459 F.Supp. 1 (1977)
Ronni ALEXANDER et al. v.
YALE UNIVERSITY.
Civ. No. N-77-277.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
December 21, 1977.
2*2 Anne Simon, New Haven, Conn., Margaret Kohn, Washington, D.C., Susan Meredith, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.
William Doyle, Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Conn., for defendant.
NEWMAN, District Judge.
The Ruling of the Magistrate is hereby adopted as the decision of the Court. Because of the significance of the issue concerning Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Ruling is set forth in full as Appendix A.
APPENDIX A
ARTHUR H. LATIMER, Magistrate.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The appropriateness of immediate federal judicial relief is at issue in the instant civil action seeking redress for purported sex discrimination at Yale University. Plaintiffs are a male faculty member and several women students or former students who fundamentally contend that the defendant university's purportedg

"failure to combat sexual harassment of female students and its refusal to institute mechanisms and procedures to address complaints and make investigations of such harassment interferes with the educational process and denies equal opportunity in education."
In requesting corrective measures "to be designed and implemented under the supervision of this Court", plaintiffs assert a right to relief individually and on behalf of a proposed class under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides in pertinent part in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...."
In express terms, Tile IX calls for administrative enforcement of that prohibition against sex discrimination, with funding cut-off a potential sanction when "compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means", 20 U.S.C. § 1682, but plaintiffs have not attempted resort to the responsible enforcing agency, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The statute contains no explicit grant of private suit rights other than through ultimate judicial review of H.E.W.'s actions, see 20 U.S.C. § 1683, and in moving to dismiss defendant chiefly argues that no right to sue can be properly "implied".
It is of course settled that no express statutory reference to a right of action is required to enable federal courts "to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose", J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), and judicial remedies accordingly have been thought appropriately "implied" when "congressional purposes are likely to be undermined absent private enforcement" by those "intended to be protected by the statute", Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25, 97 S.Ct. 926, 941, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977). The general inquiry prompted by defendant's pending motion then is "whether the creation by judicial interpretation of the implied cause of action asserted . . . is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals", id. at 26, 97 S.Ct. at 941.
That "need" inquiry here involves distinct aspects. A logical prerequisite is that there be a sufficiently defined wrong under the statute invoked, and claims for relief adequately presented by the parties plaintiff. In this regard, it should be stressed at the outset that while the complaint deserves generous reading, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), the question is not so much the customary one on motion to dismiss — whether plaintiffs could conceivably prove facts calling into play an established right 3*3 of action — as instead whether any circumstance depicted genuinely impels judicial creation of a new suit right, cf. Turpin v. Mailet, Civil No. N-75-181 (D.Conn. May 13, 1977). Such an approach is surely also consistent with Title IX's aims, for the statute is clearly addressed to specific practices of exclusion,

inequitable resource allocation and similar concrete abuses. So viewed, most claims advanced in this action are tenuous indeed.
The complaint is founded on alleged instances of sexual harassment of women students by male faculty members or administrators, and the principal claim for relief is for an order "requiring defendant to institute and continue a mechanism for receiving, investigating and adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment", with plaintiffs asserting in conclusory fashion that their reported experiences are somehow
"the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its officers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusing to consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women students, with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual harassment of female students by male faculty members and administrators."
Before considering the university's possible responsibility, however, it must be observed that in any event a number of the proposed plaintiffs simply advance no persuasive claim that they have been deprived of cognizable Title IX rights. Plaintiff John Winkler, a member of the classics department, believes his teaching effort to have been hampered by an "atmosphere of distrust [of] male professors"; plaintiff Lisa Stone, a current student, speaks of "great emotional distress" on learning that another woman student was "the subject of sexual pressures and attentions from" a male university employee; plaintiff Ann Olivarius, a recent Yale graduate, relates that she had occasion as an officer of the Undergraduate Women's Caucus when at Yale to discuss with other students their complaints of sexual harassment, and allegedly met rebuff or indifference in attempting to press such complaints herself. None of these claims is of personal exclusion from a federally funded education program or activity, or of the personal denial of full participation in the benefits of such a program or activity in any measurable sense. No judicial enforcement of Title IX could properly extend to such imponderables as atmosphere or vicariously experienced wrong, and the claims just mentioned are untenable on their face.
Since any underlying claim that she was herself denied Title IX rights in unsuccessfully pursuing others' complaints does not merit recognition, there is no need to examine the propriety otherwise of the lone request for damages, plaintiff Olivarius' incidental prayer for $500 as compensation for asserted expenditure of "time, effort and money in investigating complaints herself, preparing them to be presented to responsible officials . . . and attempting to negotiate the complexities of ad hoc `channels'". Moreover, her graduation seems to have rendered moot her claim for equitable relief, which would appear to be the case as well for plaintiff Ronni Alexander — a graduate in 1977 before suit was commenced — absent sheer conjecture that the latter may in the future wish to resume study in a field allegedly abandoned at Yale because of "sexual demands" by her tutor, cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, n. 5 at 320, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974).

Currently at Yale are two other women students who — like plaintiff Alexander — complain of a direct, personal experience of sexual harassment. Plaintiff Margery Reifler speaks in general terms of humiliation, distraction from studies and denial of recognition resulting from alleged harassment by a coach when she was manager of an athletic team; she "wanted to complain to responsible authorities" but did not. Plaintiff Pamela Price asserts that she received a poor grade in a course in her major field of study, not due to any "fair evaluation of her academic work", but as the consequence of her rejecting a professor's outright proposition "to give her a grade of `A' in the 4*4 course in exchange for her compliance with his sexual demands". Price represents that she did complain promptly after that alleged incident only to be "told by responsible officials of defendant that nothing could be done to remedy her situation"; plaintiff further alleges that long after the ensuing course mark was given, she was asked to re-submit her complaint, but then "no investigation of the incident" was made and Yale officials have indicated that "nothing further will or can be done about her complaint". Plaintiff Price is a senior, in the process of applying to law schools, and expresses immediate concern that a clearly improper low grade "could materially damage . . . likelihood of admission".
A critical difference between these two claims is that plaintiff Reifler concededly made no complaint on which Yale could act, while plaintiff Price did complain to the university and supposedly met rebuff. The former's artfully drafted but conclusory assertion that general university inertia should be equated with policy and has "the effect of actively condoning . . . sexual harassment" is simply not adequate to show that Yale acted to deny her any right, cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-377, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606-607, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Turpin, supra, and the concept of mere respondeat superior appears ill-adapted to the question of Title IX sex discrimination based on harassment incidents. This is not to say either that sexual harassment is never of concern under Title IX, or that a university may properly ignore the matter entirely. In plaintiff Price's case, for example, it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex discrimination in employment, see, e. g., Barnes v. Costle, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 561 F.2d 983, 988-992 (1977). When a complaint of such an incident is made, university inaction then does assume significance, for on refusing to investigate, the institution may sensibly be held responsible for condoning or ratifying the employee's invidiously discriminatory conduct, cf. id. at 1000-1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
But may any such private suit be entertained? The only reported appellate decision is contrary to plaintiffs' position, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit having held in the context of sex discrimination alleged by a disappointed medical school applicant that
"it would be an unwarranted exercise of federal judicial power to imply a private right of action in the face of a sophisticated scheme of administrative enforcement and judicial review that, if given

an opportunity to work, may well prove itself adequate to the task for which Congress designed it."
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1082 (7 Cir. 1977) (on rehearing). On careful study of the factors pertinent to any such conclusion, however, this Court is unable to agree that the private claim may be summarily dismissed without further inquiry into actual need.
As pointed out initially, the overall question is whether the federal court should recognize or fashion a new suit right because "necessary to effectuate Congress' goals", Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., supra, 430 U.S. at 26, 97 S.Ct. 926. The commonly accepted approach to the question of implying a judicial remedy, seemingly still valid, id. at 37, 97 S.Ct. 926, has been to examine four specific factors identified as relevant in Cort v. Ash,422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975):
"First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 [36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874] (1916) (emphasis supplied) — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 5*5 U.S. 453, 458, 460 [94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646] (1974) (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,421 U.S. 412, 423 [95 S.Ct. 1733, 44 L.Ed.2d 263] (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 [85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190] (1964). And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler,373 U.S. 647, 652 [83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605] (1963); cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 [84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423] (1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-395, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); id., at 400, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)."
It is clear that plaintiff Price is within the class Title IX was designed to protect and that the claim is in no realistic sense more appropriate for state court action. Title IX's legislative history does not unequivocally show an express congressional intent to permit or preclude a private right of action, and although the history of subsequent passage of the Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended, may perhaps be read to indicate that the latter statute's mention of Title IX was but prudent inclusion in the event courts did thereafter imply a private remedy, plaintiff's resort to this Court is certainly not ruled out, see Cort v. Ash, supra at 82, 95 S.Ct. 2080. Indeed, H.E.W. has further urged here and in Cannon that private suit enforcement would promote Title IX's purpose. The Cannon panel concluded that leave to sue "would be inconsistent with the legislative intent and underlying purposes of the statutory scheme", Cannon, supra at 1080, that court discerning "implicit" intent in the stress on the administrative process and expressing concern

lest "private parties . . . circumvent the remedial scheme created by Congress", id. at 1081, with the "remedies available" not shown "wholly inadequate", id. at 1082.
One difficulty with following Cannon is that the decision may yield substantially different enforcement rights to victims of sex discrimination than to those subjected to discrimination in federally assisted programs "on the ground of race, color, or national origin" in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.,although Title IX was obviously patterned after Title VI, including its enforcement provisions, see §§ 2000d-1, 2000d-2. It seems plain enough that Title VI violations are actionable, see, e. g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), and it is hard to understand why all Title IX claims should be less favorably regarded. It naturally has been suggested that such Title VI cases have been against "public" defendants and therefore strictly rest on the Civil Rights Act's grant of the right to sue for a deprivation under color of state law "of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws", 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Cannon, supra at 1083. If so, it could hardly be a principled distinction that one student would be at Yale and another at the University of Connecticut; if the state college student can secure judicial relief under § 1983, the more reason to imply a suit right for the identically situated private university student, cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
More importantly, perhaps, the issue of need for the remedy merits additional probing. While the Supreme Court has remarked that "express statutory provision for one form of proceeding ordinarily implies that no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature", Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419, 95 S.Ct. 1733, 1738 44 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975) ("SIPC"), see also National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) ("Amtrak"), the observation has been made 6*6 in the context of either clearer legislative intent than is provided by Title IX's ambiguous history — a statute based on Title VI and curiously followed by subsequent legislative mention of attorney's fees — compare Amtrak, supra at 459-461, 94 S.Ct. 690, or of manifestly disruptive consequences of private suit, see id. at 461-465, 94 S.Ct. 690; SIPC, supra at 421423,95 S.Ct. 1733, which are not evident for all possible Title IX claims. It is obviously significant that the enforcing agency urges recognition of private suit rights, see, e. g.,Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, n. 23 at 557, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), particularly since H.E.W.'s position that private enforcement is at least a helpful supplement is a reasonable one, cf. SIPC, supra at 424-425, 95 S.Ct. 1733. In view of that stance, it may be improvident either hastily to infer an unexpressed legislative "intent" to bar any such suit, or merely to assume inconsistency between remedies.
As amici curiae, the Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund and the National Organization for Women Legal Defense Fund contend in further support of plaintiffs that it is already patent under Title IX that "the remedies available have proven to be wholly inadequate to the task of protecting those rights", Cannon, supra at 1082. To the extent factual and concerned

with delayed and circumscribed administrative enforcement, the argument cannot be accepted outright without opportunity for reply by defendant. In the light of H.E.W.'s long delay even in promulgating enforcing regulations, however, the contentions advanced are surely not insubstantial, and it seems unsound to dismiss this complaint in its entirety at the outset on sheer assumption that administrative enforcement may prove adequate while refusing to allow a threshold showing purporting to demonstrate the contrary.
For similar reasons, plaintiff Price's complaint may not be dismissed on its face despite failure to seek any administrative recourse whatsoever, since ordinarily beneficial and fair requirements of administrative exhaustion should not be imposed absent realistic possibility of a meaningful remedy. Although H.E.W. could hardly evince indifference to what amounts to a claim that Yale has not complied with the basic implementing regulation calling for Title IX "grievance procedures", 45 C.F.R. § 86.8(b), and while under the Title VI regulations also made applicable in Title IX matters, 45 C.F.R. § 86.71, an individual may make a written complaint which would at least obligate H.E.W. to make initial "prompt investigation" if the information provided "indicates a possible failure to comply" with Title IX duties, 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b)-(c), there is good reason to believe that to leave Price to her administrative remedy would be an empty exercise. Putting to one side unconceded representations that the enforcement system is grossly deficient in actual operation, it is not realistic to expect even that "prompt" first-step administrative action — much less any multistage proceedings — could yield an effective remedy to one claiming imminent injury, with only a short interval between Yale's supposed abandonment of her complaint and the law school application process. Beyond the prayer for a court-ordered complaint mechanism, plaintiff Price has specifically requested investigation and a transcript notation in the interim that the disputed grade is under review, which clearly are potentially effective measures. Whether any such relief is proper is of course not the issue on the motion to dismiss, cf. Guild of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284, 288 (2 Cir. 1971), but can be immediately tested on plaintiff's nowpending motion for preliminary injunction.
As far as this plaintiff is concerned, defendant's attendant jurisdictional objection lacks compelling force. If the federal statutory claim may not rest on the jurisdictional grant extending to suits for relief "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights", 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), but cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 n. 1at 412, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Court cannot hold with requisite certainty in this instance that the amount in controversy is inadequate 7*7 to support proceedings under the general federal question grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendant has also suggested that Title IX may be unconstitutional if construed to allow private suit, but advances no convincing authority for that contention in the situation presented.
For the reasons stated above, the instant motion to dismiss is accordingly hereby granted as to plaintiffs Alexander, Olivarius, Reifler, Stone and Winkler, and denied as to plaintiff Price.

 
 631 F.2d 178 (1980)
Ronni ALEXANDER, Ann Olivarius, Pamela Price, Margery Reifler and Lisa Stone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
YALE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 559, Docket 79-7547.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued April 16, 1980. Decided September 22, 1980.
179*179 180*180 Nadine Taub, Women's Rights Litigation Clinic, Rutgers School of Law, Newark, N. J. (Elizabeth Schneider, New York City, Anne E. Simon, Pillsbury & Simon, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.
S. Robert Jelley, New Haven, Conn. (William J. Doyle, Edward W. Dunham, Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Joan Vermeulen, Hoboken, N. J., and Michael Krinsky, New York City, for amici curiae The American Civil Liberties Union, The Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund, Working Women's Institute, The National Conference of Black Lawyers and Black Women Organized for Political Action.
Nancy L. Davis, Joan Messing Graff, Judith E. Kurtz, San Francisco, Cal., for amici curiae Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. and Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment.

Before LUMBARD and MULLIGAN, Circuit Judges, and SPEARS, District Judge.[*]
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:
Five women who were students at Yale University appeal from a judgment entered by Judge Burns on July 3, 1979, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The appellants alleged in their complaint that Yale was violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and H.E.W.'s Title IX regulations, by refusing to consider seriously women students' complaints of sexual harassment by male faculty members and administrators. They argue that the district court erred in dismissing four of them as plaintiffs, in denying plaintiff Pamela Price's subsequent request for class certification, in excluding certain evidence from the trial of Price's claim, and in failing to grant the relief requested — an order enjoining Yale to institute a procedure for receiving and investigating complaints of sexual harassment — because Price failed to prove that she was sexually harassed. We affirm the judgment of the district court for Yale as to all of the plaintiffs.
I.
Section 1681 of Title IX (hereinafter "Title IX") states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
Under the authority of § 1682, H.E.W. requires educational institutions receiving federal assistance to "adopt grievance procedures 181*181 providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part." 45 C.F.R. § 86.8(b).
In an amended complaint filed on November 15, 1977, three female students, two female graduates, and one male professor at Yale alleged that Yale's "failure to combat sexual harassment of female students and its refusal to institute mechanisms and procedures to

address complaints and make investigations of such harassment interferes with the educational process and denies equal opportunity in education" in violation of Title IX and H.E.W.'s regulation.[1] The plaintiffs sought as relief (1) a declaratory judgment that Yale's policies and practices regarding sexual harassment violate Title IX and (2) an order enjoining Yale, among other duties, "to institute and continue a mechanism for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment, to be designed and implemented under the supervision" of the district court.
The plaintiffs sought that relief on behalf of themselves and the class, which they purported to represent, of those Yale students and faculty members "who are disadvantaged and obstructed in their educational relations" by Yale's failure to combat sexual harassment. More specifically, they sued on behalf of (1) female students who have had to choose between tolerating sexual demands from "men in positions of authority at Yale" or sacrificing "any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally;" (2) female students who "are subject to the discriminatory atmosphere adverse to their educational development created by the practice of such sexual harassment;" and (3) all faculty members "whose professional effectiveness in teaching and in engaging in the pursuit of knowledge with students is seriously impaired by that contamination of the faculty/student relationship created by defendant's tolerance of said sexual pressures."
Additionally, each plaintiff alleged an injury which was "the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its officers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusing to consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women students, with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual harassment of female students by male faculty members and administrators." Thus:
Ronni Alexander, a 1977 graduate of Yale College, alleged that she "found it impossible to continue playing the flute and abandoned her study of the instrument, thus aborting her desired professional career," because of the repeated sexual advances, "including coerced sexual intercourse," by her flute instructor, Keith Brion. Alexander further alleged that she attempted to complain to Yale officials about her harassment, but "was

discouraged and intimidated by unresponsive administrators and complex and ad hoc methods."
Margery Reifler, a member of the Class of 1980, alleged that Richard Kentwell, coach of the field hockey team, "sexually harassed" her while she was working as that team's manager, and that she "suffered distress and humiliation .... and was denied recognition due her as team manager, all to her educational detriment." Reifler further alleged that she "wanted to complain to responsible authorities of defendant about said sexual harassment but was intimidated by the lack of legitimate procedures and was unable to determine if any channels for complaint about sexual harassment were available to her."
182*182 Pamela Price, a member of the Class of 1979, alleged that one of her course instructors, Raymond Duvall, "offered to give her a grade of `A' in the course in exchange for her compliance with his sexual demands," that she refused, and that she received a grade of "C" which "was not the result of a fair evaluation of her academic work, but the result of her failure to accede to Professor Duvall's sexual demands." She further alleges that she complained to officials of Yale who failed to investigate her complaint and told her that "nothing could be done to remedy her situation."
Lisa Stone, a member of the Class of 1978, alleged that her discussions with a woman student who had been sexually harassed and the absence of an "established, legitimate procedure" for complaints of such harassment caused her "emotional distress," deprived her of "the tranquil atmosphere necessary to her pursuit of a liberal education," and put her "in fear of her own associations with men in positions of authority at Yale."
Ann Olivarius, a 1977 graduate, alleged that the absence of a procedure for complaining about sexual harassment "forced [her] to expend time, effort and money in investigating complaints herself, preparing them to be presented to responsible officials of defendant, and attempting to negotiate the complexities of ad hoc `channels.'" Olivarius further alleged that she was "subjected to threats and intimidation from individuals involved in her investigations and was given no protection or encouragement by responsible officials of defendant."[2]

Then District Judge Newman, upon the opinion of Magistrate Latimer, dismissed all the plaintiffs but Price in an order entered on December 21, 1977. 459 F.Supp. 1 (D.Conn.1977). The court dismissed Stone and Olivarius on the ground that they had not asserted claims "of personal exclusion from a federally funded education program or activity, or of the personal denial of full participation in the benefits of such a program or activity in any measurable sense." Believing that "[n]o judicial enforcement of Title IX could properly extend to such imponderables as atmosphere or vicariously experienced wrong," the court held that Stone and Olivarius "advance[d] no persuasive claim that they have been deprived of cognizable Title IX rights." The court dismissed Alexander, although she alleged a "personal experience of sexual harassment," on the ground that her graduation mooted her claim for equitable relief absent the "sheer conjecture" that she might someday wish to resume her flute studies. The court dismissed Reifler, although she too alleged a personal experience of sexual harassment, because she had not complained to anyone at Yale. Citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), the court concluded that Reifler's claim "that general university inertia should be equated with policy and has `the effect of actively condoning ... sexual harassment' is simply not adequate to show that Yale acted to deny her any right;" and the court further held that "the concept of mere respondeat superior appears ill — adapted to the question of Title IX sex discrimination based on harassment incidents." As to Price, the court held that "academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education," and it therefore refused to dismiss Price.
Price subsequently sought class certification for female students at Yale who are discriminated against on the basis of sex by Yale's policies and practices "with respect to the sexual harassment of women students by men in positions of authority, in particular by male faculty members and administrators, specifically by having to choose between toleration of, or compliance with, sexual demands and pressures by such men and any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally." Up to this time, the district court had not passed judgment upon the plaintiffs' request for class certification. Price also sought discovery aimed, in addition to 183*183 adducing evidence

supporting her personal claim, at adducing evidence supporting the claims of the class. Magistrate Latimer denied both the class certification and the extensive discovery request. In an unreported opinion, Magistrate Latimer found "no compelling reason to certify a class, there being no reasonable probability that plaintiff's individual claim will become moot in the near future ... and any equitable relief to which she may be possibly entitled being obviously such as to inure to the benefit of all." He then narrowed Price's discovery request correspondingly.
After the trial of Price's claim, Judge Burns found that "the alleged incident of sexual proposition did not occur and the grade of `C' which Miss Price received on the paper submitted to Professor Duvall and the grade of `C' which she received in his course did not reflect consideration of any factor other than academic achievement." Accordingly, although the district court agreed that Yale's procedures for handling complaints of sexual harassment were inadequate, it refused to enjoin Yale to establish a different procedure, concluding, "[I]t does not follow that, if Yale University failed to articulate appropriate procedures to deal with such a claim, a plaintiff who can show neither an improper advance nor the injury she claimed has a grievance to be redressed by this court." The district court therefore entered judgment for Yale, and the five female plaintiffs (hereinafter "appellants") brought their appeal.
II.
We first consider the claims raised by Olivarius, Stone, Alexander and Reifler. We find that the district court should be affirmed as to these plaintiffs because none of them presents a justiciable case or controversy.
In order to proceed with suit in the federal courts, a party seeking relief must establish both that he or she has suffered a "distinct and palpable injury," Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) and that "the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injury." Duke Power, supra, 438 U.S. at 74, 98 S.Ct. at 2631; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2nd Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Kaufman, C. J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 766, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978). The injury must be suffered personally by the party invoking the court's assistance, and the relief requested must redound to that party's personal benefit.
These requirements are often said to be the prerequisites for "standing" to bring suit. It is also mandatory that they be satisfied throughout the course of adjudication by the courts. This "time element of standing" comes under the rubric of mootness doctrine. See Pickus v. U. S. Board of Parole, 543 F.2d 240, 242 n.3 (D.C.Cir.1976); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 682 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). A party's case or controversy becomes moot either when the injury is healed and only prospective relief has been sought or when it becomes impossible for the courts, through the exercise of their remedial powers, to do anything to redress the injury. We find that none of the claims brought by these four plaintiffs satisfies the prerequisites of justiciability.
Olivarius's claim on appeal from her dismissal presents the weakest case for justiciability. Her allegation that she spent her own time and money investigating women students' complaints of sexual harassment because Yale refused to do so, and that Yale gave her "no protection or encouragement" when she "was subjected to threats and intimidation from individuals involved in her investigations," fails to state the "distinct and palpable injury to [herself]" that is the first requirement of standing, and is inexorably linked to the 184*184 Article III requirement of a case or controversy. Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Olivarius spent her time and money upon her own volition. The allegation that Yale failed to protect and encourage her in her investigations does not allege an injury, for it does not allege that Olivarius was hurt — in any way — by Yale's failure. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of her complaint.
As for the other plaintiffs, including Price, whose claim we discuss below, their graduations[3] appear to prevent the courts both from addressing the predominant injury relied upon — deprivation of an educational environment free from condoned harassment

— and from awarding the relief requested — an order directing Yale to institute effective procedures for receiving and adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment. None of these plaintiffs at present suffers from the alleged injury. Nor would the grant of the requested relief aid these plaintiffs in the slightest. Thus their claims appear moot.
It is perhaps more important to note that, as Yale's counsel has assured us in brief and oral argument, Yale in fact has adopted a set of procedures for hearing such complaints. The procedures were proposed by a committee consisting of faculty, administrators and students, in a report published March 1979, following a year of careful study specifically limited to the problems involved in structuring procedures appropriate for consideration of student complaints of sexual harassment. Furthermore, Yale's counsel has also assured us that although the procedures were originally designed only to receive and consider claims of sexual harassment occurring at Yale College, their jurisdiction has since been expanded to afford consideration of claims by those who suffer harassment while participating in any program sponsored by the University. We have no reason to doubt that the procedures now in effect will tend to alleviate the "atmosphere of inequality" alleged by plaintiffs in this suit. Thus, it appears that the major relief sought in this suit has already been granted.
Nothing more need be said about the complaint brought by Stone. It was based solely upon the fear of association with male faculty and administrators and the general atmosphere of tolerance or condonement of sexual harassment. Graduation has entirely mooted her claim. There is nothing a complaint procedure or any other remedy can do now to redress her alleged injuries. Therefore the exercise of federal court power to pass on her claim "would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation." Simon, supra, 426 U.S. at 38, 96 S.Ct. at 1924.
Both Alexander and Reifler, however, allege additional personal injuries. Nevertheless, what remains of their claims does not seem sufficient to justify judicial action. Their alleged injuries are too speculative. Alexander asserts that sexual harassment by her flute instructor in a University-sponsored music program deterred her from a successful career as a flutist. Needless to say, this is a highly conjectural claim. Reifler claims that sexual

harassment by her field hockey coach caused her to leave the team and fail to receive a varsity letter. What harm she has suffered as a result is not specified.
In a Title IX suit, it is the deprivation of "educational" benefits which, once proven, allows the courts to afford relief. The statute recognizes that loss of educational benefits is a significant injury, redressable by law. Where the alleged deprivation, however, relates to an activity removed from the ordinary educational process, a more detailed allegation of injuries suffered as a result of the deprivation is required. This is not to say that exclusion of all members of one sex from all extra-curricular activities would not give rise to palpable injuries which could be redressed by the courts. Rather, when such activities are involved, more specific allegations as to harm suffered 185*185 are necessary to assure "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends ...." Duke Power, supra, 438 U.S. at 72, 98 S.Ct. at 2630, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and to assure that the exercise of the courts' remedial powers may be designed to redress the alleged injuries.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine what relief a court could possibly award Reifler and Alexander. No money damages have been requested, and as already noted, graduation has mooted their claims for grievance procedures. As the district court remarked, there is nothing left that a court could do to redress Alexander's injury "absent sheer conjecture that [she] may in the future wish to resume study in a field allegedly abandoned at Yale because of `sexual demands' by her tutor." 459 F.Supp. at 3. In appellants' brief on appeal a suggestion has been made that a court might award Reifler a varsity letter, yet we do not believe that such a possibility warrants judicial scrutiny, particularly when the alleged injury is so uncertain.[4] Because we do not believe that the courts should indulge in speculation of the sort required here, we also affirm the dismissal of the complaints of Alexander and Reifler.
We thus agree with the district court that only plaintiff Price presented a justiciable claim for relief under Title IX. That claim, however, was tried and dismissed. We now turn to her assertions on appeal.

III.
The district court found that Price failed at trial to prove that her alleged sexual harassment had in fact occurred. Price argues that, her failure to prove the incident of harassment notwithstanding, the district court should have enjoined Yale to adopt a complaint procedure such as H.E.W. requires, see 45 C.F.R. § 86.8(b), because the gravamen of her complaint is that she was deprived of an institutional grievance procedure that would promptly and equitably have resolved her claim. She also argues that the district court erred in refusing to certify her suit as a class action, in limiting the evidence at her trial to that relevant to her own alleged harassment, and in refusing to reopen the record after trial to receive testimony of one who supposedly could verify her allegation. We disagree. As Price failed to prove her case, she failed to prove any perceptible harm and therefore she lacks standing to attack Yale's failure to establish a complaint procedure, and she is not a proper representative of the purported class.
Price's failure of proof forecloses her argument that the district court erred in refusing to certify her suit as a class action, for the trial court concluded that Price is not a member of the class of discriminatees she purported to represent. She is not, therefore, a proper class representative under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 23(a). Consequently, there is no reason for us to remand for class certification of Price's claim. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1896, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977). It also follows that the district court did not err in limiting the evidence at trial to that which was relevant to Price's claim.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Price's post-trial motion to receive the testimony of Richard Medley, a Yale student who once claimed to have witnessed the aftermath of Price's harassment. To support her motion, Price submitted affidavits by two Yale students who swore that two years after the alleged harassment Medley had told them that he had seen Price leave Duvall's office 186*186 visibly upset, that he had asked Duvall what had happened, and that Duvall had said that he had offered Price an "A" in return for sexual favors, but Price refused. Price also submitted the affidavit of her attorney, who swore that Medley had subsequently told her that he had concocted

this story. In opposition to Price's motion, Yale submitted the affidavit of Medley, who swore that he had been drunk and had lied when he made those statements to the Yale students.
The district court acted well within its discretion in refusing to reopen the record after trial to receive Medley's testimony, the weight of which could at best have been slight.
We affirm the judgment for Yale as to all of the plaintiffs.
[*] Honorable Adrian A. Spears, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
[1] The plaintiffs alleged that Yale "receives Federal assistance," but Yale argues that the plaintiffs have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction by failing to allege that they were subjected to discrimination in specific federally assisted programs or activities. However, in moving for dismissal. Yale accepted arguendo the allegations that it receives federal assistance and that incidents of sexual harassment pervade the university. Those allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to establish a nexus between discrimination and federal assistance. Whether such a nexus actually exists is of course a question calling for proof. Yale never raised this issue in the protracted pretrial motions, and cannot stand on it now.
[2] The Yale faculty member, John Winkler, also alleged an injury, but we do not recite his allegations or the district court's grounds for dismissal because Winkler did not appeal.
[3] The case was briefed and argued prior to the graduation of plaintiff Reifler, a member of the Yale College class of 1980. We have no reason to believe that Reifler has not graduated with her class, and we therefore apply our decision as to mootness to her claim as well.
[4] Reifler's standing to bring suit is lacking for another reason: she did not notify any University officials of her harassment allegations. The complaint in this case centers around the University's failure to make any serious response to registered complaints of sexual harassment, thereby discouraging females from availing themselves of the full benefits of a Yale education. Reifler, however, does not allege that she made any requests of Yale administrators which were ignored or given perfunctory attention. Thus, she seems an improper party to bring charges of administrative laxity.

 
 ."~..'

5~

g~ Alexander v. Yale: Collected Doucuments from the Yale Undergraduate

wa:
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Women's Caucus and Grievance Committe~.

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- STATEMENT -

w .:..r.. ~oa:

IO-u~.. On July 2, Judge Ellen Bree Burns issued her opinion in the

case Pr.ice v. Yale, finding, after a trial, that the plaintiff had

not proved her allegations of sex discrimination based on the

university's lack of adequate grievance mechanisms to handle·com-

plaints of sexual harassment. The Judge based her decision on her

findings of fact that the incident did not occur and that Price

had not shown any adverse influence on her grade in the course.

The Judge noted that when Price first complained, "Yale

University had no ••• regulations setting forth any procedures

to provide for resolution of such complaints." She further agreed

with the plaintiff that, when Yale did have regulations setting •
forth procedures, "the procedures ••• give no real guidance to

students or to faculty .as to procedure to be followed with respect '

to claims such as Miss Price had made. 11 She concluded, however,

that the absence of such procedures did not adversely affect Ms.

Price's educational opportunities.

"It is hard to imagine, 11 said Anne Simon, one of the attorneys

for Pamela Price, 11 how the judge could have come to this conclusion

when the legal basis of the case was Title IX, which requires regu-

larized procedures as part of universities• obligation not to

discriminate against their students on the basis of sex. The

decision fails to take seriously the possibility that Yale really

is under some legal obligations to its students." By focusing on

the individuals rather than on Title IX, the judge reduced the

case to a black woman's accusation and a white man's denial of

improper sexual conduct, with all too predictable results. Judge·

Burns found that the incident did not occur, but the opinion offered

no support for this conclusion. "It is appalling, in this day and

age, that a finding of this sort, which amounts to saying that

Price made the entire thing up, can be made without providing any

evidence from the trial to back i t up, 11 commented Phyllis Crocker,

a leqal worker on the case.
1 -
f)
/.-

US Ol!l'AltfMl!NT 01' HEALTH, EOUCATION & WELFAllE NA flOlfAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO· OUCED EllACfLV AS RECEIVED l"ROM f11E PERSON 011 ORGANIZATION ORIGIN• ATING If POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS ~fAfEO 00 NOT NECfSSAltlL Y REPllE• SENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE: OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

• 11 It 1 s the same old story," said Ms. Price. "Where sex is concerned, black women's accusations are considered lies and white men's denials are believed. Unfortunately, the trial, which was presided over by a woman, was merely another manifestation of the racism and sexism pervasive in society and reflected in its laws. It is symbolic that I entered this case primarily because I am a woman and lost it primarily because I am a black woman. But that is all the mor~ reason for us to continue to fight back against all forms of oppression."
"This decision makes clear that Judge Burns lacked the guts and insight necessary to really listen to a woman's painful experience of sexual harassment and to challenge Yale's neglect of her complaints. The irony, however, is that we lost this round, but achieved other important goals. Women in universities all over the country are now coming forward with their complaints, breaking the debilitating fear and isolation which have rendered sexual harassment invisible for so long," said Linda Hoaglund, of the Grievance Committee of Yale*s Undergraduate Women's Caucus.
Price's lawyers are considering appealing the decision. "We lost the wrong case," Anne Simon observed. "Judge Burns did not allow any evidence that would have shown that Yale discriminates against women. Her decision is vulnerable to attack on appeal for t h a t reason, al though her emphasis on the •facts 1· might make an appellate court less likely to reverse her decision. It's unfortunate that an issue of such legal and political importance to women was so constricted in the way it could be presented in court, but one unenlightened decision is not going to stop women from speaking out about sexual harassment."

... 2 -

.I

3

 
 Alcx.tpder v. Yale
The leqal system and the legal language have constrained the larqer issuPs ruised by Alexander v. Yale. Instead of focusinq on thf~ humi 1 i <1t ion and anguish women suffer in their experiencPs of sexual hdrassment, it has focused on legal technicalities and has become an individual damage issue. The case at this point has been effectively reduced to one Yal(' woman's experiencP of sexual harassment by one Yale professor. This is testimony to the inadequacy of the law in addrPssinq the real issues and problems in people's lives. In this instance, it has both trivialized and made abstract the very real pain of sexually harassed women.
The case raises issues relevant to all women. It is one mon:·• instance of women fighting to free themselves from the vulnerdbility that n•sults from their social and political powerlessness. We ure r0fusing to submit to the threats and manipulations of men in positions of power. We are refusing to allow tho5P men to control our liv.e.. s and tell us what to do. For b LK'k women. th i ~ struggle is compounded by the
realities of rdsicm in Amf:•rica today.
ThPrPfon•, WP dPm,a1d t hP right of women at Yale in particular t ,, r.111 Pducc1 t ion r r·"" r n:rn1 t hP deqrPda t ion of sexual harassment, r'i11t in 9> doi nq w<· d1·m.ir1r! t hP riqht. of all women to a life free

Ronni AlPx;inder

l) d m<> 1 d Pr i c P

4 l~~1dd Hoag Jund, YUWC

~ --·~

\C\~

 
 Nzw HAVEN l.IAw Cm..LEcnVE
LAw 0Fna:s ov B~N. HARVEY & SIMON
938 CHAPEi. S'J'RDT
Nsw HAvEN. CoNNECTIC111' 00510 TEl.DHONE (200) 771-8401
STATEMENT Bringing to a close nearly a year and a half of legal argument, federal judge Ellen Bree Burns has denied Yale University•s request to dismiss a lawsuit, Price v. Yale University, charging the university with sex discrimination based on sexual harassment of women students. In a ruling filed in Federal District Court in New Haven on November 29, Judge Burns cleared the way for a trial on the merits of the plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The ruling, one of a number of legal decisions in the case, was made after an extensive hearing on the role of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare in the enforcement of Title IX,
which forbids sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funds. After considering the testimony of John Bynoe, Director of HEW'S Region 1 office in Boston, Judge Burns concluded that "it is highly doubtful that HEW was practically capable of providing plaintiff Price with any meaningful remedy within an adequate period of time." And acting on legal arguments advanced by both HEW and the plaintiff, the court further concluded that "even if HEW had taken steps to pursue the sort of administrative remedy for which it is designed, such remedy would still not be
sufficiently adequate to foreclose the need for implying a private right of action under Title IX. 11
-more-
5

page 2, STATEMENT 'l'he decision disposed of the issue most consistently
pressed by Yale - that the plaintiffs in the suit must complain
to HEW, rather than seek relief in federal court. In her opinion, Judge Burns emphasized the importance of access to federal courts, noting that HEW is only empowered to· cut off federal funds to an offending institution, and "there is nothing to stop Yale from paying the price of that sanction if it so desires." Further, such a drastic step can be taken only after HEW "wrestles with the legal resources and bu,r-eaucratic footdragging of a recalcitrant recipient institution."
Anne Simon, the plaintiff's attorney, expressed satisfaction with the decision. "We are pleased that Judge Burns so clearly recognized how important it is for individual women to be able to enforce their right to an education free from sex discrimination. Now we can return to the real issue in this case - the university's responsibility to take action against sexual harassment."
November 30, 1978
J

 
 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

3 February 1978

In a path-breaking decision with profound implications for all

women, Magistrate Latimer decided that sexual harassment can be

sex discrimination in edueation. His decision reads:

.. It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex
discrimination in education ••• When a complaint of such an incident
is made, university inaction then does assume signi~icance, for on refusing to investigate, the institution may sensibly be held responsible for condoning or ratifying the employee's invidiously discriminatory conduct. 11 (p.6)

No court has recognized this before. He also concluded that such a

claim of discrimination can, at least in some circumstances, be presented

directly-to a federal court, without first having to complain to the

overburdened Department of Health, Education and Welfare. He

rejected Yale's contention that no university receiving federal funds

could be ehld responsible for discrimination except by complaint

to HEW.

In making these decisions, the judge excluded the claims of some

of the plaintiffs. This is a common practice when cases raising new

legal claim~. are first presented, as the courts try to work out how

to treat novel claims. In this case, three plaintiffs were excluded

because they were not direct victims of sexual harassment. One was

excluded because they were not direct victims of sexual harassment.

One was excluded because she has graduated, not because her complaint

might not have been valid if she were still a student. One was

excluded because the judge~ d1d not think that she had complained

about her incident enough. In none of these cases did the judge

make any dec1s1on on the facts of the claims.

These c;xclus1ons raisr· sPvc~ral questions. Are only direct

victims hurt by a system that condones soxual harassment? Do

women stop being hurt by Y<ll.P's inaction thl' moment they graduate'?

,.
Should a woman be required to complain to a nonexistent procedure befor'e she can be allowed to complain about ·....s nonexistence?
The plaintiff wh~·satisfied the judge's criteria - a direct victim, still a student, who complained vigorously - exemplifies
.. his definition of that injury of sexual harassment for which he is
willing, as a matter of law, to hold the university responsible.
Others might carry it further. But this first recognition that
Yale University is responsible under federal law for its treatment
of women who complain about sexual explo t~tion in education
is little short of revolutionary.
Official Yale reports of this case contain misrepresentations of
the judge's decision. The Yale Weekly Bulletin of Jan 23-30 states:
"The Magistrate did not reach a decision on the merits 0£ the claim of the sixth plaintiff, and declined to rule at this time on Yale's position that the claim should be dismissed ••• 11
A letter from President Gray to a emember of the Grievance Committe~
and to parents who have inquired about the lawsuit repeated the
erroneous statement. Magistrate Latimer specifically says: "Plaintiff Price's complaint may not be dismissed on its
face. (p.10) ••. For reasons stated above, the instant motion to dismiss is accordingly hereby granted as to plaintiffs Ale~ander, Olivarius, Reifler, Stone and Winkler, and denied as to plaintiff Price." (Emphasis ours) Contrary to Yale's claims, the judge did make a decision on
YalP's motion to dismiss the case of the sixth paaintiff. on January 3··1, 1978 Judq(~ Newman officially accepted Magistrate
Latimer's op1n1on~

 
 .
NEw .HAVEN ~w ColUC'l"IVB LAw OFFICES OF B~\N, H.uwv & S1MoN
938 C.u.~,u Snm:r Nzw &vu. cdNNECTrCUT 06510
TElDHONE ( 200) 771-3401

-FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE-

In a careful decision with far-ranging implications for women,

Federal Magistrate A~thur Latimer on December 21 held that the law-

suit against Yale University for sex discrimination based on sexual

harassment, pending since July, 1977' in New Haven, may go forward

to a trial on the merits. Using reasoning developed in the context

of employment discrimination, he held that sexual harassment, if

proven, can constitute sex discrimination in federally funded edu-

cational programs. This is the first time that such a ruling has

been made, according to Anne .Simon, attorney for the plaintiffs.

Magistrate Latimer also granted the right to sue in federal court,

rather than relying exclusively on recourse to the Department of.

Health, Education and Welfare, and characterized more explicitly

than ever before the requisites for such a suit.

Connecting sexual harassment in education with sexual harassment

at

work\,.Magistrate Latimer

stated

11 •••

it

is

perfectly reasonable

to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission

to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just

as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands

from supervisors have become increasingly recognized as potential

violations of Title VII•s ban against sex discrimination in employ-

. . . ment.

He held institutions responsible when victims com-

plain to officials who fail to act.

Noting that the adequacy of HEW•s enforcement of Title IX, the

statute on which the suit is based, had been questioned, Latimer

LMOREJ !J

disagreed with recent rulings that plaintiffs may not seek private redress in federal court. He found it "obviously significant that the enforcing agency urges recognition of private suit rights," as HEW did in th.is case. Relying on the extensive acceptance of the
right to sue privately in federal court under Title VI of the Civil
.Rights Act of 1964, the magistrate expressed concern that withou~ a similar right under Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in education, there will be "substantially different enforcement rights to victims of sex discrimination than to those subjected to discrimination in federally-assisted programs •on the grounds of race,

color, or national origin• •••• " In the allegations of plaintiff Pamela Price, Magistrate.Latimer
found all the elements he held necessary for such a suit. Ms. Price alleges that she received a~ade in a course that was not the result of her academic work, but,. rather a retaliation for her re-

fusal of her male professor's sexual demands. She complained extensively to Yale officials, but not to HEW. According to the· magistrate, absence of a "realistic possibility of a meaningful remedy" supported her access to federal court. Since she is now applying to law schools, the urgency of her case underlined the need for an adequate grievance procedure at Yale, the relief the lawsuit seeks. The ruling clears the way for a hearing on her request for an injunction that would temporarily suspend the operation

of the grade. Five plaintiffs were found not to meet Magistrate Latimer•s

criteria. Four of them were charactarized as not being, at the

.J

_l 0

(MORE]

time the suit was filed, directly and person~lly victimized by the alleged discrimination. The magistrate held that one student, who had graduated when the suit was filed, would not benefit from the relief sought in the case, and thus her claim was moot. Other plaintiffs• claims ~ere found not to allege a "personal exclusion from a federally funded edcuational program or activity or•••
personal denial of full participation in the benefits of such a
program or activity in any measurable sense." In considerj.ng the contours of the claims, Magistrate Latimer also pointed to what he said was a "critical distinction" between the situation of Ms. Price and other plaintiffs dismissed from the suit, based on the extent to which complaints to university officials had been made.
Commenting on the importance of the ruling and the next steps to be taken, Ms. Simon said, "I am still studying Magistrate Latimer thoughtful decision. It is an excellent example of the way women's real situation can be taken seriously. Because I think that some of the dismissed plaintiffs present claims that are important aspects of the problem of sexual harassment, I am actively contemplati: the possibilities for appealing some of the dismissals."
lENDJ
Note: A statement by Ms. Price is available on request
1 f

 
 Nt~W HAVEN LAW ~..,OLLECTIVE LAw Ot'l"ICES OF BERIC.\N, ~ARVEY & SIMON
9.'lli CHAPEL S~UT N•;w UAvt:N, CoNNF.CTfCVT 06510
T1-:u:1•m11•rn ( 200) 777-3401

F'OR IMMiDIATE RELEASE

On December 7, u.s. Magistrate Arthur Latimer approved
the addition of two women plaintiffs to the lawsuit against Yale University for sex discrimination by condoning sexual harassment of women students by male faculty and administrators. The two new undergraduate women joined three present students or recent graduates and one faculty member who filed the suit in July, 1977. "Although the suit was already very strong," said Anne Simon, attorney for the plaintiffs, "the presence of these two women broadens the range of facts brought before the court." One of the new plaintiffs had complained to Yale officials immediately after the sexual incident, to no avail. One was given a low grade in a course: one was not granted an athletic letter for managing a varsity team. Supporters of the case noted the fact that the plaintiffs now include a black woman and one woman sexually harassed by an athletic coach, raising two crucial dimensions of the problem which had not previously been represented.

Thi: OE'X t d<·V<' l opmPnts in the case should come soon in

two n(•w Judicial dN'iBinns. The first must resolve the request

by the ~OW (Nationrll Organization for Women) Legal Defense

and r:dlJl'.rltJon Fund .1nrj t h0 WEAL Fund for admission of their

'

nr am1cuf1 ~~

1 t•f

l n ::11ppor t

of the plaintiffs• view that

a pr1vat~ l<lWAUit may bo brought under Title IX of the

t-:ducat 1on Arnrmdmt•n ts ot 1en?, wh I.ch prohibits sex discrimination

1n educational progrdm~ receJving federal funds.
; MORE'1 12

The other judicial decision will resolve Yale's motion to dismiss, in whi~h they argue that the plaintiffs• complaint is inadequate to ground a legal claim under Title IX. The plaintiffs argue that the lack of an adequate grievance mechanism effectively condones the imposition of sexual pressures on
woffien students, which in turn deprives them of equal access to the benefits of a Yale education - access which male students
enjoy free of comparable sexual demands. Yale's out of court position has been that its current grievance procedures are fully adequate to the problem - if, indeed, there is a problem at all. "The circumstances of the two new plaintiffs give additional insight into the inadequacies of Yale's current practices," noted Harriet Dichter, a member of the Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus.
Women's athletics is a particularly sensitive subject for Yale women, who recently tbmplained to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare about unequal funding and facilities. Athletics has always been important in the development of women's self-confidence and physical self respect. As Emily Howe, president of the Yale Athletic Association, observed, "To be sexually harassed by a coach can be devastating to women who are striving to overcome learned physical inferiority and to become a part of the athletic community."
"Black women have always been sexually harassed, have often protested it, ~nd have been ignored even more thoroughly than wh1 tP women," said plaintiff Pamela Price. "For a white man to sexually harass a black woman can be a sexist way of expressing his racism, 11 she continued. Abbe Smith, head of the Yale Undergraduate Caucus Grievance Committee, commented,
13

"We hope that the courage of this black woman will encourage others, who may feel that women's issues have been defined in terms of the experiences of white women, to join this fiqht. 11
Plaintiff Lisa Stone spoke for the plaintiffs and all concerned in expressing the hope that Yale would understand the need to settle for an adequate grievance procedure soon. "It seems so obvious," she said,"and so much more sensible than a lengthy and expensive trial, which would only get more and more embarrassing to Ya.le."
(END)
Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus Grievance Committee Box 4761 Yale Station New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Telephone through (203) 777-3401
" 11

 
 ,.
-FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE-

The reason I am in this case is, as Mason once said to Dixon, to draw the line somewhere. I am not claiming to have been raped or subjected to grade bribery. Everyone knows that rape is not OK; we all agree that grade bribery is not OK. What happened to me, however, is also not OK. It just happens often enough that people don't think seriously about it. They pass it off as a little male fun and, therefore, trivial. But sexual harassment is not trivial. The line of what is OK and what is not OK is how this "male fun" affects the woman, as well as its
ethicality and legality. No one should have the institutionally
sanctioned right to sexually harass a woman or anyone in any way, shape or form. Especially not a hierarchical superior. That is where I draw the line.

Margery Reifler

21 December 1977

New Haven, Connecticut

15

 
 --S'l'A'J.' EM.t:.;.N'.L' - -
In November, 1977, I petitioned the Federal Court to become a plaintiff in the pending suit, Alexander vs. Yale, publicly known as the sexual harassment case. I petitioned the court for redress on two counts in the absence of any effective action being taken by Yale University to investigate my c~mplaint and/or to offer relief. The two counts are inextricably linked, the one being the direct result of the other. On the one hand, I was sexually harassed by a professor employed by the defendant; on the other, I received a grade unreflective of the merit of my work at that
t~me which can and/or will possibly irrevocably damage my career·
opportunities. On both counts I remain unsatisfied as to the nature and the extent of the action taken by Yale.
The primary issue on both counts is one of sexual discrimination. I entered Yale University in the fall of 1974, aware of its reputation as a bastion of male supremacy. Like most freshman and undergraduates in general, I did not take that reputation seriously. Yet, my experience over the next two years proved the reputation well earned in the past and in too many cases perpetuated in the present. In too many instances, I was subjected to the assumption of my inferiority as a black person as well as the assu~ption of my lack of seriousness as a woman. The particular incident which brings me here today was only a reflection of assumptions perpetuated and reinforced by the failure of Yale University to confront and effectively deal with the issue.
The issue is that as a woman student at Yale I am subject to prejudicail judgements prior to the beginning and completion of my course of study. The issue is that some, acting upon archaic and feudal assumptions, will attempt to compromise my respect for myself as a human being (i.e., as more than a sex object). The issue is that professors particularly are in a position of power; whether or not and how I will complete my education is determined as.much by them as by my own efforts_ Their position is totally based on the legitimacy granted by the institution which employs them. As such, that legitimacy should be restructured to more appropriately meet the needs of the students, male and female. More important, what is and is not legitimate in the relationship between the professional and his/her student should be defined by the institution which confers that legitimacy. Yale University has not only failed to confront and accept that responsiblity in any systematic manner, it accepts, upholds and defends the right of a professor to act in a manner detrimental to a student's education. (i.e. by a pattern, practice and policy of neglecting and refusing to process and consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women students).
That detriment can be manifested in various ways, each of which intimately connects a woman's intellectual gro~th, both to her~elf and others to a man's judgement of her sexuality. In my particular
1
case, this detriment has manifested itself not only in terms of my
'·' lr,)

own intellectual development but also in the form of a concrete obstruction to my educational advancement. I received a grade which is a reflection of the professor's personal defects rather than the quality of my work. This grade is a concrete expression of his racist and sexist appraisal of me as a person -- in my case the one attitude is· inherently linked with the other. This grade not only excludes an evalu~~lon of the quality of my work, i t includes a historical conception of the relationship between my racial heritage and my sexuality. I am offended on both counts.
At this point, the arbitrary nature of the grade threatens my educational advancement beyond my relationship with Yale. It can and will have a substantial impact on my chances of being accepted at the law school of my choice. Not only must I strive to overcome the general racist and sexist attitudes prevalent in society, I must also deal with a specific manifestation of those attitudes on a very personal and individual level.
Hence, it becomes clear that the acceptance of that grade with no investigation whatsoever of the circumstances surrounding which i t was given, requires an assent to sexual harassment and racis~ not only at Yale University but also in the attainment of my own academic goals. While others ~ay be prepared to give their assent, I cannot in all reasonableness give mine. Consequently, I have petitioned the court not only to require the establishment of a procedure within the university to effective!~ deal with these issues, I have also requested that the offending grade be temporarily removed from my transcript until this matter is resolved. As the transcript is crucial to my application to law school (which must be made soon), unless immediate and effective action is forthcoming it will be too late. Six months from now, the grade will have no effect upon my admission to law school in 1978. Now it could mean everything. Yale's failure to deal in any systematic and effective manner with the issues raised by this suit and numerous complaints from women at Yale, and the invocation of the "sanctity" of the grading procedure and of tbi.s grade in particular, reflects a completely inadequate and repressive perspective on the position of women within the university. It follows that this perspect: e serves to condone, uphold and defend a practice of racist sexual ~iscrim~nation and consequently subordination of women not only within the University, but within the society as a whole.
Pamela Price 21 December 1977
New Haven, Connecticut
'·' 17

 
 March 1978
Dear Friend: What is the price of a woman's education? We are
asking your support to help insure that it will no lc~nger include sexual harassment by male professors.

S\\e ~C)f'\.\td it. No of\e'.S 'oin9 ~o -\'e\I
tf\e ~~e di~w\t ..icn+
jt, •'S(.'1'1.tQ\ \o\11ro~Sf'lenf!. ?!
·"ow o~Surcl.

tfi!(·
l1iI
C" CDUV'5Uhf '<llflflttd
lt', p. \,ft \\iQt\t, 'fO~"'
(~g\\ Sli~hHy a9·1w;.> 9rofeSSor \1~e "'e •••• ~ CN\~ .s\ie ~ot W6t\t U?

Alnandn v. Y:Jle is a landmark lawsuit charging that Yale University condones the sexual harassment of women students in violation of Title IX•. The plaintiff was offered an ..A'. in a course in her area of specialization if she would comply with her professor's demands. She flatly refused and walked out of his office. She complained orally and in writing to responsible Yale officials even before the grade of "C" was given. Because she is a black woman, her complaints were not only viewed as inconsequential, but were ignored more blatantly than complaints of white women. Not until one and a half years later, after Alna11der v Yale was filed, did Yale act. Officials then claimed to review the grade, but ignored the sexual incident entirely. The grade was not changed.
The lawsuit asks for a grievance procedure as a remedy and preventive measure, not for damages from

1~ .

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iNSfltit me1al\lloys

.......SUhttl'wirlug

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I

individual offenders. With a procedure, the responsibility for abuse of faculty power will remain within the University, but students will be guaranteed an effective channel for complaint for the first time.

Sexual harassment ranges from sexual propositions and pressures for intimacy to molestation and rape. Sexual har~ment in education is particularly oppressive because of faculty power over student grades, recommendations and eventual employment and careers. Sexism makes higher education a difficult experience for women. Sexual harassment threatens and can destroy women's intellectual autonomy and opportunities for advancement.
Legally, the case has already won major victories for women students across the country. MagiStrate Latimer. in his decision on Yale's Motion to Dismiss, held that sexual harassment is sex discrimination and that the plaintiff can sue a private institution under Title IX. Connecting sexual harassment in education with employment, he stated:
••• it Is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimintion in education, just as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervi~ors have become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban a~ainst sex discrimination in employment...
He held institutions responsible when victims complain to officials who fail to act.
Politically. the case connects women's education with fair treatment for women workers. It has stimulated ,_.idespread organizing and consciousncss·raising on campus. It unites black and white women against a eommon expression of their subordination. It allows supportive men to ally themselves with women against this form of male domination.

Before the suit was fltc..-d, a group of concerned women from the Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus abd the administration to investigate complaints of sexual har1Wment and to take apprc priate action. Since

1 B • Tltle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §'1681)

the case was fih~l. the Grievance Committt."C has twcn inwstip:ating tlw scope of the probfom, educating the University and New Haven community about it, and working to establL5h a grievance procedure. \\!e are organizing student, faculty and staff support for the suit, and raising money to fund it and our other acti\'ities.
What is the price of this lawsuit?. This attempt to challenge the policies of a wealthy university has cost thousands of dollars in expenses and lawyers fees-and tlw bulk of the work is }'ct to come. We net.•d your help. The Grievance Committee hos raised some money and is planning benefits. But this will cover only a fraction of the costs. We need your financial contribution to continue our fight against Yale's defense of the power of male professors to sexuahy harass us. We attend college to study, not to be playthings or sex objects for male faculty members.
Your contribution will support the next steps the lawsuit requires and enables the Grievance Committee to continue its organizing. Tax deductible checks may be made out to The Capp Street Foundation and returned in the enclosed envelope.
If you would like more information about the lawsuit, the Grievance Committee or The Capp Street Foundation, please contact us at the above address.
Sincerely,
Phyllis Crocker for the Grievance Committee of the Yale Undergraduate Women's Callcus

-------....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TEAR OFF · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·
Y(•s, I want to support Alexander v. Yale, the sexual harassnwnt lawsuit. Enclosl'd is my donation o f - - - - -

Strttt City--------

19 S t a t e - - - - - - -

Please send me more information on:
_ Alcxaridcr v. l'ale _ Grievance Committee, \\'omen's Ca11t'us _ The Ca}lp Strt.>ct Foundation

 
 .,
I....
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--

5exoo\ harassmen-ta+ Yale?
•
It comes as a shock to most
people. Maybe you read about it "
in the newspaper over the summer. Yale beinq sued for condoninq sexual harassment of women students. Or maybe someone who knows you qo to Yale asked you about it. "Does this really go on at school?" Probably you don't know much about it. Or you don't believ·e anything like this could go on.
Unless it's happened to you. Or a friend. Sexual harassm~ of women students by male faculty members occurs. It is a problEiul that has been long ignored. Often, it is not even-seen as a problem. But it occurs not only here at Yale but at schools everywhere. The accounts of ~ictims are numerous and disturbin9.
Sexu.al harassment in education is particularly disturbing because of its effect on women's ability to learn. How can women students expect to get a thorough education if we cannot· feel free to seek conferences with male faculty members because of fear of assault? The point is not that every male faculty member is "attacking" his female students. The point is that Yale has no procedure through which students can complain about sexual harassment. When it happens, it is allowed to go on unchallen9ed.
Women are denied an equal opportunity to learn from professora We must always be wondering whether our teachers are respecting us not for our academic performance-- but for our sexuality. This is not to say that faculty and students should not "socialize." But it is important to recognize the inherently unequal power relationship of faculty to students. When the unequal power relationship of men to women is added in, the female student's vulnerability to harassment is very great.
In this society, male harassment of females is the norm in many contexts. This lawsuit challenges that norm-- and the acceptance of sexual harassment.
We need your help. If you have any information-- or if you'd like to help by giving some time to the work being done-- please leave your name and telephone number below and give it to the person handing out this leaflet. Or take down these numbers and address: 562-7560/777-2265/4761 Yale Station. Or drop by the
- - -.- - - - Women's Caucus office, third floor Hendrie Hall. ...... -- Thanks for your......t.. im,e....-.-.,__...._...._.
' '1 a

 
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<>

.

UNii'LD STA1'E.S .DISTRIC'l' 'coUR'l'

Dl.STRI'CT OF CONNECTICUT

behalf of themselves and all the.rs similarly situated, PLAINTIFFS
s.
UNIVERS!T'l,
DEFENDA.~~T

'
.. on

• •
•.•

•

...••
•

..

-•
• •
• •

..

: SECO~"'D A~2ENDED CO:.!PLAI~T

• •

. :INTRODUCTION

·'

1. This is a class action for declaratory and equitable

elief and money damages against Yale University. It is alleged

discriminated against plaintiffs and members of

heir class on the basis of sex in education, in that its failure

o combat sexual harassment of female students and its refusul to

mechanisms and procedu~es to address complaints and make

·nvestigations of such harassment interferes with the educational

rocess and denies equal opportunity in education. These actions

re in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,

§1681 et se~., as hereinafter more fully appears.

JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 20 u.s.c ~1681, and 28 u.s.c. §§1343, 2201~ 1331. The matter in
<>controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum
of ten thousand dollars.

--..,-

PAHTIES

• woman:

is a

graduate of Yale College and a

is a student in Yale College, Class of

and a woman:

is a student in Yale College, Class of

and a woman;

is a

graduate of Yale College

and a woman;

• is a student in Yale College, Class of

and a woman;

is a member of the faculty of Yale

University with responsibility for teaching and a man. All

plaintiffs are citizens of the United States. Yale University is

a corporation organized under a charter granted by the State of

Connecticut. It is an instit-ution of higher education which re-

ceives Federal financial assistance.

2. The plaintiffs bring this. suit on behalf of them.selves

and all other similarly situated persons, pursuant to Rule 23 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class is the class of

those students and faculty at Yale University who are disadvantaged

and obstructed in their educational relations by the policies,

practi~es, acts and omissions of the University with respect to

the sexual harassment of women students by men in positions of

authority, in particular by male faculty members and administrator~

There are three subclasses:

1. The class of all female students sexually harassed by men

in positions of authority at Yale, including all female students

()~ho, since 1973, at present and in the future, have to choose

35

between toleration of, or com~liunco ~ith, sexual demands and pressures by such men and any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally;
2. The class of female students who, since 1973, at present and in the future, are subject to the discriminatory atmosphere adverse to their educational development created by the practice of such sexual harassment, including but not limited to 'all students who have pursued complaints of sexual harassment and attempted to produce appropriate action by defendant, to their detriment;
3. The class of all faculty members whose professional effectiveness in teaching and in engaging in the pursuit of knowledge with students is seriously impaired by that contamination of the faculty/student relationship created by defendant's tolerance of said sexual pressures, which tolerance creates detrimental distraction in women students and generates an atmosphere of distrust unconducive to teaching an~ learning.
The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There are questions of law or fact common to the class. The defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. The Clqss 19 fairly and adequate].} . represented by plaintiffs herein.

0

36

•

COUN'l1 I

1. Plaintif£ Alexander entered Yale as an undcrgradu~te in

September, 1973.

2. At the time she came to Yale,· plaintiff

. was a

serious musician who anticipated majoring in· music and playing the

flute profession~lly.

3. In her first semester, plaintiff

enrolled in

the

maintained by defendant for undergraduates inter-

ested in performing music, and took private flute lessomwith the

,, an employee of defendant.

4.

' repeatedly maa-e·· sexual advances, including

coerced sexual intercourse, that were not wanted, and were pro-

tested, by plaintiff .

•

s.

'persist~d in his intimidation and coercion of

plaintiff.

, including sexual adv'!lnces to her, continuing

into .May, 1977. 6~ As a direct result of

s sexual demands, plain-

tiff

found it impossible to continue playing the flute

and abandoned her study of the instrument, thus aborting her

t. I i

i

desired professional career.

I
l.

7. As a' direct result of

s sexual demands, plain-

tiff

contemplated suicide and almost dropped out of

Yale, both in December, 1974.

(>

a. At the time of the said incidents, and again in May, 1977,

.37

<>
plaintiff

-5•attempted.to complain to responsible Yale

officials. On both occasions, she was discouraged and intimiduted
- - by unresponsive administrators and complex and ad hoc methods
which inadequately substitute for a formal and legitimate admini-

strative structure for complaints.

9. The experience of plaintiff

as set forth above

is the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its

officers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusing to

consider s~riously complaints of sexual harassment of women

students, with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual

harassment of female students by male faculty members and admini-

strators.

10. The above actions and po~icies of defendant and its

agents and employees discriminate against plaintiff

and members of her class on the basis of sex, in violation of 20

u.s.c.§1Ga1.

. .

COUNT II

1. Plaintiff Reifler 'entered Yale as an undergraduate in

September, 1976~ 2. In Fall Term, 1976·, plaintiff

became manager of

the

team.

3. In the course of her duties as manager, plaintiff

()~orked with the coach of the team,.

• II

•

38

4 .. During the

season, plaintiff •

was

sexually hurasscd by

while she was doing tasks that

were her responsibility as manager of the team.

5. As a direct result of said s~xual harassment, plaintiff

suffered distress and humiliation, was distracted from her

academic studies, was hampered in her work as .team manager, and

was denied recognition due her as team manager, all to her educa-

tional detriment. 6. Plaintiff

• wanted• to complain to responsi91e au-

thorities of defendant about said sexual harassment but was.inti-

midated by the lack of legitimate procedures and was unable to

determine if any channels for conplaint about sexual harassment

were availc:ble to her.

7 •. 'l"he experiences of plaintiff ,

,set forth above is
.

the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its

officers, agents and employees, of neglecting and refusing to

process and consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment

of women students, with the effect of actively condoning continued

sexual harassment of female students by male faculty members and

administrators.

8. ·The above actions and policies of defendant and its agonts

and employees discriminate against plaintiff and members of her
class on· the basis of sex,. in violation of 20 u.s.c. §1681.

!

39

v
COUN'r. III

1. Plaintiff Price entered Yale as an undergraduate in

September, 1974.

2. In the Fall Term, 1975, plaintiff

declared her

major field to be

3. In the Spring Term, 4976, plaintiff

enrolled in

. taught by Pro-

f essor

.then an employee of defendan.t.

4. Early in June, 1976, when plaintiff

went to Profc-

ssor

office to submit her final paper for the cO'firse, she

w~s sexually propositioned by Professo~

.. who offered to

.

give ·her a grade of "A" in the course in exchange for her compli-

ance with his sexual demands. He also remarked upon the effect of

her physical appearance on him.

5. Plaintiff

explicitly rejected and refused to comply

with Professc.:: ·

sexual demands and left his office.

6. Shortly after said incident, plaintiff

complained

about it orally and in writing to responsible officials of .defen-

dant, including her college dean and the then director of the

7. At the time these complaints were made, she was told by res~onsible officials of defendant that nothing could be done to

remedy her situation.

<>I

a. At the time of the plaintiff's complaints, no invostiga-
.' '

10

0

-0-:

tion of tho incident was made nor was disciplinary action taken

against Professor officers.

by defendant or by any of its responsible

9. Plaintiff

later received a grade of "C" in the

course. The grade was not the result of a fair evaluation of her

academic work, but the result of her failure to accede ~o Pro-

fessor ,

· . sexual demands.

10. As the direct result of her explicit rejection of said

sexual propositions, plaintiff

suffered educational detri-

ment. She has suffered distress, humiliation, has receiy.,gd.a

grade on her transcript that does not reflect the quality of her

academic performance, and has been injured, and is continuously

being injured, in her educational advancement and in the further

pursuit of her career.

11. In September, 1977i responsible officers of defendant

requested that plaintiff

.. re-submit her complaint about the

incident, which she did later in September, 1977.
12. After said resubmission, no investigation of the inci-

dent of sexual harassment was made, nor has the grade been changed.

13. Responsible officials of defendant have represented to

plaintiff that nothing further will be or can be done about her

complaint. 14. The experience of plaintiff

set forth above is the

(fesult of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its offi-

-·

4J

: l

-9-

ccrs, agents and employees, of neglecting and refusing to process

and consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women

students, with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual

harassment of female students by male faculty members and admini-

strators.

15. The above actions and policies of defendant and its

agents and employees discriminate against plaintiff

and

members of her class on the basis of sex, in violation of 20 u.s.c.

§1691.

COUNT IV

1. Plainti:fi::.Stone entered Yale as an undergraduate in

September, 1974. 2. During the course of the academic years 1974-1975, plain-

tiff

best friend, another Yale undergraduate woman, became

the subject of sexual pressures and attentions from .

. ,

an employee of defendant, and she

discussed said incidents with plaintiff in the academic years

1974-1975 and 1976-1977. l. Both the incidents themselves and the atmosphere in which

they occurred caused plaintiff

great emotional distress,

but there was no established, legitimate procedure by which she

could bring them to the attention of the responsible officials

()of defendant.

u

-10-

0

4. As a result of the said incidents and the absence of .~n

established procedure by which she could bring them to the atten-

tion of responsible officials of defendant, plainti!f

suf-

fered emotional distress, was deprived of the tranquil atmosphere

eccssary to her pursuit of a liberal education, and was put in

her own associations with men in positions of authority at

ale.

5. The experience of plaintiff

as set forth above is

the result of a pattern, practice; and policy of defendant, its
w~men~students, fficers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusir1g. to co11- l,.
J ider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of

ith the effect of actively condoning continued sexuar harassment

female students by male faculty members and administrators.

6. The above actions and policies of defendant and its agents

employees discriminate against plaintiff

and members of

class on the basis of sex, in violation of 20 u.s.c. §1681.

COUNT V

1; Plaintiff Olivarius entered Yale as an undergraduate in

·eptember, 1973.

2. During the academic year 19?6-1977, plaintiff'··

~as an officer of the 3. In this capacity, plaintiff

•
•had occasion to dis-

uss with other female students their complaints about the qu~lity
r(Sf. the ed ucation Of women at Yale, includinf~f complaints of sexual

harassment.

43

. v

-11-

4. Plaintiff

attempted to pursue such complaints,

both formally and informally, with resp)nsible officials of dcfcn-

dant.
s. In her attempts, plaintiff

·met with delays,

aggressive uninterest, hostility and intransigence.

6. As a direct result of the lack of established procedures

for recognizing and handling such complaints, plaintiff

was forced to expend time, effort and money in investigating com-

plaints herself, preparing them to be presented to responsible

officials of defendant, and attempting to negotiat~ the somplexi-
- - ties of ad hoc "channels." She was subjected to threats and inti-
midation from individuals involved in her investigations and was

being given no protection or encouragement by responsible officials

of defendant.

7. The experience of plaintif.f

~s set forth above

is the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its

officers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusing to con-

sider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women students,

with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual harassment

of female students by male faculty members and administrators.

8. TJ)e above actions and policies of defendant and its

agents and employees discriminate against plaintiff .

'.and

I ,

members of her class on the basis of sex, in violation of 20 u.s.c.

t
'

0 §1681.

44
..

<>
COUNT VI
.
1. Plaintiff Winkler came to Yale as an Assistant Professor

in the

in July, 1974.

2. During his career at Yale, he has had responsibility for

teaching undergraduates.

3. Early in the academic year 1974-1975,· one of plaintiff

• female students discussed with him the sexual harass-

ment to which her best friend, a a male professor then in the

·-· major, was subjected by

4. As a result of this discussion, plaintiff

bec.a:me

aware of the problem of sexual pressure put on women students by t

male faculty members.

s. Plaintiff

..f..urther became aware of tho obstruction

of his own teaching relations with women students, on account of

the atmosphere of distrust male professors engendered by the repu-

tation of certain male professors for sexually harassing women

students. 6.· Plaintiff

....

.

~s been unable to take any steps to

alleviate the pressure this atmosphere places on his students, as·
.
there are no established procedures for bringing complaints of

sexual harassment of women students by male professors and admini•

strators to the attention of responsible officals of defendant.

1. As a result of the traumatic effects of the atmosphere of

(>sexual pressure and demands upon women students and the absence

45

. . ..

<>

-13-

of established procedures for bringing complajnts to the attentj.on

of responsible officials of defendant, plaintiff

has had

to try to teach in an atmosphere poisoned by distrust, and he has

further been deprived of the benefit of teaching students who can

•

.

devote their concentration to study and the student/teacher rela-

tionship.

8. The experience of plaintiff

as set forth above

is the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its

officers, agents, and employees, of neglecting and refusing to

consider seriously complaints of sexual harassment of women ·

students, with the effect of actively condoning continued sexual

harassment of :female students by male faculty members and admini-

strators.

9. The above action's and policies of defendant and its agents

and employees, which have the effects on plaintiff

set

forth above, are the result of discrimination on the basis of sex,

in violation of 20 u.s.c. §1681·.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs claim:

. 1. A declaration that the policies and practices of defend&..~~
its officers, agents, and employees with respect to sexual harass-

ment of women students are in violation of 20 u.s.c. §1681:

2. An order permanently enjoining defendant, its officers,

agents, employees, successors, assigns and all person~ in active

()concert or participation with them from engaging in practices and

<B>

-14-.

i1nplcr,1cntin9 policies which discriminate on the basis of sex in

educational opportunity;

3. An order permanently e~joining defendant from failing to

have an established, legitimate mechanism for receiving, investi-

gating, and adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment of women

students;

4. An order pcrmanctly enjoining defendant, its officers,

agents, and employees from failing to take appropriate disciplinary

action against
s. An order permanently enjoining defendant, its officers,

agents, and employees from £ailing to take appropriate disciplinary

action against

6. An order permanently enjoining defendant, its officers,

agents, and employees froa failing to take appropriate disciplinary

action against

7. An order requiring def~ndant to institute and continue a

· mechanism for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints

f sexual harassment, to be designed and implemented under the

supervision of this Court;
s. A preliminary order, requiring defendant not to discon-

tinue any efforts it is making to investigate and change plaintiff

' grade in the course,

9. A preliminary order, requiring defendant to instruct

. I'

()recipients of plaintiff

transcript to disregard the cours~

u .

.. ' , and the grade therein:

0

-15-

10. A preliminary order, requiring defendant to incluu~ the

receiving and investigating of complaints of sexual harassment in

the function of the office of the Dean of Women• I 11. Compensatory damages in the amount of five hundred

dollars ($500.00) for plaintiff

12. Attorney• s fees and the costs of this action;

13. Such other and furthc::r relie·.: as this Court deems nece"'!'

ssary and proper•

•
•

..

PLAINTIFFS

•

BYA·-n-n-e-~E-.--S-im--o-n---------------------
Berktt.n, Harvey and Simon 938 Chapel Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510
.Tel. (203)-777-3401
. Their Attorney

D~ted: November 16, 1977

.

i

 
 a

____w_ \11\">,~;.. a,u_. e . <s:(J i {··,~\:te.(\;,V..Jt.\i! ··.i. .·{'Cb \'W'J. 4ji(f)Ji\ 2' jl . )'J\at#fJl);d· \$; f'(A,\W,Z . .,,, '"

28

.

Alice Dt-mbner One of the few scholars of sexual · offcrs legal and counselling reffcrars.

A {cmatc graduate student works harassment. Catharine MacKinnon. Acro!:ls the country. a numbcroi law-

closely with a male professor in.her de.. wrote this definition in a paper for the yers have ar)!uedfor redress ofrctalia·

partmcnt. She is writing her thesis on an Yale Law School entitled Se.tualJIora.u- lion taken against women in instances of

aspecl of theory he h:is pioneered. Aftcr ment: A Case oj Sex IJiscrimination. sexual hara(.smcnt.··ht many Cll:~s. the

.a'ycarofflattery and pursuit. sheenters an ..Sexual harassment...may occur as a courts have accepted.their •rgumcncs

affair with him, which runs ptea~antly for single encounter or as a series of inC:i· that sexuaJ harassment constitutes sex

several months but ends abruptly.

dents.•.It may place sexual. cpndJtions discrimin;ition. ·. Jn July 1977. the lJS

The professor agrees to continue serv- upon.•.oppo11unitics at a cJearJy-dcfiped CQun .of Appeals ·.• for the District of

c. ing on the student•s dissenation com·
mittee, believinghe can keeppcrsonaJ and

threshold...or it may occur as a pcrvasiyc or continuing condition ofthe...·enviJ--0n..

hao....~.tu. h.me.ab.r.iad...

'·the
the

.m.os...t. inn. u..c.. n.tia.1. . . co."·r.t..•. h.a.t
issue. ruled ltlat women

re· professional matters sep:rate. SeveraJ ment...Examples include: verbal seitual wereprotectcdfre>m n:talhnioll upon

months go by, during which they cones- suggestions or jokes~ constant leering or pulsing.· employers'. sexual advances.·

pond about the dissertation by Jetter. The ogling, brushing against your body acci- under the Equal Opportunity Employment··

studenr passes up several seminars re- dentally: a friendly pat, squeeze. or Act of 1972.

lated to her work that are .taught by· the pinch, catching you alone for aquick kiss, In the ca.se. Alexander v. Yale, whifb

professor. because she feels uncomfort- the indecent proposruon backed~ athreat made.sexual harassment an issue on the

able around him. The professorsuddenly and forced sexual reiations. Complex Yale campus. the presiding magistrate

wid1draws from the dissertation com- cases are posed by L"ie persistent innuen- ruled that sexual harassment in o.c1i1dcrnia

mittee and refuses to help the student in do and by the continuing threat which is .is sex discriminatin under Tide IXof the

her search for a job in industry. The stu- never consumated either sexually or Education Amendments of J9?2. ••1t is.· ·

dent must now explain to her coJleagues (otherwise). The most straightforward perfectly reasonable .to. rnainf.ain duit ·.

and prospective employers why she is not example is •put out or get out.~·•

academic advanccmentcondiuqncc.lupo~ •.

working with the man at I.he forefront of Sexual harassment within the student- submission.tosexualdemands c(lnstitutes

hetfield. She speakswith otherwomen in teacher relationshipcan occurbetween a sex discri.mination in·r.ciucrstion, just~s

the departmentand fimls he hasattempted male faculty member and a female stu- questions.of job retention or pm111otion

to seduce them. Can she charge him with dent. a female professor and a male stu· tied to sexµaldem:.u1d5 from supcryiS()l'S

and sexual hara.ument?

dent, a ! ' male student and a female pro- have become·.increasingly.·rccn.~ni;ted a$ .

• ·A homosexual male student is proposi- fessor•Otamale student a male pr<r potential violations e>fTttlc yr1 ·~ (oftbe.

lined by a male professor and re...ponds fessor. Because most faculty atYal~ are Civil Rights.Act of 1.964) ban against $e~ .•

negatively. l'Jo overt threat regarding the
studcnt•s irade is made, but the student

men. and because hererosexuality is. the norm in oursoch:ty. thebarassnientoffe-.

discrimimitiOn in·c111pJoy111ent. 0 · Sex~al haras:iroent h.as el(.istcd at

.• ··•.··· <
Yale

•. ·

feels he must do additional work ·beyond· male students by male faculty 'rnentbers as.a l)a.rrlerfor \\'Ofllen st\ldentssir.c~~t. ··

are course rcquitements - to get the grade he
had origina)ly expected. ·· ts this. sexual
hanmment?

occurs most There

ofttm. . .. ·. ·•. (:~es which

a•r. .e·.u..n..4.~·..n·i...a.·bly

h

··· ntan<lc~wbi~

ve

leastl97 I.!I1n1tye;t.t~ ~ C:~1).litl~nt»f uni.;. ·
·.v~rresiutly:Sowo·•1.·.·n· .~.no·fs../ ~u).p.~....•. .i~~.!t.~&n·.g·...•~···?·· ·

.."l"bc~ "!<» in~iden~.rcl1a1.l····ea s

.

"~' c/>- ~ ·•

.. J• · ·.ar e n e asr·1Wyem.
They raise some of the complex. issu~s in•

volved in sexual harassment in education

which an: being considr:red by the couns.

· by universities around the country. and

by the new Yale committee on grievance

procedures.

What constitutes sexual harassment of

students by faculty? \Vhat is the dividine

line between consentual sex and coerced

sex when there is an inherent power dif-

ferential between the cwo parties"? Must

there be an overt threaf~ Must there be re-

taliation? Must the student reject the pro-

position to claim that harassment has

occurred? Do there have to be repeated

advances. or is one sufficienrl Is itcnouch

for a student to feel harassed or must 1here

be clear verbal or physical advances be-:

fore an investigation is started'? Various me111~rs of the Yale commu-

nity offered a number of definitions for

seitual harassment. Ahhou!:h the incer-

prctations "·aricd widely, all .induJcd the

abuse of the power th:.tt faculty ban~ o\·cr

students,

·

Ezra ~tiles Dean James Rush su1~ges­

lcd that scxu01I h•uassmc:nt was the··\Jc-
libcrale cxploil;Uion of &iurh,,rily ,.,f one

person to rcqucst sex.u:il favors on the p.trt

of another.·' Etta On;lt, Associate: Ucan

of the Graduat~ School oficrcd a bm~d~r

definition. ··sexual h;uassmcnt c;m be

blatant or subtle. r~nging from a pu,posi-

ion or an adv~uu:c to a Jad. cf l•lct in

describing women

power '"' ai. h

is'o.nl.y

<<.;:"
recently

<;;• ·
that

7 ,~,'~''':;:,··'.!"'' r"
deople·h. J)V.Obe·

'

'

'll
w... ·

o...d. ·~. ~. d

.·. ····.~..... '.')JI:~
'a.·n..a s.'.fodied.·

y. ····~··

~

wet~.

dis~

•

gun to talk about sexuaflharassment in minated againil. ·Sex·ual hant5s1nenu,,·as

these terms. Until r.vo ~ears ago, the one of the areas covered.

problem was rarely discussed openly and One graduate studentcalked abour ahe seldom considered a problem which had harassment sh~ faced in the awni:;sillns
solutions. Like the bird~ and the bees, process: ..When 1came tu '1ate to show

sexual harassment wa.c; f9r women a fact my portfolio, a requirement for admis·

oflife. In MacKinnon's words, everyone sion to the department, I did nor rc;.dize

has ••understood and dismissed such in- what was goin!! to happen. When I had

cidents as tri\'ial. isolated, and 'per- finished discussing the final picture with sonal: or as universal ·n~tural' or 'bio- one professor, he asked me. 'Now. don't

I

.

''TJ1ere's no difference in tlie mno::nt of
harassment 1 that occurs in busfnes:; lli,d
academia.'' Studies intlic!lte taatsl!v'ea out
often v1orne11 have been l1~rassed en t:iejot1.

logical' behaviors.••

you have something else h' ..:how nle?•

In 1975, the \Vorking Women United and with th;i1 he ~rnbbt.:d me hy th1.· ...houl-

Institute now in New York City. hdJ a Jcrs. as they say in Vktori:sn mw1.•Js, ••

,,f ..srcak-out'' for womc~ who hadbccn Another stmknl had scvc,:r1.· l1.•ubts at\out
sexually harasscJ al work. Since then, th&: profession quahfi1.:a1i,ms her ~.>OS.

they ha\'c organilcd a national lilit?alion project. a hamib",._,1;. lor work int! women.

··Yuu lll::.!in to wundcr ab~tul the inten-
tions of :iDirector tlf Gr..Ju.lti..• StuJu:s

and a rcsoun:c library. 'l;hey conduct on- wt10 s~nJs mor1.• time pauinl.!., .' ,ur thll!hs

going r1.~scardi •md plan to proviJc ~up­ port scrvil..·cs for vktiuts. The Alli;mcc

aycn.1durpia1~1adJ1cinn~u.cyu1u.·arrcrecra.r••th.:m.

d1:-.1.·ussmg . .

Ag.ainst Sexual Coercion. a group fonned reccmly in C:unhri1f~.- ~fa-...:;trlm"""''os •

The wfJlncn abo compfaml'J offt,·1;.dJy
to the lkparimcnt or Health, &~.luc-.tion

2.') '

.. •

' •.1

- - - - - - - · · - - arum p~.: tme .

- - - - · .. --·· -~-····

~-- -~-~~~~-~-------------......,.

~~c tol•~l oc.curr~J. aprnadctiWc.:ec~t.f

about the<ie Jisniminat0!Y Their propo'>;al for ma Affir·

only a segment of t•1e lhat

Adequate Procedures?

Donna Schaper, As-;oc1atc Umvn"1ty

ma&ivc Action prol,!ram
sratcmcnt "A Women's cstablishc<l to m· vc'>t1·1•.atc

lahimInI:d;~1un~1dcvs.nh·1l.:1nltclhchisse

:J () Chaplain, hdicvcs that ..there's no ilif· forcncc in the amount of harassment that occurs in business and acau.1cmm· . " ·1·11c

Administratorn and faculty d1'.;arrccd
awblo1uctal1cwr h1'teit'~h' e.ardca<1puartoec. eSducr\'ecraCl;(1bitmsfcasn~d-

offwuof~al!lss;c!p!nx,aueorav.tslielcrcihpoiamamrtaipmo.l,sneummnoceifntnytwte.'wod' m.hTieclhnhheoinmusuglgLu..hhbgcucUsplt~th~~ooe-~n

figures 'llJOll'd for lhc work force, based

on of

tseenvewraolmsetundhieasv,eintxd~iccnatheatrhaastsei.dcv0c1n1

out the

job at some point in their career.

ors the

duenndicerd1•trhaadtut:h1etcprroec~ueldaulrieodnscMis:riabcpdroi-n-

'

cedurc at all. A few foi::ulty mcmbcrn and

college deans foci thar the mechanisms

representatives came to Y.alc to mvcsu"ate. thcv/ could do nothmg about the

Many students don •1 report that they exist but arc inadC4.JUatc. ''What exists have been harassed for the same reasons now is unsatisfactory," says Dean Onat

sc.exual hara'>'iment of stuu.•cnt'i bYfacuI.tY·

rape victims often don't report. They "It relics too much on individuals."

Tite Educi1tional Amendments banning

find the situarion cmbarnssing and ex- Many people feel that the ma.\ter-dean

discrimination in '1e<lera11 tionalin')litutions"" were

Ynfoutntpi•ea<sl l~'tdtucba>•:

tremely discomforting; they would rather
ery co forgcuhat it happened. .

mechanism has not v/ et been rn10•.-ed ineffecti\•c, but that it a group ot srudcn!-. ·

Congress unril 1972.

Other students do not complmn be- strongly want a more tonnal procedure,

In 1975-76 sexual harassment was

cause they think their case is an incident it should be designed and implcmcmcd.

cdEoivslacleuBgsesaeldodegaahnt,saf.o'mrAmeceecrtoinJrdEginDogfetatohneMWrt~els~~idieaDnmestiaoannl

which they may have invited in some unspecific way. "Even though I hadn 'tdone anything to provoke him, when he bcean .

forSmeavlegrarliepvraonfecsesoprnsxa.·lcsdoufreeeiI~lhnactcacsmsioirrye
to protect the faculty. llioy feel th<>t there .

Murray brought up the topic, stating that

to make advances. I kept wondering if I is always a potential for folsc accu..,ations

sexual harassment of women students •

had been suggestive," said one woman from students who attempt to seduce .

andespecially by TAs ·was asevere problem• that something should be done. The

who eventually complained. Her case involved a professor who

them or consensual relationships which break up. Howc\'cr. Donna Sch<1pcr, 1he

current dean of JE Mark Ryan was also

never reaJly propositioned her. While Associate University Chaplain. claims

presemattJmcmccting. He remembers a

takingaclasswithhim,howcvcr,hecon- ••There is no reason for a woman to ac-

discussion about issuing a statement to

tinually made suggestive comments. and cuse a man of sexual harnssmcnt if it is

the faculty cnndcrnnint: the practice of

advanccs.AfterthcsewcreopcnlyreJCCl· not true. It can only backfire on her."

nexual harassment. Most ol the deans did not like the idea and the matter. was
dropped· About llac :,ame time·, a dcpar1nit:nt

eadd~ihceeroefnusaepdrtoojescect.

her As

earlier, the professor in

when she needed
qiunetshtei~cnasweacsittehde

only person at Yake in a particular sub-

Most people agree that the masterdean channels need to be bcucr publi·
cized. 111e procedures seem clear, says Calhoun Dean EuSluce Theodore. The

chairman faced with a number of com-

discipline. Thcstudentsufforcdcmotion- problem is that students may not read ahe

plaints about a particular TA' s behavior•

ally for several months and says she sources of informtition on those pmced·

warned other department members that

might stiU be suffering if her dean and ures. As Kingman Brewster once sajd,

anyonecaughlharassingastudcnt.would

theTAforthccoursehadn'tbeensosup- ..The two least read books on the Yale

be dismissed. The TA in question was

fired. The

first

recent

reports

of

widcsprea~

portive.

.

Somestudentsare1ooconfuscdbythe1r feelings about an incident to complain. .

campus and the

are the Report Undergraduate

oRej ~tuhleat/'iroenssi.d•en"t

The U1ulergrad11atc l:eg11/ations read:

harassment came from the Women s

They are flattered that an oil.kr and erm· "If a student in Yale Collcg\! believes

Caucus in their Report to tlie Yt1le Cor·

nentprofessorwouldbcsexuaHyintcrcst- that someone acting for the University

poratio11 published iJst spring. ''It is not

ed in them. Yet, they lose some respect has behaved towards the student in a way

uncommon to hear complaints by women studcnti; of bdng propositioned by Yale
~floacwu~eltdy. ~mThee~mCbae~ursc,u"~stthr~eiedreitpoohr~telrpe_a~sdcsv.~eraAl

~

_ --~!~~~:mffneo~rres.nt~hodWefa~rptieir:owolnflaes~sr-~sd-o~sfrlu-rdr-otubh~eeekttr;otcseoh;rim~sg~apruadllidvc~eaWasn~c,cicrecetshic.eo~Os~mi"ft--~u-· -~-~edtWhtoh~annnts~iicsoo~imomf =rpraarnloc~aeplt.ei~or~clny~oa~llbo~arco!,'~rciddr~~ciu~lnpi~,~o~in~oth·nc~e,o~n~sMsecixu~dd,•ce~rona~cr·~m~~

women l'tring complaints against Offen·
. ding professors. They claim ~at the . administration was unsympatheuc and unresponsive. In July. several women filed the current law suit in order. to change university policy regardmg
harassment. . A poll of the residential colle~~ dea~s. the Chaplain's office, &he Umvcrs1ty
Health Service, and the central dean's
office yielded a tally of about 30 complaints lodged over the last fcw ycam:s. ·The complaints varicd in fom~ from wnt· ten statements to confidcnual. confc:~; sions, and covered a range ol allcgcu offenses. A similar poll of a small group of 7 facu1ty members ...:vealed 20 cases. Only Calhoun Dean Eust61cc Theodore . and TD Dean James Davie received CllD·
plaints from men about harassment by male and female profcssurs, Chough 01hcr - professorn and deans indicat.:d that they
had heard or some such cases. Almost
everyone ar.rc.:d tha1 the number of reported cases of hara.'\smcnt was probably
continued on page 1enn

.... _....,. - ..... _.,..,...... tN .........~. . . . . . . . . . . i.1~
sefuses his advances and double the retta·
bution if she complains? wm she then

haveareputation asattoubtemilkeramong

the

professor's ·. colleagues?

The consequences ofc<'mplaining can ex-

tend beyond the. uncomfon.able sit~acion

that is created in a woman s wc1rking re-

lationships as an undergraduate. Stu· dents fear that complaints wit~ damage

their chances for admission to graduate or

professional school.

for gr.tduatest.udents, the factors keep-

ing women from filing complaints are even

more severe. Dean Onat, the sole female administrator in the graduate school, and

the Title IX officer has never received a

fonnakomplaint. Grnduale students know
it is ••suicidal to complain about almost
anyching," said Cherri Watcrs, a stu~cnt

in the political science department Diam:

Ross, a graduate student in English, fola

complainls about sexual harassment were a particularpr~blcan. ••A student nmk~~g a

majorcom1>1amt would expose her.oiell m.a

way that's more harmful limn hara."smenc. The complaint could h•we a much more

profound effect on your future and the fo· cusoryoureducationthan &he in~canceof

harassment"

Students may not complain because
they do not know whom t~ r:o to, wh~t the

c:onse,1ucncell of C\lllll'lammg an: likely to be (or d1cm~lvcsur lite periton tbcy zm:

acetiitin~. mtd whether lhcir complaints
will l~ t;akcn l'Criously. lkspifc che re·

cena publicity abou& chc c"islio•~ Univcrs· 11y r.rie.!Vance ''Jtnt\:cJmct1.'' both ~rnJu· ate amt Ullilcra~raJualc sludents saill du noc

know who &u cumpfoin to.

31

,., ;t ~tt.,.1:~epes:son,compliitfi•

i

.·

•

also $eek advice on how to secure

equitable solution of the problem from ·

the Masters and Deans of the Residential

Colleges, the Chaimtan of lhe Yale Col-

lege Executive Committee, or the Asso-

ciate Dean for Student Affairs. Ifthe pro-

blem cannot be resol\'ed by infonnal dis-

cussion. the person or p-.:r~ons to whomit

is referred shall assure th:u the complaint ·

is reviewed by the appropriate authorities

and/or established procedures."

The••appropriateauthorities and/orestablished procedures·' evidently are Dean Taft. In a falc Dail)' Ne.vs interview, Taft says ..If the action is believed
to be true and is an .iccion that the Dean of Yale Collcl!c should know about. then the incident should hi:' ttn.1u1?hl to my at-
tention. I would t•ilk to ahc student and
the faculty member im·olvcd and try ao make a dctcmtination it·. in foct. the situa-
tion required action. If il cfoJ, \\•e would · have tn considi:r facuh\• dis1.· iplinary vro· ccdurcs which wauld. orcihably parallel those !!Cl fonh by the t\m~·rkan Association of Uniwrsit\' Prof1::-.~ors. ·'
On du.· 1mu.lmuc i~\1.:I. 1la.· rn"-'l'durc is simifar. Stull1.~nts slhlUl,t c:umpl.1in to &heir ad\•isor, lhc.•ir l>'\.iS, 1hcir d~'l'•ll't· mcnt chairman, lkan On;d, or 1>.:~m Pclik:m.
Sumcstudcnl!t """''11..w uo;1.•thh1.·sc: pm·
ccJurcs si•cm s;itisfic.•4t. t:,,, 1.•\a111pl1.~, Che wu1mm who rduscJ IK·r rroh.'s:-;or's ad-
vmwcs and th1:n wa... i1!nu1·...,1 hy him. is confid:ma chat &h1.• 1t11lk~sor will t1'.:_ask~-J Co leave Yale. Otlu:r Mutlc..·111s d•mn the proc1.•c.hll\:!t arc i11~tk..·uv1.•. P.und.a ltrkc, lhc n·1rn1i11in;: pl.1111t1t fin lhc faw-
suia, 11ay~ shl.' con1plain,·,1 ••huu& '""' h.1r· a."Nmcna i1widt•nt co h1.·r ,1~..111. co &:11.· ,k.
r.ar«1tn.•n1d111inn.m,;m1l1" lht• ,1m.·"·co1 nf
ahc Ahn·Aml'll'-':m l 'ut1111.il l 1.11r.·r :11hl
WP 9,-,IJ uu&ltin~ (WIJ l)\.'! douc. A win

'1biuril Jh'1~.i:;tnlri1i~ii~,h!e~~,j;1~,i.n;l,'itl;_ri't,~hl~h~c'~iu,n'i~-~.~~~ri~~it4y: 3'~'"di'''it;~lii;an.ir"nig~rio<tf'~fiac1wumlty1st·. fl,~m.h.·c·.r·.s..p.··r·.ove.··d·•··

itskc<l ha ~o rcsulmut the ,co~nphunl.' to have harassed stmknts· would have h•

·ni·:;Y then mvcsli)!atcd .the 1nc11~l'.nt by proceed •iccoruing to J\AUP guitklincs.

~•vmg the paper on v. h1c.:h the di:,putcJ The sanctions would dcpl·nd on the

i:ra<lc w;1s ba~~c·l to lwo professors m her. offcm.e, but could rnnrc from reprimand

dc1l~1rlrrwnt. . I he~ rcrcac.I .'.h~.papc~ and to dismissal, Rcpc:at offenders would he

dc('l~kd tt~at 1! m~ntcd ~he ': that ll ta.ad disdplinc<l snore severely. To date.

received. I hey dul n~'' 1~vcsuc.arcll1<:c1r· according to Dean Griffin. no faculty

cu~m;tanccs of the mc1Jcnt, an w~!e~. member has ever been explicitly

a.Pfnschcc

swt;cips lt

old.
wit

hthtaI1tc~.phreowfco-;uslodr,gtemt illsl1. mAelY

uh.1la·Sv. leh.-1sb.se.ce"u.n' 1·q' >ur·i1e0t·1l.sy.,...'.allsllklUedctttoholuea,o,vhes.cvcra.·I

toJJ her that the matter was settled. Pnce

is suing because she docs not think that Avoiding i.~aculty Suits lhc university adequately handled her

complaint. Anotherwoman whoattempted tocom-
plain throuf!h university ch:umds now faces the possibility that the man~hccom­
plained about will be rehired without an
mvestigarion into her allegations. ••1
aried lhe Yalechannds for a year. I played
their game, and now I'm angry. Nothing ~as been done and I am not the only one who has complained about this man.••

The entire procedure would have.to be conducted carcfullv and conficknually, to avoid possible lawsuits arhing fm1.n inco11cct proceedings. New York Umv~r­ sity Law School is currently face~ wath such a suit by a. professor who claims he was forccJ to resign beeaui.e of false rumors that he has sexually harassed fe· male students. He chargesthal he was unfairly c~cludcd from an investigation of

No Morals
During her second year of music les-
sons with a paniculartcachcr. he began to lock his office dt1or during the v.:ssion. He would approach her. kiss her car. and comment on her figure. He sais several times that he had no sc"ual mor-.1.ls and could not understand his wife's discom·
fort 2bout his invof\!ement with other
women. During one lesson he took out a conductor's score to show her .and ..found .. a Playboy foldout in the center. As a result of these incidents she began to f"J ''incredible emotional pressure from him.•• She dreaded practicing for her les-
sons. When her teacher asked her why
she was so nervous, sh: did not have the
courage ro tell him. kn~wing from other
scudent" how vindictNe ~e could be. She
tobavenightm~saboutbeingse't·
•. ..., . la''···. 5"0.tWit4ied

the allegations against hi!'1, and c~at the
invesligation damaged has reputahpn.
ir Even ifa new procedure wcredcsag~c~
and publicized. some focully wonder !'
would b.e used. D~an Davie doubrs that 1t would...There are mechanisms already which people don•t avail themselvescf.••
he: said. He believes that people would be even less willin~ to go toa he:uinJ;ofsicer or board th~ to their ~can. Oilier deans· feel that ahe mechanism might work best
as the second step in a· procedure where the front people were the deans.. N~ncy Cott Assistant Professor of Aft'lcncan Studies and Histoy, believes mat. at the
wleialslt~aankeessttaubdliesnhtesdfrgereirevtpanacdempirtothceatdhuare-
rassment occurs, and ~erefO!C mu'"
ahem freer ro tomptain :to tb~1r .d4:ans.
fonSneavlerpatl(p)Ceoedpulerewse.r\eV~ctaJnltct~cd:idpltt~'l·li~1·f
Qfocrminaal m~ · ·is• w ··

.. o\foh~ S~fforer SU •'. .... ··. . . . . . . .•· .
for women to d~;tl ·.• wilh .Ille· situation

lhCUl!.dV<:S, if they do 110( Want lo report

it: I) Tdl the 1m>fcssor ahat he tms one

month to leave you alone, oth~rwisc you

will try to get him fircJ; 2) Publicly cm-,

barass him in front of a sinaU gro11p of

pc(lplc who \Viii be wituc.sscs ff he trics·to

retaliate; 3)'Ducatc:n to publicly_cmbur-

ass him by telling every person in theclass

what he istloing;4)Ask ncounscllortogo

·talk to him.

·

To pn:pare students to cope with the

possibility of sexual harassment. Loma

Sarrcl, co-director of the Yale Human

Sexuality Program, pl;ms to begin_

discussing sexual harassment in her talks

wilh frc~hmcn. The Grievance .Commit·

tee of the Undcr!!raduate Women's Cau·

cus and the FacultySupJKn1 Group which

has fonncd to work with them will conttn·

ue their educational.efforts.

Professors must also truce more

responsibility for their behavior, .

according to one dean...The tcacher·pu·

pit rela~ionship is a special one, and the

kin ofcomplication s.:lluality brirgs in. is

not good... said 'Dean Davie. ..Some

people are inexperienced in handling

difficult interper:mnal relu&ionshiJls,· and

the university as a whole cannot tolerate

the dismption in the -teacher-pupil

relationship which harassment causes.'•

f'ariaatly because ofthe lawsuil. which

ha.~ been publicizccJ across the country,

sexual harassment in academia is

becoming an issue. The Modem

Langu3ses Association Con1mis'iion on

· the Status of Women in the pJ'ofossion is

beginning a ~tudy . on .. the sexual

harassment of graduate students and

academics.

·

Some schools .are .. be¥inning to

e1u1rnin,e the. •.ncid~nee of: harassment on

tJlei.rc~pu~cs•. But~ n_,i1hel,r~1ud~~·~~~

facplt ·

s

..· · t\."Clls

A number ot questions have been raised about the fonn of an alternate mechanism. Should it be a committee, a hearing board, or an ombudsperson? To what extent should students be involved? What kind of disciplinary .power should the procedure incorporate.
Judith Genova, a member of the philosophy depanmcm and the head of the f acuity Support Committee working against sexual harassmenr, sugges~s a
two-pan procedure. O_n~ comm1ttcc
compo!'ed of faculty. ad_mamstrators~ and students would receive complaints. investigate. and decide whether harassment had (lCcurrcJ but would let the faculry discipl inc the offendc.r. Deans Tafl and Griffin, however. believe that students should not he involved at all in decisions about facuhy mcmhcn•. Studcnrs can advise during a fact-finding session but only faculty are qualified to judge faculty.
However, many ot the deans and taculty foci lhat students should be inv«_>lvc~ in the cmirc process. The proceedings mvolve bo1h s1uJc11t and faculty inicrcsls. and each party will ~ccplhc other honest.
They also tcd th.it students would flc as likely lotk~idc wisely andcardully as faculty. Oc~m ot Studc-m Al lairs .Ma~csba Hill and Pierson IA:an Rachel' \\ uner were parrkubrly oubpokcn on this iss~e.
L>can Onal ~.u~!gcsb a tnttunal of J1s:ntcrcstcd pcopk wilh mcmbi.:rs from c~ch of the P<'''ihlc constttuc11i:1cs which wuuhl 1:mm: l'l\:l,tll" ir. l>c;m Ru ..h 'ugi~'-''I:. us1111• ,\ ''''i:'t:>lc ()(:.Ill ul Ya!.: Ct1l-
kl;-'.C. Jud.w l 'i •. ;:,l. :1bu;e,:, a' a h,·,u 111.: ol-
fo:cr.

they ..don•t want to fisht other people's
battles." Several graduate students also
felt strongly about this. lnfonnal proceedings, however. rend to be decentralized. And when incidents are nm reported to a central place. it is difficult to catch repeat offenders.
·Saying 'No'
Some members of the university community feel that grievance procedures are not enough. They believe that women must be taught to confront lhe situation, and learn to say 0 no" finnly. This is not as simple as it sounds...In this environment. it is not always possible to say •no.' said Dean Hill...People want to do well acadcmicallv and socially. not make
enemies and 'F's'.·· Sometimes saying
no will nol stop the harassment. In the case ofone of the original plaintiffs in the suil. Ronni Alcxamkr. a 'no' was nor enough...He grabbed '"old of m.e and began to fondle my brc*bts and kiss me. I was shocked. scared. and angry. but did not know wh::u to do. I foll I needed him as a flute &cacher, and hoped that he would respect my rclling him that I "_Vas in_now:iy intcrcsccd in a sexual rt.:fauonslup with him. Jn face. he would not take no for an answer. ••
Saying ','no.. can work only i~ th?.pr<;.
fcssor believes that a woman s no means ·'no.·' Too ofecn in this situation as in others. a woman's word is nol lakcn seriously Hthe protl'''or is intc~csr~d in c,.cr1mg hi'i power""' well as cnJOYlf1!~ a pliv,kal relationship. however. ltu.:n ~•1yi111 ·'no'' m<&)' only kaJ lo ~r.:arcr ha· roissmcnt.

however. a survey of230female t.:.raduate student~ revealed that 20 percent had received "sexual attention" from instructors. Of these women, 7 J.5 percent responded negatively ::ind fc~t the incident infringed on their c<lccahonal freedom. None of the women reported
the incidents to university officials. Clearly, administrators at Berkeley
and at Yale could easily be unaw arc of the scope of the problem, and un<lcr.:,timate
the need for effective PWl'tdurcs to combat it. Studies. public SJ"-:;i!.;.-outs, and lawsuits are necessary to br in~· att~n­ tion to problems like harass111cnt, whach !iOCic;ty would rather brush u1:d:r the rug. Academia will only elimi11;1r~ sexual harassment when it rccogni:l's the severity of the problem and cq;:hlishes
explicit and effective proccdun:s to act
decisively against offenders.

.I

33

 
 u 49

.··-·
FILED
DEc ZI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTi.HCT OF CONNECTICUT

* * * * * * ** *** *** *

*

RO:..JNI ALEXJ'\HDER, ET AL,

*

Plaintiffs

*

. II

vs.

YALE mavI::RSITY,

** CIVIL ~O. N-77-277
* *

..

~

Defendant

*

·1 *

•

•

•

•

•

..

..

•

•

*

*

*

*

* *

I

,,

RULING ON ~~OTION TO DISMISS

••

I'I

The ap~ropriateness of i~nc<liatc feJeral ju~icial ra:ief

l is at issue in the instant civil action seeking rc~ress ~0r

/
I
..I..... '

rpurported sex discrimination at Yale University. P:aint~~fs

l are a r.1alc fa cul tv r.1cnbcr and several wor..cn student.:.. or f .:.rmer
'1Ij students who fundamentally contend that thi? tlefcnc.1.:u:.;:.

!university's purported

to •• f.:iilure to cor.'uat se:.:ual harassi'lent o[ fcr.u:1lc
students and its refusal ins ti tutc ;:1cchunin..:!;

.....

and procedures to address COI!tplaints a:-.C: nu.kc in-

vestigations of such har~ssmcnt interferes wict

the educational process and denies equal opport~n­

i t yin education."

In requesting corrccti ve measures 11 to be designed .:i;-•..;. i;r.;>::.c-
,
rnented under the supervision of t~is Court", plaintiffs

assert a right to relief individually and on behalf of a pro-

posed class ur.c.icr Title IX of the Education l\mcr.<l.n.cn ..:s of

11972, which provides in pertinent part in 20 u.s.c. :; 16Sl.(a)

Ithat

..,.

"[n]o person in the United States shall, on tte: basis of sex, be cxclu~cd from p~rticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
di ~er j r:-iina ti on unuer any cduc.'.l ti on pro~rrar:i or
. . . .. activity rcccivinq Federal financial us~istanc~

50

. _________ .~,. ..,

- - ·---- ....

-------· .... ~--- -~--------

__ _,. ·-

....__.

• J

51

In express terms, Title IX calls for udrninistrutivc enforcemcnt of that-prohibition against sex discrimination, with fundi::1c; cut-off a ?Ob.:mtiu.l s.:mction \·!~en 11 cor.1pliu.:-,cc cnnnct be sccurc<l by voluntar:' ncei:-:.s", 20 u.s.c. § 1G82, rmt plaintiffs have not atte~pted resort to the res~onsiblc en-
forcinc:J agency, the DcparL-::ent of Heal th, Education .:mcl Wcl-

~......
. [!)?'t'~..~·
~.,
I .f.~.:.:
·---- ~
I
I .I I ~
"J~"~~~
r=~··'

fare. The statute contains no explicit <JTi1:1t of pr.::..vnte suit

I rig:1ts other

than through ultir:1ate

J..~ d i. ci.a l

~ review s .

o~ ~ f' .~-·.~T. l •

. ,·,'·

action~, sec 20 U.s.C. § 1683, and

niOViI;g to

I

fcndant chiefly argues that no right to sue can be properly 11 implied".

I
I

It i~ of cour!';c scttlc<l that no express statut1..:n·y refer-

1'

cncc to a ri0ht of action is required to enable f cdcral

courts "to provide such remedies as arc necessary t.o nakc
I cf f cc tivc the congressional purpose", J. I. Case C<::_:~._Eprak.,

377 U.S. 426, 4jl (1964), and judicial re~cdies accordi~sly

have been thought appropri.:ite~y "implied" ~·:hen 11 co~11:1 ressional
purposes arc likely to be undcrmineC:.: absent private enforcement" by those "intended to be protected by the statute",

£·.· • ...t..\: \ • •.•I
t ... . ,;..l:lt •I r:... ·:r.· ~·.

Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, ii nc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). The general inquiry prompted by defendant• s pcndin'."j motion then is "whether the creation by judicial interpretation of the implied cause of action asserteq • • • is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals", id. at 26.
That "need" inquiry here involves distinct aspects. A logical prerequisite is that there be a sufficientiy defined wrong un~er the statute invoked, and clains for rel~cf adcquately presented by the parties plaintiff. In this regard, it should be stressed at the outset that while the complaint
..

·.s.,._ •:.. •
·:·
.· ... .:: ...~..
.~.---.-· ..,-...

B I.

__________ --- ·- --- --:-·-: ~

~

-.---~· -~-·-~-.

·;---:-----.._

one on motion to disr.iiss -- wh~ther plaintiffs could concaivably prove facts callin~ into play an established right of action -- as instead whether any circu.~stancc <lepicted genuinely impels judicial creation of a new suit right, cf. Turpin v. Mailet, Civil No. N-75-181 (D. Conn. May 13, 1977}. Such an approach is surely also consistent ·:Tith Title IX 1 s • aims, for the statute is clearly addressed to specific practices of exclusion, inequitable resource allocation and
Isi~ilar concrete abuses. So viewed, most claims a~vanccd in this action are tenuous indeed. The cor.iplaint is founded on alleged instances of sexual harassnent of women students by rr.alc faculty members or adlministrators, and the principal claim for relief is for an
order "requiring defendant to irtstitute and continue a mechanism for receiving, investigating and «djudica.ting coinplaints of sexual harasst:lcnt",. with pl.:.inti.Efs .:t;;s.::.i: cing 1;1
11
conclusory fashion that their reported experiences are s01r.ehow
"the result of a pattern, practice, and policy of defendant, its officers, agents, ~nd clliploycos, of ncqlecting and refusing to consider scriouzly co~olaints of sexual harassncnt of woncn students, with the effoct of actively condoning continued sexual harassment of feMale students by male ' faculty members and administrators." Before considering the university's possible responsibili~y, however, it must be observed that in any event a nu.:\ber of the pror>oscd Dlaintif fs simply advance no persuasive c::.ni!'l'l thnt 1 they have been cleprived of cognizable '!'itlo IX rights. IPlaintiff John Uinklcr, a r.tember of the classics department, f believes his teaching effort to have been hamncrcd by an
3.

"atmosphere of distrust [of) rnalclprofessors"; plaintiff
I
Lisa Stone, p. current st\.ldent, sp~aks of "great emotionul

distress" on learnin0 that anothei woman student was."the

subject of sexual pressures and attentions from" a male uni-

versity employee; plaintiff Ann Olivarius, a recent Yale

graduate, relates that she had occasion as an officer of the

Underyraduate Women's Caucus when at Yale to discuss with

other students their complaints of sexual harassr.icnt, and

allesculy met rebuff or indifference in attemptinCJ to press

such complaints herself. None of these claims is of personal

exclusion from a fcclerally funded education program or

activity, or of the personal denial of full participation in
I the benefits of such a program or activity in any 1rieasurable

sense. No judicial cnforcencnt of Title IX could properly 11 extend to such imponderables as atmosphere or vicariously

experienced wrong, and the claims just mentionecl .:ire untenable •j

Ion their face.

i

I'

Since any underlying claim that she was herself denied

Title IX rights in unsuccessfully pursuing ot~ers' complaints

docs not merit recognition, there is no neccl to examine the

propriety otherwise of the lone request for damages, plaintiff

Olivarius' incidental prayer for $500 as compensation for:

asserted expenditure of "tine, effort and money in invcstiga-

ting complaints herself, preparing them to be prescr.ted to
Iresponsible officials ••• and attempting to negotiate the

Ilcor.tplexitics of -ad ·ho-c 'channels'". Moreover, her graduation
seems to have rendered r.1oot her claim for equi tabl~ re lie!,

which would appear to be the case ~s well for plaintiff Ronni

Alexander -- a graduate in 1977 before suit was cor.un.cnccd

.. abf;cnt sheer conjecture that the lntter r:1ay in the f1Jturc wish

.,

to resume study in a field al~l.cgedly abandoned at Yale because ~

of "sexual ·deraands" by her tuitor, cf. DcFun:i.s v. Odcqaard,

I

-----

416 u.s. 312, n. 5 at 320 (1974).

-+--:-j.;.

Currently at Yale are two other women students who --

like plaintiff Alexander -- complain of a direct, personal

experience of sexual harassment. Plaintiff Margery Reifler

speaks in c;eneral terns of humiliation, distraction from

st.udies an<l denial of recognition resulting from nllcc:rcd

h<lrassment by a coach when she was manager of an athletic

teai::t; she "wanted to complain to responsible authorities"

but did not. Plaintiff Pamela Price asserts that she re-

ceivcd a poor grade in a course in her major field of stuCy,

not due to any "fair evaluation of her acadc~ic work", but as

the consequence of her rejecting a professor's outright

proposition uto give her a grade of 'A' in the course in ex-

change for her compliance with his sexual demands". Price

represents that she di<l complqin pror.1r.>tly after ti-.<1-::. alle~rcd

incident only to be "told by responsible officials of defend-

ant that nothing could be done to re:ncdy her situation";

plaintiff further alleges that long af tcr the ensuing course

mark was given, she was asked to re-subnit her complaint, but

then "no investigation of the incident" was made and Yale

officials have indicated that "nothing further will or can be

done about her coI'lplaint". Plaintiff Price is a senior, in

the process of applying to law schools, and expresses ir:unedi-

atc concern that a clearly improper low <Jradc "could ~ateriallyl

damac;e • • • likelihood of a<lr.lission".

I

A critical diffcrence between these two claims is th,. t
I plaintiff Raif lor concededly made no complaint on which Yale
could act, whilo plaintiff Price did complain to ci1c univcrsit~

.. 55

ano supposea.Ly met rebuff. The fopner's artfully drafted

but conclusory assertion that general university inertia

should be equated with policy and has 11 the effect of

actively condoning • • • sexual harassment" is simply not

adequate to show that Y~le acted to deny her any right, cf.

Rizzo v. Geode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-377 (1976), Turpin, suora,

and the concept of mere resnondeat superior appears ill~1adapted to the question of Title IX sex discrimination based

,:_;_

ion harassQent incidents. This is not to say either that
Isexual harassment is never of concern under Title IX, or that

a university may properly ignore the matter entirely. In

plaintiff Price's case, for example, it is perfectly reason-
i
!able to rn~intain that academic advancement conditioned upon

submission to sc;..;:ual der:lands constitutes sex discril.lin<ltion

in education, just as questions of job retention or promotion

'tied to sexual demands from sunervisors have l>eco:ae increas-
~-~ ingly recognized as potential :iolations of Title v:I 1 5
against sex discrinination in employment, see, e.g., Barnes

I •
I. .. . t .• .. ··.~.,,..... I r. •v•.

v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988-992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). When a coraplaint of such an incident is made, university inaction then does assume significance, for on refusing to investigate, the institution may sensibly be held res~onsible for con<loning

...~~·~~,' .
.... .. .:!.",.,...~..i·f.,•·,f..'r'.,"•..,·.'......,.-.."....~.".,,:t.,,.
..
1... _ ......

or ratifying the employee's invidiously discriminatory con-

<luct,. cf. id. at 1000-1001 (MacI<innon, J., concurring).

But may an~, such private suit be entertained? The only

reported appellate decision is contrary to plaintiffs' posi-

tion, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit having

held in the context of sex cliscrimination alleged by a dis-

appointed medical school applicant that

"it would be an unwarranted exercise of federal iu<licial newer to imnly a nrivate right of action ln the face of a sonhisticatcd scheme of ad~inis-

56

trative enforcement l!nd j cUcial review that, if given an opportunity to w rk, may well prove itself ad~auatc to tho task for which Con9rcss ~e­ signed it. 11

Cannon v. Univarsitv of Chicaqa, 559 F.2~ 1063, 1082 (7 Cir.

1977) (on rehearing). On careful study of the factors

pertinent to any such conclusion, however, this Co...:.rt is un-

able to agree that the private claim may be surn.'!larily dis-
- nissed without further inquiry into actual need.

As pointetl out initially, the overall question is

whether the federal court should recognize or f <lshion a new

suit right because "necessary to effectuate Congress' goals",

Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., sunra at 2G. The com-

monly accepted approach to the question of implyi1FJ a judicial
I remedy, secmingl~ still valid, ~ at 37, has been to examine

,four specific factors identified as relevant in Cort v. Ash,

1422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975):

I

__ ''First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for
whose _e...s....o.__c. cial benefit the statute was enacted,'

11

'l'"::!~_!_-Pacific R';- Co. v. Rigsby, 241 ~.s. 33,

I

39 ,1916) (cr:rphasis supplied) -- that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of

the plaintiff? Second, is thare any indication

of legislative intent, explicit or i~plicit,

either to create such a remedy or to deny one?

See, e.g., National Railroad Passcn~g_;:_..£~..'!!..

National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.~.

453, 458, 460 l 1974) (Amtrak). 'rhird, is it

consistent with the underlying purposes of the

legislative schenc to imply such a remc<ly for

the plaintiff? Sec, e.9., Amtrak, supra;

Securities Investor Protection Cor • v. narbour,

. 42 U.S. 412, 423 19 5) 1 Calhoon v. Harvcv, 319
U.S. 134 (1964). And finally, is th- e - ca- us~ e of

action one traditionally relegated to state law,

I
I

in an arc'1 bl?sically the concern of the St;itos, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action bascJ solely on fc<lcral law?
See i:heeldin v. i·:hcclcr, 373 u.s. G47, 652 (l!.IC3):

cf. J. I. Case Co. v. ilorak, 377 u.s. 426, 434

3ua, U9t>'4) 1 1Hven'i'V. Si:~ Unknown Federal :'iarcotics

~cnts, 4o3 u.. s.

39'"4'"=195 (1971); i<l., at =:roo

-TUailnn, J., concurring in judgment) ... - ..

. .

5'7

It is clear that plaintiff Price is within the class Title IX was· designed to protect and that the claim is in no realistic sense more appropriate for state court action. Title IX's legislative history does not unequivocally s'.(1ow an express congressional intent to permit or preclude a private right of a~tion, an<l although the history of subsequent
pas!:>age of the Attorr1cy's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 u.s.c.
• § 1988, as a~en<le<l, may perhaps be read to indicate that the latter statute's mention of Title IX was but prudent inclusion in the event courts did thereafter ir.~ply a private remedy,
1 plaintiff's resort to this Court is certainly not ruled out, see Cort v. Ash, supr~ at 82. Indeed, I!.E.W. has further
I urged here an<l in Can~ that private suit enforcer.1ent would
pro~otc Title IX's purpose. 7he Cannon panel concluded that l1cave to sue "would be inconsistent with the legislative in-
1'
tent and underlyins purposes of the statutory scheme",~~, sunra at 1080, that court discerning "ir.1plicit" int.c:lt in th.a stress on the adr.·dnistrative process and cxorcssing concern lest "private parties • • • circumvent the remedial scheme created by Congress", id. at 1081, with the "remedies available" not shown "wholly im1dequate", ~ at 1082.
One difficulty with following Can~ is that the decision
may yield substantially different enforcement rights to victims of sex discrimination than to those subjected to discrim-
ination in federally assisted programs "on the ground of race, color, or national origin" in violation of Title VI of the
ICivil Rights l\ct of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000<l, !:! ~..:..!..' although
Title IX was obviously patterned after Title VI, including its cnforccMent provisions, sec gs 2000<l-l, 2000d-2. It scams plain enough that Title VI violations arc actionable, sec,

--~ . .
,..
..,_,,.. ..
:.

SR

u.s. e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414

•·

I

563, 566 (1974), and it is

'1
hard to understand why all 'l'~tle IX cluims should be less

fa\'orably regarded, see, e.g., ~~rthy v. :.:~rk:1olc.~,::;r, Civil

No. 75-ll6-C6 (D. Kan. April 19, 1977). It naturally has

. been suggested that such Tit~a VI cases have been against
•public" dcfen<.!ants and thcrqfore strictly rest on the Civil

Rights Act's grant of the right to sue for a <lcprivation

. . under color of state law "of any rights •

secured by the

Constitution and laws", 42 u.s.c. § 1983, see Cannon, sunra
I at 1083. If so, it could hardly be a principled distir.ction

that one student would be at Yale and another at the University!

of Connecticut; if the state college student can secure

judicial relief under !i 1983, the more reason to imply a suit

right for the identically situated private university st\.4d~nt,

cf. Bivens v. Six UnknO\·:n Named Agents of Federal Dureau of

N'a"rcotics, 403 U.S. 388 ( 1971).

More importantly, perhaps, the issue of need for the

remedy r:tcrits additional probing. Hhile the Supreme Court

has remarked that "express statutory provision for one form

of proceeding ordinarily implies that no other means of en-

forcement was intended by the Legislature", Securitie~

Investor Protection Coro. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975)

("!!.!!£."),see also Mational Railroad Passenc.zer Corn. v.

National Ass'n of Railroad Passenqers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)

("Amtrak"), the observation hns been mAdc in the context Of

either clc«lrer legislative intent than is provided by Titla

IX's ambiguous history -- a statute based on Title VI and

curiously followed by subsequent legislative mention of

attorney's fees .... compare~~' mmra at 459-461, or of

m.,nifcstly di1Sruptivc conscqLwncon of r>rivatc suit, sec 12.~

59

i

I

j

at 461-465, SIPC, sunra at 421..i.423, which are not evident for

all possible-Title IX claims. It is obviously significant

that the enforcing aguncy urges recognition of private suit

/rights, see, e.g., Allcl!._ v. St;_ate Dou.rd of El~cti0ns, 393
ru.s. 544, n. 23 at 557 (1969) I particularly since 1!.E.N. Is
I position that private enforcement is at least <i helpful

supplement is a reasonable one, cf. SIPC, supra at 424-425.

In view of that stance, it may be improvident either hastily

to infer an unexpressed legislative "intent" to bar any such

suit, or merely to assurne inconsistency between remedies.

I

I

As ar.lici curiae, the t·lomen' s Equity Action League

3ati~nil !Educational and Legal Dcfcese Fund and the

Organiza-

1 'tion

for

W~cn

Legal

Defense

Fund

contend

in

further

support

tof plai~tiffs that it is already patent under Title IX that

ren~dies 1"the

available have proven to be wholly inadequate

III to the task of protecting those rights", Cannon, ·s1.mra at

I '
I
I I

1082. To the extent factual qnd concerned with delayed a~d

I

I 1 cir~unscribcd administrative enforcement, the ar0umcnt cannot
j
I ',be accepted. outright without opportunity for reply by defend-
ant. In the light of H.E.W. 's long delay even in prm.1ulgating j

I
enforcing regulations, however, the contentions advanced are !

surely not insubstantial, and it seems unsound to disniss

this complaint in its entirety at the outset on sheer

assunption that administrative enforcement may prove adequate

while refusing to allow a threshol<l showinry purporting to

demonstrate the contrary.

For similar reasons, plaintiff Price's complaint ~ay not

be dismissed on its face despite failure to seek any adminis-

trativc recourse whatsoever, since ordin.:irily bcncf:i'cial and

!fair rcquirc~cnts of administrative exhaustion nhould not be

Rn

imposed absent re~listic possibil~ty of a meaningful remedy.

Al though H. E.. \\'. could hardly evince indiff erencc to what

amounts to a claiM th~1t Yale has not complied with the basic

implementing re9ulation culling for 'l'itlc IX 11 gr-iev<J.:1.c~ nro-

lcedurcs", AS C.F.R. 5 S6.8(b), and while under the Title VI

I

regulations also made applicable in Title IX matters, 45 C.F.R.,

§ 86.71, an individual :nay m~ke a written complaint which

I

. . Iwould at least obligate H.E.W. to make initial "pronpt ~nvcsti-

gation" if the· information provided "indicates a possible
Ifailure to comply" with Title IX duties, 45 C.F.R.
I§ 80.7{b)-(c), there is good reason to believe that to leave

Price to h2r administrative remedy would be an empty exercise. ~Puttinq to o~c si<lc unconceded representations that ~he en-
i! forcc~ent system is grossly deficient in actual opcrution, it

is not realistic to expect even that 11 prornpt 11 first-step ad-

ministrative action -- much less any rnulti-stagc proceedings
I-- could yielc.l an effective r~medy t.o o:lc clair::ing i:-:·.!nine:-1t
t
injury, with only a short interval between Yale's supposed

abandon:ncnt of her complaint and the law school applicatior.

process. Beyond the prayer for a court-or<lcrcd cor.-1plair.t

mechanism, plaintiff Price has spbcifically requested investi-

gation and a transcript notation in the interim that the dis-

puted grade is under review, which clearly are potentially

effective measures. Whether any such relief is proper is of

course not the issue on the motion to disMiss, cf. Build of

Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 204, 288 (2 Cir. 1971), hut

lean be irn."'.lcdiatcly tested on plaintiff's now-rending motion

for preliminary injunction.

As far as this plaintiff is conccrnc<l, defendant's

attendant jurisdictional objaction lacks compelling force. If

the

federal

statutory

claim

mI ay

,,
not test

on

th~

jµrisdictional

grant extending to suits for relief "under any ~ct of Congress

providing for the protection of civil rigl1ts", 28 U.S.C.

5 1343(4), but cf. Jones v. Aldred H. M~y_s:E.. Co., 392 U.S. t.09

n. 1 at 412 (1968), the Court cannot hold with requisite

certainty in this instance that the amount in controversy is

tinadeqJate to support oroceedings under the general federal
• question grar.t of 28 u.s.c. § 1331. Defendant has also su0-

geste<l that Title IX nay be unconstitutional if construed to

allow private suit, but advances no convincing authority for

that contention in the situation presented.

For the reasons stated above, the instant motion to disr.tiss is accordingly hereby ~Tr anted as to ~laintif f s Alexander,

Olivarius, Reifler, Stone and Winkler, and denied as to

I

plaintiff Price.

.,

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 21st ci.Jy of December 1977.
___ /?,-...:_t-Ldf~L·'-:.:-;/- ~-~;r:_~[ ,(. ~-•c.-' -1
Arthur H. Latiner United States rI.:i9istrat~

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··-1I
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62

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

.J'ill·: 4.:1u'

,.,, .. /,~ ''!'

l' :,, ~ f

'

.I• :. .ti I ,' .

** * ** * * *** * * ** * *

RONNI ALEXANDER, ET AL, Plaintiffs

* * *

vs.

* *

YALE UNI\7ERS::tTY, Defendant

*
*
*

*

* * * ** * * ** * * * ** * *

CIVIL NO. N-77-277

I

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS I'.·.

i

I. ij

Six months ago this Court denied defendant's motion to

I dismiss the complaint of a Yale senior, Pamela Price, who•

asserted an "implied" right of federal suit under Title IX's

, prohibition against sex discrimination in federally funced

educational activities, cf. 20 u.s.c. § 168l{a), claiming

that the university refused to act on her complaint that a

low.mark in her major field of study resulted from her re-

jection of the course instructor's sexual advances.

Familiarity with that earlier opinion is assumed, and on •
I
reflection and study of the record on defendant's second
II motion to dismiss the undersigned perceives no sufficient
I reason to depart from the prior decision's analysis and

I conclusions.

ll

In so indicating, it should perhaps be noted in passing

!I

"
!I

that defendant has accurately sensed that this Court was in·

I part concerned in the earlier motion proceedings at the

illogic and unfairness involved if a state university stutl~nt
G3 1

could press. her Title IX claim thrC>tjlgJ{ atilt under th~ tra..:.

ditional Civil Rights Act a.ddressed ':·to "state" denial. of

federal rights, 42 u.s.c. 5 1983, but the identically

I
I.

situat·ed private college student was denied recourse to the

I courts, cf. Divens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal .
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Defendant's cur-

I rent observation that the private/public distinction is no

~nstead I anomaly but

cor.unonly accepted is beside the point iri

this instance; the analogy offered is the fundamental dis-· ;'

tinction made by the Fourteenth Amendment's constraints on

state action, but Constitutional rights to~ue process and

equal protection themselves exist only as a shield against

•II.

the unfettered exercise of official power, while.Title IX

gives both the public and private institution student the

same statutory right of freedom from discrimination and the

qu~stion is solely how that right will be enforced. Although

defendant also suggested that the grant of a private suit

remedy may be an unconstitutional application of .Title IX,

the discrimination bar is surely a permissible condition to

acceptance of federal funding, and enforcement by private

suit in appropriate circumstances is a mafter not of con-·

stitutional moment but of whether the judicial remedy has

been properly implied.

Plaintiff holds the more general view that her specific

t

1I ex.o. erience is a function of Yale's asserted noncompliance

i

I

11
!.,I.,

with the basic implementing regulation calling for Title IX . I
"grievance procedures", 45 C.F.R. § 86.S(b), surely~ question!

of some importance for the enforcing agency. There was good i

reason at the .outset of her suit to believe that relegating .f

her to tha expressly provide<l administrative remedy, cf. 20
G4 _

I

u.s.c. S 1682, ·would be an! empty exercise. 1!!\ren prompt administrative action coui~ not have been realistically

expected to yield the effective inunediate relief which was

potenfially critical, since plaintiff was then in the midst

of the law school application process and apprehensive at .

possib.le imminent injury in that competitive situation be-

cause of her mark. That conclusion made it unnecessary to

weigh factual; contentj.ons made by amici curiae that delayed

and circumscribed agency enforcement of the law had proved the·· administrative remedy inadequate generally. An affidavit submitted by defendant's attorney now repr~sents that HEW

regional staff counsel has related that the office is

"generally able to process complaints within established

timetables, which range from 105 days to 215 days, and • • • may be extended if required for conciliation or data col-

lection". If inconsistent with information from arnici con-

cerning agency practices, counsel's affidavit only confirms

that the administrative remedy would have been futile in

plaintiff's circumstances in December.

.. Following denial of the initial motion to dismiss,
plaintiff's ensuing application for a temporary injunction went off without formal hcaring·when the parties agreed to

the university's dispatching letters to law schools to which

she had applied advising that the validity of the political

science grade in question was being contested in a lawsuit.

Plaintiff has now been admitted to the University of Califor-

nia at Berkeley, but ~ishes to pursue ~at university's

I.

special four-year program leading to both a law school degree
I,, and a master's degree in a field of graduate study -- politica
11 science in this instance because .. interestacl in the possi-·

!6S

.. , bili.ty of pursuing an acadcmi.tj c;:are~r ~nd informs the
.
Court that the necessary furthier application and support.ing

r,t

materials must be submitted by December of this year.·

in short, plaintiff's situation is still such that the
fi purported wrong complained of could directly cause her
pl~ns, ~ significant concrete injury as an impediment to career - . but the circumstances now allow and perhaos dcnand definitive If
i
inquiry into.the administrative remedy's adequacy -- of

central concern in implying remedy by suit -- including

. judicial determination of the merit or lack of merit in

plaintiff's contention that general experience has in fact

......

already shown administrative enforcement of Title IX to be

ineffective. Whether the administrative remedy bars suit

or at least requires exhaustion may and should now be

promptly decided, and decided in the context of a determina-

tion of the question of adequacy in fact, left open pre-

viously for development of a pertinent record by the parties.

The motion to dismiss is accordingly hereby denied on

the record presented; provided, that counsel are to confer

fort~with concerning preparation for and scheduling of
•
hearing before the trial Judge of the po~entially dispositive

i threshold issue mentioned above. In the interim, any dis-
'j covery and development of evidence should be focused on that

! question, to facilitate prompt final decision of the issue,
'I, cf. Rule 42 (bl , Fed. R. Civ. P.

I.1

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 30th day of June

lII 1978.
II

i

A_drt~hdur_3H2. 1L-a,ti-mlerb:~.~~f---

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,:

·.~r.

United States Magistrate

J_ ------~6~-----...-.-~~ililiiiliilliii·

 
 _, 67
..r~ ,·

PAMELA PRICE v.
YALE vNlVERSITY

CIVIl. NO. N-'f'! ....;?Tl

This action was ~ric;ira.11; brought on ·July 6, 19'/7,

by a male !'"aculty mer.&b·~r· an~i sevc1·a1 womi:n st.udcr.ts and

I
former stti.den•;s at Yale Unilvel"si ty scekiu;; 1•edJ"ess for

i
p~r·portt1d sex disc:r•ir.inatio/n at the uni vers:tty and

cdntcndin5 that Yale's allcbed "failu:r•e to combat~ S<.?xwrl

i

.

h~ra.tH~m.cnt o!' female stuum·~tz nnd its ruru~.;al to instlt.ut.,:?

!
m~cha.n1ame

and

pi~ocedures

)
t~lo

address

complaints

and

mak~?

I

!

irl!veoti"o'a..t.1.ono

or

such

I
harajssmc:?Jl~

!nter•rercs

with

t.ho

r. .•<>jifi'O"n':''"F~ijiQ)"'i'i!'\i;rtt"';'lll;

. ;

ctass ·1 The plaintiff3 asserted i a i
anJ on behalf of a prcposed

1,tidiv:idt.t0lly]

'

,l

under Title IX or th~;

Education Amendments or 1972,i?O U.S.C. §1681 (.!t 3'.:q.,

· 1

and req~ested, inter al!a, va!i'I', ious coPrectlve me~i;;;•u-·es

, ;

t

to be desi~ncd and implementecli under ~he supery1 s ion o:"

I

lhe this court. Jurisdiction of

court was invoked

:1

aifciIi

'

pursuant to 20 U.S. C. §1681

28 U.S. c.. §§ i 3113, 22Gl

J 1

and 1331.

·,r,

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A r.!OLion to umena the cdrrmJ aj nt ln wh:ich f.hu

.·-i,· .

I •

I

I

I

plaintiff, Pamela Price, was Jct-ded as u party I
on November 16, 1977, and ~ra~ted en December 7, 1977.

r t
I

A .i-ulin~ of M:;eintrate Art.hu1· IH. Latlrnnr of' D<~Ct~mh•~l· :?l_,

I

!)

ru; to all p!aintlrf:-1 except, Mt,na Pt•J(:<: hnl.dU11~ thn.t. :t

I

or rlt::n J'1t~flt

tu:tlon on lwh41)f of'

Pl"J'H~ mJ1~ht. bf'· !t:1pLt••d.

!

cpai•t:meY1t ci i' · .,

Health* i~u~at~on and Wo1 rn/rQ provt'd t.o b•· .i 11:ulo'qu:t1 •'

I

am,i, lna subse:quentt•ulint.~I filed Deccmbct• G, l~ff8, thl::;

court

found

sue h

to

be

the

I 3/
lease.

In he1' complaint p'lai(ntiff Price al.lcg.:-u th:.i.L, :tn
I
June, 1976, wh:n' she went t/':> the off'icc ot' Hnywo11d Duvall,

the professor'· who taur;ht h~r course :l.n Intern~: t ionnl

Rela.tions, roliti~al Sc1enc1I0 39b, at thl.'.' dd\•11d;111t.

.

I

university, Profe~sor Duva~l ."offered to ~ivc her u

·11n · grnde of 'A ' 1 n the com•se cxc hani;e l\>1• hcl' cump 11 anc" J

with his sexual demands." ,She fu1.. ther· alleged that, shortly

co~plaine~ after. the incident, she

ornl l,Y and :i.n wt•i t.tnii:

I
to responsible university ~fficials, and was toid nothjn~

could be done about her siJuation, thnt no invc:.>tle:atlon ·
!
was made 01" disciplinary a9t1on tal{en againct P1·ofes::.10r

or !

.

Duvall and that she later ~ece1ved a grade

"C" in

dhe the course which "was not

result of a fnir evnluntion

1 ·
or her academic work, but qhe result of her refusal t0
I
accede to Professor Duvall 'is. sexual demand." M13s Price

a~leged further that, "[a]~ the direct result ot her ex~liciL

rejection of said sexual p~oposition, [she] suffered

I
educational ~det1~1ment. Sh, has suffered distress,

, I

humiliation, ha:;; received , cradc on her t1,::.rnsc:rlpt t.hat
. doei;; not 1~erlcct the qual1tly ·or he:r ac::ukmlc pm:•foJ.•1aar:..!c,
~ int~ and has been inJ m:•etl, and s continuously be 1n,J m·l'..·d,

! '
I in hf:f" c;nlmmttonal 4dVUOC€,Orlt :ind in the futur•e pUP:Jld t

!

Of h(Jl~ CfU'01.W." PlaintH'1.. 1nl:.;o allc:,ccd that f n !'..h,tp\..c1:ibtn•,

I

~ _,

1977, ot'ficm·~ ~ the dore1i'.lant requested nhe t•c;;uiH';·r t.

her compllilnt but tl:#nt, af~er hor r'mutani::a~ion, no !nvr.•:;t.t-1
catlon or tho ;jnci!Jent wcrn lmado nor wu~~ hop 1~1·:1d" •!lnn1~·-·" i

·~~9" rmmH ol'" 1•n1.1."""•

j

II . I
l
i
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I l l female stttcl<.:nts by inalo f'n.cuJty momtH:ra :1nd :i1l!n1n.i:;t;ratoP~>.

The court, durine the seven trial days of this

case) had the benefit of the testimony, among othc1·s, o !'

l

I

officials of Ynle Universjty a:1d those academicians who . lJ

o~ :reviowed Miss Price':; oa.ncr· at the rcqtHJ:..>t of' the Univ<H'"'it·y
and of tl1e pl0'1r.tiff . . the basis of all tlw <>vl cto.1"0 ., • ,

tho court finds that the alle~ed incident of sexnal

. J

pr>oposition dld

occur and that the grado or "C" whl,:h

ooµrse did not reflect aona1derat1on er any

ll
than acadcmi(! a:phic~y~1nen~·.·i Tn~ e~µ

:-,--;.~,_'",.

~ - , " '.-\...:;._<, v .•. "-~·

nor coui<l"i'.t•
paper, clearly an aeadcrr.:i.c and sub,j ect.i.ve judgment bo.vond its compc..tence. 1'hc coul't fine.le only that .M:is;; l'rlce did not pr•ove that. lh0 i>efusal of a scxu~1 l .:idvnncc w~: ~; a considcr·ation in :;he determination of that grade by
Professor Duvall.
FhCTS
. Plaintiff rnmcla Price, currcntlv a law utud~nt u~:
major, hav lrn; commenced li1..·r· atudle;s aL LllaL v u11 i vc1•:1i 1.. 1n

3 -
71

'... ,,,,.

I '
session :.uu:t 1.-l:ts b1•oliun do.1;.·m lnt.<) \.\w dh~,,u-.inhm ~~··d.. ltm~•

whlch met weekly, each u•ider the dlr•ectlon of' a tew. :hin;;;
I
'tsslstant. In al•>S 1'1•:ic~'s ~~C'~t:lon the- t,•achl11:>: ;l~':>.h1t:1qt

was ,~umeri Austin. The f.ilnal g.N1de ln Political St~le:H.:t; 39i3
I
wa.s deriv~d f1"om two elcr.ients 1 a rinal examination which

or constitutl?d t'orty per cetjt

the r.i·~de and :in •.wJ,~111~1 l

l'l)sea1'eh p:ipc1• t-:hi~h ,.•-..>u~d count 1"01• t~lxt.y p1..·1· l!t'll\. ,,,.

I

the grade. R!ss Price r1ceivod a "C- 11 on hen· l'lnal

cours1 . examination in the

1 anci made no (!la tr:: in this 1nw

suit with respect to the ,propriety of that e;rnd<.:.
Durlnt; the sprinf; ~e:rm Miss Price who, in auui tlon
to her studies at the un~vers1ty, worked for the Af'ro-

Ame1•1can

Cultu1•al

1
Center lat

Yale

and

tauc;ht

::i

psycholot".Y

I
course at Loe H1t;h S~hooi in New Haven, round it

I
necess~lry to l'equest cxt~nsions fo1• th<' r.ltllmlnu1on of'

papers due in Political Science 39B and in History 738

21J. and Political Science

On Api;il 29, l~J'l6, nrw wnn

I

granted an cxt~nsl~n in ~ollticaI Science 39B until

I
May 31, the paper orl~lf!lally being due on J\prll 30,
I
the dat;e or her rinal ex~mination in the course.
I
On April 30, James\I Austin was one of two teaching
I
assistants ser"1ing as Pfrcto.rs for the ex~m1nat1on in

Pol1t1\!nl S..::.1cncc 39B. 'rfowar•d the cnu or t:hc• c:wmlnat~lon

.

I

period M1s3 Price, in anlacitnted stuto, told him ~'ih~

hnd

lont

n

;.;pll"u.l

!
notcbotY.

whloh

oh<:

hf.tu

in

~.iitJ

··:rnmlnrlli<m ·

room wlth her• and whlch, i:-shc c!aim0d, eont.:1.tn<~rJ hri• I I
paper on which :.she had orjllY a rew mot:•c hourt> or wo.rh
to do, he~ i·~uch druft ur[•d he:• 11ot()n. At aome 1n;,;prm.tl'lcd ,

later di:.t~ hos• nC>tcboc* ~az 1•ut.o.wnet.l to her.
'Sub•H~i;l.lontl1, on ttI~c cvonh11~ ot• J1,1nn 6, l!J'(Ci,
I
lUD=s .rrtno. tn t.hf.1 compfi y

of which colle~c Miss Price was a 1nrnnbci·. At that 1.l111e

th~ Bt"'enda Jub1n, f'orr.le?• Dean! of

college, was vloitlnG

!

Dean Balobh• In the pre~lence of h1."'r companion and

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Miss Jubin, l-Uss Price rcllated that, on t!~at d:.ly, nl'h! had

i

cone to Professov Duvall'i• office tu turn in her resoarch

i

4

paper and that Duvnll sexlually propos1 tlo:wd h<'.'t' and

~mi said thnt, 1r she did not/ oblige, she mir;lit

up \\lt.h

a 6I'ade of "C" in the COl~rse. Miss Price c l<1i1acd r>bc had refused to comply an~ asked what could be douc about

the situation. Dean Balqgh advised Miss Price, becaw.H.'
or the complexity of' sue~ a situation which occu!'•s in

pr!vate, to wait until stjc received her course· ePude since,
I
if 1t wcn~e a "C", it wou~d g1 ve her mo1~e cPcdcnce.
Miss Price acreed ~hat this was the best course or
I
action. She asked Denn rlalC1(~h t,o lwcp t.li.• mat.1,·1• 1!1111l'i.-

dcritial and expressed he~ opinion that the paper was at

I

least of "B" caliber and !that she•cxpcctcd an "A" in

the course. As plaint1rt planned to leave nho~tly for

I

i
her Junior year studies ~n Tanzania, Dean Balogh aokccl ·

..

her to write and agreed ~o "keep an eye on thn e:r:u.lo. 11 i

Within twenty-four hours ::.ass Price left New Haven.

The next morning O~Ian Balor;h r·epor•ted the episode

i
to Martin Griffin, Assoc~atc Doan of Ynl~ Collcsc and
'
Dean of Underr,raduat.c St4die:>. Sh<.: told the Deun that

I
she had sur;r.c;;;tci.l MJ ::;r.; i'1r1cc watt ulltll h<~1· 1~1·:tdu crn:w
I
in and Dean Gl'lfl'l.n aei·c.•4d lt wn::; uppropri~1te :.o w;d.t

for the eradc nnd for fuJthe.r word from ru~rn l'i•ice.
Within th!.' week Dt~ifn Bnlo~h h~tn•nc•d th:JI. Mhm 1'1•h!it

I
hod roccivod a ~rude of ,C" in Pollt1cn1 ~nalon~c 39li~
She te1'1phorwd D«!:m nr•.u·J1n :iml t·t.~f">P~1.ul t,o him
.J~<~.'1~~.£~
H

74

"J • '-~'

f

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rcpllcd he did not t.h1nl·~ any:..btn~ c:ouJd hi: dor:<: i;ritJ.l

they h0arJ from ~Js~ Price.

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On June 23, 1976, Nies Ptt·lcr· ,,,,,,t1• 1... : ' j.. ea.. ._,.. .f,. V

·c, r ,11·nr,"l ·•i· >l 1

··-

1,I

•1.-... '-""-·~• . •'-• • ~·i

I and recounted t,o Eric Lum, d:l.rt1cto1• of tho J\f1·.-) ...~c:n1~1·.lc:111 Cultural Centc1·, the samo allcr:ations n:> t.:1 i'Pufv:~r;cp

Duvall "s conduct. ~·1r. Lum advt sod lK'P to typ1' up a

statem\'!nt t•·,,,• ·t· Li•,•"> i•'l•>•.1t l•''": ,~-.b_·V·."..L-\.'.,L,. v

~ ,,,.J. -~~""'"

_ !·,••'ll,i...1_.•}1 _rt._110 ,";'4~-1UJ

.-..,..,J,,"1t'•,t••.•~• +f ',~

with him. She did not contact Dean Balogh or maJ-;o :in:i

effort to determine her coUr>$e e;:radi; from anyc;rH.• at Y:tll!,

for Tanzanl~.
Profo~Gor> ~uvall loft New Haven at the end ol' J1.HH:'

In late July or early Ausust Miss Pvice,learnod

although she 1·1.rote to Dean Bai'of~h, Eric Lum and har·nesba Hill, Dean of Student Affa:i.1·s at Yale, dur:lne hcri aiJ3crw·e, without commenting in any of that correnponden•...:e on 11cr grade or any action she wished taken with respect thereto.

Migs Price returned to !New Haven i;May, 1977,
. and althouGh she saw and sp~~e,:I " ••1 w•ith Dean Balogh
times durinr; the sprint; .. icl ~ummer, she did not mention

the ihcident.

I

I Prompted by the filin~ iof the instant law ::;ulL,

1n.AUI;Ust, 19Tl; Dean Grifflfli asked Dean Balogh} a:.:; he
I
!
a..sked all the residcnti.'.11 co~iloge deans, to 10t h.im know
anythine the unlversl ty shou~d. have knowl odf~<· of j n
!
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t,h0 conf.c:<t nf' Ll11! law ·!~!lit.! D1~a11.,.1i.:iln1~!1 1•1·111i11d 1 ·d lii111

I

of i'JJlr.z Pr.ice's chQrr;e und h'1 roquc~L£·~<.l !Jc:an B:L! ''i':il to

,

I

'

submlt a written statement. !o.-Jan BaJ 01.r,h nubm.i tt,cd :.nwh

i
a statement on Aur;uzt JO and,II nrtor n f' (.: C! f.J .•I. V •t ff, •I 1, and

6

i
1-

75

1

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11'1 MAii

I
Griffin 1•equcatcd D"~an Bal<j>r:h to a::;J.:. Ml:.w Pr•i,:l~ it'
I
wished to mal~e a fo:rmal cmbpla int. Ml:~:-; 1•1· it'•} :mlirn U. l.t'd

a compla l nt on Sept.,mber. 2f, 19'17, which D"nn Bn lo,,h

transmitted to Dean Or1ff1~ with a coverins letter on

September 27.
I
Denn Griffin and D1..':1h Tafr d~~~l·u:~~~,,,\ : ih' b··::t ?::l': h»d
i
of addressing ~iss Price's: complaint and, because
I
Professor Duvall \<:as no lo~ce1• at Yale, dctcrm.i n~.·u to
I
pt>oceed as if Miss Price' sJ allegations of impropriety
I
had boen substantiated and! determine whether her course
grade was proper. They th;Icn submitted Miss Price's

resea1..ch paper, her' wrlttc!n compln.int md a letter• r1•om I I
Eric Lum which enclosed Milss Price's statement or June

23, 197G, to Joseph Laralqmharn, chairman of the pol:i.tlcal

science department, with ~he requeat that the paper he

read by one or two personfl :1.n the department.

Profesno:r LaPalombarla reud the paper and d1.:ter·m1ned
I
that it was a mediocre paf.lcr, essentially worth a "C"
I
grade. He then cave the :~aper to Prorcssor W.i1L1:im Pnlt:~,

an African specialist in t~he political sclenel' tJ"rnl't..mr.mt,

for his evaluation, Miss ~rice's paper havine been

written about Tanzania. ¢rofc3sor Poltz wns nbt.. ~old

' the

name

of'

the

student,

I
¢1· ·why

nn

cvulu:.itJor1

wa:;

:rnu~ilt.

re Pro

:.H.>0 P

l"o l t~~,

I
hnvi n!'; l'~!Ud i

the

papc-P,

dl:te1•11i.i nud

.i t,

"C" u· ;;.;hould b~ t~l'adod ''C" n1· "1#1~'1" '

l t. W:t;\ ;•\I !'1 l l l .~, '*- Io

be ol'if~lnal rc'5enrch,

it was ;;uppo;:ed to !;1: a

think piece where the

was not cxpcwtud Lo have

detailnd knowled&c obouL

him that this was not n
.· u clear• reco1:t~cndat1on oi' :l. ~rade W::l~ r·eq1d l'Ni. ii•' al~;o

nske1.i Dean G1•.l r:"in to i!Ontact D~an Baloi.:11 and ar>k lh}!'

d~toi•minc ~>pt·c to

fro::• Mis:; !'rice Imot•Q

.ii'.i t!:; en t:.lw ld.n<i

of po.per t,hls was. Dcun Bul~Gh r•eµortcd 0ad~ t.bat thu
l
p:i.por \•:ns suppC1:.;c,1 to hn :i l'ffh":n·.~h p:q•,,:· :111d \ h:l 1
I
James Austin \'ms the tcachin¥ assistant. 1 n the eour>S(!.

This 1nro1•rr.~tion in turn w::isi.given to P1•ofc~:rnor- L:iPnlo!::baP:i

who

secured

a

copy

of

the

I
syf labus

course

and

asked

Mr. Austin also to read the ~)upe.P.

knew the identity or the stu~ent, he believed the paper

I
had :recently been SUbm:l t ted ~y the plalnt ·j ff i 11 Ol'dl"•!'

Tos to obtain course credit und

unaware of the clrcum-

stanccs promptinr; the 1.kpart*tmtal l'CV1~w oP that any

I
other person was readin~ theipapcr.
~/
a cractc or "C" to the paper.~

Mr. Austin usnlcnca

Thurcnfter- on November 15, 1'977, Dear,::; Gr:I fr:I.n,

Taft and Bal ot;h met •:!1th His~ Price~ in Dcun Tart' n of flee
..
to inform bet• Of tho l'n:ml t <j>f tlie 1.m:lvc1·~1ty :lnV•?3ti.-

gat1on. Dean Taft ~tutcd th•t if Profe3nor Duvall wore

sti 11 at tho univci•slty, i t would have cc.mduct1•<i an

inquiry undor p~oceduren estOblishod by thn American

Ii

I!

I

hact t~i;H.. n place and Jwr- d1arrvI 1 hac.l b1••-.:n ;a1l;i;t:,nt.i:t1,1:d.

I '
Dean Tctft then .tnd.tcatcd the iovalur1tlon oi' Mln;: l':•it!l>':.;

po.pci•

by

three

rcadc1•a

I
indlcs,p;ed

1 t,

~;hould

u"

1~rad(••l

11 C" nnd, ;;1ln91' J 11. h•1(!ou:i!.n.cJ f'or ~~-1 r.1,y

ehtu1~i nc ho.••

,, __;">?_-,;':.:'~

~~;--<:i;4/~i:>~-~

l

H"1H'~H:

I
r:1•itd1• •

i
t' t nn l t:i-r.1.d c • I ,<l:."-i --··;;;·• ~:;;,_..\,."

l.h,11•n wa.~

110 Im:~ i::

l'tll'

i

C-O-N-C-L-U·S·IO-!-!:·' ,-:)l-P .-LA-W-

.

I

..,

'rhe court is unaware of! any ca::>e Jn wh1c h an
! '~

allegat:ion of sexual harassmc1~t in an cdlH~a t.i.ona 1

I

rt context has been addressed. . ! har; eon::; .i.~_; l,(~l l t 1.Y IH:1.~ll

plaintiff'i contention that t~e failure of_Yale Univc~sity

I

•

t o h ave .ad op t e d regu 1ati'ons ~. fI set ic.or tl1 -proce. d. ures to

I

..b e

1"o 11owea• 10 n ca~es

o f . a 1).et;fI l~l

sex

c t <.in 1 • ·. 1.~~cri01:nn• :.1

0
i

.

i• s

in itself a···~ioiation of law,! specif::.cally that po1"t:i.<?n

:of the regulations of the Dep.~1rtmenL o_f llc'a1t:l1, 1·:dt11::d.. io1i

and Welfare, 45 C.F.R. §86.S(b), whlch i·equ.i.rv:3 thaL

I

5/

''[a] recipient [of federal fi~ancial assistan6e ~ sh~ll

I
adop~ and publish gri~~ance ptocedures providing for

prompt and equitable resolut·i~n of student anct employee
I
complaints alleging any actio~ whidh would be prQhibfted

i>}

j
oJ' such compl:;,,lnts. In the sprinf:: rH1d ::;umrncr of' 19'!'/,

Resulation XI of the Undergraduate ~0~ulation3 provjdcd

•j .

that

11 [

l]f

a

stucier.t

1:1 Yale

Coll0r:e

bel:Leves

t.hut

someone etctlnc; f'or the Universtt;r hac br::haved to•:I~;.t.rd;}

the student in a ~·:r.y that :ls :lmpropt~l"ly bar.ed upun

I

compl.'.llned of, but mny

I seoupo un cquicublo onlutlon oi' !;11·· pl'ohlcu' 1'1'""' Lk

Dean~ Collcf~e::;' Cir.:.lrm~ Master:;. und

or the Rcs:tdc-nt:tal

ti10

... 11 I-

Doan for Student I\ ffnir~. Tf' the J·roblr:m '.Hin not;. br:

7!J

80

the:

qua1i ty

of

a

r;tudcnt 1 :;

I
:·1k:.rk

ih

a

courr~e

L~

r J.ri:ll,

::1.nd

I
thls statement shall not b·.~ ~!on:..1Ll'th~d n:~ :1pplyl11r: Lt) .:1 ·

.dispute about a Grade assign~~ to a student by a mcrnb0r

I

of the fa-culty."

I

I

This court is in agreo~nent that the pl'O(>:'dtn•cs ~pt

I

forth above give no real r;uidance to stuucnts or to

,

I I

I

fac• ulty

as. to

procedure

to

I
bffollow0d

N:lth

respect

tc' I.

.

I

.

claims such as _Miss Price hap. macle. The sur;gestJon ·

.

I

.

that one first approach the bffending f'acul ty mcmhc1· ;;1ccms

ih. s.~ch ~1Y particularly inap.propri.ate(

a case. It a1 .. ·

I

•

1
appears that Yale's actual r~sponse in this cnse was
I.

entirely ad hoc but, given the unique factu~l situation

I
in this case where the plain~iff left t~e university

I
sho!rtly a.rter first indicatipg her .complaint and did

:

.· ·•

..· .. I

.

no~!, ,r~t,~.r,~,h~~til some. eley,e.· ·..

inte1"im, Yale's handllnc; of her complaint vm.5 ned.th\:!c

arbitrary nor unreasonable. The quc·s tior1 ar:i ~,;c.:~~, howevcri,

whether, given the factual flnd:Lnt~r3 mndc t)y Ud~; cOLir''L

in this case, the :inadequacy '1 of< p;r?ocedure::; to respond

,

.,

I" . '

to l'~a;l.ms of sexual dis:rimitntioii .should be udd1·o:i:o.ed

by tne court.

I -

-

I

I

An analor;y ri1ay be drawn to cases a1le>gtnr: suxuuJ

disci~-imination in em•nloyment JI In 'those c•ases a plain~iff

I

must establish that the acts \complatncd of const:i.tute

I

a condition of employment an(J that this condit:inn was

I
imposed· by the employer on t1ie bas"i.s of :.H;x. 'l'oml;; in:-~ v.

I
Public Service _Electric & Gaz1 C9., ~GS l•'.2<1 101111. (:id t;j.1·.

1

~ad 1977). If plaif!tiff

provled that a demand for•

1 I
I
sexual compliance was made o~ her bccau~c of her sex
I

and thnt·her eournc g17u.de was1" cor.d:lt:ioned on Ll1:i.L

I
compli.ancc, the annlog.v wouldj lw npt •• nut. .i L dPP:: 111•L

I
follow that; lf_Yulc.• _Hn.ivc•r::d\Ly fallud Lu a1·i~icul;!l,1:

npproprlate p1•o<!N1uPcs to d<~ao, ,w·i th :::ucl1 a c:J:ti111, :1
1,
I
81 - 10; I I

I'

I

I
the

lnJUPy

she

by thJs court.

··'''f' hasir:1·
'1
She must ::.hG)W no~ only the

conduct cla.inh:::d but that nh~~ :ts suff'm•inr: ndVt"r'f'i~" .f-,f'fPl~tn

I

.. I

.

as a consequence of' th.'.lt cotpduct. O'Shea v~ L:ittleton,

I

414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (19711) 1 Niss. Price, no loni::;cr a

I

I

I

-

student at Yale Univ~rsity, \'1f\ hc~rself un~1ffeett"'d liy

tenJe the exJ.stcnce or nonexis

of such un:i. vern:i.ty I'(;e;u-

I .

lations, even if that exist~nce or noncxl~tence ha~ an

I

,

aqverse impact on present f~male students. In iler

I
comp~aint she claimed t_ha t ~he "is continuously bcine;
i
injured, in her educational iadvancemcnt and in further
I

pursuit of her career." Sudh ·a claim can only relate
I
I,
to her allegation of an imp11oper c;rade on her tr<JnscrJpt, ,

an alJ.e~at1on she has failed to prove.

Accordlnr;ly, ~ udgmen~ r:-iay enter fc!, the defenclan.t·.

SO OHDERED

,.J.
Dated at New Haven, Conncc t .le u t, thi G el. ........J. n :y of
July, 1979.

l

i

·1I

.

§l681. 1! l'.11..ov:?.'dcs

:In

pel'L l.n1.'11t

p~n·t:

"No per:;lon ln. the Uni te~l: Stnt¢u uha l 1, ·on Llit> b:i :.~ i :: 1' I'

·.·.

.

..

•

I •

.

..

. 3ex.,..

be

exqlU.<.i"e' d

f'rom

p~rticti11ation

I

.

in»

be

dented

1~h0

bene!'1ts or. or b~ subJ~cte<l t~o cUscr:tm:t n:'..t.lon 11nd<·r·

·· . . . .•·.

. ·. .

I

a.11~· eQ.µcation prosl!am or activity i~ecei v:! ns f•'uc·i·:1.l

. . ~.

·.

I

.

rinancial assistance

-

·-

---·,. ¥

'

.

~ i

. "

__ 2/
- In Cannon v. Un·versitv or Ch:icni~o, ""-- ll.S.

,

47 ·ll.Si.L.W. 45'49 • ·4-ecid~q May ~ !1'1 197 9, the Supr·cmc Court..

. fo\.Ari~.'l,'itle> IX

of

the

E~ucat~dn I. i

Amendment.a

of

J 9'f ;~

- _,- ---· :>~ : __:,

.

_,, '·

- """

I- - ,

·' i~Pfi~it.ly Q.reates a prfvate t\li:;ht of <.H! l ton ror :":•'X

.:.tll~:~~:im:tJ;!!:t.icm in ecluca,1on.

;,;,, •

I

-;, §:I

•1:-

rhi~ C()Urt does jnot accopt; the pr'Pj10sttlon

~- - - -

i' -

-,

--- ":: - -

I

...:c~re,$Jfed t>Y dej'~ndant;'' th)Jft the- cori;cctness or the gr·ade

.:;·\; .._·c .. ·. . ·. . . .I . .•

·~e:~ie-iyecl, in f.l. case wher~ sexual haraszmenl~ 13 pr<,•1c;d

. •. .. .

.

. ·...

I ·'

1~~~Jod;'1tself .be dispc:Hlit!ive of a clair.i cf dlscr-11:Lt m.i.tlon •

. ;If;a>-~lainti'f.r··sho~ss a t\e.rm or cond:ttion han bo<!n Jmpo~wd

-·--_:..,---: -

~~ -""'

-I

a in }~•exuallYf cliscriminafol"Y _fa~hlon she wlll have

G·tated a claim •. Cf. Tomlkins y:,. PubUc Sct·v:!~'-' El·'Ctr'·ic ~'
Ga~ co., 5GS P~2d lOllil cl3d Cir. 19T/), SC'X d1.i:cpir:i1.nat:ion
I
in cmploymt.1nt. Pt"oof' thht l-h'-' .:,--:11ad•.' l:> ,.,,1•:•,.1• 1 i 11 .H1d1

... l -
83

he would nssla;n a eradE'.· of ''D". to iplhlntl i'r •.; pupe:·

but

that,

if

he. applied

i .•.•...
tl1e! st~hoq~"ds

. . ..
and rt~qut1·\.~m~nts ·

i '

, '

I
which Professor DuvaJ,.l woulf apply~ he would p1•obably

assic;n it a. c;rade of "C''. I

5/

I I

~-:

.

. .

Defl.)ndant points out in its b1•icf that pl;:;{lnt.if'f

I

i

.•..

failed to o·ffer evidence or IYalc's receipt of. federal. 1

financial assistance. Sinct, in t,he protracted an_d

vigorously contested pret1•141 motions :rnd h0af•trw:;:; j n r:! ··"

this case, defendant never Ja1sed .the 1:.::sllc that it. jo
i not subject to Title IX, it \conl? .well bf' round Lt\ ltavt.•
waived .r•equi:r'cmcnt of such ~roof.

,
84

 
 JUL 2 0 \978
Yale Undergraduate Women•s Caucus ~nd Grievance Committee

The Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus began as an organization

of six women in September 1974. Since that time our membership has

grown to inclu4e nearly two hundred members of the Yale community.

As the Caucus has grown in size we have retained a primarily

horizontal organization where members work co-operatively toward

common goals. We are committed to educational, cultural, and political

actions around issues of importance to women at Yale.

As an educational organization the Caucus is primarily concerned

with bringing women's issues and problems to the attention of the

Yale community. Our activities include: panel discussions( 11Does

Feminism Address the Needs of Women?, .. Fall, 1977; "Women and Politics,"

Spring, 1978); consciousness-raising groups; self-help groups and

Women's Studies discussion tables.

·

As a cultural organization, we provide opportunities for women

to be together in an enjoyable, relaxed atmosphere. These events

include art shows, poetry readings, films, and open houses. The

Caucus shares a "Women's Space" with five women's organizations

on campus which is a center for our cultural and educational activities.

As a political organization the Caucus works within Yale on

issues of concern to women. A summary of our political efforts

includes: admissions: Affirmative Action; gynecology; security: women's

athletics; and women's studies. Our political purpose is clear: to

promote the position of women at Yale, thus eliminating institutional

and attitudinal sexism.

The Grievance Committee was formed in March, 1977 to make the
Yale community aware of the problem of sexual harassment of women students by male faculty members. No university committee or
grievance procedure exisits to address this problem. Our primary
goal is to have the university establish an official grievance procedure specifically for sexual harassment. Toward this end we are lobbying within the university for a grievance procedure and supporting the
present class action suit in Federal District Court in New Haven.
Our work currently centers around increasing financial, political, and.moral s~pport for the lawsuit. Campus organizing has focused
on three areas: 1. disseminating information about the suit by sponsoring discussion sessions in the residential colleges and distributing fact sheets, 2. generating broad support for the · establishment of a grievance procedure by conducting a college-wide petition drive, organizing a faculty support committee and soliciting
support from campus organizations, and 3. encouraging the formation
of and participating on the Yale College Dean's Advisory Committee on Grievance Procedures. Members of the Grievance Committee have written articles and editorials for university and community newspapers
on the specific$ of the suit as well as the larger issue of sexual harassment in education. In addition to our work on the Yale campus
we have appeared on radio and television talk shows and have spoken
to groups in the community and at other colleges. Our fund-raising efforts include selling tee-shirts, inviting individuals to give benefit performances or speeches, and asking foundations as well as individuals for contributions. During the past year Dick Gregory, Robin t>iorgan and Marge Piercy are among those who have given benefit
apeeches or poetry readings for Alexander v. Yale.

 
 •
FAC'I' SHEB1' ON ALEXANDER V. YALE ( 'l'HE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE)
There have been a lot of words thrown around about the "sexual harassment" casf: against Yal0, both nationally and locally. It is time to give the pla1nt1ff 1s side of the case.
Alexander v. Yale 1s a class action suit against the university charging that Yale condonPs sexual harassment of its women students and that this constitutes sex discrimination in
violation of Title IX. It is a class action suit because the issue is larger than the individuals involved; sexual harassment of women
students is widespread enough to warrant the setting up of a gr1evancP procedure to deal with the problem. There have been many other women who have found that tht:>.ir sexuality was a decisive factor 1n whether or not they could work w 1.th a faculty member. In fact, as news of the~ invest.1gat1on leaked out, the number of complaints
reportnd snowballed. Some people have suggested that a woman who is smart enough to get into Yale should be smart enough to be able to
avoid sleeping with her professors involuntarily. THAT IS NOT THE POINT. Such pressure does rrot belong in an educational setting.
WE ARE NOT SUING THE INDIVIDUAL PROFESSORS FOR DAMA~ES. We are .simply demanding that Yale set up a workable and effective
grievance procedure. Setting up such a procedure would settle the suit.
What are the charqesr*
Pla1nt1ff ~ alleges that she was forced to have sexual relations with her professor in order to continue studies necessary to her career goals.
Plaintiff 2 was forced to waste time, effort and money invest1gat1ng thr' matter because of the· 1ack of an adequate procedure.
Pla1ntif f 3 is suing because of a friend who was subject to sexual harassment. The friend's experience diminished Plaintiff 3 1 s confidence in her male professors and this hindered her ability to, take complete advantage of the educational opportunities of the
university. Plaintiff 4 is a faculty member who contends that the
of sexual harassment poisons faculty-student relationships
Ol':r in the way of a prop·e~ r ~le-a~rn··i.-n~-~g-----=e-=.nL.:v...i.:r..o:..n:.,m;:.,e.:.n...t....._...;;:;;......._........,...........................~~........~.........

What do we want?
We want a proper grievance procedure •• We have been as'kinq tbe
un1vers1ty since last April to set tip a committee that would deal · with complaints of sexual harassment. This committee would decide .
the validity of complaints and appropriate action to redress injurieas.
Why lS it necessary to go to court?
THE PLAINTIFFS NEVER WANTED TO TAKE THE CASE TO COURT. They 4icJ: so only after exhausting all availabln options. The plaintiffs h•ve .
n.f!Vf:r been interested in the public discussion of this case and th• ·
issues it raises turning on the personalities or individuals who taaY have been involved in specific incidents. They have conscientiOl18ly tri~d to limit publication of any names and specific details of the all€~qations. The high personal cost of the lawsuit, both to t.he' plaintiffs and to the othor individuals involved, only highlight• the·· need for Yale to provide some othf:~r way to deal with this problem.
WE ARE NOT SINGLING OUT YALE UNIVf;RSITY AS AN EXCEPTIONAL
HARASSER OE" ITS PEMALE STUDENTS. We recognize that harassment probablvoce11rs on all campuses, and is not confined. to education: ~H:·x discr1m1nat1on in the form of sc•xual harassment also occurs in (•mploym£·nt s1tuat Lons. But we ar"' d1roct.ly affected by the sexual bar as.smr nt that docs oc,:u r at Val'"' and by the reluctance of the
·Hn.v1,rs1ty to investigate the problem. Tht· 1.m 1 vnrf\ J t y did not respcind to our request for a grievance
f;r·1 1:. d~Jr'"'• 'tie> had no othr·r rPc:our::;1 but to file suit. Yale can C!'i; t !H· ;;u 1 t V(·ry r·ai-; l l y by grant 1nq w; lha t grievance procedure.
FrH ir•orc infl)rmation plnm_,,. call: •'.,1.?-7$(,Q or 777-2265 or •.... ritr· to: 'rh0 Grievance CommittPP of thr> Yale Undergraduate Wornr·n'~> Cau,:u.s, 476• Yah· titation; N1!W Haven, Conn. 06520
26

 
 A\exander ~. Yale On July 7, 1977 four female undergraduates and one male professor filed
a class action suit against Yale University charging that the university
condones sexual harassment of its women students and that this constitutes
sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. It is a class action suit
because the issue is larger than the individuals involved~ sexual harassment
of women students is widespread enough to warrant the setting up of a g~ievance procedure to deal with the problem. In fact, as news of the in-
vestigation leaked out, the number of reported complaints snowballed. The
plaintiffs estimate that 75 undergraduate women (out of 2000) are sexually harassed each year.

What are the charges?

Plaintiff 1 alleges that she was forced to have sexual relations with

her professor which made it intolerable to continue studies necessary to hez

career goals.

Plaintiff 2, because of the lack of an adequate procedure, was forced

to waste time, effort, and money investigating the matter and demanding

relief.

Plaintiff 3 had a friend who was sexually harassed; her distress

increased upon being convinced that there was no avenue for complaint. Thi:

experience damaged Plaintiff 3's confidence in her male professors and the

university, hindering her ability to take advantage of the educational

opportunities at Yale.

Plaintiff 4 is a faculty member who contends that the atmosphere of

sexual harassment poisons faculty-student relationships and stands in the

way of a proper learning environment.

One of the original undergraduate plaintiffs ended her status as a

plaintiff because she did not feel she could fully participate in the case

while on a Leave of Absence during the present academic year. She was also

concerned about her vulnerable position as an undergraduate while involved

in a controversial suit.

Two undergraduate women, beyond the original plaintiffs, have asked th

court for permission to join the suit.

Plaintiff 5 alleges she was sexually harassed by the coach of the

athletic team on which she was partic.ipating. As a result of the experienc

she is no longer participating.

Plaintiff 6 alleges she was offered a higher grade in return for
sexual relations with the professor. When she refused she received a lower

grade.

'93

What do we want?
We want a proper grievance procedure. We have been asking the university for many months to set up a committee that would deal with complaints of sexual harassment. This committee would decide the validity of complaints and appropriate action to redress injuries.

What are the issues?
1. Sexual harassment is sex discrimination, whether in education or employment. In our society, where women as a group have a disproportionately smaller share of the wealth, power, and advantages than men as a group, sexual harassment, by imposing sexual criteria on women that are not imposed on men in similar situations, creates a barrier to women's opportunities , for and access to resources that would allow them to improve their situation.
2. Women are sexually harassed because they are women. They are singled out for disadvantages for no reason related to performance on the
job or potential as a student. Yet, their refusal to comply sexually often results in educational or occupational deprevations.
3. Yale's refusal to investigate the problem or to establish a grievance procedure condones sexual harassment. Women come to Yale and other colleges to study. They should be treated as scholars and human beings--not as playthings or sexual objects for the faculty.
4. The right of a private individual to sue in Federal District Court for enf0rcement of Title IX is important because H.E.W. is understaffed, overworked, and very slow, as a rule, in investigating complaints.
W.E.A.L. and N.o.w. L.D.E.F. have filed as amici cuiriae (friends of the
court) supporting the plaintiffs' private right of action under Title IX.

Suing Yale is very expensive. Since it is in the university's interest to prolong the case and drain the plaintiffs' resources, it will probably become more expensive. We desperately need money. Please make checks out to the CAPP STREET FOUNDATION~ Send checks to the Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus, Box 4761 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520. The Caucus
will also provide more information upon request.

J: 24

;J

 
 A\exander

•·v
v. lCl\e

tact sn~et

Alexander v. Yale is a landmark lawsuit charging that Yale Unive:rsity condones the sexual harassment of women students in violation of Title lX. The named plaintiff was offered an A 11 11 in a course in her area of speciali zation if she would ccmply with her professor's sexual demands.. She flatly refused and complained orally and in writing to responsible Yale off i.cials even before the grade of 11 C" was given. Because she is a black woman, her complaints were not only viewed as j.nconsequential, but were ignored even more blatantly than complaints of white women. Not until one and a half years later, after Alexander v. Yale was filed, did Yale act. Officials then claimed t0 review the grade, but ignored the sexual
incident entirely. The grade was not changed.

~xander v. Yale is a class action suit against Yale as an institution because the issue is larger than the individuals involved. · There are many other women who have found that their sexuality was a decisive factor in whether or not they could learn from a faculty member.

The lawsuit asks for a grievance procedure as a remedy and preventive measure, not for damages from individual offenders. With a procedure the responsibility for abuse of faculty power will remain within the university, but students will be guaranteed an effective channel for complaint for the first time.

Sexual Harassment

"The issue is that some, acting upon archaic and feudal assumptions, will attempt to comp~omise my respect for myself as a human being (i.e. as more than a sex object).
Statement, Pamela Price, December 21, 1977

"You begin to wonder about the intentions of a Director of Graduate

Studies who spends more time patting your thighs and pinching your

rear than discussing your academic career."

A graduate student quoted in Alice Dembner, "A Case of Sex Discrimination," ,Yale Graduate Professj.onal, March 6, 1978

~I

"It is perfectly reasonable to lllain~~in that academic advancement con-
ditioned upon submission to sexual ~emanos constitutes sex discrimination in education just as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII•s ban against sex discrimination in employment."
United States Magistrate Arthur Latimer, Ruling on Yale's Motion to Dismiss, December 21, 1977
11A woman who attempted to complain through university channels now faces the possibility that the man she complained about will be rehired without an investigation into her'allegations. 1 ! tried the Yale channels for a year, I played their game, and now I'm angry. Nothing has been done and I am not the only one who has complained about this man."
Dembner, Yale Graduate Professional
"Yale's failure to deal in any systematic and effective manner with the issues raised by this suit and numerous complaints from women at Yale, and the invocation of the •sanctity' of the grading procedure and of this grade in particular, reflects a completely inadequate and repressive perspective on the position of women within the university. It follows that this perspective serves to condone, uphold and defend a practice of racist sexual discrimination and consequently subordination of women not only within the university, but within the society as a whole."
Statement, Pamel Price, December 21, 1977
Support
On December 21, 1977, United States Magistrate Arthur Latimer decided that one of the plainti:ffs has the legal right to continue the suit against Yale university for sexual harassment in federal court; we now face a possibly long and costly cou-rt battle to determine whether Yale in fact is legally responsible to her and the class of women she represents. Your support would be greatly appreciated. Checks can be made out to the CAPP STREET FOUNDATION for a tax deductible donation. Send donations to the Yale Undergraduate Women's Caucus, Box 4761 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520. The Caucus will also provide more information on request.
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