Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 219 Filed: 04/17/06 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:2400

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 03 C 2463

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Judge Virginia M. Kendall

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Eleven plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly

situated against the City of Chicago (“the City”), the Chicago Police Department (“the CPD”), and

various Command Personnel and officers of the CPD (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the

State of Illinois. Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages and injunctive relief arise from Defendants’

handling of a war protest march that occurred on March 20, 2003 in Chicago. Because Plaintiffs

have met their burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, their Motion for Class Certification

is granted.

The Court certifies a class consisting of all persons who were surrounded by Defendants on

March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe

Way (“the bounded area”), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. The Court also certifies

three subclasses:

Subclass A-1 is defined as all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the

bounded area for one and a half to three hours before they were allowed to leave the area.

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Subclass A-2 is defined as all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were released without being charged with any crime or ordinance violation.
Subclass A-3 consists of all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were charged with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions of bond, required to appear in court on criminal charges and later the charges against them were dismissed in their favor.
Factual Background/Plaintiffs’ Allegations On March 20, 2003, thousands of individuals congregated at Federal Plaza, located on Dearborn Street between Jackson and Adams Avenues in Chicago’s downtown area, for a rally to protest the commencement of the United States war in Iraq. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25). At the end of the rally, the crowd began to march through the streets of downtown Chicago.1 (Compl. ¶ 27). When a group of marchers reached Chicago Avenue, Defendant Command Personnel allegedly issued an order for CPD officers to surround the marchers between Michigan Avenue and Mies Van Der Rohe Way. (Compl. ¶ 38). Plaintiffs allege that they were detained forcefully without instructions and without being allowed to leave the bounded area. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-44). Some of the individuals in the bounded area were not protestors, but were observers or random people on the street that got swept up. (Compl. ¶ 55). After a period of detention, Defendants began to allow some individuals
1 A group of demonstrators marched east to Lake Shore Drive and went north on Lake Shore Drive. (Compl. ¶ 29). Thereafter, the marchers exited Lake Shore Drive and headed west down Oak Street. (Compl. ¶ 30). When the march reached Michigan Avenue on Oak Street, members of the CPD lined up across Michigan Avenue and refused to allow the marchers to proceed south on Michigan Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 31). Many of the marchers that were directed away from Michigan Avenue proceeded eastward and then southward toward Chicago Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 34). The marchers then proceeded west on Chicago Avenue again towards M ichigan Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 36).
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to leave the bounded area. (Compl. ¶ 51). Defendant Command Personnel then allegedly issued an order to arrest the individuals remaining within the bounded area. (Compl. ¶ 45). CPD officers entered the crowd and arrested more than 500 individuals. (Compl. ¶ 47). These arrestees allegedly were given no warning of their arrest, no order to disperse and no opportunity to leave the area prior to their arrest. (Compl. ¶ 49). The arrestees were taken into police custody, handcuffed, escorted to police vehicles and transported to police stations. (Compl. ¶ 50). The male arrestees were taken to 727 East 111th Street and the females were taken to 5555 West Grand Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 57). Plaintiffs allege that the arrestees were confined in overcrowded and overheated cells for periods of time ranging from four to forty hours. (Compl. ¶¶ 59-60). Some arrestees were released because the CPD could not identify the arresting officer. (Compl. ¶ 62). Other arrestees were charged with one misdemeanor count of Reckless Conduct, 720 ILCS § 5/12-5, and detained until they posted bail. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-64). The charges against most of the arrestees were later dismissed. (Compl. ¶ 66).
DISCUSSION I. Requirements for Class Certification under Rule 23
This Court must conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the requirements for certification in Rule 23 are met. See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982); Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). In conducting this rigorous analysis, the Court must “make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.” Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). Such factual and legal inquiries often will require a preliminary inquiry into the merits. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (“[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe beyond the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question”). Delving into the merits is necessary in order that the Court may
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understand the elements of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses and the nature of the evidence that will be presented in adjudicating those claims and defenses. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981). With this understanding, the Court then can determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.
Plaintiffs’ claims may proceed as a class action only if: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Assuming Plaintiffs can meet this initial burden, they also must show that the requirements for one of the subsections of Rule 23(b) is met. Plaintiffs have moved to certify their class under both Rule 23(b)(2), which allows appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief, and Rule 23(b)(3), which permits a class to seek monetary damages. Because the predominant issues in this case center around Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct in seizing and arresting members of the class and any individual issues will not render the class unmanageable, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that certification on their proposed class and subclasses is appropriate under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). II. Caselaw on Mass Arrests and Mass Detentions
Courts in this district uniformly have granted class certification in cases involving the mass arrest or mass detention of individuals. See Patrykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Levett v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 2001 WL 40805, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 315 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Williams v. Brown, 214 F.R.D. 484, 485 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The first in this succession of cases involved a police raid on a Chicago bar frequented
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by homosexual men. See Patrykus, 121 F.R.D. at 360. The plaintiffs alleged that police officers ordered them to lie on the floor for periods ranging from one to three hours and submit to searches. Id. at 360. The defendants argued that a class could not be certified because individual roles and levels of participation among the defendants varied and that different degrees of harassment and injury allegedly were inflicted on the plaintiffs. Id. at 361. The court disagreed and concluded that because the claims all arose from a single event that “[c]ommon questions of fact and law concerning the defendants’ alleged behavior and of law concerning the constitutionality of defendants’ behavior clearly predominate.” Id. at 363.
The next case involved another police raid, this time on a Gypsy community center. See Johns, 145 F.R.D. at 481-82. The court found that common issues predominated where the class members’ claims each arose from the same raid, detention and search. Id. at 484. Again, the defendants focused on the varying degrees of police conduct towards class members as a reason not to certify. The court held that the differing degrees of alleged police misconduct was relevant only the extent of damages and, therefore, could not defeat predominance. Id. at 485.
In Levett v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 2001 WL 40805 at *1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 315 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2001), the court certified a class of individuals who allegedly were detained and searched without cause when entering Lincoln Park High School. While acknowledging that some factual distinctions existed among the class claims, the court still found that because the class claims sought to remedy a common legal grievance and “all center[ed] around th[e] same occurrence of events” common issues would predominate and a class action was the superior method for adjudicating the controversy. Id., 2001 WL 40805 at *3, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 315 at *11.
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The most recent case involved the alleged detention and search of numerous residents of the Stateway Gardens neighborhood in Chicago during a basketball tournament. See Williams, 214 F.R.D. at 485. Finding that the facts were similar to the aforementioned cases, the Court adopted their reasoning and certified the class. Id. at 486. In certifying, the Court noted that the defendants were unable to point to a single case denying certification in a mass detention arising from a single event. Id. Finally, the Court reserved for summary judgment questions regarding the proof of actual injury. Id. at 486-87.
In addition to these cases, a recent case from the District of Columbia involved facts and allegations similar to those presented here. Chang v. United States, 217 F.R.D. 262, 264 (D.D.C. 2003), concerned the events of September 27, 2002, when approximately 3000 to 5000 people demonstrated in the District of Columbia against the policies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States Government. On that date, police surrounded a group of 400 or so demonstrators in General John Pershing Park and arrested them. Id. The plaintiffs, on behalf of the putative class, alleged that they were handcuffed, detained on buses and later transported to a Police Academy Gymnasium for further detention. Id. The plaintiffs alleged, and internal reports revealed, that no lawful order to disperse was given and the class members were arrested without individualized determinations of probable cause. Id. at 267. In opposing certification, the defendants argued that the facts necessary to support the class members’ claims and alleged injuries were too diverse to justify certification.2 Id. at 269-270. But in light of the fact that “all of the
2 “[Federal Defendants] contend that innocent bystanders cannot assert First Amendment claims because they were not present at Pershing Park for the purpose of expressing political views. M oreover, federal defendants suggest that members of the proposed class would include ‘violent and unlawful’ demonstrators and persons who intended and desired to be arrested, as well as bystanders and journalists, thereby leading to vastly different factual and legal assertions and arguments with respect to the existence of probable cause, as well as disparate damages should any constitutional violations be found to have occurred.” Id. at 270.
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arrests occurred at the same place and time, resulting from a single police action in which the putative class members were treated as a group by the defendants,” the Court held that the predominant issue would be the liability for the unlawful detentions and arrests and therefore a class should be certified. Id. at 272.
This Court has “broad discretion” to determine whether class certification is appropriate. See Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir. 1997), citing Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993). And while these cases provide a certain level of guidance, ultimately, this Court must conduct its own rigorous analysis of the facts and claims of this case to determine whether Plaintiffs’ proposed class should be certified. III. Rule 23(a)
Rule 23(a) lists the requirements that must be met for any class certified under Rule 23: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The requirements in Rule 23(a) focus more on the similarities among the facts and legal theories relevant to each class member’s claim than the potential differences between them. And while the requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to overlap, each prong must be satisfied before a class may be certified. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (“[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . . indispensable.”). A. Rule 23(a)(1) – Numerosity
A class may be certified only if it so large that joinder is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Whether joinder is practicable may depend on several factors: “(1) the class size; the geographic dispersion of class members; (3) the type of relief sought by the class; and (4) the practicability of relitigating the common core issue.” Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 216 F.R.D. 424, 431 (N.D. Ill. 2003). While Plaintiffs need not establish the exact number of class members,
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they also cannot rely on pure speculation as to the size of their putative class. See Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989). In terms of numbers, forty often is identified as the number sufficient, but not necessary, to satisfy Rule 23(a). See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n.9 (7th Cir. 1969); Steinbrecher v. Oswego Police Officer Dickey, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
Plaintiffs aver that they currently are aware of 615 individuals in the class and estimate from the record that the class consists of approximately 800 to 850 individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-19). Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits from 250 putative class members. (New Ex. A to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification). Among these affidavits, 70 individuals purportedly belong to subclass A-1; 69 belong to subclass A-2; and 111 belong to subclass A-3. (Id.) The submission of these affidavits removes Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the size of the class from the realm of speculation and demonstrates that the number of potential class members makes their joinder or even joinder of the members of each subclass impracticable. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is met. B. Rule 23(a)(2) – Commonality
In certifying a class, the Court next must determine that its members share common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “A common nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). Such a common nucleus of operative facts can arise when each class member’s claim will depend on the same conduct by the defendants. See Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998); Allen v. City of Chicago, 828 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (commonality requirement met when there is “standardized conduct by defendants toward members of the putative
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class”). Once a common nucleus of facts is identified, commonality will not be upset by “factual variations among class members’ grievances.” Id., citing Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980).
The proposed class and each subclass are based on a common nucleus of operative facts derived from Defendants’ alleged behavior. Proof of each class member’s claim will depend, at a minimum, on whether Defendants’ conduct in surrounding the class members within the bounded area constituted a seizure, whether such a seizure was unreasonable, and whether any officer of sufficient authority and discretion that he can be deemed a policymaker under Monell and its progeny gave the order. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978); Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 1994). The members of subclass A-2 additionally share a common interest in the resolution of questions regarding whether probable cause existed for their arrest, whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed,” whether Defendants may be directed to seal, return and/or destroy all records of class members’ arrests, and whether conditions of confinement fell below reasonable standards. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1991) (standard for qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment cases); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (standard for expungement of police records); Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1996) (standard for conditions of confinement). The members of subclass A-3 share all of these common questions with other class members, plus they have common issues concerning whether Defendants knowingly filed false charges or maliciously prosecuted them. See Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill.2d 504, 512, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1996).
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Thus, a common nucleus of operative facts emerges from Defendants’ conduct in surrounding the class members within the bounded area, issuing orders to arrest, detaining the arrestees and then charging some of them. All of Defendants’ arguments regarding the purportedly distinct factual bases for the class members’ claims are more relevant to predominance, the commonality analysis of Rule 23(a)(2) focuses on Defendants’ conduct and Plaintiffs’ legal theories. The common facts and legal issues relevant to each putative class members’ claim here thus satisfy the commonality prong of Rule 23(a). C. Rule 23(a)(3) – Typicality
The Court now turns to the remaining prongs of Rule 23, prongs which compare the claims of the named plaintiffs to the claims of the putative class as a whole. A named plaintiff’s claim is typical if “it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). Similar to the commonality analysis, certain factual differences may be excused as long as the named representative’s claims are based on the same course of conduct as the class as a whole and the same legal theory. Id. at 232-33; Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 586 (7th Cir. 1982).
The eleven named plaintiffs have claims typical of the class. Each putative class representative alleges that he or she was unreasonably seized when Defendants surrounded the marchers on Chicago Avenue – the fact defining the class and subclass A-1. (Compl. ¶¶ 68-175). Four of the named plaintiffs allege further that CPD arrested them within the bounded area as required for membership in subclass A-2. (Compl. ¶¶ 106-145). Finally, two of the named plaintiffs allege that Defendants submitted false police reports and falsely charged them with misdemeanor
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reckless conduct, the course of conduct underlying the claims for subclass A-3. (Compl. ¶¶ 146175). Defendants do not contest any of these facts, but rather challenge the typicality of the named plaintiffs on the grounds that some of the class members will have been innocent observers, not disobeyed a command to disperse or other directives, not committed other criminal acts, and did not resist arrest.3 Such factual differences do not render the named plaintiffs atypical when, as here, the named plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same event and course of Defendants’ conduct that give rise to the claims of other class members and are based on the same legal theories. See De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232 (“The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members”). After carefully reviewing the evidence in the record, including Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ depositions, the class certification hearing transcripts and all of the exhibits submitted, the Court is confident that the named plaintiffs meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23. D. Rule 23(a)(4) – Adequacy of Representation
The last requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy standard has two distinct components. First, a class representative must have a sufficient stake in the outcome to ensure zealous advocacy and must not have claims antagonistic to or conflicting with the claims of other class members. See Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977). Second,
3 Defendants argue that proof of the named plaintiffs’ claims must resolve, in their entirety, the claims of the remaining class members, effectively requiring no individual issues to exist. To the extent the cases cited by Defendants would require this result, they contradict the language of Rule 23 and are not controlling in this Circuit. See Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018; De La F uen te, 713 F.2d at 232.
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counsel for named plaintiffs must be experienced, qualified, and generally able to conduct the litigation on behalf of the class. See id.
Defendants do not challenge the qualifications of class counsel. As to the adequacy of the class representatives themselves, Defendants raise the same challenges regarding individualized circumstances of arrest and detention that they raised in response to the commonality and typicality prongs. Defendants though have not shown any way in which these alleged individual circumstances make the claims of the named plaintiffs antagonistic to the claims of other class members. While the separate prongs do overlap, the primary focus of the adequacy inquiry is on potentially conflicting interests between the named plaintiffs and the remainder of the class.4 See Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018 (“A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have antagonistic or conflicting claims”). Here, the class representatives “possess the same interest and suffer[ed] the same injury as the class members.” East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891 (1977), citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216, 94 S.Ct. 2925 (1974). The appointment of class representatives for each subclass also diminishes the likelihood that the named plaintiffs will sacrifice certain claims in favor of increased benefits on other claims. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 629 (1997) (denying certification of settlement class where current plaintiffs unfairly bargained away the claims of future plaintiffs). Because each class representative has a sufficient stake in the outcome of this action by virtue of having suffered a common injury and because Plaintiffs have proven that their
4 “The adequacy of representation requirement tend[s] to merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which serve as guideposts for determining whether . . . maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n. 20 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
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claims are not antagonistic to or conflicting with the claims of other class members, the named class plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the class. IV. Rule 23(b)
In addition to satisfying the four requirements in Rule 23(a), a class also must fall within one of the Rule 23(b) categories. See Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs seek certification of classes under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs demand an injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs’ arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files. Plaintiffs also seek a judgment against Defendants for actual, compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). A. Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief when a defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case will not depend on the adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.” Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000). Much of the debate involving certification under Rule 23(b)(2) often centers on whether the relief sought is sufficiently injunctive. In this regard, nonequitable monetary relief may be obtained under Rule 23(b)(2) only if it is “incidental” to the claims for injunctive relief. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999), citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Plaintiffs bring their claims for monetary damages separately under Rule 23(b)(3),
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the relief Plaintiffs request under Rule 23(b)(2) is exclusively injunctive and the only remaining questions are whether Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and whether the remedy sought can be given to the class as a whole without material differentiation.
Plaintiffs seek, on behalf of all class members alike, an injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all records relating to Plaintiffs’ activities on March 20, 2003. “The principle is well established that a court may order the expungement of records, including arrest records, when that remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal rights.” Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As discussed with regard to the Rule 23(a) requirements, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. Thus, if Plaintiffs can prove that Defendants’ conduct violated the constitutional rights of the class members, a common question will arise as to whether Defendants should be compelled to return or destroy all records relating to class members’ activities on March 20, 2003. Accordingly, all class members are certified to seek this injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). B. Rule 23(b)(3)
Plaintiffs also seek to recover a judgment against Defendants for actual, compensatory and punitive damages. Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth the requirements for a class seeking monetary relief. The two overarching requirements are that common issues predominate and that a class action is the superior method for resolving the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In most cases, the greatest hurdle to certification of a class seeking money damages is establishing that common issues will predominate over issues individual to each class member’s claim. This case is no different and the parties focus their arguments for and against certification primarily on this prong of Rule 23.
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1. Predominance
While this Court found the commonality requirement met because of the common nucleus
of facts surrounding each class member’s claims, “the predominance criterion is far more
demanding.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24. Predominance requires not only that common questions
of law or fact exist, but that they “predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The predominance inquiry begins with an examination of the substantive elements of the
class claims and the defenses raised.5 See Simer, 661 F.2d at 672. As to each claim or defense, the
Court must examine rigorously the proof required to substantiate the class allegations and the form
it will take at trial. Id. There is no exact test for predominance. On one side, the existence of
individual issues does not defeat certification automatically. Id. Rule 23(b)(3)’s language itself
requiring predominance assumes that a certain number of individual issues may be present in a class
action. On the other side, a class action will not serve its intended purpose if it degenerates into
separate trials on almost all elements of the class claims. Id. In between these certain guideposts,
the Court must exercise its sound discretion to determine whether issues common to the class
5 Plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for false detentions, arrests, and imprisonments (Compl. ¶¶ 261263; Count I), a 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 claim for violations of the First Amendm ent Right (Compl. ¶¶ 264-267, Count II), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Mo nell policy, practice and custom claim (C omp l. ¶¶ 275 -291 , Count VI), a supplem ental state law claim for violations of the Illinois Constitution (Compl. ¶ 292, Count VII), a supplemental state law claim for false detention, arrest and imprisonment (Compl. ¶¶ 294-296, Count VIII), a supplemental state law claim for conspiracy (Compl. ¶¶ 304-312, Count XI), a supplemental state law claim for Respondeat Superior (Compl. ¶¶ 313314, Count XII), and a supplemental state law claim under 745 ILCS § 10/9-102 (“A local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages (and m ay pay any associated attorney's fees and costs) for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his employment is liable in the manner provided in this Article”) (Compl. ¶¶ 315-317, Count XIII). Additionally, certain individual plaintiffs have brought other claims: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force (Compl. ¶¶ 268-270, Count III), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for Defendants’ deliberate indifference to individuals’ medical needs (Compl. ¶¶ 271-272, Count IV), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deprivation of property (Compl. ¶¶ 273-274, Count V), and a supplemental state law claim for assault and battery (Compl. ¶¶ 297-301, Count IX). Finally, a claim for malicious prosecution is brought on behalf of subclass A-3 (Compl. ¶¶ 302-303, Count X).
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predominate over issues individual to each class member. See Retired Chicago Police, 7 F.3d at 596. A rigorous analysis of the claims, defenses and evidence presented in this case shows that common questions of law and fact predominate over individual issues. a. Fourth Amendment Claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed several violations of class members’ Fourth Amendment rights: Defendants’ unreasonably seized the class by surrounding them on Chicago Avenue, Defendants’ arrested class members without probable cause and Defendants confined class members under unreasonable conditions.
Plaintiffs allege that during the march, no Defendant or member of the CPD advised or warned marchers that it was unlawful for the march to proceed in the streets or on the sidewalks in downtown Chicago. (Compl. ¶ 37). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Command Personnel gave the order for CPD officers to surround the marchers between Michigan Avenue and Mies Van Der Rohe Way. (Compl. ¶ 38). Defendant Command Personnel then allegedly issued orders to arrest individuals within the bounded area; the Defendant Command Personnel’s orders did not specify who to arrest, nor did they grant individual officers discretion not to arrest individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 45, 46). Prior to their arrest, the arrestees allegedly were given no warning of their arrest, an order to disperse or an opportunity to leave the area. (Compl. ¶ 49). (1) Seizure and Arrest
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleges both that Defendants’ decision to surrounded the class members on Chicago Avenue constituted an unreasonable seizure and that Defendants’ subsequent order to arrest individuals within the bounded area lacked probable cause. The Constitution of the United States guarantees that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is measured in light of the totality of the circumstances and balances the degree to which a challenged action infringes on an individual’s privacy and the degree to which the action promotes a legitimate government interest. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (2001); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991) (explaining test for whether a seizure occurred). Separate from the reasonableness of a seizure, a formal arrest requires probable cause. See Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2004). Probable cause exists “if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to a reasonable arresting officer would support the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 643 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, probable cause “is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); see also Anderer v. Jones, 412 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2005).
Defendants’ general contention is that individual justifications for the seizure of the class on Chicago Avenue and the subsequent arrest of some class members will overwhelm any common issues. Defendants first argue that the inherently individualized nature of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test and the totality of the circumstances analysis applied to determining probable cause, preclude any class treatment of these issues. With particular regard to this case, Defendants assert that individual issues of fact regarding the circumstances of each class member’s seizure and arrest prevent a finding that common issues predominate.
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While admittedly there is no static or precise definition of an unreasonable seizure or probable cause, if the decision to seize or arrest a class of individuals is based upon facts and circumstances common to the class then the issue may be adjudicated through a class action. See Dunn v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 367, 377-78 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding class treatment proper for allegations that certain common conditions of detainment were unconstitutional). Were the evidence here to prove that Command Personnel made decisions based upon facts and circumstances common to all class members, the question of whether those facts and circumstances supported the alleged seizure on Chicago Avenue and later arrest of certain class members are properly resolved on a classwide basis.
The deposition testimony of Defendant Command Personnel evinces that they did not rely on individual facts or circumstances when ordering CPD officers to surround the putative class members on Chicago Avenue.6 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit F, ¶¶ 5-9.) Instead, everyone at the location was surrounded regardless of individualized conduct. (Id.) Plaintiffs also cite considerable testimony from Command Personnel as well as individual officers that the order to arrest was based on facts and circumstances common to the class, rather than an individualized assessment of probable cause. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit F, ¶¶ 2-18.)
In response, Defendants point to numerous examples of individual circumstances that would justify arrest. The relevant question though is not whether individual circumstances existed, the relevant question is whether such circumstances were taken into account in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest. Defendants offer little evidence showing that individual officers
6 Defendants cite several examples of criminal acts and other acts of disobedience com mitted by the marchers, but do not contend that only those individuals that committed such acts were included in the bounded area. In fact, Defendants concede that some individuals within the bounded area were innocent bystanders.
18

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were given or exercised discretion in determining whether probable cause existed before making arrests. (See Hrg. Tr. at 154-55, 218-19, 262-63; Hrg. Exs. 37, 38, 39) (describing individual orders to disperse given).7 Along this line, just because the officers did not arrest all of the individuals within the bounded area does not prove that an individualized assessment of probable cause to arrest was made with regard to those individuals that were arrested.8 Finally, Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the claims of those class members who went limp or otherwise resisted arrest is similarly unpersuasive. The Court must judge whether probable cause existed at the time the decision to arrest was made. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964) (“Whether [the defendant’s] arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it”). If the command already had been given to arrest, it is irrelevant whether subsequent circumstances would justify an arrest. A class member’s response to being arrested therefore cannot be at issue in deciding whether probable cause existed to make the arrest.
While sufficient evidence exists to warrant certification of the class’ Fourth Amendment claims, class certification is not the appropriate stage to ultimately resolve the parties’ factual dispute regarding the level of discretion to arrest that Command Personnel gave individual officers or that individual officers exercised. To the extent a merits determination is made later that Command Personnel limited their orders to arrest in a way that required individual officers to determine
7 That an officer gave an order to disperse does not necessarily mean that probable cause existed for an arrest. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kittoe, 229 F.Sup p. 2d 520 , 534 -35 (W .D. V a. 2002) (explaining preced ent on refusal to obey an order to disperse).
8 Several of Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that the police appeared to be arresting those closest to the area’s bou ndaries. See Exhibit 1 to Class Plaintiffs’ Closing Argument in Support of Class Certification, pp. 55-56, 10001, 342-43.
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probable cause then perhaps judgment could not be entered on a classwide basis. Of course, it would not matter what level of discretion Command Personnel granted the individual officers if no facts or circumstances could have justified the arrests. Because common issues regarding the constitutionality of Defendants’ conduct will predominate, the Court grants class certification on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment related to their seizures and arrests. (2) Conditions of confinement
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims related to the length and conditions of their confinement are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff’s Dept., 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2002); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). All the male arrestees were taken to 727 East 111th Street and the females all were taken to 5555 West Grand Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 57). The only material variation in the class members’ detention, excluding the claims brought individually, was the length of detention. The varying lengths of detention do not create individual issues sufficient to prevent a classwide determination of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim related to their conditions of confinement. (3) Qualified Immunity
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when their conduct “could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1079 (7th Cir. 2005). The qualified immunity determination requires a two-step analysis: first, whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a federal constitutional right and, second, if such a violation is asserted, then whether the right so clearly was established at the time of the alleged violation that
20

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a reasonable person would know that his actions were unconstitutional. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2150 (2001). On the date of the events alleged in this case, March 20, 2003, the constitutional right to have any arrest supported by probable cause clearly was established. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 (“Whether [the defendant’s] arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it”). The relevant qualified immunity question is thus whether “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed” to make the arrest. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229. For the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination can be adjudicated prodominately through common issues, the qualified immunity issue is subject to class treatment. See Chang, 217 F.R.D. 262, 270 (D.D.C. 2003), citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Defendants’ defenses of qualified immunity therefore do not preclude certification of the class. b. Monell Claim
Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipality or other local governing body can be sued under § 1983 in three situations: “(1) for an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) for a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, causes a constitutional deprivation, and is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law; or (3) for an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with “final policymaking authority.” Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 1994). The elements of a Monell claim and the recognized contexts for its assertion rely on proof involving the City of Chicago’s policies and practices. Thus, the question of whether
21

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an unconstitutional policy or practice existed creates another common issue that will not depend on facts individual to each class member’s claim and is appropriate for certification. c. Respondeat Superior
“It is well settled that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for the negligent, wilful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer.” Mitchell v. Norman James Construction Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 927, 932, 684 N.E.2d 872, 225 Ill. Dec. 881 (1997). The “scope of employment includes those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incident to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.” Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1495 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 360 (1989); Sunseri v. Puccia, 97 Ill. App. 3d 488, 493, 422 N.E.2d 925, 930, 52 Ill. Dec. 716 (1981).
Reviewing the elements for Plaintiffs’ state law respondeat superior action and the proof necessary to establish that claim, the Court finds common issues will exist regarding whether Defendants’ actions were “committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer” and certification of a class to pursue this claim is appropriate. d. Malicious Prosecution
A malicious prosecution claim requires Plaintiffs to show: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in the favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Swick, 169 Ill.2d at 512. Under
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the second element, the favorable termination must have been terminated in a manner “indicative of the innocence of the accused.” Id. And malice in element four is “the initiation of a prosecution for any reason other than to bring a party to justice.” Salmen v. Kamberos, 206 Ill. App. 3d 686, 691, 565 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1990).
The records demonstrate that virtually all of the charges against individuals arrested on March 20, 2003 in connection with the anti-war demonstration were dismissed. Factually, the record gives no indication that individualized determinations were made as to which arrested class members to pursue charges against. Moreover, the charges against all of the men and all of the women contained language virtually identical to the arrest reports and criminal complaints of the named representatives:
The above subject was arrested for Reckless Conduct in that he endangered the bodily safety of citizens by acting in such a reckless manner so as to disrupt vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic. The defendant acted with total disregard for the personal safety of motorists and pedestrians. (Steven Hudosh’s CPD Arrest Report and Criminal Complaint). The above subject along with 1000's of persons endangered the safety of others in that they blocked access to a fire station, positioned themselves in front of the water pumping station and blocked access to the emergency entrance to Northwestern Hospital and refused to leave after being ordered to do so by police. (Kathleen Gruber’s CPD Arrest Report and Criminal Complaint). Given the standardized language used in the arrest reports and charging documents for each member of this subclass, common questions regarding whether class members’ proceedings were resolved in a manner indicative of innocence, whether probable cause existed, and whether malice was the reason for their prosecutions.
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e. First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 The City of Chicago may regulate Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech and right to peaceably
assemble as long as the limitations are reasonable in terms of time, manner, and place. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989). A common question exists as whether Defendants’ actions in surrounding and arresting the class members constituted an unreasonable restriction on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. An individual question exists as to whether each person within the bounded area actually was exercising their First Amendment rights. Between these two questions, the Court finds that the common question will require significantly more effort to resolve and thus predominates. Accordingly, the First Amendment claims may be brought on behalf of the class. 2. Superiority
A class action should proceed only if it is superior to other methods for adjudicating the claims of the class. Considerations relevant to the superiority of the class action device include: “(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Only the fourth prong gives this Court any pause. As to the manageability of this case, Defendants’ arguments do not convince the Court that a class action would be unmanageable. Almost invariably, a finding of that a class action will be unmanageable flows from a lack of predominating common issues. See Johnston v. HBO Film Management, Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that individual issues would “present
24

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‘unsurmountable’ manageability problems”); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that “the class claims were based on widely divergent facts”). A problem that leads to substantially different forms of proof and separate mini-trials on many of the elements of the class claims. See Johnston, 265 F.3d at 194. In addition, the courts in each of Defendants’ cases found predominance lacking, whereas common issues will predominate in the adjudication of the class claims here. Because each subclass pursues its claims under the same substantive law and their claims will be resolved predominantly through common issues, a class action is the superior method for adjudicating their claims.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER Because the class and each subclass meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), the Court certifies them to pursue appropriate monetary and injunctive relief on each of the claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is granted; and Plaintiffs’ counsel are appointed as counsel for the class under Rule 23(g).

So ordered.

Date: April 17, 2006

___________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall United States District Judge Northern District of Illinois

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EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al, individually

)

and on behalf of others similarly situated,

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)

Plaintiffs, v.

)

Judge:

JUDGECOAR

)

) Magistr~OISTRAr/J~

CITY OF CHICAGO, SUPERINTENDENT )

TERRY G. HILLARD, COMMANDER

)

JOHN R. RISLEY, DEFENDANTS DOE 1-50, )

JURY DEMANDEIIIPJ? 1]
200J

DEFENDANTS DOE 51-100, and

)

DEFENDANTS ROE 1-50,

)

CIVIL RIGHTS CLASS ACTION

)

SEEKING DAMAGES AND

Defendants.

)

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

COMPLAINT

This is a civil rights class action for money damages and injunctive relief, arising under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State of

Illinois, against the City of Chicago (hereinafter, "the City"), Superintendent Hillard,

Commander Risley and other policymakers, and supervisory personnel and officers ofthe

Chicago Police Department (hereinafter "CPD") for false detentions, arrests, imprisonments and

injuries sustained by approximately 800 class members on March 20, 2003, in Chicago, Illinois.

On March 20, 2003, Defendants, acting under the color oflaw, unlawfully detained and

imprisoned the class by "herding," "sweeping" and then "pinning" demonstrators and bystanders

on the comer of Chicago and Michigan Avenues for hours and forcefully prevented the class

from peaceably assembling and speaking freely or leaving the area of a peace rally and march.

Members of the class were also subjected to excessive and unnecessary force that caused injuries.

Further, many in the class were then arrested and imprisoned in police vehicles and subsequently 1

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in jail cells from between four (4) and thirty-six (36) hours. While imprisoned, Plaintiffs were and subjected to arbitrary, unreasonable and unduly punitive confinement conditions.
Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring the Defendants to seal, return and/or destroy any records of plaintiffs' arrests and unlawful restraint of class members, and to restrain the CPD from misusing plastic and metal handcuffs. Plaintiffs also seek money damages for the injuries suffered by false detentions, arrests, imprisonments, the misuse of the handcuffs, and other excessive force and unlawful restraint.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.; the judicial code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a); and the Constitution of the United States. Supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1367. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois as the events complained of occurred in this district.
PARTIES
A. The Plaintiffs. 2. Plaintiffs at all times relevant were and are adult residents of these United States who were in Chicago, Illinois, on March 20, 2003. B. The Defendants. 3. Defendant Terry G. Hillard is, and at all times relevant herein was, the Chief of Police of the City of Chicago, with responsibility for supervising, training, assigning, administrating and controlling all officers and employees of the Chicago Police Department. He is sued individually and in his official capacity.
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4. Defendant Risley and Defendants Doe 1 through 50, at all times relevant herein, were employees ofthe CPD who held supervisory, command and/or policy-making positions, and who participated in the authorization, planning, supervision, and the execution of the police conduct complained of herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants failed, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights, to adequately train and supervise CPD officers who were involved in violating the rights of the Plaintiff class members. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Doe 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs at the present time, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities.
5. Does 51 through 100, at all times relevant herein, were employees ofthe CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants used excessive force on one or more of the Plaintiffs. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Does 51 through 100, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities.
6. Roes I through 50, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained of in the lock up areas at the police stations. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Roe 1 through 50, inclusive,
3

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are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities.
7. At all times relevant herein, Defendants Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe were acting under the color of law, under color of authority and in the scope of their employment as Chicago Police Officers.
8. Each of the Defendants caused, and is responsible for the below- described unlawful conduct and resulting injuries by, among other things, personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so; by authorizing, acquiescing in or setting into motion, policies, practices, plans or actions that led to the unlawful conduct: by failing and refusing with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights to initiate and maintain adequate training and supervision; and by ratifying the unlawful conduct that occurred by agents and officers under their direction and control, including failing to take remedial or disciplinary action.
9. Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the Jaws of the State of Illinois, is the employer and principal of the Defendant police officers, and is responsible for the policies, practices and customs of its Police Department and Police Board.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 10. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek to certify a Class and four subclasses. 11. The Class (Class A) consists of all persons who were detained, but never charged
4

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with a crime, by the CPD in the above-described herd-sweep-pin blockade on March 20, 2003, on either Oak Street or Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue, between approximately 7:00p.m. and 11:30 p.m., when each class member was detained and their freedom to leave infringed. The Class is divided into four subclasses, consisting of various groups of class members who were arrested, but never charged with a crime by the CPD. The subclasses are defmed as follows:
12. Subclass A-1 is defined as all class members who were taken into custody, but were released without being charged with any crime.
13. Subclass A-2 consists of all class members who were subjected to urmecessary and/or excessive force by Defendants in the course of the aforementioned mass arrests and who suffered additional specific physical pain and injury beyond the constitutional and other deprivations common to all members of the class.
14. Subclass A-3 consists of class members persons who, during the course of the abovementioned mass arrests, were deprived of personal property without due process oflaw.
15. Subclass A-4 consists of all class members who were taken into custody based on associational or expressive principles- i.e., because they were carrying or holding signs or harmers and/or were identified by the CPD as "leaders" or "organizers" of the protest rally.
16. The class and each subclass meets the requirements ofFRCP 23(a), as follows: a) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(l) are satisfied because the class, and each of the
subclasses, are sufficiently numerous that joinder is impractical. There are between 500 and I000 class members. Moreover, a significant number of class members were from other cities and states, and so the class is geographically
5

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disbursed.

b) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are satisfied because there are questions of law

or fact common to the class and each of the subclasses. The common questions of

law include, but are not limited to:

•

whether the detainment of individuals blockaded by the CPD for hours on

Chicago and Oak street deprived Plaintiffs and the class members of

constitutional rights;

•

whether the detainment of individuals blockaded by the CPD for hours on

Chicago and Oak constituted a false imprisonment;

•

whether the mass arrests were made without probable cause;

•

whether the Plaintiffs and the class members were engaged in lawful First

Amendment activity on the public streets and sidewalks were acting

reasonably within time, place and manner restrictions and were not

provided any alternative channels for their expression;

•

whether certain Plaintiffs andsubclass members were singled out for arrest

based on the fact they were expressing themselves by carrying signs and

banners and/or were perceived as "organizers" of the protest;

•

whether the actions of Defendants, in falsely detaining, arresting and

imprisoning Plaintiffs who were exercising their constitutional rights to

free expression further violated the rights of the class (and/or subclass

members) of their right to free speech and peaceable assembly, as

guaranteed by the federal and state constitution;

•

whether the conditions under which Plaintiffs and the class members were

confined were unduly punitive and a violation ofthe Fourteenth

Amendment and other Constitutional rights; and

•

whether the decision to make the mass arrests and the orders concerning

the manner in which Plaintiffs and the class members were to be encircled,

trapped and detained - and, as it relates to the subclasses, taken into

custody- were made by officers of sufficient rank, authority, influence,

and discretion that they can be deemed policymakers under Monell and its

progeny;

6

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,

•

whether the manner in which Defendants seized certain Plaintiffs'

property or forced certain Plaintiffs and sub-class members to abandon

property, which was not subsequently secured by the CPD, resulting in its

loss, was an unreasonable and unlawful taking or deprivation ofproperty

in violation of federal and state constitutional and common law, and

whether post-deprivation remedies were and are inadequate;

•

whether an injunction should be granted in favor of Plaintiffs and the

Class members and against the CPD as alleged herein;

•

whether Defendants, including high ranking officials of the CPD

conspired and agreed and/or otherwise acted jointly among and between

themselves to herd, surround and unlawfully detain Plaintiffs and the

Class;

The common questions of fact, include but are not limited to:

•

whether the Defendants encircled, pinned and detained the Plaintiffs and

class members;

•

whether the Defendants use afforce under the circumstances was

excessive;

•

the nature and extent of the confinement conditions, including the degree

to which Plaintiffs and the class members were denied food, denied

medical care, denied phone calls, denied necessary toiletries and feminine

hygiene products, placed in over-crowded cells and subjected to verbal

abuse, threats and neglect;

•

the nature, extent and adequacy of training of police officers to make mass

arrests without depriving citizens ofconstitutionally-guaranteed and

protected rights;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the "police code of silence," as alleged

herein;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the tacit and de facto policy of the CPD

to intimidate, abuse and harass demonstrators at rallies and protests over

the course of several years in the City of Chicago; and

•

the degree to which the complained of policies are encouraged, promoted

and effectuated, as alleged in more detail in paragraph 122.

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•.

'

c) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) are satisfied because named Plaintif!S' claims are typical of the claims of the class and each subclass they seek to represent.
d) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied because the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class and each subclass they seek to represent. The named Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to other members of the class or subclass they seek to represent. Moreover, Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and civil rights claims.
17. The class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(I) because prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants;
18. With respect to the claims for injunctive relief, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are satisfied because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, and

injunctive relief for the class as a whole is appropriate. 19. Additionally, the class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) because the common questions predominate over individual questions and prosecution of this action as a class action is the superior method of adjudication. Factors that militate in

favor of certification under Rule 23(b)(3) include:

o

Several hundred class members have already requested that a class action be

brought and asked undersigned counsel, all affiliated with the Chicago Chapter of

the National Lawyer's Guild, to bring a class action regarding the March 201h

protests; thus, the interest of members in individually controlling the prosecution

of separate actions is minimal and would be burdensome in view of the evidence

required and costs of proving the claims alleged herein;

o

on information and belief, there is no litigation concerning this controversy that

has been commenced by or against the class members;

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•

it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in the United States District Court for

the Northern District ofIllinois because the events occurred in this district and

involve federally-protected rights;

•

certification of the class and subclasses will achieve great economies of time,

effort and expense and promote uniformity of decision of the members of the

class, again thereby making a class action the superior method of adjudicating the

controversy.

20. Plaintiffs will move for class certification as soon as is practicable in accordance with

Rule 23(c).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The Emergency Demonstration

21. On March 20, 2003, thousands of people congregated at the Federal Plaza located at

Jackson Avenue and Dearborn Street in Chicago's downtown area to express concern and protest

the commencement of bombing and the inception of the 2003 United States war on Iraq.

22. A rally organized by several anti-war, anti-violence and other peace groups was held

at the Federal Plaza beginning at approximately 5:00p.m. The rally commenced with a series of

speakers expressing themselves over a sound system to the gathering crowd.

23. After the rally, the crowd having continued to increase, between five and fifteen

thousand demonstrators began to march through the streets of downtown Chicago, chanting and

carrying signs, accompanied and escorted by Chicago Police Officers.

24. When the demonstration march reached Michigan Avenue and East Lake Shore

Drive (the inner drive) at approximately 7:30p.m., Chicago Police Officers lined themselves up

across Michigan Avenue and refused to allow the demonstration to proceed.

25. The demonstration march was stalled for a period of time in excess of thirty (30)

9

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minutes at this location, during which time a number of demonstrators left the march and others arrived to join the demonstration.
26. The demonstrators were not engaged in any unlawful activity and continued to chant and express their opposition to the Iraq War.
27. The demonstration was directed away from Michigan Avenue and demonstrators proceeded eastward and then in a southern direction toward Chicago Avenue.
B. The Unlawful Detention 28. Defendants Doe began to herd and push the demonstrators onto Chicago Avenue, without warning or order to disperse; they encircled the demonstrators with numerous police officers, trapped and pinned them in the street and prohibited many from leaving the area. 29. After two to three hours, certain class members were selectively and without regard to any lawful or unlawful activity, eventually allowed to leave the demonstration and the area. 30. Other class members were then taken into police custody, handcuffed, further detained, escorted to police vehicles and transported to police stations. 31. At no time did any police personnel give any order to disperse, make any warning of impending arrests or advise persons that their conduct was unlawful or reckless, through any loud speaker or voice magnification system or any other reasonable means. C. The Manner of the Arrests 32. Certain Defendants Doe in the course of the detention and mass arrest of class members engaged in excessive and unnecessary physical force, subjecting some class members to being struck with batons, being slammed to the ground, pulling their hair and dragging them away.
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33. Certain Defendants Doe identified individuals they perceived to be leaders of the demonstration or particularly vocal activists, who were then singled out and immediately taken into custody.
34. Some class members did not intend to be part of the demonstration, did not march through the streets and were arrested attempting to return to hotels, coming out of restaurants, getting off of buses or simply observing the demonstrators and police officers.
35. In the course of detaining and arresting the Plaintiffs, Defendants placed handcuffs on many Plaintiffs in an improper, unreasonable and unsafe manner which caused many of the Plaintiffs moderate to severe pain and some, lasting injury including lacerations and nerve damage.
36. In the course of unlawfully detaining and arresting several of the Plaintiffs, Defendants took possession and/or refused to allow said Plaintiffs to remain in possession of bicycles, sound amplification devices, radios and other property causing the permanent deprivation of property belonging to Plaintiffs.
D. The Manner of Confinement 37. Class members who were taken to police stations were segregated by gender, handcuffed and searched; most of the males were taken to the police station located at 727 East 111 th Street and the majority of females were taken to the police station at 5555 West Grand Avenue. 38. Plaintiffs were required to provide information to Defendants concerning their identities, employment and other matters which were recorded on official police reports and upon information and belief continue to be maintained at the police stations.
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J
39. Class members were subjected to verbal abuse, neglect and unreasonable conditions of confinement at the police stations, including but not limited to, being deprived of food, water, telephone communication, necessary toiletries and feminine hygiene products.
40. Class members were confined in overcrowded and overheated cells for extended and unreasonable periods oftime.
41. Certain class members were deprived ofneeded medical treatment and necessary medication.
E. The Conspiracy Among Defendants 42. Defendants Doe, including high ranking officials of the CPD, conspired and agreed together and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves, to herd, surround, trap, and unlawfully detain class members on the street, many of whom were subsequently further unlawfully detained on the scene, in police vehicles and at police stations. F. The Named Plaintiffs
Prudence Browne, Angela Garcia, Elizabeth Johnson and Sophia Sieczkowski On Behalf of Themselves and the Class
43. Prudence Browne is employed at a nonprofit organization focusing on video and media production in Chicago.
44. Ms. Browne joined the demonstration after it reached Michigan Avenue and East Lake Shore Drive on March 20, 2003, and was encircled, pinned and trapped with other demonstrators by Defendants Doe on Chicago Avenue just east of Michigan Avenue.
45. Ms. Browne inquired of police personnel whether she could leave the demonstration, and was simply told she would have to wait.
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46. Ms. Browne witnessed several other demonstrators identified and singled out of the crowd by Defendants Doe, and observed Defendants Doe handcuff these demonstrators and take them away without any provocation.
47. Ms. Browne did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed she had to leave the demonstration or the area prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe.
48. Ms. Browne was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe for several hours before she was eventually allowed to leave the area.
49. Angela Garcia currently lives in Chicago, and will attend school here in the fall. 50. Ms. Garcia was among the demonstrators who were encircled and pinned by Defendants Doe on Chicago Avenue just east of Michigan Avenue on March 20, 2003. 51. Ms. Garcia inquired of police personnel whether she could leave the demonstration and was told to wait and was further prevented from leaving the area. 52. Ms. Garcia observed and was informed by others that leaders were being identified by Defendants Doe, singled out, removed from the demonstration, handcuffed and taken away from the area, without any provocation. 53. Ms. Garcia did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that she had to leave the demonstration or the area . 54. Ms. Garcia was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe for hours before she was eventnally allowed to leave the area. 55. Elizabeth Johnson traveled downtown with her husband and a young woman they
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met on the train on the way to the demonstration. 56. When the demonstration reached the area of Michigan and Chicago Avenues, Ms.
Johnson and her husband were told they could leave the area. 57. Ms. Johnson and her husband went to locate the young woman they accompanied to
the demonstration and after finding her, they attempted to leave the demonstration together. 58. At that point the Defendants Doe prevented the three from leaving the area and were
detained for hours in the street with hundreds of other class members. 59. Ms. Johnson and her companions did not commit a crime, were never ordered to
disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and were never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that they had to leave the demonstration or the area.
60. Sophia Sieczkowski attended the demonstration and observed demonstrators being taken into custody at approximately 8:30p.m. near the intersection of Chicago and Michigan Avenues.
61. Ms. Sieczkowski attempted to catch a bus to travel home and was prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe, she then walked to the other side of the demonstration in an attempt to leave but was again told by Defendants Doe she could not leave the area.
62. Ms. Sieczkowski then dialed 911 from her cellular telephone and told the 911 dispatcher she was being held against her will and requested the dispatcher speak with Defendant Doe.
63. Defendant Doe took the telephone from Ms. Sieczkowsk:i and told the dispatcher that Ms. Sieczkowski could not leave the area.
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.
'·
64. Ms. Sieczkowski was detained for approximately two hours in the street with hundreds of other class members.
65. Ms. Sieczkowski did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that she had to leave the demonstration or the area .
Kevin Vodak, Patrick Donnell, Robert Castillo, John Pennycuff On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclass A-1
66. Kevin Vodak is an attorney licensed to practice Jaw in the State of Illinois. Mr. Vodak attended the demonstration as a legal observer whose role was to facilitate any necessary negotiations with the demonstrators and police personnel.
67. At approximately 7:30p.m. Mr. Vodak was surrounded by Defendants Doe at Michigan and Chicago Avenues while standing on the sidewalk and was prohibited from leaving the area.
68. Defendants Doe refused Mr. Vodak's requests to speak with a commanding officer after he clearly identified himself as a legal observer and was handcuffed with plastic cuffs after being pointed out for arrest by an unknown supervisory police officer.
69. Another supervisory officer, with the last name of Doherty, authorized and ratified Mr. Vodak's arrest despite the Jack of probable cause that he had committed any crime, the fact that he did not commit any crime, did not resist arrest and prior to his arrest he had never been informed or warned that he must leave the area.
70. Mr. Vodak was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the police station at 727 E. Ill th Street, placed in jail cell, and unlawfully detained for approximately 11 hours before he was
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released on March 21, 2003. 71. Patrick Donnell is an attorney licensed to practice Jaw in the State of Illinois. 72. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 8:00p.m., Mr. Donnell was traveling home on
a Chicago Transit Authority bus headed north on Michigan Avenue. 73. The bus was stopped by a uniformed Chicago police officer at the intersection of
Michigan and Chicago Avenues, and the bus driver was informed that the bus was going to be rerouted.
74. Mr. Donnell exited the bus and proceeded across Michigan Avenue to the northeast comer ofMichigan and Chicago Avenues.
75. Mr. Donnell witnessed Defendants Doe encircle, pin and trap the class members on Chicago Avenue near Michigan Avenue, and also observed Defendants Doe dragging people and striking people with night sticks.
76. Mr. Donnell also witnessed a woman in the crowd with a megaphone announce "Officer Friendly we did not come here to knock heads with you," and minutes later he saw a small group of Defendants Doe charge into the crowd and apparently arrest her.
77. Mr. Donnell at no time heard any police personnel issue any general order to the crowd that people had to leave or disperse.
78. Mr. Donnell and others standing with him were then informed by police personnel that if they wished to leave the area, they were to head towards Michigan Avenue, and as they complied and began walking, they were stopped by Defendants Doe.
79. Mr. Donnell, as well as others in the crowd, informed Defendants Doe they had been instructed by police to leave in this direction, but received no response and were prohibited from
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walking further, and were a short time later arrested by Defendants Doe.
80. Mr. Donnell was handcuffed with plastic handcuffs, taken to a police vehicle and
transported to the 111th Street police station. 81. Mr. Donnell did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was prevented from
leaving the area prior to his arrest.
82. Mr. Donnell was placed in a cell with 15 others that was approximately 10 feet wide
and 12 feet in length, and unlawfully detained for approximately 14 hours until he was released on March 21, 2003.
83. Robert Castillo and John Pennycuff are community activists who had just attended a function with Mayor Richard Daley when they came upon the scene near Michigan and Chicago Avenues on March 20, 2003.
84. They observed and witnessed police misconduct, and then were prevented from leaving the area and arrested by Defendants Doe.
85. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuff were handcuffed, taken to police vehicles,
transported to the 111th Street station, where they were unlawfully detained in a cell for many hours prior to their release on March 21, 2003.
86. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuff did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and prior to their arrest they were prevented from leaving the area.
Sharon Ambielli, David Pinedee, Aaron Robin On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-2.
87. Sharon Ambielli attended the demonstration on March 20, 2003, and was taken into custody with other class members at approximately 9:15p.m. near the intersection ofMichigan
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and Chicago Avenues. 88. Ms. Ambielli was handcuffed so tightly by Defendant Doe in such an unreasonable
and excessive manner that the plastic restraints were cutting into her wrists, causing swelling and pam.
89. Ms. Ambielli's repeated requests that the handcuffs be loosened were denied until approximately II :45 p.m. when the restraints were cut off and soon thereafter she was taken to Resurrection Hospital where she was diagnosed with compressed nerve damage in her right wrist.
90. Ms. Ambielli was returned to the police station where she was processed, including taking her photographs and fingerprints, and eventually released at 5:45 a.m. on March 21, 2003, with any charges.
91. Ms. Ambielli did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and was never informed by the police prior to her arrest that she must leave the demonstration.
92. David Pinedee is a student at the Art Institute of Chicago. 93. Mr. Pinedee was approached by a Defendant Doe on Chicago Avenue near Michigan Avenue, and struck in the chest with a night stick by a Defendant Doe. 94. A Defendant Doe intentionally handcuffed Mr Pinedee in an unreasonable manner in that the handcuffs were so tightly fastened around his wrists that he was caused unnecessary pain and injury. 95. Defendants Doe dragged Mr. Pinedee to an awaiting police vehicle and transported him to the 111 th Street police station, where he was unlawfully detained for hours and released on March 21,2003.
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96. Mr. Pinedee did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and prior to his arrest was never informed by the police that he must leave the area.
97. Aaron Robin is a student at Columbia College in Chicago, Illinois. 98. Mr. Robin was trapped by Defendants Doe near Michigan and Chicago Avenues, at approximately 7:30p.m. and prohibited from leaving the area of the demonstration. 99. Mr. Robin observed Defendants Doe swinging their batons at demonstrators and pulling a female demonstrator's hair, and a Defendant Doe then grabbed him by the back of the neck, he was struck in the wrist area, and he felt a cracking in the back of his wrist. 100. Mr. Robin was then handcuffed with plastic cuffs behind his back by a Defendant Doe who intentionally, unreasonably, and repeatedly twisted his wrists back and forth, causing him great pain and injury. His complaints of pain and requests for medical attention were met with threats directed at him by a Defendant Doe. 101. Mr. Robin was taken to a police vehicle and transported to the Ill th Street police station, where his continuing complaints of pain were ignored by Defendants Doe and Roe. 101. Mr. Robin did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and he was never informed by the police prior to his arrest that he must leave the area. 102. Mr. Robin was unlawfully detained for approximately 23 hours and released on March 21, 2003, at which time, he sought medical attention and was treated for a fractured wrist.
Matt Gaines, Sarah Bergstrand On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-3.
103. Matt Gaines was among the demonstrators unlawfully detained on March 20, 2003. 104. Mr. Gaines had in his possession sound amplification equipment for use at the

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demonstration as well as a pair of two way radios for communication by leadership within the

demonstration.

105. Mr. Gaines was unlawfully taken into custody and his above described property was

taken by a Defendant Doe who failed to inventory the property or return it.

106. Sarah Bergstrand and her husband rode their bicycles down to the demonstration on

March 20,2003.

107. Ms. Bergstrand was also unlawfully detained and she was taken into custody by

Defendant Doe, who failed to inventory her property and ignored and refused her entreaty to be

allowed to secure and lock the two bicycles at the scene.

108. Ms. Bergstrand returned to the scene upon her release from custody only to find the

bicycles were gone. When she checked with the Chicago Police Department, she was told her

bicycles could not be located or returned without a property inventory slip.

Eric Peters On behalf of himself, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-4

109. Eric Peters is a student at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

110. Mr. Peters was grabbed at approximately 7:30p.m. near Michigan Avenue and East

Lake Shore Drive, by a Defendant Doe who approached him in the crowd after a supervisory

police officers yelled out ''this is one of the organizers."

111. A Defendant Doe pulled Mr. Peters to the side and slammed him into the hood of a

police vehicle, another supervisory police officer then jumped onto the hood ofthe police vehicle

and yelled to the police officers about Mr. Peters, who then threw him to the ground and stepped

on his neck.

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112. Mr. Peters was then dragged along the ground to another police vehicle and he was cuffed, transported to a police vehicle and taken to the police station at 727 East 111 th Street.
113. Mr. Peters did not conunit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was never informed by the police that he must leave the demonstration prior to his arrest.
114. Mr. Peters was unlawfully detained for approximately 28 hours, within which entire time he was not allowed to make a telephone call, and released on March 21, 2003.
115. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss ofliberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses.
COUNT I [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for False Detention, Arrest and Imprisonment]
(Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1)

116. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 117. The actions of the Defendants Hillard, Risley and Doe in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 118. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss ofliberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records

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relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT II [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Violation of First Amendment Rights] ( Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1, and Brought By Eric Peters, Individually and on Behalf of Subclass A-4)
119. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 120. Plaintiffs, who were engaged in lawful First Amendment activity on the public streets and sidewalks of the City of Chicago, were acting reasonably within time, manner and place restrictions and were not provided any alternative channels for their expression. 121. The actions of Defendants Hillard, Risley and Doe in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs who were exercising their Constitutional right to freedom of association further violated their First Amendment rights to be free from the infringement of their right to peaceably assemble, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 122. In addition, the actions of Defendants Hillard, Risley and Doe in targeting individuals who appeared to be or were perceived to be leaders, including those carrying signs or sound amplification devices, further violated the rights of Plaintiffs who were exercising their Constitutional right to freedom of expression in violation of their First Amendment right to be free from the infringement of their freedom of speech, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 123. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations
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,
of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of speech and expression, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT III [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Excessive Force Claim] (Brought by Robin and Pinedee, Individually and on Behalf of Subclass A-2)
124. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 125. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiffs with batons, pulling Plaintiffs' hair, intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs wrists too tightly, and otherwise using excessive and unjustifiable force against Plaintiffs, as well as failing to intervene to prevent said abuse despite having the opportunity and duty to do so, violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be secure in their persons, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 126. The actions of Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of
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Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss ofliberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IV [42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Unreasonable and Punitive Conditions of Confinement] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclasses A-1 and A-2)
127. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 128. The acts of Defendants Doe and Roe in detaining Plaintiffs in overcrowded and over heated police vehicles and jail cells for unnecessarily long periods oftime; in failing to provide Plaintiffs with the use of a telephone; in depriving Plaintiffs of necessary toiletries and sanitary napkins; in depriving Plaintiffs food and water for excessive periods oftime; in deliberately ignoring Plaintiffs' serious medical needs by refusing to take Plaintiffs to a hospital, clinic or doctor, knowing they had not received any medical care since they were injured, and in exacerbating the pain and injury by detaining them in cramped and painful conditions, and further imposing other arbitrary, uureasonable and punitive conditions, violated Plaintiffs' rights
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under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be secure in their person, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and their rights to due process of law and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
·COUNTY [42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Deprivation of Property] (Bronght by Gaines and Bergstrand, Individually, and on behalf of Subclass
A-3)
129. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 130. The Defendants' unreasonable actions in not allowing Plaintiffs to maintain custody oftheir property and/or unreasonably forcing Plaintiffs to abandon said property unsecured in a public place and their subsequent inability, failure and refusal to return said personal property, constituted an unlawful taking of Plaintiffs' property and an unreasonable and unconstitutional seizure in violation ofthe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' loss, further suffering and other injuries set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants
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and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VI [42 U.S.C. §1983 Monell Policy, Practice and Custom Claim] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1)
131. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 132. The actions of Defendants Doe and Roe were done pursuant to one or more interrelated de facto as well as explicit policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Chicago, its police department, its Police Board, its Office of Professional Standards (O.P.S.) and Internal Affairs Division ( I.A.D), its Personnel Division, and/or its Superintendents. 133. Upon information and belief, high ranking police officials, including Superintendent Hillard and Commander Risley, planned, authorized, directed, ratified and/or acquiesced in the unconstitutional and unlawful police actions complained of herein. 134. At all times material to this complaint the Defendant City and its police department, Superintendents, O.P.S., I.A.D., Personnel Division and/or Police Board had interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, a) the failure to properly train, supervise, discipline, transfer, monitor, counsel and otherwise control police officers engaged in committing violations of police department rules and regulations, including the excessive use of force, false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, the harassment of civilians exercising their First Amendment Rights in street demonstrations, and the manufacturing of false reports and statements as well as the physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and other police abuse,
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particularly in cases where the officers have repeatedly been accused of said acts; b) the police code of silence, particularly in cases where officers engaged in the above articulated violations; and c) encouragement offalse detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, and the attendant use of excessive force.
135. Further, the constitutional violations and damages to Plaintiffs that occurred as described herein were directly and proximately caused by the unofficial, unconstitutional, tacit policy of authorized policy makers of the City, who have, for years, deliberately ignored and indulged in violence and intimidation against demonstrators by officers assigned to "monitor" political protest demonstrations, deliberately failed to supervise and control such officers so as to prevent violations of demonstrator's rights, and deliberately undermined, negated and stifled the citizens' complaint process. Thus, rank and file officers understand there is little or no risk involved in brutal attacks on or illegal mass arrests of persons exercising Free Speech rights.
136. In addition, the City, the department and the command-level Defendants are well aware, and have been told and notified many times, that such illegal arrests and such brutal attacks occur, and happen again and again, to the point where a pattern and practice of brutality and harassment of demonstrators is readily evident, going back for may years.
137. These polices are evidenced, inter alia, by the following: a) the systemic encouragement, from the Superintendent on down, of false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, by promoting officers who make large numbers of arrests, giving them high performance ratings, based in large part on the number of arrests which they make, and ignoring the large number of citizen complaints made against many ofthese officers when making these promotions, assignments, and ratings; b}the failure to properly discipline, monitor, assign,
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counsel, transfer, supervise and otherwise control officers, including the Defendants, particularly after department records and studies, statistical data, and computer programs have, or should have, identified these officers including Defendants as "repeaters" with multiple complaints of brutality and other abuse or otherwise as actual or potential problem officers; c) the Department's failure to implement an adequate behavioral monitoring and control system or to properly implement or utilize its "repeater" lists, excessive force study, and "Brainmaker" computer software program in order to identify, monitor, supervise, discipline, assign and otherwise control such problem officers.
138. The policy, practice, and custom of a police code of silence results in police officers refusing to report instances of police misconduct, including excessive force, false detentions, false arrests and false imprisonments and other abuse of citizens of which they are aware, despite their obligation under police regulations to do so, and also includes police officers either remaining silent or giving false and misleading information during official investigations in order to protect themselves or fellow officers from internal discipline, civil liability, or criminal charges, and to peijure themselves in criminal cases where they and their fellow officers have false!y arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted the criminal Defendant.
139. The fact that the aforementioned code of silence exists, and that its adverse impact is allowed to occur through the actions and inactions of high ranking police officials including police Superintendents and former and current O.P.S. Directors, is also evidenced by the fact that while former Superintendent Martin, former O.P.S. Director Fogel and former O.P.S. Director Shines have all acknowledged publicly that they are aware of the existence of the custom and practice of a police code of silence, they as well as current OPS Director Baird have not acted to
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eliminate the code or to counteract its impact on police discipline, the use of excessive force, police torture, fabrication of evidence and false arrests and prosecutions. In particular, they do not attempt to charge or discipline police officers who make false reports and statements or remain silent to hide their fellow officers wrongdoing although the O.P.S. is empowered and given the responsibility to do so.
140. The de facto policies, practices and customs of failing to train, supervise, monitor, discipline, counsel and control, the code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests and prosecutions are interrelated and exacerbate the effects of each other, to, in the words of former O.P.S. Director Fogel, "institutionalize police lying" and "immunize police officers from discipline."
141. The aforementioned policies, practices and/or customs of failing to supervise, discipline, monitor, control, etc., the police code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests, imprisonments, prosecutions, and convictions, separately and together, proximately caused injury to the Plaintiffs in this case, inter alia, because Defendants had good reason to believe that their misconduct would not be revealed or reported by fellow officers or their supervisors, that their denials would go unchallenged by these supervisors and fellow officers, from the police Superintendents, Police Board, and Directors of the O.P.S. on down, and that they were effectively immune from disciplinary action, thereby protecting them from the consequences of their unconstitutional conduct.
142. But for the belief that they would be protected, both by fellow officers and by the department, from serious career consequences, Defendants would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in the injuries to the Plaintiffs.
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143. Said interrelated policies, practices and customs, as set forth above, both individually and together, were maintained and implemented with deliberate indifference, and encouraged the Defendants to commit the aforesaid acts against the Plaintiff and therefore acted as direct and proximate causes of said constitutional violations, and injuries to the Plaintiffs.
144. Additionally, said failure to properly train, discipline, monitor, control, assign, transfer, supervise, and counsel Defendants, was also done with deliberate indifference and likewise acted as a direct and proximate cause of the injuries to Plaintiffs.
145. These policies, practices and customs encouraged, inter alia, excessive use of force, the making of false statements and reports, and physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and were separately and together, a direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendants in this case and the injuries sustained by the Plaintiffs.
146. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct and unspoken policy of Defendants described herein, their failure to take reasonable steps to remedy the pattern and practice of police brutality, and their deliberate indifference to the serious threat to the rights of protesters, Plaintiffs were each denied her or his constitutional, statutory, and common law rights as stated below, and have suffered, and continue to suffer, mental and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, discomfort, fear, shock, anxiety, pain and harm.
147. Defendants' policies, practices, conduct, acts and omissions alleged herein have no plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein. Plaintiffs fear they will again be subjected to the misuse of plastic and metal handcuffs, beaten or harassed. Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm as a result of the continuing existence of the police records of their arrests herein. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek injunctive relief restraining Defendants from
30

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 31 of 40 PageID #:31
misusing handcuffs, herding protesters and then not allowing them freedom to leave the area and requiring them to seal and destroy the records of Plaintiffs' arrests.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs.in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; judgment against Defendant City of Chicago for compensatory damages, plus costs and attorneys' fees and whatever additional relief this court finds equitable and just.
COUNT VII [Supplemental State Law Claims for Violations ofthe Illinois Constitution)
(Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1)
148. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 149. The actions taken by Defendants denied Plaintiffs their state constitutional rights to be secure in their persons; to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; to speak, write and publish freely; to assemble in a peaceable manner; to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the Illinois Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries as set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because they acted maliciously,
31

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 32 of 40 PageID #:32
wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs ofthis action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VIII [Supplemental State Law Claims for False Detention, Arrest and
Imprisonment] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1)
150. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 151. The false detention, arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiffs on March 20th through March 21, 2003, were done wilfully and wantonly by Defendants Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe. 152. The actions of Defendant Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, emotional distress, pain and suffering as claimed above and constitute the tort of false arrest and imprisonment under Illinois law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages, and because Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs ofthis action and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
32

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 33 of 40 PageID #:33
COUNT IX [Supplemental State Law Claims for Assault and Battery] (Brought by Robin and Pinedee, Individually and on Behalf of Subclass A-2)
153. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 154. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiffs, pulling Plaintiffs' hair, and intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs' wrists too tightly causing bodily hann, were performed in a wilful and wanton manner. 155. These actions of Defendants Doe were affirmative acts and threatened to cause or did cause an unpermitted contact of a hannfu1 and/or offensive nature, to which Plaintiffs did not consent, and thus constitute assault and battery under laws ofthe State of Illinois. 156. The actions of Defendants Doe directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, emotional distress, pain and suffering. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants Doe and because they acted wilfully and wantonly, punitive damages plus the costs of this action.
COUNT X [Supplemental State Law Claim for Conversion] (Brought by all Gaines and Bergstrand, Individually, and on behalf of
Subclass A-3)
157. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 115. 158. The acts of Defendants Doe in not allowing Plaintiffs to maintain custody of their property and/or unreasonably forcing Plaintiffs to abandon said property unsecured in a public place and their subsequent inability, failure and refusal to return said personal property, constituted an unlawful taking of Plaintiffs' property and the tort of conversion under Illinois
33

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 34 of 40 PageID #:34
law, were performed in a wilful and wanton manner, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' loss, further suffering and other injuries as set forth above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants Doe and, because they acted wilfully and wantonly, punitive damages plus the costs of this action.
COUNT XI [Supplemental State Law Claim for Conspiracy] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
159. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 115. 160. Defendants Hillard, Risley,Doe and Roe agreed and together reached an understanding or agreement to engage in a course of conduct, and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves, to falsely arrest, imprison, detain, assault, batter, and inflict emotional distress on Plaintiffs. 161. Defendants conspired and arrived at an understanding and meeting ofthe minds that the police would harass, intimidate, punish and retaliate against the participants in the March 20, 2003 protest because oftheir political beliefs, and in doing so deployed a large and intimidating force of police. 162. The objectives of this conspiracy, among others, were to prevent the expression and communication of, and otherwise interfere with, the message of the constitutionally protected activities and protest of the Plaintiff class, to summarily punish the participants, to chill and deter other protest marches and rallies. · 163. The decision and related activities involved in the mass arrests of the members of the
34

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 35 of 40 PageID #:35
Plaintiff class without probable cause and the maltreatment of Plaintiff class members on the street and in the jails, were part of, and were overt acts taken in furtherance of, the conspiracy.
164. In furtherance of this conspiracy or conspiracies, the Defendants named above, together with their unsued co-conspirators, committed the overt acts set forth above, including, but not limited to, the wrongful and false detentions, arrests, imprisonments, beatings of Plaintiffs, the manufacture and construction of knowingly false inculpatory evidence against Plaintiffs, the making of knowing misstatements and the filing of false and incomplete statements and reports.
165. Said conspiracy or conspiracies and overt acts were and are continuing in nature. 166. Defendant Hillard's, Risley's, Doe's and Roe's and their co-conspirators' overt acts as set forth above, which were committed jointly and/or while conspiring together to falsely detain, arrest, falsely imprison, commit assault and battery on the Plaintiffs, constitute the tort of consprracy. 167. This conspiracy proximately caused the injuries to the Plaintiff set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants, and, because these Defendants acted maliciously, willfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' rights, for punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other relief as this court deems equitable and just.
35

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 36 of 40 PageID #:36
COUNT XII [Supplemental State Law Claim for Respondeat Superior] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually, and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
168. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 169. Defendants Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe were, at all times relevant to this Count, employees and agents of the Defendant City of Chicago. Each of the above named individual Defendants was acting within the scope of their employment, and their acts and omissions are directly chargeable to their employer the Defendant City of Chicago under state law pursuant to respondeat superior. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment for compensatory damages, jointly and severally from the City of Chicago.
COUNT XIII [Supplemental State Law Claim for 745 ILCS § 10/9-102] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually, and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
170. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 115. 171. Defendant City of Chicago was the employer of Defendants Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe at all times relevant to this complaint. 172. Defendants Hillard, Risley, Doe and Roe committed the acts alleged above in the scope of their employment as employees of Defendant City of Chicago.
36

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 37 of 40 PageID #:37
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pursuant to 745 ILCS § 10/9-102, demand judgment against
the Defendant City of Chicago in the amount awarded to Plaintiffs against the individual
Defendants as damages, attorneys' fees, costs and interest, and/or for any settlement entered into
between the Plaintiff and Defendants, and for whatever additional relief this court deems
equitable and just.
Respectfully Submitted by,
Dated: April10, 2003
L.HOFT YL.MOGUL PEOPLE'S LAW OFFICE 1180 N. Milwaukee Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60622 773/235-0070
JAMES FENNERTY James R. Fennerty and Associates 36 S. Wabash Avenue, Suite 1310 Chicago, Illinois 60603 312/422-0708
CHRISTOPHER V. LANGONE The Langone Law Firm 25 E. Washington Street, Suite 1805 Chicago, Illinois 60602 312/782-2022
MELINDA POWER West Town Community Law Office 2502 W. Division Street Chicago, Illinois 60622 773/278-6706
PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A JURY TRIAL
37

rCase: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 38 of 40 PageID #:38

JS44

(Rov. 12/96)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

(C) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS_ AND TELEPHONE NUMBER)
People's Law Office

1180 N. Milwaukee Ave.

Chicago, IL 60622

773 235-0070

ATTOIINEYS (IF KNOWN)

..=l"

Janine L. Hoft, Joey Mogul, James Fen~rty~

:3-~:..1

~ower, Christopher V. Langon~ ~ ::c~·c;

c

,_,_ ;:,'.

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (PLACE AN ''X' IN ONE BOX ONLY)

o, U.S. Government
PlaJntitr

K 3 Federal Question (U.S. Governmenr Nor a Party)

Ill. CmZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES <PUICE ' ·-·~

"""NOANT) (For Olversily Cases Only) i:: PTF DEF

AND ONE"""""' ~

::C:
PTF 'I&

C/Uzen of T111s StaiB o 1 o 1 lncorpora1Bd or Principal ~ o • 'a.•

of 6US'"8911 In ThiS State C)

=:J

0 z U.S. Govemment Oelendarrt

D40iversity (lndjca.te Citizenship of Parties in Item Ill)

C/Uzen of ~ S1a1o o 2 o 2 <ncooporated and Princ;pal- c • c • of Business In Another Staaa

Citizen or Sub}ect of a o 3 o 3 Foreign Nation Foreign Country

oe ce

IV. ORIGIN I , Original
Pr~ing

o z Removed from StaiB eoun

(PLACE AN ")("IN ONE BOX ONLY)

o :1 Remanded from o • Reinstated or

Appellate Coun

Reopened

Transferred from o 1 another district
(specily)

0 1 MLJitidistrict litigation

ll NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

CONTR,t.CT
0 UO 1nsuranc1 0 121 Mll.rlnt

TORTS

1 PEASONALINJUAV
o :no Alrpl&na

PERSONAL IN.IURV 0 312 Personl.llnjury -

FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES

0 110 Agrlcunure

! o 422 Appear 28 usc 158 o 400 srare ~pportlonment

0 uo 01nar rooe~a. Drug

0 410 Arlttti'USI

0 110 Miller Act
D 1<t0 Hllgollollbja lntlrumanl

0 '11 Airplane Product LtabllltY

Mad Mllpracucl
0 ' " P!l~nallnJury

0 121 Drug AalaltiCI S.lzura

0 423 Wltndrawal

ol Proparry 11 usc 881

28 usc 157

0 4310 Bank' and Banking 0 410 C~~IICC Ratailfl:

0 110 Rtcovery ol O..rpaym•lll

0 320 AU.IIJII libel &.

& Enfort:ement ol Judgment

Slander

ProdvClllabiiiiV 0 3U As~tos Pllrsonat

0 e:to UqiJOI Llws 0 UO RR &Tri.!Ck

0 411 Deponollllon
PROPERTY RIGHTS 0 470 R.cket- lnfl~ Mill

D 1$1 MldiCite Act
0 152 AecoverV of neralllted swcllm loan&
rE•cl \leterollnS•

0 '3CI Pederf.l Employant. llo~bllitv
0 :J40 Mollrlne
0 :145 Marine Product

lrtJury Pro<1uc1 uabtllly
PERSONAl PROPEIII1Y C 370 Other Fraud

0 ISO Airline Aeg& 0 110 Occllp&l.ional
SafetytHeollllh
0 ItO 01ner

0 120 Copyrtgnts

0 130 Pa'lent

0 !

140 Tro~demar~

CorruP1 Drg.nilaliOns
0 110 5ei8CII118 S.rw:e0 ISO S.CurlllesiCommodlt_.
E:.cnange

D 1S3 Re<:ovefY ot overpaymem

Llabiii\V

C :171 llUih I~ lendiiiiJ

0 17J customer Cnaltange

of Veteran s Benefits 0 11G S\OCktlaldii,.'SW.
0 110 0111er Conuact
0 111 Conlra~l Prodvct Llabilily
REAL PROPERTY
0 210 Laf'ld Condemnauor.
0 220 FortreiOil.Jre
0 HO Rern Lease & EJectment 0 2AO Torts to Lanct 0 241 Tort Product UabllllV 0 Ill All OIMr R..l Property

I 0 350 M01or Vehtcle 0 :ISS MOIO! ventcle

I

Proau~lliabtlll~

0 310 '"her PetsonallntiiJY

!! CIVIL RIGHTS 0 A41 Vottng 1 0 A42 Employment
0 443 Ho~mg/ AccommoctaJrons
0 A44 Wetlare
XI A40 Olner Civil Rights

0 110 Other Personal
Properly O.mage
0 :JI5 Propel'ly Damage Producl L1ablfll'1

PRISONER PETITIONS

0 610 Molim lo VKale

Scu'!lence

,... """'' G..,• Het~eaa Corpua:
0 530

0 !il&

o 0

140
no

MandMu I othlr CMRi;1111

0 511 PrisOn Conclt!o!l

LABOR

SOCIAL SECURITY

D 710 Fair Labof Standards

0 111 HIA 413!ii5TrJ

'" I 0 112 Black lung (9231
D 720 Lat:ror/Mgml RelaliOn!o 0 H:l OIWC/DlWW (405!91•

! 0 114 SSID TrUe XVI
I 0 730 l.Abor/Mgmt fleporllng IJ 115 ~SII405(gll

&. Oisclo1ure Act

0 7AO Rallwa'( Labor ACI

FEDERAL TAX SUITS

0 710 Olher Labor Utg8.1100 0 711 Empt Aef Inc
Securny Act

0 170 Taxes (U S Plolllnltft' or Defendollnt)
0 In IRS - Tl\l1d Party
26 usc 7509

12USC3410
0 111 Aglto;~.~HIIrat Ac:ls
0 H2 Economoe S1ab~ol81kln k:l 0 IP Env•Jonmeru,Ji Marian. 0 IM Energv Allocalion Acl 0 IN Freedom ol'
lniOtrrlarlo1'1 Act
0 100 ApPeal of Fee De!ermin;11r01'1 Un()ef Equal A~ Ia ,JUSia
0 150 Consllfu!IOI'Iallty of Stale STatUIM
0 ... Oilier S'lalutoiY Aci:IOM

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (CrTE THE u_s ctVIL STATIJll:: UNDER WHICH vou ARE FluNG AND WRITE BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAuse
DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL. SlATUTE$ UNLESS DIVERSITY)
The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 1331

1343 (3); the constitution of the United States and supplementary jurisdiction.

VII. REQUESTED IN

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT

0 IJNDEA FR.C P 23

DEMANDS

VIII. This case

~ is not a reliling of a previously dismissed aclion.

0 is a rcfiling of case number

, previously dismissed by Judge

CHECK YES only Wdemanded in CCIIT1pllft:

JURY DEMAND: lfJ YES

c NO

DA'I<
April1 0, 2003

UNITED STATES lliSTRICT COURT

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 39 of 40 PageID #:39

UN/TEO STATES0/STR/CTCOURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILUNOIS

KEVIN VODAK, et al.
Plaintiff
In the Matter ot CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.
Defendant

03.C-
Case Number:
\

24 63
J(J
DGt:co~~~

APPEARANCES ARE HEREBY FILED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY(S)"tMtfiSTRA.l'EJCJ

Plaintiff KEVIN VODAK ,et al.

·

/DOCKETED

Du.IJ lt(J~

~

SlO"ff"'RE' X

J-~

I"t7 Janine 'L. 'Hgft

FlAil
Peoole's Law OffLca

, "'"""' AOOAfSS
11anN.

Milwaukee

CII'I-"T~!fJPP
Chicago, IL

60622

J<U:PHOHfNUMSER

88 \'3"9" 273/235-00JO

6 1

IS>E IT tM. ON

-ROfTRW.IIAR?

YES f3\

lJW. Ao I Ull"ltTo

YES f3'

NOD NOD

- 11 2003

'I

.4~

I

v·en /I/~

-:rclivadul
FOlll
PeQple's Law Office
, ..~i'1EUi~. Milwaukee

I L CII'I~Tf/ZIP ~cage,

60622

l<L.Em~~"-oo1o

"''"'g'f4'3"g1u6"'"" isteii•M•

-ROfTRW.IIAR!

YES eJ

"""'- • rrORNEY'I

YES eJ

OESIGIIAJ<D I>S LOCAL COUNSeL?

YES eJ

':J.

--)

- - ,.... ""

·;:;
0

0- ~-~

- ,.'-.

~:~

t.:.l

Gd;

-u... ""' ' ·----~

~,
U-
~

C:l
en
:::>

Cl

NOfD NOD NOD

r-...

/) /1_ (C)

SKiNATUt 'r-11LJI!t/l

I.,..Jarrf} 'ffekde'rty

, • .,..

v

James Fennerty & Assoc.

s . STREET AOORESS
36 Wabash

Ave.,

Suite

1310

I CITY/S&~~·c·age, IL

60603

TEL.EPHONE NUMBER

312/422-0708

IOfi<T•IC.AllOI< NUWOER (SEf ITEM 4ON H•vERSE)

0793000
MEMSER Of TRIAL liAR?

YES 1!J

NOD

TIIALAiiORNEY'I

nS liJ

NOD

DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COIJNSEL?

YES ll!J

NOD

(0) /)
SIG'M. I J ./,1'1/I.J).h Qtb~

!~Melinda Power

FII'U West Town Commun~•ty Law Office

w. STREET AOOAESS 2502

Division f'+:.

CrTY-"TAiti~IP
Chicago, IL

60622

TEt.E"""'3"m'B -67o6

IOENTlfiC.ATION r<UMBEH (St< ntM • ON HtVERSOJ

618_1115
MEMBER Of TRIAL BAA?
·-· . -·

YES Gil YES 1iJ

DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COUNSEL?

YES 1iJ

NOD NOD NOD

PLEASE COMPLETE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE.

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/03 Page 40 of 40 PageID #:40

UNITED STATESDIST11/CTCOURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILUNOIS

KEVIN VODAK, et al.

Plaintiff In the Matter af
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.

-Qij.t,;

Case Number:

24 6·3
JUDGECOAR

Defendant
APPEARANCES ARE HEREBY FILED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY(S) F~GISTRATE JUDuJ; i''-'A.t\1'

Plaintiff KEVIN VODAK, et al.

....

/"\ .,

....... ,

1
""'

JlJ V/11/J/Z

w

I""""' '-'Christopher V. Langone

1-

1flAil
jorREEl

1 flAil
The Lanqone Law Firm
:25 E. Washinqton St., S11U1nJ~.te I .,.,..,

I ""'""

Chicago, IL 60602

oN~~~0/7R? -?0??

_ . .

1SEITEM40NI

2 6 1116

-.-

' TAW. B.t.R'I

YES fg(

NOD

-ROfTAW.IW<I

'"RtltU

IB) fii"'R l l 2003 L~ ....-

:J

Ln (:0

'w.:J

7:..
0-

f'.::.:

- t~ 0 IC:·~J;

;;:: ~ ~·

.,.., u()

0

::> .

YES e)

NOD

TltAI. ATIOI<NtY1

YES(g' NOD

TltAI. AT' ....,...,

'tUeJ NOD

YES eJ

NOD

""'"""
I NAME I FlAil
lsmEET
I "''Tr.iiAOet<l•

(C)
.

to)
,_

,..I'"""

.

~.,

I

I {SCE rTE'U
I t.EMI!ER OFT~ a.o.R?
,......_, ou~cn

D YES YESD D YES

NOD NOD NOD

'ISEE~M40N

""'-"Of I

I RIAL tiAH7

1'-"·~·

D YES D YES D YES

.
PLEASE COMPLETE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE.

NOD NOD NOD

 
 Minute-'lrder Case: Form (06197) 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 63 Filed: 01/15/04 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:657
United States District Court, Northern District oflllinois

Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge
CASE NUMBER

David H. Coar
03 c 2463

Sitting Judge if Other th•n Assigned Judge
DATE

NanR Nolan l/15/2004

CASE TITLE
MOTION:

Kevin Vodak vs. City of Chicago
(In the following box. (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, Jrd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(I)

0

Filed motion of [use listing in "Motion" box above.]

(2)

0

(3)

0

Brief in support of motion due _ _. Answer brief to motion due_ _. Reply to answer brief due___.

(4)

0

Ruling/Hearing on ___ set for _ _ at _ _.

(5)

0

Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for _ _ at ___.

(6)

0

Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for ___ at _ _.

(7)

0

Trial[set for/re-set for] on ___ at ___.

(8)

0

[Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___ at ___.

(9) 0

This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to] 0 FRCP4(m) 0 Local Rule 41.1 0 FRCP4l(a)(l) 0 FRCP4l(a)(2).

(10) II [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandwn Opinion and Order, defendants' motion to compel production of completed questionnaires by potential class members is denied [51-1].

(II) II

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

-
r7---

No notices required, advised in open court. No notices required. Notices mailed by judge's staff. Notified counsel by telephone. Docketing to mail notices. Mail AO 450 form. Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom

hmb

deputy's

initials

0 iPat€/i!J.e \9:~~ !!I central Clerk's Office

'
number of notice~ date mailed notice

D~ument
Number
.

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 63 Filed: 01/15/04 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:658

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et a!., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et. a!.,.
Defendants.

) )

DOCKET"""'\

)

JAN 1 6 2004

)

)

)

No. 03 C2463

)

)

Magistrate Judge Nan R Nolan

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is a civil rights putative class action alleging "false detentions, arrests, imprisonments and injuries sustained by approximately 800 class members on March 20,2003 in Chicago, Illinois." First Am. Cmplt., p. 2. Defendants seek to compel production of questionnaires completed by potential class members. Plaintiffs claim these documents are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Defendants contend no attorney-client relationship existed at the time the questionnaires were completed. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the completed questionnaires are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.

BACKGROUND On March 20, 2003, thousands of persons gathered at the Federal Plaza located at Jackson Avenue and Dearborn Street in Chicago to express concern and protest the commencement of the United States war on Iraq. Over 500 persons were arrested and approximately 200-300 people were detained on March 20, 2003. Plaintiffs state that subsequent to the arrests and detentions, the National Lawyers Guild' and the attorneys who are representing Plaintiffs "were inundated with requests for

1 The National Lawyers Guild website states that the National Lawyers Guild "is an association dedicated to the need for basic change in the structure ofour political and economic system. The Guild unites lawyers, law students, and legal workers as an effective political and social force in the service

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 63 Filed: 01/15/04 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:659
legal representation in criminal court and a myriad of other inquiries about their criminal cases, a potential civil rights lawsuit, and other legal issues relating to the police actions on March 20, 2003." Plaintiffs' Resp., p. 2. The National Lawyers Guild organized a meeting at the Chicago Temple Methodist Church for March 30, 2003. Plaintiffs state that the purpose ofthe meeting was to "provide legal information and legal representation ifdesired, to those people who were arrested or detained on March 20, 2003." Pis' Resp., p. 2. Approximately 500 persons attended the meeting.
The lawyers prepared a form questionnaire prior to the meeting. The .questionnaire sought · identification information such as name, telephone number, address, and email address. The questionnaire also asked the following questions: I) Do you have a court date? Ifyes, what is the date, time, location, and charge. Do you want a lawyer to appear with you? 2) Were you taken into custody by the police, but released without a court date? If yes, what was the date and the number of hours held? 3) Were you prevented from leaving and/or detained out on the street by the police? Ifyes, what was the date and the number of hours held? 4) Identify any persons who saw what happened to you. Plaintiffs explain that only those who were seeking legal representation or specific advice were requested to complete the form questionnaire. It was announced at the meeting that persons could write on the back of the questionnaire if they had any additional information that they wanted to convey.
Answers to the questionnaire were obtained. Plaintiffs state that the completed forms were immediately utilized to provide legal representation in criminal court for the arrestees, commencing on the first court date of April I, 2003. Plaintiffs further state that the information contained on completed questionnaires was kept confidential and provided only to lawyers who represented the
of the people."
-2-

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 63 Filed: 01/15/04 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:660
individuals in court. Plaintiffs have filed a complaint against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police
Department seeking certification of a class of protesters including those who were: 1) taken into custody but released without being charged with a crime; 2) subjected to unnecessary and/or excessive force; 3) deprived of personal property; 4) taken into custody based on associational or expressive principles; and 5) taken into custody and charged with criminal offenses. Class certification issues are being litigated and discovery is ongoing. In the course of discovery, a blank form questionnaire was produced to Defendants. Plaintiffs also produced a list ofprotesters who attended the March 30, 2003 meeting. Defendants now seek to compel production of the completed questionnaires returned to counsel.
DISCUSSION The federal rules permit "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A document is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege when: I) legal advice of any kind is sought 2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, 3) the communications relating to that purpose, 4) made in confidence, 5) by the client, 6) are at his instance permanently protected 7) from disclosure by himself or the legal adviser, 8) except the protection may be waived. United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7... Cir. 1991). A party that refuses to disclose information based on a claim of privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege applies. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000). With the exception ofwhether the persons who completed the questionnaire are to be regarded as clients, Defendants do not dispute that all ofthe requirements for the attorney-client privilege have
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been established. The purpose of the meeting was to provided legal advice to protesters. The questionnaires were provided to the lawyers in their capacity as legal advisors. The questionnaires sought information related to that purpose such as the particulars ofan individual's criminal court date. The communications in question were also made in confidence and under an expectation of privacy. The questionnaire promises that the information provided will be "held in strict confidence and used only by the attorneys providing legal representation." There has been no waiver ofthe attorney-client privilege.
Defendants argue that the completed questionnaires are discoverable because no attorney-client relationship existed. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence ofan attorney-client relationship is not dependent upon the payment of fees or upon the execution of a formal contract. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7"' Cir. 1978). Rather, "[t]he professional relationship for purposes ofthe privilege for attorney-client communications 'hinges upon the client's belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice."' ld. at 1319 (quoting McCormick on Evidence (2d ed. 1972), § 88, p. 179).
Applying these guidelines to the facts of this case, Plaintiffs have established that the persons who completed the form questionnaires reasonably believed that they were consulting counsel in their capacity as lawyers and they completed the questionnaire for the purpose of requesting legal representation. Plaintiffs explain that at the meeting, only those who were seeking legal representation or specific advice were requested to complete the form. The form questionnaire expressly states that it should be completed if a person is "interested in either legal representation on a criminal charge or to pursue a civil lawsuit." See Bauman v. Jacobs Suchard. Inc., 136 F.R.D. 460 (holding that questionnaires returned to the EEOC by prospective claimants in an age discrimination suit were protected by a defacto attorney-client privilege where only those who desired to be represented were
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asked to complete the questionnaire). Because an attorney-client relationship existed at the time the questionnaires were completed, they are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. See Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet. Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 342 (D. Mass. 1982) (holding customers of one ofdefendant's former clients reasonably regarded a court appointed Customers' Representative as their lawyer where questionnaires sent to customers prior to the filing of a civil class action were accompanied by a cover letter indicating that the Customers' Representative was acting as an attorney representing the customer's legal interests).
Defendants claim that the form questionnaire assumes that some who respond will not desire representation and thus, the questionnaire records which individuals do not want or need the services of the lawyers. Defendants cite only on the portion of the questionnaire dealing with court dates for criminal charges. That portion ofthe questionnaire asks: "Do you want a lawyer to appear with you? __ Yes _ _ No, I already have a lawyer or I will use the public defender." The fact that certain persons who completed the questionnaire may not have sought legal representation from plaintiffs' lawyers in connection with a criminal charge does not defeat the privilege. In addition to determining if persons required criminal representation, the questionnaire also requested information from individuals seeking civil representation, including whether they were taken into custody or detained on the street.
Defendants contend that in the "context ofclass actions, questionnaires filled out by witnesses and potential putative class members have not been deemed privileged and have been discoverable." Defs' Reply, p. 5. The cases cited by Defendants are easily distinguishable. In Morisky. eta!. v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 191 F.R.D. 419, 424 (D. N.J. 2000), a putative class action, plaintiffs' attorneys failed to establish that the persons who completed the questionnaires "were clients or sought to become clients at the time the employees retunied the completed questionnaires." Id. at
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423. Similarly, in Hudson v. General Dvnamics Com., 186 F.R.D. 271, 276 (D. Conn. 1999), the district court held that the attorney-client privilege did not protect initial questionnaire responses by employees who later retained plaintiffs' attorney as their lawyers because the initial questionnaires were completed not for the purpose ofobtaining legal advice but solely to serve as witness statements and were completed prior to the existence of or any attempt by the recipient to create any attorney client relationship.2 In contrast, the questionnaires in the instant case were completed by persons seeking legal representation.'
Defendants' remaining arguments do not aid their attempt to discover the completed questionnaires. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' counsel cannot assert the attorney-client privilege over everyone who attended a public meeting held to gather information from those who allegedly participated in a protest that took place in Chicago on March 20, 2003. Defendants misstate Plaintiffs' claim of privilege. Plaintiffs do not assert the attorney-client privilege on behalf of everyone who attend the public meeting. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that an attorney-client relationship existed upon completion of the form questionnaire. Defendants further argue that because persons who did not
I
protest on March 20, 2003 could have attended the meeting and filled out a form, the questionnaires
2 Similar to the present case, the Hudson court also found that questionnaires completed by the plaintiffs when they were clients or while attempting to become prospective clients are privileged. Hudson, 186 F.R.D. at 276. As the Hudson court explained: "In actions involving representation of multiple clients like this one, a client questionnaire is often prepared by counsel as an efficient substitute for more time consuming face-to-face interviews to provide the attorney with client information in response to focused questions fashioned by the attorney about the potential client and his or her claims." Id. at 275.
3 The case of Dobbs v. Larnonts Aooarel. Inc., 155 F.R.D. 650 (D. Alaska 1994), cited by Defendants, is not applicable because the court did not reach the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege protected the questionnaires from disclosure. The Dobbs court held that the third-party verbatim answers made in response to plaintiffs' attorneys' questionnaite were not protected from disclosure by the attorney work product privilege. Here, Plaintiffs do not claim that the completed questionnaires are protected under the work product doctrine.
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are not privileged. Defendants are mistaken. The privilege issue here concerns the communications contained in the questionnaires and not the communications that occurred during the group meeting. In fact, deponents have already testified as to what was communicated to the entire group at the meeting.
Defendants point out that the meeting was held before a class action was filed. The attorney client privilege covers communications where "legal advice of any kind is sought" and is not dependent upon the initiation or contemplation oflitigation. White, 950 F.2d at 430. Defendants also point out that the form questionnaire does not state that individual responding agree to be represented by the National Lawyers Guild or any other particular lawyers. The existence of an attorney-client relationship is not tied to actual employment of the lawyer. "The fiduciary relationship ex.isting between lawyer and client ex.tends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention ofthe lawyer, although actual employment does not result." Westinghouse Elec. Com., 580 F.2d atl319.
Finally, Defendants argue they have a "substantial need" to determine who participated in the protest but did not consider themselves detained by police and it would cause them "undue hardship" to obtain the information by other means. The "substantial need" and "undue hardship" exception set forth in Rule 26 applies to the attorney work-product privilege and not attorney-client information. Scurto v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 1999 WL 35311, *4 (N.D. lll. Jan. 11, 1999). Thus, an assertion of attorney-client privilege may not be overcome upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. Defendants claim that they have a legitimate interest in discovering the "facts" disclosed in the responses to the questionnaires. "It is true that only the communications and advice given are privileged; the facts communicated are still discoverable if otherwise the proper subject of discovery." Bauman, 136 F.R.D. at 463. Plaintiffs have already provided a list of the names and
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addresses of every person who signed in at the meeting. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants have ample non-privileged opportunities and avenues to discover who participated in the demonstration but did not consider themselves detained by the police. At the next status hearing, counsel shall be prepared to discuss the most appropriate and efficient avenue for Defendants to discover whatever relevant facts are contained in the completed questionnaires.
CONCLUSION For the reasons explained, Defendants' Motion to Compel production of completed questionnaires by potential class members is denied.

Dated: __1-_,(,__,S.L_~_-_,o"--'c.J'--

ENTER:
~(Cyy Q ~~
NanR.Nolan United States Magistrate Judge

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 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 1 of 44 PageID #:774

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

F 1LED
MAY 0 3 2004

KEVIN VODAK, et al, individually

)

and on behalf of others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CIDCAGO, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT )

TERRY G. mLLARD; SUPERINTENDENT PHILLIP)

CLINE; CHIEF JAMES MAURER; CHIEF JERRY )

ROBINSON; DEPUTY CHIEF TOM BYRNE;

)

DEPUTY CHIEF FRANK RADKE; DEPUTY CHIEF )

RALPH CHICZEWSKI; COMMANDER KILLACKY; )

COMMANDER SAM CHRISTIAN; COMMANDER )

DAVID DOUGHERTY; COMMANDER MARIENNE )

PERRY; COMMANDER JOHN R. RISLEY,

)

COMMANDER JOSEPH GRIFFIN; COMMANDER )

DANIEL DUGAN; COMMANDER CHARLES

)

WILLIAMS, LIEUTENANT KEVIN RYAN;

)

LIEUTENANT NEIL SULLIVAN; LIEUTENANT )

DAVE SOBSCYZK; ASSISTANT DEPUTY

)

FRANK LAMONE; FORMER ASSISTANT DEPUTY )

SUPERINTENDENT RON HUBERMAN;

)

DEFENDANTS DOE 1-50, DEFENDANTS DOE

)

51-100, CPO BARKER, Star No. 14246; CPO BILYJ, )

Star No. 3243; CPOM. BLACK, Star No. 8943; CPO L.)

COLEMAN, Star No. #3377; CPO E. CORTEZ, Star )

No. 7584; CPO DAKURAS, StarNo. 6643;

)

CPO C. DeCICCO, Star No. 6215; CPO G. GAMBOA, )

Star No. 12610;CPO R. HAGAN Star No. 14488;

)

CPO L. HEISE, Star No. 17026; CPO D. HERRERA, )

Star No. 18611; CPO R. HUGHES, Star No. 4293;

)

CPO HUNT, Star No. 3535; CPO JAROS, Star No. 9295)

CPO JOHNSON, Star No. 11292;CPO A. KIZZIAH, )

Star No. 7304; CPO D. KOONIG, Star No. 9072,

)

CPO T. LOCONE, Star No. 11623;CPO LUCAS,

)

Star No.19890;CPO METHIPARA, Star No.18220; )

CPO J. MENDOZA, Star No. 19326; CPO PARILLI, )

Star No. 10176; CPO PASQUA, Star No. 5781;CPO D. )

MICHAEL W. DOBBINS CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
No. 0.3 C 2463
Judge: COAR Magistrate: NOLAN
CIVIL RIGHTS CLASS ACTION SEEKING DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF JURY DEMANDED

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RODRIGUEZ, Star No. 13585;CPO R. RODRIGUEZ, )

Star No. 15347; CPOM. SANTOS, Star No. 12347; )

CPO J. TAITT, Star No. 11644; CPO J. TAMEZ,

)

Star No. 8760; CPO M. WEBER, Star No. 16785;

)

CPOM. WILLIAMS, Star No. 14447; and

)

DEFENDANTS ROE 1-50,

)

)

Defendants.

)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

This is a civil rights class action for money damages and injunctive relief, arising under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State of
lllinois, against the City of Chicago (hereinafter, "the City''), Superintendent Hillard,

Commander Risley and other policymakers, and supervisory personnel and officers ofthe

Chicago Police Department (hereinafter "CPD'') for false detentions, arrests, imprisonments and

injuries sustained by approximately 800 class members on March 20, 2003, in Chicago, Illinois.

On March 20, 2003, Defendants, acting under the color oflaw, unlawfully detained and

imprisoned the class by "herding," "sweeping" and then "pinning" demonstrators and bystanders

on the comer of Chicago and Michigan Avenues for hours and forcefully prevented the class

from peaceably assembling and speaking freely or leaving the area of a peace rally and march.

Members of the class were also subjected to excessive and unnecessary force that caused injuries.

Further, many in the class were then arrested and imprisoned in police vehicles and subsequently

in jail cells from between four (4) and thirty-six (36) hours. While imprisoned, Plaintiffs were

subjected to arbitrary, uureasonable and unduly punitive confinement conditions. 1n addition,

many in the class were then charged with criminal offenses and forced to appear in court until

their cases were favorably terminated.

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Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring the Defendants to seal, return and/or destroy any records of plaintiffs' arrests and unlawful restraint of class members, and to restrain the CPD from misusing plastic and metal handcuffs. Plaintiffs also seek money damages for the injuries suffered by false detentions, arrests, imprisonments, the misuse of the handcuffs, and other excessive force and unlawful restraint.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.; the judicial code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a); and the Constitution of the United States. Supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in the Northern District oflllinois as the events complained of occurred in this district.
PARTIES
A. The Plaintiffs. 2. Plaintiffs at all times relevant were and are adult residents of these United States who were in Chicago, lllinois, on March 20, 2003. B. The Defendants. 3. Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the laws of the State of lllinois, is the employer and principal of the individual defendants and is responsible for the policies, practices and customs of the Chicago Police Department, its Office of Professional Standards, its Personnel Division, its Patrol Division and its Superintendent of Police. 4. Defendant Terry G. Hillard is, and at all times relevant herein was, the Superintendent and Chief of Police of the City of Chicago, with responsibility for supervising, training,
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assigning, administrating and controlling all officers and employees of the Chicago Police Department. He is sued in his individual capacity.
5. Defendant Phillip Cline is currently Superintendent and Chief of Police of the City of Chicago, and at all times relevant herein was, the Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, the First in Command under then Superintendent Hillard, with responsibility for supervising training, assigning, administering and controlling all officers and employees of the Chicago Police Department. He is sued in his individual capacity.
6. Defendants James A. Maurer, Frank Lamone, Jerry Robinson, Thomas Byrne, Frank R. Radke, Chief Jerry Robinson, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Dougherty, Marienne Perry, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Lt. Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Lt. David Sobscyk, Ronald Huberman at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who held supervisory, command and/or policy-making positions, and who participated in the authorization, planning, supervision, and the execution of the police conduct complained of herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants failed, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights, to adequately train and supervise CPD officers who were involved in violating the rights ofthe Plaintiff class members.
7. Does 51 through 100, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants used excessive force on one or more of the Plaintiffs. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Does 51 through I00, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities
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ofthese Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
8. Defendants Barker, Bilyj, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained herein. Additionally, each ofthese Defendants signed a criminal complaint against on one or more ofthe Plaintiffs. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
9. Roes 1 through 50, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained of in the lock up areas at the police stations. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Roe 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities ofthese Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
10. At all times relevant herein, all of the individual defendants were acting under the color of law, under color of authority and in the scope of their employment as Chicago Police Officers and Supervisory Personnel.
11. Each of the Defendants caused, and is responsible for the unlawful conduct described herein, and resulting injuries by, among other things, personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so; by authorizing, acquiescing in or
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setting into motion, policies, practices, plans or actions that led to the unlawful conduct: by failing and refusing with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights to initiate and maintain adequate training and supervision; and by ratifYing the unlawful conduct that occurred by agents and officers under their direction and control, including failing to take remedial or disciplinary action.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
12. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek to certify a Class and four subclasses.
13. The Class (Class A) consists of all persons who were detained by the CPD in the above-described herd-sweep-pin blockade on March 20, 2003, on either Oak Street or Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue, between approximately 7:00 p.m. and 11 :30 p.m., when each class member was detained and their freedom to leave infringed. The Class is divided into five subclasses, consisting of various groups of class members who were detained by the CPD. The subclasses are defmed as follows:
14. Subclass A-1 is defmed as all class members who were taken into custody, but were released without being charged with any crime.
15. Subclass A-2 consists of all class members who were subjected to unnecessary and/or excessive force by Defendants in the course of the aforementioned mass arrests and who suffered additional specific physical pain and injury beyond the constitutional and other deprivations common to all members of the class.
16. Subclass A-3 consists of class members who, during the course of the abovementioned mass arrests, were deprived ofpersonal property without due process oflaw.
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17. Subclass A-4 consists of all class members who were taken into custody or detained

based on associational or expressive principles- i.e., because they were carrying or holding signs

or banners and/or were identified by the CPD as "leaders" or "organizers" of the protest rally.

18. Subclass A-5 consists of all class members who were taken into custody, charged

with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions ofbond and required to appear in court on

criminal charges brought by Defendants.

19. The class and each subclass meets the requirements ofFRCP 23(a), as follows:

a) The requirements ofRu1e 23(a)(1) are satisfied because the class, and each of the

subclasses, are sufficiently numerous that joinder is impractical. There are

between 500 and 1000 class members. Moreover, a significant number ofclass

members were from other cities and states, and so the class is geographically

disbursed.

b) The requirements ofRu1e 23(a)(2) are satisfied because there are questions oflaw

or fact common to the class and each of the subclasses. The common questions of

law include, but are not limited to:

•

whether the detaiument ofindividuals blockaded by the Chicago Police

Department (CPD) for hours on Chicago Avenue and Oak Street deprived

Plaintiffs and the class members ofconstitutional rights;

•

whether the detaimnent of individuals blockaded by the CPD for hours on

Chicago and Oak constituted a false imprisomnent;

•

whether the mass arrests were made without probable cause;

•

whether the Plaintiffs and the class members were engaged in lawful First

Amendment activity on the public streets and sidewalks were acting

reasonably within time, place and manner restrictions and were not

provided any alternative channels for their expression;

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•

whether certain Plaintiffs and subclass members were singled out for arrest

based on the fact they were expressing themselves by carrying signs and

banners and/or were perceived as "organizers" of the protest;

•

whether the actions ofDefendants, in falsely detaining, arresting and

imprisoning Plaintiffs who were exercising their constitutional rights to

free expression further violated the rights of the class (and/or subclass

members) of their right to free speech and peaceful assembly, as

guaranteed by the federal and state constitution;

whether the conditions under which Plaintiffs and the class members were

confined at police stations or in transporting vehicles were unduly punitive

and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and other Constitutional

rights; and

•

whether the decision to make the mass arrests and the orders concerning

the manner in which Plaintiffs and the class members were to be encircled,

trapped and detained- and, as it relates to the subclasses, taken into

custody- were made by officers of sufficient rank, authority, influence,

and discretion that they can be deemed policymakers under Monell and its

progeny;

•

whether the manner in which Defendants seized certain Plaintiffs' property

or forced certain Plaintiffs and sub-class members to abandon property,

which was not subsequently secured by the CPD, resulting in its loss, was

an unreasonable and unlawful taking or deprivation ofproperty in

violation of federal and state constitutional and common law, and whether

post-deprivation remedies were and are inadequate;

•

whether an injunction should be granted in favor ofPlaintiffs and the class

members and against the CPD as alleged herein;

•

whether Defendants, including high ranking officials ofthe CPD conspired

and agreed and/or otherwise acted jointly among and between themselves

to herd, surround and unlawfully detain Plaintiffs and the class;

The common questions of fact, include but are not limited to:

•

whether the Defendants encircled, pinned and detained the Plaintiffs and

class members;

•

whether the Defendants use of force under the circumstances was

excessive, including the intentional harm caused by handcuffs;

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•

the nature and extent of the confinement conditions, including the degree

to which Plaintiffs and the class members were denied food, denied

medical care, denied phone calls, denied necessary toiletries and feminine

hygiene products, placed in over-crowded cells and subjected to verbal

abuse, threats and neglect;

•

the nature, extent and adequacy of training of police officers to make mass

arrests without depriving citizens ofconstitutionally guaranteed and

protected rights;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the "police code of silence," as alleged

herein;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the tacit and de facto policy of the CPD

to intimidate, abuse and harass demonstrators at rallies and protests over

the course of several years in the City of Chicago; and

•

the degree to which the complained of policies are encouraged, promoted

and effectuated, against demonstrators in the City of Chicago by the CPD.

c) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) are satisfied because named Plaintiffs' claims

are typical of the claims of the class and each subclass they seek to represent.

d) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied because the representative parties

will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class and each subclass they

seek to represent. The named Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to other

members of the class or subclass they seek to represent. Moreover, Plaintiffs have

retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and civil rights claims.

20. The class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(l) because

prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of

inconsistent or incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants.

21. With respect to the claims for injunctive relief, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are

satisfied because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, and

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injWlctive relief for the class as a whole is appropriate.

22. Additionally, the class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule

23(b)(3) because the common questions predominate over individual questions and prosecution

of this action as a class action is the superior method of adjudication. Factors that militate in

favor of certification Wlder Rule 23(b)(3) include:

•

Several hWldred class members have already requested that a class action be

brought and asked Wldersigned coWlsel, all affiliated with the Chicago Chapter of

the National Lawyer's Guild, to bring a class action regarding the March 20th

protests; thus, the interest ofmembers in individually controlling the prosecution

of separate actions is minimal and would be burdensome in view of the evidence

required and costs of proving the claims alleged herein;

•

on information and belief, there is no litigation concerning this controversy that

has been commenced by or against the class members;

•

it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of lllinois because the events occurred in this district and

involve federally-protected rights;

•

certification of the class and subclasses will achieve great economies of time,

effort and expense and promote uniformity of decision ofthe members ofthe

class, again thereby making a class action the superior method of adjudicating the

controversy.

23. Plaintiffs will move for class certification as soon as is practicable in accordance with Rule 23(c).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The Emergency Demonstration

24. On March 20, 2003, thousands of people congregated at the Federal Plaza located at Jackson Avenue and Dearborn Street in Chicago's downtown area to express concern and protest the commencement of bombing and the inception of the 2003 United States war on Iraq.

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25. A rally organized by several anti-war, anti-violence and other peace groups was held at the Federal Plaza beginning at approximately 5:00p.m. The rally commenced with a series of speakers expressing themselves over a sound system to the gathering crowd.
26. After the rally, the crowd having continued to increase, between five and fifteen thousand demonstrators began to march through the streets of downtown Chicago, chanting and carrying signs, accompanied and escorted by Chicago Police Officers.
27. When the demonstration march reached Michigan Avenue and East Lake Shore Drive (the inner drive) at approximately 7:30p.m., Chicago Police Officers lined themselves up across Michigan Avenue and refused to allow the demonstration to proceed.
28. The demonstration march was stalled for a period of time in excess of thirty (30) minutes at this location, during which time a number of demonstrators left the march and others arrived to join the demonstration.
29. The demonstrators were not engaged in any unlawful activity and continued to chant and express their opposition to the Iraq War.
30. The demonstration was directed away from Michigan Avenue and demonstrators proceeded eastward and then in a southern direction toward Chicago Avenue.
B. The Unlawful Detention
31. Defendants Doe began to herd and push the demonstrators onto Chicago Avenue, without warning or order to disperse; they encircled the demonstrators with numerous police officers, trapped and pinned them in the street and prohibited many from leaving the area.
32. After two to three hours, certain class members were selectively and without regard to any lawful or unlawful activity, eventually allowed to leave the demonstration and the area.
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33. Other class members were then taken into police custody, handcuffed, further detained, escorted to police vehicles and transported to police stations.
34. At no time did any police personnel give any order to disperse, make any warning of impending arrests or advise persons that their conduct was unlawful or reckless, through any loud speaker or voice magnification system or any other reasonable means.
C. The Manner of the Arrests
35. Certain Defendants Doe in the course of the detention and mass arrest of class members engaged in excessive and unnecessary physical force, subjecting some class members to being struck with batons, being slanuned to the ground, pulling their hair and dragging them away.
36. Certain Defendants Doe identified individuals they perceived to be leaders of the demonstration or particularly vocal activists, who were then singled out and immediately taken into custody.
37. Some class members did not intend to be part of the demonstration, did not march through the streets and were arrested attempting to return to hotels, coming out of restaurants, getting off buses or simply observing the demonstrators and police officers.
38. In the course of detaining and arresting the Plaintiffs, Defendants placed handcuffs on many Plaintiffs in an improper, unreasonable and unsafe manner which caused many ofthe Plaintiffs moderate to severe pain and some, lasting injury including lacerations and nerve damage.
39. In the course of unlawfully detaining and arresting several of the Plaintiffs, Defendants took possession and/or refused to allow said Plaintiffs to remain in possession of
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bicycles, sound amplification devices, radios and other property causing the permanent deprivation of property belonging to Plaintiffs.
D. The Manner of Confinement
40. Class members who were taken to police stations were segregated by gender, handcuffed and searched; most ofthe males were taken to the police station located at 727 East
111 <h Street and the majority of females were taken to the police station at 5555 West Grand
Avenue. 41. Plaintiffs were required to provide information to Defendants concerning their
identities, employment and other matters which were recorded on official police reports and upon information and beliefcontinue to be maintained at the police stations.
42. Class members were subjected to verbal abuse, neglect and unreasonable conditions ofconfinement at the police stations, including but not limited to, being deprived of food, water, telephone communication, necessary toiletries and feminine hygiene products.
43. Class members were confined in overcrowded and overheated cells for extended and unreasonable periods oftime.
44. Certain class members were deprived ofneeded medical treatment and necessary medication.
E. The Filing of False Charges and Malicious Prosecution of Plaintiffs
45. Certain class members were detained until they agreed to conditions of bail, including the payment of up to One Hundred Dollars in cash for bond.
46. Certain class members were subsequently forced to appear in court and defend against false charges that they engaged in criminal conduct.
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47. All charges against class members were ultimately dismissed and the cases terminated in favor of Plaintiffs.
F. The Conspiracy Among Defendants
48. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Lamone, Maurer, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Chiczewski, Killackey, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Risley, Griffin, Dugan, and other high ranking officials of the CPD, agreed to jointly act and/or conspire among and between themselves and other officers, to herd, surround, trap, and unlawfully detain Plaintiffs and class members on the street, many of whom were subsequently further unlawfully detained on the scene, in police vehicles and at police stations.
49. Defendants, including but not limited to defendants Byrne, Radke,Chiezewski, Risley, Risley, Griffin, and Ryan, and Howard, met and conspired to give false and incomplete statements for purposes of an official report in an attempt to justify the illegal detentions, arrests and/or charges ofPlaintiffs and class members.
G. The Named Plaintiffs Prudence Browne, Angela Garcia, Elizabeth Johnson and Sophia Sieczkowski
On Behalf of Themselves and the Class
50. Prudence Browne is employed at a nonprofit organization focusing on video and media production in Chicago.
51. Ms. Browne joined the demonstration after it reached Michigan Avenue and East Lake Shore Drive on March 20, 2003, and was encircled, pinned and trapped with other demonstrators by Defendants Doe on Chicago Avenue just east ofMichigan Avenue.
52. Ms. Browne inquired of police personnel whether she could leave the demonstration,
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and was told she would have to wait. 53. Ms. Browne witnessed several other demonstrators identified and singled out of the
crowd by Defendants Doe, and observed Defendants Doe handcuffthese demonstrators and take them away without any provocation.
54. Ms. Browne did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed she had to leave the demonstration or the area prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe.
55. Ms. Browne was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe for several hours before she was eventually allowed to leave the area.
56. Angela Garcia currently lives in Chicago, and will attend school here in the fall. 57. Ms. Garcia was among the demonstrators who were encircled and pinned by Defendants Doe on Chicago Avenue just east ofMichigan Avenue on March 20, 2003. 58. Ms. Garcia inquired of police personnel whether she could leave the demonstration and was told to wait and was further prevented from leaving the area. 59. Ms. Garcia observed and was informed by others that leaders were being identified by Defendants Doe, singled out, removed from the demonstration, handcuffed and taken away from the area, without any provocation. 60. Ms. Garcia did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that she had to leave the demonstration or the area . 61. Ms. Garcia was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe for hours before she was eventually allowed to leave the area.
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'
62. Elizabeth Johnson traveled downtown with her husband and a young woman they met on the train on the way to the demonstration.
63. When the demonstration reached the area of Michigan and Chicago Avenues, Ms. Johnson and her husband were told they could leave the area.
64. Ms. Johnson and her husband went to locate the young woman they accompanied to the demonstration and after finding her, they attempted to leave the demonstration together.
65. At that point the Defendants Doe prevented the three from leaving the area and were detained for hours in the street with hundreds of other class members.
66. Ms. Johnson and her companions did not commit a crime, were never ordered to disperse, did not witness or hear any police warnings, and were never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that they had to leave the demonstration or the area
67. Sophia Sieczkowski attended the demonstration and observed demonstrators being taken into custody at approximately 8:30p.m. near the intersection of Chicago and Michigan Avenues.
68. Ms. Sieczkowski attempted to catch a bus to travel home and was prevented from leaving the area by Defendants Doe, she then walked to the other side of the demonstration in an attempt to leave but was again told by Defendants Doe she could not leave the area
69. Ms. Sieczkowski then dialed 911 from her cellular telephone and told the 911 dispatcher she was being held against her will and requested the dispatcher speak with Defendant Doe.
70. Defendant Doe took the telephone from Ms. Sieczkowski and told the dispatcher that
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Ms. Sieczkowski could not leave the area. 71. Ms. Sieczkowski was detained for approximately two hours in the street with
hundreds of other class members. 72. Ms. Sieczkowski did not commit a crime, was never ordered to disperse, did not
witness or hear any police warnings, and was never informed prior to being encircled, trapped and pinned in by Defendants Doe that she had to leave the demonstration or the area .
Kevin Vodak, Patrick Donnell, Robert Castillo, John Pennycnff On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclass A-1
73. Kevin Vodak is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State oflllinois. Mr. Vodak attended the demonstration as a legal observer whose role was to facilitate any necessary negotiations with the demonstrators and police personnel.
74. At approximately 7:30p.m. Mr. Vodak was surrounded by Defendants Doe at Michigan and Chicago Avenues while standing on the sidewalk and was prohibited from leaving the area.
75. Defendants Doe refused Mr. Vodak's requests to speak with a commanding officer after he clearly identified himself as a legal observer and was handcuffed with plastic cuffs after being pointed out for arrest by an unknown supervisory police officer.
76. Another supervisory officer, with the last name of Doherty, authorized and ratified Mr. Vodak' s arrest despite the lack of probable cause that he had committed any crime, the fact that he did not commit any crime, did not resist arrest and prior to his arrest he had never been informed or warned that he must leave the area.
77. Mr. Vodak was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the police station at 727 E.
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111til Street, placed in a jail cell, and unlawfully detained for approximately 11 hours before he was released on March 21, 2003.
78. Patrick Donnell is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. 79. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 8:00p.m., Mr. Donnell was traveling home on a Chicago Transit Authority bus headed north on Michigan Avenue. 80. The bus was stopped by a uniformed Chicago police officer at the intersection of Michigan and Chicago Avenues, and the bus driver was informed that the bus was going to be rerouted. 81. Mr. Donnell exited the bus and proceeded across Michigan Avenue to the northeast comer of Michigan and Chicago Avenues. 82. Mr. Donnell witnessed Defendants Doe encircle, pin and trap the class members on Chicago Avenue near Michigan Avenue, and also observed Defendants Doe dragging people and striking people with night sticks. 83. Mr. Donnell also witnessed a woman in the crowd with a megaphone announce "Officer Friendly we did not come here to knock heads with you," and minutes later he saw a small group of Defendants Doe charge into the crowd and apparently arrest her. 84. Mr. Donnell at no time heard any police personnel issue any general order to the crowd that people had to leave or disperse. 85. Mr. Donnell and others standing with him were then informed by police personnel that if they wished to leave the area, they were to head towards Michigan Avenue, and as they complied and began walking, they were stopped by Defendants Doe. 86. Mr. Donnell, as well as others in the crowd, informed Defendants Doe they had been
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instructed by police to leave in this direction, but receiv~ no response and were prohibited from walking further, and were a short time later arrested by Defendants Doe.
87. Mr. Donnell was handcuffed with plastic handcuffs, taken to a police vehicle and transported to the 111 th Street police station.
88. Mr. Donnell did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was prevented from leaving the area prior to his arrest.
89. Mr. Donnell was placed in a cell with 15 others that was approximately 10 feet wide and 12 feet in length, and unlawfully detained for approximately 14 hours until he was released on March 21,2003.
90. Robert Castillo and John Pennycuff are community activists who had just attended a function with Mayor Richard Daley when they came upon the scene near Michigan and Chicago Avenues on March 20, 2003.
91. They observed and witnessed police misconduct, and then were prevented from leaving the area and arrested by Defendants Doe.
92. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuffwere handcuffed, taken to police vehicles, transported to the 111 th Street station, where they were unlawfully detained in a cell for many hours prior to their release on March 21, 2003.
93. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuff did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and prior to their arrest they were prevented from leaving the area.
Sharon Ambielli, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-2.
94. Sharon Ambielli attended the demonstration on March 20, 2003, and was taken into
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custody with other class members at approximately 9: 15 p.m. near the intersection of Michigan and Chicago Avenues.
95. Ms. Ambielli was handcuffed so tightly by Defendant Doe in such an unreasonable and excessive manner that the plastic restraints were cutting into her wrists, causing swelling and pam.
96. Ms. Ambielli' s repeated requests that the handcuffs be loosened were denied until approximately 11 :45 p.m. when the restraints were cut off and soon thereafter she was taken to Resurrection Hospital where she was diagnosed with compressed nerve damage in her right wrist.
97. Ms. Ambielliwas returned to the police station where she was processed, including taking her photographs and fingerprints, and eventually released at 5:45 a.m. on March 21, 2003, without being charged with any crime or offense.
98. Ms. Ambielli did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and was never informed by the police prior to her arrest that she must leave the demonstration.
99. Daniel Pineda is a student at the Art Institute of Chicago. 100. Mr. Pineda was approached by a Defendant Doe on Chicago Avenue near Michigan Avenue, and struck in the chest with a night stick by a Defendant Doe. I0 I. A Defendant Doe intentionally handcuffed Mr Pineda in an unreasonable manner in that the handcuffs were so tightly fastened around his wrists that he was caused unnecessary pain and injury. 102. Defendants Doe dragged Mr. Pineda to an awaiting police vehicle and transported him to the Ill th Street police station, where he was unlawfully detained for hours and released on .
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March 21, 2003. 103. Mr. Pineda did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and prior to his arrest was
never informed by the police that he must leave the area. 104. Aaron Robin is a student at Columbia College in Chicago, lllinois. 105. Mr. Robin was trapped by Defendants Doe near Michigan and Chicago Avenues, at
approximately 7:30p.m. and prohibited from leaving the area of the demonstration. 106. Mr. Robin observed Defendants Doe swinging their batons at demonstrators and
pulling a female demonstrator's hair, and a Defendant Doe then grabbed him by the back of the neck, he was struck in the wrist area, and he felt a cracking in the back of his wrist.
107. Mr. Robin was then handcuffed with plastic cuffs behind his back by a Defendant Doe who intentionally, unreasonably, and repeatedly twisted his wrists back and forth, causing him great pain and injury. His complaints of pain and requests for medical attention were met with threats directed at him by a Defendant Doe.
108. Mr. Robin was taken to a police vehicle and transported to the 111th Street police station, where his continuing complaints of pain were ignored by Defendants Doe and Roe.
109. Mr. Robin did not commit a crime, did not resist arrest, and he was never informed by the police prior to his arrest that he must leave the area.
110. Mr. Robin was unlawfully detained for approximately 23 hours and released on March 21, 2003, at which time, he sought medical attention and was treated for a fractured wrist.
Matt Gaines, Sarah Bergstrand On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-3.
111. Matt Gaines was among the demonstrators unlawfully detained on March 20, 2003.
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112. Mr. Gaines had in his possession sound amplification equipment for use at the demonstration as well as a pair of two way radios for communication by leadership within the demonstration.
113. Mr. Gaines was unlawfully taken into custody and his above described property was taken by a Defendant Doe who failed to inventory the property or return it.
114. Sarah Bergstrand and her husband rode their bicycles down to the demonstration on March 20, 2003.
115. Ms. Bergstrand was also unlawfully detained and she was taken into custody by Defendant Doe, who failed to inventory her property and ignored and refused her entreaty to be allowed to secure and lock the two bicycles at the scene.
116. Ms. Bergstrand returned to the scene upon her release from custody only to find the bicycles were gone. When she checked with the Chicago Police Department, she was told her bicycles could not be located or returned without a property inventory slip.
Eric Peters On behalf of himself, the Class, and Subclasses A-1 and A-4
117. Eric Peters is a student at the University of Illinois at Chicago. 118. Mr. Peters was grabbed at approximately 7:30p.m. near Michigan Avenue and East Lake Shore Drive, by a Defendant Doe who approached him in the crowd after a supervisory police officers yelled out "this is one of the organizers." 119. A Defendant Doe pulled Mr. Peters to the side and slammed him into the hood of a police vehicle, another supervisory police officer then jumped onto the hood of the police vehicle and yelled to the police officers about Mr. Peters, who then threw him to the ground and stepped
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on his neck. 120. Mr. Peters was then dragged along the ground to another police vehicle and he was
cuffed, transported to a police vehicle and taken to the police station at 727 East 111"' Street. 121. Mr. Peters did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was never informed
by the police that he must leave the demonstration prior to his arrest. 122. Mr. Peters was unlawfully detained for approximately 28 hours, within which time
he was not allowed to make a telephone call, and eventually released on March 21, 2003.
Trina Zabarsky, Steven Hudosh and Kathleen Gmber On Behalf of Themselves, the Class and Subclass A-5
123. Trina Zabarsky is a registered nurse who is employed at a Veterans Administration hospital in Cleveland, Ohio.
124. Ms. Zabarsky was staying in downtown Chicago to attend a business-related conference during the week that included March 20, 2003; and was a registered guest at the Drake Hotel located on Michigan Avenue.
125. Ms. Zabarsky was returning to the Drake Hotel during the evening hours of March 20, 2003, when she encountered the demonstration near Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue.
126. She approached a uniformed police officer, a Defendant Doe, and presented her out of state identification card and requested she be allowed to return to her hotel.
127. Defendant Doe refused her request and told her to remain where she was located. 128. After approximately 30 minutes, Ms. Zabarsky was taken into police custody, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle and transported to the Chicago police station located at 5555 W. Grand, Chicago, Illinois.
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129. Defendants made out false and incomplete official reports and gave a false and incomplete version of the events to their superiors in order to cover up their own misconduct, including Defendant Bilyj (Star No. 3243) who signed a criminal complaint against Ms. Zabarsky for reckless conduct, falsely alleging a violation of720 ll..CS 5/12-5(a).
130. Ms. Zabarsky was not released until about 5:00 p.m the following day, after posting $100.00 bond on a charge of reckless conduct.
131. Ms. Zabarsky was unable to attend her conference that day, was forced to consult with lawyers until her case was in court on May 9, 2003, when all charges against her were dismissed and the case terminated in her favor and consistent with her innocence.
132. Ms. Zabarsky did not commit a crime, did not resist her arrest, and was never given an opportunity to leave the area prior to her arrest.
133. Steven Hudosh is employed in the area of development in a nonprofit organization and participated in the demonstration commencing upon his arrival at the federal building at approximately 5:00p.m. on March 20, 2003.
134. Mr. Hudosh was on the sidewalk of Chicago Avenue sometime after 10:00 p.m. that evening when a Chicago police officer pointed to him and said "come here."
135. Chicago police officers then took Mr. Hudosh into custody, handcuffed him and detained him for 30 hours until he was released at 4:30 a.m. the following Saturday morning.
136. The first night of Mr. Hudosh's detention was spent in a cell he shared with 30 other individuals.
137. Defendants made out false and incomplete official reports and gave a false and incomplete version of the events to their superiors in order to cover up their own misconduct,
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including signing Defendant K. Judeh's and badge number (Star No. 8825) to a false and invalid criminal complaint against Mr. Hudosh for reckless conduct, falsely alleging a violation of720 ILCS § 5/12-5(a), incorrectly asserting that Mr. Hudosh was arrested by Officer Judeh, when in fact, according to Judeh he was not at the demonstration and he was not on duty working for the Chicago Police Department on March 20, 2003, and incorrectly identifying Mr. Hudosh on the court docket as Steven Hudson.
138. As a result of the false charges filed by the Defendants, Mr. Hudosh appeared in court on April 1, 2003, with an attorney, and all charges against him were dismissed and the case terminated in his favor and consistent with his innocence.
139. Mr. Hudosh did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was never given an opportunity to leave the area prior to his arrest.
140. Kathleen Gruber is currently employed as a school counselor. 141. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 7:30p.m. Ms. Gruber was returning from work traveling on a Chicago Transit Authority bus. 142. Ms. Gruber exited the bus and approached the demonstration. 143. Ms. Gruber then joined the demonstration in order to express her peaceful protest against the war in Iraq. 144. After no more than an hour's time, Ms. Gruber was detained near the intersection of Chicago and Michigan Avenues, her repeated requests to leave the demonstration were denied by Defendants, and while she was standing on the sidewalk, she was taken into police custody, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle and transported to the police station at 5555 West Grand Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
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145. Ms. Gruber was not released until about 2:30p.m the following day, after posting $100.00 bond on a charge of reckless conduct.
146. Defendants made out false and incomplete official reports and gave a false and incomplete version of the events to their superiors in order to cover up their own misconduct, including Defendant Bilyj (Star No. 3243) who signed a criminal complaint against Ms. Gruber, or a false criminal complaint was signed with Defendant Bilyj's name without his authorization or knowledge for reckless conduct, falsely alleging a violation of720 ILCS § 5/12-5(a).
147. As a result of the false charges filed by the Defendants, Ms Gruber appeared in court on three separate court dates, with an attorney, until all charges against her were dismissed on June 19, 2003, and the case ultimately terminated in her favor and consistent with her Innocence.
148. Ms. Gruber did not commit a crime, did not resist her arrest, and was never given an opportunity to leave the area prior to her arrest.
149. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses.
COUNT I [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for False Detention, Arrest and Imprisonment] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclasses A-1 and 5)
150. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 151. The actions of the Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Huberman, Barker, Bilyj, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras,
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C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams and Doe in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and thus violated 42
u.s.c. § 1983.
152. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, angnish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT II [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Violation of First Amendment Rights] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclasses A-1 and A-5, and Brought By Eric Peters, Individually and on Behalf of Subclass A-4)
153. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 154. Plaintiffs, who were engaged in lawful First Amendment activity on the public streets and sidewalks of the City of Chicago, were acting reasonably within time, manner and
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place restrictions and were not provided any alternative channels for their expression. 155. The actions of Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne,
Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Hubennan, Barker, BilY.i, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams and Doe in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs who were exercising their Constitutional right to freedom of
association further violated their First Amendment rights to be free from the infringement of their right to peaceably assemble, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
156. In addition, the actions ofDefendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Hubennan, Barker, Bilyj, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams and Doe in targeting individuals who appeared to be or were perceived to be leaders, including those carrying signs or sound amplification devices, further violated the rights ofPlaintiffs who were exercising their Constitutional right to freedom of expression in violation oftheir First Amendment right to be free from the infringement of their freedom of speech, and thus violated
42 u.s.c. § 1983.
157. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations
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of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of speech and expression, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT III [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Excessive Force Claim] (Brought by Ambielli, Robin and Pineda, Individually and on Behalf of
Subclass A-2)
158. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 159. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiffs with batons, pulling Plaintiffs' hair, intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs wrists too tightly, and otherwise using excessive and unjustifiable force against Plaintiffs, as well as failing to intervene to prevent said abuse despite having the opportunity and duty to do so, violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be secure in their persons, papers and effects against uureasonable searches and seizures, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 160. The actions of Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of
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Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IV
[42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Unreasonable and Punitive Conditions of Confinement] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class, Subclasses A-1 and 5)
161. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 149. 162. The acts of Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Huberman, Barker, BilY.i, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams, Doe and Roe in detaining Plaintiffs in overcrowded and over heated police vehicles and jail cells for unnecessarily long periods of time; in failing to provide Plaintiffs with the use of a telephone; in depriving Plaintiffs
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of necessary toiletries and sanitary napkins; in depriving Plaintiffs food and water for excessive periods of time; in deliberately ignoring Plaintiffs' serious medical needs by refusing to take Plaintiffs to a hospital, clinic or doctor, knowing they had not received any medical care since they were injured, and in exacerbating the pain and injury by detaining them in cramped and painful conditions, and further imposing other arbitrary, unreasonable and punitive conditions, violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be secure in their person, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and their rights to due process oflaw and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNTV [42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Deprivation of Property] (Brought by Gaines and Bergstrand, Individually, and on behalf of Subclass
A-3)
163. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 164. The Defendants' unreasonable actions in not allowing Plaintiffs to maintain custody of their property and/or unreasonably forcing Plaintiffs to abandon said property unsecured in a
31

•.

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 32 of 44 PageID #:805

public place and their subsequent inability, failure and refusal to return said personal property, without due process oflaw constituted an unlawful taking ofPlaintiffs' property and an unreasonable and unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and was a direct and proximate cause ofPlaintiffs' loss, further suffering and other injuries set forth above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VI [42 U.S.C. §1983 Monell Policy, Practice and Custom Claim] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclasses A-1 and 5)
165. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 164. 166. The actions of the individual defendants were done pursuant to one or more interrelated de facto as well as explicit policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Chicago, its police department, its Police Board, its Office ofProfessional Standards (O.P.S.) and Internal Affairs Division ( I.A.D), its Personnel Division, and/or its Superintendents. 167. Upon information and belief, high ranking police officials, including Superintendent Hillard and Commander Risley, planned, authorized, directed, ratified and/or acquiesced in the unconstitutional and unlawful police actions complained ofherein. 168. At all times material to this complaint the Defendant City and its police department, Superintendents, O.P.S., I.A.D., Personnel Division and/or Police Board had interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, a) the failure to properly train,
32

:00. • ,.. Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 33 of 44 PageID #:806
supervise, discipline, transfer, monitor, counsel and otherwise control police officers engaged in committing violations of police department rules and regulations, including the excessive nse of force, false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, the harassment of civilians exercising their First Amendment Rights in street demonstrations, and the manufacturing of false reports and statements as well as the physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and other police abuse, particularly in cases where the officers have repeatedly been accused of said acts; b) the police code of silence, particularly in cases where officers engaged in the above articulated violations; and c) encouragement of false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, and the attendant use of excessive force.
169. Further, the constitutional violations and damages to Plaintiffs that occurred as described herein were directly and proximately caused by the unofficial, unconstitutional, tacit policy of authorized policy makers of the City, who have, for years, deliberately ignored and indulged in violence and intimidation against demonstrators by officers assigned to "monitor'' political protest demonstrations, deliberately failed to supervise and control such officers so as to prevent violations of demonstrator's rights, and deliberately undermined, negated and stifled the citizens' complaint process. Thus, rank and file officers understand there is little or no risk involved in brutal attacks on or illegal mass arrests of persons exercising Free Speech rights.
170. In addition, the City, the police department and the command-level Defendants are well aware, and have been told and notified many times, that such illegal arrests and such brutal attacks occur, and happen again and again, to the point where a pattern and practice of brutality and harassment of demonstrators is readily evident, going back for may years.
171. These polices are evidenced, inter alia, by the following: a) the systemic
33

. -~ . .. Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 34 of 44 PageID #:807
encouragement, from the Superintendent on down, of false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, by promoting officers who make large numbers of arrests, giving them high performance ratings, based in large part on the number of arrests which they make, and ignoring the large number of citizen complaints made against many ofthese officers when making these promotions, assignments, and ratings; b) the failure to properly discipline, monitor, assign, counsel, transfer, supervise and otherwise control officers, including the Defendants, particularly after department records and studies, statistical data, and computer programs have, or should have, identified these officers including Defendants as "repeaters" with multiple complaints of brutality and other abuse or otherwise as actual or potential problem officers; c) the Department's failure to implement an adequate behavioral monitoring and control system or to properly implement or utilize its "repeater" lists, excessive force study, and "Brainmaker'' computer software program in order to identify, monitor, supervise, discipline, assign and otherwise control such problem officers.
172. The policy, practice, and custom of a police code of silence results in police officers refusing to report instances of police misconduct, including excessive force, false detentions, false arrests and false imprisonments and other abuse of citizens of which they are aware, despite their obligation under police regulations to do so, and also includes police officers either remaining silent or giving false and misleading information during official investigations in order to protect themselves or fellow officers from internal discipline, civil liability, or criminal charges, and to peijure themselves in criminal cases where they and their fellow officers have falsely arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted the criminal Defendant.
173. The fact that the aforementioned code of silence exists, and that its adverse impact
34

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 35 of 44 PageID #:808
is allowed to occur through the actions and inactions ofhigh ranking police officials including police Superintendents and former and current O.P.S. Directors, is also evidenced by the fact that while former Superintendent Martin, former O.P.S. Director Fogel and former O.P.S. Director Shines have all acknowledged publicly that they are aware of the existence of the custom and practice of a police code of silence, they as well as no other OPS Director have acted to eliminate the code or to counteract its impact on police discipline, the use of excessive force, police torture, fabrication of evidence and false arrests and prosecutions. In particular, they do not attempt to charge or discipline police officers who make false reports and statements or remain silent to hide their fellow officers wrongdoing although the O.P.S. is empowered and given the responsibility to do so.
174. The de facto policies, practices and customs of failing to train, supervise, monitor, discipline, counsel and control, the code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests and prosecutions are interrelated and exacerbate the effects of each other, to, in the words of former O.P.S. Director Fogel, "institutionalize police lying" and "immunize police officers from discipline."
175. The aforementioned policies, practices and/or customs of failing to supervise, discipline, monitor, control, etc., the police code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests, imprisonments, prosecutions, and convictions, separately and together, proximately caused injury to the Plaintiffs in this case, inter alia, because Defendants had good reason to believe that their misconduct would not be revealed or reported by fellow officers or their supervisors, that their denials would go unchallenged by these supervisors and fellow officers, from the police Superintendents, Police Board, and Directors of the O.P.S. on down, and that
35

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 36 of 44 PageID #:809
they were effectively immune from disciplinary action, thereby protecting them from the consequences of their unconstitutional conduct.
176. But for the belief that they would be protected, both by fellow officers and by the department, from serious career consequences, Defendants would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in the injuries to the Plaintiffs.
177. Said interrelated policies, practices and customs, as set forth above, both individually and together, were maintained and implemented with deliberate indifference, and encouraged the Defendants to commit the aforesaid acts against the Plaintiff and therefore acted as direct and proximate causes of said constitutional violations, and injuries to the Plaintiffs.
178. Additionally, said failure to properly train, discipline, monitor, control, assign, transfer, supervise, and counsel Defendants, was also done with deliberate indifference and likewise acted as a direct and proximate cause ofthe injuries to Plaintiffs.
179. These policies, practices and customs encouraged, inter alia, excessive use of force, the making of false statements and reports, and physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and were separately and together, a direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendants in this case and the injuries sustained by the Plaintiffs.
180. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct and unspoken policy of Defendants described herein, their failure to take reasonable steps to remedy the pattern and practice of police brutality, and their deliberate indifference to the serious threat to the rights of protesters, Plaintiffs were each denied her or his constitutional, statutory, and common law rights as stated below, and have suffered, and continue to suffer, mental and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, discomfort, fear, shock, anxiety, pain and harm.
36

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 37 of 44 PageID #:810
181. Defendants' policies, practices, conduct, acts and omissions alleged herein have no plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein. Plaintiffs fear they will again be subjected to the misuse of plastic and metal handcuffs, beaten or harassed. Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm as a result of the continuing existence of the police records of their arrests herein. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek injunctive relief restraining Defendants from misusing handcuffs, herding protesters and then not allowing them freedom to leave the area and requiring them to seal and destroy the records of Plaintiffs' arrests.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe marmer; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; judgment against Defendant City of Chicago for compensatory damages, plus costs and attorneys' fees and whatever additional relief this court finds equitable and just.
COUNTVll [Supplemental State Law Claims for Violations of the Illinois Constitution] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclasses A-1 and 5)
182. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 183. The actions taken by Defendants denied Plaintiffs their state constitutional rights to be secure in their persons; to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; to speak, write and publish freely; to assemble in a peaceable marmer; to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the lllinois Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries as set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting
37

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 38 of 44 PageID #:811
Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VIII [Supplemental State Law Claims for False Detention,
Arrest and Imprisonment] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, on Behalf of the Class and Subclass A-1 and 5)
184. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 185. The false detention, arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiffs on March 201h through March 21, 2003, were done wilfully and wantonly by Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Huberman, Barker, BilY.i, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams, Doe and Roe. 186. The actions of Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Barker, BilY.i, M. Black, L. Coleman, E. Cortez, Dakuras, C. DeCillo, G. Gamboa, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, Hunt, Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T.
38

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 39 of 44 PageID #:812
Locone, Lucas, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Parilli, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, M. Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, M. Weber, M. Williams, Doe and Roe directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, emotional distress, pain and suffering as claimed above and constitute the tort of false arrest and imprisonment under Illinois law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages, and because Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IX [Supplemental State Law Claims for Assault and Battery] (Brought by Ambielli, Robin and Pineda, Individually and on Behalf of
Subclass A-2)
187. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 188. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiffs, pulling Plaintiffs' hair, and intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs' wrists too tightly causing bodily harm, were performed in a wilful and wanton manner. 189. These actions of Defendants Doe were affirmative acts and threatened to cause or did cause an unpermitted contact of a harmful and/or offensive nature, to which Plaintiffs did not consent, and thus constitute assault and battery under laws of the State oflllinois. 190. The actions of Defendants Doe directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries,
39

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 40 of 44 PageID #:813
emotional distress, pain and suffering. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants
Doe and because they acted wilfully and wantonly, punitive damages plus the costs ofthis action.
COUNT X [Supplemental State Law Claim for Conversion] (Brought by Gaines and Bergstrand, Individually, and on behalf of Subclass
A-3)
191. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 192. The acts ofDefendants Doe in not allowing Plaintiffs to maintain custody of their property and/or unreasonably forcing Plaintiffs to abandon said property unsecured in a public place and their subsequent inability, failure and refusal to return said personal property, constituted an unlawful taking ofPlaintiffs' property and the tort ofconversion under lllinois law, were performed in a wilful and wanton manner, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' loss, further suffering and other injuries as set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants Doe and, because they acted wilfully and wantonly, punitive damages plus the costs of this
action.
COUNT XI [Supplemental State Law Claim for Conspiracy] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
193. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 194. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Lamone, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Robinson, Chiczewski, Killacky, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Griffin, Dugan, Williams, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Huberman Doe and Roe agreed and together reached an understanding or agreement to
40

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 41 of 44 PageID #:814
engage in a course of conduct, and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves, to falsely arrest, imprison, detain, assault, batter, and inflict emotional distress on Plaintiffs.
195. Defendants conspired and arrived at an understanding and meeting of the minds that the police would harass, intimidate, punish and retaliate against the participants in the March 20, 2003 protest because of their political beliefs, and in doing so deployed a large and intimidating force of police.
196. The objectives of this conspiracy, among others, were to prevent the expression and communication of, and otherwise interfere with, the message of the constitutionally protected activities and protest of the Plaintiff class, to sununarily punish the participants, to chill and deter other protest marches and rallies.
197. The decision and related activities involved in the mass arrests of the members of the Plaintiff class without probable cause and the maltreatment ofPlaintiff class members on the street and in the jails, were part of, and were overt acts taken in furtherance of, the conspiracy.
198. In furtherance of this conspiracy or conspiracies, the Defendants named above, together with their unsued co-conspirators, committed the overt acts set forth above, including, but not limited to, the wrongful and false detentions, arrests, imprisomnents, beatings of Plaintiffs, the manufacture and construction of knowingly false inculpatory evidence against Plaintiffs, the making of knowing misstatements and the filing of false and incomplete statements and reports.
199. Said conspiracy or conspiracies and overt acts were and are continuing in nature. 200. Defendant Hillard's, Cline's, Lamone's, Maurer's, Robinson's, Byrne's, Radke's,
41

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 42 of 44 PageID #:815
Chiczewski's, Killackey's, Christian's, Dougherty's, Perry's, Risley's, Griffin's, Dugan's,Huberman's, Doe's and Roe's and their co-conspirators' overt acts as set forth above, which were committed jointly and/or while conspiring together to falsely detain, arrest, falsely imprison, commit assault and battery on the Plaintiffs, constitute the tort of conspiracy.
201. This conspiracy proximately caused the injuries to the Plaintiff set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction (a) prohibiting Defendants from using plastic handcuffs in an improper or unsafe manner; and (b) ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants, and, because these Defendants acted maliciously, willfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' rights, for punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT XII [Pendent State Law Claims For Malicious Prosecution] (Brought by Zabarsky, Hudosh, and Gruber, Individually,
and on Behalf of Subclass A-5)
202. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 149. 203. The acts of Defendants in creating a false story, falsely charging Plaintiffs with one count of reckless conduct and, thereby causing them to lose their liberty for hours and be criminally prosecuted and incur legal expenses, out of pocket losses and emotional distress constituted the tort of malicious prosecution under the laws of the State of illinois. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual or compensatory damages, and because Defendants acted willfully and wantonly, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action and such
42

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 43 of 44 PageID #:816
other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT XIII [Supplemental State Law Claim for 745 ILCS § 10/9-102] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually, and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
204. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 203. 205. Defendant City of Chicago was the employer ofDefendants Hillard, Cline, Lamone, Maurer, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Chiczewski, Killackey, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Risley, Griffm, Dugan, Huberman and the individual Defendant police officers at all times relevant to this complaint. 206. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Lamone, Maurer, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Chiczewski, Killackey, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Risley, Griffin, Dugan, Huberman and the individual Defendant police officers committed the acts alleged above in the scope of their employment as employees ofDefendant City of Chicago. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pursuant to 745 ILCS § 10/9-102, demand judgment against the Defendant City of Chicago in the amount awarded to Plaintiffs against the individual Defendants as damages, attorneys' fees, costs and interest, and/or for any settlement entered into between the Plaintiffs and Defendants, and for whatever additional relief this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT XIV [Supplemental State Law Claim for Respondeat Superior] (Brought by all Plaintiffs, Individually, and on Behalf of the Class and Each
Subclass)
207. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 149, and 182 through 206. 208. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Lamone, Maurer, Robinson, Byrne, Radke, Chiczewski, Killackey, Christian, Dougherty, Perry, Risley, Griffin, Dugan, Huberman and the individual
43

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 83 Filed: 05/03/04 Page 44 of 44 PageID #:817

Defendant police officers were, at all times relevant to this Count, employees and agents ofthe
Defendant City of Chicago. Each of the above named individual Defendants was acting within
the scope of their employment, and their acts and omissions are directly chargeable to their employer the Defendant City of Chicago under state Jaw pursuant to respondeat superior.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment for compensatory damages, jointly and severally from the City of Chicago.

April 28, 2004

Res ctfully submitted,
NEL.HOFT EYL.MOGUL PEOPLE'S LAW OFFICE
C•
1180 N. MilwaUkee Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60622 773/235-0070
JAMES FENNERTY 36 S. Wabash Avenue, Suite 1310 Chicago, illinois 60603 312/422-0708
MELINDA POWER West Town Community Law Office 2502 W. Division Street Chicago, illinois 60622 773/278-6706
CHRISTOPHER V. LANGONE 25 E. Washington Street, Suite 1805 Chicago, Illinois 60602 312/782-2000

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS OF THIS COMPLAINT 44

 
 ]'Ain~e

Order

Case:
Fonn (06197)

1:03-cv-02463

Document

#:

121

Filed:

09/08/04

Page

1

of

16

PageID

#:1183

•

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name or Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge
CASE NUMBER

David H. Coar
03 c 2463

Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge
DATE

NanR. Nolan 9/8/2004

CASE TITLE
MOTION:

Kevin Vodak vs. City of Chicago, et a!.
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g.• plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(I)

0

Filed motion of [use listing in "Motion" box above.]

(2)

0

(3)

0

(4)

0

Brief in support of motion due ___. Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due_ _.
Ruling/Hearing on ___ set for _ _ at ___.

(5)

0

Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for ___ at _ _ _.

(6) 0

Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for _ _ _ at ___.

(7) 0

Trial[set for/re-set for] on ___ at ___.

(8) 0

(Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___ at ___.

(9) 0

This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs(by/agreement/pursuant to] 0 FRCP4(m) 0 Local Rule 41.1 0 FRCP4l(a)(l) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

(IO) •

[Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,

plaintiff's second motion to compel [91-1] is granted in part and denied in part.

(11) •

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

-I~'C,",~0 :J f!~t!}Sta ·s·n ,o,',_::IJ

courtroom

hmb

\11 deputy's
j) initials

a :7 Hd 8- c11s~aoz

number ornoticet
SEP 0 9 2004
l'fa\e docketed
dR!email ~ce
mailing depu1y initials

Document Number
12/

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:1184

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, eta!., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, vs.
CITY OF CIDCAGO, et. a!., Defendants.

)

SEP 0 9 2004

)

)

)

No. 03 C 2463

)

)

Judge David H. Coar

)

)

Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel Discovery. The

Court has reviewed the contested documents and grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs' motion

for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2003, thousands of persons gathered at the Federal Plaza located at Jackson

Avenue and Dearborn Street in Chicago to express concern and protest the commencement of the

United States war on Iraq. Over 500 persons were arrested and approximately 200-300 people were

detained on that date. In this civii rights putative class action, plaintiffs allege false detentions, arrests,

imprisonments and injuries sustained by approximately 800 class members on March 20, 2003.

Defendants deny the plaintiffs' allegations and maintain "that the police acted entirely reasonably

in response to a situation where Plaintiffs, and the putative class, embarked upon a completely

unauthorized and un-permitted march through the streets of Chicago, took over Lake Shore Drive,

and repeatedly disregarded and violated their own agreements with police and police orders not to

march in various locations." Defs' Resp. at II.

)~ \

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:1185
Request No. 27 of Plaintiffs' Demand for Production of Documents and Tangible Things sought production of any and all documents, notes, files, and reports pertaining to any infonnation the defendants have on the Chicago Coalition Against War and Racism, the Autonomous Zone (AZone), the Iraq Peace Pledge, Not in My Name, Chicago-Indy Media, Andy Thayer, Chris Geovanis, and Daniel Romero. These groups, (wlih,the exception of the Chicago Coalition Against War and Racism) and individuals (with the exception of Daniel Romero) were named by Lieutenant David Sobczyk in a Case Supplementary Report (the "Report") prepared by Detective Tony H. Jin and submitted on April!, 2003. The Report includes Jin's summary of interviews with eight Chicago Police Department ("CPD") members ''relative to the acts ofcivil disobedience occurring" on March 20, 2003 and "culminating in the mass arrests of 543 individuals." Report at 3.1
In their Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs' Request to Produce, defendants identified three files of the Chicago Police Department which "may contain documents responsive to some of plaintiffs' production requests." Defendants identified the files as Chicago Police Department Organized Crime Division, Intelligence Section, First Amendment Investigation files numbered 1932003-01, 193-2003-2, and 193-2003-03 (the "First Amendment Files").
DISCUSSION Plaintiffs seek an order directing defendants to produce documents contained in the three files and directing witnesses from the CPD to answer deposition questions regarding the details of these police investigations. Defendants object to production of the First Amendment Files on the ground of relevancy and argue that these files are subject to protection from disclosure by the law
1 The Report was received by counsel in discovery in the criminal cases stemming from criminal charges brought against plaintiffs and putative class members by defendants on March 20, 2003.
-2-

,

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:1186

enforcement privilege. Defendants state that these three files contain information relating to internal police strategies and methods and the identity of undercover police officers. Defendants argue that disclosure ofthese files could result in substantial interference with future investigations, invade the privacy ofindividuals who were involved or identified in the investigations or threaten the safety of the undercover police officers. The Court addresses defendants' objections in tum. A. Relevance
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) prescribes the scope of matters upon which a party may seek discovery. "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party ... Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Trial courts have broad discretion in resolving matters relating to discovery. Patterson v. Avezy Dennison Com.• 281 F.3d 676,681 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs argue that the First Amendment Files are "relevant to show that Defendants did not arrest and/or prosecute Plaintiffs and putative class members for any illegal conduct on March 20th, but rather to punish and retaliate against them for exercising their First Amendment rights and expressing their opposition to the war in Iraq." Pis' Reply at 1. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the First Amendment Files are relevant to their claims that: 1) their rights to speak freely and assembly were harmed in violation of their First Amendment and lllinois Constitutional rights; 2) defendants have a de facto policy and practice of infringing on individuals exercising their First Amendment rights as alleged in plaintiffs' Monell count; and 3) defendants conspired and agreed amongst each other to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against plaintiffs and putative class members for expressing their First Amendment rights and political beliefs as alleged in the state law
-3-

'

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:1187

conspiracy count. Plaintiffs also argue that information contained in the First Amendment Files may illustrate defendants' state ofmind which is felevantto plaintiffs' request for punitive damages. See Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 772 (7"' dr. 2002) (holding plaintiff entitled to punitive damages in§ 1983 false arrest case where it can be shown that a defendant officer's conduct was motivated by "evil intent or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights."). Finally, plaintiffs contend that the defendant officers' states of mind are relevant to plaintiffs' state law claim for
I I
malicious prosecution. See Rodgers v. People's Gas. light & Coke Co., 733 N.E.2d 835, 842 (lll. i .
App. 2000) (stating on a claim of malicious proseCution, "[i]t is the state of mind of one commencing the prosecution, and not the actual facts of the case or the guilt or innocence of the accused, which is at issue.").
In response, defendants assert that the criminal investigations are irrelevant to the conduct that occurred on March 20, 2003 which provided the probable cause to make arrests at Chicago and Michigan Avenues. Defendants argue that a review of the documents reveals that the First Amendment investigations were directed solely at potential criminal behavior and not designed to interfere, harass, punish or retaliate against anyone for engaging in conduct protected by the Constitution. Defendants contend that there is nothing in the documents "that would even tend to show that Defendants have a de facto policy and practice of infringing on First Amendment rights." Defs' Sur-Reply at 6.
The withheld 2003 First Amendment Files are relevant to plaintiffs' First Amendment, Monell, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution claims and their request for punitive damages. The files pertain to organizations identified by defendants as being present on March 20, 2003. Defendants may deny that the First Amendment files are relevant, but plaintiffs are entitled to
-4-

'

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:1188

discovery to test that denial. In finding these files relevant for purposes of discovery, the Court

emphasizes that Lieutenant David Sobczyk noted in his interview with Detective Tony Jin "relative

to the acts of civil disobedience" occurring on March 20, 2003 that the A-Zone, Not in Our Name,

Iraqi Peace Pledge and Andy Thayer and Chris Geovanis of Chicago-Indymedia were present at the

Federal Plaza on March 20, 2003 and that the A-Zone is "an affinity organization promoting radical

civil disobedience." Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to any information defendants possess regarding

: I•

the

A-Zone

which

may

form

the

basis

for

Lieutenant

S,,

o :

b

czyk'

s

opinion

that

it

''promot[es]

radical

civil disobedience." Lieutenant Sobczyk stated in his affidavit dated June 25, 2004 that his opinion

is based on his "personal observations of the conduct of persons representing themselves to be

affiliated with the A-Zone at previous protests, including protests about the Trans-Atlantic Business

Dialogue, and most importantly, during the events of March 20, 2003." Sobczyk Aff. at '127.

Plaintiffs are not required to take Lieutenant Sobczyk's word for it when he claims that his opinion

was not based on any information contained in the First Amendment Files. Rather, plaintiffs are entitled to information defendants possess regarding the A-Zone to test Sobczyk's credibility on crossexamination regarding his statements.

Defendants also argue that reports in the files at issue which were generated after March 20,

2003 and reports on events occurring after that date are irrelevant to plaintiffs' claims that their rights were violated on March 20,2003. Defendants note that none of the post-March 20,2003 reports

relates to any of the events that occurred on March 20, 2003. Defendants overlook the fact that the

criminal prosecutions from March 20, 2003 were not dismissed until June of2003. Post-March 20,

2003 documents may be relevant to plaintiffs' claim that defendants acted maliciously when

-5-

'

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:1189

prosecuting hundreds for charges of reckless conduct.2
B. Law Enforcement Privilege
Defendants also object to production of the First Amendment Files on the basis of the law
enforcement privilege. The purpose ofthe law enforcement privilege is to "prevent disclosure oflaw
enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality ofsources, to protect witness
and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy ofindividuals involved in an investigation,
and otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation." Ostrowski v. Holem, 2002 WL
31956039, *2 (N.D. lll. Jan. 21, 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. Longini, 1997 WL 754041, at *3
(N.D. lll. Nov. 13, 1997)). The law enforcement privilege is not absolute; rather it is a qualified
privilege under which the need for secrecy must be balanced against the plaintiffs' need for access
to the information. Lepinka v. The Village of Franklin Park, 2004 WL 626830, at *2 (N.D. ill.
March 26, 2004).
The parties agree that in determining whether the law enforcement privilege applies, the
Court must consider and weigh the following ten factors: (1) the extent to which disclosure will
thwart governmental processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government information;
(2) the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the
2 Defendants further argue that disclosure is unwarranted because they will not rely on any information from the First Amendment Files in defending this case and will only rely on what occurred on March 20, 2003. Defendants further state that while they "may offer some evidence relating to background information about plans for the protest and the potential for illegal behavior or outright violence," this evidence will be based on personal observations ofpolice in othercontexts and information gathered from public sources such as the internet. Defs' Resp. at 12 n.6. Defendants cannot limit discovery in this manner. Plaintiffs are entitled to discover these fJ!es to determine whether an argument can be made that information collected in the investigations impacted defendants' actions on March 20,2003 and to cross-examine Lieutenant Sobczyk regarding his claim that evidence relating to background information was not received through these investigations.
-6-

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:1190

degree to which government self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled

by disclosure; (4) whetherthe information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether

the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential defendant to any criminal proceeding either

pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the police

investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have

arisen or may arise from the investigation; (8) whether plaintiffs suit is non-frivolous and brought

in

good

faith;

(9)

whether

the

information

sought

isavailable through
' '''

other

discovery

or

from

other

sources; and (10) the importance of the information sought to plaintiffs case. Kampien v.

Individuals of Chicago Police Department, 2002 WL 238443, *4 (N.D. TIL Feb. 19, 2002). The

claim for application of the privilege is "somewhat stronger" when law enforcement is seeking to protect ongoing investigations as contrasted with closed files, decisions to prosecute as contrasted

with decisions not to prosecute, confidential informant identities as contrasted with names of incidental witnesses, confidential law enforcement methods and tactics as contrasted with simple interview materials, and evaluative opinions as contrasted with facts. G-69 v. Degnan, 130 F.R.D.

326, 332 (D. N.J. 1990).

In the present case, each of the above factors weigh in favor of disclosure of the First

Amendment Files to the extent indicated below.

1. The extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government information

With respect to the first factor, defendants admit that the investigations "did not rely

extensively on information provided by private citizens." Defs' Resp. at 7. Nevertheless, defendants

assert that this factor should carry considerable weight in the Court's determination because many

witnesses provide law enforcement with information to solve and prevent crimes with the

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expectation that their identities will be not be released to the public. Defendants fear that disclosure

of information relating to these investigations will discourage citizen participation in future law

enforcement efforts. Because defendants have not specifically identified any information within

these files that was gathered from a private citizen, this factor weighs heavily in favor of disclosure.

This Court's review ofthe files reveals that no "citizen statements" are involved and the information

contained in the files was substantially given or gathered by law enforcement. Defendants' fears are
:I ,
unfounded. Disclosure here where no citizen statements ~~'involved and the investigations did not

rely extensively on information provided by private citizens should not intimidate potential witnesses

from disclosing information to Jaw enforcement officials.

2.

The impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed

The second factor also weighs in favor of disclosure. Defendants concede that the files in

question here contain no information relating to "confidential informants" or "cooperating

individuals." Therefore, confidential informants' identities will not be sacrificed by disclosure of

these investigation files. Defendants argue, however, that the files should not be disclosed because

the identities of uncover police officers will be revealed. Defendants have a valid interest in

preserving the anonymity of undercover intelligence officers. The effectiveness and safety of

undercover officers may be compromised if their identities are disclosed. See Aff. of Lieutenant D.

Sobczyk at 'I 11 (stating it is "crucial to keep [the] identities [of undercover police officers]

confidential so that they can be used in future investigations, if necessary, and to protect personal

safety."). Moreover, plaintiffs have not articulated any specific need for the names of undercover

officers. Defendants may redact the names of all undercover intelligence officers as well as any

identifying information contained in the files.

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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:1192

Defendants further seek to protect documents in Categories A, B, & D from File No. 1932003-01, Categories A & B from File No. 193-2003-002, and Categories A & B from File No. 1932003-03 from disclosure because they contain documents which reveal the targets of the investigations and other persons involved or identified. Law enforcement has a legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the targets of its investigations. Plaintiffs correctly point out that the targets of police investigations may likely desire to know that they were targets, but that desire does not override defendants' interest in confidentiality. Moreover, individual persons
' I
'I I
mentioned in the investigative files have a legitimate expectation ofprivacy. These law enforcement and privacy concerns do not, however, justify denying discovery altogether. As discussed below, a protective order limiting disclosure of these files to plaintiffs' attorneys in this case will adequately protect these concerns.
As to Category D ofFile No. 193-2003-01 or Category B ofFile No. 193-2003-02, the Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to discover the documents contained therein. These documents consist of a comprehensive background report on a possible target (Category D of File No. 1932003-0I) and three license plate background reports on potential targets (Category B ofFile No. 1932003-02). The CPD has a valid interest in maintaining the confidentiality of potential targets and the contents of non-public background reports on them. The documents at issue contain private information which is not necessary or relevant to plaintiffs' case. The fact that the CPD generates background reports on potential targets in First Amendment investigations is not a confidential law enforcement technique. In fact, defendants' privilege log, which was filed in the public record, indicates that these categories of documents contain background reports on possible targets of the investigations. It is sufficient that plaintiffs know that background reports were conducted in
-9-

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connection with the three First Amendment investigations at issue. The actual names of the targets and the contents of the documents are not relevant here.3 3. The degree to which government self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will
be chilled by disclosure The next factor also weighs in plaintiffs' favor. Defendants argue that disclosure of the First Amendment Files will reveal the CPD's techniques and methods of conducting intelligence investigations and "would only serve to compromise public safety." Defs' Resp. at 8. Defendants have not pointed to any governmental self-evaluation or consequent program improvement that will be chilled by disclosure here. Moreover, defendants' sweeping conclusion that public safety will be compromised by revelation of CPD's techniques and methods of conducting First Amendment investigations is insufficient to justify non-disclosure. Plaintiffs correctly point out that the procedures for initiating as well as the investigative techniques that may be used in First Amendment investigations by the CPD are matters of public record. See CPD's Addendum to General Order 02lO attached to Defs' Resp. at Exhibit E. The use ofundercover police officers to collect information about a group or organization engaged in First Amendment conduct is not a novel technique requiring protection from disclosure by the law enforcement privilege. See 2/19/04 Chicago Sun Times article titled "Police Infiltration of Protest Groups Has Civil Rights Activists Fuming," attached as Exh. E to Plfs' motion.
3 The Court notes that neither of the individuals mentioned by Lieutenant Sobczyk in the Report (Andy Thayer and Chris Geovanis) were the subject of the comprehensive background report nor are they mentioned in the license plate background reports.
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4. Whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary
The fourth factor weighs in favor of disclosure. Defendants contend that the documents
contained in Category A from File No. 193-2003-001, Category A from File No. 193-2003-002 and
Categories A & B from File No. 193-2003-003 are evaluative in nature and should not be disclosed.
These categories contain actual reports generated in the investigation. Plaintiffs state that they are
entitled to any factual data in the files, including officers' observations, collection of materials, and
statements from individuals.
The entire portion of the materials in the cited categories does not consist of evaluative comments. Moreover, many facts are so intertwined within the evaluative discussions that they cannot be separated.4 In any event, the fact that the actual reports generated in the investigations may contain evaluative material is not an absolute bar to disclosure. Such information may be highly
relevant to defendants' state of mind. As the Court noted in Anderson v. Marion County Sheriffs
Dept., 220 F.R.D. 555, 566 (S.D. Ind. 2004):
Typically, courts require reports containing both factual and evaluative materials to be disclosed in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In such cases, the evaluative materials may be the best evidence available of the state ofmind of the defendant and exempting the evaluative materials from discovery "might well bar jury scrutiny of highly relevant evidence which cannot adequately be developed in any other way."
See also RodriQuez, 1987 WL 17466 at *2 (noting that evaluative comments may reflect the attitude
of police officers which is relevant in cases alleging a pattern and practice of illegal conduct).
4 Courts have recognized that as a practical matter, it is difficult to separate factual material within a report from evaluative discussions. See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 193 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) (stating "[c]ourts should not expend too much effort trying to distinguish 'factual' from 'evaluative' information ... This distinction is likely to be elusive and often arbitrary."); RodriQuez v. City of New York, 1987 WL 17466, at *2 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 22, 1987) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between factual data and evaluative material).
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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:1195

Plaintiffs are asserting, among other things, that the CPD has a policy and practice of infringing on

individuals exercising their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs are entitled to the information in

defendants' possession regarding the groups and individuals mentioned by Lieutenant Sobczyk in

the Report to determine what impact, if any, the gathered information had on defendants' actions on

March 20, 2003. Defendants' state of mind is also directly relevant to plaintiffs' malicious

prosecution

claim

as

well

as

their

request

for

punitiv~'

' aarnages.

'' ,,

Finally, defendants have failed to make any Showing of specific harm to law enforcement

! i'

efforts that would occur by disclosure of any evaluative comments to plaintiffs' counsel. In fact,

knowledge that reports generated in First Amendment investigations might be disclosed to plaintiffs'

civil rights lawyers may lead the CPD to maintain or improve its First Amendment investigations,

not impede or compromise the investigatory process.

Defendants also contend that documents contained in Category E from File No. 192-2003-

001 and Category C from File No. 193-2003-002 should be protected from disclosure. These

documents were gathered in the course of the investigations and evaluated by law enforcement

officers. Quoting Doe v. Hudgins, 175 F.R.D. 511,514 (N.D. TIL 1997), defendants note that "[t]he

common law has generally recognized ... a privilege protecting information gathered in the course

of an enforcement investigation." Defs' Resp. at 9. The Court rejects the suggestion that the law

enforcement privilege creates a blanket exemption from disclosure for all materials gathered in a law

enforcement investigation without an analysis of the specific types of information gathered in each

case and a specific showing of harm from disclosure. The categories highlighted by defendants here

consist of pamphlets, newsletters, a series of internet postings, an advertisement, and essays which

were distributed at public events that were the subject of the investigations. Defendants do not

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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:1196
contend in their Amended Privilege Log that disclosure ofmaterials distributed at public events that were the subject of investigations will reveal confidential law enforcement techniques, procedures, and methods of evaluation. Moreover, defendants fail to make any showing of specific harm from disclosure of documents gathered at a public event and that exist in the public domain. 5. The remaining factors
The fifth factor weighs in favor of disclosure. Plaintiffs and putative class members are not defendants in any actual or pending criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question. The sixth factor also favors disclosure as defendants acknowledge that all three First Amendment investigations have been completed. Defendants contend that disclosure of these completed investigations will seriously impair future investigations ifCPD's methods and procedures and the identity of undercover officers are revealed. Defendants' contention is unpersuasive given that novel and confidential investigative techniques are not at issue here and the identity of undercover officers will not be revealed. There is also no evidence that any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the First Amendment investigations. As to the eighth and ninth factors, defendants do not contend that plaintiffs' lawsuit is frivolous and brought in bad faith or that the information sought is available through other discovery or from other sources. Finally, as discussed above, plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient need for the withheld information.
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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:1197
6. The Modified Consent Decree Defendants point out that the investigations were conducted pursuant to the Modified
Consent Decree entered in Case Nos. 74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 and this fact favors non-disclosure. The Modified Consent Decree contemplates confidentiality of certain information but does not prevent disclosure under the circumstances presented here. The Modified Consent Decree bars auditors from access to "information specifically identifying confidential information" or "to current criminal investigations that the Superintendent of Police states might be compromised by disclosure to the auditors." Modified Consent Decree at '(5. The Modified Consent Decree also provides that the Chicago Police Board cannot disclose "in any manner details that specifically identify any investigations except as otherwise permitted by law, nor shall it disclose in any manner information that would reveal the identify of a confidential informant, compromise an ongoing criminal, regulatory, or employee disciplinary investigation, or constitute an invasion of a person's privacy." Id. These terms do not prevent disclosure of relevant investigative material in a civil case. Moreover, the Modified Consent Decree's concerns about revealing the identities of confidential informants and compromising or interfering with ongoing investigations are not implicated here.5 C. Protective Order
The Court finds that good cause exists to enter a protective order limiting the disclosure of the First Amendment Files to plaintiffs' counsel in this case. Lieutenant David Sobczyk states in his affidavit that as the supervisor responsible for these investigations, he anticipated that they would
5 Defendants' claim that plaintiffs' motion is "actually a thinly-veiled attempt to attack the propriety of the First Amendment Investigations pursuant to the Modified Consent Decree" is unavailing. Defs' Sur-Reply at 2. Plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce or punish any violation of any provision of the Modified Consent Decree. Plaintiffs only sought the withheld information in response to statements made by Lieutenant Sobczyk in the post-arrest police report.
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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 121 Filed: 09/08/04 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:1198
"remain confidential pursuant to the Modified Consent Decree, and that [] information gathered would not be disclosed except as necessary to comply with the audit procedures." Sobczyk Aff. at '{9. CPD's General Order 02-10 Which incorporates the Modified Consent Decree into the CPD's operating policies and procedures requires all closed First Amendment investigation files be forwarded to the General Counsel to the Superintendent in a sealed file. See General Order 02-10, Addendum lA, VI.B.7. Sobczyk's expectation of confidentiality from public disclosure is not unreasonable given the limitations on disclosure contemplated by the Modified Consent Decree and General Order 02-10. A protective order limiting the disclosure of the First Amendment Files to plaintiffs' counsel will adequately address the CPD's legitimate expectation of privacy in its investigatory files and its valid concern that disclosure of these investigation files will reveal to the public where Unit 193 has been focusing its investigative efforts which may compromise its ability to conduct future investigations. Also, a protective order preventing the public disclosure of names of the persons involved or identified in the flles will adequately protect the privacy of these private individuals.
CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs' second motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part.
ENTER:

Dated:

an R.Nolan United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 1 of 43 PageID #:1305

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLIN((H:S

EASTERN DIVISION

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KEVIN VODAK, et. al., individually aud on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plain tiffs,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et. al.,

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No. 03 C 246:f-~ ;;;

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Magistrate Nolan(o'):i:i;i

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CIVIL RIGHTS CCASS ACTION

Defendants.

)

NOTICE OF FILING

To: Richard T. Sikes, Jr. Freeborn and Peters 311 South Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on December 30, 2004, I filed Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, attached hereto, with the Cler of the Court, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Divisio · Chicago, . 60622, and delivered a courtesy copy to Judge Coar's chambers.

e o Plaintiffs' Attorneys 18 N. Milwaukee C cago, IL 60622 7731235-0070

F'

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 2 of 43 PageID #:1306
-' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
JOEY L MOGUL, an attorney, hereby certifies that she caused a copy of the foregoing notice and attached document to be served by hand de vering a copy to Mr. Richard T. Sikes, Jr. on December 30, 2004 before 5:00p.m.

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 3 of 43 PageID #:1307

'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et. al., individually and on behalf of )

others similarly situated, and SHARON AMBIELLI, )

JOHN PENNYCUFF, ERIC PETERS, DANIEL PINEDA, AARON ROBIN, DANIEL ROMERO, BRAD THOMSON,
Plaintiffs,

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CITY OF CHICAGO; FORMER SUPERINTENDENT )

TERRY G. HILLARD; SUPERINTENDENT PHILIP )

CLINE; CHIEF JAMES MAURER; CHIEF JERRY )

ROBINSON; DEPUTY CHIEF TOM BYRNE;

)

DEPUTY CHIEF FRANK RADKE; DEPUTY CHIEF )

RALPH CHICZEWSKI; COMMANDER JOHN

)

KILLACKY; COMMANDER SAM CHRISTIAN; )

COMMANDER DAVID DOUGHERTY;

)

COMMANDER MARIENNE PERRY;

)

COMMANDER JOHN R. RISLEY; COMMANDER )

JOSEPH GRIFFIN; COMMANDER DANIEL

)

DUGAN; COMMANDER CHARLES WILLIAMS; )

LIEUTENANT KEVIN RYAN; LIEUTENANT NEIL )

SULLIVAN; LIEUTENANT DAVE SOBSCYZK; )

ASSISTANT DEPUTY FRANK LIMON; FORMER )

ASSISTANT DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT RON )

HUBERMAN; KAREN ROWAN; THOMAS EPACH, )

JR.; CPO BARKER# 14246; CPO BILYJ #3243;

)

CPO M. BLACK #8943; LIEUTENANT CARSON )

EARNEST; CPO L. COLEMAN #3377; CPO E.

)

CORTEZ# 7584; CPO W. CLUCAS #19890; CPO )

A. DAKURAS #6643; CPO C. DECICCO #6215; CPO )

G. GAMBOA #12610;CPO E. GEDREKIS #11054; )

CPO R. HAGEN #14488; CPO L. HEISE #17026; CPO )

D. HERRERA #18611; CPO R. HUGHES #4293; CPO )

HUNT #3535; CPO K. JAROS #9295; CPO JOHNSON )

#11292; CPO A. KIZZIAH #7304; CPO D. KOONIG )

#9072, CPO. T. LIEBER #6956; CPO T. LOCONTE )

#11623; CPO K. MC CLEARN #8877; SGT.

)

Judge David Coar
Magistrate Nan Nolan
CIVIL RIGHTS CLASS ACTION SEEKING DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
JURY DEMANDED

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 4 of 43 PageID #:1308

METHIPARA #18220; CPO J. MENDOZA #19326; )

CPO PASQUA #5781; CPO D. RODRIGUEZ #13585; )

CPO R. RODRIGUEZ #15347; CPO J. RYAN #18591; )

CPOM. SANTOS #12347; CPO J. TAITT #11644; )

CPO J. TAMEZ #8760; CPO J. TUMAN #3074; CPO )

M. WEBER #16785; CPOM. WILLIAMS #14447; )

DEFENDANTS DOE 1-50, and DEFENDANTS ROE )

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Defendants.

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THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT This is a civil rights class action for money damages and injunctive relief arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State of Illinois. This action is brought against the City of Chicago (hereinafter "the City"), Chicago Police Department (hereinafter "CPD") Command Personnel and policymakers, including former Superintendent Terry Hillard, Superintendent Phil Cline and Chief of Patrol James Maurer, and individual Defendant Officers, who knowingly, intentionally and vindictively trampled on the civil rights of approximately 800 peaceful protestors, bystanders and passers by at an anti-war
demonstration on March 20, 2003. Defendants, acting under the color of law, unlawfully detained and imprisoned the class
when they herded, conalled and then trapped the class on Chicago Avenue in between Michigan Avenue and Mies VanDer Rohe Way for hours, and forcefully prevented them from leaving this area. Defendants then falsely arrested more than five hundred individuals and held them in overcrowded jail cells for extensive periods of time. Over two hundred individuals were anested, taken into custody and released without being charged or cited with a crime or violation. Over 300 individuals were arrested, taken into custody, and falsely charged with baseless boilerplate allegations of Reckless Conduct, resulting in the further curtailment of their liberty when forced to appear in court, many on numerous occasions, to defend themselves. The remaining 200 to 250 members of the class not taken into custody, were allowed to leave the area of Chicago and Michigan Avenues only after they were detained for several hours and forced to abandon their signs, posters and/or banners.
Eleven named Class Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class, seek an injunction

2

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 5 of 43 PageID #:1309

requiring the Defendants to seal, return and/or destroy any records of Plaintiffs' and class members' arrests. Class Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and the behalf of the class, also seek monetary damages for the injuries they suffered when they were falsely detained, arrested and imprisoned. Further, an additional seven individually named Plaintiffs, identified herein, seek monetary damages suffered as a result of Defendants subjecting them to excessive force and

depriving them of substantial property.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

I.

The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.; the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a); and the

Constitution of the United States. Supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois as the events complained of

occurred in this district.

PARTIES

A. The Plaintiffs.

2.

Plaintiffs at all times relevant were and are residents of the United States who were in

Chicago, Illinois on March 20, 2003.

3

Plaintiffs Sarah Bergstrand, Prudence Browne, Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell, Matthew

Gaines, Angela Garcia, Kathleen Gruber, Steven Hudosh, Elizabeth Johnson, Sophia

Sieczkowski, and Kevin Vodak sue on behalf of themselves and members of the class.

Hereinafter they will be referred to as "Class Plaintiffs."

4.

Plaintiffs Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin,

Daniel Romero, and Brad Thomson sue on their own behalf. Hereinafter they will be

referred to as Individual Plaintiffs.

B. The Defendants.

5.

Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the laws

of the State of Illinois, is the employer and principal of the individual Defendants and is

responsible for the policies, practices and customs of the CPD, its Office of Professional

Standards, its Personnel Division, its Patrol Division and its Superintendent of Police.

6.

Defendant Terry G. Hillard is, and at all times relevant herein was, the Superintendent

3

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 6 of 43 PageID #:1310
and Chief of Police of the City of Chicago, with responsibility for supervising, training, assigning, administrating and controlling all officers and employees of the CPD. Former Superintendent Hillard held a command and/or policymaking position and he along with other Command members identified below, participated in the planning, supervision, and the execution of the police conduct complained of herein. He is sued in his individual capacity. 7. Defendant Philip Cline is currently the Superintendent and Chief of Police of the City of Chicago, and at all times relevant herein was, the acting Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, Chief of the Detectives Division, and the First in Command under then Superintendent Hillard, with responsibility for supervising training, assigning, administering and controlling all officers and employees of the CPD. Superintendent Cline held a command and policymaking position, and he along with Defendant Hillard and other Command members identified below, participated in the planning, supervision, and the execution of the police conduct complained of herein. He is sued in his individual capacity. 8. Defendants Thomas Byrne, Ralph Chiczewski, Sam Christian, David Dougherty, Daniel Dugan, Thomas Epach, Jr., Joseph Griffin, Ron Huberman, John Killacky, Frank Limon, James Maurer, Marienne Perry Frank Radke, John Risley, Jerry Robinson, Karen Rowan, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, David Sobscyk, and Charles Williams, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who held supervisory, command and/or policymaking positions, and who participated in the authorization, planning, supervision, and the execution of the police conduct complained of herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants failed, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' and class members' rights, to adequately train and supervise CPD officers who were involved in violating the rights of the Plaintiffs and class members. 9. Defendants Barker, Bilyj, M. Black, E. Carson, L. Coleman, W. Clucas, E. Cortez, A. Dakuras, C. DeCicco, G. Gamboa, E. Gedrekis, R. Hagen, L. Heise, D. Herrera, R. Hughes, T. Hunt, K. Jaros, Johnson, A. Kizziah, D. Koonig, T. Lieber, T. Loconte, K. McCleam, Methipara, J. Mendoza, Pasqua, D. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez, J. Ryan, M.
4

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 7 of 43 PageID #:1311
Santos, J. Taitt, J. Tamez, J. Tuman, M. Weber, and M. Williams were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained herein. Additionally, each of these Defendants signed, authorized their name to be signed, or had their names appear on a false criminal complaint or arrest report against one or more of the Plaintiffs or class members. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. 10. Does 1 through 50, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained herein. Additionally, upon information and belief, one or more of these Defendants used excessive force on one or more of the Plaintiffs. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Does 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. 11. Roes 1 through 5, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the CPD who participated in the execution of the police actions complained of in the lock up areas at the police stations. The true names and identities of Defendants designated as Roe 1 through 5, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend their complaint to show the true names and identities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. These Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. 12. At all times relevant herein, all of the individual Defendant officers and employees were acting under the color of law, under color of authority and in the scope of their employment as Chicago Police Officers, Command and Supervisory Personnel. 13. Each of the Defendants caused, and is responsible, for the unlawful conduct described herein, and resulting injuries by, among other things, personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so; by authorizing, acquiescing in or setting into motion, policies, practices, plans or actions that led to the unlawful conduct: by failing and refusing to initiate and maintain adequate training and supervision with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' and class members' rights; and by
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•,
ratifying the unlawful conduct that occurred by agents and officers under their direction and control. including failing to take remedial or disciplinary action,
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 14, Class Plaintiffs Sarah Bergstrand, Prudence Browne, Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell,
Matthew Gaines, Angela Garcia, Kathleen Gruber, Steven Hudosh, Elizabeth Johnson, Sophia Sieczkowski, and Kevin Vodak bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs herein seek to certify a class and three subclasses stemming from the class, 15, The class (class A) consists ofall persons who were herded, corralled, trapped and detained by the Defendants on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west ofMies VanDer Rohe Way (hereinafter the "detainment area"), between approximately 8:30 p,m, and 11:30 p,m, Each single class member was detained and was not free to leave this area_ 16_ Subclass A-1 is defined as all class members who were seized and detained by the Defendants in the detainment area for one and a half to three hours before they were allowed to leave the area_ This subclass consists of approximately 200 to 250 people_ 17, Subclass A-2 is defined as all class members who were seized, detained, arrested and taken into police custody by the Defendants in the detainment area and further detained at a police station, These individuals were released without being charged with any crime or ordinance violation, This subclass consists of approximately 210-225 people_ 18, Subclass A-3 consists of all class members who were seized, detained, arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area and further detained at a police station, These individuals were subsequently charged with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions of bond and required to appear in court on criminal charges brought by Defendants. This subclass consists of approximately 300 to 325 people, 19_ The class and each subclass meets the requirements ofFRCP 23(a), as follows: a) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are satisfied because the class, and each of the
subclasses, are sufficiently numerous that joinder is impracticaL There are approximately 800 class members.
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b) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are satisfied because there are questions oflaw

or fact common to the class and each of the subclasses. The common questions of

law include, but are not limited to:

•

whether Plaintiffs and class members were seized when the Defendants

herded, corralled and trapped them in the detainment area, detained them

for hours, deprived them the freedom to leave in violation of their Fourth

Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and

other constitutional and common law rights;

•

whether the Defendants lacked the requisite probable cause to seize

Plaintiffs and class members on Chicago Avenue thereby violating their

Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,

and other constitutional and common law rights;

•

whether the Defendants lacked the requisite probable cause to arrest and

take Plaintiffs and class members into custody and detain them at police

stations thereby violating their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure, other constitutional and common law

rights;

•

whether the Plaintiffs and class members were lawfully exercising their

rights to freedom of speech, association and assembly when marching and

standing on the streets and sidewalks as guaranteed by the United States

and Illinois constitutions;

•

whether the Plaintiffs and the class members who were engaged in lawful

First Amendment activity on the public streets and sidewalks were acting

reasonably within time, place and manner restrictions and were not

provided any alternative channels for their expression;

•

whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs' and class members' rights to

freedom of expression, association, and assembly were violated when

Defendants falsely detained, arrested and imprisoned Plaintiffs and class

members on Chicago Avenue;

•

whether the decision to initiate or conduct the mass arrests and the orders

concerning the manner in which Plaintiffs and the class members were to

be herded, corralled and trapped were made by officers of sufficient rank,

authority, influence, and discretion that they can be deemed policymakers

under Monell and its progeny;

•

whether an injunction should be granted in favor of Plaintiffs and the class

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members directing the Defendants to seal, return and/or detroy all records of Plaintiffs and class members arrests and detentions as alleged herein;

•

whether Defendants, including high ranking officials of the CPD,

conspired and agreed and/or otherwise acted jointly among and between

themselves to herd, corral, trap and unlawfully detain, arrest and imprison

Plaintiffs and the class; and

•

whether Defendants maliciously prosecuted members of the class by filing

false charges of Reckless Conduct, and specifically by falsifying the arrest

reports and criminal complaints by signing the names of members of the

CPD who did not have personal knowledge of a Plaintiffs' or class

members' conduct on March 20, 2003.

c) The common questions of fact, include but are not limited to:

•

whether the Defendants herded, corralled, trapped and detained the

Plaintiffs and class members preventing them from leaving the detainment

area;

•

whether the Defendants gave the Plaintiffs and class members an order to

disperse prior to their detention and/or arrest;

•

the nature, extent and adequacy of training of police officers to conduct

mass arrests without depriving citizens of constitutionally guaranteed

rights;

•

whether Defendants failed to execute proper arrest documents, including

the completion of arrest reports and criminal complaints signed by officers

with the requisite personal knowledge ofthe offense allegedly committed

by a class member in violation of the CPD's mass arrest policies;

•

the nature and extent of the confinement conditions, including the denial

of food, medical care, phone calls, necessary toiletries, feminine hygiene

products, and the spatial conditions cells;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the "police code of silence," as alleged

herein;

•

the existence, nature and extent of the tacit and de facto policy of the CPD

to intimidate, abuse and harass demonstrators at rallies and protests over

the course of several years in the City of Chicago; and

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•

the degree to which the complained of policies are encouraged, promoted

and effectuated, against demonstrators in the City of Chicago by the CPD.

d) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) are satisfied because Class Plaintiffs' claims

are typical of the claims of the class and each subclass they seek to represent.

e) The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied because the representative parties

will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class and each subclass they

seek to represent. The Class Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to other

members of the class or subclass they seek to represent. Moreover, Class

Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and civil

rights claims.

20. The class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(l) because

prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of

inconsistent or incompatible standards of conduct by the Defendants.

21. With respect to the claims for injunctive relief, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are

satisfied because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and

subclasses, and injunctive relief for the class as a whole is appropriate.

22. Additionally, the class and each of the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)

because common questions predominate over individual questions and prosecution of this

action as a class action is the superior method of adjudication. Factors that militate in

favor of certification under Rule 23(b)(3) include:

•

Several hundred class members have already requested that a class action be

brought and asked undersigned counsel, all affiliated with the Chicago Chapter of

the National Lawyer's Guild, to bring a class action regarding the March 20'"

demonstration; thus, the interest of members in individually controlling the

prosecution of separate actions is minimal and would be burdensome in view of

the evidence required and costs of proving the claims alleged herein;

•

it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois because the events occurred in this district and

involve federally-protected rights;

•

certification of the class and subclasses will achieve great economies of time,

effort and expense andpromote uniformity of decisions for the members of the

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class, thereby making a class action the superior method of adjudicating this controversy.
23. Plaintiffs have moved for class certification and seek certification in accordance with the class and subclasses defined in this Third Amended complaint. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. The Emergency Demonstration 24. On March 20, 2003, thousands of people congregated at the Federal Plaza located at
Dearborn Street between Jackson and Adams Avenues in Chicago's downtown area to protest the commencement of the United States war on Iraq. 25. A rally organized by several peace and anti-war organizations was held at the Federal Plaza at approximately 5:00 p.m. 26. By the end of the rally, the crowd had increased to between five and fifteen thousand people. 27. At the conclusion of the rally, the crowd began to march throughout the streets of downtown Chicago, chanting and carrying signs. 28. The march proceeded east to Lake Shore Drive accompanied and escorted by uniformed members of the CPD. 29. The march proceeded north on outer Lake Shore Drive accompanied and escorted by uniformed members of the CPD. 30. At Oak Street, the march exited outer Lake Shore Drive and headed west down Oak Street. 31. When the march reached Michigan Avenue on Oak Street, members of the CPD lined up across Michigan Avenue and refused to allow the demonstration to proceed. 32. The march was stalled for a period of time at this location, during which time a number of demonstrators left the march and others arrived to join the demonstration. 33. The marchers were not engaged in any unlawful activity and continued to chant and express their opposition to the Iraq War. 34. The march was directed east from Michigan Avenue and the marchers proceeded east down Oak Street and then south down inner Lake Shore Drive toward Chicago Avenue.
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35. Uniformed members of the CPD continued to escort and accompany the marchers. 36. At Chicago Avenue, marchers were directed, escorted or proceeded west on Chicago
Avenue. 37. No Defendant or member of the CPD advised or warned marchers at any time during or
after the march that it was illegal or unlawful for the march to proceed in the streets or on the sidewalks in downtown Chicago. B. The Unlawful Detention and Arrests 38. On Chicago Avenue, pursuant to orders issued by the Defendant Command Personnel, individual Defendants and Defendant Does herded and corralled marchers and others in the crowd, i.e. the class, on Chicago Avenue, trapping them in between Michigan Avenue and Mies VanDer Rohe Way (hereinafter the "detainment area"). 39. Defendants forcefully detained the class and prevented them from leaving the detainment area. 40. The class were forced to stand in the crowd, smashed and cramped up against each other, for hours, while surrounded by Defendants, many clad in riot gear armed with batons. 41. While forcefully detained, Defendants refused to provide any information or direction to the class. 42. While forcefully detained, Plaintiffs and members of the class repeatedly asked Defendant Does for permission to leave the detainment area. 43. These requests were repeatedly refused or ignored by Defendant Does. 44. Some Plaintiffs and members of the class requested permission to leave the detainment area from Defendant Does on the east or west end of the detainment area. Defendant Does directed these class members to exit from the opposite end of the detainment area. When the class member reached the other side of the detainment area, the class member was ignored or redirected back to the same side where he or she came from in the detainment area. 45. After the Defendants blockaded the detainment area, an order was issued by Defendant Command Personnel, to arrest members of the class. 46. The orders issued by the Defendant Command Personnel did not specify who to
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specifically arrest in the crowd, nor did they grant individual Defendants or Defendant Does discretion to chose not to arrest individuals in the crowd. 47. Individual Defendants and Defendant Does, pursuant to Command Personnel orders, entered the crowd and arrested over 500 individuals, comprising subclasses A-2 and A-3. 48. In some cases, Defendant Does forcefully entered the crowd, swinging their batons at members of the class, and forcefully dragging people out of the detainment area to police vehicles. 49. Individuals in subclasses A-2 and A-3 were never given a warning of their arrest, an order to disperse or an opportunity to leave the area prior to their arrest. 50. Individuals in subclasses A-2 and A-3 were taken into police custody, handcuffed, taken to police vehicles and transported to police stations. 51. Eventually, after hours of detention, Defendants began to allow members of subclass A-1 to leave the detainment area a few individuals at a time. 52. Defendants forced members of subclass A-1 to pass through a line of riot clad police officers before allowing them to leave the detainment area. 53. Defendants forced many members of subclass A-1 to abandon their signs, posters, banners, flyers and pins before they were allowed to leave the detainment area. 54. At no time did any Defendant or member of the CPD give any order to the class to disperse, make any warning of impending arrests or advise persons that their conduct was unlawful or reckless, through any loud speaker or voice amplification system or through any other reasonable means. 55. Some Plaintiffs and class members did not intend to be part of the demonstration, did not march through the streets or were arrested attempting to return to hotels, coming out of restaurants, getting off buses or simply observing the demonstrators and police officers. C. The Manner of Confinement 56. Subclass A-2 and A-3 members were handcuffed, searched, segregated by gender, placed in police vehicles and transported to police stations. 57. All of the males in subclasses A-2 ane A-3 were taken to the Area 2 police station located
at 727 East 111'" Street and all of the females in subclasses A-2 and A-3 were taken to the
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Area 5 police station at 5555 West Grand Avenue. 58. Subclass A-2 and A-3 members were required to provide information to Defendants
concerning their identities, employment and other matters which were recorded on official police reports and continue to be maintained by Defendants. 59. Class members were subjected to verbal abuse, neglect and unreasonable conditions of confinement at the police stations, including but not limited to: being deprived of food, telephone communication, medical treatment, necessary toiletries and feminine hygiene products. 60. Class members were confined in overcrowded and overheated cells for extended and unreasonable periods of time. These detention times range from four (4) to (40) hours. 61. Certain members of subclasses A-2 and A-3 were deprived of needed medical treatment and necessary medication. D. The Filing of False Reckless Conduct Charges and Malicious Prosecution
62. Members of subclass A-2 were released without charges due to the Defendants' and CPD's admission of their inability to identify the subclass members' arresting officer.
63. Members of subclass A-3 were charged with one misdemeanor count of Reckless Conduct, 720 ILCS § 5/12-5, a Class A Misdemeanor, and further detained until they agreed to conditions of bail.
64. Many of the members of subclass A-3 were forced to post a cash of up to one Hundred Dollars ($100.00) prior to their release.
65. Members of subclass A-3 were subsequently forced to appear in court and defend against the false charge of Reckless Conduct.
66. All charges against members of subclass A-3 were ultimately dismissed and the cases terminated in subclass A-3's favor.
E. The Conspiracy Among Defendants 67. Defendant Command Personnel including Defendants Hillard, Cline, Maurer, Byrne,
Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, and other high ranking officials of the CPD, conspired and agreed together and otherwise
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.
jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves, to herd, corral!, trap, and unlawfully detain the class on Chicago Avenue; they further conspired and agreed to arrest and further detain members of the class at police stations; and they further conspired and agreed to falsely prosecute class members with false criminal charges. F. The Class Plaintiffs of the Class and Subclasses
Prudence Browne, Matthew Gaines, Angela Garcia, Elizabeth Johnson and Sophia Sieczkowski
On Behalf of Themselves, the Class, and Subclass A-1
68. Prudence Browne is a resident of the City of Chicago. 69. Ms. Browne joined the demonstration after it reached Michigan Avenue at Oak Street. 70. Ms. Browne, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by
Defendants in the detainment area. 71. Ms. Browne witnessed several other members of the class arrested, handcuffed and
removed from the detainment area by Defendants without any provocation. 72. Ms. Browne did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did
not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 73. Ms. Browne was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants for approximately two to three hours before she was eventually allowed to leave. 74. Matt Gaines is a resident of the City of Chicago. 75. Mr. Gaines attended the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 76. Mr. Gaines, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 77. Mr. Gaines did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 78. Mr. Gaines was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants for approximately two to three hours before he was allowed to leave.
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79. Angela Garcia is a resident of the City of Chicago. 80. Ms. Garcia joined the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 81. Ms. Garcia, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by
Defendants in the detainment area. 82. Ms. Garcia witnessed several other members of the class arrested, handcuffed and
removed from the detainment area by Defendants without any provocation. 83. Ms. Garcia did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not
witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 84. Ms. Garcia was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants for two to three hours before she was eventually allowed to leave. 85. Elizabeth Johnson is a resident of Oak Park, Illinois. 86. Ms. Johnson traveled to the Federal Plaza with her husband. 87. Ms. Johnson and her husband joined the demonstration at Federal Plaza. 88. Ms. Johnson, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 89. Ms. Johnson witnessed several other members of the class arrested, handcuffed and removed from the detainment area by Defendants without any provocation. 90. Ms. Johnson and her husband did not commit a crime, were never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 91. Ms. Johnson and her husband were unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants for two to three hours before they were eventually allowed to leave. 92. Sophia Sieczkowski is a resident of the City of Chicago. 93. Ms. Sieczkowski joined the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 94. Ms. Sieczkowski, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 95. Ms. Sieczkowski witnessed several other members of the class arrested, handcuffed and
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removed from the area by Defendants without any provocation. 96. Ms. Sieczkowski attempted to leave by approaching officers to the east and to the west of
the detainment area but she was prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants on both sides. 97. Ms. Sieczkowski attempted to explain to Defendants Doe that Defendants Doe had directed her to this end if she wished to leave. At both sides, she was informed by Defendants Doe that she could not leave the detainment area. 98. Ms. Sieczkowski then dialed 911 from her cellular telephone and told the 911 dispatcher she was being held against her will and requested the dispatcher speak with Defendant Doe. 99. Defendant Doe took the telephone from Ms. Sieczkowski and told the dispatcher that Ms. Sieczkowski could not leave the detainment area. 100. Ms. Sieczkowski did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 101. Ms. Sieczkowski was unlawfully detained and prevented from leaving the detainment area by Defendants for two to three hours before she was eventually allowed to leave.
Sarah Bergstrand, Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell, Kevin Vodak On behalf of themselves, the Class, and Subclass A-2
102. Sarah Bergstrand is a resident of the City of Chicago. 103. Ms. Bergstrand and her husband rode their bicycles down to the demonstration at the
Federal Plaza on March 20, 2003. 104. Ms. Bergstrand and her husband, along with other class members, were herded, corralled
and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 105. Ms. Bergstrand was standing on the sidewalk holding onto her bicycle when, upon
information and belief, a Defendant supervisor approached her and a crowd of others and ordered Defendant Does to arrest them all. 106. Defendant Doe then grabbed her and passed her to another Defendant Doe who cuffed her hands with plastic handcuffs behind her back and took her to a police vehicle.
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'
107. When Ms. Bergstrand was unlawfully taken into custody by Defendants, Defendant Doe failed to inventory her property and ignored and refused her entreaty to be allowed to secure and lock her or her husband's bicycles at the scene.
108. Ms. Bergstrand did not resist his arrest. 109. Ms Bergstrand and her husband did not commit a crime, were never ordered or allowed to
disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled trapped, arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 110. Ms. Bergstrand was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 5 police station, placed in a jail cell, and unlawfully detained for approximately 12 hours before she was released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 111. Upon Ms. Bergstrand release, she returned to the scene to find the bicycles were gone. 112. When she checked with the CPD, she was told her bicycles could not be located or returned without a property inventory slip. 113. Robert Castillo is a resident of Chicago. 114. In the early evening on March 20, 2003, Mr. Castillo, along with John Pennycuff, attended a function at the Chicago Cultural Center, which was also attended by Mayor Richard M. Daley. 115. After the event at the Cultural Center, Mr. Castillo traveled to observe the demonstration. 116. Mr. Castillo first observed the demonstration at Oak and Michigan Avenues and subsequently at Chicago and Michigan Avenues. 117. At Chicago and Michigan Avenues, Mr. Castillo stood with Mr. Pennycuffnear the building on the north east comer of Chicago and Michigan Avenues. 118. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuffwere approached by police personnel who directed them to leave the area. 119. As Mr. Castillo and Mr. Pennycuff moved in the direction they were ordered to leave in, they were grabbed by a second group of Defendants Doe. 120. Mr. Castillo was approached by this second group of Defendants Doe and ordered to get up against the wall and put his hands behind his back. 121. Mr. Castillo complied with the orders and put his hands behind his back.
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'·
122. Officer Jaros cuffed his hands with plastic handcuffs behind his back. 123. Mr. Castillo did not resist his arrest. 124. Mr. Castillo did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did
not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 125. Mr. Castillo was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 2 police station, placed in a jail cell, and unlawfully detained for approximately I0 hours before he was released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 126. Patrick Donnell is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. 127. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 8:00p.m., Mr. Donnell was traveling home on a Chicago Transit Authority bus headed north on Michigan Avenue. 128. The bus was stopped by a uniformed Chicago police officer at the intersection of Michigan and Chicago Avenues, and the bus driver was informed that the bus was going to be rerouted. 129. Mr. Donnell exited the bus and proceeded across Michigan Avenue to the northeast corner of Michigan and Chicago Avenues. 130. Mr. Donnell did not hear any police personnel issue any general order to the crowd that people had to leave or disperse. 131. Mr. Donnell and others standing with him were then informed by police personnel that if they wished to leave the area, they were to head towards Michigan Avenue. 132. As Mr. Donnell and others complied with these orders and began walking, they were stopped by Defendants Doe. 133. Mr. Donnell, as well as others in the crowd, informed Defendants Doe they had been instructed by police to leave in this direction, but received no response and were prohibited from walking further. 134. A short time later, Mr. Donnell and others in the crowd were arrested by Defendants Doe. 13 5. Mr. Donnell did not resist his arrest. 136. Mr. Donnell did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested
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and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 13 7. Mr. Donnell was handcuffed behind his back with plastic handcuffs, taken to a police
vehicle and transported to the Area 2 police station, where he was unlawfully detained for approximately 14 hours before being released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 138. Kevin Vodak is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. 139. Mr. Vodak attended the demonstration as a legal observer at the Federal Plaza. 140. Ms. Vodak, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 141. Defendants Doe refused Mr. Vodak's requests to speak with a commanding officer in the detainment area after he clearly identified himself as a legal observer. 142. Mr. Vodak was subsequently arrested and handcuffed with plastic cuffs behind his back. 143. Mr. Vodak did not resist his arrest. 144. Mr. Vodak did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 145. Mr. Vodak was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 2 police station, placed in a jail cell, where he was unlawfully detained for approximately 11 hours before he was released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. ·
Kathleen Gruber and Steven Hudosh On Behalf of Themselves, the Class and Subclass A-3
146. Kathleen Gruber is currently employed as a school counselor. 147. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 7:30p.m. Ms. Gruber was returning from work
traveling on a Chicago Transit Authority bus. 148. Ms. Gruber exited the bus and walked north on Michigan Avenue and then traveled east
and joined the demonstration at inner Lake Shore Drive north of Chicago Avenue. 149. Ms. Gruber, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by
Defendants in the detainment area. 150. Ms. Gruber repeatedly requested to leave the demonstration and each of these requests
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were repeatedly denied by Defendants. 151. While Ms. Gruber was standing on the sidewalk on Chicago Avenue, she was arrested,
taken into police custody and handcuffed with plastic cuffs behind her back. 152. Ms. Gruber did not resist her arrest. 153. Ms. Gruber did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not
witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 154. Ms. Gruber was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 5 police station, where she was unlawfully detained for approximately 17 hours before she was released on March 21, 2003. 155. Prior to her release, Ms. Gruber had to post a $100.00 bond on a charge of Reckless Conduct. 156. Defendants made out false and incomplete official reports and gave a false and incomplete version of the events to falsely charge Ms. Gruber. This false documentation included falsely signing Defendant Bilyj's name and star number (Star No. 3243) on Ms. Gruber criminal complaint for Reckless Conduct, falsely alleging a violation of 720 ILCS § 5/12-5(a). 157. Defendants also improperly asserted in Ms. Gruber's arrest report that she was arrested by Officer Bilyj. 158. According to Officer Bilyj, he did not sign or authorize his name to be signed onto Ms. Gruber's arrest report or criminal complaint and he has no personal knowledge of any of Ms. Gruber's conduct on March 20, 2003. 159. As a result of the false charges filed by the Defendants, Ms Gruber appeared in court on three separate court dates with an attorney. 160. The charge against her was dismissed on June 19,2003, and the case was terminated in her favor consistent with her innocence. 161. Steven Hudosh is employed at a nonprofit organization. 162. Mr. Hudoshjoined the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 163. Mr. Hudosh, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by
20

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Defendants in the detainment area. 164. Mr. Hudosh was on the sidewalk of Chicago Avenue sometime after 10:00 p.m. when a
Chicago police officer pointed to him and said "come here." 165. Mr. Hudosh was subsequently arrested, taken into custody and handcuffed with plastic
handcuffs behind his back. 166. Mr. Hudosh did not resist his arrest. 167. Mr. Hudosh did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not
witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 168. Mr. Hudosh was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 2 police station at 111'" Street, placed in a jail cell, where he was unlawfully detained for approximately 30 hours before he was released on March 22, 2003. 169. Prior to his release, Mr. Hudosh had to post a $100.00 bond on a charge of Reckless conduct. 170. Defendants made out false and incomplete official reports and gave a false and incomplete version of the events to falsely charge Mr. Hudosh. This false documentation included Defendants or other members of the CPD signing Defendant K. Judeh's name and badge number (Star No. 8825) to a false and invalid criminal complaint against Mr. Hudosh for Reckless Conduct, falsely alleging a violation of 720 ILCS § 5/12-S(a). 171. Defendants also incorrectly asserted in Mr. Hudosh's arrest report that Mr. Hudosh was arrested by Officer Judeh. 172. According to Officer Judeh, he was not at the demonstration, he was not on duty working for the CPD on March 20, 2003, and he has no personal knowledge of Mr. Hudosh or the circumstances of his arrest on March 20,2003. 173. As a result of the false charges filed by the Defendants, Mr. Hudosh was forced to appear in court on April 1, 2003 with an attorney. 174. The charge against him was dismissed and the case was terminated in his favor consistent with his i1mocence. 175. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' actions, as detailed above, the Class
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Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer, inter alia, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and legal expenses. G. Individual Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves 176. Sharon Ambielli joined the demonstration in downtown Chicago. 177. Ms. Ambielli, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 178. At approximately 9:15p.m., Defendant Doe arrested Ms. Ambielli. 179. When Ms. Ambielli was taken into custody and cuffed, she was handcuffed so tightly by Defendant Doe in such an unreasonable and excessive manner that the plastic restraints were cutting into her wrists, causing swelling and pain. 180. Ms. Ambielli did not resist her arrest. 181. Ms. Ambielli did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 182. Ms. Ambielli was placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 5 police station and placed in a jail cell. 183. Ms. Ambielli's repeated requests that the handcuffs be loosened were denied until approximately II :45 p.m. when the restraints were cut off and soon thereafter she was taken to Resurrection Hospital for emergency treatment. 184. Ms. Ambielli was returned to the Area 5 police station and unlawfully detained for a total of eight hours before she was released on March 21, 2003, without any charge. 185. Since Ms. Ambielli's arrest and improper cuffing, Ms. Ambielli has received consistent and extensive medical treatment including surgery for the compressed nerve damage she suffered from the handcuffs on March 20, 2003. 186. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Ambielli has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses. 187. John Pennycuff is a resident of Chicago.
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188. In the early evening on March 20, 2003, Mr. Pennycuff, along with Robert Castillo, attended a function at the Chicago Cultural Center, which was also attended by Mayor Richard M. Daley.
189. After the event at the Cultural Center, Mr. Pennycufftraveled to observe the demonstration.
190. Mr. Pennycufffirst observed the protest at Oak and Michigan Avenues and subsequently at Chicago and Michigan Avenues.
191. At Chicago and Michigan Avenues, Mr. Pennycuff stood with Mr. Castillo near the building on the north east comer of Chicago and Michigan Avenues.
192. Mr. Pennycuff and Mr. Castillo were approached by police personnel who directed them to leave the area.
193. As Mr. Pennycuff and Mr. Castillo moved in the direction they were ordered to leave in, they were grabbed by a second group of Defendants Doe.
194. Mr. Pennycuff was grabbed by Defendant Doe, who grabbed his hands and cuffed his hand behind his back with plastic cuffs.
195. Mr. Pennycuff was handcuffed so tightly by Defendant Doe and in such an unreasonable and excessive manner that the plastic restraints caused him swelling and pain.
196. Mr. Pennycuff did not resist his arrest. 197. Mr. Pennycuffdid not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did
not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 198. Mr. Pennycuffwas placed in a police vehicle, transported to the Area 2 police station at 727 E. 111 '" Street, placed in a jail cell, and unlawfully detained for approximately 13 hours before he was released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 199. Eric Peters was a student at the University of Illinois at Chicago at the time of this incident. 200. Mr. Peters joined the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 201. Mr. Peters was one of the organizers of the demonstration. 202. Mr. Peters was grabbed at approximately 7:30p.m. near Michigan Avenue and Oak
23

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Street, by Defendant Doe who approached him in the crowd after a supervisory police officers yelled out "this is one of the organizers." 203. Defendant Doe pulled Mr. Peters to the side of the street and slammed him into the hood of a police vehicle. 204. Another supervisory police officer then jumped onto the hood of the police vehicle and yelled to the police officers about Mr. Peters, who then threw him to the ground and stepped on his neck. 205. Mr. Peters was then dragged along the ground to another police vehicle. 206. Mr. Peters was subsequently cuffed with plastic cuffs, placed in a police vehicle in which he was held for several hours. 207. Mr. Peters was eventually taken to the Area 2 police station. 208. Mr. Peters did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was never informed by the police that he must leave the demonstration prior to his arrest. 209. Mr. Peters was unlawfully detained for approximately 28 hours and released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 210. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Peters has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses. 211. Daniel Pineda was a student at the Art Institute of Chicago at the time of this incident. 212. Daniel Pineda attended the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 213. Mr. Pineda, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detainment area. 214. Mr. Pineda was approached by Defendant Doe in the detainment area, and struck in the chest with a night stick by Defendant Doe. 215. Defendant Doe then intentionally handcuffed Mr Pineda in an unreasonable manner in that the handcuffs were so tightly fastened around his wrists that it caused him unnecessary pain and injury. 216. Defendants Doe dragged Mr. Pineda to an awaiting police vehicle.
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217. Mr. Pineda did not resist arrest. 218. Mr. Pineda did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not
witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 219. Mr. Pineda was transported to the Area 2 police station, where he was unlawfully detained for 14 hours and released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 220. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Pineda has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses. 221. Aaron Robin was a student at Columbia College in Chicago, Illinois at the time of this incident. 222. Mr. Robin attended the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 223. Mr. Robin, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by Defendants in the detaimnent area. 224. Prior to his arrest, Mr. Robin observed Defendants Doe swinging their batons at demonstrators and pulling a female demonstrator's hair in the detainment area. 225. Defendant Doe then grabbed him by the back of the neck. 226. Mr. Robin was then struck in the wrist area by a Defendant Doe and he felt a cracking in the back of his wrist. 227. Mr. Robin was then arrested and handcuffed with plastic cuffs behind his back by Defendant Doe who intentionally, unreasonably, and repeatedly twisted his wrists back and forth, causing him great pain and injury. 228. Mr. Robin's complaints of pain and requests for medical attention were met with threats directed at him by a Defendant Doe. 229. Mr. Robin did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants in the detainment area. 230. Mr. Robin was taken to a police vehicle and transported to the Area 2 Police Station,
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where his continuing complaints of pain were ignored by Defendants Doe and Roe. 231. Mr. Robin was unlawfully detained for approximately 23 hours before he was released on
March 21, 2003 without any charge. 232. Upon Mr. Robin's release, he sought medical attention and was treated for a fractured
wrist. 233. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Robin
has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and legal expenses. 234. Daniel Romero was an organizer for the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless. 235. Mr. Romero joined the demonstration at the Federal Plaza. 236. Mr. Romero was one of the organizers of the demonstration. 237. Near the intersection of Oak and Michigan Avenues, Mr. Romero was attempting to speak to Commander Byrne. 238. Commander Byrne ordered Defendant Does to arrest Mr. Romero. 239. Defendant Does then grabbed Mr. Romero by both of his arms, his waist and his hair. 240. Defendant Does dragged Mr. Romero to an awaiting police vehicle, cuffed Mr. Romero behind his back while he still had his back pack on and shoved him in the vehicle. 241. Mr. Romero was forced to remain in the police vehicle, cuffed behind his back while wearing his back pack for several hours. 242. Mr. Romero did not commit a crime, did not resist his arrest, and was never informed by the police that he must leave the demonstration prior to his arrest. 243. Mr. Romero was unlawfully detained for approximately 14 hours before he was released on March 21, 2003 without any charge. 244. Subsequent to his release, Mr. Romero sought medical treatment for the injury to his shoulder caused by the unreasonable manner in which he was cuffed. 245. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Romero has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and medical and
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.
legal expenses. 246. Brad Thomson was a student at Manchester College in North Manchester, Indiana on the
date of this incident. 247. Mr. Thomson attended the demonstration at Federal Plaza. 248. Mr. Thomson, along with other class members, was herded, corralled and trapped by
Defendants in the detainment area. 249. While Mr. Thomson was standing on Chicago Avenue and chanting in the detainment
area numerous Defendants Doe in riot gear charged at him. 250. Defendant Does had physical contact with Mr. Thomson causing him to fall to the
ground, and two Defendants Doe fell on top of him. 251. Defendant Does then pulled Mr. Thomson to his feet. 252. While Defendants Doe were holding Mr. Thomson, Defendant Doe deliberately struck
Mr. Thomson in the face causing his nose to bleed. 253. Mr. Thomson was cuffed and transported to an awaiting police vehicle. 254. Mr. Thomson did not resist arrest. 255. Mr. Thomson did not commit a crime, was never ordered or allowed to disperse and did
not witness or hear any police warnings prior to being herded, corralled, trapped arrested and taken into custody by the Defendants. 256. He was transported to the Area 2 police station, where he was unlawfully detained for 13 hours and released on March 21, 2003 without any charges. 257. At the Area 2 police station, Mr. Thomson made numerous requests for medical attention, all of which were denied by several Defendants Roe. 258. At the Area 2 police station, other class members made numerous requests that Mr. Thomson receive medical attention, all of which were denied by several Defendants Roe. 259. After Mr. Thomson's release, he went to Rush Presbyterian Hospital to receive treatment, which included receiving five stitches to his nose. 260. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' actions, as detailed above, Plaintiff Thomson has suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress and anguish, humiliation, Joss of liberty, Joss of income and medical
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expenses.
COUNT I [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for False Detentions, Arrests and Imprisonments) (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and all Subclasses,
and all of the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
261. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 260. 262. The actions of the Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty,
Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, other individual Defendants identified herein and Does in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion or probable cause violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the United States Constitution, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 263. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because the Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT II [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Violations of the First Amendment Right] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and all Subclasses,
and all of the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
264. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 260. 265. Plaintiffs, who were engaged in lawful First Amendment activity on the public streets and
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sidewalks of the City of Chicago, were acting reasonably within time, manner and place restrictions and were not provided any alternative channels for their expression. 266. The actions of the Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, other individual Defendants identified herein and Does in falsely detaining, arresting and imprisoning Plaintiffs who were exercising their Constitutional right to freedom of association further violated their First Amendment rights to be free from the infringement of their right to peaceably assemble under the United States Constitution, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 267. The actions of the Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of speech and expression, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or refening to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because the Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable.
COUNT III [42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Excessive Force Claim] (Brought by Individually Named Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff
Peters, Pineda, Robin, Romero, Thomson)
268. Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff, Peters, Pineda, Romero and Thomson reallege paragraphs 1 through 260.
269. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiff Pineda with a baton; deliberately striking Plaintiff Thomson in the face; striking Plaintiff Robin on the wrist; intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs Ambielli's, Pennycuffs and Romero's wrists too tightly or unreasonably; slamming Plaintiff Peters to the ground; and otherwise using excessive,
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unnecessary and unjustifiable force against Plaintiffs; as well as failing to intervene to prevent said abuse despite having the opportunity and duty to do so; violated these Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be secure in their persons, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 270. The actions of Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of the violations of these Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, bodily injury, pain, suffering, mental distress, anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, loss of income, and legal expenses, as set forth more fully above. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff, Peters, Pineda, Romero and Thomson demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT IV [42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Defendants Deliberate Indifference
to Plaintiffs Ambielli's and Thomson's Medical Needs)
271. Plaintiffs Ambielli and Thomson reallege paragraphs 1 through 260. 272. The actions of the Defendants Doe and Roe in deliberately ignoring Plaintiffs Ambielli's
and Thomson's serious medical needs by refusing to take Plaintiff Ambielli or Thomson to a hospital, clinic or doctor in a timely manner, knowing they had not received any medical care since they were injured, and in exacerbating the pain and injury by detaining them in cramped and painful conditions, and further imposing other arbitrary, unreasonable and punitive conditions, violated these Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs Ambielli and Thomson demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because these Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
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'·

l

_.

COUNTY (42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim for Deprivation of Property]
(Brought by Plaintiff Romero) 273. Plaintiff Romero rea!leges paragraphs I through 260. 274. The Defendants' unreasonable actions in not allowing Plaintiff Romero to maintain
custody ofPlaintiffRomero's property and/or unreasonably forcing Plaintiff to abandon
said property, and failure and refusal to return said personal property, without due process of law constituted an unlawful taking of Plaintiff's property and an unreasonable and
unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' loss, further
suffering and other injuries set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Romero demands actual and compensatory damages against Defendants and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages,
plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court
deems equitable and just. COUNT VI
[42 U.S.C. §1983 Monell Policy, Practice and Custom Claim] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and all Subclasses,
and the Individually Named Plaintiffs)

275. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 260. 276. The actions of the individual Defendants were done pursuant to one or more interrelated
de facto as well as explicit policies, practices and/or customs of the City of Chicago, its police department, its Police Board, its O.P.S. and Internal Affairs Division (hereinafter I.A.D), its Personnel Division, and/or its Superintendents. 277. Upon information and belief, high ranking police officials, including Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byme, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, and Williams planned, authorized, directed, ratified and/or acquiesced in the unconstitutional and unlawful police actions complained of herein. 278. At all times material to this complaint the Defendant City and its police department,

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. ,_

'- _.

Superintendents, O.P.S., LAD., Personnel Division and/or Police Board had interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, a) the failure to properly train, supervise, discipline, transfer, monitor, counsel and otherwise control police officers engaged in committing violations of police department rules and regulations, including the excessive use of force, false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, the harassment of civilians exercising their First Amendment Rights in street demonstrations, complete disregard and wilful violation of CPD's mass arrest policies, and the manufacturing of false reports and statements as well as the physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and other police abuse, particularly in cases where the officers have repeatedly been accused of said acts; b) the police code of silence, particularly in cases where officers engaged in the above articulated violations; and c) encouragement of false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments, and the attendant use of excessive force. 279. Further, the constitutional violations and damages to Plaintiffs that occurred as described herein were directly and proximately caused by the unofficial, unconstitutional, tacit policy of authorized policy makers of the City, who have, for years, deliberately ignored and indulged in violence and intimidation against demonstrators by officers assigned to "monitor" political protest demonstrations; and who deliberately failed to supervise and control such officers so as to prevent violations of demonstrators' rights, and deliberately undermined, negated and stifled the citizens' complaint process. Thus, rank and file officers understand there is little or no risk involved in brutal attacks on or illegal mass arrests of persons exercising Free Speech rights. 280. In addition, the City, the police department and the command-level Defendants are well aware, and have been told and notified many times, that such illegal arrests and such brutal attacks occur, and happen again and again, to the point where a pattern and practice of brutality and harassment of demonstrators is readily evident, going back for many years. 281. These polices are evidenced, inter alia, by the following: a) the systemic encouragement, from the Superintendent on down, of false detentions, false arrests, false imprisonments,

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. " "
by promoting officers who make large numbers of arrests, giving them high performance ratings, based in large part on the number of arrests which they make, and ignoring the large number of citizen complaints made against many of these officers when making these promotions, assigmnents, and ratings; b) the failure to properly discipline, monitor, assign, counsel, transfer, supervise and otherwise control officers, including the Defendants, particularly after department records and studies, statistical data, and computer programs have, or should have, identified these officers including Defendants as "repeaters" with multiple complaints of brutality and other abuse or otherwise as actual or potential problem officers; c) the Department's failure to implement an adequate behavioral monitoring and control system or to properly implement or utilize its "repeater" lists, excessive force study, and "Brainmaker" computer software program in order to identify, monitor, supervise, discipline, assign and otherwise control such
problem officers. 282. The policy, practice, and custom of a police code of silence results in police officers
refusing to report instances of police misconduct, including excessive force, false detentions, false arrests and false imprisonments and other abuse of citizens of which they are aware, despite their obligation under police regulations to do so, and also includes police officers either remaining silent or giving false and misleading information during official investigations in order to protect themselves or fellow officers from internal discipline, civil liability, or criminal charges, and to perjure themselves in criminal cases where they and their fellow officers have falsely arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted the
criminal Defendant. 283. The fact that the aforementioned code of silence exists, and that its adverse impact is
allowed to occur through the actions and inactions of high ranking police officials including police Superintendents and former and current O.P.S. Directors, is also evidenced by the fact that while former Superintendent Martin, former O.P.S. Director Fogel and former O.P.S. Director Shines have all acknowledged publicly that they are aware of the existence of the custom and practice of a police code of silence, they as well as no other OPS Director have acted to eliminate the code or to counteract its impact on
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. \

. ~

police discipline, the use of excessive force, fabrication of evidence and false arrests and prosecutions. In particular, they do not attempt to charge or discipline police officers who make false reports and statements or remain silent to hide their fellow officers wrongdoing although the O.P.S. is empowered and given the responsibility to do so. 284. The de facto policies, practices and customs of failing to train, supervise, monitor, discipline, counsel and control, the code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests and prosecutions are interrelated and exacerbate the effects of each other, to, in the words of former O.P.S. Director Fogel, "institutionalize police lying" and "immunize police officers from discipline." 285. The aforementioned policies, practices and/or customs of failing to supervise, discipline, monitor, control, etc., the police code of silence, and the encouragement of false arrests, imprisonments, prosecutions, and convictions, separately and together, proximately caused injury to the Plaintiffs in this case, inter alia, because Defendants had good reason to believe that their misconduct would not be revealed or reported by fellow officers or their supervisors, that their denials would go unchallenged by these supervisors and fellow officers, from the police Superintendents, Police Board, and Directors of the O.P.S. on down, and that they were effectively immune from disciplinary action, thereby protecting them from the consequences of their unconstitutional conduct. 286. But for the belief that they would be protected, both by fellow officers and by the department, from serious career consequences, Defendants would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in the injuries to the Plaintiffs. 287. Said interrelated policies, practices and customs, as set forth above, both individually and together, were maintained and implemented with deliberate indifference, and encouraged the Defendants to commit the aforesaid acts against the Plaintiffs and therefore acted as direct and proximate causes of said constitutional violations, and injuries to the Plaintiffs. 288. Additionally, said failure to properly train, discipline, monitor, control, assign, transfer, supervise, and counsel Defendants, was also done with deliberate indifference and likewise acted as a direct and proximate cause of the injuries to Plaintiffs. 289. These policies, practices and customs encouraged, inter alia, excessive use of force, the

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making of false statements and reports, and physical and verbal abuse of civilians, and were separately and together, a direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by Defendants in this case and the injuries sustained by the Plaintiffs. 290. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct and unspoken policy of Defendants described herein, their failure to take reasonable steps to remedy the pattern and practice of police brutality and misconduct, and their deliberate indifference to the serious threat to the rights of demonstrators, Plaintiffs were each denied her or his constitutional, statutory, and common law rights as stated below, and have suffered, and continue to suffer, mental and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, discomfort, fear, shock, anxiety, pain and harm. 291. Defendants' policies, practices, conduct, acts and omissions alleged herein have no plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein. Plaintiffs fear they will again be subjected to false mass arrests at demonstrations without any warning, the misuse of plastic and metal handcuffs, beatings or harassment. Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm as a result of the continuing existence of the police records of their arrests herein. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek injunctive relief ordering Defendants to seal and destroy the records of Plaintiffs' arrests. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; judgment against Defendant City for compensatory damages, plus costs and attorneys' fees and whatever additional relief this court finds equitable and just.
COUNT VII [Supplemental State Law Claims for Violations of the Illinois Constitution] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and All Subclasses,
and the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
292. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs l through 260. 293. The actions taken by Defendants denied Plaintiffs their state constitutional rights to be
secure in their persons; to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; to speak,
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write and publish freely; to assemble in a peaceable manner; to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the Illinois Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and were a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries as set forth
above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants; and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs ofthis action, attorneys' fees and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VIII (Supplemental State Law Claims for False Detention,
Arrest and Imprisonment) (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and All Subclasses,
and all of the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
294. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 260. 295. The false detention, arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiffs on March 20'" through March
21, 2003, were done wilfully and wantonly by Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, other individual Defendants identified herein, Does and Roes. 296. The actions of the Defendants directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, emotional distress, pain and suffering as claimed above and constitute the tort of false arrest and imprisonment under Illinois law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages, and because Defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just.
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COUNT IX [Supplemental State Law Claims for Assault and Battery] (Brought by Individually Named Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff, Peters,
Pineda, Robin, Romero and Thomson)
297. Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff, Peters, Pineda, Robin, Romero and Thomson reallege paragraphs I through 260.
298. The acts of Defendants Doe in striking Plaintiffs, physically abusing Plaintiffs, and intentionally handcuffing Plaintiffs' wrists too tightly or unreasonably causing bodily harm, were performed in a wilful and wanton manner.
299. These actions of Defendants Doe were affirmative acts and threatened to cause or did cause an unpermitted contact of a harmful and/or offensive nature, to which Plaintiffs did not consent, and thus constitute assault and battery under laws of the State of Illinois.
301. The actions of Defendants Doe directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, emotional distress, pain and suffering. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Ambielli, Pennycuff, Peters, Pineda, Robin, Romero and
Thomson demand actual and compensatory damages against Defendants Doe and because they acted wilfully and wantonly, punitive damages plus the costs of this action and such other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just..
COUNT X [Pendent State Law Claims For Malicious Prosecution] (Brought by Class Plaintiffs Gruber and Hudosh, Individually
and on Behalf of Subclass A-3)
302. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 260. 303. The acts of Defendants in creating a false story, falsely charging Plaintiffs with one count
of Reckless Conduct and, thereby causing them to lose their liberty for hours and be criminally prosecuted and incur legal expenses, out of pocket losses and emotional distress constituted the tort of malicious prosecution under the laws of the State of Illinois. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand actual or compensatory damages, and because Defendants acted willfully and wantonly, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action and such
37

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 40 of 43 PageID #:1344
.. ,_ .... \ _
other and additional relief as this court deems equitable and just. COUNT XI
[Supplemental State Law Claim for Conspiracy] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and All Subclasses
and all of the Individually Named Plaintiffs) 304. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 301. 305. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr.,
Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, other individual Defendants identified herein and Does agreed and together reached an understanding or agreement to engage in a course of conduct, and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and between themselves, to falsely arrest, imprison, detain, assault and batter Plaintiffs. 306. Defendants conspired and arrived at an understanding and meeting of the minds that the police would harass, intimidate, punish and retaliate against the participants in the March 20, 2003 demonstration because of their political beliefs, and in doing so deployed a large and intimidating force of police. 307. The objectives of this conspiracy, among others, were to prevent the expression and communication of, and otherwise interfere with, the message of the constitutionally protected activities and protest of the Plaintiff class, to summarily punish the participants, to chill and deter other demonstrations. 308. The decision and related activities involved in the mass arrests of the members of the Plaintiff class without probable cause and the maltreatment of Plaintiff class members on the street and in the jails, were part of, and were overt acts taken in furtherance of, the conspiracy. 309. In furtherance of this conspiracy or conspiracies, the Defendants named above, together with their unsued co-conspirators, committed the overt acts set forth above, including, but not limited to, the wrongful and false detentions, arrests, imprisonments, beatings of Plaintiffs, the manufacture and construction of knowingly false inculpatory evidence against Plaintiffs, the making of knowing misstatements and the filing of false and incomplete statements and reports.
38

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310. Said conspiracy or conspiracies and overt acts were and are continuing in nature. 311. Defendant Hillard's, Cline's, Byrne's, Chiczewski's, Christian's, Dougherty's, Dugan's,
Epach, Jr.'s, Griffin's, Huberman's, Killacky's, Limon's, Maurer's, Perry's, Radke's, Risley's, Robinson's, Rowan's, Ryan's, Sullivan's, Sobscyk' s, Williams's, other individual Defendants', Doe's and Roes's and their co-conspirators' overt acts as set forth above, which were committed jointly and/or while conspiring together to falsely detain, arrest, falsely imprison, and commit assault and battery on the Plaintiffs, constitute the tort of conspiracy. 312. This conspiracy proximately caused the injuries to the Plaintiffs set forth above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to return and destroy all documents and records relating or referring to Plaintiffs' arrests and any other reference to Plaintiffs in police files based on their arrests on March 20, 2003; actual and compensatory damages against Defendants, and, because these Defendants acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' rights, for punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, attorneys' fees and such other relief as this court deems equitable and just.
COUNT XII [Supplemental State Law Claim for Respondeat Superior] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class and All Subclasses,
and the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
313. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 260, 292 through 312. 314. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr.,
Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, other individual Defendants identified herein, Does and Roes and the individual Defendant police officers were, at all times relevant to this Count, employees and agents of the Defendant City. Each of the above named individual Defendants was acting within the scope of their employment, and their acts and omissions are directly chargeable to their employer the Defendant City under state law pursuant to respondeat superior. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment for compensatory damages, jointly and
39

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severally from the City. COUNT XIII
[Supplemental State Law Claim for 745 ILCS § 10/9-102] (Brought by all Class Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of the Class All Subclasses and
the Individually Named Plaintiffs)
315. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 314. 316. Defendant City of Chicago was the employer of Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne,
Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, the Defendant individual police officers identified herein, Does and Roes at all times relevant to this complaint. 317. Defendants Hillard, Cline, Byrne, Chiczewski, Christian, Dougherty, Dugan, Epach, Jr., Griffin, Huberman, Killacky, Limon, Maurer, Perry, Radke, Risley, Robinson, Rowan, Ryan, Sullivan, Sobscyk, Williams, the Defendant individual police officers identified herein, Does and Roes committed the acts alleged above in the scope of their employment as employees of Defendant City of Chicago. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pursuant to 745 ILCS § 10/9-102, demand judgment against the Defendant City in the amount awarded to Plaintiffs against the individual Defendants as damages, attorneys' fees, costs and interest, and/or for any settlement entered into between the Plaintiffs and Defendants, and for whatever additional relief this court deems equitable and just.
. Milwaukee Avenue C ·cago, Illinois 60622 773/235-0070
JAMES FENNERTY 36 S. Wabash Avenue, Suite 1310 Chicago, Illinois 60603
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Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 140 Filed: 12/30/04 Page 43 of 43 PageID #:1347 312/422-0708 MELINDA POWER West Town Community Law Office 2502 W. Division Street Chicago, Illinois 60622 773/278-6706
December 30, 2004 PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS OF THIS COMPLAINT
41

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 223 Filed: 04/19/06 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:2428

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

)

)

)

Case No. 03 C 2463

)

)

Judge Virginia M. Kendall

)

)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Eleven plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) bring this class action against the City of Chicago (“the City”),

the Chicago Police Department (“the CPD”), and various Command Personnel and officers of the

CPD (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs seek money damages and injunctive relief for

Defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions related to the war protest march that occurred on March 20,

2003 in Chicago. On April 17, 2006, this Court certified a class consisting of all persons who were

surrounded by Defendants on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue

and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way (“the bounded area”), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and

11:30 p.m. Among the class’ claims are state law claims for violations of the Illinois Constitution

(Count VII), false detention, arrest and imprisonment (Count VIII), assault and battery (Count IX),

Respondeat Superior (Count XII), and indemnification under 745 ILCS § 10/9-102 (Count XIII)

(“the state law claims”).

Plaintiff filed their original Complaint on April 11, 2003 against the City of Chicago,

Superintendent Terry G. Hillard, Commander John R. Risley, Defendants Doe 1-50, Defendants Doe

51-100, and Defendants Roe 1-50. On May 3, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint

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in which they added nineteen individuals as defendants, all identified as employees of the CPD. On December 30, 2004, Defendants filed a Third Amended Complaint adding eight more CPD employees as defendants. Thus, a total of twenty-seven defendants have been added to this lawsuit since May 3, 2004 (“the added Defendants”). The added Defendants previously were identified in the Complaint as Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe. Defendants now move this Court to dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX, XII, and XIII against the added Defendants because those defendants were not named in the Complaint within the one-year limitations period in 745 ILCS 10/8-101, the Illinois Local Government Tort Immunity Act. If the state law claims against the added Defendants are dismissed, Defendants then ask the Court to hold that the City of Chicago cannot be held liable under the respondeat superior or indemnification counts for any liability attributable to the conduct of the added Defendants under those dismissed state law claims. Last, Defendants request that the terms Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe be removed from the Complaint.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX, XII, and XIII is granted in part and denied in part. With the exception of Count VII alleging constitutional violations, which is not subject to the one-year limitations period in the Tort Immunity Act, and with the exception of those individuals not identified to Plaintiffs before the statute of limitations expired, all the state law claims against all of the added Defendants are dismissed. Plaintiffs, however, still may pursue their timely-filed claims against the City of Chicago based on the conduct of their employees, including the added Defendants. Finally, the Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe designations are without legal significance and are stricken from the Complaint.
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DISCUSSION When considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). Although affirmative defenses are not usually resolved with a motion to dismiss, if the plaintiff’s complaint contains facts that on their face demonstrate the suit is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be disposed of under Rule 12(b)(6). See Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957). The Illinois Local Government Tort Immunity Act contains a one-year statute of limitations on any civil action against a local government and its employees:
No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date of that injury unless it is commenced without one year from the date that injury was received or the cause of action accrued. 745 ILCS 10/8-101; see Luciano v. Waubonsee Cmty. Coll., 245 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1082-83, 614 N.E.2d 904, 908 (2d Dist. 1993). Because the added Defendants were not identified by name in the Complaint until May 3, 2004, beyond the one-year statute of limitations in 745 ILCS 10/8-101, the claims against them are untimely unless Plaintiffs can show that either: (1) the statute of limitations in 745 ILCS 10/8-101 does not apply to the claim, (2) the claims relate back to the filing of the original complaint, or (3) an equitable reason exists to excuse their failure to file claims against the added Defendants within the statute of limitations.
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I. Constitutional Claims and the Tort Immunity Act’s One-Year Statute of Limitations Count VII of Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts a supplemental state law claim for violations of
the Illinois Constitution. The statute of limitations in the Tort Immunity Act does not bar claims for nontortious actions, including alleged violations of constitutional rights. See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Kildeer, 302 Ill. App. 3d 304, 705 N.E.2d 953 (2d Dist. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 184 Ill.2d 290, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the Tort Immunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations applies to nontortious civil actions). While Defendants may be correct that all of the cases rejecting the Tort Immunity Act’s bar involved claims for injunctive relief, the holdings of those cases are not so limited. See, e.g., Firestone v. Fritz, 119 Ill. App. 3d 685, 689, 456 N.E.2d 904, 908 (2d Dist. 1983) (“The Tort Immunity Act applies only to tort actions and does not bar a civil rights action”) (citations omitted). Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII is denied. II. Relation Back
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs the question of whether an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading. For state law claims, Rule 15 provides two paths for relating the addition of a party back to the original filing. See Arendt v. Vetta Sports, Inc., 99 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[An] amended complaint is therefore timely under Rule 15(c)(1) if it meets the requirements of either federal or Illinois law”). First, Rule 15(c)(3) permits the amendment to relate back when “the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,” and “the party to be brought in by amendment has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew
4

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or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3). Relation back of the claims also is permitted if the “relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). With regards to the claims that Defendants have moved to dismiss, this means Illinois law. See Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 853-55 (7th Cir. 1993), citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1943 (1985) (“Rule 15(c) is part of federal law, and its meaning is a federal question. But when trying to determine whether ‘relation back’ is essential to make the complaint timely, we must refer to the law defining the period of limitations”).
It is settled law in this circuit that Plaintiffs cannot use the relation back provisions of Rule 15 to substitute John Doe defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired. See Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of complaint as untimely where plaintiff did not add defendant officer to replace a John Doe defendant until after the statute of limitations had expired); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Rule 15(c)(3) “does not allow relation back where . . . there is a lack of knowledge of the proper party”). Thus, Plaintiffs only option to relate their claims back is to show that Illinois law would allow the relation back. Illinois’ relation-back statute provides that a cause of action against a party not originally named a defendant may relate back when that party “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him or her.” 735 ILCS § 2-616(d).
Historically, Illinois courts have construed liberally § 2-616 to allow amendments to the pleadings. See Siebert v. Bleichman, 306 Ill. App. 3d 841, 846, 811 N.E. 1225, 1233 (1999).
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Section 2-616(d) has been amended recently, however. Previous requirements in the statute were
replaced with its current language; language that almost matches Federal Rule 15(c)(3). Compare
735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (2002)1 with 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (2000).2 Relying on statements made in the
legislative history of the amendment, Illinois courts have concluded that “the legislature intended
to impose more stringent requirements for amended complaints – like those embodied n the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Pruitt v. Pervan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36, 825 N.E.2d 299, 301-302 (1st
Dist. 2005); see also Compton v. Ubilluz, 351 Ill. App. 3d 223, 233-34, 811 N.E.2d 1225, 1233 (2d
Dist. 2004) (reciting statements made during debate over the amendment). In Pruitt, the plaintiff
sued the property’s managers, but did not sue the owners of the property because she “lacked
information of the [owners’] involvement in maintaining the Property.” Id. at 302. Because her
mistake was not one about the identity of the owners but rather a lack of knowledge about their role
in causing her alleged injury, the Appellate Court held that her failure to name the owners in her
initial complaint did not constitute a mistake under § 2-616(d). Id. at 303. Based on post-
1 A cause of action against a person not originally named a defendant is not barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the time within which an action may be brought or right asserted, if all the following terms and conditions are met: (1) the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was commenced; (2) the person, within the time that the action might have been brought or the right asserted against him or her plus the time for service permitted under Supreme Court Rule 103(b) received such notice of the commencement of the action that the person will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been bro ught against him or her; and (3) it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the cause of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, ***.
2 A cause of action against a person not originally named a defendant is not barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the time within which an action may be brought or right asserted, if all the following terms and conditions are met: (1) the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was commenced; (2) failure to join the person as a defendant was inadvertent; (3) service of summons was in fact had upon the person, his or her agent or partner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate, even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity or as agent of another * * *; (4) the person, within the time that the action might have been brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that the original action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occu rrence involving or conc erning him or her; and (5) it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the cause of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, * * * even though the person was not named originally as a defendant.
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amendment cases, it appears that Illinois courts plan to interpret the language in § 2-616(d) consistent with the federal court’s construction of that same language. See id. at 302, citing Manney v. Monroe, 151 F. Supp.2d 976, 998 (2001) (no identity mistake under Rule 15(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Procedure where the plaintiff’s failure to initially name the defendant until after the limitations period expired was due to his ignorance of the defendant’s involvement in the alleged wrong). Accordingly, Plaintiffs lack knowledge regarding the added Defendants’ names or involvement in the events of March 20, 2003 is not the type of “mistake concerning the identity of the proper party” that would create grounds for their claims to relate back. III. Filing of Class Action as Tolling Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs suggest that their filing of a class complaint tolls the statute of limitations for all purported class members on claims against the added Defendants. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553, 94 S.Ct. 756, 766 (1974) (holding that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class”). The Supreme Court has explained that “[l]imitations periods are designed to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 (1983) (explaining the tolling that occurs when a class action is filed). Plaintiffs’ original complaint did not put the added Defendants on notice of any claims against them. Because the added Defendants were not named in the original class complaint, the statute of limitations against them was not tolled by its filing. See Wyser -Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the class action tolling provisions in American Pipe do not apply to a defendant not named in a class action complaint).
7

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IV. Equitable Estoppel or Equitable Tolling Illinois law governs Plaintiffs’ pleas for equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. These two
doctrines allow a party to file a claim after the statute of limitations has run when equity so requires. First, “[e]quitable estoppel suspends the running of the statute of limitations during any period in which the defendant took active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing.” Singletary v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 9 F.3d 1236, 1241 (7th Cir. 1993). Equitable estoppel thus focuses on the conduct of the defendant. Equitable tolling, on the other hand, “permits a plaintiff to sue after the statute of limitations has expired if through no fault or lack of diligence on his part he was unable to sue before, even though the defendant took no active steps to prevent him from suing.” Id.; see Plooy v. Paryani, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1085 (1st Dist. 1995) (“The tolling of a statute of limitations is normally restricted to those situations in which a plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing her cause of action through no fault of her own”). In this case, Defendants did not take active steps to prevent Plaintiffs from learning the identity of the officers nor did Plaintiffs exercise the necessary diligence to justify tolling the statute of limitations. As such, equity does not excuse Plaintiffs failure to sue the added Defendants before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Defendants’ Rule 26(a) disclosures sent to Plaintiffs on July 30, 2003, identify 18 of the 27 added Defendants as witnesses to the events that occurred at the scene of the demonstration and march. (See Defs’ Ex. D.) An additional 6 of the added Defendants were listed in the arrest reports disclosed to Plaintiffs on October 31, 2003. (See Defs’ Exs. F and G.) Of the three remaining added Defendants, Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman does not appear in any of
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Defendants’ discovery responses to date, while Officer DiCicco and Officer Jaros were identified in arrest reports tendered to Plaintiffs on October 31, 2004.
Beginning with equitable estoppel, this Court is not persuaded that Defendants fraudulently concealed the identity of Command Personnel by tendering arrest reports to Plaintiffs that contained the names of the arresting officers but that did not contain the names of the Command Personnel that allegedly ordered the arrests. The arrest reports are not deceptive, they represent what they purport to represent: they list the name of the first arresting/appearing officer, the officer that searched the arrestee and the booking officer. (See Defs’ Exs. F and G.) At the same time, all but one of the Command Personnel added as Defendants were listed in Defendants’ initial Rule 26(a) disclosures. (See Defs’ Ex. D.) Most Command Personnel also were listed in response to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory requesting Defendants to identify the chain of command in effect on March 20, 2003. (See City of Chicago’s Response to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories.) Given these facts, the Court does not find that Defendants’ fraudulently concealed the identity of any of the added Defendants. See also Davis v. Frapolly, 742 F. Supp. 971, 974 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“This is somewhat a novel application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment since the concealment was allegedly of the identity of other defendants rather than of the existence of the cause of action”).
Based on these same facts, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did not exercise the diligence necessary to equitably toll the statute of limitations as to those added Defendants named in the discovery materials. As to added Defendants Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman and Officers DiCicco and Jaros, Plaintiffs could not know their role in the events of March 20, 2003 prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and therefore were prevented from pursuing the class’ causes of action against them through no fault of their own. For this reason, the
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statute of limitations as to these latter three individuals were tolled and the claims against them are considered timely filed. The state law claims against the remaining added Defendants, however, are barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 745 ILCS 10/8-101. V. Respondeat Superior and Indemnification Claims Against the City of Chicago
With the dismissal of the state law claims against the added Defendants, the City of Chicago argues that it cannot be held liable under Count XII, respondeat superior, or Count XIII, indemnification, for the conduct of the added Defendants. See 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (“A local public entity is not liable for any injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable”). Illinois courts have “long recognized that in an action by a third party based on injuries caused by the negligence of the servant, the servant is not a necessary party in an action against the master.” McCottrell v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill. App. 3d 517, 519, 481 N.E.2d 1058, 1059 (1st Dist. 1985). McCottrell applied this maxim to claims subject to the Tort Immunity Act specifically and held that a public entity could be liable even though its employee was not named in the suit. Id. at 520, 481 N.E.2d at 1060. The fact that this Court has found the class’ claims against the added Defendants time barred does not change this result. See Bachenski v. Malnati, 11 F.3d 1371, 1378 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting McCottrell to mean that “a time bar preventing the initiation of an action against a servant does not vitiate a timely instituted claim against the master”). The only cases relieving a municipality of liability are those cases in which an affirmative finding was made that the individual officer was not liable. See Sank v. Poole, 231 Ill. App. 3d 780, 787-88, 596 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (4th Dist. 1992). Thus, if it is determined ultimately that no liability to Plaintiffs arises from the added Defendants’ actions, the City of Chicago likewise will not be held liable. Yet the failure to add an employee before the passing of the statute of limitations does not
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bar relief against the employer under the Tort Immunity Act. And while the class is time barred from pursuing many of its state law claims against almost all of the added Defendants, they may still obtain relief on their Counts of respondeat superior and indemnification from the City of Chicago if they can prove that the added Defendants would be liable and acted within the scope of their employment. VI. Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe
The Court finds no substantial reason to permit the Complaint to continue to list Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe. The defendants byline in a Complaint should be reserved for individuals and entities against which a viable claim is being brought. Even to the extent that the City of Chicago remains potentially liable for the actions of its employees, retaining the generic Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe is neither necessary nor helpful. See McCottrell, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 519, 481 N.E.2d at 1059 (holding that employees need not be named in suit in order for claim against employer to proceed); Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (noting futility of listing unknown individuals as defendants in Complaint). Accordingly, the Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe designations are stricken from the Complaint.
Conclusion and Order Wherefore, it is ordered that Counts VIII, IX, XII, and XIII are dismissed as to all of the added Defendants except Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman and Officers DiCicco and Jaros. The portion of Defendants’ motion seeking to relieve the City of Chicago from
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liability for the conduct alleged against the added Defendants in the Counts dismissed by this Order is denied. Finally, the titles Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe are ordered stricken from the Complaint.
So ordered.

Date: April 19, 2006

________________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge Northern District of Illinois

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 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 277 Filed: 08/30/06 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:3445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually and on

)

behalf of others similarly situated

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

_______________________________________ )

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

)

Counter-Plaintiff, )

v.

)

)

KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually and on

)

behalf of others similarly situated,

)

)

Counter-Defendants. )

Case No. 03 C 2463 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Eleven plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) brought this class action against the City of Chicago (“the City”), the Chicago Police Department (“the CPD”), and various Command Personnel and officers of the CPD (collectively, “Defendants”). On April 17, 2006, this Court certified a class consisting of all persons who were surrounded by Defendants on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way (“the bounded area”), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. On May 16, 2006, Defendant City of Chicago filed a counterclaim against Plaintiffs and the class they represent (“the Counterclaim”). The City’s counterclaim relies on § 8-28-020 of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago (“the Ordinance”):
Any person who causes the city or its agents to incur costs in order to provide necessary services as a result of such person’s violation of

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 277 Filed: 08/30/06 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:3446
any federal, state or local law . . . shall be liable to the city for those costs. This liability shall be collectible in the same manner as any other personal liability. Taking as true all facts alleged in the counterclaim and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Counter-Plaintiff, § 8-28-020, as applied, does not violate the First Amendment and CounterPlaintiff has stated a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Further, no novel issue of state law or exceptional circumstance convinces this Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Counterclaim. Finally, under the Federal Rules and this Court’s order the counterclaim is not untimely. Accordingly, Counter-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Counter-Plaintiff’s Allegations Counter-Defendants participated in a march that began in Federal Plaza in downtown Chicago. (Defendant City of Chicago’s Amended Counterclaim (“Countercl.”), ¶¶ 6-7.) The march continued until Counter-Defendants eventually were surrounded by members of the CPD. (Countercl. ¶ 11.) Many of the Counter-Defendants then were arrested. (Id.) Counter-Defendants allegedly violated numerous state and local laws during their march through the City of Chicago. (Countercl. ¶ 14.) Among other violations, Counter-Defendants failed to obtained a permit for their march; hindered, obstructed or delayed traffic on the streets of Chicago; and crossed roadways at points other than those within marked crosswalks. (Id.) As a result of Counter-Defendants’ conduct, the City of Chicago incurred extensive costs to provide necessary services, including the extra police forces that were called in to monitor and control the march and traffic that was disrupted by the march, and costs related to transporting, processing and housing Counter-Defendants who were arrested. (Countercl. ¶ 12.)
DISCUSSION When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take as true all facts alleged
2

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 277 Filed: 08/30/06 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:3447
in the counterclaim and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the counter-plaintiff. Cozzi Iron and Metal, Inc. v. U.S. Office Equipment, Inc., 250 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2001). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). First Amendment Challenges
Section 8-28-020 creates liability for persons that violate a federal, state or local law. Even if ostensibly engaging in First Amendment activity, “[i]ndividuals who actually engage in illegal acts and individuals who conspire to violate the law can be held liable for their actions.” U.S. v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 666 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, nothing on the Ordinance’s face nor in the allegations in the City’s counterclaim demonstrate that the Ordinance punishes First Amendment protected activity. To the extent that Counter-Defendants properly were exercising their First Amendment rights by engaging in peaceful protests and had no intent to violate the law, such facts contradict the allegations and cannot be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). See Cozzi Iron and Metal, 250 F.3d at 574; Fried Trading Co. v. Austern, 1987 WL 4773, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (“[T]he court must accept as true the well-pleaded facts of the counterclaim”).
Counter-Defendants argue further that the imposition of the requirement that marchers seek a permit for a spontaneous event is an impermissible restraint on free speech, the spontaneous event being the commencement of the War in Iraq. The City’s permitting ordinance contains a specific subsection addressing situations where the normal deadlines cannot be met. Section 10-8-330(c) provides that “[t]he executive director shall . . . consider an application for a parade which is filed less than 15 business days before the proposed event, where the purpose of the event is a spontaneous response to a current event, or where other good and compelling causes are shown.”
3

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As an initial matter, a government constitutionally may impose a reasonable permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade or rally. See Forsythe County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992), citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941). Second, on its face, the permitting ordinance does not give the executive director “unfettered discretion” to issue or deny a permit. The permitting ordinance sets forth in substantial detail the requirements for a permit and § 10-8-330(h) provides that the executive director “shall” issue a permit if certain conditions are met. Last, whether Counter-Defendants had time to apply for a permit or whether the City effectively waived the permit requirement by its conduct – that is, ratified Counter-Defendants’ behavior, are questions of fact. Failure to State a Claim
Federal notice pleading requires a short and plain statement of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (“One pleads a ‘claim for relief’ by briefly describing the events”). The statement need not allege all of the facts involved in the claim and can plead conclusions. See Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251 (stating that “[m]atching facts against legal elements comes later”). Any conclusions pleaded, however, must “provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim,” Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1998), “includ[ing] the operative facts upon which plaintiff bases his claim.” Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).
Counter-Plaintiff alleges that each member of the certified class participated in the march, which state and local laws the class members allegedly violated during the march and examples of the services necessary to respond to the alleged violations. These allegations put CounterDefendants on notice of the factual basis for the Counterclaim and, taking as true all facts alleged in the Counterclaim and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Counter-Plaintiff, it cannot
4

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be said that the Counter-Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Accordingly, the allegations state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Additionally, absent further evidence or argument, the Ordinance does not require that an individual be convicted of a violation before a claim made be brought against him under the Ordinance. While a conviction would go a long way in helping the City meet its burden of proving a violation, the plain language of the Ordinance only requires that the person violated the statute. Assuming this reading gives the City “two bites at the apple,” Counter-Defendants have offered no law or reason explaining why this is impermissible. Indeed, the principal that an individual can be liable both criminally and civilly for the same conduct is a well-established one. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993). As such, the lack of an allegation that class members were convicted of violating the law is not a ground for dismissing the Counterclaim. Supplemental Jurisdiction
This Court has discretion to decline jurisdiction over a claim if either “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law” or “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1); (4).
Counter-Defendants argue that the Counterclaim forces this Court to apply § 8-28-020 in the context of a street demonstration – a novel and complex issue of state law. Admittedly, there is little Illinois case law on § 8-28-020, only two published cases. However, the elements of the Ordinance are straightforward – a violation, an injury and causation. In fact, the novel issues of law that are likely to arise will involve the interplay between the Ordinance and the First Amendment, issues that this Court will be as able as a state court to determine.
A counterclaim in a class action is the equivalent of a defendant class action. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Srvcs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 387 (7th Cir. 1996). Defendant class actions for damages
5

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are exceptional. Id. Whether such a claim should proceed under Rule 23 will be a difficult question to answer. However, given that Counter-Defendants admit that the Counterclaim is compulsory, this Court should be the one to answer it. Therefore, this Court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Counterclaim. Timeliness
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) does not require, as Counter-Defendants contend, that a compulsory counterclaim be filed at the time a defendant file its answer or it is waived. Rule 13(a) instead requires that the compulsory counterclaim be brought in the original lawsuit or it is barred. See Burlington Northern R.Co. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Coar previously granted the City “leave to file an amended Counterclaim . . . within 30 days of this Court’s ruling on the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.” Since the City filed within those 30 days, this Court will consider its amended counterclaim timely.
Conclusion and Order Wherefore, Counter-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied. The parties should continue to appear before Magistrate Judge Nolan regarding all discovery matters and the setting or extension of any discovery schedule. So ordered.

Date: August 30, 2006

________________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge Northern District of Illinois

6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No. 03 C 2463 ) ) Judge Virginia M. Kendall ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action arises out of a march in protest of the war in Iraq that took place in downtown
Chicago, Illinois on March 20, 2003. Eleven plaintiff(s“Plaintiffs”) brought this class action against
the City of Chicago (“ the City”), the Chicago Police Departm ent (the “CPD”), and various
Command Personnel and officers of the CPD (colel ctively, “Defendants”). On April 17, 2006, this
Court certified a class consisting of all persons who were surrounded by Defendants on March 20,
2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way (the
“Bounded Area”), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. On May 16, 2006, Defendant
City of Chicago filed a counterc laim against Plaintiffs and the class they represent (the
“Counterclaim”). The City’s counterclaim relies on § 8-28-020 of the Municipal Code of the City
of Chicago (the “Ordinance”):
Any person who causes the city or its agents to incur costs in order to provide necessary services as aresult of such person’s violation of any federal, state or local law . . . shall be liable to the city for those costs. This liability shall be collectible in the sam e manner as any other personal liability.
On August 30, 2006, this Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss the City’s counterclaim.

Now before the Court is the City’s Motion for Cla ss Certification of its Counterclaim Against Class Plaintiffs/Counter-Defe ndants. Because, with respect to the proposed class of Counter-Defendants, the requirements of commonality and predominance are not satisfied in this case, the Motion for Class Certification is Denied.
Counter-Plaintiff’s Allegations Counter-Defendants participated in a m arch that began in Federal Plaza in downtown Chicago. (Defendant City of Chicago’s Amended Counterclaim (the “Counterclaim”), ¶¶ 6-7.) The march continued until Counter-Defendants eventually were surrounded by members of the CPD. (Counterclaim ¶ 11.) Many of the Counte r-Defendants then were arrested. ( Id.) CounterDefendants allegedly violated numerous state and local laws during their march through the City of Chicago. (Counterclaim ¶ 14.) Among other violations, Counter-Defendants failed to obtained a permit for their march; hindered, obstructed or delayed traffic on the streets ofChicago; and crossed roadways at point s other than thos e within m arked crosswalks. ( Id.) As a result of CounterDefendants’ conduct, the City of Chicago incurred extensive costs to provide necessary services, including the extra police forces that were called into monitor and control the march and traffic that was disrupted by the m arch, and costs related to transporting, processing and housing CounterDefendants who were arrested. (Counterclaim ¶ 12.)
DISCUSSION I. Requirements for Class Certification under Rule 23
Without citing any authority in support of itsposition, the City argues that, because the only people subject to the C ity’s counterclaim have already been cer tified by this C ourt as having satisfied Rule 23 requirements, it would be “a redundant and unnecessary exercise” to “re-examine
2

those class Plaintiffs for certification as class Counter-Defendants.” (Mem. in Support of Mtn. for Class Cert. at p. 6). Not true; cer tifying a class of Counter-Defendants for the purpose of adjudicating the City’s counterclaims is not at all the same as certifying a Plaintiffs’ class for the purpose of adjudicating common claims against the City – even if exactly the sam e individuals comprise both classes. Accordingly, the Court is not e xcused from its obligation to conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the requirements for certification in Rule 23 are met simply because the proposed class of Counter-Defendant s is com posed of t he same individuals that comprise the Plaintiffs’ class. See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982); Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). In conducting this rigorous analysis, the Court must “make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.” Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs’ claims may proceed as a class action only if: “(1) the class is so num erous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Assuming Plaintiffs can meet this initial burden, they also must show that the requirements for one of the subsections of Rule 23(b)is met. Plaintiffs have moved to certify their class under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits class certification if: (1) questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. This Court has “broad discretion” to determ ine whether class certification is appropriate. See Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir. 1997), citing Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993). In this case, the
3

Court finds that, wi th respect to the putative cl ass of Counter-Defendants the City has not even cleared the low hurdle of commonality. And even if there were common questions of law or fact applicable to the City’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs, individual issues of fact and law would certainly predominate over the common issues. II. The Requirements of Commonality and Predominance Are Not Satisfied in this Case.
When deciding whether to certify a class, the Court must determine that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Acommon nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th C ir. 1992). In the m ore traditional setting of a plaintiffs’ class, such a common nucleus of operative facts can arise when each class member’s claim will depend on the same conduct by the defendants. See Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998); Allen v. City of Chicago, 828 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (commonality requirement met when there is “standardized conduct by defendants toward members of the putative class”). Once a common nucleus of facts is identified, commonality will not be upset by “factual variations am ong class members’ grievances.” Id., citing Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980). But in t his case, the City seeks to certify a class of defendants to its counterclaim . Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry into whether thereexists a nucleus of facts common to the putative class will necessarily reach the question whetehr the City’s counterclaimdepends upon standardized conduct by – as opposed to toward – the members of the putative class.
As compared to commonality, “the predominance criterion is far more demanding.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997). Predom inance requires not only that com mon questions of law or fact exist, but that they “predom inate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). This inquiry begins with an exam ination of the
4

substantive elements of the class clai ms (or, in this case, the claim s against the class) and the defenses raised. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981). As to each claimor defense, the Court must examine rigorously the proof required to substantiate the allegations and the form the proof will take at trial. Id.
There is no precise test for predom inance. On the one hand, the e xistence of individual issues does not necessarily defeat class certification. Id. Indeed, it is implicit in the predominance requirement as set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) that a certain number of individual issues may be present in a class action. On the other hand, a class action will not serve its intended purpose if it degenerates into separate trials on almost all elements of the claims against the class. Id. With that purpose in mind, the Court exercises its sound discretion to determine whether issues common to the class predominate over issues individual to each class member. See Retired Chicago Police, 7 F.3d at 596.
In this case, under the Ordinance, the City seeks to recover expenses for resources utilized as a result of Plaintiffs’ violations of the law. The City’s counterclaim alleges that Plaintiffs (both named class representatives and unnamed class members) committed violations of a number of state and local laws, including m arching without a perm it, disorderly conduct, obstruction of traffic, nuisance, reckless conduct and obstruction of roadways. (Mem. in Support of Mtn. for Class Cert. at p. 2). To certify a class of defendants to that counterclaim, the City must demonstrate, with respect to the elem ents of its claim under the Or dinance (violation, injury, and causation) that a common nucleus of facts will control the outcome.
The Court finds that the City cannot point to standardized unlawful conduct by the class members that would justify certification of a cl ass in this case. Indeed, Plaint iffs/CounterDefendants engaged in a wide variety of conduct: some organized the march; some participated in
5

the march from its inc eption; some joined the m arch before m archers were turned around at Michigan Avenue; some joined after; and some were merely bystanders who were never a part of the march. Some individuals sat in the street and others stood on the sidewalk. Some were aware that the group did not have a permit to march and some were not.
Under these facts, the alleged violations of law are not attributable to the group as a class. Some plaintiffs may not have committed any of the violations alleged by the City.1 For example, bystanders cannot be guilty of marching without apermit. Persons who only walked on the sidewalk could not have obstructed the roadways. Marchers who may have joined the march after the City turned the crowd around at Michigan Avenue may have been unaware of any orders frompolice and thus could not have violated those orders. Thus, even though it is a low hurdle, the Court finds that the City has not satisfied the commonality requirement in this case.
And even if there were questions common to the entire class of defendants, individual issues would no doubt predominate. Members of the putative class engaged in different conduct and would have different defense s to the City’s counter claim. Resolution of that counterclaim would degenerate into separate trials to determine – at least as a threshold matter – whether each individual plaintiff committed any violations of law (or was ever even a part of the march). Accordingly, the Court also finds that the City has not satisfied the predominance requirement in this case.
1Accordingly, certification of a class would allo w for the possibility that completely innocent bystanders might wind up liable for a portion of any judgment against the class on the City’s counterclaim. That possibility alone weighs heavily against class certification here.
6

Conclusion and Order Wherefore, the C ity’s Motion f or Class Certification of its Counterclaim Against Class Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants is denied.

So ordered.

Date: March 10, 2008

________________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge Northern District of Illinois

7

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

)

KEVIN VODAK et al, individually and on

)

behalf of others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff ,

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, FORMER

)

SUPERINTENDENT TERRY G. HILLARD; )

CHIEF PHILIP CLINE; CHIEF JERRY

)

ROBINSON, DEPUTY CHIEF TOM BYRNE, )

DEPUTY CHIEF RALPH CHICZEWSKI,

)

COMMANDER JOHN KILLACKY,

)

COMMANDER SAM CHRISTIAN,

)

COMMANDER DAVID DOHERTY,

)

COMMANDER MARIANNE PERRY,

)

COMMANDER JOHN R. RISLEY,

)

COMMANDER JOSEPH GRIFFIN,

)

COMMANDER DANIEL DUGAN,

)

COMMANDER CHARLES WILLIAMS,

)

LIEUTENANT KEVIN RYAN, LIEUTENANT )

NEIL SULLIVAN, LIEUTENANT DAVE

)

SOBSCYZK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY FRANK )

LIMON; FORMER ASSISTANT DEPUTY

)

SUPERINTENDENT RON HUBERMAN,

)

COUNSEL KAREN ROWAN, COUNSEL

)

THOMAS EPACH, JR., OFFICER BARKER, )

OFFICER BILYJ, OFFICER M. BLACK,

)

LIEUTENANT CARSON EARNEST,

)

OFFICER L COLEMAN, OFFICER E.

)

CORTEZ, OFFICER W. CLUCAS, OFFICER )

A. DAKURAS, OFFICER C. DECICCO,

)

OFFICER G. GAMBOA, OFFICER E.

)

GEDREKIS, OFFICER R. HAGEN, OFFICER )

L. HEISE, OFFICER D. HERRERA, OFFICER )

R. HUGHES, OFFICER HUNT, OFFICER K. )

JAROS, OFFICER JOHNSON, OFFICER A. )

KIZZIAH, OFFICER D. KOONIG, OFFICER )

T. LIEBER, OFFICER T. LOCONTE AND

)

OFFICER K. MCCLEARN,

)

)

Defendants .

)

Case No. 03 C 2463 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER On March 20, 2003, a large group of protestors gathered in Chicago’s federal plaza to demonstrate their disapproval of the United States’ m ilitary action in Iraq. The original group, numbered between five thousand and ten thousand, left the Federal Plaza and began to m arch northward. The protestors did not have a permit to assemble or to march. As the march proceeded, thousands more individuals joined the original group. Although the march proceeded on various streets at different times throughout the evening,the primary march proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive and approximately one to two thousand marchers eventually converged in the area of Chicago Avenue and Mies Van der Rohe Way. At some point, approximately 313 individuals were arrested within this area. They were charged with reckless conduct and transported to area police stations. Approximately 800 were detained in the area for a few hours. All of the cases were eventually dismissed. As a result, two f ederal cases were f iled against the Chicago Police Departm ent and individual officers: one involving individual plaintiffs (Beal v. City of Chicago, 04 C 2039) and a class action (Vodak v. City of Chicago, 03 C 2463). Both cases were subsequently transferred to this Court’s docket. On March 30, 2007, this Court granted in part and denied in part m otions for summary judgment in Beal. On January 5, 2009, this Court consolidated the two cases for trial due to the similarity of the issues, facts and law and for the efficient adjudication of the matters. The Vodak Plaintiffs and the City Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment.
The Parties The Class is represented by the following Plai ntiffs: Sarah Bergstrand (“Bergstrand”), Prudence Browne (“Browne”), Robert Castillo(“Castillo”), Patrick Donnell (“Donnell”), Matthew
2

Gaines (“Gaines”), Angela Garcia (“Garcia”), Kathleen Gruber (“Gruber”), Steven Hudosh
(“Hudosh”) Elizabeth Johnson (“Johnson”), Sophia Sieczowski (“Sieczowski”) and Kevin Vodak
(“Vodak”). Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 1. 1 These Plaintiffs represent a Class of people that was surrounded by
Chicago Police Department Officers on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue e ast of Michigan
Avenue and west of Mies Van De r Rohe Way. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 2. Th e class is divided into three
subclasses. Id. at ¶ 3. Subclass A-1 (represented by Browne, Gaines, Garcia, Johnson and
Sieczowski) consists of persons detained in the bounded area but not taken into cust ody. Id.
Subclass A-2 (represented by Bergstrand, Castillo, Donnell and Vodak) consists of per sons who
were taken into police custody but released without charges. Id. Subclass A-3 (represented by
Gruber and Hudosh) consists of persons taken intocustody and charged with a criminal offense. Id.
The Vodak action also includes Individual Plaintiffs who have elected not to join the class: Sharon
Ambielli (“Ambielli”), John Pennycuff (“Pennycuff” ), Daniel Pineda (“Pineda”), Aaron Robin
(“Robin”) and Brad Thom son (“Thomson”). Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 4. In addition to other claim s, these
individual Plaintiffs bring claims of violations oftheir Fourth Amendment rights subject to the same
analysis as those of the class members.
1 Throughout this Opinion, the Court references the Parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact as follows: Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Statement of Facts in support of their Motions for Sumary Judgment on their Fourth Am endment Claims and the City’s Counterclaim is referred to as “ Pl. 56.1"; Defendant Officers’ Statement of Facts in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment is referred to as Off. “56.1"; Plaintiffs’ Statem ent of Facts subm itted in response to the Offi cers’ Statement of Facts in support oftheir Motion for Summary Judgment is referred to as “Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1"; the City’s Statement of Facts in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell Claims is referred to as “City 56.1"; Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts filed in response to the City’s Statement of Facts in support of its Motionfor Summary Judgment is referred to as “Pl. Resp. City 56.1"; the City’s Supplemental Statement of Facts filed in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims is referred to as “City 2nd 56.1"; and the City’s Statement of Facts filed in response to Plaintiffs’ Consol idated Statement of Facts and in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim is referred to as “City Resp. 56.1.”
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Defendants are the City of Chicago and several Chicago Police Departm ent members, including both com mand personnel and of ficers: Former Superintendent Terry G . Hillard (“Superintendent Hillard”); Form er Police Chie f Philip Cline (“Cline”); Chief Jerry Robinson (“Chief Robinson”), Deputy Chief Tom Byrne (“Deputy Chief Byrne”), Deputy Chi ef Ralph Chiczewski (“Deputy Chief Chiczewski”), Commander John Killacky (“Commander Killacky”), Commander Sam Christian (“Commander Christian”), Commander David Dougherty (“Commander Dougherty”), Commander Marienne Perry (“Co mmander Perry”), Com mander John R. Ri sley (“Commander Risley”)2, Commander Joseph Griffin (“Commander Griffin”), Commander Daniel Dugan (“Commander Dugan”), Commander Charles Williams (“Commander Williams”), Lieutenant Kevin Ryan (“Lieutenant Ryan”), Lieutenant NeilSullivan (“Lieutenant Sullivan”), Lieutenant Dave Sobscyzk (“Lieutenant Sobscyzk”), Assistant Deputy Frank Limon (“Assistant Deputy Limon”), former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman (“Assistant De puty Superintendent Huberman”), counsel Karen Rowan (“counsel Ro wan”), counsel Thom as Epach, Jr. (“counsel Epach”), Officer Barker, Officer Bilyj, Officer M. Black (“Officer Black”), Lieutenant Carson Earnest (“Lieutenant Earnest”), Offi cer L. Co leman (“Officer Colem an”), Officer E. Cortez (“Officer Cortez”), Officer W. Clucas (“Officer Clucas”), Officer A. Dakuras (“Officer Dakuras”), Officer C. Deci cco (“Officer Decicco”), Officer G. Gam boa (“Officer Gam boa”), Officer E. Gedrekis (“Officer Gedrekis”), Officer R. Hagen (“Offi cer Hagen”), Officer L. Heise (“Officer Heise”), Officer D. Herrera (“Officer Herrera”) , Officer R. Hughes (“Offi cer Hughes”), Officer Hunt, Officer K. Jaros (“Officer Jaros”), Officer Johnson, Officer A. Kizziah (“Officer Kizziah”), Officer D. Koonig (“Officer Koonig”), Officer T. Lieber (“Officer Lieber”), Officer T. Loconte
2Commander Risley died in February 2009 before the completion of this matter. 4

(“Officer Loconte”), and Officer K. McClearn (“Officer McClearn”) (collectively the “Officer Defendants”). The Parties subsequently agreedto dismiss Officers Robinson, Christian, Dougherty, Sullivan, Limon, Perry and Hunt.
The Plaintiffs claimthat they were falsely arrested and imprisoned in violation of the Federal Constitution (Count I) and Illinois Constitution (CounVt II) as well as Illinois state law (Count VIII), that they were maliciously prosecuted (Count X), that the officers violated their First Amendment Rights (Count II), and that the officers conspired together to violate their rights (Count XI). The Individual Plaintiffs bring claims of Excessive Force (Count III), deliberate indifference to medical needs (Count IV), deprivation of property (Count Va)nd assault and battery (Count IX). In addition, Plaintiffs seek to hold the City liable undetrheories of municipal liability (Count VI) andrespondeat superior (Counts XII-XIII). The City brings a Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs seeking damages for the additional costs of providing government services incurred as a result of Plaintiffs’ violations of several municipal ordinances.
The parties now bring four Motions for Summary Judgment. The Defendant Chicago Police Department members bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Class Plaintiffs’ claim s alleging that they are entitled to qualified immunity and therefore are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth and First Amendment claims and also that Plaintiffs cannot set forth evidence to support their claims of civil conspiracy, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Defendant City of Chicago brings a Motion for Sum mary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim s of municipal liability, claiming that any unlawful arrests are not pursuantto a municipal policy or custom and were not a result of decisions made by a policymaker. Plaintiffs bring a Motion for Sum mary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims, claiming that they have established as a matter of law that the
5

Defendant Officers arrested them without probable cause, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim , claiming that there is no e vidence that the Plaintiffs violated or intentionally violated any law and that they did not proximately cause any damages the City may have suffered. For the reasons stated below, Defendant Chicago Police Depa rtment Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims is denied, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim is granted.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike As an initial m atter, Plaintiffs bring a Mo tion to Stri ke Defendant Officers’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike several statements of fact therein discussing civil disobedience training that took place prior to the demonstration at issue and to strike three exhibits submitted in the record: 1) a flyer proposing “Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the War;” 2) a transcript of Chicago Police Department radio transmissions; and 3) an account of the protest distributed on ChicagoIndymedia - Webcast News. The Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant Officers’ Statement of Facts should be stricken because it violates Local Rule 56. Specifically, many supposed “statements” are lengthy paragraphs actually containing several statements of fact. Although this Court declines tostrike the Officers’ Statement of Facts as a whole, where more than one discrete issue was included within a paragraph, the Court strikes the surplus statements. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005) (“a district court doe s not abuse its discretion when, in im posing a penalty for a litigant’s non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1, the c ourt chooses to ignore and not consider the
6

additional facts that a litigant has proposed”); Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (“a district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1”).
Plaintiffs next argue that this C ourt should not consider various statem ents addressing training in or a history of practice of civil disobedience on the partof the Plaintiffs or organizations involved in the demonstration. To the extent thatany one of the Officersknew or was aware of the Plaintiffs’ prior practice of civil disruption or violence and it was take n into account when determining a course of action on the night of the march it is relevant and is considered by the Court.
Plaintiffs move to strike Defenda nt Officers’ Exhibit 23, a flyer entitled “ Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the War ,” arguing that Defendants cannot attribute the production of t he leaflet to any Plaintiff or Class Member. Defendant Officers put forth, however, factual statements establishing that the leaflet was distributed both atmeetings of organizations involved in the protest and at the rally in the Plaza. As such, the Court will consider the flyer as evidence of the tenor of the demonstration, which is relevant to the Court’s consideration of the re asonableness of the officer’s actions.
Plaintiffs move to strike Defendant Officer s Exhibit 38, a transcript of Chicago Police Department radio transm issions made during the protest, arguing that the tra nscript does not adequately identify the speakers and that the communications m ade therein were not under oath. Defendant Officers provided a list of radio identifi cation codes that allows identif ication of the speakers on the transcript and note that this list,along with the actual recordings, were produced to Plaintiffs. In addition, Defendants submit Commander Griffin’s affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the recordings and the transcript. The Courftinds that the Officers’ submission provides adequate authentication of the transcript and thus denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.
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Lastly, Plaintiffs move to strike an accountof the protest distributed on Chicago Indymedia Webcast News. The parties agree that no authorof the posting has been identified. The Motion to Strike is granted as to this posting because the unidentified individual’s account of the ma rch is hearsay and irrelevant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Chicago’s Ordinances Regulating Public Demonstrations

Chicago Municipal Code § 10-8-330 requires demonstrators to obtain a permit if they wish

to march in the street. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 7. Chief Maurer assumes that a public demonstration will

result in a march. Id. at ¶ 18. On occasion, Chicago Police Department command personnel have

allowed demonstrators to march in the street without a perm it. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17. In the past,

when the Chicago Police Department has permitted marchers to march without a permit, they have

used the “standard” route of Dearborn Street. Off.56.1 at ¶ 31. According to Chief Cline, a person

who marches where he is ordered to do so by police is not committing a crime. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 21.

Regardless, both permitted and non-permitted marches cause inconvenience and obstruct

traffic. Id. at ¶ 20. The City, for example, seeks to hold Plaintiffs liable for: 1) failure to obtain a

permit to march in violation of Section 10-8-330(b)of the municipal code; 2) committing disorderly

conduct by acting in an unreasonable m anner such as to alarm or disturb another and promote a

breach of the peace or as to provoke or aid in making a breach of the peace; 3) hindering or

disrupting traffic on the streets of downtown Ch icago in violation of Section 9-80-180 of the

municipal code; 4) committing state public nuisance violations by obstructing or encroaching on

public highways, private ways, streets and alleysin violation of 720 ILCS 5/47-5(5); 5) committing

reckless conduct by obstructing public streets and highways in a reckless m

anner and by

8

endangering the bodily safety of motorists and pedestrians in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-5(a); 7) crossing roadways at points other than those withinmarked crosswalks in violation of Section 9-60050 of the municipal code; 7) failing to yield to vehicles in roadways when crossing outside of the marked crosswalks in violation of Section 9-60-050(a) of the Municipal Code; and 8) obstructing the passage of vehicles crossing the Chicago River on Lake Shore Drive in violation of Municipal Ordinance 10-40-55. City Resp. 56.1 at ¶ 2.
The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants admit that no person obtained a permit to assemble or to march on March 20, 2003, and likewise, no person obtained a permit to authorize closure of Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
Preparation for the Demonstration The Chicago Coalition Against War and Racism (“CCAWR”) planned the demonstration against the war in Iraq that took place in Chicago on March 20, 2003. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 3. CCAWR planned the demonstration several months in advance and wanted it to begin in the Federal Plaza (“Plaza”) the day following the start of U.S. bombing in Iraq. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. The organizers discussed obtaining a permit and Organizer Ro mero believed that Organizer Andy Thayer (“Thayer”) looked into getting a permit but could notget one because they did not know the specific date for which they would need the permit. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Prior to the march, CCAWR held planning meetings during which protesters Beckstromand Nicotera provided civil disobedience training. Id. at ¶ 19, 21. An undercover Chicago Police Department officer present at these m eetings heard some organizers discussing a plan to be disruptive on Michigan Avenue and for groups to break off from the main group in order to divert
9

police. Id. at ¶ 11. In addition, he heard CCAW R members discuss var ious property crim es, obstructive conduct and outrageous conduct such as breaking windows. Id. at ¶ 23.
A flyer entitled Welcome to Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the Warwas distributed at a coalition meeting prior to the march and to marchers on the Federal Plaza on the day of the march. Id. at 17. The flyer targeted Lake Shore DriveM, ichigan Avenue, Chicago Avenue, Oak Street and several businesses and foreign consulates on Michiga n Avenue. Id. at ¶ 17. In addition, it encouraged “screwing up traffic” and “turning off their profit spigots.” Id. at 33. The Chi cago Police Department was aware of the flyer prior to the dem onstration. Id. at ¶ 32. In addition, a leaflet advertising the demonstration and encouraging civil disobedience was distributed to some members of the demonstration. Id. at ¶ 20.
Chicago Police Department Command Personnel planned and were prepared for the march on the day after the United States began to bomb Iraq, which turned out to be March 20, 2003. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 23-24. They anticipated that therewould be in excess of 5000 demonstrators. Id. at ¶ 24. Command Personnel did not discuss whether the group had a perm it to march or whether they should order them to disperse from the Federal Plaza because they did not have a permit to gather. Id. at ¶ 28.
Then-Superintendent Hillard directed the police planning for the demonstration. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 29. Commander Radke, the Deputy Chief of Special Functions at the time, met with command staff to determine the number of officers needed to respond to potential problem s. Id. at ¶ 30. According to Commander Radke and Lieutenant Neil Sullivan’s plan, First District Police were assigned to the Plaza, while Gang and Tactical units were on standby. Id. at ¶ 31- 32. The Chicago Police Department was prepared for the possibility of multiple arrests. Id. at ¶ 34.
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The Demonstration Begins in the Federal Plaza The Federal Plaza filled with somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 demonstrators by 5 p.m. on March 20, 2003. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 262-7. Superintendent Hillard warned the demonstrators before the rally that they would be prosecuted for any property dam age. Id. at ¶ 31. At the Plaza, the protest leaders used a public address systemto address the crowd, but they did not announce a march route. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 35. Although Deputy Chief Byrne knew that the organizers had not obtained a permit, he was prepared to facilitate a march. Id. at ¶ 37. The demonstrators and police did not discuss the lack of a permit or an order to disperse at this time. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 28. As the rally continued, Commander Risley spoke with Thayer, a march leader, and others about a potential march route, but they did not provide him with details. Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 36, 38. As a result, Commander Risley decided to shut down traffic.Id. at ¶ 40. Deputy Chief Byrne similarly attempted to clear squad cars from State Street so that a march could proceed. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 30. Command Personnel believed that the organizers had planned a march route in advance and were attempting to evade police. Thayer knew he wanted to march on Lake Shore Drive but not how he wanted to get there. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 43 He stated that “our goal all along was to take Lake Shore Drive.” Id. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Deputy Chief Byrnetold Commander Griffin to takehis officers to the Leo Burnett Building, located at Dearborn Street and Wacker Drive, because “it looked like this group was going to m arch down Dearborn.” Id. at ¶ 41. Past dem onstrations had marched north on Dearborn to Wacker and then west on Wacker. Id. Before the marchers stepped off the Plaza, however, Thayer told Commander Risley that they wanted to go east on Adams. Id. at ¶ 42; Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 29. As such, Lieutenant Oliver poistioned a mounted unit north of Adams on Dearborn
11

to prevent the marchers from going north. Off.56.1 at ¶ 42. Commander Risley ordered that traffic be stopped at Adam s so that m archers could go east. Id. at ¶ 45. Chicago Police Departm ent officers did not order the m archers to leave the area nor did the y prevent them from leaving the Plaza. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 29, 31-33.
The March Leaves the Plaza The marchers proceeded from the Federal Plaza in two groups - one proceeding e ast on Jackson and the other east on Adams. Id. at ¶ 34. Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huberman heard radio communications reflecting surprise that the marchers had left the Plaza in two groups. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 46. Thayer later boasted that “The po lice were caught flatfooted” by the two groups of marchers. Id. at ¶ 47. Throughout the march, the organizers communicated with each other by radio. Id. at ¶ 47. Lieutenant Oliver set up a mounted unit to block marchers from proceeding east on Adams. Id. at ¶ 52. As a result, the marchers then turned north on S tate Street, and Lieutenant Oliver positioned his unit at Monroe and State in order to stop their progress north.Id. at ¶ 52; Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 40. The m archers stopped at State and Monroe becam e unruly and began scream ing, hitting windows with sticks and chanting “Lake Shore Driv e!” Off. 56.1 at ¶ 55. The horses in the line became jittery and two were eventually rem oved from duty due to the actions of the surging protesters. Id. As a large crowd built at State and Monroe, Commander Radke gestured f or Lieutenant Oliver’s mounted unit to move aside. Id. at ¶ 54-55; Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 41. Eve ntually, the portion of the marchers proceeding on Jackson met with a police line and turned north on Michigan until they met up with the Adams Street demonstrators. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 49.
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Chicago Police Department officers followed alongside the marchers, walked in front of the crowd and monitored the march. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 35. They proceeded in a single-file line on the side of the march as it proceeded through the streets in order to prevent marchers from walking on the sidewalk. Id. at ¶ 37. The police directed traffic and helped the demonstrators move in an orderly fashion. Id. at ¶¶ 230-31.
The March Enters Lake Shore Drive Commander Risley eventually allowed the marchers to proceed northbound onto Lake Shore Drive and therefore made arrangements to stop traffic on Lake Shore Drive. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 57. He specifically directed a number of marchers to march onto Lake Shore Drive. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 42-43. Similarly, Commander Griffin told an unknown i ndividual on Lake Shore Drive who identified himself as the demonstrators’ leader that the demonstrators should be told that they could march on Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 52. Command Personnel stood at the intersection of Monroe and Lake Shore Drive as the demonstrators passed. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. The police eventually closed northbound Lake Shore Drive entirely. Id. at ¶ 54. As the march proceeded north, southbound traffic on Lake Shore Drive was crawling while northbound traffic was completely stopped. Off. 56.1 a t ¶ 64. Commander Dougherty and counsel Rowan directedand rerouted traffic on lower Wacker Drive due to safety concerns arising from the protestors’ presence on Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 67. While on Lake Shore Drive, some protestors stood on the fronts or backs of cars, banged on cars and yelled at occupants. Id. at ¶ 70. Other protestors did notengage in disruptive conduct. Id. at ¶ 61. Many protestors crossed the cement median to enter the Southbound lanes. Id. at ¶ 63. The protestors that crossed onto southbound Lake Shore Drive pounded on cars, yelled and frightened a motorist and engaged in disruptive behaviorincluding banging on doorsand windows of cars and
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breaking off antennae. Id. at ¶ 65-66. Twenty or thirty protestors shook or jumped on cars and at least one verbal confrontation occurred between a protester and a motorist. Id. at ¶¶ 67-69.
Commander Griffin periodically slowed down the demonstration as it proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive in order to keep the marchers together. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 51. He instructed Lieutenant Ryan to m ove the dem onstrators who be gan marching in the southbound lanes back to the northbound lanes. Some complied with Lieutenant Ryan’s request while others refused and ran around the police. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 72. The police st opped the crowd and f ormed a skirmish line around Grand Avenue, where it would be difficult for protesters to cross into the southbound Lanes. Id. at 72-73. Some protestors attempted to push past the officers; some screamed and threw bottles and rocks at police.Id. Commander Griffin asked an unidentified individual who identified himself as a march leader to help calm the crowd. Id. at ¶ 74.
The March Approaches Oak Street As the march proceeded north on Lake ShoreDrive, Commander Griffin had a conversation with a self-identified (but unidentified) march leader wherein the leader said that he wanted to exit Lake Shore Drive at North Avenue and that he would help get all the protestors to North Avenue. Protestors Thayer and Beckstom stated that they did not have such a conversation. Id. at ¶¶ 76-79. As the crowd approached Oak Street, the self-identified leader who had spoken with Commander Griffin disappeared back into the crowd. Commander Griffin got the impression that something was wrong and radioed for suppor t at Oak and Michigan. Id. at ¶ 80. Thayer told the people in front of the march that they could exit Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street and told the other organizers via two-way radio to exit Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street. Id. at ¶¶ 81-82. Leaders then
14

told their followers: “Let’s go down Michigan Avenue.” Id. The marchers did not tell police that they would turn onto Oak Street. Id. at ¶ 82.
Police tried to stop the marchers by instructing them to go to North Avenue. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 84. Some complied; most did not. Id. Police officers ran to the intersection of Oak and Michigan and formed a skirmish line. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86. Some of the protestors were “very confrontational” with the skirmish line and threatened to “storm” Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. Protestors jumped up and down on a squad car, tried to set it on fire and wrote on its windows with markers. Id. at ¶ 90. Deputy Chief Byrne told marcher Romero to disperse and told him that the police would not let the protestors onto Michigan. Id. at ¶ 91.
Some protestors believed that the police had guided them onto Oak. Vodak observed a line of police officers blocking progresson Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street as the marchers turned down Oak Street. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 272. Hudosh saw police direct marchers west on Oak. Id. at ¶ 303. Ambielli, similarly, simply followed all the marchers turning onto Oak from Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 318. Thompson could not see the front of themarch as it exited at Oak and thus just followed the crowd. Id. at ¶ 366.
Command Personnel met at Oak and Michigan and discussed where the marchers should be allowed to proceed from there. Id. at ¶ 59. They decided to speak to the leaders to see what the demonstrators wanted. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 92. Com manders Griffin and Risley m et with Thayer and others, and Thayer told the themthat theprotesters wanted to march down Michigan.Id. Risley told Thayer that they could not march down Michigan Avenue, but rather they needed to go back down Lake Shore Drive, disperse or be arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 96. Thayer then yelled to the crowd to “turn around and go that way. They won’t let us go down Michigan.” Id. at ¶ 98. In addition, C hief
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Maurer heard organizers announce to “go back the way you cam e” through voice amplification devices and thought the message was passed backwards through the crowd. Id. Protesters Garcia and Galvin heard others in the crowd saying to go back on Lake Shore Drive.Id. at ¶ 100. Protester Newberger heard other protesters announcing to go back the way they came on bullhorns. Id. at ¶¶ 99, 101. Eventually Protester Wolf made an announcement on a PA systemto go back down Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. Pineda heard an announcement that if he remained at Oak and Michigan he would be arrested. Id. at ¶ 103.
Although Plaintiffs concede that Command Personnel’s decision that they should return to the Plaza th e way they came was communicated, they claim it w as communicated in a conversational tone to five or six individuals a nd that any directions were not heard by the entire crowd. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 63, 65. One pr otester heard a “rumor through the crowd” that the police wanted them to go back to the Federal Plaza via Inner Lake Shore Drive. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 100. In addition, the demonstrators were not told a specific route to take to leave the area. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 64. Many of the Plaintiffs did not hear any directions and simply followed the crowd when it turned to go south on Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 163 198-99, 235, 245, 274-76, 304, 319-20, 356-57, 368.
The March Returns Down Inner Lake Shore Drive Rather than return down Inner Lake Shore Drive, som e of the protesters left through the nearby underground pedestrian tunnel. Off. 56.1 at 1¶04. Some people were allowed to leave in very small groups down Michigan Avenue. Id. The rest of the marchers headed east down Inner Lake Shore Drive where Chief Cline told mounted officers to flank the crowd. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 68.
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As the march proceeded south on Inner Lake Shore Drive, Commander Griffin asked the mounted unit to prevent marchers from going west on the side streets off of the Inner Drive such as Walton, Pearson, Delaware and Chestnut. Off.56.1 at ¶ 106; Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 71. Commander Dugan’s unit followed the march down Inner Lake Shore Drive at a considerable distance. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 117. He was told they had agreed to go down Inner Lake Shore Drive and was “following up” to make sure they did so. Id.
Some groups of protesters attempted to turn west from Inner Lake Shore Drive in order to proceed westbound on those streets.See, e.g., Id. at ¶ 106, 111, 113. Commander Griffin led officers east on Walton Street to stop at least one such group of about 50 males in their late teens to early twenties and returned to Inner Lake Shore Drive to find a group of about 150 that he also thought was attempting to “break out.” Id. at ¶ 107. Another group tried to run down De laware, and in response, Commander Griffin again told the marchers that they could not go to Michigan Avenue but rather had to march down Lake Shore Drive or be arrested. Id. at ¶ 110.
The March Reaches Chicago Avenue The Defendant Officers attempted to block protesters at each successive side street when the march got ahead of them and broke westbound on Chicago Avenue toward Michigan Avenue. See Id. at ¶ 124. Commander Griffin yelled at the marchers not to go that way and eventually ran toward Michigan Avenue. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 72. Lieutenant Ryan and other officers tried to stop the marchers on Chicago Avenue but were ignored. Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 126-127. While some protestors broke from the main group and turned west down Chicago Avenue, many continued to proceed down Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 118-119. One protestor
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estimates that while there were eight to ten thousnad protesters at Oak Street and Michigan Avenue, there were only about one to two thousand atChicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ 121.
Some demonstrators thought that the police had led them onto Chicago Avenue and some just followed the crowd without knowledge of where the police directed them. Bergstrand simply followed the crowd as did Pennycuff. Pl. 56.1 at¶¶ 236, 337. Vodak saw police on horses leading the crowd down Chicago Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 277-78. Gruber also thought the police were directing the crowd westbound on Chicago Avenue because of the position of the horses at the intersection of Chicago and Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 287, 289. Pineda thought police were blocking Lake Shore Drive and directing people onto Chicago Avenue. Id. at ¶ 368. Thomson said that the police did not indicate to demonstrators what they should or should not be doing. Id. at ¶ 371. Johnson saw mounted police at the intersection with Chci ago Avenue who looked like they were guiding the march onto Chicago; so Johnson proceeded onto Chicago. Id. at ¶¶ 201-02.
The Chicago Police Department does not allowlarge marches on Michigan Avenue fromthe Chicago River to Oak Street because of the disruption that results. Id at ¶ 97. Chief Cline ordered officers to form a line at Chicago and Michigan to prevent marchers from going West of Chicago or north or south on Michigan. Id. at ¶ 75. Police set up a skirmish line across Chicago Avenue that stopped the marchers east of Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ ¶ 76-78. Com mander Griffin ordered Commander Williams, an off-duty officer who came to the scene with others to help, to also block the east end of the crowd to prevent anyone fromleaving to the east; so he set up a line to the East. Id. at ¶¶ 78-79; Off. 56.1 at ¶ 150.
The Police Stop the Marchers at Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue
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Commander Williams began to allow individual people to leave the area ten or f ifteen minutes after establishing his line. Of f. 56.1 at ¶ 151. Many protesters ref used to go. A young woman asked Chief Maurer why she could notleave and he told her that she could.Id. at ¶ 153. In response, she conferred with someone with a bullhorn and then sat down in the streetI.d. Similarly, a woman with a dog asked counsel Epach if she could go home and feed her dog, and Chief Cline replied “come with me.” Id. at ¶ 154. In response, she conferred with an organizer and told Chief Cline that she could not leave. Id. A man in his sixties asked counsel Rowan if he could leave and when she said yes, he responded “forget it.” Id. at ¶ 186.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, allege that nobody was allowed to leave the bounded area for at least an hour. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶79-82. Bergstrand could not maneuver anywhere on Chicago Avenue and therefore could not get out. Id. at ¶ 238. Police told Donnell to elave at the corner of a building to the north, but when he proceeded there he was not allowed to go through the police line. Id. at ¶¶ 264-67. Gruber asked four or five police officerswhere she could leave and was finally told that she could not. Id. at ¶¶ 291-92. According to Hudosh, police on the west side of the crowd told people they could leave by walking east, and police on the east side of the crowd told people they could leave by walking west. Id. at ¶ 305. Hudosh finally asked police in the front of the march if he could leave, and they said no.Id. at ¶ 306. Ambielli also asked police officers whether she could leave three separate times and was told that she could not because the they had been told not to let anyone go. Id. at ¶¶ 325-27. Pineda also could not leave simply because there were so many people crowding the area. Id. at ¶ 352. Robin attempted to walk away from the police line on Michigan in order to leave but saw that a police line had also been formed behind him and therefore thought he was trapped. Id. at ¶ 360.
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Some of the protesters at Chicago and Michiagn were banging on threeor four cars. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 133. Lieutenant Ryan assisted officers struglging with a protester who was kicking while others were trying to pull him into the crowd. Id. at ¶ 135. Another protester hit Lieutenant Ryan with a skateboard and ran away.Id. Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huberman characterized the behavior on Chicago Avenue as “mob action.” Id. at ¶ 137. Some protestors were spitting and kicking what “appeared to be horse crap” at officers and othres were climbing on a CTA bus and banging on cars. Id. at ¶ 138. However, after the Chicago Police Department lines were set up, Chief Cline walked back past the crowd on the sidewalk and was notharassed nor did he see any property damage. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 17. Lt. BryanMartin of the Chicago Fire Department saw some cars and a bus stopped in front of the firehouse blocking access to the fire station. Id. at ¶ 191.
Chicago Police Departm ent members including Chiefs Cline and M aurer, Commanders Griffin and Risley and Counsel Rowan were pr esent at Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue shortly after the marchers arrived. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 24. They conferred and decided to give the marchers the options of dispersing, going backto Lake Shore Drive, or being arrested.Id. Chief Byrne discussed with Chiefs Cline and Maurer what they needed in order to arrest individuals and together they decided to begin arrests.Id. at ¶ 12. Chiefs Byrne, Cline and Maurer and Commanders Griffin and Risley gave orders to arrest . Id. at ¶ 13. Commander Griffin decided to start making arrests around 8:35 p.m . based upon t he communications with the dem onstrators at Oak and Michigan that they would not be allowed on Michigan. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 94. He did not instruct officers to provide individuals an opportunityto leave before making arrests. Id. Chief Maurer ordered the arrests on the west end of the crowd. Id. at ¶ 96. Superint endent Hillard was advised about and agreed with the decision to m ake arrests. Deputy Chi ef Chiczewski instructed Com mander
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Christian regarding the arrests on the eastern end of the demonstration. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 15. After the arrests were underway, Chiefs Cline and Maurer and counsels Rowan and Epach began discussions of what charges to bring against the arrestees. Id. at ¶ 18.
Prior to effectuating the arrests, Chief Cline never witnessed or was aware of orders to disperse given at the bounded area. Pl. 56.1 at¶ 85. Commander Williams never heard, nor did he and his officers issue, any order to disperse. Id. at ¶ 86. Commander Christian was not told to give orders to disperse. Id. at ¶ 87. Commander Dugan also did not hear any orders to disperse and did not observe officers telling people they had to leave. Id. at ¶ 88. Sergeant Maraffino and his team never told anyone to disperse and were directedto arrest and not allow people to leave. Id. at ¶ 89. Officer Bilyj also did not hear an order telling the crowd to disperse before he was directed to go into the crowd and bring out fem ales for arrest. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 90. He did not allow any of the individuals he arrested an opportunity to leave the area prior to arresting them. Id. at ¶ 91. Officer Rodriguez was not told why the crowd was to be arrested and he did not give individuals an opportunity to leave before being arrested. Id. at ¶ 92.
Plaintiffs put forth sworn affidavits of 250 class members stating that they were prevented from leaving the bounded area and that they were not given orders to disperse nor an opportunity to leave. Pl. Resp. Off. at ¶ 1. The named Class Plaintiffs testified similarly. Although Castillo was told to leave, he was arrested as he attempted to do so. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 2555- 6. In addition, he did not hear police communicating with the crowd. Id. at ¶ 254. Vodak did not receive an order to disperse. Id. at ¶ 283. Gruber testified that no police officer ever approached her and told her she would be arrested if she did not leave the area. Id. at ¶ 293. Hudosh did not hear an order to disperse at any point in the night. Id. at ¶ 307. In fact, he testified that police told him that the march would be
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allowed to continue in ten to fifteen minutes. Id. at ¶ 308. Ambielli heard no announcements from the police. Id. at ¶ 328. Pennycuff was told to leave, but was arrested as soon as he attempted to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 339-40. Pi neda did not receive any communications from police and was not ordered to disperse. Id. at ¶ 353. Robin testi fied that the police did not order people to disperse before arresting them. Id. at ¶ 360. Thomson similarly did not receive any instructions from police before he was arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 372-73.
Multiple officers gave orders to disperse or heard orders to disperse given individually prior to arrest, yelled, or broadcasted over amplification devices. Lieutenant Riccio’s group asked people if they wanted to leave at the point of poten tial arrest. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 198. Deputy Chief Byr ne repeatedly shouted to those at the police line to disperse and protesters responded by sitting down and locking arms. Id. at ¶ 142. Chief Maurer saw police “pass the word” that if the protesters did not go back the way they came, they would be arrested.Id. at ¶ 152. Pursuant to an order fromChief Maurer, Deputy Superintendent Huberman directed officers to give protestors the opport unity to disperse and place them into custody if they refused. Id. at ¶ 155. He saw officers enter the crowd and do so, and he saw a few people resist arrest. Id. Officer Mendoza heard orders to disperse and heard a protester respond over a bullhorn that the police could not make them leave. Id. at ¶ 166. Commander Radke announced orders to disperse and saw protesters sit in the street and lock arms. Id. at ¶ 170. He also heard dispersal orders announced from a squadrol behind the western skirmish line, although he was unsure of the exte nt to which all members of the demonstration could hear such an order. Id. at ¶ 171. De puty Chief Byrne saw severa l officers give dispersal orders. He ordered the arrests of those in the middle of Chicago Avenue and people who wanted to leave were
22

allowed to proceed east. Id. at ¶ 172. See also, Id. at ¶¶ 234, 236, 173, 175, 174, 179-80, 219-220, 222-224, 226-28.
Police arrested people on both the streets and thesidewalk. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 29. After about five hundred individuals were arrested, Chiefs Cline and Maurer decided to stop the arrests if people agreed to leave in small groups. Id. at ¶ 19; Off. 56.1 at ¶ 200. Once the arrests stopped, the command staff went into the crowd and gave orders to disperse. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 204. Counsel Epach and Chief Cline went into the crowd to aid in an orderly dispersal. Id. at ¶ 201. Chief Cline did not know of any arrests that occurred after this point. Id.
As the remaining marchers left, Lieutenant Ryan’s unit m onitored larger groups and he directed sergeants to m ake arrests if those groups reform ed rather than dispersed. Id. at ¶ 204. Commander Williams allowed groups as large as eight or ni ne to leave together. Id. at ¶ 205. General Counsel Rowan sent an officer to Walgreens to buy markers with which officers could write the arresting officer’s star number on arrestees’ arms. Id. at ¶ 206.
After Commander Christian was advised to stop making arrests, the officers at the east end of the area created a chute through which individuals could leave. Police informed the protestors that they could leave if they did so peacefully. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 102. Sergeant Boone supervised the chute. Id. Police took the marchers’ signs from them as they left through the chute. Id. at ¶¶ 10304. Protesters were let through the chute in a staggered manner; that is, the flow was intermittently stopped, and at the end of the night, the remaining people were released on the street. Id. at ¶¶ 10809.
The arrestees were transported to various police districts. City Re sp. 56.1 at ¶ 9. All the female arrestees were transported to the Twenty-Fif th District in Area 5. Id. The police
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department incurred overtime costs in order tocomplete the processing of the arrestees. Id. at ¶ 10. Male arrestees were sent to the Fifth District for processing, which was overseen by John Roberts, and officers from the detective division ca me to assist in processing. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Such processing of arrestees included preparing arrestand other supporting documents, health screening, searching, photographing, fingerprinting and conducting a criminal history of arrestees. Id. at ¶ 13.
Problems with the Records of Arrests Chief Cline discussed potential charges with Chief Maurer, and counsels Rowan and Epach. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 18. Rowan and Epach conferred with each other and Epach conferred with Assistant State’s Attorney Darren O’Brien a nd ASA Patrick McGuire and Corporation Counsel Dorothy Capers to determine the most appropriate charge for the arrestees. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 207. They discussed the elements of potential chargesand the appropriateness of potential sanctions.Id. They decided that the appropriate charge was reckless conduct. Id. at 208. Three hundred thirteen individuals were arresetd and all were charged with reckless conduct. Pl. 56.1 at 119. Two hundred and twenty-f our had arrest reports com pleted on them but were released without charges because their arresting officers could not be identified. Id. at ¶ 117. Two hundred and forty seven arrest reports for arrested m ales contained an identical narrative: “The above subject was arrested for Reckless Conduct inthat he endangered the bodily safety of citizens by acting in such a reckless manner so as to disrupt vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic. The defendant acted with total disregard for the personal safety of motorists and pedestrians.” Id. at ¶ 121. Seventy-one other arrest report s for males contained the same statement without the words “bodily” or “pedestrian traffic.” Id. at ¶ 123. One hundred sixty-eighat rrest reports for females also contained an identical narrative: “The subject along with 1000's of persons endangered the safety
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of others in that they blocked access to a fire station, positioned themselves in front of the water pumping station and blocked access to the emergency entrance of Northwestern Hospital and refused to leave after being told to do so by police.” Id. There is no emergency entrance to Northwestern Hospital located on Chicago Avenue betweenLake Shore Drive and Michigan Avenue.Id. at ¶ 124. In addition, ten arrest reports for females taken into custody state “above subject assembled with 100's of persons to do unlawful acts and refused to disperse when ordered to do so,” and six state “assembled with numerous other persons to do an unlawful act by refusing to disperse upon public order.” Id. at ¶¶ 125-26. Rowan testified that she thoughtthe arrest narratives adequately described each protester’s conduct. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 208.
The Chicago Police Department’s General Order for Mass Arrest Procedures states that an arresting officer must complete a multiple arrest card for each arrestee. Officers failed to complete such cards for individuals arrested at Chicago and Michigan. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 128-29. No Chicago Police Department members have been identified that can specifically testify to the conduct of any of the Class Plaintiffs or the Individual Plaintiffs other than the fact that they were present at the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ ¶ 111-114. Chicago Police Department witnesses claim to have particular knowledge of the behavior of approximately 59 of the 313 individuals arrested and charged. Id. at ¶ 120.
Officer Black is listed as the arresting o fficer on twenty-five reports, but he does not remember arresting more than five people, nor does he rem ember any specific information as to those he arrested. Id. at ¶ 131. He m ade arrests solely on information provided to him by a supervisor. Id. at ¶¶ 132-33. Officer Laurence Colem an’s name appears on seven arrest reports
25

although he did not observe any of the arrestees do anything illegal - when he first saw them they were handcuffed on Chicago avenue. Id. at ¶ 134.
Names of officers who did not arrest anyone, were not at C hicago and Michigan or were even off-duty or retired also appear on arrest reports. Id. at ¶¶ 135-139, 145-146. Officer FigeroaMitchell’s name appears on sixteen arrest reports when she was at Area Fi ve police headquarters the evening of the march and not at Chicago and Michigan. Id. at ¶ 135. Officer Kam al Judeh’s name appears on Class Plaintiff Hudosh’s arrest report, but Judeh was not on duty when he was arrested. Id. at ¶ 136. Assistant Deputy Superintendent McNulty’s name appeared on one hundred seventy-five arrest reports, although he was only on tehscene for three to five minutes, did not recall witnessing any arrests, and did notobserve what individual arrestees did prior to being arrested.Id. at ¶¶ 142, 144. McNulty authorized his name to be put on reports for individuals whose arresting officers could not be identified. Id. at ¶ 143.
Counsel Epach thought that the original arrests were made “in haste” and when he learned that Chicago Police Department was unable to identify many arresting officers, he advised Chief Cline to let the relevant arrestees go. Of f. 56.1 at ¶ 209. In addition, when he learned that some arresting officers signed the nam es of other uni nvolved officers on arrest reports, he advised assistant state’s attorney McGuire to throw those cases out. Id. at ¶ 211.
Investigation After the March The Plaintiffs assert that the m arch was on the whole peaceful. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 153. Superintendent Hillard assigned Detective Tony Jinto interview all the supervisors who were on the scene. Jin prepared a report detailing the results of his investigationI.d. at ¶¶ 148-49. He identified
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damage to two cars - one a police department vehicle and one belonging to a civilian. No one was
arrested or identified as responsible for the damage. Id. at ¶¶ 150-51. Jin did not report property
damage to any federal building or adjoining property. Id. at ¶ 152.
General Chicago Police Department Training Programs3
The Chicago Police Department is certified by the State of Illinois to train police officers
since 1985. City 56.1 at ¶ 12. In or der to be certified, the Department is required by statute to
comply with rules and minimum standards adopted by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and
Standards Board which has reviewed the Department’s curriculum and approved it since 1985. Id.
at ¶¶ 12-13. The Departm ent’s Education and Training Division trained on average over 500
officers per year in the three years before Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 11.
In 2003, the State required that each police recruit com plete a curriculum of 400 hours of
training, which the Chicago Police Department exceeded by giving its recruits over 1,000 hours of
training. Id. at ¶ 15. Specifically, the Chicago Poli ce Department required forty-one hours of
physical skills and personal fitness, sixty-three hoursof control and arrest tactics, whereas the state
required only twenty-four and twenty hours, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Recruits were given
periodic exams as well as a fifteen question exam regarding the use of force on which each recruit
3 In paragraphs 26-31 oftheir Statement of Additional Facts, addressing the Superintendent’s authority over the operations of the Chicago Police Department, Plaintiffs cite to a deposition in a completely different matter. A deposition taken in an earlier action “may be used in a later action involving the same subject matter between the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(8). This requirement has not been met. Indeed, Plaintiffs include no notation indicating to the Court whether the Rule’s requirements have been m et nor any documentation with the exception of short deposition excerpts. See Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Baltes, 15 F.3d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 1994) (lawyer did not make any effort to show the relationship between the parties and other cases). As such, the Court strikes these statements of fact and does not consider them in its decision.
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must obtain a perfect score. Recruits werer also given a comprehensive final exam at the end of their training. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. Recruits were required to pass the final exam and the operations simulation test in order to become police officers. Id.
Officers already certified and assigned to unitsalso received training known as “In-Service Training.” Id. at ¶ 24. Part of this training was “Roll Call Training,” which officers were required to attend on a daily duty basis. Id. at ¶¶ 23-25. Roll Call Training consisted mainly of lectures and instructional videos viewed via computer. Id. at ¶ 26. Chicago Police Departm ent written directives, such as General Orders and Special Orders, were also distributed duri ng Roll Call Training. Id. at ¶ 29.
In 2003, Chicago Police Department officers were governed by Chicago Poliec Department’s Rules and Regulations, General Orders, Special Orders and other written directives, and it was Chicago Police Department’s practice to enforce these directives. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. All members of the Department were required to have knowledge ofall Department and unit written directives that apply to their positions at all times relevant to the Complaint. Id. at ¶ 30. Officers could also access the written directives and stream ing videos at any police district. City Id. at ¶ 31. Any proven violation of the directives would result in discipline. Id. at ¶ 45.
Training Specific to Probable Cause and Mass Arrest The Department also trained its officers specfiically with regard to assessing probable cause and dealing with m ass arrest situations. Depart ment recruits and offi cers received training that specifically dealt with issues of probable cause for arrest, First Amendment rights and mass arrest issues. Recruit training included instruction on lega l requirements for detaining and arresting individuals for violations of state and local laws.Id. at ¶ 16. The recruits were given fourteen hours
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of training related to the United States Constitutionand laws dealing with arrest, search and seizure. Id. at ¶ 33.
The Department provided additional in-servicetraining to over two thousand Tactical, Gang and other officers in specialized units, including those who typically would be called to cit izen demonstrations, regarding crowd control and the rgihts of citizens under the First Amendment. City 56.1 at ¶ 37. These training sessoi ns took place at the National Guard Armory from August through October and lasted one day. Id. at ¶ 38. They included both classroom instruction and simulated protests. Id. at ¶ 39. The purpose of these sessions was to teach effective crowd control while ensuring the right of citizens to assemble peaceably. Id. at ¶ 40.
Police recruits are not specifically trained to verbally com municate with a crowd, and Lieutenant Libert, the commanding officer in charge of recruit training programs between March of 2001 and August of 2005, does not remember any training regarding how to disperse a crowd. Pl. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 38.
In addition, directives governing the Chicago Police Departm ent addressed these issues. General Order 02-10, Chicago Police Department’s policy relating to citi zens engaged in First Amendment Conduct, states that members “may not investigate, prosecute, disrupt, interfere with, harass, or discriminate against any person engaged in First Amendment Conduct for the purpose of punishing, retaliating, or preventing the person fromexercising his or her First Amendment rights.” City 56.1 at ¶36. This order was distributed to all Chicago Police Of ficers in January of 2003. General Order 02-11 dictates Chicago Police Departm ent’s mass arrest policy. Id. at ¶ 64. It provides a blueprint for dealing with m ass arrest situations and requires that of ficers complete a multiple arrest card for each arrestee and m ark the mass arrest card num ber on each arrestee’s
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forearm so that each arrestee can be properly identified. Id. Special Order 97-2 dictates Chicago Police Department’s policy for drafting and signi ng of criminal complaints, and requires that all complaints be sworn and verified by a member other than the complainant. Id. at ¶ 64. Also, the Chief of Patrol m ay designate a m ember to sign com plaints, and that m ember may then sign complaints for all arrestees for whic h he or she has personal knowledge of the circum stances substantiating probable cause for arrest. Id. In addition, the City is governed by a consent decree entered in Alliance to End Repression et al v. City of Chicago and ACLU v. City of Chicago that prohibits discrimination “against any person on th e basis of their conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 34.
Superintendent Hillard testif ied that he wa s not aware of any general orders, rules or regulations regarding announcing prevailing law to a crowd of people and directing themto disperse. Pl. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 33. In addition, recruits aer trained to follow superiors’ orders, and officers are obligated to arrest a person if they are ordered to do so by a superior. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. It is Command Personnel’s responsibility to convey an order to disperse to a crowd. Id. at ¶ 39. No written policies exist addressing warnings and officers are not trained regarding the requirement to provide warnings to demonstrators that their conduct is illegal before making arrests. Id. at ¶ 40.
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Training Specific to Proper Completion of Arrest Reports Recruit training includes instruction on lega l requirements for detaining and arresting individuals for violations of state and local laws as well as proper methods for preparing complete and accurate arrest reports. City 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17. Recurits are trained to complete arrest reports and criminal complaints and specifically to identify probable cause justifying arrest and the meaning of signing a declaration under penalty of perjury. Pl. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 42. Such reports m ust be completed in order for a person to be arrested and for the completion of arrest procedures. Id. at ¶ 46. The narrative section of such a report must contain facts that substantiate probable cause for the arrest but need not identify where the facts cam e from nor whether the fac ts are based on the officer’s own observation. Id. at ¶ 44. A criminal complaint is a necessary charging document that initiates a criminal proceeding against an arrestee. Id. at 48. Lieutenant Libert, the commanding officer in charge of implementing recruit training programs from March 2001 to August 2005, testified that an officer could properly sign another officer’s name to a complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43. Chicago Police Department officers are expressly forbidden to make false reports and are required to communicate accurate and factual accountsof occurrences of public interest. City 56.1 at ¶ 41. In addition, they have an affirmative duty to report acts of misconduct committed by other police officers. Id. at ¶ 42. No rule explicit ly prohibits an officer from signing another officer’s name on an arrest report or criminal complaint. See, Id. at ¶¶ 43, 50, 64,
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The Chicago Police Department’s Command Structure on March 30, 2003 On March 20, 2003, Hillard was the Superintendent of Police - the highest ranking officer of the Chicago Police Department. Pl. Resp. City56.1 at ¶ 1. Superintendent Hillard monitored the demonstration and relate d police operations from the com mand room at police headquarters continuously from the time it reached Lake Shore Drive and Chicago Avenue until it ended. Id. at ¶ 7. He was able to monitor the situation there using television screens, radio transm issions and telephone calls from command personnel. Id. Hillard did not consult the Mayor or the City Council before making his decisions regarding the protest. Id. at ¶ 17.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the m otion. Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the Court will “limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties’ [Local Rule 56.1] statem ent.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees , 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). W here a proposed statement of fact is supported by the r ecord and not adequately rebutt ed, the court will accept that statement as true for purposes of summary judgment. An adequate rebuttal requires a citation to specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated denial is not adequate. See Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134
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F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998) (“‘Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular m atter[;] rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.’”).
DISCUSSION At issue are four separate motions for Summary Judgment: 1) Defendant Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims; 2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment Claims; 3) Defendant City’s Motion for Sum mary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior Claims; and 4) Pl aintiffs’ Motion for Sum mary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim. The Court will address each of these motions in turn.
Defendant Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant Officers bring a Mo tion for Summary Judgment on a ll of Plaintiffs’ claim s, arguing that: 1) they are not liable because they are protected by qualified immunity; 2) they did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Am endment; 3) Plai ntiffs have failed to produce evidence of a conspiracy to violate their rights; and 4) Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of their state law claims.
Qualified Immunity Defendants first assert that sum mary judgment should be granted i n their favor because qualified immunity protects their actions on the night of the m arch. In evaluating claim s under §1983, courts must determine whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the official acting under color of state law is entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S.
33

—, 2009 WL 128768, at *13 (2009).4 Qualified immunity operates to shield officials who perform discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct doe s not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“[I]n light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be apparent.”). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a constitutional right was clearly established at the time the officials acted. See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000).
For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand thatwhat he is doing violates that right.”Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. To establish the existence of a clearly established right, a plaintiff need not identify a prior case involving nearly identical facts; however, unless the constitutional violation is patently obvious, the plaintiff must identify closely analogous cases that would put a reasonable officer on notice that the action is unconstitutional. See Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 767;Sivard v. Pulaski County, 17 F.3d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
In determining whether a right was clearly established, district courts m ust first look to controlling precedent on the issue from the Supreme Court and their own circuit. See Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 767. In the absenc e of c ontrolling precedent, courts look to other circuits to ascertain “whether there was s uch a clear trend in the caselaw that . . . the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.” Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, when faced with anissue of first impression, courts “tend to cloak
4 The Court may now analyze either issue before analyzing the other one. See id. 34

the government with qualified immunity.” Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Greenberg v. Kmetko, 922 F.2d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiffs allege that the officers did not have probabl e cause to arrest them because they were exercising their First Am endment rights and were not disruptive or com mitting any other crimes. The officers allege that their actions were reasonable based on the unique circumstances of the massive march; and regardless, there was no clearly established law that required them to order the plaintiffs to disperse and then provide the marchers with an opportunity to do so before arresting them.
When a plaintiff sues police officers for dam ages arising from a warrantless arrest, the officers have immunity from liability “if a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the inform ation the arresting officers possessed.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). For a warrantless arrest to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, it must be supported by probable cause. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90 (1964). Probable cause exists when “the facts an circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee was committing an offense.” Jones v. Watson, 106 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir. 1997). Therefore, police officers receive qualified immunity for their decision to make a warrantless arrest if they could have reasonably believed thathe arrestee was committing an offense. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228; Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If a case involves a question of whether probable cause existed to support an officer’s actions, the case should not be permitted to go to trial if there is any reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.”).
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Therefore, it is essential to understand what the clearly established law regarding
demonstrations was at the time of t he march. At the tim e of the dem onstration and m arch,
individuals had the right to use public streets, sidewalks and parks to engage in expressive activities
under the First Amendment. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Those “First
Amendment rights are not absolute.” U.S. Labor Party v. Oremus , 619 F.2d 683, 687 (7th Cir.
1980). Specifically, with respect to public streets and sidewalks:
[t]he authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded asinconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the m ost familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that rela tion is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to prot ection. One would not be justif ied in ignoring the f amiliar red traf fic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the m unicipal command or sought by that m eans to direct public attenti on to an announcement of his opinions . . . .
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). Under theFirst Amendment, governments may
restrict the tim e, place, and m anner of speech to keep streets open and saf e for travel. See
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1969);Oremus, 619 F.2d at 687. In that
vein, ordinances that require permits prior to marches, parades and demonstrations do not violate
the First Amendment when the process is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leaves open alternative channels of communication. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (A municipality may “regulate the use of city streets and other facilities
to assure the safety and convenience of the peopl e in their use and the concom itant right of the
36

people of free speech and assembly.”); Ill. Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[ I]ndividuals asserting First Amendment rights may not choose to ignore traffic signals, or ref use to comply with reasonable regulations governing parade perm its or the like.”). More critically, in a situation involving a large parade or demonstration:
Although [a protester] has the right to demonstrate and speak freely on [an] issue, that right does not allow him and other participants to create chaos by disrupting traffic,impeding pedestrians, endangering themselves or other people, and otherwise causing gridlock on the busy streets and sidewalks of the city of Chicago . . . . [The City has an obligation] to protect the participants, to ensure their safety and that of others in the area, to maintain an orderly flow of traffic, and to prevent disruptive or even violent confrontations.
MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1025 (7th Cir. 2001). Municipalities also have a strong interest in regulating parades and de monstrations so that they do not interfere with the provision of emergency services. See id. at 1034.
To promote these strong interests in m aintaining an orderly flow of traffic, “[i]t is we llestablished in the Illinois that the act of blockingthe free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic on public ways will support a conviction for the offense of disorderly conduct.J”ones, 106 F.3d at 779. In Jones, an alderman from Chicago and 30-50 other demonstrators interlocked their elbows and stood on the street and sidewalk in front of the entrance to a construction site to protest perceived non-compliance with minority hiring requirements at the worksite. See id. at 776. By positioning themselves there, the demonstrators prevented construction trucks from entering the worksite. See id. at 780. The police arrested the alderm an, who later brought a § 1983 action for false arr est against the arresting officers. See id. at 777. Because the officers could have reasonably believed that the alderman blocked the free flow of pedestrain or vehicular traffic on public ways, the officers
37

had probable cause to arrest the alderman for disorderly conduct. See id. at 779. Therefore, under clearly established First and Fourth Am endment law in this circuit, a police officer m ay arrest a demonstrator when the demonstration blocks public roadways.
Here, the demonstrators had no perm it to demonstrate in the Federal Pl aza, no permit to march in the streets, and no perm it to close Lake Shore Drive. City Resp. 56.1 at ¶¶ 4-5. Nonetheless, they demonstrated in the Plaza, marched through the streets of Chicago blocking traffic on numerous streets, caused the complete shutdown of the northbound lanes of Lake Shore Drive and caused m ajor slowdowns in the southbound lanes of LSD. Of f. 56.1 at ¶ 64. W hen the demonstrators turned off of Lake Shore Drive andonto Oak Street, they continued to clog that street and created congestion and blockages surrounding the area until police sent themback south down Inner Lake Shore Drive. See, e.g., Id. at ¶¶ 82, 84-86, 93-96. As the crowd proceeded south, several groups attempted to run west toward Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 106-07, 110-11, 113. Finally, the crowd turned west on Chicago Avenue where it clogged the street, blocked a fire station, and at the very least slowed access to a hospital. Id. at ¶¶ 124, 191. All along themarch, at least some among the group engaged in disruptive behavior by surging police skirm ish lines, banging on cars and harassing the occupants. Id. at ¶¶ 70, 87-88, 133.
Based on clearly established law, the dem onstrators did not have an absolute First Amendment right to march anywhere within the City of Chicago. The undisputed facts show that they did not f ollow the municipality’s process for obtaining parade perm its with respect to the march. Chicago had a significant interest in protecntig the flow of traffic onits streets and sidewalks to protect the safety of its motorists and pedestrians. More significantly, Chicago had an interest in providing emergency services to the public. However, the thousands of marchers blocked access
38

to the fire station and also restricted access to tehnearby hospital. Based on clearly established law, reasonable police officers would have known that themunicipality could restrict the time, place and manner of the marchers’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. They would have known that demonstrators do not have the right to disrupt traffic and block access to emergency services in the course of their unperm itted march. Based on Jones, they also would have known that probable cause to arrest a demonstrator exists when the demonstration blocks the flow of traffic.
Plaintiffs claim that under clearly establishedlaw, the police could only arrest the marchers if they engaged in violent or obstructive conduct or if a marcher refused to obey a lawful order to disperse after fair notice was given and an opportunity to comply. They assert that the controlling case law in this area is from the D.C. Circuit from 1977, that these two cases from thirty years ago are clearly established here in the Seventh Circuit, and that the officers therefore should have known that they were obligated to give an order to disperse to the crowd and then should have given them an opportunity to disperse prior to arresting anyone. See Washington Mobil ization Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 185 ( D.C. Cir. 1977). Unless the officers can dem onstrate that individual arrestees were acting i n a disruptive manner, according to Plaintiff’s version of the cel arly established law, there was no probable cause for arrest. Based on those D.C. Ci rcuit cases, probable cause for arrest only exists if a m archer engaged in violent or obstructive conduct or if a marcher refused to obey a lawful order to disperse after fair notice given and an opportunity tocomply with that order was also given. See Cullinane, 566 F.2d at 120; Dellums, 566 F.2d at 185; see also Barnham v . Ramsey, 338 F.Supp.2d 48, 58 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Dellums establishes a ‘bright line rule’ that where a group contains persons who
39

have not been violent or obstructive, police m ay not mass arrest the dem onstration as a group without fair warning or notice and the opportunity to come into compliance and disperse.”).
No controlling precedent exists within the Seventh Circuit to support this statement of the law. Although this Court is not limited to considering only precedent from the Supreme Court or this Circuit, in the absence of controlling preceden t from the Circuit, there must be “such a clear trend in caselaw that we can say with afir assurance that the recognition ofthe right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.” See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000).
In the Seventh Circuit inJones, while the police happened to give an order to disperse before arresting the alderman, nothing in the opinion required the police to give such an order before making an arrest during a protest or march as a matter of constitutional law. See Jones, 106 F.3d at 780. Since the D.C. Circuit decidedCullinane and Powell in 1977, one other circuit has adopted the dispersal order requirement, but that occurred after the events that gave rise to this lawsuit. See Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2006). The factthat two circuits have adopted a rule does not create a trend that the Seventh Circuit or Suprem e Court will i mminently adopt. See Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the law was not clearly established despite two cases fromother circuits articulatinga right because “[t]hese two cases do not represent a trend in the law that would inevitably lead to the result we announce here.”). Here, there i s no clearly established trend in the caselaw that would indicate that it is merely a matter of time until the Seventh Circuit adopts the requirement that a police officer must give a dispersal order before arresting unpermitted marchers in the public streets.
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Even if a clear trend in the law requiring t he police to give a dispersal order before they could arrest demonstrators existed, the facts of the previous cases upon which Plaintiffs rely must be sufficiently similar in order to put the officers on notice that their actions could be unconstitutional. See Sivard, 17 F.3d at 189. The Second Circuit did not decide Jones v. Parmley until 2006. That case, therefore, could not have provi ded notice to the officers in this case. The facts of Cullinane and Dellums must be sufficiently similar to the facts of this case in order to clearly establish the law on this matter; and they are not.
Identifying the clearly established right “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. 194, 20, overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. —, 2009 WL 128768 (2009); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated m ust have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense”). “This is not to say that an official ac tion is protected by qualified im munity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in light opf re-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the facts of the cases are significantly divergent enough that the officers could not have reasonably relied on the D.C. precedent.
First, Cullinane involved several different demonstrations and protests that occurred over a span of several years in Washington, D.C., but none of the dem onstrations included a group of several thousand people marching through city streets without a permit. See Cullinane, 566 F.2d at 111-15 (describing characteristics of seven different protests, including permitted marches and smaller demonstrations comprised of hundreds of demonstrators). In Dellums, the demonstration
41

at issue was a static group that gathered on thegrounds of the United States Capitol, not a moving mass in the center of a busy metropolitan area. See Dellums, 566 F.2d at 173.
In contrast, here, an amorphous group of several thousand unpermitted marchers clogged many main streets in the hea rt of downtown Chi cago, preventing the orderly flow of traffic and blocking access to vital public services such as a firestation and a hospital. The nature and size of the demonstration and march were unknown to thepolice prior to the demonstration and throughout the course of the evening, the nature and size of the march changed. The line of marchers did not remain in one identifiable location or even on onethoroughfare; rather, tendrils of marchers entered and exited city streets over the course of a few hours. The police responded to various splint er groups of marchers by attempting to block their departure from the main group and by attempting to direct the splinter groups back to the main group. Meanwhile, the main group grew in size as it proceeded northbound. By the time the group reached Chicago Avenue, the police were required to protect the other m ain artery in and out of the city: Michigan Av enue. Having one artery completely blocked (LSD), the officers attem pted to control the m asses at various points from entering and blocking the other artery.
This constantly-changing, ever-growing crowd comprised thousands ofindividuals marching through a number of streets with no di rectional plan or end in site. This type of m arch was not experienced in the City of Chicago in the past in this size or f ormat nor did it com port with the descriptions of the demonstrations in the Dellums and Cullinane cases. This significant factual distinction negates any conclusion that the of ficers should have known that their actions were unconstitutional in this unique situation.
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The facts of Cullinane and Dellums are not sufficiently analogous to the facts of this case to place a reasonable officer on notice of the unconstitutionality of his actions, especially when juxtaposed with Seventh Circuit precedent that established that probable cause to arrest a group of 30-50 protestors exists when the protestors blocked access to city streets without a perm it. See Jones, 106 F.3d at 779. Therefore, even ifCullinane and Dellums represented a clear trend that the Seventh Circuit would inevitably adopt, the facts ofthose cases are not sufficiently analogous to the facts present here to make clearly established law.
Secondly, the significant lapse in time between the Dellums and Cullinane cases without the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the rule set forth in those cases, supports the conclusion that a trend in case law does not exist; nor is there any sense that the Seventh Circuit would imminently adopt the holdings. It has been over thir ty years during which tim e the Seventh Circuit has addressed numerous First Amendment cases, and during that entire time, the Seventh Circuit has not adopted the holdings. This lapse in time with no action on the part of the Court negates Plaintiffs’ position that this is the clearly established law in this Circuit.
At the time of the march, the law had been clearly established that municipalities may place reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions on First Am endment rights. Given the clear precedent that First Amendment rights must yield to the municipality’s obligation to safely regulate traffic on public streets in order to protect the safety of the population and to provide em ergency services, a police officer faced with an unpermitted, amorphous group of thousands of marchers in
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the public streets could have reasonably believed thatprobable cause to arrest the marchers existed. Therefore, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.5
Civil Conspiracy
Defendant Officers argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations of civil conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence of an agreement among the officers. A conspiracyis a “combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act . . . the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damges. Richardson v. City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 1981)citing Hampton v. Hanraham, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979). The first element of such a conspiracy is an agreem ent or ‘meeting of the minds.’ Plaintiffs need not prove an express agreement, and the participants need not know the exact details of the plan nor the identity of all participants. Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 699 F.2d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1983). However, “hte conspirators must act with a single plan, the general nature and scope of which is known to each would-be cons pirator.” Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dept., 197 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs may prove a conspiracy with purely circumstantial evidence. Id. However, they must present “sufficient evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that a meeting of
5This case has been consolidated with the Beal case for trial. This Court denied the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in theBeal case because the City had not challenged that the Dellums and Cullinane cases were the clearly established law to be applied to the facts of that case. Now that the Court has been given the opportunity to review the issue for the first tim e (having accepted the positions of the parties in the Beal case before), this Court now holds that the law was not clearly established. The Court will address that decision separately in thBeeal case and allow the parties to address the im pact of this Court’s ruling in this case on the previous ruling issued in the Beal case.
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the minds had oc curred and that the parties had an understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs fail to put forth sufficient evidence to support a claim of conspiracy. The object of the Defendants’ alleged conspiracy was to arrest Plaintiffs in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs put forth evidence of various discussions between command personnel regarding the decision to begin m aking arrests and the charges to bring against the arrestees. Pl. Resp. Off. 56.1 ¶¶ 12, 24, 32; O ff. 56.1 at ¶¶ 207-208. Thi s evidence, however, cannot support a finding that there was a “m eeting of the minds” as to a decis ion to violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. At best, it s upports an inference that som e members of the Command Personnel may have agreed to arrest Plaintiffs. If a violation of rights occurred, there is no evidence to support that such was the design of a conspiracy.See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988) (“there is no such thing as accidental or inadvertent participation in a conspiracy”); see also Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (an action taken as a spontaneous response to information is not “pursuant to an agreement”).
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to a judgm ent as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claims.
False Arrest Defendants allegedly denied Plaintiffs their state constitutional rights to be secure in their persons, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to speak, write and publish freely; to assemble in a peaceful m anner, and to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the Illinois Constitution, Arti cle 1, sections 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. False arrest and false imprisonment involve the unlawful restraint of anindividual’s personal liberty, claims to which an
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arrest based upon probable cause would be a complete defense. See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 545 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). Additionally, the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act provides: “A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enf orcement of any law unless such act or om ission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.” 745 ILCS 2-202. The statute defines “willful and wanton conduct” as “a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm, or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or cons cious disregard for the safety of ot hers or their property.” 745 ILCS 10/1-210.
Whether the conduct is sufficiently willful and wanton is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and rarely should be ruled upon as a matter of law. See Mostafa v. City of Hickory Hills, 677 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 (Ill.App.Ct. 1997) . Here, this Court f inds that Def endants are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably in arresting Plaintiffs. For the reasons that justified granting qualified im munity for the alleged Fourth and First am endment violations, a reasonable juror could not conclude Def endants acted willfully and wantonly or with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041 n. 13 (7th Cir. 1998) (willful and wanton standard is “rem arkably similar” to the del iberate indifference standard).
State Law Malicious Prosecution To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a pl aintiff must prove: 1) com mencement or continuation of a legal proceeding by the defendants; 2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; 3) the absence of probable causefor such proceeding; 4) the presence of malice; and 5) damages resulting to the plaintiff. See Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996).
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Malice is present when a prosecution is initiated ofr any reason other than to bring a party to justice. See Rodgers v. People’s Gas Light and Coke Co,.733 N.E.2d 835, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000);see also Aguirre v. City of Chicago, 887 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)(“a plaintiff may demonstrate malice by showing that the prosecutor proceeded with the prosecution for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff or for some other improper motive”). A lack of probable cause does not it self show malice, and a jury may only infer malice from a lack of probable cause to arrest if there is no other credible evidence which refutes that inference. Rodgers, 733 N.E.2d at 842.
Defendants must have played a significant role in causing a prosecution in order to be held liable for malicious prosecution. See id. “A person who unwittingly gives a prosecutor f alse information of another person’s alleged crim e is not liable for m alicious prosecution, unless the person takes an active part in instituting criminal proceedings, by requesting,directing, or pressuring the prosecuting officer into instituting the proceedings.” Allen v. Berger, 784 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ill.App. 2002); see also Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996) (allegation of arrest without any further improper acts is insufficient to constitute malicious prosecution). Here, the Court found that the Defendant Officers acted reasonably in arresting Plai ntiffs, and they committed no further acts that could constitute improper acts in furtherance of the prosecution. To the contrary, at Counsel Epach’s urging, many arrestees were released when officers realized that they could not identify the arresting officers, and Epach advised the State’s Attorney’s Office not to prosecute cases involving faulty arrest re ports. Pl. 56.1 at ¶117; Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 209, 211. Because Defendants com mitted no acts in furthe rance of the prosecution beyond potentially arresting Plaintiffs without probable cause, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
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on Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. See, Beal, 2007 WL 1029364 at *11 (granting summary judgment on almost identical facts).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Their Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should grantsummary judgment in their favor on their Fourth Amendment claims because Chicago Police Department officers violated their right to be free from unreasonable seizure when they where surrounded by police in the bounded area and m any protestors were arrested without being given a legally adequate order to disperse. Specifically, they argue that all the protesters present in the Chicgao and Michigan area were arrested without probable cause. The i tems at issue in Pl aintiffs’ motion are identical to those in the Of ficer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and this Court granted the Officer Defendants’ motion, finding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims is denied.
The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims of Municipal Liability
The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be utilized to hold local governm ental units liable for § 1983 violations. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Ser vs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when its “policy or custom ” results in a constitutional injury to the plaintiff. See id. at 694. Plaintiffs submit that the City is liable under two theories of municipal liability: 1) failure to train and 2) decisions made by an individual with policymaking authority.
Failure to train
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Plaintiffs allege that the City is liable under Monell because of its fai lure to train and supervise Chicago Police Department officers. A municipality’s failure to train its police officers in a relevant respect only constitutes a policy or custom under Monell where it am ounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of personswith whom the officers come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). That is, a failure to train may only be said to evince a city policy or custom where in light of a specific officer’s duties, “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy is so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably besaid to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id at 390.
Proof of deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of simple or even heightened negligence. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit requires a high degree of culpability on the part of the policymaker before it imposes Monell liability for failure to train. Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993). In addition, the pl aintiff must show that the failure to train caused the constitutional deprivation at issue. Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1344 (7th Cir. 1997) citing Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327. Culpability, combined with the causation requirement, requires that liability be based on a f inding of actual or constructive notice on the part of policymakers that “a particular omission is likely to result in constitutional violations.” Id.
Plaintiffs can establish deliberate indifferenceand thus sustain a failure to train claimunder two circumstances: 1) “if ‘in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights’ that the def iciency exhibits deliberate indif ference on the part of
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policymakers.” Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; or 2) “when a repeated pattern of constitutional violations makes ‘the need for further training . . . plainly obvious to the city policymakers.’” Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 492 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n. 10).
Here, Plaintiffs may rely only on the second “por ng” analysis because they cite only a single incidence of unconstitutional behavior: the allegedly unconstitutional arrests and detainments that occurred in response to the demonstration on March 20, 2003. This Court has previously held that the day’s events amount to a single incident of potentially unconstitutional behavior. See Beal v. City of Chicago, 2007 WL 1029364, at * 13 (the entirety of the events that occurred in response to the demonstration constitute a single incident in part because a municipality cannot be held to have approved or countenanced events that occurred inone day). The second prong, relying on a single instance of unconstitutional behavior, is likely to apply only in narrow circum stances where a deficiency in training is “glaring.” Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409-10. Indeed, it is more difficult for plaintiffs to show the required notice of deficiencies on the part of the municipality without the aid of past incidents. See Palmquist at 1346.
Plaintiffs here allege that the training provided by the city is inadequate in two relevant respects: 1) individualized determinations of probable cause for arrest; and 2) the proper completion of arrest reports.
Individualized probable cause The City set forth extensive evidence of the training it provides its officers generally, and specifically, the training it provides regarding determinations of probable cause for arrest and arrest procedures for demonstrations. Specifically, the City puts forth undisputed facst that Chicago Police
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Department recruits are given extensive training dealing specif ically with constitutional rights related to arrest, search and seizure. City56.1 at ¶¶ 33, 40. In addition,Chicago Police Department officers in specialized units such as those who woudl typically be called to demonstrations are given additional specialized training specifically addressing effective crowd control and its relation to citizens’ rights under the First Amendment, including both classroomtraining and hands-on training that tests the officers’ ability to effectively deal with simulated protests. Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.
In addition, Chicago Police Department operates under general orders governing dealings with First Amendment behavior. Chicago Police Department General Order 02-10, which states Chicago Police Department’s official policy on First Amendment Conduct, was distributed to all Chicago Police Department officers in January of2003, not long before the demonstrations at issue. Id. at ¶ 36. This General Order specifically states that officers “m ay not investigate, prosecute, disrupt, interfere with, harass, or discrim inate against any person engaged in First Am endment Conduct for the purpose of punishing, retaliating, or preventing the person from exercising his or her First Amendment rights.” Id.
Plaintiffs point to various “holes” in Chicago Police Departm ent’s training regarding demonstrations and mass arrests. They assert that no written Chicago Police Department policies specifically note that officers arerequired to warn demonstrators that their conduct is illegal and that they should disperse bef ore making arrests and th at officers are not specif ically trained in this regard. Pl . Resp. City 56.1 at ¶¶ 33, 38-40. In addition, recruits are not trained to verbally communicate with crowds. Id. at ¶ 38.
Even if Chicago police officers’ training could be improved by specifically focusing on the necessity of a direct warning to m ass demonstrators before arrest, this is not e nough to establish
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municipal liability under Monell. Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1345 ( citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 391) (“neither will it suffice to prove that an accident orinjury could have been avoided if an officer had better or m ore training, sufficient to equip him to avoid a parti cular injury-causing conduct”). Plaintiffs do not point to any fact that could establish that City’s training of police officers is so deficient that it amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of dem onstrating citizens. To the contrary, the training directlyaddressing constitutional rights and First Amendment rights during demonstrations and mass arrests evinces a concern on the part of the City for effective handling of situations like the one at issue here. Notably, the Plaintiffs cite no past incidents that could have put the City on notice as to any potentila“holes” in its training program. As such, failure to train officers regarding individualized probable cause cannot be the basis for Monell liability.
Completion of Arrest Reports Plaintiffs next argue that the City f ailed to adequately train and supervise Chicago Police Department officers in the proper completion of arrest reports and that this failure led Plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally arrested and held. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that improper training led the officers to allow an officer without any knowledge of the relevant circumstances to sign an arrest report or an officer to sign other officers’ signatures on arrest reports. Plaintiffs first try to avail themselves of the first prong of failure to train analysis, arguing that the Seventh Circuit already held in Haywood v. City of Chicago, 378 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) that Chicago Police Department officers have a custom or practice of police officers signing other officers’ names to arrest reports. In Haywood, however, the Plaintif fs submitted officers’ deposition testimony that described this practice as “com mon” and the Defendants submitted no
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contrary evidence. Id. The court, in dicta, noted that ifsuch a practice was so common as to render it “customary” the City could be held liable under Monell on that basis. Id.
Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any evidence that the practice of permitting non-arresting officers to sign reports is common. They have failed to meet their burden.
This leaves potential liability to be established under the first prong, that the gl aring deficiency in training regarding the writing of police reports amounted to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). The City has set forth evidence to etsablish the adequacy of officer training regarding the completion of arrest reports. Recruits are given training on the legal requirements for arresting and detaining individuals as well as proper methods for completing arrest reports. City 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17. Notably, they are specifically trained to identify probable cause justifying arrest as well as the meaning of signing a docum ent under penalty of perjury. Pl. Resp. C ity 56.1 at ¶ 46. The Chicago Police Department also requires 14 hours of training as to Constitutional lim itations on arrest. City 56.1 at ¶ 33. In addition to this specific training, Chicago Police Department Special Order 97-2 dictates Chicago Polci e Department policy for draftingand signing complaints, and such policies are both distributed at roll call trainings and available for review. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 31, 64.
To undermine the City’s evidence, Plaintiffs note that Lieutenant Libert thought that a n officer could properly sign another officer’s name to a complaint. Pl. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 43. In addition, Chicago Police Department witness Judith Martin testified that she did not know whether procedures for signing a Com plaint were given in roll call training, but she did know that such training was not given in roll call training wh en she was a watch com mander. The lack of knowledge of two officials, however, is inadequateto illuminate a “glaring deficiency” in Chicago
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Police Department training which clearly cove rs proper procedures for and importance of completing arrest reports.
Decision by a Policymaker Plaintiffs next argue that the City should be held liable because the decisions that violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were made by an individual with final policymaking authority here, Hillard, the Superintendent ofPolice. Municipal liability attaches where the relevant decision maker holds final municipal policymaking authority with respect to the action at issue. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Only those with the requisite policym aking authority, however, can establish municipal policy. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). Whether an official has final policymaking authority over a certain issue is a question of state or local law. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). The Chicago Superintendent of Police is nota final policymaker because although he has the authority to make some final decisions, he doesnot have the authority to establish rules.Auriemma, 957 F.3d at 401 (C hicago Police Department superintendent is not a policym aker); see also Latuszkin v. City of Chicago , 250 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming that Chicago Police Department superior officers are not policymakers). Specifically, although the Superintendent has “complete authority to administer the department in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the city, the laws of the state, and the rules and re gulations of the police boa rd,” he has no power to countermand the statues regulating the operati on of the department. Auriemma, 957 F.3d at 40. Indeed, generally, the City Counsel and the PoliceBoard set municipal policy for the Chicago Police Department. Beal, 2007 WL 1029364, at * 14 citing Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 399-400.
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Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the holding of Auriemma, arguing that the instant case is not analogous because Auriemma dealt with employment discrimination rather than actual police procedures, an area over which the Superinte ndent has expansive control. The reasoning in Auriemma, however, applies with equal force to case s, like this one, that involve Chicago Police Department procedures. That is, he is still oblig ated “to administer the department in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the city, the lawsof the state, and the rules and regulations of the police board.” See Beal, 2007 WL 1029364, at * 14 (“plaintiffs have not identified any authority for Chicago Police Department’s command personnel to ‘countermand the statutes regulating the department’ or adopt rules for the conduct of the department”); Gates v. Towry, 507 F.Supp.2d 904, 919 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (same).
The Plaintiffs set forth a great deal of evidence establishing the breadth of Superintendent Hillard’s authority in running the Chicago Police Departm ent and in di recting Chicago Police Department’s actions at the dem onstration. However, the fact that an official has discretion in exercising particular functions does not give riseto municipal liability based on the exercise ofthat discretion. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-24;see also Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400 (“that a particular agent is at the apex of a bureaucracy makes the decision ‘final’ but does not forge a link between ‘finality’ and ‘policy.’”). Rather, the official must be responsible for establishing final government policy with regard to the activity at issue. Id.; see also Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 401 (7th Cir. 1992) (responsibility for m aking law or setting policy is the authority to adopt rules for the conduct of government); Gates, 507 F.Supp.2d at 919 (property may be retained if “deemed by the superintendent of police to be of use”) citing Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 401 (“the chief has com plete authority to administer the department in a
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manner consistent with the ordinances of the city”) andEversole, 59 F.3d at 716 (“the discretion to make final decisions to carry out the policies of a local law enforcement entity does not equate to policymaking authority”).6 Therefore, this Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that Hillard was a policymaker and thus his decisions could subject the city to liability.
Plaintiffs argue that if the superintendent did not have original policymaking authority, he was delegated such authority. Individuals with authority to ma ke municipal policy may delegate their authority, thus making another individual a policymaker for Monell purposes. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. Delegation in this context, however, is delegation of final policymaking authority, not the authority to make final, even unreviewed decisions. Lyttle v. Killackey, 528 F.Supp.2d 818, 828 (N.D.Ill. 2007) citing Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001) (“final” in this context does not have its usulameaning but rather means that there is no higher authority); see also Kujawaski v. Board of Commissioners , 183 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir 1999) (delegated authority to make hiring and firing decisions does not amount to delegation of authority to set hiring and firing policy).
Although the superintendent has a great deal ofauthority over the operations of the Chicago Police Department and ran the command center for the demonstration, the ultimate authority to set policy remained with the police board and the citycounsel. Plaintiffs point to no special delegation of authority that gave the superintendent rulem aking authority such that this situation would fall
6 Plaintiffs cite to McGreal v. Ostrov for the proposition that the superintendent may qualify as a policymaker under Monell. That case agrees that “the Municipal Code of Chicago . . .grants the chief of police author ity only to administer the department in a m anner consistent with city ordinance, state law, and police board rules and regulations.”McGreal, 368 F.3d 657, 686 (7th Cir. 2004). Indeed, McGreal specifically notes that its situation was different because it dealt with not Chicago but the Village of Alsip, which has its own codes and procedures. Id.
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outside of the related c aselaw. As such, Monell liability cannot be prem ised on Superintendent Hillard’s decisions. It follows that this Court alsorejects Plaintiffs alternative argument that Hillard delegated policymaking authority to officers on the scene - Hillard could not delegate policymaking authority that he did not originally have.
Ratification Plaintiffs last argue that, at the very least, policym akers ratified the Chicago Police Department’s actions. A m unicipality may be held liable for the actions of one who lacks f inal policymaking authority ifthat individual’s actions are ratified by the municipality; that is, ifthe final policymaking authority approvedthe decision and its basis.Killinger, 389 F.3d at 772citing Baskin v. City of Des Plaines , 138 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1998). It i s not enough that the policym aker failed to investigate, take punitive action or correct the violation.Baskin, 138 F.3d at 705;Fiorenzo v. Nolan, 965 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, th e policymaker must show deliberate or reckless indifference to the complaints at issue. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993). Even if this Court were to consider the f acts asserted by Plaintiffs, that Alderman Joseph Moore proposed a hearing on the events of March 20, 2003, that the full City Counsel never acted on the resolution and that neither the Superint endent nor any othe r Chicago Police Department personnel were required to attend Moore’s hearingnor were they censured, they would not be able to survive summary judgment on the issue of ratification. Indeed, Plaintiffs would establish at best that the policymaker failed to investigate or take punitive action regarding the violation, which is inadequate under the law. Baskin, 138 F.3d at 705; Fiorenzo, 965 F.2d at 351.
Respondeat Superior and Demand of Judgment 57

The City argues that if this Court finds that the Defendant Officers are not liable under Plaintiffs claim of respondeat superior and its demand for judgment against the City because under Section 10/2-109 of Illinois’s Tort Immunity Act “[a] local public entity is not liable for any injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” 745 ILCS 10/2109. Because this Court grants the Officer Defendants’ Motion for Sum mary Judgment in its entirety, it also holds that the City is not liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim
The City seeks damages from the Plaintiffs pursuant to Section 8-28-020 of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, alleging that it was required to incur costs such as extra police forces, transporting, processing and housing arrestees. City Resp. 56.1 at ¶ 1. Section 8-28-020 states: “Any person who causes the city or its agents to incur costs in order to provide necessary services as the result of such person’s violation of any federal, state or local law . . . shall be liable to the city for those costs. This liability shall be collectible in the same manner as any other personal liability. Id. at ¶ 2. Specificall y, the City alleges that Plain tiffs violated state or local laws when they: 1) failed to obtain a perm it to march in violation of Se ction 10-8-330 (b) of the m unicipal code; 2) committed disorderly conduct at or near C hicago and Michigan avenues by acting in an unreasonable manner such as to alarm or disturb another and promote a breach of the peace or as to provoke or aid in making a breach of the peace; 3) hindered or disrupted traffic on the streets of downtown Chicago in violation of Se ction 9-80-180 of the m unicipal code; 4) com mitted state public nuisance violations by obstructing or encroaching on public highways, private ways, streets and alleys in violation os 720 ILCS 5/47-5(5); 5) committed state reckless conduct by obstructing public streets and highways in a reckless manner and by endangering the bodily safety of motorists
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and pedestrians in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-5(a); 7) crossed roadways at points other than those within marked crosswalks in violation of 9-60-050 of the m unicipal code; 7) f ailed to yield to vehicles in roadways when crossing outside of the marked crosswalks in violation of Section 9-60050(a) or the Municipal Code; and 8) obstructed the passage of vehicles crossing the Chicago River on Lake Shore Drive in violation of M unicipal Ordinance 10-40-55. Id. at ¶ 2. The City seeks damages for overtime costs of police services that were incurred as a result of the events at issue, or in the alternative, the per person cost to porcess arrested persons, which they calculate at $169.30. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 155. The City estimates the cost of overtime hours attributable to the events at issue as $1,595,734.49. Id.
As an initial m atter, the Chicago Police Departm ent could “ratif y” the behavior of the demonstrators, thereby insulating them from liability on their actions which they interpreted to be within the confines of police orders. Specifically, if public officials act in a way that in effect tells demonstrators that their actions are acceptable, they cannot then hold themliable for their actions. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 571 (demonstrators could not beheld liable for holding their demonstration on the sidewalk by a courthouse when the police approved their meeting place); Dellums, 566 F.2d at 174, 182 (protesters could not be held liable when police initially stopped them from entering the Capitol steps but then allowed their entry after speaking with a congressman). To find them liable for demonstrating where they were essentially told they could do so “would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State.” Cox, 379 U.S. at 571 citing Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959).
The Plaintiffs here argue that they cannobt e held liable for their activities on March 30, 2003 as a whole because the police ratified their conduct. There is a fa ctual dispute as to whether the
59

police ratified the parties conduct throughout the demonstration. Witnesses testified for Plaintiffs’ that the police were in essence escorting their march - they walked on either side of the marchers, blocked traffic, and provided direction. See, Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 36-37, 47-49, 51-52, 55, 272, 303. The Witnesses testified for Defendants that the demonstrators consistently tried to evade them , surge police lines and disobey them. See, Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 46-49, 52, 55, 58, 76-79, 80-82, 106-107, 110, 113-14, 124-127. Because of this factual dispute, this Court cannot find as a matter of law that the police ratified the entirety of the march.
The fact that protected First Amendment activity is at issue “imposes a special obligation on this Court to exam ine critically the basis on which liability is im posed.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982). Put another way, “the presence of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages liability and on those persons who m ay be held accountable for those da mages.” Id. at 916-17. This is particularly noteworthy in circumstances such as those here involving speech on public issues as such speech occupies “the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). Through this lens, thelack of individualized evidence regarding any illegal, damage-causing activity by Plaintiffs is particul arly noteworthy. At the outset, this Court specially notes that it refused to certify the City’s Counterclaim as a class action, finding the lack of commonality and predominance. Thus, it is noteworthy that the City has been unable to set forth any evidence of illegal conduct specific to the palintiffs at issue in this case - we know nothing regarding specific illegal conduct of the Plaintiffs that could subject them to liability. In truth, the Chicago Police Department’s own internal investigation found only damage to two cars with no one
60

identified as responsible for the damage and no property damage to any federal building or adjoining
property. Id. at ¶ 150-52.
As such, the City seeks to hold the Plaintifs liable for their costs simply on the information
that they were participants in a m arch, which is insuf ficient for liability. See Anti-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (“automatically
criminalizing participation in a permitless march destroys the spontaneity and enthusiasm which
public demonstrations of this nature are meant to engender). Relatedly, liability cannot be placed
on the Plaintiffs simply because they were associated with a group of protesters, many of whom the
Defendants assert intentionally violated the law. See NAACP, 458 U.S. at 920 (“civil liability may
not be im posed merely because an individual belonged to a group, som e members of which
committed acts of violence”);United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 666 (7th Cir. 1998) (no liability
“without clear proof of a specific intent tofurther an unlawful aimembraced by” the group);see also
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2002) (“inorder to impose liability on
an individual for association with a group, it is necessary to establish that the group possessed
unlawful goals and that the individual held a specicf intent to further those illegal aims”); Cullinane,
566 F.2d 120 (“one who has violated no law may not be arrested for the offenses of those who have been violent or obstructive”).7
7 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs can be held liable because of the general evidence presented that an order to disperse m ay have been given and m ay have been disobeye d. In so arguing, they rely on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Braun v. Baldwin, 346 F.3d 761, 765 (2003) stating that “defiance of a police officer’s order to move is itself disorderly conduct if the order is lawful.” First, the Court note s that Braun does not address civil liability for reckless conduct. Regardless, the Court understands that refusing to obey a police offi cer’s order can be disorderly conduct, but in Braun, the court had specific evidence that a police officer approached Braun and asked him to leave, and Braun refused . Id. at 762. Here, the City has failed to produce evidence specifically addressing the behavior of any of the Counterdefendants other than the fact that they
61

Defendants have failed to set forth any evidence of specific behavior leading to specific damage. Strict liability is generally disf avored, especially when First Am endment concerns are implicated. See Anti-Arab Anti-Discrimination League, 418 F.3d at 610 c( iting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1960)and citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webste,r418 F.3d 600, 611 (6th Cir. 2005) (“any statute that chills the exercise of First Am endment rights must contain a knowledge element”)); see also CBS Corp. v. F.C.C., 535 F.3d 167, 201 (3rd Cir. 2008) (same).8 Defendants have failed to present evidence suffici ent to support their counterclaim; so the Court rules as a matter of law and grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
were present at the march. 8 Defendants argue that facts they assert re garding discussions held at meetings between
some organizers of the m arch regarding civil disobedience are e vidence of Plaintiffs’ intent to violate the law. However, Defendants provide no evidence to connect this suggested intent to Plaintiffs. As such, this am ounts again to imputing the behavior of other members of a group to Plaintiffs, which is prohibited underNAACP. See NAACP, 458 U.S. at 919 (“civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence”).
62

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendant Officers’ Motion for Sumary Judgment is granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment Claims is denied; Defendant City of Chicago’s Motion for Sum mary Judgment is granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum mary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim is granted; and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part.

So ordered. Date: February 27, 2009

________________________________________ Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge Northern District of Illinois

63

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 692 Filed: 05/14/12 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:15761

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et. al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et. al.,
Defendants.

)

No. 03 C 2463

)

)

)

Judge Virginia Kendall

)

)

)

)

)

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sarah Bergstrand, Prudence Browne, Robert Castillo, John Patrick

Donnell, Matthew Gaines, Angela Garcia, Kathleen Gruber, Steven Hudosh, Elizabeth Johnson,

Sophia Sieczkowski, individually and on behalf of the class and subclasses they represent

(collectively “Plaintiffs”), having filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action

Settlement (the “Motion,” Docket No. 688), seeking an order granting preliminary approval of the

proposed settlement of the Litigation, in accordance with the Stipulation and Agreement of

Settlement (the “Stipulation”) entered into by the Parties;

The Court being otherwise advised;

After review and consideration of the Stipulation and the Motion, and after due deliberation,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court, for purposes of this order (the “Preliminary Approval Order”), adopts the

defined terms as set forth in the Stipulation.

2. This Court approves the Settlement as set forth in the Stipulation as within the range

of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy. This preliminary approval is subject to the right of any

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 692 Filed: 05/14/12 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:15762
Class Member to challenge the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the Settlement, or the
fairness and adequacy of their representation by Class Counsel, and to show cause, if any exists,
why a final judgment dismissing the claims of the Class based on the Stipulation should not be
ordered herein after due and adequate notice to the Class has been given in conformity with this
Order and subsequent order(s) of this Court.
3. The Court previously certified a Class defined as all persons who were surrounded
by Defendants on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west of
Mies Van Der Rohe Way (“the bounded area”), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.,
and who were either detained in that area for at least one and a half hours or who were arrested and
taken to a police station, subject to the express exclusions set forth in Article II of the Stipulation.
(Docket No. 219.) The Court further certified the following subclasses pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b):
(a) Subclass A-1: all persons who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area on Chicago Avenue for one and a half to three hours before they were allowed to leave the area.
(b) Subclass A-2: all persons who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, and who were arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were released without being charged with any crime or ordinance violation.
(c) Subclass A-3: all persons who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, and who were arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were charged with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions of bond, required to appear in court on criminal charges and later the charges against them were dismissed in their favor.
Id.
4. The Court further appointed the following named Plaintiffs as class representatives
of the Class and as class representatives of the subclasses as follows:
(a) Named Plaintiffs Prudence Browne, Matt Gaines, Angela Garcia, Elizabeth Johnson, and Sophia Sieczkowski are the class representative Plaintiffs for

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 692 Filed: 05/14/12 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:15763
subclass A-1; (b) Named Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sarah Bergstrand, Robert Castillo, and John
Patrick Donnell are the class representative Plaintiffs for subclass A-2; (c) Named Plaintiffs Kathleen Gruber and Steven Hudosh are the class
representative Plaintiffs for subclass A-3.
Id. 5. The Court finds that the Settlement of this Litigation, and the use of the Class and
subclass definitions for settlement purposes is appropriate, but it shall not be deemed to be a concession by Defendants to the propriety of the certification of any class or subclasses previously certified by this Court during this Litigation, or to the propriety of certification of any class, and Defendants retain all rights to assert that class certification for purposes other than settlement is not appropriate.
6. The Court has previously appointed the People’s Law Office, James R. Fennerty & Associates, and the West Town Community Law Office to act as Class Counsel. Class Counsel is authorized to act on behalf of the Class with respect to all acts required by, or which may be given pursuant to, the Stipulation or such other acts that are reasonably necessary to consummate the proposed Settlement set forth in the Stipulation.
7. The Court directs and authorizes the Parties to retain Class Action Administration, Inc. (“CAA”) as the Claims Administrator to administer the settlement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation.
8. The preliminary approval of the Stipulation is expressly subject to the approval of the Settlement by the Chicago City Council. If the Stipulation is not approved by the City Council on or before July 1, 2012, the Settlement, the Stipulation, and this preliminary approval shall have no force and effect, and the Parties will be returned to the status quo ante as if the Stipulation had

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 692 Filed: 05/14/12 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:15764
never been entered into, as further set forth in Article XIV of the Stipulation. 9. The Court reserves the right to approve the Settlement at or after the Final Approval
Hearing with such modification as may be consented to by the Parties to the Stipulation and without further notice to the Settlement Class.
10. If this Settlement is not approved by the Court or shall not become effective for any reason whatsoever, the Settlement (including any modification thereof) made with the consent of the Parties as provided for in the Stipulation, and any actions taken or to be taken in connection therewith (including this Order and any judgment entered herein), (i) shall be without prejudice, and none of the terms shall be effective or enforceable; (ii) the costs of notice and Administrative Costs that have been incurred or expended pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation shall be paid by the City; (iii) the Parties shall revert to their Litigation positions immediately prior to the execution of the Stipulation; and (iv) the fact and terms of the Stipulation and this Settlement shall not be admissible in any trial of this Litigation.
11. All proceedings in the Litigation, other than those proceedings that may be necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the Settlement are hereby stayed and suspended until further order of this Court. Pending final determination whether Settlement should be approved, Plaintiffs and all members of the Class are barred and enjoined from commencing or prosecuting any action asserting any claims that are or relate in any way to the Settled Claims as defined in the Stipulation.
12. Neither this Order, the Motion, the Stipulation, any provisions contained in the Stipulation, any negotiations, statements, or proceedings in connection therewith, nor any action undertaken pursuant thereto shall be construed as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission or concession on the part of Defendants or any other person of any liability or wrongdoing by them, or any of them, and shall not be offered or received in evidence in any action or proceeding, or be

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 692 Filed: 05/14/12 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:15765

used in any way as an admission, concession, or evidence of any liability or wrongdoing of any nature, and shall not be construed as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission or concession that Plaintiffs, any member of the Settlement Class, or any other person, has suffered any damage.
13. The Court further reserves to a later date the approval and determination of any additional and appropriate procedures, notices or orders necessary to be adopted by it to effectuate the terms and conditions of the Settlement encompassed in the Stipulation.

Dated: May 14, 2012

_______________________________________ HONORABLE VIRGINIA M. KENDALL

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:15969

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al.,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Defendants.

Case No. 03 C 2463
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

FINAL JUDGMENT ORDER Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sarah Bergstrand, Prudence Browne, Robert Castillo, John Patrick Donnell, Matthew Gaines, Angela Garcia, Kathleen Gruber, Steven Hudosh, Elizabeth Johnson, Sophia Sieczkowski, individually and on behalf of the classes and subclasses they represent (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), and Defendants the City of Chicago, Terry Hillard, Philip Cline, James Maurer, Thomas Byrne, Frank Radke, Joseph Griffin, The Estate of John Risley, Thomas Epach and Karen Rowan (collectively, "Defendants"), having filed a Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the "Motion") (Docket No. 71 0) and supporting documents, seeking an order granting final approval of the proposed Settlement of this Litigation in accordance with the Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the "Stipulation") (Docket No. 692-7), entered into by the Parties, preliminarily approved by the Court on May 9, 2012 and approved as amended on June 28, 2012 (Docket Nos. 692, 704); Due and adequate notice having been given to the Class and Subclasses; and After review and consideration of the Stipulation, the Motion and supporting documents including the Declaration of the Claims Administrator (Ex. B to the Motion), all other pleadings filed with the Court; and having reviewed the entire record in the Litigation, conducted a hearing

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:15970
on November 7, 2012; good cause appearing, the Court being fully advised in the premises, and after due deliberation,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 1. The Court, for purposes of this Final Judgment Order (the "Order"), adopts the defined terms as set forth in the Stipulation. 2. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Litigation, Plaintiffs, the Class, the Subclasses and Defendants. 3. The Court finds that the distribution of the Notice and Proof of Claim form, and publication of the Summary Notice, as set forth in the Order on Joint Motion to Approve Notices and Schedule Final Approval Hearing (Docket No. 703) constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances to apprise all Persons within the Class and each respective Subclass of their rights regarding the proposed Settlement of the Litigation, and that these documents afforded Class Members with an opportunity to present their objections, if any, to the Settlement. The Court finds that the provision of notice to the Class Members fully met the requirements of FED. R. Crv. P. 23, the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and all other applicable law. 4. After hearing on the Motion, and based upon the submissions of the Parties before and at the hearing and subsequent thereto, the Motion is granted. This Court approves the Settlement as set forth in the Stipulation, each of the releases contained in the Stipulation, and other terms as fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the Class and each of the Subclasses. 5. In addition, the Court specifically finds:
a. The Settlement recovery is commensurate with the strength of the claims of the Class and the Subclasses.
2

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:15971

b. Further litigation of the Class Members' claims would be complex, lengthy and expensive, and not certain to yield a positive result for the Class or the Subclasses.
c. There is no indication of any collusion between Class Counsel and Plaintiff acting as class representatives, on the one hand, and Defendants, on the other. This matter has been vigorously and ably litigated by both sides.

d. Class Counsel, experienced class action attorneys in this niche of the law, have expressed the view that the Settlement terms are fair.

e. The Class Members who received appropriate notice have supported the Settlement. No Class Members have objected to the Settlement.

f. The stage of proceedings is highly appropriate for a class settlement. The Parties have taken extensive discovery and litigated summary judgment issues, and thus have a good sense of the value of the case.

6. The Parties to the Stipulation are therefore directed to consummate and perform

its terms. The Court hereby accordingly authorizes and directs the Defendants to make the

following payments from the Settlement Fund in accordance with the timing set forth below:

ReciRient A-1 Subclass Members A-2 Subclass Members A-3 Subclass Members Named Plaintiffs? Deposed Class Members3 Class Counsel's Expert Witness

Amount

Timing of Pal:ment

$500.00 per person, to 162 A- January 7, 2013 1 Subclass Members

$8,750 per person, to 178 to January 7, 2013 1801 A-2 Subclass Members

$15,000 per person, to 245 A- January 7, 2013 3 Subclass Members

$7,750 per person, to 11 January 7, 2013 Named Plaintiffs

$948.71 per person, to 39 January 7, 2013 Deposed Class Members

$14,000

January 7, 2013

1 See Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, p. 8, fn. 2. Two claims remain to be
resolved as of the date of the Final Approval Hearing. The Parties respectfully request that this Order follow and
incorporate the direction of the Claims Administrator regarding these Claims. 2 This amount will be provided to each of the Named Plaintiffs in addition to the amount each are to
receive for membership in their respective Subclass. 1 This amount will be provided to each of the Deposed Class members in addition to the amount each are
to receive for membership in their respective Subclass.

3

,_

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:15972

7. On April 6, 2012, the funds from any uncashed checks relating to the payments set forth in Paragraph 6 of this Final Judgment Order shall revert to the City of Chicago.

8. In addition, the City is directed to make the following payments pursuant to the

terms of the Stipulation, and in accordance with the timing set forth below:

Recigient
People's Law Office James R. Fennerty & Associates West Town Community Law Office People's Law Office James R. Fennerty & Associates West Town Community Law Office

Amount
$1,440,000 $480,000 $480,000 $1,440,000 $480,000 $480,000

Timin~~t of Pa1:ment
January 7, 2013 January 7, 2013 January 7, 2013 January 7, 2014 January 7, 2014 January 7, 2014

9. The Third Amended Complaint and all claims contained therein and in all prior complaints in this case are hereby dismissed with prejudice as to Plaintiffs and all Class Members, extinguishing all claims, rights, demands and causes of action which might have been asserted therein by (1) Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves, the Class, and each of the respective Subclasses, and (2) all Class Members and discharging Defendants therefrom. The Parties are to bear their own costs, except as provided in the Stipulation and herein.
10. By operation of the Order, and under the terms of the Stipulation and releases therein, it is intended to preclude, and shall preclude, Plaintiffs and all Class Members from filing or pursuing any Settled Claims under federal law or the law of any state against Defendants. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are deemed to have, and by operation of the Order shall have fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished and discharged all Settled Claims against each and all of the Released Parties, whether or not such member of the Class executed or timely delivered the Proof of Claim.

4

,_

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:15973

11. All Class Members are permanently barred and enjoined from instituting or prosecuting, in any capacity, any action or proceeding that involves or asserts any of the Settled Claims. Only those Class Members who have filed valid and timely Proofs of Claim shall be entitled to receive a distribution from the Settlement Fund. The Proof of Claim and Release executed by the Class Members shall further release all Settled Claims against the Released Parties. All Class Members shall be bound by the releases whether or not they submit a valid and timely Proof of Claim.
12. Neither the Stipulation nor the Settlement, nor any act performed or document executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the Stipulation or the Settlement (i) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the validity of any Settled Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of Defendants; or (ii) shall be offered in evidence by any Party for any purpose except as provided for in this paragraph. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Parties expressly agree that this Stipulation and the related documents may be used by Class Members seeking to expunge or seal any arrest or other records relating to the 2003 Anti-War Protest. The Released Parties may also file the Stipulation and/or the Order in any other action that may be brought against them in order to support a defense based upon principals of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, good faith settlement, accord and satisfaction, judgment bar, or any theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion or similar defense. The Parties may file the Stipulation in any proceeding brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions of the Stipulation.
13. Only those Persons identified on Exhibit 1 hereto as having met the definition of the Class and validly and timely filing Requests for Exclusion shall not be bound by this Order.

5

·-

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:15974

14. No order, objection to or appeal from any order approvmg Class Counsel's

Attorney's Fees shall in any way disturb or affect this Order and shall be considered separate

from this Order.

15. Neither this Order, the Settlement or Stipulation, nor any negotiations, statements,

or proceedings in connection therewith, nor any action undertaken pursuant thereto shall be

construed as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission or concession on the part of Defendants

or any other Person of any liability or wrongdoing by them, and shall not be offered or received

in evidence in any action or proceeding, or be used in any way as an admission, concession or

evidence of any liability or wrongdoing of any nature, and shall not be construed as, or deemed

to be evidence of, an admission or concession that Plaintiffs, any member of the Class, or any

other person, has suffered any damage, that Defendants' defenses lack merit, or that Plaintiffs

and the Class could have recovered the Settlement Fund amount, or any amount, had this

Litigation been tried; nor shall they be construed as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission

or concession by Plaintiffs or any members of the Class that any of their claims are without

merit, or that any defenses asserted by Defendants have any merit, or that damages recoverable

in the Litigation would not have exceeded the Settlement Fund.

16. The Court finds that the amount paid and other terms of the Settlement were

negotiated at arm's length and in good faith by the Parties, and reflect a settlement that was

reached voluntarily based upon adequate information and after consultation with experienced

legal counsel, and is fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the Class and each

of the Subclasses.
q 17. This matter is set for November/Dessmberc:97, 2012 at ~ ?o ah'

to address

any Request for Hearing filed with the Court pursuant to the Stipulation on or before November

6

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:15975 15, 2012. The Claims Administrator is directed to provide a copy of this Order to any Person who timely files a Request for Hearing.
18. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement of this Order.
By the Court:
j, Dated: November 2012
7

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 714 Filed: 11/07/12 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:15976
Exhibit No. 1 (List of Persons Excluded)
Subclass A-1 Hatem Abudeyyah Subclass A-2 Andy Thayer Timothy Tucker Helen Walls Subclass A-3 Vincenzo Cancasi Vincent Forgione St. John Marie Gauthier Christopher Langone Trina Zabarsky
1225479_3

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 697 Filed: 06/26/12 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:15798

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN VODAK, et al.,
vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Plaintiff, Defendants.

No. 03 C 2463 Judge Virginia M. Kendall

JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE AMENDED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Defendants City of Chicago (the “City”), Terry Hillard, Philip Cline, James Maurer,

Thomas Byrne, Frank Radke, Joseph Griffin, the Estate of John Risley, Thomas Epach and

Karen Rowan (collectively, “Defendants”), and Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sarah Bergstrand,

Prudence Browne, Robert Castillo, John Patrick Donnell, Matthew Gaines, Angela Garcia,

Kathleen Gruber, Steven Hudosh, Elizabeth Johnson, Sophia Sieczkowski, individually and on

behalf of the Class and Subclasses that they represent (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) (Defendants and

Plaintiffs are collective referred to as the “Parties” herein), move this Court to approve the Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement1 (the “Amended Stipulation,” attached hereto

as Exhibit A). In support of this Motion, the Parties state as follows:

1. The Parties previously entered into a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement of

Class (the “Stipulation,” Docket No. 689-1), which set forth the terms and conditions of the

Parties’ Settlement, including payments to members of the Class and various Subclasses who

filed timely and complete Proofs of Claim. In addition, the named Plaintiffs and Class Members

who had been deposed in this case will receive incentive payments. The total amount of the

1

Unless specifically defined herein, all capitalized terms shall have the meanings provided in the

Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement between the Parties.

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 697 Filed: 06/26/12 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:15799
agreed upon Settlement Fund is $6.2 million. In exchange, the Defendants received a release from all members of the Class relating to any and all claims relating to or arising through the 2003 Anti-War Protest. The Stipulation received preliminary approval from this Court on May 14, 2012. (Docket No. 692.)
2. Since the Court preliminarily approved the Stipulation, Parties have agreed upon additional terms, including the City’s payment of attorneys’ fees for Class Counsel in the amount of $4.8 million and the City’s role in assisting the members of Sub-Class A-2 and A-3 in obtaining expungement of their arrest and/or court records. Specifically, the Parties agreed that the City will provide Criminal History Record Information (“CHRI”) to those members who request such as a part of the Claims Administration process, at no charge (which is normally $16), for a total value of $6,400 for up to approximately 400 potential requests from Class Members. The CHRIs will be provided to Class Counsel contemporaneous with the settlement payments.
3. Accordingly, the following specific changes to the Stipulation are deemed necessary and appropriate by the Parties to memorialize the Parties’ agreement:
(a) Article VI of the Stipulation was amended to include the Parties’ resolution of the issue of attorneys’ fees, which as of the date of preliminary approval of the Settlement remained unresolved. Specifically, the Parties agreed that the City shall pay Class Counsel an amount of $4.8 million in two equal installments to be paid on January 7, 2013 and on January 7, 2014. The Amended Stipulation reflects this additional agreement. (See, e.g., Amended Stipulation, §§ 6.1, 6.2.)
(b) The Stipulation was amended to include the Parties’ agreement with respect to the issue of expungement of the arrest histories and/or court records by members of the A-2 and A-3 Subclasses, namely the provision of CHRIs to requesting Class Members who timely file Proofs of Claim. Id., Article VII.
4. In addition, the Parties agreed to modify the timing of the mailing of the Notice and the publication of the Summary Notice. The initial Stipulation provided that the mailing of
2

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 697 Filed: 06/26/12 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:15800
the Notice would be sent out thirty (30) days after City Council approval was provided. The City Council approved the Settlement on June 6, 2012, which would require the Notice to be mailed out on July 6, 2012. Because the Claims Administrator is only now being retained (by and through the Order on the Joint Motion to Approve Notices and Schedule Final Approval Hearing), this is an insufficient period of time in which to complete the mailing. Therefore, the Parties agreed to amend the schedule for mailing the Notice (to July 23, 2012) and publishing the Summary Notice (with the initial publication within 14 days of retention of the Claims Administrator). (Id., Section 11.1.) The Parties have consulted with the Claims Administrator, who has proposed that these are reasonable dates for mailing the Notice and publishing the Summary Notice.
5. A copy of the Amended Stipulation is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and a redline marking the changes from the Stipulation is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Parties jointly respectfully request that the Court enter an order, in substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit C, providing for approval of the Amended Stipulation.
3

Case: 1:03-cv-02463 Document #: 697 Filed: 06/26/12 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:15801

WHEREFORE, the Parties request that this Honorable Court enter an order in substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit C, approving the Amended Stipulation attached hereto as Exhibit A, and granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. Dated: June 26, 2012

By: Allan T. Slagel (ARDC No. 6198470) aslagel@shefskylaw.com Cary E. Donham (ARDC No. 6199385) cdonham@shefskylaw.com Heather A. Jackson (ARDC No. 6243164) hjackson@shefskylaw.com Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. 111 East Wacker Drive Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Telephone: (312) 527-4000 Facsimile: (312) 527-4011

s/ Heather A. Jackson One of the Attorneys for Defendants CITY OF CHICAGO and TERRY HILLARD, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

By: s/ Joey L. Mogul

Joey L. Mogul

One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John L. Stainthorp

Janine L. Hoft

Sarah Gelsomino

People’s Law Office

1180 North Milwaukee Avenue, 3rd Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60642

Telephone: (773) 235-0070

Facsimile: (773) 235-6699

1213947_2

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 CITY OF CHICAGO AGREES TO PAY $6.2 MILLION IN CLASS ACTION FOR PROTESTORS ARRESTED AT 2003 ANTI-WAR PROTEST
A settlement has been reached in the class action law suit Vodak v. City of Chicago, brought against the Chicago Police Department on behalf of over 700 protestors who were falsely arrested during a demonstration against the Iraq war on March 20, 2003. On that date, over 10,000 protestors demonstrated in Chicago against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, marching through downtown streets and up Lake Shore Drive before Chicago Police surrounded, detained and arrested over 700 people.
Last year an important victory was achieved in the case when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion which strongly criticized the City of Chicago for its treatment of the demonstrators and reinstated the case after it had been dismissed by the District Court. This opinion, which holds that the City cannot arrest peaceful demonstrators without warning, merely because they do not have a permit, will apply to all future demonstrations.
Now, on the eve of trial, the City has finally agreed to settle this case, agreeing to provide a total of $6.2 Million to compensate the more than 700 class members. The class is made up of three different sub-classes and the potential compensation each class member receives will depend on which sub-class they are in.
- A-3 sub-class: those who were arrested, charged and had to go to court, will receive up to $15,000 - A-2 sub-class: those arrested and released without being charged, will receive up to $8,750 - A-1 sub-class: those who were held on the street for over 90 minutes, will receive up to $500
In addition, there will be additional payments to persons who are named in the lawsuit as the class representatives and class members who were required to give depositions in the case.
Lawyers for the plaintiffs will also be negotiating with the City and petitioning the court to separately pay their legal fees and the costs of the case. This payment will be in addition to the $6.2 million paid to their clients.
There were also instances of police brutality that night and lawyers working on the case have previously settled a number of excessive force cases totaling over $300,000 in compensation for those who had handcuff injuries, broken bones and wounds requiring stitches.
This case is important not only to the class members and their attorneys, but also for civil liberties, as it scores a significant victory for the right to demonstrate in Chicago.

This substantial settlement will send an unequivocal message to the City of Chicago and its police department that they must respect the right to free speech and assembly. The class action lawsuit has been litigated by a legal team of attorneys and legal workers who are all members of the National Lawyers Guild. People’s Law Office attorneys Janine Hoft, Joey Mogul, Sarah Gelsomino and John Stainthorp, along with attorneys Melinda Power and Jim Fennerty, as well as paralegal Brad Thomson of People’s Law Office, have litigated the case for almost nine years.
For more information or updates on the settlement, visit peopleslawoffice.com or follow People’s Law Office on facebook and Twitter.

 
 639 F.3d 738 (2011)
Kevin VODAK, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Bruce Beal, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 09-2768, 09-2843, 09-2901.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued October 18, 2010. Decided March 17, 2011.
740*740 Joey L. Mogul (argued), Attorney, People's Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants in Nos. 09-2768 and 09-2843.
Mara S. Georges, Kerrie Maloney Laytin (argued), Attorneys, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Richard T. Sikes, Jr., Attorney, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees in No. 09-2768.
Mara S. Georges, Attorney, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Richard T. Sikes, Jr., Attorney, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee in No. 09-2843.
Gregory X. Gorman (argued), Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 092901.
Mara S. Georges, Kerrie Maloney Laytin (argued), Attorneys, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Joseph P. Roddy, Attorney, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees in No. 09-2901.
Before POSNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN, District Judge.[*]
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
On March 20, 2003, the day after the second war between the United States and Iraq began, a large demonstration was held in Chicago by opponents of the U.S. invasion. The demonstration resulted in some 900 arrests, which in turn produced two lawsuits, one a class action suit on behalf of 887 persons—Vodak v. City of Chicago—and the other a suit by 16 individuals—Beal v. City of Chicago. The suits, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and which were consolidated in the district court and can for the most part be discussed together, charged the City and a number of police officers with violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, together with a long list of violations of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Our focus, for reasons that will become apparent, is on the Fourth Amendment claims. The district judge dismissed both suits on summary judgment, reasoning that the officers were immune from being sued for damages

because the illegality of their action had not been clearly established when they acted, 624 F.Supp.2d 933, 955-59 (N.D.Ill.2009), and that the City was not liable because no official authorized to make policy for the City had been responsible for any of the alleged illegalities.
We'll state the facts as favorably to the plaintiffs as the record permits, as we must given the procedural posture. The statements of facts in the defendants' briefs present the evidence they'd like a jury to accept, rather than just the evidence that, being unrefuted or irrefutable, provides a permissible basis for a grant of summary judgment. Such a mode of presentation is unhelpful to the court.
741*741 The organizers of the demonstration wanted it to coincide with the start of the war. They knew war was imminent but did not know exactly when it would start. Under the Chicago ordinances governing demonstrations, a permit is required for a "parade," Chi. Munic. Code § 10-8-330(b), defined as "any march, procession or other similar activity consisting of persons, animals, vehicles or things, or combination thereof, upon any public street, sidewalk, alley or other public place, which requires a street closing or otherwise requires police officers to stop or reroute vehicular traffic because the marchers will not comply with normal and usual traffic regulations or controls." § 10-8330(a)(1). The demonstration in this case consisted mainly of a march, and we'll generally use that word in preference to parade or demonstration.
The Code requires that the application for the permit specify the date and route of the march, and gives the City five days to act on the application "except that where the purpose of [the demonstration] is a spontaneous response to a current event, or where other good and compelling cause is shown, the [City] shall act within two business days." § 10-8-330(f)(4), (7), (j). But when a march is planned for the unknown date of some triggering event, so that even two days' notice is infeasible, the police, as a matter of uncodified practice, will sometimes waive the requirement of a permit. The City's brief acknowledges the existence of a "standard route for un-permitted marches." Apparently these "unpermitted marches" are sufficiently frequent that the police have adopted a practice of "permitting" them to use a specific corridor of city streets. This waiver of the permit requirement is informal; it seems to consist just in not telling the demonstrators that they need a permit.
In discussions with the organizers of the contemplated demonstration, the police made no objections even though they were unable to work out an agreement with the organizers on the route that the march phase of the demonstration would take. The demonstrators didn't want to stay in one place; they wanted to march; but it was unclear where they wanted to march. They were being cagey; and the police, we can assume without having to decide, could have forbidden the march unless the organizers would commit to a specific route that would not cause commuting chaos or other undue disruption of the normal life of the city. But they did not insist on such a commitment. It seems to have been agreed that the march would start in the Federal Plaza on Dearborn Street, but where it would go from there was left open.

The day came, the demonstration began, and here is a map of the area in which it took place (image derived from map © 2011 Google):
742*742
X marks the beginning of the march, the lines indicate the path of the march, and Y is the area, on Chicago Avenue, where the arrests that precipitated the litigation occurred.
The demonstration began with a rally at Federal Plaza (X on the map) that turned into a march. The marchers turned east (right on the map as you face it) on Adams Street and Jackson Boulevard, which intersect Dearborn Street near the Federal Plaza, and marched all the way to Lake Shore Drive, a multilane commuting thoroughfare, where they turned north. The police tried without conspicuous success to confine the marchers to the northbound lanes of Lake Shore Drive in order to minimize blockage of traffic. As the march proceeded, the police learned from the organizers that the intended route of the march was north on Lake Shore Drive for more than two miles to North Avenue, a major east-west artery, where the marchers would turn west, leaving Lake Shore Drive, and disperse.
But when the marchers arrived, well short of North Avenue, at the intersection of Lake Shore Drive with Oak Street, which runs west and after a few blocks intersects Michigan Avenue, most of them—perhaps as many as 8,000—turned left on Oak Street and marched to its intersection with Michigan Avenue. But we need to explain the sense in which Lake Shore Drive and Oak Street "intersect." For part of its distance Lake Shore Drive actually consists of two separate 743*743 roads—the "outer drive," a limitedaccess highway on which the demonstrators were marching north, and the "inner drive," a local street immediately to the west of the outer drive. The inner drive connects with Oak Street; the outer drive does not. But the outer drive is just feet away from the inner drive at the inner drive's intersection with Oak. So it was easy for the demonstrators to cross from the outer drive to Oak and proceed west. For all we know, they, or many of them anyway, simply decided that it was too long a walk to North Avenue, so rather than going west on North Avenue and dispersing they decided to go west on Oak Street and disperse.
The police, however, who were out in force because of the size of the march, did not want the march to spill over into Michigan Avenue, a major north-south artery; a crowd on or crossing Michigan Avenue would add to the blockage of north-south traffic that the closure of the northbound lanes of Lake Shore Drive, with impedance of southbound traffic as well, was causing. It was still rush hour, and according to the City some marchers were becoming rowdy. It is undisputed that there had been rowdiness on Lake Shore Drive earlier, with some of the marchers rushing into the southbound lanes of Lake Shore Drive (where they weren't supposed to be) and banging on the hoods and windows of cars. Shouts of "Take Michigan!" had been heard, a possible reference to the opulent stores that line Michigan Avenue.

The police, alarmed, formed a line across Oak Street at the Michigan Avenue intersection, blocking the marchers, and told the organizers to direct their flock either to go east on Oak Street to the inner drive and return to Federal Plaza, or to disperse, and warned them that marchers who tried to enter Michigan Avenue would be arrested. The police claim that they shouted this warning through bullhorns.
In the confused and alarming circumstances that we've described, the authority of the police to order the crowd to disperse and return to its starting point cannot be questioned, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 573-74, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (7th Cir.2001); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir.2006), and is not. The marchers had made their point; the march was now getting out of hand; traffic was being impeded.
The marchers began reversing course, marching east on Oak Street and then south on the inner drive. Chicago Avenue is an east-west street five blocks to the south of Oak Street, and thus parallel to it and also intersecting Michigan Avenue after a few blocks. More than a thousand marchers, when they reached the intersection of Chicago Avenue and the inner drive, turned right (west—for remember that they were marching south on the inner drive) and marched down Chicago Avenue to its intersection with Michigan Avenue, where again the police formed a blocking line.
The marchers chose Chicago Avenue rather than one of the other streets that connect the inner drive to Michigan Avenue and points west because the police had set up lines of mounted officers at each intersection with the inner drive between Oak and Chicago, making it impossible to move west on those streets. What happened on Chicago Avenue is disputed. The police say they were directing the marchers to continue south but lacked enough man- and horse-power to block all 744*744 the intersections. But there is evidence that no police orders were given at the intersection of Chicago Avenue with the inner drive, although two mounted officers were on either side of Chicago Avenue at the intersection—yet their presence, not blocking the avenue, might have made the marchers think it a permitted route west for them. There is also evidence that some of the marchers thought the police were directing them onto Chicago Avenue rather than to continue south on the inner drive. In any event more than a thousand people ended up streaming west on Chicago.
Rather than telling them to turn back and return to Federal Plaza via the inner drive, the police formed a second blocking line (the first being at the intersection of Chicago Avenue with Michigan Avenue), behind the marchers, at the intersection of Chicago Avenue with a north-south street called Mies Van Der Rohe Way. Marchers proceeding down Chicago Avenue to its intersection with Michigan Avenue thus became penned between the two X's marked on the next map (also from Google) because there is no north-south street between Mies Van Der Rohe Way and Michigan Avenue, and they could not escape north on Mies Van Der Rohe Way itself because the police line behind the marchers was west of the intersection between that street and Chicago Avenue.

The police then began culling the trapped herd, arresting marchers along with people who weren't part of the march but were just trying to get home and to do so needed to cross Michigan Avenue. The police seem to have considered the marchers' presence on Chicago Avenue illegal because they'd been ordered when they had been on Oak Street to return to Federal Plaza via the inner drive, or disperse, yet instead they were trying to reach (and perhaps "take") Michigan Avenue by a parallel route to Oak.
Some of the persons trapped between the police lines on Chicago Avenue were arrested but released after an hour or two without being charged or jailed; some were jailed but released the next morning without being charged; and some were jailed and charged with reckless conduct. But all charges were dropped. There is considerable evidence of unprofessional behavior by police in arresting and jailing the people trapped between Michigan Avenue and Mies Van Der Rohe Way, but no need to discuss that behavior in this opinion; for we would have to reverse even if the police had behaved like perfect gentlemen. For the same reason, the fact that some of the marchers were rowdy and may have committed 745*745 criminal acts consisting of minor property damage and defiance of lawful police orders that some marchers may have heard, mainly the orders given (if they were given) on Oak Street or Michigan Avenue that the demonstrators were not to try to reach Michigan Avenue by an alternative route, need not be discussed in detail; demonstrators' misconduct cannot on the present record be thought to have justified the mass arrests of persons trapped by the police on Chicago Avenue.
In part because there was no permit, which would have specified the route of the march, the marchers, or at least many of them, didn't know they were supposed to continue north on Lake Shore Drive to North Avenue and were not instead to turn left on Oak Street and proceed to Michigan Avenue. That didn't mean the police had to let them enter Michigan Avenue. They had adequate reasons not to let them do so, and could in the circumstances—a large protest march that was getting out of hand—order them to return to the place where the demonstration had begun, and by a route prescribed by the police, or to disperse, but in any event not try to reach Michigan Avenue by any route. But before the police could start arresting peaceable demonstrators for defying their orders they had to communicate the orders to the demonstrators. They had to tell them not only that they couldn't enter Michigan Avenue at Oak but also that they had to return to Federal Plaza via the inner drive, or disperse (exactly what "disperse" means in this setting is unclear, but we'll assume it means go anywhere except to Michigan Avenue). The plaintiffs have submitted some 250 affidavits attesting that they did not hear or otherwise learn of any command to disperse, and anyway could not disperse once they reached a point on Chicago Avenue near its intersection with Michigan Avenue because they were trapped there between the police lines.
The defendants claim that such orders were given, either directly through bullhorns or indirectly through the organizers, but this is disputed. And even if dispersal orders were given, there would have to be evidence that the police reasonably believed that the protesters who were arrested, or at least most of them, had heard the orders. For this could not be assumed. Bullhorns will not carry from Michigan Avenue to the inner drive,

and the organizers could not relay the police order to 8,000 demonstrators even if they tried, which they may not have, since according to the defendants the organizers were trying to foment a riot. (The police are thus arguing that the organizers were trying both to help and to hinder them.) Maybe the marchers who left Oak Street without having learned of the order to return to Federal Plaza or disperse, turned right on Chicago Avenue, and marched back to Michigan Avenue should have guessed that it was a forbidden route as well, and no doubt some did, but others may simply have been following the crowd, thinking that it either was a proper route for the march or a way out. In fact Michigan Avenue would be a more direct route back to the Federal Plaza than the inner drive.
All this would be of no consequence had the police had a reason for arresting the crowd on Chicago Avenue other than that anyone in that crowd could be assumed to have willfully violated the return-or-disperse order issued at Michigan and Oak. But they had no other reason. The crowd wasn't trying to break through the police barrier at the intersection of Chicago Avenue with Michigan Avenue. The police were numerous, in riot gear, and formidable. The crowd was just milling about, predominantly peaceably (the defendants do not agree that the crowd was peaceable, 746*746 but this is a disputable and disputed contention; it cannot be confirmed without a trial). The police could have ordered the demonstrators to go back to the inner drive, could probably have herded them back there, and having done so herded them (along with lesser crowds at other side streets) the rest of the way back to Federal Plaza. What they could not lawfully do, in circumstances that were not threatening to the safety of the police or other people, was arrest people who the police had no good reason to believe knew they were violating a police order. Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C.Cir.2006); Papineau v. Parmley, supra, 465 F.3d at 59-60; Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2008); cf. Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537-38 (7th Cir.2009).
The qualification "reason to believe" is essential. The police need only probable cause to make an arrest that complies with the Fourth Amendment. The defendants argue that a reasonable police officer would think that anyone found on Chicago Avenue after the return-or-disperse order issued at Oak and Michigan was willfully violating that order. But that would not be a reasonable belief. As there was no permit, there was no prescribed march route, and there was no mechanism (at least no mechanism that was employed) for conveying a command to thousands of people stretched out on Oak Street between the inner drive and Michigan Avenue. How could the police at the intersection of Chicago and Michigan even know that the crowd on Chicago consisted of persons returning from Oak Street, rather than persons who marching north on Lake Shore Drive had turned left at Chicago rather than continuing on to Oak or North?
The underlying problem is the basic idiocy of a permit system that does not allow a permit for a march to be granted if the date of the march can't be fixed in advance, but does allow the police to waive the permit requirement just by not prohibiting the demonstration. See generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, "The Neglected Right of Assembly," 56 UCLA L.Rev. 543, 548-52 (2009); Vince Blasi, "Prior Restraints on Demonstrations,"

68 Mich. L.Rev. 1481, 1524-27 and n. 170 (1970). The defendants' lawyer at oral argument was unable to come up with a reason for such a rule. As a result not of the rule itself but of the failure to plug the hole in it, the police did not know what the route of the march would be and, reacting ad hoc and perhaps in some panic, resorted to mass arrests without justification. Or so at least a trier of fact could find on the record compiled to date.
The district judge ruled that it was not clearly established law on March 20, 2003, that police cannot upon revocation of a permit arrest any demonstrator who does not immediately cease demonstrating and leave the scene. If this is right, then the judge's ruling that the police are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity from liability in damages to any demonstrator or suspected demonstrator who was arrested is also right. But the premise is wrong. The Supreme Court had held decades earlier that police must give notice of revocation of permission to demonstrate before they can begin arresting demonstrators. Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 571-73, 85 S.Ct. 476; see also Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283-84 (10th Cir.2008); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1977).
No precedent should be necessary, moreover, to establish that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the police to say to a person go ahead and march and then, five minutes later, having revoked the permission for the march without notice 747*747 to anyone, arrest the person for having marched without police permission. This would be "an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State—convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him." Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959). So this is one of those cases in which a defense of immunity would fail even in the absence of a precedent that had established the illegality of the defendants' conduct. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269-70, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); Northen v. City of Chicago, 126 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1997). The absence of a reported case with similar facts may demonstrate nothing more than widespread compliance with well-recognized constitutional principles. Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1028 (7th Cir.1994); see also K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir.1990).
The district court dismissed the City of Chicago as a defendant on the ground that it did not participate in the unlawful arrests. For reasons based on what scholars agree are historical misreadings (which are not uncommon when judges play historian), see, e.g., David Jacks Achtenberg, "Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior," 73 Fordham L.Rev. 2183, 2204-12 (2005); Jack M. Beermann, "Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts," 48 DePaul L.Rev. 627, 629-35 (1999); Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, "Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis," 1987 Sup.Ct. Rev. 249, 257-61; Peter H. Schuck, "Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons From Tort Law and Organization Theory," 77 Geo. L.J. 1753, 1755 n. 13 (1989); see also Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431-33, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (dissenting opinion), the Supreme Court has held that municipalities are not

liable for the torts of their employees under the strict-liability doctrine of respondeat superior, as private employers are. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A person who wants to impose liability on a municipality for a constitutional tort must show that the tort was committed (that is, authorized or directed) at the policymaking level of government—by the city council, for example, rather than by the police officer who made an illegal arrest. Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, supra, 520 U.S. at 402-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382; Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 736-38, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). "Liability for unauthorized acts is personal; to hold the municipality liable, Monell tells us, the agent's action must implement rather than frustrate the government's policy." Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir.1992).
The City makes the extravagant claim that the only officials whose tortious conduct can ever impose liability on it are the members of the City Council acting through their ordinances. The City denies that the Council has delegated authority to make policy to any official of the City's government. Not even acts of the Mayor are acts of the City, it contends; they are merely acts of an errant employee. However that may be, the only rule governing policies and procedures regarding mass arrests is Chicago Police Department General Order 02-11 (Nov. 1, 2002), issued in the name of the City's Superintendent of Police pursuant to a provision of the Chicago Municipal Code stating that "the superintendent shall be responsible for the general management and control of the police department and shall have full and complete 748*748 authority to administer the department in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the city, the laws of the state, and the rules and regulations of the police board." § 2-84-040. The City Council can enact ordinances that constrain the Superintendent's authority to make mass arrests in demonstration situations, but it hasn't done so, and thus it has allowed him to be sole policymaker in relation to the events at issue in this case. He alone makes policy for demonstrations that get out of hand. His possession of this policymaking authority is consistent with Illinois state law as well as with the City's ordinances. Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App.3d 635, 271 Ill.Dec. 40, 784 N.E.2d 258, 278 (2002).
We said in Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 676 (7th Cir.2009), that "helpful in determining whether an official is a final decisionmaker is an inquiry into: (1) whether the official is constrained by policies of other officials or legislative bodies; (2) whether the official's decision on the issue in question is subject to meaningful review; and (3) `whether the policy decision purportedly made by the official is within the realm of the official's grant of authority.' Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 448 (10th Cir.1995)." The answers in this case are no, no, and yes. Or, as we said in Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2001)—but it could have been said with this case in mind—"it doesn't matter what form the action of the responsible authority that injures the plaintiff takes. It might be an ordinance, a regulation, an executive policy, or an executive act (such as firing the plaintiff). The question is whether the promulgator, or the actor, as the case may be—in other words, the decisionmaker—was at the apex of authority for the action in question" (emphasis in original).

The qualification "for the action in question" is vital. We don't know the full scope of the police superintendent's authority. But one can be an official policymaker in one domain but not in another. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) ("our cases on the liability of local governments under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue"); Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights, supra, 575 F.3d at 677-78; Kujawski v. Board of Commissioners, 183 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.1999). All that matters in this case is that Chicago's police superintendent has sole responsibility to make policy regarding control of demonstrations. He was in his headquarters throughout the March 20, 2003, demonstration, not only monitoring it but also approving the decisions of his subordinates, specifically their decisions to shield Michigan Avenue from the marchers and to make the mass arrests of the people trapped on Chicago Avenue. The superintendent was the City, so far as the demonstration and arrests were concerned. (For similar cases, see, besides Valentino, Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, supra, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702; Kujawski v. Board of Commissioners, supra, 183 F.3d at 739-40; Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir.1995); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 59-61 (2d Cir.2000).)
The City argues, on the authority of our decision in Auriemma v. Rice, supra, that the police superintendent doesn't have authority to make policy for dealing with demonstrations and mass arrests because he is required to act in conformity with the ordinances enacted by the City Council. But no ordinance constrained him. In Auriemma, 749*749 the City Council had by ordinance limited the police superintendent's discretion with respect to employment decisions. There was no similar limit in this case. There is, it is true, an ordinance in the picture—the ordinance quoted at the beginning of this opinion that forbids the grant of a permit that does not specify a date and route for the permitted activity. The ordinance complicates the task of the police of keeping demonstrations from turning into riots. But there is a difference between a law that complicates an ultimate policymaker's authority and a law that removes or curtails that authority. The City Council determines the police department's budget. The smaller the budget, the fewer police officers there are, and perhaps the less well trained they are, and both budgetary consequences will make it harder to control demonstrations. But they do not affect the police superintendent's nonfiscal authority. Authority and the tools for exercising it are distinct.
A city couldn't without violating freedom of speech and assembly flatly ban groups of people from spontaneously gathering on sidewalks or in public parks in response to a dramatic news event. But it can require a permit for a planned event on public property, especially a large-scale demonstration or march, provided it does not use the requirement to stifle demonstrations by imposing unreasonable conditions, such as having to apply for a permit 45 days in advance, a requirement that we invalidated in Church of American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 676, 682-83 (7th Cir.2003); see also Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir.1996); NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1355-57 (9th Cir.1984); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 162-63, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (concurring opinion). "[S]imple delay may permanently vitiate the expressive content of a

demonstration. A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate more emotion, than the `same' parade 20 days later. The later parade can never be the same. Where spontaneity is part of the message, dissemination delayed is dissemination denied." NAACP v. City of Richmond, supra, 743 F.2d at 1356.
We said in Church of American Knights that "the length of the required period of advance notice is critical to its reasonableness; and given that the time required to consider an application will generally be shorter the smaller the planned demonstration and that political demonstrations are often engendered by topical events, a very long period of advance notice with no exception for spontaneous demonstrations unreasonably limits free speech. A group that had wanted to hold a rally to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq and had applied for a permit from the City of Gary on the first day of the war would have found that the [invasion] had ended before the demonstration was authorized. The City does have an unwritten policy of waiving the permit requirement for a `spontaneous' demonstration, but only if the demonstration is `not planned.' The scope of the dispensation is thus opaque. Courts more skeptical than ours about the validity of advance-notice requirements point out that requiring even a short period of advance notice prevents spontaneous demonstrations." 334 F.3d at 682 (citations omitted).
The Chicago police likewise have an unwritten policy of waiving the permit requirement for a spontaneous demonstration, including (so far as we can determine) a "planned spontaneous" demonstration (oxymoron that it is), such as the one in the present case. There is no contention that the police superintendent lacked authority 750*750 to waive the permit requirement for such a demonstration. Anyway it's not the waiver that the plaintiffs are complaining about. It did them no harm. They are complaining about the decision to arrest them en masse. That was the decision of the superintendent, who is the policymaker regarding mass arrests. All the culpable conduct took place when the plaintiffs were present on Chicago Avenue, reasonably believing that they had permission to be there. The decision to waive the permit requirement did not subject the City to liability—if anything, it shielded the City from liability for curtailing freedom of speech and assembly.
Nothing in either the First Amendment or local law would have forbidden the Chicago police to require of the organizers, as a condition of waiving the permit requirement in order to allow a demonstration on a date as yet uncertain, a clear idea of the intended march route, to hold them to it, and to prepare in advance reasonable measures for preventing the demonstration from spilling over the boundaries of the authorized march. The indifference of the superintendent and his subordinates to the danger to public safety and convenience of a mass antiwar demonstration cannot be attributed to the ordinance, defective as it undoubtedly is.
The grant of summary judgment to the defendants was erroneous and must therefore be reversed. What next? The class in the class action suit (Vodak v. City of Chicago) was certified and the certification is not challenged. This means that the issues common

to the entire class will be resolved as a package, and issues common to the three subclasses as further packages. The issues common to the entire class are whether the police waived the permit requirement, whether they tried to notify the demonstrators (at Michigan and Oak, and Michigan and Chicago) that permission to demonstrate had been revoked and the demonstrators must disperse, and whether the notice if given was sufficient to justify the arrest of all those persons in the Chicago Avenue crowd who were arrested. If those issues are resolved by the trier of fact in favor of the class, any issues common to each of the three subclasses will be resolved by the same trier of fact. After all common issues have been resolved, if they have been resolved in favor of the class members (or some of them), separate hearings will doubtless be necessary to determine the damages to which each class member is entitled.
The sixteen plaintiffs in Beal v. City of Chicago are other persons arrested on Chicago Avenue, some of whom claim not to have been demonstrators but instead to have been complete innocents caught in the cross-fire, as it were. Nothing is more common than for mass arrests in riots or demonstrations to net a sizable percentage of innocents. Persons knowingly involved in a disturbance are quicker to size up the situation and flee when the police close in on them; innocents often freeze in puzzlement, becoming sitting ducks easily swept up in the police charge. It would make sense to fold the Beal plaintiffs into the class action as a fourth subclass, since their claims overlap those of the class members; we hope that will be done on remand.
It would also streamline these suits if the plaintiffs would confine their claims to the Fourth Amendment, forgoing their largely duplicative appeals to the First Amendment, civil conspiracy, malicious prosecution, assault, battery, the Illinois constitution, false arrest, false imprisonment, deprivation of property, and deliberate indifference to medical needs (the last two being charged under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 751*751 All the relief they seek and are conceivably entitled to is available to them under the Fourth Amendment; the First Amendment plays only a background role and the other grounds are redundant.
The judgments are reversed and the cases remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note that the case is already more than seven years old and we urge its expeditious resolution. The further conduct of this litigation requires, and we are confident will receive, a firm hand on the tiller by the able district judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
[*] Hon. Lynn S. Adelman, of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

 
 (2004)
KEVIN VODAK, et al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et. al., Defendants.
No. 03 C 2463.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, EASTERN DIVISION.
May 7, 2004.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
NAN NOLAN, Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil rights putative class action against the City of Chicago, Police Superintendent Hillard, Police Commander Risley, and numerous individual police officers for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for police actions in response to a demonstration which occurred on March 20, 2003. Plaintiffs move to compel answers to discovery. Plaintiffs' motion is granted in part, denied in part, and reserved in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 20, 2003, thousands of persons gathered at the Federal Plaza located at Jackson Avenue and Dearborn Street in Chicago to express concern and protest the commencement of the United States war on Iraq. Over 500 persons were arrested and approximately 200-300 people were detained. Approximately 950 police officers were assigned to work the demonstration-related events. Seventeen named plaintiffs now allege that the City of Chicago and personnel of the Chicago Police Department violated the constitutional rights of the named plaintiffs as well as similarly situated individuals on March 20, 2003 when they unlawfully detained and/or arrested demonstrators.
II. DISCUSSION
The federal rules permit "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party....Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to Interrogatories 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 directed to the City of Chicago, Interrogatories 3 through 7 directed to Individual Defendants Risley and Hillard, and the production of miscellaneous categories of documents described herein. The Court addresses each category of information below.

A. Identification of Police Officers Having Personal Knowledge of Each Arrestee or Detainee
Plaintiffs seek to discover the identity of any officer who has any personal knowledge of plaintiffs' or putative class members' arrests and/or detentions and the justifications for their detentions and arrests on March 20, 2003. Defendants have provided arrest documents that include the name and badge number of each officer allegedly assigned to the protest. Plaintiffs have conducted depositions of the "arresting officer" identified on each of the police department documents referring to each of the named plaintiffs, and apparently no arresting officer possesses any personal knowledge of the conduct of any of the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs state that each officer deposed had "no personal knowledge as to why an individual Plaintiff was arrested, what individual conduct any Plaintiff or putative class members committed, or could inform us as to who arrested Plaintiffs or the putative class members." Pls' Reply, p. 4. Plaintiffs assert that the City, thus, has a duty to interview its employees and identify which officers have particularized knowledge of which arrestees or detainees.
Plaintiffs argue that this type of class-wide discovery is relevant, even prior to certification of a class, as evidence of defendant officers' intent, preparation, plan, and modus operandi to detain and arrest all individuals at Chicago and Michigan Avenues. Plaintiffs contend that this evidence may show that plaintiffs were arrested based on a course of conduct to arrest all putative class members and refute defendants' assertions that plaintiffs were arrested on the basis of individualized determinations made by individual officers. Plaintiffs also argue that this information is relevant to plaintiffs' policy claim that defendants have a de facto pattern and practice of falsely arresting civilians, including citizens expressing their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs note that Judge Coar has not bifurcated policy discovery in this case.
Defendants do not contest the relevancy of the information sought by plaintiffs' request but rather, assert that plaintiffs' request for information from hundreds of individual police officers is overbroad, economically oppressive and premature prior to a class certification ruling.[1] Defendants state that responding to plaintiffs' request would take nearly two years and cost nearly $900,000.00. See Defendants' Group Exhibit G and Affidavit of Terrance Sheahan, Ex. H, para. 4-8. Defendants also point out, among other things, that Plaintiffs have not identified who the potential class members are. Defendants are therefore concerned about the practicality of expecting officers to offer justifications for detentions and arrests of unidentified protesters. Defendants maintain that discovery should be limited to the named plaintiffs prior to any certification of a class and state that they will interview all police officers named in the arrest reports for each of the named plaintiffs taken into custody, and attempt to identify others who have knowledge of the arrests. Defendants are directed to provide the requested information with respect to the named plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' real concern—and it is a legitimate concern—is avoiding prejudicial surprise at trial. Plaintiffs argue that the entire purpose of discovery is thwarted if they are

"surprised on the eve of trial when the Defendants decide to call 1 or 10 or 50 of the 950 police officers present at the demonstration on March 20, 2003 to testify as to why one of the 17 Plaintiffs or another putative class member was detained, arrested or charged on March 20, 2003." Pls' Reply, p. 6. Plaintiffs are correct that the whole point of the discovery process is to prevent trial by ambush. For example, with respect to potential witnesses, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires defendants to provide plaintiffs with the "name ... of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its ... defenses ..., identifying the subjects of the information." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Rule 26 also requires defendants to supplement their Rule 26(a) disclosures if they learn that the information disclosed is "incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing." Moreover, plaintiffs have specifically asked the City in Interrogatory 10 to identify all persons the City may call as a witness at trial and the subject of the testimony.
Even if the amount of time and expense involved in obtaining responsive information and drafting answers to plaintiffs' request has been inflated as suggested by plaintiffs, defendants' burdensome argument is not without merit. In an effort to balance the hardship to defendants against plaintiffs' need for access to the information to avoid unfair surprise at trial, the Court issues the following compromise. Regardless of whether a class is certified in this case, defendants shall provide to plaintiffs no later than 60 days prior to the fact discovery cut-off date, the names of any officers they may call at trial to testify regarding any particular knowledge of the individualized conduct of any of the named plaintiffs or any identified protester on March 20, 2003. Given the clear and undisputed relevance of this information, it is not inappropriate to expect defendants to provide this information prior to the close of fact discovery. This deadline will presumably allow plaintiffs a sufficient opportunity to depose these witnesses and develop evidence to contest their anticipated testimony. This compromise is not absolute. If during the course of discovery the plaintiffs' need for further information regarding this topic becomes clearer, the Court is willing to consider a renewal of this motion and the appropriateness of any sampling alternatives that the parties may suggest.
B. Identification of Police Personnel Who Gave Order or Directives on 3/20
Interrogatory 6 directed to the City asked whether any amplification devices were used on March 20, 2003 to communicate with plaintiffs and if so, the date, time, location, and substance of any communication. Two arresting officers testified during their depositions that when they were told to make arrests they were told an order to disperse was previously given to the demonstrators. In addition, defendants asserted in their response to plaintiffs' motion to compel:
Police repeatedly ordered the crowd (at Oak and Michigan) to either disperse or return to the Federal Plaza by way of Lake Shore Drive and not Michigan Avenue.... a large

group heading south on inner Lake Shore Drive suddenly turned west on Chicago Avenue determined to outrun police to Michigan Avenue. They too were stopped. As at Oak and Michigan, protestors were given repeated orders to disperse.
With respect to orders to arrest, two Sergeants and two officers have testified that they began to arrest individuals at Chicago and Michigan after receiving orders from supervisors, including Commanders to do so. Plaintiffs request that defendants identify what orders to arrest or detain were given, by whom, and in what manner they were delivered through the command structure.
Plaintiffs are entitled to discover information regarding orders to disperse and arrest, and defendants do not contend otherwise. Defendants assert, however, that depositions, rather than interrogatories, are a more practical and efficient method for obtaining the information. Plaintiffs rightly respond that they should not have to depose hundreds of members of the police department to determine who gave orders to disperse and arrest and how the orders were given. If defendants wish to proceed by deposition, the Court believes that the use of a 30(b)(6) witness or witnesses to testify regarding orders to disperse and arrest will be more productive and efficient than a significant and uncertain number of individual police officer depositions. Defendants are accordingly ordered to produce a 30(b)(6) witness or witnesses within a reasonable time to testify as to what if any orders and/or directives to disperse were given to demonstrators at Chicago and Michigan Avenues, and if orders and/or directives were communicated, the communicator of such orders and/or directives, the time and location of such orders/directives, and how these orders/directives were communicated as well as what orders to arrest or detain were given, by whom, and in what manner they were delivered through the command structure.
With respect to defendants Risley and Hillard, plaintiffs also state that they indicated that in response to several interrogatories that they may recall further directives or communications from March 20, 2003 after reviewing city wide radio transmissions from that day. Defendants maintain that a deposition would be a more efficient and appropriate manner in which to address communications or directives on the tape recordings. If defendants Risley and Hillard want to produce this relevant information by way of deposition rather than supplementing their interrogatory answers, they must review the tape recordings and anything else that might refresh their recollection before their depositions and be prepared to fully answer depositions questions regarding orders to disperse or orders to arrest that they were privy to on the night of March 20, 2003.
C. Other Interrogatory Answers
Plaintiffs limited Interrogatory No.4 to only require the City to state whether any prior large marches were allowed to take place through the streets of downtown Chicago without a permit. Defendant City has supplemented its answer to Interrogatory 4 to state that prior marches have taken place without a permit and that "contrary to what occurred on March 20, 2003, an agreement was made between the leaders of the

march and the police as to the specific route the march would take, and each march conformed to the agreed upon route." Plaintiffs seek to discover what other marches defendants are referring to (name, dates and location of the marches), and what police personnel and leaders were party to the negotiated routes in order to compare those circumstances with the March 20, 2003 march. Plaintiffs are entitled to discover this information. Defendants are directed to supplement their answer accordingly.
Interrogatory 5 directed to the City sought information concerning any command center set up for the events of the evening of March 20, 2003. The City's answer stated that there is a "command center" located at Chicago Police Headquarters that is dedicated to emergency services. The City also provided documentation which included a list of persons present at the command center, the specific actions taken by these persons, and a detailed entry of the precise times that each action was taken. Plaintiffs do not sufficiently explain how defendants' response and document production pursuant to Rule 33(d) fail to completely respond to this interrogatory. Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to Interrogatory 5.
D. Document Production
Plaintiffs seek to discover memoranda generated by attorneys as a result of interviews with firefighters. Defense counsel Terrance Sheahan conducted interviews with three firefighters relating to their observations regarding what occurred on March 20, 2003. Sheahan then drafted memoranda relating to how the firefighters' observations affect the City of Chicago's defense in this matter. Defendants claim that these attorney memoranda are protected from disclosure by the work product privilege. Plaintiffs argue that defendants waived the protections of the work-product doctrine by quoting terms stated by two of the firefighters in the City's Answer to Interrogatory 2 ("Answer"). The City's Answer stated that Firefighter Michael Schultz saw a mass of protesters going west on Chicago Avenue proceed to "roll through" a line of police officers. The City further stated in its Answer that Firefighter Roger Huff recalled the police "rounding up" the protesters and moving them further west on Chicago Avenue in an effort to unblock the entrance of the fire station. Defendants are directed to submit the attorney memoranda regarding the firefighter interviews in camera to assist the Court in determining whether they are protected in whole or in part from disclosure. Defendants shall also file a pleading responding to plaintiffs' waiver argument, including the scope of any possible waiver.
Plaintiffs also seek to compel disclosure of the named individual defendants officers' personnel files and complaint histories. Defendants object to disclosure of this information as irrelevant, overly broad, unduly burdensome, harassing and not reasonably designed to seek relevant information nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants' objection is overruled.
The personnel files and complaint histories of the individual defendant officers are relevant for purposes of discovery. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (2002 pocket part) (stating "[t]he present standard—"relevant to the claim or

defense of any party"—is still a very broad one."). Numerous courts have held that the personnel files and complaint histories of defendant officers are relevant in § 1983 actions involving police misconduct, particularly where, as here, plaintiffs allege a Monell policy, practice and custom claim against the municipality. See Langford v. City of Elkhart, 1992 WL 404443 (N.D. Ind. April 21, 1992) (noting that municipal policy claims allow a broad inquiry into police practices and procedures, citizen complaints, similar incidents, and internal disciplinary actions "extending well beyond the immediate circumstances surrounding plaintiffs' arrests."); Gibson v. New York City Police Officer Carmody, 1990 WL 52272 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1990); Hall v. Helms, 118 F.R.D. 51, 5354 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Scouler v. Craig, 116 F.R.D. 494 (D. N.J. 1987). Moreover, disciplinary records containing any similar factual allegations may be relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove motive, intent, and/or modus operandi. See Okai v. Verfuth, 275 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2001); Treece v. Hoschstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. City of Chicago 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Edwards v. Thomas, 31 F.Supp.2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1999).
Defendants argue that the Court should limit disclosure of prior complaints against defendant officers to the past five years and only those complaints similar to those raised in this lawsuit. The Court declines to so limit discovery. Plaintiffs are entitled to discover defendant officers' complaint histories, and the trial judge will determine before or at the trial whether "other acts" are similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue and thus, admissible. Lepianka v. The Village of Franklin Park, 2004 WL 626830, *2 (N.D.Ill. March 26, 2004).[2]
Finally, Defendants shall produce the FBI records, issues of the "Chicago Star," and training documents and videos by May 14, 2004.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is granted in part, denied in part, and reserved in part. Defendants shall submit the attorney memoranda regarding the firefighter interviews to chambers for an in camera review by May 17, 2004. Defendants' pleading regarding waiver of the work-product protection is due by May 24, 2004. Plaintiffs' request for fees and costs associated with bringing this motion is denied.
[1] Indeed, in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims "require purely individual determinations." Defendants further argued that certification of a plaintiff class would effectively prevent the individual police officers from testifying as to individual factors peculiar to the action he took, including the officer's observations, what the police knew of the person's conduct, whether that person disobeyed a police order or command, whether the person consented to detention, and other factors.
[2] The Court is willing to enter a protective order, for purposes of pretrial discovery, prohibiting public disclosure of categories of information legitimately entitled to protection such as the identity of complainants and witnesses. If the case proceeds to trial, the trial court will determine whether any of the protected information should become a part of the public record.

 
 Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 1 of 98
NOLAN,PROTO,REOPEN
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03−cv−02463

Vodak, et al v. Chgo, Cty of, et al Assigned to: Honorable Virginia M. Kendall Demand: $0 Case in other court: 09−02768
09−02843 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Kevin Vodak et al, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated

Date Filed: 04/10/2003 Date Terminated: 06/23/2009 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Janine L. Hoft People's Law Offices 1180 North Milwaukee Avenue Chicago, IL 60622 (773) 235−0070 Email: janinehoft@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher V. Langone Langone, Batson & Lavery LLC 17 N. Wabash Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60602 312−720−9191 Email: langonelaw@gmail.com TERMINATED: 04/14/2005
James Russell Fennerty James R. Fennerty & Associates, LLC 36 South Wabash Suite 1310 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 345−1704 Email: fennertylaw@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey David Naffziger Christensen & Ehret LLP 135 South LaSalle Street Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 634−1014 Email: jnaffziger@christensenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joey L. Mogul People's Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Chicago, IL 60622 773−235−0070 Email: joeymogul@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Ladell Stainthorp People's Law Office 1180 North Milwaukee Avenue Chicago, IL 60642 (773) 235−0070 Email: stainthorp@gmail.com

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 2 of 98

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melinda L. Power West Town Community Law Office 2502 West Division Chicago, IL 60622 (773) 278−6706 Email: melindapower@comcast.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino People's Law Office 1180 N. Milwaukee Avenue Chicago, IL 60642 (773) 235−0070 Email: sarahgelsomino@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sharon Ambielli

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Pennycuff

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 3 of 98

Plaintiff Eric Peters
Plaintiff Daniel Pineda

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 4 of 98

Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Aaron Robin

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melinda L. Power

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 5 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Daniel Romero

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Brad Thomson

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joey L. Mogul

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 6 of 98
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Ladell Stainthorp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
City of Chicago Superintendent

represented by Allan T. Slagel Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP 111 East Wacker Drive Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 527−4000 Email: aslagel@taftlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Louise Hamilton Lane & Waterman LLP 224 18th Street Suite 500 Rock Island, IL 61201 (309) 793−9211 TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy Johnson & Bell, Ltd. 33 W. Monroe Street Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−0770 Email: levyr@jbltd.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. Freeborn & Peters 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312)360−6000 Email: rsikes@freebornpeters.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle St. Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−6959 Email: sjebson@cityofchicago.org

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 7 of 98
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−4038 Email: amcausland@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick Freeborn & Peters, LLP 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 312 252 1500 Email: abrodrick@fletcher−sippel.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle St. Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 312 744 5106 Email: bradia@okgc.com TERMINATED: 12/02/2011
Brett Nolan Shefsky & Froelich Ltd 111 East Wacker Drive Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 527−4000 Email: bnolan@shefskylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP 111 East Wacker Drive Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 527−4000 Email: hjackson@taftlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey J. Mayer Akerman LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Suite 46 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 6345733 Email: jeffrey.mayer@akerman.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C. 330 N. Wabash Avenue, 22nd Floor Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 840−7000 Email: jroddy@burkelaw.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 8 of 98

Defendant
Terry G Hillard Former Superintendent

Josh Michael Engquist City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle St. Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−7852 Email: Josh.Engquist@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner City of Chicago, Law Department Corporation Counsel 30 North LaSalle Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−4746 Email: robin.shoffner@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne Miriam Rose Freeborn & Peters, LLP 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 360−6000 Email: srose@freebornpeters.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Terrence J. Sheahan Freeborn & Peters 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312)360−6000 Email: tsheahan@freebornpeters.com TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 9 of 98

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey J. Mayer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian Freeborn & Peters, LLP 311 South Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 360−6417 Email: kfabian@freebornpeters.com

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John R Risley TERMINATED: 05/03/2004

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 10 of 98

Defendant Doe Defendants Doe 1 − 50 TERMINATED: 04/19/2006
Defendant Doe Doe 51 − 100 TERMINATED: 12/30/2004
Defendant Roe Roe 1−50 TERMINATED: 04/19/2006
Defendant CPO Barker Star No. 14246; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey J. Mayer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 1400 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−4038 Email: amcausland@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 11 of 98

Defendant CPO Berggren Star No. 5224; TERMINATED: 05/03/2004
Defendant CPO Bilyj Star No 3243; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant M Black CPO Star No. 8943, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 12 of 98

Defendant CPO Cole Star No. 18270; TERMINATED: 12/30/2004
Defendant L Coleman CPO, Star No. 3377,

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 13 of 98

Defendant E Cortez CPO, Star No. 7584; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant A Dakuras CPO Star No. 6643;

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 14 of 98

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
C DeCicco CPO, Star No. 6215 TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
G Gamboa CPO, Star No. 12610; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 15 of 98

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
R Hagen CPO Star No. 14488, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
L Heise CPO Star No. 17026, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 16 of 98

(See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
D Herrera CPO Star No. 18611, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
R Hughes CPO, Star No. 4293; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 17 of 98

CPO Hunt Star No. 3535; TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
CPO Johnson Star No. 11292; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
CPO Judeh Star No. 8825; TERMINATED: 05/03/2004

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 18 of 98

Defendant A Kizziah CPO Star No. 7304, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant D Koonig Star No. 9072 TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant T Loconte Star No. 11623; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 19 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
W Clucas CPO Star No. 19890, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Sgt Methipara Star No. 18220; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
J Menodoza CPO, Star No. 19326; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 20 of 98

Defendant CPO Parilli Star No. 10176; TERMINATED: 12/30/2004
Defendant CPO Pasqua Star No. 5781, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant D Rodriguez CPO, Star No. 13585; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 21 of 98

LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
M Santos CPO, Star No. 12347

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 22 of 98

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
J Taitt CPO Star No. 11644,

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
J Tamez CPO, Star No. 8760;

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 23 of 98

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
M Weber CPO, Star No. 16785; TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
M Williams Star No. 14447,

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 24 of 98

Defendant
R Rodriguez CPO, Star No. 15347

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 25 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Philip J Cline Superintendent

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 26 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
James Maurer Chief

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 27 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Jerry Robinson Chief TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Tom Byrne Deputy Chief

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 28 of 98

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Frank Radke Deputy Chief

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 29 of 98

Defendant
Ralph Chiczewski Deputy Chief TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 30 of 98

(See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
John Killacky Commander TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Sam Christian Commander TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address)

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 31 of 98

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
David Doughtery Commander TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Commander Marienne Perry Commander, TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
John R Risley Commander,

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 32 of 98

Defendant
Joseph Griffin Commander

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne Miriam Rose (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 33 of 98

Defendant
Daniel Dugan Commander TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Josh Michael Engquist (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 34 of 98

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Charles Williams Commander TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 35 of 98

Defendant Kevin Ryan Lieutenant TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant Neil Sullivan Lieutenant TERMINATED: 07/08/2008
Defendant Dave Sobscyzk Lieutenant TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec Meacham McAusland

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 36 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Frank Limon Assistant Deputy, TERMINATED: 07/08/2008

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
Ron Huberman Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 37 of 98

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
K CPA Star No. 9295,

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant Karen Rowan

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 38 of 98

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant Thomas Epach, Jr

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 39 of 98

Defendant Carson Earnest Lieutenant, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009
Defendant

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)
Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
represented by

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 40 of 98

E Gedrekis CPO Star No. 11054, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
T Lieber CPO Star No. 6956, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 41 of 98

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
K McClearn CPO Star No. 8877, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
J Ryan CPO Star No. 18591, TERMINATED: 01/21/2009

represented by Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 42 of 98

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant
J Tuman CPO Star No. 3074,

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Defendant

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 43 of 98

Officer Officer Jaros

represented by Allan T. Slagel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott J. Jebson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec Meacham McAusland (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Bhairav Radia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2011

Brett Nolan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Ann Jackson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

Kellye L Fabian (See above for address)

Robin Denise Shoffner (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant Robert Castillo

Counter Defendant Patrick Donnell

Movant Christopher V Langone

Counter Claimant City of Chicago

represented by Jennifer Louise Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Richard Bruce Levy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Thomas Sikes , Jr.

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 44 of 98
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Audrey Lane Brodrick (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Jeffrey J. Mayer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Joseph P. Roddy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009
Terrence J. Sheahan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/02/2009

V. Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak

represented by Janine L. Hoft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher V. Langone (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/14/2005
James Russell Fennerty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey David Naffziger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joey L. Mogul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melinda L. Power (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/10/2003
04/10/2003

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT; jury demand − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of Janine L. Hoft, Joey L. Mogul, James Russell Fennerty, Melinda L. Power, Christopher V. Langone as attorney(s) for plaintiff (Three original and three copies summons(es) issued.) (Documents: 1−1 through 1−4) (hp) Modified on 04/11/2003 (Entered: 04/11/2003)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 4/10/03 in the amount of $150.00, receipt #10318676. (hp) (Entered: 04/11/2003)

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04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/14/2003 04/17/2003
04/28/2003 04/28/2003 04/28/2003 04/28/2003 05/05/2003 05/05/2003 05/07/2003 05/12/2003
06/10/2003
06/13/2003 06/13/2003 06/13/2003 06/19/2003

2 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant John R Risley on 04/11/03 (lc) (Entered: 04/15/2003)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Chgo, Cty of on 04/11/03 (lc) (Entered: 04/15/2003)
4 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Terry G Hillard on 04/11/03 (lc) Modified on 04/15/2003 (Entered: 04/15/2003)
5 MOTION by plaintiff for an order preserving evidence ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 04/18/2003)
6 MINUTE ORDER of 4/17/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Plaintiffs' motion for an order preserving evidence is granted [5−1]. The Chicago Police Department shall retain any and all tap recordings as detailed in the attached order. (Entered Order.) Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 04/18/2003)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley by Richard Thomas Sikes Jr., Richard Bruce Levy, Jeffrey J. Mayer, Terrence Sheahan (lc) (Entered: 04/30/2003)
8 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley by Jennifer Louise Koger (lc) (Entered: 05/01/2003)
9 MOTION by defendants for a protective order requiring plaintiffs to preserve evidence (Attachments); Notice (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
11 MOTION by defendants to extend time to answer or otherwise plead ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
10 RE−NOTICE by defendant of motion for a protective order requiring plaintiffs to preserve evidence [9−1] (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
12 NOTICE by defendant of motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead [11−1] (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
13 RE−NOTICE by defendant of motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead [11−1] (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
14 MINUTE ORDER of 5/12/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : For the reasons stated on the record, Defendants' motion for protective order requiring plaintiffs to preserve evidence is granted [9−1], however, the Court is entertaining this motion only as the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' attorney. Defendants' motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead is granted [11−1] for 30 days, no 60 days. Defendants to answer or plead on or before 06/13/03. (Entered Order.) Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 6/10/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Rule16(b) Scheduling/ Pretrial conference set to 9:15 7/17/03 in chambers. Report of planning conference pursuant to Rule 26(f) and proposed scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16(b) to be filed in chambers. (See reverse side of scheduling order. Copies of form reports of planning conference and proposed scheduling order are available in chambers or on the court's web page.) Mailed notice (pm) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
15 ANSWER and separate and affirmative defenses by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to plaintiff's complaint [1−1]; Jury demand; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
16 MOTION by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to dismiss requests for injunctive relief relating to future use of handcuffs ; Memorandum of Law in support; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/20/2003)
17 MOTION by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to dismiss claims against Hillard and Risley acting in their "Official Capacity" ; Memorandum of Law in support; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/20/2003)
18 MINUTE ORDER of 6/19/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendants' motion to dismiss requests for injunctive relief relating to future use of handcuffs is denied without prejudice [16−1]. Answer brief to defendants' motion to dismiss claims against Hillard and Risley acting in their "Official Capacity" [17−1] due 07/09/03. Reply to answer brief due 7/18/03. Ruling on motion to dismiss claims against Hillard and Risley

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07/09/2003 07/09/2003 07/11/2003 07/16/2003 07/17/2003 07/17/2003
07/24/2003 07/24/2003 07/28/2003 07/28/2003 07/28/2003
07/28/2003 07/28/2003

acting in their "Official Capacity" [17−1] is set for 7/24/03 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/20/2003)
20 ANSWER by plaintiff to defendant's motion to dismiss [17−1]; Notice with Motion for leave. (lc) Modified on 07/18/2003 (Entered: 07/18/2003)
20 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file first amended complaint ; Notice with Answer. (lc) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
19 REPORT by parties of planning conference. (lc) (Entered: 07/15/2003)
21 REPLY by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley in support of their motion to dismiss claims against Hillard and Risley acting in their "Official Capacity" [17−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
22 MINUTE ORDER of 7/17/03 by Hon. John A. Nordberg : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file first amended complaint is granted [20−1]. Defendants motion to dismiss original complaint is moot [17−1]. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead on or before 08/01/03. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 7/17/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Rule 16(b) scheduling conference held. All disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) shall be made on or before 7/23/03. Class Certification motions to be filed on or before 7/31/03. Answer to Class Certification motion by 10/20/03. Discovery to close on 9/30/03 on class certification issues. Any amendments to pleadings or actions to join other parties shall be filed on or before 1/31/04. Discovery ordered closed on 9/30/04. The parties shall disclose expert testimony pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) on or before 11/30/04. The parties may depose the other side's expert at any time prior to 1/30/05. The parties shall disclose any rebuttal expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(c) at any time prior to 2/28/05. The parties shall depose the opposing party's rebuttal expert by 3/30/05. Motion dispositive is due 10/30/04. Pretrial order to be submitted on 4/29/05. Pretrial conference setr to 10:30 5/20/05. Jury trial set to 10:00 6/6/05. The parties are directed to review this court's standing orders. Copies are available in chambers or through the court's web page. Mailed notice (pm) (Entered: 07/24/2003)
23 MINUTE ORDER of 7/24/03 by Hon. David H. Coar: The court's minute order of 7/17/03 is corrected to reflect that this matter was before Judge Coar and not Judge Nordberg. It is further ordered that the portion of the minute order denying [#17−1] motion to dismiss as moot is vacated. Notice mailed by judge's staff (air) (Entered: 07/25/2003)
24 MINUTE ORDER of 7/24/03 by Hon. David H. Coar: For the reasons stated on the record, defendants' motion to dismiss claims against Terry G. Hillard and John R. Risley in their official capacity is granted [17−1]. The claims against Terry G. Hillard and John R. Risley in their individual capacity shall proceed. Notice mailed by judge's staff (air) (Entered: 07/25/2003)
SUMMONS issued 6 original and 6 copies as to CPO M. Santos Star 12347, CPO R. Rodirguez, Star # 15347, CPO D. Rodriguez, Star #13585, CPO Pasqua, CPO Parilli, Star # 10176, CPO Mendoza, Star #19326. (gcy) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
SUMMONS issued 2 original and 2 copies as to CPO M. Black, Star # 8943, CPO Billy J, Star #3243. (gcy) (Entered: 07/29/2003)
25 AMENDED COMPLAINT [1−1] by plaintiff; jury demand; adding CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO Bilyj, CPO Black, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, CPO Dakuras, C DeCillo, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Locone, CPO Lucas, CPO Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, CPO R. Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, CPO Williams; Notice. (gcy) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
SUMMONS issued as to CPO Cole, CPO L Coleman, CPO E Cortez, CPO Dakuras, CPO C DeCillo, CPO G Gamboa. (gcy) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
SUMMONS issued as to CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO J Taitt, CPO J Tamez, CPO M Weber, CPO Williams. (gcy) (Entered: 08/01/2003)

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07/28/2003 07/28/2003 07/30/2003
07/30/2003 07/31/2003 07/31/2003 08/01/2003 08/01/2003 09/03/2003
09/03/2003 09/23/2003 10/07/2003
10/14/2003 10/20/2003
10/21/2003 10/21/2003 10/21/2003 10/27/2003

SUMMONS issued as to CPO Judeh, CPO A Kizziah, CPO D Koonig, CPO T Locone, CPO Lucas, CPO Methipara (gcy) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
SUMMONS issued as to CPO R Hagen, CPO L Heise, CPO D Herrera, CPO R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson. (gcy) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
28 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendants CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO Bilyj, CPO Black, CPO Cole, E Cortez, G Gamboa, R Hagen, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, CPO Methipara, J Menodoza, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, CPO Williams, R Rodriguez on 07/29/03 and L. Heise on 07/30/03 (28−1 through 28−21) (aga) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
29 RETURN OF SERVICE as to defendant CPO Dakuras. (aga) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
26 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff by Jeffrey Naffziger. (jmp) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
27 MOTION by plaintiff for class certification ; Memorandum in support. (jmp) (Entered: 08/01/2003)
30 ANSWER by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to plaintiffs first amended complaint [25−1]; Jury demand (lc) (Entered: 08/04/2003)
31 NOTICE by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley of filing answer to plaintiff's first amended complaint [30−1] (lc) (Entered: 08/05/2003)
32 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants E Cortez, CPO Dakuras, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, CPO Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Williams, R Rodriguez by Jennifer Louise Koger; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 09/08/2003)
33 MOTION by defendants to extend time to answer or otherwise plead to complaint ; Notice of motion (eav) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
34 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendants' motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead is granted to and including 10/6/03. [33−1] Mailed notice (eav) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
35 ANSWER by defendants CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO Bilyj, CPO Black, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, CPO Dakuras, C DeCillo, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Locone, CPO Lucas, CPO Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, CPO Williams, R Rodriguez and affirmative defenses to plaintiff's first amended complaint [25−1]; Jury demand; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 10/08/2003)
36 MOTION by defendants to file brief in excess of 15 pages ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
37 MINUTE ORDER of 10/20/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : For the reasons stated on the record, defendant's motion to file brief in excess of 15 pages is denied [36−1]. The defendant's answer brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion [27−1] for class certification is due 11/20/03 and not 10/20/03 as indicated in the scheduling order of 07/17/03. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
38 APPENDIX filed by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to defendants' memorandum in opposition to motion for class certification (corrected). [38−1 through 38−2] (lc) Modified on 10/28/2003 (Entered: 10/28/2003)
39 MOTION by defendants for leave to file corrected version fo memorandum in opposition of motion for class certification and supporting exhibits ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
40 MOTION by defendants to file brief in excess of 15 pages ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
41 MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendants' motion to file brief in excess of 15 pages is denied [40−1]. Defendants' motion for leave to file corrected version of memorandum in opposition of motion for class certification and supporting exhibits is granted [39−1] and the corrected conforming memorandum to

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10/29/2003 10/29/2003 10/29/2003 10/30/2003 11/03/2003
11/03/2003 11/03/2003 11/03/2003 11/03/2003 11/06/2003 11/07/2003 11/13/2003
11/25/2003 11/25/2003 12/03/2003
12/04/2003 12/04/2003 12/11/2003 12/11/2003

be filed by the close of business on Wednesday, 10/29/03. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 10/28/2003)
42 MOTION by defendants to file brief in excess of 15 pages ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
43 REVISED MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification [27−1] (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
44 EXHIBITS by defendants to revised memorandum in opposition to motion for class certification [43−1] [44−1 through 44−2]. (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
ALIAS SUMMONS issued, ten originals and ten copies as to defendants C DeCillo, Koenig, Loconte, Lucas, Pasquale, Weber, Herrera, Parrilli, Coleman, Coleman. (lc) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
45 MINUTE ORDER of 11/3/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendant's motion to file revised brief in excess of 15 pages is granted [42−1]. Plaintiff to file a reply brief in support of [27−1] Class Certification motion by 11/25/03. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
46 RETURN OF SERVICE of alias summons executed as to defendant CPO Lucas on 10/30/03. (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
47 RETURN OF SERVICE of alias summons executed as to defendant D Koonig on 10/30/03. (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
48 RETURN OF SERVICE of alias summons executed as to defendants C DeCillo, T Locone, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, M Weber on 10/30/03 [48−1 through 48−5] (lc) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
50 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Ronald Coleman, Sidney Coleman on 10/30/03. (lc) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
51 MOTION by defendants to compel discovery from plaintiffs (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
49 REFERRAL ORDER: Case referred to Hon. Nan R. Nolan for all discovery disputes/motions Mailed notice. (pm) (Entered: 11/07/2003)
52 MINUTE ORDER of 11/13/03 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's response to defendants' motion to compel discovery from plaintiffs [51−1] is due on or before 12/04/03; defendants' reply is due on or before 12/11/03. Ruling on motion to compel is set for 1/20/04 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
53 REPLY by plaintiff to motion for class certification [27−1] (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/26/2003)
54 MOTION by plaintiff to strike certain exhibits to defendant's revised memorandum in opposition to motion for class certification (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
55 MINUTE ORDER of 12/3/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : The defendant is given leave to file a response to the plaintiff's motion to strike [54−1] by 12/11/03. Plaintiff's motion to strike certain exhibits to defendants' revised memorandum in opposition to motion for class certification is taken under advisement−ruling to issue by mail with the class certificaiton ruling. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 12/04/2003)
56 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants motion to compel discovery from plaintiffs [51−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
57 AFFIDAVIT of Melinda Power. (lc) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
58 REPLY brief by defendants in support of its motion to compel discovery from plaintiffs [51−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/15/2003)
59 OPPSITION by defendants to plaintiff's motion to strike certain exhibits to defendant's revised memorandum in opposition to motion for class certification [54−1] and motion for class certification [27−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/15/2003)

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12/12/2003 12/18/2003 12/18/2003 01/15/2004
01/20/2004 01/22/2004 01/28/2004
01/29/2004 02/17/2004 03/04/2004
04/02/2004 04/07/2004
04/14/2004
04/20/2004 04/20/2004 04/23/2004 04/26/2004

60 MOTION by defendants for leave to file sur−reply addressing plaintiff's newly−presented authority ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
61 MINUTE ORDER of 12/18/03 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendant's motion for leave to file sur−reply addressing plaintiff's newly−presented authority is granted [60−1]. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
62 SUR−REPLY by defendants in opposition to motion for class certification [27−1]. (lc) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
63 MINUTE ORDER of 1/15/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : For the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum opinion and order, defendants' motion to compel production of completed questionnaires by potential class members is denied [51−1]. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice by judge's staff (lc) (Entered: 01/16/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 1/20/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 1/29/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (hmb) (Entered: 01/20/2004)
64 MOTION by plaintiff for extension of time to amend the pleadings ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/29/2004)
65 MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to amend the pleadings is granted [64−1]. Amendments to pleadings or actions to join other parties shall be filed on or before 04/28/04. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/29/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 1/29/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 3/18/04 . Mailed notice (hmb) (Entered: 01/29/2004)
66 MOTION by plaintiff to compel defendants' answers to discovery (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
67 MINUTE ORDER of 3/4/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Defendant's response to plaintiff's motion to compel [66−1] due by 04/05/04; plaintiff's reply due 4/19/04. Status hearing set for 5/7/04 at 9:30a.m. Status hearing set for 03/18/04 at 9:00a.m. is stricken. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 03/05/2004)
68 MOTION by defendants for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants' answers to discovery ; Notice. (jmp) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
69 MINUTE ORDER of 4/7/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Defendants' motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants' answers to discovery is granted [68−1]. Defendants' response is now due by 04/14/04, and plaintiffs' reply is due by 04/26/04. Status hearing set for 05/07/04 at 9:30 a.m. stands. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
70 RESPONSE by defendants City of Chicago, Terry G. Hillard, John R. Risley, CPO Berggren, Cortez, CPO Dakuras, Hagen, Heise, Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, Kizziah, CPO Methipara, Menodoza, CPO Williams and Rodriguez to plaintiff's motion to compel defendants' answers to discovery [66−1] (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
71 MOTION by defendants for an extension of time to file additional pleadings (Attachment). (lc) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
73 NOTICE by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley of motion for an extension of time to file additional pleadings [71−1] (lc) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
76 MOTION by plaintiff for certification of defendant class or in the alternative, for extension of time to amend complaint (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 04/29/2004)
72 MINUTE ORDER of 4/26/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendants' motion for an extension of time to file additional pleadings [71−1] is entered and continued to 5/3/04 at 9:00a.m. Defendant is given leave to file an amended affidavit in reference to this motion. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 04/27/2004)

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04/26/2004 04/26/2004 04/28/2004 04/28/2004 04/28/2004 04/28/2004 05/03/2004
05/03/2004 05/07/2004
05/12/2004 05/13/2004
05/14/2004 05/18/2004

74 REPLY by plaintiff in support of their motion to compel defendants' answers to discovery [66−1] (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
75 MINUTE ORDER of 4/26/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Defendant's motion for an extension of time to file additional pleadings [71−1] is entered and continued to 5/3/04 at 9:00a.m. Defendant is given leave to file an amended affidavit in reference to this motion. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 04/27/2004)
77 MINUTE ORDER of 4/28/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Plaintiff's motion for certification of defendant class [76−1] or in the alternative, for additional time to amend complaint [76−2] is entered to 5/3/04 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 04/29/2004)
78 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file second amended complaint ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
80 COUNTERCLAIM by defendant Chgo, Cty of against plaintiff Kevin Vodak (lc) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
81 NOTICE by defendant Chgo, Cty of of counterclaim [80−1] (lc) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
79 MINUTE ORDER of 5/3/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file second amended complaint is granted [78−1]. Defendants' motion for additional time to file additional pleadings is granted [71−1]. Plaintiff's motion for certification of defendant class [76−1] or in the alternative for extension of time to amend complaint [76−2] is granted. The parties are directed to meet and confer and to file a revised schedule on 05/13/04. Pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16(b) is set for 5/13/04 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
83 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [25−1] by plaintiff; Jury demand (lc) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
82 MINUTE ORDER of 5/7/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 6/9/04 at 9:00a.m. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiffs' motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part and reserved in part [66−1]. Defendants shall submit the attorney memoranda regarding the firefighter interviews to chambers for an in camera review by 05/17/04. Defendants' pleading regarding waiver of the work−product protection is due by 05/24/04. Plaintiffs' request for fees and costs associated with bringing this motion is denied. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 05/10/2004)
84 PARTIES PROPOSED REVISED SCHDEDULING ORDER by plaintiff; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 5/13/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Rule 16(b) scheduling conference held. All disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) were previously exchanged. Any amendments to pleadings or actions to join other parties shall be filed on or before 9/30/04. The plaitiff has to 6/14/04 to answer the counterclaim. Discovery ordered closed on 12/31/04. The parties shall disclose expert testimony pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) on or before 12/31/04. The parties may depose the other side's expert at any time prior to 2/28/05. The parties shall disclose any rebuttal expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(c) at any time prior to 3/31/05. The parties shall depose the opposing party's rebuttal expert by 4/15/05. Motion dispositive is due 1/31/05. Pretrial order to be submitted on 4/29/04 . Pretrial conference reset to 10:30 5/20/05. Jury trial set to 10:00 6/6/05. The parties are directed to review this court's standing orders. Copies are available in chambers or through the court's web page. Mailed notice (pm) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
86 MOTION by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley for reconsideration and the entry of a protective order (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 05/20/2004)
85 MINUTE ORDER of 5/18/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied in part and taken under advisement in part and entry of protective order is also taken under advisement. Status hearing set for 06/09/04 at 9:00 stands. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 05/19/2004)

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05/24/2004 05/26/2004 06/07/2004 06/08/2004
06/09/2004
06/14/2004
06/14/2004 06/14/2004 06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/17/2004 06/18/2004 06/22/2004 06/22/2004
06/23/2004

87 MEMORANDUM by City defendants in support of the work product privilege for attorney summaries; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
88 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 05/03/04 before The Honorable David H. Coar. (lc) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
91 SECOND MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
89 MINUTE ORDER of 6/8/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : This order addresses several outstanding issues regarding defendants' request for reconsideration and a protective order and plaintiffs' attempt to compel disclosure of a defense attorney memorandum based on oral statements of two firefighter witnesses [86−1,2]. (Entered Order.) No notice (lc) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
90 MINUTE ORDER of 6/9/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Answer brief to plaintiffs second motion to compel discovery is due 06/23/04. Reply to answer brief due 06/30/04. Ruling on plaintiffs second motion to compel set for 07/15/04 9:00a.m. Status hearing hearing held and continued to 07/15/04 at 9:00a.m. Rule 30(b)6 witnesses to be produced as soon as possible. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
92 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Phillip Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Lamone, Ron Huberman, Jaros by Jennifer Louise Koger, Richard Bruce Levy, Terrence J. Sheahan (lc) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
93 MOTION by plaintiff to dismiss defendants' counterclaim ; Memorandum of Law in Support (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
96 MOTION by defendants for leave to file instanter motion to dismiss as to newly named defendants and defendants doe and roe (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
97 NOTICE by defendant of motion for leave to file instanter motion to dismiss as to newly named defendants and defendants doe and roe [96−1] (lc) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
98 AMENDED NOTICE by defendants of motion for leave to file instanter motion to dismiss as to newly named defendants and defendants doe and roe [96−1] (lc) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
94 MINUTE ORDER of 6/17/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Answer brief to plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim [93−1] due 07/09/03. Reply to answer brief due 7/23/04. Ruling on plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim will be by mail. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
95 MOTION by defendants to limit discovery and to reconsider scope and terms of any protective order (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
99 MOTION by defendants to dismiss counts VII through XIV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint as to all defendants first named in plaintiffs' second amended complaint and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe . (lc) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
100 MINUTE ORDER of 6/22/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Motion for leave to file instanter motion to dismiss as to newly named defendants and defendants Doe and Roe is granted [96−1] and briefing schedule set as indicated on the motion to dismiss. Answer brief to motion to dismiss counts VII through XIV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint as to all defendants first named in plaintiffs' second amended complaint and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe [99−1] due 07/15/04. Reply to answer brief due 07/30/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
101 MINUTE ORDER of 6/23/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : By agreement of the parties, defendants' response brief to plaintiff's second motion to compel discovery [91−1] is due 06/25/04 and plaintiff's reply is due 07/06/04. Defendant's motion to limit discovery [95−1] and to reconsider scope and terms of any protective order [95−2] is entered. Plaintiff to respond to the motion by 07/09/04 and defendant to reply by 07/16/04. The status hearing set on 07/15/04 is stricken. Status hearing re−set for 07/29/04 at 9:00a.m. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/25/2004)

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06/25/2004 06/25/2004 06/25/2004 06/28/2004
07/01/2004
07/09/2004 07/14/2004 07/16/2004 07/16/2004 07/20/2004 07/20/2004 07/26/2004 07/26/2004 07/29/2004
07/29/2004
07/30/2004
08/03/2004

102 AMENDED MOTION by defendants to dismiss counts VII through XIV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint as to all recently−added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
103 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion to limit discovery [95−1], and to reconsider scope and terms of any protective order [95−2] (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
104 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's motion to compel discovery [91−1] (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
105 MINUTE ORDER of 6/28/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Plaintiff's oral request to extend the date for filing reply brief in support of plaintiff's second motion to compel [91−1] is granted. Plaintiff to file reply brief by 07/14/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 06/30/2004)
106 MINUTE ORDER of 7/1/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Answer brief to amended motion to dismiss counts VII through XIV of plaintiffs' second complaint as to all recently−added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe [102−1] due 07/15/04. Reply to answer brief due 8/30/04. Ruling on [102−1] amended motion to dismiss counts VII through XIV will be by mail. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
107 RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim [93−1] (Attachment). (lc) (Entered: 07/13/2004)
108 AMENDED RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to counter−defendants' motion to dismiss the countercla [107−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
109 REPLY by defendants in support of motion to limit discovery [95−1] and to reconsider scope and terms of any protective order [95−2]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
110 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file instanter reply in support of second motion to compel in excess of fifteen pages (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
111 MINUTE ORDER of 7/20/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file instanter reply in support of second motion to compel in excess of fifteen pages is granted [110−1]. Telephoned/Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
112 REPLY by plaintiff in support of plaintiffs' second motion to compel discovery [91−1] (Attachments). (lc) (Entered: 07/27/2004)
113 REPLY by plaintiff in support of their to motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim [93−1] (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
114 SUR−REPLY by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley in support of plaintiffs' second motion to compel discovery [91−1]; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
115 MINUTE ORDER of 7/29/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Defendants' motion to limit discovery [95−1] and to reconsider scope and terms of any protective order [95−2] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion for reconsideration [86−1] and the entry of a protective order [86−2] is granted in part and denied in part. (Entered Order.) Mailed notice by judge's staff (lc) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
116 MINUTE ORDER of 7/29/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 9/9/04 at 9:00a.m. The plaintiff's given leave to file a sur−reply to plaintiff's second motion to compel discovery [91−1] by 08/03/04. The defendants are to name all Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses by 08/05/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 07/30/2004)
117 REPLY by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, John R Risley to amended motion to dismiss counts VII through XIV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint as to all recently−added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe [102−1] (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
118 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' sur−reply [114−1] to plaintiffs' second motion to compel; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 08/06/2004)

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08/12/2004 08/19/2004 09/08/2004 09/09/2004
09/15/2004 09/30/2004
10/12/2004 10/14/2004
10/20/2004 10/27/2004
11/10/2004 11/12/2004 11/16/2004 11/17/2004

119 MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of to strike reply brief in support of motion to dismiss counterclaim ; Memorandum in Support; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
120 MINUTE ORDER of 8/19/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : City of Chicago's motion to strike reply brief in support of motion to dismiss counterclaim [119−1] is taken under advisement − ruling to issue by along with the motion to dismiss. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
121 MINUTE ORDER of 9/8/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiff's second motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part [91−1]. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 09/09/2004)
122 MINUTE ORDER of 9/9/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 10/14/04 at 9:00a.m. Defendant's are to file any pleadings addressing 2002 first amendment files by 09/16/04. Plaintiff's response is due by 09/23/04. If no objections are filed with the District Court regarding this Court's ruling on second motion to compel, then defendant's shall produce portions of the 2003 first amendment files by 09/23/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 09/10/2004)
123 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Defendants' oral request to extend the deadline for filing a pleading adressing the 2002 First Amendment is granted. Defendant's pleading regarding the 2002 First Amendment files is due by 09/23/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
124 MINUTE ORDER of 9/30/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : For the reasons set forth on the reverse side of this order, the Court orders a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for class certification [27−1]. The Court will hold a status hearing on 10/18/04 at 9:00a.m., in order to set a date for the hearing. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 09/30/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/12/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Status hearing reset to 9:00 10/27/04 . Mailed notice (pm) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
125 MINUTE ORDER of 10/14/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan: Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 a.m. on 11/17/04 at which time parties are to indicate whether they will participate in a settlement conference. For the reasons stated in open court, parties are to meet and confer regarding the scope of the protective order involving the first amendment issues. In addition, defendants are to turnover to plaintiffs the personnel files and complaint registers by 10/27/04. Mailed notice (air) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
126 MOTION by defendants to require plaintiffs to submit a trial plan in advance of the class certification hearing ; Notice of filing. (rbf) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
127 MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Answer brief to defendants' motion to require plaintiffs to submit a trial plan in advance of the class certification hearing [126−1] is due 11/10/04. Hearing on defendants' motion to require plaintiffs to submit a trial plan is set for 11/23/04 at 9:00 a.m. Status hearing held and continued to 11/23/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (rbf) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
128 OBJECTION by plaintiff to defendants' motion for plaintiffs to submit a trial plan in advance of the class certification hearing [126−1] ; Notice of filing (eav) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
129 MOTION by defendants for order of court to require, the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition in this case ; Notice. (vmj) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
130 THIRD MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery and plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions (Attachments); Notice. (vmj) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
131 MINUTE ORDER of 11/17/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan: Motion hearing held. Defendant to respond to plaintiffs' third motion to compel discovery [130−1] and plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions [130−2] by 11/24/04; plaintiffs' reply due 12/1/04; ruling set for 12/8/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff is to respond and file an affidavit to defendants' motion for order of court to require, the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a deposition [129−1] by 11/24/04; defendants to reply by 12/6/04; ruling set for 12/21/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered:

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 54 of 98

11/23/2004
11/23/2004 11/24/2004 11/29/2004 11/30/2004 11/30/2004 12/08/2004
12/21/2004
12/30/2004
01/18/2005 01/21/2005 01/21/2005 01/26/2005 01/26/2005

11/18/2004)
132 MINUTE ORDER of 11/23/04 by Hon. David H. Coar : Status hearing held. Hearing on class certification set for 1/31/05 at 10:00. For the reasons on the record, defendant's motion to require plaintiffs to submit a trial plan in advance of the class certification hearing is denied [126−1]. The plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint on or before 12/30/04. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
133 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion for Aaron Patterson's deposition and motion for protective order (Attachment); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
134 MOTION by defendants to strike plaintiffs' third motion to compel and for sanctions (Attachments); Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
135 MINUTE ORDER of 11/29/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing set for 12/3/04 at 9:00a.m. The briefing related to plaintiffs' third motion to compel discovery and plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions is suspended pending the status hearing. Telephoned notice (lc) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
136 MOTION by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, Phillip Cline to compel discovery from plaintiffs ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
137 MEMORANDUM of Law by defendants Chgo, Cty of, Terry G Hillard, Phillip Cline in support of its second motion to compel discovery [136−1] (Attachments). (lc) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
138 MINUTE ORDER of 12/8/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan : Plaintiff's third motion to compel discovery [130−1] and plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions [130−2] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' third motion to compel [134−1] and defendants' motion for sanctions [134−2] is denied; and defendants' second motion to compel discovery is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice [136−1] to reassertion if necessary. Defendants' motion for order of Court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition in this case [129−1] is entered and continued. Next status hearing on 12/21/04. (Entered Order.) Mailed notice by judges' staff (lc) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
139 MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/04 by Hon. Nan R. Nolan: Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for order of court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition in this case [129−1] is entered and continued to 2/15/05 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gma) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
140 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT [83−1] by plaintiffs; jury demand; Terminating defendants Doe 51−100, CPO Cole, and CPO Parilli; Adding plaintiffs Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson; Adding defendants Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, and J Tuman; Notice (ar) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
141 AMENDED response defendants to plaintiffs' request for admissions; Notice.(lxs, ) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
142 MOTION by Plaintiff Sharon Ambielli to withdraw as attorney (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
143 NOTICE for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Sharon Ambielli to withdraw as attorney 142 before Honorable David H. Coar on 1/27/2005 at 09:00 AM. (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
144 MOTION by Defendants for enlargement of time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs' third amended complaint 140 (gma, ) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
145 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of MOTION by Defendants for enlargement of time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs' third amended complaint 144 before Honorable David H. Coar on 1/31/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 01/27/2005)

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01/27/2005 01/31/2005
01/31/2005 02/02/2005
02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/10/2005
02/14/2005 02/14/2005 02/14/2005 02/14/2005 02/14/2005 02/15/2005
02/17/2005 02/17/2005

151 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion hearing held. [Doc. #142] Motion for leave to withdraw is granted. Leave granted Jeffrey D. Naffziger to withdraw as attorney for the plaintiffs. (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
146 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion hearing held on 1/31/2005 regarding motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 144 Motion for extension of time to answer 144 is granted to the extent that the Court will grant only 14 days to answer or plead. Defendants to answer or plead to the 3rd Amended Complaint on or 2/15/05. Notice given in open Court. (pm, ) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
147 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Class Certification Evidentiary hearing held on 1/31/2005. Class Certification Evidentiary hearing continued to 2/2/2005 at 02:00 PM. No notice advised in open court. (pm, ) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
148 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Class Certificatoin Evidentiary hearing held on 2/2/2005 and concluded. The parties shall submit, simultaneously, supplemental briefs (limited to 15 pages) by February 17, 2005; Replies to be submitted, simultaneously, by March 3, 2005. The Class Certification issues taken under advisement − ruling to issue by mail. Mailed notices (pm, ) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
149 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago et al. for leave to withdraw attorney appearance (gma, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
150 NOTICE of Motion by all defendants for presentment of MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago et al. for leave to withdraw attorney appearance 149 before Honorable David H. Coar on 2/10/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
152 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion hearing held. [Doc #149] Defendants' motion for leave to withdraw attorneys and request to withdraw as counsel is granted. Leave granted Jennifer Koger to withdraw as attorney for City of Chicago, Former Superintendent Terry G. Hillard, Superintendent Phillip Cline, et al. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/14/2005)
153 MOTION by Defendants counts VII, VIII, IX, XII, and XIII of plaintiffs' third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants doe and defendants Roe; Exhibits. (rbf, ) Modified on 2/8/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/15/2005)
154 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr for presentment of motion to dismiss counts VII, VII, IX, XII, and XII of plaintiff's third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe 153 before Honorable David H. Coar on 2/22/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
155 MEMORANDUM of law by all defendants in support of their motion to dismiss counts VII, VIII, IX, XIII, and XIII of plaintiffs' third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
156 NOTICE by all defendants of filing regarding their memorandum of law in support (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
158 ANSWER, and Separate and Affirmative Defenses to plaintiff's third amended complaint by defendants; Notice.(lxs, ) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
157 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held and continued to 4/7/05 at 9:00 a.m. as to defendants' motion for order of court to require the MCC to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition in this case 129 . Defendants' reply to motion 129 is to be filed by 2/22/05. Parties are directed to bring a proposed discovery plan to the next hearing. Additionally, parties are to meet and confer on possible motion to compel. Notices mailed by judge's staff. (hmb, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
160 EXHIBIT 1 by Plaintiff Sharon Ambielli (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
161 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman by Richard Bruce Levy, Terrence J. Sheahan, Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr.; Notice. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 02/22/2005)

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02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/22/2005 03/03/2005 03/03/2005 03/04/2005 03/04/2005 03/10/2005
03/22/2005 03/31/2005
03/31/2005 04/04/2005 04/04/2005 04/07/2005
04/08/2005 04/08/2005

162 POST−HEARING Brief by defendants in Opposition to class certification; Notice. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
163 CLOSING ARGUMENT by Class Plaintiffs' in support of class certification.(jmm, ) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
164 REPLY Brief by Defendants in support of their motion for order of court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotape deposition in this case; Notice; Exhibits.(lxs, ) Modified on 4/26/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/24/2005)
165 REPLY by Defendants to class plaintiffs closing argument in support of class certification; Notice.(lxs, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
166 REPLY by Plaintiffs to defendants post hearing brief concering class certification; Notice. (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
167 MOTION by Defendants to dismiss counts VII, VIII, IX, XII, and XIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe.(rbf, ) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
168 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion to dismiss counts VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe 167 before Honorable David H. Coar on 3/10/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
169 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion hearing held regarding 167 . Set deadlines as to 167 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIII of plaintiffs' third amended complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendnts Roe: Responses due by 4/1/2005; Replies due by 4/15/205. The same Motion to dismiss 153 of which was filed on 2/14/05 is moot and terminated. Mailed notice (pm, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
170 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion to dismiss 99 is moot, Motion to dismiss 102 is moot due to the filing of new motions to dismiss the 3rd amended complaint. Motions terminated: motion to dismiss 99 , motion to dismiss 102 . Mailed notice (pm, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
171 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants counterclaim [Doc. No. 93] is granted. Defendants counterclaim is dismissed, without prejudice. Defendants are granted leave to file an amended counterclaim. That amended counterclaim is to be filed within thirty days of this Court's ruling on the plaintiffs motion for class certification. Defendants motion to strike [Doc. No. 119] is terminated as moot. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/31/2005)
172 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants partial motion to dismiss state law claims against newly indentified defendants; Notice. (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
173 MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to serve second set of interrogatories to defendant City (gma, ) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
174 NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to serve second set of interrogatories to defendant City 173 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 4/7/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/04/2005)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held regarding plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve second set of interrogatories to defendant 173 . Defendants' response and proposed schedule for the remainder of fact discovery to be filed by 4/21/05. Plaintiffs' reply to the motion and their proposed schedule for the remainder of fact discovery to be filed by 5/5/05. Motion Hearing set for 4/14/2005 at 10:30 AM. Additionally, Defendant are to respond to plaintiffs' proposed protective order by 4/11/05. Judicial staff mailed notice (hmb, ) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
176 MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to withdraw appearance of Christoher V. Langone for plaintiffs (gma, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
177 NOTICE of Motion by James Russell Fennerty for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to withdraw appearance of Christoher V. Langone for plaintiffs 176

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04/11/2005 04/11/2005 04/14/2005
04/14/2005
04/15/2005 04/21/2005 04/29/2005 05/02/2005 05/04/2005 05/05/2005 05/05/2005 05/05/2005 05/05/2005

before Honorable David H. Coar on 4/14/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
178 AGREED MOTION by all parties to reset pretrial and trial dates (rbf, ) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
179 NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of agreed motion to reset pretrial and trial dates 178 before Honorable David H. Coar on 4/14/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
180 MINUTE entry before Judge David H. Coar : Motion hearing held. Agreed motion to reset pretrial and trial dates is granted to the extent that the current schedule as to the pretrial order deadline, the final pretrial conference, and the trial are all stricken until ruling on the Class Certification Motion. The plaintiff's motion for leave to withdraw appearance for plaintiffs is granted, leave granted Christopher V. Langone to withdraw as one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/18/2005)
181 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's supplemental brief in opposition to defendants motion for order of court to required the MCC to make available Aaron Patterson for deposition to be filed by 04/28/05; defendants may reply by 05/05/05. Plaintiffs motion for leave to serve second set of interrogatories is entered and continued. Motion hearing set for 05/31/05 at 10:30a.m. Fact discovery closes 07/14/05. Each side may conduct a maximum of twenty additional fact depositions. Absent good cause shown, the discovery deadline and deposition limit will not be enlarged. Defendants are ordered to produce the remaining CR files by 05/05/05. Finally, plaintiffs counsel raised the issue of disclosing the First Amended Files discussed in this Court's Opinion dated 09/09/04 to the ACLU. After balancing the various, concerns and interests then presented, the court ordered therein that the First Amended Files were to be disclosed on an attorneys eyes oly basis to plaintiffs counsel in this case. If plaintiffs counsel or the ACLU wish to seek to a modification of that ruling, they shall file an appropriate motion. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/18/2005)
182 REPLY by Defendants in support of defendants' motion to dismiss counts VII, VIII, I X, XII, and XIII of plaintiffs third amended complaint as to all defendants and as to all defendants Doe and defendants Roe; Notice.(lxs, ) Modified on 11/30/2006 (gcy, ). (Entered: 04/21/2005)
183 MOTION by Defendants to strike plaintiffs second set of interrogatories; Notice. (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/25/2005)
184 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : By agreement of counsel, plaintiffs' supplemental brief in opposition to defendants' motion for order of court to require the MCC to make available Aaron Patterson for deposition is due by 5/2/05. Judicial staff mailed notice (hmb, ) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
185 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF by plaintiffs in Opposition to defendants' motion for an order from the court requiring the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make Aaron Patterson available for a deposition 129 ; Notice. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
186 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date: 2/2/05; Before the Honorable David H. Coar. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
187 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's supplemental brief in opposition to defendants' motion for order of court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition in this case 185 ; Notice. (Attachments) (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/06/2005)
188 REPLY by Plaintiff Sharon Ambielli in support of motion for leave to serve second set of interrogatories to defendant City and response to defendants' motion to strike 173 ; Notice. (cem, ) Modified on 5/11/2005 (cem, ). (Entered: 05/11/2005)
189 FIRST set of interrogatories to defendant Barker by plaintiff. (cem, ) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
190 SECOND set of interrogatories to defendant City of Chicago by plaintiff. (cem, ) (Entered: 05/11/2005)

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05/31/2005 06/17/2005
06/17/2005 06/20/2005 06/24/2005 06/24/2005 06/24/2005 06/24/2005 07/01/2005 07/01/2005 07/01/2005 07/01/2005

191 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held on 5/31/2005 and continued to 6/17/05 at 9:30 a.m. for oral argument regarding plaintiff's motion for leave to serve 2nd set of interrogatories 173 . Judicial staff mailed notice (hmb, ) (Entered: 05/31/2005)
192 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion 173 is entered and continued. Motion to strike 183 is entered and continued. In court hearing held on 6/17/2005. Motion hearing held on 6/17/2005 regarding motion for miscellaneous relief 173 , motion to strike 183 . Status hearing set for 7/7/2005 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiffs? Motion for Leave to Serve Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant City and Defendants? Motion to Strike Plaintiffs? Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant City of Chicago and Individual Sets of Interrogatories for Each of the Following Named Police Defendants Barker, Clucas, Cortez, Gamboa, Heise, Herrera, Johnson, Kizziah, Koenig, Loconte, Mendoza, Methipara, Darlene Rodriguez, Tamez, and Weber are entered and continued. For the reasons stated in open court, Defendants shall complete the following tasks before the next status hearing: (1) attempt to provide a more realistic ?may call? witness list (specifically determine whether any of the 19 individuals identified in plaintiffs' proposed interrogatories can be removed from the list at this time); (2) provide plaintiffs with a general summary of the proposed testimony of Lt. Bulgaris, Officer Demitios Lamperis, Captain Juan Morado, Michael Toma, and Sgt. Zelitzty); and (3) provide plaintiffs with the names of any officers on their "may call" list who were simply following orders of superiors and have no individualized knowledge of orders to disperse or conduct of any arrestee that led to their arrest. Defense counsel has agreed that the City shall answer the interrogatories directed to the 15 defendant officers. Defendants shall immediately begin meeting with the officers and preparing their answers. At the next status hearing, Defendants shall be prepared to provide the Court with a date by which the defendant officers' answers to interrogatories shall be completed. Mailed notice (jlj, ) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
193 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Nan R. Nolan on 6/17/2005.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
194 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Enter Protective Order. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
195 MOTION by Plaintiffs challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
196 NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit 195 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 6/29/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
197 MOTION by Plaintiffs challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit (gma, ) Modified on 7/16/2007 (air, ). (Entered: 06/27/2005)
198 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by in support of MOTION by Plaintiffs challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit 197 (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
199 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline to strike plaintiff's motion challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit (gma, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
200 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline to strike plaintiff's motion challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit 199 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 7/7/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
201 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline for a protective order against plaintiffs' second request for admissions to the defendants (gma, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
202 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline in Support of MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline for a protective order against plaintiffs' second request for admissions to the

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07/01/2005 07/11/2005
07/12/2005 07/28/2005 08/25/2005 10/11/2005 11/08/2005 01/05/2006 01/23/2006 01/24/2006 02/01/2006
02/07/2006

defendants 201 (gma, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
203 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline for a protective order against plaintiffs' second request for admissions to the defendants 201 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 7/7/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
204 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Motion hearing held on 7/7/05. For the reasons stated in open court, plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve 2nd set of interrogatories to defendant City is denied and defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' 2nd set of interrogatories is granted in part and denied in part as moot. The remaining pending motions are entered and continued to 7/28/05 at 9:00 a.m. Fact discovery cutoff date of 7/14/05 is stricken at this time, and will be reset at a later date. Judicial staff mailed notice. (hmb, ) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
205 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date: 01/31/05; Before the Honorable David H. Coar. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/13/2005)
206 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held on 7/28/2005. Pending motions are entered and continued to 8/25/2005 at 09:00 AM. Judicial staff mailed notice. (hmb, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
207 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held on 8/25/05. For the reasons stated in open court, defendant's motion for order to require the MCC to make available Aaron Patterson for videotaped deposition 129 is withdrawn without prejudice. The remaining motions are entered and continued to 10/11/05 at 09:00 AM. Judicial staff mailed notice. (hmb, ) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
208 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 11/08/05 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants' counsel is to provide plaintiffs' counsel within the next seven days of dates and times when the witnesses discussed in open court will be available for their depositions. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
209 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motions challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses [195−1][197−1], defendants' motion to strike [199−1] and defendants' motion for protective order [201−1] are entered and continued. Case is set for further status on 01/05/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
210 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 2/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
212 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 1/23/06. Mailed notice(cem, ) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
211 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Initial status hearing set for 2/7/06 at 9:15 a.m. before Judge Kendall in Courtroom 1719. By 2/1/06, counsel are directed to confer, prepare, and file a Joint Status Report as directed in the Order Requiring Status Report and Setting Status Hearing for Newly Assigned Cases to the Calendar of Judge Kendall. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/25/2006)
213 STATUS Report by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, Kevin Vodak, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, City of Chicago, Kevin Vodak, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Doe(Defendants Doe 1 − 50), Ron Huberman, K, Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Roe, CPO Barker (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
214 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Status hearing held on 2/7/2006. Ruling as to motion to certify class 27 set for 4/17/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice

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02/28/2006
03/20/2006
04/17/2006 04/17/2006 04/17/2006 04/18/2006 04/19/2006 04/19/2006
04/19/2006 04/25/2006

(gmr, ) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
215 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections and responses to plaintiffs' request to admit 195 & 197 , Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' motion challenging the sufficiency of defendants' objections 199 and Defendants' motion for protective order against plaintiffs' 2nd request for admissions 201 are withdrawn without prejudice to refiling after the district court's ruling on class certification. Case set for further status on 04/18/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
216 MEMORANDUM by CPO Bilyj, M Black, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, John R Risley, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Doe(Defendants Doe 1 − 50), Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Doe(Doe 51 − 100), Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, CPO Barker, CPO Berggren in Support of status hearing, set motion and R&R deadlines/hearings, text entry 214 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM DISTINGUISHING PLAINTIFFS' ADDITIONAL CITED AUTHORITY (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
217 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Status hearing held and continued to 5/1/06 at 9:00 AM. Status hearing set for 7/24/06 at 9:00 AM. Fact discovery ordered closed by 7/17/06. Expert discovery ordered closed by 8/15/2006. Following the close of fact discovery, counsel are directed to discuss the possibility of a resolution of the case, and shall be prepared to advise the Court at the status hearing of 7/24/06 at 9:00 AM whether a settlement conference would be useful. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
218 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : For the reasons set out in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiffs' motion for class certification 27 is granted. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
219 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Kendall on 4/17/2006.(cdy, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
220 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held 5/1/2006 at 09:15 AM (after the status hearing with Judge Kendall). In court notice (jms, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
221 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Plaintiffs' Motion to strike certain exhibits to defendants' revised memorandum in opposition to class certification 54 is denied as moot. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
222 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : For the reasons set out in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, defendants' motion to dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX, XII, and XIII of plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint as to all added defendants and as to all defendants Doe and Defendants Roe 167 is granted in part and denied in part. It is ordered that Counts VIII, IX, XII, and XIII are dismissed as to all of the added Defendants except Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman and Officers DiCicco and Jaros. The portion of Defendants' motion seeking to relieve the City of Chicago from liability for the conduct alleged against the added Defendants in the Counts dismissed by this Order is denied. Finally, the titles Defendants Doe and Defendants Roe are ordered stricken from the Complaint. Doe and Roe terminated. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
223 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Kendall on 4/19/2006.(cdy, ) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
224 MOTION by Defendants C DeCicco, Ron Huberman for reconsideration regarding order on motion to dismiss, text entry, add and terminate parties,,,,,,,,, 222 ,

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04/25/2006 04/25/2006
04/25/2006 04/27/2006
05/01/2006 05/01/2006 05/02/2006 05/08/2006 05/08/2006 05/10/2006 05/10/2006

memorandum opinion and order 223 Certain Defendants' Huberman, Dicicco and Jaros Motion to Reconsider April 19 Order and Memorandum in Support of Same (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 part 1# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2 part 2# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 2 part 3# 5 Exhibit Exhibit 2 part 4# 6 Exhibit Exhibit 2 part 5# 7 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
225 Notice of Motion to Reconsider Court's Order of April 29, 2006 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,,,,,,,,,,,,, 224 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/1/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
226 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to consolidate cases For Trial (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
227 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion to consolidate cases,,, 226 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/1/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 04/25/2006)
228 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Defendants' Motion to Reconsider This Court's April 19, 2006 Order 224 is granted. Accordingly, Counts VII, IX, XII and XIII are dismissed as to Former Superintendent Ron Huberman, Officer DiCicco and Officer Jaros for the same reasons that these claims were dismissed against the other 24 added Defendants in this Court's April 19, 2006 order. The presentment date of 5/1/06 for said motion is stricken. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
229 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held. Plaintiffs are given leave to file their motion regarding requests for admission by 05/08/06. Defendants' response is due by 05/15/06, plaintiffs' reply is due by 05/22/06. Ruling is set for 06/05/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
231 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion hearing held. Motion to consolidate cases 226 is denied without prejudice. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
230 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Minute order dated 05/01/06 docket entry 229 is amended to include the following: Plaintiffs are required to provide defendants a will call witness list (witnesses "whom they party expects to present") and a may call witness list (witnesses "whom the party may call if the need arises") at least 45 days before the close of discovery. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/02/2006)
232 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for discovery Enforce Requests to Admit (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 05/08/2006)
233 MEMORANDUM of law by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through C# 2 Exhibit D through K# 3 Exhibit L through M)(Hoft, Janine) Modified on 5/9/2006 (emd, ). (Entered: 05/08/2006)
234 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline to clarify Defendants' Motion to ClarifyThis Court's May 1, 2006 Order; To Consolidate the Issues Relating to Plaintiffs' Oppressive Requests for Admission; and To Set a Breifing Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A and B)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
235 Notice of Motion to Clarify This Court's May 1, 2006 Order; To Consolidate the Issues Relating to Plaintiffs' Oppressive Requests for Admission; and To Set a New Briefing Schedule NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify, 234 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/16/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/10/2006)

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05/10/2006 05/11/2006 05/16/2006 05/16/2006 05/16/2006 05/17/2006 06/05/2006 06/06/2006 06/07/2006 06/07/2006
06/07/2006 06/14/2006 06/15/2006

236 Notice of Motion (corrected) to Clarify This Court's May 1, 2006 Order; To Consolidate the Issues Relating to Plaintiffs' Oppressive Requests for Admission; and To Set a New Briefing Schedule NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify, 234 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 5/16/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
237 Amended Notice of Motion for Defendants' Motion to Clarify This Court's May 1, 2006 Order; To Consolidate the Issues Relating to Plaintiffs' Oppressive Requests for Admission; and To Set a New Briefing Schedule NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify, 234 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 5/17/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
238 Defendant City of Chicago's Amended Counterclaim by City of Chicago (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
239 NOTICE by City of Chicago re other 238 Amended Counterclaim (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
240 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson to motion by plaintiff to clarify, 234 , notice of motion, 237 Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' Motion to "Consolidate Issues Relating to Plaintiffs' Admissions" (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
241 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to enforce admissions 232 shall be briefed as follows: Response is due by 06/07/06, reply is due by 06/14/06. Ruling is set for 06/29/06 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants' motion to clarify 234 is entered and continued. Status hearing set for 06/05/06 is stricken. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/19/2006)
242 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to dismiss Defendant City's Amended Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law# 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 06/05/2006)
243 NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion to dismiss 242 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/8/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
244 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Briefing schedule as to motion to dismiss 242 set as follows: Responses due by 6/29/2006. Replies due by 7/13/2006. The Court will rule by mail. The presentment date of 6/8/06 for said motion is stricken. Class Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file memorandum of law in excess of 15 pages is granted to 16 pages as filed. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
245 RESPONSE by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
246 NOTICE by City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, James Maurer re Response,,, 245 OF FILING (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
247 REPLY by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Fennerty, James) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
248 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for protective order to Limit Additional Class Member Depositions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Witness List# 2 Exhibit B−Deposition Notices)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/15/2006)

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06/15/2006 06/20/2006 06/21/2006
06/21/2006 06/21/2006 06/23/2006
06/23/2006 06/29/2006 06/29/2006 06/29/2006 06/30/2006 06/30/2006

249 Class Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for protective order 248 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 6/20/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
250 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for protective order 248 is entered and continued to 06/29/06 at 9:45 a.m. Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion 248 is due by 06/23/06. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/20/2006)
251 MOTION by Defendants W Clucas, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros for leave to file Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Part I of II# 2 Exhibit A Part II of II)(Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
252 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr for presentment of motion for leave to file,, 251 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/29/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
253 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiffs' Motion Challenging the Sufficiency of Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' Request to Admit [232−1] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order [245−2] is denied without prejudice. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
254 RESPONSE by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO LIMIT ADDITIONAL CLASS MEMBER DEPOSITIONS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E# 2 Exhibit F)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
255 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Defendants' motion for leave to file Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint instanter 251 is granted. The presentment date of 6/29/06 for said motion is stricken. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
256 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for protective order 248 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court. Plaintiffs and defendants are directed to provide a will call witness list by 07/05/06. Status hearing set for 7/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
257 INCORRECT PDF LINKED (Fennerty, James) Modified on 7/6/2006 (cdy, ). (Entered: 06/29/2006)
258 RESPONSE Counter−Plaintiff, City of Chicago's Respone to Counter−Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Its Amended Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
259 NOTICE OF CORRECTION (Incorrect document was linked to entry) (cdy, ) . (Entered: 06/30/2006)
260 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Notice of Motion# 2 Exhibit Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit Exhibit B)(Fennerty, James) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

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07/05/2006 07/07/2006 07/07/2006 07/07/2006
07/07/2006 07/12/2006
07/12/2006 07/12/2006 07/12/2006 07/13/2006
07/20/2006 07/21/2006
07/24/2006 07/28/2006

261 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion for leave to publish notice 257 is stricken as a duplicate filing of document 260. Motion for leave to publish notice of pendency of class action 260 is granted. The presentment date of 7/6/06 for said motion is stricken. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
262 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for reconsideration regarding order on motion for leave to file,, text entry,,, 261 Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Modify This Court's July 5, 2006 Order (Attachments: # 1)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
263 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,,,,,, 262 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/13/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
264 MOTION by Defendant City of ChicagoDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE NOLAN'S ORDER OF JUNE 29, 2006 AND FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR FACT AND EXPERT DISCOVERY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − G# 2 Exhibit H − L# 3 Exhibit M − N)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
265 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 264 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/13/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
266 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of ChicagoDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE NOLAN'S ORDER OF JUNE 29, 2006 AND FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR FACT AND EXPERT DISCOVERY 264 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Plaintiffs' Response Opposing Defendants' Motion for Modification and Extension of Discovery)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
267 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for extension of time to file response/reply as to response to motion 258 , motion to dismiss 242 Reply in support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
268 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief, 267 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/17/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
269 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak Exhibits A−C regarding response in opposition to motion, 266 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit B# 2 Exhibit Exhibit C)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
270 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file reply in support of motion to dismiss counterclaim 267 is granted to and including 7/24/06. The Court will rule by mail on any pending motions. Status hearing remains set for 7/24/06 at 9:00 AM. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
Set/Reset Hearings Status hearing remains set for 7/24/2006 at 09:00 AM. (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)
271 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Defendants' Motion for Modification of Magistrate Judge Nolan's Order of June 29, 2006 and for an Enlargement of Time for Fact and Expert Discovery 264 is denied. The status hearing set for 7/24/06 is stricken. The parties are ordered to appear before Magistrate Judge Nolan regarding all discovery matters and the setting or extension of any discovery schedule. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
272 REPLY by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to motion to dismiss 242 , response to motion 258 In Support of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Def. Resp. to Admissions# 2 Exhibit 2−Nolan order 6−21−06# 3 Exhibit 3−Def. Answer# 4 Notice of Filing Class Plaintiffs' Reply)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
273 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing held and continued to 09/07/06 at 9:00 a.m. By agreement of the parties, defendants' motion to clarify 234 is withdrawn. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)

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07/28/2006 07/28/2006 08/30/2006
08/30/2006 09/07/2006 09/19/2006 09/19/2006 09/25/2006
09/25/2006 09/26/2006 09/26/2006 09/27/2006 09/27/2006
09/29/2006

274 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : It is hereby ordered that the following discovery schedule is entered. Enter Agreed Order. Notices mailed by Judicial staff (gcy, ) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
275 AGREED ORDER Signed by Judge Nan R. Nolan on 7/28/2006:(gcy, ) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
276 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : For the reasons set out in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, Counter−Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 242 is denied. The parties should continue to appear before Magistrate Judge Nolan regarding all discovery matters and the setting or extension of any discovery schedule. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
277 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Virginia M. Kendall on 8/30/2006:Mailed notice(gmr, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
278 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 9/26/2006 at 09:00 AM. Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
279 MOTION Opt Out (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
280 NOTICE of Motion by Mark T. Lavery for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 279 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/25/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
281 MOTION by Defendants W Clucas, City of Chicago, M Williams, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, Counter Claimant City of Chicago for extension of time City of Chicago's Motion to Extend Time to Disclose Opinions of Damages Experts on Amended Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
282 Notice of Motion of City of Chicago's Motion to Extend Time to Disclose Opinions of Damages Experts on Amended Counterlaim NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for extension of time,, 281 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 9/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
283 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion hearing held. Motion by Christopher Langone to opt out 279 is denied as premature. Counter−defendants shall answer the Amended Counterclaim by 10/25/2006. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
284 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Defendants' Motion to Extend Time to Disclose Opinions of Damages Experts on Amended Counterclaim 281 is granted to and including 10/27/06. Motion hearing set for 09/28/06 is stricken. Status hearing set for 11/28/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
285 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for discovery City of Chicago's Motion for Order of Court to Require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to Make Available Aaron Patterson for a Videotaped Deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A and B# 2 Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
286 Notice of Motion for City of Chicago's Motion for Order of Court to Require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to Make Available Aaron Patterson for a Videotaped Deposition NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for discovery, 285 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 10/3/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 09/27/2006)
287 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Defendants' Motion to reconsider and modify this Court's July 5, 2006 order 262 is granted, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to publish notice of pendency of class action 260 is denied. When the time to publish notice is proper, the parties are ordered to confer and re−submit an agreed class notice with any objections. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

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10/03/2006 10/05/2006 10/05/2006 10/10/2006
10/13/2006 10/17/2006
10/23/2006 10/23/2006 10/25/2006 10/25/2006 10/25/2006 10/26/2006 10/27/2006

288 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Defendants' Motion for Order of Court to Require the MCC to Make Available Aaron Patterson 285 shall be briefed as follows: Response is due by 10/17/06, Reply is due by 10/27/06, Sur−Reponse is due by 11/02/06. Ruling set for 11/22/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/03/2006)
289 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoenter Order on Defendants' Motion to Challenge the Sufficiency of Plaintiffs' Answers and Objections to Defendants' Rule 36 Requests for Admission (Attachments: # 1)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
290 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 289 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 10/10/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
291 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held on Defendants' Motion to Challenge the Sufficiency of Plaintiffs' Answers and Objections 289 . Parties are ordered to meet and confer in person within the next seven (7) days to discuss the issues outlined in Defendants' motion. Defendants' Motion to Challenge 289 is withdrawn without prejudice and with leave to refile if necessary by 10/24/06. Briefing is set as follows: Response is due by 11/08/06, reply is due by 11/15/06. Ruling is set for 12/07/06. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
292 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Telephone status held. Defendants' Joint Agreed Motion to File Amended Request to Admit within thirty (30) days is granted. Plaintiff's response to defendants' amended request to admit due by 12/13/06. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/17/2006)
293 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for discovery City of Chicago's Motion for Order of Court to Require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to Make Available Aaron Patterson for a Videotaped Deposition 285 (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Cross Motion to Bar Mr. Patterson's Deposition or For Entry of A Protective Order Barring Said Deposition# 2 Exhibits A − J# 3 Exhibits K − R# 4 Exhibits S − U# 5 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 10/17/2006)
294 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to file response/reply to written discovery and disclose damge witnesses on amended counterclaim (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
295 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 294 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 10/26/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
296 Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendant Kevin Vodak's, Sarah Bergstrand's, Prudence Browne's, Matthew Gaines', Angela Garcia's, Kathleen Gruber's, Steven Hudosh's, Elizabeth Johnson's, and Sophia Sieczkowski's ANSWER to counterclaim by Defendant/Counter−Plaintiff City of Chicago by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
297 MOTION for extension of time to file answer regarding other 238 Defendant/Counter−Plaintiff's Amended Counterclaim (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
298 Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants Donnell's and Castillo's NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 297 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/31/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
300 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Defendants' Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Written Discovery & Disclose Damage Witnesses on Amended Counterclaim 294 is granted to and including 12/01/06. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
299 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Clinein Support of MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for discovery City of Chicago's Motion for Order of Court to Require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to Make Available Aaron Patterson for a Videotaped Deposition 285 Defendants? Reply in Support of Their Motion for Order of Court to Require The Metropolitan Correctional Center to

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10/30/2006 11/02/2006 11/02/2006 11/02/2006 11/03/2006 11/03/2006 11/09/2006
11/09/2006
11/09/2006 11/13/2006 11/21/2006 11/21/2006 11/21/2006 11/21/2006 11/28/2006

Make Available Aaron Patterson for a Videotaped Deposition in this Case and Response to Plaintiffs? Request for a Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through C)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
301 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Agreed Motion for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead 297 is granted to and including 11/22/2006. The presentment date of 10/31/2006 for said motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
302 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to compel (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Fennerty, James) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
303 NOTICE of Motion by James Russell Fennerty for presentment of motion to compel 302 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
304 SUR−REPLY by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to motion for discovery, 285 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
305 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : The presentment date of 11/9/2006 for Plaintiffs' motion to compel is hereby stricken. Counsel is directed to re−notice said motion before the Magistrate Judge. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
306 NOTICE of Motion by James Russell Fennerty for presentment of motion to compel 302 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 11/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
307 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 302 is entered and continued to 12/19/06 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel are directed to meet and confer to discuss disputed contention interrogatories. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 302 is due by 11/27/06. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/09/2006)
308 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered this day, Defendants' motion for order of Court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition 285 is denied, and Plaintiffs' cross−motion to quash Mr. Patterson's deposition and/or entry of a protective order barring his deposition [293−1] is granted. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. (td, ) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
309 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Nan R. Nolan on 11/9/2006.(td, ) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
310 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Status hearing set for 12/07/06 is stricken. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 302 set for 12/19/06 at 9:00 a.m. to stand. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
311 OBJECTIONS by City of Chicago to order on motion for discovery, text entry,, 308 Defendants' Objections to the Magistrate's Order Prospectively Barring the Deposition of Aaron Patterson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through B)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
312 Notice of Motion for Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate's Order Prospectively Barring the Deposition of Aaron Patterson NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
313 MOTION by Counter Defendants Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell for sanctions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − C# 2 Exhibit D# 3 Exhibit E# 4 Exhibit F)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
314 NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for sanctions 313 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
315 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion hearing held. Any response to Defendants' objections to Magistrate's order prospectively barring the deposition of Aaron Patterson 311 shall be filed by 12/8/2006. The Court will rule by mail. Any

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12/05/2006
12/05/2006 12/08/2006 12/19/2006 01/04/2007 01/04/2007 01/09/2007 01/30/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 02/09/2007

response to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 313 shall be filed by 12/5/2006 and shall not exceed 15 pages. The Court will rule by mail. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
316 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, John R Risley, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Doe, Ron Huberman, K, Karen Rowan, Doe, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, Roe, CPO Barker, CPO Berggren by Kellye L Fabian (Fabian, Kellye) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
317 RESPONSE by City of Chicago in Opposition to MOTION by Counter Defendants Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell for sanctions 313 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Fabian, Kellye) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
318 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to objections, 311 by Defendants to Magistrate's Order Barring Mr. Patterson's Deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − R# 2 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/08/2006)
319 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 302 is withdrawn. Counsel are directed to meet and confer to discuss outstanding discovery outlined in open court.Status hearing set for 1/9/2007 at 09:00 AM to stand.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
320 MOTION by Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to compel Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Counter−Defendant Discovery Requests# 2 Exhibit B Counter−Plaintiff Responses# 3 Exhibit C,D,E,F Letters to Defendants/Counter−Plaintiff)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
321 NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion to compel, 320 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 1/9/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
322 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Motion hearing held regarding motion to compel, 320 . Defendants shall respond to paragraphs 8 and 9 of plaintiff's motion to compel by 1/30/2007. Reply is due 2/14/2007. The parties are to schedule dates for depositions for all remaining persons by 1/31/2007. Hearing on plaintiffs' motion to compel is entered and continued to 2/27/2007 at 9:00 am.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
323 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago, Counter Claimant City of Chicago RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF PLAINTIFFS'/COUNTER−DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G−1# 8 Exhibit G−2# 9 Exhibit H# 10 Exhibit I)(Levy, Richard) Exhibit E removed per court order dated 1/31/07. (Entered: 01/30/2007)
324 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :The Clerk's office is hereby directed to remove Exhibit E from Defendants' Response, docket entry 323 from the public record; Forthwith. Defendants' counsel is directed to re−file a redacted version of Exhibit E with the Clerk's office. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
325 EXHIBIT E to Defendant/Counter−Plaintiff, The City Of Chicago's Response To Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' Motion To Compel Discovery by City of Chicago, City of Chicago (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 01/31/2007)
326 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak for extension of time to File the Reply in Support of Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' Motion to Compel (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 02/09/2007)

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02/09/2007 02/13/2007
02/21/2007 02/23/2007
03/05/2007 03/09/2007
03/15/2007 03/15/2007 03/21/2007
04/25/2007 05/04/2007
05/04/2007 05/09/2007 05/11/2007
05/11/2007 05/15/2007

327 Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of extension of time 326 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 2/14/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 02/09/2007)
328 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' Motion for Additional Time to File a Reply in Support of Their Motion to Compel is granted as unopposed. Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' Reply is due by 2/21/07. No appearance is necessary on 2/14/07.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
329 REPLY by Kevin Vodak, Kevin Vodak to Response, 323 , MOTION by Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to compel Discovery 320 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
330 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Defendant/Counter−Plaintiff City of Chicago shall file a surreply regarding Plaintiffs'/Counter−Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery 320 by 3/5/07. Status hearing set for 2/27/07 is reset to 3/21/07 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
331 SUR−REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago, Counter Claimant City of Chicago to motion to compel, 320 (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
332 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants Motion to Compel Discovery 320 is granted in part and denied in part. [ For further details see text below.]Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
333 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for sanctions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Fennerty, James) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
334 NOTICE of Motion by James Russell Fennerty for presentment of motion for sanctions 333 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 3/21/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
335 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Motion hearing. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions 333 is entered and continued. Status hearing set for 05/15/07 at 9:00 a.m. Outstanding depositions to be completed by 05/31/07.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
336 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :Position paper regarding consolidation for trial shall be filed by 5/17/2007, and shall not exceed 5 pages. The Court will rule by mail.Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
337 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to supplement Defendants' Motion to Supplement Their Objections To the Magistrate Order Prospectively Barring the Deposition of Aaron Patterson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A through C)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
338 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion to supplement, 337 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/9/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
339 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :Motion hearing held. Motion to supplement 337 is granted.Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
340 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to enforce This Court's March 9, 2007 Ruling (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
341 Plaintiff Vodak's NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion to enforce, 340 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 5/15/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
342 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 340 shall be briefed as follows: Response is due by 05/29/07, reply brief to be filed by 06/13/07. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions 333 is withdrawn. Status hearing set for 06/28/07 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/15/2007)

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05/17/2007
05/17/2007 05/29/2007 05/29/2007
05/29/2007 06/01/2007 06/12/2007
06/13/2007

343 DEFENDANTS' POSITION PAPER ON CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
344 Vodak Plaintiffs' Position on Consolidation and Request for Dispositive Motion and Trial Dates by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Vodak Plaintiffs' Position on Consolidation)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
345 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :The Court adopts the findings of Magistrate Judge Nolan's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 9, 2006. Defendant City's objections are hereby overruled. Defendants' motion for order of Court to require the Metropolitan Correctional Center to make available Aaron Patterson for a videotaped deposition 285 is denied.Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
346 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker for extension of time to file response/reply TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
347 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply,,, 346 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 6/1/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
348 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Defendants' Agreed Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Court Order 346 is granted. No appearance required 06/01/07 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants are given to and including 06/12/07 to file their response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce 340 . Plaintiffs are given to and including 06/19/07 file thier reply. Status hearing set for 06/28/07 at 9:00 a.m. to stand. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/01/2007)
349 RESPONSE by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE THIS COURT'S MARCH 9, 2007 RULING (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C# 2 Exhibit D−E# 3 Exhibit F−G# 4 Exhibit H−K# 5 Exhibit L−P# 6 Exhibit Q−1# 7 Exhibit Q−2# 8 Exhibit Q−3)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
350 AFFIDAVIT of FRANK F. WILSON, Ex. C to 349 by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John

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06/13/2007 06/19/2007 06/28/2007 06/28/2007 07/10/2007
07/10/2007 07/24/2007
07/27/2007

Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker regarding Response,,,, 349 (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
351 NOTICE by all defendants re affidavit,,, 350 OF FILING, EXHIBIT C to 349 (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
352 REPLY by Kevin Vodak, Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to enforce This Court's March 9, 2007 Ruling 340 , Response,,,, 349 , MOTION by Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to compel Discovery 320 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A and B# 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
353 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce This Court's March 9, 2007 Ruling [Doc. 340] is granted in part and denied in part. [For further details see text below]Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
354 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 6/28/2007 and continued to 7/24/2007 at 09:00 AM. Counsel are advised that any request for discovery must be made by 07/13/07.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
355 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to compel DISCOVERY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/10/2007)
356 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion to compel,,, 355 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 7/24/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/10/2007)
357 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to compel DISCOVERY 355 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated on the record in open court. Motion 355 hearing held. Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/24/2007 and continued for 8/16/2007 at 9:30 AM. Parties to submit joint written status report by 8/13/2007.Mailed notice (tlp,) (Entered: 07/24/2007)
358 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to compel Plaintiffs To Issue Class Notification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Sikes,

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07/27/2007 08/01/2007 08/01/2007 08/01/2007 08/03/2007 08/06/2007 08/16/2007 08/16/2007 08/16/2007 08/21/2007 09/04/2007
09/06/2007
09/26/2007
09/27/2007

Richard) (Entered: 07/27/2007)
359 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr for presentment of motion to compel,,, 358 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/14/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 07/27/2007)
360 MOTION by Movant Christopher V LangoneLeave to Opt Out (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
361 NOTICE of Motion by Mark T. Lavery for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 360 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/6/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
362 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr for presentment of motion to compel,,, 358 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/21/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
363 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions Against the Counter−Plaintiff City of Chicago 313 is denied.Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
364 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :Motion hearing held. Movant's counsel fails to appear. Motion for Christopher Langone to opt out 360 is denied as premature.Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/15/2007)
365 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 8/16/2007 and continued to 9/26/2007 at 09:00 AM. Counsel are directed to meet and confer to schedule Boston deposition, as discussed in open court, to be taken within the next two weeks.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 08/17/2007)
366 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan : Enter Protective Order. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 08/22/2007)
367 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Nan R. Nolan on 8/16/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 08/22/2007)
368 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :Motion hearing held. Briefing schedule as to motion to compel Plaintiffs to issue class notification 358 set as follows: Responses due by 9/4/2007. Replies due by 9/11/2007. The Court will rule by mail. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/22/2007)
369 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodakin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, 358 Objecting to Defendants' Proposed Class Notice (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
370 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Issue Class Notification 358 is denied. If the City intends to pursue its counterclaim against the class, the parties shall advise Magistrate Judge Nolan as to any further discovery needed on the issue. The City shall then file a motion for class certification within thirty days of completing such discovery. Plaintiffs will have thirty days to respond. The City will have two weeks to reply. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
371 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Status hearing held and continued to 09/27/07 at 12:30 p.m. Defendants are given to 10/05/07 to produce any outstanding documents as to their counterclaim and provide a certification that production of the documents is complete. Plaintiffs shall produce the missing videotape discussed in open court as soon as possible.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
372 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Status hearing held and continued to 10/9/07 at 9:00 a.m. By 10/5/07, defendants shall produce any outstanding documents regarding its counterclaim. By the next status hearing on 10/9/07, defendants shall have a date set for the deposition of Anna Florkey. By stipulation of the parties, no additional fact discovery will be allowed with the exception of the discovery contemplated in paragraph 3 of the Agreed Order entered 7/28/06 [Doc. 275].Mailed

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09/28/2007 10/11/2007
10/29/2007 10/29/2007 11/01/2007 11/13/2007 12/13/2007 12/13/2007 12/13/2007 01/14/2008 01/16/2008 01/16/2008 01/16/2008 01/18/2008
01/29/2008
03/06/2008

notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
373 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Status hearing previously set for 10/09/07 is reset to 10/11/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
374 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Status hearing held and continued to 11/13/07 at 9:00 a.m. By 10/25/07, defendants shall produce the information regarding their recent document production discussed in open court (unit numbers missing from T &A cards, index of T & A cards, and an explanation of abbreviations used on T & A cards).Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/12/2007)
375 MOTION by Movant Christopher V Langone to substitute attorney (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
376 NOTICE of Motion by Mark T. Lavery for presentment of motion to substitute attorney 375 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/8/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Lavery, Mark) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
377 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall :Motion to substitute appearance 375 is granted. The presentment date of 11/8/2007 for said motion is hereby stricken. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
378 MINUTE entry before Judge Nan R. Nolan :Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 11/13/2007. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Nan R. Nolan no longer referred to the case.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
379 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, Counter Claimant City of Chicago to certify class OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CLASS PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER−DEFENDANTS (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
380 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago, City of Chicago in support of motion to certify class 379 OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CLASS PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER−DEFENDANTS (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
381 NOTICE by City of Chicago, City of Chicago OF FILING (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
382 MEMORANDUM by Kevin Vodak in Opposition to motion to certify class 379 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C# 2 Exhibit D# 3 Exhibit E1# 4 Exhibit E2# 5 Exhibit F−I# 6 Exhibit J−L# 7 Exhibit M# 8 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
383 MEMORANDUM by Kevin Vodak, Kevin Vodak in Opposition to motion to certify class 379 CORRECTED Memorandum (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
384 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to set a briefing schedule For Motions for Summary Judgment (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
385 Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 384 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/22/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/16/2008)
386 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Plaintiff's Motion to set a briefing schedule 384 is granted. Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda due 3/15/2008; responses due 4/15/2008; replies due 4/29/2008. The 1/22/08 hearing date noticed for said motion is stricken; no appearance is required. Mailed notice. (kw, ) (Entered: 01/18/2008)
387 REPLY by City of Chicago, City of Chicago to memorandum in opposition to motion 383 TO CORRECTED PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO CITY OF CHICAGO'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION OF A COUNTER−DEFENDANT CLASS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−E# 2 Exhibit F−K# 3 Exhibit L−T# 4 Exhibit U−BB# 5 Exhibit CC−HH)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 01/29/2008)
388 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, CPO

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03/06/2008 03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/11/2008 05/22/2008 06/16/2008
06/16/2008 06/16/2008
06/16/2008
06/16/2008 06/16/2008 06/16/2008

Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Jerry Robinson, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Sam Christian, David Doughtery, Marienne Perry, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Neil Sullivan, Dave Sobscyzk, Frank Limon, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to clarify OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FIILNG MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A & B)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 03/06/2008)
389 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion to clarify,,, 388 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/11/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 03/06/2008)
390 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the City of Chicago's Motion for Class Certification of its Counterclaim Against Class Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants 379 . Mailed notice. (kw, ) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
391 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by Judge Virginia M. Kendall on 3/10/2008. (kw, ) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
392 MINUTE entry before Judge Virginia M. Kendall : Motion hearing held. Defendant's Motion to Extend Time to File Motions Summary Judgment 388 is granted. Motion due 6/16/2008; responses due 7/14/2008; replies due 7/28/2008. Jury Trial set for 1/26/2009 at 9:15 AM. Mailed notice. (kw, ) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
393 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Pretrial Conference set for 1/16/2009 at 10:00 AM. Final Pretrial Order due 1/7/2009. Motions in limine and proposed jury instructions due under separate cover 1/7/2009. Mailed notice. (kw, ) (Entered: 05/23/2008)
394 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time Individually−Named Police Officer Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Its Motions for Summary Judgment and for Leave to File a Memorandum That Exceeds The Page Limit and a Supporting 56.1 Statement of Facts That Exceeds the Paragraph Limit (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
395 Notice of Motio and Certificate of Service NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of extension of time, 394 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
396 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment City of Chicago's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VI, Count XII, and Count XIII of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Memo in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Notice of Filing Notice of Filing and Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
397 Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed Facts STATEMENT by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 9)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
398 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak for leave to file More Than 80 Statements of Undisputed Facts and Memoranda of Law in Excess of 15 Pages Instanter (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
399 Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for leave to file 398 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
400 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak for summary judgment on Defendant City of Chicago's Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Law in Support, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/16/2008)

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06/16/2008 06/16/2008
06/17/2008 06/17/2008 06/19/2008
07/03/2008 07/03/2008 07/08/2008 07/09/2008
07/09/2008 07/11/2008

401 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claims (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Law in Support, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
402 RULE 56 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak IN SUPPORT OF INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−4, # 2 Exhibit 5−7, # 3 Exhibit 8−13, # 4 Exhibit 14−19, # 5 Exhibit 20−25, # 6 Exhibit 26−34, # 7 Exhibit 35−47, # 8 Exhibit 48, # 9 Exhibit 49, # 10 Exhibit 50−59, # 11 Exhibit 60−62, # 12 Exhibit 63−66, # 13 Exhibit 67−71, # 14 Exhibit 72−75, # 15 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) Modified on 6/17/2008 (gmr, ). (Entered: 06/16/2008)
403 NOTICE of Correction regarding 402 ; The incorrect type of event was used to describe the document; The text of the entry has been edited; Terminated extra motion. (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/17/2008)
405 EXHIBIT 24a through 24f by Plaintiffs regarding Plaintiffs' Rule 26 Statement of Facts 402 . (Document not scanned). (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
404 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Its Motions for Summary Judgment and for Leave to File a Memorandum That Exceeds The Page Limit 394 is granted. Defendants are given to 7/17/2008 to file their motion for summary judgment and supporting memoranda. Defendants' memorandum is limited to 60 pages. Defendants' statement of facts is limited to 250 undisputed statements of facts. Plaintiff is granted leave to file 150 page response. Reply is limited to 20 pages. MOTION by Plaintiff for leave to file More Than 80 Statements of Undisputed Facts and Memoranda of Law in Excess of 15 Pages Instanter 398 is granted. Plaintiff's are granted leave to file 375 statements of undisputed statements of facts is granted. Defendant is granted leave to file a 20 page response to each of plaintiff's motion. Defendant is granted leave to file 275 undisputed statements of fact. Plaintiff's replies are limited to 15 pages. Court will rule by mail.Advised in open court notice (jms, ) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
406 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to dismiss voluntarily certain defendants (Agreed) (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/03/2008)
407 Plaintiffs' Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion to dismiss 406 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/9/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/03/2008)
408 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants Robinson, Christian, Dougherty, Sullivan, Limon, Perry, and Hunt pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
409 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker, Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson, Counter Claimant City of Chicago, Counter Defendants Kevin Vodak, Robert Castillo, Patrick Donnell, Movant Christopher V Langone for extension of time JOINT AGREED MOTION REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING RESPONSES TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
410 JOINT/AGREED NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of extension of time,,,, 409 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 7/14/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/09/2008)
411 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:The Joint motion for extension of time to 7/31/2008 to file responses to the motions for summary judgment 409 is granted. Replies are to be filed by 8/14/2008.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

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07/17/2008
07/17/2008
07/17/2008
07/31/2008
07/31/2008 07/31/2008 07/31/2008 07/31/2008

412 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker for summary judgment (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
413 MEMORANDUM by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker in support of motion for summary judgment,, 412 (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
414 RULE 56 1 Statement by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker regarding motion for summary judgment,, 412 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−2, # 2 Exhibit 3−7, # 3 Exhibit 8, # 4 Exhibit 9−16, # 5 Exhibit 17−20, # 6 Exhibit 21−25, # 7 Exhibit 26−32, # 8 Exhibit 33−35, # 9 Exhibit 36−38, # 10 Exhibit 39−40, # 11 Exhibit 41−46, # 12 Exhibit 47−49, # 13 Exhibit 50−62, # 14 Exhibit 63−73, # 15 Exhibit 74−82, # 16 Exhibit 83−88, # 17 Exhibit 89−98, # 18 Exhibit 99−105, # 19 Exhibit 106−109, # 20 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
415 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker, Counter Claimant City of Chicago by Joseph P. Roddy (Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
416 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file excess pages Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Legal Memo, # 2 Exhibit B−Rule56.1(b)3(C) Statement)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
417 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 416 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/5/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
418 RULE 56 1(b)(3)(A) Statement by Kevin Vodak regarding motion for summary judgment, 396 of Defendant City Of Chicago Against Plaintiffs' Monell Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B−E, # 3 Exhibit F, # 4 Exhibit G, # 5 Exhibit H, # 6 Exhibit J−L)(Power, Melinda) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
419 MEMORANDUM by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M

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07/31/2008 07/31/2008
07/31/2008
08/04/2008 08/04/2008 08/04/2008 08/04/2008 08/05/2008 08/05/2008
08/05/2008 08/08/2008
08/08/2008 08/14/2008

Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker in Opposition to motion for summary judgment 401 ON FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
420 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago to Individual and Class Plaintiffs/Counter−Defendants' Consolidated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Motions For Summary Judgment (Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
421 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago in Opposition to motion for summary judgment 400 Counter Plaintiff City of Chicago's Memorandum in Opposition to Class Plaintiff/Counter Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Amended Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
422 RULE 56 Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement Counter Plaintiff City of Chicago's Supplemental Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3 and 4, # 5 Exhibit 5 through 8, # 6 Exhibit 9, # 7 Exhibit 10 and 11)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
423 RULE 56.1(b)(3)(A) Statement by Kevin Vodak regarding motion for summary judgment, 396 Corrected (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Power, Melinda) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
424 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file excess pages 416 is granted. Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
425 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment 396 . (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
426 RULE 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Additional Facts by Plaintiffs in opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment 396 . (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
427 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a Rule 56.1 statement in excess of 40 facts is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
428 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Additional Facts in Opposition to Defendant City of Chicago's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Rule 56 statement 426 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−4, # 2 Exhibit 5−9, # 3 Exhibit 10−13, # 4 Exhibit 14−18, # 5 Exhibit 19−21, # 6 Exhibit 22A, # 7 Exhibit 22B, # 8 Errata 22C, # 9 Exhibit 22D, # 10 Exhibit 23−24, # 11 Exhibit 25−26, # 12 Exhibit 27A, # 13 Exhibit 27B, # 14 Exhibit 27C)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
429 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak of Attachments to Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant City of Chicago's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding response in opposition to motion 425 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachments A & B)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 08/05/2008)
430 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to strike Rule 56 statement,,,, 414 of Defendant Officers in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for An Extension of Time to File Their Reply Memoranda in Support of Their Motions For Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 08/08/2008)
431 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion to strike,, motion for relief, 430 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 08/08/2008)
432 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago to response in opposition to motion 425 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 08/14/2008)

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08/14/2008 08/14/2008 08/14/2008 08/19/2008 08/20/2008 08/26/2008 08/26/2008
08/26/2008 08/28/2008
08/28/2008 08/29/2008

433 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file FIFTEEN SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit City of Chicago's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 2 Exhibit 1−7)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 08/14/2008)
434 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for leave to file, 433 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 08/14/2008)
435 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago to Rule 56 statement 426 Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement Of Additional Facts In Opposition To Defendant City's Motion For Summary Judgment (Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 08/14/2008)
436 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant Officers' 56.1 statement of undisputed facts is taken under advisement. 430 Response is to be filed by 8/26/2008. The motion will be reviewed with the pending motion.Curt will rule by mail. Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to 8/28/2008 to file their reply to their motion for summary judgment is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
437 Amended Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion for leave to file, 433 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/26/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
438 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Motion by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file fifteen supplemental statements of fact in support of its motion for summary judgment 433 is granted. Motion hearing held on 8/26/2008 regarding motion for leave to file. 433 Mailed notice (tlp, ) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
439 RESPONSE by CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, Marienne Perry, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to strike Rule 56 statement,,,, 414 of Defendant Officers in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for An Extension of Time to File Their Reply Memoranda in Support of Their MotiMOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to strike Rule 56 statement,,,, 414 of Defendant Officers in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for An Extension of Time to File Their Reply Memoranda in Support of Their Moti 430 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT OFFICERS' LOCAL RULE 56.1 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR CERTAIN EXHIBITS ATTACHED THERETO (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−5, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
440 LOCAL RULE 56.1(a)(3) Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts by City of Chicago. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−7). (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/27/2008)
441 REPLY by Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak for summary judgment on Defendant City of Chicago's Counterclaim 400 , MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak for summary judgment RULE 56 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 402 , memorandum in opposition to motion, 421 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 08/28/2008)
442 RULE 56 (a)(3) Statement by Kevin Vodak regarding motion for summary judgment 400 Response to City's Supplemental Facts (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 08/28/2008)
443 REPLY by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to motion for summary judgment 401 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 08/29/2008)

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09/03/2008
09/03/2008 09/05/2008 09/05/2008 09/05/2008 09/05/2008 09/05/2008 09/10/2008
09/26/2008
09/27/2008 09/27/2008 09/27/2008 10/01/2008 10/01/2008 10/01/2008 10/01/2008

444 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to file instanter Surreply & Response to Supplemental Facts, MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file Surreply and Response to Supplemental Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A(Plaintiffs' Surreply in Opposition to City), # 2 Exhibit B(Plaintiffs' Response to Supplemental Facts))(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
445 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion to file instanter,, motion for leave to file, 444 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/9/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
446 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to clarify this Court's order dated August 19, 2008 and to Set a Date Certain by Which Plaintiffs Shall File Their Response to the Defendant Police Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
447 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion to clarify 446 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/11/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
448 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiffs' motionfor leave to file Rule 56.1 statement and surreply to defendant City's supplemental statement instanter 444 is granted. No more filings on the summary judgment will be accepted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
449 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs to Defendant City of Chicago's Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts 440 . (Exhibits). (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
450 SURREPLY by Plaintiffs in opposition to Defendant City of Chicago's motion for summary judgment 396 . (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
451 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: The Motion to Strike has been taken under advisement and will be ruled on with the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. Defendants Police Officers are not required to redraft their Rule 56 statement at this point. Plaintiffs are given until September 25, 2008 to respond to the Defendant Police Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment. Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
452 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file Instanter Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Add'l Facts, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1a, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 1b, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 1c, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 1d − 8, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 9 − 12, # 7 Exhibit Exhibits 13− 24)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 09/26/2008)
453 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to file instanter Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 09/27/2008)
454 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to file instanter Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A & B) Statement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 09/27/2008)
455 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for leave to file, 452 , motion to file instanter 454 , motion to file instanter 453 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/2/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 09/27/2008)
456 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiff's motions for leave to file instanter 452 , 453 454 , are granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 10/01/2008)
457 RULE 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement by Plaintiffs additional facts in opposition to Police Officer Defendants motion for Summary Judgment 412 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−a, # 2 Exhibit 1 − b, # 3 Exhibit 1 − c, # 4 Exhibit 1 − d thru 8, # 5 Exhibit 9 thru 12, # 6 Exhibit 13 thru 24)(hp, ) (Entered: 10/02/2008)
458 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs to Defendants Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment 412 (hp, ) (Entered: 10/02/2008)
459 RULE 56.1(b)(3)(A)&(B) Statement of Facts by Plaintiffs in response to defendants facts (Dkt. 414) and in Opposition to their motion for summary judgment (Attachments: # 1 Pages 61 thru 120, # 2 pages 121 thru 132)(hp, ) (Entered:

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 80 of 98

10/02/2008 10/10/2008 10/13/2008 10/13/2008 10/13/2008 10/13/2008 10/13/2008 10/22/2008
10/23/2008
10/24/2008 10/29/2008 10/29/2008 11/07/2008

10/02/2008)
460 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak 100 EXHIBITS regarding Rule 56 statement 459 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−4, # 2 Exhibit 5−8, # 3 Exhibit 9−14, # 4 Exhibit 15−22, # 5 Exhibit 23−28, # 6 Exhibit 29−32, # 7 Exhibit 33−36, # 8 Exhibit 37−46, # 9 Exhibit 47−50, # 10 Exhibit 51−57, # 11 Exhibit 58−65, # 12 Exhibit 66−70, # 13 Exhibit 71−84, # 14 Exhibit 85−100)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 10/02/2008)
461 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to compel Defendants' Renewed Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Issue Class Notification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 through 3)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/10/2008)
462 Notice of Motion to present Defendants' Renewed Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Issue Class Notification NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion to compel 461 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/22/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/13/2008)
463 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to clarify Defendant City's Rule 23(d) Motion to Determine the Course of Proceedings as to its Counterclaims (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/13/2008)
464 Notice of Motion to present Defendant City's Rule 23(d) Motion to Determine the Course of Proceedings as to Its Counterclaims NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion to clarify 463 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/22/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 10/13/2008)
465 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to clarify Defendant City of Chicago's Renewed Motion to Consolidate for Trial or, in the Alternative, to Clarify the Trial Date and Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 and 2, # 2 Exhibit Exhibits 3 through 5, # 3 Exhibit Exhibits 6 through 8)(Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 10/13/2008)
466 Notice of Motion to present Defendant City of Chicago's Renewed Motion to Consolidate For Trial or, in the Alternative to Clarify the Trial Date and Schedule NOTICE of Motion by Joseph P. Roddy for presentment of motion to clarify, 465 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/22/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 10/13/2008)
467 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Motion hearing held. Trial Planning Conference is set for 11/14/2008 at 01:30 PM regarding number of juries, trial length, special jury panel requirements etc. The parties are given to 10/29/2008 to submit a proposed class notice. Court will rule by 11/5/2008. Plaintiff is given to 11/7/2008 to file a response to defendant City's Rule 23(d) Motion to Determine the Course of Proceedings as to its Counterclaims.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
468 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker, Counter Claimant City of Chicago by Audrey Lane Brodrick (Brodrick, Audrey) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
469 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Suzanne Miriam Rose (Rose, Suzanne) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
470 Legal Notice of Pendency of Class Action by City of Chicago, City of Chicago , et al. (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
471 Vodak Plaintiffs' Proposal Regarding Class Notification by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
472 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak, Counter Defendant Kevin Vodak to motion to clarify 463 the City's Rule 23(d) Motion to Determine the Course of the Proceedings

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 81 of 98

11/07/2008
11/07/2008
11/12/2008 11/17/2008 11/20/2008 11/21/2008 12/04/2008 12/04/2008
12/04/2008

With Respect to the City's Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
473 REPLY by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to memorandum in support of motion,, 413 IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
474 RESPONSE by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to Rule 56 statement, 457 RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' RULE 56.1(b)(3)(C) STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO POLICE OFFICER DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−5, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
475 Defendants' Position Statement STATEMENT by City of Chicago Defendants' Position Statement with Respect to the Issues to be Discussed at the November 14, 2008 trial planning conference (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Brodrick, Audrey) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
476 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Trial planning conference held. Status hearing set for 11/20/2008 at 09:00 AM. The parties are directed to submit proposed voir dire questions by 12/8/2008.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
477 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 11/20/2008.Mailed notice (clw, ) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
478 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Notice by publication in a major newspaper is required to provide acceptable notice to unidentified class members and therefore protect the Defendants interest in the finality of the litigation. As such, this Court orders Plaintiffs to publish Class Notice in a major paper such as the Chicago Sun−Times or Chicago Tribune at their expense.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
479 Statement Noting Defendant Thomas Loconte's Death STATEMENT by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
480 MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodriguez, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Weber, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, Ralph Chiczewski, John Killacky, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Daniel Dugan, Charles Williams, Kevin Ryan, Dave Sobscyzk, Ron Huberman, K, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Carson Earnest, E Gedrekis, T Lieber, K McClearn, J Ryan, J Tuman, Officer Jaros, CPO Barker to take deposition of Andrew Spirk and to Serve Subpoena for Documentation and Videotaped Deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Brodrick, Audrey) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
481 NOTICE of Motion by Audrey Lane Brodrick for presentment of motion to take deposition,,, 480 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/9/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Brodrick, Audrey) (Entered: 12/04/2008)

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 82 of 98

12/08/2008
12/08/2008 12/09/2008 12/09/2008 12/16/2008 12/19/2008 12/19/2008 12/24/2008
01/05/2009
01/05/2009 01/06/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009

482 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodakin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants CPO Bilyj, M Black, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, G Gamboa, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, R Hughes, CPO Johnson, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Loconte, W Clucas, Sgt Methipara, City of Chicago, J Menodoza, CPO Pasqua, D Rodrigu 480 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−Letter to Defense Counsel, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
483 The Parties' Joint Proposed Questionnaire for Potential Jurors by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/08/2008)
484 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Motion hearing held on 12/9/08. Defendants motion for leave to immediately serve a subpoena for documentation and videotaped deposition of Andrew Spirk 480 is taken under advisement. Mailed notice(air, ) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
485 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Defendants' Motion for leave to immediately serve a subpoena for documentation and videotaped deposition of Andrew Spirk 480 is granted. (For further details see minute order.) Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
486 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Sua sponte, Jury Trial date of 1/26/2009 is reset for 2/12/2009 at 09:15 AM. Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 12/16/2008)
487 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to amend/correct Agreed Motion to Modify the Court's December 10, 2008 Order (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
488 NOTICE of Motion by Terrence J. Sheahan for presentment of motion to amend/correct 487 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/29/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
489 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Defendant's agreed motion to modify the court's 12/09/08 order 487 is granted. This Court's minute entry of 12/09/08 is modified as follows: Andrew Spirk's deposition must be held in both the Vodak and Beal cases at a time that is convenient to all interested counsel, but not later than 1/30/09.Mailed notice(air, ) (Entered: 12/24/2008)
490 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Defendants motions under FRCP 42(a) to consolidate the actions for trial are granted. 03 C 2463 and 04 C 2039 are consolidated for trial with one jury panel for both sets of plaintiffs. The Parties are directed to contact Judge Wayne Andersens Courtroom Deputy to arrange a status before Judge Andersen prior to January 16th for a discussion as to whether Judge Andersen can aid the parties in reaching a settlement in thematter. Judge Andersen has offered his service as a mediator.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
492 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs by Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino. (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
491 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Wayne R. Andersen: Settlement Conference set for 1/13/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
493 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants Motion In Limine to Bifurcate Trial With Damages Issues To Be Tried Individually With Other Individual Issues and The CIty's Counterclaim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibits C and D)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
494 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine to Bar Plaintiff From Introducing All Evidence of Non−Emotional Damages and to Request This Court Inform The Jury of Plaintiffs' Failure to Comply with the Discovery Rules (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
495 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion In Limine #3 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Opinions, Testimony or Evidence of Purported Expert Anthony Bouza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B part 1, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B part 2, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B part 3, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit B part 4, # 6 Exhibit Exhibits C through F)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)

Case: 1:03-cv-2463 As of: 05/17/2017 03:50 PM CDT 83 of 98

01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009
01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009

496 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #4 to Take Judicial Notice of State Statutes, City of Chicago Ordinances and Other Historical Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B and C)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
497 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine to Bar Witnesses From The Courtroom During the Testimony of any Other Witness (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
498 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #6 to Bar Plaintiffs from Introducing Any Testimony, Evidence or Argument to the Jury Regarding any Publicized Events Concerning Allegations of Police Misconduct and the Chicago Police Department's Actions During the 1968 Democratic Convention (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
499 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #7 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Any Testimony or Evidence or Arguing to the Jury that Police Officers in General Conspire, Cover−Up or Lie for Their Colleagues Through Some Form of Code of Silence (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
500 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #8 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Evidence of Violations of City of Chicago Police Department General Orders, Special Orders and Department Notices (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
501 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #9 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Evidence That Individual Defendants May Be Indemnified By The City of Chicago for Any Compensatory Damages Returned Against Them (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
502 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #10 to Bar Misleading References To Their Attorneys (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
503 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #11 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Evidence of Internal Police Investigation (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
504 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion In Limine #12 to Exclude Any Argument Or Insinuation Concerning a Witness Not Called By The City, But Equally Available to Plaintiffs (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
505 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Joint Motion In Limine #13 to Exclude Any Mention, Comment, Or Question That The City Has Documents Within Its Records Not Yet Produced (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
506 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion In Limine #14 to Exclude Any Reference to Defendants' Conduct During Production of Discovery (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
507 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants Motion in Limine #15 to Exclude Any Reference to Any Probable Testimony of Absent Witnesses (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
508 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #16 to Exclude Testimony, Evidence, or Argument Regarding Issues Decided by the Court (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
509 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #17 to Exclude Lay Opinions (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
510 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #18 to Bar Mention of Sending a Message to the City (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
511 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #19 to Exclude Evidence of Other Litigation (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)

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01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009
01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009

512 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #20 to Exclude Evidence of Defendants' Prior Conduct and Unrelated Complaint Registers (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
513 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #21 to Exclude Evidence Not Disclosed Before Trial (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
514 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #22 to Bar Witnesses From Commenting on The Credibility Or Veracity of Other Witnesses (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
515 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #23 To Bar Evidence of, Or Reference to, The City's Insurance (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
516 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #24 to Bar Evidence of, Or Reference To, Any City Actions Post March 20, 2003 (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
517 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #25 to Preclude Plaintiffs from Presenting Evidence Of Any Theories For Recovery Not Alleged In Plaintiffs' Complaint Or Pretrial Order (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
518 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #26 To Prohibit Any Party From Making Requests for New Discovery or Stipulations Before the Jury And From Making Or Discussing Trial Motions Before the Jury (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
519 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #27 to Bar Evidence Of, Or Reference To Any Settlement Offers, or Lack Thereof, And Conduct or Statements Made in Settlement Negotiations In This Action (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
520 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #28 to Bar Plaintiffs From Testifying Regarding Any Medical Conditions, Causation, Diagnosis, or Prognosis (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
521 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #29 to Exclude Testimony, Evidence or Argument Regarding the Fact that Criminal Charges Against the Plaintiffs Resulting From Their Arrests in This Matter Were Ultimately Dismissed (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
522 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #30 to Preclude Plaintiffs From Offering Testimony, Evidence or Argument That Defendants May Be Found Liable For Any Act or Injury Caused By An Act Or Omission Of Another Person (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
523 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' Motion in Limine #32 to Bar Plaintiffs From Introducing Any Testimony, Evidence or Argument To The Jury Regarding The Deposition Of Alderman Isaac Carothers Taken in Unrelated Cases on Subjects That Are Irrelevant To The Case at Bar (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
524 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicagoin limine Defendants' City of Chicago's Motion in Limine #31 to Bifurcate Plaintiffs' Monell Claim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A and B)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
525 NOTICE by City of Chicago Notice of Filing Motions in Limine (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
526 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding References to September 11, 2001 or Terrorism (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
527 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Audio Tapes of CPD and CFD (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)

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01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009 01/07/2009
01/07/2009
01/07/2009
01/07/2009
01/07/2009 01/08/2009
01/09/2009 01/13/2009
01/13/2009 01/15/2009
01/16/2009 01/16/2009

528 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Counsel (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
529 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Guilty Pleas (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
530 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding OPS and IAD (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
531 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Organizations (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
532 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Other Demonstrations (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
533 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Prior Arrests (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
534 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Class Representation (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
535 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine Regarding Aaron Patterson (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
536 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs Proposed Instructions & Defendant Objecctions, # 2 Exhibit Defendants' Additional Proposed Instructions & Plaintiffs' Objections, # 3 Exhibit Defendants' Proposed Verdict Form & Plaintiffs' Objections)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
537 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Preclude Evidence, Testimony or Argument With Respect to the Permit Statute and Other Criminal Offenses (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
538 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine With Respect to Chicago Police Department Officers' Testimony as to Amplified Orders to Disperse (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
539 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Pertaining to Any Alleged Criminal Acts by Unidentified Individuals (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 01/07/2009)
541 DRAFT PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Defendants. (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/12/2009)
540 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Kevin Vodak (Hoft, Janine) (Linked document has the incorrect case title and case number.) Modified on 1/12/2009 (gmr, ). (Entered: 01/08/2009)
543 DRAFT PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Draft Proposed Jury Instructions Part Two). (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/13/2009)
542 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: All briefing is suspended and final pretrial conference date of 1/16/2009 is stricken pending completion of the settlement discussions with Judge Anderson.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 01/13/2009)
545 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Wayne R. Andersen: Settlement Conference reset for 1/27/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
544 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: The Court stays all pretrial filings until the parties meet at status on January 29, 2009 at 2:00 p.m. The current trial date of February 12, 2009 is stricken.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
546 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to dismiss voluntarily certain defendants pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)−Second Motion (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
547 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion to dismiss 546 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/29/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/16/2009)

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01/21/2009
01/29/2009 02/03/2009 02/04/2009

548 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Plaintiffs' second motion to voluntarily dismiss certain defendants 546 is granted. Defendants Ralph Chiczewski, Daniel Dugan, Ron Huberman, John Killacky, Kevin Ryan, David Sobscyk, Charles Williams, Thomas Barker, Taras Bilyj, Michael Black, Earnest Cortez, William Clucas, Charles DeCicco, Carson Earnest, Guillermo Gamboa, Edward Gedrekis, Richard Hagen, Lawrence Heise, David Herrera, Robert Hughes, Raymond Johnson, Aaron Kizziah, David Koenig, Thomas Leiber, Thomas Loconte, Krityn McClearn, Tomi Methipara, Joaquin Mendoza, Patrick Pasqua, Darlene Rodriguez, John Ryan, Randall Ryan and Matthew Weber are dismissed pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2). Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
549 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held. The parties are given to 2/12/2009 to file a supplemental brief in the issue outlined in open court. No response is necessary.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 01/29/2009)
550 City of Chicago's Statement Noting Defendant John Risley's Death STATEMENT by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
551 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 1/29/09 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Status Hearing. Court Reporter Contact Information: APRIL METZLER, 312−408−5154, April_Metzler@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

02/13/2009 02/13/2009
02/27/2009
02/27/2009 03/03/2009 03/12/2009 03/12/2009 03/13/2009

Redaction Request due 2/25/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/9/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/5/2009. (Metzler, April) (Entered: 02/04/2009)
552 SUPPLEMENT to response to motion 458 For Summary Judgment on Behalf of the Individual Defendant Officers (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − C, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
553 DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSION PER COURT ORDER OF JANUARY 29, 2009 by L Coleman, A Dakuras, City of Chicago, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Joseph Griffin, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, J Tuman, Officer Jaros (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
554 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Defendant Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment 412 is granted. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment Claims 401 is denied. Defendant City of Chicago's Motion for Summary Judgment 396 is granted. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the City's Counterclaim 400 is granted. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 430 is granted in part and denied in part. Mailed notice (kef, ) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
555 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 2/27/2009:Mailed notice(kef, ) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
556 ENTERED JUDGMENT on 3/3/2009:Mailed notice(jms, ) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
557 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to substitute party (estate for deceased defendant Risley) (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
558 NOTICE of Motion by James Russell Fennerty for presentment of motion to substitute party 557 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/19/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
559 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: The judgment entered on March 3, 2009 is vacated. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of defendants City of Chicago et al and against plaintiffs as to Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13. Counts

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03/16/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/19/2009 03/19/2009 03/24/2009 04/08/2009 04/29/2009
04/29/2009 05/01/2009 05/01/2009 06/19/2009

3, 4, 5, and 9 brought by individual plaintiffs remain pending.Case reopened.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
560 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiff's motion to substitute the Estate of John Risley for deceased defendant 557 is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
561 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Terrence J. Sheahan Appearance of Terrence J. Sheahan for the Estate of John Risley (Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
562 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Richard Bruce Levy Appearance of Richard B. Levy for the Estate of John Risley (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
563 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Joseph P. Roddy Appearance of Joseph P. Roddy for the Estate of John Risley (Roddy, Joseph) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
564 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Suzanne Miriam Rose Appearance of Suzanne M. Rose for the Estate of John Risley (Rose, Suzanne) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
565 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Audrey Lane Brodrick Appearance of Audrey L. Brodrick for the Estate of John Risley (Brodrick, Audrey) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
566 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr Appearance of Richard T. Sikes, Jr. for the Estate of John Risley (Sikes, Richard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
567 MOTION by Plaintiffs Kevin Vodak, Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson for certificate of appealability pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
568 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for certificate of appealability 567 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/24/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
569 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Motion hearing held and continued to 4/8/2009 at 09:00 AM regarding plaintiffs' motion for certificate of appealability 567 . Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 03/24/2009)
570 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held. Parties to submit agreed stipulated dismissal order. Court will rule by mail on the Rule 54(b) issue.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
571 MOTION by Defendants L Coleman, A Dakuras, City of Chicago, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Williams, R Rodriguez, Terry G Hillard, Philip J Cline, James Maurer, Tom Byrne, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Joseph Griffin, Karen Rowan, Thomas Epach, Jr, J Tuman, Officer Jaros for leave to file INSTANTER, DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CERTIFY CLAIMS FOR APPEAL PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Claims For Appeal)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
572 NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion for leave to file,, 571 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/5/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
573 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Defendants' motion for leave to file, instanter, defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to certify claims for appeal 571 is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 05/01/2009)
574 RESPONSE by Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to certify claims for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 567 . (Exhibits). (gmr, ) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
575 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AGREED ORDERS OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS'

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06/19/2009
06/23/2009
06/30/2009
07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/10/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/21/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/22/2009
07/22/2009 07/22/2009 07/23/2009 07/28/2009

CLAIMS (Attachments: # 1 Attachments to Motion)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
576 MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AGREED ORDERS OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 575 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/24/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 06/19/2009)
577 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago motion for entry of agreed orders if dismissal with prejudice of all individual plaintiffs' claims 575 is granted. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (tlp, ) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
578 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: This Court reverses its prior decision in Beal and grants Defendants motion for summary judgment onCounts One through Three and Seven through Nine. As such, this Court has ruled upon all claims in Beal, and its judgment is therefore final and ripe for appeal.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
579 NOTICE of appeal by Kevin Vodak regarding orders 577 Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 07520000000003918072. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
580 DOCKETING Statement by Kevin Vodak regarding notice of appeal 579 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
581 Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Circuit Rule 26.1 by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
582 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
583 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 579 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
584 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 579 ; USCA Case No. 09−2768. (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
585 NOTICE of cross appeal by City of Chicago ; Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 07520000000003943530. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
586 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
587 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of cross appeal 585 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
588 BILL of Costs submitted on behalf of Defendant City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #1 Process Servers Log, # 2 Exhibit #2 Part 1 Court Reporter Transcript Fees, # 3 Exhibit #2 Part 2, # 4 Exhibit #2 Part 3, # 5 Exhibit #2 Part 4, # 6 Exhibit #2 Part 5, # 7 Exhibit #2 Part 6, # 8 Exhibit #2 Part 7, # 9 Exhibit #2 Part 8, # 10 Exhibit #2 Part 9, # 11 Exhibit #3 Hearing Transcripts #4 Non−Expert,Non−Party Witness Fees, # 12 Exhibit #5 Production Log, # 13 Exhibit #6 Pleadings/Discovery Response Cost, # 14 Exhibit #7 Declarations in Support #8 Expert Witness Costs)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Linked document has incorrect case number.) Modified on 7/23/2009. (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
589 MEMORANDUM bill of costs,, 588 by City of Chicago Defendant City of Chicago's Memorandum in Support of Bill of Costs (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing and Certificate of Service)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
590 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of cross appeal 585 ; USCA Case No. 09−2843. (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
591 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Plaintiffs. (Poor quality original− Paper documents on File). (ber, ) (Entered: 07/27/2009)
592 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for extension of time to file response/reply as to bill of costs,, 588 , memorandum 589 (Gelsomino, Sarah) (Entered: 07/28/2009)

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07/28/2009
07/29/2009
08/05/2009 08/11/2009 08/12/2009 08/17/2009 08/17/2009 08/18/2009
09/01/2009
09/01/2009
09/01/2009
09/02/2009
10/01/2009 11/09/2009 11/17/2009 01/25/2010

593 NOTICE of Motion by Sarah Jeanette Gelsomino for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief, 592 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/3/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Gelsomino, Sarah) (Entered: 07/28/2009)
594 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to8/11/2009 to file a response to defendants' bill of costs 592 is granted. Reply is to be filed by 8/18/2009. Court will rule by mail.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
595 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Kerrie Maloney Laytin. (Poor quality original − Paper document on file). (ber, ) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
596 OBJECTION to Bill of Costs by Kevin Vodak and MOTION to Stay Execution Pending Appeal (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 1 and 2, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) Modified on 8/12/2009 (gmr,). (Entered: 08/11/2009)
597 NOTICE of Correction regarding 596 . (gmr, ) (Entered: 08/12/2009)
598 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 585 , 579 (USCA no. 09−2768 & 09−2843) (dj, ) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
600 USCA RECEIVED on 8/17/09 the long record regarding notice of cross appeal 585 , notice of appeal 579 (dj, ) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
599 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago to bill of costs,, 588 , memorandum 589 , motion to stay 596 Defendant City of Chicago's Reply in Support of Its Bill of Costs (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing, # 2 Exhibit A through F)(Sheahan, Terrence) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
601 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Richard Bruce Levy Appearance for Defs., City of Chicago, Former Superintendent Hillard, Former Superintendent Cline and Other Named Chicago Police Officers (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
602 MOTION by counsel for Counter Claimant City of Chicago to withdraw as attorney Defs. City of Chicago, Former Superintendent Hillard, Former Superintendent Cline and Other Named Chicago Police Officers Mot. Withdrawal & Substitution of Attys (Levy, Richard) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
603 Not. Mot Withdrawal & Substitution of Attys for Defs. City of Chicago, Former Superintendent Hillard, Former Superintendent Cline and Other Named Chicago Police Officers NOTICE of Motion by Richard Bruce Levy for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 602 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/8/2009 at 09:00 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Notice of Motion)(Levy, Richard) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
604 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:City of Chicago defendants' motion to withdraw the appearances of Messrs. Sikes, Sheahan, Roddy, Mayer, and Ms. Rose, Ms. Broderick and Ms. Fabian and for Mr. Levy to file his appearance as counsel of record 602 is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
605 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Nan R. Nolan for disposition of defendant's bill of costs. Signed by Executive Committee on 10/1/2009. (gmr, ) (Entered: 10/05/2009)
606 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Status hearing set for 11/17/2009 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/09/2009)
607 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 11/17/2009. Defendant's fully briefed bill of costs is taken under advisement. Ruling will be by mail. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 11/17/2009)
608 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Bill of Costs and in the Alternative Motion for Stay of Execution [#596] is sustained to extent described below.[ For further details see text below.]Mailed notice(lxs, ) . (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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06/09/2011 06/09/2011 06/09/2011 06/09/2011 06/09/2011 06/10/2011 06/30/2011 06/30/2011 07/06/2011
07/07/2011
07/29/2011

609 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 09−2768 consisting of 3 Pleadings, 21 Loose Pleadings, 8 Transcripts and 10 Exhibits. (et, ) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
611 BILL of Costs from the USCA (et, ) . (Entered: 06/10/2011)
612 MANDATE of USCA dated 03/17/2011 regarding notice of appeal 579 ; USCA No. 09−2768; The judgments of the district court are Reversed, with costs, and the cases Remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. This is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (et, ) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
613 OPINION from the USCA for the Seventh Circuit; Argued 10/18/2010; Decided 03/17/2011 in USCA case no. 09−2768, 09−2843, 09−2901. (et, ) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
614 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 06/01/2011 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 579 ; Appellate case no. : 09−2768 ; On April 14, 2011, defendants−appellees filed a petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc. All the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition, and none of the active judges has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore Denied. (et, ) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
610 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Sharon Ambielli, John Pennycuff, Eric Peters, Daniel Pineda, Aaron Robin, Daniel Romero, Brad Thomson, Kevin Vodak by John Ladell Stainthorp (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
615 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Daniel Dugan, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, CPO Parilli, Frank Radke, John R Risley, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Williams by Scott J. Jebson (Jebson, Scott) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
616 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants, Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Williams by Bhairav Radia (Radia, Bhairav) (Entered: 06/30/2011)
617 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants, CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO Bilyj, M Black, Tom Byrne, Ralph Chiczewski, Sam Christian, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, W Clucas, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, Doe, Doe, David Doughtery, Daniel Dugan, Carson Earnest, Thomas Epach, Jr, G Gamboa, E Gedrekis, Joseph Griffin, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, Terry G Hillard, Ron Huberman, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, Officer Jaros, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, John Killacky, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Lieber, Frank Limon, T Loconte, James Maurer, K McClearn, J Menodoza, Sgt Methipara, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, Marienne Perry, Frank Radke, John R Risley, John R Risley, Jerry Robinson, D Rodriguez, R Rodriguez, Roe, Karen Rowan, J Ryan, Kevin Ryan, M Santos, Dave Sobscyzk, Neil Sullivan, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Weber, Charles Williams, M Williams by Robin Denise Shoffner (Shoffner, Robin) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
618 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants, CPO Barker, CPO Berggren, CPO Bilyj, M Black, Tom Byrne, Ralph Chiczewski, Sam Christian, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, W Clucas, CPO Cole, L Coleman, E Cortez, A Dakuras, C DeCicco, Doe, Doe, David Doughtery, Daniel Dugan, Carson Earnest, Thomas Epach, Jr, G Gamboa, E Gedrekis, Joseph Griffin, R Hagen, L Heise, D Herrera, Terry G Hillard, Ron Huberman, R Hughes, CPO Hunt, Officer Jaros, CPO Johnson, CPO Judeh, John Killacky, A Kizziah, D Koonig, T Lieber, Frank Limon, T Loconte, James Maurer, K McClearn, J Menodoza, Sgt Methipara, CPO Parilli, CPO Pasqua, Marienne Perry, Frank Radke, John R Risley, John R Risley, Jerry Robinson, D Rodriguez, R Rodriguez, Roe, Karen Rowan, J Ryan, Kevin Ryan, M Santos, Dave Sobscyzk, Neil Sullivan, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Weber, Charles Williams, M Williams by Alec Meacham McAusland (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 07/07/2011)
619 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Status hearing set for 8/31/2011 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 07/29/2011)

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08/25/2011 08/25/2011 08/31/2011 09/16/2011
09/22/2011 10/27/2011 11/09/2011
11/09/2011 11/15/2011 12/01/2011
12/01/2011 12/02/2011
12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011

620 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin VodakClass Plaintiffs' Motion to Establish Trial Plan (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
621 Vodak Class Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by John Ladell Stainthorp for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 620 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 8/31/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
622 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 8/31/2011. Plaintiff's motion 620 to establish a trial plan is taken under advisement. Status hearing set for 9/22/2011 at 09:30 AM. Jury Trial set for 1/30/2012 at 09:15 AM. Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 08/31/2011)
623 RESPONSE by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, Charles Williams to Plaintiffs' Proposed Trial Plan (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
624 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Status hearing held on 9/22/2011. The Beal plaintiffs are directed to submit proposed jury instructions to chambers by 10/13/2011 as stated in open court. Status hearing continued to 10/27/2011 at 10:00 A.M. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 09/23/2011)
625 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 10/27/2011.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 10/27/2011)
626 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Enter trial scheduling order: Pretrial Order due by 12/16/2011. Motions in limine with supporting memoranda due by 12/16/2011. Responses due by 12/23/2011. Pretrial Conference set for 1/20/2012 at 10:00 AM. Jury Trial set for 2/21/2012 at 09:15 AM. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
627 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/9/2011.(tsa, ) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
628 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Should the parties in the Beal case resolve the matter prior to trial, the parties in the Vodak case shall begin trial on January 30, 2012 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/15/2011)
629 MOTION by counsel for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Williams to withdraw as attorney (Radia, Bhairav) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
630 NOTICE of Motion by Bhairav Radia for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 629 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/7/2011 at 09:00 AM. (Radia, Bhairav) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
631 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by counsel for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J 629 to withdraw as counsel is granted. Bhairav Radia is given leave to withdraw his appearance. Motion hearing set for 12/7/2011 on this motion is stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/02/2011)
632 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to bar the Defendant's wearing of medals or ribbons or references to awards or commendations (Power, Melinda) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
633 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to prohibit the Defendants' use of juror investigation (Power, Melinda) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
634 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley by Josh Michael Engquist (Engquist, Josh) (Entered: 12/16/2011)

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12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011
12/16/2011 12/16/2011
12/16/2011
12/16/2011
12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011

635 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Preclude Mention of Guilty Pleas as to non Class Members (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
636 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Preclude Mention of the Cost of Police Services and/or the Testimony of CPD Finance Director Frank Wilson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
637 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING OPINIONS, TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE OF PURPORTED EXPERT ANTHONY BOUZA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit B (part 2), # 4 Exhibit B (part 3), # 5 Exhibit B (part 4), # 6 Exhibit C − F)(McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
638 MEMORANDUM by Kevin Vodak as to the Plaintiffs Burden to Prove Favorable Termination of the Criminal Proceedings in Their Malicious Prosecution Claim (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
639 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING ANY TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE OR ARGUING TO THE JURY THAT POLICE OFFICERS IN GENERAL CONSPIRE, COVER−UP OR LIE FOR THEIR COLLEAGUES THROUGH SOME FORM OF CODE OF SILENCE (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
640 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF CITY OF CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT GENERAL ORDERS, SPECIAL ORDERS, DEPARTMENT NOTICES, AND DEPARTMENTAL TRAINING (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
641 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS MAY BE INDEMNIFIED BY THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR ANY COMPENSATORY DAMAGES RETURNED AGAINST THEM (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
642 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO EXCLUDE ANY ARGUMENT OR INSINUATION CONCERNING A WITNESS NOT CALLED BY THE CITY, BUT EQUALLY AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
643 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Bar Any Argument or Evidence Relating to Plaintiffs Prior Arrests or Convictions (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
644 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Pertaining to Any Alleged Criminal Acts by Unidentified Individuals or People Who Are Not Part of the Class (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
645 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO EXCLUDE ANY MENTION, COMMENT, OR QUESTION THAT THE CITY HAS DOCUMENTS WITHIN ITS RECORDS NOT YET PRODUCED (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
646 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR MENTION OF SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE CITY (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)

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12/16/2011
12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/16/2011 12/19/2011 12/19/2011 12/19/2011 12/19/2011 12/22/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011

647 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFFS FROM OFFERING TESTIMONY, EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANTS MAY BE FOUND LIABLE FOR ANY ACT OR INJURY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF ANOTHER PERSON (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
648 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR USE OF ARREST REPORTS (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
649 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Introduction of Chicago Police and Fire Department Audio Tapes and Transcripts (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
650 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Evidence and Argument in Relation to Political Activities, Organizational Associations, Personal Opinions, Belief Systems and Individual Philosophies of Witnesses and Class Members (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/16/2011)
651 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:The parties are instructed to inform the Court whether they have settled or intend to settle Beal. This information is critical to organizing the jury for Vodak, for which the Special Jury Inquiry needs to be mailed to prospective jurors the week of December 26th 2011.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
652 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:All proposed jury questionnaires are to be submitted by the parties by December 22, 2011. Any future communications with the Court regarding this issue and all other pretrial issues should be made via proper filings and not through letter submissions.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
653 PROPOSED Jury Instructions by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan, Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
654 PROPOSED Pretrial Order (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
655 PROPOSED Voir Dire by Kevin Vodak (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Notice of Filing)(Power, Melinda) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
656 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Preclude Mention of the Cost of Police Services and/or the Testimony of CPD Finance Director Frank Wilson 636 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
657 RESPONSE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Preclude Mention of Guilty Pleas as to non Class Members 635 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
658 RESPONSE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Introduction of Chicago Police and Fire Department Audio Tapes and Transcripts 649 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
659 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to prohibit the Defendants' use of juror investigation 633 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
660 MEMORANDUM by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan in resonse

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12/23/2011
12/23/2011
12/23/2011
12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/23/2011

to plaintiffs' memorandum regarding burden of proof on malicious prosecution, docket #638 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
661 RESPONSE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Pertaining to Any Alleged Criminal Acts by Unidentified Individuals or People Who Are Not Part of the Class 644 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
662 RESPONSE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine to Preclude Evidence and Argument in Relation to Political Activities, Organizational Associations, Personal Opinions, Belief Systems and Individual Philosophies of Witnesses and Class Members 650 (McAusland, Alec) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
663 RESPONSE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan to MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodakin limine To Bar Any Argument or Evidence Relating to Plaintiffs Prior Arrests or Convictions 643 (McAusland, Alec) (Linked document has the incorrect case number). Modified on 12/27/2011 (et, ). (Entered: 12/23/2011)
664 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodakin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF CITY OF CHICAGO POLICE DEP 640 (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
665 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodakin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR USE OF ARREST REPORTS 648 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
666 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to motion in limine, 646 Sending a Message to the City (Power, Melinda) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
667 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to motion in limine, 639 to Defendants' Motion re: Code of Silence (Power, Melinda) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
668 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO EXCLUDE ANY MENTION, COMMENT, OR QUESTION THAT THE CITY HAS DOCUMENT 645 (Fennerty, James) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
669 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 641 (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
670 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFFS FROM OFFERING TESTIMONY, EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT TH 647 (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
671 RESPONSE by Kevin Vodak to MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowanin limine TO EXCLUDE ANY ARGUMENT OR INSINUATION CONCERNING A WITNESS NOT CALLED BY THE CITY 642 (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
672 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file excess pages in their Response to Defendants' Motion to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Response to

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12/23/2011 12/23/2011 12/28/2011 01/03/2012 01/05/2012 01/05/2012 01/18/2012 01/19/2012 02/01/2012 02/09/2012 03/12/2012 03/12/2012 04/20/2012 05/04/2012
05/04/2012

Defendants' Motion to Bar Plaintiffs' Police Expert)(Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
673 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, 672 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/3/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
674 Additional Exhibits 1−3 to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine #1 to Bar Plaintiffs Police Practices Expert attached to Dkt 672 Motion to File Excess Pages by Kevin Vodak (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 12/23/2011)
675 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Notice of motion set for 1/3/2012 is stricken. The Court is away. Please consult the Judges' webpage at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov to determine when the next available motion call date is and renotice your motion.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 12/28/2011)
676 Plaintiffs' Re− NOTICE of Motion by Janine L. Hoft for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, 672 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/10/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Hoft, Janine) (Entered: 01/03/2012)
677 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for leave to file excess pages in their Response to Defendants' Motion to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert 672 is granted. Motion hearing set for 1/10/2012 on this motion is stricken. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)
678 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak to Defendants' Motion in Limine #1 to Bar Opinions, Testimony or Evidence from Plaintiffs' Police Expert Anthony Bouza. (et, ) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
679 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Status hearing set for 1/19/2012 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 01/18/2012)
680 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 1/19/2012. Final pretrial conference set for 1/20/2012 and 2/3/2012 are stricken and reset to 2/2/2012 at 10:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 01/19/2012)
681 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Pretrial Conference set for 2/2/2012 is stricken and reset to 2/9/2012 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
682 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 2/9/2012. Parties report to the Court that the case has settled. Final pretrial conference and trial dates are stricken. Hearing for preliminary approval is set for 3/12/2012 at 09:00 AM.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
683 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 3/12/2012. Status hearing set for 4/27/2012 at 09:00 AM. regarding a fee petition.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
684 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Minute entry 683 is amended to reflect the time change for the status to 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
685 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:By agreement of the parties, status hearing set for 4/27/2012 is stricken and reset to 5/14/2012 at 10:00 AM.Telephoned notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 04/20/2012)
686 Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Additional Appearances MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Williams for leave to appear as Additional Appearances Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Additional Appearances (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Appearances)(Slagel, Allan) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
687 NOTICE of Motion by Allan T. Slagel for presentment of motion for leave to appear,, 686 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/14/2012 at 10:00 AM. (Slagel, Allan) (Entered: 05/04/2012)

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05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/09/2012 05/14/2012
05/14/2012 05/14/2012 05/14/2012 05/14/2012 06/26/2012
06/26/2012 06/26/2012 06/26/2012 06/28/2012

688 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin VodakFor Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
689 MEMORANDUM by Kevin Vodak in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 688 For Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement)(Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
690 NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 688 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/14/2012 at 10:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
691 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, 686 for leave to file additional appearances is granted. MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement 688 is granted. Status hearing set for 6/28/2012 at 09:00 AM. to address the timing of the notice. Enter preliminary approval of stipulation and agreement of settlement of class action.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
692 PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION ORDER Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/14/2012.(tsa, ) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
693 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, J Tuman, M Williams by Allan T. Slagel. (et, ) (Entered: 05/15/2012)
694 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Williams by Brett Nolan. (et, ) (Entered: 05/15/2012)
695 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, L Coleman, A Dakuras, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, Officer Jaros, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, R Rodriguez, Karen Rowan, M Santos, J Taitt, J Tamez, M Williams by Heather Ann Jackson. (et, ) (Entered: 05/15/2012)
696 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowan for hearing , MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen RowanJOINT MOTION TO APPROVE NOTICES AND SCHEDULE FINAL APPROVAL HEARING (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
697 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen Rowan for settlement JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE AMENDED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
698 NOTICE of Motion by Heather Ann Jackson for presentment of motion for settlement, 697 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/28/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
699 NOTICE of Motion by Heather Ann Jackson for presentment of motion for hearing,,, motion for miscellaneous relief,, 696 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/28/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
700 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 6/28/2012. Joint motion to approve notices and schedule final approval hearing 696 is granted. Joint motion to approve amended class action settlement 696 is granted. Final

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06/28/2012
06/28/2012 06/28/2012 06/29/2012 07/13/2012 08/09/2012
09/07/2012 11/02/2012 11/02/2012 11/02/2012
11/02/2012 11/07/2012
11/07/2012 11/07/2012 11/21/2012 11/27/2012 01/10/2013

approval hearing is set for 11/7/2012 at 09:00 AM. Plaintiff's attorneys fees to be filed by 11/2/2012.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
702 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Enter orders on joint motion to approve notices and schedule final approval hearing and on joint motion to approve amended class action settlement. (For further detail see separate orders). Mailed notice. (et, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
703 ORDER on Joint Motion to Approve Notices and Schedule Final Approval Hearing Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/28/2012. (et, ) (Main Document 703 replaced on 7/13/2012) (et, ). (Entered: 07/02/2012)
704 ORDER on Joint Motion to Approve Amended Class Action Settlement Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 6/28/2012. (et, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
701 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Minute entry 700 is amended to reflect that the Joint motion to approve amended class action settlement should be 697 . All other aspects of the order to stand.Mailed notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
705 NOTICE of Correction regarding 703 . (et, ) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
706 VERIFICATION OF PUBLISHED NOTICE by Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley(Commander,), Karen Rowan (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 08/09/2012)
707 REQUEST for hearing by James T. Struck (Exhibits). (et, ) (Entered: 09/12/2012)
708 MOTION by Plaintiff Kevin Vodak for attorney fees and costs (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
709 NOTICE of Motion by Joey L. Mogul for presentment of motion for attorney fees 708 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/7/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Mogul, Joey) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
710 MOTION by Defendants Tom Byrne, City of Chicago, Philip J Cline, Thomas Epach, Jr, Joseph Griffin, Terry G Hillard, James Maurer, Frank Radke, John R Risley, Karen RowanJOINT MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
711 NOTICE of Motion by Heather Ann Jackson for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 710 before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/7/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
712 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:In court hearing held on 11/7/2012. Motion for attorney fees and costs 708 is granted. Request for hearing by James Struck 707 is entered and continued to 11/27/2012 @ 9:00 a.m. Joint motion for final approval of class action settlement 710 is granted. Status hearing set for 11/27/2012 at 09:30 AM. for anyone to challenge the termination.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
713 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall: Enter final judgment order, which includes the attorney fees and costs. (For further detail see separate order). Mailed notice. (et, ) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
714 FINAL JUDGMENT Order Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/7/2012. (et, ) (Entered: 11/09/2012)
715 STATUS Report ON REQUEST FOR HEARING (JOINT) by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Certificate of Service)(Jackson, Heather) (Entered: 11/21/2012)
716 MINUTE entry before Honorable Virginia M. Kendall:Status hearing held on 11/27/2012. James Strucks' oral motion to join the class is denied. James Strucks' request for hearing is denied.Advised in open court notice (tsa, ) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
717 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/27/2012 before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. Court Reporter Contact Information: Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR,

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RMR, CRR, (312) 435−6047, Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/25/2016

Redaction Request due 1/31/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/11/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/10/2013. (McGuigan, Gale) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
718 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 09−2768 and 09−2901: Additional record consisting of Sealed Envelopes: 1 doc. 405. (tt, ) (Entered: 01/25/2016)