Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 62 Filed 10/13/16 Page 1 of 67

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

MICHAEL ROBINSON

)

5330 E Street S.E., Apt. 4

)

Washington, D.C. 20019

)

)

AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON

)

5330 E Street S.E., Apt. 4

)

Washington, D.C. 20019

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

BRANDON FARLEY

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

SEAN BABCOCK

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

THOMAS HILLIGOSS

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

KENNETH MEUSHAW

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

ALAN LARMORE

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

Civil Action No. 15-cv-00803 (KBJ)

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 62 Filed 10/13/16 Page 2 of 67

TERRENCE WALKER

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

OSIRIS LOPEZ

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

TIMOTHY CORDERO

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

RENALDO MASON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

5000 Rhode Island Avenue

)

Hyattsville, MD 20781

)

)

DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

MICHAEL MORRIS

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

LUIS ALBA DE JESUS

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

SHANNON HARRIS

)

In her individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

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Landover, MD 20785

)

)

JENNIFER GRAF

)

In her individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

MICHELLE MUNAFO

)

In her individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

PATRICK MARRON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

PETER JOHNSON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

CHANDLER COLEMAN

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

EVERETT MASON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

JERRICK JEFFREYS

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

CORDELL BARBOUR

)

In his individual capacity

)

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c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

ROBERT WILSON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

MICHAEL CICALE

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

5000 Rhode Island Avenue

)

Hyattsvilee, MD 20781

)

)

JEREMY BURCH

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Police Department )

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

TERRY HOOPER

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office

)

5303 Chrysler Way

)

Upper Marlboro, MD 20773

)

)

DILLON WILLIAMS, JR.

)

In his individual capacity

)

5373 Paddock Falls Dr.

)

Dublin, OH 43016

)

)

TERRENCE MORDECAI

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office

)

5303 Chrysler Way

)

Upper Marlboro, MD 20773

)

)

CEDRIC HEYWARD

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office

)

5303 Chrysler Way

)

Upper Marlboro, MD 20773

)

)

TRAVIS A. GRAY

)

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In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

MINH N. NGUYEN

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

PAUL SKELTON

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

ROBERT J. MUNN

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

MICHAEL A. PETTY

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

KYLE S. USKIEVICH

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

CHAD HOWARD

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

COLLIER RICE, JR.

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

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)

CHARLES GARRETT, JR.

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

THOMAS L. LEWIS, III

)

In his individual capacity

)

c/o Metropolitan Police Department

)

300 Indiana Ave. NW

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

)

Office of the County Executive

)

14741 Governor Oden Bowie Drive

)

Upper Marlboro, MD 20772

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

Office of the Mayor

)

John A. Wilson Building

)

1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

)

Washington, D.C. 20004

)

)

UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, )

AND AGENTS of the Prince George’s County )

Police Department, the District of Columbia’s )

Metropolitan Police Department, the Prince )

George’s County Sheriff’s Office, the District )

of Columbia’s Department of Corrections, and )

the District of Columbia, in their individual )

capacities

)

)

Defendants. )

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 1. Born with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities, Plaintiff Michael Robinson (“Michael”) lives a quiet life with his grandmother and caretaker, Plaintiff Agnes Joyce Robinson (“Mrs. Robinson”), in Washington, D.C. Notwithstanding his atrophied left arm, diminutive frame, and difficulty walking, processing information, and speaking, Michael used to

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enjoy a daily routine that included running errands, doing laundry, spending time with family, and visiting the local library.
2. On May 30, 2014, Michael walked around the corner from his apartment to the bus stop, where he waited to take a bus to the store to buy trash bags. After a few minutes, Michael became unnerved when he noticed a police officer staring at him from across the street. Michael decided to return to his apartment.
3. Without any provocation, Prince George’s County Police Department (“PGPD”) Officer Brandon Farley (“Farley”) got out of his car and ran after Michael, shouting at him and calling him a “motherfucker” and a “son of a bitch.” Michael, who had been sitting quietly at the bus stop until he stood up to walk home, was frightened and confused. Farley pursued Michael into his apartment building, where he struck Michael, threw him down on the steps, held him there, and tased him. Farley then dragged Michael by the neck out of the building, as Michael, afraid for his life, attempted to protect himself from Farley. Once outside, Farley released Michael from his grasp in order to hit Michael in the face with the taser and then strike Michael in the head with his hand. Momentarily free from Farley’s clutches, Michael retreated to his apartment, where he hid in the bathroom, terrified. During this encounter, Michael did not strike or in any manner threaten Farley.
4. At that point, Mrs. Robinson and several neighbors tried to explain to Farley that Michael has a disability and poses no threat to anyone. Farley ignored these pleas, pacing in front of the apartment building with his firearm and taser drawn and shouting, “It’s 100 on 1; you don’t think I need a gun?!” As this was unfolding, PGPD, Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office (“PGSO”), and the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)
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vehicles arrived on the scene until there were at least 29 police vehicles in total. Among the
officers arriving on the scene were the following (collectively, “Defendant Officers”):
x Sean Babcock (“Babcock”), Thomas Hilligoss (“Hilligoss”), Kenneth Meushaw (“Meushaw”), Alan Larmore (“Larmore”), Terrence Walker (“Walker”), Osiris Lopez (“Lopez”), Timothy Cordero (“Cordero”), Renaldo Mason (“Mason”), Douglas McMillian (“McMillian”), Michael Morris (“Morris”), Luis Alba De Jesus (“De Jesus”), Shannon Harris (“Harris”), Jennifer Graf (“Graf”), Michelle Munafo (“Munafo”), Patrick Marron (“Marron”), Peter Johnson (“Johnson”), Chandler Coleman (“Coleman”), Everett Mason (“Mason”), Jerrick Jeffreys (“Jeffreys”), Cordell Barbour (“Barbour”), Robert Wilson (“Wilson”), Michael Cicale (“Cicale”), Jeremy Burch (“Burch”), and unidentified officers of the PGPD (collectively, “PGPD Officers”);
x Terry Hooper (“Hooper”), Dillon Williams, Jr. (“Williams”), Terrence Mordecai (“Mordecai”), Cedric Heyward (“Heyward”), and unidentified officers of the PGSO (collectively, “PGSO Officers”); and
x Travis A. Gray (“Gray”), Minh N. Nguyen (“Nguyen”), Paul Skelton (“Skelton”), Robert J. Munn (“Munn”), Michael A. Petty (“Petty”), Kyle S. Uskievich (“Uskievich”), Chad Howard (“Howard”), Collier Rice, Jr. (“Rice”), Charles Garrett, Jr. (“Garrett”), Thomas L. Lewis, III (“Lewis”), and unidentified officers of the MPD (collectively, “MPD Officers”)
5. Mrs. Robinson, who had returned to the apartment to check on Michael,
eventually opened the patio door of her apartment to talk with Farley and Defendant Officers,
repeating that Michael is disabled and that there was no cause for Farley to have attacked him.
Without a warrant, a PGSO officer in tactical gear and Defendant Officers rushed past Mrs.
Robinson and into the apartment, with firearms drawn, while she loudly screamed, “No!” After
Defendant Officers found Michael in the bathroom, some of them began shouting at him and
beating him. Michael was handcuffed, marched outside, and placed in Farley’s police cruiser.
MPD Officers then put Michael in an ambulance and sent him to the hospital, where doctors
treated him for rapid heartbeat, removed a taser spike that had been lodged in his back, and noted
several cuts and bruises on his face. The hospital staff discharged Michael into the custody of
the MPD, and the Department of Corrections detained him overnight.
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6. On May 30, 2014, Farley submitted to the MPD and the PGPD narrative accounts of his interactions with Michael, Mrs. Robinson, and the neighbors on the scene. In those accounts, Farley states that Michael struck him on the left temple with a closed fist just before Farley hit Michael with the taser. A video taken by one of the witnesses, however, shows that Michael did not strike Farley. Farley also contends that Michael grabbed the taser and attempted to take it away from him. The video, though, confirms that this is false. And despite Farley’s further assertion that he was surrounded by a large, unruly, and aggressive crowd, the video reveals that the nonconfrontational bystanders were not surrounding him.
7. On May 31, 2014, Michael was taken to the courthouse and released after the only pending charge against him—misdemeanor assault on a police officer—was nolle prosequied. Because those who released him—unidentified officers, employees, and/or agents of the District of Columbia’s Department of Corrections, the District of Columbia, and/or the MPD (collectively, “Defendant Corrections Officers”)—made no attempt to reach his caretaker or otherwise provide for his safety upon release, Michael was forced to wander outside until his uncle found him pacing in the plaza outside the courthouse, confused and scared.
8. As a result of this incident, Michael has required treatment for both the physical injuries and the psychological trauma he suffered. He remains scared to leave his home, and the stability of his daily routine is lost. Michael no longer visits the library or runs errands for his family, and he often locks himself in the bathroom, especially if he sees police officers nearby. Mrs. Robinson has also suffered as a result of these actions. She has received medical treatment for elevated blood pressure and chest pains, and she must spend more time and energy looking after Michael now that he has lost the stability that she worked hard to cultivate over the 23 years since she began caring for Michael.
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9. The foregoing events were the latest in a long history of excessive force and unconstitutional policing practices on the part of law enforcement officers in Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia. It is against this backdrop that Michael and Mrs. Robinson bring this action.
NATURE OF ACTION 10. This is a civil action arising under the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1231 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq.; and the common law of the District of Columbia.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367. 12. All of Defendants’ actions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in Washington, D.C. Accordingly, this Court is an appropriate venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
PARTIES 13. Plaintiff Michael Robinson resides at 5330 E Street S.E., Washington, D.C., 20019. Michael has cerebral palsy. As a result, he has both physical and intellectual disabilities. 14. Plaintiff Agnes Joyce Robinson resides at 5330 E Street S.E., Washington, D.C., 20019. Mrs. Robinson is Michael’s grandmother and caretaker. 15. Defendant Officer Brandon Farley is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Farley acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacity as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
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16. Defendant Patrolman First Class Sean Babcock is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Babcock acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
17. Defendant Thomas Hilligoss is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Hilligoss acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
18. Defendant Corporal Kenneth Meushaw is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Meushaw acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
19. Defendant Alan Larmore is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Larmore acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
20. Defendant Officer Terrence Walker is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Walker acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
21. Defendant Corporal Osiris Lopez is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Lopez acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
22. Defendant Lieutenant Timothy Cordero is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Cordero acted at all times relevant hereto under color of
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state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
23. Defendant Patrolman First Class Renaldo Mason is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Mason acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
24. Defendant Patrolman First Class Douglas McMillian is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. McMillian acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
25. Defendant Officer Michael Morris is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Morris acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
26. Defendant Officer Luis Alba De Jesus is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. De Jesus acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
27. Defendant Corporal Shannon Harris is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Harris acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in her capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
28. Defendant Officer Jennifer Graf is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Graf acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in her capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
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29. Defendant Officer Michelle Munafo is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Munafo acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in her capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
30. Defendant Corporal Patrick Marron is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Marron acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
31. Defendant Patrolman First Class Peter Johnson is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Johnson acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
32. Defendant Patrolman First Class Chandler Coleman is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Coleman acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
33. Defendant Officer Everett Mason is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Mason acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
34. Defendant Officer Jerrick Jeffreys is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Jeffreys acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
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35. Defendant Corporal Cordell Barbour is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Barbour acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
36. Defendant Officer Robert Wilson is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Wilson acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
37. Defendant Corporal Michael Cicale is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Cicale acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
38. Defendant Officer Jeremy Burch is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Burch acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGPD.
39. Defendant Deputy Terry Hooper is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGSO. Hooper acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGSO.
40. Defendant Deputy Dillon Williams, Jr. was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGSO. Williams acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGSO.
41. Defendant Deputy Terrence Mordecai is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGSO. Mordecai acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGSO.
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42. Defendant Deputy Cedric Heyward is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGSO. Heyward acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the PGSO.
43. Defendant Travis A. Gray is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Gray acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
44. Defendant Minh N. Nguyen is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Nguyen acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
45. Defendant Paul Skelton is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Skelton acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
46. Defendant Robert J. Munn is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Munn acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
47. Defendant Michael A. Petty is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Petty acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
48. Defendant Kyle S. Uskievich is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Uskievich acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
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49. Defendant Chad Howard is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Howard acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
50. Defendant Collier Rice, Jr. is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Rice acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
51. Defendant Charles Garrett, Jr. is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Garrett acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
52. Defendant Thomas L. Lewis, III is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the MPD. Lewis acted at all times relevant hereto under color of state or local law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as an agent or an employee of the MPD.
53. Defendant Prince George’s County, Maryland, is the governmental entity that maintains the PGPD and, through it, employs Farley, Babcock, Hilligoss, Meushaw, Larmore, Walker, Lopez, Cordero, Mason, McMillian, Morris, De Jesus, Harris, Graf, Munafo, Marron, Johnson, Coleman, Mason, Jeffreys, Barbour, Wilson, Cicale, Burch, and certain unidentified officers and employees. Prince George’s County is a recipient of federal funding.
54. Defendant District of Columbia is the governmental entity that maintains the MPD and the Department of Corrections and, through them, employs or serves as the principal to Gray, Nguyen, Skelton, Munn, Petty, Uskievich, Howard, Rice, Garrett, and Lewis, and certain unidentified officers, employees, and agents. The District of Columbia is a recipient of federal funding.
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55. Defendants unidentified officers, employees, and agents of the PGPD, the PGSO, the MPD, the District of Columbia’s Department of Corrections, and the District of Columbia are the individuals who cooperated with the named Defendants to injure the Robinsons and deprive them of their clearly established constitutional rights or who otherwise tortiously injured them. Each individual is an officer, employee, or agent of Prince George’s County, the State of Maryland, or the District of Columbia.
FACTS 56. Michael, who was born with cerebral palsy, lives with his grandmother in the Marshall Heights neighborhood of the District of Columbia. He had settled into a stable daily routine that included running errands, doing laundry, spending time with family, and visiting the local library. Michael’s disability has left him with an atrophied left arm, a diminutive frame, and difficulty walking, speaking, and processing information, all of which are apparent when interacting with him. At 28 years old, Michael stands 5’3” tall, weighs only 127 pounds, and has remained under the care of his grandmother since she removed him from foster care over 23 years ago. Because of his physical and intellectual limitations, which include difficulty with information retention and long-term memory, Michael has, despite his best efforts, been unable to secure employment since graduating from the Special Education Program at Spingarn High School. Michael receives disability benefits and works with a case manager at the District of Columbia’s Department on Disability Services. 57. On May 30, 2014, Michael left his apartment, intending to ride the bus to CVS to buy trash bags so that he could do laundry for his family. Michael walked around the corner to the bus stop, as he had always done, and sat on the curb to wait for the bus to arrive. While he
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was waiting, Michael noticed a police officer across the street giving him unfriendly looks. Feeling anxious, Michael decided to walk back to his home where he felt safe.
58. Before Michael reached his apartment, he was approached by Farley, who had left his vehicle and followed Michael as he walked home from the bus stop. Upon information and belief, Farley had been called from Prince George’s County, the jurisdiction he serves, to the District of Columbia earlier that afternoon to assist his fellow PGPD officers in canvassing the District of Columbia for suspected car thieves. These PGPD officers had followed the suspects from their jurisdiction into the District of Columbia, where they witnessed the suspects leaving the stolen vehicle before fleeing on foot. The car was recovered at 301 49th St. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20019, more than one mile away from the bus stop where Michael first noticed PGPD officers. Upon information and belief, Farley and the other PGPD officers took several actions without informing the MPD (or any other representative of the District of Columbia) of their presence in the city—including towing the car from the District of Columbia to PGPD’s Crime Scene Investigation Division and initiating canvassing activities within the District of Columbia—despite many opportunities to do so during the course of the non-violent and non-exigent reclamation of the stolen vehicle. Michael, whose disability renders him unable to drive, had spent the entire morning with his family and was not involved in this car theft.
59. Without provocation or justification, Farley shouted at Michael and called him a “motherfucker” and a “son of a bitch.” Michael, who had been sitting quietly at the bus stop until he stood up to walk home, became frightened and confused. Michael carries a disability identification card with him when he takes the bus, and upon information and belief, when Farley asked Michael for identification, Michael presented Farley with this disability card.
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60. At some point during this interaction, Farley entered the apartment building and pursued Michael to the stairwell just outside of the Robinsons’ apartment unit. There, Farley struck Michael, threw him down on the steps, held him there, and tased him. The noise of this altercation attracted attention in the building. Mrs. Robinson, alarmed after hearing the loud noises in the stairwell, ran to her door and looked through the peephole in time to see Michael sprawled on the steps with a police officer standing over him, holding a taser.
61. Mrs. Robinson followed Farley as he dragged Michael by the neck out of the building through the front door. Michael, who is naturally timid, was physically overmatched, confused, and afraid for his life. Once outside, Farley let go of Michael, who he had been holding with both hands, to strike Michael in the face with the taser and in the head with his hand. As he hit Michael, Farley yelled, “Let go of my weapon!”, though Michael was not reaching for any of Farley’s weapons. Momentarily free from Farley’s clutches, Michael retreated to his apartment, where he hid in the bathroom, terrified. At no point during this encounter did Michael strike or in any manner threaten Farley.
62. Farley then holstered his firearm and taser and walked half of a block up the street to his cruiser with his back turned to the Robinsons’ apartment building. Farley called for backup but, upon information and belief, at no point contacted the MPD or attempted to obtain a warrant to enter the Robinsons’ home, notwithstanding that the situation he caused had stabilized and Michael remained paralyzed with fear in his apartment. Farley got into his police cruiser and drove it to the front of the Robinsons’ apartment building. After getting out of his car, Farley drew his firearm, waving it around at neighbors who had gathered upon hearing the altercation, and repeated his call for backup.
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63. Before and after Farley moved his cruiser, Mrs. Robinson, Michael’s caretaker, repeatedly and loudly tried to explain to Farley that she is Michael’s grandmother and that Michael poses no threat to anyone. She also told Farley that she did not understand what he wanted. Farley ignored Mrs. Robinson’s pleas, walking away from her and into the apartment building with his firearm and taser drawn. Mrs. Robinson continued crying and pleading with Farley, saying things like, “Oh, God! That’s my grandson. He has a problem!” Neighbors chimed in, too, telling Farley that Michael is “sick.” A witness even asked Farley, “Why’d you hit him? I told you he has a problem!”
64. Despite their persistence, Farley continued to ignore the chorus of voices trying to tell him about Michael’s disability. Instead, he paced in front of the building with his firearm drawn, shouting at the witnesses, “It’s 100 on 1; you don’t think I need a gun?!” Upon information and belief, there were significantly fewer than 100 neighbors nearby and not a single person, including Michael and Mrs. Robinson, threatened Farley or displayed any intention or ability to harm him.
65. When Farley finally noticed Mrs. Robinson, who had been following him and repeatedly attempting to resolve his concerns, it was only to order her, “You tell him to come out here unarmed,” even though Farley had no basis to believe that Michael was in possession of, or had access to, a weapon of any kind. She turned and went down the steps and into her apartment, where she called 911 to report that a Maryland police officer was attacking her grandson.
66. At this point, Farley escalated the situation by standing at the bottom of the stairs with his firearm drawn, shouting “Is he gonna’ come out with his hands up or not? We’re
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gonna’ kick the whole building in if he doesn’t come out.” Once again, neighbors endeavored to explain that Michael is disabled. Once again, Farley ignored them.
67. Two additional PGPD Officers arrived at the scene and joined Farley in entering the apartment building with firearms drawn. Upon information and belief, they approached the Robinsons’ apartment door, banged loudly on it, and threatened to enter. Mrs. Robinson did not open the door, and Michael remained hiding in the bathroom.
68. As this was unfolding, PGPD, PGSO, and MPD vehicles continued to arrive on the scene until there were at least 29 vehicles parked on the block, with at least as many officers streaming out of the cars, including at least two PGSO Officers in tactical gear. As these officers arrived, witnesses repeatedly told them things like, “Excuse me, sir; he’s mentally challenged,” and, “He was asking, what did he do?” When MPD Officers arrived, witnesses demanded to know why the PGPD was acting in the District of Columbia. The officers brushed off the comments, remarking, “They’re doing their thing.”
69. Mrs. Robinson eventually opened the patio door of her apartment, located just to the side of the building entrance’s stairs, to talk with the numerous officers outside. She repeated that Michael is disabled and that there was no cause for Farley to have attacked him. By this point, the Defendant Officers who arrived at the scene had confirmed with Farley that he was safe.
70. Even with all of this information and with MPD Officers present on the scene, a PGSO officer in tactical gear and Defendant Officers rushed past Mrs. Robinson and into the apartment, with firearms drawn, while she loudly screamed, “No!” Mrs. Robinson did not consent to this entry into her home, no exigent circumstances existed, and none of the Defendant Officers had obtained a warrant.
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71. As Defendant Officers continued to pour in through the patio and the front door of the apartment, an MPD officer reported, “They got him in the bathroom.” When Defendant Officers found Michael unarmed in the bathroom, he tried to run past them in fear, but several of them grabbed him, cornered him in Mrs. Robinson’s bedroom, and proceeded to hit him, shout at him, and kick him.
72. Outside, neighbors, politely and from a distance, repeatedly explained that Michael has major health problems. Mrs. Robinson continued pacing back and forth on her patio in severe emotional distress. Not a single officer attempted to speak with her.
73. Michael was handcuffed, marched outside, and placed in Farley’s cruiser. Michael, who remained handcuffed, was driven up the block in this PGPD vehicle, where he was stood up beside a PGPD car and surrounded by MPD Officers, Farley, and several PGPD and PGSO Officers. The MPD Officers patted Michael down, removed various harmless objects from his pockets, and talked with him. The MPD Officers also held Michael while PGPD Officers took photographs of Michael’s face with a camera.
74. Thereafter, the MPD sent Michael in an ambulance to the United Medical Center. He later received a bill from the D.C. Fire and EMS Department for $508.00 for the ambulance call. At the hospital, doctors treated him for rapid heartbeat, removed a taser spike that had been lodged in his back ever since Farley had tased him several hours earlier, noted several cuts and bruises on his face, and administered an analgesic and a shot for tetanus/diphtheria. When Michael’s uncle, Eric Robinson (“Mr. Robinson”), arrived at the hospital to check on Michael, he was denied access to Michael’s room.
75. Upon information and belief, at approximately 9:20 PM, hospital staff discharged Michael into the custody of MPD Officers, who ultimately transported him to the Department of
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Corrections’ Central Cell Block. Michael spent the night there and was taken to the H. Carl Moultrie Courthouse the following day.
76. At an unknown time on May 31, 2014, the only pending charge against Michael—misdemeanor assault on a police officer—was nolle prosequied. Without giving notice to Mrs. Robinson, Michael’s caretaker, or any other person who might assist him, and without any provision for his safety, Defendant Corrections Officers released Michael from custody at the courthouse.
77. Mr. Robinson had arrived at the courthouse that morning and was told by an employee, officer, or agent of the District of Columbia that Michael would appear in a specific courtroom. Mr. Robinson, relying on that information, waited in the courtroom for approximately six hours, but did not see Michael come before the judge. When he eventually left the courtroom to look for Michael, Mr. Robinson was told that Michael had already been released. After searching the courthouse, Mr. Robinson left the building and found Michael aimlessly wandering about the plaza outside the courthouse. A traumatized Michael ran up to Mr. Robinson, hugged him, and asked why he had been attacked and put in jail.
78. Since the unlawful beatings, unwarranted arrest, and unsafe release from jail, Michael has required treatment for both the physical injuries and the psychological trauma he suffered. In particular, he has been treated with anti-epileptic medicines and pain medications and has attended therapy when able. Despite this treatment, Michael remains afraid to leave his home, and the stability of his daily routine is lost. He no longer visits the library or runs errands for his family, he frequently becomes restless, and he runs back to his apartment to hide if he sees police officers nearby. Michael is so frightened of the police that he often locks himself in
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the bathroom when someone knocks on the apartment unit’s door. Michael also suffers from nightmares, has trouble sleeping, and paces at night.
79. Mrs. Robinson has likewise suffered from physical and emotional distress since the police attacked her grandson and unlawfully entered her home. After the incident, her blood pressure rose, causing her doctor to prescribe her new medication. Mrs. Robinson also suffers from chest pains, had trouble sleeping for months, and must spend more time looking after Michael than she did before the ordeal described above.
80. The unprovoked attack, lawless raid, unwarranted arrest, and unsafe release from custody shattered Michael’s previously stable existence and caused physical injury and emotional distress, the effects of which may never dissipate. Farley, Defendant Officers, and Defendant Corrections Officers, many of whom were acting outside of their jurisdiction and without a warrant, are liable for these injuries. And the municipalities and other governmental entities that employ these individuals are liable as well for the failure to train, monitor, and discipline their officers and employees, for their deliberate indifference thereto, and for the policies, practices, and customs they have instituted that enable constitutional violations.
81. The events recounted above were the latest in a long history of excessive force and unconstitutional policing practices on the part of law enforcement officers in Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia. Incidents involving PGPD officers over the years have been particularly prevalent.1 Indeed, the publicly-available annual reports of the
1 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, One Prince George’s officer convicted of assault, another acquitted in U-Md. beating trial, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/closing-arguments-coming-inpr-georges-beating-trial/2012/10/19/f754ea60-1a15-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html; Andrea Noble, D.C. police officer says PG police beat him, Wash. Times, Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct /3/dc-police-officer-says-pg-police-beat-him/?page=all; PG County Officer Charged After Video Debunks Account Of Arrest, CBS DC, Aug. 3, 2012, http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/08/03/prince-georges-county-police-officercharged-with-2nd-degree-assault/; Cpl. Rickie Adey indicted: Prince George's County Police officer faces assault charges, ABC 7 WJLA, July 27, 2012, http://wjla.com/news/local/cpl-ricky-adey-indicted-prince-george-s-countypolice-officer-faced-assault-charges-78232; Debra Cassens Weiss, Civil Rights Leader Arnwine Says Police Held
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Citizen Complaint Oversight Counsel, which monitors and adjudicates complaints against PGPD
officers, are littered with instances in which officers used aggressive, excessive, and/or
unnecessary force. See, e.g., 2014 Annual Report, Prince George’s Police Citizen Complaint
Oversight Panel, available at http://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/sites/ExecutiveBranch/
About/BoardsCommissions/Pages/Citizen-Complaint-Oversight-Panel.aspx. In addition,
instances in which PGPD officers have falsely arrested, unjustifiably incarcerated, or otherwise
unlawfully seized residents are well-documented.2
82. The extra-jurisdictional brutality that Michael suffered at the hands of Farley and
his fellow PGPD officers disturbingly parallels in significant respects the death of Prince Jones, a
Howard University student who was fatally shot in Fairfax County, Virginia, by a PGPD officer
in September 2000. See Ruben Castaneda, Officer Liable in Student’s Killing, Wash. Post, Jan.
20, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/19/AR20060119023
46.html. Although the PGPD found no wrongdoing on the part of the officer who killed Jones, a
Her at Gunpoint, Raided Home Without Showing Warrant, ABA Journal, Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.abajournal. com/news/article/civil_rights_leader_arnwine_says_police_held_her_at_gunpoint_raided_home_wi/; Ruben Castaneda, Pr. George’s jury awards $11.5 million in fatal police shooting, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 2011, http://www. washingtonpost.com/local/pr-georges-jury-awards-115-million-in-fatal-police-shooting/2011/03/14/AB9sqUh_ story.html; Ruben Castaneda, Prince George's jury awards $225,000 to unarmed man shot in back by officer, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/28/ AR2010102806341.html; Aaron Davis, Police Raid Berwyn Heights Mayor's Home, Kill His 2 Dogs, Wash. Post (July 31, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/30/AR2008073003299.html; Ruben Castaneda, Tasers Used on Bound Suspect, Wash. Post, May 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpyn/content/article /2007/05/30/AR2007053002293.html; see also American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Briefing Paper on Deaths in Police Encounters in Maryland, 2010-2014 (Mar. 2015) (noting that Maryland has the 6th highest number of police homicides according to the FBI; finding that 41% of those who died were not armed with a weapon of any kind; and finding that 31% of all those killed by police presented in a way that suggested a possible medical or mental health issue, disability, substance use or similar issue).
2 See, e.g., Amanda Loviza-Vickery, Judge Advances D.C. Police Brutality Case¸ Courthouse News Serv., Mar. 17, 2015, http://www.courthousenews.com/2015/03/17/judge-advances-d-c-police-brutality-case.htm (also accusing the officers of false arrest); Ruben Castaneda, Man falsely charged with murder in Prince George’s wins appeal, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/man-falsely-charged-with-murder-inprince-georges-wins-appeal/2011/04/25/AFDfTxkE_story.html; Ruben Castaneda, Prince George’s to pay man who accused police of assault, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 03/11/AR2010031104228.html (also accusing the officers of false arrest); Ruben Castaneda, Jury Awards Man Struck by Officer In Pr. George’s, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/ 03/27/jury-awards-man-struck-by-officer-in-pr-georges/11dcd37d-15e7-4695-94d5-14dc63b6c5c7/ (same).
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jury found the officer liable for Jones’s wrongful death. Jones’s killing ultimately led to an investigation by the Department of Justice into “allegations of brutality and racism by the [PGPD], which has been accused of excessive force for decades.” Id.; see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Black and Blue: Why Does America’s Richest Black Suburb Have Some of the Country’s Most Brutal Cops?, Wash. Monthly, June 2001, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/ 2001/0106.coates.html (“[Jones’s death] was only the latest in a string of suspicious shootings, murders, and beatings that had occurred at the hands of [PGPD] officers.”). As Michael’s ordeal attests, the “litany of brutalities” carried out by PGPD officers outside of Prince George’s County has not abated since Jones’s killing. Id.
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE 83. On May 30, 2014, Farley filed two documents with the MPD: (1) an IncidentBased Event Report, attached as Exhibit A hereto; and (2) a Complainant/Witness Statement, attached as Exhibit B hereto.3 In these documents, Farley outlined his version of the events and noted that Michael was ultimately transported by the MPD for processing. 84. Farley also submitted a narrative for purposes of a PGPD Supervisor’s Use Of Force Review, attached as Exhibit C hereto, in which he also described his version of the events. Notably, the supervisor was required to state whether the use of force complied with departmental policy. However, in the version of the report made available to the Robinsons, the supervisor’s conclusion was redacted. The supervisor was likewise required to describe what his or her review of the event showed, but this too was redacted in the version of the report made available to the Robinsons. 85. On June 26, 2014, Mr. Robinson filed a PGPD Complaint Against Police Practices, attached as Exhibit D hereto, on Michael’s behalf. Mr. Robinson hand delivered a
3 In accordance with LCvR 5.4(f), Plaintiffs have redacted personal identifiers from Exhibits A through D.
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copy to PGPD headquarters at 7600 Barlowe Road, Palmer Park, Maryland 20785, and mailed a

copy to PGPD’s Internal Affairs Division, 6707 Groveton Drive, Clifton, Maryland 20735.

Although these are the only two addresses that appear on the form, Mr. Robinson mailed a third

copy to the Circuit Courthouse in Marlboro, Maryland. This complaint describes Farley’s

unprovoked attack on Michael, the warrantless entry into the home, and Michael’s subsequent

unlawful arrest. The complaint indicates that Mrs. Robinson witnessed the events described

therein, identifies Farley by name, and includes a list of many of the PGPD, PGSO, and MPD

vehicles believed to have arrived on the scene. Upon information and belief, the following

vehicles were present on May 30, 2014:

Agency
[Maryland] [D.C.] MPD MPD MPD MPD MPD
Seat Pleasant PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD

Car # Unmarked Unmarked
6034
659 6031
4613
4701 4736 4825 4792 4851 4929 4961 4979 5102 5174 5215

License
1AV-M95 DC 10480 DC 8272 DC 9109 DC 9474 DC 9484 DC 9874 LG 86104 LG 99386 PG 2817 PG 2859 PG 2891 PG 2939 PG 2969 PG 3018 PG 3054 PG 3135 PG 3294 PG 3378 PG 3416 PG 3496 PG 3577 PG 3620

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Agency
PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGSO PGSO

Car # 5349 5355 1253
12

License
PG 3710 PG 3716 PG 3853 PG 3968 SA 4420 SA 4423

Both the District of Columbia and Prince George’s County had adequate notice of the

Robinsons’ claims.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

(VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT – EXCESSIVE FORCE)

86. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 52 are incorporated herein by reference.

87. Michael asserts this count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against: (a) Farley;

(b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero;

(i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron;

(q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch;

(y) Hooper; (z) Williams; (aa) Mordecai; (bb) Heyward; (cc) Gray; (dd) Nguyen; (ee) Skelton;

(ff) Munn; (gg) Petty; (hh) Uskievich; (ii) Howard; (jj) Rice; (kk) Garrett; (ll) Lewis; (mm)

certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (nn) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (oo)

certain unidentified officers of the PGSO; (pp) Prince George’s County; and (qq) the District of

Columbia. This count is brought against Farley and the aforementioned Defendant Officers in

their individual capacities.

88. Before or soon after Farley began his unprovoked pursuit of Michael, Farley

became aware of Michael’s physical and intellectual disabilities. As Farley pursued Michael

from the bus stop to the apartment building, Michael’s physical disability was obvious from the

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outset—indeed, Michael walks with a pronounced limp. Any possible doubt as to Michael’s condition was dispelled as soon as Farley stopped him. At that point, Farley observed Michael’s atrophied left arm, slight frame, quiet demeanor, and difficulty communicating. Moreover, Michael carries a disability identification card with him when he takes the bus, and upon information and belief, when Farley asked Michael for identification, he presented that card.
89. Ignoring Michael’s evident physical and cognitive limitations, Farley proceeded to hurl insults at him. Without provocation, Farley then unjustifiably struck Michael, pinned him down, tased him, and dragged him out of the apartment building by his neck. There, Farley again struck Michael and hit him in the head with the taser. Farley’s onslaught left Michael with a taser spike in his back, cuts on his face, and bruises all over his body.
90. At no point had Michael committed a crime or in any way threatened Farley or anybody else. Nor was there any reason to believe Michael was armed or dangerous. Indeed, Michael’s slender build and physical disabilities rendered him utterly harmless, especially in relation to Farley, who physically dwarfed Michael.
91. Farley’s use of force under these circumstances, carried out while he was acting under color of state or local law, was excessive and objectively unreasonable. Farley’s actions caused Michael to suffer substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, Farley is liable for violating Michael’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
92. After Michael, who by this point was terrified and injured, retreated to his apartment to avoid further abuse, Mrs. Robinson repeatedly tried to explain to Farley that Michael is disabled and poses no threat to anyone. Several neighbors also spoke up, explaining
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that Michael is “sick” and that “he has a problem.” Farley ignored all of them. Eschewing all opportunities to deescalate the situation, Farley called for backup and, after retrieving his cruiser, returned to the apartment building with his firearm drawn.
93. Eventually, at least 29 police vehicles arrived at the Robinsons’ apartment building with at least as many armed Defendant Officers streaming in to the street and around the premises. Defendant Officers knew or should have known about Michael’s disabilities because Mrs. Robinson and the neighbors repeatedly informed them about those disabilities.
94. Nevertheless, Defendant Officers stormed into the Robinsons’ apartment. When they found Michael cowering unarmed in the bathroom, some of them dragged him into a nearby bedroom and began hitting and kicking him. Other Defendant Officers looked on, failing to intervene to protect Michael from the unlawful beating he was receiving. Michael, whose disabilities are manifest, posed no threat to anybody.
95. All of these Defendant Officers were acting under color of state or local law. Those that hit and kicked Michael used objectively unreasonable force. Others stood by idly, failing to take reasonably available steps to halt this use of excessive force, even though they knew or should have known that their fellow officers were violating Michael’s rights. Defendant Officers thus caused Michael to suffer substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are all liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment rights, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
96. Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia have demonstrated deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of their inability to train, monitor, and/or discipline adequately their police officers regarding the use of excessive force. Indeed, their indifference
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has allowed their officers to violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights frequently, in turn directly causing harm. The pattern of excessive force used by MPD and PGPD officers also demonstrates the existence of a policy, practice, and/or custom in each department.
97. PGPD officers have been the subject of many lawsuits alleging, among other constitutional violations, excessive force. See, e.g., Walker v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:15cv-02274 (D. Md. 2015); Taylor v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:13-cv-01678 (D. Md. 2014); Culmer v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:09-cv-02877 (D. Md. 2009); McCollum v. McDaniel, 32 Fed. App’x 49 (4th Cir. 2002). The federal government has previously investigated Prince George’s County for excessive force committed by its police officers, see Aaron Davis, Justice Closes Pr. George's Police Review, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/10/AR2009021002067.html, and at one point a consent decree was in effect, see Joshua Chanin, On the Implementation of Pattern or Practice Police Reform, 15 Criminology, Crim. Just., L.& Soc’y 38, 45 (2014).
98. The District of Columbia has been sued recently for similar conduct. See, e.g., Zewuge v. District of Columbia, No. 2015-CA-001565 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2015); Lane v. District of Columbia, No. 1:14-cv-01316 (D.D.C. 2014); Kenley v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-01232 (D.D.C. 2014). And the District of Columbia was also recently the subject of a Department of Justice investigation into excessive force. See Michael R. Bromwich, Final Report of the Independent Monitor for the Metropolitan Police Department, June 13, 2008, http://www. policemonitor.org/MPD/reports/080613reportv2.pdf.
99. Here, dozens of MPD and PGPD officers participated in—or witnessed, without intervention—the unprovoked beating, kicking, dragging, tasing, and choking of a disabled man who committed no crime and posed no danger to their safety or the public’s wellbeing. Prince
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George’s County and the District of Columbia are liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment rights because they (a) have failed to provide adequate training, monitoring, or discipline, (b) have demonstrated deliberate indifference to this failure, and (c) have implemented a policy, practice, and/or custom of excessive force.
COUNT II (VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT – UNLAWFUL ENTRY) 100. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 66 are incorporated herein by reference. 101. Michael and Mrs. Robinson assert this count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Hooper; (z) Williams; (aa) Mordecai; (bb) Heyward; (cc) Gray; (dd) Nguyen; (ee) Skelton; (ff) Munn; (gg) Petty; (hh) Uskievich; (ii) Howard; (jj) Rice; (kk) Garrett; (ll) Lewis; (mm) certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (nn) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (oo) certain unidentified officers of the PGSO; (pp) Prince George’s County; and (qq) the District of Columbia. This count is brought against Farley and the aforementioned Defendant Officers in their individual capacities. 102. After they arrived at the Robinsons’ building, Farley and Defendant Officers stormed into the Robinsons’ apartment through the front door and through the open patio door, through which Mrs. Robinson had moments before exited so that she could tell the officers her grandson is disabled and poses no threat to anyone. When they raced past her and into the apartment, she yelled, “No!” Farley and Defendant Officers thus never sought nor obtained her consent to enter the apartment. And, despite the absence of any exigent circumstance, they never
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obtained a warrant authorizing them to enter, even though there would have been ample time to do so. Michael did not pose a threat to anyone’s safety that would have justified the officers’ warrantless entry.
103. Meanwhile, certain other Defendant Officers simply stood by, foregoing an opportunity to stop their fellow officers from storming into the Robinsons’ apartment without permission or a warrant.
104. All of these Defendant Officers were acting under color of state or local law. Those that entered the Robinsons’ apartment without consent or a warrant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. And those that stood by idly failed to take reasonably available measures to halt this unlawful entry, which they knew or should have known violated the Robinsons’ rights. Defendant Officers thus caused Michael and Mrs. Robinson to suffer substantial harm including, but not limited to, mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are all liable for violating Michael’s and Mrs. Robinson’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
105. Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia have demonstrated deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of their inability to train, monitor, and/or discipline adequately their police officers regarding unlawful entry. Indeed, their indifference has allowed their officers to violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights frequently, in turn directly causing harm. This pattern of unlawful entries by MPD and PGPD officers also demonstrates the existence of a policy, practice, and/or custom in each department.
106. In the last several years, multiple individuals have filed claims against Prince George’s County, alleging that its police officers have made unlawful entries. See, e.g., King v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:15-cv-01405 (D. Md. 2015); Taylor v. Prince George’s Cty., No.
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8:13-cv-01678 (D. Md. 2013); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Civil Rights Leader Arnwine Says Police Held Her at Gunpoint, Raided Home Without Showing Warrant, ABA Journal, Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/civil_rights_leader_arnwine_says_ police_held_ her_at_gunpoint_raided_home_wi/; Aaron Davis, Police Raid Berwyn Heights Mayor's Home, Kill His 2 Dogs, Wash. Post (July 31, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/ article/2008/07/30/AR2008073003299.html.
107. Moreover, upon information and belief, Prince George’s County has a practice of not imposing consequences on its officers who violate citizens’ constitutional rights. For example, Kevin Davis, who recently took over as Baltimore’s interim police commissioner, was involved in kidnapping and excessive force incidents when he was an officer in Prince George’s County, yet he was consistently promoted and attained the rank of deputy chief of the PGPD in 2009. See Ruben Castaneda, Interim police chief involved in unconstitutional detainment 16 years ago, Balt. City Paper, July 9, 2015, http;//www.citypaper.com/blogs/the-news-hole/ bcpnews-interim-police-chief-involved-in-unconstitutional-detainment-16-years-ago-20150709story.html.
108. The District of Columbia has also recently been sued for its police officers engaging in similar conduct. See, e.g., Cox v. District of Columbia, No. 2014-CA-007031 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2014); Lane v. District of Columbia, No. 1:14-cv-01316 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Andrea Noble, Report: D.C. police need guidance to avoid unlawful home entry, Wash. Times, Jun. 12, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/12/report-dc-police-needguidance-to-avoid-unlawful-h/.
109. Here, dozens of MPD and PGPD officers participated in—or witnessed, without intervention—the unlawful entry into the Robinsons’ home. Prince George’s County and the
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District of Columbia are liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment rights because they (a) have failed to provide adequate training, monitoring, or discipline, (b) have demonstrated deliberate indifference to this failure, and (c) have implemented a policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawful entry.
COUNT III (VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT – FALSE ARREST OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, UNREASONABLE SEIZURE) 110. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 76 are incorporated herein by reference. 111. Michael asserts this count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Hooper; (z) Williams; (aa) Mordecai; (bb) Heyward; (cc) Gray; (dd) Nguyen; (ee) Skelton; (ff) Munn; (gg) Petty; (hh) Uskievich; (ii) Howard; (jj) Rice; (kk) Garrett; (ll) Lewis; (mm) certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (nn) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (oo) certain unidentified officers of the PGSO; (pp) Prince George’s County; and (qq) the District of Columbia. This count is brought against Farley and the aforementioned Defendant Officers in their individual capacities. 112. Farley had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that Michael had committed or had attempted to commit a crime at the time he followed Michael down the street, cursed at him, detained him, and questioned him. Nor at that time did Farley have a reasonable basis to believe that Michael was armed or otherwise dangerous. 113. Rather than permitting Michael to return to his apartment, Farley pursued him and forcibly apprehended him. In so doing, Farley subjected Michael to physical abuse by hitting,
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tasing, dragging, and choking him. As he suffered through this brutality, Michael was unable to leave.
114. Each time he detained Michael against Michael’s will, Farley, who was acting under color of state or local law, did so without a warrant and outside of his jurisdiction.
115. Farley’s actions caused Michael to suffer substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, Farley is liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment right, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from arrest without probable cause and/or to be free from unreasonable seizure.
116. After Defendant Officers arrived at the Robinsons’ apartment, Farley falsely and maliciously told them that Michael had assaulted him and was dangerous. Farley, however, had no visible injuries. And as Defendant Officers congregated, several neighbors and bystanders told them that Michael is “mentally challenged” and that Michael had done nothing wrong. During this time, Michael remained unarmed and in the apartment, where he hid in the bathroom, terrified. Farley’s allegations were thus demonstrably false, such that any reasonable officer would have ascertained that Michael was not a threat.
117. Farley and Defendant Officers knew or should have known that Michael was harmless, that he had retreated into his own home, and that nobody had a warrant or cause to enter the Robinsons’ apartment, let alone to arrest Michael. Nevertheless, several Defendant Officers invaded the Robinsons’ home, found Michael, who was unarmed, and proceeded to hit and kick him before handcuffing him and putting him in Farley’s cruiser.
118. MPD Officers then placed Michael under arrest based solely on Farley’s false and malicious assault allegation. As a result, Michael spent the night in jail.
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119. At no point—from their arrival on the scene to taking Michael to jail—was there a reasonable basis on which Defendant Officers could have believed that Michael had committed a crime, especially in light of his obvious physical and mental disabilities.
120. Defendant Officers were acting under color of state or local law. By unlawfully detaining Michael and then falsely arresting him, they caused Michael to suffer substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment right, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from arrest without probable cause and/or to be free from unreasonable seizure.
121. Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia have demonstrated deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of their inability to train, monitor, and/or discipline adequately their police officers regarding false arrest and/or unlawful seizure. Indeed, their indifference has allowed their officers to violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights frequently, in turn directly causing harm. This pattern of false arrest and/or unlawful seizure by MPD and PGPD officers also demonstrates the existence of a policy, practice, and/or custom in each department.
122. Many individuals have filed claims against Prince George’s County, alleging that its police officers have falsely arrested, unjustifiably incarcerated, or otherwise unlawfully seized residents. See, e.g., Walker v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:15-cv-02274 (D. Md. 2015); King v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:15-cv-01405 (D. Md. 2015); Taylor v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:13-cv-01678 (D. Md. 2014); Culmer v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 8:09-cv-02877 (D. Md. 2009); Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2002).
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123. The District of Columbia has recently been sued for similar conduct. See, e.g., Zewuge v. District of Columbia, No. 2015-CA-001565 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2015); Lane v. District of Columbia, No. 1:14-cv-01316 (D.D.C. 2014); Kenley v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-01232 (D.D.C. 2014).
124. Here, dozens of MPD and PGPD officers participated in—or witnessed, without intervention—the false arrest and/or unlawful seizures of Michael. Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia are liable for violating Michael’s Fourth Amendment rights because they (a) have failed to provide adequate training, monitoring, or discipline, (b) have demonstrated deliberate indifference to this failure, and (c) have implemented a policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawful entry.
COUNT IV (VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, THE
REHABILITATION ACT, AND THE D.C. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT) 125. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 91 are incorporated herein by reference. 126. Michael asserts this count under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1231 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. against: (a) Prince George’s County; and (b) the District of Columbia. Michael also asserts this count under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq. against: (a) Prince George’s County; and (b) the District of Columbia. 127. Michael is a person with a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102, 29 U.S.C. § 705, and D.C. Code. § 2-1402.02(5A) because cerebral palsy substantially limits several of his major life activities, including his ability to walk, run, and communicate with people. Michael also suffers from diminished brain and neurological function as a result of his cerebral palsy.
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128. Soon after Farley began his unprovoked pursuit of Michael, Farley became aware of Michael’s physical and intellectual disabilities. As Farley pursued Michael from the bus stop to the apartment building, Michael’s physical disability was obvious from the outset—indeed, Michael walks with a pronounced limp. Any doubt as to Michael’s condition was dispelled thereafter when Farley stopped him. At that point, Farley observed Michael’s atrophied left arm, slight frame, quiet demeanor, and difficulty communicating. Moreover, Michael carries a disability identification card with him when he takes the bus, and upon information and belief, when Farley asked Michael for identification, he presented that card. Finally, Mrs. Robinson and her neighbors repeatedly informed Farley of his disability while Michael was cowering in the Robinsons’ apartment.
129. Defendant Officers knew or should have known that Michael is a person with a disability because (1) Michael’s difficulty in communication and walking is evident upon interacting with him, and (2) Mrs. Robinson and her neighbors repeatedly informed Defendant Officers of his disabilities.
130. Nevertheless, Farley and Defendant Officers failed to reasonably accommodate Michael’s disability in the course of their unprovoked pursuit of Michael, entry into the Robinsons’ home, and subsequent arrest, causing him to suffer greater injury and indignity than other individuals and arrestees. In addition to the severe emotional distress resulting from these actions, Michael has required treatment for both the physical injuries and the psychological trauma he suffered at the hands of these officers and as a result of their failure to reasonably accommodate his disability.
131. Potential accommodations might have included, but are not limited to, communicating with his caretaker, who was present at the scene and attempting to apprise these
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officers of Michael’s disability; working with his caretaker to approach Michael, speak with him, safely remove him from the bathroom, and arrest him, if truly necessary, without the use of force; contacting an officer or employee who specializes in communicating with disabled individuals to facilitate any necessary interaction, removal, or arrest; and ceasing the use of force once it was evident that Michael was unarmed, terrified, and incapable of fleeing.
132. By declining to take any of these measures, among others, Farley and Defendant Officers denied Michael the benefits and services of their employers, as well as subjected him to discrimination, on account of his disability.
133. As public entities that receive federal financial assistance, their employers— Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia—are vicariously liable for Farley’s and Defendant Officers’ violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The District of Columbia is also vicariously liable for all damages stemming from violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act committed by MPD Officers.
134. Additionally, Prince George’s County and the District of Columbia are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as these violations are a result of a failure to train, monitor, and discipline their officers and employees; their deliberate indifference thereto; and a practice, policy, and/or custom of the PGPD and the MPD. Indeed, the state of Maryland convened a special task force in 2013 to address this pattern and the underlying inadequate and inconsistent training for law enforcement officers, paramedics, and first responders on interacting with individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. See New Panel Begins Work After In Custody Death of Man with Down Syndrome, CBS Balt., Oct. 29, 2013,
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http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/10/ 29/new-panel-begins-work-after-in-custody-death-of-mdman-with-down-syndrome/.
135. Defendant Corrections Officers released Michael from custody on May 31, 2014. These individuals did not release him into the custody of, or make any attempt to reach, his caretaker upon release, and did not even comply with the basic release procedures required by D.C. Code § 24-211.02a(b) that are applicable to all inmates. As a result, Michael found himself stranded in a strange place, alone and frightened, until his uncle was able to find him. This caused Michael serious mental and emotional distress, from which he still suffers, and placed him at risk of physical injury.
136. Defendant Corrections Officers knew or should have known of Michael’s disability. Michael carries with him a disability identification card that, upon information and belief, was seen when Michael was processed by MPD after they took him into custody. The District of Columbia, therefore, knew that it had a special duty to Michael because of his disability. Additionally, Defendant Corrections Officers interacted with Michael as they initially processed him, kept him in custody, and oversaw his release. Because Michael’s cognitive and physical disabilities are evident upon interacting with him, they knew or should have known of Michael’s disability.
137. Failing to release Michael to his caretaker or in an alternative, safe manner thus denied him the services and benefits offered to those who are arrested by and released from the custody of the District of Columbia. Michael was entitled to a release from custody in a safe and appropriate manner consistent with his disability, and the failure to do so placed him at risk, caused him injury, and subjected him to discrimination on the grounds of his disability. The District of Columbia and Defendant Corrections Officers placed Michael in a situation made
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dangerous because of his disability, as he was abandoned in an unfamiliar place and far from his home, without regard to his disability. Because of these actions, Michael has suffered from severe mental and emotional distress and has required treatment.
138. Whether that release was the action of the MPD, the Department of Corrections, another D.C. entity or agency, or agents acting at the behest of the District of Columbia, those charged with the custody of Michael were employed by the District of Columbia or acting under the city’s direction. As a public entity that receives federal financial assistance, the District of Columbia is vicariously liable to Michael for damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The District of Columbia is also vicariously liable for damages under the D.C. Human Rights Act.
139. Additionally, the District of Columbia is liable for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon information and belief, the District of Columbia has not implemented any relevant policies or trained its employees on the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act to the release of individuals from its custody. The District of Columbia thus remains deliberately indifferent to these violations and has instituted a practice, policy, and/or custom of not accommodating disabled individuals to ensure a safe and appropriate release in accordance with their disabilities.
COUNT V (ASSAULT) 140. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 106 are incorporated herein by reference.
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141. Michael and Mrs. Robinson assert this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; and (e) Larmore.
142. Farley intentionally attempted to and threatened to do physical harm to Michael when he followed Michael to the Robinsons’ apartment building, shouted profanities at him, and approached him with his taser drawn. Farley also attempted to and threatened to do physical harm to Michael and Mrs. Robinson when he roamed outside of the apartment building with his gun and taser drawn, threatening to “kick the whole building in if [Michael] doesn’t come out.”
143. Defendant Officers intentionally attempted and threatened to do physical harm to Michael and Mrs. Robinson when they entered the Robinsons’ home. Defendant Officers also intentionally attempted and threatened to do physical harm to Michael when they removed him from the apartment’s bathroom.
144. The attempted and threatened use of force was not warranted during Michael’s or Mrs. Robinson’s interactions with Farley or the Defendant Officers.
145. As a result of these assaults, Michael and Mrs. Robinson suffered substantial harm including, but not limited to, mental and emotional distress.
146. Farley and the officers who assaulted Michael and Mrs. Robinson are liable to them for damages.
COUNT VI (BATTERY) 147. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 114 are incorporated herein by reference. 148. Michael asserts this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; and (e) Larmore.
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149. Farley purposefully punched, tased, dragged, choked, and hit Michael, among other harmful, intentional actions. Farley’s conduct was offensive and caused Michael physical harm and severe mental and emotional distress.
150. Certain Defendant Officers also intentionally hit, dragged, kicked, and otherwise attacked Michael as they removed him from the bathroom where he was hiding.
151. The aforementioned use of force was offensive and not warranted during Michael’s interactions with Farley and these Defendant Officers. Because Michael never struck them or even attempted to fight back, they could not have reasonably perceived any harm or threat that would have justified their misconduct.
152. As a result of the aforementioned batteries, Michael suffered substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
153. Farley and the officers who battered Michael are liable to him for damages. COUNT VII
(TRESPASSING) 154. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 122 are incorporated herein by reference. 155. Michael and Mrs. Robinson assert this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Hooper; (z) Williams; (aa) Mordecai; (bb) Heyward; (cc) Gray; (dd) Nguyen; (ee) Skelton; (ff) Munn; (gg) Petty; (hh) Uskievich; (ii) Howard; (jj) Rice; (kk) Garrett; (ll) Lewis; (mm) certain unidentified officers of
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the PGPD; (nn) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (oo) certain unidentified officers of the PGSO; and (pp) the District of Columbia.
156. Farley and certain Defendant Officers purposefully intruded upon the Robinsons’ apartment when they entered through the patio door and the front door and remained inside for several minutes, all without authorization from Michael, Mrs. Robinson, or any other resident. This unauthorized incursion disrupted Michael’s and Mrs. Robinson’s exclusive possession and use of their apartment.
157. By storming into the Robinsons’ apartment in tactical gear and in spite of the numerous cries from bystanders regarding Michael’s disabilities, the PGSO Officers who unlawfully entered the Robinsons’ apartment did so with gross negligence.
158. As a result of this trespassing, Michael and Mrs. Robinson suffered substantial harm including, but not limited to, both mental and emotional distress.
159. Farley and the Defendant Officers who unlawfully intruded upon the Robinsons’ home are liable to Michael and Mrs. Robinson for damages.
160. The District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the intentional acts of MPD Officers, who were acting within the scope of their employment.
COUNT VIII (FALSE ARREST OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FALSE IMPRISONMENT) 161. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 128 are incorporated herein by reference. 162. Michael asserts this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; and (e) Larmore. 163. Farley had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that Michael had committed or had attempted to commit a crime at the time he followed Michael
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down the street, cursed at him, detained him, and questioned him. Nor at this time did Farley have a reasonable basis to believe that Michael was armed or otherwise dangerous.
164. Rather than permitting Michael to return to his apartment, Farley pursued him and then forcibly apprehended him. In so doing, Farley subjected Michael to physical abuse by hitting, tasing, dragging, and choking him.
165. Certain Defendant Officers unlawfully detained Michael without a warrant when they entered the Robinsons’ apartment, removed Michael from the bathroom where he was hiding, and dragged him into the bedroom, where they proceeded to kick and hit him. These Defendant Officers then placed Michael in handcuffs and kept him in their custody as they walked him out of the apartment and until they placed him in Farley’s cruiser, where he was unlawfully detained as Farley drove Michael up the street. Farley then handed off Michael, who remained handcuffed, to MPD Officers.
166. From the time that the officers removed Michael from the bathroom to the point at which Michael was arrested by the MPD Officers, Michael was detained without a warrant, handcuffed, and unable to leave.
167. The MPD Officers patted Michael down, took photos of the injuries to his face, and arrested him on the false and unreasonable ground that he had assaulted Farley. Michael, who remained handcuffed, was kept in MPD custody in the ambulance that took him to the hospital, while he was at the hospital, and until he reached Central Cell Block, at which time he was transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
168. As a result of this false arrest and/or false imprisonment, Michael suffered substantial harm including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
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169. Farley and the officers who falsely arrested and/or falsely imprisoned Michael are liable to Michael for damages.
COUNT IX (NEGLIGENCE) 170. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 138 are incorporated herein by reference. 171. Michael asserts this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Gray; (z) Nguyen; (aa) Skelton; (bb) Munn; (cc) Petty; (dd) Uskievich; (ee) Howard; (ff) Rice; (gg) Garrett; (hh) Lewis; (ii) certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (jj) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (kk) certain unidentified officers, employees, or agents of the Department of Corrections; and (ll) the District of Columbia. 172. After Farley repeatedly struck and tased Michael, and following his call for backup and Mrs. Robinson’s call to 911, dozens of PGSO, PGPD, and MPD officers arrived at Mrs. Robinson’s apartment. With neither a warrant, an exigent circumstance, nor Mrs. Robinson’s consent, they swarmed into Mrs. Robinson’s home with their firearms drawn. After apprehending Michael, who had been cowering unarmed in the bathroom, some Defendant Officers began beating him. 173. PGPD Officers and MPD Officers who did not beat Michael had a duty to protect him from the battery being committed by their fellow officers. 174. By failing to intervene, these PGPD Officers and MPD Officers breached their obligation to ensure that the physical harm to which Michael was vulnerable did not materialize.
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175. These PGPD Officers’ and MPD Officers’ negligent conduct proximately caused reasonably foreseeable injuries to Michael, including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are liable for damages.
176. The District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of MPD Officers, who were acting within the scope of their employment.
177. After Michael spent the night in jail, and the sole charge against him was nolle prosequied, Defendant Corrections Officers released Michael from custody on his own. Defendant Corrections Officers did not release him into a family member’s custody, nor did they make any attempt to contact his caretaker, Mrs. Robinson, upon release, notwithstanding Michael’s manifest difficulty in communication and walking and his possession of a disability identification card. After being released, Michael found himself stranded in a strange place nearly six miles from his home. Michael wandered around, alone and frightened, until his uncle was able to find him.
178. Defendant Corrections Officers, who were responsible for Michael’s release, had a duty to conform to the standard of a reasonably prudent corrections officer overseeing a detainee’s release.
179. By releasing Michael on his own without contacting his caretaker, Defendant Corrections Officers breached the duty of care they owed to Michael and endangered him in the process.
180. Defendant Corrections Officers’ negligent conduct proximately caused reasonably foreseeable injuries to Michael, including mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are liable for damages.
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181. The District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of Defendant Corrections Officers committed within the scope of their employment or principal-agent relationship.
COUNT X (INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) 182. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 150 are incorporated herein by reference. 183. Michael and Mrs. Robinson assert this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Hooper; (z) Williams; (aa) Mordecai; (bb) Heyward; (cc) Gray; (dd) Nguyen; (ee) Skelton; (ff) Munn; (gg) Petty; (hh) Uskievich; (ii) Howard; (jj) Rice; (kk) Garrett; (ll) Lewis; (mm) certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (nn) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; (oo) certain unidentified officers of the PGSO; and (pp) the District of Columbia. 184. When Farley unjustifiably pursued him, Michael’s physical disabilities were obvious. Any doubt as to Michael’s condition was dispelled thereafter when Farley stopped him. Notwithstanding Michael’s evident physical and mental limitations, Farley proceeded to curse at Michael without explanation before striking and tasing him. 185. After pursuing Michael through his apartment building, Mrs. Robinson saw Farley dragging Michael by his neck towards the street. Once outside, Farley continued his onslaught, hitting Michael and striking him in the head with the taser.
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186. After Michael retreated to his grandmother’s apartment, Farley drew his firearm and called for backup. Thereafter, dozens of PGPD, PGSO, and MPD officers arrived. Farley and Defendant Officers ignored the repeated pleas of Mrs. Robinson and the numerous witnesses who by that point had gathered and were trying to explain Michael’s disabilities. Instead, Defendant Officers stormed past Mrs. Robinson and into her apartment with firearms drawn but without a warrant or her consent. After apprehending Michael inside, some of these Defendant Officers began hitting and kicking him.
187. Throughout this ordeal, Farley and Defendant Officers purposefully disregarded Mrs. Robinson’s attempts to explain Michael’s disability and their error. As a result, Mrs. Robinson was forced to watch as her disabled grandson was beaten, falsely arrested, and hauled off in handcuffs.
188. The misconduct of Farley and Defendant Officers was extreme, outrageous, and malicious. Their atrocious behavior intentionally or, at a minimum, recklessly caused Michael severe emotional distress as evidenced by the anxiety, nightmares, insomnia, restlessness, and fear from which he continues to suffer more than one year later. Their behavior also intentionally or, at a minimum, recklessly caused Mrs. Robinson severe mental and emotional distress.
189. Farley and Defendant Officers are thus liable for damages. 190. The District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the intentional acts of MPD Officers, who were acting within the scope of their employment.
COUNT XI (NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) 191. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 159 are incorporated herein by reference.
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192. Michael asserts this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against: (a) Farley; (b) Babcock; (c) Hilligoss; (d) Meushaw; (e) Larmore; (f) Walker; (g) Lopez; (h) Cordero; (i) Mason; (j) McMillian; (k) Morris; (l) De Jesus; (m) Harris; (n) Graf; (o) Munafo; (p) Marron; (q) Johnson; (r) Coleman; (s) Mason; (t) Jeffreys; (u) Barbour; (v) Wilson; (w) Cicale; (x) Burch; (y) Gray; (z) Nguyen; (aa) Skelton; (bb) Munn; (cc) Petty; (dd) Uskievich; (ee) Howard; (ff) Rice; (gg) Garrett; (hh) Lewis; (ii) certain unidentified officers of the PGPD; (jj) certain unidentified officers of the MPD; and (kk) the District of Columbia.
193. As previously alleged, upon information and belief, not all PGPD Officers and MPD Officers who swarmed into the Robinsons’ apartment directly engaged in beating Michael. When these officers failed to intervene to protect him, they acted negligently. Their negligence, in turn, placed Michael in the zone of physical danger, subjecting him to a reasonable fear of immediate and continued physical injury.
194. These PGPD Officers’ and MPD Officers’ negligent conduct caused Michael to suffer serious mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, they are liable for damages.
195. The District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of MPD Officers, who were acting within the scope of their employment.
COUNT XII (DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF PRIVACY – FALSE LIGHT) 196. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 164 are incorporated herein by reference. 197. Michael asserts this count under the common law of the District of Columbia and against Farley. 198. After Farley attacked, tased, choked, and dragged Michael, he called for backup on the false basis that Michael had assaulted him.
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199. Once officers from the PGPD, the PGSO, and the MPD arrived at the Robinsons’ apartment, Farley falsely told them that Michael had assaulted him.
200. Farley then reiterated these false allegations in at least three written police reports and complaints against Michael, including: (1) an Incident-Based Event Report filed with the MPD; (2) a Complainant/Witness Statement filed with the MPD; and (3) the narrative portion of the PGPD Supervisor’s Use Of Force Review.
201. In these statements and documents, which were disseminated to MPD and PGPD officers and employees, among others, Farley knowingly made false and malicious allegations that Michael had committed the crime of assaulting a police officer.
202. These allegations, many of which are easily refuted by the video that a witness recorded, also placed Michael in a false light, depicting him as a violent person who assaulted a police officer. Such a false depiction of one’s character would be highly offensive to any reasonable person and was, in fact, highly offensive to Michael.
203. On the basis of the false statements that Farley made orally, Michael was forcibly removed from his home and arrested, during which time he was beaten and dragged. These statements, coupled with the written false statements contained within the police reports and complaints, caused Michael to suffer significant emotional distress. Not only is he afraid to leave his apartment, but he also lives in fear that others, including the police, falsely believe that he committed a crime for which they will retaliate against him.
204. Farley, who uttered and published these false allegations about Michael, is thus liable to Michael for damages.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Michael Robinson and Agnes Joyce Robinson pray for judgment as follows:
a) An award of compensatory damages, including all appropriate pre- and postjudgment interest, in an amount to be determined that would fully compensate Michael and Mrs. Robinson for their injuries caused by the conduct of the Defendants alleged herein (as well as the cost of treating those injuries), including, but not limited to: physical harm, emotional distress, pain and suffering, embarrassment, and feelings of unjust treatment.
b) An award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined for the intentional and reckless conduct alleged herein that would effectively deter the Defendants and others similarly situated from engaging in similar conduct in the future;
c) An award of Michael’s and Mrs. Robinson’s costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 12205; 29 U.S.C. § 794a; and D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E);
d) Appropriate injunctive relief; and e) Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Michael and Mrs. Robinson request trial by jury as to all issues in this case.
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Dated: September 28, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William V. O’Reilly William V. O’Reilly (D.C. Bar No. 420109) Alexander E. Blanchard (D.C. Bar No. 1009815) Alisha M. Crovetto (D.C. Bar. No. 1030063) JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 879-3939 Email: woreilly@jonesday.com
ablanchard@jonesday.com acrovetto@jonesday.com
Dennis A. Corkery (D.C. Bar No. 1016991) Matthew K. Handley (D.C. Bar No. 89946) WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS 11 Dupont Circle, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone: (202) 319-1000 Email: dennis_corkery@washlaw.org
matthew_handley@washlaw.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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Exhibit A to
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Case No. 15-cv-00803)

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Exhibit B to
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Case No. 15-cv-00803)

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Exhibit C to
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Case No. 15-cv-00803)

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Exhibit D to
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Case No. 15-cv-00803)

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 Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MICHAEL EUGENE ROBINSON, et al. Plaintiffs
v.
BRANDON CARL FARLEY, et al.
Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

Civil Action No. 15-cv-0803 KBJ

:

:

:

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR BIFURCATION AND STAY OF DISCOVERY

Defendants, Prince George's County, Maryland (“County”), Brandon Farley, Thomas

Hilligoss, Sean Babcock, Alan Larmore, and Kenneth Meushaw, submit the following

Memorandum of Law in support of their Motion to for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery,

which is adopted and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein, and state as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the alleged apprehension and arrest of Michael Robinson inside of

his home by members of, among other law enforcement agencies, the Prince George’s County

Police Department. See generally (ECF No. 33-1 Second Amended Complaint.) In Count I of his

Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the County is liable to him for the acts of

County police officers and Prince George’s County Office of the Sheriff deputies due to the

County’s “deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of [its] inability to train, monitor,

and/or discipline [its] police officers regarding the use of excessive force” (ECF No. 33-1, ¶ 96.)

Similarly, in Counts II and III, Plaintiff and Agnes Robinson contend that the alleged unlawful

entry into their home and Plaintiff’s arrest were also pursuant to an unlawful policy of the

County. Id. at ¶¶ 105-109, 120-124. Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiff contends that the County

police officers’ alleged violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was caused by

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 2 of 6
the County’s deliberate indifference to training, monitoring and disciplining its officers. Id. at ¶134. To prove these claims, Plaintiffs intends to present evidence of a hodgepodge of lawsuits, criminal charges, and media accounts of incidents involving County and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers spanning more than ten years to which some or all of the individual defendants were not parties. Because the Plaintiffs have a full remedy at law without proof of the allegations in Counts I through IV, and because the individual defendants would suffer unfair prejudice as a result of proof of any or all of these alleged prior deficiencies, Defendants move to bifurcate Plaintiffs’ Monell claims and stay discovery as to the allegations therein.
Discovery has not commenced with respect to the any of the claims against any of the defendants II. THE LAW
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may order a separate trial of one or more issues or claims “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” A court may also bifurcate claims or issues for a separate trial “to avoid the possibilities of confusion, to further convenience, to avoid delay and prejudice, and to serve the ends of justice.” Am. Nat'l. Red Cross v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Rhode Island, 924 F.Supp. 304, 306 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Webb v. Hyman, 861 F.Supp. 1094, 1119 (D.D.C. 1994) ((internal citation omitted)). Federal courts routinely and consistently grant requests for bifurcation of constitutional claims alleged against an individual and a governmental entity. See McIntosh v. District of Columbia, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23891 *5 (D.D.C., Dec. 9, 1997) (bifurcating plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging excessive force against a police officer from claim against District of Columbia alleging a custom or policy of indifference to plaintiff’s decedent’s rights. See, also, Ransom v. Baltimore County, 111 F. Supp. 2d 704 (D. Md. 2000) (bifurcating

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 3 of 6
claims that officer violated plaintiff’s rights and committed various common law torts from claim that violation resulted from local government’s policy and custom of permitting such violations and inadequately training its officers); Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318 (D. Md. 1991) (bifurcating claims that police officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights from his claims that the officers’ supervisors and employer failed to train, supervise and investigate police misconduct).
In McIntosh, the District Court found the grounds for bifurcation in Marryshow, among other cases cited therein, persuasive. See McIntosh, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23891 at *4-5. In Marryshow, the court reasoned that necessary use of prior incidents of police brutality, the nature of such incidents and the municipal officials’ reaction to them to establish the liability of the “inactive” defendants would present the danger of unfair prejudice to the active defendants. Marryshow, 139 F.R.D. at 319-320. In addition, the court recognized that proving the occurrence of any alleged prior incidents of police misconduct would require that a jury “hear, and consider, evidence in ‘sideshow’ trials regarding these matters.” Id. at 320. In bifurcating the case, the court held that “the interests of convenience, the avoidance of prejudice, as well as expedition and economy, will best be served by severing the trial issues pertaining to Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants from those against the inactive Defendant[s].” Id. at 319. III. ARGUMENT
In this case, Plaintiffs allege in Counts I through IV that their respective injuries caused by the defendant police officers resulted from the County and the District’s policy and custom of deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of their inability to train, monitor, and/or discipline adequately their police officers regarding the use of excessive force, unlawful entry of their respective residents’ homes, and application of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. In order to

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 4 of 6
prove these claims, Plaintiffs would first have to establish that the defendant officers violated their rights. Second, Plaintiffs will necessarily have to present evidence of prior incidents that may or may not involve the defendants in order to prove that such a policy or custom exists. As such, the reasoning of Marryshow is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.
The Monell claims against the County and the District – the inactive defendants – necessarily depends on the validity of the claim that the individual defendants officers acted improperly on May 30, 2014 and/or May 31, 2014. Marryshow, 139 F.RD. at 319. See also City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986); Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F.Supp. 67, 73 (E.D.Va. 1989), aff'd 908 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990); Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716 (4th. Cir.1991). Thus, if the result in a first trial is a verdict that no individual defendant violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the Plaintiffs would have no claim against the County. Bifurcation of the claims would obviate the necessity of extensive preparation, including discovery, and trial as to the derivative claims against the County.1
The same goals of convenience, expedition and economy also would be served by bifurcation, even if Plaintiffs obtained a verdict against one or more individual defendants, because payment of the judgment for Plaintiffs’ damages would obviate the need for a second trial. See Marryshow, 139 F.R.D. at 320. Moreover, the absence of the County as an active defendant in the first trial would have no bearing on the amount of any verdict as punitive damages may not be assessed against the County. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5303(c)(1) (“A local government may not be liable for punitive damages”).
1 While it is possible that the individual defendants could avoid liability on the basis of qualified immunity, the likelihood of success of such a defense by the County defendants is small given the nature of the claims against the police officers. It is clearly established that officers may not use excessive force or enter homes without permission or a warrant.

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 5 of 6
The final goal of bifurcation, avoidance of prejudice, would also be served in this case by virtue of the proof necessary to sustain a claim against the County. In addition to showing improper conduct by the individual defendants, the Plaintiff must establish that these actions were proximately caused by a custom, practice or policy of the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94). Much, if not all, of this custom, practice or policy evidence would be irrelevant to the jury's decision as to the events of May 30, 2014, and highly prejudicial to the individual defendant officers. Moreover, it is likely, if not inevitable, that there will be conflicting evidence regarding any alleged prior incidents. Thus, as recognized in Marryshow, in determining Plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants, the jury will have to hear, and consider, evidence in 'side show' trials regarding these matters. Bifurcation would avoid this time and expense, as well as the prejudice to the individual defendants. It is largely for these reasons that federal district courts routinely bifurcate so-called Monell claims. IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Defendants respectfully request that this Court bifurcate the claims in this case. Accordingly, the following specific relief is requested:
1. Discovery regarding Plaintiffs’ claims against Prince George's County, Maryland (“inactive defendant”) is stayed to the extent that it does not relate to the claims against the individual defendant officers;
2 There shall be separate trials of those issues relating to the Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendant officers, and the Plaintiff’s claims against the County;”
3. The first trial shall resolve Plaintiff’s claims against the individual officers and the amount of any damages to which they may be entitled. a. The County may, but need not, participate in the first trial. b. In any event, Plaintiff and the County shall be bound by the results of the first trial.
4. If, in light of the result of the first trial and existing circumstances, it will be

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 42-1 Filed 08/01/16 Page 6 of 6
necessary to proceed with Plaintiffs’ claim against the County, a second trial will be scheduled. Prior to this trial, however:
a. The parties will be permitted a reasonable period of time to engage in discovery as to Plaintiffs’ claims against the County.
b. The Court will consider, in due course, any dispositive motions addressed to Plaintiffs’ claims against the County.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully pray that this Honorable Court grants this
motion and bifurcate the claims against the individual defendant officers from those against
Prince George's County, Maryland, for the purpose of trial, stays discovery regarding the
liability of Prince George's County, Maryland, and for such other relief as the Court may grant
in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
M. ANDREE GREEN COUNTY ATTORNEY
/S/ William A. Snoddy Federal Bar No. MD14012 Prince George’s County Office of Law 14741 Gov. Oden Bowie Drive, Room 5121 Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 (301) 952-5249 (301) 952-3071 wasnoddy@co.pg.md.us Attorneys for Defendant

 
 Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 1 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

MICHAEL EUGENE ROBINSON, by and

)

through AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, his legal )

guardian,

)

5330 E Street SE, Apt. #4

)

Washington, DC 20019-6079

)

)

AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON

)

5330 E Street SE, Apt. #4

)

Washington, DC 20019-6079

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

BRANDON CARL FARLEY

)

c/o Prince George's County Police Department – )

District III

)

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

Officer BABCOCK

)

c/o Prince George's County Police Department – )

District III

)

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

THOMAS HILLIGOSS

)

c/o Prince George's County Police Department – )

District III

)

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

KENNETH MEUSHAW

)

c/o Prince George's County Police Department – )

District III

)

7600 Barlowe Road

)

Landover, MD 20785

)

)

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE

)

DEPARTMENT

)

County Administration Building

)

14741 Governor Oden Bowie Drive

)

Civil Action No. 15-cv-00803

Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 2 of 26

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20772-3050

)

)

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY SHERIFF'S

)

OFFICE

)

5303 Chrysler Way

)

Upper Marlboro MD 20772

)

)

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY

)

County Administration Building

)

14741 Governor Oden Bowie Drive

)

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20772-3050

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

Office of the Attorney General

)

441 4th Street, NW, Suite 600 South

)

Washington, DC 20001

)

)

UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS of

)

Prince George’s County Police Department,

)

Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Department, )

Metropolitan Police Department,

)

D.C. Department of Corrections

)

)

Defendants. )

COMPLAINT

This civil rights action seeks redress for a series of unjustified acts, including assault and

false arrest, committed by dozens of officers of the Prince George’s County Police Department

(“PGPD”) and Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office (“PGSO”) against a disabled man who

has never posed any threat to any law enforcement officer. These illegal acts were committed in

the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) in and near the Plaintiffs’ home and were witnessed by

numerous people. Officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) failed to prevent

these acts, despite sufficient knowledge and opportunity to do so. MPD did, however, prevent the

Prince George’s County officers from taking Michael Robinson out of the District. Although,

certain of those MPD officers got plaintiff some of the medical care he needed as a result of the

assaults, they proceeded to imprison him in jail overnight. The following day, after the charge

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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 3 of 26

against him had been dropped, D.C. released him on his own in an unfamiliar location, despite the fact that their knowledge of his mental disability demanded a greater duty of care, placing him at risk of further injury.

NATURE OF ACTION 1. This is an action arising under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1231 et seq., the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq., and District of Columbia common law. 2. Officer Brandon Farley intentionally and maliciously seized Plaintiff Michael Robinson without just cause, assaulted him repeatedly, and repeatedly used his TASER on Plaintiff without just cause. 3. PGPD and PGSO officers, with firearms drawn, then entered Plaintiffs’ home by pushing past Plaintiff Agnes Robinson, and took Plaintiff Michael Robinson to the street. 4. PGPD officers then handcuffed Plaintiff Michael Robinson and placed him in a police cruiser. 5. MPD officers then took custody of Plaintiff Michael Robinson and had him treated at a hospital and incarcerated for the night. He was taken to court the following day; the charge against him, misdemeanor assault on a police officer, was dismissed; and then he was released without regard to his mental incapacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This Court has original, federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the federal constitutional and § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

7. § 1367.

This Court has jurisdiction over the common law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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8. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because all of Defendants’ actions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in Washington, DC.
PARTIES 9. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Robinson (“Michael”) resides at 5330 E Street SE, Washington, DC, 20019. 10. Plaintiff Agnes Joyce Robinson (“Mrs. Robinson”) resides at 5330 E Street SE, Washington, DC, 20019. She is Michael’s grandmother and legal guardian. 11. Defendant Officer Brandon Carl Farley (“Farley”), whom Plaintiff sues in his individual and official capacities, is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD, badge number 3696. Farley acted at all times relevant herein under color of Maryland law or under color of District of Columbia law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as agent or employee of PGPD. 12. Defendant Babcock (“Babcock”), first name unknown, whom Plaintiff sues in his individual capacity, is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Babcock acted at all times relevant herein under color of Maryland law or under color of District of Columbia law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as agent or employee of PGPD. 13. Defendant Thomas Hilligoss (“Hilligoss”), whom Plaintiff sues in his individual capacity, is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Hilligoss acted at all times relevant herein under color of Maryland law or under color of District of Columbia law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as agent or employee of PGPD. 14. Defendant Alan Larmore (“Larmore”), whom Plaintiff sues in his individual capacity, is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Larmore
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acted at all times relevant herein under color of Maryland law or under color of District of Columbia law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as agent or employee of PGPD. Upon information and belief, Larmore was sued for excessive force and false arrest and accused of assault, battery, and filing a false statement in 2013.
15. Defendant Corporal Kenneth Meushaw (“Meushaw”), whom Plaintiff sues in his individual capacity, is and was at all times relevant to this proceeding an officer of the PGPD. Meushaw acted at all times relevant herein under color of Maryland law or under color of District of Columbia law, and, in whole or in part, in his capacities as agent or employee of PGPD. Meushaw shot a District Heights police officer on December 07, 2013, during a traffic stop. See http://pgpolice.blogspot.com/2013/12/pgpd-investigates-officer-involved.html. Upon information and belief, Meushaw was sued for police misconduct in 2015, 2012, 2009.
16. Defendant Prince George’s County Police Department (“PGPD”) is the local government agency that employs at all times relevant to this proceeding Farley and Unidentified Officers. It has law enforcement authority in Prince George’s (MD) County. Upon information and belief it has some law enforcement authority in the District of Columbia by virtue of a reciprocal police mutual aid agreement.
17. Defendant Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office (“PGSO”) is the local government agency serving as the law enforcement arm of the county’s courts. It employs at all times relevant to this proceeding several of the Unidentified Officers. It has law enforcement authority in Prince George’s (MD) County. Upon information and belief it has some law enforcement authority in the District of Columbia by virtue of a reciprocal police mutual aid agreement.
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18. Defendant Prince George’s County (“PGC”) is the local government that maintains PGPD and PGSO and, through them, employs Farley and Unidentified Officers.
19. Defendant District of Columbia (“D.C.”) is the government that maintains MPD and the District’s Department of Corrections.
20. Defendants Unidentified Officers are the individuals who cooperated with the named defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their clearly established constitutional rights. Each is an employee of PGPD, PGSO, PGC, or D.C. The officers and their responsible supervisory chain of command are sued in their individual capacities.
FACTS 21. Michael was born in 1987 with cerebral palsy, which has left him with physical and mental disabilities. These include an atrophied left arm and difficulty walking, as well as difficulties speaking and with his long-term memory. Because of his intellectual disabilities, his grandmother has remained his legal guardian since taking custody of him when he was five years old. He is approximately 5’3” tall and weighs approximately 127 pounds. 22. Michael is a graduate of Spingarn High School, where he attended Special Education classes, and he has taken job training courses but had not been able to secure employment. He lives with his grandmother and frequently ran errands such as buying groceries her or himself, and would do the laundry. He would also visit the local library every day. 23. On May 30, 2014, Michael left home intending to travel to the CVS at 320 40th St. NE via a Metrobus in order to buy trash bags to do his laundry. 24. While he was waiting at a bus stop on 53rd Street, he noticed three police cars. Deeply unnerved by the officers, one or two of whom were giving him unfriendly looks, he turned and walked back home.
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25. Farley followed, parking his car just east of the intersection of 53rd and E Streets SE, and proceeding on foot.
26. Michael was coöperative and showed Farley both his non-driver’s license and his D.C.-issued disability card as forms of identification and as partial explanation that Michael did not understand what Farley wanted. Farley shouted profanities at Michael, who was very disturbed and confused by and as to what was going on and why.
27. Farley struck Michael in the hallway or stairwell of Plaintiffs’ apartment building and used his TASER on Michael. The noise of their altercation alerted Mrs. Robinson and a neighbor that something was going on and both saw, through their respective apartment doors, Farley dragging Michael towards the street door of the building.
28. Mrs. Robinson and the neighbor followed Farley and Michael as they struggled out the building’s front door. Farley had his arm around Michael’s throat and was dragging him by his neck. Michael struggled in self-defense to protect himself against being choked, dragged, and struck.
29. Farley stood behind Michael with both arms around Michael and Farley’s TASER drawn, and may have attempted to use the TASER against Michael again. Farley struck Michael in the face with the TASER in his right hand and then struck Michael with his left hand. Farley screamed, “Let go of my weapon!”, though Michael was neither touching nor reaching for any of Farley’s weapons, before dropping his right hand to his waist and swinging the TASER, apparently at full force, into the right side of Michael’s head, producing a loud crack.
30. Mrs. Robinson, less than fifteen feet away, was repeatedly explaining in a loud and pleading tone that Michael is her grandson, not a threat, and does not understand what Farley
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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 8 of 26
wants. When Farley struck Michael in the side of the head with the TASER, Michael spun away. Farley responded by drawing his firearm and pointing it forward, and then calling for backup.
31. Michael ran into the apartment building and into Plaintiffs’ apartment where he hid in the bathroom.
32. Farley entered the apartment building’s foyer and then exited, still with his drawn firearm in his right hand, though now pointed at the ground, and his TASER in his left hand.
33. Mrs. Robinson continued crying and pleading with Farley. “Oh, God! That’s my grandson. He has a problem!” she cried. Neighbors shouted things like “He’s sick!” Farley responded to none of these remarks about Michael’s mental competency. Mrs. Robinson then entered her apartment building’s foyer. A witness asked Farley, “Why’d you hit him? I told you he has a problem!”
34. Farley then holstered his firearm and TASER. He walked approximately 250 feet to his cruiser – car 5174, license plate PG 3496 -- with his back turned to Plaintiffs’ apartment building and many witnesses, entered the cruiser, and drove it back to double-park in front of Plaintiffs’ building.
35. Farley exited his cruiser and drew his firearm again while shouting at witnesses, none of whom were anywhere near him, “It’s 100 on 1; you don’t think I need a gun?!” He brushed past Mrs. Robinson into the foyer and order her, “You tell him to come out here unarmed.” She turned and went down the steps towards her apartment. When she reached the apartment, Mrs. Robinson called 9-1-1 and reported that a Maryland officer was beating her grandson.
36. Farley immediately exited the building and stood at the bottom of the stairs with his firearm drawn, alternately talking on his radio and conversing with the neighbor who
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explained that Michael is disabled. Farley shouted, presumably at Mrs. Robinson, “Is he gonna’ come out with his hands up or not? We’re gonna’ kick the whole building in if he doesn’t come out.”
37. The first two additional police vehicles, both PGPD, arrived approximately four minutes after Farley struck Michael in the head with his TASER and released him. Farley and two PGPD officers entered the apartment building foyer, all three with firearms drawn.
38. The first MPD officer then arrived on the scene, and told the witnesses who were demanding to know why PGPD was acting in Washington, “They’re doing their thing.” The MPD officer then walked into the foyer while talking on his radio. By five-and-a-half minutes after Farley struck Michael with the TASER, there were approximately fifteen police vehicles on the block – including PGPD, MPD, and PGSO – and many officers, including at least two PGSO officers in tactical gear. At this point or shortly thereafter, the arriving officers confirmed that Farley was safe.
39. Witnesses repeatedly told officers, including the MPD officer, things like “Excuse me, sir; he’s mentally challenged,” and, “And he was asking, What did he do?”
40. Mrs. Robinson opened the patio door of her apartment, located just to the east of the building entrance’s stairs, to talk with the numerous officers outside, repeating that Michael had a disability and that there was no cause to have beat him and that unidentified officers were beating on her front door. A PGSO officer in tactical gear and at least three PGPD officers, all with drawn firearms, then rushed past her into the apartment while she looked on in horror and pled for mercy.
41. As PGSO, PGPD, and MPD officers continued to pour in, an MPD officer reported, “They got him in the bathroom.” Upon information and belief, other, unidentified
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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 10 of 26
officers entered the apartment through the front door. When the officers found Michael in the bathroom, he walked across the apartment’s corridor and into Mrs. Robinson’s bedroom. Unidentified officers proceeded to beat and kick Michael. He lost a shoe in the process.
42. Numerous witnesses, politely and from a distance, repeatedly explained things like “He don’t know no better.” and, “That man got major health problems!”
43. Mrs. Robinson continued pacing back and forth on her patio in severe emotional distress but not one officer made any attempt to speak with her.
44. Michael was cuffed and marched outside, but not searched, and put into the passenger seat of Farley’s cruiser, PGPD car #5174, license plate PG 3496. The car was driven approximately thirty (30) feet east on E Street.
45. Michael, in cuffs and a single shoe, was stood beside PGPD car #5174, with MPD officers, Farley, and several other PGPD officers standing by him, while additional PGPD and PGSO officers stood slightly further away. The MPD officers patted Michael down, removing various objects from his pockets, and talked with him. They held Michael while at least two PGPD officers took photographs of Michael’s face with a camera, and the MPD officers later removed a set of handcuffs from Michael’s wrists, presumably an extra set of cuffs belonging to PGPD as Michael remained cuffed. At no point did any officer attempt to get Michael his second shoe to wear.
46. MPD sent Michael to the Not-for-Profit Hospital, d.b.a. United Medical Center, a.k.a. Greater Southeast Community Hospital, in an ambulance and he arrived at approximately 3:20PM. He later received a bill from DC Fire and EMS Department for $508.00 for the ALS1 Emergency ambulance call. At the hospital, doctors treated him for rapid heartbeat and administered an analgesic and a shot for Tetanus/Diphtheria. They also removed a hook for the
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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 11 of 26

taser that was lodged in his back. He was discharged into police custody at approximately

9:20PM.

47. Michael was then sent to the Central Cell Block of the D.C. Jail where he spent

the night. Michael was taken to the courthouse the following day and the charge against him,

misdemeanor assault on a police officer (Farley), was dismissed. Despite his diminished mental

capacity, Michael was released from D.C. custody without any assistance in getting home.

Michael’s uncle, Eric Robinson, arrived at the courthouse at approximately 9:00AM and tried to

find Michael. At approximately 3:00PM, he asked a clerk where Michael might be and was told

that Michael had been released that morning. Eric Robinson found Michael wandering about the

plaza before the courthouse in only one shoe, feeling disoriented, scared, and unsure what to do.

48. Since the assault, Michael has been treated with anti-epileptic medicines and pain

medications and has been in therapy. He has become scared to leave home and do the activities

he used to do such as visiting CVS and the library, frighten of the police, upset, and confused. He

has been restless and has had nightmares and difficulty sleeping. He often hides in the bathroom

because he is so upset.

49. The police vehicles on the scene on May 30 are believed to have included:

Agency
[Maryland] [D.C.] MPD MPD MPD MPD MPD
Seat Pleasant PGPD PGPD PGPD

Car # Unmarked Unmarked
6034
659 6031
4613

License
1AV-M95 DC 10480 DC 8272 DC 9109 DC 9474 DC 9484 DC 9874 LG 86104 LG 99386 PG 2817 PG 2859

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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 1 Filed 06/01/15 Page 12 of 26

Agency
PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGPD PGSO PGSO

Car # 4701 4736 4825 4792 4851 4929 4961 4979 5102 5174 5215
5349 5355 1253
12

License
PG 2891 PG 2939 PG 2969 PG 3018 PG 3054 PG 3135 PG 3294 PG 3378 PG 3416 PG 3496 PG 3577 PG 3620 PG 3710 PG 3716 PG 3853 PG 3968 SA 4420 SA 4423

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Assault and Battery
(Michael Robinson Against Farley, PGPD, & PGC) 50. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 49 are incorporated herein by reference.
51. Farley made many intentional attempts to do physical harm to Michael. In
addition, Farley repeatedly struck Michael and caused other harmful or offensive bodily contact.
52. Farley’s conduct was not reasonably necessary given that Michael was
coöperative and, because of his physical disabilities, posed no danger to Farley. Michael only
physically resisted Farley in self-defense after Foley had struck him.
53. As a result of Farley’s conduct, Michael suffered substantial damages including,
but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.

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54. Farley, who assaulted and battered Michael while acting under color of law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and is liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT II Negligence (Michael Robison Against Farley, PGPD, & PGC) 55. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 49 are incorporated herein by reference. 56. At no time during his pursuit of Michael did Foley adequately take account of Michael’s mental and physical disabilities, despite attempts by Michael, Mrs. Robinson, and numerous witnesses to explain them. 57. This failure to attempt to understand the situation breached the reasonable standard of care expected of all law enforcement officers. 58. Farley’s failure to attempt to understand the situation led him to negligently escalate the situation, including his repeated assaults and batteries of Michael and the acts of the other Defendants against Plaintiffs. 59. As a result of Farley’s negligent conduct, Michael suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress. 60. Farley is, therefore, liable to Michael for damages under the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT III Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Excessive Force (Michael Robinson Against Farley, PGPD & PGC) 61. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 60 are incorporated herein by reference.
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62. Under an objective standard of reasonableness, Foley’s use of force against Michael was excessive as Michael was coöperative, posed no threat to Foley, did not resist until Foley assaulted him, and had neither committed, nor was, nor appeared likely to be about to commit any illegal act.
63. As a result of Foley’s excessive force, Michael suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
64. Farley, who assaulted and battered Michael while acting under color of law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and is liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT IV Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Excessive Force (Michael Robinson Against Babcock, Hilligoss, Meushaw, Unidentified Officers of PGPD &
PGSO, PGPD, & PGC) 65. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 64 are incorporated herein by reference. 66. At least nineteen (19) marked vehicles of PGPD and at least two (2) of PGSO, with at least as many armed officers, were engaged in the raid on Plaintiffs’ home. Officers associated with these vehicles not only failed to inquire as to any special needs Michael might have but actively refused to listen to the explanations proffered by Mrs. Robinson and multiple neighbors or to take the facts those people provided into account. 67. Instead, at least seven armed PGPD and PGSO officers forced their way into Plaintiffs’ apartment through the patio door, pushing past Mrs. Robinson, and other officers forced their way through the front door.
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68. When they found Michael, these officers beat and kicked him before cuffing him and forcibly marching him out of the apartment.
69. There was no reasonable basis on which to believe that the number of officers, which created additional confusion or risk thereof, or the show of force, including the numerous drawn firearms, were necessary or appropriate to effect the questioning or even seizure or arrest of Michael and significant evidence that both were unnecessary. There was no reasonable basis to justify the beating and kicking of Michael who was scared but coöperative.
70. As a result of these PGPD and PGSO officers’ use of excessive force, Michael suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
71. These unidentified officers, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, who assaulted and battered Michael while acting under color of law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT V Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unreasonable Search Trespassing
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants) 72. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 71 are incorporated herein by reference. 73. The unidentified PGPD and PGSO officers, and any unidentified MPD officers, who engaged in the raid on Plaintiffs’ home, entered that private property without requesting or receiving permission from Plaintiffs or anyone else.
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74. Their entry was against the will of the lawful occupants, as expressed by Plaintiffs’ locking the doors and refusing to open them when so demanded by officers, and the officers had no lawful authority so to enter. Mrs. Robinson’s exercising of her right to open her patio door did not constitute an expression of, let alone an actual, change in her will.
75. The officers’ entry was unauthorized and interfered with Plaintiffs’ right to be secure in their home and persons.
76. These unidentified officers, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, who trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property while acting under color of law, violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT VI Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unreasonable Seizure or False Arrest (Michael Robinson Against All Defendants) 77. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 76 are incorporated herein by reference. 78. Farley made false and malicious allegations to MPD and PGPD officers that Michael had assaulted Farley, many of which allegations were demonstrably and visibly false to the officers at the time. 79. After being found in the bathroom of Plaintiffs’ apartment, Michael was handcuffed and placed in the passenger seat of Farley’s cruiser. 80. There was no reasonable basis on which to believe that Michael had committed or was about to commit a crime. The officers’ seizure or arrest of Michael was not justified at its inception, nor were there later circumstances sufficient to justify such a seizure or arrest.
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81. As a result of Farley’s and of these PGPD officers’ unreasonable seizure or arrest of Michael, he suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
82. Farley and these unidentified officers, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, who unreasonably seized or arrested Michael while acting under color of law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT VII Violation of the Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Denial of Due Process & Failure to Supervise Failure to Train
Failure to Intercede/Intervene (Michael Robinson Against All Defendants) 83. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 82 are incorporated herein by reference. 84. Michael, Mrs. Robinson, the neighbor, and numerous other witnesses attempted to or successfully informed the various officers at the scene of Michael’s mental disability. The disability card he had in his pocket, which he showed as identification and explanation, gave them subjective knowledge of his special needs and the particular risks he faced from their conduct. Their behavior, therefore, was deliberately indifferent to their duty to him. 85. The actions, over-actions, excessive force, and negligence of Farley and unidentified officers of PGPD and PGSO demonstrate a failure to provide adequate or proper training or supervision by PGPD and PGSO, and PGC generally, that indicates a deliberate indifference to the safety of the civilians whom its officers seek to question or bring into custody, in disregard of the heightened duty these officers owe to the personal safety of such civilians.
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86. Unidentified officers of PGPD and PGSO were aware that other officers were engaged in unlawful acts, including the use of excessive force against Michael, and had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, yet chose not to act, in violation of their duty to intercede to prevent the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and common law rights.
87. The failure of MPD officers to prevent the misconduct of the PGPD and PGSO officers, despite the fact that all relevant actions took place within the District of Columbia and MPD officers were on the scene in force before the raid on the apartment, indicates such a failure by DC to adequately train or supervise its officers as to constitute deliberate indifference to the obligations MPD owes to citizens of the District of Columbia. The MPD officers had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm done by Farley and the PGPD and PGSO officers yet chose not to act, in violation of their duty to intercede to prevent the violations of Michael’s constitutional and common law rights.
88. As a result of these failures to train their law enforcement officers and failures to intercede, Plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to Due Process and/or Equal Protection under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments. Michael suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress, and Mrs. Robinson suffered substantial damages including but not limited to mental and emotional distress.
89. Farley and the unidentified PGPD and PGSO officers, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, who assaulted and battered Michael and failed to intervene while acting under color of law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Mrs. Robinson’s rights under
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common law and are liable to Plaintiffs for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
90. The unidentified MPD officers, who were operating under color of District of Columbia law, failed to intervene and violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Mrs. Robinson’s rights under common law and are liable to Plaintiffs for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT VIII Violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
False Arrest False Imprisonment (Michael Robinson Against Farley, Unidentified Officers of MPD, & D.C.) 91. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 90 are incorporated herein by reference. 92. Farley made false and malicious allegations to MPD and PGPD officers that Michael had assaulted Farley, many of which allegations were demonstrably and visibly false to the officers at the time. 93. Michael was handcuffed and kept in MPD custody in the ambulance to the hospital, while he was at the hospital, and until he reached D.C. Jail, at which time he was transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections. He spent the night and part of the next day in the custody of Department of Corrections, or MPD officers. 94. There was no reasonable basis on which to believe that the arrest of Michael was lawful. 95. As a result of these D.C. officers’ false of arrest Michael, he suffered substantial damages including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and both mental and emotional distress.
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96. Farley and these unidentified officers, who falsely arrested Michael while acting under color of District of Columbia law, violated Michael’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are liable to Michael for damages under § 1983 and the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT IX Americans With Disabilities Act (Michael Robinson Against PGPD, PGSO, PGC, & D.C.) 97. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 96 are incorporated herein by reference. 98. Michael Robinson is a person with a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102 because cerebral palsy substantially limits inter alia, his ability to walk, run, and interact with people. 99. Farley had actual knowledge of Michael Robinson’s disability when he saw the disability card. 100. Defendants Babcock, Hilligoss, Meaushaw knew or should have known that Michael Robinson is a person with a disability. 101. Farley, Babcock, Hilligos, and Meaushaw failed to accommodate Michael Robinson in their interactions with Michael. 102. Their employers PGPD, PGSO & PGC are vicariously liable for their violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 103. D.C. and its officers had subjective knowledge that Michael had a mental disability. He had a disability ID card issued by the City and Mrs. Robinson was registered with the City as his guardian. The card was in his possession on May 30 and not only did he show it but, during the search incident to his arrest, the MPD officers patting him down found it.
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104. D.C., therefore, knew that it had a special duty to Michael because of his mental disability. It breached that duty by releasing him on his own, rather than into the custody of a guardian or other person acting in loco parentis. As a result of that breach, Michael found himself stranded, alone and frightened, in a strange place until his uncle was able to find him. This caused him serious emotional distress, as well as putting him at risk of physical injury.
105. The release denied Michael the protections and other benefits of the services provided by D.C. to pretrial detainees, placing him at risk and causing him damage. The release also constituted discrimination against him on the grounds of his mental disability as it involved D.C. and its officers placing him into a situation made dangerous specifically because of his disability. D.C. failed to accommodate for Michael’s disability despite knowing of it; having taken him from his home where he was safe and able to care for himself, D.C. and its officers placed him in an unfamiliar place, far from his home, without regard to his disability.
106. Whether that release was the action of MPD, the Department of Correction, those charged with the custody of Michael were employed by D.C.
107. D.C. is, therefore, vicariously liable to Michael for damages under Title II of the Americans With Disability Act.
COUNT X D.C. Human Rights Act (Michael Robinson Against All Defendants) 108. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 96 are incorporated herein by reference. 109. Michael Robinson is a person with a disability as defined by D.C. Code. § 21402.02(5A) because cerebral palsy substantially impairs inter alia, his ability to walk, run, anad interact with people.
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110. Farley had actual knowledge of Michael Robinson’s disability when he saw the disability card.
111. Defendants Babcock, Hilligoss, Meaushaw knew or should have known that Michael Robinson is a person with a disability.
112. Farley, Babcock, Hilligos, and Meaushaw failed to accommodate Michael Robinson in their interactions with Michael.
113. Their employers PGPD, PGSO & PGC are vicariously liable for their violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act.
114. D.C. and its officers had subjective knowledge that Michael had a mental disability. He had a disability ID card issued by the City and Mrs. Robinson was registered with the City as his guardian. The card was in his possession on May 30 and not only did he show it but, during the search incident to his arrest, the MPD officers patting him down found it.
115. D.C., therefore, knew that it had a special duty to Michael because of his mental disability. It breached that duty by releasing him on his own, rather than into the custody of a guardian or other person acting in loco parentis. As a result of that breach, Michael found himself stranded, alone and frightened, in a strange place until his uncle was able to find him. This caused him serious emotional distress, as well as putting him at risk of physical injury.
116. The release denied Michael the protections and other benefits of the services provided by D.C. to pretrial detainees, placing him at risk and causing him damage. The release also constituted discrimination against him on the grounds of his mental disability as it involved D.C. and its officers placing him into a situation made dangerous specifically because of his disability. D.C. failed to accommodate for Michael’s disability despite knowing of it; having
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taken him from his home where he was safe and able to care for himself, D.C. and its officers placed him in an unfamiliar place, far from his home, without regard to his disability.
117. Whether that release was the action of MPD or the Department of Corrections, those charged with the custody of Michael were employed by D.C.
118. D.C. is, therefore, vicariously liable to Michael for damages under the D.C. Human Rights Act.
119. The individuals defendants are liable to Michael in their individual capacities under the D.C. Human Rights Act.
COUNT XI Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants) 120. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 107 are incorporated herein by reference. 121. The entirety of Farley’s conduct towards Michael was both extreme and outrageous, and he carried it forth intentionally in front of Mrs. Robinson, Michael’s grandmother and guardian, in complete disregard of all of her pleas and explanations of Farley’s error, those of other witnesses, obvious facts, and evidence Michael presented to Farley. 122. Farley and the unidentified officers of PGPD, PGSO, and MPD, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct when they sent more than thirty (30) officers to the scene, many with weapons drawn, who intentionally and recklessly forced their way into Plaintiffs’ apartment by pushing past Mrs. Robinson. 123. Seeing her grandson beaten, severely injured, and then arrested by men who forced their way into her apartment by pushing past her and entering a door she had opened caused Mrs. Robinson severe emotional distress.
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124. These defendants, who may have included any or all of the named Defendants, are, therefore, liable to Mrs. Robinson for damages under the common law of the District of Columbia.
COUNT XII Defamation Invasion of Privacy – False Light (Michael Robinson Against Farley, PGPD & PGC) 125. The preceding paragraphs 1 through 124 are incorporated herein by reference. 126. Farley made false and malicious allegations to MPD and PGPD officers, not only in police reports he filed in the exercise of his official duties but in complaints he voluntarily filed, that Michael had committed the crime of assaulting a police officer (Farley). 127. Farley made these allegations with full knowledge that they were false. 128. Farley’s allegations placed Michael in a false light, depicting him as a violent, lawless person who would assault a police officer who was merely attempting to do his duty. Such a false depiction of one’s character would be highly offensive to any reasonable person. 129. As a result of Farley’s actions, Michael has been confused, hurt, and suffered emotional distress. Mrs. Robinson has also suffered emotional distress as a result of Farley’s actions. 130. Foley, who publicized these false allegations about Michael in his personal and official capacities, violated Plaintiffs’ rights and is liable to Plaintiffs for damages under the common law of the District of Columbia. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Michael E. Robinson and Agnes Joyce Robinson pray for judgment as follows:
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a) An award of compensatory damages in an amount to be determined that would fully compensate Plaintiffs for their injuries caused by the conduct of the Defendants alleged herein, including: emotional distress, pain and suffering, anxiety, anguish, feeling of unjust treatment, and fear;
b) An award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined that would punish the Defendants for the intentional and reckless conduct alleged herein and that would effectively deter the Defendants and others similarly situated from engaging in similar conduct in the future;
c) An award of Plaintiff’s costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 12205, and D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E).
d) Appropriate injunctive relief; and, e) An order granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff requests trial by jury as to all issues in this case.
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Dated: June 1, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Dennis A. Corkery Dennis A. Corkery (D.C. Bar No. 1016991) Matthew K. Handley (D.C. Bar No. 89946) WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS 11 Dupont Circle, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 319-1000 Email: dennis_corkery@washlaw.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 38 Filed 06/20/16 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Michael Robinson, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

Brandon Farley, et al.

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 15-cv-00803 (KBJ)

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Michael Robinson alleges that officers of the District of Columbia violated Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, when they failed
to reasonably accommodate his disabilities during his arrest and post-arrest proceedings. The
District of Columbia has moved to dismiss the ADA claim, arguing that “no D.C. Circuit case
has held that the ADA applies to arrests,” and “there are good reasons why the ADA . . . should
not apply to arrests.” Def. D.C.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) at 9. The
District of Columbia further argues that plaintiff has not cited any “provision from [the ADA]
identifying specific duties and accommodations that are appropriate during the arrest of a disabled suspect.” Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) at 9.1
The United States files this Statement of Interest to clarify that Title II of the ADA
applies to the arrest of an individual with a disability, and to explain the application of Title II’s
1 Plaintiffs also allege that officers of Prince George’s County violated Title II of the ADA, and Prince George’s County has moved (ECF No. 17 at 1, 11) to dismiss Count IV of plaintiffs’ complaint, which contains the ADA claim. However, Prince George’s County’s motion discusses only the § 1983 component of Count IV, and does not offer any reason that the statutory claim should be dismissed. Id. at 6.

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reasonable modification requirement in this context.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (the Attorney General may send any officer of the Department of Justice “to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States”). The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has the primary responsibility for enforcing the ADA, and oversees the implementation of Title II for “[a]ll programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to law enforcement.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6). The United States therefore has a particularly strong interest in ensuring the correct interpretation and application of the ADA in this context.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS All of the following facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (ECF No. 33-1). At the motion to dismiss stage, “the facts as alleged in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in the plaintiff's favor.” Wood v. Dep't of Labor, 275 F.3d 107, 108 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Plaintiff Michael Robinson alleges that he has cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 127. As a result, he is small (5’3” and 127 pounds), has an atrophied arm, and has difficulty walking, processing information, and speaking. Id. ¶ 56. Mr. Robinson was sitting at a bus stop near his house in the District of Columbia on the morning of May 30, 2014, waiting to run an errand for his family. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 57. A police officer assisting in the search for suspects in a recent car theft noticed Mr. Robinson and observed him for a few minutes. Id. ¶¶ 57, 58. Frightened, Mr. Robinson stood up to walk home. Id. ¶¶ 2, 57. The officer
2 See Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-17, Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal., et al., No. 13-1412 (S. Ct. Jan. 16, 2015) (stating that Title II applies to arrests); Statement of Interest of the United States of Am. at 11-17, Williams v. City of New York , No. 12-cv-6805 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015) (ECF No. 69) (same); Statement of Interest of the United States at 30-34, S.R. & L.G. v. Kenton Cnty., et al., No. 15-cv-143 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2015) (ECF No. 32) (same).
2

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shouted obscenities at him and pursued him. Id. ¶¶ 3, 58, 59. Mr. Robinson stopped and, when asked for identification, gave the officer his disability identification card. Id. ¶ 59. Mr. Robinson then tried to return home, but the officer pursued him into his apartment building, hit him, threw him down the steps, and tased him. Id. ¶¶ 3, 60, 61. Mr. Robinson then ran to his apartment and hid in the bathroom. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 61, 67, 71. Mr. Robinson was not armed and did not threaten the police officer in any way during these events. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 61.
Mr. Robinson’s grandmother and several neighbors tried to explain to the police officer that Mr. Robinson was disabled and posed no threat to them. Id. ¶¶ 4, 63, 66, 68, 69, 72. Without discussing the situation with Mrs. Robinson or the neighbors, the officer summoned backup; eventually, twenty-nine police vehicles were gathered at the scene. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 65, 68, 72. Several officers entered Mr. Robinson’s apartment with weapons drawn. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 68, 70. They found him unarmed in the bathroom, beat him, and handcuffed him. Id. ¶¶ 5, 71, 73. After treatment at a hospital, Mr. Robinson was charged with misdemeanor assault on a police officer and held overnight at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 75. The next day, he was taken to the courthouse and the charge of misdemeanor assault was nolle prosequied. Id. ¶¶ 7, 76. Mr. Robinson was then released alone outside the courthouse; no attempt was made to contact his family. Id. ¶¶ 7, 76. He stayed outside, “alone and frightened,” until his uncle – who had fruitlessly waited six hours to hear Mr. Robinson’s case after being given the wrong courtroom information – eventually learned that Mr. Robinson had been released and found him wandering near the courthouse. Id. ¶¶ 7, 77.
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DISCUSSION A. Statutory and Regulatory Background Under Title II of the ADA, a public entity cannot “den[y] the benefits of [its] services, programs, or activities” to a qualified individual with a disability, or subject any such individual to discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In enacting the ADA, Congress found that individuals with disabilities continually encounter discrimination in critical areas such as access to public services, including both outright intentional exclusion and the failure to make modifications to existing practices. See id. § 12101(a)(3), (a)(5). Title II of the ADA was enacted as a broad remedy to this widespread discrimination. See id. § 12101(b). The DOJ has promulgated a regulation implementing Title II’s broad nondiscrimination mandate. Id. § 12134; 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35. The regulation prohibits a public entity from providing services to individuals with disabilities that are “not as effective in affording an equal opportunity to obtain the same result . . . as that provided to others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii). Consistent with the statute, the regulation both prohibits outright discrimination and requires a public entity to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when . . . necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). This regulation is entitled to “controlling weight” so long as it is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). The Supreme Court has credited DOJ’s interpretation of Title II as implemented by the regulation. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1999).
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B. Analysis 1. Title II Applies to All Law Enforcement Activities, Including Arrests
The starting point in determining Title II’s applicability to law enforcement operations is the statutory text. See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998). Title II’s antidiscrimination provision provides that no qualified individual with a disability “shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). By its plain terms, Title II applies to all governmental entities, including law enforcement agencies. The statutory text contains no “exception that could cast the coverage of” law enforcement entities “into doubt.” Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209 (holding that state prisons “fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity’” in Title II). Accordingly, law enforcement agencies fall within the ADA’s comprehensive definition of a public entity.
The statutory text further demonstrates that arrests are covered by Title II. “[S]ervices, programs, or activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132, is an all-inclusive phrase that covers everything a public entity does. See, e.g., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 20 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “activity” as “a specific deed, action, function, or sphere of action”); see also Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211 (prison operations constitute “programs, services, [or] activities” under Title II, regardless of whether participation is mandatory or voluntary). Congress defined the term “[p]rogram or activity” in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701797, which served as the model for Title II, to mean “all of the operations of” a covered entity. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (emphasis added). Because Title II cannot “be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under” Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a), the phrase
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“service, programs, or activities” has the same broad meaning under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1998).
The legislative history confirms that Congress intended Title II to apply to law enforcement operations generally, and to arrests in particular. The House Report specified that Title II’s anti-discrimination mandate would “extend[ ] . . . to all actions of state and local governments.” H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 84 (1990) (emphasis added). The Report further identified arrests as an activity where “discriminatory treatment based on disability can be avoided by proper training.” Id. Pt. 3, at 50. In addition, legislators emphasized that Title II would address discrimination in law enforcement, including the arrest of individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. 11,461 (1990) (“Many times, deaf persons who are arrested are put in handcuffs. But many deaf persons use their hands to communicate. . . . [T]hese mistakes . . . constitute discrimination.”); id. at E1913, E1916 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (“[P]ersons who have epilepsy are sometimes inappropriately arrested because police officers have not received proper training to recognize seizures and to respond to them.”).
Similarly, the Title II regulation makes clear that Title II of the ADA applies to both law enforcement and arrests. The regulation explains that Title II’s nondiscrimination requirement “applies to anything a public entity does.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B. In its commentary on the Title II regulation, DOJ stated that “[t]he general regulatory obligation to modify policies, practices, or procedures requires law enforcement to make changes in policies that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities.” 56 Fed. Reg. 35,703 (July 26, 1991).
Pursuant to the Congressional mandate to provide guidance to covered entities, 42 U.S.C. § 12206, the DOJ has issued technical assistance to guide law enforcement entities in complying
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with the ADA, including in the context of arrests. This technical assistance confirms that DOJ has long viewed Title II as applying to arrests. Guidance issued in 2006 states that “[t]he ADA affects virtually everything that officers and deputies do,” including “arresting, booking, and holding suspects.”3 In addition, the DOJ’s Title II Technical Assistance Manual states that “[a] municipal police department encounters many situations where effective communication with members of the public who are deaf or hard of hearing is critical,” including “interviewing suspects prior to arrest,” and “interrogating arrestees.”4
Consistent with the foregoing, the majority of appellate courts to consider the issue have held that Title II applies to arrests. See Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2014) (joining the “majority of circuits” and holding that the ADA applies to police interactions), rev’d in part on other grounds by 135 S.Ct. 1765 (2015); Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 338-40 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he ADA applies to the investigation of criminal conduct”); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1998) (police department is a public entity and an arrest is a program or service). Only the Fifth Circuit has held that Title II does not apply to law enforcement activities in “exigent circumstances . . . prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life,” but that court nonetheless found that Title II did apply “[o]nce the area was secure and there was no threat to human safety.” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000); but see Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with Hainze analysis and explaining that “[t]he exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity
3 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commonly Asked Questions About the Americans with Disabilities Act and Law Enforcement § I, question 2 (Apr. 4, 2006), available at https://www.ada.gov/q&a_law.htm (“2006 Guidance”). 4 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical Assistance Manual 1994 Supplement § II- 7.1000(B), illus. 3 (Nov. 1993 & Supp. 1994), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman2up.html.
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. . . go more to the reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than whether the ADA applies in the first instance”). The one court in this district to address the question found that Title II did apply to arrests. Sacchetti v. Gallaudet Univ., No. 15-cv-455, 2016 WL 1589814, at *14 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2016).
Thus, pursuant to the statutory text and applicable regulation, and in accordance with the majority of authority, Title II’s nondiscrimination requirement applies to arrests.
2. Law Enforcement Entities Are Required to Make Reasonable Modifications to Policies, Practices, or Procedures in Arresting Individuals with Disabilities
Because law enforcement entities are subject to Title II’s nondiscrimination requirement, they must “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (the “failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright” discrimination). The reasonable modification requirement extends to the arrest of an individual with a disability.
The District of Columbia argues that plaintiffs have not cited any “provision from [the ADA] identifying specific . . . accommodations that are appropriate during the arrest of a disabled suspect.” D.C. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 20) at 9. Determining what modifications are reasonable in any given situation is a fact-specific inquiry. In the law enforcement context, questions of exigency and safety will play a large role in determining whether a particular modification is reasonable. See, e.g., Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, VA, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (“exigency is one circumstance that bears materially on the inquiry into reasonableness under the ADA”); 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (a modification is not required if it would interfere with an entity’s ability to address a significant safety threat). In its technical assistance, DOJ has explained that Title II may require a police department to, for instance,
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“modif[y] its regular practice of handcuffing arrestees behind their backs, and instead handcuff[ ] deaf individuals in front in order for the person to sign or write notes.”5 Similarly, “an interpreter may be needed in lengthy or complex transactions” involving a deaf arrestee.6 The Police
Executive Research Forum, a national membership organization composed of chief executives
from municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies, has compiled suggestions of
modifications that may be appropriate in some circumstances, including:
1. Recognizing that an individual may be overwhelmed, and removing distractions from the scene.
2. Obtaining relevant information from family members, friends or others at the scene who know the individual and his history.
3. Asking an adult member of the individual’s family to participate in transport. 4. Speaking slowly, simply, and briefly; limiting the number of people who speak to the
individual; maintaining a comfortable distance from the individual.7
Because the determination whether a requested modification is reasonable or creates a
fundamental alteration is a fact-specific, individualized question, discovery is often necessary.
See Sacchetti, 2016 WL 1589814, at *14 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and holding
that “[w]hether the plaintiffs can establish that the MPD officers’ alleged conduct amounted to a
denial of reasonable accommodations for [his] disabilities is a question properly reserved for
resolution until a meaningful opportunity for discovery is provided.”); Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914
(“The factual record will need to be further developed . . . before the remaining issues of
potential liability [on the arrestee’s ADA claim] and possible relief are determined.”); Sheehan,
743 F.3d at 1233 (“because the reasonableness of an accommodation is ordinarily a question of
5 2006 Guidance, supra note 3, § V. 6 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Communicating with People Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing: ADA Guide for Law Enforcement Officers (Jan. 2006) (under “What Situations Require An Interpreter?”), available at https://www.ada.gov/lawenfcomm.htm. 7 Police Executive Research Forum, The Police Response to People with Mental Illnesses: Including Information on the Americans with Disabilities Act Requirements and Community Policing Approaches 29-30, 34, 54, MP-5 (1997), available at www.ptb.state.il.us/resources/mentalillness/mpoliceresponse.pdf.
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fact . . . we hold that the city is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on [the arrestee’s]
ADA claim”).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court consider
this Statement of Interest in this litigation.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 2016.
VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
EVE L. HILL Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
REBECCA B. BOND Chief KATHLEEN P. WOLFE Special Litigation Counsel Disability Rights Section Civil Rights Division
/s/ Elisabeth M. Oppenheimer ELISABETH M. OPPENHEIMER Bar No. Massachusetts 686312 Trial Attorney Disability Rights Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. – NYA Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 616-3653 Facsimile: (202) 305-9775 elisabeth.oppenheimer@usdoj.gov
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Case 1:15-cv-00803-KBJ Document 38 Filed 06/20/16 Page 11 of 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that Statement of Interest, filed through the CM/ECF system on this 20th day of June 2016, will be sent electronically to the registered participates as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). I am not aware of any non-registered participants, so electronic filing is the sole means of service of this document.
/s/ Elisabeth Oppenheimer Elisabeth Oppenheimer
11

 
 Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154 (2017)

264 F.Supp.3d 154 United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Michael ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Brandon Carl FARLEY, et al., Defendants.
No. 15–cv–0803 (KBJ) |
Signed 09/01/2017
Synopsis Background: Arrestee, a 28–year-old man with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities who lived with his grandmother, and his grandmother brought action against the District of Columbia, county, and 38 individual police officers from both jurisdictions, asserting excessive force, unlawful entry, and false arrest or unreasonable seizure under § 1983, common law claims for trespass, negligence, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA). District of Columbia and District of Columbia police officers moved to dismiss.
Holdings: The District Court, Ketanji Brown Jackson, J., held that:
complaint sufficiently stated claims against the officers even though it did not allege exactly what actions each particular officer took, and
complaint stated trespass claim against District of Columbia.
Motion denied.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*155 Matthew K. Handley, Dennis A. Corkery, Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Urban Affairs, William Vincent O’Reilly, Alexander E. Blanchard, Alisha Marie Crovetto, Haley A. Wojdowski, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Sarah Ann Hunger, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
]

Gessesse Teferi, Russell A. King, Jr., William Antoine Snoddy, Prince George’s County Government, Upper Marlboro, MD, Alex Karpinski, Jordan Song En Liew, Jonathan Hale Pittman, Tram T. Pham, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge
On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff Michael Robinson (“Robinson”)—a 28–year-old man with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities—encountered a Prince George’s County police officer while Robinson was sitting at a bus stop on his way to purchase trash bags. (See Third Am. Compl. (“Compl.”), ECF No. 62, ¶¶ 1–2, 56.) This chance encounter escalated quickly; the lone officer began trailing Robinson, who hastily exited the bus-stop area and retreated to the nearby home of his grandmother and caretaker, Agnes Joyce Robinson (“Mrs. Robinson”). (See id. ¶¶ 1, 3.) Eventually, regional officers from “at least 29 police vehicles” responded to the scene, entered the Robinsons’ home, and “beat[,]” “kick[ed,]” and “tased” Robinson before finally arresting him. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5, 71.) Although no criminal charges against Robinson were ultimately pursued, as a result of this unfortunate encounter, Michael and Agnes Robinson have brought an assortment of civil claims against the District of Columbia, Prince George’s County, and various individual-officer employees of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), the Prince George’s County Police Department (“PGPD”), and the Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office (“PGSO”). (See generally id.)
*156 Before this Court at present is a motion to dismiss that the individual MPD Officers and the District of Columbia (collectively, “the District Defendants”) have filed. (See generally ECF No. 61 (“Defs.’ Mot”).) In the motion, which is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the MPD Officers argue that the Robinsons’ 204–paragraph complaint “contains no specific allegation as to any of the individual District officer defendants and, hence, operates on a completely vague, speculative level that necessitates dismissal.” (Id.
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at 7; see also Apr. 27, 2017 Hr’g Tr. (“Hr’g Tr.”), ECF No. 79, at 8 (asserting that the Robinsons’ complaint is “conclusory and unsupported as to who did what”).)1 For its part, the District argues that the Robinsons’ trespass claim against it (Count VII) should be dismissed, because Plaintiffs fail to allege adequately all of the elements of this claim. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9.)
For the reasons explained fully below, this Court rejects the MPD Officers’ contention that the Robinsons are required to identify the precise actions of each individual police officer during the alleged altercation in order to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. To the contrary, the Court finds that the Robinsons’ complaint contains sufficient factual allegations regarding the MPD Officers’ collective actions during the May 30th confrontation to support the continued prosecution of this action against the named individual defendants, and the Court also concludes that the complaint adequately alleges all elements of a trespass claim against the District. Consequently, the District Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be DENIED. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2 Michael Robinson—a 28–year-old man with cerebral palsy, intellectual disabilities, an atrophied left arm, and a diminutive frame—has difficulty walking, speaking, and processing information. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 56.) Because of his “physical and intellectual limitations,” Robinson lives with his grandmother in the Marshall Heights neighborhood of Washington, D.C. (Id. ¶ 56.)
On May 30, 2014, Robinson was sitting at a bus stop near his home when he noticed the gaze of a police officer across the street. (See id. ¶¶ 2, 57.) This officer (who was later identified as Officer Brandon Farley of the PGPD) had been called to the District of Columbia to hunt for suspected car thieves. (See id. ¶ 58.) Because Officer Farley’s gaze made Robinson feel “anxious,” Robinson decided to walk back toward the apartment that he shared with his grandmother. (Id. ¶ 57.) As Robinson began to return home, Officer Farley exited his vehicle and pursued Robinson on foot. (See id. ¶¶ 3, 59.)
The complaint alleges that, at some point, Officer Farley spoke to Robinson, asking him for identification, and Robinson presented Officer Farley with his disability
]

identification card. (See id. ¶ 59.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Farley continued to follow Robinson into the stairwell just outside of the Robinsons’ apartment unit without any “provocation or justification,” and that Officer Farley “struck Michael, threw him down on the *157 steps, held him there, and tased him.” (Id. ¶¶ 59– 60.) Meanwhile, upon hearing loud noises in the stairwell, Mrs. Robinson ran to her door and looked through her peephole. (See id. ¶ 60.) Mrs. Robinson allegedly saw her grandson sprawled out on the steps (see id.), and as she looked on, Officer Farley purportedly dragged Robinson by the neck to the outside of the building (see id. ¶ 61). At some point, Robinson managed to break free from Officer Farley’s grasp and raced into his apartment, where he hid in the bathroom. (See id.)
The complaint alleges that, while Robinson was hiding in the bathroom, Mrs. Robinson and her neighbors repeatedly attempted to inform Officer Farley of Robinson’s disabilities. (See id. ¶ 63.) Undeterred, Officer Farley called for backup and returned to the bus stop to retrieve his police cruiser. (See id. ¶ 62.) He then paced in front of the Robinsons’ building with his firearm and taser drawn, “notwithstanding [the fact] that the situation he caused had stabilized[.]” (Id. ¶ 62.) When Mrs. Robinson’s repeated efforts to reason with Officer Farley failed, she returned to her apartment and “called 911 to report that a Maryland police officer was attacking her grandson.” (Id. ¶ 65.)
According to the complaint, the situation continued to escalate from there. While Mrs. Robinson was inside her apartment, additional officers from the PGPD, PGSO, and MPD arrived at the apartment complex—at least 29 law enforcement vehicles responded to Officer Farley’s call, in all. (See id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that, as the various officers arrived, witnesses at the apartment complex “repeatedly told them things like, ‘Excuse me, sir; he’s mentally challenged[.]’ ” (Id. ¶ 68.) In addition, according to the complaint, the officers had “confirmed with Farley that [Farley] was safe” by this time. (Id. ¶ 69.) Mrs. Robinson also allegedly attempted to plead with the arriving officers; she opened the patio door of her apartment—which was located just to the side of the building entrance’s stairs—and reiterated to the officers who had gathered outside that Robinson was disabled. (See id.) The complaint alleges that, despite Mrs. Robinson’s statements, the officers “rushed past [her] and into the apartment, with firearms drawn, while she loudly screamed, ‘No!’ ” (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs allege that none of the officer defendants had a search warrant or an arrest warrant, and that Mrs. Robinson did not consent to this entry into her home. (See id. ¶ 70.) Once inside the apartment, the officers found Robinson unarmed in the
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bathroom, at which point they allegedly grabbed, hit, shouted at, and kicked him. (See id. ¶ 71.) The officers then handcuffed Robinson and placed him under arrest. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 73.)
After being restrained, Robinson was initially placed into Officer Farley’s police cruiser, but District of Columbia MPD Officers transferred him to an ambulance, and he was transported to a local hospital, where doctors removed a taser spike from his back and treated him for a rapid heartbeat, cuts, and bruises. (See id. at ¶¶ 73–74.) Robinson was subsequently discharged into MPD custody, and was detained overnight by the D.C. Department of Corrections. (See id. ¶ 75.) For his part, Officer Farley submitted several written narrative accounts of the events leading up to Robinson’s arrest, and made various allegations in those statements, including that Robinson “struck him on the left temple” prior to the use of his taser; that Robinson attempted to take the taser away from him; and that there was an unruly crowd surrounding him at the Robinsons’ apartment building. (Id. ¶ 6.)3 Plaintiffs allege *158 that there is a contemporaneous video that reveals that Officer Farley’s assertions are untrue. (See id.)
This saga finally came to an end the day after the incident, on May 31, 2014, when Robinson was taken to court and the sole pending charge against him—misdemeanor assault on a police officer—was nolle prosequied. (See id. ¶ 7.) Robinson was then released. (See id.)
B. Procedural Background Approximately one year after Robinson’s encounter with the police, the Robinsons initiated the instant lawsuit against the District of Columbia, Prince George’s County, and a number of individual officers from both jurisdictions. The Robinsons’ 12–count complaint raises a series of constitutional, statutory, and common law claims against all Defendants. (See generally id.) As relevant here, the complaint asserts three constitutional claims against the MPD Officers—excessive force (Count I), unlawful entry (Count II), and false arrest or unreasonable seizure (Count III)—all arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as common law claims for trespass (Count VII), negligence (Count IX), intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count X), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) (Count XI). (See id. ¶¶ 87, 101, 111, 155, 171, 183, 192.) The complaint also raises a total of eight claims against the District of Columbia (see id. ¶ 87 (excessive force); ¶ 101 (unlawful entry); ¶111 (false arrest); ¶126 (Americans with Disabilities Act,
]

Rehabilitation Act, and D.C. Human Rights Act); ¶ 155 (trespass); ¶ 171 (negligence); ¶ 183 (IIED); ¶ 192 (NIED)), but as far as the District is concerned, only one of these claims—trespass (which is alleged in Count VII)—is at issue here.4
Shortly after the Robinsons initiated this lawsuit, the municipal Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss in which they argued, inter alia, that the Robinsons failed to make adequate allegations regarding the District’s involvement in Robinson’s arrest, and had also failed to include plausible allegations regarding a municipal policy or custom that had caused the alleged constitutional violations. (See generally Def. Prince George’s County’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. (“PGC Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 17; Def. District of Columbia’s Mot. to Dismiss (“D.C. Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 20.) This Court stayed all of the individual officers’ obligations to respond to the complaint while it resolved the municipal Defendants’ motions (see Min. Order of May 11, 2016), and in an oral ruling on July 27, 2016, this Court denied the municipal Defendants’ motions in their entirety and lifted the stay (see Min. Entry of July 27, 2016; Min. Order of July 28, 2016; see also July 27, 2016 Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 49).5 Plaintiffs then filed a Third Amended Complaint—the current operative complaint in this matter—which provided the names of previously unidentified individual officers, but did not otherwise materially alter the Robinsons’ claims. (See generally Compl.)
On October 7, 2016, the District of Columbia and the 10 named MPD Officers *159 filed the instant motion to dismiss, in which they argue that this Court must dismiss (1) all claims against the MPD Officers, and (2) the trespass claim against the District. (See generally Defs.’ Mot.) With respect to the MPD Officers, Defendants maintain that because the complaint “contains no specific allegation as to any of the individual District officer defendants[,]” it is “completely vague” and “speculative” in a manner that “necessitates dismissal.” (Id. at 7.)6 The motion to dismiss also argues that the Robinsons have failed to allege adequately all elements of a prima facie trespass claim. (See id. at 8–9.)
The Robinsons’ brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion was filed on October 21, 2016. (See Mem. in Supp. of Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 65.) In their submissions, the Robinsons assert that Defendants “have offered no authority to support the contention that[,] at this stage of an excessive force case, a plaintiff must specifically identify which of the numerous officers involved actually hit, dragged, or kicked him.” (Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
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(“Pls.’ Suppl. Br.”), ECF No. 76, at 16.)7 Plaintiffs’ opposition brief further argues that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support all elements of their trespass claim against the District. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 7–8.)
The pending motion to dismiss became ripe for this Court’s review on February 10, 2017, after a series of court-ordered filings related to the issue of qualified immunity. (See Min. Order of Nov. 14, 2016; Individual Defs.’ Suppl. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Suppl. Br.”), ECF No. 70; Pls.’ Suppl. Br.; Individual Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. (“Defs.’ Suppl. Reply”), ECF No. 77.) This Court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion on April 27, 2017.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint, and as such, prompts an evaluation of whether or not the pleading contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged[.]” *160 Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS As explained, the individual MPD Officers contend that Plaintiffs’ “generalized use of the term ‘Defendant Officers’ ” does not provide each of them with “fair notice of the grounds upon which Plaintiffs’ claims rest” (Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 66, at 2; see also Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (arguing that the complaint lacks “specific allegations concerning particular conduct on behalf of particular, individual
]

officer defendants”)), and the District further argues that the Robinsons’ trespass claim omits allegations regarding required elements (see Defs.’ Mot. at 8 (arguing that the Plaintiffs do not “allege that there was an interference with their possessory interest or make any allegation that the District Defendants intended to interfere”)). Neither of these arguments is persuasive, for the reasons explained below.
A. The Complaint’s Description Of The Underlying Events Provides Sufficient Notice Of The Alleged Violations, And Defendants’ Other Arguments For Dismissal Are Entirely Undeveloped The essence of the MPD Officers’ dismissal argument is that the Robinsons’ complaint “contains no specific allegation as to any of the individual District officer defendants[.]” (Id. at 2 (emphasis added).) In Defendants’ view, this lack of specificity means that Plaintiffs’ claims against these officers cannot advance, and defense counsel held fast to this peculiar notion—i.e., that an alleged victim of police brutality must be able to recite what actions each particular officer took during the course of the encounter in order to state a claim—during the motion hearing, repeatedly reiterating what the District’s motion plainly maintains: that because the complaint broadly defines the “Defendant Officers” who allegedly beat and kicked Robinson to include all 38 officers (from both the District of Columbia and Prince George’s County) that were on the scene on the date in question, it is insufficient to state a claim against any of the participants. (See Defs.’ Reply at 2 (arguing that “[s]uch a generalized use of the term ‘Defendant Officers’ ” warrants dismissal of the complaint); see also Defs.’ Suppl. Reply at 5 (“There are no alleged facts as to who was watching, who was in a position to intervene, or who may or may not have reasonably believed that the other officers were engaged in unlawful activity.”).)
Before delving into the merits of this argument, the Court notes that the MPD Officers have proffered no authority for the odd proposition that a complaint that alleges false arrest and other police officer misconduct must specifically link the complained-of conduct to particular police officers (presumably by name) in order to survive a motion to dismiss. The lack of any support for this quirky contention is not surprising, because this Court cannot fathom how such could possibly be the state of the law. That is, at the beginning of the case—prior to discovery and before the plaintiff has access to any information about who the allegedly offending officers are, much less statements and reports from participants and witnesses
4

Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154 (2017)
regarding what each officer has done—it is impossible to imagine that a complaint involving the allegedly wrongful conduct of a number of police officers could ever contain the specificity that Defendants here say is required. And, indeed, existing precedent clearly indicates that no such pleading standard exists.
Specifically, courts have recognized that “an arrestee’s inability to positively identify *161 those who allegedly violated his rights is not per se fatal to his claims[,]” Shankle v. Andreone, No. 06-cv-487, 2009 WL 3111761, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and this “is especially true where the acts complained of by the plaintiff, if true, ... are likely to have prevented plaintiff from identifying which of [several] defendant officers specifically engaged in the bad acts[,]” Kornegay v. New York, 677 F.Supp.2d 653, 657 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (first two alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To put it bluntly, when a plaintiff claims that multiple officers used excessive force, “it is not reasonable to expect [the] Plaintiff[ ] to be able to provide a detailed, blow-by-blow recitation of who did what and when.” Clark v. City of Chicago, No. 10-C-1803, 2010 WL 4781467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010). (See also Hr’g Tr. at 6:9–14 (questioning the proposition that the Robinsons’ complaint needed to include officer identifiers in regard to the conduct alleged by asking, “[h]ow is a person who is on the ground being kicked by officers ... supposed to know which officer did what at this point?”).)
Notably, even after discovery has been conducted in an excessive-force case, courts have rejected the argument that individual police officers are entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff could not identify which of the officers struck the offensive blow. See, e.g., Kornegay, 677 F.Supp.2d at 657 (denying summary judgment motion where plaintiff could not say which of two officers hit him with a crutch when plaintiff’s “back was to the officers both times he was struck”). How, then, can the MPD officers here reasonably maintain that the law requires a plaintiff to make such an individualized officer identification at the outset, prior to the stage of the litigation in which the pertinent facts about the events in question are made known?
In apparent recognition of the absurdity of this proposition, the MPD Officers’ briefs subtly recast their specificity argument as one that sounds in plausibility— they insist that the Robinsons’ complaint is alleging that each and every one of the 38 individual officers engaged in all of the conduct described, which, in defendant’s view, is not plausible. (See Defs.’ Reply at 3 (emphasizing that “[i]t is not possible that each and every
]

officer ‘stormed into’ the home or ‘hit and kicked’ Mr. Robinson” (quoting Pls.’ Opp’n at 3)); see also Hr’g Tr. at 5 (arguing that “it is simply implausible to suggest that all 38 officers were involved in dragging the plaintiff into the bathroom and assaulting him there”).) But when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Robinsons’ complaint alleges no such thing. Rather, it merely contains a placeholder term—“Defendant Officers”—and necessarily defines that term to include the 10 named MPD Officers, the 24 PGPD Officers, and the 4 PGSO Officers (Compl. ¶ 4), before recounting in great detail the events that allegedly unfolded on May 30th, and asserting that the “Defendant Officers” either participated in the violation of Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights, or stood by and failed to intervene as their fellow officers did so (see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 92–95, 102–04, 117–20). It is clear to the Court that the Robinsons’ complaint is structured this way precisely because Plaintiffs have to allege either direct participation or bystander liability in order to state a claim, see Matthews v. Dist. of Columbia, 730 F.Supp.2d 33, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2010), but at this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs do not know, and cannot be reasonably expected to know, which officer did what. This distinction is subtle but important. That is, rather than affirmatively—and implausibly—alleging that all 38 officers actively engaged in the conduct *162 described, the Robinsons’ complaint merely alleges that the conduct described occurred, and that each of the 38 listed officers were present such that any of them plausibly could have been a perpetrator or a bystander in regard to the allegedly abusive acts. Exactly who did what is not asserted, but this is not a fatal omission, because a plaintiff is not required to make such specific allegations at the motionto-dismiss stage, as explained above. (See supra.)
Undaunted, the MPD Officers appear to have tried once more to recharacterize their lack-of-specificity contention—this time, in the form of a fleeting “qualified immunity” reference that is entirely devoid of any relevant substance. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 2 (“[I]n the absence of specific allegations concerning particular conduct on behalf of particular, individual officer defendants, the officers cannot determine whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.”); see also Defs.’ Suppl. Reply at 2 (arguing that the fundamental issue “is less about whether or not kicking a disabled person is a Constitutional violation, and more about whether a Constitutional violation—whatever it is—can even be alleged when done with factual allegations that are overbroad and lacking in any specificity”); Defs.’ Reply at 4 (“It is precisely the lack of detail as to each officer’s alleged misconduct that mandates immunity.”).) During the motion hearing, in response to questioning from the
5

Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154 (2017)
Court, defense counsel clarified that the MPD Officers’ qualified immunity assertion was, in fact, none other than the same contention that Defendants were pressing regarding Plaintiffs’ failure to state with specificity which of the officers engaged in what aspect of the conduct alleged. (See Hr’g Tr. at 21 (Q: “So is your qualified immunity argument linked to this same argument about notice and specificity? Is that really the crux of it?” A: “That’s the way I understand it”).) Thus, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the MPD Officers have invoked the defense of qualified immunity in name only, and as a result, the purported “qualified immunity” basis for dismissal fails for the same reason as the faulty specificity assertion discussed above.
Notably, to the extent that the MPD Defendants could have asserted qualified immunity in the traditional sense and developed substantive arguments with respect to that defense, they have failed to do so, notwithstanding this Court’s express willingness to consider such arguments. (See Min. Order of Nov. 14, 2016 (ordering supplemental briefing on the issue of qualified immunity “because neither side has developed its qualified immunity arguments with enough specificity for this Court to decide the merits of Defendants’ motion”).) This Court need not, and will not, address undeveloped arguments for dismissal on this or any other ground. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Johnson v. Panetta, 953 F.Supp.2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). And the MPD Officers’ conclusory contentions that the Robinsons’ common law claims should be dismissed also undoubtedly fit into the woefully undeveloped category. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 8 (arguing, without further elaboration, that “the Complaint fails to state a common law tort claim against any individual officer on which relief can be granted”); Defs.’ Reply at 1 (arguing, with no further explanation, that “Plaintiffs fail to properly plead a common law tort claim against the defendant *163 officers”).)8
In sum, because the MPD Officers cannot support the misguided notion that more specificity regarding individual officer conduct is needed at this stage of the litigation, and because their remaining arguments about dismissal of the complaint’s claims are utterly underdeveloped, the MPD Officers’ motion to dismiss must be DENIED.
]

B. The Complaint States A Trespass Claim Against The District Of Columbia The District’s argument that the complaint’s trespass allegations are insufficient (see Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9) also fails. “ ‘[T]he tort of trespass in the District of Columbia is the intentional intrusion of a person or thing upon property that invades and disrupts the owner’s exclusive possession of that property.’ ” Garay v. Liriano, 943 F.Supp.2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Barry, 12 Fed.Appx. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Trespass thus requires “(i) an unauthorized entry (ii) onto the plaintiff’s property (iii) that interferes with the plaintiff’s possessory interest.” Council on Am.–Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F.Supp.2d 311, 344 (D.D.C. 2011).
In the instant case, the Robinsons broadly allege that “Farley and certain Defendant Officers purposefully intruded upon the Robinsons’ apartment when they entered through the patio door and the front door and remained inside for several minutes, all without authorization from Michael, Mrs. Robinson, or any other resident.” (Compl. ¶ 156.) The complaint describes in great detail this purportedly unauthorized entry (see, e.g., id. ¶ 70 (“Defendant Officers rushed past Mrs. Robinson and into the apartment, with firearms drawn, while she loudly screamed, ‘No!’ ”)), and Plaintiffs allege that the officers’ unauthorized entry “disrupted Michael’s and Mrs. Robinson’s exclusive possession and use of their apartment” (id. ¶ 156). If true, these allegations clearly would satisfy the elements of a trespass claim as laid out above; therefore, it is plain on the face of the complaint that the Robinsons have stated a prima facie claim for trespass.
The District makes two arguments regarding why this is not so. First, the District says, the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations regarding interference with the Robinsons’ possessory interest, and second, the District maintains that the complaint fails to allege that the District Defendants intended to interfere with that interest. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9.) With respect to the first argument, the District argues that the allegations of the complaint establish only that the officers were inside the Robinsons’ home for “ ‘several minutes’ ” (id. at 9 (quoting Compl. *164 ¶ 156)), and in the District’s view, that brief period is insufficient to support a claim “that MPD officers interfered with [Plaintiffs’ possessory] interest” (id.). The District makes no attempt to explain how the degree of the alleged intrusion into the plaintiff’s possessory interest has any bearing on the validity of a trespass claim, and well-settled authority indicates that it has none. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 cmt. h (1965) (“A trespass by way of an entry by the actor in
6

Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154 (2017)

person may be a mere momentary invasion[.]”). The District has provided no authority for the proposition that the alleged disruption of a possessory interest that gives rise to a trespass claim must be a lengthy one, and this is likely so because no such authority exists.
The District’s second argument fares no better. The District contends that, because “the defendant officers merely had the intent to secure a criminal suspect” (Defs.’ Reply at 6), the Robinsons have failed to “make any allegation that the District Defendants intended to interfere” with Plaintiffs’ possessory interests for the purpose of their trespass claim (Defs.’ Mot. at 8; see also id. at 9 (emphasizing that the “MPD officers’ intent was not to unlawfully enter the property but to respond to an officer’s call for backup in the face of a potentially hostile suspect”)). It is erroneous to suggest, as the District does, that the relevant “intent must be to interfere with Plaintiffs’ possessory interest in the property” (Defs.’ Reply at 6 (emphasis omitted)); rather, it is well established that all that is required to satisfy the intent element of a trespass claim is “a conscious intent to do the act that constitutes the entry upon someone else’s real or personal property.” Nat’l Tel. Co-op. Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (“[L]iability for trespass does not depend on a defendant’s specific intent to invade unlawfully the property of another[.]” (emphasis added)).
Nor does it matter that the officers entered the Robinsons’ home for law-enforcement purposes. While it is true an officer’s lawful entrance into a home will not constitute a trespass, “[l]aw enforcement officers who enter premises

without authority are subject to common law trespass actions.” Garay, 943 F.Supp.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 25–26 (collecting cases). In this case, the Robinsons have alleged that the officers did not have the lawful authority to enter the premises, and as a result, the officers’ lawenforcement motives are no impediment to the Robinsons’ trespass claim.
Because the Robinsons’ complaint adequately alleges that the District officers intentionally entered the Robinsons’ residence and thereby interfered with the Robinsons’ possessory interests, this Court concludes that the Robinsons have stated a valid trespass claim against the District of Columbia.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the Robinsons’ complaint describes with ample specificity the events that purportedly unfolded on May 30, 2014, and also contains the necessary factual allegations to state a trespass claim against the District. Consequently, as set forth in the accompanying Order, the District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED.
All Citations
264 F.Supp.3d 154

Footnotes

1

Page-number citations to documents the parties have filed refer to the page numbers that the Court’s electronic filing system

assigns.

2

The facts recited below are drawn from the Third Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 62.)

3

Plaintiffs have attached Officer Farley’s narratives as exhibits to their complaint. (See generally Exs. A, B, C to Compl., ECF No. 62,

at 55–63.)

4

For reasons that are not explained, the District has moved to dismiss only the trespass claim. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 1.)

5

In this same oral ruling, the Court denied without prejudice the District’s request for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ common law

claims, and authorized the District to re-raise these arguments in conjunction with any challenge to the common law claims that

the individual officers raised. (See July 27, 2016 Hr’g Tr. at 30:6–13.)

6

Defendants also contend that “the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity” (Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n (“Defs.’

Reply”), ECF No. 66, at 4), but the motion provides no relevant argument on the issue; instead, it makes qualified-immunity

contentions that appear to be just another species of their lack-of-specificity argument. (See, e.g., id. (“It is precisely the lack of

]

7

Robinson v. Farley, 264 F.Supp.3d 154 (2017)

detail as to each officer’s alleged misconduct that mandates immunity.”); see also Hr’g Tr. at 21:18–23 (defense counsel conceding that the “qualified immunity argument is linked to this same argument about notice and specificity[,]” and that the latter represents “the crux” of the qualified immunity argument such that “it’s all kind of one thing”).)

7

Plaintiffs further assert that the individual Defendants “have invoked the affirmative defense of qualified immunity ... in name

only[.]” (Pls.’ Suppl. Br. at 26.)

8

The conclusory nature of the MPD Defendants’ contentions in regard to the complaint’s common law claims is not for lack of

trying on the Court’s part: during the hearing, the Court repeatedly pressed defense counsel to articulate the basis for his

assertion that the common law claims cannot proceed—say, by pointing to the common law claims and articulating the missing

elements at issue—but defense counsel repeatedly declined to do so. (See Hr’g Tr. at 43 (Q: “[T]ell me what elements are missing

with regard to the common law claims.” A: “I would not be able to approach it in the specific way you want it.”); id. at 40 (“I can’t

give you specificity with regard to which common law claim.”).) It almost goes without saying that the Court can only seriously

consider the legal positions that a party is willing and able to explain. And, to the extent that Defendants’ argument for the

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ common law claims amounts to the same specificity argument that they raised with respect to their

constitutional claims (see Defs.’ Reply at 1–4), this argument fails for the reasons already discussed.

End of Document

]

8

 
 CLOSED,JURY,STAYED,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:15−cv−00803−KBJ

ROBINSON et al v. FARLEY et al Assigned to: Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff MICHAEL ROBINSON

Date Filed: 06/01/2015 Date Terminated: 05/28/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Christopher Nathan Thatch JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 879−4658 Fax: (202) 626−1700 Email: cthatch@jonesday.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander E. Blanchard U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRG 2100 Jamieson Avenue Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 299−3818 Email: alexanderblanchard@gmail.com TERMINATED: 01/04/2017
Alisha Marie Crovetto JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 879−3791 Email: acrovetto@jonesday.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Haley A. Wojdowski 400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW #715 Washington, DC 20001 (724) 272−7671 Email: hwojdowski@gmail.com TERMINATED: 07/12/2019
Matthew K. Handley HANDLEY FARAH & ANDERSON PLLC & URBAN AFFAIRS 777 6th Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 202−559−2411 Email: MHANDLEY@HfAJUSTICE.COM TERMINATED: 05/18/2018
Nathaniel G. Ward JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 202−879−3784 Email: nward@jonesday.com

Plaintiff AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Ann Hunger OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL Civil Appeals Division 100 West Randolph Street 12th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (630) 266−8618 Email: shunger18@gmail.com TERMINATED: 09/22/2016
William Vincent O'Reilly 6626 Van Winkle Drive Falls Church, VA 22044 703−354−6323 Email: wvor@aol.com TERMINATED: 09/30/2019
Dennis A. Corkery WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS 700 14th Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 319−1000 Fax: (202) 319−1010 Email: dennis_corkery@washlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher Nathan Thatch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander E. Blanchard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/04/2017
Alisha Marie Crovetto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Haley A. Wojdowski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/12/2019
Matthew K. Handley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/18/2018
Nathaniel G. Ward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Ann Hunger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/22/2016
William Vincent O'Reilly (See above for address)

V. Defendant BRANDON FARLEY In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant SEAN BABCOCK In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019

TERMINATED: 09/30/2019
Dennis A. Corkery (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. OFFICE OF LAW FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND 14741 Governor Oden Bowie Drive Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 (301) 952−5225 Email: raking@co.pg.md.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY GOVERNMENT Office of Law 1301 McCormick Drive Suite 4100 Largo, MD 20774 (301) 952−4874 Fax: (301) 952−3071 Email: gteferi@co.pg.md.us TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted LAW OFFICE OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY MARYLAND 1301 McCormick Drive Suite 4100 Largo, MD 20774 (301) 952−5228 Email: sewhitted@co.pg.md.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY GOVERNMENT Office of Law 1301 McCormick Drive Suite 4100 Largo, MD 20774 (301) 952−3808 Fax: (301) 574−8390 Email: wasnoddy@co.pg.md.us TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019

Defendant THOMAS HILLIGOSS In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant KENNETH MEUSHAW In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT TERMINATED: 09/24/2015
Defendant PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE TERMINATED: 09/24/2015

Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Gessesse Teferi PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY GOVERNMENT Office of Law 14741 Gov. Oden Bowie Drive Suite 5121 Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 (301) 952−4874 Fax: (301) 952−3071 Email: gteferi@co.pg.md.us TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
represented by Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019

Defendant PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC Public Interest Division/Civil Enforcement Section 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9867 Fax: (202) 741−5905 Email: aimee.saginaw@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL/DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th St., NW Sixth Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9866 Fax: (202) 715−7725 Email: alex.karpinski@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC Public Interest Division/Civil Enforcement Section 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6511 Fax: (202) 741−8995 Email: jordan.liew@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Warren Christie OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6638 Fax: (202) 741−0579 Email: John.Christie@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS P.G. County Police Department, Prince George's County Sheriff's Department, Metropolitan Police Department, D.C. Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 09/24/2015
Defendant
ALAN LARMORE In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019

Jonathan Hale Pittman OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor North Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6602 Fax: (202) 741−8926 Email: jonathan.pittman@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/04/2018
Pegah Ebrahimi Eftekhari OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−5695 Fax: (202) 741−0667 Email: pegah.eftekhari@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham DOUGLAS & BOYKIN PLLC 1850 M Street NW Suite 640 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 776−0370 Fax: (202) 776−0975 Email: tpham@douglasboykin.com TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF D.C. 441 4th Street NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 727−6262 Email: walter.adams@dc.gov TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address)

Defendant UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS Prince George's County Police Department, District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia's Department of Corrections, and District of Columbia, individually and in their official capacities Defendant TERRENCE WALKER In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant OSIRIS LOPEZ In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant TIMOTHY CORDERO In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019

TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant RENALDO MASON In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant MICHAEL MORRIS In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant LUIS ALBA DE JESUS In his individual capacity

William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address)

TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant SHANNON HARRIS In her individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant JENNIFER GRAF In her individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant MICHELLE MUNAFO In her individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address)

Defendant PATRICK MARRON In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant PETER JOHNSON In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant CHANDLER COLEMAN In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017

EVERETT MASON In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant JERRICK JEFFREYS In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant CORDELL BARBOUR In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant ROBERT WILSON In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019

represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019

Defendant MICHAEL CICALE In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant TERRY HOOPER In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant DILLON WILLIAMS, JR. In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant

Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017

TERRENCE MORDECAI In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant CEDRIC HEYWARD In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Defendant TRAVIS A. GRAY In his individual capacity
Defendant PAUL SKELTON In his individual capacity

represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant ROBERT J. MUNN In his individual capacity
Defendant MICHAEL A. PETTY In his individual capacity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017

Defendant KYLE S. USKIEVICH In his individual capacity
Defendant CHAD HOWARD
Defendant COLLIER RICE, JR. In his individual capacity

Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant CHARLES GARRETT, JR. In his individual capacity
Defendant THOMAS L. LEWIS, III In his individual capacity

Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019

Defendant STATE OF MARYLAND TERMINATED: 05/27/2016
Defendant MINH N. NGUYEN
Defendant JEREMY BURCH In his individual capacity TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Amicus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

represented by Jason Lee Levine LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST (LGIT) 7225 Parkway Drive Hanover, MD 21076 (443) 561−1700 Fax: (443) 561−1701 Email: jlevine@lgit.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aimee Elizabeth Saginaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alex Karpinski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jordan Song En Liew (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tram T. Pham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017
Walter Esmond Adams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
represented by Russell A. King , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gessesse Teferi (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/23/2019
Stephen E. Whitted (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Antoine Snoddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/12/2017

Date Filed 06/01/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against ALL DEFENDANTS with Jury Demand ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−4118332) filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL

06/01/2015 06/03/2015
06/25/2015
09/24/2015 09/24/2015
09/25/2015 09/25/2015 09/25/2015 09/27/2015
09/30/2015 09/30/2015 09/30/2015

EUGENE ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons, # 10 Summons, # 11 Summons, # 12 Summons)(Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
Case Assigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (md) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
2 SUMMONS Issued Electronically as to BABCOCK, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BRANDON CARL FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, District of Columbia Attorney General, and the District of Columbia Mayor. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Consent) (md) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
3 GENERAL ORDER AND GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL CASES BEFORE JUDGE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON. The Court will hold the parties and counsel responsible for following these directives; failure to conform to this Order may, when appropriate, result in the imposition of sanctions. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 06/25/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by William Vincent O'Reilly on behalf of All Plaintiffs (O'Reilly, William) (Main Document 4 replaced on 9/25/2015) (jf). (Entered: 09/24/2015)
5 AMENDED COMPLAINT against BABCOCK, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BRANDON CARL FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, ALAN LARMORE, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS with Jury Demand filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL EUGENE ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E (redline), # 6 Summons Larmore Summons)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 09/24/2015)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexander E. Blanchard on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
7 SUMMONS (1) Issued Electronically as to ALAN LARMORE. (jf) . (Entered: 09/25/2015)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah Ann Hunger on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Hunger, Sarah) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
9 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Unidentified Employees and Agents of the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department and Department of Corrections, # 2 Summons Unidentified Employees and Agents of Prince George's County, # 3 Summons Unidentified Officers, Employees, and Agents of the District of Columbia)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 09/27/2015)
10 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the District of Columbia Attorney General. Date of Service Upon District of Columbia Attorney General 9/25/2015. Answer due for ALL D.C. DEFENDANTS by 10/16/2015. (Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
11 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Date of Service Upon the Mayor for the District of Columbia on 09/25/2015. (Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
12 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. BABCOCK served on 9/28/2015, answer due 10/19/2015; BRANDON FARLEY served on 9/29/2015, answer due 10/20/2015; THOMAS HILLIGOSS served on 9/26/2015, answer due 10/17/2015; ALAN LARMORE served on 9/26/2015, answer due 10/17/2015; KENNETH MEUSHAW served on 9/29/2015, answer due 10/20/2015; PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY served on 9/25/2015, answer due 10/16/2015; UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS served on 9/25/2015, answer due 10/16/2015 (Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 09/30/2015)

10/09/2015 10/16/2015 10/16/2015
10/16/2015 10/23/2015
11/19/2015 11/19/2015 11/25/2015 11/30/2015 11/30/2015 11/30/2015 12/01/2015 12/07/2015 12/08/2015 12/17/2015

13 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew K. Handley on behalf of AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Handley, Matthew) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
14 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 5 Amended Complaint, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Pittman, Jonathan) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 14 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. The District of Columbia shall answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint by 11/25/2015. Any further requests for extensions of time must comply with 3 the Court's General Order and Guidelines for Civil Cases. Counsel is specifically directed to Section 5 of the Appendix to the General Order and Guidelines. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/16/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
15 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by BABCOCK, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Snoddy, William) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. It is hereby ORDERED that the motion for an extension to answer is GRANTED and moving defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by 11/25/2015. It is further ordered that plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to respond to the anticipated motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice as premature. Plaintiffs make seek an extension of time to respond after a motion is filed, in a motion that comports with the Court's General Order and Guidelines. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/23/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
16 ANSWER to 5 Amended Complaint, by BABCOCK, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS. Related document: 5 Amended Complaint, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Snoddy, William) (Entered: 11/19/2015)
17 MOTION to Dismiss by PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit !)(Snoddy, William) (Entered: 11/19/2015)
18 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond To Plaintiff's Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Karpinski, Alex) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
19 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 17 MOTION to Dismiss by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Hunger, Sarah) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 19 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 17 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' response to 17 is due by 12/17/2015. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/30/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint, nunc pro tunc to 11/25/2015. The District of Columbia shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by 12/1/2015. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/30/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/30/2015)
20 MOTION to Dismiss by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Pittman, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
21 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Hunger, Sarah) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 21 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 20 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' response is due by 1/8/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 12/8/2015. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
22 Memorandum in opposition to re 17 MOTION to Dismiss filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

01/08/2016 01/12/2016 01/13/2016 01/13/2016 01/13/2016 01/14/2016 01/14/2016
01/19/2016 01/21/2016 01/28/2016 02/09/2016 02/10/2016
03/31/2016 05/10/2016

23 Memorandum in opposition to re 20 MOTION to Dismiss filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
24 AFFIDAVIT FOR DEFAULT by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
25 MILITARY AFFIDAVIT re 24 Affidavit for Default by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
26 MILITARY AFFIDAVIT re 24 Affidavit for Default by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
27 ANSWER to 5 Amended Complaint, by ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW. Related document: 5 Amended Complaint, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Snoddy, William) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
28 MOTION to Dismiss by ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW (Snoddy, William) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. On September 26, 2015, Plaintiffs served their amended complaint in this matter on defendant Alan Larmore; three days later, on September 29, 2015, Plaintiffs also served defendant Kenneth Meushaw. Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Larmore and Meushaw had until October 19, 2015, and October 20, 2015, respectively, to file their answers. As of January 12, 2016, neither had filed an answer, and Plaintiffs accordingly requested that the Clerk enter defaults against both Larmore and Meushaw. One day later, Larmore and Meushaw filed a joint answer to the amended complaint, and two days later moved to dismiss certain of Plaintiffs' claims against them. While neither Larmore nor Meushaw sought leave from this Court to file these documents out of time, in light of the judicial preference for resolving disputes on the merits rather than on technicalities, this Court will construe these Defendants' joint answer and motion to dismiss as a motion for leave to file these documents out of time, and so construed, it is hereby ordered that leave to file these documents out of time is GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of Defendant's filings, Plaintiffs' request for entry of default against Larmore and Meushaw is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/14/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
29 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 MOTION to Dismiss by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Karpinski, Alex) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 29 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply re 20 Motion to Dismiss, nunc pro tunc. The District of Columbia's reply re 20 is due by 2/9/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/21/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
30 Memorandum in opposition to re 28 MOTION to Dismiss filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
31 REPLY to opposition to motion re 20 MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Karpinski, Alex) (Entered: 02/09/2016)
MINUTE ORDER setting hearing on Defendant Prince George's County's 17 MOTION to Dismiss, Defendant District of Columbia's 20 Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants Larmore and Meushaw's 28 Motion to Dismiss on 5/24/2016 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on February 10, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
32 NOTICE of Appearance by Tram Pham on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Pham, Tram) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
33 MOTION to Amend/Correct 5 Amended Complaint, by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Second Amended Complaint), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Redline), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Email Correspondence), # 4 Exhibit 4 (Disclosures))(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 05/10/2016)

05/11/2016
05/11/2016
05/16/2016 05/16/2016 05/20/2016 05/27/2016 06/01/2016 06/20/2016 06/21/2016 06/28/2016 07/11/2016

MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' 33 Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's 33 motion is GRANTED in the interest of justice and, therefore, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is accepted as filed. It is FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the filing of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, which does not contain official−capacity claims against the individual officers, Defendants Larmore and Meushaw's 28 motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. The motions to dismiss filed by Prince George's County and the District of Columbia (ECF Nos. 17 & 20) will be construed as applying to the Second Amended Complaint, and Plaintiffs and these two defendants should be prepared to proceed with the 5/24/16 motions hearing. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the obligation of any of the individual defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Second Amended Complaint is STAYED until further order of the Court. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on May 11, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
34 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against SEAN BABCOCK, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS, TERRENCE WALKER, OSIRIS LOPEZ, TIMOTHY CORDERO, RENALDO MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, MICHAEL MORRIS, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, SHANNON HARRIS, JENNIFER GRAF, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PATRICK MARRON, PETER JOHNSON, CHANDLER COLEMAN, EVERETT MASON, JERRICK JEFFREYS, CORDELL BARBOUR, ROBERT WILSON, MICHAEL CICALE, TERRY HOOPER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, TERRENCE MORDECAI, CEDRIC HEYWARD, TRAVIS A. GRAY, PAUL SKELTON, ROBERT J. MUNN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, KYLE S. USKIEVICH, HOWARD CHAD, COLLIER RICE, JR, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, STATE OF MARYLAND with Jury Demand filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(znmw) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
35 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim by STATE OF MARYLAND (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. The Motions Hearing previously scheduled for 5/24/16 is hereby VACATED and RESET for 6/21/2016 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 17. The hearing will address the motions to dismiss filed by Prince George's County (ECF No. 17), the District of Columbia (ECF No. 20), and the State of Maryland (ECF No. 35), each of which will be ripe as of this rescheduled hearing date. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on May 16, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
36 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 05/20/2016)
37 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal re State of Maryland (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
MINUTE ORDER denying as moot 35 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction in light of Plaintiffs' 37 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal re State of Maryland. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 06/01/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
38 NOTICE of Statement of Interest by United States (Oppenheimer, Elisabeth) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 6/21/2016. Oral arguments regarding 20 MOTION to Dismiss and 17 MOTION to Dismiss heard. Motions taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (lsj) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by Alisha Marie Crovetto on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
MINUTE ORDER setting Status Conference for 7/27/2016 at 3:00 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on July 11, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 07/11/2016)

07/27/2016
07/27/2016 07/27/2016 07/28/2016
08/01/2016 08/01/2016
08/01/2016 08/02/2016 08/05/2016

40 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE filed by MICHAEL ROBINSON, AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Alba de Jesus, L., # 2 Summons Barbour, C., # 3 Summons Chad, H., # 4 Summons Cicale, M., # 5 Summons Coleman, C., # 6 Summons Cordero, T., # 7 Summons Garrett, C., # 8 Summons Graf, J., # 9 Summons Gray, T., # 10 Summons Harris, S., # 11 Summons Heyward, C., # 12 Summons Hooper, T., # 13 Summons Jeffreys, J., # 14 Summons Johnson, P., # 15 Summons Lewis, T., # 16 Summons Lopez, O., # 17 Summons Marron, P., # 18 Summons Mason, E., # 19 Summons Mason, R., # 20 Summons McMillian, D., # 21 Summons Mordecai, T., # 22 Summons Morris, M., # 23 Summons Munafo, M., # 24 Summons Munn, R., # 25 Summons Petty, M., # 26 Summons Rice, C., # 27 Summons Skelton, P., # 28 Summons Uskievich, K., # 29 Summons Walker, T., # 30 Summons Williams, D., # 31 Summons Wilson, R.)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
41 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE filed by MICHAEL ROBINSON, AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Nguyen, M.)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held on 7/27/2016 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson; Oral ruling of the court denying Motions 17 and 20 to Dismiss and lifting the stay. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (nbn) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. On July 27, 2016, the parties appeared before this Court for a status conference at which the Court issued an oral ruling on the pending motions to dismiss and lifted the stay on the obligation of the individual defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Second Amended Complaint. At the conference, the Court indicated that the responses from the individual defendants would be due 21 days after service. However, in light of the fact that different defendants will likely be served at different times, thereby potentially generating dozens of different due dates, the Court has determined that it would be more efficient to set a single date by which all responses are due. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the individual defendants' responses to the Second Amended Complaint, as well as the District's responses to the relevant common law claims (Counts VII, IX, X, and XI), are due by September 21, 2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on July 28, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 07/28/2016)
42 MOTION to Bifurcate MOTION to Stay of Discovery by SEAN BABCOCK, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Snoddy, William). Added MOTION to Stay on 8/2/2016 (jf). (Entered: 08/01/2016)
43 SUMMONS Issued Electronically as to CORDELL BARBOUR, HOWARD CHAD, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, JENNIFER GRAF, TRAVIS A. GRAY, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, ROBERT J. MUNN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
44 SUMMONS Issued Electronically as to MINH N. NGUYEN. (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 42 Motion to Bifurcate; emailed to wasnoddy@co.pg.md.us, cc'd 20 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Two−part docket entry, 2. DO NOT REFILE−Counsel is reminded to select all parts of their motion (jf, ) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
45 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. CHARLES GARRETT, JR served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; JENNIFER GRAF served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; SHANNON HARRIS served on 8/3/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; CEDRIC HEYWARD served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; TERRY HOOPER served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; PETER JOHNSON served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; PATRICK MARRON served

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08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/11/2016 08/15/2016 08/16/2016

on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; RENALDO MASON served on 8/3/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; TERRENCE MORDECAI served on 8/3/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; MINH N. NGUYEN served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; MICHAEL A. PETTY served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; KYLE S. USKIEVICH served on 8/4/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; DILLON WILLIAMS, JR served on 8/2/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
46 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. EVERETT MASON served on 8/5/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
47 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. TIMOTHY CORDERO served on 8/8/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; JERRICK JEFFREYS served on 8/8/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; OSIRIS LOPEZ served on 8/8/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; MICHELLE MUNAFO served on 8/8/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; ROBERT WILSON served on 8/8/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
48 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service of Process by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
49 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 7−27−16; Page Numbers: 1−36. Date of Issuance:8−9−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above . After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 8/30/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/9/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/7/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 48 Motion for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service of Process. Plaintiffs shall effect service on defendants on or before 8/30/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/11/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
50 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. ROBERT J. MUNN served on 8/6/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Certified Mail Return Receipt)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
51 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. MICHAEL CICALE served on 8/9/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
52 Memorandum in opposition to re 42 MOTION to Bifurcate MOTION to Stay filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
53 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Opposition to Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery by SEAN BABCOCK, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Snoddy, William) (Entered: 08/16/2016)

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MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 53 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 42 MOTION to Bifurcate MOTION to Stay, nunc pro tunc. Plaintiffs' response re 42 is due on or before 8/26/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/23/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 08/23/2016)
54 REPLY to opposition to motion re 42 MOTION to Bifurcate MOTION to Stay filed by SEAN BABCOCK, BRANDON FARLEY, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, ALAN LARMORE, KENNETH MEUSHAW, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. (Snoddy, William) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
55 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. CORDELL BARBOUR served on 8/18/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; HOWARD CHAD served on 8/26/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; CHANDLER COLEMAN served on 8/24/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; LUIS ALBA DE JESUS served on 8/24/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; TRAVIS A. GRAY served on 8/19/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; THOMAS L. LEWIS, III served on 8/28/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN served on 8/17/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; MICHAEL MORRIS served on 8/25/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; COLLIER RICE, JR served on 8/18/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; PAUL SKELTON served on 8/23/2016, answer due 9/21/2016; TERRENCE WALKER served on 8/25/2016, answer due 9/21/2016 (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 08/29/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of Defendants Prince George's County, Brandon Farley, Thomas Hilligoss, Sean Babcock, Alan Larmore, and Kenneth Meushaw's 42 Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion is DENIED without prejudice as premature. This Court has not yet set a discovery schedule in this matter, nor have the parties had the opportunity to meet and confer to prepare a proposed discovery schedule, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, as far as this Court is aware, the individual defendants' responses to the Second Amended Complaint, and also the District's responses to the relevant common law claims (Counts VII, IX, X, and XI) have yet to be filed. This Court will consider the parties' proposals regarding further proceedings, including any requests for stayed discovery and/or bifurcation, at an appropriate time in the future. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/14/2016. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/14/2016)
56 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by CORDELL BARBOUR, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Snoddy, William) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 56 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Second Amended Complaint. Defendants CORDELL BARBOUR, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, and ROBERT WILSON's Answer is due on or before 10/3/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/19/2016. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
57 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to the Second Amended Complaint by HOWARD CHAD, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Pham, Tram) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
58 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. Attorney Sarah Ann Hunger terminated. (Hunger, Sarah) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

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MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 57 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Moving Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint on or before 10/7/2016. Any further requests for extensions of time must comply with 3 the Court's General Order and Guidelines for Civil Cases. Counsel is specifically directed to Section 5 of the Appendix to the General Order and Guidelines. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/26/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
59 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct Second Amended Complaint by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Third Amended Complaint), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Redline), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Email Correspondence), # 4 Exhibit 4 (Email Correspondence))(O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
60 ANSWER to 34 Amended Complaint,,, by CORDELL BARBOUR, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. Related document: 34 Amended Complaint,,, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Snoddy, William) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
61 MOTION to Dismiss by HOWARD CHAD, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Karpinski, Alex) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, Plaintiffs' 59 Consent Motion to Amend/Correct Second Amended Complaint. The Court will construe Defendants Travis A. Gray, Minh H. Nguyen, Paul Skelton, Robert J. Munn, Michael A. Petty, Kyle S. Uskievich, Chad Howard, Collier Rice, Jr., Charles Garrett, Jr., Thomas L. Lewis, III, and the District of Columbia's 61 Motion to Dismiss as responsive to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/13/2016. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
62 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BRANDON FARLEY, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, JENNIFER GRAF, TRAVIS A. GRAY, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, CHAD HOWARD, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS, KYLE S. USKIEVICH, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON with Jury Demand filed by MICHAEL ROBINSON, AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON.(jf) (Main Document 62 replaced because redactions were not captured when filed on 12/7/2017) (td). Modified on 12/7/2017 (td). (Entered: 10/14/2016)
63 REQUEST FOR SUMMONS TO ISSUE filed by MICHAEL ROBINSON, AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Burch, J.)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
64 SUMMONS Issued Electronically as to JEREMY BURCH. (jf) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
65 Memorandum in opposition to re 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 10/21/2016)
66 REPLY to opposition to motion re 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Pham,

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Tram) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
67 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. JEREMY BURCH served on 11/3/2016, answer due 11/24/2016 (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. Defendant District of Columbia and the ten individual MPD officers who have been sued in this action (collectively, "Individual Defendants") have filed a 61 Motion to Dismiss that is ripe for this Court's review. The Court has considered the parties' submissions, and it finds that supplemental briefing regarding the issue of qualified immunity is necessary, because neither side has developed its qualified immunity arguments with enough specificity for this Court to decide the merits of Defendants' motion.
Specifically, in the motion at issue, the Individual Defendants fail to specify whether they seek qualified immunity solely on the grounds that there was no constitutional violation, or whether they also maintain that the right was not clearly established at the time of any violation. Cf. Patterson v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 300, 311 (D.D.C. 2013) ("As laid out by the Supreme Court, the two pertinent questions in determining whether qualified immunity applies are (1) whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Likewise, Plaintiffs merely assert that "broad, undeveloped assertions devoid of supporting authority cannot justify dismissal" (Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 65, at 6 n.2), and they do not otherwise respond to the Individual Defendants' qualified immunity arguments. Cf. Kyle v. Bedlion, No. 12−cv−1572, 2016 WL 1301043, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2016) ("A defendant bears the burden of raising the defense of qualified immunity in response to a claim brought under section 1983, and once the defense is asserted, the burden of proof then falls to the plaintiff to show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity." (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)).
Thus, while it appears the Individual Defendants have met their burden of raising the qualified immunity defense such that Plaintiffs now bear the burden of demonstrating why the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, the basis (or bases) upon which qualified immunity is sought have not been made clear, nor have Plaintiffs clearly articulated their arguments in opposition to that motion. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the parties shall file supplemental briefs that conform to the following specifications: first, on or before December 26, 2016, the Individual Defendants shall file a supplemental brief of no more than 15 pages that clarifies the basis (or bases) upon which they are entitled to qualified immunity. Second, on or before January 23, 2017, Plaintiffs shall file a supplemental brief of no more than 25 pages that responds to the Individual Defendants' qualified immunity arguments and explains why the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds claimed. Any reply to Plaintiffs' responsive brief shall be no more than 10 pages, and shall be filed on or before February 10, 2017. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that a motion hearing is set for April 27, 2017 at 2:30 P.M in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. The parties shall be prepared to address the qualified immunity arguments, as well as the remaining arguments raised in Defendants' 61 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/14/2016. (lckbj3) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: Motion Hearing set for 4/27/2017 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (nbn) (Entered: 11/17/2016)
68 ANSWER to 62 Amended Complaint,,, by JEREMY BURCH. Related document: 62 Amended Complaint,,, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Snoddy, William) (Entered: 11/25/2016)
69 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Pham,

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01/18/2017 01/23/2017 02/10/2017 03/17/2017
04/27/2017

Tram) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 69 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Brief. The Individual Defendants' Supplemental Brief is due on or before 12/28/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 12/21/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 12/21/2016)
70 RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,, filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Pham, Tram) (Entered: 12/27/2016)
71 SUPPLEMENT to re 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (jf) (Entered: 12/28/2016)
72 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. Attorney Alexander E. Blanchard terminated. (Blanchard, Alexander) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
73 NOTICE of Appearance by Haley A. Wojdowski on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
74 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Gessesse Teferi on behalf of SEAN BABCOCK, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON Substituting for attorney William A. Snoddy (Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 01/12/2017)
75 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. Attorney Tram T. Pham terminated. (Pham, Tram) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
76 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM in support of Opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss re 65 , Alisha) Modified text and linkage on 1/24/2017 (td). (Entered: 01/23/2017)
77 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS 76 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Liew, Jordan) Modified on 2/13/2017 (zrdj). (Entered: 02/10/2017)
78 NOTICE of Appearance by Russell A. King, Jr on behalf of SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (King, Russell) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 4/27/2017, re 61 MOTION to Dismiss. Oral arguments heard and motion taken under advisement. (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 04/27/2017)

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Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 4/27/2017 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: re 61 MOTION to Dismiss filed by COLLIER RICE, JR., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, KYLE S. USKIEVICH, ROBERT J. MUNN, CHAD HOWARD, MICHAEL A. PETTY, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, MINH N. NGUYEN, TRAVIS A. GRAY, PAUL SKELTON, CHARLES GARRETT, JR.; Motion heard and taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (tb) (Entered: 04/28/2017)
79 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 4−27−17; Page Numbers: 1−52. Date of Issuance:5−25−17. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/node/110">Transcript Order Form</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 6/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/25/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/23/2017.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 05/25/2017)
80 NOTICE of Appearance by Gessesse Teferi on behalf of SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
81 ORDER denying District Defendants' 61 Motion to Dismiss and requiring District Defendants to answer the 62 third amended complaint on or before 9/20/2017. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 9/1/2017. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
82 MEMORANDUM OPINION denying District Defendants' 61 Motion to Dismiss. See attached document for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 9/1/2017. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
83 ORDER setting Initial Scheduling Conference for 10/26/2017 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 9/1/2017. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/01/2017)
84 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 62 Amended Complaint,,, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Liew, Jordan) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
MINUTE ORDER granting 84 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. It is hereby ORDERED that the District of Columbia and Defendants Lewis, Garrett, Gray, Rice, Howard, Petty, Nguyen, Munn, Uskievish, and Skelton shall answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint on or before 9/27/2017. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/21/2017. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/21/2017)
85 ANSWER to 62 Amended Complaint,,, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. Related document: 62 Amended Complaint,,, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Liew, Jordan) (Entered: 09/27/2017)

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10/27/2017
11/03/2017 11/03/2017 11/06/2017 11/08/2017

86 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
NOTICE of Hearing: Initial Scheduling Conference set for 10/26/2017 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson has been re−scheduled for 11:00 AM.(jl) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
87 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
88 ORDER granting 87 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/26/2017. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Initial Scheduling Conference held on 10/26/2017. Scheduling order forthcoming via Chambers. The Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate due within three weeks; response due within two weeks; reply due within one week. (Mid−discovery) Status Conference set for 3/22/2018 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Post−discovery) Status Conference set for 6/12/2018 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
89 SCHEDULING ORDER: Responses to early Rule 34 requests are due on or before 11/29/17; initial disclosures pursuant to FRCP 26(a)(1) are due on or before 11/29/17; motion to join parties, amend pleadings are due on or before 2/28/18; identities of experts for Plaintiffs are due on or before 2/28/18; identities of experts for Defendants are due on or before 4/30/18; fact discovery closes on 5/31/18; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Plaintiffs are due on or before 6/29/18; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Defendants are due on or before 8/13/18; rebuttal expert disclosures under FCRP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before 9/3/18; and expert discovery closes on 9/28/18. A mid−discovery status conference is scheduled for 3/22/18 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson; a post−discovery status conference is scheduled for 6/12/18 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Dispositive motions shall be filed on or before 10/3/18; oppositions on or before 11/30/18; and replies, if any, on or before 12/14/18. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/27/2017. See attached order for details. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties appeared before the Court for an initial scheduling conference on October 26, 2017. During the conference, counsel for the Prince George's County Defendants stated that they wished to renew their previous request for the bifurcation of the claims in this case, such that the Monell claims would be set aside, including for the purposes of discovery, until the full adjudication of the claims against the individual defendant officers. Having instructed Defendants to file a motion to this effect during the conference, this Court hereby ORDERS that the following brief schedule is set in this matter: Defendants shall submit a motion to bifurcate on or before November 9, 2017, stating both their reasons for requesting bifurcation and their proposed discovery schedule. Plaintiffs shall submit a response on or before November 23, 2017. Defendants shall submit any replies on or before November 30, 2017. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/27/2017. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
90 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 62 Amended Complaint,,, by PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
91 ANSWER to 62 Amended Complaint,,, by PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. Related document: 62 Amended Complaint,,, filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON.(Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
92 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion to Bifurcate Monell Claims, MOTION for Extension of Time to by PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 92 Consent Motion for Extension of Time. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants shall submit a motion to bifurcate on or before November 16, 2017, stating both their reasons for requesting bifurcation and their proposed discovery schedule. Plaintiffs shall submit a response on or before

11/08/2017 11/08/2017 11/16/2017
11/16/2017 11/30/2017 12/07/2017
12/07/2017 01/04/2018 01/16/2018

November 30, 2017. Defendants shall submit any replies on or before December 7, 2017. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/8/2017. (lckbj3) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion to bifurcate due by 11/16/2017. Responses due by 11/30/2017, and replies are due by 12/7/2017. (jl) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
MINUTE ORDER granting 90 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Answer, nunc pro tunc. It is hereby ORDERED that Prince George's County's 91 Answer to Amended Complaint is accepted as timely. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/8/2017. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
93 Second MOTION to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(King, Russell). Added MOTION to Stay Discovery on 11/17/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 11/16/2017)
94 NOTICE to Join Second Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH re 93 Second MOTION to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery (Liew, Jordan) (Entered: 11/16/2017)
95 Memorandum in opposition to re 93 Second MOTION to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery MOTION to Stay filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
96 REPLY to opposition to motion re 93 Second MOTION to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery MOTION to Stay filed by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. (Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
97 NOTICE to Join Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Renewed Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH re 96 Reply to opposition to Motion,, (Liew, Jordan) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
98 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Attorney Jonathan Hale Pittman terminated. (Pittman, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. This Court has now considered 93 Defendants' Renewed Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery, as well as the parties' briefs regarding this issue, and it concludes that, to avoid undue prejudice to the individual Defendants, bifurcation of the Monell claims is appropriate for the purposes of trial, but the current discovery schedule should proceed as to all claims, to avoid prejudice to Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (authorizing courts to order a separate trial for reasons of

02/15/2018 02/22/2018
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"convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize"). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that 93 Defendants' Renewed Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The parties shall proceed to discovery and shall submit dispositive motions on all claims as provided in the current 89 Scheduling Order. After summary judgment, any surviving non−Monell claims (either against the individual Defendants, or against the District and County through vicarious liability) shall proceed to trial. If there is reason to proceed to the Monell claims after the conclusion of the first trial, a second trial on the Monell claims will follow. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/16/2018. (lckbj3) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
99 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 99 Joint Motion to Modify the Court's October 27, 2017 Scheduling Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the deadlines in this matter are amended as follows: Motion to join parties, amend pleadings are due on or before May 29, 2018; fact discovery closes on August 29, 2018; Plaintiffs' expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before September 27, 2018; Defendants' expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before November 12, 2018; Rebuttal expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before December 3, 2018; Expert discovery closes and all discovery complete on December 21, 2018. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Status Conference currently set for June 12, 2018, is VACATED and RESET for January 8, 2019, at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. With the exception of the foregoing modifications, which include the removal of the obligation to exchange the names of expert witnesses during fact discovery, the parties shall comply with all other directives outlined in this Courts 89 Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 2/22/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. It is hereby ORDERED that the summary judgment deadlines in this matter are amended as follows: Motions for summary judgment are due on or before 1/28/2019; Oppositions to motions for summary judgment are due on ore before 2/28/2019; replies in further support of motions for summary judgment are due on or before 3/14/2019. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 2/22/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Mid−discovery status conference set for 3/22/2018 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Post−discovery status conference set for 1/8/2019 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (gdf) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Status Conference held on 3/22/2018. (Court Reporter Sara Wick) (gdf) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
100 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. Attorney Matthew K. Handley terminated. (Handley, Matthew) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
101 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 101 Motion to Modify the Court's Scheduling Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the schedule in this matter is modified as follows: motion to join parties, amend pleadings are due on or before 8/15/2018; fact discovery closes on 11/15/2018; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Plaintiffs are due on or before 12/17/2018; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Defendants are due on or before 1/31/2019; rebuttal expert disclosures under FCRP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before 2/21/2019; expert discovery closes on 3/21/2019; motions for summary judgment shall be filed on or before 4/18/2019; oppositions thereto shall be filed on or before 5/16/2019; and replies in further support thereof, if any, on or before 5/30/2019. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the post−discovery status conference current set for 1/8/2019 is VACATED and RESET for 4/4/2019 at 10:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge

05/25/2018 08/21/2018
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09/25/2018 09/26/2018 10/31/2018
11/13/2018 11/21/2018

Ketanji Brown Jackson on 05/25/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Rebuttal due by 2/21/2018. (gdf) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
MINUTE ORDER setting telephonic status conference for Thursday, September 13, 2018, at 02:30 PM. At this conference, the parties shall be prepared to update the Court with any progress on the disputed discovery issues addressed at the telephonic status conference held on Tuesday, August 21, 2018. The parties should use the same conference call−in number and access code as used for the telephonic status conference of Tuesday, August 21, 2018. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/21/2018. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Telephone Conference held in Chambers on 8/21/2018. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (gdf) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 9/13/2018 at 2:30 PM in Chambers before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (gdf) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
102 NOTICE of Appearance by Pegah Ebrahimi Eftekhari on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ( Eftekhari, Pegah) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Telephone Conference held in Chambers on 9/21/2018. (Court Reporter: Tim Miller) (gdf) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
103 NOTICE OF JOINT CONSENT TO MEDIATION BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 09/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. It is hereby ORDERED that this case is referred to a Magistrate Judge, to be assigned at random by the Clerk's Office, for Mediation until 12/10/2018. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint Status Report on or before 12/17/2018, which shall include a proposed schedule for further proceedings if litigation is going to be necessary. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/25/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
CASE RANDOMLY REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson for mediation until 12/10/18. (zmd) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Settlement Conference set for 11/1/2018 at 02:00 PM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson. (lcdar1) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The settlement conference now scheduled for November 1, 2018 is hereby continued by this court to 2:00 p.m. on Friday, November 30, 2018. This court apologizes to counsel and the parties for any inconvenience this continuance may cause. In the interim, counsel shall continue to meet and confer in further preparation for the settlement conference.(lcdar1) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
104 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 104 Motion to Modify the Court's Scheduling Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the schedule in this matter is modified as follows: fact discovery closes on 3/1/2019; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Plaintiffs are due on or before 4/1/2019; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Defendants are due on or before 5/15/2019; rebuttal expert disclosures under FCRP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before 6/5/2019; expert discovery closes on 7/5/2019; motions for summary judgment shall be filed on or before 8/5/2019; oppositions thereto shall be filed on or before 9/5/2019; and replies in further support thereof, if any, on or before 9/19/2019. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the post−discovery status conference currently set for for 4/4/2019 is VACATED and RESET for 7/19/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/21/2018. (lckbj2) (Entered: 11/21/2018)

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03/01/2019 03/01/2019
04/16/2019
04/18/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson: Settlement Conference held on 11/30/2018. Further Settlement Conference set for 3/4/2019 at 10:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson. (lcdar1, ) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
MINUTE ORDER REFERRING CASE to a Magistrate Judge, to be assigned at random by the Clerk's Office, for management of discovery. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 12/11/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 12/11/2018)
MINUTE ORDER. In light of this Court's referral of this case to a Magistrate Judge for purposes of discovery, it is hereby ORDERED that the discovery teleconference currently set for 12/14/2018 is VACATED. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 12/11/2018. (lckbj1) (Entered: 12/11/2018)
CASE RANDOMLY REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather, for management of discovery. (zad) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
105 Joint STATUS REPORT by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
106 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 02/27/2019)
107 Joint MOTION to Continue(Reschedule) Settlement Conference by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Teferi, Gessesse) Modified on 3/4/2019 to correct docket event/text (jf). (Entered: 03/01/2019)
MINUTE ORDER granting 107 Motion for Mediation; Set/Reset Hearings: Settlement Conference set for 8/8/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 before Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 3/1/2018. (lcdar1) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
108 MINUTE ORDER granting 106 Motion to Modify. Fact discovery closes on 8/1/2019; expert discovery closes on 12/5/2019; Plaintiff's Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosure due on or before 9/3/2019; Defendant's Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosure is due on or before 10/15/2019; Rebuttal Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures are due on or before 11/5/2019; summary Judgment motions are due on or before 1/6/2020; oppositions to summary judgment motions are due on or before 2/5/2020; replies in further support of summary judgment motions are due on or before 2/19/2020; the Status Conference currently set for 7/19/2019 is VACATED and RESET for 12/10/2019 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 3/1/2019. (lckbj1) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
109 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Index of Exhibits, # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H, # 13 Exhibit I, # 14 Exhibit J, # 15 Exhibit K, # 16 Exhibit L, # 17 Exhibit M, # 18 Exhibit N, # 19 Exhibit O, # 20 Exhibit P, # 21 Exhibit Q, # 22 Exhibit R, # 23 Exhibit S, # 24 Exhibit T, # 25 Exhibit U, # 26 Exhibit V, # 27 Exhibit W, # 28 Exhibit X, # 29 Exhibit Y)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the two emailed discovery disputes sent to Chambers via email, the undersigned will hold a telephonic discovery hearing with the parties on May 3, 2019 at 11:30 AM. The Court will provide telephonic dial−in information prior to the scheduled hearing on May 3, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M.

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05/15/2019

Meriweather on 4/18/2019. (lcrm1) (Entered: 04/18/2019)
110 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. Attorney Gessesse Teferi terminated. (Teferi, Gessesse) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' 109 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, the Court GRANTS the motion finding that it is in the interests of justice for Plaintiffs to file their motion under seal in accordance with the Court's previously−issued 88 Protective Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket the motion attached to Plaintiffs' Motion [109−2] as a sealed filing. Plaintiffs shall file a redacted copy by May 2, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 4/25/2019.(lcrm1) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The telephonic discovery hearing previously scheduled for May 3, 2019 shall now be rescheduled for May 20, 2019 at 1:00 PM. Dial−in details will be provided to the parties in advance of the hearing. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 4/25/2019. (lcrm1) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
111 MOTION for Order Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants (REDACTED) by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Index of Exhibits (REDACTED), # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P, # 19 Exhibit Q, # 20 Exhibit R, # 21 Exhibit S, # 22 Exhibit T, # 23 Exhibit U, # 24 Exhibit V, # 25 Exhibit W, # 26 Exhibit X, # 27 Exhibit Y)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
112 SEALED Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit List and Exhibits A−Y, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(zjf) (Entered: 04/30/2019)
113 Memorandum in opposition to re 111 MOTION for Order Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants (REDACTED) filed by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit B.1, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D)(King, Russell) (Entered: 05/09/2019)
114 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen E. Whitted on behalf of SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Whitted, Stephen) (Entered: 05/15/2019)

05/16/2019 05/16/2019
05/20/2019 05/20/2019 07/05/2019 07/12/2019 07/29/2019 07/30/2019
08/01/2019 08/07/2019 09/19/2019

NOTICE TO COUNSEL : For the attorneys participating in the Telephone Discovery Hearing set before Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on Monday, May 20, 2019 at 1:00 PM, please follow these instructions: Dial toll−free (888) 557−8511. When prompted, enter Access Code 6913244 followed by the pound (#) sign. You will then be prompted to push the pound (#) sign again. Please remain on the line until all parties are connected for the hearing. (kk) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
115 REPLY to opposition to motion re 109 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.), 112 SEALED MOTION filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.), 111 MOTION for Order Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants (REDACTED) filed by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather: Telephonic Discovery Hearing held on 5/20/2019. Plaintiff shall file a notice on the docket, for the reasons stated on record. (Court Reporter FTR Gold; FTR Time Frame: Ctrm 7 [1:25:00−2:40:05) (kt) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
116 NOTICE of Discovery Requests and Responses by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON re Discovery Hearing, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
117 NOTICE of Change of Address by Dennis A. Corkery (Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
118 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. Attorney Haley A. Wojdowski terminated. (Wojdowski, Haley) (Entered: 07/12/2019)
119 Joint MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 119 Motion to Modify the Court's Scheduling Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the schedule in this matter is modified as follows: fact discovery closes on 1/28/2020; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Plaintiffs are due on or before 3/2/2020; expert disclosures under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) for Defendants are due on or before 4/13/2020; rebuttal expert disclosures under FCRP 26(a)(2)(B) are due on or before 5/4/2020; expert discovery closes on 6/2/2020. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the post−discovery status conference currently set for for 12/10/2019 is VACATED and RESET for 6/16/2020 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. The Court will set a briefing schedule for dispositive motions, if necessary, at the post−discovery status conference. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 7/30/19. (lckbj3) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
120 NOTICE of Appearance by Walter Esmond Adams on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Adams, Walter) (Entered: 08/01/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the order granting the parties' Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order 119 , and extending fact discovery to January 28, 2020, it is hereby ORDERED that the settlement conference now scheduled for August 8, 2019 is continued to 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, November 7, 2019. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 8/7/2019. (lcdar1) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit District's Cross Claim)(Adams, Walter) (Entered: 09/19/2019)

09/27/2019 09/30/2019 10/02/2019
10/03/2019 10/03/2019 10/08/2019 10/16/2019
10/16/2019
10/23/2019 10/29/2019 10/29/2019

122 NOTICE of Appearance− Pro Bono by Christopher Nathan Thatch on behalf of AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Thatch, Christopher) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
123 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. Attorney William Vincent O'Reilly terminated. (O'Reilly, William) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
124 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(King, Russell) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: Prince George's County Defendants' 124 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to District of Columbia Defendant's Motion For Leave to File Cross Claim is GRANTED for good cause shown. Prince George's County Defendants shall file their response on or before 10/15/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 10/03/2019. (lcrm1) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response by Prince George's County Defendants to 121 Motion by District of Columbia Defendants for Leave to File Crossclaim due by 10/15/19. (kk) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendant's Response due by 10/15/2019 (hs) (Entered: 10/08/2019)
125 Memorandum in opposition to re 121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim, 124 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim filed by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(King, Russell) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
126 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Pacer message, # 2 Exhibit response email, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(King, Russell) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
127 REPLY to opposition to motion re 121 MOTION for Leave to File Cross Claim filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Christie, John) (Entered: 10/23/2019)
128 NOTICE of Settlement with Prince George's County Defendants by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON (Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 10/29/2019)
129 STIPULATION of Dismissal as to Prince George's County Defendants Only by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crovetto, Alisha) (Entered: 10/29/2019)

10/31/2019
11/01/2019 11/01/2019 11/04/2019 11/04/2019
11/04/2019 11/13/2019 11/13/2019
11/14/2019
11/14/2019 12/09/2019 01/23/2020

130 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply by SEAN BABCOCK, CORDELL BARBOUR, JEREMY BURCH, MICHAEL CICALE, CHANDLER COLEMAN, TIMOTHY CORDERO, LUIS ALBA DE JESUS, BRANDON FARLEY, JENNIFER GRAF, SHANNON HARRIS, CEDRIC HEYWARD, THOMAS HILLIGOSS, TERRY HOOPER, JERRICK JEFFREYS, PETER JOHNSON, ALAN LARMORE, OSIRIS LOPEZ, PATRICK MARRON, RENALDO MASON, EVERETT MASON, DOUGLAS MCMILLIAN, KENNETH MEUSHAW, TERRENCE MORDECAI, MICHAEL MORRIS, MICHELLE MUNAFO, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, TERRENCE WALKER, DILLON WILLIAMS, JR, ROBERT WILSON (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Surreply, # 3 Exhibit Ex. A to Surreply)(King, Russell) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
MINUTE ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for Full Case Management. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/1/2019. (jag) (Entered: 11/01/2019)
CASE DIRECTLY REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for Full Case Management. (zad) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
131 NOTICE of Appearance by Nathaniel G. Ward on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Ward, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: This action was referred to this court for the purpose of mediation. On August 7, 2019, this court scheduled a settlement conference for November 7, 2019. This court has determined that as of this date, the parties have yet to complete discovery, and that fact discovery will not close until January 28, 2020. See 07/30/2019 Minute Order. Thus, this court, sua sponte, hereby continues the settlement conference to 10:00 AM on Wednesday, February 5, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 11/04/2019. (lcdar1) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Settlement Conference set for 2/5/2020 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 before Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson. (lcdar1) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 130 Motion for Leave to File; emailed to raking@co.pg.md.us, cc'd 19 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Invalid attorney signature, 2. DO NOT REFILE − Login/Password must match signature page (zjf, ) (Entered: 11/13/2019)
132 ENTERED IN ERROR.....Memorandum in opposition to re 130 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to the District of Columbia's Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Cross Claim filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Saginaw, Aimee) Modified on 11/14/2019 (jf). (Entered: 11/13/2019)
133 Memorandum in opposition to re 130 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to the District of Columbia's Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Cross Claim filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Adams, Walter) (Entered: 11/14/2019)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: Document No. re 132 Memorandum in Opposition, was entered in error and refiled by counsel using their assigned login/password. (See Docket Entry 133 to view document) (jf) (Entered: 11/14/2019)
134 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Adams, Walter) (Entered: 12/09/2019)
135 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather held on 05/20/2019; Page Numbers: 1−48. Date of Issuance: 01/22/2020. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Nancy J. Meyer, Telephone Number: (202) 354−3118, Tape

Number: N/A. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have 21 days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

01/31/2020 02/28/2020
02/28/2020 03/06/2020 03/06/2020 03/09/2020 03/10/2020 03/11/2020
03/11/2020 04/15/2020

Redaction Request due 2/13/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/23/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/22/2020.(Meyer, Nancy) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the record herein, it is ORDERED that the settlement conference now scheduled for February 5, 2020 is continued to 2:00 PM on Tuesday, March 24, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 1/31/2020. (lcdar1) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiffs, AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON and MICHAEL ROBINSON's 111 Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants (Redacted) and 112 Sealed Motion for Preservation Order for Prince George's County Defendants are DENIED as moot in light of the 129 Stipulation of Dismissal as to Prince George's County's Defendants Only. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 02/28/2020. (lcrm1) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: It is ORDERD that the parties shall file a joint Status Report, on or by March 11, 2020, which shall detail the status of discovery, including but not limited to, pending discovery disputes and other outstanding discovery matters. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 02/28/2020. (lcrm1) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
136 VACATED PURSUANT TO MINUTE ORDER FILED 3/11/2020.....ORDER: Supplemental Briefing shall be filed in accordance with the attached Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 03/06/2020. (lcrm1) Modified on 3/11/2020 (kk). (Entered: 03/06/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' brief due by 4/1/2020. (kk) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
137 Joint STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J. MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Christie, John) (Entered: 03/09/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the 137 Joint Status Report and the request of counsel, the settlement conference now scheduled for March 24, 2020 is VACATED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 03/10/2020. (lcdar1) (Entered: 03/10/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court has reviewed the parties' 137 Joint Status Report. It appears that the parties have reached a settlement and anticipate filing a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal. In light of this development, the 136 Order for supplemental briefing is hereby VACATED. The Court adopts the parties' proposal and ORDERS that parties file a Joint Status Report on or by April 15, 2020 if a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal has not been filed. Further, the case is ADMINISTRATIVELY STAYED in light of the pending settlement of the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 03/10/2020. (lcrm1) (Entered: 03/11/2020)
Case Stayed. (kk) (Entered: 03/11/2020)
138 Joint STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHARLES GARRETT, JR, TRAVIS A. GRAY, CHAD HOWARD, THOMAS L. LEWIS, III, ROBERT J.

04/21/2020 05/26/2020 05/28/2020

MUNN, MINH N. NGUYEN, MICHAEL A. PETTY, COLLIER RICE, JR, PAUL SKELTON, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS, KYLE S. USKIEVICH. (Christie, John) (Entered: 04/15/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court has reviewed the parties' 138 Joint Status Report. The Court adopts the parties' proposal and ORDERS that the parties file a Joint Status Report on or by July 15, 2020 if a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal has not been filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather on 04/21/2020. (lcrm1) (Entered: 04/21/2020)
MINUTE ORDER. In light of the representations in the parties' 138 Joint Status Report regarding the settlement of this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the Status Conference currently set for 6/16/2020 is VACATED. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/26/2020. (jag) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
139 STIPULATION of Dismissal Against All Defendants by AGNES JOYCE ROBINSON, MICHAEL ROBINSON. (Ward, Nathaniel) (Entered: 05/28/2020)