received from or on

27

28 Page 42

1 behalf of a class member shall be promptly provided to class counsel. No

2 matter what options the grievant chooses to resolve the complaint or concern,

3 all such matters shall be handled in a confidential manner. No retaliation shall

4 be tolerated.

5

Thereafter, if the complaint cannot be resolved by the Title IX

6 Compliance Officer to the satisfaction of all parties thereto, then class members

7 and class counsel may seek judicial assistance to resolve the complaint.

8 VI. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

9

AUSD shall provide a written report every six months during the

10 Compliance Period, on the status of AUSD's compliance with the terms of this

11 Agreement. The Title IX Compliance Officer shall be responsible for

12 coordinating and providing all reports required by this Agreement. The reports

13 shall be provided to all counsel of record in this matter. The reports shall .

14 include the following:

15

1. What compliance efforts have been made since the last reports

16

with respect to each of the substantive terms of this Agreement;

17

2. What facilities have been modified and in what manner, and what

18

interim work has been performed;

19

3. Whether all of the interim work scheduled to be completed since

20

the last report has been completed, and if not, the extent to which

21

such work has been completed and why the scheduled work was

22

not completed;

23

4. What complaints, if any, were received by AUSD regarding any

24

athletic treatment or benefits issue at AHS and the response to said

25

complaints; and

26

5. What monies were spent since the last report.

27

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1

6. What trainings have been conducted and a list of attendees

2

including their job titles.

3

7. Copies of all weight room and practice and game schedules.

4

This biannual report shall not alter AUSD's obligation to report on other

5 matters on a periodic basis as detailed within this Agreement. AUSD shall

6 submit a final report to all counsel of record in this matter within thirty (30)

7 days prior to the expiration of the Agreement. The final report shall describe

8 AUSD's compliance with this Agreement, and in particular shall set forth the 9 steps that they have taken to comply with the Equitable Relief section of this

10 Agreement.

11

At the request of Class Counsel, AUSD and Class Counsel shall meet and

12 confer every six months to review AUSD's efforts to implement this

13 Agreement, and to resolve any disputes regarding implementation or

14 enforcement. 15 VII. MILESTONES

16

For the construction work related to the softball fields at Moor Field,

17 AUSD shall perform in accordance with the following schedule:

18

1. All design work and Division of State Architects (DSA) approval

19

shall be completed by September 1,2006.

20

2. All contracts shall be advertised and awarded by January 1, 2007.

21

3. All construction will be completed by February 1, 2008.

22

The construction ofthe new girls' team locker room, and a new weight

23 room at AHS shall be completed by December 2008.

24 VIII. INSPECTIONS

25

Throughout the Compliance Period, Class Counsel may, with proper

26 prior notice to AUSD, conduct biannual inspections of the AHS facilities and

27

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1 Moor Field to monitor compliance with this Agreement, including the progress

2 of interim work.

3 IX.. RESOLUTION OF ANY DISPUTES

4

In the case any disputes arising out of or related to any alleged failure to

5 perform in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the party asserting a

6 failure ofperformance shall notify the parties herein via facsimile transmission

7 and U.S. mail. Within ten (10) business days ofthe notification, the parties

8 shall commence to "meet and confer" in good faith to resolve the dispute. If the

9 parties are unable to resolve the dispute through the "meet and confer" process,

10 either party may file a motion with the Court to resolve the issue or issues

11 specified in the "meet and confer" process. In the motion, the moving party

12 shall indicate whether the resolution of the motion requires the takingoflive

13 testimony. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover their reasonable

14 costs and attorneys fees as to any dispute.

15 X. RELEASES BY NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS

16

In consideration for the relief provided in this Agreement, the adequacy

17 of which is hereby acknowledged, on the date of the Final Approval of this

18 Agreement, all Class Members, both individually and in their entirety as a

19 Class, and Named Plaintiffs shall be deemed to discharge, release and shall

20 have released the District Defendants, and their Board, councils, elected

21 officials, trustees, officers, directors, employees, attorneys, agents and insurers,

22 and their successors and assigns, ("Released Parties") from any and all claims

23 for injunctive, equitable, or declaratory relief that are the subject of, included

24 within, and/or arise from this lawsuit, including without limitation, all claims

25 for sex discrimination under Title IX, the United States and California

26 Constitutions, and state anti-discrimination laws relating to athletic participation

27

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1 opportunities and athletic treatment and benefits at AHS.

2

This Agreement resolves all claims in plaintiffs' First Amended

3 Complaint filed in this action.

4

This General Release is intended to be a full and final compromise,

5 release and settlement of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, known

6 or unknown, suspected or unsuspected for injunctive, equitable, or declaratory

7 relief sought in this action; and, as a further consideration and inducement for

8 this Agreement, Class Members expressly waive the provisions of Section 1542

9 of the California Civil Code with respect to injunctive, equitable, or declaratory

10 'relief sought herein and which reads as follows:

11
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor

12

does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time

13

of executing the release, which if known by him or her must

have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.

14
The Class Members acknowledge that different or additional facts may

15
be discovered in addition to what they now know or believe to be true with

16
respect to the matters herein released, and that they agree that this General

17
Release shall be and remain in effect in all respects as a complete, and final

18
release of the matters released pertaining to injunctive, equitable or declaratory

19
relief, notwithstanding any different or additional facts.

20 XI.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

21
Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs will be determined by fee petition

22
heard and decided by Judge Tevrizian at the earliest possible date following the

23
effective date of this Agreement.

24

25

26

27

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Page 46

1 XII.

MONITORING

2

AUSD and the City shall be liable for plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys'

3 fees and costs incurred in conjunction with the monitoring of this Agreement up

4 to annual maximum of$18,000 per year.

5

Plaintiffs' counsel shall submit their fees and costs two times per year for

6 the following two periods December 1 -May 31 and June I-November 30.

7 XIII.

CONTINIDNG JURISDICTION

8

The Court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over this Agreement for

9 the length ofthe Compliance Period for the purpose of overseeing and

10 enforcing the terms herein.

11 XIV.

DURATION OF AGREEMENT

12

This Agreement shall be deemed effective as of December 1, 2005. The

13 Agreement shall continue to be effective and binding upon the parties for a

14 period of 6 years after the Effective Date. At that time, Defendants, AUSD may

15 move the District Court for an Order terminating its jurisdiction of this matter

16 on the basis. that obligations under the Agreement have been fully discharged.

17 Nothing in this Section shall bar Class Counsel from moving for an extension of

18 the Agreement to enforce any of its obligations.

19 XV.

MISCELLANEOUS

20

A. Full and Complete Settlement.

21

This Agreement resolves all claims in plaintiffs' First Amended

22 Complaint filed in this action.

23

B. Counterparts.

24

This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be

25 considered an original, but all of which, when taken together, will constitute

26 one and the same instrument.

27

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Page 47

1

C. Interpretation.

2

This Agreement is the product of negotiation and joint drafting so that

3 any ambiguity shall not be construed against any Party. The language of this

4 Agreement shall be construed as a whole according to its fair meaning, and not

5 strictly for or against any of the Parties. The headings in this Agreement are

6 solely for convenience and will not be considered in its interpretation. Where

7 required by context, the plural includes the singular and the singular includes

8 the plural, and the terms "and" and "or" shall mean "and/or." Nothing is this

9 Agreement shall be interpreted to relieve Defendant, AUSD of any oftheir legal

10 obligations to comply fully with any more stringent Federal and California

11 nondiscrimination statute or any accompanying regulations.

12

D. Additional Documents.

13

To the extent any documents are required to be executed by any of the

14 Parties to effectuate this Agreement, each party hereto agrees to execute and

15 serve on opposing counsel such and further documents as may be required to

16 carry out the terms of this Agreement. Defendants shall comply with this

17 subprovision with regard to Exhibits A, B, C, and D no later than December 1,

18 2005.

19

E. Authority to Bind.

20

The undersigned each represent and warrant that they are authorized to

21 sign on behalf of, and to bind Plaintiffs and Defendants, AUSD and represent

22 and warrant that this Agreement has been approved by Plaintiffs, the Alhambra

23 Unified School District Board of Education.

24

F. Notice.

25

AUSD shall bear the costs of notice to the class of the Agreement in

26 connection with the Court approval process and fairness hearing. The form of

27

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1 any such notice shall be agreed upon between the parties, and will be subject to

2 Court approval. The process must include postings in local newspapers,

3 including but not limited to the Pasadena Star News and the San Gabriel Valley

4 Tribune, distribution to students at AHS on or before December 21,2005,

5 posting on AHS's bulletin boards and the District's website.

6

G. Severability.

7

The provisions of this Agreement are severable. If any provision of this

8 Agreement or its application is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other

9 obligations, provisions or applications of this Agreement which can be given

10 effect without the invalid obligations, provisions or applications.

11

H. Integrated Agreement.

12

This Agreement shall constitute the entire integrated agreement ofthe

l3 parties. No prior drafts or prior or contemporaneous communications, oral or

14 written, shall be relevant or admissible for purposes of determining the meaning

15 of any provisions herein in any litigation or any other proceeding.

16

I. Enforceability.

17

This Agreement is binding upon the parties hereto, by and through their

18 officials, agents, employees and successors. This Agreement is enforceable only

19 by the parties, the protective class, and! or class counsel. No person or entity is

20 intended to be a third party beneficiary of the provisions of this Agreement for

21 purposes of any civil, criminal, or administrative action.

22

J. Fairness.

23

The parties, by and through their respective counsel, represent to the

24 Court that this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect Class

25 Counsel in accordance with the standards of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of

26 Civil Procedure.

27

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1 For Plaintiffs: 2

3

Dated:_ _ _ __

4

5

The Legal Aid SocietyEmployment Law Center
By: - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

6

7

Dated:_ _ _ __

8

9
For District Defendants:
10

11

12
Dated:- - - - -
13

14

15

California Women Law Center
By: _______________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Alhambra Unified School District and District Defendants
By: ______________
Attorneys for Defendant, AUSD and District Defendants

16
Alhambra Unified School District

17

Dated:- - - - - By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

18

President

19

By: ________________________

20 Assistant Secretary

21
AGREEMENT AND ORDER
22

23
IT IS SO ORDERED. 24

25 Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ 26
27

HON. RICHARD TEVRIZIAN
United States District Court

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