BAJ~

1f\\~A et A\.J )

pt~,..\;~

)

\.J.

)

) LA\-t~~~.

) eL A'L )

)

)

()Q.~~cMuh . )

<6:i). -. LV .- 4:,lq At

\J[tLLflED

tl\oTt0r-' rt)~ o(Ln8<- PLAU!-JG l)ff~M~T~

l~ CO~lflV\rT FDR- BfL[Att1 OF lt1t A6~EtO

Et-.>\{{..'i At"'~ ·TD C~fV\~l't &vlTL1 Abf~8"'T

(OM(S /Vi)v..J A cL-tsy Jtt.~~~ ~t-:oV\be.r ['n't

J

/

D. (M(-\h.) it-' flD .re.) fvtfS'-V\"+ .-to ~t( ~reed

e~1 of-rhts C~SQ / tv\t>u'J i{fs c'~rt -/-c

~J 14. oleCet-JlA~ ~ -th~ir ~~~-k jv-' C~~-kM~

11 .{:,r brQl\(I.\I".J -t~ ,~I"\~-+' i.- ·-{he e~ ~r

se.+tl~~~ o~ ·-Rt~ ~~~ ~l ~ (~~r~ -.vr~

-\h...

"'>j'''er'',<.r\-.

Ii--

~"rf·r-\- 1-

~e

~~e SI'-\'~ J

(MlJJ. {-tJtk Attl kll~e :

l· TM+ -{t-,~ ~4.-J.kh- Jir& ~~ir 11Cl,.,h
hl\Ve -{JI\\~ dis-{~Nded t-' ~ ~ e'-'~"7 A~L~

ot ~'< AS,<J. el"~'1 J ~~ ck'-t~ 6"uNSl

fAb( l of 1?

fVc Or-'e Cril''''r'er ) ~"'S /t~.'-l~ -fi-.'< AJ'~eJ. ~~

J fhf~ ~~ <?x:c~r~~{ M~ J ~ '~12

dekl'~ M+k~\r AJ~",-h· A-ri 1"V\\\c\""~~
¥ "",Uq~ erQLt~ obd-'lcl~-> -Iz, ulc>k~

At-J. {;~"+rA.~~~ 4,1"'.-> 0\ -R~ 4r<?eJ

[",~. (or e~rlK)~Q1 fvt-,~ +'~Jtt~ ~.",.-J
1hQ [rtkl\\~ J~ l~brJ\ms: +:OK -ttw +~~dl~

,+J .{;,rtk 0.~'1 f'1's<>",er -J" L<~ A Lell <k 11'-Q"1

~,s-ttJV\ At ,~~ ~,.-Jr- ~ fJ\e r( I aC S~(J1~N

:::r. {k.'k\,.," u.>lw tW\l\(\ous~ ~J 7Nk"'~I'''''~{~

re~n f" (Df, ¥ 3''''< ou+ Itrtl rYvr~rlfj/~

Jlt-d rtr~( r- ,veejeJ ~ clvt,(I~ e fr\~~~r c~,'vJdfl),-S

~ ,h~e"+ .=t+ '1Q4 IUl~) ,+ -+4b"

I#&k:;; -b !J\O~'" -to ob~Ai,J Ai-f{tJ h1Lk

Of .(;.fV\ ~I.c;~ I I¥ Ii b/ft'/. ~'f fV'vt"'1

f(\~S ~~ -4l~d tJ\.A.fv\k.fo....); (l1'\~.J'1""L~.s 0...-

~\.:i--~ .J ,-/e~-H--,< #Mi"d-r",-\"rs -Ch l .i"

+ el" ~~"j Al~'-I\.- 'I~ It-' or~r

f'0~C-~

-\-hi\r "It'~r~~~ At-'~ in Ce~L~l-\'l u.f-JlAw~( ACk ~

~ A(,E d-- D \= «)

1/~

S~

am ~¥

.ssv ~~ jO t 3<)V~

f

ri" !

\ \i~qW

J~~'1t-

rv l' J UhVlq

r J./d"'OS ~J J \)1 ~\-\it -.I~ rl<!

f'1}~}"I.lv (;1<1 IL~) 17 sJ dvj-- of'l~a1X::=j . 't

,t I i""tv C''1+.(0t\7 .1"" n~ ~o Qf'/

W /nQ4

()
JfJ\('0·b

o'1t

f4 /j~'9 ,\)Vo

vt~r')

-90<~VJ "'! W .l:yAr--G f# ~ j .y\t+sw~wtv "i/-

u, T'rl7)Qj p~
Sa.lhlll~)j

.D-VJ (1\lJ-V)
I~S!rvY

Q,-J Q.J\I
,..I~ i

aJ~
v",y

d~~9
~

a",~?.'t'~() .J'1' " J""p' fQ.\\J.tv ~~.~ oJII )N\I rfo--t o-J S:' ~ J ~ "' '1rY> r0\"l\t' ",",0J -0 ~""\'-r r.J~
St"bY lVJ~V<O\P L.\Sh & 0I'y- Q"~)~O C'-''fl
1j;~o:'~1Vvv. ~lv (\1\7 ~'VI\1""b (\"\.L --c
r 'Lvr If .J11--Q"1 ~rrt ~. r'0ltV"'w rio,,"

tQ<-l oJV aM ('lJ'lir . jQ0oa~l(>? \'--eNas~

or IUOj 4

t~.7 iV'l (-\-P'ti'it/ ~ r--V

+a.r r I ~,I~

t'1Q f'v fo<,\i'VJ5 w\( hO~ ( 0

¥Y 'to t'1~ ./0 ~J -If-r rJ~~l~) yv~ol
i-V-Xg ~ ()4 to--l or )...oh t! ~ lv/,\II
r-+-I <RrJ- \NOJ r'(I~~b aN )">'\~"9 Y"''aJ orJ

.,.. .. .#

... ... ...

~vS:h - k~r~ ~J. ~ver vef\)f~d(
LI. iN: #'I"\;..,\ctr~r, Ne !\L,., U\'~"t,~~~

l4'1'I"j r",~r. --4 I; be t/\e IV-> .s~a~~;y-J

~r ~tA~r ANl '1rA.~~~/Voi y[~

r; J ;". , c Oc.--\-."btr ,;), J Lot>~ - A I q J .), ocg

ortkr .-h, MrfV\ /\,.-J Iyl:ttl'f\~ ~'urt- <..t~

d vJ~rv ~~r{

~ e i'

)-Ie f.J'?

~ do ·-f{fJ

or Ieee, M'? 4f1!., ( I)-<.~ -t" r-'IA>''iF''\'1~ ("'-JIII.....,rk)

s. T' ~~ bee~ .{'~~ -to ~€

*' ht.J}'1+J\'1 iwid~ f" 2ClD s- J-<-I!

e ~(,I:'s.n~

~r(e./ oM.£ uJ~fe :r v"t" Mftli<1()...(~

bl?,JeiV ~7 3 j"';yk r t-.J>etv ~ fJDIV - re"~s-t(21 ¥ ;'" -t2tl ~e'" tt<fir-tivt\l)
k~ - {.., - t.,e ~ {..-' wk~ -/i,~ tvc>iq fvly

fVC'S.tI. ~ ~A oR«r l"j".q'es.

r;. Th.Q ,NMi"'iS'+/'-"l-krr /\:1:: USllj r'fk~'WS-

-tv ~ ~Q f'(~rs M~..tl~ til .AJ ~

Cv..[f'<.~ C~\'~~~ ke .~ u~kNfth(e k J

J,.Qj 4\'\11,. W~ Nt Sv..4e-i'~ (m'f'r.<\:\"\~ hArM. I

-J

fAG'E 4 of ~

~. Tr-> ~~\~ot-> V-J~ Mv~ -ZJ:~a kl.ess J
+- rrcif/\!"s A4- A!'~ oSiMf~ rt?rvV\1I"\J iJl~

wx~ SlM.re~ -f£- ~.s-4J'\<.J~J A;!v\",",~ ck f"ot(l~

kt) ptJ jJ(t

~d dif4r~ ~

o~r s\M.'\,llt"~ - .:',1~~J r"SO'-'L w e)vrrillj

SDtJ\~ f'i~~rr ~ AHu~~d -to f{)'s~r-s

4Jcovl(f' e~k)"'AI c"l~~ (b'-'~ b.oks .-,/..J

~lniD4 bck.- / ~~+ th~ '-V~* {Q~ M~

~ M I eol'{L;y(,~\ ~ ft- ~l\<-liJ }/j'J"'tje

bo~\cs Of ALt\J\~ ?~ bcck~j;/'

1Jv..1~Q,",'S; ,.q.r-J Dr1r~ (,Jh.~r-' -A~ f~ fJ:J

-fi,rett+. ~~tQ M? jUD j'>bs #'1~./ 5;0

LvQ A{Q ~l-M.f~ r~ Ov,r- {ells e-vi+k /'-'b

-Pe,h A11' ~e.;:J ~-1~J 0+ h'-'.M/\r' ;MrresJi.~

of I;~ J vk\(,~ I~ j~l~ ~ c"""tj L~ -It,

1". o",r ~-k

r t, of' isu IV 10 ~(.tJ<.t~ u..e .-tVe

+iJ L~iJ-\<\lA-kA I; Ice

Io-t- d::! ~ .+d I's"J 4"1'''I/t

,.qMl ih(1 J~~~~ ~ -t4jr Aj€",k- M

d~ i1\j 'RQ~ .~~.r' b, ''it'" +. ftofle

rA-f:t 5 ct '6

J

.J

'* (wS"p;r;J ~i-',t u~ .(." ctl<frl~ lto-
r\jh-h J ,¥ CW£M'\':J ~j r W'~c..! Ah-,
rr- NJ.\'~."'J wt M b~;~ l::hrHJ c+
d.Ri'J ilr' ~l,~ +47 ~ b-..J'M'J 0'-1.'"

d<>-tk~. Af'~ {"~-)'j +h~M (,Ji-tho~t tfJ1'j l<S

{l" rlbr"/ AM"",,,h, .

«, 14 ~~ AJ fh~,r JtJ~~- .

A"< J.\'J fhm ~"Y -f" Lc~ MI<~~ ~pcA:uno

w ~1<'1

r"''''''v over '-\-1 ~ (A..... l:=eff

VI., ,,,.. +~~~ ce.lts In~!rt~~ ./(~ -4+ -tt,~lr
MIC(('1' lhl2( ~ e-krJ j.,r~ (Dft""~ It-' ~ /"'.I\M~!

£1, :r AUlr>l\ ~Qr ~ fl?J".tfI~ J

rQ'j vJ"1 J f'<.fS1-lA~ ~ d ~ L! -~ c: ~ (It(' )
M ih Abc'-£ ~'ue",+~ ~~ .-0.~ M r AM- A- {"MftU v-1~-\S V'1~ I"v:s-"I'-",i t'1'-O",A~~e . CPr-' ~'?~ ~k

v\-\U-~~t J [M\~ -{j,t-I fro 5~ flAyr
.{;,r Ai" or~r -ti,JtJ .~« ~ .+J
~\r ~~ :'" -,..k'lp+- Cbf-O-hMf+ ~.( +hQ
P~f b o~ 1)

AjrQ«J (2~1 0+ iiis ~ AN,l DrJRr ~M
to ifV\M~av\~~ ct>'v\f~ <.<U\~ .~ ~"'eeM~.A-J
~ -{:,r f\t-''1 o~v v-Q\,~ .~. ~:~'l*, IS- e~~~ec\ ~ l,kQ A~
.J
rGt~ -CO"" 5Ijre~o..J ,
.------- g9'~I~ {'L~~dJ
~ .c:::::::~>~ £r\l () , £"""I~ II J' ') S
7 0 we L{ f·-o- 13t)''X Lf ')?
~~--\u\ He / :£-; <fb sql
of Aff2r L "2Do6 . :........:.-- /

r (Q(-h~ M A; tOf, o~ ~e
-£~~'J Ms b«~,., t:L~ ~(V~J '-lfD!" ~e
rp(~ l,rhd b;;l~ / k, def<>it~'j~e -Y/t'1e
~I'> -fi'C U.S. tvV\i\ " -hrr+ - c /4,,, / /"S-f1Jt
fl'<f"IId ~.\ d..'1~ ~ o~ Arl\ J 2.oC>b ~
~£I'-'~n H r AU.lk
::r:. .. C. L. ct.
f+ . lO~1 ~~ WA~HlkJ(,TofV
.r~\A...,Jtr\'~ /I~ I.fbJv·~
/~DIAtJA A-m~t-J~ G.8VI2RAL1~'- Otc-ftL~
-r~ C:, ~ {~ {'r> w(+~ £-th F1.o,)r
J'+. 3~l (/J. WA~J"I~ ~
:L;:J,j.\t4tf~hs J"JY l[ b ? ~'-f
~-----
~k 0. .[MAk (lJ-b~S
0-0 We'--\ f - o. fJ.C)'I- If 11
:sq L,JQs~, \\I( j :;;, C{ b I

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KATAZA TAIFA et al., Plaintiffs,
v. FRANK O’BANNON et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 3:92-CV-429 AS

)

)

)

)

RESPONSE TO VERIFIED MOTION BY PRO SE LITIGANT ERIC D. SMITH FOR CONTEMPT

Defendants, by counsel, David A. Arthur, Deputy Attorney General, urge the Court to deny the verified motion for order placing defendants in contempt for breach of the agreed entry and to comply with agreement (docket # 1003)for the reasons that:
1. There is class counsel and all pleadings should come from class counsel and not from pro se litigants and the verified motion should be stricken.
2. On October 27, 2003, the decree was terminated, after a hearing and after notice was given to the class. (Docket #995.)
3. There can be no contempt of a non-existent order.

WHEREFORE, defendants urge the Court to strike or to deny the verified motion and
to grant them all other just and proper relief.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVE CARTER Indiana Attorney General
By: s/ David A. Arthur David A. Arthur Deputy Attorney General Atty. No. 2461-48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 3, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing response with
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent notification of such filing to the
following:
Kenneth J. Falk Attorney at Law American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana kfalk@aclu-in.org And I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the
following non CM/ECF participants:

Eric D. Smith DOC #112675 Westville Control Unit PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391-0557

Office of the Attorney General Indiana Government Center South, 5th Floor 302 W. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770 Telephone: 317-232-6286 Fax: (317) 232-7979 E-Mail: David.Arthur@atg.in.gov 101591s15

s/David A. Arthur David A. Arthur Deputy Attorney General

 
 846 F.Supp. 723 (1994)
Kataza TAIFA, Paul Komyatti, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Aaron Isby, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Jr. Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus,
James Thompson, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman Morris, Michael Hegwood, Terrence Drain, Eric Malone, Michael Holland, Albert
Estep, and Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs, v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, Norman G. Owens, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction; John Nunn, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, and Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official capacity as
Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction, Defendants.
No. 3:92cv0429 AS.
United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
February 11, 1994.
724 *724 Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civ. Liberties Union, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.
Roosevelt Williams, pro se.
Wayne E. Uhl, Office of Indiana Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.
ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.
On or about January 5, 1994, the Honorable Robin D. Pierce, United States Magistrate Judge, entered a Report and Recommendation. There are numerous objections thereto, which the court has carefully examined. These plaintiffs are represented ably by Richard A. Waples and Hamid R. Kashani, both of whom this court knows to have great expertise in the area of prisoner civil rights. The court has carefully examined this Report and Recommendation, and commends both counsel and the United States Magistrate Judge for extraordinary efforts in this difficult species of prisoner civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This record indicates once again that such is plain hard work for both counsel and the judiciary. This court is without any reservations whatsoever in fully and completely approving the Report and Recommendation that the agreed entry, as well as the parties' agreements regarding state court claims, be and they are in all respects APPROVED. This renders MOOT various and sundry handwritten motions for other relief, including the appointment of counsel, filed since the entry of the Report and Recommendation. IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PIERCE, United States Magistrate Judge.
This class action challenges the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC") operated by the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") in Westville, Indiana. The MCC is a modern maximum security correctional facility which was opened by the DOC in the summer of 1991.

The parties have reached a negotiated settlement and the matter is now before the court on their joint motions to approve an agreed entry and their agreement regarding state court claims. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the motions be granted and that the proposed settlement agreement embodied in the attached Agreed Entry and agreement regarding state court claims be approved.
Procedural History
This case was originally filed in the Marion County Superior Court on May 6, 1992, against the Governor of Indiana and various DOC officials. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 1992. The action was subsequently removed, on defendants' motion, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, on May 29, 1992, and ultimately transferred to this court on July 7, 1992. Thereafter, on October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for "purposes of injunctive relief," with the class "consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana." Plaintiffs' state law claims were later remanded to state court on December 4, 1992.
The Complaint
The amended complaint (hereinafter "the complaint") alleges, among other things, that defendants have implemented a program at the MCC which incarcerates prisoners in long-term solitary confinement, subjects them sensory deprivation and arbitrary and irrational rules, physically abuses them, denies them visitation and medical and psychiatric care, and deprives them of educational, vocational, recreational, and other rehabilitative 725 programs. The complaint further alleges that this punitive segregation scheme violates *725 the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The complaint further alleges that the DOC has circumvented state statutory restrictions on classification and assignment of prisoners at the MCC, and that the DOC's internal admission procedures are subjective, thereby permitting DOC officials excessive discretion in assigning prisoners to the MCC. According to the complaint, prisoners are not provided with notice of any charges against them or given any hearing to contest their assignment to the MCC.
The complaint also includes challenges to various alleged conditions of confinement at the MCC, including: the denial of telephone privileges and use of radios and televisions; arbitrary discipline; the removal of bedding as punishment for minor infractions; extremely cold temperatures within the facility; restrictions on visitation; limited out-of-cell time; constantly illuminated cells; prohibiting the display of personal items; denial of vocational, educational and rehabilitative opportunities; denial of meaningful recreation and exercise time; contaminated drinking water; restricted access to the courts and inadequate law library; tampering with prisoner mail; confiscation of religious materials; restrictions on taking Bible study correspondence courses; unavailability of commissary items; verbal harassment; physical abuse; and denial of adequate medical and mental health care.
Settlement Negotiations
Court-sponsored settlement discussions began with a meeting between the undersigned and counsel for the respective parties at the Westville Correctional Center on November 10, 1992. Additional conferences with the court or between counsel were conducted on February 1, February 23, April 12, April 13, April 21, April 29, May 7, June 29, July 19 and July 27, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the undersigned visited and inspected the MCC, and held a preliminary hearing for the purpose of receiving comments by prisoner representatives concerning a prospective settlement. Following the preparation of a preliminary draft of the agreed entry, class counsel discussed various aspects of the proposed settlement with class representatives, as well as a number of class members. Class counsel indicate that they exchanged literally hundreds of telephone calls and items of correspondence with MCC prisoners; that they visited the MCC and held meetings with prisoners to discuss possible settlement proposals; and that comments, suggestions and objections were received from the prisoners

and discussed during settlement negotiations. The court conducted another hearing on October 12, 1993. Prior to that time, class counsel provided the court with all comments, including statements of support as well as objections, which they had received from MCC prisoners. The court also received a number of letters and written comments directly from MCC inmates, and those were included in the record. Based upon a review of the prisoner comments, the court selected a number of representative prisoners to testify at the hearing. During that hearing, the prisoners were given an opportunity to express their views in favor of, or in opposition to, the Agreed Entry, and several of their written statements were introduced as exhibits.
Adequacy of Notice
On November 2, 1993, the parties filed a joint motion requesting court approval of a proposed notice of the settlement. The court granted the parties' motion and approved the notice on the same date. Subsequently, on November 5, 1993, the Notice of Settlement was distributed by MCC staff to all prisoners then confined at the MCC. Along with a copy of the notice itself, each prisoner received an "Agreed Entry Support/Opposition Form," a copy of the entire Agreed Entry, and copies of attachments to the Agreed Entry. The notice summarized the provisions of the Agreed Entry and informed the prisoners that they were required to file any objections to it within 20 days. The court subsequently received written responses from 68 out of the approximately 200 prisoners currently incarcerated at the MCC. Of the comments received, 26 opposed the settlement, while 42 indicated their approval.
726 *726 Based upon its review of the procedure the parties have adopted for notifying class members of the proposed settlement, the court finds that the class members have been fully and accurately advised of the terms of the Agreed Entry, as well as the procedure for bringing comments supporting or opposing the Agreed Entry to the attention of the court. In addition, the 20-day comment period provided pursuant to this court's Order fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See e.g. Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1988); Diaz v. Romer, 801 F.Supp. 405, 408 (D.Colo.1992).
Summary of Settlement Terms
In general, the Agreed Entry would provide for: the assignment of prisoners to the MCC only under specified conditions; the transfer of prisoners out of the MCC after a specified period of time, provided that certain conditions are met; a commissary at the MCC, with a list of particular items to be made available; inmate access to radios and televisions under specified conditions and at inmate expense; expanded visitation and telephone privileges; the availability of additional reading materials for prisoners; increased opportunities for prisoner recreation; increased privileges with respect to keeping of personal property in cells and in the storage room; improvements in the condition of bedding; a decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the cells; additional access by prisoners to personal hygienic items; the establishment of a policy concerning the use of force by DOC personnel; expanded provisions for medical care, including mandatory psychiatric evaluations for all prisoners upon their admittance to the MCC; an expanded law library containing specified reference materials, and provisions for greater access to legal materials by prisoners; increased educational opportunities for prisoners; a substance abuse program; and improvements in inmate grievance procedures.
The proposed Agreed Entry would also dispose of plaintiffs' injunctive claims currently pending in state court. Further, once a settlement is reached regarding plaintiffs' individual damage claims in this case, plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss the state court action in its entirety.
Approval of Settlement
Before a court can approve a class action settlement, it must determine that the settlement is lawful, fair, reasonable and adequate. E.E.O.C. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir.1985); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 1982); Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Directors, etc., 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir.1980). Among the factors that a court should consider in making this "fairness" determination are: the strength of the plaintiffs' case compared to the defendants' offer; the likely length, complexity and expense of further

litigation; the amount of opposition to the settlement among affected parties; the opinion of competent counsel; and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery already completed. E.E.O.C., 768 F.2d at 889; Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 314. In considering a proposed class action settlement, a court may either approve or disapprove of the settlement; it may not rewrite the parties' agreement. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315; Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D.Pa.1987). A court "may not deny approval of a consent decree unless it is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate." E.E.O.C., 768 F.2d at 889.
The first factor 0907 the strength of the plaintiffs' case compared with the defendants' offer 0907 is considered the most important. E.E.O.C., 768 F.2d at 889; Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 314. In this regard, the court firmly believes that plaintiffs' chances of success at a trial on the merits would have been relatively low by comparison to what defendants have offered under the Agreed Entry. One of plaintiffs' principal concerns centers upon their assignment to the MCC as part of the DOC's classification process, rather than as a result of disciplinary proceedings with their attendant due process protections. It is well-established, however, that "an inmate has no liberty interest in confinement at any particular state prison and that the prison officials may effect discretionary 727 transfers of an inmate without implicating the due process clause, even if the conditions at one *727 prison are substantially worse than another." King v. Fairman, 997 F.2d 259, 262 n. 4 (7th Cir.1993). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly "rejected the notion `that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.'" Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)).
As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight the Clause does not require hearings in connection with transfers whether or not they are the result of the inmate's misbehavior or may be labelled as disciplinary or punitive.
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). Against this background, it is doubtful that the plaintiffs' complaints regarding their transfer to, and indefinite confinement at, the MCC would succeed. But the defendants have agreed, nevertheless, to only assign prisoners to the MCC under specified conditions and to transfer prisoners out of the MCC after a specified period of time, subject to certain conditions.
The plaintiffs have also challenged various conditions of their confinement at the MCC on Eighth Amendment grounds, claiming that they have been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. One of plaintiffs' primary complaints in this regard is concerned with alleged "sensory deprivation" resulting from their confinement in individual, constantly-illuminated cells, with limited access to reading material and recreation, no access to radios, televisions and educational materials, and substantial restrictions on visitation and commissary access. It is apparent, however, that the task of proving defendants' liability under the Eighth Amendment for the conditions of confinement at the MCC would be formidable.
In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the same "deliberate indifference" standard which had previously been applied to medical claims under the Eighth Amendment also governed Eighth Amendment challenges to prison conditions. Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir.1991) observed that
prisoners who contest the conditions of their confinement under the eighth amendment must establish that their custodians either established the conditions to inflict wanton pain or are deliberately indifferent to whether the conditions have these effects. The eighth amendment is concerned with `punishment', and the Court held in Wilson that showing a culpable mental state is essential in establishing that conditions of confinement are part of the `punishment.'
941 F.2d at 500.
Here, it is apparent that plaintiffs would have a difficult time proving that defendants established the conditions at the MCC, an outwardly clean, bright and modern corrections facility, to inflict wanton pain, or that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to whether the conditions at the MCC have such an effect. Defendants, nevertheless,

have agreed to alter MCC conditions in a multitude of areas. Indeed, over 30 pages of the Agreed Entry are addressed to substantial changes in plaintiffs' favor, many of which would likely not have been included in any final decree even if plaintiffs were to succeed at trial.
As for the second factor, the court finds that continued litigation would require the resolution of many difficult and complex issues, entail considerable additional expense, and likely involve weeks, perhaps months, of trial time. Because many of plaintiffs' claims are concerned with the psychological impact of various conditions or combinations of conditions, considerable testimony would be required from experts in fields such as psychology 728 and correctional administration. See e.g. Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435 *728 (N.D.Ind.1981). The resolution of plaintiffs' injunctive claims at this juncture through the proposed Agreed Entry will result in considerable savings in terms of time and expense. Clearly, the Agreed Entry represents an outcome at least comparable, if not far superior, to that which plaintiffs might achieve by proceeding to trial.
The amount of opposition to the proposed settlement is not, in court's view, substantial or controlling. Prior to the hearing of October 12, 1993, class counsel provided the court with copies of all inmate comments they had received pursuant to their own poll. Of a sample of 61 inmates, 19 supported the proposed Agreed Entry, 19 were opposed, 4 abstained, and 19 furnished no response. The court also received comments directly from a few inmates expressing opposition to the proposed settlement. While it is possible that some of the inmates who expressed opposition to the settlement prior to the October hearing did not bother to reaffirm their opposition following the dissemination of the formal, court-approved November notice, the court believes that the level of opposition among inmates has generally subsided, perhaps due to increased understanding of the terms of the proposed Agreed Entry. Following the court-approved notice, only 26 inmates out of a population of approximately 200 returned statements in opposition. The inmates who filed written objections pursuant to the court-approved notice are outnumbered almost 2 to 1 by those expressing approval, and they represent little more than 10 percent of the inmate population. The level of inmate opposition here does not justify withholding approval of the Agreed Entry. See Van Horn, 840 F.2d at 606 (class settlement approved where approximately 180 out of 400 inmates objected).
Many of the prisoners who have submitted objections find disagreement with some detail of personal interest, while ignoring the fact that the agreement achieves significant improvements or reforms in a variety of other areas. The court is also convinced that a number of inmates who have indicated a desire to proceed to trial fail to appreciate the difficulty of establishing their claims under prevailing case law and have not comprehended the benefits of a detailed and comprehensive consent decree over any decree likely to be fashioned by the court.
One small group of prisoners requires specific mention. Four of the 26 prisoners who have submitted written objections pursuant to the court-approved notice are worried that, as so-called "temporary" inmates, they have been overlooked or not included in the Agreed Entry. Their concerns are unfounded. The Agreed Entry clearly applies to all members of the inmate class, which includes "all persons who ... are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex." The Agreed Entry makes no allowance for, and thus does not permit, the assignment of prisoners to the MCC outside of the criteria and procedures set-forth in Section I.
The fourth factor calls for consideration of the opinion of competent counsel. In this regard, class counsel Richard A. Waples and Hamid R. Kashani have submitted affidavits describing their qualifications. Based upon those affidavits, as well as the court's own observations during many hours of settlement negotiations and hearings, the court believes that Mr. Waples and Mr. Kashani are well-qualified for their role as class counsel in this litigation. Through skill and perseverance, they have ably represented their clients throughout the negotiation process as well as during hearings before this court. They have expressed the belief that the settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate, and the court has no reason to doubt their judgment. Moreover, the court has no reason to believe that the Agreed Entry, or any aspect of it, is the product of collusion among or between class counsel, the defendants, any official or employee of the Indiana Department of Correction, or defense counsel.
The last factor calls for consideration of the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. Although the parties commenced settlement discussions at an early stage of this litigation, class counsel have engaged in an extensive and thorough investigation of the background and facts pertinent to the claims which 729 have been raised. That investigation included: a complete inspection of the classification records *729 of all prisoners who were confined at the MCC; a comprehensive inspection of all MCC policies, memoranda, orders,

post orders, and like materials dealing with the treatment of prisoners and the interaction of staff with prisoners; discussions with a number of former and current MCC employees, regarding MCC practices and policies; discussions with experts in the fields of medicine, psychiatry, corrections, and prisoner classification; inspection of physical operations and facilities at the MCC; communications with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and State health and environmental authorities, as well as the collection of documentation regarding tests performed on drinking water at the MCC; taking several depositions of the individual prisoners engaged in a hunger strike; contacts and communications with several MCC prisoners during the ten months preceding the filing of this action, for the purpose of gathering information with respect to policies and practices at the MCC; and numerous consultations by class counsel with class members throughout the course of this litigation. In this instance, the court is confident that the discovery and investigation undertaken by class counsel gave them a clear insight into the facts underlying plaintiffs' claims, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of those claims.
Having reviewed the terms of the proposed Agreed Entry, as well as the parties' agreement concerning the disposition of state court claims, plaintiffs' memorandum in support of the class action settlement, the affidavits submitted by counsel for the class, and the statements in support and in opposition to the proposed settlement submitted by individual MCC inmates, the court finds that the settlement embodied in the Agreed Entry and the agreement concerning state court claims is lawful, fair, reasonable and adequate. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agreed Entry, as well as the parties' agreement regarding the state court claims, signed copies of which have been attached hereto, be in all respects approved.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.1986).
Dated this 5th day of January, 1994.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 867 F.Supp. 799 (1994)
Kataza TAIFA, Paul Komyatti, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Aaron Isby, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Jr., Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus,
James Thompson, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman Morris, Michael Hegwood, Terrence Drain, Eric Malone, Michael Holland, Albert
Estep, and Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs, v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, Norman G. Owens, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction, John Nunn, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, and Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official capacity as
Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction, Defendants.
No. 3:92cv0429AS.
United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
November 4, 1994.
800 *800 Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civ. Liberties Union, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.
Aaron Isby, pro se.
Michael Holland, pro se.
Roosevelt Williams, pro se.
Carl L. Johnson, pro se.
Dyrone Henderson, pro se.
Jimmy Moorson, pro se.
Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, pro se.
Kenneth Porter, pro se.
Tome L. Hailey, pro se.
Christopher Michael Miser, pro se.
Andrew Benroy Johnson, pro se.
Wayne E. Uhl, Office of Indiana Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Honorable Magistrate Robin D. Pierce was charged by this court with the management of an exceptionally voluminous and complicated class action lawsuit brought by prisoners confined at the Maximum Control Complex (hereinafter MCC) in Westville, Indiana. After much effort, the parties reached a settlement. On February 2, 1994 this court adopted that settlement as reported in the Magistrate's Recommendation and Report dated January 6, 1994. Judgment was entered by the Clerk of this court on February 15, 1994, but this case is not yet finished. Since the entry of judgment, over 316 documents have been filed with this court contesting, approving, or commenting on the settlement and its surrounding issues. One of the more tenacious commentators has been Mr. Aaron Isby, one of the original named plaintiffs. On October 24, 1994, this court received a report and recommendation from Magistrate Pierce regarding the litigious conduct of Mr. Isby. That report is reproduced in its entirety below.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On January 21, 1994, Aaron Isby, an inmate at the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC") in Westville, Indiana, filed a motion objecting to a Report and Recommendation which had been issued by the undersigned recommending the approval of the Agreed Entry in this class action brought on behalf of present and future inmates at the MCC. According to Mr. Isby, "the illegal agreed entry" was "contrary to present laws of this countrie [sic] and US Constitution." Soon thereafter, on February 22, 1994, Mr. Isby filed a "Motion to Stay Judgment," in which he asserted that Chief Judge Sharp abused his discretion in approving the Agreed Entry concerning injunctive relief in this case. Judge Sharp denied Mr. Isby's motion to stay the judgment on March 4, 1994. Mr. Isby also attempted to appeal the Agreed Entry, but was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on March 23, 1994.

On March 24, 1994, Mr. Isby changed his approach. Instead of attacking the Agreed Entry as

illegal and unconstitutional, he filed a "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," in which he sought to hold

"defendant Sharon Hawks" (who has never been a defendant in this case) in contempt "for her

failure to abided [sic] by the mandates of the `consent and decree' approved on February 15,

1994." On April 7, 1994, Mr. Isby filed another "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," this time asserting

that the defendants were refusing to abide by the Consent Decree by using profane language to

801

antagonize and provoke prisoners, by refusing to provide prisoners with *801 tissue paper, and by

"repeatedly using excessive brutal force against MCC prisoner [sic]." On April 8, 1994, Mr. Isby

filed a motion to withdraw the record in this case "in order to adequately challenge [his] appeal

presently pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals." On April 12, 1994, Mr. Isby filed

another "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," this time asserting that he had been "brutally beat" by

corrections officers, "restrained in handcuffs, black box, belly chain, and leg irons," choked,

"restrained to a bed without access to a toilet," and denied medical attention for "a busted right

leg." Again, Mr. Isby asserted that "[d]efendants are violating the mandates in the `consent and

decree.'" On April 22, 1994, Mr. Isby filed another "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," this time

asserting that defendant Charles E. Wright was forcing him to wear a "hockey mask" whenever he

was let out of his cell (because he allegedly spit on a guard) and that Wright was using the hockey

mask to discourage Isby from taking recreation and showers, as well as legal calls from his

attorney. On May 13, 1994, Mr. Isby filed still another "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," this time

assertion that Mr. Hamid Kashani, one of the attorneys for the inmate class, should be held in

contempt because of his failure to "take immediate action to cease the unlawful acts of the

defendants."

In an Order entered on May 16, 1994, Chief Judge Sharp denied all of Mr. Isby's motions for contempt. Undaunted, Mr. Isby filed a "Motion for Emergency Writ of Mandamus" on August 8, 1994, seeking "to compel Charles E. Wright to comply with the `agreed entry.'" Thereafter, on

September 15, 1994, Mr. Isby filed a "Notice of Contempt," advising that he intended to "file a motion to enter civil contempt against defendant Charles E. Wright for violating the `agreed entry' injunctive order" in this case. On September 20, 1994, Mr. Isby filed another "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt," again challenging defendant Wright's practice of requiring him to wear a hockey mask "with masking tape at the mouth each time he is removed from his cell." Mr. Isby followed this up with a memorandum in support of his motion for civil contempt on October 4, 1994.
It is by now abundantly clear that Mr. Isby's practice of filing repetitive motions for contempt after his previous motions had been denied amount to vexatious conduct deliberately designed to harass and abuse the processes of the court. Under these circumstances, it is RECOMMENDED that any and all outstanding motions for contempt by Mr. Isby be DENIED, and that he be permanently barred from filing any other matter or pursuing any other action seeking to enforce or challenge the Consent Decree entered in this cause.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).
Mr. Isby received a copy of Magistrate Pierce's Report and Recommendation (hereinafter R & R) and timely filed his "Objection to the U.S. Magistrate Report and Recommendation" (hereinafter "Objections") on October 28, 1994. Mr. Isby argues that the R & R is "unconstitutionally sound ... under the First Amendment ... and has no legal support...." Mr. Isby called Magistrate Pierce's finding of harassment and abuse "ludicrous" and cited cases indicating that the right to access the courts is fundamental. See e.g., Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.1973).
II. DISCUSSION
This court agrees with Mr. Isby that "[i]t is now established beyond a doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Whether a prisoner has the logistical ability to traverse the jurisdictional path depends upon his mental and 802 financial resources. *802 Problems encounter by prisoners include limited access to law libraries, lawyers, copiers, and stationary, as well unaffordable filing fees. To help a prisoner cope with these sometimes seemingly insurmountable problems, courts require that inmates have reasonable access to law books, copiers, and such stationary and postage as may be necessary to enable the inmate to maintain his suit. Other inmates who have a better understanding of the law are allowed to act as "jail-house lawyers" and if a prisoner's financial condition is such that he is unable to pay the filing fees, the court may allow the inmate to proceed in forma pauperis, thus waiving the filing fee.
A quick survey of the case law reveals that although prisoners have the right to traverse the jurisdictional path to the courts, when the right is abused, a court may narrow or even barricade the path. A prisoner may erode the jurisdictional path by filing harassing and/or frivolous complaints and motions. Courts may prevent further erosion by utilizing the power granted under the All Writs Act which states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by an Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Although rare, the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked § 1651(a) on occasion to prevent abuse of the courts. "We ... direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary writs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)...." In Re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 181, 109 S.Ct. 993, 994, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989). "The goal of fairly dispensing justice is compromised when the court is forced to devote limited resources to processing repetitious and frivolous requests." In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179-80, 111 S.Ct. 596, 597, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991). The Seventh Circuit has also limited access in the face of harassing and frivolous filings. Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1983), Sassower v. American Bar Association, 33 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.1994).[1]

Seemingly hesitant to narrow the jurisdictional path, courts often instead alter the logistical obstacles in the jurisdictional path. One of the most popular methods is to modify, revoke, or enjoin the prisoner's right to proceed in forma pauperis. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 180, 109 S.Ct. at 993; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. at 596; Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735 (10th Cir.1984) (reversing District Court's in forma pauperis injunction as too broad). Because most inmates have no money, a lack of permission to proceed in forma pauperis usually stops them in their procedural tracks. Other remedies include certification of new filings or the posting of a bond. Depineda v. Hemphill, 34 F.3d 946 (10th Cir.1994); Sassower v. American Bar Ass'n, 33 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.1994).
Mr. Isby acknowledges that courts may restrict access when filings are harassing or abusive, but he denies that his filings were meant to harass or abuse the processes of the court. Moreover, Mr. Isby argues that his filings were not nearly as egregious as the filings found in In re Davis, 878 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.1989) (31 cases over a four year period); Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Comm., 936 F.2d 512 (11th Cir.1991) (106 cases); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir.1986) (176 cases).
This court recognizes that Mr. Isby's filings are not nearly as numerous as those reported in the cases he cites; however, the correlation between the abuse caused and the remedy ordered in the above cases and in this case is proportional. The filings by the petitioners in the cases cited by Mr. Isby amounted to a broad abuse upon the courts. Thus, the courts issued broad orders restricting and prohibiting filing in several different areas. In the present case, Magistrate Pierce's recommendation is limited to the class action consent decree.
Although not controlling precedent, this court finds the analytic approach developed by the 9th Circuit in De Long 803 v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (1990) helps insure that Mr. Isby is given a reasonable solution with due *803
process. The De Long court listed four requirements that must be met prior to enjoining any future filings. 1) Provide the litigant with notice and an opportunity to oppose the order before it is entered. 2) Provide an adequate record for review which includes a listing of all the cases and motions that led the court to conclude that an injunction was needed. 3) Make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions. 4) Tailor the injunction narrowly to closely fit the specific vice encountered. Id., at 1146-1148. Concluding, the De Long the Court remarked:
Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants. Nonetheless, orders restricting a person's access to the court must be based on adequate justification supported in the record and narrowly tailored to address the abuse perceived. We find such care is demanded in order to protect access to the courts, which serves as the final safeguard for Constitutional rights.
Id. at 1148-49.
This court finds that the first three requirements delineated above have been met. Notice was provided, Mr. Isby commented, and the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation provides the requisite record and findings. This court now examines the narrowness of the specific order of the Magistrate. If implemented, it would only slightly narrow the jurisdictional path to this court. In effect, this court would deny itself jurisdiction as to all filings by Mr. Isby that relate to the class action Consent Decree regardless of their legitimacy. Under the Magistrates recommendation, Mr. Isby would not be enjoined from filing any claims or motions in this court, he would only be enjoined from filing the claims and motions related to the present class action.
If Mr. Isby was still represented by counsel, such a restriction would be approved by this court without hesitation. The loss of counsel is a factor in this court's decision, but it is not a controlling factor. Mr. Isby was warned by his counsel that his pro se efforts were improper. Mr. Isby's loss of direct representation does not mean that Mr. Isby's interests are going to be ignored. As a member of the prison population at MCC (ie. one of the "others similarly situated"), Mr. Isby does have an interest in the proper execution of the class action settlement. Counsel for the remaining named plaintiffs are bound to raise mistreatment of Mr. Isby as a violation of the settlement. Thus, even if this court were to completely block Mr. Isby himself from filing any motions or complaints in connection with this class action, Mr. Isby's interests are still protected as the named plaintiffs and their counsel

seek to enforce the settlement. Nevertheless, because Mr. Isby's litigiously maverick conduct has caused him to be abandoned even by his own counsel, this court is willing to first experiment with a less restrictive order that does not foreclose a potentially legitimate claim.
III. CONCLUSION
This court fully understands the frustration and delay that Mr. Isby's prolific filings has caused the patient and careful magistrate to experience. Thus, this court does not rule out the magistrates recommendation as course of action for the near future. However, at this point this court chooses to alter Mr. Isby's logistical requirements to encourage Mr. Isby to think clearly and carefully about any future filings. Therefore, this court orders the following:
First, after considering all of Mr. Isby's motions currently pending before this court, this court now hereby DENIES all of said motions. Second, this court ORDERS that any and all future filings by Mr. Isby that have any connection whatsoever with the enforcement, content, or any other relationship to the consent decree be hereby accompanied by a signed and sworn affidavit that the issues raised in the filing have not been raised or addressed in any prior filings or orders of this court. A false or misleading affidavit shall be punished by contempt, monetary sanctions, or any other order as this court sees fit. Third, this court ORDERS that any future filings be 804 accompanied by an updated listing of the name, number, date, *804 substance, and disposition of all previous filings by Mr. Isby (including those filed prior to this order) that relate to the class action. Satisfaction of these requirements will encourage Mr. Isby to carefully screen his filings and enable this court to quickly discern between legitimate and illegitimate filings. IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] For a more complete listing of cases under § 1651(a) See, William T. Goglia, M.A., J.D., Annotation, Authority of United States District court, Under 28 USCS § 1651(a), to Enjoin, Sua Sponte, A Party From Filing Further Papers in Support of Frivolous Claim, 53 A.L.R.Fed. 651 (1994).
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)

1995 WL 646300 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South
Bend Division.
Kataza TAIFA, Paul Komyatti, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Aaron Isby, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Jr. Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus, James Thompson, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman
Morris, Michael Hegwood, Terrence Drain, Eric MALONE, Michael Holland, Albert ESTEP, and
Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs, v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of
Correction, Norman G. Owens, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the
Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction; John Nunn, in his individual and
official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, and Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official
capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction,
Defendants.
No. 3:92-cv-0429 AS. | Aug. 22, 1995.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for Kataza Taifa, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman Morris, Terrence Drain, Eric Malone, Albert Estep.
Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, Franklin A. Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN, for Paul Komyatti, Edward Broadus, James Thompson, Michael Hegwood.
Aaron Isby, SCC-Maximum, Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, Franklin A. Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN, for Aaron Isby.

Michael Holland, Pro Se.
Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for Michael Holland.
Roosevelt Williams, SCC-Maximum, Maximum Control Complex Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Richard A. Waples, Jndiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for Roosevelt Williams.
Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, for Joseph Phillips.
Carl L. Johnson, SCC-Maximum, Maximum Control Complex Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Dyrone Henderson, SCC-Maximum, Maximun Control Complex, Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Jimmy Moorson, SCC-Maximum, Maximum Control Complex, Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, SCU-Westville, Westville Correctional Center Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Franklin A. Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN, for Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai.
Kenneth Porter, SR-Indiana-30, Indiana Reformatory, Pendleton, IN, Pro Se.
Tome L. Hailey, SR-Indiana-30, Indiana Reformatory, Pendleton, IN, Pro Se.
Christopher Michael Miser, SPR-Indiana, Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, IN, Pro Se.
Andrew Benroy Johnson, SCC-Maximum, Maximum Control Complex, Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Wayne E. Uhl, Suzann W. Lupton, Office of Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Evan Bayh, James E. Aiken, Norman G. Owens, John Nunn, Charles E. Wright.
Opinion
ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.
*1 In the 1920’s when the United States was confronted with loan defaults by numerous European countries which
1

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
had been obligated during World War I, President Calvin Coolidge is reported to have stated: “They hired the money, didn’t they?” This simplistic view of the world based on a traditional Yankee’s concept of a simple agreement simply will not work in the modern world and certainly will not work in modern prisoner litigation. This court has taken the occasion to make an extensive review of the agreed entry that was signed off by Magistrate Judge Pierce, this court and counsel representing class plaintiffs in the State of Indiana in early 1994. It is to the benefit of all concerned that all of the interests in this case have been well represented by highly competent counsel. No criticism of any counsel is here intended. Notwithstanding, the representatives of the State of Indiana in that agreed entry, which is now approximately a year and-a-half in age, obligated the State of Indiana at least contractually to engage in activities with reference to inmates at the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana which went well beyond obligations imposed under the Constitution of the United States in such cases as Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Supt., Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). In the same context, it would appear that a generous reading of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), was adopted also. A very wise district judge in Georgia has with good sense and humor described the evolutionary processes of a certain species of prisoner litigation in Carter v. Ingalls, 576 F.Supp. 834 (S.D.Ga. 1983).
Having in the first instance agreed to more than was constitutionally required, the State of Indiana now is engaging in a process of backing and filling and throwing up the inhibitions of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted in Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991). Certainly, there is recent and respectable authority that would encourage the State of Indiana to back off from its pre-existing generosity. An en banc decision by the Seventh Circuit in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1831 (1994), is an authority which would encourage that process. See also Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994), an en banc decision by the Sixth Circuit upon which certiorari was denied at 115 S.Ct. 1118 (1995). This court certainly does not give any advisory opinion as to whether aside from the demands of the Constitution of the United States and its limitations on the jurisdiction of this court, these plaintiffs can enforce these generous, state-created promises under principles of contract or other substantive law in the courts of the State of Indiana.
A word needs to be said in addition to the authorities cited in the excellent and comprehensive report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Pierce filed on July 20, 1995, in regard to Bounds, and the cases cited in the report and recommendation at pages 21-26 in Brooks v.

Buscher, Nos. 94-1797 and 94-1798 (7th Cir. July 23, 1995), the issue of access to law libraries vis-a-vis access to courts under Bounds was again re-visited and the authorities cited by the magistrate were again discussed and applied. The factual setting of that case and the reasoning is relevant and revealing here. Of particular note is the following statement:
*2 “We emphasize that if a prison does choose to provide a law library, the function of a library assistant is not to act as paralegal or quasi counsel, as they might have to if the prison provided no law library and instead provided assistance as the requisite ‘persons trained in the law.”’ See also Campbell, 787 F.2d at 229 (recognizing distinction). Brooks complains that he lacked legal skills and that Ahler and the law clerks were no help to him because they also lacked legal skills. However, the right to access is not the right to a free legal education. Where the prison provides a library, a prisoner such as Brooks may be largely on his own.”
It also should be remembered that the fundamental concerns for prison security which the Supreme Court of the United States enunciated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), remain alive and well. Certainly, those security concerns have also been recently enunciated in Keeney v. Heath, No. 57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995).
There is little doubt now that provisions of the agreed entry and agreement of last year went significantly beyond that which is required under the Constitution of the United States, as most recently interpreted in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). The magistrate judge is entirely correct in his analysis of Sandin at pages 32-34 of his report and recommendation.
The recommendations both as to denial and as to granting embodied in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation are challenged in regard to at least four issues in the objection filed August 14, 1995. The so-called fruit juice issue is a security issue pure and simple, and it is not for this magistrate judge or this court to superimpose its views upon the persons who have responsibility for the day-to-day administration of this maximum control complex. The handbook issue certainly the availability of fruit juices to an inmate population is a highly desirable thing to do if it can be done consistent with security, and that appears to be a major task in this case. The so-called fruit juice issue involves more micromanagement by this court than the due process clause demands. Able counsel for the plaintiffs have argued that the magistrate judge misapplied Evans with reference to the en banc majority, but this court and the magistrate judge are of one mind on that subject. This court is not persuaded to go further in regard to sanctions than is recommended by the magistrate judge, and is not
2

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
persuaded to assess any fines at this time. The question of attorney fees does not appear to be before this court at this time, and, therefore, will be reserved for appropriate consideration later. The report and recommendation is ADOPTED without exception. IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PIERCE, United States Magistrate Judge.
This case is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to abide by the provisions of an Agreed Entry in a class action suit. The suit challenged the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the Maximum Control Complex (“MCC”) operated by the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) in Westville, Indiana. The MCC is a modern maximum security correctional facility which was opened by the DOC in the summer of 1991, and has been the source of much litigation since that time. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the plaintiffs’ motion to hold defendants in contempt be granted in part and denied in part.
Background
*3 This case was originally filed in the Marion County Superior Court on May 6, 1992, against the Governor of Indiana and various DOC officials. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 1992. The action was removed, on defendants’ motion, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 29, 1992, and transferred to this court on July 7, 1992. On October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for “purposes of injunctive relief,” with the class “consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana.” Plaintiffs’ state law claims were remanded to state court on December 4, 1992.
After extensive settlement negotiations and two hearings before the undersigned at the MCC, the parties entered into an Agreed Entry which was ultimately approved by Chief Judge Sharp on February 15, 1994. On September 13, 1994, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the Agreed Entry. The plaintiffs’ supporting memorandum identified 23 separate alleged violations. The parties agreed on remedies for several of these alleged violations prior to a contempt hearing held before the undersigned on April 6, 1995, at the MCC. Several

more were remedied before the plaintiffs submitted their post-trial brief. The contempt motion before the court is now limited to seven alleged violations of the Agreed Entry which the court has consolidated into the six issues listed below. Plaintiffs have asked the court to enforce the Agreed Entry and sanction the defendants for disregarding it. They further request that the court impose a per diem monetary sanction upon defendants to coerce their compliance with the terms of the Agreed Entry.
Issues
1. Conduct Adjustment Board Hearings. Have defendants violated ¶ IX(1) of the Agreed Entry by not allowing MCC prisoners to be represented by lay advocates of their choice at Conduct Adjustment Board (“CAB”) hearings?
2. Law Clerks for Prisoners with Special Needs. Have the defendants violated ¶ VI(6) of the Agreed Entry by failing to provide prisoners with special needs with prisoner lay advocates or law student clerks?
3. Law Library Visits and Specific Cite Requirements for Legal Materials for Prisoners in Disciplinary Segregation. Have the defendants violated ¶ IX(1) of the Agreed Entry by failing to allow prisoners on disciplinary segregation to visit law libraries, and violated ¶ VI(1) of the Agreed Entry by requiring specific cites before providing these prisoners with legal materials?
4. Free Issue of the Handbook. Have the defendants violated ¶ III(P)(4)(c) of the Agreed Entry by failing to provide prisoners with a free copy of the prisoner’s Handbook?
5. Classification. Have the defendants violated ¶¶ I(A) and II(G) by holding a prisoner at the MCC who did not meet the criteria set forth in the Agreed Entry and by failing to give him sufficient notice of the reasons for his transfer to the MCC?
*4 6. Fruit Juices on Commissary. Have the defendants violated ¶ III(B)(2) of the Agreed Entry by failing to make continuing, reasonable efforts to make fruit juices available through the prison commissary?
Contempt Standard and Interpretation of Consent Decree
To succeed on a motion for civil contempt, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party violated a court order. Goluba v. School District of
3

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1995); Stotler and Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1989). A district court “must be able to point to a decree from the court ‘which sets forth in specific detail an unequivocal command’ which the party in contempt violated.” Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Stotler, 870 F.2d at 1163) (citations omitted). A district court does not ordinarily have to find that the violation was “willful” and may find a party in civil contempt if that party “has not been ‘reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered.”’ Id.
A consent decree such as that found in the Agreed Entry here
no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.
Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Sutliff County Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992)).
Consent decrees often embody outcomes that reach beyond basic constitutional protections. See Rufo, ––– U.S. at %BF–––, 112 S.Ct. at 762 (‘we have no doubt that, to save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation... petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires...’); see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (1st Cir. 1991). Indeed, it is a rare case when a consent decree establishes only the bare minimum required by the Constitution. Often, it is precisely because parties are unsure of the current posture of the law that they are willing to compromise their positions. See Rufo, ––– U.S. at %BF–––, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63 (quoting from Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1991) (such decrees ‘would make necessary ... a constitutional decision every time an effort was made either to enforce or modify the decree by judicial action’)).
Kindred, 9 F.3d at 641-42 (footnote omitted).
Ordinarily, “the scope of the consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971)). Where a portion of the consent decree is facially ambiguous and that ambiguity

cannot be resolved on the basis of the decree’s language alone, the court will “look at the evil which the decree was designed to rectify.” Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Armour, 402 U.S. at 686 (Douglas J., dissenting)). Accordingly, interpreting the decree requires an understanding of the context in which the decree was entered. Id. at 1038; see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“[C]ontext, in the broadest sense, is the key to understanding language.”).
Agreed Entry, Stipulated Facts, Hearing Testimony, and Analysis
Lay Advocates at Conduct Adjustment Board Hearings
*5 The parties agree that the Agreed Entry provides that prisoners shall have lay advocates at CAB hearings. They disagree, however, as to who these lay advocates should be and what role they are to play.
Paragraph IX(1) of the Agreed Entry states:
All discipline, including Conduct Adjustment Board hearings, shall be consistent with Ind. Code 11-11-5-1 et seq. (attached). This does not entitle prisoners to utilize the Court’s contempt powers to challenge CAB convictions on a case by case basis. The contempt power shall be available to enforce this provision on a class-wide basis.
IND. CODE § 11-11-5-5(a)(7), which is expressly adopted by and attached to the Agreed Entry, states that prisoners facing disciplinary hearings are entitled to:
Have advice and representation by a lay advocate of his choice, if that lay advocate is available in the institution at the time for the hearing, in those hearings based upon a charge of institutional misconduct when the department determines he lacks the competency to understand the issues involved or to participate in the hearing, or when the punishment may be that specified in:
(A) Section 3(5) [IC 11-11-5-3(5)] of this chapter if the restitution is more than two hundred collars ($200);
(B) Section 3(8) [IC 11-11-5-3(8)] of this chapter if the segregation is for more than fifteen (15) days; or
4

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
(C) Section 3(6), 3(9), or 3(10) [IC 11-11-5-3(6), IC 11-11-5-3(9), or IC 11-11-5-3-(10)] of this chapter.
The question before the court is whether the defendants have met the requirements of this statute.
In the Prehearing Order, the parties stipulated that in CAB hearings at the MCC:
[t]he lay advocates assigned to assist inmates charged with disciplinary infractions are MCC staff members, not fellow inmates, and the inmate does not have his choice of who will serve as his lay advocate. They do not provide investigative services or argue the case on the inmate’s behalf. Inmates charged with disciplinary offenses may, when informed of the charge by a screening officer, request that witnesses be asked to provide written witness statements. It is MCC’s policy that the screening officer then notifies the witness(es) and gives an opportunity to provide a written statement for the CAB’s consideration.
(Prehearing Order ¶ F(5), at p. 7.)
Prisoner testimony at the contempt hearing buttresses this stipulation. Paul Komyatti, Jr., stated that when he requested a lay advocate, Correctional Counselor Wilson made himself available in that position. Wilson did not provide Komyatti with any assistance before the hearing, and appeared at the hearing as an “observer.” (Transcript of Contempt Hearing at p. 31.) Under examination by plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Komyatti testified:
Q. [W]as Mr. Wilson the lay advocate of your choice?
A. No. We have no choice of lay advocates at MCC.
Q. What did Mr. Wilson do at the hearing?
A. He showed up.
Q. Did he say anything?
*6 A. This is referring to one specific instance, but it would be a generalization of every hearing. The last time I was at a disciplinary hearing he showed up and I asked him questions concerning his role as a ‘lay advocate.’ He informed me that his role was strictly to observe whether or not my due process rights were fulfilled. And when I asked him if he knew what a due

process right was I received no reply.
Q. Based on what you understand advocacy to mean, did he advocate for you in any way?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Was he otherwise passive during the course of that proceeding?
A. Yes, he was.
Mr. Komyatti further stated that in subsequent disciplinary proceedings, he never had the lay advocate of his choice, and that the lay advocates who were assigned to him never argued a case for him, made an opening statement, interrogated a witness, made a final statement, assisted him in formulating written materials that could be submitted to the CAB, or discussed any strategy or research matters with him. (Tr. 32-33.)
Prisoner Anthony Walls provided similar testimony. He stated that though he had requested lay advocates, he never received the one of his choice. (Tr. 61-62.) According to Walls, there are two counselors at the MCC and prisoners are assigned whichever counselor is not their own as the lay advocate for their CAB hearings. (Tr. 62.) He also stated:
I’ve been told that the MCC lay advocates are not complying by -- they’re not bound to comply by the DOC definition of a lay advocate in the handbook manual. It’s a difference. And they do not assist you. They are not obligated to assist you in any type of defense during the hearing.
They say that they’re there to witness the hearing and make sure that your rights ain’t violated. But as far as gathering any information, or witness statements, in your behalf to the CAB chairman, none of that takes place.
(Tr. 61-62.) None of the lay advocates assigned to Walls made an objection at a CAB hearing or advised him on how to proceed with his case. (Tr. 63.)
On May 31, 1995, the MCC Superintendent issued an administrative directive designed to “assure that offender’s State rights are observed regarding the provision of a lay advocate in disciplinary hearings as provided by Indiana Code 11-11-5-5.” The new directive states that:
A. The superintendent shall create a list of no less than five (5) staff members approved to be used as lay advocates.
B. Each offender will be allowed, at the time of screening, to select from the approved list of lay
5

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
advocates the staff member that he wishes to act as his lay advocate. NOTE: Staff will not be expected to forfeit scheduled or regular days off to fulfill their duties as lay advocate. Same will suffice for grounds for a continuance.
C. Staff designated as lay advocates, hearing officers, and screening officers will receive training regarding the role of lay advocates.
D. Staff who have been requested as lay advocates shall be allowed at least one (1) meeting with the charged offender prior to the disciplinary hearing. The meeting(s) should convene with the charged offender as soon as possible upon notification to the lay advocate of the pending hearing. Supervisory staff will be responsible to make this time available to the staff member.
*7 E. Lay advocates will aid an offender in preparing his defense when requested by the offender, and will NOT be responsible for soliciting statements from staff. Securing witness statements is the responsibility of the Screening Officer per the ADPP.
F. The offender shall be primarily responsible for the delivery of his own defense. The lay advocate shall present to the hearing officer any procedural, due process, or other types of violations that he or she may recognize whether or not requested to intervene by the offender.
G. The lay advocate’s duties terminate at the conclusion of the hearing.
The plaintiffs concede that lay advocates are not required as a matter of due process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1992). They argue, however, that the defendants violated the Agreed Entry by denying prisoners subject to disciplinary action the right to “have advice and representation by a lay advocate of [their] choice” as required by IND. CODE § 11-11-5-5(a)(7). They further argue that the defendants are in violation of the Agreed Entry because “the staff lay advocates do not perform any functions which are traditionally expected from an advocate.” (Post-Trial Brief at p. 10.)
The defendants respond by stating that it is necessary that lay advocates be staff members because other inmates are not “available” as required by the statute. The MCC has a closed population and allowing inmates to meet with and assist other inmates is strictly forbidden for security reasons. Further, defendants state that the statute does not define the role of “lay advocate,” and does not require that inmates be supplied with advocates who act in the same way an attorney does in a criminal trial.

The defendants’ most fundamental argument on this issue, however, is that this court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the lay advocate provision of the Agreed Entry because, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, it may not enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The defendants, citing Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995), argue that this jurisdictional bar remains in place even where state officials agree in a federal consent decree to follow state law. This court must agree.
In Saahir, a prisoner had entered into a settlement agreement with prison officials allowing him to own, use, and possess a cassette tape player and tapes for listening purposes only. The agreement provided that “[t]he plaintiff shall order the tapes he desires through the Texas Department of Corrections’ Islamic Chaplain, who will facilitate and administer the order and delivery of tapes to plaintiff.” Id. at 760. The district court entered a consent decree approving and incorporating the settlement agreement and dismissed the case. Id. Saahir later brought a motion for civil contempt against the defendants alleging that they had violated the settlement agreement by confiscating 39 of his non-religious tapes. The district court granted his motion and required prison officials to return the tapes or reimburse him.
*8 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction because Saahir’s contempt motion did not involve any federal interest. The court cited its earlier decision in Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057 (1987), in support of this ruling. In Lelsz, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree against the state to the extent that the relief ordered in the decree was based on state law. 807 F.2d at 1246-47. It stated that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree beyond the guarantees contained in the Constitution because the only legitimate basis for federal court intervention consistent with the Eleventh Amendment was the vindication of federal rights. Id. at 1252.
Saahir had attempted to distinguish Lelsz by arguing that the consent decree entered in his case was based on federal law. He noted that his complaint did not have any basis in state law, but rested instead on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Saahir, the defendants agreed to settle those federal claims against them by agreeing to allow him any musical tapes he desired. He further argued this was a vindication of a federal right because it had been given to him in exchange for his dropping a suit based on a federal right.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed:
What the defendants agreed to give as a remedy ... does
6

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
not have any effect on the jurisdictional limits of a federal court. Although ‘a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial,’ Local Number 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986), the federal court ‘must fall back on its inherent jurisdiction’ when it ‘issue[s] its own, different order enforcing ... the decree,’ Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252.
47 F.3d at 761.
While at least one appellate court has strongly disagreed with the rationale announced in Lelsz and Saahir1, the Seventh Circuit adopted a similar position in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993) (in banc), cert. denied, 194 S.Ct. 1831, 128 L.Ed.2d 460 (1994). In Evans, the City had settled a suit brought by judgment creditors challenging its delay in payment of tort judgments through a consent decree. The City later challenged the injunction entered as part of that decree, and the Seventh Circuit met in banc “to consider whether a district court should require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest. The answer is No....” 10 F.3d at 475. It later elaborated by stating:
[E]ntry and continued enforcement of a consent decree regulating the operation of a governmental body depend on the existence of a substantial claim under federal law. Unless there is such a claim, the consent decree is no more than a contract, whose enforcement cannot be supported by the diversity jurisdiction and that has in court no more force than it would have outside of court.
*9 Id. at 480. See also Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) (in banc) (finding no basis in federal law to support continuance of injunction entered as part of consent decree in prisoner suit), cert. denied sub nom., Sweeton v. McGinnis, 115 S.Ct. 1118, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1995).
In the present case, the plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot make a claim that prisoners are entitled to lay advocates under federal law. It is true that the defendants adopted the state lay advocate procedures as part of the remedy to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, but “[w]hat the defendants agreed to give as a remedy does not have any affect on the jurisdiction limits of a federal court.” Saahir, 47 F.3d at 761. Because the Agreed Entry’s provision on lay advocates is based solely on state law, this court does

not have jurisdiction and RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs’ contempt motion be DENIED.

Law Clerks for Prisoners with Special Needs Under the Agreed Entry:

With respect to any prisoner who is

functionally illiterate or has an

intellectual[,] mental or physical

disability

which

would

substantially impair the prisoner’s

ability to conduct legal research,

prepare legal documents, or

correspond with the court, the DOC

shall allow such prisoner to be

assisted by inmate law clerks or

outside paralegals or law students

at DOC option.

(Agreed Entry at ¶ VI(6).) In an effort to implement this provision, the defendants agreed on July 29, 1994 to
immediately contact Professor Vandercoy at Valparaiso Law School to arrange for law student clerks to help MCC prisoners who are functionally illiterate or have intellectual mental or physical disabilities which would substantially impair the prisoners’ ability to conduct legal research, prepare legal documents, or correspond with the court.
(Parties’ First Implementation Agreement ¶ 32, at p. 6.) (Emphasis supplied.) The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have failed to satisfy this provision of the Agreed Entry, and did not abide by the Implementation Agreement in a timely manner.

In the Prehearing Order, the parties stipulated that “[t]he only inmate currently at MCC with any type of ‘special need’ is an inmate who is legally blind, Allen Clark.” (Prehearing Order ¶ F(4), at p. 6.) At the hearing, Clark testified that in order to read he puts a magnifying glass with a light on it on a book and then holds the book up to his face. (Tr. 91.) It takes him about 10 or 15 minutes to read a page. (Id.) Clark has never been allowed to have a prisoner law clerk assist him with his legal matters nor has he had an outside paralegal or law student to assist him. (Tr. 90.) The MCC has never provided anybody to help Clark prepare legal documents, correspond with the court or to do legal research. (Tr. 95.) A prison paralegal has helped him get legal materials and has sometimes given him legal materials in large print. (Tr. 92.) She has not, however, ever read anything aloud to him. (Id.)

*10 Offender Komyatti helped Clark file a habeas corpus 7

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
claim by preparing it and then having Clark rewrite it. (Tr. 94.) Clark and Komyatti were disciplined for Komyatti’s actions, and Komyatti has not offered Clark assistance again. (Id.)
The prison paralegal, Sharon Hawk, confirmed much of Clark’s account in her own testimony. She stated that she sees him every time he is scheduled for the library, which is around two hours a week. (Tr. 269, 271.) She helps him in accessing materials by enlarging everything she photocopies for him. (Id.) Hawk has read letters to Clark, but has never read a case to him. (Tr. 271.) She has never read any of the materials aloud to Clark that he could not read himself. (Id.) Hawk enlarges cases for Clark to a scale of “[p]robably 120 [[[percent].” (Tr. 270.) She does not enlarge them into big, bold letters, but enlarges it from a page in a federal reporter to an 8 ½ x 11 page.2
Clark and Hawk have had frequent discussions about Clark’s desire for Komyatti to help him with his habeas corpus case. (Tr. 273.) Hawk has never gone to the administration and told them of Clark’s requests, nor has she tried to do work on the habeas corpus case for him. (Id.) She has, however, helped Clark communicate with a clerk at the General Services Complex (“GSC”) at the Westville Correctional Center which abuts the MCC. The GSC clerk tells Clark exactly what to write on each line. (Id.) Hawk takes material over to the Westville law library where the clerk works on it and sends it back to her. Hawk then she speaks with Clark about it. (Tr. 274.) Hawk has not tried to arrange for an inmate clerk at the MCC to work with Clark, nor has she tried to arrange for an outside paralegal or outside law clerk to work with Clark. (Id.) In fact, despite their statement in the First Implementation Agreement that they would “immediately” contact Professor Vandercoy at the Valparaiso Law School to arrange for law student clerks to help MCC prisoners with specials needs, defendants did not do so until March 31, 1995 (Tr. 279-80), 245 days after the implementation agreement and only 6 days before the contempt hearing.
The court finds that the efforts by Hawk and other DOC officials to arrange for assistance for Clark, and the limited accommodations which have been made for him in the form of enlarged copies are insufficient to satisfy ¶ VI(6) of the Agreed Entry. Under that paragraph, the defendants are required to “allow ... prisoners [with intellectual, mental or physical disabilities] to be assisted by inmate law clerks or outside paralegals or law students at DOC option.” The evidence at the pre-trial hearing shows, however, that when another inmate (Komyatti) assisted Clark in filing a habeas corpus claim, both were disciplined. (Tr. 94.) The only effort to arrange for law student clerks took place 245 days after the defendants promised to do so in the First Implementation Agreement. Such a delay does not fall within the definition of “immediately.”

*11 Without interval of time, without delay, straightway, or without any delay or lapse of time. Drumbar v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 155 Pa.Super. 57, 37 A.2d 25, 27. When used in contract is usually construed to mean ‘within a reasonable time having due regard to the nature of the circumstances of the case’, although strictly, it means ‘not deferred by any period of time’. Integrated, Inc. v. Alec Fergusson Elec. Contractors, 250 C.A.2d 287, 58 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508, 509,. The words ‘immediately’ and ‘forthwith’ have generally the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression ‘within a reasonable time’ and imply prompt, vigorous action without any delay. Alsam Holding Co. v. Consolidated Taxpayers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505, 167 Misc. 732.
Black’s Law Dictionary 750 (6th ed. 1990).
The fact that the DOC may now be in compliance with the Implementation Agreement because it has contacted Professor Vandercoy does not present a defense to a contempt citation. Ex Parte Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, 555 So.2d 1075 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), cert. denied, 555 So.2d 1077 (Ala. 1990).
We find it clear that the trial court could have concluded that 110 days was not ‘immediately’ and that the Department was not in compliance with the August 1988 court order. Further, we find that it is within the court’s power to find the Department in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order and its action was not penal in nature, but was intended to compel compliance with its orders in the future.
Id. at 1076.
In the present case, the DOC waited for more than a year after Judge Sharp approved the Agreed Entry on February 15, 1994, 245 days after its representatives signed the Implementation Agreement on July 29, 1994, and 6 months after the plaintiffs filed their contempt motion on September 13, 1994, before it made any attempt at finding law students to assist prisoners such as Clark with special needs. The DOC has not tried to find an inmate clerk at the MCC to assist Clark, and it has disciplined Komyatti when he provided such assistance. Accordingly, the court concludes that the defendants have failed to comply with the Agreed Entry’s requirement that prisoners with special needs be allowed assistance or law students, and that defendants did not “immediately” remedy this deficiency as required by the Implementation Agreement. It RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs’ contempt motion be GRANTED with respect to the provision of law clerks
8

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
for prisoners with special needs.
The Bar on Law Library Visits and the Requirement that Prisoners in Disciplinary Segregation Provide Exact Case Cites
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have violated two portions of the Agreed Entry by forbidding prisoners on disciplinary segregation from visiting the MCC’s satellite law libraries and requiring that they provide exact cites for any requested materials. First, they argue that defendants have violated ¶ IX(1) of the Agreed Entry -which is quoted above in the discussion on CAB hearings -- by limiting their access to legal research materials in violation of IND. CODE § 11-11-5-4(5). That statute provides: “The department may not impose the following as disciplinary action: ... access to personal legal papers and legal research materials.” Second, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated ¶ VI(1) of the Agreed Entry, which states that prisoners “be provided legal access which is adequate and sufficient as defined by state and applicable case law,” by requiring prisoners on disciplinary segregation to provide specific cites before they may receive legal materials.
*12 The parties stipulated in the Prehearing Order that “[i]nmates who have received disciplinary segregation sentences after arriving at MCC are not permitted to leave their cells to visit the satellite law libraries.” (Prehearing Order at ¶ F(3), at p. 6.) This stipulation was supported by testimony from several prisoners at the hearing. For example, Walls testified that when he was in disciplinary segregation, he was not allowed to go to the law library. (Tr. 59.) He was allowed to request legal materials, but had to do so by providing a specific case cite or requesting a specific legal form. (Tr. 59-60.) He stated that prisoners cannot get books while they are in disciplinary segregation. (Tr. 60.) When he asked for books, he was told that “they don’t do that but maybe I could write Mr. [Michael] Scott [the administrative assistant at the MCC] and get his approval for this.” (Id.) Walls never pursued this because he was soon moved back to his regular cell. (Id.)
Walls did send a note to Hawk, the MCC paralegal, telling her the area of law on which he wanted information. She wrote him back saying that if he had specific case citations she would get them for him. (Tr. 67-68.) She did not offer to copy pages from one of the legal digests or other legal books. (Tr. 68.) Walls did not ask specifically for these:
What I asked her was very broad. I’m am amateur litigant and I asked for assistance in an area. She gave

me some cases and sent me a form. And that was about it. If I have any cases, any cases within them cases, she would be able to make copies of them cases, I couldn’t get any books and I couldn’t go to the law library because of my segregation status.
(Id. at p. 68.)
Prisoner Nicholas Broadus offered similar testimony. He stated that when he was in disciplinary segregation, he could not go to the law library and “had to fuss with Sharon Hawk to get legal materials.” (Tr. 133.) He was required to give exact cites, and could not get books with a hard cover, including digests. (Id.)
I would ask Sharon Hawk if I could have some forms or summaries or a legal book. She would ask me what would I need them for. She sent me legal work about a week ago, and I couldn’t get it unless I told her what I needed it for and showed her proof that I filed whatever I filed.
(Tr. 134.)
Broadus also testified that Hawk told him she could not do legal research or prepare legal materials for him because it was against the policy of the institution. (Tr. 133) Despite these limitations, Broadus has been able to file several law suits, but testified that he did not prepare them himself. Instead, other prisoners prepared the cases, “cadillacked” them to him and he copied them. (Id.)3
Hawk also testified about the limits on library access placed on prisoners in disciplinary segregation. She stated that offenders on disciplinary segregation are not allowed to go to the satellite law libraries. (Tr. 257.) Because of this, she provides extra services for those offenders that she would not provide to other offenders.
*13 A. We have several editions of books. Offenders on segregation aren’t allowed to have hardback books in their cells. There are numerous reference books that I have taken the hardcovers off of so that the offenders can have them in their cell.
Q. And then you deliver those books to the cell of the offender who is in disciplinary segregation?
A. I either deliver it or have an officer deliver it, or I put it in their mail.
Q. Do you ever meet with the offenders who are on disciplinary segregation, to discuss their legal requests?
9

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How frequently do you meet with offenders on disciplinary segregation?
A. I’m probably up there at least three times a week.
(Tr. 258.)
The supply of books with covers removed that can be given to prisoners on disciplinary segregation includes the two volumes of The Rights of Prisoners, Criminal Law by Scott and How to Find the Law. (Id.) However, the covers of the digests, encyclopedias, Indiana Practice, reporters, USCA, Indiana Code, and the Federal Supplement do not have their covers removed and are not available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation. (Tr. 265-66.) Newer paperback and pamphlet editions of the Federal Supplement, Federal Reporter and Supreme Court rulings are available to disciplinary segregation inmates, but older hard-bound volumes are not. (Tr. 266-67.) If there is a hardback book from which an offender on disciplinary segregation needs materials, Hawk copies the pages requested and sends them to the prisoner. She testified that she never told either Walls or Broadus while they were on disciplinary segregation that they could only get cases with exact citations. (Tr. 278.)
When inmates on disciplinary segregation want the digests, Hawk copies the index of the digests and asks them to indicate what topic they are interested in. (Tr. 267.) It usually takes her two or three days to fulfill such a request. After the prisoners look at the index, they send another message indicating which section they would like to examine. (Tr. 268.) Again, it takes Hawk two to three days to respond. (Id.) The same process is used if prisoners want another section and when they want to look at a part of the Indiana Code. Hawk testified that it can take a prisoner up to one week to get from the index of the digests to a code section, in contrast to a person in a satellite law library who can get that access immediately. (Tr. 268.) She acknowledged that obtaining access to legal information is “a little more time consuming” for prisoners on disciplinary segregation, but stated that she did not believe legal information was any less available to offenders on segregation than to other prisoners. (Tr. 269.)
Hawk does not assist prisoners on disciplinary segregation, write briefs or memoranda. She explains to prisoners that she is not an attorney and cannot do attorney work per her paralegal certificate of training and her job description at the MCC. “I’m not allowed to give legal advice or do legal work.” (Tr. 269-70.) When a prisoner needs help in drafting a document, Hawk finds a format for the type of document involved and copies it so that the prisoners have something to use as a guide. She has read through a prisoner’s draft of a legal document

three times in the last two or three years and made suggestions. (Tr. 270.)
*14 According to the Seventh Circuit,
An inmate’s access to the courts is the most fundamental of his rights; ‘all other rights of an inmate are illusory without it, being entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison warden.’ Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). To prove a violation of this crucial right, an inmate must meet both prongs of a two-part test. See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988). Under the first prong, the inmate must show that prison officials failed ‘to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’ Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1208, 111 S.Ct. 2805, 115 L.Ed.2d 978 (1991). To meet the second prong, the prisoner must generally show ‘some quantum of detriment caused by the delay of the plaintiff’s pending or contemplated litigation.’ Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1992). We however waive this showing of detriment where the prisoner alleges a direct, substantial and continuous, rather than a ‘minor and indirect,’ limit on legal materials. DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1988).
Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1994).
A prisoner’s right of access, however, is not unconditional. The constitutionally relevant benchmark is meaningful, not total or unlimited access. Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Lane v. Williams, 488 U.S. 1047 (1989); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988). Restrictions on this access will not be unconstitutional interference when justified by security concerns, which prison officials bear the burden of proving. Williams, 851 F.2d at 878. Because of the practical difficulties involved in doing research without free access to a library, however, courts tend to give close scrutiny to such “remote control” arrangements. Watson v. Norris, 729 F.Supp. 581, 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); Griffin v. Couglin, 743 F.Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
The Seventh Circuit has had the opportunity to address the sufficiency of “exact cite” or “paging” systems on several occasions. In Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1983), the court held that an exact cite system at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, was constitutionally inadequate. Under that system, prisoners
10

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
could obtain copies of necessary material only by written request accompanied by precise citations. The Seventh Circuit found:
The magistrate correctly concluded that the law library system at USP-Marion, without state law materials or supplemental legal aid, was inadequate. He aptly characterized the ... requirement for precise citations for photocopying as a ‘Catch 22’ because the inmate could obtain precise citations only if he could refer to state law materials.
*15 Id. at 1250. The Seventh Circuit did, however, approve plans submitted by prison officials to remedy the inadequate access by providing inmates either with “starter” libraries, in which the inmates themselves could do preliminary research, or with lists of legal services offices which provided assistance to inmates.
In Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986), the court upheld a modified exact cite system utilized for prisoners housed in the Control Unit at USP-Marion. Prisoners housed in the Control Unit could not use the main law library in Marion, but could request up to two specific law books from the main library at a time. Depending on the demand for a particular volume, prisoners might receive requested materials within 24 hours or might wait as much as a week. Id. at 225. In addition, there was a smaller law library in the Control Unit which prisoners could use directly. The Control Unit library did not contain case materials, and because only one inmate could use the library at a time, prisoners sometimes had to wait up to eight days before being allowed access. Id.
The Seventh Circuit found that this access, though limited, was constitutionally sufficient based on the facts presented. It noted:
Marion is the only level-six maximum security institution in the federal penitentiary system, and the Control Unit houses those inmates who are too great a security risk to be allowed in the general population. The security concerns addressed by the exact-cite paging system are unique, and again we cannot find that Marion officials have exaggerated their response to these concerns or that this restriction is irrational.

Id. at 228. The court distinguished Corgain by noting that prisoners had access to reference materials from which to derive the citations to state cases. Moreover, the plaintiff had
neither challenged the sufficiency of the reference materials available in the Control Unit library, to which he has direct access, nor alleged that the amount of time he is allowed to spend in the unit library is inadequate to conduct meaningful legal research.
Id. at 229.
Prisoners at Marion did challenge the sufficiency of smaller “basic libraries” in Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit found that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant warden because factual issues remained regarding this issue. It noted, however, that an exact-cite system may be permissible if it is “supplemented by adequate reference materials in the basic library.” Id. at 607.
In Williams, however, the Seventh Circuit found that limitations on library access placed on prisoners in protective custody violated their right of access to the courts. When an inmate on protective custody status wanted to go to the library, he was locked alone in one of seven special security cages; cellmates, co-litigants, or co-defendants could share a cage. 851 F.2d at 874. Inmates could not leave the cages, however, and depended on a library clerk to retrieve materials for them. Quoting from the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the library services provided to the protective custody inmates were inadequate because
*16 [e]ven if an inmate were attuned to the nuances of legal meaning, the limitations imposed by defendants would convert a possible work of minutes into a need to spend hours -- and, moreover, hours to which no plaintiff could gain access.
Id. at 879 (quoting 646 F.Supp. 1379, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).
Similarly, in DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1988), the court held that inmates in a Wisconsin prison’s Adjustment Center (a maximum security unit within the prison separating certain inmates from general population inmates because of alleged involvement in disturbances at the prison) had stated a claim for denial of access rights.
11

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
Prisoners in the Adjustment Center could not go to the prison library or confer personally with inmate paralegals. They could check out books from the library by written requests and consult paralegals by correspondence. Id. at 446.
After discussing Corgain, Campbell, and Caldwell, the Seventh Circuit found that this arrangement denied the plaintiff his right to access to the courts. It noted:
DeMallory ... had no access to law libraries -- even ‘starter’ or ‘basic’ libraries. Unlike the control unit in Campbell, the Adjustment Center library lacks the primary resources to allow DeMallory or other inmates to adequately begin their initial legal research or to formulate tentative theories. Moreover, because the district court was unable to appoint an attorney to represent him, DeMallory had to proceed without counsel. DeMallory’s meaningful access to the courts, therefore, rested solely on written correspondence with inmate paralegals for assistance on his Eighth Amendment claim. Dependence on untrained inmate paralegals as an alternative to library access does not provide constitutionally sufficient access to the courts. ‘Rather when inmates have no access to a law library they must be provided with assistance by trained, skilled, and independent legal personnel.’ Walters v. Thompson, 615 F.Supp. 330, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Id. at 447 (footnotes omitted).
The court finds that this case is more like DeMallory and Williams than Campbell and Caldwell. As in DeMallory, inmates on disciplinary segregation at the MCC have no access to law libraries -- even “starter” or “basic” libraries. See Prehearing Order at ¶ F(3), at p. 6 (“[i]nmates who have received disciplinary segregation sentences after arriving at MCC are not permitted to leave their cells to visit the satellite law libraries.”). See also Tr. 59, 133, 257. While the MCC does make certain reference books and digests available to prisoners (Tr. 265-68), the process of getting from these references to specific cases can be time consuming, converting the “possible work of minutes into a need to spend hours.” Williams, 851 F.2d at 879. In fact, Hawk testified that it can take a prisoner up to one week to get from the index of the digests to a code section, in contrast to a person in a satellite law library who can get that access immediately. (Tr. 268.)
*17 This testimony is in accord with a frequently-quoted passage from Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979):
Simply providing a prisoner with books in his cell, if he requests them, gives a prisoner no meaningful chance to explore the legal remedies that he might have. Legal research often requires

browsing through various materials in search of inspiration; tentative theories may have to be abandoned in the course of research in the fact of unfamiliar adverse precedent. New theories may occur as a result of chance discovery of an obscure or forgotten case. Certainly a prisoner, unversed in the law and the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance than the trained lawyer exploring his case. It is unrealistic to expect a prisoner to know in advance exactly what materials he needs to consult.4
Given the lack of access to even satellite law libraries and week-long delays in research caused by the paging system, the court holds that library access for prisoners in disciplinary segregation is not “adequate and sufficient as defined by statute and applicable case law.” Accordingly, the defendants are in violation of ¶ II(1) of the Agreed Entry, and the court RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs’ motion be GRANTED on this issue.
Free Issue of the Handbook
Paragraph III(T)(4)(c) of the Agreed Entry states that “[t]he MCC shall provide each prisoner with a free issue of the prisoner’s handbook or like material, and any revisions and amended issues as they are published.” The parties disagree on the meaning of the word “provide” in this context, with plaintiffs claiming the defendants have violated the Agreed Entry because -- though each inmate is issued a copy of the Handbook upon arrival at the MCC -- the Handbook remains the property of the MCC.
The parties have stipulated:
Defendants furnish a copy of the MCC Handbook to every inmate upon arrival at MCC. Defendants do not charge the inmate for the Handbook. The Handbook remains the property of MCC, it must be retained by the inmate at MCC, and is expected to be returned by the inmate when the inmate leaves. The inmates are told not to damage or deface the Handbook and can be subject to disciplinary action for damaging or defacing the Handbook. Inmates are permitted, at their own expense, to make
12

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
copies of the Handbook.
(Prehearing Order ¶ F(2) at p. 6.)
The plaintiffs claim that the fact that the Handbooks remain the property of the MCC and prisoners can be disciplined for damaging or defacing them means that the inmates have not truly been “provided” with a copy of the Handbook. According to the plaintiffs:
In the Agreed Entry, the parties have used the word ‘provide’ to mean ‘give.’ See e.g., Agreed Entry ¶ III(C)(2), at 13 (‘MCC, at its expense, shall provide each prisoner with sufficient amount or quantity of soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, and deodorant’) (emphasis added); ¶ III(C)(2), at 13 (‘[s]ufficient amount or quantity of body lotion, shampoo, and Q-tips will be provided to all prisoners, upon request, at DOC’s expense’) (emphasis added); ¶ III(J)(2), at 22 (‘[p]risoners shall be provided three meals a day’) (emphasis added); ¶ III(J)(3), at 22 (‘MCC will provide two extra beverage items per day with meals to each prisoner’); ¶ III(J)(3), at 22-23 (‘[c]offee will be provided in the morning’) (emphasis added); ¶ III(J)(5), at 23 (‘[s]alt shall be provided prisoners at meals’) (emphasis added). Undoubtedly, the Agreed Entry does not mandate Defendants to ‘provide’ soap, toothpaste, body lotion, shampoo, meals, beverages, coffee, and salt (to name a few) to prisoners, just to have the prisoners return the same items to Defendants.
*18 (Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief at pp. 13-14.)
The court’s own review of the Agreed Entry, however, shows that the meaning of “provide” is not as clear-cut as the plaintiffs suggest. For example, ¶ III(M)(1) states that “[p]risoners shall be provided extra blankets upon request, not to exceed three blankets in all.” There is nothing in this statement which suggests that prisoners are “given” the blankets -- or the beds they are placed on -- and do not have to return them. Similarly, the requirement in ¶ VI requiring that prisoners “be provided legal access which is adequate and sufficient as defined by statute and applicable case law,” including the maintaining of basic legal research materials in the satellite law libraries, cannot be interpreted to mean that prisoners are “given” these legal materials and have no duty to return them.5 Given this ambiguity, the court will “look at the evil which the [Agreed Entry] was designed to rectify.” Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038.
In the present case, the evil sought to be remedied by requiring that prisoners be “provided” copies of the Handbook is to prevent prisoners being subjected to disciplinary proceedings without having full knowledge of the MCC’s rules and regulations. Some courts have held that the failure to provide incoming inmates with current copies of disciplinary rules and regulations

violates their due process rights. Hamilton v. Love, 358 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976); but see Russell v. Oliver, 392 F.Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1975) (failure to post disciplinary rules is not per se constitutional violation without showing of prejudice), vacated in part on other grounds, 552 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1977).
In Hamilton, as in the present case, the defendant prison officials had agreed to provide incoming prisoners with a printed copy of all rules and regulations regarding prisoner conduct and privileges. 358 F.Supp. at 345. Unlike this case, however, they did not consistently do so, citing a “litter” problem. Id. at 346. The court found this unpersuasive, but also stated that it had made clear “that the defendants’ employees can take up the copies of such rules after they have served their purpose.” Id.
There is nothing in the Agreed Entry which prevents the defendants here from doing the same. “Furnishing” prisoners with a copy of the Handbook -- even though it remains DOC property -- for their use while incarcerated at the MCC addresses the evil sought to be remedied by the Agreed Entry. The DOC can “provide” prisoners Handbooks for their use during their incarceration at the MCC and require that they be returned undamaged -- the same way that it can provide prisoners with blankets and law books for their use. Nothing in the Agreed Entry suggests that the defendants need to “give” the inmates Handbooks in such a way as to confer ownership on a permanent basis, and the defendants cannot be held in contempt for failing to do so. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs’ contempt motion be DENIED with respect to the provision of inmate handbooks.
Classification of Prisoners Under the Criteria of the Agreed Entry
*19 Paragraph I(A) of the Agreed Entry provides:
The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual prisoner for assignment to the MCC. The prisoner shall be:
1. A committed or court ordered male adult.
2. An individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration:
(a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant.
13

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
(b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death.
(c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit.
(d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities.
(e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.
In addition, ¶ I(B)(1) of the Agreed Entry requires that “the referring facility head must notify the prisoner in writing of the reasons he is being considered for assignment to the MCC.” The plaintiffs allege that defendants should be held in contempt because a prisoner transferred to the MCC after the approval of the Agreed Entry was not given notice of the reason for his transfer.
The plaintiffs claim that John Thomas has been misclassified and wrongfully confined at the MCC because he does not meet the classification criteria and was not given proper notice of the reasons for his transfer to the MCC.6 He was transferred to the MCC on March 1, 1994, after the Agreed Entry was approved. (Tr. 115-16.)
The Classification Hearing Report authorizing Thomas’ transfer to the MCC set forth following reasons for the action:
(1) offender is being recommended for MCC;
(2) new C.D. required during process; and
(3) currently Level 4 due to score.
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21.) Thomas did not believe his transfer was justified, and on November 17, 1994, made a formal request for interview to MacMillan asking for documentation as to why he was transferred to the MCC from the ISP. (Tr. 118.) He received a response later that day, which stated only “Confidential section of packet.” (Tr. 120.) Thomas testified that he did not know why he was transferred to the MCC. (Id.)
Jim Csenar, a Classification Analyst in the DOC’s Central Office, testified that the reasons for Thomas’ transfer were outlined in a memorandum he wrote to Owens on February 4, 1994. In that memo, Csenar listed the following summary of Thomas’ violations of prison rules: three physical assaults; one fighting; eight disorderly conducts; one possession of a deadly weapon; one possession of a device capable of being a weapon; and one attempted homicide. (Tr. 184.) The attempted homicide involved Thomas’ stabbing another offender seven times upon his head, neck and abdomen regions. Csenar believed Thomas fit the criteria of the Agreed

Entry for assaultive behavior against staff or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and violent behavior which causes serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit. (Id.)
*20 Thomas admits that he was convicted by the CAB of attempted homicide of a prisoner arising out of a February, 1993, stabbing incident and that he also pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of criminal recklessness, a Class A misdemeanor, arising out of the incident. (Tr. 121, 123.) He also admits that between February, 1993, and his transfer to the MCC on March 1, 1994, he was found guilty of possessing a device capable of being used as a weapon when prison officials found a rope in his cell. (Tr. 121, 123, 124.)
In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983), the Supreme Court noted that liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from only two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the states. It then held that the Due Process Clause itself did not give prisoners a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. Id. at 468. It further held, however, that prisoners could find a liberty interest in state law where a prison regulation went beyond mere procedural guidelines and used mandatory language in connection with specified substantive predicates to govern official decisionmaking. Id. at 471-72. See also Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989).
The Court, however, recently abandoned the Hewitt approach which looked for state-created liberty interests within prison regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 63 U.S.L.W. 4601, 1995 WL 360217 (June 19, 1995). The Court noted:
Hewitt has produced at least two undesirable effects. First, it creates disincentives for states to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment. Prison administrators need be concerned with the safety of the staff and inmate population. Ensuring that welfare often leads prison administrators to curb the discretion of staff on the front line who daily encounter prisoners hostile to the authoritarian structure of the prison environment. Such guidelines are not set forth solely to benefit the prisoner. They also aspire to instruct subordinate employees how to exercise discretion vested by the State in the warden, and to confine the authority of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different treatment of similar incidents. The approach embraced by Hewitt discourages this desirable development: States may avoid creation of ‘liberty’ interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on correctional personnel.
Second, the Hewitt approach has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of
14

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)

prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone. In doing so, it has run counter to the view expressed in several of our cases that federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.
1995 WL 360217 at *6 (cites omitted).
The Court then stated:

In light of the above discussion, we

believe that the search for a

negative implication from

mandatory language in prisoner

regulations has strayed from the

real concerns undergirding the

liberty protected by the Due

Process Clause. The time has come

to return to the due process

principles we believe were

correctly established and applied in

Wolff [v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974)] and Meachum [v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215 (1976)]. Following

Wolff, we recognize that States may

under certain circumstances create

liberty interests which are protected

by the Due Process Clause. But

these interests will be generally

limited to freedom from restraint

which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such unexpected

manner as to give rise to protection

by the Due Process Clause of its

own force, see e.g., Vitek [v.

Jones], 445 U.S. [[[480], 493, 100

S.Ct. at 1263-64 [(1980)] (transfer

to mental hospital); Washington [v.

Harper], 494 U.S. [210], 221-222,

110 S.Ct. [1028], 1036-1037

[(1990)]

(involuntary

administration of psychotropic

drugs), nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.

*21 Id. (footnote omitted).
Turning to the case before it -- in which Conner alleged that prison officials had deprived him of due process when an adjustment committee refused to allow him to present witnesses during a disciplinary hearing and then sentenced him to segregation for misconduct -- the court held:

This case, though concededly

punitive, does not present a

dramatic departure from the basic

conditions

of

Conner’s

indeterminate sentence. Although

Conner points to dicta in cases

implying that solitary confinement

automatically triggers due process

protection, this Court has not had

the opportunity to address in an

argued case the question whether

disciplinary confinement of

inmates

itself

implicates

constitutional liberty interests. We

hold that Conner’s discipline in

segregated confinement did not

present the type of atypical,

significant deprivation in which a

state might conceivably create a

liberty interest. The record shows

that, at the time of Conner’s

punishment,

disciplinary

segregation, with insignificant

exceptions, mirrored those

conditions imposed upon inmates

in administrative segregation and

protective custody.

Id. at *7 (cites omitted).

In the present case, the plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Thomas’ incarceration at the MCC presented the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. While the “regime to which [Thomas] was subjected as a result of” his transfer to the MCC is undoubtedly harsher than that found in other Indiana prisons, it is “within the range of confinement to be normally expected” for prisoners held by the DOC. Id. at *8. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs’ motion that the defendants be held in contempt be DENIED.

Availability of Fruit Juices on Commissary
Under the Agreed Entry, the MCC is required to “make a continuing reasonable effort to provide fruit juices on commissary if they are available in containers which meet the security concerns of the MCC.” (Agreed Entry ¶ III(B)(2), at p. 12.) The defendants, citing concerns that the juices’ packaging could be made into a weapon, are not yet providing them on the commissary and the plaintiffs now challenge the “reasonableness” of their effort.
According to Komyatti, he has made a number of requests
15

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
and filed grievances asking for administrative relief to have juices available on the commissary. (Tr. 5.) Scott, MacMillan, and other MCC personnel have told him that because the juice would come in a container which includes foil, they could not be made available to prisoners at the MCC. (Id.)
Komyatti testified, however, that other items at the MCC contain foil packaging, including juices with their meals four to five days a week. That juice is delivered in a hardened plastic container which has a foil covering. (Id.; Plaintiffs’ Ex. 2) Other items containing foil are also included with meals: Komyatti identified two other exhibits as being foil from the inside of Corn Pops and Sugar Smacks cereal boxes. (Tr. 6-7; Plaintiffs’ Exs. 3 and 4.) In rebuttal testimony, Komyatti noted that there were items available on commissary that had foil packaging, including potato chip bags and candy bar wrappers. (Tr. 281-82.)
*22 Komyatti made prison officials aware of the foil in other food packages when he sent Scott a letter regarding the juice and included foil packaging out of either the Corn Pops or Sugar Smacks. (Tr. 9.) In response to that letter, Scott wrote back on October 14, 1994, that
the foil matter is a question of ‘gauge.’ The gauge of foil used in drink boxes is felt to be heavy enough to pose a more legitimate security concern than the lower gauges of foil such as contained in packs of cereal or instant coffee.
(Tr. 9-10; Plaintiffs’ Ex. 6.)
Scott elaborated on his response in his testimony at the contempt hearing. He stated, “It’s our feeling that it’s possible to make a weapon out of the material that they’re [the juice boxes] constructed from, and that would pose a security concern.” (Tr. 221.) He noted that he had personally contacted a number of grocers in the area in an effort to determine if fruit juice was available in a container that would not be a security concern. (Tr. 220.) He was informed that drink box packaging is pretty standard and it would be unlikely that he would find drink boxes without foil. (Id.)
Scott also testified about the items containing foil which are brought with the prisoners’ meals. He stated that prisoners are expected to turn in the plastic fruit juice cups covered with foil with their tray after a meal. These juice cups are not available on commissary, and would not be an acceptable item for offenders to keep in their cells because “[t]hose plastic cups can very easily be turned into a weapon. The cups can be torn or broken, which leaves a sharp edge, and cut skin.” (Tr. 223.) They

could also be jabbed in someone’s eye. (Id.)
The plaintiffs offered the deposition testimony of Karl E. Muszar, Jr., a professional engineer, on the question of the “gauge of the foil in juice containers and other packaging. Muszar analyzed the foil contained in the packaging produced by the plaintiffs at the contempt hearing as well as packaging from fruit juice boxes which he bought on the open market. He testified that in the metallurgical business, gauge is a term that is used to describe a number which represents the thickness of a metallic material. (Deposition of Karl E. Muszar at p. 8.) His examination of the materials showed that the aluminum foil on these items ranged in thickness from 1/1000 of an inch to 7.5/10,000 of an inch.
The foil cover from the juice cups provided with prisoners’ meals measured 1/1000 to 1.5/1000 of an inch. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 2; Muszar Dep. at p. 8.) The Corn Pops package and material from the other cereal package both measured 5/10,000 of an inch. (Plaintiffs’ Exs. 3 and 4; Muszar Dep. at pp. 8-9.) And, the Hi-C and Juicy Juice packages purchased by Muszar in the open market measured from 5/10,000 to 7.5/10,000 of an inch. (Plaintiffs’ Exs. 26 and 28; Muszar Dep. at p. 9.) Muszar testified that “there is no gauge number which goes down to the thickness range of the aluminum foil materials I have measured here.” (Muszar Dep. at p. 19.)
*23 Muszar’s testimony on cross-examination and further direct examination, however, revealed that he believed that the juice boxes he had purchased in the open market and the foil material Mr. Komyatti identified as coming from the juice cup cover and cereal boxes could possibly inflict injury.
Q. I just want to ask you, if I took this exhibit, and particularly the corner of Exhibit 25, and poked you in the eye with it, do you think the effect on your eye would be negligible? Do you think that that might cause some damage?
A. I think it would probably cause injury if you used the pointed corner of it.
MR. UHL: That’s all I have.
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUING,
QUESTIONS BY MR. KASHANI:
Q. Can you also make something out of Exhibit 2 or 3 or 4 to make the same kind of injury?
A. Oh, I think very definitely you could, especially Exhibit No. 2.
Q. How about if you fold Exhibit No. 3 a couple of times over?
16

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
A. You wouldn’t even have to fold that exhibit because it’s already -- you can just take the corner of it and you could inflict probably the same kind of an injury.
Exhibit No. 4 would have to be folded over, but you could make a pointed device out of that one, too.
(Muszar Dep. at pp. 22-23.)
Given the plaintiffs’ expert’s own testimony, the court finds that the MCC does have valid security concerns about the juice boxes’ potential use as a weapon. The fact that other items which are provided to prisoners with their meals are expected to be returned does nothing to diminish the credibility of this concern. Unlike those items, juice boxes bought from the commissary could remain in the prisoners’ cells. Moreover, this court
should be cautious about disparaging disciplinary and security concerns expressed by the correctional authorities. American jails are not safe places, and judges should not go out of their way to make them less safe. As long as the concerns expressed by correctional authorities are plausible, and the burden that a challenged regulation of jail or prison security places on protected rights a light or moderate one, the courts should not interfere.
Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 1995 WL 358065 at *2 (7th Cir. June 15, 1995).
Here, the concerns expressed by the defendants are plausible and the burden on the plaintiffs light. Several courts have barred prisoners from having items in their cells or on their persons which have a much greater constitutional significance than juice boxes. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting First Amendment claim by Native-American who claimed that prison policy used to bar him from wearing a bear tooth necklace and medicine bag around his neck due to security concerns impinged on his religious freedom); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that prison regulation prohibiting inmates from possessing rosaries and scapulars in their cells did not violate First Amendment).
*24 All that is required in the Agreed Entry is that the MCC “make continuing reasonable effort to provide fruit juices on commissary if they are available in containers which meet the security concerns of the MCC.” Scott’s testimony that he contacted a number of grocers in an effort to determine if fruit juice was available in a container that would not be a security concern demonstrates that such effort has been made thus far.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs’ motion for contempt be DENIED.
Contempt Sanctions
Among the plaintiffs’ prayers for relief is a request that the defendants be fined for their failure to abide by the Agreed Entry. The court finds that such sanctions are not necessary at this time.
The Seventh Circuit has held:
[J]udicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in the proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.
Thompson v. Cleland, 782 F.2d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947)). Where compensation is intended, a fine may be imposed payable to the complainant. Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304). A trial court “has a great deal more latitude in enforcing its own decrees in a contempt proceeding.” Ferrell v. Pierce, 785 F.2d 1372, 1383 (7th Cir. 1986). And, a district court may award attorney’s fees related to a civil contempt proceeding. BPS Guard Services, Inc. v. International Union of United Plant Guard Workers of America, 45 F.3d 205, 211 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the present case, the plaintiffs have not identified any losses sustained as a result of the contempt. Accordingly, the court may only consider if it should impose sanctions to coerce defendants’ compliance with the Agreed Entry. As the plaintiffs have helpfully pointed out, in recent years federal courts have not hesitated to exercise the power of contempt to coerce prison and jail officials to comply with court orders.7 The court, however, finds that such sanctions are not yet necessary to coerce the defendants into compliance. Unlike many of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, there have not been prior orders putting defendants on notice as to prescribed conduct and penalties,8 nor repeated delays in implementing the provisions of a consent decree.9 Instead, the court notes that defendants have been willing to compromise on a number of the issues identified in the plaintiffs’ initial contempt motion -- settling 16 out of 23 alleged violations. Given this, the court cannot find that the defendants have displayed recalcitrance making it necessary to impose monetary sanctions in order to coerce
17

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)

compliance with the Agreed Entry. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for contempt sanctions be DENIED.

the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

Conclusion

Dated this 20th day of July, 1995.

*25 Based on the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the plaintiffs’ motion for contempt with regard to lay advocates at CAB hearings, free copies of the Handbook, classification, and juice boxes on commissary be DENIED, and that plaintiffs’ motion with regard to law clerks for prisoners with special needs and law library visits and specific cite requirements for prisoners in disciplinary segregation be GRANTED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within

They may obtain law books only by a book paging system, a substantial disadvantage. First, inmates must know initially which volumes they need. However, it may take several requests for case digests before they target relevant case citations.
Second, unavoidable and lengthy delays are inherent in such a system. The process of ordering and returning books, compounded by hindrances in obtaining shepardizing results, drastically prolongs legal research.
	  

Footnotes

1

The court in Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2nd Cir. 1989) stated that it found the Lelsz decision to be “untenable. If a

federal district court can validly enter a consent decree, it can surely enforce that decree.”

2

Plaintiffs have helpfully pointed out in their Brief that a typical Federal Reporter page is 7 x 10.25 inches, yielding an area of 71.75

square inches. (Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at p. 4 n. 4.) When enlarged to an 8 1/2 x 11 page, which has an area of 93.50 square

inches, the total magnification is 130 percent.

3

According to Broadus, “cadillacking” means placing a piece of string on the end of the piece of paper and sliding it from one cell

to another. (Tr. 135.) Legal papers are commonly cadillacked between cells at the MCC. (Id.)

4

Similar language is found in Tillery v. Owens, 719 F.Supp. 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1989). In Tillery, the court held that “restrictive

housing” inmates who could not visit the law library were denied access to the courts.

Id. at 1282. See also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 775 F.Supp. 735 (D. Del. 1991) (holding that legal services provided to inmates in a Maximum Security Unit (“MSU”) were inadequate where MSU inmates were allowed into a satellite library only one at a time, and visits were limited to one visit per day and one hour per visit; prisoners at times had to wait a week or more to visit the MSU library); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1038 n. 22 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“[p]aging systems ... as the sole legal assistance furnished to inmates, have been rejected consistently by other courts of appeals”) (citing cases); Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F.Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Or. 1993) (“By 1993, no reasonable public official would have believed a paging system was by itself sufficient to protect an inmate’s fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts.”) (citing cases); Griffin, 743 F.Supp. at 1024 (holding that book request system for prisoners on protected custody did not provide them with meaningful, adequate access to the courts: “PC inmates are not able to browse through materials in order to compare legal theories and formulate ideas. This is a constitutionally impermissible situation....”).

5

Indeed, the court notes that neither of the dictionaries it consulted defines providing as “giving.” Instead, provide is defined as “[t]o

make, procure or furnish for future use, prepare. To supply; to afford; to contribute.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed. 1990).

See also The American Heritage Dictionary 996 (2d college ed. 1976): “1. To furnish; supply. 2. To make ready; prepare. 3. To

make available; afford. 4. To set down as a stipulation.”

6

Plaintiffs also argue in their Post-Trial Brief that two inmates transferred to the MCC before the Agreed Entry was signed -- Steven

Lee and Tracey Jones -- did not meet the classification criteria, and should be reclassified and transferred to another prison. The

argument regarding Lee is now moot because he was released from the MCC on July 10, 1995, and this court rejected the argument

concerning Jones on July 5, 1995, in response to the plaintiffs’ motion for an expedited ruling.

7

Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 901 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1990) Morales Feliciano v. Parole Bd., 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.

1989), cert. denied sub nom., Hernandez Colon v. Morales Feliciano, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corrections, 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Badgley v.

18

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)

Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., Santacroce v. Badgley, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987); Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Fambro v. Fulton County, Ga., 713 F.Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Albro v. Onondaga County, N.Y., 681 F.Supp. 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. State of Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 928, 1047-1054 (W.D. Mich. 1987) Tate v. Frey, 673 F.Supp. 880 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Jackson v. Whitman, 642 F.Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1986); Mobile County Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 581 F.Supp. 222 (S.D. Ala. 1984); Miller v. Carson, 550 F.Supp. 543 (M.D. Fla. 1982).

8

See e.g., Inmates of the Allen County Jail, 901 F.2d at 1199-1200.

9

See e.g., Feliciano, 697 F.Supp. at 30-31.

	  

19

 
 Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Judgment Reversed by Komyatti v. Bayh, 7th Cir.(Ind.), September 20, 1996
1995 WL 803816 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South
Bend Division.
Kataza TAIFA, et al, Plaintiffs. v.
Evan BAYH, et al, Defendants.
No. 3:92cv429AS. | Sept. 26, 1995.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Richard A. Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, Hamid R. Kashani, Indianapolis, IN, Franklin A. Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN, for plaintiffs and Aaron Isby, Westville, IN, Michael Holland, Roosevelt Williams, Carl L. Johnson, Dyrone Henderson, Jimmy Moorson, Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, Westville, IN, Kenneth Porter, Tome L. Hailey, Pendleton, IN, Christopher Michael Miser, Michigan City, IN, Andrew Benroy Johnson, and Preston Gardner, Westville, IN, plaintiffs pro se.
Ricky Outlaw, Westville, IN, appellant pro se.
Wayne E. Uhl and Suzann W. Lupton, Office of Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 On July 5, 1995 the Honorable Robin D. Pierce, United States Magistrate filed a report recommending that this court deny the Plaintiff’s Motion for a Partial, Expedited Ruling on the First Count of Plaintiff’s Motion to Hold Defendant’s in Contempt of court or Alternatively, for Preliminary Injunction with respect to Mr. Tracy Jones’s assignment to the Maximum Control Complex (MCC). Plaintiffs by attorney Hamid R. Kashani filed a timely objection to the Report and Recommendation on July 19, 1995 arguing that the Magistrate erred “by making a fresh and thorough

constitutional analysis of Jones’ claim that his assignment to the MCC violated the terms of the Agreed Entry”.
II. FACTS
Pursuant to the Agreed Entry on February 15, 1994, a prisoner must meet certain criteria in order to be transferred to the MCC. The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual prisoner for assignment to the MCC. The prisoner shall be:
1. A committed or court ordered male adult.
2. An individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration.
a. Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant.
b. Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death.
c. Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit.
d. Intensive involvement in violent gang activities.
e. Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.
Because the Agreed Entry was retroactive, prison staff officials applied the criteria to the current population of the MCC. On September 13, 1994 Plaintiffs moved to hold the Defendant’s in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the Agreed Entry. One count of the alleged contempt was that inmate Tracy Jones was being held in the MCC without meeting any of the criteria listed above. Inmate Tracy Jones was assigned to the MCC on May 4, 1993 because of gang activities. Although some prison officials did question whether inmate Jones should remain at the MCC, the eventual decision of prison officials was that Jones should remain at the MCC as a result of his gang activity. Magistrate Pierce found the decision of the prison officials complied with due process and recommended that the petition be denied.
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Kashani argues that Magistrate Pierce erred
1

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
conducting a constitutional inquiry into Mr. Tracey incarceration into the MCC. Mr. Kashani suggests that the analysis should have been contractual rather than Constitutional. This court interprets that argument as suggesting that this court should determine by de novo review on a case by case basis whether an inmate should be placed in the MCC. Such an analysis would involve this court in the day to day administration of the prison, something which this court can not or will not do. The Magistrate’s perception of this court’s responsibility in determining whether an inmate is in the MCC in violation of Agreed Entry is well taken. This court will not review the decision to place an inmate in the MCC on a de novo basis, instead, this court looks to see if the decision comports with due process.
*2 While the recent case of Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995) may have some bearing upon whether or not Tracy Jones has a liberty interest in remaining out of the general prison population, it is assumed without deciding that the present consent decree has embodied an outcome that reaches beyond a basic constitutional protections. Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.1993). Without the Agreed Entry, an inmate has no constitutional right to be assigned to a particular institution. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25, 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 96 S.Ct. 2532, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976) (no liberty interest in remaining in a particular institution) See also, Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir.1988). Therefore, the Agreed Entry goes beyond the constitutional minima, it establishes that inmates meet specified criteria prior to being sent to the MCC.
Under this assumed interest, the court must inquire whether the inmate received the basic guarantees of due process. Here, the alleged due process violation appears to be a lack of evidence to support the finding that Mr. Jones should be incarcerated in the MCC. A review of the record shows that there is some evidence to support the decision that Jones should be placed in the MCC. Supt. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). Jones had a Vice Lord tattoo on his back and he was considered a “super elite” member of the Vice Lord gang. There was also some evidence that Jones’ file at the Indiana Department of Correction Central Office documented “serious gang involvement”. Finally, eight individuals recently indicated that they feared for their physical safety if they would be placed in close, physical proximity to Mr. Jones at any time. Under the Agreed Entry, Mr. Jones received all the process he was due.
IV. CONCLUSION
This court hereby approves and adopts and incorporates

herein by reference thereto the Report and Recommendation dated July 5, 1995 of the Honorable Robin D. Pierce, United States Magistrate attached as Appendix “A.” Insofar as the September 13, 1994 petition seeks to have this court order Tracy Jones to be removed from the MCC, it is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
__________
CAUSE NO. 3:92–cv–429 AS
__________ KATAZA TAIFA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. EVAN BAYH, et al.,
Defendants.
__________
ENTRY FOR July 5, 1995 2

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
__________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for a partial, expedited ruling—or, alternatively, for preliminary injunction—on one count of its motion to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to abide by the provisions of an Agreed Entry in a class action suit. The suit challenged the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the Maximum Control Complex (“MCC”) operated by the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) in Westville, Indiana. The MCC is a modern maximum security correctional facility which was opened by the DOC in the summer of 1991, and has been the source of much litigation since that time. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the plaintiffs’ motion for the defendants to be held in contempt be denied on the one count identified in their motion for an expedited ruling.
Background
*3 This case was originally filed in the Marion County Superior Court on May 6, 1992, against the Governor of Indiana and various DOC officials. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 1992. The action was removed, on defendants’ motion, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 29, 1992, and transferred to this court on July 7, 1992. On October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for “purposes of injunctive relief,” with the class “consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana.” Plaintiffs’ state law claims were remanded to state court on December 4, 1992.
After extensive settlement negotiations and two hearings before the undersigned at the MCC, the parties entered into an Agreed Entry which was ultimately approved by Chief Judge Sharp on February 15, 1994. On September 13, 1994, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the Agreed Entry. The plaintiffs’ supporting memorandum identified 23 separate violations. The parties agreed on remedies for several of these alleged violations prior to a contempt hearing held before the undersigned on April 6, 1995, at the MCC. Several more were remedied before the plaintiffs submitted their post-trial brief. The contempt action is now limited to seven alleged violations of the Agreed Entry, and the plaintiffs have now moved for a partial, expedited

ruling—or, alternatively, for preliminary injunction—on one of those counts: Whether the defendants have violated ¶ I(A) of the Agreed Entry by holding prisoner Tracy Jones in the MCC. Plaintiffs have asked the court to order Jones’ immediate transfer out of the MCC and for sanctions against the defendants for disregarding the Agreed Entry.
Discussion
Paragraph I(A) of the Agreed Entry provides:
The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual prisoner for assignment to the MCC. The prisoner shall be:
1. A committed or court ordered male adult.
2. An individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration:
(a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant.
(b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death.
(c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit.
(d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities.
(e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.
Paragraph II(A) states that within 12 months of a prisoner’s confinement at the MCC, the DOC shall reevaluate the appropriateness of the prison’s classification and assignment. Under ¶ II(G) this reclassification requirement is retroactive to members of the class. The plaintiffs allege that Jones, who was transferred to the MCC before the Agreed Entry was signed, does not meet the classification criteria, and should be reclassified and transferred to another prison.
*4 Dawn MacMillan, a case manager at the MCC, testified that following the approval of the Agreed Entry, she conducted a retroactive review of prisoner classifications. (Tr. 283.) During the course of those reviews, she had doubts about whether some of the prisoners should be at the MCC; Jones was one of those prisoners. (Tr. 284.)
Randall Short, a classification analyst in the DOC central
3

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
office, also had doubts about Jones placement at the MCC. In a deposition prior to the contempt hearing, he testified that the DOC had determined that because of the Agreed Entry it should review the current population of the MCC to determine whether or not they met the criteria as stated in the Agreed Entry. (Short Dep. at pp. 4–5.) The first review was done by staff at the MCC. (Id. at p. 5.) They reviewed the prisoners’ packets and then sent a list of approximately 26 offenders “who they were not sure if they met the criteria as stated in the Agreed Entry” to the DOC central office. (Id.) Short reviewed those records between July 25, 1994, and August 4, 1994. (Id.) After that review and talking to Norman G. Owens (the DOC director of classification) and other staff at the DOC, it appeared to Short that there were “maybe two offenders that didn’t meet particular criteria.” (Id.) Jones was one of those inmates, and Short wrote a summary about him and the other offender and submitted it to Owens on August 10, 1994. (Id. at p. 9.)
Jones was assigned to the MCC on May 4, 1993. (Tr. 112.) Jim Csenar, another classification analyst in the DOC central office, testified at the hearing that Jones was transferred to the MCC because of his gang activities. He referred to memos written by D. Dirkey, a case manager, to the Superintendent of the Westville Correctional Center dated April 21, 1993, which stated that Jones had admitted to being in gangs. (Tr. 181.) This gang affiliation began with the Vice Lords with Jones holding the rank of “super elite.” (Id.) Jones sports a Vice Lords tatoo on his back, and the WCC gang coordinator considered him an active member of the Vice Lords. (Id.) Csenar also referred to a memorandum written by Short to Owens on April 28, 1993, stating that information garnered from confidential investigations showed that eight offenders identified Jones as a separatee, “which in effect had told the department that these eight individuals feared for their physical safety if they would be placed in close, physical proximity to Mr. Jones at any time.” (Tr. 182.)
Under cross-examination from plaintiffs’ counsel, Csenar was asked to read from a memorandum dated August 11, 1994, from Owens to John Nunn, then senior deputy commissioner of the DOC. In that memorandum, Owens wrote:
In my opinion his placement at MCC under the new criteria is questionable. He has a record of gang involvement, but the documentation involves his activities during a prior incarceration and is very limited. There’s no such documentation during his current commitment period.

*5 (Tr. 205; Plaintiffs’ Ex. 20.) Csenar also read from the August 10, 1994, memo from Short to Owens. In that memo, Short stated that Jones had

no documented record of

aggressive sexual conduct or rape.

He does have a record of gang

involvement,

but

the

documentation involves his

activities during a prior

incarceration, not the current

commitment period.

(Tr. 209; Plaintiffs’ Ex. 19.)

Jones’ reclassification was ultimately denied by the DOC. According to MacMillan when she spoke to Short about the denial, he told her “Mr. Jones had serious gang involvement that we didn’t show in our packet at MCC, but central office had it in their packet.” (Tr. 285.)

The Supreme Court has made it clear that prisoners do not have a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). See also Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir.1991). Therefore, in order to state a due process claim for a transfer into a more restrictive setting, a prisoner must find an enforceable liberty interest in state law. Before a prison regulation can be found to create this liberty interest, it must go beyond mere procedural guidelines and use mandatory language. Id. at 471.

According to the Supreme Court,
Stated simply, ‘a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.’ ... Our past decisions suggest ... that most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official decision-making, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989). The Court has also

articulated a requirement ... that the regulations contain ‘explicit mandatory language,’ i.e., specific directive to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow in order to create a liberty interest.

Id. at 463.

4

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
In sum, the use of ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ in connection with the establishment of ‘specified substantive predicates’ to limit discretion forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest.
Id.
According to the Fourth Circuit
What this all comes to is that constitutionally protected liberty interests are only created by state law regimes which in the end effectively say to inmates: ‘If facts A, B, and C are established in an appropriate fact-finding process, you are thereupon legally entitled to a more favorable security or custody classification than you presently have,’ or, ‘Unless facts A, B, and C are so established, you are legally entitled not to be placed in a less favorable classification than you now have.’
Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir.1994).
*6 At least two courts have found that rules governing prisoner classification and transfer made a part of or arising out of consent decrees in class action law suits create state law liberty interests. Rodi v. Dentetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 26–28 (1st Cir.1991); Dozier v. Hilton, 507 F.Supp. 1299, 1310–11 (D.N.J.1981). But see Beo v. District of Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026, 1028–29 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Holding that settlement agreement between individual inmate and prison officials did not create a liberty interest and distinguishing Rodi and Dozier because in those cases “individual prisoners had gained a liberty interest in their existing conditions of confinement because restrictions on altering those conditions had been embodied in a state-wide practice that gave all prisoners a liberty interest.”). The question in the present case, then, is whether the Agreed Entry has created a regime where “unless facts A, B, and C are so established, [DOC prisoners] are legally entitled not to be placed in a less favorable classification than [they] now have.” Slezak, 21 F.3d at 595. The court concludes that it does.
First, ¶ I(A) specifies that in order to be assigned to the MCC, a prisoner must be a committed or court-ordered male adult who has a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the listed criteria during the period of incarceration. These specific criteria—or “specified substantive predicates”—are accompanied by the explicitly mandatory language required by Thompson and Hewitt. Paragraph I(A)(4) states that “[t]hese are the only criteria the DOC will consider in assigning prisoners to the MCC.” And the procedures for referring a prisoner for assignment to the MCC mandate that at least two individuals are required to determine that a prisoner meet

these criteria: ¶ I(B)(1) requires that the referring facility head determine that “a prisoner meets the criteria for consideration for assignment to the MCC,” and ¶ I(B)(4) states that upon receipt of the referral materials a Classification Analyst will review them “to insure that the prisoner meets the criteria for assignment to the MCC.” Given this explicitly mandatory language, the court finds that prisoners under the control of the DOC have a liberty interest in not being assigned to the MCC.

Concluding that the Agreed Entry gives inmates a liberty interest in not being assigned to the MCC, however, does not end the inquiry into whether Jones must be transferred out of the MCC. The court must turn next to the question of what process was due. In Hewitt, the Court held that, at a minimum, an inmate placed in administrative segregation should be provided with

an informal, nonadversary review

of the information supporting [the

inmate’s]

administrative

confinement, including whatever

statement [the inmate may wish] to

submit, within a reasonable time

after confining him to

administrative segregation.

459 U.S. at 476. The Court stressed that the process due in such a situation was not elaborate:

*7 An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate would accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges in that-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.

Id. See also Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.1991) ( “The barebones constituents of fair procedure and therefore due process are (besides jurisdiction) notice and the opportunity to be heard....”).

In the present case, although the question whether Jones fit within the criteria for transfer to the MCC was the

5

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1995)
subject of debate even within the DOC, there is apparently no question that he received notice of the reasons for his transfer and that a decisionmaker reviewed those reasons and the then-available evidence supporting them. Accordingly, he received all the process he was due under both the constitution and the Agreed Entry, and the court RECOMMENDS that the Plaintiffs’ motion for contempt concerning Jones’ continued incarceration at the MCC be DENIED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21

Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.1986). Dated this 5th day of July, 1995. /s/ Robin D. Pierce
/s/ Robin D. Pierce, /s/ U.S. Magistrate Judge
cc: Chief Judge Sharp Magistrate Pierce
	  

6

 
 Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
1996 WL 441809 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South
Bend Division.
Kataza TAIFA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Evan BAYH, et al., Defendants.
No. 3:92-CV-429AS. | June 6, 1996.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Aaron Isby, Westville, IN, Pro Se.
Roosevelt Williams, Westville, IN, pro se.
Preston Gardner Pendleton, IN, Pro Se.
David A. Arthur, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Evan Bayh, defendant.
Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PIERCE, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Plaintiff, Roosevelt Williams, is an inmate at the Maximum Control Complex (“MCC”) in Westville, Indiana. On May 6, 1992, Williams, along with a number of other MCC inmates, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, Governor Evan Bayh, former Department of Correction (“DOC”) Commissioner James E. Aiken, DOC Director of Classification Norman G. Owens, DOC Deputy Commissioner of Operations John Nunn, and Charles E. Wright, former superintendent at the MCC, challenging the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the MCC. An amended complaint was filed on May 22, 1992, and on October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for “purposes of injunctive relief,” with the class “consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana.” The parties’ Agreed Entry and agreement regarding state court claims was approved by the court on February 11, 1994. Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. 1994), aff’d sub nom., Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1996).
A familiarity with the prior proceedings and rulings in this action is presumed. See Abdul-Wadood v. Wright,

––– F.3d ––––, No. 95-1349, 1996 WL 218900 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 1996); Taifa v. Bayh, No 3:92CV429AS, 1995 WL 803816 (N.D. Ind. Sep. 26, 1995); Taifa v. Bayh, No 3:92CV429AS, 1995 WL 646300 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 1995); Taifa v. Bayh, 867 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Taifa v. Bayh, No 3:92CV429AS, 1994 WL 821773 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 28, 1994); Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. 1994), aff’d sub nom., Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams’ individual damage claims against the defendants were tried before the undersigned on June 3 and 4, 1996. This Report and Recommendation constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). For the reasons which follow, it will be recommended that judgment be entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff Williams on all of his damage claims.
The Testimony and Evidence at Trial
Williams has been incarcerated at the MCC since October 17, 1991. Generally, Williams and his inmate witnesses1 testified about the conditions of confinement at the MCC. They testified about extremes in his cell temperature, forced showers with a high pressure water hose, exposure to allegedly toxic chemicals such as tear gas or pepper spray, the use of excessive force, cell extractions, limited access to a law library,2 poor ventilation, inadequate recreation opportunities, lost or withheld legal mail,3 non-confidential attorney visits, and clothing.
Much of the evidence presented by Williams generally related to events which occurred after the amended complaint was filed in May, 1992, and, therefore, such evidence was beyond the scope of the amended complaint and was not relevant or material to the issues tried by the court. Williams’ first witness, Kalonji Ra’id Nasihjihad (a.k.a. James Dunville) was not even housed at the MCC until October 26, 1994. Williams testified that during Ramadan4 in 1996, he was given a vegetarian burger made of soy bean, in his opinion a ground meat product, which his Muslim religion prohibited him from eating.
*2 Moreover, much of the testimony was presented in the absence of any time frame to establish that the testimony was relevant to Williams’ complaint. For example, John C. Cole, Jr., Richard D. Mumford, III, and Lokmar Abdul-Wadood testified that they witnessed Williams’ bedding being removed; however, they did not indicate the date or dates on which it occurred. Cole and Mumford also testified, without indicating a date or dates, that they witnessed Williams being forcibly showered. Paul Komyatti testified that he saw Williams being forcibly
1

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)
showered at the direction of Charles Wright; however, he did not indicate whether it occurred before May, 1992. Edward Broadus testified that he observed guards pull Williams from his cell and take him to the showers, but did not testify as to the date when this occurred.
Further, Williams and his witnesses testified about injuries they attributed to the conditions of confinement at the MCC. Williams testified that the conditions of confinement affected him mentally, psychologically, and physically. He testified that fumes in the MCC’s ventilation system caused his migraine headaches, and he testified that diarrhea and stomach problems were caused by the drinking water. He also testified that he was currently taking medications for stomach problems which he believed were related to the water, food, and treatment at the MCC. He testified that he was once bitten by an ant which caused a permanent hearing impairment. Several inmate witnesses, including Aaron Isby, Cole, Komyatti, Mumford, Broadus, and William Sampley attributed their health problems to the allegedly contaminated drinking water at the MCC.
In addition, the bulk of the evidence presented through the inmate witnesses concerned alleged acts and injuries visited upon them rather than Williams. Isby, Cole, Komyatti, Mumford, Broadus, and Sampley testified about the injuries they allegedly sustained from the drinking water. Cole testified that while at the MCC he was denied medical treatment, he inhaled tear gas, and his legal mail was “lost” a few times. Sampley testified that he suffered at heart attack and had problems with the medical staff at the MCC. Such evidence was irrelevant to the issues before the court and did not tend to prove Williams’ individual damage claims against the defendants.
Significantly, none of the testimony presented at trial proved any defendant personally responsible for any constitutional injury allegedly sustained by Williams within the relevant time period.
Conclusions of Law
At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 for judgment as a matter of law. It is recommended that judgment be entered in favor of all defendants on Williams’ damage claims on four grounds. First, the Eleventh Amendment bars damage claims against the defendants in their official capacities. Second, the defendants are entitled to judgment because no evidence was presented at trial to establish the defendants’ personal responsibility for Williams’ alleged constitutional deprivations or injuries. Third, the defendants should be granted judgment because the

evidence was legally insufficient to prove causation of Williams’ medical injuries. Finally, the newly enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act compels the entry of judgment for the defendants on any claim of mental or emotional injury because no evidence was presented at trial to establish that Williams suffered any physical injury as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
*3 To the extent that Williams’ individual damage claims are brought against the defendants in their official capacities, those claims are barred. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state unless the state consents to suit or Congress abrogates the state’s immunity. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir. 1993); Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 942 (1993). Because a suit against state officials in their official capacities is the same as a suit against the state itself, Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 870 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)), the Eleventh Amendment bars damage claims against state officials in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Moore, 999 F.2d at 1128-29; see also Meadows v. Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1988).
Indiana has not waived its immunity, IND. CODE § 34-4-16.7-3; see also Meadows, 854 F.2d at 1069; Hendrix v. Indiana State Public Defender Sys., 581 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Ind. 1984), and Congress has not abrogated the states’ immunity in § 1983 cases. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Brown, 824 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (N.D. Ind. 1993). Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Williams’ individual damage claims against all the defendants. See Akins v. Bd. of Gov. of State Colleges & Univ., 840 F.2d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir.) (referring to Eleventh Amendment as “jurisdictional bar” to official capacity suit for damages), vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 920 (1988); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1035 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eleventh Amendment provides “fundamental limitation on federal jurisdiction”). In addition, neither states nor state officials in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71 (1989); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, it is recommended that any and all damage claims against defendants in their official capacities be dismissed for
2

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Defendants are also entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law in their individual capacities because the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that any of the defendants were personally responsible for any claimed constitutional deprivation. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove a defendant’s personal responsibility for the claimed constitutional deprivation. Moore, 999 F.2d at 1128; Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273-4 (7th Cir. 1986); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). “[A]n individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d at 869 (emphasis in original); Rascon, 803 F.2d at 273-4. A “causal connection, or an affirmative link” must exist between the deprivation and the defendant’s conduct. Wolf-Lillie, 699 F.2d at 869; Rascon, 803 F.2d at 273. An official cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because his subordinates violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (no claim under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). No evidence presented at trial proved, or would tend to prove, that any of the defendants had any personal responsibility for any of the alleged constitutional deprivations giving rise to Williams’ alleged damages which are the subject of the amended complaint. Therefore, it is recommended that judgment be entered in favor of all defendants on Williams’ individual damage claims.
*4 Further, the absence of medical expert testimony in support of Williams’ damage claims warrants the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. Williams’ evidence of causation with respect to his damages consisted of his own testimony and that of other inmates regarding the physical, psychological, and mental injuries they attributed to the conditions of confinement at the MCC. There is absolutely no evidence to show that Williams or any other inmate was qualified to testify as to his medical or psychological condition. See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

Indeed, because the medical and psychological effects of drinking contaminated water and breathing fumes such as pepper spray would not appear to be within an ordinary person’s knowledge, the inmates’ lay testimony is insufficient without more to establish the medical causation needed to support Williams’ damage claims. See, e.g., Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1995).
Lastly, the defendants are entitled to judgment under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Public Law No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, which provides in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” No legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that Williams suffered any physical injury for which the defendants were responsible. Therefore, assuming that Williams suffered mental or emotional injuries while at the MCC for which the defendants were personally responsible, he cannot recover any damages for those injuries from the defendants.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that final judgment be entered in favor of all the defendants and against plaintiff Roosevelt Williams on all of the plaintiff’s individual damage claims and that the plaintiff bear all costs.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).
	  

Footnotes

1

Kalonji Ra’id Nasihjihad (a.k.a. James Dunville), Aaron Isby, John C. Cole, Jr., Paul Komyatti, Richard D. Mumford, III, Edward

Broadus, William Sampley, and Lokmar Abdul-Wadood testified on behalf of Williams. Nathaniel Jones-Bey, although called as a

witness, refused to testify at trial.

2

Williams testified that from October 1991 through May 1992, he sought but was denied legal assistance from the law library

paralegal, but he could not specifically identify the legal authority he was attempting to obtain.

3

Williams testified that from October 1991 through May 1992, some of his legal mail was “missing,” but he could not specifically

identify what mail was missing or when it was missing.

3

Taifa v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)

4

A month of fasting for Muslims.

	  

4

 
 Isby v. Bayh, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1996)

1996 WL 441820 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South
Bend Division.
Aaron ISBY, Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus, and Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of
Correction, Norman G. Owens, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the
Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction; John Nunn, in his individual and
official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, and Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official
capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction,
Defendants
No. 3:92CV0429 AS. | July 24, 1996.

Opinion
ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.
*1 On June 6, 1996, Magistrate Judge Pierce filed a Report and Recommendation as a result of proceedings involving the plaintiff, Roosevelt Williams. Magistrate Judge Pierce is to be commended for the care with which he has managed this case in general and the claims of this plaintiff, Roosevelt Williams in particular. The recommendation that a final judgment enter in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff is in all things approved. Judgment shall enter accordingly in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. Costs are assessed against the plaintiff. IT IS SO ORDERED.
	  

1

 
 case 3:92-cv-00429-PPS document 1017 filed 08/05/09 page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KATAZA TAIFA, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. EVAN BAYH, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

CAUSE NO. 3:92-CV-429 PS

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

Fred Peters, a non-party pro se prisoner, filed a motion for contempt, an in forma

pauperis petition, and a motion for appointment of counsel in this closed, class action case. Mr.

Peters is not a named plaintiff, though he may be member of the class. The plaintiffs in this case,

named and unnamed, are represented by Kenneth Falk, ACLU of Indiana, 1031 E. Washington

Street, Indianapolis , IN 46202-3952. To the extent that Mr. Peters believes that he is a member

of this class and that the defendants are in contempt, he needs to contact the attorney for the

class.

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES the motions (DE 1012, 1013, and 1014) and

ADVISES Fred Peters to direct all future correspondence related to this case to the plaintiffs’

attorney.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 5, 2009.

/s Philip P. Simon Philip P. Simon, Judge United States District Court

 
 Taifa v. Bayh
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division June 28, 1994, Decided ; June 28, 1994, ENTERED CAUSE No. 3:92-cv-429 AS

Reporter: 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20514; 1994 WL 821773 KATAZA TAIFA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EVAN BAYH, et al., Defendants.
Counsel: [*1] For KATAZA TAIFA, WILLIAM SAPLEY, MARK S DOUGLAS, KEVIN SANDIFER, JAMES E SHROPSHIRE, JOHN CHARLES COLE, JR, NOLAN MCDANDAL, ROBERT SMITH, ROBERT JENKINS, RICHARD MUMFORD, TILLMAN MORRIS, TERRENCE DRAIN, ERIC MALONE, ALBERT ESTEP, plaintiffs: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 E Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952, (317) 6354059, FTS 635-4105, Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883, (317) 6321000. For PAUL KOMYATTI, EDWARD BROADUS, JAMES THOMPSON, MICHAEL HEGWOOD, plaintiffs: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 E Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952, (317) 6354059, FTS 635-4105, Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883, (317) 6321000, Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, PO Box 6787, South Bend, IN 46660, 219-272-3086. For AARON ISBY, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 E Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952, (317) 635-4059, FTS 635-4105, Aaron Isby, 892219, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391, Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, [*2] Indianapolis, IN 462041883, (317) 632-1000, Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, PO Box 6787, South Bend, IN 46660, 219272-3086. For MICHAEL HOLLAND, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 E Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952, (317) 635-4059, FTS 635-4105, Michael Holland, 71940, unknown, Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883, (317) 632-1000. For ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 E Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952, (317) 635-4059, FTS 635-4105, Roosevelt Williams, 4052, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391, Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883, (317) 632-1000. For JOSEPH PHILLIPS, plaintiff: Hamid R Kashani, 445 N Pennsylvania Street, Suite 600, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883, (317) 632-1000. For CARL L JOHNSON, plaintiff: Carl L Johnson, 10039, SCCMAXIMUM,

Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391. For DYRONE HENDERSON, plaintiff: Dyrone Henderson, 856509, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391. [*3] For JIMMY MOORSON, plaintiff: Jimmy Moorson, DOC unknown, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391. For JEBEREKIAH ELEAZAR KELUBAI aka Leroy R Jeffers, plaintiff: Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, #28668, SCU-WESTVILLE, Westville Correctional Center, P.O. Box 473, Westville, IN 46391, (219) 785-2511, Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, PO Box 6787, South Bend, IN 46660, 219272-3086. For KENNETH PORTER, plaintiff: Kenneth Porter, #872854, SR-INDIANA-30, Indiana Reformatory, P O Box 30, Pendleton, IN 46064. For TOME L HAILEY, plaintiff: Tome L Hailey, 862512, SR-INDIANA-30, Indiana Reformatory, P O Box 30, Pendleton, IN 46064. For CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL MISER, plaintiff: Christopher Michael Miser, 861863, SPR-INDIANA, Indiana State Prison, P.O. Box 41, Michigan City, IN 46360. For ANDREW BENROY JOHNSON, plaintiff: Andrew Benroy Johnson, 884337, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391. For ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, plaintiff: Roosevelt Williams, 4052, SCC-MAXIMUM, Maximum Control Complex, P.O. Box 557, Westville, IN 46391.
For EVAN BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, [*4] JAMES E AIKEN, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, NORMAN G OWENS, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction, JOHN NUNN, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, CHARLES E WRIGHT, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction, defendants: Wayne E Uhl, 317-232-6333, Suzann W Lupton, Office of the Indiana Attorney General, IN Government Center S Fifth Floor, 402 W Washington, Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770, 317-232-6195.
Judges: Allen Sharp, Chief Judge, United States District Court
Opinion by: ALLEN SHARP

Opinion

1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20514, *4

Page 2 of 2

Dist. LEXIS 1166 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 1992); Byrd v. O'Grady,

1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9442 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1990).

ORDER
This cause is presently before the court on a "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt" filed on June 10, 1994, by Mark Marandola. The court notes that Mr. Marandola is neither a class representative nor counsel.
It is well-established that "individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought where there is an existing class action." [*5] McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988); Groseclose v. Dutton, 829 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1987); Green v. McKaskle, 770 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1985); Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1982); Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1975); Tetzlaff v. Swinny, 678 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D. Nev. 1987); Reese v. Chicago Police Dept., 602 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Claims for equitable relief must be made either through the class representative or by intervening in the class action. McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166; Harper v. Thomas, 988 F.2d 101, 104 (11th Cir. 1993); Ravarde v. State of Mo., 930 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1991); Long v. Collins, 917 F.2d 3, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1990); Goff, 672 F.2d at 704; Rivera v. Pelican Bay State Prison, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16966 (N.D. Ca. Nov. 16, 1993); Reed v. Richards, 1992 U.S.

In the present case, Mr. Marandola has not sought to intervene and there is nothing to suggest that his interests are not adequately [*6] represented by existing parties and counsel for the class. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 5014 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 42122 (10th Cir. 1992). Under these circumstances, Mr. Marandola had no right to file and pursue a motion for contempt or otherwise seek enforcement of the Agreed Entry in this case. If Mr. Marandola wishes to seek enforcement of the Agreed Entry, he must proceed through class counsel. Mr. Marandola should be advised, moreover, that class counsel are under a duty to exercise their own professional judgment in representing the interests of the class.
Accordingly, Mr. Marandola's "Motion to Enter Civil Contempt" filed on June 10, 1994, is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of June, 1994.
Allen Sharp
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 
 Taifa v. Bayh
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division July 20, 1995, Decided ; July 20, 1995, ENTERED CAUSE NO. 3:92-cv-429 AS

Reporter: 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494 KATAZA TAIFA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EVAN BAYH, et al., Defendants.
Subsequent History: [*1] Adopting Order of August 22, 1995, Reported at: 195 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16498.
Counsel: For PAUL KOMYATTI, MICHAEL HEGWOOD, plaintiffs: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN. Hamid R Kashani, Indianapolis, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
For AARON ISBY, plaintiff: Aaron Isby, [PRO SE], Westville, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
For JEBEREKIAH ELEAZAR KELUBAI aka Leroy R Jeffers, plaintiff: Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, [PRO SE], Westville, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
For ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, plaintiff: Roosevelt Williams, [PRO SE], Westville, IN.
For EVAN BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, JAMES E AIKEN, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, NORMAN G OWENS, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction, JOHN NUNN, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, CHARLES E WRIGHT, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Maximum Control [*2] Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction, defendants: Wayne E Uhl, Suzann W Lupton, Office of Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN.
Judges: Robin D. Pierce, U.S. Magistrate Judge. Chief Judge Allen Sharp
Opinion by: Robin D. Pierce
Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

provisions of an Agreed Entry in a class action suit. The Suit challenged the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC") operated by the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") in Westville, Indiana. The MCC is a modern maximum security correctional facility which was opened by the DOC in the summer of 1991, and has been the source of much litigation since that time. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt be granted in part and denied in part.
Background
This case was originally filed in the Marion County Superior Court on May 6, 1992, against the Governor of Indiana and various DOC officials. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 1992. The action was removed, [*3] on defendants' motion, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 29, 1992, and transferred to this court on July 7, 1992. On October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for "purposes of injunctive relief," with the class "consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana." Plaintiffs' state law claims were remanded to state court on December 4, 1992.
After extensive settlement negotiations and two hearings before the undersigned at the MCC, the parties entered into an Agreed Entry which was ultimately approved by Chief Judge Sharp on February 15, 1994. On September 13, 1994, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the Agreed Entry. The plaintiffs' supporting memorandum identified 23 separate alleged violations. The parties agreed on remedies for several of these alleged violations prior to a contempt hearing held before the undersigned on April 6, 1995, at the MCC. Several more were remedied before the plaintiffs submitted their posttrial [*4] brief. The contempt motion before the court is now limited to seven alleged violations of the Agreed Entry which the court has consolidated into the six issues listed below. Plaintiffs have asked the court to enforce the Agreed Entry and sanction the defendants for disregarding it. They further request that the court impose a per diem monetary sanction upon defendants to coerce their compliance with the terms of the Agreed Entry.

This case is before the court on plaintiffs' motion to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to abide by the

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *4

Page 2 of 17

Issues

1. Conduct Adjustment Board Hearings. Have defendants violated P IX(1) of the Agreed Entry by not allowing MCC prisoners to be represented by lay advocates of their choice at Conduct Adjustment Board ("CAB") hearings?

no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally

2. Law Clerks for Prisoners with Special Needs. Have the defendants violated P VI(6) of the Agreed Entry by failing to provide prisoners with special needs with prisoner lay advocates or law student clerks?

applicable to other judgments and decrees.Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Sutliff County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992)).

3. Law Library Visits and Specific Cite Requirements for Legal Materials for Prisoners in Disciplinary Segregation. Have the defendants violated P IX(1) of the Agreed Entry by failing to allow prisoners on disciplinary segregation to visit law libraries, and violated P VI(1) of the Agreed Entry by requiring specific [*5] cites before providing these prisoners with legal materials?
4. Free Issue of the Handbook. Have the defendants violated P III(P)(4)(c) of the Agreed Entry by failing to provide prisoners with a free copy of the prisoner's Handbook?
5. Classification. Have the defendants violated PP I(A) and II(G) by holding a prisoner at the MCC who did not meet the criteria set forth in the Agreed Entry and by failing to give him sufficient notice of the reasons for his transfer to the MCC?
6. Fruit Juices on Commissary. Have the defendants violated P III(B)(2) of the Agreed Entry by failing to make continuing, reasonable efforts to make fruit juices available through the prison commissary?

Consent decrees often embody outcomes that reach beyond basic constitutional protections. See Rufo, 502 U.S. 367 at , 112 S. Ct. at 762 ('we have no doubt that, to save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. . . petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper [*7] remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires. . .'); see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (1st Cir. 1991). Indeed, it is a rare case when a consent decree establishes only the bare minimum required by the Constitution. Often, it is precisely because parties are unsure of the current posture of the law that they are willing to compromise their positions. See Rufo, 502 U.S. 367 at , 112 S. Ct. at 762-63 (quoting from Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1991) (such decrees 'would make necessary . . . a constitutional decision every time an effort was made either to enforce or modify the decree by judicial action')).Kindred, 9 F.3d at 641-42 (footnote omitted).

Contempt Standard and Interpretation of Consent Decree
To succeed on a motion for civil contempt, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party violated a court order. Goluba v. School District of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1995); Stotler and Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1989). A district court "must be able to point to a decree from the court 'which sets forth in specific detail an unequivocal command' which the party in contempt [*6] violated." Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Stotler, 870 F.2d at 1163) (citations omitted). A district court does not ordinarily have to find that the violation was "willful" and may find a party in civil contempt if that party "has not been 'reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered.'" Id.
A consent decree such as that found in the Agreed Entry here

Ordinarily, "the scope of the consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it." Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 29 L. Ed. 2d 256, 91 S. Ct. 1752 (1971)). Where a portion of the consent decree is facially ambiguous and that ambiguity cannot [*8] be resolved on the basis of the decree's language alone, the court will "look at the evil which the decree was designed to rectify." Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Armour, 402 U.S. at 686 (Douglas J., dissenting)). Accordingly, interpreting the decree requires an understanding of the context in which the decree was entered. 45 F.3d at 1038; see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("Context, in the broadest sense, is the key to understanding language.").
Agreed Entry, Stipulated Facts, Hearing Testimony, and Analysis

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *8

Page 3 of 17

Lay Advocates at Conduct Adjustment Board Hearings
The parties agree that the Agreed Entry provides that prisoners shall have lay advocates at CAB hearings. They disagree, however, as to who these lay advocates should be and what role they are to play.
Paragraph IX(1) of the Agreed Entry states:
All discipline, including Conduct Adjustment Board hearings, shall be consistent with Ind. Code 11-11-51 et seq. (attached). This does not entitle prisoners to utilize the Court's contempt powers to challenge CAB convictions on a case by case basis. The contempt power shall be [*9] available to enforce this provision on a class-wide basis.IND. CODE § 11-11-5-5(a)(7), which is expressly adopted by and attached to the Agreed Entry, states that prisoners facing disciplinary hearings are entitled to:
Have advice and representation by a lay advocate of his choice, if that lay advocate is available in the institution at the time for the hearing, in those hearings based upon a charge of institutional misconduct when the department determines he lacks the competency to understand the issues involved or to participate in the hearing, or when the punishment may be that specified in:

are MCC staff members, not fellow inmates, and the inmate does not have his choice of who will serve as his lay advocate. They do not provide investigative services or argue the case on the inmate's behalf. Inmates charged with disciplinary offenses may, when informed of the charge by a screening officer, request that witnesses be asked to provide written witness statements. It is MCC's policy that the screening officer then notifies the witness(es) and gives an opportunity to provide a written statement for the CAB's consideration.(Prehearing Order P F(5), at p. 7.)
Prisoner testimony at the contempt hearing buttresses this stipulation. Paul Komyatti, Jr., stated that when he requested a lay advocate, Correctional Counselor Wilson made himself available in that position. Wilson did not provide Komyatti with any assistance before the hearing, and appeared at the hearing as an "observer." (Transcript of Contempt Hearing at p. 31.) Under examination by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Komyatti testified:
Q. Was Mr. Wilson the lay advocate of your choice?
A. No. We have no choice of lay advocates at MCC.
Q. What did Mr. [*11] Wilson do at the hearing?
A. He showed up.

(A) Section 3(5) [IC 11-11-5-3(5)] of this chapter if the restitution is more than two hundred dollars ($ 200);
(B) Section 3(8) [IC 11-11-5-3(8)] of this chapter if the segregation is for more than fifteen (15) days; or
(C) Section 3(6), 3(9), or 3(10) [IC 11-11-53(6), IC 11-11-5-3(9), or IC 11-11-5-3-(10)] of this chapter.The question before the court is whether the defendants have met the requirements of this statute.

Q. Did he say anything?
A. This is referring to one specific instance, but it would be a generalization of every hearing. The last time I was at a disciplinary hearing he showed up and I asked him questions concerning his role as a 'lay advocate.' He informed me that his role was strictly to observe whether or not my due process rights were fulfilled. And when I asked him if he knew what a due process right was I received no reply.
Q. Based on what you understand advocacy to mean, did he advocate for you in any way?

In the Prehearing Order, the parties stipulated that in CAB hearings at the MCC:
the lay advocates assigned to assist [*10] inmates charged with disciplinary infractions

A. No, he did not.
Q. Was he otherwise passive during the course of that proceeding?
A. Yes, he was.(Tr. 31-32.)

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *11

Page 4 of 17

Mr. Komyatti further stated that in subsequent disciplinary proceedings, he never had the lay advocate of his choice, and that the lay advocates who were assigned to him never argued a case for him, made an opening statement, interrogated a witness, made a final statement, assisted him in formulating written materials that could be submitted to the CAB, or discussed any strategy or research matters with him. (Tr. 3233.)

D. Staff who have been requested as lay advocates shall be allowed at least one (1) meeting with the charged offender prior to the disciplinary hearing. The meeting(s) should convene with the charged offender as soon as possible upon notification to the lay advocate of the pending hearing. Supervisory staff will be responsible to make this time available to the staff member.

Prisoner Anthony Walls provided similar testimony. [*12] He stated that though he had requested lay advocates, he never received the one of his choice. (Tr. 6162.) According to Walls, there are two counselors at the MCC and prisoners are assigned whichever counselor is not their own as the lay advocate for their CAB hearings. (Tr. 62.) He also stated:
I've been told that the MCC lay advocates are not complying by -- they're not bound to comply by the DOC definition of a lay advocate in the handbook manual. It's a difference. And they do not assist you. They are not obligated to assist you in any type of defense during the hearing.
They say that they're there to witness the hearing and make sure that your rights ain't violated. But as far as gathering any information, or witness statements, in your behalf to the CAB chairman, none of that takes place.(Tr. 61-62.) None of the lay advocates assigned to Walls made an objection at a CAB hearing or advised him on how to proceed with his case. (Tr. 63.)
On May 31, 1995, the MCC Superintendent issued an administrative directive designed to "assure that offender's State rights are observed regarding the provision of a lay advocate in disciplinary hearings as provided by Indiana [*13] Code 11-11-5-5." The new directive states that:

E. Lay advocates will aid an offender in preparing his defense when requested by the offender, and will NOT be responsible for soliciting statements from staff. [*14] Securing witness statements is the responsibility of the Screening Officer per the ADPP.
F. The offender shall be primarily responsible for the delivery of his own defense. The lay advocate shall present to the hearing officer any procedural, due process, or other types of violations that he or she may recognize whether or not requested to intervene by the offender.
G. The lay advocate's duties terminate at the conclusion of the hearing.
The plaintiffs concede that lay advocates are not required as a matter of due process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974); Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1992). They argue, however, that the defendants violated the Agreed Entry by denying prisoners subject to disciplinary action the right to "have advice and representation by a lay advocate of [their] choice" as required by IND. CODE § 11-11-5-5(a)(7). They further argue that the defendants are in violation of the Agreed Entry because "the staff lay advocates do not perform any functions which are traditionally expected from an advocate." (Post-Trial Brief at p. 10.)

A. The superintendent shall create a list of no less than five (5) staff members approved to be used as lay advocates.
B. Each offender will be allowed, at the time of screening, to select from the approved list of lay advocates the staff member that he wishes to act as his lay advocate. NOTE: Staff will not be expected to forfeit scheduled or regular days off to fulfill their duties as lay advocate. Same will suffice for grounds for a continuance.
C. Staff designated as lay advocates, hearing officers, and screening officers will receive training regarding the role of lay advocates.

The defendants respond by stating that it is necessary [*15] that lay advocates be staff members because other inmates are not "available" as required by the statute. The MCC has a closed population and allowing inmates to meet with and assist other inmates is strictly forbidden for security reasons. Further, defendants state that the statute does not define the role of "lay advocate," and does not require that inmates be supplied with advocates who act in the same way an attorney does in a criminal trial.
The defendants' most fundamental argument on this issue, however, is that this court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *15

Page 5 of 17

lay advocate provision of the Agreed Entry because, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, it may not enjoin state officials The Fifth Circuit disagreed:

to conform their conduct to state law. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). The defendants, citing Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995), argue that this jurisdictional bar remains in place even where state officials agree in a federal consent decree to follow state law. This court must agree.

What the defendants agreed to give as a remedy . . . does not have any effect on the jurisdictional limits of a federal court. Although 'a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a

In Saahir, a prisoner had entered into a settlement agreement with prison officials allowing him to own, use, and possess a [*16] cassette tape player and tapes for listening purposes

trial,' [*18] Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986), the

only. The agreement provided that "the plaintiff shall order

federal court 'must fall back on its inherent

the tapes he desires through the Texas Department of

jurisdiction' when it 'issue[s] its own, different order

Corrections' Islamic Chaplain, who will facilitate and administer the order and delivery of tapes to plaintiff." Id. at

enforcing . . . the decree,' Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252.47 F.3d at 761.

760. The district court entered a consent decree approving and incorporating the settlement agreement and dismissed the case. Id. Saahir later brought a motion for civil contempt against the defendants alleging that they had violated the settlement agreement by confiscating 39 of his non-religious tapes. The district court granted his motion and required prison officials to return the tapes or reimburse him.

While at least one appellate court has strongly disagreed with the rationale announced in Lelsz and Saahir 1, the Seventh Circuit adopted a similar position in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993)(in banc), cert. denied,114 S. Ct. 1831, 128 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1994). In Evans, the City had settled a suit brought by judgment creditors challenging its delay in payment of tort judgments through a consent decree. The City

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed holding that the later challenged the injunction entered as part of that decree,

district court did not have jurisdiction because Saahir's and the Seventh Circuit met in banc "to consider whether a

contempt motion did not involve any federal interest. The district court should require a unit of state or local

court cited its earlier decision in Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve

1243 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,483 U.S. 1057 (1987), in any federal interest. The answer is No. . . ." 10 F.3d at 475. It

support of this ruling. In Lelsz, the court held that it lacked later elaborated by stating:

jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree against the state to the extent that the relief ordered in the decree was based [*17] on state law. 807 F.2d at 1246-47. It stated that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree beyond the guarantees contained in the Constitution because the only legitimate basis for federal court intervention consistent with the Eleventh Amendment was the vindication of federal rights. Id. at 1252.

Entry and continued enforcement of a consent decree regulating the operation [*19] of a governmental body depend on the existence of a substantial claim under federal law. Unless there is such a claim, the consent decree is no more than a contract, whose enforcement cannot be supported by the diversity jurisdiction and that has in court no more force than it would have outside of court.Id. at 480. See also

Saahir had attempted to distinguish Lelsz by arguing that the consent decree entered in his case was based on federal law. He noted that his complaint did not have any basis in state law, but rested instead on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Saahir, the defendants agreed to settle those federal claims against them by agreeing to allow him any musical tapes he

Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994)(in banc) (finding no basis in federal law to support continuance of injunction entered as part of consent decree in prisoner suit), cert. denied sub nom., Sweeton v. McGinnis, 115 S. Ct. 1118, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1082 (1995).

desired. He further argued this was a vindication of a federal

right because it had been given to him in exchange for his In the present case, the plaintiffs have conceded that they

dropping a suit based on a federal right.

cannot make a claim that prisoners are entitled to lay

advocates under federal law. It is true that the [*20]

1 The court in Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2nd Cir. 1989) stated that it found the Lelsz decision to be "untenable. If a federal district court can validly enter a consent decree, it can surely enforce that decree."

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *20

Page 6 of 17

defendants adopted the state lay advocate procedures as part legal documents, correspond with the court or to do legal

of the remedy to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, but "what the research. (Tr. 95.) A prison paralegal has [*22] helped him

defendants agreed to give as a remedy does not have any get legal materials and has sometimes given him legal

affect on the jurisdiction limits of a federal court." Saahir, 47 materials in large print. (Tr. 92.) She has not, however, ever

F.3d at 761. Because the Agreed Entry's provision on lay read anything aloud to him. (Id.)

advocates is based solely on state law, this court does not

have jurisdiction and RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs' Offender Komyatti helped Clark file a habeas corpus claim by

contempt motion be DENIED.

preparing it and then having Clark rewrite it. (Tr. 94.) Clark

and Komyatti were disciplined for Komyatti's actions, and

Law Clerks for Prisoners with Special Needs

Komyatti has not offered Clark assistance again. (Id.)

Under the Agreed Entry:
With respect to any prisoner who is functionally illiterate or has an intellectual[,] mental or physical disability which would substantially impair the prisoner's ability to conduct legal research, prepare legal documents, or correspond with the court, the DOC shall allow such prisoner to be assisted by inmate law clerks or outside paralegals or law students at DOC option.(Agreed Entry at P VI(6).) In an effort to implement this provision, the defendants agreed on July 29, 1994 to

The prison paralegal, Sharon Hawk, confirmed much of Clark's account in her own testimony. She stated that she sees him every time he is scheduled for the library, which is around two hours a week. (Tr. 269, 271.) She helps him in accessing materials by enlarging everything she photocopies for him. (Id.) Hawk has read letters to Clark, but has never read a case to him. (Tr. 271.) She has never read any of the materials aloud to Clark that he could not read himself. (Id.) Hawk enlarges cases for Clark to a scale of "probably 120 [percent]." (Tr. 270.) She does not enlarge them into big, bold letters, but enlarges it from a page in a federal reporter to an 8 1/2 x 11 page. 2

immediately contact Professor Vandercoy at Valparaiso Law School to arrange for law student clerks to help MCC prisoners who are functionally illiterate [*21] or have intellectual mental or physical disabilities which would substantially impair the prisoners' ability to conduct legal research, prepare legal documents, or correspond with the court.(Parties' First Implementation Agreement P 32, at p. 6.) (Emphasis supplied.) The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have failed to satisfy this provision of the Agreed Entry, and did not abide by the Implementation Agreement in a timely manner.
In the Prehearing Order, the parties stipulated that "the only inmate currently at MCC with any type of 'special need' is an inmate who is legally blind, Allen Clark." (Prehearing Order P F(4), at p. 6.) At the hearing, Clark testified that in order to read he puts a magnifying glass with a light on it on a book and then holds the book up to his face. (Tr. 91.) It takes him about 10 or 15 minutes to read a page. (Id.) Clark has never been allowed to have a prisoner law clerk assist him with his legal matters nor has he had an outside paralegal or law student to assist him. (Tr. 90.) The MCC has never provided anybody to help Clark prepare

[*23] Clark and Hawk have had frequent discussions about Clark's desire for Komyatti to help him with his habeas corpus case. (Tr. 273.) Hawk has never gone to the administration and told them of Clark's requests, nor has she tried to do work on the habeas corpus case for him. (Id.) She has, however, helped Clark communicate with a clerk at the General Services Complex ("GSC") at the Westville Correctional Center which abuts the MCC. The GSC clerk tells Clark exactly what to write on each line. (Id.) Hawk takes material over to the Westville law library where the clerk works on it and sends it back to her. Hawk then she speaks with Clark about it. (Tr. 274.) Hawk has not tried to arrange for an inmate clerk at the MCC to work with Clark, nor has she tried to arrange for an outside paralegal or outside law clerk to work with Clark. (Id.) In fact, despite their statement in the First Implementation Agreement that they would "immediately" contact Professor Vandercoy at the Valparaiso Law School to arrange for law student clerks to help MCC prisoners with specials needs, defendants did not do so until March 31, 1995 (Tr. 279-80), 245 days after the implementation agreement and [*24] only 6 days before the contempt hearing.
The court finds that the efforts by Hawk and other DOC officials to arrange for assistance for Clark, and the limited

2 Plaintiffs have helpfully pointed out in their Brief that a typical Federal Reporter page is 7 x 10.25 inches, yielding an area of 71.75 square inches. (Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief at p. 4 n. 4.) When enlarged to an 8 1/2 x 11 page, which has an area of 93.50 square inches, the total magnification is 130 percent.

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *24

Page 7 of 17

accommodations which have been made for him in the form 1994, 245 days after its representatives signed the

of enlarged copies are insufficient to satisfy P VI(6) of the Implementation Agreement on July 29, 1994, and 6 months

Agreed Entry. Under that paragraph, the defendants are after the plaintiffs filed their contempt motion on September

required to "allow . . . prisoners [with intellectual, mental or 13, 1994, before it made any attempt at finding law students

physical disabilities] to be assisted by inmate law clerks or to assist prisoners such as Clark with special needs. The DOC

outside paralegals or law students at DOC option." The has not tried to find an inmate clerk at the MCC to assist

evidence at the pre-trial hearing shows, however, that when Clark, and it has disciplined Komyatti when he provided such

another inmate (Komyatti) assisted Clark in filing a habeas assistance. Accordingly, the court concludes that the

corpus claim, both were disciplined. (Tr. 94.) The only effort defendants have failed to comply with the Agreed Entry's

to arrange for law student clerks took place 245 days after the requirement that prisoners with special needs be allowed

defendants promised to do so in the First Implementation assistance or law students, and that defendants did not

Agreement. Such a delay does not fall within the definition of "immediately" remedy this deficiency as required by the

"immediately."

Implementation Agreement. It RECOMMENDS that the

plaintiffs' contempt motion be GRANTED with respect to the

Without interval of time, without delay, straightway, or without any delay or lapse of time. Drumbar v.

provision of law clerks for prisoners with special needs.

Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 155 Pa. Super. 57, 37 The Bar on Law Library Visits and the Requirement that

A.2d 25, 27. When used in contract is usually Prisoners in Disciplinary Segregation Provide

construed to mean 'within a reasonable time having Exact [*27] Case Cites

due regard to the nature of the circumstances [*25] of the case', although strictly, it means 'not deferred by any period of time'. Integrated, Inc. v. Alec Fergusson Elec. Contractor, 250 Cal. App. 2d 287, 58 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508, 509,. The words 'immediately' and 'forthwith' have generally the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression 'within a reasonable time' and imply prompt, vigorous action without any delay. Alsam Holding Co. v. Consolidated Taxpayers' Mut. Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505, 167 Misc. 732.Black's Law Dictionary 750 (6th ed. 1990).

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have violated two portions of the Agreed Entry by forbidding prisoners on disciplinary segregation from visiting the MCC's satellite law libraries and requiring that they provide exact cites for any requested materials. First, they argue that defendants have violated P IX(1) of the Agreed Entry -- which is quoted above in the discussion on CAB hearings -- by limiting their access to legal research materials in violation of IND. CODE § 11-115-4(5). That statute provides: "The department may not impose the following as disciplinary action: . . . access to personal legal papers and legal research materials." Second, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated P VI(1) of the

The fact that the DOC may now be in compliance with the Agreed Entry, which states that prisoners "be provided legal

Implementation Agreement because it has contacted Professor access which is adequate and sufficient as defined by state

Vandercoy does not present a defense to a contempt citation. and applicable case law," by requiring prisoners on

Ex Parte Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, disciplinary segregation to provide specific cites before they

555 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), cert. denied,555 So. may receive legal materials.

2d 1077 (Ala. 1990).

The parties stipulated in the Prehearing Order that "inmates

We find it clear that the trial court could have concluded that 110 days was not 'immediately' and that the Department was not in compliance with the August 1988 court order. Further, we find that it is within the court's power to find the Department in contempt for failing to comply with the court's order and its action was not penal in [*26] nature, but was intended to compel compliance with its orders in the future.Id. at 1076.

who have received disciplinary segregation sentences after arriving at MCC are not permitted to leave their cells to visit the satellite [*28] law libraries." (Prehearing Order at P F(3), at p. 6.) This stipulation was supported by testimony from several prisoners at the hearing. For example, Walls testified that when he was in disciplinary segregation, he was not allowed to go to the law library. (Tr. 59.) He was allowed to request legal materials, but had to do so by providing a specific case cite or requesting a specific legal form. (Tr. 5960.) He stated that prisoners cannot get books while they are

In the present case, the DOC waited for more than a year after in disciplinary segregation. (Tr. 60.) When he asked for

Judge Sharp approved the Agreed Entry on February 15,

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *28

Page 8 of 17

books, he was told that "they don't do that but maybe I could provides extra services for those offenders that she would not

write Mr. [Michael] Scott [the administrative assistant at the provide to other offenders.

MCC] and get his approval for this." (Id.) Walls never

pursued this because he was soon moved back to his regular

A. We have several editions of books. Offenders on

cell. (Id.)

segregation aren't allowed to have hardback books in

Walls did send a note to Hawk, the MCC paralegal, telling her the area of law on which he wanted information. She wrote him back saying that if he had specific case citations she would get them for him. (Tr. 67-68.) She did not offer to copy pages from one of the legal digests or other legal books. (Tr. 68.) Walls did not ask specifically for these:

their cells. There are numerous reference books that I have taken the hardcovers off of so that the offenders can have them in their cell.
Q. And then you deliver those books to [*31] the cell of the offender who is in disciplinary segregation?

What I asked her was very broad. I'm am amateur litigant [*29] and I asked for assistance in an area. She gave me some cases and sent me a form. And that was about it. If I have any cases, any cases within them cases, she would be able to make copies of them cases, I couldn't get any books and I couldn't go to the law library because of my segregation status.(Id. at p. 68.)

A. I either deliver it or have an officer deliver it, or I put it in their mail.
Q. Do you ever meet with the offenders who are on disciplinary segregation, to discuss their legal requests?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How frequently do you meet with offenders on disciplinary segregation?

Prisoner Nicholas Broadus offered similar testimony. He stated that when he was in disciplinary segregation, he could not go to the law library and "had to fuss with Sharon Hawk to get legal materials." (Tr. 133.) He was required to give exact cites, and could not get books with a hard cover, including digests. (Id.)
I would ask Sharon Hawk if I could have some forms or summaries or a legal book. She would ask me what would I need them for. She sent me legal work about a week ago, and I couldn't get it unless I told her what I needed it for and showed her proof that I filed whatever I filed.(Tr. 134.)
Broadus also testified that Hawk told him she could not do legal research or prepare legal materials for him because it was against the policy of the institution. (Tr. 133) Despite these limitations, Broadus has been able to file several law [*30] suits, but testified that he did not prepare them himself. Instead, other prisoners prepared the cases, "cadillacked" them to him and he copied them. (Id.)3

A. I'm probably up there at least three times a week.(Tr. 258.)
The supply of books with covers removed that can be given to prisoners on disciplinary segregation includes the two volumes of The Rights of Prisoners, Criminal Law by Scott and How to Find the Law. (Id.) However, the covers of the digests, encyclopedias, Indiana Practice, reporters, USCA, Indiana Code, and the Federal Supplement do not have their covers removed and are not available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation. (Tr. 265-66.) Newer paperback and pamphlet editions of the Federal Supplement, Federal Reporter and Supreme Court rulings are available to disciplinary segregation inmates, but older hard-bound volumes are not. (Tr. 266-67.) If there is a hardback book from which an offender on disciplinary segregation needs materials, [*32] Hawk copies the pages requested and sends them to the prisoner. She testified that she never told either Walls or Broadus while they were on disciplinary segregation that they could only get cases with exact citations. (Tr. 278.)

Hawk also testified about the limits on library access placed on prisoners in disciplinary segregation. She stated that offenders on disciplinary segregation are not allowed to go to the satellite law libraries. (Tr. 257.) Because of this, she

When inmates on disciplinary segregation want the digests, Hawk copies the index of the digests and asks them to indicate what topic they are interested in. (Tr.

3 According to Broadus, "cadillacking" means placing a piece of string on the end of the piece of paper and sliding it from one cell to another. (Tr. 135.) Legal papers are commonly cadillacked between cells at the MCC. (Id.)

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *32

Page 9 of 17

267.) It usually takes her two or three days to fulfill such a

965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1992). We however waive

request. After the prisoners look at the index, they send

this showing of detriment where the prisoner alleges

another message indicating which section they would like to

a direct, substantial and continuous, rather than a

examine. (Tr. 268.) Again, it takes Hawk two to three days to

'minor and indirect,' limit on legal materials.

respond. (Id.) The same process is used if prisoners want

DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448-49 (7th Cir.

another section and when they want to look at a part of the

1988).Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir.

Indiana Code. Hawk testified that it can take a prisoner up to

1992). See also Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036,

one week to get from the index of the digests to a code

1040-41 (7th Cir. 1994).

section, in contrast to a person in a satellite law library who can get that access immediately. (Tr. 268.) She acknowledged that obtaining access to legal information is "a little more time consuming" for prisoners on disciplinary segregation but stated that she did not believe legal information was any less available to [*33] offenders on segregation than to other

A prisoner's right of access, however, is not unconditional. The constitutionally relevant benchmark is meaningful, not total or unlimited access. Williams [*35] v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Lane v. Williams, 488 U.S. 1047, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1001, 109 S. Ct. 879 (1989);

prisoners. (Tr. 269.)

Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,488 U.S. 863, 102 L. Ed. 2d 133, 109 S. Ct. 162

Hawk does not assist prisoners on disciplinary segregation, (1988). Restrictions on this access will not be unconstitutional

write briefs or memoranda. She explains to prisoners that she interference when justified by security concerns, which prison

is not an attorney and cannot do attorney work per her officials bear the burden of proving. Williams, 851 F.2d at

paralegal certificate of training and her job description at the 878. Because of the practical difficulties involved in doing

MCC. "I'm not allowed to give legal advice or do legal work." research without free access to a library, however, courts tend

(Tr. 269-70.) When a prisoner needs help in drafting a to give close scrutiny to such "remote control" arrangements.

document, Hawk finds a format for the type of document Watson v. Norris, 729 F. Supp. 581, 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1989);

involved and copies it so that the prisoners have something to Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D.N.Y.

use as a guide. She has read through a prisoner's draft of a 1990).

legal document three times in the last two or three years and

made suggestions. (Tr. 270.)

The Seventh Circuit has had the opportunity to address the

sufficiency of "exact cite" or "paging" systems on several

According to the Seventh Circuit,

occasions. In Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.

An inmate's access to the courts is the most fundamental of his rights; 'all other rights of an inmate are illusory without it, being entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison warden.' Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d

1983), the court held that an exact cite system at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, was constitutionally inadequate. Under that system, prisoners could obtain copies of necessary material only by written request accompanied by precise [*36] citations. The Seventh Circuit found:

619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). To prove a violation of this crucial right, an inmate must meet both prongs of a two-part test. See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988). Under the first prong, the inmate [*34] must show that prison officials failed 'to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.' Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,501 U.S. 1208, 115 L. Ed. 2d 978, 111 S. Ct. 2805, (1991). To meet the second prong, the prisoner must generally show 'some quantum of detriment caused by the delay of the plaintiff's pending or

The magistrate correctly concluded that the law library system at USP-Marion, without state law materials or supplemental legal aid, was inadequate. He aptly characterized the . . . requirement for precise citations for photocopying as a 'Catch 22' because the inmate could obtain precise citations only if he could refer to state law materials.Id. at 1250. The Seventh Circuit did, however, approve plans submitted by prison officials to remedy the inadequate access by providing inmates either with "starter" libraries, in which the inmates themselves could do preliminary research, or with lists of legal services offices which provided assistance to inmates.

contemplated litigation.' Shango v. Jurich,

In Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied,479 U.S. 1019, 93 L. Ed. 2d 724, 107 S. Ct. 673

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *36

Page 10 of 17

(1986), the court upheld a modified exact cite system utilized for prisoners housed in the Control Unit at USP-Marion. Prisoners housed in the Control Unit could not use the main law library in Marion, but could request up to two specific law books from the main library at a time. Depending on the demand for a particular volume, prisoners might receive requested [*37] materials within 24 hours or might wait as much as a week. Id. at 225. In addition, there was a smaller law library in the Control Unit which prisoners could use directly. The Control Unit library did not contain case materials, and because only one inmate could use the library at a time, prisoners sometimes had to wait up to eight days

In Williams, however, the Seventh Circuit found that limitations on library access placed on prisoners in protective custody violated their right of access to the courts. When an inmate on protective custody status wanted to go to the library, he was locked alone in one of seven special security cages; cellmates, co-litigants, or co-defendants could share a cage. 851 F.2d at 874. Inmates could not leave the cages, however, and depended on a library clerk to retrieve materials for them. Quoting [*39] from the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the library services provided to the protective custody inmates were inadequate because

before being allowed access. Id.

even if an inmate were attuned to the nuances of

The Seventh Circuit found that this access, though limited,

legal meaning, the limitations imposed by defendants

was constitutionally sufficient based on the facts presented. It

would convert a possible work of minutes into a

noted:

need to spend hours -- and, moreover, hours to which

no plaintiff could gain access.851 F.2d at 879

Marion is the only level-six maximum security

(quoting 646 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).

institution in the federal penitentiary system, and the Control Unit houses those inmates who are too great a security risk to be allowed in the general population. The security concerns addressed by the exact-cite paging system are unique, and again we cannot find that Marion officials have exaggerated their response to these concerns or that this restriction is irrational.Id. at 228. The court distinguished Corgain by noting that prisoners had access to reference materials from which to derive the citations to state cases. Moreover, the plaintiff

Similarly, in DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1988), the court held that inmates in a Wisconsin prison's Adjustment Center (a maximum security unit within the prison separating certain inmates from general population inmates because of alleged involvement in disturbances at the prison) had stated a claim for denial of access rights. Prisoners in the Adjustment Center could not go to the prison library or confer personally with inmate paralegals. They could check out books from the library by written requests and consult paralegals by correspondence. Id. at 446.

had After discussing Corgain, Campbell, and Caldwell, the

neither challenged the sufficiency of the reference [*38] materials available in the Control

Seventh Circuit found that this arrangement denied the plaintiff his right to [*40] access to the courts. It noted:

Unit library, to which he has direct access, nor alleged that the amount of time he is allowed to spend in the unit library is inadequate to conduct meaningful legal research.Id. at 229.

DeMallory . . . had no access to law libraries -- even 'starter' or 'basic' libraries. Unlike the control unit in Campbell, the Adjustment Center library lacks the primary resources to allow DeMallory or other

Prisoners at Marion did challenge the sufficiency of smaller "basic libraries" in Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit found that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant warden because factual issues remained regarding this issue. It noted, however, that an exact-cite system may be permissible if it is "supplemented by adequate reference materials in the basic library." Id. at 607.

inmates to adequately begin their initial legal research or to formulate tentative theories. Moreover, because the district court was unable to appoint an attorney to represent him, DeMallory had to proceed without counsel. DeMallory's meaningful access to the courts, therefore, rested solely on written correspondence with inmate paralegals for assistance on his Eighth Amendment claim. Dependence on untrained inmate paralegals as an alternative to

library access does not

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *40

Page 11 of 17

provide constitutionally sufficient access to the

browsing through various materials in search of

courts. 'Rather when inmates have no access to a law

inspiration; tentative theories may have to be

library they must be provided with assistance by

abandoned in the course of research in the fact of

trained, skilled, and independent legal personnel.'

unfamiliar adverse precedent. New theories may

Walters v. Thompson, 615 F. Supp. 330, 340 (N.D.

occur as a result of chance discovery of an obscure

Ill. 1985).851 F.2d at 447 (footnotes omitted).

or forgotten case. Certainly a prisoner, unversed in

The court finds that this case is more like DeMallory and Williams than Campbell and Caldwell. As in DeMallory, inmates on disciplinary [*41] segregation at the MCC have no access to law libraries -- even "starter" or "basic" libraries. See Prehearing Order at P F(3), at p. 6 ("inmates who have

the law and the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance than the trained lawyer exploring his case. It is unrealistic to expect a prisoner to know in advance exactly what materials he needs to consult. 4

received disciplinary segregation sentences after arriving at [*43] Given the lack of access to even satellite law libraries

MCC are not permitted to leave their cells to visit the satellite and week-long delays in research caused by the paging

law libraries."). See also Tr. 59, 133, 257. While the MCC system, the court holds that library access for prisoners in

does make certain reference books and digests available to disciplinary segregation is not "adequate and sufficient as

prisoners (Tr. 265-68), the process of getting from these defined by statute and applicable case law." Accordingly, the

references to specific cases can be time consuming, defendants are in violation of P II(1) of the Agreed Entry, and

converting the "possible work of minutes into a need to spend the court RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs' motion be

hours." Williams, 851 F.2d at 879. In fact, Hawk testified that GRANTED on this issue.

it can take a prisoner up to one week to get from the index of the digests to a code section, in contrast to a person in a Free Issue of the Handbook

satellite law library who can get that access immediately. (Tr.

268.)

Paragraph III(T)(4)(c) of the Agreed Entry states that "the

MCC shall provide each prisoner with a free issue of the

This testimony is in accord with a frequently-quoted passage prisoner's handbook or like material, and any revisions and

from Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), amended issues as they are published." The parties disagree

cert. denied,442 U.S. 911, 61 L. Ed. 2d 276, 99 S. Ct. 2825 on the meaning of the word "provide" in this context, with

(1979):

plaintiffs claiming the defendants have violated the Agreed

Entry because -- though each inmate is issued a copy of the

Simply providing a prisoner with books in his cell, if he requests them, gives a prisoner no

Handbook upon arrival at the MCC -- the Handbook remains the property of the MCC.

meaningful chance to explore the legal remedies that

he might [*42] have. Legal research often requires

4 Similar language is found in Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1989). In Tillery, the court held that "restrictive housing" inmates who could not visit the law library were denied access to the courts.
They may obtain law books only by a book paging system, a substantial disadvantage. First, inmates must know initially which volumes they need. However, it may take several requests for case digests before they target relevant case citations.
Second, unavoidable and lengthy delays are inherent in such a system. The process of ordering and returning books, compounded by hindrances in obtaining shepardizing results, drastically prolongs legal research.Id. at 1282. See also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 775 F. Supp. 735 (D. Del. 1991) (holding that legal services provided to inmates in a Maximum Security Unit ("MSU") were inadequate where MSU inmates were allowed into a satellite library only one at a time, and visits were limited to one visit per day and one hour per visit; prisoners at times had to wait a week or more to visit the MSU library); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1038 n. 22 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("paging systems . . . as the sole legal assistance furnished to inmates, have been rejected consistently by other courts of appeals") (citing cases); Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Or. 1993) ("By 1993, no reasonable public official would have believed a paging system was by itself sufficient to protect an inmate's fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts.") (citing cases); Griffin, 743 F. Supp. at 1024 (holding that book request system for prisoners on protected custody did not provide them with meaningful, adequate access to the courts: "PC inmates are not able to browse through materials in order to compare legal theories and formulate ideas. This is a constitutionally impermissible situation . . .").

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *43

Page 12 of 17

The parties have stipulated:

"prisoners shall be provided extra blankets upon request, not

to exceed three blankets in all." There is nothing in this

Defendants furnish a copy of the MCC Handbook to statement which suggests that prisoners are "given" the

every inmate upon arrival at MCC. Defendants do blankets -- or the beds they are placed on -- and do not have to

not charge the inmate for the Handbook. The return them. Similarly, the requirement in P VI requiring that

Handbook remains the property of MCC, prisoners "be provided legal access which is adequate and

it [*44] must be retained by the inmate at MCC, and sufficient as defined by statute and applicable case law,"

is expected to be returned by the inmate when the including the maintaining of basic legal research

inmate leaves. The inmates are told not to damage or materials [*46] in the satellite law libraries, cannot be

deface the Handbook and can be subject to interpreted to mean that prisoners are "given" these legal

disciplinary action for damaging or defacing the materials and have no duty to return them. 5 Given this

Handbook. Inmates are permitted, at their own ambiguity, the court will "look at the evil which the [Agreed

expense, to make copies of the Entry] was designed to rectify." Goluba, 45 F.3d at 1038.

Handbook.(Prehearing Order P F(2) at p. 6.)

In the present case, the evil sought to be remedied by

The plaintiffs claim that the fact that the Handbooks remain requiring that prisoners be "provided" copies of the Handbook

the property of the MCC and prisoners can be disciplined for is to prevent prisoners being subjected to disciplinary

damaging or defacing them means that the inmates have not proceedings without having full knowledge of the MCC's

truly been "provided" with a copy of the Handbook. rules and regulations. Some courts have held that [*47] the

According to the plaintiffs:

failure to provide incoming inmates with current copies of

disciplinary rules and regulations violates their due process

In the Agreed Entry, the parties have used the word rights. Hamilton v. Love, 358 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973);

'provide' to mean 'give.' See e.g., Agreed Entry P Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976); but see

III(C)(2), at 13 ('MCC, at its expense, shall provide Russell v. Oliver, 392 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1975) (failure

each prisoner with sufficient amount or quantity of to post disciplinary rules is not per se constitutional violation

soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, and deodorant') without showing of prejudice), vacated in part on other

(emphasis added); P III(C)(2), at 13 ('sufficient grounds,552 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1977).

amount or quantity of body lotion, shampoo, and Qtips will be provided to all prisoners, upon request, at DOC's expense') (emphasis added); P III(J)(2), at 22 ('prisoners shall be provided three meals a day') (emphasis added); P III(J)(3), at [*45] 22 ('MCC will provide two extra beverage items per day with meals to each prisoner'); P III(J)(3), at 22-23 ('coffee will be provided in the morning') (emphasis added); P III(J)(5), at 23 ('salt shall be provided prisoners at meals') (emphasis added). Undoubtedly, the Agreed

In Hamilton, as in the present case, the defendant prison officials had agreed to provide incoming prisoners with a printed copy of all rules and regulations regarding prisoner conduct and privileges. 358 F. Supp. at 345. Unlike this case, however, they did not consistently do so, citing a "litter" problem. 358 F. Supp. at 346. The court found this unpersuasive, but also stated that it had made clear "that the defendants' employees can take up the copies of such rules after they have served their purpose." Id.

Entry does not mandate Defendants to 'provide' soap, toothpaste, body lotion, shampoo, meals, beverages, coffee, and salt (to name a few) to prisoners, just to have the prisoners return the same items to Defendants.(Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at pp. 13-14.)

There is nothing in the Agreed Entry which prevents the defendants here from doing the same. "Furnishing" prisoners with a copy of the Handbook -- even though it remains DOC property -- for their use [*48] while incarcerated at the MCC addresses the evil sought to be remedied by the Agreed Entry.

The court's own review of the Agreed Entry, however, shows The DOC can "provide" prisoners Handbooks for their use that the meaning of "provide" is not as clear-cut as the during their incarceration at the MCC and require that they be
plaintiffs suggest. For example, P III(M)(1) states that returned

5 Indeed, the court notes that neither of the dictionaries it consulted defines providing as "giving." Instead, provide is defined as "to make, procure or furnish for future use, prepare. To supply; to afford; to contribute." Black's Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed. 1990). See also The American Heritage Dictionary 996 (2d college ed. 1976): "1. To furnish; supply. 2. To make ready; prepare 3. To make available; afford. 4. To set down as a stipulation."

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *48

Page 13 of 17

undamaged -- the same way that it can provide prisoners with MCC after the approval of the Agreed Entry was not

blankets and law books for their use. Nothing in the Agreed given notice of the reason for his transfer.

Entry suggests that the defendants need to "give" the inmates Handbooks in such a way as to confer ownership on a permanent basis, and the defendants cannot be held in contempt for failing to do so. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that the plaintiffs' contempt motion be DENIED with respect to the provision of inmate handbooks.

The plaintiffs claim that John Thomas has been misclassified and wrongfully confined at the MCC because he does not meet the classification criteria and was not given proper notice of the reasons for his transfer to the MCC. 6 He was transferred to the MCC on March 1, 1994, after the Agreed Entry was approved. (Tr. 115-16.)

Classification of Prisoners Under the Criteria of the

Agreed Entry

[*50] The Classification Hearing Report authorizing

Thomas' transfer to the MCC set forth following reasons for

Paragraph 1(A) of the Agreed Entry provides:

the action:

The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual prisoner for assignment to the MCC. The prisoner shall be:
1. A committed or court ordered male adult.
2. An individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration:
(a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to [*49] staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant.
(b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death.
(c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit.
(d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities.
(e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.In addition, P I(B)(1) of the Agreed Entry requires that "the referring facility head must notify the prisoner in writing of the reasons he is being considered for assignment to the MCC." The plaintiffs allege that defendants should be held in contempt because a prisoner transferred to the

(1) offender is being recommended for MCC;
(2) new C.D. required during process; and
(3) currently Level 4 due to score.(Plaintiff's Exhibit 21.) Thomas did not believe his transfer was justified, and on November 17, 1994, made a formal request for interview to MacMillan asking for documentation as to why he was transferred to the MCC from the ISP. (Tr. 118.) He received a response later that day, which stated only "Confidential section of packet." (Tr. 120.) Thomas testified that he did not know why he was transferred to the MCC. (Id.)
Jim Csenar, a Classification Analyst in the DOC's Central Office, testified that the reasons for Thomas' transfer were outlined in a memorandum he wrote to Owens on February 4, 1994. In that memo, Csenar listed the following summary of Thomas' violations of prison rules: three physical assaults; one fighting; eight disorderly conducts; one possession of a deadly weapon; one possession of a device capable of being a weapon; and one attempted homicide. (Tr. 184.) The attempted homicide involved Thomas' stabbing [*51] another offender seven times upon his head, neck and abdomen regions. Csenar believed Thomas fit the criteria of the Agreed Entry for assaultive behavior against staff or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and violent behavior which causes serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit. (Id.)
Thomas admits that he was convicted by the CAB of attempted homicide of a prisoner arising out of a February,

6 Plaintiffs also argue in their Post-Trial Brief that two inmates transferred to the MCC before the Agreed Entry was signed -- Steven Lee and Tracey Jones -- did not meet the classification criteria, and should be reclassified and transferred to another prison. The argument regarding Lee is now moot because he was released from the MCC on July 10, 1995, and this court rejected the argument concerning Jones on July 5, 1995, in response to the plaintiffs' motion for an expedited ruling.

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *51

Page 14 of 17

1993, stabbing incident and that he also pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of criminal recklessness, a Class A misdemeanor, arising out of the incident. (Tr. 121, 123.) He also admits that between February, 1993, and his transfer to the MCC on March 1, 1994, he was found guilty of possessing a device capable of being used as a weapon when prison officials found a rope in his cell. (Tr. 121, 123, 124.)

Second, the Hewitt approach has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone. In doing so, it has run counter to the view expressed in several of our cases that federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103

and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a

S. Ct. 864 (1983), the Supreme Court noted that liberty

volatile environment.115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d

interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise

418, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4069, *19, 1995 WL 360217,

from only two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and the

at *6 (cites omitted).

laws of the states. It then held that the Due Process Clause itself did not give prisoners a liberty interest in The Court then stated:

remaining [*52] in the general prison population. Id. at 468.

It further held, however, that prisoners could find a liberty

In light of the above discussion, we believe that the

interest in state law where a prison regulation went beyond mere procedural guidelines and used mandatory language in

search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the

connection with specified substantive predicates to govern

real concerns undergirding [*54] the liberty

official decisionmaking. Id. at 471-72. See also Kentucky

protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has

Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-

come to return to the due process principles we

63, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506, 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989).

believe were correctly established and applied in

Wolff [v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d

The Court, however, recently abandoned the Hewitt approach

935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974)] and Meachum [v. Fano,

which looked for state-created liberty interests within prison

427 U.S. 215, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451, 96 S. Ct. 2532

regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d

(1976)]. Following Wolff, we recognize that States

418, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4069, 1995 WL 360217 (1995). The

may under certain circumstances create liberty

Court noted:

interests which are protected by the Due Process

Clause. But these interests will be generally limited

Hewitt has produced at least two undesirable effects.

to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding

First, it creates disincentives for states to codify

the sentence in such unexpected manner as to give

prison management procedures in the interest of

rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its

uniform treatment. Prison administrators need be

own force, see e.g., Vitek [v. Jones], 445 U.S. [480],

concerned with the safety of the staff and inmate

493, 100 S. Ct. at 1263-64 [(1980)] (transfer to

population. Ensuring that welfare often leads prison

mental hospital); Washington [v. Harper], 494 U.S.

administrators to curb the discretion of staff on the

[210], 221-222, 110 S. Ct. [1028], 1036-1037

front line who daily encounter prisoners hostile to

[(1990)] (involuntary administration of psychotropic

the authoritarian structure of the prison

drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant

environment. [*53] Such guidelines are not set forth

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

solely to benefit the prisoner. They also aspire to

incidents of prison life.Id. (footnote omitted).

instruct subordinate employees how to exercise discretion vested by the State in the warden, and to confine the authority of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different treatment of similar incidents. The approach embraced by Hewitt discourages this desirable development: States may avoid creation of

Turning to the case before it -- in which Conner alleged that prison officials had [*55] deprived him of due process when an adjustment committee refused to allow him to present witnesses during a disciplinary hearing and then sentenced him to segregation for misconduct -- the court held:

'liberty' interests by having scarcely any regulations,

or by conferring standardless discretion on

This case, though concededly punitive, does not

correctional personnel.

present a dramatic departure from the

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *55

Page 15 of 17

basic conditions of Conner's indeterminate sentence. four to five days a week. That juice is delivered in a hardened

Although Conner points to dicta in cases implying plastic container which has a foil covering. (Id.; Plaintiffs' Ex.

that solitary confinement automatically triggers due 2) Other items containing foil are also included with meals:

process protection, this Court has not had the Komyatti identified two other exhibits as being foil from the

opportunity to address in an argued case the question inside of Corn Pops and Sugar Smacks cereal boxes. (Tr. 6-7;

whether disciplinary confinement of inmates itself Plaintiffs' Exs. 3 and 4.) In rebuttal testimony, Komyatti noted

implicates constitutional liberty interests. We hold that there were items available on commissary that had foil

that Conner's discipline in segregated confinement packaging, including potato chip bags and candy bar

did not present the type of atypical, significant wrappers. (Tr. 281-82.)

deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. The record shows that, at the time of Conner's punishment, disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative

Komyatti made prison officials aware of the foil in other food packages when he sent Scott a letter regarding the juice and included foil packaging out of either the Corn Pops or Sugar Smacks. (Tr. 9.) In response to that letter, Scott wrote back on

segregation and protective custody.115 S. Ct. 2293, October 14, 1994, that

132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 1995 U.S LEXIS 4069, at *26

(cites omitted).

the foil matter is a question of 'gauge.' The gauge of

foil used in drink boxes is felt to be heavy enough to

In the present case, the plaintiffs have offered no evidence

pose a more legitimate security [*58] concern than

that Thomas' incarceration at the MCC presented

the lower gauges of foil such as contained in packs

the [*56] type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a

of cereal or instant coffee.(Tr. 9-10; Plaintiffs' Ex. 6.)

state might conceivably create a liberty interest. While the

"regime to which [Thomas] was subjected as a result of" his Scott elaborated on his response in his testimony at the

transfer to the MCC is undoubtedly harsher than that found in contempt hearing. He stated, "It's our feeling that it's possible

other Indiana prisons, it is "within the range of confinement to to make a weapon out of the material that they're [the juice

be normally expected" for prisoners held by the DOC. Id. at boxes] constructed from, and that would pose a security

*28. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that the concern." (Tr. 221.) He noted that he had personally contacted

plaintiffs' motion that the defendants be held in contempt be a number of grocers in the area in an effort to determine if

DENIED.

fruit juice was available in a container that would not be a

security concern. (Tr. 220.) He was informed that drink box

Availability of Fruit Juices on Commissary

packaging is pretty standard and it would be unlikely that he

would find drink boxes without foil. (Id.) Under the Agreed Entry, the MCC is required to "make a

continuing reasonable effort to provide fruit juices on Scott also testified about the items containing foil which are

commissary if they are available in containers which meet the brought with the prisoners' meals. He stated that prisoners are

security concerns of the MCC." (Agreed Entry P III(B)(2), at expected to turn in the plastic fruit juice cups covered with

p. 12.) The defendants, citing concerns that the juices' foil with their tray after a meal. These juice cups are not

packaging could be made into a weapon, are not yet providing available on commissary, and would not be an acceptable

them on the commissary and the plaintiffs now challenge the item for offenders to keep in their cells because "those plastic

"reasonableness" of their effort.

cups can very easily be turned into a weapon. The cups can be

According to Komyatti, he has made a number of requests and filed grievances asking for administrative relief to have juices available on the commissary. (Tr. 5.) Scott, MacMillan,

torn or broken, which leaves a sharp [*59] edge, and cut skin." (Tr. 223.) They could also be jabbed in someone's eye. (Id.)

and other MCC personnel have [*57] told him that because The plaintiffs offered the deposition testimony of Karl E.

the juice would come in a container which includes foil, they Muszar, Jr., a professional engineer, on the question of the

could not be made available to prisoners at the MCC. (Id.)

"gauge of the foil in juice containers and other packaging.

Muszar analyzed the foil contained in the packaging produced

Komyatti testified, however, that other items at the MCC by the plaintiffs at the contempt hearing as well as packaging

contain foil packaging, including juices with their meals

from fruit juice boxes which he bought on

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *59

Page 16 of 17

the open market. He testified that in the metallurgical business, gauge is a term that is used to describe a number which represents the thickness of a metallic material. (Deposition of Karl E. Muszar at p. 8.) His examination of the

Exhibit No. 4 would have to be folded over, but you could make a pointed device out of that one, too.(Muszar Dep. at pp. 22-23.)

materials showed that the aluminum foil on these items Given the plaintiffs' expert's own testimony, the court finds

ranged in thickness from 1/1000 of an inch to 7.5/10,000 of that the MCC does have valid security concerns about the

an inch.

juice boxes' potential use as a weapon. The fact that other

The foil cover from the juice cups provided with prisoners' meals measured 1/1000 to 1.5/1000 of an inch. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 2; Muszar Dep. at p. 8.) The Corn Pops package and material from the other cereal package both measured 5/10,000 of an inch. (Plaintiffs' Exs. 3 and 4; Muszar Dep. at pp. 8-9.) And,

items which are provided to prisoners with their meals are expected to be returned does nothing to diminish the credibility of this concern. Unlike those items, juice boxes bought from the commissary could remain in the prisoners' cells. Moreover, this court

the Hi-C and Juicy Juice packages purchased by Muszar in the open market measured from 5/10,000 to 7.5/10,000 [*60] of an inch. (Plaintiffs' Exs. 26 and 28; Muszar Dep. at p. 9.) Muszar testified that "there is no gauge number which goes down to the thickness range of the aluminum foil materials I have measured here." (Muszar Dep. at p. 19.)

should be cautious about disparaging disciplinary and security concerns expressed by the correctional authorities. American jails are not safe places, and judges should not go out of their way to make them less safe. As long as the concerns expressed by correctional authorities are plausible, and the burden that a challenged regulation of jail or prison security

Muszar's testimony on cross-examination and further direct examination, however, revealed that he believed that the juice

places on protected rights a light or moderate one, the courts should not interfere.

boxes he had purchased in the open market and the foil

material Mr. Komyatti identified as coming from the juice cup [*62] Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581, 1995 WL

cover and cereal boxes could possibly inflict injury.

358065 at *2 (7th Cir. June 15, 1995).

Q. I just want to ask you, if I took this exhibit, and particularly the corner of Exhibit 25, and poked you in the eye with it, do you think the effect on your eye would be negligible? Do you think that that might cause some damage?
A. I think it would probably cause injury if you used the pointed corner of it.
MR. UHL: That's all I have.
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUING,
QUESTIONS BY MR. KASHANI:
Q. Can you also make something out of Exhibit 2 or 3 or 4 to make the same kind of injury?
A. Oh, I think very definitely you could, especially Exhibit No. 2.
Q. How about if you fold Exhibit No. 3 a couple of times over?
A. You [*61] wouldn't even have to fold that exhibit because it's already -- you can just take the corner of it and you could inflict probably the same kind of an injury.

Here, the concerns expressed by the defendants are plausible and the burden on the plaintiffs light. Several courts have barred prisoners from having items in their cells or on their persons which have a much greater constitutional significance than juice boxes. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting First Amendment claim by NativeAmerican who claimed that prison policy used to bar him from wearing a bear tooth necklace and medicine bag around his neck due to security concerns impinged on his religious freedom); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that prison regulation prohibiting inmates from possessing rosaries and scapulars in their cells did not violate First Amendment).
All that is required in the Agreed Entry is that the MCC "make continuing reasonable effort to provide fruit juices on commissary if they are available in containers which meet the security concerns of the MCC." Scott's testimony that he contacted a number of grocers in an effort to determine if fruit juice was available in a container that would not be a security concern [*63] demonstrates that such effort has been made thus far. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs' motion for contempt be DENIED.
Contempt Sanctions

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, *63

Page 17 of 17

Among the plaintiffs' prayers for relief is a request that the into compliance. Unlike many of the cases cited by the

defendants be fined for their failure to abide by the Agreed plaintiffs, there have not been prior orders putting defendants

Entry. The court finds that such sanctions are not necessary at on notice as to prescribed conduct and penalties, 8 nor

this time.

repeated delays in implementing the provisions of a consent

The Seventh Circuit has held:

decree. 9 Instead, the court notes that defendants have been willing to compromise on a number of the issues identified in

Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in the proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.Thompson v. Cleland, 782 F.2d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,

the plaintiffs' initial contempt motion -- settling 16 out of 23 alleged violations. Given this, the court cannot find [*65] that the defendants have displayed recalcitrance making it necessary to impose monetary sanctions in order to coerce compliance with the Agreed Entry. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for contempt sanctions be DENIED. [*66]

303-04, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947)). Where compensation is intended, a fine may be imposed

Conclusion

payable to the complainant. Connolly v. J.T. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that

Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing the plaintiffs' motion for contempt with regard to lay

United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304). A trial court advocates at CAB hearings, free copies of the Handbook,

"has a great deal more latitude in enforcing its own classification, and juice boxes on commissary be DENIED,

decrees in a contempt proceeding." Ferrell v. Pierce, and that plaintiffs' motion with regard to law clerks for

785 F.2d 1372, 1383 (7th Cir. 1986). And, a prisoners with special needs and law library visits and specific

district [*64] court may award attorney's fees related cite requirements for prisoners in disciplinary segregation be

to a civil contempt proceeding. BPS Guard Services, GRANTED.

Inc. v. International Union of United Plant Guard

Workers of America, 45 F.3d 205, 211 (7th Cir. ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation

1995).

must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days

of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within

In the present case, the plaintiffs have not identified any the specified time waives the right

losses sustained as a result of the contempt. Accordingly, the to appeal the district court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474

court may only consider if it should impose sanctions to U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435

coerce defendants' compliance with the Agreed Entry. As the (1985);Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.

plaintiffs have helpfully pointed out, in recent years federal 1988);Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th

courts have not hesitated to exercise the power of contempt to Cir. 1986).

coerce prison and jail officials to comply with court orders. 7 The court, however, finds that such sanctions are not yet Dated this 20th day of July, 1995.

necessary to coerce the defendants

Robin D. Pierce, U.S. Magistrate [*67] Judge

7 Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 901 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1990)Morales Feliciano v. Parole Bd., 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Hernandez Colon v. Morales Feliciano, 494 U.S. 1046, 108 L. Ed. 2d 646, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 272 U.S. App. D.C. 235, 855 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986). cert. denied sub nom., Santacroce v. Badgley, 479 U.S. 1067, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 107 S. Ct. 955 (1987); Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Fambro v. Fulton County, Ga., 713 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Albro v. Onondaga County, N.Y,. 681 F. Supp. 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. State of Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 10471054 (W.D. Mich. 1987)Tate v. Frey, 673 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Jackson v. Whitman, 642 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1986); Mobile County Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 581 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ala. 1984); Miller v. Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
8 See e.g., Inmates of the Allen County Jail, 901 F.2d at 1199-1200.
9 See e.g., Feliciano, 697 F. Supp. at 30-31.

 
 Taifa v. Bayh
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division July 5, 1995, Dated ; July 5, 1995, ENTERED CAUSE NO. 3:92-cv-429 AS

Reporter: 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195 KATAZA TAIFA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EVAN BAYH, et al., Defendants.

Opinion

Subsequent History: [*1] Adopting Order of September 26, 1995, Reported at: 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20194.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Counsel: For PAUL KOMYATTI, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN. Hamid R Kashani, [COR LD NTC], Indianapolis, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
For AARON ISBY, plaintiff, [PRO SE], Westville, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
For MICHAEL HEGWOOD, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN. Hamid R Kashani, [COR LD NTC], Indianapolis, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.

This case is before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for a partial, expedited ruling -- or, alternatively, for preliminary injunction -- on one count of its motion to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to abide by the provisions of an Agreed Entry in a class action suit. The suit challenged the assignment of prisoners to, and the conditions of confinement at, the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC") operated by the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") in Westville, Indiana. The MCC is a modern maximum security correctional facility which was [*3] opened by the DOC in the summer of 1991, and has been the source of much litigation since that time. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the plaintiffs' motion for the defendants to be held in contempt be denied on the one count identified in their motion for an expedited ruling.

For PRESTON GARDNER, plaintiff: Richard A Waples, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN. Preston Gardner, [PRO SE], Westville, IN. Hamid R Kashani, [COR LD NTC], Indianapolis, IN. Franklin A Morse, II, [COR LD NTC], Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN.
RICKY OUTLAW, appellant, [PRO SE], Westville, IN.
For EVAN BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, JAMES E AIKEN, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, [*2] NORMAN G OWENS, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction, JOHN NUNN, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, CHARLES E WRIGHT, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction, defendants: Wayne E Uhl, [COR LD NTC], Suzann W Lupton, Office of Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN.
Judges: Robin D. Pierce, U.S. Magistrate Judge. Chief Judge Allen Sharp.
Opinion by: Robin D. Pierce

Background
This case was originally filed in the Marion County Superior Court on May 6, 1992, against the Governor of Indiana and various DOC officials. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 1992. The action was removed, on defendants' motion, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 29, 1992, and transferred to this court on July 7, 1992. On October 2, 1992, Chief Judge Sharp certified this case as a class action solely for "purposes of injunctive relief," with the class "consisting of all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana." Plaintiffs' state law claims were remanded to state court on December 4, 1992.
After extensive settlement negotiations and two hearings before the undersigned at the MCC, the parties entered into an [*4] Agreed Entry which was ultimately approved by Chief Judge Sharp on February 15, 1994. On September 13, 1994, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the Agreed Entry. The plaintiffs' supporting memorandum identified 23 separate violations. The parties agreed on remedies for several of these alleged violations

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195, *4

Page 2 of 4

prior to a contempt hearing held before the undersigned on meet the classification criteria, and should be

April 6, 1995, at the MCC. Several more were remedied reclassified and transferred [*6] to another prison.

before the plaintiffs submitted their post-trial brief. The contempt action is now limited to seven alleged violations of the Agreed Entry, and the plaintiffs have now moved for a partial, expedited ruling -- or, alternatively, for preliminary injunction -- on one of those counts: Whether the defendants have violated P I(A) of the Agreed Entry by holding prisoner Tracy Jones in the MCC. Plaintiffs have asked the court to

Dawn MacMillan, a case manager at the MCC, testified that following the approval of the Agreed Entry, she conducted a retroactive review of prisoner classifications. (Tr. 283.) During the course of those reviews, she had doubts about whether some of the prisoners should be at the MCC; Jones was one of those prisoners. (Tr. 284.)

order Jones' immediate transfer out of the MCC and for

sanctions against the defendants for disregarding the Agreed Randall Short, a classification analyst in the DOC central

Entry.

office, also had doubts about Jones placement at the MCC. In

a deposition prior to the contempt hearing, he testified that the

Discussion

DOC had determined that because of the Agreed Entry it should review the current population of the MCC to

Paragraph I(A) of the Agreed Entry provides:

determine whether or not they met the criteria as stated in the

Agreed Entry. (Short Dep. at pp. 4-5.) The first review was

The following criteria are to be applied when done by staff at the MCC. (Id. at p. 5.) They reviewed the

considering an individual prisoner for prisoners' packets and then sent a list of approximately 26

assignment [*5] to the MCC. The prisoner shall be:

offenders "who they were not sure if they met the criteria as

1. A committed or court ordered male adult.

stated in the Agreed Entry" to the DOC central office. (Id.) Short reviewed those records between July 25, 1994, and

2. An individual with a proven and/or

August 4, 1994. (Id.) After that review and talking to Norman

documented history of at least one of the

G. Owens (the DOC director of classification) and other

following criteria during the current period

staff [*7] at the DOC, it appeared to Short that there were

of incarceration:

"maybe two offenders that didn't meet particular criteria."

(a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious

(Id.) Jones was one of those inmates, and Short wrote a summary about him and the other offender and submitted it to Owens on August 10, 1994. (Id. at p. 9.)

destruction to the physical plant.

Jones was assigned to the MCC on May 4, 1993. (Tr. 112.)

(b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death.
(c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit.

Jim Csenar, another classification analyst in the DOC central office, testified at the hearing that Jones was transferred to the MCC because of his gang activities. He referred to memos written by D. Dirkey, a case manager, to the Superintendent of the Westville Correctional Center dated April 21, 1993, which stated that Jones had admitted to being in gangs. (Tr. 181.) This gang affiliation began with the Vice Lords with

(d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities.
(e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.Paragraph II(A) states that within 12 months of a prisoner's confinement at the MCC, the DOC shall reevaluate the appropriateness of the prison's classification and assignment. Under P II(G) this reclassification requirement is retroactive to members of the class. The

Jones holding the rank of "super elite." (Id.) Jones sports a Vice Lords tatoo on his back, and the WCC gang coordinator considered him an active member of the Vice Lords. (Id.) Csenar also referred to a memorandum written by Short to Owens on April 28, 1993, stating that information garnered from confidential investigations showed that eight offenders identified Jones as a separatee, "which in effect had told the department that [*8] these eight individuals feared for their physical safety if they would be placed in close, physical proximity to Mr. Jones at any time." (Tr. 182.)

plaintiffs allege that Jones, who was transferred to the

Under cross-examination from plaintiffs' counsel, Csenar was

MCC before the Agreed Entry was signed, does not

asked to read from a memorandum dated August 11,

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195, *8

Page 3 of 4

1994, from Owens to John Nunn, then senior deputy

mandating the outcome to be reached upon [*10] a

commissioner of the DOC. In that memorandum, Owens

finding that the relevant criteria have been

wrote:

met.Kentucky Department of Corrections v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506,

In my opinion his placement at MCC under the new

109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989). The Court has also

criteria is questionable. He has a record of gang

involvement, but the documentation involves his

articulated a requirement . . . that the regulations

activities during a prior incarceration and is very

contain 'explicit mandatory language,' i.e., specific

limited. There's no such documentation during his

directive to the decisionmaker that if the regulations'

current commitment period.(Tr. 205; Plaintiffs' Ex.

substantive predicates are present, a particular

20.) Csenar also read from the August 10, 1994,

outcome must follow in order to create a liberty

memo from Short to Owens. In that memo, Short

interest.Id. at 463.

stated that Jones had

In sum, the use of 'explicitly mandatory language,' in

no documented record of aggressive sexual conduct

connection with the establishment of 'specified

or rape. He does have a record of gang involvement,

substantive predicates' to limit discretion forces a

but the documentation involves his activities during

conclusion that the State has created a liberty

a prior incarceration, not the current commitment

interest.Id.

period.(Tr. 209; Plaintiffs' Ex. 19.)

According to the Fourth Circuit

Jones' reclassification was ultimately denied by the DOC.

According to MacMillan when she spoke to Short about the What this all comes to is that constitutionally protected liberty

denial, he told her "Mr. [*9] Jones had serious gang interests are only created by state law regimes which in the

involvement that we didn't show in our packet at MCC, but end effectively say to inmates: 'If facts A, B, and C are

central office had it in their packet." (Tr. 285.)

established in an appropriate factfinding process, you are

thereupon legally entitled to a more favorable security or

The Supreme Court has made it clear that prisoners do not custody classification than you presently have,' or, 'Unless

have a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison facts A, B, and C are so established, you are legally

population. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 74 L. Ed. 2d entitled [*11] not to be placed in a less favorable

675, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983). See also Pardo v. Hosier, 946 classification than you now have.'

F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir. 1991). Therefore, in order to state a

due process claim for a transfer into a more restrictive setting, Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir. 1994).

a prisoner must find an enforceable liberty interest in state law. Before a prison regulation can be found to create this liberty interest, it must go beyond mere procedural guidelines and use mandatory language. Id. at 471.

At least two Courts have found that rules governing prisoner classification and transfer made a part of or arising out of consent decrees in class action law suits create state law liberty interests. Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 26-28 (1st

According to the Supreme Court,

Cir. 1991); Dozier v. Hilton, 507 F. Supp. 1299, 1310-11 (D.N.J. 1981). But see Beo v. District of Columbia, 310 U.S.

Stated simply, 'a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.' . . . Our past decisions suggest . . . that most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern official decision-making, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S. Ct. at 871,

App. D.C. 137, 44 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Holding that settlement agreement between individual inmate and prison officials did not create a liberty interest and distinguishing Rodi and Dozier because in those cases "individual prisoners had gained a liberty interest in their existing conditions of confinement because restrictions on altering those

and, further, by

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195, *11

Page 4 of 4

conditions had been embodied in a state-wide practice that

gave all prisoners a liberty interest."). The question in the

An inmate must merely receive some notice of the

present case, then, is whether the Agreed Entry has created a

charges against him and an opportunity to present his

regime where "unless facts A, B, and C are so established,

views to the prison official charged with deciding

[DOC prisoners] are legally entitled not to be placed in a less

whether to transfer him to administrative

favorable classification [*12] than [they] now have." Slezak,

segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the

21 F.3d at 595. The court concludes that it does.

inmate would accomplish this purpose, although

First, P 1(A) specifies that in order to he assigned to the MCC, a prisoner must be a committed or court-ordered male adult who has a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the listed criteria during the period of incarceration. These specific criteria -- or "specified substantive predicates" -- are accompanied by the explicitly mandatory language

prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they [*14] believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges in that-available evidence against the

required by Thompson and Hewitt. Paragraph I(A)(4) states

prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.Id. See

that "these are the only criteria the DOC will consider in also Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1991)

assigning prisoners to the MCC." And the procedures for ("The barebones constituents of fair procedure and

referring a prisoner for assignment to the MCC mandate that therefore due process are (besides jurisdiction) notice and

at least two individuals are required to determine that a the opportunity to be heard….").

prisoner meet these criteria: P I(B)(1) requires that the

referring facility head determine that "a prisoner meets the In the present case, although the question whether Jones fit

criteria for consideration for assignment to the MCC," and P within the criteria for transfer to the MCC was the subject of

I(B)(4) states that upon receipt of the referral materials a debate even within the DOC, there is apparently no question

Classification Analyst will review them "to insure that the that he received notice of the reasons for his transfer and that

prisoner meets the criteria for assignment to the MCC." Given a decisionmaker reviewed those reasons and the then-

this explicitly mandatory language, the court finds that available evidence supporting them. Accordingly, he received

prisoners under the control of [*13] the DOG have a liberty all the process he was due under both the constitution and the

interest in not being assigned to the MCC.

Agreed Entry, and the court RECOMMENDS that the Plaintiffs' motion for contempt concerning Jones' continued

Concluding that the Agreed Entry gives inmates a liberty incarceration at the MCC be DENIED.

interest in not being assigned to the MCC, however, does not

end the inquiry into whether Jones must be transferred out of ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must

the MCC. The court must turn next to the question of what be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of

process was due. In Hewitt, the Court held that, at a receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the

minimum, an inmate placed in administrative segregation specified time waives the [*15] right to appeal the district

should be provided with

court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d

an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting [the inmate's] administrative

1015 (7th Cir. 1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

confinement, including whatever statement [the inmate may wish] to submit, within a reasonable

Dated this 5th day of July, 1995.

time after confining him to administrative segregation.459 U.S. at 476. The Court stressed that

Robin D. Pierce, U.S. Magistrate Judge

the process due in such a situation was not elaborate:

 
 State of Indiana County of Marion

In the Marion Superior Court
Civil Division/ Room No. 7
Cause No. 49D07-9205-CP-498

KATA2A TAIFA, PAUL KOMYATTI, WILLIAM SAMPLEY, MARK S. DOUGLAS, AARON ISBY, KEVIN SANDIFER, JAMBS E. SHROPSHIRE, JOHN CHARLES COLE, JR., PRESTON GARDNER, EDWARD BROADUS, JAMES THOMPSON, NOLAN McDANDAL, ROBERT SMITH, ROBERT JENKINS, RICHARD MUMFORD, TILLMAN MORRIS, MICHAEL HEGWOOD, TERRENCE DRAIN, ERIC MALONE, MICHAEL HOLLAND, ALBERT ESTEP, and ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, on their own behalf and on behalf of all other individuals similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
EVAN BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana; JAMES E. AIKEN, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction; NORMAN G. OWENS, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction, JOHN NUNN, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction; and, CHARLES E. WRIGHT; in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction,
Defendants.

FILED
MAY 2 21992
4
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Ta¡fa v. Bayh PC-IN-006-001

I. INTRODOCTION 1. The defendant state correction officials have implemented a program at the Westville Correctional Center's Maximum Control Complex which incarcerates prisoners in long-term solitary confinement, subjects them to sensory deprivation and arbitrary and irrational rules, physically abuses them, denies them visitors and medical and psychiatric care, and deprives them of educational, vocational, recreational, and other rehabilitative programs. This punitive segregation scheme tortures prisoners by depriving them of the basic necessities of human existence. These conditions have caused prisoners to engage in extended hunger strikes and acts of self-mutilation. This segregation scheme violates numerous state statutes, as well as the Indiana and United States Constitutions. This lawsuit seeks to end this inhumane, unjust and illegal practice.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This Court has general jurisdiction over this cause of action. 3. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Trial Rule 75(1) because a greater percentage of individual defendants reside in Marion County.

III. PARTIES A· Plaintiffs
4. Kataza Taifaƒ Paul Komyatti, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Aaron Isby, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Jr., Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus, James Thompson, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman Morris, Michael Hegwood, Terrence Drain, Eric Malone, Michael Holland, Albert Estep, and Roosevelt Williams are adult prisoners incarcerated in the Maximum Control Complex (MCC), a "supermaximum" security institution, located in Westville, Indiana.
5. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, for declaratory, injunctive and money damages relief, and, pursuant to Trial Rule 23(b)(2), for declaratory and injunctive relief, on behalf of all persons who are now or in the future will be confined in the Defendants' "supermaximum" security institutions such as MCC.
6. At the time of this filing, the class consists of over eighty (80) prisoners. This number is expected to increase to several hundred in the near future. Joinder of all members is impracticable.
7. Questions of law and fact concerning the long-term solitary confinement of prisoners in the Indiana Department of Correction are common to members of the class.
8. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.

9. The prisoners and their counsel will thoroughly and adequately represent the interests of the class-
10. The defendants have acted and have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and final injunctive relief is appropriate to the class as a whole.
B. Defendants 11. Defendant Evan Bayh is Governor of the State of Indiana
and head of the State's executive branch of government. As Governor, he appoints the Commissioner of the Department of Correction (DOC) and retains ultimate administrative authority over that Department. Governor Bayh is sued in both his individual and official capacities.
12. Defendant James E. Aiken is the Commissioner of the Department of Correction for the State of Indiana. He exercises supervisory power over Indiana State prisons including the MCC. Commissioner Aiken is sued in his individual and official capacities.
13. Defendant Norman G. Owens is Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction. He developed the criteria used to assign prisoners to solitary confinement in the MCC. Mr. Owens is sued in his individual and official capacities.
14. Defendant John Nunn is the Deputy Commissioner of Operations for the DOC. Applying Defendant Owens' selection criteria, Nunn decides which prisoners are to be assigned to

long-term solitary confinement at MCC. Mr. Nunn is sued in his individual and official capacities.
15. Defendant Charles E. Wright is Director of the MCC in . Westville, Indiana. He exercises supervisory power over the conditions and operations at the MCC. Mr. Wright is sued in his individual and official capacities.
IV. FACTS
16. Prisoners committed to the DOC must be classified pursuant to Ind. Code 35-38-3-5 and 6 as in need of minimum/ medium/ or maximum security, and are then to be assigned to a facility or program designated either as minimum/ medium/ or maximum security.
17. Indiana law provides that a prisoner can be separated from an institution's general population and subjected to solitary confinement only as provided for by statutes authorizing administrative and disciplinary segregation.
18. Contrary to Indiana law, the DOC has circumvented the statutory segregation guidelines and procedures by administratively subjecting prisoners to long-term solitary confinement in "supermaximum" security institutions such as MCC.
19. The DOC presently has one supermaximum security institution known as the Maximum Control Complex {"MCC") located in Westville, Indiana, and is constructing another supermaximum security institution in Sullivan, Indiana.

20. Approximately eighty prisoners are held in the MCCƒ although it has a maximum capacity of 186 prisoners.
21. The DOC's criteria and admission procedures for maximum control complexes promulgated by Defendant Owens are vague, subjective, and discretionary, and allow prison authorities to transfer prisoners to the MCC in retaliation for the prisoners' exercise of speech and association rights or their rights of legal redress.
22. Specifically, these criteria permit prisoners to be transferred to the MCC for such reasons as having "a proven and/or documented history of . . . serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit . . . [or] . . . intensive involvement in gangs or gang activities."
23. The criteria do not define the terms "serious disruption," "intensive involvement," "gangs," or "gang activities."
24. The criteria do not require these allegations to be "proven," in any proceeding, only "documented." Who can "document" these allegations, and what standards they are required to follow, are not set forth in the criteria.
25. Pursuant to these vague standards, several prisoners, including Plaintiff Paul Komyatti, have been placed in solitary confinement in the MCC because they have sued the DOC and assisted other prisoners in pursuing their legal rights against the DOC.
26. The admission criteria allow prisoners who have served all their disciplinary segregation time for past offenses, and

who have been released back to a prison's general population, to be resegregated in MCC based solely on their past, alreadypunished, conduct. This has happened to many prisoners, including Plaintiffs Mark Douglas and James Edward Shropshire.
27. The admission criteria leave so much discretion to prison officials that an offense as minor as throwing water on a guard can result in the prisoner being sent to the MCC. This is why Plaintiff Robert Jenkins was sent to the MCC.
28. Prisoners are not provided notice of charges against them, nor given a hearing to contest their assignment to the MCC.
29. To be assigned to the MCC, a prisoner must be free from disciplinary or administrative segregation status.
B. Defendants' "Behavior Modification" Proor«"t 30. The MCC has adopted a "behavior modification" program
which requires total submission of the prisoners to state authority, and allows a high level of discretion on the part of administrators and staff.
31. All new arrivals at the MCC are initially assigned to "Program Level III." Prisoners in Level III are denied visits for ninety (90) days, after which they are allowed only one visit every thirty (30) days. They are denied telephone privileges except one call per week. They are denied access to radios and televisions.

32. prisoners must remain infraction-free at Level III for 180 days before they can petition for promotion to the next program level.
33. Infractions as minor as violating the rules prohibiting prisoners from getting under their blankets in bed during the day, attempting to talk to other prisoners, or talking back to staff, can result in prisoners being denied promotion out of Level III.
34. Guards can give "bad day" reports to prisoners that deprive them of a full month of vested good time, thus keeping the prisoner in Level III a longer time. Prisoners are not provided a hearing to contest these bad day reports.
35. There are no clear policies to guide correctional staff with respect to stripping cells. Bedding can be removed from a prisoner's cell for such minor infractions as the failure to make the bed by 7 a.m.
36. Since prisoners must remain alone in their cells 23 hours per day with essentially nothing to do, and that temperatures can get very cold in the cells, the rule prohibiting prisoners from getting under their covers is arbitrary and unduly harsh.
37. Since many prisoners can neither read nor write, isolating them from other human beings, denying them visits and telephone calls, depriving them of educational opportunities, and prohibiting them from watching television and listening to the

radio, essentially prevents them from communicating with the outside world.
38. The second program level. Level II, provides prisoners with televisions and radios for six hours per day (but only between the hours of 12 noon and 6:00 p.m. when mostly "soap operas" are telecast), two telephone calls per week, and one visit every fourteen (14) days.
39. Prisoners must remain infraction-free at Level II for 365 days before they can petition for promotion to Level I.
40. Prisoners in Level I gain access to daytime and evening radio and television, are allowed three telephone calls per week, and permitted one visit every ten (10) days.
41. Prisoners can petition to return to their parent institution if they remain infraction-free in Level I for eighteen (18) months.
42. In view of the harsh conditions, arbitrary rules, and the total discretion of prison authorities, prisoners have little hope of ever being released from solitary confinement and going back to general population.
C. Conditions at: MCC Isolation 43. Prisoners transferred from their parent institution to
the MCC are held in complete segregation from each other, and have little contact with other human beings.

44. Prisoners at the MCC are kept in their cells 23 or more hours per day. When they are let out to exercise or shower, they do so by themselves and have no contact with other prisoners.
45. The prisoners' cell doors are solid except for a small glass window and a food slot.
46. The lights are kept on in prisoners' cells twenty-four hours per day.
47. MCC prisoners are deprived of most of their personal possessions. They are not even allowed to display pictures of loved ones in their rooms.
48. Prisoners lose track of time in MCC. There are no clocks on the walls within sight of the prisoners, and prisoners are not allowed to possess clocks or wrist watches. The MCC staff has been ordered not to tell prisoners the time of day or the day of the week.
49. Prisoners transferred to the MCC are denied visitors for ninety (90) days.
50. On the few occasions when they are allowed to receive visitors, prisoners are not allowed to see close personal friends who are not members of their immediate families.
Absence of Programs 51. Prisoners solitarily confined in the MCC are denied vocational, educational, and rehabilitative opportunities that are statutorily required to be provided to general population prisoners.
10

52. Prisoners solitarily confined in the MCC are denied meaningful recreation and exercise time that is statutorily required to be provided to general population prisoners.
Physical Conditions 53. Prisoners are exposed to extremely cold temperatures in the MCC. Temperatures have been recorded as low as 46 degrees in the cells. Even so, prisoners are denied warm clothing and are not permitted to get under their blankets during the day. If the prisoners do get under their blanket, their cells are "stripped,¯ and they are forced to lay on the cold steel bedframe or the concrete floor. To inflict more pain on prisoners by these cold temperatures, prisoners on strip-cell status have their socks removed. 54. The ambient air within the MCC is extremely dry and the water hard. As a result, prisoners have experienced extreme skin irritations. This dryness has caused some of the inmates' skin, including their lips, feet, and scalp, to peel, crack, and bleed. Because of these conditions, the MCC physician prescribed vaseline and skin lotions to be given the prisoners. Notwithstanding doctor's orders, Defendant Wright denied vaseline and lotions to the prisoners. 55. The water that the inmates have been forced to drink contains contaminants which have resulted in making many of them nauseous and has contributed to skin irritations.
11

Access to the Courts 56. Prisoner access to legal materials and attorney visits is severely restricted in the MCC. 57. The defendants have denied prisoners visits with attorneys, even though these visits were prearranged and all DOC policies were followed. 58. Even when attorneys are allowed to visit prisoners, attorney-client communications are severely restricted. 59. During the limited visitation that prisoners are allowed, including attorney-client visitation, prisoners are handcuffed and in leg irons. Prisoners and visitors are separated by a wall and window, communication is possible only through an electronic device, and these conversations can be overheard by prison officials and other visitors. 60. The law library is inadequate; no inmate trained in the law is allowed to assist prisoners; and inmates are not allowed to check-out law books. 61. Prisoners are not allowed to purchase legal books from publishers; nonlegal books are allowed. 62. Despite the fact that: many prisoners can neither read nor write, they are not provided an attorney or lay advocate during disciplinary proceedings.
63. Inmate mail, including legal mail, is tampered with and sometimes confiscated.
12

64. The defendants have instituted a new policy denying free postage and copying of legal materials to anyl·íCCprisoner with over $5.00 in his prison account. Prisoners in other DOC facilities are provided this service.
Religion 65. Prisoners are not permitted to practice their religions. They are not allowed to congregate for religious services, and some have had their Bibles, Korans, religious medallions, and headwear confiscated. 66. During the holy Muslim month of Ramadaan, the defendants deliberately denied wholesome food to Muslim prisoners. These prisoners were only fed twice per twenty-four (24) hour period, and, at times, were fed spoiled green meat and rotten eggs. The prisoners were also denied medication during this time. 67. Prisoners are not allowed to enroll in education correspondence courses, including Bible study correspondence courses. Pursuant to this policy, Plaintiff Paul Komyatti was prevented from enrolling, at his own expense, in Charles Colson's Prison Ministries Bible Study Correspondence Course.
Lss« 68. Prisoners are prohibited from smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco.
13

69. Prisoners are not allowed to have drinking cups in their cells.
70. Prisoners are not allowed to purchase food items from the commissary.
71. Prisoners are not allowed to use a washcloth while bathing.
Verbal Harassment and Physical Abuse 72. Many of the prisoners are subject to verbal abuse and harassment by prison officials. 73. Some prisoners have been physically abused. Prisoners have been injured during unnecessary and unduly rigorous cell extractions for minor rules violations, and the defendants have maliciously and wantonly inflicted pain on inmates by spraying them with chemical agents and with firehoses. 74. Plaintiff Albert Estep was savagely beaten by guard Carl Johnson. 75. Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams, had his eye severely injured when the defendants used a firehose on him. 76. Handcuffs are routinely put on too tight during cell extractions, causing great pain and injury. 77. If prisoners resist this abusive treatment, they are placed in full restraints and strapped to their steel bedframes. During this time they are only provided two meals a day.
14

Medical and Mental Health Care 78. Medical care at the MCC is grossly inadequate, and defendants are deliberately indifferent to the prisoners' serious medical needs. 79. Plaintiff William Sampley, who has a known heart condition, was on an extended hunger strike, and experienced chest pains for several days. Despite this, he was inadequately monitored and suffered a heart attack. Although he was given an Electrocardiogram (EKG), the results of the test were not even read for ten days, and thus Sampley did not receive treatment for his heart attack until ten days after it occurred. 80. Plaintiff Edward Broadus is disabled and cannot walk, yet he is not provided a wheelchair. Prison officials have denied him visits with attorneys by saying that he has refused to walk to these visits, even though he cannot do so. They have also turned a firehose on him in his cell to serve as a "shower." 81. Plaintiff Robert Jenkins had his four front teeth knocked-out in April, 1991. Despite his repeated requests for dental care, he has been told that he will not get replacements for these teeth until sometime in 1993. 82. Many of the prisoners are in need of psychiatric care which they are not receiving. Moreover, the harsh and cruel conditions which prisoners are forced to endure create great stress and exacerbate their mental health problems. 83. As a result of extended isolation and cruel conditions, Plaintiff Albert Estep had a mental breakdown and began eating
15

his own feces and wiping it all over his cell. Still, he was not provided mental health care.
84. Plaintiff Robert Jenkins is in need of extensive psychiatric care which he is not receiving. As a result of extended isolation and the harsh conditions, Jenkins has repeatedly gouged deep cuts in his forearms in senseless acts of selfmutilation.
85. The conditions are so harsh and cruel that prisoners have protested them by going on extended hunger strikes. Plaintiffs Kataza Taifa, Paul Komyatti, William Sampley and Hark Douglas were on a hunger strike for thirty-seven (37) days. They ended this hunger strike when a court ordered them to be force fed.
86. The conditions are so harsh and cruel that Plaintiff Paul Komyatti attempted to cut off his finger, and Plaintiff Kataza Taifa did cut off his finger, in desperate attempts to publicize these conditions and gain assistance in challenging them.
87. The defendants have taken the above actions under color of state law and with the intent to deprive the prisoners of their rights and/or with deliberate indifference to the safety and well-being of the prisoners.
16

V. re.¾TttS FOR RELIEF A. Indiana Code Provisions
88. The classification of prisoners as in need of "supermaximum'' security violates Indiana Code SS 35-38-3-5 and 6 which provides that prisoners shall be classified as minimum, medium, or maximum security. There is no statutory authorization for a 8upermaximum security classification.
89. The segregation of prisoners in supermaximum security institutions, and the disciplining of prisoners within MCC, all done without charges, notice, or hearings, violates the Disciplinary Segregation procedure set forth in I.C. 11-11-5 et seq. These provisions require, inter alia, that before a prisoner can be segregated from the general population for alleged misconduct, written charges of misconduct must be filed, the prisoner provided the assistance of a lay advocate, a hearing held before an impartial decisionmaker, at which the prisoner is allowed to submit evidence, and the filing of written findings of fact, evidence relied upon and the reasons for the action taken.
90. The segregation of prisoners in supermaximum security institutions violates the Administrative Segregation procedures set forth in Ind. Code S 11-10-1-7, which require, inter alia, that before a prisoner may be administratively segregated from the general population, prison officials must make a finding that segregation is necessary for the prisoner's own physical safety, or for the physical safety of others. Administrative segregation
17

is limited to thirty days unless preauthorized by the filing of additional findings of fact within that time.
91. The minimum three years of segregation violates Ind. Code § 11-10-1-7 which requires the review of a prisoner's segregation status every thirty (30) days.
92. The assignment of prisoners to at least three years of solitary confinement in the MCC violates Ind. Code S 11-10-1-6, which requires an annual review of a prisoner's security classification, and reassignment to an appropriate security classification after providing the prisoner with notice and the opportunity to challenge the classification.
93. The denial of vocational and educational programs and opportunities violates Ind. Code 11-10-5-1, which requires the DOC to implement academic and vocational programs for prisoners.
94. The denial of employment and educational programs and opportunities violates Ind. Code 11-10-1-3(b) which requires the DOC to assign prisoners to employment, education, or training programs within their assigned facility.
95. The denial of industrial or agricultural programs violates Ind. Code S 11-10-6-2 which requires the DOC to maintain and operate industry and farm programs to equip prisoners with marketable skills and the means to earn a livelihood upon the prisoners' return to the community.
96. The isolation and sensory deprivation imposed upon MCC prisoners violates Ind. Code S 11-10-11-1 which requires the DOC to establish recreational and cultural programs and activities
18

designed to develop and maintain the physical and mental health of confined persons.
B. State Constitutional Provisions 97. The vague and discretionary admission criteria and
procedures, which permit the isolation of prisoners based on their speech and association and their prior already-punished conduct, and which do not provide prisoners with notice or hearings, violate the speech/ association, due process and double jeopardy provisions of Article I, SS 3ƒ 9, and 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
98. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement violate Article I, § 15 of the Indiana Constitution, which prohibits unnecessarily rigorous treatment of prisoners.
99. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement violate Article I, § 16 of the Indiana Constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and requires that penalties be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
100. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement violate Article I, § 18 of the Indiana Constitution, which requires that the penal laws of the state be founded on principles of reformation, and not vindictiveness.
101. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement violate Article I, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which mandates due course of law.
19

102. Defendants' interference with the prisoners' rights of conscience, worship and belief violate Article I, SS 2, 3, 4 and 9 of the Indiana Constitution.
103. Defendants' interference with the prisoners' access to legal materials, access to court, and attorney-client communications, violates Article I, S 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which protects the prisoners' rights to due course of law.
C. United States Constitutional Provisions 104. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of
confinement violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
105. The solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement deprive the prisoners of their state-created liberty interests as outlined above without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
106. Defendants' interference with the prisoners' access to court and with their attorney-client communications violate the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
107. Defendants' segregation of prisoners in retaliation for the exercise of their speech and association rights and for their attempts to petition the government for redress of their grievances violates the petition, speech and association clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
20

D· Reservation of Rights 108. pursuant to the rules of pleading and practice plain-
tiffs reserve the right to assert additional violations of state and federal laws.
VI. PttAYKR FOR RKT.TKF The plaintiffs ask this Court to:
1. Certify this cause as a class action. 2. Declare that the solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement at MCC violate Indiana Code SS 11-10-1-3(b), 11-10-1-6, 11-10-1-7, 11-10-5-1, 11-10-ß-2, 11-10-11-1, 11-11-5 et sga., 35-38-3-5 and 35-38-3-6. 3. Declare that the solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement at MCC violate Article I, S§ 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 15, 16 and 18 of the Indiana Constitution. 4. Declare that the solitary confinement scheme and conditions of confinement at MCC violate Amendments One, Six, Eight, and Fourteen to the United States Constitution. 5. Enjoin the defendants from further violating the above state and federal laws; require defendants to return the prisoners presently incarcerated in the Maximum Control Complex to the general population of their parent institutions; and prohibit the defendants from assigning prisoners to the supermaximum security institutions at Westville and, in the future, at Sullivan, Indiana, in violation of Indiana and United States law.
21

6. Award money damages to the individual plaintiffs under their federal claims. At the present time, plaintiffs are pursuing their claims for money damages under their state claims directly with the defendants pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. if these efforts are unsuccessful, plaintiffs intend to amend their Complaint and seek money damages on these claims in this Court.
' 7. Retain jurisdiction of this case until all remedial orders have been fully implemented.
8. Award the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees and costs under both federal and state law.
9. Grant whatever additional relief is just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 2JL» 1992

^¿ fí/(^cr{ #r /slSO¿)¿^í C Richard A. W a p l e s ƒ

Hamid R. Kashani

Peggy A. Hillman

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Richard A. Waples, Legal Director INDIANA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 445 N. Pennsylvania St., Suite 911 Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883 317/635-4059

Peggy A. Hillman
Staff Counsel INDIANA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 445 N. Pennsylvania St., Suite 911 Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883 317/635-4059
Hamid Kashani ATTORNEY AT LAW 1800 N. Meridian St., #402 Indianapolis, IN 46202-1492 317/923-9100

22

 
 Cu»íJ<it> :

INDIANA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

|

March 31, 1994

„ „ „ „,,,. Jaifa v. Bayh

Al Brons¿ein, Director NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, #410 Washington, DC 20009

PC-N-006-002

RE: Taifa v. Bayh (Indiana Supermax Prison)

7

Dear Al:
445 N. Pennsylvania Slrt·l
Enclosed please find a copy of the Agreed Entry in the 5uitê9ii above case. Also enclosed is the report and recommendation of indianopoiB,iN46204-1883 Magistrate Pierce. We think the Agreed Entry represents the best result possible for the prisoners in this litigation. As T E L `4059 Magistrate Pierce stated in his recommendations to the Judge: FAX 3i7.635.4ios "The Agreed Entry represents an outcome at least comparable, if not far superior/ to that which plaintiffs might achieve by proceeding to trial." Report and Recommendation, p. 10 (Jan. 5, 1994).

The District Court summarized the decree's terms as follows:

"In general, the Agreed Entry would provide for: the assignment of prisoners to the MCC only under specified conditions; the transfer of prisoners out of the MCC after a specified period of time, provided that certain conditions are met; a commissary at the MCC, with a list of particular items to be made available; inmate access to radios and televisions under specified conditions and at inmate expense; expanded visitation and telephone privileges; the availability of additional reading materials for prisoners; increased opportunities for prisoner recreation; increased privileges with respect to keeping of personal property in cells and in the storage room; improvements in the condition of bedding; a decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the

THE INDIANA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION IS AN AFFILIATE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Al Bronstein March 31, 1994 Page 2
cells; additional access by prisoners to personal hygienic items; the establishment of a policy concerning the use of force by DOC personnel; expanded provisions for medical care, including mandatory psychiatric evaluations for all prisoners upon their admittance to the MCC; an expanded law library containing specified reference materials, and provisions for greater access to legal materials by prisoners; increased educational opportunities for prisoners; a substance abuse program; and improvements in inmate grievance procedures."
Report and Recommendation at 6. Thank you for your assistance in this case. Your
willingness to share experts and ideas early on was invaluable. Also thank Elizabeth, Mark and Ed for their helpful comments and assistance. Could you please see that this Agreed Entry gets circulated to them as well, and to Jenny Gainsborough who recently inquired about the agreement. Take care and I hope all is going well.
Sine
ïichard A. Waples Legal Director
RAW:vme Enclosure
MCC\BRONSTEI.001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KATAZA TAIFA, PAUL KOMYATTI,

)

WILLIAM SAMPLEY, MARK S. DOUGLAS, )

AARON ISBY, KEVIN SANDIFER,

)

JOHN CHARLES COLE, JR.,

)

PRESTON GARDNER, EDWARD BROADUS, )

JAMES THOMPSON, NOLAN McDANDAL, )

ROBERT SMITH, ROBERT JENKINS,

)

RICHARD MUMFORD, TILLMAN MORRIS, )

MICHAEL HEGWOOD, TERRENCE DRAIN, )

ERIC MALONE, MICHAEL HOLLAND,

)

ALBERT ESTEP, and ROOSEVELT

)

WILLIAMS, EDDIE SHROPSHIRE,

)

on their own behalf and on behalf )

of all other individuals

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs',

)

)

v.

) )

EVAN BAYH, individually and in

)

his official capacity as

)

Governor of the State of Indiana; )

CHRISTOPHER DeBRUYN, individually )

and in his official capacity as )

Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction; NORMAN G. OWENS, individually and in his official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction; JOHN NUNN, individually and in his official capacity as the Senior Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Indiana Department of Correction; and, CHARLES E. WRIGHT, individually and in his official capacity

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

as the Superintendent of the

Maximum Control Complex of the

Indiana Department of Correction,

Cause No. S-92-00429-M

Defendants.

AGREED ENTRY

, v·

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1

I.

ASSIGNMENT TO MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX

1

A. ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA

1

B. PROCEDURE FOR REFERRAL OF A PRISONER FOR

ASSIGNMENT TO THE MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX . . . . 2

II. ASSIGNMENT FROM THE MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX

5

A. TWELVE-MONTH REVIEW

6

B. TWENTY-FOUR CONTINUOUS VESTED

MONTH

RECLASSIFICATION

7

C. THIRTY-SIX VESTED MONTH RECLASSIFICATION . . . . 7

D. HOUSING ASSIGNMENT UPON TRANSFER .

8

E. CONDUCT-BASED ADJUSTMENT TO VESTED MONTHS . . . . 9

F. NO DELAY IN ASSIGNMENTS

9

G. RETROACTIVITY

9

III. MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX CONDITIONS

10

A. TELEVISION AND RADIO

10

B. COMMISSARY

12

C. PERSONAL HYGIENE

13

E. VISITATION AND TELEPHONE CALLS

15

F. MAIL

18

\'`

G. WRITING UTENSILS

20

H. READING MATERIALS

20

I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

22

J. MEALS

22

K. RECREATION

23

L. CLOTHING

24

M. BEDDING

25

N. PRISONERS' PERSONAL PROPERTY

25

0. FACILITIES

26

P. MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

28

IV. USE OF FORCE POLICY

30

A. USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE

30

B. LEATHER RESTRAINTS

31

C. USE OF CELL EXTRACTION TEAMS

32

D. REPORTING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE

32

V.

MEDICAL CARE

33

VI. LEGAL ACCESS

35

VII. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

39

VIII. SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM

40

IX. DISCIPLINARY RESTRICTIONS

40

ii

¯A

X.

PRISONERS' GRIEVANCES

41

XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

42

A. FORMER POLICIES SUPERSEDED

42

B. RETURN OF CONFISCATED MATERIALS

42

C. ABUSE OF PRIVILEGES

42

D. PARAGRAPH TITLES

43

E. COPIES OF THE ENTRY

43

F. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

43

G. ATTORNEY'S FEES

45

XII. MONITORING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

46

A. JURISDICTION -– IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

PHASES

46

B. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

47

C. MODIFICATION OF THE ENTRY

47

D. DEFENDANTS' PERIODICAL REPORTS

47

E. DEFENDANTS' DUTY TO EDUCATE THEIR STAFF

48

F. MONITORING BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL

48

G. PERIODIC REPORTS BY DOC

49

H. PERIODIC REPORTS BY MCC

49

XIII. DISPOSITION

50

iii

INTRODUCTION The parties, having agreed that settlement of this class action is in the best interests of all concerned, but without admitting or acknowledging that the defendants are liable or that existing conditions at the Maximum Control Complex violate any Indiana or United States constitutional or statutory law, hereby submit to the Court the following terms which shall constitute the judgment of the Court in this action with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief: The terms of this Agreed Entry [hereinafter Entry] shall apply to the defendants in their official capacities, their officers, agents, agencies, employees, successors in office, and all those acting in concert or participation with them. This Entry applies to the facility known as the Maximum Control Complex [hereinafter MCC], operated by the Indiana Department of Correction [hereinafter DOC], in Westville, Indiana. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

I.

ASSIGNMENT TO MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX

A. ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA The following criteria are to be applied when considering an individual prisoner for assignment to the MCC. The prisoner shall be: 1. A committed or court ordered male adult.

2. An individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration: (a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant. (b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death. (c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit. (d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities. (e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape.
3. Prisoners diagnosed as mentally ill shall not be incarcerated in MCC.
4. These are the only criteria the DOC will consider in assigning prisoners to the MCC.
B. PROCEDURE FOR REFERRAL OF A PRISONER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX
The following procedure is to be used for referral of a prisoner for assignment to the MCC:

¯¯`s
1. Upon determining that a prisoner meets the criteria for consideration for assignment to the MCC, the referring facility head must notify the prisoner in writing of the reasons he is being considered for assignment to the MCC. If the prisoner desires to contest the possible assignment he can do so either in writing or in person, or both, to the classification supervisor of the facility. -
2. A facility head shall submit a written request for assignment which must include: (a) A new Classification Designation Instrument and Transfer Report. (b) A copy of an updated Progress Report. (c) Copies of all Adult Disciplinary Policy and Procedure [hereinafter ADPP] Reports, Investigative Reports of acts which prompted the referral. (d) A copy of an updated Mental Health Report (including Psychiatric Report). (e) Copies of updated Medical and Dental Report. (f) A copy of the prisoner's written response, if any.
3. The completed Designation Instrument along with the Transfer Report and all relevant materials are

to be forwarded to the appropriate Classification

Analyst.

4. Upon receipt of the referral materials, the

Analyst will review all materials to ensure that

the prisoner meets the criteria for assignment to

the MCC. The Analyst will also review the

materials to ensure that all required materials

have been included. (The Analyst will request

additional information as needed.)

Upon

completion of the review, the Analyst will make

a recommendation to approve or disapprove the

assignment to the MCC, and forward the

recommendation and all relevant materials to the

Director of Classification.

5. The Director of Classification will review all

materials and either approve or disapprove the

assignment to the MCC.

(a) If disapproved, the materials will be

returned to the Analyst, and the referring

facility will be notified in writing. The

prisoner will remain in his assigned

facility.

(b) If approved, the material will be returned

to the Analyst. The prisoner and referring

facility will be notified in writing.' The

Analyst will assign the prisoner the

Security Classification Designation of Level 5, along with the appropriate Medical Code. This will cause the Transfer Authority to be issued to the referring and receiving facilities. 6. All assignments to the MCC must be approved by the Director of Classification. 7. Prisoners assigned to the MCC may appeal their assignment to the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. The prisoner's appeal shall be filed within ten (10) days after he receives notice of the reassignment. The appeal shall be determined within thirty (30) days after receipt. If the appeal is granted the prisoner will remain in his current facility. If the appeal is denied, the prisoner will be transferred to MCC. A prisoner shall not be transferred to MCC before his appeal is considered and decided. 8. If the prisoner is on Disciplinary or Administrative Segregation status, the status will be rescinded at the time of transfer to the MCC.
II. ASSIGNMENT FROM THE MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX 1. Assignments from the MCC to a lower security level facility rest largely on the behavior of the

prisoner as reflected by the accumulation of vested months. 2. A vested month is a month in which the prisoner remains free of any disciplinary conviction for a Class A or B violation or three or more class C or D violations under ADPP. A prisoner who is entitled to a vested month, by virtue of being free of any convictions so noted, shall not be required to take any further steps, such as attending a hearing, in order to earn such vested month. 3. The DOC retains the discretion at any time to review and revise downward the security classification of any prisoner assigned to MCC and transfer the prisoner to a lower level security level facility within the DOC.
A. TWELVE-MONTH REVIEW Within twelve months after confining a prisoner at MCC, the DOC shall reevaluate the appropriateness of the prisoner's classification and assignment, and make a classification-assignment decision based on that review. The Department shall consider the prisoner's accumulation of vested months in making its decision. The accumulation of twelve vested months at this review shall not require the reassignment of the prisoner to

a lower security classification, but the DOC shall consider this factor as positive progress on the part of the prisoner and shall make a good faith classification evaluation and assignment. In making this review, the Department shall interview the prisoner, discuss with him the information on which the decision will be based and allow him to challenge that information and present pertinent information of his own. The Department shall promptly notify the prisoner, in writing, of its classification-assignment decision and the reasons for it.
B. TWENTY-FOUR CONTINUOUS VESTED MONTH RECLASSIFICATION A prisoner who has served twenty-four (24) consecutive vested months shall be reclassified to a lower security classification designation and transferred from the MCC to a lower security level facility within the DOC.
C. THIRTY-SIX VESTED MONTH RECLASSIFICATION A prisoner who has served a total of thirty-six (36) vested months, the last six (6) of which the prisoner has served consecutively without a conviction for a class A or B infraction, shall be reclassified to a lower security classification designation and transferred from the MCC to a lower security level facility within the DOC.

D. HOUSING ASSIGNMENT UPON TRANSFER 1. All efforts shall be made to transfer a discharged prisoner to the prisoner's parent institution, unless there is a separatee problem or there exists a legitimate and demonstrable security concern. 2. Prisoners transferred from MCC to a lower level security facility within the DOC will be presumptively entitled to initial housing in the general population of that facility. If the classification committee of that facility concludes that general population is not appropriate housing assignment for the prisoner, then the DOC will make reasonable/sincere efforts to transfer the prisoner to another facility of the same or lower security rating where he can be housed in general population. Such efforts shall include a review by DOC's Director of Classification with an eye toward the transfer.
E. CONDUCT-BASED ADJUSTMENT TO VESTED MONTHS Prisoners may be awarded additional vested months at the discretion of the DOC for exceptionally good behavior and/or for positive progress in educational and rehabilitative pursuits. Prisoners may lose
3

accumulated vested months only for CAB convictions, at the discretion of a CAB, and then only up to the number of months a CAB could otherwise order segregation of the prisoner for the violations under the ADPP.
F. NO DELAY IN ASSIGNMENTS All reclassifications and transfers from the MCC in accordance with this Entry shall be effected within five (5) working days after the prisoner becomes eligible for the transfer.
G. RETROACTIVITY The Provisions of this Entry relative to vested months and reclassification shall be retroactive to the members of the class. Upon entry of this Entry, the DOC shall review and reevaluate each prisoner's eligibility under these provisions for reclassification. For the purpose of retroactive application to the determination of vested month, a prisoner shall be deemed entitled to a vested month if the prisoner has been free of not more than seven bad day reports, a Class A or 3 violation, or not more than two Class C or D violations.

III.

MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX CONDITIONS The Defendants agree to operate the MCC consistent with Indiana statutory, administrative and case law, the Indiana and United States Constitutions, and the standards outlined in this Entry as follows:

A. TELEVISION AND RADIO 1. All prisoners will be allowed to bring with them or acquire- a radio upon admittance and shall be allowed to retrieve from their property or acquire a television, which will fit on the TV shelf in the cell, after acquiring three (3) months of vested time. 2. Radios and TV's brought in by the prisoners shall be subject to security and health inspection. If the prisoner consents and MCC agrees, MCC may take remedial action to bring the Radios and TV's, brought in by the prisoner, within the MCC's security and health guidelines. 3. All prisoners shall be allowed to use radios in their cells when they are not otherwise occupied with MCC programs. Prisoners with three vested months or more may watch television between the hours of 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. Prisoners with six or more vested months may watch television 24 hours a day.
10

``\
4. The DOC will permit basic cable television service available to the cells if feasible and on the condition that the prisoners pay the financial cost of the cable service.
5. The DOC shall also operate a video cassette recorder and make educational programs and recreational movies available to the prisoners.
6. The low cost "Access" K-brand black and white televisions previously available to the prisoners shall remain on the list of available property. If this brand becomes unavailable to DOC, reasonable efforts will be made to replace it with a television of equivalent cost.
7. Televisions and radios removed from cells as discipline will be kept in the property room and returned to the prisoner when the suspension of the privileges is completed.
8. The DOC shall make reasonable efforts to obtain soft plastic headphones for purchase by the prisoners.
B. COMMISSARY 1. The following items will be available through commissary: (a) Items currently on commissary: (1) Small paperback dictionary (2) Small paperback thesaurus 11

¯``\

(3) (4) (5)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)

Postage Stamps Chap Stick (plastic tube only) Envelopes, including large envelopes (limit 20 weekly) 8 1/2 x 11 White, Lined Tablet Notebook filler paper
Greeting cards (2 per order) Bar soap (as needed) Mouthwash (plastic bottle) Address book Pocket folder Walk-Man Radio AA Battery 13" Color or Black & White TV

(b) Vitamins and supplements. (c) At least seven different food items (see
attached commissary list) (d) Personal hygiene materials: soap, mouthwash,
toothpaste, toothbrush, and deodorant. (e) Alkaline batteries. (f) Ink eraser. (g) Denture adhesives, containers, and hygiene
supplies for prisoners with denture (h) Prosthetic device and hygiene supplies for
prisoners with prosthetics.

2. The MCC will make a continuing reasonable effort to provide fruit juices on commissary if they are available in containers which meet the security concerns of the MCC.
3. Prisoners shall be allowed to order commissary items at least once a week.
12

4. Any prisoner with at least two (2) vested months shall be allowed to order food items from commissary.
5. Prisoners may not order or store more than seven (7) packages of commissary food items in their cells. Additionally, food items may not be stored in the personal property room.
6. A prisoner's access to commissary food items may be restricted for medical reasons, but only per a physician's or dietician's order.
C. PERSONAL HYGIENE 1. All toothbrushes will be modified by MCC for security purposes and may be kept in the cell. 2. Prisoners may keep their mouthwash in their cells. 3. MCC, at its expense, shall provide each prisoner with sufficient amount or quantity of soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, and deodorant, unless the prisoners chooses to purchase these items from the commissary. 4. Sufficient amount or quantity of body lotion, shampoo, and Q-tips will be provided to all prisoners, upon request, at DOC's expense. 5. Prisoners' shampoo, body lotion, safety-razor, and Q-tips shall be provided to them at shower time, upon request, and will not be kept in their cells.
13

6. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Entry, MCC, at its expense, shall provide indigent prisoners with personal hygiene supplies.
7. Mirrors will be installed in the shower areas to assist prisoners who wish to shave.
8. Dental floss shall be available to the prisoners, upon request, at DOC's expense.
9. Monthly haircuts will be available to prisoners who desire them.
10. Prisoners shall be allowed ten (10) minutes of shower time on each day recreation is available'to them. This provision neither limits nor requires MCC's ability to provide prisoners with additional shower opportunity.
11. Prisoners may possess sufficient amount of toilet paper in their cells.
OUT-OF-CELL TIME 1. Each prisoner at MCC shail be allowed out of his
cell for at least six (6) hours per week. 2. Prisoners may recreate one hour per day, six days
per week, consistent with the out-of-cell time provisions. 3. Other out-of-cell activities including, but not limited to the following activities, shall not be counted against out-of-cell time:
14

(a) time required for prisoner movement, (b) one sick call visit per week initiated by the
prisoner, and any other appointments ordered by the medical staff, (c) attorney telephone calls and visits, and (d) the first two (2) law library visits per week. 4. All outside trips on a given day shall not count for more than one hour of out-of-cell time for that week. Outside trip means a trip outside of the MCC.
VISITATION AND TELEPHONE CALLS 1. Procedure:
(a) Within two (2) working days from the admission of a prisoner to MCC, the prisoner shall be provided with the necessary form to designate his visitors.
(b) The visits shall begin as soon as practicable and not later than ten (10) days after MCC receives the completed form or forms from the designated visitors.
(c) Each prisoner shall be allowed to designate up to fifteen (15) visitors, excluding attorneys and clergy. Visitors need not be immediate family members. Visitors shall pass background and security check.
15

(d) Subject to the limitations of paragraph (e), each prisoner shall be allowed to modify his visitor list every six months.
(e) Visiting hours are 9:00 to 10:30 a.m., and 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., seven (7) days a week.
(f) The duration of each visit may be up to 1 and 1/2 hours, unless there is a backup of visitors.
(g) The visits will be non-contact. (h) Every visitor may re-visit the same prisoner
every fourteen (14) days. Upon application to the MCC Superintendent and based upon the distance of travel (100 miles or more one-way) or upon personal hardship, permission may be granted to exceed the fourteen-day restriction.
2. There shall be no limitation on telephone calls to attorneys and all such calls shall be made on telephone lines which cannot be monitored internally by DOC and in areas where the prisoner's voice cannot be overheard. The time spent on these calls shall not be counted against a prisoner's recreation time.
3. Prisoners are allowed to make telephone calls during their recreation time on the telephones maintained in the recreation areas.
16

4. The attorney visiting rooms shall have a slot for exchanging materials directly between the prisoners and the attorneys. The attorney-client visitation areas shall be soundproof and conversations therein shall not be capable of being monitored by MCC staff or others.
5. Prisoners may be handcuffed, but with handcuffs with a longer chain than the standard handcuffs, during visitation. The MCC's compliance with the provisions of this paragraph is contingent upon the availability of handcuffs with a longer chain than the standard handcuffs. The MCC shall make reasonable efforts to obtain handcuffs with a longer chain than the standard handcuffs.
6. Nothing herein is intended to prevent a court, with appropriate jurisdiction, from entering any order with respect to visitation, including contact visitation, which it may deem appropriate in an individual case. Contact visits will be conducted in the Westville Correctional Center.
F. MAIL 1. There shall be no restriction on First Class or legal mail unless it contains prohibited items. Mail privileges will not be denied as a fafrm of discipline.
17

2. The MCC will not prohibit mail based on its content unless the material is inflammatory and presents a demonstrable security threat to the institution. All decisions to prohibit written materials must be approved by the facility head. Prisoners must be notified of any censored material and be allowed to appeal the decision to facility head.
3. Articles about, or critical of, the Department of Correction, its facilities, including MCC, and their personnel shall not be considered, on that basis alone, to be prohibited materials.
4. No limit shall be placed on the number of stamps or envelopes a prisoner may purchase on commissary or have in his cell or the number of letters he may send or receive.
5. Defendants agree to comply with Indiana and federal law concerning correspondence including, but not limited to, Ind. Code 11-11-3-3 which provides:

If correspondence is to or from government

officials, courts, attorneys, or

representatives of the public news media,

it may not be opened, read, censored,

copied, or otherwise interfered with in

regard to its prompt delivery or

transmission. However, the department

may open it in the presence of the con-

fined person for the purpose of examining

the contents for contraband or prohibited

property-

Upon conclusion of the

inspection, the item of correspondence'

(other than any contraband or prohibited

property) must be promptly delivered or

transmitted without reading, censoring,

18

copying, or further interfering with its deliverance or transmission.
Any revisions to Ind. Code 11-11-3-3 will be
incorporated into this agreement.
6. Further, Defendants agree to comply with Indiana
and federal law concerning correspondence
including, but not limited to, Ind.
Code 11-11-3-4(b) which provides:
If correspondence is to a person not enumerated in section [11-11-3-3] of this chapter, it may be sealed by the confined person. If, however, the department has reasonable grounds to believe that the correspondence may contain contraband or prohibited property or poses an immediate danger to the safety of an individual or a serious threat to the security of the facility or program, it may be opened for inspection and removal of the contraband or the prohibited property, when appropriate, or reading and appropriate action.
Any revisions to Ind. Code 11-11-3-4 will be
incorporated into this agreement.
7. Outgoing mail shall be deposited with the United
States Post Office on the same date received from
the prisoners. Incoming mail shall be distributed
to the prisoners on the same day received from the
United States Postal Service. These provisions
shall not apply in the event of an emergency or in
the event contraband is discovered in the mail. If
19

a day is not a regular business day, the action required to be taken herein may be postponed to the next business day.
G. WRITING UTENSILS 1. Writing instruments and materials shall be available to all prisoners twenty-four (24) hours per day, consistent with Ind. Code § 11-1-5-4. 2. DOC will endeavor to obtain for purchase on commissary better quality security pens. 3. Legal envelopes will be issued to ¯prisoners upon request and there shall be no limit on the number of envelopes. Prisoners may mail as many legal envelopes per day as requested.
H. READING MATERIALS 1. Prisoners may order and/or receive books, magazines and similar publications from publishers, book clubs or bookstores. Catalogues from stores and merchants are also permitted. 2. Paperback books and magazines of all kinds shall be allowed subject to the provisions of Paragraph III(F)(2), above. A prisoner may have up to twenty-five (25) books and/or magazines in his cell at one time. The current restriction on books exceeding 1,000 pages shall not apply to legal
20

books, dictionaries, and religious books. Anyother books exceeding 1,000 pages may be cut in half, by MCC. Both halves may be kept in the prisoner's cell. Each half shall be counted as a separate book. MCC may require that the covers of hardback books be removed by MCC, with the consent of the prisoner, and kept in the property room. 3. Prisoners may return books and magazines to the property room. The reading materials which are sent to the property room by a prisoner shall be returned to the prisoner, at his request, after thirty (30) days. There shall be no limit on the number of times a prisoner may request the return of the reading materials from the property room. 4. The MCC shall operate a bookcart and make available to prisoners, on a daily basis, a variety of books and magazines. Prisoners may donate their books (including legal books), magazines, and newspapers for use by other prisoners. The MCC staff shall immediately inspect the materials so donated and, if cleared, place them on the bookcart.
I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES Reasonable efforts shall be made to acconunodate the religious practices of all prisoners at MCC. Prisoners may not be denied religious materials, including head-
21

gear, artifacts or medallions, unless these articles present a legitimate and demonstrable threat to institutional security. Nothing herein is intended to prevent a court, with appropriate jurisdiction, from entering any order with respect to visitation, including contact visitation, which it may deem appropriate in an individual case.
J. MEALS 1. Prisoners shall be issued a cup and spoon which they may keep in their cells unless they misuse them. 2. Prisoners shall be provided three meals a day, unless prohibited by pod- or institution-wide emergency conditions. In such an emergency, the prisoners shall be provided at least two meals per day with greater proportions of food than a regular meal as determined by a dietician. Additionally, in such an emergency situation, prisoners shall be allowed to keep the food in their cells until their next meal. Under all circumstances, prisoners shall receive daily nutritional requirements. Any such limitation on the number of meals may continue only so long as the emergency exists. 3. MCC will provide two extra beverage items per day with meals to each prisoner. Coffee will be
22

provided in the morning; coffee or juice will be offered in the evening. Prisoners may keep these beverages in their cups for consumption between meals. 4. Additional menu items to the regular menu shall be provided to prisoners who do not eat pork for religious reasons or who are vegetarians. All prisoners will be served meals which meet minimal dietary standards as approved by a dietician. 5. Salt shall be provided prisoners at meals. 6. Meals shall be prepared and served pursuant to conditions and regulations of the appropriate board of health.
K. RECREATION 1. A basketball shall be provided for outdoor recreation with accompanying basketball hoop. 2. An exercise bicycle will be placed in each one of the large indoor exercise rooms. All prisoners shall have the opportunity to use these bikes at least two times per week. 3. Additionally, MCC will undertake good faith efforts to provide the prisoners with other exercise and recreation equipment consistent with the security and safety of the institution.
23

4. Prisoners may choose either indoor or outdoor recreation. Prisoners will be permitted to choose outdoor recreation even when the temperature is below 32 degrees Fahrenheit, unless staff determines that weather conditions present a health or security threat. The DOC will provide prisoners with coats, hats, and gloves which they may wear during outdoor recreation.
5. Beginning on July 1, 1993, the MCC shall institute a prisoner recreation fund consistent with Ind. Code §§ 4-24-6-1 et seq. (attached).
CLOTHING 1. The DOC shall issue prisoners three (3) pairs of
clothing in their cells. The current limitation on two pairs is rescinded. 2. Prisoners may purchase and/or possess non-DOC¯ issued footwear as approved by facility head so long as they pass security inspection. The DOC will provide slippers to prisoners to wear in their cells. Prisoners may possess their own shower shoes or soft slippers in their cells. 3. The DOC shall also issue long underwear to those prisoners who request it. 4. Clothing exchange shall be at least once per week.
24

M. BEDDING 1. Prisoners shall be provided extra blankets upon request, not to exceed three blankets in all. 2. All prisoners shall retain the bedding in their cells, unless they commit an infraction involving the bedding. Prisoners shall not be prohibited from getting under their extra blankets providing the bed had been made pursuant to MCC rules.
N. PRISONERS' PERSONAL PROPERTY 1. Prisoners shall be allowed to possess and display personal effects, calendars, greeting cards, photographs, pictures, postcards, and like materials so long as these materials are not obscene or create a security risk. 2. Prisoners may display these materials on a 2 by 3 foot section of one wall in their cell. Materials placed on the wall must be flexible enough to be lifted during a search without damage, shall not be larger than one foot by one foot, and may only be adhered to the wall at the top corners of the item. Prisoners may display these materials on the ledge in their cells also. MCC shall provide prisoners with an adhesive suitable for affixing items to the wall.
25

3. Prisoners' property boxes kept in their cells and in the property room shall be replaced by boxes no smaller than 18 x 18 x 24 inches. Televisions are not required to be kept in the property room box. There are no limitations on legal materials kept in the property room.
0. FACILITIES 1. .The heating/air conditioning system at MCC shall be examined by an independent heating and air conditioning professional and repairs shall be made to correct any problems as approved by the Department of Public Works. The system shall be maintained in good operating condition. Defendants shall maintain cell temperatures no lower than 68 degrees Fahrenheit and no greater than 75 degrees Fahrenheit unless the system malfunctions in which case the Defendants shall make reasonable efforts to have it promptly repaired. 2. All plumbing materials shall be lead-free pursuant to State Regulation 675 IAC 16-1. The water in the cells shall be tested as required by the Indiana State Board of Health. 3. Plaintiffs, at their expense, will have the cell water supply at MCC tested by an independent reputable laboratory. If these tests indicate any
26

health concerns, the DOC will take any necessary corrective action. 4. If the result of Plaintiffs' independent laboratory examination, pursuant to Subsection 0(3), supra, or if a physician's examination of any of the plaintiffs, reveals any hazardous condition or defect in the water or the water supply system at MCC, then the plaintiffs' rights to pursue claims for money damages resulting from such hazardous condition or defect in the water or the water supply system at MCC prior to the date of this Entry are not precluded by this Entry. 5. The 13-watt fluorescent bulbs left on in the cells twenty-four hours per day shall be replaced with 7-watt fluorescent bulbs yielding no more than 50% of candle power or lumens of the existing lights. 6. Clocks shall be placed in such locations as to be viewable from all cells.
P. MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 1. Prisoners with twelve vested months shall not be shackled at the feet during normal out-of-cell movements within a housing section.1 A prisoner may lose this privilege, if after the prisoner is
íh housing section includes cells, the recreation area, the shower, and a satellite law library.
27

granted this privilege the prisoner is convicted by a CAB of an offense involving violence. Further, this privilege may be suspended while such a charge is pending before a CAB. 2. Prisoners have the right to marry, consistent with the prevailing law, and the DOC shall make reasonable accommodations for any marriage ceremonies. 3. The previous indigency policy of $30.00 is reinstated. Any system-wide increases of this amount will be incorporated into this Entry. 4. (a) All memoranda and like materials regarding the
conditions, rules and information related to prisoners shall be posted in an area accessible to the prisoners for a period of not less than fifteen (15) days. (b) All memoranda and like materials regarding the conditions, rules and information related to prisoners shall be kept in the satellite law libraries while they are in effect. (c) The MCC shall provide each prisoner with a free issue of the prisoners' handbook, or like material, and any revisions and amended issues as they are published. (d) Upon request, the MCC shall provide each prisoner with copies of every memorandum regarding conditions, rules and information
28

related to prisoners. Such copies shall be provided free of charge to indigent prisoners, (e) The prisoners may send through the mail the originals, if available to them, or the copies of these materials without restriction. 5. Beginning on July 1, 1993, the MCC will offer timeinstallment contracts to prisoners who owe debts to the DOC and have accumulated two consecutive vested months since the incident giving rise to the debt. This Entry does not address or determine the legality of DOC's ability to freeze or seize a prisoner's trust account. All parties reserve all rights with respect to this issue. 6. Prisoners shall earn the DOC's standard rate of prisoner pay.
IV. USE OF FORCE POLICY
Ã. USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 1. Physical force is not to be used as a means of reprisal against or punishment of a prisoner. Staff shall use only reasonably necessary physical force to maintain the custody, control, safety and security of a facility, institution or situation. 2. Equipment-assisted means of force, such as the use of water hoses, chemical agents, four-way
29

restraints, and cell extraction, may only be used when lesser degrees of physical force have failed to bring an unlawful incident under control and when prompt use is calculated to prevent or discontinue a serious offense involving violence or bodily harm. 3. The subject prisoner and all other prisoners who are exposed to chemical agents must be offered appropriate immediate medical care following the application of any chemical agent. 4. The subject prisoner and all other prisoners who are exposed to the application of a water hose must be dried off and provided dry clothing immediately following the application of the water hose. 5. MCC staff shall not use a high pressure water hose to wash a prisoner who has refused a shower.
B. LEATHER RESTRAINTS 1. Leather restraints shall not be used as a form of punishment. Leather restraints to control a prisoner in his cell shall be used only as long as necessary to control the prisoner. 2. Leather restraints may only be used if an offender presents himself as an imminent threat of inflicting serious harm to himself or others by assaulting a person, engaging in significant
30

destruction of property, attempting suicide, inflicting wounds upon himself, or displaying other signs of imminent violence. 3. If leather restrictions are used, the prisoner shall be checked by the DOC personnel at regular intervals at least three times each hour. The prisoner shall be released at least once every four hours to attend to physical needs. The use of four-way restraints for longer than four hours must be approved by a licensed psychiatrist or, if a psychiatrist is not reasonably available, any licensed physician, which approval must be renewed every four hours thereafter. 4. Except as provided herein, use of mechanical restraints shall be prohibited. 5. Prisoners shall not be placed under four-way restraint in outside hospitals except for legitimate medical or security reasons.
C. USE OF CELL EXTRACTION TEAMS 1. In all instances, a prisoner must be given an opportunity either to allow handcuffs to be applied or to face a cell extraction. After a prisoner's initial refusal to be handcuffed, the prisoner must be given an explicit final warning prior to extraction that either he allows himself to be
31

handcuffed immediately or a cell extraction team will remove him from his cell. The warnings must be explicit and must be offered at least once by the officer who originally requests the prisoner to be handcuffed and once by the pod supervisor.
D. REPORTING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 1. Staff shall ensure that a complete and accurate record of the use of physical force is made in all appropriate log books. The log entry shall contain all pertinent information regarding the incident. In addition, each staff person involved in and/or witnessing any use of physical force shall make a full written report. 2. In the case of a cell extraction, or the use of a water hose or chemical agent, the use shall be videotaped if feasible. In the case of the use of leather restraints, the initial application of restraints and the hourly check of the prisoner's willingness to cooperate shall also be videotaped if feasible. Copies of the videotapes shall be forwarded to DOC Central office for review by the Regional Director and to Plaintiffs' counsel, upon request, during the monitoring phase of this Entry as set forth in Part XII, below. Copies of all reports of the use of physical force shall be
32

forwarded to Plaintiffs' counsel on a monthly basis.
V. MEDICAL CARE 1. Every prisoner shall be given a psychiatric evaluation prior to or upon admittance to the MCC and, if necessary, be provided with appropriate shortterm care. Prisoners diagnosed as mentally ill shall not be incarcerated in MCC. If a MCC prisoner is diagnosed as mentally ill, the DOC shall transfer the prisoner * to an appropriate mental health care facility within the DOC or petition a court to transfer the prisoner to the Indiana Department of Mental Health. 2. Any prisoner who displays signs of mental disturbance as determined by the mental health staff shall receive a mental health evaluation. 3. Confidential communications between prisoners and medical staff shall be conducted in a manner not to be overheard by others, including custody staff. 4. Prisoners are encouraged to treat MCC staff in a civil manner. MCC staff are encouraged to treat prisoners in a professional manner. 5. MCC shall have health care staff adequate to carry out daily rounds, to provide access to sick call at least twice weekly, to provide nursing evaluation
33

prioritarized by level of need, to provide medical diagnostic evaluation and treatment for serious medical needs, to provide for medical screening, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and to provide for the availability of emergency services 24 hours a day, 7 days per week. 6. Prescription Drugs of all types shall be available to MCC prisoners when they are approved by DOC prescribers; determinations regarding methods of administration may be made locally in accordance with both medical and security considerations. 7. If medicine prescribed by an outside physician is denied or substituted by MCC medical staff, a record shall be created in the prisoner's medical packet to show such action and the reasons therefor. Prisoners shall not be denied pain medication simply because of their status as prisoners. 8. MCC shall provide prisoners with over-the-counter medicine, upon request, at DOC's expense, not to exceed the recommended dosage. A copy of the information sheet for the over-the-counter medicine shall be available for the prisoners' review or copying, upon request.
34

VI. LEGAL ACCESS
1. Prisoners shall be provided legal access which is
adequate and sufficient as defined by statute and
applicable case law. The DOC shall employ a
trained paralegal to assist prisoners with their
legal work. The paralegal and the prisoners shall
be allowed to meet in confidence. The paralegal
shall photocopy and provide to prisoners cases,
statutes, and relevant research materials requested
by them. The first photocopy of any legal
material, including cases and statutes, provided
through MCC paralegal shall be supplied free of
charge to a prisoner who requests it.
2. The DOC shall also supplement the MCC satellite law
libraries and maintain them with basic legal
research materials including the most recent issues
of, and supplements to, the following material:
Indiana law Ind. Code Ann., Indiana and federal
Constitutions Ind. Code Ann., Title 11 Ind. Code Ann., Title 34 Ind. Code Ann., Title 35 Ind. Code Ann., Ind. Rules of Court Ind. Code Ann., General Index Local Rules of Local Courts, including
Indiana district courts Indiana Digest, All volumes
Federal law 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981-1985 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343, 1367,
2241-2255 28 U.S.C.A. FRCP & FRE
35

28 U.S.C.A. General Index Federal Digest, Civil Rights Federal Digest, Constitution Federal Digest, Prisons Federal Digest, Habeas Corpus Federal Digest, General Index
Miscellaneous Black's Law Dictionary ACLU, Rights of Prisoners Manville/Boston, Prisoners' Self-Help
Litigation Manual
3. In addition to the materials available in the
satellite law library, the most recent issues of,
and supplements to, the following materials shall
be available to MCC prisoners upon request:
Indiana Law Ind. Code Ann., All volumes Northeastern Second or Indiana Cases, when
applicable, volume 1 to current Indiana Rules of Court — State & Federal Indiana Digest (2nd), All volumes Indiana Law Encyclopedia, All volumes Indiana Practice, All volumes
Federal Law United States Code Annotated, All volumes U.S. Supreme Court Reporter, all volumes Federal Reporter 2nd, volume 1 to current Federal Supplement, volume 1 to current Federal Rules Decisions, all volumes Federal Digest (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules
Miscellaneous Shepards for the U.S. Supreme Court, Circuit
Courts, and District Courts Shepards for the Indiana Appellate Courts Wright, Fed. Practice and Proc, all volumes Sokol, Fed. Habeas Corpus Criminal Law Reporter, currently 2 volumes F.L. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Complete Manual of
Crim. Forms, Federal and State Black's Law Dictionary Indiana Legal Directory
36

4. Prisoners have the right to leave copies of their legal materials in the satellite law libraries, for a period of six months, for use by the other prisoners. The DOC may discard any such materials after six months.
5. Prisoners, upon request, shall be allowed to visit the satellite law libraries twice per week for at least one hour each visit. Prisoners may stay in the satellite law library longer than one hour subject to its use by other prisoners and subject to staff availability for prisoner movement. It is the intent of the parties to allow prisoners the use of the satellite law libraries to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the security and resources of the MCC.
6. With respect to any prisoner who is functionally illiterate or has an intellectual mental or physical disability which would substantially impair the prisoner's ability to conduct legal research, prepare legal documents, or correspond with a court, the DOC shall allow such prisoner to be assisted by inmate law clerks or outside paralegals or law students at DOC option. Such visits will be conducted as a regular visit, and any materials passed shall be subject to search.
37

For purposes of out-of-cell time calculation, such visitation shall be treated as law library visits. For purposes of visitation, such legal assistant visits shall not be counted against the number of visitors the MCC prisoner is allowed. 7. Prisoners may photocopy their legal materials including any part thereof. The first copy of any legal material, including cases and statutes, provided through MCC paralegal shall be supplied free of charge to a prisoner who requests it. 8. Prisoners may request photocopies of legal materials on regular business days. The requested copies shall be provided to the prisoners no later than the next business day. 9. Carbon paper shall be available to the prisoners in the satellite law library. 10. Upon request, MCC shall provide prisoners with photocopies of their legal materials, at MCC's expense.
VII. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS 1. Prisoners shall be allowed to enroll in correspondence and educational courses, through institutions approved by DOC's Director of Education, upon incarceration at the MCC, consistent with restrictions on possession of
38

personal property. The DOC will pay the cost of such courses for indigent prisoners to the extent that equivalent courses are offered at Westville Correctional Center. These programs shall include the opportunity for prisoners to earn a GED. 2. MCC will designate a staff member to act as a coordinator for correspondence courses. This person will provide reasonable assistance with remedial education, applications for courses, and will serve as the proctor for any exams that are required for courses. In addition to correspondence courses and individual remedial education, MCC shall purchase a series of GED preparation video tapes that have been produced by Kentucky Educational Television. MCC will broadcast these tapes over the institutional television cable system. Any prisoner who has a TV in his cell shall have access to these GED videotapes. 3. MCC shall provide any available educational videos designed for the education of illiterate individuals. 4. Any DOC system-wide electronic media educational programs to be offered in the future will be provided to prisoners in the MCC.
39

VIII. SUBSTANCE ABtlSE PROGRAM
The MCC will provide substance abuse programming to those prisoners who desire it. This program will include direct counselling with a clinician or counsellor who has received specialized training in substance abuse counselling. The MCC will also purchase video tapes focusing on drug education and prevention and will make them available to prisoners who wish to view them.
IX. DISCIPLINARY RESTRICTIONS 1. All discipline, including Conduct Adjustment Board hearings, shall be consistent with Ind. Code 11-11-5-1 et seq. (attached). This does not entitle prisoners to utilize the Court's contempt powers to challenge CAB convictions on a case by case basis. The contempt power shall be available to enforce this provision on a class-wide basis. 2. MCC shall set aside cells to be used as segregation cells, consistent with Ind. Code §§ 11-11-5-1 et seq. and the policies of the Department of Correction. 3. The status of isolation and "strip cell" not otherwise permitted as appropriate disciplinary measures under Ind. Code §§ 11-11-5-1 et seq., are eliminated. Prisoners will no longer have their clothing, including socks, personal items, or
40

bedding removed as a disciplinary measure that is unrelated to the abuse of these items. 4. The "Program Level System" as described in the MCC Prisoner Handbook is rescinded.
X. PRISONERS` GRIEVANCES The MCC's grievance procedure shall be consistent with I.e. §§ 11-11-1-1 et seq., and regulations promulgated by the DOC. MCC shall provide prisoners with grievance forms upon request. Grievances shall be addressed fairly. No grievance shall be denied because the staff believe that a grievance does not contain the words of the prisoner making the grievance.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. FORMER POLICIES SUPERSEDED This Entry preempts any official or unofficial policies, orders, memorandum, etc., to the contrary.
B. RETURN OF CONFISCATED MATERIALS All materials confiscated from the prisoners under the MCC's prior policies shall be returned to the prisoners, upon request, if such materials are available in the prisoner's personal property and are no longer subject to confiscation under the provisions of this Entry.
41

be reduced to writing, signed by authorized representatives of each Party, and filed with this Court. In the event that the Parties are unable to resolve their disagreement, and one Party seeks to assert a violation of this Entry against the other Party, the Court, upon a properly filed motion in this cause, shall conduct an inquiry, and, if necessary shall hold an evidentiary hearing. At such hearing, the moving Party shall have the burden of proving the violation. This Entry may not be relied upon as a basis for another cause of action in a separate lawsuit: If a significant number of prisoners abuse a privilege under this Entry in a manner which compromises the safety or security of the institution, the MCC staff, or other prisoners, then the DOC may seek to withdraw that privilege from the entire MCC prisoner population. If DOC determines that such a modification is necessary, it shall present Plaintiffs' counsel with documentation of the problem. Representatives of the parties shall meet and attempt to resolve the matter in good faith. Plaintiffs will not unreasonably withhold agreement to modify a privilege provided in this Entry, if Defendants can demonstrate the existence of a legitimate security
43

problem represented by the privilege. In the event the parties are unable to resolve the matter, then Defendants may seek to modify this Entry pursuant to Section 1, supra. 3. If a privilege not provided in this Entry can be extended to the prisoners in a manner which does not compromise the safety or security of the institution, the MCC staff, or other prisoners, then the class may seek to obtain that privilege. Representatives of the parties shall meet and attempt to resolve the matter in good faith. Defendants will not unreasonably withhold agreement to incorporate new privileges in this Entry if the privilege would not present a demonstrable and legitimate security threat. In the event the parties are unable to resolve the matter, then Plaintiffs may seek to modify this Entry pursuant to Section 1, supra.
G. ATTORNEY'S FEES Plaintiffs shall be considered prevailing Parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs for past hours and costs, and for future monitoring of the conditions under which the prisoner class members are incarcerated and the progress of the Defendants' compliance with this Entry over the
44

next two years, and for any length of time that the Court should decide to retain jurisdiction and supervision of this case under Part XII below.
XII. MONITORING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A. JURISDICTION — IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING PHASES The Court shall retain active jurisdiction and supervision of this case for a period of two years from the time this Entry is entered as an order. At that time, the Court shall terminate supervision and transfer this case to its inactive docket unless the Plaintiffs move for the continuation of jurisdiction and active supervision due to an alleged failure by Defendants to fully implement and comply with the terms of this Entry. In that event, there shall be a hearing to determine whether or not jurisdiction and supervision shall continue. If the Court determines not to close the case, it shall retain jurisdiction until this Entry is fully implemented and compliance has been demonstrated by the Defendants in all substantive areas. At such time, the Defendants may move the Court to terminate its supervision and transfer this case to the inactive docket, subject to Plaintiffs' moving at a later time for reinstatement of this action based upon an alleged failure by Defendants to comply with the terms of the
45

`·``
with written progress reports detailing the steps taken to comply with the respective provisions of this Entry on a quarterly basis and for two years.
E. DEFENDANTS' DUTY TO EDUCATE THEIR STAFF Defendants shall, within two weeks of the date this Entry is approved by the Court, explain the terms of this Entry to their agents, servants, representatives, and employees (professional staff, correctional officers and other personnel), and the necessity for strict compliance therewith. Defendants shall thereafter periodically review the terms of the Entry with the MCC staff.
F. MONITORING BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL During the monitoring phase of this case, Plaintiffs' counsel and their staff shall have reasonable access to documents, facilities, personnel and MCC prisoners in order to monitor first-hand the progress of implementation. Plaintiffs' counsel and staff may visit MCC unannounced during regular business hours throughout the monitoring phase of this Entry. Upon arrival, they shall be allowed to tour the MCC facilities within a reasonable period of time.
47

3. All memoranda issued to MCC staff in compliance with V XII(D) of this Entry;
4. Dispositions on conduct reports; 5. A report reflecting prisoners' vested months; and 6. A list of prisoners who underwent an annual
classification review and the disposition thereof.

XIII.

DISPOSITION

So Ordered.

RECOMMENDED for approval:

DATED:

S¯¯,

Approved:

HON. ROBIN D. PIERCE MAGISTRATE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED:

1993

HON. ALLEN SHARP CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

49

¯`\
DISTRIBUTION:
Richard A. Waples Legal Director Indiana Civil Liberties Union 445 N. Pennsylvania, Suite 911 Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883
Haxnid R. Kashani 445 N. Pennsylvania, Suite 800 Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883
Peggy A. Hillman Staff Counsel Indiana Civil Liberties Union 445 N. Pennsylvania, Suite 911 Indianapolis, IN 46204-1883
Wayne E. Uhl Deputy Attorney General 219 State House Indianapolis, IN 46204-2794
Seth M. Lahn Deputy Attorney General 219 State House Indianapolis, IN 46204-2794
Andrew J. Fogle Legal Counsel Indiana Department of Correction 302 W. Washington St., Suite 334 Indianapolis, IN 46204-2738
Randall Koester Staff Counsel Indiana Department of Correction 302 W. Washington St., Suite 334 Indianapolis, IN 46204-2738
51

4-24-6-1

INSTITUTIONS—GENERAL PROVISIONS

676

CHAPTER 6
FUNDS BELONGING TO INMATES AND PATIENTS—RECREATION FUND CREATED

SECTION. 4-24-6-l. 4-24-6-2.
4-24-6-3.
4-24-6-4.
4-24-6-5.

"Institution" defined.
Funds held in trust — Audit of accounts — Deposit or investment.
Rules for withdrawal or deposit of funds — Payment upon discharge or release.
Us* of interest or income of fund — Deficiencies in existing funds.
Death of inmate or patient — Escape — Disposition of trust

SEC?IOW.
fund — Indebtedness of inmate or patient to institution. +-24-5-6. Patients' or inmates' recreation fund — Use. 4-24-6-7. Source of recreation fund. 4-24-6-õ¯. Existing trust funds and recreation funds — Transfer. 4-24-6-9. Superintendent or warden to account for funds — Additional bond.
4-24-6-10. [Repealed.] 4-24-6-11. Interfund transfer of money.

4-24-6-1. "Institution'* defined. — As used in this chapter, the term "institution" shall mean psychiatric, penal, correctional, benevolent, or special educational institutions owned and operated by the state of Indiana. [Acts 1957, ch. 242, § 1; 1963 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 7, § 1; P.L.5-1984, § 191.]

4-24-6-2. Funds held in trust — Audit of accounts — Deposit or investment. — (a) Subject so a designation of che specific purpose for úhe use of donated funds by a donor, che superintendent or warden of an institution shall hold in crust funds deposited with che institution for che use and benefit of, or belonging to, any inmate or patient.
(b) The superintendent or warden shall keep an accurate accounting of che receipts and disbursements of funds received under subsection (a) on books and records in accordance with the accounting procedure as prescribed by che state board of accounts.
(c) Trust funds created under this section are subject to periodic audits che state board of accounts considers necessary.
(d) Trust funds created under this 3ection shall be: (1) Deposited in depositories whose deposits are insured by che Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: or (2) Invested in government securities of che United States. [Acts 1957, eh. 242. § 2; l§59, ch- 253, § 1: P.L·3-1991. 5 2.1

Opinions of Attorney General. Recreation funds coming into the hands of the superintendents of the various institutions should b· invested ia accordance with provisions of this section, where 3uch money

lodged in che inmates' recreation fund or the patients' recreation fund is idle, non-income producing and .lot immediately needed for some legitimate expenditure. 1961. No. 10. p. 49.

4-24-6-3. Rules for withdrawal or deposit of funds — Payment upon discharge or release. — The chief administrative officer of the department, division or state agency having administrative control and supervision of any institution shall make rules and regulations concerning che withdrawal of money held in trust for any patient or inmate, and concerning che deposit at any money to be held in :rust for any patient or inmate. L*pon che discharge or release of any patient or inmate, the

677

INMATES AND PATIENTS FUNDS

4-24·6-5

superintendent or warden of the institution shall pay to the individual, or his legal guardian, all money due him from any trust account. [Acts 1957, ch. 242. § 3.]

4-24-6-4. Use of interest or income of fund — Deficiencies in existing funds. — Any interest or income derived from the deposit or investment of funds held in trust for any patient or inmate, shall be transferred from such trust fund to a special fund to be known as the "patients' recreation fund" or "inmates' recreation fund"; Provided, That in the event a trust fund has been established in any institution, which trust fund is in existence on July 1,1957, and there is a deñciency in the amount of money that properly belongs in such trust fund, the income derived from any trust fund established under the provisions of this chapter shall be paid into the trust fund until the deñciency has been fully paid. [Acts 1957, ch. 242, § 4; P.L.5-1984, § L92.]

Opinions of Attorney General. In regard co restitution of patient's crust funds errone· ously expended on behalf of another patient with the same name, if the fund in question was in existence alter July I. 1957, and was also deñcient at that time, restitution may be made from the earnings of the "patients'

recreation fund" or "inmates' recreation fund." and if the fund h·ld in crust for th· patient came into existence or became defi· cient alter July 1.1957. the income from the patients' or inmates' recreation fund may not be used co pay the deficiency. 1969. No. 28. p. 91.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Property Rights.

deposited in an inmate trust fund. Hendrix v.

Prison inmates had no property right in Evans. 713 P. Supp. 397 iN-D. Ind. 1989).

the interest earned on their personal funds

4-24-6-5. Death of inmate or patient — Escape — Disposition of trust fund — Indebtedness of inmate or patient to institution. — (a) If any inmate of any penal or correctional institution, or any patient of any psychiatric institution, shall die, his lawful heirs or devisees 3hall be entitled to any money credited to and held in trust for such inmate or patient. If the heirs or devisees of such inmate or patient are unknown, the money in such mist account shall be kept intact co the account of the unknown heirs of such inmate or patient for a period of two [2] years from the date of death. If, at the expiration of the two-year period, no heir or devisee of any deceased inmate or patient shall appear to make claim to such money, such money shall be paid to the clerk of the circuit court of the county from which such inmate or patient was committed to said institution, said money to be held and disposed of by said clerk of court in the same manner as are other unclaimed funds in his office.
(b) If any inmate of a penal or correctional institution, or if any patient of a psychiatric hospital, shall escape from such institution, or 3hall make an escape while absent from 3uch institution on parole or leave, any money credited to and held in trust for such inmate or pacienc shall be kept intact for such escaped inmate or patient for a period of two [2] years from the date of escape. If at the end of the two-year period the escaped inmate or

4-24-6-6

INSTITUTIONS—GENERAL PROVISIONS

678

patient does not appear to make claim to such money, the money shall be paid to the clerk of the circuit court of the county from which such inmate or patient was committed to said institution, said money to be held and disposed of by said clerk of court in the same manner as are other unclaimed funds in his office.
(c) No money belonging to any patient or inmate shall be paid over to the. clerk of any court as provided in this section if such inmate or patient is indebted to the state of Indiana for maintenance by 3uch institution, in which case any money credited on the books of such institution to the account of any inmate or patient shall be applied against any indebtedness or maintenance, and the balance, if any, shall then be paid to such clerk.
(d) Notwithstanding any other law, when the department of correction has determined that an offender has escaped from custody, the department of correction:
(1) May consider all of his property (except money) that is under the control of the department, to be abandoned property; (2) May dispose of the escaped inmate's abandoned property consistent with rules adopted by the department under IC 4-22·2; and (3) Is not civilly liable for the safekeeping of the escaped inmate's property. [Acts 1957, ch. 242, § 5; P.L.39-1983, § 1.1

4-24-6-6. Patients' or inmates' recreation fund — Use. — There is established in each psychiatric, benevolent, penal and correctional institution a fund to be known either as the "patients' recreation fund," "students' recreation fund" or as the "inmates' recreation fund." These funds shall be used, at the discretion of the superintendent or warden subject to the approval of the chief administrative officer of the department, division or state agency having administrative control and supervision over the institution, for the direct benefit of persons who are inmates or patients in such institutions, and shall not be used for any purposes which are covered by state appropriations: Provided, That such funds shall be expended for such purposes and in accordance with the policies of the department, division or state agency having administrative control over such institution. The expenditures may include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, purchased entertainment; magazine subscriptions for the libraries, wards or units of such institutions; special recreational equipment and supplies; special foods for parties or celebrations; phonograph records, televisions, radios, and similar items when the same cannot be purchased from regular appropriations; and such other purposes not covered by regular appropriations which will provide a direct beneñt to the inmates or patients of such institutions. [Acts 1957, ch. 242, § 5; 1965, ch. 87, § 1.1

Opinion* of Attora·r G«n«rml. Law b» prison authorities with mon·y in ¯-h« books for us· ay irtmit— avtf b· purchased fum«««' r·er·aüoa fund. 1977, No. 15. p. 33.

679

` ÏMATES AND PATIENTS FUNDS

4-24-6-9

¡

4-24-6-7. Source of recreation fund. — Money may accrue to the patients' recreation flind or inmates' recreation fund from the following sources:
(1) Gifts to the fund. (2) Profits from the operation of a commissary or canteen. (3) Interest earned by deposit of trust funds in public depositories, or income derived from trust funds invested in United States government securities as provided in section 2 [IC 4-24-6-2] of this chapter.
(4) Sale of items produced in occupational therapy. (5) Income derived from any kind of benefit entertainment for the inmates or patients.
(6) Any other money derived from any source that is not legally prohibited. (7) Any money derived from the income of any trust fund which has been deposited in any special fund of the institution. [Acts 1957, ch. 242, § 7; P.L.5-1984, § 193.]

Opinion* of Attorney General. Wardens and superintendents of penal institutions have no authority to permit employees Co place vending machines on institution prera-

ises with the view of retaining the profits for their own benefit as such profits must be placed in the "inmates' recreation fund." 1968. No. 45, p. 309.

4-24-6-8. Existing trust funds and recreation funds — Transfer. — All money held in trust for any inmate or patient of any institution on July 1, 1957, shall be transferred into a trust fund established under the provisions of this chapter. Any money in any recreational or activities fund in any institution, on July 1, 1957, shall be transferred co the "recreation fund" established under the provisions of this chapter. [Acts 1957, ch. 242. § ð; P.L.5-1984, § 194.]

4-24-6-9. Superintendent or warden to account for funds — Additional bond. — (a) The superintendent or warden of any institution shall be held in strict accounting for all money held in crust for any inmate or patient of such institution, and shall be held to a strict accounting for ail money deposited in the recreational fund of the institution.
(b) In the event the superintendent or warden delegates to any officer or employee of his institution the authority to administer the provisions of sections S and 7 [IC 4-24-6-6 and 4-24-6-7] of this chapter, such officer or employee shall, jointly with the superintendent or warden, be held to a strict accounting for all money held in trust for any inmate or patient of such institution, and shall jointly with the superintendent or warden be held to a strict accounting for all money deposited in the recreation fund of the institution. No other bond except the general performance blanket bond given by the superintendent or warden of any institution, or by an officer or employee of the institution, shall be required, but such general blanket performance bond shall cover any misfeasance or noníeasance, in the administration of sections 5 and 7 of this chapter, on the part of any superintendent, warden, officer, or employee of the institution. [Acts 1957, ch! 242, § 9; 1965, ch. 87, § 2; P.L.5-1984, § 195.]

4-24-6·10

INSTITUTIONS—GENERAL PROVISIONS

gso

4-24-6-10. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. This section, repealing chapter 223 of the Acts of 1937 v u ,-SB.,I~J

5 I of chapter 28 of she Acts of 1931. and by P.L·3-I9a4. } 196.

' ™P**'*«

4.24-6-11. Int«rfund transfer of money. — The chief administrative

officer of the department, division, or state agency that has administrative

control and supervision of an institution with a fund established under

section S [IC 4-24-6-6] of this chapter may transfer money from the

institution's fund to one (1) or more other funds established under section 6

of this chapter. The institution receiving the transferred money shall use

the transferred money in conformity with section 6 of this chanter

[P.L.30-1988, § 1.]

chapter.

CHAPTERS
CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE

MOTION.
U-ll-ô-1. Applicability of chapter.
U-ll-5-2. Rule*. U-l 1-5-3. Authorised disciplinary action. ll-ll·5-4. Prohibited disciplinary action. n-n·5·5. Hearing. 11-11-5-6. Segregation of person charged

SECTION.
U-U`5-7. U·U`õ-8.

with misconduct — Review of
sucus. Segregation upon finding of mis-
conduct — Review of status. Suspension of rights or proce·
dur*s.

11-11-5-1. Applicability of chapter. — This chapter does not apply to persons released on parole. [IC 11-11-5-1, as added by Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]
Cited: Mauricio v. Bronnenberg, 668 F. Supp. 1206 (NJ3. Ind. 1986).

11-11-5-2. Rules. — The department shall adopt rules for the maintenance of order and discipline among committed persons. These rules must describe the conduct for which disciplinary action may be imposed, the type of disciplinary action that may be taken, and the disciplinary procedure to be followed. These rules shall be made available to all committed persons. The disciplinary action imposed must be proportionate to the seriousness of the violation. For purposes of IC 4-22-2, the term "rule" as used in this section relates solely to internal policy and procedure not having the force of law. [IC 11-11-5-2, as added by Acts 1979, P.L· 120, § 4.] ·

¯`¯ï

11-11-5-3

CORRECTIONS

282

Collateral Reference*. 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 124 et seq.

72 CJ.S. Prisons § 27 et seq.

11-11-5-3. Authorized disciplinary action. — The department may impose any of the following as disciplinary action:
(1) A report, which may be made part of the person's record. (2) Extra work. (3) Loss or limitation of privileges. (4) Change in work assignment (5) Restitution. (6) Change in security classification. (7) Transfer to another facility or program. (3) Segregation from the general population of the facility or program for a fixed period of time. (9) Reassignment to a lower credit time class under IC 35-50-6-4. (10) Deprivation of earned credit time under IC 35-50-6-5. [IC 11-11-5-3, as added by Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]
Collateral References. Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 AX,R,2d 1265.

11-11-5-4. Prohibited disciplinary action. — The department may not impose the following as disciplinary action:
(1) Corporal punishment. (2) Confinement without an opportunity for at least one-half (Vj) hour of daily exercise outside of immediate living quarters, unless the department finds and documents that this opportunity will jeopardize the physical safety of the offender, or others, or the security of the facility or program. (3) A substantial change in heating, lighting, or ventilation. (4) Restrictions on clothing, bedding, mail, visitation, reading and writing materials, or the use of hygienic facilities, except for abuse of these. (5) Restrictions on medical and dental care; access to courts, legal counsel, government officials, or grievance proceedings; and access to personal legal papers and legal research materials. (6) A deviation from the diet provided to other committed persons in that facility or program. (7) Extra work exceeding a total of twenty (20) hours for one (1) rule violation, or exceeding four (4) hours in any twenty-four-hour period. [IC 11-11-5-4, as added by Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]

Collateral Reference*. Constitutionality of statutes in relation to treatment or discipline of convicts. 30 A±JL 104.
Liability for death of or injury to prisoner. 46 A_L·R. 94: 50 A.LJL 268; SI A.LJL 569.
Liability of prison authorities for injury to prisoner directly caused by assault by other

prisoner. 41 A.L.R.2d 329. Mistreatment of prisoner as contempt. 40
A±JL. 1273. Mistreatment of prisoner as ground for
removal of sheriff or other police officer. 100 A-L·Ä. 1401.
Prison conditions as amounting to cruel

¯ïofan î Pai<*

CHAPTER 5
CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE

íare t¡ãed

¶s or

vj L7.V

. •-

;J ouf

s

c

',.i:tv

0 ¿

Q-Q

U-ll-5-5. ffcarin*.

11-11-5-5. Hearing. — (a) Before imposing any disciplinary action, the

department shall afford the person charged with misconduct a hearing: to

determine his guilt or innocence and, if guilty, che appropriate action. The

charged person may waive his right co a hearing. Also, before a charge is

made, that person and a departmental employee may agree to the types of

disciplinary action enumerated in sections 3(2) and 3(3) [IC 11-11-5-3(2)

, and IC 11-11-5-3(3)] of this chapter if no record of che conduct or

:

disciplinary action is placed in the person's file. In connection with the

hearing, the person is entitled to:

(1) Have not less than twenty-four (24) hours advance written notice of

the date, time, and place of tne hearing, and of the alleged misconduct.

:

and che rule che misconduct is alleged co have violated;

(2) Have reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; (3) Have an impartial decisionmaker;

11-11-5-5

CORRECTIONS

22

(4) Appear and speak in his own behalf:
(5) Call witnesses and present evidence unless the person conducting the hearing finds that to do so would subject a witness to a substantial risk of harm, or would result in the admission of irrelevant or repetitive testimony:
(6) Confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless the person conducting the hearing finds:
(A) That to do so would subject a witness to a substantial risk of harm;
(B) That to do so would result in the admission of irrelevant or repetitive testimony; or
(C) Based upon good cause stated on the record, that a witness is unavailable to attend the hearing; (7) Have advice and representation by a lay advocate of his choice, if that lay advocate is available in the institution at the time of the hearing, in those hearings based upon a charge of institutional misconduct when the department determines he lacks the competency to understand the issues involved or to participate in the hearing, or when the punishment may be that specified in:
¯(A) Section 3(5) [IC 11-11-5-3(5)1 of this chapter if the restitution is more than two hundred dollars ($200): (B) Section 3(S) [IC 11-11-5-3(8)] of this chapter if the segregation is for more than fifteen (15) days: or
(C) Section 3(6), 3(9), or 3(10) (IC 11-11-5-3(6). IC 11-11-5-3(9), or IC 11-11-5-3(10)] of this chapter; (8) Have a written statement of the findings of fact, the evidence relied upon, and the reasons for the action taken: (9) Have immunity if his testimony is used in any criminal proceeding; (10) Have his record expunged of any reference to the charge if he is found not guilty or if a finding of guilt is later overturned; and (11) Be reimbursed for state wages lost due to action taken pending the hearing if he is found not guilty or if a finding of guilt is later overturned.
Any finding of guilt must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing.
(b) The department may not charge a committed person with a disciplinary rule violation unless it does so within ten (10) days of the date it becomes aware of that person's alleged involvement in misconduct.
(c) Consistent with the objective of adequate and effective representation and the integrity of the hearing system the department may adopt regulations which may limit the pool of persons eligible to advise and represent accused persons to inmates in the general population. In any event, facility or program employees and inmates may not directly or indirectly charge for advice or representation.
(d) Any statement made by an accused person to departmental employees during the course of an investigation or hearing is not admissible against him in any criminal proceeding arising out of the same incident unless the accused:
(1) Was informed: (i) Of his right to remain silent: (ii) That anything he says can and will be used against him in court; (iii) Of his right to have an attorney present during any questioning; (iv> His right to have an attorney appointed for him if he is unable to afford an attorney; and

-3

STATE GRANTS TO COUNTIES

Thac if he decides co answer anv

11-12^.?

IIC ll-ll-5-5. as added by A«s '979 PL P.L.99-1986. á 3: P.L.135-1993; 5 l¦]

1i¾2 °o·

? *

T4 ;

¾l 9

Í8

0?·¾R

VL ·

·

or
37.

bo
*

ch· 7;

•iMUtuuon at th· tint· of ch· he«rin¢- l n *ubs«tion lanTi: and iubsticuted 'suòdivi. .•.ion" for -elaus·- following 'waived his ri«htj under" m iubsection id)«2).

l í l · « t h T Ü . p i ? v i a i o n · P"««·«« u IC

ioqi

a«n·ndm·nt cakn eiTe« Julv i

' ¯

•VOTES TO DECISIONS

W¡tnes«».

Even thouyh ch· índiana d

are required to s·rv· as wjtnie‰,"„ ™ " t e r » ISSU· ««'<* b· verified b

11-11-5-6. Segregation of person charged with misconduct — Review of status. — Disciplinary action may not be taken against a person before a determination of guilt. However, a person charged with misconduct may be confined or separated from the general population of the facility or program for a reasonable period of time if his continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to himself, others, property, or the security of the facility or program. The department must review the status of that person at least once every Sve (5) days to determine if the reason for segregation still exists. Any time spent confined or separated from the general population before a determination of guilt must be credited toward any period of disciplinary segregation imposed. U.C 11-11-5-6, as added by Aces 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]

r
284
pending is later
ìvidence
isciplindate it uct. entation y adopt nse and In any ectly or
tal emmissible incident
n court; tiotiing; nable to
ay stop
•s under oth. [IC 87, § 7;

285

SAFE AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT

ll-ll·6-l

Crosa Reference*. Involuntary segrega· Involuntary segregation of delinquent of-

tion of criminal offender. IC 11-10-1-7.

fenders. IC U-lO-2-9.

11-11-5-7. Segregation upon finding of misconduct — Review of status. — (a) The need for and appropriateness of continued segregation of a person committed to the department under the laws oflndiana or another jurisdiction concerning custody of adults, and segregated from the general population upon a finding of misconduct, shall be reviewed by the department at least once every thirty (30) days.
(b) The need for and appropriateness of continued segregation of a person committed to the department under the laws of Indiana or another jurisdiction concerning custody of juveniles, and segregated from the general population upon a finding of misconduct, shall be reviewed by the department at least once every three (3) days. [IC 11-11-5-7, as added by Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]

Cross Reference*. Involuntary segrega- Involuntary segregation of delinquent of-

tion of criminal offender, IC 11-10-1-7.

fenders. IC 11-10-2-9.

11-11-3-8. Suspension of rights or procedures. — Any of the rights

or procedures enumerated in this chapter may be suspended upon

declaration by the official in charge of the facility or program that there

exists an emergency situation threatening the general security of the

•¢

facility or program. The rights or procedures again apply upon declaration

t • ì

by the official in charge of the facility or program that the emergency has

been resolved. [IC 11-11-5-8, as added by Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 4.]

luct — ;ainst a ed with ation of ntinued , others, at must days to :oniîned of guilt sed·[IC

MAXIMUM CONTROL COMPLEX COMMISSARY PRICE SHEET
APRIL 19, 1993
NOTICE: Ü8Z ONLY BLACK PSN WHEN TILLING OUT ORDERS 120.00 LIMIT OH ALL ORDERS

HEALTH CARS:

1815 1S30 1385 3240

?kg.
Btl.
Pfcg. Ea.

Breath Mints

* .34

Vitamins, High Potency

6.56

Hall's Cough Drops

.39

Chap Stick

.65

DENTAL CARE:

2005
2010 2045 2050 2090

Tube
Tuba Sa. Ea. Btl.

Clos9¯Up Toothpaste (No Pork) 4.6 oz. Colgate Toothpaste 6.4 ox. Soft Toothbrush Medium Toothbrush Mouthwash (Plastic Bottle Only)

1.10
1.65
.33 .33 .90

THE HANDLE OP TOOTHBRUSHES WILL BE SHORTENED BSFOSS DISTRIBUTION

SOAP:

2405

Bar

Irish Spring Soap

.43

2410

Bar

Dial Soap

.39

2430

Bar

Ivory Soap

.32

2480

Bar

Tone Soap

.46

2490

Bar

Zest Soap

.65

ALL BASS, O.J SOAP WILL BB CUT TtT HALF BEFORE DISTRIBUTION

DEODORANTS:

3020

3tl.

Roll-on Deodorant

.97

COOKIES it SNACK CAKES:

4015 4020 4025 4030 4035 4040 4045 4060 4C7O 4080

?kg. Pkg. ?kg. ?kg.
?kg. ?kg. ?kg.
3ox
?kg.
3ox

Sugar Cookies Windmill Cookies Chocolate Chip Cookies Peanut 3utter Sandwich Vanilla Sandwich Cookies Iced Oacsteal Cookies Chocolate Sandwich Cookies Graaoia 3ars
Cheese ?'3uttar Crackers Swiss Rolls

.84
.34 .34
.34 .34 •84 .34 1.23
.19 .93

 
 Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 1 of 66
CLASS,CONSPT,R/R,TERMED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Indiana [LIVE] USDC Northern Indiana (South Bend)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:92−cv−00429−PPS

Taifa, et al v. Bayh, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Philip P Simon Demand: $0 Case in other court: Archive Info − Perm (Vol 1−7),
021−08−00012 1 OF 32 206463SAN Archive Info − Perm (Vol 8−13), 021−08−00012 2 OF 32 206464SAN Archive Info − Perm (Vol 14−00017 &2 Acc), 021−08−00012 3 OF 32 206465SAN Archive Info − Perm (2 Acc), 021−08−00012 4 OF 32 206466SAN 94−01400 94−01481 94−01486 94−01487 94−01493 94−01494 94−01606 94−01928 94−02048(Riley) 94−03225 94−03346 94−03824 95−03281 95−03578 95−03873 95−03969 96−01529 96−01733 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/10/1992 Date Terminated: 09/12/1997 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Kataza Taifa TERMINATED: 10/25/1993

represented by Hamid R Kashani 445 N Pennsylvania St Suite 600 Indianapolis, IN 46204−1883 317−632−5520 Fax: 317−536−3312 Email: hkashani@aol.com TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk ACLU of Indiana 1031 E Washington St Indianapolis, IN 46202 317−635−4059 Ext 104 Fax: 317−635−4105 Email: kfalk@aclu−in.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 2 of 66

Waples &Hanger 410 N Audubon Rd Indianapolis, IN 46219 317−357−0903 Fax: 317−357−0275 Email: richwaples@aol.com TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Paul Komyatti TERMINATED: 02/23/1995

represented by Franklin A Morse , II PO Box 939 Northport, MI 49670−0939 616−386−7675 TERMINATED: 02/23/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
William Sampley TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mark S Douglas TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 3 of 66

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Aaron Isby

represented by Aaron Isby 892219 SPR−WABASH−2222 Wabash Valley Correctional Institution PO Box 2222 Carlisle, IN 47838 PRO SE

Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/16/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kevin Sandifer TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
James E Shropshire TERMINATED: 10/25/1993

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 4 of 66

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Charles Cole, Jr TERMINATED: 12/15/1994

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/15/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/15/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Edward Broadus TERMINATED: 09/16/1996

represented by Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
James Thompson TERMINATED: 03/16/1995

represented by Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/16/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/16/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 5 of 66

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/16/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Nolan McDandal TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Smith TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Jenkins TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 6 of 66

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Richard Mumford TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tillman Morris TERMINATED: 11/30/1993

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michael Hegwood TERMINATED: 09/20/1995

represented by Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 7 of 66

Terrence Drain TERMINATED: 10/25/1993

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Eric Malone TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michael Holland TERMINATED: 11/16/1994

represented by Michael Holland PRO SE

Craig R Finlayson Hayes Swift and Finlayson 590 Lincoln Bank Tower Fort Wayne, IN 46802 260−423−4422 TERMINATED: 11/16/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 8 of 66

Plaintiff Albert Estep TERMINATED: 02/09/1995
Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams TERMINATED: 07/24/1996
Plaintiff Joseph Phillips TERMINATED: 08/30/1994
Plaintiff Carl L Johnson TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Roosevelt Williams 4052 SCC−MAXIMUM Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE
Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Hamid R Kashani (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/30/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl L Johnson 10039 SCC−MAXIMUM Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 9 of 66

Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dyrone Henderson TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Dyrone Henderson 856509 Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jimmy Moorson TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Jimmy Moorson SCC−MAXIMUM Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai TERMINATED: 08/02/1995 also known as Leroy R Jeffers

represented by Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai 28668 SCU−WESTVILLE Westville Correctional Center PO Box 473 Westville, IN 46391 219−785−2511 PRO SE

Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Kenneth Porter TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Kenneth Porter 872854 SR−INDIANA−30 Pendleton Correctional Facility PO Box 30 Pendleton, IN 46064

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 10 of 66

PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Tome L Hailey TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Tome L Hailey 862512 Pendleton Correctional Facility PO Box 30 Pendleton, IN 46064 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christopher Michael Miser TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Christopher Michael Miser 861863 SPR−INDIANA Indiana State Prison PO Box 41 Michigan City, IN 46360 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Andrew Benroy Johnson TERMINATED: 02/09/1995

represented by Andrew Benroy Johnson 884337 Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Preston Gardner TERMINATED: 09/17/1996

represented by Preston Gardner Pendleton Correctional Facility PO Box 30 Pendleton, IN 46064 PRO SE

Franklin A Morse , II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Hamid R Kashani (See above for address)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 11 of 66

TERMINATED: 01/02/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth J Falk (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard A Waples (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Howard Smallwood (3:92cv475AS)

represented by Howard Smallwood 900079 Westville Correctional Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391−0473 PRO SE

V. Appellant Ricky Outlaw

represented by Ricky Outlaw 850650 Pendleton Correctional Facility 5124 W Reformatory Rd Pendleton, IN 46064−9001 PRO SE

V.
Defendant
Evan Bayh in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana

represented by David A Arthur Indiana Attorney General's Office − IAG/302 Indiana Government Center South 302 W Washington Street 5th Floor Indianapolis, IN 46204−2770 317−232−6286 Fax: 317−232−7979 Email: David.Arthur@atg.in.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzann W Lupton Baker &Daniels − Ind/IN/Mer 300 N Meridian St Suite 2700 Indianapolis, IN 46204−1782 317−237−0300 TERMINATED: 05/20/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wayne E Uhl Stephenson Morow &Semler 3077 East 98th St Suite 240 Indianapolis, IN 46280 317−844−3830

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 12 of 66

Fax: 317−573−4194 Email: wuhl@stephlaw.com TERMINATED: 08/07/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James E Aiken in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction

represented by David A Arthur (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzann W Lupton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne E Uhl (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/07/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Norman G Owens in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction

represented by David A Arthur (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzann W Lupton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne E Uhl (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/07/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Nunn in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction

represented by David A Arthur (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzann W Lupton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne E Uhl (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/07/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 13 of 66

Charles E Wright in his individual and official capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction

David A Arthur (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzann W Lupton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/20/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne E Uhl (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/07/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Movant Fred Peters
Miscellaneous Party Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad
Miscellaneous Party Omar A Anthony
Miscellaneous Party William E Riley II

represented by Fred Peters 26498 Wabash Valley Correctional Facility − 1111 PO Box 1111 Carlisle, IN 47838 219−785−2511 PRO SE
represented by Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad 13303 Indiana State Prison PO Box 41 Michigan City, IN 46360 PRO SE
represented by Omar A Anthony 862463 Maximum Control Facility PO Box 557 Westville, IN 46391 PRO SE
represented by William E Riley 862229 SR−INDIANA Pendleton Correctional Facility PO Box 28 Pendleton, IN 46064 PRO SE

Date Filed 07/10/1992

# Docket Text
1 ORIGINAL file, certified copy of transfer order and docket sheet received from SDIN at Indianapolis; Class Action Allegation; Amended Complaint; Answer of all defts (wsy) (Entered: 03/16/1993)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 14 of 66

09/21/1992
09/22/1992 03/08/1993 03/08/1993 03/16/1993 03/17/1993 04/12/1993 04/14/1993
04/29/1993 05/28/1993
06/02/1993
06/04/1993
06/04/1993 06/04/1993 06/09/1993 06/29/1993
07/02/1993 07/02/1993 07/06/1993
07/14/1993 07/14/1993

11 MINUTES: before Chief Judge Allen Sharp , Case consolidated 3:92−cv−429 with member cases 3:91−cv−474, 3:91−cv−584, 3:91−cv−623, 3:92−cv−27, 3:92−cv−49, 3:92−cv−66, 3:92−cv−67, 3:92−cv−84, 3:92−cv−116, 3:92−cv−164, 3:92−cv−208, 3:92−cv−371, 3:92−cv−472, 3:92−cv−529 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
12 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp Case referred to Judge Robin D. Pierce for settlement conf. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
26 MOTION by Roosevelt Williams for prod of doc's (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
27 MOTION by Roosevelt Williams for appointment of special monitor (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
28 ORDER by Judge Robin D. Pierce ;settlement conference set for 10:00 4/13/93 at WCC (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
29 MOTION by plaintiffs to separate claim of William Samply (wsy) (Entered: 03/20/1993)
30 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to separate claim of William Samply S92−20M [29−1]. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 04/14/1993)
31 ORDER by Judge Robin D. Pierce ;settlement conference held 4/13/93 ;settlement conference continued to 10:00 4/29/93 , (cc: all counsel) (klb) (Entered: 04/15/1993)
MINUTES: before Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Settlement conference held 4/29/93 (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/30/1993)
32 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to consolidate cases , and to stay proceedings (blh) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
33 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to stay proceedings [32−2] consolidating cases 3:92−cv−429 with member cases 3:92−cv−769 and 3:93cv51 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 06/04/1993)
34 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for appointment of special monitor [27−1], denying motion for prod of doc's [26−1] w/leave to renew (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 06/07/1993)
35 MOTION to intervene by Yazid Abdul−Wadood (wsy) (Entered: 06/07/1993)
36 MEMORANDUM in support of motion to intervene by Yazid Abdul−Wadood [35−1] (wsy) (Entered: 06/07/1993)
37 NOTICE by cnsl for plaintiffs (Hamid R. Kashani) of change of address (wsy) (Entered: 06/10/1993)
38 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce further settlement conference set for 10:30 7/19/93 w/respect to the class action only (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 06/30/1993)
39 MOTION by Roosevelt Williams for preliminary injunction (wsy) (Entered: 07/06/1993)
40 MEMORANDUM by Roosevelt Williams in support of motion for preliminary injunction [39−1] (wsy) (Entered: 07/06/1993)
41 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp Motion to intervene fld b y Lokmar Yazid Abdul−Wadood and memo in sppt referred to Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/06/1993)
42 LETTER from Michael Hegwood directed to Richard Waples ICLU (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
43 OBJECTIONS by Michael Hegwood to proposed agreed entry of ICLU (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 15 of 66

07/14/1993 07/14/1993 07/14/1993 07/14/1993 07/14/1993 07/15/1993 07/16/1993 07/19/1993 07/19/1993 07/20/1993 07/23/1993
07/26/1993 07/29/1993 08/02/1993 08/25/1993 08/26/1993 08/26/1993 08/30/1993
09/03/1993
09/07/1993 09/08/1993 09/14/1993 09/16/1993
09/20/1993 09/23/1993

44 LETTER from Edward Broadus re: class action interests (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
45 OBJECTIONS by Robert Taulton re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
46 OBJECTIONS by Billy Brown re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
47 OBJECTIONS by Roosevelt Williams to agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
48 OBJECTIONS by Michael Hegwood re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
49 LETTER from Michael Hegwood re: prison conditions &class action (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
50 OBJECTIONS by Shomari O'Bam re: DOC proposal (wsy) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
MINUTES: before Judge Robin D. Pierce , ;Settlement conference held 7/19/93 (lpw) (Entered: 07/20/1993)
51 LETTER from plaintiff Mark S Douglas re oppo to settlement and letter to ICLU, Richard Waples (smp) (Entered: 07/21/1993)
52 LETTER from plaintiff Edward Broadus re class action treatment by defts. (smp) (Entered: 07/22/1993)
53 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to intervene by Yazid Abdul−Wadood [35−1] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: Judge Sharp, all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 07/26/1993)
54 COPY OF LETTER from Michael Hegwood to Hamid R. Kashani (wsy) (Entered: 07/28/1993)
RECEIPT from Michael A. Hegwood of proposed Recommendation for Resolution re: class (wsy) (Entered: 07/30/1993)
55 LETTER from Billy Brown re: class representatives (wsy) (Entered: 08/03/1993)
56 STATUS REPORT by plaintiffs cnsl re:9/2/93 ddl for conf statement (wsy) (Entered: 08/27/1993)
57 LETTER form Agreed Entry Form Opposing the Agreed Entry from Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 08/27/1993)
58 LETTER agreed entry Opposing Agreed Entry from Mark S Douglas aka Shaka Shakur (wsy) (Entered: 08/27/1993)
59 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. Ptys to submit a confidential settlement statement re: money damage claims on/bef 9/2/93 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/31/1993)
60 ORDER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; the court now grants the parties to and including 9/9/93 in which to file their settlement memoranda.(cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 09/03/1993)
61 LETTER from Aaron Isby re: Agreed Entry form (opposing entry) (wsy) (Entered: 09/09/1993)
62 LETTER from Aaron Isby requesting copy of a motion to modify fld by Paul Komyatti. Such motion not found (wsy) (Entered: 09/10/1993)
63 LETTER from Kataza Taifa re: agreed entry/opposing same (wsy) (Entered: 09/15/1993)
64 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp approving REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [53−1], denying motion to intervene by Yazid Abdul−Wadood [35−1] (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 09/17/1993)
65 MOTION by plaintiffs for hearing on agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 09/21/1993)
66 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp Class Action Cases are referred to Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to conduct a hrg on agreed entry and to submit RRwhen completed (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/24/1993)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 16 of 66

09/27/1993
09/27/1993 10/04/1993 10/04/1993 10/07/1993 10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993
10/08/1993 10/08/1993 10/08/1993 10/15/1993 10/18/1993 10/19/1993

67 ORDER by Judge Robin D. Pierce ; the court now schedules this matter for a hearing on the Agreed Entry on 10/12/93 at 9:30 Am (South Bend time) at the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, IN (cc: all counsel, J. Sharp, M. Scott, USM) (lpw) (Entered: 09/27/1993)
68 MOTION by Roosevelt Williams for modification to agreed entry w/agreed entry attached (wsy) (Entered: 09/28/1993)
69 RESPONSE by John Charles Cole Jr to Agreed Entry (wsy) (Entered: 10/05/1993)
70 MOTION by non−pty prisoner Jeberekiahe Kelubal (SDIN) for writ to attend all hrgs re: class action suit (wsy) (Entered: 10/05/1993)
77 MOTION by Aaron Isby for writ (wsy) (Entered: 10/12/1993)
71 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; the body of Willie Billops for hrg. on 10/12/93 at 10:00Am. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
71 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; the body of John C. Cole, Jr. for hrg. at MCC on 10/12/93 at 10:15Am. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief, Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
71 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of Mark S. Douglas for hrg. on 10/12/93 at l0:30 Am. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
71 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; produce the body of Michael Hegwood for hrg. on 10/12/93 at 10:45AM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief, Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
72 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of AARON ISBY for hrg. on 10/12/93 at 11:00AM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
73 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of ROBERT JENKINS for hrg. on 10/12/93 at 11:15 AM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief, Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
74 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of PAUL KOMYATTI for hrg on 10/12/93 at 11:30 AM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
75 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of JAMES E. SHROPSHIRE for hrg. on 10/12/93 at ll:45AM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation Section of IAG). (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
76 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Judge Robin D. Pierce; to produce the body of ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS for hrg. on 10/12/93 at 1:15PM. (cc: Supt. MCC, Chief Federal Litigation Sectin of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 10/08/1993)
78 RESPONSE by Michael Hegwood in 3:92−cv−00429 in partial opposition to class−action agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 10/12/1993)
79 MEMORANDUM by Michael Hegwood in 3:92−cv−00429 in support of response [78−1] in 3:92−cv−00429 (wsy) (Entered: 10/12/1993)
80 MOTION by Paul Komyatti in 3:92−cv−00429 to modify agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 10/12/1993)
81 LETTER from Abdal Bivi (sp?) re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 10/20/1993)
82 LETTER from Richard Waples re: materials to be viewed ex parte. (wsy) (Entered: 10/20/1993)
83 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to produce prisoners: Aaron Isby, Kataza Taifa, John Charles cole, Paul Komyatti, Leroy Jeffers, Kenneth Porter, Michael Anthony Hegwood, Richard David Thompson, Bill Sampley, Preston Eugene Gardner, James C. Thmpson, Betah Parmashta Ahinadab aka Ronald D. Turner, Larry C. Williams, Mark S. Douglas at PTC ON 10/21/93 at the MCC (cc: all

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 17 of 66

10/19/1993
10/22/1993 10/22/1993
10/25/1993
11/01/1993 11/02/1993 11/02/1993
11/08/1993 11/10/1993
11/12/1993 11/19/1993 11/30/1993 12/01/1993 12/03/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993 12/07/1993

counsel, superintendent MCC/faxed 10/19/93) (wsy) (Entered: 10/20/1993)
84 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Pretrial conference set for 9:00, 9:30, 10:00, 10:30, 11:00, 11:30, 1:30, 2:00, 2:30, 3:00, 3:30 and 4:00 10/21/93 at MCC for Isby &Taifa, Cole, Komyatti, Jeffers, Porter, Hegwood, R. Thompson, J. Thompson, Sampley, Gardner, Ahinadab/Williams, and Douglas (cc: all counsel, cal) (wsy) Modified on 10/20/1993 (Entered: 10/20/1993)
MINUTES: before Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Pretrial conference held 10/21/93 (lpw) (Entered: 10/22/1993)
85 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce re: Tillman Morris. Recommended that all damage claims re Morris be dismd for his failure/refusal to attend PTC on 10/21/93. Obj hereto due w/in 10 days from receipt of this ntc (cc: all counsel, Morris, Sharp, J.) (wsy) (Entered: 10/22/1993)
86 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing party Terrence Drain, party James E Shropshire, party Kataza Taifa w/o costs and w/o prej to the right of any pty w/in 45 days to vacate this order and to add these pltfs if settlement is not consummated (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 10/28/1993)
87 OBJECTIONS by Tillman Morris to Report and Recommendation [85−1] (wsy) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
88 MOTION by plaintiff cnsl, defendant cnsl for approval of the notice of settlement (wsy) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
89 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion for approval of the notice of settlement [88−1]. Ntc of settlement is approved; same to be distributed to all inmates at MCC on a given day, along w/a copy of the proposed Agreed entry. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
90 OBJECTIONS by Tillman Morris to Report and Recommendation [85−1] (wsy) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
91 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp taking under advisement on 12/6/93 the report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [85−1] ; Brief ddl set for 12/6/93 for Morris re: damage claims (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/10/1993)
92 OBJECTIONS by Shomari O'Bam to Magistrate's RR(wsy) (Entered: 11/15/1993)
93 OBJECTIONS to Report and Recommendation [85−1] by Lokmar Yazid Abdul−Wadood (wsy) (Entered: 11/22/1993)
94 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp. RRof 10/22/93 approved &confirmed. dismissing party Tillman Morris (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
95 MOTION by attorney Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
96 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion by attorney Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Roosevelt Williams [95−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/06/1993)
97 LETTER from Martin R. Bryan re: proposed settlement (wsy) (Entered: 12/09/1993)
98 MOTION by plaintiff Tillman Morris to extend time to file memo re: damage claims (wsy) (Entered: 12/09/1993)
99 MOTION by plaintiff Kataza Taifa, plaintiff James E Shropshire, plaintiff Terrence Drain to vacate order of 10/25/93 (wsy) (Entered: 12/09/1993)
100 REPORT by plaintiffs' cnsl re: settlement conf (wsy) (Entered: 12/09/1993)
101 REPORT by plaintiff Kataza Taifa, plaintiff James E Shropshire, plaintiff Terrence Drain and Ahinadab re: dfts' not meeting obligations (wsy) (Entered: 12/09/1993)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 18 of 66

12/09/1993
12/13/1993 12/13/1993 12/13/1993 12/14/1993 12/14/1993 12/14/1993 12/28/1993 12/28/1993 12/28/1993 01/05/1994 01/06/1994
01/14/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/21/1994 01/21/1994 01/24/1994 01/24/1994 01/25/1994 01/26/1994

102 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to 12/27/93 for plaintiff Morris to file memo re: damage claims [98−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
103 MOTION by plaintiff Preston Gardner to stay proceedings (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
104 LETTER from plaintiff Preston Gardner to Judge Pierce re: conditions at MCC (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
105 LETTER from Gvila Kamau enclosing #103/104 (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
106 AFFIDAVIT of Hamid R. Kashani (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
107 AFFIDAVIT of Richard A. Waples (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
108 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of Class Action Settlement (wsy) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
109 NOTICE OF SERVICE by plaintiffs of Notice of Settlement (wsy) (Entered: 12/30/1993)
110 NOTICE OF SERVICE by plaintiffs of discovery: Pltfs' req for prod (wsy) (Entered: 12/30/1993)
111 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Tillman Morris in support of damage claims (wsy) (Entered: 12/30/1993)
113 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiffs to Certificate of Srvice of the Notice of Settlement (wsy) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
112 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. It is recommended that the agreed entry and the parties' agreement re: state court claims, be approved; objections due 1/15/94 (cc: all counsel, J. Sharp, MJ Pierce) (wsy) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
114 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to Report and Recommendation [112−1] (wsy) (Entered: 01/20/1994)
115 LETTER from plaintiff Preston Gardner directed to Charles Wright re conditions at prison (blh) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
116 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Pretrial conference set for 10:00 2/14/94 (cc: all counsel, J. Sharp, MCC) (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
117 LETTER from Jerry Stahl in opp to agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
118 LETTER from Abdal Bari re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
119 LETTER from Kevin Virgil Williams re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
120 LETTER from Betah P. Ahinadab re: obj to agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
121 LETTER from Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
122 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to [112−1] (wsy) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
123 MOTION by plaintiff Michael Hegwood for leave to file mot of obj to RR(wsy) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
124 OBJECTIONS to RRby plaintiff Michael Hegwood to [112−1] (wsy) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
MINUTES: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; settlement conference held 1/25/94 with plaintiffs Isby and Gardner (lpw) (Entered: 01/25/1994)
125 OBJECTIONS to RRby plaintiff Tillman Morris to [112−1] (wsy) (Entered: 01/27/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 19 of 66

01/28/1994 01/28/1994 01/28/1994
02/04/1994 02/04/1994 02/10/1994
02/11/1994
02/11/1994 02/11/1994 02/11/1994 02/15/1994 02/17/1994 02/18/1994 02/22/1994 02/22/1994 02/23/1994 02/23/1994 02/24/1994 02/24/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994

126 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for appointment of counsel (wsy) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
127 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams re: case numbers (wsy) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
128 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams re: enclosures: mot for appt of cnsl and 2 copies of a complaint. Mot for appt of cnsl recv'd only. (wsy) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
129 MOTION by Jerry White for courrt to order him part of complaint and settlement (wsy) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
130 AFFIDAVIT of Preston Gardner (wsy) (Entered: 02/08/1994)
133 (LATE ENTRY) OBJECTIONS to [112−1] by Lokmar Yazid Abdul−Wadood submitted ad "Motion to Amend Plaintiffs Objections..." (mjk) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
131 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp finding the motion for court to order him part of complaint and settlement [129−1] moot., finding the motion for appointment of counsel [126−1] moot., finding the motion for leave to file mot of obj to RR[123−1] moot., adopting report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [112−1] terminating case (cc: all counsel, order book). (smp) (jld). (Entered: 02/15/1994)
134 MOTION by plaintiff to compel production of med records (smp) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
135 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion to compel production of med records [134−1] (smp) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
136 STATEMENT of facts by plaintiffs in support of [134−1] (smp) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
132 CLERK'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT (cc: all counsel, Order Book) (smp) (jld). (Entered: 02/15/1994)
137 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp finding the motion to compel production of med records [134−1] moot. (mjk) (Entered: 02/18/1994)
138 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to amend objections to RR(wsy) (Entered: 02/23/1994)
141 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to stay judgment (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
142 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Aaron Isby from Dist. Court decision [131−2] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
139 LETTER from Thomas Walker (non−pty) re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
140 LETTER from Louis Allen (non−pty) re: agreed entry? (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
143 Jurisdictional Statement by plaintiff Aaron Isby (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
144 Short record sent to USCA (wsy) (Entered: 02/24/1994)
145 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to stay of judgment (smp) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
146 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams in support of motion to stay of judgment [145−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
147 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams from Dist. Court decision [132−1] (cc: all counsel, USCA) (smp) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
148 Jurisdictional Statement by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (smp) (Entered: 03/02/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 20 of 66

02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994
02/28/1994 02/28/1994 02/28/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994
03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/03/1994 03/03/1994 03/03/1994 03/03/1994

150 MOTION by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood (not a named pltf) to stay judgment (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
151 MEMORANDUM in support of motion to stay judgment [150−1] by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood (not a named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
152 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision [132−1] by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood (not a named pltf) (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
153 Jurisdictional Statement by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood (not a named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
155 MOTION by Bari, Ifoma and Stahl (not named pltfs) to stay judgment (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
156 MEMORANDUM in support of motion to stay judgment [155−1] by Abdal Bari, Guila Ifoma and Jerry Stahl (not named pltfs) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
157 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision, [131−2] by Abdal Bari, Guila Ifoma (formerly Robert Henson) and Jerry Stahl (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
158 Jurisdictional Statement by Bari, Ifoma and Stahl (not named pltfs) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
160 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision, [131−2] by Sidney Wilson (not named pltf) (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
163 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision, [131−2] by Keith LaRance (not named pltf) (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
165 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees and expenses (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
166 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for attorney fees and expenses [165−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
167 AFFIDAVIT of Richard A. Waples re petition for attorneys' fees [165−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
168 AFFIRMATION of Hamid R. Kashani re petition for attorneys' fees [165−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
169 AFFIDAVIT of Peggy A. Hillman re petition for attorneys' fees [165−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
170 AFFIDAVITS of William E. Marsh, Henry C. Karlson, Barry A. Macy, Daid A. Nowak, Charles R. Vaughan, Henry J Price, and Ronald E. Elberger re petition for attorneys' fees [165−1] (smp) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
172 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision [131−2] Anthony C. Walls (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
173 Jurisdictional Statement by Anthony Walls re: appeal (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
RECEIPT from USCA of copy of appeal of Keith LaRance (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
RECEIPT from USCA of cpy of appeal of Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wodood (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
149 Short record sent to USCA for Roosevelt Williams (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
154 Short record sent to USCA for Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood (not a named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
159 Short record sent to USCA for Abdal Bari, Guila Ifoma (formerly Robert Henson) and Jerry Stahl (not named pltfs) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
161 Jurisdictional Statement by Sidney Wilson (not named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 21 of 66

03/03/1994 03/03/1994 03/04/1994 03/04/1994
03/07/1994
03/08/1994 03/09/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/10/1994 03/14/1994 03/14/1994 03/15/1994 03/15/1994 03/15/1994
03/15/1994
03/16/1994 03/17/1994

162 Short record sent to USCA for Sidney Wilson (not named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
164 Short record sent to USCA for Keith LaRance (not named pltf) (smp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)
174 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1400 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
180 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to stay of judgment [145−1], denying motion to stay judgment [155−1], denying motion to stay judgment [150−1], denying motion to stay judgment [141−1], denying motion to amend objections to RR[138−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
171 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp permitting w/drawal of record ( 3 vol) to DAG Matt Robinson; to be retd 3/14/94 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
RECEIPT from USCA of cpy of ntc of appeal of Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
184 MOTION by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wodood to proceed in forma pauperis (wsy) (Entered: 03/14/1994)
175 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1494 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
176 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1487 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
177 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1486 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
178 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1481 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
179 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1493 (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
181 LETTER from temporary prisoner Anthony Wayne Riley re: agreed entry stipulations (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
182 AFFIDAVIT of Keith LaRance re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
183 MOTION by Abdal Bari to proceed in forma pauperis (wsy) (Entered: 03/11/1994)
185 LETTER from Sidney Wilson re: contempt proceedings fld by Hoslinger (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
186 MOTION by cnsl for plaintiffs in 3:92−cv−00429, cnsl for defendants in 3:92−cv−00429 to set aside judgment (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
187 MOTION by Mario Holsinger for civil contempt (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
188 AFFIDAVIT of Mario Holsinger re [187−1] in 3:92−cv−00429 (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
189 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to set aside judgment [186−1] [132−1] in 3:92−cv−00429 Case reopened (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
190 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [183−1] in 3:92−cv−00429, denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [184−1] in 3:92−cv−00429 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
191 MOTION by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood for ruling on prior mot to stay judgment (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
192 NOTICE by plaintiffs of filing discovery: Req for prod and interrogs to dfts (fld by cnsl) (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 22 of 66

03/17/1994 03/17/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994 03/18/1994
03/21/1994 03/22/1994 03/23/1994
03/23/1994
03/23/1994
03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 03/25/1994 03/25/1994 03/28/1994 03/30/1994

193 MOTION by Keith LaRance for contempt (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
194 AFFIDAVIT of Keith LaRance re [193−1] (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
195 Short record sent to USCA (Walls) (wsy) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
196 MOTION by Sidney Wilson to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
197 MOTION by Anthony Wayne Riley for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
198 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
199 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to resp to pltf pet for atty fees &expenses (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
200 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to extend time to resp to pltf pet for atty fees &expenses [199−1] (wsy) (Entered: 03/23/1994)
201 MOTION by Andrew B. Johnson (S92−529) for settlement (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
202 REPLY by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright re [200−1], re [199−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
203 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to resp to pltf pet for atty fees &expenses [199−1] to and incl 5/20/94 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
204 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal w/o prej [198−1], denying motion for contempt w/o prej [197−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal w/o prej [196−1], denying motion for contempt w/o prej [193−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
205 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
206 MOTION by Keith LaRance to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
207 AFFIDAVIT of Keith LaRance re [206−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
208 MOTION by Abdal Bari for relief from order of 3/15/94 re:ifp (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
209 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
210 MOTION by Kyle Ray Rimel for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
211 MOTION by Lokmar Yazid Abdul−Wadood for relief from judgment (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
LETTER from USCA re [172−1] to Anthony C. Walls re: fee to be pd or appeal will be dismd. (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
213 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1606 (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
214 OBJECTIONS by Mario Holsinger to Agreed Entry (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
215 OBJECTIONS by Tracy Jones to Agreed Entry (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 23 of 66

03/30/1994 04/01/1994 04/01/1994 04/06/1994 04/06/1994
04/07/1994 04/07/1994 04/08/1994 04/11/1994 04/11/1994 04/12/1994 04/13/1994
04/14/1994 04/18/1994
04/18/1994
04/18/1994
04/18/1994 04/18/1994 04/19/1994 04/19/1994 04/21/1994 04/21/1994
04/22/1994

216 MOTION by Kaliba Kil Somoklai for sanctions (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
217 MOTION by attorney Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Michael Holland (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
218 MOTION by Lokmar Y. Abdul−Wadood to proceed in forma pauperis (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
219 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [218−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
220 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion by attorney Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Michael Holland [217−1] (cc: all counsel, Holland) (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
221 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for contempt (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
222 OBJECTIONS by Jeberekiah E. Kelubai to Agreed Entry (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
223 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to w/draw record (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
224 MOTION by Roderick Wright for sanctions (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
LETTER from USCA re [142−1] requesting record. (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
225 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for contempt (wsy) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
226 Appeal record sent to Circuit Court re [172−1], re [147−1], re [163−1], re [160−1], re [157−1], re [152−1], re [142−1] Certification Number Z151 761 793 (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
227 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to w/draw record [223−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/18/1994)
228 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright for protective order re: 2st set of interrogs and req for prod of docs (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
229 Statement of Efforts to Settle Discovery Dispute Filed by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
230 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [172−1] Record returned consisting of: co−plts appeals pending record not returned. (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
231 Jurisdictional Statement (Lokmar Abdul−Wadood − non party) (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
232 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision, [131−2] from Mario Holsinger (non party) (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
234 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis by Mario Holsinger (non party on appeal) (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/22/1994)
235 Jurisdictional Statement by Mario Holsinger (non party on appeal) Copy sent to the Crt of Appeals (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/22/1994)
233 Short record sent to USCA (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
236 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp Case referred to Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to conduct evidentiary hearings, enter order on disposition of all nondispos pretrial matters &mo for protect order filed on 4/18/94 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
237 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/28/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 24 of 66

04/22/1994 04/25/1994 04/25/1994 04/26/1994 04/28/1994 04/28/1994 04/28/1994 04/29/1994 05/02/1994 05/02/1994
05/03/1994 05/05/1994 05/05/1994 05/05/1994 05/09/1994 05/10/1994
05/10/1994
05/10/1994 05/11/1994 05/11/1994

238 LETTER for copy of docket from plaintiff Aaron Isby; copy sent. (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
239 Copy of Appellant's Response to Appeal's Court Order filed by Sidney Wilson (Court Employee) Modified on 04/28/1994 (Entered: 04/28/1994)
240 LETTER regarding Agreed Entry from plaintiff Michael Hegwood (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
241 LETTER from non−party Denny Page re agreed entry (Court Employee) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
243 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−1928 (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
244 LETTER from Court of Appeals to Mario Holsinger. (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
245 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision [204−1] by non party Anthony Wayne Riley (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
242 MOTION for ruling on contempt mo filed 2/10/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/02/1994)
248 MOTION for ruling on motion for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
249 RESPONSE by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff William Sampley, plaintiff Mark S Douglas, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Kevin Sandifer, plaintiff John Charles Cole Jr, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Edward Broadus, plaintiff James Thompson, plaintiff Nolan McDandal, plaintiff Robert Smith, plaintiff Robert Jenkins, plaintiff Richard Mumford, plaintiff Michael Hegwood, plaintiff Eric Malone, plaintiff Michael Holland, plaintiff Albert Estep, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to motion for protective order re: 2st set of interrogs and req for prod of docs [228−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/06/1994)
247 MOTION for payment of settlement (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
246 Short record sent to USCA (for non party Anthony Wayne Riley) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/05/1994)
250 MOTION to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (from non−party Mario Holsinger) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/09/1994)
251 NOTICE of change of address from Hamid R. Kashani (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/09/1994)
252 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for contempt [197−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/10/1994)
253 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion for protective order re: 1st set of interrogs and req for prod of docs [228−1]; This order does not include disc attendant to the pltf's application for atty's fees (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/12/1994)
254 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis [250−1] and denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis both by Mario Holsinger (non party on appeal) [234−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/12/1994)
255 LETTER from non−party Sidney Wilson re: status of mo to proceed ifp on appeal. Sent copy of docket. (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/12/1994)
256 MOTION by attorney Hamid R Kashani to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Aaron Isby (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/16/1994)
257 RESPONSE to statement of efforts to settle discovery dispute by Hamid R. Kashani (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/16/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 25 of 66

05/11/1994 05/11/1994 05/13/1994 05/13/1994 05/13/1994 05/13/1994 05/16/1994
05/16/1994 05/16/1994
05/19/1994 05/19/1994
05/19/1994 05/19/1994 05/19/1994 05/19/1994 05/20/1994 05/20/1994 05/23/1994

258 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis by non−party Anthony Wayne Riley (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/16/1994)
259 LETTER req copies of complaint by non−party Sidney Wilson. (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/16/1994)
260 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for civil contempt against Hamid R. Kashini (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
261 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−2048 (Riley) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
262 COPY of Appellate Court Order to Anthony W Riley: dismiss if fee not paid within fourteen days of 5/9/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
263 LETTER re: class action from James Thompson (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
264 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt against Hamid R. Kashini [260−1], denying motion for contempt(Isby) [221−1], denying motion for sanctions (Kaliba Kil Jomoklai)[216−1], denying motion for contempt (Kyle Ray Rimel) [210−1], denying motion for contempt (Isby) [209−1], denying motion for civil contempt [187−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
265 MOTION for civil contempt by non−party George C. Roberts (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
266 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion by attorney Hamid R Kashani to withdraw appearance for plaintiff Aaron Isby [256−1] attorney Hamid R Kashani for Aaron Isby, attorney Richard A Waples for Aaron Isby (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
267 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt by non−party George C. Roberts [265−1] (cc: all counsel, Roberts) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
268 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying as moot motion to proceed in forma pauperis by non−party Anthony Wayne Riley [258−1], denying as moot motion for ruling on motion for contempt [248−1], denying as moot motion for ruling on contempt mo filed 2/10/94 [242−1], denying as moot motion for relief from order of 3/15/94 re:ifp [208−1], denying as moot motion to proceed in forma pauperis [205−1], denying as moot motion for ruling on prior mot to stay judgment [191−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
269 MOTION for civil contempt by non−party Jason E. Morales (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
270 MOTION for civil contempt by non party Jason E. Morales (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
271 MOTION for civil contempt by non−party Terry L. Stewart (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/20/1994)
272 MOTION for civil contempt from non party Terry Lee Stewart (Court Employee) Modified on 05/23/1994 (Entered: 05/20/1994)
273 LETTER re settlement intervening for 12 petitioners from plaintiff Nolan McDandal (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/24/1994)
274 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to resp to pltfs pet for atty fees and exp (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/24/1994)
275 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt from non party Terry Lee Stewart [272−1], denying motion for civil contempt by non−party Terry L. Stewart [271−1], denying motion for civil contempt by non party Jason E. Morales [270−1], denying motion for civil contempt by non−party Jason E. Morales [269−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/24/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 26 of 66

05/24/1994 05/24/1994 05/25/1994
05/25/1994
05/25/1994 05/26/1994
05/27/1994 05/31/1994 05/31/1994
06/02/1994 06/03/1994
06/03/1994 06/06/1994
06/06/1994 06/08/1994 06/09/1994 06/10/1994 06/10/1994
06/10/1994 06/10/1994 06/10/1994

276 MOTION for copies of the complete file from non−party John Thomas (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/25/1994)
RECEIPT of letter re settlement from non−party Sandy W. Catron (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/25/1994)
277 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for copies of the complete file from non−party John Thomas [276−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/25/1994)
278 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for contempt [237−1], denying motion for contempt [225−1], denying motion for sanctions [224−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
279 LETTER re: conditions from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (Court Employee) Modified on 05/26/1994 (Entered: 05/26/1994)
280 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to resp to pltfs pet for atty fees and exp [274−1] to and including 7/19/94 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) Modified on 05/26/1994 (Entered: 05/26/1994)
281 MOTION for civil contempt by non party Phillip Albert Woodard (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/01/1994)
RECEIPT of original motion to enter civil contempt by non party Phillip Albert Woodard. Original dkt no. 281 (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/02/1994)
282 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [147−1] Record retained for use in appeal no. 94−1400 (Isby) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/02/1994)
283 MOTION for civil contempt by non party Richard Hall (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/03/1994)
284 LETTER req docket and req info on ifp status from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams. Sent copy of docket, copy of order den ifp status (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
285 Discovery; responses to dfts interoggs and req for production Filed by plaintiffs in 3:92−cv−00429 (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/06/1994)
286 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [163−1] (Keith LaRance − Non Party) Record being retained for use in Appeal No. 94−1400 (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/07/1994)
RECEIPT (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
287 MOTION by plaintiffs for ruling on mo to compel production of Mr. Cole's medical records (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/09/1994)
288 LETTER re settlement agreement (#131) from plaintiff James Thompson (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
289 LETTER re R &R from non party (Robert Jones) (Court Employee) Modified on 06/13/1994 (Entered: 06/13/1994)
290 NOTICE of filing to the Seventh Circuit of Mo for Stay of Judgment by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (Court Employee) Modified on 06/13/1994 (Entered: 06/13/1994)
291 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to stay judgment (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
292 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
293 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion for ruling on mo to compel production of Mr. Cole's medical records [287−1]. Crt grants mo to compel production of Mr. Cole's medical records which had been a moot mo #134 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 27 of 66

06/10/1994 06/10/1994 06/10/1994 06/14/1994 06/14/1994 06/15/1994 06/16/1994
06/17/1994 06/20/1994 06/22/1994 06/22/1994 06/28/1994 06/28/1994 06/28/1994 06/28/1994 07/18/1994 07/18/1994 07/19/1994 07/20/1994 07/20/1994

294 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce re letter of 6/9/94 by James Thompson directing correspondence to Class counsel (cc: all counsel, Thompson) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
295 MOTION for civil contempt by non−party Mark Marandola (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
296 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt by non party Richard Hall [283−1], denying motion for civil contempt by non party Phillip Albert Woodard [281−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
297 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to stay judgment (Court Employee) Modified on 06/20/1994 (Entered: 06/20/1994)
298 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) Modified on 06/20/1994 (Entered: 06/20/1994)
RECEIPT of cpy of Petition Requesting Issuance of a Writ in the Nature of a Mandamus from Keith LaRance (wsy) (Entered: 06/16/1994)
299 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying letter [289−1] Inmate Jones advised that the court will not consider requests by indiv. members of the Class and that any correspondence should be directed to Class counsel (cc: all counsel, Jones) (wsy) Modified on 06/20/1994 (Entered: 06/16/1994)
300 NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF PERSONAL MANDATE FROM USCA AND ORDER; appeal dismissed as to appellant Bari only. Appeal remains active as to Infoma and Stahl (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/20/1994)
301 LETTER re agreed entry by non−party Steven L. Reed (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/22/1994)
302 LETTER from the USCA requesting copy of the court record. Called to inform USCA the record already being retained by the USCA due to previous appeals (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
303 LETTER from plaintiff James Thompson re agreed settlement (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
304 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt by non−party Mark Marandola [295−1] (cc: all counsel, Marandola) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/30/1994)
305 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp re Steven Reed Letter of violations by MCC officials re agreed entry. Crt will not address ltr by individual members of class action (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/30/1994)
306 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis [298−1], granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis [292−1] on appeal (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/30/1994)
307 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to stay judgment [297−1], denying motion to stay judgment [291−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/30/1994)
308 MOTION by plaintiff to compel produce medical, dental and psychological (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/19/1994)
309 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion to compel produce medical, dental and psychological [308−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/19/1994)
310 MOTION by defendant to extend time to and including 8/8/94 to respond to plt's pet for atty's fees and expenses (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/20/1994)
311 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to and including 8/8/94 to respond to plt's pet for atty's fees and expenses [310−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/21/1994)
312 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to compel produce medical, dental and psychological [308−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 28 of 66

07/20/1994
08/03/1994 08/08/1994 08/08/1994 08/08/1994 08/08/1994
08/10/1994
08/11/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994

(Entered: 07/21/1994)
313 COPY of USCA NOTIFICATION form sent to Southern district of IN in the matter of Keith Larance re: petition for writ of mandamus NO 94−8037. Ordered that the petition is denied as moot (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/21/1994)
314 SUBMISSION OF PARTIES' FIRST IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/04/1994)
315 PETITION FOR EMERGENCY WRIT OF MANDAMUS (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
316 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Aaron Isby in support of petition [315−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
317 Appendix for Emergency Writ of Mandamus by plaintiff Aaron Isby (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
318 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to and including 8/18/94 within which to respond to pltf's petition for atty's fees and expenses (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/10/1994)
319 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to and including 8/18/94 within which to respond to pltf's petition for atty's fees and expenses [318−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/11/1994)
320 NOTICE OF SERVICE by plaintiffs of ntc of depositions upon defts (smp) (Entered: 08/12/1994)
321 LETTER reqesting copies from non party Mario Holsinger (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
322 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis from non party Louis James Allen (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
323 MOTION for contempt from non party Louis James Allen (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
324 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [323−1] filed by non party Louis James Allen (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
325 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis by non party Keith LaRance (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
326 MOTION for contempt by non party Keith LaRance (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
327 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [326−1] filed by non party Keith LaRance (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
328 MOTION filed by non party Chawknee Prince Caruthers for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
329 MOTION filed by Chawknee Prince Caruthers to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
330 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [328−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
331 MOTION by non party Anthony Wayne Riley to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
332 MOTION by non party Anthony Wayne Riley for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
333 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [332−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 29 of 66

08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/15/1994 08/18/1994
08/25/1994 08/25/1994
08/26/1994
08/26/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994 08/29/1994

334 MOTION filed by non party Phillip Woodard to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
335 MOTION filed by non party Phillip Woodard for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
336 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [335−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
337 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time up to and including 8/25/94 within which to respond to Pet for Atty's fees and expenses received to docket on 8/22/94 (Court Employee) Modified on 08/23/1994 (Entered: 08/23/1994)
338 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time up to and including 8/25/94 within which to respond to Pet for Atty's fees and expenses [337−1] (cc: all counsel) (mkb) (Entered: 08/26/1994)
342 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to and including 9/4/94 to repond to pltf's pet for aty's fees and expenses Motion filed in Lafayette as an emergency filing − received in S.B. on 8/29/94 (Court Employee) Modified on 08/30/1994 (Entered: 08/30/1994)
339 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for contempt [335−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [334−1], denying motion for contempt [332−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [331−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [329−1], denying motion for contempt [328−1], denying motion for contempt [326−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [325−1], denying motion for contempt [323−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [322−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/29/1994)
340 PROGRESS REPORT on implementation of agreed entry by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/29/1994)
341 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff William Sampley to [165−1] elargement of time to resp to fee petition (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
343 MOTION by plaintiff Joseph Phillips for deconsolidation of 3:92cv164 from 3:92cv429 (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
344 MOTION from non party Keith Darnell Carter to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
345 MOTION by non party Keith Darnell Carter for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
346 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [328−1] filed by non party Chawknee Prince Caruthers (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
347 MOTION filed by non party (Cornelius Ford to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) Modified on 08/30/1994 (Entered: 08/30/1994)
348 MOTION filed by non party Cornelius Ford for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
349 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [348−1] filed by non party Cornelius Ford (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
350 MOTION filed by non party Douglas Ellis to proceed in forma pauperis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
351 MOTION filed by non party Douglas Ellis for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
352 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [351−1] filed by non party Douglas Ellis (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/30/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 30 of 66

08/30/1994 08/31/1994 09/01/1994
09/02/1994 09/02/1994 09/02/1994 09/06/1994 09/06/1994 09/06/1994 09/06/1994 09/07/1994 09/08/1994 09/08/1994 09/09/1994
09/09/1994 09/09/1994 09/09/1994 09/13/1994

354 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to and including 9/4/94 to repond to pltf's pet for aty's fees and expenses [342−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/31/1994)
353 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for deconsolidation of 3:92cv164 from 3:92cv429 [343−1] dismissing party Joseph Phillips (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/31/1994)
355 ORDE by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for contempt [351−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [350−1], denying motion for contempt [348−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [347−1], denying motion for contempt [345−1], denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis [344−1] (cc: all counsel, Ellis, Carter, Ford) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/02/1994)
356 MOTION by plaintiff for default judgment against plaintiff's attorney's fee petition (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/06/1994)
357 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for default judgment against plaintiff's attorney's fee petition [356−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/06/1994)
358 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to extend time to and including 9/4/94 to repond to pltf's pet for aty's fees and expenses [342−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/06/1994)
359 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion response ext of time [358−1] to pltfs' petition for atty's fees to &including 9/6/94 (cc: all counsel) (mlc) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
360 MOTION by defendant to extend time up to and including 9/16/94 to respond to pltf's pet for atty's fees (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
361 MOTION by plaintiffs for reconsideration of order of 8/30/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
362 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion for reconsideration of order of 8/30/94 [361−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/07/1994)
363 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to extend time up to and including 9/16/94 to respond to pltf's pet for atty's fees [360−1] (cc: all counsel) Atty Gen to respond instanter (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/08/1994)
364 NOTICE OF INTENT TO RESPOND to dfts ext of time by plaintiffs (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
365 SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY by plaintiff in support of motion for reconsideration of order of 8/30/94 [361−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
366 RESPONSE by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff William Sampley, plaintiff Mark S Douglas, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Kevin Sandifer, plaintiff John Charles Cole Jr, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Edward Broadus, plaintiff James Thompson, plaintiff Nolan McDandal, plaintiff Robert Smith, plaintiff Robert Jenkins, plaintiff Richard Mumford, plaintiff Michael Hegwood, plaintiff Eric Malone, plaintiff Michael Holland, plaintiff Albert Estep, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to motion to extend time up to and including 9/16/94 to respond to pltf's pet for atty's fees [360−1] (wsy) (Entered: 09/12/1994)
RECEIPT of letter R. Williams suggesting that he's enclosing materials.....Only a blank sheet of paper was enclosed. (wsy) (Entered: 09/12/1994)
367 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for attorney fees and expenses [165−1] in the amt of $301,229.83. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/12/1994)
368 Discovery; motion for prod of docs Filed by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/13/1994)
369 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff William Sampley in support of motion for default judgment against plaintiff's attorney's fee petition [356−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 31 of 66

09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/13/1994 09/14/1994 09/14/1994
09/14/1994 09/14/1994 09/15/1994 09/16/1994
09/16/1994 09/19/1994 09/19/1994 09/19/1994
09/20/1994

370 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for withdrawal of civil record (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
371 MOTION by plaintiffs for contempt of court (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
372 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for contempt of court [371−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
373 EXHIBITS by plaintiffs in support of mo to hold dfts in contempt of court (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
374 MOTION by plaintiff for evidentiary hearing on mo to hold dfts in contempt of court (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
375 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ;order to show cause ddl 9/30/94 in re James Thompson settlement in the amt of $702.95 (cc: all counsel, Chief Judge Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
376 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ;order to show cause ddl 9/30/94 re settlement for William Sampley of $702.95 (cc: all counsel, Chief Judge Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
377 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ;order to show cause ddl 9/30/94 re Albert Estep settlement of $249.05(cc: all counsel, Chief Judge Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
378 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for order for appointment of qualified experts (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/15/1994)
379 NOTICE OF APPEAL for Phillip Woodard, Louis J. Allen, Chawknee P. Caruthers, Anthony Riley and Keith A. LaRance from Dist. Court decision [339−1] (cc: all counsel) Notice of appeal is only signed by Keith LaRance. (Court Employee) Modified on 09/20/1994 (Entered: 09/15/1994)
380 Jurisdictional Statement for Keith A. LaRance, Anthony W. Riley, Phillip Woodard, Louis Allen, and Chawknee P. Caruthers. (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/15/1994)
381 Short record sent to USCA (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/15/1994)
382 NOTICE by plaintiff Aaron Isby that he will file a mo to enter civil contempt for violating "Agreed Entry" (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/16/1994)
383 AMENDED ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp re settlement agreement signed on behalf of defendants with James Thompson on 6/30/94, along with S92−49 and S94−53, that agreement was due 8/29/94 in the amount of $825.00 dfts directed to show cause on or before 9/30/94 (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/16/1994)
384 LETTER requesting 95 copies of Rcomplaint and settlement. Ltr req payment of $47.50 for copies. (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/19/1994)
385 LETTER from the USCA enclosing notice of appeal which was a duplication of the notice of appeal already file marked and short record sent on docket #381 (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/20/1994)
386 MOTION by plaintiff for partial summary judgment awarding atty's fees and expenses to plt's counsel in accordance with crt's order of 9/9/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/20/1994)
387 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for withdrawal of civil record [370−1] with leave of all concerned to arrive at some reasonable and manageable system to make relevant portions of the rec avail to those who have a legitimate interest in the same (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/20/1994)
388 Request to incorporate and attach appdix I to writ of Mandamus filed on 8/8/94 filed by non party Aaron Isby (Court Employee) Modified on 09/21/1994 (Entered: 09/21/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 32 of 66

09/20/1994 09/20/1994 09/20/1994 09/21/1994
09/23/1994 09/23/1994 09/26/1994 09/26/1994 09/26/1994 09/26/1994
09/26/1994
09/26/1994 09/26/1994 09/29/1994 09/29/1994 09/29/1994

389 MOTION for civil contempt by non party Aaron Isby (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
390 MOTION for evidentiary hearing on mo of civil contempt filed by non party Aaron Isby (Court Employee) Modified on 09/21/1994 (Entered: 09/21/1994)
391 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for civil contempt [389−1] filed by non party Aaron Isby (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
392 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp of referral to US Magistrate for such proceedings, including evidentiary hrgs, as are req, when appropriate, enter into the record a written order setting forth disposition of the mo for contempt filed by pltfs on 9/13/94 (cc: all counsel, Mag Pierce) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/22/1994)
393 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Telephonic Status conference set for 9:30AM on 10/11/94 (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 09/23/1994)
394 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−3225 (LaRance, Riley, Woodard, Allen, Caruthers (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/26/1994)
395 LETTER req copies of agreed entry from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams. Copies sent of Docket #131 Order approving R &R and Docket #112 R &R (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
396 PLTF'S RESPONSE to courts order of 9/19/94. Proposal in regard to individual prisoner's access to court records. (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
397 MOTION by plaintiffs in 3:92−cv−00429 for order to show cause allowing dfts until 10/15/94 to meet their settlement obligations to James Thompson (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
398 MOTION by defendant James E Aiken in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant Norman G Owens in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant John Nunn in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant Charles E Wright in 3:92−cv−00429 to alter judgment [132−1] or amend findings (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
399 MEMORANDUM by defendant Evan Bayh in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant James E Aiken in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant Norman G Owens in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant John Nunn in 3:92−cv−00429, defendant Charles E Wright in 3:92−cv−00429 in support of motion to alter judgment [132−1] or amend findings [398−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
DEPOSITION of Richard A. Waples taken on the following date(s): July 14, l994 (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
DEPOSITION of Hamid R. Kashani taken on the following date(s): 7/28/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
400 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for civil contempt [389−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
401 MOTION by defendants to extend time to respond to mo for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
402 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp; All parties and persons filing papers in this case shall also serve a copy upon the MCC Class Action File Depository, Maximum Control Complex; Clerk shall serve a copy of all papers served by the clerk upon the MCC Class Action File Depository; Clerk of the Crt shall also serve copy of updated dkt sheets upon the MCC Class Action File Depository on a quarterly basis. Superintendent of MCC shall designate a staff member to assume custody of the papers served upon the MCC Class Action File Depository hereinafter called the MCC Class Action File Custodian. Matls sent to the MCC Custodian shall be kept for a period of 1 yr. A complete dkt sht shall be kept, prior dkt shts may be discarded when updated. MCC Custodian shall assume the custody of papers served upon the MCC Depository. Prisoners, upon written req, shall be allowed to review the papers at the pod libraries. Time for review may be cntd against prisoners law library visits. ANY PERSON TAMPERING WITH THE PAPERS IN THE MCC CLASS ACTION FILE DEPOSITORY SHALL BE

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 33 of 66

09/30/1994
09/30/1994 09/30/1994 09/30/1994
10/03/1994 10/03/1994 10/03/1994 10/04/1994 10/04/1994
10/04/1994 10/06/1994 10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/11/1994 10/11/1994

PUNISHED PURSUANT TO THIS CRT'S CONTEMPT POWERS. Copy of this order shall be permanently affixed to top of packet containing MCC Class Action File Depository papers. MCC Custodian shall maintain a log of the prisoner's review req and of date and time review was allowed. Clk shall provide a single copy of the filings for the last 6 mos to the MCC Class Action File Depository (cc: all counsel, Superintendent−MCC, Each Plaintiff) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
403 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp setting aside order [367−1] refer to the Honorable Roger Cosbey on the mo for atty fees and exp to cond an evidentiary hrg and enter R &R Copy of March 1, l994 mo and supporting memo sent to Mag Cosbey (cc: all counsel, Mag Cosbey) (Court Employee) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
404 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis by non party Keith LaRance (Court Employee) Modified on 10/03/1994 (Entered: 10/03/1994)
405 RECEIPT of USCA appearance form, from non party Phillip Woodard − forwarded to the USCA (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/03/1994)
406 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to respond to mo for contempt [401−1] dfts are relieved of resp to mo to hold dfts in Cont of crt pending further scheduling after the conf set for 10/11/94(cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/03/1994)
407 MOTION to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal by non party Keith D. Carter (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
408 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision [355−1] (cc: all counsel) by non party Keith Carter (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
409 Jurisdictional Statement from non party Keith Carter (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
410 Short record sent to USCA (non−party Keith Carter) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
411 MINUTES: before Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey. Telephone scheduling conference set for 10:00 10/13/94. The Court will contact attorneys Waples, Kashani, and Lahn by telephone for said conference. (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
412 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Aaron Isby in support of motion for civil contempt [389−1] (Court Employee) Modified on 10/11/1994 (Entered: 10/05/1994)
413 ENCLOSURE LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (no enclosures included − last page of docket sent to pltf) (blh) Modified on 10/11/1994 (Entered: 10/07/1994)
415 LETTER info on case from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams. Sent copy of docket (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
416 MOTION by plaintiffs for amended order of referral (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
417 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to extend time to respond to mo for contempt [401−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
418 "Writ of Judicial Notice" stating practices at the prison (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
419 MAIL Returned [402−1] addressed to plaintiffs. No longer incarcerated in the IDOC − no forwarding addresses (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
420 NOTICE : before Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey ;scheduling conference re−set for 10:00 10/31/94 (cc: all counsel) faxed to all counsel (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/12/1994)
421 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis by non party Keith LaRance [404−1] (cc: all counsel, LaRance) (Court Employee)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 34 of 66

10/11/1994 10/11/1994
10/12/1994 10/12/1994
10/12/1994
10/12/1994 10/12/1994 10/13/1994 10/13/1994 10/13/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/17/1994 10/17/1994 10/17/1994 10/20/1994

(Entered: 10/12/1994)
422 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [407−1] (cc: all counsel, Carter) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/12/1994)
423 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce directed pltf's to file short statement of ea remaining claim under present mo for contempt on or before 10/17/94; Dfts to either admit or deny each individual claim in writing on or before 11/11/94 ; Limited Discovery ddl set for 12/23/94 ; Telephonic Status conference set for 10:00 12/6/94 crt to make necessary arrangements (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/12/1994)
424 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for order for appointment of qualified experts [378−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
425 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for order to show cause allowing dfts until 10/15/94 to meet their settlement obligations to James Thompson [397−1] in the amount of $825.00 to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel, Sharp) (Court Employee) Modified on 10/13/1994 (Entered: 10/13/1994)
426 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning payment agreement with offender William Sampley on 6/30/94 in the amount of $702.95 to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel, Pierce, Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
427 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning settlement agreement with offender Albert Estep of $249.05 to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel, Pierce, Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
428 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−3346 (Keith Carter) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
429 MAIL Returned [402−1] addressed to plaintiff Robert Smith (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/14/1994)
430 MAIL Returned [411−2] addressed to plaintiff Jimmy Moorson (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/14/1994)
431 MAIL Returned [402−1] addressed to plaintiff Jimmy Moorson (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
432 MAIL Returned [402−1] addressed to plaintiff Kenneth Porter (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
433 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion to alter judgment [132−1] or amend findings [398−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/17/1994)
434 RESPONSE to Order to Show Cause by plaintiffs regarding the crt's orders to show cause dated 9/13/94 and amended or to show cause of 9/16/94 (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/18/1994)
435 STATEMENT of claims by plaintiff in support of [371−1] (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/18/1994)
436 RESPONSE to Order to Show Cause by defendants (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/18/1994)
437 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning Mr. Isby's 6 motions for contempt and one motion for emergency writ of mandamas; that any and all outstanding motions for contempt by Mr. Isby be denied, that he be permanently barred from filing any other matter or pursuing any other action seeking to enforce or challenge Consent Decree entered and that any violation of, or attempt to evade such ban be punished by contempt, monetary sanctions, or a further order barring Mr. Isby from initiating any further suits or actions in this court, to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel, Isby) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/21/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 35 of 66

10/24/1994 10/24/1994 10/24/1994 10/25/1994 10/27/1994 10/28/1994 10/31/1994 10/31/1994
10/31/1994 11/01/1994
11/01/1994 11/02/1994
11/04/1994 11/08/1994
11/09/1994 11/09/1994

438 MOTION by defendants to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties'agreement (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/25/1994)
439 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to direct pltf Holland to file his list of witnesses, exh and contentions with respect to claims on or before 11/10/94 (cc: all counsel, Sharp) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/25/1994)
440 RESPONSE to Order to Show Cause by plaintiffs in 3:92−cv−00429 and report regarding settlement of pltf James Thompson (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/26/1994)
441 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties'agreement [438−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/26/1994)
442 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for hearing on emergency writ of mandamus (Court Employee) (Entered: 10/28/1994)
443 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to Report and Recommendation [437−1] (wsy) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
444 APPEARANCE by Keith D. Carter (non party) on USCA appearance form. Cpy sent to USCA re: Appeal #94−3346 (wsy) (Entered: 11/02/1994)
445 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp finding the report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [425−1] moot. finding the report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [426−1] moot. finding the report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [427−1] moot. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/02/1994)
446 ORDER by Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey telephone scheduling conference reset for 11:00 11/14/94 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/02/1994)
447 AMENDED ORDER of Referral by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for amended order of referral [416−1] vacating [403−2] order, reinstating order [367−1] Case referred to Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey for RRon dfts' mot to alter/amend Findings &Judgment on Atty Fees (cc: all counsel, MJ Cosbey w/copy of 3/1/94 motion, 9/9/94 order) (wsy) (Entered: 11/02/1994)
448 MAIL Returned [439−1] addressed to plaintiff Michael Holland w/notation: "Released" (wsy) (Entered: 11/02/1994)
449 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp UNCONSOLIDATING 3:92cv66 from 3:92cv429; CONSOLIDATING 3:92cv66 with 3:93cv800AS; previous deadlines vacated; pltf has to 4/1/95 to file disp mots; defts have to 6/1/95 to respond; ALL FURTHER ENTRIES WILL BE MADE ONLY ON THE LEAD DOCKET NO. 3:93CV800AS (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 11/04/1994)
450 LETTER from John E. Thomas re: Agreed Entry (wsy) (Entered: 11/07/1994)
451 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying (Isby) motion for hearing on emergency writ of mandamus [442−1], granting in part and denying in part report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [437−1], denying (Isby) motion for evidentiary hearing on mo of civil contempt [390−1];ANY AND ALL FUTURE FILINGS by Mr Isby that have any connection w to the consent decree are to be accompanied by a signed &sworn affidavit that issues raised in the filing have not been raised or addressed in any prior filings or orders of this court; FURTHER ORDERED that any future filings by Mr. Isby are to be accompanied by an updated listing of name, #, date, substance, disposition of all prev filings by Mr. Isby that relate to the class action. (cc: all counsel, MJ Pierce) (wsy) (Entered: 11/09/1994)
452 SUBMISSION of Documents Per 11/1/94 Order re: pltfs' Pet for Atty Fees/Expenses fld 3/1/94. Cpy to MJ Cosbey (wsy) (Entered: 11/10/1994)
453 SUGGESTION on the Record re: dfts' mot to alter/amend Findings &Judgment on Atty fees (ripe for ruling) fld by pltfs. Cpy to MJ Cosbey (wsy) (Entered: 11/10/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 36 of 66

11/14/1994
11/14/1994 11/16/1994 11/16/1994 11/21/1994 11/25/1994 11/25/1994 11/29/1994 11/29/1994 11/30/1994 11/30/1994
12/01/1994 12/01/1994 12/05/1994 12/08/1994
12/12/1994 12/12/1994 12/13/1994 12/14/1994 12/14/1994

454 TELE SCHED CONF: before Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey. Defendants shall file their reply brief regarding their motion to alter or amend findings and judgment on attorney's fees and costs 398 by 11/16/94. (cc: Waples, Kashani, Lahn/Uhl) (Court Employee) (Entered: 11/14/1994)
455 RESPONSE by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to motion for contempt of court [371−1] (wsy) (Entered: 11/14/1994)
456 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce dismissing pltf. Michael Holland for failure to prosecute (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/18/1994)
457 REPLY Memorandum in further sppt of re [398−1] (wsy) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
458 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of Aaron E. Isby for failure to timely pay dkt fee [142−1] Record returned consisting of: record not sent (wsy) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
459 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file a sur−reply to defts' reply memo in further sppt of their motion to alter or amend (wsy) (Entered: 11/28/1994)
RECEIPT of Pltfs' Sur−Reply to Defts' Reply Memo in further sppt of their mot to alter or amend (wsy) (Entered: 11/28/1994)
460 ORDER by Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey granting motion for leave to file a sur−reply to defts' reply memo in further sppt of their motion to alter or amend [459−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
461 SUR−REPLY by plaintiffs to defts' rply memo in further sppt of their motion to alter or amend [398−1] (wsy) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
462 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for order directing removal of his mother's name &address from prison file depository (wsy) (Entered: 12/01/1994)
466 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to alter judgment [132−1] or amend findings [398−1] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Roger B. Cosbey recommending that motion to reconsider be granted &that 9/9/94 order awarding pltf's cnsl $301,229.83 in atty's fees be vacated &that defts be permitted to submit line item objections legal brief in opp to pltf's petn for atty's fees by date certain &w/no extensions, with pltf's cns; submitting reply thereafter (cc: all counsel) (Note: RR rcvd in SB 11/7/94) (mjk) (Entered: 12/08/1994)
463 SUBMISSION of addtl evidentiary materials supporting award of attorney fees and expenses (wsy) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
464 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Aaron Isby from Dist. Court decision Order approving RRof 10/20/94 [451−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
465 Short record sent to USCA re: #464 (wsy) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
467 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce re telephonic status conf held 12/6/94. Pltfs were repesented by Hamid Kashani &defts by DAG Uhl; pltfs to file their reply to defts' response on or b/f 12/14/94 ; Telephonic Status conference adjourned to 10:00 am (South Bend time) on 1/12/95 (cc: all counsel) (mjk) Modified on 12/08/1994 (Entered: 12/08/1994)
468 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 94−3824 (wsy) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
469 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [379−1] Record returned consisting of: no record filed (wsy) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
470 LETTER from non−party Zolo Agona Azania requesting copy of Agreed Entry. Copy fees not sent/copies not made/notified Azania re: amt due (wsy) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
471 SUGGESTION of Hamid R. Kashani re: "Cole" cases (wsy) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
472 MOTION by plaintiffs cnsl to extend time to resp to mot for contempt (wsy) (Entered: 12/15/1994)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 37 of 66

12/14/1994 12/15/1994 12/19/1994 12/21/1994 12/21/1994 12/21/1994 12/22/1994 12/30/1994 01/03/1995 01/03/1995 01/06/1995 01/11/1995 01/12/1995
01/17/1995 01/17/1995 01/18/1995 01/20/1995 01/20/1995 01/20/1995 01/20/1995

473 STATEMENT by plaintiffs re: RRof 11/30/94 [466−1] (wsy) (Entered: 12/15/1994)
474 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing party John Charles Cole on all claims w/prejudice (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/16/1994)
475 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to resp to mot for contempt [472−1] to/incl 12/23/94 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/19/1994)
476 LETTER from Zolo Agona Azania (non−pty) requesting help in retrieving his files from prison officials. (wsy) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
477 MOTION by plaintiffs and defendants to vacate 9/9/94 order (wsy) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
478 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to proceed in forma pauperis (slm) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
479 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to vacate 9/9/94 order [477−1], vacating [466−1] as moot report and recommendation by Mag Judge Cosbey (cc: all counsel) (slm) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
480 LETTER from Charles C. Roche, Jr. re: conditions at MCC (wsy) (Entered: 01/06/1995)
481 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file instanter Reply Statement of Claims Under Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt of Court (wsy) (Entered: 01/06/1995)
482 REPLY by plaintiffs re [371−1] (Motion to Hold Defts in Contempt of Court) (wsy) (Entered: 01/06/1995)
483 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion for leave to file instanter Reply Statement of Claims Under Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt of Court [481−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/09/1995)
484 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting Isby's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [478−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/17/1995)
485 MINUTES: TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE held 1/12/95 before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Discovery ddl set for 1/25/95 ; Pre−trial order ddl set for 2/27/95; Final Pretrial conference set immediately prior to Evid hrg. @9:00 4/6/95 ; status conference set for 1:30 1/20/95 ;exchange of cont, wit, exhib set for 2/6/95 ; Evidentiary hearing set for 9:00 4/6/95 Ptys to file all motions in limine by 3/13/95 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/17/1995)
TRANSCRIPT filed no. of volumes: 1 for dates: 12/6/94 Court Reporter: Geneva L. Sones, Notary Public (wsy) (Entered: 01/18/1995)
486 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [160−1] (Sidney Wilson) Record returned consisting of: no record sent/no record to return (wsy) (Entered: 01/18/1995)
487 MOTION by non−pty Kweli O. Shakur for contempt of contempt re: agreed entry (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
488 SCHEDULING ORDER Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ;status conference set for 2:30 1/26/95 for Roosevelt Williams (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
489 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to produce prisoner Roosevelt Williams 1/26/95 @2:30 (cc: all counsel, Super MCC, IAG Chief, Lahn) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
490 SCHEDULING ORDER Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ;status conference set for 3:00 1/26/95 for Aaron Isby at WCC (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
491 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce to produce prisoner Aaron Isby 1/26/95 @3PM (cc: all counsel, Super MCC/by fax, IAG Chief, Lahn) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 38 of 66

01/20/1995
01/20/1995
01/23/1995 01/24/1995 01/24/1995 01/26/1995 01/27/1995 01/27/1995 01/27/1995 01/27/1995 01/27/1995
02/01/1995 02/01/1995

492 MEMORANDUM OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING ORDER Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Discovery set for 7/3/95 ; proposed pretrial order ddl set for 9/1/95 ; A 2 wk non−jury trial set for 9:00 9/25/95 at WCC; pretrial conference set for 10:00 9/15/95 ;exchange of cont, wit, exhib set for 8/18/95. THIS SCHEDO APPLIES ONLY TO PLAINTIFFS PRESTON GARDNER, EDWARD BROADUS, JAMES THOMPSON, MICHAEL HEGWOOD AND PAUL KOMYATTI (cc: all counsel, J. Shapr, Class Action Depository &Super WCC) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
493 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; recommending taht any and all damages claims asserted in this cause by William Sampley, Mark Douglas, Kevin Sandifer, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Kenkins, Richard Mumford, Eric Malone, Albert Estep, Jeberekia Eleazar Kelubai (Leroy Jeffers), Tome Hailey, Kenneth Porter, Christopher Miser, Andrew Benroy Johnson, Dyrone Henderson, Jimmy Mooreson and Carl L. Johnson BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (per telephonic PTC held 1/20/95; the court being advised that any and all such damage claims have been settled/resolved. (cc: J. Sharp, Kelubai, Hailey, Porter, Miser, Johnson, Henderson, Moorson, Johnson, Lahn, Kashani, Waples, C/A Depository) (wsy) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
494 NOTE: THIS ITEM HAS BEEN DELETED FROM THE RECORD PER ORDER OF 1/24/95 &returned to Komyatti NOTIFICATION (to Defendants) of Non−Compliance w/provisions of the Agreed Entry fld by Paul Komyatti (wsy) Modified on 01/25/1995 (Entered: 01/23/1995)
495 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. The motion for contempt of contempt re: agreed entry [487−1] by Mr. Shakur will not be addressed by the court; Shakur is neither a class representative nor counsel and has no individual claim pending in this case. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
496 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce striking miscellaneous [494−1] fld by Paul Komyatti (Notification to defts of Non−Compliance w/Provisions of the Agreed Entry); Clerk to return the document to Komyatti; Clerk to refuse to accept for filing any document not signed by counsel. (cc: all counsel, Komyatti) (wsy) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
498 MAIL Returned [493−1] addressed to plaintiff Jimmy Moorson w/notation "return to sender" (wsy) (Entered: 01/30/1995)
MINUTES: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce settlement conference held for Komyatti claims in this case (lpw) (Entered: 01/27/1995)
497 NOTICE: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Telephonic status conference set for 2:00PM on 2/3/95, to discuss the settlement agreement for plaintiffs Komyatti and Williams (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 01/27/1995)
499 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai to Report and Recommendation [493−1] (wsy) (Entered: 01/30/1995)
500 LETTER from plaintiff Michael Hegwood requesting cpy of dkt. (wsy) Modified on 01/30/1995 (Entered: 01/30/1995)
501 SCHEDULING ORDER Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; status conference conducted 1/26/95 at WCC with Mr. Isby appearing pro se and Mr. Lahn appearing for defts; no further amendments to the pleadings will be allowed; all discovery to be completed by 7/3/95; the plaintiff to provide his lists of witnesses, exhibits, and contentions to defendants by 8/18/95; defts. directed to provide to plaintiff their proposed pretrial order and file same on or before 9/1/95; a two−week bench trila was scheduled to commence 9:00AM on 9/25/95; a final pretrial conf. will be conducted immediately prior to trial on 9/25/95. (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 01/30/1995)
502 STATEMENT of Class Counsel Re: Report &Recommendation of 1/20/94 fld by class cnsl (wsy) (Entered: 02/03/1995)
503 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing party Roosevelt Williams w/o costs and w/o prej to right to vacate this order and reopen this pltf if settlement is

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 39 of 66

02/01/1995 02/06/1995 02/09/1995 02/09/1995
02/10/1995 02/15/1995 02/21/1995 02/21/1995 02/21/1995
02/23/1995
02/23/1995 02/23/1995 02/24/1995 02/28/1995 03/01/1995 03/10/1995

not consummated w/in 30 days. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 02/03/1995)
504 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing party Michael Hegwood w/o prej to right w/in 30 days to reopen this pltf if settlement is not consummated (cc: all counsel) (wsy) Modified on 02/09/1995 (Entered: 02/07/1995)
505 ORDER by USCA appointing Robert J. Palmer to represent plaintiffs/Appellants Isby, Wilson, Ifoma/Henson, Stahl and Abdul−Wadood (cc: all counsel) (wsy) Modified on 02/09/1995 (Entered: 02/07/1995)
507 APPEARANCE for plaintiff Roosevelt Williams by Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
508 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp adopting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [493−1] in the most part. Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai (Leroy Jeffers) is excluded from this order adotping the RRand is not ordered dismissed. dismissing party Andrew Benroy Johnson, party Christopher Michael Miser, party Tome L Hailey, party Kenneth Porter, party Jimmy Moorson, party Dyrone Henderson, party Carl L Johnson, party Albert Estep, party Eric Malone, party Richard Mumford, party Robert Jenkins, party Robert Smith, party Nolan McDandal, party Kevin Sandifer, party Mark S Douglas, party William Sampley WITH PREJUDICE (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
509 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams in 3:92−cv−00429 for order withdrawing setttlement agreement (wsy) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
510 MAIL Returned [508−1], [508−2] addressed to plaintiff Jimmy Moorson (no notation as to why) (wsy) (Entered: 02/16/1995)
511 MOTION by plaintiff Michael Hegwood to vacate Court order of 2/1/95 re: dismissal of claims and to reinstate claims of Mr. Hegwood (wsy) (Entered: 02/23/1995)
512 MOTION by plaintiff James Thompson for partial, final judgment (wsy) (Entered: 02/23/1995)
513 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [464−1], dismissing the appeal [408−1], dismissing the appeal [245−1], dismissing the appeal [232−1] Record returned consisting of: no record sent/none to return: NOTE: REMAINING PENDING APPEALS 94−1400, 94−1481, 94−1493, 94−1494 consolidated at USCA for briefing. (wsy) (Entered: 02/23/1995)
514 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing damage claims for plaintiff Komyatti without costs &without prejudice to right of any party upon good cause shown w/in 30 days to vacate order if settlement not consummated. Upon completion of settlement, parties may stipulate that damage claims be dism w/prej &that costs be assessed &the ct will approve stip (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
515 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; settlement conference set with plaintiff Edward Broadus for 1:30 pm, on 3/16/95 at Westville Correctional Center (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
516 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce directing Supt MCC to produce Edward Broadus at hearing to be held at WCC on 3/16/95 (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
517 NOTICE by non−party Steven O'Bryant to defts of non−compliance with provisions of agreed entry (mjk) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
518 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for appointment of counsel (wsy) (Entered: 03/06/1995)
519 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to withdraw settlement agreement (wsy) (Entered: 03/06/1995)
RECEIPT of Copy of #519 from Clerk USDC/SDIN sent to them by Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 03/13/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 40 of 66

03/16/1995 03/16/1995
03/16/1995 03/17/1995 03/17/1995
03/17/1995 03/21/1995 03/22/1995 03/23/1995 03/27/1995 03/27/1995 03/31/1995 04/05/1995 04/06/1995 04/06/1995
04/07/1995

520 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Edward Broadus, plaintiff James Thompson, plaintiff Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai by Franklin A Morse II (wsy) (Entered: 03/17/1995)
521 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to vacate Court order of 2/1/95 re: dismissal of claims and to reinstate claims of Mr. Hegwood [511−1], vacating [504−1] Scheduling order dismissing party Michael Hegwood w/o prej to right w/in 30 days to reopen this pltf if settlement is not consummated, vacating [504−2] order (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/17/1995)
522 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for partial, final judgment [512−1]; pltf to be accorded 10 vested months; dfts shall not confiscate legal opinions sent through mail....see order for further details. terminating party James Thompson (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/17/1995)
523 CLERK'S ENTRY OF PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT as to Pltf James Thompson (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/17/1995)
524 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing damage claims for this pltf w/o costs &w/o prej to right of any party upon good cause shown w/in 30 days to vacate order if settlement not consummated. Upon completion of settlement, parties pay stip that damage claims be dism w/prej &that costs be assessed &ct will approve stip; (cc: all counsel) (mjk) Modified on 03/25/1996 (Entered: 03/20/1995)
525 LETTER from plaintiff Michael Hegwood req copy of docket from 11/1/94 to present. Copy sent. Also, copy of letter sent to pltf cnsl (mjk) (Entered: 03/20/1995)
526 MOTION by plaintiff William Sampley and plaintiff Shaka Shakur for contempt against dfts for violating Agreed Entry: NOTE by Clerk: Document STRICKEN per order of 5/1/95, entry #550. (wsy) Modified on 05/03/1995 (Entered: 03/23/1995)
527 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying Roosevelt Williams's motion for appointment of counsel [518−1] (cc: Williams and all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/23/1995)
528 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for appointment of counsel (wsy) (Entered: 03/27/1995)
529 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp; This cause of action is reinstated as to pltf Roosevelt Williams. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
530 NOTICE by Atty Kashani of svc of Memo of Settlement and Release executed 3/16/95 by pltf Broadus and Atty Lahn upon AttyMilstone (wsy) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
531 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. Atty Milstone to submit a report to the court by 4/20/95 re: Broadus' position of Release; The 30−day ddl (in the Court order of 3/17/95 #524) is extended to 60 days...to conclude this settlement. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) Modified on 03/25/1996 (Entered: 04/04/1995)
534 NOTICE of change of address of Atty Richard A. Waples (wsy) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
532 PREHEARING ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
533 MINUTES: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce taking under advisement on 4/6/95 the motion for contempt of court [371−1] ; evidentiary hearing held 4/6/95; parties presents evidence, the court to hold evidence open until the taking of depositions of Carl Muszar and John Baker; plaintiffs to file their brief 20 days after the filing of the depositions and the defendants to file their response 20 days after receipt of plaintiffs' brief (cc: all counsel) (lpw) Modified on 04/07/1995 (Entered: 04/07/1995)
535 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for appointment of counsel [528−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 04/10/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 41 of 66

04/10/1995 04/10/1995
04/10/1995
04/14/1995 04/14/1995
04/14/1995 04/18/1995 04/20/1995 04/20/1995 04/20/1995 04/21/1995 04/24/1995
04/24/1995 04/24/1995 04/25/1995 04/25/1995 04/27/1995

536 RETURN of Exhibits to Linda Walker by Atty Kashani (wsy) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
537 MOTION by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Michael Hegwood, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams, plaintiff Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for expedited ruling on 1st count of pltfs' mot to hold defts in contempt , and/or for preliminary injunction (wsy) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
538 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Michael Hegwood, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams, plaintiff Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams in support of motion for expedited ruling on 1st count of pltfs' mot to hold defts in contempt [537−1], of motion for preliminary injunction [537−2] (wsy) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
539 NOTICE by plaintiffs of filing Deposition of Karl Muszar (wsy) (Entered: 04/17/1995)
540 MOTION by plaintiff Kataza Taifa, plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff William Sampley, plaintiff Mark S Douglas, plaintiff Aaron Isby, plaintiff Kevin Sandifer, plaintiff James E Shropshire for Partial Withdrawal of Motion for Partial, Expedited Ruling on the 1st Count of Pltfs' Motiont o hold defts in contempt of court and/or for preliminary judgment −− re: relief sought by Steven Lee (wsy) (Entered: 04/17/1995)
DEPOSITION of Karl E. Muszar, Jr. taken on the following date(s): 4/7/95 (wsy) (Entered: 04/17/1995)
541 MOTION by non party Sidney Wilson for copy of original complaint Note: Wilson appealed as a non−party (entry #160/Appeal No. 94−1481/Dismissed by USCA 1/17/95) Copy forwarded to chambers (wsy) (Entered: 04/19/1995)
543 RESPONSE by plaintiff Edward Broadus to Court's order of 3/31/95 [531−1] (smp) Modified on 03/25/1996 (Entered: 04/24/1995)
543 MOTION by counsel for plaintiff Edward Broadus to extend time an additional two weeks to complete its review of documents disclosed by the State (smp) (Entered: 04/24/1995)
549 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams re: status of motion for temporary restraining/preliminary order (wsy) (Entered: 04/27/1995)
542 MOTION by plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Edward Broadus, plaintiff Michael Hegwood to extend tm to/includ 5/21/95 to file witness and exh lists and contentions (slm) (Entered: 04/24/1995)
544 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE (Ntc of substitution/Lupton for Lahn) for defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright by Suzann W Lupton (wsy) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
545 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to/incl 6/5/95 to file preliminary witness list (wsy) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
546 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 5/21/95 to file witness and exhibit lists and contentions [542−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
547 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp referring to Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce the motion for contempt [526−1] (cc: MJ Pierce, Sampley, Shakur, IAG) (wsy) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
548 LETTER from non−party John E. Thomas requesting copy of Post Hearing Brief of April 6, 1995. Copy not sent/docket does not reflect a brief having been filed on 4/6/95/copy fees not received. (wsy) (Entered: 04/26/1995)
550 MOTION by plaintiff Edward Broadus for preliminary injunction (to transfer Broadus to IN Youth Center during pendency of this action) w/brief in support

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 42 of 66

04/27/1995 05/01/1995 05/04/1995 05/05/1995 05/09/1995 05/15/1995 05/15/1995 05/16/1995 05/18/1995 05/24/1995 05/25/1995
05/26/1995 05/30/1995
05/31/1995
06/02/1995 06/02/1995 06/12/1995

attached (wsy) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
551 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 6/5/95 to file their witness list [545−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
552 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp striking motion for contempt [526−1]; Sampley and Shakur are represented by counsel. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
553 LETTER from non−party Zolo Agona Azania requesting copy of "Agreed Entry". Copy not sent/Azania notified of charge (wsy) (Entered: 05/04/1995)
554 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to 5/16/95 for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief in support of motion to hold defendants in contempt (mjk) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
555 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to 5/16/95 for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief in support of motion to hold defendants in contempt [554−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 05/09/1995)
TRANSCRIPT filed no. of volumes: 1 for dates: 4/6/95 (Pretrial Conference b/f MJ Pierce); Court Reporter: Geneva L Sones (mjk) (Entered: 05/16/1995)
TRANSCRIPT filed no. of volumes: 2 for dates: 4/6/95 (trial b/f MJ Pierce); Court Reporter: Geneva L Sones (mjk) (Entered: 05/16/1995)
556 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/incl 5/23/95 for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief in support of motion to hold defendants in contempt (mjk) (Entered: 05/18/1995)
557 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 5/23/95 for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief in support of motion to hold defendants in contempt [556−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 05/18/1995)
558 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time one week for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief &30 days to file witness &exhibit lists &contentions (mjk) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
559 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time one week for plaintiffs to file post−trial brief &30 days to file witness &exhibit lists &contentions [558−1]; post−trial brief due 5/30/95; plaintiffs Broadus and Gardner to file witness and exhibit lists and contentions by 6/21/95 (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 05/26/1995)
560 LETTER from non−party John Thomas requesting copies of all pleadings filed since April 6, 1995. Note: Copies not sent...non party did not submit money for copy work. (wsy) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
561 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp referring to Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce the motion for preliminary injunction (to transfer Broadus to IN Youth Center during pendency of this action) [550−1] (cc: all counsel, MJ Pierce) (wsy) (Entered: 05/31/1995)
562 BRIEF FILED by plaintiff Paul Komyatti, plaintiff Preston Gardner, plaintiff Michael Hegwood, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams, plaintiff Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai, plaintiff Roosevelt Williams regarding [371−1] (Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt of Court) (wsy) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
563 NOTICE by non−party Steven O'Bryant of Defendants' non−compliance w/provisions of the Agreed Entry. (wsy) (Entered: 06/05/1995)
564 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend to/incl 7/20/95 time to file Witness List (wsy) (Entered: 06/05/1995)
565 WRIT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 06/13/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 43 of 66

06/12/1995 06/16/1995 06/21/1995 06/26/1995 06/27/1995 06/28/1995 06/28/1995 06/29/1995 06/29/1995 06/30/1995
07/03/1995 07/05/1995 07/05/1995 07/05/1995
07/05/1995
07/07/1995 07/07/1995 07/12/1995 07/13/1995

566 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion by defts to extend to/incl 7/20/95 time to file Witness List [564−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 06/13/1995)
567 MOTION by defendants to extend tm to/includ 7/12/95 to file post−trial brief on mot for contempt (slm) (Entered: 06/19/1995)
568 MOTION by Pltf Randy H. Collins and Defts to dismiss Collins' claims in 3:92cv429 and 3:93cv554 (wsy) (Entered: 06/22/1995)
569 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 7/12/95 to file post−trial brief on motion for contempt [567−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 06/26/1995)
570 LETTER from (non−party) John E. Thomas directed to Hamid r. Kashani requesting Kashani to w/draw as attorney (wsy) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
571 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for appointment of counsel (mjk) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
572 STATEMENT of class counsel re [568−1] stipulation of dismissal filed by Randy H Collins Sr &defendants (mjk) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
573 MOTION by plaintiffs for ruling on plaintiffs' motion for partial, expedited ruling on the first count of plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt of court or, alternatively, for preliminary injunction (mjk) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
574 MOTION by pro se class member Tracy Jones to declare class counsel ineffective in their representation (mjk) (Entered: 06/30/1995)
575 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp unconsolidating 3:92cv84AS with cause number 3:92cv429AS &reassigning cause number 3:92cv84AS to MJ Pierce for all further proceedings, incl trial (cc: all counsel, MJ Pierce) (mjk) (Entered: 07/03/1995)
576 Discovery Filed by plaintiff Aaron Isby: 1st set of interrogatories to defendants (mjk) (Entered: 07/05/1995)
577 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion to declare class counsel ineffective in their representation [574−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/06/1995)
578 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for appointment of counsel [571−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/06/1995)
579 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for preliminary injunction (to transfer Broadus to IN Youth Center during pendency of this action) [550−1] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. Recommending that Motion for Prel Inj be DENIED. (cc: all counsel, J. Sharp, O Bk) (wsy) (kds). (Entered: 07/06/1995)
580 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce. Recommending that pltfs' motion for contempt concerning Jones' incarceration at MCC be DENIDED. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (kds). (Entered: 07/06/1995)
581 RESPONSE by Class Counsel to Tracy Jones' motion to declare class counsel ineffective in their representation [574−1] (wsy) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
582 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to dismiss Collins' claims in 3:92cv429 and 3:93cv554 [568−1] dismissing party Randy H. Collins Sr. w/prejudice (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (kds). (Entered: 07/12/1995)
583 BRIEF FILED by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright regarding [371−1] (wsy) (Entered: 07/12/1995)
584 MOTION by pltfs to extend time w/in which to file pretrial submissions (wsy) (Entered: 07/14/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 44 of 66

07/13/1995 07/17/1995
07/17/1995 07/17/1995 07/19/1995
07/20/1995 07/20/1995
07/21/1995 07/25/1995 07/31/1995 08/01/1995 08/01/1995 08/01/1995
08/02/1995 08/03/1995 08/03/1995 08/04/1995

585 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for leave to depose all state witnessez (wsy) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
586 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time w/in which to file pretrial submissions [584−1], giving plaintiffs to 8/14/95 to file pretrial submissions consisting of lists of witnesses, exhibits &contentions re claims of plaintiffs, Edward Broadus &Preston Gardner (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 07/17/1995)
587 DEMAND for jury trial by plaintiff Edward Broadus (Cpy to chambers) (mjk) (Entered: 07/18/1995)
588 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce for class counsel to submit a brief status report w/in 14 days reflecting status of settlement between plaintiff Kelubai (Jeffers) &defendants on 1/11/94 (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 07/18/1995)
589 PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS to Report and Recommendation [580−1] re plaintiffs' motion for partial, expedited ruling on 1st count of plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt of court or for prel inj re Tracy Jones' assignment to MCC [573−1] (mjk) (Entered: 07/20/1995)
590 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying "Motion for Jury Trial" [587−1] absent designation of a specific cause # for Broadus' individual case (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 07/21/1995)
591 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion of plaintiffs for contempt of court [371−1] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce, recommending that the plaintiffs' motion for contempt with regard to lay advocates at CAB hearings, free copies of the Handbook, classification &juice boxes on commisary be DENIED &that plaintiffs' motion with regard to law clerks for prisoners with special needs &law library visits &specific cite requirements for prisoners in disciplinary segregation be GRANTED (cc: all counsel, Chief Judge Sharp, Magistrate Pierce) (mjk) (Entered: 07/21/1995)
592 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to extend time to/incl 8/20/95 to file Deft Witness List (wsy) (Entered: 07/24/1995)
593 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 8/20/95 to file Deft Witness List [592−1] witness list ddl set for 8/20/95 (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/27/1995)
594 RESPONSE to [588−1] by Class Counsel (wsy) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
595 MOTION by defendants to extend time to/incl 8/31/95 to respond to pltf Isby's 1st set of interrogatories (wsy) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
596 STATUS REPORT by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright (wsy) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
597 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp adopting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [579−1] denying motion for preliminary injunction (to transfer Broadus to IN Youth Center during pendency of this action) [550−1] (cc: Broadus and all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
598 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp dismissing any and all claims asserted in this cause by Jeberekia Kelubai and dismissing party Jeberekiah Eleazar Kelubai w/prejudice (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/03/1995)
599 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/incl 8/14/95 to file obj to RR(wsy) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
600 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/incl 8/31/95 to respond to pltf Isby's 1st set of interrogatories [595−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
601 Report of Class Counsel per Order for Status Report of 7/17/95 (wsy) (Entered: 08/07/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 45 of 66

08/07/1995 08/14/1995 08/14/1995 08/16/1995
08/17/1995 08/22/1995
08/28/1995 08/31/1995 09/01/1995 09/01/1995 09/05/1995 09/05/1995 09/20/1995
09/20/1995 09/21/1995 09/21/1995 09/21/1995 09/25/1995 09/26/1995
09/27/1995

602 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/incl 8/14/95 to file obj to RR[599−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/07/1995)
603 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants to continue trial date of 9/25/95 and other scheduling dates (wsy) (Entered: 08/15/1995)
604 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to Report and Recommendation [591−1] (wsy) (Entered: 08/15/1995)
605 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to continue trial date of 9/25/95 and other scheduling dates [603−1] ; exchange of contentions, witness, exhibit preliminary lists due 10/15/95 &filing ddl set for 1/4/96 ; Pre−trial order ddl set for 1/15/96 to be filed by defts; Final Pretrial conference continued from 9/15/95 to 1:30 pm on 1/26/96 ; Trial rescheduled from 9/25/95 to 9:00 am (Westville time) on 2/5/96 at Westville Correctional Center (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 08/18/1995)
606 WITNESS, EXHIBIT &CONTENTIONS list submitted by plaintiff Aaron Isby (mjk) (Entered: 08/18/1995)
607 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp adopting report and recommendation [591−1] granting in part and denying in part motion for contempt of court [371−1] See order, report &recommendations for details. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 08/24/1995)
608 MOTION by defendants to dismiss case (wsy) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
609 NOTICE by defendants of Lewis v. Faulkner (wsy) (Entered: 08/31/1995)
610 MOTION by defendants to extend time to/incl 9/21/95 to respond to pltfs' objection to RRof 7/20/95 (wsy) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
611 MOTION by defendants to extend time to/incl 9/31/95 to respond to pltf Isby's 1st set of interrogs to defts (wsy) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
612 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to extend time to/incl 9/21/95 to respond to pltfs' objection to RRof 7/20/95 [610−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/05/1995)
613 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/incl 9/31/95 to respond to pltf Isby's 1st set of interrogs to defts [611−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/05/1995)
614 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for order directing removal of his mother's name &address from prison file depository [462−1]. MCC Director Newkirk is authorized and directed to delete the address of Linda Bruce Hunter. (cc: MCC, Isby and all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/20/1995)
615 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to dismiss [608−1] dismissing party Michael Hegwood w/prej (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/20/1995)
616 LETTER from non−party requesting copy of original complaint. Costs of copies not submitted/copies not made. (wsy) (Entered: 09/22/1995)
617 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff from Dist. Court decision [607−1] (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 09/25/1995)
618 Jurisdictional Statement by plaintiffs (n/k/a: Docketing Statement) (wsy) (Entered: 09/25/1995)
619 Short record sent to USCA (wsy) (Entered: 09/25/1995)
620 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp approving, adopting &incorporating by reference report and recommendation [580−1] denying motion for contempt of court [371−1] insofar as it seeks to have court order Tracy Jones to be removed from MCC (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
621 MOTION by plaintiff Paul Komyatti to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (wsy) (Entered: 09/29/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 46 of 66

09/28/1995 10/02/1995 10/04/1995 10/05/1995 10/10/1995 10/23/1995 10/24/1995
10/27/1995
10/27/1995
10/27/1995 10/30/1995
10/30/1995 11/06/1995 11/07/1995 11/07/1995 11/07/1995 11/07/1995 11/07/1995 11/14/1995 11/14/1995 11/15/1995 11/15/1995 11/16/1995

622 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 95−3281 (wsy) (Entered: 09/29/1995)
623 Appellate Court Order to appellants re: filing fee due or appeal will be dismissed. (wsy) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
624 Report by plaintiffs in 3:92−cv−00429 re: Tracy Jones (wsy) (Entered: 10/04/1995)
625 NOTICE OF SERVICE by plaintiff of 9/26/95 Petition/Affidavit for Leave to Proceed w/o prepayment of fees &costs. (wsy) (Entered: 10/06/1995)
626 OBJECTION to Report and Recommendation/Agreed Entry for 1/5/94 by Kalonji Jihad (wsy) (Entered: 10/11/1995)
627 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants to extend time 30 days to exchange preliminary witness &exhibit lists (wsy) (Entered: 10/24/1995)
628 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time 30 days to exchange preliminary witness &exhibit lists to/incl 11/23/95 [627−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
629 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/incl 12/2/95 for plaintiffs to file petition for attorney fees attributable to individual prisoner damage claims which have been settled (mjk) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
630 NOTICE OF APPEAL by non−party Kalonji Ra'id Jihad from Dist. Court decision (regarding motion of 10/5/95 objecting to Report &Recommendation of 1/5/94) (cc: all counsel) (mjk) Modified on 10/30/1995 (Entered: 10/30/1995)
631 Jurisdictional Statement by Kalonji Ra'id Jihad re [630−1] (mjk) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
632 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 12/2/95 for plaintiffs to file petition for attorney fees attributable to individual prisoner damage claims which have been settled [629−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
633 Short record sent to USCA regarding 10/27/95 appeal by Jihad (mjk) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
634 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 95−3578 (sdf) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
635 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Jones−Bey (sdf) Modified on 11/08/1995 (Entered: 11/08/1995)
636 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Roosevelt Williams (sdf) Modified on 11/08/1995 (Entered: 11/08/1995)
637 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Aaron Isby (sdf) Modified on 11/08/1995 (Entered: 11/08/1995)
638 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Lokmar Abdul−Wadood (sdf) Modified on 11/08/1995 (Entered: 11/08/1995)
639 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Kalonji Ra'id Jihad Kalonji Ra'id Jihad (sdf) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
640 MOTION by non−party Kalonji Ra'id Jihad to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (sdf) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
641 AFFIDAVIT of Kalonji Ra'id Jihad re [640−1] (sdf) (Entered: 11/15/1995)
642 DISCOVERY: Request for Production of Documents, Filed by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 11/16/1995)
643 DISCOVERY: Request for Production of Documents Filed by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 11/16/1995)
644 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [640−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 11/20/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 47 of 66

11/20/1995 11/20/1995 11/20/1995 11/20/1995 11/20/1995 11/29/1995 11/29/1995 11/29/1995 11/30/1995
11/30/1995 11/30/1995 11/30/1995 12/04/1995 12/04/1995 12/04/1995 12/06/1995 12/06/1995
12/07/1995
12/07/1995 12/08/1995 12/11/1995 12/11/1995

645 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of HCAT for Edward Broadus (sdf) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
646 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ HCAT for Paul Komyatti (sdf) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
647 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ HCAT for John Cole (sdf) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
648 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ HCAT for William Sampley (sdf) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
649 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ HCAT for Richard Mumford (sdf) (Entered: 11/21/1995)
650 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for appointment of expert witness (smp) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
651 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (smp) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
652 WITNESS LIST, EXHIBITS AND CONTENTIONS submitted by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (smp) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
653 NOTICE OF APPEAL to USCA by "unnamed class member" Ricky Outlaw from Magistrate Report &Recommendation [112−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
654 MOTION by Ricky Outlaw to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (with attached affidavit of indigency) (mjk) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
655 Jurisdictional Statement by Ricky Outlaw re [653−1] (mjk) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
656 OBJECTIONS (entitled "Motion For Objection") by Ricky Outlaw to Report and Recommendation [112−1] (mjk) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
657 Short record sent to USCA (Outlaw appeal) (mjk) (Entered: 12/04/1995)
658 MOTION by defendant to continue trial date , and to extend all deadlines (sdf) (Entered: 12/05/1995)
659 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to deconsolidate 3:92cv208 from 3:92cv429 (sdf) (Entered: 12/05/1995)
660 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for appointment of expert witness [650−1] (cc: all counsel, Williams) (wsy) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
661 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to continue trial date [658−1], granting motion to extend all deadlines [658−2] Pre−trial order ddl reset for 5/10/96 ; Final Pretrial conference reset for 10:00 5/17/96 in South Bend;Trial reset for 9:00 6/3/96 at WCC; prel cont, wit, exhib to be filed by 3/4/96 and final cont, wit, exhib to be filed by 4/30/96 (cc: all counsel, Isby, Williams, WCC) (wsy) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
662 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [654−1] filed by non−pty Ricky Outlaw (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
663 Pleading titled WRIT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE by Roosevelt Williams (wsy) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
664 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 95−3873 (wsy) (Entered: 12/11/1995)
665 COPY of Appellate Court Order: to appellant re dismissal (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
666 COPY of Appellate Court Order: to appellant re dismissal (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 48 of 66

12/11/1995 12/11/1995 12/11/1995 12/11/1995 12/12/1995 12/12/1995 12/13/1995 12/15/1995 12/18/1995 12/26/1995 12/26/1995 12/27/1995 01/03/1996
01/03/1996 01/06/1996
01/08/1996 01/08/1996 01/24/1996 01/29/1996

667 OBJECTIONS to [112−1] by non−party class member Omar A. Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
668 NOTICE OF APPEAL from Dist. Court decision #131 (by Omar A. Anthony) (cc: all counsel) (sdf) Modified on 12/19/1995 (Entered: 12/12/1995)
669 Jurisdictional Statement by Omar A Anthony re: #668 (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
670 MOTION by Omar A Anthony to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
671 Short record sent to USCA (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
672 MOTION by plaintiff to withdraw appearance of Franklin A Morse II, Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples for Preston Gardner (sdf) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
673 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to withdraw appearance of Franklin A Morse II, Hamid R Kashani, Richard A Waples for Preston Gardner [672−1] same terminated (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 12/18/1995)
675 Discovery ( response to pltf's request for production of documents) Filed by defendants (sdf) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
674 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 95−3969 (Omar A. Anthony) (wsy) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
676 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to compel production of documents (mjk) (Entered: 12/27/1995)
677 MOTION by Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad for order to hold defendants in contempt of court (mjk) (Entered: 12/27/1995)
678 Appellate Court Order: appellant has until 1/2/96 to file memo stating why appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (sdf) Modified on 12/28/1995 (Entered: 12/28/1995)
679 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting in part dening in part motion for leave to depose all state witnesses [585−1] granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [621−1] denying as moot motions for writ of HCAT for Jones−Bey [635−1] Roosevelt Williams [636−1] for Aaron Isby [637−1] for Lokmar Abdul−Wadood [638−1] for Kalonji Ra'id Jihad [639−1] for Edward Broadus [645−1] for Paul Komyatti [646−1] for John Cole [647−1] for William Sampley [648−1] for Richard Mumford [649−1] for Roosevelt Williams [651−1] denying motion to deconsolidate 3:92cv208 from 3:92cv429 [659−1] denying motion to compel production of documents [676−1] denying motion for order to hold defendants in contempt of court [677−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
680 LETTER from non−party David R. Carter requesting copy of docket sheet (non−party copies not sent) (sdf) (Entered: 01/05/1996)
823 COPY of Appellate Court Order: dismissing the appeal [706−1] regarding Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad, and unknown class member, It is further ordered that the motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is denied as moot (sdf) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
681 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying letter requesting copy of docket sheet by non−party David R. Carter, II, directing him to 1st submit advance payment of $33.00 for copy. [680−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
682 LETTER from plaintiff Aaron Isby complaining about not being permitted access to prison library. (sdf) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
683 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to compel production of documents (sdf) (Entered: 01/25/1996)
684 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion to compel production of documents [683−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/30/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 49 of 66

01/29/1996 01/31/1996 02/02/1996 02/09/1996 02/12/1996 02/12/1996 02/12/1996 02/14/1996 02/14/1996 02/14/1996 02/14/1996 02/20/1996 02/20/1996
02/20/1996 02/23/1996 02/26/1996
02/26/1996
02/26/1996 02/27/1996 02/28/1996
02/28/1996 02/28/1996

685 MOTION by Roosevelt Williams for writ of H/C Ad Testificandum (sdf) (Entered: 01/30/1996)
686 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for writ of H/C Ad Testificandum [685−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
687 MOTION to hold dfts in contempt by non−party Fortunato H Rivera (sdf) (Entered: 02/05/1996)
688 OBJECTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to Magistrate Judge's denial of non−party involvement to produce discovery material (wsy) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
689 LETTER from Roosevelt Williams requesting copy of order denying his motion to compel....same sent (wsy) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
690 MOTION by Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad for to hold defts in contempt (wsy) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
691 MEMORANDUM by Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad in support of motion for to hold defts in contempt [690−1] (wsy) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
692 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to hold dfts in contempt [687−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/15/1996)
693 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [670−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/15/1996)
694 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for to hold defts in contempt [690−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/15/1996)
695 MEMORANDUM by Fortunato Rivera (un−named party) in support of motion to hold dfts in contempt [687−1] (sdf) Modified on 02/22/1996 (Entered: 02/16/1996)
696 LETTER from plaintiff Aaron Isby re: unfair treatment, personal property being confiscated, inadequate diet (sdf) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
697 MOTION by appellant Ricky Outlaw to withdraw motion for objection, Jurisdictional Statement docket #669, Motion for Leave to proceed IFP, Notice of Appeal docket #668 (sdf) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
698 RESPONSE of Class Counsel to R Williams' objection [688−1] (sdf) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
699 NOTICE by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad in 3:92−cv−00429 requesting copy of pleading filed on 2/12/96 (sent) (sdf) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
700 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to withdraw motion for objection, Jurisdictional Statement docket #669, Motion for Leave to proceed IFP, Notice of Appeal docket #668 [697−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
701 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [668−1] regarding Omar A Anthony and Steve Cutler (no record filed) (sdf) (Entered: 02/27/1996)
702 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM by pltf Aaron Isby to Herbert Newkirk (sdf) (Entered: 02/27/1996)
703 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying objection [688−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/28/1996)
704 COPY of Appellate Court Order: directing Omar A. Anthony to pay $105.00 filing fee, or file mot to proceed IFP. Either to be done within the next 30 days (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/1996)
705 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying habeas corpus petition Ad Testificandum as unnecessary [702−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/1996)
706 NOTICE OF APPEAL by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad from Dist. Court decision [693−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 50 of 66

02/28/1996 03/01/1996 03/01/1996
03/01/1996 03/05/1996 03/08/1996 03/11/1996 03/12/1996 03/13/1996 03/13/1996 03/15/1996 03/21/1996 03/22/1996 03/25/1996 03/25/1996 03/25/1996 03/25/1996 04/01/1996 04/05/1996 04/16/1996 04/17/1996 04/17/1996 04/18/1996 05/02/1996

707 Jurisdictional Statement by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/1996)
708 Short record sent to USCA (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/1996)
709 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the District Court [160−1], [157−1], [152−1], [142−1] Record consisting of: 5 v. pleadings being retained for use in Appeal No. 94−3978 (certified copy of decision attached) (sdf) Modified on 03/04/1996 (Entered: 03/04/1996)
710 Motion for Objection by Kalonji Ra'id Jihad (docketed as misc. event at court request) (Court Employee) (Entered: 03/07/1996)
711 EXHIBITS by plaintiff Aaron Isby (slm) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
712 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams re: copies of documents not being recieved (sdf) (Entered: 03/11/1996)
713 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 96−1529 (sdf) (Entered: 03/13/1996)
714 NOTICE (Writ of Judicial Notice) by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams re: ventilation problems (sdf) (Entered: 03/13/1996)
715 MOTION by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal trust fund ledger attached (sdf) (Entered: 03/15/1996)
716 AFFIDAVIT of Kalonji Raid Jihad to motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [715−1] (sdf) (Entered: 03/15/1996)
717 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal [715−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/18/1996)
718 LETTER of transmittal from USCA requesting record on appeal. (sdf) (Entered: 03/25/1996)
719 NOTICE OF APPEAL by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad from Dist. Court decision [717−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/25/1996)
720 Short record sent to USCA for docket entry #719 (sdf) (Entered: 03/25/1996)
CLERK'S record on appeal transmitted to Circuit UPS 12 volumes of pleadings (sdf) (Entered: 03/25/1996)
721 Appellate Court Order: dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to Kalonji Raid Jihad (sdf) (Entered: 03/26/1996)
722 Appellate Court Order: dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction; re docket #668 (sdf) (Entered: 03/26/1996)
723 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 96−1733 (sdf) (Entered: 04/03/1996)
724 COPY of Appellate Court Order: appellant file by 4/15/96 a brief memorandum stating why appeal 96−1733 should not be dismissed. (sdf) (Entered: 04/08/1996)
725 COPY of Appellate Court Order: appeal 96−1529 directing Jihad to pay filing fee or submit petition for IFP (sdf) (Entered: 04/17/1996)
726 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction (no record returned) [630−1] (sdf) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
727 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals #95−3969 is dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction (no record returned) (sdf) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
728 COPY of Appellate Court Order: Appeal #96−1733 (sdf) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
729 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp consolidating individual damage claims by Aaron Isby for purposes of trial with claims for injuctive relief asserted in 3:92cv208 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/06/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 51 of 66

05/02/1996 05/03/1996 05/03/1996 05/03/1996
05/10/1996 05/15/1996 05/17/1996 05/17/1996 05/17/1996 05/17/1996 05/20/1996
05/20/1996 05/20/1996
05/20/1996 05/20/1996

730 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp that individual damage claims asserted by Roosevelt Williams, Preston Gardner, and Aaron Isby be separated for purposes of trial (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
731 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Telephonic Status conference to reschedule pretrial ddls and trial on individual damgage claims asserted by Aaron Isby set for 11:00 6/18/96 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
732 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Telephonic Status conference to reschedule pretrial ddls and trialont he individual damage claims asserted by Preston Gardner set for 10:00 6/18/96 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
733 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce regarding [730−1] pre−trial conference for 5/17/96 at 10:00 will only be concerned with damage claims asserted by Roosevelt Williams. Trial scheduled to commence on 6/3/96 willonly involve damage claims asserted by Roosevelt Williams. Final pre−trial conference and trial scheduled on damage claims asserted by Preston Gardner and Aaron Isby are CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
734 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal [719−1] regarding Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad as unnecessary. Appellant is directed to file application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal in Appeal No. 96−1529. Record returned consisting of: (Record still at USCA) (mjk) (Entered: 05/11/1996)
735 LETTER of transmittal from USCA requesting record on appeal. re [706−1] record consisting of 12 v. pleadings previously sent to USCA 3/25/96 (sdf) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
740 WRIT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
741 Copy of LETTER from plaintiff Aaron Isby to Wayne E. Uhl (sdf) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
742 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ordering Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to file a statement indicating order in which he expects to call witnesses to testify at trial of 6/3/96: ddl to submit of 5/21/96 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) Modified on 06/07/1996 (Entered: 05/21/1996)
743 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce re individual damage claims of Roosevelt Williams Trial set for 9:30 6/3/96 (cc: all counsel) (See RRentry # 760 of 6/6/96) (sdf) Modified on 06/07/1996 (Entered: 05/21/1996)
736 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; Superintendent of MCC in Westville to produce Roosevelt Williams, Kalonji Ra'id Jihad (James Dunville), Nathaniel Jones−Bey, and Aaron Isby for trial set for 6/3/96 (cc: all counsel, Superintendent−MCC−ctfd mail, Chief, Federal Litagation Section IAG) (smp) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
737 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; Superintendent of ISP to produce John Cole, Paul Komyatti, Richard Mumford at trial at WCC on 6/3/96 at 1:00 p.m. (cc: all counsel, Supt−ISP−ctfd mail, Chief, Federal Litigation Section of IAG) (smp) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
738 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; Superintendent of Wabash Valley Correctional Institution in Carlisle, IN to produce Lokmar Abdul−Wadood at trial to be held at WCC on 6/4/96 at 9:30 a.m. (cc: all counsel, Chief of Fed Lit. IAG, Supt−Wabash Correctional−ctfd mail) (smp) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
739 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; Superintendent of Indiana Reformatory to produce Edward Broaduss and Williams Samply at trial to be held at WCC on 6/4/96 at 9;30 a.m. (cc: all counsel, Supt−IR−ctfd mail, Chief Federal Lit Section of IAG) (smp) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
744 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating attorney Suzann W Lupton for Charles E Wright, John Nunn, Norman G Owens, James E Aiken, Evan Bayh and substituting attorney David A Arthur (sdf) (Entered: 05/21/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 52 of 66

05/20/1996 05/21/1996 05/22/1996 05/22/1996 05/23/1996 05/28/1996 05/29/1996 05/29/1996 05/29/1996 05/31/1996 06/03/1996 06/03/1996 06/03/1996 06/04/1996
06/06/1996
06/06/1996
06/06/1996
06/06/1996

745 STATEMENT in compliance to the court order by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams in support of [742−1] (faxed copy) (sdf) (Entered: 05/21/1996)
746 MOTION by defendants for reconsideration of or to deny and vacate writ ad testificandum (sdf) (Entered: 05/22/1996)
747 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for reconsideration of or to deny and vacate writ ad testificandum [746−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
748 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying writ of judicial notice [740−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
749 MOTION by defendants to deny or for reconsideration and vacating writ ad testificandum (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/1996)
750 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for court to retain the court order to selection of witness under Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum (sdf) (Entered: 05/29/1996)
751 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion to deny or for reconsideration and vacating writ ad testificandum [749−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/29/1996)
752 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to amend pretrial order of 5/17/96 (sdf) (Entered: 05/30/1996)
753 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to amend Pretrial Order of 5/17/96 on plaintiff's contentions (sdf) (Entered: 05/30/1996)
RECEIPT of Pretrial Order regarding plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 06/03/1996)
754 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE HELD: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Pre−trial order approved, signed and distributed (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
755 PRE−TRIAL ORDER approved by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce : pltf refused to sign (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
756 BENCH TRIAL: DAY 1: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Pltf begins evidence with 6 witnesses (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
759 MINUTES: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce plaintiff presents further evidence &rest; deft. moves for judgment on the evidence, court to recommend granting said motion , court to issue R, case taken under advisement on 6/4/96 regarding [759−3] (lpw) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
757 MOTION by defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens, defendant John Nunn, defendant Charles E Wright to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
758 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement [757−1]; Agreed Entry approved by the Court on 2/14/94 is hereby Temporarily Modified consistent with the terms of athe agreement tendered by the parties (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/06/1996)
760 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning bench trial; it is recommended that final judgment be entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff Roosevelt Williams on all of the plaintiff's individual damage claims and that the plaintiff bear all costs to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce by plaintiff Aaron Isby (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/07/1996)
761 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion to amend Pretrial Order of 5/17/96 on plaintiff's contentions [753−1], denying motion to amend pretrial order of 5/17/96 [752−1], denying motion for court to retain the court order to selection of witness under Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum [750−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) (Entered: 06/07/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 53 of 66

06/19/1996
06/24/1996 06/26/1996 07/05/1996 07/10/1996 07/12/1996 07/12/1996
07/22/1996 07/22/1996 07/24/1996 07/25/1996 07/25/1996

762 SCHEDULING ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF STATUS CONFERENCE by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce ; Telephonic Status conference held 6/19/96; durign the conf. the court asked that defts. to suply Mr. Gardner with Copies of 1 the complaint &answer in 3:92cv84, 2 the original &any amended complaints in 3:92 cv 429, 3 any &and all answers filed in 3:92 cv 429, 4 the completed docket sheet in 3:92 cv 429; 2−day bench trial set for 9:30AM on 9/23/96, immediately prior to trial a final pretrial conf wil be held to consider the approval of a final pretrial order at WCC before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; any request for subpoena issuance accompaneid by the statutory fee must be submitted to the court by 7/26/96; any request for inmate witnesses shall be submitted by 7/26/96; plainitt shall file with the court and serve counsel for defts. his list of witnesses, exhibits and contention by 7/26/96; defts. to file the proposed final pretrial order by 9/18/96 (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 06/21/1996)
763 NOTICE/CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by defendant of documents pursuant to order of pretrial conference of 6/19/96 (sdf) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
764 MAIL Returned [762−1] addressed to plaintiff Preston Gardner: wrong box number (sdf) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
765 MOTION by Evan Bayh, James E Aiken, Norman G Owens, John Nunn to enforce settlement aggrement and dismiss individual damages claim of Edward Broadus (exhibits A−G attached) (sdf) Modified on 07/08/1996 (Entered: 07/08/1996)
766 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for hearing , and for contempt (Court Employee) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
767 MOTION by defendants 3rd motion to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement (sdf) (Entered: 07/12/1996)
768 SCHEDULING ORDER and Memorandum of Status Conference by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce regarding Plaintiff Aaron Isby; bench trial to commence on 9/19/96, final pretrial conference and consider the approval of final petrial order immediately prior to trial on 9/19/96; in the event that plaintiff wishes to secure attendance of imnate witnesses, the request shall be submitted in a separate request in writing on or before 8/1/96, in addition, plaintiff shall file and serve upon counsel of defendants witnesses, exhibits, and contentions on or before 8/1/96; defendants were directed to provide plaitiff with proposed final pretrial order, incoprorating lists of witnesses, exhibits, and contentions on or before 8/15/96, defendants were further directed to file proposed final pretrial order on or before 9/6/96 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
769 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion 3rd motion to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement, the agreement which was approved by the court on 2/14/96 is temporarily modified consistent with the terms of the agreement tendered by the parties. [767−1] (cc: all counsel) (slm) (Entered: 07/23/1996)
770 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to [768−1] (slm) (Entered: 07/23/1996)
771 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp regarding [760−1] Jugdment shall be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff Roosevelt Williams terminating party Roosevelt Williams (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/25/1996)
772 FAXED COPY OF RESPONSE to motion to enforce settlement aggrement and dismiss individual damages claim of Edward Broadus (exhibits A−G attached) [765−1] ORIGINAL RECEIVED 7/29/96 (wsy) Modified on 07/30/1996 (Entered: 07/29/1996)
773 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying objection [770−1] (Isby's obj of 7/22/96) as moot. Pltf Isby's claims for equitable or injunctive relief asserted in 3:92cv208AS) are DECONSOLIDATED from the individual damage claims asserted by Isby in 3:92cv429AS. Only Isby's individual damage claims in 3:92cv429 will be tried by the Magistrate on 9/19/96. All pretrial deadlines established by the Magistrate shall remain in full force and effect. (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/29/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 54 of 66

07/26/1996
07/26/1996 07/29/1996 07/30/1996 07/31/1996 07/31/1996 08/02/1996 08/02/1996 08/05/1996 08/05/1996 08/06/1996 08/07/1996 08/16/1996 08/20/1996
08/21/1996 08/26/1996 08/27/1996
08/27/1996
08/27/1996

774 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to enforce settlement aggrement and dismiss individual damages claim of Edward Broadus [765−1] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce re: plaintiff Edward Broadus. RECOMMENDED that all claims brought by or on behalf of Edward Broadus be dismissed with prejudice; objections due w/in 10 days (cc: all counsel) (wsy) (Entered: 07/29/1996)
775 MOTION by defendants in 3:92−cv−00429 to extend time to/incl 8/30/96 to file response to Pltf Isby's Motion to Find Defts in Contempt. (wsy) (Entered: 07/29/1996)
776 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/incl 8/30/96 to file response to Pltf Isby's Motion to Find Defendants in Contempt [775−1] (cc: all (mjk) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
777 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams requesting copy of [769−1] (copy sent) (mjk) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
778 AMENDED WITNESS, exhibits, and contentions list submitted by plaintiff Aaron Isby (sdf) (Entered: 08/01/1996)
779 MOTION by miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad for objection to order of 7/22/96 which grants motion to tmeporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement (sdf) (Entered: 08/01/1996)
780 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum (sdf) (Entered: 08/05/1996)
781 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for objection to order of 7/22/96 which grants motion to temporarily modify agreed entry and parties' agreement [779−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
782 NOTICE by plaintiff Aaron Isby of defendants continual non−compliance with the agred entry (sdf) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
783 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for clarification of court order of 7/22/96 (sdf) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
784 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to [773−1] (sdf) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
785 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams regarding case (sdf) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
PROPOSED Pre−trial Order Received from defendants (sdf) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
786 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce directing plaintiff Aaron Isby to file a statement no later than 8/26/96 indicating the order in which he expects to call his witnesses to testify at the 9/29/96 trial, and an estimate of the duration of each witness' testimony on direct examination. Due to time constraints, Mr Isby is to give his statement of witness testimony to Michael Scott who, in turn, is asked to send the list to the ocurt by fax and follow−up with the original statement by U.S. mail (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
RECEIPT of proposed pretrial order w/signature from IAG and plaintiff Aaron Isby (sdf) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
787 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to [786−1] (sdf) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
788 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; hat the Supt. of MCC produce ROOSEVELT WILLIAMD #4052 at trial on 9/19/96 at 9:30AM at WCC.(cc: Supt. MCC by cert. mail #P068 167 211, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec. of IAG, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
789 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; that the Supt. of MCC to produce AARON ISBY #892219 for trial on 9/19 and 20/96 at 9:30 at WCC. (cc: Supt. MCC by cert. mail #P068 167 212, Chief of Fed. Lit. Sec. of IAG) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
790 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce that the Supt. of Wabash Valley produce KATAZA TAIFA #10417 and JOHN COLE #14658 at

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 55 of 66

08/27/1996 08/27/1996 08/27/1996
08/27/1996 08/27/1996 08/27/1996 08/29/1996 08/29/1996
09/09/1996 09/09/1996 09/16/1996 09/16/1996 09/16/1996 09/17/1996

trial at WCC on 9/19/96 at 9:30AM. (cc: Chief of Fed. Lit. Sec. IAG, Supt. of Wabash Valley by cert. mail #P068 167 213, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
791 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; That the Supt. of ISP produce PAUL KOMYATTI #29726 at trial to be held at WCC on 9/19/96 at 9:30AM (cc: Supt. ISP by cert mail #P068 167 214, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec. IAG, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
792 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce that the Supt. of ISP produce KALIBA JOMOKALI (Richard Mumford) #854735 at trial on 9/19/96 at 1:00PM. (cc: Supt. of ISP by cert. mail. #P 068 167 215, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec of IAG, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
793 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; that the Supt. of Wabash Valley produce BATAH P. AHINADAB (Ronald Turner) #32627 and JASON MORALES #905982 at trial on 9/19/96 at 1:00PM at WCC. (cc: Supt. of Wabash Valley by cert. mail #P068 167 216, Chief. fed Lit Sec. of IAG, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
794 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; that the Supt. of MCC produce JEBEREKIAH E. KELUBIA (Leroy Jeffers) #28668 at trial on 9/19/96 at l:00PM at WCC. (cc: Supt. of MCC by cert. mail #P068 167 217, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec of IAG, D. Arthur, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
795 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; That the Supt. of ISP produce ROBERT SMITH #30636 for trial to be held at WCC on 9/20/96 at 9:30. (cc: Supt. of ISP by cert. mail. #P068 167 218, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec of IAG, D. Arther, A. Isby) (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
796 ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; that the Supt. of IR produce SIDNEY WILSON #910795 and WILLIAM SAMPLEY #851094 at trial on 9/20/96 at 9:30AM at WCC. (cc: Supt. of IR by cert. mail. #P068 167 219, Chief Fed. Lit. Sec. of IAG, D. Arther, A. Isby) (lpw) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
797 MOTION by defendants to dismiss all claims for damages on behalf of Presotn Gardner for failure to comply with the requirements of pretrial management order (sdf) (Entered: 08/29/1996)
798 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to dismiss all claims for damages on behalf of Presotn Gardner for failure to comply with the requirements of pretrial management order [797−1] It is recommended that defendants' motion to dismis be granted and that nay and all of Preston Gardner's individual claims in this cause be dismisses with prejudice(cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 08/29/1996)
799 MOTION by defendants to extend time to/including 10/7/96 to respond thplaintiff Isby's motion to find Defendants in contempt (sdf) (Entered: 09/10/1996)
800 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce granting motion to extend time to/including 10/7/96 to respond thplaintiff Isby's motion to find Defendants in contempt [799−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 09/10/1996)
801 MINUTES: before Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Status conf. held 9/16/96 with plaintiff Aaron Isby; plaintiff indicated that the case has been settled and that the trial is no longer necessary. TRIAL CANCELLED (crt rptr: Kois) (lpw) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
802 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp enforcing settlement and dismissing all claims brought on behalf of Edward Broadus with prejudice (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 09/17/1996)
803 PRE−TRIAL ORDER approved by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce : (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 09/17/1996)
804 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp approving report and recommendation motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [798−1], granting motion to dismiss all claims for damages on behalf of Presotn Gardner for failure to comply with the

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 56 of 66

09/18/1996
09/23/1996 09/23/1996 10/07/1996 10/08/1996 10/08/1996 10/08/1996
10/15/1996 10/18/1996
10/22/1996
10/23/1996 10/23/1996 10/28/1996 10/29/1996
10/30/1996
11/04/1996 11/07/1996 11/07/1996
11/22/1996

requirements of pretrial management order [797−1] dismissing party Preston Gardner with prejudice (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 09/19/1996)
805 AGREED NOTICE by plaintiff Aaron Isby stating that parties have agreed to settle damages claims, and that there will be a joint motion to dismiss claims submitted in a few days (sdf) (Entered: 09/19/1996)
806 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to find defendants in contempt (sdf) (Entered: 09/24/1996)
807 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to set up evidentiary hearing on contempt motion (sdf) (Entered: 09/24/1996)
810 LETTER from plaintiff Aaron Isby (lpw) (Entered: 10/09/1996)
RECEIVED proposed Entry Modifying Agreed Entry of 2/14/96 (lpw) (Entered: 10/09/1996)
808 MOTION by defendant to modify agreed entry (lpw) (Entered: 10/09/1996)
809 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp adopting motion to modify agreed entry [808−1], entry modifying agreed entry of 2/14/94 [0−0] (cc: all counsel) (lpw) (Entered: 10/09/1996)
811 NOTICE by plaintiff Aaron Isby of change of address (sdf) (Entered: 10/16/1996)
812 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals reversing and remanding the Decision of the District Court [Appeal [617−1] regarding Roosevelt Williams, Aaron Isby, Paul Komyatti Record to be returned at a later date (sdf) (Entered: 10/21/1996)
813 RESPONSE by defendants Charles E Wright, John Nunn, Evan Bayh, James E Aiken, Norman G Owens to motion to find defendants in contempt [806−1] (sdf) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
814 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Aaron Isby by Kenneth J Falk (sdf) (Entered: 10/24/1996)
814 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Kenneth J Falk (sdf) (Entered: 10/31/1996)
815 MOTION by plaintiffs to withdraw appearance of Richard A Waples (sdf) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
816 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to withdraw appearance of Richard A Waples [815−1] terminated terminating attorney Richard A Waples (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 10/29/1996)
817 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning [807−1], [806−1], [766−1], [766−2] to Chief Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recoommending that plaintiff Isby's motions to hold defendants in contempt and to schedule evidentiary hearings on such motions to be denied (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 10/31/1996)
818 REPLY by plaintiff Aaron Isby to motion to find defendants in contempt [806−1], to motion for contempt [766−2] (sdf) (Entered: 11/05/1996)
819 MOTION by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams for defendants to be held in contempt for violating the agreed entry assignment of th paralegal (sdf) (Entered: 11/08/1996)
820 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams in support of motion for defendants to be held in contempt for violating the agreed entry assignment of th paralegal [819−1] (sdf) (Entered: 11/08/1996)
821 ORDER by Chief Judge Allen Sharp adopting report and recommendation [817−1], denying motion for hearing [766−1], denying motion for contempt [766−2], denying motion to find defendants in contempt [806−1], denying motion to set up evidentiary hearing on contempt motion [807−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 11/25/1996)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 57 of 66

12/09/1996
01/06/1997 01/30/1997
03/14/1997
03/27/1997 03/27/1997 04/15/1997
04/30/1997 05/09/1997 05/14/1997
05/19/1997 05/19/1997 05/21/1997
05/21/1997 05/23/1997 06/03/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997

822 COPY of Appellate Court Order: directing the appellant that they have until 12/26/96 to consider whether to dismiss this appeal by filing a motion under FRAP 42(b) in order to avoid the assessment of the $105.00 appellate fees. (sdf) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
824 MANDATE from Circuit Court of Appeals regarding appeal No. 96−1529 dismissing the appeal and denying the motion to proceed IFP on appeal as moot (sdf) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
825 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp Case number 3:92cv475AS is DE−CONSOLIDATED from case number 3:92cv429AS because of plaintiff Howard Smallwood has been paroled on 1/10/97 and has not furnished cour twith a current mailing address (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/03/1997)
826 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for defendants to be held in contempt for violating the agreed entry assignment of the paralegal [819−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recommending that the motion be denied (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/17/1997)
827 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Roosevelt Williams to Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Robin Pierce[112−1] (sdf) (Entered: 03/28/1997)
828 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp vacating [825−1] order Case re−consolidated with case number 3:92cv475AS (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/31/1997)
829 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp adopting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [826−1] denying motion for defendants to be held in contempt for violating the agreed entry assignment of th paralegal [819−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
832 LETTER from non−party Deryl D. Swanigan (sdf) (Entered: 05/16/1997)
830 LETTER from non−party Kevin V. Williams regarding conditions in Maximum Control Facility (sdf) (Entered: 05/13/1997)
831 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce [830−1] regarding letter submitted by non−party Kevin V. Williams: Court will not address Mr. Williams letter. Mr. Williams has no right to sek enforcement of the Agreed Entry in the instant case (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
833 MOTION by non−party Michael Clark for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt (sdf) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
834 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce regarding letter [832−1] The court will not address this letter (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
835 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt [833−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce Recommending that Mr. Michael Clark's motion be denied(cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
836 document entitled "that defendants have violated this court provision under the rules of established laws under the agreed entry" submitted by non−party James Utley (sdf) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
837 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning 836 to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce, recommending that this motion be DENIED (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
838 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp approving report and recommendation [837−1]; denying motion by plaintiffs asserting that defendants have violated court provision under Agreed Entry [836−1] (cc: all counsel) (mjk) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
839 MAIL Returned [838−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony "not MCC" (sdf) (Entered: 06/11/1997)
840 MAIL Returned [838−1] addressed to miscellaneous Kalonji Nkrumah Jihad "not MCC" (sdf) (Entered: 06/11/1997)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 58 of 66

06/12/1997 06/17/1997 06/18/1997
06/23/1997 06/23/1997 06/23/1997 07/16/1997
07/17/1997 07/21/1997 07/22/1997 07/25/1997
07/28/1997 08/06/1997 08/07/1997 08/07/1997 08/11/1997 08/15/1997 09/04/1997 09/09/1997
09/10/1997 09/11/1997 09/12/1997

841 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for writ of execution (sdf) (Entered: 06/13/1997)
842 RESPONSE by defendants to Aaron Isby's motion for writ of execution [841−1] (mjk) (Entered: 06/18/1997)
843 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp adopting and approving motion REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [835−1], denying motion for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt [833−1] (cc: all counsel) (Court Employee) Modified on 06/19/1997 (Entered: 06/19/1997)
844 LETTER from non−party Michael Clark requesting copy of docket sheet (sent) (sdf) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
845 RESPONSE by plaintiff Aaron Isby to motion for writ of execution [841−1] (sdf) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
846 MAIL Returned [843−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
847 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp; attorneys for the defendants are now ordered to file a written status report as to each pending plaintiff Written Status report due 8/15/97 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/17/1997)
848 LETTER from non−party Lonnie Garner requesting copy of agreed entry of 2/14/94 − copy of agreed entry of 2/15/94 sent (sdf) (Entered: 07/21/1997)
849 MOTION by non−party Bobby Henard for temporary restraining order various prisoner affidavits attached (sdf) Modified on 07/22/1997 (Entered: 07/22/1997)
850 AFFIDAVIT of non−party Gerald Thomas, Nobile Williams, Steven L Phillips to motion for temporary restraining order [849−1] (sdf) (Entered: 07/22/1997)
851 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for temporary restraining order motion for temporary restraining order [849−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce; recommending that motion be denied (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/28/1997)
852 AFFIDAVIT of Paul Sowers to motion for temporary restraining order [849−1] (sdf) (Entered: 07/29/1997)
853 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce denying motion for writ of execution [841−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 08/06/1997)
854 LETTER from non−party Bobby Henard indicating that he was denied assistance by Kashani (sdf) (Entered: 08/07/1997)
855 LETTER from non−party Jeffery Junious indicating that he was denied assistance by Kashani (sdf) (Entered: 08/07/1997)
856 OBJECTIONS by non−party Bobby Henard to [851−1] (sdf) (Entered: 08/11/1997)
857 STATUS REPORT by defendants (sdf) (Entered: 08/18/1997)
858 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams requesting copy of transcript (sdf) (Entered: 09/05/1997)
859 ORDER by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce regarding [855−1] letter can neither be granted nor denied. It does not contain any particular reqauest or claim for relief (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 09/10/1997)
860 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp denying letter (request for transcripts with installment payments) [858−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 09/11/1997)
861 CLASS COUNSEL'S STATUS REPORT regarding the individual plaintiffs (sdf) (Entered: 09/11/1997)
862 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp approving and confirming REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [851−1], denying motion for temporary restraining order filed by Robby Henard [849−1] (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 59 of 66

09/12/1997
09/16/1997 09/24/1997 09/30/1997 10/06/1997 10/30/1997 10/30/1997 11/05/1997 11/05/1997 11/06/1997 11/20/1997
12/04/1997 12/08/1997 12/11/1997 12/15/1997 12/17/1997 12/17/1997 12/30/1997

863 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp: injunctive claims disposed of by partial judgment of 2/15/94 and partial judgment of 2/15/94 is reaffirmed; judgment is entered against Roosevelt Williams and in favor of the defendants on individual damage claims; judgment entered against Michael Holland and in favor of defendants on individual damage claims; judgment entered against Aaron Isby and in favor of defendants on his motion to enforce his settlement; remaining damage claims of all individual plaintiffs are settled and dismissed by the Court; terminating case (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
864 CLERK'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT for defendants against all individual plaintiffs regarding [863−1], [863−2] (cc: all counsel) (smp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
865 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams regarding judgment entered 9/16/97 (sdf) (Entered: 09/24/1997)
866 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/including 10/30/97 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses (sdf) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
867 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/including 10/30/97 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses [866−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 10/08/1997)
868 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/including 11/29/97 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses (sdf) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
872 LETTER from Richard Thompson to Judge Sharp re: communication with Hamid Kashani (letter sent to Mr. Kashani per oral directive of court) (Court Employee) (Entered: 11/26/1997)
869 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/including 11/29/97 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses [868−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
873 LETTER from Lester Wright re: communication with Hamid Kashani. (letter forwarded to Mr. Kashani per oral directive of the court) (Court Employee) (Entered: 11/26/1997)
870 LETTER entitled "Violation of Agreed Entry" from non−party Patrick Varuado #854940 (sdf) (Entered: 11/07/1997)
871 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning letter filed by Patrick Varnado offender at the Maximum control Facility in Westville regarding time limitations on showers, law library and recreation which offender says violates Agreed Entry to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce It is RECOMMENDED that the letter and any purported relief it asks for be DENIED(cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
881 MOTION by movant Edward Ellsworth (K. Tabono Sankofa) to intervene (Court Employee) (Entered: 01/12/1998)
874 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 12/09/1997)
875 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/including 12/29/97 to file motion for attorney's fees (sdf) (Entered: 12/11/1997)
876 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/including 12/29/97 to file motion for attorney's fees [875−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
877 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp adopting report and recommendation [871−1] which recommends denying the request form non−party Patrick Varnado [870−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 12/18/1997)
878 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams regarding violation of the Agreed Entry (sdf) (Entered: 12/18/1997)
879 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/including 1/28/98 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses (sdf) (Entered: 12/31/1997)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 60 of 66

01/05/1998 01/12/1998 01/28/1998 01/28/1998 02/03/1998 02/03/1998 02/05/1998 02/13/1998 02/18/1998 03/19/1998 04/08/1998 04/17/1998
05/08/1998 05/08/1998 05/08/1998 05/11/1998
05/15/1998
06/11/1998 06/15/1998 07/06/1998

880 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/including 1/28/98 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses [879−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/07/1998)
REMARK that document #881 is located at 12/4/97 (Court Employee) (Entered: 01/12/1998)
882 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to/including 2/27/98 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses (sdf) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
883 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to extend time to/including 2/27/98 to file petition for attorney's fees and expenses [882−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
884 NOTICE OF EXHIBIT DESTRUCTION for defendants. (lpw) (Entered: 02/03/1998)
885 MAIL Returned [863−2], [862−1] addressed to plaintiff Howard Smallwood "moved, left no forwarding address" (sdf) (Entered: 02/04/1998)
886 LETTER from non−party Edward L Ellsworth inquiring about a previously filed motion to intervene (sdf) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
887 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to intervene [881−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recommending that this motion by K. Tabono Sankofa be denied (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/13/1998)
888 MOTION by William E Riley to show contempt of court of entry modifying agreed entry of 2/14/94 (mjk) (Entered: 02/19/1998)
889 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp adopting report and recommendation filed by Magistrate Pierce [887−1] denying motion to intervene [881−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/20/1998)
890 NOTICE by plaintiff Aaron Isby of non−compliance with terms in the agreed entry (sdf) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
891 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Mag Judge Ribin D. Pierce concerning the Notice of Defendants Non−Compliance with Terms in the Agreed Entry by plaintiff Aaron Isby; recommending that the plaintiff's notice should be stricken from the record (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 04/20/1998)
893 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for relief from order of 11/8/94 (sdf) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
894 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby requesting recusal of U.S. Magistrate Robin D Pierce (sdf) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
895 BELATED OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Aaron Isby to [891−1] (sdf) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
892 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to show contempt of court of entry modifying agreed entry of 2/14/94 motion to show contempt of court of entry modifying agreed entry of 2/14/94 [888−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recommending that this Motion filed by William E. Riley be denied (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
896 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp approving and confirming report and recommendation [892−1], striking notice [890−1], denying motion requesting recusal of U.S. Magistrate Robin D Pierce [894−1], denying motion for relief from order of 11/8/94 [893−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/15/1998)
897 LETTER from Edward L. Ellsworth regarding a motion to intervene (sdf) (Entered: 06/11/1998)
898 LETTER requesting hearing an contempt motion from Roosevelt Williams (slm) (Entered: 06/16/1998)
899 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams (sdf) (Entered: 07/07/1998)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 61 of 66

07/21/1998 07/21/1998 08/14/1998 10/27/1998 01/04/1999 01/07/1999
02/01/1999 02/03/1999
02/11/1999
02/23/1999 03/04/1999
03/17/1999 04/02/1999 04/06/1999 05/14/1999 05/21/1999 05/21/1999 06/08/1999
06/11/1999 06/30/1999
07/08/1999

900 LETTER from plaintiff Roosevelt Williams requesting that he be allowed to file a contempt against officials at MCC (sdf) (Entered: 07/22/1998)
901 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp denying letter [899−1], denying letter [898−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/22/1998)
902 LETTER from non−party Anthony Hogan to Judge Sharp (sdf) (Entered: 08/18/1998)
903 NOTICE of defendants violations of the agreed entry by plaintiff Aaron Isby (sdf) (Entered: 10/28/1998)
904 MOTION for specific performance under modified agreed entry by non−party James Arnett (sdf) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
905 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for specific performance under modified agreed entry [904−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recommending that motion [904−1] be denied(cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 01/11/1999)
906 MOTION by non−party James Arnett to intervene as a party plaintiff in this case (sdf) (Entered: 02/02/1999)
907 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp adopting report and recommendation [905−1] denying motion for specific performance under modified agreed entry [904−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/08/1999)
908 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to intervene as a party plaintiff in this case motion to intervene as a party plaintiff in this case [906−1] to Judge Allen Sharp by Mag Judge Robin D. Pierce recommending that the motion be denied for lack of jurisdiction (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/12/1999)
909 OBJECTION to [908−1] by non−party James Arnett (sdf) (Entered: 02/25/1999)
910 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to intervene as a party plaintiff in this case [906−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 03/05/1999)
911 LETTER from non−party Anthony D Hogan addressed to Hamid Kashani regarding a hunger strike because of prison conditions (sdf) (Entered: 03/18/1999)
912 LETTER from non−party Otis Jones regarding the Agreed Entry and whether the court is still monitoring the case (sdf) (Entered: 04/05/1999)
913 LETTER from Mag Judge Pierece to non−party Otis Jones regarding Mr. Jones inquirey [912−1] of the Agreed Entry of 2/11/94 (sdf) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
914 MOTION by non−party James Arnett for ruling on objection to Magistrate's denial of movant's motion to intervene (mjk) (Entered: 05/17/1999)
915 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby to fined defendants in contempt of court's order of 2/14/94 (sdf) (Entered: 05/25/1999)
916 MOTION by plaintiff Aaron Isby for evidentiary hearing on [915−] (sdf) (Entered: 05/25/1999)
917 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp denying as moot motion for ruling on objection to Magistrate's denial of movant's motion to intervene [914−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 06/08/1999)
918 MAIL Returned [917−1] addressed to Franklin A Morse/Indiana Civil Liberties Union (sdf) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
919 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to fined defendants in contempt of court's order of 2/14/94 [915−1] (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/01/1999)
920 MAIL Returned addressed to Franklin A Morse of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union [919−1] resent to address on returned envelope (sdf) (Entered: 07/08/1999)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 62 of 66

09/20/1999 03/22/2000 03/29/2000 03/29/2000 04/05/2000 04/05/2000 05/03/2000
05/08/2000 05/12/2000 05/22/2000
05/23/2000 05/23/2000 05/23/2000 05/23/2000 05/24/2000
05/30/2000 06/01/2000 06/05/2000
06/05/2000 06/20/2000
06/26/2000 07/13/2000

921 LETTER from non−party Marland Henry Gibson requesting a copy of the docket sheet − sent (sdf) (Entered: 09/21/1999)
922 MOTION by non−party Gregory E Jacobs to hold agreed entry parties in contempt (sdf) (Entered: 03/22/2000)
923 MOTION by LokMar Yazid Abdul−Wadood for contempt against defendants (mjk) Modified on 06/02/2000 (Entered: 03/30/2000)
924 BRIEF by Lokmar Yazid Abdul−Wadood in support of motion for contempt against defendants [923−1] (mjk) Modified on 06/02/2000 (Entered: 03/30/2000)
925 MOTION by non−party Tommy Dawson for contempt (sdf) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
926 MEMORANDUM in support of motion for contempt [925−1] (sdf) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
927 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp; the Attorney General is now given to/including 6/5/00 to fully answer the 3/29/00 [923−1] motion for contempt Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/03/2000)
928 MAIL Returned [927−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
929 NOTICE by plaintiff Howard Smallwood of change of address (sdf) (Entered: 05/13/2000)
934 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp regarding non−party Tommy Dawson's motion for contempt [925−1] Clerk is directed to send a copy of motion and brief in support to IAG Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
930 NOTICE of Non−Compliance with the Agreed Entry by non−party Vernon Thomas (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
931 Request for evidentiary hearing on motin to find dfts in comtempt by non−party Vernon Thomas (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
932 Declaraton of Vernon Thomas in support of [931−1] (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
933 MOTION to find dfts in contempt by non−party Vernon Thomas (sdf) (Entered: 05/24/2000)
935 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp regarding non−party Gregory Jacobs' motion to hold agreed entry parties in comtempt the IAG has to/including 6/30/00 to respond to motion [922−1] Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 05/25/2000)
936 MAIL Returned [934−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 05/31/2000)
937 MAIL Returned [935−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 06/02/2000)
938 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to find dfts in contempt [933−1], finding the motion for evidentiary hearing [931−1] moot., denying motion for contempt [925−1], denying motion for contempt against defendants [923−1], denying motion to hold agreed entry parties in contempt [922−1] Number of pages: 2 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 06/06/2000)
939 RESPONSE by defendants to motions for contempt (sdf) (Entered: 06/06/2000)
940 LETTER from plaintiff Howard Smallwood to the court requesting to know the status of the IAG's response to a motion for contempt filed on 3/29/00 (sdf) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
941 LETTER from Marland Henry Gibson requesting docket from 9/21/99 thru present (sent) (mjk) (Entered: 06/28/2000)
942 MOTION to withdraw appearance Hamid R Kashani for plaintiff (sdf) (Entered: 07/14/2000)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 63 of 66

07/14/2000
08/01/2000 08/15/2000 10/10/2000 11/22/2000 11/22/2000 12/05/2000 12/05/2000 01/19/2001 02/14/2001 02/20/2001
03/01/2001 03/05/2001 05/07/2001 06/01/2001 06/20/2001 07/02/2001 07/18/2001 08/17/2001 09/20/2001 12/13/2001 02/08/2002 02/21/2002

943 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to withdraw appearance Hamid R Kashani for plaintiffs [942−1] Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 07/17/2000)
944 LETTER from non−party Byron Holman asking the court to enforce the Agreed Entry (sdf) (Entered: 08/01/2000)
945 LETTER from non−party Vernon Thomas re status of motions; sent copy order of 6/5/00 (with forms he requested) (Court Employee) (Entered: 08/16/2000)
946 LETTER from non−party Robert Hudson regarding the Agreed Entry and requesting to be put in the general population (sdf) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
947 MOTION by non−party Bobby Henard for the court to issue an order of contempt against the dfts (sdf) (Entered: 11/24/2000)
948 BRIEF by non−party Bobby Henard in support of motion for the court to issue an order of contempt [947−1] (sdf) (Entered: 11/24/2000)
949 MOTION for non−party Larry Holley for order of contempt (sdf) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
950 BRIEF in support of motion for order of contempt [949−1] (sdf) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
951 LETTER from movant Bobby Henard regarding motion for comtempt − (copy of motion sent) (lpw) (Entered: 01/22/2001)
952 LETTER from non−party Benjamin Stroud regarding the "Agreed Entry" (sdf) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
953 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp denying motion for order of contempt [949−1], denying motion for the court to issue an order of contempt [947−1] without prejudice and with leave to renew Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/21/2001)
954 MAIL Returned [953−1] addressed to plaintiff Howard Smallwood (sdf) (Entered: 03/02/2001)
955 MAIL Returned [953−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
956 LETTER from non−party Ernest J. Hill requesting copy of the complaint (sdf) (Entered: 05/07/2001)
957 "FORMAL COMPLAINT" Violation of modified entry agreement by non−party Ervin R Hall−Bey (sdf) (Entered: 06/04/2001)
958 LETTER from non−party Ervin R Hall−Bey requesting copy of complaint (jld) (Entered: 06/20/2001)
959 LETTER from non−party Ervin R Hall−Bey inquiring about the status of a "formal complaint" file by him − copy returned to him (sdf) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
RECEIPT of "Formal Complaint" BY non−party Ervin R. Hall−Bey (sdf) (Entered: 07/18/2001)
960 LETTER from non−party Rosalio Hernandez to Judge Sharp (mjk) (Entered: 08/18/2001)
961 LETTER from non−party Roger Jaske to Judge Sharp re Agreed Entry (sdf) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
962 MOTION to hold agreed entry parties in contempt (sdf) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
963 LETTER from non−party Otis Jones requesting a copy of "Agreed Entry" (sdf) (Entered: 02/08/2002)
964 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: by Judge Allen Sharp denying motion to hold agreed entry parties in contempt [962−1] Number of pages: 2 (cc: all counsel) (sdf) (Entered: 02/22/2002)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 64 of 66

02/25/2002 02/27/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 09/04/2002 09/12/2002 12/30/2002 03/06/2003 08/07/2003
08/07/2003
08/22/2003 08/25/2003 08/26/2003
08/28/2003 09/09/2003 09/12/2003 09/19/2003 09/24/2003 09/24/2003 09/25/2003

965 NOTICE by plaintiff Howard Smallwood of change of address (sdf) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
966 MAIL Returned [964−1] addressed to miscellaneous William E Riley − resent to new address (sdf) (Entered: 02/28/2002)
967 MAIL Returned [964−1] addressed to plaintiff Howard Smallwood (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
968 MAIL Returned [964−1] addressed to appellant Ricky Outlaw (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
969 MAIL Returned [964−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (sdf) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
979 LETTER from non−party Walter Leach to Judge Sharp (rmn) (Entered: 09/05/2003)
972 LETTER from non−party Marland Henry Gibson requesting copy of docket sheet (copy of docket sent) (rmn) Modified on 05/22/2003 (Entered: 05/22/2003)
970 LETTER from non−party Marland Henry Gibson (copy to chambers) (mjk) (Entered: 12/30/2002)
971 LETTER from Zolo Agoha Azania requesting a copy of the modified agreed entry (sdf) (Entered: 03/06/2003)
973 ATTORNEY SUBSTITUTION: terminating attorney Wayne E Uhl for Norman G Owens, attorney Wayne E Uhl for James E Aiken, attorney Wayne E Uhl for Evan Bayh, attorney Wayne E Uhl for John Nunn, attorney Wayne E Uhl for Charles E Wright and substituting attorney David A Arthur (rmn) (Entered: 08/08/2003)
974 MOTION by defendant Charles E Wright, defendant John Nunn, defendant Evan Bayh, defendant James E Aiken, defendant Norman G Owens to terminate all prospective relief that has been granted and approved in this case (rmn) (Entered: 08/08/2003)
975 MOTION for injunction filed by Melvin Fagan under this case number (rmn) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
976 MOTION by plaintiff's for extension of time to reply to motion to terminate prospective relief [974−1] (rmn) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
977 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion for extension of time to/including 9/24/03 to reply to motion to terminate prospective relief [974−1] and the effective date for the automatic stay in this case is extended 60 days to/including 11/4/02 [976−1]. Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (rmn) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
978 MOTION for injunctive order filed by non−party Melvin Fagan (rmn) (Entered: 08/28/2003)
980 LETTER from non−party Mickey Thomas re: Level 5 inmates (rmn) (Entered: 09/10/2003)
981 LETTER to Kenneth Falk, IN Civil Liberties Union from non−party Arelious Buchanan (rmn) (Entered: 09/15/2003)
982 MOTION by non−party Benny Saylor for evidentiary hearing and opposition to termination of consent decree (rmn) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
983 LETTER from non−party Lando D Logan to Judge Sharp (rmn) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
984 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion to terminate all prospective relief that has been granted and approved in this case [974−1] (rmn) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
985 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp ORAL ARGUMENT set for 10/27/03 at 1:00 pm in Lafayette, IN before Judge Allen Sharp Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (rmn) (Entered: 09/25/2003)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 65 of 66

09/29/2003 09/30/2003 09/30/2003 09/30/2003 10/16/2003 10/20/2003 10/23/2003 10/27/2003 10/27/2003 10/27/2003
11/03/2003 11/04/2003 11/06/2003 12/23/2003 12/29/2003 01/23/2004 07/25/2005 05/01/2006 05/03/2006 05/15/2006

986 FIRST SUPPLEMENT by plaintiff re motion response [984−1] to motion to erminate containing additional class comments (rmn) (Entered: 09/29/2003)
987 MAIL Returned [985−1] addressed to miscellaneous Omar A Anthony (released − not at MCC) (rmn) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
988 MOTION to withdraw appearance Wayne E Uhl (rmn) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
989 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to withdraw appearance Wayne E Uhl [988−1] terminated Number of pages: 1 (cc: all counsel) (rmn) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
990 COPY OF LETTER from non−party Arlious Buchanan to Kenneth J Falk of Indiana Civil Liberties Union (jjj) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
991 LETTER from non−party Roger Jaske to Judge Sharp re: oral argument hearing set for 10/27/03 (rmn) (Entered: 10/21/2003)
992 SECOND SUPPLEMENT re motion response [984−1] (rmn) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
993 MINUTES: Motions 0/A heard before Judge Allen Sharp discussion heard by the court. No opposition by plaintiff. (cc: all counsel) (csi) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
994 Third SUPPLEMENT by plaintiff Aaron Isby, defendant Norman G Owens, plaintiff Howard Smallwood re motion to terminate all prospective relief that has been granted and approved in this case [974−1] (csi) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
995 ORDER by Judge Allen Sharp granting motion to terminate all prospective relief that has been granted and approved this case [974−1] denying as moot motion for evidentiary hearing opposition to termination of consent decree [982−1], denying as moot motion for injunctive order filed by non−party Melvin Fagan [978−1], denying as moot motion for injunction filed by Melvin under this case number [975−1] Court has disposed of everything, case terminated. Number of pages: 1 (cc: counsel) (rmn) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
996 Letter re: status of case (docket sent) from Howard Smallwood (rmn) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
997 AGREED MOTION for Extension of Time to/including 12/26/2003 to file any claim for attorney's fees and costs . (rmn) (Entered: 11/05/2003)
998 ORDER granting 997 Motion for Extension of Time to/including 12/26/03 to File any claim for attorney's fees and costs. Signed by Judge Allen Sharp on 11/06/2003. (rmn) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
999 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by Plaintiff Kataza Taifa. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/23/2003)
1000 ORDER granting 999 Motion for Extension of Time to/including 01/26/2004 to file any claim for attorney's fees and costs. Signed by Judge Allen Sharp on 12/29/2003. (rmn) (Entered: 12/31/2003)
1001 NOTICE by Kataza Taifa of Resolution of Attorney's Fee and Cost Issue (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
1002 Letter from Howard Smallwood (rmn ) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
1003 VERIFIED MOTION for order placing defendants in comtempt for breach of the agreed entry and to comply with agreement by Kataza Taifa. (sdf, ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
1004 RESPONSE in Opposition re 1003 MOTION filed by Evan Bayh, James E Aiken, Norman G Owens, John Nunn, Charles E Wright. (Arthur, David) (Entered: 05/03/2006)
1005 VERIFIED RESPONSE to Defendants' Response to 1003 MOTION for Contempt of Court by Eric D. Smith filed by Kataza Taifa. (sdf, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)

Case: 3:92-cv-429 As of: 07/16/2014 01:46 PM EDT 66 of 66

06/12/2006
08/11/2006 08/11/2006 09/11/2006
04/21/2008 04/22/2008 07/30/2009 07/30/2009 07/30/2009 07/30/2009 08/05/2009
11/06/2009 11/30/2009 12/17/2009 12/21/2009

1006 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 1003 MOTION for order placing defendants in contempt for breach of the agreed entry and to comply with agreement: Motion Hearing set for 9/11/2006 at 10:30 AM (Eastern time) in Lafayette before Judge Allen Sharp. (jld) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

1007 NOTICE by Aaron Isby by Class Counsel Kenneth J. Falk Concerning September 11, 2006 Hearing (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/11/2006)

1008 NOTICE by Aaron Isby re 1007 Notice (Other) of Correction in Certificate of Service (Falk, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/11/2006)

1009

MOTION HEARING held on 9/11/2006 re 1003 MOTION filed by Kataza Taifa (petition was signed &filed by Eric D. Smith), before Judge Allen Sharp. Pla appeared by atty Falk. Dft appeared by atty Arthur. The Court rules that the complaint filed by Eric D. Smith is moot &dismissed. Kenneth Falk, atty for the class, took no position on the issue of Smith's contempt petition. (10:23 − 10:36) (Court Reporter Hoffman.) (csi, ) (Entered: 09/11/2006)

1010 Letter from Fred Peters requesting copy of docket sheet and consent decree. (letter sent re: cost of copies) (jld) (Entered: 04/22/2008)

1011 Letter from Clerk to Fred Peters re: copies &archive retrieval fee (jld) (Entered: 04/22/2008)

1012 MOTION for Contempt. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Declaration by Fred Peters)(jld) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

1013 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Plaintiff Fred Peters. (jld) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

1014 MOTION to Appoint Counsel by Plaintiff Fred Peters. (jld) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

1015 Letter from Fred Peters requesting copy of 1012 (copy sent) (jld) (Entered: 07/30/2009)

1017 ORDER denying 1012 Motion for Contempt; denying 1013 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; denying 1014 Motion to Appoint Counsel, ADVISING Mr. Peters to direct all future correspondence to plaintiffs' attorney. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 8/5/09. (jld) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

1018 Letter from Preston Gardner re: copies. (jld) (Entered: 11/10/2009)

1019 Letter to Preston Gardner re: Copy Fees (jld) (Entered: 11/30/2009)

1020 Letter from Fred Peters requesting copy of appendix to 1012 filed 7/30/09 (jld) (Entered: 12/18/2009)

1021 Letter to Fred Peters re: cost of copy of Appendix to 1012 (jld) (Entered: 12/21/2009)

 
 75 F.3d 1191 (1996)
Aaron E. ISBY, Sidney Wilson, Guila Ifoma f/k/a Robert Henson, Jerry Stahl, and Lokmar Abdul-Wadood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and
Paul Komyatti, Jr., William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana; James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana 1192 Department of Corrections; Norman G. Owens, in his *1192 individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Corrections; John Nunn, in his individual and official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Indiana Department of Corrections; and, Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official
capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 94-1400, 94-1481, 94-1493 and 94-1494.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued September 14, 1995. Decided February 5, 1996.
1193 *1193 Robert J. Palmer, Scott Hardy, Sheila Buckman, Law Students, argued, May, Oberfell & Lorber, South Bend, IN, Richard A. Waples, Indianapolis, IN, for Aaron E. Isby.
Hamid R. Kashani (argued), Indianapolis, IN, for Paul Komyatti, Jr., William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas.
Wayne E. Uhl (argued), Pamela Carter, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Evan Bayh, James E. Aiken, Norman G. Owens, John Nunn, Charles E. Wright.
Robert J. Palmer, Scott Hardy, Sheila Buckman, Law Students, argued, May, Oberfell & Lorber, South Bend, IN, for Sidney Wilson, Guila Ifoma, Jerry Stahl, Lokmar Yazid Abdul-Wadood.
Jerry Stahl, Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, IN, pro se.
Before CUMMINGS, FLAUM, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs are a class of prisoners at the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC"), a Westville, Indiana correctional facility. They brought this action to challenge the legality of their assignment to the MCC as well as the conditions 1194 of their confinement. They asserted violations of Indiana statutes, the *1194 Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution. After lengthy negotiations, a settlement was reached as to the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. A magistrate judge recommended approval of the settlement and the district court agreed, approving the settlement in an order entered February 11, 1994. See Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F.Supp. 723 (N.D.Ind.1994). Five prisoners ("objecting members") appeal from this order, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in approving the settlement. We disagree, however, and accordingly affirm the district court's February 11, 1994 order approving the settlement.

I.
Plaintiffs filed this action in Indiana state court, but defendants thereafter removed it to federal district court where the court certified the case as a class action "for purposes of injunctive relief" pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). As certified, the class includes "all persons who, as of May 4, 1992, and thereafter in the future, are confined or will be confined in the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana." Plaintiffs' state law claims were subsequently remanded to state court.
When the MCC opened in 1991, the Indiana Department of Corrections ("DOC") began to assign to it certain prisoners previously committed to other Indiana correctional institutions. In their complaint, plaintiffs characterized the MCC as a "supermaximum security institution" and complained that the classification of prisoners as in need of "supermaximum" security was not authorized under Indiana law. Plaintiffs further alleged that the DOC violated state statutory requirements pertaining to administrative and disciplinary segregation by administratively subjecting prisoners to "long-term solitary confinement." Moreover, plaintiffs attacked the admissions procedures and criteria for transfer to the MCC as unconstitutionally vague, subjective and discretionary under the Indiana Constitution.
Plaintiffs also challenged many aspects of the conditions of their confinement at the MCC. The complaint alleged that defendants implemented a "program" at the MCC that subjected prisoners to unlawful long-term solitary confinement, sensory deprivation, arbitrary and irrational rules, and physical abuse. Plaintiffs additionally alleged unlawful denial of visitors and medical and psychiatric care, as well as the deprivation of educational, vocational, recreational, and other rehabilitative programs. Plaintiffs further alleged that this "program" at the MCC constituted a "punitive segregation scheme" in violation of state statutes, the Indiana Constitution as well as the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In their claims for relief, plaintiffs requested that defendants be enjoined from further violations of state and federal laws, that the prisoners currently incarcerated at the MCC be returned to the general population of the correctional institutions to which they were assigned prior to their transfer to the MCC, and that the defendants be prohibited from assigning prisoners to the MCC in the future.
Prior to issuance of the report and recommendation, the magistrate judge participated in numerous settlement conferences, held a preliminary hearing at the MCC on February 1, 1993 to obtain the views and comments of prisoner representatives, reviewed numerous comments, statements and objections filed with the court, and, conducted a settlement hearing on October 12, 1993 at which several prisoners testified. See Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 725.
Subsequently, the magistrate judge granted a joint motion for approval of a proposed notice of settlement. On November 5, 1993, the notice of settlement, an "Agreed Entry Support/Opposition Form", and a complete copy of the agreed entry containing the terms of the settlement with all attachments was distributed to each of the 1195 approximately two hundred prisoners confined at the MCC on that date.[1] The notice of settlement contained *1195 a summary of the terms of the agreed entry and informed members of the plaintiff class that objections, if any, to the proposed settlement must be filed within twenty days.[2]See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The record indicates that sixty-eight out of approximately two hundred class members responded. Of those, forty-two approved the settlement, while twenty-six objected.
The agreed entry approved by the court is a fifty-one page document that addresses plaintiffs' various claims, including: assignment to and from the MCC, MCC conditions, use of force policy, medical care, access to legal materials and assistance, educational and substance abuse programs, disciplinary restrictions, and prisoners' grievances. See Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 726.
The agreed entry establishes criteria to govern the assignment of prisoners to the MCC,[3] and provides that prisoners must be transferred to another institution after a specified period of time, subject to certain conditions. The settlement requires that prisoners be transferred out of the MCC if they earn either twenty-four continuous vested months or a total of thirty-six vested months.[4]

The settlement provides for a commissary, expands access to radio and television, increases visitation and telephone rights, makes more reading materials available and expands recreational opportunities, allows prisoners to have more personal property and greater access to items of personal hygiene, improves the bedding material assigned to prisoners, decreases the intensity of twenty-four hour lights in the cells, limits the use of force by DOC personnel, expands medical care, provides a comprehensive law library with improved prisoner access, provides educational opportunities and substance abuse programs when necessary, and improves the prisoner grievance procedures.
Also included is a mechanism for resolving disputes concerning the implementation and interpretation of its terms along with detailed monitoring and reporting requirements. The district court retained jurisdiction and supervision of the case for a period of two years subject to extension under specified conditions.
II.
Defendants initially challenge our jurisdiction over these appeals on a variety of grounds.[5] First, they argue that the approval of the agreed entry was not the granting or refusal of an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). They assert that the interlocutory order appealed from neither compelled the objecting members to do 1196 anything nor refused their request for an injunction. They then argue that, to the extent the *1196 order had the effect of refusing an injunction, it did not subject the objecting members to irreparable harm, and was, therefore, not appealable. Objecting members assert that the order granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, thereby supporting appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). They take the position that they need not establish irreparable harm, but that if they do, irreparable harm is readily apparent.
Second, Defendants urge this court to clarify its holding in Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir.1970), and embrace a rule, adopted in other circuits,[6] that would require unnamed class members to formally intervene before they would have standing to appeal the approval of a class action settlement. They point out that only one of the unnamed class members who now appeals the approval of the settlement sought to intervene, and he did not appeal the denial of his motion to intervene. Defendants further contend that the one named class member who did appeal lost his named plaintiff status when he filed his notice of appeal while still represented by class counsel. For their part, objecting members argue that under Research Corp., the unnamed class members properly objected to the settlement, thereby preserving their standing to appeal its approval.
Third, defendants assert that two of the objecting members failed to file objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation and thereby waived any right to appeal they may have had. Objecting members respond that noncompliance with the rule requiring the filing of objections is not jurisdictional and should not be utilized to defeat the "ends of justice."
These jurisdictional issues are numerous, with some potentially complicated, and most will affect some but not all of the objecting members. Assuming jurisdiction, however, the merits of these appeals are simple, straightforward and easily resolved in favor of the parties defending the settlement. Thus, regardless of whether we were to dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction or to reach the merits of the appeals, the settlement would stand. Although jurisdictional issues are normally resolved prior to a determination of the merits, under the circumstances here, we may disregard potentially difficult jurisdictional issues and proceed directly to the merits where there is no practical difference in the outcome. See e.g., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 2775, 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976); Safeco Life Insurance Company v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir.1995); Rekhi v. Wildwood Industries, Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1316 (7th Cir.1995); Tisza v. Communications Workers of America, 953 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Parcel of Land, 928 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1991); Browning-Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 154-60 (2d Cir. 1990). We believe it is prudent to do so here.

III.
Federal courts naturally favor the settlement of class action litigation. E.E.O.C. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 888-89 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 3293, 92 L.Ed.2d 709 (1986); Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1013 (7th Cir.1980); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, Etc., 616 F.2d 305, 312-13 (7th Cir.1980). Although such settlements must be approved by the district court, its inquiry is limited to the consideration of whether the proposed settlement is lawful, fair, reasonable, and adequate. Hiram Walker, 768 F.2d at 889.
Our appellate review is even more narrow, as we review the determination of the district court only for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 890. As we engage in this limited review, we are mindful that the district courts have been 1197 admonished "to refrain from resolving the merits of the controversy *1197 or making a precise determination of the parties' respective legal rights," a directive that applies to our own inquiry as well. Id. at 889. See also Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir.1979); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Industries, Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900, 95 S.Ct. 184, 42 L.Ed.2d 146 (1974). Our focus, then, is upon "the general principles governing approval of class action settlements" and not upon the "substantive law governing the claims asserted in the litigation." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315.
Where, as here, constitutional claims are asserted, we recognize that public interests may potentially conflict with the desire of the parties to settle their dispute. Id. at 319. The presence of constitutional claims does not, however, prevent us from applying the principles that guide our review which allow "ample room for settlement and compromise." Id. We must, however, "apply these principles with particular care and state [our] reasoning with particular clarity." Id.
In addition, we cannot approve a class action settlement "which either initiates or authorizes the continuation of clearly illegal conduct." Id.; Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123-24 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975). As we apply this principle, however, we are mindful that "the court must not decide unsettled legal questions; any illegality or unconstitutionality must appear as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement before a settlement can be rejected on this basis." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 320. Moreover, in determining whether to reject a settlement as initiating or authorizing a "clearly illegal or unconstitutional practice, prior judicial decisions must have found that practice to be illegal or unconstitutional as a general rule." Id. at 321.
Here, objecting members contend that the district court abused its discretion when it approved the settlement because that agreement allegedly contains unlawful provisions. We disagree.
Objecting members first argue that the very existence of the MCC is unlawful because Indiana law does not authorize either supermaximum or disciplinary segregation institutions such as the MCC.[7] For their part, the state defendants deny the MCC is a segregation institution of any type and assert that the MCC is simply a high security prison which Indiana is authorized to establish.[8]
The issues raised here by objecting members are essentially the same as issues raised by plaintiffs in their complaint. To our knowledge, Indiana courts have not made any determination as to whether the MCC or anything like it is either a "supermaximum" security institution or a "disciplinary segregation institution" and, if so, whether or not the existence of the MCC violates Indiana law. The parties presumably compromised and arrived at their settlement because the law related to these issues is unclear. Of course, as a necessary consequence of settlement, the merits of these issues remain unresolved. We decline the invitation of objecting members to determine those merits. For purposes of our review, it is sufficient to note that we do not find here any illegality appearing as a legal certainty on the face of the settlement. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 320-21.
Objecting members next argue that the settlement violates Indiana law because it permits indefinite segregation. 1198 [9] Although *1198 objecting members concede that the settlement agreement provides for a classification review
after an initial twelve month period of incarceration at the MCC, they overlook the provision that upon approval of the agreed entry the DOC was required to conduct an immediate classification review and reevaluation of all

prisoners at the MCC. In our view, there is nothing appearing on the face of the settlement agreement that permits the parties to avoid the annual review requirements of Indiana Code § 11-10-1-6 (1993).[10] In fact, the agreed entry permits the DOC to conduct more frequent reviews at its discretion.
Objecting members also claim here that the vested month provisions of the settlement violate both Indiana law and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, the settlement provides that a prisoner will be transferred from the MCC to another institution upon accrual of either twenty-four continuous vested months or a cumulative total of thirty-six vested months. Prior to the settlement, no such mechanism was in place to provide an upper limit to the duration of a prisoner's assignment to the MCC. Objecting members complain that the DOC can take away accumulated vested months according to staff discretion and that prisoners may thereby lose their chance for release in violation of the due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the agreed entry provides that prisoners may lose accumulated vested months only as a result of Conduct Adjustment Board ("CAB") convictions, at the discretion of the CAB, and "then only up to the number of months a CAB could otherwise order segregation of the prisoner for the violations under the ADPP."
Objecting members challenge the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures because, in their view, they do not afford as much protection as provided by Indiana Code § 35-50-6-5 (1993), which governs the loss of "earned credit time." Objecting members concede that the Indiana Code lacks any reference to "vested months" but analogize to Indiana Code provisions pertaining to the deprivation of "earned credit time". See Indiana Code §§ 11-11-5-3(10) and 35-50-6-5(b) (1993). We note that objecting members fail to cite any Indiana authority for the proposition that "vested months" as contemplated in this settlement are equivalent to "earned credit time." Again, we need not venture into unsettled areas of Indiana law. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 320-21. To the extent that objecting members implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, we note that the accumulation or loss of "vested months" only affects the length of a prisoner's assignment to the MCC, it has no effect upon the length of the prisoner's sentence or of his commitment to the DOC. In any event, the agreed entry specifies that accumulated vested months can only be taken away after a conviction for disciplinary violations by a conduct adjustment board, presumably upon proper notice and hearing subject to the due process procedural protections sanctioned by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Recognizing, again, that we do not here determine or reach the merits of objecting members' federal constitutional claim, for our present purposes it cannot be said that the vested month provisions appear, on their face, to be unconstitutional with legal certainty. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 320-21.
We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate. The district court properly recognized that a number of factors have been consistently 1199 employed by the district courts to aid them in determining the "fairness" of class action settlements. Taifa, *1199 846 F.Supp. at 726. These include the strength of plaintiffs' case compared to the amount of defendants' settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement. Hiram Walker, 768 F.2d at 889.
Consistent with this approach, we "do not focus on individual components of the settlements, but rather view them in their entirety in evaluating their fairness." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315. We also consider the facts "in the light most favorable to the settlement." Id.
The district court properly recognized that the first factor, the relative strength of plaintiffs' case on the merits as compared to what the defendants offer by way of settlement, is the most important consideration. Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 726. The district court stated its firm belief that plaintiffs' chances for success at trial on the merits were relatively low when compared to what defendants offered in the agreed entry. Id. In support of this belief, the district court noted that one of plaintiffs' "principal concerns" was the assignment of prisoners to the MCC as part of a classification process rather than as the outcome of disciplinary proceedings which afford due process protections. As evidence that plaintiffs' prospects on this issue were not favorable, the district court relied on King v. Fairman, 997 F.2d 259, 262 n. 4 (7th Cir.1993), in which we cited Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), for the proposition that "an inmate has no liberty interest in confinement at any particular state prison and that prison officials may effect discretionary transfers of an inmate without implicating

the due process clause, even if the conditions at one prison are substantially worse than another." Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 726-27. See also Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, (1976). All of these decisions were recognized by the district court as undermining plaintiffs' chances of success on the merits. Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 727.[11] The district court then observed that despite its doubt that plaintiffs would prevail with their claims regarding their transfer to and indefinite confinement at the MCC, the defendants had agreed both to specific criteria to be utilized for the assignment of prisoners to the MCC and to specific procedures and conditions for transfer from the MCC. Id. Similarly, the district court described plaintiffs' burden of demonstrating that conditions at the MCC violated the Eighth Amendment as "formidable". Id. Counsel for plaintiff class concede that plaintiffs might not have obtained all the relief provided by the agreed entry in a final decree even if they had been successful in their efforts to convince the trial court to conclude that the MCC is a disciplinary segregation institution. The agreed entry provides comprehensive and substantial relief with respect to criteria and procedures for assignment to and transfer from the MCC as well as improvements in prison conditions. Viewed in light of the obstacles to success on the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of this factor.
With regard to the second factor, the district court opined that continuation of the litigation "would require the resolution of many difficult and complex issues," would "entail considerable additional expense," and would "likely involve weeks, perhaps months, of trial time." Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 727. The court concluded that the settlement represented "an outcome at least comparable, if not far superior, to that which plaintiffs might achieve by 1200 proceeding to trial." Id. at *1200 727-28. We concur and find no abuse of discretion here.
We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the amount of opposition to the proposed settlement did not compel its rejection. Id. at 728. Only thirteen per cent of the class submitted written objections in response to the notice of settlement. Compare Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1988) (settlement of class action approved despite objection of forty-five per cent (180 out of 400) of the prisoners). We are satisfied that the court properly considered and took into account all of the written objections filed with the court during the course of this litigation up to approval of the settlement.[12]Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 728.
Given that the complaint in this case sought, in effect, to compel the very elimination of the MCC, we are not surprised that some of the prisoners would object to any proposed settlement that contemplated the continued existence of the MCC. Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that the settlement "achieves significant improvements or reforms" despite the fact that it may not provide all the relief desired by particular, individual inmates. Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 728. To the extent that objecting members complain that the agreed entry does not go far enough in alleviating conditions at the MCC we reply that the "essence of settlement is compromise." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315. A settlement will not be rejected solely because it does not provide a complete victory to the plaintiffs. Hiram Walker, 768 F.2d at 889.
Similarly, the district court was entitled to give consideration to the opinion of competent counsel that the settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate. The district court relied upon affidavits outlining the qualifications of class counsel and perhaps more importantly upon its own observations over the course of the litigation as to the quality of the representation provided to the class. Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 728. The court's observations in this regard are significant especially given the high degree of involvement of the district court in the settlement process. We agree with the district court that there is no reason in the record to suspect that the settlement is tainted by collusion. Id.
Finally, the district court noted that while settlement discussions began at an early stage in the litigation, it was satisfied that the discovery and investigation conducted by class counsel prior to entering into settlement negotiations was "extensive and thorough," dating at least as far back as ten months prior to the filing of the complaint. Taifa, 846 F.Supp. at 728-29.
For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it approved the settlement.

AFFIRMED.
[1] The settlement was comprised of an "agreed entry" as well as a separate document whereby the parties agreed that upon approval of the agreed entry, plaintiffs would dismiss their claims for injunctive relief pending in state court. It was further stipulated that the state court action would be dismissed in its entirety upon settlement of plaintiffs' individual claims for monetary damages.
[2] Objecting members complain that notices of settlement were not placed in common areas at the MCC, but cite no authority for any such requirement. We agree with the district court that the distribution of the Notice of Settlement as described herein satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e).
[3] The agreed entry provides that the criteria for assignment are strictly restricted to "[a]n individual with a proven and/or documented history of at least one of the following criteria during the current period of incarceration: (a) Escapes with attempts to cause physical harm to staff, other prisoners, and/or the public at large, or to cause serious destruction to the physical plant. (b) Assaultive behavior against staff and/or prisoners causing serious bodily injury and/or death. (c) Rioting or inciting to riot or violence causing the serious disruption of the orderly management of a facility or unit. (d) Intensive involvement in violent gang activities. (e) Aggressive sexual conduct and/or rape."
[4] A "vested month" is defined in the agreed entry as "a month in which the prisoner remains free of any disciplinary conviction for a Class A or B violation or three or more class C or D violations under ADPP." The ADPP is the Adult Disciplinary Policy and Procedure. In order to qualify for transfer on the basis of accumulating thirty-six vested months, the last six months must be consecutive without a conviction for either a Class A or B violation.
[5] Defendants' earlier Motion to Dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction was granted in part, denied in part, and denied in part as moot in our order of January 25, 1995. We determined then that no final merits judgment has been entered in this case as plaintiffs' claims for damages remained unresolved. Accordingly, we do not have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
[6] See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir.1993); Croyden Associates v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 1251, 122 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.1988); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir.1987).
[7] The agreed entry does not refer to the MCC as either a "supermaximum" security institution or a "disciplinary segregation institution." The agreed entry does provide that once a prisoner has been assigned to the MCC, the prisoner will be assigned a Security Classification Designation of Level 5. The significance of this classification is not clear from the record. Even assuming arguendo that this is a "supermaximum" classification, objecting members fail to cite any Indiana authority that would render such a classification unlawful.
[8] In fact, the agreed entry provides that upon transfer to the MCC a prisoner's segregation status, if any, be it "administrative" or "disciplinary," is rescinded.
[9] Objecting members apparently rely here on Indiana Code §§ 11-11-5-6 and 7 (1993), which provide for five and thirty day status review, under certain circumstances, for prisoners subject to disciplinary segregation. As noted above, however, upon transfer to the MCC, a prisoner's segregation status, if any, be it "administrative" or "disciplinary," is rescinded.
[10] Indiana Code § 11-10-1-6 provides, in relevant part, that: "Sec. 6. The department shall, at least annually, review, in accord with sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, every committed offender not on parole to determine the appropriateness of his current classification and assignment and to make a classification-assignment decision based upon that review...."
[11] We note here that in Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court recently observed that state created liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause "will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an

unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." (citations omitted).
[12] We note that prior to the October 12, 1993 settlement hearing, counsel for plaintiff class supplied the district court with copies of all prisoner comments they had received. The court also reviewed all comments received directly from prisoners prior to the October 12, 1993 hearing as well as in response to the November notice of settlement. This is all in addition to the magistrate's journey to the MCC in February, 1993 to hold a preliminary hearing in order to receive comments from representative prisoners.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 96 F.3d 955 (1996)
Paul KOMYATTI, Jr., Aaron E. Isby and Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
Evan BAYH, In his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, In his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections, Norman G. Owens, In his individual and official capacity as Director of the Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 95-3281.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 15, 1996. Decided September 20, 1996.
956 *956 Hamid R. Kashani (argued), Indianapolis, IN, Franklin A. Morse, II, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, South Bend, IN, Richard A. Waples, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Wayne E. Uhl (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before COFFEY, RIPPLE and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.
In 1992, a number of prisoners incarcerated at the Maximum Control Complex ("MCC") in Westville, Indiana filed a class action against state officials. Alleging a number of federal constitutional violations, the prisoners challenged their assignment to, and the conditions of confinement at, the MCC. The parties negotiated an agreed entry, which was ultimately approved by the district court. The agreed entry, a consent decree, included a provision which, by incorporating an Indiana statutory provision, accords prisoners charged with serious disciplinary offenses certain procedural protections, including the availability of a "lay advocate," during the disciplinary process. The procedural protections provided for in the agreed entry exceed those required by the Constitution of the United States. In 1994, the prisoners filed a motion to hold the state officials in contempt for violating several provisions of the consent decree. The district court, however, refused to enforce the provisions of the consent decree beyond those provisions mandated explicitly by the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their contempt motion. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
Before proceeding further, however, we add a note of caution. After this case was submitted, the President approved the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified principally at 18 U.S.C. § 3626). This Act, the pertinent provisions of which are effective immediately, see Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, § 802(b)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 3626 note, makes substantial changes in the fashioning and enforcement of consent decrees dealing with prison conditions. Neither the state nor the plaintiffs has suggested to this court the impact of this statute upon this appeal from a denial of a motion for contempt based on noncompliance before the enactment of this legislation. We note that, in their memorandum in support of the motion for contempt, the plaintiffs state the possibility of sanctions to compensate them for losses incurred as a result of the defendants' non-compliance with the consent decree. The plaintiffs are therefore seeking more 957 than prospective compliance with the *957 terms of the consent decree. Because we believe that the district court misapprehended our precedents on the issues presented to us, we cannot permit its judgment to stand. We emphasize that, on remand, the district court, if requested to alter the consent decree previously entered by the court, must take into account the provisions of this new statute. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir.1996). We express no opinion on what changes, if any, the new statute might require in the consent decree. We leave that issue in the first instance for the district court.

I
BACKGROUND
In May 1992, a class of prisoners commenced this action against the Governor of Indiana and several officials of the Indiana Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The prisoners' action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Indiana law, challenged their assignment to, and the conditions of confinement at, the MCC.[1] The complaint alleged a number of federal constitutional violations. Relevant to this appeal, however, is the prisoners' challenge to the manner in which prison disciplinary proceedings are conducted.
The prisoners' claims for injunctive relief were resolved when the parties proposed, and the district court approved, the agreed entry. Paragraph IX(1) of the agreed entry provides:
All discipline, including Conduct Adjustment Board hearings, shall be consistent with Ind.Code 11-11-5-1 et seq. (attached). This does not entitle prisoners to utilize the Court's contempt powers to challenge [Conduct Adjustment Board] convictions on a case by case basis. The contempt power shall be available to enforce this provision on a class-wide basis.
R.112, Agreed Entry at para. IX(1). The Indiana statute referred to in this paragraph, Indiana Code § 11-11-5-1 et seq., accords certain procedural protections to prisoners charged with disciplinary offenses. It is undisputed that many of these procedural protections, including the availability of "lay advocates" for prisoners charged with serious offenses, exceed, at least when viewed outside the context of the consent decree, the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of the provisions of the state statute, Indiana Code § 11-115-5(a)(7), provides that prisoners facing disciplinary hearings are entitled to
have advice and representation by a lay advocate of his choice, if that lay advocate is available in the institution at the time of the hearing, in those hearings based upon a charge of institutional misconduct when the department determines he lacks the competency to understand the issues involved or to participate in the hearing, or when the punishment [exceeds certain levels].
Indiana Code § 11-11-5-5(a)(7). The availability of lay advocates under this section exceeds the requirements of the Due Process Clause. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2981-82, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that an advocate must be provided only when the prisoner is illiterate or where the issues are so complex that the prisoner is unable to defend against the charges); Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002, 1004 (7th Cir.1992).
In September 1994, the prisoners filed a motion in the district court to hold the defendants in contempt. The prisoners alleged that the defendants had failed to comply with certain provisions of the agreed entry, including paragraph IX(1). Specifically, the plaintiffs' motion alleged that: (1) DOC officials had denied prisoners the lay advocate of their choice, as required by Indiana Code § 11-11-5-5(a)(7); and (2) the lay advocates provided by the prison had not performed any of the functions traditionally expected of an advocate. The district court referred the contempt motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation.
958 *958 In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge took the view that the district court lacks jurisdiction to enforce paragraph IX(1) of the agreed entry on the ground that, under the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may not enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995) and this court's decision in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1831, 128 L.Ed.2d 460 (1994), the magistrate judge reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar remains in place 0907 even when state officials agree to follow state law in a federal consent decree. The prisoners have no right to lay advocates under federal law, the magistrate judge concluded, and, even though the defendants adopted Indiana's lay advocate provisions as part of the remedy to the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim, "[w]hat the defendants agreed to give as a remedy ... does not have any effect on the jurisdictional limits of a federal court." Saahir, 47 F.3d at 761; see Lelsz v.

Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1252-53 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 44, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). The district court adopted, without exception, the view expressed in the report and recommendation.
II
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs submit that the bar of the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable because, even though paragraph IX(1) of the agreed entry makes explicit reference to an Indiana Code provision, the parties did not intend to incorporate "state law" as the remedy for the plaintiffs' claim that prison disciplinary hearings are conducted in a constitutionally deficient manner. Rather, the plaintiffs assert, the DOC officials agreed to follow procedures exactly similar to the provisions found at Indiana Code § 11-11-5-1 et seq. They submit that the parties agreed to adopt, by reference only, terms that coincide with those found in the Indiana statute as it existed in 1993, and that the reference to the Indiana Code merely serves as a shorthand for those terms.[2] In the plaintiffs' view, the fact that these provisions may exceed federal constitutional requirements is not fatal to the agreed entry; consent decrees may, and often do, exceed constitutional minima.
The defendants, on the other hand, renew their position that federal court enforcement of paragraph IX(1)-with its explicit reference to the Indiana Code 0907 is tantamount to requiring state officials to comply with state law. Although they do not question the power of a federal court to enforce provisions of consent decrees which go beyond constitutional minima, see, e.g., Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir.1993), the defendants assert that a different situation is presented when, as in this case, a federal consent decree directly incorporates the terms of a state statute. Here, the Indiana statute referred to in the agreed entry provides prisoners with a procedural protection 0907 their choice of an attorney-like "lay advocate" 0907 that exceeds constitutional requirements. The defendants submit that, under these circumstances, there is no federal interest in enforcing the provisions of the state statute. See Evans, 10 F.3d at 479 ("[T]he court must ensure that there is a substantial federal claim, not only when the decree is entered but also when it is enforced, and that the obligations imposed by the decree rest on this rule of federal law rather than the bare consent of the office-holder.").
The submissions of the parties raise three related issues. The first issue, now settled by the Supreme Court, is whether a consent decree stemming from a constitutional grievance may impose upon the parties rights and obligations greater than those required directly by the Constitution. The second is whether, in formulating a 959 consent decree, a *959 federal district court may adopt by reference and incorporate a state statute as the standard to which the defendants must conform their conduct. Finally, we must confront, at least in a preliminary fashion, the question of whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, an aggrieved party may enforce, by way of a contempt proceeding, the provisions of a consent decree that impose requirements beyond those required by the Constitution of the United States.
A.
It is well established that consent decrees may embody conditions beyond those imposed directly by the Constitution itself. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389, 112 S.Ct. 748, 762-63, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992); Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.1993); see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (1st Cir.1991). The condition must, of course, be one that is related to elimination of the condition that is alleged to offend the Constitution. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3124, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974).[3] In Rufo, the Supreme Court explained:
[W]e have no doubt that, to "save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation," petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires....
502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 762 (citation omitted). Parties often are unsure of the current posture of the law and therefore are willing to compromise their positions. Kindred, 9 F.3d at 641. Parties also stipulate to particular

conditions that make it easier to monitor the decree and secure enforcement. Indeed, it is a rare case when a consent decree requires only the bare minimum required by the Constitution; "almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily" contains provisions requiring activity beyond constitutional minima. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63; see Kindred, 9 F.3d at 641.
B.
We next examine the question of whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may, in the course of formulating and approving a consent decree, incorporate a state statute as the standard to which a state defendant must conform his or her conduct. The State of Indiana does not question the power of a federal court to enter and enforce a consent decree whose requirements go beyond constitutional minima. It submits, however, that a different situation is presented when, as in this case, a federal consent decree directly incorporates a state statutory provision. In the defendants' view, enforcing such a provision through the contempt power would be tantamount to ordering state officials to comply with an Indiana statute, in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.
It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law.[4]See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir.1993); Lett v. Magnant, 965 F.2d 251, 255 (7th Cir.1992); Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir.1990). In Pennhurst, the Supreme 960 Court reasoned that such relief is unnecessary to vindicate the supreme *960 authority of federal law and that it contravenes the principles of federalism underlying the Eleventh Amendment. 465 U.S. at 105-06, 104 S.Ct. at 910-11. Clearly, then, a federal consent decree cannot rely on state law as the "foundation for relief." See NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1995) ("To the extent that NBD relies on state law as the foundation for relief against the State of Indiana, the eleventh amendment bars the way.") (citing Pennhurst).
However, a substantially different situation is presented when the parties to a federal lawsuit elect to settle a live federal constitutional claim by agreeing that their subsequent conduct will be measured against a standard articulated in a state statute. A subsequent motion to enforce such a decree is not a "federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 917. It is not, as the State of Indiana suggests, tantamount to requiring state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Rather, the remedy embodied in a consent decree "spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve" the underlying federal constitutional violation. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). Therefore, a provision in a validly-entered consent decree is an obligation on state officials to conform their conduct to federal law. Provided that the inclusion of the state statute into the consent decree is designed to remedy the federal constitutional violation alleged in the underlying complaint, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude parties to a lawsuit alleging a federal constitutional violation from incorporating the standards found in a state statute into their agreed settlement.
Articulating a standard of conduct in terms of compliance with a state statute will often better serve the concerns of federalism than the formulation of a standard that is purely the product of the federal court. State statutory law provides a convenient, ready-made body of rules, regulations and procedures that may, in a proper case, provide an appropriate remedy to the federal constitutional violation alleged in the underlying complaint. Incorporation of a state statute yields an additional benefit by minimizing the intrusiveness of the federal consent decree into state affairs. It will often permit the harmonization of the federal consent decree with the legitimate policy choices of the state government. State officials, whose conduct already is subject to the requirements of state law, are already familiar with the requirements of the state statute. Incorporation of a state statute into a federal consent decree thus obviates the need for state officials to learn and to conform their conduct to two separate standards.
Thus, a consent decree resolving a particular lawsuit may incorporate the terms of a state statute. Whether the standard embodied in a federal consent decree is articulated in terms of a state statute or not, however, the standards that govern the district court's authority to enter a consent decree are the same. In Firefighters, the Supreme Court articulated those standards. The consent decree proposed by the parties must (1) "spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject matter jurisdiction"; (2) "com[e] within the general scope

of the case made by the pleadings"; and (3) "further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." Id. at 525, 106 S.Ct. at 3077 (citations omitted).
Applying these principles to the consent decree in the case before us, it appears, on this record,[5] that the parties did not intend to incorporate state law, qua state law, into paragraph IX(1) of the agreed entry. The prisoners' underlying complaint alleged a federal constitutional violation within the subject matter of the district court 0907 that prison disciplinary proceedings are conducted in a constitutionally deficient manner. In order to settle 961 that claim, the parties elected *961 to adopt, by reference, the ready-made body of procedural protections found at Indiana Code § 11-11-5-1 et seq. Indeed, paragraph IX(1) of the agreed entry does not provide that future changes in the state statute would be incorporated into the agreement. Provided that the procedural protections referred to in this paragraph satisfy the requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Firefighters, therefore, the fact that the parties have chosen to express the remedy in terms of a state statute does not, standing alone, deprive the district court of jurisdiction to enforce the decree.
C.
The defendants suggest, albeit somewhat obliquely, that the Eleventh Amendment prevents a district court from enforcing, in a contempt proceeding, consent decree provisions which do more than impose directly the minimum requirements of the Constitution.
This issue is not a new one to this court. We confronted it in Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.1993). Kindred involved a contempt proceeding brought by an inmate at the Pendleton Reformatory. A new policy, instituted by the Superintendent, required inmates to read all incoming legal mail in the presence of Reformatory staff. Inmate James Kindred responded to the new policy by asking the district court to hold the Superintendent in contempt and to enforce a previously-entered consent decree that contained a provision concerning the opening of confidential correspondence. The district court denied enforcement of the consent decree, noting that
[i]t would be aberrant for the plaintiff class to contend or for this Court to rule that the State of Indiana was compelled by a federal decree to accord its prisoners treatment which is not compelled by the constitution, for on what grounds could such a decree possibly be based? The movants do not, here at least, challenge the new policy on constitutional grounds, hence their motion for a finding of contempt and other relief must in all respects be denied.
Kindred, 9 F.3d at 641 (quoting Bradberry v. Duckworth, No. IP 76-459-C, Entry Denying Motion for Contempt Order and Other Relief at 2-3 (S.D.Ind. Oct. 27, 1992)). This court reversed, concluding that the challenged policy was not compatible with the previously-entered consent decree. The court's opinion, when read in its entirety, makes clear that we based our decision on a determination that the challenged policy violated the consent decree 0907 and not on the ground that the new mail policy was constitutionally infirm. See id. at 642-43 & nn. 6-7. Indeed, we noted that the new mail policy at the Reformatory had withstood constitutional scrutiny in a case brought by another prisoner.[6]See Kindred, 9 F.3d at 640. Although the court remanded the case for a determination of whether the consent decree had been superseded by intervening legislation, our decision in Kindred demonstrates our willingness to enforce the terms of a consent decree as long as they are tailored to rectify the federal constitutional violation.[7] This approach is compatible with that of other circuits. In Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.1989), the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections had taken the position that he possessed the authority to alter, without court approval, those portions of a previouslyentered consent decree that exceed constitutional guarantees. In the Commissioner's view, the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over those terms. Rejecting this position, the Second Circuit held that, because the determination of how to remedy an underlying constitutional violation was within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the subsequent enforcement of a consent decree, which "springs from" that determination, is proper under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 244-45 (quoting Firefighters); see 962 also Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir.1989) (holding *962 that "a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after trial"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 865, 107 L.Ed.2d 949 (1990).

There may indeed be instances when significant factual or legal changes[8] make it inequitable for a court to continue to enforce a settlement decree. When such circumstances occur, the parties may, as the court emphasized in Kindred, seek an alteration in the terms of the consent decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). See 9 F.3d at 644. Indeed, when the parties can no longer identify an underlying dispute grounded reasonably in federal law, vacation of the decree may well be in order.[9]

This court confronted such a situation in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1831, 128 L.Ed.2d 460 (1994). In Evans, a class of judgment debtors challenged the City of Chicago's practice of delaying payment of certain judgments that had been entered against it. The district court, ruling that the challenged practice violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution, entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. A panel of this court affirmed the portion of the judgment that rested on the Equal Protection Clause.[10] The parties then entered into a consent decree providing appropriate relief from the challenged practice but, after a dispute arose as to the plaintiffs' entitlement to monetary damages, a second panel of this court reversed the earlier panel's decision on the plaintiffs' equal protection theory.[11] On remand, the district court modified 0907 but refused to vacate 0907 the consent decree. The district court reasoned that the consent decree also had settled the plaintiffs' due process claim, which had not been addressed in the second panel's decision. Sitting en banc, this court reversed the district court's refusal to vacate the consent decree. Evans, 10 F.3d at 482-83. A majority of the court took the view that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the Due Process Clause. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the plurality, indicated that the consent decree had to be set aside because a district court may not require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest. The plurality opinion explained:

[T]he [district] court must ensure that there is a substantial federal claim, not only when the decree is entered but also when it is enforced, and that the obligations imposed by the decree rest on this rule of federal law rather than the bare consent of the officeholder.

* * * * * *

[E]ntry and continued enforcement of a consent decree regulating the operation of a governmental

963

body depend on the existence *963 of a substantial claim under federal law. Unless there is such

a claim, the consent decree is no more than a contract, whose enforcement cannot be supported

by the diversity jurisdiction and that has in court no more force than it would have outside of court.

Id. at 479, 480. Although the consent decree was valid when entered, this court ordered it vacated after it concluded that the plaintiffs' underlying claims were not supported by the United States Constitution. In the absence of a live federal claim, therefore, the consent decree in Evans no longer served any federal purpose. See Balark v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. July 31, 1996) (No. 96-167).[12]

One other circuit has suggested that there may be cases in which a party will be excused from abiding by the terms of an outstanding consent decree because there is no underlying federal interest undergirding the provision that has been violated. See Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1995).[13] However, we believe that the court expressed the usual course in Kindred when it wrote that a "continuing respect for the valid decrees of a court commands that they be obeyed until changed." 9 F.3d at 644. Such an approach is certainly compatible with the traditional approach of our law. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439-40, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 2706-07, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967). Such an approach is also, we are pleased to say, most compatible with the traditions of our people and their commitment to a rule of law.

In the case before us, the district court took the view that, because a particular provision in the consent decree could not be characterized as specifically mandated by the Constitution, the provision was unenforceable as part of the consent decree and therefore could not serve as the basis for contempt. The district court erred in several respects. First, it should not have held that the proper course for the state officials was to ignore the provision

with impunity. The appropriate course, Kindred teaches, would have been to seek an alteration of the decree from the district court. Secondly, the district court assumed that the court could not retain, and enforce through its contempt power, any provision of the consent decree that could not be characterized as required by the Constitution itself. In this respect, it failed to recognize that a federal consent decree can contain a provision not explicitly required by the Constitution as long as the criteria set forth in Firefighters are met. The mere 964 congruence of the selected terms with a provision of state law does not, standing alone, *964 render the consent decree beyond the authority of the federal court. Rather, the selection of that term must be measured against the criteria in Firefighters. "If a federal court can validly enter a consent decree, it can surely enforce that decree." Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 244. If intervening legal or factual changes make enforcement inequitable, Rule 60 provides an effective remedy. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63.[14]
If the state defendants should decide to seek alteration of the consent decree, the district court will have the opportunity to undertake the reexamination envisioned by Kindred. If it determines, applying the criteria of Rufo, Firefighters and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, that the provision is no longer a valid component of the consent decree, the court may amend the decree to relieve the state officials from a provision that no longer serves any valid federal purpose.
Conclusion
Because this path was not followed in the case before us, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
[1] The case originally was filed in the Marion Superior Court. The defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. On July 7, 1992, the case was transferred to the Northern District of Indiana. The district court ordered the prisoners' state law claims remanded to state court.
[2] In support of this position, the plaintiffs point to the fact that a copy of Indiana Code § 11-11-5-1 et seq., as it existed in 1993, was attached to the agreed entry as an exhibit. Unlike other provisions in the agreed entry, moreover, paragraph IX(1) does not provide that future changes in the law would be incorporated into the agreement. Compare R. 112, Agreed Entry at para. III(F)(5)-(6) (incorporating Indiana Code § 11-11-3-3 to -4 and prescribing that future revisions to state law will be incorporated into the agreed entry).
[3] The reader is cautioned that this discussion does not take into account the explicit standards of section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).
[4] The doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, though often characterized as jurisdictional, does not function as a true jurisdictional bar. Unlike other forms of subject-matter jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment immunity can, for example, be waived by consent. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 1212-13, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987). The Supreme Court has declared, moreover, that "we have never held that [the Eleventh Amendment] is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion." Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2567 n. 19, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).
[5] We have no occasion to determine whether this particular provision of the consent decree can be said to be "narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right" or have "an adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system." These standards, embodied in section 802(a)(1) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, are not properly before us on this appeal.
[6] The court also noted that statutory amendments had left inmates at other institutions (i.e., those not party to the consent decree) without a viable statutory or constitutional basis upon which to complain. Kindred, 9 F.3d at 643.

[7] See supra note 5.
[8] We already have noted that section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act may provide such a ground.
[9] In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances in which an intervening change in facts or law warrants the revision of a consent decree. Rejecting the proposition that every clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree, the Court noted:
To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation. The position urged by petitioners "would necessarily imply that the only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards.... Substantively, this would do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements. Procedurally, it would make necessary, as this case illustrates, a constitutional decision every time an effort was made either to enforce or modify the decree by judicial action."
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90, 112 S.Ct. at 763 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir.1991)).
[10] Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1299-1300 (7th Cir.1982).
[11] Evans v. City of Chicago, 873 F.2d 1007, 1015-18 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 2560, 109 L.Ed.2d 742 (1990).
[12] See also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 44, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987).
[13] In Saahir, a prisoner had entered into a settlement agreement with prison officials allowing him to own, use and possess a cassette tape player and tapes for listening purposes. The agreement provided that Saahir "shall order the tapes he desires, through the Texas Department of Corrections' Islamic Chaplain, who will facilitate and administer the order and delivery of tapes" to him. Saahir, 47 F.3d at 760. The district court in Saahir entered a consent decree approving and incorporating the settlement agreement and dismissed the case. Saahir later brought a motion for civil contempt against the defendants, alleging that they had violated the settlement agreement by confiscating thirty-nine of his non-religious tapes. The district court granted the motion and required the prison officials to return the tapes to Saahir or to reimburse him.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain Saahir's contempt motion because it did not implicate any federal interest. According to Saahir, the defendants had agreed to settle his section 1983 claim by allowing him any musical tapes he desired. Saahir argued that this was a vindication of a federal right because it had been given to him in exchange for his dropping a suit based on federal law. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining:
What the defendants agreed to give as a remedy ... does not have any effect on the jurisdictional limits of a federal court. Although "a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial," Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986), the federal court "must fall back on its inherent jurisdiction" when it "issue[s] its own, different order enforcing ... the decree," Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252.
Saahir, 47 F.3d at 761 (parallel citations omitted).
[14] "While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that would support modification if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. at 763.

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Taifa v. Bayh, 868 F.Supp. 237 (1994)

868 F.Supp. 237 Withdrawn for N.R.S. bound volume
United States District Court, N.D. Indiana,
South Bend Division.
Kataza TAIFA, Paul Komyatti, William Sampley, Mark S. Douglas, Aaron Isby, Kevin Sandifer, James E. Shropshire, John Charles Cole, Jr., Preston Gardner, Edward Broadus, James Thompson, Nolan McDandal, Robert Smith, Robert Jenkins, Richard Mumford, Tillman
Morris, Michael Hegwood, Terrence Drain, Eric Malone, Michael Holland, Albert Estep, and Roosevelt Williams, Plaintiffs, v.
Evan BAYH, in his individual and official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, James E. Aiken, in his individual and official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of
Correction, Norman G. Owens, in his individual and official capacity as Director of the
Classification Division of the Indiana Department of Correction; John Nunn, in his individual and
official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the Department of Correction, and Charles E. Wright, in his individual and official
capacity as Director of the Maximum Control Complex of the Indiana Department of Correction,
Defendants.
No. 3:92cv0429AS. | Sept. 9, 1994.
Opinion
Editor’s Note: The opinion of the United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division, in Taifa v. Bayh, published in the advance sheet at this citation, 868 F.Supp. 237-244, was withdrawn from the bound volume because the order was vacated December 22, 1994.

ORDER VACATING ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1994
The Plaintiffs and Defendants, by counsel, having jointly moved the Court to vacate its Order of September 9, 1994, regarding attorneys’ fees and expenses herein, and the Court being duly advised, the Court now makes the following findings:
1. The Order of September 9, 1994, granted the Plaintiffs’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses filed on March 1, 1994.
2. Defendants moved to set aside the September 9 Order. The Court granted that motion but later reinstated the Order and referred Defendants’ motion to set aside to Magistrate Judge Roger B. Cosbey.
3. In a Report and Recommendation dated November 30, 1994, Magistrate Judge Cosbey recommended that Defendants’ motion to set aside the September 9 Order be granted and that the Order be vacated.
4. The parties report that, prior to the expiration of the time to object to the Report and Recommendation, they have now agreed to settle Plaintiffs’ claims for fees and expenses set forth in their Petition, and that said Petition is withdrawn as moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ Motion to Vacate is hereby GRANTED; the Court’s Order of September 9, 1994, is hereby VACATED and declared a nullity and of no further force and effect; and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cosbey is likewise VACATED as moot.
	  

1