Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 1 Filed 09/21/16 Page 1 of 42

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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V.W., a minor, by and through his parent

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and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS; :

R.C., a minor, by and through his parent and

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natural guardian SANDRA CHAMBERS;

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C.I., a minor, by and through his parent and

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natural guardian VERTELL PENDARVIS;

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M.R., a minor, by and through his parent and :

natural guardian KAREN RAYMOND;

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F.K., a minor, by and through his parent and

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natural guardian KASHINDE

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KABAGWIRA; and J.P., a minor, by and

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through his parent and natural guardian

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ALISSA QUIÑONES; on behalf of

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themselves and all others similarly situated,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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EUGENE CONWAY, Onondaga County Sheriff, :

in his official capacity; ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, :

Chief Custody Deputy of the Onondaga County :

Justice Center, in his official capacity; KEVIN M. :

BRISSON, Assistant Chief Custody Deputy, in his:

official capacity; and SYRACUSE CITY

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SCHOOL DISTRICT,

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Defendants.

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 9_:1_6__-CV-_1_1_5_0_(_D_N_ H/DEP)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. This class-action civil-rights lawsuit challenges the solitary confinement of 16and 17-year-olds, most of whom have not been convicted of any crime, at the Onondaga County Justice Center. Despite an emerging consensus that solitary confinement places juveniles at risk of serious harm—including suicide, psychosis, and post-traumatic stress disorder—and despite a national abandonment of solitary confinement of juveniles, the Onondaga County Sheriff’s

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Office has embraced the frequent and arbitrary use of solitary confinement. As the Sheriff’s Office is well aware, these practices are exposing the young people held at the so-called “Justice Center”—who are predominantly Black or Latino—to serious harm, to the point that a number of them have threatened suicide. Compounding the profound consequences of the Office’s wanton use of solitary confinement, Sheriff’s Office officials also are denying juveniles basic educational services and programming, including services needed to address their disabilities.
2. At the Justice Center, 16- and 17-year-olds are routinely confined alone in tiny, barren cells—typically about 7’ x 9’—for 23 hours a day or more for weeks and even months on end for alleged misbehavior. These children, many of whom already have mental illnesses, have little to nothing to do in the cells: no meaningful human interaction, no education or programming, no music or television, and limited reading materials. If they try to talk to other children outside their cells, they risk additional discipline. Jail staff occasionally come by, at best to ask if the juveniles are feeling homicidal or suicidal. Adults who are housed in the same area threaten to douse them in feces and urine and to sexually assault them. The children are given at most one hour each day for “recreation,” which might take place in empty, chain-linked, filthy indoors cages not much bigger than their cells. Juveniles who reach their breaking point and say that they want to kill themselves are moved to a mental health unit and confined there on suicide watch until being returned to solitary to continue their punishment.
3. The Sheriff’s Office is imposing or extending solitary confinement for minor misbehavior that is not unusual for teenagers, especially those with mental health disabilities. One juvenile was placed in solitary for 32 days for speaking loudly and refusing to be quiet and another for 20 days for being loud, disrespectful, and throwing juice; one juvenile already in solitary received an additional 60 days for throwing water through the slot of his cell door and
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another received an additional 20 days for banging on her cell door and yelling. And when children try to appeal their placement in solitary or to complain about the conditions of their confinement, Sheriff’s Office staff routinely ignore them, tell them no complaint forms are available or go so far as to tear up or throw away forms that juveniles are able to complete.
4. Sheriff’s Office staff members have sent juveniles to solitary for seemingly sadistic reasons. One deputy made each teen on a basketball court pick a number and told them that if he made a jump shot the boy with the number closest to a number the deputy had in mind would have to go to solitary. The deputy made the shot, and K.D. was sent to solitary because he picked the number closest to the deputy’s. And this basketball-shot solitary has happened on other occasions, to named plaintiff M.R. and to other children at the jail.
5. Potentially dangerous for anyone, solitary confinement can be especially harmful for juveniles, who are still developing physically, psychologically, and socially. Isolating children so that they have minimal meaningful social contact can cause trauma, depression, anxiety, and psychosis, increase the risk of suicide and self-harm, and permanently interfere with a child’s psychological and social development. For juveniles with mental illnesses or disabilities, the risk of harm from isolation is even greater because those illnesses or disabilities can worsen.
6. Having recognized in a 2012 report that “[n]owhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when it involves solitary confinement,” the U.S. Department of Justice recommended that the use of solitary confinement for juveniles in federal prisons be prohibited, and President Obama adopted that recommendation. The American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care all have called on correctional facilities to
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halt the use of solitary confinement of juveniles for disciplinary purposes, otherwise referred to as disciplinary isolation.
7. Not only is it harmful to deprive a child of meaningful social interaction or mental stimulation, it also is counterproductive to the goals of ensuring safety, security, and good order. Research shows that isolating children results in increased agitation and an increased risk of misbehavior. Facilities that have reduced their reliance on disciplinary isolation and instead adopted more appropriate techniques for managing juveniles have seen reductions in rates of violence and misbehavior. Most of these facilities allow for short-term separation—measured in hours, not days, weeks, or months—as a last resort when other options fail to diffuse situations which pose an acute risk of harm to the juvenile or others.
8. Adding to the harm being inflicted on juveniles detained at the Justice Center by solitary confinement is the routine practice of denying these children basic educational services. The most any juvenile in isolation receives is a packet of worksheets in their cell, which is no substitute for the classroom and which is particularly inappropriate and damaging for juveniles with learning disabilities.
9. The Defendants have violated and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that will end the barbaric policies and practices inside the Onondaga County Justice Center.
PARTIES The Named Plaintiffs
10. V.W. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Justice Center, where he is currently in disciplinary isolation. V.W. has received at least 9 different disciplinary
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isolation sanctions for a total of over 115 days. V.W. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his father and guardian Dereck Williams.
11. R.C. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Justice Center, where he is currently in disciplinary isolation. R.C. has received at least 3 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for a total of over 30 days. R.C. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian Sandra Chambers.
12. C.I. is an African-American 17-year-old boy incarcerated at the Justice Center. C.I. has received at least 8 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for a total of over 75 days. C.I. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian Vertell Pendarvis.
13. M.R. is an African-American 17-year-old boy detained at the Justice Center, where he is currently in disciplinary isolation. M.R. has received at least 8 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for a total of over 80 days. M.R. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian Karen Raymond.
14. F.K. is an African 17-year-old boy detained at the Justice Center. F.K. has received at least 2 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for over 40 days. F.K. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian Kashinde Kabagwira.
15. J.P. is a Hispanic 17-year-old boy detained at the Justice Center, where he is currently in disciplinary isolation. J.P. has received at least 4 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for a total of over 30 days. J.P. does not have a high school diploma. He appears in this action through his mother and guardian Alissa Quiñones.
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The Defendants 16. Eugene J. Conway is the Sheriff of Onondaga County and head of the Onondaga
County Sheriff’s Office, an administrative arm of Onondaga County. The Custody Department of the Sheriff’s Office manages the Patrick J. Corbett Onondaga County Justice Center. Sheriff Conway has final policy-making authority for Onondaga County for all policies that govern the Justice Center. Sheriff Conway also has supervisory authority over the Justice Center and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining the unlawful policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs, including those relating to discipline and to the provision of education and related services. Sheriff Conway is sued in his official capacity.
17. Esteban M. Gonzalez is the Chief Custody Deputy for the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Office. Chief Gonzalez is responsible for the management of the Justice Center and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining, and enforcing the unlawful policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs, including those relating to discipline and to the provision of education and related services. Chief Gonzalez is sued in his official capacity.
18. Kevin M. Brisson is the Assistant Chief Custody Deputy for the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant Chief Brisson is responsible for the management of the Justice Center, and is personally involved in authorizing, maintaining and enforcing the unlawful policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs, including those relating to discipline and to the provision of education and related services. Assistant Chief Brisson is sued in his official capacity.
19. The Syracuse City School District (the “District”) is the public school district for the city of Syracuse, where the Justice Center is located. It is the educational provider for incarcerated individuals at the Justice Center. The District receives federal financial assistance under the IDEA.
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FACTS Solitary Confinement at the Onondaga County Justice Center
20. Located in downtown Syracuse, the Onondaga County Justice Center is a 671-bed correctional facility that houses pre-trial detainees, sentenced individuals, and technical parole violators. It is overseen by defendant Onondaga County Sheriff Eugene Conway, with defendants Chief Custody Deputy Esteban Gonzalez and Assistant Chief Custody Deputy Kevin Brisson having day-to-day responsibility for the facility (collectively the “Sheriff’s Office”).
21. Because New York is one of only two states in the country that prosecutes children as adults as soon as they turn 16, the Justice Center houses 16- and 17-year-old juveniles as well as adults. Typically, about 30 juveniles are held at the facility at any given time. Most of them have not been convicted of a crime but instead are being held pending disposition of their cases.
22. The Justice Center has not always housed juveniles. Because of overcrowding and other concerns at the Justice Center, in 2014 juveniles were transferred from the Onondaga County Justice Center to Jamesville Correctional Facility, run by the Onondaga County Department of Correction. At Jamesville, many of the juveniles were kept in disciplinary isolation for weeks or months at a time. In the fall of 2015, the Alliance of Communities Transforming Syracuse (“ACTS”), a local advocacy organization, drew attention to the suffering of juveniles and pushed county officials to end the practice of solitary confinement for juveniles. The County Executive intervened and transferred juveniles back to the Justice Center, where they supposedly would not be subject to the same abusive practices. Media reports about Onondaga County’s end of juvenile solitary were glowing. But the celebration was premature.
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23. At the Justice Center, normal out-of-cell time for juveniles is approximately 11 hours. That time is used for recreation, showers, accessing the library, and, during weekdays, attending GED educational classes, vocational programming like painting and computer repair lessons, and other programming like parenting classes and programs led by volunteers from religious organizations.
24. The Justice Center’s disciplinary policies and practices draw no distinctions between adults and juveniles and authorize the isolation of juveniles for any rule violation. As the website of the Sheriff’s Office states: “There is a low threshold for unacceptable behavior” and “[i]nmates who do not behave, in accordance with the rules, will be locked in 23 hours a day.” For any alleged violation juveniles may be immediately “locked-in” to their cells in the juvenile unit or, pending a disciplinary hearing, confined in “administrative segregation” for up to 15 business days after which they may be sentenced to additional “punitive segregation.” Administrative segregation and punitive segregation can be served in the jail’s “Segregation Housing Unit” (SHU) or in the jail’s juvenile unit cells in “lock-in.” The Sheriff’s policy gives wide discretion to deputies to decide whether isolation is an appropriate punishment and whether it should be served in lock-in or the SHU. Whether the Sheriff’s Office labels it “lock-in,” “punitive segregation,” or “administrative segregation” and whether served in the SHU or in lock-in, it all amounts to solitary confinement: 23 hours a day of isolation with no meaningful social interaction, environmental stimulation, or human contact.
25. The jail’s dimly lit SHU consists of approximately 30 to 40 cells arrayed on two floors surrounding a barren center area and houses adults and juveniles alike. SHU cells at the Justice Center are small and stark. A typical cell is about 7’ x 9’ and contains a stainless steel toilet, sink, and shelf; a mattress; an overhead fluorescent light; and a small raised window with
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fixed metal slats. The cell floors are concrete, and the dark green walls are marred by scratch marks from previous occupants. The cell door is solid with two narrow vertical rectangularshaped plexiglass windows and a horizontal piece of plexiglass that covers two small openings below the windows where air, sound, and papers can pass through. The cell door also has a wide metal panel slot that can only be unlocked from outside. The cells have no phones, radios, or televisions, and, other than one book, people are prohibited from having personal property such as photos, old personal letters, or magazines in the cell.
26. Juveniles in the jail’s SHU cells are locked in these spaces for weeks on end with little or no out-of-cell time. They are taken out of their cells for one hour of so-called “recreation” and a 15-minute shower every other day. But even recreation time isn’t regular. Deputies will deny recreation for minor reasons, like if the juvenile hasn’t fully made his bed. Robbed of their only hour out of cell, some juveniles are kept in 24-hour isolation.
27. Juveniles locked in SHU cells have virtually no meaningful human interaction. Jail rules prohibit inmates in the cells from speaking with each other. As for interactions with jail staff, they are often limited, as deputies normally remain in an office only to emerge for their required obligations, like feeding the juveniles. Mental health workers occasionally walk through the SHU to ask inmates whether they are feeling homicidal or suicidal. Juveniles can make one phone call to a family member when they are first taken to the SHU but then are barred from all family calls. Though jail rules permit short family visits, jail staff often cancel them because the jail is on lockdown due to short-staffing.
28. Nearly every aspect about the SHU is dehumanizing. When juveniles are first brought to the SHU, they are strip-searched and told to lie down naked on the floor of their cells until staff return with their orange jumpsuits. Cell floors are sometimes still soaked in urine
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from the previous occupant. Before being able to leave a cell, the juvenile must place his hands through the metal slot in the door to be handcuffed. “Recreation” consists of being placed in a small, barren cage with a concrete floor and nothing else. Showers take place in a smaller cage, with the stalls being open to the SHU’s common area; because the stall side walls are only about 6 feet high, adults sometimes toss their feces on juveniles, called a “shitdown,” while others “shoot their piss” on them.
29. Night time rarely provides a respite from the dehumanizing conditions. The teenage boys in the SHU don’t normally sleep at night. Adults keep them awake by shouting their plans to “get at them” in the shower cells or the recreation cages. The SHU echoes. The ceiling, floor, and walls amplify screams and voices like a loudspeaker. At any hour of the night, threats like “I’mma make you suck my d**k” or “I’mma shoot piss on you in the shower” boomerang off the walls so loud they can be heard down the hall from the SHU through the unit’s locked doors.
30. Unable to sleep at night in the SHU because of the noise, some juveniles lose track of days and the time. Many sleep during the day, only to be awoken by deputies at meal time. Breakfast is confused with dinner. Lunch is confused with breakfast. Some try to adapt by marking down the days since their last court date but still remain in this state of disorientation. Staff will walk by cells around 7:30 a.m. to sign people up for recreation; juveniles who are sleeping—and they regularly are—get no recreation because deputies make no effort to wake them, which means the teenagers end up spending all 24 hours of the day in their cells.
31. Jail officials also use cells in the jail’s separate juvenile unit for disciplinary isolation. These cells are virtually identical to the SHU cells, and juveniles confined to them
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suffer the same deprivation: 23 hours a day or more routinely locked in the cell with essentially no meaningful interaction with people. And because jail officials also use the juvenile unit to house adults, juveniles in disciplinary isolation in that unit face threats from adults like the threats in SHU.
32. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds at the Justice Center are routinely locked into SHU and juvenile-unit cells for about 23 hours a day or more for weeks and months on end. Since October 2015, when the Sheriff, his Chief, and Assistant Chief Custody Deputy began routinely housing pre-trial and sentenced 16- and 17-year-olds at the Justice Center, they have placed at least 86 different juveniles into isolation over 250 times. One teenage boy was sentenced to 400 consecutive days in isolation, another to 104 days, and teenage girl to 102 days.
33. Juveniles are regularly placed in isolation at the jail for alleged misbehavior that is minor. “Misbehavior” like not addressing a staff member by his proper title, annoying the staff, being loud, violating the dress code, or not keeping a clean cell can result in weeks in disciplinary isolation. Sheriff’s Office staff even throw juveniles in solitary for the fun of it: playing games like basketball-shot solitary to determine which unlucky kid gets put in isolation. Juveniles Are More Vulnerable to the Harms of Solitary
34. Defined by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as “the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal to rare meaningful contact with other individuals,” solitary confinement can harm both adults and juveniles. But juveniles and adults are fundamentally different. Because juveniles are still developing psychologically, neurologically, and socially, they are especially susceptible to psychological harm when they are isolated from other people.
35. Juveniles in isolation face a significant risk of serious mental harm. Solitary confinement negatively impacts juveniles by perpetuating, worsening, or precipitating mental
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health concerns, including but not limited to post-traumatic stress disorders, psychosis, anxiety disorders, major depression, hypervigilence, agitation, general lack of trust, suicidal ideation, suicidal intent, self-mutilation, and suicidal behavior. Research shows that almost all suicides within juvenile correctional facilities occur when the child is in some type of isolation.
36. These mental health concerns can cause long-term harm. Solitary confinement can lead to chronic conditions like depression, which, in teenagers, can manifest as anger or as self-harm. In addition, children who experience depression and anxiety in their teenage years are at a higher risk of presenting with these diagnoses again. Damage associated with low selfesteem, vegetative features, and hopelessness associated with depression can similarly be longstanding. Depression has a 10% to 15% mortality rate associated with it, and solitary confinement increases the risk of suicide substantially compared to the general population.
37. Solitary confinement of juveniles can also lead to long-term trust issues with adults, including paranoia, anger, and hatred. Unlikely to trust others, juveniles emerging from solitary have trouble forming the therapeutic relationships necessary to address the mental health concerns resulting from solitary confinement.
38. Medical research on adolescent brains explains why juveniles are more vulnerable to the risk of long-term harm. In the adolescent brain, the connections between the frontal lobe and the mid-brain have not fully developed. If an adolescent is traumatized in certain ways, it can cause permanent changes in brain development and create a higher risk of developing permanent psychiatric conditions like paranoia and anxiety. Trauma from solitary confinement has a high likelihood of causing these permanent changes.
39. The risk of harm from solitary is made worse by the disproportionately high incidence of preexisting trauma and mental health concerns among juveniles in the criminal
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justice system. Research shows that over 60% of the youth in correctional settings have an underlying major mental illness. Stress from isolation can compound past trauma and exacerbate mental illnesses and disabilities. For those juveniles with mental illnesses or disabilities, the risk of harm is especially great. People with mental illnesses and disabilities already have cognitive deficits in their brain structure or biochemistry. They already have weakened defensive mechanisms, are at a higher risk for further mental health complications, and are more susceptible to significant trauma from social isolation. Trauma from social isolation will be more long-lasting for those with mental illnesses or disabilities than for those without.
40. In a series of Eighth Amendment cases involving the death penalty and life without parole sentences, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires that children not be punished like adults without first accounting for the unique traits that make them children. Accounting for one such trait—a child’s greater vulnerability to harm—a number of institutions have echoed the Supreme Court’s principle that children cannot be treated like adults. The National Commission on Correctional Health Care, for example, issued a statement articulating their position that juveniles should not be placed in solitary confinement for any duration and highlighted juveniles’ particular vulnerability to adverse reactions from isolation. The World Health Organization, the United Nations, and other international bodies have also recognized that solitary confinement is particularly harmful to a child’s psychological well-being and cognitive development. Acknowledging the high risk of mental illness as well as the higher rates of suicide and self-harm for youth in solitary confinement, the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur on Torture, in a 2015 report, condemned solitary confinement of children for any duration, calling it torture.
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Solitary Confinement at the Justice Center Is Seriously Harming Juveniles and Exposing Them to a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
41. The use of solitary confinement at the Justice Center is inflicting serious harm on juveniles and exposing them to a substantial risk of serious harm. Solitary confinement is causing juveniles at the Justice Center to suffer from suicidal ideation or intent, anxiety, depressive symptoms, post-traumatic symptoms, and worsening behavior. And the threats and harassment that these juveniles face from adults while in solitary confinement only serve to increase these harms.
42. T.S., a 16-year-old boy, was sentenced to over 270 days in the SHU, despite a history of mental health treatment. When he reached his breaking point, he threatened to commit suicide. After a brief stint in the behavioral health unit under constant suicide watch, T.S. was returned to the “Box,” which is what many juveniles call the SHU.
43. R.P. got into an argument with another juvenile over a basketball and was sent to the SHU, despite having previously told the mental health staff that he had tried to commit suicide when he was eleven. After one day in solitary confinement, he was so depressed that he tried to cut his wrist with a pencil. He was then moved into constant suicide watch in the behavioral health unit, after which he would have returned to solitary confinement, but he was liberated when his mother bailed him out.
44. A.C., a teenage boy when confined to the Box in May 2016, felt depressed and anxious there. Like other juveniles in the Box, A.C. couldn’t call his family because the Sheriff’s Office prohibits personal calls after an inmate’s first day in the Box. A.C. was constantly harassed by adults in the SHU. One adult spit on him while A.C. was coming out the shower. Another adult masturbated while watching A.C. walk to the showers and called out to A.C. to let him know it.
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45. Though the juveniles at the Justice Center are primarily boys, girls are occasionally detained there, are subject to the same disciplinary penalties, and can be placed in a separate 4-cell SHU that is essentially identical to the main SHU. In addition to the profound isolation they experience, girls placed in the separate SHU suffer the humiliation and danger of having to shower in a stall fully visible to male staff. One male deputy, for example, told an adult woman housed in the SHU that C.C., a 16-year-old girl, “looks better in the shower than you do.” C.C. tried to get grievance forms to complain, but was repeatedly denied. Out of frustration, she flooded her cell by clogging her toilet. The deputies made her stay in the flooded cell for 48 hours without recreation. Not Just Harmful, Solitary Confinement is Counterproductive
46. Solitary confinement is not only harmful to juveniles, it does not reduce future misbehavior. In fact, psychological research has shown the opposite: placing juveniles in solitary confinement can exacerbate the agitation and behavior that led to discipline in the first place.
47. In Ohio, the Director of the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) found that solitary confinement “does not prevent violence or reduce assaults on staff and youths; instead . . . it actually increases violence.” Analysis of five years of data showed that as the rate of solitary confinement increased, so did acts of violence—and that when DYS cut its use of solitary confinement for juveniles by 89%, it saw a 22% drop in violent acts. As DYS found, placing juveniles in solitary confinement makes it difficult for staff to provide youth with meaningful treatment and education, causes youth trauma, and causes youth to act out in anger.
48. States have been banning the use of disciplinary isolation for children held in juvenile detention facilities. So far, at least twenty-one states, including New York, have
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prohibited juvenile detention facilities from using disciplinary isolation for juveniles. Juvenile justice organizations, like the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative and the Performancebased Standards Learning Institute, have also adopted standards for eliminating the use of isolation for any reason other than to temporarily address behavior that threatens acute harm to the juvenile or others.
49. State and city officials are implementing similar bans in adult jails and prisons. For example, in North Carolina, the only other state that prosecutes children as adults as soon as they turn 16, the state’s prison commissioner has agreed to ban solitary confinement for juveniles in state prisons starting this fall. One of the commissioner’s motivations was that other states saw reductions in violence against guards after limiting solitary confinement, and he hopes North Carolina will see similar results. At Rikers Island, the second largest jail in the country, the City Corrections Commissioner and Mayor banned the use of solitary confinement for juveniles in 2014. A number of other jurisdictions, including New York, Mississippi, and Los Angeles, have also recently adopted reforms that abolish or reduce disciplinary isolation of juveniles, and, at the time of filing, there is legislation pending in California to expand those reforms statewide.
50. The recommendations of experts and the actions taken by corrections officials and legislatures reflect a growing consensus that disciplinary isolation is harmful for juveniles and unnecessary for safety. Many experts, correction officials, and legislatures agree that when isolation is used it should not be used as punishment, should be for the shortest period of time necessary to gain control of a security threat, should be under strict controls, and should involve the continual monitoring of the juvenile.
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The Sheriff’s Office Is Fully Aware of the Risks of Disciplinary Isolation and Has Deliberately Chosen to Ignore Those Risks
51. By virtue of complaints, internal reports, a lawsuit, meetings with advocates, and even a recent policy pronouncement by its own accrediting agency, the Sheriff’s Office repeatedly has been put on notice of the substantial risk of serious harm posed by its use of disciplinary isolation. Notwithstanding this notice, the Sheriff’s Office continues its regular use of disciplinary isolation and has gone so far as to destroy complaints filed by juveniles.
52. At a September 24, 2015, Ways and Means Committee meeting of the Onondaga County Legislature, county legislators questioned the use of solitary confinement at Jamesville. Defendant Gonzalez was present at the meeting and was asked to compare the practices at the Justice Center to those at Jamesville. He acknowledged being aware of “many studies done on mental health and the effects of the deprivation from any contact from anybody coming to their cell.” He attempted to distinguish practices at the Justice Center by saying that individuals in lock-in are next to another cell so they have contact with one another.
53. In November 2015, shortly after juveniles were returned to the Justice Center, Legal Services of Central New York (LSCNY) wrote Chief Gonzalez on behalf of a 16-year-old boy held in solitary confinement and warned Gonzalez that putting “a 16-year-old with history of mental health concerns in solitary confinement is cruel and inhumane and violates the U.S. Constitution as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Chief Gonzalez wrote back to Legal Services, copying the Sheriff, and acknowledged that solitary confinement is inhumane but claimed that the 23-hour confinement of the juvenile in the jail did not amount to solitary confinement. LSCNY then filed suit against Sheriff Conway and Mr. Gonzalez, alleging that putting a juvenile in solitary confinement “has the very real likelihood to cause him severe developmental and psychological harm.”
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54. Local advocates met with Sheriff Conway and Chief Gonzalez to warn them personally about the dangers of disciplinary isolation for juveniles at the jail. In December 2015, ACTS members met with Chief Gonzalez and the then-Assistant Chief Custody Deputy at the Justice Center and urged them to end the use of solitary confinement for juveniles. In January 2016, ACTS members met with Sheriff Conway in his office and urged him to do the same. Both times ACTS warned the Sheriff’s Office that solitary confinement is harmful to a juvenile’s brain development and mental health. Both times ACTS received no commitment to change.
55. In April 2016, the organization that accredits the Justice Center—the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC)—adopted a position statement that all juveniles should be excluded from solitary confinement of any duration because isolation is particularly harmful for juveniles. Upon information and belief, officials at the Sheriff’s Office were made aware of this position through NCCHC’s publications.
56. Teenagers routinely try to bring the conditions at the Justice Center to the attention of the Sheriff’s Office, but the Sheriff’s Office has systematically ignored those complaints and even have gone so far as to stonewall the children who try to complain. Deputies routinely deny juveniles grievance forms—or give them the forms only to later dump them in the trash. The few juveniles who have been able to get a hold of grievance forms to file complaints have complained to jail officials about the conditions of their disciplinary isolation. They wrote about how solitary confinement was harming them and how it is seriously harmful to any juvenile. Nothing changed. Some juveniles objected to their sanctions or administrative segregation status writing that solitary confinement is particularly damaging to them because they are juveniles with mental illnesses or disabilities. These juveniles asked to be released from solitary, but jail officials did not respond or denied their requests.
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57. Staff at the Justice Center are required to document and report through the chain of command any inmates who appear to them, or any staff member, to be in need of mental health services. Upon information and belief, jail staff, including mental health staff, informed the Sheriff’s Office that K.P. and T.S., two teenage boys, became suicidal in the Box and that mental health removed them from the Box and put them under suicide watch. Nonetheless, once K.P. and T.S.’s acute suicidal thoughts subsided, the Sheriff’s Office returned them to the Box. Upon information and belief, the Sheriff’s Office has ignored the cries for help from juveniles at the Justice Center. At least five juveniles have threatened or attempted self-harm while they were in disciplinary isolation, and a number of others told staff that they were experiencing profound psychological symptoms. C.C., for example, filed a grievance and administrative segregation appeal to tell jail officials that she was depressed from being kept in her cell for 22 to 23 hours each day. Nothing changed.
Denying Juveniles in Disciplinary Isolation Appropriate Education Under New York State Law Without Due Process
58. In addition to being placed at risk of serious harm, juveniles in isolation are also denied New York state-mandated educational services without due process.
59. County jails, along with the county’s local school district, must provide educational services to juveniles including, at minimum, three hours of individual or small group instruction. Only under specific, limited circumstances, and following a detailed process, can this right to instruction be restricted. Placement in disciplinary isolation, alone, is never a justification for shutting a juvenile out of the classroom. Yet it is the Defendants’ policy and practice to deny instruction solely because a juvenile is placed in disciplinary isolation.
60. The Sheriff’s Office’s policies bar juveniles in disciplinary isolation from attending school and from receiving tutoring or other individualized instruction or classroom
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services. Instead, these children are offered “cell study,” which consists of a packet, including newspaper clippings, crossword puzzles, and GED-related worksheets. Teachers or deputies will walk by a child’s cell and toss this packet through a slot in their locked door. Some children wake up to see a newspaper, crossword puzzles, and some worksheets splayed out on their cell floor. As a routine matter, packets are not collected, and instructional staff never review them. Many juveniles don’t complete the worksheet packet because they know it will not be reviewed by teachers, graded, or get them any school credit.
61. When juveniles are informed that they will be subject to disciplinary isolation, the Sheriff’s Office and the District don’t evaluate the impact of the discipline on their schooling. They receive no notice when charged with misbehavior that isolation will result in a complete denial of educational instruction or that they will be cut off from their regular class work. For students placed in administrative segregation, they are denied access to education—sometimes for weeks at a time—without any adjudication of their guilt of the misbehavior charges.
62. When the disciplinary hearing finally does happen, the hearing officer makes no finding that the misbehavior was related to the Justice Center’s educational program. Nor does the hearing officer make an affirmative finding that the juvenile’s continued presence in school would pose a threat to anyone. Aside from appealing the underlying disciplinary decision, there is no process for reviewing the denial of educational services.
63. Because disciplinary isolation is used so cavalierly, Defendants take away educational services for any small reason. A child who sleeps in late, fails to properly make his bed, or causes a deputy to be annoyed can be locked in a cell and denied access to school. Even though these infractions have nothing to do with school, juveniles are removed from all education and related services and programming without any notice or opportunity to be heard.
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Denying Juveniles with Disabilities in Disciplinary Isolation a Free and Appropriate Public Education Required by the IDEA
64. Juveniles with qualifying disabilities under the IDEA are also subjected to the Defendants’ policy and practice of cutting off educational instruction to juveniles in disciplinary isolation. Once in disciplinary isolation, juveniles with disabilities, like their non-disabled peers, simply receive a worksheet packet dropped off through the slot of their cell door. Those that have difficulty reading because of dyslexia or other disabilities, for example, have to make do or give up trying to learn. The teachers don’t help. The deputies don’t help. No one helps.
65. Upon information and belief, this education-by-worksheet approach does not comply with the Individualized Education Programs (“IEP”) of children with qualifying disabilities under the IDEA. Students with emotional disabilities and learning disabilities need specialized instruction and accommodations in order to access education. For example, ADHD affects attention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. One major IEP modification for children with ADHD is to break up large assignments into smaller parts. Handing a child with ADHD a bundle of worksheets does not serve to make education more accessible to him or her. In addition, these packets do not make education more accessible to those students who have significant difficulties with reading. These cell packets hardly count as education, much less special education.
66. Upon information and belief, most members of the putative class, including all of the named Plaintiffs, attended school in the Syracuse City School District. Therefore, the District has access to the IEPs of juveniles with disabilities at the Justice Center who attended District schools. The District is thus on notice that most juveniles with disabilities incarcerated at the Justice Center require special education and related services pursuant to their IEPs.
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Nonetheless, Defendants deny juveniles with disabilities the free and appropriate education required by law.
67. Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendants fail to properly determine whether a juvenile’s alleged misbehavior is a manifestation of their disabilities. Under the IDEA, a juvenile with disabilities is entitled to procedural protections if they will be excluded from school for 10 consecutive days or more or if the juvenile is subjected to a series of removals totaling more than 10 days in a school year based on a pattern of behavior. In that event, a meeting of the relevant members of the juvenile’s IEP team must be held, after inviting the juvenile’s parents, to determine if behavior resulting in the discipline is a manifestation of the juvenile’s disability. If so, the school must return the juvenile to class, and develop appropriate supports to address the behavior. Upon information and belief, none of these procedural protections are provided to juveniles with disabilities at the Justice Center.
NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS Named Plaintiff V.W.
68. Seventeen-year-old V.W. likes hip hop, playing football, and often draws when he is bored. V.W. grew up with five siblings and loves spending time with his family. V.W. was primarily raised by his dad. His father’s house recently burned down and V.W. is worried about staying in contact with him. He misses his girlfriend, who he’s known for most of his life, and he hopes he gets out of the Justice Center in time for their one year anniversary. One of V.W.’s friends was shot and killed while V.W. was detained at the Justice Center. When V.W. gets out of the Justice Center, he wants to go back to school, and then get a job and one day buy his own apartment.
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69. V.W. has been diagnosed with ADHD. Before being detained at the Justice Center, he was in 9th grade at G.W. Fowler High School in the Syracuse City School District. He struggles with math and social studies, and he failed some of his 9th grade classes.
70. V.W. is a pre-trial detainee and has been held at the Justice Center since February on bail that his family is too poor to pay. His next court date is not until November, at which point he will have been at the Justice Center for almost 9 months.
71. Since February 2016, V.W. has received at least 9 different disciplinary isolation sanctions for a total of over 115 days. V.W. has been in the Box three times, and has been placed in disciplinary isolation even for minor alleged misbehavior. In August, he was put in the Box for banging on his cell door to get the deputy’s attention so he could tell him he felt suicidal. He was later thrown in lock-in for six days for standing on a basketball in the recreation yard of the juvenile unit. Since September 8, V.W. has been in the Box for fighting with another boy after the boy made jokes about V.W.’s murdered friend.
72. In the SHU, V.W. has had little to do. During his current confinement in the Box, he had nothing to read for one week. When he goes to recreation in the SHU cages, he walks in circles or just stays still until the deputy comes to handcuff him and return him to his cell. He wishes he had photos of his family and his girlfriend in his cell, but jail rules prohibit him from having personal pictures in the SHU. Though jail rules don’t permit talking in the Box, he often can’t sleep at night because of all the yelling and screaming. Sometimes at night, stuck in his cell with nothing to do, V.W. passes time by drawing. For at least 8 days in the Box, the deputies refused to give him a change of clothes or launder his clothes, so V.W. would also pass the time washing his own underwear and socks in the sink.
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73. The first time V.W. was in the Box, the conditions were particularly terrible. The deputies shut down the water to the SHU because some individuals flooded their cells. For hours at time the whole unit would smell of urine because inmates were unable to get the deputies to turn the water back on. V.W. would sometimes urinate in the vent of the recreation cage to avoid having to sleep next to a stinky toilet.
74. V.W. has struggled in lock-in as well. His ADHD makes it difficult for him to remain still or calm. He has gotten agitated and yelled out of his cell, which has gotten him into further trouble. The deputies took away his chair for being loud while locked in on the juvenile pod.
75. V.W. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. He expressed suicidal ideation while in lock-in. And he feels stressed in both lock-in and the Box. He loses weight each time he is put the Box. In disciplinary isolation, V.W. has not been able to get any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health professionals only come to his cell to ask if he is feeling ok and if he is suicidal or homicidal.
76. In the Box and in lock-in, V.W. cannot attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with. One day during the week of September 12, 2016, V.W. woke up and found scattered crossword puzzles, a newspaper, and worksheets on his cell floor. No teacher ever helped him with the worksheets, and no one asked him to turn them in to be reviewed or graded.
77. V.W.’s disciplinary hearing for his current misbehavior charges is scheduled for the week of September 26. He received an administrative segregation notice informing him that he could submit a response to his administrative segregation designation, which requires him to
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be confined until his hearing. So V.W. submitted a response to complain that he shouldn’t be on administrative segregation because he isn’t a threat. In his response, V.W. also complained about how being in solitary confinement is harming him mentally. No one got back to V.W. about his complaints. During his current sanction in the Box, V.W. has also asked for several grievance forms to complain about the conditions of his confinement. The deputies have ignored his requests or denied him forms. When V.W. was in the Box last month, he also asked for grievances several times, and the deputies would not give him one. Named Plaintiff R.C.
78. Seventeen-year-old R.C. loves getting people to smile and laugh by making jokes. He used to work at an outdoor experiential learning and retreat center, where he helped train and nurture horses, and helped lead group activities like tours and trust building exercises. R.C. grew up in a household with his mother, a cancer survivor who has struggled to take care of him, his siblings, and his late aunt’s two teenagers. When R.C. gets out of jail, he wants to go back to school and continue working with horses and giving tours.
79. R.C. has a long history of mental health treatment and needs special education services. He has been diagnosed with ADHD. And he also has anger issues associated with his inability to concentrate. He’s been evaluated for an acute mental health concern in an emergency room. R.C. has an IEP, and, before being detained at the Justice Center, he had been taking 9th and 10th grade classes at McCarthy at W.R. Beard, a program operated by the Syracuse City School District that provides specialized services for students with social, emotional, behavioral, and academic concerns.
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80. R.C. is a pre-trial detainee and has been at the Justice Center for over a month, and cannot be released because of an alleged probation violation. He will be held at the Justice Center on a probation hold until his criminal case is resolved, which could take months.
81. Since early August, when he was detained, R.C. has received at least three disciplinary sanctions, for a total of over 30 days. R.C. is currently in the Box and has been in the Box since August 29. He is in the Box for singing Whitney Houston’s “I Will Always Love You” at night in his cell, refusing to stop when ordered by deputies, and allegedly touching a sprinkler head in his cell as deputies entered the cell to make him stop singing. He will remain in the Box for this “misbehavior” until September 30. R.C. had also previously been in lock-in for swatting toilet paper out of a deputy’s hand.
82. R.C. has little to do in the Box. To pass the time in his cell, he sometimes plays with the dead flies on the windowsill. When he gets really bored, he likes to sing to himself. He had one book in his cell in the Box, but he couldn’t understand it because it was above his reading level. Even in recreation, he has nothing to do. He just walks around the cage or stands until recreation time is over. He has lost weight and is losing his hair. Because jail rules prohibit R.C. from having moisturizers while in the Box, he has been using the facility-issued deodorant to try to alleviate his graying, flaking, and sometimes bleeding skin.
83. Since he got to the Box, R.C. has been worrying about adult harassment. In the Box, he saw someone get “piss shot on him” by an adult in the shower cells. The deputy in the Box saw this and did nothing. R.C.’s SHU cell is on the first floor of the Box. The adult who used to be directly above him was stomping throughout the night and yelling things to R.C., like “I’m gonna stab you in the showers,” “I’m gonna shoot piss on you,” and “I’m gonna make you suck my d**k.” Everyone in the Box could hear the adult, including the deputies. The deputies
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did nothing to stop this harassment and instead moved the adult to a cell adjoining R.C.’s on first floor of the Box. R.C. asked a few deputies to be moved to another cell, but they have not moved him. The adult next to R.C. continues to threaten to hurt him during recreation. R.C. has refused to go to recreation twice for fear of being in a cage next to him.
84. On Tuesday, September 20, R.C. decided to go to recreation. The adult who harasses him was in the neighboring cage. From his own cage, R.C. noticed the adult removing a plastic cup from the crotch area of his orange jumpsuit. Moments later, R.C. felt warm fluid hit his cheeks—the adult had used the cup to throw his urine in R.C.’s face.
85. R.C. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. R.C. is feeling stressed and disconnected from reality in the Box. He’s lost track of how long he has been there. Even though he never talked to himself before he came to the Box, he’s resorted to talking to himself to pass the time. He’d rather hear his own voice than the voices of adults. He thinks he’s lost more than ten pounds since being in the Box. In disciplinary isolation, R.C. has not been able to get any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health staff only come to his cell to ask if he is feeling ok and if he is suicidal or homicidal.
86. In the Box and in lock-in, R.C. cannot attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with. Instead, R.C. receives packets of worksheets that no teacher ever helps him with, and no one has asked him to turn them in to be reviewed or graded. R.C. has already missed a week and half of school and will likely miss at least 10 consecutive days of school. Neither he nor his family has
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been contacted to discuss his IEP. Upon information and belief, the practice of giving R.C. cell packets without providing any assistance does not comply with his IEP.
87. R.C. submitted a response to his administrative segregation designation to complain that he shouldn’t be on administrative segregation because he isn’t a threat. In his response, R.C. also complained about how being in solitary confinement is harming him mentally. Since being in the Box, R.C. has also asked for several grievance forms to complain about the conditions of his confinement. For days, the deputies ignored his request for a grievance. So R.C. flooded his cell to get their attention. The deputies responded by shutting off the water to his cell for several days. His cell stunk because he hadn’t been able to flush the toilet for two days.
88. A deputy eventually gave R.C. a grievance form, and he submitted it with his complaints on September 9. According to the Sheriff’s policies, deputies are supposed to try to resolve complaints within 24 hours of receiving the grievance. But the deputies haven’t responded to it. No one has. R.C. thinks the deputies threw his grievance away. R.C. also appealed his most recent sanction for signing a Whitney Houston song in his cell on the juvenile pod. Named Plaintiff C.I.
89. Seventeen-year-old C.I. likes to play basketball and draw comics, but he has often struggled with his home life. C.I. was raised by a single mother who lives with cerebral palsy and two of C.I.’s friends have died from gun violence. When C.I. gets out of the Justice Center, he wants to go back to school and hopes to one day own a bodega where people can hang out.
90. C.I. has been diagnosed with ADHD. As a young boy, C.I. received special education services in elementary school because of severe delays in his speaking abilities.
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Before being detained at the Justice Center, he had been in the 9th grade at Nottingham High School in the Syracuse City School District.
91. C.I. is sentenced on a criminal conviction and has been in the Justice Center since February 2016. At the earliest, he will not be released until March 2017.
92. C.I. has been sanctioned with disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center at least 8 times for a total of over 75 days. He was in the Box last month for nearly 10 days before his charges were dismissed because the deputy wrongly accused C.I. of being involved in a large fight that happened while C.I. was locked in his cell. But while he was wrongly in the Box, the deputies charged him with being loud at night and he was sentenced to 7 additional days of lockin as punishment. C.I. has also been in lock-in several other times, too. He served a 45-day lock-in sanction for getting in a fight. Deputies later held C.I. in lock-in for seven straight days without letting him out for recreation because C.I. kept talking through his cell door and engaged in allegedly disruptive behavior. He is currently in the juvenile unit. And he remains at risk of being placed in disciplinary isolation again.
93. C.I. was in the Box less than three weeks ago. He had nothing to do other than sleep for most of the day. Despite feeling this way, C.I. would sometimes refuse recreation. He wanted to avoid being in cages next to adults, and he didn’t like the cages because it made him feel like a zoo animal. So instead he would sometimes remain in his SHU cell for 24 hours a day.
94. C.I.’s time in lock-in has also been difficult. C.I. had his 17th birthday while he was in lock-in. While in lock-in he can see other juveniles in the unit playing basketball and talking to each other but he can’t interact with them. He watches them go to school, but he can’t go with them. He watches them eat meals, but he eats alone in his cell. While serving a lock-in
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sentence, C.I. was forced to sleep on the box bed because the deputies took his mattress, chair, and property bins as punishment for talking and yelling.
95. C.I. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. C.I. feels stressed, irritable, and hopeless, consistent with a moderate to severe major depression. He is so agitated that he has to keep moving around or do something to keep busy. He doubts his self-worth and blames himself now for anything that goes wrong. When C.I. was last in the Box, or at any previous time when he was in disciplinary isolation, he did not receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health staff would just come by his cell and ask him if he was feeling ok and if he was suicidal or homicidal.
96. Each time C.I. has been in disciplinary isolation, either in lock-in or the Box, he could not attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with. When he was in disciplinary isolation, C.I. received packets of worksheets as education. No teacher ever helped him with the worksheets, and no one asked him to turn them in to be reviewed or graded.
97. C.I. tried to file grievances at the Justice Center, but the deputies either refused to give him grievance forms or crumpled up the completed forms and threw them away. Once, a deputy drew a picture of a penis on C.I.’s grievance form before throwing it away. In March 2016, C.I. was locked in for mouthing off to a deputy. After another juvenile called the deputy a “fatass,” the deputy ordered everyone in the juvenile pod to lock in. C.I. complained about the lock-in, telling the deputy that he would “grieve your fat ass.” C.I. never got a grievance form. Instead, the deputy gave C.I. 20 days of lock-in.
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98. When C.I. was last in the Box, he asked for grievances multiple times but never received one. C.I. wrote a response to his administrative segregation designation to Defendant Gonzalez, complained about how being in solitary confinement is harming him mentally, about how he should not be placed in disciplinary isolation because he is not a threat, and about how his ADHD makes it difficult for him to be quiet when he is isolated. When he received his 8 day lock-in sanction for being loud in the Box, he submitted a disciplinary appeal making the same complaints. But he still had to serve out his sanction. Named Plaintiff M.R.
99. Seventeen-year-old M.R. loves his mom, who always looks out for him. His father passed away in 2014, and it’s still hard for him to talk about his grief. M.R. recently passed the GED test. When he gets out of jail, he wants to go to community college and then transfer to a four-year college. Eventually, he wants to become a criminal defense attorney to help out kids like him.
100. M.R. was diagnosed with ADHD and oppositional defiant disorder when he was in elementary school. Since then, he has been taking medication for his mental health concerns. Jail officials are aware of M.R.’s mental health needs. At the Justice Center, the mental health staff provide him with Seroquel, an antipsychotic medication used to treat depression, his other mental health concerns, and to help with his difficulties sleeping. Before being detained at the Justice Center, he had been taking 9th and 10th grade classes at the Twilight Academy program at Henninger High School in the Syracuse City School District. In school, he used to receive help with his classes because of his disabilities.
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101. M.R. is a pre-trial detainee and has been in the Justice Center since November 2015. He is being held without bail until his sentencing hearing in October 2016, at which point he would have spent about 10 months at the Justice Center.
102. M.R. has been sanctioned with disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center at least 8 times for a total of over 80 days. He is currently in lock-in serving a 14-day sanction for talking out of his cell door and allegedly refusing to be quiet when he was in the Box in August. He will remain in lock-in until October 2. M.R. has also been placed in disciplinary isolation for apparent sadistic reasons. Once, he had to lock-in after a deputy told him if the deputy made a jump shot then M.R. had to lock-in. The deputy made the shot. He has also been placed in disciplinary isolation several times for minor alleged misbehavior. A deputy once gave him 20 days of lock-in for spraying another inmate with water from a bottle. M.R. has also been locked in for becoming loud and disruptive over a disagreement over a cup of juice, wearing his shower shoes outside the shower instead of his issued crocs, speaking with other people on lock-in, and for covering the window on his cell in the juvenile pod with tissue so the adults could not see him using his toilet.
103. M.R. was in the Box less than three weeks ago. It was tough for him to be alone and not be able to call his family. So to pass the time, he’d do pushups or try to sleep most of the day away. Even when he left his cell for recreation, there was nothing to do. He would be in an empty cage, which he didn’t like because he felt like a caged animal. At night, people screamed, yelled, and kicked their cell doors so loudly that it made it hard to sleep.
104. In lock-in, M.R. felt restless and agitated. It’s hard for him to sit quietly for days. He has gotten in trouble for yelling at the guards to ask when he would be allowed out for his recreation time.
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105. M.R. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. M.R. feels stressed, sad, agitated, irritable, and restless. These symptoms are all consistent with major depression. In isolation, he slept a lot during the day. When M.R. was last in the Box, or at any previous time when he was in disciplinary isolation, he did not receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health staff would just come by his cell and ask him if he was feeling ok and if he was suicidal or homicidal.
106. Each time M.R. has been in disciplinary isolation, either in lock-in or the Box, he could not attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with. Last school year, when he was in disciplinary isolation, M.R. received packets of worksheets and newspaper articles as education. No teacher ever helped him with the worksheets, and no one asked him to turn them in to be reviewed or graded. He turned them in anyway, but does not know what happened to them.
107. M.R. tried to file grievances about the conditions of his confinement, but the staff would deny him forms, refuse to file the forms, or tear them up in front of him instead of passing them to the sergeant. One deputy responded to his complaints by telling M.R. to “shut up” or he would “bash” his skull. A sergeant told him that discipline is not grievable and tore up the form that M.R. had filled out.
108. When M.R. was last in the Box, he asked for grievance forms from the deputies more than twenty times. The deputies ignored him or told him he couldn’t have one, except for the one time that a deputy finally gave him two grievance forms. M.R. first used one grievance form to complain about being in solitary confinement and the conditions of solitary, but no one ever responded. After no one responded, M.R. filed a second grievance about the same
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conditions, but no one responded to that grievance either. Sometime after he returned to the juvenile pod M.R. again asked for a grievance, but the deputy told him, “You know I don’t give out grievances.” After receiving 14 days in lock-in for talking, M.R. appealed that sanction. Named Plaintiff F.K.
109. Seventeen-year-old F.K. fled a civil war in his home country when he was five years old and arrived in the U.S. with his family as a refugee. When F.K. gets out of the Justice Center, he wants to go back to school and perform music live at open mic events. F.K. eventually hopes to own a car dealership selling foreign cars.
110. F.K. was diagnosed with ADHD and with bipolar disorder. Before he was detained at the Justice Center, F.K. was prescribed antidepressants as well as bipolar disorder medication. Before being detained at the Justice Center, he was in 10th grade at Henninger High School in the Syracuse City School District. F.K. needs special education services and has an IEP. In 2013, he tested at a 2nd grade reading level.
111. F.K. is a pre-trial detainee and has been at the Justice Center since May 2016. He is being held at the Justice Center because of a hold resulting from a Family Court case. He also has bail set in his criminal case.
112. F.K. has been sanctioned with disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center at least two times for a total of over 40 days. The most recent time, in late August, a deputy sent him to the Box for fighting. Before then, F.K. had been in the Box one other time in early May for fighting an adult on the juvenile pod who had been telling F.K. to “suck his d**k” and saying that he was going to have sex with F.K.’s mother. F.K. is currently in the juvenile unit. He is at risk of being placed in disciplinary isolation.
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113. F.K. was in the Box less than two weeks ago. He had little to do in the Box. When he had recreation, deputies brought him to an empty cage. The first time he went to the Box, there was urine on the floors of the cages. All he could do during recreation was to stand in the cage for an hour. F.K. tried to sleep most of the day in the Box to escape from reality.
114. F.K. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. F.K. feels disappointed in himself, struggles with concentrating, has feelings of wanting to cry but is unable to, and is restless and more irritable. These symptoms are all consistent with a diagnosis of major depression of moderate severity. When F.K. was last in the Box, or at any previous time when he was in disciplinary isolation, he did not receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health staff would just come by his cell and ask him if he was feeling ok and if he was suicidal or homicidal.
115. In the Box, F.K. could not attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with. When he was in disciplinary isolation, F.K. received packets of worksheets that no teacher ever helped him with, and no one asked him to turn them in to be reviewed or graded. F.K. missed at least 10 consecutive days of school while in disciplinary isolation, but neither he nor his family was contacted to discuss his IEP. Upon information and belief, the practice of giving F.K. cell packets without providing any assistance did not comply with his IEP.
116. When F.K. was last in the Box, he asked deputies on several occasions for grievance forms to complain about his conditions of confinement. The deputies never gave him the requested forms.
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Named Plaintiff J.P. 117. Seventeen-year-old J.P. loves his family, but his family’s life has been shaped by
violence and trauma. Three of his siblings—a sister and two older brothers—were shot before he started high school. J.P. cleaned his brother’s stomach wound and changed his bandages, and he frequently helped his sister around the house because she could no longer walk without the help of a walker after getting shot. Two extended family members have also died while in custody: one while incarcerated in the state system and one while detained in jail. J.P. worries that he might one day also die in the Justice Center.
118. J.P. has struggled with behavioral and learning issues since he was very young. J.P. was diagnosed with ADHD at an early age. Before coming to the Justice Center, he received counseling for anger management. He was also evaluated for an acute mental health concern in an emergency room. J.P.’s mental and behavioral health challenges were often so severe that he could not remain in school long enough to get evaluated for an IEP. Before being detained at the Justice Center, J.P. was in 9th grade at Corcoran High School in the Syracuse City School District.
119. J.P. is a pre-trial detainee and has been at the Justice Center since around early July 2016. He will be held at the Justice Center on a probation hold at least until his criminal case is resolved, which could take months.
120. J.P. was sanctioned with disciplinary isolation at least 4 times for a total of over 30 days of solitary confinement. He is currently in lock-in serving a 14-day sanction for talking out of his cell door and allegedly refusing to be quiet when he was in the Box in August. He will remain in lock-in until October 2. He was in the Box from the middle of August to early September for a fight. While in the Box, towards the end of August, he was also sanctioned for talking out of his cell door. J.P. has also been sanctioned with a lock-in for a minor infraction.
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121. J.P. was in the Box less than two weeks ago. In the Box, J.P. had little to do in his cell other than doing pushups and reading a book. After he finished the book, he was not allowed to get a new book. At first, J.P. tried to sleep as much as possible so he could make the time go faster, but he couldn’t sleep at night in the Box because people were often stomping, yelling, and screaming. Sometimes, it seemed like both the deputies and the detainees would make noise just when J.P. was starting to fall asleep. It was very cold in his cell, and sometimes the guards made it even colder by putting fans in the center of the room and pointing them at his cell. If J.P. had recreation, deputies brought him to an empty cage. Because J.P. could not call his family, he would get very worried that someone had been shot or hurt when he would overhear other people shouting gossip about shootings on the outside.
122. J.P. exhibits symptoms that directly correlate with his placement in solitary confinement. J.P. is irritable and agitated consistent with worsening ADHD and worsening disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (DMDD). He has lost most of his interest in other people or things and feels more discouraged about his future than he used to. When J.P. was last in the Box, or at any previous time when he was in disciplinary isolation, he did not receive any meaningful therapy or counseling services. Mental health staff would just come by his cell and ask him if he was feeling ok and if he was suicidal or homicidal.
123. Each time J.P. has been in disciplinary isolation, either in lock-in or the Box, he has not been allowed to attend education classes or any programming. He had no notice or opportunity to be heard about the Defendants’ decision to cut him off from education classes as a sanction for the rules violations that he was charged with.
124. J.P. has tried to address his conditions and discipline through administrative channels but to no avail. For instance, in late August, around when he was sanctioned while in
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the Box for talking out his cell, J.P. asked for grievance forms twice to address his conditions of confinement and his placement in the Box. Both deputies who he asked refused to give him a form. J.P. also witnessed a deputy inform another detainee near his cell that even if they gave a form to that inmate, they would throw the grievance away upon receipt.
125. On August 30, J.P. submitted a response to his administrative segregation notice complaining that it was not fair that he was locked in for 23 hours per day, that his ADHD makes it very hard for him to be quiet and stay still, and that he should not have been placed on administrative segregation status for talking in the SHU because he is not a threat. In his response, J.P. also complained about how being in solitary confinement is harming him mentally. The response was given back to him and he was told that he needed to file a “yellow slip,” a referral form that is used to request things like laundry services. He later submitted the same complaints on a yellow slip, but jail officials did not grant his request for release from SHU. J.P. also asked for a grievance in September, but was ignored by the deputies. After receiving 14 days in lock-in for talking, J.P. appealed that sanction.
126. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have been taken under color of law. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
127. All Plaintiffs bring the First and Second Causes of Action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all present and future 16- and 17-year-olds incarcerated at the Justice Center. All class members face a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of the Sheriff’s Office’s disciplinary isolation policies and practices, and all class members face an unlawful denial of educational services without due process.
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128. Plaintiffs R.C. and F.K. bring the Third Cause of Action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a subclass of all current and future 16- and 17-year-olds with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center who are in need of special education and related services (“IDEA Subclass”).
129. All four requirements of rule 23(a) are satisfied: a. Numerosity: Joinder of all class members is impracticable because of the
size of the class and the characteristics of the class members. At any given time, all of the juveniles incarcerated at the Justice Center are at a significant risk of unconstitutional disciplinary isolation and unlawful denial of educational services. Between October 2015 and August 2016, more than 86 juveniles were placed in disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center. Every month, additional class members cycle in and out of the Justice Center. Many of these juveniles are unable to file lawsuits on their own because of their youth, disabilities, and lack of financial resources.
b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class, including but not limited to: whether the Defendants’ policies and practices of placing 16- and 17-year-olds in disciplinary isolation have resulted in and will continue to result in a violation of the class members’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; whether the Defendants have unlawfully denied educational services in violation of the class members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights; and whether the Defendants have violated the IDEA subclass members’ rights under the IDEA.
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c. Typicality: The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. All named Plaintiffs are incarcerated at the Justice Center. Each named Plaintiff has been subjected to and injured by the challenged policies and practices.
d. Adequacy of Representation: The named Plaintiffs, their representatives, and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs and their representatives have no interests in this matter that are antagonistic to other class members. Class counsel have many years of experience in civil rights and class action litigation.
130. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate under rule 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 131. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). 132. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief requested pursuant to the Declaratory Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. This Court may also grant injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 133. Venue is proper in the Northern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2). Defendants have their official residence in the Northern District of New York, and a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this district.
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CAUSES OF ACTION First Cause of Action 134. The Sheriff’s Office’s actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ rights under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Second Cause of Action 135. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the named Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Third Cause of Action 136. The Defendants’ actions or inactions have violated and continue to violate the rights of named Plaintiffs R.C. and F.K. and the rights of the putative IDEA Subclass members under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC §§ 1400 et seq.
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
a. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violate the named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
b. Declare that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated named Plaintiffs R.C. and F.K. and IDEA Subclass members’ rights under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482;
c. Enter all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief (including, but not limited to, policies, procedures, training, supervision, and monitoring) to end the ongoing violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal law;
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d. Award the Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 20
U.S.C. § 1415; and
e. Grant any other relief that the Court deems necessary and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Philip Desgranges Philip Desgranges (Bar No. 519350) Aimee Krause Stewart* Mariko Hirose (Bar No. 520250) Mariana Kovel* Christopher Dunn (Bar No. 513828) NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, N.Y. 10004 Tel: (212) 607-3300 Fax: (212) 607-3318 pdesgranges@nyclu.org

On the Complaint: Noah Breslau
Dated: September 21, 2016 New York, New York

s/ Joshua T. Cotter Joshua T. Cotter (Bar No. 518217) Susan M. Young (Bar No. 102862) Samuel C. Young (Bar No. 508916) LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK 221 S. Warren Street, 3rd Floor Syracuse, N.Y. 13202 Tel: (315) 703-6500 jcotter@lscny.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
*Pending submission of application for admission or pro hac vice admission

42

 
 Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 51 Filed 01/03/17 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

V.W., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS; R.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian SANDRA CHAMBERS; C.R., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian VERTELL PENDARVIS; M.R., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KAREN RAYMOND; F.K., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KASHINDE KABAGWIRA; and J.P., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian ALISSA QUINONES; on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Civil No. 1:16-cv-1150 (DNH) (DEP)

Plaintiffs,

v.

EUGENE CONWAY, Onondaga County Sheriff, in his official capacity; ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, Chief Custody Deputy of the Onondaga County Justice Center, in his official capacity; KEVIN M. BRISSON, Assistant Chief Custody Deputy, in his official capacity; and SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES I. Introduction
Last year, the Department of Justice (“the Department”) ended the practice of allowing the use of solitary confinement for juveniles in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing 114 (Mar. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/restrictivehousing (“DOJ Report”); Presidential

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 51 Filed 01/03/17 Page 2 of 9
Memorandum – Limiting the Use of Restrictive Housing by the Federal Government (Mar. 1,
2016) (“Presidential Memorandum”), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/01/ presidential-memorandum-limiting-use-restrictive-housing-federal.1 Plaintiffs’ case involves
precisely this practice for juveniles in the custody of a county law enforcement agency.
Plaintiffs allege that 16- and 17-year-old juvenile offenders, including those with disabilities, are subjected to solitary confinement2 in the Onondaga County Justice Center (“the Justice Center”).
Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1. Plaintiffs assert that this confinement denies them meaningful
human contact, educational programming, and mental health services, and that it violates federal
law. Id. at 1-2, 6-7. The United States submits this Statement of Interest to draw the Court’s
attention to relevant case law and to contemporary research regarding juveniles and solitary confinement.3
II. Interest of the United States
The United States files this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which
authorizes the Attorney General “to attend to the interests of the United States” in any case pending in federal court.4 The United States, acting through the Department of Justice’s Civil
1 The Bureau of Prisons does not house any incarcerated juveniles in its own facilities, but instead contracts or enters into intergovernmental agreements with state or municipal juvenile facilities to house these individuals. DOJ Report at 61. In these facilities, the Bureau’s prohibition on restrictive housing for juveniles is enforced as a contract requirement. 2 Plaintiffs use the umbrella term “solitary confinement” to refer to the Justice Center’s use of disciplinary “lockin,” “punitive segregation,” and “administrative segregation.” Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3-5. The United States has used the term “restrictive housing” to refer to solitary confinement and other forms of segregation, DOJ Report at 3, but here will use the Plaintiffs’ term. 3 The United States takes no position on any other issues not specifically addressed in this Statement of Interest. Nor does it take a position on the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs. In addition, although this Statement addresses contemporary research regarding juveniles in solitary confinement, it takes no position on the applicability of that research in any other context. 4 The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 517 states: “The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.”
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Rights Division, has a broad interest in ensuring that conditions of confinement in state and local correctional facilities are consistent with the Constitution and federal law. Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a, the Attorney General is authorized to institute a civil action to address “egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive [prisoners or detainees] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous harm.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a). Similarly, the Attorney General is authorized by Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”), to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief” to eliminate a pattern or practice of conduct by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the incarceration of juveniles that deprives those juveniles of their constitutional or federal statutory rights.
The Civil Rights Division has previously exercised the United States’ authority under CRIPA and Section 14141 to address issues related to the use of solitary confinement on juveniles in jails, including in the Jefferson County Jail in Alabama,5 the Hinds County Jail in Mississippi,6 the New York City Department of Correction Jails on Rikers Island,7 and the
5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Off. of Public Affairs, Department of Justice Announces Investigation of the Jefferson County Jail in Birmingham, Alabama (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announcesinvestigation-jefferson-county-jail-birmingham-alabama (ongoing investigation of the Jail’s use of solitary confinement on juveniles). 6 Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Hinds County, Mississippi Regarding the Hinds County Jail, United States. v. Hinds Cnty., No. 16-489 (S.D. Miss. July 19, 2016), ECF No. 8-1 at 37-38, https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883861/download (investigation and subsequent consent decree in which the Jail agreed to eliminate solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction for juveniles). 7 Consent Judgment, U.S. v. City of New York., No 11-5845 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2015), ECF No.249 at 44 (investigation and subsequent consent decree in which the Jails agreed to ban punitive solitary confinement for juveniles).
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Baltimore City Detention Center in Maryland.8 The Division also has addressed the use of solitary confinement in juvenile detention facilities, including in the Scioto and Marion Juvenile Correctional Facilities in Ohio9 and the Leflore County Juvenile Detention Center in Mississippi.10
III. Factual Allegations and Procedural Background Plaintiffs allege that the Onondaga Sheriff’s Office unconstitutionally imposes solitary confinement on juveniles in its custody at the Justice Center. Plaintiffs describe this practice as involving at least 23 hours a day in an approximately 60 square foot cell with minimal furnishings, virtually no contact with others except for adult inmates in neighboring cells who routinely harass and intimidate them, recreation in a chain-linked indoor cage that is only slightly larger than their cell and has no equipment, and no opportunity to attend educational programming. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1, 4-8. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants provide inadequate mental health care, neglecting to conduct mental health screenings before placing juveniles into solitary confinement and, once juveniles are in solitary confinement, limiting mental health services to a worker occasionally asking juveniles through their locked doors whether they are suicidal. Id. at 8-11. Plaintiffs allege that between October 1, 2015 and August 31, 2016, at least 86 juveniles were placed in solitary confinement. For instance, according to plaintiffs, 17-year-old V.W. has
8 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Special Lit. Section, Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ralph F. Boyd, Jr. to Governor Parris N. Glendening (2002), https://www.justice.gov/crt/i-background-1 (investigation and subsequent monitoring that found the Jail’s use of solitary confinement on juveniles violated federal law). 9 Agreed Order, United States v. Ohio, No. 04-1206 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014), ECF No. 148 at 2, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/06/30/ohiojuv_order_5-21-14.pdf (investigation and subsequent consent decree in which the facilities agreed to eliminate disciplinary solitary confinement for juveniles). 10 Settlement Agreement between the United States and Leflore County, Mississippi, United States v. Leflore Cnty., No. 15-00059 (N.D. Miss. May 13, 2015), ECF No. 3-1 at 10-12, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/ legacy/2015/05/14/leflore_agreement_5-13-15.pdf (investigation and subsequent consent decree in which the facility agreed to eliminate disciplinary solitary confinement for juveniles).
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received at least 9 different disciplinary isolation sanctions and has been isolated for over 115 days, 17-year-old R.C. has been isolated for a total of over 30 days, and 17-year-old plaintiff M.R. has received at least 8 different disciplinary isolation sanctions and has been isolated for over 80 days in total. Cumulatively, Defendants have allegedly placed named plaintiffs in solitary confinement for a total of nearly seven and a half years. Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. at 4.11 Plaintiffs allege that as a result of solitary confinement, they regularly experience harm in the form of anxiety, hopelessness, irritability, stress, sadness, restlessness, post-traumatic symptoms, agitation, and suicidal ideations. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 9-10.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 21, 2015. On September 23, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. Defendants filed an Answer on November 11, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a motion for Preliminary Injunction on December 21, 2016.
IV. Argument Juveniles are psychologically more vulnerable than adults. Their brains are still developing,12 “making their time spent in solitary confinement even more difficult and the developmental, psychological, and physical damage more comprehensive and lasting.” Nat’l Comm’n on Correctional Health Care, Position Statement on Solitary Confinement 2 (Apr. 2016). In 2012, the United States Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence similarly concluded that “[n]owhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when it involves solitary confinement,” including
11 Typically, about 30 juveniles are held at the facility at any given time, according to Plaintiffs. Pls.’ Complaint at 7. 12 The prefrontal cortex of the brain – the area associated with response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning, and organization – continues to develop well into a person’s 20s. See DOJ Report at 59; see also B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHO. 241, 243 (2000); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999).
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increased vulnerability to suicide.13 Robert L. Listenbee, Jr., Report of the Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence, 178 (Dec. 12, 2012).
To that end, prominent medical and correctional groups have called for a ban on solitary confinement for juveniles. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Policy Statement: Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders (Apr. 2012), http://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2012/solitary_confinement_of_juvenile_offender s.aspx; Am. Psychological Ass’n, Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders (2015), https://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/cyf/solitary.pdf; Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.apha.org/policies-andadvocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2014/07/14/13/30/solitaryconfinement-as-a-public-health-issue; Nat’l Comm’n on Correctional Health Care, Position Statement on Solitary Confinement (Apr. 2016), http://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement; c.f. Am. Med. Ass’n, Policy Statement: Solitary Confinement of Juveniles in Legal Custody (Nov. 2014) (opposing solitary confinement of juveniles for disciplinary purposes). Further, the American Correctional Association recognizes that “isolating a youth for extended periods can have serious psychological and developmental consequences.” Am. Correctional Ass’n, Letter from President Mary L. Livers and Executive Director James A. Gondles, Jr. to Staff Attorney at the Center for Children’s Law and Policy Jennifer Lutz (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.stopsolitaryforkids.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ ACA-Support-Letter.pdf.
The Justice Department’s Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) echoed this consensus by ending the practice of solitary confinement for juveniles in BOP custody. DOJ Report at 114;
13 A Department of Justice nationwide study found that half of the suicides occurring in juvenile detention facilities occurred when the juvenile was held in solitary confinement, and more than sixty percent of young people who committed suicide while in confinement had a history of being held in isolation. See Lindsay M. Hayes, Dep’t of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Suicide in Confinement: A National Survey, viii (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/213691.pdf.
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Presidential Memorandum. The Department also issued a set of “Guiding Principles” intended as best practices for correctional facilities, including those at the state and local level. See DOJ Report at 93-103 (Guiding Principles), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/815556/download. Under Guiding Principle #41, “Juveniles should not be placed in restrictive housing.” DOJ Report at 101 (Guiding Principles at 8). Under Guiding Principle #42, in “very rare situations” juveniles may be separated from others, and then only “as a temporary response to behavior that poses a serious and immediate risk of physical harm.” Id. Such placement “should be brief, designated as a ‘cool down’ period, and done only in consultation with a mental health professional.” Id.
The Supreme Court has also emphasized the particular developmental vulnerability of juveniles. It has recognized that juveniles “have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” they are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,” and their characters are not as “well formed.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Youth “is more than a chronological fact . . . it is a moment and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require an inquiry into whether the prisoner faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” and whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Thus, when analyzing these claims, the Court should consider evidence that isolating juveniles can cause serious harm. In H.C. v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986), for example, a sixteen-yearold detainee was “isolated for seven days . . . and deprived of virtually every physical or
7

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emotional stimulus,” from which “[r]eal injury can be inferred.” Id. at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, in further noting that “the conditions and length of adult confinement” can give rise to an inference of emotional damages, the Jarrard court emphasized that “[j]uveniles are even more susceptible to mental anguish than adult convicts.” Id.
Here, in addition to alleging harsh conditions of isolation, Plaintiffs proffer specific evidence that juveniles held at the Justice Center regularly experience “suicidal ideations, major depression, a disconnect from reality, post-traumatic symptoms, agitation, and worsening symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder (“DMDD”). Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 9 (citing declarations of the six named Plaintiffs and Dr. Louis Kraus, Plaintiffs’ expert who evaluated juveniles at the Justice Center). Courts have relied upon this kind of expert and scientific evidence, as well as the nature of the conditions at issue, to find that solitary confinement of juveniles violates their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 172 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 332 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Morales, where juveniles were locked into single rooms or cells for a month or more, with little opportunity to leave and no contact with staff, the court cited expert opinion that “prolonged [solitary] confinement of a child to a single building can be harmful unless the child is receiving a great deal of attention during the time of confinement.” Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. at 172. The court also noted that “[e]xperiments in sensory deprivation have shown that the absence of many and varied stimuli may have a serious detrimental effect upon the mental health of a child.” Id. Likewise, in Lollis, the court relied on the affidavits of seven psychiatrists, psychologists, and educators of delinquent juveniles, “a group made up of men and women of high standing and expertise,” who “[were] unanimous in their condemnation of extended
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isolation as imposed on children, finding it not only cruel and inhuman, but counterproductive to the development of the child.” 332 F. Supp. at 480. This Court should consider the same factors, as well as the growing body of scientific research and relevant Supreme Court case law, in assessing the harm caused to juveniles by the alleged solitary confinement practices at the Justice Center.
V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the United States files this Statement of Interest regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

January 3, 2017
RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN United States Attorney
/s/ John Hoggan JOHN D. HOGGAN, JR. Assistant United States Attorney

Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM Chief Special Litigation Section
SHELLEY R. JACKSON Deputy Chief
LAURA L. COON Special Counsel
/s/ Kyle Smiddie KYLE E. SMIDDIE ATTICUS LEE Trial Attorneys Special Litigation Section Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 307-6581 Email: kyle.smiddie@usdoj.gov Attorneys for the United States
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 Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 1 of 30

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-------~-~--

V.W., a minor, by and through his parent

and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS; R.C., a minor, by and through his parent and

natural guardian SANDRA CHAMBERS; C.r., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian VERTELL PENDARVIS; M.R., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KAREN RAYMOND; F.K., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KASHINDE KABAGWIRA; and J.P., a minor, by and

16-CV-1150 (DNH) (DEP)
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

through his parent and natural guardian

ALISSA QUINONES; on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.

EUGENE CONWAY, Onondaga County Sheriff, in his official capacity; ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, Chief Custody Deputy of the Onondaga County Justice Center, in his official capacity; KEVIN M. : BRISSON, Assistant Chief Custody Deputy, in : his official capacity; and SYRACUSE CITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants .

.------------------------------~------------------------~----~·x

Mariko Hirose, Bar # 520250 Mariana Kovel * Aimee Krause Stewart* * Aadhithi Padmanabhan* Philip Desgranges Christopher Dunn NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor N ew York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 607-3300 Fax: (212) 607-3318 mhirose@nyclu.org

Joshua T. Cotter Samuel C. Young Susan M. Young LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK 221 S. Warren Street, 3rd Floor Syracuse, NY 13202 Tel: (315) 703-6500 jcotter@lscny.org

**Not yet admitted to N.D.N.Y.
* Application for admission pro hac vice pending

DATED: September 23,2016

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 2 of 30

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

I. The Sheriffs Office Has a Pervasive Policy and Practice of Punishing Juveniles with

Solitary Confinement.

2

II. The Sheriffs Office's Solitary Confinement Policies and Practices Uniformly Deprive

Juveniles of Meaningful Contact with Other Individuals

.4

III. The Sheriffs Office's Solitary Confinement Policies and Practices Inflict Similar Types

of Serious Harm and Risks of Serious Harm on Juveniles

6

IV. The Sheriff s Office Is Aware of the Substantial Risk of Serious Harm Posed to All

Juveniles by Their Policies and Practices

8

V. The Sheriffs' Office's Policies and Practices Systematically Deprive Juveniles at the

Justice Center of Mandated Education Services

9

VI. The Named Plaintiffs Have Each Been Subjected to Defendants' Unlawful and

Unconstitutional Policies and Practices

10

SUMMARY OF MERITS CLAIMS

11

ARGUMENT

13

I. PLAINTIFFS MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(a)

14

A. The Proposed Class Is Sufficiently Numerous

14

B. Questions of Law and Fact Are Common to the Proposed Class

17

C. The Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Are Typical of the Proposed Class

21

D. The Named Plaintiffs Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class

23

II. PLAINTIFFS MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(B)(2)

24

CONCLUSION

25

ii

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 3 of 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) Andre H v. Ambach, 104 F.R.D. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 FJd 48 (3d Cir. 1994) Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sees. Corp., 222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000) Butler v. Suffolk Cty., 289 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2009) Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v.
Merck-Medco Managed Care, 504 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2007) Clarkson v. Coughlin, 145 F.R.D. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) Cutler v. Perales, 128 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) Denney v. Deutsche BankAG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) Escalera v. NY.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) G. F. v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 13-CV-03667,
2015 WL 4606078 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2015) Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 157 (1982) Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006) Hellingv. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)

11 20 20 24 19, 22, 24 11
14 14, 15
21 23 22 18 11
20 17, 21
16 12 12 12

iii

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 4 of 30

In re Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., Sec. Litig., 172 F.R.D. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971)
Jones v. Goord, 190 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
Ligon v. City of New York, 288 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
Lollis v. NY State Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997)
Marriott v. Cty. of Montgomery, 227 F.R.D. 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, No. 05-1590-CV, 2005 WL 3117194 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2005)
McGee v. Pallito, No. 04-CV-00335, 2015 WL 5177770 (D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2015)
Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Miss. 1977)
Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014)
Penn. Pub. Sch. Emps. ' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014)
Peoples v. Annucci, --- F.Supp.3d ---,2016 WL 1464613 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016)
v: Phelps. Kapnolas, 308 FJd 180 (2d Cir. 2002)
Plaintiffs Class v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd. (In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.), 262 FJd 134 (2d Cir. 2001)
Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass 'n v. Port Auth. of N. Y and NJ, 698 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1983)
R. A-G ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. OfEduc., No. 12-CV-960S, 2013 WL 3354424 (W.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013)
R.A.G. ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. OfEduc.,
569 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2014) 20, 21..

23 19 21 24 12 passim
19, 21
18, 19,24 12 19
19, 20
15
24 12
14
18
20, 21
20, 21

iv

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 5 of 30

Redmond v. Bigelow, No. 2:13-CV-393, 2014 WL 2765469 (D. Utah June 18, 2014)
Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) Shepardv. Rhea, No. 12-CV-7220, 2014 WL 5801415 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) Williams v. Conway, 312 F.R.D. 248 (N.D.N.Y 2016)
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 20 U.S.C. § 1400 34 C.F.R. § 300 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 N.Y. Compo Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 8 § 118.4 N.Y. Compo Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 9 §§ 7070 MISCELLANEOUS Statement of Interest of the United States of America,
G. F. V. Contra Costa Cty., No. 3: 13-cv-3667, 2014 WL 6471703 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13,2014)

16 passim
12 24 .18, 24 passim
13, 17 13
passim 12 12
13

v

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This civil rights action challenges the Onondaga County Sheriffs Office's policy and practice of using solitary confinement to punish 16- and 17-year-olds at the Onondaga County Justice Center. The Sheriffs Office routinely locks children, most of whom are being detained pre-trial and many of whom have mental illness, in small, stark cells by themselves for 23 hours or more a day for weeks and even months on end, depriving them of meaningful human interaction and prohibiting them from receiving educational services. These harrowing conditions are imposed on children for minor infractions like yelling, throwing juice, or standing on a basketball. Solitary confinement can inflict serious harm on any juvenile-and is especially damaging to those with preexisting mental health conditions. Recognizing this, facilities around the country are turning away from punishing juveniles with solitary confinement. The Sheriff s Office, however, has ignored the mounting research that shows the dangers of solitary confinement for juveniles, has ignored repeated warnings about harm being inflicted on juveniles in its jail, and continues to use solitary confinement in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the Sheriffs Office and the Syracuse City School District are disregarding their obligations to provide adequate education, much less special education services, to the juveniles in solitary confinement, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The named plaintiffs V.W., R.C., C.I., M.R., F.K., and J.P., each of whom is currently detained at the Justice Center, have moved to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of all 16- and 17-year-olds who are now or will be incarcerated at the Justice Center. Further, R.C. and F.K. seek to certify a subclass of juveniles incarcerated
1

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 7 of 30
at the Justice Center who are eligible for special education services under the IDEA. In support of that motion, they submit this memorandum and numerous declarations establishing the facts relevant to the motion.
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is the proper and well-established means of efficiently addressing civil rights violations, especially in prisons, where, as here, declaratory and injunctive relief is necessary to protect detainees from unlawful and dangerous policies and practices. Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their motion for class certification and certify a class and a subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).
STATEMENT OF FACTS! I. The Sheriff's Office Has a Policy and Practice of Punishing Juveniles with Solitary
Confinement. The Justice Center is a 671-bed correctional facility that is run by Eugene Conway, the Onondaga County Sheriff, along with Esteban Gonzalez, Chief Custody Deputy, and Kevin Brisson, Assistant Chief Custody Deputy (collectively, "Sheriff's Office"). Custody Dep't, Onondaga Cty. Sheriff's Office, http://sheriff.ongov.net/custody/ (last visited Sept. 22,2016), attached as Ex. 16 to Decl. of Joshua T. Cotter in Support of PIs.' Mot. for Class Cert. (Sept. 22, 2016) ("Cotter Decl. "). Although primarily an adult facility, the Justice Center also holds 16and 17-year-old boys and girls, most of whom are detained pre-trial and some of whom are awaiting sentencing or serving less than one-year of incarceration. See N. Y. State Comm 'n on Corr, Daily Pop. Count Reporting Sys. for Onondaga Cty. Jail, attached as Ex. 17 to Cotter Decl. Juveniles at the jail are mostly housed in their own wing, and when they are not being disciplined they are allowed out of their cells for approximately 11 hours a day for recreation, showers,
1 In support of this motion Plaintiffs have submitted the Declaration of Louis Kraus, M.D., Declaration of Michelle Shames, Declaration of Emily NaPier, and the Declaration of Josh Cotter, Esq., which attaches additional documentary evidence as well as the declarations of all six named plaintiffs. A more comprehensive statement of facts may be found in these submissions.
2

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 8 of 30
library use, GED classes, and vocational programming. Housing Section, Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, http://sheriff.ongov.net/custody/housing-section/ (last visited Sept. 21,2016), attached as Ex. 18 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS041: Educational and Vocational Programs ("Education Directive") (Dec. 4, 2015), attached as Ex. 25 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS-040: Inmate Labor and Industry Programs ("Programs Directive") (Sept. 1, 2010), attached as Ex. 26 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS-045: Religious Services ("Religious Directive") (Nov. 24, 2009), attached as Ex. 27 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS-021: Inmate Activities ("Activities Directive") (Sept. 16, 2009), attached as Ex. 28 to Cotter Decl.
The Sheriff s Office applies the same set of disciplinary policies to all of its detainees, including to all juveniles, whether they are pre-trial or post-conviction. See Inmate Handbook (Feb. 2016), http://sheriff.ongov.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Inmaterulebook2016.pdf, attached as Ex. 19 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS023: Inmate Discipline ("Discipline Directive") (Nov. 8,2010), attached as Ex. 20 to Cotter Decl, These policies permit disciplinary isolation of juveniles for any rule violation or misbehavior. Id. Consistent with these policies, the Justice Center has in practice disciplined juveniles with solitary confinement for minor incidents including for spraying another juvenile with a water bottle, yelling out of a cell door, putting one's feet on the table while watching TV, or distracting a deputy during count. Id.; Decl, ofV.W. ("V.W. Decl.") ~~ 14-15 (Sept, 13, 2016) ,attached as Ex. 1 to Cotter Dec!.; Dec!. ofM.R. ~~ 21, 24 ("M.R. Decl.") (Sept. 13, 2016), attached as Ex. 7 to Cotter Decl,
3

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 5-1 Filed 09/23/16 Page 9 of 30
According to the Sheriff s Office's own data, between October 1, 2015 and August 31, 2016 it disciplined at least 86 individual 16- or 17-year-olds with solitary confinement. Decl. of Michelle Shames in Support of PIs.' Mot. for Class Cert. ("Shames Decl.") ~ 7 (Sept. 22, 2016). During the same period, solitary confinement sanctions were imposed for at least 255 incidents of alleged rule-breaking by juveniles. Id. ~ 9. For those 255 incidents, the Sheriffs Office imposed 2,698 days in solitary confinement upon 16- or 17-year-olds. Id. ~ 8. Most juveniles are likely to be punished with disciplinary isolation during their time at the Justice Center because this punishment is imposed for the types of minor misbehavior that is ordinary for young people. For example, of the 18 juveniles held at the Justice Center on September 21,2016, no fewer than 13 had been punished at least once with disciplinary isolation. Id. ~ 16.
II. The Sheriff's Office's Solitary Confinement Policies and Practices Uniformly Deprive Juveniles of Meaningful Contact with Other Individuals. The Sheriffs Office uses different phrases to describe solitary confinement in its policy
documents, although all of these disciplinary policies impose the same experience of isolation that professional organizations in the field, including the organization that accredits the Justice Center, call solitary confinement. See Decl. of Dr. Louis J. Kraus ("Kraus Decl.") ~ 27 (Sept. 19, 2016); Nat'l Comm'n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation) (Apr. 10,2016), attached to Kraus Decl. as Ex. E (defining solitary confinement as "the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal to rare meaningful contact with other individuals"). When a "lock-in" sanction is imposed, a juvenile is sentenced to spend at least 23 hours a day in his or her own cell within the juvenile unit. See, e.g., V.W. Decl. ~ 5; Decl. ofC.!. ("C'!. Decl.") ~ 8 (Sept. 13, 2016), attached as Ex. 5 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. ofF.K. ("F.K. Decl.") ~ 5 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 9 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. of J.P. ("J.P. Decl.") ~ 6 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 11 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. of A.M. ("A.M. Decl.") ~ 4 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 13 to
4

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Cotter Decl. When a "punitive segregation" sanction is imposed, a juvenile must serve at least 23 hours a day in a cell within the Segregation Housing Unit ("SHU" or the "Box"), which is also where adult inmates serve punitive isolation sanctions. See Inmate Handbook 13, 26~17. The Sheriffs Office also uses the phrase "administrative segregation" to describe days spent in isolation-either in lock-in or the SHU-before a juvenile's disciplinary hearing, which routinely occurs 15 business days (i.e. 3 weeks) after the juvenile is initially placed in isolation. Discipline Directive OCJC000028; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS~ 050: Segregation Housing (Jan. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 21 to Cotter Decl.; see, e.g., V.W. Decl. ~ 17; C.r. Decl. ~ 6; M.R. Decl. ~~ 7~8; F.K. Decl. ~~ 4, 17~18; J.P. Decl. ~~14~15.
Whether they are in "lock-in," "administrative segregation," or "punitive segregation," juveniles are subject to the same dehumanizing conditions: they are locked for 23 hours a day into a cell that is approximately 7' or 8' by 9' or 10', with minimal furnishings and virtually no contact with other people. Kraus Decl. ~~ 20, 22; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS~027: Inmate Access to Telephones (Apr. 4, 2014), attached as Ex. 23 to Cotter Decl.; Onondaga Cty. Sheriffs Office, Written Directive No. CUS~047: Inmate Visitation (Nov. 26,2014), attached as Ex. 24 to Cotter Decl.; V.W. Decl. ~ 5; Decl. ofR.C. ("R.C. Decl.") ~ 5 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 3 to Cotter Decl.; C.l. Decl. ~ 8; M.R. Decl. ~ 10; F.K. Dec!. ~ 5; J.P. Decl. ~ 6; AM. Decl. ~ 4. Recreation is limited to one hour out of their cells per day, although many juveniles do not even get that much. See Inmate Handbook 26-27; V.W. Decl. ~ 6; Kraus Decl. ~ 23.2 The juveniles eat alone in their cells. Id. ~ 22. They are prohibited from
2 In the SHU, juveniles spend their one hour of recreation in a chain-linked indoor cage, only a little bigger than a SHU cell. Kraus Decl. ~ 23; V.W. Decl. ~ 6; R.C. Decl. ~ 5; C.I. Decl. ~~ 9, 13; M.R. Decl. ~~ 11,16; F.K. Decl. ~ 5; J.P. Decl. ~ 7; AM. Decl. ~ 5. There is nothing to do in the cage. See, e.g., F.K. Decl. ~ 10; AM. Decl. ~ 5. Because it makes them feel like a circus
5

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attending the Justice Center's educational programming. See Onondaga Cty. Leg. Ways & Means Comm., 2016 Budget Review of Pub. Safety Comm. Dep'ts ("Leg. Meeting Minutes") 13-14 (Sept. 24,2015), attached as Ex. 30 to Cotter Decl; V.W. Decl, ~ 7; R.C. Decl. ~ 6; C.I. Decl. ~ 11; M.R. Decl. ~~ 13-14; F.K. Dec!. ~~ 7-8; J.P. Dec!. ~ 9; A.M. Decl. ~ 6; see also Packets of Worksheets Provided to named plaintiffs ("Cell Packets") (July to Sept. 2016), attached as Ex. 29 to Cotter Decl. By rule they are not permitted to talk to each other through the doors or in passing; violation of that policy can result in more time in isolation. Inmate • Handbook 26; Kraus Dec!. ~ 24; R.C. Decl. ~ 5, 10; C.I. Decl. ~~ 10, 19-20; M.R. Decl. ~~ 12, 23; F.K. Decl. ~ 6; J.P. ~~ 8,14. Juveniles are also routinely housed next to adult inmates who harass and intimidate them. See, e.g., V.W. Decl. ~ 6; R.C. Decl. ~~ 5, 9; C.1. Decl. ~~ 9, 13; M.R Decl. ~ 11; F.K. Decl. ~ 5; J.P. Decl. ~ 7; A.M. Decl, ~ 5; see also Kraus Decl. ~~ 26,44. Mental health care for those in solitary confinement is inadequate: there is no mental health screening before placing the juveniles in solitary confinement and mental health services are generally limited to a worker stopping by occasionally to briefly ask the juveniles, through a locked door, whether they are suicidal through their locked doors. Kraus Decl., ~~ 14,45-46; V.W. Decl. ~ 9; RC. Decl. ~ 6-77; C.1. Decl. ~ 12; M.R Decl. ~~ 19-20. III. The Sheriff's Office's Solitary Confinement Policies and Practices Inflict Similar
Types of Serious Harm and Risks of Serious Harm on Juveniles. The Sheriff s Office's policy and practice of solitary confinement is inflicting similar types of serious harm and risk of serious harm on juveniles at the Justice Center. Kraus Decl. ~~ 29-44 (relying on literature listed in Exhibit C). Because juveniles are still developing socially, psychologically, and neurologically, children as a group are especially susceptible to
animal or because they do not want to be harassed by an adult in a neighboring cage, juveniles will often forgo their one hour ofrecreation. See, e.g., C.1. Decl. ~ 13; M.R. Decl. ~ 16.
6

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psychological harm caused by isolation, including psychosis, post-traumatic stress disorders, major depression, anxiety, paranoia, and suicide. Id. ~~ 30-32. Solitary confinement is also likely to negatively impact the juveniles as a group, as well as the safety of the facility, by exacerbating the agitation and misbehavior that led to discipline in the first place. Kraus Decl. ~~ 55-56. Juveniles at the Justice Center who have spent time in solitary confinement, including the named plaintiffs, are regularly experiencing these types of harm: suicidal ideations, anxiety, post-traumatic symptoms, agitation, and other psychological phenomena that correlate with the experience of solitary confinement. Kraus Decl. ~~ 39-44.
These risks of harm are particularly high for juveniles with pre-existing mental health conditions, which, based on research, is likely between 50 to 70% of the juveniles. Kraus Decl. ~~ 35-37, 56; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates (Dec. 14,2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf, attached as Ex. 34 to Cotter Decl. Even the Sheriff s Office acknowledges that at least 35% of its inmates have a mental health condition. James T. Mulder, Onondaga County Considering Less Costly Ways of Handling Surge of Mentally III Inmates, Syracuse. com, Sept. 30,2014, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/20 14/09/0nondaga_ county _ consideringIess , costly _ w ays_of_handling_surge_of_mentaUy-ill_i.html, attached as Ex. 33 to Cotter Decl. Medical professionals, including the American Medical Association, agree that juveniles with mental health conditions should not be placed in any kind of isolation for longer than one hour without a comprehensive evaluation from a physician. Kraus Decl. ~ 37.
Major organizations of medical and correctional professionals recognize the risks of these harms and categorically oppose the use of solitary confinement as punishment for juveniles. Id. ~~ 37-38,50-54. A growing number of jurisdictions and correctional systems around the
7

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country also ban or strictly limit the use of solitary confinement for people under 18. See, e.g., Natalie J. Kraner et al., Lowenstein Sandler LLP & Lowenstein Center for the Public Interest, 51-Jurisdiction Survey of Juvenile Solitary Confinement Rules in Juvenile Justice Systems (Oct. 2015), attached as Ex. 39 to Cotter Decl, IV. The Sheriff's Office Is Aware of the Substantial Risl{ of Serious Harm Posed to All
Juveniles by Their Policies and Practices The Sheriffs Office is aware of the substantial risk of serious harm posed by their policy and practice of placing juveniles in solitary confinement. At a September 24, 2015 County Legislature session, Defendant Gonzalez acknowledged that he was aware of studies showing the effects of isolation on juveniles. Leg. Meeting Minutes 13-14. Also in2015, Joshua Cotter, counsel to plaintiffs in this matter, wrote to Gonzalez to notify him of the risks posed to juveniles subjected to solitary confinement. Letter from Joshua T. Cotter, Staff Attorney, Legal Services of Central New York, to Esteban Gonzalez, Chief Custody Deputy, Onondaga County Justice Center (Nov. 23,2015), attached as Ex. 36 to Cotter Decl. Gonzalez acknowledged that "solitary confinement is against the law and inhumane" but contended that the Justice Center's use of isolation was not "solitary confinement." Letter from Esteban Gonzalez to Josh Cotter (Dec. 7, 2015), attached as Ex. 37 to Cotter Decl. Later that year, Legal Services of Central New York filed an Article 78 Petition alleging that the Justice Center policies subject juveniles to severe psychological harm. Verified Pet. & CompI. & Supporting Papers, TS. v. Conway (Dec. 15, 2015), attached as Ex. 38 to Cotter Decl, Additionally, local advocates have met in person on multiple occasions with Sheriff Conway and Gonzalez to warn them about the dangers of disciplinary isolation for juveniles at the jail. Decl, of Emily NaPier ("NaPier Decl.") ~ 4 (Sept. 22,2016).
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V. The Sheriffs' Office's Policies and Practices Systematically Deprive Juveniles at the Justice Center of Mandated Education Services

Education at the Justice Center is provided by the Syracuse City School District ("School

District"), in accordance with the policies of the Sheriff's Office. See generally Education

Directive. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that between 30% and 50% of all

incarcerated and detained juveniles are eligible for special education services. Robert B.

Rutherford Jr. et al, U.S. Office of Juv. Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Youth with

Disabilities in the Correctional System: Prevalence Rates & Identification Issues 7 (July 2002),

http://cecp.air.org/juvenilejustice/docs/Youth%20with%20Disabilities.pdf,

attached as Ex. 32 to

Cotter Decl; see also Kraus Decl. ~ 57. During the 2014-2015 school year,' the most recent year

for which plaintiffs have data, 58 juvenile detainees at the Justice Center had qualifying

disabilities under the IDEA. N.Y. State Ed. Dep't Office of Student Support Servs., Education

of Incarcerated Youth Program Plan for Onondaga County Justice Center ("Education Program

Plan") (June 2015), attached as Ex. 31 to Cotter Decl.

When juveniles are in solitary confinement, however, the Sheriff's Office has a policy of

automatically depriving the juveniles of classroom education. Leg. Meeting Minutes 13-14.

Instead, the Sheriff's Office and the School District merely give every juvenile a "cell study"

packet of newspaper clippings, crossword puzzles, and OED-related books. See V.W. Decl. ~ 7;

R.C. Decl. ~ 7; C.I. Decl. ~ 11; M.R. Decl. ~ 14; P.K. Decl. ~ 8; J.P. Decl. ~ 9; see generally Cell

Packets. The School District provides no instruction or follow-up about the packets, and the

packets are not graded and are rarely even collected. V.W. Decl. ~ 7; R.C. Decl. ~ 7; C.l. Decl.

~ 11; M.R. Decl. ~ 14; P.K. Decl. ~ 8; J.P. Decl. ~ 9. These packets are not individually tailored

3 Juveniles were only housed in the Justice Center for a portion of that school year, so this provides a minimum annual estimate. NaPier Decl. ~ 3.
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to the juvenile's IEPs and do not provide meaningful education, much less special education. Kraus Decl. at ~~ 61-63. Further, the Sheriff s Office and School District do not provide juveniles with notice or a hearing that a given rule infraction would result in deprivation of education. Nor do they convene IDEA-mandated "manifestation determination review" meetings when a juvenile is removed from the classroom for more than 10 consecutive school days or more than lOnon-consecutive days in a school year based on a pattern of behavior, to determine whether a juvenile'S misbehavior is a manifestation of his or her disability. F.K. Decl. ~ 16; R.C. Decl. ~ 7. VI. The Named Plaintiffs Have Each Been Subjected to Defendants' Unlawful and
Unconstitutional Policies and Practices The six named plaintiffs are 16- and 17-year-olds without high school degrees who are held at the Justice Center and have been and are subject to the Justice Center's unlawful and unconstitutional policies. V.W. Decl. ~~ 1-3; R.C. Decl. ~~ 1, 3, M.R. Decl. ~~ 1, 3, 6; F.K. Decl. ~~ 1, 3, 14; C.r. Decl. ~~ 1, 3, 5; J.P. Decl. ~~ 1, 3, 9. All six of them are juveniles with preexisting mental health conditions. V.W. Decl. ~ 3; R.C. Decl. ~ 6; C.I. Decl, ~ 4; M.R. Decl. ~ 4; F.K. Dec1. ~ l3; J.P. Decl. ~ 4. All six named plaintiffs have been punished multiple times with solitary confinement. Shames Decl. ~~ 10-15. Whether they serve their punishment in the SHU or lock-in, the named plaintiffs spent around 23 hours in a small cell without meaningful human contact, environmental stimulation, and education or other programming. V.W. Dec1. ~~ 5-12; R.C. Decl. ~~ 5-7; C.I. Decl. ~~ 8-16; M.R. Dec!. ~~ 10-20; F.K. Dec!. ~~ 5-11; J.P. Dec!. ~~ 511. They were deprived of opportunities to attend classroom education without any notice that this sanction would result from the rule infraction that they were charged with or a hearing to determine ifremoving them from school was appropriate. V.W. Decl. ~ 8; R.C. Decl. ~ 7; F.K. Decl. ~ 15. Instead, "education" was limited to cell packets, which were given to them with no
10

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instruction and which were rarely collected and not graded. V.W. Decl. ~ 7; R.C. Decl. ~ 7; C.l. Decl. ~ 11; M.R. Decl. ~ 14; F.K. Decl. ~ 8; J.P. Decl. ~ 9. All six are exhibiting similar types of serious harm correlated to solitary confinement-such as suicidal ideations, hopelessness, stress, sadness, agitation, irritability, and restlessness-and they are not getting adequate mental health treatment or services. Kraus Decl. ~~ 39-42; V.W. Decl. ~ 12; R.C. Decl. ~ 10; C.l. Decl. ~ 16; M.R. Decl. ~~ 16,18-20; F.K. Decl. ~ 11; J.P. Decl. ~~ 10-11.
Additionally, R.C. and F.K. have qualifying disabilities under the IDEA that make them eligible for special education services and had IEPs at their schools. R.C. Decl. ~ 6; F.K. Decl. ~ 14-15. In solitary confinement, however, they are not given individualized education tailored to their IEPs. R.C. Decl. ~ 7; F.K. Decl. ~ 14,-15. They have also not been afforded a manifestation determination review of whether their misbehavior was related to their disability. R.C. Decl. ~ 7; F.K. Decl. ~ 14-15.
SUMMARY OF MERITS CLAIMS Class certification is determined by the requirements of Rule 23 and not by an analysis of the merits of the underlying suit. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). Nevertheless, plaintiffs briefly describe the claims that they bring in this action in order to provide context for this motion. First, the Sheriffs Office violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by maintaining policies and the practice of punishing juveniles with solitary confinement, even though they knew of the profound risk of harm that solitary poses. Cf Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837-38 (1994) (holding that a defendant acts with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware and which causes injury); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 FJd 63,69-71 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the Farmer
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deliberate indifference standard also applies to Fourteenth Amendment violations); see also Helling V. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (holding that plaintiff exposed to environmental smoke stated a claim for deliberate indifference to an unreasonable risk of serious harm). Disciplinary isolation has long been recognized as inhumane for minors, and states and municipalities, professional organizations, and international bodies have condemned its use. See Morgan V. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1139-40 (D. Miss. 1977) (holding that confining children with discipline problems in "intensive treatment unit" violated Eighth Amendment and right to rehabilitation); Lollis V. N.Y State Dep t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 480~82 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that isolating a child in a "strip cell" for two weeks violated Eighth Amendment); cf Roper V. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563~67, 574~77 (2005) (looking to such sources to conclude that death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles). There is no penological justification for punishing juveniles with solitary confinement, as doing so is counterproductive to the safety and security of the facility. Kraus Decl. 'Il'll55-56. As the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have recognized, punitive treatment that inflicts pain "without penological justification" is "unnecessary and wanton," in violation of the Constitution. Hope V. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737~38 (2002); Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 FJd 180 (2d Cir. 2002).
Second, the Sheriffs Office and School District are denying the juveniles their property interest in their educational instruction in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Second Circuit established, New York law entitles juveniles without high school diplomas to a minimum of fifteen hours per week of instruction, which cannot be denied without proper notice and opportunity to be heard on the deprivation of educational services. Handberry v. Thompson, 446 FJd 335, 355 (2d Cir. 2006); N.Y. Compo Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 118.4; id. tit. 9 §§ 7070.6~7070.7.
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Third, the Sheriffs Office and the School District violate the IDEA by failing to provide a free appropriate public education ("F APE") tailored with special education and relate services that meet the needs of juveniles in solitary confinement at the Justice Center who have qualifying disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(I)(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(I). Defendants also fail to conduct a manifestation determination review when a student is removed from the classroom for more than 10 consecutive days or a series of more than 10 days in a school year based on a pattern of behavior to ensure that his or her behavior was not a manifestation of a disability. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k); 34 C.F.R. § 356; see also Statement ofInterest of the United States of America, G.F. V. Contra Costa Cty., No. 3:13~cv~3667, 2014 WL 6471703, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13,2014),
attached as Ex. 35 to Cotter Decl.
ARGUMENT The Court should certify this class and subclass because they meet the requirements of Rule 23: namely, they, satisfy all four factors of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the three options under Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs move to seek certification of the following class:
All 16~ and 17-year-olds who are now or will be incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center. Plaintiffs also seek certification of an "IDEA Subclass" consisting of: All 16~ and 17 -year-olds with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center, who are in need of special education and related services. See PIs.' Mot. for Class Cert. Specifically, Rule 23(a) requires that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) questions of law and fact are common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
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the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied by a showing that defendants have "acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole .... " Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(2). District courts must give these requirements "liberal rather than restrictive construction," Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372,377 (2d Cir. 1997), and are afforded broad discretion in certifying a class because of their ability "to alter or modify the class, create subclasses, and decertify the class whenever warranted." Plaintiffs Class v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd. (In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.), 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B)).
Courts in this circuit recognize that class actions are particularly appropriate in prisoner litigation because" [p]risoners ... come and go from institutions for a variety of reasons [and n]evertheless the underlying claims tend to remain." Clarkson v. Coughlin, 145 F.RD. 339, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the Northern District recently certified a class of detainees with hearing impairment at the Justice Center, finding that the class action device is especially suited for prisoner litigation. See Williams v. Conway, 312 F.RD. 248, 251~2 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
I. PLAINTIFFS MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(a) A. The Proposed Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.
Plaintiffs' proposed class satisfies the requirement that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This requirement "does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible-only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action appropriate." Cent. States Se. &
Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, 504 FJd 229,244-45 (2d
Cir. 2007). A class of 40 members is presumptively numerous, but the Second Circuit also
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considers several other contextual factors: "(i) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) requests for injunctive relief that would involve future class members." Penn. Pub. Sch. Emps. )Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993».
Based on the numbers alone, plaintiffs meet the numerosity requirement for both the class and the sub-class. The Justice Center does not publicize the total number of 16- and 17-yearolds incarcerated there during each year, but data made available to the plaintiffs establish that at least 86 different 16- and 17-year-olds were placed in solitary confinement there between October 1,2015 and August 31,2016. Shames Dec!. ~ 7. Because this number reflects only the juveniles placed in solitary confinement, the total number of juveniles at the Justice Center-the proposed class-would presumably be larger, likely over 100 people per year." A proposed class of this size plainly satisfies the numerosity requirement, and the lack of a precise number is immaterial. See Robidoux 987 F.2d at 935 (holding that plaintiffs need not define the exact size of the class or the identity of its members to obtain class certification, and instead may "show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members" (internal citations omitted)); Clarkson, 145 F.R.D. at 347 (holding that "lack of knowledge of the exact number of persons affected is not a bar to class certification where the defendants alone have access to such data" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The IDEA Subclass would also meet the numerosity requirement, as New York State Education Department records show that in the 2014-2015 school year the Justice Center held 58
4 It is worth noting that a sizeable proportion of juveniles who are held at the Justice Center are sanctioned with solitary confinement during the course of their detention. See Shames Dec!. ~ 16 (no fewer than 13 out of the 18 juveniles incarcerated on September 21, 2016 had been sanctioned at least once with solitary confinement).
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juveniles with a qualifying disability under the IDEA, a number that undercounts the expected annual number, as the Justice Center only held the juveniles for a portion of the 2014-2015 school year. Education Program Plan at 1; NaPier Decl. ~ 3. Based on this, plaintiffs expect at least 70 juveniles to be a part of the IDEA sub-class in a given year. See Rutherford et al., supra, at 7. These numbers are sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement. See also Williams, 312 F .R.D. at 251 (holding that a class of people with hearing impairments detained at the Justice Center had established numerosity based on an estimate that approximately 70 people had fallen within the class definition in the previous five years).
In addition to the numbers, plaintiffs make compelling showings of several contextual factors. The class definition includes future pre-trial detainees at the Justice Center; because these class members will be constantly revolving in and out of custody, the joinder of each juvenile as a plaintiff would be virtually impossible. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,110, n.11 (1975) (noting that the transient nature of pretrial detention makes it difficult for "any given individual [to] have his constitutional claim decided"); Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 252 (noting that a class action is particularly well-suited for a class at the Justice Center because of the fluid composition). The class members plainly have limited financial resources and limited ability to sue independently. See Redmondv. Bigelow, No. 2:13-CV-393, 2014 WL 2765469, at *3 (D. Utah June 18,2014) (finding that mere fact that class members were prisoners made it difficult to join individual claims, and certifying class). Even if some could bring their own case, class certification would promote judicial economy by avoiding multiple suits that would raise the same issues and seek the same injunctive relief-enjoining the Sheriffs Office and the Syracuse City School District from placing children in solitary confinement and depriving them of their
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education. See Gen. Tel. Co. a/the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,155 (1982); Robidoux 987 F.2d at 935-36.
B. Questions of Law and Fact Are Common to the Proposed Class The second requirement of Rule 23 (a) is that the case presents "questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The common contentions oflaw and fact to be resolved here include: a) Whether the Sheriffs Office's policy and practice of placing 16- and 17-year-olds in
solitary confinement expose juveniles at the Justice Center to a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; b) Whether the Sheriff s Office acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm when they subjected 16- and 17-year olds at the Justice Center to solitary confinement, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. c) Whether the Defendants' denial of all educational services to 16- and 17-year olds who were placed in solitary confinement denied the class members of their property interest in receiving education without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As for the IDEA Subclass, the common questions of law and fact include: a) Whether Defendants' policy and practice of using cell packets in lieu of classroom instruction is a systemic denial of individualized special educational services to class members who are placed in solitary confinement in violation of the Individual with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (IDEA); b) Whether Defendants' failure to convene a manifestation determination meeting after a student with a disability is placed in disciplinary isolation and misses school for more
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than 10 consecutive school days, or for more than 10 total days in a school year for a pattern of behavior, violates the students' rights under the IDEA. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief on each of these common questions of law and fact. See CompI. The Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes that to satisfy the commonality requirement, class claims "must depend upon a common contention ... of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The commonality requirement is satisfied when defendants apply a common course of prohibited conduct to the plaintiff class. See Escalera v. N. Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853,867 (2d Cir, 1970). Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that every single question oflaw or fact applicable to the class members be the same. See Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass 'n v. Port Auth. of N. Y. & N.I, 698 F.2d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding denial of class certification improper where proposed class sought review of policy or practice of denying promotion to employees who criticized defendant employer, not review of promotions themselves); accord Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. 359 ("[e]ven a single [common] question will do" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Courts after the Wal-Mart decision often analyze commonality by looking to whether there is a common answer to the questions raised by the case. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. Thus, in McGee v. Pallito, the District of Vermont held that the plaintiffs had shown commonality because they raised two common issues: "(1) the extent to which [d]efendants' policy of constant illumination disrupts inmates' circadian rhythms, sleep, and melatonin production, and (2) whether those conditions pose a reasonable risk of serious damage to health," both of which
questions were "capable of classwide resolution." No. 04-CV-00335, 2015 WL 5177770, at * 5
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(D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2015); see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 FJd 657,676 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he commonality requirement can be satisfied by proof of the existence of systemic policies and practices that allegedly expose inmates to a substantial risk of harm." (collecting cases»; Butler v. Suffolk Cty., 289 F.R.D. 80,98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Whether the County was aware of and deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the [jail] is a common question subject to class-wide resolution. ").
In the context of prisons and j ails, there are common questions oflaw and fact where "inmates have a common interest in preventing the recurrence of the objectionable conduct .... " Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453F.2d 12,24 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92,98 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[t]here is an assumption of commonality where plaintiffs seek certification of an injunctive class under Rule 23(b )(2) to right alleged constitutional wrongs"). In Marriott v. Cty. of Montgomery, this Court found commonality where a class of pre-trial detainees challenged a county jail's official procedure of strip-searching inmates who were held on minor offenses. 227 F.R.D. 159,172 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), ajJ'd, No. 05-1590-CV, 2005 WL 3117194 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2005). Similarly, another court in this District recently held that a class of hearing-impaired plaintiffs at the Justice Center had shown commonality where their grievances shared '" a common question of law or fact' and '[arise] from the same course of events.'" Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 253 (quoting Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372,376 (2d Cir. 1997».
Plaintiffs challenge policies and practices of the Justice Center that place all juveniles in the jail at substantial risk of similar types of serious harm and seek class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief. As discussed in detail above, the main class of juveniles is subjected to the same unconstitutional policy and practice of being placed in disciplinary isolation for 23 hours a
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day, including for minor infractions of the facility rules. Inmate Handbook 4-15. Once placed in solitary confinement, all juveniles are either confined to the special housing unit (SHU) or their own cells (lock-in). Id. at 13-15; see also Kraus Decl. ~ 18. In both placements they are only allowed out of their small cell for one hour a day and cannot talk to peers. Kraus Decl. ~~ 22, 24. In both placements they are denied access to all rehabilitative, social, and educational programming. Kraus Decl. ~ 23-25,61; see also Leg. Meeting Minutes 13-14; Cell Packets. These policies and practices of disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center subject juveniles to the same substantial risk of serious harm to their social, psychological and emotional development. Kraus ~~ 29-48. Commonality is therefore met for the putative class of juveniles. See Parsons, 754 F .3d at 681 (finding that policies and practices at issue were "the' glue' that holds together the putative class ... either each of the policies and practices is unlawful as to every inmate or it is not.").
The IDEA Subclass also meets the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement. In R. A-G ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., the Western District of New York found commonality within a class of schoolchildren in Buffalo because the plaintiffs' IDEA claims were "systemic, not individual" and requested "declaratory and injunctive relief against a defendant engaging in a common course of conduct toward them .... " No. 12-CV -960S, 2013 WL 3354424, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. July 3,2013), ajJ'd sub nom. R.A.G. ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 569 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48,57 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Andre H, 104 F.R.D.606, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding commonality is met where the plaintiffs challenge the policy and practices of a facility alleged to deny all students with disabilities a FAPE); G. F. v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 13CV-03667, 2015 WL 4606078, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2015) (finding commonality satisfied
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where plaintiffs challenged the facility's policy and practice of using disciplinary isolation on students with disabilities).
Here, Defendants are violating the rights of the IDEA Subclass because for all juveniles placed into solitary confinement, they engage in a practice of (1) only providing photocopied cell packets to students with disabilities with no instruction or assistance, thereby failing to provide a FAPE that conforms to the children's IEPs, and (2) universally failing to convene a manifestation determination meeting after the student has been in disciplinary isolation for more than ten school days. Kraus Decl. ~~ 60-63; R.C. Decl. ~ 6-7; F.K. Decl. ~~ 13-15; Decl. of Sandra Chambers ("Chambers Decl.") ~~ 3, 5 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 4 to Cotter Dec!.; Decl. of Kashinde Kabagwira ("Kabagwira Decl.") ~ 4, (Sept. 13, 2016), attached as Ex. 11 to Cotter Dec!. Because the IDEA Subclass is challenging systemic failures to comply with the IDEA, commonality is met and Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. Cf R. A-G ex ret. R.B., 2013 WL
3354424 at * 10 (finding commonality requirement met because single policy is equally
applicable to all members of the class). The Second Circuit recently upheld the certification of a class of IDEA plaintiffs in Buffalo who, like plaintiffs here, were challenging "a policy that is applied uniformly to all students that qualify for supplemental services under the IDEA." R.A. G. ex rei. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 569 F. App'x 41, 42 (2d Cir. 2014).
C. The Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Are Typical of the Proposed Class Rule 23 also requires that the claims of the proposed class representative be typical of the class members they seek to represent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Analysis ofthe commonality and typicality requirements tends to merge. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 (1982). The typicality requirement is satisfied where, as here, each class member's claim arises from the same course of events and the class members raise similar legal challenges to the defendants' conduct. Robidoux, 987 F. 2d at 936; see also Marriott, 227 F.R.D. at 172
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(typicality is met where each named plaintiff was harmed under the same policy at ajail). "When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected [class members] the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of minor variations in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims." Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936-37. Nor will inclusion of future class members seeking injunctive relief defeat typicality. Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 99.
In civil rights cases involving unconstitutional prison conditions, the possibility that proposed class representatives may have been confined in non-identical conditions or suffered different physical injuries is immaterial to satisfying the typicality requirement. See, e.g., Marriott, 227 F.R.D. at 172; Jones v. Goord, 190 F.R.D. 103,112 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (certifying class of state prisoners and noting that "typicality does not require identity"). "[V]iewed in the most practical way typicality is present when all members of the putative class would benefit by the success of the named plaintiff." Cutler v. Perales, 128 F.R.D. 39,45 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,562 (2d Cir. 1968».
The typicality requirement is met in the present case because the named plaintiffs and putative class members all challenge the same unconstitutional policies and practices that place them at a substantial risk of serious harm and deny them education with no due process. See V.W. Decl. ~~ 5-17; R.C. Decl. ~~ 5-11; C.L Decl. ~~ 5-16, 20-21; M.R. Decl. ~~ 6-24; F.K. Decl. ~~ 4-19; J.P. Decl. ~~ 6-16; A.M. Decl. ~ 3-10. Their injuries are also typical of injuries to 16- and 17-year olds subjected to the solitary confinement conditions. See Kraus Decl. ~~ 39-44. Additionally, the claims of the proposed IDEA Subclass representatives arise from Defendants' systemic failure to provide a FAPE to individuals with disabilities who are placed in isolation and systemic failure to convene manifestation determination meetings. See R.C. Decl. ~~ 6-7; F.K. Decl, ~~ 13-15. Plaintiffs have established typicality by demonstrating both that their
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claims are typical of those held by all members of the main class and the subclass and that members of the main class and subclass will benefit if the named plaintiffs succeed on their claims.
D. The Named Plaintiffs Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class The adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4) "is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members." Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2006). "Courts that have denied class certification based on the inadequate qualifications of plaintiffs have done so only in flagrant cases, where the putati ve class representatives display an alarming unfamiliarity with the suit." In re Frontier Ins. Group, Inc.. Sec. Litig., 172 F.R.D. 31,47 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, all the representatives of the class and subclass have been subjected to the same challenged policies and practices. See Marisol A., 126 FJd at 378 (holding that seeking broad reliefto improve all services is in the interest of all class members). The named plaintiffs have no foreseeable conflicts of interest with other class members and have articulated that they want to end the Defendants' unlawful policies. V.W. Decl. ~~ 18-19; R.C. Decl. ~~ 12-13; C.I. Decl. ~~ 25-26; M.R. Decl. ~~ 25-26; F.K. Decl. ~~ 20-21; J.P. Decl. ~~ 17-18. Their parents echo this commitment. See Decl. of Dereck Williams ("Williams Decl.") ~ 4 (Sept. 12, 2016) attached as Ex. 2 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. of Vert ell Pendarvis ("Pendarvis Decl.") ~ 4 (Sept. 13,2016), attached as Ex. 6 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. of Karen Raymond ("Raymond Decl. ") ~~ 6-7 (Sept. 14, 2016), attached as Ex. 8 to Cotter Decl.; Kabagwira Decl. ~ 5; Decl. of Alissa Quinones ("Quinones Decl.) ~ 7, (Sept. 14, 2016), attached as Ex. 12 to Cotter Decl.
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Finally, class counsel must be "qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation." Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sees. Corp, 222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs' attorneys meet this standard. Legal Services of Central New York and the New York Civil Liberties Union both have extensive experience in class action litigation and have previously represented classes of plaintiffs seeking systemic reform in federal court class action lawsuits. See Peoples v. Annucci, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2016 WL 1464613, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,2016); Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 254; Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 100; Ligon v. City of New York, 288 F.R.D. 72,84 (S.D.N.Y. 20l3); see also Decl. of Christopher Dunn (Sept. 22, 2016), attached as Ex. 14 to Cotter Decl.; Decl. of Samuel Young (Sept. 15, 2016), attached as Ex. 15 to Cotter Decl.
II. PLAINTIFFS MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(B)(2) Class certification under 23(b)(2) is proper where allegations "stem from central and systemic failures." Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 378. Furthermore, "[c]ivil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a large and amorphous class ... fall squarely into the category of [Rule] 23(b)(2) actions." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shepard v. Rhea, No. 12-CV-7220, 2014 WL 5801415, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,2014) ("Civil-rights actions are particularly appropriate for certification under Rule 23(b )(2)."). The proposed class and subclass both meet the Rule 23(b )(2) requirement that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole .... " Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b )(2). "Rule 23(b )(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member ofthe class." Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. Thus, the District of Vermont certified a 23(b)(2) class of prisoners because "the benefit of the [proposed] injunction inures to the entire class." McGee, 2015 WL 5177770 at * 4 (discussing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359.).
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Here, each class and subclass member is at risk of having their constitutional and statutory rights violated by the policies and practices of Defendants. Juveniles at the Justice Center are at a substantial risk of serious harm because of Defendants' central and systemic failure to preserve their civil rights. Should this Court grant injunctive relief, it would provide a universally applicable remedy benefitting the class as a whole by curing Defendants' civil rights violations.
CONCLUSION Because plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to grant this Motion for Class Certification.

Dated: September 23,2016 Syracuse, New York

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mariko Hirose Mariana Kovel * Aimee Krause Stewart* * Aadhithi Padmanabhan ** Philip Desgranges Christopher Dunn NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 607-3300 Fax: (212) 607-3318 mhirose@nyclu.org

Joshua T. Cotter Samuel C. Young Susan M. Young LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK 221 S. Warren Street, 3rd Floor Syracuse, NY 13202 Tel: (315) 703-6500 j cotter@lscny.org

*Application for admission to N.D.N.Y. submitted ** Not admitted in N.D.N.Y
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
V.W., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS, R.C., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian SANDRA CHAMBERS, C.I., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian VERTELL PENDARVIS, M.R., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KAREN RAYMOND, F.K., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KASHINDE KABAGWIRA, and J.P., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian ALISSA QUIONES,
Plaintiffs,
-v-
EUGENE CONWAY, Onondaga County Sheriff in his official capacity, ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, Chief Custody Deputy of the Onondaga County Justice Center, in his official capacity, KEVIN M. BRISSON, Assistant Chief Custody Deputy, in his official capacity, and SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Attorneys for Plaintiffs 125 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004
LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK Attorneys for Plaintiffs 221 South Warren Street, Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202

9:16-CV-1150
OF COUNSEL: CHRISTOPHER T. DUNN, ESQ. MARIKO HIROSE, ESQ. PHILIP L. DESGRANGES, ESQ. AADHITHI PADMANABHAN, ESQ. MARIANA L. KOVEL, ESQ. JOSHUA T. COTTER, ESQ. SAMUEL C. YOUNG, ESQ. SUSAN M. YOUNG, ESQ.

SANFORD, HEISLER LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1666 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009
ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAW Attorneys for defendants Eugene Conway,
Esteban Gonzalez, and Kevin M. Brisson John H. Mulroy Civic Center 421 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor Syracuse, NY 13202
BOND, SCHOENECK LAW FIRM Attorneys for defendant Syracuse City
School District One Lincoln Center Syracuse, NY 13202
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York 445 Broadway, Room 218 Albany, NY 12207
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20530
NAACP - CNY CHAPTER LEGAL COMMITTEE Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colvin Station, P.O. Box 397 Syracuse, NY 13205
DAVID N. HURD United States District Judge

AIMEE KRAUSE STEWART, ESQ. CAROL L. RHINEHART, ESQ.
JONATHAN B. FELLOWS, ESQ.
JOHN D. HOGGAN, JR., ESQ. Ass't United States Attorney KYLE SMIDDIE, ESQ. ATTICUS LEE, ESQ. LANESSA L. OWENS, ESQ.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. The Justice Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 B. The School District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 C. Discipline at the Jail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 D. Education in Solitary Confinement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E. Use of Solitary Confinement on Juveniles.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 F. Plaintiffs' Experts.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Dr. Krisberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Warden Parker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Dr. Kraus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 G. Government's Statement of Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 H. NAACP's Amici Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
III. DISCUSSION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Class Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1. Numerosity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. Commonality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3. Typicality.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4. Adequacy of Representation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5. Rule 23(b).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Ascertainability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B. Summary Judgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
C. Preliminary Injunction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1. Substantial Likelihood of Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 i. Eighth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 ii. Fourteenth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 ii. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2. Strong Showing of Irreparable Harm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3. Public Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4. Balance of Hardships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
IV. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER I. INTRODUCTION
The named plaintiffs1 seek relief on behalf of themselves and a putative class of fellow 16- and 17-year-olds ("juveniles") being detained at the Onondaga County Justice Center (the "Justice Center" or "Jail") by defendants Onondaga County Sheriff Eugene Conway ("Sheriff Conway"), Chief Custody Deputy Esteban Gonzalez ("Deputy Gonzalez"), and Assistant Chief Custody Deputy Kevin Brisson ("Deputy Brisson") (collectively the "Onondaga County defendants"), each of whom is being sued here in their respective official capacities.
First, plaintiffs' class action complaint alleges declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is necessary to put an end to the Onondaga County defendants' routine imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles at the Justice Center, a practice which allegedly violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Second, plaintiffs seek class relief against the Onondaga County defendants and defendant Syracuse City School District (the "School District"), which has contracted with the Justice Center to provide educational services, for allegedly denying juveniles in solitary confinement the minimum educational instruction guaranteed by state law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Third, plaintiffs seek relief against both the Onondaga County defendants and the School District (collectively "defendants") on behalf of a subclass of juvenile inmates with disabilities who are allegedly being systematically deprived of the procedural protections and
1 The named plaintiffs are V.W., R.C., C.I., M.R., F.K., and J.P. Because they are minors, the parties refer to them by their initials in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a).
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special education services guaranteed to them by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 140 et seq.
The parties have filed three motions: (1) plaintiffs have moved for class certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and (2) a preliminary injunction under FED. R. CIV. P. 65, while the School District has moved for (3) summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56 on the basis that it is the Onondaga County defendants, not the School District, who bear sole responsibility for any of the constitutional or statutory violations alleged by plaintiffs.
In addition, the United States of America (the "Government") has submitted a statement of interest in this litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 517, and the Central New York Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the "NAACP") has moved for leave to appear as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.
The parties exchanged limited discovery and the three motions were fully briefed, although the Onondaga County defendants did not submit an opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Oral argument was heard on Wednesday, February 15, 2017 in Utica, New York, where plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the NAACP's motion for leave to appear as amici were granted. Decision was reserved on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and on the School District's motion for summary judgment. II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs have submitted a mountain of evidence in support of their request for the entry of a preliminary injunction. See Pls.' Mem. Supp. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 46-33,
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7-8 & nn.1-7 (detailing evidentiary submissions).2 In response, the Onondaga County defendants have submitted an affidavit from Deputy Gonzalez, ECF No. 62, and the School District has submitted declarations from David Tantillo, ECF No. 28-2, John A. Dittmann, Jr., ECF No. 28-3, and Signe Nelson, ECF No. 28-5.
All of these materials have been considered and the particularly relevant portions will be summarized below. Notably, the parties did not press the need for an evidentiary hearing at oral argument, and an independent review of the submissions did not reveal any genuine disputes over the essential facts. Matter of Defend H2O v. Town Bd. of the Town of E. Hampton, 147 F. Supp. 3d 80, 96-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing circumstances where an evidentiary hearing on a preliminary injunction is unnecessary). Accordingly, while a few disputes over factual matters have been noted, their resolution is unnecessary in order to decide the present issues.
A. The Justice Center Opened in 1995, the Justice Center is a 671-bed correctional f acility located in downtown Syracuse, New York and operated by the Onondaga County defendants. It houses pre-trial detainees, convicted individuals serving prison sentences, and technical parole violators. Although its primary function is to hold an adult inmate population, the Jail is also used to house approximately 30 juveniles at any one time. Approximately 90% of these juveniles are pre-trial detainees, though some are already serving sentences. The Justice Center operates under a "direct supervision" method, which places a single deputy in charge of a "housing pod" of 32 to 60 inmates. Juvenile inmates are
2 Pagination corresponds to that assigned by CM/ECF. - 6 -

typically housed in Pod 2A or 5A and, as a general matter, have access to "television, commissary, law library, a quest room or mini library, telephones, recreation, religious services, various programs including education, and visitation, which may include two one-hour contact visits per week." Gonzalez Aff. ¶¶ 9-12.
B. The School District The School District bears primary responsibility for educating eligible inmates housed at the Justice Center in accordance with New York State law as well as for ensuring that juveniles with qualifying disabilities receive the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). To effect these responsibilities, the School District operates an " Incarcerated Education Program" at the Justice Center, which is staffed by 16 certified general education teachers, 4 certified special education teachers, and 1 school psychologist. According to School District personnel, new juvenile inmates who arrive at the Jail are screened with a basic educational assessment test and a disability questionnaire. Beginning in 2013, the School District and the Onondaga County defendants entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") intended to lay out the mechanics of how the School District's education program would operate inside the Justice Center. Under the MOU, the School District agreed to administer and supervise the required educational programming and, in turn, the Onondaga County defendants agreed to assume responsibility for security matters and to provide School District personnel with access to appropriate space for classroom instruction. The parties recently extended the MOU through June 2017.
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C. Discipline at the Jail The Justice Center's disciplinary policies draw no distinction between adult and juvenile inmates. An inmate who does not behave in accordance with the rules and regulations published in the Jail's Inmate Handbook is subject to disciplinary action that includes several forms of "solitary confinement," a blanket term used here to include: (1) "lock-in," where an inmate is confined to either their own cell or to a cell in the Jail's Segregated Housing Unit ("SHU"); (2) "administrative segregation," where an inmate is placed in "lock-in" or the SHU in response to alleged misbehavior pending a disciplinary hearing, which can take up to 15 days to occur; or (3) "punitive segregation," an additional period of lock-in or SHU time imposed after a disciplinary hearing finally takes place. Regardless of the label applied, solitary confinement at the Justice Center amounts to being locked in a minimally furnished cell measuring about 8 by 10 feet for approximately 23 hours a day. Juveniles in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied human contact—they must eat alone in their cells, are not permitted to talk to each other through the doors or in passing, and recreation, if any, is limited to 1 hour per day. They are also denied mental stimulus—they have no access to the radio or television and only limited access to reading materials. And they are deprived of meaningful mental health treatment—typically, "treatment" is limited to Jail staff occasionally asking juveniles whether they are feeling homicidal or suicidal, and a juvenile who admits to such thoughts is simply placed under a suicide watch. D. Education in Solitary Confinement Juveniles in solitary confinement are not permitted to attend even the limited educational instruction provided by on-site School District personnel as part of the
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Incarcerated Education Program. Instead, teachers prepare and distribute "cell packets" to juveniles in solitary confinement. These cell packets typically include newspaper clippings, crossword puzzles, and problem worksheets. According to the School District, the contents of these packets are sometimes modified for juveniles who need special education services. However, the School District admits that the Onondaga County defendants often block teachers from directly accessing juveniles being held in solitary confinement. Consequently, no direct instruction is provided, cell packets are distributed only sporadically, and students in solitary confinement "rarely return completed cell packets" for grading, follow-up, or other meaningful evaluation.
E. Use of Solitary Confinement on Juveniles According to plaintiffs, the Justice Center routinely imposes solitary confinement regardless of a juvenile's mental health history and even for minor misbehavior expected of juveniles, such as yelling or refusing to stop talking. In fact, the Jail appears to rely primarily on isolation as the preferred method of discipline, with lesser sanctions being imposed in addition to, rather than in lieu of, solitary confinement. Between October 19, 2015 and October 19, 2016, the Onondag a County defendants sanctioned 79 of the 131 juveniles held at the Justice Center with solitary confinement on at least one occasion. Nearly half (44%) of the juveniles who received this sanction (including all six named plaintiffs) served 20 or more days.3 And of the 48 juveniles who were held at the Jail for longer than the 59-day average, nearly all (96%) were punished with solitary confinement at least once.
3 These rough figures are limited to only those juveniles held past an initial, five-day "reception period."
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Notably, Deputy Gonzalez asserts "minor inmates" are "never subject to any form of solitary confinement." But this appears to be a semantic distinction of his own creation, since the remainder of his affidavit details safety- and security-based justifications for imposing on the named plaintiffs and other juvenile inmates the various forms of disciplinary isolation contemplated by the Justice Center's Inmate Handbook and challenged by plaintiffs here. See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 38 (explaining that his review of disciplinary records confirmed punishment was necessary "in all instances . . . for the safety of the inmates and staff and to retain institutional control"). For its part, School District personnel acknowledge in their declarations that disciplinary isolation of juveniles is a regular occurrence at the Jail.
F. Plaintiffs' Experts Plaintiffs have submitted detailed declarations from three experts: Barry Alan Krisberg, Ph.D., Louis J. Kraus, M.D., and Leander Parker, a W arden at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility. Each expert has visited the Justice Center, interviewed juveniles detained there, and reviewed relevant disciplinary policies and other documentation. Neither the Onondaga County defendants nor the School District have submitted evidence to rebut any of these experts' findings. 1. Dr. Krisberg4 Dr. Krisberg has extensive experience as an authority on juvenile justice and adult corrections. A four-time published author in those fields, he holds a Ph.D. in Sociology as well as a Master's degree in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. In terms of relevant academic experience, Dr. Krisberg is currently employed as a Visiting Scholar at the
4 This is only a brief summary of Dr. Krisberg's qualifications, observations, and conclusions. His entire declaration, ECF No. 46-17, has been carefully reviewed and is incorporated in full here.
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University of California, Berkeley. He has also taught and researched corrections-related topics at Berkeley's law school, the University of Hawaii, and the University of Minnesota.
Beyond these academic settings, Dr. Krisberg has served in an expert capacity or as a court monitor in cases seeking to reform the conditions applied to youth in correctional settings in California and Illinois. He has also consulted on Government investigations into the use of disciplinary isolation in the states of Indiana, Washington, and California. Notably, Dr. Krisberg has also consulted for various New York state and local entities, including conducting a review of the disciplinary isolation practices at the Rikers Island Correctional Facility at the behest of the New York City Department of Corrections.
According to Dr. Krisberg, there is an emerging consensus among professional organizations in the corrections field that disciplinary isolation of juveniles should be eliminated because research shows that isolation is an ineffective disciplinary technique for restoring facility security and is in fact counterproductive to facility discipline and security.
As Dr. Krisberg explains, the prevailing professional opinion is that disciplinary isolation programs for juveniles should be replaced with a behavior management system that includes meaningful rewards for good behavior as well as a graduated system of sanctions for misbehavior. He points out that facilities around the country have eliminated disciplinary isolation of juveniles without compromising facility discipline and security.
Dr. Krisberg visited the Justice Center in October of 2016, where he observed the male juvenile pod, other general population pods, the SHU, the mental health unit, the infirmary, and the school. He also interviewed named plaintiffs R.C., C.I., and V.W. Among other things, Dr. Krisberg notes that the Jail frequently imposes disciplinary isolation on juveniles in many instances that have nothing to do with "physically assaultive behavior."
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Dr. Krisberg further notes that even in instances where Justice Center staff appeared to be responding to a risk of imminent danger, the current disciplinary policies permit staff to detain juveniles in isolation for long after the threat has dissipated. According to Dr. Krisberg, this is not reasonably calculated to restore facility discipline or security.
Dr. Krisberg opines that the conditions on the SHU are "deplorable" and considers them among the worst he has seen in his decades of touring facilities around the country. According to him, the SHU cells are "dark, filled with graffiti, and unhygienic" and emit an "odor of human waste." He also observed a "barren, cage-like structure" that passes for the SHU's recreation area.
Dr. Krisberg notes that juveniles in the SHU reported that they were not receiving any form of schooling or instruction. These juveniles also reported verbal and physical abuse by adult inmates who share the SHU space. And while Dr. Krisberg concedes that the cells on the juvenile pod were better lit and provided better recreational space, he confirmed these cells were similar in size to the cells in the SHU.
2. Warden Parker5 Warden Parker oversees the Youthful Offender Unit at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Rankin County, Mississippi, a facility which houses juveniles convicted of violent crimes. He has over 30 years of experience in juvenile and adult corrections settings: all told, he has worked in, or managed, eight different youth facilities in Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, and Mississippi. Like Dr. Krisberg, Warden Parker has consulted on Government investigations into the treatment of juveniles in correctional facilities in Alabama
5 This is only a brief summary of Warden Parker's qualifications, observations, and conclusions. His entire declaration, ECF No. 46-23, has been carefully reviewed and is incorporated in full here.
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and Ohio. Warden Parker visited the Justice Center in November of 2016, where he toured the
school, the computer lab, the male juvenile pod, the SHU, the mental health unit, and the infirmary. He also spoke with juvenile inmates being held in the SHU as well as a juvenile who had been sanctioned with a "lock-in." The Warden also conducted interviews with named plaintiffs C.I. and V.K.
According to Warden Parker, the conditions in the SHU are "shockingly bad" and "some of the most horrible" he has ever seen: the cells were filthy, dark, and covered in graffiti. The Warden states that these conditions would never be tolerated in any of the various correctional facilities in which he has worked. Warden Parker also noted that one juvenile he spoke to had been sent to the SHU f or cursing, and another seemed to have had "no meaningful contact with any adult" since he had arrival at the Jail several weeks before.
The Warden opines that Justice Center staff impose lengthy disciplinary isolation sanctions for minor behavior and "far too frequently overall." He asserts that conditions in the SHU and the juvenile pod are "very harsh and troubling." And although the Warden notes that he uses a "short-term version of room confinement" for juveniles in his own facility, he states that his review of disciplinary records from the Jail did not reveal even a single incident of misbehavior that, in his opinion, warranted the 23-hour disciplinary isolation frequently imposed by Jail officials.
Warden Parker further opines that, even for fighting or violence, the "Justice Center is sending kids to solitary confinement in a manner that will surely create less safety and security in the jail, and not more." In sum, Warden Parker concludes that "the frequency and length of time that youths at the Justice Center were sent to 23-hour isolation was not
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reasonably calculated to restore facility discipline and security." 3. Dr. Kraus6 Dr. Kraus is Professor and Chief of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at Rush
University Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. He is also the Psychiatric Director at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School, a residential treatment program for children and adolescents with serious emotional issues. In addition to these institutional responsibilities, he also assesses and treats children and adolescents in a private practice setting.
Dr. Kraus has worked with juveniles in various correctional settings for over 26 years, including 9 years as the treating psychiatrist at the Illinois Maximum Security Youth Center in Joliet, Illinois. And like Dr. Krisberg and Warden Parker, Dr. Kraus has consulted on Government investigations into the discipline of youth in corrections settings and has served as a court-appointed monitor responsible for supervising the reform of juvenile mental health services in correctional facilities in Illinois and Arizona. Dr. Kraus also possesses extensive experience in the field of special education: for the past 22 years, he has participated in the development and implementation of individualized education programs for students with IDEA-qualifying disabilities and has testified in various settings on IDEA issues.
Dr. Kraus visited the Justice Center in September of 2016, where he evaluated ten juveniles being held there, a number which includes all six named plaintiffs. At that time, four were in SHU, one was in "lock-in," three were on the juvenile pod, and two were in behavioral health units. Each 40- to 60-minute evaluation consisted of a clinical interview, a mental
6 This is only a brief summary of Dr. Kraus's qualifications, observations, and conclusions. His entire supplemental declaration, ECF No. 46-13, as well as his original declaration, ECF No. 5-2, have been carefully reviewed and are incorporated in full here.
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health status exam, and a depression screening. Dr. Kraus also toured the juvenile wing, the behavioral health units, the SHU, and
reviewed the School District's education policies and practices as they pertain to the Justice Center. Importantly, he also reviewed the individualized education programs in place for named plaintiffs V.W. and R.C. as well as the cell packets they had in their possession.
According to Dr. Kraus, nine of the ten juveniles he interviewed have spent time in the SHU and most have also spent time in "lock-in" in their cells in the juvenile wing. Dr. Kraus notes that juveniles in lock-in and the SHU may be housed "within sight and sound" of adults at the Justice Center and, consequently, some juveniles have reported being verbally abused or sexually harassed by the adults.
Dr. Kraus further notes that although Justice Center policy states that "no form of solitary confinement is used anywhere," the reality of the Jail's practices is "synonymous" with the definition of "solitary confinement" both as he understands the term and as that term has been adopted by professional organizations in the corrections field. According to Dr. Kraus, solitary confinement puts juveniles at a substantial risk of serious harm to their social, psychological, and emotional development.
As he explains, solitary confinement perpetuates, worsens, or even in some cases precipitates mental health concerns that can lead to long-term and often permanent changes in adolescent brain development. Further, solitary confinement also poses serious risks of suicidal ideation—almost all suicides in the juvenile correctional settings occur in some type of isolation.
According to Dr. Kraus, the level of isolation and consistently inadequate degree of attention being paid to juveniles' mental health needs being experienced by juvenile inmates
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at the Justice Center poses serious risks of precisely this sort of lasting psychological harm. In fact, records show that juveniles at the Jail who reported suicidal ideation or intent were brought to barren "strip cells" and did not receive any meaningful therapeutic services. In Dr. Kraus's opinion, juveniles will recant these reports simply so they can get out of isolation and have a chance to return to the general population.7
Dr. Kraus also concluded that the School District provides inadequate special education instruction and services for juveniles with disabilities that qualify under the IDEA. Dr. Kraus reviewed "cell packets" provided to V.W. and R.C. and compared them to the IEPs in place for these juveniles. In his opinion, the cell packets were not tailored to these juveniles' IEPs; "in fact, the cell packets were not even tailored to their grade levels."
G. Government's Statement of Interest Although the Government takes no official position on the pending litigation, its submission is strongly supportive of plaintiffs' position on the solitary confinement issue. First, the Government points out that the Supreme Court has recently emphasized the particular developmental vulnerabilities of youthful offenders. Second, the Government draws attention to instances in which it has exercised its own statutory authorization to institute civil actions to address issues related to the use of solitary confinement of juveniles in detention centers in New York, Alabama, Mississippi, Maryland, and Ohio. Third, the Government offers data that backs up Dr. Kraus's opinions—the still-developing brains of juveniles face increased susceptibility to lasting damage from the imposition of solitary confinement. Fourth, the Government states that in the last year the
7 Notably, Deputy Gonzalez claims that many juveniles who initially reported suicidal ideation to mental health staff at the Justice Center later admitted those reports were made for other reasons.
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Federal Bureau of Prisons has ended the practice of allowing solitary confinement for juveniles.
Finally, the Government explains that it has since promulgated non-binding "Guiding Principles" intended as best practices for state and local correctional facilities. As relevant here, these guiding principles indicate juveniles should not be placed in restrictive housing at all and should only be separated from others on a temporary basis in emergency circumstances.
H. NAACP's Amici Brief8 The NAACP's brief draws attention to the same emerging scientific consensus stressed by plaintiffs' experts as well as the same body of relevant case law set forth by the Government in its statement of interest. In addition, the NAACP's brief identifies additional data tending to show that disciplinary isolation is disproportionately meted out to juveniles of color. As the NAACP's brief explains, "[r]acial disparities have long persisted where authorities have greater discretion in punishment." III. DISCUSSION A. Class Certification A district court enjoys broad discretion when it comes to resolving questions of class certification because it "is often in the best position to assess the propriety of the class and has the ability, . . . , to alter or modify the class, create subclasses, and decertify the class
8 "It is well-established that a district court has broad discretion to grant or deny an appearance as amicus curiae in a given case." Picard v. Greiff, 797 F. Supp. 2d 451, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Here, the NAACP's proposed submission offers data on how solitary confinement practices like the ones at issue in this litigation disproportionately affect juveniles of color. Accordingly, this motion was granted at oral argument. See, e.g., Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Kempthorne, 471 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (citation omitted) ("The usual rationale for amicus curiae submissions is that they are of aid to the court and offer insights not available from the parties.").
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whenever warranted." Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).
However, because the class action device is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only," Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979), "[a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate [its] compliance with the Rule." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) (emphasis added) ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.").
Accordingly, "the district court is required to make a 'definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues,' and must resolve material factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement." Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 476 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In re IPO").9
First, Rule 23 requires a party seeking certification to demonstrate that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
9 Of course, at this early stage the merits should be considered only to the extent they overlap with Rule 23's inquiry. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351 ("Frequently that 'rigorous analysis' will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. That cannot be helped.").
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Second, the Rule requires a party to satisfy at least one of three additional
requirements:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
Finally, courts have written a third, "implied requirement" into the Rule: a party
seeking certification must demonstrate that the proposed class is "ascertainable." Sykes v.
Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Under this additional
element, "[a]n identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to
objective criteria." Stinson v. City of N.Y., 282 F.R.D. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting In re
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
In sum, "[c]lass certification is appropriate where the proposed class meets, by a
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preponderance of the evidence following a court's 'rigorous analysis,' the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the proposed class constitutes one of the types of classes enumerated in Rule 23(b)." Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 367 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs seek to certify (1) a class composed of "[a]ll 16- and 17-year-olds who are now or will be incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center" as well as (2) a subclass of "[a]ll 16- and 17-year-olds with disabilities, as defined by the [IDEA], who are now or will be incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center, who are in need of special education and related services." Pls.' Mem. Supp. Class Cert., ECF No. 5-1, 18.
This motion was granted during the February 15, 2017 hearing. As explained there, neither the Onondaga County defendants nor the School District have meaningfully opposed plaintiffs' request for class certification. For its part, the Onondaga County defendants have not submitted any opposition. And as for the School District, its summary judgment filing simply invites the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor before issuing a ruling on the class certification question. The School District's invitation is declined for reasons that will be made clear later in this decision.
Nevertheless, because a party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate compliance with Rule 23's requirements, the relevant findings are based on plaintiffs' submissions in support of this motion and are set forth below.
1. Numerosity The first element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). This inquiry is "not strictly mathematical" but rather requires a court to "take into account the context of the particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to joinder
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based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) request for injunctive relief that would involve future class members." Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993)). In other words, "[t]he numerosity requirement in Rule 23(a)(1) does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible—only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action appropriate." Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck–Medco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs have clearly carried their burden on this element. As an initial matter, both the class and the subclass, even considered individually, exceed forty members. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d at 120 ("Numerosity is presumed for classes larger than forty members."). With respect to the class, plaintiffs' uncontested submissions, based primarily on data produced by the Onondaga County defendants, indicates that at least 86 different juveniles were placed in solitary confinement between October 1, 2015 and August 31, 2016. With respect to the subclass, plaintiffs' uncontested submissions, based on a review of New York State Education Department records, indicate that the Jail held 58 juveniles with an IDEA-qualifying disability during the 2014-15 school year.
In addition, the contextual factors also weigh heavily in favor of certification. For instance, plaintiffs' class and subclass include all future juvenile pre-trial detainees at the Justice Center, the sort of revolving population that makes joinder of individual members a difficult proposition. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Couglin, 783 F. Supp. 789, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The class action device is particularly well-suited in actions brought by prisoners due to the
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'fluid composition' of the prison population . . . [and] generally tend[s] to be the norm in actions such as this.").
And while the class members will obviously share the same geographic area, the ability of any one individual member of the class or the subclass to maintain an individual suit will necessarily be limited by the simple reality that they are being detained as part of the criminal justice process. Cf. Redmond v. Bigelow, 2014 WL 2765469, at *3 (D. Utah June 18, 2014) (acknowledging that individual members of a putative class of prisoners would face myriad practical difficulties in maintaining individual suits because they "enjoy very little freedom in their daily lives" such as the fact they "are not at liberty to meet and confer with counsel without permission" from prison authorities).
Finally, litigating this suit as a class action promotes judicial economy, since it avoids multiple individual suits that raise the same issues and seek the same relief—an end to solitary confinement for juveniles being held at the Justice Center, and an end to the deprivation of education and special education services attendant to that treatment. Cf. Williams v. Conway, 312 F.R.D. 248, 251 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (McAvoy, J.) (certifying class of present and future deaf and hearing-impaired prisoners at the Justice Center). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the class and the subclass are sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable.
2. Commonality This element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate there "are questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Importantly, this "does not require all questions of law or fact to be common," and "even a single common question will suffice." Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 286; see also Marisol A.
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v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common question of law or of fact."); Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Commonality does not mandate that all class members make identical claims and arguments, only that common issues of fact or law affect all class members.").
"The common question must lend itself to 'classwide resolution' such that 'determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.'" Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 286 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). Importantly, "factual differences in the claims of the class do not preclude a finding of commonality." Id. at 287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, what matters is "the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Id. at 286 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have met their burden on this element as well. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that the Onondaga County defendants and the School District have applied a common course of unlawful conduct to the members of the class and subclass, that the Onondaga County defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm posed by certain aspects of that common course of conduct, and that the School District and the Onondaga County defendants have collectively deprived plaintiffs of the education, special services, and related procedural protections to which they are entitled.
The common answers to these questions will drive the resolution of the litigation—whether defendants' conduct violates the Constitution or federal law, and whether defendants should therefore be enjoined from engaging in that course of conduct. See, e.g., Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 253 (finding commonality requirement satisfied based on "jail's
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alleged failure to provide class members with services for the deaf and hearing-impaired" because these grievances share a common question of law or fact and arise from the same course of events); Butler v. Suffolk Cty., 289 F.R.D. 80, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Whether the County was aware of and deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the [jail] is a common question subject to class-wide resolution."); McGee v. Pallito, 2015 WL 5177770, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2015) (finding "common issue" of whether prison officials' policy amounted to deliberate indifference and observing that "common questions" pertinent to the individual class members "frame the ultimate question of whether the Defendants' policy violates the Constitution, such that they should be enjoined from implementing it"); see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014) (observing that "numerous courts have concluded that the commonality requirement can be satisfied by proof of the existence of systemic polices and practices that allegedly expose inmates to a substantial risk of harm").
Plaintiffs' subclass meets the commonality requirement for substantially the same reasons. In particular, plaintiffs allege the School District's policy of only sporadically delivering "cell packets" in lieu of direct instruction and, relatedly, defendants' alleged failure to conduct manifestation determinations prior to imposing discipline of a certain duration, amounts to the systemic deprivation of individualized special education services in violation of the IDEA. See, e.g., R. A-G ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 3354424, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) ("Buffalo City Sch. Dist.") (permitting district-wide class certification of IDEA-qualifying students because alleged violations are "systemic, not individual"), aff'd sub nom. R.A.G. ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 569 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (noting the IDEA's exhaustion requirement "was no barrier to class certification" where "Plaintiffs allege systemic failures . . . [occurring] as a
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matter of District policy"). In sum, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there
are questions of law or fact common to the class and the subclass. 3. Typicality This requirement is satisfied if "the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). "Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same
course of events, and each class member makes similar arguments to prove the defendant's liability." Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 370-71 (citation omitted). "When the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiffs and the prospective class, typicality is usually met." Id. at 371. Generally speaking, minor variations in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims will not preclude a finding of typicality unless there are "unique defenses" that threaten to become the focus of the litigation. See Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element for substantially the same reasons as set forth above—the members of the class and subclass share the same legal arguments because their claims are based on the common application of certain challenged policies. Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 287 ("The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge such that similar considerations inform the analysis for both prerequisites."); see also e.g., Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 99 (finding typicality satisfied where, for example, "whether exhaustion should be excused because administrative remedies were unavailable . . . is a question common to all members of the class"). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims or defenses of the
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representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and the subclass. 4. Adequacy of Representation This requirement is satisfied if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). "[T]he adequacy requirement is twofold: the proposed class representative must
have an interest in vigorously pursing the claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members." Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2006). In addition, class counsel m ust be "qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation." Baffa, 222 F.3d at 60.
This inquiry "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the parties and the class they seek to represent." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). "Not every conflict, however, precludes a finding of adequacy." Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 287. "The conflict that will prevent a plaintiff from meeting the Rule 23(a)(4) prerequisite must be fundamental, and speculative conflict should be disregarded at the class certification stage." Id. (citation omitted).
"In order to defeat class certification, there must be a showing of a genuine conflict between the proposed class representative's interests and those of the other members of the class, and only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 371 (quoting in part Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193 F.R.D. 175, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element. As discussed above, the representatives of the class and the subclass have been subjected to the same common
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course of treatment by the same officials on the basis of the same policies. Each named plaintiff has expressed a clear desire to seek prospective injunctive relief from these policies, a benefit that will inure to juveniles detained at the Justice Center in the f uture.
Further, class counsel have extensive litigation experience in the class action context and in effectively seeking classwide injunctive relief in federal forums. See, e.g., Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Scheindlin, J.) (approving class settlement in litigation brought by New York Civil Liberties Unions and observing that "[t]his litigation, and the way it has been handled by all of the attorneys, is the best example of the power of impact litigation to redress conditions that affect the most vulnerable members of our society"); Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 254 (finding this element met and certifying class of pre-trial detainees at Jail in litigation brought by Legal Services of Central New York). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and the subclass.
5. Rule 23(b) Plaintiffs also satisfy this requirement. They rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). "The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them." Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. Here, the members of the class and the subclass would benefit from the same
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remedy—an order enjoining defendants from application of the policies and practices resulting in the deprivations at issue. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360 ("Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class."). Accordingly, plaintiffs have met their burden on this element.
6. Ascertainability Plaintiffs have also satisfied this requirement. The members of both the class and the subclass are readily identifiable pursuant to objective criteria, including but not limited to the records maintained by the Onondaga County defendants and the School District. In sum, plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated their compliance with the requirements for class certification. B. Summary Judgment Next, the School District has moved for summary judgment in an attempt to avoid any further direct involvement in this litigation. According to the School District, it does not, and cannot, bear responsibility for any of conditions at the Justice Center. First, the School District contends that the only reason juveniles in solitary confinement receive "cell packets" in lieu of direct instruction is because the Onondaga County defendants refuse to permit School District personnel any direct access to juveniles in solitary. Second, the School District claims that its intake processes at the Jail include appropriate screening mechanisms to identify juveniles entitled to special education services. Third, the School District claims plaintiffs have failed to administratively exhaust their IDEA claims. Generally speaking, the entry of summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
A fact is "material" for purposes of this inquiry if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jef freys v. City of N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). A material fact is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided with respect to any essential element of the claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 4. The failure to meet this burden warrants denial of the motion. Id. However, in the event this initial burden is met, the opposing party must then show, through affidavits or otherwise, that there is a material issue of fact for trial. Id. at 250.
When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve any ambiguities and draw all inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553. In sum, summary judgment is inappropriate where "review of the record reveals sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find in the [non-movant's] favor." Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation om itted); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (summary judgment is appropriate only when "there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict").
Plaintiffs oppose the School District's early bid for a ruling on the merits by pointing out that formal discovery has not even begun and asserting they should be given an opportunity to test the accuracy of the School District's claim of blamelessness before it
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should be excused from this matter. Plaintiffs contend there is a genuine need for discovery into the question of
causation: "the issue of which policies and practices - - the School District's or the Sheriff's [Office defendants] or both - - caused the [ ] violations" at issue. According to plaintiffs, there is also a need for discovery into what efforts, if any, the School District took to overcome the Onondaga County defendants' stonewalling, since sustained inaction by policymakers in the face of known violations can give rise to liability as well.
In fact, plaintiffs assert that even taking the School District at its word should not give rise to summary judgment in its favor at this juncture, since the School District has failed to demonstrate that the Onondaga County defendants' alleged interference, even if it should prove to be the sole cause of the violations, somehow operates to absolve the School District from its shared legal responsibility under the relevant governing laws. And as for exhaustion, plaintiffs assert that it may be excused where, as here, a party challenges "systemic" violations of the IDEA.
When a party seeks to take advantage of the safety valve found in Rule 56(d) to resist summary judgment on the ground that it needs to conduct discovery in order to defeat the motion, "the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).
"In our Circuit, a nonmovant seeking additional discovery in the face of a pending summary judgment motion must submit an affidavit including 'the nature of the uncompleted discovery; how the facts sought are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; what efforts the affiant has made to obtain those facts; and why those efforts
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were unsuccessful.'" DePaola v. City of N.Y., 586 F. App'x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (quoting Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Lunts v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 515 F. App'x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order).
In light of these considerations, the School District's motion for summary judgment must be denied. As the above recitation makes clear, summary judgment is a procedural mechanism typically employed after the completion of discovery. Indeed, "[o]nly in the rarest of cases may summary judgment be granted against a plaintiff who has not been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery." Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Trebor Sportswear Co., Inc. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The nonmoving party should not be 'railroaded' into his offer of proof in opposition to summary judgment.").
Of course, "you cannot use discovery to find out whether you have a claim." Gene Codes Forensics, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 812 F. Supp. 2d 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also DePaola, 586 F. App'x at 71 ("[A] party may not use Rule 56(d) as a means of finding out whether it has a case."). Therefore, even when a Rule 56(d) motion satisfies the necessary requirements, "a district court may refuse to allow additional discovery 'if it deems the request to be based on speculation as to what potentially could be discovered'—that is, a mere fishing expedition." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Marshall Granger & Co., LLP, 921 F. Supp. 2d 111, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Seneca Beverage Corp. v. Healthnow N.Y., Inc., 200 F. App'x 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order)); see also Legends Are Forever, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (Kahn, J.) ("[A] district court may refuse a party's request for additional discovery if the party has had ample time in which to pursue the discovery that it now claims is essential.").
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But those concerns are inapplicable here. "There is a critical distinction . . . between cases where a litigant opposing a motion for summary judgment requests a stay of that motion to conduct additional discovery and cases where that same litigant opposes a motion for summary judgment on the ground that it is entitled to an opportunity to commence discovery" with respect to their claims. Crystalline H20, Inc. v. Orminski, 105 F. Supp. 2d 3, 7 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (McAvoy, J.).
First, plaintiffs have submitted an affidavit in compliance with our Circuit's mandate explaining that discovery in this case has thus far been limited to their request for a preliminary injunction. See Cotter Decl., ECF No. 42-1. Among other things, it attests that plaintiffs will seek to depose various, high-ranking School District personnel to test the assertion that there is no causal relationship between any action or inaction attributable to the School District and any of the alleged violations.
Plaintiffs also attest that they will seek information concerning what efforts, if any, the School District has taken to educate juveniles in solitary confinement and how those efforts have allegedly been stymied by the Onondaga County defendants. According to plaintiffs, information gained during this process will bear on plaintiffs' IDEA claims as well as their Fourteenth Amendment claims. As the affidavit also explains, plaintiffs have not yet had an opportunity to obtain any of this information because it is not within the scope of discovery initially authorized for the limited purpose of briefing the preliminary injunction.
Despite its continued protestations to the contrary, these outstanding discovery issues and the other material identified by plaintiffs in their Rule 56(d) affidavit do in fact bear on claims of allegedly systemic violations that are viable, and may even ultimately prove successful, against the School District for reasons that will be explained in greater detail
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below. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 303 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The nonmoving party must have had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment.").
Considerations of basic fairness also counsel against granting the School District's motion at this juncture. The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts on which the School District relies to establish its initial burden of demonstrating its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law relies almost entirely on three declarations.
These three declarations come from David Tantillo, one of the full-time special education teachers employed by the School District as part of its Incarcerated Education Program, John A. Dittman, Jr., the Principal of the School District's alternative education program center, and Signe Nelson, the School District's "Incarcerated Education Coordinator." The sum and substance of each of these declarations support the School District's contention that the blame for these alleged violations lies at the feet of the Onondaga County defendants.
But plaintiffs have not yet been given an opportunity to test the veracity of the "undisputed" facts set forth in these declarations—among other things, they have not yet had an opportunity to depose any of these individuals. That is not how the truth-testing feature of our adversary system of litigation is generally thought to work best. See, e.g., Am. Home Assur. Co v. ZIM JAMAICA, 418 F. Supp. 2d 537, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("A deposition is, perhaps, the best method of assessing [declarant's] credibility and discovering additional facts [relevant to the litigation]."); G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 2002 W L 31251702, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002) (deferring consideration of a summary judgment motion where the version of facts set forth by defendants had not yet been subject to cross-examination
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through a deposition and collecting cases). In sum, "Rule 56(d) is intended as a safeguard against premature grants of summary
judgment and should generally be applied with a spirit of liberality." Lego A/S v. Best–Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., –F.R.D.–, 2017 WL 194284, at *14 (D. Conn. Jan. 18, 2017). W ith that liberal spirit firmly in mind, the School District's motion for summary judgment is denied.
C. Preliminary Injunction "A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Chobani, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 106, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). "The party seeking the injunction carries the burden of persuasion to demonstrate, 'by a clear showing,' that the necessary elements are satisfied." Reckitt Benckiser Inc. v. Motomco Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). As a general matter, the party seeking preliminary relief must show: "(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions as to the merits plus a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in their favor; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in their favor regardless of the likelihood of success; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest." Gen. Mills, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d at 115; see also Chobani, LLC v. Dannon Co., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 190, 199 (N.D.N.Y . 2016). However, in cases like this one, where the movant is not seeking to restore the status quo ante but rather requesting an order that commands an affirmative act or mandates a specific course of conduct, a heightened standard applies: this type of preliminary injunction should issue only "upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary
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relief." Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation om itted); see also N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015) (requiring a "clear" or "substantial" likelihood of success as well as a "strong showing" of irreparable harm); N.J. v. New York, 872 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("This higher standard is particularly appropriate when a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against a government body such as a school district.").
"In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of [ ] prisons." Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 167 (W .D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). In considering a request for injunctive relief, a court must give "substantial weight" to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system the relief might have. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
1. Substantial Likelihood of Success Plaintiffs assert three claims: first, they allege the Onondaga County defendants' routine use of solitary confinement on juveniles violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; second, they allege the Onondaga County defendants and the School District deny juveniles in solitary confinement the minimum educational instruction guaranteed by state law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and third, they allege the Onondaga County defendants and the School District deprive juveniles with IDEA-qualifying disabilities of the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled.
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i. Eighth Amendment As a general matter, a convicted prisoner is obligated to pursue relief for allegedly unconstitutional conditions under the Cruel and Unusual Punishm ent Clause of the Eighth Amendment while a pre-trial detainee's claim is properly brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This distinction makes sense, because "the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilty in accordance with due process of law." City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In recent years, this has been a distinction without an analytical difference because, as the Second Circuit held in Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), "[c]laims for deliberate indifference to a . . . serious threat to the health or s afety of a person in custody should be analyzed under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment." Plaintiffs correctly point out a bit of uncertainty about the continued vitality of Caiozzo's holding in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015), which held that, at least in the context of an excessive force claim, the Fourteenth Amendment grants broader protections to pre-trial detainees than the Eig hth Amendment standard that applies to those already convicted of crimes: a pre-trial detainee need only show the use of force was objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Moran v. Livingston, 155 F. Supp. 3d 278, 287 & n.1 (W .D.N.Y. 2016). Out of caution, plaintiffs apply the more demanding (but more inclusive) Eighth
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Amendment standard here.10 See City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244 (observing that a pre-trial detainee's rights are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner").
"A claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment requires (1) an 'objectively sufficiently serious . . . denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' and (2) a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind' on the part of the responsible official." Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
The objective element requires a plaintiff to "show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health," Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), which includes the risk of serious damage to one's "physical and mental soundness." LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972).
Importantly, "there is no' static test' to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious; '[t]he conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency.'" Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1995)). As relevant here, prisoners may not be exposed "to conditions that 'pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [their] future health."" Id. (quoting Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam )).
10 Yesterday, the Second Circuit resolved this uncertainty by explicitly overruling Caiozzo. See Darnell v. City of N.Y., No. 15-2870, slip op. at 41-42 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2017) (holding that "deliberate indifference" should be defined objectively when a pre-trial detainee brings a claim for a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment). However, given the lack of a full briefing on this issue and the generally time-sensitive nature of a party's request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment analysis will be adopted for present purposes, a decision which essentially operates to give defendants the benefit of a more demanding standard. However, in the event this litigation proceeds beyond this stage, the Court will entertain appropriate briefing on this issue.
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The subjective element requires a plaintiff to show "that the defendant acted with more than mere negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. "To constitute deliberate indifference, '[t]he prison official must know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'" Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quoting Jabbar, 683 F.3d at 57); see also Lapierre v. Cty. of Nassau, 459 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) ("Subjectively, the official charged with deliberate indifference must have acted with the requisite state of mind, the equivalent of criminal recklessness").
For instance, "[e]vidence that the risk was 'obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant' may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of the risk." Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2003)). In addition, conduct that is not " reasonably calculated to restore prison discipline and security" may also be considered. Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2015) (drawing distinction between good-faith efforts to maintain or restore discipline and conduct undertaken for the purpose of causing harm).
Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. First, their submissions clearly demonstrate that juveniles face an objectively sufficiently serious risk of harm from the solitary confinement practices at the Justice Center. Second, plaintif fs have identified substantial, compelling evidence in support of a finding that the Onondaga County defendants are specifically aware of, and have consciously chosen to disregard, the serious risk of harm posed by the Justice Center's solitary confinement practices as they relate to juveniles.
As plaintiffs' experts establish and the Government' statement of interest emphasizes,
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there is a broad consensus among the scientific and professional community that juveniles are psychologically more vulnerable than adults. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) ("[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (recognizing the "comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles).
And the Supreme Court has continued to stress that these f undamental differences are consequential in the Eighth Amendment context. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (observing that youth "is a moment and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage"). For instance, the Court has forbidden the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, concluded that juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for offenses short of homicide, Graham, 560 U.S. at 82, and held that, even in cases of homicide, juveniles cannot be subjected to a mandatory sentencing scheme that automatically imposes a sentence of life without parole. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
Plaintiffs persuasively analogize the circumstances at issue in this case to numerous examples from around the country where courts have found that the imposition of solitary confinement violated the constitutional rights of adult inmates with mental conditions. As plaintiffs' evidentiary submissions demonstrate, many of the juveniles in the plaintiff class suffer from similar, pre-existing mental conditions.
And as for all members of the class, plaintiffs' submissions further establish that the risks posed here are even greater, given that juveniles share the same increased vulnerability to long-term, or even permanent, psychological damage. Cf. Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("After even relatively brief periods of
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solitary confinement, inmates have exhibited systems such as . . . hallucinations, increased anxiety, lack of impulse control, severe and chronic depression, . . . sleep problems, and depressed brain functioning."). Further, the federal government and at least 21 states have prohibited the use of disciplinary isolation for juveniles (and in fact, the State of New York has also largely eliminated the practice). Cf. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 (considering "national consensus" in determining "contemporary values" of society).
Plaintiffs have also identified significant evidence demonstrating that the Onondaga County defendants have been on notice of the specific risks of serious risk of harm from these practices through personal meetings with juvenile advocacy groups, prior litigation on this issue, complaints from parents, and even their own continued observations. And as plaintiffs point out, these allegedly unconstitutional practices have continued unabated despite this pending litigation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846 (permitting court to consider "developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions" when considering subjective culpability).
Further, plaintiffs have identified substantial data from other jurisdictions as well as their own experts showing that the use of disciplinary confinement on juveniles is not reasonably calculated to restore prison safety and, even when it is, disciplinary isolation at the Justice Center continues long after any safety concerns had been abated. Deputy Gonzalez's conclusory assertion that solitary confinement was required "in all instances [ ] for the safety of the inmates and staff and to retain institutional control" does not shield the Jail's policies and practices from scrutiny. To the contrary, the Onondaga County defendants' repeated insistence that the continued practice of imposing solitary confinement on juveniles is borne of penological necessity—made in the face of a mounting consensus pointing in the
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opposite direction—strongly informs the conclusion that the imposition of such disciplinary isolation is not reasonably calculated to restore safety in these circumstances and, in fact, represents conscious disregard of the substantial risks posed on the juvenile class.
In opposition to all of this, the Onondaga County defendants contend plaintiffs have failed to comply with the administrative exhaustion requirements found in the PLRA, which provides, in relevant part, that: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Of course, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense and therefore "inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). And even assuming the named plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, "exhaustion may be excused if: (1) administrative remedies were unavailable; (2) the defendants forfeited the defense or acted in such a way as to estop them from raising it; or (3) 'special circumstances' justify non-exhaustion." Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 93 (quoting Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004)).
As the Supreme Court recently explained, "an administrative procedure is unavailable when, (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates." Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016). Plaintif fs' class complaint alleges that administrative remedies were unavailable to the plaintiff class, with Justice Center staff consistently refusing to provide grievance forms, ignoring grievances, and in some cases throwing grievances in the trash. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 77, 8-88, 97-98, 107-08, 116, 124. T he
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Onondaga County defendants have failed to rebut these allegations. Accordingly, plaintiffs have made a clear and persuasive showing on this element.
ii. Fourteenth Amendment "In a § 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must determine (1) whether a property interest is implicated, and, if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest." Singh v. Joshi, 152 F. Supp. 3d 112, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011)). "An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Singh, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 124 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). "'The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings,' but an opportunity to be heard remains the Due Process Clause's 'root requirement.'" Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)). Plaintiffs assert a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving a certain amount of minimum education under New York's Education Law. Plaintiffs contend the cell packets distributed by the School District in lieu of actual educational instruction are delivered on an inconsistent basis and, in all cases, are an inadeq uate substitute for direct instruction. The Onondaga County defendants rely on the Second Circuit's decision in Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 353 (2d Cir. 2006), to assert that plaintif fs do not have a property interest in "any particular educational conditions" and therefore any Fourteenth Amendment claim must fail. "In order for a benefit to qualify as a property interest, the person claiming it must have
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a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to the benefit, rather than a mere 'unilateral expectation of it." Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 353 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). "In determining whether a party has a legitimate claim to a benefit, 'we look to the statutes and regulations governing the distribution of benefits.'" Id. (quoting Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)). In other words, a property interest exists where "the relevant statutes and regulations 'meaningfully channel [ ] official discretion by mandating a defined administrative outcome.'" Id. (quoting Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003)).
As it turns out, Handberry does seem to provide an answer to this threshold question. There, a class of inmates claimed that New York City's jail system deprived them of the educational services to which they were entitled under state and federal law. 446 F.3d at 338. Eventually, the district court entered an injunction in favor of the plaintiff-inmates and the defendant-officials appealed. Id. at 338-39.
In considering a similar procedural due process claim as the one pressed by plaintiffs here, the Second Circuit acknowledged that New York's Education Law "treats youths who are incarcerated differently than those who are not." Handberry, 446 F.3d at 353 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 3202(7)). The Court then examined the relevant regulations before concluding that § 3202(7) could not be understood to create a " legitimate claim of entitlement" to "anything more than an education while incarcerated that is not 'wholly unsuited' to the legislature's goals." Id. at 355.
But as the Court in Handberry also went on to emphasize, the plaintiff-inmates there had already conceded "that the defendants have provided the minimum number of hours required" by New York State regulations. 446 F.3d at 355. In fact, Handberry specifically
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affirmed the district court's entry of an injunction in that case "on the basis of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" insofar as it "ensur[ed] that the defendants continue to provide the regulatory minimum of fifteen hours per week of instruction." Id.
That regulatory minimum is precisely what plaintiffs seek here. There appears to be no reasonable dispute that the decision to place a juv enile in solitary confinement occurs immediately and without any procedural protection. And although both defendants insist otherwise, plaintiffs have submitted a significant amount of persuasive evidence indicating that the cell packets that are sometimes distributed to juveniles who have been relocated to disciplinary isolation fall far short of the regulatory minimum of fifteen hours per week of instruction. Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated at this juncture that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
iii. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Originally enacted in 1975, the purpose of the IDEA is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). "The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a 'free appropriate public education'—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. –, No. 15-497, slip op. at 2 (2017). "As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises 'special education and related services'—both 'instruction' tailored to meet a child's 'unique needs' and sufficient 'supportive services' to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.' Id. (citations omitted).
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The IDEA applies to both a Local Educational Agency ("LEA") like the School District as well as a correctional facility like the Justice Center. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.2(b)(1)(ii)-(iii). And with specific, limited exceptions for children with disabilities "who are convicted as adults under State law and incarcerated in adult prisons," all age-eligible students with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE. Compare 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.101-102, with 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(1) (emphasis added).
The IDEA provides myriad procedural and substantive protections for qualifying children, two of which are relevant here. First, plaintiffs contend the cell packets distributed to members of the subclass in solitary confinement fail to satisfy the IEP requirements of the IDEA, the primary method by which educational instruction and related support services are tailored to a qualifying student's needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
Second, plaintiffs contend the routine use of solitary confinement on the subclass in response to behavioral issues occurs in violation of the "manifestation hearing" requirement of the IDEA, which requires a determination regarding whether the "behavior that gave rise to the violation" is causally related to the child's qualifying disability before any "change in placement that would exceed 10 school days" can take place. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k). Even where a change in placement is appropriate, the education provider must continue to provide the services necessary to "enable the child to continue to participate in the g eneral education curriculum, although in another setting, and to progress toward meeting the goals set out in the child's IEP." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(i).
Plaintiffs have demonstrated they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of both of these claims. As an initial matter, a review of the applicable regulations strongly
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indicates that the School District and the Justice Center jointly share the obligation to provide a FAPE to qualifying students. 20 U.S.C. § 142(a)(12); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7070.3.
For its part, the Onondaga County defendants' 10-page opposition memorandum does not address the underlying issues but instead simply points the finger at the School District, asserting that Justice Center officials "do not determine individual education plans for [ ] minor inmates, and have no knowledge of what they contain." Of course, this response completely fails to grapple with the compelling evidence submitted by plaintiffs demonstrating that the Onondaga County defendants frequently block the distribution of the cell packets.
The School District also tries to defeat these claims by asserting plaintiffs have failed to administratively exhaust them. "It is well settled that the IDEA requires an aggrieved party to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a civil action in federal or state court." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 968 (2005); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). "The exhaustion requirement 'prevents courts from undermining the administrative process and permits an agency to bring its expertise to bear on a problem as well as to correct its own mistakes.'" Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478,k 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992)).
However, "exhaustion is excused in cases where: (1) it would be futile to use the administrative due process procedures; (2) an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to law; or (3) defendants allegedly failed to implement services specified or otherwise clearly stated in a student's IEP." Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3354424, at *7. "These exceptions are grounded in the legislative history of IDEA, which recognized that there would be cases where exhaustion would be
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either legally or practically futile." Id. (citation omitted). "The futility exception is particularly relevant in actions, such as the one at hand, that
allege systemic violations of the procedural rights accorded by IDEA." Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3354424 at *8 (citation omitted). "Systemic violations are exempted from the exhaustion requirement because they 'are often the result of implemented policies and procedures, and administrative hearing officers do not have the ability to alter already existing policies.'" Id. (quoting S.W. by J.W. v. Warren, 528 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). "Indeed, because claims of generalized violations . . . lend themselves well to class action treatment,' exempting such claims from the individual administrative review process achieves the goal of promoting efficiency." Id. (internal citation, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Exhaustion is excused in this case. Contrary to how the School District would prefer to frame this issue, plaintiffs allege systemic violations of the IDEA resulting from the inadequate services and protections afforded to qualifying juveniles placed in solitary confinement. The School District cannot just point to the existence of the MOU and insist it is blameless because plaintiffs are not challenging the formal, written policy set forth in the MOU. Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the School District's real-world policy, which they allege to be a complete failure to deliver on the black letter promises of the MOU. Cf. Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging in the Monell context that policies can be "pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action or inaction"). Indeed, if the mere existence of a written policy that conformed to legal requirements always served to trump a defendant's actual conduct, a vast range of state and federal laws would be rendered toothless by savvy lawyering. After considering all of the arguments and evidence
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in the record, plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. 2. Strong Showing of Irreparable Harm "The showing of irreparable harm is perhaps the single most important prerequisite for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction." Weinstein v. Krumpter, 120 F. Supp. 3d 289, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The concept of irreparable harm has been described 'as certain and imminent harm for which a monetary award does not adequately compensate.'" Donohue v. Mangano, 886 F. Supp. 2d 126, 149-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Wisdom Import Sales Co. v. Labatt Brewing Co., 339 F.3d 101, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Plaintiffs have made such a showing here. "First, as a general matter, there is a presumption of irreparable harm when there is an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights." Donohue, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 150. In addition, plaintif fs have submitted substantial, convincing evidence that the Onondaga County defendants' continued use of solitary confinement on juveniles puts them at serious risk of short- and long-term psychological damage, and that the related deprivation of education services by both defendants hinders important aspects of their adolescent development. See, e.g., New York, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 214 ("[I]nterruption of a child's schooling causing a hiatus not only in the student's education but also in other social and psychological developmental processes that take place during the child's school, raises a strong possibility of irreparable injury." (citation omitted)); Cosgrove v. Bd. of Educ. of Niskayuna Cent. Sch. Dist., 175 F. Supp. 2d 375, 392 (N.D.N.Y . 2001) (McAvoy, J.) ("It is almost beyond dispute that wrongful discontinuation of a special education program to which a student is entitled subjects that student to actual irreparable harm."). Accordingly, this element weighs in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.
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3. Public Interest The public interest generally supports a grant of preliminary injunctive relief where, as here, a plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and a strong showing of irreparable harm. This interest is particularly strong where the rights to be vindicated are constitutional in nature. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he public interest lies with the enforcement of the Constitution."). Plaintiffs have submitted substantial, compelling evidence to rebut Deputy Gonzalez's conclusory assertion that safety and security provide an overriding justification for the policy and practice at issue in this case. Plaintiffs have also clearly shown that juveniles in solitary confinement only sporadically receive cell packets in lieu of the regulatory minimum hours of educational instruction contemplated by New York State law. Plaintiffs have convincingly demonstrated that the cell packets, when they are actually distributed to juveniles, are wholly insufficient for both the average juvenile class member as well as the members of the subclass who qualify for additional educational support under the IDEA. According ly, the public interest is served by the grant of a preliminary injunction. 4. Balance of Hardships To be sure, the Onondaga County defendants have a strong interest in maintaining safety and security at the Justice Center. A careful review of Deputy Gonzalez's affidavit makes clear that he believes these duties will become more difficult in some measure if the Jail's solitary confinement practices are restricted as they pertain to juveniles. But invoking safety and security does not provide corrections officials with carte blanche to deprive incarcerated youth of the guarantees promised by federal law. As discussed above, plaintiffs have submitted compelling evidence from Warden Parker and Dr. Krisberg that rebuts
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Deputy Gonzalez's conclusory assertion that safety and security are legitimately served by the current practices. Accordingly, the balance of hardships favors the grant of a preliminary injunction. V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated compliance with Rule 23's requirements and therefore the motion for class certification has been granted. Conversely, the School District has failed to establish that summary judgment is warranted at this early stage of the litigation, therefore its motion will be denied. Finally, because plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims and have also demonstrated that the other factors weigh in their favor, their request for a preliminary injunction will be granted.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that 1. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is GRANTED; 2. Defendant Syracuse City School District's motion for summary judgment is DENIED; 3. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED; 4. The Onondaga County defendants, their agents, servants, employees, and officers, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them and who receive actual notice of this preliminary injunction, by personal service or otherwise, are hereby IMMEDIATELY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED, pending the final determination of this action, from imposing 23-hour disciplinary isolation on juveniles at the Justice Center; 5. The Onondaga County defendants and the School District shall IMMEDIATELY afford all eligible juveniles the educational instruction to which they are entitled under New
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York State's laws and regulations; 6. The Onondaga County defendants and the School District shall IMMEDIATELY
afford all juveniles with qualifying disabilities under the IDEA with the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled; and
7. Discipline imposed on juveniles by the Onondaga County defendants must include meaningful social interaction with others, including other juveniles, and no discipline may be imposed that directly harms a juvenile's psychological condition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 22, 2017 Utica, New York.
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 Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------}{ V.W., a minor, by and tluough his parent and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.

EUGENE CONWAY, Onondaga County Sheriff, :

in his official capacity, et al.

:

16-CV-1150 (DNH) (DEP)

Defendants.
------~-----------------------------~--------~------------·X:
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR A FINAL SE'ITLEMENT AGREEMENT WHEREAS, Plaintiffs filed a class action Complaint alleging that, by locking juveniles in closed cells for disciplinary purposes, the Sheriff's Office violated Plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that, by denying juveniles educational instruction without procedural protections and special education and related services, Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; WHEREAS, the Court certified a class and a subclass in this Action on February 15, 2017; WHEREAS, the Court issued a preliminary injunction in this Action on February 22, 2017; WHEREAS, since the initiation of this Action, the Defendants have provided Plaintiffs with extensive data and documents concerning the disciplinary and education policies and practices for juveniles at the Onondaga County Justice Center;

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 2 of 17
WHEREAS, the Parties entered into a Stipulation and Order for an interim settlement agreement that was approved by the Court on April IO, 2017;
WHEREAS, the Parties have engaged in extensive settlement negotiations and have
voluntarily agreed to enter into this Settlement Agreement to resolve this Action; WHEREAS, the Parties represent and agree that this Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate to protect the interests of all Parties and the class; WHEREAS, the Parties have negotiated in good faith and have agreed to settle this
Action on the terms and conditions set forth herein; WHEREAS, nothing in this Settlement Agreement shall be construed as an admission of
law or fact or acknowledgement of liability, wrongdoing, or violation of law by the Defendants regarding any of the allegations contained in the Complaint in this Action, or as an admission or acknowledgement by Defendants concerning whether Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action by virtue of this Settlement Agreement; and
WHEREAS, the agreement and any Order entered therein shall have no precedcntial value or effect whatsoever, and shall not be admissible, in any other action or proceeding as
evidence or for any other purpose, except in an action or proceeding to enforce this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED, AGREED, AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
2

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 3 of 17
DEFINITIONS As used in this Agreement: Action means V. W., el. al. v. Conway, el. al., Case No. I 6-CV-1150 (United States District Court for the Northern District of New York), filed September 21, 2016. Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs Class means the named Plaintiffs and the class and subclass as certified by the Court in this Action. Defendants means Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez, Kevin M. Brisson in their official capacity, and the Syracuse City School District. Parties means the Plaintiffs and Defendants in this Action. School District means the Syracuse City School District. Sheriff's Office means the Onondaga County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff's Office personnel. Sheriff's Office Defendants means Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez, and Kevin M. Brisson in their official capacity. Discipline/Disciplinary means punitive actions taken in response to alleged misbehavior, including, but not limited to, the imposition of lock-in or no contact orders. Effective Date means the date of entry of the order of United States District Court for the Northern District of New York approving this Settlement Agreement. Justice Center or Jail means the Onondaga County Justice Center. Juvenile(s) means any person or persons under eighteen years of age. Youth Coalition Team means the multi-disciplinary team of the Sheriff's Office staff, medical and mental health staff contracted to provide health-related services at the Justice Center, and the Syracuse City School District staff assigned to supervise, educate, care for, or work with juveniles at the Justice Center. Settlement Agreement or Agreement means this Stipulation and Order for a Final Settlement Agreement between the Parties. Mental Health professional(s) means mental health professionals contracted by the Sheriff's Office to provide mental health-related services to inmates in the Justice Center.
3

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 4 of 17
I. BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT A. Restrictions on the Use of Confinement
l. The Onondaga County Sherifrs Office shall not place any juvenile in a segregated housing unit, including, but not limited to, cells in 5BSH3.
2. No juvenile may be locked in a closed cell f~r disciplinary purposes unless the juvenile poses an imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility and less restrictive measures will not adequately address the threat. Such confinement shall be for the minimum period of time necessary to resolve the threat.
3. No juvenile shall be locked in a closed cell pursuant to paragraph I(A)(2) for refusing to attend educational instruction.
4. As soon as practicable after locking a juvenile in his or her cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2), a deputy shall create a written incident report, describing the imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility and any less-restrictive measures that were used before confinement.
5. To ensure compliance with paragraph I(A)(2), if time and circumstances permit, the deputy on duty shall review the precipitating incident that resulted in the confinement, assess the behavior of the juvenile, and release the juvenile if he or she is no longer an imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility. If the threat has not been resolved, the deputy shall document the reasons why on the inmate monitor report.
6. The Sherifrs Office shall promptly notify Mental Health whenever a juvenile is confined to their cell pursuant to paragraph I(A)(2) so that mental health staff (those trained in mediation 4

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 5 of 17
and crisis intervention) may as soon as practicable employ mediation or crisis intervention techniques to resolve the threat, provided that the mental health staff is available to do so and deem such techniques to be appropriate. When such techniques are used, they shall be documented. 7. No juvenile shall be locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2) beyond the 8-hour staff shift during which the juvenile was first placed in such confinement unless the next shift's incoming Watch Commander first interviews the juvenile, conducts a review of all relevant documentation including the incident report, and determines that continued confinement is necessary pursuant to the standard in paragraph I(A)(2). The Watch Commander shall document his/her conclusions on the inmate monitor report, including the specific facts upon which the Watch Commander concludes that the juvenile poses an imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility, update the inmate information system, and, if continued confmement is found necessary, notify the Security and Operations Captain. No juvenile shall be locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2) for subsequent 8-hour staff shifts unless the Watch Commander conducts the review and does the documenting described in this paragraph at the beginning of each subsequent shift. 8. No juvenile shall be locked in a cell for disciplinary purposes for more than nine (9) consecutive 8-hour staff shifts, unless the Security and Operations Captain first interviews the juvenile, conducts a review of all relevant documentation including the incident report, and determines that continued confinement is necessary pursuant to the standard in paragraph l(A)(2). The Security and Operations Captain shall document his or her conclusions pursuant to the procedure in paragraph I(A)(7). If the Security and Operations Captain determines that
5

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 6 of 17
the juvenile should remain locked into his or her cell, the Sherifrs Office shall notify Plaintiffs' counsel as soon as practicable. Under these circumstances, the Youth Coalition Team shall meet at the earliest opportunity to discuss and implement a specialized behavior management plan. 9. Any juvenile locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2) beyond the initial 8-hour staff shift during which the juvenile was first placed in such confinement shall, during the subsequent 8-hour staff shift, be seen by a medical/mental health professional who will assess and document: (a) whether the juvenile poses an imminent threat of bodily harm to self or others because of a mental health concern or (b) whether the juvenile is experiencing serious harm as a result of their cell confinement. If the licensed mental health professional determines either to be the case, the Sheriff's Office shall follow the alternative placement or behavior management recommendations ofthe licensed mental health professional. 10. Any juvenile locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2) shall be afforded at least two hours of recreation per day, one shower per day, legal and non-legal visits, the education and special education and related services to which they are entitled under the law, and access to any other services to which they are entitled under the law. 11. Any juvenile locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph I(A)(2) shall be pennitted to speak with other inmates in their housing unit provided the communication does not jeopardize the safety and security of the facility. 12. Any juvenile locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph I(A)(2) shall be pennitted to eat their meals outside their cells during scheduled meal times with others unless jail staff detennines that their participation would pose a threat to the safety and security of the facility.
6

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B. Implementation of a Comprehensive Behavior Management System 13. To effectuate section I(A) of this Agreement while maintaining the safety of the Justice
Center, the Sheriff's Office shall implement a comprehensive behavior management system that shall include, at a minimum, (a) an incentive program for juveniles with a reward system to encourage positive behavior, including, but not limited to, participation in programming and education services; (b) a list of prohibited behaviors and their consequences (including a list of those behaviors for which a juvenile may be placed in confinement under paragraph l(A)(2)); (c) a least-restrictive sanctions system where sanctions are proportional to the alleged misbehavior; (d) a treatment program that screens juveniles for mental illnesses and offers psychosocial group counseling or psychiatric assessment and treatment as found necessary by licensed mental health professionals or as requested by juveniles; and (e) a description of the full range of programming offered at the Justice Center by the Sheriff's Office and the Syracuse City School District. 14. The Sheriff's Office shall apply a least-restrictive sanctions system including, but not limited to, the following: (i) on the spot correction; (ii) counseling; (iii) removal of points or privileges earned under the incentive system; and (iv) the imposition of a work task for the day. 15. The Sheriff's Office shall maintain a Youth Coalition Team to work with juveniles at the Justice Center. 16. The Sheriff's Office shall provide a Juvenile Inmate Handbook to juveniles upon their entry into the Justice Center that explains the behavior management system. The Sheriffs Office
7

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 8 of 17
shall also update its Minor Inmate Behavior Development and Management directive to describe the behavior management system to all staff. 17. The Youth Coalition Team shall develop, and the Sherifrs Office shall implement, individual behavior management plans for each juvenile following the juvenile's reception period at the Justice Center that will identify the special needs of the juvenile and any accommodations required for the juvenile's medical, mental health, or educational needs. If a licensed mental health professional has identified a juvenile as having a chronic or serious mental illness, the behavior management plans shall accommodate these juveniles by requiring that alternatives to disciplinary confinement be used except when the juvenile poses a serious and imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility. 18. The Sheriff's Office and the School District shall make good-fhlth efforts to expand programming available to juveniles. The Youth Coalition Team shall ensure that juveniles are informed of, and have access to, the programming available to them. 19. The Sherifrs Office shall train the Youth Coalition Team members and Justice Center staff who interact with juveniles (including all Watch Commanders) on the behavior management system and on techniques and best practices in supervising juveniles in an institutional context. 20. Licensed mental health professionals from the Youth Coalition Team shall provide any juvenile with psychosocial group counseling or psychiatric assessment and treatment as found necessary by the professionals or as requested by juveniles.
8

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II. EDUCATION 21. The Sherifrs Office will provide sufficient classroom space in the Justice Center, and
security staff to escort juveniles to that classroom space and supervise juveniles during instruction, as the School District determines is necessary to meet the educational obligations of this Agreement. If a juvenile refuses to attend educational instruction, the Sheriff's Office shall provide written notification of that refusal to the School District. 22. The School District will offer, and maintain sufficient staff to offer, all eligible juveniles with three hours of instruction per school day, beginning no later than ten (10) calendar days after the juveniles has been incarcerated, including during its summer session. 23. In the case of a juvenile who was classified as a Student with a Disability prior to incarceration, the instruction offered to the juvenile will be provided by a Certified Special Education Teacher, and the School District will offer to the juvenile the related services set forth on the juvenile's most recent Individualized Education Plan. 24. In the case of a juvenile who is not classified as a Student with a Disability prior to incarceration, the School District will maintain procedures for the referral and identification ofjuveniles suspected of having a disability for an evaluation and determination of eligibility for special education in accordance with the requirements of 8 NYCRR § 200.4, including the timelines set forth therein. The instructional staff of the School District at the Justice Center, the juvenile's parent, or any other person allowed to make referrals under 8 NYCRR § 200.4 may refer a juvenile for evaluation. The referrals will be directed to the Principal overseeing the Justice Center instructional program, who is currently the Principal of the
9

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 10 of 17
Johnson Vocational Center (the "Principal") and will be considered the building administrator within the meaning of 8 NYCRR § 200.4. The Principal and the School District's Director of Special Education will be responsible for obtaining consent to evaluate from the juvenile's parent, and for proceeding with the·necessary evaluations upon obtaining such consent in accordance with the requirements in 8 NYCRR § 200.4. 25. In the case of a juvenile who was classified as a Student with a Disability prior to incarceration, and who is due for an annual review, or a reevaluation, the School District will arrange such annual review or reevaluation in accordance with the requirements of 8
NYCRR § 200.4, including the timelines set forth therein. 26. The School District will take attendance of the juvenile m the educational programs,
programing offered by the School District, and special education related services at the Justice Center, and provide such records to counsel for the plaintiffs on a regular basis. In the event that the Sheriff's Office "locks down" the Justice Center, or otherwise fails to make juveniles available for instruction or programming, such events will be noted on the attendance records. 27. In the case of juveniles who are expected to be incarcerated for more than ten (10) calendar
days, instructional staff will meet with the juvenile at the time instruction is offered to advise
them of the high school credit-bearing instruction and programs available from the School
District for juveniles at the Justice Center. The School District will create a written program
participation fonn, explaining the programs and their availability (including days and times), and pennitting juveniles to select in writing the programs in which they would like to participate. Such program participation fonns will be provided to juveniles as soon as
10

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 11 of 17
practicable after their initial reception period. The School District will create a written fonn, explaining the benefits and availability of high school credit-bearing instruction, to be acknowledged and signed by the juvenile at the commencement of instruction. In the case of juveniles who are residents of the School District, during this initial meeting the School District will complete any necessary documentation to allow the juvenile, upon discharge, to resume attending the juvenile's assigned high school without the necessity of re-enrolling as a student of the School District. The School District will create a form, to be placed in a juvenile's property, informing the juvenile of the school they will be enrolled in following their discharge. 28. In the case of a juvenile who has been classified as a Student with a Disability and who has been remo·ved from instruction at the Justice Center for ten (10) or more school days during a school year for conduct tal<lng place during instruction, or where the removal from instruction has been made by the Sheriff's Office at the request of the School District, the School District and the Sheriff's Office will hold a meeting, with the juvenile's parent to be invited, to detennine whether the conduct resulting in the removal from instruction was a manifestation of the juvenile's disability as set forth in 8 NYCRR § 20 l.4(d). The School District representatives at the meeting will include a school psychologist, a special education teacher and an administrator. ill. REPORTING AND MONITORING 29. The Sheriff's Office shall allow Plaintiffs' counsel and their experts to conduct tours of the Justice Center, conduct confidential interviews with any juvenile, and observe any provision
I I

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 12 of 17
of services when requested subject to reasonable restrictions due to facility lockdowns or similar security concerns. 30. Within ten (10) days of the Effective Date, the Sheriffs office shaJl provide Plaintiffs' counsel with:
a. the Juvenile Inmate Handbook, Minor Inmate Behavior Development and Management directive.
b. the training materials used to train the Youth Coalition Team members and Justice Center staff who interact with juveniles pursuant to paragraph l(B)(l 9).
31. Each month, the Sheriffs Office shall allow Plaintiffs' counsel to enter the Justice Center (Administration) and review, scan, or copy (with scanning and copying costs to be borne by Plaintiffs' counsel) the documents Jisted in a-c of this paragraph, subject to receiving 24 hours' notice of Plaintiffs' counsel's visit to the Justice Center and subject to reasonable restrictions if the review, scanning, or copying is unduly disruptive to the good running order of the facility: : a. copies of all incident reports, inmate monitor reports, and forms that document the charges and the time in and time out of confinement for juveniles locked in a cell pursuant to paragraph l(A)(2) during the previous month; b. copies of any behavior management plans for the previous month pursuant to paragraph I(A)(8);
12

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 13 of 17
c. any document that records the following information for the previous month: (i) all incidents during which a juvenile was locked in their cell pursuant to paragraph I(A)(2) for that month, including their name, ICN, race, sex, and date of birth (month/year); (ii) the behavior that resulted in confinement; (iii) confinement begin date and time; (iv) confinement end date and time; and (v) any remarks relating to the confinement;
32. By no later than the seventh day of each month, the School District shall provide Plaintiffs' counsel with: a. the attendance forms, required by paragraph 1!(26), that were filled out for juveniles for the previous month; b. all written forms on which juveniles acknowledge the availability of high school credit-bearing instruction for the previous month; c. all program participation forms filled out by juveniles for the previous month.
33. Counsel for the plaintiffs may email Lieutenant Leland Guillaume with any questions regarding compliance with this Agreement, with a copy of the email to the counsel for the Sheriffs Office. If Lieutenant Leland Guillaume is no longer available to answer questions, the Sheriffs Office shall identify a new individual who is available.
34. The Principal will be the School District's compliance coordinator for the purposes of this Agreement, and counsel for the plaintiffs may email the Principal with any questions regarding compliance with this Agreement, with a copy of the email to counsel for the School District. If the School District changes its compliance coordinator, the School
13

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 14 of 17
District shall promptly notify Plaintiffs' cowtsel of the identity of the new compliance coordinator.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
35. The Parties agree and jointly request that the Court find that this Agreement satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).
36. The Parties commit to work in good faith to avoid enforcement actions. If Plaintiffs believe that Defendants are not in compliance with a provision of this Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs shall give notice to all parties in writing and shall state with specificity the alleged non-compliance. Upon receipt of such notice by Defendants, the Parties wiH promptly engage in good-faith negotiations concerning the alleged non-compliance and appropriate measures to cure any non-compliance. If Plaintiffs and the Defendants have not reached an agreement on the existence of the alleged non-compliance and curative measures within twenty-one (21) days after receipt of such notice of alleged non-compliance, Plaintiffs may seek all appropriate judicial relief with respect to such alleged non-compliance, upon two (2) business days' prior notice ("Escalation Notice") to counsel for the Defendants, which notice shall infonn such counsel that Plaintiffs intend to seek judicial relief. The Parties may extend these time periods by written agreement. Nothing said by any party or counsel for any party during the good-faith negotiations referenced in this paragraph may be used by the other party or parties in any subsequent litigation, including, without limitation, litigation in connection with this Agreement, for any purpose whatsoever.
37. Notwithstanding the dispute resolution procedures set forth above, if exigent circumstances arise, Plaintiffs may seek expedited judicial relief against the Defendants based upon an 14

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 15 of 17
alleged breach of this Agreement, upon three (3) business days• prior notice to counsel for the Defendants. 38. The failure by any party to enforce any provision of this Agreement with respect to any deadline or other provision herein shall not be construed as a waiver of their right to enforce deadlines or provisions of this Agreement. V. MODIFICATION 39. This Agreement may not be modified without the written consent of the Parties and the approval of the Court.
VI. SETTLEMENT TERM 40. This Agreement is effective immediately upon the final approval of the Court. 41. This Agreement shall expire on October I, 2019, unless juveniles continue to be housed at
the Justice Center, in which case this Agreement shall expire after the Sheriffs Office notifies the Court and Plaintiffs confirm that all juveniles have been permanently removed from the Justice Center and will no longer be housed there. VII. EXECUTION AND BINDING EFFECT 42. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and each counterpart, when executed, shall have the full efficacy of a signed original. Photocopies and PDFs of such signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals for any purpose. 43. The undersigned representative of each party to this Agreement certifies that each is authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to execute and bind legally such party to this document.
15

Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 16 of 17
44. The tenns and conditions of this Agreement, and the commitments and obligations of the Parties, shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, the successors and assigns of each party.
VIII. ENTIRE AGREEMENT 45. This Agreement contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the Parties with regard
to the final settlement contemplated herein, and, following the Court's final approval, supersedes all prior agreements, representations, statements, negotiations, and undertakings (whether oral or written) with regard to the settlement of this Action. IX. NOTIFICATIONS TO COUNSEL 46. Notices and other written communications pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing. Notices shall be addressed to the attorneys of the respective parties specified in the signature pages of this Agreement. 47. In the event that any substitution is to be made in counsel to receive communications under this Agreement, all counsel shall be informed, and the name and contact information for substitute counsel shall be provided. V. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 48. Following the Court's approval of this Agreement, the Parties shall engage in good-faith negotiations over reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for Plaintiffs' counsel.
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Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 97 Filed 08/28/17 Page 17 of 17

·- ·· w/)~~')~tt·

Philip D . ges, Bsq.

cero1 L RhliidUli1;<i.

Marlana ovol, Bsq. ~thf Padmanabhan, Bsq.

Onondaga County, Department ofLaw
John H. Mulroy Civil Center, 1olh Floor

Christopher Dunn, Esq.

421 :tvfontgomery Street

Nsw YOP.K CML LIBBR'J1BS UNION

SyraCllBe, New York J3202

FOUNJ>A'llON

TeL (315}435·2170

125 Broad Street, 19th Floor.

CarolRhinohart@ongov.net

New York, New York l 0004

Tel: (212) 607-3300

Altornl)I for th1 Sher(ff'8 Office Defendants

pdesgnmges@nyclu.org

mkovel@nYclu.org

apadmanabhan@nyclu.org

adunn@nyclu.org

JirkCAr:£~ C---::~~::::::.::._ell_,,oLw-s,Bsq.

Suaan M. Young, Esq. Samuel C. Young. Esq.
LBOAL SBRVICBS OP C!NTRAL NBW YORK
221 S. Warren Street Syracus0, New York 13202 Tel: (315) 703-6500 jcotter@Jscny.org syoung@lscny.oig samyoimg@lscny.org

nd Schoeneck & King LLC One Lincoln Center Syracuse, New York 13202 Tel: (315}218-8625 jfollows@bsk.com
Attorneyfor Def11ndant Syracuse Cl/)' School Dlsll'lct

Aimee Krause Stewert SANPORl>HslSLBR SHARJ>, LLP 1666 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20009 Of Counsel

Attorneys/or P/alntl/ft

Dated: June__, 2017

 
 Case 9:16-cv-01150-DNH-DEP Document 103 Filed 11/08/19 Page 1 of 1
e

). Ryan McMahon, ll
CM/yfAIIIllNI

Countyof Onondaga
Department of Law
John H. Mulroy Civic Center, 1oth Floor 421M<lntgomery Slroet. SyTacuse, ~York 13202
Phooe: 315.435.2t70 Fax: 3t5.435.5729 MunicipaVI.Illgation Unit • Fax: 315.435.2t80 Family Court Unit
www.ongov.nct

Robert A. Durr CaJrtt IJt:JI'Mf

October 31, 20 19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT· N.D. OF N.Y
FILED

Hon. David N. Hurd U.S. Di strict Judge Alexander Pirnie Federal Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse 10 Broad Street Utica, NY 13501

NOV 0 8 Z0 19

Re: V.W., e t. al. v. Euge ne Conway, et. al. 16-CV-1150

Dear Judge Hurd:

Pursuant to paragraph 41 of the Settlement Agreement (Ct. Doc. No. 97) that was executed by the parties in the above-referenced maner, I am pleased to inform this Court that lhc last juvenile was transferred out of the Onondaga Cow1ty Justice Center last week. Mr. Joshua Cotter, coW1sel for plaintiffs, independently confirmed on Friday, October 25, 2019, that there arc no longer any juveniles housed in the jail.

Based on the above, it is my understanding that the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement have been fully per forme d, and the term of the Agreement should be deemed expired.

Please advise if the Court should require anything further. Thank you.
Rfeslpec.tfutl ly/, )!; }{iJJj-~---4--
Carol L. Rhinehart Deputy County Attorney
CLR/dk

cc: Joshua Cotter, Esq. Philip Desgranges, Esq.

 
 CLOSED
U.S. District Court Northern District of New York − Main Office (Syracuse) [NextGen CM/ECF
Release 1.2 (Revision 1.2)] (Prisoner) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 9:16−cv−01150−DNH−DEP

V.W. et al v. Conway et al Assigned to: Judge David N. Hurd Referred to: Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles related Case: 9:17−cv−00817−DNH−DEP Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff
V. W. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian DERECK WILLIAMS

Date Filed: 09/21/2016 Date Terminated: 12/13/2017 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Christopher T. Dunn New York Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−344−3005 ext. 226 Fax: 212−344−3329 Email: cdunn@nyclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua T. Cotter Legal Services of Central New York − Syracuse 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 315−703−6579 Fax: 315−475−2706 Email: jcotter@lscny.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Philip L. Desgranges New York Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−607−3360 Fax: 212−607−3318 Email: pdesgranges@nyclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel C. Young Legal Services of Central New York − Syracuse 221 South Warren Street Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 315−703−6591 Fax: 315−703−6520 Email: samyoung@lscny.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan M. Young Legal Services of Central New York − Syracuse 221 South Warren Street

Plaintiff
R. C. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian SANDRA CHAMBERS

Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202 315−475−3127 Fax: 315−475−2706 Email: syoung@lscny.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan The Legal Aid Society 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10038 212−298−3144 Fax: 646−365−2717 Email: apadmanabhan@legal−aid.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aimee Krause Stewart Sanford Heisler, LLP − DC Office 1666 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20009 202−499−5200 Fax: 202−499−5199 Email: astewart@sanfordheisler.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana L. Kovel American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St. Ste 17th Floor New York, NY 10004 646−905−8870 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: mkovel@aclu.org TERMINATED: 04/05/2018
Mariko Hirose International Refugee Assistance Project One Battery Park Plaza − 4th Floor New York, NY 10004 516−701−4620 Email: mhirose@refugeerights.org TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher T. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip L. Desgranges (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff
C. I. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian VERTELL PENDARVIS

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana L. Kovel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2018
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher T. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip L. Desgranges (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana L. Kovel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2018

Plaintiff M. R. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KAREN RAYMOND
Plaintiff F. K. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian KASHINDE KABAGWIRA

Mariko Hirose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher T. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip L. Desgranges (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana L. Kovel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2018
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher T. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J. P. a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian ALISSA QUIONES

Philip L. Desgranges (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana L. Kovel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2018
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Aimee Krause Stewart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher T. Dunn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua T. Cotter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip L. Desgranges (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel C. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Young (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aadhithi Padmanabhan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Eugene Conway Onondaga County Sheriff in his official capacity
Defendant Esteban Gonzalez Chief Custody Deputy of the Onondaga County Justice Center, in his official capacity
Defendant Kevin M. Brisson Assistant Chief Custody Deputy, in his official capacity
Defendant Syracuse City School District

Mariana L. Kovel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2018
Mariko Hirose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/31/2017
represented by Carol L. Rhinehart Onondaga County Department of Law John H. Mulroy Civic Center 421 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor Syracuse, NY 13202 315−435−2170 Fax: 315−435−5729 Email: crhinehart@ongov.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Dougherty Onondaga County Department of Law John H. Mulroy Civic Center 421 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor Syracuse, NY 13202 315−435−2170 Fax: 315−435−5729 Email: kdougherty@ongov.net TERMINATED: 01/03/2017
represented by Carol L. Rhinehart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Dougherty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2017
represented by Carol L. Rhinehart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Dougherty (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/2017
represented by Jonathan B. Fellows Bond, Schoeneck Law Firm − Syracuse One Lincoln Center Syracuse, NY 13202 315−218−8000 Fax: 315−218−8100 Email: FellowJ@bsk.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kate I. Reid Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC − Syracuse One Lincoln Center Syracuse, NY 13202 315−218−8625 Email: kreid@bsk.com

Date Filed 09/21/2016 09/21/2016
09/21/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016
09/23/2016 09/28/2016 09/28/2016 09/29/2016 09/29/2016 09/30/2016 10/11/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez, Syracuse City School District (Filing fee $400 receipt number 0206−3795452) filed by J. P., C. I., R. C., M. R., V. W., F. K.. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(alh, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
2 G.O. 25 FILING ORDER ISSUED: Initial Conference set for 12/1/2016 11:00 AM in Syracuse before Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles. Civil Case Management Plan must be filed and Mandatory Disclosures are to be exchanged by the parties on or before 11/25/2016. (Pursuant to Local Rule 26.2, mandatory disclosures are to be exchanged among the parties but are NOT to be filed with the Court.) (alh, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
3 Summons Issued as to Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez, Syracuse City School District. (Attachments: # 1 Brisson, # 2 Gonzalez, # 3 Syracuse City School District)(alh, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by V. W. re 1 Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit service on defendants)(Young, Susan) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs. Motion Hearing set for 10/28/2016 10:00 AM in Utica before Judge David N. Hurd Response to Motion due by 10/11/2016 Reply to Response to Motion due by 10/17/2016. filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in support of Class Certification, # 2 Declaration of Dr. Louis Kraus in support of Plaintiffs' Mtn for Class Certification, with Exhibits A−G attached, # 3 Declaration of Joshua Cotter, Esq. in support of Pltfs' Motion for class certification, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exs. 1−13 for Cotter Decl., # 5 Exhibit(s) Exs. 14−18 of Cotter Declaration, # 6 Exhibit(s) Exs. 19−28 of Cotter Declaration, # 7 Exhibit(s) Ex. 29 of Cotter Declaration, # 8 Exhibit(s) Exs. 30−37 of Cotter Declaration, # 9 Exhibit(s) Exs. 38−39 of Cotter Declaration, # 10 Declaration of Michelle Shames in support of Pltfs' Mtn for Class Certification, # 11 Declaration of Emily NaPier in support of Pltfs Mtn for Class Certification) (Hirose, Mariko) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. re 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs. Certification of Service by Maria Rafael (Hirose, Mariko) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathleen M. Dougherty on behalf of Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
8 AFFIDAVIT of Service for motion to certify class action, memo of law and exhibits served on Eileen Steinhardt, District Clerk on 9/27/2016, filed by V. W.. (Young, Susan) (Entered: 09/28/2016)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Kate I. Reid on behalf of Syracuse City School District (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Jonathan B. Fellows on behalf of Syracuse City School District (Fellows, Jonathan) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
11 Letter Motion from Samuel Young for V. W. requesting Conference with the Court to Discuss Filing Preliminary Injunction Motion submitted to Judge Hurd . (Young, Samuel) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Mariana L. Kovel on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Kovel, Mariana) (Main Document 12 replaced on 10/11/2016) (alh, ). (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/11/2016
10/13/2016 10/14/2016 10/17/2016 10/24/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016
10/25/2016 10/28/2016 10/28/2016

CLERK'S CORRECTION OF DOCKET ENTRY re 12 Notice of Appearance: Clerk has replaced the image with the correct notice. (alh, ) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
13 Letter Motion from Kate I. Reid for Syracuse City School District requesting Adjournment of Motion Hearing submitted to Judge Hon. David N. Hurn . (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
14 Letter Motion from Kathleen M. Dougherty, Esq. for Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez requesting an adjournment of Plaintiff's motion for class certification submitted to Judge Hurd . (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
15 TEXT ORDER ON CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION − TO BE TAKEN ON SUBMIT AS OF November 25, 2016 : Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, USDJ: 13 Letter Motion from Kate I. Reid,Esq. for Syracuse City School District requesting an adjournment and 14 Letter Motion from Kathleen M. Dougherty, Esq. for Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez requesting an adjournment of Plaintiff's motion for class certification are GRANTED and 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs shall now to be taken ON SUBMITTED PAPERS ONLY before Judge David N. Hurd with no appearances by either party required or allowed. Written opinion shall follow. Responses to the motion is due by 12:00pm on November 10, 2016. A reply, if any, to the response to the motion is due by, at 12:00pm on November 17, 2016 and the motion shall be returnable and deemed submitted as of November 25, 2016. So Ordered by Judge David N. Hurd on 10/11/2016. (Entered: 10/11/2016)
16 ANSWER to Complaint by Syracuse City School District.(Reid, Kate) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
17 Letter Motion from Kathleen M. Dougherty, Esq. for Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez requesting an extension of time to file an answer to Complaint submitted to Judge Peebles . (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
18 TEXT ORDER granting 17 Letter Request for an extension of time for defendants Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, and Esteban Gonzalez to answer plaintiff's complaint on or before 11/10/2016. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 10/17/16. (sal) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
19 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Conference with the Court to Discuss an Expedited Discovery Schedule for Plaintiffs' Preliminary Injunction Motion submitted to Judge Peebles . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A., list of requested discovery)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
20 RESPONSE in Opposition re 19 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Conference with the Court to Discuss an Expedited Discovery Schedule for Plaintiffs' Preliminary Injunction Motion submitted to Judge Peebles filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Errata A)(Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
21 TEXT ORDER granting 19 Letter Request for a Telephone Conference, which is set for 10/28/2016 at 3:30 PM before Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to initiate the call to Chambers, which can be reached at (315) 234−8620 or provide the court and all counsel with a call−in number and passcode for this conference call. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 10/25/16. (sal ) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by Aadhithi Padmanabhan on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Padmanabhan, Aadhithi) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
23 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting that the Court cancel this afternoon's conference submitted to Judge Peebles . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, discovery the Sheriff's Office has agreed to provide plaintiffs, # 2 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, discovery the SCSD has agreed to provide plaintiffs)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
24 TEXT ORDER granting 23 Letter Request. Since the parties have resolved their discovery dispute, the telephone conference set for today, 10/28/2016, at 3:30 PM is cancelled. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 10/28/16. (sal )

11/02/2016
11/04/2016 11/07/2016 11/10/2016
11/10/2016 11/10/2016 11/10/2016 11/10/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016
11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/17/2016

(Entered: 10/28/2016)
25 MOTION for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice of Aimee Krause Stewart Filing fee $100, receipt number 0206−3839086. filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Petition for Admission, # 2 Exhibit(s) Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Affidavit Affidavit of Philip Desgranges, # 4 Exhibit(s) Oath on Admission, # 5 Exhibit(s) E−Filing Registration, # 6 Proposed Order/Judgment Proposed Order) Motions referred to David E. Peebles. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
26 TEXT ORDER granting 25 Motion for Limited Admission Pro Hac Vice of Aimee Krause Stewart, Esq. for plaintiffs R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 11/4/2016. (sal ) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
27 NOTICE of Appearance by Aimee Krause Stewart on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Stewart, Aimee) (Entered: 11/07/2016)
28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District Motion Hearing set for 12/23/2016 10:00 AM in Utica before Judge David N. Hurd Response to Motion due by 12/6/2016 Reply to Response to Motion due by 12/12/2016. filed by Syracuse City School District. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Material Facts, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Declaration, # 4 Exhibit(s) Exhibit 1 to Declaration of John A. Dittmann, Jr., # 5 Declaration) (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
29 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez.(Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
30 MEMORANDUM OF LAW re 28 Motion for Summary Judgment, 5 Motion to Certify Class,,,, filed by Syracuse City School District. (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Syracuse City School District re 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District, 30 Memorandum of Law (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
32 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez re 29 Answer to Complaint (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/10/2016)
33 TEXT ORDER : Due to the pending motions to 5 certify class and for 28 summary judgment, the in person Initial Conference set for 12/1/2016 at 11:00 AM in Syracuse is adjourned without date. The deadline for exchanging mandatory disclosures and filing a Civil Case Management Plan is stayed at this time. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 11/15/2016. (sal) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
34 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Conference with the Court to Seek Relief for the Sheriff's Office Defendants' Failure to Produce All Expedited Discovery submitted to Judge Peebles . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, 10−24−16 Letter to Magistrate Judge Peebles, # 2 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, 10−28−16 Letter to Magistrate Judge Peebles, # 3 Exhibit(s) Ex. C, Outstanding Expedited Discovery List)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
35 TEXT ORDER granting 34 Letter Request. A Telephone Conference is set for 11/18/2016 at 3:30 PM before Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to initiate the call to Chambers, which can be reached at (315) 234−8620 or provide the court and all counsel with a call−in number and passcode. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 11/16/2016. (sal) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
36 RESPONSE to Motion re 34 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Conference with the Court to Seek Relief for the Sheriff's Office Defendants' Failure to Produce All Expedited Discovery submitted to Judge Peeb filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
37 REPLY to Response to Motion re 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs. Request for permission to file Reply filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 11/17/2016)

11/18/2016
11/18/2016 12/05/2016 12/06/2016 12/13/2016 12/13/2016
12/13/2016 12/16/2016 12/19/2016 12/20/2016 12/21/2016

TEXT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles: Telephone Conference held on 11/18/2016. After discussing with counsel the issues raised in plaintiffs' 34 letter motion and defendants' 36 response, counsel for the County defendants will provide discovery documents to the plaintiffs, at the latest, by November 30th. Plaintiffs anticipate filing a motion for a preliminary injunction within the next couple of weeks once they receive all of the discovery documents. Magistrate Judge Peebles directs the parties to confer and hold a Rule 26(f) meeting within twenty−one days of today's date. The County defendants intend to file a motion for summary judgment. APP: Phillip Desgranges, Esq., Samuel Young, Esq., Susan Young, Esq., Kathleen Dougherty, Esq., and Jonathan Fellows, Esq.. (sal ) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
38 TEXT ORDER : The parties are directed to confer and hold a Rule 26(f) meeting within twenty−one days of today's date. Once accomplished, a discovery plan must be filed with the court. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 11/18/2016. (sal) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
39 Letter Motion from Plaintiffs' counsel for V. W. requesting extension to file response to motion for summary judgment submitted to Judge Hurd . (Young, Susan) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
40 TEXT ORDER granting 39 Letter Motion from Plaintiffs' counsel for V. W. requesting extension to file response to 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District. Plaintiffs' Response to Motion due by 12/13/2016 and Defendants' Reply to Response to Motion due by 12/19/2016. So Ordered by Judge David N. Hurd on 12/6/2016. (ptm) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
41 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Page Enlargement for Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction submitted to Judge Hurd . (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
42 RESPONSE to Motion re 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel Joshua Cotter Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(d), # 2 Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel Susan Young in Opposition to Summary Judgment, # 3 Exhibit(s) Exs. 1−6 of Young Decl., # 4 Exhibit(s) Exs. 7−8 of Young Decl., # 5 Exhibit(s) Exs. 9−10 of Young Decl., # 6 Declaration of Dr. Louis Kraus in Opposition to Summary Judgment, # 7 Declaration of Michlle Shames in Opposition to Summary Judgment, # 8 Statement of Material Facts)(Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R. re 42 Response to Motion,, (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
44 TEXT ORDER: Denying 41 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Page Enlargement for Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 12/16/2016. (ptm) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
45 RESPONSE in Support re 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District filed by Syracuse City School District. (Attachments: # 1 DECLARATION OF KATE I. REID IN SUPPORT OF SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)(Reid, Kate) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
TEXT NOTICE ON MOTION TAKEN ON SUBMIT : Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, USDJ: Re: 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District. All necessary papers having been received by the Court this motion, returnable on December 23, 2016, is hereby taken ON SUBMITTED PAPERS ONLY, With no appearances by either party required or allowed. Written opinion to follow. (ptm) (Entered: 12/20/2016)
46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Motion Hearing set for 1/27/2017 10:00 AM in Utica before Judge David N. Hurd Response to Motion due by 1/10/2017 Reply to Response to Motion due by 1/17/2017. filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Attorney Philip Desgranges in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Exhibit(s) A−G for Desgranges Declaration, #

12/22/2016 12/22/2016
12/30/2016 01/03/2017 01/03/2017 01/05/2017 01/06/2017 01/09/2017

3 Exhibit(s) H for Desgranges Declaration (Part 1 of 2), # 4 Exhibit(s) H for Desgranges Declaration (Part 2 of 2), # 5 Exhibit(s) I for Desgranges Declaration, # 6 Exhibit(s) J−N for Desgranges Declaration, # 7 Exhibit(s) O−S for Desgranges Declaration, # 8 Exhibit(s) T−Z for Desgranges Declaration, # 9 Exhibit(s) AA−AG for Desgranges Declaration, # 10 Exhibit(s) AH for Desgranges Declaration, # 11 Exhibit(s) AI−AO for Desgranges Declaration, # 12 Exhibit(s) AP−AX for Desgranges Declaration, # 13 Declaration (Supplemental) of Expert Dr. Louis Kraus in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 14 Exhibit(s) 1−3 for Kraus Suppl. Declaration, # 15 Exhibit(s) 4 for Kraus Suppl. Declaration, # 16 Exhibit(s) 5 for Kraus Suppl. Declaration, # 17 Declaration of Expert Dr. Barry Krisberg in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 18 Exhibit(s) A−F for Krisberg Declaration, # 19 Exhibit(s) G for Krisberg Declaration, # 20 Exhibit(s) H for Krisberg Declaration, # 21 Exhibit(s) I for Krisberg Declaration, # 22 Exhibit(s) J for Krisberg Declaration, # 23 Declaration of Expert Warden Leander Parker in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 24 Exhibit(s) A−B for Parker Declaration, # 25 Declaration of Michelle Shames in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 26 Exhibit(s) A for Shames Declaration, # 27 Exhibit(s) B−D for Shames Declaration, # 28 Declaration of Emily NaPier in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 29 Exhibit(s) A−E for NaPier Declaration, # 30 Exhibit(s) F−J for NaPier Declaration, # 31 Declaration of Maria Rafael in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 32 Exhibit(s) A for Rafael Declaration, # 33 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction) (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
47 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
48 TEXT ORDER : Pursuant to the Text Order entered on 11/18/2016, the parties were directed to confer and hold a Rule 26(f) meeting within twenty−on days of the date of that order. Once this was accomplished, a discovery plan was to be filed with the court. Since the document has not yet been filed with the court, the parties are directed to file a joint discovery plan in this action on or before 1/6/2017. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 12/22/2016. (sal ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
49 Letter Motion from Kathleen M. Dougherty, Esq. for Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez requesting an extension to respond to Motion under Ct. Doc. 46 submitted to Judge Hurd . (Dougherty, Kathleen) (Entered: 12/30/2016)
50 NOTICE of Appearance by Carol L. Rhinehart on behalf of Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
51 NOTICE by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Statement of Interest of United States of America (Hoggan, John) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
52 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Responding to the Sheriff's Office defendants' request for an extension to respond to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction submitted to Judge Hurd . (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
53 CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
54 UNIFORM PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Anticipated length of jury trial: 7 days. Preferred Trial Location: Syracuse. Mandatory disclosures must be exchanged by 1/13/2017. Joinder of Parties due by 10/2/2017. Amended Pleadings due by 10/2/2017. Completion of all Fact Discovery is due by 11/1/2017. Initial expert reports are to be served by 11/9/2017. Responsive expert reports are due to be served by 12/22/2017. Rebuttal expert reports are due to be served by 1/8/2018. Completion of all discovery, including expert depositions, is due by 2/7/2018. Dispositive Motions must be filed by 2/21/2018. When no dispositive motion is filed, the motion filing deadline becomes the trial ready date. The court will issue a notice scheduling a Final Pretrial Conference and Trial Date before U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd at a later time. This action is exempt from the court's Mandatory Mediation Program, however, the issue of settlement will be revisited and discussed further with counsel at a later time. *NOTE: PLEASE THE ATTACHED ADDENDUM FOR PROVISIONS OF

01/10/2017 01/10/2017 01/11/2017
01/18/2017 01/19/2017 01/20/2017 01/20/2017 01/20/2017 01/20/2017
01/20/2017

THE UPSO AND REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME* Signed by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 1/9/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Addendum to UPSO)(sal ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
55 MEMORANDUM OF LAW re 46 Motion for Preliminary Injunction,,,,,,,,, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by Syracuse City School District. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Fellows, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
56 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Syracuse City School District re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 55 Memorandum of Law (Fellows, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
57 TEXT ORDER GRANTING ADJOURNMENT OF MOTIONS: Granting in part 52 Letter Motion from Philip Desgranges, Esq. from plaintiffs regarding extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , is adjourned and the motion response and reply dates are reset as follows; Defendants' Response to the Motion is now due by 12:00pm on January 20, 2017 and Plaintiffs' Reply to the Response to the Motion, if any, is now due by 12:00pm on January 30, 2017. Oral argument as to all motions that have been filed in this matter : 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs., 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District, and 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction shall be heard and are NOW set for Friday, February 10, 2017 at 10:00AM in USDC / Utica, NY. Appearances required in Court in Utica. Please adjust your calendars accordingly. So Ordered by Judge David N. Hurd on 1/11/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 01/11/2017)
58 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting that the Court Enter the Attached Protective Order submitted to Judge Peebles . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order/Judgment Proposed Protective Order)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
59 PROTECTIVE ORDER regarding materials containing confidential information. Signed by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 1/19/2017. (sal ) (Entered: 01/19/2017)
TEXT NOTICE: Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, USDJ response and reply papers Re: 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction shall be filed no later than 5:00pm on January 20, 2017 and January 30, 2017 respectively. (ptm) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
60 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s))(Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
61 Medical Records filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) B, # 2 Exhibit(s) C, # 3 Exhibit(s) D, # 4 Exhibit(s) E, # 5 Exhibit(s) F, # 6 Exhibit(s) G, # 7 Exhibit(s) H, # 8 Exhibit(s) I, # 9 Exhibit(s) J, # 10 Exhibit(s) K, # 11 Exhibit(s) L, # 12 Exhibit(s) M)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Attachment 2 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 3 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Entered: 01/20/2017)
62 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L, # 13 Exhibit(s) M, # 14 Exhibit(s) N, # 15 Exhibit(s) O, # 16 Exhibit(s) P)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Attachment 4 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 7 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 8 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 11 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 13 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Attachment 15 replaced on 1/23/2017) (alh, ). (Entered: 01/20/2017)
63 MEMORANDUM OF LAW re 60 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, 61 Medical Records filed, 62 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of

01/23/2017 01/30/2017 02/02/2017 02/02/2017
02/15/2017
02/16/2017 02/17/2017 02/22/2017

Service)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
CLERK'S CORRECTION OF DOCKET ENTRY re 61 Medical Records filed, 62 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion: Clerk has replaced attachments 2, 3, 8, and 11 of Dkt. No. 61 and attachments 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, and 15 of Dkt. No. 62 due to personal identifiers, submissions have been redacted and replaced on the docket. (alh, ) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
64 REPLY to Response to Motion re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Supplemental Declaration of Maria Rafael ISO Reply, # 2 Declaration Second Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Louis Kraus ISO Reply, # 3 Affirmation Affirmation of Service)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
65 MOTION for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction, # 3 Cover Letter, # 4 Certificate of Service, # 5 Envelope)(alh, ) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
TEXT ORDER GRANTING ADJOURNMENT OF MOTIONS − SCHEDULING ORAL ARGUMENT : Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd the Oral argument as to all motions that have been filed in this matter : 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District, 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs., 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction shall be heard in open Court and are NOW set for Wednesday, February 15, 2017 at 2:00PM in USDC / Utica, NY. Appearances required in Court in Utica. Please adjust your calendars accordingly. (ptm) (Entered: 02/02/2017)
TEXT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David N. Hurd in Utica, NY. Motion Hearing held on 2/15/2017. Judge Hurd reviews pending motions and grants 65 MOTION Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae and accepts and considers 51 NOTICE by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Statement of Interest of United States of America. The Court further grants 5 MOTION to Certify Class and Subclass by Plaintiffs. filed by F. K., C. I., R. C., M. R., J. P., V. W., on the papers submitted, hears argument as to 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendant Syracuse City School District filed by Syracuse City School District and 65 MOTION Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by F. K., C. I., R. C., M. R., J. P., V. W. and RESERVES DECISION with written opinion to follow. Phillip L. Desgranges, Esq., Susan M. Young, Esq., Mariko Hirose, Esq. and Mariana L. Kovel, Esq. for plaintiffs R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W; Carol L. Rhinehart, Esq., for defendants Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez ; Jonathan B. Fellows, Esq. for defendant Syracuse City School District. (Court Reporter Nancy Freddoso) (2:00pm − 3:15pm) (ptm) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
66 Letter Motion from Kate I. Reid for Syracuse City School District requesting Withdraw from Representation submitted to Judge David N. Hurd . (Reid, Kate) (Entered: 02/16/2017)
67 TEXT ORDER granting 66 Letter Request from Kate I. Reid for Syracuse City School District requesting to Withdraw from Representation. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 2/17/2017. (sal ) (Entered: 02/17/2017)
68 MEMORANDUM−DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that 1. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is GRANTED (Dkt. No. 5 ); 2. Defendant Syracuse City School District's motion for summary judgment is DENIED (Dkt. No. 28 ; 3. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED (Dkt. No. 46 ; 4. The Onondaga County defendants, their agents, servants, employees, and officers, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them and who receive actual notice of this preliminary injunction, by personal service or otherwise, are hereby IMMEDIATELY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED, pending the final determination of this action, from imposing 23−hour disciplinary isolation on juveniles at the Justice Center; 5. The Onondaga County defendants and the School District shall IMMEDIATELY afford all eligible juveniles the educational instruction to which they are entitled under NewYork State's laws and regulations; 6. The Onondaga County defendants and the School District shall IMMEDIATELY afford all juveniles with qualifying disabilities under the IDEA with the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled; and 7. Discipline imposed on

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juveniles by the Onondaga County defendants must include meaningful social interaction with others, including other juveniles, and no discipline may be imposed that directly harms a juvenile's psychological condition. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 2/22/17. (alh, ) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
Set Hearings: A Status Telephone Conference is set for 6/2/2017 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to initiate the call to Chambers, which can be reached at (315) 234−8620. (sal) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
69 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting a conference with the Court to discuss defendants' violations of the Court's order submitted to Judge Hurd . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, 3−13−2017 Letter from Desgranges to Counsel for Defendants, # 2 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, 3−20−2017 Letter from Rhinehart to Desgranges, # 3 Exhibit(s) Ex. C, 3−21−2017 Email from Fellows to Desgranges)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
70 TEXT ORDER GRANTING AN IN PERSON STATUS CONFERENCE: Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, USDJ and GRANTING 69 Letter Motion from Philip L. Desgranges, Esq. requesting a conference with the Court, an IN PERSON STATUS CONFERENCE is now set for FRIDAY, March 31, 2017 AT 11:00AM in USDC / Utica, NY. Appearances by all counsel are required in Utica, NY. Please adjust your calendars accordingly. (Entered: 03/28/2017)
71 Letter Motion from Mariko Hirose for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting an expedited trial schedule submitted to Judge Hurd . (Hirose, Mariko) (Entered: 03/30/2017)
72 Letter Motion from Jonathan B. Fellows for Syracuse City School District submitted to Judge David N. Hurd . (Attachments: # 1 Ex A − 3.29.17 Corr. to C. Rhinehart)(Fellows, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/30/2017)
TEXT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David N. Hurd: IN PERSON STATUS CONFERENCE held on 3/31/2017. Judge Hurd reviews 69 Letter Motion from Philip L. Desgranges, Esq. requesting a conference with the Court and ongoing concerns regarding this Court's 68 MEMORANDUM−DECISION AND ORDER. Judge Hurd further directs parties to review and discuss possible resolution and stipulation on ongoing issues and report to the Court in writing no later than Monday, April 3, 2017 at 12:00pm. Appearances: Joshua T. Cotter, Esq., Mariko Hirose, Esq. Phillip L. Desgranges, Esq., Samuel C. Young, Esq., for plaintiffs R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.; Carol L. Rhinehart, Esq., for defendants Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez; Brendan M. Sheehan, Esq. for defendant Syracuse City School District.(ptm) (11:00am − 12:00pm) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
73 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting an Extension to File a Stipulation for the Court's Approval submitted to Judge Hurd . (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
74 TEXT ORDER; Granting 73 Letter Motion from Philip L. Desgranges, Esq. for plaintiffs requesting an extension of time to file a Stipulation for the Court's Approval. Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd, USDJ, the parties shall file a stipulation and proposed order no later than FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 2017 AT 12:00PM which shall include a definitive statement as to the further progress of this matter. THIS IS A FINAL EXTENSION OF TIME TO REPLY TO THE COURT'S REQUEST FOR STATUS REGARDING COMPLIANCE THIS COURT'S FEBRUARY 22, 2017 2017 68 MEMORANDUM−DECISION AND ORDER. NO FURTHER REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE ENTERTAINED OR GRANTED. (Status Report due by 12:00PM ON 4/7/2017) So Ordered by Judge David N. Hurd on 4/3/2017. (ptm, ) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
75 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting Requesting a Brief Extension submitted to Judge Hurd . (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
76 Letter Motion from Desgranges for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting that the Court approve the attached interim settlement agreement submitted to Judge Hurd . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Stipulation and Order for an Interim Settlement Agreement)(Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 04/07/2017)

04/10/2017
04/10/2017 05/23/2017 05/24/2017 05/24/2017 05/30/2017 05/31/2017 06/08/2017 06/09/2017 06/16/2017 06/23/2017 06/26/2017
06/28/2017

77 TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to the verbal Order of the Hon. David N. Hurd on pending letter motions; finding as moot 71 Letter Request, 72 Letter Request, and 75 Letter Request, and granting 76 Letter Motion from Philip Desgranges, Esq. for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting that the Court approve the attached interim settlement agreement. (ptm, ) (Entered: 04/10/2017)
78 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 4/10/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 04/10/2017)
79 STATUS REPORT on when the parties expect to file a final settlement agreement for the Court's approval by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
80 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUBMIT FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT : re 79 Status Report filed by F. K., C. I., R. C., M. R., J. P., V. W., (Status Report due by 6/8/2017.). Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 5/24/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
81 TEXT ORDER : Based upon the ongoing negotiations regarding the settlement agreement in this action, the status telephone conference set for 6/2/2017 at 3:00 PM is adjourned without date. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 5/24/2017. (sal) (sal ) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
82 Letter Motion from Mariko Hirose for R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W. requesting leave to withdraw as counsel submitted to Judge Hurd . (Hirose, Mariko) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
83 TEXT ORDER granting 82 Letter Request for Attorney Mariko Hirose to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs in this matter. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 5/31/2017. (sal ) (Entered: 05/31/2017)
84 STATUS REPORT Pursuant to the Court's May 24th Order by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
85 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUBMIT FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT : re 84 Status Report filed by F. K., C. I., R. C., M. R., J. P., V. W. (Status Report due by 6/16/2017.). Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 6/9/2017.(ptm) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
86 STATUS REPORT Pursuant to the Court's June 9th Order, by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
87 STATUS REPORT re. motion to preliminarily approve settlement by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
88 Joint MOTION Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approval of Notice of Settlement filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 to Notice of Motion: Signed Stipulation, # 2 Proposed Order/Judgment Preliminarily approving Settlement, # 3 Memorandum of Law of Plaintiffs in support of Joint Motion, # 4 Declaration of Joshua Cotter in support of Joint Motion, # 5 Exhibit(s) A to Cotter Decl., FOIL request to Justice Center, # 6 Exhibit(s) B to Cotter Decl., List of Sheriff's Office Discovery, # 7 Exhibit(s) C to Cotter Decl., List of School District Discovery, # 8 Exhibit(s) D to Cotter Decl., Proposed Class Notice) Motions referred to David E. Peebles. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 06/26/2017)
89 ORDER: ORDERED that; 1. The proposed settlement agreement is preliminarily approved subject to further consideration at a Settlement Fairness Hearing; 2. The form of the Notice to the Class of the Settlement Agreement (the "Notice") is approved for distribution; 3. The Notice shall be distributed by the Onondaga County defendants on or before Friday, July 7, 2017 as follows: (a) copies shall be posted, and shall remained posted for forty−five days, in English and Spanish in prominent and visible locations accessible to all juvenile inmates on a daily basis, and (b) copies shall be delivered to every juvenile housed in the Justice Center during the forty−five day Notice period; 4. Defendants shall maintain, for a period of forty−five days, at least two copies of the proposed settlement agreement for review by juveniles in any unit where juveniles are housed; 5. The Onondaga County defendants shall file and serve on plaintiffs' counsel a declaration on or before Monday, July 10, 2017, affirming that these Notice requirements have been met; 6. Any class member shall have the right to

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08/28/2017
08/28/2017 08/28/2017 11/02/2017 12/13/2017

submit a written objection to the Court in accordance with the Notice's terms; 7. Any such objection must be postmarked on or before Monday, August 21, 2017; 8. Any class member who does not timely make his or her objection in writing must do so in person at the Fairness Hearing; 9. Any class member who fails to object in writing or at the Fairness Hearing shall be deemed to have waived any such opportunity and shall forever be foreclosed from objecting to the proposed settlement agreement; and 10. A Fairness Hearing shall be held on Monday, August 28, 2017, at 11:00 a.m. in Utica, New York, at which time the Court will determine whether the Settlement Agreement should be given final approval as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 6/28/17. (alh, ) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
90 STATUS REPORT Declaration by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Attachment 1 replaced on 7/13/2017) (ptm, ). (Entered: 07/10/2017)
CLERK'S CORRECTION OF DOCKET ENTRY Per request of counsel corrected exhibit replaced at Attachment 90−1; re 90 Status Report. (ptm) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
91 NOTICE of Settlement Proposed Class Action by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
92 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez re 91 Notice of Settlement (Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
93 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez re 91 Notice of Settlement (Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
94 STATUS REPORT Regarding a Change in the Appearance Time of Counsel for the August 28th Fairness Hearing by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Cotter, Joshua) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
95 Joint MOTION Final Approval of Class−Action Settlement Motion Hearing set for 8/28/2017 02:00 PM in Utica before Judge David N. Hurd Response to Motion due by 8/11/2017 filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion, # 2 Declaration Supplemental Declaration of Joshua Cotter in Support of Joint Motion, # 3 Proposed Order/Judgment Proposed Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval) Motions referred to David E. Peebles. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
TEXT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David N. Hurd in Utica, NY. Fairness Hearing held on 8/28/2017. Judge Hurd hears statements from counsel, notes that no objections have been received and approves and Grants Final Approval of Class−Action Settlement, will sign the Stipulation and Order for a Final Settlement Agreement and further orders that the action remain open until November 2, 2017, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. Plaintiff is directed to file a status report no later than November 2, 2017. Appearances: Joshua T. Cotter, Esq., Phillip L. Desgranges, Esq. Susan M. Young and Samuel C. Young, Esq., for plaintiffs R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.Carol L. Rhinehart, Esq., for defendants Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez. Jonathan B. Fellows, Esq. for defendant Syracuse City School District. (Court Reporter Nancy Freddoso) (ptm) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
96 ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 8/28/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
97 STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 8/28/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
98 STATUS REPORT regarding class member responses to class−action settlement by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. (Desgranges, Philip) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
99 TEXT ORDER CLOSING CASE : Court having issued an order granting final approval of the Stipulation and Order for a Final Settlement Agreement (See Dkt. No. 97 ) and further ordered that the action remain open pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. The 90−day notice period under the Class Action Fairness Act having ended and the parties having not received any class−member objections to the settlement agreement, this matter is hereby closed. So Ordered by Judge David N. Hurd on 12/13/2017. (ptm) (Entered: 12/13/2017)

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100 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class filed by R. C., C. I., F. K., J. P., M. R., V. W.. Motions referred to David E. Peebles. (Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
101 TEXT ORDER granting 100 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney by Mariana L. Kovel, Esq. as counsel of record for plaintiffs. Attorney Mariana L. Kovel terminated. Authorized by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles on 4/5/2018. (sal ) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
102 Letter Motion from Carol L. Rhinehart, Esq. for Kevin M. Brisson, Eugene Conway, Esteban Gonzalez requesting that the term of the Agreement be deemed expired submitted to Judge Hurd . (Rhinehart, Carol) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
103 ORDER granting the # 102 Letter Request. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 11/8/2019. (meb) (Entered: 11/08/2019)