Case 1:13-cv-00324 Document 1 Filed 05/21/13 Page 1 of 72 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BIJU MUKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, JOY JOSEPH

ATTAYIL, VARGHESE KAINIKKERIL YOHANNAN, )

KRISHNAN VENUGOPAL, VARGHESE PAPPACHAN, )

SHOGY VEZHAPARAMBIL OUSEPHKUTTY,

)

VISWAMITHRAN RAGHAVAN, SAJIMON KUTTY,

)

KUNJACHAN VARGHESE, JOHN CHARUVILA

)

GEORGE, PHILIP BABY, BABU LAL MALI,

)

VAVACHAN MATHAI KOOTTALIL, SURJE PRASAD )

TAMANG, HARIDAS SANKARA PANICKER,

)

ESWARA R. KANITHI, GEORGE KUTTY

)

VADAKKEKOOTTU MATHEW, FRANCIS JOSEPH,

)

JAGANNADHA RAO SARAGADAM, PRABHAKARAN )

BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, KANNANKUTTY PONNAN, )

GEORGE DEVASSY ARACKAL, KIRAN MOHAN

)

BAKI, SOJAN PAUL KALIYADAN, LAKHBIR SINGH, )

KRISHNAN KANNAYAN, RAMACHANDRAN

)

MURUGAIYAN, MELVIN JOSEPH RODRIGUES,

)

KUNHIKRISHN KANIYAMKULAM VEETIL, JOSEPH )

BOBAN PERUVELIL, SREEDHARAN BABU, BIJAY

)

KUMAR BISWAS and SURESH KUMAR PILLAI

)

KAVALAMKUZHI,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL LLC, SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL )

TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P., )

MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST

)

IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES )

OF MALVERN C. BURNETT, A.P.C., INDO-AMERI

)

SOFT L.L.C., KURELLA RAO, J & M ASSOCIATES,

)

INC. OF MISSISSIPPI, BILLY R. WILKS, J & M

)

MARINE & INDUSTRIAL, LLC, GLOBAL RESOURCES, )

INC., MICHAEL POL, SACHIN DEWAN, and DEWAN )

CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (a/k/a MEDTECH

)

CONSULTANTS).

)

Defendants.

Civ. No. ________ Complaint

COMPLAINT 1. In the af termath of Hurric ane Ka trina, Pla intiffs and sim ilarly situ ated

workers, a total of approxim ately 590 Indian m en, were trafficked into the United States

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through the federal governm ent’s H-2B gue stworker program to provide labor and

services to Defendants Signal International L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal

International Texas, L.P., Signal Interna tional Texas, G.P. and their af filiates

(collectively, “Signal”). Recruited to pe rform welding, pipefitt ing, and other marine

fabrication work, Plaint iffs were subjected to forced la bor and other serious abuses at

Signal operations in Orange, Texa s. Som e similarly situated workers were subjected to

similar abuses at Signal operations in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

2. Plaintiffs bring this a ction to recov er for dam ages inflicted by Defendant

Signal and Signal’s recruiters and agents ope rating in Ind ia, the Unite d Arab Em irates,

and the United States. Defendants have

exploited and defrauded Plaintiffs by

fraudulently recruiting them to work in the United States and effectuating a broad scheme

of psychological coercion, threats of serious ha rm and physical restraint, and threatened

abuse of the legal process to maintain control over Plaintiffs.

3. Lured by D efendants’ fraudulent prom ises of legal and perm anent work-

based imm igration to the United States f or them selves and the ir f amilies, Plaintif fs

plunged them selves and their fam ilies into debt to take advantage of these seem ingly

promising opportunities. Plaintiffs assum ed these debts to pay m andatory recruitment,

immigration processing, and travel fees charged by Defendants totaling as m uch as

$11,000 – $25,000 per worker. Trusting in the ve racity of the imm igration and wor k

benefits prom ised by Defendant s, Plaintiffs further reli nquished stable em ployment

opportunities in India and as guestworkers in the Persian Gulf.

4. Defendants’ main recruiting agent in India and the United Arab Em irates

held Plaintiffs’ passports and visas and threat ened, coerced, and defrau ded Plaintiffs into

Complaint - Joseph, et al. v. Signal, et al.

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paying extraordinary fees for recruitm ent, immigration processing, and travel. Several Defendants further caused Plaintiffs to believe that if they did not work for Signal under the auspices of te mporary, Si gnal-restricted H-2B guestworker visas, they would suffer abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process, phys ical restraint, a nd/or other serious harm.
5. The false promises, collection of exorbitant recruiting fees, and strong-arm tactics of Defendant Signal and/or its agents were, upon infor mation and belief, authorized by Defendant Signal, which, in any event, learned in detail of these facts at the latest f rom the very f irst Indian H-2B workers who arrived at Signal’s f acilities in the United States as early as October 2006. Far from taking any corrective m easures, Defendant Signal ratified and perpetuated the scheme by continuing to facilitate the transportation of further waves of Indian H-2B workers, incl uding Plaintiffs herein, fro m November 2006 through April 2007.
6. Upon Plaintiffs’ arrival in the Unite d States, Defendant Signal required them to live in a guarded, overcrowded, and isolated labor camp. Signal further deceived Plaintiffs regarding their visa status, threaten ed Plaintiffs with loss of immigration status and deportation, and generally perpetrated a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud designed to render P laintiffs af raid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.
7. On March 9, 2007, Defendant Signal, using private security guards, attempted to f orcibly an d unlawf ully deport sim ilarly situ ated work ers Sabula l V ijayan and Jacob Joseph Kadakkarappally from the Pas cagoula camp in retali ation for speaking out against discrim inatory conditions in S ignal’s labor cam p in Pascagoula, Mississippi

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and for seeking counsel to understand their le gal rights. Signal sim ilarly attem pted to

forcibly and unlawfully deport sim ilarly s ituated workers Kuldeep Singh, Thanasekar

Chellappan, and Krishan Kumar.

8. Terrified by the threat of imm inent deportation and the security guards

pursuing him, Vijayan attem pted suicide and had to be tak en to a loca l hospital. During

the sam e morning, Signal personnel and s

ecurity guards succ essfully forced

Kadakkarappally, Chellappan, and Kum ar into a trailer under guard. There, Signal

detained Kadakkarappally, Chellappan, and Kumar for several hours without food or

water o r ba throom f acilities. Am idst th e chao s of the pr e-dawn raid at the Pas cagoula

camp, Kuldeep Singh hid and escaped from the Signal labor camp.

9. Having heard of the events of Ma rch 9, 2007 through cell phone reports

from sim ilarly situ ated workers in Mississipp i, the Pla intiffs herein an d othe rs in the

Texas cam p reasonab ly feared that they woul d suffer serio us harm , physica l res traint,

and/or abuse of legal process if they were to leave Signal’s em ploy. Deeply indebted,

fearful, isolated, disoriented, and u nfamiliar with their righ ts under Un ited States law,

these workers felt compelled to continue working for Signal.

10. Plaintiffs assert claim s against Defendants arising fr om violations of their

rights under the Victim s of Traffic king a nd Violence Protection Act (“TVPA”); the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatio ns Act (“RI CO”); the C ivil Rights Act of

1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Ac t of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985); and claims

for damages arising from fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (a) (civil trafficking), 18 U.S.C. § 964(c) (RICO) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). 12. This Court has supplementa l jurisdiction over caus es of action based on state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as the state law claim s arise out of the sa me nucleus of facts which support the federal claims. 13. Venue in the Eastern District of Te xas is proper under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that various Defenda nts and/or agents of De fendants, including Signal, Malvern C. Burnett, the La w Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center L.L.C., Kurella Rao, and Indo-Amerisoft, L.L.C. may be found in the Eastern District of Texas during the relevant time periods and a substantial portion of the communications, transact ions, events or om issions underlying Plaintiffs’ claim s occurred in and around the Orange, Texas area in this judicial district. 14. Declaratory relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq.
PARTIES Plaintiffs 15. Plaintiffs are for mer H- 2B guestwork ers who were recru ited from India and/or the United Arab Emirates by Defendants at various times between 2003 and 2007. 16. Plaintiffs are of South Asian Indian descent and are Indian nationals. 17. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were “persons” w ithin the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 18. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employed by Signal as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
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19. At all r elevant tim es, Plaintif fs were engag ed in inters tate comm erce and/or in the production of goods for sale in interstate commerce.
20. Plaintiff Biju Mukrukkattu Joseph (“B. Joseph”) was recruited in 2004 from Dubai, United Arab Em irates by Defe ndants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Ra o and Burnett f or work in the United Sta tes. Af ter a rriving in th e United States in Janu ary 2007, B. Joseph worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
21. Plaintiff Joy Joseph Attayil (“Attay il”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by Defendants J & M, Dewan Consultants, Burnett and Global Resources, Inc. for work in the United States. After arri ving in the United States in Decem ber 2006, Attayil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
22. Plaintiff Va rghese Kainikkeril Yo hannan (“Y ohannan”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consultants and Indo-Amerisoft for work in the United States. After arrivi ng in the United States in February 2007, Yohannan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
23. Plaintiff Krishnan Venugopal (“Venugopa l”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan Consulta nts, Burnett and Indo-Am erisoft for work in the United States. After arri ving in the United States in Decem ber 2006, Venugopal worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
24. Plaintiff Va rghese Pappachan (“Papp achan”) w as recruited beginning in 2004 from I ndia by Defendants J & M and Dewan Consultants for work in the United States. After arriv ing in the United Stat es in Decem ber 2006, Pappachan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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25. Plaintiff Shogy Vezhaparam bil Ousephkutty (“Ousephkutty”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consultants and J & M for work in the United States. After arrivi ng in the United States in January 2007, Ousephkutty worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
26. Plaintiff Viswa mithran Raghavan (“Ra ghavan”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu Dhai by Defenda nts Dewan Consultants and Indo-Amerisoft for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in Decem ber 2006, Raghavan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
27. Plaintiff Sajim on Kutty (“Kutty”) w as recruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants De wan Consultants and Pol for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Kutty worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
28. Plaintiff Kunjachan Varghese (“Var ghese”) was recruited in 2006 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Rao, Burnett and Pol for work in the United States. After arrivi ng in the United States in January 2007, Varghese worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
29. Plaintiff John Charuvila George (“Ge orge”) w as recrui ted beginning in 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan Consultants and Pol for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, George worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
30. Plaintiff Philip Baby (“Baby”) was recruited beginning in 2005 from India by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Pol, J & M a nd Burnett for work in the United States.

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After arriving in the United States in D ecember 2006, Baby worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
31. Plaintiff Babu Lal Mali (“Mali”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from the United Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan, Burnett, Rao and Indo-A merisoft for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in April 2007, Mali worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
32. Plaintiff Vavachan M athai Koottalil (“Koottalil”) was r ecruited beginning in 2003 from Dubai, United Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan, Rao and Burnett for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in July 2006, Koot talil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
33. Plaintiff Surje Prasad Tam ang (“Ta mang”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan, Rao and IndoAmerisoft for work in the United S tates. Af ter arriving in the United States in Ja nuary 2007, Tamang worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
34. Plaintiff Ha ridas Sankara Panicker (“Panicker”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India by Defendants Dewan, De wan Consultants, Pol, Global Resources and Burnett f or work in the Unite d States. Af ter arriv ing in the United States in December 2006, Panicker worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
35. Plaintiff Eswara R. Kanithi (“Kani thi”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai , United Arab Em irates by Defe ndants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global Resources and Burnett for work in the United Sta tes. After arriving in the United States in February 2009, Kanithi worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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36. Plaintiff George Kutty Vadakkekoottu Mathew (“Mathew”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Em irates by D efendants D ewan Consultants, Rao and Pol for work in the Un ited States. Af ter arr iving in th e United States in January 2007, Mathew worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
37. Plaintiff Frances Joseph (“F. Josep h”) was recruited beginning in 2006 from Dubai, United Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Pol, Burnett and J&M for work in the United States. Af ter arriving in the United States in January 2007, F. Joseph worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
38. Plaintiff Jagannadha Rao Saragada m (“Saragadam ”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India by Defendants De wan, De wan Consultants, Pol, J & M, Global Resources, and Burnett for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Saragadam worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
39. Plaintiff Prabhakaran Balakrishna Pillai (“Pillai”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by Defendant s Dewan, De wan Consultants, Burnett, Pol, and J & M, for work in the United States. After arri ving in the United States in Decem ber 2006, Pillai worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
40. Plaintiff George Devassy Arackal (“Arackal”) w as recruited beginning in 2003 from I ndia by Defendants Dewan Consu ltants, Dewan, Rao, Indo-Am erisoft and Burnett for work in the United Sta tes. Af ter arriving in th e United Sta tes in Dec ember 2006, Arackal worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
41. Plaintiff Kiran Mohan Ba ki (“Bak i”) was rec ruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consu ltants, Dewan, Global Resources, Pol and

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Burnett f or work in the United States. Af ter arriving in th e United States in Febr uary 2007, Arackal worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
42. Plaintiff Sojan Paul Kaliyadan (“Ka liyadan”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by D efendants Dewan Cons ultants, Dewan, Pol, J & M, Global Resources and Burnett for work in the United States. After arriv ing in the United S tates in December 2006, Kaliyadan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
43. Plaintiff Lakhbir Singh (“Singh”) was recruited beginning in February, 2004 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Rao and Burnett for work in the United S tates. After arriving in the United S tates in January 2007, Singh worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
44. Plaintiff Krishnan Kannayan (“Kannay an”) was recruited beginning in 2006 from India by Defendants Dewan Consulta nts, Dewan, and Pol for work in the United States. After arriving in the Unite d States in December 2006, Kannayan wo rked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
45. Plaintiff Ram achandran Murugaiyan (“Murugaiyan”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India by Defendant s Dewan, Rao, Indo-A merisoft, Pol and Burnett for work in the United Sta tes. Af ter arriving in th e United Sta tes in Dec ember 2006, Murugaiyan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
46. Plaintiff Melvin Jo seph Rodrigues (“Rodrigues”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, J & M, Pol, Burnett and Global Resour ces for work in the United States. Af ter arriving in the United S tates in February 2007, Rodrigues worked at S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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47. Plaintiff Kunhikrishn Kaniyam kulam Veetil (“Veetil”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Em irates by D efendants D ewan Consultants, J & M, Pol, Dewan and Burnett for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2007, Veetil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
48. Plaintiff Joseph Boban Peruvelil (“Per uvelil”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by D efendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Pol, and IndoAmerisoft for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Peruvelil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
49. Plaintiff Sreedharan Babu (“Babu”) was recruited beginning in early 2004 from India by Defenda nts Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Pol and Burnett for work in the United States. After arrivi ng in the United States in December 2006, Babu worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
50. Plaintiff Bijay Kumar Biswas (“Biswas”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Dubai, United Arab Em irates by De fendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, IndoAmerisoft and Burnett f or work in the United States. Af ter arriving in the United States in February 2007, Biswas worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
51. Plaintiff Suresh Kum ar Pillai Ka valamkuzhi (“Kavalamkuzhi”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from the Unite d Arab Em irates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, J & M and Burnett f or work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, Kavalamkuzhi worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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Defendants Employer Defendants - Signal 52. Defendant Signal International, L.L.C. is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and a provider of m arine and fabrication services in the Gulf Coast region, with operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama. 53. Defendant Signal International, Inc. , a com pany organized under the law s of Delaware, was form ed in 2007 as the hol ding company of Signa l International LLC, and the other Signal entities named below. 54. Defendant Signal International Texas G. P., is a Texas ge neral partnership owned by or affiliated with Signal International, L.L.C., which on information and belief, was the direct em ployer of the Plaintiffs wh ile they worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. 55. Defendant Signal Internati onal Texas, L.P. is a Texas limited partnership, which based upon information and belief is co-owned by Signal International Texas, G.P. (approximately 1%) and by Signal International L.L.C. (approximately 99%). 56. All four Signal entities will be referred to herein collectively as “Signal.”

Recruiter Defendants 57. Defendant Global Resources, Inc. (“ Global Resources”) is or was a corporation organized under the laws of Mi ssissippi and engaged in the business of recruiting w orkers from India for employm ent in the United States. G lobal Resources has or had during the relevant tim e period su bstantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.

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58. Defendant Michae l Po l (“Po l”) is or was the President of Global Resources, Inc., and resides in Mississippi. Pol has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
59. Defendant Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants) (“Dewan Consultants”) is a private lim ited liability company organized under the laws of India, whic h m aintains of fices in Mum bai (Bombay), India, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Defendant Dewan Consultants has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
60. Defendant Sachin Dewan (“Dewan” ) is the Direc tor of Dewan Consultants. Dewan resides in India and ha s substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
61. Upon information and belief, Defenda nts Dewan and Dew an Consultants have authorized and utilized Defendants Pol and Global Resour ces, and the Legal Facilitator Defendants described below, to act as their U nited States -based operations and/or agents.
62. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants Pol and Global R esources, and the Legal Facilitator Defendants describe d below, have authorized and utilized Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to act as the ir Ind ia- an d United Arab Emirates-based operations and/or agents.
63. Upon information and belief, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global Resources, and the Legal Facilitato r Defendants described below, acted as a joint venture with respect to the recruitm ent, contracting, and provisi on of Plaintiffs for labor or services.

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64. Defendants Pol and Global Resources, and the Legal Facilitator Defendants described below, utilized De fendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants to conduct and carry out their shared business interests and activities in India and the United Arab Emirates. Am ong other things, Defenda nts Pol and Global Resources have shared offices with Defendants Dewa n and Dewan Consultants in India and the United Ara b Emirates.
65. Upon information and belief, Defenda nts Dewan and Dew an Consultants have utilized Defendants Pol and Global Res ources, and the Legal Facilitator Defendants described below, to conduct and effectuate their shared business interests and activities in the United States.
66. Throughout this Com plaint, Plaintiffs refer to D efendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, and Global collectively as “Recruiter Defendants.”
Legal Facilitator Defendants 67. Defendant Malvern C. Burnett (“B urnett”) is a n attorney who resides in and maintains offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, and has substantial business contacts in Texas. 68. Defendant Gulf Coast Imm igration La w Center L.L.C. (“ GCILC”) is a limited liab ility co rporation organized under the laws of Louisian a and located in N ew Orleans, Louisiana, with substantial busine ss contacts in Texas. Upon infor mation and belief, Def endant Burnett serve s as its sole registered agen t, m ember, a nd/or corporate officer. 69. Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (“Burnett Law Offices”) is a professional law corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana and

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located in New Orlean s, Louisiana, with su bstantial bus iness con tacts in Tex as. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serv es as its sole registered agent, m ember, and/or corporate officer.
70. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants Burnett, GCIL C, and Burnett Law Offices are engaged in a joint venture and/or are alter egos in that all entities h ave the same corporate m ailing address, interm ingle business assets, fail to operate at arm s’ length, and Defendant Burnett serves as the registered agent and sole m ember and/or corporate officers for GCLIC and Burnett Law Offices.
71. Upon information and belief, Defendants Burnett, GCILC, and the Burnett Law Offices have the sam e business objectiv es and Defendant Burnett uses GCILC and the Burnett Law Offices to conduct and effectuate shared business objectives.
72. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Burnett, GCILC, and Burnett Law Offices collectively as “Legal Facilitator Defendants.”
73. The Legal F acilitator Defendants engaged in a joint venture with Kurella Rao and Indo-Ameri Soft, L.L.C., de scribed below, to conduct and carry out their shared business interests and activities in India and the United Arab Emirates. This joint venture is in addition to the joint venture desc ribed above between the Legal Facilitator Defendants and the Recruiter Defendants.

Labor Broker Defendants 74. Defendant Indo-Am erisoft, L.L.C., (“Indo-Amerisoft”) a corporation organized under the laws of Louis iana and he adquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, with substantial business contacts in Texas, is engaged in the business of recruiting and

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providing Indian laborers to United States companies and selling opportunities for United States immigration and employment to such laborers.
75. Defendant Kurella Rao (“Rao”) is th e Chairm an and Director of IndoAmerisoft, L.L.C., and m aintains of fices in the New Orleans, Louisiana m etropolitan area. Rao has substantial business contacts in Texas.
76. Defendant J & M Associates of Mississi ppi, Inc. (“J & M”), a corporation organized under the laws of Mississippi with sub stantial business contacts in Texas, was at all relevant times engaged in the business of recruiting and providing Indian laborers to United States com panies and selling opportu nities for United States immigration and employment to such laborers.
77. Defendant Billy R. Wilks (“Wilks”) was the founder and general m anager of J & M and currently acts as a consultant for the com pany. W ilks has substantial business contacts in Texas. W ilks is persona lly liable f or the cond uct of J & M. Discovery in the case of David, et al. v. Signal, et al. , United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Civ. No. 08-1220 SM/DEK) (the “ David Litigation”) has established that W ilks had full control and decision-making authority over J & M such that J & M and Wilks were alter egos of one another.
78. Wilks is the founder of J & M. He incorporated it in 1996. The main corporate of fice of J & M is W ilks’s hom e. J & M, dur ing the tim e relevan t to this litigation, was entirely beholden to W ilks for i ts business ac tivity. Further, W ilks has testified that during the time relevant to this litigation all of J & M’s decisions and policy changes would have to be approved by hi m. He was the m ain decision-m aker with regard to all of the company’s relevant bus iness activ ity. Both W ilks and his form er

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lawyer describe W ilks as the only person who knows anything a bout the com pany and that it is indeed his company, although in fact Wilks’ sons participated in the conduct of the company.
79. At some point prior to 2007, J & M wa s sued in unrelated litigation. In response to that lawsuit, W ilks set up a new corporation – J & M Marine & Industrial LLC (“J & M Marine” ) – prim arily to avoid the litigation then pending against J & M, but also to continue the work that was underway with J & M.
80. Wilks used the con tractual arrang ements and relationships he had set up between J & M and the Recruiter Defendants to crea te pr ofitable opportunities for his new J & M Marine entity. In other words, Wilks harvested the value that remained in J & M and transferred it to J & M Marine with no regard to the independent corporate identity of J & M. Such a trans ition is not reflective of the action of a corporate entity; rather, it indicates an action done for the convenience and singular strategy of the principal, Wilks.
81. In 2007, Wilks put J & M into dorm ancy. This purported change of corporate status was, upon inform ation and belief, done without a ny formal shareholder vote or board m ember meeting. Further, J & M is undercapitalized; it has, according t o Wilks, approximately $300,000 in debt. Further, Wilks, in yet another indication of the absence of corporate formalities between him and J & M, has represented to the Court in the David Litigation that he intends to borrow money so that he is able to personally fund J & M’s legal defense.
82. J & M filed a “Notice to Dissolve/Revoke” with the Mississippi Secretary of State on Septem ber 12, 2010, although it rem ained in good standing through

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December 2012, accord ing to the Mississipp i S ecretary of State’s Bu siness Serv ices website.
83. In short, there is no independence be tween Defendant W ilks and J & M. J & M was simply used as the corporate entity to facilitate Wilks’s personal business and that of his f amily. He testif ied during his de position in th e David Litigation that he did everything for the com pany. Indeed, prior to incorporating J & M in 1996, Wilks was doing the exact sam e work, as the 100% owne r, under a “doing/business/as” rubric. Once Wilks incorporated J & M in 1996, there was no change to the company activity or purpose, and J & M certainly did not obtain an identity independent from its founder.
84. Once Wilks created J & M Marine, he simply shifted his employee, Nicole Homel-Tellier, from J & M over to J & M Marine. As he ha d done with J & M, he listed himself as the reg istered agent and his hom e address as the com pany’s principal address with the Mississippi Secretary of State.
85. Both J & M and J & M Marin e clearl y sha re the sam e initials, which reference the same individuals: John and Michael Wilks.
86. Both corpor ations perf orm the same work: rec ruit labo rers to then subcontract them out to other com panies for a prof it. Given bo th entities were in the sa me business and both operated out of the sam e address, it is like ly that whatever asse ts were held by J & M (e.g., computers, printers, etc.) were at the di sposal of J & M Marine both during the time that both companies existed and also once J & M was put into dormancy.
87. More importantly, with respec t to th e “asset” crossover between the tw o companies, Defendant W ilks moved the laborers – plaintiffs and other sim ilarly situated

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– from J & M, with which they contracted, over to J & M Marine. In other words, the very revenue source of J & M became the revenue for J & M Marine.
88. In bringing the candidates over to J & M Marine, after they had signed contracts with J & M, D efendant Wilks was unequivocally holding J & M Marine out as the successor company of J & M. Further, this transition of recru its, in conjunction with avoiding the litigation then pendi ng against J & M, exem plifies the taking of the benefits of the predecessor com pany while leaving its liabilities behind. Wilks acknowledges that J & M has a $100,000 judgment against it, an obvious liability that has not tracked across to J & M Marine.
89. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Indo-Amerisoft, Rao, J & M, Wilks and J & M Marine collectively as the “Labor Broker Defendants.”

All Defendants 90. At all relevant tim es, Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global Resources, Burnett, Bu rnett Law Offices an d GCILC acted as agen ts of Defendants Signal, J & M, Indo-Am erisoft and/or Ra o for the purposes of recruiting, obtaining, contracting, transportation and/or providing Plaintiffs for labor or services. 91. All Def endants acted togethe r in a joint ve nture in co mmitting th e wrongful actions described herein. 92. The actions of the Recruiter Defenda nts and Legal Facilitator Defendants described herein were performed within the scope of their agency to Signal. 93. Individually and throu gh their agents, asso ciates, attorneys, and/or employees, all Defendants have significant contacts in or around Orange, Texas.

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94. At all r elevant tim es, Def endants were “perso ns” within that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
95. Upon inform ation and belief, Defendants have been engaged in contacts with Plaintiffs, including recruiting, obtaining, labor cont racting, providing immigrationrelated services to, transporting, harboring, providing and/or employing Plaintiffs.
96. At all relevant times, Defendants operated enterprises engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce.
STATEMENT OF FACTS The Recruitment Process Recruitment of the Plaintiffs and Other Workers 97. Beginning in 2003 and continuing through 2006, Recruiter Defendants (Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultan ts, Pol, and Global Resources ) placed ad s in various newspapers across India and the United Arab Emirates, seeking welders, fitters, and other m arine fabrication workers on beha lf of various U.S.-based com panies and individuals, including L abor Broker Defendants (Defendant s Indo-Am erisoft, Rao, and J & M). 98. Upon inform ation and belief, Recruite r Defendants placed such ads in coordination and agreem ent with Legal Faci litator Def endants (D efendants Burnett, GCILC, and Burnett Law Offices), and Labor Broker Defendants. 99. Upon inform ation and belief, since at least D ecember 2003 through at least m id-2004, Legal Facilitator Defendants and Labor Broker Defe ndants frequently communicated and consulted frequently via m ail, fax, e-m ail and/or telephone communications to coordinate and direct Recruiter Defendants’ activities, in cluding advertising efforts on behalf of Labor Broker Defendants.
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100. The advertisem ents placed by R ecruiter Defendants prom ised that qualified candidates could obtain legal perm anent resid ence (g reen cards) and thereby legally and permanently immigrate to the United States with their families.
101. In response to these advertisem ents, Plaintiffs contacted Recruiter Defendants by telephone, and/or attended m eetings and testing sess ions organized by Recruiter D efendants, L egal Facilitator De fendants, and Labor Broker Defendants and their agents, em ployees and/or representatives at several locations throughout India and the United Arab Emirates.
102. Specific facts relevan t to the experiences of Plaintiffs are set forth in the “RICO Fraud Chart” a ttached to this Com plaint as Exhib it 1, which is inco rporated herein by reference.
103. Upon information and belief, prior to attending these meetings and testing sessions, Labor Broker Defendants, Recru iter Defendants, and Legal Fac ilitator Defendants conferred in late 2003 and early 2004 by phone, m ail, fax and or e-m ail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these meetings and testing sessions.
104. In telephone communications, in-person meetings, faxes, contracts, and other written docum ents transm itted by m ail and/or wire in th e firs t half of 2004, Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator De fendants, and/or La bor Broker Defendants personally and through e mployees, agents and/ or assoc iates, told Plaintif fs that if Plaintiffs successfully p assed skills tests ad ministered in th e United Ar ab Em irates or India and paid fees totaling approxim ately 5 to 8 Indian lakh r upees (approximately

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$12,000 to $20,000), then Plaintiffs would be able to apply for permanent resident (green card) status in the United States with Labor Broker Defendants.
105. In these communications o ccurring during the first half of 2004, Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants fu rther explained to m any of the Plaintiffs, as reflected in the attached Exhibit 1, th at the installm ent paym ents would be divided among Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants.
106. In these communications o ccurring during the first half of 2004, Recruiter Defendants, Labor Broker Defendants, an d Legal Facilitator Defendants further explained to Plaintiffs that the installm ent payments woul d be divided am ong Re cruiter Defendants, and one of the two Labor Broker Defendants.
107. In telephone communications, in-p erson m eetings, faxes, written contracts, and/or other written communications, transmitted, upon information and belief, by m ail and/or wire in the first half of 2004, Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants instruct ed Plaintiffs that the tota l fees would be paid in a series of approximately three installments.
108. In these conversations in the first half of 2004, Plaintiffs were informed on several occasions by Recruiter Defendants and/ or Legal Facilitator Def endants that in exchange for an additional fee of approxim ately $1,500 per fa mily m ember, Plaintiffs would be able to obtain legal permanent residence for their spouses and children.
109. At inform ational m eetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, contracts, and other written documents tr ansmitted in late 2003 through approximately mid-2004, Recruiter Defendants, Legal Fac ilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants, personally and/or through their agents, representatives, and/or em ployees,

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represented to Plain tiffs th at Labor Broker Defendants were stable and reputab le U.S. companies offering law ful and am ple employment opportunities, and that Labor B roker Defendants would obtain for Plaintiffs green cards enabling Plaintiffs to perm anently and legally immigrate to the United States with their family members.
110. At inform ational m eetings and in telephone conversations, faxes, contracts, and other written documents tr ansmitted in late 2003 through approximately mid-2004, the Recruiter Defendants, Legal Fa cilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants, personally and/or through their agents, em ployees and/or representatives, told Plaintiffs that the g reen card process, once commenced, would be com pleted within 18 to 24 months.
111. In such co mmunications with Plaint iffs, Recruiter Def endants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defe ndants further prom ised to act diligently and do everything necessary to obtain gree n cards f or Plaintif fs in the tim elines stipulated.
112. Based on these and other contractually -binding prom ises m ade to the m regarding green cards and work opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs signed contracts (hereinafter “the green card cont racts”) at various tim es in early to m id-2004 with Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants.
113. Contracts signed by Plaintiffs and other docum ents provided to the Plaintiffs by Legal Facilitator Defendant s, Recruiter Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants through the use of mail and/or wire transmissions in and around early to mid2004, further promised that Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all

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of their paym ents if these Defendants di d n ot succeed in securing green card s for

Plaintiffs as promised.

114. Legal Facilitato r Def endants, Recr uiter Defendants, and Labor Broker

Defendants knew or should have known that they would not refund Plaintiffs’ m oney as

promised in the contracts and other documents.

115. Legal Facilitato r Def endants, Recr uiter Defendants and Labor Broker

Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the green card contracts: (a) without intent

to diligently pursue P laintiffs’ green card applications; and (b) knowingly without any

basis whats oever f or r epresenting, inter a lia: (i) that th e com panies and/or en tities

purportedly sponsoring Plaintiffs ’ applications were financia lly solvent and had reliable

and stable e mployment opportunities to pr ovide Plaintiffs; (ii) that green card

applications sponsored by su ch companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S.

immigration law; (iii) and that such applications were likely to be successfully completed

and approved within the promised timelines.

116. In reasonable reliance on Legal F

acilitator Defendants, Recruiter

Defendants and Labor Broker De fendants’ explicit and repeated prom ises regarding

green cards, family members’ ability to im migrate to the United States, and lawful and

legitimate em ployment opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs undertook

considerable econom ic, socia l, f amilial and personal sacr ifices, includ ing paym ent of

high fees, assum ption of significant interest bearing debt, loss of real and personal

property, lost work opportunities, lost or unpaid wages and additional legal fees.

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117. Plaintiffs signed contracts with Recr uiter Def endants, Leg al Facilitato r Defendants, and/or Labor Br oker Defendants and m ade the first rou nd of installm ent payments required by these contracts.
118. After Plain tiffs signed contracts with Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants and paid the first installm ent payments required by the contracts, these Defe ndants failed to provi de Pla intiffs with updates regarding the progress of their green card applications for extended periods of time.
119. When Plaintiffs contacted Recru iter Def endants, Legal Facilita tor Defendants, and/or Labor Br oker Defendants by phone, m ail, and/or e-m ail at various times between the last half of 2004 and m id-2006 to check on the progress of their green card applications, these Defendants assured them that the green card p rocess was going forward.
120. While awaiting the processing of their green cards, many of these Plaintiffs continued to incur subs tantial interest on the m oney they had borrowed for the purpose of making the first installment payment to these Defendants.
121. In or around January 2006, Recruite r Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants and Labor Broker D efendants, personally and/or through their agents, employees and/or representatives notified Pl aintiffs via telephone, e-m ail, and/or m ail communications that the labor certification required for their green card applications had been approved by the U.S. government.

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122. After this notification, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants used wire a nd/or m ail communicatio ns to collec t the second and/or third installment payments from the Plaintiffs.
123. By spring 2006, after the 18 to 24 m onth processing period prom ised by Recruiter D efendants, L egal Facilitator De fendants, and Labor Broker Defendants had elapsed, the Plaintiffs had still not received their green cards.
124. By spring of 2006, Recruiter Defendant s, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants ha d yet to refund Plaintiffs’ paym ents as prom ised by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
125. In late May and early June of 2006, th e Legal Facilitator Defendants, on behalf of Defendant Signal filed with the Mississipp i Depart ment of Em ployment Security, the Texas W orkforce Commission, and the United States Departm ent of Labor by m ail, electronic transm ission, and/or fax the com pleted form s ETA 750 and attachments seeking perm ission to import a nd hire 590 foreign guestworkers under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3, and associated adm inistrative letters and/or guidance (comm only known as “the H-2B guestworker program”).
126. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was pr ojected to be at lea st two to three years, the Legal Facilitator Defendants and Defe ndant Signal stated in these applications to the s tate workforce comm issions and fo rms ETA 7 50 that Si gnal would em ploy workers from October 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007. These applications were furnished with signatures by Signal executives swearing, under pain of perjur y, to the veracity of the information in these applications.

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127. Defendant Signal sought these workers to perform various jobs essential to its marine fabrication services business, including welding and fitting.
128. The H-2B guestworker program permits U.S. employers to import foreign workers on short-term tem porary visas to m eet labor needs when e mployers attest that they cannot find U.S. workers to perform the available jobs.
129. H-2B visas are non-imm igrant visas, are only valid for work with the specific em ployer listed on the visa, and do not provide portable and/or transferable employment authorization for the visa bearer.
130. Defendant Signal stated in the ETA 750 for ms that its need for H-2B guestworkers was “peak load and a one-tim e occurrence” and that “the tem porary workers will work f or the leng th of the pres cribed da tes of need, will be paid in accordance with the pre vailing wage, and will re turn to th eir home country at th e end of employment.”
131. In the ET A 750 form s, De fendant Signal nam ed Legal Facilitator Defendants as its agents for the pur poses of preparing and s ubmitting these applications to import H-2B guestworkers. Legal Facilitator Defendants prepared and submitted these applications on behalf of Signal.
132. At the tim e of filing the ETA 750 forms and attachm ents with the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Departm ent of Labor, Defendant Signal and the L egal Facilitator Defendants knew that S ignal projected the labo r need that it sough t to fill with foreign workers to be at least two to three years.

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133. Defendant Signal and L egal Facilitator Defendants, at or around the time they filed the ETA 750 for ms in May and June 2006, repeatedly comm unicated by telephone, mail, e-mail, and/or fax to direct and coordinate recruitment of Indian workers to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs. Upon information and belief, Signal and/or Legal Fac ilitator Def endants r epeatedly co mmunicated with Recruiter Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants by tele phone, mail, e-mail, and/or fa x to direct and coordinate recruitment of Indian workers to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs.
134. Upon information and belief, in the course of telephone, fax, e-mail and/or mail communications occurring in or ar ound May or June 2006, Defendant Signal authorized Recruiter Defendants to act as their agents in India and the United Arab Emirates for the purposes of recruiting Indian welders and fitters to fill the anticipated H2B guestworker jobs at Signal operations.
135. Upon inform ation and belief, in th e course of thes e communications , Defendant Signal further authorized Recr uiter Defendants and L egal Facilitator Defendants to represent that Signal w ould assume sponsorship of the pending and as-yetunsuccessful green card applications on behalf of, among others, Plaintiffs.
136. Upon inform ation and belief, in th e course of thes e communications , Defendant Signal further authorized Recr uiter Defendants and L egal Facilitator Defendants to represent that Signal would ap ply for at least two to three H-2B visa extensions on behalf of all the Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs, to allow them to remain in th e United S tates working for Signal while Plain tiffs’ green card app lications were being processed.

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137. Defendant Signal authorized its agents to make these representations even

though it knew or had reason to know that

such visa extensions and green card

applications would not be bona fi de and valid under United States immigration law.

Moreover, Defendant Signal author ized its agents to make these misrepresentations even

though it did not have the intention at that tim e to apply for such visa extensions and/or

green cards on behalf of all of the Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs.

138. In July and August of 2006, with specific dates and assertions as set out in

Ex. 1, the Legal Fac ilitator De fendants on behalf of Defendant Signal filed with the

United States Citizenship and Imm igration Service by m ail, electronic transm ission,

and/or fax the completed I-129 forms and attachments seeking 590 H-2B visas.

139. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was pr ojected to be at lea st two to three

years, in these H-2B visa applications Defendant Signal attested to a 10-month labor need

running from October 1, 2006 – July 31, 2007. Signal falsely represented to the

government that at the end of this 10 month period, it intended to return all H-2B workers

back to India. The Legal Facilitator Defendant s declared that the applications were based

on all inform ation of which Defendant Burne tt had any knowledge despite the fact that

the Lega l F acilitator Def endants b elieved th at Signal’s in tentions f or these wor kers

exceeded ten months.

140. In spring and summ er of 2006, Plainti ffs who had already initiated the

green card process spoke with Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/or

Labor Broker Defendants over the phone and in person regarding their long-pending

green card applications.

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141. In these comm unications, Recru iter Def endants, Leg al Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broke r Defendants offered Plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue their green cards under the sponsorship of Defend ant Signal. Plaintiffs were told that for an additional sum of approximately 35,000 to 45,000 rupees ($800 to $1,100), they could quickly obtain H-2B visas to go to the Unit ed States for work at Defendant Sig nal’s operations.
142. In these comm unications, Recru iter Def endants, Leg al Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants fa lsely assured Plaintiffs that Defendant Signal would seek at least tw o extensions of the tem porary H-2B visas with which Plaintiffs would gain a dmittance to the Unite d State s, an d that Pla intiffs’ H-2B visas would thereafter be converted to permanent green cards.
143. Upon inform ation and belief, prio r to these communications with Plaintiffs, Recruiter Defendants, Legal F acilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal communicated and consulted frequently via m ail, fax, e-m ail and/or telephone communications regarding the issu es to be discussed and repr esentations to be m ade to Plaintiffs.
144. In the ir co mmunications with Plaint iffs, Recruiter Def endants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants further failed to disclose material facts regarding the H-2B visa, including the fact that H-2B visas confer only a tem porary non-immigrant status w hich does not allow the bearer to adjust to perm anent residency status and the fact that applyi ng for H-2B visa status is f undamentally incompatible with simultaneously applying for a green card.

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145. Plaintiffs, unaware of U.S. imm igration law and the tem porary, nonimmigrant character of H-2B visas and desp erate not to forfeit the substantial fees that they had already paid, agreed, in re liance on the repres entations of Rec ruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/ or La bor Br oker De fendants, to transfer their green card applications to Def endant Si gnal’s sponsorship a nd further agre ed to work for Defendant Signal under H-2B visas pursuant to the terms explained by Recruiter Defendants.
146. In reliance on the represen tations of Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, Labor Broker Defenda nts and Defendant Signal, Plaintiffs and others s imilarly s ituated entered the United States on H-2B guestworker visas in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, or Orange, Texas f acility, and thes e Plaintiffs were as signed to the Oran ge, Texas facility.
147. Plaintiffs would not have paid the extraordinary fees charged by Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, an d/or Labor B roker Defendants for travel, green cards, visas, and work opportunitie s had they known that these Defendants’ promises and representations were false.
148. Plaintiffs would not have paid th e extrao rdinary fees cha rged by th e Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Brokers Defendants for travel, green cards, visas, and employm ent opportunities had they known that these Defendants had failed to disclose m aterial facts concerning the nature and term s and conditions of the immigration and work opportunities offered.

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Preparations and Departure for Signal Operations in the United States

149. At various tim es during the spring, summer, and fall 2006, em ployees of

Defendant Signal traveled to various locations in India and the United Arab Emirates and

tested Plaintiffs’ welding and pip efitting skills in anticipa tion of employing them in the

United States.

150. Plaintiffs paid costs necessary to travel to the cities where these tests were

held.

151. Plaintiffs paid admission fees charged to take these tests.

152. Plaintiffs attended and passed these tests, which were overseen and graded

by Defendant Signal’s and/or Defendant

Dewan’s agents, em ployees, and/or

representatives.

153. Upon information and belief, prior to attending these meetings and testing

sessions, Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defenda nts, and L egal Facilitator Defendants

conferred in spring, summer, and fall 2006 by phone, m ail, fax and or e-mail to organize,

plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these testing sessions.

154. On or about July 20, 2006 and A ugust 17, 2006, the United S tates

Department of Labor approved Signal’s la bor certification applications for 590 H-2B

workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007.

155. In approv ing these lab or cer tification applications, the U nited States

Department of Labor relied on the accuracy of the applications’ stated 10-m onth period

of labor need.

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156. On infor mation and belief, the Depart ment of Labor is prohibited by its internal guideline s to grant labo r cer tification applica tions wit hout relying on the application’s statement of temporary labor need.
157. In late August and early Septem ber 2006, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007.
158. In approving these visa petitions, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service relied on the accuracy of the petitions’ stated 10-month period of labor need and the representa tion that Defendant Signal’s need was based on a one tim e peak-load temporary demand.
159. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service must, according to regulation, rely on the state d period of the petition er’s la bor need, see 8 C.F.R.214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2006).
160. Defendant Signal, L egal Facilitator Defendants, and R ecruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signal’s applications for labor certifications and for H-2B visas were incons istent with Signal’s p rojected actu al labor n eed and theref ore Defendants knew these statements to the government were false.
161. The Recruiter Defendants and the L egal Facilitator Defendants used the H-2B visas, obtained from the U.S. Governm ent on the basis of false statem ents by Defendant Signal and the Legal Facilitator Defe ndants, to elicit paym ents of the second and/or third installment from Plaintiffs and other class members.
162. Plaintiffs entered the Un ited States on H-2B guestworker v isas, issued by the U.S. Government on the basis of false st atements by Defendant Signal and the Legal

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Facilitator Defendants, in late 2006 and early 2007 for th e purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Orange, Texas facility.
163. Around the tim e of USCIS’s visa appr oval, Plaintiffs made necessary preparations in ord er to trav el to th e Unite d S tates on H-2B visa s to work for Signal, including: paying to obtain necessary trav el and legal docum ents; m aking paym ents to the United States consu late, Recru iter Defe ndants and Legal Facilitator Defendants for mandatory H-2B visa and consular processing fees; attending H-2B visa interviews; and paying Recruiter Defendants for travel arrangements.
164. In order to secure H-2B visas to work for Signal, Plaintiffs were require d to be interviewed by United States Consular offices in Indian cities.
165. These consular in terviews necessitated that Plaintiffs pay the costs of travel from their hom es and/or current pla ces of e mployment to various large Indian cities including Chennai (Madras) and Mumbai (Bombay).
166. Recruiter Defendants and/or Legal Facilitator Def endants, acting a s Defendant Signal’s agents, required that Plaintiffs meet with Recruiter Defendants and/or the Legal F acilitator De fendants in these Indian cities prior to attending their consular interviews.
167. Upon information and belief, prior to these meetings Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants discusse d amongst them selves and with Defendant Signal by e-m ail, telephone, or in-person comm unications the topics to be discussed and instructions to be given to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated at these meetings.

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168. At these pre-in terview m eetings, Recruiter Defendants and Legal

Facilitator Defendants ensured that Plaint iffs were up-to-date on paying the fee

installments required by their green card contracts.

169. Defendants further required that P laintiffs pay an additional 35,000 to

45,000 rupees ($800 to $1,100) fee for H-2B visa processing.

170. Recruiter Defendants and/or Legal Facilitator Defendants required

Plaintiffs to sign docu ments per mitting Defen dant Sachin Dewan to receive the ir visa-

stamped passports from the Consulate on Plaintiffs’ behalves.

171. Recruiter Defendants and/or Legal Facilitator Defendants also coached the

Plaintiffs on what to say and what not to

say during consular interviews. Those

Defendants, inter alia, told Plaintiffs not to say anything about the substantial fees

Plaintiffs had been required to pay, not to st ay anything about expected green cards, and

if asked to s ay that Plaintiffs expected to be in the United States for only several m onths

and then would return to India.

172. Recruiter D efendants and/or Legal Faci litator Def endants told Pla intiffs

that if they did not follow these instructions regarding the interviews, Plaintiffs would not

receive their visas and would for feit the a ll m oneys they had previously paid to

Defendants, in addition to losing their opportunity to perm anently immigrate to the

United States.

173. During Pla intiffs’ con sular inte rviews, the consular officials took

Plaintiffs’ passports from them.

174. Once Plain tiffs’ visas were app roved, consular offici als sen t th eir

passports, with H-2B visas affixed, directly to Defendant Dewan.

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175. After rec eiving word that Plain tiffs’ visas were approved, Recruiter Defendants made travel arrangements for Plaintiffs’ departures to the United States.
176. Before Pl aintiffs coul d l eave for th e United States, however, Plaintiffs were requ ired to atten d f inal m eetings in Recruiter Defendant s’ Mumbai (Bombay) office.
177. Such m eetings typically took p lace m ere hours before Plain tiffs’ scheduled d epartures to the United States, when Recruiter Defendants’ office was teeming with anxious fellow Indian workers awaiting departure to the United States.
178. At these m eetings, Recruiter Defe ndants collected final ins tallment payments required by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
179. Recruiter Defendants also required that Plaintiffs, m ost of whom do not proficiently read or speak English, sign English language documents with little or no time for review.
180. Recruiter Defendants refused to return Plaintiffs’ passports -- which had been in Defendant Sachin Dewan’s possession since after Plaintiffs’ H-2B visas were approved by Consular Officials -- until after Plaintiffs had paid the final installments and signed the mandatory paperwork.
181. In forceful tones, Recruiter Defe ndants or their staff dem anded that Plaintiffs quickly sign the m andatory documents, lest they miss th e flights to the United States which Recruiter Defendants had scheduled for them.
182. Without possession of their passports a nd within this rushed and hostile atmosphere, Plaintiffs had no reasonable oppor tunity to review, negotiate, and/or m ake any changes to the documents presented them.

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183. On occasions when workers who ap peared at th e Mumbai office failed to

present sufficient funds to pay the final inst allment required by the green card contracts,

Defendant Dewan and his associates threatened to destroy and/or deface these workers’

passports.

184. Such threats were uttere d in the pr esence of other workers, causing thes e

workers to reasonably believe that they had no choice but to pay the f inal installments in

full.

185. Based on the Recruiter Defendants’ th reatening and coercive behavior

during these pre-departure m eetings in Mu mbai and the extrao rdinary and increasing

levels of debt they had incurred to pay the Recruiter Defendants and L egal Facilitator

Defendants for green card and H-2B visa arra ngements, Plaintiffs reasonably believed

that they had no choice but to m ake the pa yments required by th e Recruiter Defendants

and to travel to the United States to work for Defendant Signal.

186. Plaintiffs and approximately 560 other Indian H-2B workers traveled from

Mumbai to Defendant Signal’s operations in th e U.S. at various tim es from late October

2006 to April 2007 on tickets arranged by the Recruiter Defendants.

187. Pursuant to Defendant Signal’s

instructions and arrangem ents,

approximately 300 workers were sent to Sign al’s Pascagoula, Miss issippi facility and

approximately 290 workers, including these P laintiffs, were sent to S ignal’s Orange,

Texas facility upon arrival in the United Stat es, although Signal’s Orange, Texas facility

began turning away workers in or around February 2007.

188. The Plaintiffs had no c hoice but to use the Recr uiter Defendants and the

Legal Facilitator Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.

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189. The Plaintiffs had no choice but to pa y the fees the Recru iter Defendants and the Legal Facilitator Defendants charge d to secure e mployment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
190. Management personnel at Defendant Signal m ade the conscious and deliberate decision to prohibit the Plainti ffs from securing e mployment at Signal’s operations either through anot her recruiter or by bypassing recruiters’ altogether and applying directly with Defendant Signal.
Conditions at the Signal Facility in Orange 191. Upon arrival at Defendant Signal’s fac ilities in Orange, Plaintiffs wer e shocked to discover that they were expected to live in isolated, overcrowded labor camps comprised of trailer-like bunkhouses. W orkers who were sent to Pascagoula face d similar conditions. 192. Defendant Signal’s labor cam ps were lo cated in isolated, industrial areas miles removed from shopping areas, places of worship, and residential communities. The camps were enclosed by fences and accessible only by a single guarded entrance. 193. The Signal labor cam p gates at the Te xas and Mississipp i facilities were constantly monitored by security guards retained by Defendant Signal. 194. Signal’s security guards monitored Plaintiffs’ com ings and goings by requiring them to show th eir em ployee iden tification badges and record ing when Plaintiffs entered and exited the camps. Signa l’s security guards also searched Plaintiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the camp. 195. Except on r are occasions, Plaintiffs were not pe rmitted to re ceive visitors in the Signal labor camps.

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196. Up to twenty-four Indian m en were housed in each bunkhouse and m ade to sleep in two-tiered bunk beds. The bun k beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it was difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between bunks. These housing con ditions, inter alia, violated the applicable health and safety standards under the federal Occupational Health and Safety Act.
197. The Signal labor cam p bunkhouses had in sufficient toileting and bathing facilities for twenty-four m en, resulting in long lines for the bathroom s before and after work shifts.
198. Privacy was non-existent, and Plain tiffs oft en experienced extrem e difficulty sleeping due to the constant nois e re sulting f rom the c lose q uarters and th e comings and goings of workers who worked on different shifts.
199. Defendant Signal’s personnel and/or s ecurity guards cond ucted surprise searches of the dorm itory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings.
200. Plaintiffs took their m eals in Defendant Signal’s m ess halls, which were only open during lim ited hours. Due to filthy and unhygienic kitchen conditions, Plaintiffs frequently became ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization.
201. Upon information and belief, Defendant Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to f urnish the board at its Texas “man camp,” and the condition and sanitation of the board further violated federal, state, and/or local law includi ng, inter alia, the U.S. Food and Drug Adm inistration Code, as adopted and modified by Texas Food Establishment Rules.

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202. Defendant Signal deducted labor camp fees of a pproximately $35 per day ($245 per week, or approximately $1,050 per month) from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for these substandard accommodations and meals.
203. When Plaintiffs com plained and as ked to live outside the labor cam ps, Defendant Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they tried to live outside the cam ps Signal would still deduct the labor cam p fees from Plaintiffs’ wages. As a result, Plaintiffs reasonably felt that they had no choi ce but to continue living in the Signal camps.
204. Defendant Signal only housed Indian H- 2B wor kers such as Plaintiffs in its labor cam ps, which e mployees and m anagement at Signal referred to as the “reservation(s),” in a derogatory play on the comm on nam e (“Indian”) for Plaintiffs’ ethnicity and Native A mericans. Upon info rmation and belief, workers of non-Indian descent and United States citizen em ployees were neither required nor allowed to live in and/or pay for accommodations in Defendant Signal’s labor camps.
205. Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to skills testing and re-testing, onthe-job discipline, layoffs, periods w ithout work, lack of safety precautio ns, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and ot her adverse employm ent action s to whic h non-Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
206. In addition, Signal camp personnel a nd supervisors frequently subject Plaintiffs to an objectively hostile and abusiv e environment. They ofte n used offensive language in speaking with and/or referring to Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers and regularly insulted Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or alienage.

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207. During the first week of em ploying Plaintiffs and others sim ilarly situated in the United States, Defendant Signal did no t reimburse Plaintiffs and others sim ilarly situated for any of the expenses that Plain tiffs and others similarly situated were required to incur as a pre-condition of seeking employment with Signal.
208. During the first two weeks of e mploying Plaintiffs and others sim ilarly situated in the United States, Defendan t Signal deducted approxim ately $100 to $200 each week from Plaintiffs’ and other sim ilarly s ituated workers’ ch ecks for job-related tool kits which they were required to purchase from Defendant Signal.
209. Over the co urse of their em ployment at Defendant Signal, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were routinely awarded a fifty cent per hour “safety bonus” for workweeks when they were not written up fo r violations of Defe ndant Signal’s safety rules.
210. The safety bonus Defendant Signal paid the Plaintiffs and others sim ilarly situated was in addition to their regular hourly wage.
211. Upon information and belief, the safety bonus was non-discretionary w ith respect both to the decision to pay the bonus and to the amount of the bonus.
212. Defendant Signal paid the safety bonus to the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated pursu ant to a prior agreem ent or prom ise causing the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to expect the bonus paym ents regularly if they m et the required safety criteria.
213. During workweeks when the Plaintiffs and others sim ilarly situated worked m ore than 40 hours, Defendant Sign al did not pay one and one-half tim es the amount of the safety bonus for all overtime hours worked.

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214. Signal personnel and management regularly threatened Plaintiffs and other H-2B workers that if they did not co ntinue working for Signal, or did not work according to Signal’s specifications, Plaintiffs and ot her Indian H-2B workers would be deported back to India.
215. In the isolated and guarded atm osphere of the labor cam p and grappling with the crushing debts they had incurred to com e to the United States, Pla intiffs reasonably f elt that Signal’s s tatements were threa tening and f elt f orced to con tinue working for Signal despite terrible working and living conditions.
216. At regular m eetings and in one-on-one or s mall group conversations with Signal camp personnel and m anagement, some workers, including some of the Plaintiffs, voiced complaints regarding the dis criminatory treatment to which India n H-2B workers were subject. Other sim ilarly situated wo rkers also voic ed com plaints, in bo th the Orange and Pascagoula camps.
217. Workers Vijayan and Kadakkarappall y, two of the plain tiffs in the David Litigation, took leading roles in gathering a nd voicing others’ com plaints to Defendant Signal’s personnel in camp meetings in Pascagoula.
218. When Indian workers, including V ijayan and Kadakkarappally, voiced grievances regarding housing, food, and wa ges, Defendant Signal’s personnel warned them to stop complaining.
219. When Signal took no action in response to workers’ complaints, numerous Indian H-2 B workers living at th e Pas cagoula labor camp, including Vijayan and Kadakkarappally, began m eeting collectively to discuss how to persuade S ignal to

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improve conditions in its labo r camps, and also began mee ting with third pa rties to discuss how best to address their concerns.
220. Defendant Signal becam e aware of th ese m eetings, including m eetings between workers, including Vijayan and Kadakkarappally, and third parties whom Signal believed to be attorneys.
221. Defendant Signal, through its employ ees and/or agents, contacted the Recruiter D efendants and Legal F acilitator Defendants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts and the specific involvement of Vijayan and Kadakkarappally.
222. Upon inform ation and belief, duri ng these conversations Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Signal reached an agreem ent regarding steps that they would ta ke to discourage further worker or ganizing efforts and to ensure that the m ajority of the I ndian H-2B workforce continue d to work at Signal without complaint, a s well as to preven t the Indian H-2 B workforce from exercising the ir legal rights.
223. Upon inform ation and belief, Signal m anagement and c amp personnel conferred and planned intern ally and with the private Swetman security firm in Mississippi to respond to workers’ organizing activities and to take actions to ensure that the m ajority of the I ndian H-2B workforce continued to work at Signal without complaint, a s well as to preven t the Indian H-2 B workforce from exercising the ir legal rights.
224. On or about March 7, 2007, Defendan t Sachin Dewan called Vijayan’s wife at her hom e in India and warned he r th at Vijayan must stop m aking trouble at Signal.

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225. Vijayan’s wif e inf ormed Vijayan of this call, and Vijayan ca lled Defendant Dewan on or about March 8, 2007. During that conversation, Defendant Dewan told Vijayan that Dewan had learne d f rom De fendant Signa l that Vijayan wa s organizing the workers and m aking trouble. De fendant Dewan told Vijayan that if the organizing continued, all the workers would be sent back to India.
226. Vijayan informed other Indian workers about the calls he and his wife had received from De fendant Dewan, and word spread quickly through the Pascagoula and Orange camps and to these Plaintiffs, regarding the threats against Vijayan.
227. News about the calls between Defe ndant Dewan, Vijayan and Vijayan’s wife substantially heightened the reasonable fears of Plaintiffs in the Orange camp that if they complained about or tried to leave the discrim inatory and substandard working and living conditions at Signal, th e Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Signal would retaliate a gainst Pla intiffs or their f amilies with ac ts of violence o r by arranging for Plaintiffs’ deportation to India.
228. Defendant Signal called a workforce-wide meeting on or about March 8, 2007 in the Pascagoula camp, attended by Signal management and Defendant Burnett.
229. At this m eeting, Signal m anagement told the Pascagoula workers that Signal would fight back against organizing efforts by the workers.
230. Signal m anagement further threaten ed that Signal would not extend Plaintiffs’ and all other Indian H-2B worker s’ visas if any of the workers took legal action against Signal. At that same meeting Defendant Burnett told the workers that they were ineligible for other kinds of imm igration relief and could depend only on Signal to

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maintain their H-2B imm igration status and pursue their green card app lications. Th ese threats were promptly reported to the workers in Orange, including Plaintiffs.
231. At or about the sam e tim e as this cam p-wide m eeting in Pascagoula, Mississippi, Signal m anagement m ade the d ecision to term inate and forcibly deport Vijayan and Kadakkarappally, along with Ku ldeep Singh, Kum ar, and Chellappan, three Pascagoula workers who are also plaintiffs in the David Litigation, and to do so by means that would m ake an exam ple of them for th e other Indian workers in Pascagoula and in Orange, in order to keep those workers in line.
232. Early on the m orning of March 9, 2007, Signal locked the gate to its Pascagoula labor cam p, thereby obstructing the sole m eans of direct entry to and exit from the camp.
233. Around this sam e ti me, Signal camp coordinator Darrell Snyder, and approximately five security guards, som e or all of whom were obtained through the private Swetm an Security firm , swept thr ough the bunkhouses ca rrying pictures of Vijayan, Kadakkarappally, K. Singh, Kumar, and Chellappan.
234. Security guards began accosting worker s to d etermine whether th ey were the individuals shown in the pictures.
235. Plaintiffs and other Indian H- 2B workers at both cam ps becam e increasingly frightened and confused by thes e a ctivities, pa rticularly when word spr ead that Signal had locked the gate that served as the sole exit from the Pascagoula labor camp.

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236. Around 5:15 AM that morning, Vijaya n was walking tow ards the dining

area. A security guard and Darrell Snyder, a Signal em ployee, aggressively confronted

Vijayan and instructed him that he was in their custody.

237. Based on the threats m ade at the meeting on March 8, 2007 and Vijayan’s

recent phone call with Sachin Dewan, Vijayan feared what Defendant Signal m ight do to

him.

238. Vijayan beg an to panic, thinking of the enorm ous quantity of money he

had spent to come to the United States and th e massive debts he owed in India. Vijayan

knew that he would not be able to repay su ch debts if he were deported and no longer

employed by Signal.

239. These feelings, com bined with Vijaya n’s reasonable fear that Snyder and

the security guards might physically hurt him, drove Vijayan to attem pt suicide. Vijayan

had to b e tr ansported f rom the labo r cam p to a loca l hosp ital f or immediate m edical

attention.

240. While attempting to assist Vijayan in obtaining m

edical attention,

Kadakkarappally was grabbed by Darrell Snyder and/or one or m ore of the security

guards.

241. Kadakkarappally was taken forcefu lly by the arm and m arched into a

communal room in the labor camp referred to by workers as “the TV room.”

242. Upon arriving in the TV room , Ka dakkarappally found two workers

already held inside. Earlie r that morning, Darrell Snyder and the secur ity guards had

grabbed Chellappan in the communal eating area and Kumar in his bunkhouse and forced

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both of them into the TV room , where they were kept under guard and prevented fro m

leaving.

243. In the TV room , Darrell Snyder inf ormed Kada kkarappally that he and

Kumar and Chellappan were fire d and would be taken to the airport to be deported to

India. Snyder dem anded that Kadakkara ppally stay inside th e TV room, and

Kadakkarappally was prevented from leaving the TV room by security guards.

244. Kuldeep Singh, upon realizing Snyder and the security guards were

looking for him and intended to apprehend and de tain him, hid himself and later fled the

camp via an adjacent work area.

245. Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappa n were detained in the TV room,

under guard, from approximately 6 a.m. for several hours.

246. Several security guards watched over Kadakkarappally, Kum ar, and

Chellappan while they were detained. Over the course of several hours, security guards

denied Kadakkarappally, Kum ar, and Chellappan’ s repeated requests to be let out of the

TV room, to get something to drink, or to use the bathroom.

247. When Kada kkarappally, Kum ar, and Chellappan’s co-workers attem pted

to com e into the TV room to talk to the th ree workers kept inside, the security guards

pushed them back.

248. Confused a nd frightened, workers a ssembled outside the TV room to

protest the treatment of Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan.

249. At around 10 AM, Signal cam

p personnel finally perm itted

Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan to u se the b athroom accompanied by security

guards, one at a time.

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250. Around noon, Darrell S nyder and a Pascagoula police officer entered the TV room and the officer questioned why Ka dakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan were there. Snyder said that these workers had been fired and would be sent back to India.
251. By early afternoon on March 9, 2007, lo cal m edia, religious advocates, and other individuals had gath ered outside the cam p gate to express their concern over the attem pted suicid e of Vijayan an d the f orced detention of Kadakkarappally, Kum ar, and Chellappan.
252. Faced with growing protes ts by comm unity m embers and Signal employees, Defendant Signal decided not to forcibly transport Kadakkarappally, Kum ar, and Chellappan to the airport for deportation to India, and instead escorted them from the Pascagoula labor camp.
253. Other Indian H-2B workers, including these Plaintiffs, working at Signal’s Orange facilities rapidly learned of the even ts at the Pascagoula labor camp on March 9, 2007. In response and out of f ear for th eir continued well-being, som e workers surreptitiously fled both camps.
254. Within a few days of Plaintiffs’ and ot her Indian H-2B workers’ arriva l at its labor camps in late 2006 and early 2007, Si gnal personnel had conducted m eetings at the labor camps between Plaintiffs and repres entatives from specific banks. In Orange, these meetings were with representatives from Capital One Bank.
255. At the instruction of Defendant Signal, Plaintiffs opened accounts with the designated bank and agreed to di rectly deposit their wages in these accounts. Defendant Signal’s establishment of Plaintiffs’ accounts with these banks gave it unique access to and control over Plaintiffs’ funds.

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256. At some point before April 10, 2007, on information and belief, after some Indian H-2B workers had fled Signal’s Mi ssissippi cam p, the bank with which those workers had established sim ilar accounts denied those departed workers access to their bank accounts and invalidated their ATM cards.
257. Upon inform ation and belief, that Mi ssissippi bank refused the departed workers access to their own bank accounts at Defendant Signal’s behest.
258. Indian H-2 B workers s till work ing at S ignal labor cam ps, including the Plaintiffs, heard about the di fficulty departed Signal workers had in accessing their funds through Signal-established bank accounts and reasonably believed that sim ilar action might be taken against them should they try to leave Defendant Signal’s employ.
259. The information about workers’ inability to access their money, combined with other factors described herein, contributed to the reasonab le beliefs of Plaintiffs and the other rem aining Indian H-2B workers th at if they tried to le ave the em ploy of Defendant Signal th ey would face serious harm and/or threatened or actual abuse of the legal process.
260. Defendant Signal’s actions on an d after March 9, 2007 significantly intensified the reasonable fears of the remaining Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers in the Pascagoula and Orange camps that if they tried to leave Signal’s employ or oppose unlawful and coercive em ployment conditions at Signal, including by consulting with counsel, they faced the threat of physical rest raint, detention, forced deportation, or other serious harms and/or abuses of the legal process.
261. Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, Signal personnel in the Mississippi and Texas cam ps held various m eetings with the rem aining Plaintiffs and

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other Indian H-2B wor kers to discuss the st atus of Plaintiffs’ a nd other Indian H-2B workers’ visas and green card applications.
262. Upon inform ation and belief, during spring and summ er 2007 Signal personnel conferred amongst themselves and with the Recruiter Defendants and the Legal Facilitator Defendants via phone and/or e-mail to reach agreement on what should be said to workers attending the meetings.
263. Soon after March 9, 2007, Defendant Si gnal held a cam p-wide meeting in Pascagoula. Signal personnel to ld the Indian H-2B workers that Signal would sponsor their green cards if they stay ed at Signal and obeye d Signal’s rules, and warned that if workers held any m eetings against Signal’s in terests, they would be term inated. As Signal understood would happen, workers at the Orange cam p, including Plaintiffs, promptly learned what Signal personnel had said at this meeting, and understood it would apply to workers at Orange, as well.
264. In that same tim e period, Defenda nts Dewan and Burnett cam e to the Signal camp in Orange, Texas and again prom ised, in the presence of Signal personnel, that Signal, through its attorn ey Defendant Burnett, would make bona fide applications for green cards and obtain several H-2B visa extensions for the workers who had not been terminated by Sig nal (plaintiffs in the David Litigation, including David, Sulekha, Thangamani, Kandhasamy, Khuttan, Andrews and Dhananjaya), and the other Indian H2B workers. Plaintiffs reasonably believed these promises.
265. In m eetings and conversations in spring and summ er 2007, Defendant Signal, through its agents and employees at the Pascagoula and Orange facilities, continued to prom ise that Signal w ould arrange for the H-2B visa extensions and green

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cards orig inally prom ised Pla intiffs when they were rec ruited in India and the U nited Arab Emirates.
266. At the same time as Defendant Sign al was promising to arrange for H-2B visa extensions and green cards for the Plaint iffs as well as other Indian H-2B workers, Signal in fact was secretly evaluating all of the Indian workers with the intent not even to apply for visa extensions for certain of the Indian H-2B workers.
267. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence on Defendant Signal for their present and future immigration status, their continuing high levels of indebtedness, as well as other factors reasonably led P laintiffs to f ear serious harm and/or abuse of the legal process if they left Signal’s employ.
268. Under such circumstances, these Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal.
269. At various times relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant Signal refused to confirm whether valid H-2B vi sa extensions had in fact been obtained for Plaintiffs, coercing Plaintiffs to continue working for Si gnal in the hope that Signal would finally resolve their uncertain immigration status.
270. Since first contracting with Defenda nts in India and the United Arab Emirates, Plaintiffs have yet to receive from Defendants the green cards Defendants promised them . Despi te clear co ntractual provisions requiring them to do so, the Recruiter Defendants, the Legal Facilitator Defendants, and the Labor Broker Defendants have refused to refund any of the moneys Plai ntiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing.

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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003
Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor)
Defendants Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., the Recruiter Defendants (Michael Pol, Global Resources, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants), and the Legal Facilitator Defendants (Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C.
Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center) 271. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 272. Plaintiffs bring this claim against Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants. 273. Plaintiffs are autho rized to bring these civil claim s again st Defendan ts pursuant to the civil rem edies provision of the Trafficking Victim s Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 274. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants attempted to and did subject Plaintiffs to forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 275. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants knowingly attempted to and did phy sically restrain and/or threaten Plaintiffs with serious harm in order to obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. §1589(1). 276. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants knowingly attem pted to and di d obtain the labor and servi ces of Plaintiffs using a scheme, plan, or pa ttern which, in the tota lity of the c ircumstances, was intend ed to

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coerce and did coerce Plaintiffs to believ e th at they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(2).
277. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants’ scheme to isolate Plaintiffs, to coerce them to live in conditions causing psychological harm, and to limit their outside contacts, including unlawful discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was designed to convince P laintiffs that they would suffer serious harm if they were to leave the employ of Defendant Signal.
278. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants retaliated a gainst Plain tiffs f or attem pts to ex ercise th eir lega l r ights, and threa tened Plaintiffs with deportation and deceived Plai ntiffs about the term s of their imm igration status in a m anner that constitutes an a buse of the legal process under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(3).
279. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants knowingly recruited, transported, harbored, provid ed, and/or obtained th e Plaintiffs so as to obtain their labor and serv ices in violation of laws prohibiting peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor with in the m eaning of the provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (TVPA).
280. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and in additio n to the vio lations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 set forth above, Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants knowingl y recruited, transported, harbored and/or obtained the Plaintiffs for labor or services in furthera nce of these Defendants’ violations of the following provisions of Title 18, Chapter 77 of the U.S. Code:

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a. enticing, persuading, or inducing the Plaintiffs to go on boa rd an airliner and to go to various locations throughout the United Arab Emirates, India, and the United States, w ith the inten t that they m ay be made or held in modernday slavery, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1583;
b. knowingly and willfully holding Plaintiffs to involuntary servitude, as defined by the TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7102( 5)(a) and (b), violating 18 U.S.C. § 1584;
c. removing, confiscating, or possess ing Plaintif fs’ passports and other imm igration docum ents in the course of , or with the in tent to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); and
d. attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a) 281. As a proxim ate result of the conduc t of Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants, Plaintiffs have suf fered injuries to their persons, businesses, and property, and other damages. 282. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive dam ages in an amount to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees.

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) All Defendants
283. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
284. Plaintiffs’ RICO Case Statem ent, f iled conc urrently with Plain tiffs’ original Complaint, is incorporated herein by reference.
285. Plaintiffs’ claim s under the Rack eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”), are brought against all Defendants.
286. Plaintiffs are “persons ” with stand ing to sue within the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
287. Each of the Defendants is a “RICO person” within the m eaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1).
288. All Defendants and the United States C onsular officers in India constitute an association-in-fact, and ther efore an enterprise (th e “RIC O Enterprise I”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).
289. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal are an association-in -fact, and th erefore an en terprise (the “ RICO Enterprise II” ), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).
290. Recruiter D efendants, Defendant Signa l, Leg al Fac ilitator Def endants, Swetman Security, and Capital On e Bank are an association-in-fact, a nd therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise III”) within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).

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The RICO Enterprises RICO Enterprise I
291. RICO Enterpris e I at all releva nt tim es was an ongoing business relationship between all Defendants, and the United States Consular officers in India, with the comm on pur pose of recruiting, transporting, providi ng, processing, and obtaining foreign workers to work on shi pyards in the United States, including on Signal’s operations in Texas and Mississippi.
292. RICO Enterprise I was engaged in interstate commerce in that its activities and tran sactions re lating to the inte rnational and inte rstate movem ent of workers af fect interstate co mmerce and f requently requir e travel and communications acros s s tate and international lines.
293. The members of RICO Enterprise I functioned as a continuing unit. 294. Defendants conducted or pa rticipated in, and/or conspired to conduct or participate in the affairs of RICO Enterpri se I through a pattern of num erous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S. C. § 1962(d), related by their common goal to recruit, obtain, tran sport, process, and provide workers through the use of fraudulent promises, exorbitant fees, forced labor, and/or trafficking. 295. Specifically, Recruite r Def endants, Legal Fac ilitator Def endants, an d Defendant Signal conducted or participated in and/or conspired to conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by engaging in the followi ng predicate acts of ra cketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Enticement into m odern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583.

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b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; d. Trafficking persons with resp ect to m odern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; and e. Unlawful docum ent-related practice s in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); 296. Specifically, all Defendants conducted or participated in and/or conspired to conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): a. Mail fraud to further their unlawfu l schem e in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; b. Wire fraud to further their unlawf ul schem e in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and c. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.
RICO Enterprise II 297. RICO Ente rprise II w as at all relevant tim es an ongoing business relationship between Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal with the common purpose of selling Unit ed States green cards, v isas, and work opportunities to Indian workers to convince such workers to pay fees and to travel to the United States to work for companies, including Signal. 298. The members of RICO Enterprise II operated as a continuing unit.

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299. RICO Enterpris e II was engaged in inters tate comm erce in that its activities and transactions relating to the sale of United States green c ards, visas, and job opportunities affect interstate commerce.
300. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal conducted or participated in and/or conspired to conduct or participat e in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise II through a pattern of numerous acts of rack eteering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962( c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), re lated by their common goal to sell United States green cards and work opportunities to Indian workers for the purposes of furnishing such workers for employment at Signal’s operations.
301. Specifically, the Recruiter Defendants, the Lega l Facilita tor Def endants, and Defendant Signal conducted or participated in the affair s of RICO Enterprise II by engaging in the following pr edicate acts of racketeering a ctivity und er 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Enticement into m odern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583.
b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; d. Trafficking persons with resp ect to m odern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; e. Unlawful docum ent-related practice s in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); f. Mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; g. Wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and

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h. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. RICO Enterprise III
302. RICO Enterprise III was at all relevant tim es an ongoing business relationship between the Recruiter Defenda nts, th e Le gal Fac ilitator Def endants, Defendant Signal, and Capital One Bank w ith the comm on purpose of providing and maintaining a consistent and acquiescent labor force at Signal operations.
303. RICO Enterpris e I II was engage d in in terstate comm erce in tha t its activities and transactions relating to m aintaining and providing a c onsistent labor force at Signal occurred across stat e and international lines, an d involve wages and working conditions at an employer engaged in interstate commerce (Signal).
304. The members of RICO Enterprise III functioned as a continuing unit. 305. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal conducted, or participated in, a nd/or conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise III through a pattern of numerous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962( c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), re lated by their common goal to m aintain a consis tent and acquie scent H-2B Indian labor force at Signal through the use of fraudulent promises, forced labor, and trafficking. 306. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal conducted, or participated in, a nd/or conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise III by engaging in the followi ng predicate acts of rack eteering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Enticement into m odern day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583.

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b. Involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. c. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; d. Trafficking persons with resp ect to m odern day slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; e. Unlawful docum ent-related practice s in furtherance of trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a); f. Mail fraud to further their unlawfu l schem e in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; g. Wire fraud to further their unlawf ul schem e in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and h. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.
Predicate Acts Enticement into Slavery: 18 U.S.C. § 1583 307. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal, through RICO Enterprises I, II, and III will fully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and/or cons pired to co mmit m ultiple predi cate acts of enticem ent into m odern-day slavery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶ 282(a), supra. Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1584 308. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal, through Enterprises I, II, and III willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and/or conspired to comm it m ultiple pred icate acts of involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1584, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶ 282 (b), supra.

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Forced Labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1589 309. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal through RICO Enterprises I, II, and III will fully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and/or cons pired to co mmit m ultiple pr edicate acts of f orced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶¶ 276-280, supra.
Trafficking for the Purposes of Forced Labor and/or Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1590
310. As set forth in the p receding paragraphs, Recruiter Defendants, Leg al Facilitator Defendants, and De fendant Signal through RICO Enterprises I, III, and III willfully, kn owingly, and intentiona lly comm itted and/or c onspired to comm it multiple predicate acts of trafficking for the purposes of forced labor and/or involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and as set fo rth in Plaintiffs’ Fi rst Claim for Relief, ¶¶ 281-282, supra.
Document Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1592 311. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal, through Enterprises I, II, and III willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and/or conspired to comm it multip le pred icate ac ts of docum ent servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶ 282(c), supra.
Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 312. As set f orth in the pr eceding par agraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants, through RICO Enterprise I, m ade and/or c onspired to m ake fals e prom ises regarding green cards and other benefits in a schem e cal culated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sums of money.

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313. As set forth in th e preceding p aragraphs and in Exhib it 1, Recru iter

Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendant s, and Defendant Signal, through RICO

Enterprises I, II, and III, m ade and/or conspired to m ake false statem ents related to

applications subm itted to the U.S. Governm ent f or H-2B visas and f alse prom ises to

Plaintiffs regarding green cards and other be nefits in a s cheme calculated to de fraud

Plaintiffs out of large sums of money.

314. As set f orth in the pr eceding par agraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants,

through RICO Enterprise I, used the

mails and wire comm unications, including

communications via telephone, fax, internet and/or e-m ail, on num erous occasions to

further these fraudulent schemes.

315. As set forth in th e preceding p aragraphs and in Exhib it 1, Recru iter

Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendant s, and Defendant Signal, through RICO

Enterprises I, II, an d III, used the mails and wire communications, including

communications via telephone, fax, internet and/or e-m ail on num erous occasions to

further this fraudulent scheme.

316. These willful, knowing, and intentional acts constitute mail and wire fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.

Immigration Document Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)

317. As set f orth in the pr eceding par agraphs and in Exhibit 1, Defendants,

through RICO Enterprise I, fraudulently so ld and/or conspired to sell H-2B visa

extensions and green cards to P laintiffs despite thes e Defendants’ awareness that

applications for these green cards and visa ex tensions were not bona fide or lawful under

United States immigration law.

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318. As set forth in th e preceding p aragraphs and in Exhib it 1, Recru iter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendant s, and Defendant Signal, through RICO Enterprises I, II, and III, obtained, accepted, and/or received H-2B visas despite knowing these visas to have been procured through false statem ents and/ or fraud on the U.S. Government.
319. As set forth in th e preceding p aragraphs and in Exhib it 1, Recru iter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendant s, and Defendant Signal, through RICO Enterprises I, II, and III, fraudulently sold a nd/or conspired to sell H-2B visa extensions and green cards to Plaintiffs despite these Defendants’ awareness tha t applic ations f or these green cards and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law.
320. These willf ul, knowing, and intenti onal acts constitu te imm igration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).

Pattern of Related Racketeering Acts 321. Defendants engaged in the racketeeri ng a ctivity descr ibed in this Claim repeatedly starting in 2003 and continuing at least through January 2009 with respect to approximately 590 Indian workers. 322. Upon information and belief, Signal sought new Indian H-2B workers for employment at Signal who may be subject to similar racketeering activities, stopping this recruitment only upon the filing of the David Litigation. 323. Defendants, though the RICO Ente rprises, rely on the ra cketeering acts described in this Complaint to conduct their regular business activities.

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324. Defendants’ racketeering acts have or had similar purposes: to profit from the fraudulent recruitment and forced labor of Plaintiffs and other Indian workers , and to recruit, obtain, provide and maintain a consistent, submissive, and compliant Indian H-2B guestworker labor force at Signal’s operations.
325. Defendants’ acts yielded sim ilar results and caused sim ilar injuries to Plaintiffs, including payment of high fees, assumption of significant interest bearing debt, loss of real and personal property, lost wo rk opportunities, lost or unpaid wages and additional legal fees.
326. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, the racketeering acts h ave o r had s imilar pa rticipants: the Recruiter Defendants, the Legal Fac ilitator Defendants, the Labor Broker Defendants, and Signal.
327. As set f orth in the p receding par agraphs and in the attached Exhibit 1, Defendants, though the RICO Ente rprises, directed their racketeering activities at sim ilar victims: Indian workers who contacted the Recruiter Defendants in search of green cards, economic opportunity, and stable employment in the United States.
328. Defendants’ acts have or had sim ilar m ethods of comm ission, such as common recruitm ent tactic s, rela tively consis tent prac tices with resp ect to colle cting payments from Plaintiffs and other Indian workers, and use of sim ilar em ployment practices and policies with respect to Plaintiffs and other Indian workers.
Injury 329. As a direct and proxim ate result of De fendants’ willful, knowing, and intentional acts discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property and/or business, including but not lim ited to: exorbitant fees paid by P laintiffs for green cards, visas and other imm igration and recruitm ent-related services; interest on debts
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assumed by Plaintiffs to pay such fees; loss es of personal and real property incurred in reliance on Defendants’ fraudulent acts; lost and unpaid wages, excessive charges from room and board, and other pecuniary and/or losses to real or personal property.
330. Plaintiffs are entitled to an awar d of dam ages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble dam ages and attorneys ’ fees and costs associated with this action.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
42 U.S.C. § 1981 Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal
International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.) 331. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 332. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuan t to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for declaratory relief, and damages against Defendant Signal. 333. The actions of Defenda nt Signal, as se t forth herein, viol ated Pla intiffs’ rights to receive full and equal benefit of all laws as guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, including Plaintiffs’ rights to enjoy and benefit from non-discrim inatory em ployment relationships with Defendant Signal. 334. Specifically, Defendant Signa l subjected Plaintiffs to discrim inatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangements at the Signal labor camp in Orange. 335. Defendant Signal did not subject its non-Indian and/or U.S. citizen employees to the same or similar room and board arrangements.

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336. As set f orth in th e pr eceding paragraphs, Defendant Signal also im posed

discriminatory job-related requirements and adverse terms and conditions of employment

to which non-Indian and/or U.S. citizen employees were not similarly subject.

337. As set forth in the p receding paragraphs, through the action s an d

statements of its personnel referring to and/or directed at Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B

workers, Defendant Signal m aintained an o bjectively hostile and abusive work

environment on account of Plaintiffs’ race, national origin, and/or alienage.

338. As set forth in the preceding

paragraph s, Defendant Signal’s

discriminatory and offensive treatment of Plaintiffs was sufficiently severe that it created

a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

339. Plaintiffs reasonably pe rceived their work environm ent to be hostile,

abusive, and discriminatory on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or alienage.

340. Defendant Signal’s hostile, abusive, and discrim inatory treatm ent of

Plaintiffs and others similarly situated was unwelcome.

341. Defendant Signal knowingly, willfull y, m aliciously, intentionally, and

without justification acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

342. As a result of De fendant Signal’s unla wful acts , Plainti ffs have suffered

injury to their property and/or persons.

343. Plaintiffs seek all appropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorneys’

fees, costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive damages, in

an amount to be determined at trial.

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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF 1871 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Thirteenth Amendment Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.), the Recruiter Defendants (Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants), and the Legal Facilitator Defendants (Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center) 344. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 345. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for declaratory relief, and damages against Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants. 346. As set forth in the p receding parag raphs and P laintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, Defendant Signal, Recr uiter Defendants, and Legal F acilitator Defendants, along with non-defendants, acting at the discretion of those de fendants (including a private security firm and Capital One Bank) conspire d, agreed, planned and coordinated for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of thei r rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590) to be free from forced labor, i nvoluntary servitude, and trafficking in persons. 347. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants were motivated by racial, anti-Indian, and/or anti-immigrant animus when they conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and/or act ed in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

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348. Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendant s, and Legal Facilitator Defendants knowingly, willfully, m aliciously, intentionall y, and witho ut jus tification planned and acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.
349. As a resu lt of the u nlawful act s of Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered damages.
350. Plaintiffs seek all appropriate relief, including declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, costs of this action, and dam ages, including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
All Defendants 351. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 352. As set f orth in the p receding par agraphs and in the attached Exhibit 1, Defendants, individually and through their ag ents, em ployees, and/or representatives, knowingly and/or negligently m ade m aterially false and untrue statem ents and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 353. As set f orth in the p receding par agraphs and in the attached Exhibit 1, Defendants knowingly or negligently failed to disclose m aterial facts to P laintiffs regarding the nature and term s and conditio ns of application s and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States.

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354. Defendants intended that the false stat ements made by Defendants and/or their agents, e mployees, and/or representa tives would induce Plaintiffs to pay the exorbitant fees requested by the Labor Broke r Defendants, Recruite r Defendants, and/or Legal Facilitator Defendants.
355. Defendants intended that the false stat ements made by Defendants and/or their agents, em ployees, and/or representatives would induce Plaintiffs to pay exorbitant fees to the Labor Broker Defendants, Recru iter Defendants, and/or Legal Facilitator Defendants, and to leave their homes and jobs in India and the United Arab Emirates and travel to the United States to work f or the Labor Broker Defendants and/or Defendant Signal.
356. Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on Defendants’ representations. 357. In reliance or reasonable reliance on Defendants’ false and /or neg ligent representations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs paid large sums of money to Labor Broker Defendant s, Recruiter Defendants, and/or L egal Facilitator Defendants. 358. In reliance or reasonable reliance on Defendants’ false and /or neg ligent representations regarding green cards and e mployment opport unities, Plaintiffs incurred substantial interest-bearing de bts in order to pay recruitm ent, imm igration-related, and travel fees charged by Defendants and their agents, employees and/or representatives. 359. In reliance or reasonable reliance on Defendants’ false and /or neg ligent representations regarding gr een cards and employm ent oppor tunities, Plaintiffs sold personal and real property and surrendere d em ployment opportunities in India and the United Arab Emirates.

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360. In reliance or reasonable reliance on Defendants’ false and /or neg ligent representations regarding green cards and em ployment opportunities, Plaintiffs left their homes and jobs and India and ot her countries and traveled to the United States to w ork for Defendant Signal.
361. As a direct and prox imate result of Defendants’ knowing, willing , intentional, and/or negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured.
362. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive dam ages in an amount to be proven at trial.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF BREACH OF CONTRACT All Defendants
363. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
364. As set forth in the preceding paragr aphs, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees and/or repres entatives, offered to obtain perm anent residence and imm igration status f or Plaintif fs in the Un ited S tates within 18 to 24 months as well as steady work opportunities in the United States with Defendant Signal and/or Labor Broker Defendants in exchange for Plaintiffs’ payment of exorbitant fees to Defendants and their employees, agents and/or representatives and agreement to work for Defendant Signal and/or Labor Broker Defendants.
365. Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ offers , paid the agreed up on fees, and performed the agreed-upon work.

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366. Defendants breached th eir con tracts w ith Plaintiffs by failing to com ply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status.
367. In reliance on these agreem ents, Plaintiffs paid large sum s of m oney and entered into substantial debt s, surrendered other em ployment opportunities, and incurred other financial losses.
368. As a direct result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 369. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Declaratory relief; b. Compensatory damages; c. Punitive damages; d. Treble damages as authorized by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); e. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; f. A finding of alter ego between Signal International Texas, G.P. and Signal International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil; g. A finding of alter ego between Signal In ternational Texas, L.P. and Signal International LLC, thus piercing the corporate veil; h. A finding that Signal International, In c. is the successo r in inter est to Signal Inter national LLC, or in the alte rnative, a finding of alter ego between Signal International LLC a nd Signal International, Inc., thus piercing the corporate veil;

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i. A finding of alter ego among Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., thus piercing the corporate veil; j. A finding of alter ego between Global Resources, Inc. and Michael P ol, thus piercing the corporate veil; k. A finding of alter ego between Sach in Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt., thus piercing the corporate veil; l. A finding of alter ego between Billy R. Wilks and J & M, thus piercing J & M’s corporate veil; m. A finding that J & M Marine is the successor of J & M; and n. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate. Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of May, 2013.
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP

John H. Fleming Keith J. Barnett Jaliya S. Faulkner Gabriel A. Mendel Kurt Lentz Kara D. Duffle Teresa L. Sulmers (applying for pro hac vice)
999 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 Telephone: (404) 853-8000 Facsimile: (404) 853-8806

By: /s/ Daniella D. Landers Daniella D. Landers Texas Bar No. 24026260
1001 Fannin Street, Suite 3700 Houston, Texas 77002-6760 Telephone: (713) 470-6100 Facsimile: (713) 654-1301
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Complaint - Joseph, et al. v. Signal, et al.

Page 72 of 72

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 1836

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

ORDER DENYING SIGNAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is a “Motion to Transfer Action

Pursuant to First Filed Rule” (Doc. No. 23), filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal

International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., and Signal International, L.L.C. (“Signal

Defendants”). Having considered the pending motion and the corresponding Response (Doc. No.

42), Reply (Doc. No. 45), and Sur-Reply (Doc. No. 54), in light of the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 64), the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Transfer Action

Pursuant to First Filed Rule be denied, because there is not a substantial overlap between the

instant suit and Kurian David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et. al., the first filed suit.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States

filed a putative class action in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC,

Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). The Court denied class certification for the Plaintiffs’

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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 1837
trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.1 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). As a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly enslaved. (Doc. No. 42 at 4.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint in this court. (Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently, they filed their First Amended Complaint on August 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 19) and their Second Amended Complaint on December 19, 2013. (Doc. No. 64.) Currently, the Plaintiffs have filed suit against the following Defendants: Signal, Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Indo-Amerisoft L.L.C., Kurella Rao, J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, Billy R. Wilks, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). (Doc. No. 64.) The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: 1) The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; 2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; 3) The Civil Rights act of 1866; and 4) The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id.) In addition, the Plaintiffs bring state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims against all of the Defendants. (Doc. No. 64 at 65-68.) On August 19, 2013, the Signal Defendants filed the pending Motion to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule. (Doc. No. 23.)
1. The District Court has not ruled on the collective action FLSA claims in the David case, which include opt-ins by the Plaintiffs in this case. (Doc. No. 42 at 3.)
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B. Factual Background In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs,
were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 64 at 2.) The Plaintiffs claim that they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. (Id. at 3.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. First to File Rule “Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mexico Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999)). “The first-to-file rule is a discretionary doctrine.” Jones v. Xerox Commercial Solutions, LLC,
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 1839
CIV. A. No. H-13-0650, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013) (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 603). The rule is utilized “to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997). The party wishing to transfer the case has the burden to prove that transfer is warranted. Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (citing Sanofi–Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2009); VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp., No. 2:07–CV– 138, 2007 WL 2238054, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007); Buckalew v. Celanese, LTD., No. G–05– 315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005)). “In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (citing Texas Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.” White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008). “Once the likelihood of substantial overlap between the two suits has been demonstrated, it is no longer up to the second-filed court to resolve the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed.” Id. (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 605).
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 1840
IV. Analysis The Signal Defendants argue that there is substantial overlap between the instant case and the first filed case, David. While there are similarities in the two cases, the undersigned finds that the two cases do not involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions. A. Parties There is some overlap between the parties in David and the instant case, but it is not substantial. While all of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit are also plaintiffs in David, as explained below, they are only asserting FLSA claims in David, which they do not assert here.2 (Doc. No. 42 at 6.) Conversely, none of the David plaintiffs asserting non-FLSA claims are parties in the instant case. The David defendants and the Defendants in this suit are not completely identical, but for purposes of this analysis, the court agrees with Signal that the difference is insignificant. (Doc. No. 23 at 12-17.) While the first-to-file rule does not require identical parties, see Save Power Ltd., 121 F.3d at 950, “the fact that the parties are different cuts against an argument for substantial overlap.” Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *4. B. Claims While the first-to-file rule also does not require the issues to completely overlap, “the cases should be more than merely related to support a motion to transfer when venue is otherwise appropriate.” Buckalew v. Celanese, Ltd., CIV. A. No. G-05-315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *2 (S.D.
2. Even if the Plaintiffs in this case were at one point putative class members in the David class action litigation, they were never parties since the class was never certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (holding that it is erroneous to believe a nonnamed class member is a party to class action litigation before the class is certified, or if certification is ultimately denied).
Page 5 of 8

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 1841
Tex. Sept. 16, 2005). The instant suit and David are related to the extent that all of the claims asserted in this suit are also asserted by the different David plaintiffs. However, there is not substantial overlap among the claims in both suits. As the District Court established in its opinion denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in David, each of the Plaintiffs’ claims require individualized proof as it pertains to that particular plaintiff. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). Thus, not only are each of the individual plaintiffs’ forced labor, trafficking, RICO and civil rights claims different from one another in this suit, as explained below, they are entirely different from their pending FLSA claims in David. Therefore, the issues presented by the Plaintiffs cannot be resolved in the David suit. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, S. Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist. of ILA, AFL-CIO, 751 F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
1. Forced Labor and Trafficking The success of each Plaintiff’s forced labor and trafficking claim is dependent on individualized factors. The question in a forced labor case is “whether Defendants’ coercive conduct was such that it could overcome the will of the victim so as to make him render his labor involuntary.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 at 77. “This question cannot be answered via generalized class-wide proof but rather must be answered individually based upon individualized proof.” Id. Similarly, with trafficking, “individual issues will play a significant part” because involuntary servitude is an essential element of the claim. Id. at 80-81.
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2. RICO Claims The success of each Plaintiff’s RICO claim is also based on each individual’s experience because the Plaintiffs will be “required to prove that the [Defendants] committed the predicate acts upon which they rely for the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 92. As stated above, proof of the predicate acts of trafficking and forced labor are “all premised on coercion” and “cannot be made without resort to individualized proof.” Id. Additionally, in order to prove the fraud-based predicate acts, each Plaintiff will “have to prove first-party reliance on the alleged fraud that was directed at them,” because “the question of individual reliance [is] paramount to resolving whether Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a RICO violation.” Id. at 105-06. 3. Civil Rights Claims The Plaintiffs also sue the Signal Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for violating their right to “enjoy and benefit from non-discriminatory employment relationships” with the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 64 at 63.) In order to obtain compensatory damages under this claim, as sought by the Plaintiffs, each “Plaintiff must prove actual injury to himself and that injury must be attributable to (caused by) the Defendant’s disparate treatment.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *119. For this reason, the outcome of each Plaintiff’s case will vary based on their individualized experience. 4. Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants violated the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1971 by violating their right to be free from “forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 64 at 65.) Forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking all include an
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 74 Filed 02/11/14 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 1843
element of coercion, which requires an individualized analysis of each Plaintiff’s situation, as stated above. David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *128.
As one can easily discern, none of the above causes of action involve substantially similar issues to the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims pending in David, which include claims of violating the federally mandated minimum wage laws. The undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs that the proof required for the FLSA claims and the remedies sought are distinct from the proof and remedies at issue in the instant matter. Given that there is not a substantial overlap of the claims between the David litigation and this case, and with the exception of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in David, none of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit and David overlap, the court’s denial of the Signal Defendants’ motion to transfer will not result in “piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997).
V. Conclusion The undersigned finds that the instant suit does not substantially overlap with the first-filed suit, David. Accordingly, the Signal Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule (Doc. No. 23) is DENIED.
SIGNED this 11th day of February, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
Page 8 of 8

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 99 Filed 06/17/14 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 2144

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING DEFENDANT SIGNAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 70)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings.

(Doc. No. 4.) Before the undersigned magistrate judge is the “Motion of Signal Defendants to

Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” filed by Defendants Signal International, L.L.C.,

Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Signal”). Because the Plaintiffs have pleaded enough

factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state law claims

occurred in Texas, and this court cannot otherwise consider materials outside of the pleadings to

determine the instant motion, Signal’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 70) should be denied.

I. Jurisdiction

The Plaintiffs are a group of skilled construction workers of Indian descent who were

allegedly lured to the United States by Signal and a network of recruiters working on Signal’s

behalf. In their second amended complaint, the Plaintiffs assert four causes of action pursuant to

federal statutory and constitutional law: violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection

Reauthorization Act (18 U.S.C. § 1595); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Act

of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985) and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 99 Filed 06/17/14 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 2145
(Doc. No. 64.) For actions brought under federal statutory and constitutional provisions, the court has subject matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1331. In their fifth and sixth causes of action, the Plaintiffs bring state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. (Doc. No. 64.) The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in this case because the events giving rise to the claims occurred within the confines of this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 99 Filed 06/17/14 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 2146
III. Analysis Signal moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Signal argues the claims alleged in the second amended complaint arise from facts that occurred outside the United States. Consequently, Signal submits that the second amended complaint does not include enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face because the second amended complaint is “extraterritorial with regards to common law claims on its face.” (Doc. No. 70, p. 4.) Furthermore, Signal alleges this court should make an “Erie guess” to conclude the Texas Supreme Court would find “more probably than not” that the common law of Texas does not apply to state law claims “having so extraterritorial a basis.” (Id., p. 12.) Signal also moves to dismiss the complaint pro tanto1 to the degree the complaint seeks to recover the fees paid abroad with regard to the Plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 1981 and 1985. (Id., p. 23.) The Plaintiffs counter that their complaint adequately alleges facts that their state law claims occurred in Texas and that Texas law applies to their claims. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue the complaint makes clear that the tortious actions originated, were performed, and continued to occur in Texas, specifically at the Texas Labor Camp located in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 75.) The Plaintiffs allege that while recruiters working on Signal’s behalf initially lured and defrauded the Plaintiffs abroad, Signal ratified the recruiters’ actions by continuing to defraud the Plaintiffs upon their arrival in Texas. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that a fact intensive choice of law analysis is premature given the sufficient facts that plausibly support the events centered around the Texas Labor Camp. (Id., p. 9.)
1. Pro Tanto: To that extent; for so much; as far as it goes. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACK.
3

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1. State Law Claims that are “Extraterritorial in Nature”
Signal’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed because the claims in question
“arose from facts that occurred beyond the limits of American territory” is without merit. (Doc.
No. 70, p. 4.). The complaint is replete with allegations that Signal committed the state law torts
in Texas. The following is a summary of the Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. No. 64):
The Plaintiffs were recruited by Signal and its recruiters, both in the United States and abroad, to work at Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Signal and its recruiters contracted with the Plaintiffs to obtain permanent residence and immigration status in the United States within eighteen to twenty-four months. The Plaintiffs accepted Signal’s offer, paid their fees, and were transported to the Texas Labor Camp in the United States to perform work for Signal. Once at the Texas Labor Camp, Signal ratified the actions of the recruiters, and breached its obligations and defrauded the Plaintiffs regarding their immigration status upon their arrival. In the Texas Labor Camp, Signal personnel held various meetings with the Plaintiffs to discuss the status of the Plaintiffs’ visas and green card applications. Signal again promised the same visa extensions and green cards for the Plaintiffs as when they were recruited abroad. However, Signal continued to breach its contracts with the Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status. Signal and its recruiters knowingly or negligently made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. Signal intended that the false statements made by Signal and its recruiters would induce Plaintiffs to pay them exorbitant fees and remain as Texas Labor Camp under deplorable conditions.
When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must consider these facts as true.
In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205. From these allegations, the Plaintiffs have clearly
pleaded enough factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state
law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract occurred in Texas.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678. Even if the complaint alleges Signal’s actions and the Plaintiffs’
injuries occurred in Texas and India, Signal has not cited to any persuasive authority that this
4

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subjects the Plaintiffs’ entire complaint to a 12(b)(6) dismissal. In fact, district courts have the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign law claims that form part of the same case or controversy. In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 799 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
2. Pro Tanto Dismissal Second, Signal moves to dismiss the complaint pro tanto to the degree the Plaintiffs seek to recover the fees paid abroad with regard to their claims under §§ 1981 and 1985. Signal begins with the premise that §§ 1981 and 1985 claims are not extraterritorial. Signal would then like the court to compare the complaint in this suit with 1) the first amended complaint2 in David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et. al. and 2) two sentences in the David court’s order3 denying class certification concerning what damages are attributable to the David plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. Signal argues this comparison would show that at least part of the Plaintiffs’ §§ 1981 and 1985 claims in this case occurred abroad. Thus, Signal requests a pro tanto dismissal of the complaint “insofar as [sic] concerns recovery, on the basis of the civil rights statutes, of fees paid abroad.” (Doc. No. 70, p. 22.) In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court typically does not look beyond the complaint. However, a court may consider attachments to briefing if the documents are referenced in the complaint, central to the complaint, referenced by the parties, and their authenticity is not in dispute. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). While the David litigation
2. David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.) (Doc. No. 47). 3. David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et. al., Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
5

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was casually mentioned in the complaint, the David first amended complaint and the David court’s order denying class certification are not central to the Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case. (Doc. No 64.) Furthermore, Signal failed to include the documents in its briefing to this court. Obviously, without being able to consider the David court documents, Signal’s motion should not be granted on this basis.4
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 70) should be denied.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any
4 . The undersigned is also more than confused as to how their requested relief—dismissal of the complaint, “pro tanto, with regard to § 1981, for failure to state a claim, insofar as [sic] concerns the recovery, on the basis of the civil rights statutes, of fees paid abroad”—could be implemented in an intelligible order.
6

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 99 Filed 06/17/14 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 2150 such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 12th day of June, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
7

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 100 Filed 06/18/14 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 2151

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is referred

to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a Referral

Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is Defendant Malvern C. Burnett, the Law

Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C.’s

(hereinafter referred to interchangeably as “Burnett” and “the Burnett Defendants”) “Motion and

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).” (Doc. No. 31.)1 The undersigned has considered the pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc.

No. 44), reply (Doc. No. 50) and sur-reply (Doc. No. 56). The Burnett Defendants’ motion

should be denied because: 1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because the

RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process; and 2) the court also has specific personal

jurisdiction over the Defendants given the number of alleged tortious acts committed by the

Defendants both outside and inside Texas that injured the Plaintiffs within Texas.

1. This motion was previously denied as moot in light of the Plaintiffs filing their second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 67.) The Defendants subsequently filed a “Motion and Memorandum to Reassert Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 32) and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. No. 31).” (Doc. No. 69.) As such, the undersigned will analyze and discuss the original motion that was previously denied as moot.

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 100 Filed 06/18/14 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 2152
I. Background A. Procedural Background
On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.2 See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification;3 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 64.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this court. (Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently, they filed their first amended complaint on August 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 19) and their second amended complaint on December 19, 2013. (Doc. No. 64.) B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 64 , p. 2.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. (Id. at 3.) The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law
2. The Plaintiffs presumably still have FLSA claims pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Doc. No. 44, p. 5.)
3. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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Center, L.L.C. and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of conspiring with Signal and other Defendants to recruit Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations with false promises of permanent residency in the United States for the workers and their families. (Id., p. 24.)
II. Jurisdiction The Burnett Defendants move to dismiss the instant case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) alleging that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. No. 31.) Rule 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). “When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, the party asserting jurisdiction is required to present facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction to satisfy its burden.” Duke Energy Int’l, L.L.C. v. Napoli, 748 F. Supp. 2d 656, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000)). “[O]n a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). A. Nationwide Service of Process under the RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege RICO claims against all of the Defendants, including the Burnett Defendants. (Doc. No. 64.) A federal court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute if that statute provides for nationwide service
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of process and the defendant has had minimum contacts with the United States. Busch v.
Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994). The Burnett
Defendants have minimum contacts with the United States. (See Doc. No. 31, Ex. 1, Affidavit of
Malvern Burnett.) Thus, the next issue to be decided is whether the RICO statute provides
nationwide service of process.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1965 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. (b) In any action under section 1964 [the civil RICO remedies] of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.
While the Fifth Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, it appears all of the district courts in
this Circuit have interpreted § 1965(b) to confer nationwide jurisdiction in a RICO action over
nonresident defendants if the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over at least one
defendant under § 1965(a). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, No. 3-08-cv-0388-M, 2009 WL
347423, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (citing Rolls–Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
765, 778-79 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3–08–cv–0279–L, 2008 WL
4936488, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008)); see also Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., 890 F. Supp. 601,
606 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C., 401 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (W.D. Tex.
2005); cf. Flores v. Koster, No. 3:11-cv-0726-M-BH, 2013 WL 4874117, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June
28, 2013). Furthermore, the majority of circuit courts have determined that § 1965(b) confers
nationwide service of process in RICO cases. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *3 n.2
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(collecting cases). Accordingly, the undersigned will follow the majority rule that § 1965(b) of
the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process if the plaintiff can establish personal
jurisdiction over at least one defendant under § 1965(a). That is easily met here. In the instant
case, it is clear that Defendant Signal transacts its affairs in this forum as they have a facility in Orange, Texas.4
Having decided § 1965(b) provides nationwide service of process, the last inquiry is
whether the “ends of justice require” Burnett, who resides and conducts business in the Eastern
District of Louisiana and Southern District of Mississippi, be brought before the court in the
Eastern District of Texas. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (“In any action under section 1964 of this
chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require
that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause
such parties to be summoned . . . .”). “[T]he ‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept uniquely
tailored to the facts of each case.” Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit has not implemented any legal test as to what exact set of facts meet
“the ends of justice” requirement. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-456,
2006 WL 2822151, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006). While courts have used somewhat differing
tests, the two considerations that are used most frequently are 1) whether no other district court
4. The Burnett Defendants argue that even if the RICO statute provides nationwide service of process, the Plaintiffs cannot use the nationwide service of process provision because “the Plaintiffs, opting to utilize the waiver provisions of Rule 4 rather than request service pursuant to the nationwide service provisions of RICO, waived any claim for establishment of personal jurisdiction through the use of RICO’s national service provisions.” (Doc. No. 50, p. 2.) Burnett did not cite to any authority to support this argument, nor has the undersigned found any cases supporting this assertion. While it is true that a waiver of service does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5), it certainly does not eliminate a party’s ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant through a nationwide service of process provision.
Burnett also argues that even if § 1965(b) provides for nationwide service of process, “the requirements of the constitution and due process must still be fulfilled.” (Doc. No. 31, p. 2.) This argument is somewhat irrelevant. Due process concerns are subsumed when a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide service of process and the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States. Busch, 11 F.3d at 1258.
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would have personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged RICO conspirators,5 and 2) judicial economy.6
The “ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to answer in this forum because numerous defendants reside in different states, and there is likely no alternative forum in which jurisdiction would be proper as to all defendants.7 For reasons of judicial economy, the “ends of justice” should also require the Burnett Defendants to litigate this suit in Texas. There are currently forty-eight plaintiffs in this case and over forty in the four companion cases in which the Burnett Defendants are parties.8 Most of these same plaintiffs already have pending FLSA claims in the Eastern District of Louisiana stemming from the same allegations. This court has already denied Signal’s vigorous attempts to transfer this case to Louisiana. (Doc. Nos. 74, 97.) Thus, it can be assumed that approximately ninety plaintiffs will be trying this case here in Texas against the lead Defendant Signal and the other defendants that have not sought transfer. If the Burnett Defendants were dismissed from this case, most of the plaintiffs in this and the companion cases would be litigating their FLSA claims against Signal in Louisiana, all of the plaintiffs would be litigating their RICO, federal law and state law claims against the remaining defendants here, and
5. Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1986). 6. Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mortg. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.C. Del. 1978). 7. The various Signal Defendants have operations in Texas, Mississippi and Alabama and are organized under the laws of Delaware; Defendant Michael Pol is a Mississippi resident; Defendant Global Resources, Inc. is organized under the laws of Mississippi; Defendant Sachin Dewan is a resident of India while Defendant Dewan Consultants is organized under the laws of India; Defendant Malvern Burnett is a Louisiana Resident who practices law in Louisiana and Mississippi; Defendants Law Office of Malvern Burnett, APC and Gulf Coast Immigration Center were corporations organized under the laws of Louisiana; Defendant Indo-Amerisoft, L.L.C. is organized under the laws of Louisiana; Defendant Kurella Rao maintains offices in Louisiana; Defendant J&M Associates of Mississippi, Inc. and J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C. are organized under the laws of Mississippi; and Defendant Billy R. Wilks is a resident of Mississippi. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 14-21.) The Plaintiffs generally aver that most, if not all, of the Defendants have “substantial business contacts in Texas.” 8. See 1:13-cv-323; 1:13-cv-497; 1:13-cv-499; 1:13-cv-498.
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then potentially those same RICO, federal law and state law claims against only the Burnett Defendants would be litigated in an entirely different forum. That would be contrary to Congress’ intent for the “ends of justice” provision, which enables plaintiffs to bring all members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before a court in a single trial. Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d 535, 539. The undersigned also notes that it would be impractical to require roughly ninety plaintiffs to travel to a different forum all for the sake of the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two “inactive” companies located in a contiguous state.
The Burnett Defendants argue that given the conclusory allegations against them in the complaint, the “ends of justice” do not require they be brought before this court. They argue the Plaintiffs have failed to plead enough facts in their complaint to show the Burnett Defendants engaged in a conspiracy or a scheme to defraud or commit illegal acts subjecting them to the personal jurisdiction of this court. These are not relevant considerations when deciding whether “the ends of justice” require the Burnett Defendants to be brought to Texas. Questions of whether the complaint sufficiently pleads violations of the RICO statute should not be raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) challenging personal jurisdiction. See Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 347423, at *4. In fact, it is already subject of another motion to dismiss filed by the Burnett Defendants. (Doc. No. 32.) B. The Burnett Defendants are also subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this District
Although this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants due to the nationwide service provisions of the RICO statute, this court also has specific personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. Absent a statute that permits nationwide service of process, when a suit is based on a federal statute, the court looks to the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits to determine whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Omni Capital Intern., Ltd.
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Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987). The Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution. Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the undersigned’s focus is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends or satisfies constitutional requirements of due process.
In order to satisfy due process, the Burnett Defendants must have “certain minimum contacts with [Texas] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Parker v. Pro W. Contractors, L.L.C., No. 13-30142, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “The minimum contacts requirement is satisfied by either: (1) contacts that give rise to general personal jurisdiction or (2) contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994)). Because the Plaintiffs do not argue minimum contacts are satisfied through general personal jurisdiction, the undersigned will focus only on whether the Burnett Defendants have sufficient contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.
“Specific jurisdiction is proper where the defendant has ‘purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’” Parker, 2013 WL 3534082, at *1 (5th Cir. July 15, 2013) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)); see also Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Techs. Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999) (litigation must arise out of or relate to activities purposefully directed at residents of the forum). “The constitutional requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that imposing a judgment would not ‘offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’ Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008)
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(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
The complaint (Doc. No. 64) raises these allegations against the Burnett Defendants:
Signal authorized the Burnett Defendants to act as their agents for the purposes of recruiting and providing Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations. Signal further authorized the Burnett Defendants to represent that Signal would agree to sponsor bona fide green card applications for the Plaintiffs and obtain at least two H-2B visa extensions which would allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while their green card applications were being processed.
Burnett induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the green card contracts without intending to diligently pursue the Plaintiffs’ green card applications. Burnett falsely represented that (i) the companies and/or entities purportedly sponsoring the Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide the Plaintiffs; (ii) green card applications sponsored by such companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; and, (iii) such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines. Burnett also promised that the Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their payments if they did not succeed in securing green cards. However, since first contracting with the Burnett Defendants, the Plaintiffs have yet to receive the green cards. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, Burnett has refused to refund any of the money the Plaintiffs paid.
Instead of getting green cards for the Plaintiffs, the Burnett Defendants assisted Signal in securing H-2B visas that would temporarily allow the Plaintiffs to live in the United States. In July and August of 2006, the Burnett Defendants, on behalf of Signal, filed with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service the completed I-129 forms and attachments seeking 590 H-2B visas. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was projected to be at least two to three years, Signal attested to a 10-month labor need running from October 1, 2006 - July 31, 2007 in these H-2B visa applications. Signal falsely represented to the government that at the end of this 10 month period, it intended to return all H-2B workers back to India. The Burnett Defendants declared that the applications were based on all information of which they had any knowledge despite the fact that they believed Signal’s intentions for these workers exceeded ten months.
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In reasonable reliance on the Burnett Defendants’ explicit and repeated promises regarding the procurement of green cards and employment opportunities in the United States, the Plaintiffs undertook considerable economic, personal and familial sacrifices in order to amass the funds necessary to initiate the green card process with Signal. Signal authorized Burnett to falsely represent that Signal would apply for at least two to three H-2B visa extensions on behalf of all the Indian H-2B workers to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while Plaintiffs’ green card applications were being processed. In reliance on the representations of Burnett and others, the Plaintiffs entered the United States on H-2B guest worker visas in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Signal at its Orange, Texas facility. Upon arrival at Signal’s facilities in Orange, Texas, the workers were shocked to discover the awful conditions they would be forced to live and work in.
After the Indian workers started to organize and complain about their terrible working and living conditions, Signal contacted the Burnett Defendants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts. During these conversations the Recruiter Defendants, the Burnett Defendants, and Signal reached an agreement regarding steps that they would take to discourage further worker organizing efforts to ensure that the majority of the Indian H-2B workforce continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B workforce from exercising their legal rights. Signal called a workforce-wide meeting on or about March 8, 2007 in the Pascagoula camp, attended by Signal management and Burnett. At this meeting, Signal management told the Pascagoula workers that Signal would fight back against organizing efforts by the workers. These threats were promptly reported to the workers in Orange, including Plaintiffs.
Subsequently, Defendants Dewan and Burnett came to the Signal camp in Orange, Texas and again falsely promised, in the presence of Signal personnel, that Signal, through its attorney Defendant Burnett, would make bona fide applications for green cards and obtain several H-2B visa extensions for the workers who had not been terminated by Signal. The Plaintiffs reasonably believed these false promises.
In the RICO Fraud Chart attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs further
allege:
Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center L.L.C., and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. filed with
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the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Department of Labor the completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking permission to import and hire 590 foreign guest workers under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3, and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guest worker program”). In the applications to the state workforce commissions and forms ETA 750, Malvern C. Burnett and Signal stated that Signal would employ workers from October 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007, despite their knowledge that the projected labor need would be at least two-to-three years. Signal stated in letters of support to these applications that its need for H- 2B guest workers was “peak load and a one-time occurrence” and that “the temporary workers will work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage, and will return to their home country at the end of employment.” Signal executives and Malvern Burnett signed these applications swearing, under penalty of perjury, to the veracity of the information in these applications.
On March 15, 2007, Burnett attended a meeting with the Plaintiffs at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. At this meeting, Signal representatives and Malvern Burnett said that if Texas workers conducted activities “like the workers in Mississippi” they would be deported. They also told the Indian H-2B Signal employees that they would apply for green cards for all of them.
First, the Plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the minimum contact requirement by alleging the
Burnett Defendants defrauded the Plaintiffs within Texas. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of
attending a meeting at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility where he falsely promised the Plaintiffs he
would make bona fide applications for green cards and obtain several H-2B visa extensions.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs allege Burnett supplied false information to the Texas Workforce
Commission in the documents he filed to gain permission to import and hire the Plaintiffs to work
for Signal.
Second, the Plaintiffs have also satisfied the minimum contacts requirement by alleging the
Burnett Defendants committed acts outside of Texas that caused tortious injuries within Texas.
The Fifth Circuit has held that sufficient minimum contacts are established “[w]hen a nonresident
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defendant commits a tort within the state, or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state.” Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). “Even an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s conduct.” Id. (collecting cases). An individual injured in Texas “need not go to [another jurisdiction] to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in other states, intentionally, knowingly and recklessly caused severe physical, emotional and economic injuries to the plaintiffs and others” in Texas. Id. at 630. Based upon the complaint, the Plaintiffs have established that the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas because the alleged tortious acts committed by the Burnett Defendants, even if most were committed outside of Texas, caused tortious injuries within Texas. The Burnett Defendants, who allegedly conspired with Signal to lure the Plaintiffs to Orange, Texas with false promises, cannot credibly argue that they could not reasonably have anticipated being sued in this District.
Finally, it will not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants. The Fifth Circuit has used the following test to assess the reasonableness of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction: “(1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant to litigate in that forum; (2) the forum state’s interests in the matter; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the several states’ shared interest in furthering substantive social policies.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)). First, the Burnett Defendants will not face a large burden in litigating the instant case in
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this District, because the Burnett Defendants, who consist of a single attorney and two “inactive” companies, are located in Louisiana, which is contiguous to Texas. Second, the forum state, Texas, does have an interest in the matter because the forty-eight Plaintiffs were allegedly injured while working at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. Third, keeping the Burnett Defendants claims in this District will provide the most efficient resolution of this case. Notwithstanding their status as putative class members, the Plaintiffs have already moved their case once from a different federal district court after their motion for class certification was denied. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). The most expeditious option at this point would be to continue this case in this District. Finally, the Burnett Defendants have not pointed out any clashes between the substantive social policies of Texas and any other potential forum state in regards to this case. Taking these factors into consideration, the undersigned finds that this court will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice by exercising personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants.
In summary, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because the RICO statute provides for nationwide service of process. Furthermore, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have also established a prima facie case that this court has personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants by showing: 1) the Burnett Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas; and 2) it will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Burnett Defendants.
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the “Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration
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Law Center, L.L.C. to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)” (Doc. No. 31) should be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276– 77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 18th day of June, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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Law Center, L.L.C. to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)” (Doc. No. 31) should be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276– 77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 18th day of June, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 115 Filed 07/15/14 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 2313

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

ORDER DENYING BURNETT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER

Pending before the court is a “Motion to Transfer Venue and Memorandum in Support”

(Doc. No. 39), filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and

Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (“the Burnett Defendants”). Having considered the

pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc. No. 52), reply (Doc. No. 53), and sur-reply

(Doc. No. 58), the court denies the motion because there is not a substantial overlap between the

instant suit and Kurian David et al. v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C. et al., the first filed suit. See Civ. A.

No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.).

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States

filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.1 That Court denied class

1. The District Court has not ruled on the collective action FLSA claims in the David case, which include opt-ins by the Plaintiffs in this case. (Doc. No. 52, p. 9.)
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certification;2 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 64.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court against the following Defendants: the Burnett Defendants, Signal International L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively referred to as “Signal”), Indo-Amerisoft L.L.C., Kurella Rao, J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, Billy R. Wilks, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: 1) The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; 2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; 3) The Civil Rights act of 1866; and 4) The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id.) In addition, the Plaintiffs bring state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims against all of the Defendants. (Id.) On September 3, 2013, the Burnett Defendants filed the pending motion to transfer venue. (Doc. No. 39.)
2. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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B. Factual Background In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs,
were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 64, p. 2.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. (Id.)
II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. First to File Rule The Burnett Defendants move to transfer the instant case to the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to the First-Filed Doctrine. (Doc. No. 39, p. 1.) “Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mexico Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger
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of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999)). “The first-to-file rule is a discretionary doctrine.” Jones v. Xerox Commercial Solutions, LLC, CIV. A. No. H-13-0650, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013) (quoting Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 603). The rule is utilized “to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997). The party wishing to transfer the case has the burden to prove that transfer is warranted. Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *2 (citing Sanofi–Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 n. 5 (E.D. Tex. 2009); VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp., No. 2:07–cv–138, 2007 WL 2238054, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007); Buckalew v. Celanese, LTD., No. G–05–315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005)).
“In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, No. 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (citing Texas Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.” White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008).
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IV. Analysis The Burnett Defendants argue there is substantial overlap between the instant case and the first filed case, David. (Doc. No. 39, p. 1.) While there are similarities in the two cases, the court finds that the two cases do not involve such substantially similar parties and issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions. A. Parties There is some overlap between the parties in David and the instant case, but it is not substantial. While all of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit are also plaintiffs in David, as explained below, they are only asserting FLSA claims in David, which they do not assert here.3 (Doc. No. 52, p. 9.) Conversely, none of the David plaintiffs asserting non-FLSA claims are parties in the instant case. (Id.) The David defendants and the Defendants in this suit are not completely identical, but for purposes of this analysis, the court finds that the difference is insignificant. While the first-to-file rule does not require identical parties, see Save Power Ltd., 121 F.3d at 950, “the fact that the parties are different cuts against an argument for substantial overlap.” Jones, 2013 WL 3245957, at *4. B. Claims Although the first-to-file rule also does not require the issues to completely overlap, “the cases should be more than merely related to support a motion to transfer when venue is otherwise appropriate.” Buckalew v. Celanese, Ltd., CIV. A. No. G-05-315, 2005 WL 2266619, at *2 (S.D.
3. Even if the Plaintiffs in this case were at one point putative class members in the David class action litigation, they were never parties since the class was never certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (holding that it is erroneous to believe a nonnamed class member is a party to class action litigation before the class is certified, or if certification is ultimately denied).
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Tex. Sept. 16, 2005). The instant suit and David are related to the extent that all of the claims asserted in this suit are also asserted by the different David Plaintiffs. However, there is not substantial overlap among the claims in both suits. As the District Court established in its opinion denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in David, each of the Plaintiffs’ claims require individualized proof as it pertains to that particular Plaintiff. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). Thus, not only are each of the individual Plaintiffs’ forced labor, trafficking, RICO and civil rights claims different from one another in this suit, as explained below, they are entirely different from their pending FLSA claims in David. Therefore, the issues presented by the Plaintiffs here cannot be resolved in the David suit. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, S. Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist. of ILA, AFL-CIO, 751 F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1985) (“. . . a district court may dismiss an action where the issues presented can be resolved in an earlier-filed action pending in another district court.”). The Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case also rely heavily on the alleged abuses and poor working conditions at the Signal facility in Orange, Texas. Logically, the conditions experienced by the Plaintiffs in this case will be different than those experienced by a majority of the David Plaintiffs who were housed in Signal’s Pascagoula, Mississippi facility. (Doc. No. 32, Exh. 2, pp. 5-7.)4
4. Burnett asserts in his motion to transfer: “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit 1 is the entire Complaint filed in David.” (Doc. No. 39, p. 2.) However Burnett did not attach the complaint as an exhibit to his motion when it was filed. Nonetheless, Burnett did attach the David complaint to his motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 32, Exh. 2), which the court considered.
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1. Forced Labor and Trafficking The success of each Plaintiff’s forced labor and trafficking claims is dependent on individualized factors. The question in a forced labor case is “whether Defendants’ coercive conduct was such that it could overcome the will of the victim so as to make him render his labor involuntary.” David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247 at 77. “This question cannot be answered via generalized class-wide proof but rather must be answered individually based upon individualized proof.” Id. Similarly, with trafficking, “individual issues will play a significant part” because involuntary servitude is an essential element of the claim. Id. at 80-81. 2. RICO Claims The success of each Plaintiff’s RICO claim is also based on each individual’s experience because the Plaintiff will be “required to prove that the [Defendants] committed the predicate acts upon which they rely for the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 92. As stated above, proof of the predicate acts of trafficking and forced labor are “all premised on coercion” and “cannot be made without resort to individualized proof.” Id. Additionally, in order to prove the fraud-based predicate acts, each Plaintiff will “have to prove first-party reliance on the alleged fraud that was directed at them,” because “the question of individual reliance [is] paramount to resolving whether Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a RICO violation.” Id. at 105-06. 3. Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 The Plaintiffs allege that the Burnett Defendants violated the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1971 by violating their right to be free from “forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 64, p. 65.) Forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking all include
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an element of coercion, which requires an individualized analysis of each Plaintiff’s situation, as stated above. David, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *128.
As one can easily discern, none of the above causes of action involve substantially similar issues to the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims pending in David, which include claims of violating the federally mandated minimum wage laws. The proof required for the FLSA claims and the remedies sought are distinct from the proof and remedies at issue in the instant matter. Given that there is not a substantial overlap of the claims between the David litigation and this case, and with the exception of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in David, none of the Plaintiffs in the instant suit and David overlap, the court’s denial of the Burnett Defendants’ motion to transfer will not result in “piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997).
V. Conclusion The court finds that the instant suit does not substantially overlap with the first-filed suit, David. Accordingly, the Burnett Defendants’ “Motion to Transfer Venue and Memorandum in Support” (Doc. No. 39) is DENIED.
SIGNED this 14th day of July, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 124 Filed 08/04/14 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 2364

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING THE BURNETT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 32)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Before the undersigned is a “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” filed by Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as “Burnett” and “the Burnett Defendants”). (Doc. No. 32.) The undersigned has considered the pending motion and the corresponding response (Doc. No. 47), reply (Doc. No. 51) and sur-reply (Doc. No. 57). The Burnett Defendants’ motion should be denied because the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, and a motion for summary judgment is the proper vehicle to prove the Plaintiffs state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
I. Background A. Procedural Background
On March 7, 2008, twelve individuals who were allegedly trafficked into the United States filed a putative class action against the Defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana

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asserting trafficking, RICO, civil rights, and state law contract and fraud claims.1 See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220 (E.D. La.). That Court denied class certification;2 and, as a result of this ruling, the Plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit in this District, where they were allegedly subjected to deplorable working conditions at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. (Doc. No. 64.) On May 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this court. (Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently, they filed their first amended complaint on August 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 19) and their second amended complaint on December 19, 2013 (Doc. No. 64). B. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the Plaintiffs, were allegedly trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to the Signal Defendants. (Doc. No. 64 , p. 2.) The Plaintiffs claim they were lured to work for Signal through the fraudulent promise of legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families. (Id.) Subsequently, after coming to the United States, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. (Id. at 3.)
The Burnett Defendants consist of Malvern C. Burnett and his two corporations: Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. and Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. The Plaintiffs accuse Burnett of conspiring with Signal and other Defendants to recruit Indian welders and pipefitters to fill anticipated H-2B guest worker jobs at Signal’s Orange, Texas operations with false promises of permanent residency in the United States for the workers and their families. (Id., p. 24.)
1. The Plaintiffs presumably still have FLSA claims pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Doc. No. 44, p. 5.)
2. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Civ. A. No. 08-1220, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *129 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012).
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II. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs seek recovery pursuant to several federal statutes. For actions brought under these statutory provisions, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the state law causes of action, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction predicated upon supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When a court analyzes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Beaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant such a motion only when the complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
IV. Analysis The Plaintiffs allege Burnett violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
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Act (“TVPA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (“KKA”). (Doc. No. 64.) The Plaintiffs have also asserted state law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against Burnett. (Id.) First, Burnett argues the Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient facts to state any claim. (Doc. No. 32.) Second, Burnett asserts the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.) A. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
1. Insufficient Facts Burnett generally argues the Plaintiffs failed to state more than mere conclusions and recitals of statutory language without any basis in fact in their complaint. In particular, Burnett argues that the Plaintiffs did not provide any facts showing Burnett engaged in illegal activity. In addition, Burnett argues that each of the Plaintiffs’ federal claims “has as its linchpin” the false concept “that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 32, p. 2.) First, the undersigned finds, contrary to Burnett’s assertion, that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that Burnett is liable for the alleged misconduct. In their complaint (Doc. No. 64) the Plaintiffs allege the following:
The Plaintiffs were trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H-2B guest worker program to provide labor and services to Signal. Recruited to perform welding, pipefitting, and other marine fabrication work, the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal’s operations in Orange, Texas. All of the Defendants have exploited and defrauded the Plaintiffs by fraudulently recruiting them to work in the United States and effectuating a broad scheme of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and physical restraint, and threatened abuse of the legal process to maintain
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control over the Plaintiffs. Upon information and belief, since at least December 2003
through at least mid-2004, the Burnett Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants frequently communicated and consulted frequently via mail, fax, e-mail and/or telephone communications to coordinate and direct Recruiter Defendants’ activities, including advertising efforts on behalf of Labor Broker Defendants. Recruiter Defendants, the Burnett Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants personally and through employees, agents and/or associates, told Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs successfully passed skills tests administered in the United Arab Emirates or India and paid fees totaling approximately 5 to 8 Indian lakh rupees (approximately $12,000 to $20,000), then Plaintiffs would be able to apply for permanent resident (green card) status in the United States with Labor Broker Defendants. In these conversations in the first half of 2004, Plaintiffs were informed on several occasions by Recruiter Defendants and/or the Burnett Defendants that in exchange for an additional fee of approximately $1,500 per family member, Plaintiffs would be able to obtain legal permanent residence for their spouses and children. Furthermore, the Burnett Defendants told Plaintiffs that the green card process, once commenced, would be completed within 18 to 24 months. In such communications with Plaintiffs, Recruiter Defendants, Burnett, and Labor Broker Defendants further promised to act diligently and do everything necessary to obtain green cards for Plaintiffs in the timelines stipulated.
Based on these and other contractually-binding promises made to them regarding green cards and work opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs signed contracts at various times in early to mid-2004 with the Burnett Defendants. In these contracts, the Burnett Defendants further promised that Plaintiffs would promptly receive a refund of all or nearly all of their payments if the Defendants did not succeed in securing green cards for Plaintiffs. The Burnet Defendants, Recruiter Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the green card contracts: (a) without intent to diligently pursue Plaintiffs’ green card applications; and (b) knowingly without any basis whatsoever for representing, inter alia: (i) that the companies and/or entities purportedly sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications were financially solvent and had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide Plaintiffs; (ii) that green card applications sponsored by such companies would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; (iii) and that such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.
Upon information and belief, in the course of these
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communications, Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and the Burnett Defendants to represent that Signal would apply for at least two to three H-2B visa extensions on behalf of all the Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs, to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while Plaintiffs’ green card applications were being processed. Signal authorized its agents to make these representations even though it knew or had reason to know that such visa extensions and green card applications would not be bona fide and valid under United States immigration law. Moreover, Signal authorized its agents to make these misrepresentations even though it did not have the intention at that time to apply for such visa extensions and/or green cards on behalf of all of the Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs.
The Burnett Defendants filed with the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Department of Labor the completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking permission to import and hire 590 foreign guest workers under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3, and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guest worker program”). In the applications to the state workforce commissions and forms ETA 750, Burnett and Signal stated that Signal would employ workers from October 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007, despite their knowledge that the projected labor need would be at least two-to-three years. Signal stated in letters of support to these applications that its need for H- 2B guest workers was “peak load and a one-time occurrence” and that “the temporary workers will work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage, and will return to their home country at the end of employment.” Signal executives and Burnett signed these applications swearing, under penalty of perjury, to the veracity of the information in these applications.
After the Indian workers started to organize and complain about their terrible working and living conditions, Signal contacted the Burnett Defendants to express its concerns about worker organizing efforts. During these conversations the Recruiter Defendants, the Burnett Defendants, and Signal reached an agreement regarding steps that they would take to discourage further worker organizing efforts to ensure that the majority of the Indian H-2B workforce continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B workforce from exercising their legal rights. Signal called a workforce-wide meeting on or about March 8, 2007 in the Pascagoula camp, attended by Signal management and Burnett. At this meeting,
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Signal management told the Pascagoula workers that Signal would fight back against organizing efforts by the workers. These threats were promptly reported to the workers in Orange, including Plaintiffs.
Subsequently, Defendants Dewan and Burnett came to the Signal camp in Orange, Texas and again falsely promised, in the presence of Signal personnel, that Signal, through its attorney Defendant Burnett, would make bona fide applications for green cards and obtain several H-2B visa extensions for the workers who had not been terminated by Signal. The Plaintiffs reasonably believed these false promises.
Since first contracting with Defendants in India and the United Arab Emirates, Plaintiffs have yet to receive from Defendants the green cards Defendants promised them. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, the Recruiter Defendants, the Legal Facilitator Defendants, and the Labor Broker Defendants have refused to refund any of the moneys Plaintiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing.
The Plaintiffs have clearly alleged “Burnett was a principal participant in a substantial
and extremely destructive . . . trafficking scheme planned and executed among the Defendants.”
(Doc. No. 47, p. 2.) In their motion to dismiss, the Burnett Defendants argue that these facts are
merely “occurrences and actions that are consistent with any attorney representing his or her
clients.” (Doc. No. 32, p. 3.) However, the Plaintiffs have provided facts describing Burnett’s
acts that are entirely inconsistent with a “normal” attorney-client relationship. As stated above,
Burnett allegedly made false promises to the Plaintiffs to lure them into working for Signal.
Burnett also required the Plaintiffs to pay him exorbitant fees for his services, and then refused to
refund the Plaintiffs’ money when he failed to perform as promised.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have provided sufficient facts to support their argument that
Burnett is liable for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
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generally.” As detailed above, Burnett made several promises to the Plaintiffs that he allegedly knew to be untrue: 1) Signal had reliable and stable employment opportunities to provide Plaintiffs; 2) green card applications sponsored by Signal would be valid and bona fide under U.S. immigration law; 3) such applications were likely to be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines; and 4) Burnett would refund the Plaintiffs’ money if he failed to perform. (Doc. No. 64, p. 25.) In reliance on Burnett’s promises, the Plaintiffs “plunged themselves and their families into debt,” and traveled to the United States to work at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility. (Id., p. 2.)
The Plaintiffs have also provided sufficient facts alleging that Burnett conspired with Signal. More than once, in their complaint and the RICO chart attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1, the Plaintiffs allege that the Burnett Defendants worked with the Recruiter Defendants and Signal to carry out this scheme. The Plaintiffs identify letters and phone conversations showing the Defendants conspired to: 1) recruit the Plaintiffs with false promises of permanent residency for themselves and their families; and 2) keep the Plaintiffs from protesting their mistreatment and leaving Signal’s employ.
Finally, Burnett generally states the Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support their breach of contract claim. (Doc. No. 32, p. 5.) However, the Plaintiffs allege they entered into contracts with Burnett under which they would pay fees to Burnett in exchange for his promise to provide them with lawful employment and work-authorized green cards enabling them to permanently and legally reside in the United States with their families. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 25-26.) Burnett allegedly breached this contract by not fulfilling those promises and refusing to refund the fees the Plaintiffs paid him. (Id., p. 50.)
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2. Involuntary Servitude The Burnett Defendants also argue that “each of the federal causes of action has as its linchpin the concept that threats of deportation satisfies the definition of involuntary servitude,” and “as a matter of law, the threat of deportation does not satisfy a determination of involuntary servitude.” (Doc. No. 32, p. 2.) The Burnett Defendants do not elaborate on how each of the Plaintiffs’ claims is based on the premise that threats of deportation satisfy the definition of involuntary servitude. Nonetheless, the case cited by Burnett in support of his assertion is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, the plaintiffs were “seeking compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment.” Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs supported their RICO and false imprisonment claims on the theory that the defendants forced them into working by threatening to report their immigration status to the authorities. Id. at 533. The Court stated that “absent some special circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude.” Id. at 541. However, unlike the instant case, in Zavala, Wal-Mart did not contract directly with the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs did not work exclusively for Wal-Mart and “often switched jobs, freely moving to different employers in different cities;” and the plaintiffs were not housed in labor camps. Id. In fact, the Zavala court asserted that “[m]odern day examples of involuntary servitude have been limited to labor camps, isolated religious sects, or forced confinement.” Id. at 540. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs allege they were housed in a guarded, overcrowded and isolated “labor camps comprised of trailer-like bunkhouses.” (Doc. No. 64, p. 38.) The “labor camp” was allegedly surrounded by fences and was located in an
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isolated industrial area miles removed from shopping, places of worship, public transportation or
residential communities. (Id.)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Kozminski that “the
vulnerabilities of the victim are relevant in determining whether the physical or legal coercion or
threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to serve” involuntarily. United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). The Court further held that “a trial court could
properly find that evidence of . . . extremely poor working conditions is relevant to corroborate
disputed evidence regarding the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion . . . .” Id.
Therefore, a court must consider all of the relevant circumstances when determining whether the
Plaintiffs were forced to serve involuntarily. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege the
following:
The Texas Labor Camp gates were constantly monitored by security guards retained by Signal. Signal’s security guards monitored the Plaintiffs’ comings and goings by requiring them to show their employee identification badges and recording when the Plaintiffs entered and exited the camp. Signal’s security guards also searched the Plaintiffs’ packages and bags when they entered the camp. Except on rare occasions, the Plaintiffs were not permitted to receive visitors in the camp.
Up to twenty-four men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in two tiered bunk beds. The bunk beds were so tightly packed in the bunkhouses that it was difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between bunks or sit up in bed. These housing conditions violated OSHA regulations. The Texas Labor Camp bunkhouses had insufficient toilet and bathing facilities for twenty-four men, resulting in long lines for the bathrooms before and after work shifts. Signal’s personnel and security guards conducted surprise searches of the dormitory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings. Upon information and belief, Signal did not obtain the required permit(s) to furnish board at the Texas Labor Camp, and the condition and sanitation of the board provided further violated federal, state, and/or local law. When the Plaintiffs complained and asked to live outside the Texas Labor Camp, Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they
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tried to live outside the Texas Labor Camp Signal would still deduct the labor camp fees from the Plaintiffs’ wages. As a result, the Plaintiffs reasonably believed they had no choice but to continue living in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp.
Signal only housed Indian H-2B Workers such as the Plaintiffs in its Labor Camps, which other employees and management at Signal referred to as the “reservation(s).” Upon information and belief, United States citizens and other workers of non-Indian descent and non-Indian race were neither required nor allowed to live in or pay for accommodations in Signal’s Texas Labor Camp. Signal subjected the Plaintiffs to skills testing and re-testing, on-the-job discipline, layoffs, periods without work, lack of safety precautions, unfavorable job assignments, evaluation processes, and other adverse employment actions to which non-Indian and United States citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
In addition, Signal camp personnel and supervisors frequently subject Plaintiffs to an objectively hostile and abusive environment. They often used offensive language in speaking with and/or referring to Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers and regularly insulted Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or alienage.
In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the Texas Labor Camp and saddled with the crushing debts they had incurred to come to the United States in reliance upon the Defendants’ representatives, the Plaintiffs reasonably believed Signal’s statements were threatening and believed they had no choice but to continue working for Signal despite terrible working and living conditions.
The Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B Workers became increasingly frightened and confused, particularly when word spread that Signal had locked the gate that served as the sole exit from the Pascagoula labor camp. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence on Signal for their present and future immigration status, their continuing high levels of indebtedness, as well as other factors reasonably led Plaintiffs to fear serious harm and/or abuse of the legal process if they left Signal’s employ.
In light of these allegations, the undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible
claim of involuntary servitude. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the court deny
the Burnet Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible
claim.
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B. Statute of Limitations The Burnett Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims are time barred by the statute of limitations. Burnett argues the statute of limitations on the state law claims began to run, at the latest, when the David case was filed on March 7, 2008. (Doc. No. 32, p. 6.) Burnett submits that because the plaintiffs were putative class members in David, they were “necessarily aware of all the facts” that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations. (Id.) Although Burnett does not catalogue the statute of limitations for each pendent state law claim under Texas law, he claims they would expire, at the latest, in four years—2012. (Id.) The complaint in the instant case was filed in 2013. Burnett also argues the federal class action filed in the David court, which was not certified, did not toll the running of the statute of limitations on the state law claims. In response, the Plaintiffs argue the David Court explicitly tolled the statute of limitations on all of the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. (Doc. No. 47, p. 17.) In the alternative, they argue Texas law supports the tolling of the statute of limitations as to all purported members of a class upon the filing of the class action. (Id., p. 13.) The David complaint was filed on March 7, 2008. (Doc. No. 32, Exh. 2.) United States District Judge Jay Zainey, upon the consent of Signal and the Burnett Defendants, entered an order tolling the statute of limitations for the absent class members’ (who are the Plaintiffs in this case) state law claims for 120 days until after the court’s final ruling on class certification. Order, Kurian David et al. v. Signal International, L.L.C., et al., No. 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011) (Doc. No. 982). Judge Zainey entered an order denying class certification on January 4, 2012, making the expiration of the tolling period May 3, 2012. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1117). The case was subsequently transferred to United States District Judge Susie Morgan. Order Reassigning Case, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No.
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1157). Over Signal’s objection, Judge Morgan further tolled the statute of limitations for the Plaintiffs’ claims until August 28, 2013. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1379). However, pursuant to Burnett’s request, Judge Morgan clarified that prior order by stating it only tolled the limitations period for the federal law claims, not any state law claims. Order and Reasons, David, No. 2:08-cv-1220 (Doc. No. 1417).
For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is typically not to look beyond the complaint. However, a court may consider attachments to briefing regarding a motion to dismiss if the documents are referenced in the complaint, central to the complaint, referenced by the parties, and their authenticity is not in dispute. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293– 94 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Those are the only documents the undersigned should consider in deciding the motion to dismiss as it concerns the limitations issue—not the various court orders entered by the New Orleans district courts tolling state statutes of limitations for the pendent state law claims.3
Nevertheless, even if the undersigned were to consider and apply Judge Zainey’s tolling order from the date the David complaint was filed until its expiration, the undersigned would still need to go outside the pleadings to intelligently determine the appropriate accrual date for the various state law claims and what effect the tolling period from Judge Zainey’s order has on the
3. Burnett did not address the tolling orders entered by the David court, and the Plaintiffs only mentioned Judge Morgan’s initial order tolling the statute of limitations for the state law claims, not the order clarifying that the previous order only applied to the federal law claims. It should be noted that the briefing on the instant motion occurred before Judge Morgan’s order tolling the statutes of limitations was entered.
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timeliness of the pendent state law claims filed in the instant complaint.4 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), “if on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present material that is pertinent to the motion.” Accordingly, to the extent the Burnett Defendants believe the Plaintiffs’ state law claims are still barred by the statute of limitations in light of Judge Zainey’s tolling order, that is a matter best addressed in a motion for summary judgment, after the parties have had an opportunity for full discovery and the court can consider evidence outside the pleadings.
V. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the Burnett Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 32) should be denied, subject to reconsideration in a motion for summary judgment that the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
VI. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. §
4. Burnett cites Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. 1995) in support of their argument that Texas courts hold the filing of a proposed federal class action does not toll the limitations period on pendent state law claims. See also Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2008). In those cases, it does not appear the Defendants consented to the tolling of the statute of limitations, as the Burnett Defendants did here, at least for the period of time reflected in Judge Zainey’s order. As such, those cases appear to be inapposite.
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 124 Filed 08/04/14 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 2378 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 31st day of July, 2014. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON SIGNAL’S MOTION TO COMPEL (DOC. NO. 127) This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings pursuant to a referral order entered on May 22, 2013. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Signal Defendants’ Motion to Compel” (Doc. No. 127) filed by Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”). This motion centers on the resolution of one issue—to what extent does the in terrorem effect preclude discovery into the Plaintiffs’ “immigration status, immigration history, employment history, and personal information.” (Doc. No. 137, p. 14.)
Signal seeks to compel production of the Plaintiffs’ “drivers’ licenses, visas, employment authorization documents issued by the United States, T visa applications, passports with visa stamps, documents relating to a plaintiff’s involvement in or with social media, and writings relating to the plaintiff’s first paycheck from a source other than Signal.” (Doc. No. 127, p. 1.) Most of Signal’s motion is dedicated to its need for the Plaintiffs’ T visas, which is a visa available specifically to victims of human trafficking that allows those who qualify to stay in the United States for up to four years, and may even lead to permanent residence. The Plaintiffs resist production on three grounds. First, they claim that requiring production of documents that may reveal personal information or immigration status would “harass, embarrass, and oppress

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Plaintiffs . . . and otherwise chill legitimate claims against illegal activity.” (Doc. No. 137, p. 1, 4–7, 11) This is known as the in terrorem effect. Second, that there is a statutory privilege, particularly as related to the Plaintiffs’ visas. (Id. at 7–9.) Third, in its objections to discovery propounded by the Plaintiffs, Signal claimed that anything occurring after the Plaintiffs ceased working for Signal was irrelevant. Therefore, the Plaintiffs contend that Signal cannot not now seek to compel documents from this period. (Id. at p. 9–10.) In turn, the Plaintiffs request that a protective order be entered preventing discovery into “immigration status, immigration history, employment history, and personal information of Plaintiffs or their families after Plaintiffs’ employment with the Signal was terminated.” (Id. at p. 14.)
After considering the parties’ briefing and applicable authorities, the undersigned grants in part and denies in part Signal’s motion. Specifically, as to Signal’s request for the Plaintiffs’ T visas and employment authorization documents, given the nature and stage of this case, and the fact that the documents are both relevant and discoverable, the undersigned finds that Signal’s need for the information outweighs any potential in terrorem effect. Therefore, the undersigned grants Signal’s motion as to the visas and employment authorization documents. As for Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses, passports with visa stamps, and first post-Signal paycheck, Signal failed to meet its burden of why it needs this information. In addition, because Signal has resisted discovery of information from the period after the Plaintiffs stopped working for Signal, on the grounds that it is irrelevant, Signal cannot now claim that this information is discoverable. Accordingly, Signal’s motion as it relates to these items is denied.
As to the Plaintiffs’ request to enter a protective order (Doc. No. 137), the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show good cause why discovery on certain topics should be completely precluded. The information that the Plaintiffs seek to protect is relevant and
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discoverable. However, should Signal seek discovery that is clearly irrelevant and solely aimed at harassment, particularly extensive discovery regarding the Plaintiffs’ relatives or third parties, the undersigned will at that time consider whether judicially imposed limits are necessary.
I. Background 1. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs are thirty-three Indian men who allege that they are victims of human trafficking. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 2, 5–12.) The Plaintiffs assert that Signal, along with several other defendants, lured them into this country with the false promise that if they adequately performed work for Signal, that this could be a pathway to “legal and permanent work-based immigration to the United States . . . .” (Id. at 2.) Based on these allegedly false promises and misleading statements, the Plaintiffs paid significant sums of money to obtain work papers and visas to come to the United States. (Id.) Once here, the Plaintiffs claim to have found themselves in deplorable living and working conditions, as well as subject to threats of “loss of immigration status and deportation, and . . . a campaign of psychological abuse, coercion, and fraud designed to render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.” (Id. at p. 3.)
2. Procedural Background This case has its origins in a putative class action filed in the Eastern District of
Louisiana. (See Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-01220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)). Class certification was denied, which caused the individual putative class members to file suit in the districts where their injuries allegedly occurred. (See Doc. No. 1117, David, 2:08cv-01220 (E.D. La. Jan 4, 2012)). Cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Southern District of Mississippi. The Mississippi cases were consolidated and transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana under the “first-to-file” rule.
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(See Doc. No. 44, Achari v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:13-cv-222 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 18, 2013)). In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit in the Southern District of Mississippi alleging multiple Title VII violations that was also transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana. (See Doc. No. 52, EEOC v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:11-cv-179 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 29, 2012)). All of the cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana are pending in the same court.
The court in the Eastern District of Louisiana court has severely limited discovery related to immigration status. (Doc. No. 125, p. 5.); see also David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 257 F.R.D. 114, 126 (E.D. La. 2009) (“[A]ny inquiry into plaintiffs’ current immigration status, current residence and/or post-termination employment history will most assuredly strike paralyzing fear in the plaintiffs sufficient to chill any inclination they may have had to prosecute their pending claims.”). The Plaintiffs argue that “[t]o require disclosure in this case would not only conflict with other protective orders in the Related Cases, it would also allow the Signal Defendants to circumvent those orders and obtain discovery other courts have excluded.” (Doc. No. 137, p. 6.) The undersigned is confident, however, that to the extent any order entered in this case conflicts with an order entered in a related case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, any impact can be ameliorated by proper limits on the dissemination and use of the information produced.
III. Legal Standard “Generally, the scope of discovery is broad and permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.’” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). “A discovery request is relevant when the request seeks admissible evidence or ‘is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, “a district court has broad
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discretion in all discovery matters, and such discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse.” Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling . . . discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). “The moving party bears the burden of showing that the materials and information sought are relevant to the action or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Marin v. Gilberg, Civ. A. No. V-07-62, 2009 WL 426061, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2009). If the moving party meets its burden, “the burden then shifts to the party resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad, or unduly burdensome or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.” Id.
In addition, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” a party may move for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The party seeking a protective order bears the burden to show that good cause exists. See In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit has noted that this requires showing “‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garret, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978)); compare Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 77–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the idea that “protective orders must be supported by concrete factual showings” and noting that some courts only require “good cause”) (citations omitted).
IV. Analysis Signal seeks to compel the production of the Plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses, visas, employment authorization documents issued by the United States government, T visa applications, passports with visa stamps, documents relating to involvement with social media,
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and writings relating to their first paycheck from a source other than Signal. (Doc. No. 127, p. 1.) Signal does not identify which specific Requests for Production are at issue, but it appears that Requests for Production Nos. 1–8, 13, 14, and 47 call for this information.1 (Id., Ex.1.) The information that Signal seeks can be grouped into two categories: documents related to the plaintiffs’ immigration status (Requests Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8) and general personal information (Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 47). Each set will be addressed separately.
a. Documents related to the Plaintiffs’ immigration status Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 8 seek to compel production of the Plaintiffs’ T visas and supporting documents, and Requests for Production Nos. 5 and 6 seek employment authorization documents.2 As will be discussed below, if a person qualifies for a T or U visa, they can also seek employment authorization. Therefore, because these documents are somewhat related and both could identify the Plaintiffs’ current immigration status, they will be addressed together.
i. Background on T and U visas T and U visas were created with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act (“VTVPA”). See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 107, 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1477–79, 1534–37. The T visa is available to unauthorized immigrants who have been victims of human trafficking, whereas a U visa is
1. Signal failed to specially identify which of its seventy-two requests for production are at issue. The identified requests are the undersigned’s best guess. See Hart v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Del. 2010) (denying a motion to compel and noting that because the plaintiff failed to identify which of the sixty-five requests were at issue that the plaintiffs “failed to provide the necessary specificity to allow the Court to compel Defendant to reply to any individual request”).
2. Signal’s motion seeks to compel production of both T and U visas, but Signal did not specifically request the U visa in its Requests for Production. (Doc. No. 127.) The Plaintiffs, however, do not raise this as a reason not to produce the U visas. Given the similarity of the T and U visas, the undersigned will consider compelling production of both.
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available to victims of “qualifying criminal activity.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.11 (T visa); 214.14 (U visa). The Code of Federal Regulations contains a laundry list of “qualifying criminal activity,” which includes such crimes as trafficking, involuntary servitude, and slave trade. Id. § 214.14(a)(9).
The T and U visas share some important characteristics that are relevant to this case. First, they are available to not only the victim, but also certain family members of the victim. Id. §§ 214.11(o) (T visa); 214.14(f) (U visa). Second, both require cooperation with law enforcement. To obtain a T visa, the victim must comply with any reasonable requests from a law enforcement agency for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of human trafficking. Id. § 214.11(h). Similarly, to obtain a U visa, a victim must have been “helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a certifying agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her petition is based . . . .” Id. § 214.14(b)(3). Third, each visa is valid for four years, and after a period of three years, the victim may seek permanent residence. Id. §§ 245.23(a) (T visa); 241.14(g) (U visa). Lastly, each visa authorizes the victim to lawfully obtain employment. Id. §§ 214.11(l) (T visa); 214.14(i)(7) (U visa).
ii. Signal has met its burden As the movant, it is Signal’s burden to demonstrate that this information is discoverable. Signal argues that because there are substantial benefits derived from obtaining one of these visas, there may be an incentive for the Plaintiffs to fabricate their claims or exaggerate the extent of the harm that they suffered as a result of Signal’s actions in order to acquire such a visa. Therefore, according to Signal, the visas and employment authorization documents are
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discoverable because they may be probative of the Plaintiffs’ motives.3
The information that Signal seeks falls within the broad scope of discovery. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense . . .” and “relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).4
Information in the visas and visa applications may shed light on Signal’s claim that the Plaintiffs
“manufactured their allegations against Signal,” or could at least lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. (Doc. No. 122, p. 4.) For example, in the T visa application, under penalty
of perjury, a victim must check a box stating that they are a victim of severe trafficking. The
applicant is also requested to explain certain answers, such as whether they will suffer extreme
hardship if removed from the United States, and whether they have reported these acts to law enforcement, as well as submit a “personal narrative statement describing the trafficking.”5 See
I-914, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, http://www.uscis.gov/i-914. Moreover, a law
enforcement officer may also fill out a form, where they mark a box on whether the applicant has
been a victim of trafficking and describing the victimization. See I-914, Supplement B,
Declaration of Law Enforcement Officer for Victim of Trafficking in Persons,
http://www.uscis.gov/i-914 (noting that a person may qualify for a T visa without this form, but
3. Signal devotes much of its motion to arguments related to the confrontation clause and its constitutional rights to discovery. These arguments are misplaced. The confrontation clause, by its terms, only applies in the criminal setting. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”) (emphasis added). In a civil case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate Signal’s rights to information. So long as this court does not clearly abuse its discretion in applying these rules and completely deprive Signal of access to discovery (which in an extreme case may potentially be a due process violation), Signal’s constitutional rights will have been protected.
4. See also Local Civil Rule CV-26(d) (noting that information is discoverable if “it is information that is likely to have an influence on or affect the outcome of a claim or defense” or “that deserves to be considered in the preparation, evaluation or trial of a claim or defense”).
5. The Plaintiffs claim that redacted affidavits attached to their visa applications have been produced. (Doc. No. 125, p. 3 n. 1.)
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“submission of the Supplement B is strongly advised”). Signal is entitled to know what boxes, if any, were checked by the Plaintiffs or law enforcement, and any proffered descriptions, which would necessarily relate to the events giving rise to this lawsuit.
In addition, Signal is likely to argue that if there is any wrongdoing, the other defendants are to blame.6 The information contained in the visa application, particularly information describing the instances of trafficking or other alleged crimes, may be informative as to whether the any of the Plaintiffs places blame on Signal or another codefendant. While the undersigned is not determining at this juncture whether such evidence will be admissible at trial, it is not beyond belief that it might, at the very least, lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Therefore, Signal has met its burden of demonstrating this information is discoverable.
iii. The burden shifts to the Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs argue that they should not be compelled to produce immigration related documents on three grounds. First, because Signal previously claimed that documents from the time that Plaintiffs stopped working for Signal are irrelevant, Signal cannot now claim that this information is discoverable. Second, that these documents are privileged under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and as such, Plaintiffs cannot be compelled to produce these documents. Third, producing these documents would have an in terrorem effect on the Plaintiffs, as well as other victims of trafficking, and therefore, social policies trump Signal’s need for the visas.
1. The immigration documents are relevant As to the Plaintiffs’ first argument, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas cannot be classified as merely documents relating to the Plaintiffs’ post-Signal activities.
6. Signal has yet to file an answer in this case. In a parallel case, however, Signal filed a cross-claim against the other defendants, alleging: “Plaintiffs’ suit alleges that Signal was part of a concerted wrongdoing directed at foreign workers. However, Signal was a victim of the cross claim defendants’ actions rather than a willing participant.” (See Doc. No. 79, Samuel v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:13-cv-323 (E.D. Tex. April 17, 2014)).
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First, it is unclear when, or even if, any of Plaintiffs sought these visas. It is plausible that if any Plaintiffs applied for these visas, they did so while still employed at Signal. Moreover, these documents will likely contain factual statements and assertions about the Plaintiffs’ experiences related to their trafficking and their experiences while employed by Signal. Accordingly, even if the Plaintiffs applied for these visas after they left Signal, the information contained in the applications is not simply information related to Plaintiffs’ post-Signal activities. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ objection on relevancy grounds is not sufficient to deny Signal access to these documents.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is not an absolute privilege Plaintiffs argue that the confidentiality provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a) prohibits the undersigned from compelling the production of the Plaintiffs’ T visa applications and related materials. Section 1367 generally prohibits the use or dissemination of information regarding whether a person holds a T or U visa. However, according to the plain language of the statue, it only applies to: the Attorney General, or any other official or employee of the Department of Justice, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or any other official or any other official or employee of the Department of Homeland Security or Department of State (including any bureau or agency or either of such departments) 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Thus, the statute does not apply to the discovery obligations of private litigants. Plaintiffs, however, argue that when read as whole, the statute confers a privilege that runs to the Plaintiffs. Section 1376(a)(2) prohibits the above named agencies from “permit[ting] use by or disclosure to anyone . . . of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an application . . ,” and § 1376(b)(4) creates an exception, allowing certain victims to waive the restrictions on use information. The Plaintiffs argue that because §1376(b)(4)
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confers a right of waiver, that it must also create a privilege. In other words, §1376(b)(4) evidences a victim’s right not have to disclose this information, otherwise, there would be no reason for a corollary right to waive this privilege. Therefore, according to the Plaintiffs, the undersigned cannot compel them to disclose this information against their will.
Plaintiffs misread this statute. This section might be applicable if Signal had made a Freedom of Information Act request to one of the named agencies. See Hawke v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C-07-03456, 2008 WL 4460241, *5–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008). Then, if the Plaintiffs had not waived the right of non-disclosure, one of those agencies would be prohibited from disclosing this information. Here, Signal has made the request on the Plaintiffs. The undersigned does not read this statute as conferring an absolute right of privilege on the Plaintiffs in this situation. See Demaj v. Sakaj, No. 3:09-cv-255, 2012 WL 476168, at *6 (D. Con. Feb. 14, 2012) (noting that the statutory privilege only applied to the named agencies, and that if the plaintiffs were in the possession of their immigration documents, they could be compelled to produce them).
Moreover, the undersigned does not find that requiring the Plaintiffs to disclose information related to their visas would undermine the purpose of the statue. Had the Plaintiffs not sued Signal, their immigration status would be privileged and Signal would have no right to obtain their visas, even if criminal charges were filed against Signal. See Hawke, 2008 WL 4460241 at *5–7. However, once a party decides to sue and seek money damages, the calculus changes. As discussed below, Signal has a right to defend itself, and in this case, the information contained in the visas may contain relevant information.
3. The in terrorem effect does not outweigh Signal’s need for the documents
The Plaintiffs next argue that, even if the visas are relevant, they should not be required
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to produce them because if forced to do so, it would dissuade them from prosecuting this case. This is known as the in terrorem effect, and has been invoked to preclude or limit discovery into sensitive topics, particularly immigration status.
The in terrorem effect is predicated on two concepts. First, that certain remedial statutes, in order to achieve their goals, rely on enforcement by private citizens. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing that “Congress intended to empower individuals to act as private attorneys general in enforcing provisions of Title VII.”); Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 251 (2010) (noting that the VTVPA was amended in 2003 to add a private cause of action “thereby codifying a new class of private attorneys general and representing an effort to extend civil rights protections to trafficked persons.”). Second, if forced to disclose their immigration status in a lawsuit, victims may be reluctant to file suit because, if it is revealed that they are not in the country legally, they may face deportation or harassment. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064. One court even reasoned that documented workers might be deterred from enforcing their rights for “fear that their immigration status would be changed, or that their status would reveal the immigration problems of their family or friends. . .” Id. at 1065. Thus, the in terrorem effect reflects a policy choice that the enforcement of certain statutes outweighs a party’s need for full and unfettered discovery into matters that may be of minimal or no relevance. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064–66 (discussing the policy reasons behind the in terrorem doctrine and holding: “Given Title VII’s dependence on private enforcement, we find that the national effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace would be hampered by the discovery practices [the defendant] seeks to validate here.”); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A]llowing parties to inquire about
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the immigration status of other parties, . . . present[s] a danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”) (citation omitted).
There is no bright-line rule for when the in terrorem effect should limit discovery. Rather, courts balance the unique facts and posture of each case against the relevant social policies of the statutes at issue. See, e.g., Thomas A. Doyle, “Competing Concerns in Employment Litigation: How Courts are Managing Discovery of an Employee’s Immigration Status,” 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 405, 406–14 (Spring 2013) (identifying eight factors courts often consider in deciding whether to allow discovery of an employee’s immigration status). The two most relevant factors that courts tend to consider are: what statute the plaintiff is suing under and the procedural posture of the case.
As for the statute that a plaintiff is suing under, this informs whether immigration status is in any way relevant to the underlying case. Where irrelevant or merely collateral to a party’s claim or defense, courts often preclude immigration related discovery. See Topo, 210 F.R.D. at 77–78. For example, the Fifth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus and reversed a trial court’s order requiring the plaintiffs to answer questions related to their immigration status, because the “protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is documented or undocumented is irrelevant.” In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1987); see also EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., Inc., CV-10-3033-LRS, 2012 WL 442025 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting that immigration status has no bearing on determining liability under Title VII). Conversely, when immigration status is arguably relevant, courts have allowed for discovery. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., No. 3:10-cv135, 2014 WL 281979, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2014).
The heart of the issue in this case is human trafficking. One could argue that, like claims
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under Title VII or the FLSA, immigration status is irrelevant to claim for trafficking. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170–71. A person can bring a trafficking claim regardless of whether they are a citizen, legal immigrant, or undocumented worker. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1590. However, something sets a trafficking claim apart from one brought pursuant to Title VII or the FLSA— the T and U visa. These visas create a safe harbor, allowing victims of trafficking and certain other crimes to stay in the United States legally while prosecuting their case. No such equivalent visa, amnesty, or safe harbor exists for a plaintiff bringing an FLSA or Title VII claim.
The availability of these visas impact the in terrorem analysis in two important respects. First, they create an incentive for an undocumented worker to fabricate or exaggerate a claim of human trafficking. See Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979, at *1 (noting that certain immigration benefits were available to plaintiffs due to their allegations). The undersigned is not insinuating that this is the case here. However, it appears that this is at least conceivable, and Signal should have the opportunity to explore this possibility. Second, they create a safe harbor for illegal immigrants who were victims of trafficking. One of the underpinnings of the in terrorem effect is that undocumented workers will be less likely to seek redress for fear that their immigration status will be revealed and they will then face deportation. Because an undocumented worker who was the victim of severe trafficking can receive a T or U visa, any chilling effect is greatly minimized. In fact, it is difficult to imagine an undocumented worker who would bring a civil suit alleging to be a victim of trafficking, but fail to seek such a visa. Or, stated another way, it is difficult to comprehend an instance in which a person would not report that they were a victim of human trafficking for fear their T visa would be potentially discoverable in a lawsuit years later—a lawsuit they themselves initiated. The only workers whose rights might be chilled would be those who were trafficked but failed to qualify for either visa. Empirical evidence,
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however, suggests that this is a relatively small group, and the Plaintiffs have not suggested that could be the case here.7
The procedural posture of a case also impacts the in terrorem analysis. For example, in Rivera, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a protective order precluding discovery related to immigration status, because such discovery was irrelevant at that time to the issue before the court, which was liability (as opposed to damages) under Title VII. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1074–75. The trial court, however, had yet to decide whether the proceedings were going to be bifurcated, leaving the door open to the possibility that the analysis may change in the future. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1062, 1070. As one court subsequently noted, “Rivera did not foreclose the possibility that immigration status, although clearly irrelevant to the Title VII liability determination, might not become relevant later in the remedies portion of the litigation.” Rodriguez v. ACL Farms, Inc., No. cv-10-3010, 2010 WL 4683743, *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2010). Likewise, in David, one of the parallel cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, when the court first entered the protective order (that the Plaintiffs argue the undersigned should adopt), the issue being resolved was class certification. David, 257 F.R.D. at 125. Immigration status of the plaintiffs had no bearing on the issues of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id.
Courts, however, have recognized that as a case progresses and moves towards trial, the pendulum begins to swing in favor of allowing discovery, and depending on the facts of the case,
7. From 2002 through 2012, 5,820 T-1 visa applications, which are visas issued directly to the victim, were filed. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-914 – Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, Form I918 – Petition for Nonimmigrant Status Receipts, Approvals, and Denials, Fiscal Year 2013, Through Third Quarter, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-914-application-t-nonimmigrantstatus (last visited October 2, 2014). Of those applied for, 1,671 were denied, equating to 29%. As for T-2,3,4 or 5 visas, which are available to family members of a victim, 606 applications, or 20%, were denied. From 2009 through 2012, 18% of U-1 visa (victim visas) were denied, and 16% of U-2,3,4,5 (family member visas) were denied.
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a defendant’s need may outweigh any social policies that would otherwise prevent disclosure. See Cazorla, 2014 WL 281979 at *1. For example, in Cazorla, Koch Foods of Mississippi was accused of committing atrocities against Hispanic workers. Id. The court, early in the case, entered a protective order prohibiting discovery of immigration related documents. Id. Koch Foods later sought reconsideration of the protective order and specifically to compel the production of the plaintiffs’ U visas. Id. The court granted Koch’s motion as to the visas, noting that they were relevant because “immigration benefits may be made available to [the plaintiffs] because of the allegations they have made.” Id. The court held:
The issue is the relevance of the information sought by Koch Foods to the claims and defenses in this action. Koch Foods has raised a legitimate defense regarding U visas, T visas, or other immigration benefits, and it is entitled to pursue discovery, including visa applications, that supports the defense. The relevance of this information clearly outweighs its in terrorem effect, as any individuals who have applied for immigration benefits have, necessarily, already disclosed their immigration status to federal authorities. Id. at *2. Likewise, other courts, after balancing all the factors, have found that a defendant’s need for information outweighed any potential in terrorem effect. See Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., Nos. 10-cv-772, 11-cv-1132, 2012 WL 5931716, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2012) (granting a motion to compel production of the plaintiffs’ T or U visas in a human trafficking case); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. cv-11-3045, 2013 WL 3940674, at *4–7 (E.D. Wash July 31, 2013) (lifting the prohibition on discovery related to the plaintiffs’ immigration status because the information was relevant, and the plaintiffs failed to show good cause warranting a continued limitation). After weighing all the relevant factors and policies, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that “good cause” exists to enter a protective order precluding production of the Plaintiffs’ visa related documents. The Plaintiffs
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have not demonstrated that there would in fact be a chilling effect if, at this stage, they were required to disclose their visas. See In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that a party must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements”). What the undersigned finds most compelling is that, in this context, any chilling effect is largely offset by the availability of the T or U visa. A victim of trafficking does not need to choose between risking deportation by filing suit to rectify a wrong, or allowing atrocities to go unpunished in order to avoid bringing attention to their immigration status. Instead, purported victims of human trafficking are allowed to blow the whistle on their employers while at the same time being protected from deportation by obtaining a T visa. While there may be a small subset of people who are legitimate victims of trafficking but denied a T visa, when balanced against the relevancy of this information and Signal’s need for it, the undersigned finds protecting this small and undefined class is an insufficient reason to deny Signal the information it seeks.
Accordingly, the undersigned grants Signals’ motion as to the Plaintiffs’ T and U visas and any employment authorization documents issued in conjunction with these visas.
iv. Limits on further discovery and on the use and dissemination of the Plaintiffs’ documents
The Plaintiffs seek to block Signal from obtaining personal information about them, as well as their relatives. (Doc. No. 137, p. 14.) As discussed above, some discovery into the Plaintiffs’ immigration status is permissible. Nevertheless, discovery aimed at sensitive information of people who are not parties to this case may very well have an in terrorem effect on the Plaintiffs and deter them from prosecuting this suit. Signal, however, has not made such a request, as no Request for Production is aimed at documents related to any third parties. Therefore, at this time, there is no need to enter a broad protective order. Should Signal seek
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such discovery, the undersigned will at that time weigh the potential in terrorem effect against Signal’s need for the information, which may alter the balance of the various factors.
In addition, it is worth noting that discovery related to the immigration status of friends and relatives would appear to be irrelevant. For example, a condition precedent of a family member receiving a visa is that the victim be awarded a visa. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(o) (“an alien who has applied for and been granted T-1 nonimmigrant status may apply for admission of an immediate family member . . . .”). Therefore, production of the named Plaintiffs’ visa information should be sufficient for Signal to test its theories regarding the Plaintiffs’ motives. Should Signal seek discovery related to the Plaintiffs’ family members, it will need to demonstrate a particular need. However, because it is theoretically possible that such a need may exist, the undersigned will address that issue if and when it presents itself.
The Plaintiffs shall designate any documents produced pursuant to this order as “Confidential” and those documents are to be treated as “Protected Documents,” as defined in the protective order governing this case. (Doc. Nos. 55 and 94.) Moreover, the undersigned is mindful that to some extent this order conflicts with ones that have been entered in the cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Therefore, to prevent Signal from circumventing the protective orders in other cases, Signal may only use information regarding the Plaintiffs visas and immigration status produced pursuant to this order in this case; use outside this case, in any manner, including depositions, motions, etc., particularly in the EEOC case, which shares common plaintiffs, would be a violation of this order and would subject the violating party to sanctions.8
8. This does not impact the “Consent Order Regarding Use of Discovery from Related Cases.” (Doc. No. 96.) Rather, this order only applies to sensitive information, particularly information about the Plaintiffs’ immigration status. While this standard may appear vague, the undersigned is confident that if the parties take a common sense approach, there should be no issues.
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b. Requests for production seeking general personal information In addition to the immigration materials discussed above, Signal also seeks to compel production of the Plaintiffs’ “driver’s licenses, passports with visa stamps, documents relating to a plaintiffs’ involvement in or with social media, and writings relating to the plaintiffs’ first paycheck from a source other than Signal.” (Doc. No. 127, p. 1.) At the outset, Signal has objected to several requests for production propounded by the Plaintiffs on the grounds that: documents requested for the time frame January 1, 2004 through July 31, 2005 and February 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009 are not relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Signal objects to the date range in this request because only events during the recruitment of the H2B workers and their time of employment at Signal. Only that portion of the requested date is probative of the claims in this case. (Doc. No. 137, Ex. 1, pp. 2, 4, 12) (emphasis added). Signal cannot refuse to produce documents on grounds that any documents from outside a certain period are irrelevant to the dispute, and then seek to compel production of documents from this same timeframe. As the Plaintiffs correctly note, “the Signal Defendants cannot have it both ways.” (Id. at p. 10.) Because Signal has objected to any discovery after the Plaintiffs left Signal, and from the information before the court there is no indication that Signal withdrew these objections or that the parties have subsequently agreed to expand the relevant period for discovery, the undersigned denies Signal’s motion as to any of these documents that were created after the Plaintiffs left Signal. Considering this limitation as to the relevant period, the undersigned will examine whether Signal has carried its burden, and in turn, whether the Plaintiffs have carried their burden for showing why these documents should not be produced. As for Plaintiffs’ drivers licenses, passports, and first post-Signal paycheck, Signal’s motion makes no mention of why these documents are relevant to this dispute. Signal’s motion is primarily focused on the
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immigration related documents discussed above, and the main premise of its motion is that it needs documents that may evidence motive. These documents are not relevant to motive, in any way probative of motive, nor are they likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Therefore, Signal has failed to carry its burden, and its motion as to these requests is denied. Moreover, “writings relating to the plaintiffs’ first paycheck from a source other than Signal” are by definition documents that were generated after the Plaintiffs left Signal. As discussed above, Signal has declared any documents from this time irrelevant. Therefore, Signal cannot now seek to compel these documents.
As for Signal’s request for documents relating to a plaintiffs’ “involvement in or with social media,” these documents could conceivably contain information related to the issues in this case. For example, it is possible that the Plaintiffs’ social media pages contain information probative of the Plaintiffs’ living and working conditions while employed by Signal, their experiences of being trafficked, or even discussions about suing Signal. Therefore, Signal has met its minimal burden of showing that this information is discoverable. The Plaintiffs’ primary reason for resisting production of these documents is the potential in terrorem effect it would have. For reasons discussed above, the undersigned does not find that the in terrorem effect is a sufficient reason to deny Signal access to these documents, therefore, the Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of showing why they should not be compelled to produce these documents.
Accordingly, Signal’s motion is granted in part and denied in part as to the Plaintiffs’ Facebook pages. The Plaintiffs shall produce documents responsive to this Request. However, the Plaintiffs are only required to produce documents dating from the time they were being recruited, and the time that they were employed by Signal. Because Signal, in its own responses to discovery, has limited the relevant period for discovery, the Plaintiffs’ current Facebook
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profiles are irrelevant. Moreover, to the extent that the Plaintiffs communicated with their lawyers via Facebook, or its messenger program, while employed by Signal, these are privileged. Plaintiffs shall indicate whether such communications exist, and if they do and the Plaintiffs withhold them, the Plaintiffs shall produce a privilege log.
V. Conclusion It is therefore ORDERED that Signal’s “Motion to Compel” (Doc. No. 127) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Within seven (7) days, the Plaintiffs shall produce documents responsive to Signal’s Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, including information related to U visas. Signal shall also produce documents responsive the Requests for Production Nos. 12 and 13, but must only produce documents created during the recruitment process or while the Plaintiffs were employed by Signal. Should any of the documents be withheld as attorney-client communications, the Plaintiffs shall produce a privilege log sufficiently detailed so Signal may assess whether the communication is truly privileged. Signal’s motion as to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 47 is denied. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs’ request for the entry of a protective order (Doc. No. 137) is DENIED. Lastly, Signal is precluded from using information produced pursuant to this order in any other matter pending in either the Eastern District of Texas or Eastern District of Louisiana.
SIGNED this 15th day of October, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 205 Filed 12/08/14 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: 7412

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MARKUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

ORDER SEVERING AND TRANSFERRING SIGNAL’S CROSS-CLAIMS TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, and is

referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for all pretrial matters. (Doc. No. 4.)

Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Defer Signal’s Cross Claim[s] or in the

Alternative to Transfer Venue of Signal’s Cross Claim[s] Pursuant to the First-Filed Rule” (Doc.

No. 167) filed by Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Malvern C. Burnett A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast

Immigration Center, L.L.C. (collectively, “Burnett”). The certificate of conference states that

“Signal has no objection to the filing of the motion, but has not determined, as yet, its position on

the merits of the motion itself . . . .” (Id. at p. 12.) It was not indicated whether any other party

opposed the motion. However, the time for responding to Burnett’s motion has passed and no

objections were filed. Accordingly, the undersigned considers the motion unopposed. See

Local Rule CV-7(d) (“In the event that a party fails to oppose a motion in the manner prescribed

herein, the court will assume that the party has no objection.”). After reviewing Burnett’s motion

and the applicable authorities, the undersigned finds that Burnett’s motion should be granted in

part and that Signal’s cross-claims should be severed from the main action and transferred to the

Eastern District of Louisiana.

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I. Background On March 7, 2008, a putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of over five hundred plaintiffs who were allegedly victims of human trafficking. (See Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification (as to all claims except the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims), which caused the putative class members to file suit in the district where their injuries allegedly occurred. The Plaintiffs in this case filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas because they claim to have suffered their injuries at a Signal facility in Orange, Texas. Like in David, the Plaintiffs in this case sued numerous defendants. (See Doc. No. 1); (See also Doc. No. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. March 7, 2008)) (naming twelve defendants). For convenience, the Plaintiffs grouped the Defendants into four categories: “Signal” (collectively, Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., and Signal International, Inc.), “Recruiter Defendants,” (collectively, Global Resources, Inc., Michael Pol, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., and Sachin Dewan), “Legal Facilitator Defendants” (collectively, Malvern C. Burnett, Malvern C. Burnett A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast Immigration Center, L.L.C), and “Labor Broker Defendants” (collectively, Indo-Amerisoft, L.L.C., Kurella Rao, J & M Associates of Mississippi, Inc., and Billy R. Wilks). Also common to both cases are cross-claims Signal filed against these defendants. (Doc. No. 164, pp. 59–78); (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)).1 Signal filed its cross-claims in the David case in 2008, and filed its cross-claims in this case in 2014.
1. In this case, Signal claims that is has suspended its cross-claims against defendant Michael Pol (Doc. No. 164, p. 59 n. 1), and in David, Signal’s claims against him have been dismissed. (Doc. No. 1976, David v. Signal, Inl’t, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2014)).
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II. Analysis Burnett moves, pursuant to the “first-to-file-rule,” to have this court “‘[p]rophylactically’ refuse[] to hear Signal’s Cross Claims.” (Doc. No. 167, p. 8.) Alternatively, Burnett requests that the undersigned transfer his claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. (Id.) No party filed an opposition or response to Burnett’s motion, thus, it is considered unopposed. See Local Rule CV-7(d) (“In the event that a party fails to oppose a motion in the manner prescribed herein, the court will assume that the party has no objection.”). However, despite the fact that the undersigned considers Burnett’s motion unopposed, the undersigned finds it prudent to consider the merits of Burnett’s motion. “Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex. Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “In such a case, the district court in which the later action was filed may dismiss, stay, or transfer the suit in order to avoid duplicative litigation and enforce the principle of comity.” Carter v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 228 F. App’x 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “In deciding whether to apply the first-to-file rule, the Court must resolve two questions: (1) are the two pending actions so duplicative or do they involve such substantially similar issues that one court should decide the subject matter of both actions, and if so, (2) which of the two courts should take the case.” Datamize, Inc. v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 2:03-CV-321-DF, 2004 WL 1683171, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2004) (Folsom, J.) (citing Tex. Instruments v. Micron Semiconductor, 815 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). “Only the first issue is for the second-filed court to decide, however, for in this circuit, ‘[o]nce the likelihood of a substantial overlap between the two suits ha[s] been demonstrated, it [is] no longer up to the [second filed
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court] to resolve the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed.’” Nabors Drilling USA, L.P. v. Markow, Walker, P.A., 451 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The undersigned finds that the first prong of the first-to-file rule is satisfied here. Signal’s cross claims in David are not just similar or related to the ones in this case—they are identical. White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“The first-to-file rule does not require that cases be identical, but merely that there is a substantial overlap in issues and parties.”). First, Signal asserts cross-claims against the exact same parties in both cases. 2 Compare (Doc. No. 164) with (Doc. No. 60, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. May 9, 2008)); see also Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Complete identity of parties is not required for dismissal or transfer of a case filed subsequently to a substantially related action.”). It is also worth noting that Signal’s cross-claims are in no way impacted by the difference in the make-up of the plaintiffs in each case.
Second, Signal asserted identical cross-claims in each case. In addition, beyond just pleading the same causes of action against the same defendants, resolution of Signal’s cross-claims involves the same facts and raises the same issues in both cases. In contrast, the undersigned denied Signal’s and Burnett’s requests to transfer the Plaintiffs’ claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana in part because the Plaintiffs in this case worked at a different facility than the plaintiffs in David, and therefore, the proof and facts for the claims would differ between the two cases. (Doc. Nos. 74, 115.) This is not the case for Signal’s cross-claims. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that there is substantial overlap between Signal’s cross-claims in this case and those in David.
2. Signal also filed a third-party claim against Zito Companies, L.L.C. that was dismissed. (Doc. No. 391, David v. Signal, Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-1220 (E.D. La. April 7, 2009)).
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Therefore, the proper course of action is to either transfer, stay, or dismiss Signal’s cross-claims. Burnett requests that this court stay Signal’s cross claims because “simply declining to hear those Cross Claims herein would be the easiest procedural vehicle to allow Signal’s Cross Claims to proceed in the court in which they were first filed.” (Doc. No. 167, p. 8.) The undersigned, however, perceives no benefit to merely staying these claims. To do so would only invite additional litigation on issue and/or claim preclusion after these claims are decided in David. (Id. at p. 2) (“Whatever disposition may be reached in David on Signal’s Cross Claims against Burnett and the other Cross Claim Defendants will be res judicata herein.”). The first-to-file rule was meant to promote efficiency, not create additional substantive issues.
In the alternative, Burnett requests that the undersigned transfer Signal’s cross-claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Because this is the most efficient manner of resolving these claims, the undersigned finds that this is the appropriate remedy. However, in order to transfer just Signal’s cross-claims, as opposed the entire case (including the Plaintiffs’ claims), Signal’s cross-claims must first be severed from the main case. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, a “trial court has broad discretion to sever issues to be tried before it.” Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 21); see also United States v. O’Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that under Rule 21 a district court properly severed a party’s counterclaims). The undersigned has authority under Rule 21 to sever Signal’s cross-claims even though Burnett did not specifically request such relief. See Brunet, 15 F.3d at 505; United States v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIV.A 86-1094, 2004 WL 1335723, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2004) (“Thus, while neither party has asked this Court to sever, Rule 21 permits a court to sever claims sua sponte.”).
5

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III. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned GRANTS IN PART Burnett’s “Motion to Defer Signal’s Cross Claim or in the Alternative to Transfer Venue of Signal’s Cross Claim Pursuant to the First-Filed Rule.” (Doc. No. 167.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to sever from this action Signal’s cross-claims against cross-defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Indo-Ameri Soft, L.L.C., J &M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Kurella Rao, and Billy R. Wilks; and it is further ORDERED that Signal’s “Motion for Reconsideration of October 20, 2014 Oral Order” (Doc. No. 199) and Burnett’s response (Doc. No. 201), are part of the severed case; and it is further ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall TRANSFER Signal’s cross-claims against Malvern C. Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt., Ltd., Global Resources, Inc. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Indo-Ameri Soft, L.L.C., J &M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Kurella Rao, and Billy R. Wilks and the motions listed in the preceding paragraph to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
SIGNED this 8th day of December, 2014.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
6

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 208 Filed 12/23/14 Page 1 of 69 PageID #: 7424

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BIJU MUKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, JOY JOSEPH ATTAYIL, )

VARGHESE KAINIKKERIL YOHANNAN, KRISHNAN

)

VENUGOPAL, VARGHESE PAPPACHAN, SHOGY

)

VEZHAPARAMBIL OUSEPHKUTTY, VISWAMITHRAN )

RAGHAVAN, VARGHESE KUNJACHAN, JOHN

) Civ. No. 1:13-cv-0324

CHARUVILA GEORGE, PHILIP BABY, BABU LAL MALI, )

VAVACHAN MATHAI KOOTTALIL, SURJE PRASAD

)

TAMANG, HARIDAS SANKARA PANICKER, ESWARA R. ) Third Amended

KANITHI, GEORGE KUTTY VADAKKEKOOTTU

) Complaint

MATHEW, FRANCIS JOSEPH, JAGANNADHA RAO

)

SARAGADAM, PRABHAKARAN BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, )

KANNANKUTTY PONNAN, GEORGE DEVASSY

)

ARACKAL, KIRAN MOHAN BAKI, SOJAN PAUL

)

KALIYADAN, LAKHBIR SINGH, KRISHNAN

)

KANNAYAN, RAMACHANDRAN MURUGAIYAN,

)

MELVIN JOSEPH RODRIGUES, KUNHIKRISHN

)

KANIYAMKULAM VEETIL, JOSEPH BOBAN

)

PERUVELIL, SREEDHARAN BABU, BIJAY KUMAR

)

BISWAS, SURESH KUMAR PILLAI KAVALAMKUZHI, )

SURESH KAKKOTH, SEBASTIAN GEORGE

)

PANANJIKAL, BIJU POTRAYIL, PANKAJAKSHAN

)

MADHAVAN, GIJO JOHN, JOY KALLACHIYIL VARKEY, )

OMANAKUTTAN GOVINDAN KAKKANTHARA, IJU

)

JAMES, RAVI ROWTHU, VASAVAN BABU, ABRAHAM )

VARGHESE, VARGHESE KANNAMPUZHA DEVASSY, )

PAULOSE CHIRACKAL AIROOKARAN JOSEPH, and

)

SUBBURAJ RENGASAMY,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL LLC, SIGNAL

)

INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL

)

TEXAS, G.P., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.,

)

MALVERN C. BURNETT, GULF COAST IMMIGRATION )

LAW CENTER, L.L.C., LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. )

BURNETT, A.P.C., INDO-AMERI SOFT L.L.C., KURELLA )

RAO, J & M ASSOCIATES, INC. OF MISSISSIPPI, BILLY )

R. WILKS, J & M MARINE & INDUSTRIAL, LLC,

)

GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., MICHAEL POL, SACHIN

)

DEWAN, and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (a/k/a )

MEDTECH CONSULTANTS).

)

Defendants.

)

25169307.1

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THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 1. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Plaintiffs and similarly situated workers, a total of approximately 590 Indian men, were trafficked into the United States through the federal government’s H -2B guestworker pr ogram t o pr ovide l abor a nd s ervices to D efendants S ignal International L .L.C., Signal I nternational, I nc., Signal I nternational Texas, L .P., S ignal International T exas, G .P. an d t heir affiliates ( collectively, “S ignal”). R ecruited t o p erform welding, pipefitting, and other marine fabrication work, Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor and other serious abuses at Signal operations in Orange, Texas. Some similarly situated workers were subjected to similar abuses at Signal operations in Pascagoula, Mississippi. 2. Plaintiffs bring t his action t o recover for damages i nflicted b y D efendant S ignal and Signal’s recruiters and agents operating in India, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. D efendants ha ve e xploited a nd de frauded P laintiffs b y f raudulently recruiting t hem t o work in the United States and effectuating a broad scheme of psychological coercion, threats of serious harm and physical restraint, and threatened abuse of the legal process to maintain control over Plaintiffs. 3. Lured b y Defendants’ f raudulent pr omises o f l egal a nd pe rmanent w ork-based immigration to the United States for themselves and their families, Plaintiffs plunged themselves and t heir f amilies i nto de bt t o t ake advantage of t hese s eemingly pr omising oppor tunities. Plaintiffs assumed these debts to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees charged by Defendants totaling as much as $11,000 – $25,000 per worker. T rusting in the veracity o f t he i mmigration a nd w ork b enefits pr omised b y Defendants, P laintiffs f urther relinquished stable employment opportunities in India and as guestworkers in the Persian Gulf. 4. Defendants’ m ain r ecruiting a gent i n India a nd t he U nited A rab E mirates he ld Plaintiffs’ pa ssports a nd vi sas a nd t hreatened, c oerced, a nd de frauded P laintiffs i nto pa ying

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extraordinary f ees f or r ecruitment, i mmigration p rocessing, an d t ravel. S everal D efendants further c aused P laintiffs t o be lieve t hat i f t hey did not w ork f or S ignal unde r t he a uspices of temporary, S ignal-restricted H -2B guestworker vi sas, t hey w ould s uffer a buse or t hreatened abuse of the legal process, physical restraint, and/or other serious harm.
5. The false promises, collection of exorbitant recruiting fees, and strong-arm tactics of D efendant S ignal a nd/or i ts a gents w ere, upon i nformation a nd be lief, a uthorized b y Defendant Signal, which, in any event, learned in detail of these facts at the latest from the very first Indian H -2B w orkers w ho ar rived at S ignal’s f acilities i n t he U nited S tates as e arly as October 2006. F ar f rom t aking a ny corrective m easures, D efendant S ignal r atified a nd perpetuated the scheme by continuing to facilitate the transportation of further waves of Indian H-2B workers, including Plaintiffs herein, from November 2006 through April 2007.
6. Upon P laintiffs’ a rrival i n t he U nited S tates, D efendant S ignal r equired t hem t o live i n a g uarded, ove rcrowded, a nd i solated l abor c amp. S ignal f urther d eceived P laintiffs regarding their visa status, threatened Plaintiffs with loss of immigration status and deportation, and g enerally p erpetrated a cam paign o f p sychological ab use, co ercion, an d f raud d esigned t o render Plaintiffs afraid, intimidated, and unable to leave Signal’s employ.
7. On March 9, 2007, Defendant Signal, using private security guards, attempted to forcibly and unl awfully de port s imilarly s ituated w orkers S abulal V ijayan a nd J acob J oseph Kadakkarappally from the Pascagoula camp in retaliation for speaking out against discriminatory conditions i n S ignal’s labor c amp i n P ascagoula, M ississippi a nd f or s eeking c ounsel t o understand t heir l egal r ights. S ignal s imilarly a ttempted t o f orcibly and unl awfully d eport similarly situated workers Kuldeep Singh, Thanasekar Chellappan, and Krishan Kumar.

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8. Terrified b y the threat of imminent deportation and the security guards pursuing him, V ijayan a ttempted s uicide a nd ha d t o be t aken t o a l ocal hos pital. D uring t he s ame morning, Signal personnel and security guards successfully forced Kadakkarappally, Chellappan, and Kumar into a trailer under guard. There, Signal detained Kadakkarappally, Chellappan, and Kumar for several hours without food or water or bathroom facilities. A midst the chaos of the pre-dawn r aid a t t he P ascagoula c amp, K uldeep Singh hi d a nd e scaped f rom t he S ignal l abor camp.
9. Having h eard o f t he e vents of M arch 9, 2007 t hrough cell phone r eports f rom similarly s ituated workers in M ississippi, th e P laintiffs h erein a nd o thers in th e T exas cam p reasonably f eared t hat t hey would s uffer s erious harm, ph ysical restraint, and/or abuse of l egal process i f t hey w ere t o l eave S ignal’s e mploy. D eeply i ndebted, f earful, i solated, di soriented, and u nfamiliar w ith th eir r ights u nder U nited States la w, th ese w orkers f elt c ompelled to continue working for Signal.
10. Plaintiffs assert claims a gainst D efendants arising f rom violations of their rights under t he V ictims o f T rafficking an d V iolence P rotection A ct ( “TVPA”); t he R acketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 ( 42 U.S.C. § 1985); and claims for damages arising from fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (civil trafficking), 18 U.S.C. § 964(c) (RICO) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).

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12. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over causes of action based on state law pursuant t o 28 U .S.C. § 1367(a), as t he s tate l aw claims arise out of t he same nucleus of facts which support the federal claims.
13. Venue in the Eastern District of Texas is proper under 18 U .S.C. § 1965 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that various Defendants and/or agents of Defendants, including Signal, Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center L.L.C., Kurella Rao, and Indo-Amerisoft, L.L.C. may be found in the Eastern District of Texas during t he r elevant t ime periods and a s ubstantial portion of t he communications, t ransactions, events or omissions underlying Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in and around the Orange, Texas area in this judicial district.
14. Declaratory relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. PARTIES Plaintiffs
15. Plaintiffs are former H-2B guestworkers who were recruited from India and/or the United Arab Emirates by Defendants at various times between 2003 and 2007.
16. Plaintiffs are of South Asian Indian descent and are Indian nationals. 17. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were “persons” within the meaning of that term as defined by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 18. At r elevant time s, P laintiffs w ere e mployed b y S ignal a s d efined b y t he F air Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 19. At r elevant time s, P laintiffs w ere e ngaged in in terstate c ommerce a nd/or in th e production of goods for sale in interstate commerce. 20. Plaintiff Biju M ukrukkattu J oseph ( “B. J oseph”) w as r ecruited i n 2004 f rom Dubai, United A rab E mirates by Defendants Dewan C onsultants, D ewan, R ao, Burnett a nd

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Signal f or w ork i n t he United S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n J anuary 2007, B. Joseph worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
21. Plaintiff Joy J oseph A ttayil ( “Attayil”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 f rom India by Defendants J & M, Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Global Resources, Inc. and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Attayil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
22. Plaintiff Varghese K ainikkeril Y ohannan ( “Yohannan”) w as r ecruited be ginning in 2003 f rom Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Indo-Amerisoft and Signal for work in the U nited S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited States i n F ebruary 2007, Y ohannan w orked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
23. Plaintiff Krishnan V enugopal (“Venugopal”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Indo-Amerisoft and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in December 2006, Venugopal worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
24. Plaintiff Varghese P appachan (“Pappachan”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 from India by Defendants J & M, Dewan Consultants and Signal for work in the United States. After a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, P appachan w orked a t S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.
25. Plaintiff Shogy V ezhaparambil O usephkutty (“Ousephkutty”) w as r ecruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consultants, J & M and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in January 2007, O usephkutty worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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26. Plaintiff Viswamithran Raghavan (“Raghavan”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu Dhai b y Defendants Dewan C onsultants, Indo-Amerisoft and S ignal for work i n t he United S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, Raghavan w orked a t Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
27. Plaintiff Sajimon K utty (“Kutty”) was r ecruited beginning i n 2004 f rom Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Pol and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Kutty worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas f acility. K utty h as n ow d ismissed h is c laims in th is a ction, w ithout p rejudice to c laims brought on his behalf in the David and EEOC cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
28. Plaintiff Varghese K unjachan ( “V. K unjachan”) w as r ecruited i n 2006 f rom Dubai, United A rab Emirates b y Defendants D ewan C onsultants, R ao, B urnett, P ol and S ignal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, V. Kunjachan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
29. Plaintiff John Charuvila George (“George”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India b y D efendants D ewan C onsultants, P ol a nd S ignal f or work i n t he U nited S tates. A fter arriving i n t he U nited States i n D ecember 2 006, G eorge w orked at S ignal’s O range, T exas facility.
30. Plaintiff Philip B aby (“Baby”) was recruited b eginning i n 2005 f rom India b y Defendants Dewan Consultants, Pol, J & M, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Baby worked at S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.
31. Plaintiff Babu Lal Mali (“Mali”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from the United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan, Burnett, Rao, Indo-Amerisoft and Signal for work in the

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United States. After arriving in the United States in April 2007, Mali worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
32. Plaintiff Vavachan Mathai Koottalil (“Koottalil”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan, Rao, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in July 2006, Koottalil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
33. Plaintiff Surje Prasad Tamang (“Tamang”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu D habi, U nited A rab E mirates b y D efendants D ewan, R ao, Indo-Amerisoft a nd S ignal f or work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, Tamang worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
34. Plaintiff Haridas Sankara Panicker (“Panicker”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India b y D efendants D ewan, D ewan C onsultants, P ol, G lobal Resources, B urnett a nd Signal f or w ork i n t he U nited S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, Panicker worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
35. Plaintiff Eswara R . K anithi ( “Kanithi”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 f rom Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Pol, Global Resources, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2009, Kanithi worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
36. Plaintiff George K utty V adakkekoottu M athew ( “Mathew”) w as r ecruited beginning i n 2004 from Abu Dhabi, U nited A rab E mirates b y D efendants D ewan C onsultants, Rao, Pol and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, Mathew worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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37. Plaintiff F rancis J oseph ( “F. J oseph”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 200 6 f rom Dubai, U nited A rab E mirates b y Defendants D ewan C onsultants, P ol, B urnett, J & M and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in January 2007, F. Joseph worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
38. Plaintiff Jagannadha R ao S aragadam (“Saragadam”) w as r ecruited b eginning i n 2003 f rom India b y Defendants Dewan, D ewan C onsultants, P ol, J & M, G lobal R esources, Burnett a nd S ignal f or work in th e U nited S tates. A fter a rriving in th e U nited S tates in December 2006, Saragadam worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
39. Plaintiff Prabhakaran Balakrishna Pillai (“Pillai”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Pol, J & M and Signal, for work in t he U nited S tates. A fter a rriving in th e U nited S tates in D ecember 2006, P illai w orked a t Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
40. Plaintiff Kannankutty P onnan (“Ponnan”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 200 4 from Dubai b y Dewan Consulting, Sachin Dewan, Pol, Indo-Amerisoft, Burnett and Signal for work in t he United S tates. After arriving i n t he United S tates i n F ebruary, 20 07, P onnan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
41. Plaintiff G eorge D evassy Arackal ( “Arackal”) was r ecruited b eginning i n 2 003 from India by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Rao, Indo-Amerisoft, Burnett and Signal for w ork i n t he U nited S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, A rackal worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
42. Plaintiff Kiran Mohan Baki (“Baki”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from Dubai by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Global Resources, Pol, Burnett and Signal for work

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in t he U nited S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n F ebruary 200 7, A rackal w orked a t Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
43. Plaintiff S ojan Paul K aliyadan ( “Kaliyadan”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 from India b y Defendants Dewan C onsultants, D ewan, P ol, J & M , Global R esources, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Kaliyadan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
44. Plaintiff Lakhbir Singh (“Singh”) was recruited beginning in February, 2004 from Dubai, U nited A rab E mirates b y Defendants Dewan C onsultants, D ewan, R ao, Burnett a nd Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, Singh worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
45. Plaintiff Krishnan Kannayan (“Kannayan”) was recruited beginning in 2006 from India b y Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Pol and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, K annayan w orked a t S ignal’s O range, Texas facility.
46. Plaintiff R amachandran Murugaiyan ( “Murugaiyan”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 2003 from India by Defendants Dewan, Rao, Indo-Amerisoft, Pol, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, Murugaiyan worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
47. Plaintiff Melvin Joseph Rodrigues (“Rodrigues”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, J & M, Pol, Burnett, Global Resources and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2007, Rodrigues worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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48. Plaintiff Kunhikrishn Kaniyamkulam Veetil (“Veetil”) was recruited beginning in 2004 f rom A bu D habi, United A rab E mirates by Defendants Dewan C onsultants, J & M , P ol, Dewan, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in February 2007, Veetil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
49. Plaintiff J oseph B oban Peruvelil ( “Peruvelil”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Pol, Indo-Amerisoft and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in December 2006, P eruvelil worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
50. Plaintiff Sreedharan Babu (“S. Babu”) was recruited beginning in early 2004 from India by Defendants Dewan Consultants, Dewan, Pol, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in December 2006, Babu worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
51. Plaintiff B ijay K umar B iswas ( “Biswas”) w as r ecruited b eginning in 2 003 fro m Dubai, U nited A rab E mirates b y Defendants Dewan, D ewan C onsultants, Indo-Amerisoft, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2007, Biswas worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
52. Plaintiff S uresh K umar P illai K avalamkuzhi ( “Kavalamkuzhi”) w as r ecruited beginning i n 2004 f rom the U nited A rab E mirates b y Defendants Dewan C onsultants, J & M , Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in January 2007, Kavalamkuzhi worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
53. Plaintiff S uresh K akkoth ( “Kakkoth”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 200 4 f rom Dubai b y Dewan C onsulting, B urnett, R ao, Indo-Amerisoft a nd S ignal f or w ork in th e U nited

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States. A fter a rriving in th e U nited S tates i n December 2006, K akkoth w orked a t S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.
54. Plaintiff S ebastian G eorge P ananjikal ( “Pananjikal”) w as r ecruited b eginning i n 2003 from Kochi, India by Dewan Consultants, Pol, Burnett, and Signal for work in the United States. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n February 2007, P ananjikal w orked a t S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.
55. Plaintiff Biju Potrayil (“Potrayil”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India by Defendants J & M , D ewan C onsulting, P ol, S achin D ewan a nd Signal for w ork i n t he U nited States. A fter a rriving in th e U nited S tates in December 2 006, P otrayil w orked a t S ignal’s Orange, Texas facility.
56. Plaintiff Pankajakshan Madhavan (“Madhavan”) was recruited beginning in 2004 from India by Dewan Consultants, Sachin Dewan, J & M, Pol, Burnett and Signal for work in the United S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 2006, Madhavan w orked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
57. Plaintiff Gijo John (“John”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from Kochi, India by Dewan C onsultants, Indo-Amerisoft, S achin D ewan, P ol a nd S ignal f or w ork i n t he U nited States. A fter arriving in the United States in December 2006, J ohn worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
58. Plaintiff Joy Kallachiyil Varkey (“Varkey”) was recruited beginning in 2002 from Kochi, India, by J & M, Dewan Consultants, Sachin Dewan, Burnett, Pol and Signal for work in the U nited S tates. A fter a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n D ecember 20 06, V arkey worked a t Signal’s Orange, Texas and Port Arthur, Texas facilities.

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59. Plaintiff O manakuttan G ovindan K akkanthara ( “Kakkanthara”) w as r ecruited beginning i n 2004 from India b y D ewan C onsultants, S achin Dewan, Burnett, P ol, J & M and Signal f or w ork in th e U nited S tates. A fter a rriving in th e U nited S tates in D ecember 2006, Kakkanthara worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
60. Plaintiff Iju J ames ( “James”) w as recruited be ginning i n 2005 f rom t he U nited Arab E mirates b y Dewan C onsultants, G lobal R esources, J & M , B urnett, P ol, S achin D ewan and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, James worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
61. Plaintiff Ravi Rowthu (“Rowthu”) was recruited beginning in 2006 or earlier b y Dewan C onsultants, S achin D ewan, S ignal a nd others f or w ork i n t he U nited S tates. A fter arriving i n t he U nited States i n D ecember 200 6, R owthu w orked a t S ignal’s O range, T exas facility.
62. Plaintiff Vasavan Babu (“V. Babu”) was recruited beginning in 2003 from India and Dubai by Dewan Consultants, Rao, Indo-Amerisoft, Pol, Burnett and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2007, V. Babu worked at Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
63. Plaintiff A braham V arghese ( “A. Varghese”) w as r ecruited be ginning i n 2002 from Dubai by Dewan Consultants, Sachin Dewan, Indo-Amerisoft, Rao, and Signal for work in the United States. A fter arriving in the United States in February 2007, A. Varghese worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
64. Plaintiff V arghese K annampuzha D evassy (“V. D evassy”) w as r ecruited beginning in 2004 from Kochi, India by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants, Burnett, Pol, J & M

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and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in December 2006, V. Devassy worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
65. Plaintiff Paulose C hirackal A irookaran J oseph ( “P. J oseph”) w as r ecruited beginning i n l ate 2003 f rom India b y D ewan C onsultants, S achin D ewan, B urnett, P ol, IndoAmerisoft, Rao, and Signal for work in the United States. After arriving in the United States in February 2007, P. Joseph worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
66. Plaintiff S ubburaj R engasamy (“Rengasamy”) was r ecruited be ginning i n 2004 from India by Dewan Consultants, Sachin Dewan, Burnett, Pol, J&M and Signal for work in the United S tates. After a rriving i n t he U nited S tates i n F ebruary 2007, R engasamy worked i n Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.
Defendants Employer Defendants - Signal 67. Defendant Signal International, L.L.C. is a corporation organized under the laws of D elaware and a pr ovider of m arine a nd f abrication s ervices i n t he G ulf C oast r egion, w ith operations in Orange, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama. 68. Defendant S ignal International, Inc., a c ompany organized unde r t he l aws of Delaware, w as f ormed i n 2007 a s t he hol ding c ompany o f S ignal International LLC, and t he other Signal entities named below. 69. Defendant Signal International Texas G.P., is a Texas general partnership owned by or affiliated with Signal International, L.L.C., which on information and belief, was the direct employer of the Plaintiffs while they worked in Signal’s Orange, Texas facility.

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70. Defendant Signal International Texas, L.P. is a Texas limited partnership, which based upon i nformation a nd be lief i s co-owned b y S ignal International T exas, G .P. (approximately 1%) and by Signal International L.L.C. (approximately 99%).
71. All four Signal entities will be referred to herein collectively as “Signal.” Recruiter Defendants
72. Defendant G lobal R esources, Inc. (“Global R esources”) is or w as a corporation organized under the laws of Mississippi and engaged in the business of recruiting workers from India for employment in the United States. Global Resources has or had during the relevant time period substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
73. Defendant Michael Pol (“Pol”) is or was the President of Global Resources, Inc., and resides in Mississippi. Pol has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
74. Defendant D ewan C onsultants P vt. Ltd. ( a/k/a Medtech C onsultants) ( “Dewan Consultants”) i s a pr ivate l imited l iability c ompany or ganized unde r t he l aws of India, w hich maintains of fices i n M umbai ( Bombay), India, and D ubai, U nited A rab E mirates. D efendant Dewan Consultants has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
75. Defendant S achin D ewan ( “Dewan”) i s t he D irector o f D ewan C onsultants. Dewan resides in India and has substantial business contacts in or around Orange, Texas.
76. Upon i nformation and b elief, D efendants D ewan a nd D ewan C onsultants ha ve authorized a nd ut ilized D efendants P ol and Global R esources, and t he Legal Facilitator Defendants described below, to act as their United States-based operations and/or agents.
77. Upon i nformation a nd belief, D efendants P ol and G lobal R esources, and the Legal F acilitator D efendants de scribed b elow, ha ve a uthorized a nd ut ilized D efendants D ewan

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and Dewan Consultants to act as their India- and United Arab Emirates-based operations and/or agents.
78. Upon i nformation a nd b elief, D efendants D ewan, D ewan C onsultants, P ol, a nd Global Resources, and the Legal Facilitator Defendants described below, acted as a joint venture with respect to the recruitment, contracting, and provision of Plaintiffs for labor or services.
79. Defendants P ol a nd G lobal R esources, a nd t he Legal F acilitator D efendants described be low, ut ilized D efendants Dewan a nd D ewan C onsultants t o c onduct and carry out their s hared bus iness i nterests a nd activities i n India a nd t he U nited A rab E mirates. A mong other things, Defendants Pol and Global Resources have shared offices with Defendants Dewan and Dewan Consultants in India and the United Arab Emirates.
80. Upon i nformation and b elief, D efendants D ewan a nd D ewan C onsultants ha ve utilized D efendants P ol and G lobal R esources, a nd t he Legal F acilitator Defendants d escribed below, t o conduct and effectuate t heir s hared business i nterests and a ctivities i n t he U nited States.
81. Throughout t his C omplaint, P laintiffs r efer t o D efendants D ewan, D ewan Consultants, Pol, and Global collectively as “Recruiter Defendants.”
Legal Facilitator Defendants 82. Defendant M alvern C . B urnett ( “Burnett”) i s a n a ttorney who r esides in a nd maintains offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, and has substantial business contacts in Texas. 83. Defendant G ulf C oast Immigration Law C enter L.L.C. ( “GCILC”) is a limite d liability corporation or ganized unde r t he l aws of Louisiana and l ocated i n N ew O rleans, Louisiana, with substantial business contacts in Texas. Upon information and belief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer.

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84. Defendant Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (“Burnett Law Offices”) is a pr ofessional l aw c orporation or ganized unde r t he l aws of L ouisiana a nd l ocated i n N ew Orleans, Louisiana, w ith s ubstantial bus iness c ontacts i n T exas. U pon i nformation a nd be lief, Defendant Burnett serves as its sole registered agent, member, and/or corporate officer.
85. Upon information a nd be lief, Defendants B urnett, GCILC, and B urnett L aw Offices a re en gaged i n a j oint v enture an d/or ar e al ter e gos i n th at a ll e ntities h ave th e s ame corporate m ailing a ddress, i ntermingle bus iness a ssets, f ail t o ope rate at a rms’ l ength, a nd Defendant Burnett serves as the registered agent and sole member and/or corporate officers for GCLIC and Burnett Law Offices.
86. Upon i nformation a nd b elief, D efendants Burnett, G CILC, a nd t he Burnett Law Offices have the same b usiness objectives and D efendant Burnett uses G CILC and the Burnett Law Offices to conduct and effectuate shared business objectives.
87. Throughout t his C omplaint, P laintiffs r efer t o D efendants Burnett, G CILC, a nd Burnett Law Offices collectively as “Legal Facilitator Defendants.”
88. The Legal Facilitator Defendants engaged in a joint venture with Kurella Rao and Indo-AmeriSoft, L.L.C., described below, to conduct and carry out their shared business interests and activities in India and the United Arab Emirates. This joint venture is in addition to the joint venture described above between the Legal Facilitator Defendants and the Recruiter Defendants.
Labor Broker Defendants 89. Defendant I ndo-Amerisoft, L.L.C., ( “Indo-Amerisoft”) a corporation or ganized under t he l aws of Louisiana a nd he adquartered i n N ew O rleans, Louisiana, w ith s ubstantial business contacts in Texas, is engaged in the business of recruiting and providing Indian laborers

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to U nited S tates c ompanies a nd s elling o pportunities f or U nited S tates immig ration a nd employment to such laborers.
90. Defendant Kurella Rao (“Rao”) is the Chairman and Director of Indo-Amerisoft, L.L.C., a nd m aintains of fices i n t he New O rleans, Louisiana m etropolitan ar ea. R ao h as substantial business contacts in Texas.
91. Defendant J & M A ssociates o f M ississippi, Inc. ( “J & M ”), a co rporation organized under t he l aws of M ississippi with s ubstantial bus iness contacts i n Texas, was at all relevant t imes e ngaged i n t he bus iness of r ecruiting a nd pr oviding Indian l aborers t o U nited States c ompanies a nd s elling o pportunities f or U nited S tates immig ration a nd e mployment to such laborers.
92. Defendant Billy R. Wilks (“Wilks”) was the founder and general manager of J & M and currently acts as a consultant for the company. Wilks has substantial business contacts in Texas. Wilks is personally liable for the conduct of J & M. Discovery in the case of David, et al. v. Signal, et al., United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Civ. No. 081220 SM/DEK) (the “David Litigation”) has established that Wilks had full control and decisionmaking authority over J & M such that J & M and Wilks were alter egos of one another.
93. Wilks is the founder of J & M. He incorporated it in 1996. T he main corporate office of J & M is Wilks’s home. J & M, during the time relevant to this litigation, was entirely beholden t o W ilks f or i ts bus iness a ctivity. Further, W ilks ha s t estified t hat dur ing t he time relevant to this litigation all of J & M’s decisions and policy changes would have to be approved by him. H e was the main decision-maker with regard to all of the company’s relevant business activity. B oth W ilks a nd h is f ormer la wyer d escribe W ilks a s t he on ly p erson w ho know s

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anything about t he company and t hat i t i s i ndeed hi s c ompany, a lthough i n fact W ilks’ s ons participated in the conduct of the company.
94. At some point prior to 2007, J & M was sued in unrelated litigation. In response to t hat lawsuit, W ilks s et up a ne w c orporation – J & M M arine & Industrial LLC ( “J & M Marine”) – primarily to avoid the litigation then pending against J & M, but also to continue the work that was underway with J & M.
95. Wilks used the contractual arrangements and relationships he had set up b etween J & M and the Recruiter Defendants to create profitable opportunities for his new J & M Marine entity. In other words, Wilks harvested the value that remained in J & M and transferred it to J & M Marine with no regard to the independent corporate identity of J & M. Such a transition is not r eflective o f t he a ction of a c orporate e ntity; rather, i t i ndicates a n a ction don e f or t he convenience and singular strategy of the principal, Wilks.
96. In 2007, W ilks put J & M i nto dor mancy. T his pur ported c hange o f c orporate status w as, upon i nformation a nd be lief, done without a ny formal s hareholder vot e or boa rd member meeting. Further, J & M is undercapitalized; it has, according to Wilks, approximately $300,000 i n de bt. F urther, W ilks, i n yet a nother i ndication of t he absence of c orporate formalities between him and J & M, has represented to the Court in the David Litigation that he intends to borrow money so that he is able to personally fund J & M’s legal defense.
97. J & M filed a “Notice to Dissolve/Revoke” with the Mississippi Secretary of State on S eptember 12, 2010, a lthough i t r emained i n g ood s tanding t hrough D ecember 2012, according to the Mississippi Secretary of State’s Business Services website.
98. In short, there is no i ndependence between Defendant Wilks and J & M. J & M was s imply us ed a s t he corporate e ntity t o f acilitate W ilks’s pe rsonal bus iness a nd t hat of hi s

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family. H e testified during his deposition in the David Litigation that he did everything for the company. Indeed, prior to incorporating J & M in 1996, Wilks was doing the exact same work, as t he 100% o wner, un der a “doing/business/as” r ubric. O nce W ilks i ncorporated J & M i n 1996, t here w as no c hange t o t he c ompany activity or pur pose, a nd J & M c ertainly di d not obtain an identity independent from its founder.
99. Once W ilks cr eated J & M M arine, h e s imply s hifted h is em ployee, N icole Homel-Tellier, from J & M over to J & M Marine. As he had done with J & M, he listed himself as t he r egistered a gent and hi s hom e a ddress as t he c ompany’s pr incipal a ddress w ith t he Mississippi Secretary of State.
100. Both J & M and J & M Marine clearly share the same initials, which reference the same individuals: John and Michael Wilks.
101. Both c orporations pe rform t he s ame w ork: recruit l aborers t o t hen s ub-contract them out to other companies for a profit. Given both entities were in the same business and both operated o ut o f t he s ame ad dress, i t i s l ikely t hat w hatever as sets were he ld b y J & M ( e.g., computers, printers, etc.) were at t he di sposal of J & M M arine bot h during t he t ime t hat bot h companies existed and also once J & M was put into dormancy.
102. More i mportantly, w ith r espect t o t he “ asset” c rossover be tween t he t wo companies, Defendant Wilks moved the laborers – plaintiffs and other similarly situated – from J & M , w ith w hich t hey contracted, ove r t o J & M M arine. In ot her words, t he ve ry revenue source of J & M became the revenue for J & M Marine.
103. In bringing the candidates over to J & M Marine, after they had signed contracts with J & M , D efendant Wilks w as une quivocally holding J & M M arine out a s t he s uccessor company of J & M. Further, this transition of recruits, in conjunction with avoiding the litigation

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then pending against J & M, exemplifies the taking of the benefits of the predecessor company while l eaving i ts l iabilities be hind. W ilks a cknowledges t hat J & M ha s a $100,000 j udgment against it, an obvious liability that has not tracked across to J & M Marine.
104. Throughout this Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Indo-Amerisoft, Rao, J & M, Wilks and J & M Marine collectively as the “Labor Broker Defendants.”
All Defendants 105. At a ll r elevant t imes, Defendants D ewan, Dewan C onsultants, P ol, Global Resources, Burnett, Burnett Law Offices and GCILC acted as agents of Defendants Signal, J & M, I ndo-Amerisoft a nd/or R ao f or t he pur poses of r ecruiting, o btaining, c ontracting, transportation and/or providing Plaintiffs for labor or services. 106. All D efendants ac ted to gether in a jo int v enture in c ommitting th e w rongful actions described herein. 107. The act ions o f t he R ecruiter D efendants an d Legal F acilitator D efendants described herein were performed within the scope of their agency to Signal. 108. Individually and through their agents, associates, attorneys, and/or employees, all Defendants have significant contacts in or around Orange, Texas. 109. At all relevant times, Defendants were “persons” within that term as defined b y RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 110. Upon i nformation and belief, D efendants ha ve be en e ngaged i n c ontacts w ith Plaintiffs, in cluding r ecruiting, o btaining, la bor c ontracting, p roviding immig ration-related services to, transporting, harboring, providing and/or employing Plaintiffs. 111. At a ll r elevant time s, Defendants o perated en terprises engaged i n i nterstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS The Recruitment Process Recruitment of the Plaintiffs and Other Workers 112. Beginning i n 2003 a nd c ontinuing t hrough 2006, R ecruiter D efendants (Defendants D ewan, D ewan C onsultants, P ol, a nd G lobal R esources) p laced a ds i n va rious newspapers across India and the United Arab Emirates, seeking welders, fitters, and other marine fabrication workers on behalf of various U.S.-based companies and individuals, including Labor Broker Defendants (Defendants Indo-Amerisoft, Rao, and J & M). 113. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, R ecruiter D efendants pl aced s uch ads i n coordination and agreement with Legal Facilitator Defendants (Defendants Burnett, GCILC, and Burnett Law Offices), and Labor Broker Defendants. 114. Upon information and belief, since at least December 2003 t hrough at least mid2004, Legal Facilitator Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants frequently communicated and consulted f requently vi a ma il, f ax, e -mail a nd/or t elephone c ommunications t o c oordinate and direct R ecruiter D efendants’ a ctivities, i ncluding a dvertising e fforts on be half of Labor B roker Defendants. 115. The a dvertisements pl aced b y R ecruiter D efendants pr omised t hat qua lified candidates could o btain l egal p ermanent r esidence (green c ards) an d t hereby l egally and permanently immigrate to the United States with their families. 116. In response to these advertisements, Plaintiffs contacted Recruiter Defendants by telephone, a nd/or a ttended m eetings a nd t esting s essions or ganized b y Recruiter D efendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants and their agents, employees and/or representatives at several locations throughout India and the United Arab Emirates.

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117. Specific facts relevant to the experiences of Plaintiffs are set forth in the “RICO Fraud Chart” attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 1, which is incorporated herein by reference.
118. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, pr ior t o a ttending t hese m eetings a nd t esting sessions, L abor B roker Defendants, R ecruiter Defendants, an d Legal Facilitator D efendants conferred in late 2003 and early 2004 b y phone, mail, fax and or e-mail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these meetings and testing sessions.
119. In t elephone c ommunications, i n-person m eetings, f axes, c ontracts, a nd ot her written d ocuments tr ansmitted b y ma il a nd/or w ire in th e f irst h alf o f 2 004, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator D efendants, a nd/or Labor Broker D efendants pe rsonally and through employees, agents and/or associates, told Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs successfully passed skills te sts a dministered in th e U nited A rab E mirates o r India a nd p aid f ees to taling approximately 5 t o 8 Indian l akh r upees (approximately $12,000 t o $20,000), t hen P laintiffs would be able to apply for permanent resident (green card) status in the United States with Labor Broker Defendants.
120. In t hese communications oc curring dur ing t he f irst ha lf of 2004, R ecruiter Defendants an d Legal Facilitator D efendants f urther e xplained to ma ny of th e P laintiffs, a s reflected i n t he at tached E xhibit 1, that t he i nstallment pa yments w ould be di vided a mong Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants.
121. In t hese communications oc curring dur ing t he f irst ha lf o f 2004, R ecruiter Defendants, Labor B roker D efendants, a nd Legal F acilitator D efendants f urther e xplained t o Plaintiffs that the installment payments would be divided among Recruiter Defendants, and one of the two Labor Broker Defendants.

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122. In telephone communications, in-person meetings, faxes, written contracts, and/or other written communications, transmitted, upon information and belief, by mail and/or wire in the first half of 2004, R ecruiter D efendants, L egal F acilitator D efendants, and L abor B roker Defendants in structed P laintiffs th at th e to tal f ees w ould b e p aid in a s eries o f a pproximately three installments.
123. In these conversations in the first half of 2004, Plaintiffs were informed on several occasions b y R ecruiter D efendants an d/or Legal Facilitator D efendants t hat i n ex change f or an additional f ee o f a pproximately $1,500 p er f amily m ember, P laintiffs w ould be a ble t o obt ain legal permanent residence for their spouses and children.
124. At i nformational m eetings a nd i n t elephone conversations, f axes, c ontracts, an d other w ritten doc uments t ransmitted i n l ate 200 3 t hrough approximately mid-2004, R ecruiter Defendants, L egal F acilitator Defendants, and L abor B roker Defendants, personally a nd/or through t heir a gents, r epresentatives, a nd/or employees, r epresented t o P laintiffs t hat L abor Broker D efendants w ere s table a nd r eputable U .S. c ompanies of fering l awful a nd a mple employment opportunities, and that Labor Broker Defendants would obtain for Plaintiffs green cards en abling P laintiffs t o p ermanently and l egally immi grate to th e U nited S tates w ith th eir family members.
125. At i nformational m eetings a nd i n t elephone conversations, f axes, c ontracts, a nd other written documents transmitted in late 2003 through approximately mid-2004, the Recruiter Defendants, L egal Facilitator D efendants, a nd Labor Broker D efendants, pe rsonally and/or through their agents, employees and/or representatives, told Plaintiffs that the green card process, once commenced, would be completed within 18 to 24 months.

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126. In s uch c ommunications w ith P laintiffs, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants further promised to act diligently and do everything necessary to obtain green cards for Plaintiffs in the timelines stipulated.
127. Based on t hese and other contractually-binding promises made to them regarding green cards and work opportunities in the United States, Plaintiffs signed contracts (hereinafter “the g reen card co ntracts”) at v arious t imes i n ear ly t o m id-2004 w ith Recruiter D efendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants.
128. Contracts s igned b y P laintiffs and ot her documents provided t o t he P laintiffs b y Legal F acilitator D efendants, R ecruiter D efendants, a nd Labor B roker D efendants t hrough t he use o f ma il a nd/or w ire tr ansmissions in a nd a round e arly t o m id-2004, further pr omised t hat Plaintiffs w ould pr omptly receive a r efund of a ll or ne arly all of t heir pa yments i f t hese Defendants did not succeed in securing green cards for Plaintiffs as promised.
129. Legal Facilitator Defendants, Recruiter Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants knew or s hould ha ve kn own t hat t hey w ould no t r efund P laintiffs’ m oney as pr omised i n t he contracts and other documents.
130. Legal Facilitator Defendants, Recruiter Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants induced t he Plaintiffs to e nter in to th e green c ard c ontracts: (a) w ithout in tent to d iligently pursue P laintiffs’ green card a pplications; a nd ( b) knowingly w ithout a ny ba sis w hatsoever f or representing, inter alia: (i) that the companies and/or entities purportedly sponsoring Plaintiffs’ applications w ere f inancially s olvent a nd ha d reliable a nd s table e mployment oppor tunities t o provide Plaintiffs; (ii) that green card applications sponsored by such companies would be valid and bona f ide unde r U .S. i mmigration l aw; ( iii) a nd t hat s uch a pplications w ere l ikely t o be successfully completed and approved within the promised timelines.

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131. In reasonable reliance on Legal Facilitator Defendants, Recruiter Defendants and Labor B roker D efendants’ e xplicit a nd r epeated pr omises r egarding g reen c ards, f amily members’ a bility to im migrate to th e United States, a nd la wful a nd legitimate e mployment opportunities i n t he U nited S tates, P laintiffs und ertook c onsiderable e conomic, s ocial, f amilial and pe rsonal s acrifices, i ncluding pa yment of hi gh f ees, a ssumption of s ignificant i nterest bearing de bt, l oss of r eal a nd pe rsonal pr operty, lost w ork oppor tunities, lost or unpa id w ages and additional legal fees.
132. Plaintiffs s igned c ontracts w ith R ecruiter Defendants, Legal F acilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants and made the first round of installment payments required by these contracts.
133. After P laintiffs s igned contracts w ith R ecruiter D efendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants and paid the first installment payments required by the contracts, these Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with updates regarding the progress of their green card applications for extended periods of time.
134. When P laintiffs co ntacted R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants by phone, mail, and/or e-mail at various times between the last half of 2004 and m id-2006 t o c heck on t he p rogress of t heir green c ard a pplications, t hese Defendants assured them that the green card process was going forward.
135. While a waiting th e p rocessing o f th eir green c ards, ma ny o f th ese P laintiffs continued t o i ncur s ubstantial i nterest on t he money t hey ha d bor rowed f or t he pur pose of making the first installment payment to these Defendants.
136. In or a round J anuary 20 06, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants and Labor Broker D efendants, pe rsonally a nd/or t hrough t heir agents, e mployees a nd/or

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representatives n otified Plaintiffs v ia te lephone, e -mail, a nd/or ma il c ommunications th at th e labor cer tification r equired f or t heir green c ard applications ha d be en a pproved b y t he U .S. government.
137. After th is n otification, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants a nd Labor Broker Defendants us ed w ire and/or m ail c ommunications t o collect t he s econd and/or third installment payments from the Plaintiffs.
138. By spring 2006, after the 18 to 24 month processing period promised by Recruiter Defendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d Labor Broker Defendants h ad el apsed, t he Plaintiffs had still not received their green cards.
139. By spring of 2006, Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Labor Broker Defendants had yet to refund Plaintiffs’ payments as promised by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
140. In late May and early June of 2006, the Legal Facilitator Defendants, on behalf of Defendant S ignal f iled with th e M ississippi D epartment o f E mployment S ecurity, th e T exas Workforce C ommission, a nd t he U nited S tates D epartment of Labor b y m ail, e lectronic transmission, and/or f ax t he completed forms ETA 750 and attachments seeking pe rmission t o import and hire 590 foreign guestworkers under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), attendant regulations 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.3, and associated administrative letters and/or guidance (commonly known as “the H-2B guestworker program”).
141. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was projected to be at least two to three years, the Legal Facilitator D efendants a nd Defendant Signal s tated in th ese applications to th e s tate workforce commissions and forms ETA 750 that Signal would employ workers from October 1,

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2006 to July 31, 2007. These applications were furnished with signatures by Signal executives swearing, under pain of perjury, to the veracity of the information in these applications.
142. Defendant S ignal s ought t hese workers t o p erform va rious j obs essential t o i ts marine fabrication services business, including welding and fitting.
143. The H -2B guestworker pr ogram pe rmits U .S. e mployers t o i mport foreign workers on s hort-term te mporary v isas t o m eet l abor n eeds w hen em ployers at test t hat t hey cannot find U.S. workers to perform the available jobs.
144. H-2B vi sas a re non -immigrant vi sas, a re onl y valid f or w ork w ith t he s pecific employer l isted on t he vi sa, a nd do not p rovide por table a nd/or t ransferable e mployment authorization for the visa bearer.
145. Defendant S ignal s tated in th e E TA 7 50 f orms th at its n eed f or H -2B guestworkers was “peak load and a o ne-time occurrence” and that “the temporary workers will work for the length of the prescribed dates of need, will be paid in accordance with the prevailing wage, and will return to their home country at the end of employment.”
146. In the ETA 750 forms, Defendant Signal n amed Legal Facilitator D efendants as its a gents f or t he pu rposes of pr eparing a nd submitting th ese a pplications to imp ort H -2B guestworkers. Legal Facilitator Defendants prepared and submitted these applications on behalf of Signal.
147. At th e time o f f iling th e E TA 7 50 f orms a nd attachments w ith th e M ississippi Department of Employment Security, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the United States Department of Labor, D efendant S ignal a nd t he Legal F acilitator D efendants kne w t hat S ignal projected t he l abor ne ed t hat i t s ought t o f ill w ith f oreign w orkers t o be a t l east t wo t o t hree years.

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148. Defendant S ignal a nd Legal F acilitator D efendants, a t or a round t he t ime t hey filed the ETA 750 forms in May and June 2006, repeatedly communicated by telephone, mail, email, and/or fax to direct and coordinate recruitment of Indian workers to fill the anticipated H2B guestworker jobs. Upon information and belief, Signal and/or Legal Facilitator Defendants repeatedly communicated with Recruiter Defendants and Labor Broker Defendants by telephone, mail, e -mail, a nd/or f ax t o di rect a nd c oordinate r ecruitment of Indian w orkers t o f ill t he anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs.
149. Upon information and belief, in the course of telephone, fax, e-mail and/or mail communications oc curring i n or a round M ay or J une 2006, D efendant S ignal a uthorized Recruiter D efendants to a ct as th eir a gents in India a nd th e U nited A rab E mirates f or th e purposes of recruiting Indian welders and fitters to fill the anticipated H-2B guestworker jobs at Signal operations.
150. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, i n t he c ourse of t hese c ommunications, D efendant Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants to represent that Signal would assume sponsorship of the pending and as-yet-unsuccessful green card applications on behalf of, among others, Plaintiffs.
151. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, i n t he c ourse of t hese c ommunications, D efendant Signal further authorized Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants to represent that Signal would apply for at least two to three H-2B visa extensions on be half of all the Indian H2B workers, including Plaintiffs, to allow them to remain in the United States working for Signal while Plaintiffs’ green card applications were being processed.
152. Defendant Signal authorized its agents to make these representations even though it knew or had reason to know that such visa extensions and green card applications would not be

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bona f ide a nd v alid u nder U nited S tates i mmigration l aw. M oreover, D efendant S ignal authorized its agents to make these misrepresentations even though it did not have the intention at that time to apply for such visa extensions and/or green cards on behalf of all of the Indian H2B workers, including Plaintiffs.
153. In July and August of 2006, with specific dates and assertions as set out in Ex. 1, the Legal F acilitator D efendants on be half of Defendant S ignal f iled with t he U nited S tates Citizenship and Immigration Service by mail, electronic transmission, and/or fax the completed I-129 forms and attachments seeking 590 H-2B visas.
154. Knowing that Signal’s labor need was projected to be at least two to three years, in these H-2B visa applications Defendant Signal attested to a 10-month labor need running from October 1, 2006 – July 31, 2007. Signal falsely represented to the government that at the end of this 10 month period, it intended to return all H-2B workers back to India. The Legal Facilitator Defendants de clared t hat t he a pplications w ere ba sed on a ll i nformation of w hich D efendant Burnett ha d a ny k nowledge despite th e f act th at th e Legal F acilitator D efendants b elieved t hat Signal’s intentions for these workers exceeded ten months.
155. In spring and summer of 2006, Plaintiffs who had already initiated the green card process s poke w ith R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, a nd/or Labor Broker Defendants over the phone and in person regarding their long-pending green card applications.
156. In t hese co mmunications, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, and/or Labor Broker D efendants of fered P laintiffs t he oppor tunity t o pu rsue t heir green c ards under the s ponsorship of D efendant S ignal. P laintiffs w ere t old t hat f or a n a dditional s um o f approximately 35,000 t o 45,000 r upees ($800 to $1,100), they could quickly obtain H-2B visas to go to the United States for work at Defendant Signal’s operations.

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157. In t hese co mmunications, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, and/or Labor Broker Defendants falsely assured Plaintiffs t hat Defendant S ignal would s eek at least two extensions of the temporary H-2B visas with which Plaintiffs would gain admittance to the U nited S tates, a nd t hat P laintiffs’ H -2B vi sas w ould t hereafter b e c onverted t o pe rmanent green cards.
158. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, pr ior t o t hese c ommunications w ith Plaintiffs, Recruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant Signal co mmunicated and consulted frequently via mail, fax, e-mail and/or telephone communications regarding the issues to be discussed and representations to be made to Plaintiffs.
159. In th eir c ommunications w ith P laintiffs, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator Defendants, a nd/or Labor B roker D efendants f urther f ailed t o di sclose m aterial f acts r egarding the H-2B visa, including the fact that H-2B visas confer only a temporary non-immigrant status which does not allow the bearer to adjust to permanent residency status and the fact that applying for H -2B v isa s tatus is fundamentally in compatible w ith s imultaneously a pplying f or a green card.
160. Plaintiffs, una ware of U .S. i mmigration l aw a nd t he t emporary, noni mmigrant character o f H -2B vi sas a nd de sperate not to f orfeit th e s ubstantial f ees th at th ey h ad a lready paid, a greed, i n r eliance on t he r epresentations of R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator Defendants, a nd/or Labor B roker D efendants, to t ransfer t heir green c ard a pplications t o Defendant S ignal’s s ponsorship a nd further a greed t o w ork f or D efendant S ignal und er H-2B visas pursuant to the terms explained by Recruiter Defendants.
161. In r eliance o n t he representations o f R ecruiter D efendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, Labor B roker D efendants a nd D efendant S ignal, P laintiffs and o thers s imilarly

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situated entered the United States on H-2B guestworker visas in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of w orking f or D efendant S ignal a t i ts P ascagoula, M ississippi, or O range, T exas facility, and these Plaintiffs were assigned to the Orange, Texas facility.
162. Plaintiffs w ould not ha ve pa id t he e xtraordinary fees charged b y R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator D efendants, an d/or Labor B roker Defendants f or t ravel, green cards, vi sas, a nd w ork opportunities ha d t hey known t hat t hese D efendants’ pr omises a nd representations were false.
163. Plaintiffs w ould not ha ve pa id t he e xtraordinary f ees c harged b y t he R ecruiter Defendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, a nd/or Labor B rokers D efendants f or t ravel, green cards, visas, and employment opportunities had they known that these Defendants had failed to disclose m aterial f acts c oncerning t he na ture and t erms a nd c onditions of t he i mmigration and work opportunities offered.
Preparations and Departure for Signal Operations in the United States 164. At va rious t imes dur ing t he s pring, s ummer, a nd f all 2006, e mployees of Defendant Signal traveled to various locations in India and the United Arab Emirates and tested Plaintiffs’ welding and pipefitting skills in anticipation of employing them in the United States. 165. Plaintiffs paid costs necessary to travel to the cities where these tests were held. 166. Plaintiffs paid admission fees charged to take these tests. 167. Plaintiffs a ttended a nd passed t hese t ests, w hich w ere ove rseen a nd graded b y Defendant Signal’s and/or Defendant Dewan’s agents, employees, and/or representatives. 168. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, pr ior t o a ttending t hese m eetings a nd t esting sessions, Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants conferred in

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spring, summer, and fall 2006 by phone, mail, fax and or e-mail to organize, plan, and coordinate the logistics and substantive content of these testing sessions.
169. On or about July 20, 2006 and August 17, 2006, t he United States Department of Labor approved Signal’s labor certification applications for 590 H -2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007.
170. In approving these labor certification applications, the United States Department of Labor relied on the accuracy of the applications’ stated 10-month period of labor need.
171. On i nformation and belief, t he Department of Labor i s prohibited b y i ts i nternal guidelines to grant labor certification applications without relying on the application’s statement of temporary labor need.
172. In l ate August a nd early September 2006, t he U nited S tates C itizenship a nd Immigration Service approved Signal’s H-2B visa petitions for 590 H-2B workers for the period of October 1, 2006 through July 31, 2007.
173. In approving these visa petitions, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service relied o n t he accuracy of t he p etitions’ stated 1 0-month pe riod of l abor n eed a nd t he representation t hat D efendant S ignal’s ne ed w as ba sed on a one t ime pe ak-load t emporary demand.
174. The U nited S tates C itizenship a nd Immigration S ervice mu st, according to regulation, rely on the stated period of the petitioner’s labor need, see 8 C.F.R.214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2006).
175. Defendant S ignal, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d R ecruiter Defendants knew that the stated period of need in Signal’s applications for labor certifications and for H-2B visas

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were inconsistent with Signal’s projected actual labor need and therefore Defendants knew these statements to the government were false.
176. The R ecruiter Defendants an d t he Legal F acilitator D efendants u sed t he H -2B visas, obtained from the U.S. Government on t he basis of false statements by Defendant Signal and th e Legal F acilitator D efendants, to e licit p ayments o f th e s econd and/or th ird in stallment from Plaintiffs and other class members.
177. Plaintiffs entered the United States on H-2B guestworker visas, issued by the U.S. Government o n th e b asis o f f alse s tatements b y D efendant S ignal a nd th e Legal F acilitator Defendants, in late 2006 and early 2007 for the purposes of working for Defendant Signal at its Orange, Texas facility.
178. Around the time of USCIS’s visa approval, Plaintiffs made necessary preparations in or der t o t ravel t o t he United S tates on H-2B visas to w ork f or S ignal, in cluding: p aying to obtain ne cessary t ravel a nd l egal do cuments; m aking p ayments t o t he U nited S tates c onsulate, Recruiter D efendants an d Legal F acilitator D efendants f or m andatory H -2B vi sa a nd c onsular processing f ees; at tending H -2B vi sa i nterviews; a nd pa ying R ecruiter D efendants f or t ravel arrangements.
179. In o rder t o s ecure H-2B vi sas t o w ork f or S ignal, P laintiffs w ere r equired t o be interviewed by United States Consular offices in Indian cities.
180. These consular interviews necessitated that Plaintiffs pay the costs of travel from their homes and/or current places of employment to various large Indian cities including Chennai (Madras) and Mumbai (Bombay).

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181. Recruiter Defendants an d/or Legal Facilitator D efendants, acting as D efendant Signal’s a gents, r equired th at P laintiffs me et w ith R ecruiter D efendants a nd/or t he Legal Facilitator Defendants in these Indian cities prior to attending their consular interviews.
182. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, pr ior t o t hese m eetings R ecruiter D efendants a nd Legal F acilitator D efendants d iscussed am ongst t hemselves a nd w ith D efendant S ignal b y e mail, t elephone, or i n-person c ommunications t he t opics t o be discussed and i nstructions t o be given to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated at these meetings.
183. At t hese p re-interview meetings, R ecruiter D efendants an d Legal F acilitator Defendants en sured t hat P laintiffs w ere u p-to-date o n p aying th e fee in stallments r equired b y their green card contracts.
184. Defendants f urther r equired t hat P laintiffs pa y an a dditional 35,000 t o 45,000 rupees ($800 to $1,100) fee for H-2B visa processing.
185. Recruiter D efendants a nd/or Legal Facilitator D efendants required P laintiffs to sign doc uments pe rmitting D efendant S achin Dewan t o receive t heir vi sa-stamped pa ssports from the Consulate on Plaintiffs’ behalves.
186. Recruiter D efendants a nd/or Legal F acilitator D efendants al so co ached t he Plaintiffs on what to say and what not to say during consular interviews. Those Defendants, inter alia, told Plaintiffs not to say anything about the substantial fees Plaintiffs had been required to pay, not to stay anything about expected green cards, and if asked to say that Plaintiffs expected to be in the United States for only several months and then would return to India.
187. Recruiter Defendants a nd/or Legal Facilitator D efendants to ld P laintiffs th at if they did not follow these instructions regarding the interviews, Plaintiffs would not receive their

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visas a nd w ould f orfeit t he a ll m oneys t hey had pr eviously p aid t o D efendants, i n a ddition t o losing their opportunity to permanently immigrate to the United States.
188. During P laintiffs’ c onsular in terviews, th e c onsular o fficials to ok P laintiffs’ passports from them.
189. Once Plaintiffs’ visas were approved, consular officials sent their passports, with H-2B visas affixed, directly to Defendant Dewan.
190. After r eceiving w ord t hat P laintiffs’ v isas w ere approved, R ecruiter Defendants made travel arrangements for Plaintiffs’ departures to the United States.
191. Before P laintiffs could leave for t he U nited S tates, h owever, P laintiffs w ere required to attend final meetings in Recruiter Defendants’ Mumbai (Bombay) office.
192. Such m eetings t ypically took pl ace m ere hou rs be fore P laintiffs’ s cheduled departures t o t he U nited S tates, w hen R ecruiter Defendants’ o ffice was t eeming w ith an xious fellow Indian workers awaiting departure to the United States.
193. At th ese me etings, R ecruiter D efendants collected f inal in stallment p ayments required by Plaintiffs’ green card contracts.
194. Recruiter D efendants a lso r equired t hat P laintiffs, m ost of w hom do not proficiently read or s peak E nglish, s ign E nglish la nguage d ocuments w ith little o r n o time f or review.
195. Recruiter Defendants refused to return Plaintiffs’ passports -- which had been in Defendant S achin D ewan’s pos session s ince a fter P laintiffs’ H -2B vi sas w ere approved b y Consular O fficials -- until a fter P laintiffs h ad p aid th e f inal in stallments a nd s igned th e mandatory paperwork.

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196. In f orceful t ones, R ecruiter D efendants or t heir s taff de manded t hat P laintiffs quickly s ign t he m andatory doc uments, l est t hey m iss t he f lights t o t he U nited S tates w hich Recruiter Defendants had scheduled for them.
197. Without pos session of t heir pa ssports a nd within t his r ushed a nd hos tile atmosphere, P laintiffs ha d no r easonable oppor tunity t o r eview, ne gotiate, a nd/or m ake a ny changes to the documents presented them.
198. On occasions when workers who appeared at the Mumbai office failed to present sufficient f unds t o pa y the f inal i nstallment r equired b y t he green c ard c ontracts, D efendant Dewan and his associates threatened to destroy and/or deface these workers’ passports.
199. Such threats were uttered in the presence of other workers, causing these workers to reasonably believe that they had no choice but to pay the final installments in full.
200. Based o n t he R ecruiter D efendants’ t hreatening an d co ercive b ehavior d uring these pre-departure meetings in Mumbai and the extraordinary and increasing levels of debt they had incurred to pay the Recruiter Defendants and Legal Facilitator Defendants for green card and H-2B visa arrangements, Plaintiffs reasonably believed that they had no c hoice but to make the payments r equired b y t he R ecruiter D efendants and t o t ravel t o t he U nited S tates t o w ork f or Defendant Signal.
201. Plaintiffs a nd a pproximately 560 ot her Indian H -2B w orkers t raveled f rom Mumbai to Defendant Signal’s operations in the U.S. at various times from late October 2006 to April 2007 on tickets arranged by the Recruiter Defendants.
202. Pursuant to Defendant Signal’s instructions and arrangements, approximately 300 workers w ere s ent t o S ignal’s P ascagoula, M ississippi facility and approximately 290 w orkers, including these Plaintiffs, were sent to Signal’s Orange, Texas facility upon arrival in the United

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States, a lthough S ignal’s O range, T exas f acility began t urning a way workers i n or a round February 2007.
203. The P laintiffs ha d no c hoice but t o us e t he R ecruiter D efendants a nd t he Legal Facilitator Defendants to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
204. The Plaintiffs had no choice but to pay the fees the Recruiter Defendants and the Legal Facilitator Defendants charged to secure employment at Defendant Signal’s operations.
205. Management pe rsonnel at D efendant S ignal m ade t he c onscious and d eliberate decision to p rohibit th e P laintiffs f rom s ecuring employment at S ignal’s o perations e ither through a nother r ecruiter or b y b ypassing r ecruiters’ a ltogether a nd a pplying di rectly with Defendant Signal.
Conditions at the Signal Facility in Orange 206. Upon arrival at Defendant Signal’s facilities in Orange, Plaintiffs were shocked to discover t hat t hey were e xpected t o l ive i n i solated, ove rcrowded l abor c amps comprised of trailer-like bunkhouses. Workers who were sent to Pascagoula faced similar conditions. 207. Defendant S ignal’s l abor cam ps w ere l ocated i n i solated, i ndustrial ar eas m iles removed from shopping areas, places of worship, and residential communities. The camps were enclosed by fences and accessible only by a single guarded entrance. 208. The S ignal l abor cam p g ates at t he T exas a nd M ississippi f acilities w ere constantly monitored by security guards retained by Defendant Signal. 209. Signal’s s ecurity guards m onitored P laintiffs’ c omings a nd goings b y requiring them t o s how t heir e mployee i dentification b adges and r ecording w hen P laintiffs en tered an d exited t he cam ps. S ignal’s s ecurity guards al so s earched P laintiffs’ p ackages an d b ags w hen they entered the camp.

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210. Except on rare o ccasions, P laintiffs were not permitted to receive visitors in the Signal labor camps.
211. Up to twenty-four Indian men were housed in each bunkhouse and made to sleep in tw o-tiered bunk be ds. T he bunk be ds w ere s o t ightly p acked i n t he bunkhous es t hat i t w as difficult for workers to move about in the narrow passageways between bunks. T hese housing conditions, inter a lia, v iolated t he ap plicable h ealth an d s afety s tandards u nder t he f ederal Occupational Health and Safety Act.
212. The Signal labor camp bunkhouses had insufficient toileting and bathing facilities for twenty-four men, resulting in long lines for the bathrooms before and after work shifts.
213. Privacy was non -existent, an d P laintiffs o ften ex perienced ex treme d ifficulty sleeping due to the constant noise resulting from the close quarters and the comings and goings of workers who worked on different shifts.
214. Defendant Signal’s personnel and/or security guards conducted surprise searches of the dormitory areas of the bunkhouses, including searches of workers’ personal belongings.
215. Plaintiffs to ok th eir me als in D efendant S ignal’s m ess h alls, w hich w ere o nly open during limited hours. Due to filthy and unhygienic kitchen conditions, Plaintiffs frequently became ill, sometimes requiring hospitalization.
216. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, D efendant S ignal di d not obt ain the r equired permit(s) to furnish the board at its Texas “man camp,” and the condition and sanitation of the board f urther vi olated f ederal, s tate, a nd/or l ocal l aw i ncluding, inter a lia, t he U .S. F ood a nd Drug Administration Code, as adopted and modified by Texas Food Establishment Rules.

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217. Defendant Signal deducted labor camp fees of approximately $35 p er day ($245 per week, or approximately $1,050 p er month) from Plaintiffs’ paychecks for these substandard accommodations and meals.
218. When Plaintiffs complained and asked to live outside the labor camps, Defendant Signal initially refused and subsequently told workers that if they tried to live outside the camps Signal w ould s till d educt th e la bor camp f ees from P laintiffs’ w ages. As a r esult, P laintiffs reasonably felt that they had no choice but to continue living in the Signal camps.
219. Defendant Signal only housed Indian H-2B workers such as Plaintiffs in its labor camps, w hich em ployees an d m anagement at S ignal r eferred t o as t he “reservation(s),” i n a derogatory play on the common name (“Indian”) for Plaintiffs’ ethnicity and Native Americans. Upon information and belief, workers of non-Indian descent and United States citizen employees were n either r equired n or a llowed t o l ive i n a nd/or pa y f or accommodations i n D efendant Signal’s labor camps.
220. Defendant S ignal s ubjected P laintiffs to s kills te sting a nd r e-testing, o n-the-job discipline, l ayoffs, p eriods w ithout w ork, l ack of s afety p recautions, unf avorable j ob assignments, e valuation pr ocesses, a nd other adverse e mployment actions t o w hich non -Indian and U.S. citizen workers were not similarly subjected.
221. In addition, Signal camp personnel and supervisors frequently subject Plaintiffs to an objectively hostile and abusive environment. They often used offensive language in speaking with and/or referring to Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers and regularly insulted Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or alienage.
222. During the first week of employing Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in the United States, Defendant Signal did not reimburse Plaintiffs and others similarly situated for any

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of t he e xpenses t hat P laintiffs a nd ot hers s imilarly s ituated were r equired t o i ncur as a pr econdition of seeking employment with Signal.
223. During the first two weeks of employing Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in the U nited S tates, D efendant S ignal de ducted approximately $100 t o $200 e ach week from Plaintiffs’ and other similarly situated workers’ checks for job-related tool kits which they were required to purchase from Defendant Signal.
224. Over t he c ourse of t heir e mployment a t D efendant S ignal, P laintiffs a nd ot hers similarly s ituated w ere r outinely aw arded a f ifty cen t p er h our “s afety b onus” f or w orkweeks when they were not written up for violations of Defendant Signal’s safety rules.
225. The safety bonus Defendant Signal paid the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated was in addition to their regular hourly wage.
226. Upon information and belief, the safety bonus was non-discretionary with respect both to the decision to pay the bonus and to the amount of the bonus.
227. Defendant S ignal pa id t he s afety bonus t o t he P laintiffs a nd ot hers s imilarly situated pur suant t o a p rior a greement or pr omise c ausing t he P laintiffs a nd ot hers similarly situated to expect the bonus payments regularly if they met the required safety criteria.
228. During workweeks when the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked more than 40 hour s, D efendant S ignal di d not pa y one a nd one -half time s th e a mount of t he s afety bonus for all overtime hours worked.
229. Signal personnel and management regularly threatened Plaintiffs and other H-2B workers that if they did not continue working for Signal, or did not work according to Signal’s specifications, Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers would be deported back to India.

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230. In the isolated and guarded atmosphere of the labor camp and grappling with the crushing de bts t hey h ad i ncurred t o c ome t o t he U nited S tates, P laintiffs r easonably felt t hat Signal’s s tatements w ere t hreatening a nd f elt f orced t o c ontinue w orking f or S ignal de spite terrible working and living conditions.
231. At regular meetings and in one-on-one or small group conversations with Signal camp pe rsonnel and m anagement, s ome w orkers, i ncluding s ome of the P laintiffs, voi ced complaints regarding the discriminatory treatment to which Indian H-2B workers were subject. Other s imilarly s ituated w orkers a lso voi ced complaints, i n bot h the O range a nd P ascagoula camps.
232. Workers V ijayan a nd Kadakkarappally, t wo of t he pl aintiffs i n t he David Litigation, took leading roles in gathering and voicing others’ complaints to Defendant Signal’s personnel in camp meetings in Pascagoula.
233. When Indian workers, including Vijayan and Kadakkarappally, voiced grievances regarding hous ing, f ood, a nd wages, D efendant S ignal’s p ersonnel warned t hem t o s top complaining.
234. When Signal took no action in response to workers’ complaints, numerous Indian H-2B w orkers l iving a t t he P ascagoula l abor c amp, i ncluding V ijayan a nd K adakkarappally, began meeting collectively to discuss how to persuade Signal to improve conditions in its labor camps, and also began meeting with third parties to discuss how best to address their concerns.
235. Defendant S ignal b ecame aw are o f t hese m eetings, i ncluding m eetings b etween workers, including Vijayan and Kadakkarappally, and third parties whom Signal believed to be attorneys.

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236. Defendant S ignal, t hrough i ts e mployees a nd/or a gents, c ontacted t he R ecruiter Defendants an d Legal F acilitator D efendants t o express i ts c oncerns a bout w orker or ganizing efforts and the specific involvement of Vijayan and Kadakkarappally.
237. Upon i nformation and b elief, dur ing t hese c onversations R ecruiter D efendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Signal reached an agreement r egarding steps that they would take to discourage further worker organizing efforts and to ensure that the majority of the Indian H-2B workforce continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B workforce from exercising their legal rights.
238. Upon information and belief, Signal management and camp personnel conferred and planned internally and with the private Swetman security firm in Mississippi to respond to workers’ organizing activities and to take actions to ensure that the majority of the Indian H-2B workforce continued to work at Signal without complaint, as well as to prevent the Indian H-2B workforce from exercising their legal rights.
239. On or about March 7, 2007, Defendant Sachin Dewan called Vijayan’s wife at her home in India and warned her that Vijayan must stop making trouble at Signal.
240. Vijayan’s w ife in formed V ijayan o f th is c all, a nd V ijayan called D efendant Dewan on or a bout M arch 8, 2007. D uring t hat c onversation, D efendant D ewan t old V ijayan that D ewan h ad l earned f rom Defendant S ignal t hat V ijayan was o rganizing t he w orkers an d making trouble. Defendant Dewan told Vijayan that if the organizing continued, all the workers would be sent back to India.
241. Vijayan i nformed ot her Indian workers a bout the c alls h e a nd hi s w ife had received from Defendant Dewan, and word spread quickly through the Pascagoula and Orange camps and to these Plaintiffs, regarding the threats against Vijayan.

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242. News ab out t he c alls b etween D efendant D ewan, V ijayan an d V ijayan’s w ife substantially he ightened t he r easonable f ears o f P laintiffs i n t he Orange c amp t hat i f t hey complained a bout or t ried t o l eave t he di scriminatory and s ubstandard w orking and l iving conditions at S ignal, t he R ecruiter Defendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, and S ignal would retaliate a gainst P laintiffs o r th eir f amilies w ith acts o f v iolence o r b y a rranging for P laintiffs’ deportation to India.
243. Defendant Signal called a workforce-wide meeting on or about March 8, 2007 in the Pascagoula camp, attended by Signal management and Defendant Burnett.
244. At th is me eting, S ignal ma nagement to ld th e Pascagoula w orkers th at S ignal would fight back against organizing efforts by the workers.
245. Signal management further threatened that Signal would not extend Plaintiffs’ and all other Indian H-2B workers’ visas if any of the workers took legal action against Signal. A t that same meeting Defendant Burnett told the workers that they were ineligible for other kinds of immigration relief and c ould depend onl y on S ignal t o m aintain t heir H-2B immigration status and pursue their green card applications. These threats were promptly reported to the workers in Orange, including Plaintiffs.
246. At or about the same time as this camp-wide meeting in Pascagoula, Mississippi, Signal m anagement m ade t he d ecision to t erminate and f orcibly de port V ijayan and Kadakkarappally, along with Kuldeep Singh, Kumar, and Chellappan, three Pascagoula workers who a re a lso pl aintiffs i n t he David Litigation, and t o do s o b y m eans t hat w ould m ake a n example of t hem for t he ot her Indian workers i n P ascagoula a nd i n O range, i n or der t o ke ep those workers in line.

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247. Early on t he morning of March 9, 2007, S ignal locked the gate to its Pascagoula labor camp, thereby obstructing the sole means of direct entry to and exit from the camp.
248. Around t his s ame t ime, S ignal c amp c oordinator D arrell S nyder, a nd approximately five s ecurity guards, s ome or a ll of w hom w ere obt ained t hrough t he pr ivate Swetman S ecurity firm, s wept t hrough t he bunkhous es c arrying pi ctures o f V ijayan, Kadakkarappally, K. Singh, Kumar, and Chellappan.
249. Security guards b egan accosting w orkers t o d etermine w hether t hey were t he individuals shown in the pictures.
250. Plaintiffs a nd ot her Indian H -2B workers at b oth cam ps b ecame i ncreasingly frightened and confused by these activities, particularly when word spread that Signal had locked the gate that served as the sole exit from the Pascagoula labor camp.
251. Around 5:15 AM that morning, Vijayan was walking towards the dining area. A security guard an d D arrell S nyder, a S ignal em ployee, a ggressively c onfronted V ijayan a nd instructed him that he was in their custody.
252. Based on t he threats made at the meeting on M arch 8, 2007 a nd Vijayan’s recent phone call with Sachin Dewan, Vijayan feared what Defendant Signal might do to him.
253. Vijayan began to panic, thinking of the enormous quantity of money he had spent to c ome t o t he U nited S tates a nd t he m assive de bts he ow ed i n India. Vijayan kne w t hat he would not be able to repay such debts if he were deported and no longer employed by Signal.
254. These f eelings, c ombined w ith V ijayan’s r easonable f ear t hat S nyder a nd t he security guards might physically hurt him, drove Vijayan to attempt suicide. V ijayan had to be transported from the labor camp to a local hospital for immediate medical attention.

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255. While a ttempting to a ssist V ijayan in o btaining me dical attention, Kadakkarappally was grabbed by Darrell Snyder and/or one or more of the security guards.
256. Kadakkarappally was taken forcefully by the arm and marched into a communal room in the labor camp referred to by workers as “the TV room.”
257. Upon arriving in the TV room, Kadakkarappally found two workers already held inside. E arlier that morning, Darrell Snyder and the security guards had grabbed Chellappan in the c ommunal e ating a rea a nd K umar i n hi s bu nkhouse a nd f orced bot h of t hem i nto t he T V room, where they were kept under guard and prevented from leaving.
258. In t he T V r oom, D arrell S nyder i nformed K adakkarappally t hat he and Kumar and C hellappan w ere f ired a nd w ould b e t aken to t he a irport t o b e d eported t o India. S nyder demanded t hat Kadakkarappally stay i nside t he TV room, and Kadakkarappally w as pr evented from leaving the TV room by security guards.
259. Kuldeep S ingh, upon r ealizing S nyder a nd t he s ecurity guards w ere l ooking f or him a nd i ntended t o a pprehend a nd de tain hi m, hi d hi mself a nd l ater fled t he c amp vi a a n adjacent work area.
260. Kadakkarappally, K umar, and C hellappan w ere d etained i n t he T V r oom, unde r guard, from approximately 6 a.m. for several hours.
261. Several s ecurity guards watched ov er K adakkarappally, K umar, a nd C hellappan while t hey w ere de tained. O ver t he c ourse of s everal hour s, s ecurity guards denied Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan’s repeated requests to be let out of the TV room, to get something to drink, or to use the bathroom.
262. When Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan’s co-workers attempted to come into the TV room to talk to the three workers kept inside, the security guards pushed them back.

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263. Confused and frightened, workers assembled outside the TV room to protest the treatment of Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan.
264. At a round 10 A M, S ignal c amp pe rsonnel f inally pe rmitted K adakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan to use the bathroom accompanied by security guards, one at a time.
265. Around noon, D arrell S nyder a nd a P ascagoula pol ice of ficer entered t he T V room a nd t he of ficer q uestioned w hy K adakkarappally, K umar, a nd C hellappan w ere there. Snyder said that these workers had been fired and would be sent back to India.
266. By early afternoon on M arch 9, 2007, l ocal media, religious advocates, and other individuals ha d ga thered out side t he c amp gate t o e xpress t heir concern ove r t he attempted suicide of Vijayan and the forced detention of Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan.
267. Faced w ith g rowing pr otests b y c ommunity m embers a nd S ignal e mployees, Defendant Signal decided not to forcibly transport Kadakkarappally, Kumar, and Chellappan to the airport for deportation to India, and instead escorted them from the Pascagoula labor camp.
268. Other Indian H -2B w orkers, i ncluding t hese Plaintiffs, w orking a t Signal’s Orange facilities rapidly learned of the events at the Pascagoula labor camp on March 9, 2007 . In response and out of fear for their continued well-being, some workers surreptitiously fled both camps.
269. Within a f ew d ays of P laintiffs’ a nd ot her Indian H -2B workers’ arrival a t i ts labor camps in late 2006 and early 2007, Signal personnel had conducted meetings at the labor camps b etween P laintiffs an d r epresentatives f rom s pecific b anks. In Orange, t hese m eetings were with representatives from Capital One Bank.
270. At th e in struction o f Defendant S ignal, P laintiffs o pened a ccounts with th e designated bank and agreed to directly deposit their wages in these accounts. Defendant Signal’s

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establishment of Plaintiffs’ accounts with these banks gave it unique access to and control over Plaintiffs’ funds.
271. At some point before April 10, 2007, on information and belief, after some Indian H-2B w orkers ha d f led S ignal’s M ississippi c amp, t he ba nk w ith w hich t hose w orkers h ad established s imilar a ccounts de nied t hose de parted w orkers a ccess t o t heir ba nk a ccounts a nd invalidated their ATM cards.
272. Upon information and belief, that Mississippi bank refused the departed workers access to their own bank accounts at Defendant Signal’s behest.
273. Indian H-2B workers still working at Signal labor camps, including the Plaintiffs, heard about the difficulty departed Signal workers had in accessing their funds through Signalestablished ba nk accounts a nd r easonably b elieved t hat s imilar a ction m ight be t aken against them should they try to leave Defendant Signal’s employ.
274. The i nformation a bout w orkers’ i nability t o a ccess t heir m oney, c ombined w ith other f actors de scribed herein, c ontributed t o t he r easonable be liefs o f Plaintiffs a nd t he ot her remaining Indian H-2B workers that if they tried to leave the employ of Defendant Signal they would face serious harm and/or threatened or actual abuse of the legal process.
275. Defendant S ignal’s a ctions on a nd a fter M arch 9 , 2007 s ignificantly i ntensified the reasonable fears of the remaining Plaintiffs and other Indian H-2B workers in the Pascagoula and O range c amps t hat if t hey t ried t o l eave S ignal’s employ o r oppos e unl awful and coercive employment conditions at Signal, including by consulting with counsel, they faced the threat of physical restraint, detention, forced deportation, or other serious harms and/or abuses of the legal process.

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276. Throughout t he s pring a nd s ummer of 2007, S ignal personnel i n t he M ississippi and T exas c amps he ld various m eetings w ith t he r emaining P laintiffs and ot her Indian H -2B workers to discuss the status of Plaintiffs’ and other Indian H-2B workers’ visas and green card applications.
277. Upon i nformation a nd be lief, dur ing s pring a nd summer 2007 S ignal pe rsonnel conferred am ongst t hemselves an d w ith t he R ecruiter D efendants an d the Legal F acilitator Defendants vi a phone a nd/or e -mail t o r each a greement o n what s hould be s aid t o w orkers attending the meetings.
278. Soon a fter M arch 9, 2 007, D efendant S ignal held a c amp-wide me eting in Pascagoula. S ignal pe rsonnel t old t he I ndian H-2B w orkers t hat S ignal w ould s ponsor t heir green cards if they stayed at Signal and obeyed Signal’s rules, and warned that if workers held any meetings against Signal’s interests, they would be terminated. As Signal understood would happen, w orkers a t t he O range camp, i ncluding P laintiffs, pr omptly l earned w hat S ignal personnel had said at this meeting, and understood it would apply to workers at Orange, as well.
279. In that same time period, Defendants Dewan and Burnett came to the Signal camp in Orange, Texas and again promised, in the presence of Signal personnel, that Signal, through its a ttorney D efendant B urnett, w ould m ake bon a f ide a pplications f or green c ards a nd obt ain several H-2B visa extensions for the workers who had not been terminated by Signal (plaintiffs in the David Litigation, including David, Sulekha, Thangamani, Kandhasamy, Khuttan, Andrews and D hananjaya), a nd t he ot her Indian H -2B workers. P laintiffs r easonably b elieved t hese promises.
280. In m eetings a nd c onversations i n s pring a nd s ummer 2007, D efendant S ignal, through its agents and employees at the Pascagoula and Orange facilities, continued to promise

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that S ignal w ould arrange f or t he H -2B vi sa e xtensions a nd g reen c ards or iginally p romised Plaintiffs when they were recruited in India and the United Arab Emirates.
281. At th e s ame time a s D efendant S ignal w as p romising t o a rrange fo r H -2B vi sa extensions and green cards for the Plaintiffs as well as other Indian H-2B workers, Signal in fact was s ecretly e valuating all of t he I ndian w orkers w ith t he i ntent no t e ven t o a pply f or vi sa extensions for certain of the Indian H-2B workers.
282. Plaintiffs’ continuing dependence on Defendant Signal for their present and future immigration s tatus, t heir c ontinuing hi gh l evels of i ndebtedness, as well a s ot her factors reasonably l ed P laintiffs t o f ear s erious ha rm a nd/or a buse of t he l egal p rocess i f t hey l eft Signal’s employ.
283. Under such circumstances, these Plaintiffs reasonably felt like they had no choice but to continue working for Signal.
284. At v arious time s r elevant to P laintiffs’ c laims, D efendant S ignal r efused to confirm w hether v alid H -2B vi sa e xtensions ha d i n f act be en obt ained for P laintiffs, c oercing Plaintiffs t o c ontinue working f or S ignal i n t he hope t hat S ignal w ould f inally r esolve t heir uncertain immigration status.
285. Since f irst c ontracting w ith D efendants i n India and t he U nited Arab E mirates, Plaintiffs h ave yet t o r eceive from D efendants t he g reen c ards D efendants p romised t hem. Despite clear contractual provisions requiring them to do so, the Recruiter Defendants, the Legal Facilitator D efendants, and t he Labor B roker Defendants ha ve refused t o r efund a ny o f t he moneys Plaintiffs paid to them for unsuccessful green card and visa processing.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003 Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage,

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slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor) Defendants Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., the Recruiter Defendants (Michael Pol, Global Resources, Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants), and the Legal Facilitator Defendants (Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast
Immigration Law Center) 286. Plaintiffs r e-allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 287. Plaintiffs br ing t his c laim a gainst D efendant S ignal, R ecruiter Defendants, a nd Legal Facilitator Defendants. 288. Plaintiffs are authorized to bring these civil claims against Defendants pursuant to the civil remedies provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 289. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants attempted to and did subject Plaintiffs to forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 290. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants knowingly attempted to and did physically restrain and/or threaten Plaintiffs with serious harm in order to obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1589(1). 291. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants knowingly attempted to and did obtain the labor and services of Plaintiffs using a scheme, plan, or pa ttern which, i n t he t otality of t he c ircumstances, was i ntended t o coerce a nd di d c oerce Plaintiffs to b elieve th at th ey w ould s uffer s erious h arm if th ey were to le ave th e e mploy o f Defendant Signal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(2). 292. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, an d Legal Facilitator D efendants’ scheme to isolate Plaintiffs, to coerce them to live in conditions causing psychological harm, and to l imit t heir out side c ontacts, i ncluding unl awful di scrimination i n vi olation of 42 U .S.C. §

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1981, w as d esigned t o c onvince P laintiffs t hat t hey would s uffer s erious harm i f t hey were t o leave the employ of Defendant Signal.
293. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants retaliated against P laintiffs f or a ttempts to e xercise th eir le gal r ights, a nd th reatened P laintiffs with deportation and deceived Plaintiffs about the terms of their immigration status in a manner that constitutes an abuse of the legal process under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(3).
294. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants knowingly r ecruited, t ransported, ha rbored, pr ovided, a nd/or obt ained t he P laintiffs s o a s t o obtain t heir l abor and s ervices i n vi olation of l aws pr ohibiting p eonage, s lavery, i nvoluntary servitude, a nd f orced l abor w ithin t he m eaning of t he pr ovisions of t he T rafficking V ictims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (TVPA).
295. In vi olation of 18 U .S.C. § 1590, D efendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, a nd Legal F acilitator D efendants know ingly r ecruited, t ransported, ha rbored a nd/or obt ained t he Plaintiffs for labor or services in furtherance of these Defendants’ violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 set forth above.
296. As a proximate result of the conduct of Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal F acilitator D efendants, P laintiffs ha ve s uffered i njuries t o t heir pe rsons, bus inesses, and property, and other damages.
297. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees.

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) All Defendants
298. Plaintiffs r e-allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
299. Plaintiffs’ R ICO C ase Statement, f iled c oncurrently with P laintiffs’ o riginal Complaint, is incorporated herein by reference.
300. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (“RICO”), are brought against all Defendants.
301. Plaintiffs a re “ persons” w ith s tanding t o s ue w ithin t he m eaning of 18 U .S.C. § 1964(c).
302. Each o f t he Defendants is a “ RICO pe rson” w ithin t he m eaning o f 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1).
303. All D efendants a nd t he U nited S tates C onsular of ficers i n India c onstitute a n association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise I”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).
304. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal are an association-in-fact, and therefore an enterprise (the “RICO Enterprise II”), within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).
305. Recruiter D efendants, D efendant S ignal, Legal F acilitator D efendants, S wetman Security, and C apital O ne B ank ar e an association-in-fact, an d t herefore an enterprise ( the “RICO Enterprise III”) within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4).

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The RICO Enterprises RICO Enterprise I
306. RICO E nterprise I at a ll r elevant time s w as an o ngoing b usiness r elationship between all D efendants, a nd t he U nited S tates C onsular of ficers i n India, w ith t he c ommon purpose of recruiting, transporting, providing, processing, and obtaining foreign workers to work on shipyards in the United States, including on Signal’s operations in Texas and Mississippi.
307. RICO E nterprise I w as e ngaged in in terstate c ommerce in th at its a ctivities a nd transactions r elating to t he in ternational an d i nterstate m ovement o f w orkers af fect i nterstate commerce and frequently require travel and communications across state and international lines.
308. The members of RICO Enterprise I functioned as a continuing unit. 309. Defendants c onducted or pa rticipated i n, a nd/or c onspired t o c onduct or participate in the affairs of RICO Enterprise I through a pattern of numerous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 1962( c) and 18 U .S.C. § 1962( d), related by their common goal t o r ecruit, obt ain, t ransport, pr ocess, and p rovide w orkers t hrough the us e o f f raudulent promises, exorbitant fees, forced labor, and/or trafficking. 310. Specifically, R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant Signal conducted or participated in and/or conspired to conduct the affairs of RICO Enterprise I by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; and b. Trafficking pe rsons w ith r espect t o m odern d ay slavery, i nvoluntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590.

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311. Specifically, a ll D efendants c onducted or pa rticipated i n a nd/or c onspired t o conduct t he a ffairs of R ICO E nterprise I b y engaging i n t he f ollowing pr edicate a cts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Mail f raud t o f urther t heir unl awful s cheme i n vi olation of 18 U .S.C. § 1341;
b. Wire f raud t o f urther t heir unl awful s cheme i n violation of 18 U .S.C. § 1343; and
c. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. RICO Enterprise II
312. RICO E nterprise II was a t a ll r elevant time s a n o ngoing b usiness r elationship between R ecruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant S ignal w ith t he common pur pose of s elling U nited S tates gr een cards, vi sas, a nd w ork o pportunities t o Indian workers t o c onvince s uch w orkers t o pa y f ees a nd t o t ravel t o the U nited S tates t o w ork f or companies, including Signal.
313. The members of RICO Enterprise II operated as a continuing unit. 314. RICO Enterprise II w as engaged in interstate commerce in that its activities and transactions relating to the sale of United States green cards, visas, and job opportunities affect interstate commerce. 315. Recruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant S ignal conducted o r pa rticipated i n a nd/or conspired t o c onduct o r pa rticipate i n, t he a ffairs of R ICO Enterprise II through a pattern of numerous acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962( c) a nd 18 U .S.C. § 1962( d), r elated b y t heir c ommon g oal t o s ell U nited S tates gr een

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cards and work opportunities to Indian workers for the purposes of furnishing such workers for employment at Signal’s operations.
316. Specifically, t he R ecruiter D efendants, t he Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d Defendant Signal conducted or participated in the affairs of RICO Enterprise II by engaging in the following predicate acts of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; b. Trafficking pe rsons w ith r espect t o m odern d ay slavery, i nvoluntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; c. Mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; d. Wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and e. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.
RICO Enterprise III 317. RICO Enterprise III w as a t a ll r elevant t imes a n ong oing bus iness r elationship between t he R ecruiter Defendants, t he Legal Facilitator D efendants, D efendant S ignal, an d Capital O ne B ank with t he c ommon pur pose o f pr oviding a nd m aintaining a c onsistent a nd acquiescent labor force at Signal operations. 318. RICO Enterprise III was engaged in interstate commerce in that its activities and transactions r elating t o maintaining a nd pr oviding a c onsistent l abor f orce at S ignal oc curred across s tate a nd i nternational l ines, a nd i nvolve wages and w orking conditions a t a n e mployer engaged in interstate commerce (Signal). 319. The members of RICO Enterprise III functioned as a continuing unit. 320. Recruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant S ignal conducted, or participated in, and/or conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO

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Enterprise III through a pa ttern of num erous acts of r acketeering activity i n vi olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), related by their common goal to maintain a consistent and acquiescent H-2B Indian labor force at Signal through the use of fraudulent promises, forced labor, and trafficking.
321. Recruiter D efendants, Legal F acilitator D efendants, an d D efendant S ignal conducted, or participated in, and/or conspired to conduct or participate in, the affairs of RICO Enterprise III b y e ngaging i n t he f ollowing pr edicate a cts of r acketeering a ctivity und er 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1):
a. Forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; b. Trafficking pe rsons w ith r espect t o m odern d ay slavery, i nvoluntary servitude, and forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; c. Mail f raud t o f urther t heir unl awful s cheme i n vi olation of 18 U .S.C. § 1341; d. Wire f raud t o f urther t heir unl awful s cheme i n violation of 18 U .S.C. § 1343; and e. Immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.
Predicate Acts Forced Labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1589 322. Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal through RICO E nterprises I, II, a nd III willfully, kno wingly, a nd i ntentionally committed a nd/or conspired to commit multiple predicate acts of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶¶ 276-280, supra.

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Trafficking for the Purposes of Forced Labor and/or Involuntary Servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1590
323. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Recruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal through RICO Enterprises I, III, and III willfully, knowingly, and intentionally committed and/or conspired to commit multiple predicate acts of trafficking for the purposes of forced labor and/or involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and as set forth in Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, ¶¶ 281-282, supra.
Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 324. As s et f orth i n t he preceding p aragraphs a nd i n E xhibit 1, D efendants, through RICO Enterprise I, m ade a nd/or c onspired t o m ake false pr omises r egarding green c ards and other benefits in a scheme calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sums of money. 325. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, a nd D efendant S ignal, t hrough R ICO E nterprises I, II, a nd III, made a nd/or c onspired t o m ake f alse s tatements r elated t o a pplications s ubmitted t o the U .S. Government fo r H -2B v isas a nd f alse pr omises to P laintiffs r egarding green c ards a nd ot her benefits in a scheme calculated to defraud Plaintiffs out of large sums of money. 326. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs a nd i n E xhibit 1, D efendants, through RICO E nterprise I, us ed t he m ails a nd w ire c ommunications, i ncluding c ommunications vi a telephone, fax, i nternet a nd/or e-mail, on nu merous oc casions t o further t hese f raudulent schemes. 327. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, and Defendant Signal, through RICO Enterprises I, II, and III, used

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the m ails a nd w ire communications, i ncluding c ommunications vi a t elephone, f ax, i nternet and/or e-mail on numerous occasions to further this fraudulent scheme.
328. These w illful, know ing, a nd i ntentional a cts c onstitute m ail a nd w ire f raud i n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.
Immigration Document Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 329. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs a nd i n E xhibit 1, D efendants, through RICO E nterprise I, f raudulently s old a nd/or c onspired t o s ell H -2B vi sa e xtensions a nd g reen cards t o P laintiffs d espite t hese D efendants’ aw areness t hat ap plications f or t hese green cards and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 330. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, a nd D efendant S ignal, t hrough R ICO E nterprises I, II, a nd III, obtained, acc epted, an d/or r eceived H -2B vi sas de spite know ing t hese visas t o h ave b een procured through false statements and/or fraud on the U.S. Government. 331. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in Exhibit 1, R ecruiter Defendants, Legal Facilitator Defendants, a nd D efendant S ignal, t hrough R ICO E nterprises I, II, a nd I II, fraudulently s old a nd/or c onspired t o s ell H -2B vi sa e xtensions a nd g reen c ards t o P laintiffs despite these Defendants’ awareness that applications for these green cards and visa extensions were not bona fide or lawful under United States immigration law. 332. These w illful, know ing, a nd i ntentional a cts c onstitute i mmigration doc ument fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
Pattern of Related Racketeering Acts 333. Defendants engaged in the racketeering activity described in this Claim repeatedly starting in 2003 and continuing at least through January 2009 with respect to approximately 590 Indian workers.

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334. Upon i nformation a nd belief, S ignal s ought n ew Indian H -2B workers fo r employment a t S ignal who ma y b e s ubject to s imilar r acketeering activities, s topping th is recruitment only upon the filing of the David Litigation.
335. Defendants, though the RICO Enterprises, rely on the racketeering acts described in this Complaint to conduct their regular business activities.
336. Defendants’ r acketeering act s h ave o r h ad s imilar pur poses: t o pr ofit f rom t he fraudulent r ecruitment a nd f orced l abor of P laintiffs a nd ot her Indian w orkers , a nd t o r ecruit, obtain, provide and maintain a consistent, submissive, and compliant Indian H-2B guestworker labor force at Signal’s operations.
337. Defendants’ a cts yielded s imilar r esults a nd c aused s imilar in juries to P laintiffs, including payment of high fees, assumption of significant interest bearing debt, loss of real and personal property, lost work opportunities, lost or unpaid wages and additional legal fees.
338. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs and i n Exhibit 1, t he r acketeering acts have or had similar participants: the Recruiter Defendants, the Legal Facilitator Defendants, the Labor Broker Defendants, and Signal.
339. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs a nd i n t he a ttached E xhibit 1, Defendants, th ough th e R ICO E nterprises, d irected th eir r acketeering a ctivities a t s imilar victims: I ndian w orkers w ho c ontacted t he R ecruiter D efendants i n s earch o f gr een c ards, economic opportunity, and stable employment in the United States.
340. Defendants’ a cts ha ve o r ha d s imilar m ethods o f c ommission, s uch a s c ommon recruitment ta ctics, r elatively consistent p ractices w ith r espect to c ollecting p ayments f rom Plaintiffs and ot her Indian workers, and use of s imilar employment practices and policies with respect to Plaintiffs and other Indian workers.

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Injury 341. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful, knowing, and intentional acts discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their property and/or business, including but not l imited t o: e xorbitant f ees pa id b y P laintiffs f or gr een c ards, vi sas a nd ot her immigration and recruitment-related services; interest on debts assumed by Plaintiffs to pay such fees; losses of personal and real property incurred in reliance on Defendants’ fraudulent acts; lost and unpaid wages, excessive charges from room and board, and other pecuniary and/or losses to real or personal property. 342. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award o f d amages in an amount to be determined at trial, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
42 U.S.C. § 1981 Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International
Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.) 343. Plaintiffs r e-allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 344. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for declaratory relief, and damages against Defendant Signal. 345. The actions of Defendant Signal, as set forth herein, violated Plaintiffs’ rights to receive full and equal benefit of all laws as guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, including Plaintiffs’ rights t o enjoy a nd be nefit f rom non -discriminatory employment r elationships w ith D efendant Signal. 346. Specifically, Defendant Signal subjected Plaintiffs to discriminatory and offensive mandatory room and board arrangements at the Signal labor camp in Orange.

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347. Defendant Signal did not subject its non-Indian and/or U.S. citizen employees to the same or similar room and board arrangements.
348. As s et f orth i n t he p receding pa ragraphs, D efendant S ignal a lso i mposed discriminatory jo b-related r equirements a nd a dverse t erms a nd c onditions of e mployment t o which non-Indian and/or U.S. citizen employees were not similarly subject.
349. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, through the actions and statements of its personnel r eferring t o a nd/or di rected a t P laintiffs a nd ot her Indian H -2B w orkers, D efendant Signal maintained an objectively hostile and abusive work environment on account of Plaintiffs’ race, national origin, and/or alienage.
350. As s et forth i n t he p receding p aragraphs, D efendant S ignal’s d iscriminatory a nd offensive tr eatment o f P laintiffs w as s ufficiently s evere th at it c reated a h ostile w ork environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
351. Plaintiffs reasonably perceived their work environment to be hostile, abusive, and discriminatory on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or alienage.
352. Defendant Signal’s hostile, abusive, and discriminatory treatment of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated was unwelcome.
353. Defendant S ignal know ingly, w illfully, m aliciously, i ntentionally, a nd without justification acted to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.
354. As a result of Defendant Signal’s unlawful acts, Plaintiffs have suffered injury to their property and/or persons.
355. Plaintiffs seek all appropriate relief, including d eclaratory relief, attorneys’ f ees, costs of this action, and damages, including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial.

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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF 1871
42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Thirteenth Amendment Defendant Signal (Signal International LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P.), the Recruiter Defendants (Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants), and the Legal Facilitator Defendants (Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration
Law Center) 356. Plaintiffs r e-allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 357. Plaintiffs assert this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985( 3) for declaratory relief, and damages against Defendant Signal, Recruiter Defendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants. 358. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs a nd P laintiffs’ F irst C laim f or R elief, Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator Defendants, a long w ith non defendants, a cting a t t he di scretion of t hose defendants ( including a pr ivate s ecurity firm a nd Capital O ne B ank) c onspired, a greed, pl anned a nd c oordinated f or t he purpose of de priving Plaintiffs of equal protection of their rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590) to be free from forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons. 359. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, an d Legal Facilitator D efendants w ere motivated b y racial, a nti-Indian, a nd/or a nti-immigrant animus when t hey conspired t o deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and/or acted in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights. 360. Defendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, and Legal Facilitator D efendants knowingly, w illfully, m aliciously, i ntentionally, a nd w ithout j ustification planned a nd a cted t o deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

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361. As a r esult of t he unl awful a cts of D efendant S ignal, R ecruiter D efendants, a nd Legal Facilitator Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered damages.
362. Plaintiffs seek all appropriate relief, including d eclaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, costs of this action, and damages, including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
All Defendants 363. Plaintiffs r e-allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs. 364. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding p aragraphs a nd i n t he a ttached E xhibit 1, Defendants, individually and through their agents, employees, and/or representatives, knowingly and/or negligently made materially false and untrue statements and representations to Plaintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 365. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in the attached Exhibit 1, Defendants knowingly or negligently failed to disclose material facts to P laintiffs regarding the nature and terms and conditions of applications and opportunities for immigration status and employment in the United States. 366. Defendants i ntended t hat t he f alse s tatements m ade b y D efendants an d/or t heir agents, e mployees, and/or r epresentatives w ould i nduce P laintiffs t o pa y t he exorbitant f ees requested b y t he Labor B roker D efendants, R ecruiter Defendants, an d/or Legal Facilitator Defendants.

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367. Defendants i ntended t hat t he f alse s tatements m ade b y D efendants an d/or t heir agents, e mployees, a nd/or r epresentatives w ould i nduce P laintiffs t o pa y e xorbitant f ees t o t he Labor Broker Defendants, R ecruiter D efendants, a nd/or Legal Facilitator D efendants, a nd t o leave their homes and jobs in India and the United Arab Emirates and travel to the United States to work for the Labor Broker Defendants and/or Defendant Signal.
368. Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on Defendants’ representations. 369. In r eliance o r r easonable r eliance o n Defendants’ f alse an d/or n egligent representations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs paid large sums of m oney t o Labor Broker D efendants, R ecruiter Defendants, a nd/or Legal Facilitator Defendants. 370. In r eliance o r r easonable r eliance o n Defendants’ f alse an d/or n egligent representations r egarding green c ards a nd e mployment oppor tunities, P laintiffs incurred substantial interest-bearing debts in order to pay recruitment, immigration-related, and travel fees charged by Defendants and their agents, employees and/or representatives. 371. In r eliance o r r easonable r eliance o n Defendants’ f alse an d/or n egligent representations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs sold personal and real property and surrendered employment opportunities in India and the United Arab Emirates. 372. In r eliance o r r easonable r eliance o n Defendants’ f alse an d/or negligent representations regarding green cards and employment opportunities, Plaintiffs left their homes and jobs and India and other countries and traveled to the United States to work for Defendant Signal. 373. As a d irect an d p roximate r esult o f D efendants’ knowing, w illing, i ntentional, and/or negligent actions, Plaintiffs have been injured.

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374. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF BREACH OF CONTRACT All Defendants
375. Plaintiffs re -allege an d i ncorporate b y r eference e ach and ev ery al legation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
376. As s et f orth i n t he pr eceding pa ragraphs, D efendants, i ndividually a nd t hrough their a gents, e mployees a nd/or r epresentatives, of fered t o obt ain pe rmanent r esidence a nd immigration status for P laintiffs in the United S tates within 18 to 24 months as well as steady work opportunities in the United States with Defendant Signal and/or Labor Broker Defendants in exchange for Plaintiffs’ payment of exorbitant fees to Defendants and their employees, agents and/or r epresentatives a nd a greement t o w ork f or D efendant S ignal a nd/or Labor B roker Defendants.
377. Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ offers, paid the agreed upon f ees, and performed the agreed-upon work.
378. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to comply with their binding promises regarding permanent residence and immigration status.
379. In reliance on these agreements, Plaintiffs paid large sums of money and entered into substantial debts, surrendered other employment opportunities, and incurred other financial losses.
380. As a direct result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 381. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief: a. Declaratory relief; b. Compensatory damages; c. Punitive damages; d. Treble damages as authorized by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); e. An award of prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; f. A f inding of a lter e go be tween S ignal International T exas, G .P. a nd S ignal International Texas, L.P., thus piercing the corporate veil; g. A f inding of a lter e go be tween S ignal International T exas, L.P. a nd S ignal International LLC, thus piercing the corporate veil; h. A f inding th at S ignal International, Inc. is th e s uccessor in in terest to S ignal International LLC, or in t he a lternative, a f inding of alter e go b etween S ignal International LLC and Signal International, Inc., thus piercing the corporate veil; i. A finding of alter ego a mong M alvern C . Burnett, Gulf C oast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., and Law O ffices o f M alvern C. B urnett, A .P.C., t hus pi ercing t he corporate veil; j. A f inding of a lter e go between Global R esources, Inc. a nd Michael P ol, t hus piercing the corporate veil; k. A finding of alter ego between Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt., thus piercing the corporate veil; l. A finding of alter ego between Billy R. Wilks and J & M, thus piercing J & M’s corporate veil; m. A finding that J & M Marine is the successor of J & M; and

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n. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of December, 2014.
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP
/s/ Daniella D. Landers Daniella D. Landers (Texas Bar No. 24026260) 1001 Fannin Street, Suite 3700 Houston, Texas 77002-6760 Telephone: (713) 470-6100 Facsimile: (713) 654-1301 daniella.landers@sutherland.com
John H. Fleming Keith J. Barnett Kurt Lentz Travis J. Mock Kara D. Duffle Heather M. Niemeyer Mary Beth Martinez (admitted pro hac vice) 999 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 Telephone: (404) 853-8000 Facsimile: (404) 853-8806
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I he reby c ertify t hat on D ecember 23, 2014, I e lectronically f iled t he f oregoing Third
Amended C omplaint with th e C lerk o f C ourt u sing th e C M/ECF s ystem, w hich w ill
automatically send e-mail notification of such filing to all ECF participants.
I further c ertify t hat on D ecember 23, 2014, I served a t rue and c orrect c opy of t he
foregoing document upon the below-named Defendants by depositing a copy of same in the U.S.
Mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as follows:
Michael Pol Global Resources, Inc. c/o William P. Wessler, Esq. William P. Wessler, Attorney at Law 1624 24th Avenue Gulfport, MS 39501-2969 Mr. Billy Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562
I further c ertify t hat on D ecember 23, 2014, I served a t rue and c orrect c opy of t he
foregoing doc ument up on t he be low-named D efendants b y forwarding a copy t o t hem vi a
international mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as
follows:
Indo-Ameri Soft L.L.C. Vijaya Roa (Register Agent) c/o Kurella Rao #6 Isla Road, Unity Zone Dangriga, Stann Creek Dist., Belize Kurella Rao #6 Isla Road, Unity Zone Dangriga, Stann Creek Dist., Belize
/s/ Daniella D. Landers Daniella D. Landers

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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 216 Filed 01/27/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 7615

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT MICHAEL POL (DOC. NO. 98)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Before the undersigned is the “Motion of Amended Plaintiffs to Dismiss without Prejudice the Claims against Defendant Michael Pol.” (Doc. No. 98.) Plaintiffs Suresh Kakkoth, Sebastian George Pananjikal, Biju Potrayil, Pankajakshan Madhavan, Gijo John, Joy Kallachiyil Varkey, Omanakuttan Govindan Kakkanthara, Iju James, Ravi Rowthu, Vasavan Babu, Abraham Varghese, Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy, Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph, and Subburaj Rengasamy (“Amended Plaintiffs”) seek to dismiss their claims against Michael Pol without prejudice.
On May 21, 2013, thirty-three Plaintiffs (“Original Plaintiffs”) filed suit against multiple Defendants, including Michael Pol (“Pol”). (Doc. No. 1.) Pol filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy protection on June 13, 2013. The Original Plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 19), and again on December 19, 2013. (Doc. No. 64.) The amended complaints added the “Amended Plaintiffs,” but asserted no new substantive claims. The

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Amended Plaintiffs1 then sought dismissal of their causes of action against Pol because their claims could potentially violate bankruptcy laws. (Doc. No. 40) (“To the extent that the Amended Plaintiffs assert new claims against Pol that could have been brought prior to the commencement of his Chapter 7 proceedings and were not asserted in the original Complaint, such claims may be voidable in light of the automatic stay.”) (citing Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178–79 (5th Cir. 1989)).
The Plaintiffs conferred with Pol’s bankruptcy counsel, and he did not oppose the relief sought. The undersigned, however, denied the Amended Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims against Pol as moot due to the Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 67.)
The Amended Plaintiffs now reassert their motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 98.) There was no indication whether Pol consented to this reasserted motion. In addition, no other party has opposed this motion and the time for doing so has passed.
In light of Pol’s bankruptcy, and given that no party has objected, the undersigned recommends that the “Motion of Amended Plaintiffs to Dismiss without Prejudice the Claims against Defendant Michael Pol” (Doc. No. 98) be GRANTED.
Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report, and (4) no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); Local Rule CV-72(c). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo
1. At this time, Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph and Subburaj Rengasamy had yet to be added as plaintiffs and were not part of the first motion to dismiss.
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determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, (see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988)), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 27th day of January, 2015.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

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SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

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et al.

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1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON SIGNAL’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 161)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is a “Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment” (Doc. No. 161) filed by Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International,

Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”).

Signal seeks summary judgment on three of the Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that some claims are

defective as a matter of law, and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to others.

After considering the parties’ briefing (Doc. Nos. 161, 183, 187, 200) and the applicable

authorities, the undersigned recommends that Signal’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”

(Doc. No. 161) be denied.

I. Background1

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the seventeen

Plaintiffs in this case, were allegedly trafficked into the United States to provide labor for Signal’s

operations. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 2–4.) The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants made false

1. Local Rule CV-56(a) requires that a motion for summary judgment include a “Statement of Undisputed Facts.” Signal’s “Statement of Undisputed Facts” contains both hotly contested facts, as well as legal conclusions. Therefore, this section contains only a brief recitation of the background of this case and should not be construed as a statement of facts.

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promises of “permanent work-based immigration to the United States,” and that to take advantage of this promising opportunity, the Plaintiffs allegedly “plunged themselves and their families into debt . . . to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees . . . .” (Id. at p. 2.) After arriving at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to serious abuses, threatened with deportation if they left, and forced to live in substandard conditions. In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that they could not leave their jobs with Signal due to the large debts they incurred in their homeland. Signal denies any wrongdoing and denies that the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor, trafficking, or involuntary servitude.
A putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of all the workers who had allegedly been trafficked to the United States to work at Signal’s facilities in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. (See Doc. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification, which caused the individual class members to file suit where their alleged injuries occurred. See David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *37 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012). The Plaintiffs in this case worked at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, which is within this judicial district.
The Plaintiffs are suing Signal, as well as Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C, Indo-Ameri Soft, L.L.C., Kurella Rao, J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, Billy R. Wilks, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Michael Pol, Global Resources, Inc., Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/a Medtech Consultants). The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: (1) the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; (3) the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and (4) the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 50–68.) In addition, the Plaintiffs assert causes
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of action for state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against all of the Defendants. (Id.)
II. Legal Standard “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Gellhaus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (Crone, J.) This burden is not met by “merely mak[ing] a conclusory statement that the other party has no evidence to prove its case.” Inn Foods, Inc. v. Mida, No. 6:06-cv-169, 2008 WL 2078965, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2008) (Schneider, J.) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986)). “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Id. at *2 (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). “If the movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1069. The nonmovant’s “burden is not satisfied with some ‘metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. at 1075 (internal citations omitted). “Factual controversies are construed in the
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light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists.” Espinoza v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 622 F.3d 432, 437– 38 (5th Cir. 2010).
III. Analysis The Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint contains six claims for relief. (See Doc. No. 64, pp. 50–68.) Signal moved for summary judgment on three claims: violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (“TVPRA”), violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985(3)). (See Doc. No. 161.) The undersigned will address Signal’s motion on a claim by claim basis. A. First Claim: Violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 to “combat trafficking in persons.” See Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1446 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.). This act was amended in 2003 to, inter alia, create a civil remedy for certain violations of Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the United States Code. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (creating a civil remedy for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591). In their first cause of action, the Plaintiffs seek damages under the civil remedies provision of the TVPRA (18 U.S.C. § 1595) for “forced labor” (18 U.S.C. § 1589) and “trafficking with respect to . . . forced labor” (18 U.S.C. § 1590).2
2. The Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint also alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, and 1592(a). (Doc. No. 64, pp. 52–53.) The Plaintiffs’ response, however, is clear that they are abandoning their reliance on these statutes. (See Doc. No. 183, p. 1–2) (“Plaintiffs have therefore determined to simplify the case by dismissing voluntarily their claim under the TVPA to the extent it relies upon sections 1583, 1584, 1592(a) and 1592(b).”). In addition, they requested leave to file a third amended complaint that deletes these claims (Doc. No. 212), which was granted. (Oral Order, 1/28/2015.) The Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint will be considered as the operative complaint for this order, since that was the live pleading at the time of the parties’ briefing.
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Signal claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim (18 U.S.C. § 1590) because (1) the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially at the time of the alleged trafficking and (2) “‘that there is an absence of evidence to support’ the case of the Plaintiffs with regard to the scienter required by § 1590 . . . .” (Doc. No. 161, p. 20) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). As for the Plaintiffs’ claims premised on violations of §§ 1592 and 1594, Signal argues that summary judgment is warranted because imposing civil liability for violations of these two statutes would require an impermissible retroactive application of the TVPRA.
a. Applying the TVPRA to the facts of this case constitutes a domestic—not extraterritorial—application of the statute
Signal argues that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially at the time of the alleged trafficking, and because the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim stems from conduct that is “significantly extraterritorial,” their claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 12–18.) The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the TVPRA had no extraterritorial reach prior to 2008. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5071–72 (amending the TVPRA to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction). Rather, the Plaintiffs insist that they are merely seeking a domestic application of statute, and therefore, whether the TVPRA can be applied extraterritorially is irrelevant. (Doc. No. 183, pp. 9–13.) The undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs, and finds that applying the TVPRA to the facts at hand—which involves trafficking workers into the United States—requires only a domestic application of the statute.3
3. Because this case involves a domestic application of the TVPRA, the undersigned expresses no opinion on whether the TVPRA had any extraterritorial reach prior to 2008. Compare Adhikari v. Dauod & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835–36 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (withdrawing a previous opinion and holding that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially prior to 2008).
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To determine whether a statute is being applied extraterritorially or domestically, courts are to examine the facts of the case in light of the “‘focus’ of Congressional concern” in enacting the statute. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–70 (2010) (“For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States.”). For example, in Morrison, the Supreme Court considered whether §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was being applied domestically or extraterritorially. Id. The alleged misrepresentations that formed the basis of the claim were made in the United States and were about an American company, but the securities that were affected were only traded on a foreign stock exchange. Id. at 251–53. The Supreme Court found that the focus of §10(b) was on “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities,” as opposed to where the misrepresentations occurred. Id. at 267. Therefore, because the securities were only traded on a foreign exchange, as opposed to a domestic exchange, imposing liability would require an extraterritorial application of the statute.
After reviewing the plain language of the TVPRA, as well as the legislative history, the undersigned finds that what is critical under the TVPRA is “where the forced labor occurred and to where to victims were trafficked, and not from where the victims were trafficked . . . .” Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., No. SA CV 10-01172, 2012 WL 5378742, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012) (emphasis added) (reaching this conclusion based on a comparison to the facts of Morrison). For example, the Congressional findings supporting the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000—which are codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)—recognize that trafficking victims are “trafficked within or across international borders,” and that “traffickers often transport victims from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations, including foreign countries.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (5); see also Tanedo, 2012
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WL 5378742, at *6 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 1 (2000)). Here, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were eventually brought to the United States. Accordingly, imposing liability under § 1590 requires only a domestic application of the statute. (See Doc. No. 2077, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPRA are not extraterritorial)).
Signal argues that the undersigned should follow Adhikari v. Dauod & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014), which dismissed a trafficking claim on the grounds that the TVPRA did not apply extraterritorially prior to 2008. (See Doc. No. 161, pp. 13–17); see Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 835–37. Signal, however, overlooks a critical distinction—the workers in Adhikari were not trafficked to the United States—they were trafficked from Nepal to Iraq.4 Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 835–37; see also John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 998, 990, 999–1002 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that the TVPRA did not apply where the alleged involuntary servitude occurred solely in Liberia). Thus, Adhikari is not on point.
Accordingly, the undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs and finds the that transporting or recruiting of workers into the United States is a domestic—not extraterritorial—application of the TVPRA. The fact that the Plaintiffs are foreign or some of the acts may have occurred abroad does not change the domestic character of the Plaintiffs’ claims.
b. The Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Signal is liable for trafficking
Signal next argues that summary judgment is warranted because “the Plaintiffs have no evidence to prove [] that Signal always subjectively intended to convert the recruited individuals
4. Some of the workers were told that their ultimate destination would be an American military installation in Iraq, and the plaintiffs alternatively argued that Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”) made it a domestic application of the TVPRA. Adhikari, 994 F. Supp. at 833. The court found this unpersuasive. Id. at 837 (noting that “the Court [had] already expressed [an] unwillingness to rest its jurisdiction on the ‘murky area of the law’ that is the MEJA”).
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into involuntary, slave-like, forced laborers once they arrived in the United States.” (Doc. No. 161, p. 21.) Signal’s argument has three parts. First, § 1590 requires finding that Signal “knowingly” trafficked the Plaintiffs “for the purpose” of forced labor, which Signal argues requires “proof of the specific intent associated with premeditated crime.” (Id.) Second, there is no evidence to show that Signal had such intent. Third, to the extent that the Plaintiffs’ claim stems from “financial coercion” based on the large debts they incurred, this type of harm was not recognized under the TVPRA until 2008. Therefore, according to Signal, to find liability based on financial coercion alone would require a retroactive application of the statute.
i. Mental state required under §1590 It is unclear whether the parties truly dispute what is required to prove liability under § 1590. Signal argues that “what is required is proof that the recruits [were] being recruited for an unlawful form of labor, labor acquired through threats, for example, of serious harm.” (Id. at 22.) The Plaintiffs have not argued that a lesser showing is needed or that Signal is per se liable for trafficking merely by recruiting workers. However, to the extent that there is a dispute, the undersigned will address Signal’s argument. Section 1590 states: “whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §1590; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1594 (creating a civil remedy for violations of § 1590). By its terms, § 1590 requires recruiting or transporting a person with the knowledge that it is for, amongst other things, forced labor. “Knowingly” means having the factual knowledge. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 605 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term ‘knowingly’ does not have any reference to a state of mind or to knowledge of the law. The knowledge requisite to a knowing violation of a statute is factual
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knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law . . . .”) (alterations in original) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998)). Therefore, the Plaintiffs need to demonstrate that Signal had knowledge that workers were recruited or transported to be used as forced labor (or at least create a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment). In other words, “[o]btaining the services of another person is not itself illegal; it is illegal only when accompanied by one of the three given circumstances [in §1589], and the jury must find that the defendant knew that the circumstance existed.” See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2008).
As noted above, it appears that the parties agree on this proposition.5 (Doc. No. 161, p. 21–22); (Doc. No. 183, pp. 20–21.) To the extent that Signal believes that some higher mental state is required, Signal has cited no authority for such a proposition.
ii. The Plaintiffs have put forth sufficient evidence of forced labor and trafficking to create a genuine dispute of material fact
Signal claims that “the freedom the plaintiffs exercised during their time at Signal is irreconcilable with the inference that these individuals were trafficked,” thus, it is entitled to summary judgment. (Doc. No. 161, p. 25.) To support its argument, Signal presents the Plaintiffs’ depositions, in which they testified about their ability to freely come and go from Signal’s facility. (Id. at pp. 9–12.) An example from Iju James’s deposition is illustrative:
5. Perhaps the undersigned’s confusion stems from Signal’s extensive discussion of Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morrissette, the defendant was convicted for “knowingly” stealing and converting government property. Id. at 248. The defendant admitted to taking the property, but argued that he believed that it had been abandoned, and as such, did not “knowingly” convert the property. Id. The trial court, however, refused to allow this defense, which effectively read a mental state out of the statute. Id. (noting that the trial court stated: “He took it because he thought it was abandoned and he knew he was on government property. . . That is no defense . . . I will not permit you to show this man thought it was abandoned.”). The Supreme Court held that this was an error, and that the statute required the defendant to know—as a matter of fact—that he was taking government property. Id. at 270–74. Therefore, if the jury believed that he thought the property had been abandoned, he did not “knowingly” convert government property. To the extent that Morrissette instructs that the undersigned cannot simply read out of the TVPRA the “knowingly” element (which the Plaintiffs have not urged), it is applicable. Otherwise, the undersigned strains to understand Signal’s point.
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Q: Were you ever held against your will by Signal? A: Against my will? Q: Uh-huh. A. No. Q. Were you ever not free to leave? A. I don’t think so. (Id., Ex. 12, 191:11–16.) The other Plaintiffs testified similarly. (See id. at pp. 4–9.) Signal argues that because the Plaintiffs were not kept under lock-and-key and physically had the ability to leave its facility, there can be no claim of forced labor. In turn, because there is no claim of forced labor, there can be no claim for trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (prohibiting the trafficking of a person for forced labor). Signal’s argument, however, is inconsistent with the TVPRA. At the relevant time, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 prohibited knowingly providing or obtaining the labor or services of a person: (1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1478, 1486–87 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1589). By including the term “serious harm,” the statute expressly sought to not just prohibit forced labor through physical restraint, but also other oppressive forms of “nonviolent coercion” as well. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (13). Therefore, Signal’s argument that summary judgment should be granted merely because the Plaintiffs could leave its facility does not comport with the definition of forced labor under the
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TVPRA. The Plaintiffs can survive summary judgment by presenting evidence that creates a fact issue as to whether they were forced to continue working for Signal through “physical restraint,” threats of “serious harm,” or “abuse of law or the legal process.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
After reviewing the Plaintiffs’ evidence, the undersigned finds that there is a fact issue as to whether the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor. For example, Philip Baby testified that Signal made numerous threats that if he left Signal, he would be turned into immigration authorities. (Doc. No. 183, Ex. 2, 25:5–26:6.) “[M]any courts have determined that threats of deportation constitute a condition of servitude induced through abuse of the legal process.” Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases); but see Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 540–41 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[a]bsent some special circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude,” and that because the plaintiffs did not claim that they were compelled to go to work each day, nor forced to stay once their work was finished, and had considerable freedom to move to other cities and find different jobs, there was no claim of involuntary servitude); (See also Doc. No. 2077, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that Signal was not entitled to summary judgment in part because “Plaintiffs have introduced evidence from which a jury could infer Signal knowingly threatened immigration consequences in order to maintain its forced labor”)). The other Plaintiffs tell similar stories about threats of deportation. (Doc. No. 183, pp. 4–9.) Therefore, there is a fact issue as to whether the Plaintiffs were able to freely leave Signal’s facility. Accordingly, given the Plaintiffs’ testimony and the broad definition of forced labor under the TVPRA, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the Plaintiffs’ forced labor and trafficking claims.
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iii. Financial coercion was actionable under the TVPRA before the 2008 amendments
Signal next argues that to the extent that the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim is premised on the fact that the large debts that they undertook to pay the recruitment fees forced them to continue working for Signal, this was not actionable under the TVPRA until 2008. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 27– 31.) “Serious harm” was not defined in the original statute. The 2008 amendments added a definition:
The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069. Signal argues that because financial harm was added to the TVPRA in 2008, and “Congress does not legislate unnecessarily,” financial harm could not have been part of the statute prior to 2008. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 28–29.) Therefore, Signal asserts that imposing liability based on financial coercion would be an impermissible retroactive application of the 2008 amendments. The Plaintiffs argue that the statute was broad enough, at the time of the alleged trafficking, to encompass their claim of financial coercion. (Doc. No. 183, pp. 13–20.) The undersigned is not persuaded by Signal’s argument. First, while financial coercion may be a part of the Plaintiffs’ claim, it is not their only basis for imposing liability under the TVPRA. As discussed above, there appears to be other alleged actions taken by Signal that meet the definition of forced labor under the TVPRA. Second, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that it encompasses more than just threats of physical harm. Forced labor was defined at the relevant time as “threats of serious harm . . . or physical restraint.” As the court in Tanedo noted: “That § 1589 distinguishes between serious harm and physical restraint indicates
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that, prior to 2008, Congress intended that serious harm not be limited to physical harm, and instead include at least some non-physical harm, e.g., financial harm.” Tanedo, 2012 WL 5378742 at *4. The legislative history supports this reading. “[T]he House Conference Report from 2000 [] stated that the [Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000] ‘refers to a broad array of harms, including both physical and nonphysical,’ and would apply ‘where the traffickers use more subtle means designed to cause their victims to believe that serious harm will result to themselves or others if the leave’ such as threats of families’ ‘bankruptcy in their home country.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000)). In addition, while not directly addressing a claim of financial coercion, the Fifth Circuit found that, prior to 2008, “serious harm [under §1589(a)] can include psychological coercion.” United States v. Nnaji, 447 F. App’x 558, 559 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Lastly, Signal cites no case applying such a narrow interpretation of “serious harm” under the TVPRA. As the Plaintiffs correctly note, the one case upon which Signal relies does not apply the TVPRA, but rather is examining slavery as defined by international norms. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 319–23 (2d Cir. 2012).6
Because the goal of the TVPRA was to reach modern day slavery, which may take on many forms, and “serious harm” should be interpreted broadly, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs’ claim of financial coercion was cognizable before 2008. (See also Doc. No. 2077, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (Jan. 6, 2015) (holding that “serious harm under pre-amendment Section 1589 includes financial harm”)).
6. Interestingly, the district court in Velez dismissed a claim for forced labor under the TVPRA. See Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 498–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). The court converted the plaintiff’s claim from one brought under the Alien Tort Statute to one brought pursuant to § 1589, but found that the evidence did not support such a claim. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff’s fear of being yelled at was not actionable and that “by her own admission, [she] never feared physical harm . . . .” Id. at 498. Therefore, neither opinion in Velez adopts Signal’s narrow interpretation.
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c. Retroactive application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592 and 1594 is no longer at issue Signal also argues that “Section 1595 did not authorize a private right of action for violations of §§ 1592 or 1594 prior to [2008].” (Doc. No. 161, p. 18.) While Signal is correct that the civil remedies provision of the TVPRA did not expressly encompass these statutes until 2008, the Plaintiffs have abandoned their reliance on these sections (as well as §§ 1583 and 1584). (See Doc. No. 183, p. 25 n. 8); (Doc. No. 207) (moving for leave to file a third amended complaint which abandons certain claims). Therefore, there is no need to consider whether these sections apply retroactively. B. Second Claim: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) The Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief consists of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (Doc. No. 64, pp. 53–62.) Signal claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims because: (1) the Plaintiffs failed to establish a distinct RICO enterprise; (2) RICO does not apply extraterritorially; and (3) there no proof of a conspiracy. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 31–39.)
a. The Plaintiffs have alleged a distinct RICO person and RICO enterprise Signal argues that the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is “structurally defective” because the Plaintiffs “allege both that Signal is a RICO ‘person’ and that Signal was a ‘member’ of all RICO Enterprises alleged in the Second Claim for Relief . . . .” (Id. at p. 31–32.) Signal’s argument misconstrues the Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as misapplies the law on the person/enterprise distinction under RICO. “RICO claims under § 1962 require: ‘(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.” Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 625, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
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(quoting In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in original). “To establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001). RICO defines a “person” as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” 18 U.S.C. §1961(3). Signal does not dispute that it can be a RICO person. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 447 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] corporation obviously qualifies as a ‘person’ under RICO and may be subject to RICO liability.”) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984)).
“An enterprise under RICO can include the usual legal entities such as partnerships and corporations, but it also can include ‘any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity . . . .’” Bradley, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (quoting Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court has indicated that “enterprise” should be interpreted broadly. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 943–45 (2009) (noting that the “very concept of an association in fact is expansive”). Here, the Plaintiffs argue that there are two association in fact type enterprises, both of which Signal is a member. (Doc. No. 183, pp. 26–27.) To establish such an enterprise, the Plaintiffs must show evidence of “an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944.
In addition, for claims under § 1962(c), courts also require that the RICO person and RICO enterprise be distinct. St. Paul Mercury Ins., 224 F.3d at 447 (“[S]ubsection (c) requires that the RICO person be distinct from the RICO enterprise.”). This is where Signal argues that the Plaintiffs’ claim is defective. Signal insists that because “the Complaint alleges both that Signal
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is a RICO ‘person’ and that Signal was a ‘member’ of all RICO enterprises,” the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an enterprise that is separate and distinct from Signal itself. (Doc. No. 161, p. 31.)
Signal’s argument is misplaced. First, Signal is simply incorrect when it asserts that the Plaintiffs are alleging that “Signal enterprised with itself.” (Doc. No. 187, p. 5.) The Plaintiffs have alleged that Signal is a member of an enterprise; they have not alleged that the entire enterprise consists only of Signal and its officers, directors, or employees. Compare Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that “Anadarko Bank, Anadarko Bankshares, and [] three employees” were not an association in fact enterprise separate and distinct from Andarko Bank because there was no evidence that these entities “were associated in any manner apart from the activities of the bank”).
Second, Signal misconstrues the relevant case law. The cases cited by Signal do not stand for the proposition that the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is defective as a matter of law merely because a corporation is named as a person and a part of a RICO enterprise. Rather, these cases hold that the distinctiveness element was not satisfied based on the facts. For example, in Bradley, the plaintiffs alleged that the enterprise consisted of a group of companies. Bradley, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 651. The court found that there was nothing in the plaintiffs’ complaint “to suggest that the enterprise existed for any reason other than to commit the alleged predicate acts.” Id. Moreover, the court found that “even if [the plaintiffs] had adequately pled an enterprise, they have failed to plead that any Defendants were ‘employed by or associated with [the] enterprise’ as required under § 1962(c).” Id. at 651–52. Signal has not pointed to anything in the record that demonstrates, as a matter of fact, that the alleged enterprises are not distinct from the various members. Accordingly, Signal has not met its burden for summary judgment.
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Moreover, Bradley did not hold that a corporation could not—as a matter of law—be named as part of an enterprise. What Signal appears to be alluding to is a line of cases holding that when a corporation is named as a RICO person, and that same corporation is named as the enterprise, the distinctiveness requirement may not be satisfied. See Atkinson, 808 F.2d at 440; see also Heden v. Hill, 937 F. Supp. 1230, 1242 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“When the alleged Section 1962(c) violator is a legal entity, such as a corporation, this required separation is not established by merely showing that the corporation, through its employees, officers, and/or directors, committed a pattern of predicate acts in the conduct of its own business.”). As the Second Circuit noted, alleging a corporation as a member of an enterprise “does not foreclose the possibility of a corporate entity being held liable as a defendant under Section 1962(c) where it associates with others to form an enterprise that is sufficiently distinct from itself.” See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1994). In other words, groups of corporations can form an association in fact type enterprise, but a party cannot avoid the distinctiveness requirement by “alleging a RICO enterprise that consists merely of a corporation defendant associated with its own employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendants.” Isystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., No. 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672, at *5 (5th Cir. March 21, 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., 130 F.3d 143, 155) (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding allegations of an enterprise that consisted of multiple corporations). Because the Plaintiffs have alleged a larger enterprise than just Signal, the Plaintiffs’ claim is not structurally defective as a matter of law.7 (See also Doc. No. 2115, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C.,
7. Some commentators have argued that based on principles of statutory interpretation, a corporation cannot be part of an association in fact RICO enterprise. See, e.g., Randy D. Gordon, “Of Gangs and Gaggles: Can a Corporation be part of an Association-in-Fact RICO Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, and Rhetorical Perspectives, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973, 998–1008 (2014). According to Mr. Gordon, circuit courts have erred by allowing plaintiffs
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2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2014) (finding that nearly identical RICO enterprises, which
included Signal as a member, did not violate the distinctiveness requirement)).
Accordingly, because Signal does not cite to anything in the record demonstrating that the
alleged members did not form an enterprise, and because merely pleading that Signal is a member
of an enterprise is not fatal to the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims, Signal is not entitled to summary
judgment. Of course, at trial, the Plaintiffs will need to prove all of the elements of a RICO
enterprise. See, e.g., Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944 (noting that an association in fact enterprise is
“proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit”).
b. Extraterritorial application of RICO
Signal next argues that RICO does not apply extraterritorially. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 32–34.) Specifically, Signal argues that “the civil RICO claim should be dismissed pro tanto,8 based on
the theory’s often unlawful, extraterritorial nature with regard to (1) mail and wire fraud; (2)
trafficking; and (3) unlawful document related practices under § 1592.” (Id. at p. 34.) The
Plaintiffs have abandoned their claim under § 1592.
“to allege association-in-fact enterprises that include (and in many cases consist only of) corporations or other legal entities.” Id. at 1028; see also Caroline N. Mitchell, et al., “Returning RICO to Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute an Associated-in-Fact Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 13 FORDHAM J. COPR. & FIN. L. 1 (2008) (calling for a return to the “plain meaning” of RICO and arguing that based on questions asked at oral argument during Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006), many of the justices showed a concern about interpreting RICO so broadly). While these commentators raise interesting points, until the Supreme Court revisits Boyle, which instructed courts to interpret “enterprise” broadly, or the Fifth Circuit dictates otherwise, the undersigned is obligated to follow precedent. See, e.g, United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (affirming a RICO conviction when the enterprise consisted of both individuals and corporations). Moreover, Signal has not raised the issues that these commentators were discussing. Rather, Signal’s argument is based on the faulty premise that the Plaintiffs alleged that Signal has been named as the enterprise, as opposed to just a member of a larger enterprise.
8. Pro tanto is defined as: “To that extent; for so much; as far as it goes.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1259 (8th ed. 2004). The undersigned understands this to mean that to the extent that the Plaintiffs have plead a civil RICO cause of action based on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, trafficking, and unlawful document production, the Plaintiffs’ claim fails. The Plaintiffs, however, also pled the predicate act of forced labor, and Signal did not move for summary judgment on that claim.
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Signal argues as follows: RICO does not apply to conduct outside the United States, most of the alleged actionable conduct occurred abroad, therefore, the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim fails. (Id. at pp. 32–33.) Signal’s analysis is overly simplistic. While Signal is correct that numerous courts have held that RICO does not apply extraterritorially, that does not end the inquiry. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 933, 937–38 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[C]ourts have uniformly held that RICO is silent as to its extraterritorial application and that, under Morrison, it therefore has none.”). The real issue is whether applying RICO to these set of facts requires an extraterritorial application. In other words, if this were a case involving only foreign conduct, RICO would not apply. But that is not the case here. The facts of this case are partly foreign and partly domestic.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–78 (9th Cir. 2013), which involved a scheme that had both foreign and domestic ties, undertook a comprehensive analysis of what conduct RICO reaches in light of Morrison. The defendants in Xu were charged under RICO for a “scheme to steal funds from the Bank of China.” Id. at 972. They argued, however, that the entire conspiracy took place overseas, thus, they could not be charged. Id. at 974–75. The conspiracy consisted of two parts: first, “a criminal enterprise that involved . . . embezzlement against the Bank of China that occurred in China and Hong Kong,” and second, “immigration fraud to escape to the to the United States with [the] ill-gotten gains.” Id. at 975.
The court in Xu started with the presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially. Id. at 974–75. The court then examined whether “under the circumstances . . . RICO can be lawfully applied to any, or all, of Defendants’ conduct—foreign or domestic.” Id. at 975. The court noted, “Morrison frames the extraterritorial inquiry in terms of the focus of congressional concern in enacting the statute,” and while “RICO’s focus is far from clear-cut,” two general
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approaches have evolved. Id. “One camp asserts that RICO’s focus is on the enterprise,” while “the other camp asserts that RICO’s focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. In addition, after the Ninth Circuit issued Xu, the Second Circuit articulated yet another test, finding that RICO applies extraterritorially to the extent that the underlying predicate offense applies extraterritorially. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) (“RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability could attach to extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO predicate act.”). The Fifth Circuit has yet to address which test to apply and courts are split. See CGC Holding Co., L.L.C. v. Broad & Cassel, No. 13-1255, 2014 WL 6872148, at *15–17 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (noting that “[c]ourts have gone in two directions in identifying the ‘focus’ of RICO”). However, the undersigned need not guess at which test applies, since under any approach, Signal’s conduct is domestic in nature.
If the focus is on the pattern of racketeering, it is evident that there are sufficient ties to the United States to apply RICO to the instant case. As discussed above, the conspiracy in Xu had two distinct parts. Xu, 706 F.3d at 978. The first part, which consisted of stealing money from the Bank of China, had no domestic ties. Id. The second part, however, which consisted of entering the United States using fraudulent visas and passports in violation of United States immigration laws, “bound the Defendants’ enterprise to the territorial United States.” Id. Therefore, the court found that because the goal of the enterprise involved a violation of United States immigration law, “the dual parts of Defendants’ enterprise were necessarily conjoined in pursuit of that goal—i.e., to steal large amounts of money from the Bank of China and get away with it in the United States.” Id. at 978–79. The court held that the defendants could be liable under RICO.
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Here, while the actual recruitment of the Plaintiffs may have occurred abroad, it is undisputed that the goal was to bring them to the United States. This nexus to the United States ties “the Defendants’ enterprise to the territorial United States” and allows for RICO to attach. For example, had the Defendants recruited the Plaintiffs for work in Mexico, then it would be a stronger case the there was no domestic tie to trigger RICO under the pattern of racketeering test. However, because the workers were recruited for work in the United States, and actually brought here, this conduct is actionable under RICO.
Likewise, under the enterprise test, the undersigned finds that this is a domestic enterprise. Courts applying this test consider “where the enterprise’s decisions are made, as opposed to carried out, and thus centers on the ‘brains’ of an enterprise, not the ‘brawn.’” Xu, 706 F.3d at 976 (citing European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. March 8, 2011) rev’d 764 F.3d 129).9 Courts have analogized this inquiry to the “nerve center” test enunciated in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *6. The enterprises alleged in this case consist mainly of domestic entities. Compare In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 0-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (“[T]he very title of the statute, ‘Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,’ suggests an emphasis on the organization, or enterprise itself. Consistent with this principle, it has been found that RICO is inapplicable to a solely foreign enterprise.”) (citations omitted); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that the enterprise, which consisted of only Peruvian individuals and companies, was a foreign enterprise). Here, the majority of the Defendants are domestic entities, and only Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants are
9. The Second Circuit rejected this test in favor of defining RICO’s extraterritorial conduct in terms of the underlying predicate acts. European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 139 (“We think it far more reasonable to make the extraterritorial application of RICO coextensive with the extraterritorial application of the relevant predicate statutes.”). The enterprise test, however, has been applied outside of the Second Circuit, and therefore, it is still a viable approach.
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foreign. Moreover, Signal cites no portion of the factual record in making this argument and therefore, has not demonstrated that this is a foreign enterprise. The Plaintiffs, however, attached evidence that tends to show that the enterprises were driven primarily by Signal. (Doc. No. 183, pp. 31–32) (citing evidence showing how “each of the Indian-based defendants received directives from the U.S-based members”). Therefore, at the very least, there is a fact issue as to whether this would be a domestic enterprise under this approach.
In addition, under the Second Circuit’s recently minted test, the undersigned finds that RICO liability can attach to Signal’s conduct. The Second Circuit considers whether the predicate act has an extraterritorial reach. European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 139. If it does, then RICO liability can attach. Id. The court also held that “[i]f domestic conduct satisfies every essential element to prove a violation of a United States statute that does not apply extraterritorially, that statute is violated even if some further conduct contributing to the violation occurred outside the United States.” Id. at 142. Here, the Plaintiffs rely on three predicate acts: trafficking, mail fraud, and wire fraud. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs’ trafficking claim is domestic, therefore, RICO liability can attach. As for mail and wire fraud, while these statutes do not apply extraterritorially, the Plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations that Signal, along with the other Defendants, used the United States mail and wire systems to further their scheme. See id. (noting that because “[t]he complaint alleges that defendants hatched schemes to defraud in the United States, and that they used the U.S. mails and wires in furtherance of these schemes and with the intent to do so,” the domestic conduct satisfied every element essential element, and therefore, RICO liability could attach). Furthermore, Signal has pointed to nothing in the record showing that the alleged mail and wire fraud occurred only abroad. (See also Doc. No. 2115, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2014)).
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Therefore, under any of the above approaches, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.
c. Involuntary servitude/slavery Signal also seeks “partial summary judgment on the claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, and implicitly, the Thirteenth Amendment.” (Doc. No. 161, pp. 34–35.) The Plaintiffs, however, have abandoned their reliance on these statutes. Accordingly, the undersigned need not address Signal’s arguments as to these claims.
d. Conspiracy Signal argues that the Plaintiffs’ claim under §1962(d) should be dismissed because “Plaintiffs lack the evidence required to establish a triable issue concerning the scienter § 1962(d) requires under countless federal authorities.” (Id. at p. 38.) According to Signal, “missing is proof that cognitively, Signal subjectively entertained the required mens rea to defraud, i.e., knew at the time that statements concerning green cards, in that context, were fraudulent statements . . . .” (Doc. No. 187, p. 8.) “In order to demonstrate a RICO conspiracy under §1962(d), [the Plaintiffs] must demonstrate ‘(1) that two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2) that [the defendant] knew of and agreed to the overall object of the RICO offense.’” Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 825, 869 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A conspirator must at least know of the conspiracy and ‘adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.’” Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)). Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ § 1962(d) claim for two reasons. First, Signal has not carried its burden. Signal merely offers the conclusion that the
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Plaintiffs have no evidence that Signal had the requisite intent to defraud and does not cite to any portion of the record in making this argument. “It is not enough for the moving party to merely make a conclusory statement that the other party has no evidence to prove his case.” See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J. concurring); see also Ash v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Before the non-moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition to [a motion for summary judgment], the moving party must first satisfy its obligation of demonstrating that there are no factual issues warranting trial.”) (citation omitted). While Signal does not have to “negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case,” Signal must offer more than the mere assertion that the Plaintiffs cannot prove their case. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; see also Seastrunk v. Darwell Integrated Tech., No. 3:05-cv-0531, 2008 WL 190316, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008) (“The moving party, while not needing to produce evidence, must at least identify portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of evidence.”).
Second, despite Signal not meeting its burden, the Plaintiffs put forth enough evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. The Plaintiffs offer, amongst other evidence, the deposition of Sachin Dewan, who testified that Signal knew he had made false promises of permanent residency. (Doc. No. 183, p. 34.)10 This evidence creates a triable issue as to whether Signal knew of the false promises, yet participated in the conspiracy by continuing to use Dewan to recruit the Plaintiffs and facilitate the illicit scheme. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are the jury functions, not those
10. The Plaintiffs cite excerpts from the deposition of Sachin Dewan that were not attached to their motion. This is not fatal to their argument for several reasons. First, as discussed above, Signal failed to meet its burden on this issue. Therefore, the Plaintiffs did not have to come forward with any evidence. Second, the excerpts were attached to the plaintiffs’ motion in the parallel case of Samuel. (See Doc. No. 188, Ex. 36, Samuel v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:13-cv-323 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014)). Therefore, the undersigned was able to review them. Third, other evidence creates a fact issue as to whether Signal knew of the promises that were allegedly made by Dewan. (See Doc. No. 183, Ex. 25) (meeting notes from a Signal employee noting that promises of a green card may have been made).
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of a judge . . . .The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”) (citations omitted).
In sum, in light of the Plaintiffs’ evidence, there is a fact issue as to what Signal knew, when Signal knew it, and Signal’s level of participation in the overall scheme. Accordingly, summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is not warranted.
C. Claim Four: Violations of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) In the Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief, they seek damages under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3)
claiming that Defendants “conspired, agreed, planned and coordinated for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of their rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its implementing and enforcing statutes (inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§1589, 1590) to be free from forced labor, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons.” (Doc. No. 64, p. 65.) The Plaintiffs’ complaint lists three separate and distinct acts that allegedly violate § 1985(3): involuntary servitude, forced labor, and trafficking. (Id.) Unlike their claims under the TVPRA and RICO, the Plaintiffs did not abandon their claim of involuntary servitude as to their §1985(3) cause of action. Signal moves for summary judgment on two grounds. First, Signal claims that the evidence negates the Plaintiffs’ claim. (Doc. No. 161, p. 39) (“[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the truth that the plaintiffs knew that they were free to leave Signal whenever they wanted, even if leaving was in some sense painful . . . .”). Second, that §§ 1589 and 1590 are not actionable under §1985(3).
a. Definition of involuntary servitude under §1985(3) Section 1985(3) states: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages.
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42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Supreme Court has recognized only two rights protected by this statute: the right to interstate travel and the right to be free from involuntary servitude. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993).
At issue here is how broadly to interpret “involuntary servitude” under §1985(3). Signal argues that the definition, as stated in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), is controlling. (Doc. No. 161, pp. 35–38.) In Kozminski, two men were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which “prohibits conspiracy to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be from ‘involuntary servitude,’” and 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which “makes it a crime [to] knowingly and willfully hold another person ‘to involuntary servitude.’” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934. The issue in Kozminzki was “the meaning of ‘involuntary servitude’” under these two statutes. Id. at 939. The Court held that “involuntary servitude” was to be narrowly construed and limited to “the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.” Id. at 952. The Court considered statutes implementing the Thirteenth Amendment, and found that Congress had not undertaken to broadly define involuntary servitude, and “that nothing in the history of the Slave Trade statute [the precursor to §1584] suggests that it was intended to extend to conditions of servitude beyond those applied to slaves, i.e., physical or legal coercion.” Id. at 946–47.
Congress, however, expressly repudiated Kozminski’s narrow definition of involuntary servitude with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Kiwanuka, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 (“Kozminski is not controlling, as Congress has specifically addressed the Kozminski decision and rejected it as too narrow.”). This Act broadened the definition of involuntary servitude to “include cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion.” See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
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of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1446, 1467 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101). Specifically, involuntary servitude is defined as “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such a condition, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.” 22 U.S.C. § 7102(6) (emphasis added).
Here, the expanded definition of “involuntary servitude” defeats Signal’s motion. 11 Signal simply argues that because the Plaintiffs were physically free to leave, there can be no claim for involuntary servitude. (Doc. No. 161, p. 39) (“[T]he statement of Undisputed Facts above demonstrates that the Plaintiffs recognized that they could have left Signal physically if they had chosen to. Under Kozminski, the claims of slavery and involuntary servitude are therefore insupportable.”). However, as discussed above, after 2000, involuntary servitude now encompasses nonviolent coercion and threats of serious harm. A review of the evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to create a fact issue as to whether they have satisfied the current definition of involuntary servitude. For instance, each of the Plaintiffs testified that Signal threatened them with deportation. (See Doc. No. 183, pp. 4–9.) In addition, the Plaintiffs put forth evidence that the large debts they undertook left them with no viable alternative but to continue working for Signal. (Id.) While the threats of deportation and financial coercion may not have been actionable under Kozminkzi, it is these types of “nonviolent coercion” that Congress sought to reach with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Therefore, the mere fact that the Plaintiffs were physically free to leave Signal’s facility does not entitle Signal to judgment as a matter of law, and the Plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence to create a fact issue as to whether they were victims of involuntary servitude.
11. The civil remedy provision of the TVPRA did not extend to 18 U.S.C. § 1584—the crime of involuntary servitude—until 2008. However, because § 1985(3) provides the remedy, not 18 U.S.C. § 1595, finding Signal liable for damages for conspiracy to commit involuntary servitude would not be a retroactive application of § 1595.
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b. §§1589 and 1590 are actionable under §1985(3) At the outset, is unclear whether Signal is actually seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims under §1985(3) to the extent that they are relying on violations of §§ 1589 and 1590. (Compare Doc. No. 161, p. 34) (seeking a pro tanto dismissal of certain portions of the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim). The Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under §1985(3) is predicated on involuntary servitude, in addition to forced labor and trafficking. As discussed above, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the involuntary servitude prong of the Plaintiffs’ claim. However, Signal also argues that dismissal is warranted because “§1985(3) does not reach trafficking and forced labor.” (Id. at p. 40) (citing David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *36 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012)). The undersigned, however, finds that private conspiracies to violate §§ 1589 or 1590, that are motivated by racial animus, are actionable under § 1985(3). Therefore, Signal is not entitled to summary judgment. Section 1985(3) is not a source of rights, rather “the rights, privileges and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere . . . .” United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 462 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). One of the rights protected by this section is the right to be free from involuntary servitude. Therefore, if §§1589 and 1590 are statutes that enforce the Thirteenth Amendment (as the Plaintiffs argue), then a conspiracy to violate these statutes should be actionable under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Wells v. Rhodes, 928 F. Supp. 2d 920, 930–31 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that “§ 1982 provides an adequate basis for a private conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) . . . [because] § 1982 protects citizens against private infringements in their property rights . . . [and] shares a close relationship with the Thirteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a source of rights for § 1985(3).”).
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Courts have found that § 1589 is “an exercise of Congressional power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.”12 John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2007); United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that § 1589 was passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Garcia, No. 02-cr-1105-01, 2003 WL 22938040, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003) (rejecting a claim that §1589 was unconstitutional because Congress lacked power under the commerce clause, and holding that §1589 was a “proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment”); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(22) (“The right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is among those inalienable rights. Acknowledging this fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, recognizing them as evil institutions that must be abolished. Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was founded.”). Moreover, Congress is afforded wide latitude to both define modern forms of slavery and involuntary servitude, as well as to enact legislation to combat these insidious institutions. In discussing Congress’s power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit recognized that:
[T]he Supreme Court held [in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)] that the scope of Congress’s power was not limited to measures intended to end structures of slavery in a literal or a formal sense. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Congress has the authority to enact legislation necessary to abolish “badges” and “incidents” of slavery, as well as the power to rationally determine what those “badges” and “incidents” are. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 was a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment). Therefore, because § 1985(3) protects the right to be free from involuntary servitude, and §§ 1589 and 1590 define and outlaw modern day manifestations of
12. But see H.R. Rep. No. 106-487, pt. 2, at 27 (2000) (noting that the “Constitutional Authority” for the act is “Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution”).
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involuntary servitude and slavery, it follows that conspiracies to violate these statutes are actionable under § 1985(3).
The only other case that has addressed this specific issue is David, which is not binding. The court in David found that “the [Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000], which sought to criminalize involuntary servitude based [on] other forms of coercion, did not change the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.” David, 2012 WL 10759668, at *36. The undersigned, however, respectfully disagrees with the David court’s reasoning in finding that a private conspiracy to violate §§ 1589 or 1590 is not actionable under § 1985(3). First, the court in David found that extending the reach of § 1985(3) would lead to “every criminal statute that involves a victim [] potentially giv[ing] rise to a ‘right’” under § 1985(3). Id. at *36 n. 50. Section 1985(3), however, has been on the books for nearly one hundred and fifty years and only two rights have been recognized: interstate travel and involuntary servitude. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (holding that the right to be free from workplace discrimination under Title VII was not actionable under § 1985(3)). Moreover, finding statutes that combat modern day involuntary servitude actionable under § 1985(3) does not expand the rights protected by §1985, but merely clarifies the definition of involuntary servitude.
Second, the David court noted that interpreting § 1985(3) too broadly would “render it ‘a general federal tort law’” which would be “contrary to the admonition that the Supreme Court has long held since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 (1971) . . . .” Id. at *36 n. 50. Griffin, however, held that a necessary element under § 1985(3) is that “there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.” See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. This requirement limits the reach of private conspiracies
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under § 1985(3) and prevents it from becoming a federal tort law. Accordingly, the undersigned does not share the David court’s concerns.
Therefore, the undersigned finds that Signal is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ §1985(3) claim, regardless of whether it is predicated on involuntary servitude, forced labor, or trafficking.
IV. Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Signal’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” (Doc. No. 161) be DENIED.
V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report; and (4) be no more than eight pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Local Rule CV-72(c). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 219 Filed 02/04/15 Page 32 of 32 PageID #: 7652 and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). SIGNED this 4th day of February, 2015. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 222 Filed 02/12/15 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 7655

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings pursuant to a referral order entered on May 22, 2013. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned are ten motions to exclude and/or limit expert testimony. The Plaintiffs moved to exclude the following experts: Ronald J. McAlear, Virginia Miles, Dr. Kevin Fox Gotham, Donald H. Strobel, Enrique Gonzalez, and Dr. Louise Shelley. (Doc. Nos. 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156.) Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”) moved to exclude the Plaintiffs’ experts Amy Mowl and Florence Burke. (Doc. Nos. 157, 158.) Defendants Malvern C. Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern Burnett, A.P.C., and the Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. (collectively, “Burnett”) moved to exclude Signal’s expert, Enrique Gonzalez. (Doc. No. 153.) Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (collectively, “Dewan”) moved to exclude Signal’s expert, Dr. Louise Shelley. (Doc. No. 159.) Because the motions all relate to the same operative facts, apply the same law, and at times relate to one another, the undersigned will address all the pending motions in one order.

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I. BACKGROUND In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the seventeen Plaintiffs in this case, were allegedly trafficked into the United States to provide labor for Signal’s operations. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 2–4.) The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants made false promises of “permanent work-based immigration to the United States,” and that to take advantage of this promising opportunity, the Plaintiffs allegedly “plunged themselves and their families into debt . . . to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees . . . .” (Id. at p. 2.) After arriving at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to serious abuses, threatened with deportation if they left, and forced to live in substandard conditions. In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that they could not leave their jobs with Signal due to the large debts they incurred in their homeland. Signal denies any wrongdoing and denies that the Plaintiffs were subjected to forced labor, trafficking, or involuntary servitude. A putative class action was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of all the workers who had allegedly been trafficked to the United States to work at Signal’s facilities in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. (See Doc. 1, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (March 7, 2008)). The court in David denied class certification, which caused the individual class members to file suit where their alleged injuries occurred. See David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *37 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012). The Plaintiffs in this case worked at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, which is within this judicial district. The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: (1) the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; (3) the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and (4) the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 50–68.) In addition, the Plaintiffs assert causes of action
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for state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against all of the Defendants. (Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702; accord Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152; Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). The proponent of the proffered expert testimony “has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met.” United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)). The district court is to consider several criteria in determining whether an expert’s opinion is admissible. First, whether the proffered expert is qualified to testify because of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702); Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1999). “[T]o qualify as an expert, ‘the witness must have such knowledge or experience in [his] field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.’” United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 524 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Bourgeois, 950 F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Next, whether the proffered expert’s testimony is reliable. See Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. The court possesses considerable flexibility in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. Id. at 141; Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B. E. Lindholm, 447 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2006). While the Daubert factors are the most common benchmark, the court should consider all relevant factors, and is not required to analyze the Daubert factors in every case. Stolt Achievement, Ltd, 447 F.3d at 366 (citing Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149). The overarching goal “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
“The [c]ourt’s role is that of a gatekeeper only, limited to determining admissibility, not credibility of the evidence.” Knox v. Ferrer, No. 5:07-CV-6, 2008 WL 4411326, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2008) (citing Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2002)). This role requires a court to make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. The court should approach this task “with proper deference to the jury’s role as the arbiter of disputes between conflicting opinions.” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotations omitted).
The court’s assessment of admissibility is not intended to replace the adversarial system, which should highlight weak evidence. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
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shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. “The Daubert analysis should not supplant trial on the merits.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 250).
Finally, the court must determine that the proffered expert testimony is relevant. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that expert testimony is admissible only if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
III. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Ron J. McAlear as Expert” (Doc. No. 150)
Signal retained Ronald J. McAlear (“McAlear”) “for the purposes of providing information and guidance on Shipyard normal and customary practices . . . .” (Doc. No. 150, Ex. C, p. 1.) McAlear is an engineer, holds a master’s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has spent his career working in all facets of the shipbuilding industry, including at the management level. (Id. at pp. 1–2.) Though difficult to discern precisely what McAlear’s opinions are, it appears that he concludes that Signal “applies the normal and customary industry practices” in several areas, including: safety, quality, the environment, the use of I.D. badges, and the issuance of personal protective equipment. (Id. at pp. 28–29.)
The Plaintiffs seek to exclude McAlear as an expert on the grounds that: (1) he is not qualified to testify as an expert on safety; (2) his opinions are irrelevant; (3) his opinions are not based on sufficient or reliable facts or data; and (4) his methodology is flawed. (Doc. No. 150, pp. 11–14.) In addition, should the undersigned not completely exclude McAlear, the Plaintiffs
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seek to limit his opinions to those contained in the report that was served on July 29, 2014—the “Texas Report”—arguing that a later served report was untimely. (Id. at pp. 10–11.)
a. Timeliness of the David Report As an initial matter, the Plaintiffs seek to limit McAlear’s opinions to those contained in the Texas Report. (Id.) The Plaintiffs argue that McAlear drafted a more robust report for use in a parallel case—the “David Report”—after “recognizing that the Texas Report was woefully inadequate.” (Id. at p. 4.) While the Texas Report was timely, the David Report was served in this case on August 27, 2014, weeks after the deadline for disclosing experts passed. (See Doc. No. 122) (setting July 29, 2014 as the deadline for defendants to serve expert reports). “Rule 26(a) requires the expert’s initial report to include ‘a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.’” Culter v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., No. 4:10-4684, 2012 WL 2994271, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2012) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)) (emphasis in original). In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a duty to supplement expert reports. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(E); 26(e). Courts, however, have struck so-called “supplemental” reports when they were offered not because of newly learned information or to correct an error in the initial report, as is contemplated by the Rules, but rather were merely an attempt to bolster the original report. Culter, 2012 WL 2994271 at *5; see also Gallagher v. S. Source Packaging, L.L.C., 568 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“Courts distinguish ‘true supplementation’ (e.g. correcting inadvertent errors or omissions) from gamesmanship, and have therefore repeatedly rejected attempts to avert summary judgment by ‘supplementing’ an expert report with a ‘new and improved’ expert report.”). Such a decision lies within the discretion of the court. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. La.
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Land & Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257–58 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a late filed supplemental report).
Here, the David Report cannot fairly be classified as merely a supplement to the Texas Report. Signal points to no newly learned information or errors that McAlear sought to correct. Rather, Signal asserts that the David Report provides “greater explanation and support for Mr. McAlear’s conclusions”—this is the antithesis of a supplemental report. (Doc. No. 173, p. 9.) The Plaintiffs, however, fail to identify how they have been prejudiced. See Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court’s enforcement of a scheduling order that resulted in a party not being able to present expert testimony, and noting that one of the factors was the “potential prejudice in allowing” the late testimony). The David Report was served well in advance of McAlear’s deposition, and the Plaintiffs do not assert that their preparation was hindered. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not claimed that the late report required them to retain a new expert, or that it was merely offered as an attempt to avoid summary judgment. See Reliance Ins. Co., 110 F.3d at 257 (noting that if a late supplemental report were allowed, the defendants could potentially be required to seek a rebuttal witness and a delay would have been inevitable); Culter, 2012 WL 2994271 at *5.
The undersigned does not condone the serving of a late expert report—particularly without seeking leave to do so. However, given the logistical complexities of having multiple cases proceeding at the same time in two districts, and the fact that the Plaintiffs were unable to show any prejudice, the David Report will be considered as the operative expert report for this case.
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b. Scope of McAlear’s opinions Before discussing the Plaintiffs’ specific arguments, it necessary to clarify the scope McAlear’s opinions. The Plaintiffs characterize McAlear as “an expert on safety practices,” and most of their arguments are aimed at excluding McAlear as a safety expert. (Doc. No. 150, pp. 11–12.) Signal concedes that he is not an expert on safety, and asserts that he is merely opining about whether “a company operates customarily in the industry relative to safety.” (Doc. No. 173, pp. 5–6.) Signal also identifies other general areas, aside from safety practices, that McAlear discusses. (Id. at p. 2–3.) McAlear, however, at times opines that Signal’s facilities were in fact safe. For example, he states, “Signal has operated one of the safest shipyards in the Industry” and that Signal’s “safety record is evident when you compare the historical safety performance ratings from 2003 to 2013.” (Doc. No. 150, Ex. C, p. 25.) McAlear goes so far as to call Signal’s safety record “exemplary.” (Id.) Such opinions go beyond merely discussing what is customary in the industry. The undersigned finds that McAlear’s opinions on safety are inadmissible for two reasons. First, McAlear admits that he is “not an expert in safety.” (Doc. No. 150, Ex. B, 131:12.) Therefore, he is not qualified to render such opinions. Second, he has not examined sufficient information nor applied a reliable or meaningful principle to reach these particular conclusions. Rendering an opinion that Signal’s safety record is “exemplary” would require considering and balancing Signal’s safety record against that of other companies or against identifiable industry standards. McAlear undertook no such analysis. Conversely, to opine generally that Signal’s practices are consistent with industry customs only requires being familiar with the industry and being familiar with Signal’s practices.
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Accordingly, McAlear’s opinions are limited to those relating to customary practices within the marine fabrication industry, and he may not opine as to whether Signal’s facilities were in fact safe.
c. McAlear is qualified to testify about industry customs The Plaintiffs argue that McAlear’s report should be excluded because he admitted that he is not an expert on safety, and therefore, not qualified to testify as an expert. (Doc. No. 150, p. 12.) However, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs’ characterization of McAlear’s opinions is too narrow. He is not just opining on whether Signal is a safe company or about its safety record. Rather, he discusses general industry customs and Signal’s practices measured against those customs. Given McAlear’s “[o]ver 40 years of experience in all aspects of the Marine Industry,” including experience in managing and running shipyards, his practical work experience qualifies him as an expert about general practices in the industry. (Doc. No. 150, Ex. C, App. A); see also Martin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-268, 201l WL 6399690, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2011) (finding that an expert’s twenty-four years of work experience qualified him to testify as an expert); Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court did not err in finding an expert qualified to testify based on his experience).
d. McAlear’s opinions are relevant The Plaintiffs claim that McAlear’s report should be struck because “[g]eneral standards and practices in the industry and Signal’s shipyard safety practices are not relevant to” any of their claims. (Doc. No. 150, p. 11.) In response, Signal asserts that due to the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations about the use of I.D. badges and unsafe working conditions, McAlear’s opinions about general industry practices are relevant. (Doc. No. 173, pp. 2–5.) Signal is correct—the
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Plaintiffs’ complaint makes numerous references to the conditions of employment imposed by Signal. For example, the Plaintiffs’ complaint discusses the testing and re-testing by Signal, the fact that Signal charged the Plaintiffs for job-related tool kits, the use of I.D. badges, and general working conditions. (See Doc. No. 64, pp. 38–50.)
Expert testimony is admissible if it will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence . . . .” See FED. R. CIV. 702. To the extent that the Plaintiffs criticize certain conditions of their employment and complain that they were working in substandard conditions, expert testimony claiming that these are customary practices is relevant. Moreover, a potential juror is unlikely to be familiar with customary shipyard practices, and as such, expert testimony will assist the jury on this topic. The Plaintiffs, however, claim that the issue is not whether Signal operates its facility in a way that is consistent with industry customs, but rather, whether the Plaintiffs were treated differently than other similarly situated non-Indian workers employed by Signal. (Doc. No. 189, p. 2) (“[T]he practices of the industry at large, with respect to all employees, are irrelevant to the issue of Signal’s treatment of the Plaintiffs relative to other Signal employees.”). While the disparate treatment of the Plaintiffs may be the ultimate issue as to the Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim, to the extent that the Plaintiffs raise certain issues about Signal’s practices, it would be helpful to a jury (albeit marginally) to learn about general practices in the industry. Accordingly, while McAlear’s testimony may not be a perfect fit to the ultimate issue in this case, it is relevant enough to be admissible. See U.S. v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the relevance inquiry centers on “whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
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e. McAlear’s opinions are based sufficient facts and data Next, the Plaintiffs contend that McAlear’s report should be struck because he based his opinions on documents found on Signal’s website. (Doc. No. 150, p. 12–13.) Stated another way, McAlear did not consider a sufficient amount of information from a reliable source. This type of challenge goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. See 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1077 (“As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury’s consideration.”). Moreover, a review of Appendix B to the David Report illustrates that McAlear reviewed materials beyond just those available on Signal’s website. (Doc. No. 150, Ex. C, App. B.) In fact, in their argument about all the differences between the Texas Report and the David Report, the Plaintiffs highlight all the information that McAlear considered. (Doc. No. 150, pp. 4–6) (noting that McAlear considered ISO certifications, deposition excerpts, and even conducted an “informal survey” on tools and protective gear). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that McAlear has reviewed enough information to opine on whether Signal’s practices meet industry norms. To the extent that the Plaintiffs wish to challenge the bases for McAlear’s opinions, they can do so on crossexamination.
f. McAlear’s opinions are the product of reliable principles and/or methods The Plaintiffs state that McAlear has met none of the Daubert factors. (Doc. No. 150, pp. 13–14.) The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether any or all of the Daubert factors are met, but rather, whether there is any reasonable criteria on which the expert based his opinion. See Stolt Achievement, Ltd., 447 F.3d at 366; see also Huck v. City of Beaumont, 147 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (Cobb, J.) (“[T]he Daubert inquiry is always fact-specific, and . . . the
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Daubert factors may not all apply.”). Here, McAlear balanced his expertise about industry customs against sufficient information about Signal’s practices to reach the conclusion that Signal’s practices as to quality, the environment, the use of I.D. badges, and the issuance of personal protective equipment are “normal and customary” within the industry. (Doc. No. 150, Ex. C, p. 28.) This type of analysis is sufficient to support McAlear’s opinions.
g. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the undersigned GRANTS IN PART the Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Ron J. McAlear as Expert” (Doc. No. 150). McAlear may testify about general industry practices and opine on whether Signal’s practices are consistent with these customs. McAlear, however, may not opine that Signal is a safe company or has an “exemplary safety record.” B. Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Virginia Miles as Expert” (Doc. No. 151) Virginia Miles (“Miles”) is Signal’s expert on OSHA. She offers one opinion—that “prior to the 2009 Field Operations Manual there is no documentation wherein OSHA definitively claimed to have jurisdiction over non-agricultural temporary labor camps . . . .” (Doc. No. 151, Ex. A, p. 2.) Miles then supports this conclusion with five findings. (Id.) The Plaintiffs move to strike Miles’s report, arguing that: (1) it is not relevant; (2) not helpful; and (3) is merely a legal conclusion. (See Doc. No. 151.)
a. Miles’s opinion on whether certain OSHA regulations applied is relevant Plaintiffs argue, “the jurisdiction and coverage of OSHA prior to 2009 is not relevant to the legal claims at issue in this case.” (Id. at p. 2.) As a preliminary matter, this is not an OSHA enforcement action, and therefore, OSHA standards play no substantive role in this case. It is disingenuous, however, for the Plaintiffs to make a relevance argument in light of the fact that they designated an expert to offer opinions on the numerous ways in which Signal violated
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OSHA regulations. (Doc. No. 174, Ex. A) (detailing the various ways in which Signal’s “man camp” did not comply with OSHA). Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ expert specifically states, “OSHA’s Temporary Labor Camp standards apply to Signal’s housing camp at Orange, Texas.” (Id., Ex. A, p. 6.) He then uses these regulations as a guide for detailing the numerous ways in which Signal failed to comply with OSHA. (Id.); (see also Doc. No. 190) (the Plaintiffs characterized their expert as opining “that in his view the relevant OSHA regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142, did apply to non-agricultural temporary labor camps, in 2006 and 2007,” and that he “present[ed] an extensive analysis showing how far out of OSHA compliance the Texas ‘man camp’ was . . . .”). If the Plaintiffs are going to elicit testimony from an expert that Signal failed to comply with certain OSHA regulations, then Miles’s opinion, which merely offers a conflicting view on whether these regulations applied, is relevant.
b. Miles’s opinion on whether certain OSHA regulations applied is helpful Next, the Plaintiffs claim that Miles’s testimony will not be helpful because there is “nothing beyond the ken of the average juror.” (Doc. No. 151, p. 3.) The undersigned disagrees. A contested point between the parties (and their experts) is whether certain OSHA standards applied during the time in question, and whether these standards are the appropriate baseline upon which to measure Signal’s conduct. A layperson will be assisted by hearing expert testimony on whether and to what extent these regulations applied—if at all—during the relevant time.
c. Miles does not offer legal a conclusion Lastly, the Plaintiffs seek to strike Miles’s report because it consists of impermissible legal conclusions. (Id.) Miles, however, stops short of reaching a legal conclusion that the “man camps” were not subject to OSHA’s regulations on temporary labor camps. Rather, her opinion
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is that there is nothing clearly showing that these regulations applied. (See Doc. No. 151, Ex. A, p. 2) (claiming that there is “no documentation wherein OSHA definitively claimed to have jurisdiction . . .”). It appears that Signal is going to use Miles to demonstrate that the standards applied by the Plaintiffs’ expert may not have applied, and thus, discredit his opinions. Miles’s opinion is akin to merely rebutting a key assumption made by the Plaintiffs’ expert. Incidentally, the Plaintiffs’ expert comes much closer to offering a legal opinion, by stating: “OSHA’s Temporary Labor Camp standards apply to Signal’s housing camp at Orange, Texas.” (Doc. No. 174, Ex. A, p. 6.)
d. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Virginia Miles as Expert” (Doc. No. 151) is DENIED. C. The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Donald H. Strobel as Expert” (Doc. No. 154) Signal designated Donald H. Strobel as an expert on the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Doc. No. 177, p. 1.) However, there are no FLSA claims pending in this case. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant, and ergo, not helpful.” Roman v. Western Mfg., 691 F.3d 686, 694 (5th Cir. 2012). Because Stroble’s report is not helpful, it is inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 702. Accordingly, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Donald H. Strobel as Expert.” (Doc. No. 154.) Signal, however, can seek reconsideration of this order should FLSA claims ever be added to this case. D. The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham as Expert” (Doc. No. 152) Signal designated Kevin Fox Gotham, Ph.D. (“Dr. Gotham”), a professor of sociology at Tulane University, to “evaluate the availability of housing in the Gulf Coast region in . . . Orange County[,] Texas in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.” (Doc. No. 178, p. 2.) He
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offers six opinions, labeled A through F, touching on the lack of available housing in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the impacts that this had on businesses to recruit workers, and why Signal built the “man camps.” (Doc. No. 152, Ex. A.)
The Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Gotham’s report should be struck because it is (1) irrelevant and (2) based on insufficient facts and data. The Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Gotham’s report should be limited to the four opinions that were contained in the report that was served in this case, as opposed to the six opinions served in David (a parallel case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana).
a. Dr. Gotham’s last two opinions should not be struck for failing to serve them1 The report attached to the Plaintiffs’ motion contains six opinions and appears to be from David. (Doc. No. 152, Ex. A.) Though not attached to any of the parities’ briefing, the Plaintiffs claim that the report that was actually served in this case contained only four opinions. (Doc. No. 152, p. 4 n. 3.) The Plaintiffs argue that the two additional opinions that Dr. Gotham offered in David should be excluded because they were never formally served in this case. (Doc. No. 194, p. 3 n. 3.) The undersigned disagrees for two reasons. First, the Plaintiffs did not specifically move in their motion to have Dr. Gotham’s report limited to four opinions. They merely asserted in a footnote that Dr. Gotham’s report only contains four opinions, yet attached the report from David, which contains six opinions. (See Doc. No. 152, p. 4 n. 3) (noting the difference between the report served in this case and that served in David, but not requesting to have the additional
1. The decision whether to allow a late filed expert report—which is essentially why the Plaintiffs seek to limit Dr. Gotham’s opinions—involves determining whether to amend the scheduling order. This inquiry involves a four-factor test. See Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 790–91. In contrast, determining whether Dr. Gotham’s opinions are admissible, is a different inquiry. Therefore, the undersigned finds it necessary to first consider whether these opinions are properly part of this case, before determining whether they are admissible. As will be discussed below, opinions E and F are struck from this case.
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two opinions struck). It is not until the Plaintiffs’ reply is it clear that they seek such relief. (Doc. No. 194, p. 3 n. 3) (discussing the two additional opinions in David, and arguing that “[b]ecause these opinions were not provided in the Report—which will not be amended—such opinions should be excluded”) (internal citations omitted). The undersigned will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply. See Tran Enters., L.L.C. v. DHL Express (USA) Inc., 627 F.3d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 2010).
Second, even assuming the issue was properly raised, the Plaintiffs have not stated how they were prejudiced by the additional two opinions. Reliance Ins. Co., 110 F.3d at 257–58 (applying the four factor test articulated in Geiserman). The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to depose Dr. Gotham regarding all six opinions, it appears that they had his full report in advance of his deposition, and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the Plaintiffs’ deposition preparation as to all six opinions was hindered. Moreover, while Dr. Gotham testified that he does not plan to amend his report, his deposition testimony is clear that he plans to offer six opinions in this case. (Doc. No. 152, Ex. B, 156:6–159:4.) Therefore, there is no unfair surprise.
Again, the undersigned does not condone Signal’s tactics of untimely bolstering an expert report, but the Plaintiffs have failed to properly raise this issue and show any prejudice. Therefore, to the extent that the Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Gotham’s last two opinions because they were untimely (or never formally served)—their request is denied.
b. Dr. Gotham’s opinions are relevant2 The Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Gotham’s report, “which conclude[s] that Hurricanes Rita and Katrina destroyed housing and other buildings on the Gulf Coast,” is “so generalized as to be
2. The Plaintiffs moved to exclude Dr. Gotham’s report in its entirety, but did not move in the alternative to strike opinion B, which addresses the impacts that Hurricane Katrina had on Mississippi. Moreover, interspersed with Dr. Gotham’s other opinions is a discussion of the Mississippi area, which was the location of another Signal facility. The undersigned questions whether a discussion of the Mississippi region is relevant to this case.
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common sense” and therefore, fails to meet the helpfulness standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a). (Doc. No. 152, p. 3.) In addition, the Plaintiffs claim that “the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and Rita in 2005 is entirely irrelevant to the specific issue of what particular housing was available to the Plaintiffs . . . .” (Id. at p. 7.) Signal responds by arguing that Dr. Gotham’s report is helpful because it “will assist the Court and the jury in determining the nexus between Signal’s logic, intentions, and actions.” (Doc. No 178, p. 5.)
To meet the first prong of Rule 702, “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [must] help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 702(a). The Plaintiffs claim that there is no need for expert testimony on the fact that hurricanes Rita and Katrina destroyed housing on the Gulf Coast. Dr. Gotham’s opinions, however, go beyond this one basic idea. For example, he also opines on the “problems that businesses faced in attracting skilled labor in the context of widespread housing damage in the months and years after Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.” (Doc. No. 178, p. 5); (see also Doc. No. 152, Ex. A, pp. 23–27) (discussing the correlation between the lack of available housing and the difficulty in attracting workers). Moreover, the extent of the housing shortage may be beyond the knowledge of a layperson. While some jurors may still remember what life was like after the hurricanes, it is plausible that a juror may have only recently moved to the area and lacks such familiarity. In addition, these hurricanes occurred nearly ten years ago—it is possible that memories have faded. Accordingly, information regarding the housing market and the impact that it had on attracting workers to the area is helpful, and as such, meets Rule 702(a).
Furthermore, contested factual issues include why Signal allegedly forced the Plaintiffs to live in the “man camps” and why Signal needed to use an immigrant labor force. The state of the housing market is arguably relevant to these issues. Therefore, by offering a big picture
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perspective on what the housing market was like during the relevant period, Dr. Gotham’s testimony is helpful. In short, if the Plaintiffs are going to claim that there was no need for Signal to build the “man camps,” then testimony on the state of the housing market is relevant.
c. Sufficient facts and data Dr. Gotham’s opinions can be broken into two general categories: (1) general opinions about the impacts of the hurricanes (opinions A through D) and (2) opinions about Signal’s actions (opinions E and F). As to Dr. Gotham’s general testimony, he relies on sufficient facts and data to reach general conclusions about the state of the housing market and the difficulty in attracting workers to disaster areas. While the utility of such testimony is questionable, as discussed above, it meets the admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, while the Plaintiffs fault him for not considering the data on a granular enough level (i.e., examining specific vacancy rates), he considered sufficient data to conclude that the housing markets were negatively impacted by the hurricanes. Dr. Gotham’s more specific opinions, however, should be excluded. As for opinion E, Dr. Gotham has not reviewed enough specific information about housing availability in close proximity to Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas to reach the conclusion that “Signal built on-site facilities to address an acute housing shortage for workers.” (Doc. No. 152, Ex. A, p. 34); (see also id. at p. 37) (“[I]t is my opinion that the dearth of housing availability in Orange County, Texas . . . created a major obstacles for businesses in these areas to attract and keep the labor necessary for business and community recovery efforts.”). To reach such a specific opinion he would need to look at the housing market in an area in close proximity to Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas. Dr. Gotham has undertaken no such analysis. He did not consider specific data in a narrowly defined region, and even classifies his report as considering “the state of the
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housing market in general during the years after the disaster.” (Doc. No. 152, Ex. B, 68:12–14.) Dr. Gotham’s opinions that housing was impacted by the hurricanes, without something specific to the area in question or without facts showing what housing was actually available near Signal’s facility, will not support this opinion. Moreover, the specific data upon which Dr. Gotham relies focuses on the Mississippi region, not on Texas. (Doc. No. 152, Ex. A, pp. 37– 38.)
As for Opinion F, this opinion is improper because it is not helpful and usurps the role of the jury. Dr. Gotham is attempting to pass judgment on the propriety of Signal’s actions as they relate to the “man camp.” For example, he states that “Signal did not force or coerce the workers to stay in the on-site facility” (Id. at p. 42); that “no plaintiff was ever required to live in the onsite housing facilities . . . .” (Id. at p. 41); and that the housing facility benefited the Plaintiffs. (Id. at pp. 41–42.) The jury, informed about the state of housing market generally and other testimony, can determine whether Signal actually had no other choice but to build the “man camps” or that the Plaintiffs benefited from them.
d. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham as Expert” (Doc. No. 152) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Gotham may opine about the state of housing in Orange, Texas in general and the correlation between available housing and attracting skilled workers. However, opinions E and F are struck, and he may not opine as to whether there was “an acute” housing shortage in Orange, Texas, why Signal built the “man camp,” whether the Plaintiffs were required or coerced into living at the “man camp,” or whether the “man camp” actually benefited the Plaintiffs.
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E. Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke” (Doc. No. 158) Florence Burke (“Burke”) is the Plaintiffs’ expert on human trafficking. She is offered to
(1) “provide the trier of fact with background on the H2-B guest worker visa program and on human trafficking in general” and (2) “to demonstrate to the fact-finder that the facts and circumstances of this case as alleged by the Plaintiffs fit within the typical pattern of human trafficking.” (Doc. No. 181, p. 1.) Signal argues that Burke’s report should be struck for three reasons: (1) her report contains legal conclusions; (2) her opinions are unreliable; and (3) she is not qualified to render an opinion regarding the Plaintiffs’ mental state. (Doc. No. 158.)
a. Permissible scope of expert testimony on human trafficking Courts have reached varied conclusions on whether expert testimony on human trafficking is admissible. Compare Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (D. Md. 2014) (allowing some testimony about human trafficking) with (Doc. No. 2038, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., No. 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2014) (striking all expert testimony on human trafficking)). The issue is that in this context, it is difficult to delineate between an opinion that is merely a legal conclusion (i.e., that 18 U.S.C. § 1590 was violated) and testimony that educates the jury and may be helpful. While Federal Rule of Evidence 704 “abolish[ed] the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate issues of fact . . . [it] does not open the door to all opinions.” See Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 241–42 (5th Cir. 1983). “The Advisory Committee notes make it clear that questions which would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.” Id. “The line between a permissible opinion on an ultimate issue and an impermissible legal conclusion is not always easy to discern.” United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006).
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In delineating the proper of scope of expert testimony on human trafficking, the undersigned must guard against two things. First, an expert must not be allowed to instruct the jury on what the legal elements of human trafficking are (i.e., what is needed to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590)—that is the court’s job. Second, an expert must be prevented from telling the jury what conclusion to reach as to whether the Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking—that is for the jury to decide. Therefore, the issue is how to delineate between a general discussion of human trafficking, which may help the jury better understand the complexities of human trafficking and is therefore admissible, and reaching a conclusion as to whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, which would usurp the role of the jury. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that the term “human trafficking” has both a legal and a colloquial meaning, further blurring the line between permissible and impermissible testimony.
The undersigned finds the appropriate balance to be as follows: Burke may testify about “human trafficking in general,” which includes discussing the general features of human trafficking schemes, but she may not offer an opinion on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking. This will allow Burke to educate and inform the jury on the subtleties of human trafficking, which meets the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702, without directly offering a legal conclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 702(a) (requiring that an expert’s specialized knowledge “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence”). Moreover, allowing Burke to apply the facts of this case to her general standards would be tantamount to her telling the jury what conclusion to reach. See also Elat, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (striking portions of Burke’s testimony, but allowing her to testify generally about “the patterns of coercion and threats that
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are typically present in situations involving the exploitation of foreign workers” and other general topics relating to human trafficking).
Two examples of the scope of permissible and impermissible testimony may be helpful. First, the portion of Burke’s report where she offers background on human trafficking and discusses “common features of trafficking situations” is permissible because it is purely informative. (Doc. No. 158, Ex. A, p. 11.) However, Burke cannot take the next logical step and conclude that there was trafficking in this case or opine on how the Plaintiffs were affected. For example, she states: “Having considered Plaintiffs’ accounts of their trafficking experiences, it is my opinion that many of the trafficking factors identified above were present in Defendants’ conduct towards them and operated to create a psychologically coercive environment in which a reasonable worker in the Plaintiffs’ situation would have felt compelled to continue working for Signal.” (Id. at p. 12.) This is nothing more that her evaluating the facts and reaching a conclusion that there was trafficking—such an analysis is within the province of the jury.
Second, Burke discusses in general terms how victims of human trafficking are often made a set promises about what their working conditions will be like, but in reality, the conditions tend to be significantly worse. (Id. at p. 19.) This is within the scope of permissible testimony. Burke, however, crosses the line by stating: “the Plaintiffs in this case believe they were deceived and betrayed in terms of their employment conditions, living conditions, net wages, opportunity to work, overtime hours, and immigration status.” (Id. at pp. 19–20.) The jury, after hearing the facts, can evaluate whether the Plaintiffs were deceived.
The above examples are not the only places where Burke’s opinions go too far. However, because her report is so intertwined with permissible and impermissible opinions, the undersigned will not attempt to state on a paragraph-by-paragraph (or sentence-by-sentence)
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basis what is excluded from Burke’s report. The limitation that she may only opine about the characteristics of human trafficking in general, and not whether there was trafficking in this case, should suffice.
b. Signal’s other arguments Signal also raises several other arguments as to why Burke’s testimony should be excluded or limited. First, Signal argues that Burke misrepresented two of her qualifications, and therefore should be struck. (Doc. No. 158, pp. 2–3.) The undersigned disagrees. A review of her experience and training shows Burke has extensive experience working with victims of human trafficking and is qualified to testify as an expert on human trafficking. (See id., Ex. A, pp. 1–5.) Whether the school where she obtained her Ph.D. in clinical psychology is accredited by the American Psychological Association, or whether her license to be a family counselor in California is still valid, does not impact whether she is qualified as an expert on trafficking. To the extent that Signal believes that these alleged misstatements affect the weight the jury should ascribe to her testimony, it can raise such issues on cross-examination. Next, Signal argues that Burke’s report is unreliable because her interview process is flawed and that opinions based on Plaintiffs’ statements are inadmissible. (Doc. No. 158, pp. 6– 9.) Because Burke is precluded from reaching an opinion on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, or evaluating the facts of this case as they relate to human trafficking, Signal’s argument is now moot. (Id. at p. 9.) Likewise, Signal’s argument that Burke is not competent to “reach a final diagnosis” is no longer at issue, since she will not be testifying as to how these Plaintiffs were impacted.
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c. Conclusion
Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke” (Doc. No.
158) is GRANTED IN PART. Burke’s opinions shall be limited to those related to general
characteristics of human trafficking schemes, and Burke is precluded from testifying whether
these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking or in what ways the facts of this case are
similar to other known cases of human trafficking.
F. Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley as Expert” (Doc. No. 156) and Dewan’s “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony” (Doc. No. 159)
Signal designated Louise Shelley, Ph.D. (“Dr. Shelley”) to testify as an expert on “human
trafficking and related organized crime.” (Doc. No. 180, p. 1.) Dr. Shelley received her Ph.D. in
Sociology from the University of Pennsylvania, and is currently a professor at the School of
Public Policy at George Mason University. Her forty-five page report leads to one ultimate
conclusion: “Signal was not engaged in human trafficking at any stage of the process with the
H2B workers, either at recruitment, on their arrival in the United States or in their employ.” (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 44.)3 The Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Shelley’s report, arguing that:
(1) her report contains numerous legal conclusions; (2) her methodology is not valid; (3) her
testimony is not helpful; and (4) she impermissibly assesses the witnesses’ credibility. Dewan
3. There appears to be a question about what is the operative report in this case. Signal seems to assume that it is the forty-five page report that was served in David, the parallel case in the Eastern District of Louisiana, while the Plaintiffs only attached a shorter version of Dr. Shelley’s report that was apparently served in this case. The report served in David is fourteen pages longer and, according to Signal, “was a revision that contained additional information beyond that specific to the David plaintiffs.” (Doc. No. 180, p. 1.) It is unclear whether the David report was served in this case, and if it was, whether it was timely. As discussed above, parties cannot simply submit a more robust expert report under the guise that it is a supplemental report. However, after reviewing both versions of Dr. Shelley’s report, the undersigned finds that, for reasons discussed below, much (if not all) of what was added to the David report is struck. For instance, some of the added material in the David report consists of Dr. Shelley’s evaluation of the trustworthiness of the certain statements made by the plaintiffs in David. Compare (Doc. No. 156, Ex. B) with (Doc. No. 168, Ex. B, pp. 20–25.) Therefore, it makes no material difference what report is the operative report, and because the Plaintiffs have not shown how they were prejudiced by the David report, had the opportunity to depose Dr. Shelley regarding this report, and did not move to have Dr. Shelley’s report limited to the shorter version served in this case, the David report will be considered the operative report.
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also seeks to exclude Dr. Shelley’s testimony, arguing that she “makes blanket, unfounded assertions that the Dewan Defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct . . . .” (Doc. No. 159, p. 4.)
a. Dr. Shelley’s report contains impermissible legal conclusions The Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Shelley’s report should be struck because it is “replete with legal conclusions” and “[t]hese conclusions fall far outside the scope of permissible expert testimony . . . .” (Doc. No. 156, p. 5.) The Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Shelley offers numerous legal conclusions about human trafficking. For the same reasons that the Plaintiffs’ human trafficking expert report was limited, Dr. Shelley’s report must also be limited. Therefore, Dr. Shelley’s opinions are subject to the same limitation discussed above: Dr. Shelley may only discuss the general characteristics of human trafficking, but may not opine as to whether these Plaintiffs were in fact victims of human trafficking. In addition, the Plaintiffs move to exclude four other alleged legal conclusions reached by Dr. Shelley. At the outset, because Dr. Shelley’s testimony is limited to only a discussion about human trafficking generally, this part of the Plaintiffs’ motion is now moot. However, for clarity, the undersigned will address the Plaintiffs’ arguments. First, the Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Shelley offers an opinion on a “non-existent” debt bondage claim. A part of her report does address debt bondage. (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, pp. 11–12) (“[T]here was no debt bondage in this case under either the American or UN definition.”). Debt bondage has a specific legal definition, and differs from the Plaintiffs’ claim that the financial debts they incurred forced them to continue working for Signal. See 22 U.S.C. §7102(5) (defining debt bondage as “the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal services or those of a person under his control as a security for debt”). The Plaintiffs have not made a claim of
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debt bondage. Accordingly, because Dr. Shelley’s opinion regarding debt bondage does not relate to any cause of action or issue in this case, it is inadmissible. See Roman, 691 F.3d at 694.
Next, Dr. Shelley claims that “Signal was exempt from OSHA standards for the housing of its H2-B workers . . . .” (Doc. No. 156, p. 7.) Dr. Shelley is not qualified to offer an opinion on the applicability of OSHA, therefore, this opinion is struck. Third, the Plaintiffs seek to strike an opinion reached based on a letter issued by the United States Department of Justice Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Labor Practices. She opines that because the government found that Signal had not engaged in any unfair immigration related employment practices, and this necessarily includes coercion, there could be no trafficking. The Plaintiffs argue that this letter did not address Signal’s actions and does not support a conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not trafficked. Because Dr. Shelley may only testify about human trafficking generally, and may not opine as to whether there was trafficking in this case, there is no need for her to discuss this letter. Therefore, her opinions based on this letter are struck. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Shelley offers opinions on the law of agency. According to the Plaintiffs, the numerous references that she makes regarding Signal’s role in the allegedly false promises made to the Plaintiffs is tantamount to an opinion on agency. The undersigned disagrees—Dr. Shelley does not offer any opinions on agency law. However, as will be discussed below, such comments on the evidence are not helpful, and therefore, are struck from her report.
b. Helpful The Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Shelley’s opinions do not assist the trier of fact because they merely regurgitate Signal’s theory of the case. (Id. at pp. 11–13.) This is a fair characterization of much of Dr. Shelley’s report. Large portions of her report read more like an opening
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statement than an expert report. For example, she “opines” that: “Signal did not obtain workers for its facilities in Texas and Mississippi through the use of force, fraud, or coercion” (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 9); “Burnett might have engaged in deceptive promises, but as the chronology presented by the plaintiffs in the third amended complaint [demonstrates], Signal was not a part of any deceptive promises” (Id. at p. 18); “Signal did not promise the workers green cards, and they did not learn that this promise had been made by the recruiters until after the workers arrived at Signal[’s] facilities” (Id. at p. 19); “The Indian H2B workers did not have their passports or visas confiscated” (Id. at p. 38); and “[i]n reviewing the thousands of Signal emails, I saw nothing in them reflecting any effort to economize on the workers or to shortchange them.” (Id. at p. 41.) These are just a few examples of many.
Because Dr. Shelley’s opinions are limited to those related to the general characteristics of trafficking, such commentary on what the evidence establishes will not be allowed.
c. Reliability and methodology The Plaintiffs next argue, “[f]or many of her opinions, Dr. Shelley asks this Court to make ‘scientifically unsupported leaps of faith in the causal chain’” (Doc. No. 156, p. 9) (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2012)). For example, they claim that Dr. Shelley supports her opinion that there was no trafficking in this case by erroneously drawing a conclusion from a report done by the Texas Task Force on Human Trafficking. (Doc. No. 156, pp. 9–10.) Dr. Shelley may not opine as to whether there was trafficking in this case, and therefore, there is no need for her to discuss this report. Moreover, after reviewing the report upon which Dr. Shelley relied, the undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs’ assertion that Dr. Shelley is making too great a leap in claiming that this report actually absolves Signal of
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trafficking.4 (See Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 14) (opining that the “Texas State Task Force Report reveals that law enforcement authorities were working on trafficking in the region of Orange, Texas and both the Texas Task Force and the Bureau of Justice Statistics determined that the Signal case was not trafficking . . . .”). This report does not discuss this case, nor does it purport to be a discussion of all trafficking cases in Texas. Furthermore, this is just one example; Dr. Shelley offers numerous “opinions” that are reached through a less than rigorous analysis. Because her testimony is limited to discussing the general features of human trafficking schemes, these portions of her report are no longer in the case. However, because her report is replete with these types of remarks, the undersigned reiterates that any testimony given by Dr. Shelley at trial must meet the requirements of Rule 702.5
d. Dr. Shelley improperly assesses the witnesses’ credibility and character The Plaintiffs also seek to strike portions of Dr. Shelley’s report where she assesses the credibility of the witnesses. (Doc. No. 156, pp. 14–15.) Signal responds that Dr. Shelley is not passing on the witnesses’ credibility, but rather, merely elucidating the bases for her opinions. The undersigned is not persuaded. (Doc. No. 180, p. 22.) Dr. Shelley expressly opines about the character and truthfulness of certain witnesses. For example, at her deposition she testified that Signal management had “great concern” for the Indian workers—a sentiment that is echoed in her report. The jury, without the assistance of Dr. Shelley, can evaluate whether this is true.
4. See Office of the Attorney General, The Texas Response to Human Trafficking (2008), available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cj/human-trafficking.
5. Dr. Shelley, particularly in the David report, which is the operative report, draws numerous conclusions derived from questionable analysis. For example, Dr. Shelley opines, “[e]xamining Slides 1, 2, and 3 of Signal’s safety performance reveals that is has an extremely low rate of accidents.” (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 35.) As discussed above, reaching such a conclusion requires balancing Signal’s safety record against identifiable standards. See infra III.A.b. In addition, she claims that the food was good and nutritious because she ate at a restaurant run by the same caterer years later. (See Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 28).
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This is just one example of many. 6 Accordingly, Dr. Shelley may not opine as to the credibility, truthfulness, or character of any of the parties or witnesses in this case.
e. Dr. Shelley’s testimony as it relates to Dewan is improper Dr. Shelley asserts in numerous places throughout her report that Dewan engaged in either deceptive or fraudulent practices. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, pp. 9, 18–19, 22, 26.) Such testimony is improper because it is unhelpful. Whether Dewan committed fraud or engaged in deceptive practices is something the jury can readily evaluate on their own after hearing the evidence—there is no need for expert testimony on this point. Dr. Shelley cannot simply regurgitate Signal’s theory of the case through expert testimony. Accordingly, Dr. Shelley shall be precluded from opining about Dewan’s conduct.
f. Conclusion Much of Dr. Shelley’s report consists of impermissible legal conclusions, advocacy, assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, and unreliable and unfounded opinions. However, Dr. Shelley does devote a few paragraphs of her report to discussing the elements of human trafficking generally, and even opines that the Plaintiffs’ expert does not identify all elements that are “central to labor trafficking.” (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B, p. 35.)7 This portion of Shelley’s report is acceptable; the remainder of Dr. Shelley’s report is not. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley as Expert” (Doc. No. 156) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Shelley’s testimony is limited
6. Some of the added material in the David report consists of Dr. Shelley’s assessment of the certain statements. (Doc. No. 180, Ex. B.) For example, she states that “Kurian David’s T-visa application is full of incorrect statements” (Id. at p. 21); “Hemant Khuttan’s declaration raises many questions as to its veracity and the validity of his complaints” (Id. at 22); and she notes an alleged contradiction in Sony Vadusevan-Sulekha’s statement by stating that “the problem with his statement is that Signal never had any pictures of housing or residential facilities on its website. This is a fantasy not reality.” (Id. at p. 23.) Such “opinions” are improper.
7. These opinions, which are the only opinions that Dr. Shelley may offer, were also contained in the report served in this case. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 156, Ex. B, pp. 15, 23.)
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to a discussion of the general elements and characteristics of human trafficking. She, however, may not opine on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, the credibility of the Plaintiffs, or offer her assessment of the facts of this case. Dewan’s “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony” (Doc. No. 159) is GRANTED, and Dr. Shelley’s opinions as they relate to Dewan are struck.
G. The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III as Expert” (Doc. No. 155) and Burnett’s “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal’s Immigration Law Expert” (Doc. No. 153) Signal’s expert, Enrique Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), an immigration lawyer, “prepared a
report addressing various ethical and U.S. immigration law issues as they pertain to the conduct of the various parties involved in this case.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1.) The Plaintiffs moved to strike Gonzalez’s opinion II and six other “stray remarks.” (Doc. No. 155, pp. 4–7.) Signal responded by arguing that Gonzalez was not “retained to provide an opinion on plaintiffs’ conduct in this case and concedes that he will not testify at trial to any individual plaintiffs’ conduct, nor that of any plaintiffs collectively.” (Doc. No. 176, p. 1.) However, Signal claims that Gonzalez’s opinion II is “essential for the development of [his] subsequent opinions regarding Burnett.” (Id. at pp. 1–2.)
In addition, Burnett moved to exclude a large portion of Gonzalez’s report, arguing that it contains impermissible legal conclusions. (Doc. No. 153.) Signal responded and claimed that Gonzalez’s report was not “proffered to circumvent the fact finding role of the jury,” but that “the facts and the pertinent regulations are so intertwined that they must be presented in conjunction,” and therefore, his opinions are admissible in their entirety. (Doc. No. 175, p. 1.)
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a. Due to the severance and transfer of Signal’s cross-claims, Gonzalez’s opinions II-V are no longer relevant
Gonzalez offers five opinions. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A.) Because Signal’s cross-claims against Burnett and others were recently severed and transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana, opinions III through V are no longer relevant, and therefore, are inadmissible. (Doc. No. 205.) These opinions focus on duties owed by an immigration attorney to its client, and the standard of care that an immigration attorney should maintain. In other words, they are aimed at supporting Signal’s claims against Burnett for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty—claims that are no longer at issue in this case.
In addition, the undersigned finds Gonzalez’s opinion II is not helpful, and therefore, inadmissible. He opines that: “Foreign nationals seeking an H-2B visa are considered to have committed immigration fraud if they deliberately conceal their intent to remain permanently in the United States from a U.S. consular or immigration officer.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 24.) There is no cause of action in this case that centers on whether the Plaintiffs committed immigration fraud. While Signal may argue that the Plaintiffs in fact concealed their true intent in applying for H-2B visas, there is no need for expert testimony opining as to whether this amounts to immigration fraud. Signal’s primary argument that opinion II should not be struck is that it is “essential for the development of Gonzalez’s subsequent opinions regarding Burnett.” (Doc. No. 176, pp. 1–2.) However, these subsequent opinions have been struck, therefore, this argument is without merit.
Accordingly, the undersigned strikes opinions II-V. b. Other “stray remarks” are inadmissible
The Plaintiffs also move to exclude six other “stray remarks” that they claim are aimed at them and are impermissible. Two examples are illustrative. First, Gonzalez states: “The intent
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by the foreign nationals and other companies was for the workers to remain in the U.S. permanently.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 14.) Second, by “counseling foreign nationals to lie to immigration officers about their intent to remain in the U.S., Mr. Burnett, as well as the foreign nationals, knowingly committed immigration fraud.” (Id. at p. 15.)
It appears that Gonzalez is inferring that the Plaintiffs committed these acts, even though Gonzalez unequivocally testified that he is not offering any opinions on the Plaintiffs’ conduct. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. B, 191:6–13.) There is simply no other way to interpret his assertion that “the foreign nationals” (i.e., the Plaintiffs) “knowingly committed immigration fraud” by allegedly lying about their intent. Therefore, to prevent any unnecessary confusion that Gonzalez is opining about the Plaintiffs’ conduct, these remarks are struck. Moreover, these remarks are offered in Gonzalez’s report to illustrate how Burnett allegedly breached his duties. Because opinions about Burnett’s duties as an immigration lawyer are no longer relevant to this case, there is no need for such stray remarks. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.
c. Gonzalez’s opinion I All that remains is Gonzalez’s opinion I, in which he states: “it is not immigration fraud to indicate to the U.S. government that the need for H2-B workers is on a temporary basis, and then to seek an extension after extreme natural disasters like Hurricanes Rita and Katrina.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 24.) The Plaintiffs do not take issue with this opinion. Moreover, Burnett does not specifically argue that this opinion should be struck, but rather claims generally that “this Court should limit any testimony by Plaintiffs’ and Signal’s experts to the general process for obtaining non-immigrant visas and permanent work resident visas” and not allow experts to offer “any legal opinion as to what the law is or whether or not any applicable laws or regulations were breached by anyone.” (Doc. No. 153, p. 11.)
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Opinion I straddles the line between being a legal conclusion and helpful testimony on the immigration process generally. On the one hand, Gonzalez should be prevented from testifying outright that Signal did not commit immigration fraud. This would be a legal conclusion. However, looking at this opinion within in the context of Gonzalez’s report, Gonzalez does not do this. This opinion is contained in the background section of his report, and is part of his discussion of the immigration process generally. Moreover, he never actually concludes that Signal did not commit immigration fraud (even though that is what can be inferred). Therefore, opinion I is proper. While Gonzalez’s opinion comes close to offering a legal conclusion, it is not inadmissible. At trial, however, the parties will need to be vigilant to ensure that the phrasing of any questions do not elicit a pure legal conclusion. See, e.g., Owen, 698 F.2d at 240 (discussing that the way a question is phrased may elicit an improper legal conclusion) (citing FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s notes).
d. Conclusion Because Signal’s cross-claims have been transferred, the undersigned strikes opinions IIIV of Gonzalez’s report as irrelevant. The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III as Expert” (Doc. No. 155) is GRANTED and the undersigned strikes Gonzalez’s opinion II. Moreover, the six “stray remarks” identified by the Plaintiffs are also struck, and Gonzalez is precluded from offering testimony that appears to opine about the Plaintiffs’ conduct. Burnett’s “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal’s Immigration Law Expert” (Doc. No. 153) is GRANTED IN PART and Gonzalez may not offer “any testimony as to his opinions of the law, . . . [or] opinions[,] . . . legal conclusions[,] or interpretation of what the evidence establishes.” Gonzalez may, however, discuss the H2-B visa program generally and the general process for obtaining such visas.
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H. Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl” (Doc. No. 157) Signal moves to exclude or limit the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert, Amy Mowl.
(Doc. No. 157.) Mowl is an economist, and is currently on the faculty of the Institute for Financial Management and Research Business School in Chennai, India. The Plaintiffs designated Mowl to provide “a culturally specific socio-economic context to assist the jury in understanding the nature of the debts incurred by Plaintiffs in India to pay hefty recruitment fees charged by Defendants.” (Doc. No. 182, p. 1.) Signal seeks to exclude or limit Mowl’s testimony on three grounds: (1) she makes impermissible credibility determinations; (2) her testimony regarding suicide must be limited; and (3) “Mowl uses insufficient information and unreliable principles or methods in forming her opinions.” (Doc. No. 157.)
a. Credibility Determination Signal argues that Mowl passes on the credibility of the Plaintiffs’ statements, and that her “opinions impermissibly regurgitate[] the Plaintiffs’ testimony stamped with the imprimatur of her expertise.” (Doc. No. 157, p. 5.) The undersigned disagrees with Signal’s characterization of Mowl’s approach. Mowl testified that she received sworn statements made by the Plaintiffs, and because they were sworn, assumed they were true. (Id., Ex. B, 46:19– 47:16.) In addition, when questioned about whether she examined the truthfulness of the Plaintiffs’ statements, she said she did not because they were consistent with what she knows about Indian finance products. (Id.) This is not the same as opining that the statements are in fact true. Signal attempts to argue that Mowl’s opinions are similar to ones that were struck in Elat v. Ngoubene. (Doc. No. 157, p. 5.) In Elat, the expert weighed two competing sets of facts, and concluded that the plaintiff’s version of the facts was more credible than the defendants’. Elat,
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993 F. Supp. 2d at 513–14 (noting that the expert’s “evaluation of the truthfulness of Plaintiff’s version of the underlying events as compared to Defendants’ is little different from the way that juries themselves determine credibility from conflicting testimony.”). The expert then used the plaintiff’s version of the facts as the basis for her opinion. Id. Mowl did not undertake such an analysis. She merely took the plaintiffs’ statements at face value and felt she could because they were consistent with what she expected based on her experience. This is the same as forming an opinion based on documents produced in discovery.
b. Testimony regarding suicide8 To illustrate the effect that debts can have on people in India, Mowl discusses a recent wave of suicides by Indian farm workers. (Doc. No. 157, Ex. A, pp. 17–20.) Signal seeks to exclude this part of Mowl’s report on two grounds. First, Signal argues that her sources are faulty. Mowl’s sources were Indian newspapers. Signal has pointed to no reason why the reliability or truthfulness of these sources should be doubted. Moreover, this type of challenge goes to the weight that the fact finder should ascribe to the opinions, not their admissibility. See 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1077 (“As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury’s consideration.”). Second, Signal claims that Mowl has not offered any form of “peer-reviewed or other authoritative source” showing that suicide rates amongst the farming community are relevant or similar to those amongst the non-farming community. (Doc. No. 157, p. 6); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93 (noting that one of the indicia of reliability is whether the expert’s theory or technique has been subject to peer review). While courts have struck expert testimony when there is too large of an analytic gap, the undersigned does not find that such a gap exists here. 8. Signal did not argue that such testimony may be unfairly prejudicial. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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See also Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 244 (discussing that “the factors identified in Daubert may or may not pertinent in assessing reliability”). Mowl does not need to show a direct correlation between farm worker and non-farm worker suicide rates to draw an analogy. Furthermore, Signal has pointed to no studies that Mowl has ignored, and the undersigned finds it unlikely that such studies have ever been conducted.
c. Sufficiency of information and reliability of principles Signal next argues that Mowl has not reviewed sufficient information. Signal faults her for “not consider[ing] the pay data produced by Signal as part of its ESI productions,” “failing to request any banking records,” and not reviewing the deposition of Sachin Dewan. (Doc. No. 157, pp. 6–8.) The undersigned’s role, however, is to ensure that expert testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data”—not to ensure that an expert left no stone unturned. FED. R. EVID. 702. Here, after reviewing her report, the undersigned finds that Mowl has met this threshold. Mowl lists over forty sources that she considered in drafting her report. Also, a review of her deposition shows that she had cogent reasons for choosing not to review certain sources. Furthermore, an argument that an expert “did not review sufficient fats and data goes to the weight of [its] opinion, to be brought out in cross-examination and resolved by the jury, not to admissibility.” Suzion Wind Energy Corp. v. Shippers Stevedoring Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 623, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
d. Conclusion Accordingly, Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl” (Doc. No. 157) is DENIED.
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IV. Conclusion
The undersigned finds as follows:
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Ron J. McAlear as Expert” (Doc. No. 150) is GRANTED IN PART. McAlear may testify about general industry practices and opine as to whether Signal’s practices are consistent with these customs. However, McAlear may not opine that Signal is a safe company or has an “exemplary safety record”;
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Virginia Miles as Expert” (Doc. No. 151) is DENIED;
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Donald H. Strobel as Expert” (Doc. No. 154) is GRANTED subject to reconsideration should the court at a later time allow the Plaintiffs to file FLSA claims in this case;
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham as Expert” (Doc. No. 152) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Gotham may opine about the state of housing in Orange, Texas in general and the correlation between available housing and attracting skilled workers (opinions A through D). However, opinions E and F are struck, and he may not opine as to whether there was “an acute” housing shortage in Orange, Texas, why Signal built the “man camp,” whether the Plaintiffs were required or coerced into living at the “man camp,” or whether the “man camp” actually benefited the Plaintiffs;
 Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke” (Doc. No. 158) is GRANTED IN PART. Burke’s opinions shall be limited to those related to general characteristics of human trafficking schemes, and Burke is precluded from testifying as to whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking or in what ways the facts of this case are similar to other known cases of human trafficking;
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley as Expert” (Doc. No. 156) is GRANTED IN PART. Dr. Shelley’s testimony is limited to a discussion of the general elements and characteristics of human trafficking, and she may not opine on whether these Plaintiffs were victims of human trafficking, the credibility of the Plaintiffs, or offer her assessment of the facts of this case;
 Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd.’s “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony” (Doc. No. 159) is GRANTED and the undersigned strikes Dr. Shelley’s opinions about Dewan;
 The Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez, III as Expert” (Doc. No. 155) is GRANTED. The undersigned strikes Opinion II and the six other identified “stray remarks” identified by the Plaintiffs;
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 Burnett’s “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal’s Immigration Law Expert” (Doc. No. 153) is GRANTED IN PART and the undersigned strikes opinions III-V. Moreover, Gonzalez may not offer any testimony as to his opinions of the law, or opinions, legal conclusions, or interpretation of what the evidence establishes. Gonzalez may, however, discuss the H2-B visa program generally and the general process for obtaining such visas;
 Signal’s “Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl” (Doc. No. 157) is DENIED. V. Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the
right to file objections to this order. Objections to this order must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report; and (4) be no more than five pages in length.9 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED R. CIV. P. 72(a); Local Rule CV-72(b). If timely objections are made, the district court judge will “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(a).
SIGNED this 12th day of February, 2015.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
9. The local rules limit objections to a non-dispostive order to five pages. See Local Rule CV-72(b). Should any party need additional pages, they must file a motion for leave to exceed page limits.
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 241 Filed 03/06/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 7938

** NOT FOR PRINTED PUBLICATION **

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al., §

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§ CIVIL ACTION No. 1-13-CV-324

v.

§

§ JUDGE RON CLARK

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., §

§ SJF

Defendants

.

§

ORDER RE: CHOICE OF LAW

Defendants Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal

International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (“Signal Defendants”) (Doc. # 225) and Plaintiffs

(Doc. # 226), have filed briefs on choice of law, in accordance with the court’s Order (Doc. # 217).1 The parties provided the court with briefing regarding the law to apply to breach

of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and agency. The court finds that the breach of

contract and fraud claims are governed by Texas law and orders additional briefing on negligent

misrepresentation and agency.

I. Applicable Law

A federal court sitting in diversity applies substantive law of the forum state. Bayle v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010). The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as the proper expression of its choice-of-law rules.

DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). Under these rules, unless a

true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and the laws of the other jurisdiction, Texas law

1 The other Defendants have not filed any briefing on this matter and the deadline set by the court for such briefing has past.
1

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 241 Filed 03/06/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 7939
applies, because it is the forum state. Flagship Credit Corp .v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 481 F. App’x 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.1984); Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 70 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).
II. Analysis A. Breach of Contract and Fraud Claims Regarding the breach of contract claims and the fraud claims, the parties both argue that Texas law applies because no true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and India. The court agrees with the parties that no true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and the laws of India on breach of contract and fraud. Under Texas’s choice-of-law rules, as no true conflict exists, Texas law applies to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fraud claims. See Flagship Credit Corp., 481 F. App’x at 910. B. Negligent Misrepresentation As to the negligent misrepresentation claims, the court finds that a true conflict between Texas and Indian law exists. Texas law requires a showing of reliance, a pecuniary loss, and the exercise of reasonable care or competence on the part of the speaker, whereas Indian law does not. A true conflict exists, and the court must now determine the appropriate law to apply. The parties’ briefs do not appear to be discussing the same alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs’ briefing seems primarily concerned with the alleged misrepresentations made in India by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett, allegedly as agents of the Signal Defendants. The Signal Defendants’ brief discusses only the alleged misrepresentations they, themselves, made in Texas. The Signal Defendants do not appear to take a position on what the appropriate law would be if Plaintiffs established an agency relationship that would confer liability on them as a result of the actions taken by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett in India. Plaintiffs are
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ordered to inform the court whether they disagree with the Signal Defendants’ position on the law to apply to statements made in Texas. If Plaintiffs do disagree, they shall set out the factual and legal basis for such disagreement. Likewise, the Signal Defendants are ordered to inform the court if they disagree that Indian law would apply if Plaintiffs can establish that the Signal Defendants are liable for the alleged misrepresentations made in India by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett. If so, they shall set out the factual and legal basis for such disagreement.
C. Agency Plaintiffs provide a detailed comparison of Texas law regarding agency with sections of the Indian Contract Act of 1872, presumably because they plan to argue that Defendant Signal is liable for the actions taken by Defendant Dewan, Defendant Pol, and Defendant Burnett in India. Plaintiffs argue that no true conflict exists. The Signal Defendants provide no choice-of-law analysis. They appear to concede that an agency relationship exists, but that it is limited by the India Emigration Act of 1983. Plaintiffs are ordered to inform the court if they believe that the Signal Defendants implication of the India Emigration Act of 1983 affects their position that no true conflict exists.
III. Conclusion The court finds that the parties’ briefing on the issues of breach of contract and fraud, and the court’s review, are sufficient for the court to conclude that Texas law should govern those claims at trial. The parties shall have until March 13, 2015, to submit any additional choice-oflaw briefing. Any additional briefing is limited to five pages per side.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 6 day of March, 2015.
___________________________________ Ron Clark, United States District Judge 3

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 281 Filed 03/17/15 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 8782

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

ORDER DENYING SIGNAL’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (DOC. NO. 235) AND MOTION TO RE-DEPOSE THE PLAINTIFFS (DOC. NO. 242)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned are the following motions:

“Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions” (Doc. No. 235), “Motion for Expedited Hearing” (Doc. No. 243),

and “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Redepose Plaintiffs on T-Visa Evidence” (Doc. No.

242) all filed by Signal International, Inc., Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International Texas,

G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, “Signal”). The Plaintiffs oppose Signal’s

motions. (Doc. Nos. 251, 252.)

On October 15, 2014, the undersigned granted in part a motion to compel filed by Signal

requiring the Plaintiffs to produce their T-visas and visa applications within seven days. (Doc.

No. 148.) Signal seeks to have certain facts deemed established because it claims that the

Plaintiffs did not produce these documents until March 4, 2015—over four months late—and also

requests to re-depose each of the Plaintiffs for a half-day regarding these recently produced

documents. Because Signal did not diligently pursue these documents, and therefore, bears much

of the responsibility for not having these documents during the Plaintiffs’ depositions and not

receiving them until March, the undersigned finds that Signal is not entitled to the relief that it

seeks.

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 281 Filed 03/17/15 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 8783
I. Background A. Factual Background
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, approximately 590 men, including the seventeen Plaintiffs in this case, were allegedly trafficked into the United States to provide labor for Signal’s operations. (Doc. No. 64, pp. 2–4.) The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants made false promises of “permanent work-based immigration to the United States,” and that to take advantage of this promising opportunity, the Plaintiffs allegedly “plunged themselves and their families into debt . . . to pay mandatory recruitment, immigration processing, and travel fees . . . .” (Id. at p. 2.) After arriving at Signal’s facility in Orange, Texas, the Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to serious abuses, threatened with deportation if they left, and forced to live in substandard conditions. In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that they could not leave their jobs with Signal due to the large debts they incurred in their homeland.
The Plaintiffs allege that some or all of the Defendants violated the following federal statutes: (1) the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003; (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; (3) the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and (4) the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. (Id. at pp. 50–68.) In addition, the Plaintiffs assert causes of action for state-law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract against all of the Defendants. (Id.)
B. Procedural History On September 5, 2014, Signal filed a motion to compel. (Doc. No. 127.) Among other
things, Signal sought the Plaintiffs’ T-visa and T-visa applications. 1 (Id.) The Plaintiffs
1. T-visas are visas that are available to victims of human trafficking, and allow a holder to stay in the United States for up to three years, and in some cases, may even lead to permanent residency. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11.
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opposed, arguing that requiring production of these documents “would impart a very real in terrorem effect on Plaintiffs and others attempting to exercise their rights under federal trafficking and employment laws.” (Doc. No. 137, p. 1.) On October 15, 2014, the undersigned issued an order granting in part Signal’s motion, and required that the Plaintiffs produce their T-visas and visa applications within seven days of the order. (Doc. No. 148, p. 21.) Both parties objected, and requested a “clarification” from the district judge. (Doc. No. 172) (the Plaintiffs requested that “the order should be clarified to prevent disclosure of highly sensitive, irrelevant materials”); (Doc. No. 188) (Signal “urge[d] [the] Court to modify the Order to clarify the relevant period of discovery”). On February 24, 2015, the district court overruled both parties’ objections and stated that any “clarifications” of the order on the motion to compel should be addressed to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 228.) The parties sought no further clarification.
Six days later, on March 2, 2015, Signal filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that the Plaintiffs had not yet produced the required information and that this delay has caused “substantial prejudice to Signal’s trial preparation.” (Doc. No. 235.) Signal requests that nine “statements be deemed established for purposes of this litigation” and its attorneys’ fees. (Id.) On March 4, 2015, the Plaintiffs produced their T-visas and visa applications. (Doc. No. 242, p. 3.) Then, on March 6, 2015, Signal filed another motion, this time requesting to re-depose each of the Plaintiffs for a half-day based on the recently produced documents. (Id.) The Plaintiffs oppose both of Signal’s motions. (Doc. Nos. 251, 252.)
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II. Analysis A. Signal’s “Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions” (Doc. No. 235)
Whether to impose sanctions is within the discretion of the court. See Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 630–31 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, Signal requests to have nine facts deemed established because the Plaintiffs failed to timely comply with the undersigned’s order on Signal’s motion to compel. While one available sanction for failing to comply with a discovery order is finding “that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for the purposes of the action,” such relief is not appropriate here. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i).
The undersigned’s order required that the Plaintiffs produce their T-visas and applications by October 22, 2014. (Doc. No. 148, p. 21.) Signal contacted the Plaintiffs on October 30, 2014 to inquire about the status of production because the Plaintiffs had not yet produced the required information. (Doc. No. 242, Ex. A.) On this same day, the Plaintiffs appealed the undersigned’s order and requested that the district court reverse the order, or alternatively, clarify certain aspects of the order. (Doc. No. 172.) Signal’s next correspondence regarding these documents was not until February 18, 2015. (Doc. No. 235, Ex. A.)
It is entirely unclear why there was such a delay given that Signal apparently knew that “a Rule 72(a) motion for reconsideration does not automatically stay an order.” (Id.) (citing Tempay, Inc. v. Biltres Staffing of Tampa Bay, L.L.C., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2013)). Furthermore, based on the parties’ objections, at the time of Signal’s correspondence, there was some disagreement about exactly what needed to be produced. Signal’s correspondence of February 18 began the dialogue, and the parties again conferred on February
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23, at which time Signal “insisted that Plaintiffs move . . . for a stay if production were to continue to be withheld.” (Doc. No. 252, p. 3.) The Plaintiffs moved for a stay on February 24. (Doc. No. 227.) That same day, the district court overruled both parties’ objections (Doc. No. 228), which in turn mooted the Plaintiffs’ motion to stay. (Doc. No. 234.) The parties again conferred on February 26, at which time it appears that the disagreements over the scope of what had to be produced were resolved, and the Plaintiffs agreed to produce documents by March 2, and then on the 2nd, requested a two-day extension. (Doc. No. 252, p. 4.) It is unclear whether Signal expressly agreed to the March 2 deadline. Given that Signal did not move for sanctions on February 26, but rather, waited until the day Plaintiffs requested an additional two days, it appears that Signal did not have too strong of an objection to the agreed upon March 2 deadline.
Signal argues that sanctions are warranted because the Plaintiffs’ delay in producing these documents has caused “substantial prejudice to Signal’s trial preparation.” (Doc. No. 235, p. 4.) Based on the record, the undersigned is not persuaded. At the outset, neither party is an innocent actor. The undersigned’s order required that the Plaintiffs produce documents on October 22, 2014. The Plaintiffs did not move to stay their obligation until February 24, 2015. (Doc. No. 227.) Signal, however, also had an obligation to pursue its rights. Signal sent one letter in October, and then waited several months before following-up. If these documents are as critical to Signal’s defense as it asserts, Signal should have been more zealous in compelling their production. While Signal faults the Plaintiffs for adopting “a legally tenuous position in assuming that [the undersigned’s] Order was effectively stayed pending Judge Clark’s review,” given that Signal took no action for several months after the Plaintiffs appealed, it certainly appears that both parties treated their objections as having this effect. (Doc. No. 235, p. 4.)
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Accordingly, Signal’s argument that the Plaintiffs are the ones who bear the sole responsibility for the late production of documents is incorrect.
Moreover, both parties requested a “clarification” of the undersigned’s order. The district court put the onus back on the parties to work out their issues or re-brief them. (Doc. No. 228.) It appears that the parties reached an agreement on their issues, and in doing so, agreed that the Plaintiffs could have until March 2, 2015, to produce these documents, and the Plaintiffs actually produced them on March 4, 2015. Therefore, based on the parties’ conduct, the Plaintiffs were two days late in producing these documents to Signal—not four months as Signal alleges—and such a delay does not warrant the imposition of sanctions.
Furthermore, Signal is overreaching in the facts it seeks to have established. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that any sanction “must be specifically related to the particular ‘claim’ which was at issue in the order to provide discovery”). For example, Signal seeks to have deemed admitted that “each plaintiff lied and exaggerated about material facts in applying for and obtaining his T-visa” and that “[n]either Plaintiffs nor their representatives believed that Plaintiffs could obtain T-visas without lying and exaggerating about material facts with respect to each Plaintiffs’ recruitment and work at Signal.” (Id. at p. 7.) There is no basis in Signal’s motion to compel, their requests for production, or the undersigned’s order to have such facts admitted. Signal’s request is so overreaching that it must be denied. Furthermore, given that the Plaintiffs have produced this information, it is better to have the evidence presented to the jury regarding these matters as opposed to having certain key facts established on account of being a few days late in producing documents.
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The undersigned also finds that the award of attorneys’ fees in not justified. If a party fails to comply with a court’s order regarding discovery, an award of attorneys’ fees may be appropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b). Rule 37(b)(2)(C) states: “Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising the party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” The undersigned finds that there are “other circumstances” making the award of sanctions unjust. Both parties are to blame for the Plaintiffs’ untimely production of their T-visas. The Plaintiffs had no basis in law not to produce the documents, but Signal failed to zealously pursue them. As discussed above, Signal sent one letter in October 2014, and took no further action until February 2015. Moreover, it appears that there was an agreement that the Plaintiffs could produce these documents on March 2, and when they requested an additional two days (which is insignificant given that Signal had already waited four months), Signal sought sanctions. Had the Plaintiffs shown a pattern of seeking extensions or refusing to produce documents, then an award of attorneys’ fees might be appropriate, but that is not the case here. The parties were fully communicating regarding these issues, and the Plaintiffs’ request of an additional two days is reasonable. Therefore, the undersigned finds that “other circumstances” exist making the award of attorneys’ fees unjust.
B. Signal’s “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Redepose Plaintiffs on T-visa Evidence” (Doc. No. 242) Before the Plaintiffs filed this case, Signal was well aware that a contentious issue would
be the production of the Plaintiffs’ T-visas and visa applications. The court in David—a parallel case involving Signal and nearly identical allegations of human trafficking—twice addressed the
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discoverability of this information. (Doc. No. 315, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2009)) (requesting that a protective order be issued); (Doc. No. 778, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. July 22, 2010)) (moving to compel production of the plaintiffs’ T-visas). Initially, the court entered a protective order that precluded all discovery into the plaintiffs’ immigration status. See David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 257 F.R.D. 114, 125–26 (E.D. La. 2009) (“[T]his Court can only conclude that any inquiry into plaintiffs’ current immigration status, current residence, and/or post-termination employment history will most assuredly strike paralyzing fear in the plaintiffs sufficient to chill any inclination they may have had to prosecute their pending claims.”). A little over a year later, Signal moved to compel the production of the plaintiffs’ T-visas and applications. Signal’s motion was granted in part—largely because it appears that the David plaintiffs offered a compromise—and the court ordered the production of redacted statements that were attached to the plaintiffs’ T-visa applications. Signal’s request for the actual visas and applications was denied. (Doc. No. 854, David v. Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 2:08-cv-1220 (E.D. La. July 22, 2010)).
The Plaintiffs filed this action on May 25, 2013. Therefore, from the moment that this case was filed, Signal should have known—or at least strongly suspected—that there would be an issue relative to the production of the Plaintiffs’ visas. The first scheduling order required discovery to be completed by July 25, 2014, which was subsequently extended to October 17, 2014. (Doc. Nos. 61, 105, 122.) Therefore, Signal had ample time to persuade this court that the Plaintiffs should be required to produce their T-visas and applications (an endeavor in which Signal was ultimately successful) before seeking to depose the Plaintiffs.
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Signal, however, did not immediately seek written discovery from the Plaintiffs. Rather, Signal waited over a year to serve written discovery. 2 On July 22, 2014, Signal received responses from the Plaintiffs indicating that they were not going to produce visa related information. (Doc. No. 127, Ex. 2.) Signal then waited over a month before filing its motion to compel. (Doc. No. 127.) In other words, Signal was not particularly proactive (though they complied with the second amended scheduling order) in seeking this information.
What most persuasively demonstrates that Signal’s request to re-depose the Plaintiffs should be denied is that Signal scheduled—and took—three of the Plaintiffs’ depositions before its motion to compel was even ripe. The first deposition was scheduled for September 19, 2014, and Signal’s motion to compel was not fully ripe until September 29, 2014.3 (Doc. No. 242, Ex. D) (Joy Varkey’s deposition started on September 19, 2014); (Id., Ex. E) (Philip Baby’s deposition began on September 22, 2014); (Sojan Kaliyadan’s deposition began on September 26, 2014). The fact that Signal was willing to take several depositions before its motion to compel was ripe—let alone decided—demonstrates that Signal did not believe that having the Plaintiffs’ visas in-hand was as vital as it now argues. Had Signal truly needed these documents to properly depose the Plaintiffs, Signal should have served discovery earlier, which would have allowed it to
2. Assuming that the Plaintiffs’ responses were timely, and there is no indication in the record that they were not, then Signal’s requests for production were served more than one year after the Plaintiffs filed this case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (requiring responses to requests for production be served within thirty days).
3. September 29, 2014 is the date that Signal filed its reply. (Doc. No. 140.) Arguably, the motion was ripe after the Plaintiffs filed their response on September 22, 2014, which is still after the second deposition began. (Doc. No. 137); LOCAL RULE CV-7(f) (“The court need not wait for the reply or sur-reply before ruling on the motion.”). Furthermore, it is unrealistic to believe that a court, dealing with the rather novel issue of whether the in terrorem effect can shield a party from having to produce immigration related documents in a human trafficking case, will rule on the motion instantaneously. Therefore, while some of the Plaintiffs’ depositions were taken before Signal’s motion was ripe, all of them were taken before the court could reasonably have been expected to issue an order.
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have its motion to compel filed and decided before scheduling and taking these depositions.4 The
general rule is that a party may only take a witness’s deposition once. See FED. R. CIV. P.
30(a)(2)(A)(ii) (noting that leave of court is required if “the deponent has already been deposed in
the case”). Therefore, because Signal decided to take the Plaintiffs’ depositions without these
documents, it should have known that it would have no absolute right to re-depose the Plaintiffs.
In addition, the undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs’ assertion that Signal “has pointed to
no new information in the written T-visa materials” that warrants re-deposing the Plaintiffs.
(Doc. No. 251, p. 3); (see also id. at p. 9) (“Signal has not suggested, based on any of the
documents produced relating to the T-Visas, how any testimony from the Plaintiffs might be
necessary.”). At best, Signal alleges that “the testimony of the Plaintiffs could reveal additional
information.” (Doc. No. 272, p. 2) (emphasis added). Signal also references some additional
communications that were part of the Plaintiffs’ visas, but fails to clearly articulate what it believes it could learn from these or why this justifies re-deposing the Plaintiffs. (Id.)5 Furthermore, the
undersigned finds some merit to the Plaintiffs’ contention that these depositions are aimed at
harassing the Plaintiffs. It should not take a half-day as Signal requests (or three and a half hours),
even with translators, to discuss a handful of recently produced documents. The only plausible
explanation for why Signal needs this much time is that it wants to delve into issues beyond what is
4. Signal’s reply highlights why it should have been more diligent in seeking written discovery. Signal claims that it needs to re-depose the Plaintiffs because their testimony “could reveal additional discovery avenues unknown to Signal.” (Doc. No. 272, p. 2.) It is reasonable to expect that discovery early in the case may lead to new issues, that is why the parties had a year to conduct discovery. Signal, however, chose to wait until close to the end of the discovery period to serve discovery. To the extent there are “additional discovery avenues,” the time to explore them has long passed.
5. Moreover, this is a new argument that was raised in a reply. Therefore, to the extent that Signal is even claiming that these newly discovered communications entitle it to re-depose the Plaintiffs, this argument is not properly before the court. Furthermore, Signal has provided no detail on what these “third party affidavits and communications” contain, and therefore, even if this argument were before the court, Signal has not provided the court with enough information to intelligently decide whether this would warrant re-deposing the Plaintiffs.
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contained in the Plaintiffs’ T-visas and visa applications. Because Signal has failed to articulate what newly discovered information warrants re-deposing the Plaintiffs, coupled with the fact that Signal initially chose to take these depositions without having hard copies of the Plaintiffs’ T-visas and visa applications, the undersigned finds that Signal’s request to re-depose the Plaintiffs should be denied.
It also appears that Signal is trying to challenge opposing counsel’s instructions to the Plaintiffs not to answer certain questions during their depositions based on the in terrorem effect. (Doc. No. 242, p. 4) (arguing that “[u]nequivocally, the record indicates that the parties contemplated the possibility of redeposing the Plaintiffs”). This, however, is a different issue than whether the recent production of documents requires re-deposing the Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 242, p. 3) (“Signal was unable to question Plaintiffs on these highly relevant documents.”); (Id. at p. 7) (seeking to re-depose the Plaintiffs “on topics limited to T-visa applications and affidavits”); (Doc. No. 242, Ex. B) (“Signal requests consent to redepose each Plaintiff on the T-visa applications and unredacted affidavits . . . .”). As an initial matter, the instruction not to answer was likely improper given that there is no “privilege” (as that term is understood in the Federal Rules) related to the in terrorem effect, there was no protective order in place in this case (though there were in other cases), and that the Plaintiffs did not move for a protective order until September 22, 2014, which was the fourth day of depositions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (“A person may instruct a deponent to not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”)
Signal, however, had options at the time of the depositions to address opposing counsel’s objections. First, Signal could have insisted on getting answers to its questions, subject to the
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objections, and then allowed the court to rule on the objections. Instead, there is no record of what questions Signal intended on asking because Signal agreed not to ask them. Second, Signal could have received an immediate ruling on this issue by calling the District’s discovery hotline. See LOCAL RULE CV-26(e). The fact that a motion to compel was pending that contained some overlapping issues does not mean that parties could not have gotten an immediate ruling on the propriety of the Plaintiffs’ objections. In other words, Signal’s motion to compel seeking certain documents did not necessarily preclude all questions relating to the Plaintiffs’ immigration status.
Third, if Signal believed that their questions were proper (or the instruction was improper), Signal should have moved much earlier to re-depose the Plaintiffs. Instead, Signal waited five months to raise this issue. It really appears that Signal is regretting not pushing harder to have the Plaintiffs answer its questions regarding their immigration status, and is using these recently produced documents to open the door to a broad range of questions that it failed to get answers to the first time they deposed the Plaintiffs. However, whether Signal was able to question the Plaintiffs regarding certain documents—which is the only real change in circumstance since the deposition—is a different issue than whether Signal got all its questions at the depositions answered.
After considering all the circumstances, the undersigned finds that re-deposing the Plaintiffs is not warranted. If Signal truly believed that questioning the Plaintiffs on their T-visas and visa applications was so critical to its case, it could have taken steps earlier to ensure that it could ask the questions it wanted. Instead, Signal waited until late in the discovery period to serve written discovery, waited several weeks before filing a motion to compel, and took depositions with a motion pending. It actually appears that Signal is regretting its failure to take
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action on opposing counsel’s instructions not to answer certain questions during depositions, and is using the recently produced documents as a way to re-ask its questions. Signal, however, had options at that time of the depositions to ensure that it received answers to its questions, or at the very least, should have raised this issue earlier. In the end, Signal now has the documents it successfully sought through its motion to compel. Signal is free to cross-examine any of the Plaintiffs on these documents at trial, subject to any ruling by Chief Judge Clark.
III. Conclusion Signal’s argument that the “Plaintiffs’ own actions created a world where Defendants received long requested discovery on the eve of trial” is an exaggeration. (Doc. No. 242, p. 1.) Signal bears much of the responsibility for any alleged prejudice it has suffered by receiving the Plaintiffs’ T-visas and visa applications just weeks before trial. It should also be repeated that the Plaintiffs’ hands are not clean either because they failed to produce the documents as ordered by the undersigned. A ruling on a nondispositive motion by the undersigned should not be treated as an advisory opinion. Sanctions, however, are not warranted because even though the Plaintiffs failed to timely comply with the undersigned’s order on Signal’s motion to compel, Signal did not actively pursue its right to this information. Moreover, the Plaintiffs produced their T-visas and applications March 4—just two days after an agreed upon deadline. As for re-deposing the Plaintiffs, Signal chose to depose the Plaintiffs knowing that it would not be able to question them regarding their T-visas and applications. Therefore, they have no right to re-depose the Plaintiffs about these documents at this time. Accordingly, Signal’s “Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions” (Doc. No. 235) and “Motion and Memorandum in Support to Redepose Plaintiffs on T-visa Evidence” (Doc. No. 242) are
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Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 281 Filed 03/17/15 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 8795 DENIED. Furthermore, Signal’s “Motion for Expedited Hearing” (Doc. No. 243) is DENIED AS MOOT. SIGNED this 17th day of March, 2015. _________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 282 Filed 03/17/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 8796

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. ' '

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON BILLY WILKS’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 229)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc.

No. 229) filed by Defendant, Billy Wilks (“Wilks”). The Plaintiffs oppose. (Doc. No. 261.)

The Plaintiffs allege that Wilks is one of the “Labor Broker Defendants,” and that this set

of Defendants played a vital role in the alleged scheme to bring the Plaintiffs to the United States

under the false pretense that they would receive permanent residency. (Doc. No. 208, pp. 22–27)

(discussing the recruitment process). In addition, the Plaintiffs claim that Wilks is personally

liable for the conduct of J &M Associates of Mississippi, Inc. (“J & M”) because he “had full

control and decision making authority over J & M such that J & M and Wilks were alter egos of

one another.” (Doc. No. 208, p. 18.)

On February 23, 2015, Wilks filed a “Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc. No. 229.) In this

motion, Wilks seeks dismissal of the claims against him because, according to him, based on the

“undisputed facts” he “had absolutely no dealings with Signal, Global, Burnet, or Dewan in the

processing of the Plaintiffs.” (Id.) Wilks also attached another motion to dismiss, which he

claims he filed in August of 2014. In this motion, Wilks makes the same generic assertion of

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 282 Filed 03/17/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 8797
innocence. (Id.) (“This complaint fails to offer a bona fide claim which relief can be granted. None of the charges are true.”). This August motion, however, is not reflected on the docket.
After reviewing Wilks’s motion, the undersigned recommends that it be denied. First, it is untimely. The second amended scheduling order set October 17, 2014 as the deadline for dispositive motions. Wilks received this order on August 4, 2014, leaving him ample time to file a dispositive motion. (Doc. No. 125.)
Setting the untimeliness of Wilks’s motion aside, his motion should be denied on the merits. It appears that Wilks is moving for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the inquiry is whether the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief. Typically, courts are not to consider extrinsic evidence and take all well-pled facts as true. See Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the Plaintiffs’ complaint, the undersigned finds that they have stated a plausible claim against Wilks. The Plaintiffs’ complaint offers numerous facts showing that J &M was involved in the recruitment process. Moreover, there are sufficient facts that Wilks was in control of J & M, and therefore, it plausible that Wilks is the alter ego of J & M, and as such, personally liable. Moreover, all Wilks offers to support the fact that he is not liable are blanket assertions he “had no dealings” with the other defendants, or that “the J & M defendants should not be in this suit.” (Doc. No. 229.) These statements, standing alone, are insufficient to absolve Wilks of any wrongdoing.1
1. Given that Wilks is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to less stringent standards and are to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, even if Wilks’s motion is construed as a motion for summary judgment, because he has attached no evidence to support his claim that he had no involvement in the operative facts of this case, his motion fails.
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Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Billy Wilks’s “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 229) be DENIED.
Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report; and (4) be no more than eight pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); LOCAL RULE CV-72(c). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 17th day of March, 2015.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge 3

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 286 Filed 03/17/15 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 8806

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH V. SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ET AL

'

'

' '

CASE NO.: 1:13-CV-324 (RC)

'

'

ORDER ON LIMITATIONS OF TRIAL TIME This case is set for a final pretrial hearing on April 2, 2015, with trial on April 6, 2015. The court gave the parties notice that it would impose time limits on the presentation of their cases at trial. The court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and for the reasons stated allots time as follows: It has long been recognized by trial lawyers, that “[a] shorter trial promotes jury comprehension.” Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 12.3 (2004). The Federal Rules of Procedure “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. “A trial court is required to ‘exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence’ in order to ensure that evidence is presented effectively for the ascertainment of truth, time is conserved, and witnesses are protected from harassment. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).” United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 845 (11th Cir. 2011). “[M]any jurors expect information to be presented succinctly, even where it deals with complex matters.” Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 12.3 (2004). This court is well aware that many lawyers fear that jurors may not have understood a point the first, third, fifth, or tenth time it is mentioned. But the undersigned has met with the jury in each case tried in this court.
Page 1 of 4

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 286 Filed 03/17/15 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 8807
Invariably a juror asks “why do the lawyers keep repeating themselves?” As one juror commented to the undersigned, “I am a teacher. I understand the rule about ‘tell an audience what you plan to tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you told them.’ That is three times. We don’t need to hear it ten times.”
Essentially the same case has been tried once against these Defendants in New Orleans. So, counsel should be familiar with what testimony will be presented and how it may be summarized. Counsel are expected to be familiar with Fed. R. Evid. 1006 and the savings in time that can be achieved by use of skillfully prepared summaries, as well as charts, timelines, diagrams and photos. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials , 132 F.R.D. 575, 578 (1991). Counsel should also consider approved time saving techniques such as: the use of properly prepared affidavits to support the admission of those business records for which there is no agreement as to authenticity; using an expert’s résumé as an exhibit to save time on his introduction; submission of extracts of voluminous exhibits containing only the pertinent pages; and proper use of the time allowed for interim statements to quickly transition between topics, and to inform jurors about expected testimony.
Jurors shall be provided with a notebook to aid in their comprehension of the case. Counsel should discuss: definitions of terms, diagrams, key exhibits, timelines, etc. for inclusion in juror notebooks. Parties shall cooperate in providing the court with a page for each side’s witnesses, containing a photograph of the witness (about 3" x 3") with the witness’s name, title (or position, if employed by a party), and space for jurors to take notes, for inclusion in each juror notebook; See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) §§ 12.3, 12.31, 12.32, 12.422 (2004)
Time was requested for experts to opine on the law of immigration and other topics. The court will determine what law applies to the case and instruct the jury on the law as necessary. Expert
Page 2 of 4

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 286 Filed 03/17/15 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 8808
testimony on the law of immigration and on most other topics is not appropriate. See, e.g., Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1997); Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 1994); Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989).
The court=s decision is based in part upon requests for time for more than one expert on a single topic and time for several witnesses concerning the same limited facts. Such testimony is repetitive at best, and confusing and contradictory at worst. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 578 (1991).
The parties were ordered to provide the court with estimates of time needed for trial. The Order specified the information required, and stated that the estimates could be provided in camera so as not to reveal trial strategy. In many instances, parties chose to ignore the order and failed to describe the topic of expected testimony. Therefore, these requests were discounted. Defendant Billy R. Wilks chose to ignore the Court’s order and failed to submit an estimate, so the Court must base its decision on information provided by the other parties.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs will be allowed 36 hours, whether used in direct examination or cross examination. Defendants Signal International, LLC, Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., and Signal International Texas, L.P. (as a group) will be allowed 28 hours; Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD (as a group) will be allowed 8 hours; and Defendants Malvern C. Barnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC (as a group) will be allowed 8 hours, whether used in direct examination or cross examination. Plaintiffs and Defendants shall each have 10 minutes for interim statements, to be used not for argument or summation, but to inform the jury about anticipated testimony, or to direct the jury=s attention to the fact that a new topic is
Page 3 of 4

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 286 Filed 03/17/15 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 8809 about to be discussed. For example, after covering invalidity contentions with an expert, counsel might say something like: ALadies and Gentlemen, that completes Dr. Smith=s testimony about the invalidity of both patents (the necessary treatment of Plaintiff). He will now discuss Dr. Howard’s testimony about infringement of the ‘109 patent (the reasonable and necessary costs of Plaintiff’s treatment)”. A party may, at the conclusion of 80% of its allotted time, move for an extension of time. Such extension will only be granted for good cause shown, and such good cause shall include a showing that the party=s past use of time and anticipated use of remaining and requested time does not constitute undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17 day of March, 2015.
___________________________________ Ron Clark, United States District Judge
Page 4 of 4

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 241 Filed 03/06/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 7938

** NOT FOR PRINTED PUBLICATION **

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al., §

§

Plaintiffs,

§

§ CIVIL ACTION No. 1-13-CV-324

v.

§

§ JUDGE RON CLARK

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., §

§ SJF

Defendants.

§

ORDER RE: CHOICE OF LAW

Defendants Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal

International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (“Signal Defendants”) (Doc. # 225) and Plaintiffs

(Doc. # 226), have filed briefs on choice of law, in accordance with the court’s Order (Doc. # 217).1 The parties provided the court with briefing regarding the law to apply to breach

of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and agency. The court finds that the breach of

contract and fraud claims are governed by Texas law and orders additional briefing on negligent

misrepresentation and agency.

I. Applicable Law

A federal court sitting in diversity applies substantive law of the forum state. Bayle v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010). The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as the proper expression of its choice-of-law rules.

DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). Under these rules, unless a

true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and the laws of the other jurisdiction, Texas law

1 The other Defendants have not filed any briefing on this matter and the deadline set by the court for such briefing has past.
1

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 241 Filed 03/06/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 7939
applies, because it is the forum state. Flagship Credit Corp .v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 481 F. App’x 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.1984); Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 70 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).
II. Analysis A. Breach of Contract and Fraud Claims Regarding the breach of contract claims and the fraud claims, the parties both argue that Texas law applies because no true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and India. The court agrees with the parties that no true conflict exists between the laws of Texas and the laws of India on breach of contract and fraud. Under Texas’s choice-of-law rules, as no true conflict exists, Texas law applies to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fraud claims. See Flagship Credit Corp., 481 F. App’x at 910. B. Negligent Misrepresentation As to the negligent misrepresentation claims, the court finds that a true conflict between Texas and Indian law exists. Texas law requires a showing of reliance, a pecuniary loss, and the exercise of reasonable care or competence on the part of the speaker, whereas Indian law does not. A true conflict exists, and the court must now determine the appropriate law to apply. The parties’ briefs do not appear to be discussing the same alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs’ briefing seems primarily concerned with the alleged misrepresentations made in India by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett, allegedly as agents of the Signal Defendants. The Signal Defendants’ brief discusses only the alleged misrepresentations they, themselves, made in Texas. The Signal Defendants do not appear to take a position on what the appropriate law would be if Plaintiffs established an agency relationship that would confer liability on them as a result of the actions taken by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett in India. Plaintiffs are
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 241 Filed 03/06/15 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 7940
ordered to inform the court whether they disagree with the Signal Defendants’ position on the law to apply to statements made in Texas. If Plaintiffs do disagree, they shall set out the factual and legal basis for such disagreement. Likewise, the Signal Defendants are ordered to inform the court if they disagree that Indian law would apply if Plaintiffs can establish that the Signal Defendants are liable for the alleged misrepresentations made in India by Defendant Dewan and Defendant Burnett. If so, they shall set out the factual and legal basis for such disagreement.
C. Agency Plaintiffs provide a detailed comparison of Texas law regarding agency with sections of the Indian Contract Act of 1872, presumably because they plan to argue that Defendant Signal is liable for the actions taken by Defendant Dewan, Defendant Pol, and Defendant Burnett in India. Plaintiffs argue that no true conflict exists. The Signal Defendants provide no choice-of-law analysis. They appear to concede that an agency relationship exists, but that it is limited by the India Emigration Act of 1983. Plaintiffs are ordered to inform the court if they believe that the Signal Defendants implication of the India Emigration Act of 1983 affects their position that no true conflict exists.
III. Conclusion The court finds that the parties’ briefing on the issues of breach of contract and fraud, and the court’s review, are sufficient for the court to conclude that Texas law should govern those claims at trial. The parties shall have until March 13, 2015, to submit any additional choice-oflaw briefing. Any additional briefing is limited to five pages per side.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 6 day of March, 2015.
___________________________________ Ron Clark, United States District Judge 3

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 282 Filed 03/17/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 8796

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MAKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al. '

'

v.

'

'

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.,

'

et al.

'

1:13-CV-324

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON BILLY WILKS’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 229)

This case is assigned to the Honorable Ron Clark, Chief United States District Judge, and

is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters pursuant to a

Referral Order. (Doc. No. 4.) Pending before the undersigned is the “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc.

No. 229) filed by Defendant, Billy Wilks (“Wilks”). The Plaintiffs oppose. (Doc. No. 261.)

The Plaintiffs allege that Wilks is one of the “Labor Broker Defendants,” and that this set

of Defendants played a vital role in the alleged scheme to bring the Plaintiffs to the United States

under the false pretense that they would receive permanent residency. (Doc. No. 208, pp. 22–27)

(discussing the recruitment process). In addition, the Plaintiffs claim that Wilks is personally

liable for the conduct of J &M Associates of Mississippi, Inc. (“J & M”) because he “had full

control and decision making authority over J & M such that J & M and Wilks were alter egos of

one another.” (Doc. No. 208, p. 18.)

On February 23, 2015, Wilks filed a “Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc. No. 229.) In this

motion, Wilks seeks dismissal of the claims against him because, according to him, based on the

“undisputed facts” he “had absolutely no dealings with Signal, Global, Burnet, or Dewan in the

processing of the Plaintiffs.” (Id.) Wilks also attached another motion to dismiss, which he

claims he filed in August of 2014. In this motion, Wilks makes the same generic assertion of

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 282 Filed 03/17/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 8797
innocence. (Id.) (“This complaint fails to offer a bona fide claim which relief can be granted. None of the charges are true.”). This August motion, however, is not reflected on the docket.
After reviewing Wilks’s motion, the undersigned recommends that it be denied. First, it is untimely. The second amended scheduling order set October 17, 2014 as the deadline for dispositive motions. Wilks received this order on August 4, 2014, leaving him ample time to file a dispositive motion. (Doc. No. 125.)
Setting the untimeliness of Wilks’s motion aside, his motion should be denied on the merits. It appears that Wilks is moving for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the inquiry is whether the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief. Typically, courts are not to consider extrinsic evidence and take all well-pled facts as true. See Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the Plaintiffs’ complaint, the undersigned finds that they have stated a plausible claim against Wilks. The Plaintiffs’ complaint offers numerous facts showing that J &M was involved in the recruitment process. Moreover, there are sufficient facts that Wilks was in control of J & M, and therefore, it plausible that Wilks is the alter ego of J & M, and as such, personally liable. Moreover, all Wilks offers to support the fact that he is not liable are blanket assertions he “had no dealings” with the other defendants, or that “the J & M defendants should not be in this suit.” (Doc. No. 229.) These statements, standing alone, are insufficient to absolve Wilks of any wrongdoing.1
1. Given that Wilks is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to less stringent standards and are to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, even if Wilks’s motion is construed as a motion for summary judgment, because he has attached no evidence to support his claim that he had no involvement in the operative facts of this case, his motion fails.
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 282 Filed 03/17/15 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 8798
Recommendation For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Billy Wilks’s “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 229) be DENIED.
Objections Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 2011), each party to this action has the right to file objections to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must (1) be in writing, (2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report; and (4) be no more than eight pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); LOCAL RULE CV-72(c). A party who objects to this report is entitled to a de novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen days of being served with a copy of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 17th day of March, 2015.
_________________________ Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge 3

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 341 Filed 11/08/16 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 9838

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MUKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH ) ) ) )

FOURTH STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs and Defendants Sachin Dewan, Malvern Burnett and Signal International, LLC,

and certain of its affiliates (the “Signal Entities”), in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No. 335] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status

Report as of November 8, 2016.

As noted in the parties’ prior reports [Dkt. Nos. 338, 339, and 340], the Signal Entities

filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July

12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of

Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation

Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support

1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 341 Filed 11/08/16 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 9839
agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February. The Plaintiffs initially had 60 days from the distribution date to submit their claim forms, which deadline was subsequently extended through June 15, 2016.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015 [Bankr. Dkt. No. 589]. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)
In light of the entry of the Confirmation Order, the undersigned parties respectfully request that the stay remain in effect. Pursuant to the Court’s Order on July 14, 2015 [Dkt. No. 335], the parties will file a further status update in 120 days.
[signatures on following pages]
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 341 Filed 11/08/16 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 9840

Respectfully submitted, this 8th day of November, 2016.

/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming (pro hac vice) Travis J. Mock (pro hac vice) Kara D. Ford (pro hac vice) Heather M. Niemeyer (pro hac vice) Mary Beth Martinez (pro hac vice) Matthew J. Bowness (pro hac vice)
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP 999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 Telephone: (404) 853-8000 Facsimile: (404) 853-8806 john.fleming@sutherland.com travis.mock@sutherland.com kara.ford@sutherland.com heather.niemeyer@sutherland.com marybeth.martinez@sutherland.com matthew.bowness@sutherland.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

/s/ Erin Casey Hangartner (w/exp. permission) Erin Casey Hangartner (La. Bar No. 24768) Alan Dean Weinberger (La. Bar No. 13331) Elham R. Rabbani (La. Bar No. 33322) Brian C. Roux (La. Bar No. 35298) Lance R. Rydberg (La. Bar No. 02089) Mitchell P. Hasenkampf (La. Ba No. 32870) Robert L. Keller III (La. Bar No. 35188) Lauren Masur Davis (La. Bar No. 34669)
HANGARTNER RYDBERG & TERRELL, LLC 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Telephone: (504) 522-5690 Facsimile: (504) 522-5689 ehangartner@hanrylaw.com aweinberger@hanrylaw.com erabbani@hanrylaw.com broux@hanrylaw.com lrydberg@hanrylaw.com mhasenkampf@hanrylaw.com rkeller@hanrylaw.com lmasur@hanrylaw.com

and

Patricia A. Bollman (La. Bar No. 17563) James L. Cornblatt (pro hac vice)

PATRICIA A. BOLLMAN, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 3636 S. I-10 Service Road W., Suite 200 Metairie, Louisiana 70001 Telephone: (504) 218-5887 Facsimile: (504) 304-0890 patricia@bollmanfirm.com cornblatt25@gmail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, G.P., and SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.

3

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 341 Filed 11/08/16 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 9841
/s/ Timothy W. Cerniglia (w/exp. permission) Timothy W. Cerniglia (Tex. Bar 00789930) TIMOTHY W. CERNIGLIA, PLC 1521 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Telephone: (504) 586-0555 Facsimile: (504) 586-0550 tcerniglia@cerniglialaw.pro ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS MALVERN C. BURNETT, THE LAW OFFICES OF MALVERN C. BURNETT, A.P.C., and THE GULF COAST IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, LLC /s/ Stephen H. Shapiro (w/exp. permission) Stephen H. Shapiro (#21076) ATTORNEY AT LAW A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 700 Camp Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Telephone: (504) 309-8442 Facsimile: (504) 934-2000 steve@shapirolaw-nola.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS SACHIN DEWAN and DEWAN CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.
4

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 341 Filed 11/08/16 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 9842
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 8, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing Fourth Status Report with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send e-mail notification of such filing to all ECF participants. I further certify that on November 8, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the below-named Defendants by depositing a copy of same in the U.S. Mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as follows:
Michael Pol Global Resources, Inc. c/o William P. Wessler, Esq. William P. Wessler, Attorney at Law 1624 24th Avenue Gulfport, MS 39501-2969 Mr. Billy Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562
/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming

 
 Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 49 EXHIBIT 1
Plan Support Agreement
OU7438168.4

-------------------------------------------------,
Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 2 of 49
AMENDED AND RESTATED PLAN SUPPORT AGREEMENT
This AMENDED AND RESTATED PLAN SUPPORT AGREEMENT (together with all exhibits and attachments hereto, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), dated as of August 25, 2015, is entered into, on their own behalf and not on behalf of any other party (except as noted with respect to Signal International Incorporated), by and among (a) Signal International, Inc. ("SI Inc."), on behalfofitselfand its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, the "Company"); (b) the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama (the "TRSA") and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (the "ERSA" and together with the TRSA, the "RSA''); (c) the Litigation Claimants (as defined below) signatories hereto (the "Supporting Litigation Claimants"), and (d) the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "Committee") appointed in the Chapter II Cases (defined below).
The Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the Committee and any subsequent person or entity that becomes a party hereto in accordance with the terms hereof are referred to herein as the "Parties" and individually as a "£ru:!y." The RSA, Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee are collectively referred to herein as the "Supporting Parties". For the avoidance of any doubt, each of the undersigned counsel for the Supporting Litigation Claimants has executed this Agreement solely on behalf of the Supporting Litigation Claimants and not in its own capacity. The undersigned counsel is not, and shall not be deemed to be, a Party and shall not have any obligation under this Agreement. Any obligations of the Supporting Litigation Claimants under this Agreement are those of the Supporting Litigation Claimants.
Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan Term Sheet (as defined below). Notwithstanding anything hereio to the contrary, this Agreement shall not be binding upon the Company until the PSA Order (as defined below) is entered. Votes on a plan shall not be solicited from any of the Supporting Parties until a Disclosure Statement (as defined below) is approved by the Bankruptcy Court (as defined below).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS
WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the RSA (in such capacity, the "Secured Lenders") owns or controls, in the aggregate, 100% of the amounts outstanding (the "First Lien Debt") under that certain Credit Agreement, dated as ofJanuary 31, 2014, (as amended and restated, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Credit Agreement") by and among SI Inc., as borrower, Signal International, LLC ("SI LLC"), Signal Ship Repair, LLC ("SSR"), Signal International Texas GP, LLC ("SI GP") and Signal International Texas, L.P. ("SI Texas"), as guarantors, the Secured Lenders party thereto, and the Administrative Agent (as defined below);
WHEREAS, the TRSA, as administrative agent under the Credit Agreement (in such capacity, the "Administrative Agent"), has agreed to (i) consent to the Company's post-petition use of its cash collateral and (ii) provide post-petition DIP financing in the approximate aggregate principal amount of $91 million (consisting of a roll-up of the entire First Lien Debt plus $20 million of new money) (the "DIP Facilitv");
WHEREAS, there are approximately 475 former employees and recruits (together with any and all similarly situated plaintiffs, the "H-2B Workers") of the Company hired and/or recruited
01:17611641.6

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 3 of 49
through the United States H-2B immigration program who, along with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have asserted or may assert certain legal and equitable claims against the Company which claims the Company denies;
WHEREAS, certain of the H-2B Workers and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (together with any H-2B Workers that assert subsequent claims, the "Litigation Claimants") have commenced litigation currently pending against the Company and, on May II, 2015, five of those Litigation Claimants obtained judgment against the Company in the amount of$12,258,600 (plus prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest, fees costs and expenses) in David v. Signal International LLC (Case No. 08-1220) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana;
WHEREAS, the Supporting Litigation Claimants have threatened on behalf of themselves certain legal and equitable actions against the Company, certain representatives of the Company, and the RSA (as Secured Lenders);
WHEREAS, prior to the Petition Date (defined below), the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants engaged in negotiations in an effort to settle all issues and claims among themselves (the "Settlement") and to implement a financial restructuring (the "Restructuring") of the Company, each consistent with the terms and conditions set forth in an original Plan Support Agreement dated July 12, 2015, and in the term sheet attached thereto as Exhibit A (the "Original Plan Support Agreement");
WHEREAS, on July 12,2015 (the "Petition Date"), following the execution of the Original Plan Support Agreement by the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the Company commenced voluntary cases (the "Chapter II Cases") under chapter II of title II ofthe United States Code, II U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (as amended, the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court");
WHEREAS, the Original Plan Support Agreement has been previously amended to revise certain deadlines set forth therein;
WHEREAS, subsequent to the Petition Date, the Company, the RSA, and the Supporting Litigation Claimants engaged in discussions with the Committee regarding certain informal objections (the "Informal Objections") that the Committee raised regarding the: (x) Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing Pas/petition Financing, (ii) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Claims, (iii) Authorizing Use ofCash Collateral, (iv) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition, (v) Modifying the Automatic Stay and (vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing [D.!. I I}; (y) Debtors' Motion for Entry ofan Order Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Plan Support Agreement [D.I. 112}, and (z) Debtors:Motionfor Entry of (i) an Order (a) Approving Sales and Bidding Procedures in Connection with Sale ofAssets ofthe Debtors, (b) Approving Bid Protections, (c) Approving Form and Manner ofNotice, (d) Scheduling the Auction and Sale Hearing, (e) Authorizing Procedures Governing Assumption and Assignment ofCertain ExecuJory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and (j) Granting Related Relief; and (ii) an Order (a) Approving Purchase Agreement, (b) Authorizing Sale Free and Clear ofAll Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests, and (c) Granting Related Relief[D.I. 120);
01:17611641:6
2

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 4 of 49
WHEREAS, in order to resolve the Informal Objections, the Supporting Parties agreed to, among other things, certain revisions to the Original Plan Support Agreement, as set forth in this Agreement and Plan Term Sheet attached hereto as Exhibit A;
WHEREAS, in order to implement the Settlement and Restructuring, the Company has agreed, on the terms and conditions set forth herein, to use reasonable best efforts to consummate the Settlement and Restructuring through the Plan (as defined below);
WHEREAS, the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants are prepared to commit, on the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, and to the extent legally permissible, to, if and when solicited in accordance with applicable bankruptcy law, vote to accept the Plan and support its confirmation;
WHEREAS, the Committee is prepared to commit, on the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, and to the extent legally permissible, to recommend that holders of Claims against the Debtors vote to accept the Plan, and support its confirmation;
WHEREAS, the Plan Term Sheet is t~e product of arm's-length, good-faith negotiations among the Parties and their respective professionals and sets forth the material terms and conditions of the Settlement and Restructuring, as supplemented by the terms and conditions of this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and the mutual covenants and agreements set forth herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:
1. Plan Term Sheet. The principal terms and conditions of the Settlement and Restructuring are set
forth in the Plan Term Sheet and shall be incorporated by the Company in the Plan.
2. Certain Definitions. As used in this Agreement, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Alternative Transaction" means any plan, proposal or offer of dissolution, winding up, liquidation, reorganization, merger, consolidation, business combination, joint venture, partnership, sale of assets or restructuring of the Company, other than as described herein and in the Plan Term Sheet.
(b) "Claims" means all claims as such term is defined in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, and individually referred to as a "Claim."
(c) "Confirmation Order" means an order of the Bankruptcy Court confirming the Plan pursuant to section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.
(d) "Disclosure Statement" means the disclosure statement for the Plan, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time subject to the terms of this Agreement, that is prepared and distributed in accordance with, among other things, sections 1125, 1126(b), and 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 3018 ofthe Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and other applicable law.
(e) "Disclosure Statement Order" means an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Disclosure Statement and the Solicitation, which order shall be materially consistent with this Agreement.
(f) "Effective Date" means the effective date of the confirmed Plan.
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(g) "First Lien Debt" means any and all Claims arising under the Credit Agreement and the other Loan Documents (as defined in the Credit Agreement).
(h) "H-2B Claims" means any and all legal or equitable Claims or causes of action of any nature or description whatsoever, whether known or unknown, and whether the same have previously been asserted, could previously have been asserted, or could in the future be asserted by or on behalf of any H2B Worker against the Company or RSA.
(i) "Plan" means the chapter ll plan for the Company, as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time subject to, and consistent in all material respects with, the terms of this Agreement and the Plan Term Sheet, that is prepared and distributed in accordance with, among other things, sections 1125, 1126(b), and 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and other applicable law.
Gl "Plan Documents" means the Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Disclosure Statement Order, the
related solicitation materials, the Confirmation Order, the PSA Assumption Motion, the PSA Order, and each other agreement, instrument, pleading, order or certificate or other related document utilized to implement the Plan, including any exhibits, amendments, modifications or supplements made from time to time thereto but in each case excluding the Plan Supplement Documents (as defined below).
(k) "Plan Supplement Documents" means the Plan Supplement (as defined in the Plan), and such other definitive documentation relating to the Company as is necessary to consummate the Restructuring and the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby.
(I) "Plan Support Effective Date" means the date upon which this Agreement becomes effective and binding on the Parties in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 hereof.
(m) "Plan Support Period" means the period commencing on the Plan Support Effective Date and ending on the earlier of (i) the Effective Date and (ii) the date on which this Agreement is terminated in accordance with Section 8 hereof.
(n) "PSA Assumption Motion" means the motion and proposed form of order to be filed by the Company with the Bankruptcy Court within five (5) business days after the Petition Date seeking the approval and assumption of this Agreement pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and granting related relief.
(o) "PSA Order" means an order ofthe Bankruptcy Court approving the PSA Assumption Motion.
(p) "Requisite H-2B Workers" means (i) a majority in number of the H-2B Workers voting on the Plan and (ii) two-thirds (2/3) of the aggregate amount of the H-2B Claims voting on the Plan.
(q) "Restructuring Documents" means the Plan Documents, the motions and orders, the Plan Supplement Documents, and each other agreement, instrument, pleading, order, instrument or certificate or other related document utilized to implement the Restructuring, or the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby, and to obtain confirmation of the Plan.
(r) "RSA's Advisors" means (i) Burr & Forman LLP, as legal counsel to the RSA, (ii) Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, as Delaware legal counsel to the RSA, and (iii) Houlihan Lokey Capital, as financial advisor to the RSA.
(s) "Solicitation" means the solicitation of votes in connection with the Plan pursuant to sections 1125 and 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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(t) "Termination Events" means the events oftermination listed in section 8 hereof, with each event individually referred to herein as a "Termination Event".
(u) "Westport Loan" has the meaning set forth in the Plan Term Sheet.
3. Condition Precedent. It is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this Agreement that there is no payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party), without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party, as of the Petition Date (which condition may be waived by the Supporting Litigation Claimants in their sole discretion). If this condition is not satisfied, this Agreement shall be void and of no effect.
4. Means for Effectuating the Settlement and Restructuring. The Company shall seek to effectuate the Settlement and Restructuring through the confirmation and consummation of the Plan in accordance with this Agreement and the Plan Term Sheet.
5. Preparation of Restructuring Documents. The Company shall, in consultation with the RSA's Advisors and the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, prepare all of the Restructuring Documents necessary for the Company to obtain confirmation and consummation ofthe Plan in a form reasonably acceptable to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee, provided any Plan shall provide the Company and RSA with a full release of all H-2B Claims, including any and all derivative claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
6. Agreements ofthe Company.
(a) Affirmative Covenants. The Company, jointly and severally, agrees that for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof (including, without limitation, the Fiduciary Out provided for in Section 25 of this Agreement) and except as otherwise consented to in writing by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee, the Company shall do, and shall cause to be done, the following:
(i) (A) complete the preparation, as soon as reasonably practicable after the Plan Support Effective Date, of each ofthe Plan, the Disclosure Statement and the other Restructuring Documents (including, without limitation, all motions, applications, orders, agreements and other documents, each of which, for the avoidance of doubt, shall contain terms and conditions materially consistent with this Agreement and acceptable to the Supporting Parties), (B) provide the Restructuring Documents or any documents relating to post-petition financing or cash collateral to, and afford reasonable opportunity of comment and review of such documents by, the RSA's Advisors, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and counsel to the Committee, no less than three (3) business days in advance of any filing, execution, distribution or use (as applicable) thereof and (C) consult with the RSA's Advisors, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee in good faith and with reasonable and ample notice regarding the form and substance of any of such documents in advance of the filing, execution, distribution or use (as applicable) thereof;
(ii) file the Plan and Disclosure Statement with the Bankruptcy Court by September 4, 2015;
(iii) prepare and file with the Bankruptcy Court statements of financial affairs and required schedules under chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code for the Company no later than August II, 2015;
(iv) (A) support, and take all reasonable actions necessary to facilitate, the implementation and consummation of the Settlement and Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the timely
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preparation, filing and approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation of the Restructuring) in accordance with this Agreement; (B) take all reasonable actions necessary to oppose in good faith any objection to the Settlement, the Restructuring, and/or the Restructuring Documents; and (C) not take any action that is inconsistent with, or that would be reasonably expected to prevent, interfere with, delay or impede the implementation or consummation of the Settlement and Restructuring;
(v) obtain final approval of the DIP financing by the Bankruptcy Court as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event later than September 10, 2015;
(vi) obtain entry of the PSA Order by the Bankruptcy Court as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event later than the earlier of (a) the date of entry of an order by the Bankruptcy Court granting final relief with respect to the DIP Facility; or (b) September I, 2015;
(vii) obtain entry of the Bid Procedures Order by the Bankruptcy Court no later than September I, 2015, which Bid Procedures Order must contain a requirement that, in order to participate in the Auction, each bidder must agree to abide by the terms of the Westport Participation Agreement (as defined in the Plan Term Sheet);
(viii) obtain entry of the Disclosure Statement Order no later than October 9, 20 15;
(ix) commence Solicitation no later than 5 business days after entry of the Disclosure Statement Order by the Bankruptcy Court;
(x) hold the Auction no later than October 23, 2015;
(xi) obtain entry of the Sale Approval Order and Confirmation Order by the Bankruptcy Court no later than November 24, 2015;
(xii) the effective date of the Plan and the closing on the sale shall have occurred no later than 20 days after the Bankruptcy Court's entry of the Confirmation Order;
(xiii) prior to the Confirmation Hearing, commence avoidance actions against Max Specialty Insurance Company to avoid any avoidable liens;
(xiv) timely file a formal written objection to and contest in good faith any motion filed with the Bankruptcy Court by any party seeking the entry of an order (A) directing the appointment of an examiner with expanded powers or a trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases;
(xv) timely file a formal written objection to and contest in good faith any motion filed with the Bankruptcy Court by any party seeking the entry of an order modifying or terminating the Company's exclusive right to file and/or solicit acceptances of a chapter II plan;
(xvi) (A) support and take any and all actions necessary, appropriate or reasonably requested by the Supporting Parties to facilitate the Settlement and Restructuring, including the solicitation, confirmation, and consummation of the Plan, (B) not take any action that is inconsistent with, or that would delay or impede the Restructuring, including, without limitation, Solicitation, confirmation, or consummation of the Plan and (C) perform its obligations under this Agreement in accordance with its terms and as set forth in the Plan;
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(xvii) operate the business of the Company in the ordinary course (giving effect to the existence of the Chapter 11 Cases);
(xviii) keep the Supporting Parties regularly informed about the operations of the Company and the status of the Westport Loan and provide the Supporting Parties any information that is reasonably requested regarding the Company or the Westport Loan (including all reports, compliance certificates, and any other documents or information required to be delivered pursuant to the terms of the Westport Documents);
(xix) promptly notify the Supporting Parties in writing of any governmental or third party complaints, litigations, investigations, or hearings (or communications indicating that the same may be contemplated or threatened) against the Company or of any related correspondence received;
(xx) comply in all material respects with applicable laws (including making or obtaining all required consents and/or appropriate filings or registrations with, notifications to, or authorizations, consents or approvals of any regulatory or governmental authority, and paying all taxes as they become due and payable);
(xxi) maintain the good standing (or equivalent status under the laws of its incorporation or organization) under the laws of the state or other jurisdiction of the Company and the Company's affiliates in which they are incorporated or organized; and
(xxii) use reasonable best efforts to obtain any and all required governmental, regulatory and/or third party approvals necessary or required for the implementation or consummation of the Restructuring or the approval by the Bankruptcy Court of the Restructuring Documents.
(b) Negative Covenants. The Company agrees that for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof (including, without limitation, the Fiduciary Out provided for in Section 25 of this Agreement) and except as otherwise consented to in writing by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee, the Company shall not, directly or indirectly, do or permit to occur any of the following:
(i) seek, solicit, propose, support, make an agreement to, or take steps or actions that are reasonably likely or intended to result in the submission of an Alternative Transaction, including without limitation, the dismissal or conversion of the Chapter II Cases;
(ii) modify the Plan, in whole or in part, in a manner that is inconsistent with any material aspect of this Agreement;
(iii) withdraw or revoke the Plan or publicly announce its intention not to pursue the Plan;
(iv) take any action or file any motion, pleading or other Restructuring Document with the Bankruptcy Court (including any modifications or amendments thereof) that is inconsistent with any material aspect of this Agreement, the Plan Term Sheet or any other Restructuring Document and is not otherwise reasonably satisfactory in all respects to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors, and the Committee;
(v) commence an avoidance action or other legal proceeding that challenges the validity, enforceability, or priority of the First Lien Debt and/or the H-2B Claims;
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(vi) other than as required by this Agreement or the Plan, amend their respective certificates or articles of incorporation, bylaws or comparable organizational documents;
(vii) (A) merge with or into, or consolidate or amalgamate with, any other person, (B) permit any other person to merge with or into, or consolidate or amalgamate with, it, or (C) purchase, lease or otherwise acquire (in one transaction or a series of transactions) all or any substantial part of the assets of any other person;
(viii) change materially their respective financial or tax accounting methods, except insofar as may be required by a change in generally accepted accounting principles in the U.S. or applicable law, or revalue any of its material assets;
(ix) (A) hire, after the date hereof, any officer, (B) enter into, adopt or amend any employment agreements or any management compensation or incentive plans, or increase in any manner the compensation or benefits (including severance) of any director, officer or management level employee of the Company;
(x) pay any post-petition trade payable or other post-petition expense prior to the date such trade payable or expense is due and payable, except to the extent in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice;
(xi) incur or suffer to exist any indebtedness or any guarantee of any indebtedness of any person, except (A) indebtedness and guarantees existing and outstanding immediately prior to the date hereof and (B) trade payables, and liabilities arising and incurred in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practices;
(xii) (A) purchase or acquire any indebtedness, debt securities or equity securities of any person, or (B) make any loans or advances to, or investments in, any person, other than in the ordinary cotiTSe of business;
(xiii) incur any liens or security interests, except any liens or security interests or otherwise arising by operation of law in the ordinary course of business; or
(xiv) pursue, consent to, or encourage any claim or cause of action against the Supporting Litigation Claimants, the RSA or their respective representatives.
(c) Automatic Stay. The RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants are authorized to take any actions necessary to effectuate the termination of this Agreement in accordance with its terms notwithstanding section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law and no cure period contained in this Agreement shall be extended pursuant to sections I05, I08 or 365 of the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law without the prior written consent of the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants through their advisors.
7. Agreements of the Supporting Parties.
(a) Support of Settlement and Restructuring. Each of the Supporting Parties agrees that, for the duration of the Plan Support Period, subject to the terms and conditions hereof, such Supporting Party shall:
(i) support, and take all reasonable actions necessary to facilitate the implementation and consummation of, the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Company's entry into a commitment or agreement with respect to debtor-in-possession financing or the use of cash collateral, the
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Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation of the Restructuring pursuant to the Plan so long as each of the foregoing is not inconsistent with this Agreement); provide~ however, that the Supporting Litigation Claimants shall not be required to take any affirmative action under this Agreement or any provision thereof other than to vote in favor of the Plan as described in clause 7(a)(ii) below or vote against an Alternative Transaction as described in clause 7(a)(iv) below;
(ii) (A) subject to the receipt by the Supporting Parties, as applicable, of the Disclosure Statement approved by the Disclosure Statement Order, timely vote, or cause to be voted, as applicable, Claims to accept the Plan by delivering duly executed and completed ballots accepting the Plan on a timely basis following commencement of the Solicitation, pursuant to the terms of the Disclosure Statement Order and not opt out of or object to the releases provided for in the Plan, and (B) not change or withdraw such votes (or cause or direct such votes to be changed or withdrawn).
(iii) with respect to the Committee, recommend that holders of Claims vote to accept the Plan on a timely basis following commencement of the Solicitation and otherwise support confirmation of the Plan;
(iv) not (A) directly or indirectly seek, propose, support, assist, solicit, or vote for any Alternative Transaction, (B) support or encourage the termination or modification of the Company's exclusive period for the filing of a chapter II plan or the Company's exclusive period to solicit a chapter II plan, or (C) take any other action, including but not limited to initiating any legal proceedings or enforcing rights as a holder of Claims, that is inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents, or that would prevent, interfere with, delay or impede the implementation or consummation of the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan and the consummation ofthe Restructuring pursuant to the Plan); and
(v) subject to the receipt of a disclosure statement and other solicitation materials approved by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, the RSA and the Supporting Litigation Claimants shall timely vote or cause to be voted their Claims against any Alternative Transaction;
provide~ however, that, except for legal fees incurred in furtherance of seeking approval and enforcement of this Agreement, nothing in this Section 7(a) shall require any Supporting Party to incur any expenses (other than de minimis), liabilities or other obligations, or agree to any commitments, undertakings, concessions, indemnities or other arrangements that could result in expenses (other than de minimis), liabilities or other obligations to any such Supporting Party; provided further, that under no circumstance shall the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee be obligated to support or be prohibited from objecting to any Plan, Restructuring Documents, settlement, or any other aspect of the Chapter II Cases which does not fully dispose of all H-2B Claims to the RSA's, Supporting Litigation Claimants', or Committee's reasonable satisfaction, as applicable; and, provided further, notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, nothing in this Agreement shall require any member of the Committee to take any action, or to refrain from taking any action, to the extent that taking such action or refraining from taking such action would be inconsistent with such Committee member's fiduciary obligations under applicable law.
(b) Rights of Supporting Parties Unaffected. Nothing contained herein shall limit (iXA) the ability of any of the Supporting Parties to consult with other Supporting Parties or the Company or advisors or (B) the rights of the Supporting Parties under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, foreclosure or similar proceeding, including, without limitation, appearing as a party in interest in any matter to be adjudicated
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in order to be heard concerning any matter arising in the Chapter II Cases, in each case, so long as such consultation or appearance is not inconsistent with the Supporting Parties' obligations hereunder or under the terms of the Plan and is not intended or reasonably likely to materially delay or prevent confirmation or the consummation of the Restructuring (including, but not limited to, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Restructuring Documents, the Solicitation and confirmation of the Plan); (ii) limit the ability of the Secured Lenders to enter into any transactions in connection with the First Lien Debt, subject to the terms hereof; or (iii) any right of the Secured Lenders under (x) the Credit Agreement and (y) any other applicable agreement, instrument or document that gives rise to a Claim of the Secured Lenders.
(c) Additional Claims. To the extent any Supporting Party, as applicable, (i) acquires additional Claims, or (ii) holds or acquires any other claims against or equity interests in the Company, such Supporting Party agrees that any such Claims, or other claims or equity interests shall be subject to this Agreement including the obligations with respect to Claims set forth in Section 7(a) hereof. For the avoidance of doubt, if any Supporting Party transfers or assigns any claims against or equity interests in the Company, this Agreement shall be binding on such transferee or assignee in all respects as if a Supporting Party to this Agreement.

8. Termination of Agreement.

(a) Supporting Parties' Termination Events. Upon written notice from a Supporting Party delivered in accordance with Section 22 hereof (with a copy of such written notice delivered to all Parties), at any time (X) after the receipt by a Supporting Party of a Fiduciary Out Notice or (Y) the occurrence of, and during the continuation of, any of the following events, in each case, unless waived in writing by the Supporting Party (each, a "Suooorting Party Termination Event"), the respective Supporting Party may terminate this Agreement with respect to all Parties, and no failure or delay by the Supporting Party in exercising its right to terminate this Agreement shall operate as a waiver thereof or limit in any way such termination right:

(i)

the breach in any material respect by the Company of any of its obligations, undertakings,

representations, warranties or covenants of the Company set forth in this Agreement, including under

Sections 6(a), 6(b) or II of this Agreement, and such breach remains uncured for a period of three (3)

business days from the receipt of written notice ofsuch breach from the Supporting Party;

(ii) at 5:00p.m. prevailing Eastern Time on the first business day after the failure of the Company to satisfy any of the milestones set forth in Subsections (ii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), or (x) of Section 6(a) hereof, provided that such failure is not the result of a material breach by any of the
Supporting Party of the terms of this Agreement; and provided fm:!!!IT, that the Company shall have three
(3) business days from receipt ofa written notice from a Supporting Party to cure the failure to satisfy such milestones in a manner that does not prevent or diminish in a material way compliance with the terms of this Agreement;

(iii) the issuance by any governmental authority, including any regulatory authority, or court ofcompetent jurisdiction, ofany ruling, judgment or order preventing the consummation ofa material portion of the Restructuring;

(iv) the Plan is amended or otherwise modified so as to be inconsistent with this Agreement or modified so as to have a material impact on a Supporting Party;

(v) the Bankruptcy Court grants relief that is materially inconsistent with this Agreement or the Plan (in each case, with such amendments and modifications as have been effected in accordance with the terms hereof);
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(vi) the Bankruptcy Court enters an order (A) directing the appointment of an examiner with expanded powers or a chapter II trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases, (D) terminating exclusivity under section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, (E) making a finding of fraud, dishonesty or misconduct by any executive, manager, officer or director of the Company, regarding or relating to the Company;
(vii) upon the withdrawal, waiver, amendment or modification by the Company ofthe Plan or any of the Restructuring Documents or the filing of a pleading seeking to withdraw, waive, amend or modifY any term or condition of the Plan or any of the Restructuring Documents, which withdrawal, waiver, amendment, modification or filing is materially inconsistent with this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents (in each case, as this Agreement, Plan and the Restructuring Documents may be amended from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof) or is materially adverse to the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, or, if the Company files any motion or pleading with the Bankruptcy Court that is not consistent with this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents (in each case, as this Agreement, the Plan or the Restructuring Documents may be amended from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof) in a material substantive respect, and such motion or pleading has not been withdrawn prior to the earlier of(A) three (3) business days after the Company receives written notice from the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee that such motion or pleading is inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents, as applicable and (B) the entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving such motion;
(viii) the Company seeks, solicits, proposes, supports, or makes an agreement to, or takes steps or actions that are reasonably likely or intended to result in the submission of an Alternative Transaction;
(ix) the failure to satisfY any material condition to effectiveness set forth in the Plan by the deadlines set forth in such Plan, except as such conditions may be waived by the Company and the Supporting Parties;
(x) a payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Company or any other party) (which occurrence or continuance, as the case may be, is a Supporting Party Termination Event solely with respect to the Supporting Litigation Claimants and may be waived by the Supporting Litigation Claimants in their sole discretion);
(xi) the denial of either interim or final authority for DIP financing from the RSA, denial of the PSA Order, the Bid Procedures Order, the Disclosure Statement Order, Sale Approval Order, or Confirmation Order; and
(xii) the occurrence of any Event of Default under, and as defined in, the DIP Facility.
Notwithstanding the above, upon written notice delivered in accordance with Section 22 to all of the Parties either (x) the RSA, (y) the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or (z) the Committee may terminate this Agreement as to themselves upon the occurrence of the events in Sections 8(a)(ii) or if any of the Plan Documents, motions and orders, the Plan Supplement Documents and the other Restructuring Documents is not materially consistent with the treatment of such Party as set forth in this Agreement, the Plan or the Disclosure Statement. Moreover, upon written notice delivered in accordance with Section 22 to all of the Parties, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, as applicable, may terminate this Agreement upon the filing by the Company of a motion to convert or dismiss the Chapter II Cases or the assertion of any claims against the RSA or the Supporting Litigation Claimants, as applicable. The termination by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee as
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contemplated in this paragraph, shall be a Supporting Party Termination Event and the Supporting Party shall have a right to terminate this Agreement with respect to all Parties.

(b) Company Termination Events. The Company may terminate this Agreement as to all Parties, upon written notice (the "Company Termination Notice") delivered in accordance with Section 22 hereof, upon the occurrence of any of the following events, unless waived in writing by the Company:

(i)

the breach in any material respect by the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or

the Committee ofany of the covenants, obligations, representations or warranties under this Agreement,

which breach remains uncured for a period ofthree (3) business days from the receipt ofthe Company

Termination Notice;

(ii) the failure of the Requisite H-2B Workers to affirmatively vote in favor of the Plan;
(iii) the issuance by any govermnental authority, including any regulatory authority or court ofcompetent jurisdiction, of any ruling, judgment or order enjoining the consummation ofa material portion of the Restructuring;

(iv) the entry by the Bankruptcy Court of an order (A) directing the appointment ofan examiner with expanded powers or a chapter II trustee, (B) converting the Chapter II Cases to cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, or (C) dismissing the Chapter II Cases;

(v) the failure to confirm the Plan due to the failure of the class of the H-2B Workers to meet the requirements set forth in section 1126(c) ofthe Bankruptcy Code or due to the Bankruptcy Court otherwise denying confirmation of the Plan; or

(vi) the entry of a final, non-appealable judgment or order declaring this Agreement or any material portion hereof to be unenforceable or preventing consummation of the Plan or the Restructuring or any material portion thereof by any governmental authority, including the Bankruptcy Court, or any other regulatory authority or court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) Mutual Termination. This Agreement, and the obligations ofall Parties hereunder, may be terminated by mutual written agreement among the Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the
Committee.

(d) Effect of Termination. Upon the termination of this Agreement in accordance with this Section 8, and except as provided in Section 16 herein, this Agreement shall forthwith become void and of no further force or effect and each Party shall, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement, be immediately released from its liabilities, obligations, commitments, undertakings and agreements under or related to this Agreement and shall have all the rights and remedies that it would have had and shall be entitled to take all actions, whether with respect to the Restructuring or otherwise, that it would have been entitled to take had it not entered into this Agreement, including all rights and remedies available to it under applicable law, the Credit Agreement and any ancillary documents or agreements thereto; provided, however, that in no event shall any such termination relieve a Party hereto from (i) liability for its breach or non-performance of its obligations hereunder prior to the date of such termination and (ii) obligations under this Agreement which by their terms expressly survive termination ofthis Agreement. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, any of the Termination Events may be waived in accordance with the procedures established by Section 12 hereof, in which case the Termination Event so waived shall be deemed not to have occurred, this Agreement shall be deemed to continue in full force and effect, and the rights and obligations of the Parties hereto shall be restored, subject to any modification set forth in such waiver. If this Agreement has been terminated in accordance with this
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Agreement at a time when pennission of the Bankruptcy Court shall be required for a Supporting Party to change or withdraw (or cause to change or withdraw) its vote, as applicable, to accept the Plan, the Company shall not oppose any attempt by such Supporting Party to change or withdraw (or cause to change or withdraw) such vote at such time.
9. Good Faith Cooperation; Further Assurances; Acknowledgement.
The Parties shall cooperate with each other in good faith and shall coordinate their activities (to the extent practicable and subject to the tenns hereof) in respect of(a) all matters concerning the implementation of the Settlement and Restructuring and (b) the pursuit and support of the Settlement and Restructuring (including confirmation of the Plan). Furthermore, subject to the tenns hereof, each of the Parties shall take such action as may be reasonably necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes and intent of this Agreement, including making and filing any required governmental or regulatory filings and voting any claims against or securities of the Company in favor of the Plan (provided that, except for legal fees incurred in furtherance of seeking approval and enforcement of this Agreement, none of the Supporting Parties shall be required to incur any expenses, liabilities or other obligations in connection therewith other than de minimis), and shall refrain from taking any action that would frustrate the purposes and intent of this Agreement. This Agreement is not, and shall not be deemed, a solicitation for consents of a chapter 11 plan or reorganization or a solicitation to tender or exchange any securities. The acceptance of the Plan by the Supporting Parties, as applicable, will not be solicited until the Supporting Parties have received the Disclosure Statement and related ballot(s), as approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
10. Restructuring Documents.
Each Party hereby covenants and agrees, subject to the proviso contained in section 7(a)(i) hereof, (i) to negotiate in good faith the Restructuring Documents each of which shall, to the extent applicable (A) contain the same tenns as, and be otherwise consistent with, this Agreement (as this Agreement may be amended from time to time in accordance with the tenns hereof) in all respects and (B) be in form and substance acceptable to the Parties to the extent required herein and section 6(a), and (ii) to execute (to the extent such Party is a party thereto) and otherwise support the Restructuring Documents, as applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, each Party agrees to (a) act in good faith and use commercially reasonable efforts to support and complete successfully the implementation of the Plan and the Restructuring in accordance with the tenns of this Agreement, (b) do all things reasonably necessary and appropriate in furtherance of consummating the Restructuring in accordance with, and within the time frames contemplated by, this Agreement, and (c) not take any actions inconsistent with this Agreement or the Restructuring Documents.
11. Representations and Warranties.
(a) Each Party, severally (and not jointly), represents and warrants to the other Parties that the following statements are true, correct and complete as of the date hereof:
(i) If the Party is an entity, such Party is validly existing and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation or organization, and has all requisite corporate, partnership, limited liability company or similar authority to enter into this Agreement and carry out the transactions contemplated under this Agreement and the Plan and perfonn its obligations contemplated under this Agreement and the Plim, and the execution and delivery of this Agreement and the perfonnance of such
OU7611641.6
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 15 of 49
Party's obligations under this Agreement and the Plan have been duly authorized by all necessary corporate, limited liability company, partnership or other similar action on its part;
(ii) If the Party is an entity, the execution, delivery and performance by such Party of this Agreement does not and will not (A) violate any provision of law, rule or regulation applicable to it or any of its subsidiaries or its charter or bylaws (or other similar governing documents) or those of any of its subsidiaries, or (B) with respect to the Company, conflict with, result in a breach ofor constitute (with due notice or lapse of time or both) a default under any contractual obligation to which it or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates is a party, or to which its or any of its subsidiaries' or affiliates' assets are bound, other than breaches that arise from the filing of the Chapter II Cases;
(iii) If the Party is an entity, the execution, delivery and performance by such Party of this Agreement and the consummation of the Restructuring does not and will not require any registration or filing with, consent, authorization or approval of, or notice to, or other action to, with or by, any federal, state or governmental authority or regulatory body except such filings as may be necessary or required under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, "blue sky" laws, the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court in connection with the Chapter I 1 Cases, the Plan and the Disclosure Statement; and
(iv) subject to the provisions of sections 1125 and 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, this Agreement is the legally valid and binding obligation of such Party, enforceable in accordance with its terms, except as enforcement may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or other similar laws relating to or limiting creditors' rights generally or by equitable principles relating to enforceability or a ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.
(b) Each Party has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters of this type, or has been adequately advised by competent counsel, and is capable ofevaluating the merits and risks of entering into this Agreement and of making an informed decision, and has conducted, or has had its counsel conduct, an independent review and analysis of the business and affairs of the Company that it considers sufficient and reasonable for purposes of entering into-this Agreement.
12. Amendments and Waivers.
Any provision of this Agreement, including the exhibits attached hereto, may be amended or waived if, and only if, such amendment or waiver is in writing and is signed, in the case of an amendment, by the Company, the RSA, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, or the Committee, or in the case of_a waiver, by the Party against whom the waiver is to be effective. Any amendment to this Agreement made in accordance with this section 12 shall become effective and binding upon all Parties whether or not such Party consented to such amendment; provided, however that no amendment shall be effective against any Secured Lender, any Supporting Litigation Claimant, or the Committee if such amendment materially adversely impacts such Party with respect to Restructuring as compared to that contemplated by this Agreement unless consented to in writing by such adversely affected Party.
No failure or delay by any party in exercising any right or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise thereof preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege. A Supporting Parties' Termination Event may not be waived except in a writing signed by the Supporting Party adversely affected. Any waiver of any condition, term or provision to this Agreement must be in writing signed by the Parties entitled to
waive such condition, tenn or provision.
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 16 of 49
13. Effectiveness.
Subject to section 3 herein, this Agreement shall become effective and binding upon the Parties when counterpart signature pages to this Agreement have been executed and delivered by the Company, the Administrative Agent, TRSA, ERSA, a majority in number and two-thirds in amount of the Litigation Claimants (individually or by counsel), and the Committee. With respect to any party that becomes a Party to this Agreement by executing and delivering a signature page to this Agreement after the Plan Support Effective Date, this Agreement shall become effective vis-a-vis such party on the date such signature page is delivered to the Company.
14. GOVERNING LAW; JURISDICTION; WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL.
THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY CONFLICTS OF LAW PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ANY OTHER JURISDICTION. BY ITS EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH OF THE PARTIES HEREBY IRREVOCABLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY AGREES THAT ANY LEGAL ACTION, SUIT, DISPUTE OR PROCEEDING ARISING UNDER, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE BROUGHT IN THE FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION LOCATED IN THE STATE AND COUNTY OF DELAWARE OR IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURT (FOR SO LONG AS THE COMPANY IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT) AND EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO IRREVOCABLY ACCEPTS AND SUBMITS ITSELF TO THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF SUCH COURTS, GENERALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY, AND WAIVES ANY OBJECTIONS AS TO VENUE OR INCONVENIENT FORUM. EACH PARTY HERETO IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING CONSENT TO JURISDICTION, SO LONG AS THE BANKRUPTCY COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHAPTER II CASES, EACH OF THE PARTIES AGREES THAT THE BANKRUPTCY COURT SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER UNDER OR ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT, AND HEREBY SUBMITS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.
Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute a waiver by any Party of any (i) right to have final orders in any and all non-core matters entered only after de novo review by a United States District Judge; (ii) right to trial by jury in any proceeding as to any and all matters so triable therein, or in any case, controversy or proceeding related hereto, whether or not such jury trial right is pursuant to statute or the United States Constitution; (iii) right to have the reference withdrawn by the United States District Court in any matter or proceeding subject to mandatory or discretionary withdrawal; or (iv) other rights, claims, actions, defenses, setoffs, recoupments or other matters to which any Litigation Claimant is entitled under any agreements or at law or in equity or under the United States Constitution. All of the above rights are expressly reserved and preserved without exception and with no purpose of conceding jurisdiction in any way by this filing or by any other participation in this matter.
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15. Soecific Performance/Remedies.
It is understood and agreed by the Parties that money damages would not be a sufficient remedy for any breach of this Agreement by any Party and each non-breaching Party shall be entitled to specific performance and injunctive relief as a remedy of any such breach, in addition to any other remedy to which such non-breaching Party may be entitled, at law or in equity, without the necessity of proving the inadequacy of money damages as a remedy, including an order of the Bankruptcy Court requiring any Party to comply promptly with any of its obligations hereunder, and no remedy other than specific performance shall be available to the non-breaching Party. Each Party agrees to waive any requirement for the securing or posting of a bond in connection with such remedy.
16. Survival.
Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement pursuant to section 8 hereof, the agreements and obligations of the Parties in this section 16 and sections 8(d), II, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 and 26 hereof (and any defined terms used in any such section) shall survive such termination and shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with the terms hereof.
17. Headings.
The headings of the sections, paragraphs and subsections of this Agreement are inserted for convenience only and shall not affect the interpretation hereof or, for any purpose, be deemed a part of this Agreement.
18. Successors and Assigns; Severability; Several Obligations.
(a) This Agreement is intended to bind and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, executors, administrators and representatives. If any provision of this Agreement, or the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, such invalidity or unenforceability shall attach only to such provision or part thereof and the remaining part of such provision hereof and this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect so long as the economic or legal substance of the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated hereby are not affected in any marmer materially adverse to any Party. Upon any such determination of invalidity, the Parties shall negotiate in good faith to modifY this Agreement so as to effect the original intent of the Parties as closely as possible in a reasonably acceptable marmer in order that the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated hereby is consummated as originally contemplated to the greatest extent possible.
(b) The agreements, representations and obligations of each of the Supporting Parties under this Agreement are, in all respects, several and not joint and several.
19. No Third-Partv Beneficiaries.
Unless expressly stated herein, this Agreement shall be solely for the benefit ofthe Parties and no other person or entity shall be a third-party beneficiary hereof or have any rights hereunder.
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 18 of 49

20. Prior Negotiations; Entire Agreement.

This Agreement, including the exhibits and schedules hereto (including the Plan Term Sheet) constitutes the entire agreement of the Parties, and supersedes all other prior negotiations (oral or written), with respect to the subject matter hereof, provided, however, that the Parties acknowledge that any confidentiality agreements (if any) heretofore executed between the Company and any Supporting Party shall continue in full force and effect.
21. Counterparts.

This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which together shall be deemed to be one and the same agreement. Execution copies of this Agreement may be delivered by facsimile, electronic mail or otherwise, which shall be deemed to be an original for the purposes of this section 21.
22. Notices.

All notices hereunder shall be deemed given if in writing, in the English language, and delivered by electronic mail to the following addresses (or at such other electronic mail addresses as shall be specified by like notice):
Signal International, Inc. and its subsidiaries RSA Battle House Tower II North Water Street Suite 16250 Mobile, Alabama 36602 Telephone: (251) 544-2623 Facsimile: (251) 544-2643 Attention: Cbris Cunningham, CFO Email: ccunningham@signalint.com
with a copy to:

OU7611641.6

Hogan Lovells US, LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 918-3000 Facsimile: (212) 918-3100 Attention: Christopher R. Donoho III Email: cbristopher.donoho@hoganlovells.com
And a copy to:
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP Rodney Square 1000 North King Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253 Attention: M. Blake Cleary
17

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 19 of 49
Email: mbcleary@ycst.com
The Committee
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones 919 North Market Street, 17th Floor Wilmington, DE 1980 I Attention: Bradford J. Sandler Email: bsandler@ps~law.com
Fredrikson & Byron P.A., plaintiffs' counsel in Marimuthu v. Signal Int'l, LLC Sten-Erik Hoidal: shoidal@fredlaw.com Steven R. Kinsella: skinsella@ftedlaw.com Lousene M. Hoppe: lhoppe@fredlaw.com
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Samuel v. Signal Int'l, LLC Shane G. Ramsey: sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Joseph v. Signal Int'l, LLC John H. Fleming: john.fleming@sutherland.com Bryan M. Ward: bryan.ward@sutherland.com
DLA Piper LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Meganathan v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Timothy H. Birnbaum: timothy.birnbaum@dlapiper.com
Equal Justice Center, plaintiffs' counsel in Kambala v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Christopher J. Willett: cwillett@equaljusticecenter.org
SPLC I Crowell & Moring LLP I Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., plaintiffs' counsel in David v. Signal lnt'l, LLC Alan Howard: ahoward@crowell.com Leslie A. Davis: ldavis@crowell.com Meredith Stewart: meredith.stewart@splcenter.org Daniel Werner: daniel.werner@splcenter.org Hugh D. Sandler: hsandler@nussbaumpc.com
Latham & Watkins LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Achari v. Signal Int'l, LLC Daniel D. Adams: daniel.adams@lw.com Mark A. Broude: mark.broude@lw.com David F. McEihoe: david.mcelhoe@lw.com Rabel Kohn: rachel.kohn@lw.com
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Cbakkiyattil v. Signal Int'l, LLC Eben P. Colby: eben.colby@skadden.com David M. Turetsky: david.turetsky@skadden.com Anthony W. Clark: anthony.clark@skadden.com Jason M. Liberi: jason.liberi@skadden.com
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 20 of 49
McDermott Will & Emery LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Krishnakutty v. Signal Int'l, LLC Nathan F. Coco: ncoco@mwe.com
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Devassy v. Signal Int'l, LLC Christopher Rheinheimer: crheinheimer@manatt.com Stephen T. Raptis: sraptis@manatt.com
Covington & Burling LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Singh v. Signal Int'l, LLC Jose E. Arvelo: jarvelo@cov.com
Kaye Scholer LLP, plaintiffs' counsel in Thomas v. Signal lot'!, LLC Michael Bullerman: michael.bullerman@kayescholer.com Tricia M. Beckles: tricia.beckles@kayescholer.com
The Retirement Systems of Alabama 20 I South Union Street Montgomery, AL 36130 Attn: M. Hunter Harrell: Hunter.Harrell@rsa-al.gov Attn: Leura Canary: Leura.Canary@rsa-al.gov Telephone: (334) 517-7109 Facsimile: (334) 517-7099
with a copy to:
Burr & Forman LLP Derek F. Meek, Esq. 420 North 20th Street, Suite 3400 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 458-5471 Facsimile: (205) 244-5679 Email: dmeek@burr.com
Any notice shall be effective upon confirmation of the electronic mail transmission.
23. Reservation of Rights; No Admission; Common Interest Privilege; Tolling ofClaims.
Except as expressly provided in this Agreement and in any amendment among the Parties, nothing herein is intended to, or does, in any manner waive, limit, impair or restrict the ability of each of the Parties to protect and preserve its rights, remedies and interests, including without limitation, its claims against any of the other Parties (or their respective affiliates or subsidiaries) or its full participation in the Chapter II Cases. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement and in any amendment among the Parties, if the transactions contemplated by the Settlement and Restructuring are not consununated, or if this Agreement is terminated for any reason, the Parties fully reserve any and all of their rights, remedies, and Claims. This Agreement and the Plan are part of a proposed settlement of matters that could otherwise be the subject of litigation claims among the Parties. Pursuant to Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, any applicable state rules of evidence and any other applicable law, foreign or domestic, this Agreement, the Restructuring Documents and all negotiations relating thereto shall not be admissible into evidence in any proceeding other than a proceeding to enforce the terms of this
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 21 of 49
Agreement or the applicable Restructuring Documents. This Agreement and the Restructuring Documents shall in no event be construed as or be deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession on the part of any Party of any claim or fault or liability or damages whatsoever. Each of the Parties denies any and all wrongdoing or liability of any kind and does not concede any infirmity in the claims or defenses which it has asserted or could assert. The parties hereto intend to establish and have established a common interest privilege with respect to the subject matter of and communications regarding or relating to this Agreement and the documents and transactions contemplated by this Agreement. Each of the Parties agrees that the running of the statutes oflimitations or doctrines oflaches applicable to all claims that any Party may be entitled to take or bring in order to enforce its rights and remedies, if any, against any other Party at law or equity is, to the fullest extent permitted by law, tolled and suspended during the Plan Support Period.
24. Prevailing Partv.
If any Party brings an action or proceeding against any other Party based upon a breach by such Party of its obligations hereunder, the prevailing Party shall be entitled to the reimbursement of all reasonable fees and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorneys', accountants' and financial advisors fees in connection with such action or proceeding, from the non-prevailing Party.
25. Fiduciarv Duties.
(a) The Company shall notifY the Supporting Parties in writing as promptly as practicable after receipt by the Company or its representatives or agents of any proposal or offer from any person or entity to effect a restructuring of the Company, any Alternative Transaction or a transaction in conflict with the Restructuring or any request for confidential information relating to the Company, which notice shall indicate the identity of the person or entity making the proposal, offer, or request and the material terms of any such proposal, offer, or request to the extent permitted by applicable law.
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, nothing in this Agreement shall require the Company, or any of its respective directors or officers (in such Person's capacity as a director or officer) to take any action, or to refrain from taking any action, to the extent that taking such action or refraining from taking such action would be inconsistent with such Person's fiduciary obligations under applicable law (the rights of the Company and its respective directors and officers under this section 25(b), the "Fiduciary Out"); provided that the Company shall promptly notifY the Secured Lenders, the Supporting Litigation Claimants, and the Committee if any such action is taken, or refrained from being taken, that would otherwise be in violation of this Agreement (a "Fiduciary Out Notice").
(c) None of the Supporting Parties shall have any fiduciary duty or other duties or responsibilities in any kind or form to each other, the Company, or any of the Company's creditors or other stakeholders as a result of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby. Each ofthe Supporting Parties has negotiated this Agreement on its own behalf and not on behalf of any other party. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, there are no commitments among or between the Supporting Parties. Further, the Parties agree that, except as set forth in the Plan, and/or any Plan Supplement Documents, or the Disclosure Statement, this Agreement does not constitute a commitment to, nor shall it obligate any of the Parties to, provide any new financing or credit support.
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 22 of 49
26. Representation by Counsel.
Each Party acknowledges that it has been represented by, or provided a reasonable period of time to obtain access to and advice by, counsel with this Agreement and the Settlement and Restructuring contemplated herein. Accordingly, any rule of law or any legal decision that would provide any Party with a defense to the enforcement of the terms of this Agreement against such Party based upon lack of legal counsel shall have no application and is expressly waived.
27. Independent Analysis.
Each of the Parties hereby confirms that it has made its own decision to execute this Agreement based upon its own independent assessment of documents and information available to it, as it has deemed appropriate.
28. Publicity.
Each Party shall not (a) use the name of any other Party in any press release or other publication (which excludes court pleadings, case name and litigation references, and communications with interested parties in connection with the Chapter II Cases) without such other Party's prior written consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, or (b) disclose to any person the principal amount or percentage of its Claims held by any other Party; provided, however, that nothing herein shall limit the right of any Party to discuss litigation relating to the H-2B Claims in any publication or to use the Company names in connection with such discussion; provided, further, that no such discussion or publication shall include use of the names or acronyms "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama", "TRSA", "Employee's Retirement System of Alabama", "ERSA", "Retirement Systems of Alabama" or "RSA", or identify by name any officer, director or employee thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Supporting Parties consent to the disclosure by the Supporting Parties in the Restructuring Documents, motions and orders, as applicable, or as otherwise required by law or regulation, of the execution, terms and contents ofthis Agreement. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to waive, amend or modify the terms of any confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement between the Company and any Supporting Party.
29. Rule oflnterpretation.
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, it is the intent of the Parties that all references to votes or voting in this Agreement be interpreted to include votes or voting on a chapter II plan under the Bankruptcy Code. Time is of the essence in the performance of the obligations of each of the Parties. The words "hereof," "herein" and "hereunder" and words of like import used in this Agreement shall refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular provision of this Agreement. References to any Articles, Sections, exhibits, annexes, and schedules are to such Articles, Sections, exhibits, annexes, and schedules of this Agreement unless otherwise specified. All exhibits and schedules annexed hereto or referred to herein (including any exhibits, schedules or attachments thereto) are hereby incorporated in and made a part ofthis Agreement as if set forth in full herein. Any singular term in this Agreement shall be deemed to include the plural, and any plural term the singular. Whenever the words "include," "includes" or "including" are used in this Agreement, they shall be deemed to be followed by the words "without limitation," whether or not they are in fact followed by those words or words of like import. "Writing," "written" and comparable terms refer to printing, typing and other means of reproducing words (including electronic media) in a visible form. Any reference to "business day" means
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 23 of 49
any day, other than a Saturday, a Sunday or any other day on which banks located in New York, New York are closed for business as a result of federal, state or local holiday and any other reference to day means a calendar day.
[THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE Is INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK[
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Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 24 of 49
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed and delivered by their respective duly authorized officers or agents, solely in their respective capacity as officers or agents ofthe undersigned and not in any other capacity, as of the date first set forth above.
Signal International, Inc., on behalfofitself and each ofits direct and indirect subsidiaries

01:1761l64L5

[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 25 of 49
TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALABAMA, as Secured Lender and Administrative Agent By:
M. Hunter Harrell Director of Private Placements EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALABAMA, as Secured Lender By:
[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement] ~

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 26 of 49
Harvinder Singh Antony Antony Valiyaparaml>il Srinivasa Rao Kambala Biju Kunjupanickan Mabendran Periyasamy Annadurai Ruthirapathi Nesamony Wilson Robi Pradeep Kumar Srinivasa Rao Gonna Amandeep Singh Kang Saravanan Arunachalam Chandra Sekhar Dwadasi Rama Harbans Singh Ponniab Muthu Kumar Malkiab Paul Abdulla Keepurath Maideen Francis Sequira Unnikrishna Pilla Balakrishna Pillai Ramana Palika Ragukumar Chinnian as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:1~ Name: Kayvon Sabourian Title: Attorney Firm: Equal Justice Center

~-- ~--------------------------------------------------
Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 27 of 49

Varghese Kurisinkal Devassy,

George Chacko Edavazhic,l(al,

Prasad Kunju Kunju,

Ampattu Varughese Mathew,

Antony Sajan Oottuparambil-Michael,

Sivan Raghavan,

Vijayan Nair Sankara-Pillai,

Ani! Scaria,

Mandeep Singh,

John Malakaran Thomas,

Saju Christy Vallarian,

""""'"' """"::?1 IsaacWilson Vazhikudilil,
Benny Yohannan,
~atto"Q

by U..ir

By:

~ ..

'

Name: Stephen Raptis

Title: Attorney

Finn: Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 28 of 49
Pravin Kumar Singh, and Radhakrishnan Nair Mangalathu Malayil Vasukuttan, as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their allom~ey
By: N:-I0:-0'S"d''.AriTiV~~C7i'O-''-;--!'=----­
Title: Attorney for Pravin Kumar Singh and Radhakrishnan Nair Mangalalhu Malayil Vasukuttan Firm: Covington & Burling LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 29 of 49

George Kutty Puthiya Parampil Thomas,

Ravi Thammina, Zakir Husain Ghulam

Husain, Joshy Kaiprampattu Joseph,

Reghunadhan Palachuvattilputhenpura

Narayanannair, Sivakumar Ramakrishnan

Nair, Antoney Tharayil Xavier, Yacob

Thachil Varghese, Davis Antony, Gogy

Joseph, Mathew Jackson, Philip

Pindakadavil George, Sunny Cherian,

Krishnan Thankappan Assari, Venkatarao

Buridi, Sarma Venkata Satyanarayana Bhiri,

Maheshwara Rao Molletti, Bhaskararao

Nimmadala, Ganapathi Rao Akkireddi,

Satyanarayana Vangapandu, Srinu Kalla,

Baiju Paul, Rajan Pazhambalakode, Babu

Karippai Ouseph, Subranarayana Karuppiah,

David Raju Tuloori, Saji Chettiyara Baby,

Joseph Thomas Kanjiraparambil, Shanoj

Joseph, Kantibhai Khemabhai Prajapati

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by t

attorney~·

.

.:::::;?

By: ' ~ /?« C4

Benjamin Partner Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019-9710 Tel: (212) 836-8000 Fax (212) 836-8689

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 30 of 49

RAJU MEGANATIIAN, SARAVANAN RAMASAMY, SARAVANACHELVAN NARAYANASAMY, MARUTHAMUTHU MAYAVU, as Supporting Litigation Claim(lnts by their attorney

Fl: By: 1-;'....;.i1·

H ' jJ; "' h:(,o,l=f.

Timothy H. Bi baum

DLA Piper LLP (US)

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 31 of 49
Pradeep Chembil Raman, John Abraham Kalampukatt, Gopalakrishnan Unniampathu Vettical Nair, Davis Mathai Meledan, Thomas Baby Madakkameprathu, Francis Kottackal Ouseph, Sudheeran Panayamthatta, Telson Joseph Pazhampilly, Ajith Chellayyan Swarnamma, Thomas Varghese Vattakkattu, Purayil Arjunan Padinhare, Shawkat Ali Shaikh, Anthony Marian, Jaison Antony Thekkumpuram, Shaju Olangattu Mathew, Roy Punakkattu George, Arunkumar Shaw Narayan Shaw, George Paily Paulose Chakkiyattil, Sukumar Moses Dokka, Jeegan Joseph Cheruthalakal Michael, Shajan Varghese, Prakash Kuttiyil Chandrasekharan Nair, Chandrasekhara Pillai Rajesh Chemmanappilly, Jacob Mathew, Shibu Thankachan, Sreekumar Janardhanan Pillai, Subash Chandra Shukla, Radhakrishnan Kakkathiruthi, as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:~~,:;;~~~~~,;;:::::::::__ _
Name: Eben P. Colby Title: Partner Firm: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, &
FlomLLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 32 of 49
Joy Joseph Attayil Sreedharan Babu Vasavan Babu Philip Baby Kiran Mohan Bald Bijay Kumar Biswas George Arackal Devassy Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy John Charuvila George Omanakuttan Govindan [Kakkanthara] Iju James Gijo John Biju Mukrukkattu Joseph Francis Joseph Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph Varghese Kainikkeril [Yohannan] Suresh Kakkoth Sojan Paul Kaliyadan Eswara R. K.anithi Krishnan Kannayan Suresh Kumar Pillai Kavalamkuzhi Vavachan Mathai Koottalil Varghese Kunjachan Pankajakshan Madhavan Babu Lal Mali George Kutty Vadakkekoottu Mathew Ramachandran Murugaiyan Shogy Vezhaparambil Ousephkutty Sebastian George Pananjikal Haridas SankaraPanicker Varghese Pappachan Joseph Bohan Peruvelil Prabhakaran Balakrishna Pillai Kannankutty Ponnan Biju Potrayil Viswamithran Raghavan Subburaj Rengasamy Melvin Joseph Rodrigues RaviRowthu Jagannadha Rao Saragadam Lakhbir Singh Smje Pmsad Tamang Abraham Varghese Joy Kallachiyil Varkey Kunhikrishn Kaniyamkulam Veetil Krishnan Venugopal

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 33 of 49 as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
r Cl Asbill & Brennan LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas The Grace Building, Floor 40 New York, NY 10036 Tel: 212-389-5016 Email: kara.ford@sutherland.com Attorneyfor Plaintifft
•

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 34 of 49

Sabu Puthukkuttumel Veede Krishnakutty and Thampy Putham Parambil Edicula, respectively

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their

J'M attorn(v, .._

A

By:~--<1~W~_V _ V_'_ _ _ __

Name: Nathan F. Coco

Title: Partner

Finn: McDennott Will & Emery LLP

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 35 of 49

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP II 00 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4528 Telephone: (404) 815-6500 Facsimile: (404)-815-6555 bdorris@kilpatricktownsend.com

Aby Karickathara Raju, Atha Mohammad Abdul, Belthazar Peter, Biju Perumpilly George, Chandran Shaju Thanissery, Galla Venkata Rama Krishna, Johny Mandy Mathai, Kesavarao Bundankayala, Krishna Gonthina, Lohithakshan Madampet, Nayappulli Jayachandran, Mohanan Balakrishna Pillai, Raju Divakaran, Reji Samuel, Samuel Jose Kumrumthodathil, Santhosh Kumar Rajendran Pillai, Sumesh Porambathuparambil Subramanian
as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
William E. Dorris Georgia Bar No. 225987
Attorneyfor Plaintiffs

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 36 of 49
KURIAN DAVID, SONY VASUDEVAN SULEKHA, PALANYANDI THANGAMANI, MURUGANANTHAM KANDHASAMY, HEMANT KHUTTAN, PADAVEETTIYIL ISSAC ANDREWS, KECHURU DHANANJAYA, SABULAL VIJAYAN, KRISHAN KUMAR, JACOB JOSEPH KADDAKKARAPPALL Y, KULDEEP SINGH, and THANASEKAR CHELLAPPAN
as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their attorney
By:!=~~~~~::~=~::::= Daniel Werner Senior Supervising Attorney Southern Poverty Law Center 1989 College Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30317

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 37 of 49
Balamurugan Marimuthu, Moorthy Nadhamuni, Muralidharan Arumugam, Muruganandam Arumugam, Rajendran Sappani, Rajendran Subramani, Sammanasunathan Siluvaimuthu, Satheesh Kannan Marimuthu, and Satyanarayana Ellapu as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their al/orney
By: ~:;oiill Name: Title: Attorney Firm: Fredrikson & Byron P.A.

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 38 of 49

Varghese Varkey Abraham,

Lakshmanan Ponnayan Achari,

Subhashithan Bahuleyan,

Kodakeril Baby Biji,

Xavier Disoliyan,

Rajankunju Geevarghese,

Jomon George,

Shaiju Vadakkal George,

Pnaveen Kulathum Muriyi Gopalakrishnan,

Mouleswararao Guntamukkala,

Eldose !sac,

Raveendranathan Mookaparambil !tty,

Joy Jacob,

Biju John,

Shibu Joseph,

Thansilas Joseph,

Kulath Somanathan Kalayam,

Sunilkumar Marottikkal Kuttan,

Bhaskaran Sreedharan Kutty,

Parshottam Ramchandra Mangani,

Prakash Moses Kanagiah Manonmoni,

Adharsan Manuel,

Jacob Mazhukkattu Mathew,

Johny Mathew,

Nandhakumar Naglll'l!i,

Shaji Veluthalakuzhiyil Nanoo,

Mangalan Chandrasekharan Pillai,

Radhakrishna Pillai Sivarama Pillai,

Aby Molathu Poulose,

Justin Poulose,

Appunni Arul Prakash,

Nibu Raju,

Sreenivasarao RaPutby,

Balwinder Singh,

Ranjit Singh,

Savinder Singh,

Shanmugam Subramanian,

Ninan John Tharakan,

Kittayi Sunil Kumar Therattil,

Moni Panikulangara Thomas.

Thenooran Kumaran Unnikrishnan,

Benny Chittilappilly Vareed,

George PulikkCJI!U'IIIllbil Varghese,

Estate ofKuliyanlckal Paily Varghese,

Benny Kattukariyil Varkey,

Shahi Vijayan, and

John Yohannan

as Supporting Litigation Claimants by their

~s attorney

•

Title: Associate
Firm: Latham & Watkins LLP [Signature Page to Amended Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 39 of 49
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Signal International, Inc. et al. By its coWJsel
By: lsi Bradford J. Sandler Bradford J. Sandler Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones

01:17611641.6

[Signature Page to Plan Support Agreement]

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 40 of 49
EXHffiiTA PLAN TERM SHEET
OLI7611641.5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 41 of 49

THIS TERM SHEET DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SOLICITATION OF VOTES FOR A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION FOR PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 1125 AND 1126 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE OR AN OFFER OR SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER WITH RESPECT TO ANY SECURITIES. SUCH OFFERS OR SOLICITATIONS MAY ONLY BE MADE IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND/OR SECURITIES LAWS AND AFfER PUBLICATION AND DELIVERY OF THE PLAN AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PLAN.

SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CIIAPTER ll PLAN TERM SHEET

This non-binding term sheet (the "Term Sheet") describes the material terms of a proposed chapter 11 plan of

reorganization (the "Plan·~ for Signa/International, Inc. ("Sf Inc. ·~ and its subsidiaries. This Term Sheet does not

constitute a contractual commitment ofany party but merely represents the proposed terms for a restructuring ofthe

Debtors' (as defined below) capital structure and obligations and is subject in all respects to the negotiation,

execution and delivery ofdefinitive documentation, including entry into an acceptable plan support agreement (the

"PSA "PSA

·~ between the Debtors Creditor Parties·~. This

and certain of their Term Sheet does not

creditors include a

or potential creditors party hereto description ofall the relevant terms

(collectively, the and conditions of

the restructuring contemplated herein.

This Term Sheet shall not constitute a commitment to exchange any debt, /end funds to any ofthe Debtors (defined below}, vote in a certain way or otherwise negotiate or engage in the transactions contemplated herein.

This Term Sheet is strictly confidential and may not be shared with anyone other than its intended recipients. It is proffered in the nature of a settlement proposal in fortherance of settlement discussions and is intended to be entitled to the protections ofRule 408 ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence and all other applicable statutes or doctrines protecting the use or disclosure ofconfidential information and iriformation exchanged in the context ofsettlement discussions.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Transaction Ovenriew Proposed Debtors:

Signal International, Inc., Signal Ship Repair, LLC, Signal International, LLC, Signal International Texas GP, LLC, and Signal International Texas, L.P. (collectively, the "Debtors"), in chapter II
cases to be filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court").

Chapter 11 Plan:
Debt and Claims to be Restructured:

The Debtors will propose the Plan that implements all of the tenns set forth in this Tenn Sheet.
(a) $75 million in principal plus all other amounts outstanding evidenced by (i) a $50,250,000 Tenn Loan Note held by the Teacher's Retirement System of Alabama (the "TRSA" and such note, the "TRSA Note") and (ii) a $24,750,000 Tenn Loan Note held by the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (the "ERSA" and such note, the "ERSA Note", and together with the TRSA Note, the "Senior Notes"), both subject to the terms and conditions of that certain Credit Agreement dated as of January 31, 2014 (as may be amended, modified, supplement and extended from time to time, the "Credit Agreement") between SI Inc., as Borrower, and TRSA, as

01:17602622.5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 42 of 49

Post-Petition Financing Sale oftbe Assets; Closing
01:17602622.5

Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent (such debt, the "First Lien Debt"),
(b) Claims pursuant to a pre-petition judgment against the Debtors in the approximate estimated amount of$15 million entered in favor of 5 former workers of the Debtors (the "Judgment Claims").
(c) Claims pursuant to a pre-petition judgment against the Debtors in the approximate estimated amount of $4 million entered in favor of Max Specialty Insurance Company ("Max Specialty").
(d) All potential, threatened or pending claims against the Debtors by approximately 500 former employees and recruits of the Debtors hired and/or recruited by the Debtors througb the United States H-2B immigration program arising out of or related to such employment or recruitment, which are contingent, unliquidated and disputed (collectively with the Judgment Claims, the "Litigation Claims" and the holders thereof, the "Litigation Claimants"). For plan purposes only, the Litigation Claims shall be estimated in the total aggregate amount of no less than $200 million.
(e) General unsecured claims, other than the Max Specialty judgment, totaling approximately $3 .I million or such other amount as the Bankruptcy Court may determine such that the Litigation Claims constitute no less than 95% of all unsecured claims..
The TRSA shall (i) consent to the Debtors' post-petition use of its cash collateral and (ii) provide post-petition DIP fmancing in the amount of up to $20 million plus a roll-up of the First Lien Debt (the "DIP Facility"); provided that if the Bankruptcy Court has not granted the PSA Order (as defined in the PSA) prior to final relief being granted by the Bankruptcy Court with respect to the DIP Facility, the Litigation Claimants shall be entitled to object to such final relief and/or terminate the PSA.
a) As part of the Plan, the Debtors shall sell substantially all of their assets at an auction (the "Auction") pursuant to court approved bid procedures (the "Bid Procedures"). The TRSA and ERSA shall serve as the stalking horse bidder (the "Stalking Horse Bidder") and be entitled to credit bid all amounts outstanding under the DIP Facility (the "Stalking Horse Credit Bid").
b) The Bid Procedures shall require any "Qualified Bid" (to be defined in the Bid Procedures) to, among other things, include cash proceeds sufficient to: (i) provide for payment of all outstanding obligations of the First Lien Debt and the DIP Facility in full on the Effective Date (the "Secured Debt Cash Obligations"); (ii) provide for a break-up fee not exceeding $1 million to the Stalking Horse Bidder; provided that the Bankruptcy Court's authorization of a break-up fee in any form or amount shall not be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the PSA; (iii) fund a distribution payment to the general unsecured creditors, including Max Specialty (the "GUC Payment Amounf' and together with the Secured Debt Cash Obligations and Break-Up Fee, the "Plan Cash Amount"); and (iv) overbid
2

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 43 of 49

Estate Avoidance Actions
Treatment of Claims Administrative Expense Claims (including 503(b)(9) Claims}: Priority Tax Claims: Other Priority Claims: First Lien Debt:
0117602622.5

the Plan Cash Amount by no less than $1 million (the "Required Overbid", and together with the Plan Cash Amount, the "Minimum Qualified Bid").
c) The party submitting the higbest or otherwise best Minimum Qualified Bid at the Auction shall be selected as the prevailing bidder (the "Prevailing Bidder''), subject to approval by order of the Bankruptcy Court (the "Sale Approval Order") at the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.
d) The Prevailing Bidder shall take all purchased assets free and clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances.
e) The closing shall occur within 20 days following conftrmation of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court.
The Prevailing Bidder shall purchase the estates' causes of action, including any avoidance actions (the "Acquired Avoidance Actions") under the Bankruptcy Code, and covenant to not sue on the Acquired Avoidance Actions except as set forth below. For the avoidance of doubt, the Prevailing Bidder shall agree to waive and release any and all causes of action against the Released Parties (as defined below).
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, within a reasonably prompt time, the Debtors or the Prevailing Bidder shall commence an avoidance action against Max Specialty to avoid any avoidable liens against the assets ofthe Debtors.
Payable in full in cash on the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") or on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent of the Prevailing Bidder.
Unclassified -Non-Voting
Payable in full in cash on the Effective Date of the Plan or on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent of the Prevailing Bidder.
Unclassified -Non-Voting
Payable in full in cash on the Effective Date or on such other .terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent ofthe Prevailing Bidder.
Unimpaired -Deemed to Accept
On the Effective Date, the Senior Notes shall each be cancelled, and on account of the allowed claim of the TRSA in respect of the First Lien Debt, the TRSA, as administrative agent, shall either (i) acquire substantially all of the Debtors' assets as the Prevailing Bidder at the Auction or (ii) be paid in full, in cash, the total amount under the DIP Facility (including the roll-up of the First Lien Debt) by the
3

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 44 of 49

Other Secured Claims: Litigation Claims:
OLI7602622.5

Prevailing Bidder at the Auction.
Potentially Impaired - Entitled to Vote
On the Effective Date, all allowed secured claims ("Other Secured Claims") shall be either paid in full in cash, receive delivery of collateral securing any such claim and payment of any interest requested under section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, or be treated on such other terms as agreed between the Debtors and the holder thereof, subject to the reasonable consent ofthe Prevailing Bidder.
Unimpaired- Not Entitled to Vote.
On the Effective Date of the Plan, the claims of the Litigation Claimants shall be deemed allowed in full, and shall be deemed to have been settled as herein provided.
The Debtors shall establish a settlement trust (which form shall be satisfactory to the Southern Poverty Law Center) in respect of the claims of the Litigation Claimants (the "Litigation Settlement Trust"). On the Effective Date, the Prevailing Bidder will receive, free and clear of liens, claims or encumbrances (including, without limitation, the pre-petition liens of TRSA and ERSA) other than the participating interest of the Litigation Settlement Trust described below, all right, title and interest of the Debtors in and to certain purchase money indebtedness currently owing to Signal International Texas, LP, by Westport Orange Shipyard, LLC, in the principal amount of up to $29,894,469 (the "Westport Loan"), together with all instruments or documents evidencing, securing. governing or otherwise pertaining to the Westport Loan (the "Westport Documents"). The Westport Loan and the Westport Documents will be transferred to the Prevailing Bidder subject to a continuing participation interest in favor of the Litigation Settlement Trust, which shall be governed by a loan participation agreement (the "Westnort Participation Agreement"), in form and content reasonably acceptable to the Litigation Settlement Trust and the Prevailing Bidder (collectively, the "Westoort Participants"). For the avoidance of doubt, upon the Effective Date of the Plan, TRSA, ERSA and the Collateral Agent under the Credit Agreement will execute any documents necessary to effect a release and discharge of their respective Hens, encumbrances and security interests on the Westport facility.
The Westport Participation shall provide that each Westport Participant share on a pro rata basis in all proceeds derived from the Westport Loan (including scheduled payments of principal and interest, prepayments, proceeds of enforcement or proceeds of liquidation of collateral) as follows:
• The Litigation Settlement Trust shall receive a 66.9% participating interest, and the Prevailing Bidder shall receive a 33.1% participating interest, in and to the Westport Loan and the Westport Loan Documents. The participating interests described above are referred to herein as each Westport Participant's ''Sharing Ratio".
4

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 45 of 49

OLI7602622.5

• If the Westport Loan is prepaid in full, in accordance with its terms, prior to its scheduled maturity date, and the application of the Litigation Settlement Trust's Sharing Ratio to such prepayment results in an aggregate recovecy of less than $20 million by the Litigation Settlement Trust, then the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be entitled to receive additional proceeds from such prepayment in an amount sufficient to increase its aggregate recovery from the Westport Loan to $20 million.
• The maximum aggregate amount payable to the Litigation Settlement Trust by virtue of its Sharing Ratio shall for all purposes be capped at $22 million. Upon receipt of said amount by the Litigation Settlement Trust, all further payments or other recoveries with respect to the Westport Loan will be payable solely to the Prevailing Bidder.
Pursuant to the Westport Participation Agreement, if TRSA, ERSA or an affiliate or designee thereof is the Prevailing Bidder, TRSA and ERSA will be responsible for the collection and distribution of the proceeds ofthe Westport Loan and, if necessary, the enforcement thereof, for the ratable benefit of the Westport Participants. All outof-pocket costs and expenses reasonably and actually incurred by TRSA and ERSA in connection with the administration of the Westport Loan shall be payable from proceeds thereof prior to any distribution to the Westport Participants in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Pursuant to the Westport Participation Agreement, if none of TRSA, ERSA or an affiliate or designee thereofis the Prevailing Bidder, the Litigation Settlement Trust will be responsible for the collection and distribution of the proceeds of the Westport Loan and, if necessary, the enforcement thereof, for the ratable benefil of the Westport Participants. All out-of-pocket costs and expenses reasonably and actually incurred by the Litigation Settlement Trust in connection with the administration of the Westport Loan shall be payable from proceeds thereof prior to any distribution to the Westport Participants in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
All internal costs and expenses incurred in connection with the administration of the Litigation Settlement Trust following the Effective Date shall be borne solely by the Litigation Settlement Trust.
Any payments of principal received by any of the Debtors, TRSA or ERSA on account of the Westport Loan from June 30, 2015 through the Effective Date of the Plan, shall be held in trust for the benefit of the Westport Participants and will be distributed to the Westport Participants on the Effective Date in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Any payments of interest received by any of the Debtors, TRSA or ERSA on account of the Westport Loan from November 5, 2015 through the Effective Date of the Plan, shall be held in trust for the benefit of the Westport Participants and will be distributed to the
5

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 46 of 49

General Unsecured Claims:
OL17602622.5

Westport Participants on the Effective Date in accordance with their respective Sharing Ratios.
Any cash bid arnounts in excess of the Plan Cash Amount (such amount the "Sale Ovemayment") made on the Effective Date and not subject to a valid and perfected lien shall be paid as follows:
• First, to the Litigation Settlement Trust to reduce, on a dollarw for-dollar basis, its participating interest in the Westport Loan (not to exceed a total of $20 million). In such event, the Sharing Ratio of the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be recalculated to account for all sums received from such Sale Overpayment. If the Sale Overpayment is in an amount adequate to result in the immediate payment of the sum of $20 million to the Litigation Settlement Trust, then the Westport Loan will be transferred to the Prevailing Bidder not subject to a continuing participation interest by any party.
• Second, any Sale Overpayment greater than $20 million paid to the Litigation Settlement Trust as set fortb above (such amount the "Excess Sale Overpayment") will be shared as follows: 22.5% of the Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to holders of General Unsecured Claims (as defined below), not subject to dilution by the Litigation Claimants, and 77.5% of the Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to Litigation Claimants, not subject to dilution by the holders of General Unsecured Claims, provided, that at such time as the holders of General Unsecured Claims (other than the Litigation Claims) have received payment in full of the allowed amount of their claims, 100% of any remaining Excess Sale Overpayment shall be paid to the Litigation Claimants.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Litigation Settlement Trust shall not receive any guarantee or other credit support as to the Westport Loan from the Prevailing Bidder, the Debtors or any PSA Creditor Party.
The trustee of the Litigation Settlement Trust will be selected by the Southern Poverty Law Center and will be responsible for establishing a claims allowance and allocation process with respect to distributions under the Litigation Settlement Trust.
Impaired - Entitled to Vote
In consideration for the purchase of the Acquired Avoidance Actions purchased in connection with the sale of substantially all of the Debtors' assets, on the Effective Date, each holder of an allowed general unsecured claim, other than the Litigation Claimants, shall receive, on account of its claim (each, a "General Unsecured Claim"), its pro rata share (determined without taking the Litigation Claimants into account) of GUC Payment Amount and its pro rata share ofthat portion ofthe Excess Sale Overpayment allocated to the holders of General Unsecured Claims as set fortb above.
The GUC Payment Amount shall be an aggregate amount equal to the lesser of (i) $900,000, or (ii) an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount of all allowed General Unsecured Claims
6

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 47 of 49

Intercompany Claims: Equity Interests: General Provisions Allowance ofClaims:
Incorporation: Release and Related Provisions Exculpations: Releases:
0 I: 17602622.5

which remain outstanding after all assumption and cure has been implemented with respect thereto.
Impaired - Entitled to Vote
All intercompany claims between and among SI Inc. and its direct and indirect subsidiary Debtors shall be released and discharged on the Effective Date of the Plan. There shall be no distributions on account oflntercompany Claims.
Impaired- Entitled to Vote
All rights of existing holders of shares of stock, options, warrants and common equity interests in SI Inc. shall be extinguished as of the Effective Date, and owners thereof shall receive no distribution on account of such stock, options, warrants and equity interests.
Impaired- Deemed to Reject
The Debtors and the PSA Creditor Parties stipulate to and shall not challenge in any respect the approval of the DIP Facility, including the roll-up ofthe First Lien Debt.
The trustee of the Litigation Settlement Trust shall be solely responsible for determining the mechanism for distribution of the Trust assets to the Litigation Claimants.
The Debtors reserve the right to challenge the amount, validity or extent of all claims against the Debtors other than the claims of the PSA Creditor Parties.
Each of the Debtors shall remain incorporated in the State of Delaware.
Subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, the Plan Participants and the Committee and its advisors and Related Parties, shall be exculpated from liability for their actions in connection with the chapter II cases, with customary carve-outs for gross negligence and willful misconduct
Subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, the Plan shall provide that the Released Parties (as defmed below), be released from liability for all Released Claims (as defined below).
"Released Parties" shall mean (i) the Plan Participants, (ii) the Related Parties of the Plan Participants, and (iii) the Related Parties of any Related Parties of the Plan Participants.
"Plan Participants" shall mean (i) the Debtors, (ii) the PSA Creditor Parties, (iii) the Litigation Claimants, (iv) the Litigation Settlement Trust, and (v) the holders of all H-2B Claims (as defined in the PSA).
"Related Parties" shall mean, with respect to any person or entity,
7

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 48 of 49

Director and Officer Indemnification:
lfljunction:
Conditions to Closing
01: 17602622.5

any past, present or future representative, controlling person, officer, director, agent, attorney, advisor, employee, subsidiary or affiliate, shareholder, partner (general or limited), member, manager, equity holder, trustee, executor, predecessor in interest, successor or assign of any such person or entity.
"Case Professionals" shall mean the attorneys, accountants, consultants, financial advisors and other third party professionals who have represented the Plan Participants in connection with the negotiation and implementation of the Plan and the Plan Documents, each as defined in the PSA.
"Released Claims" shall mean (i) any and all claims or causes of action, other than Retained Claims, by or among the Released Parties and (ii) any and all claims or causes of action that the Committee, but not the Committee's members, may otherwise be entitled to assert against the Released Parties, both relating to any prepetition date acts or omissions, whether known or unknown, pertaining to the business activities and operations ofthe Debtors, the debts, liabilities, obligations and assets of the Debtors, the ownership, management, direction or control ofthe Debtors, prosecution ofthe Litigation Claims, settlement efforts and negotiations related to the Litigation Claims, negotiation of and entry into this Agreement (including all exhibits and addenda hereto), or any transactions or communications among the Released Parties with respect to any of the foregoing.
"Retained Claims'~ shall mean the following claims or causes of action held by certain of the Plan Participants, which shall be retained by such Plan Participants and shall not be Released Claims: (i) the claims or causes of action ofthe Litigation Claimants against Malvern C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C., Sachin Dewan, and Dewan Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a/k/al Medtech Consultants), and (ii) the claims or causes of action of any Plan Participant against its own Related Parties, other than the Released Related Party Claims.
"Released Related Partv Claims" means any claims or causes of action against (i) the officers, directors, shareholders or other equity holders of the Debtors, or (ii) the Case Professionals, all of which shall be Released Claims and shall not be Retained Claims.
Director and officer insurance will continue in place for the directors and officers of all of the Debtors during the chapter II cases on existing terms. The Debtors shall be permitted to purchase tail coverage for current and former directors and office~ subject to funding availability under the DIP Facility.
Ordinary and customary injunction provisions shall be included in the Plan.
ll1is restructuring and all compromises herein shall be subject to (i) commencement of the Chapter I I cases, (ii) the absence of any payment default under the Westport Loan (determined without giving effect to any alleged waiver by the Debtors or any other party), (iii) after approval of a disclosure statement as containing
8

Case 15-11498-MFW Doc 279-1 Filed 09/01/15 Page 49 of 49

Aoology by the Debtors

adequate information, solicitation of votes approving the Plan, (iv) the execution of definitive documentation mutually acceptable to, and signed on to by, the parties to the PSA, each in their sole discretion, (v) the entry of an order confirming the Plan, which order is not subject to a stay of execution and otherwise final according to its terms and under applicable law, (vi) all actions, documents and agreements necessary to implement the Plan shall have been effected or executed and, to the extent required, filed with the applicable governmental units in accordance with applicable laws, and (vii) the Debtors shall have received all authorizations, consents, regulatory approvals, rulings, letters, no~action letters, opinions or documents that are determined by the Debtors or the PSA Creditor Parties to be necessary to implement the Plan and that are required by law, regulation or order.
Within 2 weeks from the entry of the PSA Order the Debtors shall issue a formal letter of apology to the Litigation Claimants for the Debtors' conduct that gave rise to the Litigation Claims, such letter to be in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Litigation Claimants through their advisors. For the avoidance of doubt, such letter of apology shall for all purposes be deemed a Restructuring Document under the PSA, and shall be subject to the effect of Section 23 of the PSA.

0 I: 17602622.5
9

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 344 Filed 07/07/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 9853

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MUKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH ) ) ) )

SIXTH STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs, in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy [Dkt. No. 335] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of July 7, 2017. (Prior reports have been from all parties, but counsel for a defendant in this action has noted lack of current involvement in Signal’s bankruptcy proceedings, so counsel for Plaintiffs is responsible for this report.) As noted in the parties’ prior reports [Dkt. Nos. 338, 339, 340, 341 and 343], the Signal Entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the “Confirmation

1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 344 Filed 07/07/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 9854
Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February, 2016. Initial partial payments on accepted claims have been distributed this month.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015 [Bankr. Dkt. No. 589]. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)
In light of the entry of the Confirmation Order, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the stay remain in effect. Pursuant to the Court’s Order on July 14, 2015 [Dkt. No. 335], Plaintiffs will file a further status update in 120 days.
[signatures on following page]
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 344 Filed 07/07/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 9855
Respectfully submitted, this 7th day of July, 2017.
/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming (pro hac vice) Travis J. Mock (pro hac vice) Kara D. Ford (pro hac vice) Heather M. Niemeyer (pro hac vice) Matthew J. Bowness (pro hac vice) EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP 999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 Telephone: (404) 853-8000 Facsimile: (404) 853-8806 johnfleming@eversheds-sutherland.com travismock@eversheds-sutherland.com karaford@eversheds-sutherland.com heatherniemeyer@eversheds-sutherland.com matthewbowness@eversheds-sutherland.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
3

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 344 Filed 07/07/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 9856
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on July 7, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing Sixth Status Report with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send e-mail notification of such filing to all ECF participants. I further certify that on July 7, 2017 I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the below-named Defendants by depositing a copy of same in the U.S. Mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as follows:
Michael Pol Global Resources, Inc. c/o William P. Wessler, Esq. William P. Wessler, Attorney at Law 1624 24th Avenue Gulfport, MS 39501-2969 Mr. Billy Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562
/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming

 
 Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 345 Filed 11/06/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 9857

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION

BIJU MUKRUKKATTU JOSEPH, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH ) ) ) )

SEVENTH STATUS REPORT Plaintiffs, in accordance with the Court’s Order Staying Case Pursuant to Bankruptcy

[Dkt. No. 335] requiring the parties to file a notice every 120 days informing the Court of the status of the Signal bankruptcy proceedings, hereby file this Status Report as of November 6, 2017. (Reports prior to the Sixth Report were from all parties, but counsel for a Defendant in

this action noted lack of current involvement in Signal’s bankruptcy proceedings, so counsel for

Plaintiffs is responsible for this report.)

As noted in the parties’ prior reports [Dkt. Nos. 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, and 344], the

Signal Entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 12, 2015. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015) (the “Bankruptcy Court”).1 On November 24, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan

of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [ECF No. 555] (the

1 The other entities are: Signal Ship Repair, LLC (Case No. 15-11499), Signal Int’l, LLC (Case No. 15-11500), Signal Int’l Texas GP, LLC (Case No. 15-11501), and Signal Int’l Texas, L.P. (Case No. 15-11502). By the Bankruptcy Court’s order, all five cases are being jointly administered with the Signal Int’l, Inc. case. In re Signal Int’l, Inc., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 55.

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 345 Filed 11/06/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 9858
“Confirmation Order”), confirming the Signal Entities’ plan of liquidation, which implemented the plan support agreement among the Plaintiffs, the Signal Entities and certain other parties, for the settlement of, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the relevant Signal Entities. Pursuant to the Plan, a litigation trust (the “Signal Litigation Trust”) has been created for the distribution of the settlement proceeds. That process remains ongoing, as the Signal Litigation Trust distributed Trust Claim Forms in February, 2016. Initial partial payments on accepted claims were distributed in July, 2017.
The Plan became effective on December 14, 2015 [Bankr. Dkt. No. 589]. As of that date, pursuant to the Confirmation Order, “any suit, legal action, or other proceeding … in any forum in the United States that is released, stayed, or enjoined pursuant to Article XI of the Plan against or affecting any Released Party [the Signal Entities], shall be stayed, enjoined or otherwise prohibited from continuation as to any Released Party.” (Confirmation Order at 25.)
In light of the entry of the Confirmation Order, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the stay remain in effect. Pursuant to the Court’s Order on July 14, 2015 [Dkt. No. 335], Plaintiffs will file a further status update in 120 days.
[signatures on following page]
2

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 345 Filed 11/06/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 9859
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of November, 2017.
/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming (pro hac vice) Travis J. Mock (pro hac vice) Kara D. Ford (pro hac vice) Heather M. Niemeyer (pro hac vice) Matthew J. Bowness (pro hac vice) EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP 999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 Telephone: (404) 853-8000 Facsimile: (404) 853-8806 johnfleming@eversheds-sutherland.com travismock@eversheds-sutherland.com karaford@eversheds-sutherland.com heatherniemeyer@eversheds-sutherland.com matthewbowness@eversheds-sutherland.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
3

Case 1:13-cv-00324-RC-ZJH Document 345 Filed 11/06/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 9860
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 6, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing Seventh Status Report with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send e-mail notification of such filing to all ECF participants. I further certify that on November 6, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the below-named Defendants by depositing a copy of same in the U.S. Mail, with sufficient postage thereon to insure delivery, and properly addressed as follows:
Michael Pol Global Resources, Inc. c/o William P. Wessler, Esq. William P. Wessler, Attorney at Law 1624 24th Avenue Gulfport, MS 39501-2969 Mr. Billy Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562
/s/ John H. Fleming John H. Fleming

 
 Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 1 of 75
CASREF,PROTECTIVE−ORDER,STAYED
U.S. District Court Eastern District of TEXAS [LIVE] (Beaumont) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00324−RC−ZJH

Joseph et al v. Signal International, LLC et al Assigned to: Judge Ron Clark Referred to: Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn Related Cases: 1:13−cv−00323−MAC−ZJH
1:13−cv−00497−MAC−ZJH
1:13−cv−00499−MAC−ZJH
1:13−cv−00498−RC−ZJH
Case in other court: Eastern District of Louisiana, 2:08−cv−01220−SM−DEK
Cause: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Biju Makrukkattu Joseph

represented by Daniella Landers Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP − Houston First City Tower 1001 Fannin, Suite 3700 Houston, TX 77002−6760 713−470−6110 Fax: 713−654−1301 Email: daniella.landers@sutherland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel Sutherland Asbill & Brennan − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404/853−8042 Fax: 404/853−8806 Email: gabe.mendel@sutherland.com TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP − Houston First City Tower 1001 Fannin Suite 3700 Houston, TX 77002−6760 713−470−6163 Fax: 713−654−1301 Email: gary.shiu@sutherland.com TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas 40th Floor New York, NY 10036 212.389.5033 Fax: 212.389.5099 Email: heatherniemeyer@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner Sutherland Asbill & Brennan − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 2 of 75
Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404.853.8192 Fax: 404.853.8806 Email: jaliya.faulkner@sutherland.com TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404−853−8065 Fax: 404−953−8806 Email: johnfleming@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 212.389.5016 Fax: 212.389.5099 Email: karaford@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett Sutherland Asbill & Brennan − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404−853−8384 Fax: 404−853−8806 Email: keith.barnett@sutherland.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz Sutherland Asbill & Brennan − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404−853−8000 Fax: 404−853−8806 Email: kurt.lentz@sutherland.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart Southern Poverty Law Center 1055 St. Charles Ave, Suite 505 New Orleans, LA 70130 504−486−8982 Fax: 504−486−8947 Email: meredith.stewart@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP − NY 1114 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 212.775.8767 Fax: 212.775.8800 Email: sramsey@kilpatricktownsend.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 3 of 75

Teresa L Sulmers Sutherland Asbill & Brennan − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404.853.8209 Fax: 404.853.8806 Email: teri.sulmers@sutherland.com TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Joy Joseph Attayil

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 4 of 75

Varghese Kainikkeril Yohannan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Krishnan Venugopal

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 5 of 75

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Varghese Pappachan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 6 of 75

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Shogy Vezhaparambil Ousephkutty

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 7 of 75

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Viswamithran Raghavan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 8 of 75

Plaintiff Sajimon Kutty

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 9 of 75

TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Kunjuchan Varghese

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff John Charuvila George

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 10 of 75

TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Philip Baby

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eben P Colby Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP − Boston 500 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02116 617.573.4800 Fax: 617.573.4822 Email: eben.colby@skadden.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 11 of 75

TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Babu Lal Mali

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 12 of 75

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Vavachan Mathai Koottalil

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 13 of 75

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Surje Prasad Tamang

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 14 of 75

Plaintiff Hanridas Sankara Panicker

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 15 of 75

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Eswara R. Kanithi

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff George Kutty Vadakkeko Mathew

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 16 of 75

TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Francis Joseph

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 17 of 75

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Jagannadha Rao Saragadam

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 18 of 75

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Prabhakaran Balakrishna Pillai

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 19 of 75

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Kannankutty Ponnan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 20 of 75

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff George Devassy Arackal

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Kiran Mohan Baki

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 21 of 75

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Sojan Paul Kaliyadan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eben P Colby (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 22 of 75

Plaintiff Lakhbir Singh

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 23 of 75

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Krishnan Kannayan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 24 of 75

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Ramachandran Murugaiyan

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 25 of 75

Plaintiff Melvin Joseph Rodrigues
Plaintiff

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 26 of 75

Kunhikrishn Kaniyamkulam Veetil

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Joseph Boban Peruvelil

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 27 of 75

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Sreedharan Babu

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 28 of 75

TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff Bijay Kumar Biswas

represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 29 of 75

Plaintiff Suresh Kumar Pillai Kavalamkuzhi

Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
represented by Daniella Landers (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabriel Adam Mendel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
John H Fleming (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kara D Ford (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Keith Barnett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kurt Lentz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 30 of 75

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Teresa L Sulmers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Plaintiff All Plaintiffs

represented by Anjali J Nair Southern Poverty Law Center 1055 St. Charles Ave, Suite 505 New Orleans, LA 70130 (334) 414−4756 Fax: (504) 486−8947 Email: anjali.nair@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Bryan M Ward Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404.853.8249 Fax: 404.853.8806 Email: bryan.ward@sutherland.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Mary Beth Martinez Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas 40th Floor New York, NY 10036 212.389.5008 Fax: 212.389.5099 Email: marybethmartinez@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J Bowness Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP − Atlanta 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 2300 Atlanta, Ga 30309−3996 404−853−8912 Fax: 404−853−8806 Email: matthewbowness@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 31 of 75

Plaintiff Pankajakshan Madhavan
Plaintiff Ravi Rowthu

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Travis J Mock Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas 40th Floor New York, NY 10036 212.389.5066 Fax: 212.389.5099 Email: travismock@eversheds−sutherland.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 32 of 75

Plaintiff Gijo John
Plaintiff Suresh Kokkoth

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 33 of 75

Plaintiff Sebastian George Pananijkal
Plaintiff Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy
Plaintiff Joy Kallachiyil Varkey

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eben P Colby (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 34 of 75

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Biju Potrayil

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Abraham Varghese

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 35 of 75

Plaintiff Vasavan Babu
Plaintiff Iju James

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eben P Colby (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014
Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 36 of 75

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Omanakuttan Govindan Kakkanthara

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jaliya S Faulkner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Subburaj Rengasamy

represented by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/14/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather M Niemeyer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 37 of 75
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith B Stewart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shane G Ramsey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniella Landers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Signal International, LLC

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman Herman Law Firm 1601 Elm Street Suite 2002 Dallas, TX 75201 214−624−9805 Fax: 469−383−3469 Email: jherman@herman−lawfirm.com TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Email: aweinberger@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Christopher Roux Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: broux@hanrylaw.com TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominic J Gianna Middleberg Riddle & Gianna 201 St Charles Ave Suite 3100 New Orleans, LA 70170 504−525−7200 Fax: 504−581−5983 Email: dgianna@midrid.com TERMINATED: 03/19/2014
Elham R Rabbani Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 38 of 75
New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: erabbani@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Casey Hangartner Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: ehangartner@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hal D Ungar Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 (504) 522−5690 Fax: (504) 522−5689 Email: hungar@hanrylaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James L Cornblatt Patricia A Bollman, APLC 3636 S Interstate 10 Service Rd W Metarie, LA 70001 504.218.5887 Email: jcornblatt25@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Patrick Maney Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: kmaney@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lance R Rydberg Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lrydberg@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Masur Davis Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: lmasur@hanrylaw.com

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 39 of 75

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: mhasenkampf@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman Patricia A Bollman, APLC PO Box 13707 New Orleans, LA 70185 504.218.5887 Fax: 504.304.0890 Email: patricia@bollmanfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II Hangartner, Rydberg, Terrell & Hart, LLC One Shell Square 701 Poydras Street, Suite 310 New Orleans, LA 70139 504.522.5690 Fax: 504.522.5689 Email: rkeller@hanrylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International, Inc.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 40 of 75

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, G.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 41 of 75

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Signal International Texas, L.P.

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 42 of 75

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Malvern C. Barnett

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia Timothy W. Cerniglia, PLC 1521 St Charles Ave New Orleans, LA 70130 504−586−0555 Fax: 504−586−0550 Email: tcerniglia@cerniglialaw.pro LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Indo−Ameri Soft, L.L.C. TERMINATED: 03/10/2015

Defendant
Kurella Rao TERMINATED: 03/10/2015

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 43 of 75

Defendant J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi Defendant Billy R. Wilks
Defendant J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C. Defendant Global Resources, Inc. Defendant Michael Pol Defendant Sachin Dewan
Defendant Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD also known as Medtech Consultants
Cross Claimant Signal International, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Billy R. Wilks 9136 Heather Lane Moss Point, MS 39562 PRO SE
represented by Stephen H Shapiro Stephen H Shapiro, Attorney at Law, LLC 700 Camp Street New Orleans, LA 70130 504.309.8442 Fax: 504.934.2000 Email: steve@shapirolaw−nola.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014
Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 44 of 75

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
Signal International Texas, G.P. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 45 of 75

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
Signal International Texas, L.P. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 46 of 75

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
Signal International, LLC TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Jonathan Marc Herman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan Dean Weinberger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Christopher Roux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/29/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dominic J Gianna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/19/2014

Elham R Rabbani (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Casey Hangartner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hal D Ungar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James L Cornblatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 47 of 75
Kevin Patrick Maney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lance R Rydberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Masur Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mitchell P Hasenkampf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Keller , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant Malvern C. Barnett TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Sachin Dewan TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Global Resources, Inc. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 Cross Defendant Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014
Cross Defendant Indo−Ameri Soft, L.L.C. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014 Cross Defendant

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Stephen H Shapiro (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 48 of 75

J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Cross Defendant
J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Cross Defendant
Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

represented by Timothy W Cerniglia (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant
Michael Pol TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Cross Defendant
Kurella Rao TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Cross Defendant
Billy R. Wilks TERMINATED: 12/08/2014

Date Filed 05/21/2013
05/21/2013 05/21/2013
05/21/2013 05/22/2013 05/22/2013 05/28/2013 05/30/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0540−4146745.), filed by Biju Makrukkattu Joseph. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Summons(es), ***FILED IN ERROR. SUMMONS(ES) ARE NOT FILED AS ATTACHMENTS. THEY NEED TO BE EMAILED TO THE CLERK'S OFFICE FOR ISSUANCE. PLEASE IGNOR.*** # 4 Summons(es), # 5 Summons(es), # 6 Summons(es), # 7 Summons(es), # 8 Summons(es), # 9 Summons(es), # 10 Summons(es), # 11 Summons(es), # 12 Summons(es), # 13 Summons(es), # 14 Summons(es), # 15 Summons(es), # 16 Summons(es), # 17 Summons(es), # 18 Summons(es), # 19 Summons(es), # 20 Summons(es))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
Case Assigned to Judge Ron Clark. (aam, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
2 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. ORDER GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS. Rule 26(f) attorney conference must occur by 6/11/13. Rule 16 Management/Scheduling Conference set for 8/28/2013 at 9:00 AM in Ctrm 2 (Beaumont) before Judge Ron Clark. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 5/21/13. (tkd, ) Modified on 5/21/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 05/21/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore document #2, Order Governing Proceedings. This order was entered prematurely by the Court. (tkd, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
3 SUMMONS Issued as to All Defendants and emailed to plas' atty for service. (aam, ) (Entered: 05/22/2013)
4 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn for all pretrial proceedings. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 5/22/13. (tkd, ) (Entered: 05/23/2013)
5 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Keith Barnett on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4155821. (Barnett, Keith) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
6 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by John H Fleming on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4159980. (Fleming, John) (Entered: 05/30/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 49 of 75

06/03/2013 06/17/2013 06/17/2013 06/17/2013 07/12/2013 07/12/2013 07/12/2013 07/15/2013 07/15/2013 07/15/2013 07/15/2013 07/16/2013
07/31/2013
07/31/2013 08/01/2013
08/01/2013 08/06/2013

7 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kurt Lentz on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4163747. (Lentz, Kurt) (Entered: 06/03/2013)
8 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Gabriel Adam Mendel on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4182522. (Mendel, Gabriel) (Entered: 06/17/2013)
9 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Teresa L Sulmers on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4182825. (Sulmers, Teresa) (Entered: 06/17/2013)
10 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kara D Duffle on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4182854. (Duffle, Kara) (Entered: 06/17/2013)
11 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Biju Makrukkattu Joseph. Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC. waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
12 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Biju Makrukkattu Joseph. Malvern C. Barnett waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
13 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Biju Makrukkattu Joseph. Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
14 Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint re Signal International, LLC.( Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
15 Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint re Signal International, Inc..( Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
16 Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint re Signal International Texas, G.P..( Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
17 Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint re Signal International Texas, L.P..( Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
Defendants' Unopposed First Applications for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint are GRANTED pursuant to Local Rule CV−12 for Signal International, Inc, Signal International Texas G.P., Signal International Texas L.P. and Signal International LLC to 8/19/2013. 30 Days Granted for Deadline Extension.( tkd, ) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
18 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 8/1/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/31/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore document #18, First Amended Complaint. Attorney will refile to add the new plaintiffs to the docket sheet.(tkd, ) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
19 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs, Pankajakshan Madhavan, Ravi Rowthu, Gijo John, Suresh Kokkoth, Sebastian George Pananijkal, Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy, Joy Kallachiyil Varkey, Biju Potrayil, Abraham Varghese, Vasavan Babu, Iju James, Omanakuttan Govindan Kakkanthara. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 8/2/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 08/01/2013)
20 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Jaliya S Faulkner on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4248408. (Faulkner, Jaliya) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
21 ADVISORY to the Parties. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/6/13. (tkd, ) (Entered: 08/07/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 50 of 75

08/06/2013
08/19/2013
08/19/2013 08/20/2013 08/20/2013 08/20/2013 08/21/2013 08/26/2013
08/26/2013 08/26/2013 08/26/2013 08/26/2013 08/26/2013 08/27/2013 08/30/2013

22 ORDER GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS. Rule 26(f) attorney conference must occur by 9/5/13 with a joint report due 10/10/13. Rule 16 Management/Scheduling Conference set for 10/17/2013 at 10:15 AM in Ctrm 4 (Beaumont) before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/6/13. (tkd, ) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
23 MOTION to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/19/2013)
24 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 08/19/2013)
25 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C. waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
26 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
27 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Billy R. Wilks waiver sent on 6/25/2013, answer due 8/26/2013. (pkb, ) (Entered: 08/20/2013)
28 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Erin Casey Hangartner on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4277134. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 08/21/2013)
29 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. Responses due by 9/23/2013 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 8/26/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 08/26/2013)
30 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION to Dismiss by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 8/26/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 08/26/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore documents # 29 and 30, Motions to Dismiss. The wrong PDF documents were attached. Attorney will refile. (tkd, ) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
31 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Defendant Affidavit, # 2 Proposed Text − Rule 12(b)(2) Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
32 MOTION to Dismiss by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 − La. Complaint, # 2 Proposed Text − Rule 12(b)(6) Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
33 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Billy R. Wilks, J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C. (Attachments: # 1 Letter from Pltf's Atty, # 2 Letter from Billy Wilks)(tkd, ) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
34 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Hal D Ungar on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4285873. (Ungar, Hal) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
35 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Elham R Rabbani on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4291435. (Rabbani, Elham) (Entered: 08/30/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 51 of 75

08/30/2013 08/30/2013 08/30/2013 09/03/2013 09/04/2013
09/05/2013 09/05/2013 09/05/2013 09/05/2013 09/12/2013 09/12/2013 09/12/2013 09/12/2013 09/18/2013 09/18/2013

36 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Dominic J Gianna on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4291466. (Gianna, Dominic) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
37 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Patricia Bollman on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4291488. (Bollman, Patricia) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
38 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Alan Dean Weinberger on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4291539. (Weinberger, Alan) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
39 MOTION Transfer Venue by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/03/2013)
40 MOTION of Plaintiffs First Named in the Amended Complaint to Dismiss Without Prejudice Their Claims Against Defendant Michael Pol by Vasavan Babu, Varghese Kannampuzha Devassy, Iju James, Gijo John, Omanakuttan Govindan Kakkanthara, Suresh Kokkoth, Pankajakshan Madhavan, Sebastian George Pananijkal, Biju Potrayil, Ravi Rowthu, Abraham Varghese, Joy Kallachiyil Varkey. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/5/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/04/2013)
41 FILED IN ERROR per attorney. Please ignore. RESPONSE in Opposition re 23 MOTION to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/5/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/05/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore document #41, Response to Motion to Transfer Action. Per attorney, there was an error in the document. Attorney will refile. (tkd, ) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
42 RESPONSE in Opposition re 23 MOTION to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
43 RESPONSE in Opposition re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/6/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/05/2013)
44 RESPONSE in Opposition re 31 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Appendix, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
45 REPLY to Response to Motion re 23 MOTION to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
46 REPLY to Response to Motion re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 32 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Appendix, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
48 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION For Extension Of Time For Service On Defendants by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/19/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/18/2013)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore document #48, Motion for Extension of Time for Service on Defendants. Motion is missing the required certificate of conference and must be refiled. (tkd, ) (Entered: 09/19/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 52 of 75

09/19/2013 09/19/2013 09/19/2013 09/20/2013 09/23/2013 09/23/2013 09/23/2013 09/23/2013 09/27/2013 09/27/2013 10/01/2013 10/10/2013 10/11/2013 10/17/2013
10/17/2013
10/25/2013 11/18/2013 12/19/2013 12/19/2013

49 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time for Service on Defendants by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/20/2013 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/19/2013)
50 REPLY to Response to Motion re 31 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
51 REPLY to Response to Motion re 30 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/19/2013)
52 RESPONSE to Motion re 39 MOTION Transfer Venue filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
ORAL ORDER granting 49 Motion for Extension of Time for Service on Defendants. Deadline extended to 1/17/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 9/23/13. (zjh1) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
53 REPLY to Response to Motion re 39 MOTION Transfer Venue filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
54 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 23 MOTION to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
55 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
56 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 31 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
57 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 32 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
58 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 39 MOTION Transfer Venue filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
59 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Proposed Scheduling Order Deadlines, # 2 Exhibit B: Signal Defendants' Supplemental Contentions of Fact)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
60 NOTICE of Discovery Disclosure by All Plaintiffs (Notice of Service of Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures) (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: 10:20 am − 10:38 am Scheduling Conference held on 10/17/2013. Appearances: Daniella Landers & John Fleming, Pla counsel; Patricia Bollman & Erin Hangartner, Def counsel. (Courtroom Deputy & DCR Op: Piper.) (ttp, ) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
61 SCHEDULING ORDER setting various deadlines. Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/9/2015 at 9:00 AM and Jury Selection/ Trial set for 4/13/2015 at 9:00 AM in Ctrm 2 (Beaumont) before Judge Ron Clark. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/17/13. (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
62 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 61 Scheduling Order by Billy R. Wilks on 10/21/13 (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
63 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/18/13. (tkd, ) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
64 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs, Paulose Chirackal Airookaran Joseph, Subburaj Rengasamy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
65 SUMMONS Issued as to Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD and sent by FedEX to plas' atty for service(aam, ) (Entered: 12/19/2013)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 53 of 75

01/02/2014 01/16/2014
01/17/2014 01/17/2014 01/23/2014
01/30/2014
01/30/2014 01/30/2014 02/10/2014
02/11/2014 02/18/2014 02/21/2014
03/03/2014 03/07/2014
03/11/2014 03/17/2014 03/17/2014

66 NOTICE of Change of Address by Erin Casey Hangartner (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
67 ORDER denying without prejudice the following motions: 24 Motion to Dismiss; 31 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; 32 Motion to Dismiss; 40 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice the claims against deft Michael Pol. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/16/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
68 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Service on Foreign Defendants by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 68 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/17/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
69 MOTION to Reassert 31 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 32 Motion to Dismiss by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 1/24/2014 (tkd, ). Modified on 1/24/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 01/23/2014)
70 MOTION to Dismiss (Partially) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
71 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Kurella Rao served on 1/4/2014, answer due 1/27/2014. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
72 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Indo−Ameri Soft, L.L.C. served on 1/4/2014, answer due 1/27/2014. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
73 RESPONSE to Motion re 69 MOTION to Reassert 31 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 32 Motion to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 2/11/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/10/2014)
74 ORDER denying 23 Motion to Transfer Action Pursuant to First Filed Rule. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/11/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
75 RESPONSE in Opposition re 70 MOTION to Dismiss (Partially) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
76 MOTION for Reconsideration re 74 Order denying motion to transfer by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/24/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/21/2014)
77 RESPONSE in Opposition re 76 MOTION for Reconsideration re 74 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
78 REPLY to Response to Motion re 76 MOTION for Reconsideration re 74 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
79 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Gary Ka−Kui Shiu on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Shiu, Gary) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
80 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 76 MOTION for Reconsideration re 74 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
81 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (Dominic J. Gianna) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/17/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 54 of 75

03/19/2014 03/25/2014 03/25/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/07/2014
04/07/2014
04/07/2014 04/09/2014 04/09/2014 04/22/2014 04/28/2014

ORAL ORDER granting 81 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Dominic J Gianna terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3−19−14. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
82 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response To Burnett's Reasserted Motion To Dismiss [ECF−69] by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/31/2014: # 1 Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/25/2014)
83 RESPONSE to Motion re 69 MOTION to Reassert 31 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 32 Motion to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/31/2014: # 2 Revised Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/25/2014)
84 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Jonathan M. Herman and Middleberg Riddle Group by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Herman, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 84 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jonathan Marc Herman terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/4/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
85 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. First MOTION for Discovery Plaintiffs' First Requests For Production of Documents To Defendants Signal International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas L.P., and Signal International Texas, G.P. by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 4/7/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 04/07/2014)
86 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. First MOTION for Discovery Plaintiffs' First Requests For Production of Documents To Defendants Malveryn C. Burnett, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 4/7/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 04/07/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore documents # 85−86, Requests for Production by plaintiffs. This court does not accept discover requests for filing. (tkd, ) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 82 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/9/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 04/09/2014)
87 SUMMONS Returned Executed by All Plaintiffs. Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD served on 2/17/2014, answers due 4/18/2014. (tkd, ) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
88 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Brian Christopher Roux on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4624081. (Roux, Brian) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
89 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Case Management Conference held on 10/17/2013 before Judge Zack Hawthorn. Court Reporter: Tonya Jackson, Telephone number: 409.654.2833.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.txed.uscourts.gov

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 5/22/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/2/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/31/2014. (tj, ) (Entered: 04/28/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 55 of 75

04/30/2014 05/01/2014 05/27/2014 05/28/2014
06/03/2014 06/03/2014 06/06/2014 06/09/2014
06/09/2014 06/11/2014 06/11/2014 06/13/2014
06/17/2014 06/18/2014 06/24/2014 06/25/2014
06/25/2014
06/25/2014

90 Agreed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Expert Witness Designations by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 90 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/1/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
91 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Automatic Stay of Claims Against Defendants Kurella Rao and Indo−Ameri Soft, LLC (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 05/27/2014)
92 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint re Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD.( Shapiro, Stephen) Modified on 5/29/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 05/28/2014)
93 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 64 Amended Complaint by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
94 ANSWER to 64 Amended Complaint by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD.(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 93 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/6/13. (zjh1) (Entered: 06/06/2014)
95 Unopposed MOTION for Entry of Consent Orders Regarding Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Order re Protocols for Production of ESI, # 2 Consent Supplemental Protective Order, # 3 Consent Clawback Order, # 4 Consent Order re Use of Discovery from Related Cases)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 6/10/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 06/09/2014)
96 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Submission of Expert Disclosure (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 95 Motion for Discovery. The oral order granting this motion will operate as a signature of the proposed orders. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6−11−2014. (Hawthorn, Zack) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
97 ORDER denying 76 Motion pursuant to Federal Rule 72 and LR 72(b) for review of magistrate's decision. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 6/11/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 06/12/2014)
98 MOTION of Amended Plaintiffs to Dismiss Without Prejudice the Claims Against Defendant Michael Pol, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 6/16/2014 (tkd, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/17/2014: # 1 Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 06/13/2014)
99 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that 70 Motion to Dismiss should be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/12/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
100 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 69 Motion to Reassert 31 Motion to Dismiss. It is recommended that 31 Motion to Dismiss should be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/18/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Telephone Conference set for 6/26/2014 08:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. (ttp, ) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
101 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) Modified on 6/26/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 06/25/2014)
102 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Corrected Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Shapiro, Stephen) Modified on 6/26/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 06/25/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore documents # 101−102, Motions to Withdraw as Counsel. Motion wil be refiled to comply with local rules re: motion and combined memorandum, certificate of conference, corrected heading.***

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 56 of 75

06/26/2014
06/26/2014 06/26/2014 06/27/2014 06/30/2014 07/02/2014

(tkd, ) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: 8:37am − 9:41 am Telephone Conference held on 6/26/2014. Appearances: John Fleming, Daniella Landers, Pla cnsl; Hal Ungar, Alan Weinberger, Timothy Cerniglia and Stephen Shapiro, Dft cnsl. (Courtroom Deputy & DCR Op: Piper, T.) (ttp, ) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Certificate of Conference, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
104 OBJECTION to 100 Report and Recommendation by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 7/11/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 06/26/2014)
105 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER resetting various deadlines. Final Pretrial Conference remains set for 4/9/15. Jury selection and trial remain set for 4/13/15. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 6/26/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
106 OBJECTION to 99 Report and Recommendations by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
107 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Telephone Hearing held on 6/26/2014 before Judge Zack Hawthorn. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Tonya Jackson, Telephone number: 409.654.2833.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have seven (7) business days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. The policy is located on our website at www.txed.uscourts.gov

07/07/2014
07/07/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER.. Redaction Request due 7/28/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/7/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/3/2014. (tj, ) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
108 ORDER designating plaintiffs for first trial setting. The parties have agreed the following Plaintiffs are designated to proceed to trial for the courts first trial setting: John Charuvila George, Iju James, Paul Sojan Kaliyadan, Sajimon Kutty and Joy Kallachiyill Varkey.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/7/2014. (bjc) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
109 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 105 Amended Scheduling Order by Billy R. Wilks on 6/30/14. (dlc) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
110 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lance R Rydberg on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4740861. (Rydberg, Lance) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
111 ***FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE IGNORE.*** MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record For The Plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order on Motion To Withdraw)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 7/11/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 07/11/2014)
NOTICE of Deficiency regarding the motoin to withdraw as attorney submitted by All Plaintiffs. No certificate of conference. Correction should be made by 1 business day. (bjc) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
112 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (Gary K. Shiu) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Unopposed Motion To Withdraw Gary K. Shiu As An Attorney Of Record For The Plaintiffs)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 07/11/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 57 of 75

07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/15/2014 07/15/2014 07/17/2014
07/21/2014
07/21/2014 07/23/2014
07/29/2014 07/29/2014 07/31/2014 08/04/2014 08/04/2014
08/04/2014 08/11/2014 09/05/2014

ORAL ORDER granting 112 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Gary Ka−Kui Shiu terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/14/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
113 RESPONSE in Opposition re 103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Of Record For Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants PVT. LTD. filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
114 RESPONSE in Opposition to 104 Objections To Magistrate's Recommendation to Deny Burnett's Jurisdictional Motion filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 7/15/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/14/2014)
115 ORDER denying 39 Motion to transfer venue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/14/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
116 ADVISORY concerning page limitations for appeals of magistrate judge decisions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/15/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 07/16/2014)
117 RESPONSE in Opposition to 106 Signal's Objections to 99 Report and Recommendation that Signal's Motion to Dismiss be Denied filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 7/18/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/17/2014)
118 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and extend other case related deadlines by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
119 REPLY to Response to Motion re 103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
120 REPLY in Further Support of Signal's Objections to 99 Report and Recommendation by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 7/24/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/23/2014)
121 NOTICE of Expert Witness Disclosure by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 7/30/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/29/2014)
122 SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER granting 118 Consent Motion for extension of time to complete discovery and extend other case related deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/29/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 07/30/2014)
123 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 69 Motion to Reassert 31 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 32 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/4/14. (zjh1) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
124 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE recommending the Burnett Defendants' "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)" should be denied re 32 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 7/31/14. (dlc, ) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
125 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 122 Second Amended Scheduling Order by Billy R. Wilks on 8/2/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 08/07/2014)
126 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 124 Report and Recommendation by Billy R. Wilks ON 8/8/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
127 MOTION to Compel by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Part 1) − Plaintiffs' Responses, # 2 Exhibit 1 (Part 2) − Plaintiffs' Responses, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Plaintiffs' Facebook Pages, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Depo Excerpts, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 09/05/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 58 of 75

09/11/2014 09/11/2014 09/11/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/12/2014 09/15/2014 09/15/2014 09/22/2014 09/22/2014 09/22/2014 09/29/2014 10/08/2014 10/08/2014 10/08/2014

128 ORDER adopting 99 Report and Recommendation and denying 70 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 9/11/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
129 ORDER adopting 100 Report and Recommendation and denying 31 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(2). Burnett's alternative request for an interlocutory appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals is also denied. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 9/11/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
130 ORDER adopting 124 Report and Recommendation and denying 32 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 9/11/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
131 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Heather M Niemeyer on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832432. (Niemeyer, Heather) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
132 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Kevin Patrick Maney on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832458. (Maney, Kevin) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
133 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Robert L Keller, II on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4832928. (Keller, Robert) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
134 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by James L Cornblatt on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4833035. (Cornblatt, James) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
135 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Mitchell P Hasenkampf on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4834400. (Hasenkampf, Mitchell) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
136 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Lauren Masur Davis on behalf of Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4835102. (Davis, Lauren) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
137 RESPONSE in Opposition re 127 Motion to Compel and REQUEST for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Signal's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production, # 2 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 9/23/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/22/2014)
138 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 137 Response in Opposition to Motion,.. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
139 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 137 Response in Opposition to Motion,.. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
140 REPLY in Further Support of 127 MOTION to Compel filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 9/30/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 09/29/2014)
141 Emergency Agreed MOTION to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/9/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/08/2014)
142 RESPONSE in Opposition re 141 Emergency Agreed MOTION to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines filed by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Shapiro, Stephen) Modified on 10/9/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/08/2014)
143 MOTION to Conduct a Telephone Status Conference re 141 Emergency Agreed MOTION to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines, 142

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10/08/2014 10/09/2014
10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014
10/09/2014 10/15/2014 10/16/2014 10/17/2014
10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014

Response in Opposition to Motion by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) Modified on 10/9/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/08/2014)
144 REPLY to Response to Motion re 141 Emergency Agreed MOTION to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/9/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/08/2014)
145 ORDER Setting Telephonic Conference on 103 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney and 141 Emergency Agreed Motion to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines. Telephonic Conference set for 10/9/2014 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. This order grants 143 Motion to Conduct a Telephone Status Conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/9/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
146 MOTION to Withdraw 103 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 146 Motion to Withdraw 103 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−9−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
ORAL ORDER denying 141 Motion for Extension of Time for reasons stated during telephonic conference held on 10−9−2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−9−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn: Motion Hearing held on 10/9/2014 re 141 Emergency Agreed MOTION to Extend Motion Filing and Deposition of Experts Deadlines filed by All Plaintiffs. Court hears arguments. Court denies motion. (Court Reporter DCR − Jill Veazey.) (jmv, ) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
147 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 127 MOTION to Compel and [ECF No. 137] Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Protective Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
148 MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 127 Motion to Compel. Further ordered that 137 Request for protective order is denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10/15/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
149 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER setting various deadlines. Final Pretrial Conference reset for 4/2/2015 at 9:00 AM. Jury Selection/Trial reset for 4/6/2015 at 9:00 AM. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 10/16/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
150 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Ron J. McAlear As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − McAlear Expert Report (filed in Texas), # 2 Exhibit B − McAlear Deposition (10−10−2014), # 3 Exhibit C − McAlear Expert Report (filed in David case), # 4 Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion To Exclude Ron J. McAlear As Expert)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
151 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Virginia Miles As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Virginia Miles Expert Report (Joseph case), # 2 Text of Proposed Order (Miles))(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
152 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Kevin Fox Gotham − Expert Report (Joseph case), # 2 Exhibit B − Kevin Fox Gotham Deposition (10−06−2014), # 3 Text of Proposed Order (Gotham))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
153 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal's Immigration Law Experts by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). Modified on 11/3/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 60 of 75

10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014 10/17/2014
10/17/2014
10/17/2014
10/17/2014 10/20/2014

154 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Don H. Strobel As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Don H. Strobel − Export Report (Joseph case), # 2 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
155 MOTION in Limine To Limit Testimony Of Enrique Gonzalez, III As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Enrique Gonzalez, III − Expert Report (Joseph case), # 2 Exhibit B − Enrique Gonzalez, III − Deposition (09−30−2014), # 3 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
156 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley As Expert by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Dr. Louise Shelley − Deposition (09−23−2014), # 2 Exhibit B − Dr. Louise Shelley Expert Report (Joseph case), # 3 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
157 MOTION in Limine /Limit Report and Testimony of Amy Mowl by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Expert Report Joseph in Globo, # 2 Exhibit A Expet Report Samuel in Globol, # 3 Exhibit A Expert Report David in Globol, # 4 Exhibit B − deposition testimony, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
158 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Expert Report Joseph in Globo, # 2 Exhibit A − Expert Report Samuel in globol, # 3 Exhibit A Expert Report David in Globol, # 4 Exhibit B − deposition testimony, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
159 MOTION in Limine or to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
160 ***FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE IGNORE.*** MOTION for Summary Judgment (Partial) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Issue, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 19, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15, # 18 Exhibit 16, # 19 Exhibit 17, # 20 Exhibit 18, # 21 Exhibit 19, # 22 Exhibit 20, # 23 Exhibit 21, # 24 Exhibit 22, # 25 Exhibit 23)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/20/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
161 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Issues, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15, # 18 Exhibit 16, # 19 Exhibit 17, # 20 Exhibit 18, # 21 Exhibit 19, # 22 Exhibit 20, # 23 Exhibit 21)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
162 MOTION for Leave to File 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading, # 3 Exhibit A−J, # 4 Exhibit K−X, # 5 Exhibit Y−AA, # 6 Exhibit 1−10, # 7 Exhibit 11−13, # 8 Exhibit 14−16, # 9 Exhibit 17, # 10 Exhibit 18−19, # 11 Exhibit 20A Part 1, # 12 Exhibit 20A Part 2, # 13 Exhibit 21−24, # 14 Affidavit, # 15 Statement of Uncontested Facts)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
163 Additional Attachment (Exhibit 25) to Main Document: 162 MOTION for Leave to File 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/20/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/17/2014)
***FILED in wrong case. Document # 160, motion for partial summary judgment. PLEASE IGNORE.***

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 61 of 75

10/20/2014 10/20/2014
10/21/2014 10/22/2014 10/22/2014 10/22/2014 10/22/2014 10/28/2014 10/29/2014 10/30/2014 10/30/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014

(bjc) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
ORAL ORDER denying 162 Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Signal has not filed a cross−claim against defendants Malvern C. Burnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. or the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 10−21−2014. (zjh1) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
164 ANSWER to 64 Second Amended Complaint , CROSSCLAIM against Malvern C. Barnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD, Global Resources, Inc., Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Indo−Ameri Soft, L.L.C., J&M Associates, Inc. of Mississippi, J&M Marine & Industrial, L.L.C., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C., Michael Pol, Kurella Rao, Billy R. Wilks by Signal International, Inc., Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, LLC.(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/21/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/20/2014)
165 EXHIBIT 20 to 162 MOTION for Leave to File 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 20)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 10/22/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/21/2014)
166 ANSWER to 19 First Amended Complaint, 64 Second Amended Complaint by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 10/23/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/22/2014)
167 MOTION to Transfer Venue by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cerniglia, Timothy) (Two−part motion; see also #169 Motion to Defer Crossclaim) Modified on 10/23/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/22/2014)
168 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Travis J Mock on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4894928. (Mock, Travis) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
169 MOTION to Defer Signal's Crossclaim by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Docketed for statistical purposes only; second part of 2−part motion. See also 167 Motion to Transfer Venue) (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
170 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Mary Beth Martinez on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−4903242. (Martinez, Mary) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
171 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 149 Amended Scheduling Order by Billy R. Wilks on 10/18/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
172 MOTION for Reconsideration of 127 Motion to Compel and OBJECTION to 148 Memorandum and Order on Motion to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Form I−914 Application)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 10/31/2014 (tkd, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/31/2014: # 2 Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/30/2014)
173 RESPONSE in Opposition re 150 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Ron J. McAlear As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
174 RESPONSE in Opposition re 151 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Virginia Miles As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Clyde Payne, # 2 Exhibit B − Portions of 1989 OSHA Field Manual)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
175 RESPONSE in Opposition re 153 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal's Immigration Law Experts filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Enrique Gonzalez, # 2 Exhibit B

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 62 of 75

10/31/2014 10/31/2014 10/31/2014
10/31/2014 11/01/2014
11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/03/2014 11/04/2014

− Speaking Engagement)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 11/3/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 10/31/2014)
176 RESPONSE in Opposition re 155 MOTION in Limine To Limit Testimony Of Enrique Gonzalez, III As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Expert Report of Enrique Gonzalez, # 2 Exhibit B − relevant portions of deposition trancript, # 3 Exhibit C − Speaking Engagements)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
177 RESPONSE in Opposition re 154 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Don H. Strobel As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
178 RESPONSE in Opposition re 152 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Richard Marler, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Lisa Spears, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Information considered by Kevin Fox Gotham, # 4 Exhibit 4 − CV of Kevin Fox Gotham, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Relevant portions of deposition transcript of Kevin Fox Gotham)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
179 MOTION for Leave to File Memorandam Opposition to Daubert Motions in Excess of Page Limits by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
180 RESPONSE in Opposition re 159 MOTION in Limine or to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony, 156 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley As Expert filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/01/2014)
181 RESPONSE in Opposition re 158 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − Report, # 3 Exhibit B − Deposition)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
182 RESPONSE in Opposition re 157 MOTION in Limine /Limit Report and Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Amy Mowl, # 2 Exhibit A − Amy Mowl Report, # 3 Exhibit B − Amy Mowl Deposition)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
ORAL ORDER granting 179 Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11−03−2014. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
183 RESPONSE in Opposition re 161 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Response to Signal's Statement of Issues to be Decided by Court, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 INDEX to Exhibits, # 4 Exhibit 1 − James Dep. Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit 2 − Baby Dep. Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit 3 − Varkey Dep. Excerpts, # 7 Exhibit 4 − Kaliyadan Dep. Excerpts, # 8 Exhibit 5 − Sanders e−mail (02/02/2007), # 9 Exhibit 6 − S. Dewan Class Dep. Excerpts (2009), # 10 Exhibit 7 − Pol Dep. Excerpts (2009), # 11 Exhibit 8 − Multilateral Business Agreement, # 12 Exhibit 9 − Power of Attorney, # 13 Exhibit 10 − Signal letter to Dewan (06/19/2006), # 14 Exhibit 11 − Skilled Worker Recruitment Agreement, # 15 Exhibit 12 − Burnett 2006 Retention Letter, # 16 Exhibit 13 − Burnett Jurisdiction Dep. Excerpts (2008), # 17 Exhibit 14 − Burnett Class Dep. Excerpts (2009), # 18 Exhibit 15 − Schnoor Class Dep. Excerpts (2009), # 19 Exhibit 16 − Cunningham Class Dep. Excerpts (2010), # 20 Exhibit 17 − Burnett Fee Agreement (July 2007), # 21 Exhibit 18 − Burnett Fee Agreement (Sept. 2007), # 22 Exhibit 19 − Global Resources e−mail (08/24/2006), # 23 Exhibit 20 − Weekly Update (08/11/2006), # 24 Exhibit 21 − Dewan/Burnett e−mails (12/16/2006), # 25 Exhibit 22 − Burnett letter to US Dep't of Home Security, # 26 Exhibit 23 − I−129 Petition, # 27 Exhibit 24 −

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 63 of 75

11/06/2014 11/06/2014 11/06/2014 11/07/2014

Orange Master List, # 28 Exhibit 25 − John Sanders notes (11/17/2006), # 29 Exhibit 26 − John Sanders notes (01/19/2007), # 30 Exhibit 27 − John Sanders notes (11/20/2006), # 31 Exhibit 28 − Compilation of e−mails)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
184 RESPONSE in Support re 158 MOTION in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
185 MOTION for Leave to Supplement Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
186 ***FILED IN ERROR. PLEASE IGNORE.*** AMENDED ANSWER to Plaintiffs' RICO Fraud Chart (Exhibit 1) 164 Answer to Amended Complaint, Crossclaim,,,, by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 11/7/2014 (bjc, ). (Entered: 11/06/2014)
***FILED IN ERROR. Document # 324, exhibit. Exhibits are not filed as a stand alone document. PLEASE IGNORE. Attorney will re−file.***

11/10/2014 11/10/2014 11/10/2014 11/10/2014 11/11/2014 11/11/2014
11/11/2014 11/12/2014

(bjc) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
187 REPLY to Response to Motion re 161 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
188 RESPONSE in Opposition re 172 MOTION for Reconsideration re 148 Order on Motion to Compel and Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
189 REPLY to Response to Motion re 150 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Ron J. McAlear As Expert In Support Of Motion To Exclude filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
190 REPLY to Response to Motion re 151 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Virginia Miles As Expert In Support Of Motion To Exclude Virginia Miles filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Payne Deposition Excerpt, # 2 Exhibit B − Exhibit 1 [Payne] Report, # 3 Exhibit C − Signorino Deposition Excerpt)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/10/2014)
191 REPLY to Response to Motion re 157 MOTION in Limine /Limit Report and Testimony of Amy Mowl filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Amy Mowl depo transcript, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
192 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Response of Signal Defendants Opposing Plaintiffs' Objection [#172] to Magistrate's Memorandum and Order [#148] Granting in Part and Denying in Part Signal's Motion [#127] to Compel by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
193 RESPONSE in Opposition re 172 MOTION for Reconsideration re 148 Order on Motion to Compel and Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 11/11/2014)
194 REPLY to Response to Motion re 152 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham As Expert filed by All Plaintiffs (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 11/13/2014

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 64 of 75

11/12/2014 11/12/2014 11/12/2014 11/13/2014 11/17/2014
11/20/2014 11/20/2014 11/21/2014 11/24/2014 12/04/2014 12/08/2014

(tkd, ). (Entered: 11/12/2014)
195 REPLY to Response to Motion re 156 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Dr. Louise Shelley As Expert filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 11/13/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/12/2014)
196 REPLY to Response to Motion re 154 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Don H. Strobel As Expert filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 11/13/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/12/2014)
197 REPLY to Response to Motion re 155 MOTION in Limine To Limit Testimony Of Enrique Gonzalez, III As Expert filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − E−mail (Aug. 24, 2006))(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 11/13/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/12/2014)
198 AMENDED ANSWER to 64 Second Amended Complaint by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 11/14/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/13/2014)
199 MOTION for Reconsideration of 10/20/2014 Oral Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Partial MSJ re Burnett, # 3 Statement of Uncontested Facts, # 4 Text of Proposed Order (MSJ), # 5 Exhibit A, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit C, # 8 Exhibit D, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H, # 13 Exhibit I, # 14 Exhibit J, # 15 Exhibit K, # 16 Exhibit L, # 17 Exhibit M, # 18 Exhibit N, # 19 Exhibit O, # 20 Exhibit P, # 21 Exhibit Q, # 22 Exhibit R, # 23 Exhibit S, # 24 Exhibit T, # 25 Exhibit U, # 26 Exhibit V, # 27 Exhibit W, # 28 Exhibit X, # 29 Exhibit Y, # 30 Exhibit Z, # 31 Exhibit AA, # 32 Exhibit 1, # 33 Exhibit 2, # 34 Exhibit 3, # 35 Exhibit 4, # 36 Exhibit 5, # 37 Exhibit 6, # 38 Exhibit 7, # 39 Exhibit 8, # 40 Exhibit 9, # 41 Exhibit 10, # 42 Exhibit 11, # 43 Exhibit 12, # 44 Exhibit 13, # 45 Exhibit 14, # 46 Exhibit 15, # 47 Exhibit 16, # 48 Exhibit 17, # 49 Exhibit 18, # 50 Exhibit 19, # 51 Exhibit 20, # 52 Exhibit 20A, # 53 Exhibit 21, # 54 Exhibit 22, # 55 Exhibit 23, # 56 Exhibit 24, # 57 Exhibit 25, # 58 Exhibit 26, # 59 Exhibit 27, # 60 Exhibit 28, # 61 Exhibit 29, # 62 Exhibit 30, # 63 Exhibit 31)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 11/18/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/17/2014)
200 SUR−REPLY to Reply to Response to Motion re 161 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
201 RESPONSE in Opposition re 199 MOTION for Reconsideration of 10/20/2014 Oral Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 11/20/2014)
202 REPLY to Response to Motion re 172 MOTION for Reconsideration re 148 Order on Motion to Compel and Objection to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/21/2014)
203 RESPONSE in Opposition re 185 MOTION for Leave to Supplemental Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (see also 198 ) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
204 STIPULATION of Dismissal of Claims of Plaintiff Sajimon Kutty by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 12/04/2014)
205 ORDER SEVERING AND TRANSFERRING CROSS−CLAIMS. Order granting in part 167 and 169 Motions to Defer or Transfer Venue of Cross−claims. The Clerk is directed to sever Signal's cross−claims against cross−defendants Malvern C Burnett, Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants Pvt Ltd, Global Resources Inc, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center LLC, Indo−Ameri Soft LLC, J&M Associates Inc of Mississippi, J&M Marine & Industrial LLC, Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett APC, Michael Pol, Kurella Rao, and Billy R Wilks. These claims are to be transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Further ordered that 199 Signal's Motion for Reconsideration and 201 Burnett's Response are part of the severed action. Signed by

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12/11/2014 12/12/2014 12/23/2014 12/23/2014 01/06/2015 01/07/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/15/2015
01/15/2015 01/15/2015 01/16/2015 01/16/2015 01/27/2015
01/28/2015 01/30/2015 01/30/2015

Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 12/8/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
***Cross−claims transferred from Texas Eastern have been opened in Eastern District of Louisiana as case 2:14−cv−02826, filed 12/11/2014. (tkd, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
206 ORDER granting 185 Signal's Motion for leave to supplement answer to second amended complaint. The relief requested by pltfs in their response is denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 12/12/14. (tkd, ) (Entered: 12/15/2014)
207 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
208 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 12/29/2014 (tkd, ). (Entered: 12/23/2014)
209 EXHIBIT A to 208 Third Amended Complaint.. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 1/7/2015 (bjc, ). (Entered: 01/06/2015)
210 ORDER setting time limits for each party to present its case. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 1/7/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 01/08/2015)
211 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 1/15/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 01/15/2015)
212 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 210 Order by Billy R. Wilks on 1/12/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
213 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 211 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authority.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit David Doc. No.2045 (Gotham), # 2 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2069 (McAlear), # 3 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2077 (Partial SJ − TVPA), # 4 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2090 (Partial SJ − TVPA; modifies Doc. No. 2077), # 5 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2115 (Partial SJ − RICO), # 6 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2131 (Mowl), # 7 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2132 (Signorino and Payne [for Miles]), # 8 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2136 (Gonzalez))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
214 Second MOTION for Leave to File Unopposed Supplemental Authority by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
215 Additional Attachments to Main Document: 214 Second MOTION for Leave to File Unopposed Supplemental Authority.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit David Doc. No. 2134)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 211 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1−16−2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 214 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1−16−2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
216 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending that the 98 MOTION of Amended Plaintiffs to Dismiss Without Prejudice the Claims Against Defendant Michael Pol be granted. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1/27/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 207 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 1−28−2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
217 ORDER directing the parties to submit briefing on any issues related to choice of law or conflicts on law by 2/20/15. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 1/30/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
218 ORDER re Presenting Witnesses. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 1/30/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 01/30/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 66 of 75

02/04/2015 02/05/2015 02/09/2015 02/11/2015 02/12/2015
02/17/2015 02/18/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015
02/23/2015 02/24/2015 02/24/2015 02/25/2015 02/25/2015 02/26/2015

219 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that 161 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/4/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
220 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 216 Report and Recommendation by Billy R. Wilks. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/06/2015)
221 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 217 and 218 Orders by Billy R. Wilks on 2/5/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 192 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Response. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2−11−2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
222 MEMORANDUM and ORDER on the Parties' Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony. Order granting in part 150 Motion to Exclude Ron J McAlear as Expert; denying 151 Motion to Exclude Virginia Miles as Expert; granting in part 152 Motion to Exclude Kevin Fox Gotham as Expert; granting in part 153 Motion to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Signal's Immigration Law Expert; granting 154 Motion to Exclude Donald H Strobel as Expert; granting 155 Motion to Limit the Testimony of Enrique Gonzalez III as Expert; granting in part 156 Motion to Exclude Dr Louise Shelley as Expert; denying 157 Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Amy Mowl; granting in part 158 Motion in Limine to Exclude/Limit Testimony of Florence Burke; granting 159 Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 2/12/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
223 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 219 Report and Recommendation by Billy R. Wilks on 2/11/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
224 OBJECTIONS to 219 Report and Recommendation filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/19/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/18/2015)
225 Choice of Law BRIEF by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/23/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/20/2015)
226 Choice of Law BRIEF filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index to Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Sharma Decl., # 3 Exhibit 2 − Atty Servs Agmt, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Dewan Agmt w/Kaliyadan, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Global Resources Agmt w/Dewan, # 6 Exhibit 5 − Recruitment Agmt between Global and Signal, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Signal Agmt w/Burnett, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Power of Atty (Dewan) (08/03/06), # 9 Exhibit 8 − Signal Agmt w/Dewan, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Power of Atty (Dewan) (6/19/06), # 11 Exhibit 10 − Burnett Dep. Excerpts, # 12 Exhibit 11 − Dewan Dep. Excerpts, # 13 Exhibit 12 − Kaliyadan Dep. Excerpts, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Multilateral Business Agmt)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 2/23/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/20/2015)
229 LETTER MOTION to Dismiss by Billy R. Wilks. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
227 MOTION to Stay re 148 Order on Motion to Compel by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
228 ORDER denying 172 Pltf's Motion for Reconsideration of Signal's Motion to Compel and Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order. Order also denying 188 Signal's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 2/24/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
231 OBJECTIONS to 222 Memorandum and Order Regarding Daubert Motions by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 2/26/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/25/2015)
232 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 02/25/2015)
233 OBJECTION pursuant to Federal Rule 72(a) and LR72(b) to 222 Memorandum and Order on Motions to Exclude Testimony filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 2/27/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 02/26/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 67 of 75

03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/03/2015 03/04/2015 03/05/2015 03/05/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015 03/06/2015
03/06/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/10/2015

234 ORDER denying as moot 227 Motion for stay of order on motion to compel. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 2/28/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
235 MOTION for Sanctions (FRCP 37) by Signal International Texas, G.P. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment added on 3/4/2015: # 3 Revised Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/02/2015)
236 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Bryan M Ward on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5082322. (Ward, Bryan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 9/6/2016: # 1 Sealed Attachment) (pkb, ). (Entered: 03/03/2015)
237 ORDER adopting 216 Report and Recommendation and granting 98 Motion of amended plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice the claims against deft Michael Pol. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/4/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/05/2015)
238 FILED IN ERROR as a motion. This is a notice only. MOTION for Disclosure (Plaintiffs' Video Deposition Designations) by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/6/2015 (tkd, ). Modified on 3/6/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/05/2015)
239 FILED IN ERROR as a motion. This is a notice only. MOTION for Disclosure Deposition Designations by Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/6/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/05/2015)
240 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt by Billy R. Wilks on 3/3/15 of copies of emails and attachments sent to counsel regarding Final Pretrial and Exhibit Preparation and forwarded to pro se dft Billy R. Wilks via CMRRR. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
241 ORDER re: Choice of Law. The Court concludes that Texas law should govern the breach of contract and fraud claims at trial. The parties have until 3/13/15 to submit any additional choice−of−law briefing. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/6/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
242 MOTION to Redepose Plaintiffs on T−Visa Evidence by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/9/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/06/2015)
243 MOTION to Expedite Hearing on Signal's Motion to Redepose Plaintiffs on T−Visa Evidence by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/06/2015)
244 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Shane G Ramsey on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5089524. (Ramsey, Shane) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
245 RESPONSE to 233 Signal's Objection To Magistrate's Memorandum and Order on the Parties' Motions To Exclude Testimony by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/10/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/09/2015)
246 ORDER directing plaintiffs to file responses to the following motions by 3/11/15 at 5:00 pm: 235 Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions, 242 Motion to Redepose Plaintiffs on T−Visa Evidence and 243 Motion for Expedited Hearing. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/9/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
247 RESPONSE in Opposition to 224 Signal's Objections to 219 Report and Recommendation by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/10/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/09/2015)
248 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 248 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/10/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 68 of 75

03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/10/2015 03/11/2015
03/11/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015
03/12/2015
03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015
03/12/2015 03/12/2015

ORAL ORDER granting 232 Unopposed Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/10/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
249 Unopposed MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Kurella Rao and Indo−Ameri Soft, LLC by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
250 ORDER granting 249 Motion to Dismiss pltfs' claims against defts Kurella Rao and Indo−Ameri Soft LLC without prejudice. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/10/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
251 RESPONSE in Opposition re 242 MOTION to Redepose Plaintiffs on T−Visa Evidence filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Order on Motion in Limine filed in David Case, # 2 Exhibit B − E−mail and Press Release, # 3 Exhibit C − Excerpts from David Trial Testimony, # 4 Exhibit D − Excerpts from Kadakkarappally Dep., # 5 Exhibit E − Excerpts from Baby Dep.)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
252 RESPONSE in Opposition re 235 MOTION for Sanctions (FRCP 37) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpts from Baby Dep., # 2 Exhibit B − Order (Davis v. Signal))(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/12/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/11/2015)
253 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Eben P Colby on behalf of Philip Baby, Iju James, Sojan Paul Kaliyadan, Joy Kallachiyil Varkey. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5096184. (Colby, Eben) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
254 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Related to Gender Based Equal Pay Act Lawsuit of Lisa Spears by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/12/2015: # 3 Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/12/2015)
255 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs From Reference to Alleged Oral Promises as Contracts by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
256 MOTION in Limine Regarding the Use of David Verdict and Trial Testimony by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
257 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate and Limit the Presentation of Otherwise Irrelevant Financial Information by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
258 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Motion in Limine Regarding the Use of Inflammatory Terms by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
259 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence of Events Occurring in Mississippi on March 8 and 9 of 2007 by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
260 MOTION in Limine by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
261 RESPONSE in Opposition re 229 MOTION to Dismiss of defts Billy Wilks, J & M Associates of Mississippi, Inc., and J & M Marine & Industrial, LLC filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/13/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/12/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 69 of 75

03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015
03/12/2015 03/12/2015 03/12/2015
03/12/2015 03/12/2015
03/13/2015 03/13/2015 03/13/2015 03/13/2015 03/16/2015 03/16/2015

262 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Deposition Designations (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
263 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Objections to and Counter−Designations for Video Deposition Designations Submitted by Signal Defendants [ECF No. 239]) (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
264 MOTION in Limine re Refund Payments Made to Non−Signal Workes by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
265 MOTION in Limine Regarding T−Visas, Immigration Status, etc. by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
266 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence Related to OSHA Applicability and Compliance by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/23/2015: # 3 Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/12/2015)
267 MOTION in Limine Regarding Post−Signal Activities by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
268 MOTION in Limine Regarding Signal's Post−Lawsuit Conduct by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − Rhonda George Dep. (excerpt))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
269 MOTION in Limine Regarding Counsel's Political Views, Resources, etc. by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − Soni Dep. (Vol. II − excerpt), # 3 Exhibit B − Bingle Trial Testimony, # 4 Exhibit C − Schnoor Dep. (excerpt), # 5 Exhibit D − Schnoor Trial Testimony, # 6 Exhibit E − Marler e−mail, # 7 Exhibit F − James Dep. (Vol. I − excerpt), # 8 Exhibit G − Varkey Dep. (excerpt), # 9 Exhibit H − Kaliyadan Dep. (excerpt), # 10 Exhibit I − Baby Dep. (excerpt), # 11 Exhibit J − James Dep. (Vol. II − excerpt), # 12 Exhibit K − Soni Dep. (Vol. I − excerpt))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
270 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM of Choice of Law by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 3/13/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/12/2015)
271 Proposed Pretrial Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Burnett Defendants' Witness List, # 2 Dewan Defendants' Witness List, # 3 Signal Defendants' Witness List, # 4 Plaintiffs' Witness List, # 5 Burnett Defendants' Exhibit List, # 6 Dewan Defendants' Exhibit List, # 7 Signal Defendants' Exhibit List, # 8 Plaintiffs' Exhibit List)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
272 REPLY to Response to Motion re 242 MOTION to Redepose Plaintiffs on T−Visa Evidence filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
273 BRIEF filed (Supplemental Brief on Choice of Law Filed Pursuant to Court's Mar. 6, 2015 Order (Doc. 241)) by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
274 NOTICE by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (Signal's Objections to Video Deposition Designation [ECF 238]) (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
275 BRIEF (Signal Defendants' Supplemental Choice−of−Law Brief) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/13/2015)
276 Emergency MOTION to Continue Trial (Ex Parte) by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
277 RESPONSE in Opposition re 267 MOTION in Limine Regarding Post−Signal Activities filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 70 of 75

03/16/2015
03/16/2015
03/16/2015
03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/17/2015 03/18/2015 03/18/2015
03/18/2015 03/18/2015 03/18/2015

Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
278 RESPONSE in Opposition re 265 MOTION in Limine Regarding T−Visas, Immigration Status, etc. filed by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C.. (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
279 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Reply in Support of Rule 37 Sanctions by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/16/2015)
280 ORDER denying 276 Motion to Continue. Should any party file for bankruptcy, it is ordered to notify this court immediately and include the court and case number for the proceedings. The party filing for bankruptcy is further ordered to notify opposing counsel immediately of the bankruptcy proceedings, so that opposing counsel does not inadvertently violate any stay issued by the bankruptcy court. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/16/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
281 ORDER denying 235 Motion for Sanctions; denying 242 Motion to Take Deposition ; denying as moot 243 Motion to Expedite. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 03/17/2015. (ttp, ) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
282 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending the 229 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Billy R. Wilks be denied.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/17/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
283 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Anjali J Nair on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5104010. (Nair, Anjali) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
284 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Meredith B Stewart on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5104012. (Stewart, Meredith) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
ORAL ORDER denying as MOOT 279 Motion for Leave to File Reply Under Seal. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 3/17/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
285 ORDERED that the magistrate judges report and recommendation (Doc. No. 219) is adopted; and the Motion (Doc. No. 161) is denied.. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/17/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
286 ORDER on limitations of trial time. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/17/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
287 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT by Billy R. Wilks on 3/14/15 of 241 Order. (mrp, ) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
288 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance − Pro Hac Vice by Matthew J Bowness on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0540−5107129. (Bowness, Matthew) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
289 SEALED MOTION in Limine Regarding Use of Inflammatory Terms by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/19/2015: # 3 Text of Proposed Order) (bjc, ). Modified on 3/19/2015 (bjc, ). (Entered: 03/18/2015)
290 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Gabriel A. Mendel) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
291 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Jaliya S. Faulkner) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/18/2015)
292 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Teresa L. Sulmers, now Teresa S. Bouchard) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/18/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-324 As of: 11/23/2019 11:26 AM CST 71 of 75

03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015
03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015

293 RESPONSE in Opposition re 268 MOTION in Limine Regarding Signal's Post−Lawsuit Conduct filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit A−1, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit B−1, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
294 RESPONSE in Opposition re 267 MOTION in Limine Regarding Post−Signal Activities filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
295 RESPONSE in Opposition re 269 MOTION in Limine Regarding Counsel's Political Views, Resources, etc. filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
296 RESPONSE in Opposition re 264 MOTION in Limine re Refund Payments Made to Non−Signal Workes filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
297 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Signal Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of T−Visas, Related Documents, and Immigration Status by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
298 OBJECTIONS by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC to 262 Notice of Deposition Designations (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/20/2015 (bjc, ). (Entered: 03/19/2015)
299 SEALED RESPONSE to Motion re 265 MOTION in Limine Regarding T−Visas, Immigration Status, etc. filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
300 OBJECTIONS by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC to 271 Proposed Witness List (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/20/2015 (bjc, ). (Entered: 03/19/2015)
301 RESPONSE in Opposition re 254 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Related to Gender Based Equal Pay Act Lawsuit of Lisa Spears filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1 − David Trial Tr. (excerpts), # 3 Exhibit 2 − Spears Dep. (excerpts), # 4 Exhibit 3 − Cunningham Dep. (excerpts))(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
302 RESPONSE in Opposition re 266 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence Related to OSHA Applicability and Compliance filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − OSHA Memorandum)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
303 RESPONSE in Opposition re 255 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs From Reference to Alleged Oral Promises as Contracts filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
304 RESPONSE in Opposition re 257 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate and Limit the Presentation of Otherwise Irrelevant Financial Information filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − David Order on Bifurcation)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
305 RESPONSE in Opposition re 264 MOTION in Limine re Refund Payments Made to Non−Signal Workes filed by Sachin Dewan, Dewan Consultants PVT.LTD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Master List of Refunds)(Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 03/19/2015)

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03/19/2015
03/19/2015
03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/20/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015

306 RESPONSE in Opposition re 259 MOTION in Limine To Exclude Evidence of Events Occurring in Mississippi on March 8 and 9 of 2007 filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1 − David Ex. 940, # 3 Exhibit 2 − David Ex. 1489, # 4 Exhibit 3 − Rigolo Dep. (excerpts), # 5 Exhibit 4 − Marler Dep. (excerpts), # 6 Exhibit 5 − Schnoor Dep. (excerpts), # 7 Exhibit 6 − Snyder Trial Testimony, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Stopher Dep. (excerpts), # 9 Exhibit 8 − James Dep. (excerpts), # 10 Exhibit 9 − Varkey Dep. (excerpts), # 11 Exhibit 10 − Baby Dep. (excerpts), # 12 Exhibit 11 − Kaliyadan Dep. (excerpts), # 13 Exhibit 12 − Cunningham Trial Testimony, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Shouse Trial Testimony)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
307 RESPONSE in Opposition re 256 MOTION in Limine Regarding the Use of David Verdict and Trial Testimony filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Cunningham Trial Testimony, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Schnoor Trial Testimony, # 4 Exhibit 3 − David Trial Ex. 199, # 5 Exhibit 4 − Burnett Dep. (excerpts), # 6 Exhibit 5 − Dewan Dep. (excerpts), # 7 Exhibit 6 − Pol Trial Testimony, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Marler Trial Testimony, # 9 Exhibit 8 − Binion Trial Testimony, # 10 Exhibit 9 − Marler Dep. (excerpts), # 11 Exhibit 10 − Sanders Dep. (11−19−09) (excerpts), # 12 Exhibit 11 − Rigolo Dep. (excerpts), # 13 Exhibit 12 − Bingle Trial Testimony, # 14 Exhibit 13 − Schnoor Dep. (excerpts), # 15 Exhibit 14 − Varkey Dep. (excerpts), # 16 Exhibit 15 − Kadakkarappally Trial Testimony, # 17 Exhibit 16 − Snyder Dep. (10−1−09) (excerpts), # 18 Exhibit 17 − David Trial Ex. 126, # 19 Exhibit 18 − Empl. Agmt., # 20 Exhibit 19 − Bingle Dep. (excerpts), # 21 Exhibit 20 − David Trial Ex. 715, # 22 Exhibit 21 − Man Camp Agmt., # 23 Exhibit 22 − Sanders Dep. (11−20−09) (excerpts), # 24 Exhibit 23 − Spears E−Mail, # 25 Exhibit 24 − HRT_SIA000308269, # 26 Exhibit 25 − Snyder Dep. (5−28−14) (excerpts), # 27 Exhibit 26 − Snyder Dep. Exs. 6−12, # 28 Exhibit 27 − Maness Trial Testimony)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
308 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 271 Proposed Pretrial Order, (Plaintiffs' Objs. to Signal's and Dewan's Witness Lists) (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
309 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs (of Plaintiffs' Objections to and Counter−Designations to Signal's Deposition Designations [Doc. 239]) (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
310 NOTICE by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC Chart of Signal Oppositions to Plaintiffs' MIL (Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
311 NOTICE by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. Objection to Plaintiffs' Witness (Cerniglia, Timothy) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
312 OBJECTIONS to 308 Pltfs' Exhibits by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/24/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
313 OBJECTIONS to Pltfs' Exhibits by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 3/24/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
314 OBJECTION to Signal's Exhibits by Malvern C. Barnett, Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, LLC., Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, A.P.C. (Cerniglia, Timothy) Modified on 3/24/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
315 Proposed Jury Instructions by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
316 FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore. MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal (Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Signal's Motion in Limine Regarding the Use of Inflammatory Terms) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/24/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
317 SEALED RESPONSE to Motion re 289 SEALED MOTION in Limine Regarding Use of Inflammatory Terms filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A − Sanders e−mail (11−05−2006), # 3 Exhibit B − Schnoor Dep. (excerpts), # 4 Exhibit C − Rigolo Dep. (excerpts), # 5 Exhibit D − Memo. of

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03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/23/2015 03/24/2015 03/24/2015 03/24/2015 03/30/2015
04/02/2015 04/06/2015
04/07/2015 04/07/2015
04/08/2015
04/16/2015 05/29/2015

Understanding, # 6 Exhibit E − GM Proposal for Labor Camp, # 7 Exhibit F − General Marine Leasing Proposal for Labor Camp, # 8 Exhibit G − George Dep. (excerpts), # 9 Exhibit H − Binion Dep. (excerpts), # 10 Exhibit I − Bingle Dep. (excerpts), # 11 Exhibit J − Cunningham Dep. (excerpts), # 12 Exhibit K − Tanner Dep. (excerpts), # 13 Exhibit L − Hospital Emergency Room Records (S. Vijayan), # 14 Exhibit M − Baby Dep. (excerpts), # 15 Exhibit N − Baby Dep. Ex. 31, # 16 Exhibit O − Sanders e−mail (10/12/2006))(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 3/24/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/23/2015)
***FILED IN ERROR. Please ignore document # 316, Pltfs' Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Motion must be refiled with a certificate of conference. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
319 ORDER denying 231 Pltfs' Objections to 222 Memorandum and Order on the Parties' Daubert Motions. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/22/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
320 ORDER denying 233 Defts' Objections to 222 Memorandum and Order on the Parties' Daubert Motions. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/22/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
318 ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL. Final Pretrial Conference reset for 7/9/2015 at 9:00 AM. Jury Selection/Trial reset for 7/13/2015 at 9:00 AM. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/24/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
321 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal (Brief in Opposition to Signal's Motion in Limine Regarding Use of Inflammatory Terms) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) (Entered: 03/24/2015)
322 Certified Mail GREEN CARD showing receipt of 282 Report and Recommendation by Billy R. Wilks on 3/21/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
323 Stricken by 326 Order. OBJECTION pursuant to Federal Rule 72(a) and LR 72(b) to 281 Memorandum and Order denying Signal's motion to re−depose the plaintiffs filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 3/31/2015 (tkd, ). Modified on 4/8/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/30/2015)
324 MOTION to Seal Rec. Doc. 323 by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
325 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 323 Objection to Memorandum and Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Landers, Daniella) Modified on 4/7/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 04/06/2015)
ORAL ORDER granting 325 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/7/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
326 ORDER granting in part 324 Motion to file Objection to Memorandum and Order under seal. The Clerk is directed to strike #323 Objection. Signal may re−file its objections in compliance with this order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 4/7/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
327 OBJECTION to 281 Order denying Signal's Motion to re−depose the Plaintiffs (Pursuant to Federal Rule 72(a) and LR 72(b)) filed by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 4/9/2015 (bjc, ). (Entered: 04/08/2015)
328 ORDER adopting 282 Report and Recommendation and denying 229 Motion to Dismiss filed by Billy R. Wilks. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 4/16/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
329 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 327 Objection to Order denying motion to re−depose the plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ward, Bryan) Modified on 6/1/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 05/29/2015)

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05/29/2015 06/01/2015 06/10/2015
06/26/2015
06/29/2015 07/13/2015
07/14/2015
07/30/2015 09/04/2015 11/12/2015 03/11/2016 07/11/2016 11/08/2016 11/16/2016
11/29/2016 03/08/2017 07/07/2017 11/06/2017 03/06/2018

ORAL ORDER denying 329 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 5/29/2015. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
330 RESPONSE to 327 Signal's Objections to Judge Hawthorn's Order on Signal's Motion to Re−Depose Plaintiffs filed by All Plaintiffs. (Landers, Daniella) Modified on 6/2/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 06/01/2015)
331 Consent MOTION to Continue Trial Date by All Parties by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit C−1)(Hangartner, Erin) (Entered: 06/10/2015)
332 ORDER granting 331 MOTION to Continue Trial Date by All Parties. Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/2/2016 09:00 AM in Ctrm 2 (Beaumont) before Judge Ron Clark. Jury Selection and Trial set for 6/6/2016 09:00 AM in Ctrm 2 (Beaumont) before Judge Ron Clark.. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 6/26/2015. (bjc, ) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
333 ORDER denying 327 Defts' Objections to 281 Order denying motion to re−depose the plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 6/29/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
334 SUGGESTION OF BANKRUPTCY by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1, # 2 Exhibit A−2, # 3 Exhibit A−3, # 4 Exhibit A−4, # 5 Exhibit A−5)(Hangartner, Erin) Modified on 7/14/2015 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/13/2015)
335 ORDER STAYING CASE Pursuant to Bankruptcy. The parties are directed to notify the Court every 120 days regarding the status of bankruptcy proceedings. A letter brief regarding severance of certain claims may be filed by 7/31/15; deadline for any opposition is governed by Local Rule CV−7(e). Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 7/14/15. (tkd, ) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
336 Letter Brief filed by All Plaintiffs (Ward, Bryan) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
337 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Anjali J. Nair) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Ward, Bryan) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
338 STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Ward, Bryan) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
339 STATUS REPORT (Second Status Report) by All Plaintiffs. (Ward, Bryan) (Entered: 03/11/2016)
340 THIRD STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 7/12/2016 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/11/2016)
341 FOURTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 11/8/2016 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/08/2016)
342 Ex Parte MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Brian C. Roux by Signal International Texas, G.P., Signal International Texas, L.P., Signal International, Inc., Signal International, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hangartner, Erin) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/17/2016: # 2 Revised Proposed Order) (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/16/2016)
ORDER granting 342 Defendants' Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Brian Christopher Roux terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 11/29/2016. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
343 FIFTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 3/8/2017 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/08/2017)
344 SIXTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 7/10/2017 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/07/2017)
345 SEVENTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 11/7/2017 (tkd, ). (Entered: 11/06/2017)
346 EIGHTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 3/7/2018 (tkd, ). (Entered: 03/06/2018)

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07/02/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 10/31/2018 03/01/2019 07/02/2019 10/30/2019

347 NINTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 7/3/2018 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/02/2018)
ORAL ORDER granting 291 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jaliya S Faulkner terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/27/2018. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
ORAL ORDER granting 290 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Gabriel Adam Mendel terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/27/2018. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
ORAL ORDER granting 292 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Teresa L Sulmers terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/27/2018. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
ORAL ORDER granting 337 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Anjali J Nair terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn on 8/27/2018. (zjh1, ) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
348 STATUS REPORT (Tenth Status Report) by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
349 STATUS REPORT (Eleventh Status Report) by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
350 TWELFTH STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) Modified on 7/3/2019 (tkd, ). (Entered: 07/02/2019)
351 STATUS REPORT Thirteenth Status Report by All Plaintiffs. (Fleming, John) (Entered: 10/30/2019)