Case3:15-cv-00221-JST Document1 Filed01/15/15 Page1 of 11

1 Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750

Sarah M. Morris* 2 CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

3

ENFORCEMENT CENTER 104 Broadway, Suite 400

4 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 757-7901

5 tfox@creeclaw.org

smorris@creeclaw.org 6

7

Bill Lann Lee – Cal Bar. No. 108452 Julie Wilensky – Cal. Bar No. 271765 Joshua Davidson – Cal. Bar No. 275168 LEWIS, FEINBERG, LEE, RENAKER & JACKSON, P.C. 476 9th Street Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 839-6824 blee@lewisfeinberg.com jwilensky@lewisfeinberg.com mcaesar@lewisfeinberg.com

8 Julia Campins – Cal. Bar No. 238023

Kevin W. Williams*

Hillary Benham-Baker – Cal. Bar No. 265019 COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY

9 CAMPINS BENHAM-BAKER, LLP

COALITION

8 California #703 10 San Francisco, CA 94111

655 Broadway #775 Denver, CO 80203

11

(415) 373-5333 julia@cbbllp.com

(303) 839-1775 kwilliams@ccdconline.org

12 hillary@cbbllp.com

13 *Pro hac vice application forthcoming

14 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed 15 Class

16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

17

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

18

SAN FRANCISCO/OAKLAND DIVISION

19

20 THE CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

21

ENFORCEMENT CENTER, on behalf of itself, and ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN,

22 RUTHEE GOLDKORN, and KENNETH KILGORE, on behalf of themselves and a

23 proposed class of similarly situated persons

defined below, 24

25 Plaintiffs,

26

v.

Case No. _______________
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

27 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST, 28
Defendant.

COMPLAINT

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1

Plaintiffs, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”), on behalf of

2 itself, and Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Kenneth Kilgore on behalf of

3 themselves and a proposed class defined below, by and through undersigned counsel, file their

4 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and respectfully allege as follows:

5

INTRODUCTION

6

1.

For more than 20 years, the Americans with Disabilities Act has required hotels

7 that provide transportation services to their guests to provide equivalent accessible transportation

8 services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters.

9

2.

Nevertheless Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (“HPT”) – which owns

10 and/or operates approximately 288 hotels spread among more than 40 states – has repeatedly

11 failed to provide wheelchair-accessible transportation in hotels that provide transportation to

12 nondisabled guests.

13

3.

As a result, while HPT’s nondisabled guests staying at these hotels can take

14 advantage of airport shuttle services and transportation services to areas near the hotel, guests

15 who use wheelchairs or scooters are denied these services. This action is limited to HPT’s

16 violations of state and federal requirements governing accessible transportation, including for

17 example purchase and lease of accessible vehicles and provision of accessible transportation.

18

4.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief establishing that HPT has engaged

19 in violations of the ADA and California state law, and requiring HPT to comply with these

20 statutes by providing wheelchair-accessible transportation services that are equivalent to the

21 transportation services provided to nondisabled guests at HPT’s hotels.

22

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

23

5.

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

24 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. (“ADA”), and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq.

25 (“the Unruh Act”).

26

6.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

27 §§ 1331 and 1343, and pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims brought

28 under the laws of the State of California. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for

COMPLAINT

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1 declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

2

7.

Venue is proper within this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

3

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

4

8.

This action arises in part in San Mateo County and thus is properly assigned to the

5 San Francisco/Oakland Division.

6

PARTIES

7

9.

Plaintiff the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”) is a

8 nationwide civil rights membership organization based in Denver, Colorado whose mission

9 includes, among other purposes, ensuring that persons with disabilities participate in our nation’s

10 civic life without discrimination, including in the opportunity to benefit from the services

11 provided by hotels.

12

10. Plaintiff Ann Cupolo-Freeman is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all

13 relevant times a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman has diastrophic

14 dysplasia and uses a motorized wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning

15 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable

16 California law, including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Cupolo-

17 Freeman requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services

18 offered by hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state

19 requirements governing provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is

20 also a tester in this litigation.

21

11. Plaintiff Ruthee Goldkorn is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all times

22 material hereto a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff Goldkorn has multiple sclerosis and

23 uses a power wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42

24 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable California law,

25 including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Goldkorn requires a

26 wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services offered by hotels, she has

27 a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state requirements governing

28 provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is also a tester in this

COMPLAINT

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1 litigation.

2

12. Plaintiff Kenneth Kilgore is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all times

3 material hereto a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff Kilgore is a quadriplegic who uses

4 a wheelchair for mobility. He has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §

5 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable California law, including

6 California Government Code section 12926. Because Mr. Kilgore requires a wheelchair-

7 accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services offered by hotels, he has a personal

8 interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state requirements governing provision

9 of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. He is also a tester in this litigation.

10

13. Defendant HPT is an investment trust incorporated in Maryland, with its principal

11 place of business at Two Newton Place, 255 Washington Street, Suite 300, Newton,

12 Massachusetts. HPT is a publicly traded real estate investment trust. HPT owns and/or operates

13 hotels throughout the United States, including approximately 35 hotels in the State of California.

14

FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS

15

14. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

16 located in San Bruno, CA, a hotel that provides its guests with a shuttle service to and from the

17 San Francisco International Airport and at least one Bay Area Rapid Transit station.

18

15. On or about October 22, 2014, Plaintiff Kilgore telephoned the Staybridge Suites

19 San Francisco Airport hotel and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. He

20 was informed that the hotel does not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

21

16. Had Plaintiff Kilgore been informed that the hotel did provide wheelchair-

22 accessible shuttle services, he intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. He was

23 deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

24

17. Plaintiff Kilgore would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

25 in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if he calls and is told that

26 such accessible services exist.

27

18. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Country Inn & Suites by Carlson

28 Sunnyvale located in Sunnyvale, CA, a hotel that provides its guests with a shuttle to and from

COMPLAINT

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1 the San Jose International Airport, in addition to a local shuttle service to business parks within a

2 five-mile radius of the hotel.

3

19. On or about October 28, 2014, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman telephoned the Country

4 Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle

5 services. She was informed that the hotel does not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

6

20. Had Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman been informed that the hotel did provide

7 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services.

8 She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

9

21. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman would like to stay at the contact the Country Inn &

10 Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

11 so if she calls and is told that such accessible services exist.

12

22. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Residence Inn San Diego Downtown

13 located in San Diego, CA, a hotel that provides its guests with a local shuttle service within a

14 three-mile radius of the hotel, including to and from San Diego International Airport.

15

23. On or about October 17, 2014, Plaintiff Goldkorn telephoned the Residence Inn

16 San Diego Downtown and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She was

17 informed that the hotel does not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

18

24. Had Plaintiff Goldkorn been informed that the hotel did provide wheelchair-

19 accessible shuttle services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

20 deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

21

25. Plaintiff Goldkorn would like to stay at the Residence Inn San Diego Downtown

22 in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if she is told that such

23 accessible services exist.

24

26. On information and belief, HPT owns and/or operates a number of other hotels in

25 the United States that offer transportation services to their guests but do not offer equivalent

26 transportation services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters. These hotels include, without

27 limitation:

28

A. Radisson Hotel Phoenix Airport, 427 N 44th St., Phoenix, AZ

COMPLAINT

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1

B. Hyatt Place Tempe/Phoenix Airport, 1413 W Rio Salado Pkwy., Tempe, AZ

2

C. Staybridge Suites Ft. Lauderdale – Plantation, 410 N Pine Island Rd., Plantation,

3

FL

4

D. Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta/North Point Mall, 1325 North Point Dr.,

5

Alpharetta, GA

6

E. Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center, 4601 Ridgeview Rd., Atlanta, GA

7

F. Wyndham Atlanta Galleria, 6345 Powers Ferry Rd. NW, Atlanta, GA

8

G. Hyatt Place Atlanta/Duluth/Gwinnett Mall, 3530 Venture Pkwy., Duluth, GA

9

H. Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Naperville, 1837 Centre Point Cir., Naperville,

10

IL

11

I. Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago – Schaumburg, 1200 Bank Dr.,

12

Schaumburg, IL

13

J. Candlewood Suites Dallas – By the Galleria, 13939 Noel Rd., Dallas, TX

14

K. Hyatt Place Dallas – North/By the Galleria, 5229 Spring Valley Rd., Dallas, TX

15

L. Wyndham Dallas Suites – Park Central, 7800 Alpha Rd., Dallas, TX

16

M. Staybridge Suites Herndon - Dulles, 13700 Coppermine Rd., Herndon, VA

17

27. On information and belief, after August 25, 1990, HPT has purchased or leased

18 vehicles for use on fixed-route and/or demand-responsive transportation systems in place at its

19 hotels.

20

28. CREEC brings this action based on associational standing on behalf of its

21 members. CREEC’s members – including Mr. Kilgore, Ms. Goldkorn, and Ms. Cupolo-

22 Freeman – include persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility, who

23 would like to stay at HPT hotels and use their transportation services, but have been deterred and

24 prevented from doing so by the failure of those hotels to provide equivalent, wheelchair-

25 accessible transportation services. Because CREEC seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief,

26 individual participation of CREEC members is not required.

27

29. Prior to filing this litigation, attorneys from CREEC wrote to HPT, explaining that

28 many of its hotels are in violation of the transportation provisions of the ADA and state law, and

COMPLAINT

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1 requesting that it bring its hotels into compliance with these statutes. HPT did not respond to this

2 letter.

3

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

4

30. Plaintiffs Cupolo-Freeman, Goldkorn, and Kilgore (the “Representative

5 Plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class defined as follows:

6 individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who have been, or in the future will be,

7 denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned

8 and/or operated by HPT because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at

9 those hotels.

10

31. Joinder of all members of the proposed class would be impracticable because,

11 without limitation, the class consists of numerous individuals who are geographically diverse,

12 these individuals are very difficult to identify and they are unlikely to be able to bring individual

13 suits.

14

32. There are numerous common questions of law and fact, including but not limited

15 to:

16

A. Whether Defendant HPT is a “private entity[y] . . . not primarily engaged in the

17

business of transporting people”;

18

B. Whether hotels owned and/or operated by Defendant HPT provide fixed-route

19

and/or demand-responsive transportation systems;

20

C. Whether Defendant HPT has purchased or leased any vehicles after August 25,

21

1990 for use on fixed-route or demand-responsive systems, and if so, the seating

22

capacity of those vehicles;

23

D. Whether Defendant HPT’s transportation vehicles are readily accessible to and

24

usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs;

25

and

26

E. Whether Defendant HPT has ensured that the transportation system in place at

27

each hotel, when viewed in its entirety, meets the equivalent service requirements

28

of 49 C.F.R. part 37.

COMPLAINT

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1 //

2

33. The claims of the Representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class

3 because they arise from the same course of conduct engaged in by Defendant HPT, are based on

4 the same alleged violations of the same statutes and regulations, and seek the same relief.

5

34. The Representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of

6 the class. The Representative Plaintiffs have no interests adverse to the interests of other

7 members of the class. Further, the attorneys they have retained include counsel who have been

8 appointed as class counsel in, and have successfully litigated, numerous disability rights class

9 actions across the country.

10

35. Finally, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper here because Defendant HPT

11 has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

12 appropriate final injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

13

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

14

15

36. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein.

16

37. Title III requires that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis

17 of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

18 advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns .

19 . . or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a).

20

38. Hotels that provide fixed-route transportation services to guests must comply with

21 the following requirements:

22

A. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity

23

over 16 passengers must be wheelchair-accessible;

24

B. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity

25

of under 16 passengers must be either wheelchair-accessible or equivalent service

26

must be provided.

27

39. Hotels that provide on-demand transportation services to guests must either

28 provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles or ensure that equivalent service is provided.

COMPLAINT

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1

40. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates “an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of

2 lodging,” which is a place of public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), and is

3 also a “private entit[y] not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people” pursuant to

4 49 C.F.R. part 37.

5

41. Defendant HPT has engaged in illegal disability discrimination, as defined by

6 Title III, including without limitation, by failing to ensure that transportation vehicles in use at its

7 hotels are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals

8 who use wheelchairs, by failing to ensure that its hotels provide equivalent accessible

9 transportation services to such individuals, and/or by failing to ensure that personnel are trained

10 to proficiency with respect to the provision of accessible transportation services.

11

42. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of Title III have caused, and

12 in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs and the class.

13

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, § 51, et seq., and the Unruh Act’s

14

Incorporation of the ADA

15

43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein.

16

44. Defendant HPT’s hotels are business establishments and, as such, must comply

17 with the provisions of the Unruh Act.

18

45. The Unruh Act guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are entitled to

19 full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

20 establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the State of California. Cal.

21 Civ. Code § 51(b).

22

46. A violation of the ADA, the DOJ Standards, or Title 24 is also a violation of the

23 Unruh Act.

24

47. Defendant HPT has violated the Unruh Act by, inter alia, denying, or aiding or

25 inciting the denial of, Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to the full and equal accommodations,

26 advantages, facilities, privileges, or services offered at Defendant’s business establishments,

27 specifically the transportation services offered at Defendant’s hotels.

28

COMPLAINT

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1

48. Defendant has also violated the Unruh Act by denying, or aiding or inciting the

2 denial of, Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal access arising from the provisions of the

3 ADA.

4

49. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of the Unruh Act have

5 caused, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs and the

6 class.

7

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

8 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment as follows:

9

1. A declaration that Defendant HPT’s conduct as alleged here has violated, and

10 continues to violate, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Unruh Civil

11 Rights Act, as well as their implementing regulations;

12

2. Issuance of a permanent injunction requiring Defendant HPT to comply with the

13 ADA and the Unruh Act;

14

3. Award of Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law; and

15

4. Such other additional or alternative relief as the Court finds just and proper.

16

17 Dated: January 15, 2015

Respectfully Submitted,

18

19

By: _/s/ Timothy P. Fox

20

Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750

21

Sarah M. Morris* CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

22

ENFORCEMENT CENTER

104 Broadway, Suite 400

23

Denver, CO 80203

24

(303) 757-7901 tfox@creeclaw.org

25

smorris@creeclaw.org

26 27 28
COMPLAINT

Bill Lann Lee – Cal Bar. No. 108452

Julie Wilensky – Cal. Bar No. 271765 Joshua Davidson – Cal. Bar No. 275168

LEWIS, FEINBERG, LEE, RENAKER & JACKSON, P.C.

476 9th Street

- 10 –

CASE NO. _________

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
COMPLAINT

Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 839-6824 blee@lewisfeinberg.com jwilensky@lewisfeinberg.com mcaesar@lewisfeinberg.com
Julia Campins – Cal. Bar No. 238023 Hillary Benham-Baker – Cal.Bar No. 265019 CAMPINS BENHAM-BAKER, LLP 8 California #703 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 373-5333 julia@cbbllp.com hillary@cbbllp.com
Kevin W. Williams* COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION 655 Broadway #775 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 839-1775 kwilliams@ccdconline.org
*Pro hac vice application forthcoming
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

- 11 –

CASE NO. _________

 
 Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 38 Filed 08/03/15 Page 1 of 14

1 Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750

Bill Lann Lee – Cal Bar. No. 108452

Sarah M. Morris, Pro Hac Vice 2 CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

Julie Wilensky – Cal. Bar No. 271765 Joshua Davidson – Cal. Bar No. 275168

3

ENFORCEMENT CENTER 104 Broadway, Suite 400

Linda Lam – Cal. Bar No. 301461 LEWIS, FEINBERG, LEE & JACKSON, P.C.

4 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 757-7901

476 9th Street Oakland, CA 94612

5 tfox@creeclaw.org

(510) 839-6824

smorris@creeclaw.org 6

blee@lewisfeinberg.com jwilensky@lewisfeinberg.com

7 Julia Campins – Cal. Bar No. 238023

jdavidson@lewisfeinberg.com llam@lewisfeinberg.com

8 Hillary Benham-Baker – Cal. Bar No.265019

CAMPINS BENHAM-BAKER, LLP

Kevin W. Williams, Pro Hac Vice

9 8 California #703

COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY

San Francisco, CA 94111 10 (415) 373-5333

COALITION 655 Broadway #775

11 julia@cbbllp.com hillary@cbbllp.com

Denver, CO 80203 (303) 839-1775

12

kwilliams@ccdconline.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed

13 Class

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17

18 THE CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND
19 ENFORCEMENT CENTER, on behalf of
itself, and ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN, 20 RUTHEE GOLDKORN, and JULIE
21 REISKIN, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated persons
22 defined below,

Case No. 3:15-cv-00221-JST
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

23

Plaintiffs,

24

v.

25 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST,
26 Defendant.
27

28

- 1 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1

Plaintiffs, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”), on behalf of

2 itself, and Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin on behalf of themselves

3 and a proposed class defined below, by and through undersigned counsel, file their Class Action

4 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and respectfully allege as follows:

5

INTRODUCTION

6

1.

For more than 20 years, the Americans with Disabilities Act has required hotels

7 that provide transportation services to their guests to provide equivalent accessible transportation

8 services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters.

9

2.

Nevertheless Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (“HPT”) – which owns

10 and/or operates approximately 290 hotels spread among 38 states – has repeatedly failed to

11 provide equivalent wheelchair-accessible transportation in hotels that provide transportation to

12 nondisabled guests.

13

3.

As a result, while HPT’s nondisabled guests staying at these hotels can take

14 advantage of airport shuttle services and transportation services to areas near the hotel, guests

15 who use wheelchairs or scooters are denied equivalent services. This action is limited to HPT’s

16 violations of state and federal requirements governing accessible transportation, including for

17 example purchase and lease of accessible vehicles and provision of accessible transportation.

18

4.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief establishing that HPT has engaged

19 in violations of the ADA and California state law, and requiring HPT to comply with these

20 statutes by providing wheelchair-accessible transportation services that are equivalent to the

21 transportation services provided to nondisabled guests at HPT’s hotels.

22

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

23

5.

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

24 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. (“ADA”), and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq.

25 (“the Unruh Act”).

26

6.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

27 §§ 1331 and 1343, and pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims brought

28 under the laws of the State of California. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for

- 2 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1 declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

2

7.

Venue is proper within this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

3

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

4

8.

This action arises in part in San Mateo County and thus is properly assigned to the

5 San Francisco/Oakland Division.

6

PARTIES

7

9.

Plaintiff the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”) is a

8 nationwide civil rights membership organization based in Denver, Colorado whose mission

9 includes, among other purposes, ensuring that persons with disabilities participate in our nation’s

10 civic life without discrimination, including in the opportunity to benefit from the services

11 provided by hotels.

12

10. Plaintiff Ann Cupolo-Freeman is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all

13 relevant times a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman has diastrophic

14 dysplasia and uses a motorized wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning

15 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable

16 California law, including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Cupolo-

17 Freeman requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services

18 offered by hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state

19 requirements governing provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is

20 also a tester in this litigation.

21

11. Plaintiff Ruthee Goldkorn is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all times

22 material hereto a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff Goldkorn has multiple sclerosis and

23 uses a power wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42

24 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable California law,

25 including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Goldkorn requires a

26 wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services offered by hotels, she has

27 a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state requirements governing

28 provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is also a tester in this

- 3 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1 litigation.

2

12. Plaintiff Julie Reiskin is a member of CREEC and is and has been at all times

3 material hereto a resident of the State of Colorado. Plaintiff Reiskin is a Board Member of the

4 Legal Services Corporation and the Executive Director of the Colorado Cross-Disability

5 Coalition. She travels frequently across the country. Plaintiff Reiskin has multiple sclerosis and

6 uses a power wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42

7 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable California law,

8 including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Reiskin requires a

9 wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services offered by hotels, she has

10 a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state requirements governing

11 provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is also a tester in this

12 litigation.

13

13. Defendant HPT is an investment trust incorporated in Maryland, with its principal

14 place of business at Two Newton Place, 255 Washington Street, Suite 300, Newton,

15 Massachusetts. HPT is a publicly traded real estate investment trust. HPT owns and/or operates

16 hotels throughout the United States, including approximately 37 hotels in the State of California.

17

FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS

18

14. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Country Inn & Suites by Carlson

19 Sunnyvale located in Sunnyvale, CA, a hotel that provides its guests with a shuttle to and from

20 the San Jose International Airport, in addition to a local shuttle service to business parks within a

21 five-mile radius of the hotel. The shuttle is available from 7 AM until 7 PM Monday through

22 Friday. Guests simply notify the front desk when they arrived that they will want a ride. The

23 website for this hotel provides information concerning the inaccessible shuttle, but provides no

24 information concerning accessible shuttle services.

25

15. On or about October 28, 2014, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman telephoned the Country

26 Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle

27 services. She was informed that the hotel does not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

28 //

- 4 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1

16. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had

2 it informed Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to

3 use those services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

4 accessible shuttle services.

5

17. On or about June 17, 2015, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman again telephoned the

6 Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible

7 shuttle services. She was informed that the hotel does not have an accessible shuttle, but that

8 arrangements could be made to secure wheelchair-accessible transportation. Plaintiff Cupolo-

9 Freeman requested the phone number of the taxi company that the hotel would call to make these

10 arrangements. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman called this company to request information on their

11 wheelchair-accessible transportation services, and was given the phone number of a separate

12 company, a company called Just Go.

13

18. According to its website, Just Go is “super busy” and recommends that

14 reservations be made “as far in advance as you can (we accept reservations for up to 30 days in

15 advance),” and at a minimum at least 48 hours in advance to ensure a ride. Further, whereas

16 transportation services provided by the hotel are available beginning at 7 AM, Just Go begins

17 operations at 8 AM.

18

19. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

19 offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: the accessible transportation services

20 are not offered during the same hours that the inaccessible transportation services are offered; the

21 accessible transportation services require longer advance notice than the inaccessible

22 transportation services; and information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is available on the

23 hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is not. Discovery may

24 reveal additional ways in which the accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

25 offered to nondisabled guests.

26

20. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had

27 it informed Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to

28 //

- 5 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1 use those services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2 accessible shuttle services.

3

21. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman would like to stay at the Country Inn & Suites by

4 Carlson Sunnyvale in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

5 hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation services.

6

22. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

7 Mesa in San Diego, CA, a hotel that, according to its website, provides its guests with free local

8 shuttle service to locations within a five-mile radius of the hotel.

9

23. On or about June 24, 2015, Plaintiff Goldkorn telephoned the Staybridge Suites

10 San Diego-Sorrento Mesa and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She

11 was informed that the hotel does not have an accessible shuttle. Plaintiff Goldkorn was told that

12 the hotel could request a local wheelchair-accessible taxi for a guest requiring accessible

13 transportation, but that the guest would have to pay for the taxi.

14

24. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

15 offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: guests who use wheelchairs or scooters

16 for mobility must pay for accessible transportation services, whereas nondisabled guests are

17 provided with free transportation services. Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the

18 accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those offered to nondisabled guests.

19

25. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had

20 it informed Plaintiff Goldkorn of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

21 services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

22 shuttle services.

23

26. Plaintiff Goldkorn would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

24 Mesa in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

25 accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation services.

26

27. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Hyatt Place Colorado Springs Garden of

27 the Gods in Colorado Springs, CO, a hotel that provides its guests with free local shuttle service

28 within a five-mile radius of the hotel, including to downtown Colorado Springs. The website for

- 6 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 38 Filed 08/03/15 Page 7 of 14

1 this hotel provides information concerning the inaccessible shuttle, but provides no information

2 concerning accessible shuttle services.

3

28. On or about June 23, 2015, Plaintiff Reiskin telephoned the Hyatt Place Colorado

4 Springs Garden of the Gods and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She

5 was informed that the hotel does not have an accessible shuttle. Plaintiff Reiskin was told that

6 the hotel could request a local accessible taxi for a guest requiring accessible transportation, but

7 that the guest would have to pay for the taxi.

8

29. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

9 offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: guests who use wheelchairs or scooters

10 for mobility must pay for accessible transportation services, whereas nondisabled guests are

11 provided with free transportation services; and information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is

12 available on the hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is not.

13 Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the accessible transportation services are not

14 equivalent to those offered to nondisabled guests.

15

30. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had

16 it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

17 services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

18 shuttle services.

19

31. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Hyatt Place Colorado Springs Garden of

20 the Gods in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

21 accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation services.

22

32. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates the Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

23 in San Bruno, CA a hotel that, according to its website, provides its guests with complimentary

24 shuttle service to and from San Francisco Airport and to other locations within a five-mile radius

25 of the hotel. Nondisabled guests using the hotel’s shuttle service are asked to notify the hotel an

26 hour in advance for the airport shuttle and a day in advance for the non-airport shuttle. The

27 website for this hotel provides information concerning the inaccessible shuttle, but provides no

28 information concerning accessible shuttle services.

- 7 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1

33. On or about June 29, 2015, Plaintiff Reiskin telephoned the Staybridge Suites San

2 Francisco Airport and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She was

3 informed that the hotel does not have an accessible shuttle, and that the hotel would need at least

4 two days advance notice to arrange accessible transportation for a guest. In addition, the hotel

5 employee stated that it was unclear whether the hotel or the guest would have to pay for the

6 accessible shuttle.

7

34. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

8 offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: guests who use wheelchairs or scooters

9 for mobility must provide at least two days advance notice, whereas nondisabled guests need

10 only provide one hour notice for the airport shuttle, and one day notice for the non-airport

11 shuttle; nondisabled guests know in advance that they will not be required to pay for their

12 transportation services, whereas disabled guests do not know whether this will be the case; and

13 information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is available on the hotel website, whereas

14 information concerning the accessible shuttle is not. Discovery may reveal additional ways in

15 which the accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those offered to nondisabled

16 guests.

17

35. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had

18 it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

19 services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

20 shuttle services.

21

36. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

22 in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel accurately

23 informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation services.

24

37. On information and belief, HPT owns and/or operates a number of other hotels in

25 the United States that offer transportation services to their guests but do not offer equivalent

26 transportation services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters. These hotels include, without

27 limitation:

28

A.

Radisson Hotel Phoenix Airport, 427 N 44th St., Phoenix, AZ

- 8 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1

B. Hyatt Place Tempe/Phoenix Airport, 1413 W Rio Salado Pkwy., Tempe, AZ

2

C. Staybridge Suites Ft. Lauderdale – Plantation, 410 N Pine Island Rd., Plantation,

3

FL

4

D. Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta/North Point Mall, 1325 North Point Dr.,

5

Alpharetta, GA

6

E. Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center, 4601 Ridgeview Rd., Atlanta, GA

7

F. Wyndham Atlanta Galleria, 6345 Powers Ferry Rd. NW, Atlanta, GA

8

G. Hyatt Place Atlanta/Duluth/Gwinnett Mall, 3530 Venture Pkwy., Duluth, GA

9

H. Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Naperville, 1837 Centre Point Cir., Naperville,

10

IL

11

I. Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago – Schaumburg, 1200 Bank Dr.,

12

Schaumburg, IL

13

J. Candlewood Suites Dallas – By the Galleria, 13939 Noel Rd., Dallas, TX

14

K. Hyatt Place Dallas – North/By the Galleria, 5229 Spring Valley Rd., Dallas, TX

15

L. Wyndham Dallas Suites – Park Central, 7800 Alpha Rd., Dallas, TX

16

M. Staybridge Suites Herndon - Dulles, 13700 Coppermine Rd., Herndon, VA

17

38. On information and belief, after August 25, 1990, HPT has purchased or leased

18 vehicles for use on fixed-route and/or demand-responsive transportation systems in place at its

19 hotels.

20

39. On information and belief, HPT relies on third parties to provide accessible

21 transportation services at many of its hotels.

22

40. On information and belief, many of these third parties do not provide accessible

23 transportation services that are equivalent to the transportation services provided to nondisabled

24 guests. For example, and without limitation, these third-party transportation companies do not

25 have the capability or capacity to provide equivalent transportation services, do not provide

26 transportation services during the hours that such services are available to nondisabled guests,

27 and/or require longer advance notice than nondisabled guests must provide.

28

- 9 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1

41. CREEC brings this action based on associational standing on behalf of its

2 members. CREEC’s members – including Ms. Reiskin, Ms. Goldkorn, and Ms. Cupolo-

3 Freeman – include persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility, who

4 would like to stay at HPT hotels and use their transportation services, but have been deterred and

5 prevented from doing so by the failure of those hotels to provide equivalent, wheelchair-

6 accessible transportation services. Because CREEC seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief,

7 individual participation of CREEC members is not required.

8

42. Prior to filing this litigation, attorneys from CREEC wrote to HPT, explaining that

9 many of its hotels are in violation of the transportation provisions of the ADA and state law, and

10 requesting that it bring its hotels into compliance with these statutes. HPT did not respond to this

11 letter.

12

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

13

43. Plaintiffs Cupolo-Freeman, Goldkorn, and Reiskin (the “Representative

14 Plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class defined as follows:

15 individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who have been, or in the future will be,

16 denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned

17 and/or operated by HPT because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at

18 those hotels.

19

44. Joinder of all members of the proposed class would be impracticable because,

20 without limitation, the class consists of numerous individuals who are geographically diverse,

21 these individuals are very difficult to identify and they are unlikely to be able to bring individual

22 suits.

23

45. There are numerous common questions of law and fact, including but not limited

24 to:

25

A. Whether Defendant HPT is a “private entity[y] . . . not primarily engaged in the

26

business of transporting people”;

27

B. Whether hotels owned and/or operated by Defendant HPT provide fixed-route

28

and/or demand-responsive transportation systems;

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1

C. Whether Defendant HPT has purchased or leased any vehicles after August 25,

2

1990 for use on fixed-route or demand-responsive systems, and if so, the seating

3

capacity of those vehicles.

4

D. Whether Defendant HPT’s transportation vehicles are readily accessible to and

5

usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs;

6

and

7

E. Whether Defendant HPT has ensured that the transportation system in place at

8

each hotel, when viewed in its entirety, meets the equivalent service requirements

9

of 49 C.F.R. part 37.

10

46. The claims of the Representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class

11 because they arise from the same course of conduct engaged in by Defendant HPT, are based on

12 the same alleged violations of the same statutes and regulations, and seek the same relief.

13

47. The Representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of

14 the class. The Representative Plaintiffs have no interests adverse to the interests of other

15 members of the class. Further, the attorneys they have retained include counsel who have been

16 appointed as class counsel in, and have successfully litigated, numerous disability rights class

17 actions across the country.

18

48. Finally, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper here because Defendant HPT

19 has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

20 appropriate final injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

21

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. 22

23

49. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein.

24

50. Title III requires that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis

25 of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

26 advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns .

27 . . or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a).

28

51. Hotels that provide fixed-route transportation services to guests must comply with

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

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1 the following requirements:

2

A. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity

3

over 16 passengers must be wheelchair-accessible;

4

B. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity

5

of under 16 passengers must be either wheelchair-accessible or equivalent service

6

must be provided.

7

52. Hotels that provide on-demand transportation services to guests must either

8 provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles or ensure that equivalent service is provided.

9

53. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates “an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of

10 lodging,” which is a place of public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), and is

11 also a “private entit[y] not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people” pursuant to

12 49 C.F.R. part 37.

13

54. Defendant HPT has engaged in illegal disability discrimination, as defined by

14 Title III, including without limitation, by failing to ensure that transportation vehicles in use at its

15 hotels are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals

16 who use wheelchairs, by failing to ensure that its hotels provide equivalent accessible

17 transportation services to such individuals, and/or by failing to ensure that personnel are trained

18 to proficiency with respect to the provision of accessible transportation services.

19

55. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of Title III have caused, and

20 in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs and the class.

21

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, § 51, et seq., and the Unruh Act’s

22

Incorporation of the ADA

23

56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein.

24

57. Defendant HPT’s hotels are business establishments and, as such, must comply

25 with the provisions of the Unruh Act.

26

58. The Unruh Act guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are entitled to

27 full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

28 //

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1 establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the State of California. Cal.

2 Civ. Code § 51(b).

3

59. A violation of the ADA, the DOJ Standards, or Title 24 is also a violation of the

4 Unruh Act.

5

60. Defendant HPT has violated the Unruh Act by, inter alia, denying, or aiding or

6 inciting the denial of, Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to the full and equal accommodations,

7 advantages, facilities, privileges, or services offered at Defendant’s business establishments,

8 specifically the transportation services offered at Defendant’s hotels.

9

61. Defendant has also violated the Unruh Act by denying, or aiding or inciting the

10 denial of, Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal access arising from the provisions of the

11 ADA.

12

62. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of the Unruh Act have

13 caused, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs and the

14 class.

15

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

16 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment as follows:

17

1. A declaration that Defendant HPT’s conduct as alleged here has violated, and

18 continues to violate, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Unruh Civil

19 Rights Act, as well as their implementing regulations;

20

2. Issuance of a permanent injunction requiring Defendant HPT to comply with the

21 ADA and the Unruh Act;

22

3. Award of Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law; and

23

4. Such other additional or alternative relief as the Court finds just and proper.

24

25 Dated: August 3, 2015

Respectfully Submitted,

26

27 28
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

By: /s/ Timothy P. Fox

Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750 Sarah M. Morris, Pro Hac Vice

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER 104 Broadway, Suite 400 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 757-7901 tfox@creeclaw.org smorris@creeclaw.org
Bill Lann Lee – Cal Bar. No. 108452 Julie Wilensky – Cal. Bar No. 271765 Joshua Davidson – Cal. Bar No. 275168 Linda Lam – Cal. Bar No. 301461 LEWIS, FEINBERG, LEE & JACKSON, P.C. 476 9th Street Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 839-6824 blee@lewisfeinberg.com jwilensky@lewisfeinberg.com jdavidson@lewisfeinberg.com llam@lewisfeinberg.com
Julia Campins – Cal. Bar No. 238023 Hillary Benham-Baker – Cal. Bar No.265019 CAMPINS BENHAM-BAKER, LLP 8 California #703 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 373-5333 julia@cbbllp.com hillary@cbbllp.com
Kevin W. Williams, Pro Hac Vice COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION 655 Broadway #775 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 839-1775 kwilliams@ccdconline.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

- 14 -

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00221-JST

 
 1

2

3

4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND
7 ENFORCEMENT CENTER, et al.,

8

Plaintiffs,

9

v.

10 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST,

11

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00221-JST
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Re: ECF No. 60

United States District Court Northern District of California

12

Plaintiffs have brought this putative class action, alleging that Defendant Hospitality

13 Properties Trust (“HPT”), which owns approximately 300 hotels spread across 38 states, has

14 violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. by

15 failing to provide equivalent wheelchair-accessible transportation at its hotels that provide 16 transportation to guests who do not use wheelchairs. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for 17 class certification. ECF No. 60. The motion is denied.

18 I. BACKGROUND

19

A. Factual and Procedural Background

20

Plaintiff Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”) is “a nationwide civil

21 rights membership organization based in Denver, Colorado whose mission includes . . . ensuring

22 that persons with disabilities participate in our nation’s civic life without discrimination, including

23 in the opportunity to benefit from the services provided by hotels.” ECF No. 38 ¶ 9. Each of the

24 Named Plaintiffs (Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin) is a member of

25 CREEC, has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Id.

26 ¶¶ 10–12. Each of the Named Plaintiffs “requires a wheelchair accessible vehicle in order to

27 utilize transportation services offered by hotels” and has served as a “tester” of a particular HPT-

28 owned hotel’s compliance with ADA requirements regarding wheelchair-accessible transportation.

1 Id. Defendant HPT is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”), which owns approximately 300

2 hotels across 38 states, including approximately 37 hotels in California. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13.

3 Approximately 142 of these hotels provide transportation services to guests. ECF No. 60 at 5.

4

On October 28, 2014, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman called the Country Inn & Suites located in

5 Sunnyvale, CA—a hotel owned by HPT which provides its guests with a shuttle to and from the

6 San Jose International Airport—and asked if the hotel provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle

7 services. Id. ¶ 15. She was informed that the hotel does not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle

8 services. Id. On June 17, 2015, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman once again called the Country Inn &

9 Suites and once again was informed that the hotel does not provide a wheelchair-accessible shuttle

10 service. Id. ¶ 17. She was told, however, that the hotel could make arrangements with a taxi

11 company for wheelchair-accessible transportation. Id. Cupolo-Freeman called the taxi company

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 that the hotel used and was told that reservations should be made “at a minimum at least 48 hours

13 in advance to ensure a ride.” Id. ¶ 18. She alleges that “[t]he purportedly accessible transportation

14 services are not equivalent to those offered nondisabled guests [because] the accessible

15 transportation services are not offered during the same hours that the inaccessible transportation

16 services are offered; the accessible transportation services require longer advance notice than the

17 inaccessible transportation services; and information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is

18 available on the hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is not.” Id. ¶

19 19.

20

On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff Reiskin called a second HPT-owned hotel, the Hyatt Place in

21 Colorado Springs, CO, which provides guests with free local shuttle service to locations within a

22 five-mile radius of the hotel. Id. ¶ 27–28. She was informed that the hotel does not have a

23 wheelchair-accessible shuttle. Id. ¶ 28. She “was told that the hotel could request a local

24 [wheelchair]-accessible taxi for a guest requiring accessible transportation, but that the guest

25 would have to pay for the taxi.” Id. She alleges that the hotel’s “purportedly accessible

26 transportation services are not equivalent to those offered nondisabled guests [because] guests who

27 use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility must pay for accessible transportation services, whereas

28 nondisabled guests are provided with free transportation services[,] and information concerning 2

1 the inaccessible shuttle is available on the hotel website, whereas information concerning the

2 accessible shuttle is not.” Id. ¶ 29.

3

On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff Reiskin called a third HPT-owned hotel, the Staybridge Suites

4 San Francisco Airport, which provides its guests with complimentary shuttle service to and from

5 the San Francisco Airport and to other locations within a five-mile radius of the hotel. Id. ¶¶ 32–

6 33. She was informed that the hotel does not have a wheelchair-accessible shuttle, and that the

7 hotel would need at least two days advance notice to arrange accessible transportation for a guest,

8 whereas nondisabled guests were only required to notify the hotel an hour in advance for the

9 airport shuttle and a day in advance for the non-airport shuttle. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. She alleges that the

10 hotel’s “purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those offered

11 nondisabled guests [because] guests who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility must provide at

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 least two days advance notice, whereas nondisabled guests need only provide one hour notice for

13 the airport shuttle, and one day notice for the non-airport shuttle; nondisabled guests know in

14 advance that they will not be required to pay for their transportation services, whereas disabled

15 guests do not know whether this will be the case’ and information concerning the inaccessible

16 shuttle is available on the hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is

17 not.” Id. ¶34.

18

Finally, on June 24, 2015, Plaintiff Goldkorn called a fourth HPT-owned hotel, the

19 Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa, which provides guests with free local shuttle service

20 to locations within a five-mile radius of the hotel. Id. ¶ 22. She was similarly informed that the

21 hotel does not offer a wheelchair-accessible shuttle. Id. ¶ 23. She “was told that the hotel could

22 request a local wheelchair-accessible taxi for a guest requiring accessible transportation, but that

23 the guest would have to pay for the taxi.” Id. Goldkorn alleges that “[t]he purportedly accessible

24 transportation services are not equivalent to those offered nondisabled guests [because] guests who

25 use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility must pay for accessible transportation services, whereas

26 nondisabled guests are provided with free transportation services.” Id. ¶ 24.

27

Each of the Named Plaintiffs alleges that had the HPT-owned hotel-in-question provided

28 equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, she intended to stay at the hotel and use those 3

1 services. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20, 25, 30, 35. Each of the Named Plaintiffs also alleges that she was deterred

2 from staying at the hotel-in-question by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

3 shuttle services. Id.

4

On January 15, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint, raising claims under Title III

5 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §

6 51, et seq. ECF No. 1. On August 3, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint

7 (“FAC”), raising the same two claims. ECF No. 38. The FAC does not seek damages; it seeks

8 only declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 38 at 13. On November 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed

9 a motion seeking to certify a class consisting of:

United States District Court Northern District of California

10

Individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, since

January 15, 2013, have been, or in the future will be, denied the full

11

and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at

hotels owned and/or operated by Hospitality Properties Trust

12

because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services

at those hotels. 13
ECF No. 60 at 14.

14

B. The Americans with Disabilities Act 15
The ADA was enacted “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards

16 addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).

17 Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2011). The ADA provides that

18 “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal

19 enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any

20 place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place

21 of public accommodation.” Id. § 12182(a).

22 The ADA specifically provides that “[i]t shall be considered discrimination for a private

23 entity which operates a fixed route system1 . . . to purchase or lease a vehicle with a seating

24 capacity in excess of 16 passengers (including the driver) for use on such system . . . that is not

25 readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use

26

27 1 “The term ‘fixed route system’ means a system of providing transportation of individuals (other

28

than by aircraft) on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(4).

4

1 wheelchairs.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(B)(i). Moreover, “if a private entity which operates a fixed route

2 system . . . purchases or leases a vehicle with a seating capacity of 16 passengers or less (including

3 the driver) . . . that is not readily accessible to or usable by individuals with disabilities, it shall be

4 considered discrimination for such entity to fail to operate such system so that, when viewed in its

5 entirety, such system ensures a level of service to individuals with disabilities, including

6 individuals who use wheelchairs, equivalent to the level of service provided to individuals without

7 disabilities.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(B)(ii).

8

The ADA also prohibits discrimination with respect to “demand responsive systems.”2 In

9 this respect, the ADA provides that discrimination includes:

10

(i) a failure of a private entity which operates a demand responsive

system . . . to operate such system so that, when viewed in its

11

entirety, such system ensures a level of service to individuals with

disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, equivalent to

12

the level of service provided to individuals without disabilities; and

United States District Court Northern District of California

13

(ii) the purchase or lease by such entity for use on such system of a

vehicle with a seating capacity in excess of 16 passengers (including

14

the driver) . . . that is not readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities (including individuals who use

15

wheelchairs) unless such entity can demonstrate that such system,

when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to individuals

16

with disabilities equivalent to that provided to individuals without

disabilities. 17

Id. § 12182(b)(2)(C).

18

II. JURISDICTION 19
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiffs’ 20
first claim for relief arises under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. The Court has 21
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ California Unruh Civil Rights Act claim pursuant to 28 22
U.S.C. § 1367. 23

III. LEGAL STANDARD 24
Class certification under Rule 23 is a two-step process. First, Plaintiff must demonstrate 25
that the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of 23(a) are met. “One 26

27 2 “The term ‘demand responsive system’ means any system of providing transportation of

28

individuals by a vehicle, other than a system which is a fixed route system.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(3).

5

1 or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members

2 only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are

3 questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

4 parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will

5 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “Class certification

6 is proper only if the trial court has concluded, after a ‘rigorous analysis,’ that Rule 23(a) has been

7 satisfied.” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542–43 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

8 Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)). In addition, “[w]hile it is not an

9 enumerated requirement of Rule 23, courts have recognized that “in order to maintain a class

10 action, the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”

11 Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. C.I.A., 288 F.R.D. 192, 211 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970)).

13

Second, a plaintiff must also establish that one of the bases for certification in Rule 23(b) is

14 met. Here, Plaintiff invokes Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that “the party opposing the class has

15 acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or

16 corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

17 23(b)(2). The “class plaintiff has the burden of showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are

18 met and that the class is maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(b).” Narouz v. Charter

19 Communications, LLC, 591 F. 3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010).

20 IV. ANALYSIS

21

A. Standing

22

Before the Court decides whether to certify a class, the Court must determine whether

23 Plaintiffs have Article III standing. “A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of

24 establishing that it has satisfied the ‘case-or-controversy’ requirement of Article III of the

25 Constitution . . . .” D’Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.

26 2008). The case-or-controversy requirement of Article III requires that, in order for a party to

27 have standing to raise a claim: (1) the party invoking federal jurisdiction must have suffered an

28 actual or threatened injury; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged 6

1 conduct; and (3) the injury must be redressable. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

2 560–61 (1992). An actual or threatened injury requires damages to “a legally protected interest

3 which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

4 hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, to establish

5 standing to pursue injunctive relief in particular, Plaintiffs “must demonstrate a real and immediate

6 threat of repeated injury.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In a

7 class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Bates v.

8 United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007).

9

Here, the parties do not appear to dispute, and the Court finds no reason to doubt, that

10 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fairly traceable to defendant’s challenged conduct and that the

11 alleged injury is redressable by the Court. The standing analysis thus turns on whether Plaintiffs

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 have suffered an injury-in-fact and whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of future

13 injury sufficient to support injunctive relief.

14

Plaintiffs argue that each of the Named Plaintiffs has standing to pursue injunctive relief

15 because “(1) they called HPT hotels and were told by the hotels that although they do provide

16 [wheelchair] inaccessible transportation, they do not provide equivalent [wheelchair] accessible

17 transportation [as required by the ADA]; (2) as a result, the [Named] Plaintiffs are deterred from

18 patronizing those hotels; and (3) [the Named Plaintiffs] will patronize the hotels once the hotels

19 provide equivalent accessible transportation . . . .” ECF No. 60 at 11.

20

“Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an accessibility barrier violating its

21 provisions, it is not necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely preclude the

22 plaintiff from entering or from using a facility in any way.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947. Instead,

23 “[o]nce a disabled individual has encountered or become aware of alleged ADA violations that

24 deter his patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation,

25 he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant’s conduct and capable of being

26 redressed by the courts, and so he possesses standing under Article III . . . .” Id. (quoting Doran v.

27 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, each of the Named Plaintiffs’

28 “initial encounter with accessibility barriers”—their being informed by the HPT-owned hotels that 7

1 the hotels did not provide equivalent wheelchair-accessible transportation as the hotels provided to

2 guests who do not use wheelchairs—“constituted an injury-in-fact.” Id. at 947–48.

3

“Although encounters with [] noncompliant barriers related to one’s disability,” such as the

4 Court has found here, are sufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact for standing purposes, a

5 plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must additionally demonstrate ‘a sufficient likelihood that he

6 will again be wronged in a similar way.’” Id. at 948 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

7 U.S. 95, 111(1983)). In this respect, Plaintiffs argue that they have been deterred from patronizing

8 the HPT-owned hotels-in-question and that they will patronize these hotels if, and when, the

9 alleged ADA violations are remedied. ECF No. 60 at 11; ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 16, 20, 25, 30. Because

10 the Ninth Circuit has held that “a plaintiff can demonstrate sufficient injury to pursue injunctive

11 relief when [alleged violations of the ADA] deter him from returning to a noncompliant

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 accommodation,” the Court also concludes that the Named Plaintiffs have standing to seek

13 injunctive relief. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950 (stating that “a plaintiff who is deterred from

14 patronizing a store suffers the ongoing ‘actual injury’ of lack of access to the store”).

15

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because “Plaintiffs admit their status as

16 ‘testers’ whose sole purpose in attempting to patronize four HPT hotels was to determine whether

17 those hotels provided ADA-compliant shuttle services.” ECF No. 64 at 9; see also ECF No. 64 at

18 12 (“Here, there was and is no organic reason or motive for any of the putative class

19 representatives to visit any of the four hotels that they called.”). However, none of the authority

20 cited by Defendants stands for the proposition that a plaintiff’s status as a “tester”—or the fact that

21 a plaintiff lacks “organic” motives for visiting an accommodation—defeats a finding of standing

22 in ADA Title III cases.

23

While the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this precise issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that

24 “testers fall within the protected group of ‘any person[s]’ that may enforce rights created by §

25 3604(f)(2) [of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”)] when they are violated by

26 discriminatory housing conditions.” Smith v. Pacific Properties and Development Corp., 358 F.3d

27 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the fact that

28 section 3604(f)(2) of the FHAA prohibited discrimination “against any person in the terms, 8

1 conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities

2 in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap . . . .” Id. at 1102–04. Similarly, here,

3 the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability,”

4 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added), and “any person who is being subjected to discrimination

5 on the basis of disability” may bring suit, id. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, at least

6 two other Circuit Courts have held that a plaintiff’s “tester motive . . . does not foreclose standing

7 for his claim under . . . Title III” of the ADA. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d

8 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Abercrombie & Fitch

9 Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A]nyone who has suffered an invasion of the legal

10 interest protected by Title III may have standing, regardless of his or her motivation in

11 encountering that invasion.”).

United States District Court Northern District of California

12

The Court thus concludes that the Named Plaintiffs status as “testers” is irrelevant to the

13 standing analysis. Because each of the Named Plaintiffs has met the requirements for standing in

14 ADA Title III cases as outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Chapman, the Court concludes that 15 Plaintiffs have established standing.3

16

B. Class Certification

17

1. Rule 23(a) requirements

18

a. Numerosity

19

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is

20 impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[C]ourts generally find that the numerosity factor is

21

22

3 The Court finds unpersuasive Defendant’s argument that “[e]ven assuming that the individual Plaintiffs have standing to sue and seek injunctive relief against the one or two hotels that each

23

called, that does not mean that they have standing to sue any other hotels” because “Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that any of them intend to visit any other HPT hotels.” ECF No. 64 at 15.

24

As Plaintiffs note, Defendant’s argument “conflates standing with the requirements of Rule 23.” ECF No. 70 at 9. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a Named Plaintiff must

25

establish standing with respect to each of the violations that the plaintiff seeks to remedy on behalf of a class. Rather, “[i]n a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the

26

requirements [for standing with respect to herself].” Bates, 511 F.3d at 985. After a class is certified, “the ‘plaintiff’ [is] broadened to include the class as a whole, and no longer simply those

27

named in the complaint.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 870 (9th Cir. 2001). At that point, “[t]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established” against the

28

entire class. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument.

9

1 satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members.” In re Facebook, Inc., PPC Advertising

2 Litig., 282 F.R.D. 446, 452 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Because Plaintiffs seek only “injunctive and

3 declaratory relief, the numerosity requirement is relaxed and plaintiffs may rely on [ ] reasonable

4 inference[s] arising from plaintiffs’ other evidence that the number of unknown and future

5 members . . . is sufficient to make joinder impracticable.” Arnott v. U.S. Citizenship &

6 Immigration Servs., 290 F.R.D. 579, 586 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Sueoka v. United States, 101

7 Fed. App’x 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2004) (memorandum disposition)).

8

Here, Defendant admits that “roughly 250 guests per year request accessible service” at

9 just one of the 142 HPT-owned hotels that offer transportation to guests. ECF No. 60 at 17 (citing

10 ECF No. 58-1 at 38). Given that the number of potential class members that stayed at a single

11 HPT-owned hotel in a single year far exceeds the number of class members that courts typically

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 find satisfies the numerosity requirement, the Court concludes that the numerosity requirement is

13 satisfied here. Moreover, the fact that the proposed class is geographically dispersed across

14 approximately 29 states, ECF No. 58 ¶¶ 4–5, supports a finding of numerosity. See Evans v.

15 Linden Research, Inc., No. 11-cv-01078-DMR, 2012 WL 5877579, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,

16 2012) (“Joinder may be impracticable where a class is geographically dispersed and class

17 members difficult to ascertain or identify.”)

18

b. Commonality

19

A Rule 23 class is certifiable only if “there are questions of law or fact common to the

20 class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) [e]ven a single [common]

21 question will do.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the

22 common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which

23 means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of

24 each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 2551. “‘What matters to class certification . . . is not

25 the raising of common ‘questions’ ‒ even in droves ‒ but rather the capacity of a classwide

26 proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’” Id. (quoting

27 Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97,

28 131–32 (2009)). Additionally, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class 10

1 members ‘have suffered the same injury,’” which cannot merely be the suffering of “a violation of

2 the same provision of law.” Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157

3 (1982)).

4

Plaintiffs raise several arguments regarding commonality. First, Plaintiffs contend that

5 “HPT’s alleged (and admitted) failure to put in place any practices or policies to ensure

6 compliance with ADA hotel transportation regulations creates an issue common to the class.”

7 ECF No. 60 at 20. That is, Plaintiffs assert that “HPT’s lack of a uniform policy or practice to

8 ensure compliance with the ADA’s accessible transportation requirements at its hotels causes

9 harm to the class as a whole, regardless of differences in the specific transportation services

10 offered at any particular hotel.” ECF No. 70 at 12.

11

Defendant responds that because of its status as a REIT, HPT cannot and “does not operate

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 any of the hotels that it owns.” ECF No. 64 at 22. That is because

13

[a] REIT may directly hire and pay independent contractors to

provide services not customarily provided by tenants, but the

14

independent contractor must maintain and operate the facilities

through which the services are rendered. If [these] independent

15

contractor requirements are not met, then the independent contractor

is disregarded for REIT qualification purposes and the services

16

provided will be considered as having been performed by the REIT.

17 ECF No. 65-14 (Declaration of James P. de Bree, Jr.) (citing Treasury Regulation § 1.856-

18 4(b)(5)). In other words, if HPT were to “operate” any of its hotels, it would lose the tax

19 advantages of the REIT structure. Hence, HPT’s hotels are operated by “management companies”

20 under long-term management agreements. ECF No. 64 at 22. “[W]ith respect to shuttle and

21 transportation services, the Management Companies (not HPT) are responsible for such

22 operations, including any decision about whether to provide such services.” Id. Defendants thus

23 argue that “[g]iven different Management Companies and in all likelihood different managers at

24 each hotel, there is no commonality in HPT’s conduct or omissions here that is relevant to the

25 disposition of this lawsuit.” Id.

26

There are two parts to Defendant’s argument. The first is that HPTcannot operate the

27 hotels it owns in a manner that provides appropriate, accessible transportation services, because it

28 cannot operate these hotels in any respect; otherwise, it would forfeit the tax benefits of the REIT 11

1 laws. This argument is not compelling. If the law required Defendant to develop and implement a

2 policy of affirmatively providing accessible transportation at all of its properties, the availability

3 (or potential loss) of tax benefits to do otherwise would be no defense. The obligation to avoid

4 discrimination would trump the opportunity to receive a tax-related economic benefit.

5

There is a second part to Defendant’s argument, however, that is more persuasive: that

6 there is no law requiring the owner of a group of hotels, such as HPT, to have a uniform policy

7 across its hotels ensuring compliance with the ADA, and that in the absence of such a law there is

8 no class-wide issue for adjudication. HPT acknowledges that each of its hotels must comply with

9 the ADA, and that HPT—as the hotels’ owner—is liable if an individual hotel violates that

10 obligation. But HPT argues that there is no requirement that it maintain and enforce a policy

11 regarding accessible transportation at the REIT level, and Plaintiffs cite no authority imposing

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 one. Absent such a requirement, it is unclear how HPT’s admitted lack of a policy regarding the

13 operation of shuttle or transportation services could serve as the “glue” holding together Plaintiff’s

14 claims. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. Unlike in other cases finding commonality based on a

15 system-wide policy, it is simply not the case here that there exists a policy that “is unlawful as to

16 every [member of the proposed class] or [] is not.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 678 (9th Cir.

17 2014).

18

Moreover, as in Castenada v. Burger King Corp., 264 F.R.D. 557, 568 (N.D. Cal. 2009),

19 “plaintiffs have failed to make the case that [defendant] has any common offending policies . . .

20 that [resulted in] common accessibility barriers at different [hotels].” The evidence shows that,

21 while many of Defendant’s properties may not be in compliance with the ADA, the manner in

22 which they are potentially out of compliance, and the proof of that non-compliance, differs

23 significantly from property to property. Because Plaintiffs can point to no common offending

24 policy, proving that each of the 142 hotels violated the ADA would require 142 trials within a

25 trial. Id. As the Burger King court noted, in such circumstances, “[e]ach location would vary. . . .

26 Possibly some [locations] would be found to have no violations at all. . . . Litigating [142] in one

27

28 12

1 case would be impossible without a common method of proof.” 4 Id. at 568–69. Such a

2 conclusion strongly counsels against a finding of commonality.

3

Finally, the cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their theory of commonality provide little

4 assistance. In each of Plaintiffs’ cases, a centralized decision-maker was alleged to have

5 implemented the deficient policies at issue, and in several of the cases the plaintiffs provided

6 concrete evidence of system-wide policies, a showing that Plaintiffs here have failed to make.

7 See, e.g., Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, 278 F.R.D. 501, 512 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

8 (“Defendants do not seriously dispute that all of the challenged facilities and barriers are

9 controlled by GGNRA as a centralized decision-maker.”); Parsons, 754 F.3d at 681 (This case

10 “involves uniform statewide practices created and overseen by two individuals who are charged by

11 law with ultimate responsibility for health care and other conditions of confinement in all ADC

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 facilities, not a grant of discretion to thousands of managers.”); Californians for Disability Rights,

13 Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 346 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he common question

14 addressed by this lawsuit is whether and to what extent Caltrans has violated the ADA on a

15 ‘systematic basis for many years through the use of improper design guidelines and the failure to

16 ensure compliance with even those deficient guidelines.”) (emphasis added); Hernandez v. Cty. of

17 Monterey, 305 F.R.D. 132, 157 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding commonality based on “systemic and

18 centralized policies or practices in a prison system that allegedly expose[d] all inmates in that

19 system to a substantial risk of serious future harm”). By contrast here, Plaintiffs have not argued

20 that HPT serves in any way as a centralized decision-maker that is required by law to implement

21 uniform policies and practices across the hotels that it owns.

22

Second, Plaintiffs argue that they have offered “significant proof” that HPT operates under

23 a general policy or practice of discrimination. ECF No. 60 at 20. Plaintiffs contend that they have

24

25 4 The Named Plaintiffs’ own allegations show that litigating the proposed class’s claims would be

26

impossible without conducting 142 mini-trials. While some of the hotels contacted by the Named Plaintiffs are alleged to have not offered any wheelchair-accessible transportation at all, others are

27

alleged to have offered wheelchair-accessible transportation, but required guests to cover the costs. ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 14–36. Still other hotels are alleged to have required at least two days advance

28

notice to arrange wheelchair-accessible transportation for a guest, whereas nondisabled guests were required to provide less notice. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.

13

1 submitted evidence through their expert that “more than 90% (128) of the 142 HPT hotels that 2 offer transportation services were violating the ADA transportation regulations.”5 Id. at 21.

3 While “commonality is satisfied where [a] lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that

4 affects all of the putative class members,” Rosas v. Baca, No. 12-cv-00428, 2012 WL 2061694, at

5 *3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012) (quoting Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868), Plaintiffs admit that HPT has

6 no system-wide policy relating to Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 60 at 21 (“HPT admits that, based

7 on its status as a REIT, it has not even attempted to put in place practices or policies to ensure

8 compliance with ADA transportation regulations.”). As a result, even if Plaintiffs were able to

9 show that 90% of HPT’s hotels violated the ADA, Plaintiffs would only be able to do so by

10 putting forward evidence regarding each of HPT’s 142 hotels individually. Litigating these 142

11 individual cases within one class action “would be impossible without a common method of

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 proof,” which Plaintiffs do not offer. Burger King, 264 F.R.D. at 569.

13

Third, Plaintiffs argue that “there are a number of issues central to each class member’s

14 claim that can be resolved on a classwide basis, most notably concerning the impact, if any, of 26

15 U.S.C. § 856 and 26 C.F.R. § 1.856-4 -- the REIT tax provisions -- on Defendant’s obligations

16 under the ADA.” ECF No. 60 at 19. According to Plaintiffs, “Defendant argues that the REIT tax

17 provisions do not allow it to operate or manage its hotels and thus prevent it from ensuring that

18 transportation services at those hotels comply with the ADA.” Id. As a result, Plaintiffs claim

19 that each of the proposed class members claims’ requires resolution of the same questions,

20

21 5 “Plaintiffs, through their expert Dr. Michael Quinn, have called 138 of the 142 HPT hotels that

22

provide transportation services to hotel guests.” ECF No. 60 at 6. According to Plaintiffs, these calls provide evidence that 128 of the HPT-owned hotels violated the ADA. Id. For instance,

23

“101 hotels stated during at least one call with Dr. Quinn that they do not provide any accessible transportation services.” Id. at 8. Eight hotels required guests who need wheelchair-accessible

24

transportation to pay for those services. Id. Another eight hotels required guests who needed wheel-chair accessible transportation to provide more advanced notice than guests who can use

25

inaccessible transportation services. Id. Finally, at least eleven hotels “were able to give specific details about inaccessible transportation services provided by the hotels, but had no idea even what

26

company to call to find accessible transportations services.” Id. Defendant argues that the contents of Dr. Quinn’s expert report should not be considered by the Court in making its

27

determination on class certification and have moved to exclude the expert testimony. ECF No. 67. The Court need not address Defendant’s motion to exclude and strike expert testimony, however,

28

because, as explained above, “even if properly considered, [the expert] testimony does nothing to advance respondents’” claims regarding commonality. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.

14

1 including: (1) whether “the REIT tax provisions actually cause a real estate investment trust to

2 lose its favorable tax status simply by modifying its hotel practices and procedures to comply with

3 the ADA”; and (2) “If so, is this a defense to claims brought under the ADA?” Id.

4

As the Court explained earlier, the Court does not believe that the REIT tax provisions

5 provide a defense to a claim of ADA violations. Moreover, Defendant has clarified that “HPT

6 does not contest in this action that an owner [of a hotel, such as HPT,] cannot contract away its

7 ADA obligations to a manager and [the owner] remains jointly and severally liable to disabled

8 plaintiffs” for ADA violations. ECF No. 64 at 24 n.15. That is, Defendant admits that its status as

9 a REIT does not immunize it from liability for ADA violations committed by the hotels that it

10 owns. Rather, Defendant argues that its status as a REIT simply explains why it has implemented

11 no system-wide policy mandating ADA compliance. ECF No. 64 at 24.

United States District Court Northern District of California

12

The Court concludes that the purportedly common questions posed by Plaintiffs regarding

13 the REIT tax provisions do not support a finding of commonality. Because Defendant admits that

14 it would be liable for ADA violations committed by the hotels it owns, there is no need to answer

15 these questions. Instead, to prevail against Defendant, Plaintiffs would have to show the extent to

16 which each of the allegedly noncompliant HPT-owned hotels violates the ADA.

17

Mere claims that plaintiffs “have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law” do

18 not support a finding of commonality. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2551. Because Plaintiffs have not

19 put forward any common question, the truth or falsity of which “will resolve an issue that is

20 central to the validity of each one of the [plaintiffs’] claims in one stroke,” id., the Court concludes

21 that Plaintiffs have failed to establish commonality.

22

c. Typicality

23

Defendant next challenges whether the proposed class meets the typicality requirement. In

24 certifying a class, courts must find that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are

25 typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The purpose of the

26 typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the

27 interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). “Under

28 the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably 15

1 coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.”

2 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)).

3 “The test of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the

4 action is based on conduct which is not unique to the Named Plaintiffs, and whether other class

5 members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Id. (quoting Hanon, 976 F.2d at

6 508).

7

“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Falcon, 457

8 U.S. 146, 157 n. 13. Here, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to identify

9 any HPT policy across the 142 allegedly ADA-noncompliant hotels, which policy could support a

10 finding of commonality. Because the 142 individual hotels are not alleged to have operated under

11 a common policy, each of the Named Plaintiffs here “have suffered different injuries than those

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 suffered by purported class members who encountered different [ADA violations] at other [HPT-

13 owned hotels] that the named plaintiffs did not visit.” Burger King, 264 F.R.D. 571–72. By

14 contrast, the cases cited by Plaintiff finding typicality where plaintiffs alleged violations of the

15 ADA across many locations each involved an alleged common policy or practice instituted by a

16 single defendant operating each of the accommodations in question. See Arnold v. United Artists

17 Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Plaintiffs alleged that “defendant has

18 been engaging in a policy and practice of failing to include wheelchair seating [at the more than 70

19 theaters operated by defendant] that complies with the ADAAG requirements.”); Park v. Ralph’s

20 Grocery Co., 254 F.R.D. 112, 120 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (Plaintiffs alleged that “defendant’s

21 inadequate ‘Disabled Patrons’ policy and/or lack of required policies, all result from a centralized

22 decision-making process.”). Plaintiffs’ claims therefore do not satisfy the typicality requirement.

23

d. Adequacy

24

“The adequacy of representation requirement . . . requires that two questions be addressed:

25 (a) do the Named Plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class

26 members and (b) will the Named Plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on

27 behalf of the class?” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). Among

28 other functions, the requirement serves as a way to determine whether “the Named Plaintiff’s 16

1 claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly

2 and adequately protected in their absence.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 n.13.

3

Defendant does not specifically argue that Plaintiffs and their counsel fail to meet Rule

4 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement. Plaintiffs argue that “[n]either the Plaintiffs nor their counsel

5 has conflicts of interest with the proposed class,” especially given that “[n]one of the [Named

6 Plaintiffs] seeks any monetary damages.” ECF No. 60 at 22. Plaintiffs also assert that the

7 proposed class counsel will vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the class just as they

8 “have litigated dozens of class actions [before], including numerous class actions under the ADA .

9 . . .” Id. at 23. Plaintiffs further claim that “[t]hey have the resources to litigate this case, as they

10 have done with numerous similar class actions in the past.” Id. Nothing in the record suggests,

11 and Defendant does not argue, otherwise. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied the adequacy

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 requirement.

13

e. Ascertainability

14

“[C]ourts addressing motions to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) have held that ‘apart

15 from the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must

16 demonstrate that an identifiable and ascertainable class exists.’” In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308

17 F.R.D. 577, 596 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., No. 12-cv-

18 2907, 2014 WL 580696 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014)). Some courts in this district, however, have

19 held that “the ascertainability requirement does not apply to Rule 23(b)(2) actions.” Id. at 597.

20 The Court need not address whether the ascertainability requirement applies to Rule 23(b)(2)

21 actions, such as this one, because Defendants merely argue that Plaintiffs have not “provide[d] a

22 clear class definition under Rule 23(c)(1)(B).’” ECF No. 64 at 28 (citing In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,

23 308 F.R.D. at 597–98).

24

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), “[a]n order that certifies a class action must define

25 the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses. . . .” Plaintiffs propose defining a class

26 consisting of:

27

Individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, since

January 15, 2013, have been, or in the future will be, denied the full

28

and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at

17

United States District Court Northern District of California

hotels owned and/or operated by Hospitality Properties Trust

1

because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services

at those hotels. 2

ECF No. 60 at 14. Defendant argues that “[w]hile it may be easy to define and identify

3

individuals who use wheelchair or scooters, it is a far different story to identify which of these

4

individuals have experienced difficulties with accessible transportation services at HPT hotels or

5

when.” EC No. 64 at 29. Defendant further argues that “aside from the three test Plaintiffs, whose

6

‘difficulties’ were well-engineered by CREEC, Plaintiffs have failed to identify even a single

7

putative class member who has experienced any difficulties with transportation services at a HPT

8

hotel.” Id.

9

Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Defendant fails to cite any case in which similar

10

class definitions were found to be insufficiently clear under Rule 23(c)(1)(B). By contrast, the In

11

re Yahoo Mail Litig. court found the following proposed class to be sufficiently clear under that

12

Rule: “all persons in the United States who are not Yahoo Mail subscribers and who have sent

13

emails to or received emails from a Yahoo Mail subscriber from October 2, 2011 to the present, or

14

who will send emails to or receive emails from a Yahoo Mail subscriber in the future.” 308

15

F.R.D. at 598. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition here is no less clear

16

than the class definition in In re Yahoo Mail Litig. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ proposed class

17

definition is sufficiently clear under Rule 23(c)(1)(B).

18

2. Rule 23(b)(2) 19
Rule 23(b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 20
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 21
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 22
23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to 23
each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class 24
member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” 25
Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2557. “These requirements are unquestionably satisfied when members of 26
a putative class seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies or practices that are 27
generally applicable to the class as a whole.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688 (citing Rodriguez v. 28

18

1 Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011)). “That inquiry does not require an examination of

2 the viability or bases of the class members’ claims for relief, does not require that the issues

3 common to the class satisfy a Rule 23(b)(3)-like predominance test, and does not require a finding

4 that all members of the class have suffered identical injuries.” Id. “The fact that some class

5 members may have suffered no injury or different injuries from the challenged practice does not

6 prevent the class from meeting the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d

7 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009).

8

Plaintiffs argue that HPT has “refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class”

9 because “HPT has a practice of not providing equivalent accessible transportation services at

10 hotels it owns.” ECF No. 60 at 24. Plaintiffs further contend that “[c]ourts routinely certify Rule

11 23(b)(2) classes where defendants fail to implement uniform policies or practices to comply with

United States District Court Northern District of California

12 the law, even though the specific legal violations may be manifested in different ways with respect

13 to different class members or locations.” ECF No. 70 at 10. Plaintiffs suggest that the Court

14 could “issue an injunction requiring HPT to comply with the ADA at its properties.” ECF No. 70

15 at 12.

16

Such an injunction does not constitute “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

17 relief [that] is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). To satisfy

18 Rule 23(b)(2), the proposed injunction must be “more specific than a bare injunction to follow the

19 law.” Parsons, 754 F.3d 657, 689 n. 35 (9th Cir. 2014). However, Plaintiffs have suggested just

20 that. ECF No. 70 at 12. Moreover, as was the case in Burger King:

21

[F]inal common injunctive relief would only be appropriate as to

those [locations] where there are in fact accessibility violations, and

22

the relief would even then vary from location to location. . . . [T]he

actual injunctive relief ordered must be individually fashioned for

23

each location. . . . Because every [location] will have different

violations, any ordered injunctive relief will primarily need to be

24

tailored [location-by-location].

25 264 F.R.D. at 569. Accordingly, the Court concludes that “[t]here can be no ‘generally applicable’
26 relief in this case as to patrons of all [142 hotels].” Id. Plaintiffs have thus failed to establish the
27 requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).
28

19

1

CONCLUSION

2

Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims under Title III of the ADA against HPT. The

3 Court concludes, however, that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the commonality and typicality

4 requirements of Rule 23(a), as well as the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court

5 denies Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

6

The Court sets a further Case Management Conference on June 1, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. A

7 Joint Case Management Statement is due ten court days beforehand.

8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 Dated: April 15, 2016 10 11 12

______________________________________ JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge

United States District Court Northern District of California

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FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER, on behalf of itself; ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN; RUTHEE GOLDKORN; JULIE REISKIN, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated persons defined below,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16269 D.C. No. 3:15cv-00221-JST
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 15, 2017 San Francisco, California
Filed August 9, 2017

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Brian M. Morris,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Morris

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act / Standing / Class Certification
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in an action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act regarding transportation services at hotels.
The panel held that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain this ADA suit. The panel held that a plaintiff who lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment is not in ADA compliance may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA. Agreeing with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the panel held that a plaintiff may also assert constitutional standing where her only motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance.

* The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), given the lack of consistent policies or practices across the hotels owned by the defendant but operated by others.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, District Judge Morris concurred in the majority’s analysis of standing. Dissenting from the majority’s determination that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, Judge Morris wrote that the plaintiffs satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23.

COUNSEL
Timothy P. Fox (argued), Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Denver, Colorado; Bill Lann Lee, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Berkeley, California; Julia Campins, Campins Benham-Baker LLP, Lafayette, California; Julie Wilensky, Disability Rights California, Oakland, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
David Raizman (argued), Christopher F. Wong, and Kathleen J. Choi, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
Lindsay Nako, Jocelyn D. Larkin, and Lynnette Miner, Impact Fund, Berkeley, California, for Amici Curiae Impact Fund, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center, Disability Rights Oregon, Disability Rights Washington, Equal Rights Advocates, Legal Aid Association of California, Legal Aid Society – Employment Law Center,

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

National Association of the Deaf, National Disability Rights Network, and National Federation of the Blind.

OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
This case presents two questions of constitutional standing to assert claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the question of whether those claims are maintainable as a class action. We must decide (1) whether a plaintiff may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA where she lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment is not in ADA compliance; and (2) whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing where her only motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance. We conclude that standing may be asserted in both circumstances. However, although plaintiffs have standing to maintain this ADA suit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality requirement, given the lack of consistent policies or practices across the hotels owned by defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (“HPT”), but operated by others.
I.
HPT is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) that owns hotels across the United States. REITs are vehicles for investors to own a fraction of a group of real estate holdings. Under federal statute, REITs are exempt from taxation on corporate profits; shareholders are taxed only when they

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receive dividends.1 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–859. To avoid taxation at the corporate level, REITs must, among other things, remain passive investors and delegate the management of particular facilities. Id. § 856(d)(7).

Named Plaintiffs Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin (“Named Plaintiffs”) are physically disabled and use wheelchairs for mobility. Cupolo-Freeman and Goldkorn reside in California, while Reiskin lives in Colorado. Each phoned an HPT-owned hotel located in her state of residence that provided free local shuttle services, and each was informed that the hotel at issue did not provide equivalent shuttle service for mobilityimpaired people. Each alleges that she would have stayed at the hotel she called but for its failure to provide equivalent shuttle service. In addition, each alleges that she still intends to stay at the hotel, but that its failure to provide equivalent shuttle service deters her from doing so at present.

Cupolo-Freeman, Goldkorn, and Reiskin, along with the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (collectively “CREEC”),2 filed a putative class action against HPT in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that HPT had failed to offer

1 The Senate Finance Committee defines REITs as entities that “receive[] most of [their] income from passive real-estate related investments.” S. Rep. No. 106-201, at 55 (1999). REITs receive conduit taxation treatment to “permit individual investors to get the benefit of centralized management and diversification without being subjected to an extra layer of corporate taxes.” Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 99.5 (2017).
2 After filing this appeal, CREEC voluntarily dismissed its claims before the district court. Nevertheless, for simplicity’s sake, we follow the district court in referring to appellants as “CREEC.”

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equivalent accessible transportation services at its hotels in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(B), 12182(b)(2)(C).
Section 12182(a) provides:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A hotel is a public accommodation. Id. § 12181(7)(A). Section 12182(b)(2)(B) specifically requires private entities that “operate” “fixed route systems” to provide equivalent service to those with disabilities. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(B). Section 12182(b)(2)(C) requires the same of entities that “operate” “demand responsive systems.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(C). CREEC alleges that, while most HPT hotels provide some form of free local transportation service, very few provide equivalent service that is accessible to people who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility.
Before the district court, CREEC moved to certify the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. It defined the class as people with limited mobility who have been or will be denied equivalent transportation services at HPT hotels. CREEC alleges that the common questions of fact and law include “[w]hether Defendant HPT’s transportation vehicles are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs,” and “[w]hether Defendant HPT has ensured that the transportation system in place at each hotel,

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when viewed in its entirety, meets the equivalent service requirements of” the ADA. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). They also assert that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2) because HPT “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
The district court denied the motion. It held that the proposed class did not meet the threshold Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality because HPT delegates the operation of its hotels to management companies. Deciding CREEC’s claims, the district court held, would necessitate 142 “mini-trials” to determine whether the particular practices at each of the 142 challenged hotels violate Title III. In the alternative, the district court held that CREEC failed to meet the Rule 23(a) requirement of typicality, and failed to establish that injunctive relief would be “appropriate respecting the class as a whole,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). CREEC timely appealed.
II.
The district court had federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), which allows for interlocutory appeals from denials of class-action certification.
III.
We first address whether CREEC has properly asserted Article III standing. The following three elements constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) an “injury in fact” suffered by the plaintiff; (2) a causal connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct;

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and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). HPT argues that the Named Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy both the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements. We address these contentions in turn.
A. The Named Plaintiffs have properly alleged injury in fact.
Article III “requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). A plaintiff has sustained an injury in fact only if she can establish “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, a party seeks injunctive relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (alteration omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must allege “continuing, present adverse effects” stemming from the defendant’s actions. Id.
A plaintiff experiences continuing adverse effects where a defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA deters her from making use of the defendant’s facility. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). We have dubbed this the “deterrent effect doctrine.” Id. at 949–50. “[W]hen a plaintiff who is disabled within the meaning of the ADA has actual knowledge of illegal barriers at a public accommodation to which he or she desires access, that plaintiff need not engage in the ‘futile gesture’ of attempting to gain access in order to show actual

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injury. . . .” Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). “So long as the discriminatory conditions continue, and so long as a plaintiff is aware of them and remains deterred, the injury under the ADA continues.” Id. at 1137.
The relevant question, therefore, is whether the Named Plaintiffs are presently deterred from visiting HPT-owned hotels. We limit our evaluation to the pleadings. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (The elements of standing “must be supported at each stage of the litigation in the same manner as any other essential element of the case.”).
The Named Plaintiffs have alleged in the First Amended Complaint that they intend to visit the relevant hotels, but have been deterred from doing so by the hotels’ noncompliance with the ADA. They further allege that they will visit the hotels when the non-compliance is cured. Thus, the ADA violations have prevented them from staying at the hotels. Without such averments, they would lack standing. However, “construing the factual allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs,” as we must at this preliminary stage, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013), we conclude that the Named Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury in fact. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. Their harm is “concrete and particularized,” and their intent to visit the hotels once they provide equivalent shuttle service for the disabled renders their harm “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
HPT contends that this is the wrong result. It offers several reasons why the named plaintiffs cannot meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement: (1) they did not actually visit

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the hotels; (2) they do not intend to do so unless and until the alleged ADA violations are remedied; (3) they are motivated to visit the hotels only by their desire to test them for ADA compliance; and (4) they failed to allege injury in the original complaint, instead doing so only in the First Amended Complaint. None of these facts defeats standing.
1. The Named Plaintiffs were not required to visit the hotels.
While HPT concedes that a plaintiff need not make repeated in-person visits to ADA non-compliant sites in order to demonstrate that the defendant’s noncompliance has deterred her access, see Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135, it contends that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement unless she has had at least one “personal encounter” with the alleged barrier. HPT argues that the Named Plaintiffs fail to meet this threshold because they merely telephoned the hotels to inquire about transportation services available to disabled guests.
However, the purported requirement urged by HPT of a “personal encounter” with an access barrier lacks foundation in Article III. Actually visiting a hotel, as opposed to phoning, does not make a plaintiff’s injury any more concrete: she is deterred from using the accommodation in either event. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. It is the plaintiff’s “actual knowledge” of a barrier, rather than the source of that knowledge, that is determinative. Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135.
True, whether a plaintiff has visited a facility in the past may be indicative of whether she will do so in the future. Requiring a plaintiff to “personally encounter” a barrier in order to obtain an injunction under Title III might screen out plaintiffs who do not in fact intend to use the facility—that is, plaintiffs for whom an injury is not actually imminent.

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See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. However, while past actions may constitute “evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, they are not necessarily dispositive evidence. For example, evidence of concrete travel plans would be sufficient to show that a disabled plaintiff intends to visit a facility, even if she has not travelled there in the past. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. Contrariwise, in the absence of travel plans, a past visit might not be sufficient evidence of imminent future harm. See id.
Requiring a plaintiff to “personally encounter” a barrier would also cause line-drawing problems. Would it be enough to travel to the hotel and ask the concierge whether the hotel’s shuttle service accommodates the disabled, or must a plaintiff actually attempt to use the purportedly deficient accommodation? If the concierge says there is no accommodation, must the plaintiff perform a visual inspection or review schedules to verify this? What if the plaintiff is blind?
Nevertheless, HPT insists its “personal encounter” requirement is dictated by precedent, citing a district court case, Brooke v. Peterson, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1207–11 (C.D. Cal. 2016), for this proposition. Surveying Ninth Circuit cases on the deterrent effect doctrine, the Brooke court concluded that our precedent requires a plaintiff to allege “personal, percipient knowledge of [alleged] barriers [to access]” to sufficiently assert standing. Id. at 1207–10. According to Brooke, secondhand knowledge—obtained, for example, from a concierge or the plaintiff’s agent—is insufficient. Id.
The Brooke court reads too much into our prior cases. While it places talismanic weight on our use of the term “return” in Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953, and D’Lil v. Best

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Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2008), those cases used the term to distinguish planned visits from past ones, not to differentiate “personal” and “percipient” knowledge from secondhand knowledge. The cases cited in Brooke all happened to involve plaintiffs who had observed the lack of accommodation firsthand, but none of them held that this was a constitutional requirement.
Accordingly, we reject HPT’s invitation to create a bright-line predicate of a “personal encounter” with a barrier to access as a requirement for standing under ADA Title III. Making case-by-case determinations about whether a particular plaintiff’s injury is imminent is well within the competency of the district courts. See, e.g., Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1335–37 (11th Cir. 2013) (assessing various factors in determining whether plaintiff suing under ADA Title III was likely to actually visit the supermarket, including prior visits, proximity of residence to store, plans for future visits, and status as an “ADA tester who has filed many similar lawsuits”).
2. The Named Plaintiffs need not intend to visit the hotels until after remediation.
HPT next contends that the Named Plaintiffs failed to establish “a sufficient likelihood that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way,” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948, given their allegation that they do not plan to stay at the hotels unless and until HPT remedies the alleged violations. This argument has some superficial appeal, because courts have denied standing where a plaintiff was unlikely to actually experience a threatened harm. See, e.g., Morton, 405 U.S. at 734–35; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64.
However, this is really just a roundabout way of challenging the rule that a plaintiff need not engage in a

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“futile gesture” to establish Title III standing if she is on notice that the establishment “does not intend to comply” with the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). As we held in Pickern, “under the ADA, once a plaintiff has actually become aware of discriminatory conditions existing at a public accommodation, and is thereby deterred from visiting or patronizing that accommodation, the plaintiff has suffered an injury.” 293 F.3d at 1136–37. The injury continues so long as equivalent access is denied. Thus, HPT’s contention fails.
3. Motivation for visiting the hotels is irrelevant.
Our court has yet to decide whether plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA can claim “tester standing.” We begin our analysis of this question with Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–74 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that testers have standing to sue under Sections 804(d) and 812(a) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(d), 3612(a). The Court first noted that Section 804(d) prohibits representations “to any person because of race” that a dwelling is unavailable, when in fact it is available. Id. at 373. The Court reasoned that Section 804(d) “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the availability of housing,” and that an invasion of this right causes harm that is potentially cognizable under Article III. Id. at 373–74. Whereas Congress in Section 804(a) required a “bona fide offer” to rent or purchase before a plaintiff could sue for discriminatory refusal to sell or rent, it included no such limitation in Section 804(d). Id. at 374. The Court relied on this absence of limiting language to hold that plaintiffs who “pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices” have standing to sue for violations of Section 804(d). Id. at 373–75.

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We have held that the disabled may assert tester standing under the FHA. After Havens Realty was decided, Congress amended the FHA to specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of “handicap” in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Following the reasoning of Havens Realty, we held that tester standing was available under this provision. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2004). We reasoned that, as with the provision at issue in Havens Realty, § 3604(f)(2) was by its terms not limited to bona fide purchasers. Id. at 1104. We held that “[i]nterpreting § 3604(f)(2) to exclude [testers] from enforcing their right to be free from discrimination undermines the specific intent of the [Fair Housing Act Amendments], which is to prevent disabled individuals from feeling as if they are second-class citizens.” Id.
Only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have considered in published opinions whether “tester standing” is viable under Title III of the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Houston that nothing in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 12182 constrains the statutorily created right “to be free from disability discrimination in the enjoyment of [a] facility” based on a plaintiff’s motive for accessing the facility. 733 F.3d at 1332. Indeed, the court observed, § 12182(a) states that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability,” much like the prohibition against misrepresenting the availability of housing to “any person” in Havens Realty. Houston, 733 F.3d at 1332 (alteration in original). The court also noted that the ADA’s enforcement provision, § 12188, provides that “‘any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability’ may bring suit,” exactly tracking the “any person” language of Havens Realty. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)) (alteration in original). Finally, the Houston

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court pointed out that Congress knows how to limit standing to sue under discrimination statutes to certain groups of people, having done so both in the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (requiring “bona fide offer” to rent or purchase in order to bring suit), and Title III of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (limiting suits for some actions to “clients or customers of the covered public accommodation”), but that it chose not to do so in § 12182(a). Houston, 733 F.3d at 1333. Accordingly, the court reasoned, a plaintiff’s status as a tester does not deprive her of the right to sue for injunctive relief under § 12182(a). Id. at 1332–34.
The Tenth Circuit has also held that tester standing is viable under Title III of the ADA. Colo. Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2014). The Colorado Cross court noted that “Title III provides remedies for ‘any person’ subjected to illegal disability discrimination.” Id. at 1211 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)). Thus, it concluded that “anyone who has suffered an invasion of the legal interest protected by Title III may have standing, regardless of his or her motivation in encountering that invasion.” Id.
We also conclude that motivation is irrelevant to the question of standing under Title III of the ADA. The Named Plaintiffs’ status as ADA testers thus does not deprive them of standing.
4. Injury is alleged in the operative complaint.
Citing the general rule that standing is determined “at the time the action commences,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000), HPT argues that two of the three Named Plaintiffs, Goldkorn and Reiskin, lack standing because they failed to include the

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factual bases for their allegations in the original complaint. However, “the proper focus in determining jurisdiction are the facts existing at the time the complaint under consideration was filed.” Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The First Amended Complaint was the complaint under consideration when the district court assessed standing, and it remains operative. Goldkorn and Reiskin adequately allege in that complaint that they were injured by HPT hotels’ failure to accommodate their disabilities. Accordingly, HPT’s argument fails.
B. The harm suffered by the Named Plaintiffs is redressable.
HPT also contends that the district court erred in finding that CREEC has standing because the Named Plaintiffs’ injuries are not redressable, given that it would be impossible for a court to fashion a class-wide injunction. However, this is just a reiteration of HPT’s view of the merits of CREEC’s claims. A plaintiff need only show that “a favorable decision will relieve” her injuries. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982). The Named Plaintiffs have requested that the court fashion an injunction mandating that the HPT hotels comply with the ADA. If the Named Plaintiffs were to prevail and receive their requested relief, then their injuries would be redressed. They have therefore satisfied the redressability requirement, whether or not they are correct on the merits.
IV.
A district court’s order denying class certification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014). Assuming the district court has applied the correct legal standard, the

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reviewing court may set aside its decision only if the court’s reasoning was “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id.
A party seeking class certification must demonstrate that (1) “joinder of all members is impracticable,” (2) “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” (3) the named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses are typical of those of the class, and (4) “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
If a party succeeds in establishing all four of the 23(a) elements, it must then satisfy one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). CREEC relies on Rule 23(b)(2), which requires a showing that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” CREEC contends that injunctive relief is appropriate because HPT has failed to ensure the provision of equivalent shuttle services at its hotels, and because the district court could conceivably instruct HPT to implement uniform policies or practices to comply with the ADA.
The district court denied CREEC’s class certification motion, concluding that CREEC failed to demonstrate either commonality or typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)–(3). It also held that CREEC failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b) because the injunction it sought would have been impermissibly vague, nothing more than “a bare injunction to follow the law.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 689 n.35 (9th Cir. 2014).
Rule 23(a)(2) requires “a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart

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Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). A contention is common to all members if “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id.
HPT—a REIT—owns some 302 hotels across the United States. CREEC has alleged that 142 of these hotels operate shuttle services in a manner that violates the ADA. However, HPT does not itself operate the hotels. To enjoy tax benefits under statute, REITs must, among other things, remain passive investors and delegate the management of particular facilities. 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7). Accordingly, HPT employs various professional management companies that are “eligible independent contractors” to operate the hotels it owns. An “eligible independent contractor” is a person or corporation that is “actively engaged in the trade or business of operating qualified lodging facilities,” and that does not control more than 35 percent of the REIT’s shares or voting power.3 26 U.S.C. §§ 856(d)(3), 856(d)(9). Although HPT’s agreements with the management companies require the latter to “comply with all laws in their fulfillment of their management agreement obligations,” those agreements also stipulate that the management companies “shall have sole, exclusive and uninterrupted control over the operation of the Hotels.” HPT “does not set or provide the Management Companies with any uniform

3 HPT has contracted its hotel operations out to only a handful of independent operators. According to its website, its 500 hotels are operated by six eligible independent contracting firms, including such household names as Wyndham and Hyatt. Portfolio, HPT, http://www.hptreit.com/portfolio/properties/default.aspx (last visited June 28, 2017). Presumably these managers maintain control over the properties they have contracted to manage, could themselves be named as defendants in separate class actions, and could ultimately be held responsible for any discriminatory practices.

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policy or plan regarding the operation of shuttle or transportation services at its hotels.” Thus, it is the management companies, not HPT, that decide whether to offer local transportation services and that set the terms on which those services operate.
HPT argues that there can be no common question regarding the operation of its hotels as a matter of law, because federal law requires HPT to delegate operating authority to independent contractors if it wishes to maintain its REIT status and the tax benefits that flow therefrom. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(l)(3)(A). However, the district court held that the fact that HPT lacks a specific and uniform policy to ensure ADA compliance at its hotels defeated commonality, regardless of HPT’s reasons for lacking such a policy. The court reasoned that, absent a legal duty to adopt specific policies to comply with the ADA, “it is unclear how HPT’s admitted lack of a policy regarding the operation of shuttle or transportation services could serve as the ‘glue’ holding together Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352). Given that there was no “common offending policy,” the court held, “proving that each of the 142 hotels violated the ADA would require 142 trials within a trial.” Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the class lacked commonality. The court correctly found that HPT did not have a policy regarding how its eligible independent contractors had to comply with the ADA. CREEC insists that HPT maintained an unwritten, de facto policy of non-compliance that resulted in widespread ADA violations. See, e.g., Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165–66 (finding commonality based on alleged unofficial policy of discouraging employees from reporting overtime). However, CREEC has not alleged any facts that would support this theory. On the allegations in the amended

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complaint, HPT has done nothing to discourage its contractors from complying with the ADA. Indeed, HPT’s contracts require hotel operators to comply with applicable federal and state laws. This is a policy of delegation, not of non-compliance. While commonality may be established based on a “pattern of officially sanctioned . . . [illegal] behavior,” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2011), merely pointing to a pattern of harm, untethered to the defendant’s conduct, is insufficient.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the factual issues regarding alleged ADA violations are significantly different at the various hotels.4 There is no evidence of a single, “general policy of discrimination” that could serve as a common issue. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352– 53. A practice may indeed be evidence of a systematic policy, see, e.g., Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165–66 & n.5, but it is undisputed that HPT, pursuant to its contracts, does not participate in the management and operation of the hotels. Absent any allegation that HPT somehow discourages its contractors from complying with the ADA, CREEC cannot

4 Specifically, the district court found that:
While some of the hotels contacted by the Named Plaintiffs are alleged to have not offered any wheelchair-accessible transportation at all, others are alleged to have offered wheelchair-accessible transportation, but required guests to cover the costs. Still other hotels are alleged to have required at least two days advance notice to arrange wheelchairaccessible transportation for a guest, whereas nondisabled guests were required to provide less notice.
Civ. Rights Educ. & Enforcement Ctr., 317 F.R.D. at 101 n.4 (citations omitted).

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establish a pattern of discrimination orchestrated by HPT, as it must in order to establish a question of fact common to its claims against HPT.
CREEC tried to avoid this conclusion at oral argument by insisting that HPT has a “nondelegable duty” to comply with the ADA specifically. Nondelegable duty is a tort concept associated with vicarious liability theories. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 57 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2012). Contrary to CREEC’s contention, however, the concept “does not mean that an actor is not permitted to delegate [an] activity to an independent contractor.” Id. Rather, it means that an actor “will be vicariously liable for the contractor’s tortious conduct in the course of carrying out the activity.” Id. Even if HPT would be vicariously liable for ADA violations by its hired contractors, we fail to see how this fact bears on commonality. It would only create a common issue as to where the financial burden of liability would fall, not one regarding the question of that liability. While the latter issue is “central to the validity” of CREEC’s claims, WalMart, 564 U.S. at 350, the former is not.
The cases the dissent cites for the proposition that similarity of the harm to plaintiffs may constitute a common issue, with nothing more, are inapposite. Those cases all involved a common policy or practice. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs challenged written policy that failed to provide for adequate ADA requirements at parole hearings); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs challenged practice of holding detainees for longer than six months); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2014) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs made “detailed

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factual allegations concerning the existence of uniform, statewide policies and practices in all [Arizona Department of Corrections] facilities . . . [that] expose all . . . inmates to a substantial risk of harm”). To the extent the dissent suggests that HPT has intentionally failed to comply with the ADA, CREEC has not made such an allegation. Intentional noncompliance would amount to an unofficial policy of discrimination—a common issue weighing in favor of class certification. But a “policy against having uniform . . . practices” is decidedly not a common issue. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355.
CREEC contends that this result gives multiple-facility owners perverse incentives to vary their operating practices across facilities or contract out operations to independent managers. However, this argument rests on an important unstated premise: that firms will violate the ADA rather than comply with it, so long as they can avoid class-action suits. Assessing whether this premise is empirically true lies beyond judicial competence; altering incentives to comply with the ADA, beyond judicial authority. We emphasize that our holding is limited to the issue of class certification under Rule 23. Whatever the incentives to sue under the ADA, Rule 23 does not require HPT to manage its properties in a manner that would facilitate class actions if and when ADA violations do occur.5
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that CREEC failed to meet the commonality

5 We do not reach HPT’s argument that the ADA does not apply to it because it is not an “operator” of transportation services at the hotels it owns. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b). First, this issue is not before us, because it goes to the merits, not the issue of class certification. Second, even if this argument were to bear on class certification, we need not reach it because we affirm the district court on other grounds.

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requirement, we need not reach CREEC’s arguments regarding typicality, remedy, or expert certification.
AFFIRMED.

MORRIS, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s determination that CREEC may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA. I also concur in the majority’s determination that CREEC may possess constitutional standing where its members visit a facility solely to test for ADA compliance. I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification under Rule 23. I respectfully dissent from this portion of the majority’s opinion.
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The Supreme Court agreed that Congress possessed the authority to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of race. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261–62. Congress acted again to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations—this time on the basis of disability.
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal enjoyment of [accommodations] by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Congress made no distinction

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whether the owner was a natural person, a partnership, a corporation, a REIT, or any other type of structure allowed under the law. Congress outlawed discrimination on the basis of disability.
CREEC seeks to root out in a systematic fashion what it perceives to be discrimination against persons with disabilities by HPT and other hotel owners. CREEC has chosen a class action under Rule 23 as its favored vehicle to accomplish the task. The majority reasons that the lack of a “common offending policy” followed by the independent contractors who manage HPT’s hotels “would require 142 trials within a trial” to determine whether each hotel and its independent contractor manager violated the ADA. The majority’s conclusion will permit HPT to avoid for all practical purposes the consequences of the ADA. CREEC and other advocates of the rights of the disabled now will be required to seek equal treatment one motel at a time.
The majority cites Armstrong, 275 F.3d 849, to support its determination that merely pointing to a pattern of harm proves insufficient to satisfy Rule 23. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong affirmed class certification for a group of prisoners and parolees who suffered from six different categories of disability, including mobility impairments. Id. at 854. The plaintiffs alleged that multiple provisions of California’s policies and practices during its parole and parole revocation hearing proceedings, at numerous facilities across the state, discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities. Id.
The Board argued on appeal that the wide variation in the nature of the particular class members’ disabilities precluded a finding of commonality. The Board contended that separate representative lawsuits should have been filed by the hearing impaired, the vision impaired, the

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developmentally impaired, the learning impaired, and the mobility impaired. We disagreed. We noted that plaintiffs in civil rights litigation satisfy the commonality requirement “where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Id. at 868. Individual factual differences among the individual class members did not preclude commonality where all suffered “similar harm from the Board’s failure to accommodate their disabilities.” Id.
Plaintiffs here all suffer from similar harm based on HPT’s failure to accommodate their disabilities as required by the ADA. As recognized in Armstrong, whether one hotel provides no van service for people with mobility impairments, while another hotel charges extra for van service for people with mobility impairments proves irrelevant to the issue of class certification. Whether all of the putative class members suffer from the failure of HPT’s hotels to accommodate their disabilities as required by the ADA instead should drive the analysis. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the “existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates” proves sufficient to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality requirement. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010). Rodriguez reversed the district court’s denial of class certification of claims filed on behalf of detainees held without bond hearings pursuant to “general immigration statutes.” Rodriquez, 591 F.3d at 1113. The government opposed class certification on the ground that class members suffered detention for different reasons and under the authority of different statutes. Id. at 1122. We applied the commonality requirement “to look only for some shared legal issue or a common core of facts.” Id. We determined that the commonality existed in the “constitutional issue at

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the heart of each class member’s claim for relief.” Id. at 1123. The denial of equivalent transportation in violation of the ADA stands at the heart of CREEC’s claims for relief. This shared legal issue satisfies the commonality requirement as applied in Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1122.
With respect to typicality, Armstrong again proves instructive. The plaintiffs satisfied the typicality requirement based on their same injury: “a refusal or failure to afford them accommodations as required by statute.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 869. In the case of mobility impaired persons, their injuries lied in their “inability to overcome the physical barriers to attendance” at the hearings. Id. As a result, all of the class members suffered the deprivation of services provided by the Board. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132. It mattered not that one Board facility may have failed to provide van transportation for mobility impaired prisoners, while another Board facility may have failed to provide hearing or translation assistance for hearing impaired prisoners. It mattered that the Board failed to provide the accommodations required by law. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 869. The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1124, likewise concluded that the fact that the government detained putative class members under different statutes and that some putative class members stood at different points in the removal process failed to defeat the typicality requirement. All putative class members suffered from the same practice of prolonged detention while in immigration proceedings. Id.
CREEC suffers from a similar alleged deprivation of transportation services provided by HPT’s hotels. Plaintiffs allege that HPT’s hotels have refused or failed to afford them the accommodations required by the ADA. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 672 (9th Cir. 2014), upheld class certification

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of Eighth Amendment health care and conditions-ofconfinement claims brought by “[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical, mental health and dental care practices of the [Arizona Department of Corrections].” A broader and more diverse group of claims seems difficult to contemplate. Arizona could not contemplate a more diverse group of claims as it argued that “Eighth Amendment healthcare and conditions-ofconfinement claims are inherently case specific and turn on many individual inquiries.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 675. The Ninth Circuit determined instead that alleged policies and practices of statewide applications “expose all inmates in ADC custody to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 676. We too should recognize that the alleged practices of HPT’s hotels in failing to comply with the equivalent transportation requirement of the ADA exposes CREEC and its members to a substantial risk of serious harm.
HPT’s decision to establish a REIT as its preferred ownership structure should not shield HPT from its alleged systematic effort to evade the equivalent transportation requirements of the ADA. The majority’s conclusion that CREEC’s claims would require 142 mini trials within a trial should defeat class certification allows HPT to shirk its responsibilities as the owner under the ADA. I believe that CREEC has satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23, as analyzed by the Court in Armstrong, Rodriguez, and Parsons.

 
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FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER, on behalf of itself; ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN; RUTHEE GOLDKORN; JULIE REISKIN, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated persons defined below,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16269 D.C. No. 3:15cv-00221-JST
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 15, 2017 San Francisco, California
Filed August 9, 2017

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Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Brian M. Morris,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Morris

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act / Standing / Class Certification
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in an action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act regarding transportation services at hotels.
The panel held that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain this ADA suit. The panel held that a plaintiff who lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment is not in ADA compliance may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA. Agreeing with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the panel held that a plaintiff may also assert constitutional standing where her only motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance.

* The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), given the lack of consistent policies or practices across the hotels owned by the defendant but operated by others.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, District Judge Morris concurred in the majority’s analysis of standing. Dissenting from the majority’s determination that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, Judge Morris wrote that the plaintiffs satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23.

COUNSEL
Timothy P. Fox (argued), Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Denver, Colorado; Bill Lann Lee, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Berkeley, California; Julia Campins, Campins Benham-Baker LLP, Lafayette, California; Julie Wilensky, Disability Rights California, Oakland, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
David Raizman (argued), Christopher F. Wong, and Kathleen J. Choi, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
Lindsay Nako, Jocelyn D. Larkin, and Lynnette Miner, Impact Fund, Berkeley, California, for Amici Curiae Impact Fund, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center, Disability Rights Oregon, Disability Rights Washington, Equal Rights Advocates, Legal Aid Association of California, Legal Aid Society – Employment Law Center,

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National Association of the Deaf, National Disability Rights Network, and National Federation of the Blind.

OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
This case presents two questions of constitutional standing to assert claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the question of whether those claims are maintainable as a class action. We must decide (1) whether a plaintiff may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA where she lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment is not in ADA compliance; and (2) whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing where her only motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance. We conclude that standing may be asserted in both circumstances. However, although plaintiffs have standing to maintain this ADA suit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality requirement, given the lack of consistent policies or practices across the hotels owned by defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (“HPT”), but operated by others.
I.
HPT is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) that owns hotels across the United States. REITs are vehicles for investors to own a fraction of a group of real estate holdings. Under federal statute, REITs are exempt from taxation on corporate profits; shareholders are taxed only when they

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receive dividends.1 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–859. To avoid taxation at the corporate level, REITs must, among other things, remain passive investors and delegate the management of particular facilities. Id. § 856(d)(7).

Named Plaintiffs Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin (“Named Plaintiffs”) are physically disabled and use wheelchairs for mobility. Cupolo-Freeman and Goldkorn reside in California, while Reiskin lives in Colorado. Each phoned an HPT-owned hotel located in her state of residence that provided free local shuttle services, and each was informed that the hotel at issue did not provide equivalent shuttle service for mobilityimpaired people. Each alleges that she would have stayed at the hotel she called but for its failure to provide equivalent shuttle service. In addition, each alleges that she still intends to stay at the hotel, but that its failure to provide equivalent shuttle service deters her from doing so at present.

Cupolo-Freeman, Goldkorn, and Reiskin, along with the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (collectively “CREEC”),2 filed a putative class action against HPT in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that HPT had failed to offer

1 The Senate Finance Committee defines REITs as entities that “receive[] most of [their] income from passive real-estate related investments.” S. Rep. No. 106-201, at 55 (1999). REITs receive conduit taxation treatment to “permit individual investors to get the benefit of centralized management and diversification without being subjected to an extra layer of corporate taxes.” Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 99.5 (2017).
2 After filing this appeal, CREEC voluntarily dismissed its claims before the district court. Nevertheless, for simplicity’s sake, we follow the district court in referring to appellants as “CREEC.”

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equivalent accessible transportation services at its hotels in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(B), 12182(b)(2)(C).
Section 12182(a) provides:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A hotel is a public accommodation. Id. § 12181(7)(A). Section 12182(b)(2)(B) specifically requires private entities that “operate” “fixed route systems” to provide equivalent service to those with disabilities. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(B). Section 12182(b)(2)(C) requires the same of entities that “operate” “demand responsive systems.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(C). CREEC alleges that, while most HPT hotels provide some form of free local transportation service, very few provide equivalent service that is accessible to people who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility.
Before the district court, CREEC moved to certify the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. It defined the class as people with limited mobility who have been or will be denied equivalent transportation services at HPT hotels. CREEC alleges that the common questions of fact and law include “[w]hether Defendant HPT’s transportation vehicles are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs,” and “[w]hether Defendant HPT has ensured that the transportation system in place at each hotel,

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when viewed in its entirety, meets the equivalent service requirements of” the ADA. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). They also assert that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2) because HPT “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
The district court denied the motion. It held that the proposed class did not meet the threshold Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality because HPT delegates the operation of its hotels to management companies. Deciding CREEC’s claims, the district court held, would necessitate 142 “mini-trials” to determine whether the particular practices at each of the 142 challenged hotels violate Title III. In the alternative, the district court held that CREEC failed to meet the Rule 23(a) requirement of typicality, and failed to establish that injunctive relief would be “appropriate respecting the class as a whole,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). CREEC timely appealed.
II.
The district court had federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), which allows for interlocutory appeals from denials of class-action certification.
III.
We first address whether CREEC has properly asserted Article III standing. The following three elements constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) an “injury in fact” suffered by the plaintiff; (2) a causal connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct;

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and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). HPT argues that the Named Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy both the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements. We address these contentions in turn.
A. The Named Plaintiffs have properly alleged injury in fact.
Article III “requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). A plaintiff has sustained an injury in fact only if she can establish “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, a party seeks injunctive relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (alteration omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must allege “continuing, present adverse effects” stemming from the defendant’s actions. Id.
A plaintiff experiences continuing adverse effects where a defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA deters her from making use of the defendant’s facility. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). We have dubbed this the “deterrent effect doctrine.” Id. at 949–50. “[W]hen a plaintiff who is disabled within the meaning of the ADA has actual knowledge of illegal barriers at a public accommodation to which he or she desires access, that plaintiff need not engage in the ‘futile gesture’ of attempting to gain access in order to show actual

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injury. . . .” Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). “So long as the discriminatory conditions continue, and so long as a plaintiff is aware of them and remains deterred, the injury under the ADA continues.” Id. at 1137.
The relevant question, therefore, is whether the Named Plaintiffs are presently deterred from visiting HPT-owned hotels. We limit our evaluation to the pleadings. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (The elements of standing “must be supported at each stage of the litigation in the same manner as any other essential element of the case.”).
The Named Plaintiffs have alleged in the First Amended Complaint that they intend to visit the relevant hotels, but have been deterred from doing so by the hotels’ noncompliance with the ADA. They further allege that they will visit the hotels when the non-compliance is cured. Thus, the ADA violations have prevented them from staying at the hotels. Without such averments, they would lack standing. However, “construing the factual allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs,” as we must at this preliminary stage, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013), we conclude that the Named Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury in fact. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. Their harm is “concrete and particularized,” and their intent to visit the hotels once they provide equivalent shuttle service for the disabled renders their harm “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
HPT contends that this is the wrong result. It offers several reasons why the named plaintiffs cannot meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement: (1) they did not actually visit

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the hotels; (2) they do not intend to do so unless and until the alleged ADA violations are remedied; (3) they are motivated to visit the hotels only by their desire to test them for ADA compliance; and (4) they failed to allege injury in the original complaint, instead doing so only in the First Amended Complaint. None of these facts defeats standing.
1. The Named Plaintiffs were not required to visit the hotels.
While HPT concedes that a plaintiff need not make repeated in-person visits to ADA non-compliant sites in order to demonstrate that the defendant’s noncompliance has deterred her access, see Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135, it contends that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement unless she has had at least one “personal encounter” with the alleged barrier. HPT argues that the Named Plaintiffs fail to meet this threshold because they merely telephoned the hotels to inquire about transportation services available to disabled guests.
However, the purported requirement urged by HPT of a “personal encounter” with an access barrier lacks foundation in Article III. Actually visiting a hotel, as opposed to phoning, does not make a plaintiff’s injury any more concrete: she is deterred from using the accommodation in either event. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. It is the plaintiff’s “actual knowledge” of a barrier, rather than the source of that knowledge, that is determinative. Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135.
True, whether a plaintiff has visited a facility in the past may be indicative of whether she will do so in the future. Requiring a plaintiff to “personally encounter” a barrier in order to obtain an injunction under Title III might screen out plaintiffs who do not in fact intend to use the facility—that is, plaintiffs for whom an injury is not actually imminent.

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See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. However, while past actions may constitute “evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, they are not necessarily dispositive evidence. For example, evidence of concrete travel plans would be sufficient to show that a disabled plaintiff intends to visit a facility, even if she has not travelled there in the past. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. Contrariwise, in the absence of travel plans, a past visit might not be sufficient evidence of imminent future harm. See id.
Requiring a plaintiff to “personally encounter” a barrier would also cause line-drawing problems. Would it be enough to travel to the hotel and ask the concierge whether the hotel’s shuttle service accommodates the disabled, or must a plaintiff actually attempt to use the purportedly deficient accommodation? If the concierge says there is no accommodation, must the plaintiff perform a visual inspection or review schedules to verify this? What if the plaintiff is blind?
Nevertheless, HPT insists its “personal encounter” requirement is dictated by precedent, citing a district court case, Brooke v. Peterson, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1207–11 (C.D. Cal. 2016), for this proposition. Surveying Ninth Circuit cases on the deterrent effect doctrine, the Brooke court concluded that our precedent requires a plaintiff to allege “personal, percipient knowledge of [alleged] barriers [to access]” to sufficiently assert standing. Id. at 1207–10. According to Brooke, secondhand knowledge—obtained, for example, from a concierge or the plaintiff’s agent—is insufficient. Id.
The Brooke court reads too much into our prior cases. While it places talismanic weight on our use of the term “return” in Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953, and D’Lil v. Best

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Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2008), those cases used the term to distinguish planned visits from past ones, not to differentiate “personal” and “percipient” knowledge from secondhand knowledge. The cases cited in Brooke all happened to involve plaintiffs who had observed the lack of accommodation firsthand, but none of them held that this was a constitutional requirement.
Accordingly, we reject HPT’s invitation to create a bright-line predicate of a “personal encounter” with a barrier to access as a requirement for standing under ADA Title III. Making case-by-case determinations about whether a particular plaintiff’s injury is imminent is well within the competency of the district courts. See, e.g., Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1335–37 (11th Cir. 2013) (assessing various factors in determining whether plaintiff suing under ADA Title III was likely to actually visit the supermarket, including prior visits, proximity of residence to store, plans for future visits, and status as an “ADA tester who has filed many similar lawsuits”).
2. The Named Plaintiffs need not intend to visit the hotels until after remediation.
HPT next contends that the Named Plaintiffs failed to establish “a sufficient likelihood that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way,” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948, given their allegation that they do not plan to stay at the hotels unless and until HPT remedies the alleged violations. This argument has some superficial appeal, because courts have denied standing where a plaintiff was unlikely to actually experience a threatened harm. See, e.g., Morton, 405 U.S. at 734–35; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64.
However, this is really just a roundabout way of challenging the rule that a plaintiff need not engage in a

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“futile gesture” to establish Title III standing if she is on notice that the establishment “does not intend to comply” with the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). As we held in Pickern, “under the ADA, once a plaintiff has actually become aware of discriminatory conditions existing at a public accommodation, and is thereby deterred from visiting or patronizing that accommodation, the plaintiff has suffered an injury.” 293 F.3d at 1136–37. The injury continues so long as equivalent access is denied. Thus, HPT’s contention fails.
3. Motivation for visiting the hotels is irrelevant.
Our court has yet to decide whether plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA can claim “tester standing.” We begin our analysis of this question with Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–74 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that testers have standing to sue under Sections 804(d) and 812(a) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(d), 3612(a). The Court first noted that Section 804(d) prohibits representations “to any person because of race” that a dwelling is unavailable, when in fact it is available. Id. at 373. The Court reasoned that Section 804(d) “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the availability of housing,” and that an invasion of this right causes harm that is potentially cognizable under Article III. Id. at 373–74. Whereas Congress in Section 804(a) required a “bona fide offer” to rent or purchase before a plaintiff could sue for discriminatory refusal to sell or rent, it included no such limitation in Section 804(d). Id. at 374. The Court relied on this absence of limiting language to hold that plaintiffs who “pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices” have standing to sue for violations of Section 804(d). Id. at 373–75.

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We have held that the disabled may assert tester standing under the FHA. After Havens Realty was decided, Congress amended the FHA to specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of “handicap” in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Following the reasoning of Havens Realty, we held that tester standing was available under this provision. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2004). We reasoned that, as with the provision at issue in Havens Realty, § 3604(f)(2) was by its terms not limited to bona fide purchasers. Id. at 1104. We held that “[i]nterpreting § 3604(f)(2) to exclude [testers] from enforcing their right to be free from discrimination undermines the specific intent of the [Fair Housing Act Amendments], which is to prevent disabled individuals from feeling as if they are second-class citizens.” Id.
Only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have considered in published opinions whether “tester standing” is viable under Title III of the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Houston that nothing in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 12182 constrains the statutorily created right “to be free from disability discrimination in the enjoyment of [a] facility” based on a plaintiff’s motive for accessing the facility. 733 F.3d at 1332. Indeed, the court observed, § 12182(a) states that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability,” much like the prohibition against misrepresenting the availability of housing to “any person” in Havens Realty. Houston, 733 F.3d at 1332 (alteration in original). The court also noted that the ADA’s enforcement provision, § 12188, provides that “‘any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability’ may bring suit,” exactly tracking the “any person” language of Havens Realty. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)) (alteration in original). Finally, the Houston

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court pointed out that Congress knows how to limit standing to sue under discrimination statutes to certain groups of people, having done so both in the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (requiring “bona fide offer” to rent or purchase in order to bring suit), and Title III of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (limiting suits for some actions to “clients or customers of the covered public accommodation”), but that it chose not to do so in § 12182(a). Houston, 733 F.3d at 1333. Accordingly, the court reasoned, a plaintiff’s status as a tester does not deprive her of the right to sue for injunctive relief under § 12182(a). Id. at 1332–34.
The Tenth Circuit has also held that tester standing is viable under Title III of the ADA. Colo. Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2014). The Colorado Cross court noted that “Title III provides remedies for ‘any person’ subjected to illegal disability discrimination.” Id. at 1211 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)). Thus, it concluded that “anyone who has suffered an invasion of the legal interest protected by Title III may have standing, regardless of his or her motivation in encountering that invasion.” Id.
We also conclude that motivation is irrelevant to the question of standing under Title III of the ADA. The Named Plaintiffs’ status as ADA testers thus does not deprive them of standing.
4. Injury is alleged in the operative complaint.
Citing the general rule that standing is determined “at the time the action commences,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000), HPT argues that two of the three Named Plaintiffs, Goldkorn and Reiskin, lack standing because they failed to include the

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factual bases for their allegations in the original complaint. However, “the proper focus in determining jurisdiction are the facts existing at the time the complaint under consideration was filed.” Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The First Amended Complaint was the complaint under consideration when the district court assessed standing, and it remains operative. Goldkorn and Reiskin adequately allege in that complaint that they were injured by HPT hotels’ failure to accommodate their disabilities. Accordingly, HPT’s argument fails.
B. The harm suffered by the Named Plaintiffs is redressable.
HPT also contends that the district court erred in finding that CREEC has standing because the Named Plaintiffs’ injuries are not redressable, given that it would be impossible for a court to fashion a class-wide injunction. However, this is just a reiteration of HPT’s view of the merits of CREEC’s claims. A plaintiff need only show that “a favorable decision will relieve” her injuries. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982). The Named Plaintiffs have requested that the court fashion an injunction mandating that the HPT hotels comply with the ADA. If the Named Plaintiffs were to prevail and receive their requested relief, then their injuries would be redressed. They have therefore satisfied the redressability requirement, whether or not they are correct on the merits.
IV.
A district court’s order denying class certification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014). Assuming the district court has applied the correct legal standard, the

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reviewing court may set aside its decision only if the court’s reasoning was “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id.
A party seeking class certification must demonstrate that (1) “joinder of all members is impracticable,” (2) “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” (3) the named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses are typical of those of the class, and (4) “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
If a party succeeds in establishing all four of the 23(a) elements, it must then satisfy one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). CREEC relies on Rule 23(b)(2), which requires a showing that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” CREEC contends that injunctive relief is appropriate because HPT has failed to ensure the provision of equivalent shuttle services at its hotels, and because the district court could conceivably instruct HPT to implement uniform policies or practices to comply with the ADA.
The district court denied CREEC’s class certification motion, concluding that CREEC failed to demonstrate either commonality or typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)–(3). It also held that CREEC failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b) because the injunction it sought would have been impermissibly vague, nothing more than “a bare injunction to follow the law.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 689 n.35 (9th Cir. 2014).
Rule 23(a)(2) requires “a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart

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Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). A contention is common to all members if “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id.
HPT—a REIT—owns some 302 hotels across the United States. CREEC has alleged that 142 of these hotels operate shuttle services in a manner that violates the ADA. However, HPT does not itself operate the hotels. To enjoy tax benefits under statute, REITs must, among other things, remain passive investors and delegate the management of particular facilities. 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7). Accordingly, HPT employs various professional management companies that are “eligible independent contractors” to operate the hotels it owns. An “eligible independent contractor” is a person or corporation that is “actively engaged in the trade or business of operating qualified lodging facilities,” and that does not control more than 35 percent of the REIT’s shares or voting power.3 26 U.S.C. §§ 856(d)(3), 856(d)(9). Although HPT’s agreements with the management companies require the latter to “comply with all laws in their fulfillment of their management agreement obligations,” those agreements also stipulate that the management companies “shall have sole, exclusive and uninterrupted control over the operation of the Hotels.” HPT “does not set or provide the Management Companies with any uniform

3 HPT has contracted its hotel operations out to only a handful of independent operators. According to its website, its 500 hotels are operated by six eligible independent contracting firms, including such household names as Wyndham and Hyatt. Portfolio, HPT, http://www.hptreit.com/portfolio/properties/default.aspx (last visited June 28, 2017). Presumably these managers maintain control over the properties they have contracted to manage, could themselves be named as defendants in separate class actions, and could ultimately be held responsible for any discriminatory practices.

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policy or plan regarding the operation of shuttle or transportation services at its hotels.” Thus, it is the management companies, not HPT, that decide whether to offer local transportation services and that set the terms on which those services operate.
HPT argues that there can be no common question regarding the operation of its hotels as a matter of law, because federal law requires HPT to delegate operating authority to independent contractors if it wishes to maintain its REIT status and the tax benefits that flow therefrom. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(l)(3)(A). However, the district court held that the fact that HPT lacks a specific and uniform policy to ensure ADA compliance at its hotels defeated commonality, regardless of HPT’s reasons for lacking such a policy. The court reasoned that, absent a legal duty to adopt specific policies to comply with the ADA, “it is unclear how HPT’s admitted lack of a policy regarding the operation of shuttle or transportation services could serve as the ‘glue’ holding together Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352). Given that there was no “common offending policy,” the court held, “proving that each of the 142 hotels violated the ADA would require 142 trials within a trial.” Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the class lacked commonality. The court correctly found that HPT did not have a policy regarding how its eligible independent contractors had to comply with the ADA. CREEC insists that HPT maintained an unwritten, de facto policy of non-compliance that resulted in widespread ADA violations. See, e.g., Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165–66 (finding commonality based on alleged unofficial policy of discouraging employees from reporting overtime). However, CREEC has not alleged any facts that would support this theory. On the allegations in the amended

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

complaint, HPT has done nothing to discourage its contractors from complying with the ADA. Indeed, HPT’s contracts require hotel operators to comply with applicable federal and state laws. This is a policy of delegation, not of non-compliance. While commonality may be established based on a “pattern of officially sanctioned . . . [illegal] behavior,” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2011), merely pointing to a pattern of harm, untethered to the defendant’s conduct, is insufficient.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the factual issues regarding alleged ADA violations are significantly different at the various hotels.4 There is no evidence of a single, “general policy of discrimination” that could serve as a common issue. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352– 53. A practice may indeed be evidence of a systematic policy, see, e.g., Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165–66 & n.5, but it is undisputed that HPT, pursuant to its contracts, does not participate in the management and operation of the hotels. Absent any allegation that HPT somehow discourages its contractors from complying with the ADA, CREEC cannot

4 Specifically, the district court found that:
While some of the hotels contacted by the Named Plaintiffs are alleged to have not offered any wheelchair-accessible transportation at all, others are alleged to have offered wheelchair-accessible transportation, but required guests to cover the costs. Still other hotels are alleged to have required at least two days advance notice to arrange wheelchairaccessible transportation for a guest, whereas nondisabled guests were required to provide less notice.
Civ. Rights Educ. & Enforcement Ctr., 317 F.R.D. at 101 n.4 (citations omitted).

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establish a pattern of discrimination orchestrated by HPT, as it must in order to establish a question of fact common to its claims against HPT.
CREEC tried to avoid this conclusion at oral argument by insisting that HPT has a “nondelegable duty” to comply with the ADA specifically. Nondelegable duty is a tort concept associated with vicarious liability theories. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 57 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2012). Contrary to CREEC’s contention, however, the concept “does not mean that an actor is not permitted to delegate [an] activity to an independent contractor.” Id. Rather, it means that an actor “will be vicariously liable for the contractor’s tortious conduct in the course of carrying out the activity.” Id. Even if HPT would be vicariously liable for ADA violations by its hired contractors, we fail to see how this fact bears on commonality. It would only create a common issue as to where the financial burden of liability would fall, not one regarding the question of that liability. While the latter issue is “central to the validity” of CREEC’s claims, WalMart, 564 U.S. at 350, the former is not.
The cases the dissent cites for the proposition that similarity of the harm to plaintiffs may constitute a common issue, with nothing more, are inapposite. Those cases all involved a common policy or practice. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs challenged written policy that failed to provide for adequate ADA requirements at parole hearings); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs challenged practice of holding detainees for longer than six months); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2014) (commonality satisfied where plaintiffs made “detailed

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

factual allegations concerning the existence of uniform, statewide policies and practices in all [Arizona Department of Corrections] facilities . . . [that] expose all . . . inmates to a substantial risk of harm”). To the extent the dissent suggests that HPT has intentionally failed to comply with the ADA, CREEC has not made such an allegation. Intentional noncompliance would amount to an unofficial policy of discrimination—a common issue weighing in favor of class certification. But a “policy against having uniform . . . practices” is decidedly not a common issue. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355.
CREEC contends that this result gives multiple-facility owners perverse incentives to vary their operating practices across facilities or contract out operations to independent managers. However, this argument rests on an important unstated premise: that firms will violate the ADA rather than comply with it, so long as they can avoid class-action suits. Assessing whether this premise is empirically true lies beyond judicial competence; altering incentives to comply with the ADA, beyond judicial authority. We emphasize that our holding is limited to the issue of class certification under Rule 23. Whatever the incentives to sue under the ADA, Rule 23 does not require HPT to manage its properties in a manner that would facilitate class actions if and when ADA violations do occur.5
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that CREEC failed to meet the commonality

5 We do not reach HPT’s argument that the ADA does not apply to it because it is not an “operator” of transportation services at the hotels it owns. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b). First, this issue is not before us, because it goes to the merits, not the issue of class certification. Second, even if this argument were to bear on class certification, we need not reach it because we affirm the district court on other grounds.

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requirement, we need not reach CREEC’s arguments regarding typicality, remedy, or expert certification.
AFFIRMED.

MORRIS, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s determination that CREEC may rely on the “deterrent effect doctrine” to establish constitutional standing under the ADA. I also concur in the majority’s determination that CREEC may possess constitutional standing where its members visit a facility solely to test for ADA compliance. I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification under Rule 23. I respectfully dissent from this portion of the majority’s opinion.
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The Supreme Court agreed that Congress possessed the authority to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of race. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261–62. Congress acted again to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations—this time on the basis of disability.
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal enjoyment of [accommodations] by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Congress made no distinction

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

whether the owner was a natural person, a partnership, a corporation, a REIT, or any other type of structure allowed under the law. Congress outlawed discrimination on the basis of disability.
CREEC seeks to root out in a systematic fashion what it perceives to be discrimination against persons with disabilities by HPT and other hotel owners. CREEC has chosen a class action under Rule 23 as its favored vehicle to accomplish the task. The majority reasons that the lack of a “common offending policy” followed by the independent contractors who manage HPT’s hotels “would require 142 trials within a trial” to determine whether each hotel and its independent contractor manager violated the ADA. The majority’s conclusion will permit HPT to avoid for all practical purposes the consequences of the ADA. CREEC and other advocates of the rights of the disabled now will be required to seek equal treatment one motel at a time.
The majority cites Armstrong, 275 F.3d 849, to support its determination that merely pointing to a pattern of harm proves insufficient to satisfy Rule 23. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong affirmed class certification for a group of prisoners and parolees who suffered from six different categories of disability, including mobility impairments. Id. at 854. The plaintiffs alleged that multiple provisions of California’s policies and practices during its parole and parole revocation hearing proceedings, at numerous facilities across the state, discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities. Id.
The Board argued on appeal that the wide variation in the nature of the particular class members’ disabilities precluded a finding of commonality. The Board contended that separate representative lawsuits should have been filed by the hearing impaired, the vision impaired, the

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developmentally impaired, the learning impaired, and the mobility impaired. We disagreed. We noted that plaintiffs in civil rights litigation satisfy the commonality requirement “where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Id. at 868. Individual factual differences among the individual class members did not preclude commonality where all suffered “similar harm from the Board’s failure to accommodate their disabilities.” Id.
Plaintiffs here all suffer from similar harm based on HPT’s failure to accommodate their disabilities as required by the ADA. As recognized in Armstrong, whether one hotel provides no van service for people with mobility impairments, while another hotel charges extra for van service for people with mobility impairments proves irrelevant to the issue of class certification. Whether all of the putative class members suffer from the failure of HPT’s hotels to accommodate their disabilities as required by the ADA instead should drive the analysis. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the “existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates” proves sufficient to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality requirement. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010). Rodriguez reversed the district court’s denial of class certification of claims filed on behalf of detainees held without bond hearings pursuant to “general immigration statutes.” Rodriquez, 591 F.3d at 1113. The government opposed class certification on the ground that class members suffered detention for different reasons and under the authority of different statutes. Id. at 1122. We applied the commonality requirement “to look only for some shared legal issue or a common core of facts.” Id. We determined that the commonality existed in the “constitutional issue at

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CREEC V. HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST

the heart of each class member’s claim for relief.” Id. at 1123. The denial of equivalent transportation in violation of the ADA stands at the heart of CREEC’s claims for relief. This shared legal issue satisfies the commonality requirement as applied in Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1122.
With respect to typicality, Armstrong again proves instructive. The plaintiffs satisfied the typicality requirement based on their same injury: “a refusal or failure to afford them accommodations as required by statute.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 869. In the case of mobility impaired persons, their injuries lied in their “inability to overcome the physical barriers to attendance” at the hearings. Id. As a result, all of the class members suffered the deprivation of services provided by the Board. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132. It mattered not that one Board facility may have failed to provide van transportation for mobility impaired prisoners, while another Board facility may have failed to provide hearing or translation assistance for hearing impaired prisoners. It mattered that the Board failed to provide the accommodations required by law. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 869. The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1124, likewise concluded that the fact that the government detained putative class members under different statutes and that some putative class members stood at different points in the removal process failed to defeat the typicality requirement. All putative class members suffered from the same practice of prolonged detention while in immigration proceedings. Id.
CREEC suffers from a similar alleged deprivation of transportation services provided by HPT’s hotels. Plaintiffs allege that HPT’s hotels have refused or failed to afford them the accommodations required by the ADA. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 672 (9th Cir. 2014), upheld class certification

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of Eighth Amendment health care and conditions-ofconfinement claims brought by “[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical, mental health and dental care practices of the [Arizona Department of Corrections].” A broader and more diverse group of claims seems difficult to contemplate. Arizona could not contemplate a more diverse group of claims as it argued that “Eighth Amendment healthcare and conditions-ofconfinement claims are inherently case specific and turn on many individual inquiries.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 675. The Ninth Circuit determined instead that alleged policies and practices of statewide applications “expose all inmates in ADC custody to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 676. We too should recognize that the alleged practices of HPT’s hotels in failing to comply with the equivalent transportation requirement of the ADA exposes CREEC and its members to a substantial risk of serious harm.
HPT’s decision to establish a REIT as its preferred ownership structure should not shield HPT from its alleged systematic effort to evade the equivalent transportation requirements of the ADA. The majority’s conclusion that CREEC’s claims would require 142 mini trials within a trial should defeat class certification allows HPT to shirk its responsibilities as the owner under the ADA. I believe that CREEC has satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23, as analyzed by the Court in Armstrong, Rodriguez, and Parsons.

 
 Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 1 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7

ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN, et al.,

8

Plaintiffs,

9

v.

10

HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST,

11

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00221-JST
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Re: ECF No. 129

12

13

Before the Court is Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust’s motion for summary

14 judgment. ECF No. 129. The Court will deny the motion.1

15 I. BACKGROUND

16

Plaintiffs Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin are disabled

17 individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility. They, along with the Civil Rights Education and

18 Enforcement Center (“CREEC”), filed this putative class action against Defendant Hospitality

19 Properties Trust (“HPT”), contending that HPT violated the Americans with Disabilities Act

20 (“ADA”) by failing to provide accessible transportation services at the hotels it owns. CREEC

21 subsequently dismissed all of its claims with prejudice. ECF No. 97.

22

The Court found that Plaintiffs had standing to bring this action but denied Plaintiffs’

23 motion for class certification based on a lack of commonality and typicality and a failure to

24 comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). ECF No. 88.

25 Plaintiffs appealed the Court’s decision, and the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the appeal under

26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). ECF No. 102. The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the Court’s

27

28

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument.

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 2 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 determination on standing and its “finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality

2 requirement, given the lack of consistent policies or practices across the hotels owned by

3 defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (‘HPT’), but operated by others.” Civil Rights Educ. &

4 Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Properties Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017) (“CREEC”). The court did

5 not reach the issues of typicality or the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 1106.

6

The Ninth Circuit described the basic facts of this case, which no party disputes:

7

HPT is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) that owns hotels

across the United States. REITs are vehicles for investors to own a

8

fraction of a group of real estate holdings. Under federal statute,

REITs are exempt from taxation on corporate profits; shareholders

9

are taxed only when they receive dividends. 26 U.S.C. §§ 856-859.

To avoid taxation at the corporate level, REITs must, among other

10

things, remain passive investors and delegate the management of

particular facilities. Id. § 856(d)(7). 11

Named Plaintiffs Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie

12

Reiskin (“Named Plaintiffs”) are physically disabled and use

wheelchairs for mobility. Cupolo-Freeman and Goldkorn reside in

13

California, while Reiskin lives in Colorado. Each phoned an HPT-

owned hotel located in her state of residence that provided free local

14

shuttle services, and each was informed that the hotel at issue did

not provide equivalent shuttle service for mobility-impaired people.

15

Each alleges that she would have stayed at the hotel she called but

for its failure to provide equivalent shuttle service. In addition, each

16

alleges that she still intends to stay at the hotel, but that its failure to

provide equivalent shuttle service deters her from doing so at

17

present.

18 Id. at 1096-97 (footnote omitted).

19

The court further explained that HPT “owns some 302 hotels across the United States” but

20 “does not itself operate the hotels.” Id. at 1103. Instead, it “employs various professional

21 management companies . . . to operate the hotels it owns.” Id. HPT’s agreements with those

22 companies require compliance with all laws, but provide that “the management companies ‘shall

23 have sole, exclusive and uninterrupted control over the operation of the Hotels.’ . . . Thus, it is the

24 management companies, not HPT, that decide whether to offer local transportation services and

25 that set the terms on which those services operate.” Id. at 1104.

26

The ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of

27 disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,

28 or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 2

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 3 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A hotel is a

2 public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A).

3

Section 12182(b)(2) lists “[s]pecific prohibitions,” including the two at issue in this case:

4

(B) Fixed route system

5

(i) Accessibility

6

It shall be considered discrimination for a private entity which

operates a fixed route system and which is not subject to section

7

12184 of this title to purchase or lease a vehicle with a seating

capacity in excess of 16 passengers (including the driver) for use on

8

such system, for which a solicitation is made after the 30th day

following the effective date of this subparagraph, that is not readily

9

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including

individuals who use wheelchairs. 10

(ii) Equivalent service 11

If a private entity which operates a fixed route system and which is

12

not subject to section 12184 of this title purchases or leases a vehicle

with a seating capacity of 16 passengers or less (including the

13

driver) for use on such system after the effective date of this

subparagraph that is not readily accessible to or usable by

14

individuals with disabilities, it shall be considered discrimination for

such entity to fail to operate such system so that, when viewed in its

15

entirety, such system ensures a level of service to individuals with

disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, equivalent to

16

the level of service provided to individuals without disabilities.

17

(C) Demand responsive system

18

For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, discrimination

includes – 19

(i) a failure of a private entity which operates a demand

20

responsive system and which is not subject to section 12184 of this

title to operate such system so that, when viewed in its entirety, such

21

system ensures a level of service to individuals with disabilities,

including individuals who use wheelchairs, equivalent to the level of

22

service provided to individuals without disabilities; and

23

(ii) the purchase or lease by such entity for use on such

system of a vehicle with a seating capacity in excess of 16

24

passengers (including the driver), for which solicitations are made

after the 30th day following the effective date of this subparagraph,

25

that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities (including individuals who use wheelchairs) unless such

26

entity can demonstrate that such system, when viewed in its entirety,

provides a level of service to individuals with disabilities equivalent

27

to that provided to individuals without disabilities.

28

3

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United States District Court Northern District of California

1 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(B)-(C) (“Transportation Provisions”).2 A “fixed route system” is “a

2 system of providing transportation of individuals (other than by aircraft) on which a vehicle is

3 operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(4). A

4 “demand responsive system” is “any system of providing transportation of individuals by a

5 vehicle, other than a system which is a fixed route system.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(3).

6

HPT contends that the manner in which its hotels are managed – through agreements that

7 give management companies sole control over the hotels’ operation – precludes any finding of

8 liability in this case. Specifically, HPT argues that the Transportation Provisions do not apply to it

9 because it is not “a private entity which operates” a fixed route or demand responsive system. 42

10 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(B)-(C). Although HPT raised this argument on appeal, the Ninth Circuit did

11 not reach it for two reasons: “First, this issue is not before us, because it goes to the merits, not the

12 issue of class certification. Second, even if this argument were to bear on class certification, we

13 need not reach it because we affirm the district court on other grounds.” CREEC, 867 F.3d at

14 1106 n.5. HPT now asks this Court to decide the question in its favor on summary judgment.

15 II. LEGAL STANDARD

16

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

17 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

18 A dispute is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a

19 verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the

20 case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When deciding a motion for

21 summary judgment, the court must draw “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party’s

22 favor and may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Id. at 255.

23

Where the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial,

24 that party “has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each

25 issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474,

26

27 2 Section 12184 applies to private entities that are “primarily engaged in the business of

28

transporting people and whose operations affect commerce” and is not at issue in this case. 42 U.S.C. § 12184(a).

4

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United States District Court Northern District of California

1 480 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the party moving for summary judgment would not bear the burden of

2 proof at trial, that party “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the

3 nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough

4 evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire &

5 Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party satisfies

6 its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce admissible evidence to show

7 that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1102-03. If the nonmoving party fails to make

8 this showing, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

9 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

10 III. DISCUSSION

11

It appears that the scope of liability under the Transportation Provisions has only been

12 directly considered by one other court.3 In Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v.

13 Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC, the district court concluded that the term “private entity” was

14 “consistent with, and not distinct from ‘a place of public accommodation’ identified in Section

15 12182(a). Thus, a properly named defendant alleged to have discriminated against a plaintiff in

16 violation of these provisions would be an owner, lessor, lessee, or operator of the ‘private entity’

17 identified in subsections 12182(b)(2)(B) & (C).” 222 F. Supp. 3d 934, 949 (D. Colo. 2016). The

18 court clarified that the “private entities” to which it referred were the hotels themselves.4 Id.

19

20

3 Plaintiffs brought two other cases regarding inaccessible hotel shuttles, naming as defendants the REITs that owned the hotels, but both cases settled without litigation over liability. In one case,

21

the REIT “acknowledge[d] that it could be found statutorily liable in the event of an ADA violation.” Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Ashford Hosp. Tr., Inc., No. 15-cv-00216-DMR,

22

2016 WL 1177950, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). In the other, the court signed the parties’ proposed order, which noted that the Department of Transportation “regulations broadly define

23

‘operate’ to include ‘the provision of transportation service by a public or private entity itself or by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with the entity,’” and that “[t]he

24

ADA explicitly prohibits covered entities such as RLJ [the REIT] from ‘directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,’ engaging in actions otherwise prohibited by title

25

III.” Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. RLJ Lodging Tr., No. 15-cv-0224-YGR, 2016 WL 314400, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 and 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)).

26 4 HPT is incorrect when it argues that, under Sage, “it is beyond dispute that HPT does not own

27

the ‘private entities’ that operate the transportation services.” ECF No. 135 at 11 (emphasis in original). To the contrary, the “private entities” under Sage are the hotels themselves, and it is not

28

disputed that HPT does own those entities. The Sage court considered whether the defendants operated the hotels at issue in that case because that was the only potential source of liability; the

5

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 6 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 (noting that it was undisputed that the two hotels at issue “are private entities and places of public

2 accommodation that provide transportation services via fixed route or demand responsive

3 systems,” and therefore moving on to “determine whether there exist genuine issues of material

4 fact as to whether [defendants] are owners, lessors, lessees, or operators of the hotels”). In

5 reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that the ADA’s definition of “public

6 accommodation” refers to a list of “private entities,” including hotels. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.

7 § 12181(7)(A)).

8

Another district court reached a similar conclusion, although the scope of who would be

9 liable under the Transportation Provisions was not directly before it. In J.H. by & through

10 Holman v. Just for Kids, Inc., the court considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 12182 covered

11 transportation systems not connected with a place of public accommodation. 248 F. Supp. 3d

12 1210 (D. Utah 2017). In concluding that it did not, the court interpreted § 12182 as “prohibit[ing]

13 discrimination in the administration of transportation systems operated by a place of public

14 accommodation or by a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public

15 accommodation, such as a shuttle service operated by a hotel.” Id.

16

This statutory interpretation has some appeal. The ADA’s legislative history indicates that

17 the Transportation Provisions were intended to cover, “for example, a business that runs a shuttle

18 service on the side for its customers or a hotel that runs a transportation service for its patrons.”

19 136 Cong. Rec. E1913-01, E1919, 1990 WL 80290 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)

20 (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 116 (1990), as reprinted in 1990

21 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 399 (“For example, where a hotel at an airport provides free shuttle service, the

22 hotel need not purchase new vehicles that are accessible so long as it makes alternative equivalent

23 [arrangements] for transporting people with disabilities who cannot ride the inaccessible vehicles.”

24 (emphasis added)). Likewise, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations

25 implementing the Transportation Provisions provide that: “Shuttle systems and other

26

27 plaintiffs did not contend that the defendants owned, leased, or leased to the hotels. Sage, 222 F.

28

Supp. 3d at 949-53 (applying definition of “operate” adopted by Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)).

6

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 7 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 transportation services operated by privately-owned hotels, car rental agencies, historical or theme

2 parks, and other public accommodations are subject to the requirements of this part for private

3 entities not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.37(b)

4 (emphasis added). And the Department of Justice’s ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual

5 refers to “[p]ublic accommodations that provide transportation,” and gives as an example “airport

6 shuttle services operated by hotels.” Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical

7 Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities § III-4.4700,

8 available at https://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (emphasis added).

9

However, the Ninth Circuit has noted the ADA’s “awkward drafting” in defining “public

10 accommodation” by listing a number of types of “private entities [to be] considered public

11 accommodations.” Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 874

12 (9th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The issue in that case was whether a publicly owned

13 stadium is a public accommodation subject to Title III of the ADA if it is operated by a private

14 entity. The defendants argued “that § 12181(7)(C) must be read as if it provided that ‘a stadium is

15 considered a public accommodation if it is a private entity,’” and that a publicly owned stadium

16 cannot be a public accommodation. Id. at 874. In considering this question, the court explained

17 that “[s]tadiums and ‘other place[s] of exhibition or entertainment,’ see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C),

18 are never ‘entities,’ private or public.” Id. (emphasis in original). Instead, a stadium is “a physical

19 location or facility. To make sense of the statute, there must be some relationship between the

20 private entity and the ‘place of exhibition or entertainment’ to which access is sought.” Id. at 874-

21 75 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The same reasoning would appear to apply to hotels

22 and other “place[s] of lodging” that constitute public accommodations under 42 U.S.C.

23 § 12181(7)(A) – i.e., that they are physical locations or facilities and not entities. Thus, the Court

24 cannot conclude that “private entity” in the Transportation Provisions should be construed as

25 referring to the hotels themselves.

26

Nonetheless, use of the word “operates” in the Transportation Provisions does not exclude

27 HPT from liability. Title III is silent on the meaning of “operate,” both in the context of operating

28 a public accommodation and operating a fixed route or demand responsive system. In the context 7

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United States District Court Northern District of California

1 of who “operates a place of public accommodation” under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), the Ninth Circuit

2 has adopted the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation from Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d

3 1063 (5th Cir. 1995): “Specifically, ‘to operate’ means ‘to put or keep in operation,’ ‘to control or

4 direct the functioning of,’ or ‘to conduct the affairs of; manage.’” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts,

5 Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). HPT urges the Court to apply the same definition

6 of “operates” to the Transportation Provisions and correctly cites the general rule that “identical

7 words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same

8 meaning.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). But, here, there is reason to depart from

9 the general rule. The Neff court “construed [‘operates’] in accord with its ordinary and natural

10 meaning” only “[b]ecause the ADA does not define the term” in the context of operating a public

11 accommodation. Neff, 58 F.3d at 1066 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

12 parties have also identified no regulations implementing the ADA that define what it means to

13 operate a place of public accommodation. In the context of operating a fixed route system or

14 demand responsive system, however, Title II of the ADA contains the following definition: “The

15 term ‘operates’, as used with respect to a fixed route system or demand responsive system,

16 includes operation of such system by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or

17 relationship with a public entity.”5 42 U.S.C. § 12141(4). This is some indication of

18 Congressional intent as to the meaning of “operates” in the context of fixed route and demand

19 responsive transportation systems.

20

In addition, the ADA specifically tasked the DOT with issuing regulations to carry out the

21 Transportation Provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a)(1). These regulations provide that: “Operates

22

23

5 Similar to the Transportation Provisions in Title III, Title II prohibits “a public entity which operates a fixed route system” from purchasing or leasing vehicles that are “not readily accessible

24

to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a). It also prohibits “a public entity [which] operates a demand responsive

25

system” from purchasing or leasing new vehicles that are “not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless such system, when

26

viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12144. The

27

Transportation Provisions contain identical language, except that they apply only to vehicles “with a seating capacity in excess of 16 passengers (including the driver).” 42 U.S.C.

28

§ 12182(b)(2)(B)(i) (fixed route system); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(C)(ii) (demand responsive system).

8

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 9 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 includes, with respect to a fixed route or demand responsive system, the provision of

2 transportation service by a public or private entity itself or by a person under a contractual or other

3 arrangement or relationship with the entity.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.3. Where, as here, “‘the statute is

4 silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,’ the court must defer to ‘the agency’s

5 answer [if it] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” Disabled Rights Action

6 Comm., 375 F.3d at 876 (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

7 Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). Although HPT argues that it is not liable under the DOT

8 regulation, it does not argue that the DOT’s interpretation is in any way impermissible. To the

9 contrary, the DOT’s interpretation is consistent with Title II’s statutory definition of “operates” in

10 the context of fixed route and demand responsive systems, thus ensuring that the phrases “operates

11 a fixed route system” and “operates a demand responsive system” are interpreted consistently

12 throughout the ADA. Accordingly, the Court defers to the DOT regulation and concludes that the

13 Transportation Provisions apply to any private entity that provides transportation service “itself or

14 by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with the entity.” 49 C.F.R.

15 § 37.3.

16

HPT contends that it does not fit within this definition, but the Court disagrees. According

17 to HPT’s president and chief executive officer, HPT has entered into management agreements

18 with a number of companies that “control, manage, and direct all operations, policies and

19 procedures at HPT’s owned hotels.” ECF No. 129-2 ¶ 6. “With respect to shuttle and

20 transportation services at HPT’s owned hotels, the Management Companies are responsible for

21 any such services, including deciding whether to provide such services and, if provided,

22 determining the scope and manner of services.” Id. ¶ 10. HPT argues that the management

23 companies, and not HPT, are therefore liable under the Transportation Provisions as the entities

24 that provide transportation services. But what HPT’s position fails to acknowledge is that the

25 management companies only have authority to provide transportation services because of their

26 agreements with HPT. Absent those agreements, the management companies would have no

27 authority to provide any services, including transportation services, at HPT-owned hotels. Thus,

28 the management companies provide transportation services “under a contractual or other 9

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 10 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1 arrangement or relationship with” HPT, and HPT therefore “operates” those services under the

2 DOT regulation’s definition. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3.

3

HPT argues that the “contractual or other arrangement or relationship with the entity” must

4 be specific to the transportation services – i.e., that for HPT to be liable, it must have a contract

5 with an entity specifically to provide transportation services. But nothing in the statute or the

6 regulations is so limiting, and courts are to “reject restrictive interpretations of the ADA.”

7 Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC, 862 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017). Instead, courts

8 must “construe the language of the ADA broadly to advance its remedial purpose,” which is “to

9 provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

10 individuals with disabilities” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards

11 addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754

12 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)-(2). Interpreting “contractual or other

13 arrangement or relationship with the entity” to include arrangements or relationships that delegate

14 operational control, even if transportation services are not specifically mentioned, advances the

15 ADA’s broad remedial purpose.

16

Because the Court finds no disputed fact as to HPT’s liability as an “operator” of the

17 transportation systems as defined by the DOT regulation, it does not reach HPT’s arguments

18 concerning whether an owner of a public accommodation that does not also “operate” a

19 transportation system can be held liable for failing to comply with the Transportation Provisions.

20 Nor does the Court reach Plaintiffs’ argument that HPT is judicially estopped from taking that

21 position based on its previous concession that it “does not contest in this action that an owner

22 cannot contract away its ADA obligations to a manager and remains jointly and severally liable to

23 disabled plaintiffs.” ECF No. 64 at 31 n.15 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(D)).

24 / / /

25 / / /

26 / / /

27 / / /

28 / / / 10

Case 3:15-cv-00221-JST Document 142 Filed 02/26/19 Page 11 of 11

United States District Court Northern District of California

1

CONCLUSION

2

HPT’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The parties shall appear for a case

3 management conference on April 3, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., and file a joint case management statement

4 on or before March 27, 2019.

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: February 26, 2019 7 8

______________________________________ JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge

9

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11

12

13

14

15

16

17

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24

25

26

27

28 11

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 1 of 81

1 Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750

Bill Lann Lee – Cal. Bar. No. 108452

Amy F. Robertson, Pro Hac Vice 2 CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER.

3

ENFORCEMENT CENTER 104 Broadway, Suite 400

2030 Addison St., Suite 500 Berkeley, CA 94704

4 Denver, CO 80203 (303) 757-7901

(510) 431-8484 blee@creeclaw.org

5 tfox@creeclaw.org

6 arobertson@creeclaw.org

Linda M. Dardarian – Cal. Bar No. 131001 Andrew P. Lee – Cal. Bar No. 245903

7

Julia Campins – Cal. Bar No. 238023

Raymond A. Wendell – Cal. Bar No. 298333

Hillary Benham-Baker – Cal. Bar No.265019 GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO

8 CAMPINS BENHAM-BAKER 935 Moraga Road, Suite 200

300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612

9 Lafayette, CA 94549

(510) 763-9800

10

(415) 373-5333 julia@campinsbenhambaker.com

ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com alee@gbdhlegal.com

11 hillary@campinsbenhambaker.com

rwendell@gbdhlegal.com

12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

14

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

15

16

ANN CUPOLO-FREEMAN, RUTHEE GOLDKORN, JULIE REISKIN, and

17 KATHERINE CORBETT,

18

Plaintiffs,

19

v.

Case No. 3:15-cv-00221-JST PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

20 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST,
21 Defendant.
22

23 Plaintiffs, Ann Cupolo-Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin, and Katherine Corbett
24 file their Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
25 and allege as follows:
26

27

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 1

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 2 of 81

1

INTRODUCTION

2

1.

For more than 25 years, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has

3 required hotels that provide transportation services to their guests to provide equivalent

4 accessible transportation services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters.

5

2.

Nevertheless, Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust (“HPT”) -- which owns

6 and/or operates approximately 290 hotels spread among 38 states -- has repeatedly failed to

7 provide equivalent wheelchair-accessible transportation in hotels that provide transportation to

8 nondisabled guests.

9

3.

As a result, while HPT’s nondisabled guests staying at these hotels can take

10 advantage of airport shuttle services and transportation services to areas near the hotels, guests

11 who use wheelchairs or scooters are denied equivalent services. This action is limited to HPT’s

12 violations of state and federal requirements governing accessible transportation, including for

13 example purchase and lease of accessible vehicles and provision of accessible transportation.

14

4.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief establishing that HPT has engaged

15 in violations of the ADA and California state law, and requiring HPT to comply with these

16 statutes by providing wheelchair-accessible transportation services that are equivalent to the

17 transportation services provided to nondisabled guests at HPT’s hotels.

18

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19

5.

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

20 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq., and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. (“the

21 Unruh Act”).

22

6.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

23 §§ 1331 and 1343, and pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims brought

24 under the laws of the State of California. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for

25 declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

26

7.

This Court has specific jurisdiction over HPT because it owns and/or operates one

27 or more hotels located within the State of California and this District.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 2

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 3 of 81

1

8.

This Court has pendent personal jurisdiction over claims relating to hotels in other

2 states because all of the claims relating to HPT arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.

3

9.

Venue is proper within this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)(2), and

4 (d) and pursuant to the doctrine of pendent venue.

5

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

6

10. This action arises in part in San Mateo County and thus is properly assigned to the

7 San Francisco/Oakland Division.

8

PARTIES

9

11. Plaintiff Ann Cupolo-Freeman is and has been at all times material hereto a

10 resident of Alameda County in the State of California. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman has diastrophic

11 dysplasia and uses a motorized wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning

12 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable

13 California law, including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Cupolo-

14 Freeman requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services

15 offered by hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state

16 requirements governing provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is

17 also a tester in this litigation.

18

12. Plaintiff Ruthee Goldkorn is and has been at all times material hereto a resident of

19 the State of California. Plaintiff Goldkorn has multiple sclerosis and uses a power wheelchair for

20 mobility. She has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical

21 disability as that term is defined in applicable California law, including California Government

22 Code section 12926. Because Ms. Goldkorn requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to

23 utilize transportation services offered by hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels

24 comply with federal and state requirements governing provision of accessible transportation

25 services to hotel guests. She is also a tester in this litigation.

26

13. Plaintiff Julie Reiskin is and has been at all times material hereto a resident of the

27 State of Colorado. Plaintiff Reiskin is a Board Member of the Legal Services Corporation and

28 the Executive Director of the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition. She travels frequently across

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 3

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 4 of 81

1 the country. Plaintiff Reiskin has multiple sclerosis and uses a power wheelchair for mobility.

2 She has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability

3 as that term is defined in applicable California law, including California Government Code

4 section 12926. Because Ms. Reiskin requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize

5 transportation services offered by hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels

6 comply with federal and state requirements governing provision of accessible transportation

7 services to hotel guests. She is also a tester in this litigation.

8

14. Plaintiff Katherine Corbett is and has been at all times material hereto a resident

9 of Contra Costa County in the State of California. Plaintiff Corbett is a writer, publisher, and

10 public speaker. She travels frequently across the country. Plaintiff Corbett has post polio

11 syndrome and uses a power wheelchair for mobility. She has a disability within the meaning of

12 the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and a physical disability as that term is defined in applicable

13 California law, including California Government Code section 12926. Because Ms. Corbett

14 requires a wheelchair-accessible vehicle in order to utilize transportation services offered by

15 hotels, she has a personal interest in ensuring that hotels comply with federal and state

16 requirements governing provision of accessible transportation services to hotel guests. She is

17 also a tester in this litigation.

18

15. Defendant HPT is an investment trust incorporated in Maryland, with its principal

19 place of business at Two Newton Place, 255 Washington Street, Suite 300, Newton,

20 Massachusetts. HPT is a publicly traded real estate investment trust. HPT owns and/or operates

21 hotels throughout the United States, including approximately 47 hotels in the State of California.

22

FACTS

23

16. HPT owns and/or operates hotels -- including but not limited to those discussed

24 below -- that provide fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation systems and HPT

25 operates such transportation systems, either directly or through a contractual or other

26 arrangement or relationship.

27

17. The hotels discussed below all appear on the List of HPT Properties available on

28 this webpage: https://www.hptreit.com/portfolio/properties/default.aspx (last visited and

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 4

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 5 of 81

1 downloaded March 14, 2019) which is incorporated herein by reference. A list of the hotels

2 discussed below, along with their address, cities, and states is set forth in an Appendix hereto.

3

18. HPT has engaged in a pattern or practice of failing to provide accessible and/or

4 equivalent transportation at its hotels, including but not limited to the violations described below.

5 Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the accessible transportation services violate

6 Title III and/or the Unruh Act.

7

19. Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale located in Sunnyvale, CA, is

8 owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive

9 transportation system at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or

10 relationship.

11

a. Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale provides its guests with a

12

shuttle to and from the San Jose International Airport, in addition to a local

13

shuttle service to business parks within a five-mile radius of the hotel. The

14 shuttle is available from 7 AM until 7 PM Monday through Friday. Guests

15

16

simply notify the front desk when they arrive that they will want a ride. The

17

website for this hotel provides information concerning the inaccessible shuttle,

18

but provides no information concerning accessible shuttle services.

19

b. On October 7, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Country Inn & Suites

20

by Carlson Sunnyvale. During the call, the staff member learned from the

21

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

22 to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
23

24

c. On or about October 28, 2014, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman telephoned the

25

Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale and asked if it provided

26

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She was informed that the hotel does

27

not offer wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 5

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 6 of 81

1

d. On or about June 17, 2015, Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman again telephoned the

2

Country Inn & Suites by Carlson by Carlson Sunnyvale and asked if it

3

provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. She was informed that the

4 hotel does not have an accessible shuttle, but that arrangements could be made

5

6

to secure wheelchair-accessible transportation. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman

7

requested the phone number of the taxi company that the hotel would call to

8

make these arrangements. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman called this company to

9

request information on their wheelchair-accessible transportation services, and

10

was given the phone number of a separate company, a company called Just

11

Go.

12 e. According to its website, Just Go is “super busy” and recommends that
13

14

reservations be made “as far in advance as you can (we accept reservations for

15

up to 30 days in advance),” and at a minimum at least 48 hours in advance to

16

ensure a ride. Further, whereas transportation services provided by the hotel

17

are available beginning at 7 AM, Just Go begins operations at 8 AM.

18

f. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

19

offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: the accessible

20

transportation services are not offered during the same hours that the 21

22

inaccessible transportation services are offered; the accessible transportation

23

services require longer advance notice than the inaccessible transportation

24

services; and information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is available on

25

the hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is

26

not. Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the accessible

27 transportation services are not equivalent to those offered to nondisabled
28 guests.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 6

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 7 of 81

1

g. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and

2

had it informed Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman of those services, she intended to

3

stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from doing so by

4 the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

5

6

h. Plaintiff Cupolo-Freeman would like to stay at the Country Inn & Suites by

7

Carlson Sunnyvale in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services,

8

and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

9

accessible transportation services.

10

i. Plaintiff’s expert called Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale on

11

September 21, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

12 phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does
13

14

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Country Inn & Suites by Carlson

16

Sunnyvale on January 16, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

17

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

18

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

19

transportation.

20

k. Plaintiff Corbett called Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale on 21

22

May 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

23

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

24

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

25

20. Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa in San Diego, CA, is owned and/or

26 operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system

27 at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 7

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1

a. Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa, according to its website,

2

provides its guests with free local shuttle service to locations within a five-

3

mile radius of the hotel.

4 b. On October 9, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San

5

6

Diego-Sorrento Mesa. During the call, the staff member learned from the

7

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

8

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

9

c. On or about June 24, 2015, Plaintiff Goldkorn telephoned the Staybridge

10

Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa and asked if it provided wheelchair-

11

accessible shuttle services. She was informed that the hotel does not have an

12 accessible shuttle. Plaintiff Goldkorn was told that the hotel could request a
13

14

local wheelchair-accessible taxi for a guest requiring accessible transportation,

15

but that the guest would have to pay for the taxi.

16

d. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

17

offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: guests who use

18

wheelchairs or scooters for mobility must pay for accessible transportation

19

services, whereas nondisabled guests are provided with free transportation

20

services. Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the accessible 21

22

transportation services are not equivalent to those offered to nondisabled

23

guests.

24

e. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and

25

had it informed Plaintiff Goldkorn of those services, she intended to stay at

26

the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from doing so by the

27 hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.
28

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1

f. Plaintiff Goldkorn would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Diego-

2

Sorrento Mesa in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

3

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

4 accessible transportation services.

5

6

g. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa on

7

September 1, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

8

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

9

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

11

Mesa on January 16, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

12 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
13

14

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

16

Mesa on June 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

17

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

18

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

20

Mesa on July 23, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the 21

22

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

23

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

24

k. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento

25

Mesa on September 27, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

26

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

27 guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
28

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1

21. Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport in San Bruno, CA is owned and/or

2 operated by HPT.

3

a. Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport, according to its website, provides

4

its guests with complimentary shuttle service to and from San Francisco

5

Airport and to other locations within a five-mile radius of the hotel.

6 Nondisabled guests using the hotel’s shuttle service are asked to notify the

7

8

hotel an hour in advance for the airport shuttle and a day in advance for the

9

non-airport shuttle. The website for this hotel provides information concerning

10

the inaccessible shuttle, but provides no information concerning accessible

11

shuttle services.

12

b. On October 6, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San

13

Francisco Airport. During the call, the staff member learned from the

14 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
15

16

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

c. On or about June 29, 2015, Plaintiff Reiskin telephoned the Staybridge

18

Suites San Francisco Airport and asked if it provided wheelchair-accessible

19

shuttle services. She was informed that the hotel does not have an accessible

20

shuttle, and that the hotel would need at least two days advance notice to

21

arrange accessible transportation for a guest. In addition, the hotel employee

22

stated that it was unclear whether the hotel or the guest would have to pay for 23

24

the accessible shuttle.

25

d. The purportedly accessible transportation services are not equivalent to those

26

offered nondisabled guests in at least the following ways: guests who use

27

wheelchairs or scooters for mobility must provide at least two days advance

28

notice, whereas nondisabled guests need only provide one hour notice for the

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1

airport shuttle, and one day notice for the non-airport shuttle; nondisabled

2

guests know in advance that they will not be required to pay for their

3

transportation services, whereas disabled guests do not know whether this will

4 be the case; and information concerning the inaccessible shuttle is available

5

6

on the hotel website, whereas information concerning the accessible shuttle is

7

not. Discovery may reveal additional ways in which the accessible

8

transportation services are not equivalent to those offered to nondisabled

9

guests.

10

e. Had the hotel provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and

11

had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the

12 hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s
13

14

lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

15

f. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Francisco

16

Airport in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

17

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

18

transportation services.

19

g. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport on August

20

17, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that 21

22

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

23

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

24

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

25

on January 17, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

26

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

27 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
28

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1

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport

2

on January 23, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

j. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport on May

7

14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

8

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

9

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

k. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport on May

11

20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

12 the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free
13

14

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

22. Candlewood Suites Boston Burlington is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

16 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

17 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

18

a. On September 15, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites Boston

19

Burlington. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

20

that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not

21

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

22

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Boston Burlington on

23

January 16, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the 24

25

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

26

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

c. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Boston Burlington on August

28

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

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1

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

2

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

d. Had Candlewood Suites Boston Burlington provided equivalent wheelchair-

4 accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

5

6

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

7

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

8

shuttle services.

9

e. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Boston

10

Burlington in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

11

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

12 transportation services.
13

14

23. Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville is owned and/or operated by HPT,

15 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

16 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

17

a. On August 18, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites Chicago

18

Naperville. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

19

that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not

20

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

21

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville

22

on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services 24

25

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville on May 21,

27

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

28

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1

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

2

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

d. Had Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville provided equivalent

4 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

5

6

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

7

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

8

accessible shuttle services.

9

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Chicago

10

Naperville in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

11

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

12 transportation services.
13

14

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville on June 14,

15

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

16

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

17

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

24. Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

19 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

20 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On August 24, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites Chicago

22

O’Hare. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

23

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide 24

25

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare on

27

January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

2

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare on May 21,

4 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

5

6

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

7

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

d. Had Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare provided equivalent wheelchair-

9

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those

10

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

11

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

12 shuttle services.
13

14

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Chicago

15

O’Hare in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

16

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

17

transportation services.

18

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare on June 14,

19

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

20

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free 21

22

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

23

25. Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria is owned and/or operated by HPT,

24 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

25 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

26

a. On October 17, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites

27

Dallas by the Galleria. During the call, the staff member learned from the

28

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1

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

2

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria on

4 November 10, 2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

5

6

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

7

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria on

9

August 17, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

10

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

11

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria
13

14

on January 18, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

15

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

16

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria on May

18

29, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

19

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

20

free wheelchair-accessible transportation 21

22

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria on August

23

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

24

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

25

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

g. Had Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria provided equivalent

27 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of
28 those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

h. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Dallas by the

4 Galleria in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

5

6

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

26. Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris Plains is owned and/or operated by

9 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

10 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

11

a. On July 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites Parsippany

12

Morris Plains. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

13

that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15 b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris
16

17

Plains on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

18

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

19

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

20

transportation.

21

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris Plains on

22

May 29, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

23

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does 24

25

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

d. Had Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris Plains provided equivalent

27

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

28

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Parsippany

4 Morris Plains in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

5

6

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

7

accessible transportation services.

8

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris Plains on

9

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

10

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

11

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 27. Candlewood Suites Philadelphia Willow Grove is owned and/or operated by
13 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel
14 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Candlewood Suites
16

17

Philadelphia Willow Grove. During the call, he learned from the

18

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

19

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Candlewood Suites Philadelphia Willow

21

Grove on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

22

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

23

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible 24

25

transportation.

26

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Candlewood Suites Philadelphia Willow Grove on

27

May 29, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

2

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Candlewood Suites Philadelphia Willow Grove on

4 August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

5

6

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

7

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

e. Had Candlewood Suites Philadelphia Willow Grove provided equivalent

9

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

10

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

11

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

12 accessible shuttle services.
13

14

f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Candlewood Suites Philadelphia

15

Willow Grove in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

16

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

17

accessible transportation services.

18

28. The Chase Park Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis is owned and/or operated by

19 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

20 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On January 22, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called The Chase Park

22

Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis. During the call, the staff member learned

23

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation 24

25

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called The Chase Park Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis on

27

May 28, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

2

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Had The Chase Park Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis provided equivalent

4 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

5

6

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

7

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

8

accessible shuttle services.

9

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the The Chase Park Plaza Royal

10

Sonesta St. Louis in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

11

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

12 accessible transportation services.
13

14

e. Plaintiff Corbett called The Chase Park Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis on

15

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

16

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

17

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation

18

29. Country Inn & Suites San Diego North is owned and/or operated by HPT,

19 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

20 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On October 9, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Country Inn & Suites

22

San Diego North. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services 24

25

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Country Inn & Suites San Diego North on August

27

27, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

2

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Country Inn & Suites San Diego North

4 on January 16, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

5

6

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

7

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Country Inn & Suites San Diego North on May 14,

9

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

10

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 e. Had Country Inn & Suites San Diego North provided equivalent
13

14

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

15

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

16

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

17

accessible shuttle services.

18

f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Country Inn & Suites San Diego

19

North in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so

20

if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible 21

22

transportation services.

23

g. Plaintiff Reiskin called Country Inn & Suites San Diego North on May 20,

24

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

25

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

26

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

30. Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights North is owned and/or operated by

2 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

3 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

4

a. On September 2, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Courtyard Chicago

5

Arlington Heights North. During the call, he learned from the individual(s)

6

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

7 does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

9

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights

10

North on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

11

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

12

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

13

transportation.

14

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights North on

15 May 21, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the
16

17

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

18

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

d. Had Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights North provided equivalent

20

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

21

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

22

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

23

accessible shuttle services. 24

25

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Courtyard Chicago Arlington

26

Heights North in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

27

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

28

accessible transportation services.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights North on

2

June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

3

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

4 not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

g. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights

7

North on July 11, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

8

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

9

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights

11

North on August 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

12 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services
13

14

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights

16

North on September 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

17

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

18

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

19

transportation.

20

31. Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway is owned and/or operated by HPT, 21

which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either 22

directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship. 23

a. On July 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Courtyard Dallas Central 24

25

Expressway. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

26

that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not

27

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

28

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1

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway on

2

January 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

4 to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway on May 29,

7

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

8

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

9

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway on

11

July 18, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s)

12 on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but
13

14

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway on August

16

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

17

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

18

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

f. Had Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway provided equivalent wheelchair-

20

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those 21

22

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

23

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

24

shuttle services.

25

g. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Courtyard Dallas Central

26

Expressway in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

27 do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible
28 transportation services.

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1

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway on

2

September 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

4 to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

32. Courtyard Dallas Richardson @ Campbell is owned and/or operated by HPT,

7 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

8 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

9

a. On January 22, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard Dallas

10

Richardson @ Campbell. During the call, the staff member learned from the

11

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

12

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Courtyard Dallas Richardson @ Campbell on May

14

29, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

15 the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide
16

17

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

c. Plaintiff Corbett called Courtyard Dallas Richardson @ Campbell on

19

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

20

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

21

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

22

d. Had Courtyard Dallas Richardson @ Campbell provided equivalent

23

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of 24

25

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

26

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

27

accessible shuttle services.

28

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1

e. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Courtyard Dallas Richardson @

2

Campbell in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

3

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

4 transportation services.

5

6

33. Courtyard San Jose Airport is owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates a

7 fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly or through

8 a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

9

a. On October 17, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard San Jose

10

Airport. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

11

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

12

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Courtyard San Jose Airport on August 17, 2015.

14

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

15 provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free
16

17

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Courtyard San Jose Airport on January

19

12, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

20

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

21

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

22

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Courtyard San Jose Airport on May 14, 2018.

23

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel 24

25

provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

26

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Courtyard San Jose Airport on May 20, 2018.

28

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide free

2

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

f. Had Courtyard San Jose Airport provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible

4 shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she

5

6

intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from

7

doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle

8

services.

9

g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Courtyard San Jose Airport in the

10

future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

11

accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation

12 services.
13

14

34. Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park is owned and/or operated by HPT,

15 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

16 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

17

a. On January 17, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Crowne Plaza

18

Charlotte Executive Park. During the call, the staff member learned from

19

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

20

services to guests, but does not provide wheelchair-accessible transportation.

21

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park on May 28,

22

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

23

hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide 24

25

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

c. Had Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park provided equivalent

27

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

28

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive

4 Park in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if

5

6

the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park on August

9

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

10

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 f. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park
13

14

on August 31, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

15

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

16

to guests, but does not provide wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

g. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park

18

on October 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

19

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

20

to guests, but does not provide wheelchair-accessible transportation. 21

22

35. Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago Schaumburg is owned and/or

23 operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system

24 at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

25

a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Hawthorn Suites by

26

Wyndham Chicago Schaumburg. During the call, the staff member learned

27

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

2

transportation.

3

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago

4 Schaumburg on November 12, 2014. During the call, she learned from the

5

6

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

7

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago

9

Schaumburg on August 11, 2015. During the call, he learned from the

10

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

11

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago
13

14

Schaumburg on January 17, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

15

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

16

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

17

transportation.

18

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago

19

Schaumburg on May 28, 2018. During the call, she learned from the

20

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services 21

22

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

23

f. Had Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago Schaumburg provided

24

equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff

25

Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

26

services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent

27 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.
28

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1

g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham

2

Chicago Schaumburg in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

3

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

4 equivalent accessible transportation services.

5

6

h. Plaintiff Corbett called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago

7

Schaumburg on June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the

8

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services

9

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

36. Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Greensboro is owned and/or operated by HPT,

11 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

12 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

13

a. On August 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham

14

Greensboro. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

15 that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not
16

17

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham

19

Greensboro on January 12, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

20

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

21

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

22

transportation.

23

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Greensboro on May 24

25

28, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

26

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

27

free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

d. Had Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Greensboro provided equivalent

2

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

3

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

4 was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

5

6

accessible shuttle services.

7

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham

8

Greensboro in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

9

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

10

transportation services.

11

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Greensboro on

12 August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the
13

14

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

15

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

16

37. Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Salt Lake City Fort Union is owned and/or

17 operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system

18 at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

19

a. On January 16, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Hawthorn Suites by

20

Wyndham Salt Lake City Fort Union. During the call, the staff member

21

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

22

transportation services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

23

accessible transportation. 24

25

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Salt Lake City Fort

26

Union on August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s)

27

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

28

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

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1

c. Had Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Salt Lake City Fort Union provided

2

equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff

3

Corbett of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

4 services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent

5

6

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

7

d. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham

8

Salt Lake City Fort Union in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

9

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

10

equivalent accessible transportation services.

11

38. Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall is owned and/or operated

12 by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the

13 hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

14

a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn

15 Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall. During the call, the staff member
16

17

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

18

transportation services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

19

accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall

21

on November 10, 2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on

22

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

23

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point

26

Mall on August 17, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s)

27

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but

28

does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North

2

Point Mall on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

3

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

4 services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

5

6

transportation.

7

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall

8

on May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

9

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

10

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

11

f. Had Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall provided

12 equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff
13

14

Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

15

services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent

16

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

17

g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta

18

North Point Mall in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

19

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

20

accessible transportation services. 21

22

h. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall

23

on June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

24

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

25

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North

27 Point Mall on July 13, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from
28 the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

2

transportation.

3

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North

4 Point Mall on August 1, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

5

6

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

7

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

8

transportation.

9

k. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North

10

Point Mall on September 20, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

11

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

12 services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible
13

14

transportation.

15

39. Residence Inn Dallas Central Expressway is owned and/or operated by HPT,

16 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

17 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

18

a. On July 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Dallas Central

19

Expressway. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone

20

that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not

21

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

22

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Central

23

Expressway on January 30, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned 24

25

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

26

services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

27

transportation.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Central

2

Expressway on July 13, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

3

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

4 services to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

5

6

transportation.

7

d. Plaintiff Reiskin called Residence Inn Dallas Central Expressway on May

8

29, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

9

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

10

free wheelchair-accessible transportation

11

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Dallas Central Expressway on

12 August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the
13

14

phone that the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does

15

not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

16

f. Had Residence Inn Dallas Central Expressway provided equivalent

17

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

18

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

19

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

20

accessible shuttle services. 21

22

g. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Residence Inn Dallas Central

23

Expressway in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

24

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

25

transportation services.

26

40. Residence Inn Dallas Market Center is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

27 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

28 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

a. On August 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Dallas Market

2

Center. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

3

the hotel provides free transportation services to guests, but does not provide

4 free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on

7

January 30, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

8

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

9

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on May 29,

11

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

12 hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free
13

14

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on

16

July 13, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s)

17

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

18

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation

19

e. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on

20

August 1, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the 21

22

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

23

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

24

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on August 13,

25

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

26

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

27 wheelchair-accessible transportation.
28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

g. Had Residence Inn Dallas Market Center provided equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

3

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

4 deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

5

6

shuttle services.

7

h. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Residence Inn Dallas Market

8

Center in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so

9

if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

10

transportation services.

11

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Market Center on

12 September 20, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the
13

14

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

15

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

16

41. Residence Inn Dallas Richardson is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

17 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

18 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

19

a. On July 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson.

20

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

21

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

22

accessible transportation.

23

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson on September 21, 24

25

2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

26

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

27

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson on

2

January 30, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson on July

7

13, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

8

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

9

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson on August 13,

11

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

12 hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free
13

14

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

f. Had Residence Inn Dallas Richardson provided equivalent wheelchair-

16

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

17

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

18

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

19

shuttle services.

20

g. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Residence Inn Dallas Richardson 21

22

in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

23

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

24

transportation services.

25

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Dallas Richardson on

26

September 20, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

27 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
28 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

42. Residence Inn Raleigh Cary is owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates a

2 fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly or through

3 a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

4

a. On August 18, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Residence Inn Raleigh Cary.

5

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

6

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

7 accessible transportation.

8

9

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Residence Inn Raleigh Cary on January

10

24, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

11

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

12

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Residence Inn Raleigh Cary on May 28, 2018.

14

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

15 provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-
16

17

accessible transportation.

18

d. Had Residence Inn Raleigh Cary provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible

19

shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she

20

intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from

21

doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle

22

services.

23

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Residence Inn Raleigh Cary in the 24

25

future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

26

accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation

27

services.

28

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1

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Residence Inn Raleigh Cary on August 13, 2018.

2

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

3

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

4 accessible transportation.

5

6

43. Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

7 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

8 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

9

a. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Royal Sonesta Houston

10

Galleria. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

11

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

12

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria on

14

January 26, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

15 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
16

17

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria on May 20, 2018.

19

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

20

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

21

accessible transportation.

22

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria on August 13, 2018.

23

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel 24

25

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

26

accessible transportation.

27

e. Had Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria provided equivalent wheelchair-

28

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

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1

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

2

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

3

shuttle services.

4 f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria in

5

6

the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

7

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

8

transportation services.

9

44. Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

10 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

11 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

12

a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites

13

Andover Boston. During the call, the staff member learned from the

14

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

15 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
16

17

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston on August 25,

18

2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

19

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

20

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

21

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston on

22

January 23, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, 24

25

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

d. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston on May 28,

27

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

28

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1

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

2

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston on August 13,

4 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

5

6

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

7

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

f. Had Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston provided equivalent wheelchair-

9

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

10

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

11

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

12 shuttle services.
13

14

g. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston

15

in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

16

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

17

transportation services.

18

45. Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter Center East is owned and/or operated by

19 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

20 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter

22

Center East on January 18, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

23

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation 24

25

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter Center East

27

on May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

28

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1

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

2

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter Center East provided equivalent

4 wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

5

6

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

7

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

8

accessible shuttle services.

9

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-

10

Perimeter Center East in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

11

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

12 equivalent accessible transportation services.
13

14

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter Center East

15

on June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

16

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

17

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

46. Sonesta ES Suites Burlington Boston is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

19 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

20 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On September 21, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Sonesta ES Suites

22

Burlington Boston. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

23

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not 24

25

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. On January 23, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites

27

Burlington Boston. During the call, the staff member learned from the

28

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1

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

2

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Burlington Boston on May 28,

4 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

5

6

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

7

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

d. Had Sonesta ES Suites Burlington Boston provided equivalent wheelchair-

9

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those

10

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

11

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

12 shuttle services.
13

14

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Burlington

15

Boston in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so

16

if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

17

transportation services.

18

47. Sonesta ES Suites Chicago-Lombard is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

19 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

20 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On January 23, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites

22

Chicago-Lombard. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, 24

25

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Chicago-Lombard on August 13,

27

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

28

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1

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

2

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Chicago-Lombard provided equivalent wheelchair-

4 accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

5

6

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

7

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

8

shuttle services.

9

d. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Chicago-

10

Lombard in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

11

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

12 transportation services.
13

14

48. Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland Airport is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

15 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

16 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

17

a. On January 26, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites

18

Cleveland Airport. During the call, the staff member learned from the

19

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

20

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

21

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland Airport on May 29,

22

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

23

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free 24

25

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland Airport provided equivalent wheelchair-

27

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those

28

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

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1

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

2

shuttle services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland

4 Airport in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

5

6

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland Airport on August 13,

9

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

10

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 49. Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport is owned and/or operated by
13 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel
14 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On January 17, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites
16

17

Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. During the call, the staff member learned

18

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

19

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport on

21

May 28, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

22

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

23

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport provided equivalent

26

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

27

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

28

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St.

4 Paul Airport in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

5

6

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport on

9

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

10

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

11

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 50. Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth Junction is owned and/or operated by HPT,
13 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either
14 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On January 26, 2018, staff for plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites
16

17

Monmouth Junction. During the call, the staff member learned from the

18

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

19

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth Junction on May 29,

21

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

22

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

23

wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth Junction provided equivalent

26

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

27

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth

4 Junction in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

5

6

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth Junction on August

9

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

10

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 51. Sonesta ES Suites Omaha is owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates a
13 fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly or through
14 a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On January 24, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites
16

17

Omaha. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

18

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

19

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Omaha on May 28, 2018. During

21

the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

22

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

23

accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Omaha provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible

26

shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she

27

intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from

28

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1

doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle

2

services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Omaha in the

4 future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

5

6

accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation

7

services.

8

52. Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany is owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates

9 a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly or

10 through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

11

a. On August 31, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany.

12

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

13

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

14

accessible transportation.

15 b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany on January
16

17

26, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

18

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

19

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany on May 29, 2018.

21

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

22

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

23

accessible transportation. 24

25

d. Had Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany provided equivalent wheelchair-

26

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those

27

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

2

shuttle services.

3

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany in

4 the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

5

6

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany on August 13, 2018.

9

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

10

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

11

accessible transportation.

12 53. Sonesta ES Suites Portland-Vancouver is owned and/or operated by HPT,
13 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either
14 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On January 22, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta ES Suites
16

17

Portland-Vancouver. During the call, the staff member learned from the

18

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

19

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Sonesta ES Suites Portland-Vancouver on May 20,

21

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

22

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

23

wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Had Sonesta ES Suites Portland-Vancouver provided equivalent

26

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

27

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

28

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

d. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Sonesta ES Suites Portland-

4 Vancouver in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

5

6

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

7

transportation services.

8

e. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta ES Suites Portland-Vancouver on August

9

13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

10

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 54. Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island is owned and/or operated by HPT, which
13 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly
14 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On August 11, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Sonesta Resort Hilton Head
16

17

Island. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

18

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

19

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island on

21

January 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

22

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

23

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Plaintiff Corbett called Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island on August 13,

26

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

27

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

28

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

d. Had Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island provided equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

3

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

4 deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

5

6

shuttle services.

7

e. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island

8

in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

9

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

10

transportation services.

11

55. Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North Point is owned and/or operated by HPT,

12 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

13 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

14

a. On August 25, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta

15 North Point. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone
16

17

that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

18

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North

20

Point on January 18, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

21

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

22

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

23

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North Point on May 24

25

20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

26

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

27

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

28

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1

d. Had Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North Point provided equivalent

2

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

3

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

4 was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

5

6

accessible shuttle services.

7

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Alpharetta

8

North Point in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

9

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

10

transportation services.

11

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North Point on June

12 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that
13

14

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

15

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

16

g. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North

17

Point on July 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

18

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

19

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North 21

22

Point on July 24, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

24

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

25

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North

26

Point on September 25, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

27 the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to
28 guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

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1

56. Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East is owned and/or operated by

2 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

3 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

4

a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites

5

Atlanta Perimeter Center East. During the call, the staff member learned

6

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

7 to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

9

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East on

10

November 12, 2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

11

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

12

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East

14

on August 25, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

15 phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not
16

17

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter

19

Center East on January 18, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

20

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

21

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

22

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East

23

on May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the 24

25

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

26

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

f. Had Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East provided equivalent

28

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

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1

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

2

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

3

accessible shuttle services.

4 g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Atlanta

5

6

Perimeter Center East in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

7

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

8

equivalent accessible transportation services.

9

h. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East on

10

June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

11

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

12 provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
13

14

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter

15

Center East on July 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

16

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

17

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter

19

Center East on July 23, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

20

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to 21

22

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

23

k. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter

24

Center East on September 27, 2018. During the call, the staff member

25

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

26

transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

27 transportation.
28

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1

57. Staybridge Suites Chatsworth is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

2 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

3 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

4

a. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth.

5

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

6

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

7 accessible transportation.

8

9

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on January

10

12, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on

11

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

12

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

13

c. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on May 14, 2018.

14

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

15 provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-
16

17

accessible transportation.

18

d. Had Staybridge Suites Chatsworth provided equivalent wheelchair-

19

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

20

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

21

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

22

shuttle services.

23

e. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Chatsworth in 24

25

the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

26

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

27

transportation services.

28

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1

f. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on May 20, 2018.

2

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

3

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

4 accessible transportation.

5

6

g. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on June 22,

7

2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on the

8

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

9

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on July 23,

11

2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on the

12 phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not
13

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Chatsworth on

16

September 27, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

17

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

18

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

58. Staybridge Suites Dallas Las Colinas is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

20 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

21 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

22

a. On January 30, 2018, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites

23

Dallas Las Colinas. During the call, the staff member learned from the 24

25

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

26

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

b. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Dallas Las Colinas on May 20,

28

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

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1

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

2

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Dallas Las Colinas on August 13,

4 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

5

6

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

7

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

d. Had Staybridge Suites Dallas Las Colinas provided equivalent wheelchair-

9

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

10

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

11

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

12 shuttle services.
13

14

e. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Dallas Las

15

Colinas in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so

16

if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

17

transportation services.

18

59. Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows is owned and/or operated by

19 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

20 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

21

a. On October 17, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites

22

Denver South-Park Meadows. During the call, the staff member learned

23

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation 24

25

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows on

27

September 2, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

28

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1

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

2

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park

4 Meadows on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

5

6

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

7

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

d. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows on

9

May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

10

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

11

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 e. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows on
13

14

June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

15

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

16

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

f. Had Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows provided equivalent

18

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

19

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

20

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair21

22

accessible shuttle services.

23

g. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Denver South-

24

Park Meadows in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

25

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

26

accessible transportation services.

27 h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park
28 Meadows on June 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

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1

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

2

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park

4 Meadows on July 17, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

5

6

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

7

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park

9

Meadows on August 27, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

10

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

11

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 60. Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation is owned and/or operated by
13 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel
14 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites
16

17

Fort Lauderdale Plantation. During the call, the staff member learned from

18

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

19

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation on

21

November 10, 2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

22

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

23

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation on

26

August 25, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

27

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

28

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

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1

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale

2

Plantation on January 19, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

3

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

4 to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation on

7

May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

8

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

9

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation on

11

June 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

12 phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not
13

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

g. Had Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation provided equivalent

16

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

17

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

18

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

19

accessible shuttle services.

20

h. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale 21

22

Plantation in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will

23

do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

24

transportation services.

25

61. Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

26 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

27 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

28

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1

a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites

2

Herndon-Dulles. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on November 12,

7

2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

8

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

9

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on August 17,

11

2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

12 hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free
13

14

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

d. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on

16

January 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

17

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

18

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on May 20, 2018.

20

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel 21

22

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

23

accessible transportation.

24

f. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on

25

August 9, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

26

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

27 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.
28

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1

g. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on August 13,

2

2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

3

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

4 wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

h. Had Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles provided equivalent wheelchair-

7

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those

8

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

9

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

10

shuttle services.

11

i. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles

12 in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the
13

14

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

15

transportation services.

16

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on

17

October 8, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

18

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

19

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

k. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles on 21

22

October 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

23

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

24

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation

25

62. Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW Colonnade is owned and/or operated by

26 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

27 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

28

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1

a. On September 2, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites San

2

Antonio NW Colonnade. During the call, he learned from the individual(s)

3

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests. During a

4 follow-up call on September 3, 2015, he learned from the individual(s) on the

5

6

phone that the hotel does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

7

transportation.

8

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW

9

Colonnade on January 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

10

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

11

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW Colonnade on
13

14

May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

15

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

16

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW Colonnade on

18

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

19

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

20

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 21

22

e. Had Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW Colonnade provided equivalent

23

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

24

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

25

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

26

accessible shuttle services.

27 f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Antonio
28 NW Colonnade in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

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1

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

2

accessible transportation services.

3

63. Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho Bernardo Area is owned and/or operated

4 by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the

5 hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

6

a. On October 9, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San

7 Diego Rancho Bernardo Area. During the call, the staff member learned

8

9

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

10

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

11

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho Bernardo

12

Area on August 11, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s)

13

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15 c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho
16

17

Bernardo Area on January 12, 2018. During the call, the staff member

18

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

19

transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

20

transportation.

21

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho Bernardo

22

Area on May 14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on

23

the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not 24

25

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

e. Had Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho Bernardo Area provided

27

equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff

28

Corbett of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

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1

services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent

2

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.

3

f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Diego

4 Rancho Bernardo Area in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

5

6

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

7

equivalent accessible transportation services.

8

g. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho

9

Bernardo Area on June 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

10

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

11

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho
13

14

Bernardo Area on July 23, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned

15

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation

16

to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho

18

Bernardo Area on September 27, 2018. During the call, the staff member

19

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

20

transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible 21

22

transportation.

23

64. Staybridge Suites San Jose is owned and/or operated by HPT, which operates a

24 fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly or through

25 a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

26

a. On October 7, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San

27

Jose. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on the

28

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1

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

2

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

3

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites San Jose on August 17, 2015.

4 During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

5

6

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

7

accessible transportation.

8

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites San Jose on January 23,

9

2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s) on the

10

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

11

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 d. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites San Jose on May 14, 2018. During
13

14

the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

15

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

16

accessible transportation.

17

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites San Jose on May 20, 2018. During

18

the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

19

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

20

accessible transportation. 21

22

f. Had Staybridge Suites San Jose provided equivalent wheelchair-accessible

23

shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those services, she

24

intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was deterred from

25

doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle

26

services.

27 g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites San Jose in the
28 future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the hotel

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

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1

accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible transportation

2

services.

3

65. Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach is owned and/or operated by HPT,

4 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

5 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

6

a. On October 9, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites

7 Torrance Redondo Beach. During the call, the staff member learned from

8

9

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

10

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

11

b. Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach on

12

August 17, 2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the

13

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15 c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo
16

17

Beach on January 12, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

18

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

19

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach on May

21

14, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

22

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

23

wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

e. Had Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach provided equivalent

26

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

27

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

28

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1

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

2

accessible shuttle services.

3

f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Torrance

4 Redondo Beach in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

5

6

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

7

accessible transportation services.

8

g. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach on May

9

20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

10

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo
13

14

Beach on July 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

15

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

16

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

17

i. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo

18

Beach on August 8, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

19

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

20

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation. 21

22

j. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo

23

Beach on September 28, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

24

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

25

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

26

66. Staybridge Suites Vancouver Portland Metro is owned and/or operated by

27 HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel

28 either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 69

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 70 of 81

1

a. On September 15, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Staybridge Suites

2

Vancouver-Portland Metro. During the call, he learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland

7

Metro on January 22, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

8

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

9

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland Metro on

11

May 20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

12 phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not
13

14

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

d. Had Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland Metro provided equivalent

16

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of

17

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

18

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

19

accessible shuttle services.

20

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Staybridge Suites Vancouver21

22

Portland Metro in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and

23

will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent

24

accessible transportation services.

25

f. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland

26

Metro on August 3, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

27 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
28 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 70

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 71 of 81

1

g. Plaintiff Corbett called Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland Metro on

2

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the

3

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

4 provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

h. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Staybridge Suites Vancouver-Portland

7

Metro on October 12, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

8

the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to

9

guests. During a follow-up call on the same day, the staff member learned

10

from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel does not provide free

11

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

12 67. Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter (aka Wyndham Atlanta Galleria) is owned and/or
13 operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system
14 at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.
15 a. On October 30, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Wyndham Atlanta
16

17

Perimeter. During the call, the staff member learned from the individual(s)

18

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

19

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

20

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter on November 10,

21

2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

22

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

23

wheelchair-accessible transportation. 24

25

c. Plaintiffs’ expert called Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter on August 31, 2015.

26

During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

27

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

28

accessible transportation.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 71

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 72 of 81

1

d. Plaintiffs’ expert called Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter on September 15,

2

2015. During the call, he learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

3

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

4 wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

e. Plaintiff Reiskin called Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter on May 20, 2018.

7

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

8

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

9

accessible transportation.

10

f. Had Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter provided equivalent wheelchair-

11

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Reiskin of those

12 services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was
13

14

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

15

shuttle services.

16

g. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter in

17

the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

18

hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

19

transportation services.

20

h. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter on June 14, 2018. 21

22

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

23

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

24

accessible transportation.

25

68. Wyndham Dallas Park Central is owned and/or operated by HPT, which

26 operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either directly

27 or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 72

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 73 of 81

1

a. On October 17, 2014, staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Wyndham Dallas

2

Park Central. During the call, the staff member learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

b. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Dallas Park Central on November 12,

7

2014. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the

8

hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

9

wheelchair-accessible transportation.

10

c. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Wyndham Dallas Park Central on

11

January 30, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from the

12 individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,
13

14

but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

15

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Dallas Park Central on August 13, 2018.

16

During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel

17

provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-

18

accessible transportation.

19

e. Had Wyndham Dallas Park Central provided equivalent wheelchair-

20

accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of those 21

22

services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She was

23

deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-accessible

24

shuttle services.

25

f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Wyndham Dallas Park Central in

26

the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do so if the

27 hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible
28 transportation services.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 73

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 74 of 81

1

69. Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and Conference Center is owned and/or

2 operated by HPT, which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system

3 at the hotel either directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

4

a. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Wyndham Hamilton Park

5

Hotel and Conference Center. During the call, he learned from the

6

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

7 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

8

9

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and

10

Conference Center on January 24, 2018. During the call, the staff member

11

learned from the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free

12

transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

13

transportation.

14

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and Conference

15 Center on May 28, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s)
16

17

on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

18

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

19

d. Had Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and Conference Center provided

20

equivalent wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff

21

Reiskin of those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those

22

services. She was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent

23

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. 24

25

e. Plaintiff Reiskin would like to stay at the Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel

26

and Conference Center in the future and use the hotel’s transportation

27

services, and will do so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides

28

equivalent accessible transportation services.

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 74

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 75 of 81

1

f. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and Conference

2

Center on August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the

3

individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests,

4 but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

5

6

70. Wyndham Houston West Energy Corridor is owned and/or operated by HPT,

7 which operates a fixed route and/or demand responsive transportation system at the hotel either

8 directly or through a contractual or other arrangement or relationship.

9

a. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ expert called Wyndham Houston West

10

Energy Corridor. During the call, he learned that the hotel provides free

11

transportation to guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible

12

transportation.

13

b. Staff for Plaintiffs’ counsel called Wyndham Houston West Energy

14

Corridor on January 26, 2018. During the call, the staff member learned from

15 the individual(s) on the phone that the hotel provides free transportation to
16

17

guests, but does not provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

18

c. Plaintiff Reiskin called Wyndham Houston West Energy Corridor on May

19

20, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the phone that

20

the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not provide free

21

wheelchair-accessible transportation

22

d. Plaintiff Corbett called Wyndham Houston West Energy Corridor on

23

August 13, 2018. During the call, she learned from the individual(s) on the 24

25

phone that the hotel provides free transportation to guests, but does not

26

provide free wheelchair-accessible transportation.

27

e. Had Wyndham Houston West Energy Corridor provided equivalent

28

wheelchair-accessible shuttle services, and had it informed Plaintiff Corbett of

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 75

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 76 of 81

1

those services, she intended to stay at the hotel and to use those services. She

2

was deterred from doing so by the hotel’s lack of equivalent wheelchair-

3

accessible shuttle services.

4 f. Plaintiff Corbett would like to stay at the Wyndham Houston West Energy

5

6

Corridor in the future and use the hotel’s transportation services, and will do

7

so if the hotel accurately informs her that it provides equivalent accessible

8

transportation services.

9

71. On information and belief, after August 25, 1990, each of the above hotels has

10 purchased or leased vehicles for use on fixed-route and/or demand-responsive transportation

11 systems in place at the hotels.

12

72.

HPT relies on third parties to provide accessible transportation services at many

13 of its hotels.

14

73. Many of these third parties do not provide accessible transportation services that

15 are equivalent to the transportation services provided to nondisabled guests. For example, and

16 without limitation, these third-party transportation companies do not have the capability or

17 capacity to provide equivalent transportation services, do not provide transportation services

18 during the hours that such services are available to nondisabled guests, and/or require longer

19 advance notice than nondisabled guests must provide.

20

74. On information and belief, HPT has not designated a person to coordinate its

21 efforts to comply with applicable ADA regulations governing transportation.

22

75. On information and belief, neither HPT nor any of the hotels listed above has a

23 complaint procedure that is advertised to the public, accessible to and useable by people with

24 disabilities, and results in prompt responses to complaints.

25

76. HPT does not take any -- or sufficient -- measures to ensure that the hotels that it

26 owns and/or operates, including but not limited to those discussed above, provide compliant

27 equivalent accessible transportation services.

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 76

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 77 of 81

1

77. Prior to filing this litigation, attorneys for Plaintiffs wrote to HPT, explaining that

2 many of its hotels are in violation of the transportation provisions of the ADA and state law, and

3 requesting that it bring its hotels into compliance with these statutes. HPT did not respond to this

4 letter.

5

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. 6

78. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein. 7

79. Title III requires that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis 8

of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 9

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns . 10

. . or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a). 11

80. Hotels that provide fixed-route transportation services to guests must comply with 12

the following requirements: 13

A. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity 14

15

over 16 passengers must be wheelchair-accessible;

16

B. For all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity

17

of under 16 passengers must be either wheelchair-accessible or equivalent service

18

must be provided.

19

81. Hotels that provide on-demand transportation services to guests must either

20 provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles or ensure that equivalent service is provided.

21

82. Defendant HPT owns and/or operates “an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of

22 lodging,” which is a place of public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), and is

23 also a “private entit[y] not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people” pursuant to

24 49 C.F.R. part 37.

25

83. Defendant HPT has engaged in illegal disability discrimination, as defined by

26 Title III, including without limitation, by failing to ensure that transportation vehicles in use at its

27 hotels are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals

28 who use wheelchairs, by failing to ensure that its hotels provide equivalent accessible

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 77

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 78 of 81

1 transportation services to such individuals, and/or by failing to ensure that personnel are trained

2 to proficiency with respect to the provision of accessible transportation services.

3

84. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of Title III have caused, and

4 in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs.

5

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, § 51, et seq., and the Unruh Act’s

6

Incorporation of the ADA

7

85. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation herein.

8

86. Defendant HPT’s hotels are business establishments and, as such, must comply

9 with the provisions of the Unruh Act.

10

87. The Unruh Act guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are entitled to

11 full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

12 establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the State of California. Cal.

13 Civ. Code § 51(b).

14

88. A violation of the ADA, the DOJ Standards, or Title 24 is also a violation of the

15 Unruh Act.

16

89. Defendant HPT has violated the Unruh Act by, inter alia, denying, or aiding or

17 inciting the denial of, Plaintiffs’ rights to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,

18 facilities, privileges, or services offered at Defendant’s business establishments, specifically the

19 transportation services offered at Defendant’s hotels.

20

90. Defendant has also violated the Unruh Act by denying, or aiding or inciting the

21 denial of, Plaintiffs’ rights to equal access arising from the provisions of the ADA.

22

91. Defendant HPT’s ongoing and continuing violations of the Unruh Act have

23 caused, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to cause, harm to the plaintiffs.

24

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

25 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment as follows:

26

1. A declaration that Defendant HPT’s conduct as alleged here has violated, and

27 continues to violate, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Unruh Civil

28 Rights Act, as well as their implementing regulations;

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 78

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 79 of 81

1

2. Issuance of a permanent injunction requiring Defendant HPT to comply with the

2 ADA and the Unruh Act, including but not limited to:

3

a. Purchasing an accessible vehicle for each of its hotels that lacks such a

4

vehicle, causing such hotels to purchase such vehicles, and/or ensuring that

5

such hotels provide equivalent accessible transportation;

6 b. Ensuring that hotel personnel are trained to proficiency in the operation of

7

8

relevant vehicles and the availability of accessible transportation;

9

c. Implementing a complaint procedure -- and ensuring that its hotels implement

10

such a procedure -- that provides for prompt and equitable resolution of

11

complaints; and

12

d. Designating an HPT representative to coordinate its efforts to comply with

13

applicable ADA regulations governing transportation;

14 3. Award of Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law; and
15 4. Such other additional or alternative relief as the Court finds just and proper.
16

17 Dated: May 15, 2019
18 19

Respectfully Submitted,

20

By: /s/ Amy F. Robertson

21

Timothy P. Fox – Cal. Bar No. 157750

22

Amy F. Robertson, Pro Hac Vice CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

23

ENFORCEMENT CENTER 104 Broadway, Suite 400

24

Denver, CO 80203

(303) 757-7901

25

tfox@creeclaw.org

26

arobertson@creeclaw.org

27

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

28

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00221-JST PAGE 79

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 80 of 81 Appendix to Plaintiffs' Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint

Hotel Candlewood Suites Boston Burlington Candlewood Suites Chicago Naperville Candlewood Suites Chicago O’Hare Candlewood Suites Dallas by the Galleria Candlewood Suites Parsippany Morris Plains Candlewood Suites Philadelphia (Horsham) Willow Grove Chase Park Plaza Royal Sonesta St. Louis Country Inn & Suites by Carlson Sunnyvale Country Inn & Suites San Diego North Courtyard Chicago Arlington Heights North Courtyard Dallas Central Expressway Courtyard Dallas Richardson @ Campbell Courtyard San Jose Airport Crowne Plaza Charlotte Executive Park Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Chicago Schaumburg Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Greensboro Hawthorn Suites by Wyndham Salt Lake City Fort Union Residence Inn Atlanta Alpharetta North Point Mall Residence Inn Dallas Central Expressway Residence Inn Dallas Market Center Residence Inn Dallas Richardson Residence Inn Raleigh Cary Royal Sonesta Houston Galleria Sonesta ES Suites Andover Boston Sonesta ES Suites Atlanta-Perimeter Center East Sonesta ES Suites Burlington Boston Sonesta ES Suites Chicago-Lombard Sonesta ES Suites Cleveland Airport Sonesta ES Suites Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport Sonesta ES Suites Monmouth Junction Sonesta ES Suites Omaha Sonesta ES Suites Parsippany Sonesta ES Suites Portland-Vancouver

Address 130 Middlesex Turnpike 27 W. 300 Warrenville Rd. 4021 N. Mannheim Rd. 13939 Noel Road 100 Candlewood Dr 250 Business Center Dr 212-232 N. Kingshighway Boulevard 1300 Chesapeake Terrace 5975 Lusk Boulevard 3700 N. Wilke Road 10325 N. Central Expressway 2191 N. Greenville Avenue 1727 Technology Drive 5700 Westpark Drive 1200 E. Bank Dr. 7623 Thorndike Road 6990 S. Park Center Drive 1325 North Point Drive 10333 N. Central Expressway 6950 N. Stemmons Freeway 1040 Waterwood Drive 2900 Regency Parkway 2222 West Loop South 4 Tech Drive 1901 Savoy Drive 11 Old Concord Road 2001 S Highland Avenue 17525 Rosebough Drive 3040 Eagandale Place 4225 US Highway 1 6990 Dodge Street 61 Interpace Pkwy 8005 NE Parkway Drive

City(ies) Boston, Burlington Chicago, Naperville Chicago, O'Hare Dallas, by the Galleria Parsippany, Morris Plains Horsham (Willow Grove) Saint Louis Sunnyvale San Diego Arlington Heights Dallas Northpark Dallas/Richardson San Jose Charlotte Chicago, Schaumburg Greensboro Salt Lake City, Fort Union Atlanta/Northpoint Mall Dallas Nrth Prk Dallas Mkt Ctr Dallas-Richardson Raleigh/Carey Houston Andover/Boston Atlanta Burlington/Boston Lombard Middleburg Heights A/P Eagan South Brunswick Omaha Parsippany Vancouver

Page 1

State MA IL IL TX NJ PA MO CA CA IL TX TX CA NC IL NC UT GA TX TX TX NC TX MA GA MA IL OH MN NJ NE NJ OR

Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 160 Filed 05/14/19 Page 81 of 81 Appendix to Plaintiffs' Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint

Hotel Sonesta Resort Hilton Head Island Staybridge Suites Alpharetta North Point Staybridge Suites Atlanta Perimeter Center East Staybridge Suites Chatsworth Staybridge Suites Dallas Las Colinas Staybridge Suites Denver South-Park Meadows Staybridge Suites Fort Lauderdale Plantation Staybridge Suites Herndon-Dulles Staybridge Suites San Antonio NW Colonnade Staybridge Suites San Diego Rancho Bernardo Area Staybridge Suites San Diego-Sorrento Mesa Staybridge Suites San Francisco Airport Staybridge Suites San Jose Staybridge Suites Torrance Redondo Beach Staybridge Suites Vancouver Portland Metro Wyndham Atlanta Perimeter Wyndham Dallas Park Central Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel and Conference Center Wyndham Houston West Energy Corridor

Address 130 Shipyard Drive 3980 North Point Parkway 4601 Ridgeview Road 21902 Lassen 1201 Executive Circle 7820 Park Meadows Drive 410 North Pine Island Road 13700 Coppermine Rd. 4320 Spectrum One 11855 Avenue of Industry 6639 Mira Mesa Blvd 1350 Huntington Ave. 1602 Crane Court 19901 Prairie Ave. 7301 NE 41st Street 6345 Powers Ferry Road 7800 Alpha Road 175 Park Avenue 14703 Park Row

City(ies) Hilton Head Alpharetta Atlanta Perimeter Chatsworth Las Colinas Denver Lone Tree Ft. Lauderdale Dulles (Herndon,VA) San Antonio Carmel Mountain Sorrento Mesa San Francisco San Jose Torrance Portland-Vancover Atlanta (Perimeter) Dallas Florham Park Houston

State SC GA GA CA TX CO FL VA TX CA CA CA CA CA OR GA TX NJ TX

Page 2

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00221-JST Document 200 Filed 01/31/20 Page 1 of 4

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 Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 1 of 24
CLOSED,PROTO,REFSET−SVK
U.S. District Court California Northern District (Oakland) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:15−cv−00221−JST

Cupolo−Freeman et al v. Hospitality Properties Trust Assigned to: Judge Jon S. Tigar Referred to: Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen (Settlement) Cause: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Date Terminated: 01/31/2020 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 446 American with Disabilities − Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center on behalf of itself TERMINATED: 06/17/2016

represented by Timothy P. Fox Civil Rights Education & Enforcement Center 104 Broadway, Suite 400 Denver, CO 80203 303−757−7901 Fax: 303−595−9705 Email: tfox@creeclaw.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy F. Robertson Civil Rights Education & Enforcement Center 1245 E. Colfax Ave. Suite 400 Denver, CO 80218 303−757−7901 Fax: 303−595−9705 Email: arobertson@creeclaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Paul Lee Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763−9800 Fax: (510) 835−1417 Email: alee@gbdhlegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bill Lann Lee Civil Rights Education & Enforcement Center 2030 Addison Street, Suite 500 Berkeley, CA 94704 510−431−8484 Email: blee@creeclaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hillary Jo Benham−Baker Campins Benham−Baker, LLP 935 Moraga Road, Suite 200 Lafayette, CA 94549 415−373−5333 Fax: 415−373−5334 Email: hillary@campinsbenhambaker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Toshio Kano Davidson

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 2 of 24
Lewis Feinberg Lee & Jackson, P.C. 476 9th Street Oakland, CA 94607 510−839−6824 Fax: 510−839−7839 Email: jdavidson@lewisfeinberg.com TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Julia Campins Campins Benham−Baker, LLP 935 Moraga Road, Suite 200 Lafayette, CA 94549 415−373−5333 Fax: 415−373−5334 Email: julia@campinsbenhambaker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie Wilensky Disability Rights California 1330 Broadway, Suite 500 Oakland, CA 94612 510−267−1200 Email: julie.wilensky@cco.sccgov.org TERMINATED: 08/05/2016
Kevin W. Williams Colorado Cross−Disability Coalition Legal Program 1385 South Colorado Boulevard, Suite 610−A Denver, CO 80222 303−839−1775 Email: kwilliams@ccdconline.org TERMINATED: 01/18/2018
Linda Mary Dardarian Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763−9800 Fax: (510) 835−1417 Email: ldar@gbdhlegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Pham Lam Gibbs Law Group LLP 505 14th Street Suite 1110 Oakland, CA 94612 510−350−9700 Fax: 510−350−9701 Email: lpl@classlawgroup.com TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Raymond Alexander Wendell Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 510−763−9800 Fax: 510−835−1417 Email: rwendell@gbdhlegal.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Morris Civil Rights Education & Enforcement

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 3 of 24

Plaintiff Ann Cupolo−Freeman
Plaintiff Ruthee Goldkorn

Center 104 Broadway, Suite 400 Denver, CO 80203 303−757−7901 Email: smorris@creeclaw.org TERMINATED: 02/03/2016
represented by Timothy P. Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Robertson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Paul Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Lann Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary Jo Benham−Baker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Toshio Kano Davidson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Julia Campins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Julie Wilensky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2016
Kevin W. Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2018
Linda Mary Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Pham Lam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Raymond Alexander Wendell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2016
represented by Timothy P. Fox (See above for address)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 4 of 24

Plaintiff
Kenneth Kilgore on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated persons defined below TERMINATED: 07/14/2015

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Robertson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Paul Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Lann Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary Jo Benham−Baker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Toshio Kano Davidson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Julia Campins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Julie Wilensky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2016
Kevin W. Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2018
Linda Mary Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Pham Lam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Raymond Alexander Wendell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2016
represented by Timothy P. Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Lann Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary Jo Benham−Baker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 5 of 24

Plaintiff Julie Reiskin

Joshua Toshio Kano Davidson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Julia Campins (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie Wilensky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2016
Kevin W. Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2018
Linda Pham Lam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Raymond Alexander Wendell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2016
represented by Amy F. Robertson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Paul Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Lann Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary Jo Benham−Baker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Toshio Kano Davidson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Julia Campins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Julie Wilensky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2016
Kevin W. Williams (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2018
Linda Mary Dardarian (See above for address)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 6 of 24

Plaintiff
Katherine Corbett on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated persons defined below

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Pham Lam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/07/2015
Raymond Alexander Wendell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Morris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2016
Timothy P. Fox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy P. Fox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy F. Robertson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Paul Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bill Lann Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary Jo Benham−Baker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Campins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/29/2019
Linda Mary Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust

represented by David Howard Raizman Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−239−9800 Fax: 213−239−9045 Email: david.raizman@ogletreedeakins.com TERMINATED: 05/23/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Dipanwita Deb Amar

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 7 of 24
Arnold & Porter LLP Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 415 434−1600 Fax: 415 677−6262 Email: dipanwita.amar@aporter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer B. Furey Goulston & Storrs PC 400 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02110 617−482−1776 Fax: 617−574−4112 Email: jfurey@goulstonstorrs.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Frank Wong Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−239−9800 Fax: 213−239−9045 Email: christopher.wong@ogletreedeakins.com TERMINATED: 01/17/2019
Kathleen Jenny Choi Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−239−9800 Fax: 213−239−9045 Email: kathleen.choi@ogletreedeakins.com TERMINATED: 05/23/2019
Ki Jhana R Friday Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−239−9800 Fax: 213−239−9045 Email: kijhana.friday@ogletreedeakins.com TERMINATED: 01/17/2019
Mariana Korsunsky Goulston & Storrs PC 400 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02110 617−482−1776 Fax: 617−574−4112 Email: mkorsunsky@goulstonstorrs.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew P. Horvitz Goulston & Storrs PC 400 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02110 617−482−1776

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 8 of 24
Fax: 617−574−4112 Email: mhorvitz@goulstonstorrs.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/15/2015
01/15/2015 01/15/2015
01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015
01/20/2015 01/22/2015
01/22/2015

# Docket Text
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Hospitality Properties Trust, (Filing Fee: $400.00, receipt number 0971−9212555) Filed by Kenneth Kilgore, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ruthee Goldkorn, Ann Cupolo−Freeman. (Attachments: #(1) Civil Cover Sheet)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
2 Proposed Summons. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
3 Case assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte.
Counsel for plaintiff or the removing party is responsible for serving the Complaint or Notice of Removal, Summons and the assigned judge's standing orders and all other new case documents upon the opposing parties. For information, visit E−Filing A New Civil Case at http://cand.uscourts.gov/ecf/caseopening.
Standing orders can be downloaded from the court's web page at www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges. Upon receipt, the summons will be issued and returned electronically. Counsel is required to send chambers a copy of the initiating documents pursuant to L.R. 5−1(e)(7). A scheduling order will be sent by Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) within two business days. (cjlS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
4 Initial Case Management Scheduling Order for Cases Asserting Denial of Right of Access under Americans with Disabilities Act. (Attachments: # 1 Standing Order)(mclS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
5 Summons Issued as to Hospitality Properties Trust. (mclS, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
6 Summons Returned Unexecuted by Kenneth Kilgore, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ruthee Goldkorn, Ann Cupolo−Freeman as to Hospitality Properties Trust. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
7 Proposed Summons. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/15/2015) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
8 Summons Issued as to Hospitality Properties Trust. (mclS, COURT STAFF) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
9 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice by Sarah Morris, (Filing Fee: $305.00, receipt number 0971−9215732) filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(Morris, Sarah) (Filed on 1/16/2015) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
10 ORDER Granting 9 Application for Admission of Attorney Pro Hac Vice signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte.(shyS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/20/2015) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
11 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice, (Filing Fee: $305.00, receipt number 0971−9228046) filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore. (Attachments: #(1) Certificate/Proof of Service Certificate of Good Standing, Colorado)(Williams, Kevin) (Filed on 1/22/2015) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
12 Certification of Interested Entities or Persons filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore (Attachments: #(1) Certificate/Proof of Service)(Morris, Sarah) (Filed on 1/22/2015) (Entered: 01/22/2015)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 9 of 24

01/22/2015 01/23/2015
01/26/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015 02/09/2015 02/17/2015 02/17/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 02/27/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/25/2015 03/25/2015

13 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/22/2015) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
14 CLERK'S NOTICE OF IMPENDING REASSIGNMENT TO A U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: The Clerk of this Court will now randomly reassign this case to a District Judge because a party has not consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. You will be informed by separate notice of the district judge to whom this case is reassigned. ALL HEARING DATES PRESENTLY SCHEDULED BEFORE THE CURRENT MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARE VACATED AND SHOULD BE RE−NOTICED FOR HEARING BEFORE THE JUDGE TO WHOM THIS CASE IS REASSIGNED. This is a text only docket entry; there is no document associated with this notice. (shyS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/23/2015) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
15 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Hon. Jon S. Tigar for all further proceedings. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte no longer assigned to the case. Signed by Executive Committee on 1/26/15. (sv, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/26/2015) (Entered: 01/26/2015)
16 ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEY KEVIN W. WILLIAMS PRO HAC VICE. by Judge Jon S. Tigar; granting 11 Motion for Pro Hac Vice. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2015) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
17 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore (Morris, Sarah) (Filed on 1/28/2015) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
18 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore of CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (Attachments: #(1) Certificate/Proof of Service)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 2/9/2015) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
19 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANT HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST TO RESPOND TO re 1 PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/17/2015) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher Frank Wong (Wong, Christopher) (Filed on 2/17/2015) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
21 ANSWER to Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/27/2015) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
22 Certification of Interested Entities or Persons filed by Hospitality Properties Trust (Civil L.R. 3−15) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/27/2015) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
23 Corporate Disclosure Statement (Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/27/2015) (Entered: 02/27/2015)
24 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore of Firm Name Change (Lee, Bill) (Filed on 3/23/2015) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
25 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore of Firm Name Change (Corrected) (Lee, Bill) (Filed on 3/23/2015) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
26 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER to Suspend General Order 56 filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore. (Campins, Julia) (Filed on 3/25/2015) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
27 ORDER SUSPENDING GENERAL ORDER 56 AND SETTING INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE re 26 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Suspend General Order 56 filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Kenneth Kilgore, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Case Management Statement due by 5/19/2015. Initial Case Management

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 10 of 24

03/26/2015 04/02/2015 04/28/2015 05/19/2015 06/03/2015
07/14/2015 07/30/2015 07/31/2015 07/31/2015
07/31/2015
08/03/2015 08/12/2015 08/17/2015

Conference set for 6/3/2015 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on March 25, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/25/2015) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
28 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore of Notice of Motion to Consolidate in Potentially Related Case (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Morris, Sarah) (Filed on 3/26/2015) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
29 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by Hospitality Properties Trust.. (Friday, Ki Jhana) (Filed on 4/2/2015) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Linda Pham Lam (Lam, Linda) (Filed on 4/28/2015) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
31 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 5/19/2015) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
32 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. Jon S. Tigar: Initial Case Management Conference held on 6/3/2015. Class Certification Motion due by 11/12/2015. Further Case Management Conference set for 9/23/2015 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco. Court Reporter: Not reported. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 6/3/2015) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
33 STIPULATION of Dismissal of All Claims of Kenneth Kilgore with Prejudice filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 7/14/2015) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
34 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER for Protective Order filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 7/30/2015) Modified on 7/31/2015 (wsn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 07/30/2015)
35 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER to File First Amended Complaint filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1, #(2) Proposed Order)(Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 7/31/2015) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
36 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 34 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER for Protective Order filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on July 31, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/31/2015) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
37 ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION The Court hereby approves the parties' stipulation permitting Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall file such a complaint no later than seven days from the date of this order. by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 35 Stipulation (jstlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/31/2015). This is a text only order. There is no document associated with this order. Modified on 8/3/2015 (wsn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 07/31/2015)
38 FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust. Filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ruthee Goldkorn, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Julie Reiskin. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 8/3/2015) (Entered: 08/03/2015)
39 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER Setting Class Certification Expert Disclosure Deadlines filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 8/12/2015) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
40 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Continue Further Case Management Conference)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 8/17/2015) (Entered: 08/17/2015)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 11 of 24

08/17/2015 08/19/2015 08/19/2015 09/21/2015 09/21/2015 09/21/2015 09/22/2015
09/22/2015 09/23/2015 10/07/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015

41 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 40 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER TO CONTINUE FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Further Case Management Conference set for 10/7/2015 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on August 17, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/17/2015) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
42 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 39 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Setting Class Certification Expert Disclosure Deadlines filed by Julie Reiskin, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on August 19, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/19/2015) (Entered: 08/19/2015)
43 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUSTS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Friday, Ki Jhana) (Filed on 8/19/2015) (Entered: 08/19/2015)
44 NOTICE of Change of Address by Julia Campins (Campins, Julia) (Filed on 9/21/2015) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
45 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR PARTIES' CLASS CERTIFICATION EXPERT DISCLOSURE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order Extending Time for Parties' Class Certification Expert Disclosure)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 9/21/2015) (Entered: 09/21/2015)
46 ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR PARTIES' CLASS CERTIFICATION EXPERT DISCLOSURE re 45 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR PARTIES' CLASS CERTIFICATION EXPERT DISCLOSURE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on September 21, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/21/2015) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
47 ORDER REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. The Court notes that a Case Management Conference is scheduled for October 7, 2015. However, it appears that there are no issues requiring judicial supervision at this time. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to file either (1) a request to vacate the October 7, 2015 Case Management Conference or (2) an updated Case Management Statement by September 23, 2015. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on September 22, 2015. (jstlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/22/2015) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
48 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER re 47 Order; −Stipulated Request to Vacate Case Management Conference filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order Vacating Case Management Conference)(Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 9/22/2015) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
49 ORDER VACATING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE re 48 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Stipulated Request to Vacate Case Management Conference filed by Julie Reiskin, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on September 23, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/23/2015) (Entered: 09/24/2015)
50 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin of Withdrawal of Linda Lam and Joshua Davidson (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 10/7/2015) (Entered: 10/07/2015)
51 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER TO FURTHER EXTEND TIME FOR PARTIES' CLASS CERTIFICATION EXPERT DISCLOSURE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Extending Time for Parties' Class Certification Expert Dislcosure)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 10/8/2015) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
52 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 51 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER TO FURTHER EXTEND TIME FOR PARTIES' CLASS CERTIFICATION EXPERT DISCLOSURE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust.

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 12 of 24

11/02/2015 11/12/2015 11/12/2015 11/12/2015
11/12/2015 11/12/2015 11/12/2015 11/13/2015 11/13/2015 12/03/2015 12/04/2015 12/07/2015 12/07/2015

Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on October 8, 2015. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/8/2015) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
53 NOTICE of Change of Address by Julie Wilensky and Bill Lann Lee (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 11/2/2015) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
54 NOTICE of Change of Address by Kevin William Williams (Williams, Kevin) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
55 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER re 32 Case Management Conference; −Stipulated Request to Set Briefing Deadlines for Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Declaration of Christopher F. Wong, #(2) Proposed Order Setting Briefing Schedule)(Wong, Christopher) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
56 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. Motion Hearing set for 1/14/2016 02:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 11/27/2015. Replies due by 12/4/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration of Julie Reiskin, # 3 Declaration of Ruthee Goldkorn, # 4 Declaration of Ann Cupolo Freeman, # 5 Declaration of Julia Campins, # 6 Declaration of Julie Wilensky, # 7 Declaration of Kevin Williams)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
57 Declaration of Timothy P. Fox in Support of 56 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Summary Table, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Related document(s) 56 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
58 Declaration of Marissa McGarry in Support of 56 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Related document(s) 56 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
59 Declaration of Michael P. Quinn in Support of 56 MOTION for Class Certification filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit A)(Related document(s) 56 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 11/12/2015) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
60 MOTION for Class Certification − CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 56 filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. Motion Hearing set for 1/14/2016 02:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 11/27/2015. Replies due by 12/4/2015. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 11/13/2015) (Entered: 11/13/2015)
61 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 55 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER; −Request to Set Briefing Deadlines for Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on November 13, 2016. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/13/2015) (Entered: 11/13/2015)
62 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Request to File Brief, # 2 Proposed Order)(Friday, Ki Jhana) (Filed on 12/3/2015) (Entered: 12/03/2015)
63 ORDER by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 62 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/4/2015) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
64 RESPONSE to (re 56 MOTION for Class Certification, re 60 MOTION for Class Certificatioin − CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 56 ) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/7/2015) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
65 Appendix of Evidence re 64 Opposition/Response to Motion for Class Certification filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 Part 1, # 3 Exhibit 2 Part 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8 Part 1, # 10 Exhibit 8 Part 2, # 11 Exhibit 9 Part 1, # 12

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 13 of 24

12/07/2015 12/07/2015
12/15/2015 12/15/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 12/28/2015

Exhibit 9 Part 2, # 13 Exhibit 10, # 14 Exhibit 11, # 15 Exhibit 12, # 16 Exhibit 13 Part 1, # 17 Exhibit 13 Part 2, # 18 Exhibit 14, # 19 Exhibit 15)(Related document(s) 64 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/7/2015) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
66 Request for Judicial Notice in Support of re 64 Opposition/Response to Motion for Class Certification filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Related document(s) 64 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/7/2015) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
67 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION to Exclude and Strike 65 Appendix; −Motion to Exclude and Strike Expert Testimony of Dr. Michael Patrick Quinn filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion Hearing set for 1/14/2016 02:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 12/21/2015. Replies due by 12/28/2015. (Attachments: #(1) Proposed Order)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/7/2015) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
68 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Request to File Reply Brief Up to 25 Pages, # 2 Proposed Order)(Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 12/15/2015) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
69 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO FILE REPLY BRIEF OF UP TO 25 PAGES IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Jon S. Tigar ;granting 68 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/15/2015) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
70 REPLY (re 60 MOTION to Certify Class CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 56 ) in Support of Motion for Class Certification filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
71 Declaration of Julie Wilensky in Support of 70 Reply to Opposition/Response, In Support of Class Certification filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Related document(s) 70 ) (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
72 RESPONSE (re 67 MOTION to Strike 65 Appendix,, Motion to Exclude and Strike Expert Testimony of Dr. Michael Patrick Quinn ) filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
73 Declaration of Michael Patrick Quinn in Support of 72 Opposition/Response to Motion, filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Related document(s) 72 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
74 Declaration of Amy F. Robertson in Support of 72 Opposition/Response to Motion, filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Related document(s) 72 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
75 Declaration of Marissa McGarry in Support of 72 Opposition/Response to Motion, filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Related document(s) 72 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
76 Request for Judicial Notice re 70 Reply to Opposition/Response, in Support of Motion for Class Certification filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Related document(s) 70 ) (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 12/21/2015) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
77 REPLY (re 67 MOTION to Strike 65 Appendix,, Motion to Exclude and Strike Expert Testimony of Dr. Michael Patrick Quinn ) filed byHospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/28/2015) (Entered: 12/28/2015)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 14 of 24

12/28/2015 01/13/2016
01/14/2016 01/14/2016 01/14/2016 01/14/2016 01/15/2016 01/25/2016 01/27/2016 02/03/2016 04/15/2016

78 Declaration of Christopher F. Wong in Support of 77 Reply to Opposition/Response to Motion to Exclude and Strike Expert Testimony of Dr. Michael Patrick Quinn filed byHospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Related document(s) 77 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/28/2015) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
79 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION to Dismiss Against All Plaintiffs Based on Lack of Standing; Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion Hearing set for 2/18/2016 02:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 1/27/2016. Replies due by 2/3/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Against All Plaintiffs Based On Lack of Standing, # 2 Appendix of Unpublished Cases ISO Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Exhibit Appendix pages 2 to 19, # 4 Declaration of David Raizman ISO Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust's Motion to Dismiss, # 6 Exhibit B, pages 61 to 64)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/13/2016) Modified on 1/14/2016 (fff, COURT STAFF). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/15/2016: # 5 Document removed by 83 Order (wsn, COURT STAFF). Modified on 1/15/2016 (wsn, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 01/13/2016)
80 ERRATA to re 79 MOTION to Dismiss Against All Plaintiffs Based on Lack of Standing; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; −−NOTICE OF ERRATA AND RE−FILING OF EXHIBIT "A" TO DECLARATION OF DAVID RAIZMAN filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit A to Notice of Errata)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/14/2016) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
81 MOTION to Remove Incorrectly Filed Document (Docket No. 79−5) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Vilma Bottger, # 2 Proposed Order Granting Motion)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/14/2016) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
82 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. Jon S. Tigar: Motion Hearing held on 1/14/2016 re 67 MOTION to Strike Motion to Exclude and Strike Expert Testimony of Dr. Michael Patrick Quinn filed by Hospitality Properties Trust; 60 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Julie Reiskin, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Court Reporter: Pam Batalo. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 1/14/2016) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
83 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMOVE INCORRECTLY FILED DOCUMENT; DOCKET NUMBER 79−5 by Judge Jon S. Tigar; granting 81 Motion to Remove Incorrectly Filed Document. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/14/2016) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
84 CLERK'S NOTICE REGARDING 79 MOTION TO DISMISS. The Court has held the 79 Motion to Dismiss in abeyance. (See 82 Minute Entry). The briefing schedule and hearing date previously set for 2/18/2016 are vacated pending further order of the Court. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/15/2016) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
85 Request for Judicial Notice re 60 MOTION for Class Certification − CORRECTION OF DOCKET # 56 filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1) (Related document(s) 60 ) (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 1/25/2016) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
86 Request for Judicial Notice in Connection with 60 Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1)(Related document(s) 85 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/27/2016) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
87 NOTICE filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin of Withdrawal of Sarah Morris (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 2/3/2016) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
88 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Jon S. Tigar; denying 60 Motion for Class Certification. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/15/2016) (Entered: 04/15/2016)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 15 of 24

04/15/2016 04/18/2016 04/25/2016
04/26/2016 05/06/2016 05/17/2016 05/23/2016
05/23/2016 06/03/2016 06/08/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016

Set Deadlines/Hearings: Case Management Statement due by 5/18/2016. Further Case Management Conference set for 6/1/2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/15/2016) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
89 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on January 14, 2016 before Hon. Jon S. Tigar by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin, for Court Reporter Pam Batalo. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 4/18/2016) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
90 Transcript of Proceedings held on 01/14/16, before Judge Tigar. Court Reporter Pamela A. Batalo, telephone number 626−688−7509; pamela_batalo@cand.uscourts.gov. Per General Order No. 59 and Judicial Conference policy, this transcript may be viewed only at the Clerk's Office public terminal or may be purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber until the deadline for the Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Any Notice of Intent to Request Redaction, if required, is due no later than 5 business days from date of this filing. (Re 89 Transcript Order, ) Redaction Request due 5/16/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/26/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/25/2016. (Related documents(s) 89 ) (Batalo, Pam) (Filed on 4/25/2016) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
91 TRANSCRIPT ORDER for proceedings held on 01/14/2016 before Hon. Jon S. Tigar by Hospitality Properties Trust, for Court Reporter Pam Batalo. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 4/26/2016) (Entered: 04/26/2016)
92 USCA Notice Re Petition for Permission to Appeal. (tnS) (Filed on 5/6/2016) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
93 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 5/17/2016) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
94 ORDER CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE On the Court's own motion, the Case Management Conference currently scheduled for June 1, 2016 is CONTINUED to June 8, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. At the conference, the parties should be prepared to address the question of whether this case should be stayed, at least for some period of time, while the Ninth Circuit considers Plaintiffs' petition to appeal the Court's order denying class certification under FRCP 23(f). (Entered by Judge Jon S. Tigar) (Filed on 5/23/2016) This is a text−only order; there is no document associated with this entry (Entered: 05/23/2016)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Further Case Management Conference set for 6/8/2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/23/2016) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
95 CLERK'S NOTICE REGARDING LOCATION OF HEARING. The Further Case Management Conference set for 6/8/2016 at 2:00 PM will be held in Courtroom 11, 19th Floor, San Francisco. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/3/2016) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
96 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. Jon S. Tigar: Further Case Management Conference held on 6/8/2016. Further Case Management Conference set for 9/7/2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco.Total Time: 11 minutes. Court Reporter: Not reported. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 6/8/2016) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
97 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 6/16/2016) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
98 MINUTE ORDER NOTING DISMISSAL re 97 Stipulation, filed by Julie Reiskin, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on June 17, 2016. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/17/2016) (Entered: 06/17/2016)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 16 of 24

07/21/2016 07/26/2016 07/27/2016 07/27/2016 08/05/2016 08/19/2016 08/22/2016
09/13/2016 08/11/2017 08/25/2017 12/06/2017 12/18/2017 12/19/2017
12/27/2017 01/17/2018 01/17/2018 01/18/2018 01/22/2018

99 Notice of Appeal − FEE PAID, (Filing Fee: $505.00, receipt number 0971−10627054). (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 7/21/2016) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
100 NOTICE filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin of Ninth Circuit Rule 3−2 Representation Statement (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 7/26/2016) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
101 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Notice (Case Number 16−16269). (tnS) (Filed on 7/27/2016) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
102 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ORDER (USCA Case No. 16−80055). (tnS) (Filed on 7/27/2016) (Entered: 07/27/2016)
103 NOTICE by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin of Withdrawal of Counsel (Wilensky, Julie) (Filed on 8/5/2016) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
104 Joint MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 8/19/2016) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
105 ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE re 104 Joint MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference filed by Julie Reiskin, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on August 22, 2016. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/22/2016) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
106 ORDER TERMINATING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Jon S. Tigar terminating 79 Motion to Dismiss. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/13/2016) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
107 Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re Appeal Number 16−16269. (tnS) (Filed on 8/11/2017) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
108 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ORDER re USCA Case Number 16−16269. (tnS) (Filed on 8/25/2017) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
109 ORDER of USCA (case no. 16−16269) denying petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc. (tnS) (Filed on 12/6/2017) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
110 Joint REQUEST to Schedule Case Management Conference re 105 Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 12/18/2017) (Entered: 12/18/2017)
111 CLERK'S NOTICE SETTING TELEPHONIC CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. A Telephonic Case Management Conference is set for 1/31/2018 at 2:00 PM before Judge Jon S. Tigar. A Joint Case Management Statement is due 1/22/2018 by 5:00 PM. Please email to the Courtroom Deputy Clerk (jstcrd@cand.uscourts.gov) one number at which all attorneys appearing by telephone can be reached. Because more than one conference will be set at that time, the conference may not begin precisely at 2:00 PM. Each participant in the call must use a landline. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/19/2017) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
112 Mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (tnS) (Filed on 12/27/2017) (Entered: 12/27/2017)
113 NOTICE of Appearance by Linda Mary Dardarian (Dardarian, Linda) (Filed on 1/17/2018) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
114 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew Paul Lee (Lee, Andrew) (Filed on 1/17/2018) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
115 NOTICE of Change In Counsel by Kevin W. Williams (Williams, Kevin) (Filed on 1/18/2018) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
116 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/22/2018) (Entered: 01/22/2018)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 17 of 24

01/31/2018 02/06/2018 02/07/2018
02/14/2018 02/15/2018 02/15/2018 05/24/2018 05/25/2018
07/12/2018 07/13/2018
08/24/2018

117 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jon S. Tigar: Telephone Conference held on 1/31/2018. Telephone Conference set for 2/8/2018 at 11:00 AM before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Total Time in Court: 23 minutes. Court Reporter: Not Reported. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 1/31/2018) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
118 JOINT STATEMENT and Request Regarding Proposed Case Schedule and Further Telephonic Case Management Conference; [Proposed] Order re 117 Telephone Conference filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/6/2018) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
119 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 118 JOINT STATEMENT and Request Regarding Proposed Case Schedule and Further Telephonic Case Management Conference; [Proposed] Order re 117 Telephone Conference filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Telephonic Case Management Conference set for 2/21/2018 at 2:00 PM. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on February 7, 2018. Please email to the Courtroom Deputy Clerk (jstcrd@cand.uscourts.gov) one number at which all attorneys appearing by telephone can be reached. Because more than one conference will be set at that time, the conference may not begin precisely at 2:00 PM. Each participant in the call must use a landline. (jstlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/7/2018) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
120 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER for Collection of Undisputed Attorneys' Fees and Costs for Fourth Quarter of 2017 re 119 Order Re Case Schedule filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order on Stipulation Re: Case Schedule)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 2/14/2018) (Entered: 02/14/2018)
121 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 120 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER. Motion Hearing set for 8/2/2018 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on February 15, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/15/2018) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
122 CLERK'S NOTICE VACATING HEARING. The Telephone Conference set for 2/21/2018 is VACATED. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/15/2018) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
123 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER re 121 Stipulation and Order,, Set Deadlines/Hearings, Modifying Feb. 15, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 5/24/2018) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
124 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 123 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER Modifying Feb. 15, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion due by 7/13/2018. Responses due by 8/17/2018. Replies due by 8/31/2018. Motion Hearing set for 10/25/2018 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on May 25, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/25/2018) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
125 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER Modifying May 25, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule re 124 Stipulation and Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 7/12/2018) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
126 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 125 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER Modifying May 25, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion due by 8/27/2018. Responses due by 10/5/2018. Replies due by 10/19/2018. Motion Hearing set for 11/15/2018 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on July 13, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/13/2018) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
127 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER r eSTIPULATION MODIFYING JULY 13, 2018 ORDER REGARDING CASE SCHEDULE re 126 Stipulation and Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order, #(2)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 18 of 24

08/27/2018
09/04/2018
09/28/2018 10/02/2018 10/02/2018 10/26/2018 11/16/2018 12/14/2018 12/14/2018 01/04/2019

Certificate/Proof of Service)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 8/24/2018) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
128 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 127 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER re STIPULATION MODIFYING JULY 13, 2018 ORDER REGARDING CASE SCHEDULE filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion due by 9/4/2018. Responses due by 10/12/2018. Replies due by 10/26/2018. Motion Hearing set for 12/6/2018 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 09, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on August 27, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/27/2018) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
129 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION for Summary Judgment, Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points & Authorities filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion Hearing set for 12/6/2018 02:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 09, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 10/12/2018. Replies due by 10/26/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of David Raizman, # 2 Declaration of John Murray, # 3 Exhibit 1 to Murray Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 2 to Murray Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 3 to Murray Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 4 to Murray Declaration, # 7 [Proposed] Order)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 9/4/2018) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
130 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER Modifying August 27, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule re 128 Stipulation and Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order on Stipulation Modifying August 27, 2018 Order Regarding Case Schedule)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 9/28/2018) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
131 ORDER ON STIPULATION MODIFYING AUGUST 27, 2018 ORDER REGARDING CASE SCHEDULE re 130 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER re 128 Stipulation and Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on October 2, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/2/2018) (Entered: 10/02/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment. Responses due by 10/26/2018. Replies due by 11/16/2018. Motion Hearing set for 1/10/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/2/2018) (Entered: 10/02/2018)
132 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE to (re 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment, Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment) filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Declaration of Timothy Fox)(Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 10/26/2018) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
133 REPLY (re 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment, ) filed byHospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 11/16/2018) (Entered: 11/16/2018)
134 ORDER REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING AND CONTINUING MOTION HEARING re 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on December 14, 2018. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/14/2018) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment,. Motion Hearing set for 2/14/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/14/2018) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
135 Supplemental Brief in Response to re 134 Order, re 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment, Or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment − Supplemental Brief in Response to Court's December 14, 2018 Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 134 , 129 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/4/2019) (Entered: 01/04/2019)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 19 of 24

01/04/2019 01/17/2019 01/18/2019 01/18/2019 01/25/2019 02/14/2019
02/26/2019
03/05/2019 03/06/2019 03/14/2019 03/14/2019
03/18/2019
03/19/2019

136 Request for Judicial Notice re 135 Supplemental Brief in Response to Court's December 14, 2018 Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Related document(s) 135 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/4/2019) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
137 NOTICE of Substitution of Counsel by Kathleen Jenny Choi (Choi, Kathleen) (Filed on 1/17/2019) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
138 Supplemental Brief re 134 Order, filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin. (Related document(s) 134 ) (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/18/2019) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
139 Request for Judicial Notice filed byCivil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin. (Fox, Timothy) (Filed on 1/18/2019) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
140 Supplemental Reply Brief re 138 Supplemental Brief − Reply in Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 138 , []) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 1/25/2019) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
141 CLERK'S NOTICE VACATING HEARING re 129 MOTION for Summary Judgment. The hearing scheduled for 2/14/2019 at 2:00 PM is vacated. The motion has been taken under submission by the Court without oral argument. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/14/2019) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
142 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Jon S. Tigar; denying 129 Motion for Summary Judgment. Case Management Statement due by 3/27/2019. Further Case Management Conference set for 4/3/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/26/2019) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
143 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice, (Filing Fee: $310.00, receipt number 0971−13144144) filed by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Kenneth Kilgore, Julie Reiskin. (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 3/5/2019) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
144 ORDER by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 143 Motion for Pro Hac Vice. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/6/2019) (Entered: 03/06/2019)
145 NOTICE of Change of Address by Amy F. Robertson (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 3/14/2019) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
146 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION to Certify Question for Interlocutory Appeal; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of David Raizman [28 U.S.C. Section 1292(B)] filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Motion Hearing set for 4/18/2019 02:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 09, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Responses due by 3/28/2019. Replies due by 4/4/2019. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 3/14/2019) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
147 NOTICE OF MOTION, MOTION, AND MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Declaration of Amy F. Robertson with exhibits, #(2) [Proposed] Order)(Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 3/18/2019) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
148 CLERK'S NOTICE CONTINUING MOTION HEARING as to 147 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. This motion has been noticed for hearing on a date when the Court is not available. The briefing and hearing schedule is set as follows: Responses due by 4/1/2019. Replies due by 4/8/2019. Motion Hearing set for 5/9/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/19/2019) (Entered: 03/19/2019)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 20 of 24

03/19/2019 03/21/2019 03/22/2019
03/22/2019
04/19/2019 04/19/2019
04/26/2019 04/26/2019 04/26/2019 04/29/2019 05/08/2019 05/14/2019 05/14/2019 05/14/2019

149 NOTICE of Appearance by Raymond Alexander Wendell (Wendell, Raymond) (Filed on 3/19/2019) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
150 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER Modifying Briefing Deadlines and Date for Hearing and Case Management Conference re 131 Stipulation and Order filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order)(Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 3/21/2019) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
151 STIPULATION AND ORDER ON STIPULATION MODIFYING BRIEFING DEADLINES AND DATE FOR HEARING AND CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE re 150 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER filed by Julie Reiskin, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn. Case Management Statement due by 4/26/2019. Further Case Management Conference set for 5/16/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on March 22, 2019. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/22/2019) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 146 MOTION for Leave to Appeal /Motion to Certify Question for Interlocutory Appeal, 147 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Responses due by 4/19/2019. Replies due by 4/26/2019. Motion Hearing set for 5/16/2019 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 9, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/22/2019) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
152 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE to (re 146 Motion to Certify Question for Interlocutory Appeal) filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 4/19/2019) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
153 OPPOSITION/RESPONSE to (re 147 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Declaration of David Raizman, #(2) Exhibit 1−6 to Declaration of David Raizman, #(3) Declaration of John G Murray, #(4) Exhibit 1 to Declaration of John G Murray)(Raizman, David) (Filed on 4/19/2019) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
154 REPLY (re 147 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief) filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Attachments: #(1) Robertson Declaration with Exhibit)(Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 4/26/2019) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
155 REPLY (re 146 MOTION for Leave to Appeal − Motion to Certify Question for Interlocutory Appeal) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 4/26/2019) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
156 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Raizman, David) (Filed on 4/26/2019) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
157 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 4/29/2019) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
158 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by Judge Jon S. Tigar; denying 146 MOTION to Certify Question for Interlocutory Appeal. (wsnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/8/2019) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
159 Order Granting 147 Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Second Amended And Supplemental Complaint by Judge Jon S. Tigar. Amended and Supplemental Complaint due by 5/15/2019. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/14/2019) ). (Entered: 05/14/2019)
160 Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant Hospitality Properties Trust. Filed by Julie Reiskin, Ruthee Goldkorn, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Katherine Corbett. (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 5/14/2019) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
161 MOTION to Appear by Telephone filed by Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 5/14/2019) (Entered:

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05/14/2019 05/15/2019

05/14/2019)
162 Statement of Non−Opposition to re 161 MOTION to Appear by Telephone at Case Management Conference filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 161 ) (Raizman, David) (Filed on 5/14/2019) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
163 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 161 Motion to Appear by Telephone.

05/15/2019 05/16/2019

Not less than 24 hours before the hearing, please email to the Courtroom Deputy Clerk (jstcrd@cand.uscourts.gov) a number where the party appearing by telephone can be reached.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/15/2019) (Entered: 05/15/2019)
164 UPDATED JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin. (Dardarian, Linda) (Filed on 5/15/2019) (Entered: 05/15/2019)
165 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jon S. Tigar: Further Case Management Conference held on 5/16/2019. The Court will issue a written scheduling order.

Total Time in Court: 22 minutes. Court Reporter: Marla Knox.

05/16/2019
05/22/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/24/2019

Plaintiff Attorney: Julia Campins, Linda Mary Dardarian, Amy F. Robertson. Defendant Attorney: David Howard Raizman. (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 5/16/2019) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
166 CASE MANAGEMENT SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 6/14/2019. Defendants motion to dismiss, transfer, or sever due by 6/6/2019. Defendants motion to dismiss, transfer, or sever due Hearing set for 7/18/2019 02:00 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 09, 19th Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Telephone Further Case Management Conference set for 8/9/2019 before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Mandatory settlement conference September 27 − November 22, 2019. Close of Fact Discovery due by 2/14/2020. Designation of Experts due by 3/13/2020. Rebuttal Reports due by 4/10/2020. Close of Expert Discovery due by 5/8/2020. Dispositive Motions due by 5/29/2020. Pretrial Conference Statement due by 9/4/2020. Pretrial Conference set for 9/11/2020 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Jury Trial set for 10/5/2020 − 11/24/2020 08:30 AM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on May 16, 2019. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/16/2019) (Entered: 05/16/2019)
167 NOTICE of Substitution of Counsel; [Proposed] Order filed by Dipanwita Deb Amar (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 5/22/2019) (Entered: 05/22/2019)
168 Order Granting 167 Notice of Substitution of Counsel filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on May 23, 2019. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
169 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER to Continue Deadlines in Scheduling Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
170 Declaration of Dipanwita Deb Amar in Support of 169 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER to Continue Deadlines in Scheduling Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 169 ) (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
171 [Proposed] Order Granting re 169 STIPULATION to Continue Deadlines in Scheduling Order filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
172 NOTICE by Hospitality Properties Trust of Withdrawal of Counsel and Request to Remove Attorneys from Court's Electronic Case Filing Notices (Raizman, David) (Filed on 5/23/2019) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
173 Order Granting Stipulation 169 to Continue Deadlines in Scheduling Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar. Defendants motion to dismiss, transfer, or sever due by

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 22 of 24

05/28/2019 05/31/2019 05/31/2019 05/31/2019 06/01/2019 06/03/2019 06/10/2019 06/10/2019 07/17/2019 07/18/2019
08/21/2019
08/21/2019 08/21/2019

8/1/2019. Amended Pleadings due by 8/9/2019. Defendants motion to dismiss, transfer, or sever Hearing set for 9/11/2019 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Close of Fact Discovery due by 4/10/2020. Designation of Experts due by 5/8/2020. Designation of Rebuttal Experts due by 6/5/2020. Dispositive Motion due by 7/24/2020. Telephone Conference set for 10/11/2019 01:30 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Mandatory Settlement Conference 11/22/2019 − 1/17/2020. Pretrial Statement due by 10/30/2020. Pretrial Conference set for 11/6/2020 01:30 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. Jury Trial set for 11/30/2020 − 1/14/2021 08:30 AM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2019) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
174 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice, (Filing Fee: $310.00, receipt number 0971−13385183) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Furey, Jennifer) (Filed on 5/28/2019) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
175 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice, (Filing Fee: $310.00, receipt number 0971−13395491) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Horvitz, Matthew) (Filed on 5/31/2019) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
176 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 174 Motion for Pro Hac Vice as to Jennifer B. Furey. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/31/2019) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
177 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 175 Motion for Pro Hac Vice as to Matthew Horvitz. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/31/2019) (Entered: 05/31/2019)
178 MOTION for Leave to Appear in Pro Hac Vice, (Filing Fee: $310.00, receipt number 0971−13399565) filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Korsunsky, Mariana) (Filed on 6/1/2019) (Entered: 06/01/2019)
179 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 178 Motion for Pro Hac Vice as to Mariana Korsunsky.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/3/2019) (Entered: 06/03/2019)
180 ORDER OF REFERENCE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR SETTLEMENT. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on June 10, 2019. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/10/2019) (Entered: 06/10/2019)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen for Settlement (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/10/2019) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
181 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Attachments: #(1) Declaration of Dipanwita Deb Amar, #(2) [Proposed] Order)(Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 7/17/2019) (Entered: 07/17/2019)
182 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEADLINE IN SCHEDULINGORDER FOR MOTION TO DISMISS,TRANSFER, OR SEVER by Judge Jon S. Tigar. Motions due by 8/22/2019. Motion Hearing set for 10/16/2019 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/18/2019) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
183 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed by Hospitality Properties Trust, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin, and Katherine Corbett. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 8/21/2019) Modified on 8/22/2019 (jmlS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 08/21/2019)
184 Declaration of Dipanwita Deb Amar in Support of 183 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed byHospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 183 ) (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 8/21/2019) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
185 Proposed Order re 183 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 8/21/2019) (Entered: 08/21/2019)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 23 of 24

08/21/2019 186 CLERKS NOTICE REGARDING LOCATION CHANGE FOR JUDGE JON S. TIGAR

Effective August 26, 2019:

Judge Jon S. Tigar's courtroom and chambers will be located at the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building and United States Courthouse, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612.

On or after the effective date, all court appearances, filings, and deliveries of chambers copies must be made at the Oakland Courthouse (https://cand.uscourts.gov/locations). For updated scheduling information, please visit https://cand.uscourts.gov/jst.

08/22/2019 09/05/2019 09/05/2019 09/05/2019 09/06/2019 09/06/2019 10/08/2019
10/09/2019 10/10/2019 10/10/2019

Judge Tigar's case assignments will be updated to reflect the correct office assignment (for example: 3:19−cv−00123−JST will now be 4:19−cv−00123−JST). (This is a text−only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ecgS−adi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/21/2019) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
187 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEADLINE IN SCHEDULING ORDER FOR MOTION TO DISMISS, TRANSFER, OR SEVER by Judge Jon S. Tigar. Motions due by 9/6/2019. Motion Hearing set for 11/13/2019 2:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/22/2019) (Entered: 08/22/2019)
188 STIPULATION to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed by Hospitality Properties Trust, Ann Cupolo−Freeman. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 9/5/2019) Modified on 9/6/2019 (cpS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/05/2019)
189 Declaration of Dipanwita Deb Amar in Support of 188 STIPULATION to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed byHospitality Properties Trust. (Related document(s) 188 ) (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 9/5/2019) Modified on 9/6/2019 (cpS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/05/2019)
190 Proposed Order re 188 STIPULATION to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 9/5/2019) Modified on 9/6/2019 (cpS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/05/2019)
191 ORDER by Judge Jon S. Tigar GRANTING 188 STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEADLINE IN SCHEDULING ORDER FOR MOTION TO DISMISS, TRANSFER, OR SEVER. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/6/2019) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Motions due by 10/18/2019. Motion Hearing set for 12/18/2019 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/6/2019) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
192 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed by Hospitality Properties Trust, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin and Katherine Corbett. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Dipanwita Deb Amar, # 2 Proposed Order)(Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 10/8/2019) Modified on 10/9/2019 (jmlS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 10/08/2019)
193 UPDATED JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin and Hospitality Properties Trust. (Dardarian, Linda) (Filed on 10/9/2019) Modified on 10/10/2019 (jmlS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 10/09/2019)
194 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 192 Stipulation to Continue Deadlines in Scheduling Order forMotion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/10/2019) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Motions due by 12/18/2019. Responses due by 1/15/2020. Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever Hearing set for 2/12/2020 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/10/2019) (Entered: 10/10/2019)

Case: 4:15-cv-221 As of: 05/27/2020 09:45 AM PDT 24 of 24

10/29/2019 12/11/2019 12/11/2019 12/12/2019
12/13/2019
01/28/2020 01/31/2020 01/31/2020

195 NOTICE by Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn, Julie Reiskin Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel (Benham−Baker, Hillary) (Filed on 10/29/2019) (Entered: 10/29/2019)
196 NOTICE of Change of Address by Amy F. Robertson and Timothy P. Fox (Robertson, Amy) (Filed on 12/11/2019) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
REMINDER: Counsel must update personal profile for change of contact information to be in effect. Re: 196 Notice of Change of Address filed by Julie Reiskin, Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman, Ruthee Goldkorn (jmlS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/11/2019) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
197 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED ORDER to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order for Motion to Dismiss, Transfer, or Sever filed by Hospitality Properties Trust, Julie Reiskin, Katherine Corbett, Ann Cupolo−Freeman and Ruthee Goldkorn . (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Proposed Order)(Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 12/12/2019) Modified on 12/12/2019 (jmlS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 12/12/2019)
198 Order by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 197 Stipulation to Continue Deadline in Scheduling Order. Motions due by 1/15/2020. Responses due by 2/18/2020. Motion Hearing set for 3/18/2020 02:00 PM in Oakland, Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor before Judge Jon S. Tigar.(mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/13/2019) (Entered: 12/13/2019)
199 ORDER VACATING MOTION HEARING DATE re 198 . Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on January 28, 2020. (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2020) (Entered: 01/28/2020)
200 STIPULATION for Dismissal with Prejudice filed by Hospitality Properties Trust. (Amar, Dipanwita) (Filed on 1/31/2020) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
***Civil Case Terminated. Per Stipulation 200 (mllS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/31/2020) (Entered: 01/31/2020)