Case 2:03-cv-05462-LDD Document 1 Filed 09/30/03 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

DAN LEPORE & SONS COMPANY and

)

L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, female, and

retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Charging Party Beth Anne Burroughs, who was

adversely affected by such practices. The Commission alleges that Charging Party, a female

stone mason, was sexually harassed by Defendant Dan Lepore’s foreman and her male co-

workers on two construction sites. The Commission further alleges that Ms. Burroughs was then

subjected to disparate treatment based on her gender when she was evicted by the general

contractor, Defendant L.F. Driscoll, from the job site because she was not wearing safety

glasses, while male employees who failed to wear safety glasses and hard hats were not similarly

evicted.

The Commission also contends that after Charging Party reported the sexual harassment

to Defendant Dan Lepore, she was not hired for additional projects in retaliation for her

complaints. As a result of the harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation she experienced,

Charging Party Burroughs incurred wage losses and suffered emotional distress damages.

Case 2:03-cv-05462-LDD Document 1 Filed 09/30/03 Page 2 of 7

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337,

1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to § 706(f) (1) and (3) of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII")

and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being

committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"),

is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and

enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1)

and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f) (1) and (3).

4. At all relevant times, Defendant Dan LePore & Sons Company has continuously

been and is now a Pennsylvania Corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania and the

town of Conshohocken, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees.

5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer

engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h)

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).

6. At all relevant times, Defendant L.F. Driscoll Company has continuously been

and is now a Pennsylvania Corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania and the town

of Bala Cynwyd, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees.

7. At all relevant times, Defendant L.F. Driscoll Company has continuously been an

employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b),

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Case 2:03-cv-05462-LDD Document 1 Filed 09/30/03 Page 3 of 7
(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h). STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Charging Party Beth Anne Burroughs filed charges of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer and by Defendant L.F. Driscoll Company. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
7. Since at least July 2001, Defendant Dan LePore & Sons Company (Defendant Employer) has engaged unlawful employment practices at its Philadelphia, Pennsylvania construction sites in violation of Sections703(a) (1) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(a) (1) and 2000e-3(a) by subjecting Charging Party Beth Anne Burroughs to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliating against her after she complained about sexual harassment. The unlawful employment practices include but are not limited to the following:
(a) Starting in 2001, in the presence of Defendant Employer’s foreman, male co-workers at a Philadelphia construction site on the University of Pennsylvania campus made sexually offensive remarks to Ms. Burroughs, such as telling her she needed to “get laid,” and asking what color undergarments she was wearing;
(b) Also starting in 2001, co-workers talked about their sex lives, commented on the size of Ms. Burroughs’ breasts, and placed a picture of a scantily-clad woman in the tool area used by the stone masons;
(c) After November 2001, when Ms. Burroughs was transferred to the Kimmel Center construction site, also in Philadelphia, a senior stone mason, in the presence of Defendant Employer’s foreman, told Ms. Burroughs that he wanted to slap her “coolie” (Italian word for buttocks) as she bent over to do her job and further stated “nice girls put it in for you;”
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(d) On or about November 27, 2001, Defendant Employer’s foreman approached Ms. Burroughs on the work site and made a sexually-offensive comment, gesturing to her vaginal area; Ms. Burroughs objected to this remark by the foreman, telling him to “ stop it” or “knock it off;”
(e) On November 29, 2001, in the presence of Defendant Employer’s foreman, Ms. Burroughs was evicted from the Kimmel Center work site, allegedly because she was not wearing safety glasses; at that time, Ms. Burroughs reported the sexually offensive atmosphere at the work sites to the President of Defendant Employer, who told Ms. Burroughs that her allegations were inconsistent with the characteristics of his employees;
(f) After reporting the sexual harassment, Ms. Burroughs approached Defendant Employer’s President on several occasions, seeking employment as a stone mason on other projects for which Defendant Employer was hiring;
(g) Despite her efforts, Ms. Burroughs was not offered a position as a stone mason after her complaints.
8. Since at least November 2001, Defendant L.F. Driscoll has engaged in unlawful employment practices at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania construction sites on which it operates as General Contractor, in violation of Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) by subjecting Charging Party Beth Anne Burroughs to disparate treatment based on her gender, female and interfering with her employment relationship with Defendant Employer. The unlawful employment practices by Defendant L.F. Driscoll include:
(a) On November 29, 2001, Ms. Burroughs was singled out for warnings because she was not wearing safety glasses while males working on the construction site were not similarly treated. Due to these warnings, Ms. Burroughs was evicted from the Kimmel Center site by
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Defendant L. F. Driscoll’s Safety Inspector, who did not warn or evict males who failed to wear hard hats and/or safety glasses;
(b) Due to Defendant L.F. Driscoll’s disparate treatment of Ms. Burroughs, Defendant L.F. Driscoll assisted Defendant Employer in its retaliatory failure to hire Ms. Burroughs for other employment and thus interfered with Ms. Burroughs’ employment opportunities in violation of Title VII.
9. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraphs 7and 8, above, has been to deprive Beth Anne Burroughs of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because of her gender and because of retaliation.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, were intentional.
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Beth Anne Burroughs.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, Defendant L.F. Driscoll, their officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in sex discrimination, sexual harassment, failure to hire, and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex or retaliation. B. Order Defendant Employer and Defendant L. F. Driscoll to institute and carry out policies and practices which effectively prohibit sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in the work place, and which eradicate the effects of their past and present
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unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer and Defendant L. F. Driscoll to make whole Ms.
Burroughs by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, where applicable, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement or front pay.
D. Order Defendant Employer and Defendant L. F. Driscoll to make whole Ms. Burroughs by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, including but not limited to out-of-pocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer and Defendant L. F. Driscoll to make whole Ms. Burroughs by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, including but not limited to pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of life's pleasures, depression, anxiety, stress, panic, and other physical and psychological symptoms and conditions, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer and Defendant L.F. Driscoll to pay Ms. Burroughs punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraphs 7 and 8, above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
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JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Eric S. Dreiband General Counsel James L. Lee Deputy General Counsel Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20507
JACQUELINE H. McNAIR Regional Attorney
JUDITH A. O’BOYLE Supervisory Trial Attorney
CYNTHIA A. LOCKE Trial Attorney EEOC 21 S. 5th Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 440-2683 Pennsylvania ID No. 37637
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 Case 2:03-cv-05462-LDD Document 24 Filed 01/29/04 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY : COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAN LEPORE & SONS COMPANY and L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

NO. 03-CV-5462

MEMORANDUM ORDER Presently before the Court is the Amended Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiff Filed by Beth Anne Burroughs Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 24(a) (Dkt. No. 19). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. I. Factual Background and Procedural History In 2003, Beth Anne Burroughs (“Burroughs”) filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC” or the “Commission”). (Compl. ¶ 6). On September 30, 2003, more than thirty days after Burroughs filed her charges of discrimination, the EEOC filed the instant action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alleging unlawful gender biased employment practices and retaliation. (See generally Compl.). The Commission alleges that the charging party, Beth Anne Burroughs (“Burroughs”) was sexually harrassed by Defendant Dan Lepore & Sons Company’s (“Lepore”) foreman and male co-workers on two separate construction sites. The Commission also alleges that Burroughs was also subjected to disparate
1

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treatment as a consequence of her gender when she was evicted by the general contractor, Defendant L.F. Driscoll Company (“Driscoll,” Lepore and Driscoll collectively identified as “Defendants”), from the job site because she was not wearing safety glasses. Male employees who also failed to wear safety glasses and hard hats were not similarly evicted. (Id.) The Commission further alleges that, in retaliation for reporting the sexual harassment to Driscoll, Burroughs was not hired for future projects.
On October 10, 2003, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), Burroughs’s filed a Motion to Intervene As Party Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 2). On November 6, 2003, Burroughs filed an Amended Motion to Intervene As Party Plaintiff, adding an antitrust claim under the Clayton Act. (Dkt. No. 6). In her amended motion, Burroughs seeks to assert the following claims: (1) federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act; (2) a state law claim for gender discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”); and (3) violations of Article I § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which is commonly identified as the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment (“PERA”).
Burroughs asserts that her claims arise from the same operative facts as the claims asserted by the EEOC, and that to grant the motion to intervene would further the important interest of judicial economy. While the EEOC is amenable to intervention, Defendants oppose intervention on numerous grounds.
II. Legal Standards Rule 24(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene.” See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 24(a)(1). Title VII provides
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that “the person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also EEOC V. DPCE, Inc., 1990 WL 54995, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. April 25, 1990). The statue, however, does not grant an unconditional right to assert additional claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also EEOC v. The West Co., 1986 WL 1239, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1986) (“The fact that [plaintiff] has an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s Title VII action, however, does not provide her with an unconditional right to bring state law claims in the same action.”). Additionally, the right to intervene “presupposes the presentation of a cognizable claim that the intervenor would have standing to pursue.” EEOC v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 2003 WL 21282193, at * 1 (Jan. 13, 2003) (citations omitted). Thus, a motion to intervene should be denied when standing is lacking or the complaint fails to present cognizable claims. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) clearly grants to Burroughs the right to intervene this action. The right to intervene, however, is not coextensive with the assertion of additional claims. Thus, the narrow issues before the court concern the appropriate scope of Burroughs’s intervention and whether the complaint asserts cognizable claims for which she has standing.
A. Antitrust Claims In Count I of her proposed complaint-in-intervention, Burroughs asserts antitrust claims against Lepore and Driscoll pursuant to the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. and 15 U.S.C. § 15 et. seq., respectively. Lepore and Driscoll argue that Burroughs’s claims under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act cannot be added because: (1) they impermissibly expand the scope of the Title VII litigation; (2) she lacks standing to assert claims under either Act; and (3) she fails to state a claim under either Act. (Defendant L.F. Driscoll’s Motion in Opposition to
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Plaintiff’s Amended Motion Intervene at 3-6; Defendant Dan Lepore & Sons Company Motion in Opposition to the Amended Motion to Intervene of Beth Anne Burroughs at 1-3). Burroughs urges the Court to grant the Motion to Intervene and decide the issue of pendent jurisdiction only should Defendants file a Rule 12(b) motion. (Burroughs’ Reply to Defendant Lepore’s Motion Opposing the Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs at 1).
Neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act “provide a remedy for what are in actuality Title VII claims.” Daley v. St. Agnes Hospital, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (citing Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 83 F.R.D. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1979)); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 429 (1986). Stated differently, “the type of injury redressed by Title VII is not related to the type of injury cognizable under antitrust laws, for [they provide] remedy for sex discrimination.” Daley, 490 F. Supp. at 1318. Policy considerations also disfavor allowing plaintiffs to recast Title VII claims as antitrust claims: “[B]y simply phrasing their claim in terms of the malleable term ‘competition’ and bringing in a civil action sounding in antitrust, plaintiffs could easily circumvent the vital administrative procedure of Title VII and virtually eliminate the EEOC’s role as conciliator, thereby frustrating a major policy behind the statute.” Id., (quoting Monk v. Island Creek Coal Co., 1979 WL 266, at * 8 (W.D. Va. July 24, 1979)). In determining whether a plaintiff has standing to pursue antitrust claims “courts must analyze the question of antitrust injury from the viewpoint of the consumer of the product or services at issue" as antitrust laws were promulgated to protect competition, not competitors. See Hughes v. Halbach & Braun Indus., Ltd., 10 F. Supp. 2d 491, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct 897, 74
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L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). Burroughs specifically alleges that Lepore and Driscoll acted in concert to “remove
Burroughs from both the RPAC site and the Wharton School site on the false pretext of a minor safety infraction, after she tried to stop ongoing sexual harassment,” (Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention ¶ 38), and that this action is “ongoing and continuous and directed specifically at Burroughs in illegal retaliation for attempts to stop constant sexual harassment altering the terms and conditions of her employment.” (Id. ¶ 45). Burroughs also alleges that as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ illegal action, she has suffered antitrust injury, loss of income and earning capacity, and continues to be excluded from relevant job markets. She seeks treble damages, among other relief, for Defendants’ “illegal concerted action in restraint of trade and boycotting her, based on her gender.” (Id. ¶ 43).
On its face, Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention fails to allege the type of injury antitrust laws were designed to remedy. See Daley, supra; Hughes, supra. Although Burroughs alleges that she suffered “antitrust injury,” it is clear from a reading of the proposed complaint-in-intervention that in actuality she seeks a remedy for injury to competitors, not to competition. Indeed, Count I of Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention attempts to recast Title VII claims into purported violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Simply stated, Burroughs alleges specific acts of sexual discrimination which result in the type of injury redressed by Title VII, not the type of injury cognizable under antitrust laws. Accordingly, Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention fails on its face to allege antitrust injury.
Even if Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention alleged antitrust injury, inclusion of antitrust claims in the instant action would unduly complicate the proceedings and shift the
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focus the litigation from the EEOC’s Title VII claims. See Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. Rekrem, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing EEOC v. National Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 1991 WL 161364, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). Accordingly, Burroughs’s motion to intervene to litigate the antitrust claims presented in Count I is denied.
B. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act Claim In Count II of her proposed complaint-in-intervention, Burroughs asserts claims against Driscoll for violations of the PHRA. Burroughs alleges that Driscoll violated the PHRA by aiding and abetting Lepore in its illegal retaliatory and discriminatory treatment. (Burroughs Motion at ¶ 49). Driscoll argues that Burroughs’s claim under the PHRA cannot be properly added because it fails to meet the requirements for exercising pendent jurisdiction. Specifically, Driscoll argues that Plaintiff’s “aiding and abetting” theory contradicts the EEOC’s theory that Driscoll violated Title VII by treating Burroughs differently because of her sex. (Defendant L.F. Driscoll’s Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Intervene at 6). Burroughs contends that the Court should grant her motion to intervene and reserve judgment on the issue of pendent jurisdiction until receipt of a Rule 12(b) motion. (Burroughs’ Reply to Defendant Lepore’s Motion Opposing the Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs at 1). Burroughs has an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s Title VII action; she does not, however, have an unconditional right to bring state law claims in the same action. See EEOC v. The West Co., 1986 WL 1239, at *3. The “[e]xercise of pendent jurisdiction requires an examination of both constitutional and discretionary considerations.” Id., (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966)). In assessing whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction, the Court must consider the following three factors: (1) whether the pendent
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state claims and the federal claim on which jurisdiction is based derive from a common nucleus of operative facts; (2) whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the state law claims or the pendent party would violate a specific federal policy which seeks to limit the scope of federal jurisdiction; and (3) fairness to the litigants, judicial economy, and the interests of federalism. See Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of America, 726 F.2d 972, 989-90 (3d Cir. 1984).
A review of the Complaint filed by the EEOC and the proposed complaint-in-intervention reveals that Burroughs’s claims under the PHRA and the EEOC’s Title VII claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. Indeed, Driscoll does not dispute this. (Burroughs’ Reply to Defendant Lepore’s Motion Opposing the Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs at 1). Instead, Driscoll argues that Burroughs’s claim is inconsistent with the EEOC’s theory of liability, and that it would contravene federal policy to permit an intervenor to determine the scope and the focus of litigation. (Defendant L.F. Driscoll’s Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Intervene at 6). This Court does not view Burroughs’s aiding and abetting claim as inconsistent with the EEOC’s theory of liability. In relevant part, the EEOC alleges that Driscoll’s disparate treatment of Burroughs in evicting her from the Kimmel Center construction site “assisted” Lepore in its retaliatory failure to hire her for future employment. (Compl. ¶ 8). Under the circumstances of this case, the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the PHRA count would not conflict with a specific federal policy which seeks to limit the scope of federal jurisdiction. Further, given the overlapping factual and legal issues presented by the EEOC’s Complaint and Count II of Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention, principles of fairness and judicial economy weigh in favor granting Burroughs’s motion to intervene to assert PHRA violations.
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C. Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment Claim Count III of Burroughs’s proposed complaint-in-intervention seeks to raise violations of the PERA. (Id. ¶ 52). Defendants contend that the PERA does not authorize claims brought by private actors. (Driscoll’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Intervene at 1). Burroughs implores the Court to grant the motion to intervene and decide the issue of standing only upon presentation of a Rule 12(b) motion. (Burroughs’ Reply to Defendant Lepore’s Motion Opposing the Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs at 1). As discussed previously, the right to intervene “presupposes the presentation of a cognizable claim that the intervenor would have standing to pursue.” Victoria’s Secret Stores, 2003 WL 21282193, at * 1. While Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not ruled on the issue of whether a private cause of action for damages exists under the PERA, courts in this circuit have concluded that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not create such a right. See Ryan v. General Machine Products, 277 F. Supp. 2d 585. 595 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because the PERA does not create a private right of action); see also Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. 013386, 2001 WL 1132401, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2001)). As Burroughs lacks standing to assert claims under the PERA, her Motion to Intervene to assert the PERA violations alleged in Count III is denied. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Burroughs’s motion to intervene is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.
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ORDER AND NOW this ___ day of January 2004, upon consideration of the Amended Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiff Filed by Beth Anne Burroughs Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 24(a) (Dkt. No. 6), and the responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Burroughs’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. More specifically: 1. Burroughs’s Amended Motion to Intervene to raise the antitrust claims alleged in Count I is DENIED. 2. Burroughs’s Amended Motion to Intervene to raise the PHRA claims asserted in Count II is GRANTED. 3. Burroughs’s Amended Motion to Intervene to raise the PERA violations alleged in Count III is DENIED. 4. Burroughs’s Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiff Filed by Beth Anne Burroughs Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 24(a) (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED as moot. 5. Burroughs is directed to file an amended complaint in conformity with this order on or before February 16, 2004.
By the Court:
Legrome D. Davis
9

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY : COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAN LEPORE & SONS COMPANY and L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

NO. 03-CV-5462

MEMORANDUM ORDER Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Burroughs’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No.27). For the reasons that follow, Burroughs’s motion is DENIED.
Factual Background and Procedural History In 2003, Beth Anne Burroughs (“Burroughs”) filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC” or the “Commission”). (Compl. ¶ 6). On September 30, 2003, more than thirty days after Burroughs filed her charges of discrimination, the EEOC filed the instant action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alleging unlawful gender biased employment practices and retaliation. (See generally Compl.). The Commission alleged that Beth Anne Burroughs (“Burroughs”) was sexually harassed by Defendant Dan Lepore & Sons Company’s (“Lepore”) foreman and male co-workers on two separate construction sites. The Commission also alleged that Burroughs was also subjected to disparate treatment as a consequence of her gender when she was evicted by the general contractor, Defendant L.F.
1

Driscoll Company (“Driscoll,” Lepore and Driscoll collectively identified as “Defendants”), from the job site because she was not wearing safety glasses. Male employees who also failed to wear safety glasses and hard hats were not similarly evicted. (Id.) The Commission further alleges that, in retaliation for reporting the sexual harassment to Driscoll, Burroughs was not hired for future projects.
On October 10, 2003, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), Burroughs’s filed a Motion to Intervene As Party Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 2). On November 6, 2003, Burroughs filed an Amended Motion to Intervene As Party Plaintiff, adding an antitrust claim under the Clayton Act. (Dkt. No. 6). In her amended motion, Burroughs sought to assert the following claims: (1) federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act; (2) a state law claim for gender discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”); and (3) violations of Article I § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which is commonly identified as the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment (“PERA”).
On January 29, 2004, this Court granted in part and denied in part Burroughs’ Motion to Intervene. (Dkt. No. 24). Specifically, the Court granted the motion to the extent that Burroughs sought to assert claims against Defendants pursuant to the PHRA, and denied the motion to the extent that Burroughs sought to assert claims pursuant to antitrust laws and the PERA. The Court found that Burroughs lacked standing to prosecute the claims asserted under the PERA because the PERA does not confer a private right of action for damages.
Burroughs filed a complaint-in-intervention on February 9, 2004. At that time, Burroughs also filed the instant motion seeking reconsideration of the Court’s ruling with respect to Burroughs’ proposed PERA claim. Burroughs urges reconsideration as a result of the
2

perceived need to correct a clear error of law and to prevent manifest injustice. (Pl. Reply Br. at 2). Defendant Driscoll opposes reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 29).
Courts should grant motions for reconsideration sparingly, reserving them for instances where there has been “(1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the emergence of new evidence not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice.” General Instrument Corp of Delaware. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d., 197 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Harsco Corp. V. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895 (1986) (“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”). Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration. See U.S. v. Phillips, Nos. Civ. A. 97-6475, 93-CR-513, 2001 WL 527810, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2001) (citing Burger King Corp. v. New England Hood and Duct Cleaning Co., No. 98-3610, 2000 WL 133756, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2000)).
Burroughs contends that the Court should grant her motion for reconsideration to prevent a manifest injustice because her counsel failed to properly brief the issues surrounding Burroughs’ PERA claims, and she should not be penalized for her counsel’s mistake. (Pl. Br. at 1). Additionally, Burroughs asserts that the Court should correct a clear error of law because she, as a private litigant, has standing to assert a claim under the PERA. (Pl. Reply Br. at 2 ). Defendant Driscoll contends that the Court should deny Burroughs’s motion as a matter of law because Burroughs’ counsel’s failure to brief this arguments is not cognizable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(g). (Def. Br. at 1).
“A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that a court
3

reconsider repetitive arguments that have already been fully examined by the court or a request to raise arguments that could have previously been asserted.” Assisted Living Group, Inc. v. Upper Dublin Township, Civ. A. No. 97-3427, 1997 WL 762801, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1997) (citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 799 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)) (disposing of a motion to reconsider a denial of a motion to intervene). Indeed, in her Reply to Defendant Driscoll’s Opposition to Intervention, Burroughs made the tactical decision not to contest the merits of Driscoll’s PERA argument, and instead asserted that Driscoll’s motion constituted “an extra, preliminary motion to dismiss.” (Pl. Reply Br. at 2.)1 Because Burroughs simply asks this Court to consider “arguments that could have previously been asserted,” Burroughs fails to meet the standard for granting a motion for reconsideration. See Assisted Living Group, 1997 WL 762801, at *2. Therefore, Burroughs’ Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Burroughs’ motion for reconsideration is further denied to the extent that it seeks to correct an alleged manifest error of law. Indeed, the issue of whether there is a private cause of action under the PERA is not conclusively resolved within the Third Circuit. See Ryan v. General Machine Products, 277 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that there is no private cause of action under the PERA), Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that there was no private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Sabitini v. Reinstein, No. 99-2393, 1999 WL 636667, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1999) (same); Cf. Imboden v. Chowns Communications Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 453 (E.D. Pa.

1

Burroughs contends neither party properly briefed the merits of the PERA private

right of action previously. (Pl. Reply Br. at 2). Burroughs, however, is incorrect. (See Def.

Driscoll’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Its motion in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Intervene at 1-2).

4

2002) (allowing a private plaintiff to proceed with her claim under the PERA against defendant without a showing of state action) and Barrett v. Greater Hatboro Chamber of Commerce, Inc., Civ. A. No. 02-4421, 2003 WL 22232869 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2003) (same).2 This Court, however, finds that neither Imboden nor Barrett specifically addresses the issue of standing under the PERA; rather, both cases address the issue of whether a cause of action lies against private actors under the PERA. On the contrary, Ryan v. General Machine Products is squarely on point; this Court agrees with its analysis and conclusion. Ryan, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Thus, Burroughs has failed to demonstrate the need to correct a manifest error of law; consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
AND NOW this day of March 2004, upon consideration of Burroughs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 24), and the responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Burroughs’ motion is DENIED.
By the Court:
Legrome D. Davis

2

Burroughs also relies on Pfeifer v. Marion Center Area School District, 917 F.2d

779 (3d Cir. 1990), Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association Inc., 15 F.

Supp. 2d 740, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1998) and Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance

Commissioner of Pennsylvania, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984) for the proposition that a

private cause of action exists under the PERA. As with Imboden and Barrett, each of these cases

specifically addresses the issue of whether a plaintiff may state a claim under the PERA in the

absence of state action, not whether there is private right of action for damages under the PERA.

5

 
 Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 1 of 6
CLOSED, STANDARD
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:03−cv−05462−LDD

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY et al Assigned to: HONORABLE LEGROME D. DAVIS Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/30/2003 Date Terminated: 12/29/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

represented by CYNTHIA A. LOCKE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 21 S. 5TH ST STE 400 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−440−2683 Email: cynthia.locke@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JACQUELINE H. MCNAIR U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 801 MARKET ST. PENTHOUSE, SUITE 1300 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 215−440−2666 Email: jacqueline.mcnair@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JUDITH A. O'BOYLE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 21 S. 5TH ST STE 400 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 215−440−2687 Email: judith.oboyle@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Plaintiff BETH ANNE BURROUGHS

represented by ANITA F. ALBERTS 3185 PELHAM PLACE 40 E. Court St. 3dflr. (Office) DOYLESTOWN, PA 18902 215−794−5204 Fax: 215−345−8551 −office Email: afalawyer@comcast.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant

Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 2 of 6

DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY

represented by ANTHONY B. HALLER BLANK ROME LLP ONE LOGAN SQUARE 18TH &CHERRY STS PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−6998 215−569−5690 Email: haller@blankrome.com TERMINATED: 11/12/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

DAVID F. WHITE MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN &GOGGIN 620 FREEDOM BUSINESS CENTER SUITE 300 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406 610−354−8262 Email: dfwhite@mdwcg.com TERMINATED: 03/30/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY

ROBERT P. STYLE ASTOR WEISS KAPLAN &MANDEL THE BELLEVUE 6TH FLOOR BROAD STREET AT WALNUT PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 215−732−7131 TERMINATED: 03/25/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY

JOHN P. MEYERS KELLY MCLAUGHLIN FOSTER 620 W. GERMANTOWN PIKE SUITE 350 PLYMOUTH MEETING, PA 19462 610−941−7971 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MICHAEL D. KEFFER BLANK ROME COMISKY &McCAULEY ONE LOGAN SQUARE PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−569−5761 Email: keffer−m@blankrome.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY

represented by ANTHONY B. HALLER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MICHAEL D. KEFFER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor Defendant
DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, INC.

represented by MICHAEL D. KEFFER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 3 of 6

Intervenor Defendant L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY

represented by MICHAEL D. KEFFER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Movant
BETH ANNE BURROUGHS TERMINATED: 02/09/2004

represented by ANITA F. ALBERTS (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/10/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY

Date Filed 09/30/2003 09/30/2003 09/30/2003 10/10/2003 10/24/2003
10/24/2003
11/05/2003
11/06/2003 11/10/2003 11/10/2003 11/10/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY , filed by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.(ti, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/25/2003 (mbh, ). (Entered: 09/30/2003)
Two Original Summons Issued as to DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY.Given To: Counsel on 9/30/03 (ti, ) (Entered: 09/30/2003)
DEMAND for Trial by Jury by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION. (ti, ) (Entered: 09/30/2003)
2 MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF FILED BY BETH ANNE BURROUGHS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 24(a),CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (COMPLAINT OF INTERVENOR BETH ANNE BURROUGHS ATTACHED)(ar, ) (Entered: 10/10/2003)
3 SUMMONS Returned Executed by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION re: Gregory A. Strack served Summons and Complaint upon Ky siv, receptionist on behalf of DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY by personal service. DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY served on 10/21/2003, answer due 11/10/2003. (cdd, ) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION re: Gregory A. Strack served Summons and Complaint upon Mary Jo Gildorf, Manager of Legal Services on behalf of L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY by personal service. L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY served on 10/21/2003, answer due 11/10/2003. (cdd, ) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
5 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY SHALL HAVE UP TO AND INCLUDING 11/19/03 TO PLEAD OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE "MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF FILED BY BETH ANN BURROUGHS" IN THIS MATTER.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 11/5/03. 11/6/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 11/06/2003)
6 AMENDED MOTION FILED BY BETH ANNE BURROUGHS TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (signed Amended Complaint of Intervenor attached)(cdd, ) (Entered: 11/06/2003)
7 Stipulation Extending Time to Answer the complaint. DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY answer due 11/24/2003, with Clerk's approval. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
8 ANSWER by L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY to Complaint with Jury Demand, Certificate of Service.(cdd, ) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
Issue Joined. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/12/2003)

Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 4 of 6

11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/19/2003 11/21/2003
11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/24/2003
12/05/2003 12/11/2003 12/19/2003 12/22/2003 12/24/2003 01/29/2004

9 Praecipe by L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY to Correct the Docket to reflect that Pepper Hamilton LLP has not represented, and does not represent, Defendant Dan Lepore &Sons Company, etc. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
10 Entry of Appearance by ANTHONY B. HALLER on behalf of L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY with Jury Demand. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY for re 9 Praecipe/Request, 10 Notice of Appearance. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
12 Withdrawal of Entry of Appearance by ANTHONY B. HALLER on behalf of DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, Certificate of Service. (cdd, ) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
13 Entry of Appearance by DAVID F. WHITE on behalf of DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY with Jury Demand. (cdd, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/17/2003 (ar, ). (Entered: 11/13/2003)
14 STIPULATION to Extend Time to Respond or Otherwise Plead to Amended Motion to Intervene by DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY. (MEYERS, JOHN) Modified on 11/20/2003 (fh) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
15 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY SHALL HAVE UP TO AND INCLUDING 12/5/03 TO PLEAD OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF FILED BY BETH ANNE BURROUGHS IN THIS MATTER.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 11/20/03. 11/21/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
16 Answer to Complaint with Jury Demand and Affirmative Defenses by DEFENDANT DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY. (MEYERS, JOHN) Modified on 11/24/2003 (fh) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
17 Disclosure Statement by DEFENDANT DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY. (MEYERS, JOHN) Modified on 11/24/2003 (fh) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
18 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY SHALL HAVE UP TO AND INCLUDING 12/22/03 TO PLEAD OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF OF BETH ANN BURROUGHS.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 11/21/03. 11/24/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
19 Motion filed by L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY in Opposition to Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Intervene, Certificate of Service. (cdd, ) (Entered: 12/08/2003)
20 MOTION FILED BY L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY TO SUPPLEMENT ITS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE, MEMORANDUM, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.(cdd, ) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 MOTION to Intervene filed by DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, Certificate of Service.(MEYERS, JOHN) Modified on 12/24/2003 (md). (Entered: 12/19/2003)
22 Reply filed by BETH ANNE BURROUGHS to Defendant Driscoll's Motion Opposing Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(cdd, ) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
23 Reply filed by BETH ANNE BURROUGHS to Defendant Lepore's Motion Opposing Intervention of Beth A. Burroughs, Certificate of Service.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(cdd, ) (Entered: 12/24/2003)
24 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT BETH ANNE BURROUGHS AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. BURROUGHS' AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE TO RAISE THE ANTITRUST CLAIMS ALLEGED IN COUNT I IS DENIED. BURROUGHS' AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE TO RAISE THE PHRA CLAIMS ASSERTED IN COUTN II IS GRANTED. BURROUGHS' AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE TO RAISE THE PERA VIOLATIONS

Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 5 of 6

01/30/2004 02/09/2004 02/09/2004 02/13/2004
02/23/2004 03/01/2004 03/05/2004 03/05/2004 03/12/2004 03/15/2004 03/22/2004 03/25/2004 03/30/2004
03/30/2004

ALLEGED IN COUNT III IS DENIED. BURROUGHS' MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PARTY PLAINTIFF FILED BY BETH ANNE BURROUGHS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 24(a) IS DENIED AS MOOT. BURROUGHS IS DIRECTED TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAITN IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS ORDER ON OR BEFORE 2/16/04.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 1/28/04. 1/30/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 01/30/2004)
25 Entry of Appearance by ANTHONY B. HALLER on behalf of L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY with Certificate of Service. (cdd, ) (Entered: 01/30/2004)
26 Intervenor COMPLAINT filed by BETH ANNE BURROUGHS, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(cdd, ) (Entered: 02/09/2004)
27 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY BETH ANNE BURROUGHS.MEMORANDUM, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. (Attachments: # 1 MEMO# 2 COS)(stb, ) (Entered: 02/10/2004)
28 ORDER THAT L.F. DRISCOLL'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE IS GRANTED; ETC.. SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D.DAVIS ON 2/13/04. 2/17/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED.(jl, ) Modified on 2/19/2004 (cdd, ). (Entered: 02/17/2004)
29 Brief in Response to 27 MOTION for Reconsideration with Certificate of Service filed by DEFENDANT L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(KEFFER, MICHAEL) Modified on 2/25/2004 (fh) (Entered: 02/23/2004)
30 ANSWER to Intervenor Complaint with Affirmative Defenses, Certificate of Service by DEFENDANT L.F. DRISCOLL COMPANY.(KEFFER, MICHAEL) Modified on 3/3/2004 (fh) (Entered: 03/01/2004)
31 NOTICE OF HEARING: RULE 16 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SET FOR TUESDAY 3/16/2004 02:00 PM IN JUDGE'S CHAMBERS ROOM 5918 BEFORE HONORABLE LEGROME D. DAVIS. (cls, ) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
32 REPLY to Defendant DRISCOLL'S Brief Opposing MOTION for Reconsideration filed by BETH ANNE BURROUGHS, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(mar, ) . (Entered: 03/05/2004)
33 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING: RULE 16 CONFERENCE SET FOR THURSDAY 3/25/2004 04:00 PM IN JUDGE'S CHAMBERS BEFORE HONORABLE LEGROME D. DAVIS. (cls, ) (Entered: 03/12/2004)
34 MEMORANDUM ORDER THAT BURROUGHS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 3/15/04. 3/16/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 03/16/2004)
35 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING: RULE 16 CONFERENCE SET FOR THURSDAY 3/25/2004 04:45 PM IN JUDGE'S CHAMBERS BEFORE HONORABLE LEGROME D. DAVIS. (cls, ) (Entered: 03/22/2004)
36 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by ROBERT P. STYLE on behalf of DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY. (cdd, ) (Entered: 03/26/2004)
37 Entry of Appearance by MICHAEL D. KEFFER on behalf of DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, INC. and Withdrawal of Appearance by DAVID WHITE for DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, INC. with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (KEFFER, MICHAEL) Modified on 3/31/2004 (np). (Entered: 03/30/2004)
38 ANSWER to Intervenor Complaint with Certificate of Service by DAN LEPORE &SONS COMPANY, INC..(KEFFER, MICHAEL) (Entered: 03/30/2004)

Case: 2:03-cv-5462 As of: 04/19/2010 01:21 PM EDT 6 of 6

03/30/2004 08/16/2004
09/20/2004 10/19/2004 12/29/2004 02/24/2005

39 SCHEDULING ORDER THAT ALL FACTUAL DISCOVERY SHALL BE COMPLETED BY 10/1/2004. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS SHALL BE FILED BY 11/3/2004, ETC. SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 3/30/04. 3/31/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(kw, ) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
40 ORDER THAT THE CLERK SHALL REFER THIS MATTER TO THE HON. DIANE M. WELSH, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE, FOR A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. TH EDATE AND TIME OF THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SHALL BE SET BY JUDGE WELSH.SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 8/13/04. 8/17/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(cdd, ) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
41 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: DISCOVERY DUE BY 1/12/2005. MOTIONS DUE BY 1/19/2005. RESPONSES THERETO DUE 2/9/05. SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 9/20/04. 9/21/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(stb, ) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
42 Minute Entry for Settlement Conference held on 10/15/04 before Judge DIANE M. WELSH. (cdd, ) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
43 ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 41.1(b). SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 12/29/04. 12/29/04 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E−MAILED AND FAXED.(cls, ) (Entered: 12/29/2004)
44 CONSENT DECREE; THIS CASE IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, SUBJECT TO COURT'S JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSENT DECREE; DEFENDANTS SHALL BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES.. SIGNED BY JUDGE LEGROME D. DAVIS ON 2/23/05. 2/24/05 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND FAXED.(afm, ) (Entered: 02/24/2005)

 
  EEOC v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co. and L.F. Driscoll Co. No. 2:03‐CV‐5462‐LDD (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2005)
The Philadelphia District Office filed this individual Title VII case alleging that defendant Dan Lepore & Sons Co., a Philadelphia area masonry contractor, subjected charging party to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her for complaining of the harassment, and that L.F. Driscoll Co., which manages construction projects in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, disciplined charging party because of her sex. From July to November 2001, charging party, the only female stone mason in her local bricklayers' union, worked at defendant Lepore's University of Pennsylvania construction site. At that site, charging party's male coworkers subjected her to unwelcome and sexually offensive comments, which she asked them to stop. In November 2001 defendant Lepore transferred charging party to its Kimmel Center site. At this job site, charging party's male supervisor and coworkers subjected her to pervasive offensive sexual comments. On November 27 charging party told the supervisor to stop making the comments. Two days later, a safety inspector employed by defendant Driscoll evicted charging party from the job site for a safety violation (failure to wear safety goggles). Men who engaged in the same infraction were not warned or disciplined. After being evicted from the site, charging party complained to Lepore's president about the sexual harassment she had experienced. She thereafter applied to Lepore for work on numerous other projects, but was hired only once and was laid off after 9 days.
Under the 3‐year consent decree resolving this case, defendants will pay $75,000 to charging party: Defendant Lepore will pay $45,000 and defendant Driscoll will pay $30,000. Defendant Lepore will reinstate charging party into a stone mason position on a Princeton, New Jersey project starting in spring 2005, and will guarantee her at least 1 year's work as a stone mason on that project or, if the project lasts less than 1 year, on other projects.