:-.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. NELSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, TABITHA NANCE, TONY WARD AND DANIEL TODD, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

ELECTRONI('ALLY FILED PLAINTIF:FS

v.

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

AND

JIM LANTRIP, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

DEFENDANTS

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT I. Introduction
1. Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Linda Joyce ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert Teague, Tabitha Nance, Tony Ward and Daniel Todd file this action individually and on behalf of all persons SUbjected to unconstitutional strip-searches on admission and/or release from the Hopkins County Jail since January 9, 2002.
2. Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance, Timothy May and Linda Ford file this action in· their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail ("Jail"), after becoming entitled to release, to remove

their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so ("the Release Class"). This class of individuals includes individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail after they were ordered released on their own recognizance; individuals who were strip searched just prior to release from the Jail after they were ordered released on bond and subsequent to posting of bond; and individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail for any other reason without reasonable grounds for doing so. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated since January 9, 2002.
3. Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance, Daniel Todd and Tony Ward file this action in their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related minor offenses who were required by Defendal1ts in the Jail to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated from January 9, 2002 to the present.
4. Such searches have been and continue to be regularly conducted by Defendants and there are hundreds of members of each subclass. There are questions of law and fact in this case that are common to all members of each subclass. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of their respective subclass, and they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of such subclasses.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue 5. Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, seek actual and punitive damages from Defendants under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for gross and unconscionable violations of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,

Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, this COUli has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.c. §§1331 and 1343. Plaintiffs and the other members of their class also seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages under the pendent jurisdiction of this Court for negligence, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As Hopkins County, Kentucky, is the residence of all defendant parties to this action and the location of all acts pertinent to this suit, venue is proper in this Court.
III. Class Action 6. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(l), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are two subclasses before the Court. 7. The first subclass consists of all individuals an'ested for minor non-violent and non-drug related offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. 8. The second subclass consists of all persons who were required by Defendants in the Jail, after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so. 9. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all class members. They are members of the subclasses and their claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs are offended at the treatment accorded them and the class members and will aggressively pursue the interests of the entire class. Plaintiffs' interest in obtaining injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages for the violations of their constitutional rights and

privileges are consistent with and not antagonistic of those of any other person within their subclass.
10. Given the circumstances of their search, as detailed below, Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that Defendants regularly require persons arrested for nonviolent, nondrug related minor offenses to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies on admission to the jail even though the Jail has not determined any individualized suspicion for doing so and regularly require persons to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies prior to their release from the Hopkins County Jail even though (a) there exists no reasonable grounds for doing so, and (b) such persons have been ordered released. Such searches violate the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and the clearly established law of this circuit, as set forth in Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cel'f denied, 493 U.S. 977, 110 S.Ct. 503 (1989). The only question that remains to be resolved is whether Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, or to an award of compensatory and punitive damages and, if so, the extent of such an award.
11. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because:
(a) A mUltiplicity of suits with consequent burden on the courts and Defendants should be avoided.
(b) It would be virtually impossible for all class members to intervene as parties-plaintiff in this action.
(c) Upon adjudication of Defendants' liability, claims of the class members can be determined by this Court.

IV. I)arties 12. Plaintiffs are residents of various counties within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 13. Defendant Hopkins County, at all times mentioned herein, employed, was responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom for, and was responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail. 14. Defendant Jim Lantrip is Jailer of Hopkins County, and as such established policies formally or by custom for, and was responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail.
V. Nature of Defendants' Conduct 15. Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with one another, engaged in the conduct described herein under color of the law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins County. The offenses described below resulted from the failure of the state and county agencies and individuals to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Defendants' conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, or indicated active malice toward Plaintiffs and the class or at least a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to their constitutional and common law rights, justifying an award of punitive damages in addition to the actual damages which Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to recover.

VI. Facts 16. On June 28, 2002, Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester Turner were arrested for a violation ofKRS 222.202 (alcohol intoxication), a misdemeanor offense, and were taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Sutton and Turner were not strip-searched upon admission to the Hopkins County Jail. They were subsequently taken to Court where they were ordered released on their own recognizance. Instead of being released immediately, Sutton and Turner were returned to the Hopkins County Jail and, prior to their release, were strip-searched, apparently because of the requirements of Paragraph 1 (c) of the written policy of the Hopkins County Jail, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 17. Plaintiff Linda Joyce Ford was arrested in September, 2002, for writing a bad check, a violation of KRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense, and was taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Upon entry to the Jail, Ford was taken into a room where she was required to takc off her clothes, squat on the floor and cough. She was then forced to turn around, bend over, spread her buttocks and cough. Upon release from the Jail, Ford was again SUbjected to an unconstitutional strip search prior to being allowed to leave the Jail. 18. On October 9, 2002, Timothy May was arrested for speeding ten miles over the speed limit, operating on a suspended license and for failure to pay a ticket. Each of these offenses are a misdemeanor. On entry to the Hopkins County Jail, May was forced to take off all
turn of his clothes, lift his genitals, around, bend over, and spread his buttocks. Upon release
from the Jail, May was again SUbjected to an unconstitutional strip search prior to being allowed to leave the Jail.
19. Plaintiff Ladonia Nelson was subject to an unconstitutional strip search on four occasions. In February, 2002 and May 2002, she was atTested for minor non-drug related

offenses. She was pregnant during both incarcerations. She was forced to remove her clothing on a number of occasions, squat, spread her buttocks, and cough. These searches occurred upon entry to the jail and immediately prior to her release.
20. Plaintiff Robin Littlepage was arrested in August, 2002, for charges related to failure to make an appearance. Upon entry to the Jail, Hopkins County officers forced her to remove her clothing, lift her breasts, squat for an inspection, and cough. Immediately prior to her release, Littlepage was forced to remove her clothing in the presence of a Hopkins County officer.
21. Plaintiff Robert Teague was arrested in January, 2003, for writing a bad check, a violation ofKRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense. Upon entry to the Jail, Teague was forced to submit to a physical inspection of his body by removing his clothes and spreading his buttocks. Immediately prior to his release, he was forced to remove his clothing in front of a Hopkins COWlty officer.
22. Plaintiff Tabitha Nance was arrested in May, June, and October, 2003, for theft by deception for writing a bad check. On each occasion, Nance was subjected to an unconstitutional strip search at the Hopkins County Jail upon entry and release. On at least one occasion, Nance, a female, was forced to submit to an unconstitutional strip search by a male guard.
23. Plaintiff Tony Ward was arrested in May 2004 for a non-violent non-drug related minor offense. Upon entry to the Jail, Mr. Ward was forced to submit to an unconstitutional strip search in front ofa Hopkins County Jail officer.
24. Plaintiff Daniel Todd was arrested in April 2003 for a non-violent non-drug related minor offense. Upon entry to the Jail, Mr. Ward was forced to submit to an unconstitutional strip search in front of a Hopkins County Jail officer.

VII. The Law and Defendants' Policy 25. In 1979, the United States Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee has the right not to be searched unless the reasonableness of such a search is established by
t
"balancing ... the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, supra at 559 (emphasis added). On April 18,1989, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Masters v. Crouch, supra, in which it held:
It was clearly established on October 21, 1986, ... that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be subjected to a strip-search unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the particular person might be caITying or concealing weapons or other contraband. rd. at 1257. In this case, Plaintiffs were arrested for nonviolent minor offenses. At the time of the unconstitutional strip searches, Defendants did not have any individualized reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. Under such circumstances, Defendants' requirement that Plaintiffs - on admission and after they had been ordered released -- expose the most private part of their physical persons for a visual inspection was unconscionable, was an illegal strip-search by any definition, and was a flagrant violation of the balancing requirement of Bell v. Wolfish, supra.
VIII. Causes of Action A. CountI
26. Paragraph 1-25 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 26.
27. Plaintiffs' searches, described above, were part of a continuing pattern of misconduct and is the result of policies, procedures, customs and practices of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins County, either written or unwritten, that are systematically applied

whenever an arrestee is admitted to or released from the Hopkins County Jail. Such practices
constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and evince a total, intentional and unreasonable
disregard for the constitutional and common law rights of the citizens of Kentucky, including
Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and the wholesale violations of those rights likely to
result from the systematic pursuit of such practices.
28. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and their subclasses, through Defendants'
intentional or grossly negligent conduct, were unconstitutionally detained in an environment that
communicated to Plaintiffs that they would be subjected to physical force if they did not compl y
with the demands to be strip searched. In conducting these unconstitutional strip searches, Plaintiffs were deprived without due process of law of the following rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Consti~ution of the United States in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(a) Their right to be secure in their person against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(b) Their right to privacy in their person against unreasonable intrusions under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(c) Their right to the equal protection of the law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(d) Their right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
29. Moreover, given the pre-existing law that clearly prohibited Defendants' conduct,
Defendants' searches of Plaintiffs and the members of their subclass were intentional, wanton
and malicious, and were indicative of Defendants' total and reckless disregard of, indifference to the rights of, and risk of harm to, Plaintiffs and the other members of the class.

B. Countll 30. Paragraphs 1-29 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 30. 31. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants, without justification, negligently or intentionally inflicted upon Plaintiffs and the subclasses severe mental and emotional distress.
C. Count III 32. Paragraphs 1-31 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 32. 33. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants were negligent, and grossly negligent, all to the damage of Plaintiffs and the subclasses.
IX. Damages 34. Paragraphs 1-33 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 34. 35. Plaintiffs and the members of the classes were unjustifiably and unconstitutionally searched in a manner that generated tremendous and overwhelming embarrassment, humiliation and mental and emotional distress. As a result, they have suffered, and are entitled to recover, actual damages. Furthermore, Defendants' violations of the constitutional and common law rights of Plaintiffs and the classes were cruel, malicious, and evinced a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to those rights, entitling Plaintiffs and the class to recover punitive damages from Defendants in order to deter such conduct in the future.
X. Declaratory .Judgment and Permanent Injunction 36. Paragraphs 1-35 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 36.

37. In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the subclasses request that this Court
lssue a declaratory judgment deeming unconstitutional any and all statutes, ordinances,
regulations, policies, procedures, customs or practices under which they were forced to expose
their genitalia for visual inspection, and further request that this Court permanently enjoin
Defendants from following or enforcing such statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies,
procedures, customs or usages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the subclasses they represent request (a) that this action
proceed as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and (b) a trial by jury, and further request that
they and all members of the class (c) be awarded actual and punitive damages, (d) be granted the
declaratory and injunctive relief requested herein, and (e) be awarded their costs, attorneys' fees,
pre and post judgment interest and all other relief to which they are entitled under law or in
equity.
Respectfully Submitted,
sl Bart L. Greenwald Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile) bgreenwald@fbtlaw.com
and
Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 540-2300 (Telephone) (502) 585-2207 (Facsimile)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 31, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
clerk of the court by using the CMIECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to
the following:
John T. Soyars
FOSTER, SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 East 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42240
Michael Sullivan 100 S1. Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727
Stacey A. Blankenship Denton & Keuler P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929
sf Bart L. Greenwald Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile) bgreenwald@fbtlaw.col11
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 525667v.1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTIUCT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. NELSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, TABITHA NANCE, TONY WARD AND DANIEL TODD, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

ELECTRONICALLY FILED PLAINTIFFS

v.

HOPKlNSCOUNTY,KENTUCKY

AND

JIM LANTRIP, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER

On Motion of Plaintiffs, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and being

. otherwise sufficiently advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended

Complaint is GRANTED and Defendants shall have twenty (20) days from the date of this

Order to serve and file their answer to the Complaint.

Tendered by:
sf Bart L. Greenwald Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile) bgreenwald@fbtlaw.com
and Gregory A. Belzley Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 W. Jefferson St. Louisville, KY 40202
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 525814v.1
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 76735
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIFFS

ANSWER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JAMES JANTRIP, HOPKINS COUNTY JAILER, TO PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
v.

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

DEFENDANTS

Come the Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his individual and official capacities (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through the undersigned counsel, and for their answer to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint state as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed.
SECOND DEFENSE Responding to the individually numbered paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants state as follows: 1. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the statements

1

contained in numerical paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 30, 32, 34, and 36 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, and, therefore, deny same.
2. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in numerical paragraphs 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, and 37 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.
3. Defendants admit the allegations set forth in numerical paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.
4. As to numerical paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Defendant Jim Lantrip is Jailer of Hopkins County Jail. As to the remaining allegations of paragraph 14, Defendants deny same.
5. As to numerical paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that on June 28, 2002 Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester Turner were arrested for alcohol intoxication and were taken to the Hopkins County Jail and were not strip-searched. As to the remaining allegations of paragraph 16, Defendants deny same.
6. As to numerical paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiff Linda Joyce Ford was arrested in September, 2002, for writing a bad check. As to the remaining allegations of paragraph 17, Defendants deny same.
7. As to numerical paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that in February, 2002 and May, 2002 Plaintiff, Ladonia Nelson was arrested for a minor non-drug related offense and was pregnant during both incarcerations. As to the remaining allegations of paragraph 19, Defendants deny same.
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8. As to numerical paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiff Robert Teague was arrested in January, 2003 for writing a bad check. As to the remaining allegations in paragraph 21, Defendants deny same.
9. As to numerical paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiff Tabitha Nance was arrested in May, June, and October, 2003 for theft by deception for writing a bad check. As to the remaining allegations in paragraph 22, Defendants deny same.
10. As to numerical paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiff Tony Ward was arrested in May, 2004 for a non-violent non-drug related offense. As to the remaining allegations in paragraph 23, Defendants deny same.
11. As to numerical paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiff Daniel Todd was arrested in April, 2003 for a non-violent non-drug related offense. As to the remaining allegation in paragraph 24, Defendants deny same.
12. Allegations that are not specifically admitted herein are denied. THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants hereby reiterate all defenses identified in the previous Answers. FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
3

FIFTH DEFENSE No act or omissions of any individual Defendant violated any clearly established rights of the Plaintiff under the laws of the Constitution of the United States, thus entitled each individual Defendant to qualified immunity from suit.
SIXTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages, if any, were solely caused by the acts and omissions of Plaintiffs’, and/or the acts and omission of the third persons or parties, known or unknown, thus barring Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.
SEVENTH DEFENSE To the extent that Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action for violation of their right to procedural due process, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at state law, or alternatively, has failed to plead the inadequacy of remedies under state law, thus barring Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.
EIGHTH DEFENSE At all times alleged in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Defendants were acting in good faith and performing discretionary functions, thus entitling them to official immunity for suit, in their individual capacities, respectively, with respect to any claims arising under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
NINTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable parties, in whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, thus barring Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiffs have failed to identify parties not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
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TENTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for punitive damages.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE These Defendants affirmatively plead those defenses contained in F.R.C.P. 8 (c).
TWELFTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is barred by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-71.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint against Defendants is barred by the Doctrines of Absolute and/or Qualified Immunity.
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint against Defendants is barred by the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint against Defendants is barred by the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE Plaintiffs fail to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, for recovery of costs of suit, including, but not limited to, their reasonable attorneys fees, trial by jury, and any and all other relief to which Defendants may appear to be entitled.
5

Respectfully submitted, DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929 Phone 270-443-8253 Fax 270-442-6000 By: s/ Stacey Blankenship
Stacey A. Blankenship ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 22nd, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
R. MICHAEL SULLIVAN ALLEN W. HOLBROOK SULLIVAN MOUNTJOY STAINBACK & MILLER P O BOX 727 100 ST ANN STREET OWENSBORO KY 42302-0727 Attorney for Defendants
HON BART L GREENWALD HON JAMES R CRAIG FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 WEST MARKET STREET 32ND FLOOR LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
HON GREGORY A BELZLEY DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 WEST JEFFERSON STREET LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
HON JOHN T SOYARS FOSTER SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 EAST 14TH STREET P O BOX 24 HOPKINSVILLE KY 42240 Attorney for Defendants
on this 22nd day of March, 2006
By s/ Stacey Blankenship Stacey A. Blankenship
7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03CV-3-M
EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
VS.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky,

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Response To Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss I. Introduction
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for three reasons that are not supported by ~ controlling law. Specifically, the Prison Litigation Reform Act - upon which Defendants wholly rely for their first two arguments - does not apply to inmates who have been released from jail. No less than eight Courts of Appeals - including the Sixth Circuit - have recognized that the PLRA does not apply to the facts of this action (i.e. that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners). See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201,210 n.10 (3rd Cir. 2002); see also Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 2003). Further, even if the PLRA did apply (which it does not), it is well settled that the PLRA does not bar recovery for nominal and punitive damages. See Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003).

As for Defendants’ third argument regarding statute of limitations, the United States Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have been unwavering in their rulings that all statutes of limitations are tolled for individual plaintiffs when a class action complaint is filed. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 411 U.S. 538, 550 (1974); Wyser-Pratte Management v. Telxon, 413 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2005) ("the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class.")
Accordingly, Defendants’ arguments simply do not apply to the facts of this action and are contrary to prevailing and easily obtainable legal authority. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss and allow Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to trial.
II. Statement Of Facts On January 9, 2003l, Plaintiffs Sutton and Turner filed a complaint in their individual capacity and on behalf of "all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants, in the Hopkins County Jail, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection when there was no reasonable grounds for believing that they were concealing weapons or contraband." Complaint, ¶ 1. On January 18, 2005, Plaintiffs filed, with leave of this Court, their First Amended Complaint and added Linda Ford and Timothy May as class representatives. Upon joint motion of the parties, on March 16, 2005 the Court subsequently certified two subclasses of the original broader class: 1) "all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail, after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for visual inspection ("release class")"; and 2) "all persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants to remove their
~ In their motion to dismiss, Defendants erroneously indicate that Plaintiff’s Original Complaint was filed on January 9, 2002. The actual date, as evidenced by the file stamp, is January 9, 2003.
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clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail ("entry class")". Agreed Order at ¶¶ 2(a) and 3. Each sub-class includes all individuals who were treated from January 9, 2002 to the present. Id. On June 3, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of this Court, and added plaintiffs Ladonia Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert Teague and Tabitha Nance as additional class representatives. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 2. As admitted by Defendants, all of the additional class representatives - Ford, May, Nelson, Littlepage, Teague and Nance - were members of the original class because their claims arose between January 9, 2002, and the present. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ¶ I.
III. Argument A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act Does Not Apply To This Action.
1. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies Is Not Required Because The PLRA Does Not Apply To Former Prisoners.
The PLRA does not apply to former inmates or prisoners. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201,210 (3rd Cir. 2002); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165 (2nd Cir. 1999); Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321,323 (7th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998); Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 980 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Third Circuit succinctly stated just three years ago: "We note that every Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has held that the PLRA does not apply to actions filed by former prisoners." Id. at n.10. (citing to decisions from the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7tla, 8th, 9th, and 11t~ Circuits) (emphasis added). Further, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that "exhaustion applies only to those who are currently detained, not former prisoners." Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 2003) quoting in parenthetical, Page, 201 F.3d at 1139. The PLRA provides
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that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added) The PLRA specifically defines "prisoner" as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation pretrial release, or divisionary program." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (emphasis added). Thus, as the Seventh Circuit eloquently articulated:
The statutory language does not leave wiggle room; a convict out on parole is not a "person incarcerated or detained in any facility"... [m]ost sections of the PLRA use the term "prisoner," and...this term does not comprehend a felon who has been released. Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d at 323. (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated, "the natural reading of the text is that, to fall within the definition of "prisoner," the individual in question must be currently detained. Page, 210 F.3d at 1139. Therefore, former prisoners who file prison condition actions are no longer "prisoners" and need not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of this provision. Greig, 169 F.3d at 167; Page, 201 F.3d at 1140 (holding that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners and accordingly neither does the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement). The legal justification for the precedent is simple. Congress enacted the PLRA to "reduce quantity and improve quality of prisoner suits." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). "Congress deemed prisoners to be pestiferous litigants because they have so much free time on their hands and there are few costs to filing suit." Kerr, 138 F.3d. at 323. All circuits holding that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners agree on the policy considerations driving the PLRA’s enactment, namely litigant-happy inmates with nothing better to do with their time than
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file lawsuits. Several of those circuits similarly agree that this consideration becomes markedly less of a concern following release. See Harris, 216 F.3d at 980 ([b]ut the provision [§ 1997e(e)] reflects Congress’ belief that because of the difference in opportunity costs, a substantial number of such claims will not be re-filed after release... [t]hat is the judgment Congress made about what the difference in opportunity costs between inmates and former inmates would mean.); Greig, 169 F.3d at 167. Specifically, "[o]pportunity costs of litigation rise following release, diminishing the need for special precautions against weak suits. Kerr, 138 F.3d at 323.
Defendants, however, failed to make this Court aware of these important legal precedents, and instead only cited to irrelevant cases that only involved inmates who remained incarcerated. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U .S. 731 (2001) (action filed while plaintiff was still incarcerated); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (same); Freeman v. Berge, 283 F.Supp.2d 1009 (W.D.Wis., 2003) (same); Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989, 991 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
Thus, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under § 1997e(e) fails as a matter of law because Plaintiffs, as former inmates, are not subject to the PLRA and were therefore not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this action. Every one of Plaintiffs’ class representatives have been released from jail and Defendants have failed to identify any members of either sub-class who would not be a member of their class. Finally, Defendants specifically requested this Court to certify the subclasses as including any inmate, regardless of whether the inmates have been released. See Agreed Order Executed by John Soyars, Defendants’ Counsel March 16, 2005. Defendants therefore should be estopped from now bringing this argument. Because the PLRA does not
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apply to the facts of this action, Defendants’ argument relating to exhaustion of remedies is to no
avail.
2. Even If The PLRA Applied To This Action (Which It Does Not), Plaintiffs Can Recover Nominal And Punitive Damages For Violation Of Their Constitutional Rights By Defendants.
Plaintiffs’ ability to recover compensatory damages likewise is not limited by the PLRA
because, in accordance with the authority stated above, the PLRA does not apply to former
prisoners. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this argument also must be denied.
However, even if the PLRA does apply (which it does not), it is not a complete bar to
recovery, but rather, is only a limitation on recovery available to Plaintiffs. Calhoun v. Detella, 319F.3d 936. 940 (7th Cir. 2003). Although the PLRA might bar recovery of compensatory
damages for mental and emotional injuries suffered without a showing of personal injury, the
statute is inapplicable to awards of nominal or punitive damages for Constitutional violations. Id. at 941; Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 878-880 (10th Cir. 2001); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411,418 (2nd Cir. 2002). As the Third Circuit articulated in Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,533 (3rd Cir. 2003):
Section 1997e(e)’s requirement that a prisoner demonstrate physical injury before he can recover for mental or emotional injuries applies only to claims for compensatory damages. Claims seeking nominal or punitive damages are typically not "for" mental or emotional injury but rather "to vindicate constitutional rights" or "to deter or punish egregious violations of constitutional rights," respectively.
(internal citations omitted).
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ would need to plead and prove physical injury is
nonsensical, as explained by the Seventh Circuit:
"It]his contention if taken to its logical extreme would give prison officials free reign to maliciously and sadistically inflict psychological torture on prisoners, so long as they take care not to inflict any physical injury in the process.
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ld. at 940. Regardless, Defendants tender this argument without citation to any legal authority other
than the statute in question. As evidenced above, however, recovery for nominal and punitive damages for Constitutional violations, even in the absence of physical injury, is consistent with the law. In both their Original Complaint and their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged numerous Constitutional violations arising from the improper strip-searches. Complaint, ¶ 15 and Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 26. Thus, even if the PLRA would apply (which it does not), the law is well settled that Plaintiffs can still recover nominal and punitive damages for the violations of their Constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that recovery is completely barred fails and their motion to dismiss must be denied. B. The Statute Of Limitations Is Tolled For All Class Members.
Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is even more puzzling than their PLRA arguments. The United States Supreme Court could not have been more clear when it espoused more than 30 years ago that the statute of limitations is toiled for all potential class members when a class action complaint is filed. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 411 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) ("The filing of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class subsequently determined."); Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1983);. The Sixth Circuit concurs, holding that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class." Wyser-Pratte Management v. Texlon, 413 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2005).
The first paragraph of Plaintiffs’ original complaint states that Plaintiffs Sutton and Turner "file this action...on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail to remove their clothing for a visual inspection despite
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the absence of any reasonable grounds for believing they were concealing weapons or contraband." Complaint, ¶ 1. The third paragraph succinctly states: "The class consists of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants, in the Hopkins County Jail, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection when there was no reasonable grounds for believing that weapons or contraband had been concealed on or in their bodies." Id. at ¶ 3. Further, the Agreed Order entered into in this action on March 16, 2005 (to which Defendant’s specifically agreed), divided that overall class into two subclasses: one for all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing after being entitled to release ("release class"); and a second subclass for all persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were improperly required to remove their clothing ("entry class").
Defendants’ argument that the additional class representatives’ claims are not actionable under the applicable statute of limitations is simply wrong. Defendants ignore the simple fact that the additional class representatives were part of the original class. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants do not dispute that the additionally named plaintiffs’ alleged strip-searches all .took place after January 9, 2002. This Court expressly certified the class, upon agreement by Defendants, to include "all individuals who were so treated from January 9, 2002 to the present." Agreed Order at ¶ 4. The additional class representatives, as named in the amended complaints, are therefore members of the original class. Therefore, the binding authority of this Court makes clear that the statute of limitations on their claims are tolled and included in the overall class.
IV. Conclusion This action has been on the Court’s docket for nearly three years. During that time, Plaintiffs have spent thousands of hours filing three complaints, hiring experts and drafting reports, gathering detailed information on over 7,000 inmates, mailing questionnaires to each of
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those former inmates, answering written discovery, preparing for and attending depositions and appearing at a mutually agreed upon mediation during which Defendants’ requested that Plaintiffs perform even more costly discovery before they would agree to seriously discuss settlement. Defendants’ have agreed to a discovery schedule, which ends December 15, 2005 and already have agreed to class certification as the most judicially effective manner in which to proceed with this litigation.
Now, nearly two months before the close of discovery, Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss that is so inaccurate in its legal reasoning and analysis that it has accomplished nothing more than to delay, harass and cause Plaintiffs to needlessly expend even more time and money on this action. Defendants’ actions are so lacking in legal justification that Plaintiffs requested that Defendants withdraw their motion to limit the needless expense Plaintiffs would incur in opposing it. Defendants rebuffed this request out of hand without even considering the legal precedent cited by Plaintiffs; instead immediately responding via paralegal that Defendant’s counsel was out of town but, nevertheless, would not withdraw the motion. See Correspondence from Bart L. Greenwald to Stacey Blankenship, faxed on October 11, 2005, and Correspondence from Debbie Albritton, paralegal to Stacey Blankenship, to Bart Greenwald, October 11, 2005, collectively attached as Exhibit A.
None of Defendants’ grounds for dismissal survive even a cursory review of the relevant authority. First, the PLRA does not apply to the facts of this action. It cannot be made clearer that former prisoners are not subject to any provision of the PLRA, which renders moot Defendants’ arguments regarding Defendants’ duty to exhaust administrative remedies and Plaintiffs’ need to plead and prove physical injury. Second, even if the PLRA did apply (which it does not) Plaintiffs can still recover nominal and punitive damages for Constitutional violations.
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Finally, Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is not only specious but also patently incorrect. All Plaintiffs named in the amended complaints are members of the class identified in the original, timely filed, complaint and the subsequent class certification and therefore the statute of limitations is tolled as to all their claims. For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and allow Plaintiffs to proceed with their action.
Respectfully submitted, FROST BROWN TODD, LLC
Bart L. Greenwald Laura C. Leone 400 W. Market St., 32nd Floor Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363 (502) 589-5400 Attorney for Plaintiffs DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
Gregor~A. l~elzley Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 W. Jefferson St. Louisville, KY 40202
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the ~ day of October, 2005, a treeand accurate copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on:
John T. Soyars Foster Soyars & Associates 209 East 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42240 Michael Sullivan 100 ST Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727 Stacey A. Blankenship Demon & Keuler P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929
~ounsel for Plaintiffs
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 500992v. 1
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et al., Plaintiffs
VS.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.

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ELECTRONICALLYFILED

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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03CV-3-M

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PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DECERTIFY CLASS Introduction
Every reason exists for this case to move forward as a class action. Two federal district courts in Kentucky, when confronted with virtually identical facts, certified strip-search class actions for precisely the reasons that apply here. When certification was challenged in one of those cases, certification was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, relying on law that refutes all of the arguments advanced by Defendants for decertifying a class action that was originally certified with their agreement.
The Court should not be misled -- Defendants argue nothing in support of their motion that they did not know when they originally agreed to certification. Defendants had good reasons for agreeing to certification, reasons they abandon now in an inexplicable attempt to obtain some undefined procedural advantage. Clearly, they offer the Court no more superior means for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy than the class action mechanism presently in place. Defendants simply wish to discard that mechanism and the obvious procedural advantages it offers the Court in favor of the institution of hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- of individual actions.

Defendants concede in their motion that decertification is likely to result in at least 730 individual actions: "It is without a doubt that the Court will be required to conduct an individual determination of liability, as well as damages, if any, as to each potential class member (at this time 730 or so) ...." Defendants’ Motion, p. 7. Defendants’ estimate of the number of potential class members is based upon just the number of questionnaires that have been completed and returned to Plaintiffs’ counsel after an unsolicited mailing. It does not take into account: (a) that Plaintiffs mailed almost 7000 questionnaires; (b) that more than 2200 were returned undelivered; and (c) that Plaintiffs are still receiving completed questionnaires from potential claimants.
That Plaintiffs have not yet received responses from approximately 4000 potential claimants to whom questionnaires were presumably delivered should not be taken as any indication that such claimants were not strip-searched in violation of their constitutional rights, or that many will not assert an individual claim if required and given the opportunity to do so. First, the response rate of more than 15% of delivered questionnaires is relatively high for an unsolicited mailing from a lawyer with whom laypersons have had no previous contact. Second, a variety of factors could explain why questionnaires have not been returned by class members, including but not limited to: (1) questionnaires lost in the mail either prior to delivery or in the course of their return; (2) delivery of questionnaires to the wrong address; (3) questionnaires discarded after delivery as "junk mail"; (4) questionnaires opened and discarded by persons other than the intended recipient; (5) suspicion of the addressee upon receipt of correspondence from a lawyer with whom they have not had previous contact; (6) illiteracy or some other disability that prevented the addressee from understanding and responding to the questionnaire; and (7) embarrassment. After all, the Seventh Circuit has characterized the strip and visual body cavity searches to which Plaintiffs were subjected as "demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive,
2

signifying degradation and submission." MaryBeth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th
Cir. 1983). Why abandon a class action in favor of hundreds, perhaps thousands of trials on liability and
damages? Defendants expect the Court to believe that jail officers will remember whether an individual claimant was strip-searched, and if so, why -- i.e., that they will have a specific,
independent recollection, unsupported by any documentation, &not strip-searching one individual
among many they may have seen on one day many years before, or of the details that warranted a particular claimant’s strip-search.1 Such evidence, if it exists, and even if admissible under the
circumstances, would have dubious credibility, and would certainly not have the weight to overcome the mountain of evidence -- the testimony from not only hundreds of victims of the Jail’s unconstitutional strip-search practices but from at least one former Jail employee2 -- that the Jail
customarily strip-searched persons on admission to and just prior to their release from the Jail without regard to whether there existed the reasonable, individualized suspicion required by the
clearly-established law. SeeMasters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977
(1989).
Background Plaintiffs petitioned for class certification on January 18, 2005. In their 21-page supporting memorandum, Plaintiffs argued that this case satisfied all the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 (a)
and (b) for certification as a class action. Plaintiffs attached to their petition 87 statements from individuals who claimed to have been subjected to an unconstitutional strip-search upon entry to the
1 The subclasses certified in this case with the agreement of Defendants rtm from January 9, 2002 (one year preceding the date on which Plaintiffs filed their original class action complaint). See Agreed Order of March 16, 2005, ¶4. Because trial has been scheduled in this case to begin January 8, 2007, testifying officers may be asked to recall events happening as many as five years prior.
2 Donald Gossett, who worked at the Jail from December 2000 to January 2002, testified that it was the Jail’s policy to strip-search everyone entering the Jail’s general population, returning from Court, and just prior to release. See Exhibit A, Gossett depo., pp. 14, 18-19, 22-25.

Jail. Of those 87 individuals, 32 also claimed to have been subjected to a strip-search upon release
from the Jail. Plaintiffs also attached to their petition an additional eight statements of individuals
who claimed only to have been subjected to an unconstitutional strip search upon release from the
Jail.
Despite having already deposed the original Plaintiffs to this action, Lester Turner and
Edward Sutton, and having been provided the statements attached as exhibits to the memorandum in
support of Plaintiffs’ petition, Defendants in their three-page response did not dispute any of the
following:
(1) That there are questions of law or fact common to all members of each class;
(2) That the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class;
(3) That the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class;
(4) That the prosecution of separate actions by or against the individual members of the class would create a risk of either (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (b) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(5) That the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; and
(6) That the questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
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The only argument Defendants offered in opposition to Plaintiffs’ petition for certification was that the numerosity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) was not satisfied. For obvious reasons, numerosity is not raised now as an argument by Defendants in support of their motion to decertify.
Despite Defendants’ initial opposition to Plaintiffs’ petition, they subsequently agreed to the certification of two sub-classes: 1) "All persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail, after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for visual inspection"; and 2) "All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail". See Agreed Order of March 16, 2005, ¶¶ 2(a) and 3. Each sub-class includes all individuals who were subjected to such searches since January 9, 2002. Id, ¶ 4.
Why did Defendants first oppose Plaintiffs’ petition, only to subsequently agree to class certification? On January 31, 2005, after filing their petition for class certification and prior to Defendants’ response, Plaintiffs sent to Defendants a letter encouraging them to agree to class certification. In that letter, Plaintiffs explained that if Defendants persuaded the Court to deny Plaintiffs’ petition, it would produce a worse result for Defendants than certification because it would trigger a "flood of separate lawsuits" that would be far more expensive to try than to settle, and that might well make settlement impossible. See Exhibit B. Defendants apparently agreed.
Argument I. Defendants’ Have Failed to Show Any New Facts or Law That Warrant
Decertification. A court cannot decertify a class action without a sound basis. GeneralElec. Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982); In re Exterior Siding and Aluminum Coil

AntitrustLitig., 696 F.2d 613,616 (8th Cir. 1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c). "Although a Rule 23 ruling might be conditional, a judge will not alter a previous ruling unless changes in the facts call for it." In re Exterior Siding, supra at 616.
Moreover, the grounds offered for decertification must not "be ones that ... could have been argued earlier but were not." In re Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., Securities Litig., 838 F. Supp. 109, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). The party proposing decertification "should, at a minimum, show some newly developed facts or law in support of their desired action." Kramer v. Scientific ControlCorp., 67 F.R.D. 98, 99 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration of certification because the grounds they gave could have been asserted earlier, but were not).
Defendants argue that this class action must be decertified because the Court must conduct "730 individual trials to determine (1) whether the person was actually strip-searched; and if so (2) whether there was reasonable suspicion for doing so." Defendants’ Memorandum, p. 20. This argument is based upon what has always been Defendants’ central defense in these proceedings -that the searches, if they occurred at all, were justified by a reasonable suspicion. See Defendants’ original Answer (filed more than three years ago), ¶ 11. Absolutely nothing has occurred in this case to make this argument any more relevant now than it was prior to Plaintiffs’ petition for class certification. II. Plaintiffs Would Be Unfairly and Manifestly Prejudiced By Decertification.
On motion to decertify, a district court must also consider "whether the parties or the class would be unfairly prejudiced by a change in proceedings at this point." Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, § 30.18 at 238; see also In re Harcourt Bracer Jovanovich, Inc. Securities Litig., 838 F.Supp. 109, 114 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend class action order because defendants’ defenses against the class would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of some of the
6

named class representatives). Plaintiffs already have incurred substantial expense in reviewing all of Defendants’ inmate files for the purpose of acquiring contact information for direct mailing of notice of class certification to potential class members. Plaintiffs also have borne the expense of published notice. Having been notified of certification of this class action, many potential class members undoubtedly have justifiably relied upon the class procedure to adjudicate their rights, and have not yet come forward to advance individual claims. The subclasses are simply too large for decertification not to result in the exclusion of a significant number of meritorious claims.
Also, in reliance upon Defendants’ agreement to class certification, Plaintiffs disclosed to Defendants work product and attorney/client-privileged information to advance settlement. After this class action was certified with the agreement &Defendants, the Honorable Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel -- again with the agreement of the parties -- entered an Order setting a settlement conference for July 14, 2005. At the settlement conference, the parties were unable to reach a settlement because Defendants had questions about the likely volume of claims. In an effort to estimate class volume to advance settlement, Plaintiffs included with notice of class certification questionnaires inquiring whether the persons to whom direct notice was mailed had been stripsearched at the Jail. Had there been any issue about the propriety of certification at the time, Plaintiffs would have been entitled to withhold questionnaire responses from Defendants as work product and as attorney/client-privileged communications. However, Judge Goebel ordered Plaintiffs to provide to Defendants copies of all questionnaires that were returned to class counsel, and Plaintiffs, in reliance on Defendants’ good faith and representations, and to address Defendants’ questions about the size of the putative class, readily agreed. Decertification now would grant Defendants an advantage they would not have had before, and would obviously unfairly prejudice Plaintiffs.
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Finally, Defendants have waited until just eight months before trial to ask this Court to decertify this class action and to start litigating from scratch more than 700 claims. Plaintiffs have already waited more than three years for resolution of their claims. Nowhere in Defendants’ Memorandum is it explained how breaking this litigation into more than 700 pieces will lead to a quicker, more efficient resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims. III. Federal Authority -- Particularly the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion in Eddleman -- Is
Dispositive of All of Defendants’ Arguments. Plaintiffs incorporate the entirety of the arguments in their Memorandum in Support of Petition for Class Certification as if fully set forth herein, and will not repeat them here. Instead, Plaintiffs will focus on refuting the specific contentions of Defendants’ Motion. A. Eddleman is Directly Applicable to This Case. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Eddleman v. Jefferson County, 1996 U. S.App. LEXIS 25298 (August 29, 1996), cited by Defendants in their motion, is an unpublished decision. However, having cited and attempted to distinguish Eddleman in their motion, Defendants have made it fair game. Eddleman is the only case in which the Sixth Circuit has addressed certification of a stripsearch class action, and it affirmed the decision of the district court judge, the Honorable Edward H. Johnstone, to certify a class action in that case. It has unquestionable precedential value in relation to the issue now before the Court. Given the Sixth Circuit’s controlling authority over this Court, there is no published opinion -- save one from the Supreme Court, which has not issued an opinion on a strip-search class action -- that is as important or directly relevant to the Court’s resolution of the issues presented by Defendants’ Motion)
3 In conformity with the requirements of 6 Cir. R. 28(g), Plaintiffs attach hereto as Exhibit C a full copy of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Eddleman.

Defendants have attempted to distinguish Eddleman from this case on two grounds. Defendants argue first that there was a written policy in Eddleman, not present in this case, that mandated the unconstitutional searches in issue there. But the fact that the plaintiffs in Eddleman were strip-searched pursuant to a written policy, as opposed to an unwritten custom or practice, had no bearing on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. In addition, the Jail’s strip-search policy required that "[a] strip search ... be given anytime an inmate has ... been outside the jail and is returning to the jail." See Exhibit D. Plaintiffs contend that this provision of the Jail’s strip-search policy mandated the strip-searches of persons like Messrs. Sutton and Turner, who were taken to court, ordered released by a judge, but then strip-searched prior to their release after they were returned to the Jail.
Second, Defendants argue that Eddleman was decided prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e ("the PLRA"). But this Court has already held that the PLRA is inapplicable to this case (see Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 19, 2005, pp.
Plaintiffs, Under Eddleman, Have Satisfied the Rule 23(a) Requirements of Commonality and Adequacy of Representation. Defendants claim that their strip-search determinations were all based upon a "decision tree" that took into account "any number of reasons" -- including a claimant’s criminal background,4 jail file and any other conduct "that would invoke reasonable suspicion" -- in determining whether a strip-search of an individual was warranted. Defendants’ Memorandum, p. 16. As a consequence, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Rule 23 (a) requirements of commonality or adequacy of representation because the Court must conduct "mini-trials" of each Plaintiff’s claim to determine whether they were strip-searched and, if so, why.
4 Defendant Lantrip has already testified that the Jail did not take into account an arrestee’s criminal background in deciding whether to strip-search. See Exhibit E, 1/17/06 Lantrip depo., pp. 14-16.
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But the law is clear that in deciding whether to certify or decertify a class action, it is the
allegations of Plaintiffs that must be accepted as true, and that any doubts as to certification must be resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir.
1977). Plaintiffs have alleged -- and, as set forth below, the evidence adduced in discovery thus far
supports -- that Defendants had a policy, custom and practice of strip-searching persons on
admission to and/or just prior to release from the Jail without regard to whether there existed the
requisite, individualized reasonable suspicion required by law. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint,
¶¶2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 25 and 27.
The defendants in Eddleman made a similar argument as Defendants here, and it was soundly
rejected by the Sixth Circuit:
Defendants contend that the representative Plaintiffs’ claims have "substantive factual differences" and do not meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) ....
This ... does not defeat the commonality requirement because Plaintiffs’ legal theory is that all members of the class were subject to unconstitutional searches after being arrested for minor offenses pursuant to a blanket policy or custom .... Common legal theories therefore bind the class even if some sets of facts are more severe than others. This is true even where the putative plaintiff is subject to a full strip search instead of a partial one, or the fact that some individuals may fail to meet the qualifications for the class because it can be shown that there was reasonable suspicion to strip search them .... These isolated instances of non-commonality are not grounds for denying class certification.
Eddleman, Exhibit B at "11-13 (emphasis added). For the same reason, the Sixth Circuit in
Eddleman denied the defendants’ argument that factual differences among the claims rendered the
named class plaintiffs inadequate representatives of the unnamed class. Id, * 14.
C. Plaintiffs, Under Eddleman, Have Satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3)Requirements of Predominance and Superiority.
For the same reasons referenced above, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
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affecting individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and just adjudication of the controversy. Again, the same argument was advanced by defendants in Eddleman and rejected by the Sixth Circuit:
Defendants argue that because the reasonableness of any search must be examined on a case-by-case basis, the constitutionality of strip searches cannot be properly evaluated in a class action. The basis for the complaint, however, arises precisely because the Defendants did not conduct an individualized assessment of the need for each search. Plaintiffs allege, and that allegation must be taken as true for our purposes here, that their constitutional rights were violated by a policy or custom, written or unwritten, to search every arrestee who entered the jail, regardless of the individual circumstances. Due to the single legal theory and the similar facts for each Plaintiff, a class action would be superior to individual actions. Id., "16-17 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit also held that decertification on account of varying damages among the class members is also not appropriate. "Varying damage levels rarely prohibit a class action if the class members’ claims possess factual and legal commonality." Id., * 18. See also Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635,640 (6th Cir. 1993) (granting class certification on common question of liability, even though damages were disparate); De LaFuente v. Stokely Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 233 (7th Cir. 1983) (Rule 23(b)(3) class actions commonly involve differing levels of injury and damages across the class; however, that does make Rule 23(b)(3) certification inappropriate). It was for these reasons that the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification in Eddleman, and it is for these same reasons that Defendants’ motion to decertify should be denied.~
5 Subsequent to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Eddleman, another federal court in Kentucky certified yet another strip-search class action. Wilson v. Franklin County, Civil Action No. 97-35 (E.D.Ky. 1997) (Hon. Joseph M. Hood presiding). See Exhibit F.
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D. The Authorities Cited by Defendants Are Distinguishable and Are Buried Under the Overwhelming Weight of Federal Precedent Favoring Certification of Strip-Search Class Actions.
The authorities cited by Defendants that do not concern strip searches are all readily distinguishable from the case at hand. For instance, In Re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3 d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) was a product liability case concerning the sale of penile implants that spanned 22 years. The Sixth Circuit found class certification improper because 1) the penile implant products were different; 2) each plaintiff had a unique complaint; and 3) each plaintiff received different information or assurances from his treating physician. Id., at 1085. American Medical is simply inapplicable to this case, as are the other authorities cited by Defendants involving fraud, Title VII violations, and work/life restrictions imposed on prostitutes in Winnemucca, Nevada.
Defendants cite to only two strip-search cases in which a federal court denied class certification --Bledsoe v. Combs, 2000 WL 681094 (S.D.Ind. 2000) and Noon v. Sailor, 2000 WL 684274 (S.D.Ind. 2000). Both opinions were written by the same judge in another jurisdiction and in a different circuit, were issued the same day, and were unpublished. Both opinions are identical but for the names of the parties and the estimated number of potential claimants. It is thus reasonable to question whether the court subjected the class certification issues in those cases to the "rigorous analysis" required by law. In any event, the court found that joinder of the 17 plaintiffs in Bledsoe and the 103 plaintiffs in Noon "provides a practical alternative to the proposed class action." Id., at 3. That is hardly the case here with more than 730 claims and counting.
In any event, this unpublished authority is literally buried under the weight of federal precedent favoring the certification of strip-search class actions. See Tardiffv. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Garyv. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891 (7tla Cir. 1999);Eddleman v. Jefferson County, Ky., 1996 WL 495013 (6t~ Cir. 1996); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8t~ Cir. 1987); Bell v.
12

Manson, 590 F.2d 1224 (2nd Cir. 1978); Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006); Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Nilsen v. Fork County, 400 F. Supp.2d 266 (D. Me. 2005); McBean v. City of New Fork, 228 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y., 2005); Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 227 F.R.D. 159 (N.D.N.Y., 2005); Dodge v. County of Orange, 226 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Smook v. Minnehaha County, 340 F.Supp.2d 1037 (D.S.D. 2004); Williams v. Brown, 214 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Bfihovde v. St. Croix County, Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607 (W.D. Wis. 2003 ); Maneely v. City of Newburgh, 208 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y., 2002); Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp.2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001); Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass. 2000); Hurley v. Coughfin, 158 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Doe v. Calumet City, Ill., 754 F.Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Smith v. Montgomery County, Md., 573 F.Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1983); Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976). In fact, the courts in both Bfihovde and Maneely cited but declined to follow Bledsoe and Noon.6 IV. Defendants Cannot Credibly Refute Plaintiffs’ Claims That the Jail Had a Practice of
Strip-Searching Persons On Admission To or Just Prior To Their Release From the Jail Without Reasonable Suspicion. Plaintiffs have never argued that the documentation in a claimant’s inmate file should not be taken into account in assessing the legitimacy of claims, and Defendants’ discussion on pages 18 and 19 of their memorandum shows just how easily the wheat can be separated from the chaff-- indeed, this is the very process in which the parties engaged in resolving the Jefferson County and Franklin County strip-search class actions. But "no documentation was maintained by Defendants as to who was strip-searched" at the Jail. See Defendants’ Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, p. 2. This
6 With the exception of Eddleman, this list does not include strip-search class actions, like Wilson v. Franklin County, supra n. 5, that were certified and resolved with no reported decision.
13

is a serious violation of Kentucky law as well as the Jail’s own internal policies. It entitles Plaintiffs to an adverse inference instruction that every Plaintiff who was strip searched was strip searched without any reasonable suspicion, and may even bar Defendants from presenting any evidence to the contrary.
Kentucky law mandates that "[t]he jailer shall require that a strip search or body cavity search shall be documented. Documentation shall include: 1) basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a search; 2) date and time of search; 3) name of prisoner; 4) name of person conducting search; 5) type of search; and 6) result of search." 501 KAR 3:120 (emphasis added). Further, the Hopkins County Jail policy, instituted specifically in respect to the Kentucky regulations, states that "When an inmate is ordered to be strip searched, the Deputy Jailer will note the reason for this decision on the inmate incident report and make a log entry listing the inmate’s name and explaining the purpose of the search. Explain the probable cause that existed to warrant the strip search." See Exhibit D. Neither the Kentucky regulation nor the Jails’ strip-search policy provide for any exceptions. Whenever a strip-search is conducted, the law and policy both require documentation.
"[W]here one party wrongfully denies another the evidence necessary to establish a fact in dispute, the court should draw the strongest allowable inference in favor of the aggrieved party." Welsh v. U.S., 844 F. 2d 1239, 1247 (6th Cir. 1988), quoting NationalAss’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal. 1987); Latimore v. CitibankFed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The violation of a record-retention regulation creates a presumption that the missing record contained evidence adverse to the violator."); Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8t~ Cir. 1994) (because employer violated record retention regulation, plaintiff"was entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the destroyed documents would have bolstered her case"). Thus, Plaintiffs at a minimum will be entitled to an adverse inference instruction stating that because Defendants did not
14

maintain the appropriate records, the jury must infer that, had they kept those records, the records would have shown that Defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to strip search Plaintiffs and that Defendants had a custom and practice of strip searching inmates at the Jail regardless of whether there was the requisite individualized, reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, due to Defendants’ willful failure to abide by the requirements of Kentucky law as well as their own internal policies, the adverse inference in this case should be considered irrebuttable -- conclusively establishing the lack of reasonable suspicion on the part of Defendants in conducting the strip searches at issue. It is within the inherent power of this Court to determine not only that an adverse inference is warranted under the circumstances, but also that the inference is an irrebuttable one that denies Defendants the opportunity to present testimonial or other evidence to contradict it. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (recognizing inherent power of courts to fashion remedies for conduct that disrupts the judicial process); U.S.v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993) (court has inherent power to sanction parties). Ample authority exists for the exclusion of testimonial evidence on an issue that should have been preserved in another form, as is the case here. See, e.g., UniguardSec. Ins. v. LakewoodEng’g &Mfg., 982 F.2d 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding exclusion of testimony in response to defendant’s failure to maintain physical evidence); Harmann v. Ridge Tool Co., 539 N.W.2d 753,756-57 (Mich. App. 1995) (excluding evidence and explaining "it would be unfair to permit the negligent party to benefit from his own error... Whether the evidence was destroyed or lost accidentally or in bad faith is irrelevant, because the opposing party suffered the same prejudice").
Based on Defendants’ blatant disregard for the law requiring documentation of all strip searches and the resulting prejudice to Plaintiffs, an irrebuttable adverse inference is warranted. This Court has the inherent authority to impose such a sanction, and the end result of that sanction means
15

that Defendants are barred from attempting to offer any evidence that the strip searches at issue were based on reasonable suspicion.
Even if the Court chooses not to impose such a sanction, whether a claimant was stripsearched and why will be based entirely upon the recollection of Jail officers. Defendants are suggesting that Jail officers can independently recollect whether they strip-searched one particular individual among many -- and if so, why -- on a day two, three, four or even five years ago. Such a suggestion beggars credulity. In any event, Plaintiffs have already asked Defendants to identify persons having such recollections with regard to the over 730 claimants identified thus far (see Exhibit G), and Plaintiffs eagerly await their response. V. Can Defendants Even Afford the Litigation of Hundreds, Much Less Thousands, of
Individual Actions? It is doubtfial Defendants have the economic wherewithal to bear the burden of hundreds or thousands of individual actions. In fact, it is for this reason primarily that Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion. While the certification of this class action was and remains fully supported by law as well as logic, individual actions might ultimately deliver the largest recovery for Plaintiffs -were Defendants able to pay it. Plaintiffs thus find themselves in the unusual position of resisting Defendants’ flirtation with economic suicide in order to preserve what is perhaps the only source from which they can recover their damages. Assume that the Court ultimately tries only 700 cases, and that each case costs Defendants an average of only $10,000 to prepare and try -- both very conservative assumptions. Even then, Defendants’ legal fees and expenses alone would amount to $7 million, and this does not take into account actual and punitive damages assessed against them at trial, or the attorneys’ fees they will owe prevailing plaintiffs under 42 U. S.C. § 1988.
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Defendants’ insurer has initiated a declaratory judgment action in an effort to establish that it
has no coverage obligation to Defendants for the claims in this litigation. Kentucky Ass’n of
Counties All Lines Fund Trust v. Hopkins County, et aL, Action No. 05-CI-851, Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Franklin Circuit Court, Div. II.
Conclusion
Defendants’ Motion does not make any sense procedurally or economically. Nowhere in
Defendants’ Motion do they offer this Court any explanation of how breaking this single class action
into at least 700 pieces will make the Court’s job any easier, or will resolve this litigation any faster.
Defendants’ arguments are rejected by the controlling authority in Eddleman and the enormous
weight of other federal authorities favoring certification of strip-search class actions. Defendants
had good, practical reasons for agreeing to certification the first time around, and those reasons -- not
to mention the law -- require that their motion be denied.
Respectfully Submitted,
s/ Bart L. Greenwald Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile) bgreenwald@fbtlaw, com
and
Gregory A. Belzley D1NSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 540-2300 (Telephone) (502) 585-2207 (Facsimile)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 14, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk
of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the
following:
Michael Sullivan 100 St. Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727
Stacey A. Blankenship Denton & Keuler P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929
I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following non- CM/ECF participants:
John T. Soyars FOSTER, SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 East 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42240
Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202
s/ Bart L. Greenwald Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile) bgreenwald@fbtlaw, corn
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 54526 lv.3
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 77894
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M
EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
REPLY TO RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DECERTIFY CLASS v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

Come the Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his individual and official capacities (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through the undersigned counsel, and for their Reply to Response to Motion to Decertify Class, hereby state as follows:
I. ARGUMENT A. Defendants have not failed to show any new facts or law that warrant decertification. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ Motion should be denied because they have
failed to show any new facts or law that warrant decertification. In arguing that Defendants must put forth “newly developed facts or law in support of their desired action”, Plaintiffs cite a vacated Eight Circuit opinion (In re Exterior Siding and Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 696 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1982)(vacated by In re Exterior

1

Siding and Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 705 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1983) and two district court cases from New York and Pennsylvania.
The New York case is easily distinguishable because it merely involved a Plaintiff requesting an amendment to the certification order. In re Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 109, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Of course a Plaintiff is required to set forth a change in facts or law before the certification order is amended, as the Plaintiff always carries the burden of proving the elements necessary for certification. See In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
As to the Pennsylvania District Court opinion, Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., although that District Court made the bold statement that Defendants must show newly discovered facts or law to support their argument for decertification, the judge did not cite any authority to support his proposition. 67 F.R.D. 98, 99 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
As the Defendants explained in their Motion to Decertify, it is the Sixth Circuit’s position that after certification, the district court must continue to ensure that the requirements of class certification remain satisfied as the case progresses, and the court may alter or amend the certification if the requirements are no longer met. See e.g., Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1214 (6th Cir.1997). Obviously, since the Sixth Circuit allows decertification sua sponte by the trial court, the Sixth Circuit therefore does not require newly discovered facts or law to justify decertification. It is sufficient if the requirements of class certification are no longer met, whatever that reason may be.
Regardless of whether the Sixth Circuit requires newly developed facts, the Defendants offer the following that has occurred since certification:
2

1. Plaintiffs sent the Defendants 750 completed potential class member
questionnaires.
2. Defendants’ counsel sifted through each of them individually, determining
that many fail to state a claim on their face.
3. The inmate files obtained by Defendants’ counsel to date indicate a
reasonable suspicion for strip search in two-thirds of the files reviewed.
4. Defendants’ counsel’s investigation of some of the 750 claims has
revealed that deputy jailers recall some of the potential class members’ incarcerations
and can testify that no such strip searches occurred.1 Furthermore, in November, 2005,
Defendants produced over 2,300 pages of strip search reports that have been maintained
by Defendants since July 1, 2003. (See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second
Request for Production of Documents, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”2). Certainly,
Defendants can use this evidence to rebut an unlawful strip search claim.
5. Depositions of six of the ten Plaintiffs have been taken. The depositions
1 In their Response, Plaintiffs’ express their doubt that jailers will be able to recall whether a particular class member was strip searched “many years before”. However, maybe since Plaintiffs’ counsel are from Louisville they do not understand small towns. Hopkins County and Madisonville (the County’s seat) are small. Most people that live there went to school together, are neighbors, know someone that knows that person, have kids that are in school together, etc. As such, the deputy jailers personally know many of the people that are incarcerated at the Hopkins County Detention Center. As such, especially the incarcerations of friends, former schoolmates, neighbors, etc., will be memorable. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have submitted claims as recent as December, 2005, so many of the claims are not “many years before” as Plaintiffs allege. And finally, as explained in Defendants’ Motion to Decertify, Deputy Jailers Tucker and Coy have already testified in this case that they recall Sutton’s and Turner’s booking and release, as well as specific details about the arrest. Regardless, Plaintiffs’ doubt in this regard can be used to impeach the witnesses. It is irrelevant for purposes of this Motion. Whether Plaintiffs believe the testimony or not, surely Defendants at least get the opportunity to present the testimony to a jury. 2 Rather than attaching all 2,341 pages of strip search reports, Defendants merely attached a sampling of 30 for this Court’s review and consideration. Furthermore, Defendants’ counsel misunderstood what said records represented, as it was her understanding that the Jail merely kept records of strip search incidents that were the result of unique incidents resulting in reasonable suspicion to search. However, said clients have since explained that said records are of ALL strip searches that occurred at the Jail since July 1, 2003, whether covered by the policy or not. A review of these records indicates that appears to be true, as they show strip searches upon entry for drug or violent offenses, work release, suicide watch, transfer from another facility, etc. As such, Defendants intend to file a Motion to Amend their Objections to reflect arguments that are in conformity to the evidence previously provided to Plaintiffs.
3

revealed a much different story than what was told in the questionnaires. One admitted to a previous drug conviction; several admitted that they were a transfer from a different facility (which it is Defendants’ position that those persons transferred from another facility are subject to strip search); one admitted that she had attempted suicide a year before her incarceration and informed the booking officer of such (again, it is Defendants’ position that such persons are subject to a strip search in order to prevent a possible suicide in the jail). As a result, Defendants believe that if each and every one of Plaintiffs’ class members were deposed and their jail files analyzed, similar facts would come to light in a majority of cases. In other words, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs to Defendants at the certification stage have turned out to be completely different, raising numerous defenses that were not apparent after the depositions of Sutton and Turner (who were the only named Plaintiffs prior to this Court’s certification).
6. Plaintiffs claim to have over 7,000 class members at this time (See SurReply filed by Plaintiffs, dated April 17, 2006). This is vastly different than the 95 number that was provided just prior to class certification. (See Plaintiffs’ Petition to Certify).
As a result, even if the law requires Defendants to bring forth a change in law or fact to justify decertification, Defendants have met their burden. Furthermore, the mere fact that this case has become unmanageable since certification due to the sheer numbers and the fact that it is apparent that each class member will need an individual determination on liability is sufficient justification for decertification. In their Response, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that because Defendants signed an agreed order to certification, they should be precluded from requesting decertification. However, they
4

cite no authority that a defendant’s agreement to class certification during an early stage of the proceedings bars a later challenge to certification.
Courts consistently hold that if unmanageability emerges as the proceedings unfold, the court may decertify the class under Rule 23(c)(1) at any point before final judgment. See e.g., Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 189 (4th Cir. 1993)(“[T]he district court must make certain that manageability and other types of problems do not overwhelm the advantages of conditional certification. Should such concerns render the class mechanism ineffective, the district court must be prepared to use its considerable discretion to decertify the class.”); Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 184 F.R.D. 556, 567 (E.D.Va 1999) (“Should management concerns prove intractable, the Court may simply decertify the class.”); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Finding that “[w]hen, and if, the district court is convinced that the litigation cannot be managed, decertification is proper.”). For these reasons alone, Defendants are entitled to decertification.
B. Plaintiffs will not be unfairly and manifestly prejudiced by decertification. Plaintiffs argue that they would be unfairly prejudiced by a decertification order because (1) they have incurred substantial expense in reviewing all of Defendants’ inmate files for purposes of acquiring contact information; (2) the class members would be unfairly prejudiced because they have relied on this class action and therefore not come forward to advance their individual claims; (3) they would have been entitled to withhold questionnaire responses from Defendants as work product and as attorney/clientprivileged communications; and (4) the Defendants have waited until eight months before trial to ask for decertification.
5

As to their first argument, prior to certification, Plaintiffs visited Defendants’ facility and obtained the names of 1,797 individuals and mailed questionnaires to each. Plaintiffs’ counsel incurred expenses with this exercise before they even knew if the class would be certified. Regardless, attorneys across this country everyday incur expenses that they may not recover. It is the nature of the practice. Obviously, Plaintiffs’ counsel may attempt to recoup expenses if a judgment or settlement occurs in the individual cases that Plaintiffs’ counsel claim they will bring if decertified. Regardless, surely Plaintiffs are not arguing that Defendants’ due process rights should be violated, i.e., Defendants should not be entitled to present their defenses as to each and every class member, in order to ensure that Plaintiffs’ counsels’ expenses are recouped. See Perez v. Metabolife Int., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262 (S.D. Fl 2003).
As to their second argument, there is nothing to prevent the individual class members from coming forward to advance individual claims following decertification. Certainly it is within the Court’s inherent power to alleviate these concerns upon decertification. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354-5 (1983) (Holding that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action. Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.”). As such, it is of no consequence at this time that the class members have not filed individual actions.
Their third argument is perplexing. Plaintiffs argue that giving Defendants copies
6

of the questionnaires was a waiver of their attorney work product/attorney client privilege that they would not have done but for the certification. However, Plaintiffs attached 95 completed questionnaires to their Petition to Certify, which was obviously filed before this Court certified this case as a class action. As such, it appears that Plaintiffs’ counsel voluntarily waived any work-product/attorney client privilege argument that they may have in said questionnaires before Defendants even agreed to the certification. Finally, if Plaintiffs believed the documents were privileged, they should have asserted the privilege.
As to their fourth argument, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants waited eight months before trial to request decertification. First, it should be pointed out that Defendants’ Motion was filed 9 ½ months before trial, rather than eight. Second, even if the class was decertified, the named Plaintiffs would have the right to proceed with the scheduled trial. Furthermore, motions to decertify are typically filed following discovery, which of course is usually within just a few months of the trial date. As explained previously, the Court can decertify a class at any time prior to final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(C); Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms Inc., 672 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (W.D.Mich.1987) (noting “that . . . class certification . . . is flexible . . . and . . . the practice of defining subclasses and of decertifying an existing class often accommodates the products of discovery and even development at trial”); Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1214 (6 th Cir.1997). As such, it is of no consequence that Defendants filed their Motion 9 ½ months before trial.
Finally, the fact that Plaintiffs now argue that they will be prejudiced if the Motion to Decertify is granted is ironic in light of a recent letter written by Plaintiffs’
7

counsel to Defendants’ counsel. (See Exhibit “B”, attached hereto). In that letter,
Plaintiffs counsel expressed surprise that Defendants were seeking to decertify this action
and further explained how decertification could only be beneficial to their clients, since
they would likely be entitled to more damages. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims of prejudice
are dubious at best.
C. Federal authority is not dispositive of the Defendants’ arguments.
1. Eddelman v. Jefferson County is clearly distinguishable.
As Defendants explained in their Motion to Decertify, Eddelman is clearly
distinguishable for numerous reasons, the most important factor being that Eddelman
involved an across-the-board strip search policy such that the defendants in that case
were not entitled to come forward with testimony and/or evidence to establish that each
class member was not strip searched. This is a HUGE distinction. In this case,
Defendants’ due process rights will be violated if they are not given this opportunity,
resulting in this class action having become unmanageable and lacking in commonality
and typicality as is required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Plaintiffs claim that whether there was an across-the-board strip search policy in
Eddelman had no bearing on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. However, the following
language quoted by the Plaintiffs in their Response clearly shows otherwise:
Defendants argue that because the reasonableness of any search must be examined on a case-by-case basis, the constitutionality of strip searches cannot be properly evaluated in a class action. The basis for the complaint arises precisely because the defendants did not conduct an individualized assessment of the need for each search. Plaintiffs allege, and that allegation must be taken as true for our purposes here, that their constitutional rights were violated by a policy or a custom, written or unwritten, to search every arrestee who entered the jail, regardless of the individual circumstances. Due to the single legal theory and the similar facts for each plaintiff, a class action would be superior to individual
8

actions. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). (See p. 11 of Plaintiffs’ Response). As such, Plaintiffs’ arguments in this regard are clearly incorrect. The Sixth Circuit determined that certification was proper in Eddelman because the defendants did not make “an individualized assessment of the need for each search.” As explained in Defendants’ Motion to Decertify, pursuant to Defendants’ policies, the deputy jailers were required to conduct an “individualized assessment” prior to each strip search. Plaintiffs argue the Court must blindly accept as true the allegations they have made in this case. However, even Plaintiffs’ own evidence, i.e., completed questionnaires, indicate that not all persons who were incarcerated at the Hopkins County Detention Center were strip-searched. (See 32 questionnaires provided by Plaintiffs to Defendants wherein the persons deny having been strip searched at the Jail, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”). Furthermore, Defendants’ policy as to those “inmates” returning to the jail is irrelevant. As Defendants’ expert witness has explained, the policy did not require a strip search of those “persons” returning from the jail that had been ordered released by the Court as those persons were no longer considered “inmates”. (Sabbatine depo., pp. 24-5, 30, 61-3, attached hereto as Exhibit “D”). In addition, a review of the questionnaires attached hereto as Exhibit “B”, as well as a review of the other 720 or so questionnaires, clearly show that many persons deny being strip searched upon release. (See Report prepared by Defendants indicating that only 337 of said 720 persons claim to have been strip searched upon release, attached hereto as Exhibit “E”). Finally, Defendants argued that Eddelman is inapplicable because the PLRA was not in existence at that time, requiring an individual determination as to (1) exhaustion of
9

administrative remedies; and (2) physical injury. It is Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs are incorrect in their statement that “this Court has already held that the PLRA is inapplicable to this case.” Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss this Complaint in its entirety, claiming that it is barred by the PLRA. This Court entered an Order denying Defendants’ Motion and determining that the PLRA is inapplicable to those persons that were not incarcerated at the time of the filing of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (See Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 19, 2005). Obviously, that does not mean that the PLRA is entirely inapplicable to this case. In fact, the PLRA mandates otherwise. If a potential class member was incarcerated when this suit was filed, his claim is barred by the PLRA.
To date, Defendants have received jail records from Hopkins, Union, Henderson and Webster Counties for January 9, 2003. They indicate that 63 of the 750 potential class members were incarcerated on that date. (See Exhibit “F”, attached hereto). Of course, this process is cumbersome and next to impossible. Unfortunately, there are many county records, as well as the Department of Corrections’ records, that need to be obtained to ensure that persons that are not entitled to recover an award pursuant to the PLRA do not.
Obviously, if this case was decertified, requiring these persons to file individual actions, then Defendants could conduct discovery as to each to determine their status as of January 9, 2003. Unfortunately, in the class action case of Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, the U.S. District Court in Louisville concluded that “interrogatories are improper, directed as they are to members of the class who are not named plaintiffs.” 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971). “It is not intended that members of the class should be treated
10

as if they were parties plaintiff, subject to the normal discovery procedures, because if
that were permitted, then the reason for [Rule 12(a)] would fail.” Id. As such, unless this
action is decertified, Defendants are precluded from engaging in discovery to determine
each member’s status as of the filing of the Complaint. Obviously, the Defendants in
Eddelman did not have to worry about the incarceration status of each class member, as
the PLRA had not been enacted at that time. Clearly, Eddelman is inapplicable and
should not be used by Plaintiffs to justify and/or defend certification.
2. Plaintiffs have not satisfied Commonality and Adequacy of Representation elements of Rule 23(a).
Again, Plaintiffs rely on Eddelman to support their theory that they meet the
commonality and adequacy of representation requirements because the Court in
Eddelman determined that the Plaintiffs in that case met the commonality requirement.
Defendants reiterate what has previously been argued --- the fact that the Defendants in
this case had a policy that required an “individual assessment” before a strip search could take place distinguishes Eddelman and easily defeats Plaintiffs’ commonality argument.
Before an inmate was strip searched at Hopkins County Detention Center, the deputy jailer was required to consider numerous factors.3 This key element was not present in
Eddelman Plaintiffs also argue that they meet the commonality requirement because “the
evidence adduced in discovery thus far supports --- that Defendants had a policy, custom
and practice of strip-searching persons . . . without regard to whether there existed the
3 In footnote 4, Plaintiffs state that “Defendant Lantrip has already testified that the jail did not take into account an arrestee’s criminal background in deciding whether to strip search.” This argument is made in the face of the exhibit that they attach which clearly shows that Lantrip testified that they may not have had a print out of the state’s “criminal history” at the time of booking but they had access to the Jail’s records which showed what the person had been previously arrested for in Hopkins County, as well as any previous criminal charges provided by the inmate to the booking officer upon questioning. (See Exhibit “E” to Plaintiffs’ Response, pp. 14-16).
11

requisite, individualized reasonable suspicion required by law.” However, only 10 per cent of those contacted by Plaintiffs thus far have responded to the questionnaire claiming they were strip searched. This does not mean that those persons were subject to an unlawful strip search. At least 32 so far have returned questionnaires claiming that they were not subjected to a strip search at all. (See Exhibit “C”). Furthermore, as explained in the Motion to Decertify, 247 of those questionnaires fail to state a claim on their face. In reviewing the inmate files, thus far, nearly two-thirds indicate reasonable suspicion. And finally, at least 61 of those potential class members are barred by the PLRA. So Plaintiffs’ numbers are not what they would like this Court to think. Regardless, whether there was a practice or custom of strip searching inmates at the jail is a question for the jury. In other words, the Plaintiffs should not be allowed to foreclose the Defendants from presenting evidence that a strip search did not occur as to each class member by relying on an issue that is yet to be determined by the jury.
3. Plaintiffs have not satisfied the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23.
Again, Plaintiffs rely on Eddelman to support their theory that they have met the superiority and predominance requirements. For the same reasons stated previously, Eddelman is inapplicable. If this case was to proceed to trial, this Court would be required to hold mini-trials on each and every claim. Clearly, this case has become unmanageable and Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that individual determinations will not predominate over the common issues. Furthermore, due to the unmanageability of this action, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the superiority requirement. In Eddelman because everyone was strip-searched, a fact determination as to whether the person was even strip-searched was not necessary. Clearly, this fact
12

determination is necessary in this case. 4. The authorities cited by Plaintiffs are distinguishable. Defendants have provided this Court with two cases identical to the incident case
wherein the District Judge in those cases determined that a class action was not appropriate. Bledsoe v. Combs, 2000 WL 681094 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Noon v. Sailor, 2000 WL 684274 (S.D. Ind. 2000). Plaintiffs fail to distinguish those cases but merely claim that because they are unpublished this Court should not consider them. However, as will be illustrated, Bledsoe and Noon are the only cases that Defendants and apparently even Plaintiffs can find with facts similar to those in this case.
Plaintiffs provide a string-cite of 20 cases which they claim is “the weight of federal precedent favoring the certification of strip-search class actions.” Defendants do not question that a class action is appropriate in certain strip search cases. Defendants claim that it is not appropriate when there is no across-the-board policy mandating strip searches such that individual assessments must occur. Here are Plaintiffs’ cited cases with the distinguishing characteristics:
Tardiff v. Knox County4 involved classes certified to contain only those who were searched without evaluation for individualized suspicion. Id. at 3. Importantly, the court noted that if it were necessary to conduct an individual analysis in many of the searches as to whether a defendant’s evaluation revealed reasonable suspicion for the search, such individualization of issues might compromise the feasibility of a class action, thereby leading to its doom. Id. at 5-6.
Gary v. Sheahan5 only addresses the proper procedure for a party to follow in
4 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004). 5 188 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1999).
13

order to appeal from a district court’s denial of its motion to decertify a class. McDonell v. Hunter 6 was a 23(b)(2) (not (b)(3)) class action brought by Iowa
Department of Corrections employees seeking injunctive relief from an across-the-board policy of defendants which subjected them to strip-searches, urinalysis and vehicle searches.
Bell v. Manson 7 was also a 23(b)(2) (not (b)(3)) class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief which was brought by pretrial detainees who were subjected to strip-searches after their return from court appearances pursuant to an across-the-board policy. It is important to note that 23(b)(2) class actions do not require the Plaintiffs to prove predominance and superiority.
Bynum v. District of Columbia 8 merely represents the district court’s final order of approval of settlement of a class action brought by past, present and future detainees in the District of Columbia Department of Corrections challenging the department’s policy of conducting suspicionless strip-searches of inmates declared releasable after court appearances. Bynum contains no analysis as to the propriety of class certification. However, a fair reading of that opinion indicates that the policy being challenged was one of conducting across-the-board, suspicionless strip-searches of those entitled to release.
Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 9 was a strip-search class action brought by inmates challenging the across-the-board policy of defendant to automatically stripsearch, without reasonable suspicion, all arrestees remanded to the sheriff on any warrant and all inmates returning from court appearances, including those ordered released.
6 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1986). 7590 F.2d 1224 (2nd Cir. 1978). 8 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006). 9 405 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
14

Further, the case deals exclusively with the legal analysis as to the constitutionality of the searches and does not touch upon the procedural propriety of certifying such cases as class actions.
Nilsen v. York County, 10 deals exclusively with the court’s analysis of the proper method of allocating attorney’s fees in a strip-search class action. As such, said opinion is devoid of any analysis as to the procedural propriety of maintaining said actions on a class basis.
McBean v. City of New York, 11 was a class action brought by pretrial detainees challenging an across-the-board policy of conducting strip-searches of every detainee newly admitted to its facilities. The court upheld the certification and noted that “plaintiffs in this action are unified by a common legal theory (DOC’s blanket policy subjecting all post-arraignment misdemeanor arrestees to intake strip-searches was unconstitutional) and by common facts (each was allegedly subjected to one or more strip searches in accordance with this policy).” Id. at 502. The court then addressed the superiority requirement by providing that “[a] class action is also the most efficient and superior means through which to resolve these claims, where the class size is estimated at over 55,000 individuals.” Id. at 503.
Marriott v. County of Montgomery 12 was a class action brought by detainees challenging the constitutionality of the defendants’ across-the-board “change-out” policy which required all new admittees to be strip searched. The Court determined that the only questions of fact that differed “among the members of the class relate to the extent of the search to which each individual was subjected, which would affect the amount of
10 400 F.Supp.2d 266 (D. Me. 2005). 11 228 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 12 227 F.R.D. 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
15

compensatory damages.” Id. at 173 (emphasis added). Dodge v. City of Orange 13 is an inmate strip-search class action challenging the
constitutionality of an alleged across-the-board strip-searching policy. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that “everyone was searched pursuant to a uniformly-applied policy. Implicit in that allegation is the notion that no individualized assessments were made for anyone.” Id.
Bullock v. Sheahan 14 was an inmate strip-search case brought in response to an alleged policy of defendants’ strip-searching all male inmates without reasonable suspicion prior to their release and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their constitutional rights.
Smook v. Minnehaha County 15 was a class action brought by former detainees at a county juvenile detention center challenging the constitutionality of the center’s policy of conducting strip-searches of all minors upon their admission regardless of the type of offense they were arrested for or whether there was reason to believe that the minors had weapons or contraband.
Williams v. Brown 16 was a class action but it was not brought by inmates and was not dealing with strip-searches. Rather, plaintiffs were detained by police and searched while they attended a neighborhood basketball tournament. The court declined to follow the ruling of an inmate strip-search case submitted by defendants for the reason that such a case is too dissimilar to the one at bar.
13 226 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 14 225 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 15 340 F.Supp.2d 1037 (D.S.D. 2004). 16 214 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
16

Blihovde v. St. Croix County, Wisconsin17 dealt with an across-the-board policy. Plaintiffs brought the case alleging to have been subjected to unconstitutional strip searches conducted by defendants pursuant to a policy to strip-search all arrestees at the jail without individualized suspicion. Id. at 613.
Maneely v. City of Newburgh, 18 was an inmate strip-search class action challenging the constitutionality of defendants’ policy requiring the systematic strip search of all persons being held awaiting arraignment. Defendants did not distinguish between persons charged with lesser offenses, nor did it require officers to consider whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe that a particular detainee was carrying a weapon or contraband.
Ford v. City of Boston 19 involved an express policy of the City of Boston to transfer all female arrestees who could not post bail to Suffolk County’s maximum security jail, which had a policy of subjecting all of these jail admittees, to strip and visual body cavity searches regardless of the crimes with which they are charged, or any other individual factors.
Mack v. Suffolk County 20 was another class action challenging the constitutionality of the above practices of the City of Boston and the County of Suffolk. Here, suit was brought again challenging the uniform strip-search policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department whereby City pre-arraignment detainees transferred to Suffolk County were subjected to a visual body and cavity search as a matter of course upon their admission.
17 219 F.R.D. 607 (W.D.Wis. 2003). 18 208 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 19 154 F.Supp.2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001). 20 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass. 2000).
17

Hurley v. Coughlin 21 is not relevant to this case as it involved a class of inmates, protected by a previously entered consent decree regarding strip search practices, who were attempting to obtain various forms of relief due to defendant’s failure to follow the consent decree.
Johns v. DeLeonardis22 involved a class of gypsies who brought suit against police officers who interrupted a meeting of the Chicago Gypsie Council and, without a warrant or any explanation as to their reasons, subjected all present to various searches of their persons, including strip-searches in some instances. In the course of granting plaintiffs’ motion to maintain the class, the court provided that “there can be no doubt that a common core of operative facts gave rise to common legal questions in the plaintiffs’ claims. All the alleged injury arose from a single occurrence, the raid and subsequent conduct of the defendants at the …meeting. The question of whether the raid violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs is the sole issue presented by this case.” Id. at 483.
Doe v. Calumet City, Illinois 23 involves a class action brought by female arrestees challenging the city police department’s unwritten practice of consistently imposing indiscriminate strip-searches of female arrestees. The testimony of those conducting the searches revealed that neither they, nor any other officers were required to make any reasonable suspicion determination before conducting a strip search, except in the case of male arrestees. In addition, no inquiry or analysis was conducted as to why the facts of this case rendered it proper for class certification.
21 158 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 22 145 F.R.D. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 23 754 F.Supp. 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
18

Smith v. Montgomery County, Maryland 24 was a class action brought to challenge the constitutionality of defendants’ indiscriminate, across-the-board stripsearch policy.
Hodges v. Klein 25 was a 23(b)(2) (rather than 23(b)(3)) class action in which a class of inmates requested the Court to enjoin the Defendant from conducting anal examinations of certain inmates. It is distinguishable because it is a 23(b)(2) case, which does not require predominance and superiority. Furthermore, there exists no discussion or analysis as to the procedural propriety of this issue being determined on a class basis.
Clearly, Plaintiffs have failed to bring forth even one case that is similar to this action to support their theory that a class action should be maintained. In contrast, Defendants have presented this Court with two nearly identical cases (albeit unpublished) wherein the Court determined that class actions were not appropriate. Defendants are clearly entitled to decertification.
D. Plaintiffs’ are not entitled to an irrebuttable presumption that all persons incarcerated at the Hopkins County Detention Center were subjected to a strip search.
Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants cannot credibly refute Plaintiffs’ claims that the Jail had a practice of strip-searching persons on admission to or just prior to their release from the Jail without reasonable suspicion.” First, as explained previously, even Plaintiffs’ own evidence indicates that 32 persons, at this time, deny having been strip searched at all, much less without reasonable suspicion.
Second, Defendants offer an Affidavit of Donald Corum to rebut Plaintiffs’ argument that this Court should assume that everyone that was contacted by Plaintiffs
24 573 F.Supp. 604 (D.Md. 1983). 25 412 F.Supp. 896 (D. N.J. 1976).
19

(approximately 7,000) were strip searched. (See Affidavit of Donald Corum, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”). Donald Corum has received two notices and questionnaires concerning this suit. The most recent notice and questionnaire were received last week and are attached to Mr. Corum’s Affidavit. After he received this second notice and questionnaire, Mr. Corum contacted the Defendants questioning why he was receiving said notice since he was not strip searched at the Jail during his incarceration. He has not returned the questionnaire to Plaintiffs’ counsel telling them that he was not strip searched because he “doesn’t want any part of this case.” (Id.). The question is: How many more people have been contacted by the Plaintiffs but have not responded merely because the “don’t want any part of this case.”? The point is: The Jail clearly did not strip search everyone that was incarcerated at the Jail.
Third, as shown by example in Defendants’ Motion to Decertify, many of those who claim to have been strip searched were done so with reasonable suspicion. And if the percentages play out, nearly two-thirds of those that claim to have been strip searched can be rebutted with evidence in the Jail’s files (that does not include those that may be rebutted by looking at the person’s criminal file or speaking with the deputy jailer who may have an independent memory).
Finally, the Defendants ask this Court to consider Plaintiffs’ letter that accompanied the questionnaire received by Mr. Corum.26 It is on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s letterhead, rather than in the format approved by this Court. In addition, the courtapproved language has been changed. Of significance is the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel changed the definition of a strip search. In the letter, a strip search is defined as “a search in which you were required to remove all or part of your clothing by a jail
26 Defendants only learned last week of this letter, sent by Plaintiffs’ counsel without leave of Court.
20

officer so that he/she could conduct a visual examination of all or part of your body.” Obviously, this is not the legal definition for a strip search. Under this definition, merely showing your leg or arm would be a strip search. The Court-approved definition of strip search is contained on the questionnaire, which provides that “the term ‘strip-search,’ as used in the question above, means that you were required by the jail to remove all or part of your clothing so that men’s buttocks or genitalia, or women’s buttocks, genitalia or breasts, were visible to one or more jail employees.” So how many of those persons responding to Plaintiffs’ letter and completing the questionnaire are under the impression that they were “strip searched” as that term is defined in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s letter? In fact, Mr. Corum states in his Affidavit that he believes the letter was “misleading”. Clearly, this does nothing but bolster Defendants’ claim that each of these people should be subjected to discovery and that Defendants should be allowed to bring forth evidence that each one of these people were not strip searched, i.e., resulting in this case having become unmanageable.
Plaintiffs go on to argue that Defendants should be precluded from bringing forth this evidence because they failed to keep records of strip-searches as is required by 501 KAR 3:120 and the Jail’s policy. The cases cited by Plaintiffs involved the Defendant’s failure to retain existing records, not defendant’s failure to create a record. There has been no spoliation of evidence in this case because the allegedly spoiliated evidence never existed. Moreover, as explained previously, beginning on and since July 1, 2003, Defendants have kept records of all persons strip-searched at the Hopkins County Detention Center. Since that date, the deputy jailers have maintained records of the names of all inmates that have been strip-searched, the reason for strip search, the date of
21

strip search, and the name of the strip searching officer. Plaintiffs have copies of these reports in their possession. So Defendants are not in violation of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations, nor their policies, as Plaintiffs allege, and therefore would not be subject to a jury instruction pursuant to the doctrine of spoliation.
As such, Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants should be prevented from presenting evidence that persons were not strip searched is without merit. Not only will Defendants be able to present testimony of the booking officers, they will also be able to present the Jail’s records that fail to show a strip search, or if the record indicates a strip search, said records will set forth the reasonable suspicion for said search. Regardless, this will require a trial on the merits as to each persons’ unlawful strip search claim, again resulting in a lack of commonality, superiority, predominance, and manageability.
E. The practical considerations of this Motion do not mandate certification. In the last section of their Response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants cannot afford the litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual actions. Defendants’ Motion for Decertification and Reply should make it clear to this Court that if this action is decertified, it is doubtful that there will be 750 claims since many of those fail to even state a claim on their face. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel will be governed by Fed. R. Civ. R. 11, requiring them to conduct some sort of investigation before the claims are filed, which will likely result in far fewer cases than Plaintiffs predict, since Defendants’ counsel’s investigation of these claims show reasonable suspicion in two-thirds of those cases reviewed.27
27 One has to assume that such is the case in nearly all class actions because every case reviewed by Defendants’ counsel shows the defendants opposing certification and the plaintiffs requesting it. If it is as Plaintiffs’ suggest, i.e., that individual actions will cost the Defendants more than a class action, then the defendants should always want class certification, with plaintiffs opposing it. In other words, Defendants
22

If this action is decertified, this Court’s job will be much easier as it is hoped that only credible claims will be brought forth following decertification. Furthermore, Defendants will be allowed to engage in discovery as to each of those “credible” claims, for purposes of gathering evidence of reasonable suspicion and evidence to support PLRA defenses. Thereafter, Defendants would be entitled to file Motions for Summary Judgment, many of which will be granted, resulting in far fewer trials. Finally, those cases surviving summary judgment could be consolidated by this Court, if necessary, preventing hundreds of individual trials, as Plaintiffs claim.
At present, Plaintiffs claim approximately 720 unlawful strip searches, many of which are not even credible on their face; Defendants are prohibited from engaging in discovery as to these claims, resulting in less credible summary judgment motions (assuming one can even be filed against class members as opposed to parties). Furthermore, in order to protect Defendants’ due process rights, if not decertified, this Court must allow Defendants an opportunity to bring forth evidence as to each claim, resulting in jury trials as to all class members. As such, Defendants’ argument makes sense both procedurally and economically.
WHEREFORE, defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his individual and official capacities, request that their Motion to Decertify by granted.
do not buy Plaintiffs’ argument that they merely oppose this Motion to protect Defendants’ financial condition.
23

Respectfully submitted,
DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929 Phone 270-443-8253 Fax 270-442-6000
By: s/Stacey A. Blankenship Stacey A. Blankenship
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 28, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
R. MICHAEL SULLIVAN ALLEN W. HOLBROOK SULLIVAN MOUNTJOY STAINBACK & MILLER P O BOX 727 100 ST ANN STREET OWENSBORO KY 42302-0727 Attorney for Defendants
HON BART L GREENWALD HON JAMES R CRAIG FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 WEST MARKET STREET 32ND FLOOR LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
HON GREGORY A BELZLEY DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 WEST JEFFERSON STREET LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
24

HON JOHN T SOYARS FOSTER SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 EAST 14TH STREET P O BOX 24 HOPKINSVILLE KY 42240 Attorney for Defendants on this 28 day of April, 2006 By _s/Stacey A. Blankenship_____
Stacey A. Blankenship
25

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

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EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD AND TIMOTHY D. MAY INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY
AND
JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKlNS COUNTY, KENTUCKY
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

I. Introduction 1. Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner, Plaintiffs, file this action in their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail ("Jail"), after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband ("the Release Class"). This class of individuals includes individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail after they were ordered released on their own recognizance; individuals who were strip searched just prior to release from the Jail after they were ordered released on bond and subsequent to posting of bond; and individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail for any other reason without reasonable grounds for believing that they were concealing weapons

or contraband. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated from January 9, 2002 to the present.
2. Linda Joyce Ford and Timothy D. May file this action in their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated from January 9, 2002 to the present.
3. Such searches have been and continue to be regularly conducted by Defendants and there are hundreds of members of each subclass. There are questions of law and fact in this case that are common to all members of each subclass. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of their respective subclass, and they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of such subclasses.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue 4. Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, seek actual and punitive damages from Defendants under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for gross and unconscionable violations of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.c. §§1331 and 1343. Plaintiffs and the other members of their class also seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages under the pendent jurisdiction of this Court for negligence, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As Hopkins County, Kentucky, is the residence of all

defendant parties to this action and the location of all acts pertinent to this suit, venue is proper in this Court.
III. Class Action 5. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are two subclasses before the Court. The first subclass consists of all individuals arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. 6. The second subclass consists of all persons who were required by Defendants in the Jail, just after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. 7. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all class members. They are members of the subclasses and their claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs are offended at the treatment accorded them and the class members and will aggressively pursue the interests of the entire class. Plaintiffs' interest in obtaining injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages for the violations of their constitutional rights and privileges are consistent with and not antagonistic of those of any other person within their subclass. 8. Given the circumstances of their search, as detailed below, Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that Defendants regularly require all persons arrested for nonviolent minor offenses to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies on admission to the jail and all inmates after their return from Court appearances and prior to their release from

the Hopkins County Jail, even though (a) there exists no reasonable grounds for believing that weapons or contraband have been concealed upon their persons and (b) such persons have been ordered released on their own recognizance. Such searches violate the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and the clearly established law of this circuit, as set forth in Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 977, 110 S.Ct. 503 (1989). The only question that remains to be resolved is whether Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, or to an award of compensatory and punitive damages and, if so, the extent of such an award.
9. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjUdication of this controversy because:
(a) A multiplicity of suits with consequent burden on the courts and Defendants should be avoided.
(b) It would be virtually impossible for all class members to intervene as parties-plaintiff in this action.
(c) Upon adjUdication of Defendants' liability, claims of the class members can be determined by this Court. IV. Parties
10. Plaintiffs are residents of various counties within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
11. Defendant Hopkins County, at all times mentioned herein, employed, was responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom for, and was responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail.

12. Defendant Jim Lantrip is Jailer of Hopkins County, and as such established policies formally or by custom for, and was responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail.
V. Nature of Defendants' Conduct 13. Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with one another, engaged in the conduct described below under color of the law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins. The offenses described below resulted from the failure of the state and county agencies and individuals to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Defendants' conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, or indicated active malice toward Plaintiffs and the class or at least a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to their constitutional and common law rights, justifying an award of punitive damages in addition to the actual damages which Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to recover.
VI. Facts 14. On June 28, 2002, Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester Turner were arrested for a violation ofKRS 222.202 (alcohol intoxication), a misdemeanor offense, and were taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Because their offense, their background and their behavior did not generate any suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband on their persons, Plaintiffs were not strip-searched upon admission to the Hopkins County Jail. Plaintiffs were subsequently taken to Court where they were ordered released on their own recognizance. Instead of being released immediately, Plaintiffs were taken back to the Hopkins County Jail

" ,
and, pnor to their release, were strip-searched, apparently because of the requirements of Paragraph 1 (c) of the written policy of the Hopkins County Jail, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
15. Plaintiff Linda Joyce Ford was arrested in September, 2002 for writing a bad check., a violation of KRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense, and was taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Plaintiff was taken into a room where she was told to take off her clothes, squat on the floor and cough. Then she was forced to tum around, bend over, spread her buttocks and cough. Plaintiff Timothy D. May was subjected to similar treatment. On October 9, 2002, Timothy May was arrested for speeding ten miles over the speed limit, opearating on a suspended license and for failure to pay a ticket. He was taken to the Hopkins County Jail, where he was told take off all of his clothes, lift his genitals, tum around, bend over, and spread his buttocks.
VII. The Law and Defendants' Policy 16. In 1979, the United States Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee has the right not to be searched unless the reasonableness of such a search is established by "balancing ... the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." Bell v. Wolfish supra at 559 (emphasis added). On April 18, 1989, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Masters v. Crouch, supra, in which it held:
It was clearly established on October 21, 1986, ... that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be SUbjected to a strip-search unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the particular person might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. !d. at 1257. In this case, Plaintiffs were arrested for nonviolent minor offenses. Neither their behavior nor their background gave Defendants any reasonable grounds for believing that they might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. Under such circumstances,

--------------------------
Defendants' requirement that Plaintiffs - on admission, and after they had been ordered released -- expose the most private part of their physical persons for a visual inspection was unconscionable, was an illegal strip-search by any definition, and was a flagrant violation of the balancing requirement of Bell v. Wolfish, supra.
VIII. Causes of Action A. Count I
17. Paragraph 1-16 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 17.
18. Plaintiffs' searches, described above, were part of a continuing pattern of misconduct and is the result of statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs and practices of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins County, either written or unwritten, that are systematically applied whenever an arrestee is admitted to or released from the Hopkins County Jail. Such practices constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and evince a total, intentional and unreasonable disregard for the constitutional and common law rights of the citizens of Kentucky, including Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and the wholesale violations of those rights likely to result from the systematic pursuit of such practices.
19. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and their classes, through Defendants' intentional or grossly negligent conduct, were deprived without due process of law of the following rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United States in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(a) Their right to be secure in their person against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;

1

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(b) Their right to privacy in their person against unreasonable intrusions under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(c) Their right to the equal protection of the law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(d) Their right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
20. Moreover, given the pre-existing law that clearly prohibited Defendants' conduct, Defendants' searches of Plaintiffs and the members of their subclass were intentional, wanton and malicious, and were indicative of Defendants' total and reckless disregard of, indifference to the rights of, and risk of harm to, Plaintiffs and the other members of the class.
B. Count II 2l. Paragraphs 1-20 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 21. 22. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants, without justification, negligently or intentionally inflicted upon Plaintiffs and the subclasses severe mental and emotional distress.
C. Count III 23. Paragraphs 1-22 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 23. 24. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants were negligent, and grossly negligent, all to the damage of Plaintiffs and the subclasses.
IX. Damages 25. Paragraphs 1-24 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 25. 26. Plaintiffs and the members ofthe classes were unjustifiably and unconstitutionally searched in a manner that generated tremendous and overwhelming embarrassment, humiliation

" ,

•

•

and mental and emotional distress. As a result, they have suffered, and are entitled to recover, actual damages. Furthermore, Defendants' violations of the constitutional and common law rights of Plaintiffs and the classes were cruel, malicious, and evinced a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to those rights, entitling Plaintiffs and the class to recover punitive damages from Defendants in order to deter such conduct in the future.
X. Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction 27. Paragraphs 1-26 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 27. 28. In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the class request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment deeming unconstitutional any and all statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs or practices under which they were forced to expose their genitalia for visual inspection, and further request that this Court permanently enjoin Defendants from following or enforcing such statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs or usages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the subclasses they represent request (a) that this action proceed as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and (b) a trial by jury, and further request that they and all members ofthe class (c) be awarded actual and punitive damages, (d) be granted the declaratory and injunctive relief requested herein, and (e) be awarded their costs, attorneys' fees, pre and post judgment interest and all other relief to which they are entitled under law or in equity.

•
Respectfully Submitted, DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
az 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 540-2300 (Telephone) (502) 585-2207 (Facsimile) and FROST BROWN TODD LLC
cliens? James R. Craig 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile)
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 426943v.l

 
 - - ----------------------------------

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. NELSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY
AND
JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT I. Introduction
1. Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert Teague, and Tabitha Nance file this action individually and on behalf of all persons subjected to unconstitutional strip-searches on admission and/or release from the Hopkins County Jail from January 9, 2002, to the present.
2. Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, and Tabitha Nance file this action in their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail ("Jail"), after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so ("the Release Class"). This class of

------------------------------------------ -
individuals includes individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail after they were ordered released on their own recognizance; individuals who were strip searched just prior to release from the Jail after they were ordered released on bond and subsequent to posting of bond; and individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail for any other reason without reasonable grounds for doing so. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated from January 9,2002 to the present.
3. Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, and Tabitha Nance file this action in their individual capacity and on behalf of all persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. This subclass of people includes all individuals who were so treated from January 9,2002 to the present.
4. Such searches have been and continue to be regularly conducted by Defendants and there are hundreds of members of each subclass. There are questions of law and fact in this case that are common to all members of each subclass. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of their respective subclass, and they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of such subclasses.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue 5. Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, seek actual and punitive damages from Defendants under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.c. § 1983, for gross and unconscionable violations of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, this

Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.c. §§1331 and 1343. Plaintiffs and the other members of their class also seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages under the pendent jurisdiction of this Court for negligence, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As Hopkins County, Kentucky, is the residence of all defendant parties to this action and the location of all acts pertinent to this suit, venue is proper in this Court.
III. Class Action 6. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(l), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are two subclasses before the Court. 7. The first subclass consists of all individuals arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. 8. The second subclass consists of all persons who were required by Defendants in the Jail, just after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so. 9. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all class members. They are members of the subclasses and their claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs are offended at the treatment accorded them and the class members and will aggressively pursue the interests of the entire class. Plaintiffs' interest in obtaining injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages for the violations of their constitutional rights and privileges are consistent with and not antagonistic of those of any other person within their subclass.

10. Given the circumstances of their search, as detailed below, Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that Defendants regularly require all persons arrested for nonviolent minor offenses to remove their clothing for a visual inspection of their bodies on admission to the jail and all inmates after their return from Court appearances and prior to their release from the Hopkins County Jail, even though (a) there exists no reasonable grounds for doing so, and (b) such persons have been ordered released. Such searches violate the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and the clearly established law of this circuit, as set forth in Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 977, 110 S.Ct. 503 (1989). The only question that remains to be resolved is whether Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, or to an award of compensatory and punitive damages and, if so, the extent of such an award.
11. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because:
(a) A multiplicity of suits with consequent burden on the courts and Defendants should be avoided.
(b) It would be virtually impossible for all class members to intervene as parties-plaintiff in this action.
(c) Upon adjudication of Defendants' liability, claims of the class members can be determined by this Court. IV. Parties
12. Plaintiffs are residents of various counties within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
13. Defendant Hopkins County, at all times mentioned herein, employed, was responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom for, and was

responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail.
14. Defendant Jim Lantrip is Jailer of Hopkins County, and as such established policies formally or by custom for, and was responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, the officers and employees of the Hopkins County Jail.
V. Nature of Defendants' Conduct 15. Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with one another, engaged in the conduct described below under color of the law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins County. The offenses described below resulted from the failure of the state and county agencies and individuals to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures either formally or by custom to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Defendants' conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, or indicated active malice toward Plaintiffs and the class or at least a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to their constitutional and common law rights, justifying an award of punitive damages in addition to the actual damages which Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to recover.
VI. Facts 16. On June 28, 2002, Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester Turner were arrested for a violation of KRS 222.202 (alcohol intoxication), a misdemeanor offense, and were taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Because their offense, their background and their behavior did not generate any suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband on their persons, Sutton and Turner were not strip-searched upon admission to the Hopkins County Jail.

They were subsequently taken to Court where they were ordered released on their own recognizance. Instead of being released immediately, Sutton and Turner were returned to the Hopkins County Jail and, prior to their release, were strip-searched, apparently because of the requirements of Paragraph 1 (c) of the written policy of the Hopkins County Jail, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
17. Plaintiff Linda Joyce Ford was arrested in September, 2002, for writing a bad check, a violation of KRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense, and was taken to the Hopkins County Jail. Upon entry to the Jail, Ford was taken into a room where she was required to take off her clothes, squat on the floor and cough. She was then forced to turn around, bend over, spread her buttocks and cough.
18. On October 9, 2002, Timothy May was arrested for speeding ten miles over the speed limit, operating on a suspended license and for failure to pay a ticket. Each of these offenses are a misdemeanor. On entry to the Hopkins County Jail, May was forced to take off all of his clothes, lift his genitals, tum around, bend over, and spread his buttocks.
19. Plaintiff Ladonia Nelson was subject to an unconstitutional strip search on four occasions. In February, 2002, she was arrested for writing a bad check, a violation of KRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense. She was six months pregnant. She was forced to remove her clothing on a number of occasions, squat, spread her buttocks, and cough. These searches occurred upon entry to the jail and immediately prior to her release. In May, 2002, she was arrested for failure to pay the fine for her violation of KRS 514.040. She was subjected to the same treatment. Nelson was nine months pregnant when forced to submit to the second two searches.

20. Plaintiff Robin Littlepage was arrested in August, 2002, for charges related to failure to make an appearance. Upon entry to the Jail, Hopkins County officers forced her to remove her clothing, lift her breasts, squat for an inspection, and cough. Immediately prior to her release, Littlepage was forced to remove her clothing in the presence of a Hopkins County officer.
21. Plaintiff Robert Teague was arrested in January, 2003, for writing a bad check, a violation of KRS 514.040, a misdemeanor offense. Upon entry to the Jail, Teague was forced to submit to a physical inspection of his body by removing his clothes and spreading his buttocks. Immediately prior to his release, he was forced to remove his clothing in front of a Hopkins County officer.
22. Plaintiff Tabitha Nance was arrested in May, June, and October, 2003, for theft by deception for writing a bad check. On each occasion, Nance was subjected to an unconstitutional strip search at the Hopkins County Jail upon entry and release. On several occasions in November, 2003, Nance, a female, was forced to submit to an unconstitutional strip search by a male guard.
VII. The Law and Defendants' Policy 23. In 1979, the United States Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee has the right not to be searched unless the reasonableness of such a search is established by "balancing ... the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, supra at 559 (emphasis added). On April 18, 1989, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Masters v. Crouch, supra, in which it held:
It was clearly established on October 21, 1986, ... that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be subjected to a strip-search unless there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the particular person might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. Id. at 1257. In this case, Plaintiffs were arrested for nonviolent minor offenses. Neither their behavior nor their background gave Defendants any reasonable grounds for believing that they might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. Under such circumstances, Defendants' requirement that Plaintiffs - on admission, and after they had been ordered released -- expose the most private part of their physical persons for a visual inspection was unconscionable, was an illegal strip-search by any definition, and was a flagrant violation of the balancing requirement of Bell v. Wolfish, supra.
VIII. Causes of Action A. CountI
24. Paragraph 1-23 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 24.
25. Plaintiffs' searches, described above, were part of a continuing pattern of misconduct and is the result of statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs and practices of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Hopkins County, either written or unwritten, that are systematically applied whenever an arrestee is admitted to or released from the Hopkins County Jail. Such practices constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and evince a total, intentional and unreasonable disregard for the constitutional and common law rights of the citizens of Kentucky, including Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and the wholesale violations of those rights likely to result from the systematic pursuit of such practices.
26. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and their subclasses, through Defendants' intentional or grossly negligent conduct, were deprived without due process of law of the

following rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United
States in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(a) Their right to be secure in their person against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(b) Their right to privacy in their person against unreasonable intrusions under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(c) Their right to the equal protection of the law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(d) Their right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
27. Moreover, given the pre-existing law that clearly prohibited Defendants' conduct,
Defendants' searches of Plaintiffs and the members of their subclass were intentional, wanton
and malicious, and were indicative of Defendants' total and reckless disregard of, indifference to
the rights of, and risk of harm to, Plaintiffs and the other members of the class. B. Count II
28. Paragraphs 1-27 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this
Paragraph 28. 29. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants, without justification, negligently or
intentionally inflicted upon Plaintiffs and the subclasses severe mental and emotional distress.
C. Count III 30. Paragraphs 1-29 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 30.
31. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants were negligent, and grossly negligent, all to the damage of Plaintiffs and the subclasses.
IX. Damages

32. Paragraphs 1-31 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 32.
33. Plaintiffs and the members of the classes were unjustifiably and unconstitutionally searched in a manner that generated tremendous and overwhelming embarrassment, humiliation and mental and emotional distress. As a result, they have suffered, and are entitled to recover, actual damages. Furthermore, Defendants' violations of the constitutional and common law rights of Plaintiffs and the classes were cruel, malicious, and evinced a total and reckless disregard for and indifference to those rights, entitling Plaintiffs and the class to recover punitive damages from Defendants in order to deter such conduct in the future.
x. Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction
34. Paragraphs 1-33 above are incorporated herein by reference and made this Paragraph 34.
35. In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the subclasses request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment deeming unconstitutional any and all statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs or practices under which they were forced to expose their genitalia for visual inspection, and further request that this Court permanently enjoin Defendants from following or enforcing such statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, procedures, customs or usages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the subclasses they represent request (a) that this action proceed as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and (b) a trial by jury, and further request that they and all members of the class (c) be awarded actual and punitive damages, (d) be granted the declaratory and injunctive relief requested herein, and (e) be awarded their costs, attorneys' fees,

pre and post judgment interest and all other relief to which they are entitled under law or in
equity.
Respectfully Submitted,
DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
a Greg4ory~AL ~~zl,ey{6j4fJ (JRfj
1400 PNC Plaza 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 540-2300 (Telephone) (502) 585-2207 (Facsimile)
and
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
@nVJames R. Craig 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 6th day of June, 2005, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was
served by u.s. Mail, postage prepaid, on:
John T. Soyars FOSTER, SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 East 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42240
LOULibrary 0102019.0509083 453072v.l

 
 79707
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIFFS

v.

MOTION FOR REMEDIAL MEASURES

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

DEFENDANTS

Come the Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his

individual and official capacities (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through the

undersigned counsel, and for their Motion for Remedial Measures hereby state as

follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This motion is brought in response to a supplementary notice of class action and

accompanying questionnaire which was sent by Plaintiffs’ counsel and received by

numerous persons, including Donald Corum and Teri Matheny. (Letter attached hereto

as Exhibit “A”; Affidavits of Corum and Matheny, attached hereto as Exhibits “B” and

“C”, respectively). This notice, which was in the form of a letter on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

letterhead (hereinafter the “letter”), was sent on April 14, 2006. Said letter was not

disclosed to Defendants nor approved by this Court.

In this letter, Plaintiffs’ counsel explains the nature of the action and subclasses

1

involved, notes that the recipient did not respond to a previous notice and again invites the recipient to join the class. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel fabricated a new definition for the term “strip-search” which is certain to mislead many recipients to believe that they have a claim when they truly do not.
Despite this Court’s official sanctioning of the definition of the term “stripsearch” for purposes of this action, and without the support of any judicial precedent, Plaintiffs’ counsel elected to redefine a “strip-search” as “a search in which you were required to remove all or part of your clothing by a jail officer so that he/she could conduct a visual examination of all or part of your body.” This letter was clearly a misleading attempt to entice prospective class members to join the action even though they had not truly been strip-searched at the Hopkins County jail.
Such conduct is potentially an ethical violation and is certainly a violation of the spirit and express language of Rule 23. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to remedial measures at the expense of Plaintiffs’ counsel and an order prohibiting further contact between Plaintiffs’ counsel and prospective class members without prior Court approval.
II. DISCUSSION A. THE PRESENT SOLICITATION LETTER PREJUDICES THE
ENTIRE ACTION BY TAINTING THE MINDS OF PROSPECTIVE CLASS MEMBERS AND PREVENTING THEIR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION. “Courts are concerned during the period after certification but before the expiration of the exclusion period with the possibility of solicitation or champerty by the attorneys for the class representative…” 5 Newberg on Class Actions § 15:15 (Thompson/West 2006)(internal citations omitted). An illustration of the reasons for such concern can be found in Impervious Paint
2

Industries, Inc. v. Ashland Oil.1 Although the court in Impervious was adjudicating the propriety of contacts initiated by a defendant, the court did set forth rules governing plaintiffs’ counsels relating to contact with potential class members. Regarding the time between the institution of the class action and the close of the exclusion period, the court provided that “for the purposes of the obligation to avoid unethical solicitation, class counsel must treat the class members as non-clients.” Id. at 722. Accordingly, the court held that “it would also appear that contact initiated by class counsel prior to the close of the opt-out period would be unethical as direct solicitation of clients, if the purpose or predictable effect of the contact is to discourage a decision to opt out of the class.” Id.
The court spoke to the rationale for the above holding when it recognized that “[i]t is essential that the class members’ decision to participate or to withdraw be made on the basis of independent analysis of its own self-interest. It is the responsibility of the Court as a neutral arbiter, and of the attorneys in their adversary capacity, to insure this type of free and unfettered decision.” Id. at 723. The court further noted that “[t]he mechanism selected for accomplishing this is the class notice, which is designed to present the relevant facts in an unbiased format.” Id.
It is without question that the potential class members so contacted have had their decision making process tainted by the persuasive and biased nature of the letter. The letter is clearly in contravention to the spirit of Rule 23(b)(3) which requires that potential class members make their decision to participate based upon an independent analysis of their own self interest. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct has clearly prejudiced Defendants in that it renders a free and unfettered decision as to the participation of putative class
1 508 F.Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
3

members all but impossible. B. THE SOLICITATION LETTER VIOLATES NOT ONLY THE
SPIRIT OF RULE 23(b)(3) BUT ALSO THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF RULE 23 REGARDING THE DISSEMINATION OF NOTICE. Fed. R. Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B) provides that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” (emphasis added). Leading authorities in the field recognize the mandatory nature of the courts obligation by noting that “Rule 23 makes clear that the district court has a key role in the provision of notice, mandating that the court shall direct the appropriate notice to members of the class.” McLaughlin on Class Actions at 5408.(emphasis in original). “The district court has an affirmative obligation in its capacity as fiduciary for absent class members to review the proposed notice to ensure that it meets the requirements of due process.” Id. at 5-409; citing Schisler v. Hecker, 787 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1986)(“[T]he district court should examine that notice, and fashion its own more effective notice, if necessary.”); Macarz v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 54, 57 (D. Conn. 2001)(“The Court bears the responsibility of directing the best notice practicable to class members and safeguarding them from unauthorized, misleading communications from the parties or their counsel.”). Clearly, it is this Court’s place to orchestrate the class notice in such a way as to comport with the requirements of due process and to guard against abuse of the class action by the parties or their counsels by engaging in unauthorized and misleading communications. Needless to say, Plaintiffs’ counsel has usurped this Court’s function
4

by sending the most recent letter. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel has called into question his ability to adequately represent the class by engaging in the very behavior that this Court is responsible for guarding against. Such behavior is prejudicial to not only the Defendants, but to the entire action. Accordingly, curative measures are required. C. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO CURATIVE MEASURES AT
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL’S EXPENSE. The Manual for Complex Litigation provides that “[i]f class members have received communications containing misinformation or misrepresentations, a curative notice from the court, at the expense of those at fault, may be appropriate.” Id. As to the nature of some other curative measures, the Manual suggests “extending deadlines for opting out, intervening or responding to a proposed settlement, or voiding improperly solicited opt outs.” Other sanctions, such as disclosure of information gained in violation of the attorney-client relationship, contempt and fines, assessment of fees, or in an egregious situation, the replacement of counsel or of a class representative, may be justified.” Id. This Court is now faced with the challenge of setting right the frame of mind of potential class members and of dispelling the self-serving misrepresentations contained in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s solicitation letter. Defendants opine that the prejudice caused can be satisfactorily remedied by a curative notice sent at Plaintiffs’ counsel’s expense to those persons who have responded to the April, 2006 notice and letter (apparently 200 or so thus far according to Plaintiffs’ counsel). Additionally, Defendants request that this Court prohibit any further contact with potential class members by Plaintiffs’ counsel without prior court approval. Furthermore, in light of the prejudice caused to Defendants by Plaintiffs’
5

counsel’s actions, Defendants request that this Court order Plaintiffs’ counsel to produce to Defendants all other of the same or similar letters sent to potential class members, as well as any and all records of any kind which relate to other communications, or attempted communications, by Plaintiffs’ counsel of potential class members, including
2
any responses received from said class members. The propriety of the relief sought by Defendants is supported by the holdings of
3
Gulf Oil Company v. Bernard, which provides that an order limiting communications between parties and potential class member is not an unconstitutional prior restraint when such order is carefully drawn to limit speech as little as possible and is based upon a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties. However, what makes the injunctive relief sought all the more proper is the fact that it will not act as a prior restraint on speech at all because it is a measure taken in response to improper contacts which have already occurred. See Meek, 620 N.E.2d at 986.
The argument that the cost of this Court’s curative measures must be borne by Plaintiffs’ counsel is supported by the fact that such conduct is in violation of the ethics rules. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(7.01)(1) provides that “ “[a]dvertise” or “advertisement” means to furnish any information or communication containing a lawyer’s name or other identifying information…” with the exception of a list of communications enumerated as (a) through (i), none of which apply to the letter by Plaintiffs’ counsel. This letter is clearly an attempt to solicit professional employment and constitutes an advertisement. As such, the letter is governed by SCR 7.
2 This information is simultaneously sought from Plaintiffs via discovery request. 3 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
6

SCR 3.130(7.07) provides that “[f]or any advertisement on which an advisory

opinion has not been sought, the Commission, or its designee, shall review such filings

for compliance with the Advertising Rules and Advertising Regulations.” It is assumed

that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not submit the present solicitation letter for review by the

Attorneys’ Advertising Commission, its designee or any other person or entity.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct is in violation of SCR 3.130(7.07).

The solicitation further runs afoul of SCR 3.130(7.09)(3) which requires that the

communication contain the words “THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT” in all capital

letters. Such disclosure is to be contained on the “envelope, document or electronic

devise in which such communication is transmitted.”

WHEREFORE, for the forgoing reasons, defendants herein, Hopkins County,

Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his individual and official capacities, hereby respectfully

request the following relief:

a. That, at the expense of Plaintiffs’ counsel, this Court forward an

official notice to all potential class members who have sent a questionnaire to Plaintiffs’

counsel since April 14, 2006, instructing them as to the true legal definition of a strip-

search and other principles to consider in making their determination to participate in the

action; and

b. A Court order prohibiting upon further contact of potential class

members by Plaintiffs’ counsel without prior court approval; and

c.

A Court order requiring Plaintiffs’ counsel to produce to

Defendants all responses received from said class members since April 14, 2006.

7

Respectfully submitted, DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929 Phone 270-443-8253 Fax 270-442-6000 By: s/ Stacey Blankenship
Stacey A. Blankenship ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on June 15th, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
R. MICHAEL SULLIVAN ALLEN W. HOLBROOK SULLIVAN MOUNTJOY STAINBACK & MILLER P O BOX 727 100 ST ANN STREET OWENSBORO KY 42302-0727 Attorney for Defendants HON BART L GREENWALD HON JAMES R CRAIG FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 WEST MARKET STREET 32ND FLOOR LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
8

I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
HON GREGORY A BELZLEY DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 WEST JEFFERSON STREET LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs HON JOHN T SOYARS FOSTER SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 EAST 14TH STREET P O BOX 24 HOPKINSVILLE KY 42240 Attorney for Defendants on this 15th day of June, 2006 By s/ Stacey Blankenship
Stacey A. Blankenship
9

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO

S=ILED
JEFFREY A. APPERSON, CLERK
JUL 11 2008
U.S. lJiv i t'(.ll.,; I COURT WEST'N. OIST. KENTUCKY

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et al., Plaintiffs
vs. HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03CV-3-M ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
May it please the Court: For more than two decades, the Sixth Circuit and courts across the country have
consistently held that pretrial detainees arrested for non-violent, non-drug-related misdemeanor offenses may not be strip searched upon admission to a detention facility without individualized reasonable suspicion that the particular detainee is hiding weapons or contraband. In complete disregard for this firmly established constitutional standard, the Defendants admit that the Hopkins County Jail (the "Jail") employs a blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees including all non-violent, non-drug-related misdemeanor offenders - who are transferred to the Jail from another facility, without making any individualized determination whether there is reasonable suspicion that any particular transferee is concealing contraband or weapons. This policy, on its face, plainly violates the Fourth Amendment. The Plaintiff Class, therefore, is entitled to a partial summary judgment finding that the Jail's policy is unconstitutional, and that

any class member searched pursuant to the Jail's policy has been subjected to an illegal search in violation of the class member's constitutional rights.
Moreover, preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to cease the pattern and practice of illegal strip searches that is currently ongoing at the Hopkins County Jail. Every day, individuals admitted to the Jail following an institutional transfer are subjected to unconstitutional strip searches that are not warranted by any individualized reasonable suspicion. The harm caused by these constitutional violations is irreparable. Preliminary injunctive relief is therefore necessary to cease these constitutional violations pending a full adjudication of the merits and entry of appropriate permanent injunctive relief.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY This is a class action lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, which was originally filed by Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner "in their individual capacities and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for believing they were concealing weapons or contraband." [Complaint ~ 1.] The Plaintiffs' class action complaint alleged that "such searches have been and continue to be regularly conducted by Defendants and there are potentially hundreds of members of the subject class." [Jd.] On March 16, 2005, the Court entered an Agreed Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. [3/16/05 Class Cert. Order.] The Court's Order certified two subclasses - the "Admissions Class" and the "Release Class" - defined as follows: a. All persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail ("Jail"), after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection.... [the "Release Class"]
2

[b.] All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. [the "Admissions Class"] [3/16/05 Class Cert. Order ~~ 2-3.] Each of these classes includes all persons who were so treated from January 9, 2002, to the present. [Id. ~ 4.] The Named Class Representatives of the Admissions Class are Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance, Daniel Todd and Tony Ward. [Third Am. Compl. ~ 3.] Each of these Plaintiffs was admitted to the Jail following an arrest on minor, non-weapons-related, non-drug-related offenses, including writing bad checks, failure to appear, and traffic violations. [Third Am. Compl. ~~ 17-24.] Each of the Class Representatives of the Admissions Class alleged that upon admission to the Jail, they were forced to remove their clothes and submit to a visual strip search inspection. [Id.] During these searches, Plaintiffs were, among other things, subjected to visual inspection of their genitals, instructed to bend over and spread their buttocks for visual inspection, and, in the case of female Plaintiffs, asked to lift their breasts for inspection. [/d. See also, e.g., Ford Dep. at 2124 (attached as Exh. A); May Dep. at 30-31 (attached as Exh. B); Nelson Dep. at 23-24, 31-32, 38-39 (attached as Exh. C); Teague Dep. at 33-36 (attached as Exh. D).]
UNDISPUTED FACTS In his deposition, James Lantrip, who served as Hopkins County Jailer from 1987 until his retirement on July 31, 2005, explained the policies and procedures of the Hopkins County Jail (the "Jail") governing strip searching arrestees upon admission to the Jail. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 6 -21 (attached as Exh. E).] According to Jailer Lantrip, an arrestee brought to the Jail is met at the door by a Jail officer and asked to complete a medical questionnaire to determine
3

whether there is a need for immediate medical attention. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 11.] If no immediate medical attention is required, the arrestee is taken to the booking desk, where the booking officer collects information for the purposes of doing an "initial classification," which includes determining whether the arrestee is to be strip searched. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 15.]
If the booking officer determines that an arrestee "fall[s] under a strip searchable reason," they would be strip searched. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 6-7.] According to official Jail policy, "strip searchable reasons" include charges involving serious violent felonies, past history of violence, drug charges, suicide risk, and "people coming from other facilities not in your jurisdiction that you had no control over before they arrived":
Q: Now, when you were the Jailer at the Hopkins County jail, what was the policy at the jail for strip search of persons on admission to the jail?
A: Well, you question them, you look at their charges, why they're there. Determine if they fall under the strip searchable reasons.
* * * *
Q: That being whether they were a felon, had a past history of violence, were drug charges, suicide risk, people coming from other facilities, is that what you'd look at?
A: At his initial arrest? Q: Yes. A: Yes. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 6-7.] Notably, the initial booking process does not include running a criminal history background check, or "NCIC" report, on the arrestee. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 15-18.] Further, a full criminal history check is not performed on an arrestee until the "full-blown classification" process, which is performed the day after the arrestee is booked into the Jail. [1117/06 Lantrip
4

Dep. at 15-16.] Thus, the decision to strip search an arrestee is made before obtaining a criminal history report on the subject. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 17.] Hopkins County Jail Policy Concerning Strip Search ofInstitutional Transfers
Jailer Lantrip testified that in addition to strip searches that might be ordered based on factors such as history of contraband, drug charges, or suicide risk, the Jail's official policy also calls for automatically strip searching all arrestees who are transferred to the Hopkins County Jail from another jurisdiction, regardless of the charge:
Q: Now you also mentioned· strip searching people coming from other facilities. Now what do you mean by that?
A: If we get - our sheriff goes somewhere and picks somebody up, bring[s] him back here from a jail in another county or state or a sheriff or somebody from another county or state brought one to us, we'll have occasions where the jail themselves may transfer someone to us from another facility.
Q: Now would those persons be strip searched? A: Yes. Q: Regardless of their charge? A: Yes. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26. See also 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. (Defendants' Expert) at 64-65 (attached as Exh. F); August 30, 2005 Soyars Letter, Exhibit 7 to 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. (attached as Exh. G) ("The jail does have a policy of strip-searching inmates upon transfer from another facility.").] Thus, traffic offenders and minor misdemeanor offenders - as well as those arrested on more serious charges - are subject to automatic strip searches following an institutional transfer to the Jail. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26.] Jailer Lantrip testified that this is a "blanket policy." [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 27.] All arrestees who are transferred from other jurisdictions or facilities are strip searched, without
5

regard to the circumstances surrounding the transfer or other factors indicating that there is

reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee is secreting contraband:

Q: Now, have there been institutional transfers, arrestees brought to the Hopkins County jail from other facilities that you are familiar with in which a decision was made to forego a strip search of that individual?

A: Shouldn't be.

Q: So this is a blanket policy, anyone coming to Hopkins County jail from another facility is to be strip searched period?

A: Period.

* * * *

A:

. Policy is one of those things one shoe fits everybody with rare, rare

exceptions I would think, and off the top of my head I can't even think of one ...

. Okay, so, you know, that's just one of those things, so it's a blanket thing. If

you come from another facility that we have not authority over, no control of,

you're checked when you hit our door.

[1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 27,52-53 (emphasis added).]

Jailer Lantrip stated that transferees are strip searched out of a concern that the arrestee

might have obtained contraband either during their prior stay in the transferring facility or during

their transportation to the Hopkins County Jail, and might smuggle this contraband into the

Hopkins County Jail. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26.] However, Jailer Lantrip admitted that the

Jail's policy is not based on any particular facts known to the Jail staff about the circumstances

under which arrestees are transferred, such as what kind of security precautions are taken by the

Hopkins County Sheriff in conducting the transfer or whether the arrestees were ever

unsupervised during the transfer. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 51-52.]

Jailer Lantrip testified, for example, that the Jail staff knew "very little" about the Sheriff

Department's security practices in transferring arrestees:

6

Q: What do you know about the security procedures employed by the Hopkins County Sheriff in transporting prisoners that they'd picked up at another jail to the Hopkins County Jail?
A: Very little. I couldn't tell you that it was any better or worse than anyone else's. That would probably depend on which officer went.
[1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 51 (emphasis added).] Jailer Lantrip also admitted that upon admission of a detainee transferred from another
facility, Jail staff did not inquire about the circumstances of a particular detainee's transfer to determine if that detainee had an opportunity to obtain or conceal contraband:
Q: .... I'm just talking about whether [the arrestees] could have acquired contraband while in the custody of the Hopkins County sheriff.
A: Yes, they could. I mean, you never know if there's a bathroom stop or whatever.
Q: Can you determine that once they're admitted to the Hopkins County jail? A: Could I determine that? Q: Yeah. You could ask the sheriff whether there'd been a bathroom stop or
any opportunity for A: I guess you could. I don't think we ever did. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep.at 52 (emphasis added).] Thus, under the Jail's policy, the decision to strip search arrestees transferred from other facilities was not based on any actual information indicating a risk of contraband smuggling among institutional transferees as a class of offenders, or any individualized determination that a particular arrestee had an opportunity to hide contraband. Rather, Jailer Lantrip testified that arrestees transferred from other facilities were strip searched merely because the Jail did not know the circumstances of their custodial history: "I have no idea what kind of jail they came from, how tight it was run or how loose it was run, what they were allowed to have in that jail. I
7

have no idea where they stopped en route to our jail, who they've had contact with, those type things." [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26 (emphasis added).] Expert testimony concerning justification for strip searches ofinstitutional transfers
Notwithstanding the justification offered for the Jail's blanket strip search policy by Jailer Lantrip, Defendants' own purported expert witness, Ray Sabbatine, testified that the mere fact that an arrestee is transferred from another facility, in the absence of other factors, is not sufficient justification for a strip search:
Q: .... [J]ust the mere fact that they're being institutionally transferred, that alone is not a justification for a strip search?
A: That's correct in the absence of other factors that would justify the search. [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 70-71 (attached as Exh. F).]
Sabbatine is a consultant in the field of criminal justice, who has served in a number of positions in the Kentucky criminal justice system, including jail administrator for Lexington, KY. He was retained by the Defendants to render an opinion "as to the propriety of both policy and practice of the Hopkins County Detention Center as they relate to the strip-searching of offenders housed in that facility." [7/17/03 Sabbatine Report at 1.] Sabbatine based his opinions upon an examination of "the policies of the [Hopkins County] facility and their consistency with State and Federal standards of care and whether practices are consistent with acceptable policy." [Id.]
Sabbatine's testimony was clear that, in his expert opinion, strip searching an arrestee solely because the arrestee was transferred from another jurisdiction is not justified:
Q: . . . . [W]hen you've got an inmate coming from another facility for whatever reason, ... under what circumstances would it be inappropriate to strip search them?
8

A: If a person were not otherwise strippable and the person did not spend - in other words, the person did not go beyond the booking area of the other facility and then were transferred to the second jail and they were not strippable, in other words, it would almost be similar to a person being arrested, taken to the police station for an interview, and then dropped off at jail, then I don't believe that to give me reason to be concerned about the presence of a contraband for an otherwise nonstrippable offender. Okay? As the period of time extends in the sending facility and whether or not there was a hospital run of that person because they may have been a DUI that ended up going to the hospital and then coming back to the facility and then transferred to the second facility, in other words, in order to examine it I need the full circumstance of the custodial happenings in the initial facility. Time would be a factor, incident would be a factor; okay? If in the original facility they were undergoing a pat frisk and there were contraband uncovered, if they were undergoing a pat search and they refused the pat search and said, don't touch me, okay, if that other facility had an alert on them for suicide, if that other facility had an alert on them for prior introduction of contraband, okay, that and the transfer of that information to the second facility would give reason for examination at the second facility as to whether or not the person was searchable. So when you talk about a custodial time frame, to have only one piece of it doesn't give me enough information to draw a conclusion that would satisfy me as to whether or not the person was likely to be strippable when they entered the second facility.
[12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 67-69 (emphasis added).] Thus, Defendants' own expert conceded
that the mere fact that a detainee was transferred from another facility, by itself, does not indicate
a security risk sufficient to justify a strip search. Only an examination of the individual
circumstances surrounding the arrestee's custodial history would provide enough information to
determine that a sufficient risk of contraband existed to warrant a search. [Id.]
Plaintiffs' expert witness, Gordon Kamka, echoed Mr. Sabbatine's testimony on this
issue and opined that "[a] strip search due to transfer from another correctional facility cannot be
justified for security reasons ...." [8/30/05 PIs. Tender of Supp. Expert Op.]
9

Records ofsearches conducted pursuant to County's blanket strip search policy The records produced by the Defendants demonstrate the scope and regularity of the
Jail's blanket strip search policy for arrestees transferred from other facilities. These records reveal that strip searches of institutional transferees have been, and continue to be, a routine and frequent occurrence at the Jail.
Beginning in July 2003, the Jail began using a "Jail Tracker" computer program, which records every instance in which a strip search was performed, the reason each search was conducted, and the results of the search. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 39.] In response to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, Defendants produced Jail Tracker records for all strip searches conducted by the Defendants between July 2003 and May 25,2006. The Jail Tracker records show that during this period, 1159 arrestees were subjected to strip searches after being transferred to the Jail from another facility. [B. Thacker Aff. ~~ 4-5 & Exhibit A thereto (attached as Exh. H).] For each of these 1159 strip searches, the only grounds for the search identified in Defendants' records is "transfer from another facility." [B. Thacker Aff. ~ 5.] No other factors supporting the decision to search, such as history of contraband, drug charges, etc., are identified in any of these records. [Id.]
Moreover, Plaintiffs' inspection of Defendants' records revealed that these strip searches generated some kind of positive result in only six (6) of the 1159 instances, which equates to approximately five-tenths of one percent (0.5%) of the persons searched. [Id. at ~ 6.] In five of these instances, moreover, the only contraband reported found was identified as cigarettes, tobacco, or matches, while the sixth result was listed merely as "code 4." [Id. at ~ 6.]1
,1 Moreover, the Jail Tracker records do not indicate whether the contraband was found somewhere where only a strip search would detect it - such as in a body cavity - as opposed to the arrestee's clothing, where a simple pat down search could have located it.
10

Prior to the implementation of the Jail Tracker program in July 2003, the practice of the Jail was to only make a record of a strip search when the search was performed pursuant to an individualized reasonable suspicion and there was a positive finding of contraband. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 38-40; 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 38-39.] Thus, prior to July 2003, the Jail failed to make any record of strip searches conducted pursuant to an automatic or blanket strip search policy or where no contraband was found. This failure to document pre-July 2003 strip searches was contrary to the mandates of the applicable Kentucky Administrative Regulations, which provide that "[t]he Jailer shall require that a strip search or body cavity search shall be documented." 501 KAR 3:120, § 23(c)1.
Even in the absence of reliable Jail records prior to July 2003, however, the post July 2003 Jail Tracker records, combined with Jailer Lantrip's testimony, clearly reveal the scope and regularity of the Jail's policy of strip searching all arrestees transferred from other facilities. The undisputed facts plainly demonstrate that at all times relevant to this lawsuit, every detainee who came to the Jail from another facility was subjected to an automatic strip search upon arrival. This policy resulted in a large number of arrestees - including those arrested for nonviolent misdemeanor and traffic-related offenses - being strip searched, despite the absence of any other factors indicating that the particular arrestee was likely to pose a risk of smuggling weapons or contraband. Strip searches ofNamed Plaintiffclass representatives
Several of the Named Plaintiff class representatives are among those who were subjected to suspicionless strip searches pursuant to the Jail's blanket strip search policy. In his supplemental expert report, Mr. Sabbatine reviewed materials relating to Named Plaintiffs Linda H. Ford, Timothy P. May, Robert R. Teague, Robin G. Littlepage, Tabitha L. Joyce, and Ladonia
11

Davis Nelson. [11122/05 Sabbatine Supp. Rep. at 1.] Sabbatine's review of the record showed that five of these six Plaintiffs had been strip searched following a transfer from another facility? [Id. See a/so, e.g., Ford Dep. at 18-22; May Dep. at 27-30; Nelson Dep. at 20-22; Teague Dep.
at 33.] For at least two of these Named Plaintiffs, Linda Ford and Timothy May, Mr. Sabbatine
conceded that he could find no factors that would justify a strip search, other than the transfer from another facility. [11/22/05 Sabbatine Supp. Rep. at 2.] Sabbatine therefore opined that the available information was "not conclusive" of the need for a strip search. [Id.] Sabbatine
testified that the mere fact that Ford and May were transferred from another facility would not warrant a strip search. [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 70.] Whether a strip search of these Plaintiffs was justified, Sabbatine explained, depended on whether officers at the Jail had made queries
about the circumstances surrounding each detainee's transfer, and whether the particular
information they learned demonstrated a risk that the individual detainee was concealing contraband:
A: Both Ford and May were transferred. I don't know whether the information was transferred from the transferring facility to the second facility. I do not know whether there were queries by the second facility, Hopkins, as to whether there were circumstances that would have justified a search....
* * * *
Q: Right. So the mere fact of an institutional transfer without more does not automatically necessitate or justify a strip search by the receiving facility; correct?
A: The circumstances of the transfer may. The transfer in itself without additional factors may not.
2 Notably, in the case of the one Named Plaintiff who had not been transferred from another facility, Robin G. Littlepage, Mr. Sabbatine did not find any information in her records that would support a decision to conduct a strip search. [11122/05 Sabbatine Supp. Report at 2; 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 75.]
12

[12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 69-70 (emphasis added).]3
ARGUMENT
Defendants' records indicate that since July 2003, 1159 strip searches have been
conducted on the sole grounds that the detainee was transferred from another facility, without
any other articulated basis for suspecting the detainee of harboring contraband. These strip
searches plainly violate well established principles of constitutional law, which hold that a
pretrial detainee charged with non-violent, non-drug-related offenses may not be subjected to the
severe humiliation and invasion entailed by a strip search without at least an individualized
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is harboring contraband. The mere fact that a detainee has
been transferred from another facility does not excuse jail officials from satisfying the Fourth
Amendment's individualized reasonable suspicion requirement. Nor does the fact of a transfer,
without more, satisfy the individualized reasonable suspicion requirement. The Plaintiffs are
therefore entitled to a partial summary judgment finding Defendants' policy unconstitutional and
finding that any member of the Admissions Class searched pursuant to Defendant's policy has
been subjected to an unconstitutional strip search.
I. Defendants' blanket policy to automatically strip search all detainees transferred from other facilities, without individualized reasonable suspicion, is unconstitutional.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Ireland v. Tunis, 113
3 With respect to Named Plaintiffs Teague and Nelson, Sabbatine indicated that a search could have been justified based on information that these individuals had drug-related charges in their criminal histories. However, Sabbatine could not verify whether the drug-related charges pre-dated or post-dated the strip search. [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 71-73.] Sabbatine also admitted that he "had no way of knowing" whether the Jail was in possession of this criminal history information at the time the strip searches were ordered. [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 108-09.] Mr. Sabbatine also suggested that the strip search of Plaintiff Nance may have been justified by an indication ofa prior suicide attempt. However, Ms. Nance denied telling the Jail officers that she was suicidal at the time of her admission, or that she had attempted to kill herself within the past three months. [Nance Dep. at 15-16 (attached as Exh. I).]
13

F.3d 1435, 1440 (6th Cir. 1997). The material facts concerning the unconstitutionality of the Defendants' strip search policy are undisputed. The Defendants admit that the Jail has a blanket policy of subjecting all detainees transferred from other facilities to an automatic strip search upon admission to the Jail - regardless of the charge and regardless of the particular circumstances of the detainee. Indeed, the Defendants admit that they did not even inquire about the circumstances of any individual detainees' transportation to the Jailor prior custody in the transferring facility before determining whether to order a strip search. Defendants therefore have admitted that detainees transferred from other facilities - including persons charged with non-violent, non-drug-related misdemeanor offenses - are routinely strip searched without individualized suspicion that a particular detainee is concealing contraband. This practice violates detainees' clearly established constitutional rights.
A. Under clearly established constitutional law, pretrial detainees charged with non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses may not be strip searched absent individualized reasonable suspicion.
- Courts have repeatedly recognized that "strip and visual body cavity searches impinge seriously upon the values that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect." Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (15t Cir. 1997). Strip searches of pretrial detainees have been described as "demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and humiliation." Mary Beth G. v. City a/Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). It is therefore well established that "a strip search is an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude." Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393,395 (10th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, in 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee has the right not to be strip searched unless the reasonableness of the search is established by "balancing of
14

the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979).
Applying this balancing test to strip searches of arrestees charged with non-violent, non-
drug-related misdemeanor offenses, which are not normally associated with a high risk of
smuggling contraband or weapons, "[t]he decisions of all the federal courts of appeals that have
considered the issue [have] reached the same conclusion: a strip search of a person arrested for a
traffic violation or other minor offense not normally associated with violence and concerning
whom there is no individualized reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or
concealing a weapon or other contraband, is unreasonable." Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248,
1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).4
In Masters v. Crouch, the Sixth Circuit held that Jefferson County, Kentucky's blanket
policy of strip searching all pretrial detainees who were transferred into the general jail
population violated the detainees' clearly established constitutional rights. Id. The court
concluded that Fourth Amendment balancing test discussed in Wolfish "does not validate a
4See also, e.g., NG. v. State 0/ Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e have ruled that
strip searches may not be performed upon adults confined after arrest for misdemeanors, in the absence of reasonable suspicion concerning possession of contraband.... [A]II the circuits to have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion ....") (emphasis added); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 109-112 (lSI Cir. 2001) (When an arrestee "has been charged with only a misdemeanor involving minor offenses or traffic violations, crimes not generally associated with weapons or contraband, courts have required that officers have a reasonable suspicion that the individual inmate is concealin* contraband."); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (lSI Cir. 1997); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 397 (l0 Cir. 1993) (citing "unanimous circuit authority condemning blanket strip search policies applied to minor offense detainees") (emphasis added); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment precludes prison officials from performing striplbody cavity searches of arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest."); Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding "blanket policy calling for strip searches of all misdemeanor arrestees" to be unconstitutional); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (81h Cir. 1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (91h Cir. 1984); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (lOth Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City o/Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 113 (4th Cir. 1981); Davis v. City 0/
Camden, 657 F. Supp. 396,400-401 (D.NJ. 1987); Thompson v. County o/Cook, 428 F. Supp. 2d 807 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
15

blanket policy of strip searching pretrial detainees." Id. at 1253. The court relied on the numerous decisions from other circuits, which found no basis for believing that, as a class, a minor offenders charged with non-violent, non-drug-related crimes presented a risk of smuggling contraband. In the absence of such evidence, "the only justification for [a blanket] policy was institutional convenience" - i.e., that a blanket policy is "easier to administer than one which requires a balancing of interests in each case and an individual determination of need." Id. at 1254 (citing Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73). The Sixth Circuit agreed with the other circuits that "institutional convenience" was insufficient to justify the intrusion of a strip search in the case of minor offenders. Accordingly, the court held "[i]t was equally clearly established that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be subjected to a strip search unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the particular person might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband." Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
Thus, under Masters, it is clearly unconstitutional to strip search non-violent, non-drugrelated offenders upon initial admission to a detention center pursuant to a blanket strip search policy that does not require an individualized finding of reasonable suspicion. But under the Jail's blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees transferred from other facilities, that is exactly what happens. Jailer Lantrip's unequivocal testimony was that all such transferees are searched automatically, regardless of their charges. [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26.] Moreover, Jailer Lantrip readily acknowledged that Jail officers do not make any individualized assessment of whether there is a reasonable suspicion that any particular arrestee transferred from another facility is carrying or concealing contraband based on the arrestee's charges, the circumstances surrounding the arrestee's transfer, or the conditions of the arrestee's confinement in the
16

transferring facility. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26-27, 51-53.] Rather, once it is determined that an arrestee has been transferred from another facility, he or she is automatically strip searched without respect to the circumstances. [Id.] This is precisely the kind of blanket strip search policy held unconstitutional in Masters.
B. The mere fact that a detainee has been transferred from another facility is insufficient as a matter of law to justify a strip search in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion.
Defendants have not, and cannot, identify any valid basis for concluding that the individualized reasonable suspicion requirement of Masters may be abandoned merely because an arrestee has been transferred from another facility. No case law supports such a radical conclusion. Nor is there any other basis in the record for concluding that the well-established rule set forth in Masters would not apply in this circumstance. To the contrary, Defendants' own expert witness flatly conceded that the mere fact that an arrestee has been transferred from another facility, by itself, is insufficient to justify a strip search.
1. The case law confirms that arrestees transferred from other facilities may not be strip searched in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion.
No court that has ever found that the mere fact that an arrestee has been transferred from another facility, without more, is sufficient to warrant a strip search at the receiving facility. To the contrary, courts have consistently held that strip searches of nonviolent, non-drug-related minor offenders are unconstitutional in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion, even in circumstances where the searches were conducted following a transfer from another
facility. See, e.g., NG. v. State 0/ Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2004); Shain v.
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); Dodge v. County o/Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Lee v. Perez, 175 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (unconstitutional to strip search
17

arrestee following transport to regional detention center to post bail); Ford v. Suffolk County, 154 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001). Accord Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739,741 (8th Cir. 1985)
(noting that circumstances of custody did not establish reasonable suspicion where "[0]fficers
were with [plaintiff] every moment after they read him the warrant; they watched him dress and
go to the bathroom, thereby eliminating any chance that he might have secreted a weapon on his
person").
In N. G. v. State of Connecticut, for example, the court squarely held that strip searches
cannot be not justified "simply because of transfers to other facilities." 382 F.3d 225,233 (2d
Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). The court rejected the defendants' contention - which mirrors the
justification offered by Jailer Lantrip in this case - that strip searches following transfers are
necessary "because it would be 'foolish' to rely on the searching at [the prior facility] and
because contraband might have been picked up during transport." Id at 234 n.12. According to
the court, the mere possibility that contraband could be acquired during a transfer did not justify
a blanket policy of searching all transferees. Rather, the court concluded that a strip search can
only be justified upon examination of the individualized circumstances surrounding the transfer
of a particular detainee to determine if a reasonable suspicion exists:
Arguably, it was more convenient for the personnel at GDC to strip search S.C. upon her admission there, rather than determine whether she had been strip searched upon her prior admission to NHJDC and had remained in custody throughout the transfer process. Mere convenience, however, cannot be a sufficient interest to justify such a serious impairment of privacy. We recognize that unavoidable circumstances might arise, even during a period of continuous custody, that create opportunities for an inmate to acquire contraband, in which event a strip search might well be reasonable. No such circumstances were shown in this case. Id. at 234. 5
5 NG. involved strip searches of juveniles upon admission to juvenile detention facility. The court in N G. held that blanket policies mandating strip searches upon initial admission to custody could be
18

Ford v. Suffolk County also is squarely on point. 154 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001). In Ford, the court granted partial summary judgment on § 1983 liability to a plaintiff class comprised of women who were subjected to routine strip searches upon their transfer from City of Boston facilities to the Suffolk County jail. Until May of 1999, the Suffolk Jail had a blanket policy of subjecting all of these female admittees to a routine strip search upon admission to the jail. Id. at 135. See also id. at 133-34. The court concluded that the policy was unconstitutional because "Jail officials made no individualized findings of reasonable suspicion prior to conducting strip searches of BPD [Boston Police Department] arrestees." Id. at 142 (emphasis added). Although the class members in Ford, by definition, had all been transferred from another facility, the court concluded that "the County cannot reasonably have suspected the women, as a class, of harboring weapons or contraband at the time of admission." Id. at 142 (emphasis added). The court noted that the factual record did not indicate that the BPD's practices in transferring detainees to the Suffolk county facility were not secure. Id. The court concluded that the defendants could not constitutionally adopt a blanket strip search policy simply to avoid making an individualized assessment of the particular circumstances of each transferee: "[a]n indiscriminate strip-search policy routinely applied ... can not be justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations." Id. at 142 (quotation omitted).
Similarly, in Dodge v. County of Orange, the court granted a permanent injunction to plaintiffs in a strip search class action, holding that it was unconstitutional for a county correctional facility to automatically strip search nonviolent and non-drug related offenders
justified in the case of juveniles, even though such policies would not be justified for adult offenders, based on the state's special interest in detecting physical or sexual abuse. 382 F.3d at 237. It is significant that even though the NG. court recognized a much broader scope of state authority to strip search juvenile offenders than adult offenders, the court still found an insufficient justification for subjecting juveniles to a blanket strip search policy following transfers from other facilities. Id. at 234.
19

following their remand to county facility from other law enforcement agencies or correctional facilities. 282 F. Supp. 2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The plaintiffs in Dodge were all remanded to the county facility from other facilities while awaiting trial or the posting of bail. Id. The Defendants in Dodge defended their policy with the same institutional security arguments offered by Jailer Lantrip - i.e., that "no prudent correctional administrator could safely rely on security precautions taken by other law enforcement agencies, or even correctional facilities that may have had custody of the inmate before he or she arrived at OCCF." Id. at 47. The Dodge court nonetheless found that a blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees admitted to the facility plainly violated the established law that "persons charged with a misdemeanor and remanded to a local correctional facility have a right to be free of a strip search absent reasonable suspicion that they are carrying contraband." Id. at 82.
The Dodge court followed the Second Circuit's decision in Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001), which reached the same conclusion on similar facts. In Shain, as in the Dodge case, the plaintiff was strip searched pursuant to a blanket policy requiring strip searches of all arrestees remanded to the custody of a county correctional facility by a court. The court concluded that "it was clearly established in 1995 [the time of the searches] that persons charged with a misdemeanor and remanded to a local correctional facility like NCCC have a right to be free of a strip search absent reasonable suspicion that they are carrying contraband or weapons." Id. at 66. Shain acknowledged that particular circumstances in an individual detainee's custodial history might create reasonable suspicion - "for example, a person who is allowed to visit the bathroom unescorted" - but concluded that "the remand [to the county correctional facility] could not provide reasonable and individualized suspicion." Id. at 64, 66.
20

The teaching of these cases is clear. The fact of an institutional transfer, without more, does not warrant abandoning minor offenders' rights not to be strip searched in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion. In this case, Jailer Lantrip admits that no such individualized assessment was made before ordering a strip search of institutional transferees. Instead, arrestees transferred from other facilities were subject to an "automatic" strip search, regardless of the circumstances surrounding their prior custody or transfer. This blanket policy is plainly unconstitutional.
2. The Jail's blanket strip search policy is not based on any specific factual basis for suspecting institutional transferees, as a class, of harboring contraband.
In invalidating blanket strip search policies for detainees transferred from other facilities, courts have emphasized the absence any factual basis for suspecting institutional transferees, as a class, of harboring contraband. See, e.g., Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 142. Accord Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (citing absence of any factual basis for finding that minor offenders, as a class, were likely to harbor contraband in invalidating blanket strip search policy for all incoming arrestees). The record in this case provides no reason to doubt these decisions. To the contrary, Defendants concede that the Jail's blanket strip search policy was not based on any particular facts known to the Defendants about the security practices involved in transferring detainees to the Hopkins County Jail. And the Defendants' own records fail to show a heightened risk of harboring contraband among detainees transferred from other facilities. Indeed, Defendants' own expert concedes that a detainee may not be strip searched merely because he was transferred from another facility. The only justification offered by the Defendants for searching all transferees, regardless of their individual circumstances, is the fact that the Defendants lacked
21

---- -------------------.
information to evaluate the security risk presented by any particular transferee. This justification
is insufficient as a matter of law.
Initially, it is uncontested that the Jail's blanket strip search policy was not based on any
facts known to the Defendants about the security practices involved in transporting arrestees to
the Hopkins County Jail. To the contrary, Jailer Lantrip candidly admitted that he knew "very
little" about these practices. [1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 51.] Jailer Lantrip further conceded "I
don't think we ever did" ask about the circumstances surrounding transfers to the Hopkins
County Jail to determine if a detainee had the opportunity to conceal contraband. [1117/06
Lantrip Dep. at 52.] 6
Additionally, the Defendants' own records belie any suggestion that institutional
transferees as a class are more likely to be concealing contraband. Of the 1159 recorded strip
searches that were ordered over the past three years on the basis of "transfer from another
facility," all but six produced negative results. [Thacker Aff. ~ 6 (attached as Exh. H).] Thus, an
6 The deposition testimony of the Named Plaintiffs also refutes any suggestion that transferees, as a class, were uniformly transferred under circumstances that would create security concerns. Ms. Ford, for example, testified that she had already been strip searched at the transferring facility, and was taken into custody and transferred to the Hopkins County Jail immediately upon her release. [Ford Dep. at 18-22.] See generally Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (fact that some plaintiffs had already been strip searched at transferring facility defeated claim that transferees, as a class, presented heightened security risk). Likewise, Ms. Nelson testified that on the three occasions she was transferred from the Caldwell County Jail to the Hopkins County Jail, she was never "booked in" to the general population at the Caldwell Jail, and merely waited 2-3 hours at the Caldwell facility until she could be transported to Hopkins County. [Nelson Dep. at 20-22.] According to Defendants' expert, Mr. Sabbatine, this kind of circumstance - i.e., where "the person did not go beyond the booking area of the [transferring] facility and then [was] transferred to the second jail" - would not "give me reason to be concerned about the presence of a contraband for an otherwise nonstrippable offender." [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 67-68.] Sabbatine explained that under these circumstances, there is no basis for differentiating a transferee from "a person being arrested, taken to the police station for interview, and then dropped off at the jail." [Id. at 67-68.] Plaintiff May similarly testified that he was arrested in Webster County and placed immediately into a holding cell, where he remained until his transfer. May testified that he was taken "directly from the hole, the holding cell to the Hopkins County Jail. ... And they ran about a hundred miles an hour all the way to the [Hopkins County] jail." [May Dep. at 27-28.] May further testified that the Webster County officers searched his clothes and performed a pat down immediately before his transfer to the Hopkins County Jail. [May Dep. at 29-30.]
22

infinitesimal 0.51768 % of strip searches of arrestees transferred from other facilities generated any kind of positive result. And in five of these cases, the only contraband found was cigarettes or tobacco-related items.7 [Id. at ~ 6.] See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (affirming summary judgment and rejecting proffered jail security justification where "only a few items have been recovered from the body cavities of women arrested on minor charges over the years"); Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (granting summary judgment, finding no reasonable basis for concluding that transferees, as a class, were likely to be concealing contraband where contraband was found in less than one percent of searches).
Moreover, Defendants' own expert witness conceded that the mere fact that a detainee was transferred from another facility is not sufficient to warrant a strip search "in the absence of other factors that would justify the search." [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 70-71 (attached as Exh. F).] Mr. Sabbatine, who offered an expert opinion concerning the "State and Federal standards of care" regarding strip search policies and practices, testified that a decision to strip search an arrestee upon transfer to the second facility could only be made after examination of the "full circumstance of the custodial happenings in the initial facility." [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 68.] The mere fact that an arrestee had been transferred from another facility, according to Sabbatine, "doesn't give me enough information to draw a conclusion that would satisfy me as to whether or not the person was likely to be strippable when they entered the second facility." [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 69 (emphasis added).]
Plaintiffs' expert, Gordon Kamka, was of the same view: "[a] strip search due to transfer form another correctional facility cannot be justified for security reasons ...." [8/30/05 PIs. Tender ofSupp. Expert Op. (emphasis added).]
7 The only information shown in the sixth case were the words "code 4." There is no explanation' in Defendants' records of what "code 4" stands for.
23

The only justification offered for the Jail's policy was Jailer Lantrip's testimony that he cannot have confidence in the security of any transfer because he has "no idea" about the security conditions in the transferring jail or "where they stopped en route to our jail, who they've had contact with, those type things." [1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26.]
But Jailer Lantrip's unspecified and unsubstantiated concerns about security practices involved in institutional transfers is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify a blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees transferred from other facilities. Indeed, the Second Circuit in N G. rejected an identical justification offered by the defendants in that case, who claimed in would be "foolish" to rely on the security practices at other facilities or the transferring officers who previously had custody of a detainee. 382.F.3d at 234 n.l2. Similarly, the Dodge the court held a blanket strip search policy for institutional transferees unconstitutional despite defendants' claim that "no prudent correction administrator could safely rely on security precautions taken by other law enforcement agencies ...that may have had custody of the inmate before he or she arrived." 282 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
Reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search must be based on information "known to the officer at the time of the search." Thompson v. County o/Cook, 408 F. Supp. 2d 807, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26155, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing Kaniffv. United States, 351 F.3d 780, 785 (7th Cir. 2003» (emphasis in original).8 Here, the decision to search was not based on any facts known to Jail staff at the time of the searches that indicated a risk of contraband. Rather, the blanket strip search policy was put in place because the Jail staff simply did not know the facts necessary to determine whether a security risk existed. But "Defendants have not explained nor cited cases for the somewhat remarkable proposition that the lack of information can create
8 See also generally Maryland v . Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (constitutionality of search must be judged "in light of the information available to [the officers] at the time they acted").
24

a reasonable suspicion." Id at *20 (emphasis added). Indeed, a rule holding that the mere absence of information is sufficient to justify a strip search would "encourage officers and jailers to deliberately refrain" from obtaining the information necessary to make reliable individualized risk assessments. Id.
The fact that the Jail's blanket strip search policy is not based on any actual knowledge about the specific security practices involved in transferring arrestees, or particular facts about the circumstances of any individual transfers, "demonstrate[s] that the only justification for the policy [is] institutional convenience" - i.e., that a policy of strip searching all detainees transferred from another facility "is easier to administer than one which requires a balancing of interests in each case and an individual determination of need." Masters, 872 F.2d at 1254 (citing Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73)). The Sixth Circuit, along with all other courts to have considered the issue, has clearly held that institutional convenience is not a sufficient interest to justify a blanket strip search policy. Id. Put simply, "[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied . . . cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease." Logan, 660 F.2d at 1013.
In sum, the Defendants' blanket policy of individually strip searching all detainees transferred from other facilities plainly violates pretrial detainees' clearly established constitutional rights. Every court that has considered the issue has agreed that the fact of an institutional transfer, by itself, does not justify a strip search in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion. Even Defendants' own expert witness concedes this point. And Defendants have conceded that in the case of institutional transfers, they did not make the inquiries necessary to make an individualized determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed. Thus, any class members strip searched pursuant to the Defendants' policy have been
25

subjected to an unconstitutional search, and are entitled to partial summary judgment establishing Defendants' liability for their § 1983 claims. II. Hopkins County is liable, as a matter of law, for unconstitutional strip searches
conducted pursuant to the Jail's official policy of automatically strip searching all detainees transferred from another facility without individualized reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs are also entitled to a partial summary judgment finding that Hopkins County is liable for unconstitutional strip searches conducted pursuant to the Jail's blanket strip search policy for institutional transferees. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court squarely held that a municipal entity will be liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 when the defendant's "official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution." 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipal defendant's official policy may be evinced through formal enactments, such as "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers," or by an established practice that "[a]1though not authorized by written law, ... is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Cash v. Hamilton County Dept. of Adult Probation, 388 F.3d 539, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). See also City ofSt. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Here, there is no dispute it was the official policy at the Jail to require strip searches of all detainees transferred from other facilities. See, e.g., 1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 6-7 (attached as Exh. E); 1/17/06 Lantrip Dep. at 26-27 (Jail had "blanket policy" to strip search all institutional transfers); 1117/06 Lantrip Dep. at 52-53 ("Policy is one of those things one shoe fits everybody . . . . so it's a blanket thing. If you come from another facility ... that we have no authority over, no control of, you're checked when you hit our door."); 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 64-65
26

(attached as Exh. F); 12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep., Exhibit 7, August 30, 2005, Soyer Letter (attached as Exh. G) ("The jail does have a policy of strip-searching inmates upon transfer from another facility."). Under Monell, therefore, Hopkins County is liable for the unconstitutional strip searches caused by this policy.
Courts have routinely held municipal defendants liable for unconstitutional strip searches under comparable circumstances.9 In Weber v. Dell, for example, the Second Circuit found that the county defendant was liable under Monell for an unconstitutional strip search where "the County and the Sheriff conceded[d] that pursuant to jail policy a jail employee undertook a strip/body cavity search of Mrs. Weber after her arrest on misdemeanor charges in the absence of any ground other than her status as an arrested person for concluding that she was likely to be concealing contraband." 804 F.2d 796, 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1986).
Also illustrative is Blihovde v. St. Croix County, 219 F.R.D. 607 (W.D. Wis. 2003), which involved a class action alleging illegal strip search policies at a county jail. Based upon defendants' testimony concerning the practices at the jail, the court found that the jail custom was to search all incoming inmates without regard to reasonable suspicion. The court found this testimony established the county's liability under Monell, noting that "even when there is no express policy, a municipality may be liable when there is a custom of unconstitutional conduct." Id.at618.
9 See, e.g., Wachtler v. County a/Herkimer, 35 FJd 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that liability of county would be established if "standard procedures for admitting a person to the jail . . . included routine strip searches of misdemeanor arrestees, absent reasonable suspicion of weapons or contraband"); 0 'Brien v.
Borough 0/ Woodbury Heights, 679 F. Supp. 429, 434-35 (D.N.J. 1988) (county held liable for
unconstitutional strip search where "Defendants ... concede that it is the policy of the Gloucester County Jail to strip search all inmates regardless of the charge."); Davis v. City a/Camden, 657 F. Supp. 396,402 (D.N.J. 1987) (requirements for municipal liability satisfied where county "admitted that the Camden County Sheriffs Office maintained a policy of having an officer oftIle same sex strip search any person unable to post bail").
27

III. Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. This Court should also preliminarily enjoin the Defendants from continuing to enforce
their blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees transferred from other facilities without reasonable suspicion that a particular detainee is concealing contraband or weapons. There are absolutely no factual disputes - the existence and nature of the Jail's blanket strip search policy is undisputed. This policy is unconstitutional as a matter of law. An oral hearing is therefore unnecessary, and the Court should enter the requested preliminary injunction without delay. United States v. McGhee, 714 F.2d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 1983) (evidentiary hearing is not required when motion for preliminary injunction presents "no triable issues of fact").
"A district court must consider four factors when determining whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction: (1) the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest." Deja vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001).
In cases based on government violations of individuals' constitutional rights, a sufficient showing of likelihood of success will often be decisive. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, "when reviewing a motion for a preliminary injunction, if it is found that a constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a finding of irreparable injury is mandated." ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438,445 (6th Cir. 2003). "In other words, the first factor of the four-factor preliminary injunction inquiry--whether the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits--should be addressed first insofar as a successful showing on the first factor mandates a successful showing on the second factor--whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm." Id.
28

Likewise, "it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party's constitutional rights." G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). And "if the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood that the challenged law is unconstitutional, no substantial harm to others can be said to inhere in its enjoinment." Deja vu o/Nashville, Inc., 274 F.3d at 400.
As explained fully in Part I, supra, Defendants' blanket policy of strip searching all pretrial detainees transferred from other facilities without individualized suspicion is patently unconstitutional on its face and has caused, and continues to cause, repeated violations of arrestees' constitutional rights. The unconstitutionality of this policy is indisputable. Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated both a strong likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. See Dodge v. County o/Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that court's determination that blanket strip search policy was unconstitutional was sufficient to demonstrate requisite irreparable harm for preliminary injunction).
Moreover, the undisputed factual record in this case confirms that a preliminary injunction will promote the public interest, and not cause undue harm to the Defendants' interest in jail security. Indeed, Defendants' own expert conceded that the mere fact that an arrestee has been transferred from another facility does not present a heightened security risk, in the absence of other factors suggesting the transferee had an opportunity to conceal contraband. [12/5/05 Sabbatine Dep. at 67-68.] Thus, Defendants have no demonstrated need to search every single detainee transferred from another facility, regardless of the specific circumstances surrounding a particular detainee.
Additionally, the fact that the strip searches of only six of the 1159 detainees transferred from other facilities generated any kind of positive results - and in five of these instances the
29

-------------------------------,
only results reported were a finding of cigarettes or related items, such as matches10 - clearly demonstrates that ceasing blanket strip searches of these arrestees will not result in a substantial increase in the amount of contraband brought into the Jail. [B. Thacker Aff. ~ 6 (attached as Exh. H).] Indeed, it is not clear from the Jail's records whether a strip search was necessary to detect the contraband, even in those six instances. The Jail's records do not show whether contraband was concealed in a place that would only be located during a strip search, such as a bodily orifice, or whether it was located in a place, such as an arrestee's clothing, where it could have been discovered during a simple pat down search or through a search of the detainee's clothing after the detainee donned a jail uniform.
Moreover, the Jail can protect its institutional security interests by taking the necessary steps to identify and search those particular offenders who, because of their individual circumstances, may pose a security risk. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1984); Dodge, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (rejecting claim that it is "impossible" for booking officers to make individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion upon each detainee's transfer to county correctional facility). And "[o]f course, the County remains free to enhance its security by implementation of procedures that are less intrusive than strip searches, including the use of pat down searches and metal detectors ...." Giles, 746 F.2d at 618 (affirming injunction against blanket strip search policy).
Finally, in assessing the possible hardship to the Defendants, the Court must consider that if the Defendants continue to follow their blanket strip search policy, they will continue to expose themselves to additional § 1983 claims for punitive and compensatory damages from
10 In the sixth instance, the only result reported was "code 4." Defendants' records do not explain what "code 4" means.
30

detainees sUbjected to unconstitutional strip searches. The Dodge court cited a similar concern
in granting injunctive relief in that case:
I note that defendants would suffer similar hardship even if I did not enter an injunction. . . . OCCF would expose itself to punitive damages in individual Section 1983 actions if it reverted to its past policy of strip searching all arrestees. Of course, one of the functions of punitive damages is to force a party to comply with the law. Thus, there exists a distinct possibility that OFFC would suffer the same hardship regardless of whether I issue an injunction.
See Dodge, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
In sum, all factors weigh in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction should therefore be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment and for
preliminary injunctive relief should be GRANTED.
Respectfully Submitted,
Jj
Gregory . Belz ey DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 WestJefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 540-2300 (Telephone) (502) 585-2207 (Facsimile)
and
Bart L. Greenwald Jason Renzelmann FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 589-5400 (Telephone) (502) 581-1087 (Facsimile)
31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.,.c..
I certify that on this JLCfay of July, 2006, a copy of the foregoing was served via United States Mail, sufficient postage prepaid, upon:

John T. Soyars FOSTER, SOYARS & ASSOC. 209 East 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42240

R. Michael Sullivan Allen W. Holbrook SULLIVAN, MOUNTJOY, STAINBACK
& MILLER, P.S.C. P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727

Stacy A. Blankenship DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002

LOULibrary TMP.TMP 567127v.2

32

 
 80805

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OWENSBORO DIVISION

CASE NO.: 4:03CV-3-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

PLAINTIFFS

v. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONAND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JIM LANTRIP INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER OF HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY

DEFENDANTS

Come the Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, in his

individual and official capacities (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through the

undersigned counsel, and for their Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and for a Preliminary Injunction and in the Alternative for their Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, hereby state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a Preliminary

Injunction claiming that Hopkins County Jail’s (hereafter “Jail”) former procedure of

strip searching those inmates who were transferred from another county jail is

unconstitutional. It is Defendants’ position that the procedure was in fact constitutional

and in accordance with Kentucky’s Administrative Regulations. As such, Defendants

1

request that this Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Preliminary Injunction. In the alternative, Defendants have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asking this Court to find that the former procedure is constitutional and to dismiss those Plaintiffs and/or Class Members that were strip searched pursuant to this procedure. II. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is undisputed that, until recently, the Jail had a procedure of strip searching inmates who were transferred from another jail. (See Affidavit of Chris Fields, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). However, in light of this suit, on May 25, 2006, the Jail adopted a more conservative strip search procedure which now only allows a strip search of a transfer from another facility if the criminal charges (past or present) invoke reasonable suspicion or of course, unless they fit into some other category.1 (See Affidavit of Chris Fields).
Plaintiffs incorrectly state that “the decision to strip search an arrestee is made before obtaining a criminal history report on the subject.” In fact, the Jail maintains a criminal history report in their computer system for every person arrested and booked into the Hopkins County Jail. When a person is brought into the jail, whether as an initial arrestee or a transfer from another institution, that person’s criminal history in Hopkins County is reviewed to determine if his/her criminal history would invoke reasonable suspicion to strip search. (See Lantrip Depo., p. 14, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”) (“[I]f they’ve been arrested in our jail and brought to our jail, booked in before, it would show their previous arrests in the computer.”). Furthermore, during the booking process, the
1 It should be noted that Defendants changed this portion of the strip search procedure pursuant to the undersigned’s advice that because no court has ruled on this issue, they should refrain from strip searching persons upon transfer from another jail until this Court can address the issue.
2

inmate is asked about his criminal history. (Lantrip depo., p. 16, attached hereto as
Exhibit “B”).
Accordingly, even if the Jail did not previously have a procedure of strip
searching every inmate upon transfer from another facility, it is likely that an inmate
might be strip searched for any number of other reasons, such as current or past criminal
charges, refusing to submit to a pat down search, identified as a suicide risk, or other
circumstances that would invoke reasonable suspicion.
The Jail implemented the former procedure on transfers because such an inmate
was exposed to areas to which the public had access before and/or during the transfer,
increasing the likelihood that the inmate could possess contraband (weapons, drugs,
cigarettes, etc.). The procedure was implemented in light of the following language in
the Kentucky Administrative Regulations:
(b) A prisoner may be strip searched only on reasonable suspicion . . . . Reasonable suspicion shall be based upon one (1) or more of the following:
1. A current offense involving felony violence, drug charges, or fugitive status;
2. A criminal history of offenses involving the use of a weapon or the possession of contraband;
3. Institutional behavior, reliable information, or history that indicates possession or manufacturing of contraband, the refusal to submit to a clothed pat down search, or a clothed pat down search reveals the possession of contraband;
4. Contact with the public by a contact visit, court appearance that takes place in an area to which the public may have access, or after transport from or through an area to which the public may have access; or
5. The court has ordered commitment to custody after arraignment, conviction, sentencing, or other court appearance, and the prisoner was not in custody prior to the court appearance.
501 KAR 3:120(3)(b) (emphasis added) (attached hereto as Exhibit “C”).
3

III. ARGUMENT A. Because the procedure is no longer in effect, this Court cannot declare it unconstitutional. Plaintiffs request an order from this Court declaring the procedure of strip
searching inmates following transfer to unconstitutional. However, this Court is barred from doing so under the circumstances. In Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Ky, the Sixth Circuit was asked to declare the City’s zoning ordinance as it applied to Brandywine, Inc., an adult bookstore, unconstitutional. 359 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2004). After suit was filed, Richmond amended the ordinance, effectively repealing the provision that prohibited Brandywine, Inc. from operating where it was located. Id. at 833-34. The Sixth Circuit held that “[w]e can neither declare unconstitutional nor enjoin the enforcement of a provision that is no longer in effect.” Id. at 836.
As stated previously, the Defendants have amended the procedure at issue such that persons who are transferred from other detention facilities are only strip searched if their past or current criminal charges invoke reasonable suspicion or if they fit into one of the other categories listed in this procedure that mandate a strip search. (See Exhibit “A”). As such, the challenged procedure “is no longer in effect.” Pursuant to the dictates of the Sixth Circuit, as a result, this Court cannot declare the procedure unconstitutional. Defendants request that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be denied.
B. Defendants are nevertheless entitled to a ruling that their past practice was constitutional in accordance with the Supreme Court’s rulings on these issues.
Any analysis of a strip search policy must start with a consideration of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case on the subject, Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In reviewing the many constitutional claims in that case, the Supreme Court recognized that:
4

The problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.
Id. at 547-58.
In Bell, the Court was asked to consider whether a strip search of every jail
inmate following a contact visit was constitutional where there was no reasonable belief
to indicate that the inmate was concealing contraband. In that case, the Court employed
the following balancing test:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559. The Court further noted that “[a] detention facility is a unique place fraught
with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other
contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Id. In addition, the Court stated that the
fact that only one inmate had been “discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the
institution on his person may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search
technique as a deterrent than to a lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and
import such items when the opportunity arises.” After balancing the significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution in strip searching all inmates following a
contact visit with the privacy interests of the inmates, the Court determined that the strip
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searches of inmates following contact visits were lawful. Id. In 1987, the Supreme Court was again faced with a constitutional challenge to
prison administration policies and rules in Turner v. Safley. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Although this case did not involve a challenge to a strip search policy, the Court did however, again discuss a court’s role in considering a constitutional challenge to a prison’s policies and procedures and the type of scrutiny that should be undertaken. The Turner Court recognized that “courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.” Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). The Court further stated that:
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Id. at 85. The Court then discussed the proper standard of review in cases involving questions of prisoners’ rights. In doing so, the Court held that the test is not one of strict scrutiny but is as follows: “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. For purposes of determining whether the regulation is reasonable, the Court set forth four factors to be considered: First, “there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Id. at 89-90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984)). Second, the Court must consider the existence of alternative means for inmates to exercise their constitutional rights. In considering this factor, “courts should be
6

particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.’” Id. at 89-90 (and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)). Third, courts must consider the impact that accommodation of these constitutional rights may have on other guards and inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources. And fourth, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.
This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. But if an inmate can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. Id. at 90-91. In Cornwell v. Dahlberg, the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court’s ruling in a strip search case for failing to take into consideration the four Turner factors. 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs cite Masters v. Crouch, a Sixth Circuit opinion, which held that “a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor offense not normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband, is unreasonable.” 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989). However, the reasoning in Masters is inapplicable to this case, since the search in Masters was part of the initial booking procedure following the prisoner’s arrest. Defendants’ policy is in accordance with this ruling. It allows a strip search of a person who is arrested and initially brought to the Hopkins County Jail only if they have past or present drug charges or past or present weapons charges or if some other factors invoke reasonable suspicion. As such, their
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policy is in conformance with the Masters’ holding. (See Old and New Policies, attached to Chris Fields’ Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”).
Defendants’ procedure at issue herein is not a blanket policy of strip searching all inmates as was addressed in Masters. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge the Jail’s procedure of strip searching only those inmates who were arrested in a county outside of Hopkins County, held in a detention facility there, and then transported (within a few hours, days, weeks, months, or even years) to the Hopkins County Jail on charges pending in Hopkins County. The “legitimate penological” reasons for strip searching those inmates are the fact that, during their previous incarceration and/or transport to Hopkins County, they were in “areas to which the public may have access.” 501 KAR 3:120(3)(b). As such, these inmates are different from those that are strip searched during the initial booking process following arrest, as those persons, prior to their arrest, did not know they were going to jail and therefore did not have sufficient time, nor an opportunity to access areas where contraband could be found. In other words, in situations such as those posed in Masters, the deterrent rationale for the Bell search is simply less relevant given the essentially unplanned nature of the arrest and subsequent incarceration. See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984) (overruled on other grounds).
In light of these concerns, courts in this circuit have consistently held that inmates who leave the confines of a Jail may be subjected to strip searches upon their return without regard to their criminal charges or history given the time and opportunity such inmates have for obtaining and/or hiding contraband. In Richerson v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov’t, Judge Forester held that where inmates are allowed to leave a jail facility for purposes of a court appearance and therefore have access to areas to which the
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public also has access, “a policy of strip searching the detainees upon their return from the courthouse and prior to being placed back in the general population of the detention center is both justified and reasonable.” 958 F.Supp. 299, 307 (E.D. Ky. 1996). Whether there was individualized reasonable suspicion was irrelevant to that Court’s ruling.
In 1993, the Sixth Circuit (in an unpublished opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit “D”), held that, regardless of the criminal charges or whether there is individualized reasonable suspicion, a “prison regulation of requiring strip searches . . . before and after appointments scheduled outside the prison is justifiable and is not an exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Mowatt v. Visser, 14 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 1993).
Again, in an unpublished opinion, in the case of Black v. Franklin County, Kentucky (attached hereto as Exhibit “E”), Judge Hood dismissed claims of inmates who alleged an unlawful strip search after returning to jail from work release and after returning to jail from court appearances (even though they had been under the supervision of the jail employees the entire time), determining that such searches were reasonable. 2005 WL 1993445 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
Other Circuits agree. In Goff v. Nix, the Eighth Circuit held that visual body cavity searches by prison officials before and after visits to the prison infirmary, which was located outside the secure walls of the main prison, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 803 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1987). In that case, the prisoners were in restraints and under constant supervision the entire time that they were in the infirmary. Nevertheless, the Court held that “prison officials have legitimate security concerns due to the availability of weapons and because the infirmary is not as secure as most other portions of the institution.” Id. at 369. Further, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the
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“medical personnel at the infirmary are provided under contract and may not be as sensitive to security precautions as the prison administrators would desire.” Id. In addition, the Eighth Circuit held that strip searches following court appearances did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Similarly, in Michenfelder v. Sumner, the Ninth Circuit held that a strip search policy that required a visual body cavity search every time the prisoner left or returned to his cell, as well as after movement under escort was reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate penological interests and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988).
In Peckham v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, the Seventh Circuit held that a prison’s policy of strip searching an inmate following a court appearance, medical appointment, or a contact visit did not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights. 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998). The inmates’ criminal histories were irrelevant.
In Dougherty v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit held that a prison’s policy of strip searching inmates following court appearances was constitutional. 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
Also, in Arruda v. Fair, the First Circuit held that the prison’s policy of strip searching inmates when they left and re-entered their cell following a visit to the prison law library and infirmary did not violate the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. 710 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1983). This was true even though guards accompanied the inmate to and from the library and infirmary.
Thus, numerous federal courts from several circuits have recognized the legitimate security interests of a jail in strip searching inmates coming from places not
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secured by jail personnel, including less secure areas of a detention facility. Consistent with these decisions, and as will be discussed in more detail, a jail has a legitimate security concern when receiving transfers from other detention facilities over which the jail has no control and who may have been in areas accessible to the public.
C. Applying the Supreme Court’s tests to the facts of this case, Defendants’ former strip search policy of persons transported to the Hopkins County Detention Center from other detention facilities is constitutional.
Applying the Bell v. Wolfish and Turner v. Safely tests, it is without a doubt that the Defendants’ former procedure of strip searching those inmates that are transferred from other detention facilities is constitutional. The Bell test requires this Court to balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” In doing so, this court must consider: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is conducted; (3) the justification for initiating it; (4) and the place in which it is conducted.
In general, the strip search procedure at the Jail following transfer can be gleaned from a review of the testimony of Plaintiff Robert Teague, who was strip searched following a transfer from another detention facility. Robert Teague testified that in 2003 he was arrested in Christian County, Kentucky for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. (Teague depo., pp. 29-31). He was lodged in the Christian County Jail where he was not subject to a strip search even though he had a pending drug charge. (Teague depo., p. 31).
The following day he was transported to court where he pled guilty to the charges. Upon his return to Christian County Jail, he was again not strip searched. He was then served with an outstanding warrant from Hopkins County for theft by deception. He was
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held at the Christian County Jail until a transport officer arrived to take him to the Hopkins County Jail. (Teague depo., p. 32). Upon arrival at the Hopkins County Jail and following booking, Teague was taken into a small room (the property room) by a male deputy jailer for purposes of changing into a jail uniform. He was placed behind a curtain and asked to remove his street clothes. He was told to show the bottom of his feet, bend over, spread his buttocks, cough, and then hold up his scrotum. Thereafter, he was given jail clothes to put on and was taken to a general population cell. (Teague depo., p 36). The deputy jailer was the only one in the room during the strip search and did not touch Teague at anytime. (Teague depo., pp. 35-36).
The scope and manner of the strip search following a transfer, as well as the place conducted (the first, third, and fourth factors of the Bell test), were clearly reasonable. The inmate was searched by a jailer of the same sex during a change out procedure, in a room out of view of other persons, and the inmate was not touched by the deputy jailer in the process.
The second factor, i.e., “justification for initiating [the search]” outweighs any invasion of the inmates’ personal rights. Obviously, the justification for a strip search following transfer from another detention facility is to prevent the introduction of contraband into the facility that could expose the inmates and staff to harm. An inmate who has been incarcerated in another detention facility has possibly been exposed to contraband, especially if that detention facility has lenient procedures upon intake, as well as after contact visits, court appearances, medical appointments, and work programs. Just a few years ago, the Crittenden County Jail was searched by law enforcement agencies, with guns, alcohol, and unauthorized visitors being found in and among the
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general population areas. (See Affidavit of James Lantrip, attached hereto as Exhibit “F” and newspaper articles, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”). Crittenden County is only a few miles from the Hopkins County Detention Center and is one of the facilities that frequently transferred inmates to Hopkins County. (See Affidavit of James Lantrip).
It is unknown how many other detention facilities in Kentucky have similar lax procedures. A County should not have to rely on the security procedures of another detention facility. There is no way of knowing what those procedures are and if they are in fact utilized and/or enforced by the transferring detention facility. The safety of the Jail’s staff and inmates are at risk, which must be protected.
For the same reasons, the Kentucky Corrections Cabinet does not rely on the searching procedures of other detention facilities. Their strip search procedure requires all inmates to be strip searched upon transfer from another detention facility --- “All inmates shall be subject to a strip search if . . . entering . . . an institution.”2 (See Kentucky Corrections Search Policy, attached hereto as Exhibit “H”).
Obviously, an inmate in a detention facility has had ample opportunity to realize that he is incarcerated, may continue to be incarcerated, and therefore has had ample time to hide contraband on his person. Furthermore, if that inmate is incarcerated in a facility that allows smoking, he has been around and/or had possession of cigarettes, which are considered contraband at the Hopkins County Jail. (See Affidavit of James Lantrip, attached hereto as Exhibit “F”). Hopkins County was the first detention center in Kentucky to go smoke free. In addition, many detention facilities today still allow smoking.
2 The Corrections Cabinet does not receive inmates directly upon arrest but only after the inmate has been held in a county detention center for several months or sometimes even years.
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The justification for the strip search can be found in the Kentucky Administrative Regulations directed to local jails, which specifically provide that an inmate may be strip searched “after transport from or through an area to which the public may have access.” Plaintiffs’ own expert testified that the Kentucky Administrative Regulation applicable to strip searches is “very good” and that every jail should “adopt it as their policy.” (Kamka depo., pp. 24-25, attached hereto as Exhibit “I”).
It is without question that inmates transported from one county to another are likely transported “from or through an area to which the public may have access”, such as jail lobbies, parking lots, unsecured transport vehicles, as well as restrooms, restaurants, etc, if a bathroom or meal break is taken during the transport. As the Supreme Court stated in Bell,
Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. It is clear that even if this Court were to only consider the Bell test, the Defendants’ former practice of strip searching those inmates who were transferred from another detention facility is reasonable and the justification clearly outweighs any invasion of rights that may occur as a result of the search. As such, the transferred inmates’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by this practice and/or policy and the Defendants are clearly entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law on this issue. If however, this Court disagrees with Defendants’ arguments and determines that the policy was violative of the inmates’ rights, this Court must nevertheless uphold it if it
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is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. This rational relationship test requires this Court to consider the following factors:
(1) whether there is a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether there are alternative means for inmates to exercise their constitutional rights; (3) the impact that accommodation of these constitutional rights may have on other guards and inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.
First, Defendants have previously explained that their justification for strip searches under this scenario is rationally connected to the policy. Strip searches following transfer from other detention facilities (where contraband may have been readily available and where, during the transfer, inmates were exposed to areas where the public may have access) will prohibit and/or deter contraband from being brought into the Jail. Furthermore, the alternative proposed by Plaintiffs is not reasonable.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants should be required to conduct some sort of investigation upon receiving each new transfer before determining whether a strip search should be conducted. In this “utopia”, the booking officer would need to interview the transporting officer to determine if the inmate was transported through a jail lobby, parking lot, or other area exposed to the public before he was placed in his/her vehicle. Of course, this practice would be as full-proof as the transporting officer’s memory. As to the actual transport, the booking officer would also have to ask: (1) whether the transporting officer thoroughly searched his vehicle after his last transport of an inmate/arrestee; (2) whether the inmate was allowed to sit in the front or back seat; (3)
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whether the inmate was allowed to smoke cigarettes during the transport and/or had them in his possession when he took him into custody; (4) whether the inmate was handcuffed the entire time during the transport; (5) whether any stops were made during the transport; (6) where the inmate’s personal belongings were kept during the transport; (7) whether his personal belongings (upon taking him into custody) contained any items of contraband, e.g., cigarettes, prescription drugs, knives, etc. Again, this process would have to rely strictly on the transporting officer’s memory.
In addition, the booking officer would have to call the transferring facility and determine if, during his incarceration, the inmate (1) had any contact visits; (2) had any court appearances; (3) worked outside the facility; (4) had been taken for any medical treatment outside of the facility; (5) had any violent or drug charges pending against him in that county; (6) had been given any furloughs; (7) had reported to the jail via a controlled intake procedure; (8) had been strip searched at anytime during his incarceration; (9) had been intermingled with any violent or drug offenders.3
The person who answers the phone at the jail is not going to have this information. This type of information would have to be gathered from various sources such as the medical staff, the Class D program director, administrative staff, etc. This procedure would be extremely cumbersome, not necessarily reliable, a long process that could take hours or even days, and is therefore not a reasonable “ready alternative.”
Furthermore, recall that the Supreme Court stated that This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. But if an inmate
3 Recall Teague fits into several of these categories. He was charged with possession of marijuana by Christian County, had been to court, was likely held with other drug offenders, and had not been strip searched at anytime during his incarceration at the Christian County Jail.
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can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. Id. at 90-91. This alternative is not reasonable and would not be at “de mimimis cost”. This would require the Jail to hire more deputies, as more time is needed to book an inmate. It would also require the Jail to hold the inmate in an area that has no access to other inmates, etc. until all of the information is gathered (hours or even days). And it would require the staff to be more sensitive to any safety concerns that may exist while this investigation is conducted. Both Bell and Turner caution that “Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. . . . [C]ourts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48. And “courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.’” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, recall that two Eastern District of Kentucky courts have held that inmates who are taken to court and/or are on work detail can be strip searched upon their return to the facility. See Richerson and Black, supra. There is absolutely no legitimate reason to differentiate between inmates who are transported to court by a transporting officer and/or on supervised work detail (and therefore likely to have accessed areas to which the public has access) and those inmates who are transported from one correctional facility to another (and also likely have accessed areas to which the public has access). In fact, persons who have been transferred from another facility may be more of a
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security risk than those who were merely transported to court or on work detail. At least in the latter, the detention facility is aware of its own security practices, knows whether the person has been previously strip searched, and exercises control over the deputy jailers who supervise them in court and on work detail. In the case of a transferred inmate, the detention facility knows absolutely nothing about the security practices of the other facility, nor whether the inmate has been previously strip searched (and even if so, how thorough that procedure is), and has absolutely no control over the transporting officer who supervised the inmate during the transport.
In light of the deference that must be accorded to a detention facility’s rules and regulations, it is clear that this Court must rule that Defendants’ practice of stripsearching inmates following a transfer from another detention facility is a reasonable response to a legitimate penological interest and/or concern. Defendants therefore are entitled to partial summary judgment on this issue, as a matter of law.
D. Those cases cited by Plaintiffs for the proposition that a strip search following a transfer from another facility are not relevant and highly distinguishable.
The Plaintiffs have cited five cases which they claim support their argument that inmates cannot be strip searched “following a transfer from another facility.” First, it should be noted that four of the five cases are from the Second Circuit, which apparently takes a very conservative view of a jail’s right to strip search as that circuit does not even recognize the right to strip search inmates following medical treatment or a court appearance. See Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff who was arrested, failed to turn over a pocket knife to the police, placed in a holding room at the police station, subsequently taken to the hospital where he was treated, and then
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thereafter taken to a court appearance was improperly strip searched upon his arrival at the jail). The other three Second Circuit cases cited by Plaintiffs are Lee v. Perez, 175 F.Supp.2d 673 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); N.G. and S.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2nd Cir. 2004); and Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F.Supp.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). All three of these cases cite Shain v. Ellison to support their holdings.
Interestingly, in Shain, despite the dissent’s argument otherwise, the Second Circuit refused to apply the Turner four factor “reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives” standard. 273 F.3d 65-6, 70. The majority believed that the Turner opinion only applied to prisons, not jails. Had the majority applied the test, however, they would have ruled that strip searching an inmate after he refused to hand over a pocket knife, was treated at the local hospital, and had a court appearance was rationally related to a legitimate penological objective.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has applied the Turner four factor “reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives” test to suits brought by pre-trial detainees challenging jail regulations. See e.g., Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991) and Ward v. Washtenaw Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 881 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1989). In addition, several sister courts within this Circuit have applied that test to cases in which pre-trial detainees challenged a jails’ strip search policies. See e.g., Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D. Mich., 2005); Johnson v. City of Kalmazoo, 124 F.Supp.2d 1099 (W.D. Mich., 2000).
As a result, because the Second Circuit cases do not apply the same test as the Sixth Circuit, they should not be considered by this Court. Regardless, as will be discussed below, those cases cited by Plaintiffs, are highly distinguishable because four
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of the five of them did not involve a transfer from another correctional facility. Shain v. Ellison involved a man arrested by the Nassau County Sheriff’s
Department, taken to the hospital and then a court appearance before he was initially incarcerated. 273 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001). The Court held that the policy of strip searching “each newly admitted inmate”, regardless of the criminal charges or whether there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmate has contraband is unconstitutional. This holding is clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case as the inmate was not a transfer from another correctional facility. Furthermore, it clearly contradicts the holding of several courts in the Sixth Circuit.
Lee v. Perez (a Second Circuit case) similarly involved a man who was arrested, taken to the police department to be booked and then taken to court for arraignment before his initial incarceration. 175 F.Supp.2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Accordingly, this case is likewise distinguishable because the arrestee was not a transfer from another correctional facility, as Plaintiffs’ suggest.
N.G. and S.G. v. Connecticut (Second Circuit) involved two runaway juveniles who were not charged with any crimes. 382 F.3d 225 (2nd Cir. 2004). They were strip searched pursuant to Connecticut’s blanket strip search policy for all those admitted to juvenile detention centers. The Second Circuit concluded that the searches conducted upon each initial entry into the custody of the State’s juvenile authorities were lawful, but that “repetitive searches conducted while the girls remained in custody” upon transfer to other juvenile detention centers operated by the State of Connecticut was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This case is clearly distinguishable because there is no evidence that the inmates
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who are received at Hopkins County have already been strip searched by anyone at the previous detention facility and are therefore subjected to “repetitive searches.” Furthermore, in N.G. and S.G., the State of Connecticut owned all of the juvenile detention centers and therefore knew whether the juvenile had previously been strip searched. In addition, Connecticut transported the juveniles. In this case, Hopkins County has no way of knowing whether an inmate was strip searched at the former detention facility, and if they were, to what extent. Nor does Hopkins County have custody of the inmate during the transport.
This case is further distinguished by the fact that the persons strip searched in N.G. and S.G. were juveniles who were not charged with any crimes. One can certainly understand the Court’s reluctance to allow repetitive strip searches of juveniles who are not charged with a crime. In contrast, in this case, the inmates are adults who are charged with crimes. Clearly, for many reasons, this case is distinguishable.
Dodge v. County of Orange (another Second Circuit case) involved inmates who challenged the County’s strip search policy, which dictated that all newly arrested and/or arraigned inmates be strip searched upon their initial arrival at the jail, without regard to the nature of the charges against the inmate. 282 F.Supp.2d 41, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). There is absolutely no indication in the opinion that the plaintiffs in that case were incarcerated in another detention facility prior to their incarceration in Orange County. As such, this case is likewise easily distinguishable.
Finally, the only alleged “transfer case” cited by the Plaintiffs that is not from the Second Circuit is Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F.Supp.2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001). However, that case also did not involve an inmate who was transferred from another detention
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facility. In Ford, the plaintiffs were “female prisoners arrested or detained by members of the Boston Police Department [who] were processed in the usual manner and then transported to the Suffolk County Jail for . . . detainment.” Id. at 135. Again, this case is distinguishable, as it does not involve the opportunities for exposure to areas where contraband can be found as in cases when a person is arrested, taken to a detention facility outside of Hopkins County where they can remain for several hours, days, weeks, or months, wherein they can be “exposed to areas to which the public has access” and then transported to Hopkins County by a transporting officer, where again they can be “exposed to areas to which the public has access.”
Plaintiffs’ have not cited one single relevant case that supports their argument that the Defendants’ former procedure of strip searching inmates following a transfer from another detention facility is unconstitutional. Defendants also have not found any cases in which a court has ruled that a practice of strip searching inmates following a transfer from another county detention facility is unconstitutional. This case is one of first impression. Plaintiffs are asking this Court to be the first Court to determine that a practice utilized by numerous jails and prisons across the United States is unconstitutional, citing only Second Circuit distinguishable authority for their arguments. However, undoubtedly, the Bell, Richerson, Black line of reasoning clearly dictates a finding of constitutionality in this case.
E. The Defendants’ strip search records which indicate a low occurrence of positive results following transport is merely a “testament to the effectiveness” of the search policy.
Plaintiffs attempt to argue that Defendants do not have reasonable suspicion to strip search inmates who are transferred from another detention facility because the strip
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search reports for the last three years indicate positive results in only six instances.
However, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court was unimpressed with a similar
argument made by the Plaintiffs. They determined that the fact that only one inmate had
been “discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution on his person may
be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to a
lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such items when the
opportunity arises.” 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
Furthermore, in Richerson, citing Bell, Judge Forester likewise categorically
rejected a similar argument. 958 F.Supp. 299 (E.D. Ky. 1996). In considering this
argument, the Court stated as follows:
It is clear that a detention center has a legitimate interest in preventing the flow of contraband into the facility. As previously pointed out, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish noted that the smuggling of contraband is ‘all too common an occurrence.’ Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S at 559. While the plaintiff argues that the actual number of times contraband is found in the detention center is relatively insignificant, the Court is unprepared to discount the seriousness of any occurrence of contraband in a detention center. The Court is also mindful of the Supreme Court’s suggestion that the lack of contraband ‘may be more testament to the effectiveness’ of a search policy ‘as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates’ to smuggle contraband when given the opportunity. Id. Thus, the Court is unimpressed by an argument based on the perceived lack of documented incidents involving contraband found within the detention center.
Id. at 306.
Inmates being transferred to Hopkins County are likely aware that they may
be subjected to a strip search upon their arrival at the Hopkins County Jail. As such, this
Court must conclude, as the Supreme Court did, that the low occurrence of positive
results is merely a “testament to the effectiveness” of the strip search policy “as a
deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates” to smuggle contraband
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into the Jail. Furthermore, it only takes one person to smuggle dangerous contraband into the
Jail to cause serious problems, such as injuries, escapes, and/or death. A lax procedure in this regard could result in the Jail’s liability for damages as a result of only one incident when contraband was not found. Plaintiffs appear to attempt to minimize the results of the strip search procedures because in five of the six cases, “the only contraband found was cigarettes or tobacco-related items.” (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 23, emphasis added). However, as former Jailer James Lantrip stated in his affidavit, cigarettes are contraband in the Hopkins County Jail. Persons who are able to smuggle cigarettes into the facility are commonly faced with threats of violence from other inmates who are desperate for a cigarette. In addition, cigarettes are used as a form of barter for trading prescription medications, food, and for gambling. (See Lantrip Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit “F”). Therefore, in this type of setting, cigarettes can be as lethal and/or dangerous as a weapon, drugs, etc. Until Plaintiffs and/or their counsel have been in a position to supervise inmates, many of whom are dangerous, it is inappropriate to pass judgment on what type of contraband should cause concern.
F. Even if this Court determines that the Jail’s former procedure is unconstitutional, Plaintiffs and/or the class members are not entitled to partial summary judgment because this Court must undertake an independent analysis to determine if each of them would have been otherwise subject to a lawful strip search.
Even if this Court determines that the Jail’s former procedure of strip searching inmates upon arrival following a transfer from another detention facility is unconstitutional, Plaintiffs and/or class members are not automatically entitled to a finding that they were “subjected to an illegal search”, as Plaintiffs request. Teague’s
24

deposition testimony is illustrative. Just the day before he was transferred to Hopkins County, he had been charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. He had not been strip searched upon entry into the Christian County Jail. He went to court, where he pled guilty to the charges and again was not strip searched following his court appearance. The fact that Teague, on the day of transfer, had been convicted of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, in and of itself would make him eligible for a lawful strip search. See 501 KAR 3:120(3)(b).
Likewise, Ladonia Nelson, who was strip searched following a transfer from the Caldwell County Jail testified that she was previously convicted of possession of methamphetamine. Clearly, she would have been subjected to a lawful strip search. 501 KAR 3:120(3)(b). Regardless, without considering each inmate file, criminal record, etc., it is impossible to determine if each Plaintiff/class member was subjected to a lawful strip search. As such, even if this Court determines that the strip search policy at issue is unconstitutional, Plaintiffs’ Motion to the extent that it requests a ruling that those Plaintiffs/class members who were subjected to a strip search following a transfer are entitled to a ruling that their search was illegal in violation of their constitutional rights must be denied pending a review of each inmate’s criminal record, jail records, etc.
G. Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs request this Court to issue a preliminary injunction, ordering the Defendants to discontinue enforcement of their procedure of strip searching all arrestees transferred from other detention facilities. They cite the correct test which is that the Court must consider (1) the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the
25

injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest. Déjà vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001).
However, Plaintiffs cannot meet this test and are therefore not entitled to a preliminary injunction. First, as Defendants have made clear in this Response and Motion, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits.
Second, the Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued. Defendants have repealed the previous procedure and replaced it with a procedure that only allows a strip search of a transferring inmate if his criminal charges or some other factor invokes reasonable suspicion. (See Exhibit “A”). In Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Ky, an adult bookstore challenged a city’s zoning ordinance seeking injunctive and monetary relief. 359 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2004). During the pendency of the action, the city amended the offending ordinance such that it no longer prohibited Brandywine, Inc. from operating in the zone where it was located. The Sixth Circuit held that the mootness doctrine precluded the Court from issuing an injunction when the ordinance was no longer in effect. Id. at 836. “We can neither declare unconstitutional nor enjoin the enforcement of a provision that is no longer in effect.” Id. As a result, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief must be denied as the Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits, and regardless of that, they will not suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued since the procedure is no longer in effect. IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants hereby respectfully request that Plaintiffs’
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Motion for Summary Judgment and for Preliminary Injunction be denied and that
Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. This Court is barred from
determining that a former procedure is unconstitutional. However, Defendants request
that this Court determine that the past procedure of strip searching those inmates
following a transfer from another detention facility was in fact constitutional and
therefore dismiss all such claims by the Plaintiffs/class members.
Respectfully submitted,
DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929 Phone 270-443-8253 Fax 270-442-6000
By: s/ Stacey Blankenship Stacey A. Blankenship
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 31st, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
R. MICHAEL SULLIVAN ALLEN W. HOLBROOK SULLIVAN MOUNTJOY STAINBACK & MILLER P O BOX 727 100 ST ANN STREET OWENSBORO KY 42302-0727 Attorney for Defendants
HON BART L GREENWALD HON JAMES R CRAIG FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 WEST MARKET STREET 32ND FLOOR LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs
27

I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
HON GREGORY A BELZLEY DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 WEST JEFFERSON STREET LOUISVILLE KY 40202 Attorney for Plaintiffs HON JOHN T SOYARS FOSTER SOYARS & ASSOCIATES 209 EAST 14TH STREET P O BOX 24 HOPKINSVILLE KY 42240 Attorney for Defendants on this 31st day of July, 2006 By _s/ Stacey Blankenship_____
Stacey A. Blankenship
28

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO

[Filed Electronically]

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et al., Plaintiffs
vs. HOPKINS COUNTY, KY, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03-CV-3-M ) ) ) )

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT I. INTRODUCTION
The parties, by counsel, enter into this Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement"), which they will submit to the Court for its approval. The Agreement settles all claims of the "Entry" Class and "Release" Class certified by the Court, including, without limitation on the generality of the foregoing, claims of class representatives and absent class members who have not opted out, for all money damages, attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and interest, by establishing a common fund of $3 million, to be shared among participating class members after payment of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, claims administration expenses, payment to class representatives, and payment to deposed class members, as provided in ¶¶ 30 and 31 below. Under this Agreement class members will receive one payment no matter how many times they were admitted into and/or searched while incarcerated at the Hopkins County Detention Center ("the Jail") during the class period.

II. TERMS A. Notice 1. Notice of the settlement shall issue on or before August 18, 2008, both
directly to the last known addresses of all potential class members and by publication, and in a form to be agreed upon by the parties, approved by the Court, and intended to maximize notice to the class and ease the filing of proofs of claim and administration of the settlement.
B. Settlement Fund 2. Defendants will provide a settlement fund of $3 million to settle all claims of Plaintiffs and the classes, including claims for attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses, costs of administering the settlement, and interest, if any. 3. The parties agree and acknowledge that Defendants have denied liability in whole, and that the payment and other agreements contained herein were made and were given without admission of liability which is expressly denied, and which payment and other agreements were made and given by Defendants solely for the purpose of avoiding the expense of litigation, attorneys’ fees, and other costs. No language contained in this Agreement or in any orders issued by the Court approving or denying either preliminary or final approval to this Agreement shall in any way be construed as acknowledgments or admissions of liability, all of which are expressly denied by Defendants. 4. Defendants and their counsel agree to provide reasonable assistance to Plaintiffs’ counsel and to the Claims Administrator to facilitate the administration of this settlement by providing access to data, information and documents necessary to determine the last known address and contact information for all potential class members. Any
2

information provided pursuant to such disclosure order shall be used only in connection with this litigation, and shall be kept confidential and not disclosed to anyone other than Plaintiffs' counsel and the Claims Administrator except as set forth in this Agreement.
5. Any request for such additional fees and costs shall be by application to the Court with opportunity for objection by Defendants. No such motion shall be allowed nor any additional fees or costs paid by the Defendants due to delays in the claims process for any reason, provided the Defendants have paid the $3 million settlement proceeds set forth in ¶ 2 above to the Claims Administrator to establish the settlement fund in accordance with this Agreement. The payment of said amount shall fulfill and satisfy any and all financial obligations of the Defendants under this Agreement and no further fees or costs of any kind shall be paid by the Defendants.
6. Defendants shall maintain and control the settlement funds until such time as they are distributed to the Claims Administrator, who shall set up an interest bearing bank account or accounts at a bank within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, as may be appropriate, for payment of the qualifying individual claims which may be allowed under this Agreement. The Claims Administrator shall also post a bond and obtain appropriate insurance to guarantee the performance of the obligations required of the Claims Administrator under this Agreement and to pay for any claims of liability in connection with administration of the settlement fund. Such funds shall be distributed to qualified claimants by the Claims Administrator within 30 days of entry of the Court's Order resolving any appeals of disqualified claimants and dismissing this case.
3

III. COURT SUPERVISION 7. Defendants shall be obligated to perform their obligations under this
Agreement upon the Court's entry of an order approving this Agreement after a fairness hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e). After entry of such order, this case shall remain pending during administration of the settlement. The Court may enter orders as appropriate to enforce this Agreement, to adjudicate the rights and responsibilities of the parties, to resolve appeals from Defendants and/or disqualified claimants, and to effect fair and orderly administration, as necessary, of the settlement fund. After distribution of all settlement proceeds and satisfaction and completion of all duties and responsibilities imposed by this Agreement, the Court shall enter an order of dismissal effecting the dismissal of all class claims against Defendants with prejudice, and incorporating the terms of this Agreement pursuant to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
8. Any deadlines, dates, or other details in this Agreement may be amended only by agreement of the parties and after approval of the Court on a showing of good cause. IV. FAIRNESS HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 23 (e) FED. R. CIV. P.
9. A fairness hearing regarding this settlement will be conducted on October 20, 2008, beginning at 9:00 a.m., before the United States District Court in Owensboro, Kentucky. The deadline for filing claims shall be set for a date not less than 60 days following the fairness hearing and the Order approving this Agreement.
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V. CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR 10. Class counsel recommends that Analytics, Inc. be approved by the Court as
Claims Administrator. Analytics, Inc. has substantial experience in processing claims filed by claimants in class action settlements similar in size and scope to the settlement in this action, and performing related administrative work and, if approved by the Court at the preliminary approval hearing, shall be retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel under a contract requiring a bond or surety to Defendants for the settlement funds, with all payments being paid from the settlement fund. Counsel for the parties and the parties themselves shall have no responsibility or liability for administering the settlement.
11. The Claims Administrator will administer notice to class members in the manner prescribed by the Court; shall accept and docket all claim forms; shall send copies of all objections to the settlement to counsel for the parties on a rolling basis as soon as practicable after they are received; shall send copies of all claims forms to counsel for the parties on a rolling basis as soon as practicable after they are received, who shall have an opportunity to object; shall sustain or overrule any objections of Defendants to claims made, subject to further appeal to the Court; shall send all notices that a claim has been either accepted or rejected to class members; shall resolve any appeals of claim denials, subject to further appeal to the Court; shall calculate the amount of each claim pursuant to the formula set out in this Agreement; shall distribute settlement funds to approved claimants; and shall report to the Court as necessary including providing a final report.
12. Counsel for the parties will oversee settlement administration and will provide direction to the Claims Administrator as needed. In the event of any dispute as to whether any of the parties has failed to comply with any of the terms of this Agreement, the parties
5

shall contact the Court in an effort to resolve any such dispute prior to filing any motion seeking specific performance. VI. NOTICE, OBJECTIONS, AND CLAIMS
13. The Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Certification of Class Action and Settlement and of the Fairness Hearing (“Notice of Settlement") and a Settlement Claim Form by first class mail postage prepaid to all potential class members at their last known addresses on or before August 18, 2008. The Notice of Settlement and Settlement Claim Form shall be in a form jointly agreed to by the parties and submitted to and approved by the Court. If any mail is returned by the post office with notice of a more current address, the Claims Administrator will resend the notice to that address. The Claims Administrator is not required to make any further efforts to send mail directly to class members. A Notice of Settlement and Settlement Claim Form will be made available to anyone who requests such information. Claim forms will be available on request through the Claims Administrator including through a toll-free number.
14. The Notice of Settlement will include a summary of the terms of the settlement and the class member’s right to contest the settlement.
15. The Settlement Claim Form shall request the class member’s contact information, affirmation that he meets the class definition and that all information on the claim form is true and accurate, instructions for check delivery, and a Form W-9. The claim form shall include an acknowledgement that the information set forth therein is true and correct to the best of the claimant’s recollection, and is signed under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
6

16. The Claims Administrator will also publish the Notice of Settlement ("Published Notice") in the Madisonville Messenger, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Providence Journal Enterprise, the Kentucky New Era, the Dawson Springs Progress, the Central City Leader News, the Owensboro Messenger Inquirer, the Sebree Banner, the Sturgis News, the Henderson The Gleaner, and the Paducah Sun. The Published Notice shall be in a form jointly agreed to by the parties and submitted to and approved by the Court. Defendants agree to post the Published Notice in the admission area of the Jail. The notices will be posted contemporaneously with the mailing of the Notice of Settlement and publication of the Published Notice, and will remain posted until the last day that the settlement claim forms can be filed. In addition, Defendants have agreed to make available, during the same time frame defined in the prior sentence, to inmates (or anyone else) who requests it, a copy of the Notice of Settlement, and the cost of those copies shall be paid out of the settlement fund and shall be considered part of the cost of administering the settlement and shall not serve to increase Defendants' costs or liabilities under this Agreement.
17. The Claims Administrator will send a claim form to anyone who requests one before the time for filing claim forms has expired. The Claims Administrator will also maintain a toll-free number for claimants to call to request a claim form or with questions. This number will be operational for at least five months following Court approval of this Agreement.
18. In order for a class member to claim a share of the settlement, he/she must submit to the Claims Administrator a valid and complete Settlement Claim Form, postmarked no later than 60 days following the date of entry of the Court Order approving
7

this Agreement after the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) fairness hearing. This deadline is the “Claims Deadline.” The Claims Administrator shall forward copies of the claims forms to Defendants’ counsel as they are received, and Defendants’ counsel shall have 60 days after the date they receive each claim form to file written objections to any individual claims with the Claims Administrator. This 60-day period for objecting may be extended by the Claims Administrator or by the Court for good cause shown. The Claims Administrator shall make a written decision as to any objection within five days of receipt thereof, after giving Plaintiffs’ counsel three weeks to respond in writing to Defendants’ objections, which can be extended by the Claims Administrator or the Court for good cause shown. The parties shall provide copies of all written objections and/or responses thereto to opposing counsel. Any appeal of such written decision of the Claims Administrator with which Plaintiffs or Defendants disagree must be filed with the Court within 15 days of the such party's receipt of the Claims Administrator's written decision.
19. In order for a class member to object to the proposed settlement, he/she must submit a written objection to the Claims Administrator, but such written objection must be postmarked not later than October 10, 2008, and must be received by the Claims Administrator prior to the fairness hearing, in order to be considered timely. The Claims Administrator shall provide copies of all objections to counsel for the parties as soon as practicable by mail and/or fax as may be necessary, so that all objections are provided to counsel for the parties prior to the fairness hearing. Alternatively, or in addition to filing a written objection, an objector may appear in person or through counsel at the fairness hearing when the objection will be considered by the Court. The objecting class member must also submit a Settlement Claim Form to the Claims Administrator if he wishes to be
8

eligible to share in the settlement should it be approved despite his objection. VII. APPROVAL AND APPEALS
20. The Claims Administrator will review each claim form to determine whether the claimant is a qualifying class member by confirming: (a) that the Settlement Claim Form is timely and valid; (b) that the information on the form is consistent with available data previously provided by Defendants, and supplemented by Defendants in their objection, if any; and (c) that the form is completely filled out and signed.
21. The Claims Administrator may, with knowledge and written consent of Defendants, waive a technical defect in a claim form to achieve substantial justice.
22. If a claimant does not meet the class definition, the Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Claim Denial to the claimant. Notices of Claim Denial shall be sent promptly but in no event later than 90 days following the Claims Deadline. The denial notice will indicate the reason or reasons for the denial.
23. In order to object to the Claims Administrator’s determination that he is not a class member, a claimant must file a written appeal to the Claims Administrator postmarked no later than 15 days after the date of the mailing of the Notice of Claim Denial. He must include reliable written documentation, which need not be an official record, that shows that he is a class member, and he may also include a sworn written statement subject to the penalty of perjury. The Claims Administrator will consult with counsel for the parties and make a determination on each appeal no later than 30 days after the deadline for class members to file such appeals. The Claims Administrator will inform the class member in writing of its determination, and provide copies to all counsel within 30 days of such determination. In order to object to the Claims Administrator’s final determination that he is
9

not a class member, a claimant must file a written appeal with the Court postmarked no later than 15 days after the date of the mailing of the final Notice of Claim Denial. Rulings by the Claims Administrator may also be appealed by the parties directly to the Court within 15 days of the receipt of the notice from the Claims Administrator approving or denying the claim. There shall be no further right of appeal beyond review of the ruling of the Claims Administrator by the Court.
24. The Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Claim Approval (“Notice of Claim Approval”) to each approved claimant, absent objection, promptly but in no event later than 90 days after the Claims Deadline.
25. A claimant who used a different name upon admission to the Jail must present documentation establishing that he/she is the person referred to in Defendants’ records. VIII. EXPENSES, ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
26. All administrative costs, including the Claims Administrator’s fees and expenses, will be paid from the settlement funds.
27. Plaintiffs’ attorneys' fees and litigation expenses will be paid from the settlement funds.
28. Class counsel will be paid only the actual attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in this litigation, not to exceed $1.5 million.
29. Plaintiffs' litigation expenses and attorney's fee will be calculated and paid within 30 days of entry of the Order approving this Agreement following the fairness hearing. Claims administration costs, including but not limited to any additional attorney fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs' counsel after June 9, 2008, will be calculated and
10

paid within 30 days of entry of the Order of Dismissal by the Court. In addition, any copy costs incurred by Defendants pursuant to the obligation described in ¶16 above will be itemized and submitted to the Claims Administrator and counsel for Plaintiffs prior to entry of the Order of Dismissal, and will also be paid within 30 days of entry of the Order of Dismissal. IX. DISTRIBUTION TO CLASS MEMBERS
30. Named class representatives Eddie Sutton and Lester Hank Turner (the first and originating plaintiffs in this case) will receive $35,000.00 each; named class representatives Robin Littlepage, Tim May, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia Nelson, Linda Ford and Robert Teague $25,000.00 each; and named class representatives Daniel Todd and Tony Ward $15,000.00 each, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants as well as for their service as named class representatives, including but not limited to surrendering their anonymity, bringing suit, submitting to discovery, and participating in and authorizing the settlement of this class action as set forth herein, all in complete satisfaction and discharge of their duties as named class representatives. Their checks shall issue within 30 days of entry of the Order approving this Agreement following the fairness hearing.
31. In addition to the above, all class members who have valid claims, who have been deposed in these proceedings, and who submit a claim form, shall be paid $4,000.00 each in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants. A list identifying such persons is attached hereto as Appendix A.
32. All remaining class members will receive payment from the settlement funds that remain after deducting attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, expenses of claims
11

administration, payments to class representatives, and payments to deposed class members. Persons subjected only to one or more strip-searches on admission to the Jail, or one or more strip-searches after they became entitled to release from the Jail, and thus are members of only the "Entry" Class or the "Release" Class, will be paid an amount up to but not exceeding $1500.00, depending upon the number of approved claimants to the settlement fund, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants. Persons subjected both to one or more strip-searches on admission to the Jail and one or more strip-searches after they became entitled to release from the Jail, and thus are members of both the "Entry" Class and the "Release" Class, will be paid an amount up to but not exceeding $2500.00 depending upon the number of approved claimants to the settlement fund, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants.
33. The Claims Administrator will calculate the amount of money due each class member by assigning three points to every approved claimant who is a member of only one of the certified classes. Approved claimants who are members of both classes will be assigned five points. The Claims Administrator will divide the amount remaining in the settlement fund (after the payments made as provided above) by the total number of points to determine the amount each approved claimant will receive. Class members will receive only one payment no matter how many times they were admitted into and/or searched while incarcerated at the Jail during the class period.
34. Each class member’s check will be made payable only in his or her name or, upon the death of a class member, to the personal representative of the deceased class member’s estate upon filing an affidavit in compliance with the applicable statutory procedure for collection of personal property by affidavit of the rightful heir. The check will
12

be mailed to the class member at their mailing address. Any change of address request must be made in writing and must be signed by the claimant.
35. If a participating class member is confined in a prison, hospital, or other institution and has provided the address of such institution for payment, the settlement check will be sent to an appropriate institutional address unless the class member makes other acceptable arrangements in writing with the Claims Administrator. If a claimant’s check is returned and the Claims Administrator has no record of a forwarding address, the Claims Administrator, after consulting with counsel for the parties, shall have discretion to take reasonable steps to locate such claimant. X. POST-DISTRIBUTION ADMINISTRATION
36. Any settlement funds remaining after all payments contemplated by this Settlement Agreement have been paid will be returned by the Claims Administrator to Defendants.
37. At the conclusion of the claims administration process, the Claims Administrator shall provide a full and complete report to the parties and the Court that will include: (a) a list of approved claimants and the amounts paid to each; (b) a list of individuals whose claims were rejected by the administrator and the reasons therefor; and (c) a detailed accounting of all expenses incurred by and fees of the Claims Administrator. XI. DECEASED CLASS MEMBERS
38. If a class member is deceased, a legally authorized representative may file a Settlement Claim Form on behalf of the estate. However, the representative must provide to the Claims Administrator the documentation required by ¶ 34 above, as well as a certified copy of the Probate Court order appointing the person as the authorized
13

representative of the deceased class member prior to the claims’ deadline, or the claim will be denied.
XII. RELEASE 39. In consideration of payment of the settlement amount, Defendants will be released from all liability for all class members’ claims for all strip- searches that were part of this lawsuit including class members who do not file claims, except for any class members who requested exclusion and filed a claim within the statute of limitations. The parties have expressly agreed that the release of claims arising from the settlement includes all visual inspections, including without limitation visual body cavity inspections, that otherwise fall within the scope of the claims certified as a class action by the Court in this case. The parties also agree that all such claims against all of Defendants' employees and other agents are barred because the settlement expressly covers Defendants, its employees and agents. Class members will be afforded an opportunity for exclusion as provided for in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(3), and as specified in the Notice of Settlement which will be submitted to the Court for approval.
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Date: July 17, 2008 Date: July 17, 2008
LOULibrary TMP.TMP 729745v2

For Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class:
/s/ Gregory A. Belzley______________ Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202
Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202
For Defendants:
/s/ Stacey A. Blankenship_____________ Stacey A. Blankenship Denton & Keuler P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929
Michael Sullivan 100 St. Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727

15

 
 Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 520 Filed 01/26/10 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 6045

120487

FILED ELECTRONICALLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION Case No. 4:03-CV-00003-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et. al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DISMISSING

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et. al.

DEFENDANTS

*** *** *** *** ***

The parties having filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and Order

Dismissing this action, and the Court now being otherwise sufficiently advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. This class action and all claims against all Defendants and their insurers are hereby

dismissed with prejudice;

2. All class members who did not make a timely request to be excluded from the class

are barred and enjoined from commencing and/or prosecuting any claim or action

against Defendants relating to the claims alleged in the Complaint filed herein;

3. All funds remaining in the settlement fund shall be returned to Defendants’ insurers

within seven (7) days of entry of this Judgment;

4. This is a final judgment, and there is no just cause for delay of its entry.

Copies to: Counsel of record

January 25, 2010

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:03CV-003-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated

PLAINTIFFS

V.

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon a Sealed Letter and ClaimForm filed by PamWilliams

[DN 487]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision.

On July 11, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement in this case. On August 25,

2008, the claims administrator, Analytics, Inc., mailed potential class members a Notice of Hearing

and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form via first-class mail at her last known address

[See DN 425]. The notice inform ed potential class m embers of the October 20, 2008, Fairness

Hearing and of the December 31, 2008, deadline for filing of claim forms. On October 20, 2008,

the Court approved the settlement agreement.

On August 26, 2009, this C ourt received a letter and claim form from Pamela Williams.

Williams’ claim form, dated August 24, 2009, alleges illegal entry and release searches. In her letter

to the Court, Williams represents that she was contacted in October of 2008 about the case and she

expressed her interest in continuing with her calims against the Defendants. Additionally, Williams

indicated that she has moved several times in the last year and did not receive the notice in question.

According to Williams, she contacted class counselrecently and was informed by counsel to notify the Court that she had moved.
“The Court has general equitable power to modify the terms of a class action settlement.” In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation, 189 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D.N.J. 1999). “A Court may assert this power to allow late-filed proofs of claim and late-cured proofs of claim.” Id. (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig. , 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); The M anual For Complex Litig. § 30.47 at 248 (3d ed.1995) (“Adequa te time should be allowed for late claim s before any refund or other disposition of settlement fund occurs.”)); Grace v. City of Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413, 415 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (“The adoption of the good cause standard [to a deci sion to accept untimely claim forms] is ‘an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion in defining the scope of the class action judgment and settlement.’”) (quoting Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 1981)). Courtsconsidering requests to extend deadlines for filing claimforms in class actions frequently analyze these late claims “under the rubric of whether the claimant has shown ‘excusable neglect.’” In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing In reCendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321, 324 (D.N.J. 1999)). See also Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2000); Silvercreek Management, Inc. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 534 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2008). In determining whether a claimant should have the benefit of excusableneglect the Court should examine the following four factors: “1) the danger of prejudice to the nonm ovant; 2) the length of the delay and its potential effect on judicial proceedings; 3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” In re Orthopedic
2

Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.3d at 322-323 (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.). Based upon a review of the record and after conids ering the factors set forth above, the Court
will permit Williams to submit the late claim form. Defendants cannot prove harm given that the original limit of Defendants’ financial obligation has not been expanded. Similarly, the Court finds that the eight m onth delay will not unnecessa rily prolong these proceedings. The claim s administrator is currently reviewing one claimand the case has not been closed. Further, Williams represents to the Court tha t she did not receive the notice in question. Upon learning of the settlement, she prom ptly submitted the claim form provided by class counsel and a letter of explanation to the Court. Accordingly, after a review of the above factors, the Court will permit Williams to submit a claim form to the claims administrator. Class counsel shall provide the Claims Administrator the claim form filed by Williams in this action. The parties shall adhere to the claims approval and appeal process set forth in the settlem ent agreement executed on Jul y 11, 2008. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 18, 20-23.)
Despite Defendants’ arguments, the Court declines to address whether W illiams qualifies as a class m ember under either the entry or release class. However, upon an initial revi ew of Williams’ claim form, the Court foresees a potential factual issue that will need to be addressed by the Claims Administrator. In answering questionsregarding her release strip search claim, Williams checked the answer “Yes” in response to the question, “Did the strip search(es) upon release occur . . . [u]pon release from Jail, but before you were transferred to another jail or prison?” Williams qualified this answer by underlining only the portion “[u]pon release from jail.” Thus, the Claims Administrator will have to determine whether Williams was strip searched upon release from jail or, instead, was strip searched before she was transferred to another jail or prison.
3

For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDEREDthat no later than October 23, 2009, class counsel shall provide the Claims Administrator the claim form attached to Pam Williams’ letter.

cc: counsel of record Pam Williams

October 9, 2009

4

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:03CV-003-M

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated

PLAINTIFFS

V.

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon a motion by Chyrle Taylor for a declaration of rights,

to intervene, and to hold in abeyance [DN 474] and on a m otion by Chyrle Taylor for equitable

relief, for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), or, in the alternative, to reopen [DN 484]. Fully

briefed, this matter is ripe for decision.

On July 11, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement in this case. On August 25,

2008, the claims administrator, Analytics, Inc., mailed potential class members, including Chyrle

Taylor, a Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form via first-class

mail at her current residence [See DN 425]. The notice inform ed potential class members of the

October 20, 2008, Fair ness Hearing and of the December 31, 2008, deadline for filing of claim

forms. On October 20, 2008, the Court approved thesettlement agreement. Jonathan Reid, Project

Manager for Analytics, Inc., testified that records ofthe claims administrator indicate that the notice

sent to Taylor was not returned as undelivered and that Analytics did notreceive a claim form from

Taylor. (Jonathan Reid Affidavit at ¶ 1-3.)

On August 19, 2009, Taylor, through counsel, filed two motions essentially challenging the
class notification procedure utilized by the Court and requesting an extension of time to submit a
claim. Taylor represents that she has filed outnumerous forms since June of 2005, attended a claim
meeting in May of 2007, received correspondence in this matter, was deposed on August 15, 2007,
and repeatedly called the office of class c ounsel to check on the status of her claim during 2008.
According to Taylor, she spoke personally with Mr. Belzley on Septem ber 26, 2008, and was
informed that the case was settled and that sh e “would be getting [ her] money ‘sometime next
year.’” Taylor represents that she did not receive the Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action
Settlement and Claim Form mailed by Analytics in August of 2008. Taylor states that she called
class counsel on August 12, 2009, to check on the statusof the case and was informed that she was
not entitled to payment because she hadn’t completed a claim form. (Taylor Affidavit at ¶ 14.)
A. Notice
Taylor maintains that the notice ofthe settlement provided to the class members violated the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the Due Process Clause. “Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e)(1), a district court, when approving a class action settlement, ‘must direct notice
in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.’” Fidel v. Farley,
534 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The Due Prcoess Clause, moreover, gives unnamed class members the right to notice of the settlement of a class action. [ DeJulius v. New England Health Care Em ployees Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 943-44 (10th Cir. 2005)] (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). To com port with the requirem ents of due process, notice m ust be “reasonably calculated to reach interested par ties.”
2

Karkoukli’s, Inc. v. Dohany, 409 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoti ng Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-20, 70 S.Ct. 652); see also DeJulius, 429 F.3d at 944. Due process does not, however, require actual notice to each party intended to be bound by the adjudication of a representative action. DeJulius, 429 F.3d at 944 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14, 70 S.Ct . 652); In re Integra Realty Res., Inc. , 262 F.3d 1089, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2001); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1994). Fidel, 534 F.3d at 513-514. On October 20, 2008, the Court approved the settlement agreement between the parties and directed that potential class members be informed of the settlement and afforded the opportunity to make claims against the settlem ent fund. Thereafter, 3,437 individual notices of settlement and proof of claimforms were mailed to potential classmembers via first-class mail. The Court directed that notice be published in no less than 11 newspape rs of general circulation providing potential class members with contact information from which they could obtain a proof of claim form. The claims administrator also set up a website fromwhich class members could download and print off proof of claim forms. The Court finds that the notice process approved by the Court was adequate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the standards of due process because i t was directed in a reasonable m anner to all prospective class members who would be bound by theSettlement Agreement. Contrary to Taylor’s argument, there is no requirement in the rules or case law that such notices be sent certified mail or be made by telephoning all class m embers. “[N]otice by first class m ail ordinarily satisfies r ule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that class m embers receive ‘the best notice practicable under the circumstances.’” Peters v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1992); UAW v. General Motors Corp. , 2006 WL 891151, 34 (E.D. Mi ch. 2006); Johnson v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 2006 WL 2433474, *4 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (first class mail to class members’ last known addresses satisfies notice requirement); In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Securities Litigation,
3

1995 WL 355722 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Accordingly, the Court rejects Tayl or’s challenge to the sufficiency of notice of the class settlement.
B. Excusable Neglect Pursuant to Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), Taylor requests an enlargement of time in which to file a late claim and participate in the settlement. Additionally, Taylor submits that there should be no need for her to file a claimform since all the necessary proof regarding the substan ce of her claim is in the record. Accordingl y, Taylor argues that the Court should accept her statusas a class member and grant her the award set forth in the settlement agreement. “The Court has general equitable power to modify the terms of a class action settlement.” In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation, 189 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D.N.J. 1999). “A Court may assert this power to allow late-filed proofs of claim and late-cured proofs of claim.” Id. (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); The Manual For Complex Litig. § 30.47 at 248 (3d ed.1995) (“Adequa te time should be allowed for late claim s before any refund or other disposition of settlement fund occurs.”)); Grace v. City of Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413, 415 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (“The adoption of the good cause standard [ to a decision to accept untimely claim forms] is ‘an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion in defining the scope of the class action judgment and settlement.’”) (quoting Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 1981)). Courts considering requsets to extend deadlines for filing claimforms in class actions frequently analyze these late claims “under the rubric of whether the claimant has shown ‘excusable neglect.’” In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing In reCendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321, 324 (D.N.J. 1999)).
4

See also Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993); In

re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2000); Silvercreek Management, Inc.

v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 534 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2008). In determining whether a

claimant should have the benefit of excusableneglect the Court should examine the following four

factors: “1) the danger of prejudice to the nonm ovant; 2) the length of the delay and its potenti al

effect on judicial proceedings; 3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the

reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” In re Orthopedic

Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.3d at 322-323 (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.).

Based upon a review of the record and after conidsering the factors set forth above, the Court

concludes that Taylor’s actions constitute excu sable neglect. The Court f inds that under the

circumstances articulated by Taylor and verified by class counsel Taylor adequately pursued her

claim against the Defendants. Defendants cannot prove harm given that the original lim it of

Defendants’ financial obligation has not been expanded. Similarly, the Court finds that the eight

month delay will not unnecessarily prolong theesproceedings. The claims administrator is currently

reviewing one claim and the case has not been closed. Further, Taylor represents to the Court that

she did not receive the notice in question and had not m

oved from her original address.

Additionally, the record reflects that Taylor com municated with class counsel on at least one

occasion and called the class action hotline on numerous occasions in 2008. Class counsel verified

that Taylor had spoken with him in September of 2008. In the present litigation, Taylor filled out

the initial claim forms and submitted to a deposition regarding her strip search claim . The Court

finds that Taylor adequately pursued her claim in good faith. Accordingly, a fter a review of the

above factors, the Court will permit Taylor to submit a claim form to the claims administrator in

5

accordance procedures set forth in the Settlem ent Agreement. However, the Court declines to decide whether Taylor qualifies as a m ember of the class at this tim e. Instead, the parties shall adhere to the claims approval and appeal processset forth in the Settlement Agreement executed on July 11, 2008. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 18, 20-23.)
For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by Chyrle Taylor for a declaration of rights, to intervene, a nd to hold in abeyance [DN 474] and the m otion by Chyrle Taylor for equitable relief, for relie f pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), or, in the alternative, to reopen [DN 484] is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than October 23, 2009 , claimant, Chyrle Taylor, shall file a claim form with the Claim s Administrator.

cc: counsel of record Thresa Hinton, counsel for Chyrle Taylor

October 9, 2009

6

 
 Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418 Filed 07/18/08 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 5340

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03CV-00003-JHM
EDWARD LEE SUTTON, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.
VS.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Upon motion of the parties, and the Court having considered the arguments of counsel and being otherwise sufficiently advised;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ motion is GRANTED and the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement attached to this Order as Exhibit A;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the settlement shall issue no later than August 18, 2008.
ENTERED this July 18, 2008

Copies to: Counsel of Record

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 5341

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO

[Filed Electronically]

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et al., Plaintiffs
vs. HOPKINS COUNTY, KY, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03-CV-3-M ) ) ) )

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT I. INTRODUCTION
The parties, by counsel, enter into this Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement"), which they will submit to the Court for its approval. The Agreement settles all claims of the "Entry" Class and "Release" Class certified by the Court, including, without limitation on the generality of the foregoing, claims of class representatives and absent class members who have not opted out, for all money damages, attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and interest, by establishing a common fund of $3 million, to be shared among participating class members after payment of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, claims administration expenses, payment to class representatives, and payment to deposed class members, as provided in ¶¶ 30 and 31 below. Under this Agreement class members will receive one payment no matter how many times they were admitted into and/or searched while incarcerated at the Hopkins County Detention Center ("the Jail") during the class period.

EXHIBIT A

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 5342
II. TERMS A. Notice 1. Notice of the settlement shall issue on or before August 18, 2008, both
directly to the last known addresses of all potential class members and by publication, and in a form to be agreed upon by the parties, approved by the Court, and intended to maximize notice to the class and ease the filing of proofs of claim and administration of the settlement.
B. Settlement Fund 2. Defendants will provide a settlement fund of $3 million to settle all claims of Plaintiffs and the classes, including claims for attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses, costs of administering the settlement, and interest, if any. 3. The parties agree and acknowledge that Defendants have denied liability in whole, and that the payment and other agreements contained herein were made and were given without admission of liability which is expressly denied, and which payment and other agreements were made and given by Defendants solely for the purpose of avoiding the expense of litigation, attorneys’ fees, and other costs. No language contained in this Agreement or in any orders issued by the Court approving or denying either preliminary or final approval to this Agreement shall in any way be construed as acknowledgments or admissions of liability, all of which are expressly denied by Defendants. 4. Defendants and their counsel agree to provide reasonable assistance to Plaintiffs’ counsel and to the Claims Administrator to facilitate the administration of this settlement by providing access to data, information and documents necessary to determine the last known address and contact information for all potential class members. Any
2

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 5343
information provided pursuant to such disclosure order shall be used only in connection with this litigation, and shall be kept confidential and not disclosed to anyone other than Plaintiffs' counsel and the Claims Administrator except as set forth in this Agreement.
5. Any request for such additional fees and costs shall be by application to the Court with opportunity for objection by Defendants. No such motion shall be allowed nor any additional fees or costs paid by the Defendants due to delays in the claims process for any reason, provided the Defendants have paid the $3 million settlement proceeds set forth in ¶ 2 above to the Claims Administrator to establish the settlement fund in accordance with this Agreement. The payment of said amount shall fulfill and satisfy any and all financial obligations of the Defendants under this Agreement and no further fees or costs of any kind shall be paid by the Defendants.
6. Defendants shall maintain and control the settlement funds until such time as they are distributed to the Claims Administrator, who shall set up an interest bearing bank account or accounts at a bank within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, as may be appropriate, for payment of the qualifying individual claims which may be allowed under this Agreement. The Claims Administrator shall also post a bond and obtain appropriate insurance to guarantee the performance of the obligations required of the Claims Administrator under this Agreement and to pay for any claims of liability in connection with administration of the settlement fund. Such funds shall be distributed to qualified claimants by the Claims Administrator within 30 days of entry of the Court's Order resolving any appeals of disqualified claimants and dismissing this case.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 5344
III. COURT SUPERVISION 7. Defendants shall be obligated to perform their obligations under this
Agreement upon the Court's entry of an order approving this Agreement after a fairness hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e). After entry of such order, this case shall remain pending during administration of the settlement. The Court may enter orders as appropriate to enforce this Agreement, to adjudicate the rights and responsibilities of the parties, to resolve appeals from Defendants and/or disqualified claimants, and to effect fair and orderly administration, as necessary, of the settlement fund. After distribution of all settlement proceeds and satisfaction and completion of all duties and responsibilities imposed by this Agreement, the Court shall enter an order of dismissal effecting the dismissal of all class claims against Defendants with prejudice, and incorporating the terms of this Agreement pursuant to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
8. Any deadlines, dates, or other details in this Agreement may be amended only by agreement of the parties and after approval of the Court on a showing of good cause. IV. FAIRNESS HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 23 (e) FED. R. CIV. P.
9. A fairness hearing regarding this settlement will be conducted on October 20, 2008, beginning at 9:00 a.m., before the United States District Court in Owensboro, Kentucky. The deadline for filing claims shall be set for a date not less than 60 days following the fairness hearing and the Order approving this Agreement.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 5345
V. CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR 10. Class counsel recommends that Analytics, Inc. be approved by the Court as
Claims Administrator. Analytics, Inc. has substantial experience in processing claims filed by claimants in class action settlements similar in size and scope to the settlement in this action, and performing related administrative work and, if approved by the Court at the preliminary approval hearing, shall be retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel under a contract requiring a bond or surety to Defendants for the settlement funds, with all payments being paid from the settlement fund. Counsel for the parties and the parties themselves shall have no responsibility or liability for administering the settlement.
11. The Claims Administrator will administer notice to class members in the manner prescribed by the Court; shall accept and docket all claim forms; shall send copies of all objections to the settlement to counsel for the parties on a rolling basis as soon as practicable after they are received; shall send copies of all claims forms to counsel for the parties on a rolling basis as soon as practicable after they are received, who shall have an opportunity to object; shall sustain or overrule any objections of Defendants to claims made, subject to further appeal to the Court; shall send all notices that a claim has been either accepted or rejected to class members; shall resolve any appeals of claim denials, subject to further appeal to the Court; shall calculate the amount of each claim pursuant to the formula set out in this Agreement; shall distribute settlement funds to approved claimants; and shall report to the Court as necessary including providing a final report.
12. Counsel for the parties will oversee settlement administration and will provide direction to the Claims Administrator as needed. In the event of any dispute as to whether any of the parties has failed to comply with any of the terms of this Agreement, the parties
5

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 5346
shall contact the Court in an effort to resolve any such dispute prior to filing any motion seeking specific performance. VI. NOTICE, OBJECTIONS, AND CLAIMS
13. The Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Certification of Class Action and Settlement and of the Fairness Hearing (“Notice of Settlement") and a Settlement Claim Form by first class mail postage prepaid to all potential class members at their last known addresses on or before August 18, 2008. The Notice of Settlement and Settlement Claim Form shall be in a form jointly agreed to by the parties and submitted to and approved by the Court. If any mail is returned by the post office with notice of a more current address, the Claims Administrator will resend the notice to that address. The Claims Administrator is not required to make any further efforts to send mail directly to class members. A Notice of Settlement and Settlement Claim Form will be made available to anyone who requests such information. Claim forms will be available on request through the Claims Administrator including through a toll-free number.
14. The Notice of Settlement will include a summary of the terms of the settlement and the class member’s right to contest the settlement.
15. The Settlement Claim Form shall request the class member’s contact information, affirmation that he meets the class definition and that all information on the claim form is true and accurate, instructions for check delivery, and a Form W-9. The claim form shall include an acknowledgement that the information set forth therein is true and correct to the best of the claimant’s recollection, and is signed under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 5347
16. The Claims Administrator will also publish the Notice of Settlement ("Published Notice") in the Madisonville Messenger, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Providence Journal Enterprise, the Kentucky New Era, the Dawson Springs Progress, the Central City Leader News, the Owensboro Messenger Inquirer, the Sebree Banner, the Sturgis News, the Henderson The Gleaner, and the Paducah Sun. The Published Notice shall be in a form jointly agreed to by the parties and submitted to and approved by the Court. Defendants agree to post the Published Notice in the admission area of the Jail. The notices will be posted contemporaneously with the mailing of the Notice of Settlement and publication of the Published Notice, and will remain posted until the last day that the settlement claim forms can be filed. In addition, Defendants have agreed to make available, during the same time frame defined in the prior sentence, to inmates (or anyone else) who requests it, a copy of the Notice of Settlement, and the cost of those copies shall be paid out of the settlement fund and shall be considered part of the cost of administering the settlement and shall not serve to increase Defendants' costs or liabilities under this Agreement.
17. The Claims Administrator will send a claim form to anyone who requests one before the time for filing claim forms has expired. The Claims Administrator will also maintain a toll-free number for claimants to call to request a claim form or with questions. This number will be operational for at least five months following Court approval of this Agreement.
18. In order for a class member to claim a share of the settlement, he/she must submit to the Claims Administrator a valid and complete Settlement Claim Form, postmarked no later than 60 days following the date of entry of the Court Order approving
7

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 5348
this Agreement after the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) fairness hearing. This deadline is the “Claims Deadline.” The Claims Administrator shall forward copies of the claims forms to Defendants’ counsel as they are received, and Defendants’ counsel shall have 60 days after the date they receive each claim form to file written objections to any individual claims with the Claims Administrator. This 60-day period for objecting may be extended by the Claims Administrator or by the Court for good cause shown. The Claims Administrator shall make a written decision as to any objection within five days of receipt thereof, after giving Plaintiffs’ counsel three weeks to respond in writing to Defendants’ objections, which can be extended by the Claims Administrator or the Court for good cause shown. The parties shall provide copies of all written objections and/or responses thereto to opposing counsel. Any appeal of such written decision of the Claims Administrator with which Plaintiffs or Defendants disagree must be filed with the Court within 15 days of the such party's receipt of the Claims Administrator's written decision.
19. In order for a class member to object to the proposed settlement, he/she must submit a written objection to the Claims Administrator, but such written objection must be postmarked not later than October 10, 2008, and must be received by the Claims Administrator prior to the fairness hearing, in order to be considered timely. The Claims Administrator shall provide copies of all objections to counsel for the parties as soon as practicable by mail and/or fax as may be necessary, so that all objections are provided to counsel for the parties prior to the fairness hearing. Alternatively, or in addition to filing a written objection, an objector may appear in person or through counsel at the fairness hearing when the objection will be considered by the Court. The objecting class member must also submit a Settlement Claim Form to the Claims Administrator if he wishes to be
8

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 5349
eligible to share in the settlement should it be approved despite his objection. VII. APPROVAL AND APPEALS
20. The Claims Administrator will review each claim form to determine whether the claimant is a qualifying class member by confirming: (a) that the Settlement Claim Form is timely and valid; (b) that the information on the form is consistent with available data previously provided by Defendants, and supplemented by Defendants in their objection, if any; and (c) that the form is completely filled out and signed.
21. The Claims Administrator may, with knowledge and written consent of Defendants, waive a technical defect in a claim form to achieve substantial justice.
22. If a claimant does not meet the class definition, the Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Claim Denial to the claimant. Notices of Claim Denial shall be sent promptly but in no event later than 90 days following the Claims Deadline. The denial notice will indicate the reason or reasons for the denial.
23. In order to object to the Claims Administrator’s determination that he is not a class member, a claimant must file a written appeal to the Claims Administrator postmarked no later than 15 days after the date of the mailing of the Notice of Claim Denial. He must include reliable written documentation, which need not be an official record, that shows that he is a class member, and he may also include a sworn written statement subject to the penalty of perjury. The Claims Administrator will consult with counsel for the parties and make a determination on each appeal no later than 30 days after the deadline for class members to file such appeals. The Claims Administrator will inform the class member in writing of its determination, and provide copies to all counsel within 30 days of such determination. In order to object to the Claims Administrator’s final determination that he is
9

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 5350
not a class member, a claimant must file a written appeal with the Court postmarked no later than 15 days after the date of the mailing of the final Notice of Claim Denial. Rulings by the Claims Administrator may also be appealed by the parties directly to the Court within 15 days of the receipt of the notice from the Claims Administrator approving or denying the claim. There shall be no further right of appeal beyond review of the ruling of the Claims Administrator by the Court.
24. The Claims Administrator will send a Notice of Claim Approval (“Notice of Claim Approval”) to each approved claimant, absent objection, promptly but in no event later than 90 days after the Claims Deadline.
25. A claimant who used a different name upon admission to the Jail must present documentation establishing that he/she is the person referred to in Defendants’ records. VIII. EXPENSES, ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
26. All administrative costs, including the Claims Administrator’s fees and expenses, will be paid from the settlement funds.
27. Plaintiffs’ attorneys' fees and litigation expenses will be paid from the settlement funds.
28. Class counsel will be paid only the actual attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in this litigation, not to exceed $1.5 million.
29. Plaintiffs' litigation expenses and attorney's fee will be calculated and paid within 30 days of entry of the Order approving this Agreement following the fairness hearing. Claims administration costs, including but not limited to any additional attorney fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs' counsel after June 9, 2008, will be calculated and
10

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 5351
paid within 30 days of entry of the Order of Dismissal by the Court. In addition, any copy costs incurred by Defendants pursuant to the obligation described in ¶16 above will be itemized and submitted to the Claims Administrator and counsel for Plaintiffs prior to entry of the Order of Dismissal, and will also be paid within 30 days of entry of the Order of Dismissal. IX. DISTRIBUTION TO CLASS MEMBERS
30. Named class representatives Eddie Sutton and Lester Hank Turner (the first and originating plaintiffs in this case) will receive $35,000.00 each; named class representatives Robin Littlepage, Tim May, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia Nelson, Linda Ford and Robert Teague $25,000.00 each; and named class representatives Daniel Todd and Tony Ward $15,000.00 each, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants as well as for their service as named class representatives, including but not limited to surrendering their anonymity, bringing suit, submitting to discovery, and participating in and authorizing the settlement of this class action as set forth herein, all in complete satisfaction and discharge of their duties as named class representatives. Their checks shall issue within 30 days of entry of the Order approving this Agreement following the fairness hearing.
31. In addition to the above, all class members who have valid claims, who have been deposed in these proceedings, and who submit a claim form, shall be paid $4,000.00 each in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants. A list identifying such persons is attached hereto as Appendix A.
32. All remaining class members will receive payment from the settlement funds that remain after deducting attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, expenses of claims
11

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 418-2 Filed 07/18/08 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 5352
administration, payments to class representatives, and payments to deposed class members. Persons subjected only to one or more strip-searches on admission to the Jail, or one or more strip-searches after they became entitled to release from the Jail, and thus are members of only the "Entry" Class or the "Release" Class, will be paid an amount up to but not exceeding $1500.00, depending upon the number of approved claimants to the settlement fund, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants. Persons subjected both to one or more strip-searches on admission to the Jail and one or more strip-searches after they became entitled to release from the Jail, and thus are members of both the "Entry" Class and the "Release" Class, will be paid an amount up to but not exceeding $2500.00 depending upon the number of approved claimants to the settlement fund, in full and final settlement of all their claims against Defendants.
33. The Claims Administrator will calculate the amount of money due each class member by assigning three points to every approved claimant who is a member of only one of the certified classes. Approved claimants who are members of both classes will be assigned five points. The Claims Administrator will divide the amount remaining in the settlement fund (after the payments made as provided above) by the total number of points to determine the amount each approved claimant will receive. Class members will receive only one payment no matter how many times they were admitted into and/or searched while incarcerated at the Jail during the class period.
34. Each class member’s check will be made payable only in his or her name or, upon the death of a class member, to the personal representative of the deceased class member’s estate upon filing an affidavit in compliance with the applicable statutory procedure for collection of personal property by affidavit of the rightful heir. The check will
12

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be mailed to the class member at their mailing address. Any change of address request must be made in writing and must be signed by the claimant.
35. If a participating class member is confined in a prison, hospital, or other institution and has provided the address of such institution for payment, the settlement check will be sent to an appropriate institutional address unless the class member makes other acceptable arrangements in writing with the Claims Administrator. If a claimant’s check is returned and the Claims Administrator has no record of a forwarding address, the Claims Administrator, after consulting with counsel for the parties, shall have discretion to take reasonable steps to locate such claimant. X. POST-DISTRIBUTION ADMINISTRATION
36. Any settlement funds remaining after all payments contemplated by this Settlement Agreement have been paid will be returned by the Claims Administrator to Defendants.
37. At the conclusion of the claims administration process, the Claims Administrator shall provide a full and complete report to the parties and the Court that will include: (a) a list of approved claimants and the amounts paid to each; (b) a list of individuals whose claims were rejected by the administrator and the reasons therefor; and (c) a detailed accounting of all expenses incurred by and fees of the Claims Administrator. XI. DECEASED CLASS MEMBERS
38. If a class member is deceased, a legally authorized representative may file a Settlement Claim Form on behalf of the estate. However, the representative must provide to the Claims Administrator the documentation required by ¶ 34 above, as well as a certified copy of the Probate Court order appointing the person as the authorized
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representative of the deceased class member prior to the claims’ deadline, or the claim will be denied.
XII. RELEASE 39. In consideration of payment of the settlement amount, Defendants will be released from all liability for all class members’ claims for all strip- searches that were part of this lawsuit including class members who do not file claims, except for any class members who requested exclusion and filed a claim within the statute of limitations. The parties have expressly agreed that the release of claims arising from the settlement includes all visual inspections, including without limitation visual body cavity inspections, that otherwise fall within the scope of the claims certified as a class action by the Court in this case. The parties also agree that all such claims against all of Defendants' employees and other agents are barred because the settlement expressly covers Defendants, its employees and agents. Class members will be afforded an opportunity for exclusion as provided for in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(3), and as specified in the Notice of Settlement which will be submitted to the Court for approval.
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Date: July 17, 2008 Date: July 17, 2008
LOULibrary TMP.TMP 729745v2

For Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class:
/s/ Gregory A. Belzley______________ Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC PLAZA 500 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202
Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202
For Defendants:
/s/ Stacey A. Blankenship_____________ Stacey A. Blankenship Denton & Keuler P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929
Michael Sullivan 100 St. Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727

15

 
 Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 5416

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO

[Filed Electronically]

EDWARD LEE SUTTON, et al., PLAINTIFFS
vs. HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al.,
DEFENDANTS

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03-CV-3-M ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED ORDER APPROVING CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENT

On October 20, 2008, this Court conducted a Fairness Hearing in order to assess

whether the settlement reached by the parties in this litigation is fair, reasonable, adequate,

and should be approved. Such hearing having been held, the Court finds as follows:

1. This settlement was mediated by Magistrate Judge Robert Goebel.

Magistrate Judge Goebel is an experienced mediator and knows the obligations of the

Court in overseeing class action settlements of this kind. This settlement was preceded by

more than five years of litigation in this case. The parties evaluated over 1000

questionnaires that were filled out and returned by potential claimants, over 100

depositions were conducted in this case, and the parties separately performed jury

research in consultation with experts in jury dynamics to determine the range of results

were these cases tried. As a consequence, counsel had not only a thorough understanding

of the law and facts bearing on this litigation, but had researched the likely impact of those

facts on a jury were this case not settled.

Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 5417
2. The settlement in this case was reached only after numerous, private, armslength negotiations between the parties, and after no less than three settlement conferences mediated by Magistrate Judges, in which each side repeatedly argued its position and argued the risks the other would bear were the case not settled. The strengths and weaknesses of the case on both sides were thoroughly researched, explored through discovery, and argued in settlement. There is no question but that counsel had sufficient information to arrive at an informed evaluation on which this settlement is based.
3. This class action covers the period from January 9, 2002 to June 8, 2008. Plaintiffs claimed that the Hopkins County Detention Center (“the Jail”) had in place a policy which required that all persons, even persons arrested for minor offenses, be stripsearched before their admission to the Jail’s general population, and after they became entitled to release from the Jail. The Jail, however, had in place a written policy which Defendants claimed prohibited the strip-searches of persons arrested for minor offenses on admission to the Jail unless there existed reasonable grounds for believing that such arrestees were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. Although the Jail had a written policy that indicated that all detainees who were taken to court and then returned to the Jail were to be strip-searched, a policy that Plaintiffs contended was applied even if detainees were ordered released, Defendants claimed that the Jail's unwritten custom and practice was to strip-search on return to the Jail only those persons who had not been ordered released. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants performed illegal strip-searches by observing pre-trial detainees while they changed into and out of jail uniforms, a claim that was also contested by Defendants.
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4. Liability was thus a vigorously contested issue in this case, unlike prior stripsearch class action cases in Kentucky in which the defendants' unlawful conduct was actually directed by a written policy of the jail in issue. It was unclear how many Plaintiffs would be willing to surrender their anonymity and bear the inconvenience of testifying at trial about an incident that many might consider personal and embarrassing. Those that chose to testify would then be presented with the challenge of communicating to the jury their recollection of incidents that may have occurred more than six years ago. Were Plaintiffs to prevail on the issue of liability, Plaintiffs would then have to endure a second series of trials, in which each Plaintiff's damages would likely be determined separately, and each Plaintiff would be confronted with the challenge of communicating to the jury the depth of the intangible damages -- the humiliation, shame and distress -- they sustained as a consequence of their strip-search. Even were these damages effectively communicated to the jury, it was likely that jury verdicts would vary greatly in amount. While a jury could award damages in excess of the sum a claimant might receive under this settlement, there was as great a chance that the jury might award significantly less, particular to those who having a lengthy criminal history. Throughout the litigation, the question would remain whether jurors would be predisposed to believe law enforcement officials over other citizens, particularly citizens with a criminal record. Counsel for Defendants were experienced litigators and would continue to provide a vigorous defense against all claims.
5. Defendants were unwilling voluntarily to pay more to settle this case. Pushing on to trial would have significantly delayed Plaintiffs' recovery, if any. Had trials eventually resulted in even greater total liability for the County, Plaintiffs would have been confronted
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with the additional delay of appeals, and depending on future circumstances, the additional risk of recoverability of the judgment.
6. Class members under the settlement are divided into four groups: (a) the named class representatives, who surrendered their anonymity and spearheaded this litigation throughout its course; (b) the unnamed class members who responded to questionnaires sent by counsel and were subsequently deposed in the case; (c) unnamed class members who are members of both the "Entry" and "Release" classes certified in this case; and (d) unnamed class members who are only a member of one class or the other. The settlement provides that the ten named class representatives will divide among themselves the sum of $250,000.00. Named class representatives, depending upon their length in service, will receive between $15,000.00 and $35,000.00 each. Plaintiffs at the hearing provided the Court an Exel spreadsheet showing 32 prior strip-search class action settlements. That spreadsheet shows that amounts typically paid named class representatives, in cases in which it can be determined, range between $10,000.00 and $25,000.00.
7. With the exception of Messrs. Sutton and Turner, who originated this case, the named class representatives are receiving between $15,000.00 and $25,000.00, well within the range of reasonableness established by prior settlements. The $35,000.00 to be paid to Messrs. Sutton and Turner is not unreasonable, either. This is all the named class representatives will receive -- they will not be entitled to any additional payment under the terms of the Settlement Agreement proposed to the Court.
8. Not enough can be said for the individual citizen, with no formal legal training, who believes their constitutional rights have been violated, exercises the initiative of
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 5420
contacting counsel, and then agrees to surrender their anonymity and be named as a plaintiff in a civil rights case that becomes a matter of public record. The named class representatives participated in three mediations of this case, numerous meetings with counsel and periodic contact via telephone, and responded to written discovery and were all deposed. They have honorably discharged their responsibilities as named class representatives, and each approved the settlement that has now been tendered to the Court.
9. The Court should encourage citizens to make the sacrifices and accept the responsibilities willingly undertaken and faithfully discharged by the named class representatives in this case. The Court has compared these amounts to settlements in comparable cases, and has found them reasonable, particularly given the length and complexity of this litigation, the named class representatives' numerous meetings with counsel and their attendance at three separate mediations (all of which occurred in a city other than the one in which they live), the faithful discharge of their duties, and the significance of this case and the ultimate result.
10. Unnamed class members with qualifying claims, who filled out and returned questionnaires and were also deposed in this case, will be paid $4,000.00 each. This amount compares very favorably even to settlements in which liability was not an issue, and the fact that these class members will receive more than the other members of the unnamed class is warranted given the initiative exercised by these class members in filling out and returning a questionnaire with no expectation of gain, and then submitting to a videotaped deposition in which they were examined by opposing counsel.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 5421
11. The recovery of remaining unnamed class members who qualify as members of both the "Entry" and the "Release" classes will be capped at $2,500.00. The recovery of class members who belong to only one class or the other will be capped at $1,500.00. Defendants were unwilling to agree to caps any higher than these. The named class representatives had to choose whether to accept such caps, or reject such caps, scuttle the settlement, and proceed to trial with all the delay inherent in such a process, not to mention the ever-present risk of non-recovery. Given the hard financial realities presently confronting many potential claimants, the named class representatives decided to accept the caps and tender this settlement for the consideration of the class. These caps nonetheless compare very favorably even to settlements in which liability was not an issue. Thus, while there are disparities in the treatment of members of the class, the Court finds the basis for those disparities to be reasonable, and the amounts in issue to be fair, reasonable and adequate.
12. Class members will only recover for one entry search and/or one release search, even though they may have been subjected to multiple entry and release searches. However, allowing class members to recover for searches following multiple arrests would substantially complicate and increase the expense of class administration, thus reducing that portion of the settlement fund available to pay the claims of unnamed class members. From a public policy standpoint, allowing class members to recover for searches following multiple arrests effectively rewards repeated acts of criminal conduct, which instead should be discouraged. The recovery of a claimant with a lengthy criminal record should not exceed that of a citizen subjected to a violation of her constitutional rights and an egregious
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 5422
invasion of her privacy following her sole arrest. The Court thus finds this provision of the settlement to be fair and reasonable.
13. Funds will revert to Defendants only if -- after all payments contemplated by the settlement, including the maximum approved claimants can receive under the terms of the settlement -- there remain any funds in the settlement account. As a consequence, the reversion provision of the proposed Settlement Agreement in no way infringes upon the amount, fairness or reasonableness of what will be paid to qualified claimants. Moreover, as with the per claim caps, reversion was a non-negotiable condition of settlement for Defendants, and reflected a responsible effort on Defendants' part given public funding of the settlement amount.
14. No amount of the settlement fund will be set aside for late claims. Establishing such a reserve would decrease the sums paid to qualified claimants if the settlement fund would otherwise be exhausted by payment approved claims. In addition, a reserve would necessarily raise thorny issues of the amount of the appropriate set-aside, the appropriate grace period to allow for late claims, disparities in treatment of claimants, and what should be done in the event the amount set aside is too much or too little. These issues would unnecessarily complicate an otherwise straightforward settlement process, and would increase claims administration expense, thus reducing the recovery of approved claimants.
15. Plaintiffs' counsel is seeking to recover only for the time and expense they have actually invested in this case. Greg Belzley, lead counsel for the class, is an experienced litigator and a partner at Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. He first became involved in strip-search litigation with the filing of Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cert.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 5423
denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989). He has since been lead counsel for plaintiffs in five stripsearch class actions, three of which have previously been settled. This case is one of two strip-search class actions now pending in Kentucky in which Mr. Belzley is lead counsel for Plaintiffs. Mr. Belzley has argued numerous strip-search appeals before the First and Sixth Circuits, including an en banc proceeding before the First Circuit. Mr. Belzley is highly experienced in the law, litigation and settlement of strip-search class actions. Bart L. Greenwald is a commercial litigator with class action experience, and a partner at Frost Brown Todd LLC. He and Mr. Belzley and their respective firms shared the load in this case. Plaintiffs turned to these Louisville firms after they were unable to find more local counsel to represent them.
16. This Court has observed the conduct of these counsel throughout this litigation. The record reflects that they have skillfully, effectively and zealously advocated the position of the class throughout these proceedings, and have achieved a fair and reasonable result for their clients. More than five years of hard-fought litigation preceded this settlement. Discovery was extensive and thorough. Issues of class certification and liability were thoroughly researched and argued and reargued as the parties vied for advantage. Civil rights and class action litigation both involve complex issues of law and procedure. Plaintiffs’ counsel bore all fees and expenses during the five years of this litigation, and bore all risk of loss had Plaintiffs not prevailed. Instead of seeking some profit to offset the time and expenses put at risk in this litigation, Plaintiffs' counsel seeks only to be compensated for the time and expense actually invested in the case, a request that has been unanimously approved by the named class representatives.
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 5424
17. The notice of settlement and claim form were negotiated by the parties with the assistance of, and were ultimately approved by, Magistrate Judge Goebel. The notice of settlement is simple and straightforward, as is the proof of claim form. The parties have created a settlement process that can be understood and administered by the claimants themselves, regardless of their socio-economic or educational background. Approved claimants will receive a substantial settlement simply by completing a proof of claim form and mailing it back to the Claims Administrator for verification and approval. Each claimant whose claim is rejected will receive a letter explaining why the claim was rejected, and will be provided the opportunity of an appeal first to the Claims Administrator, and then to this Court. There was no evidence at the hearing that claimants do not understand the terms of the settlement, find the proof of claim form confusing or hard to complete, or do not understand the process by which they may assert a claim for recovery of a portion of the settlement.
18. More than 3,400 notices have been mailed to potential claimants explaining the terms of the settlement and detailing the method by which claimants could file objections. In addition, notice has been published in 11 newspapers published in and around Hopkins County, including the Madisonville Messenger and the Louisville CourierJournal. No objections have been filed to the terms of the settlement discussed above, and the Court regards this fact as additional evidence establishing the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement under review.
19. The Claims Administrator, Analytics, Inc., is continuing to seek potential claimants for whom it has no address or has a bad address, and mail notice as soon as a
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Case 4:03-cv-00003-JHM-ERG Document 432 Filed 10/20/08 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 5425
new address is found. In addition, all persons who contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel or the Claims Administrator to advise of their potential claim were also mailed claim forms.
For all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the settlement in this litigation to be fair, reasonable and adequate under the circumstances, and that the interests of the class as a whole are better served by this settlement instead of the pursuit of this litigation through trial. By separate Judgment, claims of all class members who have not made a timely request to be excluded from the class will be dismissed with prejudice.
This the _____ day of ____________, 2008.

United States District Court Judge

Respectfully submitted,

October 20, 2008

/s/ Gregory A. Belzley________ Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 1400 PNC Plaza 500 W. Jefferson St. Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD, LLC 400 W. Market St., 32nd Floor Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Copies to: Counsel of record

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 Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

2005 WL 3478152 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky.
Edward Lee SUTTON, Lester H. Turner, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Wilson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, and Tabitha
Nance Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated Plaintiffs v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and Jim Lantrip, Individually and in his official capacity as
Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky Defendants
No. Civ.A. 403CV003-M. | Dec. 19, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Bart L. Greenwald, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl, Louisville, KY, James Robert Craig, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiffs.
Allen W. Holbrook, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY, John T. Soyars, Foster, Soyars & Associates, Hopkinsville, KY, R. Michael Sullivan, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY, Stacey A. Blankenship, Denton & Keuler, LLP, Paducah, KY, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MCKINLEY, J.
*1 This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County [DN 58]. Fully briefed, this matter stands ripe for decision. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff, accept all the factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251, 117 S.Ct. 2409, 138 L.Ed.2d 175 (1997). A judge may not grant a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion based on a disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. Wright v. MetroHealth Medical Center, 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1041, 134 L.Ed.2d 188 (1996). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for which the law provides relief. Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir.1994).
The standard of review requires that a plaintiff plead more than bare legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996). The complaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1064. “In practice, a ... complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726 (citation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider all papers and exhibits appended to the complaint, as well as any matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Hirsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir.1995).
II. BACKGROUND
This case involves a series of incidents that allegedly occurred at the Hopkins County Jail from January 9, 2002 to the present. The Plaintiffs are a class of former inmates of the Hopkins County Jail who were allegedly forced to submit to strip-searches. As a result of what they view as violations of their constitutional rights, the Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky.
The first Complaint was filed on January 9, 2003. An Amended Complaint was subsequently filed on March 18, 2005.1 The Court also certified the class on that day pursuant to an Agreed Order. The parties agreed that the class should be divided into two subclasses. The first subclass “consists of all individuals arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.” This first subclass may be referred to as the “entry” class. The second subclass “consists of all persons who were
1

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

required by Defendants in the Jail, just after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so.” This second subclass may be referred to as the “release” class.
*2 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants make the following arguments: that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), that Plaintiffs cannot recover absent a showing of physical injury under the PLRA, even for nominal and punitive damages, that most of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, that the Plaintiffs in the “entry” class are not typical of those in the “release” class, that the amended complaints do not relate back to the original Complaint, that the Agreed Order certifying the class does not bar the Defendant’s current challenge to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and the timeliness of this action, and that certain named and unnamed Plaintiffs lack standing. The Plaintiff has responded and the Court’s discussion of the issues follows.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicability of the PLRA The Defendants contend that the PLRA is applicable to both current as well as former prisoners. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The Plaintiffs in this action are former prisoners; thus, the applicability of the PLRA as to their case hinges upon the interpretation of the word “prisoner.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) defines the term prisoner “as any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”
All appellate courts which have considered the issue have held that the term “prisoner” does not apply to those who have been released. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 n. 10 (3d Cir.2002) (citing the decisions of several circuits). Furthermore, a sister court in this circuit has held that, The plain language of the PLRA suggests that former prisoners do not fall within its scope as §§ 1997e(a), (e), and (h) speak of those prisoners “confined in a jail, prison or other correction facility” or “incarcerated or detained,”

a status to be determined at the time the suit is “brought.” § 1997e(a), (e), & (h). The Sixth Circuit has yet to address this issue, but it is widely held that “prisoner” means someone confined, incarcerated, or detained, not a former prisoner. (citations omitted)....In this matter, it is clear that a literal application of § 1997(e) does not find itself “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” (citation omitted). The plain language of the statute is clear and bolstered by the legislative history of § 1997e, suggesting not only Congressional intent to relieve the court system of the burden of excessive petitioning on the part of those incarcerated persons but also an intent to first permit those charged with the responsibility for jail and prison facilities to remedy wrongs that occur on their watch and to improve conditions for those incarcerated under their care. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. § 14408-01, § 14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir.1999). These goals will not be subverted by holding that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners. In fact, this Court finds Defendants’ proposed interpretation to be nonsensical. To require former prisoners to initiate or pursue those internal, administrative remedies once they have left the confines of a facility is a strained application of § 1997e at best. n7 Former prisoners are no longer members of the community that such administrative processes and limitations are meant to serve. This is particularly so with those prisoners who are incarcerated for short periods of time as their opportunity to initiate and pursue administrative remedies while incarcerated is temporally limited at best.
*3 Smith v. Franklin County, 227 F.Supp.2d 667, 675-676 (E.D.Ky.2002). See also Black v. Franklin County, Kentucky, No. 3:05-18-JMH, 2005 WL 1993445, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Aug 16, 2005) (noting that the position that the PLRA applies to former prisoners “is decidedly the minority view.” (citations omitted).
This Court joins the majority of courts which have held the PLRA inapplicable to those who persons who file claims after their release from prison. This conclusion is supported by the plain language of the PLRA and the Defendant’s policy rationale for a contrary decision is rejected. Thus, the Court holds that the PLRA does not apply to this action, and it is immaterial that the Plaintiffs failed to first exhaust any administrative remedies.2
B. Physical Injury Requirement of the PLRA The Defendants argue that even if the Court finds the PLRA to be inapplicable to former prisoners, the Court should adopt a requirement that only plaintiffs who can show a “physical injury” can state a claim. The Plaintiffs again argue that the PLRA is inapplicable to former prisoners.
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Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

Defendants support their argument by citing Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y.2002), aff’d Cox v. Malone, No. 02-161, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 3008 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2003), which held that,
The reasoning of Greig cannot be extended to the physical injury requirement of section 1997e(e). Section 1997e(a) is a procedural requirement requiring prisoners to fully exhaust their claims within the prison system before bringing a federal action. It makes no sense to apply this procedural requirement to former inmates who can no longer avail themselves of prison grievance procedures. Section 1997e(e), on the other hand, is a substantive limitation on the type of actions that can be brought by prisoners. Its purpose is to weed out frivolous claims where only emotional injuries are alleged.
The Cox opinion has been criticized, though, including by a sister court in this circuit: In Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y.2002), the district court attempted to distinguish circuit precedent that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to former prisoners as a “procedural requirement” and held that the damage limitation did apply to former prisoners because it is a “substantive limitation.” This Court cannot accept that distinction, however, because it ignores the plain language of the statute. Subsections (a) and (e) both refer only to “a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” The court in Smith v. Franklin County stated: The Sixth Circuit has yet to address this issue, but it is widely held that “prisoner” means someone confined, incarcerated, or detained, not a former prisoner. (citations omitted). This Court agrees with that observation and further holds that there is no principled way to construe one section to include only current prisoners and expand the other to apply to former prisoners.
*4 Rose v. Saginaw County, No. 01-10337-BC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29567, at *31-*32 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 21, 2005).
The Court agrees with Rose. The statute is clear in defining the term “prisoner,” and there is “no principled way to construe one section to include only current prisoners and expand the other to apply to former prisoners.” Thus, the absence of a physical injury is no bar to the Plaintiff’s claims.

C. Statute of Limitations, Tolling and Typicality “[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). The Defendants argue that the statute of limitations for the claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint was not tolled because those claims are not typical of the claims brought in the original Complaint. Specifically, the Defendant argues that only claims typical of the “release” class were asserted in the original Complaint and thus, only the statute of limitation of those type claims were tolled. Thus, the claims of the “entry” class were required to be brought with one year of the date of their search upon “entry.” Defendant asserts that all “entry” class claims are time-barred.
The Court rejects the Defendants’ argument. The original Complaint asserted a broad class claim and defined the class as “all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants, in the Hopkins County Jail, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection when there was no reasonable grounds for believing that weapons or contraband had been concealed on or in their bodies.” According to settled law, the limitations period for all those in the purported class is tolled until the class is certified. The so-called “entry” class members are clearly within the purported class as stated in the original Complaint.
The Defendants further argue the point of typicality by contending that unique defenses as to the “release” class defeats typicality. This argument is one that should have been made prior to the class being certified. However, the Defendant’s initial opposition to certification did not mention this lack of typicality. More importantly, the Defendant entered into an Agreed Order certifying the class, essentially agreeing that the typicality requirement was met. The fact that a “release” subclass was certified should allow for any defenses to be made as against that subclass.
D. Standing The Defendants’ final argument challenges the standing of certain members of the class. Specifically, the Defendants assert that those persons who had not yet been allegedly strip-searched at the time the original Complaint was filed do not have standing to join this suit as a party or member. The Defendants’ motion is hinged on the proposition that standing is to be determined at the time the complaint is filed. Defendants reason that since the definition of the class includes those subjected to unconstitutional strip-searches between January 9, 2002
3

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

to the present, many of those included in the class lack standing because they had not suffered injury at the time the original Complaint was filed.
*5 Regarding standing in class actions, the Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) found that,
There must not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23, n11 but there must be a live controversy at the time this Court reviews the case. (citation omitted).
The standing requirement of the named Plaintiff in the original Complaint has been met. The question of whether to include others in a class who may have suffered the same constitutional injury as the named plaintiffs is a question of class definition, not standing.
Under Defendants’ logic anyone subjected to an unconstitutional search after January 9, 2003, does not have standing to join in this class action. Presumably, Defendants incorrectly believe such claims would now be time-barred. In Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628, (1983), the Supreme Court stated, We conclude, as did the Court in American Pipe, that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” 414 U.S., at 554,

94 S.Ct., at 766. Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.
In this case, the statute of limitations on the claims of all those subjected to unconstitutional searches after January 9, 2003 was tolled by virtue of the filing of the original Complaint. Those claimants were included within the class as it was defined and certified by terms which were agreed to by the Defendants. If this Court should now redefine the class to exclude all those who suffered unconstitutional searches after the date of the filing of the original Complaint, then the class action would be decertified. The statute of limitations would be extended on those claims to allow those persons to pursue their individual claims. Obviously, the Defendants at one time believed that handling all these claims in one class action was superior to all other methods of adjudication or else they would not have agreed to the definition of the class. If that thinking has changed, Defendants should file an appropriate motion advancing legitimate reasons to redefine the class at this stage of the litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DN 58] is DENIED.
	  

Footnotes

1

Plaintiffs also filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 8, 2005.

2

Since the PLRA does not apply to this action, the Court need not consider whether Plaintiffs could have recovered only nominal

and punitive but not compensatory damages for violations of their constitutional rights by the Defendants had the PLRA been

applicable.

	  

4

 
 Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 119856 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division.
Edward Lee SUTTON, Lester H. Turner, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Wilson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, and Tabitha
Nance Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and Jim Lantrip, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 4:03CV-003-M. | Jan. 11, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Bart L. Greenwald, James Robert Craig, Laura C. Leone, Jason Renzelmann, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiffs.
Allen W. Holbrook, R. Michael Sullivan, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY, John T. Soyars, Foster, Soyars & Associates, Hopkinsville, KY, Sam R-G Clymer, Stacey A. Blankenship, Denton & Keuler, LLP, Paducah, KY, for Defendants.
Opinion

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must find that the pleadings, together with the depositions, interrogatories and affidavits, establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and of identifying that portion of the record which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the non-moving party is required to do more than simply show that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The Rule requires the nonmoving party to present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. It is against this standard that the Court reviews the following facts.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOSEPH H. McKINLEY, JR., United States District Court Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on a motion by Plaintiffs, Edward Lee Sutton individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction [DN 135] and on a motion by Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, for partial summary judgment [DN 142]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction is denied and Defendants’ motion for partial summary is granted.

II. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky. This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner “in their individual capacities and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for believing they were concealing weapons or contraband.” (Complaint at ¶ 1.) On March 16, 2005, the Court entered an Agreed Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The Court’s Order certified two subclasses-the “Release Class” and the “Admissions Class”-defined as follows:
*2 a. All persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail
1

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

(“Jail”), after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection. This class of individuals includes individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail after they were ordered released on their own recognizance[;] individuals who were strip searched just prior to release from the Jail after they were ordered released on bond and subsequent to posting of bond; and any individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from Jail for any other reason; and
[b.] All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.
(Class Certification Order, 3/16/05, ¶¶ 2-3.) Each of these classes includes all persons who were so treated from January 9, 2002, to the present. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
The Named Class Representatives of the Admissions Class are Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance, Daniel Todd and Tony Ward. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that each of these Plaintiffs was admitted to the Jail following the arrest on minor, non-weapons-related, non-drug-related offenses, including writing bad checks, failure to appear, and traffic violations. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-24.) Plaintiffs allege that upon admission to the jail, each representative was forced to remove his or her clothes and submit to a visual strip search inspection. (Id.)
It is undisputed that until May 25, 2006, the Hopkins County Jail automatically strip searched all pretrial detainees transferred from other facilities-including those charged with non-violent, non-drug-related misdemeanors-without regard to the individual circumstances surrounding the transfer or other factors indicating a reasonable suspicion to believe the transferee is concealing weapons or contraband. (Jim Lantrip Dep at 26-27, 51-53.) Jailer Lantrip testified that transferees are strip searched out of a concern that the transferees might have obtained contraband either during their prior stay in the transferring facility or during their transportation to the Hopkins County Jail.
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the constitutionality of this policy. Plaintiffs argue that the Hopkins County Jail employs an unconstitutional blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees-including all non-violent, non-drug-related misdemeanor offenders-who are transferred to the Jail from another facility, without making any individualized determination whether there is reasonable suspicion that any particular transferee is concealing contraband or

weapons. Plaintiffs maintain that since this policy plainly violates the Fourth Amendment, they are entitled to partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs also seek preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the Hopkins County Jail from continuing with the transferee policy or from reinstating the policy.
*3 Defendants disagree arguing that the Hopkins County Jail’s former procedure of strip searching those inmates who were transferred from another county jail is constitutional. Defendants contend that the Jail implemented the former procedure on transfers because a transferee was exposed to areas to which the public had access before and/or during the transfer, increasing the likelihood that the inmate could possess contraband. Defendants maintain that the procedure was implemented in light of the 501 KAR 3:120(3)(b) which provides in relevant part: “A prisoner may be strip searched only on reasonable suspicion.... Reasonable suspicion shall be based upon one ... or more of the following: ... (4) Contact with the public by a contact visit, court appearances that takes place in an area to which the public may have access, or after transport from or through an area to which the public may have access.... ” Defendants request partial summary judgment declaring this policy constitutional.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Law The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” A strip search complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment so long as it is reasonable. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). A broad-based policy allowing strip searches without regard to individualized reasonable suspicion is evaluated by the test announced in Bell v. Wolfish. See, e.g., Johannes v. Alameda Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 2006 WL 2504400, *8 (N.D.Cal. August 29, 2006). In Bell v. Wolfish, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a policy to strip search every inmate, including pretrial detainees, following a contact visit with persons from outside the institution. The Supreme Court found that the possibility of smuggling drugs, weapons, and other contraband into the institution presented significant and legitimate security interests. In finding that the searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court employed the following balancing test:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
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Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
Applying this balancing test to strip searches of arrestees charged with non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses, the Sixth Circuit in Masters v. Crouch held that Jefferson County, Kentucky’s blanket policy of strip searching all pretrial detainees arrested for a simple traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion violated the detainees’ clearly established constitutional rights. Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989). According to the Sixth Circuit, while Bell v. Wolfish does not validate a blanket policy of strip searching pretrial detainees, it does authorize “ ‘particularized searches where objective circumstances indicate such searches are needed to maintain institutional security.’ “ Masters, 872 F.2d at 1253-54. The Sixth Circuit found that normally no threat to institutional security “exists when the detainee is charged with a traffic violation or other nonviolent minor offense.” Id. at 1255. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s search was justified because the plaintiff would come into contact with other prisoners. The Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he fact of intermingling alone has never been found to justify such a search without consideration of the nature of the offense and the question of whether there is any reasonable basis for concern that the particular detainee will attempt to introduce weapons or other contraband into the institution.” Id. at 1254.
*4 The Sixth Circuit concluded that a pretrial detainee has the right not to be searched unless the reasonableness of such a search is established by balancing the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights occasioned by the search. Masters, 872 F.2d at 1257 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559); see also Richerson v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 958 F.Supp. 299, 305 (E.D.Ky.1996). Applying this balancing test, the Sixth Circuit held that “[i]t was ... clearly established that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be subjected to a strip search unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the particular person might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband.” Masters, 872 F.2d at 1257.
Utilizing the standards articulated in both Bell v. Wolfish

and Masters v. Crouch, two district courts in the Eastern District of Kentucky have addressed the constitutionality of strip searches of certain classes of pretrial detainees. In Richerson v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 958 F.Supp. 299 (E.D.Ky.1996), the district court upheld the constitutionality of a policy by the Fayette County Detention Facility to strip search all pretrial detainees upon return from a court appearance. The district court noted that the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish “has counseled wide-ranging deference to prison officials in security matters.” Id. at 306. Applying the balancing test for reasonableness set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, the district court held that
in circumstances like those presented here, where pretrial detainees, including those charged with minor, nonviolent offenses, are kept in a detention center’s general population prior to arraignment, ... and are thereafter put in a position where exposure to the general public presents a very real danger of contraband being passed to a detainee, a policy of strip searching the detainees upon their return from the courthouse and prior to their being placed back in the general population of the detention center is both justified and reasonable.
Richerson, 958 F.Supp. at 307. According to the district court, “the detention center’s legitimate security interests outweigh the detainees’ privacy interests in such a situation.” Id.
Based on the same reasoning, the district court in Black v. Franklin County, Kentucky, 2005 WL 1993445 (E.D.Ky. August 16, 2005), dismissed the claims of inmates and/or pretrial detainees who were strip searched after returning to jail from work release or from court appearances finding that those searches did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
B. Searches of Transferred Detainees The issue before the Court is whether the policy of strip searching all detainees transferred from other facilities is reasonable under the balancing test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish. The Court must balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Doing so requires the Court to weigh “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id.
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Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

*5 The scope of the invasion of Plaintiffs’ personal rights is significant. “It is well accepted that strip searches with visual body cavity inspection are extremely intrusive.” Johannes, 2006 WL 2504400, * 11 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 560). The manner and place in which Plaintiffs were strip searched has not been challenged by the Plaintiffs. Thus, the justification for the policy is the critical question. Hopkins County Jail’s justification for strip searching all persons transferred from another detention facility is to prevent the introduction of contraband into the facility that could expose the inmates and staff to harm.
“It is clear that a detention center has a legitimate interest in preventing the flow of contraband into the facility.” Richerson, 958 F.Supp. at 306. The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish recognized that “[a] detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. See also Richerson, 958 F.Supp. at 306. A detainee who has been incarcerated in another facility has potentially been exposed to contraband, especially if the facility has lenient procedures with respect to court appearances, contact visits, medical programs and work programs. Additionally, just as in Richerson, detainees that are transported from one facility to another are transported through areas to which the public may have access. Therefore, these contacts outside of the jail provide opportunities for transferees, even those charged with non-violent, non-drug related offenses, to obtain contraband before they enter the Hopkins County Jail.
There appears to be no difference between detainees who are transported to court by a transporting officer and detainees who are transported from one correctional facility to another-both are likely to have access to areas to which the public may have access. Defendants correctly point out that detainees who have been transferred from another facility may be more of a security risk than those who were merely transported to court or on work detail. In the latter, the detention facility is aware of its own security practices and exercises control over the deputy jailers who supervise the detainees in court and on work detail. In the case of a transferred detainee, the detention facility is unaware of the security practices of the other facility and has absolutely no control over the transporting officer who supervised the detainee during the transport.
Plaintiffs rely on Masters in urging the Court to find that the Hopkins County Jail’s policy of strip searching detainees following transfer from another county detention facility is unconstitutional. The Court is mindful
Footnotes

that in Masters the Sixth Circuit, utilizing the balancing test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, found that “a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor offense not normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband, is unreasonable,” 872 F.2d at 1255. However, the Sixth Circuit in Masters did not address transferred detainees and the security concerns posed by such transfers. Instead, Masters addressed the constitutionality of strip searching arrestees upon their initial arrival at the jail. As distinguished by the district court in Richerson, Masters “was part of the initial booking procedure.” Richerson, 958 F.Supp. at 305. While Plaintiffs in this case were charged with non-violent, non-drug related offenses, the facts and circumstances surrounding the strip searches in the present case following Plaintiffs’ transfer to the Jail are distinguishable from those in Masters. Id. at 306. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the searches in this case, including the security concerns, are more closely analogous to facts and circumstances justifying the search in Richerson and Black.1
*6 According to the United States Supreme Court in Bell, “[p]rison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48. Applying the reasonableness test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court finds that the Jail’s legitimate security interests discussed above outweigh the privacy interests of detainees who are transferred from another jail or facility. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Hopkins County Jail’s policy of strip searching pretrial detainees who are transferred from other facilities is reasonable and justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by Plaintiffs, Edward Lee Sutton individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction [DN 135] is denied and the motion by Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, for partial summary judgment [DN 142] is granted.
	  

4

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

1

Plaintiffs have submitted two cases which involved the “transfer” of detainees to other facilities. See N.G. and S.G. v. Connecticut,

382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir.2004) and Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F.Supp.2d 131 (D.Mass.2001). In N.G. and S.G., the plaintiffs were

juveniles who were strip searched pursuant to Connecticut’s blanket strip search policy for all those admitted to juvenile detention

centers. The Second Circuit upheld the searches of the juveniles upon initial entry into the custody of the State’s juvenile

authorities, but found that the repetitive searches conducted upon transfer to other juvenile detention centers operated by the State

of Connecticut was a violation. The Court finds this case distinguishable in that the State of Connecticut owned and operated all of

the juvenile detention centers and transported the juveniles from one facility to another. Additionally, Ford v. City of Boston did

not involve a detainee transferred from one county jail facility to another. Instead, in Ford, the plaintiffs were female detainees

arrested by the Boston Police Department who processed in the normal manner at the police department and then transported to the

Suffolk County Jail for detainment. These facts appear to be more analogous to Masters than the present case.

	  

5

 
 Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Declined to Follow by Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, N.D.Iowa, September 2, 2008
2007 WL 119892 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division.
Edward Lee SUTTON, Lester H. Turner, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Wilson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, and Tabitha
Nance Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and Jim Lantrip, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 4:03CV-003-M. | Jan. 11, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Bart L. Greenwald, James Robert Craig, Laura C. Leone, Jason Renzelmann, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiffs.
Allen W. Holbrook, R. Michael Sullivan, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY, John T. Soyars, Foster, Soyars & Associates, Hopkinsville, KY, Sam R-G Clymer, Stacey A. Blankenship, Denton & Keuler, LLP, Paducah, KY, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOSEPH H. McKINLEY, Jr., United States District Court Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on a Motion by Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, to decertify the class [DN 95]. Fully briefed, this matter stands ripe for decision. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Decertify is denied.
I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a series of incidents that allegedly occurred at the Hopkins County Jail from January 9, 2002 to the present. The Plaintiffs are a class of former inmates of the Hopkins County Jail who were allegedly forced to submit to strip-searches. As a result of what they view as violations of their constitutional rights, the Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip, individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky.
This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner “in their individual capacities and on behalf of all persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for believing they were concealing weapons or contraband.” (Complaint at ¶ 1.) On March 16, 2005, the Court entered an Agreed Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The Court’s Order certified two subclasses-the “Release Class” and the “Admissions Class”-defined as follows:
a. All persons arrested for minor offenses who were required by Defendants in the Hopkins County Jail (“Jail”), after becoming entitled to release, to remove their clothing for a visual inspection. This class of individuals includes individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from the Jail after they were ordered released on their own recognizance[;] individuals who were strip searched just prior to release from the Jail after they were ordered released on bond and subsequent to posting of bond; and any individuals who were strip searched just prior to their release from Jail for any other reason; and
[b.] All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.
(Class Certification Order, 3/16/05, ¶¶ 2-3.) Each of these classes includes all persons who were so treated from January 9, 2002, to the present. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
The Named Class Representatives of the Release Class are Edward Lee Sutton, Lester Turner, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance, Timothy May and Linda Ford. (Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that each representative was subject to a strip search prior to their release from the jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-24.) The Named Class Representatives of the Admissions Class are Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robin Littlepage, Robert R. Teague, Tabitha Nance,
1

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Daniel Todd and Tony Ward. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that each of these Plaintiffs was admitted to the Jail following the arrest on minor, non-weapons-related, nondrug-related offenses, including writing bad checks, failure to appear, and traffic violations. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-24.) Plaintiffs allege that upon admission to the jail, each representative was forced to remove his or her clothes and submit to a visual strip search inspection. (Id.)
*2 Defendants now argue that the Class should be decertified because it fails to comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
The Supreme Court requires a district court to conduct a “rigorous analysis” into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met before certifying a class. In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (6th Cir.1996). The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class, but that discretion must be exercised within the framework of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Id.; Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981); Boggs v. Divested Atomic Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 62-63 (S.D.Ohio 1991). In determining whether to certify a class, the Court assumes the truth of the allegations in the complaint and does not consider the merits of the action. Bradberry v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 222 F.R.D. 568 (W.D.Tenn.2004); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.Ohio 1999). The party seeking certification bears the burden of proof. In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d at 1079; Boggs, 141 F.R.D. at 63. To meet this burden, Plaintiffs must show that all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are as follows:

the evidentiary development of the case. Richardson v. Bryd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); Bradberry, 222 F.R.D. at 571. “The district judge must define, redefine, subclass, and decertify as appropriate in response to the progression of the case from assertion to facts.” Richardson, 709 F.2d at 1019. Therefore, the Court may alter or amend certification if the requirements are no longer met. See Bradberry, 222 F.R.D. at 571 (citing Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1214 (6th Cir.1997); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 276 (4th Cir.1980)). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C)(“An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). In fact, “the district court may decertify a class if there is a subsequent showing that the grounds for granting certification no longer exist or never existed.” McGee v. East Ohio Gas Co., 200 F.R.D. 382, 387 (S.D.Ohio 2001)(citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
*3 Defendants argue that the Court should exercise its power under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C) and decertify the present class. Defendants maintain that it has become apparent during the litigation that each claim by each potential class member will require a detailed inquiry into the alleged strip search in order to ascertain whether such person can even become a member of the class, resulting in a lack of commonality required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2), a lack of fair and adequate representation required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4) and a lack of predominance of common questions of law or fact required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). According to Defendants, given the vast number of class members involved in the present action, the individualized inquiries would present an insurmountable administrative burden which would render the controversy unmanageable as a class action. The Court will address these arguments in turn.

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Once these conditions are satisfied, the party seeking certification must then demonstrate that the class falls within one of the subcategories of Rule 23(b).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the district court is charged with the duty of monitoring its class decisions in light of

III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 23(a)
1. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires a showing that the number of members in the proposed class is so large as to make joinder “impracticable.” Relying on jail records, Plaintiffs assert that there are at least 7,000 members of the proposed class. This is sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Defendants do not challenge this conclusion. See Blihovde v. St. Croix Co., Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607, 616 (W.D.Wis.2003).
2

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

1. Commonality To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the proponents of certification of the class must demonstrate that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”
The class-action was designed as “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).... Class relief “is ‘peculiarly appropriate’ when the ‘issues involved are common to the class as a whole’ and when they ‘turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class.” Id. at 701.... For in such cases, “the class-action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.” [General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) ].
In re American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1080.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the commonality test is qualitative rather than quantitative, “that is, there need be only a single issue common to all members of the class.” In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1080; Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 923 (1998). Additionally, “the mere fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class remain after the common questions of the defendant’s liability have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion that a class action is impermissible.” Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.1988)(cited with approval in In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1080).1
*4 In challenging the Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the commonality requirement, Defendants argue that the Hopkins County Jail strip searches persons pursuant only to a written jail policy. According to Defendants, each Plaintiff and potential class member in this case could have been stripped searched for any number of reasons-including a claimant’s criminal background, jail file and any other conduct “that would invoke reasonable suspicion.” (Defendants’ Motion to Decertify at 16.) Defendants maintain that the commonality requirement is not satisfied in the present case because a “blanket” strip-search policy does not exist and because of differences that may arise in establishing an individual class member’s right to recover, “such as assessing the reasonableness of each search and determining damages.” Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 616.
The Court finds that Defendants’ arguments “do not demonstrate that there are no common questions of law or

fact,” id., and are more applicable to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement analysis. The commonality requirement does not mean all questions of law and fact must be identical, but rather that an issue of law and fact exists that inheres in the complaints of all the class members. See In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1080; Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473 (D.Colo.1998). “When the party opposing the class has engaged in some course of conduct that affects a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action, one or more of the elements of that cause of action will be common to all of the persons affected.” Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, § 3.10 at 3-51 (3d ed.1992).
Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants had a policy, custom, or practice of strip-searching persons on admission to and/or just prior to release from the Hopkins County Jail without regard to whether there existed the requisite individual, reasonable suspicion required by law. Given this allegation, the existence and constitutionality of the county’s policy, custom or practice are common questions. Therefore, just as in Eddleman, common legal theories therefore bind the class. Eddleman v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 1996 WL 495013, *4 (6th Cir. August 29, 1996). As noted by the Sixth Circuit, “[t]his is true even where the putative plaintiff is subject to a full strip search instead of a partial one, or the fact that some individuals may fail to meet the qualifications for the class because it can be shown that there was reasonable suspicion to search them or the fact that some potential plaintiffs may decide to ‘opt-out.’ “ Id. at *4. In the present case, Plaintiffs allege similar conduct by the same Defendants. Id . Therefore, the Court finds that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been met. Boggs, 141 F.R.D. at 64.
3. Typicality To satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), the proponents of class certification must demonstrate that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” See Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976). “ ‘[A] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.’ “ In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Newberg and Conte, § 3.13 at 3-76). “When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.” Newberg and Conte, § 3 .13 at 3-77. Because each named Plaintiff alleges an unconstitutional strip search after arrest for a minor
3

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

violation or before release from jail, the claims of the representatives are typical of the class as a whole. See, e.g., Eddleman, 1996 WL 495013, *4; Dodge v. County of Orange, 226 F.R.D. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.2005); Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 619.
4. Adequacy of Representation *5 Finally, to satisfy the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), the proponents of certification must demonstrate that ‘the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
The Sixth Circuit has articulated two criteria for determining adequacy of representation: “ ‘1) the representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class, and 2) it must appear that the representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.’ “ In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Senter, 532 F.2d at 525); Boggs, 141 F.R.D. at 66. Rule 23(a)(4) tests “ ‘the experience and ability of counsel for the plaintiffs and whether there is any antagonism between the interests of the plaintiffs and other members of the class they seek to represent.” In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Cross v. National Trust Life Insurance Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir.1977)). “ ‘[I]f there is more than one named representative, it is not necessary that all the representatives meet the Rule 23(a)(4) standard; as long as one of the representatives is adequate, the requirement will be met.’ “ Cook v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378, 387 (D.Colo.1993)(quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1765 at 277 (2d ed.1986)).
Defendants assert that no member of the Class could ever fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class because the Court must conduct mini-trials of each Plaintiff’s claim and determine whether a strip search occurred and, if so, whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. The Court finds that the named Plaintiffs have common interests with unnamed members of the class. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have asserted claims typical of other class members. Specifically, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants had a policy, custom, or practice of strip-searching persons on admission to and/or just prior to release from the Hopkins County Jail without regard to whether there existed the requisite individual, reasonable suspicion required by law. No evidence exists that the representative Plaintiffs differ from the class members in any significant circumstance with respect to this issue which would obstruct their ability to vigorously represent the proposed class.
Furthermore, the Defendants in this case do not challenge the qualification or ability of Plaintiffs’ counsel to

effectively represent the class. The Court has reviewed and considered the qualifications of Plaintiffs’ counsel and find that counsel have sufficient experience and ability to fairly and adequately represent the interest of the class.
The Court finds that the named Plaintiffs adequately represent the interests of the class as a whole and that the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) have been satisfied.
B. Rule 23(b) Requirements
After satisfying Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites, the party seeking certification must demonstrate that the action satisfies one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs contend that continued certification of the class is proper under Rule 23(b)(3).
*6 A class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) if the Court finds “that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).
Subdivision (b)(3) of Rule 23 parallels subdivision (a)(2) of Rule 23 in that both require that common questions exist, but subdivision (b)(3) contains a more stringent requirement that common issues “predominate” over individual issues. In re American Medical, 75 F.3d at 1084. The predominance question “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). “The court, therefore, must balance concerns regarding issues common to the class as a whole with questions affecting individual class members.” O’Connor v. Boeing North America, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 339 (C.D.Cal.1998). However, “ ‘[a] single common issue may be the overriding one in the litigation, despite the fact that the suit also entails numerous remaining individual questions.’ “ Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 620 (citing Newburg & Conte, § 4.25 at 4-84).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because individual issues regarding class membership and personal damages will predominate over the common issues identified by Plaintiff. See Noon v. Sailor, 2000 WL 684274 (S.D.Ind. March 14, 2000). Defendants contend that the Hopkins County Jail had a written policy that required an “individual assessment” before a strip search could take place, and as a result, this fact defeats Plaintiffs’ argument of predominance and distinguishes the case from Eddleman. Defendants maintain that if this
4

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

case were to proceed to trial, the Court would be required to hold mini-trials on each and every claim to determine class membership, if the class member was strip searched, and if so, whether Defendants had reasonable suspicion for doing so. Defendants further argue that the case has become unmanageable and, as a result, Plaintiffs have also failed to meet the superiority requirement.
1. Predominance “[C]ase law suggests that, when a uniformly applied policy is challenged, the validity of the policy predominates over individual issues.” Dodge v. County of Orange, 226 F.R.D. 177, 181 (S.D.N .Y.2005). Consistent with this principle, the Sixth Circuit found class certification appropriate in a case in which the plaintiff class challenged a blanket or uniform strip search policy, despite the presence of some factual variation in the claims. Eddleman v. Jefferson County, 1996 WL 495013 (6th Cir. August 29, 1996). See also Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2004)(affirming certification of two 23(b)(3) strip search liability classes); Dodge, 226 F.R.D. 177; Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 2004 WL 1125922, *3-5 (N.D.Ill. May 17, 2004)(certifying 23(b)(3) liability strip search sub-classes); Blihovde v. St. Croix County, Wisconsin, 219 F.R.D. 607, 622-23 (W.D.Wis.2003)(certifying 23(b)(3) strip search class); Maneely v. City of Newburgh, 208 F.R.D. 69, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y.2002)(certifying 23(b)(3) strip search class as to the issue of whether defendants had an unconstitutional policy). In the present case, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants had a policy, custom, or practice of strip-searching persons on admission to and/or just prior to release from the Hopkins County Jail without regard to whether there existed the requisite individual reasonable suspicion required by law. (Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 25 and 27.) Additionally, Plaintiffs have presented the deposition testimony of Donald Gossett, who was employed at the jail from December 2000 to January 2002. Gossett testified that it was the Jail’s policy to strip-search everyone entering the Jail’s general population, returning from Court, and just prior to release. (Gossett Dep. at 14, 18-19, 22-25.) Thus, consistent with Eddleman, the issues of the existence of the policy or custom, the constitutionality of the policy or custom, and whether that policy or custom was applied to the Plaintiff class are the predominant liability issues in this case. See Dodge, 226 F.R.D. at 182.
*7 Defendants disagree and argue, first, that Eddleman does not apply to the present case because the written policy of the Hopkins County Jail reflects that a blanket strip search policy did not exist at the Jail. Specifically, Defendants argue that the written policy of the Hopkins County Jail, unlike the written policy in Eddleman, clearly requires the deputy jailers to conduct an

“individualized assessment” prior to each strip search. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the existence of this written strip search policy by the Hopkins County Jail does not distinguish the present case from Eddleman nor bar the Plaintiffs’ class action claim. Just as in Eddleman, Plaintiffs have consistently alleged that the Hopkins County Jail had a widespread policy, custom or practice to strip search all persons who entered the Jail, regardless of the individual circumstances. And, just as in Eddleman, “[t]he basis for the complaint ... arises precisely because the Defendants did not conduct an individualized assessment of the need for each search.” Eddleman, 1996 WL 495013, *5. Ultimately, a reasonable jury could find that the Hopkins County Jail failed to follow its written policy, and instead followed a custom or practice to strip search all persons on admission to the jail or release from the jail without regard to whether there existed reasonable suspicion to do so.
Defendants also argue that the questionnaires demonstrate that the Hopkins County Jail did not have a blanket policy of strip-searching all persons. For example, Defendants state that in 32 of the 750 questionnaires returned to Plaintiffs’ counsel, the respondent denied being strip searched at the Hopkins County Jail. Further, Defendants argue that of the 718 persons claimed to have been strip searched, 413 deny having been strip searched on release. Assuming Defendants’ assessment of the questionnaires are true, it does not establish the absence of any policy, custom, or practice. See Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 618. “Defendants cite no authority holding that a custom does not exist if there is even one exception to the rule.” Id. at 618. Instead, a custom is a widespread practice. Whether Plaintiffs can ultimately prove the existence of a policy or custom is an issue to be resolved at trial.
Second, Defendants maintain that under the current Entry Class definition, the Court would be required to hold mini-trials on each claim to determine class membership. The Entry Class is defined as “[a]ll persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Defendants in the Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.” The Court agrees with the Defendants that the language of the current Entry Class definition is susceptible to an interpretation that in order to establish class membership, the Court is required to determine “the absence of any reasonable suspicion” with respect to each potential class member. However, an examination of the Third Amended Complaint reveals that the basis of the complaint is a broad general claim that the Hopkins County Jail had a policy, custom or practice of strip searching all persons admitted to and/or released from the jail without regard to whether they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband. (Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 25, 27.) To avoid any confusion and to conform to the
5

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Third Amended Complaint, the Court sua sponte amends the Entry Class definition as follows: “All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection on admission to the Jail without regard to whether they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.”
*8 Third, Defendants argue that individual issues predominate as it relates to the class damage claims, and as a result, decertification of the class is necessary. The Court disagrees. Although Defendants are correct that there may be some variation in the class members’ amount of damages, numerous cases exists “in which courts have rejected arguments that differences in damages among the class members should preclude class certification.” Blihovde, 219 F.R .D. at 621 (citing Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 640 (6th Cir.1993)). “Varying damage levels rarely prohibit a class action if the class members’ claims possess factual and legal commonality.” Eddleman, 1996 WL 495013, *6. When damages vary, the court may bifurcate the lawsuit so that the defendants’ liability can be determined initially. Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 621 (“If there are genuine common issues ... then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.’ “ Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir.2003)). Additionally, courts have also recognized the use of a magistrate or special master to address any individualized issues including damages or decertification of the class after a finding of liability.
Given these reasons, the Court finds that the potential for varying claims of damages does not mandate class decertification. Instead, the Court will bifurcate the lawsuit permitting the Defendants’ liability to be determined initially. In the event a jury determines that the Hopkins County Jail maintained an unconstitutional blanket strip search policy, the Court will then determine the best approach for the second phase of the litigation.
Fourth, the Court recognizes that potential individual issues may exist if, regardless of the Hopkins County Jail’s uniform policy, “some plaintiffs were strip searched based upon ‘reasonable and contemporaneously held suspicion.’ “ In re Nassau Co. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir.2006). See also Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 621 (Even if the county’s strip-search policy or custom violates the Fourth Amendment, a defendant may avoid liability to particular class members “if an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a class member was concealing weapons or contraband.”).2 Courts generally recognize that “if plaintiffs can establish that defendants had an unconstitutional strip search policy or custom, defendants will have the burden to show that a particular search was reasonable.” Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at

622; Doe, 754 F.Supp. at 1220; Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16, 24 (D.Mass.2000)(“To require Plaintiff to prove that each individual search was unsupportable, as well as indiscriminate, would be unnecessary and unfair. Given that these [persons] were routinely strip-searched, the burden rests on Defendants to demonstrate that particular searches were reasonable.”). However, “[t]he existence of this defense does not foreclose class certification.” In re Nassau Co. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d at 230 (citation omitted); Tardiff, 365 F.3d at 5-6. Any individual issues with respect to defenses and/or damages will be considered in the second phase of the litigation.
*9 Finally, Defendants argue that individualized assessments will be necessary to determine if a potential class member was incarcerated when the suit was filed, or is currently incarcerated, thus, barring his or her claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Plaintiffs argue that the Court has already ruled that the PLRA was not applicable to this action. In a previous motion, the Defendants argued the case should be dismissed because none of the Plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court, noting that the Plaintiffs were all former prisoners, held that the PLRA did not apply to claims filed by former prisoners. The Court has not answered the question presented now, which is whether the PLRA bars the claims asserted on behalf of current prisoners in a class action by Plaintiffs who are former prisoners. This is purely a legal question which needs to be resolved at some point during this litigation. However, the Court concludes that the question of whether certain class members’ claims are barred by the PLRA does not warrant decertification of the class.
2. Superiority For Rule 23(b)(3) certification to be proper, a class action also must be the most “fair and efficient” method of resolving this case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In analyzing that question, courts must consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the interest of the class members in maintaining separate actions; (2) “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class”; (3) “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and (4) “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).
First, the Court finds that litigating the existence of a uniform policy for the class as a whole would “both reduce the range of issues and promote judicial economy.” Dodge, 226 F.R.D. at 184. “Every member of the class who did not opt out would be bound by a
6

Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

decision that there was, or was not, a uniform policy in effect during a particular time period.” Id. Even if the second phase of the litigation is ultimately resolved on a non-class basis, “the issues and evidence relevant to these individual adjudications would be substantially narrowed.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, given the fact that recovery of many of the potential class members may be relatively small and that many of the class members may not be aware that they have a claim, the interest of individual class members in maintaining separate actions is also small.
Second, the action has already progressed substantially as a class action for over a year. Third, concentrating this litigation in one forum simplifies the litigation. As discussed above, the resolution of the existence of a uniform policy streamlines the case. Fourth, while the Court recognizes there may be some difficulties in management of the class action, these concerns can be adequately addressed with bifurcation of the issues. Therefore, the Court concludes that “a class action provides the most feasible and efficient method of determining liability.” Blihovde, 219 F.R.D. at 622.
*10 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) with respect to their claims that the Defendants had an unconstitutional policy or custom of strip searching all persons for minor offenses on admission to and/or just prior to their release from jail regardless of the circumstances. If Plaintiffs prove there was an unconstitutional policy or custom, the Plaintiffs will be permitted to proceed with the second phase of the ligation. The structure of the second phase of the litigation will be addressed after the liability phase is resolved.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the prerequisites for certification of the class under Rule 23. For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by Defendants to decertify the class [DN 95] is denied. The Entry Class definition is amended as follows: “All persons arrested for non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offenses who were required by the Jail to remove their clothing for visual inspection on admission to the Jail without regard to whether they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a scheduling conference to develop a litigation plan consistent with this Opinion. Prior to the scheduling conference, the parties shall review the notice of class certification mailed to prospective class members to ensure that it complies fully with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B), including an explanation (1) that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires, (2) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and (3) of the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3). Additionally, the notice will need to reflect the amended definition of the class. The modifications of the notice required by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) shall be discussed at the scheduling conference.
	  

Footnotes

1

Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which also requires that such common questions predominate over individual questions, the existence of

significant common legal or factual issues is enough to meet Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold commonality requirement.

2

See also Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir .1995); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th

Cir.1983); Maneely, 208 F.R.D. at 77-78 (use of unconstitutional strip search policy does not automatically render each search

unconstitutional). Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 2004 WL 1125922, *4 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. May 17, 2004)(“[I]n the event that

defendants believe that specific searches or classes of searches had a reasonable antecedent justification, defendants are not

precluded from offering proof that the subjects of those searches should be excluded from the class.”).

	  

7

 
 Sutton v. Hopkins County
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division January 11, 2007, Decided
CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:03CV-003-M

Reporter: 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3152 EDWARD LEE SUTTON, LESTER H. TURNER, LINDA JOYCE FORD, TIMOTHY D. MAY, LADONIA W. WILSON, ROBIN LITTLEPAGE, ROBERT R. TEAGUE, and TABITHA NANCE, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, PLAINTIFFS v. HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, DEFENDANTS
Subsequent History: Remanded by Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73967 (W.D. Ky., Aug. 19, 2009)
Prior History: Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3150 (W.D. Ky., Jan. 11, 2007)
Counsel: [*1] For Edward Lee Sutton, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Lester H. Turner, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Linda Joyce Ford, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Timothy D. May, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff: Bart L. Greenwald, Laura C. Leone, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Jason Renzelmann, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY; Gregory A. Belzley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY.
For Robin Littlepage, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Tabitha Nance, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Ladonia W. Nelson, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Robert R. Teague, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff: Laura C. Leone, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bart L. Greenwald, Jason Renzelmann, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY; Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY.
For Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Plaintiff: Bart L. Greenwald, Jason Renzelmann, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY; Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY.
For Hopkins [*2] County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, Defendant: Allen W. Holbrook, R. Michael Sullivan, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY; John T. Soyars, LEAD ATTORNEY,

Foster, Soyars & Associates, Hopkinsville, KY; Sam R-G Clymer, Stacey A. Blankenship, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Denton & Keuler, LLP, Paducah, KY.
Judges: Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., Judge.
Opinion by: Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on an Objection by Defendants to the Magistrate's Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendants' motion to set a deadline for former inmates to return questionnaires [DN 94]; on a motion by Defendants for remedial measures [DN 125]; on a motion by Defendants for leave to file an amended motion for remedial measures and to withdraw original motion for remedial measures [DN 137]; and on a motion by Plaintiffs for a hearing date [DN 161].
The Court being sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The Objection by Defendants to the Magistrate's Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendant's motion to set a deadline [*3] for former inmates to return questionnaires [DN 94] is overruled. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that "Rule 23 does not . . . require members of any class affirmatively to opt into membership." Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,544 U.S. 1034, 125 S. Ct. 2272, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (2005). Requiring Plaintiffs to submit completed questionnaires by a certain deadline essentially creates an unacceptable mandatory "opt-in" requirement.
2. The motion by Defendants for leave to file an amended motion for remedial measures and to withdraw the original motion for remedial measures [DN 137] is granted.
3. The motion by Defendants for remedial measures [DN 125] is denied. On April 14, 2006, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a cover letter on firm letterhead and a questionnaire to some of the potential class members requesting the addressee to complete and return the questionnaire. Defendants complain that the cover letter that

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3152, *3

Page 2 of 2

accompanied the questionnaire shortened the definition of the

term "strip-search." Defendants request a corrective notice be 4. The motion by Plaintiffs for a hearing date [DN 161] is

sent to those persons who received this letter from counsel denied.

and who have returned the [*4] questionnaire. Having reviewed the cover letter and questionnaire, the Court denies the Defendants' motion for remedial measures. The Court finds it significant that the Plaintiffs' counsel attached the

5. The motion by Plaintiffs to compel responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests [DN 115] is referred to the Magistrate Judge.

exact questionnaire previously approved by Defendants and this Court which contained the Court approved definition of Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., Judge

strip search. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the Court anticipates no confusion related to the shortened definition

United States District Court

contained in the cover letter.

January 11, 2007

 
 Sutton v. Hopkins County
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky March 16, 2006, Decided
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03CV-00003-JHM

Reporter: 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11243 EDWARD LEE SUTTON, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, and LESTER H. TURNER, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, PLAINTIFFS vs. HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, and JIM LANTRIP, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, DEFENDANTS
Subsequent History: Motion denied by Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3143 (W.D. Ky., Jan. 11, 2007)
Prior History: Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34698 (W.D. Ky., Dec. 19, 2005)
Counsel: [*1] For Edward Lee Sutton, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Lester H. Turner, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Linda Joyce Ford, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Timothy D. May, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Robin Littlepage, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Tabitha Nance, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Ladonia W. Nelson, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Robert R. Teague, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff: Bart L. Greenwald, James Robert Craig, Laura C. Leone, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY; Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl, Louisville, KY.
For Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Plaintiff: Bart L. Greenwald, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY; Gregory A. Belzley, Dinsmore & Shohl, Louisville, KY.
For Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky, Defendant: Allen W. Holbrook, R. Michael Sullivan, Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback & Miller, P.S.C., Owensboro, KY; John T. Soyars, [*2] Foster, Soyars & Associates, Hopkinsville, KY; Stacey A. Blankenship, Denton & Keuler, LLP, Paducah, KY.
Judges: E. Robert Goebel, United States Magistrate Judge.
Opinion by: E. Robert Goebel
Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' MOTION TO SET DEADLINE FOR FORMER INMATES TO RETURN QUESTIONNAIRE (DN 80). Plaintiffs have filed a Response (DN 83) objecting to the motion, and Defendants have filed their Reply (DN 85) to the Response. The matter is ripe for ruling. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
DISCUSSION
This litigation is a class action wherein the class alleges its members were subjected to an unlawful strip search by employees of the Defendant, Jim Lanthrip, the Hopkins County, Kentucky Jailer, when members of the class were incarcerated there.
In an effort to determine potential class members, counsel for the Plaintiffs mailed nearly 7,000 questionnaires to these potential members. Defendants apparently agreed to the form of the notice and questionnaire (Response, DN 83, p.2). The last of these questionnaires was mailed as late as September 15, 2005 (Motion, DN 80, p.2). To date, 564 questionnaires have been completed and returned to [*3] Plaintiffs' counsel, and more than 2,400 notices and questionnaires were returned, undelivered. This would leave approximately 4,000 notices and questionnaires presumably delivered for which no response was received (Response DN 83, p.2).
Defendants argue that to appropriately defend/evaluate the case, they are entitled to know how many persons claim to have been unlawfully searched (Motion, DN 80, p.2). Defendants state they "wish to contact those former inmates who were not strip searched for purposes of establishing that there was no custom of unlawfully strip searching inmates." (Motion, DN 80, p.2). Defendants acknowledge, "However, until those persons are no longer considered 'potential' class members, Defendants cannot ethically [contact them]." (Motion, DN 80, p.2). Impervious Paint Industries v. Ashland Oil, 508 F.Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981). Obviously, any former inmate of the jail incarcerated during the relevant time period who was not subjected to a strip search at any time is not a potential member of the Plaintiff class, and may be contacted by Defendants with impunity. However, Defendants did not keep such records (Motion, DN 80, p.2).

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11243, *3

Page 2 of 2

Defendants' [*4] solution to their dilemma is to "propose a

ruling that Plaintiffs have sixty (60) days (presumably from a For the Court [*5] to rule as Defendants request would result

date established by the Court) in which to provide Defendants in forever barring potential class members from coming on

with a questionnaire for each class member. Only those board the lawsuit. Such a ruling by the Court is the functional

persons that have submitted a questionnaire to Plaintiffs prior equivalent of a court ordered mandatory "opt in" requirement,

to that date, alleging an unlawful strip search and fitting into that is "speak" (or act) now or forever be silenced. This the one of the two described subclasses, should be allowed to Court cannot do. Mandatory "opt-in" requirements for

participate as a class member. It will be assumed that those Plaintiffs, as it relates to federal class action litigation, has

who fail to respond by that date were not unlawfully strip long been rejected. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2); Kern v. Siemens searched and/or do not want to participate in the class action." Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124-129 (2nd Cir. 2004); Clark v.

(Reply, DN 85, p.5).

Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir. 1974);

Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325, 327

If the Court bought into this fix then "potential" class (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

members lose their potentiality, and Defendants would be free

to contact them.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the

Defendants' Motion to Set Deadline for Former Inmates to

Defendants' motion is not well-taken. No doubt there is a Return Questionnaire (DN 80) is DENIED.

substantial number of persons who received the notice and

questionnaire who were not strip searched and therefore are March 16, 2006

not potential class members. It is simply unknown who they are. But as Plaintiffs have persuasively argued, there may be E. Robert Goebel

any number of good reasons why potential class members (those who were subjected to a strip search) have not returned United States Magistrate Judge

the questionnaire.

 
 Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 1 of 47
CASREF,CLASS,CLOSED,PROTOR
U.S. District Court Western District of Kentucky (Owensboro) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:03−cv−00003−JHM−ERG

Sutton, et al v. KY Hopkins County, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/09/2003 Date Terminated: 01/26/2010 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Edward Lee Sutton Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Bart L. Greenwald Frost Brown Todd LLC − Louisville 400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202−3363 502−589−5400 Fax: 502−581−1087 Email: bgreenwald@fbtlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley P.O. Box 278 Prospect, KY 40059 502−292−2452 Fax: 502−494−6186 Email: gbelzley@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Robert Craig Tachau Meek PLC 101 S. Fifth Street, Sutie 3600 Louisville, KY 40202−3120 502−238−9900 Fax: 502−238−9910 Email: jcraig@tachaulaw.com TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone Fultz, Maddox, Hovious &Dickens PLC 101 S. Fifth Street, 27th Floor Louisville, KY 40202−3116 502−588−2015 Fax: 502−588−2020 Email: lleone@fmhd.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle Frost Brown Todd LLC − Louisville 400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202−3363 502−568−0312 Fax: 502−581−1087 Email: swettle@fbtlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann Frost Brown Todd LLC − Louisville

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 2 of 47

400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202−3363 502−779−8185 Fax: 502−581−1087 Email: jrenzelmann@fbtlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Lester H. Turner Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Linda Joyce Ford Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 3 of 47

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Timothy D. May Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robin Littlepage Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

represented by

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 4 of 47

Tabitha Nance Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Ladonia W. Nelson Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert R. Teague Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by James Robert Craig (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY

Laura C. Leone (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 5 of 47

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel Todd

represented by Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tony Ward

represented by Susan S. Wettle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bart L. Greenwald (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory A. Belzley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Renzelmann (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Movant Kentucky Association of Counties All Lines Fund Trust
Movant

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 6 of 47

Bobby A. Eversole

Movant Nicholis Belle

represented by Nicholis Belle 809 Madison Street Providence, KY 42450−1329 270−884−2382 PRO SE

V. Intervenor Plaintiff Chyrle Ava Taylor

represented by Thresa Taylor Hinton Hinton &Hinton 113 East Center Street P. O. Box 895 Madisonville, KY 42431 270−821−8819 Fax: 270−821−8207 Email: thresahinton@bellsouth.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Hopkins County, Kentucky

represented by Allen W. Holbrook Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback &Miller, P.S.C. 100 St. Ann Street P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302−0727 270−926−4000 Fax: 270−683−6694 Email: aholbrook@smsmlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas R. Moore Denton &Keuler, LLP 555 Jefferson Street, Suite 301 Paducah, KY 42001 270−443−8253 Fax: 270−442−6000 Email: dmoore@dklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John T. Soyars Foster, Soyars &Associates 209 E. 14th Street P.O. Box 24 Hopkinsville, KY 42241−0024 270−886−1272 Fax: 886−3910 Email: mfoster@hopkinsville.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R. Michael Sullivan Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback &Miller, P.S.C.

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 7 of 47

100 St. Ann Street P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302−0727 270−926−4000 Fax: 270−683−6694 Email: msullivan@smsmlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel G−R Clymer McCracken County Attorney's Office 301 S. Sixth Street Paducah, KY 42003 270−444−4709 Fax: 270−444−4728 Email: sclymer@co.mccracken.ky.us TERMINATED: 06/18/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Samuel J. Wright Farmer and Wright PLLC 329 N 5th St Paducah, KY 42001 270−443−4431 Fax: 270−443−4631 Email: sam@farmerwright.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stacey A. Blankenship Denton &Keuler, LLP 555 Jefferson Street, Suite 301 Paducah, KY 42001 270−443−8253 Fax: 270−442−6000 Email: sblankenship@dklaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jim Lantrip Individually and in his official capacity as Jailer of Hopkins County, Kentucky

represented by Allen W. Holbrook (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas R. Moore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John T. Soyars (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Michael Sullivan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel G−R Clymer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/18/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 8 of 47

Samuel J. Wright (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stacey A. Blankenship (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Interested Party Eddie E. Burnette Interested Party Paul E. Bowman Interested Party Adam Gray Interested Party Roy M Bates Interested Party John Roger McGee Interested Party Christian L. Powers
Interested Party Elvis Bister
Claimant Jhonni Upton Claimant Misti Titus

represented by Christian L. Powers 151703 K.S.P. P.O. Box 5128 Eddyville, KY 40238 PRO SE
represented by Elvis Bister P.O. Box 161 Garrison, KY 41141 PRO SE

Date Filed 01/09/2003
01/14/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed and (Summons(es) issued) filing fee pd − receipt # 320935 (PRM) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
2 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. Case referred to Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel for determination of nondispositive matters (cc: all counsel and Mag. Judge Goebel) [Entry Date: 1/14/03] (PRM) (Entered: 01/14/2003)

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01/17/2003 01/17/2003 01/30/2003 02/07/2003 03/26/2003 04/01/2003 04/02/2003
05/20/2003 06/02/2003 06/03/2003 06/09/2003 06/11/2003 06/11/2003
10/28/2003 10/29/2003
02/17/2004 02/20/2004 02/20/2004 06/01/2004 06/01/2004

RETURN OF SERVICE executed upon defendant KY Hopkins County on 1/13/03 (PJH) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
RETURN OF SERVICE executed upon defendant Jim Lantrip on 1/13/03 (PJH) (Entered: 01/22/2003)
3 ANSWER by defendant KY Hopkins County, defendant Jim Lantrip to [1−1]; jury demand (PRM) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
4 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr.; litigation plan ddl set for 3/14/03; telephonic scheduling conference set for 10:30 4/1/03 before Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel (cc: all counsel) [Entry Date: 3/31/03] (PJH) (Entered: 03/31/2003)
5 STATEMENT regarding plaintiffs' Rule 26 initial disclosures by plaintiff Edward Lee Sutton, plaintiff Lester H. Turner (PRM) (Entered: 03/27/2003)
6 LITIGATION PLAN by defendants and plaintiffs re [4−2] (PJH) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
7 SCHEDULING ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel; telephonic scheduling conference held on 4/1/03; initial disclosures ddl set for 4/1/03; plas' disclosure of expert testimony ddl set for 6/2/03; dfts' disclosure of expert testimony ddl set for 7/1/03; motions to join add'l parties and motions to amend pleadings ddl set for 8/1/03; discovery ddl set for 10/1/03; dispositive motion ddl set for 11/3/03; telephonic status conference set for 9:30 10/2/03 before Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel (cc: all counsel) [Entry Date: 4/2/03] (PJH) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
8 EXPERT WITNESS filed by plaintiffs (PJH) (Entered: 05/23/2003)
9 MOTION by defendants to extend time to 8/1/03 to file expert witness disclosure ; order tendered (PJH) (Entered: 06/02/2003)
10 RESPONSE (NO OBJECTION) by plaintiff to motion to extend time to 8/1/03 to file expert witness disclosure [9−1] ; order tendered (PJH) (Entered: 06/05/2003)
FILE SUBMITTED to ERG (EAS) (Entered: 06/09/2003)
FILE RETURNED (SEALED) (Entered: 06/11/2003)
11 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel granting motion to extend time to 8/1/03 to file expert witness disclosure [9−1] ; Discovery ddl set for 11/3/03 ; amendments ddl set for 9/1/03 ; dispositive motion ddl set for 12/3/03 ; telephone conf. set for 10:00 11/6/03 before Magistrate Judge E. R. Goebel (cc: all counsel) [Entry Date: 6/11/03] (SEALED) (Entered: 06/11/2003)
12 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER tendered . (PJH) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
13 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 10/28/03; Amended Pleadings due by 9/1/2003. Discovery due by 2/17/2003. Dispositive Motions due by 4/15/2004. Expert Witness (Defendant) due by 8/1/2003. Joinder of Parties due by 9/1/2003. Telephonic Status Conference set for 2/20/2004 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.(PJH) (Entered: 10/29/2003)
14 STATUS REPORT by Edward Lee Sutton ; Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A; # 2 Exhibit B; # 3 Proposed Order)(SDB) (Entered: 02/19/2004)
Proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : Telephonic Status Conference held on 2/20/2004. (PJH) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
15 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 2/20/04; Discovery due by 8/18/2004. Dispositive Motions due by 10/18/2004. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/1/2004 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.(PJH) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
16 STATUS REPORT and MOTION to set deadline for certification of a class action by Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(PJH) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
Proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : Telephonic Status Conference held on 6/1/2004. (PJH) (Entered: 06/10/2004)

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06/10/2004 08/02/2004 08/10/2004 10/13/2004 10/25/2004 10/26/2004 11/29/2004 12/06/2004 01/18/2005
01/18/2005
01/31/2005 02/10/2005 02/17/2005 02/18/2005

17 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 6/1/04. Plas' certification for class action due 9/1/04. Discovery due by 11/18/2004. Dispositive Motions due by 1/18/2005. Telephonic Status Conference set for 8/26/2004 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.(PJH) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
18 AGREED ORDER tendered amending deadlines by Hopkins County, Kentucky ; Jim Lantrip ; Edward Lee Sutton ; Lester H. Turner. (PJH) Modified on 8/2/2004 − added text (PJH). (Entered: 08/02/2004)
19 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 8/4/04. Discovery due by 2/18/2005. Dispositive Motions due by 4/18/2005. Certification for Class Action due by 12/1/2004. Telephonic Status Conference set for 2/22/2005 10:30 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.(PJH) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
20 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 10/13/04. Discovery Hearing set for 10/20/2004 09:00 AM in Teleconference before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.(PJH) (Entered: 10/13/2004)
Proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : TelephonicDiscovery Hearing held on 10/25/2004. (PJH) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
21 REPORT by E. Robert Goebel on 10/25/04. (PJH) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
22 Agreed Order extending class certification motion deadline to 1/17/05 by Hopkins County, Kentucky ; Jim Lantrip ; Edward Lee Sutton ; Lester H. Turner. (PJH) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
23 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 11/30/04 re 19 . Motion for Class Certification due by 1/17/2005.(PJH) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
24 MOTION to Certify as a Class Action by Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 2/6/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support # 2 Index of Exhibits# 3 Exhibit A − Hopkins County Policy# 4 Exhibit B − Statements of Entry Class Plaintiffs# 5 Class Action Questionnaire of Stephanie Marie Clede# 6 Class Action Questionnaire continued# 7 Class Action Questionnaire of Natasha Maria Hunter# 8 Class Action Questionnaire of Larry Wayne Martin# 9 Class Action Questionnaire of Phillip Jermaine Powell# 10 Class Action Questionnaire of Vicki Lynn Tapp# 11 Exhibit C − Statements of Release Class Plaintiffs# 12 Exhibit D − Linda Joyce Ford Statement# 13 Exhibit E − Timothy D. May Statement# 14 Exhibit F − Photograph of Undeliverable Questionnaires (not scanned)# 15 Exhibit G − George A. Eddleman, II, et al., vs. Jefferson County, Kentucky, et al.# 16 Exhibit H − Judy A. Wilson, et al., v. Franklin County Correctional Complex, et al.# 17 Proposed Order)(PJH) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
25 MOTION for Leave to file first amended complaint by Edward Lee Sutton ; Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 2/7/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit A − Blank Copy of Class Action Questionnaire# 3 Exhibit B − Photograph of Undeliverable Questionnaires# 4 Exhibit C − First Amended Complaint# 5 (Exhibit 1 to amended complaint) Hopkins County Jail Strip−Search Policy# 6 Proposed Order)(PJH) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
26 STIPULATION extending time to 2/10/05 to respond to 25 MOTION for Leave to file first amended complaint and petition to certify as a class action by Hopkins County, Kentucky ; Jim Lantrip ; Edward Lee Sutton ; Lester H. Turner. (PJH) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
27 RESPONSE to Motion re 24 MOTION to Certify Class, 25 MOTION for Leave to file first amended complaint by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (PJH) (Entered: 02/10/2005)
28 REPLY to Response to Motion re 24 MOTION to Certify Class by Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (PJH) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
29 REPLY to Response to Motion re 25 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint by Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner. (LMW) (Entered: 02/18/2005)

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02/23/2005
03/07/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/18/2005
03/18/2005 03/25/2005 04/06/2005 05/05/2005 06/03/2005 06/06/2005 06/08/2005 06/08/2005
06/08/2005

30 ORDER for proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : Status Conference held on 2/22/2005. The parties shall submit an agreed stipulation by 3/4/2005 for the Court to consider the definition of class action. Should the parties not reach an agreement, they shall submit a report by 3/4/2005 indicating they cannot agree and the Plaintiffs' Petition to Certify as a Class Action is ripe for ruling by Judge McKinley. cc:Counsel(LMW) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
31 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 03/07/2005 extending to 03/11/2005 for parties to submit agreed stipulation regarding definition of class action. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
32 Proposed Agreed Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky ; Jim Lantrip ; Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner. (LMW) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
33 JOINT STATUS REPORT by Hopkins County, Kentucky ; Jim Lantrip ; Edward Lee Sutton AND Lester H. Turner. (LMW) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
34 AGREED ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 3/16/2005; re 30 Status Conference 24 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, 25 MOTION for Leave to filed by Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Case Referred to Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel for status conference. Motions terminated: 24 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, 25 MOTION for Leave to filed by Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint GRANTED and Defendants have 20 days from date of this Order to answer said complaint. Motion to Certify a Class Action is GRANTED. See Order for specifics of classes certified. cc:Counsel, Magistrate Judge Goebel(LMW) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
35 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against Hopkins County, Kentucky AND Jim Lantrip filed by Edward Lee Sutton AND Lester H. Turner. Related document: 1 Complaint.(LMW) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
36 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 03/25/2005; Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/26/2005 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, K. Lovell(CSD) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
37 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions by Hopkins County, Kentucky, and Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 4/13/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(LMW) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
38 ORDER re Telephonic Status Conference held on 04/26/2005 before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel; Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/1/2005 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 05/05/2005)
39 Proposed Agreed Order to file Second Amended Complaint by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 tendered Second Amended Complaint and exhibits)(CDFS) (Entered: 06/03/2005)
40 MOTION to Substitute Second Amended Complaintby Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order (Agreed)# 2 Proposed Second Amended Complaint)(CSD) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
41 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 06/08/2005 granting 40 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
42 ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel reTelephone Conference held on 6/01/2005; Settlement Conference statements due by 7/7/2005. Settlement Conference set for 7/14/2005 10:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
43 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip filed by Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Related document: 1 Complaint.(CSD) (Entered: 06/09/2005)

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06/13/2005
07/15/2005
07/15/2005
07/15/2005 07/28/2005 08/01/2005
08/02/2005 08/03/2005
08/08/2005 08/23/2005 08/30/2005 09/22/2005 09/27/2005
09/30/2005 10/03/2005 10/13/2005 10/20/2005

44 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 6/10/2005; granting 37 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Dispositive motion deadline of 4/18/2005 VACATED. Should settlement conference on 7/14/2005 not be successful, a new scheduling order will be established. cc:Counsel, Secretary to U. S. Magistrate Judge Goebel(LMW) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
45 REPORT &ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel re Settlement Conference held on 7/14/2005. Telephonic Status Conference set for 8/3/2005 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel for the purpose of resetting certain scheduling ddls. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Third Party Complaint and Request to restrain and direct third party defendant not to participate in Franklin Circuit Court action by Hopkins County and Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 8/2/2005 (Attachments: # 1 tendered Third Party Complaint# 2 Proposed Order)(CDF) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
47 NOTICE of Appearance by Allen W. Holbrook and R. Michael Sullivan on behalf of Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip (CDF) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
48 ANSWER to SECOND Amended Complaint 43 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(JBM) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
49 RESPONSE to Motion re 46 MOTION for Leave to file Third Party Complaint; filed by movant Kentucky Association of Counties All Lines Fund Trust . Replies due by 8/15/2005. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
50 NOTICE of Appearance as Co−Counsel by Hopkins County, Kentucky (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
51 ORDER for proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : Telephonic Status Conference held on 8/3/2005. Discovery due by 12/15/2005. Dispositive Motions due by 1/31/2006. TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE set for 12/19/2005 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel cc: Counsel, PH, KL(JBM) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
52 REPLY to Response to Motion re 46 MOTION for Leave to file a Third Party Complaint by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
53 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 8/19/05; denying 46 Motion for Leave to file third−party complaint cc: Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
54 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORTS by plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(JBM) (Entered: 08/31/2005)
55 Proposed Agreed Order by the parties(JBM) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
56 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 9/26/05; that the parties are granted leave to depose David W. Williamson at the correctional institution where he is incarcerated at a time and place to be designated by the institution.cc: Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 09/27/2005)
57 NOTICE Defendants' Supplemental Expert Report by Hopkins County, Kentucky (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Supplemental Expert Report)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 09/30/2005)
58 MOTION to Dismiss by Hopkins County, Kentucky. Responses due by 10/21/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
59 Letter from Tim Lee Warner requesting to be put on the mailing list of the class action. (JBM) (Entered: 10/13/2005)
60 RESPONSE to Motion re 58 MOTION to Dismiss by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Edward Lee Sutton and Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 11/3/2005. (Attachments:

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 13 of 47

10/20/2005 10/21/2005
10/26/2005 11/03/2005 11/10/2005 11/22/2005 11/23/2005 11/23/2005 11/23/2005 11/28/2005 11/28/2005 11/30/2005 12/14/2005 12/16/2005
12/19/2005
12/20/2005 12/22/2005

# 1 Exhibit A: Correspondence)(LMW) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/24/2005 (CSD). (Entered: 10/20/2005)
61 NOTICE of Deficiency re 60 Response to Motion, : failure to comply by filing proposed order will be brought to the attention of the Court. Response due by 10/27/2005. (LMW) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
Response to 61 Notice of Deficiency re proposed order with DN 60 by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (CSD) (Entered: 10/24/2005)
62 LETTER addressed to Tim Lee Warner concerning request for class action lawsuit paperwork. (PRM) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
63 REPLY to Response to Motion re 58 MOTION to Dismiss by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
64 MOTION for Leave to filed Surreply to defendants reply to Response to Motion to DIsmiss by Plaintiffs. Responses due by 11/28/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support # 2 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
65 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT by Hopkins County, Kentucky. Responses due by 12/12/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Amended Supplemental Expert Report)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
66 RESPONSE to Motion re 64 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply by Hopkins County, Kentucky. Replies due by 12/7/2005. (Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/23/2005 (JBM). (Entered: 11/23/2005)
67 Proposed Order to Response to Plaintiff's Motion to File Surreply by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
68 MOTION to Amend/Correct 51 Status Conference,, Schedules, by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 12/12/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Holbrook, Allen) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
69 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 11/28/05; granting 64 Motion for Leave to file surreply. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 11/28/2005)
70 SURREPLY re 58 MOTION to Dismiss by Plaintiffs(JBM) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
71 RESPONSE to Motion re 68 MOTION to Amend 51 Scheduling Order (Incorrectly styled as a Reply) by Plaintiffs. Replies due by 12/14/2005. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
72 REPLY to Response to Motion re 68 MOTION to Amend 51 Scheduling Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (JBM) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
73 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 12/16/05; Discovery due by 6/20/2006. Dispositive Motions due by 8/15/2006. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/23/2006 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, PH, KL(JBM) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
74 ORDER for proceedings held before E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Conference held on 12/19/2005. Motions to amend or add Class representatives due by 1/31/2006. Jury Trial set for 1/8/2007 09:00 AM in Courtroom before Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. cc:Counsel, ES, PH, JC(JBM) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
75 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 12/19/05; motion 58 to Dismiss is DENIEDcc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
76 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 12/21/05; Exhibit List due by 11/8/2006. Proposed Jury Instructions due by 12/20/2006. Motions in Limine due by 11/22/2006. Responses due by 12/6/2006; Jury Trial set for 1/8/2007 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom before Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr..cc:Counsel, JC(JBM) (Entered: 12/22/2005)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 14 of 47

01/31/2006
02/02/2006 02/06/2006 02/08/2006 02/14/2006 02/15/2006 02/23/2006 02/23/2006 02/27/2006
02/28/2006 03/03/2006 03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/17/2006 03/17/2006

77 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 2/21/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Third Amended Complaint# 2 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
78 Proposed Agreed Protective Order by plaintiffs and Defendants (JBM) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
79 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 2/6/06cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
80 MOTION Motion To Set Deadline For Former Inmates to Return Questionnaire by Hopkins County, Kentucky. Responses due by 2/27/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Class Action# 2 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
81 RESPONSE to Motion re 77 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 2/28/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified on 2/15/2006 (JBM). (Entered: 02/14/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 81 Response to Motion; Error: Only one filer chosen; Correction: Defendant John Lantrip added as additional filer. (JBM) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
82 DEPOSITION of James Lantrip taken on 1/17/06 by Robin Littlepage. (Attachments: # 1 Deposition of James Lantrip (part two of two))(JBM) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
83 RESPONSE to Motion re 80 MOTION Motion To Set Deadline For Former Inmates to Return Questionnaire by plaintiffs Replies due by 3/9/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit # 3 Proposed Order)(JBM) Additional attachment(s) added on 3/13/2006 (JBM). (Entered: 02/24/2006)
84 REPLY to Response to Motion re 77 MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Ltr dated 1/4/06 to Blankenship)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 84 Reply to Response to Motion; Error: Typed name omitted by s/; Correction: Attorney advised of signature requirements (JBM) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
85 REPLY to Response to Motion re 80 MOTION Motion To Set Deadline For Former Inmates to Return Questionnaire by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
86 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 3/9/06; granting 77 Motion for Leave to file Third Amended Complaint. Defendants shall have 20 days to answer cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
87 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, filed by Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner.(JBM) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
*** Defendants shall have 20 days to answer the Third Party complaint. Anser Due date set for 3/29/06. (JBM) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
88 REPORT by E. Robert Goebel on 3/16/06; Written ruling denying motion 80 to set Deadline for Former Inmates to Return Questionaire to be issued by separate order.cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
89 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 3/16/06; Denying: 80 MOTION To Set Deadline For Former Inmates to Return Questionnaire filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky,.cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 03/17/2006)

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03/17/2006 03/17/2006
03/22/2006
03/22/2006 03/27/2006 03/27/2006
03/28/2006 03/28/2006 03/31/2006 04/06/2006 04/13/2006
04/13/2006 04/14/2006

90 ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 3/16/06; Telephonic Status Conference set for 3/15/2006 at 9:30 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
91 MOTION to Modify Amended Scheduling Order and Extend Expert Disclosure Deadline by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 4/4/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
92 RESPONSE to Motion re 91 MOTION to Modify Amended Scheduling Order and Extend Expert Disclosure Deadline by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 4/5/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Denied Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Amended Scheduling Order# 2 Proposed Order Order to Motion to Modify Amended Scheduling Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
93 ANSWER to Amended Complaint Third Complaint by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
94 Objection to 89 Memorandum &Opinion, Order, Terminate Motions, 88 Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −Notice of Class Action# 2 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
95 MOTION to Decertify Class by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 4/14/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Decertify Class# 2 Exhibit A − case law# 3 Exhibit B − case law# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G# 9 Exhibit H# 10 Exhibit I# 11 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
96 REPLY re 91 MOTION to Modify Amended Scheduling Order and Extend Expert Disclosure Deadline by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Craig, James) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class; Error: Attachments not described correctly; Correction: Attachment description corrected (JBM) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
97 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT OPINION by plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(JBM) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
98 RESPONSE to re 94 defendants Objections to Magistrate Judge''s Memorandum Opinion and Order by Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
99 ORDER by USMJ E. Robert Goebel on 3/30/06 granting 91 Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. Expert disclosure shall be completed by Plaintiffs no later than 3/31/06 and by Defendants no later than 4/30/06. Rebuttal disclosures shall be completed by Plaintiffs by 5/15/06 and Sur−rebuttal by Defendants by 5/31/06. cc: Counsel.(NMB) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
100 REPLY re 98 Response, to Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Opinion &Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
101 RESPONSE to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 4/28/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Excerpts from depo of Donald Gossett# 2 Exhibit B−Plas' correspondence dated 01/31/2005# 3 Exhibit C−Sixth Circuit's decision in Eddleman# 4 Exhibit D−Provision of dft's strip search policy# 5 Exhibit E−Excerpts from depo of James Lantrip# 6 Exhibit F−Memorandum Opinion, Order in Wilson# 7 Exhibit G−Plas' 2nd set of discovery requests# 8 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) Modified on 4/17/2006 to add exhibit descriptions(CSD). (Entered: 04/14/2006)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 16 of 47

04/17/2006 04/19/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006
05/04/2006 05/04/2006 05/05/2006
05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/12/2006 05/18/2006
05/23/2006

NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 101 Response to Motion,, ; Error:Attachments not described; Correction:Attachment description added by Court (CSD) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
102 MOTION for Leave to file Surreply to 100 reply in support of Objections to Magistrates Memorandum Opinion and Order; filedby plaintiffs. Responses due by 5/8/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Surreply# 2 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
103 SUPPLEMENT re 99 Order on Motion to Modify, by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Sabbatine Expert comments)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
104 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Number Limitations by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 5/16/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
105 REPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Response to Plaintiffs' Second Set of RFP# 2 Exhibit B − Letter to Holbrook from Greenwald# 3 Exhibit C − Not strip searched questionnaires# 4 Exhibit D − Sabbatine Deposition# 5 Exhibit E − Strip searched on release# 6 Exhibit F − Incarcerated on January 9, 2003# 7 Exhibit G − Affidavit of Donald Corum)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
106 RESPONSE to Motion re 104 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Number Limitations by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (NO OBJECTION) (CSD) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
107 MOTION for Leave to file Surreply by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 5/22/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Surreply# 2 Exhibit A−Depo of James Lantrip# 3 Exhibit B−Citation of Authority# 4 Proposed Order)(CSD) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
108 RESPONSE to Motion re 102 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Defendants' Reply in Support of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Opinion by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 5/19/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to file Surreply and ordering that Defendants are granted leave to file a Response to Plaintiffs' Surreply)(Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 5/5/2006 (CSD). (Entered: 05/05/2006)
ERROR: DOCKETED AS SEPARATE DOCUMENT (Entered: 05/05/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re Response; Error:Proposed Response to Sur−Reply filed as separate document; Correction:Proposed Response to Sur−Reply attached to appropriate document (CSD) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
109 RESPONSE to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class (Supplement to Original Response) by Linda Joyce Ford. Replies due by 5/26/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5/5 letter from Ms. Blankenship# 2 Exhibit 5/8 letter from Mr. Belzley)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
110 RESPONSE to Motion re 107 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to Reply in Support of Motion to Decertify by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/1/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Response to Plaintiffs Surreply to Defendants Motion to Decertify# 2 Exhibit A−Teague transcript# 3 Exhibit B−Nance transcript# 4 Exhibit C−Turner transcript# 5 Exhibit D−Sutton transcript# 6 Exhibit E−Daniel Todd questionnaire# 7 Exhibit F−Tony Ward questionnaire)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
111 SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class Second Supplement by Linda Joyce Ford. Replies due by 6/6/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Response to Plaintiff's Second Set of Discovery Requests)(Belzley, Gregory) Modified text on 5/24/06 (JM) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 17 of 47

06/07/2006 06/07/2006 06/07/2006 06/08/2006
06/09/2006 06/09/2006 06/13/2006
06/13/2006 06/13/2006 06/13/2006
06/14/2006 06/14/2006
06/14/2006 06/14/2006
06/15/2006

112 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 6/7/06; granting 107 Motion for Leave to file surreply to plaintiffs motion 95 . cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
113 SURREPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class by plaintiffs (JBM) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
114 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 6/7/06; granting 104 Motion for Leave to exceed page limitation. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
115 MOTION to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 6/26/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests# 2 Exhibit May 5 Stacey Blankenship letter# 3 Exhibit Defendants' Responses to Second Set of Discovery# 4 Exhibit May 23 Greg Belzley e−mail# 5 Exhibit June 1 Stacey Blankenship letter# 6 Proposed Order Order compelling responses)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
116 REPLY to Response to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class to Plaintiffs' Second Supplement Response by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
117 SUPPLEMENT re 94 Objection by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Affidavit)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
118 RESPONSE to Supplement to Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Opinion and Order by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) Modified on 6/13/2006 to create link to Objections. (CSD). Additional attachment(s) added on 6/15/2006 (CSD). (Entered: 06/13/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 118 Response; Error:Document not linked; Correction:Linked to appropriate document (CSD) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
119 NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION Re:PDF Error: incorrect document attached to docket entry by efiler re: 118 Response, ; Correct document attached to this entry. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
120 RESPONSE to Motion re 95 MOTION to Decertify Class Final Supplement to Response by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/27/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit June 12 e−mail exchange)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
121 NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION Re:PDF Error: incorrect document attached to docket entry by efiler re: 119 Notice of Docket Correction re:PDF; Correct document attached to this entry. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
122 RESPONSE to Motion re 115 MOTION to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/28/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Pla Sutton's Answers to Dfts' Third Set of Interrogatories) # 2 Proposed Order (Blankenship, Stacey) Modified on 6/15/2006 to add exhibit description(CSD). (Entered: 06/14/2006)
123 Proposed Order re 122 Response to Motion by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
124 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 6/26/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Gossett Questionnaire# 2 Exhibit B− Gossett Deposition Transcript# 3 Exhibit C− 501 KAR 3:120# 4 Exhibit D− Class Action Letter# 5 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 118 Response, ; Error:Incorrect pdf attached by e−filer; Correction:Corrected pdf attached by Court (CSD) (Entered: 06/15/2006)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 18 of 47

06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/16/2006 06/21/2006
06/21/2006 06/22/2006 06/23/2006 06/23/2006 06/23/2006 06/30/2006
07/11/2006 07/12/2006 07/13/2006 07/14/2006

NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 122 Response to Motion; Error:Attachment not described; proposed order filed as separate document; Correction:Attachment description corrected; proposed order attached to motion (CSD) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
125 MOTION for Remedial Measures by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 7/3/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Letter# 2 Exhibit B− Affidavit of Donald Corum# 3 Exhibit C− Affidavit of Teri Cotton# 4 Proposed Order to Motion for Remedial Measures)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
126 REPLY to Response to Motion re 115 MOTION to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
127 RESPONSE to Motion re 124 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 7/5/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) Additional attachment(s) added on 6/22/2006 (JBM). (Entered: 06/21/2006)
128 NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION Re:PDF Error: incomplete document attached to docket entry by efiler re: 127 Response to Motion, ; Correct document attached to this entry. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
129 REPLY to Response to Motion re 124 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Discovery of Absentee Class Members# 2 Exhibit B−Interrogatories &Requests for Production of Documents to Class Members# 3 Exhibit C−List of Questionnaires)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
130 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 6/22/06; granting 102 Motion for Leave to file surreply. Further ordered that the Defendants are GRANTED leave to file a reponse to Plaintiffs Surreply. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
131 SURREPLY re 100 Reply and Support of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Opinion and Order. Filed by Plaintiffs (JBM) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
132 RESPONSE to re 131 Surreply by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(JBM) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
133 RESPONSE to Motion re 125 MOTION for Remedial Measures by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 7/14/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Ltr dated 6/30/06 to Blankenship# 2 Exhibit B − Belzley correspondence and questionnaire)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
135 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs; Responses due by 7/31/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support # 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G# 9 Exhibit H# 10 Exhibit I# 11 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
134 REPLY to Response to Motion re 125 MOTION for Remedial Measures by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Class Action# 2 Exhibit B− Letter to Bart Greenwald)(Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 9/7/2006 (CSD). (Entered: 07/12/2006)
136 MOTION for Leave to Substitute Exhibit "B" by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 7/31/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B−Letter to Bart Greenwald# 2 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
137 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Amended Motion for Remedial Measures and Motion to Withdraw Original Motion for Remedial Measures by Hopkins County,

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 19 of 47

07/20/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006 07/28/2006 07/31/2006
07/31/2006 07/31/2006
08/02/2006 08/02/2006 08/03/2006 08/03/2006 08/09/2006

Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 8/1/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit Amended Motion for Remedial Measures)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
138 NOTICE of Appearance by Jason Renzelmann on behalf of Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner (Renzelmann, Jason) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
ERROR: Wrong event selected (Entered: 07/27/2006)
140 RESPONSE to Motion re 137 Joint MOTION for Leave to File Amended Motion for Remedial Measures and Motion to Withdraw Original Motion for Remedial Measures by plaintiffs; Replies due by 8/10/2006. (JBM) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/1/2006 (JBM). (Entered: 07/28/2006)
146 Letter from Darryl Grady re: class action suit.(NMB) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
147 Letter from Danny Williams re: class action suit. (NMB) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 139 Response; Error: Wrong event selected; Correction: redocketed as Response to Motion by the Court (see 140 for viewing of the document) (JBM) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
141 NOTICE OF FILING PROPOSED ORDER: denying Joint Motion to File Amended Motion for Remedial Measures and Motion to Withdraw Original Motion For Remedial Measures by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner re 140 Response to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Renzelmann, Jason) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 8/18/2006 (Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/1/2006 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2006)
143 RESPONSE to Motion re 135 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 8/14/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Affidavit of Chris Fields# 2 Exhibit B−Deposition Transcript James Lantrip# 3 Exhibit C− 501 KAR 3 120# 4 Exhibit D− Mowatt v. Visser# 5 Exhibit E− Black v. Franklin County, Kentucky# 6 Exhibit F− Affidavit of Jim Lantrip# 7 Exhibit G− News articles# 8 Exhibit H− KY Corrections Search Policy# 9 Exhibit I− Deposition Transcript Gordon Kamka# 10 Proposed Order Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment &Preliminary Injunction &Defendants Cross−Motion Partial Summary Judgment)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
144 NOTICE of Filing Deposition in support of 143 Response by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Deposition transcript LaDonia Nelson)(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified on 8/3/2006 to create link to DN 143(CSD). (Entered: 08/02/2006)
145 NOTICE of FilingDeposition in support of 143 Response by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Deposition transcript Robert Teague)(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified on 8/3/2006 to create link to DN 143 (CSD). (Entered: 08/02/2006)
148 CLERK'S LETTER sent to Danny Williams along with docket sheet re: class action. (PRM) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
149 CLERK'S LETTER sent to Darrell Grady along with docket sheet re: class action. (PRM) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
150 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation Extending Time for Filing Reply Brief. by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Renzelmann, Jason) (Entered: 08/09/2006)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 20 of 47

08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/16/2006 08/18/2006
08/18/2006 08/21/2006 08/31/2006 09/07/2006 09/07/2006 09/14/2006
09/29/2006 10/02/2006 10/09/2006

151 AGREED ORDER by E. Robert Goebel on 8/14/06; re 135 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Preliminary Injunction; Reply due by 8/18/2006.cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
152 MOTION to Hold Deadlines in Abeyance by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 9/5/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
153 RESPONSE to Motion re 152 MOTION to Hold Deadlines in Abeyance by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 8/30/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
154 RESPONSE to Motion re 142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Preliminary Injunction by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 9/1/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Renzelmann, Jason) (Entered: 08/18/2006)
155 REPLY to Response to Motion re 135 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by plaintiffs (on same pleading as 154 and redocketed for report purposes) (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 154 Response to Motion, ; Error: Pleading additionally contained a reply to motion but was only filed as a response to motion; Document was scanned to PDF rather than converted using conversion software; Correction: Clerk has refiled document as a reply to response to motion; attorney advised of conversion requirements (JBM) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
156 REPLY to Response to Motion re 142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
157 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 09/06/2006 granting 124 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery, granting 152 Motion to Hold in Abeyance; jury trial of 01/08/2007 vacated. cc:Counsel, Jury Clerk(CSD) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
158 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 09/06/2006 granting 136 Motion for Leave to Substitute Exhibit. cc:Counsel(CSD) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
159 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Response to Defendants' Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 10/2/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Tendered Proposed Sur−Reply# 3 Exhibit A − In re: Nassau Co. Strip Search Case)(Renzelmann, Jason) (Entered: 09/14/2006)
160 RESPONSE to Motion re 159 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply in Response to Defendants' Cross−Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 10/13/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Denying# 2 Proposed Order Granting# 3 Response to Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 160 Response to Motion; Error: Typed name of Attorney omitted next to s/ on signature lines; no date on certificate of service; Correction: attorney advised of signature requirements (JBM) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
161 MOTION for Hearing Date by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 10/27/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 10/09/2006)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 21 of 47

10/13/2006 10/13/2006
10/13/2006 10/24/2006 10/25/2006
10/25/2006
10/31/2006 11/27/2006 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007
01/19/2007 01/22/2007 01/22/2007

162 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 10/13/2006; granting 159 Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Defendants granted leave to file response to surreply. cc:Counsel(LMW) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
163 SURREPLY re 142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, and Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: in re: Nassau County Strip Search cases)(LMW) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
164 RESPONSE TO SURREPLY re 142 Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky and Jim Lantrip. (LMW) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
165 MOTION for Leave to Supplement Legal Authority by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 11/13/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Supplement Legal Authority)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
166 RESPONSE to Motion re 165 MOTION for Leave to Supplement Legal Authority by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 11/8/2006. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
167 RESPONSE to Motion re 161 MOTION for Hearing Date by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 11/8/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Chart Justified Strip Search and/or Ineligible to Participate in Class on face of questionnaire# 2 Exhibit B Chart Justified Strip Search and/or Ineligible to Particpate in Class Apparent in Jail Records# 3 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
168 ORDER by Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 10/31/06; granting 165 Motion for Leave to supplement legal authority. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
169 NOTICE of Change of Address and request to be removed as counsel by James Robert Craig. (NMB) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
170 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 1/11/07; motion 95 to decertify class is denied; matter referred to Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel for scheduling conference.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
171 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 1/11/07; motion 135 for partial summary judgment and for preliminary injunction is denied; motion 142 for partial summary judgment is granted. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
172 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 1/11/07; Referring Motion: 115 MOTION to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests; Objection 94 overruled; defendant's motion 137 for leave to file an amended motion for remedial measures and to withdraw the original motion for remedial measures is granted; 125 motion for remedial measures is denid; motion 161 for hearing is denied.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
173 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 1/19/07; Telephonic Scheduling Conference set for 2/1/2007 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel; by 1/30/07, counsel shall meet to discuss a proposed scheduling order.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
174 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 1/19/07; granting in part and denying in part 115 Motion to Compel; by 2/6/07 Defendant's shall supplement their responses to written discovery request no.4. cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
ERROR: Incorrect event used. Reflied by the Court. See 176 for viewing of this pleading. (Entered: 01/22/2007)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 22 of 47

01/22/2007
01/23/2007
01/24/2007 01/25/2007 01/29/2007 01/29/2007 02/01/2007 02/05/2007 02/06/2007 02/09/2007 02/12/2007 02/12/2007

176 COPY OF PETITION TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL (original petition filed with the 6CCA. This is NOT a notice of appeal) as to 170 Memorandum &Opinion, Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Petition for Permission to Appeal# 2 Exhibit A− Memorandum Opinion &Order# 3 Exhibit B− Policy &Procedure# 4 Exhibit C− Sutton Deposition Transcript# 5 Exhibit C − Turner Deposition Transcript# 6 Exhibit C−Nance Deposition Transcript# 7 Exhibit C− Todd Deposition Transcript# 8 Exhibit C− Ward Deposition Transcript# 9 Exhibit D−Teague Deposition Transcript# 10 Exhibit E−Matthew Dukes Questionnaire# 11 Exhibit F− Bledsoe v. Combs# 12 Exhibit G− Noon v. Sailor# 13 Exhibit H−Strip Search Reports# 14 Exhibit I−Gossett Deposition Transcript)(JBM) Modified on 1/24/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 01/23/2007)
177 (Currently not applicable due to incorrect filing of 176 ) Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to all counsel re 176 Notice of Appeal. (Attachments: # 1 Appeal Letter# 2 Appeal Memo# 3 Docket Sheet# 4 Memorandum Opinion and Order# 5 Notice of Appeal# 6 Exhibit A# 7 Exhibit A part 2 of 2# 8 Exhibit B# 9 Exhibit C# 10 Exhibit C part 2 of 5# 11 Exhibit C part 3 of 5# 12 Exhibit C− part 4 of 5# 13 Exhibit C− part 5 of 5# 14 Exhibit D# 15 Exhibit E# 16 Exhibit F# 17 Exhibit G# 18 Exhibit H# 19 Exhibit I)(JBM) Modified text on 1/24/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 01/23/2007)
178 MOTION for Reconsideration re 171 Memorandum &Opinion, Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 2/12/2007 (Belzley, Gregory) Additional attachment(s) added on 1/26/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 01/24/2007)
179 Proposed Order re 178 MOTION for Reconsideration re 171 Memorandum &Opinion, Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
180 MOTION to Compel by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 2/16/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit A − Int and RFP to Class Members# 3 Exhibit B − Class Member's Answers to Int and RFP)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
181 MOTION for Settlement Conference by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 2/16/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin : Telephonic Scheduling Conference held on 2/1/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
182 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 2/2/07; Daubert Motion due by 9/18/2007. Discovery due by 8/3/2007. Dispositive Motions due by 9/18/2007. Telephone Conference set for 3/14/2007 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin.cc:Counsel, KL, KB(JBM) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
183 RESPONSE to Motion re 178 MOTION for Reconsideration re 171 Memorandum &Opinion, Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 2/20/2007. (Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/12/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 02/06/2007)
184 Proposed Order re 183 Response to Motion by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
185 RESPONSE to Motion re 180 MOTION to Compel by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 2/26/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
186 REPLY to Response to Motion re 178 MOTION for Reconsideration re 171 Memorandum &Opinion, Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 23 of 47

02/26/2007 03/01/2007 03/06/2007 03/08/2007
03/14/2007 03/28/2007 04/16/2007 04/18/2007 04/20/2007
05/03/2007 05/11/2007 05/11/2007 05/14/2007
05/14/2007 05/15/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007

Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 02/12/2007)
187 REPLY to Response to Motion re 180 MOTION to Compel by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 02/26/2007)
188 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 3/1/07; Telephone Conference set for 3/6/2007 at 2:00 PM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin.cc:Counsel, TC, KB(JBM) (Entered: 03/01/2007)
roceedings held before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin : Telephone Conference held on 3/6/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
189 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 3/8/07; finding as moot 180 Motion to Compel; by 3/12/07 plaintiffs shall provide defendants the completed questionaires that plaintiffs have withheld; by 4/13/07 defendants shall provide to plaintiffs the information in the jail files for those who filed out the questionaire. Telephonic conference set for 3/14/07 is REMANDED; Telephonic Conference is set for 3/28/07 at 1:00pm before Magistrate Dave Whalin. cc:Counsel, TC, KB(JBM) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
190 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 3/14/07; Settlement Conference set for 4/18/2007 at 10:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin.cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
191 ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin : Telephone Conference held on 3/28/2007. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
192 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 4/16/07; denying 178 Motion for Reconsideration cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin : Settlement Conference held on 4/18/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
193 ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin : Settlement Conference held on 4/20/2007. Parties were not able to reach a resolution of the case. All deadlines and discovery is STAYED until further order of the Court. cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
194 REPORT ON SETTLEMENT by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 5/3/07; Parties unable to reach an agreement.cc:Counsel(JBM) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
195 SEALED MOTION. Responses due by 5/29/2007. (TLB) (JBMS). (Entered: 05/11/2007)
196 SEALED MOTION. Responses due by 5/29/2007. (TLB) (JBMS). (Entered: 05/11/2007)
197 MOTION for Trial on Liability by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 6/1/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
198 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/14/07; Telephone Conference set for 5/30/2007 at 10:30 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
199 SEALED ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 5/14/2007; re 195 SEALED MOTION.cc:Counsel(TLB) (JBMS). (Entered: 05/15/2007)
200 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and File Dispositive Motions by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 6/6/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
201 RESPONSE to Motion re 197 MOTION for Trial on Liability by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/7/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − pg 6,7, and 45 of Lantrip Depo# 2 Exhibit B − Part 1 of no strip search

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 24 of 47

05/25/2007
05/30/2007 05/31/2007 05/31/2007 06/01/2007
06/01/2007 06/01/2007 06/05/2007
06/07/2007 06/07/2007 06/11/2007 06/15/2007 07/05/2007
07/09/2007

questionnaires# 3 Exhibit B − part 2 of no strip search questionnaires# 4 Exhibit B − part 3 of no strip search questionnaires# 5 Exhibit B −part 4 of no strip search questionnaires# 6 Exhibit C − vague questionnaires# 7 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
202 REPLY to Response to Motion re 197 MOTION for Trial on Liability, 200 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and File Dispositive Motions by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Conference held on 5/30/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
203 RESPONSE to Motion (SEALED) re 196 SEALED MOTION by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 05/31/2007)
204 SEALED MOTION by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 6/18/2007 (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 05/31/2007)
205 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 6/1/07; parties to sumit notice of Class certification by 6/7/2007. Witnesses (Defendant) due by 7/2/2007. Witnesses (Plaintiff) due by 6/15/2007. Telephone Conference set for 7/30/2007 at 9:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
206 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 6/1/07; finding as moot 197 Motion for Trial on Liability, finding as moot 200 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (this is the same pleading as 205 and redocketed for report purposes) (JBM) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
207 SEALED REPLY to Response to Motion re 196 SEALED MOTION (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 06/04/2007)
208 MOTION Approve attached Notice to Class Members by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 6/25/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice to Class Members# 2 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
209 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 6/7/07; denying 208 Motion to Approve attatched Notice to Class Members with directions to re−submit the motion in accordance with the recommendations of the Court. cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
210 Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Conference held on 6/7/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
211 SEALED ORDER by Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin on 6/11/07 cc:Counsel(JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 06/11/2007)
212 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Samuel G−R Clymer by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
213 MOTION to Consider approval of attached Notice to Class Members by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 7/23/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice to Class Members# 2 Proposed Order)(Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 07/05/2007)
214 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/9/07; granting 213 Motion to Consider. The Notice attached to Plaintiff's Motion as Exhibit A is approved for publication and shall be sent to all potential class Plaintiffs whom Plaintiff's counsel believe they have valid mailing addresses. cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 07/09/2007)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 25 of 47

07/10/2007 07/16/2007
07/18/2007 07/19/2007 07/19/2007
07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 08/01/2007
08/02/2007

215 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/10/07; Telephone Conference reset for 7/30/2007 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, KL, PH(JBM) (Entered: 07/10/2007)
216 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 8/3/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Craig, James) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Conference held on 7/18/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
217 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/18/07; granting 216 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
218 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/18/07; Notice of Class action recently approved by the Court shall be mailed to all potential class members unaccompanied by questionaires or other types of communications from either Plaintiffs or Defendant; Motions due by 8/7/2007.cc:Counsel, PH(JBM) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
219 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Don Ezell taken on 08/15/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
220 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Chryle Ava Taylor taken on 08/15/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
221 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of William Ray Bowling taken on 08/15/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
222 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Charles Boze taken on 08/15/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
223 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Mark Allen Buchanan taken on 08/15/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
224 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Rodney Carter taken on 08/16/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
225 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Julie Ann James taken on 08/16/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
226 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Trent Enrico Martin taken on 08/16/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
227 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION of Robyn Denise Mitchell taken on 08/16/2007 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) Modified text on 8/1/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
228 NOTICE to Take Deposition of James A Webb, Jr. by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
229 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/31/07; Plaintiffs are authorized to file a Motion for Protective Order; Telephone Conference set for 8/29/2007 at 4:00 PM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:Counsel, PH, KL(JBM) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
230 MOTION to Amend/Correct Defendants' Questionnaire by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Responses due by 8/20/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' quesionnaire#

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 26 of 47

08/03/2007 08/06/2007 08/06/2007 08/07/2007
08/08/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007 08/14/2007 08/24/2007 08/29/2007 09/05/2007
09/07/2007 09/07/2007
09/07/2007

2 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
231 NOTICE of Entry of Appearance by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
ERROR: Incorrect event chosen. Refiled by the Court. See 233 for viewing of this document. (Entered: 08/06/2007)
233 RESPONSE to Motion re 230 MOTION to Amend/Correct Defendants' Questionnaire by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (this was originally e−filed by the attorney using an incorrect event. The Court has refiled this pleading) Replies due by 8/20/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(JBM) (Entered: 08/07/2007)
234 MOTION to Amend/Correct Objections to Plaintiffs' Questionnaire by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Responses due by 8/27/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − sample questionnaire# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Clerk has verified with attorney that this was intended to be filed as a motion.) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/9/2007 (JBM). (Entered: 08/07/2007)
235 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Order by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip re 234 MOTION to Amend/Correct Objections to Plaintiffs' Questionnaire (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 08/08/2007)
236 RESPONSE to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Questionnaire by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 08/10/2007)
ERROR: Incorrently sfiled by attorney. Re−filed by the Court. Please see 238 for viewing of this document. (Entered: 08/10/2007)
ERROR: Attorney made duplicate Filing . Please see 238 for viewing of this document. (JBM). (Entered: 08/10/2007)
238 REPLY to Response to Motion re 230 MOTION to Amend/Correct Defendants' Questionnaire by Plaintiffs. (originally e−filed by attorney. Refiled by the Court.) (JBM) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
Remark: Pursuant to DN 169, James R. Craig requested to no longer receive notification in this case. (MLG) (Entered: 08/14/2007)
239 REPLY re 236 Response, To Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Questionnaire by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Questionnaire) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Telephone Status Conference held on 8/29/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
240 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 9/4/07; Dispositive Motions due by 5/1/2008; Jury Trial set for 9/8/2008 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom before Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. (anticipated trial length: 4 weeks); Telephone Conference set for 9/19/2007 at 9:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel, KL, PH, ES, JC (JBM) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
241 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 9/6/07; granting in part and denying in part 230 Motion to Amend QUestionaire; Objections are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 09/07/2007)
242 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 9/6/07; granting in part and denying in part 234 Motion to Amend; Objections are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part; Status Conference set for 9/19/2007 at 9:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel, PH, KL (JBM) (Entered: 09/07/2007)
243 SEALED− OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION FORM (stating that he does NOT wish to opt out) filed by Eddie E. Burnette (JBM) Modified on 9/18/2007: Removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/07/2007)

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09/10/2007
09/10/2007
09/10/2007 09/11/2007
09/12/2007 09/12/2007 09/13/2007 09/13/2007 09/13/2007 09/14/2007 09/14/2007 09/17/2007 09/19/2007 09/20/2007

244 MOTION Bar contacts with opt−outs by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner.Responses due by 9/28/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Legate Opt−Out Form# 2 Exhibit Brown Opt−Out Form# 3 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
245 SEALED− OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order; The following people have sent opt out forms to the Court: William H. Jett, Charles A. Martin, Edward L. White, Anyhony L. Ratliff, Larry D. Music, Thomas G. Rousseau, Archie D. Lloyd, James D. Phillips, Philip A. Grable, Betty E. Virge, Terry L. Richard. (JBM) Modified on 9/18/2007: Removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/11/2007)
246 SEALED− OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION form submitted by Paul E. Bowman (NOTE− this person has marked that he desires to stay in the case) (JBM) Additional attachment(s) added on 9/11/2007 (Mayfield, Jason). Modified on 9/18/2007: removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/11/2007)
247 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. on 9/10/07; Proposed Jury Instructions due by 8/25/2008; Pre−trial Memorandum due by 8/25/2008; Proposed Voir Dire due by 8/25/2008; Jury Trial set for 9/8/2008 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom before Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. (anticipated length of trial: 4 weeks) cc:Counsel; JC (JBM) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
248 MOTION for Reconsideration by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner.Responses due by 10/1/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
249 SEALED− OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order signed by Barry G. Brown, Anthony D. Henderson, Lamont A. Bell, Barry L. Abbott, Falon R. Kessinger. (JBM) Modified on 9/18/2007: removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/13/2007)
250 RESPONSE to Motion re 248 MOTION for Reconsideration by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Replies due by 9/27/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
251 RESPONSE to Motion re 244 MOTION Bar contacts with opt−outs by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Replies due by 9/27/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − June 14, 07 e−mail# 2 Exhibit B − June 18, 07 e−mail# 3 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
253 SEALED− OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM signed by John A. Babb re 241 Order (JBM) Modified on 9/18/2007: removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/14/2007)
252 REPLY to Response to Motion re 244 MOTION Bar contacts with opt−outs by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
254 REPLY to Response to Motion re 248 MOTION for Reconsideration by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
255 SEALED− OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order signed by: Jason W. Crowe, Julia H. Crossfield, Carol A. Gibson, Terry A. Hammons, Rhey D. Mills, Rhonda K. Brasher, Jerri A. Fisk. (JBM) Modified on 9/18/2007− removed PDF (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 09/17/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Status Conference held on 9/19/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
256 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 9/19/07; granting 244 Motion to bar contacts with any persons returning opt−out forms; finding as moot 248 Motion for Reconsideration; Telephone Conference set for 10/3/2007 at 10:00 AM before

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 28 of 47

09/20/2007
09/24/2007 09/28/2007 10/01/2007 10/03/2007 10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/09/2007 10/12/2007 10/12/2007 10/15/2007 10/15/2007 10/18/2007 10/22/2007 10/22/2007 10/22/2007 10/23/2007

Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel, KL, PH (JBM) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
257 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 9/19/07; Court shall place under seal all completed opt−out/exclusion forms filed with the Court prior to entry of this order; Clerk shall seal any opt−out exclusion forms filed with the Court after entry of this order; Access to these opt−out/exclusion forms filed under seal shall be limited to counsel for the parties and Court personnel; No earlier than 11/5/07 the Clerk of Court shall send copies of the opt−out/exclusion forms filed under seal to lead counsel for the parties. cc: Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
260 SEALED LETTER by Adam Gray requesting to be made part of the class action. (JBM) (Entered: 10/02/2007)
258 SEALED− OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order by Alvin Belcher, Rebecca Arndt Dannie Williams, Gerrit Jaber, Dennis Webb, Bobby Werner, Michael Cummings and Donald Hipwell. (JBM) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
259 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order; received from Dane Locke, Alton Tichenor, Martha May and Robert Strader (JBM) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
261 SEALED OPT−OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order by Terry L. Mitchell (JBM) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
262 SEALED− OPT/OUT EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order from William T. Taylor, Adam J. Wilson. (JBM) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
263 SEALED− OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order; forms by James D. Brown, Joan E. Legate, Rodney C. Wester (JBM) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
264 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 10/4/07; Telephone Conference reset for 10/22/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel. cc:Counsel, PH, KL (JBM) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
265 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order by Francis A. Danforth, Rhonda G. Drake, Rhey D. Mills. (JBM) (Entered: 10/09/2007)
266 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM signed by Roy M Bates (Note at the bottom states that he "does not wish to opt out" (JBM) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
267 SEALED NOTICE of filing SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM filed by plaintiff. Form signed by Terry R. Moore. (JBM) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
268 SEALED− NOTICE/LETTER re: opt out/exclusion forms. Letter by John Roger McGee stating he desires to be made part of the class action (JBM) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
269 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order signed by Timothy W. Mitchell (JBM) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
270 SEALED OPT−OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order; signed by Beverly J. Mann (JBM) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
271 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order signed by Pamela J. Williams (JBM) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
272 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition of John Allard Sr. by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Responses due by 11/9/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Status Conference held on 10/22/2007. (LMW) (Entered: 10/23/2007)
273 REPORT AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 10/23/2007; Telephone status conference conducted 10/22/2007. Telephonic Status Conference set for 11/16/2007 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel for the purpose of addressing issues that may arise as a result of the parties reviewing the completed op out/exclusion forms. The Court will initiate the call. Telephonic

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 29 of 47

10/23/2007
10/23/2007 10/23/2007 10/24/2007 10/25/2007 10/29/2007 10/30/2007 10/30/2007 10/30/2007 11/01/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007
11/06/2007

Status Conference set for 12/14/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel for the purpose of addressing any issues that arise as a result of the parties reveiwing the completed questionnaires. The Court will initiate the call. cc: Counsel, Secretary to USMJ Goebel (LMW) (Entered: 10/23/2007)
274 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 10/23/2007 directing that the Clerk of Court place under seal all completed questionnaire forms filed with the Court. Further ordered that access to these completed questionnaire forms filed under seal shall be limited to counsel for the parties and Court personnel. Further ordered that no earlier than 12/5/2007, the Clerk shall send copies of the completed questionnaire forms filed under seal to lead counsel for the parties. cc: Counsel, Secretary to USMJ Goebel (LMW) (Entered: 10/23/2007)
275 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re 241 Order by Larry A. Arnett and Tommy G. Conrad (JBM) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
276 SEALED OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order by Brian C. Armstead (Entered: 10/24/2007)
Remark: Counsel for Plaintiffs advised KLL he has no objection to Motion at DN 272. (KL) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
277 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 10/24/07; granting 272 Motion for Leave to take Deposition of John Allard, Sr. at the Hopkins County Jail. cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 10/25/2007)
278 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition of John Lyon by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Responses due by 11/16/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave) (Blankenship, Stacey) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/31/2007 (Mayfield, Jason). (Entered: 10/29/2007)
279 SEALED OPT OUT/ EXCLUSION FORM re: 241 Order signed by Lista K. Foster. (JBM) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
280 NOTICE by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip re 278 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition of John Lyon (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
281 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition of Rebecca Baize by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Responses due by 11/19/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
282 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re: 241 Order signed by Danny C. Bratcher Jr. (JBM) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
283 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 11/2/07; granting 281 Motion for Leave to take deposition of Rebecca Baize at the Hopkins County Jail. cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
284 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 11/2/07; granting 278 Motion for Leave to take Deposition of John Lyon at the Hopkins County Jail. cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
Remark: Sealed Opt−out/Exclusion forms were mailed this day to lead counsel Bart L. Greenwald and Allen W. Holbrook. (JBM) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
285 SEALED QUESTIONAIRE Re: Order 274 returned by Bob Richardson, Jamie Flickinger, Timothy Hopkins, Richard Manning, William Duncan, Donald Hipwell, Robert Oliver, Phillip Griffey, Lance Oakley, Jerry Gibbs, Tamara Boyd, Richard Rickard, Paul Gatlin, Sean Allen, Lista Foster, Calbert Brooks, Aaron Campbell, Frank Mitchell, Danny Riley, James Poe, Bryan Crick, Theresa Rice Bauer, Richard Daugherty, Gerald Quinn, Stephen Crowe, Harvey Woods, Caraughlen Combs, Realus Tyson, Dwight Capps, Jon Cotton. NOTE− one return made stating that Tim Gates does not live at this address and is in prison (LaGrange).) (JBM) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
286 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Derrick Mack, Joseph Davis, Daven Crabtree, Edwin Smith and Beau Curtsinger. (JBM) (Entered: 11/06/2007)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 30 of 47

11/07/2007
11/07/2007 11/08/2007 11/09/2007 11/09/2007 11/13/2007 11/13/2007
11/14/2007 11/15/2007 11/16/2007 11/16/2007 11/19/2007 11/20/2007 11/21/2007 11/21/2007

287 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order; returned by David Criswell, Scott Clevenger, Jeffrey Drake, Warren Campbell, Jamie Edwards, Sheila Short, Jack Scott, Jr., Karl Schwars, Nina McVay, Tamy DuPass, Shelton Spears, Jr., Alfred Newman, Crystal Stevens, Rickey Johnson, Alton Tickenor, Walter Cramer, Daan Wiley, Michael Rice II, Katrina Eschman and Kerney Thomas, III. (JBM) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
288 MOTION for Samuel J. Wright to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 65, receipt number 623210.by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip.Responses due by 11/26/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Samuel J. Wright# 2 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
289 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Gregory Cootes, Dorothy Alexander, Kenneth Boyd, Joshua Martin, Timothy Basham, Steven Yurga, Donald Perkins, Bobby Parker, Nicholas Long, Clem Seaton, Layne Barker, Harlan Gallop and Clifton Baucum Sr. (JBM) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
290 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Douglas Richardson, Adam Grey,Eric Clark, Jonathan Stewart, Joann Warer, Roger Gamble, Brandon Pate, Nroman Stone, Donna Teague, Denise Lewis, Brijdo Lopez, Matt Hull, Dennis Webb (JBM) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
291 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 11/9/07; granting 288 Motion for attorney Samuel J. Wright to Appear Pro Hac Vice cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
292 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORMS re: 241 Order returned by Jackson W. Cottrell and Clem E. Seaton (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
293 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Christopher Austin, Natalie Droste, Wanda Belza, Glen Prather, Jr., Jennifer Hopkins, Marty Hollis, Kyle Turner, Derek Offutt, Paul Love, Ashley Holland, Joshua Hodge, Brandon Polley, Lucas Duff, Shirley Williams, Homer McKinney, Jackson Cottrell, Amanda Copeland, Jon Hibbs,Timothy Daniel, Christopher Thomas, Sherry Capps and David Duncan (JBM) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
294 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 returned by Darrell Grady, Patrick Floyd, Scott Eichholz, Brian Donnelly, Christina Turner and Ryan Watkins (JBM) (Entered: 11/14/2007)
295 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Dustin Moore, Sarah Avery, Phillip Weir, Dave Burbage, Keith Alexander, Luke Short, Daniel Ray, Alan Pettus, Jeremy Wingfield, Adrian Satterfield and James Lewis. (JBM) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
296 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order Returned by Jeffrey Scott Bone, Michael Sweet, Billy Mann, Sarah Thompson, William Bivins and Pamela Cotton (JBM) (Entered: 11/16/2007)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel : Telephone Conference held on 11/16/2007. (JBM) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
297 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Anastassia Alfred, William, Nesbett, III, William Hayes, Jr., Hansley Sisk, Joshua Fulkerson, Theresa Faughender, Andrew Wincent, Rickie Morehead, Joshua Gamblin, Tara Johnson, Troy Wright and Nancy Maddox. (JBM) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
298 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Hadley Henry, James Neathery and Christian Powers (JBM) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
299 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 11/20/07; Telephone conference held; it was agreed that the Court should contact anyone whose intentions were ambiguous. Counsel shall provide list of persons to be contacted. cc:Counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
300 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Donna Smith, James Williams, William Boyd, Charles Morrow and JW McLevain (JBM) (Entered: 11/21/2007)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 31 of 47

11/26/2007
11/27/2007 11/27/2007 11/27/2007 11/28/2007 11/29/2007 11/30/2007 12/03/2007 12/03/2007 12/05/2007 12/05/2007 12/05/2007
12/10/2007 12/11/2007 12/11/2007 12/13/2007 12/17/2007

301 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by William Moore, Christopher Mefford, Arliss Cottner, Daniel Gray, Jason Slaton, Jerry Vincent, Burnice Johnson, Mark Whitaker, Anthony Redgers, Shawn Whiehair, Michael Oldham, William Taylor and Christial Bagwell. (JBM) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
302 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Brian Pendley. (JBM) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
303 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re: 241 Order returned by Marty Canter (JBM) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
Remark: pleading 303 mailed to attorneys Bart Greenwald and Stacey Blankenship on this day. (JBM) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
304 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by: Jody O'Barr, Christopher Doss, Charles Beringer, Jolinda Teague (Walters), Joe Phaup and Larry Wyatt (JBM) (Entered: 11/28/2007)
305 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 returned by Cassandra Harvey, Jeffery Adams, Kathy Alfred, Cassie McKinney, Don Scott, Eric Darrow and Deborah Crawford (JBM) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
306 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by David Sisk and Michael Wilks (JBM) (Entered: 11/30/2007)
307 SEALED OPT OUT−EXCLUSION FORM re: 241 Returned by Carol C. Brooks (mailed to attorneys Bart Greenwald and Stacey Blankenship on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/03/2007)
308 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by Randall Palmer, Paul DeBandi, Jacob Larkins, Donald Stone, Eldridge Hampton, Donavon Fox and Jonathon Pavvent. (JBM) (Entered: 12/03/2007)
Remark: Copies of all sealed questionnaires have been mailed to attorneys Bart Greenwald and Stacey Blankenship on this day via FedEx. (JBM) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
309 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order returned by: Thad Pepper and John Mimms. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
310 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition of Harvey McFarland by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 12/24/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
311 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRES re: 274 Order Returned by Angela Love (Duvall), Rhonda Duncan and Tony Ballard (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/10/2007)
312 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by John Christopher Harris (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/11/2007)
313 SEALED Letter (sealed per ERG chambers) by Christian L. Powers (mailed copies to lead counsel on this day). (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 12/11/2007)
314 SEALED Letter from Elvis Bister (copies mailed with cover letter to lead counsel on this day by ERG Chambers) (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 12/13/2007)
315 REPORT AND ORDER for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/14/2007. Discussion focused on a 12/13/2007 report summarizing efforts by staff attorney, Walter Connolly, to telephonically contact each of the 48 individuals identified by counsel. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1) Counsel for Plaintiffs may contact all 48 of the individuals. 2) Counsel for Defendants may contact only those individuals who have indicated they want to be excluded from the class action lawsuit. 3) A telephonic status conference shall be conducted on March 6, 2008, at 1:30 p.m., C.S.T. cc: Counsel, Secretary to ERG (CDF) (Entered: 12/17/2007)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 32 of 47

12/17/2007 12/20/2007 12/21/2007
12/21/2007 12/26/2007 01/07/2008 01/08/2008 01/09/2008
01/11/2008 01/11/2008 01/16/2008 01/22/2008 01/28/2008 02/01/2008 02/01/2008 02/04/2008 02/19/2008
02/20/2008
02/20/2008

316 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order: Returned by Adrian Rhoades and Billy Morseman. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day.) (JBMS) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
317 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order; returned by Jeremy Rogers (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/20/2007)
318 REPORT AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 12/20/07; Counsel for Plaintiffs may contact all 48 of the individuals; Counsel for Defendants may contact only those individuals who have indicated they want to be excluded from the class action lawsuit during a telephonic conversation with Mr. Connolly or by marking the box on the opt out/exclusion form. cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
319 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Thomas Brown (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day.) (JBM) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
320 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Randel Southerland. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 12/26/2007)
321 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re: 241 Order returned by Alesia Cotton (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
322 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 1/28/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 01/08/2008)
323 RESPONSE to Motion re 322 MOTION for Leave to Take Deposition filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 1/23/2008. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 01/09/2008)
324 ORDER granting 310 Motion for Leave to take Deposition of Harvey McFarland. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 1/11/08. cc:counsel, PH (JBMS) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
325 ORDER granting 322 Motion for Leave to take deposition of James Webb. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 1/11/08. cc:counsel, PH (JBMS) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
326 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order received by Dudle P. Browne. (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day.) (JBM) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
327 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: Order 274 returned by Roy Vanburen (copies mailed to lead counsel of record on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
328 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Jason V. Young. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 01/28/2008)
329 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Teneka D. Edwards (JBM) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
Remark: copies of 329 mailed to lead counsel on this day. (JBM) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
330 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Seth Moore (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 02/04/2008)
331 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
332 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
333 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Jerry Lee Crenshaw Sr. (copies forwarded to lead counsel on this day.) (JBM) (Entered: 02/20/2008)

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02/26/2008 02/26/2008 03/05/2008 03/06/2008 03/07/2008 03/11/2008 03/17/2008 03/31/2008
04/14/2008 04/16/2008 04/22/2008 04/30/2008

334 AGREED ORDER TO TAKE DEPOSITION by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 2/26/08; Defendants are granted leave to take the deposition of Harvey McFarland, at the Western Correctional Complex, Kentucky.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
335 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 2/26/08; Discovery due by 7/14/2008.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 02/26/2008)
336 MOTION in Limine Regarding Gordon Kamka by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 3/24/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Kamka CV, # 2 Exhibit Kamka deposition excerpts, # 3 Exhibit Ireland v. Hodes, # 4 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 03/05/2008)
Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: TelephonicStatus Conference held on 3/6/2008. (JBM) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
337 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation Extending Time to Respond to Motion in Limine by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/07/2008)
338 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 3/6/08; Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/5/2008 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:counsel, KL, PH (JBM) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
339 AGREED ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION IN LIMINE by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 3/14/08 re: 336 MOTION in Limine Regarding Gordon Kamka: Defendants Responses due by 3/31/2008cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
340 RESPONSE to Motion re 336 MOTION in Limine Regarding Gordon Kamka filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 4/14/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Newspaper Articles, # 2 Exhibit B − Applicable Court Orders − jail sentence and probation, # 3 Exhibit C − Applicable Court Order − indicted for insurance fraud, # 4 Exhibit D − Jail Commitment, # 5 Exhibit E − Termination Letter, # 6 Exhibit F − Court Order − child support back pay, # 7 Exhibit G − Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order − sale of farm land, # 8 Exhibit H − Worthless check charge, # 9 Exhibit I − Opinion − United States v. Arhebamen, # 10 Exhibit J − April 4, 06 Relevant pg of Kamka Depo Transcript, # 11 Exhibit K − 1996 Indictment − 3rd degree arson, # 12 Exhibit L − January 23, 08 Relevant pgs of Kamka Depo Transcript, # 13 Exhibit M − 1996 Indictment − insurance fraud, # 14 Exhibit N − January 23, 08 Relevant pgs of Kamka Depo Transcript, # 15 Exhibit O − October 16, 07 Relevant pgs of Kamka Depo Transcript, # 16 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
341 REPLY to Response to Motion re 336 MOTION in Limine Regarding Gordon Kamka filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
342 MOTION for Leave to Supplement Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 5/5/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Settlement Agreement, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
343 Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/18/2008; No later than 5/19/08 Parties are to submit proposed joint questionnaires to be sent to potential jurors. Court shall conduct ex parte conferences with counsel for the parties regarding the number of witnesses each side intends to call at trial. cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
344 MOTION to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Witness, Gordon Kamka by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008

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04/30/2008 04/30/2008 04/30/2008
05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008
05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008

(Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Gordon Kamka Deposition, # 3 Exhibit B − Decision Tree, # 4 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
345 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
346 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Post Court Strip Searches by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − 8/18/05 Kamka Expert Report, # 3 Exhibit B − Unpublished Opinion (Mowatt v. Visser), # 4 Exhibit C − Unpublished Opinion (Black v. Franklin Co.), # 5 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
347 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Suicide by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − National Study of Jail Suicides (1−27), # 3 Exhibit A − National Study of Jail Suicides (28−58), # 4 Exhibit A − National Study of Jail Suicides (Appendix A − E), # 5 Exhibit B − Suicide and Homocide in State Prisons and Local Jails Report, # 6 Exhibit C − Sabbatine Deposition pgs 81−83, # 7 Exhibit D − Jail Lesson Plan re Suicide in Jail, # 8 Exhibit E − Jail Lesson Plan (Basics of Suicide Prevention), # 9 Exhibit F − LEXIS Opinion (Linden v. Washtenaw), # 10 Exhibit G − LEXIS Opinion (Mead v. Co. of St. Joseph), # 11 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
348 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Public Intoxication by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Public Intoxication, # 2 Proposed Order Public Intoxication) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
349 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Clothing Exchange by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Deposition of James Lantrip, # 3 Exhibit B − Unpublished Opinion (McCullar v. Babb), # 4 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
350 MOTION for Summary Judgment Re Sutton &Turner by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Depo of David Williamson p 15−16, # 3 Exhibit B − Depo of Carl Coy p 25, # 4 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contraband by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Deposition Transcript of James Lantrip (Pgs 8−9), # 3 Exhibit B − Applicable pgs of Jail Policy and Procedure Manual, # 4 Exhibit C − Lock Box Property Inventory, # 5 Exhibit D − Incident Reports (Carlisle and Thompson), # 6 Exhibit E − Incident Report (Holzhauser), # 7 Exhibit F − Incident Report (Powell), # 8 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
352 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Class Members − Signs of Intoxication by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
353 MOTION for Summary Judgment Tabitha Nance by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
354 MOTION for Summary Judgment Timothy May by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 35 of 47

05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008 05/01/2008
05/01/2008
05/01/2008

355 MOTION for Summary Judgment Linda Ford by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
356 MOTION for Summary Judgment Robert Teague by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
357 MOTION for Summary Judgment Re: Tony Ward by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
358 MOTION for Summary Judgment LaDonia Nelson by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
359 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Sutton and Turner by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Deposition of David Williamson pgs 15−16, # 3 Exhibit B − Deposition of Carl Coy pg 25, # 4 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
360 MOTION for Summary Judgment Daniel Todd by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2008: # 3 Exhibit A) (JBM). (Entered: 05/01/2008)
361 NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION Re:PDF Error: Exhibit A not attached document attached to docket entry by efiler re: 360 MOTION for Summary Judgment Daniel Todd ; Correct document attached to this entry. (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
362 MOTION for Summary Judgment Robin Littlepage by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Jail Records, # 3 Exhibit B − Applicable Policy of Jail, # 4 Proposed Order) (Wright, Samuel) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
363 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Prison Litigation Reform Act by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Non−exhaustive list (initial filing of suit), # 3 Exhibit B − Non−exhaustive list (granting of Motion to Certify), # 4 Exhibit C − HCDC's Grievance Procedure, # 5 Exhibit D − Affidavit of Lantrip, # 6 Exhibit E − Affidavit of Blue, # 7 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
364 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Post Conviction Release Claims or in the alternative, for Bifurcated Custom, Policy and Practice Phase of Trial by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Portions of Sutton's Court &Jail Records, # 3 Exhibit B − Portions of Turner's Jail &Court Records, # 4 Exhibit C − Unpublished Opinion (Izquierdo v. Crawford), # 5 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
365 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 5/19/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 2 Exhibit A − Part 1 − Chart Naming Each Plaintiff Class Member and Depo Transcripts, # 3 Exhibit A − Part 2 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 4 Exhibit A − Part 3 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 5 Exhibit A − Part 4 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 6 Exhibit A − Part 5 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 7 Exhibit A − Part 6 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 8 Exhibit A − Part 7 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 9 Exhibit A − Part 8 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 10 Exhibit A − Part 9 − Depo Transcipts Continued, # 11 Exhibit A

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 36 of 47

05/02/2008 05/02/2008 05/02/2008 05/06/2008
05/06/2008 05/06/2008 05/07/2008
05/07/2008
05/07/2008
05/07/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/13/2008

−Part 10 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 12 Exhibit A − Part 11 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 13 Exhibit A − Part 12 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 14 Exhibit A − Part 13 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 15 Exhibit A − Part 14 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 16 Exhibit A − Part 15 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 17 Exhibit A − Part 16 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 18 Exhibit A − Part 17 − Depo Transcripts Continued, # 19 Exhibit B − Timeline, # 20 Exhibit C − Case Law, # 21 Exhibit D − Post Instructions, # 22 Exhibit E − Policy, # 23 Proposed Order) (Greenwald, Bart) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/6/2008: # 24 Page 4 of Exhibit A) (JBM). (Entered: 05/01/2008)
366 DEPOSITION of Edward Lee Sutton taken on 01−15−04 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
367 DEPOSITION of Lester Hank Turner, Jr. taken on 01−15−2004 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
368 DEPOSITION of Timothy D. May taken on 11/07/2005 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
369 NOTICE by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner re 365 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Notice of Corrected Filing re Exhibit A (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Page 4 of Exhibit A) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
370 DEPOSITION of Linda Ford taken on 11/08/2005 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit to Deposition Transcript) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
371 DEPOSITION of Daniel Todd taken on 05/17/2006 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit to Deposition Transcript) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
372 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation to Take Deposition of Robin Hogan Kittinger by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
373 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation to Take Deposition of Jimmy Kelley by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
374 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation to Take Deposition of Ronnie Gipson by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
375 Letter from Bobby A. Eversole. (JBM) (Entered: 05/08/2008)
376 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/9/08; Joint or Individual Status Reports due by 5/23/2008. Settlement Conference set for 6/2/2008 at 10:00 AM in Chambers before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:counsel, KL, PH (JBM) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
377 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
378 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/12/08 re 377 Proposed Agreed Order: The entry of the tendered Agreed Order extending the deadline for the parties' responses to their opponents' motions for partial summary judgment is DENIED.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 05/13/2008)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 37 of 47

05/13/2008 05/13/2008 05/13/2008 05/16/2008 05/16/2008 05/16/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008
05/19/2008 05/19/2008

379 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/12/08; the defendants are granted leave to take the deposition of Robin Hogan Kittinger, at the Hopkins County Detention Center.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
380 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/12/08; the Defendants are granted leave to take the deposition of Jimmy Kelley, at the Hopkins County Detention Center.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
381 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 5/12/08; the Defendants are granted leave to take the deposition of Ronnie Gipson, at the Webster County Detention Center.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
382 MOTION to Make Final and Appealable Summary Judgment on Institutional Transfers by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 6/3/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
383 RESPONSE to Motion re 344 MOTION to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Witness, Gordon Kamka filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 5/30/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, Raymond Sabbatine Depo Excerpts, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
384 DEPOSITION of Tony Ward taken on 05/17/2006 by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
385 RESPONSE to Motion re 347 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Suicide filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Raymond Sabbatine Depo Excerpts, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
386 RESPONSE to Motion re 348 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Public Intoxication filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, U.S. v. Calhoun, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
387 RESPONSE to Motion re 363 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Prison Litigation Reform Act filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, McCray v. Peachey, # 2 Exhibit B, Deposition Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit C, Laws v. Walsh, # 4 Exhibit D, DeFranco v. Wolfe, # 5 Exhibit E, Tabarez v. Butler, # 6 Exhibit F, Thomas v. Keyser, # 7 Exhibit G, pp. 1−9, Rahim v. Sheahan, # 8 Exhibit G, pp. 10−17, Rahim v. Sheahan, # 9 Exhibit H, Orange v. Strain, # 10 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
388 RESPONSE to Motion re 352 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Class Members − Signs of Intoxication filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Black v. Franklin County, # 2 Exhibit B, Joe Blue Depo Excerpts, # 3 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
389 RESPONSE to Motion re 346 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Post Court Strip Searches filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, James Lantrip Depo Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit B, Raymond Sabbatine Depo Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit C, Gary v. Sheahan 1998, # 4 Exhibit D, Gary v. Sheahan 1997, # 5 Exhibit E, Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, # 6 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 38 of 47

05/19/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008
05/19/2008

390 RESPONSE to Motion re 364 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Post Conviction Release Claims or in the alternative, for Bifurcated Custom, Policy and Practice Phase of Trial filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, James Lantrip Depo Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit B, Raymond Sabbatine Depo Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit C, Gary v. Sheahan 1997, # 4 Exhibit D, Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, # 5 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
391 RESPONSE to Motion re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contraband filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Jack Sizemore Depo Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit B, Permitted Items, # 3 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
392 RESPONSE to Motion re 349 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Clothing Exchange filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Defendants' 2004 Strip−Search Policy, # 2 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
393 RESPONSE to Motion re 345 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavitof Stuart Pendley, # 2 Exhibit B − Affidavit of Brian Wiles, # 3 Exhibit C − Affidavit of Randall Charles Powers, # 4 Exhibit D − Depo of Donald Gossett, # 5 Exhibit E − Depo of James Lantrip 03/06/03, # 6 Exhibit F − Depo of Richard Frymire, # 7 Exhibit G − Depo of James Lantrip 01/17/06, # 8 Proposed Order) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
394 RESPONSE to Motion re 365 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Defendants' Policy, Custom, or Practice filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/2/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Part 1 − Affidavits, # 2 Exhibit A − Part 2 − Affidavits, # 3 Exhibit A − Part 3 −, # 4 Exhibit A − Part 4 − Affidavits, # 5 Exhibit B − Deposition James Lantrip pg. 45, # 6 Exhibit C − Deposition transcript Joe Blue, # 7 Exhibit D − Questionnaires, # 8 Exhibit E − Affidavit Misti Moore, # 9 Exhibit F − Deposition Transcript Jennifer Matheny, # 10 Exhibit G − Incident Reports, # 11 Exhibit H − Jail Policies, # 12 Exhibit I − Kamka Deposition transcript, # 13 Exhibit J − Deposition Transcript James Lantrip pg 56−57, # 14 Proposed Order to Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
395 CLASS REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS'IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM CLASS REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS'IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 355 Motion for Summary Judgment, 350 Motion for Summary Judgment, 362 Motion for Summary Judgment, 358 Motion for Summary Judgment, 357 Motion for Summary Judgment, 353 Motion for Summary Judgment, 360 Motion for Summary Judgment, 354 Motion for Summary Judgment, 356 Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Depo of Janes Lantrip 03/06/03, # 2 Exhibit B − Depo of Raymond J. Sabbatine 08/13/03, # 3 Exhibit D − Case Law − Calvin v Sheriff of Will County, # 4 Exhibit E − Depo of Lester Hank Turner, Jr. 01/15/04, # 5 Exhibit F − Depo of Tabitha Rance 11/07/05, # 6 Exhibit G − Depo of Linda Ford 11/08/05, # 7 Exhibit H − Depo of James Lantrip 01/17/06, # 8 Exhibit I − Case Law − Mowatt vv Visser, # 9 Exhibit J − Case Law − Black v Franklin County, # 10 Exhibit C − Case Law − Gary v Sheahan 08/20/1998, # 11 Exhibit K − Case Law − Gary v Sheahan 04/18/1997, # 12 Exhibit L − Depo of Daniel Todd 05/17/06, # 13 Exhibit M − Depo of Robin Littlepage 11/07/05, # 14 Exhibit N − Release Robin Littlepage, # 15 Exhibit O − Moore &Spenard Records, # 16 Exhibit P − Case Law − Pulliam v Winslow, # 17 Proposed Order) by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 39 of 47

05/20/2008
05/21/2008 05/21/2008 05/23/2008 05/28/2008 05/28/2008 05/29/2008
05/29/2008 05/30/2008 05/30/2008 06/02/2008

Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
396 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Beyond the Deadline by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 6/9/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to Motion for Leave, # 2 Supplement Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 3 Exhibit A − Jail Photograph, # 4 Exhibit B − Deposition pages of Lantrip's 1−17−06 transcript, # 5 Exhibit C − pages from Lantrip's 3−6−03 deposition) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/20/2008)
397 ORDER granting 396 Motion for Leave to file supplemental response to Plaintiff's motion for Partial Summary Judgment beyond the deadline.. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 5/21/08. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
398 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE to Motion re 365 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/4/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Jail Photograph, # 2 Exhibit B − Deposition pages of Lantrip's 1−17−06 transcript, # 3 Exhibit C − pages from Lantrip's 3−6−03 deposition) (JBM) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
399 MOTION to Strike 393 Response to Motion,, (Exhibit C − Randall Powers Affidavit) by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 6/10/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Debbie Albritton, # 2 Exhibit B − Emails between counsel, # 3 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
400 RESPONSE to Motion re 382 MOTION to Make Final and Appealable Summary Judgment on Institutional Transfers filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 6/11/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Appeal (Jackson v. Herrington), # 2 Proposed Order − Denying Plaintiffs' Motion, # 3 Proposed Order − Granting Defendants' Motion) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/28/2008)
401 MOTION make this Court's January 11, 2007, Order denying Defendants' Motion to Decertify Final and Appealable re 170 Memorandum &Opinion, Order by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 6/16/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Appeal (Jackson v. Herrington), # 2 Proposed Order) (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 05/28/2008)
402 REPLY to Response to Motion re 401 MOTION make this Court's January 11, 2007, Order denying Defendants' Motion to Decertify Final and Appealable re 170 Memorandum &Opinion, Order MOTION make this Court's January 11, 2007, Order denying Defendants' Motion to Decertify Final and Appealable re 170 Memorandum &Opinion, Order, REPLY filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
403 RESPONSE to Motion re 401 MOTION make this Court's January 11, 2007, Order denying Defendants' Motion to Decertify Final and Appealable re 170 Order Denying Defendant's motion to Decertify. filed by Linda Joyce Ford. (Note− this response was filed within the same pleading 402 and has been refiled by the Court for report purposes) Replies due by 6/12/2008. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (JBM) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
404 REPLY to Response to Motion re 364 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Post Conviction Release Claims or in the alternative, for Bifurcated Custom, Policy and Practice Phase of Trial filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
405 REPLY to Response to Motion re 348 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Public Intoxication filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
406 REPLY to Response to Motion re 344 MOTION to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Witness, Gordon Kamka filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Blankenship, Stacey) (Entered: 06/02/2008)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 40 of 47

06/02/2008 06/02/2008 06/02/2008
06/02/2008
06/03/2008 06/10/2008 07/11/2008
07/11/2008 07/16/2008 07/18/2008 07/18/2008 07/18/2008 08/01/2008

407 REPLY to Response to Motion re 347 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Suicide filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Tabitha DeHart Records) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
408 REPLY to Response to Motion re 346 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Post Court Strip Searches filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Relevant pgs to Joe Blue Deposition (pg. 80−81)) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
409 REPLY to Response to Motion re 351 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contraband filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Affidavit of Jailer Joe Blue and Relevant Photos, # 2 Exhibit B − Article ("More and More Jails Going Smoke Free"), # 3 Exhibit C − Article ("DOCS begins phase−in of ban on indoor smoking in state prisons"), # 4 Exhibit D − Presentation ("Smoke−Free Air in State Correctional Facilities: What is the Law?")) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
410 REPLY re 365 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Re Defendants' Policy, Custom and Practice of Conducting Illegal Strip Searches filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Case − Canaday v. Kelley, # 2 Exhibit B − Case − Kmart Corporation v. 21st Century Pets, Inc.) (Wettle, Susan) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
411 REPORT for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Settlement Conference held on 6/2/2008; the parties reached an amicable resolution to the case. Appropriate pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court. cc:counsel, ES, JC, PH (JBM) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
412 ORDER Jury Trial is VACATED. All pending motions are denied as MOOT.. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 6/10/08. cc:counsel, PM (JBM) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
413 MOTION for Settlement by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 7/29/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Settlement Agreement, # 2 Proposed Order) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 07/11/2008)
414 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation Setting Settlement Fairness Hearing by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 07/11/2008)
415 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/15/08; Telephone Conference set for 7/17/2008 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel.cc:counsel, KL, PH (JBM) (Entered: 07/16/2008)
416 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/17/08; Fairness Settlement Agreement Hearing set for 10/20/2008 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom before Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr..cc:counsel, ES (JBM) (Entered: 07/18/2008)
417 REPORT for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Telephone Conference held on 7/18/2008. The Court and Counsel discussed certain changes to be made to the Agreed Motion to Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Agreement which Plaintiff's counsel was to make. cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 07/18/2008)
418 ORDER granting 413 Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement attached); Notice of settlement shall issue no later than 8/18/2008. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 7/18/08. (Attachments: # 1 Settlement Agreement) cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 07/18/2008)
419 SEALED OPT OUT/EXCLUSION FORM re 241 Order received from Kevin A. VanBuren (copies mailed to attorneys Bart Greenwald and Stacy Blankenship on

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 41 of 47

08/05/2008 08/07/2008
08/11/2008
08/13/2008 08/14/2008
08/15/2008 08/18/2008 08/18/2008 08/25/2008 09/25/2008 10/10/2008 10/16/2008 10/20/2008

this day) (JBM) (Entered: 08/01/2008)
420 REPORT for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel: Telephone Conference held on 7/29/2008. Parties to continue negotiating the content of the notice of settlement and claim form. cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
421 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation re Notice of Hearing and Proposed Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement, # 2 Exhibit B − Claim Form) by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
422 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation to Approve Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement, # 2 Exhibit B − Claim Form) by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
423 ORDER by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 8/12/08; the agreed motion to approve revised versions of the Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and the Claim Form (DN 422 exhibits A and B) is GRANTED.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
424 MOTION for Leave to Approve Final Revised Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form and to Extend Deadline for Filing by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 9/2/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − E−mail between counsel, # 2 Proposed Order − approving Final Revised Notice and Class Action Settlement and Claim Form, # 3 Proposed Order − Extending Deadline for Mailing) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 08/14/2008)
425 NOTICE by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip re 424 MOTION for Leave to Approve Final Revised Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form and to Extend Deadline for Filing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement, # 2 Exhibit B − Claim Form) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
426 ORDER granting 424 Motion for Leave to Approve Final Revised Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement and Claim Form. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 8/15/08. cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
427 ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE for mailing Notice of Hearing and Proposed Class Action Settlement by Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel on 8/15/08; Extension granted through 8/25/08.cc:counsel, PH (JBM) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
428 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order returned by Alexander Troy Winchester. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 08/25/2008)
429 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order; Returned by Mary Janelle Daugherty (copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
430 Proposed Order Approving Class−Action Settlement by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 10/10/2008)
431 SEALED QUESTIONNAIRE re: 274 Order. Received by Shellie Nichole (Embrey) King. (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) (JBM) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
432 ORDER APPROVING CLASS−ACTION SETTLEMENT by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/20/08; The Court finds the settlement in this litigation to be

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 42 of 47

02/11/2009
02/11/2009
02/23/2009 02/25/2009 03/02/2009
03/02/2009
03/16/2009
03/19/2009 03/19/2009 03/23/2009 03/25/2009 03/30/2009 05/11/2009 05/15/2009

fair, reasonable and adequate under the circumstances, and that the interests of the class as a whole are better served by this settlement instead of the pursuit of this litigation through trial. By separate Judgment, claims of all class members who have not made a timely request to be excluded from the class will be dismissed with prejudice.cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
433 MOTION for Ruling on "Remoteness" Issue by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 3/2/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support FOR RULING ON REMOTENESS, # 2 Exhibit G − MARY BULL ET AL V CITY &COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, # 3 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
434 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 3/2/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− FILED UNDER SEAL, # 2 Exhibit B − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 3 Exhibit C − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 4 Exhibit D − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 5 Exhibit E − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 6 Exhibit F − FILED UNDER SEAL, # 7 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 02/11/2009)
435 (Sealed) Questionnaire re 274 Order received from Frank David Fickas (Copies mailed to lead counsel on this day) NOTICE: The original paper document will be shredded 60 days after the filed date. (JBMS) (Entered: 02/23/2009)
436 Sealed Document re 433 Motion for Ruling on Remoteness Issue. NOTICE: The original paper document will be shredded 60 days after the filed date. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits part 2 of 3, # 2 Exhibits part 3 of 3) by Hopkins County, Kentucky. (JBMS) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
437 RESPONSE to Motion re 433 MOTION for Ruling on "Remoteness" Issue filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 3/16/2009. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
438 MOTION for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal re Response to Motion for Ruling on Remoteness Issues by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 3/20/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Re A−F to be filed under seal) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
439 REPLY to Response to Motion re 433 MOTION for Ruling on "Remoteness" Issue filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Mattingly v Grayson County, # 2 Exhibit B − Shouse v. Daviess County, # 3 Exhibit C − Bechtold v. Stearns County, # 4 Exhibit D − Estate of Johnson v Robinson, # 5 Exhibit E − Courier−Journal article, # 6 Exhibit F− Affidavit of Mike Lewis, # 7 Exhibit G− Memo date June 13, 2008, # 8 Exhibit H − Beyer v. Johnson City) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
440 ORDER granting 434 Motion for Leave to file Exhibits under seal. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 3/19/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
441 ORDER granting 438 Motion for Leave to file Exhibits Under seal. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 3/19/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
442 Sealed Document − NOTICE: The original paper document will be shredded 60 days after the filed date. (JBMS) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
443 Sealed Document− NOTICE: The original paper document will be shredded 60 days after the filed date. (JBMS) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
444 ORDER denying 433 Motion for Ruling on the issue of "remoteness.". Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 3/27/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 03/30/2009)
445 Letter from Gary M. Pyle (JBM) (Entered: 05/12/2009)
446 Letter from Donna Reiff requesting update (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (JBM) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 43 of 47

05/28/2009 06/08/2009 06/12/2009 06/12/2009 06/18/2009 06/22/2009 06/22/2009 06/23/2009 06/23/2009
06/23/2009
06/23/2009 06/23/2009 06/23/2009 06/24/2009
06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/29/2009 06/29/2009

447 Letter from Donna Reiff (JBM) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
448 Letter from Tammy Duncan (JBM) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
449 NOTICE of Upton's and Titus' appeal of the Denial of their Claims on the Issue of Remoteness by Jhonni Upton, Misti Titus re 432 Order,, (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
450 RESPONSE to re 448 Letter − Tammy (Benton) Duncan Appeal of Claim Denial filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
451 NOTICE LETTER re: denial of Appeal claim. Filed by Roger Miller re 432 Order (JBM) (Entered: 06/18/2009)
452 RESPONSE to re 451 Notice (Other) of Appeal of Claim Denial by Roger Miller filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/22/2009)
453 NOTICE LETTER/Appeal to of Final Notice of Claim Denial re 432 Order (JBM) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
454 RESPONSE to re 449 Notice (Other) of Appeal of Claim Denial by Misti Titus filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
455 RESPONSE to re 453 Notice (Other) of Appeal of Claim Denial by Joe Browder filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Inmate Rap Sheet, # 2 Exhibit B − Inmate View, # 3 Exhibit C − Inmate View, # 4 Exhibit D − Inmate View and Order dated 8/8/03, # 5 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
456 RESPONSE to re 449 Notice (Other) of Appeal of Claim Denial by Jhonni Upton filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Intake Medical Screening, # 2 Exhibit B − Intake Medical Screening, # 3 Exhibit C − Intake Medical Screening, # 4 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
457 REPLY re 454 Response to Misti Titus' Appeal on the Issue of "Remoteness" filed by Misti Titus. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
458 Letter from Donna Reiff (EAS) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
459 REPLY re 456 Response, to Jhonni Upton's Appeal on the Issue of "Remoteness" filed by Jhonni Upton. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
460 RESPONSE to re 452 Response to Appeal of Roger Miller filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
461 RESPONSE to re 447 Letter, 458 Letter Appeal of Donna Reiff filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Donna Reiff Claim Form, # 2 Exhibit B − Questionnaire, # 3 Exhibit C − April 14, 2009, Ltr from Reiff, # 4 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
462 NOTICE LETTER/Appeal of Final Notice of Claim Denial by Gary Pylec (KJS) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
463 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 6/26/09: see order for specifics cc:counsel (KJS) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
464 NOTICE of Compliance re service of Response to Appeal of Tammy Duncan by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
465 RESPONSE to re 462 Letter, 445 Letter Appeal of Claim Denial by Gary Pyle filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Jail Records (Inmate Rap Sheet), # 2 Exhibit B − May 16, 2009, Claim Form, # 3 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 06/29/2009)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 44 of 47

06/30/2009
06/30/2009 06/30/2009 07/02/2009 07/07/2009 07/16/2009 07/17/2009
07/20/2009 08/19/2009
08/19/2009 08/20/2009 08/20/2009
08/20/2009 08/20/2009 08/20/2009 08/20/2009 08/20/2009 08/21/2009 08/25/2009

466 STIPULATION re 463 Order of June 26, 2009 by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
467 Letter from Donna Reiff re 458 Letter (KJS) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
468 Letter from Gary Pyle re 462 Letter (KJS) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
469 Sealed Document by the plaintiffs (JBM) (JBMS). (Entered: 07/07/2009)
470 Letter from Gary Pyle (JBM) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
471 REPLY re 455 Response to Appeal of Final Claim Denial by Joe Browder. (JBM) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
472 MOTION to Amend/Correct 418 Order on Motion for Settlement, Motion to Allow Early Payment of Qualifying Claims and Certain Administrative Fees by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner Responses due by 8/4/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Greenwald, Bart) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
473 ORDER granting 472 Motion to Allow Early Payment of Qualifying Claims and Certain Administrative Fees. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 7/20/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
474 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment, MOTION to Intervene, MOTION to Stay Responses due by 9/7/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit) (Hinton, Thresa) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/24/2009: # 3 Memorandum in Support) (JBM). (Entered: 08/19/2009)
475 ERROR: Efiler made duplicate entry. Document has been removed. Please see 474 for viewing. (Entered: 08/19/2009)
476 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Joe Browder, Jr. 453 is DENIED.cc:counsel, Joe Browder, Jr. (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
477 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; the Appeal of Tammy (Benton) Duncan 448 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Claims Administrator is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the Claims Administrator for further consideration.cc:counsel, Tammy Duncan (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
478 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Roger Miller 451 is DENIED.cc:counsel, Roger Miller (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
479 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Gary Pyle 462 , 468 and 470 is DENIED.cc:counsel, Gary Pyle (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
480 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Donna Reiff 458 and 467 is DENIED.cc:counsel, Donna Reiff (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
481 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Misti Titus 449 is DENIED. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
482 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/19/09; Decision of the Claims Administrator is AFFIRMED; the appeal of Jhonni Upton 449 is DENIED. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
483 MEMORANDUM re 474 Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Motion to Intervene, Motion to Stay by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief by Intervenor Plaintiff Chyrle Ava Taylor Responses due by 9/14/2009 (Hinton, Thresa) (Additional attachment(s) added on

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 45 of 47

08/25/2009 08/25/2009
08/26/2009
08/26/2009 08/26/2009 08/26/2009 08/28/2009 09/01/2009 09/02/2009
09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/05/2009 09/08/2009 09/15/2009

8/26/2009: # 1 Exhibit) (JBM). (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/27/2009: # 2 Proposed Order) (JBM). (Entered: 08/25/2009)
485 ERROR: attorney e−filed exhibit as separate entry. Clerk has reattached exhibit to subject motion 484 . Please see 484 for viewing. (Entered: 08/25/2009)
MOTION for Relief pursuant to 60(b) or in the alternative MOTION to Reopen by Chyrle Ava Taylor. Responses due by 9/14/2009 (NO PDF ATTACHED: attorney failed to select appropriate motion reliefs when filing 484 . The Clerk has refiled for report purposes. Please see 484 for viewing of this pleading) (JBM) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re: 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief and 485 Attachments. Motion 484 included 3 separate motion reliefs yet only one was selected by the efiler. The clerk has corrected this by refiling the additional motion reliefs. The exhibit to said motion was filed as a separate entry instead of as an attachment. The Clerk has removed and attached this exhibit to said motion 484 . E−filer failed to tender a proposed order with said motion. A deficiency notice is forthcoming. Clerk has spoke with efiler with regards to policies and procedures. (JBM) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
486 NOTICE of Deficiency re 484 Motion for Equitable Relief : Proposed Order not tendered. Failure to comply will be brought to the attention of the Court. Response due by 8/31/2009. (JBM) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
487 Sealed Document (JBMS) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
488 Proposed Order by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 08/26/2009)
489 ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 8/28/09; re 487 Sealed Document. Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the letter and claim form filed under seal to lead counsel for the parties. Counsel shall respond to the letter and claim form no later than 9/14/09.cc:counsel, Pam Williams (JBM) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
490 RESPONSE to re 489 Order, 487 Sealed Document filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Pamela Williams Jail Records, # 2 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
491 RESPONSE to Motion re 474 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION to Intervene MOTION to Stay, 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief, MOTION for Relief pursuant to 60(b) MOTION to Reopen Case MOTION for Relief pursuant to 60(b) filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. Replies due by 9/16/2009. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
492 REPLY to Response to Motion re 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief filed by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
493 MOTION for Leave to File Pleading under Seal by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 9/22/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Response to Motions for Equitable Relief, FRCP 60(b) Relief, and Reopen, # 2 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
494 RESPONSE to Motion re 474 MOTION for Declaratory Judgment MOTION to Intervene MOTION to Stay filed by Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip. Replies due by 9/18/2009. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
495 Objection to 493 MOTION for Leave to File Pleading under Seal filed by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 09/05/2009)
496 NOTICE of withdrawal of objection by Chyrle Ava Taylor re 495 Objection (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
497 ORDER granting 493 Motion for Leave to file Pleading under Seal. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 9/14/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 09/15/2009)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 46 of 47

09/16/2009 09/18/2009 09/22/2009 09/23/2009
09/25/2009 09/30/2009 09/30/2009
10/05/2009 10/05/2009
10/05/2009 10/06/2009 10/07/2009 10/13/2009
10/13/2009

498 SEALED RESPONSE to Motion re 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief Replies due by 9/30/2009. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Proposed Order) by Defendants . (JBMS) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/5/2009: # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F) (JBMS). (Entered: 09/16/2009)
499 REPLY to Response to Motion re 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief filed by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit phone records, # 2 Exhibit depo. excerpts, # 3 Proposed Order) (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 09/18/2009)
500 RESPONSE to re 499 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
501 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE to re 499 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) Modified text on 9/24/2009 (JBM). (Entered: 09/23/2009)
502 REPLY to Response to Motion re 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief rebuttal re: class counsel's response to tendered phone records filed by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit) (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
503 MOTION for Leave to Substitute Exhibit B and to File Exhibit under Seal by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 10/19/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 09/30/2009)
504 MOTION for Leave to File Additional Exhibits by Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 10/19/2009 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unpublished Opinion − Mattingly v. Grayson County, # 2 Exhibit Unpublished Opinion − Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, # 3 Exhibit Unpublished Opinion − McCullar v. Babb, # 4 Proposed Order) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 09/30/2009)
505 ORDER granting 503 Motion for Leave to Substitute Exhibit B and to file exhibit under seal. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/2/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 10/05/2009)
506 ORDER granting 504 Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits. The Clerk is directed to accept the unpublished opinions as Exhibits D,E and F to Defendant's sealed Response to Motions for Equitable Relief, for relief Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(, or to Reopen 498 . Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/2/09. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 10/05/2009)
507 REPLY re 484 MOTION hearing/equitable relief reply to defendants additional exhibits filed by Chyrle Ava Taylor. (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 10/05/2009)
508 Proposed Agreed Order/Stipulation by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner. (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 10/06/2009)
509 Sealed Document re 498 Sealed Response to Motion (Sealed Exhibit B filed pursuant to Court order 505 ) (JBMS) (Entered: 10/07/2009)
510 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The motion 474 for a declaration of rights, to intervene and to hold in abeyance; and the motion 484 for equitable relief, for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), or in the alternative to reopen are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. FURTHER ORDERED that by no later than 10/23/09, Claimant Chyrle Taylor, shall file a claim form with the Claims Administrator. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/9/09. cc:counsel, Theresa Hinton (JBM) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
511 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/8/09; No later than 10/23/09, class counsel shall provide the Claims Administrator the claim form attached to Pam Williams' letter.cc:counsel, Pam Williams (JBM) (Entered: 10/13/2009)

Case: 4:03-cv-3 As of: 07/03/2013 05:21 PM EDT 47 of 47

10/19/2009 10/20/2009
10/21/2009 10/26/2009 11/16/2009 11/18/2009 11/19/2009 01/21/2010
01/26/2010
01/14/2013 01/26/2013
02/11/2013
03/04/2013

512 AGREED ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 10/16/09: see order for specificscc:counsel (KJS) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
513 NOTICE of Compliance with Court's October 13, 2009 Order by Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner re 511 Memorandum &Opinion, Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, E−Mail to Claims Administrator, # 2 Exhibit B, Letter to Claims Administrator) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 10/20/2009)
514 NOTICE of Compliance with Court's Order (Dkt. No. 510) by Chyrle Ava Taylor (Hinton, Thresa) (Entered: 10/21/2009)
515 NOTICE/LETTER submitting claim by Robert C. James (JBM) (Entered: 10/27/2009)
516 MEMORANDUM OPINION &ORDER by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 11/13/2009 denying request to file late claim 515 . cc:counse, Robert James (CSD) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
517 NOTICE of Change of Address by Gregory A. Belzley (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
518 NOTICE of Change of Address by Gregory A. Belzley (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
519 Joint MOTION for Leave to Enter Final Judgment and Order by Plaintiffs Linda Joyce Ford, Timothy D. May, Robin Littlepage, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Tony Ward, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester H. Turner, Defendants Hopkins County, Kentucky, Jim Lantrip Responses due by 2/15/2010 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jonathan Reid re: final report of the Claims Administrator, # 2 Exhibit A − approved claims, # 3 Exhibit B − denied claimants, # 4 Exhibit C − additional approved claimants, # 5 Exhibit D − additional denied claimants, # 6 Exhibit E − appeals received from Analytics, # 7 Exhibit F − appeals to Court, # 8 Exhibit G − payments to approved claimants, # 9 Exhibit H − un−cashed payment, # 10 Proposed Order Dismissing and Final Judgment) (Moore, Douglas) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
520 FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DISMISSING granting 519 Motion for Leave to enter Final Judgment and Order dismissing. This class action and all claims against defendants and their insurers are dismissed with prejudice. Final Judgment and no just cause for delay.. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 1/25/10. cc:counsel (JBM) (Entered: 01/26/2010)
521 MOTION for Relief by Movant Nicholis Belle; Responses due by 2/7/2013. (JBM) (Entered: 01/15/2013)
522 RESPONSE to Motion re 521 MOTION for Relief filed by Edward Lee Sutton, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Lester H. Turner, Tony Ward. Replies due by 2/14/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Settlement Administrator, # 3 Proposed Order) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 01/26/2013)
523 NOTICE of Filing of Return Receipt from Nicholis Belle by Linda Joyce Ford, Robin Littlepage, Timothy D. May, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia W. Nelson, Edward Lee Sutton, Robert R. Teague, Daniel Todd, Lester H. Turner, Tony Ward (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Belle return receipt) (Belzley, Gregory) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
524 ORDER denying 521 Motion for Relief. Signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 3/1/13. cc:counsel, Petitioner (pro se) (JBM) (Entered: 03/04/2013)

 
 Turner Claims Administrator P.O. Box 2002
Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002
CLAIM FORM

CLAIM FORM Must be postmarked by December 31, 2008.

WRITE ANY NAME AND ADDRESS CORRECTIONS BELOW OR IF THERE IS NO PREPRINTED DATA TO THE LEFT, YOU MUST PROVIDE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS HERE:
Name

Address:

City, State, and Zip Code:

Late claims will be denied. You must complete and mail this Claim Form, postmarked by December 31, 2008, to:
Turner Claims Administrator P.O. Box 2002
Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002
Please see below to learn how to ﬁle for a deceased class member.

Step One - Provide your basic information.
Please note that it is your responsibility to notify the Claims Administrator in writing at the above address if the address you provide changes.

SSN:

Date of Birth:

Email:

Home Phone:

Work Phone:

Cell Phone:

Provide the following information about someone who will always know how to contact you.

Name: Address: Home Phone:

Work Phone:

Relation to you: City, State, Zip:

Cell Phone:

To File for a Deceased Class Member:
To submit a Claim Form on behalf of a deceased class member in Step One, give the class member’s name and your contact information; in Step Four, sign your own name and note your relationship to the class member. To receive a settlement check for a deceased class member, you must be appointed a personal representative of the class member’s estate or complete an afﬁdavit of entitlement in compliance with Kentucky law, or satisfy the equivalent procedure under the state law that applies to the estate. You must send documentation of your appointment as personal representative, the original of an afﬁdavit of entitlement, or the equivalent, to the Claims Administrator by December 31, 2008, or the claim will be denied. You may need to consult an attorney or probate court for more information on this process.

Please check one box to indicate how your check should be handled if your claim is approved:

Mail the check to my address above.

Hold the check for me to pick up in person.

Mail the check to this address:

If you do not select any of these options, the check will be sent to your address.

If you select this option, a letter to the address you entered for yourself above will inform you of when and where to pick up the check. You will need to provide a reliable photo ID when you pick up your check.

Address: x
City: State:

Zip Code:

Step Two - Please answer the following questions truthfully. If you do not select Yes, No, or Don’t Recall, then the form will be treated as if you selected Don’t Recall.
Your answers to the following questions will assist in determining the validity of your claim. Provide as much detail as possible after searching your memory and/or any records you may have kept. If you cannot recall when an event occurred, or you cannot locate any written record of an event, you may write “I don’t know” as an answer to one or more of these questions. You will not be automatically disqualiﬁed as a claimant if you do not recall the information requested. This information is only being used to assist in the evaluation of your claim.

ENTRY STRIP SEARCH INFORMATION

(1) Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), were you strip-searched on admission to the Hopkins County Detention Center (“the Jail”) after your arrest for a non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offense and without regard to whether there existed a reasonable, individualized suspicion that you might be carrying or concealing weapons or contraband?

Yes

No

***NOTE: You were “strip-searched” if you were required to remove all or part of your clothing for visual inspection of your buttocks, breasts and/or genitalia.

If your answer is NO to Question No. 1, please skip ahead to Question No. 5.

(2) List the date(s) of your arrest(s) when you were strip-searched, with the criminal charge(s) for each arrest when the strip search(es) occurred. Provide criminal charge(s), month, date, and/or year, if known (if you cannot recall when an event occurred, or you cannot locate any written record of an event, state that you do not recall; or if you only know part of the information, provide as much as you do recall):

(a) criminal charges: ____________________________________ (b) criminal charges: ____________________________________ (c) criminal charges: ____________________________________

date: ___________________ date: ___________________ date: ___________________

(3) Prior to the search(es) listed above, were you ever charged with a drug or violence-related offense?  Yes  No  Don’t Recall
If “Yes”, provide the date(s) of the prior drug or violence charge(s), if known:______________________

(4) At the time that you were strip-searched entering the jail, did the strip search(es) occur:

(a) After you were taken directly to the Jail after being sentenced by a Judge in court?

Date(s), if known:__________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall

2

(b) After turning yourself into the Jail? Date(s), if known:__________________
(c) After returning from work release? Date(s), if known:__________________
(d) Prior to being placed on suicide watch? Date(s), if known:__________________
(e) After you were transferred from another jail? Date(s), if known?_________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall  Yes  No  Don’t Recall  Yes  No  Don’t Recall  Yes  No  Don’t Recall

RELEASE STRIP SEARCH INFORMATION

(5) Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), after your arrest for a minor offense, were you stripsearched after you became entitled to be released from the Jail pursuant to an order of the court, payment of bond, or any other reason?

Yes

No

***NOTE: You were “strip-searched” if you were required to remove all or part of your clothing for visual inspection of your buttocks, breasts and/or genitalia.

If the answer to Question No. 5 is NO, you may skip this section and proceed to Step Three.
(6) Provide the criminal charge(s) for which you had been arrested when this strip search(es) occurred and the corresponding dates when the strip search(es) occurred. Provide criminal charge(s), month, date, and/or year, if known (if you cannot recall when an event occurred, or you cannot locate any written record of an event, state that you do not recall; or if you only know part of the information, provide as much as you do recall):

(a) criminal charges: ____________________________________

date: ___________________

(b) criminal charges: ____________________________________

date: ___________________

(c) criminal charges: ____________________________________

date: ___________________

(7) Did the strip search(es) upon release occur:

(a) After you had been ordered by a judge to be released on your own recognizance?

Date(s): ___________________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall

(b) After bond was posted for your release? Date(s): ___________________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall

(c) After you had completed your sentence? Date(s): ___________________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall

(d) Upon release from the Jail, but before you were transferred to another jail or prison?

Date(s): ___________________________

 Yes  No  Don’t Recall

3

Step Three - Substitute W-9 Request for Taxpayer Identiﬁcation Number. This should be your Social Security Number, unless you have been given a different number by the IRS for this purpose.
(9 digits)
The number shown on this form is my correct taxpayer identiﬁcation number (or I am waiting for a number to be issued to me), and I am not subject to backup withholding because: (a) I am exempt from backup withholding, or (b) I have not been notiﬁed by the IRS that I am subject to backup withholding as a result of a failure to report all interest or dividends, or (c) the IRS has notiﬁed me that I am no longer subject to backup withholding.
If you have been notiﬁed by the IRS that you are subject to backup withholding, you must cross out the word “not” in “b” and check here:
Step Four - Please sign under penalty of perjury that all of the information you provided in this form is true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief. It is important that your answers are truthful. If you sign this and you know that the statement is not true, you can be charged with perjury pursuant to 18 USCA § 1621, 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
Under penalty of perjury, I certify that all of the information provided on this form is true and correct:

(Signature)

(Date)

Step Five - Mail this form, postmarked by December 31, 2008.

Mail this form to: Turner Claims Administrator P.O. Box 2002 Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002

This form must be postmarked by December 31, 2008, or your claim will be denied.

The Claims Administrator will send notice to indicate that your claim form was received. You should keep a copy of this form as your receipt. If you move, notify the Claims Administrator in writing so that your check will be sent to the correct address.

4

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT OWENSBORO

Edward Sutton, et al., Plaintiffs v. Hopkins County, KY, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) CIVIL NO. 4:03-CV-3-M ) )

The Federal Court for the Western District of Kentucky authorized this notice. This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.
NOTICE OF HEARING AND PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Your legal rights are affected whether you act or do not act. Please Read this Notice Carefully.
There will be a hearing in the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro, 423 Frederica St, Owensboro, KY 42301, before the Honorable Joseph McKinley on October 20, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. CDT to determine whether to approve a proposed $3 million settlement as full, ﬁnal, and complete settlement of any and all claims that were made or could have been made by the class. If approved by the Court, you could get a payment from a $3 million class action settlement if you meet ALL of the following conditions:
1. Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), you were strip-searched on admission to the Hopkins County Detention Center (“the Jail”) after your arrest for a qualifying non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offense and without regard to whether there existed a reasonable, individualized suspicion that you might be carrying or concealing weapons or contraband; and/or
2. Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), after your arrest for a minor offense, you were stripsearched after you became entitled to be released from the Jail pursuant to an order of the court, payment of bond, or any other reason.
***NOTE: You were “strip-searched” if you were required to remove all or part of your clothing for visual inspection of your buttocks, breasts and/or genitalia.
Many reasons exist as to why you might not be a member of the class. Those reasons are too numerous to list in detail here. If you submit a claim and are not deemed to be a class member, the class administrator will inform you as to the reason(s) for that decision.
A $3 million settlement has been proposed in a class action lawsuit about alleged illegal strip-searches that took place when persons were admitted to, or became eligible for release from, the Jail at any time from January 9, 2002, to June 2, 2008 (inclusive). The settlement fund may pay cash to those who submit valid claims after deducting attorneys’ fees, the costs and expenses of administering this settlement, and the payouts to the class representatives and deponents.
You are receiving this notice because records show that you may be a class member. To see if you qualify, you must submit a complete Settlement Claim Form, postmarked by December 31, 2008, to:
Turner Claims Administrator P.O. Box 2002
Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002
If you submit a claim form and qualify as a class member, you will be eligible to share in this settlement. The amount of money you receive depends on the following:
1. The money remaining after payment of the attorneys’ fees, the costs of this litigation, the costs of administering this settlement, and the payouts to the class representatives; and
2. The number of timely, valid claims submitted.

THESE ARE YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND OPTIONS IN THIS SETTLEMENT:

SUBMIT A CLAIM FORM

This is the only way to get a payment. Remember: Claim Forms postmarked after December 31, 2008 will not be considered for payment.

EXCLUDE YOURSELF OBJECT
DO NOTHING

If you exclude yourself, you will not be bound by the Settlement or judgment. You will not get a cash payment in this case. You will be free to pursue your claims against the defendants at your own expense. This is the only option that allows you to bring your own lawsuit for the claims raised in this case. You must exclude yourself from the Settlement by October 10, 2008. If you exclude yourself, however, you will not be allowed to rejoin this class action and your individual claim may be barred by the statute of limitations and you may get nothing.
If you want to object to the settlement but you do not exclude yourself, you may object by writing to the Claims Administrator explaining why you believe the settlement is not fair, postmarked no later than October 10, 2008, or you may appear in Court at the Fairness Hearing on October 20, 2008 at 9 a.m. If you have not checked in at the court by 9 a.m. CDT, your appeal will not be heard. You must also submit a claim form to preserve your right to receive payment.
You get no payment. You will still be bound by the settlement and you give up your right to sue the defendants or employees of the state on these claims later.

THE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS
How much will my payment be?
We do not yet know the amount of the payments. The tentative settlement agreement reached between the parties and preliminarily approved by the Court dictates that a person who is a member of one class will receive payment not to exceed $1,500 and a person who is a member of both classes will receive payment not to exceed $2,500, even if the person was strip searched more than once for each class. Payments will not exceed $2,500.00 to any claimant, except for the named or deposed plaintiffs as described below.
Attorneys’ fees and expenses will ﬁrst be paid from the settlement fund. The named plaintiffs believe that Plaintiffs’ Counsel are entitled to recoup their actual hourly fees and costs up to and including June 9, 2008, not to exceed $1.5 million, and any actual costs and attorney’s fees after that date. The named plaintiffs will also be paid from the settlement fund. Class counsel requests, and Defendants have agreed to, payment of $250,000.00 to be divided among the class representatives in full and ﬁnal settlement of their claims against Defendants, as well as for several years of service as named class representatives, including, but not limited to surrendering their anonymity, bringing suit, submitting to depositions, and participating in and authorizing the settlement of this class action. Further, certain class members have been deposed in this action, and the parties have agreed that those deponents who have valid claims are entitled to $4,000 each.
The remaining amount will be divided among the claimants who submit valid and timely claims. The amount for each individual claimant will depend on how many people submit valid claim forms and whether they are members of each of the two classes. The amount per person will decrease as the number of forms submitted increases.
How can I get a payment?
You must ﬁll out the Settlement Claim Form completely and mail it to the Claims Administrator. A Claim Form is included with this notice. You can also obtain a Claim Form from the Website www.turnersettlement.com. The envelope must be postmarked no later than December 31, 2008; if it is not, your claim will be denied.

2

The settlement check will be written in your name with your social security number. Your check will be sent to your mailing address. If you move, you must notify the Claims Administrator in writing of your new address or the check will be sent to your old address. If you are incarcerated, your check will be deposited in your Inmate Trust Fund Account.
When will I get my payment? You will not be paid until the settlement is approved by the Court and any appeals are complete. The Court will hold a hearing on October 20, 2008, to decide whether to approve the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Settlement checks will be issued after the Court approves the settlement and all appeals are completed. You may visit the website or contact the Claims Administrator for updates.
Will I have to pay taxes on my payment? You may have to pay taxes on your payment. You should consult your tax preparer when you ﬁle your tax returns. The Claims Administrator will send you a 1099 Form. (If you have questions about backup withholding, Form W-9 or Form 1099, call your tax preparer or the IRS Information Reporting Program Customer Service Section, toll free at (866) 455-7438, 8:30 am to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.)
WHO IS IN THE SETTLEMENT
What is a Class Action and who are Class Members? In a class action, one or more people, called Class Representatives (in this case, Edward Lee Sutton, Lester Hank Turner, Robin Littlepage, Tim May, Tabitha Nance, Ladonia Nelson, Linda Ford, Robert Teague, Daniel Todd and Tony Ward), sue on behalf of all people who have similar claims. All of the people who were similarly treated are known as a Class or Class Members. One court resolves the issues for all Class Members.
What claims will be released by this Settlement? This settlement resolves all claims alleging illegal strip-searches that took place when persons were admitted to or released from the Jail from January 9, 2002, to June 2, 2008 (inclusive). The settlement releases all of these claims against the Jail and its employees. The settlement does not release any other claims, for example claims of wrongful arrest or excessive force. If you wish to pursue claims that are not covered by the settlement, you must ﬁle an individual lawsuit on your own behalf. These claims may be barred by the statute of limitations.
How do I know if I am a Class Member and part of the Settlement? You are a Class Member if you meet ALL factors below:
1. Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), you were strip-searched on admission to the Hopkins County Detention Center (“the Jail”) after your arrest for a qualifying non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanor offense and without regard to whether there existed a reasonable, individualized suspicion that you might be carrying or concealing weapons or contraband; and/or
2. Between January 9, 2002 and June 2, 2008 (inclusive), after your arrest for a minor offense, you were stripsearched after you became entitled to be released from the Jail pursuant to an order of the court, payment of bond, or any other reason.
***NOTE: You were “strip-searched” if you were required to remove all or part of your clothing for visual inspection of your buttocks, breasts and/or genitalia.
NOTE: You are not a class member if you were either (1) strip-searched while you were serving a sentence or after a judge had ordered that you be kept in jail while awaiting trial, (2) you were strip-searched because a correctional ofﬁcer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that you were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband, (3) you were arrested for and/or charged with a crime involving a felony or other non-qualifying offense, or (4) your prior incarceration record justiﬁed a strip search. This list is not exhaustive. There could be other reasons why you are not a member of the class.
3

What if I was arrested for more than one crime?
The most serious charge for an arrest will determine your class membership. If any one of the charges was a crime involving weapons or drugs, or a felony, you are not a class member for that arrest.
What if I was found not guilty of the crime for which I was arrested?
You are entitled to the same settlement amount whether you were found guilty or not guilty of the crime. However, if you were strip searched after your arrest for a crime involving weapons or drugs, or a felony, you are not a class member regardless of whether you were subsequently found not guilty of the charge.
What if I was arrested and strip searched more than once; can I still participate?
Yes. As stated above, the tentative settlement agreement reached between the parties and preliminarily approved by the Court dictates that a person who is a member of one class will receive payment not to exceed $1,500, and a person who is a member of both classes will receive payment not to exceed $2,500, even if that person were strip searched more than once for each class. Payments will not exceed $2,500 to any claimant, except for the named or deposed plaintiffs as described below.
What if I was at the jail before January 9, 2002?
The time period for being a class member is based on the legal requirement that a case must be ﬁled within a certain time period; this is called the statute of limitations. The law in Kentucky only allows a person to bring a claim within one year after his or her rights were violated. Because this case was ﬁled on January 9, 2003, class members include only those who were strip searched in the year before that date and thereafter. If you were strip searched at the Jail before January 9, 2002, it may be too late to bring a lawsuit.
What if I am still unsure about whether I am part of the Settlement?
If you are unsure whether you are a member of the class, ﬁll out and return the Settlement Claim Form. If the settlement is approved, you will be notiﬁed if you do not qualify. If you qualify you may receive a check. You may also visit the settlement website on the Internet at www.turnersettlement.com, or call (866) 308-7614 to speak to a Settlement Administrator or Class Counsel to answer your questions.
Who makes the ﬁnal decision about who qualiﬁes as a Class Member?
The Claims Administrator makes the decision about who qualiﬁes as a Class Member. However, this decision is subject to review by the Court. The records kept by the Jail will determine if you are a Class Member. If the records do not show that you ﬁt the class deﬁnition, or do not show that you have a qualifying claim, your claim will be denied. You can appeal your denial to the Claims Administrator by sending documentation and information regarding the dates you believe you were held and strip searched. A decision of the Claims Administrator can be appealed to the District Court. (If you are not a Class Member, you are not bound by this settlement, and can take action as an individual if you wish.)
How did the lawyers in this case ﬁnd me and how can I protect my privacy?
After you were arrested, you gave your name and address at the Jail. The District Court ordered that this information be given to the lawyers for the plaintiffs. The Court ordered that this information must remain conﬁdential and cannot be further disclosed. Only the lawyers in the case, the Claims Administrator, and the State’s administrators for collections of applicable liens will know your name and, in most cases, only those persons just mentioned who have been authorized by the Court’s Order will see your Claim Form. Those persons who learn your identity as a result of this Settlement cannot disclose your private information.
What should I do if I do not want to participate in the class action?
If you do not wish to participate in the class action, you can either exclude yourself or do nothing. If you do not send in a claim form, you will not be a participating Class Member and you will not receive a payment. You will also be barred from ﬁling a case on these claims in the future.
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EXCLUDING YOURSELF FROM THE SETTLEMENT
If I exclude myself, can I get money from this Settlement? No, you will not get a payment from this settlement. You will not be legally bound by the settlement. You can bring your own lawsuit. However, your individual claim may be barred by the statute of limitations and you may get nothing. Class counsel will not represent you in pursuing your claims. If you exclude yourself, do not send in a Claim Form. You cannot object to the settlement if you ask to be excluded. A request to be excluded means you have opted out of this case.
How do I ask to be excluded from the settlement? To exclude yourself from the settlement, you must send a letter by mail saying that you want to be excluded from Sutton, et al. v. Hopkins County, et al. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, and sign the letter. You must mail your exclusion request postmarked no later than October 10, 2008, to the Claims Administrator at Turner Claims Administrator, P.O. Box 2002, Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002. The Claims Administrator will ﬁle your notice with the Court and counsel. You cannot exclude yourself by phone or by e-mail.
If I do not exclude myself, can I sue the Jail for the same thing later? No. Unless you exclude yourself, you give up the right to sue the Jail or its employees for the claims that this settlement resolves. This case resolves all claims for alleged illegal strip-searches that took place when persons were admitted to or released from the Jail from January 9, 2002, to June 2, 2008 (inclusive). Remember, the exclusion deadline is October 10, 2008.
OBJECTING TO THE SETTLEMENT
What if I think the proposed settlement is unfair? What can I do? If you wish to object to the proposed settlement, you or a lawyer on your behalf must either state your objections to the Court in a letter sent to the Claims Administrator, postmarked no later than October 10, 2008, or appear in the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro, 423 Frederica St, Owensboro, KY 42301, on October 20, 2008 at 9 a.m. CDT to present your objections. If you do not check in with the Court by 9 a.m. CDT on that date, your objection will not be heard. If you write, the Claims Administrator will forward your objection to the Court and to the lawyers. You may object to the proposed settlement and still be eligible to receive a payment. If you wish to claim money should the settlement be approved, you must submit a valid Settlement Claim Form by the December 31, 2008 deadline even if you object to the settlement.
THE COURT’S FAIRNESS HEARING
What is a Fairness Hearing? The Court will hold a hearing to decide whether to approve the settlement. The Court will consider whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. The Court will also decide whether to approve the request for attorneys’ fees, costs, expenses and the recoveries by the named plaintiffs. If the Court approves the proposed settlement, it will affect all class members.
When and where is the hearing? The Hearing will be at 9 a.m. CDT on October 20, 2008, in the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro, 423 Frederica St, Owensboro, KY 42301, before the Honorable Joseph McKinley, Judge.
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Do I have to come to the hearing? May I or my lawyer speak at the hearing?
You may, but are not required, to attend the hearing. Class counsel will answer any questions the Court may have. You are welcome to come at your own expense. If you object to the settlement and you want to explain the objection to the Court, you can attend the hearing or hire your own lawyer to attend for you.

THE LAWYERS IN THIS CASE Who are the lawyers in this case?

The lawyers for the plaintiffs are:

Gregory A. Belzley DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 500 West Jefferson Street 1400 PNC PLAZA Louisville, KY 40202

Bart L. Greenwald FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202

The lawyers for the defendants are:

Stacey A. Blankenship Douglas Moore DENTON & KEULER P.O. Box 929 Paducah, KY 42002-0929

Michael Sullivan 100 St. Ann Building P.O. Box 727 Owensboro, KY 42302-0727

How will the plaintiffs’ lawyers be paid?
Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ fees and expenses will ﬁrst be paid from the settlement fund. The named plaintiffs believe that Plaintiffs’ Counsel are entitled to recoup their actual hourly fees and costs up to and including June 9, 2008, not to exceed $1.5 million, and any actual costs and attorney’s fees after that date. The named plaintiffs will also be paid from the settlement fund.
OTHER INFORMATION
If you wish to view the Court ﬁle or a copy of the proposed settlement agreement, you may go to the Clerk of the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro, 423 Frederica St, Owensboro, KY 42301, during regular business hours. You can also view the settlement papers on the web at www.turnersettlement.com.
To obtain more information or ask questions about the settlement, you can call the Claims Administrator toll-free at (866) 308-7614; write to the Claims Administrator at Turner Claims Administrator, P.O. Box 2002, Chanhassen, MN 55317-2002; or visit the Internet website at www.turnersettlement.com. On the website you will ﬁnd answers to frequently asked questions, a downloadable claim form, plus additional information that may help you determine if you are a Class Member.
Important: Please do not call the Court directly with questions about the settlement. Please contact the Claims Administrator or visit the website.

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