Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 1 Filed 09/26/13 Page 6 of 29

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARA PALLADINO and ISABELLE BARKER

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No.

THOMAS W. CORBETT, in his official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania, and his successors in office; and KATHLEEN KANE, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and her successors in office

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory

provision of Pennsylvania's marriage law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704, to the extent that it bars the

recognition of legally valid marriages of same-sex couples that were entered into in other states.

2. Furthermore, to the extent that the Pennsylvania statute purports to be authorized

by federal law, specifically, Section 2 ofthe Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C

("DOMA"), Plaintiffs similarly challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA. The

United States Supreme Court already has ruled unconstitutional Section 3 ofDOMA, which, like

the Pennsylvania statute challenged herein, purported to ban the recognition of legally valid

marriages of same-sex couples for the purpose of determining entitlements to benefits under

federal laws.

3.

Plaintiffs, Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker, are Pennsylvania residents who

were legally married in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts while Massachusetts residents.

They relocated to Pennsylvania in August 2005 and have since resided continuously in

Pennsylvania.

4. In thirteen states (California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Delaware, New

York, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Maine)

and the District of Columbia, same-sex couples may marry legally. Pennsylvania, however,

specifically forbids same-sex marriage by statutory decree. Although Plaintiffs and countless

others consider Pennsylvania's refusal to marry same-sex couples to be discriminatory and

unconstitutional, this action does not challenge that aspect of Pennsylvania law.

5. Plaintiffs are already lawfully married and do not seek to be married again in a

new ceremony or process in Pennsylvania. Rather, they seek the protections afforded by the

United States Constitution to decrees, licenses, orders and judgments entered by other states. 2

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Specifically, they demand that their marriage license and decree, which were issued in Massachusetts, be given full faith and credit by Pennsylvania in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. Additionally, they demand that their right to travel between the states and to enjoy the full privileges bestowed upon them in Massachusetts not be abridged by Pennsylvania law.
6. The Pennsylvania statute states in pertinent part that "[a] marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth." As a result, the marriage that Plaintiffs entered into lawfully in Massachusetts is not recognized as valid in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania treats the marriage as a nullity and instructs Plaintiffs' four-and-a-half year old child, who was born to two lawfully married persons and who has lived continuously with two loving and committed parents, that so long as his family resides here, his parents will be labeled and treated as unmarried.
7. As residents of Pennsylvania, lawfully married couples such as Plaintiffs are denied the basic rights that were conferred on them by another sovereign state, solely because of a discriminatory, arbitrary and irrational distinction that infringes on their own constitutional rights, and the rights of other sovereign states to recognize and sanction marriages of their own citizens.
8. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize and respect the legal effects of valid same-sex marriages from other states adversely impacts Plaintiffs and same-sex couples across Pennsylvania in significant ways. It excludes them from the many rights and legal protections available to spouses and denies them many federal protections afforded to married couples, such as those provided under the Family Medical Leave Act and the Social Security Act. In addition,
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Plaintiffs are denied many Pennsylvania-specific protections, such as the ability to file joint state tax returns.
9. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize those legal same-sex marriages entered into outside of Pennsylvania also infringes on the fundamental right to travel, including the right of United States citizens to migrate between states, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. This treatment is subject to heightened scrutiny because it burdens the exercise of fundamental rights and denies Plaintiffs their rights to recognition guaranteed under the Constitution.
10. Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek (a) a declaration that Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into in sovereign states other than Pennsylvania violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; (b) a declaration that Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize marriages of samesex couples validly entered into outside of Pennsylvania violates the fundamental right to travel, including the right to migrate between states, which is protected by the United States Constitution; (c) a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (d) a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (e) a declaration that Section 2 of DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; and (f) a permanent injunction directing Defendants and Pennsylvania to recognize the marriage ofthe Plaintiffs and the marriages of other same-sex couples validly entered into in states outside of Pennsylvania.
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THE PARTIES Plaintiffs
11. Plaintiffs Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker met while living in New York City, New York and have been in a committed relationship since 1998.
12. Because their lives were commingled and they intended to remain in their committed relationship, Cara and Isabelle registered for Domestic Partnership Status in the State ofNew York in 2002.
13. In early 2004, Cara and Isabelle relocated to Massachusetts to take advantage of employment and educational opportunities.
14. In May 2004, Massachusetts passed legislation that recognized the right of samesex couples to enter into legally binding marriages. On February 10, 2005, Cara and Isabelle were married in Northampton, Massachusetts. At the time, both Cara and Isabelle were citizens of Massachusetts, residing in Northampton, Massachusetts. Cara and Isabelle expected at the time of their marriage that they would remain residents of Massachusetts and enjoy the protections of Massachusetts law.
15. After completion of her doctoral studies, Isabelle was unable to find employment within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. As a result, Isabelle accepted a postdoctoral fellowship with Bryn Mawr College in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. In August 2005, Cara and Isabelle moved to Pennsylvania.
16. In 2005, in order for Cara to be included on Isabelle's health insurance benefits and since their marriage was not recognized, Isabelle's employer required Plaintiffs to submit an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership.
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17. In 2007, in order for Isabelle to be included on Cara's health insurance benefits and since their marriage was not recognized, Cara's employer required Plaintiffs to submit an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership.
18. Isabelle became pregnant in 2008 through in vitro fertilization. As soon-to-be parents of a newborn child, Cara and Isabelle recognized the need to engage in estate and family planning. Because their marriage is not recognized under the laws of Pennsylvania, they could not rely on the legal presumptions about inheritance, succession and family rights that attach as a matter oflaw to couples whose marriages are recognized in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, in September 2008, Cara and Isabelle had to undertake the expense and burden of retaining legal counsel to prepare Pennsylvania estate and family planning documents that would have been unnecessary had their lawful Massachusetts marriage been recognized here.
19. Pennsylvania does not consider Cara and Isabelle to be spouses and, therefore, they are denied the legal presumption authorizing them to make decisions for each other in the event of sickness or infirmity. To ensure that in the event of an emergency or personal tragedy they would be afforded the privileges that are bestowed automatically on couples whose marriages are recognized by Pennsylvania, Cara and Isabelle had to rely on privately retained lawyers to execute durable powers of attorney, wills and letters of instructions that would be unnecessary for opposite-sex married couples.
20. On January 30, 2009, Isabelle gave birth to their son, W.P., in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
21. The Pennsylvania Department of Health, Vital Records issued the birth record for W.P., but refused to list Isabelle's spouse, Cara, as the other parent-despite the fact that under Pennsylvania law, children born to lawfully married couples are presumed to be the children of
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that marriage. Instead, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Vital Records, processed the birth certificate as if W.P. had been born to a single parent-Isabelle.
22. The fact that his parents' marriage is not recognized within Pennsylvania harms W.P. materially by reducing family resources, and "humiliates" him, as the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013), by denying his family the social recognition and respect that it would enjoy if his parents' lawful out-of-state marriage was recognized.
23. In an attempt to minimize some of this state-sponsored stigmatization of their newborn son, Cara and Isabelle decided to proceed with a second-parent adoption that allowed Cara to become a lawful parent ofW.P., even though in the eyes of Pennsylvania, W.P.'s parents were unmarried. On April 7, 2009, Cara and Isabelle filed a Petition for Adoption in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
24. On March 13, 2009, attorneys for Cara and Isabelle were required to submit a letter to Cara's employer proving that an adoption action was pending so that W.P. could be added to the family health insurance plan through Cara's employer.
25. On June 12, 2009, the second-parent adoption ofW.P. was finalized. 26. Currently, Cara, Isabelle, and W.P. live in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Cara has since accepted employment in the fundraising department of Bryn Mawr College. Isabelle is currently an Assistant Dean at Bryn Mawr College. 27. As residents of Pennsylvania, Cara and Isabelle have been denied the dignity and status that Pennsylvania accords to married couples, including similarly situated opposite-sex couples who are married in other states and then move to Pennsylvania. The legal significance of a valid public act, to which Cara, Isabelle and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts are
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parties, has been denied to Plaintiffs. The benefits and privileges given to an opposite-sex couple have been withheld from Cara and Isabelle. Their family has been stigmatized and denied the protections that the United States Constitution affords to out-of-state decrees, licenses and judgments and to travelers between states, solely because Pennsylvania has opted to treat a certain class of citizens, i.e., same-sex couples who were validly married in other states, differently from the way it treats opposite-sex couples who were also validly married in other states.
28. In doing so, Pennsylvania has refused to extend full faith and credit to a legally binding marriage decree issued by another sovereign state. Pennsylvania has also infringed upon the right to travel, which includes the right to migrate freely to any state in the union, guaranteed to all United States citizens.
Defendants 29. Defendant Thomas W. Corbett is the Governor of Pennsylvania, and he is being sued in his official capacity as the chief executive officer of Pennsylvania. Pursuant to Article IV, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Governor Corbett and his successors are responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Pennsylvania, including the laws that exclude same-sex couples from having their marriages recognized within Pennsylvania, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704. 30. Defendant Kathleen G. Kane is the Attorney General of Pennsylvania. She and her successors are sued in their official capacity pursuant to the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-204. 31. Defendants are, and at all relevant times have been, acting under color of state law, and are sued solely in their official capacities.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 32. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article IV ofthe United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 33. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(l) and 1391(b)(2) because both Defendants are residents of Pennsylvania and conduct the business of the Pennsylvania within this District, and because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to this case occurred in this District.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Pennsylvania's Failure to Recognize Marriage for Legally Married Same-Sex Couples
34. Pennsylvania's Marriage Law, 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 1101 et seq., governs marriages in Pennsylvania. In a stark departure from Pennsylvania's usual recognition of marriages entered into in other states, the Marriage Law made "void in this Commonwealth" any "marriage between persons of the same sex ... entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into." 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704.
35. As a result, even if same-sex couples were and remain legally married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in Pennsylvania and are treated as a nullity for all purposes involving access to state-sanctioned benefits, rights and privileges.
The Exclusion of Same-Sex Married Couples from Recognition of their Marriages Causes Substantial Harm to Such Couples and Their Families.
36. There are more than 600 Pennsylvania-specific benefits available to legally married couples. By refusing to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples from other states, Pennsylvania law deprives them of numerous state protections that are available to opposite-sex married couples in Pennsylvania by virtue of their marriages, including the right to file joint state
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tax returns, the ability to own property in joint tenancy by the entirety, and the ability to inherit a spouse's estate without being taxed.
37. Some of the federal protections for married couples are only available to couples if their marriages are legally recognized in the states in which they live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(l)(A)(i) (spouses's eligibility for Social Security benefits based on law of state where couple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(b) (same for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, Plaintiffs, who are already married, cannot access such federal protections as long as Pennsylvania refuses to recognize their existing marriage.
38. Refusing to recognize legal marriages of same-sex couples also harms those couples and their children by denying them the social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood meanings that command respect for a couple's relationship and the commitment they have made.
39. The refusal to recognize their inclusion within the institution of marriage demeans and stigmatizes same-sex married couples and their children by sending the message that they are less worthy and valued than families headed by opposite-sex married couples.
40. The impact ofthe exclusion from recognition ofmarriages of same-sex married couples and their families is extensive and real. Plaintiffs recognize that marriage entails both benefits to and obligations on each other and they welcome both.
Refusing to Recognize the Legal Marriages of Same-Sex Couples Is Not Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest and Cannot Withstand Heightened Scrutiny.
41. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize the legal marriage of same-sex couples who were married in other jurisdictions but now domiciled in Pennsylvania is neither rational nor
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justified. It is intended specifically to demean and impose inequality on a group of citizens who are entitled to the protections ofthe United States Constitution, telling others throughout Pennsylvania that Plaintiffs' otherwise lawful and valid marriage is unworthy of recognition merely because of their sexual orientation. Moreover, like Section 3 ofDOMA, which was declared to be unconstitutional, it makes it more difficult for children such as W.P. to understand and appreciate the integrity and closeness of their families.
42. When Pennsylvania enacted the 1996 amendment prohibiting marriage for samesex couples, legislators in favor of the amendment purported to rely on "support of the traditional family unit." 1996 Pa. Legis. J. (House), at 2017; see also id. at 2019 ("[T]he large majority [of Pennsylvanians] do not want our traditional marriage institution and our state of morals to be changed."); id. at 2022 ("This is a vote about family values and traditional beliefs."). Some legislators said there was a need to protect against a financial burden on businesses and taxpayers. !d. at 2018 ("[I]f we are forced to recognize same-sex marriages, this would put an unfunded mandate on our businesses, another burden on our taxpayers, and so on."); id. at 2017 ("Social Security, tax and other benefits presently conferred on spouses would have to be expanded to include married partners of the same sex. The financial costs imposed on society by the forced recognition of same-sex marriage cannot even be calculated at this time."). And, it was argued, "it is imperative that we in Pennsylvania should stand up for traditional marriage for the benefit of families and children in the Commonwealth and our future." !d. at 2022.
43. These purported justifications-and any other explanations that might now be offered-cannot pass constitutional muster because they are intended to demean, rather than protect, the rights of citizens.
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Moral Opposition to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples and Support of the Traditional Family 44. Neither tradition nor fading moral disapproval of same-sex relationships offers a
rational or compelling basis to warrant impinging on the fundamental rights of validly married same-sex couples under the law.
45. Pennsylvania does not apply moral standards to its recognition of opposite-sex marriages. Pennsylvania law does not scrutinize or question the commitment, love, dignity, or status of men and women who marry in other states. It does not ask whether opposite-sex couples who married in other states were old enough to marry, mentally competent, loving, decent, moral or committed to child rearing. It does not ask whether they have known each other long enough and treated each other with respect and compassion. On the contrary, it recognizes their marriage licenses and contracts without qualification or question.
46. It is only with regard to same-sex couples who have married in other states that Pennsylvania injects a "moral," albeit antiquated and discriminatory, set ofjudgments into the recognition of the couples' legal status. No matter how loving and committed the same-sex couple is who married in another state, no matter how long they have lived in harmony and functioned with their children as a strong and viable family unit, and no matter how legally solid their marriage was determined to be in the state where they wed, Pennsylvania rejects their out of state marriage licenses and contracts based on a single, pernicious, and unyielding criterion.
47. As with all United States citizens, the United States Constitution guarantees the plaintiff couple (and other validly married same-sex couples) the right to enter and leave another state without encumbrance or penalty.
48. Further, the United States Constitution grants every United States citizen the right to migrate to and become a resident of another state and, in so doing, the right to be treated equally to other residents of that state in the enjoyment of the privileges and benefits afforded by
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the law of the state of domicile. Pennsylvania's marriage law, and 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §1704, specifically the section targeting out-of-state lawful marriages, impermissibly infringes upon that right by (1) deterring migration by same-sex married couples to new states and (2) penalizing same-sex married couples who enter and choose to reside in states such as Pennsylvania that refuse to recognize their marriages. Protection of Children
49. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples is not rationally related to child welfare concerns. The government has a vital interest in protecting the well-being of children, but the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage bears no relation to this interest. To the contrary, it harms children in Pennsylvania.
50. Pennsylvania law recognizes that neither sexual orientation nor gender has any bearing on a couple's ability to rear children successfully and, thus, treats same-sex couples the same as opposite couples with respect to adoption and recognition as parents through the in loco parentis doctrine. Pennsylvania courts routinely grant adoptions to same-sex couples, recognizing that the adoptions are in the best interest of the children. Any assertion that Pennsylvania does not consider same-sex couples equally effective parents cannot be credited, given Pennsylvania's willingness to cast aside the kind of stereotypical bias that led to the enactment of the challenged Pennsylvania statute, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704, and permit samesex couples to adopt children.
51. Moreover, there is no valid basis for Pennsylvania to assert a preference for child rearing by opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples. There is a consensus within the scientific community, based on over thirty years of research, that children raised by same-sex couples are just as well adjusted as children raised by opposite-sex couples. This is recognized by every major professional organization dedicated to children's health and welfare including the
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American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America.
52. Other courts have found, after trials involving expert testimony, that there is no rational basis for favoring parenting by opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that the research supporting the conclusion that "[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted" is "accepted beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology"), aff'd sub nom., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacatedfor lack ofstanding sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); In reAdoption ofDoe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *20 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) ("[B]ased on the robust nature of the evidence available in the field, this Court is satisfied that the issue is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold otherwise; the best interests of children are not preserved by prohibiting homosexual adoption."), aff'd sub nom., Florida Dep 't ofChildren & Families v. Adoption ofXX G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., Nos. 1999-9881, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9 and 2004 WL 3200916, at *3-4 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (holding based on factual findings regarding the well-being of children of same-sex parents that "there was no rational relationship between the [exclusion of same-sex people from becoming foster parents] and the health, safety, and welfare of the foster children"), aff'd sub nom., Dep 't ofHuman Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006).
53. Refusing to recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples who were married in other states but are now domiciled in Pennsylvania has no conceivable benefit to children of
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opposite-sex couples. Such refusal does not encourage opposite-sex couples who have children to marry or stay married for the benefit of their children. And the children of opposite-sex spouses will continue to enjoy the same benefits and protections that flow from their parents' marriages.
54. Refusing to recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples who were married in other states but are now domiciled in Pennsylvania serves only to harm the children raised by such same-sex couples by denying their families significant benefits and by branding their families as inferior and less deserving of respect and, thus, encouraging private bias and discrimination. According to the 2010 United States Census, there are over 6,000 same-sex couples raising children in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's interest in the welfare of children of same-sex parents is or should be as great as its interest in the welfare of other children.
55. Pennsylvania's irrational and discriminatory statute may also cause unintended violations of other laws, including those that prohibit bigamy. If, by way of example, a same-sex couple is married in Massachusetts or any of the growing number ofjurisdictions that permit such unions, and, without divorcing, one of those individuals relocates to Pennsylvania, that person would then be permitted to enter into an opposite-sex marriage in Pennsylvania. Because Pennsylvania does not recognize the prior same-sex marriage and considers it void, there would be no barrier to the second marriage. Should that opposite-sex married couple then travel to Massachusetts or any other state that recognizes the original same-sex marriage, they would be bigamists. No public interest is served by such an irrational patchwork of inconsistent schemes that would treat such a couple as lawfully married in one state but as criminal bigamists in another.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
Violation of Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
(42 u.s.c. § 1983)
56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
57. Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who are legally married under the laws of Massachusetts.
58. Plaintiffs have been issued a marriage license and certificate as a result of a public act and decree of another sovereign state.
59. Defendants refuse to recognize Plaintiffs' valid marriage from another sovereign state and, thus, refuse to give effect to a valid and legally binding public act and decree issued in Massachusetts.
60. As set forth above, Defendants have no basis for this refusal aside from outright discrimination based on a highly suspect and invalid classification. This discriminatory treatment cannot withstand any level of scrutiny because the exclusion does not rationally further any legitimate government interest, but serves only to disparage and injure same-sex couples and their families.
61. The Pennsylvania statute is not and cannot be authorized by Section 2 ofDOMA. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which the acts, records, and proceedings of a state shall be proved and given effect for purposes of full faith and credit, but may not prescribe that the acts, records, and proceedings of one state shall be given no effect in another.
62. Defendants overtly deny full faith and credit to Plaintiffs' valid marriage by enforcing Pennsylvania statute, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 and thereby violating the constitutional
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rights of Plaintiffs in violation of Article IV ofthe United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, which are of a continuing nature and will cause them irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as requested in this Complaint.
COUNT II Deprivation of the Fundamental Right of Travel in
Violation of the United States Constitution
(42 u.s.c. § 1983)
63. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
64. The United States Constitution, including the Due Process Clause, protects the liberty of individuals to travel throughout the nation, uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations that unreasonably burden or restrict their movement.
65. This right guards against interference with citizens' rights "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
66. The right to travel prohibits both laws that affirmatively interfere with or prevent a citizen's travel, and also laws that "penalize[e) those who choose to" migrate to another state. !d. at 629-30. The right extends not only to temporary visits to other states, but also to becoming a permanent resident of another state.
67. Pennsylvania resident couples that have been married lawfully outside of Pennsylvania, whether same sex or opposite sex, are similarly situated for purposes of marriage. However, out-of-state marriages of opposite-sex residents are recognized as valid in Pennsylvania whereas the valid marriages of same-sex couples are considered void in this Pennsylvania.
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68. Pennsylvania's distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex marriages constitutes an impermissible infringement on the constitutionally protected right to travel held by all citizens of the United States, which includes the right to migrate freely and, upon choosing to reside in another state, to receive the rights, benefits and privileges afforded to others who reside in that other state.
69. Pennsylvania's distinction between these similarly situated groups unjustifiably infringes upon the right to travel by ( 1) deterring same-sex couples from exercising their right to migrate to Pennsylvania and (2) penalizing new residents who choose to migrate to Pennsylvania. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).
70. Pennsylvania's distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex marriages also impermissibly infringes upon the right to travel by creating separate classes of citizens in violation of the guarantee of equal protection for citizens of the United States who have moved to other states. See Attorney-General ofNY v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898,905 (1986).
71. A law that has the effect of imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel is subject to strict scrutiny and may be upheld only upon a showing that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. Defendants cannot satisfy this requirement; indeed, the challenged statutes are not even rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate government interest.
72. Defendants have no rational or compelling justification to impinge upon Plaintiffs' right to travel and/or migrate to Pennsylvania. See id. at 904 (burdens on the right to migrate require "the State to come forward with a compelling justification [for the challenged law].").
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73. Pennsylvania's refusal to give effect to legally binding and valid marriages sanctioned by other states cannot survive the requisite level of constitutional scrutiny.
74. Accordingly, Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere in the United States violates the fundamental right to travel, including the right of all United States citizens to migrate and establish residency in any state.
75. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of the right to travel, including the right to migrate, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
76. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, which are of a continuing nature and will cause them irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as requested in this Complaint.
COUNT III Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 u.s.c. § 1983)
77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
78. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from "depriv[ing] any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest.
79. The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
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80. The Due Process Clause ofthe United States Constitution also protects fundamental liberty interests in choices that lie at the core of personal dignity, privacy, and autonomy, including each person's right to family integrity and intimate association.
81. Additionally, as the United States Supreme Court set forth in Windsor, (1) a same-sex couple who has entered into a valid marriage has a liberty interest in its marital status that is protected by the due process guarantees of the federal Constitution, and (2) governmental refusal to recognize a same-sex couple's existing marital status denies that protected liberty interest. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2695.
82. Pennsylvania regularly recognizes the out-of-state marriages of opposite-sex couples domiciled in Pennsylvania.
83. Defendants' actions infringe Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected interests in liberty by penalizing Plaintiffs' constitutionally-protected choices in the most intimate and personal areas oftheir lives.
84. Pennsylvania law denies Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples of their fundamental rights by refusing to recognize the marriages into which they entered in other states.
85. Because government interference with this fundamental liberty interest triggers strict scrutiny, Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize Plaintiffs' valid Massachusetts marriage may be upheld only upon a showing that the restrictions are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. Defendants cannot satisfy this requirement; indeed, the Pennsylvania statute is not even rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate government interest.
86. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
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87. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
88. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, which are of a continuing nature and will cause them irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as requested in this Complaint.
COUNT IV Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 u.s.c. § 1983)
89. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
90. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. Same-sex and opposite-sex married couples are similarly situated for the purposes of marriage.
92. The Pennsylvania law at issue in this case that refuses to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly celebrated in another jurisdiction is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs because it violates equal protection guarantees by categorically depriving Plaintiffs of their rights on the basis of an irrational, punitive and unjustifiable classification.
93. As a result of such discrimination, Plaintiffs are deprived of the many benefits afforded opposite-sex couples. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize Plaintiffs valid marriage denies Plaintiffs equal dignity and respect, treats them and their child as second class citizens and their legal marriage as second-class marriage.
21

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 1 Filed 09/26/13 Page 27 of 29
94. This second-class status invites private bias and discrimination by instructing all persons with whom Plaintiffs interact, including their own child, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. Pennsylvania statute 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 reflects moral disapproval and animus toward Plaintiffs.
95. The impermissible classifications created by a Pennsylvania statute that refuses to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly celebrated in another jurisdiction violate equal protection guarantees both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
96. Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize the valid Massachusetts marriage of Plaintiffs does not sufficiently advance any important or compelling government interest to survive heightened scrutiny. This categorical deprivation is not rationally related to the furtherance of any legitimate government interest, let alone narrowly tailored to substantially advance any compelling or important government interest.
97. .Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
98. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
99. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged herein, which are of a continuing nature and will cause them irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as requested in this Complaint.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 1. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause embodied in Article IV,§ 1 ofthe United States Constitution;
22

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 1 Filed 09/26/13 Page 28 of 29

2. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the right to travel, including the right to migrate and establish residence in any state, guaranteed by the United States Constitution;
3. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
4. Enter a declaratory judgment that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
5. Enter a declaratory judgment that Section 2 ofDOMA violates the Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and is null and void; 6. Enter a permanent injunction directing Defendants to recognize the Massachusetts
marriage of Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker; 7. Enter a permanent injunction directing Defendants to recognize the marriages
validly entered into outside of Pennsylvania by other similarly situated same-sex couples;

8. Award costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

and 9.

Enter all further relief to which Plain>9Is may b j -.--~~
By:lt~­
Michael L. Banks (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 35052) Eric Kraeutler (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 32189) MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921 215.963.5000 (telephone) 215.963.5001 (fax) ekraeutler@morganlewis.com mbanks@morganlewis.com
Benjamin L. Jerner (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 82695) Tiffany L. Palmer (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 76202) Jerner & Palmer, P.C.

23

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 1 Filed 09/26/13 Page 29 of 29 5401 Wissahickon Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19144 215.843.6000 (telephone) 215.843.6006 (fax) TPalmer@JPLaw.com BJemer@JPLaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs
24

 
 Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 80 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARA PALLADINO, et al.

:

:

v.

:

:

THOMAS W. CORBETT, et al.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-5641

ORDER AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 2014, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is placed in civil SUSPENSE pending expiration of the deadline to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 13-1861, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014).

BY THE COURT:
/s/ Mary A. McLaughlin_ MARY A. McLAUGHLIN, J.

 
 Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 81 Filed 10/22/14 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARA PALLADINO and ISABELLE BARKER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS W. CORBETT, in his official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania, and his successors in office; and KATHLEEN KANE, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and her successors in office,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 2:13-cv-05641-MAM

STIPULATED ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL In light of the May 20, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 1:13-cv-1861, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68771 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014), declaring (inter alia) that 23 Pa.C.S. § 1704 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and permanently enjoining the enforcement thereof, the parties have stipulated and moved to dismiss this action by court order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(a)(2). Under the decision in Whitewood v. Wolf, the marriage of Plaintiffs Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker, which was entered into under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (as evidenced by a marriage certificate dated February 11, 2005), shall in all respects be deemed valid and recognized for all purposes under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, Defendants agree that they will take no steps to deprive Plaintiffs of the benefits accorded by the validity and recognition of their marriage under Pennsylvania law.

DBl/80981836.1

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 81 Filed 10/22/14 Page 2 of 2

Therefore, consistent with the parties' stipulation and this Order, the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED. As agreed by the parties, all parties shall bear their own costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
s/ Michael L. Banks Michael L. Banks (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 35052) Eric Kraeutler (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 32189) Joseph B.G. Fay (Pa I.D. No. 33480) Vanessa R. Brown (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 315115) Elisa P. McEnroe (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 206143) William 0. Mandycz (admitted pro hac vice) Jane Manchisi (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 309085) Jonathan D. Wall (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 316692) Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP 1701 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921

Counsel for Defendant Governor Thomas W. Corbett
s/ Joel L. Frank William H. Lamb (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 04927) Joel L. Frank (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 46601) Maureen M. McBride (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 57668) Lamb McErlane PC 24 East Market St. P.O. Box 565 West Chester, PA 19381

Counsel for Defendant Attorney General Kathleen Kane

s/ M Abbegael Giunta M. Abbegael Giunta (Pa. Bar I.D. No. 94059) Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General Strawberry Square, l 51h Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120
BY THE COURT:

DBI/80981836.1

2

 
 Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)

CARA PALLADINO and

)

ISABELLE BARKER

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS W. CORBETT, in his official )

capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania,

)

and his successors in office;

)

and KATHLEEN KANE, in her official )

capacity as Attorney General of

)

Pennsylvania, and her successors in office, )

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Case No. 13-05641 Judge Mary A. McLaughlin

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2013, this Court certified to the Attorney General of the United States that the constitutionality of Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) has been called into question by Plaintiffs, who are Pennsylvania residents seeking Pennsylvania’s recognition of their same-sex marriage entered into in Massachusetts. See Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 [Dkt. 15]. The United States requested, and was granted, extensions of time until April 4, 2014 to assess the propriety of its intervention in this case following the completion of the parties’ dispositive motions. The United States now files this Statement of Interest, see 28 U.S.C. § 517, to advise the Court that it will not intervene at this time because the Court can and should resolve this case without reaching the issue of Section 2’s constitutionality.

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 2 of 9
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Section 2 of DOMA because the harm they claim is caused not by Section 2, but by the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting recognition of their samesex marriage. This Court can accordingly resolve this case solely by determining the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, and it need not and should not address Plaintiffs’ conditional challenge to Section 2. Courts should “not reach constitutional issues unnecessarily,” Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 106 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008), and should particularly avoid “[s]triking down an Act of Congress,” which is “‘the gravest and most delicate duty that [a] [c]ourt is called on to perform,’” Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (citation omitted)), when the circumstances do not require it. If, however, the Court were nevertheless to conclude at some point that this case requires it to address the construction or constitutionality of Section 2, the United States respectfully requests leave to intervene at that time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
RELEVANT BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple residing in Pennsylvania who were legally married in Massachusetts while residents there. See Compl. ¶ 3. They brought this suit to challenge the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statutory provision that declares that it is “the strong and longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman,” and that “[a] marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.” 23 Pa. Con. Stat. § 1704; see Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10. Plaintiffs allege that Section 1704’s exclusion of their same-sex marriage from marriage recognition under Pennsylvania law has caused them substantial harm. See Compl. ¶¶ 36-40. They argue that Section 1704 violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Full Faith and
2

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 3 of 9
Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution, and a constitutional right to travel. See id. ¶ 10; see also Pls.’ MSJ [Dkt. 27] at 57 n.29 (citing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, and the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in support their claim of a fundamental right to travel).
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA on these bases (other than a right to travel), but only to the extent that Section 2 is deemed to provide independent authorization for Section 1704. Compl. ¶ 2 (“to the extent that the Pennsylvania statute purports to be authorized by federal law, specifically, Section 2 of [DOMA], Plaintiffs similarly challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA”); Pls.’ MSJ [Dkt. 27] at 49 (“To the extent Section 2 of DOMA purports to allow the Commonwealth to refuse to adhere to the strictures of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, it exceeds Congress’s power under the Constitution.”).
Section 2, enacted by Congress in 1996, provides as follows: No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. As this language indicates, Section 2 does not require that States take any particular position on recognition of same-sex marriages, but provides that no State is required to provide such recognition.
3

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 4 of 9
STATEMENT THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 2 OF DOMA It is well-established that a court should avoid reaching the issue of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress unless essential to the decision of a case. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’”) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)); Egolf, 526 F.3d at 106 n.2 (“We do not reach constitutional issues unnecessarily . . . .”); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482, 484 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The general rule, based upon overriding policy considerations, is to avoid constitutional issues unless essential to the decision of a case.”) (citing Ashwander); Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1979) (“A basic principle of judicial review holds that a court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’”) (quoting Ashwander). For the reasons discussed below, the United States respectfully submits that a determination of the constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA is not necessary for the resolution of this case. A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge Section 2 of DOMA. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2, because their alleged injury is neither traceable to Section 2 nor redressable by a judgment that Section 2 is unconstitutional. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“[t]o establish Article III standing, an injury must be,” among other things, “fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redressable by a favorable ruling”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ alleged injury—the non-recognition in Pennsylvania of their
4

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 5 of 9
Massachusetts marriage—stems solely from Section 1704, the provision of Pennsylvania law prohibiting Pennsylvania from recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages. A declaration that Section 2 is unconstitutional would not remedy Plaintiffs’ injury, because Section 1704 would still preclude Pennsylvania from recognizing their Massachusetts marriage. The only way for Plaintiffs to remedy their alleged injury is to obtain a judgment that Section 1704 itself is unconstitutional. 1
At least one federal district court has found in circumstances similar to this case that a same-sex couple seeking recognition of their out-of-state marriage by their state of residence lacked standing to challenge Section 2 of DOMA. In Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014), which involved a same-sex Oklahoma couple married in California, whose marriage Oklahoma would not recognize, the court held that Section 2 was not causally related to the plaintiffs’ asserted injuries. The court reasoned that “the injury of non-recognition stems exclusively from state law,” id. at 1266, and that Section 2 “does not stand as any significant obstacle between [the plaintiffs] and recognition of their California marriage in Oklahoma,” id. at 1267. The court explained that Section 2 “does not have any coercive or determinative effect on Oklahoma’s non-recognition of [plaintiffs’] California marriage, id., observing that Section 2 “does not mandate that states take any particular action, does not remove any discretion from states, does not confer benefits upon non-recognizing states, and does not punish recognizing states,” id. at 1266. For similar reasons, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Section 2 of DOMA here.
1 It is not surprising, therefore, that Plaintiffs’ proposed order accompanying their motion for summary judgment seeks declaratory relief only as to Section 1704. [Dkt. 27] at 1.
5

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 6 of 9
B. This Court Can and Should Resolve Plaintiffs’ Challenge to the Pennsylvania Statute Without Addressing the Constitutionality Of Section 2.
If this Court determines that Section 1704 must be struck down, then Plaintiffs will obtain recognition of their marriage by Pennsylvania (the relief they seek in this case), rendering irrelevant the constitutionality of Section 2. The only possible reason to address the constitutionality of Section 2 in this case would be if the Court were to conclude that the constitutionality of Section 2 is a necessary prerequisite to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute that is the actual cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged injury. Defendants in this case, however, have not relied on Section 2 to support the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Section 1704. Defendant Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane did not invoke Section 2 in her motion to dismiss or opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Defendant Governor Thomas Corbett has argued that Section 2 is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, but he also has argued that a determination as to the constitutionality of Section 2 “would have no effect” on the Pennsylvania law challenged by Plaintiffs: “With or without DOMA, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel Pennsylvania to define and recognize marriage according to Massachusetts law.” Corbett MTD [Dkt. 20-1] at 36 (emphasis added); see also Corbett Resp. Mem. [Dkt. 38] at 28 (same). In light of Defendants’ arguments, this Court need not and should not reach the question of Section 2’s validity.
Even if Defendants in this case had relied on Section 2 to support Section 1704, it is wellsettled that the Court should address all other possible arguments about Section 1704’s constitutionality before addressing an argument that might require adjudication of Section 2’s constitutionality. Were the Court to conclude either that Section 1704 violates the Equal
6

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 7 of 9

Protection or Due Process Clauses or a right to travel, or that it withstands those constitutional challenges and would also be constitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause even in the absence of Section 2, then the Court would have no need to address (1) whether Section 2 is relevant to Section 1704’s constitutionality under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or (2) whether Section 2 itself is constitutional. In Bourke v. Beshear, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2014 WL 556729, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014), for example, the court concluded that Kentucky law’s “denial of recognition for valid same-sex marriages violates the United States Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law;” it then explained that “Section 2 of DOMA, as a permissive statute, is not necessary to the disposition of Plaintiffs’ case” and thus declined to “analyze its constitutionality.” Id. n.9. If the Court nevertheless determines that it must address those Section 2 questions, the government would seek leave to intervene at that point.
CONCLUSION The United States’ decision not to intervene at this time is based on the fact that consideration of Section 2 is not necessary to this Court’s resolution of this case and on the wellsettled principle that a court should avoid deciding the constitutionality of an Act of Congress whenever possible. If this Court nevertheless concludes that it is necessary to construe or decide the constitutionality of Section 2, then the United States respectfully requests that the Court afford it an opportunity to intervene at the appropriate time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).

Dated: April 4 , 2014

Respectfully submitted,
STUART F. DELERY Assistant Attorney General
ZANE DAVID MEMEGER United States Attorney

7

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 8 of 9 ARTHUR R. GOLDBERG Assistant Branch Director /s/Jean Lin Jean Lin Jennie L. Kneedler United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Tel: (202) 514-3716 Fax: (202) 616-8470 jean.lin@usdoj.gov
8

Case 2:13-cv-05641-MAM Document 51 Filed 04/04/14 Page 9 of 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 4, 2014 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Statement of Interest of the United States was filed electronically and served via ECF on all counsel of record.
By: /s/ Jean Lin Jean Lin

 
 Case: 2:13-cv-5641 As of: 11/05/2017 04:29 PM EST 1 of 9
CLOSED,STANDARD
United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:13−cv−05641−MAM

PALLADINO et al v. CORBETT et al Assigned to: HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN Case in other court: USCA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
14−02766
USCA, 15−01192 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/26/2013 Date Terminated: 10/22/2014 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 950 Other Statutes: Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question

CARA PALLADINO

represented by MICHAEL L. BANKS MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−2921 Email: mbanks@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

WILLIAM O. MANDYCZ MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−963−4686 Email: wmandycz@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BENJAMIN L. JERNER JERNER & PALMER PC 5401 WISSAHICKON AVENUE PHILADELPHIA, PA 19144 215−843−6023 Email: bjerner@jplaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ELISA P. MCENROE MORGAN LEWIS BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−2921 215−963−5917 Email: emcenroe@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ERIC KRAEUTLER MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103−2921 215−963−4840 Fax: 215−963−5001 Email: eric.kraeutler@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MELINA R. DIMATTIO MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST. PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−963−5485 Email: mdimattio@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:13-cv-5641 As of: 11/05/2017 04:29 PM EST 2 of 9

VANESSA RENEE BROWN MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1701 MARKET ST PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 215−963−5913 Email: vbrown@morganlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ISABELLE BARKER

represented by MICHAEL L. BANKS (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

WILLIAM O. MANDYCZ (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

BENJAMIN L. JERNER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ELISA P. MCENROE (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ERIC KRAEUTLER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MELINA R. DIMATTIO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

VANESSA RENEE BROWN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
THOMAS W. CORBETT IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND HIS SUCESSORS IN OFFICE

represented by WILLIAM H. LAMB LAMB MCERLANE, P.C. 24 EAST MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 565 WEST CHESTER, PA 19381−0565 610−430−8000 Fax: 610−692−0877 Email: wlamb@lambmcerlane.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JOEL L. FRANK LAMB MCERLANE PC 24 EAST MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 565 WEST CHESTER, PA 19381−0565 610−430−8000 Fax: 610−692−6210 Email: jfrank@lambmcerlane.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:13-cv-5641 As of: 11/05/2017 04:29 PM EST 3 of 9

MAUREEN M. MCBRIDE LAW OFFICES OF WINDLE & McERLANE, P.C. 24 EAST MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 565 WEST CHESTER, PA 19381−0565 610−430−8000 Fax: 610−692−6210 Email: mmcbride@lambmcerlane.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
KATHLEEN KANE IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND HER SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE

represented by MARY ABBEGAEL GIUNTA Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor's Office of General Counsel 333 Market Street 17th Floor HARRISBURG, PA 17101 717−787−9350 Email: magiunta@pa.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
PA TREASURER ROBERT M. MCCORD

represented by CHRISTOPHER B. CRAIG COMMONWEALTH OF PA DEPT OF TREASURY 127 FINANCE BUILDING HARRISBURG, PA 17120 717−787−2740 Email: ccraig@patreasury.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor
JAMES D SCHNELLER TERMINATED: 03/04/2014

represented by JAMES D SCHNELLER 430 EAST LANCASTER AVENUE E 25 ST. DAVIDS, PA 19087 PRO SE

Date Filed 09/26/2013
09/26/2013 10/15/2013
10/15/2013
10/15/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against THOMAS W. CORBETT, KATHLEEN KANE ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 088954.), filed by CARA PALLADINO, ISABELLE BARKER.(mima, ) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
Summons Issued as to THOMAS W. CORBETT, KATHLEEN KANE. Two Given To: Counsel on September 26, 2013 (mima, ) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by VANESSA RENEE BROWN on behalf of ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO with Certificate of Service(BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
3 AFFIDAVIT of Service by J.R. Lotwick re: served Summons & Complaint upon Thomas W. Corbett (accepted by C. Palmer) by hand delivery on October 3, 2013 (BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
4 AFFIDAVIT of Service by J.R. Lotwick re: served Summons & Complaint upon Kathleen G. Kane (accepted by K. Miller) by hand delivery on October 3, 2013 (BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

Case: 2:13-cv-5641 As of: 11/05/2017 04:29 PM EST 4 of 9

10/16/2013 10/17/2013 10/21/2013 10/21/2013 10/22/2013 10/23/2013 10/24/2013
10/24/2013 10/31/2013 11/01/2013
11/01/2013
11/01/2013 11/04/2013 11/04/2013 11/20/2013

5 NOTICE of Appearance by WILLIAM H. LAMB on behalf of THOMAS W. CORBETT with Certificate of Service(LAMB, WILLIAM) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by ERIC KRAEUTLER on behalf of ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO with Certificate of Service(KRAEUTLER, ERIC) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by MARY ABBEGAEL GIUNTA on behalf of KATHLEEN KANE with Certificate of Service(GIUNTA, MARY) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
8 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint by THOMAS W. CORBETT, KATHLEEN KANE, ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. (LAMB, WILLIAM) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTY; COPY FORWARDED TO JUDGE FOR APPROVAL) Modified on 10/22/2013 (md). (Entered: 10/21/2013)
9 NOTICE by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO of Constitutional Challenge to a Statute Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 (BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by ELISA P. MCENROE on behalf of ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO with Certificate of Service(MCENROE, ELISA) (Entered: 10/23/2013)
11 ORDER THAT A RULE 16/STATUS CONFERENCE SET FOR 11/1/2013 09:30 AM. COURT ASKS COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES TO TALK BEFORE THAT DATE CONCERNING A SCHEDULE FOR THE CASE. PLEASE FAX TO THE COURT ON OR BEFORE 10/31/13, AT NOON, YOUR SUGGESTED SCHEDULE, ETC.SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 10/24/13. 10/24/13 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 10/24/2013)
12 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE UNTIL 11/25/13 TO ANSWER, PLEAD OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO COMPLAINT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 10/23/13. 10/24/13 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 10/24/2013)
13 STATUS REPORT Rule 16 Status Report by THOMAS W. CORBETT. (LAMB, WILLIAM) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
14 ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS SHALL ANSWER, PLEAD OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT BY 11/25/13. PLAINTIFFS SHALL FILE ANY OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS AND ANY CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON OR BEFORE 12/20/13.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 11/1/13. 11/1/13 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED(rf, ) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
15 ORDER THAT COURT HEREBY CERTIFIES TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS AFFECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST, SECTION 2 OF THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, 28 U.S.C. 1738C, IS CALLED INTO QUESTION BY THE ABOVE CAPTIONED CASE, TO WHICH NEITHER THE UNITED STATES, NOR ANY AGENCY, OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE UNITED STATES, IS A PARTY.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 11/1/13. 11/1/13 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) Modified on 11/5/2013 (afm, ). (COPY TO US ATTORNEY IN PHILA AND DC) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
16 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN: Status Conference held on 11/1/13. (rf, ) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
17 NOTICE of Appearance by JOEL L. FRANK on behalf of THOMAS W. CORBETT with Certificate of Service(FRANK, JOEL) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by BENJAMIN L. JERNER on behalf of ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO with Certificate of Service(JERNER, BENJAMIN) (Entered: 11/04/2013)
19 APPLICATION for PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION of (William O. Mandycz) filed by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. Proposed Order, Sponsors Statement, Certificate of Service. (FEE PAID PPE091884, $40.00) (ems) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

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11/25/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013
12/20/2013 01/09/2014 01/13/2014 01/13/2014
01/13/2014 01/17/2014 02/03/2014 02/04/2014 02/11/2014 02/11/2014

20 MOTION to Dismiss filed by THOMAS W. CORBETT.Brief and Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Brief of Defendant Governor Thomas Corbett in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(LAMB, WILLIAM) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
21 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim filed by KATHLEEN KANE.Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Brief Brief in Support of Kane's Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Her)(GIUNTA, MARY) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
22 ORDER THAT APPLICATION FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF WILLIAM O. MANDYCZ IS GRANTED.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 12/8/13. 12/9/13 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
23 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT, KATHLEEN KANE, SHALL HAVE AN EXTENSION OF TIME UNTIL 12/9/2013 TO ANSWER, PLEAD, OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT, AND PLAINTIFFS SHALL HAVE AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANY OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CORBETT AND DEFENDANT KANE'S MOTIONS AND FILE ANY CROSS−MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNTIL ON OR BEFORE 1/13/2014; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 12/8/2013. 12/10/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED AND E−MAILED. (ems) (Entered: 12/10/2013)
24 NOTICE by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA re 15 Order,, Acknowledgement of Constitutional Challenge and Request for Extension of Time (LIN, JEAN) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
25 ORDER THAT UNITED STATES MAY INTERVENE IN THIS ACTION ON OR BEFORE 3/14/14.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 1/8/14. 1/9/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO.Certificate of Service.(BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
27 Combined Memorandum of Law in Opposition re 21 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim, and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt 26] 20 MOTION to Dismiss filed by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Eric Kraeutler, # 2 Exhibit Declaration of Isabelle Barker)(BROWN, VANESSA) Modified on 1/14/2014 (lisad, ). (Entered: 01/13/2014)
28 Amended Declaration re 27 Response in Opposition to Motion, by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. (KRAEUTLER, ERIC) Modified on 1/14/2014 (lisad, ). (Entered: 01/13/2014)
29 APPLICATION TO INTERVENE, EXHIBITS, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by JAMES D SCHNELLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(rf, ) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
30 Response in Opposition re 29 Application/Petition for Leave to Intervene Filed by James Schneller and The Philadelphia Metro Task Force by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. (BROWN, VANESSA) (Entered: 02/03/2014)
31 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REGISTER AS AN ECF USER, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER..(rf, ) (Entered: 02/04/2014)
32 STIPULATION For Extension of Time of Scheduling Order by THOMAS W. CORBETT. (FRANK, JOEL) (FILED IN ERROR BY ATTORNEY; COPY FORWARDED TO JUDGE FOR APPROVAL) Modified on 2/11/2014 (nd, ). (Entered: 02/11/2014)
33 JOINT STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS CORBETT AND KANE HAVE UNTIL 2/19/14 TO FILE A RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. PLAINTIFFS HAVE UNTIL 3/7/14 TO FILE REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 2/11/14. 2/12/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE, EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 02/12/2014)

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02/12/2014
02/14/2014 02/15/2014 02/19/2014 02/19/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014
03/07/2014 03/10/2014 03/12/2014 03/12/2014 03/14/2014 03/20/2014
03/20/2014

34 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE UNTIL 3/12/14 TO FILE A REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 2/12/14. 2/12/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
35 Memorandum of Law re 21 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim, 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by KATHLEEN KANE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Bishop v. Oklahoma)(GIUNTA, MARY) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
36 JURY DEMAND, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by JAMES D SCHNELLER. (rf, ) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
37 MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT OF, OR TO STRIKE, RESPONSE TO APPLICATION TO INTERVENE AND LETTER WITH OPINION ATTACHED, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER..(rf, ) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
38 Memorandum of Law re 20 MOTION to Dismiss , 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by THOMAS W. CORBETT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(LAMB, WILLIAM) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
39 MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION.SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 3/3/14. 3/4/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
40 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT APPLICATION TO INTERVENE (DOC. 29) IS DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED THAT SCHNELLERS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REGISTER AS AN ECF USER (DOC. 31) AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT (DOC. 37) ARE DENIED AS MOOT. REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL ON THE APPLICATION TO INTERVENE (DOC. 36) IS DENIED.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 3/3/14. 3/4/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
41 REQUEST for Extension of Time to File Motion to Intervene or Statement of Interest filed by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Certificate of Service.(LIN, JEAN) Modified on 3/10/2014 (md). (Entered: 03/07/2014)
42 ORDER THAT REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IS GRANTED AND UNITED STATES MAY INTERVENE IN THIS ACTION ON OR BEFORE 4/4/14.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 3/10/14. 3/11/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by MELINA R. DIMATTIO on behalf of ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO with Certificate of Service (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(DIMATTIO, MELINA) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
44 REPLY to Response to Motion re 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(KRAEUTLER, ERIC) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
45 ORDER THAT MOTION HEARING SET FOR 5/28/2014 10:00 AM AS OUTLINED HEREIN.SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 3/14/14. 3/14/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
46 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADING, WITH APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE−AMENDED,CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/20/2014: # 1 APPLICATION) (rf, ). (Entered: 03/20/2014)
47 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE−AMENDED, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by JAMES D SCHNELLER. (rf, ) (FILED IN ERROR) (Entered: 03/20/2014)

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03/24/2014 03/24/2014 03/27/2014 04/04/2014 04/15/2014 04/15/2014 04/15/2014
04/15/2014 04/17/2014 04/17/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 05/01/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014

48 MOTION to File Amicus Brief filed by ROBERT M. MCCORD.Motion of Pennsylvania Treasurer Robert M. McCord For Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Exhibit)(CRAIG, CHRISTOPHER) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
49 ORDER THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADING (DOC. NO. 46) IS DENIED. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 3/24/2014. 3/25/2014 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE MOVANT AND E−MAILED. (aeg, ) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
50 RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION OF RESPONDENT ATTORNEY GENERAL KATHLEEN KANE AND TO MOTION TO STAY THE DEADLINE by JAMES D SCHNELLER. (rf, ) (Entered: 03/27/2014)
51 Statement of Interest by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (LIN, JEAN) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
52 MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
53 ORDER THAT MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE (DOC. 52) IS DENIED.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 4/15/14. 4/15/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
54 ORDER THAT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS (DOC. 48) IS GRANTED. CLERK OF COURT SHALL FILE THE AMICUS CURIAE BREIF THAT IS ATTACHED TO THE PENNSYLVANIA TREASURER'S MOTION., ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 4/15/14. 4/15/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
55 BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE,PENNSYLVANIA TREASURER ROBERT M. McCord, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (rf, ) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
56 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN: Telephone Conference held on 4/17/14 (rf, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
57 ORDER THAT ORAL ARGUMENT IS RESCHEDULED FOR 5/15/2014 09:30 AM AS OUTLINED HEREIN.SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 4/17/14. 4/17/14 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
58 MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPLICATION INTERVENE, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
59 ORDER THAT MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON MOTION (DOC. 58) IS DENIED AS MOOT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 4/24/14. 4/24/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED (rf, ) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
60 NOTICE of Appearance by MAUREEN M. MCBRIDE on behalf of THOMAS W. CORBETT with Certificate of Service(MCBRIDE, MAUREEN) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
61 MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPLICATION TO INTERVENE, MEMORANDUM OF LAW, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
62 MOTION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) *MOTION FORWARDED TO THE USCA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT PER COURT ORDER OF 5/12/14, DOC. 66* (Entered: 05/12/2014)
63 ORDER THAT MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPLICATION TO INTERVENE (DOC. 61) IS DENIED AS MOOT. THE COURT HAS ALREADY DENIED AS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR MOTION TO STAY THAT WAS FILED ON 4/24/14 (DOC. 58,59) THE

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05/12/2014
05/12/2014 05/12/2014
05/14/2014 05/15/2014 05/15/2014 05/15/2014
05/16/2014
05/19/2014
05/19/2014
05/19/2014 05/20/2014 05/22/2014
05/22/2014 05/28/2014

MOVANTS REQUEST A STAY OF THIS CASE PENDING ACTION BY THE COURT ON THE MOVANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED APPLICATION TO INTERVENE, FILED ON APRIL 15 (DOC. 52). THE COURT HAS ALREADY DENIED THAT MOTION (DOC. 53), ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/12/14. 5/12/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
64 ORDER THAT CLERK OF COURT SHALL DOCKET THE ATTACHED CORRESPONDENCE.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/12/14. 5/12/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
65 Faxed Letter to the Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin from Pro Se James Schneller. (rf, ) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
66 ORDER THAT MOTON TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DOC. 62) IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. FURTHER ORDERED THAT CLERK OF COURT SHALL SEND THIS MOTION TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT AS OUTLINED HEREIN.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/12/14. 5/13/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED. *1 COPY TO USCA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT*(rf, ) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
67 MOTION TO AMEND MOTION FOR STAY, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER..(rf, ) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
68 NOTICE OF APPEAL by JAMES D SCHNELLER. PENDING Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk. Motion For IFP Pending before USCA for Third Circuit (rf, ) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
69 Clerk's Notice to USCA re 68 Notice of Appeal : (rf, ) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
70 ORDER THAT MOTION TO AMEND MOTION FOR STAY (DOC. 67) IS DENIED AS MOOT AS OUTLINED HEREIN.SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/15/14. 5/15/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
71 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN: Motion Hearing held on 5/15/2014 re 21 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim filed by KATHLEEN KANE, 20 MOTION to Dismiss filed by THOMAS W. CORBETT, 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ISABELLE BARKER, CARA PALLADINO (aeg, ) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
72 ORDER THAT MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL IS DENIED AS OUTLINED HEREIN.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/19/14. 5/19/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
73 ORDER THAT CLERK OF COURT SHALL DOCKET THE ATTACHED CORRESPONDENCE.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/19/14. 5/19/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO SCHNELLER, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
74 MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER..(rf, ) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 68 Notice of Appeal filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER. USCA Case Number 14−2766 (ems) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
75 ORDER THAT ON OR BEFORE 5/29/14 PLAINTIFFS SHALL SHOW CAUSE WHY THEIR CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS MOOT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/22/14. 5/22/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
SHOW CAUSE RESPONSE DUE BY 5/29/2014. (rf, ) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
76 TRANSCRIPT of Oral Argument held on 5/15/14, before Judge MCLAUGHLIN. Court Reporter/Transcriber K. HAGGERTY. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the

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05/28/2014 05/28/2014
06/17/2014 09/08/2014
10/22/2014 11/18/2014 11/19/2014
11/21/2014 01/09/2015 01/09/2015 01/10/2015 01/16/2015 01/22/2015 05/06/2015

deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 6/18/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/30/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/26/2014. (rf, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
77 Notice of Filing of Official Transcript with Certificate of Service re 76 Transcript − PDF, 5/28/14 Entered and Copies Emailed and Mailed.. (rf, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
78 ORDER THAT ON OR BEFORE 6/20/14 THE PLAINTIFFS SHALL SHOW CAUSE WHY THEIR CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS MOOT.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 5/28/14. 5/28/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
79 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN: Telephone Conference held on 6/17/14 (rf, ) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
80 ORDER THAT MATTER IS PLACED IN CIVIL SUSPENSE PENDING EXPIRATION OF THE DEADLINE TO PETITION THE U.S. SUPREME COURT FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN WHITEWOOD V WOLF, NO. 13−1861, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. PA. MAY 20, 2014). SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 9/8/14. 9/8/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
81 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL AS OUTLINED HEREIN.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 10/22/14. 10/22/14 ENTERED AND COPIES EMAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
82 MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT AND AMEND COMPLAINT OR TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS FROM ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..(rf, ) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
83 ORDER THAT MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT AND AMEND COMPLAINT OR TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DOC. 82) IS DENIED.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN ON 11/19/14. 11/19/14 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE INTERVENOR, E−MAILED.(rf, ) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
84 ORDER of USCA THAT JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT ENTERED 4/15/14 BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS TAXED AGAINST APPELLANT. (rf, ) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
85 NOTICE of Change of Address by JAMES D SCHNELLER, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE(rf, ) (Entered: 01/12/2015)
86 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS, EXHIBITS, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER.(rf, ) Modified on 1/13/2015 (rs, ). (Entered: 01/12/2015)
87 NOTICE OF APPEAL by JAMES D SCHNELLER. Copies to Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals Clerk. Fee Not Paid. (rf, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
88 Clerk's Notice to USCA re 87 Notice of Appeal : (rf, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 87 Notice of Appeal filed by JAMES D SCHNELLER. USCA Case Number 15−1192 (jaa, ) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
89 ORDER of USCA THAT APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION (rf, ) (Entered: 05/06/2015)

 
 Contact:

Julia Eidelman (215) 732-3378, ext. 116 office (267) 908-2980 mobile julia@equalityforum.com

www.equalityforum.com

For Immediate Release - September 26, 2013
Same-Sex Marriage Case Filed in Federal Court 37 States Do Not Recognize Lawful Same-Sex Marriages
A federal suit was filed today in Philadelphia to declare unconstitutional the Pennsylvania statute that bans recognition of same-sex marriage legally entered into states that authorize same-sex marriages. The suit raises important constitutional questions that the courts have not addressed, including the impact of full faith and credit clause, which requires states to respect judgment, decrees and orders of other states, and the constitutional right to travel between states without penalty or deprivation of legal rights. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex couples to marry.
The focus of the suit is Pennsylvania’s Defense of Marriage Act, which singles out same-sex couples for discriminatory treatment by refusing to recognize their marriage licenses that were properly issued in other states. The suit also raises claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
The suit was brought by Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker, who were married in February 2005 in Massachusetts, where they then resided. The couple has been together since 1998. The couple relocated to Pennsylvania in August 2005, when Isabelle Palladino accepted a postdoctoral fellowship at Bryn Mawr College in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. Cara and Isabelle desired to have children. Isabelle became pregnant and delivered a son in January 2009.
The complaint names Governor Thomas Corbett and Attorney General Kathleen Kane as the defendants. Pennsylvania is one of 37 states that does not recognize legally sanctioned samesex marriages. Pennsylvania law states that marriages of same-sex couples from other states are considered “void”. There are an estimated 125,000 same-sex married couples in the United States. Like heterosexual married couples, many same-sex families relocate to another state for business, education, family and/or other reasons.
The lawsuit is designed to eliminate legally married same-sex couples and their families being demeaned and treated as second class citizens if they move to Pennsylvania, as has happened to Cara, Isabelle and their son.
“I want to thank the plaintiffs, Cara Palladino and Isabelle Barker, for having the courage to bring this important action. For more than 225 years, states have honored valid marriages entered into in other states – with rare exception. But even in those rare exceptions, most

notably inter-racial marriages, the Supreme Court eventually held that states could not deny a valid marriage from another state.”, stated California Lt. Governor Gavin Newsom. “This summer, the Supreme Court finally recognized that same-sex couples should be treated equally under the law. Ideally every state would marry couples without regard to gender. But until that is the universal truth, we expect states to recognize legally valid marriages performed in California, regardless of that state’s position on same-sex marriage.”
Equality Forum, which is a national and international LGBT civil rights organization with an educational focus is coordinating the suit. “Since the inception of the nation, almost all marriages sanctioned by one state have been accepted by all other states.”, stated Malcolm Lazin, Executive Director, Equality Forum. “Failure by Pennsylvania to recognize a legal marriage denigrates Cara, Isabelle and their son and denies them important family protections and benefits.”
Michael Banks and Eric Kraeutler, partners, Morgan Lewis & Bockius are lead counsel. Morgan Lewis & Bockius is a law firm headquartered in Philadelphia with 24 offices worldwide and over 1,600 law professionals. Tiffany Palmer and Benjamin Jerner of Jerner & Palmer, P.C. are co-counsel. Jerner & Palmer, P.C. is a law firm focusing on LGBT family law and estate planning in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
Co-lead counsel Michael Banks and Eric Kraeutler stated, “Given the importance of these constitutional issues and the impact on so many same-sex couples and children, we hope that the court will decide this case quickly so that the rights and dignity of all people in Pennsylvania will be respected.”
“Upon crossing the border into Pennsylvania, Cara and Isabelle’s marital status was stripped from them by Pennsylvania’s Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Pennsylvania’s DOMA took away from Cara and Isabelle monetary rights, property rights, tax exemptions, the right to make medical decisions for each other if they are sick or injured, among hundreds of other state and federal benefits,” stated Ben Jerner, partner at Jerner & Palmer, P.C.
According to Delaware Governor Jack A. Markell, “When an opposite-sex couple is married in Delaware, other states historically have recognized the validity of that marriage. Why should it be any different for same-sex couples? When a same-sex couple is married under Delaware law, other states should recognize the validity of that marriage and afford that couple the fundamental rights and privileges to which they are entitled. Simply put, it’s a matter of fairness.”
•••••••