Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 1 Filed 05/13/13 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

KRYSTLE BROWN,

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714 Tewkesbury Place, NW

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Washington, DC 20012

)

)

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Individually And On

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Behalf Of A Class of

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Similarly Situated

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Plaintiffs,

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)

v.

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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

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Office of the Attorney General

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441 4th Street, NW

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Washington, DC 20001

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CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

300 Indiana Avenue NW

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Washington, DC 20001

)

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VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR

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1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 316 )

Washington, DC 20004

)

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Defendants.

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___________________________________ )

Case No. _______________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1. Krystle Brown, by and through her attorneys, on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated, brings this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants the

District of Columbia, the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), and

the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants’ unconstitutional

scheme of seizing cars and retaining them indefinitely pending potential civil forfeiture

proceedings, without providing individual owners a prompt, post-deprivation hearing before a

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neutral arbiter in which they can challenge the self-interested police decision to seize, hold, and attempt to take ownership of their private property.
2. Ms. Brown alleges as follows, based on personal knowledge as to matters in which she has personal involvement and information and belief as to all other matters.
Nature of the Action 3. Ms. Brown is a D.C. resident whose car was seized by Defendants on April 4, 2013, after officers claimed to find two empty firearms magazines inside a pocketbook inside the car. Ms. Brown has been without her car since April 4, 2013. 4. Police gave Ms. Brown a letter dated April 22, 2013, stating that her car would be administratively forfeited and disposed of unless she paid to police a “penal sum” of $1,962 for the right to challenge the police seizure in court. 5. Even if she paid the sum, she would not receive her car back pending any legal proceedings. According to Defendants’ policy, payment of the “penal sum” is required before Defendants will even file a civil suit formally to forfeit the vehicle in Superior Court. If the “penal sum” is not paid within 30 days, the statute permits police to sell the vehicle and retain the proceeds with no further process. 6. D.C.’s civil forfeiture scheme does not provide for a prompt, post-deprivation hearing in which property owners can test the validity of the police seizure of their vehicles, and can challenge the validity of the police’s continued retention of the vehicle pending a determination on the merits of any forfeiture action. In accordance with MPD and District policy, Ms. Brown has received no such hearing in the five weeks since the seizure and impoundment of her car.
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7. The MPD’s profitable and self-interested scheme of seizing vehicles pursuant to D.C’s civil forfeiture statute without a prompt, post-deprivation opportunity to challenge the District’s initial seizure and continued retention of the vehicle pending any potential forfeiture litigation violates Ms. Brown’s right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8. Ms. Brown seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction and Venue
9. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
10. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Parties
11. Ms. Brown is a 28-year-old resident of the District of Columbia. She graduated in 2007 from the University of North Carolina Wilmington with a B.A. in Spanish, and from the University of the District of Columbia in 2009 with a B.S. in Biology. She subsequently worked for several years as a raw materials specialist and quality assurance specialist at a biopharmaceutical vaccine company in Rockville, Maryland. She has been unemployed since November 2012, and she is currently helping to take care of her grandmother while studying for the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT).
12. Vincent Gray is the Mayor of the District of Columbia and is responsible for implementing the policies of the District of Columbia as they relate to property seized by District police officers pursuant to the District’s statutory civil forfeiture scheme. He is sued in his official capacity.
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13. Cathy Lanier is the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia and is responsible for executing the policies of the District of Columbia as they relate to property seized by District police officers pursuant to the District’s statutory civil forfeiture scheme. She is sued in her official capacity.
14. The District of Columbia is the municipal entity employing the Mayor and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department.
Factual Background A. Civil Forfeiture in the District of Columbia 15. The MPD seizes and forfeits millions of dollars in private property every year. D.C. law allows the MPD to keep the financial proceeds of the forfeitures that its officers pursue. D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(4)(B). 16. Civil forfeiture in the District of Columbia is governed by the procedures set forth in D.C. Code §§ 7-2507.06a and 48-905.02.1 17. Property owners have no other mechanism to get their property back under D.C. law. Under the civil forfeiture statute, seized property “shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the Mayor.” D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(2). 18. Pursuant to District policy, at some undetermined point after the MPD seizes a person’s car, the MPD notifies the owner of the seized property that he or she is not permitted to challenge the seizure and forfeiture in court unless the person pays to the MPD a “penal sum” in the amount of 10% of the value of the property (as that value is determined by the police). The “penal sum,” which police also call a “bond,” must be no less than $250 and no greater than
1 There are several statutory provisions pertaining to forfeiture. Each of those employs the procedures outlined in § 48-905.02, which is part of the District’s laws pertaining to “controlled substances.” Forfeiture related to firearms is additionally covered by D.C. Code § 7-2507.06a.
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$2,500, D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(3)(B), and the amount is set pursuant to the discretion of individual police officers based on their assessment of the value of the seized property.
19. It is the policy and practice of the District of Columbia not to begin legal process in which the vehicle owner may participate unless and until the “penal sum” is paid.
20. If the “penal sum” is not paid, the District may immediately forfeit the vehicle with no further process.
21. It is the policy and practice of the District of Columbia to make no initial showing of probable cause before a neutral and independent decisionmaker that the property is forfeitable, and to offer no justification before a neutral and independent decisionmaker for retaining possession of the vehicle during the pendency of any future legal proceedings, notwithstanding the hardships suffered by owners deprived of their vehicles for months or years and the availability of alternative, less restrictive means to protect the District’s interests.
22. It is the policy and practice of the Metropolitan Police Department to require claimants to pay the “penal sum.” Though a claimant may apply for waiver or reduction of the “penal sum” if he or she cannot afford it, it is wholly within the discretion of individual officers of the Metropolitan Police Department whether to grant a waiver or reduction in the “penal sum.” According to FOIA disclosures, the MPD does not have any standard procedures requiring officers to notify owners that the “penal sum” can be waived or reduced. Nor does MPD have any formal standards regarding how it is determined whether the claimant can afford the amount set by officers.
23. Once property owners pay the “penal sum,” they still do not receive their property back pending litigation. Instead, the District holds the property until it begins forfeiture proceedings against the property in Superior Court. Although the statute requires the District to
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begin proceedings “promptly” if a person pays the required amount, see D.C. Code § 48905.02(c), in practice, there is nothing prompt about the District’s actions. In most cases, nothing happens for months even after the “penal sum” is paid. Once the District of Columbia initiates proceedings by filing a Libel of Information seeking forfeiture, the claimant, who is not provided with an attorney, is forced to litigate the civil action on his or her own if he or she cannot afford a lawyer, including filing an answer, engaging in civil discovery and, ultimately, conducting a trial. At trial, the evidentiary burden is placed on the individual property owner to prove that his or her property is not subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(3)(G). The entire process can take months or years.
24. Although D.C. law provides that “[a]n innocent owner’s interest in a conveyance which has been seized shall not be forfeited . . .,” D.C. Code § 7-2507.06a(c); D.C. Code § 48905.02(a)(7)(A), at no point before the civil trial—which can take place months or years after the seizure—are owners given any opportunity to demonstrate that they are “innocent.” An innocent owner in D.C. thus cannot promptly challenge the judgment of the police officer who decided on the scene that his or her car should become property of the District.
25. Applicable law provides a number of reasons that property seized by a police officer may not ultimately be forfeitable, including a lack of probable cause, a lack of a proportionate connection to an enumerated forfeitable offense, an innocent owner, an illegal seizure (the exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture cases to prevent police from forfeiting property on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence), or a simple factual error. The lack of a prompt post-seizure hearing thus permits Defendants to retain private property indefinitely even if the seizing officer’s asserted basis for forfeiture would not result in forfeiture when the case ultimately comes to court.
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26. During the months or years during which the District holds the vehicles, owners are deprived of the use of their property but are nonetheless obligated to continue making any loan payments required on a vehicle or risk losing the vehicle to the lending agency because, under the statute, the MPD will return vehicles to the lender upon default. D.C. Code § 48905.02(a)(4)(D); § 7-2507.06a(b)(2). Some vehicle owners are also required by the terms of their loans to maintain expensive full insurance coverage on their vehicles, even when those vehicles are sitting idle in a police lot.
27. Owners are not compensated for depreciation in the vehicle’s value or for expenses related to removing their vehicle from the police lot. For example, many vehicles do not start after spending many months on the police lot, and must be towed.
28. The MPD has a direct financial stake in erecting obstacles in front of claimants seeking return of their property. The proceeds from seizing private property go to paying the MPD’s expenses, including seizure operations themselves. D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(4)(B). Moreover, the leftover proceeds “shall be used, and shall remain available until expended regardless of the expiration of the fiscal year in which they were collected, to finance law enforcement activities of the Metropolitan Police Department . . . .” Id.
B. The Seizure and Continued Retention of Ms. Brown’s Car 29. MPD officers seized Ms. Brown’s car on April 4, 2013. According to police, the seizure occurred after officers approached Ms. Brown’s home on the evening of April 3, 2013, looking for Rouchell Chesson, Ms. Brown’s boyfriend, whom they believed to have an outstanding warrant and to possess firearms. As police officers approached Ms. Brown’s home, officers recognized Mr. Chesson and a woman whom officers later identified as Ms. Brown outside the house. When Mr. Chesson saw police, he began running, leading to a brief chase
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during which a police officer fired at Mr. Chesson before Mr. Chesson surrendered. A firearm, bullets, and magazines were allegedly found near Mr. Chesson and in his path, and a small amount of marijuana was allegedly found on Mr. Chesson during his police interview.
30. After apprehending Mr. Chesson, officers claim to have gone over to Ms. Brown’s car and searched it, finding a pocketbook inside the car and finding two empty firearm magazines inside the pocketbook. Officers then seized the car in the early morning of April 4, 2013.
31. Based on these events, Officers obtained a search warrant for the home outside of which Mr. Chesson and Ms. Brown were confronted, finding a marijuana cigarette and ammunition inside. Ms. Brown was later charged with misdemeanor offenses based on what officers claimed to find inside the home, and she was appointed an attorney by the court because of her inability to pay.
32. The charges against Ms. Brown do not involve her vehicle. The Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the case in Superior Court has submitted the necessary paperwork to police releasing the car and indicating that it is not needed as evidence.
33. After the seizure, Ms. Brown called police repeatedly to attempt to get information about her car. The police have not explained to Ms. Brown why they have seized and continue to retain her car for forfeiture. Police also retained, without explanation, cash and other items, including Ms. Brown’s driver’s license.
34. On April 22, 2013, nearly three weeks after the impoundment of the car, police gave Ms. Brown a standard notice letter explaining that her car would be administratively forfeited under D.C. controlled substance and firearms laws unless she paid to police $1,962 for the right to commence a court challenge to the police decision. Other than citing to D.C. drug
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and gun laws generally, the letter does not explain why those laws would apply to Ms. Brown’s car. The letter provided a phone number for Ms. Brown to call for more information about forfeiture, but that number has been disconnected.
35. Even if Ms. Brown paid the “penal sum” of $1,962, however, her car would not be returned during the pendency of any civil forfeiture case in which she could actually litigate Defendants’ right to take and sell her car.
36. On May 8, 2013, Ms. Brown submitted to police an application to waive the requirement that she pay this sum because she is indigent.
C. Ms. Brown’s Reliance on Her Car 37. Vehicle owners whose cars are seized and held indefinitely by police suffer serious hardships from the loss of their vehicles, for example losing the ability to get to work and fulfill basic tasks necessary to the health and welfare of themselves and their families. 38. Ms. Brown is no different. Like every other owner whose car is held indefinitely by police, Ms. Brown has suffered and continues to suffer serious hardships from the loss of her car. Ms. Brown relies extensively on her car. In addition to using her car for basic tasks like groceries, appointments, errands, and visits with friends and family (including her ill godmother and her eight-year-old brother, for whom she helps to care), Ms. Brown needs her car to take care of her grandmother, who raised her, and her grandmother’s husband, who live in Largo, Maryland. For example, in the weeks following the seizure, Ms. Brown had to take her grandmother to a hospital or to a local nursing home every other day to visit her husband, who is very ill. In the week of May 5, her ill husband returned home, and Ms. Brown is now responsible for responding to emergencies at the home, as well as for checking on her grandmother in non-emergency situations and for taking her grandmother to get groceries, to go
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to the bank, to pay bills, and to run other errands that the elderly couple can no longer

accomplish on their own. All of this requires her to drive frequently to Maryland, approximately

twenty miles from her home in the District of Columbia.

39. Since the seizure of her vehicle, Ms. Brown has been forced to rent a car to meet

this basic family obligation at significant and unsustainable expense.

40. While police hold her car, Ms. Brown is forced to pay for alternate transportation

even while still being held responsible for the insurance payments on the car that sits idle in the

police lot. The situation is not sustainable for Ms. Brown and her family because Ms. Brown

remains unemployed and in significant personal debt, including debt she took out to finance her

education and the loan on her vehicle. Each day that she goes without her car is more difficult

for her and her family.

D. No Avenue of Relief Is Available to Ms. Brown

41. The District of Columbia has taken no action with respect to the seizure of Ms.

Brown’s car. The District has not filed an action in Superior Court.

42. Ms. Brown has no other legal remedy to seek the return of her car. The civil

forfeiture statute bars all actions for replevin. D.C. Code § 48-905.02(d)(2).

43. The civil forfeiture statute provides no process for claimants seeking to challenge

the seizure of their property or its continued retention, other than the proceedings instituted by

the Attorney General upon the payment of the “penal sum”—proceedings which can take months

or years once initiated.

Class Action Allegations2

44. Plaintiff brings this Class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly

2 The class action allegations are discussed in more detail in the contemporaneously filed Motion to Certify Class and Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

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situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 45. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant
to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which
Plaintiff and unknown Class members can challenge the seizure and retention of their vehicles. 47. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
requirements of those provisions. 48. Plaintiff’s proposed Class is defined as all those whose vehicles have been or will
be seized by police and are being or will be unconstitutionally retained by Defendants because of Defendants’ failure to provide a prompt post-seizure hearing before a neutral arbiter to test the validity of the seizure and the validity of the continuing government impoundment of the property pending any future litigation. Plaintiff also proposes as a subclass all indigent vehicle owners whose cars have been seized for forfeiture and for whom the MPD has charged or will charge a “penal sum” as a purported prerequisite to challenging the police seizure and planned forfeiture of their property.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 49. As of September 21, 2012, the Metropolitan Police Department was retaining for civil forfeiture approximately 300 vehicles seized from individual property owners in the District. See Motion To Certify Class at 4. 50. As of April 24, 2013, the police had seized and were currently retaining an additional 75 cars since September 21, 2012. See id at 5. 51. None of the owners of these cars have received a prompt, post-deprivation opportunity to challenge the seizure and retention of their vehicles.
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52. There are approximately 16-20 additional vehicles seized each month for forfeiture whose owners will also be denied due process in the same manner as Ms. Brown. Id.
53. Defendants follow the statutory requirement of requiring a “penal sum” of 10% of the value of the vehicle for each owner whose car has been seized. Id.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 54. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. See Motion to Certify at 7-9. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central issue, which does not vary from Class member to Class member, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any particular Class member: Defendants’ institutional and systemic course of conduct in denying prompt, post-seizure hearings to private individuals whose cars are seized by police and impounded for civil forfeiture. The resolution of that legal issue will determine whether all members of the class are entitled to the procedural due process relief that they seek. C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 55. Ms. Brown’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, and Ms. Brown has the same interests in this case as all other members of the Class, as Ms. Brown and all Class members are suffering from the failure of the Defendants to provide a prompt postseizure hearing before a neutral arbiter. The constitutional answer to whether car owners are entitled to such a hearing will determine the claims of Ms. Brown and every other class member. D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 56. Ms. Brown is an adequate representative of the Class because she is a member of the Class and her interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the Class. There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the potential Class, all of whom have a
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similar interest in being provided procedural due process with respect to the possession by the government of their cars.
57. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys from the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia who have experience in litigating complex matters and extensive knowledge of the District of Columbia’s civil forfeiture scheme. Counsel for Plaintiff has recently pursued significant similar litigation in this Court challenging Defendants’ civil forfeiture practices as they relate to vehicles and worked diligently for months to assist numerous individual property owners subject to the District’s unconstitutional forfeiture scheme. See Motion to Certify at 1-3. These efforts have included extensive interviews and investigation, Freedom of Information Act requests, cooperation with the Office of Attorney General to resolve dozens of cases, conducting trainings on civil forfeiture, and engaging in extensive legal and academic research. Counsel is intimately familiar with the District’s civil forfeiture scheme, as well as its interaction with local criminal practice and federal constitutional precedent. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her attorneys. See Motion to Certify at 11.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 58. Class action status is appropriate here because the Defendants, following their forfeiture scheme, have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. Thus, a declaration that car owners are entitled, as a matter of due process, to a prompt postseizure hearing before a neutral arbiter when Defendants seize their cars, and an injunction ordering Defendants to provide such process or release the car, will apply to the class as a whole. The procedural due process to which car owners are entitled under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), when the government takes their cars does not vary from class member to
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class member. See Motion to Certify at 7-9, 11-14, & n.7 (citing Simms v. District of Columbia et al., 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101 (D.D.C. 2012)). Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
Claims for Relief One: The Seizure and Continued Retention of Ms. Brown’s Vehicle Without a Prompt, Post-Deprivation Hearing Before a Neutral Decision-Maker Violates Procedural Due Process. 59. Ms. Brown incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-58 above. 60. The District of Columbia has deprived Ms. Brown (and the other class members) of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing at which Ms. Brown can test the validity of the police seizure of her car and at which Defendants are required to justify the MPD’s continued retention of the vehicle pending any potential civil forfeiture proceedings. Two: Requiring Ms. Brown, Who Is Indigent, to Pay a “Penal Sum” in Order to Challenge the Seizure of Her Vehicle Violates Due Process. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-60 above. 62. Defendants deprived Ms. Brown of her rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution by requiring her, as an indigent claimant, to pay a substantial sum in order to secure the right to challenge the self-interested police taking of her car in court. Three: MPD’s Financial Conflict of Interest in Forfeitures Violates Due Process. 63. Ms. Brown incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-62 above. 64. Because the MPD has a significant financial stake in the outcome of forfeiture proceedings, its decision to seize and retain Ms. Brown’s vehicle pending any civil forfeiture proceedings, as well as its decisionmaking power over Ms. Brown’s penal sum determination, violates due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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Request for Relief
WHEREFORE, Ms. Brown requests that this Court issue a judgment against Defendants:
a. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from retaining Ms. Brown’s car, and the vehicles belonging to members of the class, unless and until Defendants provide the process required by the Fifth Amendment;
b. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing to seize and retain for forfeiture cars belonging to class members unless and until Defendants provide the process required by the Fifth Amendment;
c. Declaring that due process requires a vehicle owner like Ms. Brown and the other class members to be provided a prompt post-seizure hearing at which the owner can contest the validity of the initial seizure and the validity of the government’s continued retention of the vehicle pending any forfeiture litigation;
d. Declaring that Defendants’ financial interest in civil forfeiture renders Defendants’ decisionmaking with respect to the seizure and retention of private property and the determination of any “penal sum” constitutionally infirm under the Fifth Amendment; and
e. Granting any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
__/s/ Julia Leighton__________________ Julia Leighton (D.C. Bar No. 422363)
__/s/ Tara Mikkilineni________________ Tara Mikkilineni (D.C. Bar No. 997284)
__/s/ Sonam Henderson_______________ Sonam Henderson (D.C. Bar No. 1010801)
__/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________ Alec Karakatsanis (D.C. Bar No. 999294)
Special Litigation Division Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia 633 Indiana Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20004 (202)-628-1200
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Date: May 13, 2013
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V flIX3

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Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 1-1 Filed 05/13/13 Page 2 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN, et al.

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Plaintiffs,

v.

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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

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CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

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VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR

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Case No.

Defendants.

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DECLARATION OF KRYSTLE BROWN

1. 1, Krystle Brown, am 28 years old. I was born in the District of Columbia in

1984, and I have lived in the District ever since, with the exception of attending college.

2. 1 am a 2007 graduate of the University of North Carolina Wilmington, with a

B.A. in Spanish. I also graduated in 2009 from the University of the District of Columbia with a

B.S. in Biology. I graduated from Woodrow Wilson High School in D.C. in 2002.

3. After graduation, I worked for several years as a raw materials specialist and

quality assurance specialist at a biopharmaceutical vaccine company in Rockville, Maryland.

4. I have been unemployed since November 2012, and I am currently helping to take

care of my grandmother while studying for the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT).

5. On April 4, 2013, police officers with the Metropolitan Police Department seized

my car after claiming to find two empty firearms magazines in a bag inside of the car.

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6. The police have kept my car ever since. In the days and weeks after the seizure, I called the police numerous times to get information about my car, but I was unable to obtain information from the police.
7. On April 22, 2013, I went to the area of the police impound lot and was given a Notice of Intent to Administratively Forfeit my car. The notice cited D.C. laws relating to firearms and controlled substances. No mention was made in the Notice of my other property that had been taken from the car, including my driver’s license, money, and other belongings.
8. The Notice told me to pay a “bond” to police of $1,962 or else my car would be disposed of without any further proceedings. An officer told me that police would sell my car.
9. On May 8, 2013, I submitted to police an application to waive the requirement that I pay this sum because I am indigent. My application to police recounted my unemployment, my expenses, my lack of other assets, my qualification for court-appointed counsel, and the significant debt that I have incurred from my car loan, student loans, credit cards, and utilities.
10. I depend on my car for many important things in my life. I depend on my car for groceries, appointments, errands, and seeing friends and family, including my eight-year-old little brother who I help to take care of and my godmother, who is ill. It is also difficult to obtain and commit to work, temporary paying jobs, or volunteering without a car. My grandmother. who essentially raised me, also greatly needs my help. In the weeks after my car was taken, my grandmother needed to be taken to the hospital or the nursing home every other day to visit her husband, who is very seriously ill. In the week of May 5, her husband returned home, but he needs a great deal of care that my grandmother is not able to provide by herself. As a result. I must be prepared at any time to drive to her house in Largo, Maryland whenever there is an

_)DLIa&C18
Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 1-1 Filed 05/13/13 Page 4 of 4 emergency or whenever she needs help. I must also pick her up so that she can get groceries, go to the bank, attend medical appointments, and accomplish a variety of other errands.
11. Since police have kept my car, I have been forced to rent a car at significant expense and inconvenience to meet these basic obligations for my grandmother. I am renting this car with money that I cannot afford to spend at a time when I am forced to continue my monthly insurance payments of over $200 for the car that police are keeping. The increased financial and family stress has been extremely hard for me. I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct.
Date
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 Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21 Filed 08/16/13 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN On behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13-CV-686 (ESH)

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CONSENT MOTION TO STAY

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Local Civil Rule 7, Defendants

District of Columbia, Cathy Lanier, and Vincent Gray (collectively, “Defendants”), by and

through counsel the Office of the Attorney General of the District of Columbia, respectfully

move to stay the above-captioned litigation pending legislative action by the Council of the

District of Columbia to amend existing civil forfeiture laws.

Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s car was improperly seized by

the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and that District of Columbia law does

not provide her with a prompt, post-deprivation opportunity to challenge that seizure and the

continued retention of the car pending possible civil forfeiture proceedings. Class Action

Compl., ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiff further alleges that the Metropolitan Police Department’s financial

interest in forfeitures and the waivable bond requirement for challenging forfeiture violate the

Due Process Clause. Id. at ¶¶ 61-64. Plaintiff’s car has since been released back to her.

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21 Filed 08/16/13 Page 2 of 3
There are currently two bills before the D.C. Council that would address the gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Councilmember Tommy Wells, the chairman of the committee considering the bills, has convened a working group to reconcile the two and generate a compromise bill. Counsel for both parties are included in the group.
In light of these legislative developments and the programmatic changes instituted by the District, the parties have reached an agreement to stay the pending litigation until the anticipated compromise bill passes (or fails to pass). The terms of this agreement are set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) attached to this Motion as Exhibit A. The parties believe that implementing the terms of the MOU will address the issues raised in this lawsuit to the extent feasible under existing law.
In accordance with Local Civil Rule 7(m), Defendants conferred with Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have consented to this motion.
The grounds and reasons for granting this motion are set forth more fully in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and proposed Order.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 2013. Respectfully submitted, IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia ELLEN A. EFROS Assistant Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Litigation Division /s/ Grace Graham GRACE GRAHAM [D.C. Bar No. 472878] Chief, Equity Section Public Interest Division

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21 Filed 08/16/13 Page 3 of 3
/s/ Gary Feldon GARY FELDON [D.C. Bar No. 987142] Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, NW Sixth Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 724-5691 Facsimile: (202) 730-0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-1 Filed 08/16/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN On behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR
Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 13-686 (ESH)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CONSENT MOTION TO STAY

In support of its Consent Motion to Enlarge Time, the District of Columbia, Cathy

Lanier, and Vincent Gray rely upon the following points and authorities:

1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B);

2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d);

3. LCvR 7(m);

4. Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the relief sought in Defendants’ Motion, as their

counsel has consented to the relief; and

5. This Court’s inherent power to control its docket.

Dated: August 16, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-1 Filed 08/16/13 Page 2 of 2
ELLEN A. EFROS Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Litigation Division
/s/ Grace Graham GRACE GRAHAM [D.C. Bar No. 472878] Chief, Equity Section Public Interest Division
/s/ Gary Feldon GARY FELDON [D.C. Bar No. 987142] Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, NW Sixth Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 724-5691 Facsimile: (202) 730-0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-2 Filed 08/16/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN On behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR
Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. 13-686 (ESH)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

[PROPOSED] ORDER

Upon consideration of Defendants’ consent motion to stay proceedings, and upon lack of

opposition thereto, it is by the Court, this _____ day of _______________, 2013,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED;

ORDERED that all deadlines in this case, including Defendants’ deadline to respond to

Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, Motion for Class Certification, and Motion for Preliminary

Injunction shall be stayed at least until the Council of the District of Columbia has voted on a bill

to amend the District of Columbia’s civil forfeiture laws;

ORDERED that the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the

parties shall be incorporated by reference into this Order but that the enforcement provisions

contained in the Memorandum shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the terms of the

Memorandum; and it is

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-2 Filed 08/16/13 Page 2 of 2
FURTHER ORDERED that, when the stay put in place by this Order expires, Defendants shall, within five (5) business days, move the Court either to establish a new schedule for the stayed deadlines or to dismiss the litigation with Plaintiff’s consent.
HON. ELLEN HUVELLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

KRYSTLE BROWN,

)

)

Individually And On

)

Behalf Of A Class of

)

Similarly Situated

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

)

VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 1:13-cv-00686-ESH

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Plaintiff, Krystle Brown, and Defendants, the District of Columbia, Cathy Lanier and

Vincent Gray, hereby agree and stipulate to the Memorandum of Understanding in the above-

captioned case:

Current Status of Litigation. Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint, Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Class Certification (collectively, “Plaintiff’s Filings”) on

May 15, 2013, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations involving some of the same

issues as in Judge Sullivan’s decision in Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F.Supp.2d 90

(D.D.C. 2012). Since the time of filing, Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel for Defendants have

been working to implement changes to the District of Columbia’s forfeiture process. Given

those efforts, Plaintiff has consented to several motions to extend the District’s responses to the

Plaintiff’s Filings. In light of the progress that is being made on obtaining relief for putative

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 2 of 7
class members and on improving the District’s forfeiture procedures generally, and in light of pending legislation providing reforms that would address the constitutional infirmities alleged in Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff and Defendants have agreed to jointly move for a stay of proceedings until new legislation addressing the District’s forfeiture laws becomes effective, at which time the parties shall advise the Court as to how they wish to proceed. The parties are currently working together, along with other interested entities, on these legislative efforts. Either party may move to terminate the stay in the event that the other party fails to comply with the terms of this Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). This stay will allow the parties to devote energy to addressing the constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff instead of litigating.1
1. Release of Seized Vehicles. The parties agree that they will continue to work together through informal channels to return seized vehicles to owners as quickly as practicable in the manner in which they have been working together since the filing of the Powell, Chung, and Moreira cases in this Court. This informal process involves only a small percentage of the vehicles being held as it applies only to seized vehicles specifically brought to the District’s attention after the Public Defender Service learns about the seizure of a particular vehicle. It is the intent of the parties to continue this process. To date, the parties have arranged the return of over forty vehicles in this manner. Further, the District has chosen not to pursue forfeiture against the over 200 vehicles seized before January 1, 2013.
1 It is not the intention of either party that the interim measures agreed upon in this MOU are coextensive with the process required by the Constitution or constitute waivers of any rights, claims, or defenses in subsequent litigation. The interim measures are also not intended to reflect the parties’ beliefs about what would be an optimal outcome for the current legislative process.
2

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 3 of 7
2. Release of Evidentiary Holds. The parties agree that they will continue to facilitate the speedy release of evidentiary holds placed on vehicles. Current policy requires forms to be submitted to police by prosecutors at the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) or the District’s Office of Attorney General (“OAG”) before a vehicle can be released. Both parties will attempt to continue working in good faith with the USAO and OAG prosecutors to ensure that the USAO and OAG continue to develop and implement practices and procedures to promptly release evidentiary holds on vehicles.
3. Reviewing Status of Impounded Vehicles. The District agrees to continue reviewing the cases of vehicles that are held (including those that are seized in the future) by the Metropolitan Police Department and to release those vehicles to the owners as quickly as practicable, either with or without conditions, depending on the District’s decision about whether it will seek forfeiture of the vehicle. The District also agrees to provide bi-weekly reports to Plaintiff’s counsel to ensure that the process of review is moving as quickly as practicable. These reports will include information in the following categories:
a) The number of total vehicles currently held; b) The number of vehicles that have been released from evidentiary holds; c) The number of vehicles approved for return with no conditions; d) The number of vehicles approved for return with conditions; e) The number of vehicles actually returned to their owners; and f) List of vehicles and identifying information for vehicles which can be released but
for which the District is having difficulty notifying the owner. In addition to the bi-weekly reports described above, in order to allow Plaintiff’s counsel to monitor the efficacy of the MOU in meeting the constitutional violations alleged, on request the District shall provide information identifying individual vehicles and their owners that are being
3

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 4 of 7
held, including any contact information for the owners that is available to the District. Plaintiff’s counsel shall only make such a request to “spot check” compliance with the terms of the MOU and shall not do so for more than five vehicle owners in any one-month period. These checks will be selected by Plaintiff’s counsel at random based on a list of property control numbers of seized vehicles provided by the District.
4. Moratorium on Vehicle Auctions. The District agrees to continue its current moratorium on the sale of vehicles seized for forfeiture.
5. Notice to Vehicle Owners and Lienholders Whose Vehicles Are Seized For Forfeiture. The District will provide registered owners and registered lienholders of property seized by the District following execution of this MOU with information on, and forms for: (a) submitting claims; (b) obtaining prompt preliminary release; and (c) submitting bonds, applications for waiver or reduction of bonds, and petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture. Such information will be given to owners along with any notice of the District’s intent to forfeit the owner’s property. The parties have agreed to certain interim notice forms to implement this process pending the consideration of the D.C. Council of proposed forfeiture legislation. The parties agree to continue to work together to disseminate the interim notice forms to property owners as quickly as possible and to revise those forms if necessary.
6. Information and Notice of Currently Impounded Vehicles. The District agrees to inform all registered owners and registered lienholders of vehicles currently within the District’s custody about how to apply for preliminary or permanent release of those vehicles. For such owners and lienholders the District additionally agrees to provide the same interim notice forms as those provided to the owners of property seized by the District following execution of this MOU.
4

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 5 of 7
7. Standards for Determining Indigence in Bond Waiver Applications. The District agrees that it will implement as soon as practicable standards for review of applications for waiver of the bond requirement that are consistent with the eligibility standards for Criminal Justice Act services set forth in Standard 4 of the Memorandum from Chief Judge H. Carl Moultrie I to All Members of the District of Columbia Bar, dated March 17, 1983, as amended. Additionally, the District agrees to waive the bond requirement for any individual who has been found indigent by the D.C. Superior Court or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in the case resulting in the seizure or has been found indigent by one of those courts in the six months preceding the filing of a claim. The application for waiver or reduction of bond will be formatted to allow all necessary information for the District to implement this standard and need not be notarized. The District agrees not to require any notarized documents or tax filings in a waiver application other than the affidavit sworn under penalty of perjury attesting to the truth of information contained in the application form. Should the applicant materially and intentionally misrepresent information in the application for waiver or reduction of bond, the District may seize and retain the property pending forfeiture proceedings and shall require the applicant to pay the full bond amount without accepting any further waiver applications. The District additionally agrees that this process for determining eligibility for waiver or reduction of bond will apply to all property seized for forfeiture.
8. Notice to Owners and Lienholders Currently in Forfeiture Settlement Negotiations. The District agrees to notify all property owners and lienholders of the new procedures for obtaining preliminary release of the property and for waiver of the bond requirement before entering into any settlement of a forfeiture claim and provide any relevant forms for seeking preliminary release or waiver of bond. This requirement may be met by providing the owner or
5

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 6 of 7

lienholder with the interim notice forms and informational material once those documents have been agreed upon by the parties. This provision shall not be interpreted to require any bond that has already been paid to be returned to the owner or lienholder, although the District will in its discretion evaluate a subsequent Application for Waiver or Reduction of Bond using the same criteria set forth above and will return a bond payment if the person otherwise meets indigency requirements.
Enforceability. Breach of this MOU by the District entitles Plaintiff to withdraw consent to the stay of litigation and to re-commence legal proceedings to obtain the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Class Certification. Plaintiff agrees to provide the District an opportunity to cure any alleged breach, and may withdraw consent and re-commence litigation, including the preliminary injunction motion, only after good faith efforts to resolve any dispute arising from this MOU have failed.
Status Reports to the Court. The parties agree to provide bi-monthly reports to the Court informing the Court of the status of the parties’ efforts to resolve the litigation.
Executed this 16th day of August, 2013.

ELLEN A. EFROS Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Litigation Division

/s/ Grace Graham

_____

GRACE GRAHAM [D.C. Bar No. 472878]

Chief, Equity Section

Public Interest Division

__/s/ Julia Leighton_____________ Julia Leighton (D.C. Bar No. 422363
__/s/ Tara Mikkilineni____________ Tara Mikkilineni (D.C. Bar No. 997284)
__/s/ Sonam Henderson__________ Sonam Henderson (D.C. Bar No. 1010801)

6

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 21-3 Filed 08/16/13 Page 7 of 7

/s/ Gary Feldon _______________ GARY FELDON [D.C. Bar No. 987142] Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, NW Sixth Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 724-5691 Facsimile: (202) 730-0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

__/s/ Alec Karakatsanis__________ Alec Karakatsanis (D.C. Bar No. 999294) Special Litigation Division Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia 63 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 628-1200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

7

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 22 Filed 08/16/13 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________

)

KRYSTLE BROWN,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

Defendant.

)

_________________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 13-0686 (ESH)

ORDER Upon consideration of Defendants’ consent motion to stay proceedings, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the matter is STAYED at least until the Council of the District of Columbia has voted on a bill to amend the District of Columbia’s civil forfeiture laws; it is further ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to be renewed in the event the stay is lifted; it is further ORDERED that the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the parties shall be incorporated by reference into this Order but that the enforcement provisions contained in the Memorandum shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the terms of the Memorandum; it is further ORDERED that if the stay put in place by this Order is lifted, the parties shall confer and, within five (5) business days, file a proposed schedule for further proceedings; and it is further

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 22 Filed 08/16/13 Page 2 of 2 ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to administratively close this matter pending further Order of the Court. .
/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: August 16, 2013
2

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN

)

)

Individually and on Behalf of a Class

)

of Similarly Situated Plaintiffs,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

)

and

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 13-686 (ESH)

CONSENT MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendants

respectfully move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint as moot. The grounds

and reasons for granting Defendants’ motion are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of

Points and Authorities and proposed Order.

DATE: June 29, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia
ELIZABETH SARAH GERE Acting Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Division
/s/ Toni Michelle Jackson TONI MICHELLE JACKSON [D.C. Bar No. 453765]

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33 Filed 06/29/15 Page 2 of 2
Chief, Equity Section 441 4th Street, N.W., Sixth Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 442-9784 E-mail: toni.jackson@dc.gov
/s/ Gary Feldon GARY FELDON [D.C. Bar No. 987142] Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street N.W., Sixh Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 724-5691 Facsimile: (202) 730-0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN

)

)

Individually and on Behalf of a Class

)

of Similarly Situated Plaintiffs,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

)

and

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 13-686 (ESH)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CONSENT MOTION TO DISMISS

, Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”)

as moot. See F. R. C. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).

Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction to decide only “actual,

ongoing controversies.” See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). “‘Even where litigation

poses a live controversy when filed, the mootness doctrine requires a federal court to refrain

from deciding it if events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the

parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.’”

LaRoque v. Holder, 679 F.3d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915

F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc)).

In her Complaint, Plaintiff Brown asserted that Defendants violated her rights when they

seized and retained her car for civil forfeiture because of three purported constitutional

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 2 of 3

infirmities in the District of Columbia’s civil forfeiture laws. Compl., ¶¶ 59-64. Specifically, she

alleged that the laws were unconstitutional because they: (1) did not provide for a prompt post-

deprivation hearing to challenge the retention of her vehicle pending the outcome of the civil

forfeiture proceedings; (2) required her to pay a cost bond to challenge the forfeiture of her car;

and (3) gave decisionmaking powers over the vehicle’s seizure and the bond amount to the

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), which had financial interests in the outcomes. Id. The

Complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 15.

On June 16, 2015, the Congressional review period ended for the Civil Asset Forfeiture

Amendment Act of 2014 (“Act”), 62 D.C. Reg. 1920 (Feb. 13, 2015). The Act provides prompt

post-deprivation retention hearings, eliminated cost bonds, and all money from civil forfeitures

will now go the D.C. General Fund, not MPD. Id. at 1, §§ 106, 110(a)(2) & (a)(3). Further,

Plaintiff Brown’s car was returned to her more than two years ago.

Plaintiff Brown’s case is moot. The return of her car alone arguably mooted the case. See

Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93-94 (2009) (dismissing a challenge to a municipality’s civil

forfeiture procedures as moot when the plaintiff’s car was returned during the pendency of the

case). Any additional relief that Plaintiff (or the putative class she sought to represent) could

have received under the Complaint was mooted as of the effective date of the Act. The fact that

there is nothing left to decide in this case is clear from Plaintiff’s consent to dismissal. See

generally U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 411 (1980) (stating that a case

becomes moot when the parties are no longer adverse). Thus, this Court no longer has

jurisdiction over the case and should dismiss it.

DATE: June 29, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 3 of 3
ELIZABETH SARAH GERE Acting Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Division
/s/ Toni Michelle Jackson TONI MICHELLE JACKSON [D.C. Bar No. 453765] Chief, Equity Section 441 4th Street, N.W. 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 442-9784 E-mail: toni.jackson@dc.gov
/s/ Gary Feldon GARY FELDON [D.C. Bar No. 987142] Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street N.W. 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 724-5691 Facsimile: (202) 730-0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov

Case 1:13-cv-00686-ESH Document 33-2 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KRYSTLE BROWN

)

)

Individually and on Behalf of a Class

)

of Similarly Situated Plaintiffs,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

CATHY LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, )

)

and

)

)

VINCENT GRAY, MAYOR,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Civil Action No. 13-686 (ESH)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Consent Motion to Dismiss, it is this ____ day of __________,

2015, ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

______________________________ ELLEN HUVELLE JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-686 As of: 07/12/2015 01:28 PM EDT 1 of 5
CLOSED,STAYED,TYPE−D
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00686−ESH

BROWN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al Assigned to: Judge Ellen S. Huvelle Cases: 1:13−cv−00569−CRC
1:09−cv−01062−CRC Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff
KRYSTLE BROWN

Date Filed: 05/13/2013 Date Terminated: 08/20/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alec George Karakatsanis EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, INC. 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 681−2409 Email: alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org TERMINATED: 05/30/2014
Jenna Marie Cobb PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Special Litigation Division 633 Indiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 842−2502 Email: jmcobb@pdsdc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Loveland Leighton PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 633 Indiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 824−2428 Fax: (202) 824−2628 Email: jleighton@pdsdc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonam Alexander H. Henderson PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR DC Special Litigation Division 633 Indiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 628−1200 Email: shenderson@pdsdc.org TERMINATED: 09/18/2014
Tara Mikkilineni PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 633 Indiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 (202) 824−2502 Fax: (202) 824−2682 Email: tmikkilineni@pdsdc.org TERMINATED: 05/30/2014

V.

Case: 1:13-cv-686 As of: 07/12/2015 01:28 PM EDT 2 of 5

Defendant
CATHY L. LANIER in her official capacity as Chief of Police

represented by Gary Daniel Feldon OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Public Interest Division 441 4th Street, NW One Judiciary Square− 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−5691 Fax: (202) 730−0640 Email: gary.feldon@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chad Wayne Copeland OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6623 Fax: (202) 741−8880 Email: chad.copeland@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
VINCENT C. GRAY in his official capacity as Mayor

represented by Gary Daniel Feldon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chad Wayne Copeland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Gary Daniel Feldon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chad Wayne Copeland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/13/2013
05/13/2013 05/13/2013 05/13/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−3321453) filed by KRYSTLE BROWN. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
2 CIVIL COVER SHEET by KRYSTLE BROWN filed by KRYSTLE BROWN.(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by KRYSTLE BROWN (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
4 MOTION to Certify Class by KRYSTLE BROWN (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-686 As of: 07/12/2015 01:28 PM EDT 3 of 5

05/13/2013 05/13/2013 05/13/2013 05/13/2013 05/14/2013
05/15/2013 05/15/2013 05/15/2013 05/15/2013
05/15/2013 05/20/2013
05/20/2013 05/20/2013
05/21/2013 05/31/2013 06/17/2013

5 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE The District of Columbia by KRYSTLE BROWN filed by KRYSTLE BROWN.(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
6 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE Vincent Gray, Mayor by KRYSTLE BROWN filed by KRYSTLE BROWN.(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
7 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE Cathy Lanier, Chief of Police by KRYSTLE BROWN filed by KRYSTLE BROWN.(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
Case Assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. (sth) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
8 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS (3) Issued as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER, District of Columbia Attorney General, and the District of Columbia Mayor. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons)(sth) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Tara Mikkilineni on behalf of KRYSTLE BROWN (Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Julia Loveland Leighton on behalf of KRYSTLE BROWN (Leighton, Julia) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
11 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Date of Service Upon the Mayor for the District of Columbia on 05/15/2013. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
12 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the District of Columbia Attorney General. Date of Service Upon District of Columbia Attorney General 5/15/2013. Answer due for ALL D.C. DEFENDANTS by 6/5/2013. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
13 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. KRYSTLE BROWN served on 5/15/2013 (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
14 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 4 MOTION to Certify Class , MOTION to Stay re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 1 Complaint, 4 MOTION to Certify Class by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Gary Daniel Feldon on behalf of All Defendants (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 14 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply and granting 14 Motion to Stay Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction: Upon consideration of Defendants' consent motion to stay proceedings, and upon lack ofopposition thereto, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion be GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Certification no later than June 29, 2013; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction no later than June 17, 2013, unless withdrawn or further stayed. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 5/20/13. (lcesh1) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer to complaint and response to motion for class certification due by 6/29/2013. Response to motion for preliminary injunction due by 6/17/2013. (zmm, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Sonam Alexander H. Henderson on behalf of KRYSTLE BROWN (Henderson, Sonam) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
17 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 4 MOTION to Certify Class , Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-686 As of: 07/12/2015 01:28 PM EDT 4 of 5

06/17/2013
06/18/2013 06/27/2013 07/01/2013
07/02/2013 07/11/2013 07/12/2013
07/15/2013 08/05/2013 08/06/2013
08/06/2013 08/06/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting 17 Consent Motion for Extension of Time: Upon consideration of Defendants' consent motion to stay proceedings, and the lack of opposition thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Certification no later than July 15, 2013; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction no later than July 1, 2013, unless withdrawn or further stayed. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 17, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 06/17/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer complaint and response to motion for class certification due by 7/15/2013. Response to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction due by 7/1/2013. (zmm, ) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
18 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 4 MOTION to Certify Class , and 1 COMPLAINT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 06/27/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 18 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response: Upon consideration of Defendants' consent motion to stay proceedings, and upon lack of opposition thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion be GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Certification no later than July 29, 2013; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction no later than July 15, 2013, unless withdrawn or further stayed. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 7/1/13. (lcesh1) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer to Complaint and Response to Motion for Class Certification due by 7/29/2013. Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction due by 7/15/2013. (zmm, ) (Entered: 07/02/2013)
19 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 4 MOTION to Certify Class by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 07/11/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 19 Consent Motion for Extension of Time: Upon consideration of Defendants' consent motion to stay proceedings, and upon lack of opposition thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion be GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Certification no later than August 5, 2013; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction no later than August 19, 2013, unless withdrawn or further stayed. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on July 12, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer to complaint and response to motion for class certification due by 8/5/2013. Response to motion for preliminary injunction due by 8/19/2013 unless withdrawn or further stayed. (mm, ) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
20 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 4 MOTION to Certify Class by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of 20 Defendants' consent motion to stay proceedings, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Certification no later than August 30, 2013; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction no later than August 16, 2013, unless withdrawn or further stayed signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on 8/6/13. (ztnr, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
Case Stayed. (ztnr, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Motion for Class Action is due by 8/30/13, Defendant's response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is due by 8/16/2013 (unless withdrawn or further stayed).

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08/06/2013 08/16/2013
08/16/2013
08/26/2013 01/31/2014 03/26/2014 05/27/2014 05/29/2014 05/29/2014 05/30/2014 05/30/2014 07/25/2014 09/18/2014 09/18/2014 09/18/2014 01/27/2015 06/29/2015
06/29/2015

(ztnr, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer due by 8/30/2013. (ztnr, ) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
21 Consent MOTION to Stay re 3 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 1 Complaint, 4 MOTION to Certify Class by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 08/16/2013)
22 ORDER granting 21 defendants' consent Motion to Stay; denying without prejudice 3 plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying without prejudice 4 plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class; and directing Clerk to administratively close the case pending further order of the Court. See order for details. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on August 16, 2013. (AG) (Entered: 08/16/2013)
23 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by All Defendants. Case related to Case No. 13−569. (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
24 STATUS REPORT by KRYSTLE BROWN. (Henderson, Sonam) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
25 STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER. (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
26 STATUS REPORT by KRYSTLE BROWN. (Henderson, Sonam) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
27 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by KRYSTLE BROWN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
28 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Tara Mikkilineni by KRYSTLE BROWN (Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 27 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Alec George Karakatsanis terminated. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 30, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 28 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Tara Mikkilineni terminated. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on May 30, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
29 STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER. (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Jenna Marie Cobb on behalf of KRYSTLE BROWN (Cobb, Jenna) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
31 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by KRYSTLE BROWN (Henderson, Sonam) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 31 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Sonam Alexander H. Henderson terminated. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 18, 2014. (AG) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
32 NOTICE Substitution of Counsel by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER re 15 Notice of Appearance (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
33 Consent MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VINCENT C. GRAY, CATHY L. LANIER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 33 Consent Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction: Upon consideration of the Consent Motion to Dismiss, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on June 29, 2015. (AG) (Entered: 06/29/2015)