Case: 3:17-cv-169 As of:01/21/2020 01:50 PM CST 1 of 7
CLOSED,JJV,JURY
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Arkansas (Northern Division) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17−cv−00169−JM

Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County et al Assigned to: Judge James M. Moody Jr. Case in other court: USCA8, 17−03770 Cause: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff
Justice Network Inc

Date Filed: 06/30/2017 Date Terminated: 11/28/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by John Timothy Edwards Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Avenue Suite 1250 Memphis, TN 38103 901−525−6278 Fax: 901−525−6294 Email: tedwards@bbfpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph E. Horowitz Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Avenue Suite 1250 Memphis, TN 38103 901−525−6278 Fax: 901−525−6294 Email: ecfcivil@bbfpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin McCormack Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Avenue Suite 1250 Memphis, TN 38103 901−525−6278 Fax: 901−525−6294 Email: kmccormack@bbfpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall J. Fishman Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Avenue Suite 1250 Memphis, TN 38103 901−525−6278 Fax: 901−525−6294 Email: ecfcivil@bbfpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard S. Townley Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Avenue Suite 1250

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Memphis, TN 38103 901−525−6278 Fax: 901−525−6294 Email: ecfcivil@bbfpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Craighead County
Defendant David Boling Judge, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Tommy Fowler Judge, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Bay, City of

represented by Jason E. Owens Jason Owens Law Firm, PA Post Office Box 850 Conway, AR 72033−0850 501−764−4334 Email: owens@jowenslawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Patrick E. Hollingsworth Arkansas Attorney General's Office Catlett−Prien Tower Building 323 Center Street, Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201−2610 501−682−1051 Email: phollingsworth@uasys.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Delena C. Hurst Arkansas Attorney General's Office Catlett−Prien Tower Building 323 Center Street, Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201−2610 501−682−2007 Fax: 501−682−2591 Email: delena.hurst@arkansasag.gov TERMINATED: 11/27/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Patrick E. Hollingsworth (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Delena C. Hurst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/27/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson Arkansas Municipal League Post Office Box 38 North Little Rock, AR 72115−0038 501−374−3484 Fax: 501−978−6560 Email: jwilkerson@arml.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Bono, City of
Defendant Brookland, City of
Defendant Caraway, City of
Defendant Cash, City of
Defendant Egypt, City of
Defendant Jonesboro, City of
Defendant Lake City, Arkansas
Defendant Monette, City of

represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ralph C. Ohm Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1558 Hot Springs, AR 71902−1558 501−624−7555 Email: aperma@hotspringslaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Lennon Wilkerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/30/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with Jury Demand for Violation of Civil Rights and State Law, for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages against all Defendants filed by Justice Network Inc. (Fee $ 400. Receipt Number LIT062557.) Summons issued as to David Boling and Tommy Fowler and returned to counsel for service. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(mef) (Entered: 06/30/2017)

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07/03/2017 07/03/2017 07/07/2017
07/13/2017 07/13/2017 07/13/2017 07/13/2017 07/17/2017
08/04/2017 08/04/2017 08/04/2017 08/07/2017 08/07/2017 08/07/2017
08/07/2017 08/07/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017

2 ORDER of Recusal. The clerk must reassign this case at random by chip exchange. Signed by Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. on 7/3/2017. (mcz) (Entered: 07/03/2017)
3 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT. Based on 2 Order, the Clerk's office has reassigned the case to Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 7/3/2017. (scw) (Entered: 07/03/2017)
Summons Issued as to Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Craighead County, Egypt, City of, Jonesboro, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of and returned to counsel for service. (alm) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
4 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Joseph Horowitz. Fee $100 receipt number 0860−3082882. Filed by All Plaintiffs (Edwards, John) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Kevin McCormack. Fee $100 receipt number 0860−3082906. Filed by All Plaintiffs (Edwards, John) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
6 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Randall J. Fishman. Fee $100 receipt number 0860−3082927. Filed by All Plaintiffs (Edwards, John) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
7 MOTION for Leave to Appear pro hac vice by Richard S. Townley. Fee $100 receipt number 0860−3082931. Filed by All Plaintiffs (Edwards, John) (Entered: 07/13/2017)
8 ORDER admitting Joseph Horowitz, Kevin McCormack, Randall J. Fishman, and Richard S. Townley to practice pro hac vice before this Court in this matter and to represent Plaintiff. It is further ordered that the Court waives the local counsel requirement pursuant to Local Rule 83.5(d). Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 7/17/2017. (mcz) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Jason E. Owens on behalf of Craighead County (Owens, Jason) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
10 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Craighead County (Owens, Jason) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
11 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Craighead County. (Owens, Jason) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by John Lennon Wilkerson on behalf of Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Egypt, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of (Wilkerson, John) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Egypt, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of (Wilkerson, John) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
14 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Egypt, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of. (Wilkerson, John) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
15 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Jonesboro, City of (Ohm, Ralph) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
16 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Jonesboro, City of. (Ohm, Ralph) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
17 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Egypt, City of served on 7/18/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
18 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Bay, City of served on 7/17/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
19 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Monette, City of served on 7/17/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
20 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Lake City, Arkansas served on 7/17/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)

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08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/08/2017 08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/10/2017 08/18/2017
08/18/2017
08/23/2017 08/23/2017 08/23/2017
08/25/2017 08/29/2017

21 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Brookland, City of served on 7/19/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
22 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Caraway, City of served on 7/20/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
23 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. David Boling served on 7/19/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
24 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Bono, City of served on 7/18/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
25 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Craighead County served on 7/19/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
26 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Cash, City of served on 7/18/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
27 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Jonesboro, City of served on 7/18/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/08/2017)
28 NOTICE of Appearance by Delena C. Hurst on behalf of David Boling, Tommy Fowler (Hurst, Delena) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by David Boling, Tommy Fowler (Hurst, Delena) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
30 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by David Boling, Tommy Fowler. (Hurst, Delena) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
31 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Justice Network Inc. Tommy Fowler served on 8/9/2017. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
32 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 10 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 15 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Justice Network Inc (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum)(Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
33 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 10 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 15 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM . Responses due by September 1, 2017. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 8/18/17. (amr) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
34 NOTICE of Appearance by Jon M. Greenbaum on behalf of Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (jap) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
35 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Attachment: # 1 Exhibit A) (jap) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/23/2017: # 2 Exhibit A − Complete) (thd). (Entered: 08/23/2017)
36 NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re: 35 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief. CORRECTION: The original Exhibit A was attached to docket entry 35 in error (incomplete image file) due to a clerical mistake by the Clerk's office. The complete Exhibit A was added as an attachment to docket entry 35 and is attached hereto for review by the parties. (thd) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
37 RESPONSE in Support re 35 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Craighead County. (Owens, Jason) (Entered: 08/25/2017)
38 RESPONSE in Opposition re 10 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 15 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Justice Network Inc. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 08/29/2017)

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08/30/2017 08/31/2017
09/05/2017 09/06/2017
09/06/2017 09/08/2017
09/08/2017 09/11/2017
09/18/2017 10/12/2017
10/24/2017
10/24/2017 11/07/2017 11/21/2017 11/21/2017 11/27/2017
11/27/2017

39 MOTION for Leave to File Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by David Boling, Tommy Fowler (Hurst, Delena) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
40 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 39 Motion for Leave to File. Separate Defendants, David Boling and Tommy Fowler may file a reply brief on or before September 18, 2017. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 8/31/17. (amr) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
41 MOTION for Leave to File Reply by Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Egypt, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of (Wilkerson, John) (Entered: 09/05/2017)
42 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 41 Motion for Leave to File. Separate Defendants will have up to and including 9/8/17 in which to file their reply brief. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 9/6/17. (amr) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
43 RESPONSE in Opposition re 35 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Justice Network Inc. (Edwards, John) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
44 REPLY to Response to Motion re 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Bay, City of, Bono, City of, Brookland, City of, Caraway, City of, Cash, City of, Egypt, City of, Lake City, Arkansas, Monette, City of. (Wilkerson, John) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
45 MOTION for Order to Adopt Separate Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motions to Dismiss by Jonesboro, City of (Ohm, Ralph) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
46 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 45 Motion to allow the adoption and incorporation of Separate Defendants' reply brief. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 9/11/17. (amr) (Entered: 09/11/2017)
47 REPLY to Response to Motion re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by David Boling, Tommy Fowler. (Hurst, Delena) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
48 INITIAL SCHEDULING ORDER:Rule 26(f) Conference to occur by 11/13/2017; Rule 26(f) Report due by 11/27/2017. Proposed Jury Trial set sometime during the week of 7/30/2018 at 9:15 AM in Jonesboro Courtroom # 324 before Judge James M. Moody Jr. Signed at the Direction of the Court on 10/12/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Final Scheduling Order)(kog) (Entered: 10/12/2017)
49 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 35 Motion for Leave to File an amicus brief. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law is directed to file its amicus brief within five (5) days of the entry of this order. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 10/24/17. (amr) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
50 BRIEF filed by Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits to Amicus Brief)(Greenbaum, Jon) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
51 RESPONSE re 50 Brief (non−appeal) Response to Amicus Brief by Justice Network Inc (Edwards, John) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Patrick E. Hollingsworth on behalf of David Boling, Tommy Fowler (Hollingsworth, Patrick) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
53 MOTION to Substitute Attorney by David Boling, Tommy Fowler (Hollingsworth, Patrick) (Entered: 11/21/2017)
54 (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no pdf document associated with this entry.) ORDER granting 53 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Delena C. Hurst terminated. Patrick E. Hollingsworth is substituted as counsel for Defendants Boling and Fowler. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 11/27/17. (amr) (Entered: 11/27/2017)
55 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Justice Network Inc. Joint Report (Edwards, John) (Entered: 11/27/2017)

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11/28/2017 11/28/2017 12/20/2017 12/21/2017 12/21/2017 12/21/2017 12/27/2017 07/26/2019 07/26/2019 08/21/2019

56 ORDER granting 10 , 13 , 15 , and 29 Motions to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 11/28/2017. (jak) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
57 JUDGMENT consistent with the Order entered on this date, it is considered, ordered, and adjudged that all claims against the Defendants are dismissed. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 11/28/2017. (jak) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
58 NOTICE OF APPEAL re 56 Order and 57 Judgment by Justice Network Inc. (Edwards, John) (Docket text modified on 12/21/2017 to establish linkage) (jak) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
NOTICE OF DOCKET CORRECTION re 58 Notice of Appeal. CORRECTION: The docket text was modified to establish linkage to docket entries 56 Order and 57 Judgment. (jak) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
59 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL and NOA SUPPLEMENT as to 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc re: 56 Order and 57 Judgment. (mcz) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
60 USCA Docketing Letter and Briefing Schedule as to 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc. USCA Case Number 17−3770. (mcz) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
61 USCA Appeal Fees received $505 paid, receipt number LIT065052 re 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc. (mcz) (Entered: 12/27/2017)
62 OPINION of USCA as to 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc. (cmn) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
63 USCA JUDGMENT as to 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc: The judgment of the district court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court. (cmn) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
64 MANDATE of USCA in accordance with the opinion and judgment of 07/26/2019, as to 58 Notice of Appeal filed by Justice Network Inc. (cmn) (Entered: 08/21/2019)

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JUN 3 0 2017

JONESBORO DIVISION

JAM~~CK

By:

,

CLERK

""DEP CLERK

THE JUSTICE NETWORK, INC.

PLAINTIFF,

vs.

Civil Action Number: 3~ \l W Uf\-~

CRAIGHEAD COUNTY, JUDGE DAVID BOLING, in his individual and official capacity, JUDGE TOMMY FOWLER, in his individual and official capacity, CITY OF BAY, CITY OF BONO, CITY OF BROOKLAND, CITY OF CARAWAY, CITY OF CASH, CITY OF EGYPT, CITY OF JONESBORO, LAKE CITY, and CITY OF MONETTE,

DEFENDANTS.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND STATE LAW; FOR DECLRATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
(Jury Trial Demanded)

Plaintiff, acting by and through its undersigned attorneys, brings this Complaint against Defendants, and states as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. The Justice Network, Inc. ("The Justice Network") has been providing probation services to criminal defendants in Craighead County for over 20 years. Each probation client enters into a contract with The Justice Network, agreeing to pay probation fees in exchange for services provided, such as drug screenings and classes. The Justice Network's Jonesboro branch employed 12 full time employees, all residents of Craighead County. As a result of the policies and conduct of the Defendants, The Justice Network has ceased all operations in Craighead County, and has had been forced to terminate its 12 employees.

This case assigned to Distri: Judge ~ ~

and to Magistrate Judge\/ D_i~

-

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 2 of 29
2. Starting in 2016, Judges David Boling and Tommy Fowler, newly elected District Court Judges in Craighead County, instituted an "Amnesty Program," which forgives fees owed by the probation clients to The Justice Network.
3. By the conduct and the practices implemented in their courts, Boling and Fowler have unilaterally decreed that The Justice Network is not entitled to fees owed under the contracts between each probation client and The Justice Network.
4. As a direct result of Fowler's and Boling's interference in the contractual relationship between The Justice Network and the probation clients, The Justice Network has suffered significant economic loss, and will continue to sustain additional economic ·loss in the future, should the unlawful "Amnesty Program" continue.
5. This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by The Justice Network, Inc. for violations of the Constitutional rights of The Justice Network under The Contracts Clause (Article I , Section 10 of the United States Constitution) and the Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
6. The Contracts Clause and Takings Clause are made applicable to the States by virtue of the 14th Amendment.
7. This action also alleges violations ofArticle 2, Section 22 ofthe Constitution ofthe State of Arkansas (private property shall not be taken without just compensation).
8. This action seeks a declaratory judgment, finding that Defendants effectuated a custom and policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to The Justice Network, in violation of the Article 1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution and Article 2, Section 17 as well as Article 2, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
2

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 3 of 29
9. This action also seeks injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from executing a custom and policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to The Justice Network, in violation ofthe Article 1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 17 as well as Article 2, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This Complaint seeks damages pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for the violation of the civil and constitutional rights of The Justice Network and for violations of the laws of the State of Arkansas. 11. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, which provides that the Federal District Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 12. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims presented herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. 13. This action involves citizens of two different states and the amount in controversy exceeds Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00). By virtue of the parties' citizenship and the amount in controversy, this Court has jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to
28 u.s.c. § 1332.
14. The events and omissions giving rise to this civil action occurred within the Eastern District of Arkansas, Jonesboro Division; therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(l)-(2) and 28 U.S.C. §83(a)(5), the proper venue for this action is in the Jonesboro Division ofthe United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas.
3

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 15. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands a jury trial of this action as is its right pursuant to Amendment VII to the Constitution of the United States of America.
PARTIES 16. Plaintiff, The Justice Network, with its principal office located at 2430 Poplar Avenue, 3ro Floor, Memphis, Tennessee 38112, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Tennessee, and was incorporated in 1990. 17. Community Corrections Corporation, doing business as The Justice Network, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Community Corrections Corporation was incorporated in 1992 under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. 18. The Justice Network purchased a controlling interest in Community Corrections Corporation in December 1997. The Justice Network has operated Community Corrections Corporation, doing business as The Justice Network, since December 1997. 19. The County of Craighead is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. 20. The County ofCraighead may be served with process ofthis Court by serving same upon Ed Hill, Craighead County's Chief Executive Officer at 511 Union Street, Suite 119, Jonesboro, Arkansas 74201, pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7). 21. Defendant County of Craighead operates and manages the District Courts in Craighead County.
4

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22. The Defendant, David Boling (hereinafter, "Boling"), is a District Judge in Craighead County District Court and has held that post at all relevant times material to this action. Judge Boling is a "person" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is being sued in his individual capacity.
23. The Defendant, Tommy Fowler (hereinafter "Fowler"), is a District Judge in Craighead County District Court and has held that post at all relevant times material to this action. Judge Fowler is a "person" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is being sued in his individual capacity.
24. The Defendant County of Craighead, at all relevant times, employed Boling and Fowler.
25. At all times relevant hereto and in all their actions described herein, defendants Boling and Fowler were acting under color of state law and pursuant to their authority as members of the judiciary.
26. In addition to serving as a District Judge in Craighead County, Defendant Boling is employed as a City Judge in a number of cities in Craighead County.
27. The cities where Boling serves as City Judge include: The City of Bay, The City of Bono, The City of Brookland, The City of Caraway, The City of Cash, The City of Egypt, The City of Jonesboro, Lake City and The City of Monette (hereinafter, "City Defendants").
28. In addition to serving as a District Judge in Craighead County, Defendant Fowler is employed as a City Judge in a number of cities in Craighead County.
29. The cities in which Fowler serves as a City Judge include: The City of Bay, The City of Bono, The City of Brookland, The City of Caraway, The City of Cash, The City of Egypt, The City of Jonesboro, Lake City and The City of Monette.
5

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 6 of 29
30. The City Defendants, at all relevant times, employed Boling and Fowler. At all times relevant hereto and in all their actions described herein, defendants Boling and Fowler were acting under color of state law and pursuant to their authority as members of the judiciary.
31. The City of Bay is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Bay may be served with process by serving Darrell Kirby, the City of Bay's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer, at 220 Elder Street, Bay, Arkansas 72411.
32. The City of Bono is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Bono may be served with process by serving Danny C. Shaw, City of Bono's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 241 East College Street, Bono, Arkansas 72416.
33. The City of Brookland is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Brookland may be served with process by serving Kenneth D. Jones, City ofBrookland's Mayor and ChiefExecutive Officer at 613 Holman, Brookland, Arkansas 7241 7.
34. The City of Caraway is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Caraway may be served with process by serving Barry Riley, City of Caraway's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 102 East State Street, Caraway, Arkansas 72419.
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35. The City of Cash is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Cash may be served with process by serving Michael Cureton, City of Cash's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 3669 Highway 18, Cash, Arkansas 72421.
36. The City of Egypt is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Egypt may be served with process by serving Jerry Cook, City of Egypt's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 11063 Highway 91, Egypt, Arkansas 72421.
37. The City of Jonesboro is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Jonesboro may be served with process by serving Harold Perrin, City of Jonesboro's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 300 South Church Street, Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401.
38. Lake City is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), Lake City may be served with process by serving Jon Milligan, Lake City's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 406 Court Street, Lake City, Arkansas 72437.
39. The City of Monette is a public entity which is a political subdivision created and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(a)(7) and Arkansas Code Ann. 14-43-504(a), City of Monette may be served
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 8 of 29
with process by serving Jerry Qualls, City ofMonette's Mayor and Chief Executive Officer at 119 North Edmonds, Monette, Arkansas 72447.
EXHAUSTION OF PRE-LAWSUIT PROCEDURES 40. Some of the claims brought herein are brought pursuant to the laws of the State of Arkansas. As this action is brought against the County of Craighead as well as the City Defendants - and not the State of Arkansas - the Plaintiffis not required to exhaust its administrative remedies in the Arkansas Claims Commission, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated§ 19-10-204 (a).
BACKGROUND 41. The Justice Network is a private probation company, and it offers services to probation clients in Craighead County. Services offered to the probation clients include: program and counseling coordination, public service work, random drug screening, curfew monitoring, or any other condition of probation ordered by the court. 42. The Justice Network also offers a variety of classes to its probation clients, including: life skills, parenting skills, anger management, alcohol safety school and drug offender school. Classes are taught by caring professionals, with certificates of completion awarded at the conclusion of each class. 43. Since 1997, The Justice Network has provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of Craighead County. 44. Since 1997, the Justice Network has also provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction ofthe courts in the City ofJonesboro, City of Bay, City ofBrookland, Lake City, City of Caraway, City of Monette, City of Bono, City of Cash and City of Egypt ("City Courts").
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 9 of 29
45. From 1997 until February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been charged in Craighead County District Court or the City Courts, and who required probation services, were placed under the supervision of The Justice Network.
46. The Justice Network contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement contains, inter alia, a $35 monthly fee for probation services. The Public Service Fee Agreement includes, inter alia, a $15 monthly fee for the supervision ofpublic service work (a typical condition ofprobation). That fee structure has been in place since the early 2000's, without any increase. Copies of the Probation Fee Agreement and Public Service Fee Agreement are attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
47. In conjunction with the contract between The Justice Network and each probation
(_)
client, the probation clients were directed, by way of court order, to pay the fees referred to in the above paragraph to The Justice Network.
48. The court order provides that probation clients are to pay all probation supervision fees to The Justice Network for each month of supervised probation. A copy of the "Order of Probation/Supervision" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
49. In the court order, a number of"Special Conditions" were typically included as part of the order of probation. Some of those "Special Conditions" include: attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, attending counseling (inpatient or outpatient), attending anger management class and/or performing public service work.
50. In the event the probation client failed to abide by the order of probation and did not complete the "Special Conditions" ordered by the court, The Justice Network would file an affidavit with the court indicating what condition or conditions were not completed.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 10 of 29
51. The affidavit was then countersigned by the Craighead County prosecutor and the Judge.
52. The judge of the District Court would order that restitution be paid to The Justice Network for all outstanding fees owed to The Justice Network.
53. The same process was followed in the City Courts, including the court order directing fees to be paid to The Justice Network.
54. The collection of fees owed by the probation clients to The Justice Network is a ministerial act to which immunity does not attach.
55. For cases pending in the District Court, the District Court would collect the fees owed by the probation clients to The Justice Network and forward those funds to The Justice Network.
56. For cases pending in the City Courts, the City Court would collect the fees owed by the probation clients to The Justice Network and forward those funds to The Justice Network.
57. This system whereby the District Court and City Courts collected fees owed to The Justice Network and subsequently disbursed those fees to The Justice Network was in place for nearly twenty (20) years, from 1997 until 2016.
City of Jonesboro 2010 Report Finding that Private Sector Probation Services is More Cost Effective than Municipal Control Over Probation Services
58. The City of Jonesboro performed a comprehensive cost benefit analysis studying the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing private sector probation service providers, such as The Justice Network. A report summarizing those findings was published in July 2010.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 11 of 29
59. The report finds that the City of Jonesboro receives more economic benefit when using private sector probation services from The Justice Network than it would if it were to keep those services "in house."
60. The report concluded that a Probation Department operated by the City of Jonesboro would not generate a profit.
61. In addition, the report indicates that it is economically advantageous for the City of Jonesboro to retain a private sector firm to provide probation services for the City of Jonesboro.
Judicial Elections in Craighead County Results in Ouster of The Justice Network 62. Elections for two District Court judicial seats in Craighead County took place in early 2016. The contest in Division 1 was between incumbent Keith Blackman and challenger David Boling. 63. In an interview with the Jonesboro Sun, published on February 14, 2016, Boling accused Blackman of "illegal conduct." 64. Boling stated in the interview that the District Court's relationship with a private, for-profit probation service provider (The Justice Network) was an example of Blackman "not following the law." 65. Boling specifically stated that should he be elected, The Justice Network would not be used to provide probation services for defendants in his court. 66. Boling added that "What happens is that The Justice Network, in order for them to continue to feed, they have to have people in the system." 67. The contest in Division 2 was between Tommy Fowler and Scott Wilhite.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 12 of 29
68. Fowler was interviewed by the Jonesboro Sun on February 7, 2016. He indicated that he does "not support the privatization of probation services....the privatization of it in any aspect leads to the questionability of credibility and just a distrust."
69. Probation, he added, is to punish and rehabilitate offenders, "it's not a moneymaking arm ofthe government. !fit's privatized, that's what's left. It's to make sure enough people are coming through to meet the bottom line."
70. On March 4, 2016, Fowler told a Sun reporter that he is opposed to the idea of private probation services as "there will always be an ethical dilemma with such a system."
71. These comments of both Boling and Fowler ignore the contractual relationship existing between the probation clients and The Justice Network.
72. Fowler and Boling won their respective elections on March 1, 2016. The Jonesboro Sun published an article on March 2, 2016, indicating that both judges planned to "sever ties" with The Justice Network after being sworn in.
73. That article went on to note that "discontinuing the use of the Justice Network by the District Court was a central part of the campaigns of Boling and Fowler."
74. An article published in the Jonesboro Sun on March 4, 2016, concerning the victory of Judges Boling and Fowler, stated as follows:
Segments of the community, including some who write in the space at The Sun, have challenged the fairness and necessity of the Justice Network, a Memphis-based for-profit outfit that provides probation and other services to the County through Craighead County District Court. Whether people in the "system" were treated fairly and whether the County was doing a disservice to the community by using the for-profit business rather than taking the process "inhouse" has moved like a snowball rolling down a long, slightly declining hill.
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75. Following the election, Boling continued his verbal assault on The Justice Network. In an article published by the Sun on March 4, 2016, Boling stated, "It's a vicious cycle of a revolving door. Someone may be assessed the fines, they've paid off part of it. Their records may not be complete and they could potentially be brought back in front of the court."
76. In a television interview with KAIT8 on March 4, 2016, the chief concern Boling expressed was the absence of a contract between The Justice Network and Craighead County. Boling said, "You want a contract so you know the terms and conditions. What are my obligations? What are their obligations? There's a lot of money not to be able to go back and say, hey are they upholding their end of the bargain?"
77. Boling's emphasis on contract terms is inconsistent with his decision to nullify the contracts between The Justice Network and the probation clients.
78. The "Amnesty Program" instituted by Boling cancelled payments owed by hundreds of probation clients to The Justice Network. That conduct directly interfered with the contractual relationship that existed between The Justice Network and each probation client.
79. Contrary to the 2010 report, Boling advocated for all probation services m Craighead County to be brought "in house" in the March 4 article.
Judges Fowler and Boling Institute an "Amnesty Program" Forgiving Fees owed by Probation Clients to The Justice Network
80. Boling assumed the bench in July 2016, when he was appointed by the Governor of Arkansas to complete the unexpired term of the late Curt Huckaby.
81. In an article in the Jonesboro Sun, published on August 11, 2016, Boling stated that he dismissed the case of one defendant on probation and "purged" the remaining debt that had not been paid.
82. Some of the debt that was purged were court costs.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 14 of 29
83. A portion of the "purged" debt was fees which were owed by the defendant to The Justice Network, pursuant to a contract signed by that defendant and The Justice Network.
84. The August 12, 2016 edition of The Sun continued its coverage on the new policies instituted by Boling and Fowler. The paper reported that Boling said that he would "consider nonpayment cases on a case-by-case basis."
85. The article went on to note that "Boling and Fowler ... don't see how a private, for-profit business with a vested financial interest in keeping folks on its rosters, is a good service for the community."
86. The Sun reported on December 7, 2016, that Fowler and Boling planned to implement an "Amnesty Program" in January and February 2017.
87. As part of that program, Fowler and Boling met with probation offenders who had outstanding fines that were due, to discuss payment options.
88. On January 26, 2017 the Sun reported that Fowler and Boling had introduced a "temporary amnesty program," allowing offenders who were delinquent on their payments to reset their payment plan.
89. The fees owed to The Justice Network, contained in the Court Order annexed as Exhibit "A," were summarily stricken from each Order by the judges.
90. The fees owed to The Justice Network were forgiven by Boling and Fowler as part of the "Amnesty Program."
91. Fowler and Boling also instituted a program of "Jail Credit." 92. Under that program, costs owed to the Court and fees owed to Plaintiff were forgiven in lieu of time served in prison.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 15 of 29
93. Upon information and belief, many ofthe probation clients given "Jail Credit" were never incarcerated.
94. Fowler and Boling's conduct directly interfered with the contractual relationship formed between The Justice Network and each probation client.
95. Boling stated the following in an interview given to the Jonesboro Sun on January 26, 201 7: "What I think is going to happen, what I expect is occurring, is that the money in fines and fees that were going to The Justice Network, which was a substantial amount of money, that money is not going to them. I anticipate, and what I think is occurring, is that it is going to the City and County fines that are owed." (emphasis added)
96. Boling and Fowler enacted a program setting forth an illegal policy which interferes with the lawfully formed contracts between The Justice Network and its clients.
97. The impact of the "Amnesty Program" was that it unlawfully declared that fees owed by probation clients under their contacts with The Justice Network were cancelled and nullified.
98. Defendants Boling and Fowler have inappropriately used their office and politiCal influence to impose and establish a policy in the Craighead County District Court which interferes with the contractual relationship that exists between The Justice Network and Justice Network's probation clients.
99. Defendants Boling and Fowler have inappropriately used their office and political influence to impose and establish a policy in the City Courts located throughout Craighead County which interferes with the contractual relationship that exists between The Justice Network and Justice Network's probation clients.
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100. The above-referenced policy enacted by Boling and Fowler was done maliciously and under the guise of the performance of Boling and Fowler's official duties.
101. The "Amnesty" declaration ratified a policy that nullified and abrogated the contractual duty owed by hundreds of probation clients to pay administrative fees owed to The Justice Network.
102. As a direct result of the above-referenced policy established by Fowler and Boling, The Justice Network has sustained significant economic damage, and continues to sustain economic damage.
103. The amount offees rendered uncollectable due to the conduct of Fowler and Boling is in the hundreds of thousands, and continues to grow.
104. This economic loss, caused by the unlawful policy instituted by the Defendants, represents an unlawful governmental taking of a substantial property right.
105. Fowler and Boling have used their judicial office and powers to unlawfully impose a policy intended to punish The Justice Network by interfering with Plaintiff's contractual relationships.
106. Fowler and Boling have used their judicial office and powers to unlawfully take The Justice Network's substantial property rights without due process oflaw.
107. Defendants Fowler and Boling repeatedly provided the local press with incomplete and misleading information about Plaintiff, resulting in excess of thirty articles and editorials - all reflecting negatively on The Justice Network.
COUNT ONE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of Contracts Clause) 108. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above.
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109. Article I, §10 ofthe United States Constitution provides that"[n]o State shall ... pass any...Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... "
110. The contracts entered into by and between The Justice Network and the probation clients constitute contractual obligations between parties.
111. Judges Boling and Fowler, through their policy of declaring an unauthorized and illegal "Amnesty" on fees owed to The Justice Network, have substantially impaired (and continue to substantially impair) The Justice Network's contractual relationships with its probation clients.
112. The policy established by Judges Fowler and Boling materially alters an important term - namely, the amount of fees owed by each probation client to The Justice Network under that probation client's contract.
113. The interference in contract on the part of Judges Fowler and Boling substantially impairs The Justice Network's contractual rights under the agreements made between The Justice Network and the probation clients, in violation of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution.
114. The above conduct is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which bars governmental actions impairing on contract rights.
115. The "Amnesty Program" program established by Boling and Fowler denies The Justice Network any notice or an opportunity to be heard or to consent to the purported modification of its contracts with the probation clients.
116. By denying Plaintiff its rights to be heard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judges, under color of state law, have acted unlawfully and denied plaintiff its rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States within the meaning of Section 1983 of Title 42.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 18 of 29
117. A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 lies for impairment of contract under the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, as applied to the States under the 14th Amendment.
COUNT TWO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of Takings Clause) 118. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 119. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 120. This limitation on government powers has been imposed on the States through the 14th Amendment. 121. Moreover, valid contracts are property, whether the contracting parties are a corporation, an individual, a municipality or the United States. 122. Where property rights contained in contracts are taken without due process of law and without just compensation, damages are owed to the party whose contract was taken. 123. By cancelling all fees owed to The Justice Network, the Defendants willfully deprived Plaintiff of its rights under the contracts Plaintiff had entered into with the probation clients. 124. Said action was taken without notice and without any opportunity for a fair hearing, in violation ofthe United States Constitution. 125. The policies of Defendants in establishing the "Amnesty Program" and the above conduct of Defendants constitute an unlawful and unilateral taking.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 19 of 29
126. The conduct of Defendants in annulling the fees owed to Plaintiff pursuant to contract is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which bars governmental takings of private property, including contracts.
COUNT THREE Violation of Property Rights (State Law Claim) 127. Plaintiffre-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 128. A contract is an item of property under the laws of the State of Arkansas. 129. The policy enacted by Fowler and Boling violated Plaintiffs property rights. 130. Article 2, section 22 of the Arkansas State Constitution, entitled "Property Rights," provides that taking without just compensation is prohibited. "The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor." 131. By cancelling all fees owed to The Justice Network, the Defendants willfully deprived Plaintiff of its rights under the contracts Plaintiff had entered into with the probation clients. 132. Said action was taken without notice and without any opportunity for a fair hearing, in violation of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. 133. The policies of Defendants in establishing the "Amnesty Program" and the above conduct of Defendants constitute an unlawful and unilateral taking. 134. The conduct of Defendants in annulling the fees owed to Plaintiff is actionable pursuant to Article 2, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, which bars governmental takings of private property, including contracts.
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COUNT FOUR
Tortious Interference with Contract 135. Plaintiffre-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 136. Valid contracts were entered into between hundreds of probation clients and The Justice Network with respect to services provided to said probation clients. 137. Defendants were aware of the above-mentioned contracts between the probation clients and The Justice Network. 138. Defendants Fowler and Boling intentionally rendered those contracts meaningless when declaring an "Amnesty Program" which forgave fees owed by the probation clients to The Justice Network. 139. The "Amnesty Program" and the cancellation of fees owed to Plaintiff was how Fowler and Boling followed through on promises made on their respective campaign trails. Said campaign promises were motivated by the political aspirations of both Fowler and Boling. 140. Defendants' policy in enacting the unlawful "Amnesty Program" and conduct in striking the fees owed to The Justice Network was without legitimate justification. 141. Plaintiffhas and will incur actual damages through the actions of the Defendants in that fees owed to the Plaintiff were nullified and the contracts were made worthless by the policy of the Defendants. 142. As a direct result of Defendants interference with Plaintiffs contracts, Plaintiffhas incurred actual damages through the loss of the benefits of the contract.
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143. The policies enacted by Defendants and the conduct of the Defendants was malicious, reckless, wanton, and/or accomplished with a conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff.
144. As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages. COUNT FIVE
Unjust Enrichment 145. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 146. The Justice Network provided probation services to its probation clients. 147. Under the Order of Probation/Supervision, attached as Exhibit "B," The Justice Network was under court order to provide probation services to defendants in Craighead County and in the City Courts. 148. Had The Justice Network not provided those probation services, the Defendant County of Craighead and City Defendants would have had to either (1) pay another private probation provider for those services; or (2) institute an "in house" program to service probation clients. 149. The County of Craighead and the City Defendants received the benefit of The Justice Network providing probation services. 150. The Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff. 151. The circumstances render Defendants' retention of the benefit inequitable unless the Defendants pay the Plaintiff the value of the benefit. 152. Contrary to all good faith and fair dealing, The County of Craighead has been unjustly enriched by receiving the benefits of the probation services provided by The Justice Network without reimbursing The Justice Network for those services.
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153. Contrary to all good faith and fair dealing, the City Defendants have been unjustly enriched by receiving the benefits of the probation services provided by The Justice Network without reimbursing the Justice Network for those services.
COUNT SIX Supervisory Liability and Ratification
(42 U.S.C. Section 1983) (Against Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants)
154. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained h'erein, the legations set forth above.
155. Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants expressly and tacitly encouraged, ratified, and/or approved of the policy enacted by Fowler and Boling declaring that fees owed to the Plaintiff were forgiven.
156. Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants knew that such conduct was unjustified and would result in violations of constitutional rights.
157. The customs, policies, and/or practices of Defendant Craighead County and City Defendants were a direct and proximate cause of the economic damages sustained by Plaintiff.
158. Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants failed to adequately train and supervise their employees and/or agents to prevent the occurrence of the constitutional violations occurring in this incident.
159. Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants also failed to promulgate appropriate policies or procedures or take other measures to prevent the establishment of the unconstitutional and illegal "Amnesty Program."
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160. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned customs, policies and/or practices of the Defendant Craighead County and the City Defendants, the Plaintiff sustained economic loss and continues to suffer economic losses, as alleged herein.
COUNT SEVEN
Declaratory Judgment 161. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 162. At all times relevant herein it was, and continues to be, the policy and custom of Defendants Fowler and Boling to interfere with the contracts between the probation clients of The Justice Network and The Justice Network. 163. Judge Boling told the Jonesboro Sun on January 26, 2017 that "the money in fines and fees that were going to The Justice Network, which was a substantial amount of money, that money is not going to them." 164. The "Amnesty Program" established by Fowler and Boling, declaring that any fees owed by the probation clients have been forgiven, is an unlawful violation of the United States Constitution Article I, section 10 (Takings Clause), the Fifth Amendment (Contracts Clause) and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. 165. The policy enacted by Fowler and Boling in declaring the "Amnesty Program" and annulling the fees owed to Plaintiff also constitutes tortious interference with contract. 166. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Defendants Boling and Fowler effectuated a custom and policy nullifying contracts entered into by The Justice Network and its probation clients in violation of (1) Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution; (2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) Article 2, section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
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COUNT EIGHT Injunctive Relief 167. Plaintiffre-alleges and incorporates by reference, as though fully contained herein, the allegations set forth above. 168. Defendants Fowler and Boling's "Amnesty Program" and subsequent cancellation ofhundreds of thousands of dollars owed to The Justice Network, despite validly formed contracts between Plaintiff and the probation clients, violates the United States Constitution, as well as numerous state and federal laws, as described above. 169. The policy enacted by Fowler and Boling has caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury. 170. Plaintiff has lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in now uncollectable fees, and will continue to loose significant sums of money should the policies enacted by Defendants continue. 171. Plaintiff is entitled to Injunctive Relief enjoining Defendants Fowler and Boling from executing a policy and custom cancelling fees rightfully owed to The Justice Network. Said policy is in violation of (1) Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution; (2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) Article 2, section 22 of the Constitution of the State ofArkansas.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants: a. A monetary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants for actual or
compensatory and presumed damages sustained by the Plaintiff, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for violations of the civil and constitutional rights of The Justice Network arising
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out of the unlawful policies established by the Defendants in declaring that fees owed to The Justice Network were forgiven, and for violations of duties as described in this Complaint, for which the Defendants should be held liable and responsible in an amount to be determined by a jury that is in excess of the sum of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00); b. Punitive damages in an amount determined by a jury; c. A judgment in favor ofthe Plaintiffand against the Defendants under the pendent state law claims for violation of the Arkansas State Constitution and for tortious interference with contract, sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of the policy and conduct of the Defendants, in an amount to be determined by a jury in excess of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00); d. A declaratory judgment finding that Defendants effectuated a custom and policy to forgive fees owed to Plaintiffby probation clients (under the "Amnesty Program"), in violation of (1) Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution (Contracts Clause); (2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Takings Clause); and (3) Article 2, section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas (Property Rights); e. Injunctive Relief enjoining Defendants from executing a custom and policy to forgive fees owed to Plaintiff by probation clients (under the "Amnesty Program"), in violation of (1) Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution (Contracts Clause); (2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Takings Clause); and (3) Article 2, section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas (Property Rights);
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f. A judgment in favor ofthe Plaintiff and against the Defendants for the Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, plus all costs of this action and all of the Plaintiffs related litigation costs, litigation fees, and litigation expenses, as well as prejudgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law;
g. A judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants for such other relief, either general or specific, which the Court may deem appropriate in law or equity and for which the Plaintiff duly prays.

June, 2017.

Y SUBMITTED, this the 29th day of

John mothy Edwards (Arkansas Bar No. 2010111) Randall J. Fishman (Tennessee Bar No. 7097) pro hac vice admission pending Richard S. Townley (Tennessee Bar No. 28164) pro hac vice admission pending Kevin McCormack (Tennessee Bar No. 29295) pro hac vice admission pending Joseph E. Horowitz (New York Bar No. 4201026) pro hac vice admission pending Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. 200 Jefferson Ave., Suite 1250 Memphis, TN 38103 Telephone: (901) 525-6278 Fax: (901) 525-6294 tedwards@bbfpc.com rfishman@bbfpc.com richard@bbfpc.com kmccormack@bbfpc.com jhorowitz@bbfpc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 27 of 29

THE JUSTICE NE,TWORK, Inc.
Probation Fee Agreement

This agreement is made and entered into th.is

day of

2016, by

and between

the client, and The Justice

Network, Jnc. to carry out the Probation and/or ,sentencing options ordered by the presiding

Court of Craighead County, Arkansas in the followfug manner. for services rendered by The

Justice Network, Inc.., the client agrees fo pay the fees as follows:
:tNIT1AtJ

___ Months Probati<m @ $35 per month _ _ _ Probation Extension Fee @ $35 per mo•Jlh
___ Other:---------~----------

$,_ _ __ $,_ _ __
$._ _ __

TOTAL: $______

A late charge 2f five dCJUars ($5.00l Yl>ill be charged each month if payments are not receivro by the 5111 day of the month. Any retainer fee provided for is non-refundable. The client hereby agrees to pay all expenses in advanC(:. IfinstallmetJt payments are provided for, upon fiulun: to make payment in full of any instaUment, all outstauding foes shall at once become due and payabJc at the option of The Justice Nctwotk. Inc. Sho\JJd this agreement be placed in the hands of an outside collection agency or an attoroey for enforcement. the client will pay all costs of enforcement, together wi1h a reasonable attomc:y fee. I agree t.o be contacted by Tue Justice Network, Inc. even if I am on a Do Not Call list. Jn addition, J consent to be called at tbe phone number provided or any future phone numbers provided by me. including ccllul,ar, which may be for tbe purpose ofcollection. of fees.

WITNESS SIGNATURE

DATE

DATEIN:: DIVISIOH: - - - - - - - -

0 START DA.Tl! :

DATE OUT:

AnORNEY: ---~------~~ PUBLIC DEFENDER 0
OFFENSE~---~-------~-~-

Offl:NSE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~----

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (._" _ _ _ ___.,) Ol'Fl!NSE - - - - - - - - - - - - -

O DWIS 11

#2

0 Fines 0 ourn@ _ _ _ _ 0 INPT@___ 0 AA/NAC

lpe1 wk/mo

0 STOPLlfflNG D AMC @ JNEr

DIM

0 DDS D DOS 0 --'---- HOUIS PSW D Drug Tests

0 0 LIPE SICIUS

DVC 4t JNET

DIM

0 0 HCC MA.DO 0

DAYSJAIL L - DAYS SUSP)

0 othe~.~---------~-------~------- By:
0 Prohlbltediromcontodln11i1-.,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-..,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - : - - - - - - -

- - - - -...1111-" JUDGE~--------~-------~----~

EXHIBIT

P: JNI INTAKE

I ~

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 28 of 29

THE JUSTICE NETWORK, Inc,
Public Service Fee Agreement

. This agreement is made and entered into this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.. 2016, by
and between - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -...... tb.e client, and The Justice
Network, Inc. to carry out the Probation and/or sentencing options ordered by the presiding Court of Craighead County, Arkansas in the following manner: for services rendered by The Justice Network, Iuc., the clientagrees to pay the fees as follows:
INITIAf4

___ Hours Public Service @ $15 per month for _ _ _ Mo:1.1.ths

$_ _ _ _ _ __

---'X""'---- $2.~ Public Service Processing Fee

$ 25.00

___ Public Service Extension Fee@$15 per month for ___ Months $_ _ _ _ _ __

___ Post Contempt of Court Fee @ $l5 per month for

Months $---~-

TOTAL: $----------

A late charge. or five dollars ($5.00l will. be charged each montb. if pa}'me.nts are not received by the 5u. dav of th.e month. Any

retainer fee provided foi i.s non-refundable. The client hereby agrees to pay all c:xpenses :in advance:. Ifinstallment paymrots are provided

for, upon .fa.Uure to make poyment in full of any installm:::nt, all outstBDdiDg fees shall at once become due: and payable at the option of

Tue Justice: Network. Jnc Should this agi:eeroent be placed in the bands of an outside oollc:ction ~cy or an attomc:y for mforcement,

the client will pay all c-0sts of enfot'Cl;ment, together with a reasonable attorney fee. I agree to be contacted by The Justice Network, Inc.

c:vc:n if I am on a Do Not Call list. In addition, I consent to be called at the phone number provided or any future phone nwnbers provided

by me, including a:Uular, which may be for the purpose ofcollection of tees.

· ·

·

CLIENT SI9NATURE WITNESS SIGNATURE

DATE DATE

SO,~~~i SECURITY.NUMBER

TOTAL HOURS AGY~T~t _ __
_ _TKT# _ __
AGY _ _TICTt _ __
AGY _ _TICT#_~~
Notes:·

DIVISION{s) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - '~----- OffENSE _ __,__ _ _ _ _ _ __,,h,,..,rs'----
OFFENSE _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~--~h=r,__ __
0ff£NSE~---------~h=R.___ _
OFFENSE -----------'In""'"'--

JUDGE : ___Blackman _ _Huckaby Other:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r: JNl J>S\'l' INTAKE

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 1 Filed 06/30/17 Page 29 of 29

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAIGHEAD COUNTY, ARKANSAS

- - - State ofArl.cansas --City of_~~-,-~--,---~~~

.

v ..

*

*

Defeo.da:o.t Date of Birth

*

Charge(s): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

*

'--~~~~~~---~-O~RD~E_R_O_F_P_R_O_B_A_T_I_O_N~l-S_UP_E_R_VI~S-IO_N~~~~~~~~____,'

On the

day bf

20___. came before this Court the above...entitled n1att:er. The defendant...

has entered a plea of guilty O( has been convicted of the abo_ve-listed charge(s), and has been sentenced to

days in th~

Craighead County Detontion Center; it is fllrther ordered 1ha.t the imposition of

days ofthe'sentence is hereby suspended and

said defendant is hereby placed on supervised. probation as follows: ·

_ _ Probation. is fur a period of

months and shall end on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ unless otherwise

extended by this Court. Probation sh.all be supervised h:>' a Case Officer of:

11iE nJSTICE NETWORK, flllC.. 906 S. Main St., Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401.

_ _ Probation is to be extended for a period of

months. Any extended probation term shall be added to the end of the

original sentmce. All prior special conditions must J?e completed. Probation shall be supervised by a Case Officer of:
nm IDSTICE NE1WORK, JNC., 906 S. Main St., Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401.

1. The defendant shaJI comply witb these rules:

a. Obey all federal, state and local laws.

b. Immediatt1ly report all arrests and traffic citations, regardless of disposition, to your Case Officer.

c. Report or meet with your Case Officer as directed.

d Pay fines mad costs imposed by this Court.

e. Keep your Case Officer ioformed aud updated as to your address, phone number(s) and place of employment.

f. Do not use, sell, distribute or possess any controlled substance, unless said substance is legitimately prescribed to you

by a physician and/or you are authorized to do so by bw.

g. Work faithfu1ly at suitable employment.

h. Do not possess or drink alcoholic or intoxicating beverages.
i. Submit to drug and/or alcohol testing as directed by the case Officer.

j. Pay the probation supervision fee in the amotn1t of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) each D101lth for tb.e period of supervised

probation. such payment to be made to The Justice Network, Inc.

·

k Allow searches of home, vehicle, person or other property at any time requested by probation oftice,r or law

-·enfon:eroent officer.

2. The defendant must alsp c0mply with the additional special condition.<; as indicated:

_ _ _ Do not possess firearms or other prohlbited weapons.

_ _ _ AA INA meetings _ _.times per ~ve_ek

_ _ _ MADD Class

_____ DWI School

Leven·· J.,evelII

---Inpatient Counseling ®-~~::-...__

_ _ _ Parenting Class _ _ _ Life Skills Classes

_ _ _ outpatient Counseling®--------

_ _ _ Dfug Offender School

_ _ _ Domestic Violexi.oe Classes @ - - - - - - -

_ _ _ Hot Check Class

~--Anger_Management Classes @ - - - - - - -

- - - Stoplifting Class

Public Service Wortc fot:

hours

- - - M a k e i:estitution to the vi.ctim(s) in the amount of$ _ _ _ Have no oontactwith _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ _ Other=---------...-------------~---------
3. Classes, counseling, restitution, fines, probation fees and/or public service must be oom.ple:ted and proof provided to The Justice Netwoik before probation is completed.

I. the above nani.ed defendant, have read or have had read t.o me the foregoing Order. I understand that if I fail to comply with any term or condition, my probation could be revoked, additional charges may be filed, and/or I may be ordered to serve jail time in
additioo to my original sentence. Further, I understand that I will not move from or reside outside Craighead County until tbe case ,...~_cer gives mepennission to do so.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

C:Ucuit Judg£

Pboue Nwnbu·

EXHIBIT

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 56 Filed 11/28/17 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS JONESBORO DIVISION

THE JUSTICE NETWORK, INC.

PLAINTIFF

v.

NO. 3:17CV00169 JM

CRAIGHEAD COUNTY, JUDGE DAVID BOLING, in his individual and official capacity, JUDGE TOMMY FOWLER, in his individual and official capacitiy, CITY OF BAY, CITY OF BONO, CITY OF BROOKLAND, CITY OF CARAWAY, CITY OF CASH, CITY OF EGYPT, CITY OF JONESBORO, LAKE CITY, and CITY OF MONETTE

DEFENDANTS

ORDER Pending are the motions to dismiss of Separate Defendants, Judge David Boling, Judge Tommy Fowler, Craighead County, Arkansas, City of Jonesboro, and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland, Caraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City and Monette. (Docket #’s 10, 13, 15 and 29). Plaintiff has filed a response and Defendants have filed replies. For the reasons set forth herein Defendants’ motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff filed its Complaint with this Court on June 30, 2017 alleging that its constitutional, statutory and common law rights were violated when two Arkansas State District Court Judges, Boling and Fowler, allegedly ordered the forgiveness of certain fees owed to the Plaintiff by state probationers. Plaintiff, The Justice Network, a for-profit corporation, provided services to probation clients in Craighead County and in courts in the Cities of Jonesboro, Bay, Brookland, Lake City, Caraway, Monnette, Bono, Cash and Egypt. Plaintiff claims that it contracted with each

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 56 Filed 11/28/17 Page 2 of 5
individual probation client whereby the Plaintiff agreed to provide probation services and the probation client agreed to pay a monthly fee. Plaintiff complains that Separate Defendants, Judge Tommy Fowler and Judge David Boling instituted an Amnesty Program starting in January 2017, which declared that all fees owed by the probation clients to the Justice Network were forgiven. The Justice Network seeks to recoup these fees. All of the Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” and such “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.2009).
Based upon the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint, from 1997 to February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been charged in Craighead County District Court or the City Courts, and who required probation services, where placed under the supervision of The Justice Network. Plaintiff claims that Boling and Fowler implemented an “Amnesty Program” in
2

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 56 Filed 11/28/17 Page 3 of 5
January and February 2017. As part of the program, the judges met with probation offenders who had outstanding fines to discuss payment options. The judges allowed offenders to reset their payment plan, entered new orders of probation deleting the Justice Network from the Order, forgave court costs, probation fees and allowed costs and fees to be forgiven in lieu of time served in prison.
The Court finds that Judge Boling and Judge Fowler are entitled to absolute judicial immunity against all of Plaintiff’s claims. Unless judges act completely outside all jurisdiction, they are absolutely immune from suit when acting in their judicial capacity. Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir.1997). In Arkansas, “[a]ll courts of record, district courts, and city courts . . .shall have the authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically prohibited by law.” Ark. Code Ann. §16-90-115. Further, [d]uring a period of . . . probation, upon the petition of a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court's own motion, a court may: (1) Modify a condition imposed on the defendant.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-312. The acts of Judge Boling and Judge Fowler, modifying, suspending or terminating the terms of probation, previously imposed by the Court, are judicial acts. See John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Pennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2009)(finding the judge defendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and were entitled to absolute immunity, when they signed and enforced a court order disallowing “credit bonding.”). See also, Peak v. Richardson, 2008 WL 762110, at *8 (E.D.Mo. March 19, 2008) (“revoking a bail bond agent's privilege to write bail bonds in a judge's court or circuit is a judicial action, i.e., an act taken in the judge's judicial capacity”).
Plaintiff claims Craighead County and the City Defendants are liable for the constitutional
3

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 56 Filed 11/28/17 Page 4 of 5
violations suffered by Plaintiff based on official policy or custom. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). However, a municipality may be held liable for an employee’s unconstitutional actions under § 1983 if the municipality’s custom or policy caused the action. Id. at 692. Plaintiff claims that Judge Fowler and Judge Boling were authorized policymakers of the City and County defendants and that the actions of the defendant judges should be imputed to the City and County defendants. State district court judges are state government officials and are not employees of the cities. Ark. Const. Amend. 80; Ark. Code Ann. §16-17-1101, et seq. Further, even if the judges were employees of the cities, Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s judicial decisions were “not a final policy decision of a type creating municipal liability under §1983.” See, Granda v. City of St. Louis, 472 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 2007).
Finally, Plaintiff’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment, ratification and supervisory liability also fail. No supervisor or employee relationship exists between the judges and the City and County defendants. Plaintiff failed to state any facts which would support a finding that the City or County defendants had any authority or control over the judges. And, the probation services at issue were provided to the probation clients. Plaintiff has failed to state facts which demonstrate that the City or County defendants received something of value to which they were not entitled by the forgiveness of a debt owed by the probation clients to the Plaintiff. Spencer v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 193, 5-6 (2017).
For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of November, 2017.
4

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 56 Filed 11/28/17 Page 5 of 5 ______________________________ James M. Moody Jr. United States District Judge
5

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
JONESBORO DIVISION

)

THE JUSTICE NETWORK, INC.

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

CRAIGHEAD COUNTY, et al.

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

No. 17-cv-00169
District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. Magistrate Judge Joe J. Volpe

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW

The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (the “Lawyers’ Committee”) submits

this brief as amicus curiae in order to highlight the perversity of Plaintiff The Justice Network,

Inc.’s complaint and the relief requested therein. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the decisions

of Judges Bowling and Fowler to waive certain costs, fees, and fines and to end local courts’

relationship with The Justice Network was not done to “punish” Plaintiff, but fully justified as a

matter of law and policy. Under the prior status quo, The Justice Network collected upwards of a

half million dollars a year off the backs of thousands of largely poor and disproportionately

minority Arkansans in Craighead County alone, and for those who simply could not afford to pay,

it worked with the court system to impose additional fines and to ensure their imprisonment. As

Judges Bowling and Fowler recognized, there were at least two serious problems with this Justice

Network-led regime. First, it caused widespread harm and systematically perpetuated

fundamentally unfair and unequal treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 2 of 13
people without any regard for their ability to pay court-imposed debt. Second, it undermined faith in the criminal justice system and deprived probationers of due process by preying on poor and disproportionately minority populations. I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Lawyers’ Committee is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, formed in 1963 at the request of President John F. Kennedy to enlist the private bar’s leadership and resources in combating racial discrimination and the resulting inequality of opportunity. As a part of that work, the Lawyers’ Committee is dedicated to preventing the criminalization of poverty, ending mass incarceration, and securing criminal justice reform through impact litigation and other means. The Lawyers’ Committee is actively challenging the kinds of constitutional violations described in the brief in another matter in this Court. See Dade v. Sherwood, Case No. 16-cv-00602 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016). The Lawyers’ Committee has a significant interest in the outcome of this case, as it pertains to the ability judges to ensure equal justice and due process in their courtrooms, and, consequently, protect the civil rights of minorities and indigent defendants in Craighead County. II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff in the above-captioned case is a Tennessee corporation that was employed as the sole provider of misdemeanor probation supervision in Craighead County, Arkansas for approximately twenty years, from 1997 until February 2017. Doc. 1 ¶¶16, 45. Defendants are District Judges of the Craighead County District Court, David Boling and Tommy Fowler (the “Judges”); the County of Craighead; and nine cities within the County, namely, the cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland, Caraway, Cash, Egypt, Jonesboro, Lake and Monette. Id. ¶¶22-23, 26-29.
In a complaint filed June 30, 2017, The Justice Network, Inc. alleges that an “Amnesty Program” instituted by the Judges, “which forgives fees owed by the probation clients” to Plaintiff,
2

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 3 of 13
illegally infringed upon Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Contracts and Takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution (prohibiting takings). Id. ¶¶5, 7. Plaintiff further alleges that the Judges tortiously interfered with the contracts between Plaintiff and their probationer-clients and that the defendant municipalities have been unjustly enriched. Id. ¶¶135-153. Plaintiff seeks “actual or compensatory and presumed damages,” as well as punitive damages, for its injuries. Id. at pp. 24-25. It requests a declaratory judgment that the Judges illegally “effectuated a custom and policy to forgive fees owed to Plaintiff by probation clients (under the “Amnesty Program”) … .” Id. at 25. And it asks the Court to enjoin the Judges from waiving any other fees allegedly owed by probationers to The Justice Network. Id.
As alleged, prior to the Judges’ election, all persons convicted of misdemeanors in the Craighead County District Court, or in “City Courts” within the County, whose sentence included probation “were placed under the supervision of The Justice Network.” Id. ¶45. Probation orders routinely included a provision requiring probationers to pay monthly supervision fees to Plaintiff. Id. ¶47; id. at 29 (blank order). Plaintiff also separately required probationers to sign a “Probation Fee Agreement,” which Plaintiff alleges constituted a contract between Plaintiff and their probationer-clients. Id. ¶46; id. at p. 27, 28 (fee agreements). Per the “contract,” probationers agreed to pay, inter alia, $35 per month, and, if ordered to complete community service, an additional $15 per month. Id. at 27, 28.1 All fees were due “in advance.” Id.
Plaintiff’s response to any failure to “abide by the order of probation,” including a failure to pay Plaintiff’s fees, was to seek the defaulting probationer’s arrest and a new order of “restitution” from the court for fees owed. “In the event [a] probation client failed to abide by the
1 Plaintiff’s “Probation Fee Agreement” also contemplates a $35 per month “Probation Extension Fee.” Doc. 1 at 27. Plaintiff’s “Public Service Fee Agreement” contemplates a $25 “Public Service Processing Fee;” a $15 per month “Public Service Extension Fee;” and a $15 per month “Post Contempt of Court Fee.” Id. at 28. Both agreements impose an additional $5 per month late charge for any payments received after the 5th of the month. Id. at 27-28.
3

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 4 of 13
order of probation …, The Justice Network would file an affidavit with the court indicating what condition or conditions were not completed.” Id. ¶50. “The affidavit was then countersigned by the Craighead County prosecutor and the [former] Judge.” Id. ¶51. “The judge of the District Court would order that restitution be paid to [Plaintiff] for all outstanding fees ….” Id. ¶52.
In March 2016, the citizens of Craighead County elected the defendant Judges, who largely ran on a platform of ending the local courts’ relationship with Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶72, 73, 65, 68. Defendant Boling explained his decision to the local paper, in part, as follows: “‘[I]n order for [Plaintiff] to continue to feed, they have to have people in the system.’” Id. ¶66. Defendant Fowler, similarly, indicated that he does “‘not support the privatization of probation services’” because “‘the privatization of [probation] in any aspect leads to the questionability of credibility and just a distrust.’” Id. ¶68. He added: “‘[I]t’s not a money-making arm of the government. If it’s privatized, that’s what’s left. It’s to make sure enough people are coming through to meet the bottom line.’” Id. ¶69. Per the local paper’s summary, “‘Boling and Fowler … don’t see how a private, for-profit business with a vested financial interest in keeping folks on its rosters, is a good service for the community.’” Id. ¶85 (alteration in original).
Upon taking office, the Judges “followed through on promises made on their respective campaign trails.” Id. ¶139. The Judges ended the relationship with Plaintiff and implemented an “Amnesty Day” program, in which the Judges “met with probation offenders who had outstanding fines … to discuss payment options[,]” and in some instances waived select debt. Id. ¶¶1, 86-90. Due to cancellation of “payments owed by hundreds of probation clients,” Plaintiff alleges a loss of “hundreds of thousands of dollars in now uncollectable fees.” Id. ¶¶ 78, 170 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff alleges the Judges did all this to “punish” Plaintiff and/or to further the Judges’ own “political aspirations.” Id. ¶¶105, 139.
4

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 5 of 13
All defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. See Docs. 10, 13, 15, 29. III. ARGUMENT
A. The Prior Status Quo Resulted in Widespread Harm and Constitutional Violations The Justice Network’s assertion that the Judges stopped using Plaintiff’s “services” and
began to individually consider the propriety of debts imposed in connection with those “services” in order to punish The Justice Network is belied by facts well known to Plaintiff implied by its Complaint. See Doc. 1 ¶105 (alleging the Judges acted in order to “punish” Plaintiff). Even a quick perusal of the local paper reveals a years’ long history of harm in Craighead County under the prior status quo, indifferently imposed in pursuit of company profit. See Exhibits 1-6. The Justice Network’s practice of seeking warrants for the arrest of their “clients” solely and immediately for failure to pay and/or attend a class or assignment scheduled by the company (not a judge) pushed thousands of people into cycles of debt, fear, poverty, and incarceration.
When the Defendant Judges took office, they found an estimated 50,000 outstanding warrants from the misdemeanor court, for more than 8,000 different individuals. See Exhibit 1, Amnesty Deadline Draws Full House, THE SUN, Feb. 11, 2017. That is almost one warrant for every two residents of Craighead County. See U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Craighead County, Arkansas (July 2016), available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6wg57y [last accessed Aug. 17, 2017] (showing County population of 105,835). That is an average of more than five warrants for each affected individual. Defendant Boling recalled one day in August 2016 when thirty-four people appeared before him in court; only six were accused of crimes; the remainder (twenty-eight individuals) were jailed solely on warrants issued for failure to pay. Exhibit 2, Keith Inman, Judges Plan Changes for District Court, THE SUN, Dec. 7, 2016. Some of them involved shocking sums owed as a result of misdemeanor convictions. Defendant Fowler’s clerks, for example,
5

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 6 of 13
identified fifty-one people “in the court’s Jonesboro division alone who owed more than $10,000 in fines and other fees.” Exhibit 3, Keith Inman, District Judges Explain Changes, THE SUN, Jan. 26, 2017. It should be noted this amount is twenty times the amount authorized under Arkansas law in punitive fines for Class C misdemeanors, and four times the maximum amount authorized for even the highest misdemeanor fine. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-201 (fine capped at $2,500, and $500 for Class A and C misdemeanors respectively).
Local residents described widespread hopelessness on the part of Plaintiff’s “clients.” Vicki Crego, Executive Director of the Women’s Crisis Center of Northeast Arkansas, spoke to the local paper about “a woman in the crisis center who had gotten a job and was working diligently to get back on her feet.” Exhibit 4, Keith Inman, Ministers Question Local Justice System, THE SUN, Nov. 8, 2012. “Because she had a job, she was unable to complete court-ordered public service work by the deadline, she said.” Id. “A contempt of court warrant was issued, and she was arrested.” Id. The arrest then cost the woman her job, and her children, who were placed in foster care. Id. Pastor Adrian Rodgers related the catch-22 nature of Plaintiff’s “agreement” for probationers he had counseled who could not afford the monthly fees: the agreements require probationers to “pay a fee to get started with public service and monthly fees for as long as it takes to complete the work,” but “Rodgers said some probationers don’t go to … monthly appointments because they don’t have money to pay the fee.” Id. And “[i]f they don’t pay the fee, they’re not allowed to perform the work, Rodgers said.” Id. Then “[i]f they don’t perform the work, they’re arrested and receive more fines and fees and are ordered to perform more work ….”
On account of Plaintiff’s summary procedures, even “clients” who were in compliance could end up in jail. Kevin Richardson, a local employer, told the paper “of one employee who
6

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 7 of 13
was arrested on warrants on her way to work. She had proof she performed her public service but
still had to go to jail ….” Id. “‘More often than not, they lose hope,’ Richardson said.” Id.
The editors of the local paper, The Sun, repeatedly published impassioned calls for change.
On July 11, 2012, under the headline “Justice Network an Oxymoron,” Editor Chris Wessel wrote:
Last year, The Justice Network collected $556,548 in fees from clients referred to the firm from the district court. For the first six months this year, the company has already collected $355,001. Last month, one man paid $695 in fees. What The Sun has found is that clients often face an unreasonable and inflexible schedule to complete public service and classes to meet their probation requirements. As soon as a class or public service schedule is missed, The Justice Network issues a warrant for the client’s arrest, and the revolving door spins some more — more fines, more fees, more classes, more arrests. On top of that, mistakes have been made, and probationers have been rearrested for not meeting their probation requirements when they’ve actually met them. […] Those caught up in the system have a terrible time getting out. They have a hard time keeping a job to pay off the fines and fees because The Justice Network assigns the public service and class schedule to the probationer. They don’t have a choice. […] We want to know why the failure rate of probation is so high here. We suspect it’s because The Justice Network is more interested in making money than helping those on probation complete their public service and classes and become productive members of the community once again.
Exhibit 5, Editorial, Justice Network an Oxymoron, THE SUN, July 11, 2012; see also Exhibit 6,
Editorial, Ministers Input Needed to Change Probation System, THE SUN, Nov. 9, 2012 (“Like a
maze with no exit, the … probation system is more often a dead end than a remedy for lawbreakers
to turn their lives around and become productive members of society. Much of that is because the
private company that operates … [it] has found it far more lucrative if lawbreakers fail … .”).
The spiraling debt and hopelessness of thousands of County residents under the prior status
quo more than justifies the Judges’ decisions to end their courts’ relationship with The Justice
Network. The harms perpetrated additionally fell disproportionately on minority Arkansans,
7

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 8 of 13
adding another level of inequality to a system that threatened jail for poor persons but not for rich.2 And, as if that weren’t reason enough, the prior status quo resulted in widespread violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the incarceration of any person for the sole reason that he or she is poor and cannot afford to pay some amount of money. E.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (holding statute that permitted imprisonment resulting “directly from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs” is “an impermissible discrimination that rests on ability to pay”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that subjecting petitioner to “imprisonment solely because of his indigency” works an invidious discrimination); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (“[A] sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the [probationer’s] failure to pay. … To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.”); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447 (2011) (outlining due process requirements for civil contempt proceeding).
This prohibition derives from both due process and equal protection principles. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665 ; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (“In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.”) (citing Bearden). Imprisonment for failure to pay is “fundamentally unfair,” and a violation of due process, in the absence of evidence that such failure to pay was the defendant’s fault. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666, 666 n.7, 673. And such imprisonment offends equal protection
2 Cf. Racial Disparities in the Arkansas Criminal Justice System, UALR William H. Bowen School of Law, Report of Research Findings (2015) (“People of color make up less than a quarter of the population of Arkansas but constitute almost half of the incarcerated population.”), available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5492f99ce4b0a0509513144d/t/579a1adb5016e11db1e98669/1469717213747/ RACIAL+DISPARITIES+IN+CRIMINAL+JUSTICE+SYSTEM+%28EXECUTIVE+SUMMARY%29.pdf [last accessed Aug. 20, 2017].
8

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 9 of 13
because only those who cannot afford to pay will be imprisoned. Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41; Tate, 401 U.S. at 398. Thus, as here, “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis of” cases involving “the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 664.
The practices of Plaintiff under the prior status quo undeniably resulted in the routine jailing of poor or low-income Arkansans without any finding that their alleged failure to pay was willful, and without notice that their ability to pay was at issue or an opportunity to be heard on their ability to pay before their arrest and detention. Public accounts show this to be true, but Plaintiff’s allegations also admit as much. In describing the prior status quo, Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n the event [a] … client failed to abide by the order of probation[,]” Plaintiff “would file an affidavit with the court indicating what condition or conditions were not completed.” Doc. 1 ¶50. The County prosecutor and former Judge would “countersig[n]” the affidavit for arrest. Id. ¶51. Once Plaintiff’s client was arrested and arraigned, the “judge of the District Court would order that restitution be paid” to Plaintiff “for all outstanding fees owed ….” Id. ¶52. In other words, Plaintiff’s Complaint describes a conveyor-belt process for the efficient violation of Arkansans’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, wherein the District Court and the criminal justice system became a generation and enforcement mechanism for Plaintiff’s revenue.
B. For-Profit Probation Undermines Faith in the Criminal Justice System Relatedly, although Plaintiff claims mal-intent, the express words of the Judges included
in Plaintiff’s Complaint make clear their primary motivation for ending the relationship: the concept of a for-profit entity administering “probation” is perverse. See supra. For-profit probation administration puts profit before the interests of the probationers, their families, communities, and the public at large.
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Ironically, there can be no better proof of the Judges’ point than the instant lawsuit. The Justice Network complains that the Judges’ expressed concerns about the well-being of individuals subject to their jurisdiction and the credibility of the justice system itself “ignore the contractual relationship existing between the probation clients and The Justice Network.” Id. ¶71. Plaintiff asks this Court for an order declaring it illegal for the Judges to alter the terms of existing probation orders and even to affect future probation orders for the sole reason that a change in the status quo affects the company’s bottom line. Id. at 24. To wit, Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin the Judges from waiving any more fees, for whatever reason, because Plaintiff “has suffered significant economic loss, and will continue to sustain additional economic loss in the future, should the unlawful ‘Amnesty Program’ continue.” Id. ¶4. This is an unambiguous assertion that The Justice Network’s top priority is not the administration of justice for which it has been tasked, but rather maintaining its revenue stream. Generally speaking, revenue generation is a logical top priority for a for-profit company. But, as the voters of Craighead County and the Judges understand, there is no place for profit motive in a justice system.
It is well-established that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution demands justicesystem decision-makers be free from pecuniary bias. Almost a century ago, in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927), the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio law that provided for trial before a village mayor who could levy fines that would be used in part to cover his “fees and costs, in addition to his regular salary.” The Court held the Ohio scheme unconstitutional on two independent grounds, “both because of [the mayor’s] direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.” Id. at 535 (emphasis added). The question of bias is to be considered from an objective
10

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 11 of 13
perspective, with the likely behavior of an average person in mind, and encompasses a concern for
both actual impropriety and even the mere appearance of it. As the Court explained:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it, but the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law. Id. at 532. The Court has since repeatedly affirmed that Due Process requires justice-system
decision-makers be free from pecuniary bias. E.g. Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S. 57
(1972); Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987).
Amicus does not assert that Plaintiff’s role under the prior status quo was tantamount to a
judge’s, or in any way judicial. However, Plaintiff was entrusted to make decisions about the
terms of their “clients’” payment and community service plans, and, to the extent the former judge
considered Plaintiff’s decisions part of his probation order, Plaintiff was empowered to deprive its
“clients” of their fundamental right to physical liberty (and so much more) nearly at will, by simply
submitting an affidavit. See supra. Again, as the Judges and citizens of Craighead County
recognized, the placement of so much power into the hands of a company driven primarily by its desire to ensure and increase its own revenue stream is facially intolerable.3
3 The U.S. Department of Justice briefly summarized the point, and the problem, with respect to for-profit probation companies generally in March of 2016 as follows:
[D]ue process concerns arise when … designees [of the court] have a direct pecuniary interest in the management or outcome of a case—for example, when a jurisdiction employs private, for-profit companies to supervise probationers. In many such jurisdictions, probation companies are authorized not only to collect court fines, but also to impose an array of discretionary surcharges (such as supervision fees, late fees, drug testing fees, etc.) to be paid to the company itself rather than to the court. Thus, the probation company that decides what services or sanctions to impose stands to profit from those very decisions.
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 12 of 13
Again, The Justice Network’s filing of the instant case alone exemplifies the problem. The
Justice Network’s suit makes abundantly clear that The Justice Network is more concerned about
keeping its “clients” on probation and paying monthly fees than it is about any of the justice or
fairness issues underlying the Judges’ actions. An individual probationer, the Judges, or the public
at large cannot trust The Justice Network to make impartial decisions about whether to recommend
extension of probation, revocation of probation, or an individual’s arrest for an alleged violation,
when doing so would harm The Justice Network … as alleged by The Justice Network in this suit.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this action.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jon M. Greenbaum Jon M. Greenbaum (D.C. Bar No. 489887) Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 1401 New York Ave NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662-8315 jgreenbaum@lawyerscommittee.org
Joseph Dell’Armi (NY Bar No. 5184130)* Venable. LLP 1270 Avenue of the Americas 24th Floor New York, NY 10020 (212) 808-5674 jdellarmi@venable.com *Petition for Admission to Practice pending
Attorneys for Amicus
Exhibit 7, Vanita Gupta, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dear Colleague Letter Regarding Enforcement Fees and Fines (Mar. 14, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download [last accessed Aug. 17, 2017].
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50 Filed 10/24/17 Page 13 of 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 24, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the Easter District of Arkansas by using the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system. I have filed the foregoing on ECF.
________________________ Jon M. Greenbaum
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Archive Info: News Feb 11, 2017
Amnesty deadline draws full house
JONESBORO — Craighead County District Judge Tommy Fowler knew it was going to be a busy day.
When he arrived at the Justice Complex at 7:45 a.m. Friday, people were standing in a line that extended to the sidewalk. Court wasn't scheduled to begin until 9:30 a.m.
It was the final day for people with outstanding warrants for failure to appear in court, nonpayment of fines or other contempt charges to appear before Fowler or Judge David Boling to make arrangements to pay outstanding fines and avoid arrest. Not everyone was able to get into the courtroom Friday. Boling, who presided, was only able to meet with 211 people, who collectively had 1,305 warrants thrown out.
In four amnesty sessions since Jan. 20, 563 people appeared before one of the judges, eliminating 2,886 of the backlog of an estimated 50,000 warrants in misdemeanor court. The court has warrants out for more than 8,000 people, Fowler said.
"Don't mistake kindness for weakness," Fowler said of the program. "That's not weakness. We're still enforcing the law."
The judges said many of the people were facing weekly or monthly payment plans that forced them to choose between providing for their families or paying the fines. Fowler said 91 percent of the people who appeared before him had jobs. He said those were the people he was thinking about when the program was initiated.
"These are people who are fearful every time they get behind the wheel to go to their job, but they are working and trying to better themselves," Fowler said.
Though the program didn't require payments up front, many people paid.
Fowler offered a couple of examples. On Feb. 3, he met a woman who is on active duty in the Air Force in Texas. She had a warrant for failure to perform public service on a conviction for having no liability insurance.
"She told me that she drove 10 hours to be here," Fowler said, explaining that a family member told her of the amnesty program. The charge hanging over her prevented her from being considered for promotion, Fowler said.
"I thanked her for her service, and I will consider her service to her country in lieu of her public service work and told her to go home," Fowler said. "I had a man drive from North Carolina last week. He had about $1,600 in old fines that he had not paid," the judge recounted. "He brought $1,200 with him. I told him if he would pay $1,100, I would write the rest off, and (he could) take the other $100 and go by Driver Control, get his license reinstated and go on back to North Carolina."
While the amnesty program is over for now, Boling and Fowler said other people who have outstanding warrants still have opportunities to get right with the court, They can appear on regular court days and speak to a judge after he has completed his scheduled docket. "And I've been telling people, if you get a tax return and you want to come in and talk to Judge Boling or myself after court, we'll see what we can do to help you out," Fowler said. "Because a lot of this stuff is aged and has been accruing over years."
Fowler said there is a 10-year statute of limitations on fine collections.
Fowler said he has been asked to make a presentation to fellow district judges across the state "about our true amnesty program" at a conference in March. By then, he will be able to compile more accurate information on the impact of the program.
This year's program differed from previous amnesty programs, and many people were leery of it, especially at the beginning, Fowler said. Previous programs here required defendants to surrender to police so that the warrants could be served. They then had to pay the underlying charges in full plus a $50 warrant service fee at the time of surrender, complete all prior sentencing as ordered by the court, such as classes or public service work, and pay any restitution owed, often to The Justice Network. The Justice Network, a private for-profit business, provided probation services for the court for many years. The company charged p-obationers fees in addition to what was owed to the court.
The company no longer serves the court. In Texarkana, an amnesty program is underway in that misdemeanor court, The court there waives a $350 warrant fee and jail time if full payment is received for delinquent citations.
However, after the amnesty period expires March 31, the Texarkana, Arkansas, Police Department plans to conduct a "warrant round-up" targeted at finding and arresting anyone who is wanted on an outstanding warrant, according to a press release.

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Archive Info: News - Dec 07, 2016
Judges plan changes for district court
By Keith Inman, Sun Staff Writer, inman(Ojonesborosun.com JONESBORO — In about three weeks, the system for handling misdemeanor criminal cases will change, as two new judges begin presiding over Craighead County District Court. Judge David Boling, appointed in July to complete the late Judge Curt Huekaby's term, began to implement some changes then. More change will come in January when Boling succeeds Keith Blackman in Division 1 and Tommy Fowler takes over Division 2. Both Fowler and Boling campaigned on a promise that they would end outsourcing of probation services in district court. The Justice Network, a private, for-profit company based in Memphis, has provided the service for many years, and few can remember a time when the company wasn't here. While the company will continue operations in neighboring Greene and Poinsett counties, Fowler and Boling say probation services and court-ordered public service work will be under their control. Details of exactly how that will work haven't been finalized, Fowler said Monday, The judges plan final meetings with Craighead County Sheriff Marty Boyd and Jonesboro Police Chief Rick Elliott next week. Elliott said Tuesday he may have to amend his proposed 2017 budget, depending on what gets worked out. "It's all going to be a learning curve for us, but if this is what the court wants for us, we'll do our best to make it work," Elliott said. Fowler, who was appointed to complete the term of the late Circuit Judge Lee Fergus in August 2015, said his duties in the six counties of the 2nd Judicial District have delayed some of the work in developing a plan with Boling. "We have been assessing the situation and addressing it," Fowler said. While the preliminary plan hasn't been reduced to writing, Fowler said a primary change will be fewer mandates for community service and the fees associated with them. Instead, the judges will look for ways to allow offenders to work their way out of the court system.. That includes more realistic fine payment plans. In August, Boling cited a day in which 34 people appeared before him in court. Only six were accused of committing a crime. The other 28 were jailed on warrants charging them with nonpayment of fines. Fowler said he and Boling plan to implement an amnesty program in January and February in which they will devote some Fridays to simply meeting with offenders who owe fine payments but are struggling to keep up. It will be the offender's responsibility to appear in court on those days. No new warrants or fees will be implemented, Fowler said. Rather, the judges and the offenders will discuss what the defendant can realistically pay. They will still face consequences if they refuse to make the lower, more realistic weekly or monthly payment, the judge said. "And not everything will work, I know that," Fowler said.

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Archive Info: News - Jan 26, 2017
District judges explain changes
By Keith Inman, Sun Staff Writer, ininan@lonesherosunicom JONESBORO — It's only been a few weeks, but Craighead County's new district judges said they believe new policies they've established have had positive impacts.
Speaking Wednesday to the Kiwanis Club of Jonesboro, Judges Tommy Fowler and David Boling said fewer people are needlessly going to jail, and people facing fines for misdemeanor offenses have a better chance of actually paying them off. The issue of nonpayment of fines was one that drove the election, Fowler said. After serving more than a year as a circuit judge, Fowler said he learned that district court payment requirements were higher than for those convicted of felonies. While former Judge Keith Blackman expected misdemeanor offenders to pay $115 per month under a payment plan, felons were only expected to pay $50 per month in circuit court. He said $50 is more reasonable.
"Here's what I hope to accomplish," Fowler said. "Habits. Good habits. You pay your house payment. You pay your electric bill. You pay your car payment. Every month. Not trying to pay ahead. You can't do that. I want to see six straight months of developing a habit of paying toward your fines and costs."
Fowler said his clerk's office identified 51 people in the court's Jonesboro division alone who owed more than $10,000 in fines and other fees. People who had nonpayment of fines warrants typically had their licenses suspended automatically without a hearing.
Boling said he and Fowler, instead of issuing warrants that require offenders to post a bond or go to jail, now issue summonses to court where defendants have an opportunity to make payments and avoid losing their licenses.
Keith Bowers, administrator of the Craighead County Detention Center, confirmed that the jail population has declined in recent weeks, from an average of about 300 prisoners to 249 on Wednesday morning. That means a cost savings for the county, he said. "Several things go down when your population goes down," Bowers said. "I hope what they're doing will last."
The judges also introduced a temporary amnesty program, which allows offenders who are behind on their payments to reset their payment plans with no further penalties. Those sessions are scheduled for 9:30 a.m. to noon on Fridays. Fowler said he canceled almost 200 warrants for 44 people who attended the first session last week. Those people were charged with either nonpayment of fines, failure to appear in court or failure to perform public service. He said fewer than five of the people were unemployed, but he said the others weren't earning enough money to keep up with their payments. "Again, we're not soft on crime, but we're looking at it in a different approach in trying to help people get back on their feet," Fowler said. He used the case of a disabled veteran who visited the amnesty session last week.
"He was on a fixed income," Fowler said. "He had gotten behind on his fine payments. After the warrant was issued, you can't pay anymore because the warrant's there. That happened in 2012. For the last four years, he has been living and running a scared life, afraid of getting pulled over because his license was suspended."
Fowler said he quashed all the warrants and gave him a letter to reinstate his license.
"He paid off the $1,200 that he owed to the court, he went and got his license back and he's free. He's done. He's now back on track."
The amnesty program will continue for the next three Fridays.
Another option the court gives to defendants is the opportunity to enter conditional pleas of guilty. Fowler said that allows defendants to delay sentencing until they have time to come up with money to pay their fines. Known as Docket 3, it not only gives the defendant some breathing room to acquire the cash needed, but it also eliminates the need to summon arresting officers to court, Fowler said. Boling and Fowler also followed through on their promises to end the use of a private, for-profit probation service.
They said they hope to have a new system in place by April.
The primary goal of public service work in the new system will be to give defendants an option to work off their fines if they don't have the financial means to pay, Boling said. While it may seem the new judges' practices may reduce revenue for city and county governments, Boling predicted that won't be the case. "What I think is going to happen, what I expect is occurring, is that the money and fines and fees that were going to The Justice Network, which was a substantial amount of money, that money is not going to them," Boling said. 'I anticipate, and what I think is occurring, is it is going to the city and county fines that are owed."
That's because The Justice Network collected its money first, he said.

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Archive Info: News - Nov 08, 2012
Ministers question local justice system
By Keith Inman, Sim Staff Writer
JONESBORO — As people lied into the Justice Complex to attend Craighead County District Court on Wednesday afternoon, one man was overheard saying, 'the judge is locking everybody up today.'
'All right,' another man replied. 'I'm starving. I need a warm place to step. It was cold out there last night.'
A reporter couldn't tell if the man was serious.
Meanwhile, at St. Bernards Medical Centel, local ministers were discussing whether true justice is meted out at the Justice Comets.
'Once they get Into the system. it's impossible to get out,' Vicki Grego, executive director of the Women's Crisis Center of Northeast Arkansas, told members of the Jonesboro Ministerial Alliance.
Crego told of a woman in the crisis center who had gotten a Job and was working diligently to get back on her feet. Because she had a job, she was unable to complete court-ordered public service work by the deadline, she said. A contempt of court warrant was issued, and she was arrested. When that happened, Crego said, the woman's children were placed into foster rare.
She also lost her job, because she couldn't get out of jail, Crego said.
One man on attendance said probationers can receive extensions if they pay an additional fee to the Justice Network, a Memphis-based company that Provides probation services for the court,
'I have a real problem with that.' Crego said. 'Does the judge know that? 1 don't know.'
John Miles, senior pastor 01 first United Methodist Church, said several ministers have become concerned with some of the stones they've heard as they try to help people better their circumstances. He said Adrian Rodgers, pastor of Fullness of kW Ministries, has been especially concerned.
Rodgers said many people he has counseled over the years make a mistake, then get saddled with monthly probation tees. They must pay a fee to get started with public service and monthly fees for as long as it takes to complete the work. Rodgers said some probationers don't go to the justice Network office for their monthly appointments because they don't have money to oay the fee. If they don't pay the lee, they're net allowed to perform the work, Rodgers said. If they don't perform the work, they're arrested and receive more lines and fees and are ordered to perform more work, the pastor said.
WithOut money to pay fines or fees, Probationers are constantly rearrested, Rodgers said. 'They've been in jail enough to be considered a career criminal,' Rodgers said.
Rodgers said he's seen instances where )ustlee Network employees lose documentation of work already performed by probationers. Warrants are issued, and probationers are arrested, even though the probationers have their own documented proof, "e said.
Often probationers don't even know they've failed to fully comply with court orders. In other jurisdictions. Rodgers said he has found tne court will send warning letters before issuing warrants.
'In our great city, they send you nothing,' he said.
Rodgers said the cost, police agencies and the Craighead County Detention Center also have communication issues.
'you go to the jail, they'll give you one amount (owed). You go to the police department, they'll tell you a different amount.'
Kevin Richardson, owner of an answering service, said some of his employees 'have issues,'
He told of one employee who was arrested on warrants on her way to work. She had proof she performed her public service but still had to go to jail, Richardson said.
'More often than not, they lose hope,' Richardson said. 'Is anybody here comfortable with this?' Mikis asked.
Christopher Jones, pastor of First Presbyterian Church, wasn't.
'We're preying on the least of those living in our community,' Jones said. 'There's no wonder our racial tensions are going through the roof. This is a justice issue, not a Justice Network Issue.'
'It's easy money on the backs of the poor.' Rodgers said.
Miles Said ministers hope to arrange a meeting with District judge Keith Blackman to discuss concerns.
Blackman said late Wednesday he would be happy to meet with them and explain the system. The Justice Network operates above boa,d, Blackman said.
'I'm basically satisfied with their services. It's a tough job,' Blackman said. 'There's always a question here or there, but I have checked thine out, and when I see a question that arises in my mind, I've looked at that and queried, and they're very open and willing to show me what transpired, what didn't transpire, and the circumstances. 1 haven't had any problems dealing with them over issues that may have arisen; not anything real substantial.' The Sun reported in June that the county and cities that use the distnct court didn't have a contract, in apparent violation of state law. They Mill don't,
The law requires the approval of the governing bodies — the Quorum court and city councils.
City and county officials have explored the possibility of developing their own probation offices. OS most cities and counties In the state do. However, Blackman said Jonesboro officials have not found it financially feasible.
Jonesboro Mayor Harold Perrin said city officials don't have access to adequate information to know whether it's feasible. II he can get that information, he may be able to form an opinion.

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Archive Info: Opinion - Jul 11, 2012
Justice Network an oxymoron
You'd think the company that does in excess of a half million dollars a year on behalf of Craighead County government would have a contract.
So far, no one can find a copy or obtain one from The Justice Network Inc. — the private company that provides probation services to the Craighead County District Court. State law says a contract is required.
Dean Ross, chief executive of The Justice Network, told The Sun in June the company did have a contract with the county, but no one has been able to produce one. Since that initial contact in June, Ross won't return the newspapers calls.
The county has hag as much luck as Sun reporter Keith Inman. Tony Thomas, administrative assistant to County Judge Ed Hill, told Inman he's been unable to obtain a signed copy from The Justice Network.
"We have been unable to make contact with the main office there in Memphis, and they have not reached back out to us,"4 Thomas told The Sun. "... I would assume that if they had a contract, we would have a copy by now."4, Join the club.
Until The Sun took an in-depth look at how the company operates in Craighead County, the county judge's office and mayors of all cities that use the court didn't even receive monthly reports The Justice Network is required by law to provide. Those officials are now receiving the reports.
What they show is that probation services in Craighead County is big business. The Justice Network administers probation and court-ordered public service and places clients in court-ordered classes. The fees The Justice Network charges are in addition to fines and court costs assessed by District Judge Keith Blackman.
Last year, The Justice Network collected $556,548 in fees from clients referred to the firm from district court. For the first six months this year, the company has already collected $355,001. Last month, one man paid $695 in fees.
What The Sun has found is that clients often face an unreasonable and inflexible schedule to complete public service and classes to meet their probation requirements. As soon as a class or public service schedule is missed, The Justice Network issues a warrant for the client's arrest, and the revolving door spins some more — more fines, more fees, more classes, more arrests. On top of that, mistakes have been made, and probationers have been rearrested for not meeting their probation requirements when they've actually met them.
One former probationer even carries around the receipts showing he's paid his fines and fees and completed his community service just so they won't mistakenly arrest him again.
Those caught up in the system have a terrible time getting out. They have a hard time keeping a job to pay off the fines and fees because Tie Justice Network assigns the public service and class schedule to the probationer. They don't have a choice.
In a recent in-depth look at the top 10 repeat criminals in Craighead County, all 10 had been arrested 24-29 times in the past five years. Most of those were warrants for failing to complete public service and classes.
If the county is going to continue to let The Justice Network run its probation program, the company needs to come clean with the public. We've got lots of questions that only company officials can answer, and they aren't talking.
We want to know why the failure rate of probation is so high here. We suspect it's because The Justice Network is more interested in making money than helping those on probation complete their public service and classes and become productive members of the community once again.
The probation system in Craighead County and surrounding counties administered by The Justice Network is broken. It needs to be fixed.
When someone or something keeps their thumb on people who are down and out, it's highly unlikely they will rise above their circumstances and far more likely they will give up and continue the cycle of crime in our community. There's no way out,
Ironically, in Greene County, The Justice Network returns 10 percent of what it collects to the county. That would be a big chunk of change for Craighead County, considering The Justice Network has operated the probation system here since the 1990s. Then again, nobody can find the contract.
City and county officials need to get a handle on this problem in our community. If representatives of The Justice Network aren't willing to meet with them in a public setting to get the many issues squared away, then they need to work together to develop a better probation system here that's run by the government and accountable to the people it serves.
—Chris Wessel

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Archive Info: Opinion Nov 09, 2012
Ministers' input needed to change probation system
Like a maze with no exit, the Craighead County District Court's probation system is more often a dead end than a remedy for lawbreakers to turn their lives around and become productive members of society.
Much of that is because the private company that operates the court's probation system has found it far more lucrative if lawbreakers fail their court-ordered punishments, which include fines, fees and community service. Under the current system operated by The Justice Network, the Memphis-based company that provides probation services for the court, lawbreakers find themselves entangled in a system that's nearly impossible to get out of. And it's all about the money. Since Sun reporter Keith Inman's in-depth series on The Justice Network last June, little has been done to change the system or remedy the problems. Quorum court members talked about it, and city and county officials said they'd look into the matter, but so far everything is status quo.
District Court Judge Keith Blackman even said he's pleased with the job The Justice Network is doing in Craighead County.
Apparently, Blackman doesn't get out of his robes much and talk to the parents and loved ones of lawbreakers who committed crimes most likely related to their addiction to drugs and/or alcohol. What's happening is criminal, but since it's happening to criminals, few folks have cared. Until now.
On Wednesday, a group of local ministers met to discuss the problems with the county's probation system. "Once they get into the system, it's impossible to get out:. Vicki Grego, executive director of the Women's Crisis Center of Northeast Arkansas, told members of the Jonesboro Ministerial Alliance. Crego told of a case that we heard described dozens of times by other folks. It's a perfect Catch-22 situation where lawbreakers are assigned hundreds of hours of community service that they have to pay to complete. They are assigned jobs and classes by The Justice Network that must be completed when and where The Justice Network assigns them.
Many times, it's impossible to maintain a job to pay the fines and fees to complete public service. Sometimes The Justice Network Goofs up in its scheduling or accounting, and probationers are picked up for failing to complete community service.
Many times the probationer doesn't have the money to pay to do community service. The result: A warrant is issued, the probationer is re-arrested, thrown in jail and given more fines, fees and community service on top of what they already couldn't complete. Often they lose whatever job they had and, in at least one case, lost their children. We have no problem with lawbreakers paying fines and fees and being assigned community service. That's the price for breaking the law and a way to pay your community back for having to deal with your indiscretions. However, the current system preys on society's least favorite class — the poor and the addicted — and, as Adrian Rodgers, pastor of fullness of Joy Ministries, put it best: "It's easy money on the backs of the poor.".
Some residents have been arrested so many times they are considered career criminals, even though most of their crimes are simply not being able to pay the fees and complete community service. What starts out as shoplifting or theft turns into a revolving door at the courthouse. The good news is several ministers with the Jonesboro Ministerial Alliance plan to meet with Judge Blackman, and he is amenable to the gathering. With any luck, the ministers will help Blackman see The Justice Network in the light of those who are taken advantage of by the current system. The goal of district court's probation system should be to punish and rehabilitate lawbreakers — not make it impossible for them to get on their feet again by enriching a private company. The city and county should follow the ministers' lead and re-evaluate the probation system. —Chris Wessel

http://www.jonesborosun.com/archives/result.php?1D=712728,kw=Justice%20Network

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EXHIBIT 7

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U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division Office for Access to Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
March 14, 2016
Dear Colleague:
The Department of Justice (“the Department”) is committed to assisting state and local courts in their efforts to ensure equal justice and due process for all those who come before them. In December 2015, the Department convened a diverse group of stakeholders—judges, court administrators, lawmakers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, advocates, and impacted individuals—to discuss the assessment and enforcement of fines and fees in state and local courts. While the convening made plain that unlawful and harmful practices exist in certain jurisdictions throughout the country, it also highlighted a number of reform efforts underway by state leaders, judicial officers, and advocates, and underscored the commitment of all the participants to continue addressing these critical issues. At the meeting, participants and Department officials also discussed ways in which the Department could assist courts in their efforts to make needed changes. Among other recommendations, participants called on the Department to provide greater clarity to state and local courts regarding their legal obligations with respect to fines and fees and to share best practices. Accordingly, this letter is intended to address some of the most common practices that run afoul of the United States Constitution and/or other federal laws and to assist court leadership in ensuring that courts at every level of the justice system operate fairly and lawfully, as well as to suggest alternative practices that can address legitimate public safety needs while also protecting the rights of participants in the justice system.
Recent years have seen increased attention on the illegal enforcement of fines and fees in certain jurisdictions around the country—often with respect to individuals accused of misdemeanors, quasi-criminal ordinance violations, or civil infractions.1 Typically, courts do not sentence defendants to incarceration in these cases; monetary fines are the norm. Yet the harm
1 See, e.g., Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf (finding that the Ferguson, Missouri, municipal court routinely deprived people of their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and other federal protections); Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf (reporting on fine and fee practices in fifteen states); American Civil Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf (discussing practices in Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, and Washington state).
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caused by unlawful practices in these jurisdictions can be profound. Individuals may confront escalating debt; face repeated, unnecessary incarceration for nonpayment despite posing no danger to the community2; lose their jobs; and become trapped in cycles of poverty that can be nearly impossible to escape.3 Furthermore, in addition to being unlawful, to the extent that these practices are geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward raising revenue, they can cast doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal and erode trust between local governments and their constituents.4
To help judicial actors protect individuals’ rights and avoid unnecessary harm, we discuss below a set of basic constitutional principles relevant to the enforcement of fines and fees. These principles, grounded in the rights to due process and equal protection, require the following:
(1) Courts must not incarcerate a person for nonpayment of fines or fees without first conducting an indigency determination and establishing that the failure to pay was willful;
(2) Courts must consider alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay fines and fees;
(3) Courts must not condition access to a judicial hearing on the prepayment of fines or fees;
(4) Courts must provide meaningful notice and, in appropriate cases, counsel, when enforcing fines and fees;
(5) Courts must not use arrest warrants or license suspensions as a means of coercing the payment of court debt when individuals have not been afforded constitutionally adequate procedural protections;
(6) Courts must not employ bail or bond practices that cause indigent defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release; and
(7) Courts must safeguard against unconstitutional practices by court staff and private contractors.
In court systems receiving federal funds, these practices may also violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, when they unnecessarily impose disparate harm on the basis of race or national origin.
2 Nothing in this letter is intended to suggest that courts may not preventively detain a defendant pretrial in order to secure the safety of the public or appearance of the defendant. 3 See Council of Economic Advisers, Issue Brief, Fines, Fees, and Bail: Payments in the Criminal Justice System that Disproportionately Impact the Poor, at 1 (Dec. 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf (describing the disproportionate impact on the poor of fixed monetary penalties, which “can lead to high levels of debt and even incarceration for failure to fulfil a payment” and create “barriers to successful re-entry after an offense”). 4 See Conference of State Court Administrators, 2011-2012 Policy Paper, Courts Are Not Revenue Centers (2012), available at https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2011-12-COSCA-report.pdf.
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As court leaders, your guidance on these issues is critical. We urge you to review court rules and procedures within your jurisdiction to ensure that they comply with due process, equal protection, and sound public policy. We also encourage you to forward a copy of this letter to every judge in your jurisdiction; to provide appropriate training for judges in the areas discussed below; and to develop resources, such as bench books, to assist judges in performing their duties lawfully and effectively. We also hope that you will work with the Justice Department, going forward, to continue to develop and share solutions for implementing and adhering to these principles.
1. Courts must not incarcerate a person for nonpayment of fines or fees without first conducting an indigency determination and establishing that the failure to pay was willful.
The due process and equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit “punishing a person for his poverty.” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government may not incarcerate an individual solely because of inability to pay a fine or fee. In Bearden, the Court prohibited the incarceration of indigent probationers for failing to pay a fine because “[t]o do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 672-73; see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that state could not convert defendant’s unpaid fine for a fine-only offense to incarceration because that would subject him “to imprisonment solely because of his indigency”); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970) (holding that an indigent defendant could not be imprisoned longer than the statutory maximum for failing to pay his fine). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), holding that a court violates due process when it finds a parent in civil contempt and jails the parent for failure to pay child support, without first inquiring into the parent’s ability to pay. Id. at 2518-19.
To comply with this constitutional guarantee, state and local courts must inquire as to a person’s ability to pay prior to imposing incarceration for nonpayment. Courts have an affirmative duty to conduct these inquiries and should do so sua sponte. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. Further, a court’s obligation to conduct indigency inquiries endures throughout the life of a case. See id. at 662-63. A probationer may lose her job or suddenly require expensive medical care, leaving her in precarious financial circumstances. For that reason, a missed payment cannot itself be sufficient to trigger a person’s arrest or detention unless the court first inquires anew into the reasons for the person’s non-payment and determines that it was willful. In addition, to minimize these problems, courts should inquire into ability to pay at sentencing, when contemplating the assessment of fines and fees, rather than waiting until a person fails to pay.
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Under Bearden, standards for indigency inquiries must ensure fair and accurate assessments of defendants’ ability to pay. Due process requires that such standards include both notice to the defendant that ability to pay is a critical issue, and a meaningful opportunity for the defendant to be heard on the question of his or her financial circumstances. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (requiring courts to follow these specific procedures, and others, to prevent unrepresented parties from being jailed because of financial incapacity). Jurisdictions may benefit from creating statutory presumptions of indigency for certain classes of defendants—for example, those eligible for public benefits, living below a certain income level, or serving a term of confinement. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-20-10 (listing conditions considered “prima facie evidence of the defendant’s indigency and limited ability to pay,” including but not limited to “[q]ualification for and/or receipt of” public assistance, disability insurance, and food stamps).
2. Courts must consider alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay fines and fees.
When individuals of limited means cannot satisfy their financial obligations, Bearden requires consideration of “alternatives to imprisonment.” 461 U.S. at 672. These alternatives may include extending the time for payment, reducing the debt, requiring the defendant to attend traffic or public safety classes, or imposing community service. See id. Recognizing this constitutional imperative, some jurisdictions have codified alternatives to incarceration in state law. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-102(f)(4)(A) (2015) (providing that for “failure to report to probation or failure to pay fines, statutory surcharges, or probation supervision fees, the court shall consider the use of alternatives to confinement, including community service”); see also Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5 (discussing effectiveness of fine payment plans and citing examples from several states). In some cases, it will be immediately apparent that a person is not and will not likely become able to pay a monetary fine. Therefore, courts should consider providing alternatives to indigent defendants not only after a failure to pay, but also in lieu of imposing financial obligations in the first place.
Neither community service programs nor payment plans, however, should become a means to impose greater penalties on the poor by, for example, imposing onerous user fees or interest. With respect to community service programs, court officials should consider delineating clear and consistent standards that allow individuals adequate time to complete the service and avoid creating unreasonable conflicts with individuals’ work and family obligations. In imposing payment plans, courts should consider assessing the defendant’s financial resources to determine a reasonable periodic payment, and should consider including a mechanism for defendants to seek a reduction in their monthly obligation if their financial circumstances change.
3. Courts must not condition access to a judicial hearing on prepayment of fines or fees.
State and local courts deprive indigent defendants of due process and equal protection if they condition access to the courts on payment of fines or fees. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that due process bars states from conditioning access to
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compulsory judicial process on the payment of court fees by those unable to pay); see also Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm’rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 502 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding that the conditioning of an appeal on payment of a bond violates indigent prisoners’ equal protection rights and “‘has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law’” (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959)).5
This unconstitutional practice is often framed as a routine administrative matter. For example, a motorist who is arrested for driving with a suspended license may be told that the penalty for the citation is $300 and that a court date will be scheduled only upon the completion of a $300 payment (sometimes referred to as a prehearing “bond” or “bail” payment). Courts most commonly impose these prepayment requirements on defendants who have failed to appear, depriving those defendants of the opportunity to establish good cause for missing court. Regardless of the charge, these requirements can have the effect of denying access to justice to the poor.
4. Courts must provide meaningful notice and, in appropriate cases, counsel, when enforcing fines and fees.
“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); see also Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (discussing the importance of notice in proceedings to enforce a child support order). Thus, constitutionally adequate notice must be provided for even the most minor cases. Courts should ensure that citations and summonses adequately inform individuals of the precise charges against them, the amount owed or other possible penalties, the date of their court hearing, the availability of alternate means of payment, the rules and procedures of court, their rights as a litigant, or whether in-person appearance is required at all. Gaps in this vital information can make it difficult, if not impossible, for defendants to fairly and expeditiously resolve their cases. And inadequate notice can have a cascading effect, resulting in the defendant’s failure to appear and leading to the imposition of significant penalties in violation of the defendant’s due process rights.
Further, courts must ensure defendants’ right to counsel in appropriate cases when enforcing fines and fees. Failing to appear or to pay outstanding fines or fees can result in incarceration, whether through the pursuit of criminal charges or criminal contempt, the imposition of a sentence that had been suspended, or the pursuit of civil contempt proceedings. The Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be provided the right to counsel in any criminal proceeding resulting in incarceration, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), and indeed forbids imposition of a suspended jail sentence on a probationer who was not afforded a right to counsel when originally convicted and sentenced,
5 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981), when it prohibited conditioning indigent persons’ access to blood tests in adversarial paternity actions on payment of a fee, and in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996), when it prohibited charging filing fees to indigent persons seeking to appeal from proceedings terminating their parental rights.
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see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants likewise may be entitled to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for failure to pay fines or fees. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518-19 (holding that, although there is no automatic right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support, due process is violated when neither counsel nor adequate alternative procedural safeguards are provided to prevent incarceration for inability to pay).6
5. Courts must not use arrest warrants or license suspensions as a means of coercing the payment of court debt when individuals have not been afforded constitutionally adequate procedural protections.
The use of arrest warrants as a means of debt collection, rather than in response to public safety needs, creates unnecessary risk that individuals’ constitutional rights will be violated. Warrants must not be issued for failure to pay without providing adequate notice to a defendant, a hearing where the defendant’s ability to pay is assessed, and other basic procedural protections. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519; Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671-72; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. When people are arrested and detained on these warrants, the result is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Rather than arrest and incarceration, courts should consider less harmful and less costly means of collecting justifiable debts, including civil debt collection.7
In many jurisdictions, courts are also authorized—and in some cases required—to initiate the suspension of a defendant’s driver’s license to compel the payment of outstanding court debts. If a defendant’s driver’s license is suspended because of failure to pay a fine, such a suspension may be unlawful if the defendant was deprived of his due process right to establish inability to pay. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that driver’s licenses “may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood” and thus “are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment”); cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1977) (upholding revocation of driver’s license after conviction based in part on the due process provided in the underlying criminal proceedings); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1979) (upholding suspension of driver’s license after arrest for driving under the influence and refusal to take a breath-analysis test, because suspension “substantially served” the government’s interest in public safety and was based on “objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him,” making the risk of erroneous deprivation low). Accordingly, automatic license suspensions premised on determinations that fail to comport with Bearden and its progeny may violate due process.
6 Turner’s ruling that the right to counsel is not automatic was limited to contempt proceedings arising from failure to pay child support to a custodial parent who is unrepresented by counsel. See 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2519. The Court explained that recognizing such an automatic right in that context “could create an asymmetry of representation.” Id. at 2519. The Court distinguished those circumstances from civil contempt proceedings to recover funds due to the government, which “more closely resemble debt-collection proceedings” in which “[t]he government is likely to have counsel or some other competent representative.” Id. at 2520. 7 Researchers have questioned whether the use of police and jail resources to coerce the payment of court debts is cost-effective. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 505, 527-28 (2011). This strategy may also undermine public safety by diverting police resources and stimulating public distrust of law enforcement.
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Even where such suspensions are lawful, they nonetheless raise significant public policy concerns. Research has consistently found that having a valid driver’s license can be crucial to individuals’ ability to maintain a job, pursue educational opportunities, and care for families.8 At the same time, suspending defendants’ licenses decreases the likelihood that defendants will resolve pending cases and outstanding court debts, both by jeopardizing their employment and by making it more difficult to travel to court, and results in more unlicensed driving. For these reasons, where they have discretion to do so, state and local courts are encouraged to avoid suspending driver’s licenses as a debt collection tool, reserving suspension for cases in which it would increase public safety.9
6. Courts must not employ bail or bond practices that cause indigent defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release.
When indigent defendants are arrested for failure to make payments they cannot afford, they can be subjected to another independent violation of their rights: prolonged detention due to unlawful bail or bond practices. Bail that is set without regard to defendants’ financial capacity can result in the incarceration of individuals not because they pose a threat to public safety or a flight risk, but rather because they cannot afford the assigned bail amount.
As the Department of Justice set forth in detail in a federal court brief last year, and as courts have long recognized, any bail practices that result in incarceration based on poverty violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC, at 8 (M.D. Ala., Feb. 13, 2015) (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671; Tate, 401 U.S. at 398; Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41).10 Systems that rely primarily on secured monetary bonds without adequate consideration of defendants’ financial means tend to result in the incarceration of poor defendants who pose no threat to public safety solely because they cannot afford to pay.11 To better protect constitutional rights while ensuring defendants’ appearance in court and the safety of the community, courts should consider transitioning from a system based on secured monetary bail alone to one grounded in objective risk assessments by pretrial experts. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 23-1321 (2014); Colo. Rev. Stat. 16-
8 See, e.g., Robert Cervero, et al., Transportation as a Stimulus of Welfare-to-Work: Private versus Public Mobility, 22 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 50 (2002); Alan M. Voorhees, et al., Motor Vehicles Affordability and Fairness Task Force: Final Report, at xii (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/About/AFTF_final_02.pdf (a study of suspended drivers in New Jersey, which found that 42% of people lost their jobs as a result of the driver’s license suspension, that 45% of those could not find another job, and that this had the greatest impact on seniors and lowincome individuals). 9 See Am. Ass’n of Motor Veh. Adm’rs, Best Practices Guide to Reducing Suspended Drivers, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.aamva.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3723&libID=3709 (recommending that “legislatures repeal state laws requiring the suspension of driving privileges for non-highway safety related violations” and citing research supporting view that fewer driver suspensions for non-compliance with court requirements would increase public safety). 10 The United States’ Statement of Interest in Varden is available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/02/13/varden statement_ of_interest.pdf. 11 See supra Statement of the United States, Varden, at 11 (citing Timothy R. Schnacke, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM, at 2 (2014), available at http://nicic.gov/library/028360).
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4-104 (2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.066 (2015); N.J. S. 946/A1910 (enacted 2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (permitting pretrial detention in the federal system when no conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and safety of the community, but cautioning that “[t]he judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person”).
7. Courts must safeguard against unconstitutional practices by court staff and private contractors.
In many courts, especially those adjudicating strictly minor or local offenses, the judge or magistrate may preside for only a few hours or days per week, while most of the business of the court is conducted by clerks or probation officers outside of court sessions. As a result, clerks and other court staff are sometimes tasked with conducting indigency inquiries, determining bond amounts, issuing arrest warrants, and other critical functions—often with only perfunctory review by a judicial officer, or no review at all. Without adequate judicial oversight, there is no reliable means of ensuring that these tasks are performed consistent with due process and equal protection. Regardless of the size of the docket or the limited hours of the court, judges must ensure that the law is followed and preserve “both the appearance and reality of fairness, generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also American Bar Association, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Rules 2.2, 2.5, 2.12.
Additional due process concerns arise when these designees have a direct pecuniary interest in the management or outcome of a case—for example, when a jurisdiction employs private, for-profit companies to supervise probationers. In many such jurisdictions, probation companies are authorized not only to collect court fines, but also to impose an array of discretionary surcharges (such as supervision fees, late fees, drug testing fees, etc.) to be paid to the company itself rather than to the court. Thus, the probation company that decides what services or sanctions to impose stands to profit from those very decisions. The Supreme Court has “always been sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the criminal justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to compromise the performance of their duty.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987). It has expressly prohibited arrangements in which the judge might have a pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in the outcome of a case. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (invalidating conviction on the basis of $12 fee paid to the mayor only upon conviction in mayor’s court); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (extending reasoning of Tumey to cases in which the judge has a clear but not direct interest). It has applied the same reasoning to prosecutors, holding that the appointment of a private prosecutor with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case constitutes fundamental error because it “undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding.” Young, 481 U.S. at 811-14. The appointment of a private probation company with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of its cases raises similarly fundamental concerns about fairness and due process.
* * * * *
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Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 50-1 Filed 10/24/17 Page 22 of 22 The Department of Justice has a strong interest in ensuring that state and local courts provide every individual with the basic protections guaranteed by the Constitution and other federal laws, regardless of his or her financial means. We are eager to build on the December 2015 convening about these issues by supporting your efforts at the state and local levels, and we look forward to working collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure that every part of our justice system provides equal justice and due process.
Sincerely,
Vanita Gupta Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
Lisa Foster Director Office for Access to Justice
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 Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 62 Filed 07/26/19 Page 1 of 23
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________
No. 17-3770 3:17-cv-00169-JM ___________________________
Justice Network Inc. lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v. Craighead County; David Boling, Judge, in his individual and official capacity; Tommy Fowler, Judge, In his individual and official capacity; Bay, City of; Bono,
City of; Brookland, City of; Caraway, City of; Cash, City of; Egypt, City of; Jonesboro, City of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City of lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees -----------------------------Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro ____________ Submitted: April 17, 2019 Filed: July 26, 2019 ____________
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________
Appellate Case: 17-3770 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Entry ID: 4812357

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SMITH, Chief Judge.
The Justice Network Inc. (TJN) appeals from the district court’s1 dismissal of its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Judge David Boling, in his individual and official capacity; Judge Tommy Fowler, in his individual and official capacity; Craighead County, Arkansas; the City of Jonesboro; and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland, Caraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette.2 The suit arises from Craighead County District Judges Boling and Fowler’s implementation of an Amnesty Program forgiving all fees that probationers owed to TJN for probation services. We hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity on TJN’s claims. Additionally, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are state government officials whose actions are not attributable to Craighead County or the City Defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s § 1983 suit.
I. Background3 TJN is a private probation company, and it offers services to probation clients in Craighead County. Services offered to the probation clients include program and counseling coordination, public service work, random drug screening, curfew monitoring, or any other condition of probation ordered by the court. TJN also offers a variety of classes to its probation clients, including life skills, parenting skills, anger management, alcohol safety school, and drug offender school.
1The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
2We refer to the City of Jonesboro and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland, Caraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette collectively as “the City Defendants.”
3“We recite these facts as alleged in [TJN’s] complaint and assume them to be true.” Awnings v. Fullerton, 912 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019).
-2-
Appellate Case: 17-3770 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Entry ID: 4812357

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Since 1997, TJN has provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of Craighead County. Since that time, it has also provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the City Defendants’ courts (“City Courts”). TJN’s Jonesboro branch employed 12 fulltime employees, all residents of Craighead County.
From 1997 until February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been charged in Craighead County District Court (“District Court”) or the City Courts, and who required probation services, were placed under TJN’s supervision. TJN contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement set forth a $35 monthly fee for probation services and included a $15 monthly fee for the supervision of public service work (a typical condition of probation). A court order issued in conjunction with the Probation Fee Agreement directed each probation client to pay all probation supervision fees to TJN for each month of supervised probation.
If the probation client failed to abide by the probation order and failed to complete his or her court-ordered special conditions, TJN would file an affidavit with the court indicating what conditions were not completed. The Craighead County prosecutor and the judge would then countersign the affidavit. The judge of the District Court would order the probationer to pay restitution for all outstanding fees owed to TJN. The same process was followed in the City Courts, including the court order directing the probationer to pay fees to TJN. For cases pending in the District Court, the District Court would collect the fees that the probation clients owed to TJN and forward those funds to TJN. For cases pending in the City Courts, the City Courts would collect the fees that the probation clients owed and forward those funds to TJN. This system operated for nearly 20 years, from 1997 until 2016.
In early 2016, Judges Boling and Fowler were elected Craighead County District Judges. During the election, Judge Boling stated that if he were elected, he
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would end the use of TJN’s probation services in his court. Likewise, Judge Fowler stated during his campaign that he opposed the privatization of probation services.
On August 11, 2016, Judge Boling was reported in a local newspaper as stating “that he dismissed the case of one defendant on probation and ‘purged’ the remaining debt that had not paid.” Compl. at 13, ¶ 81, Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00169-JM (E.D. Ark. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 1. This “purged” debt included court costs and fees that the defendant owed to TJN pursuant to a contract between the defendant and TJN. On August 12, 2016, the local newspaper reported that Judge Boling said he would “consider nonpayment cases on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 14, ¶ 84.
On December 7, 2016, the local newspaper reported that Judges “Fowler and Boling planned to implement an ‘Amnesty Program’ in January and February 2017.” Id. at ¶ 86. “As part of that program, [Judges] Fowler and Boling met with probation offenders who had outstanding fines that were due, to discuss payment options.” Id. at ¶ 87.
On January 26, 2017, the local newspaper reported that Judges Fowler and Boling had implemented a “temporary amnesty program,” which “allow[ed] offenders who were delinquent on their payments to reset their payment plan.” Id. at ¶ 88. The fees owed to TJN were summarily stricken from each new order of probation. Judges Boling and Fowler forgave the fees owed to TJN as part of the “Amnesty Program.” Id. at ¶ 90. Judges Fowler and Boling also instituted a “Jail Credit” program. Id. at ¶ 91. This program forgave the costs owed to the court and fees owed to TJN in lieu of time served in prison. “[M]any of the probation clients given ‘Jail Credit’ were never incarcerated.” Id. at 15, ¶ 93.
As a result of the Amnesty Program, and the consequent loss of revenue, TJN has ceased all operations in Craighead County and has been forced to terminate its 12
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employees. TJN has suffered significant economic loss and will continue to sustain that loss in the future if the Amnesty Program continues.
TJN brought suit against Judges Boling and Fowler; Craighead County; and the City Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. TJN also alleged violations of the Arkansas Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Ark. Const. art. II, § 22. TJN sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants effectuated a custom and policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN, in violation of Article 1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 17 and Article 2, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. It also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from executing a custom and policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. First, the court found that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to absolute judicial immunity against all of TJN’s claims because “[u]nless judges act completely outside all jurisdiction, they are absolutely immune from suit when acting in their judicial capacity.” Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00169-JM, 2017 WL 5762397, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997)). The court also noted, “In Arkansas, ‘[a]ll courts of record, district courts, and city courts . . . shall have the authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically prohibited by law.’” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-115). According to the district court, Arkansas law also provides that “ [d]uring a period of . . . probation, upon the petition of a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court’s own motion, a court may: (1)
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Modify a condition imposed on the defendant.” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-312). The district court concluded that the judicial decisions “modifying, suspending or terminating the terms of probation, previously imposed by the Court, are judicial acts.” Id. (citing John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Pennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2009) (finding the judge defendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and were entitled to absolute immunity, when they signed and enforced a court order disallowing “credit bonding”)).
Second, the district court granted Craighead County and the City Defendants’ motions to dismiss because “[s]tate district court judges are state government officials and are not employees of the cities. Further, even if the judges were employees of the cities, Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s judicial decisions were ‘not a final policy decision of a type creating municipal liability under § 1983.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Finally, the court concluded that TJN’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment, ratification, and supervisory liability also failed because
[n]o supervisor or employee relationship exists between the judges and the City and County defendants. Plaintiff failed to state any facts which would support a finding that the City or County defendants had any authority or control over the judges. And, the probation services at issue were provided to the probation clients. Plaintiff has failed to state facts which demonstrate that the City or County defendants received something of value to which they were not entitled by the forgiveness of a debt owed by the probation clients to the Plaintiff.
Id.
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II. Discussion On appeal, TJN argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims against Judges Boling and Fowler using judicial immunity. TJN argues that the judges’ termination of TJN as probation services provider and forgiveness of fees due it were not judicial acts but instead administrative decisions. TJN also argues that Judges Boling and Fowler were authorized policymakers whose actions are attributable to Craighead County and the City Defendants; therefore, the district court erred in dismissing TJN’s claims against the municipal defendants.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 574 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2009).
A. Judicial Immunity We first consider TJN’s argument that Judges Boling and Fowler are not entitled to judicial immunity.
“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). It “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. “A judge is immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.” Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12 (internal citations omitted).
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1. Judicial Capacity “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In examining these factors, “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. But “[i]f judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.’” Id. at 12–13 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, not the ‘act itself.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). This means that to determine whether an act is judicial, courts “look to the particular act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge.” Id.
Arkansas statutory law creates and circumscribes the judicial sentencing power of district courts and city courts.
A district court or city court may:
(A) Place a defendant on probation or sentence him or her to public service work; and
(B) As a condition of its order, require the defendant to pay a:
(i) Fine in one (1) or several sums; and
(ii) Probation fee or a public service work supervisory fee in an amount to be established by the district court or city court.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-322(a)(1). In addition, “[t]he court may discharge the defendant from probation at any time.” Id. § 16-93-314(a)(1). And, district courts and city courts possess the “authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically prohibited by law.” Id. § 16-90-115(a). Finally, “upon the court’s own motion, a court may . . . [m]odify a condition [of probation] imposed on the defendant.” Id. § 16-93-312(a)(1).
Did Judge Boling’s and Judge Fowler’s dismissal of probationers’ cases, “purging” of fees that probationers owed, and resetting payment plans for delinquent probations via court order sufficiently relate to these general functions? We conclude that they did. The judges’ reviewing of individual probationers’ cases and amending of probation orders are related to the district court’s authorized functions of placing a defendant on probation, requiring a defendant to pay a probation fee, discharging a defendant from probation at the court’s discretion, suspending the imposition of a defendant’s fine, and modifying a defendant’s condition of probation.
TJN attempts to analogize this case to cases in which courts have held that judges who make staffing decisions engage in administrative personnel decisions, not official judicial acts protected by judicial immunity.4 These cases are inapposite.
4See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a judge’s demotion and discharge of a court employee were administrative acts not protected by judicial immunity); McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Hiring and firing of employees is typically an administrative task . . . .The decision to fire the plaintiff did not involve judicial discretion; in other words, the judge did not utilize his education, training, and experience in the law to decide whether or not to retain plaintiff.”); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cty., Mo., 729 F.2d 541, 549 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding county judge’s decision to transfer hearing officer not “official judicial act” but rather “administrative personnel decision”); Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (holding county judge, in hiring or firing county employees, is not exercising a judicial function but, rather, is
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TJN’s complaint states that the judges “dismissed” the probationers’ cases, Compl. at 13, ¶ 81; “‘purged’ the remaining debt that had not been paid,” id., and entered “Order[s]” that permitted probationers to “reset their payment plan” where all fees owed were “forgiven” in lieu of time served. Id. at 14, ¶¶ 89, 88, 90. TJN does not allege that these orders mentioned TJN as an independent contractor or employee of the court or the judges; in fact, it alleges that their fee agreement contract was “stricken” from the judges’ orders and not mentioned at all. Id. at ¶ 89. TJN alleges conduct by the judges that constitute judicial acts, not employment decisions.
Furthermore, there was no employment relationship or contract for services between the judges, Craighead County, or the City Defendants, nor did the judges ever “terminate” TJN’s work in their orders; this is because the contractual relationship at issue is between TJN and the probationers. The complaint provides that “[e]ach probation client enters into a contract with [TJN], agreeing to pay probation fees in exchange for services provided, such as drug screenings and classes.” Id. at 1, ¶ 1.5
While a district court or city court “may contract” with a probation services provider “[u]pon request of the district court judge or city court judge,” Ark. Code
performing administrative and ministerial duties and thus cannot claim judicial immunity with respect to a civil rights action arising out of those activities); Atcherson v. Sienbenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 538 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (supervising and terminating a probation officer was not acting in a judicial capacity and thus was not protected by absolute immunity from a civil rights action brought by the probation officer), vacated on other grounds, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).
5See also id. at 2, ¶ 3 (“Boling and Fowler have unilaterally decreed that [TJN] is not entitled to fees owed under the contracts between each probation client and [TJN].”); id. at 2, ¶ 4 (“As a direct result of Fowler’s and Boling’s interference in the contractual relationship between [TJN] and the probation clients . . . .”); id. at 9, ¶ 46 (“[TJN] contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement contains, inter alia, a $35 monthly fee for probation services.”).
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Ann. § 16-17-127(a), the complaint does not allege that either Judge Boling or Judge Fowler made such a request. In fact, the complaint shows that neither judge wanted to use the services.
Therefore, this case is not analogous to those cases relied upon by TJN in which judges have terminated employees.
2. Jurisdiction In examining whether a judge acted “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed us to construe broadly ‘the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction . . . where the issue is the immunity of a judge.’” Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[A]n action—taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before him—cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
TJN argues that Arkansas law makes the Department of Corrections the entity responsible for the administration of probation services. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-27-124(a) (“The purpose of this act is to establish a Division of Community Correction that shall assume the management of all community correction facilities and services, execute the orders of the criminal courts of the State of Arkansas, and provide for the supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult offenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community.”). While this statute places the Department of Corrections in supervision of offenders, it does not authorize the Department of Corrections to alter the terms of supervision for offenders. Instead, the Arkansas Constitution grants state district courts “original jurisdiction, concurrent with [state] Circuit Courts, of misdemeanors” and any criminal jurisdiction as provided by the Arkansas General Assembly. Ark. Const. amend. 80, §§ 7(B), 10; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101 (same). State district courts also enjoy “original [and exclusive] jurisdiction . . . for the trial of violations
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of ordinances of any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101(a)(4).
A court may sentence a misdemeanor offender to probation. See id. § 5-4-301 (“Crimes for which suspension or probation prohibited—Criteria for suspension or probation in other cases.”). As explained supra, “[a] district court or city court may: (A) Place a defendant on probation . . . ; and (B) As a condition of its order, require the defendant to pay a: (i) Fine . . . ; and (ii) Probation fee or a public service work supervisory fee.” Id. § 5-4-322(a)(1). “A condition of probation shall be closely monitored and supervised by the district court or city court or by a probation officer.” Id. § 5-4-322(a)(3)(A).
Based on these statutory provisions, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler did not act in a clear absence of their jurisdiction because Arkansas law provides that the state district court and city courts have jurisdiction to modify or dismiss probation sentences and conditions of the misdemeanor offenders.
3. Conclusion on Judicial Immunity Because Judges Boling and Fowler acted within their judicial capacity and did not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed the damages claims against them based on judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.
B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Our conclusion that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity does not resolve whether TJN may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition to monetary damages, TJN sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendant judges created a custom and policy with the Amnesty Program; and (2) an injunction prohibiting the defendant judges from implementing their custom and policy using the Amnesty Program. See Compl. at 25, ¶¶ d–e.
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On appeal, TJN argues that it is entitled to injunctive relief because the judges’ conduct was not a judicial act. Appellant’s Br. at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983; LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (injunctive relief not barred when judges act in enforcement capacity)). It also argues that declaratory relief is available in actions brought against judicial officials. Id. at 55–56 (citing Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000); Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Francis v. Pellegrino, 224 F. App’x 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order)).
Judge Boling and Judge Fowler respond that judicial immunity prohibits TJN’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they argue that their absolute judicial immunity bars all relief.
In Pulliam v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer acting in his or her judicial capacity is not immune from actions under § 1983 seeking prospective injunctive relief. 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). Congress responded to Pulliam in 1996 by amending § 1983 to abrogate its holding.6 Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, “judicial immunity typically bars claims for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officials acting in their judicial capacity. Only when a declaratory decree is violated or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around
6The Senate report indicates that the amendment “restores the doctrine of judicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to . . . Pulliam” because Pulliam had departed from “400 years of common-law tradition and weakened judicial immunity protections.” S. Rep. 104–366, at *36–37, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4216.
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judicial immunity.” Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02819-RDP, 2014 WL 5090723, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2014).
In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that a declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief. See Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F. App’x 763, 766 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial immunity now extends to suits against judges where a plaintiff seeks not only monetary relief, but injunctive relief as well.”). The question then becomes whether TJN is entitled to declaratory relief post-Pulliam and Congress’s amendment to § 1983.
Currently, most courts hold that the amendment to § 1983 does not bar declaratory relief against judges. See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar declaratory relief . . . .”); Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580, 2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity protects the Defendants only from Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. But § 1983 does not explicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief.”); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he amendment to § 1983 limits the type of relief available to plaintiffs who sue judges to declaratory relief.”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 1996 amendment to § 1983 would limit the relief available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.”).
The Tenth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he only type of relief available to a plaintiff who sues a judge is declaratory relief, but not every plaintiff is entitled to this remedy.” Lawrence, 271 F. App’x at 766 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). “A declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act.” Id. (emphasis added). A complaint “seeking . . . a declaration of past
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liability” against a judge instead of “future rights” does not satisfy the definition of “declaratory judgment” and renders declaratory relief unavailable. Id. “Furthermore,” retrospective declaratory relief cannot “be granted as ‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.’” Id. at 766 n.7 (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Thus, declaratory relief is limited to prospective declaratory relief. See, e.g., Davis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-cv-0693 LEK/ATB, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity also does not shield judges from claims for prospective declaratory relief.[] In this case, plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is purely retrospective. She seeks a declaratory judgment that past actions that occurred in the context of the Family Court proceedings violated her constitutional rights.” (internal citation omitted)).
Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that TJN’s request for declaratory relief is retrospective; as a result, TJN is not entitled to such relief under § 1983. “Although [TJN] . . . refers to the judges’ actions as ‘policies,’ essentially, . . . [it] is asking the court to invalidate the actions of [Judges Boling and Fowler].” Id. (emphasis added); see also Compl. at 16, ¶ 101.
C. Municipal Defendants TJN next argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims against Craighead County and the City Defendants because “Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s actions were done pursuant to an official municipal policy and their conduct caused a constitutional tort.” Appellant’s Br. at 49.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on
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a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.
TJN argues that Judges Fowler and Boling were authorized policymakers of Craighead County and the City Defendants and that the judges’ actions should be imputed to Craighead County and the City Defendants. But whether the judges’ actions should be imputed to the municipal defendants depends on whether the judges are their employees.
We recently addressed whether the Phillips County District Court Clerk “is a state government official whose actions are not attributable to the City.” Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, Ark., 912 F.3d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 2019). In Evans, the district court had dismissed a § 1983 complaint based on the clerk’s and Phillips County District Court’s status as “state-government officials who are [not] employed by [the City].” Id. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, “conclud[ing] that the complaint state[d] at least a plausible claim that the clerk was a city official at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, in which case the City could be accountable for actions of the clerk that establish or carry out an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality.” Id. at 1147. This was because when the Arkansas General Assembly established a pilot program creating a limited number of state-funded state district court judgeships, Phillips County was not included in that program. Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-1101(8) (2008)). As a result, “[j]udges outside the pilot program, like those in Phillips County, continued to be employees of the cities or counties, or both, that they served.” Id. It was not until after the events alleged in the complaint that Phillips County was “reorganized as [a] state district court[] and
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served by a state district court judge.” Id. (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-171112(a)(1) (2015)).
Following the reasoning of Evans, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are employees of the State of Arkansas, not Craighead County or the City Defendants. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-17-1111(a)(2) (2011) makes clear that the district judgeships in Craighead County became “state district court judgeships” as of January 1, 2013, before the events in this case. It also makes clear that these judges are “state” judges despite the cost-sharing requirements of § 16-17-1106(b)(1)(A). Id.
Because Judges Boling and Fowler are not employees of Craighead County or the City Defendants, their actions cannot be imputed to them. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the claims against them.
III. Conclusion Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit
Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse 111 South 10th Street, Room 24.329
St. Louis, Missouri 63102

VOICE (314) 244-2400 FAX (314) 244-2780
www.ca8.uscourts.gov

July 26, 2019

Mr. Josef Horowitz BALLIN & BALLIN Suite 1250 200 Jefferson Avenue Memphis, TN 38103
RE: 17-3770 Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County, et al
Dear Counsel:
The court has issued an opinion in this case. Judgment has been entered in accordance with the opinion. The opinion will be released to the public at 10:00 a.m. today. Please hold the opinion in confidence until that time.
Please review Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Eighth Circuit Rules on postsubmission procedure to ensure that any contemplated filing is timely and in compliance with the rules. Note particularly that petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be received in the clerk's office within 14 days of the date of the entry of judgment. Counsel-filed petitions must be filed electronically in CM/ECF. Paper copies are not required. No grace period for mailing is allowed, and the date of the postmark is irrelevant for pro-se-filed petitions. Any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc which is not received within the 14 day period for filing permitted by FRAP 40 may be denied as untimely.
Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court
CMD
Enclosure(s)
cc: Ms. Ashley N. Brown Mr. Joseph D. Dell'Armi Mr. John T. Edwards Mr. Randall J. Fishman Mr. Jon M. Greenbaum Mr. Patrick E. Hollingsworth Mr. Robert Thomas James Mr. Jim McCormack Mr. Kevin McCormack Ms. Jennifer L. Merritt
Appellate Case: 17-3770 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Entry ID: 4812357

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 62 Filed 07/26/19 Page 19 of 23 Mr. Ralph Charles Ohm Mr. Jason E Owens Mr. Richard S. Townley Mr. John Lennon Wilkerson
District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 3:17-cv-00169-JM
Appellate Case: 17-3770 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Entry ID: 4812357

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Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit
Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse 111 South 10th Street, Room 24.329
St. Louis, Missouri 63102

VOICE (314) 244-2400 FAX (314) 244-2780
www.ca8.uscourts.gov

July 26, 2019

West Publishing Opinions Clerk 610 Opperman Drive Building D D4-40 Eagan, MN 55123-0000

RE: 17-3770 Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County, et al

Dear Sirs:

A published opinion was filed today in the above case.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Josef Horowitz, of Memphis, TN. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellant brief; Randall J. Fishman, of Memphis, TN, John T. Edwards, of Memphis, TN.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees Boling and Fowler was Robert Thomas James, AAG, of Little Rock, AR. Ashley N. Louks, Arkansas AAG, also appeared on the brief of Boling and Fowler.

John Lennon Wilkerson, of North Little Rock, AR, presented argument on behalf of all other appellees.

The following attorney(s) appeared on the amicus brief filed by Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Jon M. Greenbaum, of Washington, DC, Joseph D. Dell'Armi, of New York, NY.

The judge who heard the case in the district court was Honorable James M. Moody, Jr. The judgment of the district court was entered on November 28, 2017.

If you have any questions concerning this case, please call this office.

Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court

CMD Enclosure(s) cc: MO Lawyers Weekly
District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 3:17-cv-00169-JM

Appellate Case: 17-3770 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Entry ID: 4812357

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 62 Filed 07/26/19 Page 21 of 23

17-3770 Justice Network Inc v . Craighead County, et al "Signed Opinion Filed "

(3:17-cv-00169-JM)

ca08ml_cmecf_Notify to:

07/26/2019 08:27 AM

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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Notice of Docket Activity

The following transaction was filed on 07/26/2019

Case Name:

Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County, et al

Case Number: 17-3770

Document(s): Document(s)

Docket Text: OPINION FILED - THE COURT: Lavenski R. Smith, Jane Kelly and Jonathan A. Kobes AUTHORING JUDGE:Lavenski R. Smith (PUBLISHED) [4812357] [17-3770] (Catherine Dolan)
Notice will be electronically mailed to:
Ms. Ashley N. Brown: ashley.brown@arkansasag.gov, ashleylouks01@gmail.com, crystal.carey@arkansasag.gov, agcivil@arkansasag.gov Mr. Joseph D. Dell'Armi: jdellarmi@venable.com, joe@dellarmi.com Mr. John T. Edwards: tedwards@bbfpc.com, diane@bbfpc.com Mr. Randall J. Fishman, Attorney: rfishman@bbfpc.com Mr. Jon M. Greenbaum: jgreenbaum@lawyerscommittee.org Mr. Patrick E. Hollingsworth, Assistant Attorney General: phollingsworth@uasys.edu Mr. Josef Horowitz: jhorowitz@bbfpc.com Mr. Robert Thomas James: robert.james@arkansasag.gov, toni.hamp@arkansasag.gov Mr. Jim McCormack, Clerk of Court: ared_appeals@ared.uscourts.gov Mr. Kevin McCormack: kmccormack@bbfpc.com Ms. Jennifer L. Merritt: Jennifer.Merritt@ArkansasAG.gov, toni.hamp@arkansasag.gov, agcivil@arkansasag.gov Mr. Ralph Charles Ohm: aperma@hotspringslaw.net, ralphohm@aol.com Mr. Jason E Owens: owens@jowenslawfirm.com, miranda@jowenslawfirm.com, lewis@jowenslawfirm.com

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 62 Filed 07/26/19 Page 22 of 23
Mr. Richard S. Townley: ecfcivil@bbfpc.com Mr. John Lennon Wilkerson: jwilkerson@arml.org, mcaffee@arml.org MO Lawyers Weekly: michaelh@mesjassociates.com, clash@molawyersmedia.com West Publishing: us08@westdcs.west.thomson.com
The following document(s) are associated with this transaction: Document Description: Published Opinion filed Original Filename: 173770P.pdf Electronic Document Stamp: [STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1105112566 [Date=07/26/2019] [FileNumber=4812357-0] [2df6c18e2edeec7183724338bdc6f2a78658b4600d1197af89d540b0e1f63ff1d291919311b245e8 5a8a6d3cbbabb7c7d6352ceb502b51c54ee7d508afa19998]]
Document Description: Counsel Opinion Letter Original Filename: /opt/ACECF/live/forms/CathyDolan_173770_4812357_CounselOpinionLetters_285.pdf Electronic Document Stamp: [STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1105112566 [Date=07/26/2019] [FileNumber=4812357-1] [bb8c1ca654d86cb7feef6435031f46a71d4f161d5e039b432131f2b5e435d0756f7766da6b1ea773 0395e6da99ac67d14469dd49c1c97ca6f4f1562e28c000d4]] Recipients:
 Ms. Ashley N. Brown  Mr. Joseph D. Dell'Armi  Mr. John T. Edwards  Mr. Randall J. Fishman, Attorney  Mr. Jon M. Greenbaum  Mr. Patrick E. Hollingsworth, Assistant Attorney General  Mr. Josef Horowitz  Mr. Robert Thomas James  Mr. Jim McCormack, Clerk of Court  Mr. Kevin McCormack  Ms. Jennifer L. Merritt  Mr. Ralph Charles Ohm  Mr. Jason E Owens  Mr. Richard S. Townley  Mr. John Lennon Wilkerson Document Description: Letter To Publishing Original Filename: /opt/ACECF/live/forms/CathyDolan_173770_4812357_LettersToPublishing_284.pdf Electronic Document Stamp: [STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1105112566 [Date=07/26/2019] [FileNumber=4812357-2] [0ef0fd125a4d28231e0b2c4b5651d0baa77eca18539574d44b9327a852844b2580f4fd77b1b871b c4b255ec469f4b09f01e54710794ad9826298b52cbd52a8f8]] Recipients:  MO Lawyers Weekly

Case 3:17-cv-00169-JM Document 62 Filed 07/26/19 Page 23 of 23
 West Publishing The following information is for the use of court personnel:
DOCKET ENTRY ID: 4812357 RELIEF(S) DOCKETED:
for publication DOCKET PART(S) ADDED: 6336929, 6336930, 6336931