3:12-cv-03042-SEM-TSH # 1 Page 1 of 19

E-FILED

Thursday, 09 February, 2012 02:46:45 PM

Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JAMES FONTANO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

S.A. GODINEZ, Director of the

)

Illinois Department of Corrections;

)

ALEX DAWSON, Warden of Logan

)

Correctional Center; JOHN DOE, Assistant )

Warden of Operations at Logan Correctional )

Center;JOHN DOE, Assistant Warden of )

Programs at Logan Correctional Center; )

KEVIN STANDLEY; D. SIMMONS;

)

GARY BENDER; VILLA JENNINGS; )

B. CALL; OFFICER FISHEL;

)

and SALEH OBAISI,

)

)

Defendants.

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Case No. 3:12-cv-3042

COMPLAINT Plaintiff JAMES FONTANO, by his undersigned attorneys, for his complaint against Defendants S.A GODINEZ, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; ALEX DAWSON, Warden of Logan Correctional Center; JOHN DOE, Assistant Warden of Operations at Logan Correctional Center; JOHN DOE, Assistant Warden of Programs at Logan Correctional Center; LIEUTENANT KEVIN STANDLEY, Supervisory Officer at Logan Correctional Center; MAJOR D. SIMMONS, Supervisory Officer at Logan Correctional Center; VILLA JENNINGS, employee at Logan Correctional Center; B. CALL, employee at Logan Correctional Center; GARY BENDER, employee at Logan Correctional Center; OFFICER FISHEL, employee at Logan Correctional Center; and SALEH OBAISI, Medical Officer at Logan Correctional Center, alleges as follows:

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of Plaintiff‟s rights as secured by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted in this complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff James Fontano is a citizen of the State of Illinois. In August 2011, he was sexually and physically assaulted multiple times by his cellmate while in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections within the Central District of Illinois. He was thereafter disciplined and retaliated against for reporting the assaults. Plaintiff was released from custody on September 15, 2011, and he currently resides in the City of Chicago. 4. Defendant S.A. Godinez was the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections and maintained administrative and supervisory authority over the operations at Logan Correctional Center, where Plaintiff was housed at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Godinez failed to implement or administer adequate screening procedures in the allocation of inmate housing assignments at Logan Correctional Center. Godinez also facilitated or approved the unreliable investigative methods and unwarranted disciplinary charges taken in response to Plaintiff‟s report that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate. 5. Defendant Alex Dawson was the warden of Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Dawson failed to implement or administer adequate screening procedures in the allocation of inmate housing assignments at Logan Correctional
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Center. Dawson also facilitated or approved the unreliable investigative methods and unwarranted disciplinary charges taken in response to Plaintiff‟s report that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate.
6. Defendant John Doe was the assistant warden of operations at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Doe failed to implement or administer adequate screening procedures in the allocation of inmate housing assignments at Logan Correctional Center. Doe also facilitated or approved the unreliable investigative methods and unwarranted disciplinary charges taken in response to Plaintiff‟s report that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate.
7. Defendant John Doe was the assistant warden of programs at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Doe failed to implement or administer adequate screening procedures in the allocation of inmate housing assignments at Logan Correctional Center. Doe also facilitated or approved the unreliable investigative methods and unwarranted disciplinary charges taken in response to Plaintiff‟s report that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate.
8. Defendant Fishel was a correctional officer at Logan Correctional Center and in charge of inmate housing in the prison‟s reception area. Fishel failed to implement or administer adequate screening procedures in allocating Plaintiff‟s housing assignment.
9. Defendant Kevin Standley was a supervisory officer at Logan Correctional Center and a member of the prison‟s Internal Affairs Department at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Standley was in charge of investigating Plaintiff‟s report of sexual abuse. Standley intimidated and coerced Plaintiff to force him to retract the rape allegations. Standley also approved false charges against Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff‟s refusal to retract the allegations.
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10. Defendant Major D. Simmons was a supervisory officer at Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case. He approved the false disciplinary charges against Plaintiff recommended by Defendant Standley in the “Offender Disciplinary Report.”
11. Defendant B. Call was an employee at Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case. He approved the false disciplinary charges against Plaintiff recommended by Defendant Standley in the “Offender Disciplinary Report.”
12. Defendant Villa Jennings was an employee at Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case and a member of the prison‟s Adjustment Committee, which issued the “Final Summary Report” approving disciplinary measures against Plaintiff.
13. Defendant Gary Bender was an employee at Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case and a member of the prison Adjustment Committee, which issued the “Final Summary Report” approving disciplinary measures against Plaintiff.
14. Defendant Saleh Obaisi was a medical officer and physician at Logan Correctional Center at the time of the events giving rise to this case. Obaisi conducted an improper medical examination of Plaintiff and submitted a false medical report to prison officials. Obaisi facilitated the unlawful investigative methods and unwarranted disciplinary charges taken in response to Plaintiff‟s report that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate.
15. Each of the government-employed defendants is sued in his or her individual capacity. Each government-employed defendant acted within the scope of his or her employment. All defendants acted under the color of the laws, regulations, and customs of the State of Illinois. All of the defendants‟ actions constituted “state action” as defined under federal law.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS The Defendants Failed to Protect Plaintiff from a Known and Substantial Threat of Physical and Sexual Violence 16. On or about July 11, 2009, Plaintiff—a first-time offender with no prior contacts with the criminal justice system—was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to two years of probation. Plaintiff remained on probation until he was found to have violated one of the conditions of his release. In lieu of serving an extended term of supervised release, Plaintiff accepted a plea bargain of a one-year prison sentence, with the understanding that he would spend at most six months in prison on account of good time credits, and potentially as few as 60 days incarceration if he remained on good behavior and received early discharge due to prison overcrowding. Plaintiff also believed that he would spend the entirety of his sentence in a low-security work camp. 17. Upon his admission to the Illinois Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Plaintiff was housed at Pittsfield Work Camp at Jacksonville Correctional Center, a minimum security institution for low-level offenders. However, in March 2011, a month after entering Pittsfield, Plaintiff was charged with a minor disciplinary violation. Despite the minor nature of the charge, Plaintiff received a disciplinary transfer to Logan Correctional Center (“Logan CC”) in Lincoln, Illinois. There, Plaintiff was forced to spend 7 days in disciplinary segregation before being transferred to the prison‟s reception and classification area. 18. At the time he was transferred to Logan, Plaintiff, a twenty-year old white male, was 5‟7‟‟ tall and weighed approximately 150 pounds. He was a non-violent offender with no gang affiliations, expected to serve substantially less than one year in prison. He had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. Due to his youth, race, small size, lack of criminal
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history, lack of gang affiliation, and the fact that he had committed a non-violent offense, Plaintiff was a highly vulnerable inmate.
19. Plaintiff was particularly vulnerable in comparison to the rest of the prison population at Logan CC. Logan is a medium-security correctional facility that houses offenders convicted of the most serious crimes under Illinois law, including murder, rape, and armed robbery. Plaintiff‟s offense was trivial in comparison to the crimes for which most of Logan‟s two thousand inmates are incarcerated.
20. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Logan CC was administered and managed by the prison‟s warden, Defendant Dawson, the assistant warden of operations, John Doe, and the assistant warden of programs, John Doe. Defendant Godinez established and implemented policies and procedures regarding the operations of the entire DOC prison system, including Logan CC. As prison administrators, Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Doe, and Doe knew that inmate-on-inmate violence was a commonplace occurrence both in Logan CC and within the DOC generally, and that Logan CC was failing to properly address the problem. They obtained this knowledge both from their personal experience administering prisons within the Illinois system, and because such systematic failures had been widely reported over the past ten years by various advocacy and governmental organizations.
21. A 2001 study published by Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) reported on the pervasive problem of inmate-on-inmate rape in prisons throughout the United States, including in Illinois. See Human Rights Watch, No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons, April 2001 (available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/hrw/hrwmalerape0401.pdf) (hereinafter, “HRW Report”). The HRW Report determined that “rape and other sexual abuses occur in prison because correctional officials … do little to stop them from occurring,” for
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instance, by monitoring inmates and implementing prisoner classification polices that separate “dangerous prisoners from those whom they are likely to victimize.” Id. at 14. The Report found that “[i]n the worst cases, prisoners are actually placed in the same cell with inmates who are likely to victimize them.” Id. at 111. In advocating for stricter classification policies, HRW delineated several “risk factors” that make an inmate more likely to be targeted for sexual assault by other inmates, including an inmate‟s youth, small size, white racial identity, and lack of criminal history. Id. at 53-59. The HRW Report subsequently led Congress to pass the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA), legislation in which Congress acknowledged the prevalence of prison rape in U.S. institutions and recognized that “young first-time offenders are at increased risk of sexual victimization.” 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4).
22. The HRW Report findings were later confirmed by the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC), created by the PREA to investigate the incidence of prison rape in correctional facilities throughout the country. NPREC‟s 2009 report found that “youth, small stature, and lack of experience in correctional facilities appear to increase the risk of sexual abuse by other prisoners.” National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report, June 2009, at 7 (available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf). As a result, the NPREC concluded that prisons must conduct targeted risk assessments of “all incoming prisoners specifically for risk of sexual assault” and establish “baseline requirements for when and how to screen prisoners for risk of being a victim or perpetrator of sexual abuse.” Id. at 8.
23. On the state level, the Illinois DOC has also acknowledged the necessity of implementing classification standards to prevent violence and rape in correctional facilities. Minutes from a 2009 meeting of the Illinois Department of Corrections Adult Advisory Board show that the Department hired a consultant to review and revamp DOC‟s classification system,
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which had not been “looked at” in over 10 years. See Minutes, Adult Advisory Board Meeting, Illinois Department of Corrections, Kaskaskia Community College, Aug. 24, 2009; see also Minutes, Adult Advisory Board Meeting, Illinois Department of Corrections, Decatur Correctional Center, Oct. 25, 2010. Minutes from another board meeting in 2010 describe the Department‟s intent to develop a “strategic plan” to reorganize inmate placements according to inmates‟ “medical, educational, substance, security, and geriatric needs.” Minutes, Adult Advisory Board Meeting, Illinois Department of Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center, July 26, 2010 (emphasis added). Despite their actual knowledge of the need for strengthened classification and assignment procedures, Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Doe, and Doe continued to use the old, inadequate screening procedures at the time Plaintiff was transferred to Logan CC.
24. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, as a result both of their personal experience and well-publicized government policy-making efforts, Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Doe, and Doe knew that prison rape was an endemic problem within the State‟s prison system and that vulnerable inmates, like Plaintiff, were most at risk of being the victims of physical and sexual violence perpetrated by other inmates. They were also aware that in order to protect the prison‟s most vulnerable inmates, it was essential to take into account each inmate‟s age, physical size, offense of conviction, sentence, criminal record, and gang affiliation in assigning shared cells.
25. Despite their knowledge, and in violation of prevailing standards, the Defendants failed to implement screening and classification procedures designed to identify and protect atrisk inmates such as Plaintiff. Instead, the Defendants ignored Plaintiff‟s obvious vulnerability—described in paragraph 18—and, in April 2011, facilitated and approved
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Plaintiff‟s placement in a two-person cell with one Quentin Robinson, an imposing 185-pound violent offender and known Gangster Disciple affiliate, who was serving a twenty-year sentence for armed and aggravated battery and had a history of instituting fights within the prison. The cell assigned to Plaintiff and Robinson was located in the B-wing of X-house, the section of Logan CC reserved for gang-affiliated inmates with disciplinary problems, and known to be the most dangerous area in the entire prison. By their actions, the Defendants intentionally disregarded the known and substantial risk that Plaintiff would be harmed while in their custody.
26. Defendant Fishel, the officer in charge of allocating inmate housing assignments at Logan CC, knew the facts regarding Plaintiff‟s vulnerability, alleged above, and the obvious and substantial risks to Plaintiff of assigning him to share a cell with Robinson. Like Godinez, Dawson, Doe, and Doe, Fishel did not implement or follow procedures to prevent Plaintiff from being housed with an inmate who presented a known physical threat. In failing to do so, Fishel disregarded the known and substantial risk that Plaintiff would be physically and sexually assaulted by his cellmate.
27. As a direct result of these failures in both policy and practice, Plaintiff was physically beaten and raped multiple times by Robinson.
28. On or about August 3, 2011, Plaintiff was alone in his locked cell until 10:15 p.m., at which time Robinson returned to the cell. Plaintiff and Robinson went to bed at approximately 12 a.m. Shortly after, Robinson came over to Plaintiff‟s bed, told him to “get up and drop „em,” and anally raped and beat him. The following day, on or about August 4th, Plaintiff attempted to transfer cells through the prison‟s housing placement office without reporting the rape. The request was denied. On or about the night of August 4th, Robinson again assaulted Plaintiff, raping him, beating him, and forcing him to perform oral sex. The next
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day, on or about August 5th, while Plaintiff was in his unlocked cell preparing to attend his G.E.D. class, Robinson once again attempted to rape Plaintiff. In order to evade Robinson‟s advances, Plaintiff ran from the cell yelling. Later that day, Plaintiff became afraid to return to his cell and so informed a correctional officer that he had been raped multiple times by Robinson. Plaintiff told the officer that he did not feel safe in his cell.
Plaintiff Was Subjected to Unlawful Retaliation for Exercising His Constitutional Right to Report a Grievance 29. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, the Defendants knew that Logan and the DOC generally did not maintain adequate policies or procedures for dealing with victims of inmate rape. The previously-described HRW Report found that a “central problem with regard to sexual abuse in prison…is the inadequate—and in many instances, callous and irresponsible—response of correctional staff to complaints of rape.” HRW Report at 15. In this regard, the Report emphasized: When an inmate informs an officer that he has been threatened with rape or, even worse, actually assaulted, it is crucial that his complaint be met with a rapid and effective response. Most obviously, he should be brought somewhere where his safety is protected and where he can explain his complaint in a confidential manner. If the rape has already occurred, he should be taken for whatever medical care may be needed and—a step that is crucial for any potential criminal prosecution—where physical evidence of rape can be collected. Id. The HRW Report determined, however, that this proper response was uncommon in most institutions, and that instead, prisons often isolate the victim, locking him in segregative custody rather than instituting adequate internal disciplinary proceedings or facilitating an external criminal prosecution against the offender. Id. at 15. 30. At the time Plaintiff reported his own rape, these same problems existed at Logan CC. Upon reporting the attacks, Plaintiff was placed in segregation, subjected to disciplinary
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proceedings, and punished. He was not given proper medical care, and his complaint was never referred to local law enforcement for further legal action.
31. Instead, after reporting the rapes, Plaintiff was transferred to the segregation unit within the prison infirmary. Once in the infirmary, Defendant Obaisi, the prison‟s doctor and medical officer, performed a faulty medical examination and rape kit on Plaintiff. Despite the fact that Plaintiff had been anally raped several times in the previous three days, attacks that left seminal fluid in Plaintiff‟s rectum, Obaisi reported to prison authorities that he could find “no trauma” or other physical evidence on Plaintiff‟s body to suggest rape. Obaisi also placed the sterile test kit swabs directly on the unsterile countertop, told inappropriate jokes throughout the examination, and accused Plaintiff of lying about being assaulted. By failing to provide Plaintiff with proper medical treatment and submitting a false report to prison authorities, Obaisi facilitated, approved, and promoted the Defendants‟ scheme to retaliate against Plaintiff and deprive him of his constitutional rights.
32. Following Obaisi‟s examination, Defendant Standley was assigned to investigate Plaintiff‟s allegations of sexual assault. On or about August 7th, Standley conducted a one-onone interview with Plaintiff. During this interview, Standley threatened Plaintiff that he would receive additional prison time if he refused to retract the allegations. Fearing for his safety if he was forced to endure additional incarceration, Plaintiff withdrew his accusations against Robinson. However, after Standley left Plaintiff‟s presence, Plaintiff re-asserted the allegations, telling his prison counselor that he had in fact been raped multiple times by Robinson. During the remainder of his incarceration, Plaintiff continued to maintain that he had been raped by his cellmate.
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33. After Plaintiff was released from Logan CC, Robinson was himself transferred from the prison. On information and belief, Robinson‟s transfer was punishment for assaulting Plaintiff. However, in the month following the attacks, while Plaintiff was still incarcerated at Logan CC, the Defendants failed to take any disciplinary action against Robinson. At no point in time did prison authorities report the incident to local law enforcement authorities or the office of the local State‟s Attorney. Instead, Standley and unknown prison officials administered a polygraph examination to Robinson, during which Robinson lied and denied that he had sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Standley and the officers who administered the polygraph reported that Robinson had tested truthful. Standley refused to allow Plaintiff to take a polygraph examination, though Plaintiff asked to do so.
34. Standley used the unreliable results from Robinson‟s polygraph examination to threaten Plaintiff with over five months of additional incarceration. On or about August 18th, Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket and offense report, authored by Standley and approved by Defendants Simmons and Call, charging Plaintiff with “impeding or interfering with an investigation” and “giving false information to an employee.” Offender Disc. Report (attached as Ex. A). Standley based these findings on the “lack of physical evidence, conflicting statements, [and] Deception Detection Test results.” Id. In reality, the “lack of physical evidence” was a result of improper collection procedures by Defendant Obaisi; Plaintiff‟s allegedly “conflicting” statements were obtained by Standley‟s intimidation tactics; and the “Deception Detection Test” results were the result of an unreliable and false polygraph examination.
35. On or about August 26th, Plaintiff was found guilty of the charges set forth in Standley‟ s false disciplinary report by the Adjustment Committee, headed by Defendant
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Dawson and including Defendants Jennings and Bender. The Committee placed Plaintiff on “BGrade” disciplinary status and ordered him to complete two months of segregation. See Final Summary Report (attached as Ex. B).
36. On or about August 11, 2011, Defendant Dawson was informed in a written letter from Plaintiff‟s counsel that Plaintiff had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate and that he was being disciplined by prison officials for reporting the assaults. After Plaintiff was attacked, Dawson also spoke directly with Plaintiff and Plaintiff‟s parents about Plaintiff‟s rape allegations. Despite his actual knowledge that Plaintiff had consistently alleged that he was raped, and despite having both the power and opportunity to intervene to protect Plaintiff from ongoing retaliation, Dawson failed to prevent Plaintiff from being subject to retribution or discipline the other Defendants under his command for their unlawful conduct. Instead, Dawson approved the disciplinary charges against Plaintiff and took concerted action to conceal both Robinson‟s crimes and his subordinate officers‟ retaliatory actions.
37. On or about August 12, 2011, Defendant Godinez was also informed in a written letter from Plaintiff‟s counsel that Plaintiff had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate and that he was being disciplined by prison officials for reporting the assaults. Despite his actual knowledge that Plaintiff had consistently alleged that he was raped, and despite having both the power and opportunity to intervene to protect Plaintiff from ongoing retaliation, Godinez failed to prevent Plaintiff from being subject to retribution or discipline the other Defendants under his command for their unlawful conduct.
38. Though a victim of a violent crime, the Defendants punished Plaintiff by keeping him in segregation throughout the entire month following the assaults. While in segregation, Plaintiff was not allowed access to writing materials, he was prevented from finishing his G.E.D.
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course (though he had been scheduled to take the exam one week after he was attacked), and he was allowed to wash only once every 7 days. Most egregiously, Plaintiff was initially prevented from seeing his parents, who did not find out that Plaintiff had been sexually abused until well after the attack.
39. After being placed in segregation, Plaintiff drafted journal entries describing the events alleged above. However, unknown prison employees confiscated his personal papers. Plaintiff‟s journal detailing these events was not returned to Plaintiff upon his release from prison, nor has it been returned as of the date of the filing of this complaint. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff‟s journal remains in the custody of Logan CC officials.
40. Prior to his release from Logan CC, Plaintiff was not allowed to pack his own belongings. Prison officials packed Plaintiff‟s personal effects, as well as those of Robinson, who was transferred on or about the same date that Plaintiff was released. In the course of packing Plaintiff‟s and Robinson‟s effects, unknown prison employees placed Plaintiff‟s items, including a Bible that contained all of Plaintiff‟s personal and family contact information, in Robinson‟s bag. Robinson has since used this information to repeatedly place harassing phone calls to Plaintiff‟s friends and family.
PLAINTIFF’S DAMAGES 41. Plaintiff has suffered serious injury as a direct and proximate result of the misconduct of the Defendants alleged in the preceding paragraphs. Because the Defendants failed to institute proper inmate screening processes and maintain adequate housing procedures, Plaintiff was the victim of a series of violent sexual assaults while in the Defendants‟ custody. 42. In the immediate aftermath of these assaults, rather than receiving proper medical care, emotional support, and access to the appropriate legal resources, Plaintiff was subjected to
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intimidation and unwarranted disciplinary action by the Defendants. Plaintiff was punished merely for asserting his rights as a victim of a violent crime.
43. As a result of the Defendants‟ wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered severe physical and emotional trauma. Plaintiff was victimized twice—first, as a result of the Defendants‟ failure to protect him from serious physical injury and, second, as a result of the Defendants‟ attempts to suppress and conceal the incident by engaging in acts of retaliation and intimidation. Plaintiff continues to suffer from humiliation, depression, rage, anxiety, panic attacks, insomnia, and post-traumatic stress.
COUNT I Failure to Protect in Violation of the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. §1983 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 45. Count I is alleged against Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Doe, Doe, and Fishel. 46. Under settled United States Supreme Court authority, and in accordance with the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff is entitled to be free from a known and unreasonable risk of serious harm while in the custody of the State. 47. In violation of Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment rights, Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Doe, Doe, and Fishel knew and consciously disregarded the substantial risk that Plaintiff would be injured while in custody at Logan Correctional Center. The Defendants, acting individually and in conspiracy, failed to employ adequate screening procedures for assigning inmates to cells, despite the significant and obvious risk that Plaintiff, a vulnerable inmate, would be subjected to serious harm by his cellmate, a serious offender with a history of violence.
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48. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants‟ failure to protect Plaintiff by implementing adequate classification and screening procedures, Plaintiff was unlawfully subjected to an unreasonable risk of serious harm and suffered damages.
COUNT II Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 50. Count II is alleged against all named defendants. 51. The Defendants, individually and in conspiracy, violated Plaintiff‟s First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments rights by subjecting him to retaliation for exercising his constitutional right to report a personal grievance to prison authorities. The Defendants subjected Plaintiff to threats, intimidation, and internal disciplinary procedures in order to retaliate against him for reporting a series of sexual assaults and to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing the allegations. 52. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants‟ retaliatory actions, Plaintiff suffered damages.
COUNT III Civil Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 54. Count III is alleged against all named defendants.
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55. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants and other co-conspirators not yet known to Plaintiff acted in concert with one another to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means.
56. The Defendants and other co-conspirators not yet known to Plaintiff reached an agreement among themselves to both deprive Plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable harm and subject him to unlawful retaliation, in violation of his constitutional rights, in the manner described above.
57. In furtherance of this conspiracy, and as set forth in the complaint above, each of the co-conspirators committed overt acts and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity.
58. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit agreement referenced above, Plaintiff‟s rights were violated and he suffered damages.
COUNT IV Failure to Intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 60. Count IV is alleged against all named defendants. 61. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants (and other as-yet-unknown individuals) knew that Plaintiff‟s rights were being violated, had the realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent or stop the constitutional misconduct alleged above, and failed to do so. 62. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally and with willful indifference to Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights.
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63. As a result of the Defendants‟ failure to intervene, Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights were violated and he suffered damages.
COUNT V State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 64. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 65. Count V is alleged against all named defendants. 66. The acts of the Defendants as set forth above were both extreme and outrageous. The Defendants intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the probability that they would cause, severe emotional distress to Plaintiff. 67. The misconduct described above was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to Plaintiff‟s rights. 68. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct described above, Plaintiff‟s rights were violated and he suffered damages.
COUNT VI State Law Claim for Civil Conspiracy 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 70. Count VI is alleged against all named defendants. 71. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendants and other co-conspirators not yet known to Plaintiff acted in concert with one another to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means.
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72. In furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable harm and retaliation while in State custody, the Defendants and other unknown coconspirators committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity.
73. The misconduct described above was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to Plaintiff‟s rights.
74. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit agreement referenced above, Plaintiff‟s rights were violated and he suffered damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff James Fontano prays that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, costs and attorneys‟ fees, and punitive damages against each of the Defendants in their individual capacities, and for such further additional relief as this court may deem appropriate and just.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted, JAMES FONTANO By: /s/ Alexa Van Brunt
One of his attorneys
Locke E. Bowman Alexa Van Brunt Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-1336
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E-FILED
Monday, 28 March, 2016 03:43:06 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES FONTANO, Plaintiff,
v.
S.A. GODINEZ, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No.: 12-3042-SEM-TSH ) ) ) ) )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Defendants’ motion is denied because genuine

issues of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment in

Defendants Alex Dawson’s and Kevin Standley’s favor.

The basic facts of this case are as follows. Plaintiff James

Fontano began serving a term of imprisonment with the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) in February 2011. Fontano has

since been released from IDOC’s custody. Fontano was first

assigned to the Jacksonville Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”) but

was transferred to the Logan Correctional Center (“Logan”) after

spending only two weeks at Jacksonville.

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Logan was a medium security prison in 2011 which is one step above a minimum security prison. Fontano was assigned to B wing, cell 54 in the X house at Logan.
After about a month at Logan, Fontano’s cellmate began making physical contact with him in the form of slapping his buttocks and attempting to massage his shoulders. Fontano informed his cellmate that he was not interested in receiving such physical contact from him. Fontano reported to Officer Riggins that his cellmate had been touching his buttocks, and Officer Riggins referred Fontano to Internal Affairs.
Defendant Lt. Kevin Standley was in charge of Internal Affairs at Logan during the relevant time. After Fontano reported the incident with his cellmate to Lt. Standley, Lt. Standley told Fontano that he could walk himself to segregation to get out of his cell and away from his cellmate. Fontano did not want to go voluntarily to segregation for the fear that he would have an additional fifteen (15) days added to his sentence.
Thereafter, Fontano’s cellmate continued to try to rub Fontano’s shoulders or would attempt to make some sort of physical contact with him on a periodic basis. Fontano spoke with
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Lt. Standley for a second time, but no action was taken by Lt. Standley. Fontano did not present himself to segregation after reporting, for a second time, the physical contact from his cellmate.
On August 5, 2011, Fontano reported to Officer McKinney that he had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate. Officer McKinney took Fontano to the Health Care Unit to be examined and to receive medical attention as needed. While at the Health Care Unit, Fontano reported to Lt. Standley that his cellmate had sexually assaulted him.
On August 6, 2011, Dr. Ashley determined that Fontano should be placed on crises watch. Logan does not have a protective custody unit, and so, inmates who require segregation and who are in distress are generally housed in the Health Care Unit. Fontano remained in the Health Care Unit for an extended period of time.
On August 18, Fontano received a disciplinary ticket for providing false information regarding his alleged sexual assault. The adjustment committee recommended a finding of guilty on this disciplinary ticket because Fontano admitted to recanting his rape allegations, because Fontano’s cellmate passed a lie detector test, and because Fontano’s physical examination was inconsistent with
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Fontano’s rape allegations. Fontano clams that he was threatened and coerced into recanting his story and that the investigation was flawed and conducted in a biased, retaliatory manner. Ultimately, Fontano was found guilty on the disciplinary ticket and was given segregation time.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995). The moving party has the burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which demonstrates that there is a
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genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. The “‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999).
Finally, a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to oppose successfully a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “This standard applies when cross motions for summary judgment
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are filed” as they are here. Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2004).
III. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT In conjunction with filing his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Fontano filed a stipulation to dismiss. In this stipulation, Fontano agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, to dismiss Defendants Simmons, Bender, Jennings, Call, and Fishel with prejudice. Fontano also agreed to dismiss his failure to protect claim (Count I) against Defendant Alex Dawson who was the Warden at Logan. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendants Simmons, Bender, Jennings, Call, and Fishel from this case. In addition, the “John Doe Defendants” are terminated from this case. Fontano has not moved to substitute the true identity of the John Doe Defendants, and the time to do so has expired. Therefore, they are dismissed as parties to this case. A. Questions of fact exist on Fontano’s retaliation claim. That leaves Warden Dawson and Lt. Standley against whom Fontano has asserted five claims. Defendants argue that they are
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entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that Fontano was not placed in segregation because he made a report of a sexual assault. On the contrary, Defendants claim that Fontano was placed into segregation because he made a false statement and provided false information during the investigation of his sexual assault claims.
“An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). “Otherwise permissible actions by prison officials can become impermissible if done for retaliatory reasons.” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir 2000). In order to state a claim for retaliation for exercising one’s First Amendment right, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he has suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor” behind the retaliatory actions. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
“A ‘motivating factor’ in this context ‘is a factor that weighs in [on] the defendant’s decision to take the action complained of-in other words, it is a consideration present to his mind that favors,
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that pushes him toward action.” Dace v. Smith-Vasquez, 658 F. Supp. 2d 865, 881 (S.D. Ill. 2009)(quoting Hasan v. United States Dept. of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff may demonstrate that his speech was a motivating factor behind the defendant’s retaliatory actions by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2012). “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption.” Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. College, 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation omitted). Direct evidence is rare and is something along the lines of a direct admission. Naficy v. Illinois Dept. of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 512 (7th Cir. 2012); Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008).
On the other hand, “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . is evidence from which a trier of fact may infer that retaliation occurred.” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966. “Circumstantial evidence may include suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior towards or comments directed at other[s] . . . .” Long v. Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of Illinois, 585 F.3d 344, 350 (7th Cir.
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2009). Regardless of whether the plaintiff offers direct or circumstantial evidence, “[t]o demonstrate the requisite causal connection in a retaliation claim, [a] plaintiff[] must show that the protected activity and the adverse action are not wholly unrelated.” Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000). “If he can show that retaliatory animus was a factor, then the burden shifts to the defendants to prove that the same actions would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct.” Soto v. Bertrand, 2009 WL 1220753, * 1 (7th Cir. 2009).
Fontano has presented sufficient evidence with which to create a question of fact regarding Defendants’ motive for placing him into segregation. Fontano has offered evidence that Lt. Standley threatened him and demanded that Fontano drop or recant his allegations that he had been raped. When Fontano would not do so, Lt. Standley conducted a flawed investigation of the rape allegation and approved Fontano’s placement into segregation. Lt. Standley claims that placement in Logan’s segregation that was at the prison’s Health Care Unit was not punitive in nature. However, that question is best left for the jury to decide in this case.
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Finally, Fontano has offered evidence that at least raises a question of fact regarding the thoroughness of Lt. Standley’s investigation into his rape allegations. This evidence when paired with the timing of Fontano’s placement into segregation precludes summary judgment in Lt. Standley’s favor on Fontano’s retaliation claim against him.
Similarly, issues of fact preclude summary judgment in Warden Dawson’s favor. According to Fontano, Warden Dawson approved Lt. Standley’s flawed investigation of his rape allegations, ignored evidence that Fontano had been threatened into recanting his allegations of rape, and approved Fontano’s placement into segregation even though Warden Dawson knew that the discipline was unwarranted. Fontano claims that Warden Dawson took these actions in order to conceal Lt. Standley’s and his own misdeeds with regard to Fontano’s rape allegations and their unresponsiveness to his claims.
In short, Fontano’s evidence raises a question of fact regarding Lt. Standley’s and Warden Dawson’s motives regarding Fontano’s rape allegations and Fontano’s placement into segregation. Motive is generally a question that must be decided by the jury. Davison v.
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International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 627, 2015 WL 753545, * 6 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2015)(“summary judgment is typically inappropriate for resolving questions of a party’s motive or intent; this is also question of fact for the jury.”); Ashman v. Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to Fontano’s claim that Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. B. Questions of fact exist on Fontano’s failure to intervene
claim. Questions of fact also exist on Fontano’s claim that Lt. Standley and Warden Dawson violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene on his behalf to protect him from his cellmate. “In failure to protect cases, a prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Seventh Circuit has held: Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
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other prisoners. An inmate can prevail on a claim that a prison official failed to protect him if the official showed deliberate indifference; that is, that the defendant was subjectively aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. To make a guard subjectively aware of a serious risk of attack, the inmate must communicate a specific and credible danger. But even when he is aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, a prison guard is not liable if he responds reasonably to the risk, whether or not his response ultimately prevents the harm.
Gidarisingh v. Pollard, 2014 WL 3511697, * 3 (7th Cir. July 17,
2014)(internal quotations and citations omitted). “Once prison
officials know about a serious risk of harm, they have an obligation
to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d
563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008)(internal quotation omitted). “If prison
officials are aware of a serious threat and do nothing, that is
deliberate indifference.” Gidarisingh, 2014 WL 3511697 at * 4.
However, “a general risk of violence in a maximum security
unit does not by itself establish knowledge of a substantial risk of
harm.” Shields, 664 F.3d at 181. A state actor who fails to
intervene to prevent other state actors from infringing upon the
constitutional rights of citizens may be held liable under § 1983 if
the state actor: (1) had reason to know that a constitutional
violation had been committed and (2) had a realistic opportunity to
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intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 37 F.34d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 2001).
Here, Fontano has offered sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on his claim that Lt. Standley and Warden Dawson failed to intervene on his behalf in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Fontano reveals that both Lt. Standley and Warden Dawson were participants in investigating Fontano’s rape allegations and in disciplining him for providing false statements. Neither took any action(s) to prevent the other from violating Fontano’s Constitutional rights by stopping the other from retaliating against Fontano and unjustly disciplining him. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied on Fontano’s failure to intervene claim. C. Questions of fact exist on Fontano’s conspiracy claims.
Summary judgment is also denied on Fontano’s conspiracy claims under both federal and Illinois laws. As for his federal conspiracy claim, Fontano “must present facts showing that these defendants had an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights and further prove an actual deprivation of rights arising from
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overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.” Jones v. St. Clair Cty., 2016 WL 759556, * 1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2016)(citing Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988)). An agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence as long as the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that a meeting of the minds had occurred and the parties had an understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2002).
As for his conspiracy claim under Illinois law, Fontano must demonstrate: “(1) an agreement between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means; and (2) at least one tortious act by one of the co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement that caused an injury to the plaintiff. Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 2007)(citing McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill.2d 102, 720 N.E.2d 242, 258 241 Ill. Dec. 787 (Ill. 1999). “The agreement is a necessary and important element of this cause of action.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “A defendant who innocently performs an act which happens to fortuitously further the tortious purpose of another is not liable
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under the theory of civil conspiracy.” Adcock v. Brakegate, 164 Ill.2d 54, 645 N.E.2d 888, 894, 206 Ill. Dec. 636, (Ill. 1994).
Sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Warden Dawson and Lt. Standley agreed with one another to deprive Fontano of his constitutional rights and to inflict injury upon him. For example, Warden Dawson acknowledged during his deposition that he assigned Lt. Standley to perform the investigation of Fontano’s rape allegations, and Warden Dawson also participated in the early stages of the investigation. Warden Dawson also approved Lt. Standley’s investigation.
As the head of Internal Affairs, Lt. Standley had an obligation to conduct a thorough and fair investigation and to report his findings to Warden Dawson. Fontano claims that Lt. Standley did not conduct a fair and unbiased investigation but conducted one that sought to conceal his and Warden Dawson’s violation of his rights. Specifically, Warden Dawson and Lt. Standley agreed to conceal the shoddy investigation by punishing and disciplining Fontano for alleging that he had been raped.
Based upon this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants conspired against Fontano in violation of both his
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federal rights and rights under Illinois law. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Fontano’s conspiracy
claims is denied.
D. Questions of fact preclude summary judgment on Fontano’s emotional distress claim.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Fontano’s claim
under Illinois law of the intentional infliction of emotional distress is
also denied. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has recently explained:
To survive summary judgment on an IIED claim under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant intended that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress, or knew that there was at least a high probability that the conduct would inflict severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress. Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001)(citing McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988)). IIED requires more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” McGrath, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d at 809 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Illinois law, one factor that influences the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct is the degree of power or authority that the actor has over the plaintiff. Id. at 809–10.
Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 851552, * 9 (7th
Cir. Mar. 4, 2016).
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Retaliating against an individual for reporting a sexual assault satisfies the standard of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law. E.g., Thomas v. Habitat Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002)(holding that the “entire course” of retaliatory conduct taken against plaintiff for reporting sexual harassment was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). A reasonable jury could conclude based upon Fontano’s testimony and his expert’s testimony that Fontano suffered severe emotional distress. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Fontano suffered this severe emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ retaliation and attempts to conceal their misdeeds after Fontano reported his allegations of rape. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied. E. Defendants are not immune from suit.
Finally, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the doctrine of qualified immunity. As for Defendants’ arguments based upon sovereign, those arguments are directed towards Fontano’s failure
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to protect claim. Fontano has dismissed his failure to protect claim. Therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapposite.
As for Defendants’ arguments based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity, the law was established long before the incident in this case that a state official may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising his Constitutional rights. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 276 (7th Cir. 1996). As explained supra, questions of fact preclude summary judgment on Fontano’s claims, and questions of fact also preclude summary judgment on whether Defendants’ actions would entitle them to qualified immunity. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendants Simmons, Bender, Jennings, Call, and Fishel from this case.
2. The Clerk of the Court is also directed to terminate the “John Doe Defendants” from this case.
3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [98] is DENIED.
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4. This case will proceed to trial against Defendants Alex Dawson and Kevin Stanley on the following claims asserted by Plaintiff:
a. Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights;
b. Defendants failed to intervene on his behalf in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights;
c. Defendants conspired against him in violation of his federal constitutional rights;
d. Defendants conspired against him in violation of his rights under Illinois law; and
e. Defendants inflicted emotional distress upon him in violation of rights under Illinois law.
5. A final pretrial conference is set for May 9, 2016, at 9:30 a.m.
6. Trial is set for June 14, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. 7. The Parties are reminded of their obligation to file a proposed Final Pretrial Order that complies with the Local Rules.
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ENTERED this 28 day of March, 2016 ___/s Sue E. Myerscough___________ SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 E-FILED
Wednesday, 27 June, 2012 04:40:26 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JAMES FONTANO, Plaintiff,
v.
S.A. GODINEZ, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) 12-CV-3042 ) ) )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Plaintiff, a former inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections,

pursues claims arising from alleged assaults by his former cellmate and

alleged retaliation against Plaintiff for reporting the assaults. All

Defendants have been served and have appeared through counsel.

Accordingly, the status conference set for July 2, 2012 will be cancelled in

lieu of this order, which rules on Defendants’ motions to dismiss and sets

scheduling deadlines.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

Federal notice pleading requires a “short and plain statement of the

1

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations must give enough detail to give “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))(add’l citation omitted). The factual “allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged . . . . Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
Allegations The Court recounts only those allegations necessary to resolve the pending motions to dismiss.
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In or around April, 2011, Plaintiff began serving a one-year sentence for parole violations. He was housed at the Pittsfield Work Camp at Jacksonville Correctional Center, a minimum security prison where he understood he would be spending his entire sentence. However, the next month he was transferred to Logan Correctional Center, a medium security prison, due to an alleged minor disciplinary charge.
At Logan Correctional Center, Plaintiff was placed in a wing “reserved for gang-affiliated inmates with disciplinary problems, and known to be the most dangerous area in the entire prison.” (Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 25). Plaintiff’s young age, Caucasian race, slight size, lack of gang affiliation, relative lack of criminal history, and inexperience with the prison setting allegedly made him a prime target for assault by other inmates. Despite Plaintiff’s obvious and known vulnerability, he was assigned to a cell with “an imposing 185-pound violent offender and known Gangster Disciple affiliate, who was serving a twenty-year sentence for armed and aggravated battery and had a history of
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instituting fights within the prison.” (Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 25).
On or about August 3 and 4, 2011, Plaintiff’s cellmate beat and
raped Plaintiff multiple times. The cellmate attempted to rape Plaintiff
again on August 5, 2011, but Plaintiff was able to run away and report
the assaults to officers. (Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 28).
Plaintiff’s report of the assaults allegedly set off a concerted effort
by Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff and to conceal the assaults.
The alleged retaliation and cover-up included intimidating Plaintiff into
recanting, accusing and punishing Plaintiff for purportedly lying about
the assault, refusing to allow Plaintiff to take a polygraph, and relying on
false and unreliable polygraph results.
Defendant Dr. Obaisi conducted a medical examination on Plaintiff
in response to Plaintiff’s report of the assaults. Dr. Obaisi allegedly:
performed a faulty medical examination and rape kit on Plaintiff. Despite the fact that Plaintiff had been anally raped several times in the previous three days, attacks that left seminal fluid in Plaintiff’s rectum, Obaisi reported to prison authorities that he could find “no trauma” or other physical evidence on Plaintiff’s body to suggest rape. Obaisi also placed sterile test kit swabs directly on the unsterile countertop, told inappropriate jokes throughout the
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examination, and accused Plaintiff of lying about being assaulted. By failing to provide Plaintiff with proper medical treatment and submitting a false report to prison authorities, Obaisi facilitated, approved, and promoted the Defendants’ scheme to retaliate against Plaintiff and deprive him of his constitutional rights.
(Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 31).
Plaintiff filed this case in February, 2012, pursuing six claims. The
first four claims are federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: failure to
protect; retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights; civil
conspiracy; and, failure to intervene. The other two claims are state law
claims: intentional infliction of emotional distress and state law civil
conspiracy.
ANALYSIS
I. The determination of whether state sovereign immunity bars the state law claims against the IDOC Defendants is premature. Therefore, the IDOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied (d/e 19).
Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Jennings, Call, Standley, Fishel,
Bender, and Simmons (the "IDOC Defendants") argue that state
sovereign immunity bars the state claims from proceeding against them in
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any court except the Illinois Court of Claims. They cite 705 ILCS 505/8(d), which, in relevant part, grants the Illinois Court of Claims “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear state tort claims against the State.
Reasonable minds might debate whether Defendants’ argument is a jurisdictional one or an affirmative defense subject to waiver, but the debate will not affect the outcome here since Defendants have not waived the argument. Compare Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 518 (7th Cir. 2012)(district court did not err in retaining jurisdiction over state law claims against state employee because Rodriguez “makes clear that a state employee’s sovereign-immunity defense does not impact a federal court’s jurisdiction over a case.”), with Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2002)(concluding that district court “improperly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction” over state law negligence claim against state employee because Illinois law granted exclusive jurisdiction to Illinois Court of Claims), and Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001)(Illinois statutes “vest[] jurisdiction over state tort claims against the state in the Illinois Court of Claims.”); Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill.2d
6

302, 310 (2004)(“[A]ll claims against the state for damages sounding in
tort must be brought in the Court of Claims—no other tribunal,
including our circuit courts, has jurisdiction of any such claim.”). Either
way, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s state law tort claims
against the individual Defendants are essentially claims against the State
of Illinois. If they are, the claims must be dismissed.
“[S]tate immunity rules apply to . . . state law claims in federal court.” Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001). A state
law claim against a state employee is essentially a claim against the State
of Illinois when:
there are (1) no allegations an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of state employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within the employee's normal and official functions of the State . . . .
Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295 (1990)(citing appellate court). Also
relevant is whether a “‘judgment for the plaintiff could operate to control
the actions of the State or subject it to liability.’” Richman v. Sheahan,
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270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001). “Sovereign immunity affords no protection, however, when it is alleged that the State's agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit court.” Healy, 133 Ill.2d 295, 375 (1990).
Reciting these standards is easier than applying them. For example, the Seventh Circuit has found that state law claims are effectively against the State in cases involving malicious prosecution, negligent exposure to electrical wires, high speed police pursuits, and restraining an individual during a court hearing pursuant to a judge’s order. See, e.g., Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009)(malicious prosecution claim); Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2002)(prisoner’s exposure to electrical wires); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001)(restraint during court hearing); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high-speed police chase). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has also remarked that federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against prosecutors in their personal capacities.
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Rodriguez v. Cook County, Ill., 664 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court has noted that state sovereign immunity does not protect state employees from state law claims arising from acts that violate constitutional or statutory law. See, e.g., Healy, 133 Ill.2d 295; Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill.2d 302 (2004)(state sovereign immunity did not apply to state law civil conspiracy claim against individual state employees, where employees allegedly violated state law by making false accusations against Plaintiff to Illinois State Police); see also Stevens v. Dewitt County, 2012 WL 1066890 * 7 (C.D. Ill. 2012, Judge Myerscough)(not reported in F.Supp.2d)(declining to dismiss state law malicious prosecution claim on state sovereign immunity grounds, with leave to renew the argument at summary judgment).
Given the above discussion, the Court believes that this issue should be decided on a more developed record and more thorough briefing. Accordingly, Defendants motion will be denied with leave to renew at the summary judgment stage. II. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state claims against
Defendant Dr. Obaisi under federal notice pleading standards.
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Accordingly, Dr. Obaisi’s motion to dismiss will be denied. A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim A First Amendment retaliation claim requires an “activity protected by the First Amendment,” a “deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future,” and, a motive to inflict that deprivation because of the First Amendment activity. Gomez v. Randle, — F.3d —, 2012 WL 1660975 * 6 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal cites and quotations omitted). Dr. Obaisi argues that the retaliation claim against him must be dismissed because “nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff’s reporting of the rape incident was a substantial or motivating factor behind any of Dr. Obaisi’s alleged conduct.” (d/e 25, p. 5). The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that “[b]y failing to provide Plaintiff with proper medical treatment and submitting a false report to prison authorities, Obaisi facilitated, approved, and promoted the Defendants’ scheme to retaliate against Plaintiff and deprive him of his constitutional rights” to report the assaults. (Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 31). In the Court’s
10

opinion, these allegations are sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Dr. Obaisi.
Dr. Obaisi contends that no allegations suggest that he was aware of Plaintiff’s report of the assaults, but a plausible inference of knowledge arises based on Dr. Obaisi’s purported examination in response to that report. Dr. Obaisi further advances that Plaintiff “does not allege that the [seminal] fluid was still present when Obaisi examined him . . . .” (d/e 25, p. 6). However, Plaintiff specifically alleges that “[d]espite the fact that Plaintiff had been anally raped several times in the previous three days, attacks that left seminal fluid in Plaintiff’s rectum, Obaisi reported to prison authorities that he could find ‘no trauma’ or other physical evidence on Plaintiff’s body to suggest rape.” (Complaint, d/e 1, ¶ 31). These allegations imply that seminal fluid still existed in Plaintiff’s rectum at the time of the examination. In any event, the time for arguing inferences is at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Obaisi intentionally and knowingly failed to document existing physical evidence of Plaintiff’s rape to help cover up the rape and to
11

retaliate against Plaintiff for reporting the assaults. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)(“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). A developed factual record will reveal whether the evidence supports these allegations .
B. Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine Dr. Obaisi argues that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against him. “[U]nder the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine a conspiracy cannot exist solely between members of the same entity.” Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 184 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 1999)(citing Wright v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Services, 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (7th Cir.1994))(“‘managers of a corporation jointly pursuing its lawful business do not become “conspirators” when acts within the scope of their employment are said to be discriminatory or retaliatory.’”)(quoted cite omitted). However, Plaintiff correctly points out that Dr. Obaisi works for a different entity than the other Defendants. Dr. Obaisi is employed by
12

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., not the State of Illinois. Dr. Obaisi cites no legal support for his assertion that he was an “agent” of the Illinois Department of Corrections or that he should be considered part of the same “entity” as the other Defendants for purposes of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The case he cites, Wright v. DCFS, 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (1994), involved employees of the same state agency–the “same collective entity.” Accordingly, the Court need not reach the debate over whether the doctrine would apply if Dr. Obaisi and the other Defendants were actually employed by the same entity.
Dr. Obaisi also argues that Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Obaisi knowingly and intentionally created a false medical report in order to help the other Defendants cover up those assaults and retaliate against Plaintiff for bringing those assaults to light.1 See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012)(conspiracy claim stated
1According to response to the motion to dismiss, “Dr. Obaisi conducted an intentionally substandard physical examination and drafted a false medical report in order to conceal evidence of the rapes; that Dr. Obaisi then gave this report to prison authorities, knowing it would be used in an investigation of Mr. Fontano’s allegations.” (d/e 26, p. 9).
13

where, though “only rather conclusory direct allegations of conspiracy,” allegations of harassment allowed plausible inference of conspiracy: “Under Twombly, all plaintiff needed to allege was a plausible account of a conspiracy.”). In the Court’s opinion, these allegations are sufficient to state a plausible § 1983 conspiracy claim. This is not the kind of “vast, encompassing conspiracy” or complex litigation that might require more detailed factual allegations. Compare with Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009)(“plaintiff must meet a high standard of plausibility” where the claim “may be paranoid pro se litigation, arising out of a bitter custody fight and alleging . . . a vast, encompassing conspiracy”); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (complex antitrust litigation).
C. Failure to Intervene and Personal Responsibility Dr. Obaisi argues that the failure to intervene claim is too conclusory, allowing no plausible inference that he knew the other Defendants intended to harm Plaintiff, or that he had a realistic opportunity to prevent that harm. However, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Obaisi intentionally created a false medical report, knowing that the
14

other Defendants would use the report to punish Plaintiff for reporting the assaults. The Court does not know what more needs to be alleged. Dr. Obaisi’s realistic opportunity to prevent the harm arguably would have been to inform Defendants that the report was false. Plaintiff may have an uphill battle proving these allegations, but proof is not required at this stage. For the same reasons, a plausible inference of personal responsibility arises against Dr. Obaisi.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Dr. Obaisi argues that the allegations against him do not allow an inference that he engaged in conduct sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” to give rise to a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. He contends that, at most, the allegations permit only an inference of negligence, and that no concrete factual allegations suggest he knew his conduct would inflict severe emotional distress. In Illinois, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements for a showing of intentional infliction of emotional distress: “(1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional
15

distress and (3) the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress.” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir.2001). Necessarily, however, “the tort does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. (quoting McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78, 127 Ill.Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1988)). This standard is quite high. In order to meet the threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant's conduct must extend beyond the bounds of human decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized community. Id.; see also Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (1992).
Lewis v. School Dist. # 70, 523 F.3d 730, 746-67 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff alleges more than negligence or gross negligence. He
alleges that he was anally and orally raped, and that physical evidence of
those rapes existed when he was examined by Dr. Obaisi, including
seminal fluid in Plaintiff’s rectum. According to Plaintiff, “Dr. Obaisi,
the only prison official with the authority and expertise to physically
corroborate Mr. Fontano’s rape allegations, entered into an agreement
with the other defendants to undermine [Plaintiff’s] claims.” (d/e 26, p.
15). In furtherance of this agreement, Dr. Obaisi allegedly intentionally
created a false medical report and intentionally failed to collect physical
evidence of the assault. In the Court’s opinion, these allegations are
16

sufficient to state a claim against Dr. Obaisi for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. As Plaintiff points out, he was at Dr. Obaisi’s mercy regarding the physical corroboration of the assaults. See McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78, 86-87 (1998)(“the more control which a defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely that the defendant’s conduct will be deemed outrageous.”).
E. State law civil conspiracy claim To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: “(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of accomplishing by some concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, (3) in furtherance of which one of the conspirators committed an overt tortious or unlawful act.” Miller v. Hecox, 2012 Ill. App. (2d) 110546, — N.E.2d — (2d Dist. 2012)(quoting Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill.2d 302, 317 (2004). Federal notice pleading standards apply to state claims proceeding in federal court. Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Technical Financing, 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) Dr. Obaisi argues that no factual allegations plausibly suggest an
17

agreement between Dr. Obaisi and the other Defendants to conspire against Plaintiff. He contends that the allegations suggest only that his alleged “faulty” report “fortuitously further[ed] the tortious purpose of another.” (d/e 25, p. 12). This argument depends on Dr. Obaisi’s knowledge and intent, neither of which can be determined at the notice pleading stage. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Obaisi intentionally fabricated a medical report to undermine Plaintiff’s allegations of assaults, with the purpose of assisting Defendants with a scheme to cover up the assaults and retaliate against Plaintiff. Plaintiff may allege knowledge, malice, intent, and other conditions of the mind generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Whether Plaintiff will have evidence to prove these allegations is another matter. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Dr. Obaisi’s motion to dismiss is denied (d/e 24). 2) The motion to dismiss by Defendants Bender, et al., is denied (d/e 19). 3) The parties’ joint, proposed discovery plan is adopted (d/e 27),
18

except that the proposed trial date does not give the Court enough time

to rule on dispositive motions. The final pretrial conference is set for

January 7, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. by personal appearance of counsel. The

proposed, agreed final pretrial order is due December 21, 2013. The jury

selection and trial are scheduled on the Court’s trailing trial calendar for

February 5, 2014. The actual date for jury selection and trial will be

determined at the final pretrial conference.

4) The status conference scheduled for July 2, 2012 is cancelled as

unnecessary.

ENTERED: June 27, 2012

FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough SUE E. MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

 
 E-FILED
Friday, 12 July, 2013 09:23:45 AM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JAMES FONTANO, Plaintiff,
v.
S.A. GODINEZ, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) 12-CV-3042 ) ) )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Plaintiff pursues claims arising from his alleged sexual and

physical assault by another inmate in Logan Correctional Center.

Before the Court are Plaintiff's renewed motion to compel against

Defendants and Plaintiff's motion to compel the IDOC to produce

subpoenaed documents.

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense . . . . For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

"The scope of relevance is broad." Dauska v. Green Bay

Page 1 of 9

Packaging, Inc., --- F.R.D. ---, 2103 WL 2088216 * 5 (E.D. Wis. 2013)(quoting in support Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1978) (relevance "'has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter [sic] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case'"); NDK Crystal, Inc. v. Nipponkoa Ins. Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 43093 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 2011)(unpublished)(Rule 26(b)(1)'s revision in 2000 still encompasses a "liberal discovery standard."). "District courts have broad discretion in discovery matters." James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago, 707 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2013). I. Information regarding the reason for Plaintiff's transfer from the Pittsfield work camp to Logan Correctional Center is relevant to Plaintiff's claims and is discoverable.
Plaintiff started his incarceration in Pittsfield work camp, a minimum security facility, but Plaintiff was later transferred to Logan Correctional Center, a medium security prison, purportedly as a result of a "physical roughhousing" incident at Pittsfield. Plaintiff seeks "information pertaining to the roughhousing incident that resulted in Plaintiff's transfer from Pittsfield work camp to Logan Correctional Center." (Pl.'s Mot. Compel at 4). The information
Page 2 of 9

requested includes documents revealing the basis for Plaintiff's transfer and documents revealing what happened to the other inmates involved in the incident.
The IDOC Defendants object on grounds of relevance, pointing out that Plaintiff's Complaint focuses on the failure of Defendants to properly screen Plaintiff for cellmate placement at Logan, not on the transfer of Plaintiff from Pittsfield to Logan. Plaintiff counters that his claim for deliberate indifference encompasses not only the rooming decision but also the transfer decision. According to Plaintiff, discovery has revealed that Plaintiff's minimum security designation was "manually overridden" to allow Plaintiff's transfer to Logan. Plaintiff asserts that he needs to know all the facts regarding his transfer in order to determine whether to amend his claims.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff's failure to protect claim as framed by his Complaint is focused on the rooming decision at Logan, but the claim also alleges broadly that Defendants "disregarded the substantial risk that Plaintiff would be injured" at Logan. (Compl. ¶ 47). The risk of the injury allegedly began with Plaintiff's transfer to Logan. Additionally, Defendants' classification procedures are part
Page 3 of 9

of the failure to protect claim, which would include the override of Plaintiff's minimum security classification allowing Plaintiff's transfer to Logan. Thus, the information sought is relevant to Plaintiff's failure to protect claim. II. Past discipline of Logan inmates for prison sexual assault and Prison Rape Elimination Act compliance documents are relevant to Plaintiff's claims and are discoverable.
Plaintiff seeks information on discipline meted out to Logan inmates for sexual assault or misconduct from January 1, 2008, to August 5, 2011. The IDOC Defendants object on grounds of relevance. However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that this information is relevant to the pervasiveness and severity of the risk of sexual assault in Logan, which is relevant to the deliberate indifference inquiry.
Plaintiff also seeks documents that IDOC must compile under the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601, et seq. (PREA), and documents relating to compliance with that Act, see 28 C.F.R. §115 et seq. (setting national standards under the Act). Data must be collected for every allegation of sexual abuse, 28 C.F.R. § 115.87, and "aggregated sexual abuse data," with personal identifiers
Page 4 of 9

redacted, must be made publicly available. Plaintiff seeks this information from both the IDOC Defendants and, through a subpoena, the IDOC.
As with the discipline of Logan inmates for sexual misconduct, the PREA information could be relevant to the pervasiveness of sexual assault at Logan, which could be relevant to the deliberate indifference inquiry.
The IDOC argues that the PREA information sought is confidential in order to protect inmates' privacy and encourage inmates to come forward to disclose sexual abuse by inmates. The Court agrees that inmates who have been sexually assaulted in prison have privacy interests in keeping that information confidential. See Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004)(medical records of patients who received late-term abortions not discoverable because non-party patients' privacy interests outweighed marginal probative value). However, much of this information is already being produced regarding documentation of sexual assaults at Logan. A protective order is also in place which allows documents to be marked "confidential" or
Page 5 of 9

"for attorney's eyes only." At this point the PREA information will be compelled, with the
redaction of personal identifiers from the documents such as name and inmate number. If, after reviewing the information, Plaintiff believes that unredaction of the personal identifiers is necessary, Plaintiff may file a motion. At that point the Court will be presented with a more concrete dispute. III. Plaintiff's requests for information on all lawsuits filed after January 1, 2008 which allege an IDOC employee's deliberate indifference to an inmate's risk of sexual assault is overbroad, cumulative, and its relevance too speculative.
Plaintiff asks "for all lawsuits filed since January 1, 2008 that allege that any IDOC employee was deliberately indifferent to a risk that an IDOC inmate would be sexually assaulted by another IDOC inmate, please produce the complaint, all written discovery responses provided by any of the IDOC defendants in the action, and copies of the transcripts of depositions taken of any IDOC defendant in the action." (Pl.'s 2nd Req. Prod. Docs. at 16). Plaintiff also asks for the name, case number, and the court presiding over each case. The IDOC Defendants object to these requests as irrelevant, too
Page 6 of 9

broad, and too burdensome. Deposition transcripts and discovery responses in all inmate
sexual assault cases arising in Illinois prisons for the last 4 ½ years is simple too far afield from Plaintiff's claims in this case from a relevance perspective to justify the burden. Pursuant to this order, Plaintiff will receive the IDOC's documents relating to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, which should show the incidence of sexual assault across IDOC prisons. Plaintiff will also receive documents on sexual assaults at Logan and disciplines of Logan inmates for sexual assault. All this information will give a picture of the pervasiveness of sexual assault in IDOC prisons. If the sexual assaults at Logan resulted in litigation, Plaintiff may attempt to obtain the discovery materials in those cases, at which point the Court will be able to determine if production is appropriate. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff's renewed motion to compel is granted (d/e 44) as provided in paragraph (3) below, except for Plaintiff's requests regarding all lawsuits filed against IDOC employees since January 1, 2008 alleging deliberate indifference to an inmate's risk of being
Page 7 of 9

sexually assaulted (Pl.'s 2nd Req. Prod. Doc. # 16; Pl.'s 3rd Interr. # 5). 2) Plaintiff's motion to compel third party production against
the IDOC is granted (d/e 52), except for the medical records of inmate Saylor. The Court agrees that inmate Saylor's privacy interest in his medical records should be considered before ordering the production of the records. Plaintiff may renew his motion to compel Saylor's medical records after reviewing the investigation materials regarding Saylor's allegations of sexual assault. The remaining information will be produced by IDOC as provided in paragraph (3) below.
3) By August 12, 2013, Defendants and/or the IDOC are directed to provide to Plaintiff:
a) Information which the IDOC Defendants or the IDOC have already agreed to provide, including but not limited to information about: Logan inmates' sexual assault allegations for the past five years; inmate Kemp's master file; documents relating to inmate Saylor's allegations of sexual assault; employee time sheets, records, and logs; polygraph procedures; training documents; and, security overrides.
Page 8 of 9

b) Information relating to Plaintiff's and other inmates'

transfers from Pittsfield Work Camp to Logan Correctional Center

sought in Plaintiff's second request for production numbered 1-4 and

third set of interrogatories numbered 1 and 2.

c) Information relating to inmate discipline for sexual

assault or misconduct sought in Plaintiff's second request for

production of documents numbered 17.

d) Information relating to the Prison Rape Elimination

Act sought in Plaintiff's second request for production of documents

numbered 18.

4) A status conference is set for September 17, 2013, at 3:30

p.m. by telephone to discuss rescheduling the fact discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

ENTERED: July 12, 2013

FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough SUE E. MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 9 of 9

 
 Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 1 of 20
56,CLOSED,REFER
U.S. District Court CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (Springfield) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12−cv−03042−SEM−TSH

Fontano v. Godinez et al Assigned to: Judge Sue E. Myerscough Referred to: Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/09/2012 Date Terminated: 09/09/2016 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner Petitions − Prison Conditions Jurisdiction: Federal Question

James Fontano

represented by Locke E Bowman RODERICK MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 375 E Chicago Ave Chicago, IL 60611 312−503−0844 Email: l−bowman@law.northwestern.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Mills UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 (773) 769−1411 Fax: 773−769−2224 Email: alanmills@comcast.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi RODERICK MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 375 E Chicago Ave Chicago, IL 60611 312−503−2492 Fax: 312−503−1294 Email: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vanessa del Valle RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 312−503−5932 Fax: 312−503−1271 Email: vanessa.delvalle@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexa Van Brunt RODERICK MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 375 E Chicago Ave Chicago, IL 60611

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 2 of 20
312−503−1336 Fax: 312−503−1272 Email: a−vanbrunt@law.northwestern.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant S.A. Godinez Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 03/18/2014
Defendant Alex Dawson Warden of Logan Correctional Center

represented by Christopher L Higgerson ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62706 217−782−9014 Fax: 217−524−5091 TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Molloy OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62706 217−782−9014 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: mmolloy@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Ratz ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62706 217−782−9094 Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: jratz@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa A Cook ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62706 217−782−9094 Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: lcook@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Fanning ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 500 S Second St Springfield, IL 62706

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 3 of 20

217−782−2077 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: rfanning@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Doe Assistant Warden of Operations at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

Defendant
John Doe Assistant Warden of Programs at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

Defendant
Lieutenant Kevin Standley Supervisory Officer at Logan Correctional Center

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua D Ratz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa A Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Major D. Simmons Supervisory Officer at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gary Bender employee at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 4 of 20

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Villa Jennings employee at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
B. Call employee at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Officer Fishel TERMINATED: 03/28/2016

represented by Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Saleh Obaisi Medical Officer at Logan Correctional Center TERMINATED: 03/19/2015

represented by Adam Scott Guetzow HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP Ste 300 222 N LaSalle St Chicago, IL 60601−1081 312−704−3129 Fax: 312−704−3001 Email: aguetzow@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/12/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew M Ramage BROWN HAY & STEPHENS LLP Suite 700 205 S Fifth St PO Box 2459 Springfield, IL 62705−2459 217−544−8491 Fax: 217−241−1333 Email: aramage@bhslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 5 of 20
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rodger A Heaton HINSHAW & CULBERTSON Ste 200 400 S Ninth St Springfield, IL 62701 217−528−7375 Fax: 217−528−0075 TERMINATED: 09/17/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Respondent William Barnes

represented by Margaret Molloy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher L Higgerson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa A Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Fanning (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/09/2012
02/09/2012 03/02/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0753−1311118.), filed by James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A: Offender Disciplinary Report, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B: Final Summary Report)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/14/2012: # 3 Civil Cover Sheet) (DM, ilcd). (Entered: 02/09/2012)
2 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Alexa Van Brunt on behalf of James Fontano (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. S.A. Godinez waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 03/02/2012)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Gary Bender waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
5 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. B. Call waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
6 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Alex Dawson waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
7 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Fishel waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
8 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Villa Jennings waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
9 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Saleh Obaisi waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 6 of 20

04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/03/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012 04/05/2012
04/11/2012 04/16/2012
04/16/2012 04/25/2012 04/27/2012
04/27/2012 04/30/2012 05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/10/2012

10 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. D. Simmons waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
11 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by James Fontano. Kevin Standley waiver sent on 2/14/2012, answer due 4/16/2012. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
12 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Locke E Bowman on behalf of James Fontano (Bowman, Locke) (Entered: 04/03/2012)
13 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Andrew M Ramage on behalf of Saleh Obaisi (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
14 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Rodger A Heaton on behalf of Saleh Obaisi (Heaton, Rodger) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
15 Designation of Lead Counsel by Andrew M Ramage on behalf of Saleh Obaisi. (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
16 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST pursuant to Local Rule 11.3 by Saleh Obaisi. (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
17 MOTION for Protective Order HIPAA Qualified Protective Order by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 4/23/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
TEXT ORDER: The docket reflects that Defendants have signed waivers of service and their Answers are due on April 16, 2012. A scheduling conference pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 is set for June 18, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. by telephone conference. The clerk will initiate the call. The parties are directed to file an agreed, proposed discovery plan by June 11, 2012 which includes dates for initial disclosures and addresses the issues listed in Local Rule 16.2 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(b) and 26. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 04/05/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
18 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 4/30/2012 (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
19 MOTION to Dismiss Counts V and VI by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 5/3/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counts V and VI)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
20 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 04/16/2012)
21 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Alan Mills on behalf of James Fontano (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 04/25/2012)
TEXT ORDER: The unopposed motion for a protective HIPAA order filed by Defendant Obaisi is granted d/e 17 . The clerk is directed to affix the Court's electronic signature to the proposed order and to docket the order. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 04/26/2012. (DM, ilcd) Added document hyperlink brackets on 4/27/2012 (ME, ilcd). (Entered: 04/27/2012)
22 HIPAA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 04/26/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
23 RESPONSE to Motion re 19 MOTION to Dismiss Counts V and VI filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
24 MOTION to Dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V and VI by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 5/24/2012 (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
25 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V and VI by Saleh Obaisi. (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
TEXT ORDER: Dr. Obaisi's unopposed motion for an extension to file his Answer is granted (d/e 18). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 05/10/2012. (DM, ilcd)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 7 of 20

05/24/2012 05/31/2012 06/11/2012 06/27/2012
07/11/2012 07/11/2012 07/19/2012 07/20/2012 07/24/2012 08/01/2012 09/04/2012 09/04/2012
09/06/2012 09/07/2012 09/12/2012 10/01/2012

(Entered: 05/10/2012)
26 RESPONSE to Motion re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V and VI filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 05/24/2012)
27 DISCOVERY PLAN − PROPOSED/Report of Rule 26(f)Planning Meeting by James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 05/31/2012)
TEXT ORDER: The conference scheduled for June 18, 2012 is rescheduled to July 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the Court may hear the case, in order to allow more time for the Court to rule on the pending motions to dismiss. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 06/11/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
28 OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 06/27/2012. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Dr. Obaisi's motion to dismiss is denied (d/e 24 ). The motion to dismiss by Defendants Bender, et al., is denied (d/e 19 ). The parties' joint, proposed discovery plan is adopted (d/e 27 ), except that the proposed trial date does not give the Court enough time to rule on dispositive motions. The final pretrial conference is set for January 7, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. by personal appearance of counsel. The proposed, agreed final pretrial order is due December 21, 2013. The jury selection and trial are scheduled on the Court's trailing trial calendar for February 5, 2014. The actual date for jury selection and trial will be determined at the final pretrial conference. The status conference scheduled for July 2, 2012 is cancelled as unnecessary. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
29 Amended ANSWER to 1 Complaint, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley.(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 07/11/2012)
30 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 7/30/2012 (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 07/11/2012)
31 STATUS REPORT Pertaining to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (Joint) by James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
TEXT ORDER: Defendant Obaisi's motion to extend his deadline for filing an Answer is granted (d/e 30). The Court adopts the parties' agreed report governing the discovery of electronically stored information (d/e 31). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 07/20/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
32 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Saleh Obaisi.(Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saleh Obaisi re: Defendant Obaisi's Initial Rule 26 Disclosure (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 08/01/2012)
NOTICE of Hearing: A telephone conference is set for 4:00 p.m. today, September 4, 2012. The clerk will initiate the call. (CT, ilcd) (Entered: 09/04/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: STATUS CONFERENCE. Plaintiffs represented by Attorneys Locke F. Bowman, Alan Mills, and Alexa Van Brunt. Defendants represented by Attorneys Christopher L. Higgerson and Andrew M. Ramage. On Court's own motion Status Hearing called to discuss possible conflict of interest. Parties to advise Court in writing by Friday, 9/7/2012 of their decisions. Hearing adjourned. (Court Reporter KS.) (CT, ilcd) (Entered: 09/05/2012)
34 NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 09/06/2012)
35 NOTICE Regarding Conflict re Status Conference, (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
36 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saleh Obaisi Re: Defendant Saleh Obaisi's Answers to Plaintiff James Fontano's First Set of Interrogatories and Defendant Saleh Obaisi's Response to Plaintiff James Fontano's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Deadlines set pursuant to the Proposed Discovery Plan, d/e 27 filed on 5/31/2012 and the Court's Opinion of 6/27/2012, d/e 28 . Discovery due by

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 8 of 20

10/25/2012 10/26/2012 10/26/2012 11/21/2012
11/21/2012 12/10/2012 12/10/2012 12/10/2012 12/11/2012
01/10/2013
01/28/2013 01/30/2013 02/12/2013

12/21/2012. Plaintiff's Expert Disclosure due by 1/25/2013. Defendant's Expert Disclosure due by 5/24/2013. Motions due by 8/22/2013. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 10/01/2012)
37 MOTION for Protective Order (Agreed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 11/13/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Proposed Agreed Protective Order)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/25/2012)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for entry of an agreed protective order is granted (d/e 37 ). The clerk is directed to affix the Court's electronic signature to the proposed order and to docket the order. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/26/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 10/26/2012)
38 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/26/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 10/26/2012)
39 MOTION to Compel by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 12/10/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A:Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production, # 2 Exhibit B:Defendants' Amended Response to Plaintiff's Request for Production, # 3 Exhibit C: Parties' correspondence, # 4 Exhibit D: Agreed Protective Order, # 5 Exhibit E: Letter from counsel for IDOC Defendants, # 6 Exhibit F: IDOC redacted discovery, # 7 Exhibit G: Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, # 8 Exhibit H: Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/21/2012)
40 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Agreed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 12/10/2012 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/21/2012)
41 STRICKEN PER TEXT ORDER of 12/11/2012. RESPONSE to Motion re 39 MOTION to Compel filed by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. (Higgerson, Christopher) Modified on 12/11/2012 (DM, ilcd). (Entered: 12/10/2012)
42 MOTION to Strike 41 Response to Motion to Compel by Defendant D. Simmons. Responses due by 1/2/2013 (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
43 RESPONSE to Motion re 39 MOTION to Compel filed by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's agreed motion to extend the fact discovery deadline to March 21, 2013 is granted (d/e 40 ). Defendants' motion to strike their first response to the motion to compel is granted (d/e 42 ). The clerk is directed to strike document 41. Plaintiff's motion to compel is denied (d/e 39 ) with leave to renew if Plaintiff does not receive the information promised in Defendants' response (d/e 43 ). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/11/2012. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 12/11/2012)
44 Second MOTION to Compel and Renewed First Motion to Compel by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 1/28/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Plaintiff's 2nd RFP to IDOC Defendants, # 2 Exhibit B: Plaintiff's 3rd Set of Interrogatories to IDOC Defendants, # 3 Exhibit C: Defendants' Objections to 2nd RFP and 3rd Set of Interrogatories, # 4 Exhibit D: December 12, 2012 Letter Van Brunt to Higgerson, # 5 Exhibit E: December 24, 2012 Letter Higgerson to Van Brunt)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
45 RESPONSE to Motion re 44 Second MOTION to Compel and Renewed First Motion to Compel filed by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 01/28/2013)
46 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 2/19/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Reply Memorandum to the IDOC Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel and Renewed Motion to Compel)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
47 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saleh Obaisi Re: Defendant Dr. Saleh Obaisi's First Set of Interrogatories Propounded Upon Plaintiff and Dr. Saleh Obaisi's Request for Production of Documents and Things to Plaintiff (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered:

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 9 of 20

03/11/2013 03/13/2013
03/13/2013 03/18/2013 03/19/2013 03/19/2013
04/16/2013 05/03/2013 06/28/2013 07/12/2013
07/12/2013 08/12/2013 08/12/2013 09/03/2013 09/17/2013

02/12/2013)
48 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSE INMATE, QUENTIN ROBINSON #R11577, VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 3/28/2013 (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 03/11/2013)
TEXT ORDER: Defendant Obaisi's motion to depose inmate Robinson via video conference is granted (d/e 48 ). Defendant Obaisi is responsible for arranging the deposition. Plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to file a reply is granted (d/e 46 ). The clerk is directed to separately docket Plaintiff's reply. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 03/13/2013. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 03/13/2013)
49 Plaintiff's REPLY to Defendants' Response to 44 Second MOTION to Compel and Renewed First Motion to Compel filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 03/13/2013)
50 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Agreed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 4/4/2013 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 03/18/2013)
51 NOTICE to Take Deposition of QUENTIN ROBINSON #R11577 on Wednesday, March 27, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend the fact discovery deadline is granted (d/e 50 ). The deadline for fact discovery is vacated. The fact discovery deadline will be rescheduled after the Court rules on the pending motion to compel and after consultation with the parties regarding what discovery remains. The dispositive motion deadline is vacated, to be rescheduled when the fact discovery deadline is rescheduled. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 03/19/2013. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
52 MOTION to Compel Third Party Production by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/3/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
53 RESPONSE to Motion re 52 MOTION to Compel Third Party Production filed by Respondent William Barnes. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
54 MOTION to Quash Subpoena by Respondent William Barnes. Responses due by 7/15/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Subpoena to Testify)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 06/28/2013)
55 OPINION: Plaintiff's renewed motion to compel is granted (d/e 44 ) as provided in paragraph (3). Plaintiff's motion to compel third party production against the IDOC is granted (d/e 52 ). By August 12, 2013, Defendants and/or the IDOC are directed to provide to Plaintiff information as provided in paragraph (3). Status Conference set for 9/17/2013 at 03:30 PM by telephone from Springfield (court will place call) before Judge Sue E. Myerscough. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/12/2013. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
56 RESPONSE to Motion re 54 MOTION to Quash Subpoena filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Defendant Obaisi Deposition Excerpts)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
57 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saleh Obaisi Answers to Plaintiff James Fontano's Second Set of Interrogatories (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 08/12/2013)
58 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Adam Scott Guetzow on behalf of Saleh Obaisi (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 08/12/2013)
59 MOTION for Sanctions and a Finding of Contempt by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 9/20/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: STATUS CONFERENCE held on September 17, 2013. Attorneys Sheila Bedi, Alan Mills and Alexa Van Brunt present via telephone on behalf of Plaintiff. Assistant Attorney General Christopher Higgerson present via telephone on behalf of Defendants Godinez, Dawson, Standley, Simmons, Bender, Jennings, Call, Fishel and Barnes. Attorney Andrew Ramage present via telephone on behalf of Defendant Obaisi.

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 10 of 20

09/20/2013
09/20/2013 09/27/2013 10/01/2013 11/12/2013 11/22/2013 11/27/2013 12/16/2013 12/20/2013 01/17/2014 01/29/2014
01/29/2014

Discussion held regarding Motion to Quash (d/e 54 ) and Motion for Sanctions and a Finding of Contempt (d/e 59 ). Status of discovery addressed. Deadlines set. Order to enter. Hearing adjourned. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
60 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 09/20/2013. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Deadlines set as follows: Fact discovery ends January 17, 2014. Plaintiff's expert disclosure deadline is March 17, 2014. Defendants' expert disclosure deadline is May 17, 2014. The expert discovery deadline is July 17, 2014. Dispositive motions are due September 17, 2014. The final pretrial and trial dates are vacated, to be rescheduled, if necessary, after the Court rules on dispositive motions.(DM, ilcd) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
61 RESPONSE to Motion re 59 MOTION for Sanctions and a Finding of Contempt filed by Defendant S.A. Godinez. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
62 Response by Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley PRODUCTION PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF JULY 12, 2013. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B1, # 3 Exhibit B2, # 4 Exhibit C1, # 5 Exhibit C2, # 6 Exhibit C3, # 7 Exhibit C4)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
63 Response by Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley re 60 Order on Motion for Sanctions,, Terminate Deadlines and Hearings, Set/Reset Deadlines:,,,,,,,, . (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
64 MOTION for Sanctions (Renewed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 11/29/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
65 MOTION for Hearing by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 12/9/2013 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/22/2013)
66 REPLY to Response to Motion re 64 MOTION for Sanctions (Renewed) For Discovery, Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees filed by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
67 MOTION for Protective Order by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 1/2/2014 (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
68 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 67 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
69 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 2/3/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's motion to set in−person hearing on the status of discovery 65 is GRANTED. The hearing is set for February 10, 2014, at 2:30 p.m. However, the Court will conduct the hearing by video conferencing rather than in−person. The Court's video conference system was established as a cost−savings mechanism for just this type of hearing. The Court will be able to view the parties and all attorneys on the main screen that is (approximately) ten feet by fourteen feet. In addition, the courtroom contains ten other smaller, individualized screens on which the Court will be able to view the parties and their attorneys. The Court will consider all pending motions at this hearing. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a video writ to the place of Plaintiff's institution notifying the institution of the hearing and Plaintiff's participation therein. The parties should contact the clerk's office no later than a week in advance of the hearing in order to make arrangements to appear by video conferencing. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 01/28/2014. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
CORRECTED TEXT ORDER: Upon review of the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated within the IDOC. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court need not prepare and send a video writ for Plaintiff's appearance. Instead, Plaintiff may

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 11 of 20

02/10/2014
02/12/2014 02/12/2014
02/26/2014 03/10/2014 03/18/2014 03/18/2014
03/26/2014 04/30/2014 05/06/2014 05/19/2014

attend the hearing via video conference at the same location as his counsel. Otherwise, the Court's prior text order remains in full force and effect. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 01/29/2014. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: Status Conference held on 2/10/2014. Alan Mills, Alexa Van Brunt and Sheila Bedi present via video conferencing on behalf of Plaintiff, James Fontano. Christopher Higgerson present in person on behalf of Defendants Godinez; Dawson; Standley; Simmons; Bender; Jennings; Call and Fishel. Edward Huntley present in person on behalf of IDOC Defendants. Andrew Ramage present in person on behalf of Defendant Obaisi. Discussion held regarding pending motions and deadlines. Further discussion held regarding the status of the deposition of Defendant Godinez. Motion to extend discovery deadline GRANTED. (ORDER TO ENTER) (Court Reporter KS) (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to instructions from Chief Judge James E. Shadid, the assignment of this case to Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore is withdrawn due to his resignation. The district judge assigned to this case will handle all matters until a new magistrate judge is appointed. Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 2/11/2014. (MC, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
70 ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/12/2014. Respondent William Barnes' Motion to Quash Subpoena, d/e 54 is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, d/e 64 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order, d/e 67 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Third Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery, d/e 69 is GRANTED. The discovery deadline is extended by ninety (90) days. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/12/2014. (MAS, ilcd) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
71 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed Motion to Extend Additional Discovery Deadlines) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 3/17/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
72 MOTION to Dismiss Defendant S.A. Godinez (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 3/27/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss Defendant S.A. Godinez 72 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendant S.A. Godinez is hereby dismissed without prejudice as a party Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/18/2014. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend deadlines for expert disclosures, expert discovery, and dispositive motions 71 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff's expert disclosure deadline is extended to June 16, 2014. Defendants' expert disclosure deadline is extended to August 15, 2014. The expert discovery deadline is extended to October 15, 2014. Dispositive motions must be filed by December 16, 2014. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/18/2014. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to instructions from Chief Judge James E. Shadid, this case is now referred to Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins due to his appointment as U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Central District of Illinois. Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 3/26/14. (DK, ilcd) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
73 MOTION to Compel Third Party Illinois Department of Corrections by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/19/2014 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Physical Evidence Subpoena, # 2 Exhibit B: Correspondence, # 3 Exhibit C: Inspection Subpoena, # 4 Exhibit D: November 2013 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition, # 5 Exhibit E: January 2014 30(b)(6) Subpoena, # 6 Exhibit F: Keane Dep. Excerpts, # 7 Exhibit G: Austin Dep. Excerpts)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
74 MOTION for Hearing by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/23/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
75 RESPONSE to Motion re 73 MOTION to Compel Third Party Illinois Department of Corrections filed by Respondent William Barnes. (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 05/19/2014)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 12 of 20

06/16/2014 06/20/2014 07/17/2014
08/26/2014 09/10/2014
09/16/2014 09/17/2014
10/06/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 11/11/2014 11/11/2014 12/02/2014 12/08/2014

76 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 7/3/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
77 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 7/10/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
78 ORDER: Plaintiff's motion 76 and amended motion 77 to extend the deadline for fact discovery, expert disclosures, expert discovery, and dispositive motion are GRANTED. Accordingly, the discovery deadline is extended to July 16, 2014. Plaintiff's expert disclosure deadline is extended to August 16, 2014. Defendants' expert disclosure deadline is extended to September 15, 2014. The expert discovery deadline is extended to November 14, 2014. The dispositive deadline motion is extended to January 15, 2015. Plaintiff's motion to set an in−person hearing on the status of discovery 74 is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion to compel 73 is DENIED as moot. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 7/17/2014. (GL, ilcd) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
79 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 9/12/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
TEXT ORDER. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend deadlines for expert disclosures, expert discovery, and dispositive motions 79 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff's expert disclosure deadline is extended to September 5, 2014. Defendants' expert disclosure deadline is extended to October 6, 2014. The expert discovery deadline is extended to December 5, 2014. Dispositive motions must be filed by February 5, 2015. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 9/10/2014. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
80 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 10/3/2014 (Heaton, Rodger) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Attorney Rodger Heaton's motion to withdraw 80 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Attorney Heaton's representation of Defendant Dr. Obaisi is terminated, and Dr. Obaisi will remain represented by attorneys Ramage and Geutzow. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 09/17/2014. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 09/17/2014)
81 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Saleh Obaisi re Expert Report (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
82 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Eldon Vail on 10/17/14 (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
83 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Brenda Smith on 11/07/14 (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
84 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Heather Devore on 11/14/14 (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
85 NOTICE to Take Deposition of David Lisak on 11/14/14 (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
86 NOTICE to Take Deposition of BRENDA SMITH via video conference on Friday, January 16, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. EST (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
87 NOTICE to Take Deposition of HEATHER DEVORE via video conference on Friday, January 16, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. EST (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
88 Final MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Agreed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 12/19/2014 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 12/02/2014)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's unopposed final motion to extend expert discovery and dispositive deadlines 88 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the expert discovery deadline is extended to January 19, 2015, and the dispositive motion deadline is extended to March 23, 2015. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 12/08/2014. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 13 of 20

12/15/2014 12/15/2014 12/16/2014 12/30/2014 01/05/2015 01/06/2015 01/06/2015 01/06/2015 01/12/2015
03/10/2015 03/19/2015
03/23/2015 03/23/2015
04/09/2015 04/15/2015
04/27/2015 04/27/2015

89 NOTICE to Take Deposition of HEATHER DEVORE on Thursday, January 8, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. EST via video conference (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
90 NOTICE to Take Deposition of DAVID LISAK on Friday, January 16, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. MST via video conference (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
91 NOTICE to Take Deposition of DAVID LISAK on Friday, January 16, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. MST via video conference (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 12/16/2014)
92 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Adam Guetzow and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP) by Defendant Saleh Obaisi. Responses due by 1/16/2015 (Guetzow, Adam) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
93 NOTICE of Change of Address by Andrew M Ramage (Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
94 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Brenda Smith on 01−16−2015 by Defendant Saleh Obaisi.(Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
95 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Heather Devore on 01−08−15 by Defendant Saleh Obaisi.(Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
96 NOTICE to Take Deposition of David Lisak on 01−16−15 by Defendant Saleh Obaisi.(Ramage, Andrew) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
TEXT ORDER: Attorney Adam Guetzow and the law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson's motion to withdraw 92 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Attorney Guetzow and the law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson's representation of Defendant Dr. Obaisi is terminated, and Dr. Obaisi will remain represented by attorney Andrew Ramage. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 01/12/2015. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
97 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Defendant Saleh Obaisi by James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
TEXT ORDER. Pursuant to Plaintiff's stipulation of dismissal and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), Defendant Saleh Obaisi is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate him as a party in this case. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/19/2015. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
98 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 4/16/2015 (Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
99 MEMORANDUM in Support re 98 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
100 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 98 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 4/27/2015 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's unopposed motion for extension of time 100 is GRANTED, and Plaintiff has up to and including April 27, 2015, within which to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/15/2015. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
101 STIPULATION of Dismissal as to Defendants Fishel, Call, Bender, Simmons and Jennings and as to Count I by James Fontano. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/27/2015)
102 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Unopposed) by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/14/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/27/2015)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 14 of 20

04/27/2015 04/27/2015 05/04/2015 05/04/2015 05/21/2015 03/28/2016
03/31/2016 03/31/2016 04/01/2016 04/06/2016
04/07/2016 04/28/2016 04/28/2016 05/02/2016
05/02/2016

103 Exhibit Index to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/27/2015)
104 Exhibit (Continued) − Ex. 11 by James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 12, # 2 Exhibit 13, # 3 Exhibit 14, # 4 Exhibit 15, # 5 Exhibit 16, # 6 Exhibit 17, # 7 Exhibit 18, # 8 Exhibit 19, # 9 Exhibit 20, # 10 Exhibit 21, # 11 Exhibit 22, # 12 Exhibit 23)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/27/2015)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file 102 is GRANTED, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff's response brief that is attached to his motion for leave to file. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 05/04/2015. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
105 Plaintiff James Fontano's RESPONSE to Defendants' 98 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. SEE d/e's 103 and 104 for exhibits attached to Response. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
106 REPLY to Response to Motion re 98 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Higgerson, Christopher) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
107 ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 03/28/2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendants Simmons, Bender, Jennings, Call, and Fishel from this case. The Clerk of the Court is also directed to terminate the "John Doe Defendants" from this case. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 98 is DENIED. This case will proceed to trial against Defendants Alex Dawson and Kevin Stanley. A final pretrial conference is set for May 9, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. Trial is set for June 14, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
108 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Margaret Molloy on behalf of William Barnes, Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
109 MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Christopher Higgerson to be replaced by Margaret Molloy, by Respondent William Barnes, Defendants Gary Bender, B. Call, Alex Dawson, Fishel, S.A. Godinez, Villa Jennings, D. Simmons, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 4/18/2016 (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
110 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Vanessa del Valle on behalf of James Fontano (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
TEXT ORDER:Defendants' motion to substitute counsel 109 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants are now represented by attorney Margaret Molloy, and attorney Christopher Higgerson's representation of Defendants is terminated. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle−Haskins on 4/6/2016. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
111 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Sheila A Bedi on behalf of James Fontano (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
112 MOTION to Continue Trial Date by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 5/16/2016 (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
113 RESPONSE to Motion re 112 MOTION to Continue Trial Date filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The parties are reminded to adhere to the Court's standing order on final pretrial conference, exhibits, and jury instructions. www.ilcd.uscourts.gov, orders and rules by Judge tab. The documents and motions listed in that standing order are due at least seven days before the final pretrial conference. The final pretrial conference remains scheduled for May 9, 2016, which means that the final pretrial submissions are due by the end of today. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/2/2016. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
114 Proposed Pretrial Order by James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 15 of 20

05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016
05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/03/2016 05/04/2016
05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/09/2016
05/09/2016

115 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Lisa A Cook on behalf of William Barnes, Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
116 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Proposed Alternate or Additional Jury Instructions and Motions in Limine by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 5/19/2016 (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
117 MOTION in Limine by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
118 MOTION in Limine TO BAR ANY REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFFS IDOC DISCIPLINARY RECORD by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
119 MOTION in Limine TO BAR REFERENCES TO PLAINTIFFS ILLEGAL DRUG USE by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
120 MOTION in Limine TO BAR REFERENCE TO THE REASONS FOR WITNESS ELDON VAILS RESIGNATION FROM HIS POSITION AS SECRETARY OF THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
121 MOTION in Limine TO BAR ANY REFERENCE TO QUENTIN ROBINSONS UNSUBSTANTIATED ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFF HAD AN AFFILIATION WITH THE WHITE SOULS GANG by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
122 MOTION in Limine TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO READ EXCERPTS FROM THE DEPOSITION OF QUENTIN ROBINSON by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 5/6/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
123 RESPONSE to Motion re 116 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Proposed Alternate or Additional Jury Instructions and Motions in Limine filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Defendants' motion for an extension (to May 16, 2016) to file their alternate/additional jury instructions and motions in limine is granted ( 116 ). The final pretrial conference scheduled for May 9, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. shall instead be a conference to address the rescheduling of the final pretrial conference and Defendants' motion to continue the trial date. Defense counsel shall appear by phone. Plaintiff's counsel shall appear by video, if possible, otherwise by phone. The clerk is directed make video conferencing arrangements with Plaintiff's counsel. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/4/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
124 Exhibit re 114 Proposed Pretrial Order numbered Plaintiff's proposed jury intsructions by James Fontano. (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
125 Exhibit re 114 Proposed Pretrial Order numbered joint proposed jury instructions by James Fontano. (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 5/9/2016. Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills present via video on behalf of Plaintiff, James Fontano. Lisa Cook and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General, present via phone. Oral waiver of Plaintiff's appearance by Plaintiff's counsel. Waiver accepted by Court. Order to enter. Additional Final Pretrial Conference set for June 6, 2016 at 3:00 PM before Judge Sue E. Myerscough, Courtroom1, Springfield. Hearing adjourned. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
126 ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/9/2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Defendants' motion to continue the trial is granted 112 . The trial will be rescheduled for June 28, 2016, or July 5, 2016. Possible dates for a settlement conference with Judge Hawley are: May 24, May 26, June 1, or June 3, 2016. A final pretrial conference is scheduled for June 6, 2016, at 3:00 p.m. Defense counsel shall appear in person. Plaintiff's counsel may appear in person or by video. Plaintiff shall appear in person or by video. The clerk is directed to issue a video writ to secure Plaintiff's

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 16 of 20

05/09/2016 05/16/2016 05/16/2016 05/16/2016 05/17/2016
05/17/2016 05/17/2016 05/18/2016
05/26/2016
05/27/2016 06/01/2016 06/01/2016

presence at the final pretrial conference, if necessary. Motion in Limine as follows: Motion 117 remains pending; Motion 118 granted; Motion 119 granted; Motion 120 granted; Motion 121 granted and Motion [122} granted in part and denied in part. (Attachments: # 1 Court's handwritten rulings as to proposed Voir Dire)(DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
127 FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 05/09/2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
128 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of Heather DeVore by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 6/3/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
129 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of David Lisak by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 6/3/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
130 Proposed Jury Instructions by Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to Judge Myerscough's 126 Order, this case is set for a Settlement Conference on Thursday, 5/26/2016 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 2 in Springfield before Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley. Plaintiff Fontano to appear in person with counsel. Parties to submit directly to chambers a settlement statement stating their position in regard to settlement by 5/23/16. This shall include history of offers and demands along with a brief statement of position on facts and legal issues. Do not file this statement with the clerk office or exchange with opposing parties. Parties have leave of court to email the statement directly to chambers at hawley@ilcd.uscourts.gov. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 5/17/16. (WG, ilcd) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley added as settlement judge. (WG, ilcd) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
131 VACATED per Text Order of 5/18/2016. VIDEO WRIT issued for Plaintiff's video appearance at the Final Pretrial Conference on 6/06/2016 at 3:00 PM. (Copy of writ and letter e−mailed to Cook County) (Attachments: # 1 Cook County Request Form) (DM, ilcd) Modified on 5/18/2016 (DM, ilcd). (Entered: 05/17/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Plaintiff's counsel has notified the Court that Plaintiff is waiving his personal appearance and attendance at the final pretrial conference. Accordingly, the video writ issued compelling Plaintiff's appearance at the final pretrial conference is recalled and vacated. Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants have also notified the Court that, if the case does not settle at the settlement conference before U.S. Magistrate Judge Hawley, they would be available for trial on June 28, 2016. Accordingly, jury trial is set to begin on June 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. The Clerk of the Court is directed to prepare and to issue a personal appearance writ compelling Plaintiff's attendance at the trial. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 05/18/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley: Settlement Conference held on 5/26/2016. Alan Mills, Sheila Bedi, and Vanessa del Valle present on behalf of Plaintiff, James Fontano. Plaintiff James Fontano was not present. Lisa Cook and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General, present along with IDOC Representative Ed Huntley. No settlement reached. (ME, ilcd) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley no longer assigned to case as a settlement referral as no settlement was reached on 5/26/16. (WG, ilcd) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The Court sua sponte VACATES the June 6, 2016 final pretrial conference and RESETS the final pretrial conference to June 13, 2016, at 3:00 p.m. The final pretrial conference will occur in Springfield, Illinois, in Courtroom I. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 06/01/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
132 RESPONSE to Motion re 128 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of Heather DeVore filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered:

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 17 of 20

06/01/2016 06/10/2016 06/10/2016 06/13/2016
06/16/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/17/2016 06/21/2016 06/21/2016 06/23/2016
06/23/2016 06/23/2016

06/01/2016)
133 RESPONSE to Motion re 129 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of David Lisak filed by Plaintiff James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
TEXT ORDER: This case is set for Final Pretrial Conference on June 13, 2016, at 3:00 PM. Plaintiff James Fontano's in−person presence in Springfield, IL is required for the hearing. The parties are directed to collaborate to meet that requirement. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/10/2016. (MJ, ilcd) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
134 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Joshua D Ratz on behalf of Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley (Ratz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 6/13/2016. Plaintiff James Fontano present in person with counsel of record, Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills. Joshua Ratz and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General, present in person on behalf of Defendants. Clarification made by Plaintiff as to its Motion to Limine. Oral response by Defendant. Motion in Limine rulings rendered. Jury Instruction Conference held. Parties to inform Court whether they will consent to the jury asking questions. Jury Selection process given. Trial procedures and courtroom equipment reviewed. Length of trial will be 3−4 days. Due to possible conflict of dates, Jury Trial will commence on June 27, 2016 at 9:00 AM before Judge Sue E. Myerscough, Courtroom 1, Springfield. Hearing adjourned. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
135 Proposed Jury Instructions by James Fontano. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
136 MOTION for Reconsideration Jury Instruction Relating to Plaintiff's IIED Claim by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 7/5/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
137 MOTION for Clarification by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/5/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
138 MOTION for Reconsideration Intent to Give Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/5/2016 (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
139 MOTION For Special Interrogatories by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/5/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
140 MOTION in Limine to bar references to Plaintiff's Post 2011 Incarceration by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 7/8/2016 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
141 MOTION in Limine to bar references to Plaintiff's convictions by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 7/8/2016 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
142 ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 06/23/2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Plaintiff's motion to bar any reference to an alleged phone call between John Fontano and John Hotwagner 117 is DENIED with leave to re−raise the issue at trial. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider jury instruction regarding his IIED claim 136 is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion in limine to bar references to his post 2011 incarceration 140 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion in limine to bar references to his criminal convictions 141 is GRANTED. Defendants' motion for clarification 137 is GRANTED. Defendants' motion for reconsideration 138 is DENIED. Defendants' motion for special interrogatories 139 is DENIED. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
143 TEXT ORDER: With this text order, the Court sends its voir dire and preliminary instructions. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/23/2016. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
144 MOTION for Reconsideration re 135 Proposed Jury Instructions by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/11/2016 (Ratz, Joshua) (Entered:

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 18 of 20

06/23/2016 06/24/2016 06/24/2016 06/24/2016 06/24/2016 06/27/2016
06/28/2016 06/28/2016
06/28/2016 06/29/2016

06/23/2016)
145 MOTION for Reconsideration of Ruling Barring Use of Plaintiff's Conviction for Attempting to Foil/Defeat a Screen Test by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/11/2016 (Ratz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
146 Exhibit List amended by James Fontano. (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
147 AMENDED DOCUMENT by James Fontano. witness list. (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
148 Exhibit List (Amended) by Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
149 Exhibit re 145 MOTION for Reconsideration of Ruling Barring Use of Plaintiff's Conviction for Attempting to Foil/Defeat a Screen Test by Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Ratz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: JURY SELECTION/JURY TRIAL held on 6/27/2016. Plaintiff James Fontano present in person with counsel of record, Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills. Law students Michelle Page and Christian Segar also present with Plaintiff's counsel. Defendants Alex Dawson and Kevin Standley present in person with counsel of record, Robert Fanning, Joshua Ratz and Margaret Molloy, Office of Attorney General. Pending Motions addressed and rulings rendered. Issue of potential witness Robinson discussed. Plaintiff's counsel to inform Court of position at lunch break. Agreement by parties as to preliminary instructions with instructions to be displayed to jurors. Jury Selection began. Statement of Case given. Summary of Claims and Witness List read and displayed. Prospective Jurors sworn and panel of 14 called. Voir Dire Questions asked and displayed. Strikes taken. Jury of 8 accepted. Jury impaneled, sworn and admonished of rights. Preliminary Jury Instructions given and displayed by Court. Outside the presence of the jury, Plaintiff and Defendants informed Court that neither party will call potential witness Robinson. Opening statements presented. Plaintiff presented case in chief. Witness called, sworn and questioned. Evidence entered. Plaintiff called and sworn. Additional evidence presented. Estimated number of witnesses stated for following day. Jury excused for day to reconvene at 9:00 AM on June 28, 2016. Admitted trial exhibits dated and initialed by Court. Trial adjourned for the day to resume at 9:00 AM on Tuesday, June 28, 2016. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) Duplication of attorney appearance corrected−−Modified on 6/28/2016 (DM, ilcd). (Entered: 06/27/2016)
150 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Robert L Fanning on behalf of William Barnes, Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley (Fanning, Robert) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: JURY TRIAL continued on 6/28/2016. Plaintiff James Fontano present in person with counsel of record, Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills. Law students Michelle Page and Christian Segar also present with Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Alex Dawson and Kevin Standley present in person with counsel of record Robert Fanning, Joshua Ratz and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General. Issue addressed regarding jury asking questions of witnesses. Plaintiff submitted proposed jury instruction. Positions stated. Motion for Reconsideration addressed. Court reserved ruling. Jury requested clarification of how to ask witness questions. Court reiterated previously stated jury instruction. Plaintiff continued presentation of case in chief. Witnesses called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented. Jury Questions submitted to witnesses. Defendant Standley called, sworn and questioned. Additional evidence presented. Outside the presence of the jury, discussion held regarding Motion in Limine. Motion denied. Jury excused and trial adjourned until 9:00 AM on June 29, 2016. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
151 Proposed Jury Instructions by James Fontano. (del Valle, Vanessa) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
152 Proposed Jury Instructions by Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Ratz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/29/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 19 of 20

06/29/2016 06/29/2016
06/30/2016 06/30/2016
06/30/2016 06/30/2016 06/30/2016 07/05/2016 08/01/2016

153 TEXT ORDER: With this text order the Court sends the final marked jury instructions. The Court has not yet ruled on the Court's proposed 2 (pp. 22−23) or the Court's 3 (proposed verdict form). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/29/16. (SG, ilcd) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: JURY TRIAL continued on 6/29/2016. Plaintiff James Fontano present in person with counsel of record, Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills. Law students Michelle Page and Christian Segar also present with Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Alex Dawson and Kevin Standley present in person with counsel of record Robert Fanning, Joshua Ratz and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General. Issue addressed regarding testimony of a witness to be called by Plaintiff. Positions stated. Ruling rendered. Defendant Standley's testimony will reconvene at the presentation of Defendants' case in chief. Jury questions as to Defendant Standley will be addressed at that time. Plaintiff continued presentation of case in chief. Witness called, sworn and questioned. Evidence presented. Defendant Dawson called, sworn and questioned. Additional evidence presented. Issue as to line−up of Plaintiff witnesses addressed. With agreement of the parties, Defendants will present a witness out of sequence. Witness testimony continued. Court advised jury that evidence would be taken out of order and defense would call a witness at this time. Witness called, sworn and questioned. Discussion held as to possible conclusion of presentation of case and deliberation. Jury excused for day to reconvene at 9:00 AM on June 30, 2016. Exhibit and jury conference held. Plaintiff advised Court that video witness scheduled for June 30th would not be called. Offer of Proof made by defense case and accepted by Court. Length of Closing Arguments discussed. Trial adjourned for the day to resume at 9:00 AM on Thursday, June 30, 2016. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
154 RULE 50 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 7/18/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Sue E. Myerscough: JURY TRIAL concluded on 6/30/2016. Plaintiff James Fontano present in person with counsel of record, Locke Bowman, Sheila Bedi, Vanessa Del Valle and Alan Mills. Law students Michelle Page and Christian Segar also present with Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Alex Dawson and Kevin Standley present in person with counsel of record, Joshua Ratz and Margaret Molloy, Office of the Attorney General. Acknowledgment by Court of Defendants' Rule 50 Motion to be presented at the close of Plaintiff's case. Jury Instruction conference held. Exhibits previously admitted were initialed and dated by Court. Plaintiff rested. At the close of plaintiff's case, Defendants' Rule 50 motion asserted with ruling deferred until review by Court. Presentation of Defendants' case in chief began. Defendant Standley called, sworn and questioned. Jury questions asked. Defendants' Rule 50 Motion denied. Discussion regarding further witness testimony and closings. After lunch break, Court informed by parties that a settlement had been reached. Plaintiff stated personal acknowledgment and satisfaction of settlement terms. Jury called to court and discharged. Order to enter. Trial concluded. (Court Reporter KS.) (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
155 Jury Questions−−marked 1 thru 19. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
157 Plaintiff's Exhibit List−−Marked at Trial. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
158 Defendants' Exhibit List−−Marked at Trial. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
TEXT ORDER Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/5/16. Following the lunch break on the third day of trial, the parties reported to the Court that they have settled this case. Accordingly, the jury was informed of the settlement and discharged. Within 30 days of the entry of this order, the parties are directed to submit a joint stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties and lead counsel. For the record, at trial the Court granted Defendants' motion for reconsideration regarding the admission of Plaintiff's conviction for foiling a screen test 145 . Defendants' motion for reconsideration regarding jury instructions is denied as moot 144 . (SW, ilcd) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
159 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Stipulation of Dismissal by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 8/18/2016 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 08/01/2016)

Case: 3:12-cv-3042 As of: 12/11/2016 03:03 PM CST 20 of 20

08/02/2016
08/11/2016 08/15/2016
08/19/2016 08/22/2016
09/01/2016 09/09/2016

TEXT ORDER: The Parties' joint motion for extension of time 159 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Parties have up to and including August 11, 2016, within which to file their joint stipulation of dismissal. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/02/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
160 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Stipulation of Dismissal by Plaintiff James Fontano. Responses due by 8/29/2016 (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The Parties' joint motion for extension of time 160 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Parties have up to and including August 19, 2016, within which to file their joint stipulation of dismissal. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/15/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
161 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to File The Stipulation of Dismissal (Joint) by Defendants Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. Responses due by 9/6/2016 (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
TEXT ORDER: The Parties' joint motion for third extension of time 161 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Parties have up to and including September 1, 2016, within which to file their joint stipulation of dismissal. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/22/2016. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
162 STIPULATION of Dismissal (Joint) by Alex Dawson, Kevin Standley. (Molloy, Margaret) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
163 ORDER Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 09/08/2016. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. This case is dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs. This case is terminated. (DM, ilcd) (Entered: 09/09/2016)