Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

WALLACE BOLDEN, GREGORY CHISM, DONALD DUNCAN, LINDELL EPPS, JAMES GAGE, MARVIN GREEN, TERRANCE JACKSON, JOE JONES, EDDIE LUCAS, GUY SUTTON, .JACKIE WHITE, ZELMA WHITE, and a class of similarly situated others,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WALSH GROUP d1h/a WALSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Defendant.

06cv4104 JUDGE LEFKOW MAG JUDGE VALDEZ

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs WALLACE BOLDEN, GREGORY CHISM, DONALD DUNCAN, LINDELL EPPS, JAMES GAGE, MARVIN GREEN, TERRANCE JACKSON, JOE JONES, EDDIE LUCAS, GUY SUTTON, JACKIE WHITE, and ZELMA WHITE, individually and on behalfofall others similarly situated, by and through their undersigned Counsel of Record, for their complaint against THE WALSH GROUP d/b/a WALSH CONSTRUCTION CO., allege and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. This case follows the failure of EEOC conciliation efforts between Walsh Construction and the 12 plaintiff~ after elass filings resulted in dctcnninations of a pattern and practice of pervasive race discrimination in violation ofTille VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000 el seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII") and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 198 I, as amended ("Section 198 I), and 42 U.S.c. §1981 (a).
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2. For years, Defendant Walsh has engaged in a pattern and practice of race discrimination against Blacks that has dramatically reduced its Black labor force by systematically laying off Black laborers and labor foremen and replacing them with non-Blacks.
3. Furthermore, on information and belief: Blacks who appcared at the gates ofvarious Walsh construction sites were told that there was no work available, while non-Blacks were told that thcrc was work available and were hired or rehired. On information and belief, various Walsh Construction Project supervisors and other high ranking Walsh Construction employees collaborated to place non-Blacks in new jobs at other Walsh Construction sites when work was complctc at one site, while Blacks were simply laid off without being placed at other sites.
4. Blacks were also given less dcsirablc work assignments and more dangerous work assignments than those given to non-Blacks, werc dcnicd resources providcd to non-Blacks (including two way radios needed to safely operatc cranes as well as other tools), and were subjected to racist comments which creatcd a hostile work environment, including being referred to as "monkeys" and "niggers", hearing references 10 Ihe KKK, and hcaringMexican workers commonly referred to as "new niggers."
5. This Class Action Complaint is brought by twelve (12) Blacks in their individual and reprcscntativc capacities on bchalfof a class ofsimilarly situated Blacks that wcrc systemically laid off, refused hire or recall, discharged/constructivcly discharged, subjected to a racially hostile environment, and discriminated against by Defendant Walsh based on their race in thc tcnns, conditions and privileges of their employment.
6. Each Plaintiff properly filed a Charge ofDiscrimination with thc Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging violations of Title VII. The EEOC found that each
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Plaintiffand the class of Blacks that they represent had reasonable causc to believe that his "charge of employment discrimination is true." Right·To-Sue letters have been issued by the EEOC to the Plaintiffs.
7. Each Plaintiff, and the putativc Class, has suffered sevcrc and egregious injuries and damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct as alleged herein.
PARTIES
a. Plaintiffs.
8. Plaintiff, Wallacc Boldcn, (hereinafter "Bolden") is a Black individual who resides within thc tcrritorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Bolden was a laborer and/or labor supervisor in the cement division of Walsh Construction.
9. Plaintiff, Gregory Chism, (hereinafter "Chism") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of l11inois, Eastcrn Division. Chism was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
10. Plaintifl Donald Duncan, (hereinatler "Duncan") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of thc United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Dunean was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
11. Plaintiff, Lindell Epps, (hereinafter "Epps") is a Black individual who residcs within the territorial jurisdiction of the United Statcs Distriet Court for the Northcrn District of l11inois, Eastcrn Division. Epps was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
12. Plaintiff, James Gage, (hereinafter "Gage") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States Distriet Court for the Northern Distriet of minois,
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Eastern Division. Gage was a laborer with Walsh Construction. 13. Plaintiff, Marvin Green, (hereinafter "Green") is a Black individual who resides
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Green was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
14. Plaintitr; Terrance Jackson, (hereinafter "Jackson") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Jackson was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
15. Plaintifl~ Joe Jones, (hereinafter "Jones") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction ofthe United States District Court tor the Northern District ofIllinois, Eastern Division. Jones was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
16. Plaintifl~ Edward Lucas, (hereinafter "Lucas") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of I1linois, Eastern Division. Eddie was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
17. Plaintitl: Guy Sutton, (hereinafter "Sutton") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Sutton was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
18. Plaintiff, Jackie White, (hereinafter "J. White") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District or Illinois, Eastern Division. J. White was a labor foreman with Walsh Construction.
19. Plaintiff, Zelma White, (hereinafter "Z. White") is a Black individual who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court tor the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Z. White was a laborer with Walsh Construction.
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20. Bolden, Chism, Duncan, Epps, Gage, Green, Jackson, Jones, Lucas, Sutton, J. Whitc, and Z. White are collectively referred to herein as "Named Plaintiffs".
b. Defcndant. 21. Defendant, Walsh Group d/b/a Wash Construction Co. (hereinafter "Walsh"), is on
information and belief, a corporation licensed and doing business within the State of Illinois and within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. On further information and belief; Defendant Walsh is in the business of constructing buildings in the Chicago area and 13 other metropolitan areas across the United States. Walsh is an appropriate defendant under Title VII and Section 1981.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT UNDER TITLE VII AND 42 U.S.c. § 1981
22. Each named Plaintiff timely med a Charge of Discrimination with the Chicago District Office ofthe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Named Plaintitfs in this action filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC on the following dates and with the tollowing charge numbers:
(a.) Marvin Green, Charge No. 21 OA200902, filed February 21,2002; (h.) Terrance Jackson, Charge No. 21 OA200926, filed February 21,2002; (c.) Joe Jones, Charge No. 21OA203344, filed June 3, 2002; (d.) Eddie Lucas, Charge No. 21 OA202158, filed March 13,2002; (e.) Guy V. Sutton, Charge No. 210A203406, tiled June 5, 2002; (f.) Donald Duncan, Charge No. 210A203342, tiled June 3, 2002; (g.) Lindell Epps, Charge No. 21OA202351, filed March 28, 2002;
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(h.) James Gage, Charge No. 210A202265, filed March 21,2002; (i). Jackie White, Charge No. 21OA201875, filed February 2,2002; (j.) Zelma White, Charge No.210 A 201873, filed February 21,2002; (k.) Wallace Bolden, Charge No.210A203422, filed June 6,2002 ;and (I.) Gregory Chism, Charge No.21 OA30163 I, filed January 27,2003. Attached hereto as Exhihit "A, " and in,,()rporated herein/br reference, is a true and corn'd C()py ()f each Named Plaintiff's respective EEOC Charge of Discrimination. 23. The EEOC issued a "Determination" that found in favor of each Plaintiff and determined that the evidence obtained in the investigation establishes reasonable cause to believe that Defendant discriminated against the Plaintiffs, as well as a Class of similarly situated Blacks. Attached hereto as Exhihit "B "and incorporated hereinfiJr reference, is a true and correct copy of Each Plaintiff's EEOC Determination. 24. Each Named Plaintiff has properly exhausted all administrative requirements and initiated litigation within ninety (90) days ofreceiving hislher notice ofright-to-sue letter regarding same.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 25. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343(3) and (4), 1658 and 2201 and 2202. This is a suit authorized and instituted pursuantto the Act of Congress known as "The Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.c. § 2000 et seq., as amended by the "Civil Rights Act ofl991" and the "Civil Rights Act of 1866," 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981(a). 26. Venue is proper in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (B) & (C) because Defendant Walsh has offices, maintains personnel records, and engages in or ratifies
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unlawful conduct in the Northern District of Illinois adversely affecting the Named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 27. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the attached Charges of Discrimination that were filed by each named Plaintiff. See Exhibit "A. " 28. All allegations contained herein are plead in the alternative to the extent necessitated for proper construction under the law. 29. All allegations contained herein are plead based on personal knowledge as to those allegations that one or more Plaintiffs have personal knowledge of and upon information and belief as to all other allegations. 30. The Named Plaintiffs were all laborers or labor foremen working for Walsh on various construction projects. 31. Defendant Walsh knowingly adopts, ratifies, maintains and utili;-:es selection criteria, policies, procedures, and practices for hiring, lay offs, discharge and/or constructive discharge, recall, compensation, and job assignments that it knew or should have known had a disparate impact against Black employees and/or disparately treated Black employees less flworahly than its nonBlack employees. 32. Defendant Walsh intended to discriminate against the named Plaintiffs and other Blacks on the basis of their race in the terms, conditions and privileges of their employment. Moreover, the racially hostile environment created by the defendant was so severe and/or pervasive that it interfered with Plaintiffs', and other Black employees', ability to perform their job duties and responsibilities.
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33. Each Named Plaintiffwa~ qualified for the construction po~itions which they held and/or for which they applied. However, they were laid off, di~charged and/or con~tructivcly discharged, and failed to be hired, or failed to be recalled because of their race, Black.
34. Defendant Walsh was fully aware, or should have known, ofthe nature and ~copc of the race discrimination and harassment occurring on their construction sites; however, Defendant Walsh took no action to stop the discrimination/harassment.
35. The Named Plaintiffs, and other Black employees, have complained about racial hara~smcnt and race di~crimination regarding hiring, discharge and/or constructive discharge, lay offs, recaIl, compensation, their work environment, their terms and conditions ofemployment, and general discriminatory treatment of Black employees.
36. Despite the complaints and knowledge ofthe defendant regarding the differential and di~criminatory treatment of the Named Plaintiffs and Black~ a~ a class, Defendant Wal~h ha~ taken no action to, address, correct, prevent, or otherwise stop the discrimination, harassment, and/or di~paratc impact of it~ policies and procedurc~.
37. The systemic, pattern and practice ofrace discrimination again~t Blacks, includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(a.) failure to hire or recall Black employees; (b.) discharge and/or constructive discharge and/or lay otT of Black employees; (c.) assignments to Black employees of dirtier and more dift1cultjobs; (d.) a racially hostile work environment; (e.) failure to allow Black employees the opport.unity to work overtime, while allowing similarly situated non-Black crnployccs the opportunity to work overtime;
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(f.) reducing and/or eliminating hours of work for Black employees, while at the same time, increasing the total hours of work available to non-Black employees;
(g.) otherwise treating Black employees less favorably in the tenns, conditions, responsibilities, and privileges of employment as compared to non-Black employees. 38. Each Named Plaintift: and the putative elass members, have been adversely affected by the systemic racial discrimination challenged in this case with regards to selection decisions for hiring, recalls, layoffs, job assignments, discharge and/or constructive discharge, compensation, work environment, and other tenns and conditions of employment. This racial discrimination adversely atfected Plaintiffs, and the Class they seek to represent, by denying them the opportunity to work in a race neutral, integrated work environment. 39. There is no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason tor the unlawful race discrimination in hiring, recalls, lay offs,job assignments, discharge and/or constructive discharge, compensation, work environment, and tenns, conditions and privileges of their employment. 40. Defendant Walsh's unlawful actions as alleged herein have caused severe and egregIOus injury and damage to the Named Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent.
CLASS ALLEGAnONS A. CLASS DEFINITION 41. The Named Plaintitl"s bring this suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Black employees and tbnner employees of the Defendant. The Named Plaintiffs arc members of the class they seek to represent. That Class consists ofcurrent, tonner, and future Black employees of Defendant who, from at least January 2001 to the present, have been subjected to one or more aspects of the racial discrimination and harassment described in Ihis Complaint.
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8. CLASS PERIOD 42. The Class Period is from at least January 2001 through the present. C. NUMEROSITY AND IMPRACTICABILITY OF JOINDER 43. The class that the Named Plaintiffs seek to represent is too numerous to make joinder practicable. The proposed class consists ofhundreds offormer, current, and future Black employees who either have been, or will be, employed by Defendant. D. COMMON OUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT 44. The prosecution of the claims of the Nmned Plaintitls involve adjudication of common questions of tact and law to the putative class, including but not limited to: (a) Whether the Defendant has engaged in systemic racial discrimination, including a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination and practices having unlawful disparate impact and/or systemic disparate treatment in its selection procedures with regards to hiring, recalls, layoft:~, discharge and/or constructive discharge, job assigrunents, compensation, work environment, and other terms and conditions of employment in a manner made unlawful by the statutes under which this action is brought. (b) Whether the Defendant required Blacks to work in more dangerous and/or less desirable positions than non-Black employees; (c) Whether the Defendant terminated Blacks because of their race and/or failed to hire and/or recall Blacks because of their race; (d) Whether the Defendant required Blacks to work in a hostile work environment; and (e) Whether the Defendant treated the Named Plaintiffs, and other Blacks, less tavorably than non-Blacks in the terms, conditions, responsibilities, benetlts and privileges of employment with
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Defendant Walsh. 45. The Defendant's procedures challenged herein, as well as the other systemic
policies and practices that make up these procedures, are determined at the corporate level of the Defendant's operations and do not vary significantly from one construction site or geographical location to another. The employment policies, practices and procedures challenged in this Complaint are not unique or limited to one construction site or geographical area, hut rather affect the Named Plaintiffs and the members of tbe proposed class in the same way throughout the Defendant's operations.
C. TYPICALITY OF CLAIMS AND RELIEF SOUGHT 46. The systemic racial discrimination challenged in this Complaint has affected, and continues to affect, both the named Plaintitls and the class they seek to represent in the same way as they have been laid ofI; discharged and/or constructively discharged, denied recall and/or hire, subjected to a racially hostile work environment, and have been denied and other benefits terms, conditions, responsibilities and privileges ofemployment which has affected, and continue to affect, their employment and compensation. Moreover, the Defendants' discriminatory selection policies, practices and procedures have deprived, and continues to deprive, Black employees of the opportunity to work with people of their own race. 47. The Defendant has failed to create adequate incentives for its managerial/supervisory workforce to comply with equal employment opportunity laws regarding each of the policies, practices and procedures described in this Complaint and has failed to discipline adequately its managers and other supervisory employees for violation of these laws. 48. The claims of the Named Plaintitls and the relief necessary to remedy the clailns of
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the Named Plaintiffs are the same as the claims of the putative class members and the rclief necessary to remedy these claims. The Named PlaintitIs seek the following rclieffortheir individual claims and the claims of the putative class: (I) a declaratory judgment that the Defendant has engaged in systemic racial discrimination as described above; (2) a permanent injunction against such continuing systemic discrimination; (3) damages, backpay and other equitable remedies necessary to make the Named Plaintiffs and putative class members whole from Defendant's past discrimination, including, but not limited to, reinstatement and/or frontpay.
E. ADEOUACY OF REPRESENTATION 49. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as retlected in the preceding paragraphs. There are no contlicts of interest between the Named Plaintiff~ and the members of the proposed class as each would benefit similarly from the imposition of the proposed remedies for the discriminatory employment policies, practices, and procedures challenged in this Complaint. The Named Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in litigating major class actions in the field ofemployment discrimination, and who are prepared and able to meet the time and fiscal demands of class action litigation of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience, and resources of the Named Plaintiffs and their counscl to litigate competently the individual and class claims ofrace-based employment discrimination at issue satisfY the adequacy of representation requirement under Fcd.R.eiv.p. 23(a)(4). F. EFFICIENCY OF CLASS PROSECUTION OF COMMON CLAIMS 50. Certification of a class of similarly-situated Blacks is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions oflaw and fact that are common to the individual claims ofthe Named Plaintiffs and the proposed class. The individual claims ofthe Named Plaintiffu
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and thosc ofthe putative class require resolution ofthe common question ofwhethcr the Dcfcndant has engaged in a systemic pattern and practice of racial discrimination antI/or practices which have had disparatc impact and/or disparate treatment against Blacks. The Named Plaintiffs scck for themselvcs and the putative class remedies to eliminate the adverse effects ofsuch discrimination in their own and the putativc elass members' lives, careers and working conditions and to prcvcnt continued racial discrimination in the future. The Named Plaintifls have standing to seek such relief Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject to re-litigation in a multitude ofindividuallawsuits with an attendant risk ofinconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification ofthe class of Blacks advcrsely affcctcd by the common questions oflaw and fact set forth in this Complaint is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the cvidcnce and arguments necessary to rcsolve such questions for the Namcd Plaintiffs, the putativc class and the Defendant. The Named Plaintitlis' individual and elass claims are premised upon the traditional bifurcated method ofproof and trial for disparate impact and systemic disparatc treatment claims ofthe type at issuc in this Complaint. Such a bifurcated method of proof and trial is the most efficient method ofresolving such common issues.
G. CERTIFICATION IS SOUGHT PURSUANT TO FED. R. elv. P. 23(h)(2) 51. The Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Named Plaintiffs and the proposed elass by adopting and following systemic practiccs and procedures that are racially discriminatory. Racial discrimination is the Defendant's standard operating procedurc rather than a sporadic occurrence. The Defendant has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the elass by: (I) adopting and following selection procedures for hiring, recalls, layoffs, discharge, constructive discharge, job assignments and compensation that systemically discriminate against
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Black individuals; and (2) refusing to provide a non-discriminatory work environment and other equal terms and conditions of work to Black employees. The Defendant's systemic discrimination and refusal to act on grounds that are not racially discriminatory have made appropriate final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
52. Injunctive and declaratory reliefis the predominate reliefsought in this case hecause it is hoth the accumulation ofthe proofof the Defendant's indi vidual and class-wide liability at the end ofStage I of a hifurcated trial and the essential predicate tor the Named Plaintif[~' and class members' entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies at Stage II of such a trial. Declaratory and injunctive relief flows directly and automatically from proofofthe common questions oflaw and fact regarding the existence ofsystemic racial discrimination against Black employees. Such reliefis the factual and legal predicate for the Named Plaintiffs' and the class members' entitlement to monetary and non-monetary remedies tor individual losses caused by such systemic discrimination.
H. CERTIFICATION IS SOUGHT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.23(b)(3) 53. The common issues offact and law affecting the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and proposed class members, including but not limited to, the common issues identified above, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. 54. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication ofthe claims of the Named Plaintiffs and members ofthe proposed class. 55. The cost ofproving the Delendant's systemic disl-Timination makes it impracticable tor the Named Plaintiffs and memhers ofthe proposed class to prosecute their claims individually. 56. The Named Plaintiffs arc unaware of any pending race discrimination class lawsuit brought against the Defendant, and the Northern District ofTl1inois is the most logical forum in which
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to litigate the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and the proposed class. COUNT I
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,42 U.S.c. § 2000e, et seq. (All Plaintiffs v. Defendant)
57. Plaintiff~ restate and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
58. All Plaintiffs bring Count One claims against the Defendant. 59. All conditions precedent to tiling of a Title VII claim have been satistied. 60. Defendant has discriminated against the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent with regards to a hostile work environment, hiring, discharge, constructive discharge, lay off~, recalls, job assignments, compensation, and other terms and conditions ofcmployment because oftheir race in violation ofTitlc VB of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et Sl'q., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 61. The Named Plaintiffs and the putative class they seek to represent have been subjected to systemic racial discrimination, including but not limited to, a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination and practices having unlawful disparate impact on their employment opportunities. 62. The Dcfendant's policies, practices and procedures have a disparate impact against the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent. Such policies, practices and procedures are not valid, job relatcd or justified by business necessity. There are objective and structured selection procedures available to the Defendant which would havc less disparate impact on Blacks and equal or greater validity and job relatcdncss, but the Defendant has refused to consider or to use such policies, practices, or procedures.
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63. The Plaintiff.~ and the class they seck to represent have been directly atlh;ted by the discriminatory policies, practices and procedures set forth above by, among other things, being deprived of the opportunity to work in an environment free of racial discrimination. Such discrimination also denies the Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent the opportunity of working in a fully, racially integrated work environment and otherwise adversely affects their opportunity for enjoyment ofwork as compared with non-Black employees who do not have to work in situations in which members of their race are victims of racial discrimination.
64. The Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent are attempting to redress the wrongs alleged in this suit through equitable relief, including backpay and other equitable remedies. An equitable judgment is the only means ofsecuring adequate relieffor the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent. The Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent arc now suffering and will continue to sutler irreparable injury from the Defendant's unlawful policies, practices and procedures as set forth herein unless enjoined by this Court.
65. By reason of Defendant's discriminatory employment practices, the Named Plaintiff~ and the class they seek to represent have experienced extreme harm, including loss of compensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits, and as such, are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
66. Defendants engaged in the conduct complained of herein with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.
COUNT II DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE IN VIOLATION OF TilE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 16

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(All Plaintiffs v. Defendant) 67. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiffs bring Count Two claims against the Defendant. 69. Defendant has discriminated against the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seck to represent with regards to a hostile work environment, hiring, discharge, constructive discharge, lay otIs, recalls, compensation, job assignments, and other tenms and conditions ofemployment because of their race in violation of the Civil Rights Aet of 1866, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 and 1981 (a). 70. Defendant's conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard ofthe rights of the Named Plaintitl's and members of the proposed class. 71. By reason of Defendant's pattern and practice of employment discrimination, the Named PlaintitIs and the proposed class members have experienced extreme harm, including loss of compensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits, and as such, are entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended.
COUNT III UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TITLE VII OF THE CIVil. RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (PlaintiffZelma White, on behalfofherself, v. Defendant) 72. PlaintitIrestatcs and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein 73. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Zelma White in her individual capacity against the Deti:mdant.
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74. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against PlaintiffZelma White tor reporting/complaining about sexual harassment, racial harassment, andlor a racially hostile work environment, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 and 1981 (a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
75. There was no legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the retaliation, harassment andlor termination of PlaintiffZelma White from her employment at Defendant.
76. PlaintitT Zelma White, by reporting and complaining about the unlawti.J1 discrimination, was exercising her right to complain about unlawful race and sex discrimination under Title VI!.
77. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard of the rights ofthe Plaintiff Zelma White.
78. Plaintiff Zelma White has experienced extreme harm, including loss of compensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & § 198I(A).
COUNT IV UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OFT"" CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Plaintiff Jackie White, on behalfofhim.~elf, v. Defendant) 79. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set torth herein
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80. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Jackie White in his individual capacity against Defendant.
81. The Detendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintitnackie White for reporting/complaining about mce discrimination/ hostile environment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981 (a) and Title Vll orthc Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
82. There was no legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the discrimination, retaliation, harassment and/or termination ofPlaintitfJackie White from his employment at Defendant.
83. Plaintiff Jackie White, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination, was exercising his right to complain about unlawful race discrimination under Title Vll.
84. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard of the rights of the PlaintiffJackie White.
85. PlaintiffJackie White has experienced extreme harm, including loss ofcompensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & § 1981(A).
COUNT V UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 and TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (PlaintiffDonald Duncan, on behalfofhim8elf, v. Defendant)
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86. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reterence all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein
87. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Donald Duncan in his individual capacity against Defendant.
88. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff Duncan for reporting/complaining about race discrimination! hostile environment in violation ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981 (a) and Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq.
89. There was no legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the discrimination, retaliation, harassment and!or termination of Plaintitf Duncan from his employment at Defendant.
90. PlaintiffDuncan, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination, was exercising his right to complain about unlawful race discrimination under Title VII.
91. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, will ful and conducted with disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff Duncan.
92. Plaintiff Duncan has experienced extreme harm, including loss of compensation,
wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & § 1981(A).
COUNT VI UNLAWFUL RETAUATION AND TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OFTHE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 01<' 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TITLE VB OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ef seq.
20

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 21 of 27 ,,
(plaintiff Terrance Jacbon, on behalfofhim,~e(f, v. Defendant) 93, Plaintiffrestates and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein 94. This Count is brought by PlaintiffTerrance Jackson in his individual capacity against Defendant. 95. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff Jackson for reporting/complaining about racc discrimination/ hostile environment in violation ofthe Civil Rights Act ofl866, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 and 1981 (a) and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 96. There was no legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the discrimination, rctaliation, harassment and/or tennination of Plaintiff Jackson from his employment at Defendant. 97. PlaintiffJackson, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination, was exercising his right to complain about unlawful race discrimination under Title VII. 98. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conductcd with disrcgard of the rights of the Plaintiff Jackson. 99. Plaintiff Jackson has experienced extreme hann, including loss of compensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other enlployment benefits as a direct and proximatc cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amendcd, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and thc Civil Rights Aet of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 & § 1981(A).
COUNT VII UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND TERMINAnON IN VIOLAnON OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866,42 U.S.c. § 1981 and TITLE vn OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
21

t, f l . )

,I

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 22 of 27

OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (PlaintiffJ(IC Jones, on behalfofhimself, v. Defendant)
100. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by rdefence all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set ttlrth herein
IO\. This Count is brought by Plaintitf Joe Jones in his individual capacity against Defendant.
102. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plainti ff Jones tor reporting/complaining about race diserimination/ hostile environment in violation ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981(a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
103. There was no legitimate non"dis\'Timinatory basis tor the discrimination, retaliation, harassment and/or tennination of Plaintitf Jones from his employment at Defendant.
104. Plaintiff Jones, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination, was exercising his right to complain about unlawful race discrimination under Title VII.
105. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard of the rights of the Plaintitl'Jones.
106. PlaintiffJones has experienced extreme harm, including loss ofcompensation, wages,
back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & § 1981(A).
COUNT VIII
22

•••

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 23 of 27

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TITLE VlI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Plaintiff Gregory Chi.~m, on behalfof himself, v. Defendant)
107. Plainti t1' restates and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this
Complaint as though fully set forth herein 108. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Gregory Chism in his individual capacity against
Defendant. 109. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff Chism for
reporting/complaining and/or being associated with reporting/complaining about race discrimination/ hostile environment in violation of the Civil Rights Act ofl866, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 and 1981 (a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
110. There was no legitimate non·discriminatory basis for the discrimination, retaliation, harassment and/or termination of Plaintiff Chism from his employment at Defendant.
III. Plaintiff Chism, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination and/or being associated with such conduct, was exercising his rights under Title VII.
112. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff Chism.
113. PlaintiffChism has experienced extreme harm, including loss ofcompensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation/discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 & § 1981(A).
23

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 24 of 27
COUNT XI UNLAWFUL RETALIATlON AND TERMINAnON IN VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866,42 U.S.c. § 1981 and TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e et seq. (PlaintiffLindell Epps, on behalfofhimself, v. Defendant) 114. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein 115. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Lindell Epps in his individual capacity against Defendant. 116. The Defendant unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff Epps for reporting/complaining about race discrimination! hostile environment in violation ofthe Civil Rights Act ofl866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981(a) and Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 117. There was no legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the discrimination, retaliation, harassment and/or termination of Plaintiff Epps from his employment at Defendant. 118. Plaintiff Epps, by reporting and complaining about the unlawful discrimination, was exercising his right to complain about unlawful race discrimination under Title VIT. 119. Defendant's conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard of the tights of the Plaintiff Epps. 120. Plaintiff Epps has experienced extreme harm, ineluding loss of compensation, wages, back and front pay, damages and other employment benefits as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unlawful retaliation!discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 V.S.c. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42
24

'. k . "I

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 25 of 27

U.S.C. § 1981 & § 1981(A). PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Named Plaintifls, on behalf of themselves and the proposed class they seek to represent, request the following relief: I. Acceptance ofjurisdidion of this cause; 2. Certitication of the case as a class action maintainable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), 23(b)(2) and/or 23(b)(3) on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff class, and designation of the Named Plaintifls as representatives of the proposed class and their counsel of record as class counsel; 3. A declaratory judgment that the employment practices challenged hercin are unlawful and violative of the rights secured to Named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class; 4. A preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendant and its partners, officers, owners, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with it, from engaging in any furthcr unlawful practices, policies, customs, usages, and racial discrimination as set torth herein; 5. An Order requiring the Defendant to initiate and implement programs that: (i) provide equal employment opportunities and a non-hostile work environment for Black employees; (ii) remedy the effeds of the Defendant's past and present unlawful employment pradices; and (iii) eliminate the continuing effects of the discriminatory practices described herein above; 6. An Order reqUiring the Defendant to initiate and implement systems tbr the selection of individuals to hold jobs in a non-discriminatory matmer; 7. An Order placing or restoring the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent into those
25

....... I

.~

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 26 of 27

jobs they should now be occupying but tor the Defendant's discriminatory practices; 8. An Order directing the Defendant to adjust the wage rates and benetlts for the Named PlaintitlS and the class they seek to represent to the level that they should be enjoying but for the Defendant's discriminatory practices; 9. An award of back pay; front pay; lost bcnetlts; preferential rights to jobs; damages for lost compensation and job benefits suffered by the Named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent; 10. An Order requiring the Defendant to make the Named Plaintiffs, and the class they seek to represent, whole by awarding them back pay (plus interest), compensatory, punitive, liquidated, and/or nominal damages; II. An award of litigation costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to the Named Plaintiffs and proposed class members; 12. Prejudgment and Post-Judgment interest; 13. An Order that this Court retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with any order issued; and 14. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY

Dated: July 28, 2006

Respectfully submitted, PLAINTIFFS
26

Case 1:06-cv-04104 Document 1 Filed 07/28/06 Page 27 of 27

Aaron B. Maduff Atty. No. 06226932 Jason M. Johnson Atty. No. 06286500 Maduff, Medina & Maduff, LLC One East Wacker Suite 2122 Chicago, IL 60601 Voice: (312) 276-9000 Fax: (312) 276-9001 www.maduffiaw.com
Kathleen C. Chavez Atty. No. 06255735 Chavez Law Firm, P.C. Attorney for the Plaintiffs 416 South Second Street Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232-4480 (630) 232-8265 FAX
Robert F. Childs, Jr. Atty No. ASB-2223-C60R Jon C. Goldfarb Atty No. ASB-5401-F58J Maury S. Weiner Atty No. ASB-8856-W86M Herman N. Johnson, Jr. Atty No. ASB-3607-R5OJ Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC The Kress Building 30119th St.N. Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 314-0500 (205) 254-1500 - Fax (Motion for Pro Hac Vice Pending)

ONE OF THEIR ATroRNEYS

27

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

WALLACE BOLDEN, GREGORY CHISM, )

DONALD DUNCAN, LINDELL EPPS,

)

JAMES GAGE, MARVIN GREEN,

)

TERRANCE JACKSON, JOE JONES, EDDIE )

LUCAS, GUY SUTTON, JACKIE WHITE, )

and ZELMA WHITE, on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

WALSH GROUP, doing business as WALSH )

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 06 C 4104 Judge Joan H. Lefkow

OPINION AND ORDER

Twelve construction workers filed this putative class action against Walsh Construction

Company (“Walsh”), alleging that Walsh discriminates against black employees in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and the Civil

Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended. Before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to

certify four classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). For the following

reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [#128] is granted in part and denied in part.1

1 In a companion opinion and order, this court denies Walsh’s motion to strike the EEOC Investigative Memorandum and EEOC Determinations submitted by plaintiffs in support of their motion for class certification. This court also grants in part and denies in part Walsh’s motion to strike the report and testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, Stan V. Smith.

BACKGROUND I. Walsh Construction Company
Walsh is a construction company that does business throughout the United States and employs thousands of laborers during any given year. From 2000 to 2009, Walsh employed approximately 2,610 journeymen and 175 foremen on 262 construction projects in the Chicago area.2
The typical construction project is managed independently, with little oversight from Walsh’s corporate office. Usually, a project manager or business group leader selects a superintendent. The superintendent supervises foremen, and either the superintendent or the foremen hire journeymen and assign their tasks. Foremen supervise the journeymen, who are usually assigned to crews that have specialized responsibilities such as pouring concrete or directing trucks. The number of employees who work on a crew and the amount of work vary among job sites.
Walsh does not have a policy for hiring journeymen, and decisions regarding hiring are left to the discretion of the superintendents and foremen. Neither does Walsh have a policy regarding layoffs. Layoffs are common at Walsh and in the rest of the construction industry.
Superintendents and foremen also have the discretion to assign overtime work. Pursuant to Walsh’s collective bargaining agreement with the laborers’ union, the union may designate certain laborers as union stewards. Stewards have the right of first refusal for any overtime.
2 The parties alternately refer to “laborers,” “journeymen laborers” and “journeymen.” The court uses the term “journeymen” to denote laborers who have not been promoted to the foreman position.
2

Overtime is voluntary, which means that journeymen have the right to reject overtime that is offered.
Walsh’s official employment policy prohibits discrimination or harassment based on race. (See Walsh Employee Handbook at 13.) Walsh provides anti-discrimination training to its superintendents and foremen through the Human Resources Department. II. Plaintiffs’ Allegations and Motion for Class Certification
The named plaintiffs, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, and Zelma White, all of whom are black, were journeymen or foremen at Walsh. Although plaintiffs worked on various construction sites during their tenure at Walsh, most were employed on a project known as “Skybridge,” which was a commercial and residential building project that began in 2000. When Skybridge first began, John Taheny was the superintendent and Robert Kuna was the foreman. Skybridge was temporarily shut down for financial reasons, and during this time Taheny and Kuna worked on another residential building project known as Park Place. When Skybridge resumed, Jim Grumber was the project superintendent, Arthur Crummie was a carpenters’ foreman and plaintiff Jackie White was a laborers’ foreman. Taheny, Kuna, Grumber, and Crummie are white. Plaintiffs Chism, Gage, and Lucas were employed in Walsh’s roving concrete crew, referred to as the Concrete Laborers Division, which poured concrete at various construction sites. Robert DeBoer, who is white, supervised the concrete crew.
Between February 2002 and January 2003, each plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging discrimination on the basis of race. (Compl. Ex. A, Plaintiffs’ EEOC
3

Charges.) The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Walsh had discriminated against each plaintiff, as well as other black employees, through its hiring and layoff practices and by harassing black employees and subjecting them to different terms and conditions of employment. (See Compl. Ex. B, EEOC Determinations for Named Plaintiffs; Pls.’ Ex. 2, EEOC Investigative Memorandum.) The EEOC concluded that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Walsh discriminated against black employees by paying lower wages or denying overtime or bonuses. (See Pls.’ Ex. 2, EEOC Investigative Memorandum.)
Asserting both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of liability, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Walsh discriminates against black employees through its hiring, firing, job assignment, and compensation practices. Plaintiffs also allege that the working conditions at Walsh amounted to a hostile work environment.
The parties conducted extensive expert and non-expert discovery before plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification. Plaintiffs’ expert, Stan V. Smith, conducted a statistical analysis of time card data provided by Walsh to determine whether Walsh’s allegedly discriminatory behavior had a common impact on the putative class members. He examined time card data for employees in the Chicago area that include an employee’s race, position (such as journeyman or foreman), the job and job location, union membership and position, and designation of hours as regular, overtime, or double time. Smith concluded that Walsh hires fewer black employees and that black employees work fewer hours, receive less overtime, receive fewer promotions, and are terminated more often than non-black employees. Walsh hired its own expert, Robert Topel, who concluded that Smith had erred by concluding that the relevant labor market is the entire black population in Cook County rather than the population of
4

qualified blacks living in the Chicago Metropolitan area. Topel also concluded that Smith’s
analysis of the time card data is fundamentally flawed because it compares black employees to
all non-black employees, rather than performing comparisons between blacks, whites, and
Hispanics. Walsh has filed a motion to strike Smith’s expert report and testimony, which the
court grants in part and denies in part in a companion opinion and order. As explained therein,
Smith’s conclusions regarding Walsh’s hiring and termination practices, the decline in the
number of hours worked by black employees, and his calculation of “hedonic damages” are
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Walsh’s motion to strike is
denied with respect to Smith’s analysis of the disparities in hours worked, compensation
received, and promotions from journeyman to foreman.
Plaintiffs now seek to certify the following classes:
“Hostile Work Environment Class,” comprising all blacks employed by Walsh at any time between June 1, 2001, and the present.
“Hire, Re-Hire and Promotion Class,” comprising all blacks employed by Walsh at any time during the period June 1, 2001, [through] the present, who were denied hire, re-hire/re-call, promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race.
“Work Hours and Compensation Class,” comprising blacks employed by Walsh at any time during the period June 1, 2001, through the present, who were denied opportunities to work, not afforded overtime hours or not afforded premium pay hours, because of their race.
“Layoff and Termination Class,” comprising all blacks, employed by Walsh at any time during the period June 1, 2001, [through] the present, who were laid off or terminated because of their race.
(Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. at 2–3.) Although plaintiffs’ proposed class definitions include no job
or geographic limitations, plaintiffs now represent that the classes may be limited to the Chicago
5

Metropolitan area and to blacks who were employed as journeymen. (Pls.’ Resp. to Walsh’s Mot. to Supp., Dkt. #162.) Plaintiffs request that the court either certify all classes under Rule 23(b)(3) or bifurcate the proceedings and certify a hybrid class under Rule 23(b)(2) for equitable relief and Rule 23(b)(3) for damages.
REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION3 A party seeking to certify a class action must meet two conditions. First, the movant must show the putative class satisfies the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Second, the action must qualify under at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1017; Hardin v. Harshbarger, 814 F. Supp. 703, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Here, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) requires a finding that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
3 Both parties have supplemented their briefs to address the Supreme Court’s decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011), and several recent Seventh Circuit decisions that were decided after formal briefing was complete. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 592745 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012); Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012).
6

that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Courts retain broad discretion in determining whether a proposed class meets the Rule 23 certification requirements. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998). “Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a proposed class satisfied the Rule 23 requirements, but they need not make that showing to a degree of absolute certainty.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “It is sufficient if each disputed requirement has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The court must “carefully apply the requirements of Rule 23(a) to Title VII class actions,” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982), and “precise pleadings” are needed, because without specificity the court cannot define the class or determine the adequacy of representation, and the employer does not know how to defend. Id. at 160–61 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS I. Whether there are Questions of Law or Fact Common to the Class
Walsh vigorously disputes that plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.4 It argues that plaintiffs cannot meet the commonality requirement because their claims are premised on the alleged illegality of myriad employment decisions made by numerous managers at hundreds of construction sites. Thus, concludes Walsh, the viability of each class members’ claim will turn on individual, as opposed to class-wide, issues of fact and law.
4 Walsh does not challenge that plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
7

For the commonality requirement to be met, “there must exist ‘questions of law or fact
common to the class.’” Keele, 149 F.3d at 594 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). A single
common question is enough.5 Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374
(2011)). Plaintiffs must show that class members “have suffered the same injury.” Falcon,
457 U.S. at 157. “What matters to class certification . . . is . . . the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of litigation.” Ross, 667
F.3d at 908 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original)).6
Application of the commonality requirement must be measured against the “important
development in the law”7 expressed in Wal-Mart.8 There, the Court concluded that neither a
disparate impact nor a disparate treatment sex discrimination claim met the commonality
requirement. As distilled by Circuit Judge Posner in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 592745, at *5 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012),
5 Although Ross uses the term “common claim,” it cites the Supreme Court’s statement in WalMart, “We quite agree that for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will do.” See 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
6 The Seventh Circuit has not been consistent in its short form of Wal-Mart v. Dukes. This opinion uses Wal-Mart even where a Seventh Circuit case refers to it as Dukes.
7 McReynolds, 2012 WL 592745, at *5. 8 The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart alleged disparate treatment and disparate impact claims on behalf of 1.5 million putative class members, all current or former Wal-Mart employees who alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against them on the basis of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions. See 131 S. Ct. at 2547. The plaintiffs did not allege that Wal-Mart had an express corporate policy against the advancement of women but, instead, asserted that “local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees.” Id. at 2548. The plaintiffs further alleged that because Wal-Mart knew that the policy had a discriminatory effect, the refusal to limit local managers’ discretionary authority amounted to disparate treatment under Title VII. Id.
8

Wal-Mart holds that if employment discrimination is practiced by the employing company’s local managers, exercising discretion granted them by top management (granted them as a matter of necessity, in Wal-Mart’s case, because the company has 1.4 million U.S. employees), rather than implementing a uniform policy established by top management to govern the local managers, a class action by more than a million current and former employees is unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination complained of do not present a common issue that could be resolved efficiently in a single proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
The Seventh Circuit in McReynolds ruled that the commonality requirement was met
where an employer had a company-wide “teaming policy,” which delegated to local brokers the
formation of broker teams, and an “account distribution policy,” which awarded accounts based
on past revenue generation by brokers. It decided that whether the policies cause racial
discrimination and whether they are justified by business necessity are issues common to the
entire class and appropriate for class-wide determination. See id. at *8.
Plaintiffs, seeking to navigate the waters between Wal-Mart and McReynolds, assert that
Walsh has a company-wide policy of setting up each project as, essentially, its own business,
with no material oversight of supervisors. (Dkt. No. 172 at 4, ¶ 6.) (They set out a number of
variations of the same policy, such as a policy of gate hiring (id. ¶ 7(d)), as well as a policy of
not addressing complaints of discrimination and racial harassment (id. ¶ 7(h)).) Walsh, on the
other hand, urges the court to conclude that Wal-Mart forecloses a class action where the alleged
policy is delegation of employment decisions to the discretion of local managers.
One possible distinction between McReynolds and Wal-Mart (other than the comparative
size of the putative classes) is the presence in McReynolds, and the absence in Wal-Mart, of a
company-wide policy more definite than that of granting all hiring and promotion decisions to
local managers. On examination, however, this distinction seems razor-thin. Wal-Mart’s local 9

managers were given broad discretion to hire, set wages and hours, promote and dismiss
employees, which led the Supreme Court to conclude that the experiences of the representative
plaintiffs and the statistical evidence did not permit an inference of a discriminatory policy.
Merrill Lynch’s local brokers were required by company-wide policy to form teams but the
individual brokers decided who would be on their teams, resulting in individualized decisions
that tended to exclude black brokers. Both cases concern a company-wide policy of delegation
of discretionary authority to a low-enough level that employment decisions are based on the
decider’s personal comfort level, resulting in a statistical disparity disfavoring a protected class.9
In its police department hypothetical (set out in the margin10), the court in McReynolds states that
a department-wide policy of granting patrol officers discretion in choosing their partners is “not
9 The McReynolds court suggested that, unlike the Wal-Mart situation, the team policy and the account distribution policy at Merrill, Lynch might be shown to increase the amount of discrimination over that which would be present if total discretion were delegated to local managers. This presupposes, however, that total discretion would produce discrimination. If so, then it, too, would be a policy subject to challenge.
10 See McReynolds, 2012 WL 592745, at *7:
Suppose a police department authorizes each police officer to select an officer junior to him to be his partner. And suppose it turns out that male police officers never select female officers as their partners and white officers never select black officers as their partners. There would be no intentional discrimination at the departmental level, but the practice of allowing police officers to choose their partners could be challenged as enabling sexual and racial discrimination—as having in the jargon of discrimination law a “disparate impact” on a protected group—and if a discriminatory effect was proved, then to avoid an adverse judgment the department would have to prove that the policy was essential to the department's mission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73, 174 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2009); Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1098–99 (7th Cir. 2000). That case would not be controlled by Wal-Mart (although there is an undoubted resemblance), in which employment decisions were delegated to local managers; it would be an employment decision by top management.
10

controlled by Wal-Mart” because the delegation of discretion came from the top.11 The policy of delegating discretion to patrol officers to pick their partners is difficult to distinguish from a policy of delegation of discretion to superintendents at the job site to pick the journeymen they hire, promote, lay off, and fire. At the same time, it is difficult to distinguish from Wal-Mart, if viewed from the stance that each job site is a free-standing “company” that sets its own policy and entails hundreds of individualized decisions on a continual basis. McReynolds does not address the quantity or quality of proof supporting the finding of commonality and it is unclear what proof could ultimately result in an inference that Merrill Lynch had discriminatory intent.
Ultimately, this court takes its cue from the Seventh Circuit’s characterization in McReynolds of Wal-Mart’s holding: “Wal-Mart holds . . . a class action by more than a million
. . . is unmanageable [and] the incidents of discrimination complained of do not present a common issue that could be resolved efficiently in a single proceeding.” 2012 WL 592745, at *5. This language implies that the Seventh Circuit reads Wal-Mart as a case where the difficulties of manageability and lack of efficiency overwhelmed any potential common issue based on delegation of authority. Or as Falcon teaches, without specificity, it was impossible to define the class or determine adequacy of representation, and the employer could not know how to defend.
The conclusion of this dissertation, then, is that the question whether Walsh’s companywide policy of delegating to job site superintendents discretionary authority to make employment
11 Moreover, Wal-Mart acknowledges “that, in appropriate cases, giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title VII liability under a disparate-impact theory—since ‘an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking can have precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination.’” 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1988) (brackets omitted)).
11

decisions at the job site discriminates against black journeymen and foremen and whether that policy is justified by business necessity may be common questions, if plaintiffs can demonstrate an evidentiary basis for their class definition.
A. Disparate Treatment Class Under a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive by relying on either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 & 336, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977).12 This is an uphill climb under Wal-Mart. The Court emphasized that, in resolving a disparate treatment claim, “the crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for a particular employment decision.’” 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 81 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1984)). Class plaintiffs must be able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why I was disfavored.” Id. (emphasis in original). They must “identify a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.” Id. at 2454–55. To paraphrase Falcon, the representative plaintiffs must not only demonstrate the validity of their own claims, they must present proof (1) that this discriminatory treatment is typical of the employer’s challenged employment practices, (2) that the employer’s practices are motivated by a policy of race discrimination that pervades the company, or (3) that this policy of race discrimination is reflected in the employer’s other employment practices. See 457 U.S. at 158. As indicated in Wal-Mart, the evidence needs to
12 Courts analyze discrimination claims under Section 1981 in the same manner as claims brought under Title VII. Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1996).
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point to a conclusion that employment decisions are determined by “stereotyped thinking.” 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (citation omitted).
The types of evidence that are available, statistical, anecdotal, and sociological, are relevant, but Wal-Mart is not clear about how much evidence is enough. See id. at 2555 (establishing a disparity in pay or promotion patterns does not demonstrate commonality); id. at 2556 (anecdotal evidence must be sufficient to raise an inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory); id. at 2553–54 (expert sociological testimony that the corporate culture makes the employer vulnerable to bias is useless unless it can demonstrate how regularly “stereotyped thinking” determines employment decisions). Plaintiffs here have submitted valid statistical evidence indicating that Walsh’s policy of supervisory discretion resulted in fewer work hours, less overtime, and fewer promotions for black journeymen.13 Plaintiffs have also submitted anecdotal evidence comprising (1) EEOC charges filed by former Walsh employees, (2) Walsh’s position statement in response to a former employee’s charge of discrimination, and (3) declarations and deposition testimony of named plaintiffs and some putative class members.
The sixteen EEOC charges provide only limited support for plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Eight charges were filed by individuals who were not journeymen and therefore not class members. (See Pls.’ Ex. 12, Charge filed by Clay (project manager); Ex. 13, Charge filed by Bredy (assistant analyst); Ex. 20, Charge filed by McKinley-Wadlington (safety secretary); Ex. 21, Charge filed by Clark (administrative assistant); Ex. 22, Charge filed by
13 As discussed supra, the court granted Walsh’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ statistical analysis of Walsh’s hiring and discharge practices.
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Jackson (project engineer); Ex. 23, Charge filed by Thompson (project engineer); Ex. 24, Charge filed by Melton (operating engineer); Ex. 25, Charge filed by McDuff (truck driver).) Plaintiffs have cited no evidence suggesting that complaints filed by individuals other than journeymen might be relevant to plaintiffs’ class claims. Of the eight charges filed by journeymen, two involve allegations of racial harassment and intimidation that would only support plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claim.14 (See Pls.’ Ex. 9, Charge filed by Thompson; Ex. 10, Charge filed by Britt.) Two other journeymen claimed that they had been denied hire in August and September 2000, possibly by the same supervisor. (See Pls.’ Ex. 11, Charge filed by Reed (denied hire by “Bob Cooney”); Ex. 19, Charge filed by Sutton-Paskett (denied hire by “Bob Cohen”).) The four remaining charges allege discriminatory layoff or discharge but do not name a specific work site or supervisor. (See Pls.’ Ex. 14, Charge filed by Peoples; Ex. 16, Charge filed by Hickman; Ex. 17, Charge filed by Smith; Ex. 18, Charge filed by Rowe.)
Walsh’s position paper regarding a charge of discrimination filed by Devell Brittmon, a journeyman, indicates that Brittmon alleged that he had been laid off after taking an extended medical leave from the Park Place project in 2001. (See Pls.’ Ex. 15 at WALSH000779.) It also appears that Brittmon alleged that he had been denied work at “several other” construction sites. (Id. at WALSH000780.)
Finally, Walsh has submitted declarations and deposition testimony from Guy Sutton, Eddie Lucas, Keith Hudson, Marvin Greene, Jeff Carroll, and Wallace Bolden, all of whom are putative class members or named plaintiffs. Sutton testified that blacks were required to do more
14 Carla Rowe did not specify her position, but she alleged that her wrist was “broken during work” and stated that she was laid off after she requested work from a white superintendent. (See Pls.’ Ex. 18.) These allegations suggest that she was a journeyman laborer.
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heavy lifting and strenuous work than non-blacks. Hudson, Greene, and Carroll testified that blacks were laid off more frequently than non-blacks at the Cook County Hospital, The Heritage, The Columbian, Millennium Park, and Brooks Homes sites. Bolden, Greene, Hudson, and Lucas testified that blacks did not get as many hours or as much overtime as non-blacks at the Skybridge, McCormick Place, Millennium Park, Brooks Homes, Cook County Hospital, The Heritage, and The Columbian sites.
Despite the lack of guidance on the type and quantity of evidence that would be sufficient, this court concludes that plaintiffs fall short of the threshold. Wal-Mart indicates that plaintiffs’ limited statistical evidence, which is the only evidence of company-wide disparities at Walsh, does not demonstrate that there was a common practice of intentional discrimination at Walsh’s individual work sites, which is the key issue presented by plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims. See 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (because of the subjective nature of each supervisor’s employment decisions, “demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s”); id. at 2555–56. Plaintiffs have not submitted any anecdotal evidence to support their claim for failure to promote. Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence of discriminatory work hours and overtime practices is limited to seven out of the 262 construction sites that Walsh operated during the relevant time period. Their anecdotal evidence of discriminatory layoff and termination practices is limited to five constructions sites. This showing is too weak to support the conclusion that there will be a common question of whether supervisors at all of Walsh’s construction sites engaged in “stereotyped thinking” that adversely affected black journeymen. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 & n.9. The court will not certify a disparate treatment class.
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B. Disparate Impact Class Disparate impact liability is premised on the notion that a facially neutral policy results in discrimination against members of a protected class. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355 n.15 & 336. It does not require proof of discriminatory intent, alleviating the plaintiffs’ burden of proof compared to a disparate treatment claim. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971) (“If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”); see also Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 2003) (“To succeed on a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact on the basis of race. Once this impact is shown, the defendant must demonstrate that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.” (quotations and citations omitted)). Certainly, the types of evidence described in Wal-Mart are all relevant, although valid statistical analysis is essential. Anecdotal evidence is more likely to demonstrate that the disparity is spread throughout the company. See Ross, 667 F.3d at 909–10 (in wage and hour case, plaintiffs had demonstrated commonality of issue where they submitted declarations from ninety-six potential class members, who together worked at approximately eighty-three percent of the defendant’s Illinois branches). Plaintiffs rely on the same evidence, summarized supra, to support certification of their disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Although this evidence is not sufficient to support certification of a disparate treatment class, it does support the conclusion that there are common questions of law or fact with respect to a subset of plaintiffs’ disparate impact classes.
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Specifically, plaintiffs have demonstrated that Walsh’s official policy is to allow superintendents and foremen complete discretion in assigning work hours and overtime. Although journeymen have the right to refuse overtime, because it is voluntary, there is no evidence that journeymen are entitled to request additional overtime if they do not feel that it is being distributed fairly.15 According to plaintiffs, Walsh’s superintendents and foremen tend to offer overtime and work hours to non-black journeymen in the first instance. This allegation is supported by statistical analysis showing that black journeymen, on average, receive fewer hours than non-black journeymen. To paraphrase McReynolds, whether Walsh’s policy of allowing foremen and superintendents to assign work hours and overtime without reference to any objective criteria has a negative impact on black journeymen, and whether this policy is justified by business necessity, are issues common to the entire class. See 2012 WL 592745, at *7–8. An individualized assessment of each journeyman’s circumstances is not necessary to determine that Walsh’s company-wide policy results in the denial of work hours and overtime pay. See Ross, 667 F.3d at 910.
Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that there are common issues of fact with respect to the promotion class. Walsh does not contest plaintiffs’ assertion that a supervisor’s decision to promote a journeyman to the foreman position is completely discretionary and that Walsh does not have any objective promotion criteria in place. According to plaintiffs, this is an employment decision made by top management that results in discrimination against black
15 For example, when one of Walsh’s senior project managers was asked whether there is anything he does to make sure that project overtime is being assigned fairly, he responded, “Usually it’s done by, you know, who wants to work it, who’s available to work it. You know, so it usually kind of goes voluntarily.” (Def.’s Ex. 9, Logan Dep. at 73.)
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journeymen. Whether Walsh’s policy of allowing foremen and supervisors to make promotion decisions without reference to any objective criteria, and whether this policy is justified by business necessity, are issues common to the entire class. See McReynolds, 2012 WL 592745, at *7–8.
Plaintiffs have not, however, established that there are issues common to the layoff/termination or hire/rehire classes. The court has granted Walsh’s motion to exclude Smith’s analysis of Walsh’s termination, hire, and rehire data. Without any valid statistical evidence, plaintiffs are left with a handful of anecdotes that relate to a small fraction of Walsh’s construction sites. Given the myriad supervisors and employment decisions at issue, this is not enough to demonstrate that there is a “common nucleus of operative fact,” Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018, among the class grievances. Indeed, plaintiffs do not even argue that the court may certify their proposed classes if it rules that Smith’s expert report is inadmissible. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to certify a layoff/termination class and hire/rehire class will be denied.
C. Hostile Work Environment Class In order to succeed on their hostile work environment claim, plaintiffs will need to prove (1) that harassment was based on race; (2) that it was subjectively and objectively hostile; (3) that it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with an employee’s ability to perform assigned duties; and (4) that there is a basis for employer liability. See, e.g., Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000). A hostile work environment claim, like a disparate impact claim, does not require proof of discriminatory intent. See Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2007). An employer can avoid liability for a supervisor’s harassing conduct if no tangible employment action was taken and it can
18

demonstrate (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities. See Huff, 493 F.3d at 898–901 (discussing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998)). Prior to Wal-Mart, numerous courts recognized that whether there is an “overarching and pervasive hostile work environment” can present a common question of fact or law that satisfies Rule 23(a)(2). See, e.g., Smith v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., 234 F.R.D. 648, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 00 CV 680, 2001 WL 1795093, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2001); Adams v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Nos. 98 C 4025, 96 C 7717, 2001 WL 336830, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2001); Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 387–88 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 222–23 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Plaintiffs have submitted voluminous testimony, affidavits, and the EEOC Investigative Memorandum showing that supervisors at the Skybridge and Park Place jobs referred to black employees as “niggers,” “coons,” “monkeys,” “possums,” “squirrels,” “black-bitches,” “black mother-fuckers,” and other derogatory names. Blacks were also referred to as lazy and worthless employees who didn’t want do any work. For example, plaintiffs’ evidence indicates that Arthur Crummie, the carpenter’s foreman on the Skybridge project, stated that he resented that he had to hire blacks and that Walsh didn’t need the “monkeys” any more because he could give work to Mexicans, whom he referred to as the “new niggers.” Plaintiffs have submitted evidence that Robert DeBoer, the supervisor of the Concrete Laborers Division, made similarly offensive
19

comments and stated that black workers, in comparison to Hispanics and whites, were lazy and dirty.
The named plaintiffs also testify that they saw offensive graffiti in Walsh’s portable toilets at multiple sites, including statements such as “niggers go home,” swastikas, “KKK,” and “sending you back to Africa.” Employees saw multiple hangman’s nooses at Walsh sites, including The Heritage and Millennium Park. Plaintiff James Gage testified that a noose was hanging from the ceiling of the break shanty at the Schaumburg site for about two weeks. (Gage Dep. at 33–35.)
Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that there is a common issue of fact as to whether Walsh management knew of its supervisors’ harassing conduct at various construction sites and yet allowed supervisors to act with unfettered discretion on the job. The record makes clear that certain supervisors, such as Robert Kuna, were known by Walsh management to be overt racists but were unchastened and allowed to supervise multiple job sites over the course of several years.16 The evidence also indicates that other supervisors explicitly or implicitly condoned their
16 John Taheny, who was Kuna’s supervisor at Skybridge, testified that he had heard rumors that Kuna was racist before they worked together. Taheny testified that Kuna was a “bigot” who used the word nigger “every other word” and that as a result Taheny “got him fired.” Taheny further testified that he had to go to his boss to fire Kuna, even though he was Kuna’s supervisor, because Kuna knew Dan Walsh and had “friends within the company.”
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colleagues’ racist conduct.17 Plaintiffs have also submitted testimony that racial graffiti would stay up for days or weeks until people cleaned and emptied the port-a-johns.18
In addition, whether Walsh exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any racial
harassment will be an issue common to the class. It is significant that Walsh’s construction
supervisors would have worked on multiple construction sites over the course of the class period.
Kuna, for example, testifies that he worked on thirteen different jobs between 1997 and 2002 and
that he was rehired by Walsh in 2007, despite the EEOC’s determination that he had contributed
to a racially hostile work environment at Walsh. Given the cyclical nature of construction work,
the frequent transfer of personnel between sites, and the complete lack of on-the-job oversight by
corporate management, this case is not like the multi-facility or multi-division discrimination
cases that Walsh relies upon in its opposition brief. See Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802
(8th Cir. 2011); Carlson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. Civ. 02-3780, 2005 WL 758602
(D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2005); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga.
2001); Faulk v. Home Oil Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 645 (M.D. Ala. 1999). Nor, for these same
reasons, is it necessary for plaintiffs to show that racial harassment was explicitly supported by
Walsh’s corporate management in order to demonstrate a commonality of issue. Compare with
17 Crummie testified that he had heard black employees complain about Kuna but that “so far as I’m concerned . . . it wasn’t my business” because Kuna worked on “another job.” Crummie conceded that people often referred to plaintiff Jackie White’s crew as “the black crew” on the Skybridge project, because most of the other crews were white or Hispanic. Taheny testified that DeBoer, who managed the Concrete Laborers Division, “could have said the nigger word in front of me” but that it would not have been “in such a way that it would be taken as being an affront to anybody.” When DeBoer was asked whether he had ever called a black employee a “nigger” during the EEOC investigation, he implausibly stated that he could not remember.
18 Kuna stated that he frequently painted over graffiti with spray paint on Walsh job sites but that “here’s the thing, I’m a project superintendent I’m not a fucking monitor of the toilets.”
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Adams, 2001 WL 336830, at *13. It is enough that Walsh’s management allegedly knew of certain supervisors’ harassing conduct yet nevertheless transferred these supervisors from job to job, over several years, without any oversight. Finally, Walsh makes much of the fact that some plaintiffs testified that they did not experience racial discrimination at every Walsh construction site. Whether this testimony precludes a finding of a hostile work environment is a merits issue.19
For all of these reasons, plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2)’s commonality requirement. Plaintiffs class will be limited, however, to blacks who were worked on Walsh’s construction sites, as opposed office employees or other support personnel.
II. Whether the Claims or Defenses of the Class Representatives are Typical of the Class The typicality requirement focuses on the class representatives. As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, however, “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 n.13. In general, “[a] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Keele, 149 F.3d at 595 (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)). The
19 In addition, in doing so, Walsh overstates the significance of plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the pervasiveness of discrimination at Walsh. Plaintiff Jackie White, for example, testified that Robert Kuna had harassed him while he was working on the Skybridge site. White admitted that he had previously worked with Kuna on five other projects, and that he didn’t have any “clash-ins” with Kuna on the other jobs. White qualified this statement, however, by asserting that Kuna was a “serious, serious problem.” When White was asked why Kuna “became such a problem just at Skybridge” he replied, “He probably was the same way all the time. It’s just I just experienced it at the Skybridge.”
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existence of defenses against certain class members does not defeat typicality. Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996).
A. Disparate Impact Work Hours/Compensation Class and Promotion Class The class representatives, along with the unnamed class members, were subject to the same allegedly unlawful employment practice. Their claims are based on the same legal theory and are subject to the same defenses. Although differences in class representatives’ and the class members’ injuries and treatment times are undeniable, this is not fatal to a finding of typicality as “[t]ypical does not mean identical.” Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Walsh argues that some of the plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the class because in certain years they exceeded the average hours worked by all laborers employed by Walsh in the Chicago Metropolitan area, or worked at or near the average. In addition, some plaintiffs received more overtime than the average laborer in certain years. These objections relate to damages, not theories of liability or applicable defenses. Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims are governed by the same legal theories and will be subject to the same common proof as the class members’ claims. Therefore plaintiffs’ proposed work hours/compensation class and promotion class satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. B. Hostile Work Environment Class Plaintiffs’ proposed hostile work environment also satisfies Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. Plaintiffs, along with the unnamed class members, were subject to the same alleged
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hostile work environment. The same legal theories and defenses are relevant to their claims. Therefore plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class. III. Adequacy of Class Representatives
To meet Rule 23’s adequacy of representation requirement, “the representative must be able to ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’” Keele, 149 F.3d at 594 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). The requirement has “two parts: ‘the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest’ of the class members.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). Walsh does not contest the adequacy of plaintiffs’ class counsel. Nor does Walsh challenge the adequacy of the class representatives with respect to the hostile work environment class.
With respect to the disparate impact classes, Walsh argues (1) that Jackie White and Bolden cannot be class representatives for a work hours/overtime class because they were employed as foremen during the relevant time period, and (2) none of the named plaintiffs can represent a promotion class because they do not allege that they were denied a promotion while they were working at Walsh. Both of these arguments raise issues relating to plaintiffs’ standing to sue as class representatives.
To have standing to sue as a class representative, a plaintiff “must be part of that class, that is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he represents.” Keele, 149 F.3d at 592–93 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 41 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1974)); E. Tex. Motor
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Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 52 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1977). Jackie White and Bolden cannot serve as class representatives because they were not employed as journeymen during the relevant time period. As discussed supra, in response to Walsh’s supplemental submissions on Wal-Mart, plaintiffs have asserted that their proposed classes are limited to “a single job category (journeyman laborer).” (See Dkt. #162 at 3.) Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence of work hours and overtime disparities is also limited to journeymen. Therefore White and Bolden, who were employed only as foremen, are not part of the class. Walsh raises no objection to the other class representatives under Rule 23(a)(4). Therefore the fact that Jackie White and Bolden cannot serve as class representatives does not defeat plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a work hours and compensation class.
Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a promotion class, on the other hand, must be denied. No named plaintiff alleges that he or she was denied a promotion at Walsh and none include a claim of failure to promote in their EEOC charge. (See Compl. Ex. A.) Therefore they are not members of the class they purport to represent and do not have standing to sue as class representatives. See Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703–04 (7th Cir. 1993); Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., Ind., 724 F.2d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1983). Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to submit anecdotal evidence suggesting that any unnamed class members intend to allege that they were qualified for a promotion that they did not receive. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a promotion class will be denied for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). See Harriston, 992 F.2d at 703–04.
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IV. Whether Plaintiffs’ Proposed Classes Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(b) Plaintiffs request monetary relief that includes back pay, front pay, lost benefits,
preferential rights to jobs, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. (Compl. at 25–26.) They also request an injunction that would require Walsh to change its employment practices. Plaintiffs concede that the court cannot certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class that would provide all of these requested forms of relief because the monetary relief would not be “incidental” to the injunction. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 825–26 (7th Cir. 2011); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898–99 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998)).
The Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts to consider three alternatives for handling class action claims that, as here, request both an injunction and monetary relief. See Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, AFL-CIO, 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898–99). First, the court may certify the entire proceeding under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. Second, the court may authorize divided certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class for an injunction and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for damages. Id. Third, the court may certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for an injunction and monetary relief but require notice and the opportunity to opt-out pursuant to its plenary authority under Rules 23(d)(2) and (d)(5). Id. at 582; accord Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2004); but see Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:20 (8th ed., updated Nov. 2011) (noting that the validity of “hybrid” classes after Wal-Mart is unclear). Plaintiffs request either the first or second option.
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A. Rule 23(b)(2) Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Walsh argues that the court cannot certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class because none of the named plaintiffs is currently employed at Walsh and therefore they lack standing to represent a class of plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. The parties have cited district court cases that reach contrary conclusions as to whether former employees may represent a class seeking injunctive relief in an employment discrimination case. Compare In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp’t Practices Litig., 273 F.R.D. 424, 438 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (former employees have standing); Walker v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 06 C 6906, 2007 WL 2903180, at * 7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2007) (same); Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., No. 00 C 5755, 2000 WL 1774091, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000) (same); with Butler v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 06 C 5400, 2008 WL 474367, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2008) (former employees do not have standing); Smith, 234 F.R.D. at 666 (same); Hawkins v. Groot Indus., Inc., No. 01 C 1731, 2003 WL 22057238, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2003) (same). The Seventh Circuit has not addressed this issue. Wal-Mart, however, suggests that the Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that the former employees in that case lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. See 131 S. Ct. at 2559–60. The court need not decide this thorny issue because it is clear that certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is not appropriate. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (because class certification issues were dispositive, Court did not reach Article III standing issues raised by objectors to class action settlement). In
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Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court emphasized that the validity of a Rule 23(b)(2) class depends on whether the injunctive relief is appropriate to the class “as a whole.” See 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis in original)). When a significant percentage of the class members are not current employees, injunctive relief will not benefit the entire class. See id. Given the transitory nature of construction work, it is likely that many class members, like the named plaintiffs, are no longer employed at Walsh. Therefore injunctive relief will not be appropriate to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs will only be permitted to seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
B. Rule 23(b)(3) Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class can be maintained if “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Issues that are relevant include (1) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (2) the extent and nature of any ongoing litigation, (3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of plaintiffs’ claims in this forum, and (4) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). To determine whether predominance and superiority are satisfied, courts examine “the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ claims, the proof necessary for those elements, and the manageability of trial on those issues.” Reed v. Advocate Health Care, No. 06 C 3337, 2009 WL 3146999, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1981)).
i. Disparate Impact Work Hours/Compensation Class 28

To prevail on their disparate impact claim, plaintiffs will need to show that Walsh’s policy of supervisory discretion resulted in a disparate impact on black journeymen. See, e.g., City of Chicago, 351 F.3d at 311–12. Once this impact is shown, Walsh must demonstrate that the practice is justified by a “business necessity.” Id. The burden then shifts back to plaintiffs to show that an alternative employment practice exists. Id. at 312.
All of the elements of plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim are subject to common proof. The key issue will be the strength of plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, and the same statistical evidence will be relevant to all of the class claims. Walsh’s demonstration of a business necessity, and plaintiffs’ attempt to rebut that showing, will also be subject to common proof for all of the putative class members’ claims.
Walsh argues that common issues will not predominate because each plaintiffs’ claim will require individualized proof of their supervisor’s discriminatory intent and the circumstances under which they were denied work hours or overtime. The issue of intent relates to plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims, which will not be certified for class action proceedings. Walsh’s concern about the individual circumstances of each plaintiff relates primarily to the issue of damages. In general, however, courts focus on issues relating to liability, not damages, when determining whether the predominance requirement has been met. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 244 F.R.D. 469, 480 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2010); Fletcher v. ZLB Behring LLC, 245 F.R.D. 328, 332 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also Federal Practice & Procedure § 1778 (3d ed. updated through 2011); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 23.45 (3d ed. updated through 2012). To the extent such inquiries
29

will be necessary to a determination of damages, solutions can be devised to make the inquiry fair, efficient, and manageable. Taking the foregoing into account, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is met.
In addition, resolving the disparate impact claim through a class action would be more efficient than hundreds of individual suits. Walsh does not present any compelling argument regarding superiority, instead reiterating the same objections that related to predominance. For all of these reasons, plaintiffs’ work hours/compensation class meets Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of this class will be granted.
ii. Hostile Work Environment Class As discussed infra, plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claim will require proof that plaintiffs were harassed on account of their race, that the harassment was subjectively and objectively hostile, that the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to interfere with their ability to perform their duties, and that there is a basis for Walsh’s liability. See Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 505. If no adverse employment action resulted, Walsh may present an affirmative defense to employer liability under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, which would require it to demonstrate that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that plaintiffs unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The common questions of whether certain supervisors created an objectively hostile work environment and whether Walsh management knew of the supervisor’s actions and failed to correct their behavior will be significant to all of the class members’ hostile work environment
30

claims. These issues will also be subject to common proof. Although there will undoubtedly be differences among work sites and individual employee’s experiences, the court is not convinced that any individual issues will overwhelm the common issues. “‘[P]redominate’ should not be automatically equated with ‘determinative’ . . . when one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3).” Federal Practice & Procedure § 1778; see also 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.45 (“Courts generally agree that the predominance of common issues does not mean that common issues merely outnumber individual issues. Nor should a court determine predominance by comparing the time that the common issues can be anticipated to consume in the litigation to the time that individual issues will require. Otherwise, only the most complex common issues could predominate . . . .”). Indeed, plaintiffs’ evidence indicates that similar conduct is at the heart of all of the class members’ claims. Therefore despite the number of construction sites involved, the proof of offensive conduct may be similar for all class members. See Warnell, 189 F.R.D. at 387; Markham, 171 F.R.D. at 224.
Walsh argues that plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to common proof because the court will need to determine whether each individual employee found Walsh’s work environment to be subjectively hostile. See Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F.R.D. 424, 437 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (declining to certify hostile work environment class because a pattern or practice finding of a hostile work environment would not resolve the issue of whether each individual found the work environment to be subjectively hostile); but see Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F.R.D. 430, 440 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (certifying hostile work environment class under Rule 23(b)(3) where underlying facts were the same as those in Radmanovich). The court disagrees.
31

“[T]he landscape of the total work environment, rather than the subjective experiences of each individual claimant, is the focus for establishing a pattern or practice of . . . harassment which is severe and pervasive.” Warnell, 189 F.R.D. at 387 (quoting EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1074 (C.D. Ill. 1998)). There can be little question that black employees would have been offended by the alleged conduct that is at the heart of plaintiffs’ hostile work environment case. See id.; Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d at 472 (noting that the “employer’s contention that even partial class certification is inappropriate because workers may have liked being called ‘nigger’ and ‘jungle bunny,’ chuckled when other workers . . . displayed nooses in the workplace, or at least not minded such things, strains credulity”). If the evidence indicates that certain employees were not offended by the conduct of Walsh’s supervisors, then individual evidence regarding subjective reactions can be presented. See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d at 472.
In addition, Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement has been met. Concentrating separate actions based on the same underlying conduct in one action promotes judicial economy and efficiency and consistency of judgments. Although some difficulties may be encountered in managing the class action, the court is confident that the parties can devise solutions to address these issues and ensure that the adjudication of the case is both fair and efficient.
Taking the foregoing into account, plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements. The court will certify plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class under Rule 23(b)(3).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
32

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [#128] is granted in part and denied in part. Because plaintiffs have satisfied the necessary elements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), the court will certify the following hostile work environment class: All blacks employed by Walsh on its construction sites in the Chicago Metropolitan area during the time period June 1, 2001, through the present. The named plaintiffs are appointed class representatives of the hostile work environment class.

The court will also certify the following disparate impact class: All blacks employed as journeymen by Walsh in the Chicago Metropolitan area at any time during the period June 1, 2001, through the present, who were denied opportunities to work, not afforded overtime hours or not afforded premium pay hours, because of their race. Plaintiffs Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, and Zelma White are appointed class representatives of the work hours and compensation class. This case is set for a status on May 1, 2012 at 8:30 a.m.

Dated: March 30, 2012

Enter:____________________________________ JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW United States District Judge

33

 
 Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 1 of 29
PROTO,TERMED,VALDEZ
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06−cv−04104

Bolden et al v. Walsh Group Assigned to: Honorable Joan H. Lefkow Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 07/28/2006 Date Terminated: 12/12/2013 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Wallace Bolden TERMINATED: 12/06/2012

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff Maduff & Maduff, LLC 205 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2050 Chicago, IL 60601 (312)276−9000 Email: docketclerk@madufflaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY

Adam L. Gill Duane Morris LLP 190 South LaSalle Street Suite 3700 Chicago, IL 60603 312 499−6728 Fax: 312−499−6701 Email: algill@duanemorris.com TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexios James Dravillas Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: ajd@fmcolaw.com

Herman N Johnson , Jr Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis 301 19th Street, North The Kress Building Birmingham, AL 35203 (205)314−0500 Email: rjohnson@wcqp.com TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson Law Office of Jason M. Johnson 500 Lake Cook Road #350 PMB 1350 Deerfield, IL 60015 Email: jason@jmjohnsonlaw.com TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland The Law Firm of John C. Ireland 636 Spruce Street South Elgin, IL 60177 (630) 464−9675 Email: atty4employees@aol.com

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 2 of 29
TERMINATED: 06/11/2007
Jon C. Goldfarb Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC 301 19th Street, North The Kress Building Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 314−0500 Email: jgoldfarb@wcqp.com
Kathleen Currie Chavez Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−4480 Fax: (630) 232−7452 Email: kcc@fmcolaw.com
Matthew J. Herman Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: mjh@fmcolaw.com
Maury S. Weiner Wiggins, Childs, Quinn and Pantazis, LLC The Kress Building 301 19th Street, North Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 314−0500 Email: mweiner@wcqp.com TERMINATED: 06/26/2007
Michael D. Wong SmithAmundsen LLC 3815 E. Main Street, Suite A−1 St. Charles, IL 60174 (630) 587−7972 Fax: (630) 5877960 Email: mwong@salawus.com TERMINATED: 01/30/2013
Peter Lawrence Currie Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil, LLC 10 West State Street Suite 200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Fax: (630) 232−7452 Email: plc@fmcolaw.com
Robert F Childs , Jr Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis 301 19th Street, North The Kress Building Birmingham, AL 35203 (205)314−0500 Email: rchilds@wcqp.com
Robert M. Foote Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC 10 West State Street

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 3 of 29

#200 Geneva, IL 60134 (630) 232−7450 Email: rmf@fmcolaw.com

Plaintiff Gregory Chism

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron Meyers & Flowers, LLC. 3 North 2nd St. Suite 300 St. Charles, IL 60174 (630) 232−6333 Email: ac@meyers−flowers.com TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 4 of 29

Plaintiff Donald Duncan
Plaintiff Lindell Epps

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013
Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010
Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008
John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007
Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007
Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013
Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam L. Gill (See above for address)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 5 of 29

TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Gage

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 6 of 29

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marvin Green

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 7 of 29

Plaintiff Terrance Jackson

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007
Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007
Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013
Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013
Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010
Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008
John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007
Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 8 of 29

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joe Jones

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 9 of 29

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eddie Lucas

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 10 of 29

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Guy Sutton

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jackie White

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 11 of 29

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Zelma White and a class of similarly situated others

represented by Aaron Benjamin Maduff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam L. Gill (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

Alexios James Dravillas

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 12 of 29

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Herman N Johnson , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/08/2010

Jason M. Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/05/2008

John Craig Ireland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/11/2007

Jon C. Goldfarb (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew J. Herman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maury S. Weiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2007

Michael D. Wong (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2013

Peter Lawrence Currie (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert F Childs , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacquetta Bolden

represented by Jacquetta Bolden PRO SE

Alexander Helme Caron (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/19/2013

V.
Defendant
Walsh Group doing business as Walsh Construction Company

represented by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney Hinshaw & Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: adelaney@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tom H. Luetkemeyer InfoLawGroup LLP 225 W. Washington

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 13 of 29
22nd Floor Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3000 Email: tluetkemeyer@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M Gilbert Polsinelli, PC 161 North Clark Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 819−1900 Email: sgilbert@polsinelli.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/28/2006 07/28/2006 07/28/2006
07/31/2006 08/01/2006 08/02/2006 08/02/2006 08/14/2006
08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/29/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps; Jury Demand.(vkd, ) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (vkd, ) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps by Jason M. Johnson. (vkd, ) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs by Aaron Benjamin Maduff. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
8 EXHIBITS to the complaint by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps; 1 (rp, ) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Wallace Bolden by Kathleen Currie Chavez (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Wallace Bolden by Robert M. Foote (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
9 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps. Walsh Group waiver sent on 8/1/2006, answer due 10/2/2006. (Maduff, Aaron) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
10 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of plaintiffs by Robert F Childs, Jr; Order entered granting leave by Joan H. Lefkow. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 1112677. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
11 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of plaintiffs by Herman N Johnson, Jr; Order entered granting leave by Joan H. Lefkow. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 1112677. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
12 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of plaintiffs by Maury S. Weiner; Order entered granting leave by Joan H. Lefkow. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 1112677. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
13 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of plaintiffs by Jon C. Goldfarb; Order entered granting leave by Joan H. Lefkow. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 1112677. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
14 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing set for 9/28/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/29/2006)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 14 of 29

09/28/2006 09/29/2006 09/29/2006 09/29/2006 09/29/2006 09/29/2006 10/02/2006 10/02/2006 10/02/2006 10/10/2006 10/26/2006
10/31/2006
01/23/2007 03/06/2007 03/20/2007
03/20/2007 03/29/2007 03/30/2007
04/27/2007

15 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing reset to 10/10/2006 at 09:30 AM by agreement. Telephoned notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
16 Incorrect document linked to entry. ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Walsh Group by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney (Delaney, Aimee) Additional attachment(s) added on 10/2/2006 (air, ). (Entered: 09/29/2006)
17 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Walsh Group by Tom H. Luetkemeyer (Luetkemeyer, Tom) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
18 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Walsh Group. (Luetkemeyer, Tom) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
19 NOTICE by Walsh Group re waiver of service executed 18 (Luetkemeyer, Tom) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
20 NOTICE of Correction regarding attorney appearance 16 . (air, ) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
21 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Walsh Group by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
22 Defendant's ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Walsh Group(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
23 NOTICE by Walsh Group re answer to complaint 22 (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
24 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing held on 10/10/2006. Scheduling conference set for 10/31/2006 at 09:30 AM. In court notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
25 Case number incomplete on document. Joint Proposed Discovery Schedule by James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps (Johnson, Jason) (Entered: 10/26/2006)
26 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Scheduling conference held on 10/31/2006. Parties Proposed Discovery Schedule 25 is adopted. Non−expert class certification discovery to be completed by 6/15/2007. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification due by 11/16/2007; response due by 12/14/2007; reply due by 1/28/2008. Status hearing set for 1/23/2007 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
27 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Status hearing held on 1/23/2007 and continued to 3/6/2007 at 09:30 AM.In court notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
28 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Status hearing held on 3/6/2007 and continued to 6/12/2007 at 09:30 AM.In court notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/06/2007)
29 MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps for leave to appear as Attorney (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
30 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion for leave to appear, 29 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/29/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
31 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file additional appearance of Peter L. Currie on their behalf 29 is granted.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
32 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps by Peter Lawrence Currie (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
33 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for extension of time to Answer Outstanding Discovery and to Extend Discovery Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Delaney,

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04/27/2007 04/30/2007 05/01/2007 05/01/2007 05/03/2007
06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/18/2007 06/19/2007 06/21/2007
06/26/2007 08/14/2007 11/06/2007 11/06/2007

Aimee) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
34 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of extension of time 33 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/3/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
35 NOTICE by Robert M. Foote of Change of Address (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
36 NOTICE by Kathleen Currie Chavez of Change of Address (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
37 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps by John Craig Ireland (Ireland, John) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
38 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Defendant's motion for extension of time to answer outstanding discovery and to extend discovery schedule 33 is granted. Defendant is given 14 days to complete all outstanding written discovery. Non−expert class certification discovery to be completed by 7/16/2007. Plaintiffs' report regarding class certification due by 8/16/2007. Defendant to complete deposition(s) of plaintiffs' class certification expert(s) by 9/7/2007.Defendant's report regarding class certification due by 10/8/2007. Plaintiffs to complete deposition(s) of defendant's class certification expert(s) by 10/29/2007. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to be filed by 11/30/2007; response due by 12/31/2007; reply due by 1/28/2008; ruling will issue by mail.Status hearing set for 8/14/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
39 MOTION by Plaintiff Wallace Bolden for extension of time to complete discovery (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
40 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 39 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/21/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
41 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 39 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/21/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
43 MOTION by Plaintiffs counsel Maury S. Weiner to withdraw (cdy, ) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
42 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Joint motion for extension of time to extend discovery schedule 39 is granted. Non−expert class certification discovery to be completed by 11/16/2007. Plaintiffs' report regarding class certification due by 12/16/2007. Defendant to complete deposition of plaintiffs' class certification expert by 1/16/2008. Defendant's report regarding class certification due by 2/6/2008. Plaintiffs to complete deposition of defendant's class certification expert by 3/5/2008. Plaintiff's motion for class certification due by 4/2/2008. Defendant's reponse to plaintiff's motion for class certification due by 5/2/2008; plaintiff's reply due by 6/2/2008.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
44 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Motion of Maury S. Weiner to withdraw 43 is granted. Maury S. Weiner is withdrawn as attorney of record for plaintiff in this case Attorney Maury S. Weiner terminated. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
45 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing held and continued to 11/8/2007 at 9:30a.m.Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 08/14/2007)
46 MOTION by Plaintiff Wallace Bolden for extension of time to complete discovery (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 11/06/2007)
47 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 46 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/8/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 11/06/2007)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 16 of 29

11/07/2007 11/08/2007 11/08/2007
02/11/2008 02/11/2008 02/14/2008
05/07/2008 05/07/2008 05/13/2008
05/23/2008 06/04/2008
06/04/2008 07/22/2008 07/22/2008

48 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps by Adam L. Gill (Gill, Adam) (Entered: 11/07/2007)
49 CERTIFICATE of Service by Adam L. Gill on behalf of all plaintiffs (Gill, Adam) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
50 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Status hearing stricken and reset to 2/14/2008 at 09:30 AM. Joint motion to extend discovery schedule 46 is granted. Non−expert class certification discovery to be completed by 2/14/2008. Plaintiffs' report regarding class certification to be filed by 3/17/2008. Defendant to complete deposition of plaintiffs' class certification expert by 4/15/2008. Defendant's report regarding class certification due by 5/6/2008. Plaintiffs' to complete deposition of defendant's class certification expert due by 6/3/2008. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to be filed by 7/1/2008; response due by 7/31/2008; reply due by 9/8/2008.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/09/2007)
51 MOTION by Plaintiff Wallace Bolden for extension of time to complete discovery (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
52 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 51 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/14/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
53 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan H. Lefkow :Joint motion to extend discovery schedule 51 is granted. Date by which non−expert discovery will close is extended to 5/13/2008. The remaining scheduling dates will be reset at the next status hearing. Status hearing stricken and reset to 5/13/2008 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
54 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for extension of time to complete discovery and enter agreed protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
55 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 54 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/13/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 05/07/2008)
56 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Joint motion to extend discovery and enter agreed protective order 54 is granted. Parties shall submit a proposed revised scheduling order resetting any effected scheduling dates from the Court's orders of 11/8/2007 and 2/14/2008. Parties shall submit a proposed protective order incorporating the Court's required language listed on the Court's web site. These two proposed orders shall be submitted to chambers no later than 5/21/2008. Status hearing reset to 8/26/2008 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
57 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE Order. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/23/2008.(lcw, ) (Entered: 05/27/2008)
58 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Enter Amended Agreed Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs' expert report due by 10/30/2008. Defendants' expert report is due by 1/9/2009. Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert due by 3/9/2009. Plaintiffs' class certification motion due by 5/11/2009; response due by 6/11/2009; reply due by 7/13/2009; ruling will issued by mail. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/06/2008)
59 AMENDED AGREED SCHEDULING ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/4/2008:(ca, ) (Entered: 06/06/2008)
60 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps to withdraw as attorney (Johnson, Jason) (Entered: 07/22/2008)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Jason M. Johnson for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 60 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/26/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Johnson, Jason) (Entered: 07/22/2008)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 17 of 29

08/05/2008 08/26/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 10/02/2008 12/16/2008 12/16/2008 12/17/2008 12/18/2008 04/28/2009 05/27/2009 05/29/2009 06/16/2009 07/08/2009 07/09/2009
07/09/2009

62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion of Jason M. Johnson to withdraw as counsel 60 is granted. Jason M. Johnson is withdrawn as counsel for plaintiffs. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
63 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 8/26/2008 and continued to 10/30/2008 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/28/2008)
64 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for extension of time to complete discovery (Luetkemeyer, Tom) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
65 NOTICE of Motion by Tom H. Luetkemeyer for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 64 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/2/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Luetkemeyer, Tom) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
66 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Joint motion for extension of time 64 is granted. Non−expert discovery ordered closed by 12/31/2008. Status hearing of 10/30/2008 reset for 12/18/2008 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
67 MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps for extension of time to complete discovery (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 12/16/2008)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 67 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/18/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 12/16/2008)
69 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Walsh Group by Scott M Gilbert (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 12/17/2008)
70 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Joint motion for extension of time to complete discovery 67 is granted. Discovery deadline extended to 4/28/2009. Status hearing stricken and reset for 4/28/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
71 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 4/28/2009 and continued to 5/28/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
72 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing reset for 5/29/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
73 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 5/29/2009 and continued to 7/9/2009 at 09:30 AM to set a final schedule if case has not been resolved.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
74 NOTICE by Aaron Benjamin Maduff of Change of Address (Maduff, Aaron) (Entered: 06/16/2009)
75 JOINT PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER by James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
76 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 7/9/2009 and continued to 9/10/2009 at 9:30 a.m. Enter Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs motion to compel to be filed by 7/31/2009; responses to be filed by 8/14/2009; reply to be filed by 8/28/2009. Fact discovery closes 11/30/2009. Parties will disclose their respective experts by 12/1/2009. Expert reports to be exchanged by 12/18/2009. Rebutall expert reports are due by 1/22/2010. Expert discovery closes 2/19/2010. Plaintiff's motion for class certification to be filed by 3/5/2010; response to be filed by 4/5/2010; reply to be filed by 4/30/2010. [For further detail see separate order(s).] Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
77 SCHEDULING ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/9/2009(ca, ). (Entered: 07/14/2009)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 18 of 29

07/31/2009 07/31/2009
07/31/2009 07/31/2009 08/06/2009 08/07/2009 08/14/2009 08/14/2009
08/17/2009
08/18/2009 08/28/2009 09/09/2009 11/19/2009

78 MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps to compel DISCOVERY (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
79 MEMORANDUM by James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps in support of motion to compel 78 DISCOVERY (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q)(Currie, Peter) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
80 MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps for leave to file instanter brief in excess of fifteen pages (Currie, Peter) Modified on 8/3/2009 (cdy, ). (Entered: 07/31/2009)
81 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion for leave to file instanter brief in excess of fifteen pages, 80 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/13/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) Modified on 8/3/2009 (cdy, ). (Entered: 07/31/2009)
83 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Maria Valdez for all discovery motions and discovery supervision Signed by Executive Committee on 8/6/09.(ca, ) (Entered: 08/11/2009)
82 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file instanter brief in excess of 15 pages 80 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion to compel 78 is being referred to Magistrate Judge Valdez and is removed from this Court's motion call of 8/13/2009.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
84 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file instanter brief in excess of 15 pages (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
85 RESPONSE by Walsh Groupin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps to compel DISCOVERY 78 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8)(Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
86 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Parties having agreed on a briefing schedule to Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery 78 as follows: Response to be filed 8/14/09; Reply to be filed 8/29/09. The said motion is taken under advisement. The parties will be notified if ruling on motion will be needed. MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file instanter brief in excess of 15 pages 84 is granted. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
87 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: Minute entry dated 8/17/09 document number 86 is amended to reflect correction of date as follows: "Reply to be filed 8/28/09." Order to stand in all other respects."Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
88 REPLY by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − E)(Currie, Peter) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
89 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing of 9/10/2009 reset for 11/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
90 MOTION by Plaintiffs James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps to Strike the Current Scheduling Order and Extend Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Currie, Peter) Modified on 11/20/2009 (ca, ). (Entered: 11/19/2009)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 19 of 29

11/19/2009 11/20/2009 11/23/2009 11/23/2009 11/24/2009
11/24/2009 12/08/2009
01/28/2010 02/25/2010 03/10/2010 04/01/2010 04/08/2010 04/20/2010
05/04/2010
05/04/2010 05/11/2010 05/13/2010

91 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion to strike, 90 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
92 Incorrect PDF (Johnson, Herman). Modified on 11/23/2009 (ca, ). (Entered: 11/20/2009)
93 NOTICE of Correction regarding 92 (ca, ). (Entered: 11/23/2009)
94 UNOPPOSED MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Wallace Bolden to withdraw Herman N. Johnson, Jr. as Counsel for the Plaintiffs (Johnson, Herman) Modified on 11/24/2009 (ca, ). (Entered: 11/23/2009)
95 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held and continued to 1/28/2010 at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to strike scheduling order 90 is granted. Enter order. The 7/9/2009 scheduling order is stricken. Scheduling conference is set for 1/28/2010 at 9:30 a.m. to set a new discovery schedule. [For further detail see separate order(s).] Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
96 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/24/2009(ca, ). (Entered: 11/25/2009)
97 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Maria Valdez: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery 78 is granted in part, denied in part, and denied as moot in part. (For further details see minute order.)Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 12/08/2009)
98 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 1/28/2010 and continued to 2/25/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
99 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 2/25/2010. Scheduling Conference set for 4/1/2010 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
100 NOTICE by Kathleen Currie Chavez of Change of Address (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 03/10/2010)
101 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Scheduling conference held on 4/1/2010 and continued to 4/20/2010 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
102 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw Herman N. Johnson, Jr. as counsel for plaintiffs 94 is granted. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/09/2010)
103 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Scheduling conference held on 4/20/2010. Joint oral motion to extend discovery deadline is granted to 7/20/2010. Status hearing set for 7/13/2010 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/20/2010)
104 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plts' Rule 26 Disclosures, # 2 Exhibit Def's Rule 26 Disclosures, # 3 Exhibit December 8, 2009 Court Order, # 4 Exhibit Plts' April 19, 2010 Letter)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
105 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion for protective order, 104 before Honorable Maria Valdez on 5/11/2010 at 09:45 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 05/04/2010)
106 Re− NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion for protective order, 104 before Honorable Maria Valdez on 5/13/2010 at 09:45 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
107 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Motion hearing held on 5/13/2010. The parties have resolved the outstanding issues after the parties have meet and confer. Therefore, Defendant's motion for protective order 104 is withdrawn. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 20 of 29

07/13/2010 09/16/2010 09/24/2010 09/24/2010 10/06/2010
10/06/2010 11/05/2010 11/05/2010 11/10/2010 11/10/2010 11/15/2010 11/16/2010
11/29/2010
11/29/2010

108 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 7/13/2010 and continued to 9/16/2010 at 08:30 AM. Discovery deadline extended to 9/20/2010. This is the final extension. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
109 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Defendant fails to appear.Status hearing held and continued to 11/18/2010 at 08:30 AM. The parties are directed to meet and confer on a discovery completion schedule and class certification briefing schedule. The parties are directed to file a written report by 9/24/2010.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
110 PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED SCHEDULING PLAN by Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
111 STATUS Report and Proposed Schedule by Walsh Group (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
112 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Enter Scheduling Order. Fact discovery will close on 11/1/2010. Plaintiffs will disclose their experts and respective expert reports by 11/1/2010; defendant will disclose its experts and respective expert reports by 12/1/2010. Any rebuttal experts must be disclosed with respective expert reports by 1/14/2011. Expert discovery will close on 2/14/2011. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification to be filed by 2/1/2011; response due by 3/1/2011; reply due by 3/15/2011.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/06/2010)
113 SCHEDULING ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/6/2010:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 10/06/2010)
114 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for extension of time to disclose experts (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
115 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of extension of time 114 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/16/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
116 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to strike Dr. Smith's Report and Opinions Relating to Failure to Promote (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Dr. Smith Expert Reports, # 2 Exhibit Unreported Decisions, # 3 Exhibit EEOC Charges, # 4 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Interrogatory Answers)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
117 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion to strike, 116 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/16/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
118 RESPONSE by Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma Whitein Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for extension of time to disclose experts 114 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B)(Currie, Peter) (Entered: 11/15/2010)
119 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 11/16/2010. Defendant's motion for extension of time for expert disclosure 114 is granted as stated on the record. Parties are to submit a proposed revised scheduling order to chambers via the proposed order mailbox on Judge Lefkow's website by 11/23/2010. Defendant's motion to strike Dr. Smith's report and opinions 116 is denied as stated on the record. Status hearing of 11/18/2010 stricken and reset for 1/25/2011 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
120 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The Joint Proposed Scheduling plan is adopted. Defendant will disclose any expert and expert reports on or before December 22, 2010. The Parties' rebuttal reports are due on or before January 21, 2011. Expert discovery closes on February 11, 2011. Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification will be filed on or before March 1, 2011; response due by 4/1/2011; reply due by 4/15/2011. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
121 JOINT Proposed Scheduling Plan by Parties(ca, ). (Entered: 12/01/2010)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 21 of 29

01/25/2011 02/21/2011 02/21/2011 02/24/2011 03/08/2011 03/09/2011
03/09/2011 03/09/2011 03/11/2011 03/14/2011
04/04/2011

122 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 1/25/2011. Further status hearing will be set after ruling on plaintiff's motion for class certification, which is due on March 1, 2011.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/25/2011)
123 JOINT MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White to amend BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON CLASS CERTIFICATION (Currie, Peter) Modified on 2/22/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 02/21/2011)
124 NOTICE of Motion by Peter Lawrence Currie for presentment of motion to amend/correct, 123 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/24/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 02/21/2011)
125 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Joint motion to amend briefing schedule on class certification 123 is granted. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is due March 8, 2011; Defendant's Response to Motion for Class Certification is due April 8, 2011; and Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification is due April 22, 2011.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
126 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White for Class Certification (Foote, Robert) Modified on 3/9/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 03/08/2011)
127 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White for leave to file instanter brief in excess of fifteen pages (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit 19, # 21 Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit 21, # 23 Exhibit 22, # 24 Exhibit 23, # 25 Exhibit 24, # 26 Exhibit 25, # 27 Exhibit 26, # 28 Exhibit 27, # 29 Exhibit 28, # 30 Exhibit 29, # 31 Exhibit 30, # 32 Exhibit 31, # 33 Exhibit 32, # 34 Exhibit 33, # 35 Exhibit 34, # 36 Exhibit 35, # 37 Exhibit 36, # 38 Exhibit 37, # 39 Exhibit 38, # 40 Exhibit 39, # 41 Exhibit 40)(Foote, Robert) Modified on 3/10/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 03/09/2011)
128 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White for class certification CORRECTED (Foote, Robert) Modified on 3/10/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 03/09/2011)
129 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion to file instanter,,, 127 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/15/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 03/09/2011)
130 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion to file instanter brief in excess of fifteen pages 127 is granted. Response to plaintiffs' corrected motion for class certification 128 due by 4/12/2011; reply due by 4/26/2011; ruling by mail. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/11/2011)
131 MEMORANDUM by Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White in support of motion to certify class, 128 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40)(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 03/14/2011)
132 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 04/04/2011)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 22 of 29

04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011
04/13/2011 04/19/2011
05/17/2011

133 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file excess pages for Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Testimony of Stan V. Smith, PhD (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
134 Defendant's NOTICE of Motion by Scott M Gilbert for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 133 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/19/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
135 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to bar Expert Report and Testimony of Stan V. Smith, PhD (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
136 MEMORANDUM of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Testimony of Stan V. Smith, Ph.D. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
137 Defendant's NOTICE of Motion by Scott M Gilbert for presentment of motion to bar 135 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/19/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
138 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to strike the EEOC Investigation Memorandum and Determinations Relied Upon in Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
139 Defendant's NOTICE of Motion by Scott M Gilbert for presentment of motion to strike 138 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/19/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
140 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file instanter brief in excess of fifteen pages for its Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Gilbert, Scott) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 4/13/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 04/12/2011)
141 Defendant's NOTICE of Motion by Scott M Gilbert for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 140 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/19/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Gilbert, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
142 RESPONSE Brief by Walsh Group in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White for class certification 128 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31)(Gilbert, Scott)(Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 4/13/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 04/12/2011)
143 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White by Matthew J. Herman (Herman, Matthew) (Entered: 04/13/2011)
144 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 4/19/2011. Defendant's motion for leave to file instanter memorandum in support of motion to exclude and bar 135 in excess of fifteen pages 133 is granted up to seventeen pages. Defendant's motion for leave to file instanter response brief to plaintiffs' motion for class certification 128 in excess of fifteen pages 140 is granted up to forty−nine pages. Plaintiffs are to file responses to motion to exclude and bar 135 and motion to strike 138 within the reply in support of the motion for class certification 128 . Plaintiffs' oral motion to extend time to file reply brief is granted to 5/17/2011. Plaintiffs' oral motion to file brief in excess of fifteen pages is granted up to but not more than what defendant is being allowed. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
145 RESPONSE by Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma Whitein Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to strike the EEOC Investigation Memorandum and Determinations Relied Upon in

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 23 of 29

06/07/2011
06/07/2011 06/07/2011 06/07/2011 06/07/2011 06/07/2011 06/07/2011
06/07/2011 06/13/2011 06/13/2011 06/13/2011 06/14/2011

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification 138 , MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to bar Expert Report and Testimony of Stan V. Smith, PhD 135 CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WALSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANYS MOTION TO STRIKE EEOC INVESTIGATIVE MEMORANDUM ANDDETERMINATIONS RELIED UPON IN PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, MOTION TO EXCLUDE AND BAR THE EXPERT REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF STAN V. SMITH, PH.D., AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42)(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 05/17/2011)
146 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures, Undisclosed Witnesses and Improper Charge Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Plts' Initial Disclosures, # 2 Exhibit B− Plts' Supplemental Disclosures, # 3 Exhibit C− Group Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit D− Plts' Second Suppl. Disclosures, # 5 Exhibit E− Group Exhibit)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
147 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion to strike, 146 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/14/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
148 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file Sur−Reply In Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendant's Sur−Reply)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
149 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion for leave to file 148 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/14/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
150 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to strike Declaration of Dr. Stan Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Declaration of Dr. Stan Smith)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
151 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion to strike 150 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/14/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
152 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group for leave to file Reply Briefs In Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike EEOC Investigation Memorandum and Determination and Motion to Strike Report and Testimony of Dr. Stan Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Reply Brief In Support of Motion to Strike EEOC Investigation Memorandum and Determination, # 2 Exhibit 2− Reply Brief In Support of Motion to Strike Report and Testimony of Dr. Stan Smith)(Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
153 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion for leave to file, 152 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/14/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 06/07/2011)
154 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendant's motion for leave to file reply briefs in support of motion to strike EEOC materials and Daubert motion 152 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/13/2011)
155 REPLY Brief by Defendant Walsh Group in Support of its Motion to strike the EEOC Investigation Memorandum and Determinations 138 (ca, ). (Entered: 06/14/2011)
156 REPLY Brief by Defendant Walsh Group in Support of its Motion to Exclude the Expert Report and Testimony of Stan V. Smith, Ph.D 135 (ca, ). (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 6/14/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 06/14/2011)
157 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 6/14/2011. Defendant's motions to strike 146 , 150 are denied for the reasons stated on the record.

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 24 of 29

06/14/2011 07/29/2011
07/29/2011 08/04/2011 08/18/2011
10/21/2011 01/25/2012 01/25/2012 01/31/2012 02/09/2012 02/09/2012 02/16/2012 02/17/2012
02/17/2012

Defendant's motion for leave to file a sur−reply in opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification instanter 148 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
158 SUR−REPLY by Defendant Walsh Group in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class certification (ca, ). (Entered: 06/16/2011)
159 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to supplement the Record based upon the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #1− Wal−Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes decision)(Delaney, Aimee) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 8/1/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 07/29/2011)
160 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion to supplement 159 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/4/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
161 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendant's motion to supplement record based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision on Wal−Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. 159 is granted. Plaintiffs have until 8/18/2011 to file a brief memorandum regarding this decision.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
162 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White To Defendant's Motion to Supplement Record based upon the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Wal−mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al (Foote, Robert) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 8/19/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 08/18/2011)
163 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Honorable Maria Valdez no longer referred to the case.Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 10/21/2011)
164 MOTION by Defendant Walsh Group to supplement the REcord Based on Application of the United States Supreme Court Decision Wal−Mart v. Dukes (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
165 NOTICE of Motion by Aimee Elizabeth Delaney for presentment of motion to supplement 164 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/31/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 01/25/2012)
166 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 1/31/2012. Defendant's motion to supplement the record 164 is granted. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/31/2012)
167 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White to supplement the Record (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
168 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion to supplement, 167 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/16/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
169 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement the record in response to defendant's motion for leave to supplement the record 167 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
170 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White to supplement the Record in Response to Walsh's Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record Based Upon Application of Wal−Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 02/17/2012)
171 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion 170 is considered plaintiff's supplement in response to defendant's motion for leave to supplement the record 167 .Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/17/2012)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 25 of 29

02/29/2012
02/29/2012 03/05/2012
03/05/2012 03/09/2012 03/30/2012
03/30/2012 03/30/2012
03/30/2012 03/30/2012 04/24/2012 04/24/2012 04/26/2012 05/01/2012 05/08/2012
05/08/2012 05/15/2012

172 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White to supplement the Record Based Upon the 7th Circuit's Reversal of McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Foote, Robert) (Entered: 02/29/2012)
173 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion to supplement, 172 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/6/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 02/29/2012)
174 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record Based Upon the 7th Circuits Reversal of McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch. 172 is granted. Defendant may file a brief response to the supplement by 3/9/2012.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
175 SUPPLEMENT to the record based upon the 7th Circuits Reversal of McReynolds V. Merrill Lynch. (mr, ) (Entered: 03/06/2012)
176 RESPONSE by Defendant Walsh Group to supplement 175 to the Record based on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch (Delaney, Aimee) (Entered: 03/09/2012)
177 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Enter Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in the Opinion and Order, plaintiffs' motion for class certification [#128] is granted in part and denied in part. Status hearing is set for 5/1/2012 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
178 OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/30/2012:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
179 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Enter Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in the Opinion and Order, defendant's motion to strike Smith's report and testimony [#135] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion to strike the EEOC Investigative Memorandum and EEOC Determinations [#138] is denied.Mailed notice(mad, ) (dl, ). (Entered: 03/30/2012)
180 OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/30/2012:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
181 NOTICE of Correction regarding document number 179 . (dl, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)
182 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Wallace Bolden to withdraw as attorney by John Ireland (Ireland, John) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
183 NOTICE of Motion by John Craig Ireland for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 182 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/26/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Ireland, John) (Entered: 04/24/2012)
184 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion of John C. Ireland for leave to withdraw his appearance on behalf of plaintiffs 182 is granted effective 6/11/2007 nunc pro tunc. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 04/30/2012)
185 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 5/1/2012. Case stayed pending appeal. Parties will notify the Court when a decision has been rendered.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/02/2012)
186 MOTION by Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White, Defendant Walsh Group to withdraw (Gill, Adam) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
187 NOTICE of Motion by Adam L. Gill for presentment of motion to withdraw 186 before Honorable Joan Humphrey − Mag Lefkow on 5/15/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Gill, Adam) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
188 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion of Adam L. Gill to withdraw his appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs 186 is granted. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 05/17/2012)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 26 of 29

05/17/2012
05/21/2012 07/17/2012 07/17/2012 07/17/2012 08/30/2012
08/30/2012 08/30/2012 09/18/2012 10/15/2012 10/30/2012 11/26/2012
11/27/2012
11/27/2012 11/27/2012
11/27/2012 11/28/2012

189 ORDER from USCA regarding notice of appeal no. 12−8013: IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Leave to Appeal is GRANTED. Petitioners shall pay the required appellate fees to the clerk of the district court within seven days from the entry of this order. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(d)(1). Once the district court notifies this court that the fees have been paid, the appeal will be entered on this court's general docket. (mr, ) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
191 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal ; USCA Case No. 12−2205. (mr, ) (Entered: 05/22/2012)
192 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal (USCA no. 12−2205). (gel, ) (Entered: 07/17/2012)
193 NOTICE to transmit record on appeal (mr, ) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
194 USCA RECEIVED on 7/17/2012 the long record regarding notice of appeal (gel, ) (Entered: 07/18/2012)
195 MANDATE of USCA dated 8/8/2012 regarding notice of appeal; USCA No. 12−2205; The order certifying two multi−site classes is REVERSED, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (mr, ) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
196 OPINION of USCA regarding notice of appeal; USCA No. 12−2205, argued 7/24/2012, decided 8/8/2012. (mr, ) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
197 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit regarding the record on appeal in USCA no. 12−2205; No record to be returned. (mr, ) (Entered: 08/31/2012)
198 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
199 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing set for 10/30/2012 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/15/2012)
200 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 10/30/2012 and continued to 11/27/2012 at 8:30 A.M. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
201 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White by Michael D. Wong (Wong, Michael) (Entered: 11/26/2012)
202 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 11/27/2012. By agreement of the parties, case referred to Magistrate Judge Valdez for a settlement conference. Status hearing continued to 3/5/2013 at 8:30 A.M. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
203 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Maria Valdez for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: a settlement conference. Mailed notice by judge's staff.(srb,) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
204 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: This case has been referred to Judge Valdez to conduct a settlement conference. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order of Settlement Conference found on the Judge's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. The parties shall jointly contact the courtroom deputy, Yolanda Pagan, at 312/408−5135 with mutually agreeable dates or appear at 10:00 a.m. on 12/6/12 to set a settlement conference date. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship.Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
205 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Status hearing set 11/6/12 in Court's calendar is stricken. Parties shall appear for status on 12/6/12 pursuant to minute entry 204 . Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
206 SUGGESTION of Death as to Plaintiff Wallace Bolden (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 11/28/2012)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 27 of 29

11/29/2012 11/29/2012 11/30/2012 12/05/2012 12/06/2012
12/06/2012 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 01/24/2013 01/24/2013 01/24/2013 01/30/2013 01/30/2013 02/04/2013 03/04/2013 03/05/2013

207 MOTION by Plaintiff Wallace Bolden to substitute party (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
208 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion to substitute party 207 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/6/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
209 NOTICE of Motion by Robert M. Foote for presentment of motion to substitute party 207 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/6/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
210 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White by Alexios James Dravillas (Dravillas, Alexios) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
211 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 12/6/12. Settlement conference set for 3/5/13 at 2:00 p.m. Judge Valdez requires full compliance with the Court's Standing Order on Settlement Conference found on Judge Valdez's website available at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov, or the parties can contact courtroom deputy, Yolanda Pagan, at 312/408−5135 for a copy. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Court's Standing Order may result in the unilateral cancellation of the settlement conference by the Court. Absent leave from the Court, cancellation will result if the Plaintiff fails to submit to chambers copies of the settlement letters four days prior to the settlement conference. Because of the volume of settlement conferences conducted by Judge Valdez, once a settlement conference date has been agreed upon, no continuance will be granted without a motion showing extreme hardship. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
212 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Plaintiff's Motion for substitution of party 207 is granted. Jacquetta Bolden is substituted for Wallace Bolden as plaintiff in this action. No appearance necessary on 12/6/2012. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
213 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Jacquetta Bolden, Wallace Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White to withdraw as attorney (Wong, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
214 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Wong for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 213 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/30/2013 at 09:00 AM. (Wong, Michael) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
215 NOTICE by Robert M. Foote of Change of Address and Change of Firm Name (Foote, Robert) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
216 NOTICE by Alexios James Dravillas of Change of Address and Change of Firm Name (Dravillas, Alexios) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
217 NOTICE by Matthew J. Herman of Change of Address and Change of Firm Name (Herman, Matthew) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
218 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
219 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion of Michael D. Wong to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff 213 is granted. Attorney Michael D. Wong terminated. Mailed notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
220 NOTICE by Kathleen Currie Chavez of Change of Address And Notice of Firm Name Change (Chavez, Kathleen) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
221 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 3/5/2013 is stricken and reset for 4/2/2013 at 08:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
222 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez:Settlement conference held on 3/5/2013. Matter set for continued settlement conference on 4/9/2013 at 02:00 PM.Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 03/06/2013)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 28 of 29

03/25/2013 04/09/2013 04/17/2013 04/18/2013 04/26/2013 05/09/2013 05/14/2013 05/20/2013
05/28/2013 06/11/2013
06/20/2013 06/27/2013 09/12/2013 11/07/2013 11/08/2013 11/19/2013

223 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 4/2/2013 reset for 4/18/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
224 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez:Settlement conference held on 4/9/2013. Parties are directed to meet and confer on continued settlement conference setting and jointly contact Yolanda Pagan at 312−408−5135 no later than 4/17/13. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 04/11/2013)
225 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jacquetta Bolden, Gregory Chism, Donald Duncan, Lindell Epps, James Gage, Marvin Green, Terrance Jackson, Joe Jones, Eddie Lucas, Guy Sutton, Jackie White, Zelma White by Alexander Helme Caron (Caron, Alexander) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
226 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 4/18/2013 and continued to 5/30/2013 at 08:30 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/18/2013)
227 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Continued Settlement Conference set for 5/9/2013 at 02:00 p.m. in Courtroom 1041. Defendant's are granted leave to appear by phone. Counsel shall jointly call Chambers at 312−435−5690 and press no. 3. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 04/26/2013)
228 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Settlement conference held on 5/9/2013 and continued. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
229 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Continued Settlement Conference set for 5/20/2013 at 02:00 p.m. in Courtroom 1041. Defendants are granted leave to appear by phone. Counsel for defendant shall be present. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 05/14/2013)
230 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez: Settlement conference held on 5/20/2013. Parties reached settlement agreement. Settlement agreement was heard in open Court under seal. Any request for transcript will require leave of Court prior to ordering transcripts. Status hearing set for 6/11/2013 at 10:00 a.m. on report of settlement. If settlement documents are finalized prior to 6/11/13, the status will be stricken. Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
231 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 5/30/2013 stricken and reset for 6/20/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
232 MINUTE entry before Honorable Maria Valdez:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 6/11/2013. Counsel for Plaintiff advised the Court that parties are completing the settlement documents and will be filing their dismissal before the District Court shortly. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Honorable Maria Valdez no longer referred to the case.Mailed notice (yp, ) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
233 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 6/20/2013 and continued to 9/12/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/20/2013)
234 NOTICE by Peter Lawrence Currie of Change of Address (Currie, Peter) (Entered: 06/27/2013)
235 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 9/12/2013 and continued to 12/12/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
236 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Wallace Bolden to withdraw as attorney Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff (Caron, Alexander) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
237 NOTICE of Motion by Alexander Helme Caron for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 236 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/19/2013 at 08:30 AM. (Caron, Alexander) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
238 ORDER Entered by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/19/2013: Motion of Alexander H. Caron for leave to withdraw as attorney for plaintiff 236 is granted. Mailed notice (a previously misplaced document.) (tlm) (Entered: 12/11/2013)

Case: 1:06-cv-4104 As of: 11/03/2016 10:31 PM CDT 29 of 29

12/12/2013

239 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 12/12/2013. Parties report that the case has settled. Joint oral motion to dismiss is granted. Case dismissed pursuant to settlement. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/12/2013)