IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

FILED
2012 Aug-28 PM 02:57 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

GINA KAY RAY, KALUS K. JOHNSON,

)

and DEUANTE T. JEWS individually and )

for a class of similarly situated persons )

or entities,

)

)

Plaintiffs;

)

)

v.

)

)

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, INC, )

a corporation; CORRECTIONAL

)

HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, INC., a

)

Corporation; CHILDERSBURG, ALABAMA, )

a municipal corporation; and B.J. MEEKS, )

in his official capacity as Mayor of

)

Childersburg, Alabama,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Deuante T. Jews, Kalus K. Johnson and Gina Kay Ray

(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, upon

personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and

belief as to all other matters, by and through their undersigned counsel, and with leave

of the Court show unto the Court the following:

JURISDICTION

1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it concerns a

controversy arising under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 1331. This is

a civil rights action, declaratory judgment action, and injunction action brought under 42

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U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202, and the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama and its laws.
2. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), authorizing jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
3. This action also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2022. The cause of action and the underlying claims and allegations made the subject of this suit concern the civil rights of plaintiffs’ class. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b) and (c).
PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT 4. The plaintiff Deuante T. Jews is an individual resident of Harpersville Alabama. The plaintiff Kalus K. Johnson is an individual resident of Childersburg, Alabama. The plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Vincent, Alabama. All three are over 19 years of age. 5. The defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. (hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama and in this district which sells itself as “not a social service agency” but a “for profit” company which offers services to governmental entities “free of charge” to the cities, as “an offender paid system.” At all times, JCS has operated under the color of state law in collecting fines, costs and fees, being allowed to act as a quasijudicial agency of the City of Childersburg. 6. The defendant Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (hereinafter listed as “JCS” also) is a Delaware corporation, maintaining its principal place of business in
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Greenwood Village, Colorado, but shares the same corporate officers at the same address as JCS. It appears to be the successor of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired it, continuing to do business with plaintiffs as JCS and operating the same.
7. The Town of Childersburg, Alabama (“Childersburg”) is a municipal corporation located within Talladega County, Alabama. It operates a police force and a municipal court, doing so under the direction of its chief executive officer, Mayor B.J. Meeks, who is sued in his official capacity.
FACTS OVERVIEW 8. The Plaintiffs bring this action because of the operation of the municipal courts under these defendants has violated and continues to violate the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated. Defendants have imposed a system whereby the clerical and quasi-judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully contracted to a private business, using the color of state law for the collection of private fees and allowing public money to be collected and kept by the private business, in violation of Alabama law and of the Constitution. 9. Defendants have operated the court by clothing JCS with the appearances of state authority allowing JSC employees to intimidate persons and referring to them as “probation officers” though none have such authority under Alabama statutes. JCS employees are also allowed to construct documents which appear to be court orders, holding such out as having the force and effect of court orders, when they were not lawful orders of probation. Defendants have known of this fraudulent activity, but have fashioned a system of allowing JCS a free reign in
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collecting fines, to threaten plaintiffs’ class with incarceration, and by incarcerating persons who have not paid. Members of plaintiffs’ class have been placed on “probation” by defendants in virtually all cases, especially where there is no jail sentence possible or where it would never be imposed, and this “probation” is a means of coercing payment of fines, costs and the fees of JCS.
10. This public ruse is maintained by the defendants in order to impose and collect fines and costs from citizens, and is accomplished by allowing JCS to determine how much each municipal court defendant will be charged for the collection “services” of JCS each month, how much of the public money paid will be kept by JCS and how much it will rebate to Childersburg. Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg has unlawfully entered into the business arrangement with JCS whereby the private entity has been given control and access over public funds and the ability to take such funds. This is in violation of state law and of the Alabama Constitution. Further, defendants have allowed JCS to increase its monthly probation fee from the $35.00 once imposed and listed on the printed probation sheets to $45.00 per month, doing so without legal authority of proper basis or authorization.
11. Defendants have operated the system without concern for protecting the rights of indigent persons in plaintiffs’ class, having no due process protections or procedures to ensure that constitutional rights are violated. The operation and structure of the system run by JCS is such that the Court should declare it to be unlawful and unconstitutional, with any continued operation enjoined and prohibited.
THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS 12. Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Vincent, Alabama, who was
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jailed in Childersburg, Alabama, for nonpayment for a period of four days in 2010 and then an additional 21 days in 2011, and further time in April and May of 2012. Due to her inability to pay and indigency, she remained in jail throughout this period of time until a friend was able to acquire $300.00 to secure her release. Her release was authorized by an employee of JCS, as she had been charged with failure to obey court order – the payment of fines and costs to the satisfaction of JCS.
13. On August 10, 2010 Ms. Ray was found guilty of driving without insurance and with her license suspended, being fined a total of $1,146.00 to be paid at $145.00 a month, all through JCS, with it getting a fee of $45.00 per month. She was later jailed by defendants, but was released on May 1, 2012, when the $300.00 was paid. Defendants have followed a practice of maintaining persons on probation for far longer than the two-year limit imposed by Alabama law, keeping some persons on for years, adding fines, costs and the JCS fees when there is no authority for such. Plaintiff Ray has had other tickets combined with the ongoing charges. Defendants have imposed a standard payment of $145.00 per month, regardless of the circumstances or the ability of the person to pay the extensive fines customarily imposed. While plaintiff Ray has made some payments, she at all times has been indigent and unable to pay the full amounts and the additional probation fees charged by JCS. Throughout this period of time JCS has provided no services to Ms. Ray, acting merely as a collection agency imposing additional fees without control or approval by the municipal judge. Further, she has been incarcerated without any formal probation revocation hearing, any hearing regarding indigency, and being held and later released at the whim of JCS.
14. Plaintiff Kalus K. Johnson, as a result of being found guilty on certain
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tickets and traffic fines, was required by the Municipal Court of Childersburg to pay a total of $1,844.00. Johnson has a balance of over $3,203.00 at present, and all payments must be made only to JCS each month or he will be subject to incarceration. At all times, Johnson has been indigent, but despite this inability to pay as ordered, has been jailed at least six times by defendants for his failure and inability to pay these charges. On each of these incarceration periods, he was not given credit for the $15.00 per day credit is required by the Alabama Code.
15. Within the last six months, Johnson was jailed by defendants and was released only after family members were able to pay $500.00 to JCS. He had been told by “probation officers” from JCS that he would stay in jail for at least a year if the $500.00 was not paid. Though the $500.00 was paid, his balance had an additional charge for $317.00 since JCS had requested that the arrest warrant be issued. While Johnson has made payments throughout the period of time, he has been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees imposed and other charges by JCS. Like the other plaintiffs, Johnson received no services from JCS other than collection activities and suffered the same constitutional violations.
16. Plaintiff Deuante T. Jews was charged in 2008 by defendants with the misdemeanor offense of harassment. He was never tried, and the alleged victim placing the charge went to prison. As a result, the charge against Mr. Jews was dismissed, but he was nonetheless charged court costs of $166.00. When he could did not pay that, he was placed on probation at the additional rate of $45.00 per month. After not paying satisfactorily to JCS, a warrant was issued and additional costs of
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$317.00 were imposed for it, though JCS listed it as “restitution” on the JCS and court records, even though no restitution was involved.
17. These charges continued to accumulate, and plaintiff Jews has been jailed on five occasions for “failure to obey a court order”. One jailing was for 42 days, with no apparent credit for time served, contrary to Alabama law. While Mr. Jews has made some payments on these charges, he at all times has been indigent and unable to pay the unconstitutional fine amounts and probation fees imposed. His treatment by defendants has been in violation of his constitutional rights. His release on October 22, 2009, was occasioned by family members paying $582.00, and he was released with no order by the municipal judge.
18. The efforts at collection against plaintiff Jews have continued to the present time, showing a balance in May, 2012 of $343.00 plus $295.00 in probation fees. His payment receipt for $25.00 paid on May 25, 2012 reflects JCS applying $15.00 to the “restitution” and $10.00 for probation fees to JCS. An earlier receipt from March 9, 2012 reflects his payment of $200.00, with half to “restitution” and the other $100.00 to probation fees. That receipt shows a “Probation End Date: 10/22/11” over four months before the payment was accepted. The later May receipt, however, lists the probation being resumed and running from 3/9/12 to 3/9/14.
PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ALLEGATIONS 19. The classes which the individual plaintiffs seek to represent consist of all persons who have been adversely affected by the actions of defendants within the past two years in the city court of Childersburg, with such classes defined as follows:
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(A) All individuals who were indigent and despite that indigency were incarcerated without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay court charges and fees and for services allegedly rendered by JCS.
(B). All individuals who have paid unlawful amounts of $45.00 per month, rather than the authorized amount of $35.00 as initially set by the defendants.
(C) . All individuals who were indigent and nevertheless paid the probation fees to defendant JCS.
(D). That in the event this Court decides that defendants illegally established the for-profit probation collection scheme, the class of all individuals who received only fines and not initial jail sentences, but who paid probation fees during the said period.
20. The Class which the named Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of those
people listed in the above paragraph, being persons adversely affected by the actions of
defendants as noted herein. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and equitable relief,
including injunctive relief as well as directing the defendant municipality to credit any
and all outstanding balances owed by class members appropriately.
21. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. As of this time, the exact number in the Class is unknown but would be
more than one thousand.
22. Plaintiffs' treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the
Class. While there might be factual differences in the treatment of individual members
of the class, the harm flows from similar policies and practices by defendant.
22. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and
have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation. Plaintiffs
have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Class.
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23. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by many Class members may be small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting solely members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:
(a). Whether the Defendants’ policy and practice of converting unpaid fines and costs to days of incarceration, without any determination concerning an individual’s ability to pay, is illegal; (b). Whether the Defendants’ policy and practice of ignoring due process and other constitutional requirements before incarcerating individuals for failure to pay fines and costs is illegal. Specifically, the Defendants fail to appoint adequate or any counsel for indigent defendants, fail to make any inquiry into indigency before imposing fines and costs, fail to give adequate notice of the nature of a probation or other delinquency hearing, fail to provide a probation revocation hearing, fail to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation and the evidence relied upon, fail to hold a hearing to determine indigency before revoking probation and otherwise imposing incarceration, fail to make written findings concerning an individual’s willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for nonpayment.
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(c) Whether the Defendants have the legal right to delegate to JCS the quasi-judicial functions of collecting fines and costs, and whether defendants can charge unreasonable collection fees which bear no reasonable relation to the cost.
(d) Whether defendants can raise the monthly charge to $45.00 without proper municipal action.
(e) Whether defendants must grant credit to incarcerated defendants for each day of incarceration.
(f) Whether defendants can allow JCS to determine the amount it will retain from amounts collected, and thereby arbitrarily increase the amount an individual owes for fines and costs.
(g) Whether defendants can impose fines and court costs that exceed that statutory maximum and whether any such fines can be collected as “restitution”.
(h) Whether defendants can arbitrarily extend the period of probation beyond the two-year limit imposed by state law or collect fines and probation fees when there is no lawful authority for probation to continue.
(i) Whether JCS has operated in such an unlawful and unconstitutional manner, and whether it is so structured , that declaratory and injunctive relief should be granted to prohibit it from operating as part of the Childersburg court system.
(j) Whether defendant Childersburg can legally or constitutionally contract with a private entity, sharing revenues in the operation of its court system. 24. The Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
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25. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class Action. The data concerning the Class members and the transaction details and amounts involved is largely computerized by the town and JCS. Other paper records should be readily available for use in the court.
26. The names and addresses of the Class members are a matter of public record and notice can be provided to the Class members via First Class U. S. mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court.
CAUSES OF ACTION 27. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have violated their statutory and constitutional rights and those of the members of their class by establishing a profitmaking scheme to fund the cost of the court system upon those least able to pay. The evidence will establish that JCS will claim no responsibility to determine indigency, instead saying that such function is one for the court. The Judge has stated that such matters are left to the discretion of JCS, and the result is a system devoid of consideration of a person’s ability to pay. No alternative means of punishment, such as community service, are used as a substitute for heavy fines and probation fees. 28. There are no due process protections to determine indigency, to provide notice or legal counsel before probation revocation, no adequate hearings or findings of contempt other than failure to pay. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JSC at its discretion uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and cost for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, these defendants will revoke probation, imposes additional fines and costs and
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incarcerate the individual and /or impose unreasonable bond requirements, without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency before taking such punitive action. These collective actions routinely impose court costs and fines that exceed the statutory maximum provided by law, and impose unreasonable fees for the costs of incarceration, and result in the defendants taking action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
29. The Defendants violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights which require that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all individuals irrespective of their economic status. Further, the incarceration is in violation of the limits set by law.
30. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by limiting punishment to the payment of a fine for those able to pay it, yet automatically converting the fine into an indefinite prison term and incarcerating those who did not pay as directed by JCS, though they lacked the means to pay the fine.
31. The Defendants violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by failing to inquire into the reasons for the Plaintiffs’ failure to pay the fines imposed, or the propriety of reducing the fine, extending the time for payments, or ordering some other alternative means of punishment, such as community service, all the while continuing to allow JCS to impose the monthly probation fee.
32. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by failing to appoint legal counsel or adequate counsel for indigent defendants before revoking probation and imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
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33. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis. The Defendants have failed to develop any consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated are eventually released.
34. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by adding certain additional unreasonable fees, costs, and other carrying charges for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding related to an earlier charge.
35. The Defendants have sought to continue to collect fines and costs and incarcerate Plaintiffs after its jurisdiction has expired.
36. These defendants through their joint action have systematically applied § 1518-62 of the Code of Alabama in an unconstitutional fashion denying the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights. Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful nonpayment.1
37. The defendants, through their joint and consistent action, systematically
1Section 15-18-62 Imprisonment for failure to pay fines and costs. In cases of willful nonpayment of the fine and costs, the defendant shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county as follows: (1) If the fine and costs do not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), no more than 10 days; (2) If the fine and costs exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but do not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), no more than 20 days; (3) If the fine and costs exceed five hundred dollars ($500), but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), no more than 30 days; and (4) For every additional one hundred dollars ($100) or fractional part thereof, 4 days.
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imprisoned the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent for nonpayment with no determination of willfulness and with no determination of the indigency and ability to pay of these defendants. This form of application of § 15-18-62 results in an unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights guaranteed to the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
38. The result of this consistent systematic action of these defendants is essentially a debtor’s prison for fines and other charges levied by JCS under contract with the various municipalities for which it works. Declaratory and injunctive relief should be granted to prohibit JCS from continuing such operation in Childersburg.
COUNT ONE - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 39. The Defendants, acting under color of state law, systematically deprived the Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, of their rights and immunities secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 40. The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their Constitutional right to due process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution by automatically imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs without a hearing to determine indigency, as well as the other unlawful conduct more fully described in this Complaint. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries.
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COUNT TWO - DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 41. The Plaintiffs aver that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their Constitutional rights to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution by automatically imposing incarceration upon those unable to pay fines and costs without a hearing to determine indigency, as well as the other conduct more fully described in this Complaint. Further, defendants coerced payment of fines, costs and fees by threat of incarceration, when such was illegal and improper, whereas persons with financial means were not subject to such punishment and discrimination. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damage.
COUNT THREE - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 42. The Plaintiffs aver that Defendants acting under color of state law violated their constitutional rights to due process by effectively imposing terms of incarceration and other costs and fines beyond the statutory maximum allowed under Alabama law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries.
COUNT FOUR - ILLEGAL PROSECUTION
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Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
43. Defendants have violated the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and their class by prosecuting persons where there is no jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law, doing so intentionally in an effort to coerce payment of fines and costs. These efforts have resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class for offenses such as “failure to obey a court order”.
Further Defendants have added enhancements and other fines and costs where there is no jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law. These efforts have also resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class, causing such persons to pay amounts not due and owing.
As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as alleged.
COUNT FIVE - FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND UNLAWFUL DETENTION Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part
hereof. 44. The Defendants are liable for false imprisonment for unlawfully detaining
the Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, thereby depriving them of their personal liberty in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama Code Section 6-5-170, and Alabama common law.
As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as alleged.
COUNT SIX - FALSE ARREST
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Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
45. The Defendants falsely arrested Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, doing so without probable cause, and doing so illegally to coerce payment. Said action was done intentionally and/or recklessly with knowledge that the Plaintiffs would be harmed and in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama law, and Alabama common law.
As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered damage and injuries as alleged.
COUNT SEVEN - MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 46. The Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, doing so without probable cause, and doing so illegally to coerce payment. Said action was done intentionally and/or recklessly with knowledge that the Plaintiffs would be harmed and in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama law, and Alabama common law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered damage and injuries as alleged.
COUNT EIGHT - ABUSE OF PROCESS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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47. Defendants committed the tort of abuse of process by intentionally and/or recklessly using and misusing the criminal legal process to harass and intimidate Plaintiffs and those similarly situated for improper and illegal reasons.
As part of the defendants’ system, the defendants routinely threaten criminal fines, imprisonment, and probation revocation to collect fines and private fees, doing so in part to financially benefit defendant JCS. As a proximate consequence of these actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damage as alleged.
COUNT NINE UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF ALABAMA CODE SECTION 15-18-62
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
48. These defendants through their joint action have systematically applied § 15-18-62 of the Code of Alabama in an unconstitutional fashion denying the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights.
Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful failure to comply. Defendants have ignored these requirements of law, causing damage to plaintiffs and their class.
COUNT TEN - OPERATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL ENTERPRISE IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS
49. Defendants have illegally agreed and contracted to create and operate a quasi-judicial system in which the town and JCS are a joint profit-making venture in violation of Alabama law. The town has conspired and acquiesced in allowing JCS to
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choose how much of any payment it elects to keep, with no set rules or regulations governing such. Payments by members of plaintiffs’ class are arbitrarily kept by JCS when amounts paid should be credited to the court fines and costs. Sums of money have been wrongfully withheld from plaintiffs and their class by such action, causing damage to plaintiffs’ class. Additionally, defendants have added unreasonable fees in the guise of restitution payments, doing so to keep individuals within the payment system and further benefit JCS. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy such continued unlawful action by defendants.
COUNT ELEVEN - DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 50. Defendants have created and operated a system in their court that is unconstitutional and continues to violate the rights of plaintiffs’ class. The structure and operation of JCS is such that it is a continuing violation of constitutional rights and should be enjoined from further operation in Childersburg. Plaintiffs are entitled to continued declaratory and injunctive relief declaring JCS to be an illegal and unconstitutional violator of their rights, to the extent that such relief is proper. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court will take jurisdiction of this cause and upon the final hearing: a. certify this matter as a proper class action maintainable under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Award the Plaintiff such actual damages as this Court shall find the
Plaintiffs have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit;
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c. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits the Defendants from engaging in the violations of law set forth hereinabove;
d. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class members damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal to any amounts paid on fines and/or fees levied by Defendants that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful (along with interest), and the annulment of any remaining unpaid fines or charges that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful;
e. declare that JCS is an illegal and unconstitutional entity which should be enjoined from further operation in or contact with the city court in Childersburg;
f. declare that the use of private for-profit probation companies is unlawful and contrary to Alabama law and its Constitution;
g. award to the Plaintiffs and Class the cost of this matter, including a reasonable attorneys' fee;
h. Award to the Plaintiffs and the Class members such other, further and different relief to which they are entitled.
By: s/William M. Dawson
William M. Dawson DAW002 ASB-3976-S80W Attorney for Plaintiffs 2229 Morris Avenue Birmingham, AL 35203 205 323-6170 FAX 205 278-3430 bill@billdawsonlaw.com
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By: s/G. Daniel Evans
G. Daniel Evans ASB-1661-N76G The Evans Law Firm 1736 Oxmoor Road, Ste. 101 Birmingham, AL 35209 205 870-1970 FAX 205 870-7763 gdevans@evanslawpc.com
By: s/Alexandria Parrish
Alexandria Parris ASB-2477-D66P The Evans Law Firm 1736 Oxmoor Road, Ste. 101 Birmingham, AL 35209 205 870-1970 FAX 205 870-7763 ap@evanslawpc.com
Plaintiffs demand trial by struck jury on all issues in this case.
William M. Dawson
Address of Defendants:
Judicial Correction Services, Inc. c/o CT Corporation System 2 N. Jackson Street, Suite 605 Montgomery, AL 36104
Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. c/o CEO Doug Goetz 6200 S. Syracuse Way, Ste. 440 Greenwood Village, Colorado 80111
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Childersburg, Alabama c/o City Clerk 201 8th Avenue SW P.O. Box 369 Childersburg, AL 35044 B. J. Meeks, Mayor of Childersburg 201 8th Avenue SW P.O. Box 369 Childersburg, AL 35044
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 10 Filed 09/18/12 Page 1 of 5

FILED
2012 Sep-18 PM 04:59 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et. al, individually

}

and for a class of similarly situated

}

persons or entities,

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

v.

}

}

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS

}

SERVICES, et. al.,

}

}

Defendants.

}

Case No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

ORDER

The matter is before the court on Defendants' Judicial Correction Services, Inc. and

Correctional Healthcare Services, Inc. Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6), filed on September 18, 2012.

The parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the motions in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached

hereto and made a part of this order as if fully set out herein. Plaintiffs' responsive submission(s)

shall be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Defendants' reply

submission(s) shall be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the

responsive submission(s) is filed.

Any non-summary judgment motions filed after the entry of this order SHALL comply with

the provisions of Exhibit B without further order from the court.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of September, 2012.

___________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 10 Filed 09/18/12 Page 2 of 5
EXHIBIT B Non-Summary Judgment Motion Scheduling Order1 The court recognizes that a number of motions filed with the court do not require additional briefing before the court takes them under consideration. However, to the extent the parties determine that briefing is necessary on a non-summary judgment motion, or to the extent the court orders briefing on a non-summary judgment motion, the following schedule and requirements for the submission of briefs are established. Except for good cause shown, briefs that do not conform to the requirements of this Order will be stricken. A. Schedule 1. Upon the filing of any non-summary judgment motion, the movant shall either incorporate into the motion the arguments and/or authorities upon which it relies or simultaneously file a separate brief with its initial motion. 2. The opponent's responsive brief shall be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days thereafter. (NOTE: Days should be calculated without taking into account FED.R.CIV.P. 6. However, if the due date falls on a weekend or court holiday, the due date shall be the next business day). 3. The movant's reply brief shall be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the opponent's responsive brief was due. (NOTE: Days should be calculated without taking into account FED.R.CIV.P. 6. However, if the due date falls on a weekend or court holiday, the due date shall be the next business day).
1NOTE: The following instructions do not apply to summary judgment motions unless an order of the court specifically provides otherwise. Any motion(s) for summary judgment filed in this action shall be governed by the provisions of Appendix II to the Uniform Initial Order, which can be viewed on the court's website at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/Proctor/ProctorsPage.htm.

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 10 Filed 09/18/12 Page 3 of 5
The parties shall transmit their briefs in such a manner that their opponents will not suffer any undue delay in the receipt of their service copies of any briefs. It is the intent of the court that each party shall be afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard and counsel are expected to take care that service of copies is not unreasonably delayed.2 Upon conclusion of the submission schedule, the court may take the motion under submission without further notice to the parties and materials submitted after the close of the submission schedule will not be considered in ruling on the motion absent obtaining leave of court. B. Briefs
The parties shall electronically file their briefs through the court's CM/ECF system and shall submit an exact courtesy copy of the brief to the Clerk's office for delivery to the court's chambers.3 The parties are then required to email their briefs, in WordPerfect format, to the chamber's email address at proctor_chambers@alnd.uscourts.gov. The materials submitted to the Clerk's office for delivery to the court's chambers, as well as those sent via email, shall contain the exact same materials and only the materials which are electronically filed through the court's CM/ECF system. There must be no differences between the electronically "filed" briefs and the "copy" provided to the court, except that the courtesy copy submitted for chambers must be three-hole punched. In the event of a later appeal, the court will not look favorably upon motions to supplement the record on appeal to add materials on the ground that such materials were submitted to the court but were not electronically "filed" with the Clerk.
2The opposing party should typically receive a copy of all materials on the same date that the submission is made to the court, but in no event more than one (1) business day later.
3Deliveries are no longer accepted in the court's chambers unless prior arrangements have been made.
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Briefs should be entitled "[Movant's or Opponent's] [Initial, Responsive or Reply] Submission in Response to Exhibit B of the Court's Order" to ensure that the brief will be filed by the Clerk in the official court record. The text of initial and responsive briefs shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages and reply briefs are limited to ten (10) pages.4 Briefs exceeding ten (10) pages in length shall have incorporated therein a table of contents that accurately reflects the organization of the brief itself. Tables of Contents shall not be included for purposes of computing the number of pages in a brief. C. Required Certification
Counsel for either party (or any individual under the direction or control of a party), signing any document, including an affidavit, in connection, either directly or indirectly, with a motion, response to such a motion, or a reply to any such response, shall certify by his or her personal signature and as an officer of the court that he or she has affirmatively and diligently sought to submit to the court only those documents, factual allegations, and arguments that are material to the issues to be resolved in the motion, that careful consideration has been given to the contents of all submissions to ensure that the submissions do not include vague language or an overly broad citation of evidence or misstatements of the law, and that all submissions are non-frivolous in nature. D. Oral Argument
Upon receipt of the motion, the court may schedule the motion for consideration at a separate hearing or motion docket. Oral argument is not required, but either party may submit a request for oral argument by serving a request on the court and opposing party. Requests for oral argument must be separately submitted for delivery to the court's chambers (not filed). The court will permit oral
4Briefs must be typewritten and double spaced, using at least twelve point type. The court expects that counsel will respect the page limitation established by this order. Transparent attempts on the part of counsel to circumvent page limitations by manipulating type sizes, margins, line spacing, or other similar end runs will not be tolerated.
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 1 of 84

FILED
2013 Apr-26 PM 05:07 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, KRISTY FUGATT,

)

TIMOTHY FUGATT and DEUNATE T. JEWS, )

Individually and for a class of similarly )

situated persons or entities,

)

)

Plaintiffs;

)

)

v.

)

)

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, INC., )

a corporation; CORRECTIONAL

)

HEALTHCARE COMPANIES INC., a

)

corporation; THE CITY OF CHILDERSBURG )

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Gina Kay Ray, Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, and Deunate T. Jews,

(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, upon

personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and belief

as to all other matters, by and through their undersigned counsel, and with leave of the

Court, file this Second Amended and Restated complaint as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it concerns a controversy

arising under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. '1331. This is a civil rights

action brought under 42 U.S.C. '' 1983 and 1988.

2. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. ''

1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), authorizing jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. '

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 2 of 84
1983 to enforce civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
3. This action also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 2201
and 2022.
4. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391 (b) and
(c).
PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT
5. The plaintiff Deunate T. Jews is an individual resident of Harpersville,
Alabama.
6. The plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Vincent, Alabama.
7. The plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
8. The plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
9. The classes which the individual Plaintiffs seek to represent consist of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
AND
All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
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10. The defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. (hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama and in this District which markets itself as “not a social service agency,” but a “for profit”company which offers services to governmental entities “free of charge” to the cities as “an offender paid system.” At all times, JCS has operated under the color of state law.
11. The defendant Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (also hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, maintaining its principal place of business in Greenwood Village, Colorado, but shares the same corporate officers at the same address as JCS. It appears to be the successor of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired it, continuing to do business as JCS and operating the same.
12. The City of Childersburg, Alabama, (“Childersburg”) is a municipal corporation located within Shelby County, Alabama. The City Council and Mayor B.J. Meeks control the policy making for Childersburg and also hire the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court.
FACTS 13. The Plaintiffs bring this action because the operations at Alabama municipalities such as Childersburg which use JCS, by a joint policy and practice, have violated and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated. 14. JCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various
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municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama. JCS’s marketing approach to these cities emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.
15. JCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform.
16. Under the system established by JCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers”1 and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
17. Under this system and by agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
18. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests
1In contrast, even a judicial volunteer is required to meet greater and more specific qualifications, careful screening, specific training and continual oversight established by the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’). See Ala. Rule of Judicial Administration Rule 42.
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that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following: a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added).
19. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS and approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also serves as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities also under contract with JCS.
20. The JCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has since the agreement been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg.
21. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the JCS contract, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied is automatically placed on probation using the JCS orders and forms, even when there is no jail sentence adjudicated. This is routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS then require the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract with Childersburg.
22. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees are heavily
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directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C. The training manual used by JCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer
systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS monitors those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J.
23. The City Council and Mayor B.J. Meeks control the policy making for Childersburg and also hire the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court. The decision to use this JCS system was an administrative decision of Childersburg, by and through its mayor, and not a decision of the municipal court judge or the Chief Justice, or any other employee of the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’).
24. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, has clothed JCS with the
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appearances of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. The JCS employees attend each municipal court session and are referred to as “parole officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes. Under this system, “offenders” are not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but are instead required by Childersburg to make all payments, including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs, to JCS at the JCS office.
25. This public ruse is maintained by Childersburg and JCS in order to impose and collect fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and is accomplished by allowing JCS to control the money, determine how much each municipal court “offender” must pay each month, how much will be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS each month and how much of it will rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
26. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
27. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by Childersburg and JCS, JCS’s determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements
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is routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
28. The collective actions of JCS and Childersburg are inextricably interwoven with each other and routinely result in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts, and impose additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS routinely exceed the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in JCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg taking joint action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
29. After improperly imposing probation when no jail sentence is involved, incarceration then follows if the fine, together with the fees added by JCS, are not paid as dictated by JCS.
30. Despite directing the municipal courts such as Childersburg that incarceration of an individual “offender” is needed when payment is not made, JCS undertakes no determination of the reasons for nonpayment, and does not consider such things as the Plaintiffs’ disability, unemployment, or assets, in regard to the nonpayment of the fines.
31. JCS denies any responsibility and takes no action under its operations with Childersburg to determine indigency, and provides no instruction in its employee manual for the consideration of indigency. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg,
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however, contends that under its contract it is JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order.
32. Under this system jointly implemented by JCS and municipalities such as Childersburg, after simple fines are converted to “probation” for payment, jail often results for the “offender” who does not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS. This system uses JCS’s conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original penalty had only been a fine.
THE PLAINTIFFS 33. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are individuals who have received or may receive in the future only fines with no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS, but whose fines were converted or may be converted to probation under JCS, and those who are currently or were formerly indigent and, despite that indigency, were incarcerated, or may be incarcerated in the future, for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to the Alabama municipalities with which it contracts. Subclasses would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. GINA KAY RAY 34. Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Vincent, Alabama, who was brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance”
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and “driving while license suspended.” She was fined $548 and $598 for these charges with no jail sentence. Ms. Ray was not financially able to pay the fines when levied and was ordered to be on probation with JCS on the JCS form, to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and $10 charge to set up her file. Her monthly payment on these amounts was set by JCS at $145 per month.
35. On July 14, 2011, Ms. Ray was charged at the Childersburg Municipal Court on charges of “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” For these charges she was fined $248 and $598 respectively, but with no jail sentence. Since she could not pay these fines either she was again placed on “probation’ with JCS and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set fee. Her monthly payment on these amounts was also set by JCS at $145 per month. Though the “probation” period for her 2010 and 2011 cases overlap in time, JCS treated these as “consecutive cases” so that the period would then extend well beyond 24 months and result in monthly fees to JCS for both cases.
36. Ms. Ray was and has been indigent and was not able to pay for her insurance, tag or license, much less the fines and fees for JCS, but, in accordance with the policy and practice of Childersburg which was established in its contract with JCS, neither the Childersburg Municipal Court nor JCS ever made any inquiry into her inability to pay at the time of levying the fine or thereafter.
37. Due to her inability to pay as directed by JCS, Ms. Ray was jailed at the request of JCS on its claim of her “failure to obey a court order” which was approved by Childersburg. Ms. Ray was placed in the Talladega County jail for a period of four days in 2010 and then an additional 21 days in 2011, and further time in April and May of 2012.
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38. Due to her inability to pay and her indigency, she remained in jail throughout these periods of time. On May 1, 2012, a friend of Ms. Ray was able to acquire $300.00 which was the amount determined and demanded by JCS to secure her release from jail.
39. At the point of Ms. Ray’s release in May 2012, employees of JCS authorized the release on the previous charge of “failure to obey court order” and she was directed to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.”
40. On June 14, 2012, Ms. Ray was again brought before the Municipal Court in Childersburg on charges of “attempt to evade,” “expired tag” and “driving while revoked.” Once again, she was fined $698, $218, $598 on these charges respectively with no jail sentence. She could not pay these fines and once again placed on “probation” with JCS and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month for 24 months and $10 file set up fee.
41. While Ms. Ray has made some small payments, she at all times has been indigent and unable to pay the full amounts and the additional probation fees charged by JCS and Childersburg. The remaining balances are still demanded by JCS and Childersburg.
42. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to Ms. Ray and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees and, despite knowledge that Ms. Ray was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and has taken actions to incarcerate Ms. Ray without any due process.
43. On each of her incarcerations, Ms. Ray was incarcerated without the benefit of legal counsel, without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of her indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released
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based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS. KRISTY AND TIMOTHY FUGATT
44. The Fugatts have twin children and had a third child who was born with serious medical conditions which required constant medical care in Birmingham for two years until his death in June, 2011. As a result, both parents had extended stays at the hospital with their child and made numerous trips to and from Birmingham to their home in Sylacauga.
45. On one trip on November 13, 2010, Kristy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed by the Childersburg Police Department for having an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license.
46. Timothy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed on or about December 3, 2010 by Childersburg Police for having an expired license tag on the same vehicle. Both of the Fugatts were set for court on January 13, 2011 at the Childersburg Municipal Court.
47. The Childersburg court records reflect the Fugatt cases were nol prossed upon payment of the court costs of $198.00 for the expired license and $148.00 each for the expired tag charges.
48. Due to these financial burdens, the Fugatts were unable to immediately pay the traffic fines and were placed on “probation” under JCS. Under the mandated terms of the probation, they were each charged an additional $45.00 per month for JCS’s probation “service.”
49. The Fugatts paid as best they could, but when they were unable to make
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payments as were ordered by JCS employees, they were required to drive to Childersburg and explain why they could not pay. JCS set the dates upon which the Fugatts were to report to the JCS office and were told that they would be jailed if they did not come. Many times the Fugatts were not able to make phone contact due to limited phone access to JCS. Nevertheless, they were repeatedly threatened with jail for any non-appearance at the JCS office.
50. The Fugatts told JCS employees about their inability to pay as demanded and even provided medical records. Instead of assistance from JCS, the Fugatts were called liars and continually threatened with arrest and incarceration for non-payment.
51. Each of the Fugatts was also charged $317.00 for “Failure to Obey Court Order” on September 26, 2011.
52. Despite their inability to pay the initial fine, the amounts JCS claimed the Fugatts owed kept increasing, with added as “fines,” “restitution,” “other” and “probation fees.”
53. When the Fugatts could not appear at the JCS offices as commanded, a warrant of arrest was issued.
54. On Sunday afternoon February 26, 2012, a Childersburg officer came to their home in Sylacauga, threatened them with a taser and arrested them, taking them from their young children to the jail at Childersburg and instructing them that DHR would be called for care of their kids. This was avoided only by relatives arriving in time to take care of the young children.
55. Only after relatives collectively brought $900.00 to the Childersburg jail were
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the Fugatts released from jail. 56. JCS claims the Fugatts still owe well over $1,000.00 and, as a result, the
Fugatts face further persecution and incarceration unless relief is granted. The receipts attached as Exhibit K show amounts in arrears as $512 and $427 on July 13, 2012. Each plaintiff paid $50 on that date, with one getting $25 credit toward the fine and the other getting only $23, whereas JCS kept the remaining $25 for one and $27 for the other. The amount owed has been increased by $90 each month since July, 2012 by JCS.
57. On February 26, 2012, the date of their arrest, each of the Fugatts was charged an additional $317 for “Failure to Appear,” though there was no judge present that Sunday and no judicial order was signed. These additional charges totaled $1,268, plus the $90 monthly JCS fee, all resulting from the expired tag and expired driver’s license.
58. While plaintiff Timothy Fugatt has maintained some employment, the hours he was able to work were quite limited by these serious medical issues and family responsibilities. As a result, the Fugatts have been and are indigent.
59. Though the Fugatts had repeatedly informed JCS of their situation, no relief was granted. The Fugatts were not afforded due process of law, in that they were continually punished with increased amounts due and owing, threats of incarceration for not paying, and ultimate incarceration.
60. In addition, the Fugatts, as with all the plaintiffs, were treated differently than persons able to pay the court costs when first imposed, merely because of their economic status.
61. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to the Fugatts
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and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that the Fugatts were unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate the Fugatts without any due process. The remaining balances are still demanded by JCS and Childersburg.
62. On their incarcerations, the Fugatts were jailed without the benefit of legal counsel, without any notice of charges, without formal probation revocation hearing, and without any hearing on the issue of their indigency, but simply incarcerated and, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg personnel and pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
63. On October 11, 2012 the Fugatts were again required to appear at Childersburg Municipal Court. While there, a JCS employee told the Fugatts that they now owed over $1,000 in court costs, fines and probation fees with Kristy owing $557 and Tim owing $517. DEUNATE T. JEWS
64. Deunate T. Jews is a resident of Harpersville, Alabama, and was charged in 2008 in the Childersburg Municipal Court on the charge of harassment. Mr. Jews was never tried and the alleged victim placing this charge went to prison. As a result, the charges against Mr. Jews were dismissed, but on October 22, 2009 he was nonetheless charged court costs of $166 and since he could not pay this amount, he was placed on probation with JCS for 24 months for payment with the additional requirement that he also pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set up fee. When Mr. Jews did not pay those
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amounts, an arrest warrant was issued at the request of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.”
65. Because this warrant to arrest Mr. Jews him was issued, an additional $317 was added to his bill with JCS listed as “restitution” on the JCS and court records, even though no restitution was ever involved.
66. On September 22, 2009 Mr. Jews was arrested and placed in the Childersburg jail for thirty (30) days for “failure to appear.”
67. Based on these unlawful charges, Mr. Jews was incarcerated in October 2009 at the request of JCS and was only able to secure his release by the payment of a “cash bond” of $582 paid by others on his behalf which prompted JCS to secure Mr. Jews’ release though a release authorization signed by the Childersburg city clerk. At his release, he was ordered to appear in “Judicial Corrections” Municipal Court.
68. When Mr. Jews was unable to pay the ever growing JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest and Mr. Jews was jailed for thirty (30) days in May 2010.
69. JCS has and is continuing to charge Mr. Jews “restitution,” “probation fees,” and “court money” fees, which, because of his indigency, he is and was unable to pay. In February 2011 Mr. Jews was able to pay JCS $500 which JCS took in exchange for avoiding jail.
70. When Mr. Jews was again unable to pay the continuing, escalating JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest and Mr. Jews was jailed for thirty (30) days in February 2012.
71. On May 25, 2012 Mr. Jews paid JCS $25; JCS applied $15 to “restitution”
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though there was none, and $10 to “Probation Fee.” JCS gave Mr. Jews a receipt acknowledging his payment in which it listed: Fees in arrears = $295.00; Pay off not including Probation fees: $343.00; Monthly Probation Fees: $45: Court Money Due from other Probations: Fines: $1,807. This JCS receipt stated a probation start date of March 9, 2012, which was the date Mr. Jews was released from his most recent incarceration, and a probation end date of March 9, 2014 which is nearly six years after the charges against him were dismissed. See Exhibit L.
72. Mr. Jews was again arrested in September 2012 for another thirty (30) days in jail when he was unable to pay any of the JCS fees.
73. Though the “probation” originally ordered on October 22, 2009 was for 24 months, it is still continuing with additional JCS charges accruing each month.
74. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges imposed by JCS. JCS shows a balance due from Mr. Jews in March 2012 of $358.
75. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees imposed and other charges by JCS.
76. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to Mr. Jews and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that Mr. Jews was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate Mr. Jews without any due process.
77. On each of his incarcerations, Mr. Jews was incarcerated without the benefit
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of legal counsel, without notice of charges, and without any formal probation revocation
hearing, or any hearing on the issue of his indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on
some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were
taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and
contract with JCS.
PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ALLEGATIONS
78. The Classes which the named Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
AND
All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
79. The members of the Classes and subclasses are so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable.
80. As of this time, the exact number in the Classes is unknown but would be
more than one thousand.
81. Plaintiffs' treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the
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Classes and subclasses and is ongoing. 82. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and
have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Classes.
83. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by many Class members may be small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged.
84. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting solely members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:
a. Whether policy and practice of automatically placing on probation all municipal offenders who cannot immediately pay fines and costs but who have no jail sentence is legal; b. Whether the policy and practice of converting unpaid fines and costs to days of incarceration, without any determination concerning an individual’s ability to pay, is legal; c. Whether the policy and practice of requiring every order of the municipal court to require probation fees for JCS is legal; d. Whether the policy and practice of incarcerating individuals for failure to pay fines and costs with no finding of willfulness is legal.
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e. Whether the policy and practice of failing to appoint counsel for indigent defendants when a jail sentence is involved is legal; f. Whether the policy and practice of failing to make any inquiry into indigency before imposing fines and costs is legal; g. Whether the policy and practice of failing to give adequate notice of the charge and nature of a probation revocation hearing, failing to provide a probation revocation hearing, failing to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation and the evidence relied upon, failing to hold a hearing to determine indigency before revoking probation and otherwise imposing incarceration, failing to make written findings concerning an individual’s willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for nonpayment are legal; h. Whether JCS can raise its monthly probation fee charge to $45 without proper municipal action; i. Whether the policy and practice of charging incarcerated municipal defendants a daily fee for each day the person is incarcerated is legal; j. Whether the policy and practice of imposing fines and court costs that exceed that statutory maximum for municipal is legal; k. Whether the policy and practice of extending “probation” for municipal offenses beyond 24 months is legal; l. Whether the policy and practice which fails to give any credit for time spent incarcerated is legal.
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m. Whether a municipality can legally enter a contract binding upon its municipal court. 85. JCS and Childersburg have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 86. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class Action. The data concerning the Class members and the transaction details and amounts on each charge is largely computerized by the municipalities and by JCS. 87. The names and addresses of the Class members are a matter of public record and are also kept by JCS and notice can be provided to the Class members via First Class U.S. Mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court.
COUNT ONE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 88. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and has denied those rights of the class members. 89. JCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama including Childersbrug. JCS’ marketing approach to these cities
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emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.
90. JCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform.
91. Under the system established by JCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers” and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
92. Under this system and by agreement with cities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court are unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
93. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 94. JCS is, by virtue of this contract with municipalities such as Childersburg, clothed with the appearance of a state actor and its actions are inextricably interwoven
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with those of the municipalities such as Childersburg. Under its contract and its operations, JCS employees were and are represented to the plaintiffs and class members to be “probation officers” acting “on behalf of City of Childersburg.” Exhibit M.
95. The JCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has since the agreement been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. The orders supplied by JCS require the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract.
96. Under the JCS contract and procedures, the resulting policy and practice at the municipal courts such as Childersburg automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court.
97. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially placed on “probation” with JCS under this practice though none had been sentenced to any jail time.
98. That “probation” requirement, under agreement between JCS and Childersburg, is required to be part of every printed order at the municipal courts such as Childersburg which also requires payment of monthly fees to JCS.
99. The policy and practice method of JCS, after requiring probation orders for those unable to pay with additional fees for JCS, also imposes incarceration for a failure to pay fines, fees and costs.
100. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such
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as the Plaintiffs and class members, is accomplished by JCS leveling charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
101. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made under the JCS system and methods.
102. JCS expressly denies any responsibility to determine indigency of the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs or to determine any reasons for an inability to pay the fine. Therefore, when an “offender” is unable to pay the fine and additional fees required by JCS, JCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg cooperate with each other to issue arrest warrants initiated by JCS based upon claims of “failure to obey court order.”
103. All of the named Plaintiffs were indigent at the time of the charges levied against them in Childersburg and at the times of their incarcerations. Each was unable to pay the fines and fees demanded by JCS due to their indigency and each was incarcerated as stated in detail in the above facts after recommendation by JCS.
104. The incarceration process used by JCS includes the use of JCS drafted forms to be implemented by the municipalities such as Childersburg which are then approved by administrative personnel at Childersburg without a hearing to determine indigency.
105. Under the policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg, unpaid fines and costs are unlawfully converted to undetermined days in jail for which the “offenders” have been also charged Thirty-One Dollars per day ($31/day), but are given no credit for time spent
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in jail against the fines levied. 106. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized
and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees are heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C.
The training manual used by JCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS monitors those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J.
107. The agreement and forms drafted by JCS are uniformly used by it. 108. Clothing JCS with the color of state law and authority is purposely structured
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under the JCS system for it to impose and collect its fees, fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and is accomplished by providing JCS control over the money collected, the payment amount and schedule, the location where the money must be paid and control over how much will be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS each month as opposed to how much of it will be rebated to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
109. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by cities such as Childersburg and JCS, JCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements is routinely accepted without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
110. The actions and efforts of JCS routinely result in court costs, fines and fees which exceed the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS routinely exceed the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in JCS taking action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
111. This system uses JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate
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individuals whose original case had only been a fine. 112. In this process of converting fines to jail time, JCS and Childersburg do not
give adequate notice of the nature of any lawful charge, fail to conduct hearings, fail to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation or the evidence relied upon, and fail to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
113. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, JCS and Childersburg also fail to provide counsel for the “offenders.”
114. After jailing an “offender,” JCS acts to further violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim of JCS and payments it has secured. As a result, there is no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated are granted release.
115. Under the practice and policy of JCS used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine is levied, additional fees, costs and other charges are added to the “offender” bill with JCS for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
116. In some cases, under the practice and policy of JCS, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused is nonetheless required to pay JCS fees. See Exhibit D.
117. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T.
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Jews discussed above, costs and fees for JCS can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration.
118. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT TWO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 119. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and the rights of the class members. 120. By contract, Childersburg has delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 121. That agreement was signed by the city mayor and binds Childersburg in specific municipal court areas requiring that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following: a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee
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One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 122. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS. 123. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, also approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also serves as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities which have agreed to similar contracts. 124. Municipalities are prohibited from laws, ordinances and policies which are in conflict with state law. See Ala Code Section 11-45-1. Also see, Ala. Const. Article 4 Section 89. 125. State law also dictates a separation of the branches of government. Ala Const. Article 3, Section 43.2 Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by The Chief Justice of Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala Const., Art 6, Section 139. 126. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts3 and the Childersburg City Council has the legislative power to enact regulations
2Ala. Const. Art. III, Section 43 states: In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.
3Ala. Code Section 11-43-83 - The mayor shall see that all contracts with the town or city are
faithfully kept or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required in judicial proceedings for and on behalf or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required
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and ordinances4, but neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
127. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
128. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and The Chief Justice.
129. Probation is only appropriate when an individual has been sentenced to jail time and not when only a fine has been assessed as is the case with the Plaintiffs and class members. As a result, the Childersburg policy and contract to include probation in every court order mandates a judicial practice that continually deprives indigent misdemeanants of their constitutional rights.
130. The policy and contract of Childersburg is also in violation of the Alabama Constitution. Article I, Section 20 Ala. Const. specifically prohibits imprisonment for the payment of debts, yet the policy enforced at Childersburg regularly jails misdemeanants upon the recommendation of JCS for failure to pay fines, fees and costs. Article I, Section
in judicial proceedings for and on behalf of the city or town and no sureties shall be required on such bond. He shall perform such other executive duties, in addition to those prescribed in this article, as may be required of him by the council.
4Ala. Code Section 11-43-43 - All legislative powers and other powers granted to cities and towns
shall be exercised by the council, except those powers conferred on some officers by law or ordinance. The council shall perform the duties required by this title and other applicable provisions of law.
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16 Ala. Const. requires that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient surety, but despite this prohibition, misdemeanants are regularly jailed without lawful conviction under any contempt proceedings or probation violation and with no bail being set.
131. Each of the Plaintiffs was imprisoned, and some repeatedly, under these policies of Childersburg for their failure to pay fines, costs and the added fees mandated by the illegal contract between Childersburg and JCS. None of the Plaintiffs were accorded any hearing or consideration of their indigency before being jailed nor were any provided notice of charges, a hearing on charges levied that might result in imprisonment, or provided assistance of counsel before being imprisoned.
132. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the contract and policy adopted by the City, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied is automatically placed on probation. This process uses the JCS orders and forms even when there is no jail sentence adjudicated. This is routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS under the agreement with Childersburg then require the individual to make payments to JCS, rather than the city clerk, of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees.
133. The Childersburg City Clerk actively enforces these requirements as part of the policy and procedures established under this contract and refuses to accept payments of fines and costs referring those payers such as the Plaintiffs instead to the JCS offices.
134. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, has clothed JCS with the
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appearances of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. Childersburg, as a matter of its agreement and policy, allows the JCS employees to attend each municipal court session and refers to JCS employees as “parole officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes.
135. Under this system implemented by Childersburg, “offenders” are not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but are instead directed by Childersburg to make all payments including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs to JCS at the JCS office at hours and locations set by JCS.
136. The policy adopted and implemented by Childersburg is to comply with its contract with JCS.
137. Childersburg allows JCS to control the money collected from persons such as Plaintiffs, and to determine how much each such municipal court “offender” must pay each month.
138. Childersburg also allows JCS to determine how much of the collected sums will be credited to the collection “services” of JCS each month and how much of it will rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the municipal court fines adjudged.
139. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
140. Despite the lack of authority to do so, Childersburg permits JCS, at its discretion, to use threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for
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purposes of collection. 141. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS,
Childersburg permits JCS to determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs.
142. Under the system operated at Childersburg, JCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable release requirements is routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
143. Childersburg permits JCS to control and dictate these functions and, as a consequence, this routinely results in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts and impose additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees at Childersburg routinely exceed the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
144. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg contends that under the Childersburg contract, it is JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order and therefore no investigation of indigency is undertaken by Childersburg as a matter of policy.
145. Under this system implemented at Childersburg, after simple fines are illegally converted to “probation” for payment, jail often results for the “offender” who does
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not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS and enforced by Childersburg. This system uses and accepts JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
146. Under this system at Childersburg, each of the Plaintiffs was first only fined, but then automatically placed on “probation” though no jail sentence was adjudicated. Though each of the Plaintiffs was indigent, Childersburg made no investigation of that matter. When the Plaintiffs were unable to pay the fines, costs and additional JCS fees that Childersburg agreed to levy, recommendations from JCS were made and followed by Childersburg to incarcerate each of them for undetermined times.
147. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such as the Plaintiffs and class members, is also accomplished by bringing charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
148. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made under the system at Childersburg.
149. Childersburg adopts implements JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
150. In this process of converting fines to jail time, Childersburg does not give adequate notice to the “offender” of the nature of any lawful charge, its fails to conduct
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hearings, fails to make written findings concerning the reasons for any probation revocation or the evidence relied upon, and fails to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
151. Under this policy and practice at Childersburg when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, Childersburg also fails to provide counsel for the “offenders.”
152. After jailing an “offender,” Childersburg acts to further violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim of JCS and payments it has secured. As a result, there is no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated are granted release.
153. Under the practice and policy used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine is levied, additional fees, costs, and other charges are added to the “offender” bill for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
154. In some cases, under the practice and policy adopted and implemented at Childersburg, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused is nonetheless required to pay JCS fees. See Exhibit D.
155. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews, whose specific facts are included above, the costs and fees at Childersburg can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration all with the
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knowledge and participation of Childersburg. 156. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the
Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT THREE VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 157. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members to be free from unreasonable seizure. 158. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 159. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fines imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well. 160. Under Alabama law, a fine can only be converted into jail time if the court
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makes findings under Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully
failed to pay the fines. Even there, the statute provides specifics as to potential jail time.
161. Under the system created and implemented by JCS, there is no hearing to
determine if an “offender” had willfully refused to pay nor any consideration of indigency
and factors preventing payment.
162. Under the system created and implemented by JCS at Childersburg, every
person who is unable to pay a simple fine and costs in full is placed on “probation.”
Though their inability to pay the fine gives immediate notice of the “offenders’” financial
limitations, the JCS system adds further costs and fees each month to these “offenders”
who were already unable to pay the fines levied. The result increases the financial burden
of persons who are accused of no more than traffic violations or misdemeanors.
163. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fines and costs.5
5Ala. Const. Art. I, Section 20 provides: “That no person shall be imprisoned for debt.” It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State, 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so. Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution. "These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553. Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
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164. Despite the longstanding law prohibiting incarceration for one’s inability to pay a fine/debt, JCS instituted arrest warrants for Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr. Fugatt when JCS knew these plaintiffs could not pay the fines and fees JCS ordered and despite the fact that none had been initially given any jail time whatsoever.
165. Unless prompt payment of its fees and fines is made as determined by JCS, JCS takes steps to have the “probation” revoked or initiates charges for “failure to obey court order” beginning the process of incarcerating an individual who otherwise would never have seen jail under the original adjudication.6
166. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed under the JCS process as described and under the specific facts as stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
167. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FOUR VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
6 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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168. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members to be free from unreasonable seizure.
169. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg, has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
170. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fine imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well.
171. Under Alabama law, a simple fine can only be converted into jail time if the court makes findings under Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully failed to pay the fines.
172. Childersburg’s policy of including probation with JCS in every municipal court order created the process by which misdemeanants were incarcerated without a willfulness hearing as required by Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 and in violation of Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.
173. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fines or costs.7
7
It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of
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174. Despite longstanding legal precedent prohibiting incarceration for one’s inability to pay a fine/debt, Childersburg’s policy and personnel working in conjunction with JCS unlawfully arrested and jailed Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr. Fugatt for their inability to pay simple fines and the added fees and costs dictated by the Childersburg contract with JCS.
175. Childersburg police, municipal court processes and jail all became tools of collection under forms and processes issued by JCS and which were routinely followed by Childersburg. Childersburg’s policy and practice after clothing JCS with the appearance of a state actor acting on its behalf, allowed JCS to threaten arrest or revocation of probation and/or incarceration in order to coerce these indigents to pay Childersburg fines and JCS fees for misdemeanor offenses not otherwise subject to jail time under the original adjudication.
176. When these threats failed to produce sufficiently, Childersburg police, clerks and other personnel cooperated with JCS to arrest and jail the Plaintiffs.
177. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under the
equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so.
Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution.
"These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553. Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
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JCS process as described and under the specific facts stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.8
178. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FIVE VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 179. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members. 180. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 181. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel is not provided for the indigent “offenders.” 182. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the
8 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS pursuant to JCS form orders and its contract with the city.
183. The “probation” process at JCS is essentially a collection vehicle for the city customer which adds monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine. JCS provided no services to the Plaintiffs, but represents itself as acting on behalf of the city which clothes it with that appearance. See Exhibit M.
184. JCS denies any responsibility to investigate the indigency of the “offenders” and thus takes no action to determine or consider disabilities, employment status or other reasons justifying non payment.
185. Simple fines without jail sentences are automatically and illegally converted to “probation” under the JCS system used at Childersburg if the offender cannot promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
186. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail and actual incarceration take place if the fines, fees and costs are not paid as scheduled by JCS.
187. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the JCS collection system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines.
188. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS focus on collections, charges of “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” are initiated by JCS under its system.
189. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful
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adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS nor its city customer like Childersburg provide counsel for those “offenders.”
190. At the point jail sentences are potential, the JCS system used at Childersburg uses a charge of “probation violation,” but does not provide notice of charges, findings required for conviction. Similarly, JCS also uses a charge of “failure to obey court order,” though that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 is the basis, under the JCS system there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
191. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed under this JCS system at Childersburg and without any assistance of counsel.
192. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
193. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their sixth amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT SIX VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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194. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members.
195. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
196. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg, when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel is not provided for the indigent “offenders.”
197. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS pursuant to JCS form orders and the contract approved by Childersburg.
198. The contract signed by Childersburg approved a “probation” process as essentially a collection vehicle for the city to collect its fines. That agreement, as discussed above, conflicts with state statutes, violates state constitutional requirements for separation of power in the branches of government and exceeds the authority of the mayor and council.
199. Under that agreement, Childersburg allows JCS to add monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine when adjudicated even though JCS provides no services to them.
200. Under the agreement and with the knowledge and approval of Childersburg,
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JCS represents itself as acting on behalf of the city which clothes it with that appearance. See Exhibit M.
201. Under this agreement, Childersburg has unlawfully invaded the province of the municipal court and mandated that each order there contain provisions for fees to JCS.
202. By its agreement, at Childersburg, simple fines without jail sentences are automatically and illegally converted to probation under the JCS system used at Childersburg if the offender cannot promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
203. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail are used by JCS with the approval of Childersburg and actual incarceration then takes place by police and other city personnel at Childersburg if the fines, fees and costs are not paid as scheduled by JCS.
204. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the Childersburg agreement to adopt and use the JCS collection system in the administration of its court system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines.
205. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS focus on collections, charges are routinely initiated claiming “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order.” These are initiated by JCS under its system and then approved by Childersburg personnel.
206. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS nor Childersburg provide counsel for those “offenders.”
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207. At the point when jail sentences become potential, Childersburg presents charges of alleged “probation violation,” but does not provide notice of charges, nor are findings made as required for conviction. Similarly, though JCS also regularly proposes a charge of “failure to obey court order” which Childersburg then pursues, that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-1862 is used as the basis, under the Childersburg system with JCS there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
208. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under this JCS system and none were provided any assistance of counsel in the process leading to their incarceration.
209. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
210. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT SEVEN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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211. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and class members.
212. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
213. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and as such limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.
214. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a).
215. As mentioned above, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
216. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
217. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances,
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none of which were followed by JCS. 218. Under these facts, after substantial fines were levied against indigent
persons such as the Plaintiffs, JCS, operating under an illegal contract with Childersburg, then increased that burden with additional monthly fees and costs charged by JCS. For the named Plaintiffs, the total amounts demanded by JCS exceeded the $500 limitation on the municipal court authority.
219. Under the JCS system at Childersburg, though JCS made no inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system or the reason for their failure to make payments, JCS increased the amount demanded from the Plaintiffs to the point that even partial payments could not be made.
For example, Timothy Fugatt was fined $148, has currently paid over $450, and is told that he still owes over $500, all from an initial $148 fine for an expired tag. Charging over six times the initial fine is excessive, disproportionate to the violation and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Deunate Jews was fined $166 for a dismissed charge, has paid over $800, and is told that he still owes over $1,807, all from an initial $166 fine for a dismissed charge. Charging over fifteen times the initial fine is excessive and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
220. The Plaintiffs were all indigent and their failure to pay JCS as demanded resulted in threats of arrests and ultimately incarceration based upon JCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
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221. These fines and fees levied against the Plaintiffs exceeded the statutory limits of the court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-18-62.
222. JCS also failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
223. The practice and policy of JCS in instituting charges resulting in jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
224. Each of the named Plaintiffs was, at all pertinent times, indigent and each was incarcerated at the behest of JCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS, though all had initially only received fines by the Childersburg Municipal Court.
225. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
226. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
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COUNT EIGHT VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 227. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and class members. 228. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 229. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and, as such, limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such. 230. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a). 231. As mentioned above, Ala. Code, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment, but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
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232. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
233. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances, none of which were followed by JCS nor required by Childersburg.
234. Under these facts, Childersburg illegally contracted with JCS to add monthly fees and costs to each municipal court order. This agreement increased the substantial fines levied against indigent persons such as the Plaintiffs.
235. Neither Childersburg nor JCS made inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system. As a result, only the Plaintiffs’ failure to make payments as dictated by JCS under the agreement with Childersburg resulted in threats of arrests. If threats failed to produce the demanded payments, arrest and incarceration follows under process at Childersburg based upon JCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
236. These fines exceeded the statutory limits of the municipal court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-1862.
237. Once in jail, Childersburg failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
238. The practice and policy at Childersburg of imposing jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive
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fines and cruel and unusual punishment. 239. Each of the named Plaintiffs was at all pertinent times indigent and each was
incarcerated by Childersburg personnel at the behest of JCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS.
240. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
241. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT NINE DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 242. JCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 243. JCS, though a private company, has been clothed with the color of state law
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by the specific actions of Childersburg all pursuant to an agreement between these parties. 244. As referenced above, by agreement, JCS employees attend all municipal
court sessions, collect city fines and costs, are labeled as “probation officers,” carry badges and regularly represent themselves as acting “on behalf of the City of Childersburg.” Additionally, the JCS forms are used at the municipal court and fees for JCS are included in every court order there.
245. In the system established by an illegal agreement between JCS and Childersburg, the actions of JCS are inextricably intertwined with those of the government.
246. The practice and policy under this agreement automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Childersburg and is a required part of every printed order at the municipal court and requires payment of monthly fees to JCS.
247. Persons who are financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg are not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons are not charged any fees for JCS and are not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process.
248. For those such as the Plaintiffs who are unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” under JCS is required on every court order.
249. This requirement on its municipal court is part of the city contract with JCS. That contract, as discussed above, exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the
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separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government as embodied in the Alabama Constitution. Ala. Const, Article 3, Section 43.
250. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposes incarceration and additional costs on individuals who are unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as lawfully required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code, Section 15-18-62.
251. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
252. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8. The JCS policy at Childersburg is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” cannot pay immediately and creates its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed.
253. These additional JCS fines result in disparate treatment between those who can immediately pay the fine from those who are unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
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254. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
255. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT TEN DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 256. JCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 257. This is accomplished by the illegal contractual agreement between JCS and Childersburg whereby their actions are inextricably intertwined in a practice and policy which automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Childersburg
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and is part of every printed order at the municipal court and requires payment of monthly fees to JCS.
258. Persons who are financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg are not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons are not charged any fees for JCS and are not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process.
259. For those such as the Plaintiffs who are unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” with JCS is required on every order.
260. This requirement is part of the city contract with JCS. That contract, as mentioned, above exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government.
261. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposes incarceration and additional costs on individuals who are unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as would lawfully be required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code Section 15-18-62.
262. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
263. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code
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Section 12-14-8. The JCS policy at Childersburg is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” who cannot pay immediately and creates its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed.
264. These additional JCS fines result in disparate treatment between those who can immediately pay the fine from those who are unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
265. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
266. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT ELEVEN DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part
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hereof. 267. A real controversy exists between these parties concerning several issues
including the validity of the JCS contract with Childersburg and the legality of the actions taken under that contract such that declaratory relief is appropriate.
268. Plaintiffs request the Court to declare that the JCS contract with Childersburg was void ab initio because Childersburg had no authority to contractually bind its municipal court.
269. Childersburg entered into an agreement with JCS that exceeded both statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities. Furthermore, that agreement violated the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Alabama Constitution. See Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. As a result, that agreement is void and due to be declared a nullity.
270. Alabama state law also dictates a separation of the branches of government. Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by The Chief Justice of Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala. Const., Art 6, Section 139
271. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts and the Childersburg City Council has the legislative power to enact regulations and ordinances, but neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
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272. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
273. That agreement also violates the uniformity required by statute for processing traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
274. The process Childersburg under JCS is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” who cannot pay immediately and creates other “rules” for further penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed. “Offenders” who are able to immediately pay the fine are charged one rate, but those that are unable to immediately pay for the same offense are charged the fine and required to pay JCS monthly fees that accumulate each month that passes.
275. The “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in municipal jurisdictions that have not contracted for JCS to charge its fees to those who cannot pay and as a result violates uniformity requirements of Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
276. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and The Chief Justice.
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277. Plaintiffs also request the Court to declare the actions of JCS and Childersburg under this contract to be unconstitutional under the premises discussed above. Under this void agreement, JCS and Childersburg have implemented joint policies and practices to prosecute persons such as the Plaintiffs where there is no jurisdiction or authority to do so under Alabama law, doing so intentionally in an effort to coerce payment of fines and costs from indigent people. These efforts have resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class beyond the limited jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
278. Further, JCS and Childersburg have added increased punishment, fines and costs after adjudication and even where there has been no adjudication of guilt, all without jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law.
279. JCS and Childersburg, through their joint action, have systematically applied Ala. Code § 15-18-62 in an unconstitutional fashion denying the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights.
280. Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful nonpayment.9
9Section 15-18-62 Imprisonment for failure to pay fines and costs. In cases of willful nonpayment of the fine and costs, the defendant shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county as follows: (1) If the fine and costs do not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), no more than 10 days; (2) If the fine and costs exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but do not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), no more than 20 days; (3) If the fine and costs exceed five hundred dollars ($500), but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), no more than 30 days; and
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281. Under JCS and Childersburg policies and practices, and through their joint and consistent action, “offenders” before the Childersburg Municipal Court such as the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent are systematically imprisoned for nonpayment with no determination of willfulness and with no consideration of their indigency or ability to pay.
282. Furthermore, once imprisoned, the requirements of time to be served under § 15-18-62 are ignored by the practice and policy of JCS and Childersburg.
283. The result of this consistent systematic policy and practice of JCS and Childersburg is essentially a debtor’s prison for fines and charges levied by JCS under a void contract with the various municipalities for which it works.
284. Plaintiffs request the Court to enjoin the actions of JCS and Childersburg identified herein to prevent the continuation of these violations of statutory and constitutional prohibitions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court will take jurisdiction of this cause and upon the final hearing:
a. Certify this matter as a proper class action maintainable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. Award the Plaintiffs such damages as this Court shall find the Plaintiffs have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit;
c. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which declares the
(4) For every additional one hundred dollars ($100) or fractional part thereof, 4 days.
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JCS contract with municipalities such as Childersburg to be void and in violation of the statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities; d. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which enjoins JCS and Childersburg from engaging in the violations of law set forth hereinabove; e. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits the JCS and Childersburg in the future from placing persons on probation for simple fines and declares that any current probation and fees for simple fines is void; f. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits JCS and Childersburg in the future from assessing fines in excess of $500 and extending probation periods beyond 24 months and declare that any previously assessed fines and probationary periods in excess of these limits to be void; g. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits the JCS and Childersburg in the future from imprisoning indigent persons for failure to pay fines and fees and ordering the release of any currently incarcerated indigent persons who were jailed for these reasons; h. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class members damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal to any amounts paid on fines and all fees levied by JCS
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and Childersburg that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful
(along with interest), and the annulment of any remaining unpaid fines
that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful;
i. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class the cost of this matter, including a
reasonable attorneys' fee;
j. Award to the Plaintiffs and the Class members such other, further and
more general relief as the Court may deem appropriate under these
circumstances including cost of these proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans ASB-1661-N76G Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: gdevans@evanslawpc.com
s/ Alexandria Parrish Alexandria Parrish ASB-2477-D66P Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: ap@evanslawpc.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this the 26th day of April, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing Second Amended and Restated Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: Jay M. Ezelle, Esquire STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP Seventh Floor, 100 Brookwood Place P.O. Box 598512 Birmingham, Alabama 35259-8512 Timothy P. Donahue, Esquire A. Donald Scott, Jr., Esquire DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1020 22nd Street South Birmingham, Alabama 35205
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans
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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 65 of 84 EXHIBIT A

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 66 of 84 EXHIBIT B

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 67 of 84 EXHIBIT C

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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 70 of 84 EXHIBIT D

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 71 of 84 EXHIBIT E

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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 77 of 84 EXHIBIT I

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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 79 of 84 EXHIBIT K
PL0001

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PL0005

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PL0003

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 50 Filed 04/26/13 Page 84 of 84 PL0004

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et. al, individually and }

for a class of similarly situated persons or }

entities,

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

v.

} Case No.: 2:12-CV-02819-RDP

}

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, }

et. al,

}

}

Defendants.

}

FILED
2013 Sep-26 PM 04:20 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION “I fight authority / Authority always wins.” Throughout his hit-making career, John Mellencamp (a.k.a., Johnny Cougar, John Cougar, and John Cougar Mellencamp) has struck a chord with the American public, garnering acclaim for his revealing insights on everyday life. However, the above lyric, from one of Mellcamp’s most enduring songs,1 fails to ring true in the present case. Here, Plaintiffs assert that the Town of Childersburg, Alabama (“Childersburg”) and Judicial Corrections Services, Inc./Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (collectively “JCS”)2 have abused their authority over municipal criminal defendants. Childersburg and JCS counter, in part, that this court lacks the authority to entertain Plaintiffs’ claims. Contrary to Mellencamp’s chorus line, authority doesn’t always win. Indeed, in this case, the arguments of Childersburg and JCS substantially fail.

1 JOHN COUGAR MELLENCAMP, AUTHORITY SONG (Island/Mercury 1983).
2 Plaintiffs allege that Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. shares the same corporate officers at the same address as JCS and appears to be the successor of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired it and continues to do business as JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 11). For purposes of this memorandum opinion, “JCS” shall refer to both JCS and CHC collectively, and references to the collective parties will be made in the singular form.

Before the court is Defendant Town of Childersburg=s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #51), filed on May 28, 2013. The Motion (Doc. #51) has
been fully briefed. (Docs. #52, #61, #64). For the reasons outlines below, the Motion (Doc. #51) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.3
I. Procedural History Plaintiffs Gina Kay Ray, Kalus K. Johnson, and Deuante T. Jews initiated this lawsuit by
filing a Complaint (Doc. #1) on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against JCS,
Childersburg, and B.J. Meeks, in his official capacity as Mayor of Childersburg, Alabama. After
a status conference on November 20, 2012, the court terminated the then-pending motions to
dismiss (Docs. #6, #12) and directed Plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint to correct
“shotgun” pleading deficiencies. (Doc. #28). Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on
December 20, 2012 and dropped Defendant B.J. Meeks as a party. (Doc. #29). After a hearing
on April 4, 2013, the court instructed Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint to yet again
correct “shotgun” pleading deficiencies. (Doc. #43). At that time, the court also terminated the
motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Doc. #43). Plaintiffs4 filed a Second Amended and Restated Complaint (Doc. #50) against JCS and
Childersburg on April 26, 2013 on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated.5 The
3 To be clear, this memorandum opinion only addresses the Town of Childersburg=s Motion to Dismiss. Any findings or conclusions reached herein do not apply to Defendant Judicial Correction Services (AJCS@), which has filed a separate Motion to Dismiss. Defendant JCS=s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #55) will be considered in a separate memorandum opinion and order.
4 The court notes that Kalus K. Johnson is no longer listed as a named plaintiff, while Kathy and Timothy Fugatt have been added as named plaintiffs. Gina Kay Ray and Deunate T. Jews remain named plaintiffs.
5 Plaintiffs seek to represent the following classes: All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include
2

Second Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against Childersburg: (1) a Section
1983 claim for denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Two); (2) a
Section 1983 claim for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count Four); (3)
a Section 1983 claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Count Six); (4) a
Section 1983 claim for excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment (Count Eight); (5) a Section 1983 claim for denial of equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Ten); and (6) a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief
(Count Eleven).
II. Factual Allegations
A. General Background
Defendant Childersburg, with the approval of its Mayor and Town Council, contracted
with Defendant JCS to provide probation and fee collecting services for Childersburg’s Municipal Court. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 12, 18-19).6 Childersburg was also responsible for the hiring
of its municipal court judge, Larry Ward. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 19). Pursuant to the agreement between
Childersburg and JCS, any time a person appearing before the court is unable to pay the court
costs and/or fines associated with the charges at issue, that person is automatically placed on
those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. AND All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. (Doc. #50 at & 9). This memorandum opinion does not address Plaintiffs= purported class allegations. These matters will be heard when and if Plaintiffs move for certification of this matter as a class action. 6 Plaintiffs assert that the operative agreement was drafted by JCS and signed by the Mayor of Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 18). However, Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of the agreement to the Second Amended Complaint.
3

probation using forms provided by JCS, regardless of whether a jail sentence was imposed. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 21). As part of this arrangement, the municipal court is to include in each of its orders a probation supervision fee of $35 per month7 and a probation account set-up fee of $10, both payable to JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 20). Payment of these fees is ordered even if adjudication is withheld. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 21).
JCS employees attend each municipal court session, carry badges, and are referred to as “parole officers.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 24). The probation orders provided by JCS to Childersburg municipal court require individuals to make payments directly to JCS. (Doc. #50 at && 21, 24). JCS controls what payments are made and determines how much each individual must pay each month, how much is credited to JCS, and how much is rebated to Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at & 25). After a sentence of probation is ordered, JCS sends letters to individuals indicating that failure to appear for an assigned court date “will result in a warrant being issued” for the individual’s arrest and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 22; Doc. #50, Ex. F). Some JCS forms instruct probationers that they may avoid their court date if they pay a monetary amount determined by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 22; Doc. #50, Ex. G). JCS permits individuals placed on probation who live more than thirty (30) miles from the JCS office to mail in their payments. (Doc. #50 at & 22).
If an individual fails to pay a satisfactory amount, JCS then determines whether to revoke the individual=s probation (in which case the individual is jailed) or whether to impose additional fines and costs. (Doc. #50 at && 27, 29). Childersburg personnel follow JCS=s recommendations regarding whether to incarcerate an individual or impose other bond requirements without conducting hearings to determine why an individual has not made payments, whether the individual may be indigent, or whether the individual is entitled to counsel. (Doc. #50 at & 27).
7 This fee has since been increased to $45 per month. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 20).
4

JCS takes no action to determine indigency and has denied that it has any responsibility to make that determination. On the contrary, Childersburg=s municipal judge contends that under the agreement with JCS, it is JCS that should determine whether an individual is unable to pay due to indigency, and, if so, abate appropriate fees in the probation order. (Doc. #50 at & 31).
JCS trains its employees on the issuance of warrants for arrest and provides forms for that purpose. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. E). JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if the individual subsequently complies with payment of fees and costs. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. I). If an individual is arrested, JCS monitors jail statuses as part of case management reports. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. J).
Under the agreement between Childersburg and JCS, individuals are often responsible for fines that exceed the statutory maximum of $500.00 that municipal courts may impose. (Doc. #50 at & 28). In addition, the periods of probation imposed in order to collect fines and fees for JCS often exceed the two year statutory maximum. (Doc. #50 at & 28).
B. Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is a resident of Vincent, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). She appeared before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance” and “driving while license suspended.” (Doc. #50 at ¶34). She was fined a total of $1146, but did not receive a jail sentence. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). JCS set her monthly payments on these amounts at $145. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). Ms. Ray appeared before the Childersburg Municipal Court again on July 14, 2011, having been charged with “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). She was fined $248 in connection with the “expired tag” charge and $598 in connection with the “driving while license suspended” charge, but did not receive a jail sentence. (Doc. #50
5

at ¶ 35). Because she could not pay the fines, she was again placed on probation with JCS and ordered to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and $10 account set-up fee. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). JCS set her monthly payments on these amounts at $145. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). JCS treated this period of probation as separate from her August 2010 probation. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35).
Ms. Ray maintains that she was and has been indigent, and, therefore, unable to pay her fines and fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 36). Despite these assertions, neither Childersburg nor JCS inquired into her ability to pay at any time during the process. (Id.). Because she was unable to pay as instructed, Ms. Ray was jailed at the discretion of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 37). She spent four days in the Talladega County Jail in 2010 and an additional twenty-one days in 2011. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 37). Ms. Ray also spent time in the Talladega County Jail in April and May 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶37). In each instance, Ms. Ray was jailed without a probation revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 43).
Ms. Ray was released on May 1, 2012, after a friend came forward with the $300 required by JCS for her release. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 38). At that time, JCS authorized the release of the previous charge of “failure to obey court order” and directed Ms. Ray to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 39).
C. Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is a resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 7). Mrs. Fugatt was scheduled to appear in Childersburg Municipal Court on January 13, 2011 on charges of driving with an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license, but her case was nol prossed upon payment of the charges’ court costs, which amounted to $346. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 4547). Mrs. Fugatt was unable to pay the attendant traffic fines at that time and was placed on probation by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 48). Mrs. Fugatt was charged $45 per month for the probation
6

services of JCS. (Id.). Mrs. Fugatt was unable to make regular payments in accordance with the JCS schedule, and was threatened with incarceration by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 49-50). She was fined an additional $317 on September 26, 2011 for “Failure to Obey Court Order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 51).
After failing to appear at a scheduled meeting at JCS’s office, a warrant was issued for Mrs. Fugatt’s arrest. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 53). The arrest warrant was executed on February 26, 2012, at which time Mrs. Fugatt was placed in custody at the Childersburg City Jail. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 54). Mrs. Fugatt was jailed without a probation revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62). At the time of her arrest, Mrs. Fugatt was fined another $317 for “Failure to Appear.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 57). Mrs. Fugatt was released from jail after payment of $500 was made to the Childersburg Police Department. (Doc. #50, Ex. K).
As of October 11, 2012, Mrs. Fugatt still owed $557. Mrs. Fugatt asserts that she was indigent throughout the relevant period of time, and that she repeatedly attempted to inform JCS of that fact. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 50, 59). JCS did not attempt to independently determine or verify whether she was indigent, but rather pursued its collection efforts without regard to her economic status. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 59-61).
D. Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is a resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 8). On December 3, 2010, Mr. Fugatt was stopped and ticketed for driving with an expired license tag. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 46). He was due to appear in court on January 13, 2011, but his case was nol prossed after he paid $148 in court costs. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 47). However, Mr. Fugatt was unable to pay the concomitant fine and was placed on probation with JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 48). Under the JCS program, Mr. Fugatt was required to pay $45 a month in administration costs, in addition to
7

monthly payments related to the traffic fine. (Id.). Mr. Fugatt was irregular in both his payments and appearances at JCS’s offices, and that resulted in him being fined an additional $317 on September 26, 2011 for “Failure to Obey Court Order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 49-51).
After a subsequent failure to attend a scheduled meeting at JCS’s office, an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Fugatt. He was arrested on February 26, 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 53-54). Mr. Fugatt was incarcerated without a revocation hearing or the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62). At this time, Mr. Fugatt was once again fined $317, this time for “Failure to Appear.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 57). He was released from jail after the payment of $400 to the Childersburg Police Department. (Doc. #50, Ex. K).
As of October 11, 2012, Mr. Fugatt still owed $517. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 63). Mr. Fugatt informed JCS that he was indigent throughout the relevant time period (Doc. #50 at ¶59-60), but JCS made no determination as to Mr. Fugatt’s indigence (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62).
E. Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews Plaintiff Deunate Jews is a resident of Harpersville, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). In 2008, Mr. Jews was charged with harassment. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Although the charge was subsequently dismissed, Mr. Jews was assessed $166 in court costs on October 22, 2009. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Unable to pay the court costs, Mr. Jews was placed on probation for two years, during which he was required to pay a $10 set-up fee, $45 per month in probation administration costs, and his court costs. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Mr. Jews failed to make the required payments, and that resulted in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest for “failure to obey a court order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). At that time, JCS added an additional $317 to Mr. Jews’ balance, a charge that JCS categorized as “restitution.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 65).
8

Mr. Jews was arrested on September 22, 2009 and was incarcerated in the Childersburg City Jail for thirty days. (Doc. # 50 at ¶ 66). Mr. Jews’ was released after securing a $582 “cash bond,” but found himself back in jail in May 2010, serving another thirty days for failure to pay his JCS fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 67-68). In February 2011, Mr. Jews avoided additional jail time by paying $500 to JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 69). However, Mr. Jews was jailed again in February 2012 and was released on March 9, 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 71). From that date, he was assigned an additional two year probation period, which is scheduled to end on March 9, 2014. (Id.). In September 2012, Mr. Jews was placed in jail for another thirty days for failure to pay his JCS fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 72). In every instance, Mr. Jews was incarcerated without a formal revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 77).
As of May 25, 2012, Mr. Jews owed the following amounts to JCS: $295 for “fees in arrears,” $343 for “Pay off not including Probation fees,” $45 in “Monthly Probation Fees,” and $1,807 in “Court Money Due from other Probations.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 71). Throughout the relevant period, Mr. Jews was unable to make payments to JCS as a result of his indigence. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 75). JCS has made no attempt to gauge Mr. Jews’ financial ability to pay a fine, costs, or fees, nor did it account for Mr. Jews’ indigency in its collection practices. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 76). III. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That being said, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to belief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and
9

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Supreme Court has recently identified “two working principles” for a district court to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions when they are “couched as [] factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 68. Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under prong one, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are wellpleaded and assume their veracity; and under prong two, the court must proceed to determine the claim’s plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. If the court determines that
10

well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Id. IV. Discussion
After careful review, the court concludes that Defendant’s motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
A. Overview of Defendant’s Arguments in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss advances a number of arguments. Indeed, rather than address each of Plaintiffs’ claims individually, the motion seeks to cut Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint off at the knees, primarily arguing that “[a]ll of the actions complained of in the Second Amended Complaint are judicial acts, and the Complaint fails to address the factual allegations necessary to proceed with a claim against Childersburg, as opposed to the State of Alabama, for acts of its courts.” (Doc. #52 at 1). In essence, Defendant’s challenge is one rooted in the second prong of the facial plausibility standard promulgated in Twombly and Iqbal. That is, Defendant asserts that even if all of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are taken as true, no legally plausible claims can be maintained against the Town, and dismissal of this suit is required. Defendant devotes significant space to an examination of the Alabama court system and the § 1983 liability of municipalities, concluding that, in the present circumstances, Childersburg cannot be subjected to claims under § 1983. In doing so, Defendant essentially seeks dismissal of five of Plaintiffs’ six claims: (1) Plaintiffs’ §1983 claim for denial of due process under the 14th Amendment (Count Two); (2) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count Four); (3) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment (Count Six); (4) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count Eight);
11

and (5) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Ten).
Additionally, Defendant’s Motion asserts a number of alternative foundations for dismissal, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, absolute judicial immunity, federalism and comity concerns, and O’Shea v. Littleton’s bar on prospective injunctive relief.8 All of Defendant’s arguments are addressed below.
B. Defendant Childersburg is Subject to § 1983 Liability The Town argues initially that it is not subject to § 1983 municipal liability in this case. A claim is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a litigant suffers a deprivation of federal rights at the hand of a person acting under the color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). However, municipal liability under § 1983 is somewhat circumscribed; indeed, municipalities are only liable when a municipal employee’s allegedly unconstitutional actions are undertaken “in execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may sufficiently establish the existence of a “policy” by identifying “(1) an officially promulgated [municipal] policy or (2) an official custom or practice of the [municipality] shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). In both instances, a plaintiff must illustrate that the governmental entity has “authority and responsibility over the governmental function in issue.” Id. at 1330. Furthermore, the policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivations complained of. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
8 Through these various theories, Defendant effectively seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ sixth and final claim against Childersburg for declaratory and injunctive relief (Count 11).
12

Defendant argues that the Town of Childersburg does not possess the authority necessary for § 1983 liability to attach, pointing to the organization of the Alabama court system and the Childersburg Municipal Court’s position within it. (Doc. #52 at 9-10). Under Alabama Code § 12-1-2, “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in a unified judicial system which shall consist of . . . such municipal courts as may be provided by law.” As such, the Alabama Supreme Court, not Childersburg, has authority over the Childersburg Municipal Court. Likewise, under Alabama Code § 12-14-13, municipal courts themselves are bestowed with control over the application and implementation of probation. Defendant seizes upon this distribution of power, contending that Childersburg cannot be liable under § 1983 if it has neither policymaking authority over the Childersburg Municipal Court, nor control over the probationary process. (Doc. #52 at 9-10).
However, municipalities like Childersburg are responsible for furnishing “appropriate facilities and necessary supportive personnel” to municipal courts. Alabama Code § 12-14-2 (1975). “Necessarily implied” by that assignment of responsibility is “[t]he power to contract with a private firm to aid in the collection of delinquent municipal court fines . . . “ Wilkins v. Dan Haggerty & Associates, Inc., 672 So.2d 507, 510 (Ala. 1995). In failing to address head on its own authority to appoint a probationary services provider such as JCS, the Town misses the theoretical crux of Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs contend that, in carrying out its duty to assist and support the Childersburg Municipal Court, Childersburg entered into a contract that handcuffed the autonomy of the municipal court and imbued JCS with a power unchecked by procedural safeguards. (See Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 23, 27, 28, 30-32). Indeed, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the policy (contracting out probation services) of a state actor (Childersburg) was the “moving
13

force” behind their constitutional deprivations. The court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements for claims under § 1983.
C. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Preclude Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Present Case
Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case on the basis of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to assert that consideration of Plaintiffs’ suit would constitute impermissible “interference with valid state court judgments.” (Doc. #52 at 15). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the proposition that “federal courts, other than the Supreme Court [of the United States], have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Indeed, RookerFeldman reinforces notions of federalism generally, and the statutory scheme of federal jurisdiction in particular, which “does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Com’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has its most direct application in instances where an unsuccessful state court litigant chooses not to pursue an appeal at the state level, instead resolving to challenge the state court decision in a lower federal court. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284 (describing Rooker-Feldman as largely applicable to “cases brought by state-court losers . . . inviting district court review and rejection of [the state court’s] judgments”). To be sure, such attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts are clearly misguided. But this case is not one of them. Here, Plaintiffs do not seek to overturn their convictions,9 but rather ask the court for various types of legal and equitable relief flowing from post-conviction events. (See, e.g., Doc. #50 at ¶ 284).
9 Substantive judgments were not even entered in three of the four plaintiffs’ cases, as Mr. and Mrs. Fugatt’s cases were nol prossed and Mr. Jews’ case was dismissed.
14

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to cases that have the potential to besmirch or void related state court judgments. See, e.g., Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2011). It is within this line of precedent that Defendant apparently attempts to couch the present case. The Town implies that, like Goodman, this case represents an indirect challenge to the judgments of a state court, i.e., the Childersburg Municipal Court. (Doc. #52 at 15). In Goodman, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a § 1983 suit seeking damages for the submission of a fraudulent affidavit in a previously-litigated, child custody case. The Goodman court held that the affidavit in question was too central to the state court’s judgment to later be challenged in federal court. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334. Properly understood, Goodman acts to preserve the spirit of Rooker-Feldman by shielding state court judgments from collateral attacks; however, its reasoning is inapplicable to this case. Plaintiffs’ suit does not amount to a collateral attack on any judgment of the Childersburg Municipal Court. Indeed, the present scenario is readily distinguishable from that in Goodman in that Plaintiffs’ suit in this court does not address the judgments of the Childersburg Municipal Court in the least. Not only does Plaintiffs’ suit not challenge the merits of the municipal court’s decisions, but it also does not call into question any of the bases on which those judgments were reached. Rather, Plaintiffs appear only to challenge the post-judgment probationary program.
In actuality, the instant case much more closely resembles Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, a Sixth Circuit case in which a former prisoner brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the Public Defender’s policy of not pursuing indigency hearings for defendant due to be placed in jail for unpaid fines had resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. 501 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 2007). On appeal, the Public Defender argued that the prisoner’s suit should be summarily dismissed, as it called into question a previous state
15

court judgment, i.e., the underlying conviction. Id. at 598-99. The Sixth Circuit rebuffed this line of argument, holding, “A conclusion that procedures, or rather the lack of procedures, that culminated in Power’s incarceration violated his constitutional rights has nothing to do with the propriety of his underlying convictions.” Id. at 604. Likewise here, because it is the administration of the municipal court’s sentences that is the focus of the Plaintiffs’ suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude this court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.
D. Absolute Judicial Immunity Is Inapplicable to Childersburg The Town also asserts that it is protected from suit by absolute judicial immunity. (Doc. #52 at 16). Judicial immunity shields judges from liability as long as they do not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction” and their acts are judicial in nature. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). “Nonjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity when their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). Indeed, judicial immunity is extended to “those officials with discretionary power similar to that exercised by a judge” in order to “ensure courageous exercise of that discretionary power.” Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972)). The operative question in evaluating whether judicial immunity extends to a given party is whether the party was exercising the discretion or performing a function normally associated with the judiciary. Id. Because an act of a nonjudicial party is only protected by judicial immunity if that act is in fact a judicial one, Childersburg’s actions in the present situation must have been of a judicial character in order for the Town to fall under the protective umbrella of judicial immunity.
16

Defendant’s bare assertion that “the Town [of Childersburg] is entitled to the same absolute immunity enjoyed by the judges” is unpersuasive. (Doc. #52 at 17). Here, Childersburg’s action —contracting with JCS for the provision of probationary services—amounts to an administrative act, one that is statutorily delegated to the Town of Childersburg, not the Childersburg Municipal Court. Alabama Code § 12-14-2 (1975). As such, it is not an act normally reserved for the judiciary; in fact, it is a job expressly reserved for a branch of government other than the judiciary. Consequently, Childersburg cannot claim the protection of judicial immunity and is free to be the target of the present suit.
E. Federalism and Comity Concerns Do Not Counsel in Favor of Dismissal Although Defendant Childersburg does not expressly or individually address issues of federalism and comity in its supporting brief (Doc. #52), it does incorporate those arguments made by Defendant JCS in its own brief in support of dismissal (Doc. #55). Invoking “longstanding and well-established principles of federalism and comity,” Defendant JCS argues (and the argument is, in turn, adopted by Childersburg) that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is barred by both the exclusive federal remedy of habeas corpus and the Younger abstention doctrine. The court will address these arguments below.
1. Habeas Corpus Is Not the Exclusive Remedy for Redressing Plaintiffs’ Alleged Deprivations
The federal habeas corpus statute limits its availability to those persons who are “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This makes sense, as “[t]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus is the “sole federal remedy” available to a person in custody seeking release or reduction. Id. at 486. As a result, “[a] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to
17

challenge the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’” or seek an “immediate release from prison” or a reduction in the length of confinement. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489).
Alleging that Plaintiffs, by way of their probation sentences, are “in custody” “within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute,” Defendant JCS concludes that Plaintiffs’ only method of injunctive vindication is the writ of habeas corpus (i.e., Plaintiffs’ current suit, rooted primarily in § 1983, is improper). (Doc. #56 at 11). In support of this creative construction of the term “custody,” Defendant relies on Jones v. Cunningham, a 1963 Supreme Court decision that addressed the bounds of custody for purposes of habeas applicability. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). In Jones, the Court held that Petitioner, a parolee, was entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus, as the requirements of his parole program were so restrictive and confining that he was effectively in custody. Id. at 242-43. The Eleventh Circuit has subsequently incorporated the reasoning of Jones, finding that a former prisoner, who remained “subject to the terms of his sex offender probation,” was “in custody” for purposes of the federal habeas statute. Hamner v. Deputy Sec. of the Fl. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F. App’x 875, n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 242-43).
But, while it seems well-established that custody means “something less than close physical confinement” in the habeas context, Jones, 371 U.S. at 239, Plaintiffs’ probationary sentences in the present case do not exhibit the severe restraint or liberty necessary to constitute “custody.” See Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, California, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (“The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty . . . its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more
18

conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.”). Plaintiffs’ probationary program—which consists of monthly payments, occasional visits to JCS’s office, and various appearances in municipal court—appears considerably less stringent than that faced by the petitioner in Jones, who was confined to “a particular community, house, and job,” could not “drive a car without permission,” and had to allow his parole officer “to visit his home and job at any time.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. Likewise, it is safe to understand at this, the pleading stage, that Plaintiffs’ probation is less restrictive than was the Hamner Petitioner’s, a sex offender who was subjected to a heightened form of probation, including restrictions as to where he could live and work. See Florida Statute § 775.21—“The Florida Sexual Predators Act.” Rather, Plaintiffs’ level of restraint more closely resembles that of the appellant in Duvallon v. Florida, who was fined after being convicted of a misdemeanor, but was later threatened with incarceration for failure to make payments on the fine. 691 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that “where, as here, the judgment of the state court imposes only a fine with no provision for incarceration, appellant’s liberty is not restrained, she is not ‘in custody’ and her bare assertion of constitutional deprivation will not support federal court jurisdiction for § 2254 relief.” Id. at 485. Like the Duvallon appellant, Plaintiffs’ are not so restrained that they are “in custody,” preventing their use of a writ of habeas corpus.10 As a result, the writ of habeas corpus is not Plaintiffs’ exclusive federal remedy; in fact, it is not a remedy available to Plaintiffs at all.
In any event, even if the court concluded that they were “in custody” (and thus entitled to bring suit under the federal habeas corpus statute), Plaintiffs would still be entitled to pursue other remedial avenues. A writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy only in those actions
10 At this stage, the court’s “custody” determination is made on the limited factual allegations of the pleadings. However, further development of the factual record, particularly as it relates to the nature of Plaintiffs’ probationary requirements, may warrant reconsideration of this issue.
19

that “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson,

544 U.S. at 81-82. Indeed, “§ 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success

in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Id. at 81

(emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiffs essentially advance procedural challenges to the Town’s conduct—e.g.,

the lack of an indigency hearing after failure to pay fines and/or the lack of providing counsel

prior to incarceration—rather than attacking the propriety of their confinement or probation.

(See, e.g., Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 131, 208). Indeed, the thrust of their claim is Plaintiffs’ assertion that

certain procedural aspects of Childersburg’s probation program are wrongful and they primarily

pursue injunctive relief that seeks to render those procedures invalid. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284). The

Supreme Court has recognized as cognizable similar actions by habeas-eligible plaintiffs.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (“We conclude that respondents’ claims are cognizable under §1983 . .

. [Respondents] seek relief that will render invalid [] state procedures . . . Neither respondent

seeks an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community.”). However,

to the extent that Plaintiffs seek “release of any currently incarcerated indigent persons who were

jailed for these reasons,” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284(g)), their only federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against the continued incarceration

of similarly situated persons is due to be dismissed, but Plaintiffs’ remaining injunctive demands

may proceed.

2.

The Younger Abstention Doctrine Does Not Work to Bar Plaintiffs’

Claims

Defendant additionally claims (by incorporating JCS’ arguments) that Plaintiffs’

demands for injunctive relief violate the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal

20

courts from “stay[ing] or enjoin[ing] pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Although federal courts generally have an obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them, “in exceptional cases federal courts may and should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference with state proceedings.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Such abstention should be exercised when 1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing, 2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and 3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceedings. Id. (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Right off the bat, Defendant’s abstention argument runs aground and founders upon the first Younger prong—none of the Plaintiffs are currently involved in ongoing state judicial proceedings. Indeed, all of Plaintiffs’ state cases have long been resolved—Ray’s most recent case was adjudicated in July 2011, the Fugatts had their cases nol prossed in January 2011, and Jews’ case was apparently dismissed in October 2009. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 35, 46, 64). Furthermore, the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is not intended to contradict or overturn the substance of the prior state court proceedings, but instead targets Childersburg’s postjudgment procedure, removing the very concern that animates the Younger doctrine’s concern with improper interference with a pending state proceeding. Because “the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism ‘have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding,’” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)), no Younger-style concerns prevent this court from hearing Plaintiffs’ suit.
21

F. O’Shea v. Littleton’s Bar on Injunctive Relief Does Not Apply to Plaintiffs’ Equitable Claims
Defendant Childersburg also incorporates JCS’s argument with respect to O’Shea v. Littleton, a 1974 Supreme Court decision that cautions against the use of injunctive relief by lower federal courts in certain circumstances. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). In O’Shea, the Supreme Court rejected the relief requested by a class of citizens who alleged that law enforcement officials were applying state criminal law and procedures in a racially discriminatory manner. The Court held that 1) the named plaintiffs, none of whom was identified as having specifically suffered an injury, did not have standing to bring the suit, and 2) plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief would constitute an improper and impractical intrusion on the state court system. Id. at 504. Defendant asserts that “[t]he same two grounds require dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request for prospective injunctive relief.” (Doc. #56 at 14). The court addresses these arguments in turn.
1. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Claims for Prospective Injunctive Relief
Defendant attempts to draw an analogy between the O’Shea respondents and the Plaintiffs here, alleging that the latter have “failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy.” (Doc. #56 at 14 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 493)). It was clear in O’Shea that respondents lacked standing; indeed, “neither the complaint nor respondents’ counsel suggested that any of the named plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed were themselves serving an allegedly illegal sentence or were on trial or awaiting trial before petitioners.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. As there was no indication of an imminent threat of injury, the O’Shea Court declined to entertain the suit, avoiding the “speculation and conjecture” that accompany an undeveloped case or controversy. Id. at 497.
22

However, unlike the class members in O’Shea, Plaintiffs’ allegations of future injury evince “sufficient immediacy and reality” to establish standing in the present case. Id. Although “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief,” it seems clear, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, that Plaintiffs are experiencing “continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. at 496. Apparently, all of the Plaintiffs are still on probation and still owe various fines and fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 41, 63, 74). As such, they are under the present and constant threat of being subjected to the allegedly illegal methods and procedures utilized by JCS to collect municipal fines and assessments. Plaintiffs face the prospect of a return to jail at any time, imbuing them with the standing necessary to make claims for prospective injunctive relief.
2. Management and Execution of Plaintiffs’ Requested Injunctive Relief Does Not Present the Same Risks and Challenges as Those Present in O’Shea v. Littleton
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief raises the same issues of manageability and comity as the proposed injunction in O’Shea. (Doc. #56 at 15-17). In O’Shea, respondents did not challenge any state laws or procedures as illegal, only the individual actions of law enforcement officials. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500. As a result, their proposed injunctive relief lacked a tangible target, seeking instead to monitor the behavior of law enforcement officials in the course of criminal prosecutions and generally ferret out racial discrimination at the state court level. Id. Because it “contemplated interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners,” the O’Shea Court worried that such an injunction would amount to “an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.” Ultimately, the Court declined to permit an “abrasive and unmanageable intercession.” Id. at 500, 504.
23

While the complexities associated with administering injunctions have long caused federal courts to view such relief with wariness and caution, see, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, these concerns are simply not present in the present case. In essence, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the current procedures, or lack thereof, associated with the collection of municipal fees in Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284). Unlike the individual behavior targeted in O’Shea, reformation of the procedures complained of here would not require constant, painstaking determinations. Rather, a comprehensive injunction, if granted, would be effective in halting the challenged procedures, establishing new procedures, and providing guidance in the areas of their implementation and execution. Because Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief does not fall within that proscribed by O’Shea and its progeny, the court will continue to entertain Plaintiffs’ equitable claims moving forward.
3. Childersburg Is Entitled to Contract With a Private Company for the Provision of Probationary Services to the Childersburg Municipal Court
Plaintiffs’ theory of liability regarding Defendant Childersburg centers on the contract that it executed with Defendant JCS. For reasons explained above, Plaintiffs’ claim that Childersburg engaged in constitutional deprivations by entering into an unwieldy contract with JCS is cognizable, satisfying the basic pleading requirements for an action under § 1983. However, to the extent Plaintiffs suggest that Childersburg lacked the authority to enter into a contract with JCS, or that it is illegal for a municipality to make a contract, any contract, with a private provider of probationary services,11 Plaintiffs misunderstand the prevailing law in
11 See Doc. # 50 at ¶ 17 (“[B]y agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully delegated to JCS…”); Doc. #50 at ¶ 268 (“Plaintiffs request the Court to declare that the JCS contract with Childersburg was void ab initio because Childersburg had no authority to contractually bind its municipal court.”); Doc. #50 at ¶ 271 (“…neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of [Childersburg’s] judiciary.”).
24

Alabama. Indeed, it is clear that Alabama municipalities are statutorily vested with the power to provide assistance to their municipal court system, Alabama Code § 12-14-2 (1975), and a permissible implication based upon this statutory grant is “the power to contract with a private firm to aid in the collection of delinquent municipal court fines….” Wilkins, 672 So.2d at 510.
That being said, contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs’ request that the Childersburg/JCS contract be voided12 is not due to be dismissed at this time.13 Consideration of Defendant’s arguments about this issue would be more proper at the summary judgment stage, after discovery has shed light on the contents and nature of the contract. V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #51) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2013.
_______________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12 Doc. #50 at ¶ 284(c) (asking the court to “[e]nter an injunction and other declaratory relief which declares the JCS contract with municipalities such as Childersburg to be void and in violation of the statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities.”).
13 Doc. #52 at 20.
25

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et. al, individually and }

for a class of similarly situated persons or }

entities,

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

v.

} Case No.: 2:12-CV-02819-RDP

}

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, }

et. al,

}

}

Defendants.

}

FILED
2013 Sep-26 PM 04:25 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION “I fight authority / Authority always wins.” Throughout his hit-making career, John Mellencamp (a.k.a., Johnny Cougar, John Cougar, and John Cougar Mellencamp) has struck a chord with the American public, garnering acclaim for his revealing insights on everyday life. However, the above lyric, from one of Mellcamp’s most enduring songs,1 fails to ring true in the present case. Here, Plaintiffs assert that the Town of Childersburg, Alabama (“Childersburg”) and Judicial Corrections Services, Inc./Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (collectively “JCS”)2 have abused their authority over municipal criminal defendants. Childersburg and JCS counter, in part, that this court lacks the authority to entertain Plaintiffs’ claims. Contrary to Mellencamp’s chorus line, authority doesn’t always win. Indeed, in this case, the arguments of Childersburg and JCS substantially fail.

1 JOHN COUGAR MELLENCAMP, AUTHORITY SONG (Island/Mercury 1983).
2 Plaintiffs allege that Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. shares the same corporate officers at the same address as JCS and appears to be the successor of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired it and continues to do business as JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 11). For purposes of this memorandum opinion, “JCS” shall refer to both JCS and CHC collectively, and references to the collective parties will be made in the singular form.

Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Doc.
#55), filed on May 28, 2013 by Defendants JCS. The Motion (Doc. #55) has been fully briefed.
(Docs. #56, #60, #63). For the reasons outlined below, the Motion (Doc. #55) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.3
I. Procedural History Plaintiffs Gina Kay Ray, Kalus K. Johnson, and Deuante T. Jews initiated this lawsuit by
filing a Complaint (Doc. #1) on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against JCS,
Childersburg, and B.J. Meeks, in his official capacity as Mayor of Childersburg, Alabama. After
a status conference on November 20, 2012, the court terminated the then-pending motions to
dismiss (Docs. #6, #12) and directed Plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint to correct
“shotgun” pleading deficiencies. (Doc. #28). Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on
December 20, 2012 and dropped Defendant B.J. Meeks as a party. (Doc. #29). After a hearing
on April 4, 2013, the court instructed Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint to yet again
correct “shotgun” pleading deficiencies. (Doc. #43). At that time, the court also terminated the
then-pending motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Doc. #43). Plaintiffs4 filed a Second Amended and Restated Complaint (Doc. #50) against JCS and
Childersburg on April 26, 2013 on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated.5 The
3 To be clear, this memorandum opinion only addresses Judicial Correction Services, Inc. and Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.=s Motion to Dismiss. Any findings or conclusions reached herein do not apply to Defendant Town of Childersburg (“Childersburg”), which has filed a separate Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Town of Childersburg=s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #51) will be considered in a separate memorandum opinion and order.
4 The court notes that Kalus K. Johnson is no longer listed as a named plaintiff, while Kathy and Timothy Fugatt have been added as named plaintiffs. Gina Kay Ray and Deunate T. Jews remain named plaintiffs.
5 Plaintiffs seek to represent the following classes: All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may
2

Second Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against JCS: (1) a 42 U.S.C. §1983
claim for denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count One); (2) a Section
1983 claim for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count Three); (3) a
Section 1983 claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Count Five); (4) a
Section 1983 claim for excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment (Count Seven); (5) a Section 1983 claim for denial of equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Nine); and (6) a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief
(Count Eleven).
II. Factual Allegations
A. General Background
Defendant Childersburg, with the approval of its Mayor and City Council, contracted
with Defendant JCS to provide probation and fee collecting services for Childersburg’s Municipal Court. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 12, 18-19).6 Childersburg was also responsible for the hiring
of its municipal court judge, Larry Ward. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 19). Pursuant to the agreement between
Childersburg and JCS, any time a person appearing before the court is unable to pay the court
be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. AND All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. (Doc. #50 at & 9). This memorandum opinion does not address Plaintiffs= purported class allegations. These matters will be heard when and if Plaintiffs move for certification of this matter as a class action. 6 Plaintiffs assert that the operative agreement was drafted by JCS and signed by the Mayor of Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 18). However, Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of the agreement to the Second Amended Complaint.
3

costs and/or fines associated with the charges at issue, that person is automatically placed on probation using forms provided by JCS, regardless of whether a jail sentence was imposed. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 21). As part of this arrangement, the municipal court is to include in each of its orders a probation supervision fee of $35 per month7 and a probation account set-up fee of $10, both payable to JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 20). Payment of these fees is ordered even if adjudication is withheld. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 21).
JCS employees attend each municipal court session, carry badges, and are referred to as “parole officers.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 24). The probation orders provided by JCS to Childersburg municipal court require individuals to make payments directly to JCS. (Doc. #50 at && 21, 24). JCS controls what payments are made and determines how much each individual must pay each month, how much is credited to JCS, and how much is rebated to Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at & 25). After a sentence of probation is ordered, JCS sends letters to individuals indicating that failure to appear for an assigned court date “will result in a warrant being issued” for the individual’s arrest and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 22; Doc. #50, Ex. F). Some JCS forms instruct probationers that they may avoid their court date if they pay a monetary amount determined by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 22; Doc. #50, Ex. G). JCS permits individuals placed on probation who live more than thirty (30) miles from the JCS office to mail in their payments. (Doc. #50 at & 22).
If an individual fails to pay a satisfactory amount, JCS then determines whether to revoke the individual=s probation (in which case the individual jailed) or whether to impose additional fines and costs. (Doc. #50 at && 27, 29). Childersburg personnel follow JCS=s recommendations regarding whether to incarcerate an individual or impose other bond requirements without
7 This fee has since been increased to $45 per month. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 20).
4

conducting hearings to determine why an individual has not made payments, whether the individual may be indigent, or whether the individual is entitled to counsel. (Doc. #50 at & 27). JCS takes no action to determine indigency and has denied that it has any responsibility to do so. (Doc. #50 at ¶27). On the contrary, Childersburg=s municipal judge contends that under the agreement with JCS, it is JCS that should determine whether an individual is unable to pay due to indigency, and, if so, abate appropriate fees in the probation order. (Doc. #50 at & 31).
JCS trains its employees on the issuance of warrants for arrest and provides forms for that purpose. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. E). JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if the individual subsequently complies with payment of fees and costs. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. I). If an individual is arrested, JCS monitors jail statuses as part of case management reports. (Doc. #50 at & 22; Doc. #50, Ex. J).
Under the agreement between Childersburg and JCS, individuals are often responsible for fines that exceed the statutory maximum of $500.00 that municipal courts may impose. (Doc. #50 at & 28). In addition, the periods of probation imposed in order to collect fines and fees for JCS often exceed the two year statutory maximum. (Doc. #50 at & 28).
B. Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is a resident of Vincent, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). She appeared before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance” and “driving while license suspended.” (Doc. #50 at ¶34). She was fined a total of $1146, but did not receive a jail sentence. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). JCS set her monthly payments on these amounts at $145. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 34). Ms. Ray also appeared before the Childersburg Municipal Court again on July 14, 2011, having been charged with “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” (Doc. #50 at ¶
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35). She was fined $248 in connection with the “expired tag” charge and $598 in connection with the “driving while license suspended” charge, but did not receive a jail sentence. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). Because she could not pay the fines, she was again placed on probation with JCS and ordered to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and $10 account set-up fee. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). JCS set her monthly payments on these amounts at $145. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35). JCS treated this period of probation as separate from her August 2010 probation. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 35).
Ms. Ray maintains that she was and has been indigent, and, therefore, unable to pay her fines and fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 36). Despite these assertions, neither Childersburg nor JCS inquired into her ability to pay at any time during the process. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 36). Because she was unable to pay as instructed, Ms. Ray was jailed at the discretion of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 37). She spent four days in the Talladega County Jail in 2010 and an additional twenty-one days in 2011. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 37). Ms. Ray also spent time in the Talladega County Jail in April and May 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶37). In each instance, Ms. Ray was jailed without a probation revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 43).
Ms. Ray was released on May 1, 2012, after a friend came forward with the $300 required by JCS for her release. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 38). At that time, JCS authorized the release of the previous charge of “failure to obey court order” and directed Ms. Ray to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 39).
C. Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is a resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 7). Mrs. Fugatt was scheduled to appear in Childersburg Municipal Court on January 13, 2011 on charges of driving with an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license, but her case was nol prossed upon payment of the charges’ court costs, which amounted to $346. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 45-
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47). Mrs. Fugatt was unable to pay the attendant traffic fines at that time and was placed on probation by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 48). Mrs. Fugatt was charged $45 per month for the probation services of JCS. (Id.). Mrs. Fugatt was unable to make regular payments in accordance with the JCS schedule, and was threatened with incarceration by JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 49-50). She was fined an additional $317 on September 26, 2011 for “Failure to Obey Court Order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 51).
After failing to appear at a scheduled meeting at JCS’s office, a warrant was issued for Mrs. Fugatt’s arrest. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 53). The arrest warrant was executed on February 26, 2012, at which time Mrs. Fugatt was placed in custody at the Childersburg City Jail. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 54). Mrs. Fugatt was jailed without a probation revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62). At the time of her arrest, Mrs. Fugatt was fined another $317 for “Failure to Appear.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 57). Mrs. Fugatt was released from jail after payment of $500 was made to the Childersburg Police Department. (Doc. #50, Ex. K).
As of October 11, 2012, Mrs. Fugatt still owed $557. Mrs. Fugatt asserts that she was indigent throughout the relevant period of time, and that she repeatedly attempted to inform JCS of that fact. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 50, 59). JCS did not attempt to independently determine or verify whether she was indigent, but rather pursued its collection efforts without regard to her economic status. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 59-61).
D. Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is a resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 8). On December 3, 2010, Mr. Fugatt was stopped and ticketed for driving with an expired license tag. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 46). He was due to appear in court on January 13, 2011, but his case was nol prossed after he paid $148 in court costs. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 47). However, Mr. Fugatt was unable to
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pay the concomitant fine and was placed on probation with JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 48). Under the JCS program, Mr. Fugatt was required to pay $45 a month in administration costs, in addition to monthly payments related to the traffic fine. (Id.). Mr. Fugatt was irregular in both his payments and appearances at JCS’s offices, and that resulted in him being fined an additional $317 on September 26, 2011 for “Failure to Obey Court Order.” (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 49-51).
After a subsequent failure to attend a scheduled meeting at JCS’s office, an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Fugatt. He was arrested on February 26, 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 53-54). Mr. Fugatt was incarcerated without a revocation hearing or the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62). At this time, Mr. Fugatt was once again fined $317, this time for “Failure to Appear.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 57). He was released from jail after the payment of $400 to the Childersburg Police Department. (Doc. #50, Ex. K).
As of October 11, 2012, Mr. Fugatt still owed $517. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 63). Mr. Fugatt informed JCS that he was indigent throughout the relevant time period (Doc. #50 at ¶59-60), but JCS made no determination as to Mr. Fugatt’s indigence (Doc. #50 at ¶ 62).
E. Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews Plaintiff Deunate Jews is a resident of Harpersville, Alabama. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). In 2008, Mr. Jews was charged with harassment. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Although the charge was subsequently dismissed, Mr. Jews was assessed $166 in court costs on October 22, 2009. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Unable to pay the court costs, Mr. Jews was placed on probation for two years, during which he was required to pay a $10 set-up fee, $45 per month in probation administration costs, and his court costs. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). Mr. Jews failed to make the required payments, and that resulted in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest for “failure to obey a court order.”
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(Doc. #50 at ¶ 64). At that time, JCS added an additional $317 to Mr. Jews’ balance, a charge that JCS categorized as “restitution.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 65).
Mr. Jews was arrested on September 22, 2009 and was incarcerated in the Childersburg City Jail for thirty days. (Doc. # 50 at ¶ 66). Mr. Jews’ was released after securing a $582 “cash bond,” but found himself back in jail in May 2010, serving another thirty days for failure to pay his JCS fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 67-68). In February 2011, Mr. Jews avoided additional jail time by paying $500 to JCS. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 69). However, Mr. Jews was jailed again in February 2012 and was released on March 9, 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 71). From that date, he was assigned an additional two year probation period, which is scheduled to end on March 9, 2014. (Id.). In September 2012, Mr. Jews was placed in jail for another thirty days for failure to pay his JCS fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 72). In every instance, Mr. Jews was incarcerated without a formal revocation hearing and without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 77).
As of May 25, 2012, Mr. Jews owed the following amounts to JCS: $295 for “fees in arrears,” $343 for “Pay off not including Probation fees,” $45 in “Monthly Probation Fees,” and $1,807 in “Court Money Due from other Probations.” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 71). Throughout the relevant period, Mr. Jews was unable to make payments to JCS as a result of his indigence. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 75). JCS has made no attempt to gauge Mr. Jews’ financial ability to pay a fine, costs, or fees, nor did it account for Mr. Jews’ indigency in its collection practices. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 76). III. Standard of Review
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can exist in two substantially different forms: facial attacks and factual attacks. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). When presented with a
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facial attack on the complaint, the court determines whether the complaint has sufficiently
alleged subject-matter jurisdiction. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260. The court proceeds as if it
were evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; that is, it views the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and accepts all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id.
On the other hand, factual attacks question “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and
affidavits, are considered.” Id. (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.
1990)). When a court is confronted with a factual attack, the standard of review diverges
considerably:
[T]he trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction—it’s very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.
Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)). “When a district court has pending before it both a 12(b)(1)
motion and a 12(b)(6) motion, the generally preferable approach, if the 12(b)(1) motion
essentially challenges the existence of a federal cause of action, is for the court to find
jurisdiction and then decide the 12(b)(6) motion.” Jones v. State of Ga., 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th
Cir. 1984).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
That being said, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to belief above the 10

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Supreme Court has recently identified “two working principles” for a district court to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions when they are “couched as [] factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 68. Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under prong one, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are wellpleaded and assume their veracity; and under prong two, the court must proceed to determine the
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claim’s plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Id. IV. Discussion
After careful review, the court concludes that Defendant’s motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
A. Overview of Defendant’s Arguments in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Seeking dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss advances a variety of arguments, each tailored to the various types of relief sought by Plaintiffs. (Doc. #55 at 1-2). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims, representing five of the six claims brought against JCS, “are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, the doctrine of judicial immunity, and, for any orders of probation entered more than two years before the filing of this case, the statute of limitations.” (Doc. #55 at 1). Defendant also attacks Plaintiffs’ sixth and final claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that 1) the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to overturn past probation orders, 2) the Younger abstention doctrine and the exclusive federal remedy of habeas corpus bar the enjoinment of current probation or incarceration, and 3) the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), counsels against granting Plaintiffs’ request for prospective injunctive relief. (Doc. #55 at 2). Finally, Defendant asks the court to rebuff Plaintiffs’ demand that the contract between JCS and Childersburg be voided, asserting that only state law issues are
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involved and Alabama law clearly allows such a contract. (Doc. #55 at 2). Each of Defendant’s arguments is addressed below.
B. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Are Cognizable 1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a Section 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512, U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Indeed, a “state prisoner may not maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state sentence he is serving.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998). Heck’s so-called “favorable-termination” rule is intended to promote “finality and consistency,” upholding “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 48586.
Alleging that Plaintiffs’ suit seeks to show that “the orders sentencing them to probation or incarceration were invalid,” JCS concludes that “a ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of their probation orders,” in violation of Heck’s favorable-termination rule. (Doc. #56 at 3-4). Although Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims are related to and connected to their imprisonment, it does not necessarily follow, as JCS asserts, that the claims are barred by Heck. “Not every civil action by a former prisoner for damages tied in some way to his incarceration involves Heck’s application.” Morrow v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing the holding in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)).
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In fact, Heck is inapplicable to the current case for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiffs challenge the procedures, or lack thereof, associated with the probation process, not the underlying rulings of the Childersburg Municipal Court. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “Heck does not bar purely procedural claims brought under § 1983.” Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs’ allegations are just such claims and their successful resolution would not necessarily invalidate Plaintiffs’ convictions/sentences. See, e.g., Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, 501 F.3d 592, 604 (6th Cir. 2007) (opining that “if Powers succeeds in his § 1983 suit, that means only that the failure to grant Powers an indigency hearing was wrongful, not that the order committing him to jail was wrongful.”). Second, Plaintiffs, as a result of their abbreviated jail terms, lacked the time necessary to pursue habeas suits. While not universal, a number of Circuits recognize an exception to Heck’s favorable-termination rule for “§ 1983 plaintiffs who lack a habeas option for the vindication of their federal rights.” Powers, 501 F.3d at 603; see also Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Leather v. Ten Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999). In Morrow v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Eleventh Circuit likewise acknowledged such an exception, finding that a jail term of ten days was “of [such] a duration that a petition for habeas relief could not have been filed and granted while Plaintiff was unlawfully in custody.” 610 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, none of the Plaintiffs are currently incarcerated and their prior stints in jail were too fleeting to permit the filing and resolution of a habeas suit. As a result, Plaintiffs’ suit is not subject to Heck’s favorable-termination rule.
2. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity Is Inapplicable to JCS JCS also asserts that it is shielded from Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims by absolute quasijudicial immunity. (Doc. #56 at 4). Judicial immunity shields judges from liability as long as
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they do not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction” and their acts are judicial in nature. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). “Nonjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity when their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). Indeed, judicial immunity is extended to “those officials with discretionary power similar to that exercised by a judge” in order to “ensure courageous exercise of that discretionary power.” Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972)). As with judges, nonjudicial officials “must be acting within the scope of their authority” in order to enjoy judicial immunity. Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Property Management & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.3d 599, 603 (11th Cir. 1985)). At the most basic level, the operative question in evaluating whether judicial immunity extends to a given party is whether the party was exercising discretion or performing a function normally associated with the judiciary. Id.
JCS claims that it is “entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for its role in carrying out the orders of the municipal courts,” as “Plaintiffs make no allegation that JCS acted contrary to the orders of the municipal courts or outside the scope of their authority.” (Doc. #56 at 6). Were JCS’s characterization of its role in the probationary process not contradicted by Plaintiffs’ pleadings, no barriers would stand in the way of reaching the conclusion that JCS is entitled to the protection of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However, Plaintiffs attack the very premises on which JCS rests its immunity argument, arguing that 1) the actions complained of were primarily administrative, rather than judicial, in nature (Doc. #60 at 6—“Plaintiffs challenge the municipal policy and system that has resulted from such contract with JCS, not individualized judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making independent from, or unrelated to, the challenged
15

municipal system, policy, or custom.”); and 2) JCS exceeded the authority normally vested in probation officials (Doc. #50 at ¶ 27—“Despite lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection.”). It may be appropriate to revisit the issue of absolute quasi-judicial immunity after initial discovery more clearly illuminates the organization and operation of the municipal court system in Childersburg; however, accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, as the court must, JCS is not entitled to judicial immunity at this stage.
3. Resolution of the Statute of Limitations Issue Is Inappropriate at This Time
The statute of limitations in Alabama for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-250 (1989) (holding that § 1983 actions are governed by the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations in states with more than one statute of limitations); Alabama Code § 6-2-38(l) (1975) (“All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years). As such, the claims of Plaintiffs Kristy and Timothy Fugatt are not implicated by JCS’s statute of limitations argument, as all of the actions underlying their claims occurred within the two years preceding the filing of the present suit, which occurred on August 28, 2012. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 45-46). But JCS does argue that the claims of Plaintiff Ray and Plaintiff Jews are time-barred, noting that both of their municipal cases were initiated prior to the two-year limitations period. (Doc. #56 at 7). Although Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint confirms that both cases originated outside of the limitations period (Ms. Ray first appeared in court on August 12, 2010 and Mr. Jews was charged with harassment sometime in 2008), these
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revelations are not necessarily dispositive of the statute of limitations issue, as the period of limitations is measured from the time at which a plaintiff’s claim accrues.
“[W]hen a Section 1983 action accrues is a question of federal law.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Rubin v. O’Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980)). A federal claim does not accrue until “the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1990). Likewise, a federal action doesn’t accrue until “the plaintiff is aware or should have been aware who has inflicted the injury.” Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716 (citing Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980)). An accrual determination is difficult at this juncture, as the pleadings do not reveal crucial factual elements (e.g., the time at which Ray and Jews became aware of their alleged injuries or realized who had allegedly inflicted such injuries). Clearly, a greater level of factual development is required to make such an evaluation, reinforcing the notion that “a statute of limitations defense is generally not appropriate for evaluation on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” McDaniel v. City of Fairfield, 2013 WL 1180320 (N.D.Ala.) (quoting Oliver v. M/V Barbary Coast, 2012 WL 2898055 (S.D.Ala.)). Because it is not facially apparent that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred, JCS’s motion to dismiss on a statute of limitations basis is denied.
C. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Preclude Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Present Case
JCS also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case on the basis of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to assert that consideration of Plaintiffs’ suit would constitute impermissible “interference with valid state court judgments.” (Doc. #52 at 15). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the proposition that “federal courts, other than the
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Supreme Court [of the United States], have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Indeed, RookerFeldman reinforces notions of federalism generally, and the statutory scheme of federal jurisdiction in particular, which “does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Com’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has its most direct application in instances where an unsuccessful state court litigant chooses not to pursue an appeal at the state level, instead resolving to challenge the state court decision in a lower federal court. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284 (describing Rooker-Feldman as largely applicable to “cases brought by state-court losers . . . inviting district court review and rejection of [the state court’s] judgments”). To be sure, such attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts are clearly misguided. But this case is not one of them. Here, Plaintiffs do not seek to overturn their convictions,8 but rather ask the court for various types of legal and equitable relief flowing from post-conviction events. (See, e.g., Doc. #50 at ¶ 284).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to cases that have the potential to besmirch or void related state court judgments. See, e.g., Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2011). It is within this line of precedent that Defendant apparently attempts to couch the present case. Defendant implies that, like Goodman, this case represents an indirect challenge to the judgments of a state court, i.e., the Childersburg Municipal Court. (Doc. #52 at 15). In Goodman, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a Section 1983 suit seeking damages for the submission of a fraudulent affidavit in a previously-litigated, child custody case. The Goodman court held that the affidavit in
8 Substantive judgments were not even entered in three of the four plaintiffs’ cases, as Mr. and Mrs. Fugatt’s cases were nol prossed and Mr. Jews’ case was dismissed.
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question was too central to the state court’s judgment to later be challenged in federal court. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334. Properly understood, Goodman acts to preserve the spirit of Rooker-Feldman by shielding state court judgments from collateral attacks; however, its reasoning is inapplicable to this case. Plaintiffs’ suit does not amount to a collateral attack on any judgment of the Childersburg Municipal Court. Indeed, the present scenario is readily distinguishable from that in Goodman in that Plaintiffs’ suit does not address the judgments of the Childersburg Municipal Court in the least. Not only does Plaintiffs’ suit not challenge the merits of the municipal court’s decisions, but it also does not call into question any of the bases on which those judgments were reached. Rather, Plaintiffs appear only to challenge the postjudgment probationary program.
In actuality, the instant case much more closely resembles Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, a Sixth Circuit case in which a former prisoner brought a Section 1983 action, alleging that the Public Defender’s policy of not pursuing indigency hearings for defendant due to be placed in jail for unpaid fines had resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. 501 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 2007). On appeal, the Public Defender argued that the prisoner’s suit should be summarily dismissed, as it called into question a previous state court judgment, i.e., the underlying conviction. Id. at 598-99. The Sixth Circuit rebuffed this line of argument, holding, “A conclusion that procedures, or rather the lack of procedures, that culminated in Power’s incarceration violated his constitutional rights has nothing to do with the propriety of his underlying convictions.” Id. at 604. Likewise here, because it is the administration of the municipal court’s sentences that is the focus of the Plaintiffs’ suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude this court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.
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D. Federalism and Comity Concerns Do Not Counsel in Favor of Dismissal Invoking “longstanding and well-established principles of federalism and comity,” JCS argues that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is barred by both the exclusive federal remedy of habeas corpus and the Younger abstention doctrine. The court will address these arguments below.
1. Habeas Corpus Is Not the Exclusive Remedy for Redressing Plaintiffs’ Alleged Deprivations
The federal habeas corpus statute limits its availability to those persons who are “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This makes sense, as “[t]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus is the “sole federal remedy” available to a person in custody seeking release or reduction. Id. at 486. As a result, “[a] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’” or seek an “immediate release from prison” or a reduction in the length of confinement. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489).
Alleging that Plaintiffs, by way of their probation sentences, are “in custody” “within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute,” JCS concludes that Plaintiffs’ only method of injunctive vindication is the writ of habeas corpus (i.e., Plaintiffs’ current suit, rooted primarily in Section 1983, is improper). (Doc. #56 at 11). In support of this creative construction of the term “custody,” JCS relies on Jones v. Cunningham, a 1963 Supreme Court decision that addressed the bounds of custody for purposes of habeas applicability. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). In Jones, the Court held that Petitioner, a parolee, was entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus, as
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the requirements of his parole program were so restrictive and confining that he was effectively in custody. Id. at 242-43. The Eleventh Circuit has subsequently adopted the reasoning of Jones, finding that a former prisoner, who remained “subject to the terms of his sex offender probation,” was “in custody” for purposes of the federal habeas statute. Hamner v. Deputy Sec. of the Fl. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F. App’x 875, n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 242-43).
But, while it seems well-established that custody means “something less than close physical confinement” in the habeas context, Jones, 371 U.S. at 239, Plaintiffs’ probationary sentences in the present case do not exhibit the severe restraint on liberty necessary to constitute “custody.” See Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, California, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (“The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty . . . its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.”). Plaintiffs’ probationary program—which consists of monthly payments, occasional visits to JCS’s office, and various appearances in municipal court—appears considerably less stringent than that faced by the petitioner in Jones, who was confined to “a particular community, house, and job,” could not “drive a car without permission,” and had to allow his parole officer “to visit his home and job at any time.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. Likewise, it is safe to understand at this, the pleading stage, that Plaintiffs’ probation is less restrictive than was the Hamner Petitioner’s, a sex offender who was subjected to a heightened form of probation, including restrictions as to where he could live and work. See Florida Statute § 775.21—“The Florida Sexual Predators Act.” Rather, Plaintiffs’ level of restraint more closely
21

resembles that of the appellant in Duvallon v. Florida, who was fined after being convicted of a misdemeanor, but was later threatened with incarceration for failure to make payments on the fine. 691 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that “where, as here, the judgment of the state court imposes only a fine with no provision for incarceration, appellant’s liberty is not restrained, she is not ‘in custody’ and her bare assertion of constitutional deprivation will not support federal court jurisdiction for § 2254 relief.” Id. at 485. Like the Duvallon appellant, Plaintiffs’ are not so restrained that they are “in custody,” preventing their use of a writ of habeas corpus.9 As a result, the writ of habeas corpus is not Plaintiffs’ exclusive federal remedy; in fact, it is not a remedy available to Plaintiffs at all.
In any event, even if the court concluded that they were “in custody” (and thus entitled to bring suit under the federal habeas corpus statute), Plaintiffs would still be entitled to pursue other remedial avenues. A writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy only in those actions that “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82. Indeed, “§ 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiffs essentially advance procedural challenges to JCS’s conduct—e.g., against the lack of an indigency hearing after failure to pay fines and/or the lack of providing counsel prior to incarceration—rather than attacking the propriety of their confinement or probation. (See, e.g., Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 131, 208). Indeed, the thrust of their claim is Plaintiffs’ assertion that certain procedural aspects of Childersburg’s probation program are wrongful and they primarily
9 At this stage, the court’s “custody” determination is made on the limited factual allegations of the pleadings. However, further development of the factual record, particularly as it relates to the nature of Plaintiffs’ probationary requirements, may warrant reconsideration of this issue.
22

pursue injunctive relief that seeks to render those procedures invalid. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284). The Supreme Court has recognized as cognizable similar actions by habeas-eligible plaintiffs. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (“We conclude that respondents’ claims are cognizable under §1983 . . . [Respondents] seek relief that will render invalid [] state procedures . . . Neither respondent seeks an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community.”). However, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek “release of any currently incarcerated indigent persons who were jailed for these reasons,” (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284(g)), their only federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against the continued incarceration of similarly situated persons is due to be dismissed, but Plaintiffs’ remaining injunctive demands may proceed.
2. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Does Not Work to Bar Plaintiffs’ Claims
JCS additionally claims that Plaintiffs’ demands for injunctive relief violate the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from “stay[ing] or enjoin[ing] pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Although federal courts generally have an obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them, “in exceptional cases federal courts may and should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference with state proceedings.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Such abstention should be exercised when 1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing, 2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and 3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceedings. Id. (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
23

Right off the bat, Defendants’ abstention argument runs aground and founders upon the first Younger prong—none of the Plaintiffs are currently involved in ongoing state judicial proceedings. Indeed, all of Plaintiffs’ state cases have long been resolved—Ray’s most recent case was adjudicated in July 2011, the Fugatts had their cases nol prossed in January 2011, and Jews’ case was apparently dismissed in October 2009. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 35, 46, 64). Furthermore, the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is not intended to contradict or overturn the substance of the prior state court proceedings, but instead targets Childersburg’s postjudgment procedure, removing the very concern that animates the Younger doctrine’s concern with improper interference with a pending state proceeding. Because “the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism ‘have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding,’” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)), no Younger-style concerns prevent this court from hearing Plaintiffs’ suit.
E. O’Shea v. Littleton’s Bar on Prospective Injunctive Relief Does Not Apply to Plaintiffs’ Equitable Claims
Attacking Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective injunctive relief, JCS points to O’Shea v. Littleton, a 1974 Supreme Court decision that cautions against the use of injunctive relief by lower federal courts in certain circumstances. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). In O’Shea, the Supreme Court rejected the relief requested by a class of citizens who alleged that law enforcement officials were applying state criminal law and procedures in a racially discriminatory manner. The Court held that 1) the named plaintiffs, none of whom was identified as having specifically suffered an injury, did not have standing to bring the suit, and 2) plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief would constitute an improper and impractical intrusion on the state court system. Id. at
24

504. JCS asserts that “[t]he same two grounds require dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request for prospective injunctive relief.” (Doc. #56 at 14). The court addresses these arguments in turn.
1. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Claims for Prospective Injunctive Relief
JCS attempts to draw an analogy between the O’Shea respondents and the Plaintiffs here, alleging that the latter have “failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy.” (Doc. #56 at 14 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 493)). It was clear in O’Shea that respondents lacked standing; indeed, “neither the complaint nor respondents’ counsel suggested that any of the named plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed were themselves serving an allegedly illegal sentence or were on trial or awaiting trial before petitioners.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. As there was no indication of an imminent threat of injury, the O’Shea Court declined to entertain the suit, avoiding the “speculation and conjecture” that accompany an undeveloped case or controversy. Id. at 497.
However, unlike the class members in O’Shea, Plaintiffs’ allegations of future injury evince “sufficient immediacy and reality” to establish standing in the present case. Id. Although “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief,” it seems clear, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, that Plaintiffs are experiencing “continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. at 496. Apparently, all of the Plaintiffs are still on probation and still owe various fines and fees. (Doc. #50 at ¶¶ 41, 63, 74). As such, they are under the present and constant threat of being subjected to the allegedly illegal methods and procedures utilized by JCS to collect municipal fines and assessments. Plaintiffs face the
25

prospect of a return to jail at any time, imbuing them with the standing necessary to make claims for prospective injunctive relief.
2. Management and Execution of Plaintiffs’ Requested Injunctive Relief Does Not Present the Same Risks and Challenges as Those Present in O’Shea v. Littleton
JCS also argues that Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief raises the same issues of manageability and comity as the proposed injunction in O’Shea. (Doc. #56 at 15-17). In O’Shea, respondents did not challenge any state laws or procedures as illegal, only the individual actions of law enforcement officials. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500. As a result, their proposed injunctive relief lacked a tangible target, seeking instead to monitor the behavior of law enforcement officials in the course of criminal prosecutions and generally ferret out racial discrimination at the state court level. Id. Because it “contemplated interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners,” the O’Shea Court worried that such an injunction would amount to “an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.” Id. Ultimately, the Court declined to permit an “abrasive and unmanageable intercession.” Id. at 504.
While the complexities associated with administering injunctions have long caused federal courts to view such relief with wariness and caution, see, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, these concerns are simply not present in this case. In essence, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the current procedures, or lack thereof, associated with the collection of municipal fees in Childersburg. (Doc. #50 at ¶ 284). Unlike the individual behavior targeted in O’Shea, reformation of the procedures complained of here would not require constant, painstaking determinations. Rather, a comprehensive injunction, if granted, would be effective in halting the present challenged procedures, establishing new procedures, and providing guidance in the areas of their implementation and execution. Because Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief does not
26

fall within that proscribed by O’Shea and its progeny, the court will continue to entertain Plaintiffs’ equitable claims moving forward.
F. Plaintiffs’ Request to Void the Contract Between JCS and Childersburg is Not Due to Be Dismissed At This Time
JCS seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request to void the contract between JCS and Childersburg,10 reasoning, alternatively, that 1) this court should decline jurisdiction because the issue is purely one of state law, and 2) the contract is valid under Alabama law. (Doc. #56 at 1719).
1. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider the Validity of the JCS/Childersburg Contract
JCS is correct in its assertion that the issue of whether a municipality can enter into a contract “binding [] its municipal court” is one of state law. See Alabama Code § 12-14-2 (1975); Wilkins v. Dan Haggerty & Associates, Inc., 672 So.2d 507, 510 (Ala. 1995) (“The power to contract with a private firm to aid in the collection of delinquent municipal court fines [is] ‘necessarily implied’ from the power granted to cities . . . in § 12-14-2(a) . . .”). However, this court has largely declined to dismiss the federal claims in this case, rendering proper the court’s continued consideration of the related state law issue.
2. It Is Unclear At This Time Whether The Contract Conforms to Alabama Law
JCS also argues that, even if this court retains jurisdiction over the instant issue, the overwhelming force of Alabama law requires dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request to void the JCS/Childersburg contract. (Doc. #56 at 18). And to the extent Plaintiffs suggest that
10 Doc. #50 at ¶ 284(c) (asking the court to “[e]nter an injunction and other declaratory relief which declares the JCS contract with municipalities such as Childersburg to be void and in violation of the statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities.”).
27

Childersburg lacked the authority to enter into a contract with JCS, or that it is illegal for a municipality to make a contract, any contract, with a private provider of probationary services,11 Plaintiffs misunderstand the prevailing law in Alabama. Indeed, it is clear that Alabama municipalities are statutorily vested with the power to provide assistance to their municipal court system, including the making of contracts with private companies to provide probation services. Alabama Code § 12-14-2 (1975); Wilkins, 672 So.2d at 510.
That being said, contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs’ request that the JCS/Childersburg contract be voided is not due to be dismissed at this time. The nature of the contract has not yet been fully developed—it remains to be seen whether the contract conforms to state law, or exceeds the permissible boundaries for such contracts. At this time, the court must accept Plaintiffs’ allegations (i.e., the contract invades the province of the municipal court and tramples on established procedural limitations) as true, making dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request inappropriate. V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #55) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2013.
_______________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11 See Doc. # 50 at ¶ 17 (“[B]y agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully delegated to JCS…”); Doc. #50 at ¶ 268 (“Plaintiffs request the Court to declare that the JCS contract with Childersburg was void ab initio because Childersburg had no authority to contractually bind its municipal court.”); Doc. #50 at ¶ 271 (“…neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of [Childersburg’s] judiciary.”).
28

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

FILED
2014 Oct-09 PM 03:38 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

GINA KAY RAY, et al.,

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

v.

}

}

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, }

INC., et al.,

}

}

Defendants.

}

Case No.: 2:12-CV-02819-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on Non-Party Larry Ward’s Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. # 97), filed May 21, 2014. The motion presents interesting questions related to the proper application and scope of judicial immunity which should be afforded a former part-time municipal judge. As discussed in more detail below, this court’s Order (Doc. # 119), entered August 22, 2014, narrowed the issues now before the court. As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs now argue that judicial immunity does not protect Ward at all where “prospective collateral relief” is sought. (Doc. # 120 at 1). If judicial immunity does protect Ward, however, the court must determine to what extent discovery may be sought from Ward as to acts and omissions taken in his nonjudicial, administrative capacity.
For the reasons outlined below, the court’s August 22, 2014 Order (Doc. # 119) is due to be affirmed, and Ward’s Motion (Doc. # 97) is due to be granted in part and denied in part. I. Procedural History
On April 26, 2013, Plaintiffs Gina Kay Ray, Kalus K. Johnson, and Deuante T. Jews (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their Second Amended and Restated Complaint (Doc. # 50), on

behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, against Defendants Judicial Collection Services (“JCS”) and the City of Childersburg (“Childersburg”). Plaintiffs allege various constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the contractual relationship between JCS and Childersburg for probation and fee collection services. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages. (Doc. # 50 at 61-63).
On May 14, 2014, Plaintiffs served a subpoena for testimony and production of documents on nonparty Larry Ward (“Ward”). (Doc. # 97, Ex. A-1). Plaintiffs sought various documents from Ward, including (1) any documents relating to JCS whatsoever; (2) procedural manuals or other documents concerning any of the municipal courts at which Ward served; (3) copies of K1 and W-2 forms showing income earned by Ward as a municipal court judge for any municipality in Alabama for the last five years; (4) awards received by Ward for service as a municipal judge; (5) contracts between Ward and any of the municipalities he served; (6) documents showing remuneration from bond activity in any of the municipalities Ward served; (7) documents showing rating adjustments on bonds for any of the municipalities Ward served; and (8) awards received by Ward for participation in bond issues in Alabama for the past five years. (Id.). Ward filed a motion opposing the discovery request and asserts that he is protected by judicial immunity. (Doc. # 97).
After the issue was briefed (Docs. # 101 & 105) and the court heard oral argument on the matter, the court entered an Order (Doc. # 119) granting in part and denying in part Ward’s Motion (Doc. # 97). The court granted the motion insofar as it sought to limit, but not entirely preclude, Ward’s deposition to questions involving his “nonjudicial involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services” between JCS and Childersburg.
2

To aid the court and the parties in determining the extent of the permissible discovery, the Order (Doc. # 119) also permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding: (1) the distinction between Ward’s judicial and administrative responsibilities during his tenure as municipal court judge for Childersburg, and (2) the relevance, if any, of Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), to the issue. The issues now before the court have been fully briefed. (Docs. # 120 & 121). II. Facts
Ward is a former part-time municipal court judge for Childersburg and various other municipalities. (Docs. # 101 at 1-2). Otherwise, Ward’s full-time employment over the relevant time-period is as a municipal bond salesman with Morgan Keegan & Company, now known as Raymond James Financial. (Docs. # 101 at 1-2).
Under a contract between JCS and Childersburg, JCS provided various probation and fee collecting services to Childersburg. (See Doc. # 50 at ¶¶ 12, 18-19). Plaintiffs allege that when a probationer was unable to pay a fine, the probationer was assigned to JCS for what Plaintiffs deem “the administrative action of collections.” (Doc. # 120 at 8). Plaintiffs offer testimony from Childersburg’s mayor that suggests JCS was hired by Childersburg upon the recommendation of Ward and a city council member. (Id. at 7).
The record is unclear regarding the full extent of Ward’s involvement with JCS. Childersburg was responsible for the hiring of Ward as its municipal court judge. (Doc. # 50 at ¶ 19). Plaintiffs allege that
[Ward] signed separate blank JCS ‘probation’ order forms which were later filled out by JCS employees. Many of these were filled in to retroactively include fines levied years earlier. These ‘orders are not filed in the court, are not kept by Childersburg and ultimately are shredded after being scanned to the JCS Probation Tracker system.
3

(Doc. # 120 at 8). Furthermore, JCS may have sent out all notices of hearings and violations of
probation establishing hearing dates. (Id.). Plaintiffs argue that these facts, taken together,
establish Ward is beyond the protection of judicial immunity and should be subjected to
discovery.
III. Discussion
Ward attempts to quash Plaintiffs’ outstanding subpoena claiming the protection of
judicial immunity. (Doc. # 97). Although Ward is a nonparty, “[t]he policy behind immunity
does not merely extend to suits, it also extends to protection against discovery.” In re Lickman,
304 B.R. 897, 903 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004). Accordingly, “[u]ntil [the] threshold immunity
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).1
Ward’s Motion requires this court to address several issues: (A) whether judicial
immunity protects Ward; (B) if immunity does provide Ward with protection, to what extent
does it shield him from discovery; and (C) to what extent, if any, has Ward waived his immunity.
For the reasons outlined below, the court finds judicial immunity shields Ward with one
exception: he is subject to discovery related to his nonjudicial involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services between JCS and Childersburg.2
1 See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (“Harlow emphasizes that even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as ‘[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817)); Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 815 F.2d 368, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court noted that the protection afforded government officials by the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity would be greatly depreciated if it did not include protection from discovery. . . . [C]lose control of discovery is essential to the preservation of meaningful official immunity.”); Lickman, 304 B.R. at 903; LeClerc v. Webb, 2003 WL 21026709 (E.D. La. May 2, 2003) (court granted stay of discovery pending determination of immunity).
2 Because the court concludes that Ward is entitled to judicial immunity as to certain of his judicial actions, the court need not address Ward’s argument under Rule 45(c). Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ request is not overly broad, unduly burdensome, cumulative, or unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with regard to Ward’s nonjudicial role in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract between JCS and Childersburg.
4

A. Judicial Immunity Provides Some Protection to Ward in This Case, Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Defendants for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief.
Plaintiffs argue judges only have immunity from damage claims for acts or omissions
taken in their judicial capacity, but no judicial immunity exists in cases claiming prospective
collateral relief. (Doc. # 120 at 1-2).3 As such, Plaintiffs suggest that “[b]ecause Judge Ward
would have no judicial immunity from those forms of prospective declaratory or injunctive relief
even if he had been sued for such relief personally, he also has no such immunity from being
deposed as a witness on the claims for such prospective relief against Childersburg and JCS.”
(Id. at 2) (emphasis added). For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs’ argument is off the mark.
1. Plaintiffs’ Premise, That Judicial Immunity Is Inapplicable in Cases Seeking Prospective Collateral Relief, Rests on Questionable Precedent.
The premise of Plaintiffs’ argument relies on the validity of Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522 (1984), which held that judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against
judicial officers for acts or omissions taken in a judicial capacity. Congress, however, responded
to Pulliam by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an attempt to abrogate Pulliam’s holding regarding
the scope of judicial immunity. After the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (“FCIA”)
amendments, § 1983 now reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
3 “The distinction between ‘judicial’ and ‘administrative’ acts does not apply to claims for prospective relief rather than damages. Not even acts or omissions performed in a judicial capacity are immune from prospective declaratory relief and certain forms of prospective injunctive relief under Pulliam v. Allen, and the subsequent amendment of § 1983 . . . . For this reason, the initial question before the Court must be whether judicial immunity exists for the type of prospective relief pled in the Amended Complaint.” (Doc. # 120 at 1) (citations omitted).
5

taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added); see also Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).4
It cannot be seriously disputed that, after the FCIA, judicial immunity typically bars
claims for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officials acting in their judicial capacity.
Only when a declaratory decree is violated or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs
have an end-run around judicial immunity — and neither is true here. This abrogation of
Pulliam has been widely recognized. See Guerin v. Higgins, 8 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2001);
Haas v. Wisconsin, 109 F. App’x 107, 114 (7th Cir. 2004); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242
(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (discussing amendment’s purpose and effect); Kuhn v. Thompson,
304 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of Com. of Mass.,
83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000); Kampfer v. Scullin, 989
F. Supp. 194, 201-02 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580, 2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007).5
Plaintiffs neither allege that Defendants have violated a declaratory decree nor that
declaratory relief is unavailable. On the contrary, the very nature of their claims, which seek
both declaratory and injunctive relief, indicates that declaratory relief is available. See, e.g.,
4 Defendants also note that Pulliam’s holding was further abrogated by the FCIA to the extent that it permitted plaintiffs to obtain attorneys’ fees from judicial officers who are enjoined under its exemption to judicial immunity. Pub. L. 104-317, § 309(a), 110 Stat. 3847 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no judicial officer shall be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, in any action brought against such officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.”)).
5 For example, in Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2004), Alabama voters brought suit against the members of Alabama’s Court of the Judiciary for certain alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 1318-21. The court stated, “Congress amended Section 1983 to reverse Pulliam, and restore judicial immunity . . . .” Id. at 1323. The district court held that judicial immunity protected a judicial officer from a suit claiming prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 1322-23.
6

Kuhn, 304 Id. at 1335 n.11 (“Plaintiffs seem to acknowledge the availability of declaratory relief
by seeking it in this very action.”); see also Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 210; Finn v. County of
Albany, No. 98–CV–844, 1999 WL 291820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 1999). Accordingly,
judicial immunity is available for Plaintiffs claims which seek injunctive relief.
Notwithstanding § 1983’s clarity regarding injunctive relief, that statute fails to address
the availability of prospective declaratory relief to defeat judicial immunity. Plaintiffs contend
the FCIA amendment to § 1983 still permits suits against judges for such declaratory relief. (Doc. # 120 at 4).6 Plaintiffs argue that the amendments merely created a “procedural condition
precedent to an injunction” without otherwise broadening the coverage of judicial immunity.
(Doc. # 120 at 3). Plaintiffs’ arguments are not wholly lacking in support. Courts have gone
both ways on the issue.
The Eleventh Circuit has provided some guidance. Our circuit has taught us that, in
Pulliam,
the Supreme Court concluded that judicial immunity is not a bar to demands for injunctive relief against state judges. Congress abrogated Pulliam, however, by passing the [FCIA], which amended § 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Because Appellant specifically requests declarative relief, judicial immunity protects the Defendants only from Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. But § 1983 does not explicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief. Esensoy, 2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (emphasis added). On the one
hand, Esensoy supports Plaintiffs’ argument. In that decision, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have
permitted an exemption from judicial immunity where plaintiffs requested declaratory, and not
6 Plaintiffs suggest the Eleventh Circuit approved this argument in Bolin v. Story. 225 F.3d at 1242. In Bolin, however, the court addressed Bivens claims against federal judicial officers, not § 1983 claims.
7

merely, injunctive relief against a judge.7 On the other hand, Esensoy is an unpublished opinion and even it acknowledges that Congress abrogated Pulliam, at least in part, by passing the FCIA. Moreover, the guidance as to Pulliam’s validity is also dicta — and, to be sure, dicta buried in a footnote.8 Id. at 2.
There is really no question that in passing the FCIA, Congress was responding to Pulliam. The Pulliam decision only exempted prospective injunctive relief from the application of judicial immunity. See 466 U.S. at 527-28. Addressing the issue in Esensoy, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “§ 1983 does not explicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief.” 2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.5. But one might argue Congress did not feel the need to explicitly bar claims for declaratory relief because no such exemption from judicial immunity had ever previously been recognized. Plaintiffs’ response to that point is that “[w]e never had a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief” (Doc. # 120 at 4), and therefore, when Congress amended § 1983, it did so against a common law backdrop which permitted declaratory relief against officers in their judicial capacity. No authority supports this argument, and the court concludes that it is far wide of the mark. Other courts have wrestled with the issue and have held that Pulliam has been effectively overruled. See, e.g., Guerin, 8 F. App’x at 32 (“We also reject plaintiff’s contention that he is entitled to declaratory relief based on Pulliam v. Allen, . . . given that the Pulliam holding with respect to such relief has been effectively overruled by Congress.”).
7 Here, as in Esensoy, Plaintiffs explicitly seek both injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. # 50 at 57-63 (Count Eleven)). Unlike Esensoy, however, Plaintiffs also seek an award of “such damages as this Court shall find the Plaintiffs have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit.” (Id. at 61).
8 The circuit court ultimately dismissed appellant’s § 1983 claim on other grounds, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant in that case was not awarded immunity. Esensoy, 2007 WL 257342, at *2.
8

Although Pulliam has been abrogated by the FCIA -- that is, it has been abrogated to the
extent that a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief -- it is unnecessary for this court to make
any finding with respect to Plaintiffs’ assertion that the FCIA still permits suits against judges for
prospective declaratory relief. Indeed, for the reasons stated below, even if Pulliam exempted
claims for prospective declaratory relief from the bar of judicial immunity, this court would find Pulliam inapplicable in the instant case.9
2. Pulliam Would Not Apply in Because Plaintiff Seeks No Relief from Ward.
Even if the court were to accept Plaintiffs’ premise that Pulliam has not been abrogated
to the extent that it permits prospective declaratory relief, Plaintiffs’ argument still necessarily
fails. First, by its plain language, Pulliam does not control the instant case. Specifically,
Pulliam held that “[j]udicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a
judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 1981. Here, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief (both prospectively and retrospectively) against JCS
and Childersburg. Those parties are not judicial officers and at no point in this case have Plaintiffs sought any relief against Ward.10 Therefore, regardless of Pulliam’s continued
viability, this case is simply not the type contemplated by the plain language of that decision’s
9 Perhaps because it would be an exceedingly weak argument, Plaintiffs do not suggest that the amendments to § 1983, which create the “condition precedent to injunctive relief,” are inapplicable in this instance because this case does not involve an “action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). This case involves an action brought against Defendants JCS and Childersburg only. Therefore, nothing in the text of § 1983 itself requires violation of a declaratory decree or declaratory relief to be unavailable before injunctive relief is sought from Ward — a nonparty. Were Plaintiffs’ to adopt this textual stance, however, they would be forced to confront the issue that Pulliam only purports to exempt from immunity claims for “prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 1981 (emphasis added). The court addresses that particular argument supra.
10 Ward has retired from his judgeship and, as both parties recognize, any claim against him for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief would be moot.
9

holding, which provides only for an exemption from immunity where prospective relief against a party (who is a judge) is sought.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ theory calls upon the court to engage in rank speculation. Federal courts are limited to addressing only actual cases and controversies, not hypotheticals. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). Plaintiffs argue that as Ward would not have immunity from prospective relief “if he had been sued for such relief personally,” he also has no immunity from being deposed as a witness on the claims for such relief against Childersburg and JCS. (Doc. # 120 at 2). To accept Plaintiffs’ theory, the court would be required to assume that if Ward still served in a judicial capacity (because that would be a required showing to subject him to a claim for prospective relief), and in that event if Plaintiffs had brought an appropriate claim against him, that could potentially exempt him from judicial immunity. And, as their argument continues, if the court made a finding that Ward would not be protected by judicial immunity in that hypothetical case, the court would then be free to conclude Ward also should not be protected in this (different) case.
The court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to speculate as to the exact mix of hypothetical claims against nonparties that would have existed under a wholly different set of facts to justify subjecting Ward to Plaintiffs’ discovery request.11 In this case, Ward is a nonparty witness and a retired municipal court judge, and Plaintiffs brought suit against only JCS and Childersburg for money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The court will not offer a guess or
11 Plaintiffs suggest that, as the “masters of their Complaint,” their entire complaint should be considered — not just Plaintiff’s damages claim against Defendants JCS and Childersburg. (Doc. # 120 at 6). But that argument also is without merit. The court has searched through Plaintiffs’ complaint to find any prospective relief sought against Ward in his judicial capacity. There is none.
10

opinion as to what discovery would be permitted had Plaintiffs brought a claim against Ward for declaratory relief while he was still serving in a judicial capacity.12
3. The Policy Underlying Judicial Immunity Favors Limiting Discovery of Nonparty Judicial Officers with Respect to Actions Taken in Their Judicial Capacity.
Finally, the policy supporting judicial immunity weighs against subjecting nonparty judicial officers (or in this case, former judicial officers) to discovery for actions taken in their judicial capacity where prospective injunctive relief is sought. Plaintiffs’ argue that nonparty judicial officers lose immunity from discovery for acts and omissions taken in their judicial capacity where prospective declaratory relief is claimed. But as Ward has indicated in his Reply (Doc. # 97 at 7), courts in this circuit have denied similar arguments. In Lickman, the court quashed a subpoena directed to a judge and his judicial assistant noting “the policy behind immunity does not merely extend to suits, it also extends to protection against discovery.” 304 B.R. at 903. The court further noted that “inquiries of this kind can be particularly disruptive of effective government.” Id. “The purpose of judicial immunity is for benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. . . . His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.” In re Lickman, 304 B.R. 897, 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967))).
In a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the ‘consequences’ with which we were concerned in Harlow are not limited to liability for money
12 Again, the problems outlined here are only compounded by Pulliam’s shaky precedential value in light of the FCIA amendments to § 1983. In any event, to the extent it remains good law, Pulliam’s exemption from judicial immunity is inapplicable here.
11

damages; they also include ‘the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—
distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and
deterrence of able people from public service.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816).13 As Mitchell acknowledges, protection from money
damages is not the sole rationale for judicial immunity, and the other consequences of litigation
apply equally to judges subjected to discovery in any case, seeking any form of relief.
Furthermore, a contrary holding would have absurd results. This judicial overreach
would subject every former state judge in the country to the threat of discovery in any
proceeding where the judge’s inside knowledge (gained in from actions taken in her judicial
capacity) could have plausibly led to relevant information in a collateral matter. There is not a
conceivable limitation that could reasonably be placed on Plaintiffs’ proposed rule. And for this
reason (among others) the court refuses to create any broader exemption to the time honored and
well-established doctrine of judicial immunity. The actions of judicial officers taken in their
judicial capacity must be as stringently protected when those officers are attacked indirectly as
13 Justice Field articulated three policy considerations underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Because the nature of the adversarial system leaves one party to litigation invariably dissatisfied, if left unchecked, lawsuits attacking judges would abound. Id. at 348. The consequences of these attacks could be serious. First, the practice would facilitate relitigation on every matter in perpetuity as each judge would be called before another to justify a prior decision. Id. Second, judges would be incentivized to redirect their attention away from their judicial functions, instead being forced to preserve exhaustive records justifying their decisions. Id. at 349. Finally, independence requires judges be free from constant fear of the personal consequences that might ensue from an erroneous decision. Id. (“The public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to secure the independence of the judges, and prevent them being harassed by vexatious actions”); see also Thomas J. Noto, III, Pulliam v. Allen: Delineating the Immunity of Judges from Prospective Relief, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 829, 837 (1985). It is this final consideration that primarily concerns the court in this case.
Of course, it is simply irrelevant that Ward is no longer serving in a judicial capacity. Retired judicial officers are protected by judicial immunity to the same extent and for the same reasons that sitting judges are. See, e.g., Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1979) (former state judge still cloaked with judicial immunity from bribery charge after being removed from the bench and incarcerated on income tax charges); Grove v. Rizzolo, 441 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1971) (summarily finding former county judge still protected by judicial immunity); Flanagan v. Shamo, 111 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (same); Lickman, 304 B.R. at 902 (“Judicial immunity is still accorded a former sitting judge if the complaints against him arise from the judicial acts taken when he was a judge.”).
12

nonparties, just as they are when they are attacked directly as defendants. To hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs an end-run around judicial immunity, leading to deleterious collateral litigation.
B. Judicial Immunity Does Not Protect Ward from Discovery into His Involvement in Negotiating, Recommending, and Executing the Contract for Services Between JCS and Childersburg.
Having concluded Ward is entitled to judicial immunity, the court must next determine the extent to which Ward is protected. As a general rule, judicial immunity applies only with respect to those acts taken while judges are acting in their judicial capacity unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). This court has previously concluded that Ward is subject to discovery for his “nonjudicial involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services” between Defendants JCS and Childersburg. (Doc. # 119). In this light, the court now addresses the distinction between Ward’s judicial and nonjudicial roles.
Plaintiffs argue that the “delegation of authority to JCS for its collections efforts is all administrative and void of any other function.” (Doc. # 120 at 9). Thus, Plaintiffs suggest that Ward is subject to discovery as to “the city contract, recommendation, approval and implementation of the contract,” (Doc. # 120 at 7), and Plaintiffs specifically request documents that would show “how this probation process administratively works.” (Doc. # 129 at 13).
The court takes a functional approach in determining whether a judge’s actions are taken in judicial capacity, so as to entitle a judge to judicial immunity from suit, finding that the relevant inquiry “is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, not the act itself.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (noting courts must looks to “the particular act’s relation to the general function performed by a judge”); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (finding “whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relates to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it
13

is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity”).14
1. Ward’s Role in Negotiating, Recommending, and Executing Any Contract Between JCS and Childersburg Is Nonjudicial and Subject to Plaintiffs’ Discovery.
At the outset, the court agrees with Plaintiff that Ward’s judicial functions could not encompass his role in “negotiating, recommending, and executing” any contract for probation services between JCS and Childersburg. At its heart, these acts are nonjudicial, administrative services. This conclusion merely reaffirms the court’s August 22, 2014 Order (Doc. # 119), and Ward no longer disputes this point. (See Doc. # 121 at 7). The court finds, however, that Ward’s involvement beyond the negotiating, recommending, and executing of JCS-Childersburg contract was generally judicial in nature.
2. Ward’s Exercise of Control over Post-Conviction Probation Matters Are Judicial in Nature and Protected from Discovery.
The court concludes that Ward’s exercise of control over post-conviction probation matters was judicial in nature and, therefore, he is protected against discovery in that area by way of his judicial immunity. Ward’s actions at issue here are of the same nature and function as probation revocation hearings, sentencing, and indigency hearings, which have commonly been held to constitute normal judicial functions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Owens, CV513-022, 2013 WL 1898175 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2013) (“Actions associated with Plaintiff’s probation revocation hearing and sentencing are activities taken within the judge’s judicial capacity because such actions constitute normal judicial functions.”), adopted by CV513-022, 2013 WL 1898172 (S.D.
14 The Eleventh Circuit has further clarified that whether a judge’s actions are made while acting in her judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity. Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983).
14

Ga. May 7, 2013); Lee v. Wood, CIV.A.04-00710BHB, 2007 WL 2460756 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 27, 2007) (handling parole revocation proceedings are judicial functions).
Furthermore, the Probation Tracker-generated documents used by Ward, which include Notices to Show Cause, Petitions for Revocation, and Probation Orders are clearly judicial in nature and function, not administrative. Plaintiff argues these documents are “post conviction, administrative tools for strong arm collection.” (Doc. # 120 at 8). These documents, however, are of the same character as any judicial action or order. Each of the documents essentially altered the rights and liabilities of the parties in those cases that were pending before Ward. Judges routinely communicate with parties and court officials with regard to cases, both on and off the record, through text orders and other informal communications.
To the extent procedural errors can be found in his orders, Ward was nevertheless exercising judicial functions, and such errors do not remove his decisions from the category of protected judicial actions. In their attempts to validate their subpoena to Ward, Plaintiffs allege that Ward signed numerous blank JCS probation orders that were later filled out by JCS employees and also allege many of the forms were filled in years later. (Doc. # 120 at 8). Here, the court makes no finding as to the propriety of Ward’s actions, but that is not the key issue. It is well-settled that judicial immunity applies even when a judge’s acts are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 359 (1978). Indeed, “[i]f judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or [even] in excess of his authority.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). Thus, Plaintiffs’ assertions that Ward’s hearings and probation revocation orders were marred with grave procedural errors are of no moment; he is still protected by judicial immunity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359.
15

Similarly, neither does the frequency or efficiency of Ward’s probation practices alter
their inherently judicial nature or function. Plaintiffs allege that Ward has reduced the probation
procedures to “automatic” administrative procedures. (Doc. # 101 at 7). The Sixth Circuit has
recognized that “the fact that a judge’s orders follow a certain pattern does not automatically
convert those orders into [administrative] ‘rules.’” Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 104-05 (6th Cir. 1994). The court finds Mann’s holding persuasive.15 Obviously, if a process cannot be
sufficiently flawed to remove it from the protection of judicial immunity, neither can it be too routinized.16
C. Ward Has Not Waived His Judicial Immunity by Choosing To Testify in Another Case.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even if Ward is otherwise protected by judicial immunity,
Ward has waived that protection. (Doc. # 101 at 8-9). Waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kia Motors of Am.,
Inc., 486 F.3d 1229, 1233 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs have failed to show any waiver
occurred here. Ward has timely and properly raised his immunity defense in this case. That
Ward testified as a nonparty in a separate case against the Town of Harpersville does not
constitute a waiver here. By sitting for deposition in the case against Harpersville, Ward did not
knowingly and voluntarily open himself up to discovery or suit in each and every case in which
15 Plaintiffs argue Ward’s actions in “implementing” the City’s contract were administrative, and point particularly to his actions related to the collection of fines and certain post-conviction forms generated by JCS’s Probation Tracker database. (Doc. # 120 at 8). The court notes that the record is largely ambiguous as to the specific interaction Ward had with respect to JCS beyond issuing probation orders and establishing various probation procedures. To be clear, this ambiguity will not be clarified through discovery, because discovery will not be allowed until the immunity issue is decided. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 (“inquiries of this kind can be particularly disruptive of effective government”).
16 To be clear, nothing in this Memorandum Opinion should be read to stop Plaintiffs from pursuing Probation-Tracker-documents from other sources. Plaintiffs should generally be able to retrieve this subject of discovery from JCS or Childersburg. The court remains skeptical that a retired municipal court judge would retain any of the documents regarding post-conviction of various probationers that would be useful to Plaintiffs.
16

he presided as a municipal court judge, or each case arising from the use of the JCS Probation Tracker system. Cf. Diaz v. Glen Plaid, LLC, 7:13-cv-853-TMP, 2013 WL 5603944, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2013) (holding that sovereigns entitled to immunity “may ‘pick and choose’ the cases to which they are willing to consent”). Ward has not waived his right to judicial immunity to which he is otherwise entitled. IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court affirms and clarifies the August 22, 2014 Order. (Doc. # 119). Ward’s Motion to Quash Subpoena and Protective Order (Doc. # 97) is due to be granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is denied to the extent that it would prohibit nonparty Ward from being deposed. The Motion is granted insofar as it seeks to limit Ward’s deposition to questions involving his involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services between JCS and Childersburg. Ward is not subject to discovery for his interactions with JCS in his judicial capacity, including Ward’s handling of various post-conviction probation procedures, probation revocation hearings, and the issuance of various probation orders, along with issuance of other Probation Tracker documents.
An Order will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion. DONE and ORDERED this October 9, 2014.
_________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 256 Filed 07/27/15 Page 1 of 63

FILED
2015 Jul-27 PM 05:44 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, KRISTY FUGATT,

)

TIMOTHY FUGATT and DEUNATE T. JEWS, )

Individually and for a class of similarly

)

situated persons or entities,

)

)

Plaintiffs;

)

)

v.

)

)

JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., )

a corporation; CORRECTIONAL

)

HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, INC., a

)

corporation; CHC COMPANIES INC., d.b.a. )

CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE

)

COMPANIES, INC., a corporation;

)

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, a

)

limited liability company;

)

THE CITY OF CHILDERSBURG.

)

)

Defendants

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Gina Kay Ray, Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, and Deunate T. Jews,

(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, upon

personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and belief

as to all other matters, by and through their undersigned counsel, and with leave of the

Court, file this Third Amended and Restated complaint as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it concerns a controversy

arising under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. '1331. This is a civil rights

action brought under 42 U.S.C. '' 1983 and 1988.

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 256 Filed 07/27/15 Page 2 of 63
2. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. ''
1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), authorizing jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. '
1983 to enforce civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
3. This action also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 2201
and 2022.
4. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391 (b) and
(c).
PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT
5. The plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama.
6. The plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
7. The plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
8. The plaintiff Deunate T. Jews is an individual resident of Childersburg,
Alabama.
9. The classes which the individual Plaintiffs seek to represent consist of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
AND
All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include
2

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 256 Filed 07/27/15 Page 3 of 63
those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. 10. The defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama and in this District which markets itself as “not a social service agency,” but a “for profit”company which offers services to governmental entities “free of charge” to the cities as “an offender paid system.” At all times, JCS has operated under the color of state law. 11. The Defendant Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (also hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama. It appears to be a previous parent of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired JCS, continuing to do business as JCS and operating the same. 12. The Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. (‘CHC’) (also hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama. JCS and Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. are, upon information and belief, wholly-owned and fully integrated corporations of CHC Companies, Inc. CHC Companies, Inc. also does business under the name of Correctional Healthcare Companies and employs and/or directs employees in the JCS operations. 13. The Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC (‘CCS’) (also hereinafter “JCS”) is a Kansas limited liability corporation, registered as a foreign limited liability company and doing business in the State of Alabama. CCS, upon information and belief, recently purchased CHC Companies, Inc. and has merged CHC’s operations, its subsidiaries and its headquarters with its own. The CCS home office and headquarters is now in Nashville,
3

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Tennessee, from which, upon information and belief, it now controls the operations of its subsidiaries including CHC Companies, Inc., Correction Healthcare Companies, Inc. and JCS and employs and/or directs employees in the JCS operations.
14. The City of Childersburg, Alabama, (“Childersburg”) is a municipal corporation located within Shelby County, Alabama. The City Council and Mayor B.J. Meeks controlled the policy making for Childersburg and also hired the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court.
FACTS 15. The Plaintiffs bring this action because the operations at Alabama municipalities such as Childersburg which use JCS, by a joint policy and practice, have violated and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated. 16. JCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama. JCS’s marketing approach to these cities emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city. 17. JCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform. 18. Under the system established by JCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education
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or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers”1 and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
19. Under this system and by agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
20. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 21. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS and approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also served as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities also under contract with JCS. Similarly, the current judge, Chad Woodruff, was appointed in a similar manner. The Childersburg municipal court meets once a month for a few hours on the second Thursday of the month. 22. The JCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court
1In contrast, even a judicial volunteer is required to meet greater and more specific qualifications, careful screening, specific training and continual oversight established by the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’). See Ala. Rule of Judicial Administration Rule 42.
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with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has since the agreement been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg.
23. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the JCS contract, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied is automatically placed on probation using the JCS orders and forms, even when there is no jail sentence adjudicated.2 This is routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS then require the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract with Childersburg.
24. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees are heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C.
The training manual used by JCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that
2 Childersburg recently terminated its contract with JCS by vote and signature of all city council members and the mayor on May 19, 2015 effective June 20, 2015. (See Exhibit N)
6

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their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS monitors those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J.
25. The City Council and its Mayor control the policy making for Childersburg and also hire the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court starting in 2005 and continued to use JCS until the City Council and Mayor voted to terminate the contract on May 19, 2015. See Exhibit N. The decision to use this JCS system was an administrative decision of Childersburg, by and through its mayor, and not a decision of the municipal court judge or the Chief Justice, or any other employee of the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’).
26. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, clothed JCS with the appearance of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. The JCS employees attended each municipal court session and were referred to as “parole officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes. Under this system, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead required by Childersburg to make all payments, including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs, to JCS at
7

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the JCS office. 27. This public ruse was maintained by Childersburg and JCS in order to impose
and collect fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and was accomplished by allowing JCS to control the money, determine how much each municipal court “offender” must pay each month, how much would be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS each month and how much of it would rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
28. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
29. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by Childersburg and JCS, JCS’s determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements was routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
30. The collective actions of JCS and Childersburg are inextricably interwoven with each other and routinely resulted in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts, and imposed additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation”
8

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imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which resulted in JCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg taking joint action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
31. After improperly imposing probation when no jail sentence is involved, incarceration then follows if the fine, together with the fees added by JCS, are not paid as dictated by JCS.
32. Despite directing the municipal courts such as Childersburg that incarceration of an individual “offender” is needed when payment is not made, JCS undertakes no determination of the reasons for nonpayment, and does not consider such things as the Plaintiffs’ disability, unemployment, or assets, in regard to the nonpayment of the fines.
33. JCS denies any responsibility and took no action under its operations with Childersburg to determine indigency, and provides no instruction in its employee manual for the consideration of indigency. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg, however, contended that under its contract it is JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order.
34. Under this system jointly implemented by JCS and municipalities such as Childersburg, after simple fines are converted to “probation” for payment, jail often results for the “offender” who does not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS. This system uses JCS’s conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original penalty had only been a fine.
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THE PLAINTIFFS 35. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are individuals who have received or may receive in the future only fines with no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS, but whose fines were converted or may be converted to probation under JCS, and those who are currently or were formerly indigent and, despite that indigency, were incarcerated, or may be incarcerated in the future, for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to the Alabama municipalities with which it contracts. Subclasses would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. GINA KAY RAY 36. Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama, who was brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance” and “driving while license suspended.” She was fined $398 and $498 for these charges with no jail sentence. Ms. Ray was not financially able to pay the fines when levied and was ordered to be on probation with JCS on the JCS form, to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and $10 charge to set up her file. Her monthly payment on these amounts was set by JCS at $145 per month. 37. On July 14, 2011, Ms. Ray was charged at the Childersburg Municipal Court on charges of “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” For these charges she was fined $168 and $498 respectively, but with no jail sentence. Since she could not pay these fines either she was again placed on “probation’ with JCS and ordered to pay JCS
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$45 per month and $10 file set fee. Her monthly payment on these amounts was also set by JCS at $145 per month. Though the “probation” period for her 2010 and 2011 cases overlap in time, JCS treated these as “consecutive cases” so that the period would then extend well beyond 24 months and result in monthly fees to JCS for both cases.
38. Ms. Ray was and has been indigent and was not able to pay for her insurance, tag or license, much less the fines and fees for JCS, but, in accordance with the policy and practice of Childersburg which was established in its contract with JCS, neither the Childersburg Municipal Court nor JCS ever made any inquiry into her inability to pay at the time of levying the fine or thereafter.
39. Due to her inability to pay as directed by JCS, Ms. Ray was jailed at the request of JCS on its claim of her “failure to obey a court order” which was approved by Childersburg. Ms. Ray was placed in the Talladega County jail for a period of four days in 2010 and then an additional 21 days in 2011, and further time in April and May of 2012.
40. Due to her inability to pay and her indigency, she remained in jail throughout these periods of time. On May 1, 2012, a friend of Ms. Ray was able to acquire $300.00 which was the amount determined and demanded by JCS to secure her release from jail.
41. At the point of Ms. Ray’s release in May 2012, employees of JCS authorized the release on the previous charge of “failure to obey court order” and she was directed to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.”
42. On June 14, 2012, Ms. Ray was again brought before the Municipal Court in Childersburg on charges of “attempt to evade,” “expired tag” and “driving while revoked.” Once again, she was fined $248, $218, $598 on these charges respectively with no jail sentence. She could not pay these fines and once again placed on “probation” with JCS
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and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month for 24 months and $10 file set up fee. 43. While Ms. Ray has made some small payments, she at all times has been
indigent and unable to pay the full amounts and the additional probation fees charged by JCS and Childersburg. The remaining balances are still demanded by JCS and Childersburg.
44. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to Ms. Ray and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees and, despite knowledge that Ms. Ray was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and has taken actions to incarcerate Ms. Ray without any due process.
45. On each of her incarcerations, Ms. Ray was incarcerated without the benefit of legal counsel, without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of her indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS. KRISTY AND TIMOTHY FUGATT
46. The Fugatts have twin children and had a third child who was born with serious medical conditions which required constant medical care in Birmingham for two years until his death in June 2011. As a result, both parents had extended stays at the hospital with their child and made numerous trips to and from Birmingham to their home in Sylacauga.
47. On one trip on November 13, 2010, Kristy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed by the Childersburg Police Department for having an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license.
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48. Timothy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed on or about December 3, 2010 by Childersburg Police for having an expired license tag on the same vehicle. Both of the Fugatts were set for court on January 13, 2011 at the Childersburg Municipal Court.
49. The Childersburg court records reflect the Fugatt cases were nol prossed upon payment of the court costs of $198.00 for the expired license and $148.00 each for the expired tag charges.
50. Due to these financial burdens, the Fugatts were unable to immediately pay the traffic fines and were placed on “probation” under JCS. Under the mandated terms of the probation, they were each charged an additional $45.00 per month for JCS’s probation “service.”
51. The Fugatts paid as best they could, but when they were unable to make payments as were ordered by JCS employees, they were required to drive to Childersburg and explain why they could not pay. JCS set the dates upon which the Fugatts were to report to the JCS office and were told that they would be jailed if they did not come. Many times the Fugatts were not able to make phone contact due to limited phone access to JCS. Nevertheless, they were repeatedly threatened with jail for any nonappearance at the JCS office.
52. The Fugatts told JCS employees about their inability to pay as demanded and even provided medical records. Instead of assistance from JCS, the Fugatts were called liars and continually threatened with arrest and incarceration for nonpayment.
53. Each of the Fugatts was also charged $317.00 for “Failure to Obey Court Order” on September 26, 2011.
54. Despite their inability to pay the initial fine, the amounts JCS claimed the 13

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Fugatts owed kept increasing, with added as “fines,” “restitution,” “other” and “probation fees.”
55. When the Fugatts could not appear at the JCS offices as commanded, a warrant of arrest was issued.
56. On Sunday afternoon February 26, 2012, a Childersburg officer came to their home in Sylacauga, threatened them with a taser and arrested them, taking them from their young children to the jail at Childersburg and instructing them that DHR would be called for care of their kids. This was avoided only by relatives arriving in time to take care of the young children.
57. Only after relatives collectively brought $900.00 to the Childersburg jail were the Fugatts released from jail.
58. JCS claims the Fugatts still owe well over $1,000.00 and, as a result, the Fugatts face further persecution and incarceration unless relief is granted. The receipts attached as Exhibit K show amounts in arrears as $512 and $427 on July 13, 2012. Each plaintiff paid $50 on that date, with one getting $25 credit toward the fine and the other getting only $23, whereas JCS kept the remaining $25 for one and $27 for the other. The amount owed has been increased by $90 each month since July, 2012 by JCS.
59. On February 26, 2012, the date of their arrest, each of the Fugatts was charged an additional $317 for “Failure to Appear,” though there was no judge present that Sunday and no judicial order was signed. These additional charges totaled $1,268, plus the $90 monthly JCS fee, all resulting from the expired tag and expired driver’s license.
60. While plaintiff Timothy Fugatt has maintained some employment, the hours he was able to work were quite limited by these serious medical issues and family
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responsibilities. As a result, the Fugatts have been and are indigent. 61. Though the Fugatts had repeatedly informed JCS of their situation, no relief
was granted. The Fugatts were not afforded due process of law, in that they were continually punished with increased amounts due and owing, threats of incarceration for not paying, and ultimate incarceration.
62. In addition, the Fugatts, as with all the plaintiffs, were treated differently than persons able to pay the court costs when first imposed, merely because of their economic status.
63. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to the Fugatts and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that the Fugatts were unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate the Fugatts without any due process. The remaining balances are still demanded by JCS and Childersburg.
64. On their incarcerations, the Fugatts were jailed without the benefit of legal counsel, without any notice of charges, without formal probation revocation hearing, and without any hearing on the issue of their indigency, but simply incarcerated and, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg personnel and pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
65. On October 11, 2012 the Fugatts were again required to appear at Childersburg Municipal Court. While there, a JCS employee told the Fugatts that they now owed over $1,000 in court costs, fines and probation fees with Kristy owing $557 and Tim owing $517.
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DEUNATE T. JEWS 66. Deunate T. Jews is a resident of Childersburg, Alabama, and was charged
in 2008 in the Childersburg Municipal Court on the charge of harassment. Mr. Jews was never tried and the alleged victim placing this charge went to prison. As a result, the charges against Mr. Jews were dismissed, but on October 22, 2009 he was nonetheless charged court costs of $166 and since he could not pay this amount, he was placed on probation with JCS for 24 months for payment with the additional requirement that he also pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set up fee. When Mr. Jews did not pay those amounts, an arrest warrant was issued at the request of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.”
67. Because this warrant to arrest Mr. Jews him was issued, an additional $317 was added to his bill with JCS listed as “restitution” on the JCS and court records, even though no restitution was ever involved.
68. On September 11, 2009 Mr. Jews was arrested and placed in the Talladega jail forty-one (41) days for “failure to appear.”
69. Based on these unlawful charges, Mr. Jews was incarcerated at the request of JCS. At his release, he was ordered to appear in “Judicial Corrections” Municipal Court.
70. When Mr. Jews was unable to pay the ever growing JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest. Mr. Jews was arrested on August 18, 2010, by Childersburg police officer Mark Holmes for the charge of “FTOCO” and a $935 cash bond was demanded for his release. Mr. Jews was again taken to the Talladega County jail where he stayed until September 9, 2010.
71. JCS has and is continuing to charge Mr. Jews “restitution,” “probation fees,” 16

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and “court money” fees, which, because of his indigency, he is and was unable to pay. On January 13, 2011, Childersburg police officer Luke Benefield arrested Mr. Jews on the FTOCO charge. Although the arrest warrant lists a $1,035 cash only bond, Childersburg released Mr. Jews when family members paid $500 the next day. Upon his release, Mr. Jews was notified that he had to appear in the Childersburg court on March 10, 2010.
72. When Mr. Jews was again unable to pay the continuing, escalating JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest and Mr. Jews was arrested and jailed on February 21, 2012. Childersburg police booked Mr. Jews and he was transported to the Talladega County Jail. Childersburg demanded a $1,000 cash bond for his release.
73. On March 8, 2012, Mr. Jews was released from the Talladega County jail when he appeared in court and a family member paid JCS $200.
74. On May 25, 2012 Mr. Jews paid JCS $25; JCS applied $15 to “restitution” though there was none, and $10 to “Probation Fee.” JCS gave Mr. Jews a receipt acknowledging his payment in which it listed: Fees in arrears = $295.00; Pay off not including Probation fees: $343.00; Monthly Probation Fees: $45: Court Money Due from other Probations: Fines: $1,807. This JCS receipt stated a probation start date of March 9, 2012, which was the date Mr. Jews was released from his most recent incarceration, and a probation end date of March 9, 2014 which is nearly six years after the charges against him were dismissed. See Exhibit L.
75. Though the “probation” originally ordered on October 22, 2009 was for 24 months, it is still continuing with additional JCS charges accruing each month.
76. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges
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imposed by JCS. JCS shows a balance due from Mr. Jews in March 2012 of $358. 77. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has
been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges imposed by JCS. JCS closed out Mr. Jews on December 17, 2014 with an entry of “PrePayment/Bond in the amount of $166.
78. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to Mr. Jews and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that Mr. Jews was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate Mr. Jews without any due process.
79. On each of his incarcerations, Mr. Jews was incarcerated without the benefit of legal counsel, without notice of charges, and without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of his indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ALLEGATIONS 80. The Classes which the named Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. AND
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All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. 81. The members of the Classes and subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 82. As of this time, the exact number in the Classes is unknown but would be more than one thousand. 83. Plaintiffs' treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the Classes and subclasses and is ongoing. 84. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Classes. 85. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by many Class members may be small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. 86. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting solely members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether policy and practice of automatically placing on probation all
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municipal offenders who cannot immediately pay fines and costs but who have no jail sentence is legal; b. Whether the policy and practice of converting unpaid fines and costs to days of incarceration, without any determination concerning an individual’s ability to pay, is legal; c. Whether the policy and practice of requiring every order of the municipal court to require probation fees for JCS is legal; d. Whether the policy and practice of incarcerating individuals for failure to pay fines and costs with no finding of willfulness is legal. e. Whether the policy and practice of failing to appoint counsel for indigent defendants when a jail sentence is involved is legal; f. Whether the policy and practice of failing to make any inquiry into indigency before imposing fines and costs is legal; g. Whether the policy and practice of failing to give adequate notice of the charge and nature of a probation revocation hearing, failing to provide a probation revocation hearing, failing to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation and the evidence relied upon, failing to hold a hearing to determine indigency before revoking probation and otherwise imposing incarceration, failing to make written findings concerning an individual’s willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for nonpayment are legal; h. Whether JCS can raise its monthly probation fee charge to $45 without proper municipal action;
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i. Whether the policy and practice of charging incarcerated municipal defendants a daily fee for each day the person is incarcerated is legal; j. Whether the policy and practice of imposing fines and court costs that exceed that statutory maximum for municipal is legal; k. Whether the policy and practice of extending “probation” for municipal offenses beyond 24 months is legal; l. Whether the policy and practice which fails to give any credit for time spent incarcerated is legal. m. Whether a municipality can legally enter a contract binding upon its municipal court. 87. JCS and Childersburg have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 88. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class Action. The data concerning the Class members and the transaction details and amounts on each charge is largely computerized by the municipalities and by JCS. 89. The names and addresses of the Class members are a matter of public record and are also kept by JCS and notice can be provided to the Class members via First Class U.S. Mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court.
COUNT ONE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part
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hereof. 90. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and has denied those rights of the class members.
91. JCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama including Childersbrug. JCS’ marketing approach to these cities emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.
92. JCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform.
93. Under the system established by JCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers” and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
94. Under this system and by agreement with cities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court are unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
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95. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 96. JCS is, by virtue of this contract with municipalities such as Childersburg, clothed with the appearance of a state actor and its actions are inextricably interwoven with those of the municipalities such as Childersburg. Under its contract and its operations, JCS employees were and are represented to the plaintiffs and class members to be “probation officers” acting “on behalf of City of Childersburg.” Exhibit M. 97. The JCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has since the agreement been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. The orders supplied by JCS require the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract. 98. Under the JCS contract and procedures, the resulting policy and practice at the municipal courts such as Childersburg automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. 99. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially placed on “probation” with JCS under this practice though none had been sentenced to any jail time. 100. That “probation” requirement, under agreement between JCS and Childersburg, is required to be part of every printed order at the municipal courts such as
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Childersburg which also requires payment of monthly fees to JCS. 101. The policy and practice method of JCS, after requiring probation orders for
those unable to pay with additional fees for JCS, also imposes incarceration for a failure to pay fines, fees and costs.
102. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such as the Plaintiffs and class members, is accomplished by JCS leveling charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
103. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made under the JCS system and methods.
104. JCS expressly denies any responsibility to determine indigency of the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs or to determine any reasons for an inability to pay the fine. Therefore, when an “offender” is unable to pay the fine and additional fees required by JCS, JCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg cooperate with each other to issue arrest warrants initiated by JCS based upon claims of “failure to obey court order.”
105. All of the named Plaintiffs were indigent at the time of the charges levied against them in Childersburg and at the times of their incarcerations. Each was unable to pay the fines and fees demanded by JCS due to their indigency and each was incarcerated as stated in detail in the above facts after recommendation by JCS.
106. The incarceration process used by JCS includes the use of JCS drafted forms to be implemented by the municipalities such as Childersburg which are then approved by administrative personnel at Childersburg without a hearing to determine
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indigency. 107. Under the policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg, unpaid fines and costs
are unlawfully converted to undetermined days in jail for which the “offenders” have been also charged Thirty-One Dollars per day ($31/day), but are given no credit for time spent in jail against the fines levied.
108. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees are heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C.
The training manual used by JCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS monitors those “offenders”
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placed in jail. See Exhibit J. 109. The agreement and forms drafted by JCS are uniformly used by it. 110. Clothing JCS with the color of state law and authority is purposely structured
under the JCS system for it to impose and collect its fees, fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and is accomplished by providing JCS control over the money collected, the payment amount and schedule, the location where the money must be paid and control over how much will be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS each month as opposed to how much of it will be rebated to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
111. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by cities such as Childersburg and JCS, JCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements is routinely accepted without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
112. The actions and efforts of JCS routinely result in court costs, fines and fees which exceed the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS routinely exceed the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in JCS taking action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
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113. This system uses JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
114. In this process of converting fines to jail time, JCS and Childersburg do not give adequate notice of the nature of any lawful charge, fail to conduct hearings, fail to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation or the evidence relied upon, and fail to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
115. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, JCS and Childersburg also fail to provide counsel for the “offenders.”
116. After jailing an “offender,” JCS acts to further violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim of JCS and payments it has secured. As a result, there is no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated are granted release.
117. Under the practice and policy of JCS used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine is levied, additional fees, costs and other charges are added to the “offender” bill with JCS for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
118. In some cases, under the practice and policy of JCS, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused is nonetheless required to pay JCS fees. See Exhibit D.
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119. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews discussed above, costs and fees for JCS can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration.
120. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT TWO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 121. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and the rights of the class members. 122. By contract, Childersburg has delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 123. That agreement was signed by the city mayor and bound Childersburg in specific municipal court areas requiring that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following: a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added).
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124. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with
JCS.
125. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, also approved the employment
of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan,
also served as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities which have agreed to
similar contracts.
126. Municipalities are prohibited from laws, ordinances and policies which are in
conflict with state law. See Ala Code Section 11-45-1. Also see, Ala. Const. Article 4
Section 89.
127. State law also dictates a separation of the branches of government. Ala Const. Article 3, Section 43.3 Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and
towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of
the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town
establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by The Chief Justice of
Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala Const., Art 6, Section 139.
128. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts4 and the Childersburg City Council has the legislative power to enact regulations
3Ala. Const. Art. III, Section 43 states: In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.
4Ala. Code Section 11-43-83 - The mayor shall see that all contracts with the town or city are
faithfully kept or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required in judicial proceedings for and on behalf or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required in judicial proceedings for and on behalf of the city or town and no sureties shall be required on such bond. He shall perform such other executive duties, in addition to those prescribed in this article, as may be required of him by the council.
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and ordinances5, but neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
129. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
130. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and The Chief Justice.
131. Probation is only appropriate when an individual has been sentenced to jail time and not when only a fine has been assessed as is the case with the Plaintiffs and class members. As a result, the Childersburg policy and contract to include probation in every court order mandates a judicial practice that continually deprives indigent misdemeanants of their constitutional rights.
132. The policy and contract of Childersburg is also in violation of the Alabama Constitution. Article I, Section 20 Ala. Const. specifically prohibits imprisonment for the payment of debts, yet the policy enforced at Childersburg regularly jails misdemeanants upon the recommendation of JCS for failure to pay fines, fees and costs. Article I, Section 16 Ala. Const. requires that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient surety, but despite this prohibition, misdemeanants are regularly jailed without lawful
5Ala. Code Section 11-43-43 - All legislative powers and other powers granted to cities and towns
shall be exercised by the council, except those powers conferred on some officers by law or ordinance. The council shall perform the duties required by this title and other applicable provisions of law.
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conviction under any contempt proceedings or probation violation and with no bail being set.
133. Each of the Plaintiffs was imprisoned, and some repeatedly, under these policies of Childersburg for their failure to pay fines, costs and the added fees mandated by the illegal contract between Childersburg and JCS. None of the Plaintiffs were accorded any hearing or consideration of their indigency before being jailed nor were any provided notice of charges, a hearing on charges levied that might result in imprisonment, or provided assistance of counsel before being imprisoned.
134. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the contract and policy adopted by the City, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied was automatically placed on probation. This process used the JCS orders and forms even when there was no jail sentence adjudicated. This was routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS under the agreement with Childersburg then require the individual to make payments to JCS, rather than the city clerk, of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees.
135. The Childersburg City Clerk actively enforced these requirements as part of the policy and procedures established under this contract and refused to accept payments of fines and costs referring those payers such as the Plaintiffs instead to the JCS offices.
136. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, clothed JCS with the appearance of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. Childersburg, as a matter of its agreement and policy, allowed the JCS employees to attend each municipal court session and referred to JCS employees as “parole officers”
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in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes.
137. Under this system implemented by Childersburg, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead directed by Childersburg to make all payments including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs to JCS at the JCS office at hours and locations set by JCS.
138. The policy adopted and implemented by Childersburg was to comply with its contract with JCS.
139. Childersburg allowed JCS to control the money collected from persons such as Plaintiffs, and to determine how much each such municipal court “offender” must pay each month.
140. Childersburg also allowed JCS to determine how much of the collected sums would be credited to the collection “services” of JCS each month and how much of it would rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the municipal court fines adjudged.
141. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
142. Despite the lack of authority to do so, Childersburg permitted JCS, at its discretion, to use threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection.
143. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, Childersburg permitted JCS to determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs.
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144. Under the system operated at Childersburg, JCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable release requirements was routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
145. Childersburg permitted JCS to control and dictate these functions and, as a consequence, this routinely resulted in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts and impose additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees at Childersburg routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which resulted in action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
146. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg contended that under the Childersburg contract, it was JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order and therefore no investigation of indigency was undertaken by Childersburg as a matter of policy.
147. Under this system implemented at Childersburg, after simple fines were illegally converted to “probation” for payment, jail often resulted for the “offender” who did not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS and enforced by Childersburg. This system used and accepted JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employed JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
148. Under this system at Childersburg, each of the Plaintiffs was first only fined,
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but then automatically placed on “probation” though no jail sentence was adjudicated. Though each of the Plaintiffs was indigent, Childersburg made no investigation of that matter. When the Plaintiffs were unable to pay the fines, costs and additional JCS fees that Childersburg agreed to levy, recommendations from JCS were made and followed by Childersburg to incarcerate each of them for undetermined times.
149. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such as the Plaintiffs and class members, was also accomplished by bringing charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
150. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made under the system at Childersburg.
151. Childersburg adopted and implemented JCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employed JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
152. In this process of converting fines to jail time, Childersburg did not give adequate notice to the “offender” of the nature of any lawful charge, it failed to conduct hearings, failed to make written findings concerning the reasons for any probation revocation or the evidence relied upon, and failed to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
153. Under this policy and practice at Childersburg when a simple fine was transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, Childersburg also failed to
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provide counsel for the “offenders.” 154. After jailing an “offender,” Childersburg acted to further violate the Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim of JCS and payments it secured. As a result, there was no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated were granted release.
155. Under the practice and policy used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine was levied, additional fees, costs, and other charges were added to the “offender” bill for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
156. In some cases, under the practice and policy adopted and implemented at Childersburg, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused was nonetheless required to pay JCS fees. See Exhibit D.
157. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews, whose specific facts are included above, the costs and fees at Childersburg can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration all with the knowledge and participation of Childersburg.
158. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
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COUNT THREE VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 159. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members to be free from unreasonable seizure. 160. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 161. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fines imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well. 160. Under Alabama law, a fine can only be converted into jail time if the court makes findings under Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully failed to pay the fines. Even there, the statute provides specifics as to potential jail time. 161. Under the system created and implemented by JCS, there is no hearing to determine if an “offender” had willfully refused to pay nor any consideration of indigency and factors preventing payment. 162. Under the system created and implemented by JCS at Childersburg, every person who is unable to pay a simple fine and costs in full is placed on “probation.” Though their inability to pay the fine gives immediate notice of the “offenders’” financial limitations, the JCS system adds further costs and fees each month to these “offenders”
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who were already unable to pay the fines levied. The result increases the financial burden
of persons who are accused of no more than traffic violations or misdemeanors.
163. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment
of fines and costs.6
164. Despite the longstanding law prohibiting incarceration for one’s inability to pay
a fine/debt, JCS instituted arrest warrants for Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr.
Fugatt when JCS knew these plaintiffs could not pay the fines and fees JCS ordered and
despite the fact that none had been initially given any jail time whatsoever.
165. Unless prompt payment of its fees and fines is made as determined by JCS,
JCS takes steps to have the “probation” revoked or initiates charges for “failure to obey
court order” beginning the process of incarcerating an individual who otherwise would
never have seen jail under the original adjudication.7
6Ala. Const. Art. I, Section 20 provides: “That no person shall be imprisoned for debt.” It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State, 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so.
Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution.
"These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553.
Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
7 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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166. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed under the JCS process as described and under the specific facts as stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
167. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FOUR VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 168. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members to be free from unreasonable seizure. 169. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg, has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 170. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fine imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well. 171. Under Alabama law, a simple fine can only be converted into jail time if the court makes findings under Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully failed to pay the fines.
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172. Childersburg’s policy of including probation with JCS in every municipal court
order created the process by which misdemeanants were incarcerated without a willfulness
hearing as required by Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 and in violation of Alabama case law,
the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.
173. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fines or costs.8
174. Despite longstanding legal precedent prohibiting incarceration for one’s
inability to pay a fine/debt, Childersburg’s policy and personnel working in conjunction with
JCS unlawfully arrested and jailed Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr. Fugatt for their
inability to pay simple fines and the added fees and costs dictated by the Childersburg
contract with JCS.
175. Childersburg police, municipal court processes and jail all became tools of
collection under forms and processes issued by JCS and which were routinely followed by
8
It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so.
Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution.
"These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553.
Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
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Childersburg. Childersburg’s policy and practice after clothing JCS with the appearance of a state actor acting on its behalf, allowed JCS to threaten arrest or revocation of probation and/or incarceration in order to coerce these indigents to pay Childersburg fines and JCS fees for misdemeanor offenses not otherwise subject to jail time under the original adjudication.
176. When these threats failed to produce sufficiently, Childersburg police, clerks and other personnel cooperated with JCS to arrest and jail the Plaintiffs.
177. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under the JCS process as described and under the specific facts stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.9
178. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FIVE VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 179. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members.
9 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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180. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
181. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel is not provided for the indigent “offenders.”
182. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS pursuant to JCS form orders and its contract with the city.
183. The “probation” process at JCS is essentially a collection vehicle for the city customer which adds monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine. JCS provided no services to the Plaintiffs, but represents itself as acting on behalf of the city which clothes it with that appearance. See Exhibit M.
184. JCS denies any responsibility to investigate the indigency of the “offenders” and thus takes no action to determine or consider disabilities, employment status or other reasons justifying non payment.
185. Simple fines without jail sentences are automatically and illegally converted to “probation” under the JCS system used at Childersburg if the offender cannot promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
186. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail and actual incarceration take place if the fines, fees and costs are not paid as scheduled by JCS.
187. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the JCS
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collection system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines. 188. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS focus on collections, charges
of “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” are initiated by JCS under its system. 189. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders”
such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS nor its city customer like Childersburg provide counsel for those “offenders.”
190. At the point jail sentences are potential, the JCS system used at Childersburg use a charge of “probation violation,” but does not provide notice of charges, findings required for conviction. Similarly, JCS also uses a charge of “failure to obey court order,” though that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 is the basis, under the JCS system there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
191. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed under this JCS system at Childersburg and without any assistance of counsel.
192. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
193. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their sixth amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
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COUNT SIX VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 194. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members. 195. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 196. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS at Childersburg, when a simple fine was transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel was not provided for the indigent “offenders.” 197. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS pursuant to JCS form orders and the contract approved by Childersburg. 198. The contract signed by Childersburg approved a “probation” process as essentially a collection vehicle for the city to collect its fines. That agreement, as discussed above, conflicts with state statutes, violates state constitutional requirements for separation of power in the branches of government and exceeds the authority of the mayor and council. 199. Under that agreement, Childersburg allowed JCS to add monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine when adjudicated even
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though JCS provides no services to them. 200. Under the agreement and with the knowledge and approval of Childersburg,
JCS represented itself as acting on behalf of the city which clothes it with that appearance. See Exhibit M.
201. Under this agreement, Childersburg has unlawfully invaded the province of the municipal court and mandated that each order there contain provisions for fees to JCS.
202. By its agreement, at Childersburg, simple fines without jail sentences were automatically and illegally converted to probation under the JCS system used at Childersburg if the offender could not promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
203. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail were used by JCS with the approval of Childersburg and actual incarceration then took place by police and other city personnel at Childersburg if the fines, fees and costs were not paid as scheduled by JCS.
204. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the Childersburg agreement to adopt and use the JCS collection system in the administration of its court system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines.
205. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS focus on collections, charges were routinely initiated claiming “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order.” These were initiated by JCS under its system and then approved by Childersburg personnel.
206. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS nor Childersburg provide counsel for those
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“offenders.” 207. At the point when jail sentences become potential, Childersburg presented
charges of alleged “probation violation,” but did not provide notice of charges, nor were findings made as required for conviction. Similarly, though JCS also regularly proposed a charge of “failure to obey court order” which Childersburg then pursued, that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 is used as the basis, under the Childersburg system with JCS there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
208. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under this JCS system and none were provided any assistance of counsel in the process leading to their incarceration.
209. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
210. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT SEVEN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 211. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS acting under color of state law in violation of 42
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U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and class members.
212. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
213. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and as such limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.
214. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 1522-54(a).
215. As mentioned above, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
216. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
217. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances, none of which were followed by JCS.
218. Under these facts, after substantial fines were levied against indigent persons
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such as the Plaintiffs, JCS, operating under an illegal contract with Childersburg, then increased that burden with additional monthly fees and costs charged by JCS. For the named Plaintiffs, the total amounts demanded by JCS exceeded the $500 limitation on the municipal court authority.
219. Under the JCS system at Childersburg, though JCS made no inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system or the reason for their failure to make payments, JCS increased the amount demanded from the Plaintiffs to the point that even partial payments could not be made.
For example, Timothy Fugatt was fined $148, has currently paid over $450, and is told that he still owes over $500, all from an initial $148 fine for an expired tag. Charging over six times the initial fine is excessive, disproportionate to the violation and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Deunate Jews was fined $166 for a dismissed charge, has paid over $800, and is told that he still owes over $1,807, all from an initial $166 fine for a dismissed charge. Charging over fifteen times the initial fine is excessive and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
220. The Plaintiffs were all indigent and their failure to pay JCS as demanded resulted in threats of arrests and ultimately incarceration based upon JCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
221. These fines and fees levied against the Plaintiffs exceeded the statutory limits of the court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-18-62.
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222. JCS also failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
223. The practice and policy of JCS in instituting charges resulting in jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
224. Each of the named Plaintiffs was, at all pertinent times, indigent and each was incarcerated at the behest of JCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS, though all had initially only received fines by the Childersburg Municipal Court.
225. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
226. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT EIGHT VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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227. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and class members.
228. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
229. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and, as such, limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.
230. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 1522-54(a).
231. As mentioned above, Ala. Code, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment, but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
232. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
233. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances,
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none of which were followed by JCS nor required by Childersburg. 234. Under these facts, Childersburg illegally contracted with JCS to add monthly
fees and costs to each municipal court order. This agreement increased the substantial fines levied against indigent persons such as the Plaintiffs.
235. Neither Childersburg nor JCS made inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system. As a result, only the Plaintiffs’ failure to make payments as dictated by JCS under the agreement with Childersburg resulted in threats of arrests. If threats failed to produce the demanded payments, arrest and incarceration followed under process at Childersburg based upon JCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
236. These fines exceeded the statutory limits of the municipal court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-1862.
237. Once in jail, Childersburg failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
238. The practice and policy at Childersburg of imposing jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
239. Each of the named Plaintiffs was at all pertinent times indigent and each was incarcerated by Childersburg personnel at the behest of JCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS.
240. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the
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municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
241. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT NINE DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY JCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 242. JCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 243. JCS, though a private company, has been clothed with the color of state law by the specific actions of Childersburg all pursuant to an agreement between these parties. 244. As referenced above, by agreement, JCS employees attended all municipal court sessions, collected city fines and costs, were labeled as “probation officers,” carried badges and regularly represented themselves as acting “on behalf of the City of Childersburg.” Additionally, the JCS forms were used at the municipal court and fees for JCS were included in every court order there. 245. In the system established by an illegal agreement between JCS and
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Childersburg, the actions of JCS are inextricably intertwined with those of the government. 246. The practice and policy under this agreement automatically requires
“probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Childersburg and was a required part of every printed order at the municipal court and required payment of monthly fees to JCS.
247. Persons who are financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg are not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons are not charged any fees for JCS and are not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process.
248. For those such as the Plaintiffs who were unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” under JCS was required on every court order.
249. This requirement on its municipal court is part of the city contract with JCS. That contract, as discussed above, exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government as embodied in the Alabama Constitution. Ala. Const, Article 3, Section 43.
250. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposed incarceration and additional costs on individuals who were unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as lawfully required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code, Section 15-18-62.
251. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the
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municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
252. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8. The JCS policy at Childersburg is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” cannot pay immediately and creates its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed.
253. These additional JCS fines result in disparate treatment between those who can immediately pay the fine from those who are unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
254. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
255. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal
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charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent. COUNT TEN
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 256. JCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 257. This was accomplished by the illegal contractual agreement between JCS and Childersburg whereby their actions are inextricably intertwined in a practice and policy which automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Childersburg and was part of every printed order at the municipal court and required payment of monthly fees to JCS. 258. Persons who were financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg were not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons were not charged any fees for JCS and were not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process. 259. For those such as the Plaintiffs who were unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” with JCS was required on every order. 260. This requirement is part of the city contract with JCS. That contract, as mentioned above, exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and
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imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government.
261. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposed incarceration and additional costs on individuals who were unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as would lawfully be required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code Section 15-18-62.
262. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
263. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8. The JCS policy at Childersburg was not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it added fees only to “offenders” who could not pay immediately and created its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who could not pay as directed.
264. These additional JCS fines resulted in disparate treatment between those who could immediately pay the fine from those who were unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement were processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
265. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under
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this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
266. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT ELEVEN DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 267. A real controversy exists between these parties concerning several issues including the validity of the JCS contract with Childersburg and the legality of the actions taken under that contract such that declaratory relief is appropriate. 268. Plaintiffs request the Court to declare that the JCS contract with Childersburg was void ab initio because Childersburg had no authority to contractually bind its municipal court. 269. Childersburg entered into an agreement with JCS that exceeded both statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities. Furthermore, that agreement violated the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Alabama Constitution. See Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. As a result, that agreement is void and due to be declared a nullity. 270. Alabama state law also dictates a separation of the branches of government.
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Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by The Chief Justice of Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala. Const., Art 6, Section 139
271. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts and the Childersburg City Council has the legislative power to enact regulations and ordinances, but neither the Mayor nor the Council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
272. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
273. That agreement also violates the uniformity required by statute for processing traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
274. The process Childersburg under JCS is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” who cannot pay immediately and creates other “rules” for further penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed. “Offenders” who are able to immediately pay the fine are charged one rate, but those that are unable to immediately pay for the same offense are charged the fine and required to pay JCS monthly fees that accumulate each
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month that passes. 275. The “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS arrangement are processed and
fined differently than “offenders” in municipal jurisdictions that have not contracted for JCS to charge its fees to those who cannot pay and as a result violates uniformity requirements of Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
276. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and The Chief Justice.
277. Plaintiffs also request the Court to declare the actions of JCS and Childersburg under this contract to be unconstitutional under the premises discussed above. Under this void agreement, JCS and Childersburg have implemented joint policies and practices to prosecute persons such as the Plaintiffs where there is no jurisdiction or authority to do so under Alabama law, doing so intentionally in an effort to coerce payment of fines and costs from indigent people. These efforts have resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class beyond the limited jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
278. Further, JCS and Childersburg have added increased punishment, fines and costs after adjudication and even where there has been no adjudication of guilt, all without jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law.
279. JCS and Childersburg, through their joint action, have systematically applied Ala. Code § 15-18-62 in an unconstitutional fashion denying the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights.
280. Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines
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and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful nonpayment.10 281. Under JCS and Childersburg policies and practices, and through their joint
and consistent action, “offenders” before the Childersburg Municipal Court such as the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent are systematically imprisoned for nonpayment with no determination of willfulness and with no consideration of their indigency or ability to pay.
282. Furthermore, once imprisoned, the requirements of time to be served under § 15-18-62 are ignored by the practice and policy of JCS and Childersburg.
283. The result of this consistent systematic policy and practice of JCS and Childersburg is essentially a debtor’s prison for fines and charges levied by JCS under a void contract with the various municipalities for which it works.
284. Plaintiffs request the Court to enjoin the actions of JCS and Childersburg identified herein to prevent the continuation of these violations of statutory and constitutional prohibitions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court will take jurisdiction of this cause and upon the final hearing:
10Section 15-18-62 Imprisonment for failure to pay fines and costs. In cases of willful nonpayment of the fine and costs, the defendant shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county as follows: (1) If the fine and costs do not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), no more than 10 days; (2) If the fine and costs exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but do not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), no more than 20 days; (3) If the fine and costs exceed five hundred dollars ($500), but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), no more than 30 days; and (4) For every additional one hundred dollars ($100) or fractional part thereof, 4 days.
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a. Certify this matter as a proper class action maintainable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. Award the Plaintiffs such damages as this Court shall find the Plaintiffs have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit;
c. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which declares the JCS contract with municipalities such as Childersburg to be void and in violation of the statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities;
d. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which enjoins JCS and Childersburg from engaging in the violations of law set forth
hereinabove; e. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits
JCS and Childersburg in the future from placing persons on probation for simple fines and declares that any current probation and fees for simple fines is void; f. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits JCS and Childersburg in the future from assessing fines in excess of $500 and extending probation periods beyond 24 months and declare that any previously assessed fines and probationary periods in excess of these limits to be void; g. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits JCS and Childersburg in the future from imprisoning indigent persons
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for failure to pay fines and fees and ordering the release of any
currently incarcerated indigent persons who were jailed for these
reasons;
h. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class members damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 equal to any amounts paid on fines and all fees levied by JCS
and Childersburg that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful
(along with interest), and the annulment of any remaining unpaid fines
that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful;
i. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class the cost of this matter, including a
reasonable attorneys' fee;
j. Award to the Plaintiffs and the Class members such other, further and
more general relief as the Court may deem appropriate under these
circumstances including cost of these proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans ASB-1661-N76G Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: gdevans@evanslawpc.com
s/ Alexandria Parrish Alexandria Parrish ASB-2477-D66P Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101
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Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: ap@evanslawpc.com
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr. ASB-1754G63R D. Patrick Evans ASB-3209-R67G Attorneys for the Plaintiffs Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis LLC The Kress Building, 301 19th Street North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Telephone: (205) 314-0500 Fax: (205) 254-1500 E-Mail: rwiggins@wigginschilds.com E-Mail: pevans@wigginschilds.com
Erwin Chemerinsky Attorney for the Plaintiffs University of California Dean of Irvine School of Law 401 E. Peltason Drive Irvine, CA 92697-8000 Telephone: (949) 824-7722 E-mail: EChemerinsky@law.uci.edu
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand trial by struck jury.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 27th day of July, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing Third Amended and Restated Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Timothy P. Donahue, Esquire DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1020 22nd Street South Birmingham, Alabama 35205
David R. Boyd, Esquire Will Hill Tankersly, Esquire
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Gregory C. Cook, Esquire Ed R. Haden, Esquire L. Conrad Anderson, IV, Esquire Adam K. Israel, Esquire Ginny Willcox Leavens, Esquire Chase T. Espy, Esquire BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1500 Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Michael L. Jackson, Esquire Larry S. Logsdon, Esquire WALLACE, JORDAN, RATLIFF & BRANDT, L.L.C. P.O. Box 530910 Birmingham, Alabama 35253
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans

DEFENDANTS’ ADDRESSES:

CHC COMPANIES INC.

SERVE REGISTERED AGENT:

CORPORATE CREATIONS NETWORK, INC.

6 OFFICE PARK CIRCLE #100

MOUNTAIN BROOK, AL 35223

PLEASE SERVE BY CERTIFIED MAIL

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC

SERVE REGISTERED AGENT:

CORPORATE CREATIONS NETWORK, INC.

6 OFFICE PARK CIRCLE #100

MOUNTAIN BROOK, AL 35223

PLEASE SERVE BY CERTIFIED MAIL

63

 
 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 305 Filed 02/01/16 Page 1 of 66

FILED
2016 Feb-01 PM 05:28 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, KRISTY FUGATT,

)

TIMOTHY FUGATT and DEUNATE T. JEWS, )

Individually and for a class of similarly

)

situated persons or entities,

)

)

Plaintiffs;

)

)

v.

)

)

JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., )

a corporation; CORRECTIONAL

)

HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, INC., now

)

known as CHC COMPANIES INC., d.b.a. )

CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE

)

COMPANIES, INC., a corporation;

)

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, a

)

limited liability company;

)

THE CITY OF CHILDERSBURG.

)

)

Defendants

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED COMPLAINT

COME NOW, Gina Kay Ray, Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, and Deunate T. Jews,

(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, upon

personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and belief

as to all other matters, by and through their undersigned counsel, and with leave of the

Court, file this Fourth Amended and Restated complaint as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it concerns a controversy

arising under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. '1331. This is a civil rights

action brought under 42 U.S.C. '' 1983 and 1988.

2. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. ''

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 305 Filed 02/01/16 Page 2 of 66
1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), authorizing jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. '
1983 to enforce civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
3. This action also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 2201
and 2022.
4. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391 (b) and
(c).
PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT
5. The Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama.
6. The Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
7. The Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama.
8. The Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews is an individual resident of Childersburg,
Alabama.
9. The classes which the individual Plaintiffs seek to represent consist of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
AND
All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court.
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10. The Defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama and in this District which markets itself as “not a social service agency,” but a “for profit”company which offers services to governmental entities “free of charge” to the cities as “an offender paid system.” At all times, JCS has operated under the color of state law.
11. The Defendant formerly known as Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (also hereinafter“CHC”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama. In their initial complaint, filed August 28, 2012, plaintiffs described Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. stating:
Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (hereinafter listed as “JCS” also) is a Delaware corporation, maintaining its principal place of business in Greenwood Village, Colorado, but shares the same corporate officers at the same address as JCS. It appears to be the successor of JCS, having purchased or otherwise acquired it, continuing to do business with plaintiffs as JCS and operating the same. (Doc. 1 ¶6) This description can only apply to the entity Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. which had undergone a name change hereinafter described before the initial complaint was filed. That action changed the name to CHC Companies, Inc., but the entity still continued doing business as Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. This is the only entity that meets the description of the entity identified in the initial complaint as: 1. A Delaware Corporation. (Exhibit 2, pg. 2) 2. Maintains its principal place of business in Greenwood Village, Colorado.
(Exhibit 2, pg. 2) 3. Is the successor of JCS acquiring and merging it into itself on September 30,
2011. ((Doc. 292 - Exhibit 1 - filed under seal - recitals and Section 2.1, signature page pg. 59) Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. was incorporated on June 26, 2006 with
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the State of Delaware’s Secretary of State under file number 4181381. This is the entity which the Plaintiffs named and described in the initial complaint. However, on July 11, 2011, a Second Amendment to the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation signed by its CEO, Douglas D. Goetz, was filed changing the name of Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. to CHC Companies, Inc. (Exhibit 2 - pg. 51).
The initial complaint was served on CHC’s Chief Executive Officer, Doug Goetz, on September 7, 2012. (Doc. 5 pg. 2). At the time Mr. Goetz was served with the initial complaint, he was the CEO of both Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. and CHC Companies, Inc. Despite the correct identification of the intended party defendant and proper service, the CHC entities have attempted to blur their true identity through simultaneous name changes involving another wholly owned entity which is not related to this controversy.1 Further, counsel of record for the entity now known as Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. (f/k/a CHC Companies, Ltd.), despite being informed of these facts, has insisted that they are only representing the unrelated entity formerly known as CHC Companies, Ltd and have refused to properly respond to discovery requests on behalf of CHC Companies, Inc. (f/k/a Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.).
CHC Companies, Inc. (f/k/a Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.) continues to do business as Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. On September 30, 2011, CHC
1On July 11, 2011, Doug Goetz as CEO of all entities involved, simultaneously changed names of two corporations. The corporate name of Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. was changed to CHC Companies, Inc., while the corporate name of another wholly owned company unrelated to this controversy - CHC Companies, Ltd. - was simultaneously changed to Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (Exhibit 3) This purposeful ambiguity between identical names was further promoted by CHC Companies, Inc. signing legal documents in the name of CHC Companies, Inc. while continuing to do business as Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (‘CHC’).
Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (f/k/a CHC Companies, Ltd.) - merged six (6) corporations into itself on December 22, 2011, but none of the companies was JCS. (Exhibit 4)
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Companies, Inc. merged Judicial Correction Services, Inc. into its operations pursuant to a merger agreement. Through this merger, CHC Companies, Inc. d/b/a Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. assumed the “assets, rights, privileges, powers and franchises of, and be subject to all the liabilities, restrictions, disabilities and duties” of JCS. Doug Goetz, CHC Companies, Inc.’s CEO, executed this agreement on behalf of CHC. (Doc. 292 - Exhibit 1 - filed under seal - recitals and Section 2.1, signature page pg. 59)
12. The Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC (hereinafter ‘CCS’) is a Kansas limited liability corporation, registered as a foreign limited liability company and doing business in the State of Alabama. On June 24, 2014, CCS purchased CHC Companies, Inc. and has merged CHC’s operations, its subsidiaries and its headquarters with its own. The CCS home office and headquarters is now in Nashville, Tennessee,2 from which it now directs and controls the operations of all its merged corporations including CHC Companies, Inc. The JCS operations have been fully integrated with the operations of other CHC companies - HPL, PNA, CHC, and JCS. JCS is part of a division known as CCS’s State and Federal Division, which is managed by Don Houston. (Exhibit 6) CCS controls the accounting, litigation and other operational aspects of the JCS operations contained within this division and employs all the personnel within the JCS operations and that division.
13. The City of Childersburg, Alabama, (“Childersburg”) is a municipal corporation located within Shelby County, Alabama. The City Council and Mayor B.J. Meeks controlled the policy making for Childersburg and also hired the municipal court
2 CHC Companies, Inc. (f/k/a Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.) and continuing to do business as Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. filed is annual report with Colorado’s Secretary of State on July 8, 2015 listing its principal office and street address as: 1283 Murfreeboro Rd. Suite 500, Nashville, TN 37217. The same address as CCS’s principal office. (Exhibit 5)
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judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court. FACTS
14. The Plaintiffs bring this action because the operations at Alabama municipalities such as Childersburg which use JCS, by a joint policy and practice, have violated and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated.
15. JCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama. JCS’s marketing approach to these cities emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.
16. JCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform.
17. Under the system established and implemented by JCS/CHC/CCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS/CHC/CCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS/CHC/CCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements,
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JCS/CHC/CCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers”3 and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
18. Under this system and by agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully delegated to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
19. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 20. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS and approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also served as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities also under contract with JCS. Similarly, the current judge, Chad Woodruff, was appointed in a similar manner. The Childersburg Municipal Court meets once a month for a few hours on the second Thursday of the month. 21. The JCS/CHC/CCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has, since the agreement, been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. 22. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the JCS contract, a
3In contrast, even a judicial volunteer is required to meet greater and more specific qualifications, careful screening, specific training and continual oversight established by the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’). See Ala. Rule of Judicial Administration Rule 42.
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person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied is automatically placed on probation using the JCS orders and forms, even when there is no jail sentence adjudicated.4 This is routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS then require the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract with Childersburg.
23. The JCS/CHC/CCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS/CHC/CCS employees are heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C.
The training manual used by JCS/CHC/CCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of
4 Childersburg recently terminated its contract with JCS by vote and signature of all city council members and the mayor on May 19, 2015 effective June 20, 2015. (See Exhibit N)
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arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS monitors those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J.
24. The city council and its mayor control the policy making for Childersburg and also hire the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court starting in 2005 and continued to use JCS until the city council and mayor voted to terminate the contract on May 19, 2015. See Exhibit N. The decision to use this JCS system was an administrative decision of Childersburg, by and through its mayor, and not a decision of the municipal court judge or the Chief Justice, or any other employee of the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’).
25. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, clothed JCS with the appearance of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. The JCS/CHC/CCS employees attended each municipal court session and were referred to as “parole officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes. Under this system, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead required by Childersburg to make all payments, including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs, to JCS at the JCS office.
26. This public ruse was maintained by Childersburg and JCS in order to impose and collect fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and was accomplished by allowing JCS to control the money, determine how much each municipal court “offender” must pay each month, how much would be credited for each payment to the collection
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“services” of JCS each month and how much of it would rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
27. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
28. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by Childersburg and JCS, JCS’s determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements was routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
29. The collective actions of JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg are inextricably interwoven with each other and routinely resulted in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts, and imposed additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which resulted in JCS/CHC/CCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg taking joint action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
30. After improperly imposing probation when no jail sentence is involved,
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incarceration then follows if the fine, together with the fees added by JCS, are not paid as dictated by JCS.
31. Despite directing the municipal courts such as Childersburg that incarceration of an individual “offender” is needed when payment is not made, JCS/CHC/CCS undertakes no determination of the reasons for nonpayment, and does not consider such things as the Plaintiffs’ disability, unemployment, or assets, in regard to the nonpayment of the fines.
32. JCS/CHC/CCS denies any responsibility and took no action under its operations with Childersburg to determine indigency, and provides no instruction in its employee manual for the consideration of indigency. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg, however, contended that under its contract it is JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order.
33. Under this system jointly implemented by JCS/CHC/CCS and municipalities such as Childersburg, after simple fines are converted to “probation” for payment, jail often results for the “offender” who does not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS. This system uses JCS’s conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original penalty had only been a fine.
THE PLAINTIFFS 34. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are individuals who have received or may receive in the future only fines with no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS, but whose fines were converted or may be converted
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to probation under JCS/CHC/CCS, and those who are currently or were formerly indigent and, despite that indigency, were incarcerated, or may be incarcerated in the future, for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS/CHC/CCS to the Alabama municipalities with which it contracts. Subclasses would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. GINA KAY RAY
35. Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama, who was brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance” and “driving while license suspended.” She was fined $398 and $498 for these charges with no jail sentence. Ms. Ray was not financially able to pay the fines when levied and was ordered to be on probation with JCS on the JCS form, to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and $10 charge to set up her file. Her monthly payment on these amounts was set by JCS at $145 per month.
36. On July 14, 2011, Ms. Ray was charged at the Childersburg Municipal Court on charges of “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” For these charges she was fined $168 and $498 respectively, but with no jail sentence. Since she could not pay these fines either she was again placed on “probation” with JCS and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set fee. Her monthly payment on these amounts was also set by JCS at $145 per month. Though the “probation” period for her 2010 and 2011 cases overlap in time, JCS treated these as “consecutive cases” so that the period would then extend well beyond 24 months and result in monthly fees to JCS for both cases.
37. Ms. Ray was and has been indigent and was not able to pay for her
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insurance, tag or license, much less the fines and fees for JCS, but, in accordance with the policy and practice of Childersburg which was established in its contract with JCS, neither the Childersburg Municipal Court nor JCS ever made any inquiry into her inability to pay at the time of levying the fine or thereafter.
38. Due to her inability to pay as directed by JCS, Ms. Ray was jailed at the request of JCS on its claim of her “failure to obey a court order” which was approved by Childersburg. Ms. Ray was placed in the Talladega County jail for a period of four days in 2010 and then an additional 21 days in 2011, and further time in April and May of 2012.
39. Due to her inability to pay and her indigency, she remained in jail throughout these periods of time. On May 1, 2012, a friend of Ms. Ray was able to acquire $300.00 which was the amount determined and demanded by JCS/CHC to secure her release from jail.
40. At the point of Ms. Ray’s release in May 2012, employees of CHC authorized the release on the previous charge of “failure to obey court order” and she was directed to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.”
41. On June 14, 2012, Ms. Ray was again brought before the Municipal Court in Childersburg on charges of “attempt to evade,” “expired tag” and “driving while revoked.” Once again, she was fined $248, $218, $598 on these charges respectively with no jail sentence. She could not pay these fines and once again placed on “probation” with JCS/CHC and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month for 24 months and $10 file set up fee.
42. While Ms. Ray has made some small payments, she at all times has been indigent and unable to pay the full amounts and the additional probation fees charged by JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg. The remaining balances are still demanded by
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JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg. 43. Throughout this period of time, JCS/CHC/CCS has provided no services to
Ms. Ray and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees and, despite knowledge that Ms. Ray was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS/CHC/CCS has sought to collect and has taken actions to incarcerate Ms. Ray without any due process.
44. On each of her incarcerations, Ms. Ray was incarcerated without the benefit of legal counsel, without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of her indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS/CHC/CCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS. KRISTY AND TIMOTHY FUGATT
45. The Fugatts have twin children and had a third child who was born with serious medical conditions which required constant medical care in Birmingham for two years until his death in June 2011. As a result, both parents had extended stays at the hospital with their child and made numerous trips to and from Birmingham to their home in Sylacauga.
46. On one trip on November 13, 2010, Kristy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed by the Childersburg Police Department for having an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license.
47. Timothy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed on or about December 3, 2010 by Childersburg Police for having an expired license tag on the same vehicle. Both of the Fugatts were set for court on January 13, 2011 at the Childersburg Municipal Court.
48. The Childersburg court records reflect the Fugatt cases were nol prossed
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upon payment of the court costs of $198.00 for the expired license and $148.00 each for the expired tag charges.
49. Due to these financial burdens, the Fugatts were unable to immediately pay the traffic fines and were placed on “probation” under JCS. Under the mandated terms of the probation, they were each charged an additional $45.00 per month for JCS’s probation “service.”
50. The Fugatts paid as best they could, but when they were unable to make payments as were ordered by JCS employees, they were required to drive to Childersburg and explain why they could not pay. JCS set the dates upon which the Fugatts were to report to the JCS office and were told that they would be jailed if they did not come. Many times the Fugatts were not able to make phone contact due to limited phone access to JCS. Nevertheless, they were repeatedly threatened with jail for any nonappearance at the JCS office.
51. The Fugatts told JCS employees about their inability to pay as demanded and even provided medical records. Instead of assistance from JCS, the Fugatts were called liars and continually threatened with arrest and incarceration for nonpayment.
52. Each of the Fugatts was also charged $317.00 for “Failure to Obey Court Order” on September 26, 2011.
53. Despite their inability to pay the initial fine, the amounts JCS/CHC claimed the Fugatts owed kept increasing, with added as “fines,” “restitution,” “other” and “probation fees.”
54. When the Fugatts could not appear at the JCS offices as commanded, a warrant of arrest was issued.
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55. On Sunday afternoon, February 26, 2012, a Childersburg officer came to their home in Sylacauga, threatened them with a taser and arrested them, taking them from their young children to the jail at Childersburg and instructing them that DHR would be called for care of their kids. This was avoided only by relatives arriving in time to take care of the young children.
56. Only after relatives collectively brought $900.00 to the Childersburg jail were the Fugatts released from jail.
57. JCS/CHC/CCS claims the Fugatts still owe well over $1,000.00 and, as a result, the Fugatts face further persecution and incarceration unless relief is granted. The receipts attached as Exhibit K show amounts in arrears as $512 and $427 on July 13, 2012. Each plaintiff paid $50 on that date, with one getting $25 credit toward the fine and the other getting only $23, whereas JCS/CHC kept the remaining $25 for one and $27 for the other. The amount owed has been increased by $90 each month since July 2012 by JCS/CHC.
58. On February 26, 2012, the date of their arrest, each of the Fugatts was charged an additional $317 for “Failure to Appear,” though there was no judge present that Sunday and no judicial order was signed. These additional charges totaled $1,268, plus the $90 monthly JCS/CHC fee, all resulting from the expired tag and expired driver’s license.
59. While Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt has maintained some employment, the hours he was able to work were quite limited by these serious medical issues and family responsibilities. As a result, the Fugatts have been and are indigent.
60. Though the Fugatts had repeatedly informed JCS/CHC of their situation, no
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relief was granted. The Fugatts were not afforded due process of law, in that they were continually punished with increased amounts due and owing, threats of incarceration for not paying, and ultimate incarceration.
61. In addition, the Fugatts, as with all the Plaintiffs, were treated differently than persons able to pay the court costs when first imposed, merely because of their economic status.
62. Throughout this period of time, JCS/CHC/CCS has provided no services to the Fugatts and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that the Fugatts were unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS/CHC/CCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate the Fugatts without any due process. The remaining balances are still demanded by JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg.
63. On their incarcerations, the Fugatts were jailed without the benefit of legal counsel, without any notice of charges, without formal probation revocation hearing, and without any hearing on the issue of their indigency, but simply incarcerated and, later released based upon the determination of JCS/CHC/CCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg personnel and pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
64. On October 11, 2012 the Fugatts were again required to appear at Childersburg Municipal Court. While there, a CHC employee working in its JCS division told the Fugatts that they now owed over $1,000 in court costs, fines and probation fees with Kristy owing $557 and Tim owing $517. DEUNATE T. JEWS
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65. Deunate T. Jews is a resident of Childersburg, Alabama, and was charged in 2008 in the Childersburg Municipal Court on the charge of harassment. Mr. Jews was never tried and the alleged victim placing this charge went to prison. As a result, the charges against Mr. Jews were dismissed but, on October 22, 2009, he was nonetheless charged court costs of $166 and since he could not pay this amount, he was placed on probation with JCS for 24 months for payment with the additional requirement that he also pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set up fee. When Mr. Jews did not pay those amounts, an arrest warrant was issued at the request of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.”
66. Because this warrant to arrest Mr. Jews was issued, an additional $317 was added to his bill with JCS listed as “restitution” on the JCS and court records, even though no restitution was ever involved.
67. On September 11, 2009, Mr. Jews was arrested and placed in the Talladega jail forty-one (41) days for “failure to appear.”
68. Based on these unlawful charges, Mr. Jews was incarcerated at the request of JCS. At his release, he was ordered to appear in “Judicial Corrections” Municipal Court.
69. When Mr. Jews was unable to pay the ever growing JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest. Mr. Jews was arrested on August 18, 2010, by Childersburg police officer Mark Holmes for the charge of “FTOCO” and a $935 cash bond was demanded for his release. Mr. Jews was again taken to the Talladega County Jail where he stayed until September 9, 2010.
70. JCS has and is continuing to charge Mr. Jews “restitution,” “probation fees,” and “court money” fees, which, because of his indigency, he is and was unable to pay. On
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January 13, 2011, Childersburg police officer Luke Benefield arrested Mr. Jews on the FTOCO charge. Although the arrest warrant lists a $1,035 cash only bond, Childersburg released Mr. Jews when family members paid $500 the next day. Upon his release, Mr. Jews was notified that he had to appear in the Childersburg court on March 10, 2010.
71. When Mr. Jews was again unable to pay the continuing, escalating JCS/CHC fees, JCS/CHC issued another warrant for his arrest and Mr. Jews was arrested and jailed on February 21, 2012. Childersburg police booked Mr. Jews and he was transported to the Talladega County Jail. Childersburg demanded a $1,000 cash bond for his release.
72. On March 8, 2012, Mr. Jews was released from the Talladega County Jail when he appeared in court and a family member paid JCS/CHC $200.
73. On May 25, 2012, Mr. Jews paid JCS/CHC $25; JCS/CHC applied $15 to “restitution” though there was none, and $10 to “Probation Fee.” JCS/CHC gave Mr. Jews a receipt acknowledging his payment in which it listed: Fees in arrears = $295.00; Pay off not including Probation fees: $343.00; Monthly Probation Fees: $45: Court Money Due from other Probations: Fines: $1,807. This JCS/CHC receipt stated a probation start date of March 9, 2012, which was the date Mr. Jews was released from his most recent incarceration, and a probation end date of March 9, 2014 which is nearly six years after the charges against him were dismissed. See Exhibit L.
74. Though the “probation” originally ordered on October 22, 2009 was for 24 months, it is still continuing with additional JCS/CHC/CCS charges accruing each month.
75. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges imposed by JCS/CHC/CCS. JCS/CHC/CCS shows a balance due from Mr. Jews in March
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2012 of $358. 76. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he has
been indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges imposed by JCS/CHC/CCS. JCS/CHC/CCS closed out Mr. Jews on December 17, 2014 with an entry of “Pre-Payment/Bond in the amount of $166.”
77. Throughout this period of time, JCS/CHC/CCS has provided no services to Mr. Jews and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that Mr. Jews was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS/CHC/CCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate Mr. Jews without any due process.
78. On each of his incarcerations, Mr. Jews was incarcerated without the benefit of legal counsel, without notice of charges, and without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of his indigency, but simply incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS/CHC/CCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ALLEGATIONS 79. The Classes which the named Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of:
All individuals who have in the past, or may in the future, receive only fines and no jail sentence for charges before the Alabama municipal courts which employ JCS/CHC/CCS and whose fines were, or may be in the future, converted to a probation under JCS/CHC/CCS; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. AND
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All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay charges and fees for services allegedly rendered by JCS/CHC/CCS to Alabama governments with which it contracts; a subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received, or may receive in the future, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court. 80. The members of the Classes and subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 81. As of this time, the exact number in the Classes is unknown but would be more than one thousand. 82. Plaintiffs' treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the Classes and subclasses and is ongoing. 83. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Classes. 84. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by many Class members may be small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. 85. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting solely members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether policy and practice of automatically placing on probation all municipal offenders who cannot immediately pay fines and costs but who
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have no jail sentence is legal; b. Whether the policy and practice of converting unpaid fines and costs to days of incarceration, without any determination concerning an individual’s ability to pay is legal; c. Whether the policy and practice of requiring every order of the municipal court to require probation fees for JCS/CHC/CCS is legal; d. Whether the policy and practice of incarcerating individuals for failure to pay fines and costs with no finding of willfulness is legal. e. Whether the policy and practice of failing to appoint counsel for indigent defendants when a jail sentence is involved is legal; f. Whether the policy and practice of failing to make any inquiry into indigency before imposing fines and costs is legal; g. Whether the policy and practice of failing to give adequate notice of the charge and nature of a probation revocation hearing, failing to provide a probation revocation hearing, failing to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation and the evidence relied upon, failing to hold a hearing to determine indigency before revoking probation and otherwise imposing incarceration, failing to make written findings concerning an individual’s willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for nonpayment are legal; h. Whether JCS/CHC/CCS can raise its monthly probation fee charge to $45 without proper municipal action; i. Whether the policy and practice of charging incarcerated municipal
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defendants a daily fee for each day the person is incarcerated is legal; j. Whether the policy and practice of imposing fines and court costs that exceed that statutory maximum for municipal is legal; k. Whether the policy and practice of extending “probation” for municipal offenses beyond 24 months is legal; l. Whether the policy and practice which fails to give any credit for time spent incarcerated is legal; m. Whether a municipality can legally enter a contract binding upon its municipal court. 86. JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 87. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class Action. The data concerning the Class members and the transaction details and amounts on each charge is largely computerized by the municipalities and by JCS/CHC/CCS. 88. The names and addresses of the Class members are a matter of public record and are also kept by JCS/CHC/CCS and notice can be provided to the Class members via First Class U.S. Mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court.
COUNT ONE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY JCS/CHC/CCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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89. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS/CHC/CCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and has denied those rights of the class members.
90. JCS/CHC/CCS operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal and county governments and has contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama including Childersbrug. JCS/CHC/CCS’ marketing approach to these cities emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.
91. JCS/CHC/CCS routinely uses a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trains its employees using a training manual replete with forms for court use and for contacting the “offenders” from whom it is seeking collection. As a result, the JCS/CHC/CCS approach is highly systemized and uniform.
92. Under the system established by JCS/CHC/CCS, its employees are not required to have criminal justice or legal training, nor are they required to have any social work education or meet any minimum law enforcement standards as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS/CHC/CCS requires only that its employees be 21 years old, a non felon, with two years of college who complete 40 hours of training by JCS/CHC/CCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS/CHC/CCS employees are then labeled “Probation Officers” and permitted to carry the JCS issued badge in collecting its fees, court fines and costs.
93. Under this system and by agreement with cities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court are unlawfully delegated to
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JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
94. The agreement drafted by JCS and signed by the city mayor and JCS attests that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 95. JCS/CHC/CCS is, by virtue of this contract with municipalities such as Childersburg, clothed with the appearance of a state actor and its actions are inextricably interwoven with those of the municipalities such as Childersburg. Under its contract and its operations, JCS/CHC/CCS employees were and are represented to the Plaintiffs and Class members to be “probation officers” acting “on behalf of City of Childersburg.” Exhibit M. 96. The JCS/CHC/CCS system provides “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS/CHC/CCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 has since the agreement been increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. The orders supplied by JCS require the individual to make payment to JCS/CHC/CCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract. 97. Under the JCS contract and procedures, the resulting policy and practice at the municipal courts such as Childersburg automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court.
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98. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially placed on “probation” with JCS/CHC under this practice though none had been sentenced to any jail time.
99. That “probation” requirement, under agreement between JCS and Childersburg, is required to be part of every printed order at the municipal courts such as Childersburg which also requires payment of monthly fees to JCS.
100. The policy and practice method of JCS/CHC/CCS, after requiring probation orders for those unable to pay with additional fees for JCS/CHC/CCS, also imposes incarceration for a failure to pay fines, fees and costs.
101. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such as the Plaintiffs and class members, is accomplished by JCS/CHC/CCS leveling charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
102. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made under the JCS/CHC/CCS system and methods.
103. JCS/CHC/CCS expressly denies any responsibility to determine indigency of the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs or to determine any reasons for an inability to pay the fine. Therefore, when an “offender” is unable to pay the fine and additional fees required by JCS/CHC/CCS, JCS/CHC/CCS and the municipalities such as Childersburg cooperate with each other to issue arrest warrants initiated by JCS/CHC/CCS based upon claims of “failure to obey court order.”
104. All of the named Plaintiffs were indigent at the time of the charges levied against them in Childersburg and at the times of their incarcerations. Each was unable to
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pay the fines and fees demanded by JCS/CHC/CCS due to their indigency and each was incarcerated as stated in detail in the above facts after recommendation by JCS/CHC/CCS.
105. The incarceration process used by JCS/CHC/CCS includes the use of JCS/CHC/CCS drafted forms to be implemented by the municipalities such as Childersburg which are then approved by administrative personnel at Childersburg without a hearing to determine indigency.
106. Under the policy and practice of JCS/CHC/CCS at Childersburg, unpaid fines and costs are unlawfully converted to undetermined days in jail for which the “offenders” have been also charged Thirty-One Dollars per day ($31/day), but are given no credit for time spent in jail against the fines levied.
107. The JCS/CHC/CCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines and its fees -- not traditional probation services. That collection focus allows the “offenders” to mail in payments if they live 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS/CHC/CCS employees are heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C.
The training manual used by JCS/CHC/CCS instructs its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provides court forms to order probation and payment to JCS/CHC/CCS. The payments to JCS/CHC/CCS are ordered under these forms even when adjudication is withheld. See Exhibit D.
The JCS/CHC/CCS training system also provides sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F.
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Similar JCS/CHC/CCS forms instruct the “offender” that they can avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS/CHC/CCS. See Exhibit G.
Finally, the JCS/CHC/CCS manual instructs its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provides forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant is issued, JCS/CHC/CCS also provides forms for warrant dismissal if JCS/CHC/CCS determines that the “offender” is now in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once arrested, JCS/CHC/CCS monitors those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J.
108. The agreement and forms drafted by JCS/CHC/CCS are uniformly used by it.
109. Clothing JCS/CHC/CCS with the color of state law and authority is purposely structured under the JCS/CHC/CCS system for it to impose and collect its fees, fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and is accomplished by providing JCS/CHC/CCS control over the money collected, the payment amount and schedule, the location where the money must be paid and control over how much will be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS/CHC/CCS each month as opposed to how much of it will be rebated to the towns such as Childersburg toward the fines adjudged.
110. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS/CHC/CCS, at its discretion, uses threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS/CHC/CCS, JCS/CHC/CCS will determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs. Under the system operated jointly by cities such as Childersburg and JCS/CHC/CCS, JCS/CHC/CCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements is routinely accepted without
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conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
111. The actions and efforts of JCS/CHC/CCS routinely result in court costs, fines and fees which exceed the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS/CHC/CCS routinely exceed the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in JCS/CHC/CCS taking action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
112. This system uses JCS/CHC/CCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employs JCS/CHC/CCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
113. In this process of converting fines to jail time, JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg do not give adequate notice of the nature of any lawful charge, fail to conduct hearings, fail to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation or the evidence relied upon, and fail to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
114. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS/CHC/CCS when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg also fail to provide counsel for the “offenders.”
115. After jailing an “offender,” JCS/CHC/CCS acts to further violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim
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of JCS/CHC/CCS and payments it has secured. As a result, there is no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated are granted release.
116. Under the practice and policy of JCS/CHC/CCS used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine is levied, additional fees, costs and other charges are added to the “offender” bill with JCS/CHC/CCS for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
117. In some cases, under the practice and policy of JCS/CHC/CCS, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused is nonetheless required to pay JCS/CHC/CCS fees. See Exhibit D.
118. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews discussed above, costs and fees for JCS/CHC/CCS can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration.
119. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries, including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT TWO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 120. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has denied their right to due process and the rights of the class members.
121. By contract, Childersburg has delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
122. That agreement was signed by the city mayor and bound Childersburg in specific municipal court areas requiring that its municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added). 123. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS. 124. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, also approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also served as municipal judge for Harpersville and at other cities which have agreed to similar contracts. 125. Municipalities are prohibited from laws, ordinances and policies which are in conflict with state law. See Ala Code Section 11-45-1. Also see, Ala. Const. Article 4 Section 89. 126. State law also dictates a separation of the branches of government. Ala Const. Article 3, Section 43.5 Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and
5Ala. Const. Art. III, Section 43 states: In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of
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towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by The Chief Justice of Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala Const., Art. 6, Section 139.
127. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts6 and the Childersburg city council has the legislative power to enact regulations and ordinances,7 but neither the mayor nor the council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
128. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
129. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and the Chief Justice.
130. Probation is only appropriate when an individual has been sentenced to jail time and not when only a fine has been assessed as is the case with the Plaintiffs and
laws and not of men.
6Ala. Code Section 11-43-83 - The mayor shall see that all contracts with the town or city are
faithfully kept or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required in judicial proceedings for and on behalf or performed. He shall execute all deeds and contracts and bonds required in judicial proceedings for and on behalf of the city or town and no sureties shall be required on such bond. He shall perform such other executive duties, in addition to those prescribed in this article, as may be required of him by the council.
7Ala. Code Section 11-43-43 - All legislative powers and other powers granted to cities and towns
shall be exercised by the council, except those powers conferred on some officers by law or ordinance. The council shall perform the duties required by this title and other applicable provisions of law.
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Class members. As a result, the Childersburg policy and contract to include probation in every court order mandates a judicial practice that continually deprives indigent misdemeanants of their constitutional rights.
131. The policy and contract of Childersburg are also in violation of the Alabama Constitution. Article I, Section 20, Ala. Const. specifically prohibits imprisonment for the payment of debts, yet the policy enforced at Childersburg regularly jails misdemeanants upon the recommendation of JCS/CHC/CCS for failure to pay fines, fees and costs. Article I, Section 16, Ala. Const. requires that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient surety, but despite this prohibition, misdemeanants are regularly jailed without lawful conviction under any contempt proceedings or probation violation and with no bail being set.
132. Each of the Plaintiffs was imprisoned, and some repeatedly, under these policies of Childersburg for their failure to pay fines, costs and the added fees mandated by the illegal contract between Childersburg and JCS/CHC/CCS. None of the Plaintiffs were accorded any hearing or consideration of their indigency before being jailed nor were any provided notice of charges, a hearing on charges levied that might result in imprisonment, or provided assistance of counsel before being imprisoned.
133. At the Childersburg Municipal Court operating under the contract and policy adopted by the City, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied was automatically placed on probation. This process used the JCS/CHC/CCS orders and forms even when there was no jail sentence adjudicated. This was routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The orders supplied by JCS/CHC/CCS under the agreement with
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Childersburg then require the individual to make payments to JCS/CHC/CCS, rather than the city clerk, of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees.
134. The Childersburg city clerk actively enforced these requirements as part of the policy and procedures established under this contract and refused to accept payments of fines and costs referring those payers such as the Plaintiffs instead to the JCS offices.
135. Childersburg, through its contract and operation, clothed JCS/CHC/CCS with the appearance of state authority and has allowed JCS employees to carry badges. Childersburg, as a matter of its agreement and policy, allowed the JCS/CHC/CCS employees to attend each municipal court session and referred to JCS/CHC/CCS employees as “parole officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes.
136. Under this system implemented by Childersburg, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead directed by Childersburg to make all payments including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs to JCS/CHC/CCS at the JCS office at hours and locations set by JCS/CHC/CCS.
137. The policy adopted and implemented by Childersburg was to comply with its contract with JCS.
138. Childersburg allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to control the money collected from persons such as Plaintiffs, and to determine how much each such municipal court “offender” must pay each month.
139. Childersburg also allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to determine how much of the collected sums would be credited to the collection “services” of JCS/CHC/CCS each month and how much of it would rebate to the towns such as Childersburg toward the municipal
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court fines adjudged. 140. This system, as a matter of routine, violates the rights of persons such as the
Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency.
141. Despite the lack of authority to do so, Childersburg permitted JCS/CHC/CCS, at its discretion, to use threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection.
142. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS/CHC/CCS, Childersburg permitted JCS/CHC/CCS to determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked, or impose additional fines and costs.
143. Under the system operated at Childersburg, JCS/CHC/CCS’ determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable release requirements was routinely accepted by Childersburg personnel without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action.
144. Childersburg permitted JCS/CHC/CCS to control and dictate these functions and, as a consequence, this routinely resulted in court costs and fines which exceed the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts and impose additional “jail fees” determined by the city clerk for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees at Childersburg routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which resulted in action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so.
145. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg contended that under
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the Childersburg contract, it was JCS/CHC/CCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order and therefore no investigation of indigency was undertaken by Childersburg as a matter of policy.
146. Under this system implemented at Childersburg, after simple fines were illegally converted to “probation” for payment, jail often resulted for the “offender” who did not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS/CHC/CCS and enforced by Childersburg. This system used and accepted JCS/CHC/CCS’ conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employed JCS/CHC/CCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
147. Under this system at Childersburg, each of the Plaintiffs was first only fined, but then automatically placed on “probation” though no jail sentence was adjudicated. Though each of the Plaintiffs was indigent, Childersburg made no investigation of that matter. When the Plaintiffs were unable to pay the fines, costs and additional JCS/CHC/CCS fees that Childersburg agreed to levy, recommendations from JCS/CHC/CCS were made and followed by Childersburg to incarcerate each of them for undetermined times.
148. Incarceration of individuals who cannot pay their fines and added fees, such as the Plaintiffs and class members, was also accomplished by bringing charges against them for “failure to obey court order,” though there is no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
149. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala. Code §15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations are made
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under the system at Childersburg. 150. Childersburg adopted and implemented JCS/CHC/CCS’ conclusion of a
“probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” and employed JCS/CHC/CCS forms for the issuance of warrants to incarcerate individuals whose original case had only been a fine.
151. In this process of converting fines to jail time, Childersburg did not give adequate notice to the “offender” of the nature of any lawful charge, it failed to conduct hearings, failed to make written findings concerning the reasons for any probation revocation or the evidence relied upon, and failed to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs.
152. Under this policy and practice at Childersburg when a simple fine was transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, Childersburg also failed to provide counsel for the “offenders.”
153. After jailing an “offender,” Childersburg acted to further violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by arbitrarily granting early release to some individuals while denying it to others under similar circumstances without any rational basis based upon the whim of JCS/CHC/CCS and payments it secured. As a result, there was no consistent standard of review or logical system under which those incarcerated were granted release.
154. Under the practice and policy used at Childersburg, after an adjudication under which a fine was levied, additional fees, costs, and other charges were added to the “offender” bill for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier.
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155. In some cases, under the practice and policy adopted and implemented at Childersburg, even where there has been a deferred adjudication, the accused was nonetheless required to pay JCS/CHC/CCS fees. See Exhibit D.
156. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews, whose specific facts are included above, the costs and fees at Childersburg can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration, all with the knowledge and participation of Childersburg.
157. As a proximate consequence of this deprivation of due process, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT THREE VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY JCS/CHC/CCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 158. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS/CHC/CCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the Class members to be free from unreasonable seizure. 159. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 160. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the
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Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fines imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well.
160. Under Alabama law, a fine can only be converted into jail time if the court makes findings under Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully failed to pay the fines. Even there, the statute provides specifics as to potential jail time.
161. Under the system created and implemented by JCS/CHC/CCS, there is no hearing to determine if an “offender” had willfully refused to pay nor any consideration of indigency and factors preventing payment.
162. Under the system created and implemented by JCS/CHC/CCS at Childersburg, every person who is unable to pay a simple fine and costs in full is placed on “probation.” Though their inability to pay the fine gives immediate notice of the “offenders’” financial limitations, the JCS/CHC/CCS system adds further costs and fees each month to these “offenders” who were already unable to pay the fines levied. The result increases the financial burden of persons who are accused of no more than traffic violations or misdemeanors.
163. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fines and costs.8
8Ala. Const. Art. I, Section 20 provides: “That no person shall be imprisoned for debt.” It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State, 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so. Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be
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164. Despite the longstanding law prohibiting incarceration for one’s inability to pay a fine/debt, JCS/CHC/CCS instituted arrest warrants for Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr. Fugatt when JCS/CHC/CCS knew these Plaintiffs could not pay the fines and fees JCS/CHC/CCS ordered and despite the fact that none had been initially given any jail time whatsoever.
165. Unless prompt payment of its fees and fines is made as determined by JCS/CHC/CCS, JCS/CHC/CCS takes steps to have the “probation” revoked or initiates charges for “failure to obey court order” beginning the process of incarcerating an individual who otherwise would never have seen jail under the original adjudication.9
166. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed under the JCS/CHC/CCS process as described and under the specific facts as stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
167. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FOUR
made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution.
"These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553. Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) 9 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 168. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the rights of the Class members to be free from unreasonable seizure. 169. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 170. In addition to a denial of due process guaranteed the Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment, the arrest and detainment of these “offenders” who cannot pay the fine imposed under this system constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well. 171. Under Alabama law, a simple fine can only be converted into jail time if the court makes findings under Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 (1975) that a defendant has willfully failed to pay the fines. 172. Childersburg’s policy of including probation with JCS/CHC/CCS in every municipal court order created the process by which misdemeanants were incarcerated without a willfulness hearing as required by Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 and in violation of Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 173. Under Alabama case law, the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment
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of fines or costs.10
174. Despite longstanding legal precedent prohibiting incarceration for one’s
inability to pay a fine/debt, Childersburg’s policy and personnel working in conjunction with
JCS/CHC/CCS unlawfully arrested and jailed Ms. Ray, Mr. Jews, Ms. Fugatt, and Mr.
Fugatt for their inability to pay simple fines and the added fees and costs dictated by the
Childersburg contract with JCS.
175. Childersburg police, municipal court processes and jail all became tools of
collection under forms and processes issued by JCS/CHC/CCS and which were routinely
followed by Childersburg. Childersburg’s policy and practice, after clothing JCS/CHC/CCS
with the appearance of a state actor acting on its behalf, allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to
threaten arrest or revocation of probation and/or incarceration in order to coerce these
indigents to pay Childersburg fines and JCS/CHC/CCS fees for misdemeanor offenses not
otherwise subject to jail time under the original adjudication.
176. When these threats failed to produce sufficiently, Childersburg police, clerks
and other personnel cooperated with JCS/CHC/CCS to arrest and jail the Plaintiffs.
10It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that an indigent defendant cannot be required to serve jail time for nonpayment of fine and costs. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lingle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 210, 283 So.2d 660 (1973); Smith v. State 51 Ala.App. 212, 283 So.2d 662 (1973). "To imprison an indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws." Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir.1977). This is not a case of a defendant who, though capable of paying a fine, refuses or neglects to do so.
Although Section 15-22-52, Alabama Code 1975, states that payment of fine and costs may be made a condition of suspension of sentence or probation, in State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So.2d 865 (1950), our Supreme Court indicated that such a condition was contrary to our constitution.
"These benefits (probation and suspension of sentence) are not the subject of bargain and sale to be conditioned on the payment of costs and fees assessed as an incident to the prosecution and trial and to condition these benefits on the payment of such costs and fees violate the letter and spirit of Section 13 of the Constitution of 1901 which provides that 'justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'" Esdale, 253 Ala. at 553.
Crutcher v. State, 439 So. 2d 725; 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
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177. Each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under the JCS/CHC/CCS process as described and under the specific facts stated above all of which constitute unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.11
178. As a proximate consequence of this unlawful seizure, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity all while being indigent.
COUNT FIVE VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY JCS/CHC/CCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 179. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS/CHC/CCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members. 180. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 181. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS/CHC/CCS at Childersburg when a simple fine is transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel is not provided for the indigent “offenders.” 182. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the
11 “Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Oliver, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
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Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS/CHC/CCS pursuant to JCS/CHC/CCS form orders and its contract with the city.
183. The “probation” process at JCS/CHC/CCS is essentially a collection vehicle for the city customer which adds monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine. JCS/CHC/CCS provided no services to the Plaintiffs, but represents itself as acting on behalf of the city which clothes it with that appearance. See Exhibit M.
184. JCS/CHC/CCS denies any responsibility to investigate the indigency of the “offenders” and thus takes no action to determine or consider disabilities, employment status or other reasons justifying non payment.
185. Simple fines without jail sentences are automatically and illegally converted to “probation” under the JCS/CHC/CCS system used at Childersburg if the offender cannot promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
186. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail and actual incarceration take place if the fines, fees and costs are not paid as scheduled by JCS/CHC/CCS.
187. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the JCS/CHC/CCS collection system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines.
188. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS/CHC/CCS focus on collections, charges of “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” are initiated by JCS/CHC/CCS under its system.
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189. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS/CHC/CCS nor its city customer like Childersburg provide counsel for those “offenders.”
190. At the point jail sentences are potential, the JCS/CHC/CCS system used at Childersburg use a charge of “probation violation,” but does not provide notice of charges, findings required for conviction. Similarly, JCS/CHC/CCS also uses a charge of “failure to obey court order,” though that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 is the basis, under the JCS/CHC/CCS system there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
191. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed under this JCS/CHC/CCS system at Childersburg and without any assistance of counsel.
192. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
193. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries, including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT SIX VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.
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194. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the Class members.
195. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
196. Under this joint policy and practice of JCS/CHC/CCS at Childersburg, when a simple fine was transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, counsel was not provided for the indigent “offenders.”
197. Each of the named Plaintiffs was initially ordered to pay only a fine at the Childersburg municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS/CHC/CCS pursuant to JCS/CHC/CCS form orders and the contract approved by Childersburg.
198. The contract signed by Childersburg approved a “probation” process as essentially a collection vehicle for the city to collect its fines. That agreement, as discussed above, conflicts with state statutes, violates state constitutional requirements for separation of power in the branches of government and exceeds the authority of the mayor and council.
199. Under that agreement, Childersburg allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to add monthly fees to the “offender” who has already disclosed an inability to pay the fine when adjudicated, even though JCS/CHC/CCS provides no services to them.
200. Under the agreement and with the knowledge and approval of Childersburg, JCS/CHC/CCS represented itself as acting on behalf of the City which clothes it with that
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appearance. See Exhibit M. 201. Under this agreement, Childersburg has unlawfully invaded the province of
the municipal court and mandated that each order there contain provisions for fees to JCS/CHC/CCS.
202. By its agreement, at Childersburg, simple fines without jail sentences were automatically and illegally converted to probation under the JCS/CHC/CCS system used at Childersburg if the offender could not promptly pay the entire fine and costs.
203. After this conversion from a fine to probation, threats of jail were used by JCS/CHC/CCS with the approval of Childersburg and actual incarceration then took place by police and other City personnel at Childersburg if the fines, fees and costs were not paid as scheduled by JCS/CHC/CCS.
204. The jeopardy of jail time was not present when the simple fines were adjudicated against the Plaintiffs and would not have been present but for the Childersburg agreement to adopt and use the JCS/CHC/CCS collection system in the administration of its court system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines.
205. With the Plaintiffs’ inability to pay and the JCS/CHC/CCS focus on collections, charges were routinely initiated claiming “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order.” These were initiated by JCS/CHC/CCS under its system and then approved by Childersburg personnel.
206. At that point, jail sentences become potential jeopardy for the “offenders” such as the Plaintiffs on charges that have never before been subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Nevertheless, neither JCS/CHC/CCS nor Childersburg provide counsel for those “offenders.”
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207. At the point when jail sentences become potential, Childersburg presented charges of alleged “probation violation,” but did not provide notice of charges, nor were findings made as required for conviction. Similarly, though JCS/CHC/CCS also regularly proposed a charge of “failure to obey court order” which Childersburg then pursued, that is not a valid charge. If willful failure to pay under state statutes such as Ala. Code Section 15-18-62 is used as the basis, under the Childersburg system with JCS/CHC/CCS, there is no finding or hearing on the issue of willfulness.
208. Each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed by Childersburg under this JCS/CHC/CCS system and none were provided any assistance of counsel in the process leading to their incarceration.
209. These actions constitute a denial of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
210. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT SEVEN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY JCS/CHC/CCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 211. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS/CHC/CCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
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excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and Class members.
212. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
213. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and as such limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.
214. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 1522-54(a).
215. As mentioned above, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment, but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
216. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
217. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances, none of which were followed by JCS/CHC/CCS.
218. Under these facts, after substantial fines were levied against indigent persons
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such as the Plaintiffs, JCS/CHC/CCS, operating under an illegal contract with Childersburg, then increased that burden with additional monthly fees and costs charged by JCS/CHC/CCS. For the named Plaintiffs, the total amounts demanded by JCS/CHC/CCS exceeded the $500 limitation on the municipal court authority.
219. Under the JCS/CHC/CCS system at Childersburg, though JCS/CHC/CCS made no inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system or the reason for their failure to make payments, JCS/CHC/CCS increased the amount demanded from the Plaintiffs to the point that even partial payments could not be made.
For example, Timothy Fugatt was fined $148, has currently paid over $450, and is told that he still owes over $500, all from an initial $148 fine for an expired tag. Charging over six times the initial fine is excessive, disproportionate to the violation and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Deunate Jews was fined $166 for a dismissed charge, has paid over $800, and is told that he still owes over $1,807, all from an initial $166 fine for a dismissed charge. Charging over 15 times the initial fine is excessive and violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
220. The Plaintiffs were all indigent and their failure to pay JCS/CHC/CCS as demanded resulted in threats of arrests and ultimately incarceration based upon JCS/CHC/CCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
221. These fines and fees levied against the Plaintiffs exceeded the statutory limits of the court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-18-62.
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222. JCS/CHC/CCS also failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
223. The practice and policy of JCS/CHC/CCS in instituting charges resulting in jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
224. Each of the named Plaintiffs was, at all pertinent times, indigent and each was incarcerated at the behest of JCS/CHC/CCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS/CHC/CCS, though all had initially only received fines by the Childersburg Municipal Court.
225. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
226. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT EIGHT VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 227. The Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg, acting under color of state law in
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in its actions with the Plaintiffs and Class members.
228. By contract as discussed in detail above, Childersburg has illegally delegated many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court to JCS/CHC/CCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees.
229. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and, as such, limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.
230. Under Alabama law, a municipal court has no authority to award a fine on any particular charge over $500.00, Ala. Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3), and even lawful probation for misdemeanors cannot, by statute, extend beyond a two-year period. See Ala. Code § 1522-54(a).
231. As mentioned above, Ala. Code, § 15-18-62 is the only statutory method under which a fine levied by a court on adjudication can be converted to imprisonment, but that can legally occur only where the court finds willful nonpayment of the fine and cost.
232. Even upon proper notice and a finding of willful nonpayment under § 15-1862, the conversion of fine to imprisonment has a specific ratio such that a fine not to exceed $500.00 shall result in no more than 20 days. See Ala. Code § 15-18-62(2).
233. Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the method for dealing with fines, restitution and the failure to pay under a variety of circumstances, none of which were followed by JCS/CHC/CCS nor required by Childersburg.
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234. Under these facts, Childersburg illegally contracted with JCS to add monthly fees and costs to each municipal court order. This agreement increased the substantial fines levied against indigent persons such as the Plaintiffs.
235. Neither Childersburg nor JCS/CHC/CCS made inquiry into the indigency of the “offenders” in the system. As a result, only the Plaintiffs’ failure to make payments as dictated by JCS/CHC/CCS under the agreement with Childersburg resulted in threats of arrests. If threats failed to produce the demanded payments, arrest and incarceration followed under process at Childersburg based upon JCS/CHC/CCS’ recommendation that the offender had “failed to obey a court order” or had violated “probation.”
236. These fines exceeded the statutory limits of the municipal court and the incarceration periods imposed for the failure to pay exceeded those in Ala. Code §15-1862.
237. Once in jail, Childersburg failed to give credit to the jailed Plaintiffs for the time they served as required under statute at the rate of $15 per day against the fine.
238. The practice and policy at Childersburg of imposing jail time for inability to pay its fees, fines and costs violates the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
239. Each of the named Plaintiffs was at all pertinent times indigent and each was incarcerated by Childersburg personnel at the behest of JCS/CHC/CCS for their inability to pay fines, fees and costs on the schedule determined by JCS/CHC/CCS.
240. As a result of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, each of the Plaintiffs was subjected to excessive fines, fees, and costs beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipality and violation of the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
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punishment. 241. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Eighth Amendment
rights, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT NINE DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY JCS/CHC/CCS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 242. JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deny the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 243. JCS/CHC/CCS, though a private company, has been clothed with the color of state law by the specific actions of Childersburg, all pursuant to an agreement between these parties. 244. As referenced above, by agreement, JCS/CHC/CCS employees attended all municipal court sessions, collected city fines and costs, were labeled as “probation officers,” carried badges and regularly represented themselves as acting “on behalf of the City of Childersburg.” Additionally, the JCS/CHC/CCS forms were used at the municipal court and fees for JCS/CHC/CCS were included in every court order there. 245. In the system established by an illegal agreement between JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg, the actions of JCS/CHC/CCS are inextricably intertwined with those of
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the government. 246. The practice and policy under this agreement automatically requires
“probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Childersburg and was a required part of every printed order at the municipal court and required payment of monthly fees to JCS/CHC/CCS.
247. Persons who are financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg are not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons are not charged any fees for JCS/CHC/CCS and are not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process.
248. For those such as the Plaintiffs who were unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” under JCS/CHC/CCS was required on every court order.
249. This requirement on its municipal court is part of the City contract with JCS. That contract, as discussed above, exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government as embodied in the Alabama Constitution. Ala. Const, Article 3, Section 43.
250. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposed incarceration and additional costs on individuals who were unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as lawfully required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code, Section 15-18-62.
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251. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
252. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8. The JCS/CHC/CCS policy at Childersburg is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” cannot pay immediately and creates its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed.
253. These additional JCS/CHC/CCS fines result in disparate treatment between those who can immediately pay the fine from those who are unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS/CHC/CCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
254. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
255. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by
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having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT TEN DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY CHILDERSBURG Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 256. JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deny the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 257. This was accomplished by the illegal contractual agreement between JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg whereby their actions are inextricably intertwined in a practice and policy which automatically requires “probation” for any person who, despite having no jail sentence, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg and was part of every printed order at the municipal court and required payment of monthly fees to JCS/CHC/CCS. 258. Persons who were financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs at Childersburg were not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons were not charged any fees for JCS/CHC/CCS and were not subjected to threats of arrest and incarceration in the collection process. 259. For those such as the Plaintiffs who were unable to fully pay the fine and costs when levied by the municipal court, “probation” with JCS/CHC/CCS was required on every order. 260. This requirement is part of the City contract with JCS/CHC/CCS. That
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contract, as mentioned above, exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of municipalities and imposes on the municipal court an agreement in violation of the separation of powers doctrine between the branches of government.
261. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying a fines and costs, this policy and practice at Childersburg routinely imposed incarceration and additional costs on individuals who were unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as would lawfully be required under Alabama statutes. See Ala Code Section 15-18-62.
262. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate rational state interest basis.
263. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal court which is required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8. The JCS/CHC/CCS policy at Childersburg was not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it added fees only to “offenders” who could not pay immediately and created its own “rules” for penalizing individuals who could not pay as directed.
264. These additional JCS/CHC/CCS fines resulted in disparate treatment between those who could immediately pay the fine from those who were unable to immediately pay the fine. Furthermore, those “offenders” within the Childersburg/ JCS/CHC/CCS arrangement were processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that have not allowed JCS/CHC/CCS to charge additional fees to those who cannot pay. There is no state authority for such disparate treatment.
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265. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded.
266. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered injuries, including having fines converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS/CHC/CCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
COUNT ELEVEN DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 267. A real controversy exists between these parties concerning several issues including the validity of the JCS contract with Childersburg and the legality of the actions taken under that contract such that declaratory relief is appropriate. 268. Plaintiffs request the Court to declare that the JCS contract with Childersburg was void ab initio because Childersburg had no authority to contractually bind its municipal court. 269. Childersburg entered into an agreement with JCS that exceeded both statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities. Furthermore, that agreement violated the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Alabama Constitution. See Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. As a result, that agreement is void and due to be declared a nullity.
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270. Alabama state law also dictates a separation of the branches of government. Ala. Const., Article 3, Section 43. Under that doctrine, legislative powers granted to cities and towns are exercised by the city council, Ala. Code, Section 11-43-43, while the mayor of the city is responsible for executive duties. Ala. Code, Section 11-43-83. If the town establishes a municipal court, its administration is supervised by the Chief Justice of Alabama. Ala. Code, Section 12-2-7 et. seq.; Ala. Const., Art 6, Section 139.
271. Childersburg’s mayor has the executive power to execute and enforce contracts and the Childersburg city council has the legislative power to enact regulations and ordinances, but neither the mayor nor the council has the power to invade the administration of its judiciary.
272. Childersburg exceeded its statutory authority and acted in conflict with state statute and constitutional limitations when, acting through its mayor, it agreed with JCS to bind its municipal court to include probation and fees for JCS in every court order entered by its hired judge. That action essentially sold the court process for purposes of increasing income to the city.
273. That agreement also violates the uniformity required by statute for processing traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
274. The process Childersburg under JCS/CHC/CCS is not uniform with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it adds fees only to “offenders” who cannot pay immediately and creates other “rules” for further penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed. “Offenders” who are able to immediately pay the fine are charged one rate, but those that are unable to immediately
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pay for the same offense are charged the fine and required to pay JCS/CHC/CCS monthly fees that accumulate each month that passes.
275. The “offenders” within the Childersburg/JCS/CHC/CCS arrangement are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in municipal jurisdictions that have not contracted for JCS to charge its fees to those who cannot pay and as a result violates uniformity requirements of Ala. Code Section 12-14-8.
276. The illegal agreement and policy of Childersburg invades and overrides the judicial authority and court administration reserved to the municipal judge and The Chief Justice.
277. Plaintiffs also request the Court to declare the actions of JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg under this contract to be unconstitutional under the premises discussed above. Under this void agreement, JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg have implemented joint policies and practices to prosecute persons such as the Plaintiffs where there is no jurisdiction or authority to do so under Alabama law, doing so intentionally in an effort to coerce payment of fines and costs from indigent people. These efforts have resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their Class beyond the limited jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
278. Further, JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg have added increased punishment, fines and costs after adjudication and even where there has been no adjudication of guilt, all without jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law.
279. JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg, through their joint action, have systematically applied Ala. Code § 15-18-62 in an unconstitutional fashion denying the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights.
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280. Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful nonpayment.12
281. Under JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg policies and practices, and through their joint and consistent action, “offenders” before the Childersburg Municipal Court such as the Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent are systematically imprisoned for nonpayment with no determination of willfulness and with no consideration of their indigency or ability to pay.
282. Furthermore, once imprisoned, the requirements of time to be served under § 15-18-62 are ignored by the practice and policy of JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg.
283. The result of this consistent systematic policy and practice of JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg is essentially a debtor’s prison for fines and charges levied by JCS/CHC/CCS under a void contract with the various municipalities for which it works.
284. Plaintiffs request the Court to enjoin the actions of JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg identified herein to prevent the continuation of these violations of statutory and constitutional prohibitions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court
12Section 15-18-62 Imprisonment for failure to pay fines and costs. In cases of willful nonpayment of the fine and costs, the defendant shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county as follows: (1) If the fine and costs do not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), no more than 10 days; (2) If the fine and costs exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but do not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), no more than 20 days; (3) If the fine and costs exceed five hundred dollars ($500), but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), no more than 30 days; and (4) For every additional one hundred dollars ($100) or fractional part thereof, 4 days.
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will take jurisdiction of this cause and upon the final hearing: a. Certify this matter as a proper class action maintainable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Award the Plaintiffs such damages as this Court shall find the Plaintiffs have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit; c. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which declares the JCS contract with municipalities such as Childersburg to be void and in violation of the statutory and constitutional limitations on municipalities; d. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which enjoins JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg from engaging in the violations of law set forth hereinabove; e. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg in the future from placing persons on probation for simple fines and declares that any current probation and fees for simple fines is void; f. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg in the future from assessing fines in excess of $500 and extending probation periods beyond 24 months and declare that any previously assessed fines and probationary periods in excess of these limits to be void; g. Enter an injunction and other declaratory relief which prohibits
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JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg in the future from imprisoning indigent persons for failure to pay fines and fees and ordering the release of any currently incarcerated indigent persons who were jailed for these reasons; h. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class members damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal to any amounts paid on fines and all fees levied by JCS/CHC/CCS and Childersburg that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful (along with interest), and the annulment of any remaining unpaid fines that are found unconstitutional and/or unlawful; i. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class the cost of this matter, including a reasonable attorneys' fee; j. Award to the Plaintiffs and the Class members such other, further and more general relief as the Court may deem appropriate under these circumstances including cost of these proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans ASB-1661-N76G Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: gdevans@evanslawpc.com s/ Alexandria Parrish Alexandria Parrish
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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 305 Filed 02/01/16 Page 65 of 66
ASB-2477-D66P Attorney for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: ap@evanslawpc.com
D. Patrick Evans ASB-3209-R67G The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: dpevans@evanslawpc.com
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr. ASB-1754G63R Attorney for the Plaintiffs Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis LLC The Kress Building, 301 19th Street North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Telephone: (205) 314-0500 Fax: (205) 254-1500 E-Mail: rwiggins@wigginschilds.com
Erwin Chemerinsky Attorney for the Plaintiffs University of California Dean of Irvine School of Law 401 E. Peltason Drive Irvine, CA 92697-8000 Telephone: (949) 824-7722 E-mail: EChemerinsky@law.uci.edu
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand trial by struck jury.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 1st day of February, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing Fourth Amended and Restated Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
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Timothy P. Donahue, Esquire DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1020 22nd Street South Birmingham, Alabama 35205 David R. Boyd, Esquire Will Hill Tankersly, Esquire Gregory C. Cook, Esquire Ed R. Haden, Esquire L. Conrad Anderson, IV, Esquire Adam K. Israel, Esquire Ginny Willcox Leavens, Esquire Chase T. Espy, Esquire BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1500 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Michael L. Jackson, Esquire Larry S. Logsdon, Esquire WALLACE, JORDAN, RATLIFF & BRANDT, L.L.C. P.O. Box 530910 Birmingham, Alabama 35253 F. Lane Finch, Jr., Esquire Brian C. Richardson, Esquire Swift Currie McGhee and Hiers, LLP 2 North 20th Street, Suite 1405 Birmingham, AL 35203
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

FILED
2017 Feb-17 AM 08:55 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

GINA KAY RAY, et al.,

}

}

Plaintiffs,

}

}

v.

} Case No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

}

JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS SERVICES, }

INC., et al.,

}

}

Defendants.

}

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg’s (hereinafter “City”)
Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. # 390, 391, 422). The motions are fully briefed.
(Docs. # 419, 420, 452-54, 495). After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, the
court concludes that the City’s summary judgment motions are due to be granted.
II. The Rule 56 Evidence and the Undisputed Facts1
A. Procedural History
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs present five claims for monetary relief and
one claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. First, they allege that the City violated their due
process rights by delegating certain functions of the Childersburg Municipal Court (hereinafter
“Municipal Court”) to Defendant Judicial Corrections Services (hereinafter “JCS”), binding the
1 The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed to be undisputed, their respective responses to those submissions, and the court’s own examination of the evidentiary record. All reasonable doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Info Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts that could be established through live testimony at trial. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).

Municipal Court to utilize JCS’s private services, imposing probation in orders that did not impose suspended incarceration sentences, creating a probation system that imposed fines and fees without regard for a probationer’s indigency, “routinely accept[ing]” recommendations to incarcerate or restrict probationers without conducting delinquency or probation hearings, failing to provide indigency hearings before imprisoning probationers for failure to pay, and imposing fines, court costs, and probation sentences without jurisdiction. (See Doc. # 305 at ¶¶ 120-57).
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the City violated their rights to be free from unreasonable seizure because it unlawfully delegated authority to JCS and “created the process by which [probationers] were incarcerated without a willfulness hearing.” (Id. at ¶¶ 169, 172). They allege that the City’s employees participated in unlawfully arresting them for failing to pay fines and fees to JCS. (Id. at ¶ 174).
Third, Plaintiffs claim that the City violated their constitutional right to counsel by participating in a “joint policy and practice” with JCS that “transformed” sentences of fines and fees into imprisonment sentences without granting Plaintiffs access to counsel. (See id. at ¶¶ 194-210).
Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that the City violated their Eighth Amendment rights by contracting with JCS to impose monthly fees against indigent probationers, imposing fees in excess of statutory limits, and jailing probationers for failing to pay fees and fines. (See id. at ¶¶ 227-41).
Fifth, Plaintiffs claim that the City denied them equal protection by engaging in a contractual policy that arbitrarily imposed disparate treatment on the basis of wealth. (See id. at ¶¶ 257, 262). According to Plaintiffs, the City’s “practice and policy” treated poor people less favorably than wealthier people because Municipal Court defendants who were able to pay the
2

imposed fines and costs did not face the additional burden of probation under JCS’s supervision, whereas defendants who were unable to pay those fines and costs were placed on probation, charged additional fees, and subjected to threats of incarceration. (See id. at ¶¶ 257-59, 261).
Finally, Plaintiffs’ operative complaint seeks several forms of declaratory and injunctive relief against the City. Plaintiffs request that the court declare the probation services contract between the City and JCS (hereinafter “JCS-City Contract”) void because it violates Alabama state law. (Id. at ¶¶ 268-69). And, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the City committed unconstitutional conduct pursuant to the JCS-City Contract. (Id. at ¶ 277). Plaintiffs also request that the court enjoin the City and JCS from committing the constitutional violations identified in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 284).
This court has denied the City’s motion to dismiss an earlier complaint. (See Docs. # 6566). The City has now filed three separate motions for summary judgment. One motion seeks summary judgment for the claims by Plaintiffs Timothy and Kristy Fugatt. (Doc. # 390). The second motion seeks summary judgment for the claims by Plaintiff Deunate Jews. (Doc. # 391). The third motion seeks summary judgment for the claims by Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray. (Doc. # 422). Following the submission of these summary judgment motions, the court administratively terminated Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, pending its rulings on Defendants’ summary judgment motions. (Doc. # 496).
B. Formation of the Relationship Between the City, the Municipal Court, and JCS
On June 21, 2005, Childersburg’s City Council approved a proposal to replace its private probation service with JCS. (Doc. # 421-7 at 2).2 The City Council’s minutes reported that
2 For ease of reference, this opinion refers to the page numbers of the parties’ briefs, the minuscript pages in deposition transcripts, and the CM/ECF page numbers for exhibits with unnumbered pages, such as the City Council’s minutes cited above.
3

Judge Larry Ward and the Municipal Court’s clerk had recommended JCS.3 (Id.). Thereafter, the City’s mayor and a JCS vice president signed the JCS-City Contract. (Doc. # 392-16 at 3). The JCS-City Contract purported to include the Municipal Court as a party to that agreement. (Id.). Moreover, the City’s mayor signed the contract on behalf of the “CITY/COURT OF CHILDERSBURG, Alabama.” (Id.). But the Municipal Court’s judge did not sign the contract. (See id.).
The JCS-City Contract required JCS to perform supervision for “all probated cases sentenced by the [Municipal] Court,” including supervision of indigent probationers. (Id. at 4). This contract also directed JCS to notify the Municipal Court of non-complying probationers. (Id. at 5). It allowed JCS to collect fines, restitution, and court costs on behalf of the Municipal Court if directed to do so. (Id.). JCS agreed not to charge its standard probation fee to indigent probationers. (Id. at 4). Furthermore, it agreed not to charge supervision fees to probationers who paid their fines and court costs within a week of their sentencing hearing. (Id.).
JCS agreed not to charge the City or the Municipal Court for its services. (Id. at 6). Instead, the JCS-City Contract purportedly obligated the Municipal Court to include certain fees in “each Court Order.” (Id.). These fees included a $35.00 monthly probation fee and a $10.00 probation set-up fee. (Id.).
It is unclear whether it was a City official or the Municipal Court’s judge that initially proposed JCS as a private probation service for the Municipal Court. The mayor who signed the JCS-City Contract testified that JCS worked with the Municipal Court, not the City, even though JCS had entered into a contract with the City. (Doc. # 392-9 at 76). He claimed that Judge Ward had recommended JCS. (Id. at 45). In contrast, Judge Ward claimed to be unaware of the JCS-
3 The City’s former mayor, B.J. Meeks, also testified that Judge Ward and the magistrate had recommended JCS. (Doc. # 392-9 at 52-53).
4

City Contract during his deposition and was not able to say who would be authorized to bind the Municipal Court to such a contract. (Doc. # 392-5 at 10, 12). He denied any involvement in the contract’s formation. (Id. at 12-13). He also denied recommending JCS to the City or its mayor. (Id. at 18, 42).
The City Council terminated the JCS-City Contract in May 2015. (Doc. # 392-63 at 2). C. Operation of the Municipal Court Judge Ward served as the judge for the Municipal Court from 1976 to 2013. (Doc. # 392-5 at 7). He claims he was unaware of the JCS-City Contract, did not know that JCS had increased its monthly probation fee, and did not understand who was authorized to bind the Municipal Court to a contract with JCS. (Id. at 26, 34). Judge Ward also provided this “illuminating” testimony during his deposition about the scope of his work for the Municipal Court: [Plaintiff’s counsel]: . . . Am [I] understanding you to say that you go out there [to the City] two hours a month, and you don’t know anything at all except what you learned as Judge and as it relates to Childersburg or its operations or its court’s operations, correct? [Judge Ward]: I think that’s correct. (Id. at 91). Nonetheless, Judge Ward stated that the Municipal Court had “very little interference or communication with the City.” (Id. at 35). Judge Ward only worked “a couple of hours a month” for the Municipal Court. (Id. at 24). For his services, the City paid Judge Ward $12,000 per year. (Doc. # 392-9 at 55). According to Judge Ward, the Municipal Court’s clerks -- who also served as magistrates -- were hired by the City’s mayor and city council. (Doc. # 392-5 at 22-23). Judge Ward did not have the power to hire, fire, or discipline the Municipal Court’s clerks. (Id. at 23-24). Those clerks were paid by the City “through Municipal Corrections funds.” (Doc. # 392-10 at 27). The City’s
5

treasurer believed that the Municipal Court’s former magistrate had been a City employee. (Id. at 26-27). But she stated that the Municipal Court’s current magistrate was an employee of the Court. (Id. at 27).
According to JCS’s Childersburg office manager, Lisha Kidd, Judge Ward signed blank court orders, and Kidd would fill them in based on the judge’s instructions. (Doc. # 392-2 at 105). JCS only provided probation services when probation was mandated by a municipal court order. (Id. at 107). After Judge Ward had sentenced an individual to probation, Kidd informed the probationer about the terms of probation in a separate room. (Id. at 122-23). A probationer owed almost no fees to JCS if the court-ordered fines were paid within seven days of sentencing. (Id. at 109, 121). Once JCS began charging probation fees, though, a probationer could not end his or her probation sentence by merely paying off the fines originally imposed by the Municipal Court.4 (Id. at 109-10).
During Judge Ward’s tenure as the Municipal Court’s judge,5 JCS employees drafted probation revocation petitions if probationers had failed to comply with the terms of probation. (See id. at 123-24). JCS informed the Municipal Court of the probationer’s payment history and missed appointments. (Id. at 124). Then, JCS would select a date for a hearing and inform the probationer of the hearing by mail. (Id. at 127). A JCS employee would determine whether the Municipal Court should hold a compliance hearing or a revocation hearing, depending on whether the probationer had met his or her obligations. (Id. at 129-30).
4 According to Kidd, JCS’s probation fees were incorporated into the Municipal Court’s probation order as JCS assessed them against the probationer. (Doc. # 392-2 at 110).
5 The Municipal Court’s procedures changed significantly when the City appointed a new municipal court judge. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-2 at 126-27 (stating that the Municipal Court had begun setting probation revocation hearings itself four to six months before Kidd’s deposition, whereas JCS had set the hearing dates earlier)).
6

JCS’s form probation revocation petitions informed the Municipal Court of the appointments a probationer had missed and the amount he or she owed to the City and to JCS. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-32 at 2). They requested an arrest warrant from the Municipal Court “if necessary.” (See, e.g., id.). The petitions included an order setting a hearing that purportedly was signed by the Municipal Court’s judge or a Court magistrate. (See, e.g., id.). Some revocation-hearing orders informed the probationer that the hearing could be cancelled if a payment was made.6 (See, e.g., id.). The revocation-hearing orders suspended the probationer’s sentence “until a resolution [was] decided.” (See, e.g., id.). According to Plaintiffs, JCS did not file the revocation petitions with the Municipal Court before the scheduled revocation hearings, even though the revocation orders indicated that they had been approved by the Municipal Court prior to the revocation hearing. (Doc. # 392-2 at 194).
JCS did send revocation petitions and revocation-hearing orders to probationers by mail. (Id. at 196). JCS also sent notices to show cause to non-compliant probationers. (Id. at 197). A notice to show cause would direct a probationer to appear at the Municipal Court and explain why he or she had failed to pay the court-imposed fines and fees. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-34 at 2). It warned a probationer that an arrest warrant would be issued if he or she failed to appear at the hearing. (Id.). It stipulated that the hearing could be cancelled if the probationer reported to JCS and paid a certain amount. (Id.). These notices were not filed with the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 392-2 at 206).
If a petitioner failed to appear at a revocation hearing, the Municipal Court’s magistrate often would issue a capias warrant. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-35 at 2 (capias warrant issued after Plaintiff Jews had failed to appear at a revocation hearing). The Municipal Court issued capias
6 Some revocation-hearing orders did not include the option of cancelling the hearing by making a payment. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-43 at 2).
7

warrants when a probationer had “failed to report, as ordered by the [Municipal] Court[,] on a previous court date.” (Doc. # 392-2 at 312). Many of these warrants stated that a defendant had been convicted of “FTOCO”, otherwise known as failure to obey court order. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-35 at 2). (See also Doc. # 392-2 at 312-13 (explaining the failure to obey court order charge)). The Municipal Court convicted a probationer of this charge when he or she had failed to comply with an order directing him or her to appear at a hearing. (Id. at 313). According to the City’s attorneys, though, a City employee searched through the City’s records and found no municipal ordinance criminalizing failure to obey a court order.7 (Doc. # 402-35). The Municipal Court’s arrest warrants included a cash bond that an arrestee had to pay in order to be released. (See, e.g., Doc. # 392-35 at 2). The Municipal Court’s magistrate set that bail amount using a written schedule. (Doc. # 392-13 at 74-75).
D. Probation of Plaintiffs Timothy and Kristy Fugatt City police issued Kristy Fugatt two traffic tickets in November 2010 for driving with an expired tag and an expired license. (Doc. # 392-66 at 14-15). Fugatt renewed her license (Doc. # 392-6 at 105), and the Municipal Court only assessed court costs for each ticket, (Doc. # 39266 at 14-15). When Kristy Fugatt informed the Municipal Court judge that she could not pay the full amount charged, he directed her to an intake area to “talk to JCS.” (Doc. # 392-6 at 105-07). Fugatt signed an intake form stating that she would pay a certain amount. (Id. at 108-09). Fugatt was placed on probation under JCS’s supervision. (See Doc. # 392-18 at 9 (stating that Kristy Fugatt had been sentenced to 24 months’ probation in January 2011)). Timothy Fugatt received a traffic ticket in December 2010 for driving with an expired vehicle tag. (Doc. # 392-66 at 11). The Municipal Court did not convict him of the traffic
7 Moreover, the arrest reports drafted by City police officers provide no citation to the ordinance arrestees violated when failing to obey a court order, even though many of those reports cited other legal provisions that the arrestee had violated. (See, e.g., Docs. # 392-36 at 2; 396-42 at 2; 392-57 at 2).
8

offense but ordered him to pay court costs. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt testified that he had attempted to inform the Municipal Court judge about his child’s terminal illness during the hearing but did not get an opportunity to speak to the judge due to the speed of the proceedings. (Doc. # 392-7 at 74). Similar to his wife, the Municipal Court also sentenced Timothy Fugatt to 24 months’ probation under JCS’s supervision. (Doc. # 392-19 at 7).
JCS issued revocation petitions for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on June 28, 2011. (Docs. # 392-18 at 7; 392-19 at 6). The Municipal Court held revocation hearings for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on August 11, 2011, but neither of them appeared at the hearing. (Id.). The Municipal Court issued warrants against both probationers in August 2011. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt’s August 2011 arrest warrant stated that he had been convicted of failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 392-20 at 2). This warrant required Timothy Fugatt to pay $540 as a cash bond in order to be released. (Id.).
A City police officer arrested Timothy Fugatt on February 26, 2012. (Id. at 4). Timothy and Kristy Fugatt have testified that the officer arrested both of them on this date. (Docs. # 40227 at 3; 402-28 at 3). The Fugatts were taken to the City’s police station and placed in a holding cell. (Id.). City police released them on February 26th after they had paid $900 for a cash bond. (Id.). JCS’s records indicate that the Municipal Court reinstated the Fugatts’ probation sentences in May 2012. (Docs. # 392-18 at 7; 392-19 at 5). The Municipal Court issued warrants against the Fugatts in November 2012 after they failed to appear in court. (Docs. # 392-18 at 4; 392-19 at 3). The Municipal Court then reinstated their probation sentences in January 2013. (Id.). Ultimately, the Municipal Court terminated the Fugatts’ probation sentences on November 1, 2014. (See Doc. # 392-18 at 4).
9

E. Probation of Plaintiff Deunate Jews
Plaintiff Jews was charged with harassment in 2008. (See Doc. # 392-27 at 2). The
Municipal Court dismissed the harassment charge against Jews in January 2009, subject to
conditions that Jews (1) pay court costs to the Municipal Court and (2) avoid contact with the
complainant. (Id.). During a deposition, Jews claimed that he had contested the Municipal
Court’s authority to impose court costs against him when the criminal charge against him had
been dismissed. (Doc. # 392-1 at 50). Judge Ward responded that he would “lock [Jews] up”
unless he signed a probation order. (Id. at 50-51). Jews did not ask Judge Ward any more
questions because he believed that the judge would imprison him if he “said any little thing.”
(Id. at 51). Jews was unable to pay the assessed court costs on the date of the hearing. (Id. at
52).
After signing a probation order, Jews advised a JCS employee that he would not report to
JCS’s probation office because the Municipal Court had forced him to sign the probation order.
(Id. at 56). He informed the JCS employee that he would not pay the imposed court costs
because his case had been dismissed. (Id. at 59).
The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in Jews’s case on February 12, 2009, but Jews did not appear at the hearing.8 (Doc. # 392-33 at 6). The Municipal Court’s magistrate
issued a capias warrant against Jews on February 17, 2009 for failure to obey a court order.
(Doc. # 392-35 at 2). The warrant directed Jews to pay a bond of $487 to be released. (Id.).
8 The parties dispute whether JCS provided Jews prior notice of the revocation hearing. Plaintiffs claim that the City has offered no evidence that a notice to show cause was mailed to Jews because the notice included in the record was unsigned. (Doc. # 420 at 3). In addition, Jews has testified that he did not receive a failure to report letter allegedly mailed to him in January 2009 or a notice to show cause allegedly mailed to him in February 2009. (Doc. # 392-1 at 59-62). The City has averred that JCS tried to mail Jews these letters, but he did not receive them because he had provided an inaccurate address to JCS. (Doc. # 391 at 4). (See also Doc. # 392-33 at 6 (stating that a JCS employee had sent Jews a failure to report letter in January 2009 and a notice to show cause in February 2009)). Given the parties’ dispute regarding whether JCS mailed the notices to show cause to Plaintiffs, the court has not accepted the City’s averments that JCS employees mailed these notices.
10

Jews was arrested in September 2009. (Doc. # 392-36 at 3). In October 2009, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence and charged him a $317 warrant fee.9 (Doc. # 392-33 at 6). Jews was released from the Talladega County Jail on October 22, 2009. (Doc. # 382-11 at 65).
JCS petitioned the Court to revoke Jews’s probation again in December 2009. (Doc. # 392-33 at 5). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in January 2010, and Jews did not appear at the hearing. (Id.). The Municipal Court’s magistrate issued another capias warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO. (Doc. # 392-45 at 2). This arrest warrant increased his bond amount to $935. (Id.). City police arrested Jews on August 18, 2010. (Doc. # 392-46 at 2). On September 9, 2010, the Municipal Court fined Jews $317 for the failure-toobey offense and reinstated his probation. (Doc. # 392-38 at 2). A City employee authorized Jews’s release from the Talladega County Jail on September 9th. (Doc. # 382-11 at 67).
In November 2010, JCS filed another revocation petition against Jews. (Doc. # 392-33 at 5). Jews did not appear at the Municipal Court’s December 2010 revocation hearing in his case. (Id.). The Municipal Court issued another capias warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO, and he was arrested on January 10, 2011. (Doc. # 392-50 at 2-3). A City employee, Misty Hepp, authorized Jews’s release from jail on January 14, 2011, after a $500 bond had been paid on his behalf. (Doc. # 392-51 at 2). The Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence in March 2011 and charged him a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 392-33 at 5).
In May 2011, JCS again petitioned the Municipal Court to revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 392-54 at 2). The revocation petition asserted that Jews needed to pay $773 to close his
9 The Court issued a separate probation order for Jews on this date. (Doc. # 392-37 at 2). But JCS’s records indicated that the Court merely reinstated his prior probation term. (Doc. # 392-33 at 6).
11

case. (Id.). Yet again, Jews did not appear at a revocation hearing in June 2011. (Doc. # 392-33 at 4). On June 10, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued another warrant against Jews based on a conviction for failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 392-56 at 2). This warrant required Jews to pay $1,090 in bail to be released. (Id.). A City officer arrested Jews in February 2012 after detaining him to check for outstanding warrants. (Doc. # 392-57 at 2-3). Jews fled from the officer and was detained for resisting arrest and failure to obey a court order. (Id.). During a March 2012 hearing, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 392-33 at 4). The Court issued yet another probation order. (Doc. # 392-58 at 2). This order fined Jews $717 for resisting arrest and $1,090 for FTOCO. (Id.). The City’s police department released Jews from jail on March 8, 2012. (Doc. # 382-12 at 13).
In June 2012, JCS requested that the Municipal Court revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 392-33 at 3). The revocation petition was not signed by a JCS employee, and the order directing a hearing was not signed by the Municipal Court’s judge. (Doc. # 392-59 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in August 2012; Jews did not attend that hearing. (Doc. # 39233 at 3). According to JCS’s probation records, the Municipal Court issued a warrant on August 10, 2012. (Id. at 2). The Municipal Court terminated Jews’s probation sentence in December 2014.10 (Doc. # 382 at 114).
F. Probation of Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray In June 2010, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with a suspended license and without proof of insurance. (Doc. # 423-4 at 2). Ray pled guilty to both charges during a Municipal Court hearing on August 12, 2010. (Id. at 3). Ray testified that a public defender attended the
10 The City disputes that Jews’s probation sentence was terminated, based on the probation records attached to its summary judgment filings. (Doc. # 453 at 8). The probation records attached to the City’s summary judgment motion, however, were produced in June 2013, more than a year before Jews’s probation ended. (See Doc. # 392-33 (time stamped on June 21, 2013)). Therefore, there is no genuine dispute to Plaintiffs’ claim that Jews’s probation sentence ended in December 2014.
12

hearing, but she did not believe that an attorney would assist her with a traffic ticket. (Doc. # 423-1 at 38-39). Judge Ward imposed a 3-day suspended imprisonment term for each conviction, along with a 24-month probationary sentence. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3). Ray was unable to recall whether Judge Ward mentioned the suspended imprisonment term during the hearing. (Doc. # 423-1 at 43-44). Judge Ward fined Ray $400 for each traffic offense, imposed $198 in court costs for the suspended license offense, and imposed $148 in court costs for the no insurance offense. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3).
According to JCS’s probation records, JCS prepared a revocation petition against Ray on September 20, 2010. (Doc. # 423-11 at 8). The revocation petition filed by the City was not signed by the probation officer or the Municipal Court’s judge. (See Doc. # 423-8 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing on October 14, 2010, which Ray attended. (Doc. # 423-11 at 8). JCS issued another revocation petition on December 30, 2010, based on Ray’s failure to attend probation sessions, pay assessed court fines and fees, and pay probation fees. (Doc. # 423-14 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing for Ray on January 13, 2011, but she failed to appear. (Doc. # 423-11 at 7). Consequently, on January 18, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant premised upon a FTOCO conviction. (Doc. # 423-15 at 2). The warrant provided for a bond of $1,353. (Id.).
Ray was arrested on January 19, 2011. (See Doc. # 455-5). She remained in the Talladega County Jail until February 10, 2011. (See id.). The Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation on February 10, 2011, and imposed a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-17 at 2). In June 2011, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with an expired tag and a revoked license. (Doc. # 423-31 at 2). Ray pled guilty to both offenses in July 2011. (Id. at 3). The Municipal Court imposed 5-day suspended imprisonment sentences, 24 months of probation, fines totaling $500,
13

and court costs totaling $346 for the two convictions. (Id.). In August 2011, a City officer again
charged Ray with driving with a revoked license and an expired tag. (Doc. # 423-28 at 2). As
with her earlier tickets, the Municipal Court imposed a 5-day suspended imprisonment sentences
for the expired-tag offense, 24 months of probation for the expired-tag offense, fines totaling
$500, and court costs totaling $346. (Id. at 3).
On January 4, 2012, a JCS employee found that Ray had violated her probation because she owed the City $1,008 and JCS $433 in fees.11 (Doc. # 423-11 at 4). The Municipal Court
held a revocation hearing on February 10, 2012 that Ray did not attend. (Id.). Thus, the
Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant against Ray for FTOCO. (Doc. # 423-23 at
2). The warrant provided a bail amount of $3,173. (Id.). On April 21, 2012, City police officers
detained Ray because they suspected that she had an active warrant. (Doc. # 423-24 at 2-3). She
fled from the officers in her car until she was blocked in by traffic. (Id. at 3). The officers issued
her tickets for driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempted escape.
(Doc. # 423-27 at 2, 4).
Ray was held in jail from April 21, 2012 to May 1, 2012 on the charge of FTOCO. (Doc.
# 455-7). On April 26, 2012, the Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation and imposed a
$317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-25 at 2). The court’s probation order stated that Ray owed
$3,173 in costs. (Id.). The order stated that Ray could not be released from jail until $300 had
11 The parties dispute whether JCS sought to revoke Ray’s probation in January 2012 based on her failure to attend scheduled probation appointments. Plaintiffs state that Ray “attended over 20 JCS appointments” and had paid over $3,000 towards her probation obligations. (Doc. # 454 at 6). The City states that a JCS employee relied on Ray’s failure to attend scheduled appointments to support a revocation petition. (Doc. # 423-19 at 2). JCS’s probation records for Ray suggested that its request to revoke her probation was based solely on the amount she owed, as the probation notes did not mention Ray’s failure to appear at scheduled meetings as a rationale for revoking her probation. (Doc. # 423-11 at 4 (“THE DEF IS IN VIOLATION OF PROBATION DUE TO OUTSTANDING [FEES AND FINES] TO THE CITY OF 1008.00/$433.00 JCS FEES, TOTALING $1441.00.”). At a minimum, there is a genuine factual basis to dispute JCS’s asserted reason for seeking a revocation hearing against Ray in January 2012.
14

been paid on her behalf. (Id.). Ray was released from jail on May 1, 2012 after someone had paid $300 on her behalf. (Doc. # 423-1 at 149).
In June 2012, Ray pled guilty to driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempting to escape. (Doc. # 423-27 at 3, 5). The Municipal Court sentenced Ray to a 5 day suspended incarceration sentence, along with 24 months’ probation, for each conviction. (Id.). It fined her $400 for driving with a revoked license, $400 for attempting to flee, and $100 for driving with an expired tag. (Id.). It imposed a total of $444.00 in court costs against Ray. (Id.).
JCS again requested that the Municipal Court revoke Ray’s probation in August 2012. (Doc. # 423-11 at 3). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in September 2012 and issued a warrant against Ray after she had failed to appear at the hearing. (Id.). Ray’s probation sentence was terminated by court order on November 1, 2014. (Doc. # 422 at 11). III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and – by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file – designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
15

Id. at 324. The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Anderson”). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. For Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”
16

Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The law is clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). IV. Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Claims for Monetary Damages
The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for two primary reasons. First, the City argues that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom is at issue in this case because Plaintiffs’ claims relate to judicial acts, and the Municipal Court’s officers are state officials. (See, e.g., Doc. # 390 at 10-20). Second, the City argues that no municipal policy or custom presented in the operative complaint caused the alleged misconduct by JCS or the Municipal Court. (See, e.g., id. at 21-28). In addition, two of the City’s three summary judgment motions assert that the City is entitled to summary judgment on certain claims based on the relevant statute of limitations. (Docs. # 391 at 24 & n. 14; 422 at 30 n. 16). The court addresses each of these arguments below.
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A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show That Their Injuries Resulting from Probation Practices Are Attributable to Policies Instituted by the City’s Final Policymakers
The City contends that it is due to be granted summary judgment on the threshold ground that no City policy or custom is at issue in this case because Plaintiffs complain of judicial acts for which the Municipal Court is responsible. (See Doc. # 390 at 12). According to the City, the Municipal Court was responsible for making indigency determinations, appointing counsel where necessary, revoking and controlling probation, setting bail, issuing warrants, and incarcerating individuals. (Id. at 12-15). In addition, the City argues that the Municipal Court’s officials were state employees, not municipal employees. (Id. at 17-20).
Plaintiffs respond that this is a factual question for a jury to decide because the JCS-City Contract, along with the practices of the Municipal Court, City police, and City employees, provide evidence of a policy or custom set in place by the City, not the Municipal Court. (See Doc. # 419 at 18). Plaintiffs have proposed an especially broad policy or custom for which the City should be held liable. (Id. at 18-19). This policy includes the following alleged constitutional or legal violations: (1) ordering probation in order to collect fines, (2) threatening arrest through form application, (3) requesting the arrest of probationers for failure to pay fines, (4) issuing warrants with bond amounts corresponding to the amount owed to the City and JCS, (5) arresting probationers based on an unlawful charge, (6) keeping defendants on probation for more than two years, (7) charging warrant fees with no basis in law, (8) failing to provide counsel to defendants, (9) failing to give jail credit to imprisoned probationers, (10) failing to provide required hearings before revoking probation, and (11) terminating probation or jail terms
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when an individual paid the amount owed to the city.12 (Id.). The court concludes that the City has the better argument.
i. Legal Standards It is axiomatic that a municipality, such as the City, is only liable under Section 1983 when a municipal employee or agent undertakes an action in “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 690. A plaintiff may establish the existence of a municipal “policy” by identifying “(1) an officially promulgated [municipal] policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the [municipality] shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In both instances, a plaintiff must illustrate that the governmental entity has “authority and responsibility over the governmental function in issue.” Id. at 1330. “[L]ocal governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control.” Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In analyzing whether a municipality had control over a policymaker, the court must determine whether the municipality controlled the policymaker with regard to the “particular area or function” at issue. Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331-32. “[S]tate law determines whether a particular official has final policymaking authority.” McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1996). “[S]tate law always should direct [courts] ‘to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy’” in
12 The court shares the confusion that the City expressed at oral argument about the precise contours of the policy or custom that Plaintiffs want to hold the City accountable for. (See Doc. # 559 at 82-83 (explaining the City’s confusion over whether the policy or custom arose from the JCS-City Contract or a broader extortion scheme)).
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a given area. Id. (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988)). Federal courts must respect the allocation of policymaking authority dictated by state law and “may not assume that final policymaking authority lies in some entity other than that in which state law places it.”13 Id. (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 131). In some cases, though, multiple officials or governmental bodies can share final policymaking authority. Id. at 1578.
State law also establishes whether a particular official acts as a municipal policymaker or a state policymaker with regard to a particular issue. See Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288. In Turquitt, the Eleventh Circuit held that an Alabama sheriff acted as a state policymaker when he or she established policies for operating a county jail. Id. at 1288-91. To support its holding, the Eleventh Circuit relied on (1) the Alabama Constitution’s designation of sheriffs as state officers in the executive department, (2) Alabama case law that designated a sheriff as a state executive officer, (3) the legislative history of the Alabama Constitution, (4) the lack of authorization for counties to supervise county jails, and (5) the delegation of supervision over sheriffs to state executive agencies. See id. at 1288-89. The Turquitt opinion recognized that Alabama law held a county responsible for funding the county jail and maintaining the physical plant of a jail and that a county was obligated to pay the county sheriff’s salary. Id. at 1289-90. But the Turquitt court nevertheless concluded that a county lacked control over a sheriff through his or her salary because the county could not change the sheriff’s salary or refuse to pay it. Id. at 1290. Finally, while the Turquitt opinion recognized a county’s duty to pay for jail operations, it declined to adopt a theory that the county partnered with the sheriff to operate a county jail because Alabama law only authorized a county to make funds available for operating a jail, while the sheriff -- a state officer -- held the duty of allocating those funds. Id.
13 Accordingly, the issue of who is the responsible policymaker for a particular policy is a question of state law, not a question of fact for a jury to decide. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124.
20

In Grech, an en banc opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a Georgia sheriff acted as a county official or a state official when providing warrant records to a crime information center and training employees to maintain those records. See 335 F.3d at 1348. The Grech court held that Georgia sheriffs acted as state officials when conducting these duties. Id. at 1348. The Eleventh Circuit noted that a state agency ran the crime information center and provided training requirements for employees entering data into the warrant database. Id. at 1344-46. The state also published procedures for entering warrants into the database and periodically validating those warrants. Id. at 1346. Finally, a state agency was responsible for auditing sheriffs’ warrant records and sanctioning sheriffs’ offices for violating the state’s standards. Id. at 1347. For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Georgia sheriffs acted for the state and were controlled by the state when providing and maintaining warrant records in the state’s crime information database. Id.
ii. Alabama Law on Municipal Courts Under Alabama law, “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in a unified judicial system” that includes “such municipal courts as may be provided by law.” Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(a); Ala. Code § 12-1-2. This judicial power includes jurisdiction over criminal cases. Ala. Code § 12-1-3. The Alabama Supreme Court has been authorized to create procedural and administrative rules for municipal courts. Id. § 12-2-19(a). The Alabama Constitution requires municipal judges to possess law licenses and allows the state legislature to set other qualifications for municipal judges. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 145. As a judge in the Alabama judicial system, a municipal court judge may be investigated by Alabama’s Judicial Inquiry Commission. See id., Art. VI, § 156(b) (allowing the commission to investigate “any judge of a court of the judicial system of this state”). The Judicial Inquiry
21

Commission may file charges against a municipal judge for violating the state’s Canon of Judicial Ethics with the Court of the Judiciary. Id. The Court of the Judiciary may sanction a municipal judge for violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics, committing misconduct, or failing to perform his or her duties.14 Id., Art. VI, § 157(a)(1).
Municipal court judges may suspend a sentence and place a defendant on probation for up to two years. Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a). A municipal court judge also may direct a probation officer or another suitable person to investigate the probationer. Id. § 12-14-13(b). He or she may impose suitable conditions of probation, including an obligation for the probationer “[t]o pay the fine and costs imposed or such portions thereof as the judge may determine and in such installments as the judge may direct.” Id. § 12-14-13(d)(7).
A municipal court judge may defer a defendant’s obligation to pay court costs or fines or direct the defendant to pay them in installments. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(d). Fines are to be paid to the municipal court’s clerk unless the municipal court directs otherwise. Id. 26.11(e). “Incarceration shall not automatically follow the nonpayment of a fine or restitution. Incarceration should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for nonpayment.” Id. 26.11(i)(1).
Alabama municipal courts are authorized to employ magistrates. See Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(B). These magistrates possess the authority to issue arrest warrants, set bail, receive guilty pleas for certain cases, accept pleas of indigency, and appoint counsel for indigent defendants, among other duties. Id. 18(I)(B)(2). The Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration establish qualifications for magistrates and require them to take an oath of office. Id. 18(II)(A), (IV). The
14 Notably, the Alabama Supreme Court has instituted mandatory continuing education requirements for municipal court judges. Ala. R. Mandatory Continuing Educ. for Municipal Ct. Judges, Municipal Magistrates/Clerks, and Probate Judges, Rule II, available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/ManJEd.pdf.
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comments in the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration clarify that magistrates are judicial officers authorized by the Alabama Constitution.15 Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18, Comment. See also Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(b) (permitting the Alabama legislature to “create judicial officers with authority to issue warrants”).
Alabama municipalities are directed to provide facilities and other adequate support for Alabama municipal courts.16 Ala. Code § 12-14-2(a); Wilkins v. Dan Haggerty & Assocs., 672 So. 2d 507, 510 (Ala. 1995). Municipalities have the power to abolish municipal courts and to reestablish municipal courts. Ala. Code §§ 12-14-17(a); 12-14-19(a). They are required to pay the municipal court judge’s salary. Id. § 12-14-33(a). Moreover, they are allowed to provide probation services, clerks, and magistrates to municipal courts. Id. § 12-14-2(a). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that municipalities may “contract with a private firm to aid in the collection of delinquent municipal court fines” to fulfill their duties to adequately support municipal courts.17 Wilkins, 672 So. 2d at 510.
In Wilkins, the Alabama Supreme Court also held that a municipal court judge could impose additional fees on individuals who had failed to appear before the municipal court and individuals who had failed to completely pay fines imposed by the court. Id. at 510-11. The Wilkins Court noted that the fines issued by the municipal court in that action did not exceed the $500 jurisdictional limit. Id. at 510. The Wilkins opinion did not decide whether a municipality could impose an additional fine in such circumstances but did opine that the Wilkins plaintiffs might have been “correct in arguing that a mayor or city council acting alone cannot legally
15 Magistrates must complete a mandatory certification course. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(A)(4). 16 Notably, municipal court judges are not entitled to benefits provided to state employees. Ala. Code § 12-1-15(a). 17 Alabama law also grants municipalities the power to enter into contracts in furtherance of their governmental functions. Ala. Code § 11-40-1. Municipal court judges are not expressly granted the power to enter into contracts. See id. § 12-14-31.
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impose an additional fine on persons who have already been ticketed or given a misdemeanor citation.” Id.
iii. The City’s Municipal Court Judge was the Final Policymaker Responsible for the Terms of Plaintiffs’ Probation Orders, JCS’s Probation Practices, and the Procedures Used by the Municipal Court to Revoke and Reinstate Probation
Alabama law demonstrates that the policymaker responsible for the policies that led to JCS’s conduct against Plaintiffs was the Municipal Court’s judge, Judge Ward. State law granted Judge Ward the authority to sentence defendants to probation, to set probation conditions, to impose fines on defendants, and to establish payment plans for defendants when they could not immediately pay the fines imposed. See Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a), (d); Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(d). Likewise, Judge Ward was responsible for determining an appropriate punishment when an individual failed to pay fines imposed on him or her. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(i)(1).
Although Alabama law placed policymaking authority for probation, fine issuance, bond determinations, and indigency determinations with the Municipal Court and its judge, this court denied the City’s motion to dismiss this action because Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the JCS-City Contract “handcuffed the autonomy of the municipal court.” (Doc. # 65 at 13). Indeed, Alabama law granted the City authority to provide probation services to the Municipal Court and to contract with a private probation service. Ala. Code § 12-14-2(a); Wilkins, 672 So. 2d at 510. Moreover, the JCS-City Contract purported to bind the Municipal Court to its terms, and the City’s mayor claimed to sign the contract on behalf of the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 39216 at 3). On its face, the JCS-City Contract bound the Municipal Court to include certain fees in its probation orders. (Id. at 6). But, as noted above, the Municipal Court’s judge did not sign the contract. (See id. at 3). So, what effect did the contract have on the Municipal Court?
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Whatever legal obligations the JCS-City Contract placed on Judge Ward, it did not (and could not) obligate Judge Ward to set certain terms of probation. The court has found no Alabama law or authority supporting the proposition that the JCS-City Contract bound the Municipal Court to appoint JCS as the probation service for all defendants or to include JCS’s probation fees in every probation order. Indeed, the only analogous opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court suggests that an Alabama municipality cannot impose additional fees or fines on a municipal-court defendant. See Wilkins, 672 So. 2d at 510 (“[T]he plaintiff class may be correct in arguing that a mayor or city council acting alone cannot legally impose an additional fine on persons who have already been ticketed or given a misdemeanor citation . . . .”). Plaintiffs argue that the Municipal Court’s judge merely “followed the direction” of the City’s mayor and City Council when he sentenced individuals to probation supervised by JCS. (Doc. # 419 at 21). Even if true, though, the City’s mayor and the City Council did not impose unconstitutional terms and conditions of probation, unconstitutionally imprison probationers without an indigency determination or access to counsel, unlawfully impose fees and probation terms beyond the statutory maximums available, or unconstitutionally treat defendants disparately based on their wealth. Those actions were committed either by the Municipal Court or by JCS employees after JCS had been assigned to supervise Plaintiffs’ probation.
iv. The Municipal Court Judge Did Not Act as a City Policymaker In light of Alabama’s delegation of judicial authority to the state judicial system, it follows as a matter of law and logic that the Municipal Court’s judge acted as a state policymaker when sentencing Plaintiffs to probation, setting terms of probation, designating JCS as the probation agency, and revoking or reinstating probation. This state’s supreme law, the
25

Alabama Constitution, designates municipal courts as courts under the unified judicial system.18 Ala. Cost. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(a). See Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288 (relying, in the first instance, on the Alabama Constitution’s designation of a sheriff as a state official). The Alabama Supreme Court, a state agency, held the authority to create procedural and administrative rules that regulated the Municipal Court. Ala. Code § 12-2-19(a). See Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1289 (relying on a state agency’s control of rules regarding the policy at issue as evidence that the sheriff had acted as a state policymaker). And it is state law that provides the Municipal Court authority to impose probation on defendants, not the City’s municipal code. See Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a), (d). Finally, a state court -- the Court of the Judiciary -- is responsible for sanctioning a municipal court’s judge for misconduct or ethical violations.19 See Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, §§ 156 & 157. See also Grech, 335 F.3d at 1347 (considering a state agency’s control over sanctions as evidence that a sheriff acted as a state policymaker when maintaining warrant records). Although the City paid Judge Ward’s salary, that fact alone did not grant the City control over him. Cf. Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1290 (recognizing that an Alabama sheriff was not a county official even though his salary was paid by a county). Because the Municipal Court’s judge was a member of the state’s judicial system, implemented state law when issuing and supervising probation sentences, and was subject to the disciplinary control of
18 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that Alabama state judges are state officials, even though many of them have limited jurisdictions. McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 792 (1997). And Alabama municipal courts are included in the same unified judiciary system as the Alabama circuit and district courts. Ala. Cost. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(a).
19 Indeed, the Court of the Judiciary recently suspended a municipal court judge without pay for eleven months for failing to comply with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure before imprisoning offenders for failing to pay court-issued fines and costs. See In the Matter of Armstead Lester Hayes III, Ct. of the Judiciary Case No. 49, Final Judgment (Ala. Ct. Judiciary Jan. 5, 2017).
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a state agency, the court finds that he acted as a state policymaker, not a municipal policymaker, when implementing the probation policies at issue in this case.20
Plaintiffs have argued that the Municipal Court’s judge was hired by the City and did not actually supervise the Municipal Court’s employees. (See Doc. # 419 at 19). To the extent that supervision of the Municipal Court’s clerks and magistrates is at issue, though, it is an issue of Judge Ward’s dereliction of duty, not the City’s implementation of its own policies and customs, because the municipal court judge held control of the judicial functions of the municipal court. Although Alabama law imposed an obligation on the City to pay for supporting personnel, see Ala. Code § 12-14-2(a), it did not grant the City any control over the Municipal Court’s judicial functions, see Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(a) (placing the state’s judicial power in the hands of the unified judiciary branch).
The court recognizes that a plurality opinion in the Grech case decided that Georgia sheriffs were state officers, notwithstanding an express constitutional provision that Georgia sheriffs were county officers. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1332-44. The Grech plurality readily acknowledged, though, that this section of the plurality opinion did not obtain a majority vote. See id. at 1347 n. 46. In accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in Turquitt, the court simply cannot look to the plurality opinion in Grech (i.e., an opinion with no precedential effect) and deem the City’s municipal court judge to be a City policymaker. Such an approach would eviscerate the provision in the Alabama Constitution that incorporates all municipal courts into the state’s unified judicial system. See Turquitt, 137 F.3d 1288 (beginning its analysis of
20 This conclusion is consistent with case law from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a municipal court judge was not acting under a municipal policy or custom because he performed the acts at issue as a state judicial officer); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992) (“We have repeatedly held . . . that a municipal judge acting in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state law does not act as a municipal official or lawmaker.”).
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state law with the Alabama Constitution and the legislative history of that Constitution). It would also contravene the earlier en banc decision in Turquitt.
Plaintiffs also have claimed that the Municipal Court was not a separate entity from the City. (Doc. # 419 at 20). This argument cuts no ice. The Alabama Constitution plainly designates the municipal court as an agency under the unified judicial system, not the municipality. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(a). While the municipality had an obligation to adequately fund the municipal court, the Eleventh Circuit has held in an analogous context that a county’s duty to pay a sheriff and jail personnel does not translate to control over the sheriff.21 Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1290 (quoting McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1997)). Similarly, Plaintiffs contend that the City should be held responsible for the Municipal Court’s acts because it benefitted the fines and fees collected through the alleged constitutional violations. (See, e.g., Doc. # 419 at 19). Although the court recognizes that the City received payments from JCS for fines and fees imposed by the Municipal Court, that does not resolve the question of whether it is responsible for the Municipal Court’s probation policies. This is so even if the probation policies benefitted the City by allowing it to not pay for JCS’s probation supervision services and by making it more likely that probationers would pay the full amount of fines and fees owed.
v. To the Extent a Municipal Court Magistrate’s Customs and Policies Caused Plaintiffs’ Damages, the Magistrate Acted as a Policymaker for the Municipal Court, Not the City
Plaintiffs have indicated that the Municipal Court’s magistrate was responsible for arrest warrants based on “bogus charges” of failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 419 at 19). The
21 The City inadvertently supported this argument by insisting that Plaintiffs’ injunctive claims are moot because “Childersburg has adopted extensive new procedures which address all concerns.” (Doc. # 391 at 28 n. 16). While this footnote can be read broadly as an assertion of control over the Municipal Court by the City, the record demonstrates that the Municipal Court’s judge adopted new probation and probation revocation procedures in August 2014 on behalf of the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 423-38 at 2).
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court understands this to be an argument that constitutional violations related to those warrants resulted from a policy or custom initiated by the magistrate. And the court also recognizes that the Municipal Court’s magistrate held the authority to issue warrants without the approval of the Municipal Court’s judge. See Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(B)(2)(i). But, like a municipal court judge, a municipal court magistrate is not a policymaker for the City when conducting judicial acts, such as issuing a warrant. Woodard v. Town of Oakman, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (granting an Alabama municipality summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim regarding the issuance of an arrest warrant because the municipality did not control the magistrate’s issuance of that warrant). This is because he or she is controlled by the state’s judiciary system.
As the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration demonstrate, a magistrate is a judicial officer under the control of Alabama’s unified judiciary. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18, Comment (referring to Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VI, § 139(b)). Municipal court magistrates are granted authority to conduct judicial acts by rules promulgated by the Alabama Supreme Court. See Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(B)(2). Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has set qualification and certification standards for magistrates. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(A)(4), (II)(A). Thus, regardless of the City’s responsibility to pay the magistrate, the magistrate did not act as a municipal officer when conducting her judicial duties. See Woodard, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
vi. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown that a Policy or Custom Enacted by the City’s Police Department is at Issue in This Case
Plaintiffs have argued that the City’s policy or practice included “arrests by city police on the bogus charge [of] FTOCO.” (Doc. # 419 at 18-19). The court construes this as an argument that the City instituted a policy or custom of falsely arresting and imprisoning individuals based on unlawful warrants. To be sure, this argument challenges conduct attributable to employees
29

who were controlled by the City, rather than by the state judiciary. Nevertheless, this particular Section 1983 challenge is directed at law enforcement officers’ executions of court-issued arrest warrants. Therefore, it runs into two insuperable obstacles.
The first obstacle is that the City’s police officers are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for executing facially valid court orders. Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). An order can be facially valid even if it contains a legal error. Id. at 556. Specifically, an officer is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for executing a court order if it is facially fair, it was issued by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the suit, and it was issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings. Id. Here, Plaintiffs have not indicated (much less presented any substantial evidence) that the arrest warrants for FTOCO were facially invalid, nor have they questioned the Municipal Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants. Indeed, Alabama law grants the Municipal Court’s magistrates jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18(I)(B)(2). Although the Rule 56 record indicates that the City never passed an ordinance outlawing failure to obey a court order (see Doc. # 402-35), a City police officer was not (and is not) empowered to question the validity of a conviction referenced in a Municipal Court arrest warrant when he or she had no involvement in procuring the arrest warrant. As the former Fifth Circuit stated, the law does not require a police officer to choose between a charge of dereliction of duty for failing to effectuate an arrest warrant and Section 1983 liability for acting on the warrant. Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)). Therefore, it is unlikely that Plaintiffs could maintain Section 1983 claims against individual City police officers for executing facially valid arrest warrants based on an offense that did not exist.
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The second obstacle -- and the more consequential one here -- is that Plaintiffs have not identified the final decisionmaker for the City who was responsible for issuing a policy or custom directing officers to arrest probationers based on invalid FTOCO charges. If Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims concerning these arrests are based solely on the officers’ arrests, then the City cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior basis for the conduct of employees who lacked final decisionmaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Moreover, if these Section 1983 claims are based on the adoption of the JCS-City Contract, then Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the JCS-City Contract itself contained any policy or custom regarding the duties of the City’s police. (See generally Doc. # 392-16). Simply put, the court cannot discern from the Rule 56 record any policy or custom by the City to have its police department effectuate a “collection practice” by arresting probationers based on warrants purportedly predicated on FTOCO charges. (Doc. # 419 at 1). Indeed, the undisputed facts do not support such a theory.
vii. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the probation customs and policies implemented by the City’s Municipal Court judge, the Municipal Court magistrate, and JCS are not attributable to a City policymaker. Thus, as Plaintiffs cannot show that their harms resulted from the execution of a City custom or policy, summary judgment is due to be granted to the City on Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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B. Alternatively, the JCS-City Contract and Any Custom or Policy of the City was Not the Moving Force Behind Plaintiffs’ Alleged Constitutional Violations
As an alternative basis for summary judgment, the City has argued that Plaintiffs present no direct causal link between its policies and the constitutional harms they claim in this action. (Doc. # 390 at 21). The court agrees.
To present a viable Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom was the “moving force” behind his or her injury. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). This causation element of a Section 1983 claim is easier to prove when the municipality’s action itself violates the Constitution. Id. at 404. But, if a plaintiff’s claim relies on a facially lawful policy or custom causing a constitutional violation, a court must apply a rigorous standard of causation to avoid imposing respondeat superior liability on a municipality. Id. at 405.
Thus, the court cannot apply a strict “but for” causation standard when reviewing whether a facially valid municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation by others. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation merely because its custom or policy made it more likely that a constitutional violation would occur. Id. (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 411). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has explained that a court must determine that a defendant’s act was a proximate cause of the ultimate constitutional violation in order for it to be considered a moving force. Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). Using this framework in Powers, the Sixth Circuit discussed situations where a judicial act constitutes a superseding cause that severs the chain of liability begun by another state actor’s conduct. Id. at 610. A judicial act generally severs the chain of liability where a judge
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misapplies the law after another state actor has informed him or her of all the material facts. Id. A judicial act generally does not sever the chain of liability, though, if the other state actor misrepresents or omits material facts. Id.
In McDowell, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether a county could be held liable under Section 1983 on the ground that it had failed to properly fund and staff a jail where the plaintiff failed to identify a pattern of injuries linked to those budgetary decisions. See 392 F.3d at 1291. It then examined whether the plaintiff’s injuries “were a ‘plainly obvious consequence’ of that [budgetary] decision.” Id. at 1292 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 412). It held that the plaintiff had failed to present the requisite causal link between the county’s budgetary policy and his injuries because jail officials had been instructed to obtain an ambulance for the plaintiff to be sent to the hospital when the jail could not arrange for his transportation due to a lack of personnel. See id. at 1293.
Here, the Rule 56 evidence, even when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, shows that the JCS-City Contract did not proximately cause the illegal probation terms, unlawful probation procedures, unlawful arrest warrants, or unlawful imprisonment terms described in the operative complaint. It is true that the JCS-City Contract made JCS available to the Municipal Court for probation services. But Alabama law permitted the City to make private probation services available to its Municipal Court. Wilkins, 672 So. 2d at 510. Nothing in the JCS-City Contract required the Municipal Court to sentence certain defendants to probation. Nor did the JCS-City Contract prevent the Municipal Court from holding indigency hearings or directing JCS to supervise a probationer without charging fees.22 In addition, no evidence indicates that
22 The court recognizes the possibility of some implicit or oral agreement that the Municipal Court would not order JCS to supervise probationers without providing for compensation from probationers. But the Rule 56 record contains no evidence of such an agreement. Both Judge Ward and the City’s former mayor have denied
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the City or its policymakers omitted material information from the Municipal Court or misrepresented facts to the municipal court. Cf. Powers, 501 F.3d at 610.
Plaintiffs suggested at oral argument that the City should be held responsible for the Municipal Court’s and JCS’s probation policies because the JCS-City Contract was in effect for over ten years and the City did not act to stop the alleged constitutional violations by JCS and the Municipal Court. (See Doc. # 559 at 68-69 (“We have a system that has gone on for over 10 years that the council and the mayor put in place and that they fed from until we sued them. And to suggest that there was no control over [Judge] Larry Ward, that just ignores the facts.”)). Obviously, JCS’s “conduct” resulted in a financial benefit to the City. But the City cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely on the basis of a principal-agent relationship between JCS and itself, even assuming that the JCS-City Contract obligated JCS to perform any duties for the City. See Evans v. City of Talladega, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1362 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (declining to impose Section 1983 liability on a municipality for conduct committed by a private agent who operated a historic theater because the service performed by the agent was not “a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state”). If the court premised the City’s Section 1983 liability on that relationship alone, it would be tantamount to imposing respondeat superior liability. Plaintiffs have not presented Rule 56 evidence indicating that a final policymaker for the municipality knew of the alleged unconstitutional conduct by JCS or the Municipal Court when permitting the JCS-City Contract to be renewed or when renewing Judge Ward’s contract with the City.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown that the JCS-City Contract proximately caused the alleged constitutional violations in the complaint, and the City is entitled to summary
communicating with JCS before the City entered into the JCS-City Contract. The City denied at oral argument that the contract allowed JCS to draft form orders for the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 559 at 87).
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judgment, even if the JCS-City Contract was considered to be the relevant municipal policy or custom.
C. Plaintiff Jews’s Due Process Claim Based on His 2009 Probation Sentence With No Underlying Suspended Sentence is Time-Barred, But the Claims of Plaintiff Ray are Not Time-Barred
The City has raised a statute of limitations defense to various claims made by Plaintiffs Ray and Jews. (Docs. # 391 at 24 & n. 14; 422 at 30 n. 16). Specifically, the City has claimed that Jews’s claims based on the Municipal Court’s imposition of probation in January 2009, his September 2009 arrest, his October 2009 Municipal Court hearing, and his August 2010 arrest are time-barred because Jews was aware of the allegedly unconstitutional aspects of his probation in January 2009.23 (Doc. # 391 at 24). The court is not impressed by the parties’ sparse briefing on this issue. Nevertheless, it is appropriate for the court to consider this challenge to Plaintiffs’ monetary claims because it is wholly separate from the municipal policy issues discussed above. And the court agrees with the City that some of Jews’s claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations in Alabama for Section 1983 claims is two years. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (holding that Section 1983 actions are governed by the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations in states with more than one statute of limitations); Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l) (“All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years). “[W]hen a Section 1983 action accrues is a question of federal law.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Rubin v. O’Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980)). A federal claim does not accrue until “the plaintiff knows or has reason to
23 Likewise, the City contends that Plaintiffs’ claims based on Ray’s initial probation sentence are timebarred because the sentence was imposed on August 12, 2010, and this action was filed on August 28, 2012. (Doc. # 422 at 30 n. 16). The court addresses Plaintiff Ray’s claims below.
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know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1990). Likewise, a federal action doesn’t accrue until “the plaintiff is aware or should have been aware who has inflicted the injury.” Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716 (citing Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980)).
One exception to the federal standard for accrual of a claim is the continuing violations doctrine, and the Eleventh Circuit has applied this exception to Section 1983 cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Shorstein, 217 F. App’x 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). “Under the continuing violations doctrine, the statute of limitations is tolled for a claim that otherwise would be time-barred where the violation giving rise to the claim continues to occur within the limitations period.” Natl. Parks & Conservation Assn., Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 502 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982)). In other words, the doctrine “permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” Robinson v. United States, 327 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hipp v. Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2001)). “When the violation alleged involves continuing injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, at the time the unlawful conduct ceases.” Id. (citations omitted). “The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis . . . is whether the plaintiff[] complain[s] of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into the present, which does.” Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 580-81 (11th Cir. 1994)) (changes in original). “Where a continuing violation is found, the plaintiff[] can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired.” Knight, 19 F.3d at 581.
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Here, those claims that accrued on or after August 28, 2010 are not time-barred. There is
no question that the Fugatts’ claims were presented to the court within the statute of limitations
because the Municipal Court did not sentence them to probation until January 2011. (Docs. #
392-18 at 3; 392-19 at 2). Likewise, the City cannot dispute that Plaintiff Ray’s claims are
timely unless a claim is premised solely upon events that occurred between August 12, 2010 and
August 28, 2010. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 3 (noting that Plaintiff Ray’s probation had commenced
on August 12, 2010)). However, all of the alleged constitutional violations against Ray that
could have commenced at her original sentencing appear to be continuing violations. At a
minimum, Plaintiff Ray’s due process claim presents a continuing violation because the
probation order entered in her case imposed periodic probation fees for JCS with any regard for her indigency.24 Likewise, Plaintiff Ray’s equal protection claim presents a continuing violation
because her probation order charged periodic probation fees due to her inability to pay the court-
imposed fines and fees in a lump sum. Therefore, the court is unable to find that any of Plaintiff
Ray’s claims should be dismissed as time-barred.
The City presents a more meritorious argument that one of Plaintiff Jews’s due process
claims is time barred. (Doc. # 391 at 24). This claim is premised upon the fact that some of the
Municipal Court’s orders included probation sentences without imposing a jail sentence as well.
(See Doc. # 305 at ¶ 130). To the extent such a claim is valid, the facts underlying the due
process claim were available to Jews by examining the sentencing documents. And, since Jews
24 Many of the alleged due process violations against Ray occurred within the two-year limitations period, as JCS sought to revoke her probation for the first time in September 2010 and the Municipal Court held its first revocation hearing in Ray’s case in January 2011. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 8). Likewise, her Section 1983 unreasonable seizure and inadequate counsel claims appear timely because the Municipal Court held its first revocation hearing in her action, a magistrate issued an arrest warrant, and she was sent to Talladega County Jail in January and February 2011. Because the Municipal Court’s original judgment against Ray imposed a fine within the $500 statutory maximum and a probation sentence at the 24-month statutory maximum, (see Doc. # 423-4 at 3), her Eighth Amendment claim premised upon the imposition of fines and probation terms above the statutory maximum must have accrued within the limitations period.
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attended the initial hearing before the Municipal Court, he was aware (or should have been aware) of who inflicted this due process injury. Cf. Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716. This due process claim presents a one time violation, not a continuing violation. Cf. Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183. Accordingly, in the alternative, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff Jews’s due process claim for unlawfully imposing a probation sentence with no underlying jail sentence because that claim is time barred.25 V. Analysis of Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
In two footnotes, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. (Docs. # 390 at 29 n. 13; 391 at 28 n. 16). The City insists that these claims are moot because (1) it has terminated the JCS-City contract, (2) it has appointed a new municipal court judge, (3) it has appointed a new municipal court magistrate, (4) it has adopted new court procedures, and (5) the Municipal Court has not issued any arrest warrants for individuals placed on probation. (See id.). Plaintiffs have responded that their declaratory and injunctive claims are not moot because “injunctive and declaratory relief is nonetheless needed to prevent reoccurrence of these events and to declare the challenged practices to be unconstitutional.” (Doc. # 419 at 30 n. 10). Frankly, there is a good argument that an argument in a footnote is no argument at all. But, enforcement of that principle here would hurt both sides. And, since the court has determined that the City is entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ monetary damages claims, it is appropriate to also address whether the City is entitled to summary judgment for the declaratory and injunctive relief claims.
25 The City summarily argues that “all of Jews’s claims based on events occurring prior to August 28, 2010 are time barred.” (Doc. # 391 at 24 n. 16). As explained further above, this argument is too simplistic because it does not consider that some of the claims in this action present continuing violations, such as Plaintiffs’ equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims.
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In their complaint, Plaintiffs have requested that the court enjoin the City from placing
defendants on probation for paying fines, assessing fines greater than $500 against a defendant,
placing a defendant on probation for more than 24 months, or imprisoning indigent probationers
for failure to pay fines or fees. (See Doc. # 305 at 62-64 (listing requested injunctions in the
complaint’s prayer for relief)). The fatal flaw in these requests is that it is the Municipal Court,
not the City, which possesses control over a probationer’s terms of probation.
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation has
occurred because of a municipality’s policy or custom in order to receive prospective relief
against a municipality under Section 1983, such as a declaratory judgment or an injunction. Los
Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 34 (2010) (“We conclude that Monell’s holding
applies to § 1983 claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for
damages.”). As explained in detail above, the Municipal Court’s customs and policies relating to
fines, fees, probation terms, and arrest warrants are not policies or customs of the City because
the Municipal Court’s judge acts as a state policymaker when establishing or applying such
judicial customs or policies. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot receive prospective relief against the
City regarding probation procedures or warrant procedures of the Municipal Court, regardless of
whether the Municipal Court’s judicial acts violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.26
Plaintiffs also have requested a declaration that the JCS-City Contract is void, along with
other contracts between JCS and other Alabama municipalities. (See Doc. # 305 at 62-63). The
26 The court acknowledges that in another federal-court action against an Alabama municipality and the municipal court judges employed by that city, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which included declaratory and injunctive relief affecting the municipal court. See generally Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, 2014 WL 11090432 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (unpublished). Notably, the settlement agreement in the Mitchell litigation enjoined the municipal court judges and the municipal court from using a private probation service and required them to comply with designated judicial procedures. See id. at *2-9. It did not enjoin the city from committing judicial acts that violate the Constitution. See id. at *4 (requiring the municipality to prevent its jail administrator from jailing individuals without a designated notice and to file a motion for joinder). While this settlement agreement is not binding on the court in any sense, it illustrates that most of the issues presented in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint are not actually controlled by the City’s policies or procedures.
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JCS-City Contract undoubtedly was a policy instituted by the City’s final policymakers. However, Plaintiffs currently lack standing to challenge the validity of that contract in a declaratory action because it is undisputed that the City terminated it in 2015. (Doc. # 392-63). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief from a federal court must show “a reasonable expectation that the injury they have suffered will continue or will be repeated in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999). At the commencement of this suit, Plaintiffs certainly had a reasonable expectation of future injury from the JCS-City Contract because JCS still was providing probation services to the Municipal Court and Plaintiffs still were probationers under JCS’s supervision. (See Doc. # 65 at 23 (relying on allegations that Plaintiffs were still subject to probation)).
But it now is undisputed that the JCS-City contract has been terminated and that JCS is no longer operating in Alabama. (See Doc. # 492 at 18). None of the Plaintiffs currently are subject to a probation sentence from the Municipal Court. The court recognizes that the City could possibly enter into a similar probation services contract or that JCS could reenter business in the state of Alabama. But the mere possibility of similar conduct by the City does not present a controversy that the court may resolve through a declaratory judgment. See Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1348 (holding that a remote chance of plaintiffs facing actions against their bank account under a Florida statute did not present a substantial likelihood of future injury). For these reasons, the City is entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ claims seeking injunctive relief, and Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is due to be dismissed for lack of standing. VI. Conclusion
There is really no question that the City’s Municipal Court operated in fundamental violation of Alabama law under Judge Larry Ward’s tenure. Under well-settled Alabama law,
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Judge Ward was responsible for supervising the Municipal Court, its magistrates, and its probation supervision provider. Yet, Judge Ward only appeared at the Municipal Court for a few hours a month, and claims he had no knowledge regarding the municipal court outside of his judicial responsibilities.27 Nothing in this opinion should be taken as an endorsement of the Municipal Court’s operating procedures under Judge Ward or his “supervision” of that Court.
Having said that, this court does not function as a super-legislative body, and it cannot order the City to pay monetary relief or enjoin the City merely because it appointed and paid a judicial officer who recklessly failed to supervise the Municipal Court’s private probation service. Nor can it hold the City liable for the Municipal Court’s failure to comply with Alabama law when conducting judicial functions. It cannot issue an injunction against the City based on customs and policies of a state policymaker, even if that policymaker was paid by the City. And it cannot declare a municipal contract illegal when the contract is no longer in effect.
For these reasons, the City’s motions for summary judgment (Docs. # 390, 391, 422) are due to be granted. The City is also due to be dismissed from this action. A separate order will be issued along with this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this February 17, 2017.
_________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
27 Arguably, the City encouraged Judge Ward to spend little time on non-judicial matters by paying him merely $12,000 per year. (See Doc. # 392-9 at 55).
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 626 Filed 09/12/17 Page 1 of 86

FILED
2017 Sep-12 PM 04:55 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

} } } } } Case No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP } } } } }

MEMORANDUM OPINION In the 19th century, American drinking establishments began offering free lunches to their patrons. Of course, the practice was designed to attract drinking customers, who, while they didn’t pay for lunch, surely paid for their beer. This led a wiser consumer to observe that “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” The phrase’s application carries beyond restaurants and bars. It is a core economics principle. See Milton Friedman, There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch (Open Court Publishing Co. 1975). In this case, Defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”) offered something much more valuable than lunch to Alabama counties and municipalities. It offered “free” supervision of probationers and “free” collection of fines and court costs owed to courts. Moreover, it offered municipal courts throughout the state of Alabama “free” document drafting and “free” intake services (to be provided, of course, after the municipal court ruled upon a defendant’s charge and crafted a sentence that included probation supervised by JCS). All of this, of course, at absolutely no cost to the counties, municipalities, and municipal courts which hired JCS. Or, so they thought. As it turns out, the services were provided without charge to the municipalities, but they were not free. In fact, the court is

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 626 Filed 09/12/17 Page 2 of 86
reminded of a different quote attributed to the inimitable Will Rogers: “It’s not what you pay a man, but what he costs you that counts.” AZ Quotes, http://www.azquotes.com/quote/249468 (last visited July 24, 2017). I. Introduction
The named Plaintiffs in this action were sentenced to probation by the City of Childersburg Municipal Court (“Municipal Court”) because they did not pay fines or court costs imposed by the Municipal Court on the date of sentencing. The Municipal Court directed Plaintiffs to remit $35 to $45 a month to JCS on top of the fines and court costs they were ordered to pay the court. Plaintiffs claim that they were not able to pay the fines and court costs, there never was a proper indigency determination, and they are now before the court to remedy alleged constitutional violations stemming from the probation procedures implemented by JCS on behalf of the Municipal Court.
This case is before the court on: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare the City of Childersburg’s (the “City”) “Probation” Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection (Doc. # 424); (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract between JCS & the City of Childersburg Void Ab Initio (Doc. # 426); (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders (Doc. # 545); (4) Defendants’ JCS and Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (“Correctional Healthcare”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray (Doc. # 469); (5) Defendants’ JCS and Correctional Healthcare Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews (Doc. # 522); and (6) Defendants’ JCS and Correctional Healthcare Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt (Doc. # 535). The
2

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parties have fully briefed the motions, and they are under submission. (See Docs. # 425, 427, 470, 472-75, 500-505, 510, 523, 530, 536, 544, 546, 550, 556, 567, 573, 575, 577-78, 588, 590, 596-97). The court held oral argument regarding these motions on July 24, 2017.
After careful review, and for the reasons explained below, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment are due to be denied. Defendant Correctional Healthcare is due to be granted summary judgment on all claims. But, Defendant JCS is due to be granted summary judgment in part and denied summary judgment in part, as discussed in detail below. II. The Rule 56 Evidence and the Undisputed Facts
The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed to be undisputed, their respective responses to those submissions, and the court’s own examination of the evidentiary record. All reasonable doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Info Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts that could be established through live testimony at trial. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).
A. Procedural History In their Fourth Amended and Restated Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant JCS entered into a “joint policy and practice” with Alabama municipalities, such as the City, that violated both their statutory and constitutional rights. (Doc. # 305 at ¶ 14). They state that JCS implemented a “highly systemized and uniform” approach for providing services to municipalities and municipal courts. (Id. at ¶ 16). Under the system described in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Defendant JCS conducted “many administrative and judicial functions of
3

Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 626 Filed 09/12/17 Page 4 of 86
the municipal court.” (Id. at ¶ 18). As compensation for performing those functions, JCS received a monthly probation fee of $35 to $45 a month and a set-up fee of $10, both of which were included in the probation orders provided to the municipal court by JCS. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 96).
Plaintiffs contend that the City unlawfully delegated “the collection of court fines, costs[,] and private fees” to JCS. (Id. at ¶ 93). In a contract signed by the mayor, the City purportedly bound the Municipal Court to establish a probation fee and a set-up fee in each probation order. (Id. at ¶¶ 94, 99). Thereafter, JCS designated certain employees as “probation officers” and allowed them to use a privately-issued badge to collect fees, fines, and court costs. (Id. at ¶ 92). Under the alleged practices of the Municipal Court, every defendant who was unable to immediately pay all fines and costs imposed by the court was placed on probation under the supervision of JCS. (Id. at ¶¶ 97-98). “This [was] routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Moreover, JCS’s employees allegedly threatened to revoke an individual’s probation, increase the fines and costs owed by a probationer, or increase the jail time a probationer faced if he or she was not able to pay JCS. (Id. at ¶ 110).
Plaintiffs present five claims for monetary damages against Defendants JCS, CHC Companies, Inc. (“CHC Companies”),1 and Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“Correct Care”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs first allege that JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care violated their due process rights through the postadjudication supervision system provided to the Municipal Court. (See id. at ¶¶ 89-119). Plaintiffs point to several features of JCS’s policies and practices as violations of their due process rights, including: (1) the incarceration of individuals for failing to pay fines, fees, and
1 CHC Companies was the corporation that purchased JCS in September 2011, not Correctional Healthcare. Plaintiffs have not disputed at this stage that Defendant Correctional Healthcare is due to be granted summary judgment.
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costs owed (id. at ¶ 100); (2) the institution of charges against probationers for “failure to obey a court order” (“FTOCO”) if the probationer could not pay the fines and fees owed to JCS and the Municipal Court (id. at ¶ 101); (3) the issuance of arrest warrants for individuals based on FTOCO charges (id. at ¶ 103); (4) JCS’s failure to determine whether the named Plaintiffs were indigent or to determine why they could not pay the amounts owed, despite the fact that they were indigent when FTOCO charges were instituted against them (id. at ¶¶ 103-04); (5) the failure to conduct delinquency or probation hearings before incarceration (id. at ¶ 110); (6) the imposition of fines, fees, and court costs exceeding the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts (id. at ¶ 111); (7) the imposition of terms of probation exceeding two years (id.); and (8) the failure to provide “adequate notice of the nature of any lawful charge” (id. at ¶ 113). Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that JCS violated Plaintiff Jews’s due process rights by collecting costs and fees from him when the charges against him had been dismissed by the Municipal Court. (Id. at ¶ 118).
Second, Plaintiffs allege that JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure by instituting a system under which probationers were arrested and detained for failing to pay fines and fees. (Id. at ¶¶ 158-67). They allege that JCS’s probation system deprived the Municipal Court’s probationers of a judicial hearing to determine whether the probationers had willfully refused to pay fines and fees owed to JCS and the Municipal Court. (Id. at ¶ 161). Moreover, they claim that JCS sought arrest warrants against all named Plaintiffs when it knew that the Plaintiffs could not pay the fines and fees imposed against them. (Id. at ¶ 164). According to the Fourth Amended Complaint, all of the named Plaintiffs were arrested and detained pursuant to this unconstitutional process implemented by JCS. (Id. at ¶ 166).
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Third, Plaintiffs allege that JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care violated their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel by implementing a policy or practice that “transformed” fines and fees into indefinite imprisonment sentences without providing access to counsel. (Id. at ¶¶ 17993). They contend that JCS employees threatened the named Plaintiffs with imprisonment and incarceration if they failed to pay the amounts owed to JCS and the Municipal Court on the schedule set by JCS. (Id. at ¶ 186). When Plaintiffs were unable to pay the fines and fees owed, JCS instituted FTOCO charges or probation violation charges in the Municipal Court. (Id. at ¶ 188). Although Plaintiffs faced a potential imprisonment sentence at that point, neither JCS nor the City provided counsel to the probationers. (Id. at ¶ 189).
Fourth, Plaintiffs claim that JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care violated their Eighth Amendment rights by imposing excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment in accordance with JCS’s probation system. (Id. at ¶¶ 211-26). According to the Plaintiffs, JCS demanded more than the statutory maximum fine of $500 per charge from probationers. (Id. at ¶ 218). Moreover, JCS allegedly violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment by imposing probation fees that far exceeded the initial fines and court costs ordered by the Municipal Court. (Id. at ¶ 219). In some situations, JCS charged probationers six to fifteen times the initial fine imposed by the Municipal Court through monthly probation fees. (Id.). Plaintiffs also accuse JCS of incarcerating them for terms longer than those allowed under Alabama Code § 15-18-62. (Id. at ¶ 221). In addition, JCS failed to account for $15 per day jail credits that should have been applied to offset the fines owed. (Id. at ¶ 222).
Fifth, Plaintiffs assert that JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care denied them their rights to equal protection by subjecting them to disparate treatment on the basis of wealth. (Id. at ¶¶ 242-55). According to Plaintiffs, the probation scheme implemented by JCS and the
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Municipal Court classified Municipal Court defendants on the basis of wealth because those financially able to pay all fees and court costs were not placed on probation, whereas those who could not pay the full amount owed were invariably placed on probation. (Id. at ¶¶ 247-48). Plaintiffs insist that there was no rational state interest for the disparate classification. (Id. at ¶ 251). Indeed, according to Plaintiffs, the probation scheme violated Alabama statutory law that required the Municipal Court “to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines.” (Id. at ¶ 252). Thus, Plaintiffs contend that JCS lacked authority “to charge additional fees to those who [could not] pay.” (Id. at ¶ 253).
In the Fourth Amended Complaint’s count for declaratory and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs request that the court declare the contract between JCS and the City (hereinafter the “JCS-City Contract”) void ab initio because (1) the City lacked authority to bind its Municipal Court, (2) the contract violated the separation of powers doctrine and other limitations on municipal authority, and (3) the contract unlawfully invaded the judiciary’s authority over court administration. (Id. at ¶¶ 267-76). Next, Plaintiffs request that the court “declare the actions of [JCS, CHC Companies, Correct Care, and the City] under this contract to be unconstitutional under the premises discussed above.” (Id. at ¶ 277). Plaintiffs ask the court to enter injunctions prohibiting JCS, CHC Companies, and Correct Care from (1) committing the legal violations described in the Fourth Amended Complaint, (2) “placing persons on probation for simple fines,” (3) “assessing fines in excess of $500 and extending probation periods beyond 24 months,” and (4) “imprisoning indigent persons for failure to pay fines and fees.” (Id. at p. 6364). Plaintiffs’ count for declaratory and injunctive relief does not seek relief due to JCS supervising probation for individuals with non-adjudicated offenses or blank probation orders.
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(See id. at ¶¶ 267-84). Additionally, Plaintiffs’ requests for relief do not ask the court to award restitutionary damages. (Id. at p. 63-64).
B. Formation of the Relationship Between the City, the Municipal Court, and JCS
On June 21, 2005, Childersburg’s City Council approved a proposal to replace its private probation service with JCS. (Doc. # 421-7 at 2).2 The City Council’s minutes reported that Judge Larry Ward and the Municipal Court’s clerk had recommended JCS.3 (Id.). Thereafter, the City’s mayor and a JCS vice president signed the JCS-City Contract. (Doc. # 392-16 at 3). The JCS-City Contract purported to include the Municipal Court as a party to that agreement. (Id.). Moreover, the City’s mayor signed the contract on behalf of the “CITY/COURT OF CHILDERSBURG, Alabama.” (Id.). But the Municipal Court’s judge did not sign the contract. (See id.).
The JCS-City Contract required JCS to perform supervision for “all probated cases sentenced by the [Municipal] Court,” including supervision of indigent probationers. (Id. at 4). This contract also directed JCS to notify the Municipal Court of non-complying probationers. (Id. at 5). It required JCS to maintain case files “with the terms and conditions of probation, reporting dates, field contacts as they occur and . . . the amounts and dates of monies collected.” (Id.). It allowed JCS to collect fines, restitution, and court costs on behalf of the Municipal Court if directed to do so. (Id.). JCS agreed not to charge its standard probation fee to indigent probationers. (Id. at 4). Furthermore, it agreed not to charge supervision fees to probationers who paid their fines and court costs within a week of their sentencing hearing. (Id.). The JCS-
2 For ease of reference, this opinion refers to the page numbers of the parties’ briefs, the minuscript pages in deposition transcripts, and the CM/ECF page numbers for all other exhibits, such as the City Council’s minutes cited above.
3 The City’s former mayor, B.J. Meeks, also testified that Judge Ward and the magistrate had recommended JCS. (Doc. # 392-9 at 52-53).
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City Contract did not specify whether JCS was to send notice of court hearings to probationers. (See id. at 4-5).
JCS also agreed not to charge the City or the Municipal Court for its services. (Id. at 6). Instead, the JCS-City Contract purportedly obligated the Municipal Court to include certain fees in “each Court Order.” (Id.). These fees included a $35.00 monthly probation fee and a $10.00 probation set-up fee. (Id.).
The mayor who signed the JCS-City Contract testified that JCS worked with the Municipal Court, not the City, even though JCS had entered into a contract with the City. (Doc. # 392-9 at 76). He claimed that Judge Ward had recommended JCS. (Id. at 45). But, Judge Ward testified he was unaware of the JCS-City Contract until the date of his deposition and was not able to say who would be authorized to bind the Municipal Court to such a contract.4 (Doc. # 392-5 at 10, 12). He denied any involvement in the contract’s formation. (Id. at 12-13). He also denied recommending JCS to the City or its mayor. (Id. at 18, 42). Judge Ward conceded, though, that he had worked with JCS in other municipal courts, including the municipal courts in Harpersville, Lincoln, Gurley, and Stevenson, Alabama. (Id. at 18).
Contrary to JCS’s strenuous assertion,5 the Rule 56 record does not establish whether Judge Ward approved the form documents produced by JCS employees, such as probation orders and failure to report letters. Judge Ward refused to testify about whether the Municipal Court had agreed to allow JCS to send threatening letters to probationers or whether he knew that JCS was sending such letters to probationers. (See Doc. # 392-5 at 71-74). Although Colleen Ray
4 When Judge Ward testified in a similar state-court action, he confirmed his knowledge that JCS supervised indigent probationers at no cost to the municipality or the probationer. (Doc. # 402-36 at 58). He agreed that JCS had “a financial interest in getting as much money out of [probationers] as they [could].” (Id. at 90).
5 (See Doc. # 470 at 5) (stating, as an undisputed fact, that “[a]ll of the probation orders, petitions for revocation, failure-to-report letters, and probation-violation letters in probation cases sentenced by the Childersburg Municipal Court were drafted and implemented by JCS pursuant to the directives of the Childersburg municipal judge”)
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testified that JCS sent out such orders and letters at the direction of the Municipal Court, she claimed that the Municipal Court would have approved the documents when it began to work with JCS. (See Doc. # 471-4 at 284-85). Colleen Ray did not work at the Childersburg JCS office in 2005, the year JCS began to supervise probationers for the Municipal Court and when the form orders would have been approved by the court. (See Doc. # 471-3 at 41-42) (stating that Colleen Ray was an office manager for JCS in Foley, Alabama from 2005 or 2006 to 2008). Accordingly, the Rule 56 record reveals that Ray lacks personal knowledge of whether Judge Ward approved the form documents used by JCS.6
In August 2014, after Judge Ward retired from the Municipal Court, the Municipal Court’s judge established new policies and procedures for setting bail, ensuring defendants’ right to counsel, imposing sentences when defendants failed to pay ordered fines and court costs, ordering probation, and revoking probation. (See generally Doc. # 128-1). The City Council terminated the JCS-City Contract in May 2015. (Doc. # 392-63 at 2).
C. JCS’s Policies JCS’s training manual indicates that JCS primarily concerned itself with enforcing the financial penalties and fees imposed by the probation orders it supervised. For example, JCS instructed its employees to schedule probationers’ appointments based on whether they had paid the full monthly amount owed under the probation order. (Doc. # 402-2 at 72). The amount paid to JCS determined whether an employee scheduled monthly, bi-weekly, or weekly probation appointments. (Id.). Likewise, if a probationer failed to appear at a JCS appointment, JCS
6 In addition, Colleen Ray recalled that the municipal court judges orally approved the form documents. (Doc. # 471-4 at 294). She could not recall whether JCS employees documented these oral approvals. (Id. at 294, 296).
For similar reasons to those discussed above, the court finds that Lisha Kidd lacks personal knowledge concerning Judge Ward’s approval of the form documents. Kidd testified that the she used the form orders and documents when supervising probationers pursuant to the court’s directions. (Doc. # 471-1 at 122). But, she was not hired to work with JCS in Childersburg until approximately 2010. (See id. at 40-41).
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directed its employees to “[r]eview the amount the [probationer] is behind on fines and fees” and to “determine the amount to be brought to the next appointment” before trying to contact the probationer by telephone. (Doc. # 402-3 at 10). JCS also required employees to review a report of expiring probation cases so that probation did not expire before the probationer met “the court ordered conditions” (which of course included, among other things, the condition to pay JCS’s monthly supervision fee). (Doc. # 402-2 at 66). JCS’s Probation Tracker, a proprietary software program used by JCS, also informed each probation officer, at the start of every work day, “the amount of monies collected in fees since the beginning of the month [versus] the amount of monies that should have been collected on cases assigned for the entire month.” (Id. at 37). Probation Tracker calculated this percentage “daily in order to help keep track of progress of fee collections during the month.” (Id.).
JCS employees filled out the probation orders for defendants placed on probation by judges. (Id. at 14). JCS instructed its employees on how to calculate the monthly payments that probationers should be directed to pay as follows:
Note that payments are not to be less than $135/$140/$145 monthly, unless a specified amount is ordered by the Judge. Company policy is to try to never make payments less than $85 per month. Add the amount of fines, court costs[,] and restitution payments, divide that number by number of months the defendant has been sentenced to probation minus one month. Take the amount derived and add the monthly probation fee. Round the amount up to the nearest $5. (Id.). JCS’s manual reminded its employees that a municipal court judge would determine the length of the defendant’s probation. (Id.). Under JCS’s policies, an employee generally requested a probation revocation hearing if (1) a probationer missed three appointments, (2) a probationer missed one appointment and a failure to report letter was returned to JCS in the mail, or (3) all phone numbers provided by the probationer were disconnected or contained incorrect information. (Doc. # 402-3 at 23). JCS
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instructed its employees to not request a warrant solely because a probationer owed fees. (Id.). Moreover, it provided special instructions to obtain the address for a probationer whose mail had been returned to JCS. (Id.). JCS told its employees to use Accurint to obtain a mailing address for probationers whose letters were returned to the sender.7 (Id.).
JCS’s training manual instructed employees to tell probationers who appeared for a revocation hearing that they needed to pay the amount owed for probation in full or the amount they were directed to pay in an earlier letter to have the revocation hearing dismissed. (Doc. # 402-3 at 36). JCS allowed its employees to “determine an amount to dismiss the hearing” if the probationer told the employee that he or she could not pay the full amount requested. (Id.). If the JCS employee decided to not dismiss the revocation hearing, the employee was instructed to “take the [probationer] before the Judge and let the Judge make a decision on the case.” (Id.). JCS told its employees that they must be prepared to answer questions and make a recommendation regarding the terms of revocation. (Id.). The sample recommendation given in the manual included an imprisonment term and an amount to be paid before release. (Id.).
If a probationer supervised by JCS received another probationary sentence supervised by JCS, JCS instructed its employees to place the new probation sentence on hold “until the current [probation] case is paid in full.” (Doc. # 402-2 at 41). As its training manual explained:
If a defendant has more than one case in the same court, the second and subsequent cases are to be placed on hold. Once the first case is paid in full, the second case is to be made active the day the first case is paid in full. The probation date on the admin. screen will be changed to the date the first case is paid in full. Click on the calculate button and the [Probation Tracker] system will update the number of months the defendant will be on probation. Once the second case is paid in full, the above is to be followed for the third case, and so on.
7 “Accurint is a website subscribed to by JCS that is available to use to look up a defendant and verify their last address.” (Doc. # 402-4 at 44). JCS successfully found several probationers by using this service. (Id.). One JCS employee handled all the requests for information from Accurint. (Id.).
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(Doc. # 402-3 at 53). Moreover, if a probationer was sentenced to probation and supervised by JCS in two or more jurisdictions, JCS only collected supervision fees for the first case initially. (Id.). Once the individual paid off all fees in the first case, JCS began to collect supervision fees in the second case. (Id.). JCS’s policies called for 70 percent of each payment to be applied to fines and 30 percent to be applied to fees. (Id. at 44).
If a probation sentence expired but the probationer failed to complete the terms of probation, JCS employees usually placed the probationer in an unsuccessful termination status. (Id. at 47-48). However, if the probationer continued making payments after the expiration of his or her probation term, JCS instructed its employees to keep the probation in an active status. (Id. at 48). And, if the probationer completed the conditions of probation within a reasonable time, JCS would ask a court to successfully terminate the probation. (Id.).
D. JCS’s Services to the Municipal Court Under the terms of the form probation order used by the Municipal Court, a defendant sentenced to probation by the Municipal Court was obligated to report to a probation officer -employed by JCS -- as instructed. (See, e.g., Doc. # 471-12 at 2). A defendant was also required to notify his or her probation officer whenever the defendant changed a residence or employment. (Id.). A defendant was compelled to pay JCS $35 or $45 a month, as well as a $10 set-up fee. (See id.). Moreover, the defendant was directed to make monthly payments towards the fines and costs owed to the Municipal Court. (See id.) (directing Plaintiff Ray to pay $145 a month towards the $1,146 she owed to the court in August 2012). The Municipal Court also could order a defendant to (1) make restitution payments, (2) complete a jail sentence, (3) complete certain education programs, or (4) return to court at a later date to show completion of
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an obligation. (See id.). The probation orders warned defendants about the Municipal Court’s power to modify or revoke probation as follows:
The Court may at any time modify any conditions of your probation, change or extend probation, discharge defendant[,] or revoke probation. You are subject to arrest for violation of any condition imposed by this order, and your probation may be revoked accordingly. (Id.) (emphasis in original). When signing an order of probation, a defendant affirmed that he or she had counsel or had “waived [the] right to counsel for all proceedings to this date.” (Id.). According to JCS’s Childersburg office manager, Lisha Kidd, Judge Ward signed blank court orders, and Kidd would fill them in based on the judge’s instructions. (Doc. # 471-1 at 105, 446-47). JCS only provided probation services when probation was mandated by a municipal court order. (Id. at 107). After Judge Ward had sentenced an individual to probation, Kidd informed the probationer about the terms of probation in a separate room. (Id. at 122-23). A probationer owed almost no fees to JCS if the court-ordered fines were paid within seven days of sentencing. (Id. at 109, 121). Once JCS began charging probation fees, though, a probationer could not end a probation sentence by merely paying off the fines originally imposed by the Municipal Court. (Id. at 109-10). Kidd could not recall whether she had ever supervised any probationer who had been declared indigent by the Municipal Court. (Id. at 231-32). However, she asserted that JCS did not determine whether a probationer was indigent because that was not its responsibility.8 (Id. at 232). The parties dispute how Judge Ward instructed JCS employees on the terms to include in the pre-signed orders. Both parties rely on testimony from Kidd regarding instructions placed on sticky notes. (See Docs. # 470 at 5 & n. 13; 500 at 2). During her deposition, Kidd explained that she would write oral instructions from Judge Ward to JCS in the written orders that had been
8 Colleen Ray also testified that JCS did not determine whether probationers it supervised were indigent, although there was an indigent status indicator in its Probation Tracker software. (Doc. # 471-3 at 160-61).
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pre-signed by him. (Doc. # 471-1 at 103-05). Additionally, when asked about discrepancies between a fine issued by the Municipal Court and the record of that fine in JCS’s Probation Tracker database, Kidd testified that she obtained the fine placed in Probation Tracker from a sticky note a court magistrate attached to the court file. (Id. at 443-45). Although she scanned a defendant’s probation order into Probation Tracker, she did not scan the Municipal Court’s order on the charge or the sticky note with additional information into Probation Tracker. (Id. at 447). Indeed, Kidd could not recall what happened to the sticky notes she relied on to determine the fine amounts. (Id. at 511). Nor was she aware whether Probation Tracker had a function allowing her to scan sticky notes into the electronic probation record. (See id. at 511-12). She returned the sticky notes to the Municipal Court with the case file. (Id. at 512-13).
Kidd explained during her deposition that JCS employees sent delinquency letters to probationers “as representative[s] of the Childersburg Municipal Court.” (See id. at 268-69). She testified that the Municipal Court hired them to be “probation agents.” (Id. at 269). During Judge Ward’s tenure with the Municipal Court, JCS employees drafted probation revocation petitions if probationers had failed to comply with the terms of probation. (See id. at 123-24). JCS informed the Municipal Court of the probationer’s payment history and missed appointments. (Id. at 124). Then, JCS would select a date for a hearing and inform the probationer of the hearing by mail “pursuant to the [Municipal Court].” (Id. at 127). A JCS employee would determine whether the Municipal Court should hold a compliance hearing or a revocation hearing, depending on whether the probationer had met his or her obligations. (Id. at 129-30).
JCS’s form revocation petitions informed the Municipal Court of the appointments a probationer had missed and the amount owed to the City and to JCS. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-1 at
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2). JCS requested an arrest warrant from the Municipal Court “if necessary.” (See, e.g., id.). The petitions included an order setting a hearing that purportedly was signed by the Municipal Court’s judge or a Court magistrate. (See, e.g., id.). Some revocation-hearing orders informed the probationer that the hearing could be cancelled if a payment was made.9 (See, e.g., id.). The revocation-hearing orders suspended the probationer’s sentence “until a resolution [was] decided.” (See, e.g., id.). JCS did not file the revocation petitions with the Municipal Court before the scheduled revocation hearings, even though the revocation orders indicated that they had been approved by the Municipal Court prior to the revocation hearing. (Doc. # 471-1 at 194).
JCS did send revocation petitions to probationers by mail. (Id. at 194). JCS also sent notices to show cause to non-compliant probationers.10 (Id. at 197). A notice to show cause would direct a probationer to appear at the Municipal Court and explain why he or she had failed to pay the court-imposed fines and fees. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-32 at 2). It warned a probationer that an arrest warrant would be issued if he or she failed to appear at the hearing. (Id.). It stipulated that the hearing could be cancelled if the probationer reported to JCS and paid a certain amount. (Id.). These notices were not filed with the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 471-1 at 206). When letters or notices were returned to JCS’s office, Kidd sometimes attempted to locate another address for the probationer by contacting the post office, contacting the Municipal Court, or requesting an Accurint search. (Doc. # 471-31 at 7). JCS ceased to send notices of hearings to probationers on behalf of the court four to six months before Kidd’s first deposition, which
9 Not all revocation-hearing orders included the option of cancelling the hearing by making a payment. (See, e.g., Doc. # 524-9 at 2). In a deposition regarding the operation of another municipal court, Judge Ward affirmed that JCS’s employees should not have the ability to determine how much a probationer needed to pay to avoid a hearing before the sentencing court. (Doc. # 402-36 at 81).
10 JCS employees also prepared violation reports for the Municipal Court. (E.g., Doc. # 524-25 at 2). JCS did not send these violation reports to the probationer. On at least one occasion, a JCS employee recommended jailing a probationer until they paid what they owed. (Id.).
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occurred in June 2014. (Doc. # 471-1 at 1, 126-27). Thus, JCS sent notices of revocation hearings to probationers on behalf of the Municipal Court until after this suit commenced.
JCS did not conduct indigency determinations for probationers. (Doc. # 471-31 at 10). If a probationer could not pay the fines and fees charged to her, Kidd would schedule a hearing with the Municipal Court. (Id.). Kidd has stated that the Municipal Court provided “forms for determining indigency.” (Id. at 11). Judge Ward has explained that he directed JCS to place probationers on indigency status for probation if the probationer could not pay and he expected JCS to “work with” such indigent probationers. (Doc. # 402-36 at 81). Moreover, he has testified that the municipal courts he operated would dismiss a case if the probationer “absolutely” could not pay the amounts owed. (Id.).
During revocation hearings, Kidd informed the judge about the probationer’s payment history and the number of appointments missed. (Doc. # 471-1 at 123-24). She denies that she ever recommended a disposition on any revocation petition during a revocation hearing. (Id. at 124). Although the length of revocation hearings varied, the longest revocation hearing Kidd recalled at the Municipal Court lasted ten minutes. (Id. at 133).
If a petitioner failed to appear at a revocation hearing, the Municipal Court’s magistrate often would issue a capias warrant. (See, e.g., Doc. # 471-26 at 2) (capias warrant issued after Plaintiff Ray had failed to appear at a revocation hearing). The Municipal Court issued capias warrants when a probationer had “failed to report, as ordered by the [Municipal] Court[,] on a previous court date.” (Doc. # 471-1 at 312). Many of these warrants stated that a defendant had been convicted of FTOCO charges. (See, e.g., Doc. # 471-26 at 2). (See also Doc. # 471-1 at 312-13) (explaining the failure to obey court order charge). The Municipal Court convicted a probationer of this charge when the probationer failed to comply with an order directing
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appearance at a hearing. (Id. at 313). According to the City’s attorneys, though, a City employee searched through the City’s records and found no municipal ordinance criminalizing failure to obey a court order.11 (Doc. # 402-35). The Municipal Court’s arrest warrants included a cash bond that an arrestee had to pay to be released.12 (See, e.g., Doc. # 471-26 at 2). The Rule 56 record does not reveal (1) how FTOCO charges were initiated, (2) whether the Municipal Court formally convicted defendants of FTOCO violations, (3) the sentences defendants received for FTOCO convictions, and (4) whether those sentences included imprisonment terms.
Once a probationer failed to appear at a revocation hearing, a JCS employee placed the probation sentence on warrant status in Probation Tracker. (Doc. # 471-1 at 272-73). JCS employees did not confirm that a warrant had been issued before they changed a probationer’s status from active to warrant. (Id. at 273). JCS’s involvement in the probationer’s case ceased once the case entered warrant status. (Id. at 274). JCS did not charge probation supervision fees while a probationer was in warrant status. (Id.). The probationer’s file stayed closed until a new court date was set for the probationer or the probationer paid the amounts owed “in full directly to the [Municipal] Court.” (Id.). In one case, though, the JCS probation file remained closed in warrant status until May 2012, even though the probationer had been arrested in February 2012. (Id. at 274-75) (discussing Timothy Fugatt’s probation sentence).
In some circumstances, a Municipal Court magistrate conducted a 72-hour hearing for a probationer after he or she was arrested by City police. (See Doc. # 436-6 at 13) (describing a 72-hour hearing conducted at the Talladega County Jail for Johnny Norwood, Jr.). However,
11 Moreover, the arrest reports drafted by City police officers provide no citation to the ordinance arrestees purportedly violated when failing to obey a court order, even though many of those reports cited other legal provisions that the arrestee had violated. (See, e.g., Docs. # 392-36 at 2; 396-42 at 2; 392-57 at 2).
12 Misty Hepp, a magistrate for the Municipal Court, set that bail amount using a written schedule. (Doc. # 392-13 at 74-75). But, Hepp did not become a court clerk until September 2014, well after the warrants at issue in this case were issued. (Id. at 27).
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nothing in the Rule 56 record indicates that any of the named Plaintiffs received such a 72-hour hearing, even though Plaintiffs Ray and Jews were imprisoned for more than 72 hours following their arrests.13
E. Probation of Plaintiffs Timothy and Kristy Fugatt City police issued Kristy Fugatt two traffic tickets in November 2010 for driving with an expired tag and an expired license. (Doc. # 392-66 at 14-15). Fugatt renewed her license (Doc. # 392-6 at 105), and the Municipal Court only assessed court costs for each ticket, (Doc. # 39266 at 14-15). When Kristy Fugatt informed the Municipal Court judge that she could not pay the full amount charged, he directed her to an intake area to “talk to JCS.” (Doc. # 392-6 at 105-07). Fugatt signed an intake form stating that she would pay a certain amount. (Id. at 108-09). Fugatt was placed on probation under JCS’s supervision. (See Doc. # 392-18 at 9) (stating that Kristy Fugatt had been sentenced to 24 months’ probation in January 2011). Timothy Fugatt received a traffic ticket in December 2010 for driving with an expired vehicle tag. (Doc. # 392-66 at 11). The Municipal Court did not convict him of the traffic offense but ordered him to pay court costs. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt testified that he had attempted to inform the Municipal Court judge about his child’s terminal illness during the hearing but did not get an opportunity to speak to the judge due to the speed of the proceedings. (Doc. # 392-7 at 74). Similar to his wife, the Municipal Court also sentenced Timothy Fugatt to 24 months’ probation under JCS’s supervision. (Doc. # 392-19 at 7). In early 2011, JCS scheduled weekly probation appointments for the Fugatts; indeed, JCS employees sometimes scheduled multiple appointments in one week if the Fugatts failed to show
13 According to Hepp, a Municipal Court magistrate, the Municipal Court began releasing imprisoned probationers on their own recognizance in September 2014 if they had not paid bail when the 72-hour hearing occurred. (Doc. # 392-14 at 120-21) (pages 415-16 of the deposition transcript). Hepp did not specifically testify about the Municipal Court’s policies regarding 72-hour hearings before September 2014.
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up at the office. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 7-8; 537-25 at 10-11). Timothy Fugatt told a JCS employee in January 2011 that his child was terminally ill and that he could not make a payment to JCS until he had received a tax refund. (Doc. # 537-25 at 9). The Fugatts did not appear at 11 of the 12 probation appointments scheduled by JCS in April, May, and June 2011.14 (See Docs. # 537-24 at 7-8; 537-25 at 10-11).
JCS issued revocation petitions for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on June 28, 2011, which comported with the form revocation petitions described above. (Docs. # 537-1 at 2; 537-2 at 2). Timothy Fugatt’s revocation petition explained that he had failed to report to JCS for 16 scheduled appointments and had failed to pay $223 as ordered. (Doc. # 537-1 at 2). The revocation petition explained that a payment of $223 would close his case. (Id.). It warned him that a warrant would be issued if he failed to appear at the Municipal Court on August 11, 2011. (Id.). Kristy Fugatt’s revocation petition averred that she had missed 17 scheduled appointments and had failed to pay $371. (Doc. # 537-2 at 2). It explained that a payment of $371 would close her case and that a warrant would be issued if she failed to appear at the probation revocation hearing scheduled for August 11. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt testified that they likely
14 The parties dispute whether JCS employees mailed failure to report letters or delinquency letters to the Fugatts. Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare assert that a JCS employee sent four failure to appear letters and two delinquency letters to Plaintiffs Kristy Fugatt and Timothy Fugatt. (Doc. # 536 at 9) (citing Docs. # 537-26, 537-27, 537-28, and 537-29). Plaintiffs assert there is no evidence that the letters were placed in the mail. (Doc. # 567 at 7). And, Timothy Fugatt testified that he did not remember whether he received the letters. (Doc. # 537-19 at 108-09). The Probation Tracker records reveal that JCS employees sometimes noted in Probation Tracker when they mailed some of the letters to the Fugatts. (See Doc. # 537-24 at 6) (note on April 25, 2011 that a JCS employee was sending a failure to report letter). At other times, JCS employees placed a failure to report letter in the Probation Tracker record without any notation or indication that the letter had been mailed to the probationer. (See id.) (describing a failure to report letter written on May 24, 2011). Ultimately, the court finds that the dispute about whether JCS mailed failure to report letters or delinquency letters does not concern a material issue of fact because such a failure is not part of any cognizable due process claim.
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would not have received the revocation petitions because their house had been foreclosed upon.15
(Doc. # 537-19 at 111).
The Municipal Court held revocation hearings for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on August
11, 2011, but neither of them appeared at the hearings. (Docs. # 537-24 at 5-6; 537-25 at 7).
The Municipal Court issued warrants against them both in August 2011. (Id.). Both August
2011 arrest warrants stated that the Fugatts had been convicted of failure to obey a court order.
(Docs. # 537-33 at 2; 537-34 at 2). Timothy Fugatt’s warrant required him to pay $540 as a cash
bond in order to be released. (Doc. # 537-33 at 2). Kristy Fugatt’s warrant required her to pay a
cash bond of $688. (Doc. # 537-34 at 2).
A City police officer arrested the Fugatts on February 26, 2012. (Docs. # 537-36 at 2-3;
537-38 at 2-3); (Docs. # 402-27 at 3; 402-28 at 3) (Timothy and Kristy Fugatt testifying that the
officer arrested both of them on that date). The Fugatts were taken to the City’s police station
and placed in a holding cell. (Docs. # 402-27 at 3; 402-28 at 3). City police released them on
February 26th after they had paid $900 for a cash bond. (Id.).
JCS’s records indicate that in May 2012 the Municipal Court reinstated the Fugatts’
probation sentences. (Docs. # 537-24 at 5; 537-25 at 7). The Municipal Court issued a new
probation order against Timothy Fugatt based upon the FTOCO offense on April 26, 2012.
(Doc. # 537-3 at 2). This probation sentence ended on April 26, 2014. (Id.). Although the
15 The parties dispute whether the revocation petitions and related notices to show cause were mailed to Plaintiffs Kristy and Timothy Fugatt. Defendants state that a JCS employee mailed the petitions to the Fugatts along with notices to show cause. (Doc. # 536 at 9). They cite a notice to show cause in the Rule 56 record, which instructed Kristy Fugatt “to appear in [the Municipal] Court on August 11, 2011 . . . to explain why you have failed to pay fine and costs as ordered by this court.” (Doc. # 537-32 at 2). Plaintiffs dispute that the petitions and notices to show cause were mailed to them. (Doc. # 567 at 8). In support, they note that (1) the Fugatts do not recall receiving the documents, and (2) the notice to show cause was unsigned and undated. (Doc. # 537-32 at 2). Notably, on several occasions, JCS employees recorded in the Probation Tracker record when documents were mailed to a probationer, but they did not note on the Fugatts’ probation records that the June 2011 revocation petitions had been placed in the mail. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-24 at 6). Given the parties’ dispute about this issue, the court has not accepted (for purposes of Rule 56) JCS’s statement that it mailed the revocation petitions and notices to show cause to the Fugatts in August 2011.
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Municipal Court actually issued a new probation order for a different offense, JCS’s records state that the court reinstated Timothy Fugatt’s probation for the expired tag offense adjudicated in January 2011. (Doc. # 537-24 at 5). JCS also recalculated the probation date for that offense from January 2011 to May 1, 2014.16 (Id.). Similarly, the Municipal Court also reinitiated Kristy Fugatt’s earlier probation sentence and added a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 537-4 at 2). Moreover, the Municipal Court fined Kristy Fugatt $168 for a speeding offense. (Id.). The Rule 56 record does not indicate whether she received the speeding ticket for which she was fined. JCS placed Kristy Fugatt’s May 2012 probation sentence on hold. (Doc. # 537-41 at 2). JCS prepared revocation petitions and notices to show cause against Kristy and Timothy Fugatt in August 2012. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5). Timothy Fugatt called JCS on August 28, 2012 and confirmed that he had received the paperwork that was mailed to him. (Doc. # 537-24 at 4). A JCS employee told him that he could report to JCS on August 31 or September 7, but he did not show up to JCS’s office on either of those dates. (See id.).
The Municipal Court cancelled revocation hearings concerning the Fugatts on September 13, 2012. (Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5). According to Kidd’s notes in Probation Tracker, Timothy Fugatt called her and demanded a new court date because he believed the revocation hearings were set for 1:30 P.M. (Doc. # 537-24 at 4). He spoke with a Municipal Court employee before calling JCS, but the employee told him that JCS was responsible for deciding whether to set a new court date. (Id.). Kidd generated new revocation petitions and notices to show cause and mailed them to the Fugatts on September 19. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5).
16 The Rule 56 record does not indicate whether JCS created a separate Probation Tracker entry for the probation sentence Timothy Fugatt received in April 2012.
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The Fugatts appeared before the Municipal Court on October 11, 2012. (See Doc. # 53724 at 4). They explained their financial situation to Judge Ward, who commented that they were “using [their] son as an excuse not to pay for [their] fines.” (Doc. # 537-23 at 234). They filled out a hardship form to explain their financial situation, and JCS agreed to “waive the fees after [the Fugatts] paid $200.” (Id. at 235). JCS also agreed that the Fugatts could report to a probation officer in Sylacauga, Alabama because they were being required “to drive to Childersburg every four days even if [they] couldn’t pay anything.” (Id. at 236). But, Timothy Fugatt called Kidd on October 31, 2012 and informed her that he could not make the payment because he had to pay approximately $1500 for other bills. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). Kidd contacted a Municipal Court magistrate about the issue, and the Municipal Court mailed subpoenas for the Fugatts to appear on November 7. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4-5). The Municipal Court issued warrants against the Fugatts in November 2012 after they failed to appear in court. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4).
Timothy Fugatt appeared at the Municipal Court in December 2012 and agreed to pay $100 towards the amounts his wife and he owed. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). He told the court that he would pay the fines off with a tax refund. (Id.). The Municipal Court then reinstated the Fugatts’ probation sentences in January 2013. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4). JCS placed Kristy Fugatt’s probation sentence on unsupervised status in January 2013, after JCS and the Municipal Court had been informed of the present lawsuit. (Doc. # 537-25 at 4). It placed Timothy Fugatt’s probation sentence on hold in February 2013 after consulting with a magistrate at the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). Ultimately, the Municipal Court terminated the Fugatts’ probation sentences on November 1, 2014, during the pendency of this action. (See Doc. # 537-25 at 4).
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F. Probation of Plaintiff Deunate Jews Plaintiff Jews was charged with harassment in 2008. (See Doc. # 392-27 at 2). The Municipal Court dismissed the harassment charge against Jews in January 2009, subject to conditions that Jews (1) pay court costs to the Municipal Court and (2) avoid contact with the complainant. (Id.). During a deposition, Jews claimed that he had contested the Municipal Court’s authority to impose court costs against him when the criminal charge against him had been dismissed. (Doc. # 524-5 at 50). Judge Ward responded that he would “lock [Jews] up” unless he signed a probation order. (Id. at 50-51). Jews did not ask Judge Ward any more questions because he believed that the judge would imprison him if he “said any little thing.” (Id. at 51). Jews was unable to pay the assessed court costs on the date of the hearing. (Id. at 52). After signing a probation order, Jews advised a JCS employee that he would not report to JCS’s probation office because the Municipal Court had forced him to sign the probation order. (Id. at 56). He informed the JCS employee that he would not pay the imposed court costs because his case had been dismissed. (Id. at 59). Moreover, he provided JCS the address for his uncle’s residence, rather than his own address. (Id. at 60). He submitted this address to JCS because he did not plan to pay what the Municipal Court had directed him to pay. (Id. at 60-61). Consequently, Jews did not receive a letter that JCS sent to him on January 27, 2009. (Id. at 5960). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in Jews’s case on February 12, 2009, but Jews did not appear at the hearing.17 (Doc. # 524-22 at 6). The Municipal Court’s magistrate
17 The parties dispute whether JCS provided Jews prior notice of the revocation hearings scheduled with the Municipal Court. Jews’s Probation Tracker record does not indicate whether JCS employees sent the revocation petitions and notices to show cause to him. (See Doc. # 524-22 at 6). In contrast, as discussed above, Kidd occasionally noted in Probation Tracker when she mailed documents to the Fugatts. Given the parties’ dispute
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issued a capias warrant against Jews on February 17, 2009 for failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 392-35 at 2). The warrant directed Jews to pay a bond of $487 to be released. (Id.). Jews was arrested in September 2009. (Doc. # 392-36 at 3). In October 2009, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence and charged him a $317 warrant fee.18 (Doc. # 52422 at 6). The Court’s probation order sentenced Jews to probation for FTOCO. (Doc. # 524-6 at 2). Jews was released from the Talladega County Jail on October 22, 2009. (Doc. # 382-11 at 65).
JCS petitioned the Municipal Court to revoke Jews’s probation again in December 2009. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in January 2010, and Jews did not appear at the hearing. (Id.). A magistrate issued another capias warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO. (Doc. # 392-45 at 2). This arrest warrant increased his bond amount to $935. (Id.). City police arrested Jews on August 18, 2010. (Doc. # 392-46 at 2). On September 9, 2010, the Municipal Court fined Jews $317 for the failure-to-obey offense and reinstated his probation. (Doc. # 392-38 at 2). Hepp again authorized Jews’s release from the Talladega County Jail on September 9th. (Doc. # 382-11 at 67).
In November 2010, JCS filed another revocation petition against Jews. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5). Jews did not appear at the Municipal Court’s December 2010 revocation hearing in his case. (Id.). The Municipal Court issued another capias warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO, and he was arrested on January 10, 2011. (Doc. # 392-50 at 2-3). A City employee, Misty Hepp, authorized Jews’s release from jail on January 14, 2011, after a
regarding whether JCS mailed the revocation petitions and notices to show cause to Plaintiffs, the court has not accepted Defendants’ averments (for purposes of Rule 56) that JCS employees mailed these notices.
18 The Municipal Court issued a separate probation order for Jews on this date. (Doc. # 392-37 at 2). But JCS’s records indicate that the court merely reinstated his prior probation term. (Doc. # 524-22 at 6).
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$500 bond had been paid on his behalf. (Doc. # 392-51 at 2). The Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence in March 2011 and charged him a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5).
In May 2011, JCS again petitioned the Municipal Court to revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 392-54 at 2). The revocation petition asserted that Jews owed $773 to close his case. (Id.). A JCS employee and Judge Ward signed the petition, but the City’s prosecutor did not sign it. (Id.). Yet again, Jews did not appear at a revocation hearing in June 2011. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). On June 10, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued another warrant against Jews based on a conviction for failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 392-56 at 2). This warrant required Jews to pay $1,090 in bail to be released. (Id.). A City officer arrested Jews in February 2012 after detaining him to check for outstanding warrants. (Doc. # 392-57 at 2-3). Jews fled from the officer and was detained for resisting arrest and failure to obey a court order. (Id.).
According to Jews’s Probation Tracker records, during a March 2012 hearing, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). The Court issued another probation order for the resisting arrest and FTOCO charges. (Doc. # 392-58 at 2). This order recounted fines of $717 for resisting arrest and $1,090 for FTOCO. (Id.). And, it placed Jews on probation until March 8, 2014. (Id.). The City’s police department released Jews from jail on March 8, 2012. (Doc. # 382-12 at 13). In May 2012, JCS recalculated Jews’s probation expiration date for the 2009 probation order stemming from the harassment charges. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). It stated that his probation on that charge actually was due to end on March 9, 2014. (Id.).
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In June 2012, JCS requested that the Municipal Court revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 524-22 at 3). The revocation petition was not signed by a JCS employee, and the order directing a hearing was not signed by the Municipal Court’s judge. (Doc. # 392-59 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in August 2012; again, Jews did not attend that hearing. (Doc. # 524-22 at 3). According to JCS’s probation records, the probation sentence entered warrant status on August 10, 2012. (Id. at 2). The Municipal Court ultimately terminated Jews’s probation sentence in December 2014, during the pendency of this action. (Doc. # 382 at 114).
G. Probation of Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray In June 2010, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with a suspended license and without proof of insurance. (Doc. # 423-4 at 2). Ray pled guilty to both charges during a Municipal Court hearing on August 12, 2010. (Id. at 3). Ray testified that a public defender attended the hearing, but she (Ray) did not believe that an attorney would assist her with a traffic ticket. (Doc. # 471-7 at 38-39). Ray does not think that Judge Ward identified the public defender during the hearing. (Id. at 39). Judge Ward imposed a three-day suspended imprisonment term for each conviction, along with a 24-month probationary sentence. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3). Ray was unable to recall whether Judge Ward mentioned the suspended imprisonment term during the hearing. (Doc. # 471-7 at 43-44). Judge Ward fined Ray $400 for each traffic offense, imposed $198 in court costs for the suspended license offense, and imposed $148 in court costs for the no insurance offense. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3). According to JCS’s probation records, JCS prepared a revocation petition against Ray on September 20, 2010.19 (Doc. # 423-11 at 8). The revocation petition contained in the Rule 56 record was not signed by the probation officer or the Municipal Court’s judge. (See Doc. # 423-
19 As with Plaintiff Jews, Plaintiff Ray’s Probation Tracker records do not indicate whether JCS mailed the September 2010 revocation petition to her. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 8). But, her Probation Tracker records state that Kidd mailed petitions and notices to Ray in January 2012 and August 2012. (Id. at 3-4).
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8 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing on October 14, 2010, which Ray attended. (Doc. # 423-11 at 8). JCS issued another revocation petition on December 30, 2010, based on Ray’s failure to attend probation sessions, pay assessed court fines and fees, and pay probation fees. (Doc. # 423-14 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing for Ray on January 13, 2011, but she failed to appear. (Doc. # 423-11 at 7). Consequently, on January 18, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant premised upon a FTOCO conviction. (Doc. # 423-15 at 2). The warrant provided for a bond of $1,353. (Id.).
Ray was arrested on January 19, 2011. (See Doc. # 455-5). She remained in the Talladega County Jail until February 10, 2011. (See id.). The Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation on February 10, 2011, and imposed a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-17 at 2). In June 2011, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with an expired tag and a revoked license. (Doc. # 423-31 at 2). Ray pled guilty to both offenses in July 2011. (Id. at 3). The Municipal Court imposed 5-day suspended imprisonment sentences, 24 months of probation, fines totaling $500, and court costs totaling $346 for the two convictions. (Id.). In August 2011, Ray was again charged with driving with a revoked license and an expired tag. (Doc. # 423-28 at 2). As with her earlier tickets, the Municipal Court imposed a 5-day suspended imprisonment sentence for the expired-tag offense, 24 months of probation for the expired-tag offense, fines totaling $500, and court costs totaling $346. (Id. at 3).
On January 4, 2012, a JCS employee found that Ray had violated her probation because she owed the City $1,008 in fines and costs and JCS $433 in fees.20 (Doc. # 423-11 at 4). The
20 The parties dispute whether JCS sought to revoke Ray’s probation in January 2012 based on her failure to attend scheduled probation appointments. Plaintiffs state that Ray “attended over 20 JCS appointments” and had paid over $3,000 towards her probation obligations. (Doc. # 454 at 6). Defendants state that a JCS employee relied on Ray’s failure to attend scheduled appointments to support a revocation petition. (Doc. # 470 at 14). JCS’s probation records for Ray suggest that its request to revoke her probation was based solely on the amount she owed, as the probation notes did not mention Ray’s failure to appear at scheduled meetings as a rationale for revoking her probation. (Doc. # 423-11 at 4) (“THE DEF IS IN VIOLATION OF PROBATION DUE TO OUTSTANDING
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Municipal Court held a revocation hearing on February 9, 2012 that Ray did not attend. (Id.). Thus, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant against Ray for FTOCO. (Doc. # 423-23 at 2). The warrant provided a bail amount of $3,173. (Id.). On April 21, 2012, City police officers detained Ray because they suspected that she had an active warrant. (Doc. # 42324 at 2-3). She fled from the officers in her car until she was blocked in by traffic. (Id. at 3). The officers issued her tickets for driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempted escape. (Doc. # 423-27 at 2, 4).
Ray was held in jail from April 21, 2012 to May 1, 2012 on the charge of FTOCO. (Doc. # 455-7). On April 26, 2012, the Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation and imposed a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-25 at 2). The court’s probation order stated that Ray owed $3,173 in costs. (Id.). The order stated that Ray could not be released from jail until $300 had been paid on her behalf. (Id.). Ray was released from jail on May 1, 2012 after someone paid the $300. (Doc. # 471-7 at 149).
In June 2012, Ray pled guilty to driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempting to escape. (Doc. # 423-27 at 3, 5). The Municipal Court sentenced Ray to a 5 day suspended incarceration sentence, along with 24 months’ probation, for each conviction. (Id.). It fined her $400 for driving with a revoked license, $400 for attempting to flee, and $100 for driving with an expired tag. (Id.). It also imposed a total of $444.00 in court costs against Ray. (Id.).
JCS again requested that the Municipal Court revoke Ray’s probation in August 2012 due to the outstanding fines and fees she owed to JCS and the City. (Doc. # 423-11 at 3). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in September 2012 and issued a warrant against Ray
[FEES AND FINES] TO THE CITY OF 1008.00/$433.00 JCS FEES, TOTALING $1441.00.”). At a minimum, there is a genuine factual dispute as to JCS’s asserted reason for seeking a revocation hearing against Ray in January 2012.
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after she had failed to appear at the hearing. (Id.). Ray’s probation sentence was terminated by court order on November 1, 2014. (Doc. # 422 at 11). III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Anderson”). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. For Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
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When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The law is clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).
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IV. Analysis The court addresses the parties’ summary judgment arguments below. A. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Defendants initially argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek the declaratory and
injunctive relief requested in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 470 at 44). They claim that standing no longer exists for the declaratory and injunctive relief sought because (1) the JCS-City Contract has been terminated, (2) JCS no longer operates in the state of Alabama, (3) the Municipal Court has adopted new policies and procedures addressing the alleged procedural deficiencies in this action, and (4) the Municipal Court has appointed new personnel. (Id.). Thus, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot show that the conduct of which they complain will occur in the future. (Id. at 45).
Plaintiffs respond that the court should adopt its ruling on the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief in a case related to this one. (Doc. # 500 at 45) (referencing Woods, et al. v. City of Columbiana, et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-00493-RDP, Docs. # 88 & 89). In Woods, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief “based upon future harm” without prejudice, “subject to repleading if [JCS] reenters business in the state of Alabama.” (Case No. 2:15-cv-00493-RDP, Doc. # 88). The court explained during a hearing in that case that the plaintiffs could seek a ruling on whether a contract between JCS and a municipal defendant was void from its inception, to the extent that such a ruling was relevant to a legal claim. (Id., Doc. # 89 at 18). But, the court declined to allow plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the contract was void and unenforceable because the parties had agreed that the contract at issue was no longer in place and that JCS no longer operated in the state of Alabama. (Id.).
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To establish standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show “a real and immediate— as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat of future injury.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001), and Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief from a federal court also must show “a reasonable expectation that the injury they have suffered will continue or will be repeated in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999). A party’s Article III standing to bring suit is determined by whether it had standing at the time of filing. Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). In this case, the court has already concluded that Plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective injunctive relief at the time this suit was filed in 2012. (See Doc. # 67 at 25-26). Thus, Defendants’ request to dismiss the declaratory and injunctive counts for lack of standing is due to be denied.
Mootness addresses justiciability concerns arising from factual changes that occur after a case’s filing. “[M]ootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 887 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare appear to rely on JCS’s voluntary cessation of operation in Alabama to justify mooting the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.21 “It is well settled that ‘a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does
21 The Rule 56 record does not conclusively demonstrate whether JCS’s decision to stop operations in the state of Alabama was voluntary or involuntary. JCS involuntarily ceased operations in Childersburg because the city council terminated the JCS-City Contract. (Doc. # 392-63 at 2). But, JCS has not explained why it ceased operations in other Alabama jurisdictions.
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not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.’” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)). Nevertheless, a case may be moot due to a private defendant’s voluntary cessation of conduct “if subsequent events [make] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior [cannot] reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
Here, Plaintiffs have asked the court to extend the mootness decision rendered in a related case to the present case. The court concludes that this request is appropriate. Accordingly, the court concludes that the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed without prejudice as moot, subject to repleading if Defendant JCS reenters business in the state of Alabama. To be clear, this ruling does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking to support a damages claim by asking the court to rule that particular conduct was illegal. Indeed, the court addresses all three of Plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motions, which request such rulings, below.
B. Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Damages Claims Plaintiffs present three issues on which they believe they are entitled to summary judgment. First, they argue that the court should summarily declare JCS’s probation supervision practices for the Municipal Court as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See generally Doc. # 425). Second, they argue that the court should declare the JCS-City Contract to be void from its inception. (See generally Doc. # 427). Third, they claim that the court should declare void any probation sentence initiated by a blank order or premised upon an offense that was not adjudicated by the Municipal Court’s judge. (See generally Doc. # 545).
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Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare present a number of reasons why they contend they are entitled to summary judgment. The court begins its analysis by discussing the general defenses presented to the § 1983 claims at the core of this case. Because none of those defenses resolve all of the § 1983 claims, the court will also discuss whether Plaintiffs have presented a triable § 1983 claim based on a due process, Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, or equal protection violation. Next, the court will address whether Plaintiffs have presented a triable § 1983 conspiracy claim. Finally, the court will discuss Plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion, which seeks to declare the JCS-City Contract void.
1. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Defendant JCS argues that it is entitled to “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” because it followed orders and directives from the Municipal Court when it performed functions relating to Plaintiffs’ judicial proceedings. (Doc. # 470 at 28). JCS insists that the Municipal Court directed JCS employees to draft and promulgate all of the documents at issue in this case, including probation orders, petitions for revocation, failure-to-report letters, and probationviolation letters. (Id. at 30-31). Moreover, it claims that the Municipal Court instructed or requested its employees to enforce the conditions of probation mandated by the court. (Id. at 33). It emphasizes that Alabama law permitted JCS employees to seek reports from probationers, issue written reports to the Municipal Court, use suitable methods to improve probationers’ conduct, and initiate probation revocation proceedings. (Id. at 33-34). Plaintiffs contend that JCS has mischaracterized the debt collection functions it performed for the City as “probation services.” (Doc. # 500 at 36). They argue that JCS performed administrative functions, rather than judicial functions, because (1) its employees operated a “highly systemic post-adjudication collection system,” (2) the documents sent to
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probationers were form documents provided by JCS, (3) none of the documents sent by JCS were filed in court records, and (4) JCS marketed its services to municipalities as fine collection services. (Id. at 37-38). Plaintiffs further emphasize that the Municipal Court’s judge signed blank probation orders prior to any adjudication, JCS employees filled in those probation orders, and JCS employees often included fines levied years earlier against the probationer in later probation orders. (Id. at 38). And, they insist that JCS employees exceeded the authority provided to probation officers because they threatened to imprison probationers who failed to pay on time and manipulated payments made by probationers to prolong probation terms. (Id. at 39-40).
As outlined above, the parties’ briefs have focused on whether JCS’s employees committed or assisted in adjudicative acts. But, the quasi-judicial immunity question ultimately turns on a more fundamental inquiry: whether a private corporation can seek quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims premised upon policies or customs that caused its employees to violate individuals’ constitutional rights.
“Absolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute immunity.” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). Under this immunity doctrine, “[n]onjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity when their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). To receive quasi-judicial immunity, an official must act within the scope of his or her authority. Id. Courts review whether a nonjudicial official receives quasi-judicial immunity “through a functional analysis of the action taken by the official in relation to the judicial process.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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As several courts have explained, quasi-judicial immunity is a defense to individual capacity § 1983 suits, but not official capacity suits. VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that commissioners for the Nebraska State Racing Commission could not receive quasi-judicial immunity in their official capacities); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810-11 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a sheriff and county judge could not claim quasi-judicial or qualified immunity for official-capacity § 1983 claims); Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 327 & n. 5 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining, in a footnote, that official capacity claims against members of a township’s board of supervisors are not subject to quasi-judicial immunity, even though the board members were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in their individual capacities). When a private corporate entity contracts with a public entity to offer functions “traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state[,] . . . it becomes the functional equivalent of [a] municipality.” Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). In other words, a suit against such a corporate entity is an official capacity suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985) (explaining that an official capacity § 1983 suit is one “against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and that personal immunity defenses are unavailable in such suits). Because Plaintiffs are not suing Defendants JCS or Correctional Healthcare in an individual capacity, Defendants cannot seek quasi-judicial immunity.22 Cf. Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the rationale against immunity for municipalities “is applicable in § 1983 suits against non-governmental entities not
22 The Middle District of Tennessee recently concluded -- in an analogous action against a for-profit probation servicer and other defendants -- that for-profit corporations are not entitled to claim the defense of quasijudicial immunity because (1) courts generally have declined to extend immunity to private contractors, (2) the public interest is not served by extending immunity to for-profit entities, and (3) the corporation is not equivalent to the employee of the corporation who performs a task integral to the judicial process. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 767-68 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
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entitled to qualified immunity”), overruled on other grounds as explained in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010).23
Indeed, both the Fourth Amended Complaint and the summary judgment briefs demonstrate that this action is an official capacity suit. Plaintiffs allege in their Fourth Amended Complaint that JCS established a “highly systemized and uniform” policy for collecting court fines, costs, and fees during their performance of delegated administrative and judicial functions. (See Doc. # 305 at ¶¶ 16, 18). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ operative complaint explains that JCS’s uniform system (i.e., its policy or practice) caused Municipal Court defendants and probationers to suffer the constitutional violations at issue in this action. (Id. at ¶¶ 97, 161, 181, 218, 223, 246-48). Additionally, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare rely on Buckner and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to argue that Plaintiffs need to prove that a custom or policy caused the constitutional violations. In response, Plaintiffs have pointed to evidence that JCS instituted a system that was such a custom or policy. (Doc. # 500 at 43-45). From these allegations and arguments, the court concludes that this is an official capacity suit against JCS and Correctional Healthcare, subject to the elements for such suits identified in Monell.
By way of their pleadings, which have joined the issues in this case, the parties have picked the rules of this game, and quasi-judicial immunity appears nowhere in those rules. Therefore, Defendants’ request for quasi-judicial immunity is due to be denied.
23 In Swann, the parties agreed that a private corporate defendant was not eligible to receive qualified immunity. 388 F.3d at 837.
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2. Qualified Immunity Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare have requested qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. (Doc. # 523 at 28-30). They claim that JCS’s employees conducted court-appointed tasks as part of their discretionary functions. (Id. at 28-29). Additionally, they assert that JCS’s employees acted within their lawful powers as probation officers. (Id. at 29). Finally, they claim that the named Plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff Jews, have not presented a violation of any clearly established constitutional right. (Id.). For example, JCS and Correctional Healthcare state that no clearly established law required JCS to provide an indigency hearing to a probationer under its supervision. (Id.). Nor was it clearly established that JCS violated Plaintiff Jews’s rights by sending him notice of a revocation hearing through first-class mail. (Id.). In a footnote, JCS and Correctional Healthcare summarily aver that private entities are eligible to receive qualified immunity. (Id. at 28 n. 171). Plaintiffs respond that JCS is not entitled to claim qualified immunity because it was operating as a private, for-profit company under a contract with the City. (Doc. # 530 at 37-38). Moreover, Plaintiffs insist that JCS and its employees violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. (Id. at 38). For example, they contend that JCS violated Plaintiff Jews’s clearly established rights by providing no notice at all before initiating probation revocation proceedings in the Municipal Court. (Id.). As with Defendants’ quasi-judicial immunity claim, a threshold issue is whether JCS and Correctional Healthcare are entitled to even assert a qualified immunity defense. The Eleventh Circuit has provided a clear answer to this question: Private corporations that enter contracts to provide traditionally public services are functionally equivalent to municipalities for purposes of § 1983 suits, Buckner, 116 F.3d at 452, and, like municipalities, they are not entitled to claim
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qualified immunity. See Swann, 388 F.3d at 837. Therefore, Defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity is due to be denied.
3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that the court should grant summary judgment on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Plaintiffs are attacking the validity of the Municipal Court’s orders and judgments. (Doc. # 470 at 37-38). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims center on the obligations directed in the probation orders and the arrest warrants issued by the Municipal Court. (Id.). Plaintiffs respond that they are not challenging the Municipal Court’s adjudication of the charges against them. (Doc. # 500 at 41-42). Rather, they contest the unconstitutional conduct resulting from the probation sentences they received because of their “inability to pay immediately.” (Id. at 42). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state court litigation.” Cormier v. Horkan, 397 F. App’x 550, 552 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts lack authority to review “final judgments of a state court.” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009)). This narrow doctrine forecloses federal review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). See also id. at 293 (describing the “paradigm situation” for Rooker-Feldman preclusion as one
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where a plaintiff seeks “to undo the [state-court] judgment in its favor”). According to the Supreme Court, Rooker-Feldman does not prevent a party from litigating a matter previously litigated in a state court proceeding. Id. at 293. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that state-law preclusion, rather than Rooker-Feldman preclusion, should be considered when analyzing an independent claim from that raised in a state court that “denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which [the plaintiff] was a party.” Id. (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Nevertheless, after Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine continues to bar “federal court jurisdiction where the issue before the federal court [is] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judgment so that (1) the success of the federal claim would ‘effectively nullify’ the state court judgment, or that (2) the federal claim would succeed ‘only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.’” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the inextricably intertwined standard continues to apply after the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil and Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006)) (quoting Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)). In Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred a state prisoner from challenging a state court’s denial of post-trial DNA testing through a § 1983 claim. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1263. It distinguished Alvarez’s as-applied challenge to the state court’s handling of his particular motion for post-trial testing from a § 1983 challenge to a state’s DNA access statute, which would not be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. (distinguishing Alvarez’s case from the § 1983 action considered by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011)).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in situations where the plaintiff lacked a “reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings.” Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996). For example, a plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim against a government entity for a regulatory taking is not barred by Rooker-Feldman due to the plaintiff’s appeal of the initial regulatory decision because the plaintiff cannot raise a Takings Clause claim until the regulatory decision denying the property interest is final. Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., ex rel. Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here, by and large, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims do not challenge the probation orders or sentences imposed by the Municipal Court. Rather, they are challenging the policies and practices of JCS that reportedly caused constitutional violations to occur during JCS’s supervision of them. Properly understood, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint do not ask the court to undo the orders or sentences issued by the Municipal Court. Rather, they request that JCS and other Defendants be required to pay damages for constitutional violations allegedly caused by the administration of those orders and judgments. See Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[a]ssertions of injury that do not implicate state-court judgments are beyond the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Feldman dismissed the plaintiffs’ action because “the plaintiffs’ waiver petitions were judicial in nature and not legislative, ministerial, or administrative”).
For purposes of the Rooker-Feldman issue, this case is similar to Powers, where the plaintiffs sued a public defender’s office for violating their constitutional rights by instituting a custom or policy of not asking for indigency hearings. 501 F.3d at 597. The Powers court did
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not apply Rooker-Feldman even though the claims at issue implicitly criticized a state trial court’s failure to conduct indigency hearings not requested by public defense attorneys. Likewise, Plaintiffs claim here that JCS and its employees violated their constitutional rights by instituting customs or policies that caused constitutional violations. Cf. Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569 F. App’x 669, 675 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar plaintiffs from seeking money damages for fraud related to the generation of foreclosure-related documents). And, those claims are not foreclosed merely because Plaintiffs implicitly criticize the Municipal Court for failing to prevent certain constitutional violations. Cf. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (affirming that a state-court loser may file an independent claim asking a federal court to reach a different legal conclusion from that reached in the statecourt action). For these reasons, Defendants’ request to dismiss all § 1983 claims on the basis of Rooker-Feldman preclusion is due to be denied.
Defendants insist that Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably intertwined with the Municipal Court judgments entered against them. But, many of Plaintiffs’ claims, such as the due process, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment claims, concern either JCS’s administration (or, more accurately, maladministration) of the probation orders or the Municipal Court’s actions committed before issuing probation orders or arrest warrants. These claims do not ask the court to find that the Municipal Court made an incorrect legal ruling. Rather, they ask the court to find either that JCS administrated the orders in violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or that the Municipal Court used unconstitutional procedures. Simply put, a claim challenging actions taken in the course of obtaining a judgment or order or in execution of that judgment or order can be distinct from a challenge to the judgment or order. See Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 66566 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 779 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims present a more plausible Rooker-Feldman issue. Plaintiffs allege in their Fourth Amended Complaint that JCS violated their Eighth Amendment rights by charging probation supervision fees far in excess of the $500 maximum that should have applied. (See Doc. # 305 at ¶¶ 211-26). The Municipal Court, however, imposed the indefinite monthly supervision fees on Plaintiffs when it sentenced them to probation. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment challenge to the fees exceeding $500 is inextricably intertwined with the Municipal Court’s orders. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, which alleges that JCS participated in a joint practice whereby the Municipal Court improperly sentenced individuals who were too poor to pay their fines to probation, inextricably contests the probation sentences themselves, rather than the Municipal Court’s procedures. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their equal protection rights by placing them on probation once they could not immediately pay the amounts owed to the Municipal Court. (See Doc. # 425 at 10) (“JCS and Childersburg violated the doctrine of equal protection by requiring individuals who could not immediately pay their fines and court costs to be placed on JCS probation and forced to pay additional money to JCS.”). Clearly, Plaintiffs were “placed” on probation by the court’s probation orders. Consequently, their equal protection claims are inextricably intertwined with the orders themselves, as Plaintiffs could only succeed on the equal protection claims to the extent that the Municipal Court unconstitutionally sentenced them to probation.
Having said that, the court is uncertain whether Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is unclear whether Plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise Eighth Amendment or equal protection challenges to their probation sentences. Alabama law grants a defendant a right to appeal a municipal court’s
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decision if the defendant is convicted of an offense. Ala. R. Crim. P. 30.1(a). But, three of the four Plaintiffs -- Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, and Jews -- were not convicted of an offense before the Municipal Court initially sentenced them to probation. (See Docs. # 392-27 at 2; 39266 at 11, 14-15). Thus, it appears that these three Plaintiffs lacked any ability to directly appeal the initial probation orders. And, because they were not convicted of criminal offenses during their initial Municipal Court proceedings, they could not have sought post-conviction review in an Alabama state court. Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt, and Jews lacked a reasonable opportunity to raise these constitutional claims in their state proceedings. As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar these Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment or equal protection claims.24 Powell, 80 F.3d at 467.
One of Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment necessarily falls within the scope of Rooker-Feldman preclusion. Plaintiffs have asked the court to declare certain Municipal Court orders void, including probation orders that lack an underlying offense adjudication and unsigned probation orders.25 (See Doc. # 546 at 17-19, 21-22). Defendants respond that this motion is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Docs. # 573 at 14-16; 575 at 9-11). The court agrees. To the extent Plaintiffs ask the court to declare Municipal Court probation orders void, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Arthur, 569 F. App’x at 677 (holding that plaintiffs’ request to declare a
24 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does appear to bar Plaintiff Ray’s Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims against all Defendants because those claims are inextricably intertwined with her probation order, and she had an opportunity to contest the constitutionality of her probation order in her state proceedings through a direct appeal to the circuit court. Having said that, and in any event, Plaintiff Ray’s Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims fail on the merits, for the reasons explained below.
25 Specifically, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment asks the court to declare “that all blank orders showing no adjudication of an offense to be void and that all JCS probations based thereon or on those without probation orders to be without effect and therefore void.” (Doc. # 545 at 1). Although the court finds that the motion is not barred to the extent it challenges JCS’s administration of probation cases unsupported by any court order, the named Plaintiffs lack standing to present that particular claim because the Municipal Court issued probation orders with respect to each of them.
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state-court judgment “null and void” was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Drees v. Ferguson, 396 F. App’x 656, 657-58 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff’s request for a district court to declare a state-court judgment void due to “corruption of the judicial process” was barred by Rooker-Feldman). Plaintiffs insist that the court should consider their request because Rooker-Feldman does not apply to situations where no judgment, conviction, or adjudication occurred. (See Doc. # 597 at 4-5). But this argument misses the mark in the context of Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion: If there is no actual state-court judgment, what exactly is the court being asked to declare void? Thus, Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 545) is due to be denied to the extent it seeks to void Municipal Court probation orders.
4. Heck v. Humphrey and the Availability of Habeas Relief In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare reiterate that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. # 470 at 39-41). According to Defendants, Plaintiff Ray was in custody during her term of probation because the Municipal Court had sentenced her to a suspended term of imprisonment. (Id. at 39-40). Moreover, they insist that Plaintiff Ray alleges she was subjected to significant restraints on her liberty because she reportedly was “hounded” by JCS employees and sometimes required to report weekly to the JCS office. (Id. at 40). Plaintiffs respond by simply noting that Ray was not in custody during her probation stint with JCS (Doc. # 500 at 43), and Defendants have not cited Alabama law to support the argument that Ray was in custody during her probationary sentence. (Id.). They also reiterate their argument that the JCS policies and practices should be classified as a “collection service” rather than a private probation service. (Id.). Finally, they contend that a writ of habeas corpus
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is not the sole relief available to Ray (and the other named Plaintiffs) in this action because their claims would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the Municipal Court’s orders. (See id.).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. Indeed, a “state prisoner may not maintain an action under [ ] § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state sentence he is serving.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Heck’s so-called “favorable-termination” rule is intended to promote “finality and consistency,” upholding “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 485-86. The favorabletermination rule ensures that “state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.”26 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (emphasis in original).
26 As already noted, three of the named Plaintiffs (Jews, Kristy Fugatt, and Timothy Fugatt) would have been unable to obtain state court review of constitutional issues related to their initial probation orders and sentences because they were not convicted of any particular offense. A municipal court defendant only has the right to appeal to a circuit court if “convicted of an offense.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 30.1(a). Likewise, a defendant must be convicted of a criminal offense to file a post-conviction motion in Alabama courts. Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (limiting the postconviction motion to “any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense”). Plaintiffs Jews, Kristy Fugatt, and Timothy Fugatt were not convicted of criminal offenses when the Municipal Court placed them on probation for failure to pay fines and/or court costs. Thus, by asserting that these Plaintiffs were in custody and thus should have sought habeas review, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare essentially argue that they should have filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition without obtaining any state court review whatsoever. The court harbors substantial doubts that the Eleventh Circuit would look favorably upon such an expansion of the habeas remedy under § 2254. See
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The Eleventh Circuit has limited Heck’s rule from applying to actions where (1) a plaintiff is not in custody and (2) that plaintiff does not seek relief that implies the invalidity of his conviction. Morrow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the Morrow opinion recognized that Heck does not bar cases where a plaintiff was not in custody for a sufficient period of time to obtain habeas relief. Id. (“This case is one in which the alleged length of unlawful imprisonment—10 days—is obviously of a duration that a petition for habeas relief could not have been filed and granted while Plaintiff was unlawfully in custody.”). A concurrence in Morrow noted that several courts have discerned an exception to Heck where a plaintiff is no longer in custody and is precluded from obtaining habeas relief. Id. at 1273 (Anderson, J., concurring specially) (citing Powers, 501 F.3d at 603; Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); and Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Here, for reasons similar to those explained in the court’s Memorandum Opinion denying JCS’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 67 at 13-14), Heck continues to be inapplicable to this case. This suit challenges the procedures used by JCS to supervise Plaintiffs’ probation, not the substantive correctness of the criminal judgments or sentences. As such, it is within the category of “purely procedural” actions not barred by Heck. See Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). With the exception of the partial summary judgment motion seeking to declare unsigned probation orders void and some requests for declaratory and injunctive relief (that are now moot), Plaintiffs have not asked the court to invalidate any Municipal Court order, reduce the length of their custody, or address the substantive validity of any criminal judgment. Nor have they filed a type of § 1983 claim that implicitly challenges their guilt for a substantive offense (such as a false arrest claim). As the named Plaintiffs are no longer in custody and do
Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the imposition of a fine was insufficient to place a petitioner in custody for purposes of § 2254).
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not seek to invalidate -- explicitly or implicitly -- any convictions or sentences, the claims in this suit are not barred by Heck.
5. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claims Before turning to the specific due process claims asserted by Plaintiffs, the court notes that throughout their summary judgment briefs, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare insist that they did not commit the conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ due process claims. With regard to Plaintiff Ray, they argue that the Municipal Court imposed a suspended imprisonment sentence along with each of Ray’s probation sentences. (Doc. # 470 at 18). With regard to all Plaintiffs, these Defendants insist that JCS did not issue arrest warrants based on FTOCO charges; rather, it was the Municipal Court’s magistrate that issued the warrants. (E.g., id. at 19). And, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare claim that the Municipal Court determined the amount that a probationer had to pay to be released from jail. (Id.). They contend that the Municipal Court ordered all of the fines and fees the named Plaintiffs were required to pay. (Id. at 20-21). Likewise, they insist that the Municipal Court tolled the Plaintiffs’ probation sentences for significant periods of time. (Docs. # 470 at 21; 523 at 20; 536 at 18). They also claim that the Municipal Court changed Jews’s, Kristy Fugatt’s, and Timothy Fugatt’s initial probation sentences through later orders. (Docs. # 523 at 20; 536 at 18). JCS and Correctional Healthcare deny that JCS’s threats to Jews, Kristy Fugatt, or Timothy Fugatt violated any due process rights because those communications accurately informed them of the risks they faced by not complying with the terms of probation.27 (Docs. # 523 at 21; 536 at 19). They assert that the probation supervision fees which benefitted JCS did not exceed any statutory cap because the statutory cap in Alabama Code § 13A-5-12(a)(3) only
27 These Defendants further deny violating Plaintiff Jews’s due process rights through any threat because Jews “testified unequivocally that he never received those letters and documents.” (Doc. # 523 at 21).
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concerns fines. (E.g., Doc. # 470 at 22-23). JCS and Correctional Healthcare further contend that, even if the probation fees were considered fines, they did not violate any due process right because (1) the violation of a state statute does not automatically qualify as a constitutional violation, and (2) the supervision fees were not grossly excessive. (Id. at 23-24). JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that the Municipal Court was responsible for making any indigency determination. (Id. at 24-25). Moreover, they insist that Plaintiffs received revocation hearings and notice of the charges against them before they were incarcerated. (Id. at 25).
Plaintiffs respond that the Rule 56 record supports a finding that constitutional violations occurred as alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint. For example, they assert that JCS submitted a revocation petition against Plaintiff Ray in which it represented that she needed to pay $1,036 to have her probation closed. (Doc. # 500 at 19). Although JCS claimed to have provided notice to her, there is an issue of fact regarding whether she received notice of the revocation hearing scheduled by JCS. (Id. at 19, 22). Then, after JCS had requested an arrest warrant, the City issued an arrest warrant -- based upon a reported FTOCO conviction -- that obligated Plaintiff Ray to pay over $1,300 to be released from jail. (Id. at 19).
Plaintiffs contend that JCS’s policies should not be considered probation services because it actually operated as a “collection system.” (Id. at 22). According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he undisputed evidence shows that, pursuant to the joint scheme of JCS and the City, [Plaintiff] Ray was repeatedly jailed when she did not pay and was then kept in jail until the sooner of 1) a court date or 2) defendants getting paid.” (Id. at 23). Moreover, they contend that JCS drafted and supplied orders that charged Plaintiffs fees unauthorized by Alabama law. (Id. at 25). And, they insist that JCS cooperated with the City to extend probationers’ sentences beyond two years’ probation. (Id. at 25-26). They contend that JCS’s failure to provide notice of hearings to them
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violated their due process rights. (Id. at 26-27). Finally, they insist that JCS deprived them of due process by instituting a scheme that failed to provide them revocation hearings or contempt hearings. (Id. at 27).
As discussed in further detail above, the Fourth Amended Complaint alleged that several features of JCS’s probation practices violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. The court will discuss each of them separately below after outlining the basic legal principles governing Plaintiffs’ Monell claims under § 1983.
a. Legal Principles of § 1983 Claims Pursuant to Monell As already noted, when a private entity contracts to perform a traditional function exclusively within the state’s prerogative, “it becomes the functional equivalent of the municipality.” Buckner, 116 F.3d at 452. A municipality is liable under § 1983 when a municipal employee or agent undertakes an action in “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. A plaintiff may establish the existence of a municipal “policy” by identifying “(1) an officially promulgated [municipal] policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the [municipality] shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker.” Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). To present a viable § 1983 claim against a municipality (or private entity), a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom was the “moving force” behind an injury. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). This causation element of a Section 1983 claim is easier to prove when the entity’s action itself violates the Constitution.
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Id. at 404. But, when a plaintiff’s claim relies on a facially lawful policy or custom causing a constitutional violation, a court must apply a rigorous standard of causation to avoid imposing respondeat superior liability on a municipality. Id. at 405.
For these and other reasons, the court cannot apply a strict “but for” causation standard when reviewing whether a facially valid municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation by others. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation merely because its custom or policy made it more likely that a constitutional violation would occur. Id. (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 411). Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has explained, a court must determine that a defendant’s act was a proximate cause of the ultimate constitutional violation in order for it to be considered a moving force. Powers, 501 F.3d at 608. Applying this framework in Powers, the Sixth Circuit discussed situations where a judicial act constitutes a superseding cause that severs the chain of liability begun by another state actor’s conduct. Id. at 610. A judicial act generally severs the chain of liability where a judge misapplies the law after another state actor has informed the judge of all the material facts. Id. A judicial act generally does not sever the chain of liability, though, if the other state actor misrepresents or omits material facts. Id.
b. Incarcerating Probationers for Mere Failure to Pay Amounts Owed to JCS and the Municipal Court and Failure to Conduct Indigency Determinations
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610 (1985). In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the Supreme Court established a substantive limit on when courts may revoke probation for a probationer’s failure to pay fines or restitution. Black, 471 U.S. at 611. The Bearden opinion requires a court
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conducting a revocation hearing to ask a probationer why he or she failed to pay a fine or restitution ordered as a condition of probation. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. On the one hand,“[i]f the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority.” Id. On the other hand, “[i]f the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment.” Id.
Here, the court finds no custom or policy attributable to JCS that was a moving force behind the named Plaintiffs’ failure to receive a full revocation hearing before arrest warrants were issued on FTOCO charges. Indeed, JCS directed its employees to request probation revocation hearings when a probationer’s mail was returned to the JCS office, a probationer missed three appointments, or a probationer failed to respond to all communications. (Doc. # 402-3 at 23). The Rule 56 record shows that JCS employees in Childersburg sought probation revocation hearings when Plaintiffs failed to show up for probation appointments. Plaintiffs claim that JCS employees (rather than Municipal Court employees) were responsible for seeking warrants based on FTOCO charges, thereby bypassing the revocation hearing required under Bearden. However, Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence in the Rule 56 record showing that JCS employees were responsible for this chicanery. Nor have Plaintiffs pointed to a JCS custom or policy of using non-existent legal charges to avoid Bearden hearings. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not presented a triable § 1983 claim against JCS based on this alleged due process violation.
Similarly, Plaintiffs have not presented a JCS custom or policy that was a moving force behind the Municipal Court’s failures to determine Plaintiffs’ indigency. Alabama law directs a
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court to consider a defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay a fine when determining whether to impose a fine. Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(b). And, if a probationer breaches the terms of probation by not paying fines, costs, restitution, or other assessments, it is a court, not a probation officer, that “must inquire into the probationer’s financial status and determine whether the probationer is indigent.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.5(a). Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt’s testimony indicates that the Municipal Court often did not offer defendants an opportunity to explain their indigency during the fast-paced court proceedings. (See Doc. # 537-19 at 74). JCS’s employees understood, though, that indigency determinations were to be conducted by the Municipal Court. (See Doc. # 471-31 at 10-11) (testimony by Kidd that indigency determinations were to be conducted by the Municipal Court). JCS’s training manual also explained that a court would determine whether a defendant was indigent at sentencing. (Doc. # 402-3 at 47). To be sure, JCS stood to benefit financially if the Municipal Court declared fewer probationers to be indigent, as it would not be obligated to supervise those indigent probationers without payment of fees or costs – by the probationers themselves. But, Plaintiffs have not shown that JCS instituted a policy or custom that prevented the Municipal Court from performing indigency determinations (or that made such determinations less likely to occur, for that matter). Therefore, Defendants are due to be granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that they violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights by preventing Plaintiffs from receiving indigency hearings at the sentencing stage or the revocation stage.
c. Instituting FTOCO Charges Against Probationers and Issuing Arrest Warrants Purportedly Based on FTOCO Charges
After careful review, the court concludes that this due process claim is more properly analyzed as a Fourth Amendment claim as it challenges the arrest and pretrial detention of Plaintiffs pursuant to arrest warrants. The Supreme Court recently held that the standards and
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procedures governing arrest and pretrial detention arise from the Fourth Amendment. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 914-15, 919 (2017). Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to extend substantive due process rights to address the right “to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause,” which is protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994). The court will address this claim in the Fourth Amendment discussion below.
d. Failure to Provide Adequate Notice of Probation Revocation Hearings
The Supreme Court has mandated that, before a defendant subject to probation has his probation revoked, the defendant must receive a preliminary and final revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). “At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a written report of the hearing.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that “a person facing revocation of supervised release is entitled to written notice of the alleged violation or violations and disclosure of the evidence against him.” United States v. Jackson, 568 F. App’x 655, 658 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Alabama’s criminal procedure rules provide that a defendant should receive notice of hearings “by delivering or by mailing copies to their last known addresses, or, if no address is known, by leaving copies with the clerk of the court.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 34.4.
Here, with regard to many of the revocation petitions, Plaintiffs have presented a genuine factual question concerning whether JCS mailed the notices to them in accordance with Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 34.4. Plaintiffs have denied that they received written notice of the revocation hearings by mail. (See Docs. # 500 at 9-10; 530 at 4-6; 567 at 7-8). And, JCS
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employees failed to note in the Probation Tracker system whether they mailed most of the revocation petitions at issue in this case (even though they noted in Probation Tracker that revocation petitions had been sent in other situations, including twice involving the Fugatts). Moreover, while Plaintiff Ray’s Probation Tracker records show that letters mailed to her in September 2010 and November 2010 were returned to JCS, the Probation Tracker does not state whether the December 2010 revocation petition was mailed to Plaintiff Ray or whether it was returned to JCS. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 7-8). From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that JCS failed to provide written notice of the alleged probation violations and the revocation hearings to Plaintiffs Ray, Jews, Kristy Fugatt, and Timothy Fugatt unless its employees noted in Probation Tracker that the documents were mailed.
Having said that, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that JCS instituted a policy or custom that was the moving force behind any due process violation concerning the failures to provide notice. Indeed, JCS’s training manual instructed employees to mail probation revocation petitions, along with probation violation letters, to the probationer. (Doc. # 402-3 at 31). Moreover, the manual directed that if mail sent to a probationer by JCS was returned, JCS employees were to “run Accurint and mail the revocation information to the address obtained through Accurint.” (Id. at 23). Plaintiffs have not pointed to another official custom or policy that could be considered a moving factor for any of these particular due process violations. Nor have they claimed that a final policymaker was responsible for failing to send written notice of the revocation hearings. Because Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a JCS custom or policy to be the moving force behind their failure to receive written notice of probation revocation hearings, Defendants are due to be granted summary judgment on this claim.
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e. Imposing Fines and/or Fees Exceeding the Statutory Maximum Plaintiffs have not clearly argued whether their due process claim concerning fines and fees exceeding the statutory maximum is a procedural due process claim or substantive due process claim. Regardless, Plaintiffs’ due process claim regarding the fines and fees enforced by the Municipal Court rests on the premise that those fines and fees exceeded the applicable statutory maximum. (See Doc. # 305 at ¶ 111) (complaining that JCS’s customs and policies resulted in “court costs, fines and fees which exceed the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the court finds this issue of state law far from clear. An Alabama municipal court may require a probationer to pay “the fine and costs imposed or such portions thereof as the judge may determine.” Ala. Code § 12-14-13(d)(7). The Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure explain that a sentencing court has broad discretion to determine the conditions of probation. Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.1, Editors’ Notes, Committee Comments. Those conditions must be included in the written probation order. Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.1. Alabama law mandates that a probationer supervised by the Board of Pardons and Paroles pay $40 per month toward the cost of supervision if he or she has an income. Ala. Code. § 1522-2(a)(1). For a violation of municipal ordinances, the maximum fine is $500. Ala. Code § 1145-9(b). Plaintiffs have not identified -- and the court’s independent research has not found -- a statutory limit on probation supervision fees to private corporations under Alabama law. Indeed, Alabama law allows a court wide discretion to determine the conditions of probation, and those conditions may include costs imposed on the probationer. Ala. Code § 12-14-13(d)(7); Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.1, Editors’ Notes, Committee Comments. Indeed, if supervised by the Board of
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Pardons and Paroles, a probationer must pay $40 a month, which is in effect similar to the supervision fee that was charged by JCS. Ala. Code. § 15-22-2(a)(1). Although the court has not found an Alabama statute expressly permitting state courts to order probation fees paid to private corporations, it also has not found a statute expressly limiting a municipal court’s wide discretion to determine probation conditions.
Plaintiffs’ due process challenge to the fines and fees enforced by JCS heavily relies on the fine limitation in Alabama Code § 11-45-9(b). This argument finds some support in Wilkins v. Dan Haggerty & Associates, Inc., 672 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1995). There, the Alabama Supreme Court considered whether a municipal court could impose delinquent fees on defendants who had failed to answer the charges against them. Id. at 510. The Alabama Supreme Court held that a municipal court could impose the delinquent fees as increases to the scheduled fines for the offense. Id. In doing so, it expressly recognized that the delinquent fees did not exceed the jurisdictional limit for municipal court fines. Id. Although the court recognizes a plausible analogy between the delinquent fees in Wilkins and the supervision fees at issue in this case, this case is nevertheless distinguishable from Wilkins because the fines in Wilkins were added to the defendants’ sentences long after adjudication. See id. (concluding that the judge was authorized to increase the fines after giving many defendants years to respond to the charges against them in municipal court). Thus, Wilkins does not foreclose a municipal court from exercising the authority to impose supervision fees in addition to a fine, pursuant to its wide discretion to determine conditions of probation.
Ultimately, the court is not convinced that Plaintiffs can present a triable procedural or substantive due process claim premised on the fines and fees enforced by JCS. To show a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must present “(1) a deprivation of a
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constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionallyinadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs have not explained how the state provided constitutionally-inadequate process to them as a remedy for any statutory violations stemming from the excessive probation fees. Although neither JCS nor the Municipal Court provided pre-deprivation hearings before charging the monthly probation fees, the state can satisfy due process by providing adequate post-deprivation remedies when pre-deprivation hearings are not feasible. Watkins v. Israel, 661 F. App’x 608, 610 (11th Cir. 2016). “A post-deprivation remedy is adequate when it is capable of fully compensating the deprived individual.” Id.
Plaintiffs have not addressed whether post-deprivation remedies were available to them under Alabama law to obtain refunds, restitution, or disgorgement from JCS. Moreover, the government’s interest in sharing supervision costs with probationers would be undermined by requiring pre-deprivation hearings before collection of small probation fees. See id at 610-11 (holding that a plaintiff failed to allege constitutionally-inadequate process for seizing uniform and subsistence fees because his prison provided a post-deprivation grievance process, the prison’s policy was a ministerial charge that posed a small risk of erroneous deprivation, and predeprivation hearings would have harmed the government’s interest). Because Plaintiffs have failed to show that they received constitutionally-inadequate process when JCS charged them monthly probation supervision fees, they have not presented a triable procedural due process claim regarding the supervision fees.28
28 To the extent that Plaintiffs’ due process claim challenges the Municipal Court’s imposition of warrant fees for FTOCO charges, the court finds no triable procedural due process claim because Plaintiffs received predeprivation hearings before the Municipal Court imposed the warrant fees. The Municipal Court imposed the warrant fees when the Plaintiffs appeared before the court and were placed back on probation following an arrest. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-4 at 2). Although it appears that the Municipal Court deducted the warrant fees from the cash bonds paid by incarcerated probationers, it also appears that the court provided Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard before formally imposing the warrant fees.
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Plaintiffs cannot present a triable substantive due process claim based on the imposition of fines and fees because this claim rests on executive acts that do not shock the conscience.29 Plaintiffs’ claimed right to be free from fines or fees above the statutory maximum created by Alabama law plainly asserts a state-created right, rather than a federally-created right. “Where a person’s state-created rights are infringed by a ‘legislative act,’ the substantive component of the Due Process Clause generally protects that person from arbitrary and irrational governmental action.” Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2014). Legislative acts, such as laws and broad executive regulations, generally apply to a larger segment of society and involve policymaking rather than administrative applications. Id. at 1280. In contrast, “[e]xecutive acts typically arise from the ministerial or administrative activities of the executive branch and characteristically apply to a limited number of people, often to only one.” Id. Such executive acts only present a substantive due process violation if they shock the conscience. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998). “Determinations of what is egregious conduct must not be made in the glow of hindsight; decisions made by a government actor must be egregious—that is, shock the conscience—at the time the government actor made the decision.” Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that the imposition of the aggregate fines and fees against them violated their due process rights because the fines and fees exceeded the applicable statutory maximum. But, this conduct cannot be said to shock the conscience when it was unclear at the time whether the probation supervision fees violated Alabama state law. Even if the probation
29 Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights created by the Constitution. Cf. Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs have not pointed to any fundamental right infringed by JCS’s and the Municipal Court’s conduct concerning monetary fines and fees.
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supervision fees violated Alabama law (a particularly uncertain proposition for the reasons explained above), the Supreme Court has clearly held that “errors of state law do not automatically become violations of due process.” Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160 (2009). Moreover, the Municipal Court imposed the indeterminate probation supervision fees in its probation orders, and Plaintiffs offer no authority whatsoever to support the proposition that a court’s mistake of law on an undecided issue can be enough to shock the conscience. This court cannot say that the fees ordered by the Municipal Court and charged by JCS shocked the conscience when Alabama law requires probationers to pay a substantially similar fee to the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Ala. Code. § 15-22-2(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ due process claim based on the imposition of fines and fees allegedly exceeding the statutory maximum cannot proceed under a procedural due process theory or a substantive due process theory.
f. Imposing Probation Sentences Exceeding the Statutory Maximum
As with Plaintiffs’ due process challenge to the fines and fees administered by JCS, it is unclear whether they challenge JCS’s administration of the probation sentences as a violation of procedural or substantive due process. With regard to substantive due process, Plaintiffs would have to show that the administration of their probation sentences shocked the conscience in order to establish a triable due process claim, since the imposition and administration of those sentences is an executive act. Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47. As this claim ultimately rests on violations of state law, and Plaintiffs have not identified analogous authority where a court found the administration of sentences to constitute conduct that shocks the conscience, the court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any substantive due process claim arising from the allegedly unlawful extension of probation sentences past the two year statutory maximum.
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The procedural due process issues presented by this claim are more interesting. In binding precedent, the former Fifth Circuit held that the “extension of a non-custodial period of supervision to a term within the statutory limits (does not) implicate a liberty interest sufficient to require a preextension hearing as a constitutionally commanded right.” United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiffs’ due process claim, though, does not rest on an extension of probation sentences to the statutory maximum. Rather, it rests on extending probation sentences beyond the statutory maximum. In the analogous context of parole, the Second Circuit has held that “[u]nder both the due-process clause and state law, an inmate has a liberty interest in being released upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment.” Calhoun v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1993). Likewise, a defendant sentenced to probation has a liberty interest in being released at the end of his or her probation sentence, which is a significant imposition on his or her liberty. In Calhoun, the Second Circuit explained that a defendant’s liberty interest in release from confinement meant that he could not be deprived of such release without due process. Calhoun, 999 F.2d at 653.
Here, a reasonable jury could find that JCS unconstitutionally extended Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt’s and Deunate Jews’s probation sentences beyond the statutory maximum without providing any notice to Plaintiffs of the extension or any opportunity for a hearing. JCS’s own records reflect that it extended these two Plaintiffs’ probation sentences for earlier charges by 24 months when the Municipal Court actually issued probation orders in different cases. (See Docs. # 524-22 at 4; 537-24 at 5). Nothing in the Rule 56 record indicates that JCS employees informed Timothy Fugatt or Jews of these modifications to their 2009 and 2011 probation sentences. Nor does the record reflect that the Municipal Court agreed to these
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modifications. Indeed, JCS extended the probation term for Timothy Fugatt’s 2011 sentence five days beyond the probation term approved by the Municipal Court in the April 26, 2012 order. (Compare Doc. # 537-24 at 5 with Doc. # 537-3 at 2).
Defendants’ arguments that, as a matter of law, they did not violate these Plaintiffs’ due process rights are unavailing. JCS contends that Plaintiffs’ probation terms were “changed by the later probation orders of the Childersburg Municipal Court,” but a jury could reach a different finding regarding the Municipal Court’s orders. (Doc. # 523 at 20). The Municipal Court issued new probation orders for distinct charges. And, JCS justified its recalculation of the probation dates by asserting that the Municipal Court had reinstated its earlier probation sentences, not based on the new and distinct probation orders.
JCS also argues that Plaintiffs suffered no constitutional harm because the Municipal Court tolled the probation sentences when the revocation petitions were initiated, such that their probation terms were not in effect for more than two years. (See Doc. # 523 at 20) (asserting that these orders from the Municipal Court tolled Jews’s probation sentence for 28 months). This argument would be more compelling if the Rule 56 record showed that JCS employees in Childersburg tried to calculate how much time elapsed between the initiation of probation and the revocation order(s) tolling probation. But, a reasonable jury could find from the summary judgment record that JCS invariably recalculated probation following purported reinstatements by extending the sentence 24 months from the reinstatement date. Because Timothy Fugatt and Jews had served time toward those probation sentences, the invariable 24 month extensions caused their probation sentences to exceed the applicable two year statutory maximum. Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a). A probationer is entitled to due process protections for such an extension, and JCS granted Timothy Fugatt and Jews no due process in its administrative recalculations.
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Finally, a reasonable jury could find that JCS’s customs and policies were the moving force behind the constitutional harm Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Deunate Jews suffered. JCS directed its employees that, if a court imposed multiple probation sentences on a particular defendant, the employee should place the later probation sentence on hold until the defendant completed paying all amounts owed on the first case. (Doc. # 402-3 at 53). If a defendant completed payments for one case, then JCS would activate the second probation sentence and calculate the number of months that the probationer would be supervised. (Id.). Moreover, JCS’s probation reinstatement policies let employees choose the amount of time left on a probationer’s sentence. (See Doc. # 402-3 at 43) (instructing employees to enter a reinstatement into Probation Tracker by changing the probation date, entering the number of months and days left on probation, and calculating the new date). These JCS policies instructed employees to extend the length of probation cases until all amounts owed were paid, prevented probation terms from running consecutively, and granted considerable discretion to JCS employees to determine the amount of time left on a reinstated probation case. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that JCS’s case handling customs and policies -- rather than the conduct of its employees -- was the moving force behind the procedural due process violations Timothy Fugatt and Deunate Jews suffered.30 Defendants’ motion to dismiss this due process claim is due to be denied.
6. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Claims Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare deny that they violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. They note that Plaintiff Ray received a suspended imprisonment sentence when she initially was placed on probation. (Doc. # 470 at 18). They insist that no record evidence supports Plaintiffs’ claims that JCS issued their arrest warrants. (See id. at 19).
30 Neither of these due process claims is barred by the two year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. JCS unlawfully extended Jews’s probation sentence in March 2012 and Fugatt’s probation sentence in May 2012.
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Moreover, the Municipal Court controlled the calculation of bail amounts that Plaintiffs needed to pay to be released from custody. (See id. at 19-20) (explaining that a JCS employee attempted to assist Plaintiff Ray and have her released from jail, but a Municipal Court employee insisted on payment of the bond).
Plaintiffs respond that JCS requested that the City issue arrest warrants for FTOCO charges, even though no formal FTOCO charges were filed with the Municipal Court, no hearings were held on the charges, and no convictions were entered for the charges. (E.g., Doc. # 500 at 22). They further argue that FTOCO charges were “concocted . . . by the City under the JCS system to enforce the extortion threats of JCS.” (Id. at 23). Because of these arrest warrants, Plaintiffs claim that they were arrested and held until they paid the cash bail or until the Municipal Court held its once-monthly court date. (Id.).
Properly read, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims either present a false arrest or malicious prosecution action against JCS. The court will begin its analysis of the Fourth Amendment claims by discussing false arrest claims based on unlawful procurement of an arrest warrant. “In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court established that even if a magistrate approves an arrest warrant, the officer who applied for the warrant may be liable for violating the Constitution if the evidence presented to the magistrate was insufficient to establish probable cause.” Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App’x 904, 908 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)). For example, an officer may be held liable for violating the Fourth Amendment if he or she proffers an affidavit for a warrant that lacks a basis for a belief that the suspect violated the law and an affirmative statement that the officer has personal knowledge of
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the circumstances of the alleged crime.31 Id. at 908-09 (discussing Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994), and Garmon v. Lumpkin Cty., 878 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (11th Cir. 1989)).
The flaw in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claims is that the JCS employees responsible for issuing the revocation petitions had probable cause to believe Plaintiffs committed the probation violations reported to the Court. The record reveals that Municipal Court magistrates issued arrest warrants against the named Plaintiffs after they had failed to appear before the Municipal Court at scheduled revocation hearings. Before those hearings, JCS employees drafted probation revocation petitions against the Plaintiffs, which were submitted to the Municipal Court on the date of the hearings. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these revocation petitions can be analogized to applications for arrest warrants because JCS asked the Municipal Court to issue an arrest warrant, if necessary. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-1 at 2). Having said that, JCS employees had probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs had failed to appear to scheduled appointments and had failed to keep up with their monetary probation conditions. And, JCS employees affirmed in the revocation petitions that they had investigated the named Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Doc. # 537-1 at 2) (“Based on the investigation of the undersigned and the information received therefrom, your Petitioner verily believes that the Defendant has violated one or more of the written conditions of probation . . . .”). Therefore, JCS employees did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by submitting revocation petitions that asked the Municipal Court to issue arrest warrants if necessary.
The Rule 56 record does not reveal whether any JCS employee requested issuance of the arrest warrants on FTOCO charges. There is no arrest warrant application from a JCS employee
31 The court understands that generally when a plaintiff brings such a false arrest claim against an individual officer, the plaintiff must show that the officer lacked arguable probable cause because an officer sued in his or her individual capacity is entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Carter, 557 F. App’x at 908-09. But, here, Defendants are not entitled to seek qualified immunity because they are being sued in their official capacities.
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seeking an arrest warrant on FTOCO charges. Nor is there a transcript of the Municipal Court hearings indicating whether JCS asked for the arrest warrants, a prosecutor asked for the arrest warrants, or the Municipal Court decided to issue the warrants sua sponte. Thus, the court cannot say that JCS or its employees applied for the FTOCO arrest warrants issued by the Municipal Court. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims premised on those warrants fail, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any false arrest claim in the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Likewise, Plaintiffs have not established any triable issue related to their malicious prosecution claims. “To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). The elements for a malicious prosecution claim include: (1) “a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant”; (2) “with malice and without probable cause”; (3) “that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor”; and (4) “caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs have not established the third element: that the FTOCO charges instituted against them were terminated in their favor. Indeed, the FTOCO charges against Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Jews were not terminated in their favor, as these Plaintiffs were sentenced by the Municipal Court to probation for FTOCO. (See, e.g., Docs. # 524-6 at 2; 537-3 at 2). As for Plaintiffs Ray and Kristy Fugatt, nothing in the Rule 56 record shows that the FTOCO charges were terminated in their favor. Because a reasonable jury could not find from the Rule 56 record that the allegedly unlawful FTOCO charges were terminated in Plaintiffs’ favor,
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Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment for any Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim in the Fourth Amended Complaint.
7. Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment Claims Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that JCS did not deny the named Plaintiffs any right to counsel. (E.g., Doc. # 470 at 27-28). They assert they are entitled to summary judgment for this claim for two reasons. First, they claim that the Municipal Court was solely responsible for appointing counsel if necessary. (Id. at 27). Second, they contend that Plaintiffs were not entitled to counsel during their revocation proceedings because they did not request counsel and their revocation proceedings did not present complex, difficult, or disputed probation violations. (Id. at 27-28). Plaintiffs respond that JCS participated in a joint system with the City that violated their constitutional rights. (E.g., Doc. # 500 at 21). Pursuant to this scheme, JCS provided pre-printed probation orders that stated a petitioner had waived his or her right to counsel. (Id. at 23). Because of this statement in the form probation orders, Plaintiffs insist that JCS endeavored “to avoid the intrusion of legal counsel.” (Id.). Plaintiffs also argue that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), required that they receive assistance from appointed counsel before being incarcerated. (Id. at 24). Moreover, they contend that the identity of the party formally responsible for conducting indigency hearings is irrelevant because the financial relationship created by the JCS-City Contract relied on directing probationers to pay for JCS’s supervision services. (See id. at 24-25). In circumstances similar to those presented by Plaintiff Ray, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel is applicable when she is sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment and a probationary sentence. Alabama v.
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Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002). The Supreme Court observed that a defendant imprisoned for a probation violation in such a circumstance is incarcerated for the underlying crime, not for the probation violation. Id. The Supreme Court declined to consider whether a probationer with a suspended imprisonment sentence imposed without the assistance of counsel could be sent to jail following a contempt proceeding where the probationer received the assistance of counsel. See id. at 672-74. It also declined to review whether such a probationer could be sent to jail following a probation revocation hearing where the probationer was represented by counsel because revocation hearings in Alabama at that time did not afford the probationer a right to counsel and did not allow a probationer to contest the underlying conviction. Id. at 666-67.
A defendant may waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). “The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled.” Id. In the context of a post-arrest interrogation, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel after he receives a Miranda warning. Id. at 786-87. But, when a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel closer to a trial, a court should conduct a more rigorous, searching, and formal examination to ensure that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2002). Such an examination -- commonly called a Faretta hearing -- should inform the defendant about the nature of the charges, the possible punishments, basic trial procedure, and the risks of representing himself or herself. Id.
Here, the record indicates that Plaintiff Ray’s Sixth Amendment rights might have been violated when the Municipal Court imposed her suspended imprisonment sentences. Ray’s testimony indicates that she did not receive a warning about her right to counsel from Judge
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Ward before being sentenced to suspended imprisonment terms (see Doc. # 471-7 at 39), much less the detailed disclosures provided in a Faretta hearing. Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that she affirmed her waiver of the right to counsel when she signed a probation order, but her probation order does not contain any explanation of her right to counsel. Therefore, under Shelton, Plaintiff Ray’s Sixth Amendment rights might have been violated.
Likewise, Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt’s, Kristy Fugatt’s, and Jews’s Sixth Amendment rights might have been violated by the Municipal Court because they were imprisoned without being afforded counsel. These Plaintiffs did not receive any suspended imprisonment sentence during their initial hearings before the Municipal Court, so they would not have been entitled to the appointment of counsel at that stage. But, these Plaintiffs were entitled to representation by counsel before being imprisoned for a criminal offense – whether that offense was contempt or a “failure to obey a court order.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972). Alternatively, to the extent it could be said that the Municipal Court deferred imposing an imprisonment sentence against Plaintiffs Jews, Kristy Fugatt, and Timothy Fugatt subject to probation, these Plaintiffs were entitled to counsel at the revocation hearing where the imprisonment sentence was imposed. See Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
Having said that, the court cannot find in the Rule 56 record a custom or practice by JCS that was a moving force behind the Sixth Amendment violations presented in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. First, the JCS-City Contract did not foreclose the Municipal Court from providing counsel to individuals it sentenced to suspended or actual imprisonment. (See generally Doc. # 392-16). Indeed, the JCS-City Contract says nothing at all regarding a defendant’s or probationer’s right to counsel. (See generally id.). Likewise, the training manual in the Rule 56 record contains no JCS custom or policy regarding a probationer’s right to
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counsel. (See generally Docs. # 402-2, 402-3, & 402-4). This omission is not surprising because it is the duty of a court imposing a term of imprisonment -- not a probation officer supervising the defendant -- to appoint counsel for the defendant. Cf. Ala. R. Crim. P. 6.1, Editors’ Notes, Committee Comments (“Of necessity, this [the right to counsel] will require that the judge determine before trial that, regardless of the evidence presented, the maximum punishment will not include incarceration.”). Accordingly, if Plaintiffs suffered a violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Municipal Court -- not JCS -- committed the violation.
Plaintiffs point to the form probation orders as proof that JCS had a policy or custom of avoiding the appointment of counsel. (E.g., Doc. # 500 at 23). That argument misses the mark. The pre-printed probation orders asserted that a probationer had counsel or had waived counsel “for all proceedings to this date.” (E.g., Doc. # 471-21 at 2). The court interprets this as an acknowledgment of the prior conduct of the Municipal Court, not as a statement of JCS’s intent to shut out counsel. Significantly, the probation orders are silent about whether a probationer waived her right to counsel for future proceedings. As such, the court cannot conclude that these provisions in the probation orders evince a JCS custom or policy of denying probationers the right to counsel. Because the court cannot identify any policy or custom from JCS that was a moving force behind the Sixth Amendment violations discussed in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare are due to be granted summary judgment on this claim.
8. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment Claims In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that the Municipal Court did not impose any fine or fee that exceeded a statutory maximum. (Doc. # 470 at 22). In particular, they claim that probation supervision fees, like
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court costs, were not a part of any fine imposed by the Municipal Court. (Id. at 23). Moreover, they argue that in advancing these claims Plaintiffs conflate a violation of state law with a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See id. at 23 & n. 154). Indeed, according to Defendants, the probation fees were not excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment because (1) they were not financial penalties for a criminal offense and (2) they were not grossly disproportionate to the offenses at issue. (Id. at 23-24).
Plaintiffs respond that, to the extent JCS’s probation fees are considered fines, they exceeded the $500 statutory limit. (Doc. # 500 at 29). They note that probation supervision fees are not addressed in the Alabama statute authorizing municipal courts to sentence defendants to probation. (Id. at 30) (discussing Alabama Code § 12-14-13). Moreover, they claim that JCS should not have been entitled to obtain probation supervision fees because its employees were not qualified to serve as probation officers. (See id. at 31-32).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits courts from imposing “excessive fines.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Its Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)). In an opinion addressing whether civil punitive damages awards are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme Court explained that “the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.” Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added). See also Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 263 (8th Cir. 1994) (defining a “fine” as “a payment extracted by the government and payable to the government”). The Supreme Court’s statement of law in Browning-Ferris conclusively resolves Plaintiffs’ Excessive Fines Clause claim. Because the
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probation supervision fees were paid to a private corporation, not the government, they are not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ excessive fines claim.
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ challenge to the length of their incarceration terms under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is a non-starter. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “[‘]encompasses a narrow proportionality principle’ that applies to non-capital sentences.” United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1340 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 1341 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Unless a defendant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to his or her offense, the court need not compare the sentence to those received in other jurisdictions for similar offenses. Id. at 1342 (“Without an initial judgment that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime, comparative analysis of sentences has no role to play.”). Here, the named Plaintiffs were incarcerated between one day and eighty days32 for not appearing before the Municipal Court at scheduled hearings. Although the Plaintiffs were incarcerated for non-violent and relatively harmless conduct, the relatively short duration of the incarceration terms Plaintiffs suffered through were not grossly disproportionate to the conduct at issue. Accordingly, Defendants are due to be granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims.
32 Plaintiffs Kristy and Timothy Fugatt were released from custody when they paid cash bonds on the date of their arrests. (Docs. # 402-27 at 3; 402-28 at 3). Plaintiff Jews spent eighty days in jail during four separate stints. (See Doc. # 530 at 22).
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9. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims Both Plaintiffs and Defendants seek summary judgment for the equal protection claims. In one of their motions for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs assert that JCS’s probation practices violated their equal protection rights because poor defendants in the City’s Municipal Court were forced to pay more in fines and fees simply because they were poor. (Doc. # 425 at 10). Plaintiffs claim that the Municipal Court’s probation procedure, as implemented by JCS, determined the punishment a defendant received by his or her wealth status. (Id. at 11). Defendant JCS contends that the Municipal Court did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by placing Plaintiffs on probation when they needed to pay assessed fines and fees over time. (Doc. # 473 at 8-9). JCS insists that Plaintiffs have not pointed to the JCS custom or policy that violated their equal protection rights. (See id. at 9-10). JCS also questions whether Plaintiffs actually were in fact indigent. (Id. at 10-11). Moreover, according to JCS, Plaintiffs were incarcerated for failing to appear before the Municipal Court, not for failing to pay amounts owed to the Municipal Court. (Id. at 11-12). In opposing Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 motion, JCS argues that Plaintiffs have conceded the existence of factual disputes about JCS’s custom or policy. (Id. at 15-16). Finally, according to JCS, Plaintiffs have not addressed the rational basis standard that applies to wealth-based disparities. (Id. at 16-17). In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare argue that the named Plaintiffs did not suffer the constitutional harms alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint. They reiterate that the named Plaintiffs were incarcerated for failing to appear as ordered by the Municipal Court, not for failing to pay fines due to indigency. (E.g., Doc. # 470 at 19). Moreover, they claim that the named Plaintiffs received revocation hearings and that their probation sentences were never formally revoked. (Id. at 25). Plaintiffs also
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reiterate in their opposition briefs that the imposition of monthly probation fees violated their equal protection rights. (E.g., Doc. # 500 at 17).
A court violates a defendant’s equal protection rights if it incarcerates that defendant solely because he or she lacks the resources to pay a fine or restitution. United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2016). In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a court “may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine.” The Williams opinion vacated a judgment that required a defendant sentenced to the maximum imprisonment term to remain in jail “to ‘work off’ the monetary obligations [from a $500 fine] at the rate of $5 per day.” Id. at 236, 245. The Williams Court explained, though, that a state “is not powerless to enforce judgments against those financially unable to pay a fine.” Id. at 244. In a footnote, it referred to the appellant’s argument that a state could, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, “impose a parole requirement on an indigent that he do specified work during the day to satisfy the fine.” Id. at 244 n. 21.
In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a court may not subject a defendant to imprisonment “solely because of his indigency.” There, the Supreme Court addressed whether a court could subject an indigent defendant to imprisonment for unpaid traffic fines where the state law did not allow an imprisonment sentence for the traffic offenses. See id. at 396-97. The Court indicated in a footnote that a state could, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, direct a defendant to pay a fine in installments. See id. at 400 n. 5. Ultimately, the Tate opinion reversed the state court’s judgment that the imprisonment sentence was constitutional. Id. at 397, 401.
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Here, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have not presented a triable equal protection violation. Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim does not fall within the scope of Williams or Tate because the Municipal Court did not sentence Plaintiffs to imprisonment due to their inability to pay fines or court costs.33 Rather, the Municipal Court sentenced them to probation. Neither Williams nor Tate prohibit a court from imposing a different form of sentence on a defendant unable to pay a fine than one able to pay a fine. Indeed, the Williams opinion indicated in a footnote that a court could constitutionally direct an indigent defendant to perform community service in lieu of paying a fine, whereas it presumably would not sentence a defendant able to pay a fine to community service. See 399 U.S. at 244 n. 21. The court finds that the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Williams and Tate, did not prohibit the Municipal Court from sentencing the named Plaintiffs to probation because they were unable to pay fines.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not shown a basis for a reasonable jury to find that the Municipal Court sentenced them to imprisonment following the revocation hearings solely because of their wealth. The Rule 56 record shows that JCS also relied on Plaintiffs’ nonattendance at scheduled probation appointments to justify the revocation petitions. And, the Rule 56 record provides little, if any, indication of what the Municipal Court considered during the revocation hearings that Plaintiffs did not attend. The record only shows that the Municipal
33 This case is also distinguishable from United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2013), which Plaintiffs rely upon in their partial summary judgment motion. In Flowers, the government requested that the district court imprison a convicted defendant, instead of placing her in home confinement, because the defendant’s indigency prevented her from paying for the cost of monitoring. Id. at 1296. The district court in Flowers concluded that sentencing the defendant to imprisonment because she was unable to pay for monitoring raised “serious constitutional concerns.” See id. at 1300-01. This conclusion is fully in line with Williams and Tate because the defendant essentially faced imprisonment solely due to her inability to pay a particular fee. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs complain that the Municipal Court placed them in a collection scheme (or probation system) because of their wealth, not that the Municipal Court sentenced them to imprisonment because of their wealth. The Rule 56 record shows that the Municipal Court subjected Plaintiffs to imprisonment after they had failed to show up at probation appointments, in addition to not paying amounts owed to JCS and the Municipal Court.
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Court’s magistrate issued arrest warrants for FTOCO after such revocation hearings, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a relationship between FTOCO charges and their wealth. While the FTOCO charges might well have lacked a basis in law, they suggest that the Municipal Court imprisoned Plaintiffs for their perceived failure to appear, rather than their poverty. In any event, as discussed above, there is insufficient Rule 56 evidence to show that JCS played a significant enough role in procuring warrants on FTOCO charges. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on their equal protection claim is due to be denied, and all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
10. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Conspiracy Claim Plaintiffs asserted during oral argument that they could obtain relief under § 1983 based on a conspiracy claim directed at JCS and the Municipal Court. (See Doc. # 620 at 79-82, 8687). Defendants responded that a § 1983 conspiracy claim could be viable “if the judge and the private party get together and say -- you know, violate these people’s rights and so I can profit off of them.” (Id. at 40). But, Defendants insisted that the record lacks evidence demonstrating “any relationship there between Judge Ward and JCS.” (Id.). “Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “It does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional violation. Conspiracy may, however, enlarge the pool of responsible defendants by demonstrating their causal connections to the violation; the fact of the conspiracy may make a party liable for the unconstitutional actions of the party with whom he has conspired.” Id. A plaintiff can present a § 1983 conspiracy claim “by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” Grider v. City of Auburn,
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Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish such a conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parties “reached an understanding” to deny a plaintiff his or her federal rights, and (2) the actions committed by the parties pursuant to the conspiracy actually impinged upon a plaintiff’s federal rights. Id. (quoting Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990)). Importantly, a plaintiff may prove the existence of a § 1983 conspiracy through circumstantial evidence. Id. Such an agreement may be inferred from the parties’ relationship, their overt acts, their concert of action, and the totality of their conduct. Am. Fed. of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla., 637 F.3d 1178, 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). Indeed, a jury may infer the existence of an agreement from evidence that the conspirators committed acts that are unlikely to have been taken in the absence of such an agreement. Mendocino Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999).
For example, in Newsome v. Lee County, Alabama, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202-03 (M.D. Ala. 2006), the plaintiff claimed that a prison official and inmates had conspired to deprive her of her Fourteenth Amendment rights by committing a sexual assault against her. The court found an agreement between the official and the inmates to violate the plaintiff’s rights because (1) the officer placed the victim in the jail cell with the inmates, (2) the officer provided condoms to the inmates, and (3) the officer observed the resulting sexual assault without intervening. Id.
a. Existence of an Agreement to Infringe Constitutional Rights Here, Plaintiffs have shown that a reasonable jury could find a conspiracy entered into by Defendant JCS and the Municipal Court to violate their constitutional rights, in violation of § 1983. Plaintiffs have presented the following circumstantial evidence from which an agreement to violate their constitutional rights may be inferred. First, the City’s former mayor, who signed the JCS-City Contract, testified that Judge Ward recommended JCS to the City. (Doc. # 392-9 at
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45). The City Council’s minutes also reflect Judge Ward’s recommendation. (Doc. # 421-7 at 2). Judge Ward has confirmed that he worked with JCS employees in other cities. (See Doc. # 392-5 at 18). From this evidence, a juror could find that a relationship existed between Judge Ward and JCS and that the relationship existed before JCS commenced operations for the Municipal Court in 2005.34 Moreover, a juror could find that Judge Ward advocated for the City to hire JCS.
Second, the Municipal Court’s judge consistently placed defendants on probation supervised by JCS -- which required the individuals to pay additional fees -- when those defendants could not pay the fines and costs owed to the Municipal Court. Moreover, the Municipal Court’s judge consistently failed to consider defendants’ indigency when they complained to the court that they could not pay the imposed fines and fees. According to Plaintiffs Timothy and Kristy Fugatt, they informed the court of their inability to pay, but the Municipal Court judge placed them on probation without further discussion. (See Docs. # 392-6 at 105-07; 392-7 at 74). Judge Ward has acknowledged JCS’s financial interest in supervising an increasing number of paid probationers. (Doc. # 402-36 at 90). And, under the JCS-City Contract, JCS’s financial interests would be harmed by the Municipal Court declaring a probationer indigent, as JCS would be obligated to supervise the defendant’s probation for free. (See Doc. # 392-16 at 4). In light of the financial incentive to not declare defendants indigent, a juror could view Judge Ward’s consistent failure to conduct indigency determinations as circumstantial evidence of an agreement between his court and JCS to not address probationers’ indigency before imposing additional probation supervision fees.
34 Indeed, JCS’s counsel claimed at oral argument that the Municipal Court’s judge should be considered JCS’s ultimate decisionmaker with regard to conduct JCS conducted pursuant to the Municipal Court’s orders. (Doc. # 620 at 25). The Municipal Court’s judge may not be considered JCS’s final decisionmaker, but this argument nevertheless underlines the close working association between JCS’s employees and the Municipal Court’s judge.
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Third, the Municipal Court consistently issued arrest warrants for failure-to-appear or FTOCO “convictions” after JCS reported probationers to the court. Defendant JCS has insisted that the Municipal Court was solely responsible for these FTOCO warrants. However, JCS employees requested the issuance of arrest warrants in the probation revocation petitions submitted to the Municipal Court on the date of the hearings. And, the magistrate’s reported statement to Timothy Fugatt -- that JCS decided the schedule for probation revocations -- belies JCS’s argument that it merely followed the Municipal Court’s orders with regard to probation issues.35 (Doc. # 537-24 at 4). It is not disputed that JCS employees were present at the revocation hearings where the named Plaintiffs failed to appear. Nor is it disputed that JCS asked the Municipal Court to issue arrest warrants -- if necessary -- in the revocation petitions. There is sufficient Rule 56 evidence that this conduct was concerted (i.e., conduct agreed upon between JCS employees and Municipal Court employees, including the Municipal Court’s judge). Therefore, a reasonable juror could infer an agreement to issue arrest warrants for FTOCO charges -- unsupported by any statutory authority -- in lieu of conducting the indigency hearings required by both Bearden and Alabama law.
b. Constitutional Violations Caused by Agreement between JCS and the Municipal Court
Plaintiffs have presented at least two kinds of constitutional violations that reasonably could have been caused by an unlawful conspiracy between JCS and the Municipal Court. First, the named Plaintiffs suffered constitutional violations caused by the purported agreement when the Municipal Court effectively revoked their probation sentences and issued arrest warrants against them without conducting any indigency determination. Second, the named Plaintiffs’
35 Similarly, JCS’s “following orders” defense is also belied by its independent recalculation of the probation sentences issued by the Municipal Court following arrests.
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Sixth Amendment rights were violated when they were denied the assistance of counsel before being imprisoned for criminal offenses.
The Rule 56 record indicates that the Municipal Court denied Plaintiffs any opportunity to explain their indigency or their inability to pay the fines and fees imposed by the Municipal Court before effectively revoking Plaintiffs’ probation sentences. JCS issued revocation petitions against all of the named Plaintiffs based, in part, on their failures to pay amounts owed to JCS and the Municipal Court. (See, e.g., Doc. # 471-15 at 2). From Timothy Fugatt’s testimony, a jury could find that the Municipal Court failed to consider indigency before placing Plaintiffs and others on probation following the adjudication of criminal charges. (Doc. # 392-7 at 74). And, the record contains no evidence showing that the Municipal Court considered the reasons for Plaintiffs’ failures to pay before issuing the arrest warrants at issue in this case. Since FTOCO charges were not based on an actual municipal ordinance and the warrants were issued after revocation hearings, a jury could reasonably find the FTOCO warrants to be, in practical effect, probation revocations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have presented triable Bearden due process violations that arguably were caused by the agreement between JCS and the Municipal Court described above.
Defendants argue that the Municipal Court issued the arrest warrants because the named Plaintiffs failed to appear at the relevant revocation hearings. (See, e.g., Doc. # 620 at 24). And, certainly, based upon the Rule 56 record, a fact-finder could reasonably find that the Municipal Court issued the arrest warrants because of Plaintiffs’ failures to appear, rather than their failures to pay. But, in light of the evidence that JCS sought revocation due to Plaintiffs’ failures to pay and that the Municipal Court failed to consider Plaintiffs’ indigency before
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effectively revoking their probationary sentences, this is an issue for trial, not summary judgment.
Moreover, the Rule 56 record reasonably indicates that the Municipal Court denied all of the named Plaintiffs appointed counsel before imprisoning them for criminal offenses. According to Plaintiff Ray’s testimony, the Municipal Court did not inform her of the right to counsel before imposing her suspended imprisonment sentences. (See Doc. # 471-7 at 38-39). No evidence available to the court suggests that Plaintiff Ray made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel before receiving the suspended imprisonment sentences. Thus, under Alabama v. Shelton, the Municipal Court violated Ray’s right to counsel before imposing the suspended imprisonment sentences. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662. Moreover, in light of the printed acknowledgment of waiver of counsel in the probation forms used by JCS, a reasonable juror could find that an agreement between the Municipal Court and JCS was in place and caused the Municipal Court’s constitutional violation. Accordingly, Plaintiff Ray has presented a triable § 1983 conspiracy claim for the Municipal Court’s denial of her right to counsel during the proceedings where she received suspended imprisonment sentences.36
Likewise, Plaintiffs Jews, Timothy Fugatt, and Kristy Fugatt have presented a triable § 1983 conspiracy claim based on the Municipal Court’s failures to appoint them counsel or obtain valid waivers. As discussed above, a reasonable jury could find that the FTOCO warrants constituted effective revocations of probation. And, although the Municipal Court did not formally sentence Jews, Timothy Fugatt, or Kristy Fugatt to a suspended imprisonment sentence,
36 Plaintiff Ray’s Sixth Amendment claim is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. At a minimum, Plaintiff suffered a Sixth Amendment violation in June 2011 when the Municipal Court imposed suspended imprisonment sentences following her 2011 arrest without appointing counsel or obtaining a valid waiver of the right to counsel. (See Doc. # 423-31 at 2). City officers arrested and detained Ray following the issuance of this suspended imprisonment sentence. (Doc. # 423-24 at 2-3).
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the Municipal Court effectively sentenced them to imprisonment based upon its revocation of the probationary sentences they had received. Alabama law states that probation suspends execution of a sentence, see Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a), and it defies logic, fact, and law to revoke probation if there is no underlying imprisonment sentence to execute. The court concludes that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs Jews, Timothy Fugatt, and Kristy Fugatt should have received the assistance of appointed counsel or validly waived their right to counsel before the Municipal Court revoked their probation sentences through the FTOCO warrants. Cf. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662. The Municipal Court denied them this constitutional right, and a jury could find that the denial was caused by the agreement it entered with JCS. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to proceed to trial on these § 1983 conspiracy claims.37
c. The City is Not a Party to the § 1983 Conspiracy Plaintiffs have argued at length that they have put forth substantial evidence that the City is a part of the joint scheme involving JCS and the Municipal Court. (See, e.g., Doc. # 500 at 27). The court disagrees. While the City’s mayor signed the JCS-City Contract, the Rule 56 record does not show any continuing involvement of the City’s decisionmakers in the Municipal Court’s actions or the private probation services that are at issue. Indeed, the City’s former mayor testified that JCS worked with the Municipal Court, not the City. (Doc. # 392-9 at 76). The court does not dispute Plaintiffs’ argument that the City financially benefited from JCS’s avaricious conduct. But, there is insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to suggest that the City agreed with JCS (or anyone else) to violate probationers’ constitutional rights. Therefore, the court maintains its view that the City is entitled to summary judgment on all claims.
37 Plaintiff Jews’s Sixth Amendment § 1983 conspiracy claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, either. The Municipal Court arguably violated Jews’s Sixth Amendment rights when it revoked his probation in December 2010. (Doc. # 392-50 at 2-3). That revocation occurred within the two year limitations period.
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11. Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment to Declare the JCSCity Contract Void Ab Initio
Plaintiffs claim that the JCS-City Contract is due to be declared void for four reasons. First, they argue that the contract unlawfully bound the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 427 at 8-13). Second, they argue that the contract is void for illegal consideration because it relied on probation supervision fees imposed in violation of due process and equal protection to obtain JCS’s services. (Id. at 13). Third, they argue that the contract violates the Alabama Constitution because the City did not solicit competitive bids. (Id. at 14-18). Finally, they argue that the JCSCity Contract unlawfully required probationers to pay fees unauthorized by state statute and caused poor defendants to not be treated uniformly. (Id. at 18-22). Plaintiffs further contend that, because the JCS-City Contract was void ab initio, JCS should be directed to pay restitution to the innocent probationers required to pay fees. (Id. at 22).
Defendant JCS responds, in relevant part, that the court should not consider this summary judgment motion because it denied Plaintiffs leave to add the theory to their Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 472 at 6-7). Before it was dismissed as a Defendant from this action, the City argued that Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion raised claims concerning the JCS-City Contract found nowhere in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 475 at 8). And, the City observed that the Fourth Amended Complaint lacked a claim for restitutionary relief. (Id. at 89). The court agrees with the City.
A plaintiff may not raise a claim for the first time through an argument in a summary judgment brief. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff wishing to assert a new claim must amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Id. at 1315. In Gilmour, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not argue a contractual breach of duty claim for the first time at the summary judgment stage
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where her complaint had raised claims of negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, bad faith, infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contract. See id. at 131415.
Here, Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion seeking to declare the JCS-City Contract void ab initio is either moot or an improper addendum to the Fourth Amended Complaint. That is, to the extent Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the JCS-City Contract was void ab initio, their summary judgment motion is due to be denied as moot because the JCS-City Contract has been terminated by the City Council.38 (Doc. # 392-63 at 2). And, to the extent Plaintiffs seek restitution from JCS, their summary judgment motion is due to be denied because they did not allege in the Fourth Amended Complaint that they were entitled to restitution for monies paid pursuant to a void contract. Plaintiffs have not argued in their summary judgment motion that a decision on the legality of the JCS-City Contract would advance any of their other claims against the remaining Defendants. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment to declare the JCS-City contract void is due to be denied. VI. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that: 1. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment to declare JCS’s probation
practice a denial of equal protection (Doc. # 424) is due to be denied. 2. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment to declare the JCS-City Contract
void ab initio (Doc. # 426) is due to be denied. 3. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment to declare probation based upon
non-adjudicated offenses and blank orders void (Doc. # 545) is due to be denied. 4. Defendant Correctional Healthcare is due to be granted summary judgment.
38 As explained earlier in this case, Plaintiffs have not (and cannot) show that the conduct authorized by the JCS-City Contract is likely to recur. The Municipal Court has adopted new probation and probation revocation policies, the City has terminated its contract with JCS, and JCS no longer operates in the state of Alabama.
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5. Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are due to be dismissed without prejudice as moot, subject to repleading if Defendant JCS reenters business in the state of Alabama.
6. Defendant JCS’s motions for summary judgment (Docs. # 469, 522, 535) are due to be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant JCS is due to be granted summary judgment on Counts Three, Seven, and Nine of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant JCS is also due to be granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ due process claim, except for the claim that it violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights by extending their probation sentences beyond the statutory maximum without affording due process. Defendant JCS is due to be denied summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claims in part, as described above.
An order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered. DONE and ORDERED this September 12, 2017.
_________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 685 Filed 06/15/18 Page 1 of 15

FILED
2018 Jun-15 PM 03:36 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.

} } } } } Case No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP } } } } }

MEMORANDUM OPINION This case is before the court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. # 663). In this motion, Plaintiffs request that the court reconsider three claims on which it granted summary judgment to Defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”). The parties have fully briefed the motion (Docs. # 663, 668, 671), and it is ripe for decision. The court concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration is due to be granted in part and denied in part. I. Standard of Review Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically authorize motions for reconsideration, they are common enough in practice. However, reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy which must be used sparingly.” Jackson v. Wesley, No. 6:11-cv-686-Orl-28GJK, 2011 WL 2144696, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2011). Rule 59 allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment in a civil case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Serrano v. United States, 411 F. App’x 253, 255 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). Therefore, the court will construe Plaintiffs’ motion as one filed pursuant to Rule 59(e).

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“Reconsidering the merits of a judgment, absent a manifest error of law or fact, is not the purpose of Rule 59.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010). The moving party must do more than merely ask the court for a reevaluation of an unfavorable ruling. “A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). II. Analysis
Plaintiffs ask the court to reconsider its rulings on their Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause claims. The court has thoroughly reviewed their arguments and the earlier summary judgment order, but finds no basis for altering its prior opinion.
A. Reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Claim Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the summary judgment granted to JCS on their Fourth Amendment false-arrest claims because they contend JCS employees lacked probable cause to believe the named Plaintiffs committed a crime when they applied for arrest warrants. (Doc. # 663 at 6-14). First, Plaintiffs argue that the JCS employees lacked probable cause to believe that they willfully had failed to pay fines and fees because JCS knew that only defendants unable to pay fines levied by the City of Childersburg’s Municipal Court (“Municipal Court”) were placed on JCS probation, and JCS failed to provide relevant information to the Municipal Court. (Id. at 8-9). Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Municipal Court lacked probable cause to issue arrest warrants for failure to obey a court order because the court order violated was not issued until the date of the warrant. (Id. at 10-14). Plaintiffs’ arguments do not justify reconsidering the summary judgment granted to Defendant JCS on their Fourth Amendment claim.
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The revocation petitions in the Rule 56 record reflect that JCS employees knew of Plaintiffs’ failures to appear at scheduled probation appointments and their failures to pay fines and probation fees at the time of filing. (E.g., Docs. # 537-1 at 2; 537-2 at 2). When the Municipal Court’s judge sentenced defendants to JCS-supervised probation, he ordered defendants to report to JCS as instructed, pay JCS’s supervision fees, and pay fines and costs imposed by the Municipal Court. (E.g., Doc. # 471-12 at 2). As such, JCS employees could have justified their requests to revoke probation on either basis. Plaintiffs argue that the failureto-report charges are red herrings because JCS did not consistently require probationers to report to a physical office if they made the required payments in a timely manner. (Doc. # 663 at 7 n. 7). That argument does not demonstrate, though, that JCS employees lacked a basis to believe that Plaintiffs failed to report for probation appointments, in violation of their probation orders, when those employees submitted revocation petitions to the Municipal Court including such charges. Cf. Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App’x 904, 908-09 (11th Cir. 2014). Because the Rule 56 record reveals a reasonable basis for JCS employees to believe Plaintiffs violated their probation orders by failing to appear at scheduled probation appointments, the court concludes again that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims against JCS, based on the revocation petitions, fail to present a triable claim.
Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendant JCS violated their Fourth Amendment rights when the FTOCO warrants were issued misses the mark for the reasons explained in the court’s initial Memorandum Opinion. That is, the Rule 56 record lacks evidence to support Plaintiffs’ position that JCS employees requested the issuance of arrest warrants on FTOCO convictions. The timeline of revocation proceedings in the Childersburg Municipal Court helps illustrate this. Generally, JCS employees drafted probation revocation petitions when probationers had failed to
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comply with the terms of probation. (Doc. # 471-1 at 123-24). A JCS employee would determine whether the Municipal Court should hold a compliance hearing or a revocation hearing, depending on whether the probationer had met his or her obligations. (Id. at 129-30). The revocation petitions generated by JCS did not ask the Municipal Court to issue arrest warrants on FTOCO charges, although they requested the issuance of an arrest warrant, if necessary. (E.g., Docs. # 537-1 at 2; 537-2 at 2). Then, JCS would select a date for a hearing and inform the probationer of the hearing by mail. (Doc. # 471-1 at 127). JCS did not file the revocation petitions with the Municipal Court before the scheduled revocation hearings, even though the revocation orders indicated that they had been approved by the Municipal Court prior to the revocation hearing. (Id. at 194).
During revocation hearings, JCS employees informed the judge about the probationer’s payment history and the number of appointments missed. (Id. at 123-24). One JCS employee testified that JCS employees presented the revocation petitions to the Municipal Court on the date of the hearings described in them (id. at 581), but she did not testify that JCS employees applied for or sought arrest warrants on FTOCO charges.1 If a petitioner failed to appear at a revocation hearing, the Municipal Court often would issue a capias warrant signed by a magistrate. (Doc. # 471-26 at 2). Nothing in the Rule 56 record indicates that JCS drafted those capias warrants for the Municipal Court. As the court explained in its earlier Memorandum Opinion, the Rule 56 record also does not reveal (1) how FTOCO charges were initiated, (2) whether the Municipal Court formally convicted defendants of FTOCO violations, (3) the sentences defendants received for FTOCO convictions, and (4) whether those sentences included imprisonment terms.
1 Indeed, that JCS employee denied recommending dispositions to the Municipal Court during revocation hearings. (Doc. # 471-1 at 124).
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Thus, in light of the Rule 56 evidence described above, the court concludes that the summary judgment record is silent as to who initiated the FTOCO arrest warrants: JCS employees, Municipal Court employees, or both. This silence is significant given the fact that this case has been in litigation for nearly six years now.
The fact that the court has found triable issues on Plaintiffs’ Bearden and equal protection claims is of no help here. The distinction comes down to this: JCS certainly could conspire with the Municipal Court and agree to aid that court in violating the rights of probationers. And, the court recognizes that while the Municipal Court and the judge of that court cannot be sued for that conspiracy, JCS can because (unlike the judicial actors) it may not assert judicial immunity. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a conspiracy claim where the Rule 56 record provides no substantial evidence that shows the issuance of arrest warrants (as opposed to seeking revocation)2 was within the scope of any conspiratorial agreement between JCS and the Municipal Court. Because of that lack of Rule 56 evidence, Plaintiffs cannot proceed on a Fourth Amendment claim against JCS related to the issuance of the FTOCO arrest warrants.
B. Reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim Plaintiffs argue that the court should reconsider its ruling that the equal protection claims based on JCS’s charging of various probation fees falls outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). (Doc. # 663 at 16-19). Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court’s opinions in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
2 The court distinguishes JCS’s conduct in seeking probation revocation from seeking the issuance of an arrest warrant because issuing an arrest warrant is inherently a judicial function requiring judicial decisionmaking, whereas requesting the revocation of probation is a function commonly performed by probation officers. Under the circumstances presented in these cases, it would have been unclear whether an arrest warrant was needed until the probation revocation hearing occurred and the participants in the hearing discovered that the probationer failed to appear.
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U.S. 371 (1971), to argue that equal protection rights for impoverished individuals extend beyond a prohibition on additional imprisonment for inability to pay fines, restitution, bond, or other costs. Plaintiffs’ primary arguments fail to convince the court, but their argument that the equal protection claim is on a parallel track with the Bearden claim is convincing.
As an initial matter, the court’s conclusion that Williams and Tate prohibit the imposition of additional imprisonment because a defendant lacks financial resources is consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2016) (“In [Williams, Tate, and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)] the Supreme Court held that it violates equal protection principles to incarcerate a person ‘solely because he lacked the resources to pay’ a fine or restitution.”); United States v. Vasquez, 874 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Should circumstances change, however, and [the defendant] then be unable to pay the fine, it would be unconstitutional to require him to stand committed until the fine is paid.”); Crowden v. Bowen, 734 F.2d 641, 642 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The equal protection clause does not allow a state to extend a prisoner’s sentence beyond the maximum period prescribed by law by refusing to give the prisoner credit for presentencing detention occasioned by the prisoner’s financial inability to make bail.”). Additionally, the court’s summation of Williams and Tate is consistent with the persuasive authority it has found through its independent research. See, e.g., United States v. Burgum, 633 F.3d 810, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams, Tate, and Bearden for the proposition that “the Constitution forbids imposing a longer term of imprisonment based on a defendant’s inability to pay restitution”); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) (“And while the Williams Court similarly failed to articulate a precise standard of review, the fact that the case involved the denial of an indigent defendant’s physical liberty appeared dispositive.”); Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[The
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petitioner’s] reliance on Tate and Williams is misplaced. Those cases stand for the proposition that no person may be incarcerated, upon conviction of a crime, for a period longer than the maximum sentence set by statute solely on the basis of his or her inability to pay a criminal fine.”).3 These authorities support limiting the holdings of Williams and Tate to cases where an individual is subjected to a term of imprisonment or a longer period of imprisonment due solely to indigency or an inability to pay certain amounts.
Notably, Plaintiffs have not presented an analogous case where a court has extended equal protection rights against wealth-based disparate treatment to prohibit sentencing an individual to probation for his or her inability to pay a fine. The cases Plaintiffs rely upon are distinguishable. The Supreme Court’s rulings in M.L.B. and Mayer concern indigents’ access to appellate review of criminal convictions and terminations of parental rights. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 128 (holding that the state could not withhold a sufficiently complete record to permit appellate review from a parent whose parental rights had been terminated by the trial court due to that parent’s inability to pay for the record’s preparation); Mayer, 404 U.S. 198-99 (holding that a sufficiently complete record for appellate review must be provided to an indigent defendant appealing a non-felony conviction and a fine). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Boddie concerned indigents’ due process right to access trial courts without paying court fees in order to obtain a divorce, which cannot be obtained without access to the courts. 401 U.S. at 382-83. Because
3 See also Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 768 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (“The dissent cites Williams v. Illinois and Bearden v. Georgia for the proposition that ‘once all of the assigned punishment has been imposed, except for the payment of financial obligations, failure to pay those financial obligations cannot be used to continue depriving felons of their freedom.’ However, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Williams and Bearden do not stand for such a broad principle.”) (citation omitted); Noel v. State, 191 So. 3d 370, 379 (Fla. 2016) (applying Bearden and Burgum to hold that a trial court violated a defendant’s due process rights by expressly conditioning a two-year reduction of his imprisonment sentence on payment of restitution); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (“Williams specifically deals with a defendant who, solely because of his indigency, had been incarcerated for a period in excess of the maximum penalty for the crime that he was convicted of. Tate concerns a fine converted into a jail sentence solely because the defendant was indigent and unable to pay it. The holdings go no further.”).
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Plaintiffs have not supported their argument for extending Williams and Tate to the probation context, reconsideration on that ground is not warranted.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs insist that the equal protection claims should proceed past summary judgment because JCS’s practices against probationers unable to pay the fines imposed by the Municipal Court lack any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. (Doc. # 663 at 19-20). Plaintiffs acknowledge that the City of Childersburg had a legitimate interest in collecting fines for violations of municipal ordinances (id. at 20), but argue that JCS’s methods of supervising probationers bore no rational relationship to that legitimate interest. (Id.). State action “that does not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). Even under rational-basis review, state action can violate the Equal Protection Clause if the justifications for it “[makes] no sense in light of how the [state actor] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.” Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n. 4 (2001) (discussing City of Cleburne). As the parties raising an equal protection challenge under the rational basis standard, Plaintiffs face the burden of negating “every conceivable basis” for Defendants’ conduct, “even if that basis has no foundation in the record.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009)
In City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that legislative classifications based on mental disability are subject to rational-basis review. 473 U.S. at 442-47. Nevertheless, it held that a municipality’s zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for housing of the mentally disabled violated the Equal Protection Clause because the municipality did not require
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special use permits for other multiple-dwelling facilities and medical-care facilities, such as “apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses.” Id. at 447. The Supreme Court explained that the negative attitudes of adjoining property owners towards the mentally disabled, standing alone, could not justify the differential treatment. Id. at 448. And, it disregarded the other justifications for the zoning ordinance because the identified issues with the proposed home applied to other types of housing that did not require special use permits. Id. at 449-50 (rejecting the municipality’s arguments that the zoning ordinance was justified by flooding concerns, the size of the proposed home, the number of occupants, the desire to avoid population concentrations and congestion, fire hazards, neighborhood serenity, and the avoidance of danger to other residents because those concerns would apply to other types of housing that did not require a special use permit).
Here, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails under rational-basis review. As Plaintiffs concede, the City had a legitimate interest in collecting fines for violations of its municipal ordinances. Additionally, the City (and the Municipal Court) had a legitimate interest in encouraging citizens to pay their outstanding fines. See O’Bradovich v. Village of Tuckahoe, 325 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing an equal protection claim based on disparate treatment of citizens denied parking permits for outstanding parking tickets because of the city’s legitimate interest in encouraging payment of fines). The Municipal Court and JCS treated offenders unable to pay the fines instituted by the Municipal Court differently from those able to pay the fines at the time of issuance or within a week of issuance. But, it is both clear and
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beyond debate that Municipal Court defendants unable to pay their fines immediately (including the named Plaintiffs) were not similarly situated to those able to pay their fines immediately. Municipal court defendants who paid the issued fines upon issuance did not need encouragement; defendants who failed to pay did. The government’s interest in encouraging the payment of fines cannot justify imprisonment, following Williams and Tate, but it can justify other alternative means of punishment. For this reason, Plaintiffs have failed to negate every conceivable legitimate basis for the differential treatment afforded to them, and their equal protection claims cannot proceed under rational-basis review.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the court should reconsider its grant of summary judgment on the equal protection claim because there is evidence from which a jury could find that JCS employees conspired with Municipal Court officials to imprison them solely because of their failures to pay fines and fees to JCS. (Doc. # 663 at 20-21). They assert that such a claim is consistent with the claim that these individuals conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights in violation of Bearden. (Id. at 21). As to this argument, the court agrees. As explained in the court’s earlier opinion, the Rule 56 record contains substantial evidence that the Municipal Court failed to consider indigency when determining whether to revoke defendants’ probation terms. (See Doc. # 626 at 81-82). Similarly, unlike their claim based upon the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the Rule 56 evidence that Plaintiffs’ probation terms were revoked solely due to their failures to pay, and that the Municipal Court’s revocations on that sole ground were within the scope of the conspiracy between Defendant JCS and Municipal Court officials. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim against JCS under Williams and Tate is due to go forward on a § 1983 conspiracy theory.4
4 At oral argument, Defendant JCS argued that Plaintiffs cannot receive relief on reconsideration based upon arguments that could have been raised earlier or evidence that could have been presented earlier. See Arthur,
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C. Reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment Claim Plaintiffs request that the court reconsider its summary judgment on their Excessive Fines Clause claim because other courts have applied the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines to fees paid to private corporations. (Doc. # 663 at 24-25). Plaintiffs merely offer non-binding authority from other courts to support their position that fees paid to private corporations can be considered “fines” for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. (See id. at 24). And, although Plaintiffs have proffered these decisions as persuasive authority, the court is not persuaded, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Excessive Fines Clause “was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.” Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989) (emphasis added). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ assertion that persuasive authority “uniformly” supports applying the Excessive Fines Clause to JCS’s fees is simply wrong. See, e.g., Jackson v. Whitworth, No. 1:04-CV-3181-JOF, 2006 WL 8431536, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2006) (declining to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to electronic monitoring fees incurred as a condition of parole because “there is no allegation in the complaint that any portion of the fee is paid to the government”); Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 806-07 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (refusing to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to the freezing of bank accounts by the Office of Foreign Asset Control because the plaintiff had “not been required to make any sort of payment in cash, or in kind, to the government”), aff’d on other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003); Parsons v. Pond, 126 F. Supp. 2d 205, 221-22 (D. Conn. 2000)
500 F.3d at 1343. First, the court’s partial grant of reconsideration does not violate this principle because Plaintiffs essentially present an inconsistency in the court’s summary judgment order (allowing the Bearden claim to go forward while precluding the equal protection claim from going forward), which could not have been presented before the court entered the summary judgment order. Second, while the court recognizes the heightened standard Plaintiffs must meet in order to justify reconsideration of the summary judgment order, this case has lasted for nearly six years, and it is time to get the meritorious and triable issues in this case moving towards disposition.
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(concluding that a claim against a defendant for requiring a plaintiff to attend psychiatric
sessions at his own expense failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because “the money
appears to have been paid to [the psychiatrist] and not the government”), aff’d, 25 F. App’x 77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 881 (2002).
In addition, the court concludes that its summary judgment to Defendants on the Eighth
Amendment claim was appropriate because the fees charged by JCS were not grossly
disproportionate to the offenses at issue.5 To determine whether a fine is grossly
disproportionate, the court examines “(1) whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at
whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the
legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm caused by the defendant.” United
States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs argue that the fees they paid
to JCS were grossly disproportionate to their offenses because probationers charged such fees
“were no more culpable than individuals who were not charged fees,” some probationers were
charged fees on dismissed charges, and some probationers were charged fees far in excess of the
statutory maximum fine. (Doc. # 663 at 26-27). The difficulty in analyzing Plaintiffs’ excessive
fines claim is that JCS charged Plaintiffs a large amount of money in smaller monthly payments,
which combined, for certain probationers, to exceed the $500 threshold for municipal court fines.
5 The parties have not addressed -- and the court need not decide -- whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the Supreme Court noted that it had not fully incorporated “the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines” into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 765 n. 13. The Fifth Circuit relied, in part, on the lack of incorporation to affirm a summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim against Louisiana statutes requiring certain bail-related fees. Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 652 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Dazet v. Foster, 539 U.S. 915 (2003). Of course, if the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs’ excessive fine claim fails because the alleged Eighth Amendment violations stem from the enforcement of state-court orders and judgments. But, the Supreme Court authority on that matter is unclear, as the Court stated in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), that the Fourteenth Amendment “makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.” Id. at 433-34 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). While the court observes this possible flaw in Plaintiffs’ excessive fines claim, it declines to address it more fully here because the parties have not raised it.
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Other courts have addressed whether certain periodic payments, when considered in the aggregate, constitute grossly disproportionate fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. In Wemhoff v. City of Baltimore, 591 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2008), the court considered an Eighth Amendment claim against a $16 monthly late payment penalty applied to a $23 civil fine. Id. at 808-09. The court concluded that the initial penalty could not be considered excessive because the penalty and the civil fine, when combined, was less than many civil fines issued for parking violations. Id. at 809. Additionally, it concluded that the rate of accrual was not excessive because the accrual rate diminished over time as the city applied the same monthly charge against the plaintiff for “the underlying offense of nonpayment.” Id. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the continuing nature of the late penalties made them grossly disproportionate fines because the plaintiff received notice from the city about the late fees and took no steps to pay what he owed or arrange payment. Id.
In Waters v. Bass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Va. 2004), the plaintiff presented an Eighth Amendment challenge to a $1.00 per day room and board fee charged by the Virginia Beach City Jail to non-federal prisoners. Id. at 806-07. The court determined that the fee was not excessive because it provided “partial reimbursement” for state expenses that a prisoner would be responsible for if he or she were not incarcerated. Id. at 809 (quoting Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, the $1.00 per day fee was lower than that charged by other governments. Id. at 809 & n. 13. Indeed, the federal government permits deductions from a prisoner’s wages for room and board fees. Id. at 806. Finally, the Waters court recognized that “fees and fines to cover costs of incarceration are part and parcel of what a criminal defendant may expect to pay upon conviction and imprisonment.” Id. at 809.
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Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the probation supervision fees charged by JCS were grossly disproportionate to the offenses at issue. Plaintiffs have not disputed that they were within the classes of individuals at whom the relevant municipal ordinances were aimed. (See Doc. # 663 at 26-27). See also Browne, 505 F.3d at 1281. In addition, the $35 to $45 per month probation supervision fee charged by JCS is comparable to the fee charged by Alabama’s Board of Pardons and Paroles, indicating that the fee is not grossly excessive. Ala. Code § 15-22-2(a)(1) (requiring a $40 per month supervision fee for probationers or parolees who have an income). See also Browne, 505 F.3d at 1281. Individuals placed on probation should expect to pay some form of supervision fee to cover the costs of supervision. See Waters, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 809 (explaining that prisoners should expect to pay some amount to cover room and board expenses). While the supervision fees and other charges certainly accrued over time to exceed the $500 statutory limit for municipal court misdemeanor fines, the continuing nature of the supervision fees is not a basis for declaring them to be grossly disproportionate, especially in light of the work that JCS employees performed. Cf. Wemhoff, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 809 (denying excessive fines claim based on accrual of late fees because the plaintiff failed to make efforts to pay off the fine and late fees owed to the defendant). For these reasons, even if the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the probation supervision fees payable to JCS (and, as explained earlier, the court concludes that it does not), Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the Excessive Fines Claim because JCS’s fees were not grossly disproportionate to the offenses at issue. III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 663) is due to be denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
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_________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 691 Filed 07/06/18 Page 1 of 41

FILED
2018 Jul-06 PM 04:46 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, KRISTY FUGATT, TIMOTHY FUGATT and DEUNATE T. JEWS, Individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs;
v.
JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., a corporation;
Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP
FIFTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

INTRODUCTION Pursuant to this Court’s Order and Opinion of June 15, 2018, (Docs.687, 688), Plaintiffs file this Fifth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs Gina Ray Kay, Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, and Deunate T. Jews bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant Judicial Corrections Services (“JCS”), a for-profit probation company acting under color of law, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights and the rights of persons similarly situated.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it concerns a controversy arising under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 2. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4), authorizing jurisdiction of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
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enforce civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 3. This action also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2022. 4. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).
PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT 5. Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama. 6. Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. 7. Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt is an individual resident of Sylacauga, Alabama. 8. Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews is an individual resident of Childersburg, Alabama. 9. Defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (hereinafter “JCS”) is a Delaware corporation, registered as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Alabama and in this District which markets itself as “not a social service agency,” but a “for profit” company which offers services to governmental entities “free of charge” to the cities as “an offender paid system.” At all times, JCS has operated under the color of state law.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 10. JCS operated a for profit enterprise that marketed its services to various municipal and county governments and contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama to collect unpaid fines and court costs from people brought before municipal courts in traffic and other misdemeanor cases. JCS’ marketing approach to these cities emphasized that its fees would be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts would improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city. 11. JCS routinely used a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer
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cities and similarly trained its employees using a training manual replete with forms for courts to use during proceedings, and for courts and JCS to use to contact the “offenders” from whom they are collecting. As a result, the JCS approach was highly systemized and uniform across municipalities. 12. Under the system established and implemented by JCS, its employees were not required to have criminal justice or legal training, have any social work education, or meet any minimum law enforcement standards, as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS required only that its employees be at least 21 years old, have no felony convictions, have at least two years of college, and complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. On satisfying those requirements, JCS employees were then labeled “Probation Officers,”1 permitted to carry a JCS issued badge in some municipalities, and collect fees, court fines and costs. 13. Under this system and by agreement with municipalities such as Childersburg, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court were unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 14. The agreement drafted by JCS and agreed to by the mayor of Childersburg is substantially the same contract form used throughout Alabama and stated that the municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . “(emphasis added).
1 In contrast, even a judicial volunteer is required to meet greater and more specific qualifications, careful screening, specific training and continual oversight established by the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’). See Ala. Rule of Judicial Administration Rule 42.
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JCS’s contracts with other cities sometimes set the monthly fee at $45. 15. Childersburg, through its mayor and council, approved the agreement with JCS and approved the employment of Larry Ward as judge of its municipal court. Ward, a bond salesman at Morgan Keegan, also served as municipal judge for Harpersville, Bridgeport, Dora, Hollywood, Lincoln, Ohatchee and Springville which were cities also under contract with JCS. The Childersburg Municipal Court meets once a month for a few hours on the second Thursday of the month. 16. The JCS system provided “Order of Probation” forms to the municipal court with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file set up charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 was later increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. In Childersburg and Harpersville, Municipal Court Judge Larry Ward pre-signed blank probation orders printed by JCS. 17. At municipal courts operating under the JCS contract, a person unable to fully pay fines and costs when levied would be placed on probation using the JCS orders and forms, even when the underlying offense is not punishable by a jail sentence or when no suspended sentence is imposed. This was routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs. The order forms supplied by JCS then required the individual to make payment to JCS of the fines, costs and additional monthly fees as required under its contract with the city. 18. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software is highly systemized and focuses on collections of fines, costs, and its fees—not traditional probation services. That system was used in every municipal court in which JCS operated in Alabama. For example, “offenders” were allowed to mail in payments if they lived 30 miles from the
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JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees were heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C. 19. The training manual used by JCS instructed its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provided court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS were ordered under these forms even when there was no adjudication of whether the individual was responsible for committing an underlying offense or adjudication was withheld. See Exhibit D. 20. The JCS training system was used in every municipal court in which JCS operated in Alabama and also provided sample letters for use after probation was ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instructed the “offender” that they could avoid the court date if they pay an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G. 21. The JCS training manual instructed its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provided forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After the arrest warrant was issued, JCS also provided forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determines that the “offender” was in compliance. See Exhibit I. Once a person was arrested, JCS monitored those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J. 22. The city council and its mayor controlled the policymaking for Childersburg, hired the municipal court judge, contracted for JCS to provide “probation services” at the municipal court starting in 2005, and continued to use JCS until they voted to terminate the contract on May 19, 2015. See Exhibit N. The decision to use JCS was an administrative decision of the cities such as Childersburg, by and through its mayor,
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and not a decision of the municipal court judge or the Chief Justice, or any other employee of the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’). The cities did not issue a request for proposal (‘RFP’) prior to signing the contract, and the cities did not competitively bid this exclusive contract. 23. Alabama municipalities like Childersburg, through their contracts with JCS and operations, clothed JCS with the appearance of state authority and many allowed JCS employees to carry badges. The JCS employees attended each municipal court session and were referred to as “probation officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none have such authority under Alabama statutes. Under this system, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead required to make all payments, including those for fines, restitution, probation fees and court costs, to JCS at the JCS office. 24. This public ruse was maintained by Alabama municipalities like Childersburg and JCS in order to impose and collect fines and costs from citizens such as the Plaintiffs, and was accomplished by allowing JCS to control the money, determine how much each municipal court “offender” must pay each month, how much would be credited for each payment to the collection “services” of JCS each month and how much of it would rebate to the municipalities toward the fines adjudged. 25. This system, as a matter of routine, violated the rights of persons such as the Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent by imposing fines, costs, and fees on indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency. 26. Despite the lack of authority to do so, JCS, at its discretion, used threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS would
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determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked. Under the system
operated jointly by Alabama municipal courts and JCS, JCS’s determination to
incarcerate an individual was routinely accepted by city and court personnel without
conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much
less any ability-to-pay determination or appointment of counsel before taking such
punitive action. In fact, JCS’ Contract with many cities/cities’ court explicitly agreed that
JCS, a financially interested party, will provide testimony stating: “the [probation] ‘officer’
will testify as to the circumstances of the case.”2
27. The collective actions of JCS and the Alabama municipalities like Childersburg
with which it contracted were inextricably interwoven with each other under an
agreement and understanding and routinely resulted in court costs, fines, and fees
which exceeded the statutory maximum of $500 for municipal courts, and in some
cases also imposed additional “jail fees” for the costs of any incarceration. Similarly,
the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines and fees for JCS
routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which resulted in JCS and
the municipalities taking joint action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals
2 The following contracts include this provision: Albertville p. 1 section G, Arab p. 4 section G, Bay Minette p. 8 Exhibit A ¶6,Brookwood p. 29 section G, Calera p. 33 Exhibit A ¶6, Childersburg p. 37 Exhibit A ¶6, Citronelle p. 41 Exhibit A ¶6, Clanton p. 46 Exhibit A ¶6, Dauphin Island p. 54 Exhibit A ¶6, Dora p. 58 Exhibit A ¶6, East Brewton p. 63 Exhibit A ¶6, Fairhope p. 67 Exhibit A ¶6, Falkville p. 70 Section G, Fort Payne p. 74 Exhibit A ¶6, Haleyville p. 87 Exhibit A ¶6, Hartselle p. 91 Exhibit A ¶6, Hollywood p. 95 Exhibit A ¶6, Homewood p. 99 Section G, Hueytown p. 104 Section G, Jackson p. 108 Exhibit A ¶6, Jacksonville pp. 112, 316 Exhibit A ¶6, Jemison p. 116 Exhibit A ¶6, Kinston p. 125 Exhibit A ¶6, Lake View p. 127 Exhibit A ¶6, Leeds pp. 131, 143 Exhibit A ¶6, Town of Level Plains p. 147 Exhibit A ¶6, Loxley p. 153 Section G, Millbrook p. 157 Exhibit A ¶6, Montevallo p. 161 Exhibit A ¶6, Montgomery p. 165 Exhibit A ¶6, Mount Vernon p. 170 Exhibit A ¶6, Northport p. 177 Exhibit A ¶6, Orange Beach p. 180 Section G, Owens Crossroads p. 183 Section G, Ozark p. 187 Section G, Pleasant Grove p. 192 Exhibit A ¶6, Priceville p. 196 Exhibit A ¶6 (signed by Mayor and City Judge), Rainbow City p. 200 Section G, Rainsville p. 204 Exhibit A ¶6, Robertsdale p. 211 Section G, Saraland p. 215 Exhibit A ¶6, Scottsboro p. 219 Exhibit A ¶6, Somerville p. 226 Section G, Southside p. 229 Section G, Sylacauga p. 235 Exhibit A ¶6 (signed by Mayor and City Judge), Talladega p. 243 Section G, Tallassee p. 247 Exhibit A ¶6, Troy p. 259 Section G, Warrior p. 269 Exhibit A ¶6, Ashford p. 273 Exhibit A ¶6, Attalla p. 276 Section G, Blountsville p. 279 Section G, Bridgeport p. 283 Exhibit A ¶6, Brighton p. 287 Exhibit A ¶6, Dauphin Island pp. 300, 303 Exhibit A ¶6, Notasulga pp. 320, 325 Exhibit A ¶6.
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without any jurisdiction to do so. 28. Although probation was routinely imposed on individuals who were not convicted of any underlying offense—or who were charged with an offense for which no jail sentence could lawfully be imposed, individuals were arrested and incarcerated if the fine, together with the fees added by JCS, were not paid as dictated by JCS. 29. Despite directing the municipal courts such as Childersburg that incarceration of an individual “offender” is needed when payment is not made, JCS undertakes no determination of the reasons for nonpayment, and does not consider such things as the Plaintiffs’ disability, unemployment, or assets, in regard to the nonpayment of the fines. 30. JCS denies any responsibility and took no action under its operations with Alabama municipalities to determine ability to pay, and provides no instruction in its employee manual for the consideration of indigency. The municipal court judge employed by Childersburg, however, contended that under its contract it is JCS that should determine if an “offender” is unable to pay due to indigency and if so, to abate any fees in the probation order. 31. Under this system jointly implemented by JCS and municipalities such as Childersburg, after simple fines were converted to “probation” for payment, jail often resulted for any “offender” who did not meet the payment scheduled set by JCS. Based on JCS’s allegation of a “probation violation,” warrants were issued for “failure to obey court order” or failure to pay, and individuals whose original penalty had only been a fine—or even who were not found guilty of any offense and were only assessed court costs—ended up being imprisoned.
THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERIENCES A. Gina Kay Ray
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32. Gina Kay Ray is an individual resident of Bonaire, Alabama, who was brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court on August 12, 2010 on charges of “no insurance” and “driving while license suspended.” She was fined $398 and $498 for these charges and received a suspended jail sentence, but was not sentenced to serve any jail time. Ms. Ray was not financially able to pay the fines when levied and was ordered to be on probation with JCS. Ms. Ray did not voluntarily agree to be put on JCS probation, but signed the JCS papers because the judge ordered her to do so. Pursuant to the JCS form probation order, Ms. Ray was required to pay JCS an additional $45 per month and a $10 charge to set up her file. Her monthly payment on these amounts was set by JCS at $145 per month. 33. On July 14, 2011, Ms. Ray was brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court on charges of “expired tag” and “driving while license suspended.” For these charges she was fined $168 and $498 respectively, and received a suspended jail sentence. Since she could not pay these fines either, she was again ordered to “probation” with JCS and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month and $10 file set fee. Ms. Ray did not voluntarily agree to be put on JCS probation, but signed the JCS papers because the judge ordered her to do so. Her monthly payment on these amounts was also set by JCS at $145 per month. Though the “probation” period for her 2010 and 2011 cases overlap in time, JCS treated these as “consecutive cases” so that the period would then extend well beyond 24 months and result in monthly fees to JCS for both cases. 34. Ms. Ray was and has been indigent and was not able to pay for her insurance, tag or license, much less the JCS fees, but, in accordance with the policy and practice of Childersburg which was established in its contract with JCS, neither the Childersburg Municipal Court nor JCS ever made any inquiry into her inability to pay at the time of
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levying the fine or thereafter. 35. Due to her inability to pay as directed by JCS, Ms. Ray was arrested and jailed at the request of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.” Ms. Ray was placed in the Talladega County jail for a period of four days in 2010 and then an additional 21 days in 2011, and further time in April and May of 2012. 36. Due to her inability to pay and her indigency, she remained in jail throughout these periods of time. On or about April 26, 2012, a friend of Ms. Ray was able to acquire $300.00 which was the amount determined and demanded by JCS to secure her release from jail. 37. At the point of Ms. Ray’s release on or about April 26, 2012, an employee of JCS completed a pre-printed, pre-signed probation order stating, “Val Jews reporting w/300 before Def can be released,” The probation order listed a $317 fine and an offense of “Reinstate w/warrant fee.” After the $300 was paid, Ms. Ray was directed to appear in “Judicial Corrections Municipal Court.” 38. On June 14, 2012, Ms. Ray was again brought before the Municipal Court in Childersburg on charges of “attempt to evade,” “expired tag” and “driving while revoked.” She was fined $248, $248, and $598 on these charges and again received a suspended jail sentence but was not sentenced to serve any jail time. She could not pay these fines and once again placed on “probation” with JCS and ordered to pay JCS $45 per month for 24 months and $10 file setup fee. 39. While Ms. Ray has made some small payments, she at all times has been indigent and unable to pay the full amounts and the additional probation fees charged by JCS and Childersburg. At the time this lawsuit was filed, remaining balances were still demanded by JCS and Childersburg.
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40. Ms. Ray was also subjected to JCS probation in the Town of Harpersville. JCS demanded payments and compliance with its demands without any probation orders. Despite the fact that no probation orders were issued by the municipal court, JCS demanded money from Ms. Ray. When she was unable to pay the amounts JCS demanded, JCS changed her status in ProbationTracker to “warrant;” and she was arrested and jailed for eight days. 41. Throughout this period of time, JCS provided no services to Ms. Ray and acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees and, despite knowledge that Ms. Ray was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and has taken actions to incarcerate Ms. Ray without any due process and kept on probation beyond the statutory maximum of two (2) years. 42. On each of her adjudications and incarcerations, Ms. Ray was denied the benefit of legal counsel, without any formal probation revocation hearing, or any hearing on the issue of her indigency. Despite no legal counsel, Ms. Ray was incarcerated and, on some occasions, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval, agreement and participation of the Childersburg city court pursuant to their policy, contract and conspiracy with JCS. B. Kristy And Timothy Fugatt 43. The Fugatts have twin children and had a third child who was born with serious medical conditions which required constant medical care in Birmingham for two years until his death in June 2011. As a result, both parents had extended stays at the hospital with their child and made numerous trips to and from Birmingham to their home in Sylacauga. 44. On one trip on November 13, 2010, Kristy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed by
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the Childersburg Police Department for having an expired license tag and an expired driver’s license. 45. Timothy Fugatt was stopped and ticketed on or about December 3, 2010 by Childersburg Police for having an expired license tag on the same vehicle. Both of the Fugatts were set for court on January 13, 2011 at the Childersburg Municipal Court. 46. The Childersburg court records reflect that the Fugatts’ cases were nol prossed upon payment of the court costs of $198.00 for the expired driver’s license and $148.00 each for the expired tag charges. They were not sentenced to a suspended jail sentence or required to serve any jail time. 47. Due to these financial burdens, the Fugatts were unable to immediately pay the court costs and were ordered to “probation” under JCS. The Fugatts did not voluntarily agree to be put on JCS probation, but signed the JCS papers because the judge ordered them to do so. Under the mandated terms of the probation, they were each charged a $10 set up fee and an additional $45.00 per month for JCS’s probation “service.” 48. The Fugatts paid as best they could, but when they were unable to make payments as were ordered by JCS employees, they were required to drive to Childersburg and explain why they could not pay. JCS set the dates upon which the Fugatts were to report to the JCS office and were told that they would be jailed if they did not come. Many times the Fugatts were not able to make phone contact due to limited phone access of JCS. Nevertheless, they were repeatedly threatened with jail for any nonappearance at the JCS office. 49. The Fugatts told JCS employees about their inability to pay as demanded and even provided medical records. Instead of assistance from JCS, the Fugatts were
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called liars and continually threatened with arrest and incarceration for nonpayment. 50. Although the City of Childersburg’s accounting records show that Mr. Fugatt had paid his court costs in full as of May 18, 2011, JCS claimed that he still owed money, kept him on probation, and continued to demand payment. JCS then sought an arrest warrant for Mr. and Mrs. Fugatt based on their alleged failure to pay. 51. When the Fugatts did not appear in court on August 11, 2011- the date set by JCS for its ‘petition for revocation’ - each of the Fugatts was assessed $317.00 for “Failure to Obey Court Order” on September 26, 2011, and a warrant of arrest was issued. 52. Despite their inability to pay the initial court costs, the amounts JCS claimed the Fugatts owed kept increasing, with added as “fines,” “restitution,” “other” and “probation fees.” 53. On Sunday afternoon, February 26, 2012, a Childersburg officer came to their home in Sylacauga, threatened them with a taser and arrested them, taking them from their young children to the jail at Childersburg and instructing them that DHR would be called for care of their kids. This was avoided only by relatives arriving in time to take care of the young children. 54. Only after relatives collectively brought $900.00 to the Childersburg jail were the Fugatts released from jail. (Exhibit K) 55. On February 26, 2012, the date of their arrest, each of the Fugatts was charged an additional $317 for “Failure to Appear,” though there was no judge present that Sunday and no judicial order was signed. These additional charges totaled $1,268, plus the $90 monthly JCS fee, all resulting from the expired tag and expired driver’s license.
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56. In July 2012, JCS charged Mr. Fugatt an additional $234 in “restitution.” Although no restitution was ordered by the municipal court or assessed for his nol prossed ticket, and although the City of Childersburg’s records showed that he had paid off the court costs he owed over a year earlier, neither the City nor its municipal court challenged these added charges. 57. After their arrests, JCS continued to demand payments from Mr. and Mrs. Fugatt in excess of the balance recorded by the City. In addition, although Mrs. Fugatt was never charged with speeding, she was ordered to JCS probation for someone else’s speeding ticket using a pre-printed JCS probation order that Judge Ward pre-signed. Although the person who had actually gotten the speeding ticket was also put on JCS probation for the offense, JCS sought to collect the balance owed for that ticket from Mrs. Fugatt. 58. On October 11, 2012, the Fugatts were again required to appear at Childersburg Municipal Court by JCS employees. While there, a JCS employee working in its JCS division told the Fugatts that they now owed over $1,000 in court costs, fines and probation fees with Mrs. Fugatt owing $557 and Mr. Fugatt owing $517. 59. On December 13, 2012, Mr. Fugatt was once again ordered to JCS probation for a “Proof of Insurance” violation. The probation order was not signed by the judge and did not include any jail sentence. JCS set up this term of probation to run consecutive to Mr. Fugatt’s previous probation for the initial expired tag (which he had paid in full eighteen (18) months earlier on May 18, 2011), demanding that he pay another $10 setup fee and $135 per month, including a monthly JCS fee of $35. 60. While Mr. Fugatt maintained some employment, the hours he was able to work were quite limited by these serious medical issues and family responsibilities. As a
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result, the Fugatts were very poor. 61. Though the Fugatts had repeatedly informed JCS of their situation, no relief was granted. The Fugatts were not afforded due process of law, in that they were continually punished with increased amounts due and owing, threats of incarceration for not paying, and ultimately incarceration. 62. In addition, the Fugatts, like all the Plaintiffs, were treated differently than persons able to pay the court costs when first imposed, merely because of their economic status. 63. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to the Fugatts and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that the Fugatts were unable to pay and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate the Fugatts without any due process and kept them on probation after their city court costs had been paid in full and beyond the statutory maximum of two (2) years. 64. The Fugatts were jailed without the benefit of legal counsel, without any notice of charges, without formal probation revocation hearing, and without any hearing on the issue of their indigency, but simply incarcerated and, later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg personnel and pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
Deunate T. Jews 65. Deunate T. Jews is a resident of Childersburg, Alabama, and brought before the Childersburg Municipal Court in 2008 on the charge of harassment. Mr. Jews was never tried, and the alleged victim placing this charge went to prison. As a result, the charges against Mr. Jews were dismissed but, on October 22, 2009, he was
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nonetheless charged court costs of $166. Since he could not pay this amount, he was ordered to probation with JCS for 24 months for payment with the additional requirement that he also pay JCS $45 per month and a $10 file set up fee. Mr. Jews did not voluntarily agree to be put on JCS probation, but signed the JCS papers because the judge ordered him to do so. Mr. Jews was not sentenced to serve any jail time. 66. When Mr. Jews did not pay the amounts demanded by JCS, an arrest warrant was issued at the request of JCS for “failure to obey a court order.” Because this warrant to arrest Mr. Jews was issued, an additional $317 was added to his bill with JCS listed as “restitution” on the JCS and court records, even though no restitution was involved. 67. On September 11, 2009, Mr. Jews was arrested and placed in the Talladega jail forty-one (41) days for “failure to appear.” 68. Based on these unlawful charges, Mr. Jews was incarcerated at the request of JCS. At his release, he was ordered to appear in “Judicial Corrections” Municipal Court. 69. When Mr. Jews was unable to pay the ever growing JCS fees, JCS sought another warrant for his arrest. Mr. Jews was arrested on August 18, 2010, by Childersburg police officer Mark Holmes for the charge of “FTOCO” and a $935 cash bond was demanded for his release. Mr. Jews was again taken to the Talladega County Jail where he stayed until September 9, 2010. 70. JCS charged Mr. Jews “restitution,” “probation fees,” and “court money” fees, which, because of his indigency, he was unable to pay. On January 13, 2011, Childersburg police officer Luke Benefield arrested Mr. Jews on the FTOCO charge. Although the arrest warrant lists a $1,035 cash only bond, Childersburg released Mr.
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Jews when family members paid $500 the next day. Upon his release, Mr. Jews was notified that he had to appear in the Childersburg court on March 10, 2010. 71. When Mr. Jews was again unable to pay the continuing, escalating JCS fees, JCS issued another warrant for his arrest and Mr. Jews was arrested and jailed on February 21, 2012. Childersburg police booked Mr. Jews and he was transported to the Talladega County Jail. Childersburg demanded a $1,000 cash bond for his release. 72. On March 8, 2012, Mr. Jews was released from the Talladega County Jail when he appeared in court and a family member paid JCS $200. 73. On May 25, 2012, Mr. Jews paid JCS $25; JCS applied $15 to “restitution” though there was none, and $10 to “Probation Fee.” JCS gave Mr. Jews a receipt acknowledging his payment in which it listed: Fees in arrears = $295.00; Pay off not including Probation fees: $343.00; Monthly Probation Fees: $45: Court Money Due from other Probations: Fines: $1,807. This JCS receipt stated a probation start date of March 9, 2012, which was the date Mr. Jews was released from his most recent incarceration, and a probation end date of March 9, 2014 which is nearly six years after the charges against him were dismissed. See Exhibit L. 74. Though the “probation” originally ordered on October 22, 2009 was for 24 months, it continued—with charges accruing each month—until this lawsuit was filed and lawyers for the City of Childersburg wrote, and the City magistrate to sign and sent, a letter to JCS requesting that JCS terminate hundreds of probations that exceeded the statutory two year maximum. 75. While Mr. Jews has made payments throughout the period of time, he was indigent and unable to pay the full amount of the probation fees and other charges imposed by JCS. JCS closed out Mr. Jews on December 17, 2014 with an entry of
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“Pre-Payment/Bond in the amount of $166.” 76. Throughout this period of time, JCS has provided no services to Mr. Jews and has acted merely as a collection agency charging additional fees, and despite knowledge that Mr. Jews was unable to pay these fines and indigent, JCS has sought to collect and take actions to incarcerate Mr. Jews without any due process. 77. Each time Mr. Jews was incarcerated, it was without the benefit of legal counsel, without notice of charges, and without any formal probation revocation hearing or any hearing on the issue of his indigency. On some occasions, he was later released based upon the determination of JCS. These actions were taken with the approval and participation of Childersburg pursuant to its policy and contract with JCS.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING CONSPIRACY BETWEEN JCS
AND THE CITY OF CHILDERSBURG 78. JCS entered into an agreement and/or reached an understanding with the Childersburg Municipal Court to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 79. The parties’ relationship was established by a contract between JCS and the City and its court. Following the date of this contract in 2005, there was concerted consistent action between JCS and the municipal court showing evidence of their agreement and understanding, to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights. 80. The relationship between these parties was established by the City’s former mayor signing a contract with JCS which was recommended by the municipal judge for the City of Childersburg. JCS was hired for the collection of city court fines and costs. 81. This agreement provided that the municipal judge, Larry Ward, would include in
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his orders sending people to JCS that those people would be required to pay JCS a setup fee and monthly fee. 82. This agreement also stated that JCS would provide testimony “as to the circumstances of the case” as a ‘probation officer.’ 83. The same municipal judge, Larry Ward, also worked for other Alabama municipal courts where JCS had been hired for the same services including Harpersville, Dora, Ohatchee, Lincoln, Bridgeport, Hollywood and Springville. 84. In furtherance of the understanding and agreement between JCS and the Childersburg Municipal Court, Judge Ward consistently placed persons appearing before him on “probation” with JCS for the collection of fines and court costs when they could not immediately pay these fines and court costs to the municipal court when they were assessed. This referral to JCS “probation” occurred regardless of the existence of a suspended jail sentence and required those individuals to pay additional JCS fees. The “order” for probation was presigned by Ward in blank for use by the JCS employees as part of the practice and conspiratorial understanding between these parties. 85. In ordering people to JCS “probation” for collection of fines and court costs, Judge Ward consistently failed to consider the persons’ poverty, even when they complained to the court they could not immediately pay the fines, costs and fees when they were imposed. Instead of consideration of their poverty, and in furtherance of the conspiratorial understanding and agreement with JCS, Judge Ward placed the named Plaintiffs and class members on probation without inquiry into their ability to pay. 86. The actions of Judge Ward in furtherance of the conspiratorial understanding and agreement with JCS, were done with full understanding and acknowledgment that
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JCS had financial interests in extending the paid supervision of individuals placed with it for “probation.” Those financial interests, in fact, were harmed if an individual sent to JCS was formally declared to be indigent as JCS agreed to not charge indigent people probation fees. 87. This conspiratorial agreement and understanding between JCS and the municipal court of Childersburg is further shown by the consistent failure of Judge Ward to make any indigency determinations and by JCS’ policy position that it has no responsibility to address the poverty of the person sent to it even when it possessed specific information about the person showing their disabilities, unemployment, and the lack of income. 88. This conspiratorial agreement and understanding between JCS and the municipal court of Childersburg is further shown by the consistent failure of Judge Ward to appoint counsel to those he ordered to JCS ‘probation’ and JCS’ pre-printed probation order, which Judge Ward pre-signed, including the following language above the offender’s signature line. “I have counsel or have waived my right to counsel for all proceedings to this date and have received a copy of this ORDER.” 89. In furtherance of this understanding between JCS and the City of Childersburg Municipal Court, the court there routinely issued arrest warrants for failure to appear, failure to pay or failure to obey court order after JCS requested this in its petition to revoke probation. The warrants issued by the city court, in fact, showed these charges as convictions and were based upon JCS’ institution of the petition for revocation though no hearing had occurred on those charges. The agreement and understanding between JCS and the city municipal court in Childersburg was further implemented by JCS providing to the court its petition for revocation as the tool to acquire the warrant
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from the City court in order to facilitate the arrest of person who had not paid. 90. In furtherance of this conspiratorial agreement and understanding, after JCS petitioned for revocation beginning the process to acquire a warrant, neither JCS nor the municipal court took steps to provide counsel for the persons pursued or to inform them of this right and any notice about these proceedings was allowed to be given by JCS - not the city court. 91. The petitions for revocation sought by JCS under its agreement and understanding with Childersburg Municipal Court were all predicated on failure of the individual to pay the fines and fees demanded. Those petitions were discharged when such payment was forthcoming and with “probation” itself promptly terminated when the fees, fines and costs were fully paid. These petitions used under this conspiratorial agreement and understanding in turn were accepted by the city court as the basis for arrest warrants on charges such as failure to obey, failure to appear, failure to pay and failure to obey court order. 92. In furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement and understanding between JCS and the city court of Childersburg, JCS was allowed to determine the monthly payments required and to allocate of any such payment between JCS or the City without any audit by the City as to the correctness or its accounting before the City court complied with the request of JCS for warrants. 93. This conspiratorial agreement and understanding between JCS and the municipal court of Childersburg is further shown by the hundreds of people who were kept on JCS probation beyond the statutory maximum of two (2) years during which time JCS continued to demand monthly fees. 94. These concerted efforts between the city court and JCS, including the city judge
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and the other employees of the court, show an agreement and understanding that warrants would be issued if money was not paid by the person sent to JCS for collection, all while ignoring the requirement of consideration of poverty as required under constitutional law, Bearden v. Georgia, and Alabama law.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 95. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent two main classes and two subclasses:
Fees class: All individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by Alabama municipal courts to JCS for the collection of fines, fees and costs, and who paid fees to JCS.
Childersburg Fees Subclass: All individuals in the Fees Class who were assigned to JCS probation by the Childersburg Municipal Court. AND Arrest and Jail Class: All individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by Alabama municipal courts to JCS probation and who were arrested and/or incarcerated without an ability-to-pay determination after failing to pay fees, fines, or court costs to JCS. Childersburg Arrest and Jail Subclass: All individuals in the Arrest and Jail class who were assigned to JCS probation by the Childersburg Municipal Court. 96. The members of the Classes and Subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 97. As of this time, the exact number in the Classes is unknown but would be more than one thousand. 98. Plaintiffs’ treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the Classes and subclasses and is ongoing. 99. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and have
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retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Classes. 100. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by many class members may be small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. 101. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes, and predominate over any questions affecting solely members of the Classes. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Classes are:
a. Whether policy and practice of automatically placing on probation all municipal offenders who cannot immediately pay fines and costs but who are not, or could not be, sentenced to jail is legal;
b. Whether the policy and practice of converting unpaid fines and costs to days of incarceration, without any determination concerning an individual’s ability, to pay is legal;
c. Whether the policy and practice of requiring every order of the municipal court to require probation fees for JCS is legal;
d. Whether the policy and practice of arresting and incarcerating individuals for failure to pay fines and costs with no finding of willfulness is legal.
e. Whether the policy and practice of failing to appoint counsel for indigent defendants when a jail sentence is involved is legal;
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f. Whether the policy and practice of failing to make any inquiry into indigency before imposing additional fines and costs is legal;
g. Whether the policy and practice of failing to give adequate notice of the charge and nature of a probation revocation hearing, failing to provide a probation revocation hearing, failing to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation and the evidence relied upon, failing to hold a hearing to determine indigency before revoking probation and otherwise imposing incarceration, failing to make written findings concerning an individual’s willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for nonpayment are legal;
h. Whether JCS can raise its monthly probation fee charge to $45 without proper municipal action;
i. Whether the policy and practice of charging incarcerated municipal defendants a daily fee for each day the person is incarcerated is legal;
j. Whether the policy and practice of imposing fines and court costs that exceed that statutory maximum for municipal is legal;
k. Whether the policy and practice of extending “probation” for municipal offenses beyond 24 months is legal;
l. Whether the policy and practice which fails to give any credit for time spent incarcerated is legal;
102. JCS and Alabama municipalities including Childersburg have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
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corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. 103. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The data concerning the class members and the transaction details and amounts on each charge is largely computerized by the municipalities and by JCS. 104. The names and addresses of the class members are a matter of public record and are also kept by JCS and notice can be provided to the class members via First Class U.S. Mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court.
COUNT ONE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY JCS, BOTH THROUGH ITS OWN INDEPENDENT ACTS AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CHILDERSBURG MUNICIPAL COURT
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 105. Plaintiffs aver that JCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, denied them, and all class members, their right to due process. 106. At the Childersburg municipal court these constitutional violations were the result of a conspiracy between JCS and the Childersburg municipal court as shown by an agreement, understanding and practice implemented by those parties there in the collection of court fines and costs. 107. JCS operated a for profit enterprise that marketed its services to various municipal and county governments and contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama including Childersburg to collect unpaid fines and court costs from people brought before municipal courts in traffic and other misdemeanor cases. JCS’
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marketing approach to these cities emphasized that its fees would be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts would improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city. 108. JCS routinely used a form contract to establish its relationship with its customer cities and similarly trained its employees using a training manual replete with forms for courts to use during proceedings, and for courts and JCS to use to contact the “offenders” from whom they were collecting. As a result, the JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform across municipalities in Alabama. 109. Under the system established by JCS, its employees were not required to have criminal justice or legal training, have any social work education, or meet any minimum law enforcement standards, as is required of state probation officers. Instead, JCS required only that its employees be at least 21 years old, have no felony convictions, have at least two years of college, and complete 40 hours of training by JCS on its processes. Upon satisfying those requirements, JCS employees were then labeled “Probation Officers,” permitted to carry a JCS issued badge in some municipalities, and to collect fees, court fines, and costs. 110. Under this system and by agreement with cities, such as Childersburg municipal court with which JCS conspired, many administrative and judicial functions of the municipal court were unlawfully delegated to JCS, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and private fees. 111. The agreement drafted by JCS and agreed to by mayor of Childersburg stated that the municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:
a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee One time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . “(emphasis added).
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JCS used similar contracts with other cities and sometimes set the monthly fee at $45. 112. JCS is, by virtue of its contracts with municipalities such as Childersburg, clothed with the appearance of a state actor and its actions were interwoven with those of the municipalities. Under JCS’s contracts and its operations, JCS employees were represented to the Plaintiffs and class members to be “probation officers” acting “on behalf of” the municipalities. Exhibit M. 113. In accord with the contract language, JCS provided “Order of Probation” forms to municipal courts like Childersburg with the printed requirement on each form that the “offender” pay JCS $35 per month plus $10 for a file setup charge. See Exhibit A. The monthly fee of $35 after the agreement was increased to $45 per month for each “offender” at Childersburg. The orders supplied by JCS required the individuals sent to JCS to pay JCS the in addition to the fines, costs, and additional monthly fees as required under its contract. 114. Under the JCS contract, policy, and procedures and agreement, municipal courts such as Childersburg’s required “probation” for any person who was unable to immediately pay in full the fine and/or costs when levied by the municipal court. Since collection was the goal, JCS probation was imposed even in cases where the debtor did not receive any jail sentence, was never convicted of a jailable offense, or where probationers were assessed court costs but were not convicted of anything at all. 115. That “probation” requirement, under agreement between JCS and the cities, was required to be part of every printed order at the municipal courts such as Childersburg which also required payment of monthly fees to JCS. In fact, JCS’ Contract with many cities/cities’ court including Childersburg explicitly agreed that JCS, even though a financially interested party, will provide testimony stating: “the [probation] ‘officer’ will
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testify as to the circumstances of the case.”3
116. As a result of JCS, policy and practice, people who failed to pay fines, fees and
costs were subject to arrest, detention, and incarceration. At Childersburg municipal
court, JCS conspired with that court under an agreement, understanding and practice to
use this “probation,” threats of additional court action, petitions for revocation, arrests
and jail as tools to extort collection without inquiry into the person’s ability to pay.
117. Incarceration of individuals who could not pay their fines, costs, and added fees,
such as the Plaintiffs and class members, was accomplished by JCS seeking warrants
against them for charges of failure to pay or “failure to obey court order,” though there is
no such state statute or city ordinance which defines this as a criminal act.
118. Though a determination of willful refusal to obey a court order as required by Ala.
Code § 15-18-62 can lawfully lead to incarceration, no such determinations were made
under the JCS system and methods. Under the JCS conspiracy with the Childersburg
municipal court, neither determinations of willfulness nor inquiry into the ability to pay as
required by Bearden v Georgia were done.
119. JCS expressly denies that it had any responsibility to inquire or determine why
3 The following contracts include this provision: Albertville p. 1 section G, Arab p. 4 section G, Bay Minette p. 8 Exhibit A ¶6,Brookwood p. 29 section G, Calera p. 33 Exhibit A ¶6, Childersburg p. 37 Exhibit A ¶6, Citronelle p. 41 Exhibit A ¶6, Clanton p. 46 Exhibit A ¶6, Dauphin Island p. 54 Exhibit A ¶6, Dora p. 58 Exhibit A ¶6, East Brewton p. 63 Exhibit A ¶6, Fairhope p. 67 Exhibit A ¶6, Falkville p. 70 Section G, Fort Payne p. 74 Exhibit A ¶6, Haleyville p. 87 Exhibit A ¶6, Hartselle p. 91 Exhibit A ¶6, Hollywood p. 95 Exhibit A ¶6, Homewood p. 99 Section G, Hueytown p. 104 Section G, Jackson p. 108 Exhibit A ¶6, Jacksonville pp. 112, 316 Exhibit A ¶6, Jemison p. 116 Exhibit A ¶6, Kinston p. 125 Exhibit A ¶6, Lake View p. 127 Exhibit A ¶6, Leeds pp. 131, 143 Exhibit A ¶6, Town of Level Plains p. 147 Exhibit A ¶6, Loxely p. 153 Section G, Millbrook p. 157 Exhibit A ¶6, Montevallo p. 161 Exhibit A ¶6, Montgomery p. 165 Exhibit A ¶6, Mount Vernon p. 170 Exhibit A ¶6, Northport p. 177 Exhibit A ¶6, Orange Beach p. 180 Section G, Owens Crossroads p. 183 Section G, Ozark p. 187 Section G, Pleasant Grove p. 192 Exhibit A ¶6, Priceville p. 196 Exhibit A ¶6 (signed by Mayor and City Judge), Rainbow City p. 200 Section G, Rainsville p. 204 Exhibit A ¶6, Robertsdale p. 211 Section G, Saraland p. 215 Exhibit A ¶6, Scottsboro p. 219 Exhibit A ¶6, Somerville p. 226 Section G, Southside p. 229 Section G, Sylacauga p. 235 Exhibit A ¶6 (signed by Mayor and City Judge), Talladega p. 243 Section G, Tallassee p. 247 Exhibit A ¶6, Troy p. 259 Section G, Warrior p. 269 Exhibit A ¶6, Ashford p. 273 Exhibit A ¶6, Attalla p. 276 Section G, Blountsville p. 279 Section G, Bridgeport p. 283 Exhibit A ¶6, Brighton p. 287 Exhibit A ¶6, Dauphin Island pp. 300, 303 Exhibit A ¶6, Notasulga pp. 320, 325 Exhibit A ¶6.
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people did not make their payments or whether they were able pay to. Therefore, when an “offender” was unable to pay the fine and additional fees required by JCS, JCS and the municipal courts in cities such as Childersburg cooperated to issue arrest warrants initiated by JCS. 120. All the named Plaintiffs were indigent both at the time of charges were levied against them in Childersburg and at the times of their incarcerations. Each was unable to pay the fines and/or costs and fees demanded by JCS due to their indigency and each was arrested and incarcerated by Childersburg based on JCS’s recommendation and pursuant to the conspiratorial agreement and understanding between these parties. 121. Under the policy and practice of JCS and the municipalities like Childersburg, unpaid fines and costs were unlawfully converted to undetermined days in jail for which the “offenders” were sometimes charged by the day for their time in jail and were often given no credit for time spent in jail against the fines levied. 122. The JCS system and its “Probation Tracker” software was used in all of the Alabama cities where JCS operated and was highly systemized and focused on collections of fines, costs, and its fees—not traditional probation services. For example, “offenders” were allowed to mail in payments if they lived 30 miles from the JCS office. See Exhibit B. In fact, the daily tasks of the JCS employees were heavily directed to collecting, counting and depositing the money collected. See Exhibit C. 123. The training manual used by JCS instructed its employees on the use of its computer systems in tracking the payments made by the “offenders” and provided court forms to order probation and payment to JCS. The payments to JCS were ordered under these forms even when there was no adjudication of whether the individual was responsible for committing an underlying offense or adjudication is withheld. See
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Exhibit D. 124. The JCS training system also provided sample letters for use after probation is ordered, threatening the “offender” that “a warrant will be issued for your arrest” and that their “court date cannot and will not be reset.” See Exhibits E and F. Similar JCS forms instructed the “offender” that they could avoid the court date if they paid an amount determined by JCS. See Exhibit G. 125. The JCS training manual instructed its employees on the issuance of warrants of arrest and provided forms for that purpose. See Exhibit H. After an arrest warrant was issued, JCS also provided forms for warrant dismissal if JCS determined that the “offender” was now in compliance (i.e., had paid). See Exhibit I. Once a person was arrested, JCS monitored those “offenders” placed in jail. See Exhibit J. 126. The agreement and forms drafted by JCS are uniformly used by it. 127. JCS controlled the money collected from debtors, the required payment amounts and schedules, and the location where the money must be paid. Furthermore, it controlled how much of each payment was credited to its own collection “services” each month, and how much of it was forwarded to the towns such as Childersburg toward the underlying fines and/or costs. 128. JCS, at its discretion, used threats of revoking probation, increased fines and costs, and jail time for purposes of collection. Under this system, should an individual fail to pay to the satisfaction of JCS, JCS would determine that the individual’s “probation” should be revoked. Under the system operated jointly by JCS and municipal courts such as Childersburg’s, JCS’ recommendation of incarcerating an individual and/or imposing unreasonable bond requirements was routinely accepted without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings,
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much less any determination of ability to pay or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action. At Childersburg municipal court these actions occurred as a result of the conspiratorial agreement and understanding between JCS and the Childersburg municipal court. 129. JCS’s practices in Alabama municipal courts and its conspiracy with Childersburg’s court routinely resulted in the charging of court costs, fines and fees which exceeded the jurisdictional maximum of $500 for municipal courts. Similarly, the periods of “probation” imposed for purposes of collecting fines, costs, and fees for JCS routinely exceeded the two-year statutory maximum, all of which results in JCS and the municipal courts including Childersburg’s court taking joint action to detain and otherwise incarcerate individuals without any jurisdiction to do so. 130. Under this system and under its conspiracy with Childersburg based on JCS’ allegation of a “probation violation,” warrants were issued for “failure to obey court order” or failure to pay, and individuals whose original penalty had only been a fine—or even those who were not found guilty of any offense and were only assessed court costs—ended up being imprisoned. 131. Under this system and under its conspiracy with Childersburg in this process of converting fines and/or costs to jail time, JCS and municipal courts like Childersburg did not give adequate notice of the nature of any lawful charge, failed to conduct hearings, failed to make written findings concerning the reasons for revoking probation or the evidence relied upon, and failed to make written findings concerning any willful nonpayment of fines and costs before imposing incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs. 132. Under this system and under its conspiracy with Childersburg, when a simple
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fine was transformed into a jail sentence of an undetermined time, JCS and the courts also failed to provide counsel for the “offenders.” 133. Under this system and under its conspiracy with Childersburg after an adjudication under which a fine is levied, additional fees, costs and other charges are added to the “offender’s” bill with JCS for each new arrest, alleged probation violation, or contempt proceeding including, in some cases, those relating to charges years earlier. 134. In some cases, under the practice and policy of JCS, even where there has been a deferred adjudication in anticipation of future dismissal, the accused is nonetheless required to pay JCS fees. See Exhibit D. 135. Even in cases where a charge is dismissed as with the Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews discussed above, costs and fees for JCS can be levied and collection pursued through threats and repeated incarceration. 136. JCS’s policy and practice at city courts like Childersburg of imposing onerous fees on debtors who were unable to promptly pay in full municipal fines or costs, and threatening them with arrest if they failed to make payments and arresting them, deprived Plaintiffs and the class members of their rights under the Due Process Clause. 137. Under this system and under its conspiracy with Childersburg JCS’s policy and practice of seeking the arrest and imprisonment of debtors for failure to pay was done without any determination that the nonpayment was willful and without any other inquiry into indigency or ability to pay. These actions likewise deprived Plaintiffs and the class members of their rights under the Due Process Clause. 138. At Childersburg municipal court, these Due Process violations were the result of a conspiracy shown by an agreement or understanding and practice between JCS and
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Childersburg municipal court to impose JCS probation on debtors who were unable to pay municipal fines or costs all at once, and to implement JCS’s terms of probation, and execute JCS’s requests to arrest and imprison debtors for nonpayment without any determination that the nonpayment was willful or any other inquiry into indigency or ability to pay. As a proximate consequence of these deprivations of due process, Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered injuries, to their liberty and dignity, such as having fines, costs, and fees far in excess of their initial penalties levied against them, facing the constant threat of arrest for nonpayment even when never convicted of a jailable offense or any offense at all, having fines and/or costs converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully arrested and incarcerated for indefinite periods of time, and having their probation extended for longer than the court-imposed 24-month maximum.
COUNT TWO VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY JCS, IN CONSPIRACY WITH CHILDERSBURG MUNICIPAL COURT
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 139. The Plaintiffs aver that JCS, acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violated their Sixth Amendment rights and the rights of the class members. 140. At the Childersburg municipal court these constitutional violations were the result of a conspiracy between JCS and the Childersburg municipal court as shown by an agreement, understanding and practice implemented by those parties there in the collection of court fines and costs. 141. Under the joint policy and practice of JCS and pursuant to an agreement or
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understanding with the Childersburg municipal court, when a simple fine was transformed into a jail sentence, counsel was not provided for the indigent “offenders.” 142. Some named Plaintiffs and many class members were initially ordered to pay only a fine or costs in municipal court, but due to their inability to pay, each was placed on “probation” under JCS pursuant to JCS form orders and its contract with the municipality. 143. JCS denies that it had any responsibility to investigate the indigency of the “offenders” and took no action to determine or consider disabilities, employment status or other reasons justifying nonpayment. 144. Under the JCS system used in Alabama municipalities and the conspiracy with Childersburg, simple fines and/or costs including those without jail sentences were illegally converted to “probation” if the offender could not promptly pay the entire fine and costs. 145. After their fines were converted to probation, debtors were threatened with jail and actually arrested and imprisoned if the fines, fees, and costs were not paid as scheduled by JCS. 146. For Plaintiffs and some class members who were not convicted of any underlying offense, or who were convicted of an offense that is punishable by a fine only, there would have been no risk of jail time but for the JCS collection system illegally requiring “probation” for simple fines and costs. 147. Because debtors on probation were often wholly unable to pay, JCS frequently submitted petitions for revocation of probation charging debtors with “probation violations.” Arrest warrants would then be issued by the municipal court for “failure to obey court order,” failure to appear, or failure to pay, all without any inquiry into debtors’
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ability to pay. 148. Under the practice, and conspiratorial agreement at Childersburg municipal court, each of the named Plaintiffs while indigent was unlawfully jailed under this JCS system without any assistance of counsel 149. Plaintiffs and class members did not have the benefit of counsel—and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel—during crucial legal proceedings, including when they were first sentenced to JCS probation (and were first saddled with the risk of being jailed for failure to comply with its terms); when petitions for revocation of probation were submitted; or when they were in fact jailed. Furthermore, no ability-topay determinations were made for them as required by Bearden v. Georgia, and they were not informed that counsel would be provided for them if they were indigent. These failures to provide counsel violated their Sixth Amendment rights. 150. These Sixth Amendment deprivations at Childersburg were the result of a conspiratorial agreement or understanding between JCS and Childersburg municipal court to deny debtors their right to counsel, as evidenced by the uniformity of the denials there, as well as preprinted JCS forms stating, with respect to each probationer, that the probationer had already waived the right to counsel. 151. As a proximate consequence of this violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, the Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries, including having fines and/or costs converted to jail sentences, being unlawfully arrested and incarcerated for undetermined periods of time with the loss of their liberty and injury to their dignity, by having fines and costs in excess of statutory limits levied against them and by having other illegal charges for JCS fees, costs and restitution levied all while being indigent.
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COUNT THREE DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BY JCS, BOTH THROUGH ITS OWN INDEPENDENT ACTS AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CHILDERSBURG MUNICIPAL COURT
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. 152. JCS and Alabama municipal courts like Childersburg’s have acted jointly under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deny the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 153. At Childersburg these constitutional violations were the result of a conspiracy as shown by an understanding, agreement and practice between the Childersburg municipal court and JCS. This is shown by placing debtors on JCS probation solely because they could not pay municipal fines and/or costs, implementing JCS’s terms of probation, and executing JCS’s requests to arrest and imprison debtors without an ability-to-pay determination. 154. As referenced above, by agreement, JCS employees attended municipal court sessions, collected city fines and costs, were labeled as “probation officers,” some carried badges, and regularly represented themselves as acting “on behalf of” the municipalities like Childersburg. Additionally, the JCS forms were used at the municipal court and fees for JCS were included in every city court order referring debtors to JCS. In the system established by an illegal agreement between JCS and Alabama cities such as Childersburg, the actions of JCS are inextricably intertwined with those of the government. 155. The practice and policy under this agreement requires “probation” for any person who, regardless of jail time, is financially unable to fully pay the fine and costs when
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levied by the municipal court. That probation requirement is part of the agreement between JCS and Alabama cities like Childersburg, and required payment of monthly fees to JCS. 156. Persons who were financially able to fully pay the levied fine and costs in Alabama municipal courts were not placed on “probation.” As a result, those persons were not charged any fees for JCS and were not subjected to threats of probation revocation, arrest and incarceration in the collection process. 157. Once on “probation” for purposes of paying fines and costs, this policy and practice implemented by JCS in conspiracy with Childersburg municipal court routinely imposed incarceration and additional costs on individuals who were unable to pay fines and costs, without any determination of willfulness as lawfully required under Alabama statutes. See Ala. Code, Section 15-18-62 and without any determination of ability to pay as is required under Bearden v. Georgia. 158. This disparate treatment based upon the wealth of the “offender” before the municipal court is a violation of equal protection and cannot be justified on any legitimate basis. 159. This inequality of treatment is also beyond the authority of the municipal courts which are required by Alabama statute to uniformly process traffic infractions and penalties for misdemeanors in accordance with specified maximum fines. See Ala. Code § 12-14-8. JCS policy is not in accord with the procedures established by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts because it imposes fees only on “offenders” cannot pay immediately and creates its own rules for penalizing individuals who cannot pay as directed. 160. These additional JCS fees result in disparate treatment of those who can
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immediately pay compared to those cannot. Furthermore, those “offenders” within jurisdictions that contract with JCS are processed and fined differently than “offenders” in jurisdictions that do not contract with JCS. 161. Each of the Plaintiffs was required to pay the additional costs and fees under this disparate system and each of the named Plaintiffs was subjected to threats including petitions for probation revocation and each was unlawfully jailed for their inability to pay as demanded under the conspiracy between JCS and the municipal court of Childersburg. 162. JCS’s policy and practice by virtue of an understanding and agreement conspiracy with the Childersburg municipal court imposed onerous fees on debtors who were unable to pay municipal fines or costs all at once, threatened them with probation violation and arrested and jailed them if they failed to make payments, while imposing none of these harsh conditions on debtors with sufficient resources to pay their court fines or costs right away deprived Plaintiffs and the class members of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 163. JCS’s conspiratorial policy and practice with Childersburg of including the arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiffs and the class members for failure to pay without any determination that the nonpayment was willful, any other inquiry into indigency or their ability to pay, likewise deprived Plaintiffs and the class members of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 164. As a proximate consequence of this denial of the right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs and class members suffered injuries to their liberty and dignity, such as having fines, costs, and fees far in excess of their initial penalties levied against them, facing the constant threat of arrest for nonpayment even
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when never convicted of a jailable offense or any offense at all, having fines and costs converted to jail sentences, and being unlawfully arrested and incarcerated.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court will assume jurisdiction of this cause and upon the final hearing: a. Certify this matter as a proper class action maintainable under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Award the Plaintiffs such damages as this Court shall find the Plaintiffs
have sustained, together with punitive, or exemplary damages as the law shall permit; c. Award to the Plaintiffs and class members damages and relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; d. Award to the Plaintiffs and Class the cost of this matter, including a reasonable attorneys' fee; e. Award to the Plaintiffs and the class members such other, further and more general relief as the Court may deem appropriate under these circumstances, including cost of these proceedings.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the classes, request trial by jury on all claims so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
s/ G. Daniel Evans 39

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G. Daniel Evans ASB-1661-N76G Alexandria Parrish ASB-2477-D66P D. Patrick Evans ASB-3209-R67G Maurine C. Evans ASB-4168-P16T Attorneys for the Plaintiffs The Evans Law Firm, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, Alabama 35209 Telephone: (205) 870-1970 Fax: (205) 870-7763 E-Mail: gdevans@evanslawpc.com E-Mail: ap@evanslawpc.com E-Mail: dpevans@evanslawpc.com E-Mail: mevans@evanslawpc.com
Erwin Chemerinsky Berkeley Law, University of California 215 Boalt Hall Berkeley, CA 94720 E-Mail: echemerinsky@berkeley.edu
Leslie A. Bailey Brian Hardingham Public Justice 475 14th Street, Suite 610 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 622-8150 E-Mail: bailey@publicjustice.net E-Mail: bhardingham@publicjustice.net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 6th day of July, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Complaint with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Will Hill Tankersley, Esquire Gregory C. Cook, Esquire L. Conrad Anderson, IV, Esquire Ginny Willcox Leavens, Esquire Ed R. Haden, Esquire Chase T. Espy, Esquire Balch & Bingham LLP 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1500
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Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Timothy P. Donahue, Esquire DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1020 22nd Street South Birmingham, Alabama 35205 Michael L. Jackson, Esquire Larry S. Logsdon, Esquire Wesley K. Winborn, Esquire WALLACE, JORDAN, RATLIFF & BRANDT, L.L.C. P.O. Box 530910 Birmingham, Alabama 35253 F. Lane Finch, Jr., Esquire Brian Richardson, Esquire Swift Currie McGhee and Hiers, LLP 2 North 20th Street, Suite 1405 Birmingham, AL 35203 Wilson F. Green, Esquire Fleenor & Green LLP 1657 McFarland Blvd. N., Ste. G2A Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35406
s/ G. Daniel Evans G. Daniel Evans
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 Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 744 Filed 09/26/19 Page 1 of 48

FILED
2019 Sep-26 PM 04:41 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GINA KAY RAY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants.

} } } } } Case No.: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP } } } } }

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. (Doc. # 707). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 708, 709, 714, 715 and 719). After careful review, and for the reasons discussed below, the court concludes the Motion is due to be denied. I. Background The named Plaintiffs in this action were ticketed for various traffic offenses and sentenced to probation by the City of Childersburg Municipal Court because they did not pay the fines or court costs imposed by the Municipal Court on the date of their sentencings. Individuals who were unable to immediately pay all fines and costs imposed by the court were placed on probation under the supervision of Judicial Correction Services (“JCS” or “Defendant”). (Doc. # 305 at ¶¶ 97-98). While on probation, Plaintiffs were required to pay an additional $35 to $45 a month to JCS (on top of their fines and court costs). Plaintiffs assert that “[t]his [was] routinely done with no investigation into the indigency of the individual or the reasons for their inability to pay the fine and costs.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiffs further allege that these practices violated their constitutional rights. (Doc. # 305 at ¶ 14).

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A. JCS Operations JCS marketed its private probation services to cities and towns throughout Alabama and, in doing so, presented them as “offender paid” services. (Doc. # 392-11 at 192-93). JCS did not charge a City or Municipal Court for its services, but instead collected a “$35.00 per month flat fee” and an additional “[o]ne time probationer set-up fee of $10.00” from “probationers.” (Doc. # 392-16 at 6). Once JCS started charging its monthly fees, a person on probation could not end her sentence by simply paying off the amount of the original debt. (Doc. 195-1 at 109-10). Childersburg began contracting with JCS in 2005. (Doc. # 421-7 at 2). The contract provided that JCS would collect fines, restitution, and court costs on behalf of a Municipal Court. (Doc. # 392-16 at 4). JCS’s standard contract required JCS to perform supervision for “all probated cases sentenced by the [Municipal] Court,” including indigent probationers. (Id.). However, JCS agreed not to charge its standard probation fees to indigent probationers or to probationers who paid their fines and court costs within a week of their sentencing hearing. (Id. at 4). The contract required JCS to maintain case files “with the terms and conditions of probation, reporting dates, field contacts as they occur and . . . the amounts and dates of monies collected.” (Id.). JCS’s policies and procedures were set forth in three main sources: (1) the JCS contract; (2) the JCS Probation Tracker software program, which was used to manage probation cases; and (3) the JCS Training Manual. JCS employees were trained using the JCS Training Manual, a copy was kept at every office, and every employee had access to Probation Tracker. (Doc. # 392-11 at 65-66, 77, 107-108). The JCS Training Manual provides a flow chart for “Working a Typical Case,” and describes how to perform tasks in Probation Tracker, including the use of various codes to indicate each probationer’s status and associated actions taken by JCS. (Doc. # 392-11 at 6566, 77, 107-108).
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Once a city contracted with JCS, JCS provided form Probation Orders. (Docs. # 392-11 at 170-72; 195-1 at 232). The pre-printed form orders included the standard “conditions of probation,” and were filled out by JCS employees. (Doc. # 708-2 at 27). The form Order contained a single line printed at the bottom of the page stating, “I have counsel or have waived my right to counsel for all proceedings to this date and have received a copy of this ORDER.” (Doc. # 708-2 at 27). The form contains no explanation regarding the right to counsel. (Id.).
Probation Tracker also contains a case file for each person on probation, and each file has a page where JCS employees can chronicle collection efforts and information gathered. Documents generated by the Municipal Court were generally scanned into Probation Tracker and linked to the individual’s case file. (Docs. # 392-11 at 170-72; 195-1 at 232). JCS’s records indicate a large number of people sentenced to JCS probation by the Childersburg Municipal Court were collecting SSI or unemployed. (Docs. # 708-1 at ¶ 59; 708-7 at 801-805). Nonetheless, the record contains evidence that neither JCS nor the Childersburg Municipal Court had a practice of inquiring into whether people had the ability to pay the court debt or fees at any point. (Docs. # 392-11 at 161; 195-1 at 232).
When probationers could not make a scheduled payment, JCS threatened to have them arrested. (Docs. # 195-1 at 304; 641-46 at 131). And when they could only make a partial payment, JCS often allocated as much of the payment (or, in some instances, even more) to its own fees as it did to the court’s fine, thereby prolonging the amount of time it took for debtors to satisfy their underlying debts to the city. (Docs. # 697 at 73-75, 88, 104; 697-7 at 1; 697-1).
If a debtor repeatedly failed to make payments, JCS generated a petition for revocation, which requested the Municipal Court to revoke the debtor’s probation and issue an arrest warrant. (Docs. # 697-11 at 46; 626 at 15-16, 66, 80). Neither JCS nor the Childersburg Municipal Court
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informed probationers that they could only lawfully be jailed if they willfully refused to pay even though they were able to pay. (Doc. # 195-1 at 134; 708-2 at 76).
When arrested, probationers who could not make payments were jailed overnight, and some were detained for days or even weeks until a payment was made on their behalf. (Doc. # Docs. 697-7 at 1; 697-1 at 1). JCS submitted payments to the Municipal Courts each month, but it was JCS which determined how the probationers’ payments were allocated between court fines and JCS’s fees. (Doc. # 194-1 at 288). A significant portion of the payments made to secure release of probationers from jail was allocated by JCS for its fees, not just for court fines. (Id.).
JCS did not inform the Municipal Courts the total amount collected from probationers or how much the company kept for itself in fees. (Id. at 69-70, 180-94). Cities typically did not monitor or audit JCS’s activities and often did not keep records as to who was assigned to JCS, let alone how long each person had been on JCS probation. (Id.; Doc. # 195-1 at 92-93). As a result of these and other factors, individuals on probation occasionally ended up paying more than the amount of their original court debt. (Docs. # 194-1 at 69-70, 180-94).
Under Alabama law, a municipal court may not sentence a defendant to a term of probation that exceeds two years. Ala. Code § 12-14-13(a). JCS frequently extended probationers’ sentences beyond the two-year statutory limit. (Docs. # 187-3, 183-4, 708-11 at 11-12). They did this in a number of ways, including extending the sentence 24 months from the reinstatement date when marking a person’s probation sentence as reinstated, even if the person had served time toward those probation sentences; extending sentences for existing charges by 24 months when the municipal court issued probation orders in a different case; placing probation sentences on hold and then starting them long after the sentence date; and entering a longer sentence in Probation Tracker than the sentence ordered by the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 626 at 12-13, 63-64). JCS’s
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Training Manual provided instructions to modify the term of probation, and this included extension of the probation. (Doc. # 708-3 at 44). JCS’s Training Manual specifically addresses the subject of continuing to collect fees from debtors after their probation terms ended. (Id.).
The Training Manual also has a section related to procedures that “will be followed when a defendant has more than one case.” (Doc. # 708-3 at 43). Those procedures specify that:
If a defendant has more than one case in the same court, the second and subsequent cases are to be placed on hold. Once the first case is paid in full, the second case is to be made active the day the first case is paid in full. The probation date on the admin. screen will be changed to the date the first case is paid in full. [] Once the second case is paid in full, the above is to be followed for the third case, and so on. (Doc. # 708-3 at 43). However, the Manual’s Ethical & Professional Behavior Do’s and Don’ts section explicitly provides that a JCS employee must not “[m]odify a court sentence without approval from that court.” (Doc. # 708-3 at 81). Plaintiffs assert that JCS records show that over 20,000 people in the state of Alabama, including three of the four named Plaintiffs, were kept on probation for longer than two years for one probation sentence. (Docs. # 708-1 at ¶¶ 38-39, 708-11 at 27, 33-450). B. Probation of Plaintiffs Timothy and Kristy Fugatt Childersburg police issued Kristy Fugatt two traffic tickets in November 2010 for driving with an expired tag and an expired license. (Doc. # 392-66 at 14-15). Kristy Fugatt renewed her license (Doc. # 392-6 at 105), and the Municipal Court only assessed court costs for each ticket, (Doc. # 392-66 at 14-15). When Kristy Fugatt informed the Municipal Judge that she could not pay the full amount charged, he directed her to an intake area in order to “talk to JCS.” (Doc. # 392-6 at 105-07). Kristy Fugatt signed a form stating that she would pay a certain amount. (Id. at 108-09). She was placed on probation under JCS’s supervision. (See Doc. # 392-18 at 9) (stating that Kristy Fugatt had been sentenced to 24 months’ probation in January 2011).
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Timothy Fugatt received a traffic ticket in December 2010 for driving with an expired vehicle tag. (Doc. # 392-66 at 11). He was not convicted of the traffic offense but was ordered to pay court costs. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt testified that he had attempted to inform the Municipal Judge about his child’s terminal illness during the hearing, but he did not get an opportunity to speak to the judge due to the rapid pace of the proceedings. (Doc. # 392-7 at 74). Similar to his wife, the Municipal Court also sentenced Timothy Fugatt to 24 months’ probation under JCS’s supervision. (Doc. # 392-19 at 7).
In early 2011, JCS scheduled weekly probation appointments for both the Fugatts. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 7-8; 537-25 at 10-11). Timothy Fugatt told a JCS employee in January 2011 that his child was terminally ill and that he could not make a payment to JCS until he had received a tax refund. (Doc. # 537-25 at 9). In April, May, and June 2011, the Fugatts did not appear at 11 of the 12 probation appointments scheduled by JCS. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 7-8; 537-25 at 10-11). The parties dispute whether JCS employees mailed failure to report letters or delinquency letters to the Fugatts. Timothy Fugatt testified that he did not remember whether he received the letters. (Doc. # 537-19 at 108-09). Probation Tracker records reveal that JCS employees sometimes noted in Probation Tracker when they mailed some of the letters to the Fugatts. (See Doc. # 537-24 at 6). At other times, JCS employees placed a failure to report letter in the Probation Tracker record without any notation or indication that the letter had been mailed to the probationer. (See id.)
JCS prepared revocation petitions for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on June 28, 2011. (Docs. # 537-1 at 2; 537-2 at 2). Timothy Fugatt’s revocation petition explained that he had failed to report to JCS for 16 scheduled appointments and had failed to pay $223 as ordered. (Doc. # 5371 at 2). The revocation petition explained that a payment of $223 would close his case. (Id.). It warned him that a warrant would be issued if he failed to appear at the Municipal Court on August
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11, 2011. (Id.). Kristy Fugatt’s revocation petition averred that she had missed 17 scheduled appointments and had failed to pay $371. (Doc. # 537-2 at 2). It explained that a payment of $371 would close her case and that a warrant would be issued if she failed to appear at the probation revocation hearing scheduled for August 11. (Id.). Timothy Fugatt testified that they likely would not have received copies of the revocation petitions because their house had been foreclosed upon. (Doc. # 537-19 at 111).
The Municipal Court held revocation hearings for Kristy and Timothy Fugatt on August 11, 2011, but neither of them appeared at the hearings. (Docs. # 537-24 at 5-6; 537-25 at 7). The Municipal Court issued arrest warrants for both in August 2011. (Id.). Both warrants stated that the Fugatts had been convicted of failure to obey a court order (“FTOCO”). (Docs. # 537-33 at 2; 537-34 at 2). Timothy Fugatt’s warrant required him to pay $540 as a cash bond in order to be released. (Doc. # 537-33 at 2). Kristy Fugatt’s warrant required her to pay a cash bond of $688. (Doc. # 537-34 at 2).
A Childersburg police officer arrested the Fugatts on February 26, 2012. (Docs. # 537-36 at 2-3, 537-38 at 2-3, 402-27 at 3, 402-28 at 3). They were taken to the police station and placed in a holding cell. (Docs. # 402-27 at 3; 402-28 at 3). They were released the same day after they had paid $900 for a cash bond. (Id.).
In May 2012, the Municipal Court reinstated the Fugatts’ probation sentences. (Docs. # 537-24 at 5, 537-25 at 7). On April 26, 2012, the Municipal Court issued Timothy Fugatt a new Probation Order regarding the FTOCO offense. (Doc. # 537-3 at 2). This probation sentence ended on April 26, 2014. (Id.). Although the Municipal Court actually issued a new probation order for a different offense, JCS’s records state that the court reinstated Timothy Fugatt’s probation for the expired tag offense adjudicated in January 2011. (Doc. # 537-24 at 5). JCS also recalculated the
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probation date for that offense - from January 2011 to May 1, 2014.1 (Id.). Similarly, the Municipal Court also reinitiated Kristy Fugatt’s earlier probation sentence and added a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 537-4 at 2). Moreover, the Municipal Court fined Kristy Fugatt $168 for a speeding offense. (Id.). The record does not indicate whether she received the speeding ticket for which she was fined. JCS placed Kristy Fugatt’s May 2012 probation sentence on hold. (Doc. # 537-41 at 2). In August 2012, JCS prepared revocation petitions and draft notices to show cause against Kristy and Timothy Fugatt. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5). Timothy Fugatt called JCS on August 28, 2012 and confirmed that he had received the paperwork that was mailed to him. (Doc. # 53724 at 4). A JCS employee told him that he could report to JCS on August 31 or September 7, but he did not show up to JCS’s office on either of those dates. (See id.).
The Municipal Court cancelled revocation hearings concerning the Fugatts on September 13, 2012. (Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5). According to Kidd’s notes in Probation Tracker, Timothy Fugatt called her and demanded a new court date because he believed the revocation hearings were set for 1:30 P.M. (Doc. # 537-24 at 4). He spoke with a Municipal Court employee before calling JCS, but the employee told him that JCS was responsible for deciding whether to set a new court date. (Id.). Kidd generated new revocation petitions and notices to show cause and mailed them to the Fugatts on September 19. (See Docs. # 537-24 at 4; 537-25 at 5).
The Fugatts appeared before the Municipal Court on October 11, 2012. (See Doc. # 53724 at 4). They explained their financial situation to Judge Ward, who commented from the bench that they were “using [their] son as an excuse not to pay for [their] fines.” (Doc. # 537-23 at 234). They filled out a hardship form to explain their financial situation, and JCS agreed to “waive the fees after [the Fugatts] paid $200.” (Id. at 235). JCS also agreed that the Fugatts could report to a
1 The record does not indicate whether JCS created a separate Probation Tracker entry for the probation sentence Timothy Fugatt received in April 2012.
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probation officer in Sylacauga, Alabama because they were being required “to drive to Childersburg every four days even if [they] couldn’t pay anything.” (Id. at 236). But, Timothy Fugatt called Kidd on October 31, 2012 and informed her that he could not make the payment because he had to pay approximately $1500 for other bills. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). Kidd contacted a Municipal Court magistrate about the issue, and the Municipal Court mailed subpoenas for the Fugatts to appear on November 7. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4-5). After they failed to appear in court at that hearing, the Municipal Court issued warrants for the Fugatts. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4).
Timothy Fugatt appeared at the Municipal Court in December 2012 and agreed to pay $100 towards the amounts his wife and he owed. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). He told the court that he would pay the fines off with a tax refund. (Id.). The Municipal Court then reinstated the Fugatts’ probation sentences in January 2013. (Docs. # 537-24 at 3; 537-25 at 4). JCS placed Kristy Fugatt’s probation sentence on unsupervised status in January 2013, after JCS and the Municipal Court had been informed of the present lawsuit. (Doc. # 537-25 at 4). It placed Timothy Fugatt’s probation sentence on hold in February 2013 after consulting with a magistrate at the Municipal Court. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). Ultimately, the Municipal Court terminated the Fugatts’ probation sentences on November 1, 2014, which was during the pendency of this action. (See Doc. # 537-25 at 4).
C. Probation of Plaintiff Deunate Jews Plaintiff Jews was charged with harassment in 2008. (See Doc. # 392-27 at 2). The Municipal Court dismissed the harassment charge against Jews in January 2009, subject to two conditions: that Jews (1) pay court costs to the Municipal Court and (2) avoid contact with the complainant. (Id.). During a deposition, Jews claimed that he had contested the Municipal Court’s authority to impose court costs against him when the criminal charge against him had been dismissed. (Doc. # 524-5 at 50). Judge Ward responded that he would “lock [Jews] up” unless he
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signed a probation order. (Id. at 50-51). Jews did not ask Judge Ward any more questions because he believed that the judge would imprison him if he “said any little thing.” (Id. at 51). Jews was unable to pay the assessed court costs on the date of the hearing. (Id. at 52).
After signing a probation order, Jews advised a JCS employee that he would not report to JCS’s probation office because the Municipal Court had forced him to sign the probation order. (Id. at 56). He informed the JCS employee that he would not pay the imposed court costs because his case had been dismissed. (Id. at 59). Moreover, he provided JCS the address for his uncle’s residence, rather than his own address. (Id. at 60). He submitted this address to JCS because he did not plan to pay what the Municipal Court had directed him to pay. (Id. at 60-61). Consequently, Jews did not actually receive a letter that JCS sent to him on January 27, 2009. (Id. at 59-60).
The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in Jews’s case on February 12, 2009, but Jews did not appear at the hearing.2 (Doc. # 524-22 at 6). The Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant against Jews on February 17, 2009 for failure to obey a court order. (Doc. # 39235 at 2). The warrant directed Jews to pay a bond of $487 to be released. (Id.). Jews was arrested in September 2009. (Doc. # 392-36 at 3). In October 2009, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence and charged him a $317 warrant fee.3 (Doc. # 524-22 at 6). The court’s probation order sentenced Jews to probation for FTOCO. (Doc. # 524-6 at 2). Jews was released from the Talladega County Jail on October 22, 2009. (Doc. # 382-11 at 65).
2 The parties dispute whether JCS provided Jews prior notice of the revocation hearings scheduled with the Municipal Court. Jews’s Probation Tracker record does not indicate whether JCS employees sent the revocation petitions and notices to show cause to him. (See Doc. # 524-22 at 6). In contrast, as discussed above, Kidd occasionally noted in Probation Tracker when she mailed documents to the Fugatts. Given the parties’ dispute regarding whether JCS mailed the revocation petitions and notices to show cause to Plaintiffs, on this record, the court has not accepted JCS’s averments that JCS employees mailed these notices.
3 The Municipal Court issued a separate probation order for Jews on this date. (Doc. # 392-37 at 2). But JCS’s records indicate that the court merely reinstated his prior probation term. (Doc. # 524-22 at 6).
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JCS petitioned the Municipal Court to revoke Jews’s probation again in December 2009. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in January 2010, and Jews did not appear at the hearing. (Id.). A magistrate issued another capias warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO. (Doc. # 392-45 at 2). This arrest warrant increased his bond amount to $935. (Id.). City police arrested Jews on August 18, 2010. (Doc. # 392-46 at 2). On September 9, 2010, the Municipal Court fined Jews $317 for the failure-to-obey offense and reinstated his probation. (Doc. # 392-38 at 2). A City employee, Misty Hepp, authorized Jews’s release from the Talladega County Jail on September 9. (Doc. # 382-11 at 67).
In November 2010, JCS filed another revocation petition against Jews. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5). Jews did not appear at the Municipal Court’s December 2010 revocation hearing in his case. (Id.). The Municipal Court issued another capias warrant against Jews based on his conviction for FTOCO, and he was thereafter arrested on January 10, 2011. (Doc. # 392-50 at 2-3). Hepp again authorized Jews’s release from jail on January 14, 2011, after a $500 bond had been paid on his behalf. (Doc. # 392-51 at 2). The Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation sentence in March 2011 and charged him a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 524-22 at 5).
In May 2011, JCS again petitioned the Municipal Court to revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 392-54 at 2). The revocation petition asserted that Jews owed $773 to close his case. (Id.). A JCS employee and Judge Ward signed the petition, but the City’s prosecutor did not sign it. (Id.). Yet again, Jews did not appear at a revocation hearing in June 2011. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). On June 10, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued another warrant against Jews based on a conviction for FTOCO. (Doc. # 392-56 at 2). This warrant required Jews to pay $1,090 in bail to be released. (Id.). A City police officer arrested Jews in February 2012 after detaining him to check for
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outstanding warrants. (Doc. # 392-57 at 2-3). Jews fled from the officer and was detained for resisting arrest and FTOCO. (Id.).
According to Jews’s Probation Tracker records, during a March 2012 hearing, the Municipal Court reinstated Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). The court issued another probation order for the resisting arrest charge and FTOCO charge. (Doc. # 392-58 at 2). This order recounted fines of $717 for resisting arrest and $1,090 for FTOCO. (Id.). And, it placed Jews on probation until March 8, 2014. (Id.). The City’s police department released Jews from jail on March 8, 2012. (Doc. # 382-12 at 13). In May 2012, JCS recalculated Jews’s probation expiration date for the 2009 probation order stemming from the harassment charges. (Doc. # 524-22 at 4). It stated that his probation on that charge actually was due to end on March 9, 2014. (Id.).
In June 2012, JCS requested that the Municipal Court revoke Jews’s probation. (Doc. # 524-22 at 3). The revocation petition was not signed by a JCS employee, and the order scheduling a hearing was not signed by the Municipal Court’s judge. (Doc. # 392-59 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in August 2012; again, Jews did not attend that hearing. (Doc. # 524-22 at 3). According to JCS’s probation records, the probation sentence entered warrant status on August 10, 2012. (Id. at 2). The Municipal Court ultimately terminated Jews’s probation sentence in December 2014, which was during the pendency of this action. (Doc. # 382 at 114).
In 2015, Jews was sentenced to four years in prison for making a terroristic threat, after having been convicted of another felony in 2014. (Doc. # 431-19).
D. Probation of Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray In June 2010, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with a suspended license and without proof of insurance. (Doc. # 423-4 at 2). Ray pled guilty to both charges during a Municipal Court hearing on August 12, 2010. (Id. at 3). Ray testified that a public defender attended the hearing, but she (Ray) did not believe that an attorney would assist her with a traffic ticket. (Doc. # 471-7
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at 38-39). Ray does not believe that Judge Ward identified the public defender during the hearing. (Id. at 39). Judge Ward imposed a three-day suspended imprisonment term for each conviction, along with a 24-month probationary sentence. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3). Ray could not recall whether Judge Ward mentioned the suspended imprisonment term during the hearing. (Doc. # 471-7 at 4344). Judge Ward fined Ray $400 for each traffic offense, imposed $198 in court costs for the suspended license offense, and imposed $148 in court costs for the no insurance offense. (Doc. # 423-4 at 3).
According to JCS’s probation records, JCS prepared a revocation petition against Ray on September 20, 2010.4 (Doc. # 423-11 at 8). The revocation petition contained in the record was not signed by the probation officer or the Municipal Court’s judge. (See Doc. # 423-8 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing on October 14, 2010, which Ray attended. (Doc. # 42311 at 8). JCS issued another revocation petition on December 30, 2010, based on Ray’s failure to attend probation sessions, pay assessed court fines and fees, and pay probation fees. (Doc. # 42314 at 2). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing for Ray on January 13, 2011, but she failed to appear. (Doc. # 423-11 at 7). Consequently, on January 18, 2011, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant premised upon a FTOCO conviction. (Doc. # 423-15 at 2). The warrant provided for a bond of $1,353. (Id.).
Ray was arrested on January 19, 2011. (See Doc. # 455-5). She remained in the Talladega County Jail until February 10, 2011. (See id.). The Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation on February 10, 2011, and imposed a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-17 at 2). In June 2011, a City officer ticketed Ray for driving with an expired tag and a revoked license. (Doc. # 423-31 at 2).
4 As with Plaintiff Jews, Plaintiff Ray’s Probation Tracker records do not indicate whether JCS mailed the September 2010 revocation petition to her. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 8). But, her Probation Tracker records state that Kidd mailed petitions and notices to Ray in January 2012 and in August 2012. (Id. at 3-4).
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Ray pled guilty to both offenses in July 2011. (Id. at 3). The Municipal Court imposed 5-day suspended imprisonment sentences, 24 months of probation, fines totaling $500, and court costs totaling $346 for the two convictions. (Id.). In August 2011, Ray was again charged with driving with a revoked license and an expired tag. (Doc. # 423-28 at 2). As with her earlier tickets, the Municipal Court imposed a 5-day suspended imprisonment sentence for the expired-tag offense, 24 months of probation for the expired-tag offense, fines totaling $500, and court costs totaling $346. (Id. at 3).
On January 4, 2012, a JCS employee found that Ray had violated her probation because she owed the City $1,008 in fines and costs and JCS $433 in fees. (Doc. # 423-11 at 4). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing on February 9, 2012. (Id.). Ray did not attend. (Id.). Thus, the Municipal Court’s magistrate issued a capias warrant against Ray for FTOCO. (Doc. # 423-23 at 2). The warrant provided a bail amount of $3,173. (Id.). On April 21, 2012, City police officers detained Ray because they suspected that she had an active warrant. (Doc. # 423-24 at 23). She fled from the officers in her car until she was blocked in by traffic. (Id. at 3). The officers issued her tickets for driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempted escape. (Doc. # 423-27 at 2, 4).
Ray was held in jail from April 21, 2012 to May 1, 2012 on the charge of FTOCO. (Doc. # 455-7). On April 26, 2012, the Municipal Court reinstated Ray’s probation and imposed a $317 warrant fee. (Doc. # 423-25 at 2). The court’s probation order stated that Ray owed $3,173 in costs. (Id.). The court ruled that Ray could not be released from jail until $300 had been paid on her behalf. (Id.). Ray was released from jail on May 1, 2012 after someone paid the $300. (Doc. # 4717 at 149).
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In June 2012, Ray pled guilty to driving with an expired tag, driving with a revoked license, and attempting to escape. (Doc. # 423-27 at 3, 5). The Municipal Court sentenced Ray to a 5-day suspended incarceration sentence, along with 24 months’ probation, for each conviction. (Id.). It fined her $400 for driving with a revoked license, $400 for attempting to flee, and $100 for driving with an expired tag. (Id.). It also imposed a total of $444.00 in court costs against Ray. (Id.).
JCS again requested that the Municipal Court revoke Ray’s probation in August 2012 due to the outstanding fines and fees she owed to JCS and the City. (Doc. # 423-11 at 3). The Municipal Court held a revocation hearing in September 2012 and issued a warrant against Ray after she had failed to appear at the hearing. (Id.). Ray’s probation sentence was terminated by court order on November 1, 2014. (Doc. # 422 at 11).
E. The Different Municipal Courts at Issue in this Action JCS provided services to a number of different municipal courts, and its managers worked in multiple municipal courts. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶ 22, 431-2 at ¶ 28 431-3, 431-4 at ¶ 12, 30). The procedures and preferences of those courts varied. For instance, some courts accepted payments directly. Others did not. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶ 50, 431-4 at ¶ 21). Courts also covered different topics at their hearings. (Doc. # 431-1 at ¶ 46). At the initial appearance, Judge Hutchinson of Geraldine, Alabama required probationers to return to the courtroom after filling out probation paperwork to ensure they understood the requirements of probation. (Doc. # 431-4 at ¶ 12). Other courts were not as helpful or compliant. Of course, a court’s procedures and preferences necessarily overrode any provisions of the JCS Training Manual. (Id.). Indigence cannot reliably be determined from Probation Tracker. (Doc. # 431-1 at ¶ 61, 431-2 at ¶ 33, 431-4 at ¶ 40). At some revocation hearings, some courts covered the reasons for non-payment. (Doc. # 431-4 at ¶ 12). April Mims provided declaration testimony that, the
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Albertville, Alabama Municipal Court performed indigency evaluations and utilized a community service program for probationers unable to pay fines. (Docs. # 431-3, 431-1 at ¶ 66). Between 2009 and 2015, many probationers in Albertville performed community service instead of paying fines. (Id.). There is evidence that other courts did not properly consider indigency. (Docs. # 708-13 – 708-16).
Probation Tracker was designed as a tool for JCS, but it does not contain all of the information pertinent to an individual’s probation. (Docs. # 431-2 at ¶ 20, 431-4 at ¶ 29). Several cities did not use the Probation Tracker “Jail” status code. (Doc. # 431-1 at ¶ 22). In fact, JCS was not normally notified if a probationer was jailed. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶ 22, 431-2 at ¶ 16). If JCS was notified, it was sporadic and when it occurred it was often communicated by family members; therefore, incarcerations could not be accurately tracked in that system. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶¶ 22, 57, 431-2 at ¶¶ 16, 23, 431-4 at ¶¶ 25, 31). When the code was used, it was most often the case that a probationer was jailed on an offense unrelated to his or her probation with JCS. (Docs. # 431-2 at ¶ 16, 431-4 at ¶ 25). When a probationer was jailed for non-compliance, some courts gave probationers credit of $15-30 per day against fines for jail time served. (Doc. # 431-4 at ¶¶ 14, 53). Other courts did not give any financial credit. (Id.). Nor was JCS reliably informed when warrants were issued. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶ 34, 431-4 at ¶ 20).
The Municipal Courts also took different approaches to setting hearings. For example, in Childersburg, Alabama, a probationer only came before the judge if his or her individual circumstances warranted court review. By contrast, in Columbiana, the Columbiana Municipal Court immediately scheduled a compliance hearing for each probationer to occur ninety days after the initial order of probation. (Doc. # 431-1 at ¶ 14). There were other differences.
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Judge Ward of the Childersburg Municipal Court did not engage in any dialogue to ensure probationers understood the charges against them and the risks of self-representation, nor was there any colloquy to ensure they freely chose to waive their right to counsel. (Docs. # 708-13 – 70810). Instead, each probationer was simply required to sign a probation order with form language regarding waiver of counsel. (Id.). When JCS presented petitions for revocation of probation and the Childersburg Municipal court issued them, Plaintiffs were arrested and jailed without any inquiry to determine whether any failure to pay was willful or due to indigence. (Id.).
In August 2014, after Judge Ward retired from the Childersburg Municipal Court, the Municipal Court established new policies and procedures for setting bail, ensuring defendants’ right to counsel, imposing sentences when defendants failed to pay ordered fines and court costs, ordering probation, and revoking probation. (See generally Doc. # 128-1). Childersburg terminated its relationship with JCS effective June 20, 2015. (Doc. # 392-63 at 2).
In the Columbiana Municipal Court, at the beginning of each court session, Judge Atchison read prepared remarks. (Case No. 2:15-cv-00493-RDP, Doc. # 183-26 at 1, 5-6).5 Those remarks informed defendants, among other things, that they had a right to be represented by counsel and that, if jail was a possible punishment and they were unable to pay for an attorney, one may be appointed. (Id. at 2, 5-6). During court, defendants were given a copy of Unified Judicial System form C-44B, Explanation of Rights Plea of Guilty. (Id. at 3, 8-9). Form C-44B provides that “[e]xcept in minor misdemeanors (a misdemeanor offense or municipal ordinance violation for which the defendant will not be punished by sentence of imprisonment), the court will go over these rights ….” (Doc. # 183-26).
5 Although Plaintiffs’ counsel has disputed this fact, the cited testimony does not establish that Judge Atchison failed to follow this procedure. Rather, the record evidence cited by Plaintiffs shows only that Plaintiffs did not recall his remarks and did not receive a written copy of them. (Docs. # 183-8 at 101-02, 105, # 183-27 at 268-69).
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Magistrate Seale gave defendants an affidavit of substantial hardship (which was another state form) when (1) Judge Atchison told her to do so, or (2) when an attorney was appointed at a bond hearing. (Doc. # 183-1 at 96). Judge Atchison occasionally referred a defendant who submitted a substantial hardship affidavit to probation with JCS, but he instructed JCS to waive their fees for that individual. (Doc. # 160 at 28-29). II. Class Certification Standard
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class. Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992). “Before a district court may grant a motion for class certification, a plaintiff seeking to represent a proposed class must establish that the proposed class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Little v. TMobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff must also “establish [each of] the four requirements listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).” Id. That rule requires a class plaintiff to show:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “These four requirements commonly are referred to as ‘the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation,’ and they are designed to limit class claims to those ‘fairly encompassed’ by the named plaintiffs’ individual claims.” Piazza v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)).
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Once the party seeking certification shows that the Rule 23(a) requirements have been satisfied, the party must still show that the putative class meets at least one of Rule 23(b)’s requirements. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3), and alternatively seek to certify an “issue” class under Rule 23(c)(4). Rule 23(b)(3) provides that certification is appropriate if the “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class meets Rule 23’s requirements. Brown v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016). “All else being equal, the presumption is against class certification because class actions are an exception to our constitutional tradition of individual litigation.” Id. And to determine whether class treatment is appropriate, a court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” of the elements of Rule 23(a) and (b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013). While a district court’s class certification analysis “may ‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim,’ Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013) (citations omitted). Rather, “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs also seek certification under Rule 23(c)(4). (Docs. # 707 at 2, 709 at 56-57). Under Rule 23(c)(4), “an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
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respect to particular issues.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4). However, courts “have emphatically rejected attempts to use the (c)(4) process for certifying individual issues as a means for achieving an end run around the (b)(3) predominance requirement.” City of St. Petersburg v. Total Containment, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting O'Neill v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 469, 481 (S.D. Fla. 2006)). III. Analysis
Plaintiffs seek to certify certain Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes. They define a statewide class as follows:
1. Statewide Due Process Class: All individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by Alabama municipal courts to JCS probation for the collection of court debt and who served more than 24 months on any single probation sentence. (Doc. # 707). They also seek to certify a narrower class, which advances two different claims: 2. Childersburg Jail Class: All individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by the Childersburg Municipal Court to JCS probation for the collection of court debt and jailed after an alleged probation violation. AND All individuals who, after being assigned to JCS by August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay fines, fees and costs. A subclass of this class which would include those individuals within the above class who received such treatment in Childersburg. (Doc. # 707). In seeking to certify these classes under Rule 23, Plaintiffs have placed at issue three separate alleged constitutional violations, which they contend occurred during the “class period” – i.e., between August 28, 2010 (two years prior to the filing of the original complaint) and November 2015 (when JCS ceased doing business in Alabama). (Doc. # 709 at 8). One claim is on behalf of the Statewide Due Process Class, and two claims are on behalf of the Childersburg Jail Class. (Id.). In advancing their Statewide Due Process class claim, Plaintiffs seek to pursue
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their “direct” § 1983 claim against JCS, asserting that JCS unilaterally extended the probation sentences of class members beyond the 24-month statutory maximum, without court intervention. (Doc. # 709 at 9).
As part of their the Childersburg Jail class, Plaintiffs seek to pursue (1) a Bearden claim, asserting that JCS conspired with the Childersburg Municipal Court to revoke probations and issue arrest warrants without a determination of indigency, thereby violating their due process rights; and (2) a Sixth Amendment claim, asserting that JCS conspired with the Childersburg Municipal Court to fail to appoint counsel and/or obtain valid waivers of counsel. (Doc. # 709 at 8-9).
JCS opposes class certification. It argues that neither the Statewide Due Process Class, nor the Childersburg Jail Class, is ascertainable. It further argues that predominance is not satisfied for many of the same reasons the class is not ascertainable: individualized inquiries and evidence will be required. JCS also questions whether all named Plaintiffs are adequate to represent the class. (Doc. # 714).
A. Standing “It is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit that prior to the certification of a class, and before undertaking an analysis under Rule 23, the district court must determine that at least one named class representative has Article III standing to raise each class claim.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 679 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Wolf Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000); Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A]ny analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing.”)). Indeed, “[o]nly after the court determines the issues for which the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others.” Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1482. “To have standing, a plaintiff
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must show (1) he has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, not just merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2003).
JCS does not appear to challenge Plaintiffs’ standing in this case, and perhaps with good reason – Plaintiffs appear to satisfy the necessary elements of standing. All four named plaintiffs were sentenced to JCS probation by the Childersburg Municipal Court, and all were subsequently jailed for failure to pay court debt, without counsel or determination regarding indigency. The court has already determined that two Plaintiffs were kept on probation by JCS for longer than two years. Accordingly, the court is satisfied the named Plaintiffs have standing.
B. Ascertainability In addition to standing, a class plaintiff must show that the proposed class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable. Little, 691 F.3d at 1304. The threshold issue of “ascertainability,” relates to whether the putative class can be identified: “[a]n identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x. 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). These “objective criteria” should be “administratively feasible,” meaning that the identification of class members should be “a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiries.” Bussey, 562 F. App’x. at 787 (citation omitted) (reversing district court decision finding ascertainability satisfied where class could not be identified by reference to objective information in the defendant's records). The district court must be satisfied that this requirement can be met even before delving into the rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 elements. See id. If a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the putative class is clearly
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ascertainable, then class certification is properly denied. See Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x. 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that district court denying class certification because the class was not adequately defined or clearly ascertainable did not abuse its discretion and commit a clear error of judgment).
A plaintiff can rely upon a defendant’s records to identify class members. Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015). But, in doing so, the plaintiff must “establish that the records are in fact useful for identification purposes, and that identification will be administratively feasible.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that all of the proposed classes are sufficiently ascertainable. The court disagrees and addresses the ascertainability issues raised in this case below.
1. Whether the Statewide Due Process Class is Ascertainable As to the statewide class, Plaintiffs argue that “[u]sing the extensive data collected in Probation Tracker, the underlying database, and JCS’s own codes, it is possible to identify [] people throughout Alabama who remained on probation for a single sentence longer than two years—as well as who among that group was subsequently jailed or charged JCS fees.” (Doc. # 709 at 29). They further note that “JCS provided a list of everyone it had kept on probation longer than 24 months as of April 2014.” (Id.). In their initial brief, Plaintiffs devoted little time to the issue of ascertainability.6 (Doc. # 709 at 29-30). They argued that the class can be ascertained by searching data collected in Probation Tracker to determine who was on probation for longer than twenty-four months for a single offense. (Id.). And they rely on the policies set forth in JCS’s Training Manual for what should be contained in Probation Tracker. (Id.).
6 It is not clear if that was an oversight or intentional (the latter owing to the difficulty in showing ascertainability in this case).
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JCS points out that Plaintiffs’ proposed statewide class is actually defined more broadly than their individual claims. (Doc. # 714 at 10). The direct Due Process claim against JCS (Doc. # 626 at pp. 62-64) alleges that JCS unilaterally -- without any involvement of the municipal court -- extended a single probation beyond the 24 months. The proposed class definition, however, is broader than that; it includes both probationers who (purportedly) had probations unilaterally extended by JCS, as well as those whose probations were extended via court intervention. (See Doc. # 707 at 1 (“[A]ll individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by Alabama municipal courts to JCS probation for the collection of court debt and who served more than 24 months on any single probation sentence.”); Doc. 709 at 2)). Plaintiffs’ definition also fails to account for tolling.
Plaintiffs’ expert Peter Coons developed a list of Plaintiffs’ proposed Statewide Due Process Class by running SQL searches in Probation Tracker. In particular, Coons searched for probationers who, according to Probation Tracker records, had a probation period that exceeded twenty-four months between the Sentence Date and the status being changed to “Terminated” or “Terminated Modified.” (Doc. # 708-1 at 19-20). Coons admitted that he had not accounted for tolling. (Doc. # 715-1 at 174-75).
As an initial matter, there is a substantial question as to whether, fundamentally, the proposed class definition is flawed because it looks simply at whether probation sentences exceeded twenty-four months. Under Alabama law, there is not a blanket prohibition of any sentence exceeding twenty-four months. See Owens v. State, 728 So. 2d 673, 679-680 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (“[w]e overrule our holding in Miller, and the cases cited therein, to the extent that it implies that the maximum probation period can never exceed two years from the date of sentencing”). Another judge of this court has relied on Owens in making tolling calculations in
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another private probation case. Hunter v. Etowah Cty. Court Referral Program, LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1182 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (“As Owens reveals, however, Plaintiffs’ calculation of the maximum probation period [] is substantively wrong because it fails to account for return to court orders, arrest warrants, and other events that support tolling.”).
Tolling of probation sentences is triggered under Alabama law by two types of events: revocation-related activity and time spent in jail. Owens, 728 So.2d at 679-80 (“there are several alternative methods by which probation revocation proceedings can be initiated that will toll the running of the probation period.”); Johnson v. State, 161 So. 3d 1229, 1231 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (“Johnson’s probation was tolled while he served his sentence in Walker County, and his term of probation did not begin until he was released from incarceration on June 15, 2009.”).
To remedy this issue, Plaintiffs propose an improved methodology to identify the class. (Doc. # 719 at 6-7). Plaintiffs propose to search for activity codes more than twenty-four months after the sentence date, and then exclude from that list any probationer whose Probation Tracker file contains an Order of Probation, thereby excluding probationers whose probation was extended by court order. (Id.). However, even if this revised methodology could potentially address tolling related to revocation-related activity and probations extended by court order, it does not even attempt to account for tolling based on incarceration.
Plaintiffs protest that they are not required to perfectly exclude everyone who was not injured from the class. (Doc. # 719 at 10). They also argue that JCS should not be able to rely on the unreliability of its own records to defeat class certification. (Id. at 12). Plaintiffs focus on those probationers who are properly with the class – such as those placed on consecutive probation holds by JCS. (Id. at 18). They contend that consecutive sentences that exceed the statutory maximum are unlawful. (Id.) (citing Ex. Parte Jackson, 415 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Ala. 1982).
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But, crucially, Plaintiffs have not proposed a solution to account for tolling based on a probationer’s imprisonment. As is readily apparent based on the named Plaintiffs’ probations, incarceration was not an infrequent event. Moreover, Probation Tracker was not designed to replace court records; rather, it was intended to be a tool for JCS’s employees. (Docs. # 431-2 at ¶ 20, 431-4 at ¶ 29). JCS’s employees did not always consistently record events in the database.7 Moreover, JCS employees were not systematically (or even reliably) notified when probationers were jailed. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶ 22, 431-2 at ¶ 16). Therefore, incarcerations could not be accurately tracked using Probation Tracker. (Docs. # 431-1 at ¶¶ 22, 57, 431-2 at ¶¶ 16, 23, 431-4 at ¶¶ 25, 31). This deficiency is not due to any fault of JCS.
It would appear that to account for tolling due to incarceration, an individualized statewide criminal records check would be required on each of the thousands of probationers whose probations exceeded twenty-four months, something not proposed by Plaintiffs. Even if such a search had been proposed, it is not an administratively feasible basis for identifying membership in the class. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff establishes Rule 23's implicit ascertainability requirement by proposing an administratively feasible method by which class members can be identified); Bussey, 562 F. App’x. at 787 (identification of class members should be “a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiries”).
The court is not requiring Plaintiffs to perfectly exclude from the class everyone who was not injured. What it is requiring at this advanced stage of this seven-year-old case is that Plaintiffs
7 For example, Plaintiff Jews’s Probation Tracker record does not indicate whether JCS employees sent revocation petitions and notices to show cause to him. (See Doc. # 524-22 at 6). Kidd occasionally noted in Probation Tracker when she mailed documents to the Fugatts. Plaintiff Ray’s Probation Tracker records do not indicate whether JCS mailed the September 2010 revocation petition to her. (See Doc. # 423-11 at 8). But, her Probation Tracker records state that Kidd mailed petitions and notices to Ray in January 2012 and August 2012. (Id. at 3-4).
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point to an administratively feasible basis for identifying membership in the statewide class. Because they have not done so (and by all indications cannot), they have not established that the class is adequately ascertainable. For this reason alone, certification of Plaintiffs’ proposed Statewide Due Process class should be denied.
2. Whether the Childersburg Jail Class is Ascertainable Plaintiffs seek to pursue their conspiracy-based claims on behalf of a Childersburg Jail Class. But, JCS argues that this class, too, is not properly ascertainable. (Doc. # 714 at 34). Plaintiffs’ proposed Class List includes 275 probationers. (Docs. # 709 at 9, 708-7 at 717). This list was generated by querying Probation Tracker for probationers who were placed on warrant status during the relevant time period. (Doc. # 709-1 at ¶ 55). The warrant list was compared to a Talladega County Jail spreadsheet recording those admitted to its jail. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ expert, Peter Coons, then “filter[ed] the results further by offense type[, by] “exclud[ing] all offenses that appeared to be legitimate arrests such as a DUI and includ[ing] offenses that appeared to be post adjudication, such as failure to obey a court order (FTOCO).” (Id.). In this manner, Coons was able to identify: (a) 275 individuals who were jailed in the Talladega Jail, (b) 309 individuals who were arrested, and (c) 405 individuals who had warrants. (Id.). Then, Coons screened for people for whom JCS had recorded certain indicators that are correlated to poverty (such as unemployment, disability, or receiving Social Security) and identified ninety-two people. (Id.). JCS argues that Coons’s proposed class list is over-inclusive on its face. (Doc. # 714 at 35). It points out that “what Coons isolated were probationers apprehended by Childersburg and then ‘jailed,’ for any length of time, on any offense which Coons deemed not to be ‘legitimate.’” (Id.; see also Doc. # 708-1 at ¶ 56 (the list included all probationers who “were arrested and jailed, and
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then released and put back on JCS probation.”)). At his deposition, Coons could not articulate what standard he used to determine what offenses were deemed “legitimate” except to state that “they were related to a JCS incident.” (Doc. # 715-1 at 69). He included “FTA public intox” but excluded cocaine possession, murder and burglary. (Id.) He testified that those offenses “potentially could be JCS-related” and that one “would have to do further potential possible research on them.” (Doc. # 715-1 at 70).
Of course, this list may still be overly inclusive because it could include probationers who were not jailed on probation-revocation related offenses. See Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x. 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's denial of certification where the proposed class definition “impermissibly includes members who have no cause of action”). Further, according to Coons, to narrow the list, additional research would be required, including an examination of individual files not maintained by JCS. (Docs. # 708-1 at ¶ 56, 715-1 at 82-90).
Plaintiffs argue that some level of individual review is acceptable. Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 947. But the process described by Coons is outside of that safe zone. It is not administratively feasible. Any such process must be able to construct a proper list of class membership (which still has not been identified with any particularity). The Coons process does not do that. It is also plainly individualized. Worse, it is unmanageable. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x. at 946 (“Identifying class members is administratively feasible when it is a ‘manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiry.’” (quoting Bussey, 562 F. App’x. at 787) (emphasis added)).
Because Plaintiffs have not proposed an administratively feasible basis for identifying membership in the Childersburg class, they have not established that the class is adequately ascertainable. For this reason alone, certification of Plaintiffs’ proposed Childersburg Jail class should be denied.
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C. The Rule 23(a) Requirements Although the classes are not properly ascertainable, for completeness, the court examines the Rule 23(a) requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) requires the proposed classes to meet the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. In examining whether the party seeking certification has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, the Eleventh Circuit has counseled that “[a]lthough the trial court should not determine the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim at the class certification stage, the trial court can and should consider the merits of the case to the degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be satisfied.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
1. Numerosity Under Rule 23(a)(1), the plaintiff must show that the settlement class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. See Rule 23(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has held that the numerosity requirement is “a generally low hurdle” and “less than twenty-one is inadequate [and] more than forty [is] adequate....” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, JCS does not challenge numerosity. (Doc. # 714). The proposed statewide class is estimated to number in the thousands. Even the Childersburg class is estimated to be in the hundreds. Therefore, the proposed classes easily meet the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury ....’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
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350, (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). The claims must depend on a common contention the “truth or falsity [of which] will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 350. The Supreme Court has found that, for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common question of law or fact is sufficient. Id. at 359. The analysis of this Rule 23(a) requirement (and all of the other Rule 23(a) requirements) must be a rigorous one. In Dukes, the Supreme Court unquestionably raised the bar on what a plaintiff must show to establish commonality. As the Court instructed, “[w]hat matters [in the commonality analysis] is not the raising of common ‘questions’ -- even in droves -- but, rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U Law Rev. 97, 132 (2009)) (emphasis added).
JCS does not challenge Plaintiffs’ compliance with the commonality requirement. (Doc. # 714). Plaintiffs have identified common questions of law and fact for both proposed classes that are common to all potential class members. Members of the proposed Childersburg Jail Class have two claims in common: the Bearden claim and the Sixth Amendment claim. They argue that both claims will be proven through common evidence. (Doc. # 709 at 32). More specifically, with regard to their Bearden claim, Plaintiffs assert that common evidence will show that, before submitting petitions for revocation, before issuing arrest warrants, or before jailing proposed class members, JCS and the Childersburg Municipal Court took no steps whatsoever to ensure that only those who were able to pay and willfully refused were imprisoned. (Doc. # 709 at 32). With regard to their Sixth Amendment Claim, Plaintiffs assert that common proof will show that JCS and the
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court used the same JCS form probation order for every class member which contained a one-line acknowledgement waiving their right to counsel. (Doc. # 709 at 34). The proposed Childersburg Jail class, therefore, meets the commonality requirement because these issues to be tried are common to all potential class members.
Members of the proposed Statewide Due Process class all claim that JCS unilaterally extended their probation for more than two years without court intervention. Plaintiffs assert that common evidence in this regard includes the following: (1) JCS had a policy of running probation terms consecutively; and (2) JCS policies granted JCS employees discretion to extend probation after the terms of probation had expired; and (3) JCS regularly extended probation sentences for two years following a reinstatement to probation. (Doc. # 709 at 37-38). Without delving into the merits of these claims, the court finds that there are common issues to be tried as to all proposed Statewide Due Process class members therefore this class, too, satisfies the commonality requirement.
3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “[T]he typicality requirement is permissive; representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” In re Checking Account Overdraft, 275 F.R.D. 666, 674 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Brown v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 602, 605 (S.D. Fla. 2003)). While commonality looks at whether class members’ claims are common to each other, typicality is satisfied where the named plaintiffs’ claims “arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory” as the claims of the class.
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Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
“Like commonality, the test for typicality is not demanding.” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D. 645, 653 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 532 (M.D. Fla. 1996)). “‘Where an action challenges a policy or practice, the named plaintiffs suffering one specific injury from the practice can represent a class suffering other injuries, so long as all the injuries are shown to result from the practice.’” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D. at 653 (quoting Baby Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted)).
JCS does not strenuously argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the typicality requirement. (Doc. # 714 at 23). However, JCS highlights some factual differences between two of the named Plaintiffs (Timothy Fugatt and Deuante Jews) and putative class members. For example, those two named Plaintiffs each had multiple probations. (Id.). However, the named Plaintiffs and class members share the same core constitutional claims based on the same legal theories. Those claims challenge the same pattern or practice of conduct, generally based on JCS’s policies, that allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. Because at least some of Plaintiffs’ claims can be established by common proof of JCS’s uniform application of its policies related to probation, the court finds that typicality is satisfied.
4. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy-of-representation requirement is satisfied when (i) the class representatives have no interests conflicting with the class; and (ii) the representatives and their attorneys will properly prosecute the case. Sosna v.
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Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003).
JCS only addresses the adequacy of the named Plaintiffs in a footnote, and only with respect to Deuante Jews. No argument is made that the other named Plaintiffs are inadequate representatives. 8 JCS argues that “Jews is clearly inadequate as a putative representative” because his credibility is “uniquely assailable.” (Doc. # 714 at 8, n.3 (citing Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 726 (11th Cir. 1987) (“named plaintiffs might not qualify as adequate class representatives because they do not possess the personal characteristics and integrity necessary to fulfill the fiduciary role of class representative”); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1279 n.22 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that credibility attacks on a representative are “inherently factdependent”)). JCS points out that Jews testified that he had no intention of paying his fines and gave JCS an incorrect address so that he could not be located. (Doc. # 714 at 8, n.3 (citing Doc. # 524-5 at 60-61)). JCS also notes that Jews either is (or was) in prison serving a multi-year sentence for making terroristic threats (Doc. # 431-19), and argues that “[n]o rational class member would want their claims being adjudicated in reliance upon a factfinder’s assessment of Mr. Jews’s credibility.” (Doc. # 714 at 8, n.3).
Nonetheless, the court finds that neither the named Plaintiffs, nor their counsel, have any interests that are antagonistic to those of the absent class members. The central issues in this case relate to JCS’s handling of probation for the Childersburg, and other Municipal Courts where Plaintiffs were each sentenced to probation. Each named Plaintiff, like each absent class member, has a strong interest in proving that JCS’s policies and procedures were unlawful and in
8 As to the 24-month claim, the court previously determined that Timothy Fugatt and Jews have standing to pursue that claim. (Doc. # 626). Under that ruling, even if Jews is inadequate, Timothy Fugatt can serve as the class representative.
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demonstrating the impact of the illegal conduct and obtaining redress. Plaintiffs thus share the interests of the class and will properly and adequately represent the class.
The law firms and attorneys seeking to represent the class here include qualified and experienced lawyers who will prosecute the claims on behalf of the proposed class with diligence and vigor. The court is familiar with the lawyers seeking to represent the class, as they have appeared before the court numerous times. The court is satisfied that the named Plaintiffs and the lawyers seeking appointment as class counsel will properly and adequately prosecute this case.
D. Rule 23(b)(3) When a party seeking certification has met the requirements of Rule 23(a), that does not end the court’s Rule 23 inquiry. A named Plaintiff must also show that the putative class meets at least one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs seek certification by Rule 23(b)(3), which requires, among other things, that (1) common questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and (2) class resolution is “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) imposes two additional requirements: a plaintiff must show “predominance” and “superiority.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997). Here, JCS contests only predominance. (Doc. # 714).
1. Predominance The Supreme Court has described the “predominance” requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) as “even more demanding than Rule 23(a),” and noted that the court has a duty to “take a ‘close look’ at whether common questions predominate over individual ones.” Comcast Corp, 569 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted) (holding that proposed class of cable subscribers alleging antitrust conduct did not meet Rule 23(b)(3) “predominance” requirement, where damages from specifically alleged
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conduct were not capable of measurement on classwide basis). The predominance standard is similar to the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), but is far more demanding, and mandates particular caution where “individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623; see Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) is ‘far more demanding’ than the commonality requirement found in Rule 23(a)(2).”). The predominance requirement “‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by [class] representation.’” Carriuolo, 823 F.3d at 985 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24). A plaintiff cannot satisfy the predominance requirement if, as a practical matter, resolution of common issues will “break [] down into an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues.” Andrews v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996).
The predominance inquiry begins with consideration of the elements of the underlying cause of action, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 810-11 (2011), and requires the court to consider “how a trial on the merits would be conducted if a class were certified.” Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 218 (5th Cir. 2003). Judge Pryor recently put it this way:
To determine whether the requirement of predominance is satisfied, a district court must first identify the parties’ claims and defenses and their elements. See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1254 & n. 7. The district court should then classify these issues as common questions or individual questions by predicting how the parties will prove them at trial. See id. at 1255. Common questions are ones where “the same evidence will suffice for each member,” and individual questions are ones where the evidence will “var[y] from member to member.” Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005). Brown v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016).
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a. Statewide Due Process Class Plaintiffs assert that the predominance prong is met for their statewide 24-month claim because the key factual and legal issues can be resolved through common evidence and focus on JCS’s routine practices. But Plaintiffs’ arguments are superficial, and they fail to drill down into the elements of the claim. (Doc. # 709 at 44). On the other hand, JCS has dug deep into the elements of the 24-month claim and argues that proof of the claim requires individualized evidence destroying predominance. (Doc. # 714 at 20). JCS identifies potential predominance-related problems with each of the elements of the 24month claim. (Doc. # 714 at 21-32). JCS has the better end of the argument. To establish their 24-month claim, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that a probationer’s single probation term exceeded twenty-four months, after accounting for tolling, (2) that the extension was pursuant to JCS policy and there was no court involvement, (3) the probationer did not receive notice of the extension and thus was without an opportunity to contest the extension, and (4) the probationer suffered the loss of a liberty interest or suffered other damages by remaining on probation for over twenty-four months. (Doc. # 626 at 62-64). That is, Plaintiffs must show that JCS unilaterally extended each class member’s probation beyond twenty-four months, without court intervention. But class members, including two of the currently named Plaintiffs for this claim, Timothy Fugatt and Deunate Jews, were placed on multiple probations. The evidence in the record shows that the municipal court entered both Orders of Modification, and well as Superseding Probation Orders with regard to these two named Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ expert, Peter Coons, has proposed to exclude probationers with Orders of Modification from the class. But that solution does not remedy the problem of Superseding Probation Orders. Where such an order is in
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place, an individualized fact-finding inquiry would be required to determine whether subsequent Probation Orders were Superseding Orders.
The court has already found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Fugatt’s and Jews’s subsequent orders of probation were Superseding Orders. That is, there is an issue as to whether the court intended to encompass prior and subsequent offenses under one unified probation (thus causing any sentence in excess of twenty-four months to be the result of a court action, not JCS), or such orders were simply new orders of probation confined solely to the subsequent charges (where a 24-month excess was attributable to JCS). (Doc. # 626 at 63) (“JCS contends that Plaintiffs’ probation terms were ‘changed by the later probation orders of the Childersburg Municipal Court,’ but a jury could reach a different finding regarding the Municipal Court’s orders.”)(emphasis added). It follows therefore that there are individualized factual issues with regard to the intent of the Municipal Court about the later probation order for Mr. Fugatt and Jews. This illustrates that such an individual examination of the probation orders will have to be undertaken for each probationer in a multiple-probation situation for Plaintiffs to establish the first two elements of their 24-month claim.9
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the JCS Training Manual as evidence that it was JCS’s policies and practices that extended probations beyond twenty-four months. But individual probationers were not always on a consistent path. There is evidence that the procedures and preferences of the different municipal courts varied, and that those preferences overrode anything in the Training Manual. (Doc. # 431-2 at ¶ 28). For example, Marcy Freeman, a probation officer in JCS’s
9 For example, Timothy Fugatt was in court on December 18, 2013 and agreed to pay off certain fines by February 2013. There are two Orders of Modification of Probation listed on his case-action summary dated November 8, 2012 and January 14, 2013. (Doc. # 537-24 at 3). There is also an order on the case-action summary dated October 12, 2012, ordering that JCS must “waive[] all future supervision fees.” (Docs. # 537-24 at 4, 537-58). Thus, for one of the named Plaintiffs with multiple probations, there is evidence that different types of court orders intervened to extend the original probation term.
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Montgomery office, testified that it was the Montgomery Municipal Court’s practice to set a hearing for all probationers’ whose 24-month probation periods were about to expire. (Doc. # 7157 at 64-68). JCS would then follow whatever instructions the judge gave after those hearings. (Id. at 68). Further, the JCS Training Manual itself provides that JCS employees were not to “[m]odify a court sentence without approval from that court.” (Docs. # 708-3 at 81; 715-5 at ¶ 29).
Plaintiffs also propose to use certain probation tracker codes to identify those class members with appropriate 24-month claims. But not all cities use the same (or even all of the) available codes. (Id.). Furthermore, not all events relating to a probation are necessarily reflected in a code. (Doc. # 431-2 at ¶ 23). Sometimes, orders regarding how to handle various probation issues or statuses were issued orally.10 (Docs. # 715-4 at ¶ 15, 715-5 at ¶ 19). Municipal Courts are not like United States District Courts. They do not enjoy the same resources (courtroom personnel, law clerks, and support staff) and often have crushing caseloads. Municipal judges work part-time, and usually maintain law practices. Oral orders are more frequent and necessary. In a perfect world, everything would be documented. But Municipal Courts do not live in that world. Oral orders happen, and there is evidence of them in this case. To say the least, individual issues abound with respect to the first two elements of the Statewide Class claim.
The third element of the 24-month claim is that Plaintiffs did not receive notice of the extension of probation and an opportunity to contest it. Proof in this regard, too, will require individualized determinations. What was communicated to the probationers (and what notice they received) are not simply matters that can be discerned by examining Probation Tracker. The
10 Plaintiffs protest the consideration of a municipal court’s “oral orders” as an explanation as to why certain sentences were extended. (Doc. # 719 at 7) (“This is absurd.”). They point to the JCS Manual, which instructs, “If it is not documented, it did not happen.” (Id.). But, that argument misses this point: if JCS failed to document an oral order of a municipal court, that does not mean the court’s order “did not happen.” Rather, that provision of the manual counsels JCS’s employees to document their actions on a file. The key takeaway is that there were oral orders, and an individual inquiry would be necessary to see if each class member’s sentence was affected by an oral order.
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evidence shows that sometimes notices were logged in Probation Tracker and sometimes they were not. Some of the named Plaintiffs have raised issues about receiving notices from JCS. Jews provided the wrong address to JCS, so to the extent he did not receive notice of an extension, that was at least partially of his own making. And, JCS’s employees also had oral communications with probationers. These individualized communications would have to be examined to eliminate them as a possible basis or reason for an extension, or to determine notice about the potential for an extension.
The fourth element of the 24-month claim requires proof that class members suffered damages from the extension of their probation. Proof on this element would require an examination of jail time ordered by the court and the amount of money paid to JCS by probationers after the expiration of the twenty-four month period, after accounting for tolling. This would quite plainly require individualized proof. Moreover, as noted with regard to the Fugatts, there is evidence that courts occasionally waived JCS fees. Thus, there is not a reliable model, formula, or body of common proof which could be used to calculate damages on a class-wide basis. To the contrary, those determinations will be dependent upon individual proof.
Furthermore, Eleventh Circuit precedent “plainly require[s] that compensatory damages in a § 1983 suit be based on actual injury caused by the defendant rather than on the ‘abstract value’ of the constitutional rights that may have been violated.” Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2000). Such an “actual injury” can include monetary loss, physical pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, impairment of reputation, and personal humiliation. Id. at 1231. All of these types of damages would have to be shown individually.
Although individualized damages do not always defeat predominance, “individual damages defeat predominance if computing them ‘will be so complex, fact-specific, and difficult
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that the burden on the court system would be simply intolerable.’” Brown v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, individual damages defeat predominance when they are accompanied by “significant individualized questions going to liability.” Brown, 817 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260). Here, the individualized nature of the damages inquiry is accompanied by individualized inquiries going to the other elements of the 24-month claim.
Common issues will not predominate over individual questions if “as a practical matter, the resolution of [an] overarching common issue breaks down into an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues.” Babineau v. Fed. Express Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2009). That is exactly the situation presented here. The individualized inquiries necessary to accommodate for variations in probations, tolling, notice, variation in court operations, and damages render resolution of this 24-month claim on a class-wide basis unmanageable, thus destroying predominance.
b. The Childersburg Jail Class Bearden Claims Under Bearden v. Georgia, a court may not jail a probationer for nonpayment of court debt without first inquiring into whether she had the means to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 471 U.S. 606, 6 (1985). Nonpayment must be willful before a probationer can lawfully be jailed. See United States v. Mojica-Leguizamo, 447 F. App’x 992, 996 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversing revocation of probationer’s supervised release based in part on the government’s failure to prove willful failure to pay). Plaintiffs assert that these claims require proof of three elements: “(1) the members of the Childersburg Jail Class were arrested and jailed for failure to pay court debt; (2) they were jailed without the required Bearden determination; and (3) the moving force behind these constitutional
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violations was an agreement between JCS and the Childersburg Municipal Court.” (Doc. # 709 at 25). Plaintiffs must also prove that the deprivation of a Bearden hearing caused them to suffer damages, and they must offer an administratively feasible method of proving damages in a class context.
To prove the first element of the claim, Plaintiffs must show not just that the probationer was jailed, but that he or she was jailed because of a failure to pay. This will require an individualized inquiry. Evidence in the record shows that revocation proceedings were initiated, warrants were issued, and probationers were jailed for a variety of reasons other than a failure to pay. For example, another reason for the initiation of revocation proceedings was a failure to attend probation appointments. As the court has already noted, “JCS directed its employees to request probation revocation hearings when a probationer’s mail was returned to the JCS office, a probationer missed three appointments, or a probationer failed to respond to all communications” and that “JCS employees in Childersburg sought probation-revocation hearings when Plaintiffs failed to show up for probation appointments.” (Doc. # 626 at 53, 76). Therefore, an individualized inquiry into the reason a probationer was jailed is required in order to establish the first element of this claim.
The second element presents two problems for Plaintiffs. First (and again), analysis of it will require an individualized inquiry. Second, establishing this element is complicated by the fact that Plaintiffs must prove both an affirmative and a negative. Plaintiffs must affirmatively prove indigency. They must also show absence of an appropriate Bearden hearing. And, they must make such a showing on a class wide basis. The Rule 23 record before the court contains evidence that each of the named Plaintiffs failed to attend a hearing on a petition to revoke their probation at which the court might have addressed indigency. (Doc. # 626 at 23-28). Moreover, the Plaintiffs’
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indigency claim involves their assertion that on a class wide basis, probationers were jailed for not paying the fines (and fees). But to succeed, Plaintiffs are required to show that the class members were unable to pay (which, itself will require individualized proof) and steer around the issue of whether any failure to pay was willful. Here, one of the named Plaintiffs (Jews) testified that he never intended to pay his fines. (Doc. # 524-5 at 60-61). That suggests a willful failure to pay. It also illustrates the key point here: willfulness will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis for each probationer. To the extent that Kristy Fugatt is indigent, there is evidence that she made no effort to find a job. (Doc. # 431-8 at 20-21). Furthermore, Judge Ward testified that he routinely provided Bearden hearings to probationers. (Doc. # 402-36 at 46–48, 97). Therefore, this claim will require individualized examinations of the reason for each revocation hearing, what topics were covered at a plethora of hearings, and whether the facts of each hearing amounted to a Bearden violation. This level of detailed, individualized proof demonstrates that common issues do not predominate here.
Finally (and again), it does not appear that the issue of damages can be appropriately addressed on a class wide basis with use of common proof. Plaintiffs argue that they seek compensatory damages, for arrests, days spent in jail, and days spent on probation. (Doc. # 709). But these types of damages require inherently individualized assessments. Plaintiffs argue that general damages are also appropriate, but they cite no Eleventh Circuit authority for that proposition. (See Doc. # 709 at 48-49). There is a reason for that. Our circuit precedent establishes that individual damages defeat predominance when, as here related to Plaintiffs’ Bearden claim, they are accompanied by “significant individualized questions going to liability.” Brown, 817 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260). Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the predominance requirement for the Childersburg Jail Class Bearden claim.
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c. The Childersburg Jail Class Sixth Amendment Claim “‘The Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages applies in all cases where an indigent defendant faces incarceration, regardless whether the offense was a misdemeanor or felony.’” Pittman v. United States, 2011 WL 1085107, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 997018 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2011) (quoting United States v. Rubio, 629 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2010)). A defendant may waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). To establish this claim, Plaintiffs must establish indigency and a deprivation of the right to counsel. As this court has already determined, proof of indigency is inherently individualized. Furthermore, named Plaintiffs Ray and Jews were able to have themselves declared indigent and were appointed counsel. Ray filled out an Affidavit of Substantial Hardship and had Patrick Evans appointed to represent her. (Doc. # 471-7 at 180). Jews used hardship forms in Talledega and was appointed counsel more than once. (Doc. # 524-5 at 139–41, 147–49). But whether a probationer received court-appointed counsel is not the only case-by-case inquiry required on this motion. For those who did not have counsel, there is still another question: whether the probationer at issue validly waived counsel? This requires another individualized inquiry. The JCS form Probation Order contained a single line waiver pre-printed at the bottom of the page stating, “I have counsel or have waived my right to counsel for all proceedings to this date and have received a copy of this ORDER.” (Doc. # 708-2 at 27). To be clear, the form contains no explanation regarding the right to counsel. (Id.). But that does not dispense with the necessary inquiry (and proof) as to whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In the class
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context, that inquiry would require an examination of what was discussed with each class member at each sentencing.
As with Plaintiffs’ Bearden claim, proof of damages will be required on Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim. That will require an individualized assessment of actual compensatory damages. Again, when such an individualized inquiry is combined with “significant individualized questions going to liability,” that combination tends to defeat predominance. Brown, 817 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260). Therefore, the court cannot say that common questions of fact and law predominate in relation to the Childersburg Jail Class Sixth Amendment claim. Id.
d. Conclusion as to Predominance After careful review, the court is satisfied that Plaintiffs cannot establish that any of their claims satisfies the predominance requirement. Each class member’s claims would require distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding those claims. Regarding their statewide 24-month claim, each class member will be required to go beyond the general allegations of the class claim and present evidence that their probation terms exceeded twenty-four months. For each class member who can do so, s/he will also have to establish (1) the extension was pursuant to JCS policy, (2) s/he did not receive notice of the extension and an opportunity to contest the extension, and (3) s/he was harmed (i.e., damaged) by the violation. Similarly, to establish a Bearden claim, each class member will be required to show that (1) s/he was arrested and jailed for failing to pay a court debt, (2) s/he was jailed without the required Bearden hearing, and (3) JCS was the moving force behind the deprivation of the Bearden hearing. Finally, to prove a Sixth Amendment claim, each class member would be required to show that s/he was indigent but was denied the right to counsel. The trier of fact would also have to consider whether s/he knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel.
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No matter how the issues in this case are framed, it is clear that while each class member’s claims may start off under the “class umbrella,” ultimately those claims will rise or fall depending on individual proof which is specific to that class member’s circumstances. When there is a requirement of such individualized, distinct proof to allow class members to succeed on their claims, the proponents of a class cannot establish the predominance requirement. This is neither a novel nor ground-breaking observation.
That individualized proof defeats predominance has been the law in this circuit for over twenty years. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997). In Jackson, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had “a nationwide practice or policy of discriminating against its customers and its employees on the basis of race.” Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1001. The district court certified a customer class who claimed that Motel 6 facilities had a policy of denying rooms or renting less desirable rooms to African Americans. The defendant sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to decertify that customer class. The Eleventh Circuit granted the writ and held that putative class was “not certifiable because it fails the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).” Id. at 1004–05. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant’s evidence of a pattern and practice of discrimination satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, the court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims would “require distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding each alleged incident of discrimination.” Id. at 1006. (“The issues that must be addressed include not only whether a particular plaintiff was denied a room or was rented a substandard room, but also whether there were any rooms vacant when that plaintiff inquired; whether the plaintiff had reservations; whether unclean rooms were rented to the plaintiff for reasons having nothing to do with the plaintiff's race; whether the plaintiff, at the time that he requested a room, exhibited any non-racial characteristics
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legitimately counseling against renting him a room; and so on.”) In granting the requested relief, the court expressed its expectation that “most, if not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims [would] stand or fall, not on the answer to the question whether [the defendant] ha[d] a practice or policy of racial discrimination, but on the resolution of these highly case-specific factual issues.” Id. It therefore determined that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the customer class.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) as to all claims.
E. Rule 23(c)(4) Issue Class Certification Plaintiffs alternatively request that an “issues class” be certified under Rule 23(c)(4) to address a limited set of operative liability issues. (Doc. # 709 at 56-57). Plaintiffs propose that the court certify a liability-only class for trial and focus on the monetary relief in a second phase. (Doc. # 709 at 56) (citing Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1310 (N.D. Fla.), recons. denied, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1212 (N.D. Fla. 2017) (exercising “discretion under Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a liability-only class and bifurcate damages from liability”)). Alternatively, Plaintiffs assert that the court could certify subclasses to resolve specific limited issues. Courts are split as to whether issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) may be certified unless the cause of action as a whole first satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Compare Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (Rule 23(c)(4)(A) certification as to a specific issue is available only if common questions predominate in the claim as a whole) with In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is available to certify particular issues “regardless of whether the claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement). The Eleventh Circuit has yet to provide clear guidance as to which rule applies. But, courts have been wary of certifying classes under Rule 23(c)(4) without
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any showing that common issues predominate over the case. See Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 317 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (citing authority and stating that “courts have emphatically rejected attempts to use the (c)(4) process for certifying individual issues as a means for achieving an end run around the (b)(3) predominance requirement.”). As the Fisher court concluded, “the proper interplay between Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) is that a class action as a whole must satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement. If, and only if, it does so, then Rule 23(c)(4) may apply as simply a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common issues for a class trial.” Fisher, 238 F.R.D. at 316.
Here, there is another problem. Plaintiffs have not provided any specific reasons in support of their request for issue certification, other than the fact that Rule 23(b)(3) may not be available to them. (Doc. # 709 at 56-57). The court also notes that, even if it certified an issue class, each class member’s claim would still need to be separately tried to determine issues such as indigency, tolling, and damages. It is these individualized issues that would predominate, even in a Rule 23(c)(4) liability trial. Therefore, certifying an issues class would not promote judicial efficiency. Certification of a common issues class will not dispose of a single case or eliminate the need for a single trial. All of this leads the court to conclude that certification of a Rule 23(c)(4) class under these unique facts would be an end run around Rule 23(b)(3), and in any event, would not be a superior method of addressing Plaintiffs’ claims. IV. Conclusion
For all of these reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the classes they propose are clearly ascertainable. In addition, they have not shown that common questions predominate over individual issues with respect to any of the proposed classes. Finally, they have not established this as an appropriate case to certify a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class.
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Case 2:12-cv-02819-RDP Document 744 Filed 09/26/19 Page 48 of 48 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 707) is due to be denied. A separate order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this September 26, 2019. _________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
48

 
 Alerts not yet Supported for this Docket STAYED,CLOSED,CASREF,PROTECTIVE ORDER
U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama (Southern) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:12-cv-02819-RDP

Ray et al v. Judicial Corrections Services Inc et al Assigned to: Judge R David Proctor Referred to: Magistrate Judge John E Ott (Settlement) Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 08/28/2012 Date Terminated: 09/29/2020 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Gina Kay Ray individually and for a class of similarly situated persons or entities

represented by Maurine C Evans THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, AL 35209 205-870-1970 Fax: 205-870-7763 Email: mevans@evanslawpc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexandria Parrish THE EVANS LAW FIRM 1736 Oxmoor Road Birmingham, AL 35209 205-870-1970 Fax: 205-870-7763 Email: ap@evanslawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel P Evans THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC 1736 Oxmoor Road Suite 101 Birmingham, AL 35209 205-870-1970 Fax: 205-870-7763 Email: dpevans@evanslawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Erwin Chemerinsky 401 East Peltason Drive Irvine, CA 92697-8000 949-824-7722 Email: EChemerinsky@law.uci.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans THE EVANS LAW FIRM, P.C. 1736 Oxmoor Road, Suite 101 Birmingham, AL 35209 1-205-870-1970 Fax: 1-205-870-7763 Email: gdevans@evanslawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie A Bailey PUBLIC JUSTICE 475 14th Street, Suite 610 Oakland, CA 94612 510-622-8203 Email: lbailey@publicjustice.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC 301 North 19th Street Birmingham, AL 35203-3204 205-314-0500 Fax: 205-254-1500 Email: rwiggins@wigginschilds.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M Dawson DAWSON LAW OFFICE 1736 Oxmoor Road, #101 Birmingham, AL 35209 307-7021 Email: bill@billdawsonlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kalus K Johnson individually and for a class of similarly situated persons or entities TERMINATED: 04/26/2013
Plaintiff Deuante T Jews individually and for a class of similarly situated persons or entities

represented by Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M Dawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maurine C Evans (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie A Bailey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M Dawson (See above for address)

Plaintiff Timothy Fugatt
Plaintiff Kristy Fugatt

TERMINATED: 04/05/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maurine C Evans (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie A Bailey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian Hardingham PUBLIC JUSTICE 475 14th Street, Suite 610 Oakland, CA 94612 510-622-8216 Email: bhardingham@publicjustice.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie A Bailey

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maurine C Evans (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Judicial Corrections Services Inc a corporation

represented by Jay M Ezelle STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP 100 Brookwood Place Seventh Floor Birmingham, AL 35209 205-868-6000 Fax: 205-868-6099 Email: JEzelle@starneslaw.com TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry S Logsdon

WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC P.O. Box 530910 Birmingham, AL 35253 205-870-0555 Fax: 205-871-7534 Email: llogsdon@wallacejordan.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L Jackson WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC P O Box 530910 Birmingham, AL 35253 205-870-0555 Fax: 205-874-3251 Email: mjackson@wallacejordan.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wayne Morse , Jr WALDREP STEWART & KENDRICK LLC 2323 2nd Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 205-327-8325 Fax: 205-327-8395 Email: morse@wskllc.com TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
C Clayton Bromberg , Jr STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP 100 Brookwood Place, 7th Floor P O Box 598512 Birmingham, AL 35259-8512 205-868-6000 Fax: 205-868-6099 Email: ccb@starneslaw.com TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas N Robertson BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP 1819 5th Avenue North One Federal Place Birmingham, AL 35203 205-521-8000 Email: drobertson@bradley.com TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen A Sistrunk STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP 100 Brookwood Place, 7th Floor Birmingham, AL 35209 205-868-6000 Fax: 205-868-6099 Email: sasistrunk@gmail.com TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wesley Kyle Winborn WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT 800 Shades Creek Parkway Birmingham, AL 35209 205-874-0310 Fax: 205-874-3276 Email: wwinborn@wallacejordan.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William P Gray , Jr GRAY & ASSOCIATES LLC 3800 Colonnade Parkway, Ste. 35 Birmingham, AL 35243 205-968-0900 Fax: 205-968-6534 Email: wpg@grayattorneys.com TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wilson F Green WILSON F GREEN LLC PO Box 2536 Tuscaloosa, AL 35403

Defendant
Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc a corporation

205-722-1018 Email: wilson@wilsongreenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jay M Ezelle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY
Larry S Logsdon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L Jackson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wayne Morse , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
C Clayton Bromberg , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas N Robertson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen A Sistrunk (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wesley Kyle Winborn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William P Gray , Jr

Defendant Childersburg, Alabama a municipal corporation TERMINATED: 12/20/2012
Defendant B J Meeks in his official capacity as Mayor of Childersburg, Alabama TERMINATED: 12/20/2012
Defendant Childersburg, City of , The TERMINATED: 02/17/2017

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by A Donald Scott , Jr DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1020 22nd Street South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-871-8858 Fax: 205-879-1679 Email: dscott@donahueassociates.com TERMINATED: 10/11/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy P Donahue DONAHUE & ASSOCIATES LLC 1020 22nd Street, South Birmingham, AL 35205 205-871-8858 Fax: 205-879-1679 Email: timdonahue@donahueassociates.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by A Donald Scott , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/11/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy P Donahue (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Will Hill Tankersley BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 6th Avenue North Suite 1500 Birmingham, AL 35203 205-521-8100 Fax: 205-488-5679 Email: wht@balch.com

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
A Donald Scott , Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/11/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Kent Israel BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1500 Birmingham, AL 35203 205-226-3495 Fax: 205-488-5821 Email: aisrael@balch.com TERMINATED: 09/08/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chase Tristian Espy BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 Sixth Ave N Suite 1500 Birmingham, Al 35201 205-226-3448 Fax: 205-488-5853 Email: cespy@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Knox Friedman MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC 1901 Sixth Avenue North 2400 Regions Harbert Plaza Birmingham, AL 35203-2618 United Sta 205-254-1227 Fax: 205-254-1999 Email: cfriedman@maynardcooper.com TERMINATED: 09/11/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Robert Pickett LLOYD GRAY WHITEHEAD & MONROE PC 2501 Twentieth Place South Ste 300 Birmingham, Al 35223

205-967-8822 Fax: 205-967-2380 Email: dpickett@lgwmlaw.com TERMINATED: 02/27/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David R Boyd BALCH & BINGHAM LLP P.O. Box 306 1901 Sixth Avenue North, Ste. 1500 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 205-251-8100 Fax: 866-783-2739 Email: dboyd@balch.com TERMINATED: 09/09/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edgar R Haden BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 6th Avenue North Suite 1500 Birmingham, AL 35201 205-251-8100 Fax: 205-488-5648 Email: ehaden@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ginny Willcox Leavens BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 1500 Birmingham, AL 35203 205-226-8766 Fax: 205-488-5738 Email: gwillcox@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory C Cook BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1901 6th Avenue North Suite 1500 P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 205-226-3421 Fax: 205-488-5613 Email: gcook@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. d/b/a Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., a corporation TERMINATED: 05/09/2018
Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC a limited liability company TERMINATED: 05/09/2018

L Conrad Anderson , IV BALCH & BINGHAM LLP 1710 6th Avenue North P O Box 306 Birmingham, AL 35201-0306 205-251-8100 Fax: 205-488-5729 Email: canderson@balch.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy P Donahue (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Fredrick Lane Finch , Jr SWIFT, CURRIE, MCGHEE & HEIRS Two North 20th Street, Ste. 1405 Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 314-2403 Fax: (205) 244-1373 Email: lane.finch@swiftcurrie.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian C Richardson SWIFT CURRIE MCGHEE & HIERS LLP Two North 20th Street Suite 1405 Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 314-2404 Fax: (205) 244-1373 Email: brian.richardson@swiftcurrie.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Fredrick Lane Finch , Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant Childersburg, City of, The

Brian C Richardson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Will Hill Tankersley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam Kent Israel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chase Tristian Espy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Robert Pickett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David R Boyd (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edgar R Haden (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ginny Willcox Leavens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory C Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
L Conrad Anderson , IV (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy P Donahue

V. Counter Defendant Gina Kay Ray
Counter Defendant Deuante T Jews
Counter Defendant Timothy Fugatt

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexandria Parrish (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Defendant Kristy Fugatt

Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Erwin Chemerinsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Wiggins , Jr (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
G Daniel Evans (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/28/2012
08/29/2012 08/29/2012 08/30/2012 09/04/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Childersburg, Alabama, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, B J Meeks, filed by Gina Kay Ray, Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson.(KAM, ) (Entered: 08/28/2012)
Filing Fee Received: $350, Receipt# 1126-1744571 (ALND# B4601036560). (Dawson, William) Modified on 8/30/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 08/29/2012)
2 Request for service by certified mail filed by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Dawson, William) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
3 Summons Issued as to Childersburg, Alabama, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, B J Meeks; mailed certified mail. (AVC) (Entered: 08/30/2012)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks served on 8/31/2012, answer due 9/21/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 09/04/2012)

09/07/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012 09/18/2012
09/21/2012 09/21/2012 09/21/2012 09/21/2012 09/24/2012

5 SUMMONS Returned Executed Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc served (no date on green card); Judicial Corrections Services Inc served on 8/31/2012, answer due 9/21/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 09/07/2012)
6 MOTION to Dismiss by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
7 Brief in Support of Dismissal in Compliance with Exhibit B of the Court's Order 6 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 9/18/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 09/18/2012)
8 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 9/18/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 09/18/2012)
9 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 9/18/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 09/18/2012)
10 ORDER -The matter is before the court on Defendants' Judicial Correction Services, Inc. and Correctional Healthcare Services, Inc. Motion to Dismiss 6 . The parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the motions in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached hereto. Pltfs' responsive submission(s) shall be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Dfts' reply submission(s) shall be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submission(s) is filed. Any non-summary judgment motions filed after the entry of this order SHALL comply with the provisions of Exhibit B without further order from the court. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/18/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas N Robertson on behalf of Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Robertson, Douglas) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
12 MOTION to Dismiss by Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks. (Scott, Alvin) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy P Donahue on behalf of Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks (Donahue, Timothy) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
14 MOTION for Joint Scheduling Order by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/21/2012)
15 ORDER-Before the court is Pltfs' Motion for Joint Scheduling Order 14 . The motion is GRANTED. The court will consolidate the briefing schedule on Dfts' Motions. Pltfs' responsive submissions to both Motions

10/02/2012 10/02/2012 10/02/2012
10/05/2012
10/05/2012 10/05/2012 10/10/2012

to Dismiss 6 & 12 SHALL be filed on or before 10/5/2012. Dfts' reply submissions SHALL be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submissions are filed. Any nonsummary judgment motions filed after the entry of this order SHALL comply with the provisions of "Exhibit B" attached to the court's order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/24/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
16 MOTION to Extend Time to File Reply Submission by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
17 INITIAL ORDER GOVERNING ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGSreminding parties of their obligations under FRCP 26(f) and Local Rule LR26.1(d)- with appendices attached. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/2/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
18 TEXT ORDER- Before the court is Defendants Judicial Correction Services and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Motion to Extend Time to File Reply Submission (Doc. # 16), filed on October 2, 2012. For good cause shown, the Motion is GRANTED. Defendants Judicial Correction Services and Correctional Healthcare Companies SHALL file a Reply, if any, to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss on or before October 10, 2012. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/2/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
19 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is Defendants Town of Childersburg and B.J. Meeks' informal request for an extension of time to file a reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For good cause shown, the request is GRANTED. Defendants Town of Childersburg and B.J. Meeks SHALL file a reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on or before OCTOBER 10, 2012. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/5/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 10/05/2012)
20 RESPONSIVE SUBMISSION to Motion to Dismiss 6 filed by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 10/5/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 10/05/2012)
21 RESPONSIVE SUBMISSION to Motion to Dismiss 12 filed by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 10/5/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 10/05/2012)
22 REPLY to Responsive Submission to Motion to Dismiss 20 , 21 in Compliance with Exhibt B of the Court's Order filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 10/10/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 10/10/2012)

10/10/2012 10/19/2012 10/26/2012 10/30/2012 11/01/2012
11/20/2012
11/20/2012

23 REPLY Brief filed by Defendants Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks re: 22 REPLY (other), 21 Response to Motion, 12 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks. (Scott, Alvin) (Entered: 10/10/2012)
24 RESPONSE to Plaintiff's Request for Oral Argument filed by Childersburg, Alabama, B J Meeks. (Scott, Alvin) (Entered: 10/19/2012)
25 TEXT ORDER -Before the court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. #6, #12), filed on September 18, 2012 and September 21, 2012. The court hereby SETS this matter for ORAL ARGUMENT on Tuesday, November 20, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L. Black Courthouse, 1729 5th Ave. North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/26/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 10/26/2012)
26 Joint MOTION to Stay Discovery and to Suspend Obligations Under FRCP Rule 26(a) and Local Rule 26.1 by Childersburg, Alabama, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, B J Meeks. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 10/30/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 10/30/2012)
27 TEXT ORDER- Before the court is Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay Discovery and Suspend Obligations Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a) and Local Rule 26.1 (Doc. #26), filed on October 30, 2012. For good cause shown, the Motion (Doc. #26) is GRANTED. Once the court rules upon the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. #6, #12), the court will set this matter for a status conference to discuss further scheduling. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/1/2012. (AVC) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Plaintiffs shall draft a restated amended complaint as directed and provide a copy to dfts by 12/6/2012. Plaintiffs shall file the restated amended complaint no later than 12/20/2012. Defendants' responsive pleading shall be filed no later than 1/14/2013. The parties shall have the Rule 26 Meeting no later than 1/21/2012.(Court Reporter Anita McCorvey.) (KLL) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
28 ORDER-re: Status Conference held on this date. Pltfs are instructed to file an amended complaint by 12/20/2012 to correct "shotgun" pleading deficiencies. Pltfs SHALL share a draft of the amended complaint with Dfts by 12/6/2012. Dfts SHALL file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint by 1/17/2013. The court hereby LIFTS the stay on the parties' obligations under FRCP 26(a) and Local Rule 26.1. The parties SHALL confer about a date during the week of 1/21/2013 on which to conduct a parties planning meeting. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/20/2012. (AVC, ) (Entered: 11/20/2012)

12/20/2012 01/16/2013 01/16/2013 01/17/2013 01/17/2013 02/05/2013 02/05/2013 02/06/2013
02/20/2013 02/20/2013

29 AMENDED and Restated Complaint by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 12/20/2012 (AVC). (Entered: 12/20/2012)
30 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
31 Brief in Support of Dismissal of the Amended Complaint 30 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 1/16/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 01/16/2013)
32 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint by Childersburg, Alabama. (Scott, A) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
33 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 32 by City of Childersburg, The . (Scott, A) Modified on 1/18/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 01/17/2013)
34 RESPONSE to Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Restated Complaint in Response to Exhibit B of Court's Order 30 filed by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 2/6/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 02/05/2013)
35 RESPONSIVE Submission to Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 32 filed by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 2/6/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 02/05/2013)
36 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is Defendants Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., Judicial Corrections Services, Inc., and the Town of Childersburg's informal request for additional time within which to file their replies to Plaintiffs' responses to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. #30, #32). For good cause shown, the request is GRANTED. On or before February 20, Defendants SHALL file any reply briefs in accordance with Exhibit B, attached to the Initial Order. (Doc. #17). Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/6/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
37 BRIEF in Support of Dismissal of the Amended Complaint 30 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) Modified on 2/20/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 02/20/2013)
38 REPLY to Plaintiffs' Responsive Submission to Motion to Dismiss 35 filed by Childersburg, Alabama. (Scott, A) Modified on 2/20/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 02/20/2013)

03/14/2013 03/28/2013
04/02/2013 04/02/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013

39 TEXT ORDER -The court has been informed that the parties are in disagreement regarding a parties' planning report. This matter is hereby SET for a hearing on April 4, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse, 1729 Fifth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 35203. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/14/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 03/14/2013)
40 TEXT ORDER -This matter is set for a hearing on April 4, 2013 to discuss disputes regarding the parties' planning report. During this hearing, the court may hear legal argument on the pending motions to dismiss (Docs. #30, #32). In the event the court does so, the parties should be prepared to present legal argument on the following issues related to these motions: (1) Whether JCS/CHC acted "under the color of state law;" (2) Whether Plaintiffs' Complaint states a claim for relief against JCS/CHC and Childersburg under Section 1983 for Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment violations; (3) Whether Plaintiffs' Complaint states a claim for municipal liability against Childersburg; and (4) Whether Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/28/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 03/28/2013)
41 TEXT ORDER -This matter is currently set for a hearing on Thursday, April 3, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. The hearing is hereby RESET for 1:30 p.m. that same day. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/2/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
42 CORRECTED TEXT ORDER -This matter is currently set for a hearing on Thursday, April 4, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. The hearing is hereby RESET for 1:30 p.m. that same day. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/2/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Status Conference held on 4/4/2013. Plaintiffs shall amend the complaint as directed within 15 days; defendants' responsive pleading due within 30 days thereafter. (Court Reporter Anita McCorvey.) (KLL) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
43 ORDER: In accordance with the discussions during the status conference on 4/4/13, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: Plaintiffs SHALL file a Second Amended Complaint on or before 4/19/13; Defendants SHALL respond to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of its filing; the parties SHALL have a face to face meeting before Defendants file any response to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint; 30 and 32 , Motions to Dismiss, are MOOT. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 04/04/13. (CVA) (Entered: 04/04/2013)

04/05/2013 04/05/2013 04/17/2013
04/23/2013 04/24/2013 04/24/2013
04/24/2013 04/24/2013

44 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Dawson, William) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
ORDER Before the court is a Motion to Withdraw (Doc. #44), filed on April 5, 2013 by William M. Dawson. For good cause shown, the Motion (Doc. #44) is GRANTED. Attorney Dawson is hereby TERMINATED. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/5/13. (ASL) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
45 TEXT ORDER-Before the court is Plaintiffs' informal request for an extension of time within which to file their Second Amended Complaint. For good cause shown, the Request is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their Second Amended Complaint on or before Friday, April 26, 2013. All other terms in the court's April 4, 2013 order remain operative. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 04/17/13. (CVA) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
46 NOTICE of Appearance by Jay M Ezelle on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Ezelle, Jay) (Entered: 04/23/2013)
47 MOTION to Withdraw by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
48 TEXT ORDER: Before the court is a Motion to Withdraw, 47 , filed on April 24, 2013. For good cause shown, the Motion, 47 , is GRANTED. Attorney Morse is TERMINATED from his representation of Defendants Judicial Correction Services and Correctional Healthcare Services. These Defendants are now represented by Jay Ezelle, Douglas Robertson, and William Gray, all of whom have filed notices of appearance on behalf of these Defendants. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 04/24/13. (CVA) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
49 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Robertson, Douglas) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
ORDER Before the court is a Motion to Withdraw (Doc. #49), filed on April 24, 2013 by attorneys William Gray and Douglas Roberston. For good cause shown, the Motion (Doc. #49) is GRANTED. Attorneys Gray and Robertson are TERMINATED from their representation of Defendants Judicial Correction Services and Correctional Healthcare Companies. These Defendants will continue to be represented by Jay Ezelle. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/24/13. (ASL) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

04/26/2013
05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/28/2013 05/30/2013 05/30/2013
06/04/2013

50 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT and Restated Complaint against Judicial Corrections Services, Inc, Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., Childersburg, City of, The filed by Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray, Kalus K Johnson, Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt.(Evans, G) (Entered: 04/26/2013)
51 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint by Childersburg, Alabama. (Scott, A) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
52 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 51 by City of Childersburg(Scott, A) Modified on 5/28/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 05/28/2013)
53 NOTICE of Appearance by C Clayton Bromberg, Jr on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
54 NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen A Sistrunk on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Sistrunk, Stephen) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
55 MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
56 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 55 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) Modified on 5/29/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 05/28/2013)
57 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert L Wiggins, Jr on behalf of Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
58 TEXT ORDER - Before the court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Docs. #51, #55), both filed on May 28, 2013. The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motions (Docs. #51, #55) in accordance with Exhibit B, which is attached to the Initial Order. (See Doc. #17). Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 05/30/13. (SFR, ) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
59 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is Plaintiffs' unopposed informal request for an extension of time to file responses to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. #51, #55). The request is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their responses on or before Friday, June 7, 2013. Defendants SHALL file their replies, if any, on or before Friday, June

06/07/2013 06/07/2013 06/13/2013
06/14/2013 06/20/2013 09/26/2013 09/26/2013
09/26/2013 09/26/2013

14, 24013. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/4/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
60 RESPONSE to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 55 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 6/10/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 06/07/2013)
61 RESPONSIVE Submission to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 51 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) Modified on 6/10/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 06/07/2013)
62 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is Defendant Town of Childersburg's unopposed informal request for an extension of time to file its reply brief regarding its Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #51). The request is GRANTED. Defendant Town of Childersburg SHALL file its reply on or before June 20, 2013. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/13/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
63 REPLY in Further Support of JCS's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 55 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Ezelle, Jay) Modified on 6/17/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 06/14/2013)
64 REPLY to Responsive Submission to Motion to Dismiss 61 filed by Childersburg, Alabama. (Scott, A) Modified on 6/20/2013 (AVC). (Entered: 06/20/2013)
65 MEMORANDUM OPINION-re: Dft's Motion to Dismiss 51 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
66 ORDER-In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion 65 , Dft's Motion to Dismiss Pltfs' Second Amended Complaint 51 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Pltfs' claims further set out in this order are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
67 MEMORANDUM OPINION-re: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 55 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
68 ORDER -In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion 67 , Dft's Motion to Dismiss Pltfs' Second Amended Complaint 55 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plfs' claims as further set out in this order are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 09/26/2013)

10/07/2013 10/07/2013 10/10/2013 10/11/2013
10/11/2013 11/26/2013 11/26/2013 12/11/2013 12/12/2013
12/13/2013 12/16/2013

69 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Robert Pickett on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Pickett, Daniel) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
70 MOTION to Withdraw A. Donald Scott, Jr. by Childersburg, City of, The. (Scott, A) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
71 ANSWER to 50 Amended Complaint by Childersburg, City of, The.(Pickett, Daniel) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
72 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is a Motion to Withdraw (Doc. #70), filed on October 7, 2013 by attorney A. Donald Scott, Jr. The Motion is GRANTED. Attorney Scott is TERMINATED. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/11/2013. (AVC) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
73 ANSWER to Complaint by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc.(Bromberg, C) (Entered: 10/11/2013)
74 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
75 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Ezelle, Jay) (Entered: 11/26/2013)
76 MOTION for Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
77 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendants Opposed Motion for Protective Order 76 , filed on December 11, 2013. In order to resolve the parties disagreement over the proposed protective order [76, Ex. A], this case is SET for a hearing on Thursday, December 19, 2013 at 10:30 a.m. in courtroom 7A of the Hugo L. Black U.S. Courthouse. The parties SHALL submit briefs detailing their objections to the proposed protective order on or before December 16, 2013, and SHALL submit reply briefs on or before December 18, 2013.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/12/2013. (KAM, ) (Entered: 12/12/2013)
78 MOTION to Continue Hearing on Motion for Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
79 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendants Motion to Continue Hearing on Motion for Protective Order 78 , filed on December 13, 2013. For good cause shown, the Motion 78 is GRANTED. On or before December 20, 2013, the parties SHALL provide the court with suitable alternative dates on which to hold the continued hearing. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/16/13. (ASL) (Entered: 12/16/2013)

12/20/2013 01/02/2014
01/06/2014 01/07/2014 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 03/20/2014 03/26/2014 03/31/2014
04/24/2014

80 NOTICE by Childersburg, City of, The Notice of Hearing Dates (Pickett, Daniel) (Entered: 12/20/2013)
81 TEXT ORDER - This case is SET for a telephone conference at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday, January 8, 2014 to discuss the parties dispute over Defendants Proposed Protective Order [76, Ex. A]. The court will initiate the call. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/2/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
82 RESPONSE to Motion for Protective Order 76 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
83 REPLY in Further Suppor of Motion for Protective Order 76 filed by Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bromberg, C) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 1/8/2014. The proposed Protective Order will be entered separately by the court as agreed to by the parties. (KLL) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
84 ORDER granting 76 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/8/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
85 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/8/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
86 Joint MOTION to Supplement Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Ezelle, Jay) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
87 SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/26/2014. (KAM, ) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
88 ORDER SETTING RULE 16(b) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE Scheduling Conference set for 4/24/2014 10:00 AM in chambers Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Judge R David Proctor. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/31/14. (ASL) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Scheduling Conference held on 4/24/2014. A separate Scheduling Order will be entered by the court. (KLL) (Entered: 04/24/2014)

04/25/2014
04/29/2014
05/12/2014 05/13/2014 05/13/2014
05/14/2014 05/14/2014 05/19/2014 05/20/2014 05/21/2014

89 SCHEDULING ORDER that all deadlines apply as further set out: Discovery due by 12/2/2014; Mediation in 2/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 3/13/2015; Pretrial conference ready in 7/2015; This case will be trial ready in 8/2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/25/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
90 TEXT ORDER - For clarification, the deadline noted in paragraph 10 Dispositive Motions - in the court's Scheduling Order 89 entered April 25, 2014, relates to summary judgment motions only not for class certification but for summary judgment only. Motions for class certifications remains as listed in paragraph 11 of September 16, 2014 Order. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/29/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
91 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
PHV Fee paid for attorney Erwin Chemerinsky: $50.00, Receipt# B4601053033. (AVC) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
92 ORDER- re: 91 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The motion is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. By 5/21/2014, Attorney Chemerinsky SHALL: Certify to the Court that the has read and understands: any local rule in this District; the Alabama State Bar Pledge of Professionalism; and this court's CM/ECF requirements. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/13/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
93 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
94 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
95 CERTIFICATE of Counsel re 92 Order,, Add and Terminate Attorneys,, Terminate Motions, CERTIFICATION OF ERWIN CHEMERINSKY by G Daniel Evans on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
96 MOTION to Compel by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
97 MOTION to Quash Non-Party Larry Ward's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order by Larry Ward. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bolus, John) (Entered: 05/21/2014)

05/21/2014 98 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/21/2014)

05/21/2014 99 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/21/2014)

05/27/2014

100 RESPONSE to Motion to Compel Production of Documents 96 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Bromberg, C) (Entered: 05/27/2014)

05/28/2014

101 Opposition to Motion to Quash and for Protective Order 97 filed by Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2 (Part 1 of 2), # 3 Exhibit 2 (Part 2 of 2))(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/28/2014)

05/29/2014 102 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order 89 by Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/29/2014)

05/29/2014

103 TEXT ORDER- Before the court is Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Scheduling Order (Doc. #102), filed on May 29, 2014. For good cause shown, the Motion (Doc. #102) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs SHALL join any additional parties and/or amend the pleadings on or before July 30, 2014, while Defendants SHALL do the same on or before August 29, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/29/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 05/29/2014)

05/30/2014

104 REPLY in Support of Motion to Compel 96 filed by Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/30/2014)

06/02/2014 105 REPLY Brief in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena 97 filed by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 06/02/2014)

07/28/2014 106 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/28/2014)

07/29/2014

107 TEXT ORDER - This case is SET for a hearing in the undersigneds courtroom at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday, August 13, 2014 to discuss the parties ongoing discovery disputes. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/29/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 07/29/2014)

07/30/2014 108 MOTION to Re-Set Hearing on Discovery Matters by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 07/30/2014)

07/31/2014 109 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Non-Party Larry Ward's Unopposed Motion to Re-Set Discovery Hearing 108 , filed on July 30,

2014. For good cause shown, the Motion 108 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the hearing previously set for 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday, August 13, 2014, is RESET at 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, August 19, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/31/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 07/31/2014)

08/01/2014 110 NOTICE of Appearance by Edgar R Haden on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Haden, Edgar) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 111 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam Kent Israel on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Israel, Adam) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 112 NOTICE of Appearance by Ginny B Willcox on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Willcox, Ginny) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 113 NOTICE of Appearance by David R Boyd on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Boyd, David) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 114 NOTICE of Appearance by L Conrad Anderson, IV on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Anderson, L) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 115 NOTICE of Appearance by Chase Tristian Espy on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Espy, Chase) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 116 NOTICE of Appearance by Will H Tankersley, Jr on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/01/2014 117 NOTICE of Appearance by Gregory C Cook on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 08/01/2014)

08/05/2014 118 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 08/05/2014)

08/19/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 8/19/2014. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 08/19/2014)

08/22/2014

119 ORDER-The parties SHALL conduct a face-to-face meeting to develop a discovery plan and file a joint meeting report by 8/29/2014. Larry Ward's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order 97 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED to the extent that it would prohibit Larry Ward from being deposed. The Motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to limit Ward's deposition to questions involving his nonjudicial involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services between Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. and the City of Childersburg. By 8/22/2014,

the parties SHALL file briefs regarding the issues as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/22/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 08/22/2014)

08/22/2014 120 POST-HEARING Brief on Motion to Quash Deposition of Larry Ward 97 (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/22/2014)

08/22/2014 121 SUPPLEMENTAL Brief in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena 97 filed by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 08/22/2014)

08/29/2014

122 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit The City of Childersburg's Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 08/29/2014)

09/02/2014

123 TEXT ORDER - This matter is before the court on an informal request for additional time to file the joint report and proposed discovery order referred to in the court's August 22, 2014 Order 119 . The request is GRANTED. The parties SHALL file the report on or before Tuesday, September 2, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/2/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/02/2014)

09/03/2014

124 JOINT REPORT OF DISCOVERY MEETING by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/03/2014)

09/04/2014

125 TEXT ORDER - In accordance with the telephonic conference held on September 3, 2014, parties are DIRECTED to file a joint status report with the Clerk of the Court on or before September 17, 2014. This report SHALL update the court on the progress the parties are making in the area of the discovery, including the production of a mirror-image of Probation Tracker, along with a sufficient opportunity for counsel (and their respective IT personnel) to test the mirror image against the electronic data produced by the actual software. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/4/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/04/2014)

09/09/2014

126 ORDER AMENDING SCHEDULING ORDER-re: Motion to Compel JCS's Production of Documents 96 ; Motions to Modify Scheduling Order 106 & 118 . The court AMENDS the Scheduling Order 89 and EXTENDS the deadlines as set out: Discovery due by 6/2/2015; Mediation in 8/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 9/14/2015; Pretrial Conference ready in 1/2016; This case will be trial ready in 2/2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/9/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/09/2014)

09/10/2014 127 ORDER granting 122 Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Dft SHALL file its Amended

Answer by 9/12/2014 Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/10/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/10/2014)

09/12/2014

128 ANSWER to 50 Second Amended and Restated Complaint with COUNTERCLAIM against Gina Kay Ray, Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

09/12/2014

129 Transcript of Proceedings held on 8/19/2014, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah Turner, Telephone number 256-656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 10/3/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/14/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/11/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

09/17/2014

130 Discovery STATUS REPORT by Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 09/17/2014)

09/24/2014

131 CORRECTED Transcript of Proceedings held on 8/19/2014, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S Turner, Telephone number 256-656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 10/15/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/27/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/23/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/24/2014)

09/24/2014 132 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel P Evans on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Evans, Daniel) (Entered: 09/24/2014)

10/09/2014 133 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/9/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 10/09/2014)

10/09/2014

134 ORDER-re: Non-Party Larry Wood's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order 97 . The court AFFIRMS and CLARIFIES the Order of 8/22/2014 119 . The motion 97 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED to the extent that it would prohibit nonparty Ward from being deposed. The motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to limit Ward's deposition testimony to questions and answers related to his involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services between JCS and Childersburg. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/9/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 10/09/2014)

10/10/2014

135 MOTION to Compel by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/10/2014)

10/15/2014

136 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Compel 135 . The court REMINDS the parties to brief the Motion 135 in accordance with Exhibit B, attached to the Initial Order 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/15/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 10/15/2014)

10/17/2014

137 ANSWER to City of Childersburg Counterclaims 128 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray.(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/17/2014)

10/17/2014

138 RESPONSE to Motion to Compel 135 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/17/2014)

10/24/2014

139 MOTION to Extend Time to File Reply in Support of Motion to Compel by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/24/2014)

10/27/2014

140 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion for Extension of Time 139 . Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Defendant Childersburg SHALL file its Reply [139-1] on or before Wednesday, October 29, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/27/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 10/27/2014)

10/28/2014 141 REPLY in Support of Motion to Compel 135 filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/28/2014)

10/28/2014

142 Second MOTION to Compel by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/28/2014)

10/31/2014

143 MOTION to Compel Depositions by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Ltr of 6/5/14, # 2 Exhibit B - 30(b)(5)&(6) Notice of Deposition of Childersburg rep, # 3 Exhibit C - Childersburg's Objections to Notice of Deposition)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

10/31/2014

144 MOTION for Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition, # 2 Exhibit Childersburg's Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition, # 3 Exhibit Correspondence)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

11/03/2014

145 ORDER - re: Dft Childersburg's First Motion to Compel 135 ; Childersburg's Second Motion to Compel 142 ; Pltfs' Motion to Compel 143 and Dft Childersburg's Motion for Protective Order 144 . Counsel for dft Childersburg and Pltfs SHALL conduct a face-to-face meet and confer on all outstanding discovery matters by 11/7/2014. Thereafter, by 11/10/2014, counsel SHALL file a joint report advising the court of any remaining discovery issues and a proposed consolidated briefing schedule on the matter. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/3/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 11/03/2014)

11/05/2014

146 RESPONSES to 142 Motion to Compel filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A 7/2/14 Letter from Evans to Pickett, # 2 Exhibit B - 8/15/14 Letter from Evans to Anderson, # 3 Exhibit C - 8/29/14 Letter to Counsel, # 4 Exhibit D - 10/28/14 Letter from Evans to Anderson, # 5 Exhibit E Notice of Deposition of Childersburg rep, # 6 Exhibit F - Notice of Deposition of Brenda Wyers, # 7 Exhibit G - 10/23/14 Letter from Evans to Anderson)(Evans, G) (Entered: 11/05/2014)

11/05/2014

147 ORDER - re: 146 Response to Dft's Second Motion to Compel. Pltfs' response does not conform to the court's order 145 . Although the court will not strike the response, no further responses SHALL be filed on any pending discovery issue until the parties comply with the court's November 11, 2014 Order and the court enters a briefing schedule on these motions. In addition to what is already required, the joint report required by the court's November 3, 2014 Order SHALL also include a summary of argument on each of the issues raised by the parties' respective discovery motions. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/5/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 11/05/2014)

11/10/2014 148 JOINT REPORT of Meet-and-Confer filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 11/10/2014)

11/20/2014

149 ORDER - re: 148 Joint Report of Meet-and-Confer, addressing several outstanding discovery issues. Parties request for additional, consolidated briefing on these issues is GRANTED. Pltfs SHALL file a responsive briefing addressing only these issues by 12/5/2014. If necessary, Childersburg may file a Reply to Pltfs' responsive briefing by 12/10/2014. The parties SHALL otherwise brief the issues raised by the motions in accordance with Exhibit B, attached to the courts Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/20/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 11/20/2014)

12/04/2014 150 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 12/04/2014)

12/05/2014

151 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is the parties' Joint Motion to Extend 150 . The Motion 150 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file a responsive briefing on or before December 8, 2014. Defendants may file a reply on or before December 12, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/5/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 12/05/2014)

12/08/2014

152 Opposition to Motion for Protective Order 144 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1)(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/08/2014

153 RESPONSE in Opposition re 135 MOTION to Compel , 144 MOTION for Protective Order to Limit Scope of Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Deposition Opponents' Submission Responsive To Exhibit B of The Court's Order Regarding the City of Childersburg's Objections to Deposition Notice, Motion For Protective Order (Doc. 144) and Motion to Compel (Doc. 135) (CORRECTED) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs Exhibit 1)(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 12/08/2014)

12/10/2014

154 NOTICE by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re 153 Response in Opposition to Motion,, Errata To Plaintiffs' Opposition (Doc. 153) (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 12/10/2014)

12/11/2014

155 Unopposed MOTION to Extend Time to File Reply in Support of 144 Motion for Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

12/11/2014

156 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to File Reply in Support of Motion for Protective Order 155 . For good cause shown, the Motion 155 is GRANTED. Defendant City of Childersburg SHALL file a reply on or before

December 22, 2014. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/11/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 12/11/2014)

12/22/2014

157 Consolidated RESPONSE to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, Reply in Support of Motion for Protective Order, and Reply in Support of Motion to Compel filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 12/22/2014)

12/29/2014

158 Plaintiffs' Motion For Permission to File A Reply To The City of Childersburg's Brief In Support Of Its Motion For Protective Order by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 12/29/2014)

12/30/2014

159 ORDER -re: 158 Motion for Permission to File a Reply. The Motion is GRANTED. By 1/2/2015, Plts SHALL file their sur-reply. The remaining issues raised are SET for a hearing on 1/7/2015 at 1:00p.m., in Courtroom 7A of the Hugo L Black US Courthouse. Counsel for both Pltfs and Childersburg SHALL attend. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

12/31/2014

160 REPLY 157 The City Of Childersburg's New Argument Based On Its Counterclaim For Declaratory Relief filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 12/31/2014)

01/07/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 1/7/2015 re 135 MOTION to Compel filed by Childersburg, City of, The, 142 Second MOTION to Compel filed by Childersburg, City of, The, 144 MOTION for Protective Order to Limit Scope of Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Deposition filed by Childersburg, City of, The. The court will enter a separate order. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/08/2015

161 ORDER-re: 135 Motion to Compel, 142 Second Motion to Compel, 143 Motion to Compel Depositions, and 144 Motion for Protective Order. The court ORDERS that Motion 135 is DENIED, by 1/26/2015, Dfts SHALL disclose the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information, which they have not previously disclosed. By 1/30/2015, Pltfs SHALL disclose the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information, which they have not previously disclosed. Motion 144 is GRANTED IN PART. By 1/23/2015, Dft SHALL deliver a Rule 30(b)(6) representative to testify as to the topics enumerated in Plaintiffs Deposition Notice. Motions 142 & 143 are ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED as MOOT. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/8/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/13/2015

162 MOTION to Quash Subpoena and MOTION for Protective Order by Brenda Wyers. (Attachments: # 1 Subpoena, # 2 9.25.14 Letter, # 3 Doctor's Evaluation, # 4 Psychologist Letter, # 5 10.24.14 Letter)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 01/13/2015)

01/16/2015

163 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is nonparty Brenda Wyers Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order 162 . This matter is SET for a teleconference at 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday, January 20, 2015. The court will initiate the call to counsel for Plaintiffs, Defendants, and nonparty Wyers. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/16/15. (CTS, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)

01/20/2015

164 OPPOSITION to 162 Motion to Quash Subpoena And For Protective Order filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 01/20/2015)

01/20/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 1/20/2015. The court will enter a separate order. (KLL) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

01/21/2015

165 ORDER denying 162 Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order. Wyers SHALL consult psychiatrist, or other physician, regarding her current and future ability to sit for a deposition in this matter as a non-party. By 1/30/2015. Wyers SHALL update the parties as to her ability to sit for the noticed depositions based on an updated medical evaluation. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/21/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

02/10/2015

166 Transcript of Proceedings held on 1/7/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 3/3/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/13/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/11/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 02/10/2015)

02/16/2015

167 MOTION to Amend 126 Scheduling Order by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/16/2015)

02/16/2015

168 NOTICE of Appearance by Larry S Logsdon on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 02/16/2015)

02/16/2015

169 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael L Jackson on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/16/2015)

02/16/2015

170 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Bromberg, C) (Entered: 02/16/2015)

02/17/2015

171 ORDER -Pltfs' Unopposed Motion to Amend Scheduling Order 167 and Dfts' Motion to Withdraw Attorney 170 are GRANTED. The deadlines in the Scheduling Order are EXTENDED as set out. Discovery due by 8/31/2015; Mediation in 11/2015; Dispositive Motion due by 12/14/2015; Pretrial conference ready in 4/2026; This case will be trial ready in 5/2016. The law firm of Starnes Davis Florie LLP and attorneys Jay M. Ezelle, C. Clayton Bromberg, Jr., and Stephen A. Sistrunk are TERMINATED. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/17/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 02/17/2015)

02/24/2015

172 MOTION FOR PRESERVATION ORDER by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A 11/28/12 Letter, # 2 Exhibit B - 10/8/14 Letter from Defense Counsel, # 3 Exhibit C - Proposed Preservation Order)(Evans, G) (Entered: 02/24/2015)

02/24/2015

173 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Preservation Order 172 . The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 172 in accordance with Exhibit B, which is attached to the Initial Order 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/24/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 02/24/2015)

02/27/2015 174 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Childersburg, City of, The. (Pickett, Daniel) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

02/27/2015

175 TEXT ORDER- This matter is before the court on the Motion to Withdraw filed by attorney Daniel R. Pickett. 174 The Motion 174 is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate attorney Pickett. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/27/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 02/27/2015)

03/03/2015

176 RESPONSE to 172 Motion for Preservation Order filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/03/2015)

03/06/2015

177 REPLY to 176 JCS' Objection for Preservation Order filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - 2 23 15 ltr to Logsdon & Jackson, # 2 Exhibit 2 - 10 21 14 ltr to G Willcox, # 3 Exhibit 3 - 10 28 14 ltr From G Willcox, # 4 Exhibit 4 - 11 20 14 ltr from C Bromberg, # 5 Supplement Deposition Excerpts of Lisha Kidd)(Evans, G) (Entered: 03/06/2015)

03/10/2015

178 MOTION to Strike 177 Reply to JCS's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Preservation Order by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/10/2015

179 ORDER -A hearing on all outstanding motions in this case is SET for 3/19/2015 at 10:00a.m, in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L Black US Courthouse. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/10/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 03/10/2015)

03/17/2015

180 TEXT ORDER - The hearing scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 19, 2015, is POSTPONED. On or before Monday, March 23, 2015, the parties SHALL submit to the court proposed dates and times for a rescheduled hearing. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/17/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 03/17/2015)

03/20/2015 181 MOTION to Compel by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

03/23/2015

182 TEXT ORDER - The hearing previously scheduled for March 19, 2015, is RESET for 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, April 7, 2015, in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse, 1729 5th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/23/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 03/23/2015)

03/24/2015

183 RESPONSE to Motion re 181 MOTION to Compel PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO CHILDERSBURGS SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Ltr to Conrad Anderson 3 17 15, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Ltr to Conrad Anderson 2 17 15, # 3 Exhibit 3 Childersburg's 9 14 Report, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 5 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 6 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 7 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 8 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 9 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 10 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 11 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 12 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 13 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 14 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 15 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 16 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 17 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 18 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants, # 19 Exhibit 4 - Recalled Warrants)(Evans, G) (Entered: 03/24/2015)

04/06/2015

184 ORDER -re: Motion for Preservation Order 172 and Motion to Compel 181 . The court ORDERS that Motion 172 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the hearing scheduled for 4/7/2015 is CONTINUED GENERALLY. By 4/24/2015, the parties SHALL submit a joint report updating the court on the progress the parties have made in discovery and any issues that the parties foresee in meeting the remaining court-mandated deadlines. A hearing is SET for 4/28/2015 at 1:30p.m., in Courtroom 7A. At this hearing, the court will consider both the Motion to Compel 181 and the status of all remaining scheduling deadlines. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/6/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 04/06/2015)

04/24/2015

185 TEXT ORDER - Upon the informal request of the parties, the deadline for the joint report due April 24, 2015, is EXTENDED, and the parties SHALL file the joint report on or before Tuesday, April 28, 2015. In addition, the hearing previously set for April 28, 2015, is RESET for 1:30 p.m. on Monday, May 4, 2015, in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse, 1729 5th Avenue North, Birmingham Alabama 35203. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/24/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 04/24/2015)

04/28/2015 186 PARTIES' Joint Submission in Response to the Court's Order of April 6, 2015 by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 04/28/2015)

05/01/2015

187 DEPOSITION of Misty Hepp taken on 4/29/15 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Deposition Excerpts of Misty Hepp, # 2 Exhibit 186 to Hepp Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 187 to Hepp Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 198 to Hepp Deposition, # 5 Exhibit 202 to Hepp Deposition, # 6 Exhibit 214 to Hepp Deposition, # 7 Exhibit 215 to Hepp Deposition)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/01/2015

188 SUPPLEMENTAL Submission to Parties' Joint Submission 186 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Depo Notice of 30(b)(6) rep)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/04/2015 189 Brief Regarding Scope of Court Clerk and Magistrate Misty Hepp's Deposition Testimony. (Willcox, Ginny) (Entered: 05/04/2015)

05/04/2015

190 Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Deposition Responses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 184 - Ltr - Childersburg to Kidd 3/15/14, # 2 Exhibit 185 - Ltr - Childersburg to Kidd 8/27/14, # 3 Exhibit 197 Misty Hepp Oath of Office, # 4 Exhibit 201 - Court History printout, # 5 Exhibit 216 - Subpoena to Ms. Jeffares, # 6 Exhibit 188 - 10/23/14 ltr re overpayment, # 7 Exhibit 218 -Order of Probation)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/04/2015)

05/04/2015

191 RESPONSE to 188 Supplemental Submissions to Parties' Joint Submission filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 05/04/2015)

05/04/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 5/4/2015 re 181 MOTION to Compel filed by Childersburg, City of. The court will enter a separate order outlining the briefing schedule as discussed at the hearing. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 05/04/2015)

05/05/2015

192 ORDER-re: Motion to Compel 181 , the parties' Joint Status Report 186 , and the parties' supporting briefs 187 , 188 , 189 , 190 , 191 . The court ORDERS that all deadlines falling on or after 5/18/2015, are STAYED pending Pltf's notice to the court that the subjects of discovery related to the Probation Tracker database have been satisfactorily provided. By 5/25/2015, if Dfts have not provided Pltfs with the appropriate access, Ptlfs SHALL request the court to hold a status conference on the issue. By 5/18/2015, the parties SHALL file briefs regarding Dft Childersburg's assertions of qualified immunity. By 5/26/2015, the parties MAY file reply briefs. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/5/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 05/05/2015)

05/07/2015

193 Transcript of Proceedings held on 5/4/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256)-656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 5/28/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/7/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/5/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 05/07/2015)

05/18/2015

194 BRIEF on Claims of Judicial Immunity as a Bar to Discovery by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Misty Hepp)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

05/18/2015 195 MOTION to Reconsider by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Deposition of Lisha

Kidd 6 25 14, # 2 Exhibit B - JCS docs, # 3 Exhibit C - Examples of blank orders)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

05/18/2015

196 MOTION to Compel Former Judge Larry Ward To Answer Deposition Questions by Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Motion To Compel Larry Ward To Answer Deposition Questions, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12)(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

05/18/2015 197 SECOND Brief Regarding the Scope of Court Clerk and Magistrate Misty Hepp's Immunity. (Willcox, Ginny) (Entered: 05/18/2015)

05/26/2015

198 MOTION to Set Status Conference by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

05/26/2015

199 REPLY Brief regarding the Scope of Court Clerk and Magistrate Misty Hepp's Immunity filed by The City of Childersburg. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

05/26/2015

200 REPLY Brief Regarding Judicial Immunity of Misty Hepp filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

05/27/2015

201 MOTION for Briefing Schedule on 195 Motion to Reconsider and 196 Motion to Compel Directed to a Non-Party to the Case by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 05/27/2015)

05/28/2015

202 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Non-Party Larry Ward's Motion for Briefing Schedule on Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Compel Directed to a Non-Party to the Case 201 . For good cause shown, the Motion 201 is GRANTED. On or before Wednesday, June 10, 2015, Ward SHALL respond to each of Plaintiffs' pending motions [195, 196]. Any reply by Plaintiffs is due on or before Friday, June 19, 2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/28/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

05/28/2015

203 MOTION to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/28/2015)

06/04/2015

204 MOTION to Strike and Response to 203 the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C,

# 2 Exhibit D, # 3 Exhibit E, # 4 Exhibit F, # 5 Exhibit G, # 6 Exhibit H, # 7 Exhibit I, # 8 Exhibit J)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/04/2015)

06/04/2015

205 RESPONSE in Opposition re 203 MOTION to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd Notice of Filing Under Seal filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/04/2015)

06/08/2015

206 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Documents Under Seal by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/08/2015

207 MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/08/2015

208 REPLY to JCS and in Support of 203 Motion to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Examples of questions and responses)(Evans, G) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/08/2015

209 RESPONSE in Opposition to 207 Motion to Seal Documents filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/08/2015 210 RESPONSE to 198 Motion for Set Status Conference filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/08/2015)

06/09/2015

211 REPLY to 209 Plaintiffs' Opposition to Its Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/09/2015)

06/10/2015 212 RESPONSE in Opposition to 195 Motion to Reconsider filed by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 06/10/2015)

06/10/2015 213 OPPOSITION to 196 Motion to Compel filed by Larry Ward. (Bolus, John) (Entered: 06/10/2015)

06/10/2015 214 RESPONSE in Opposition to 195 Motion to Reconsider filed by The City of Childersburg. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 06/10/2015)

06/15/2015

215 ORDER-re: 198 Motion to Set Status Conference. The motion is GRANTED IN PART. This case is SET for a hearing on 6/25/2015 at 10:00a.m., in Courtroom 7A of the Hugo L Black US Courthouse. The court will address all pending motions at the hearing. Counsel for all parties SHALL attend. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/15/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/15/2015)

06/16/2015

216 ORDER -re: 206 Motion for Extension of Time, and 207 Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal. The court ORDERS that Motion 206 is GRANTED. Motion 207 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. By 6/17/2015, JCS SHALL file unredacted versions of Exhibits A and B to its Response to Motion to Compel Deposition which contain sensitive personal, identifying information UNDER SEAL. JCS SHALL also file redacted versions of those documents on the public record. The parties SHALL review the record and identify any previous filing which discloses information or documents that refer to, reflect upon, or relate to: any current or former probationer supervised by JCS, or the City of Childersburg, or any current or former employee of JCS or the City. By 6/25/2015, the parties SHALL file redacted versions of these documents for the public record. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/16/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/16/2015)

06/17/2015 217 ***Document Sealed -Pursuant to Order (doc# 216). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (AVC) (Entered: 06/17/2015)

06/17/2015

218 MOTION to Reset Status Conference Or To Excuse One Of Their Attorneys From Attending by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 06/17/2015)

06/17/2015

219 NOTICE of Filing Redacted Exhibits A&B to Response to Motion to Compel Deposition Pursuant to Order 216 filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Redacted, # 2 Exhibit BRedacted)(Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 06/17/2015)

06/18/2015

220 MOTION to Permit Consolidated Reply to the Three Briefs Filed In Opposition to Their Motion To Compel And Motion To Reconsider by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 06/18/2015)

06/18/2015

221 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Permit a Consolidated Reply to the Three Briefs Filed in Opposition to Their Motion to Compel and Motion to Reconsider 220 . For good cause shown, the Motion 220 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their reply briefs on or before Friday, June 19, 2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/18/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/18/2015)

06/19/2015

222 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Plaintiffs' motion to reset the status conference scheduled in this case. 218 . For good cause shown, the motion 218 is GRANTED. The hearing previously set for June 25, 2015, is CANCELED and RESET for 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 2, 2015, in Courtroom 7A of the Hugo L. Black U.S. Courthouse. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/19/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/19/2015)

06/19/2015

223 Consolidated Reply Brief to 212 , 213 and 214 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 06/19/2015)

06/19/2015

224 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Third Amended and Restated Complaint, # 2 Exhibit A Third Amended and Restated Complaint, # 3 Exhibit A - Third Amended and Restated Complaint)(Evans, G) (Entered: 06/19/2015)

06/22/2015

225 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 224 . The Motion 224 is opposed. The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 224 in accordance with Exhibit B, attached to the court's Initial Order 17 . Specifically, Defendants SHALL file any responsive submission to Plaintiffs' Motion 224 on or before Monday, June 29, 2015. Plaintiffs SHALL file any reply on or before Wednesday, July 1, 2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/22/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/22/2015)

06/22/2015 226 Brief in Support of 224 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint . (Evans, G) (Entered: 06/22/2015)

06/25/2015

227 NOTICE of Filing Redacted Documents Pursuant to Order 216 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Hepp depo exh 201 (Doc 190-4), # 2 Exhibit B - Hepp depo exh 218 - (Doc 197-7), # 3 Exhibit C - Exb B to Mot Reconsider (Doc 195-2, pg 7,14-15))(Evans, G) (Entered: 06/25/2015)

06/29/2015

228 MOTION for Persmission to File A Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 223 filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

06/29/2015

229 OPPOSITION to 224 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

06/29/2015

230 RESPONSE in Opposition to 224 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

06/30/2015

231 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is the City of Childersburg's Motion for Permission to File a Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 228 . The Motion 228 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file any response on or before July 1, 2015 by 4:30 PM. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/29/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 06/30/2015)

06/30/2015 232 Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 223 Motion to Reconsider filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 06/30/2015)

07/01/2015

233 REPLY to 230 Opposition to File Amended Complaint filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

07/01/2015

234 REPLY to 229 Opposition to File Amended Complaint filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Plaintiffs' 1st 30B JCS notice of deposition, # 2 Exhibit B - 3/16/15 ltr with 30B depo notice, # 3 Exhibit C - Logsdon 3/20/15 email, # 4 Exhibit D - 4/1/15 ltr to Logsdon, # 5 Exhibit E - 4/2/15 lrt to Logdson, # 6 Exhibit F - Corp Disclosure - ND Ohio case, # 7 Exhibit G - Emails re JCS's corp disclosure, # 8 Exhibit H - Kidd bankruptcy info, # 9 Exhibit I - Revised depo notice for 30B of CHC, Inc., # 10 Exhibit J CHC Objection to Proposed depo notice, # 11 Exhibit K - 6/10/15 ltr to Logsdeon re docs and supp disclosures, # 12 Exhibit L - AL SOS re CHC Companies)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

07/01/2015

235 RESPONSE to 232 Sur-Reply filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Wiggins, Robert) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

07/01/2015

236 Supplemental Response to 198 Motion for Status Conference filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2015)

07/02/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 7/2/2015. A separate order will be entered by the court addressing re 203 MOTION to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, 196 MOTION to Compel Former Judge Larry Ward To Answer Deposition Questions filed by Gina Kay Ray, 224 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, 195 MOTION to Reconsider filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 07/02/2015)

07/06/2015

237 ORDER-re: City of Childersburg's Motion to Compel 181 , Pltfs' Oral Motion to Compel the Deposition of Misty Hepp, Pltfs' Motion to Recondiser 195 , Pltfs' Motion to Compel 196 , Pltfs' Motion to Compel Deposition of Lisha Kidd 203 , and Pltfs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Compliant 224 . Motion 181 is GRANTED. By 7/20/2015, the parties SHALL file initial disclosures that more completely comply with FRCP 26. Pltfs' Oral Motion to Compel the Deposition of Misty Hepp is GRANTED. Hepp SHALL testify in a court-supervised deposition that may last no more than two (2) hours. The court will confer with the

07/08/2015 07/10/2015
07/10/2015

parties in setting a date and time for this deposition. Motions 195 & 196 are DENIED. Motion 203 is GRANTED. Motion 224 is GRANTED IIN PART and DENIED IN PART. To the extent pltfs seek leave to add additional dfts, the motion is GRANTED. To the extent Pltfs seek leave to otherwise amend their Second Amended Complaint to add new claims and/or theories, the motion is DENIED. By 7/10/2015, Pltfs SHALL file their Third Amended Complaint in compliance with this Order. By 7/8/2015, Pltfs SHALL submit in camera the letter Pltfs sent to potential class members, which was addressed at the July 2 hearing. By 7/20/2015, Pltfs SHALL serve on Dft City of Childersburg an amended 30(b)(6) notice that is narrowly tailored to those topics that the City has not yet addressed. To the extent there is disagreement over the scope of the topics noticed, the parties SHALL meet and confer before filing any additional motion with the court. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/6/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/06/2015)
238 MOTION for Leave to File Motion to Compel Under Seal by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/08/2015)
239 ***TERMINATED***, pursuant to Order 244 THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED COMPLAINT against Childersburg, Alabama, Childersburg, City of, The, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC, filed by Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Order of Probation, # 2 Exhibit B - Mail in Form, # 3 Exhibit C - Daily Tasks, # 4 Exhibit D - Order to withhold adjudication, # 5 Exhibit E - Reporting for Probation Form, # 6 Exhibit F - Violation of Terms Letter, # 7 Exhibit G Violation of Terms Letter, # 8 Exhibit H - Warrant Instructions, # 9 Exhibit I - Warrant Dismissal Instructions, # 10 Exhibit J - Case Management Reports, # 11 Exhibit K - Childerburg Termination Notice of JCS, # 12 Exhibit L - Fuggat receipt & JCS notice, # 13 Exhibit M Tim Fuggat's case PIF, # 14 Exhibit N - Kristy Fuggat on Probation, # 15 Exhibit O - Jews assessed cc on dismissed case, # 16 Exhibit P JCS jail recommendation, # 17 Exhibit Q - Jews' receipt, # 18 Exhibit R JCS contract with Childersburg)(Evans, G) Modified on 7/14/2015 (AVC). (Entered: 07/10/2015)
240 Request for service by certified mail filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/10/2015)

07/10/2015

241 Request for service by certified mail filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/10/2015)

07/13/2015 242 Summons Issued as to CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC; mailed certified mail. (AVC) (Entered: 07/13/2015)

07/13/2015

243 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel Under Seal 238 . For good cause shown, the Motion 238 is GRANTED. As soon as practicable, Plaintiffs SHALL file their motion to compel the deposition of Brenda Wyers under seal. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/13/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/13/2015)

07/13/2015

244 ORDER -The court has received an objection that Pltfs' Third Amended Complaint 239 does not comply with the court's 7/6/2015 Order 237 . The court and parties SHALL proceed as follows: Pltfs' Third Amended Complaint 239 is ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED. The court ORDERS that by 7/20/2015, the parties SHALL have a face-to-face meeting to discuss Pltfs' Third Amended Complaint and to ensure that the pleading complies with the court's 237 . By 7/27/2015, Pltf SHALL re-file its Third Amended Complaint. If any objections to the pleading remain, dfts MAY file a motion in accordance with Exhibit B, which is attached to the Initial Order 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/13/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/13/2015)

07/14/2015

245 SEALED MOTION-pursuant to Order (doc# 243)-Sealed Motion to Compel Deposition of Brenda Wyers by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11)(AVC) (Entered: 07/15/2015)

07/16/2015

246 Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/2/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 8/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for

07/16/2015

8/16/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/14/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
247 IMAGE removed - docketing error (Entered: 07/16/2015)

07/16/2015 248 IMAGE removed - docketing error (Entered: 07/16/2015)

07/16/2015 249 IMAGE removed - docketing error (Entered: 07/16/2015)

07/16/2015 07/16/2015

250 Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/2/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 8/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/16/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/14/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
251 ***SEALED***Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/2/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 8/6/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/16/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/14/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/16/2015)

07/20/2015

252 SUMMONS Returned Executed CHC Companies, Inc.; Correct Care Solutions, LLC served on 7/15/2015, answer due 8/5/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/20/2015)

07/22/2015 253 Summons Returned Unexecuted as to CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (AVC) (Entered: 07/22/2015)

07/22/2015 254 NOTICE of Intent to Request Redaction of Portions of 251 by Childersburg, City of, The (Leavens, Ginny) (Entered: 07/22/2015)

07/27/2015

255 TEXT ORDER -Before the court is nonparty Brenda Wyers's informal request to file a response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 245 under seal. For good cause shown, this request is GRANTED. On or before Wednesday, July 29, 2015, nonparty Wyers SHALL file her responsive submission under seal. The Clerk of the Court is also DIRECTED to file any subsequent reply pertaining to Plaintiff's Motion 245 under seal. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/27/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/27/2015)

07/27/2015

256 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND RESTATED COMPLAINT against CHC Companies, Inc., Childersburg, City of, The, Correct Care Solutions, LLC, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, filed by Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Order of Probation, # 2 Exhibit B - Mail in Form, # 3 Exhibit C - Daily Tasks, # 4 Exhibit D - Order to withhold adjudication, # 5 Exhibit E - Reporting for Probation Form, # 6 Exhibit F - Violation of Terms Letter, # 7 Exhibit G - Violation of Terms Letter, # 8 Exhibit H - Warrant Instructions, # 9 Exhibit I - Warrant Dismissal Instructions, # 10 Exhibit J - Case Management Reports, # 11 Exhibit K - Fugatt receipts, # 12 Exhibit L - Deunate Jews' Receipt, # 13 Exhibit M - Fugatt receipt and notice, # 14 Exhibit N - Childerburg Terminates JCS contract)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/27/2015)

07/27/2015

257 Request for service by certified mail filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/27/2015)

07/27/2015

258 Request for service by certified mail filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/27/2015)

07/28/2015 259 ALIAS Summons Issued as to CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC; mailed certified mail. (AVC) (Entered: 07/28/2015)

07/28/2015

260 ***Document Sealed-Pursuant to Order (doc# 255)-Response of NonParty Brenda Wyers to Motion to Compel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (AVC) (Entered: 07/28/2015)

07/31/2015

261 SUMMONS Returned Executed CHC Companies, Inc.; Correct Care Solutions, LLC served on 7/30/2015, answer due 8/20/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/31/2015)

08/05/2015

262 TEXT ORDER - On or before Tuesday, August 18, 2015, the parties are ORDERED to submit a joint report that details the current status of discovery in this case and informs the court as to the parties' anticipated schedule for concluding discovery. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/5/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 08/05/2015)

08/10/2015 263 ANSWER to 256 Third Amended Complaint by Childersburg, City of, The.(Leavens, Ginny) (Entered: 08/10/2015)

08/13/2015

264 CORRECTED ANSWER to 256 Third Amended Complaint and COUNTERCLAIM against All Plaintiffs by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Standing Order)(Espy, Chase) (Entered: 08/13/2015)

08/17/2015 265 MOTION to Dismiss by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 08/17/2015)

08/18/2015

266 TEXT ORDER - This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 265 . The parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached to the court's September 18, 2012 Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/18/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 08/18/2015)

08/18/2015

267 Parties' Joint Submission in Response to the Court's Order of August 5, 2015 262 filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 08/18/2015)

08/21/2015

268 MOTION for Protective Order and Sanctions by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 08/21/2015)

08/21/2015

269 TEXT ORDER - Before the court is Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions 268 . Plaintiffs and Defendant City of Childersburg SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached to the court's September 18, 2012 Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/21/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 08/21/2015)

08/24/2015

270 RESPONSE in Opposition 265 Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/24/2015)

08/27/2015

271 REPLY to 270 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 08/27/2015)

08/28/2015

272 RESPONSE to 268 Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions < filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Notice of Deposition of 30(b)(b) rep of Childersburg, # 2 Exhibit B - Sandra Donahoo depo excerpts - re no knowledge, # 3 Exhibit C - Sandra Donahoo depo excerpts - instructed not to answer, # 4 Exhibit D- 4 30 15 email from Cook to Evans, # 5 Exhibit E - 4/30/15 ltr from Evans to Cook, # 6 Exhibit F - Aimee Burnette depo excerpts - no knowledge, # 7 Exhibit G - 7 1 15 ltr from Willcox re Chief Wesson, # 8 Exhibit H - Revised 30(b)(6) depo notice of Childersburg, # 9 Exhibit I - 8/3/15 Ltr from Willcox to Evans re depo topics, # 10 Exhibit J - 8/10/15 from Evans to Willcox re topics, # 11 Exhibit K - 7 14 15 Email from Anderson to Evans, # 12 Exhibit L 7/16/15 Email from Tankersley to Evans)(Evans, G) (Entered: 08/28/2015)

08/28/2015

273 NOTICE of Filing Depositions of Sandra Donahoo taken on 4/30/15 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Sandra Donahoo)(Evans, G) (Entered: 08/28/2015)

08/28/2015

274 NOTICE of Filing Depositions of Aimee Burnette taken on 5/21/15 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Aimee Burnette)(Evans, G) (Entered: 08/28/2015)

08/28/2015

275 NOTICE of Filing Depositions of Misty Hepp taken on 8/4/15 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition of Misty Hepp)(Evans, G) (Entered: 08/28/2015)

08/31/2015

276 ANSWER to 256 Third Amended and Restated Complaint by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc.(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 08/31/2015)

08/31/2015

277 REPLY in Support of 268 Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 08/31/2015)

09/02/2015 278 MOTION for Preservation Order by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/02/2015)

09/03/2015

279 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Preservation Order 278 . The court notes that it is perplexed that in this age of high-speed communications over various media, the parties were unable to confer prior to Plaintiffs filing this Motion. Because this Motion is therefore opposed, the parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached to the court's September 18, 2012 Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/3/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

09/09/2015

280 RESPONSE to 278 Second Motion for Preservation Order filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 09/09/2015)

09/14/2015

281 REPLY in Support of 278 Motion for Preservation Order filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Deposition of Lisha Kidd 9/1/15)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/14/2015)

09/24/2015

282 RENEWED Motion to Compel Deposition of 30(b) Representative of the City of Childersburg and Motion to Compel Discovery by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - 8 26 15 Ltr from Evans to Cook, # 2 Exhibit 2 - 8 28 15 ltr from Anderson to Evans, # 3 Exhibit 3 - 9 16 15 ltr from Evans to Cook, # 4 Exhibit 4 - 9 18 15 ltr from Cook to Evans, # 5 Exhibit 5 - 9 21 15 ltr from Evans to Cook, # 6 Exhibit 6 - 9 23 15 ltr from Cook to Evans)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/24/2015)

09/25/2015

283 TEXT ORDER-Before the court is Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel Deposition of 30(b)(6) Representative of the City of Childersburg And Motion to Compel Discovery 282 . The parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached to the court's September 18, 2012 Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/25/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 09/25/2015)

09/28/2015

284 Supplemental Response to 278 Second Motion for Preservation Order filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 09/28/2015)

10/01/2015

285 RESPONSE to 282 Renewed Motion to Compel filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

10/05/2015

286 REPLY in Support of 282 Renewed Motion to Compel filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Notice of Depo of Doug Wesson, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Email from Willcox 6 4 15 cancelling Wesson depo, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Notice of

Depo of Wesson for 6 9 15, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Email from Anderson re Wesson depo, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Willcox ltr of 8 14 14, # 6 Exhibit 6 - Hepp depo notice for 4 29 15)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/05/2015)

10/10/2015 287 NOTICE of Change of Address by Fredrick Lane Finch, Jr (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/10/2015)

10/10/2015

288 NOTICE of Appearance by Brian C Richardson on behalf of CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 10/10/2015)

10/14/2015

289 MOTION to File Sur-Reply in Opposition to CHCC and CCS's Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

10/14/2015

290 ORDER -re: 289 Motion to File Sur-Reply in Opposition to CHCC and CCS's Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint. The motion is GRANTED. Pltfs are DIRECTED to file the Sur-Reply. Further, Pltf's request to file under seal the document dated 9/30/2011 is GRANTED. The document SHALL be filed under seal. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/14/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

10/14/2015

291 SUR-REPLY in 265 Opposition to CHCC and CCS's Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 Management Services Agr between CHC & CSS, # 2 Exhibit 3 Supplmental Disclosure Stmts of CHC & JCS)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/14/2015)

10/15/2015

292 ***Document Sealed, Pursuant to Order 290 -Exhibit 1 to Sur-Reply in Opposition to CHCC and CCS's Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (AVC) (Entered: 10/15/2015)

10/27/2015 293 Corporate Disclosure Statement by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/27/2015)

10/27/2015 294 Corporate Disclosure Statement by CHC Companies, Inc.(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/27/2015)

12/18/2015

295 ORDER- This case is SET for a hearing on 12/29/2015 at 3:30p.m., on all pending motions (Docs# 245 , 265 , 268 , 278 , 282 ) in chambers of the undersigned located at the Hugo L Black US Courthouse. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/18/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/18/2015)

12/29/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 12/29/2015 re 278 MOTION for Preservation Order filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy

Fugatt, 265 MOTION to Dismiss filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 245 SEALED MOTION filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, 282 RENEWED Motion to Compel Deposition of 30(b) Representative of the City of Childersburg and Motion to Compel Discovery filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt. A separate order will be entered by the court outlining the new deadlines as discussed at the hearing. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 12/29/2015)

12/30/2015

NOTICE of Referral to Mediation. Magistrate Judge John E Ott has been randomly drawn to mediate this action. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

296 ORDER -re: 278 Motion for Preservation Order. In accordance with the reasons set forth on the record at the 12/29/2015 Hearing, the Motion is MOOT. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

297 ORDER -re: Letters submitted to the court for in camera review. The court ORDERS that the class communications at issue were proper. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

298 ORDER- re: Motion to Compel Deposition of Brenda Wyers 245 ; and Renewed Motion to Quash 260 . The court hereby ORDERS that the Motion to Compel 245 is GRANTED IN PART, as set out. The Renewed Motion to Quash 260 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The court DENIES the request to quash the subpoena. The subpoena is MODIFIED as set out. The court GRANTS the Motion insofar as it requests an appropriate protective order. The court hereby ENTERS a Protective Order to relieve Ms. Wyers of the burdens of a verbal deposition as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

299 ORDER -re: Motion to Dismiss 265 . The motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Pltfs' request to file an amended complaint is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. Pltfs SHALL file the amended complaint by 2/1/2016. Counsel for Plts and Dfts CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, SHALL meet and confer before 2/1/2016, regarding the proposed amended complaint. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

300 ORDER -re: Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions 268 . In accordance with the reasons set forth at the 12/29/2015 Hearing, the court AFFIRMS its previous Protective Order 161 . Motion 268 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED to the extent that it would award Dft sanctions. It is GRANTED to the extent the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the City of Childersburg SHALL

be complete once the City makes available a Police Department representative to testify concerning the Police Department's knowledge of the matters set forth in the City's August 3, 2015 letter. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

12/30/2015

301 ORDER- re: Renewed Motion to Compel 282 . The court ORDERS that the Motion is MOOT insofar as it requests further Rule 30(b)(6) testimony from Defendant City of Childersburg. Pltfs' Motion is DENIED insofar as it requests testimony from individual City of Childersburg police officers. The motion is DENIED to the extent that it compels responses to Interrogatory No. 15. The parties SHALL comply with the order as set out. Dft's request for attorneys' fees and sanctions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/30/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/30/2015)

01/05/2016

302 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER-The court hereby MODIFIES the 2/17/2015 Order 171 as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/5/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 01/05/2016)

01/12/2016

303 Transcript of Proceedings held on 12/29/2015, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 2/2/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/12/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/11/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 01/12/2016)

01/15/2016

304 JOINT REPORT Regarding Outstanding Discovery Requests by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Anderson, L) (Entered: 01/15/2016)

02/01/2016

305 FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED COMPLAINT against CHC Companies, Inc., Childersburg, Alabama, Correct Care Solutions, LLC, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc, filed by Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2 - CHC Request to do business in AL, # 2 Exhibit 3 - CHC 7 11 11 2nd Cert of Amendment, # 3 Exhibit 4 CHC Co LTD corp doc, # 4 Exhibit 5 - CHC & CSS CO SOS docs,

# 5 Exhibit 6 - Correct Care Solution docs, # 6 Exhibit A - Order of Probation, # 7 Exhibit B - Mail in form, # 8 Exhibit C - Daily Tasks, # 9 Exhibit D - Order to Withhold adjudication, # 10 Exhibit EReporting to Probation form, # 11 Exhibit F - Violation of terms letter, # 12 Exhibit G - Violations of terms letter, # 13 Exhibit H - Warrant Instructions, # 14 Exhibit I - Warrant Dismissal Instructions, # 15 Exhibit J - Case Management reports, # 16 Exhibit K - Fugatt receipts, # 17 Exhibit L - Jews receipts, # 18 Exhibit M - Fugatt receipt and notice, # 19 Exhibit N - Childersburs Terminates JCS)(Evans, G) (Entered: 02/01/2016)

02/02/2016 306 NOTICE of Change of Address by Daniel P Evans (Evans, Daniel) (Entered: 02/02/2016)

02/05/2016

307 MOTION to Compel and Update to Joint Report Regarding Outstanding Discovery Dispute by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/05/2016)

02/09/2016

308 ORDER-Pltfs' counsel did not request a conference with the court regarding their Motion to Compel 307 even though the court expressly required this prerequisite step. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Pltfs wish to formally move to compel the City of Childersburg to comply with disputed discovery requests, Pltfs SHALL first request a conference with the court. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/9/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 02/09/2016)

02/10/2016

309 Plaintiffs Request for a Conference with the Court Pursuant to Doc. 302 by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/10/2016)

02/11/2016

310 ANSWER and Defenses to 305 Fourth Amended and Restated Complaint against All Plaintiffs by Childersburg, City of, The.(Leavens, Ginny) (Entered: 02/11/2016)

02/16/2016

311 ANSWER to 305 Fourth Amended and Restated Complaint by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC.(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 02/16/2016)

02/16/2016

312 ANSWER to 305 Fourth Amended and Restated Complaint by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc.(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/16/2016)

02/17/2016

313 Plaintiff's Request for Conference With Court by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/17/2016)

02/17/2016

314 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Requests for a Conference with the Court Pursuant to Doc. 302 309 313 . The Requests 309 313 are GRANTED and this case is SET for a conference on March 9, 2016, at 1:00 p.m. in chambers of the undersigned. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/17/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 02/17/2016)

02/18/2016

315 ORDER TEXT Telephone Conference set for 2/22/2016 03:00 PM before Magistrate Judge John E Ott; parties to call 888-808-6929 and use access code 5917763 to participate; Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 2/18/2016. (BST) (Entered: 02/18/2016)

02/22/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Telephone Conference held on 2/22/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 02/22/2016)

02/23/2016

316 ORDER The court will meet with counsel for the plaintiffs on March 17, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. in chambers; The court will meet with counsel for defendants Judicial Corrections Services,Inc.; Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.; CHC Companies, Inc.; and CorrectCare Solutions, LLC; on March 17, 2016, at 1:00 p.m. in chambers;The court will meet with counsel for defendant City of Childersburg on March17, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. in chambers;Mediation with clients will be conducted on April 26 & 27, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.;and,Written materials may be submitted by March 14, 2016, for the March 17, 2016sessions.. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 2/23/2016. (KAM ) (Entered: 02/23/2016)

02/25/2016

317 ORDER re 316 Order, the mediation set for 4/26/16 and 4/27/16 is reset for 5/16/2016 and 5/17/16 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge John E Ott; Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 2/25/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 02/25/2016)

02/29/2016

318 TEXT ORDER - The conference scheduled for March 9, 2016, is RESET for Wednesday, March 2, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. in chambers of the undersigned. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/29/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

02/29/2016

319 RESPONSE to 313 Plaintiffs' Request for Conference with the Court filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Plaintiffs' Fourth Discovery Request to Judicial Correction Services, Inc.), # 2 Exhibit B (Letter from counsel for JCS to counsel for Plaintiffs), # 3 Exhibit C (Excerpts from transcript of hearing on Dec. 29, 2015))(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/29/2016)

03/02/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: In Chambers Conference held on 3/2/2016. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 03/02/2016)

03/07/2016

320 ORDER- re: Joint Report Regarding Outstanding Discovery Requests 304 . In accordance with the instructions set forth as the 3/2/2016 conference, the court hereby ORDERS that the parties SHALL comply with this order as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/7/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 03/07/2016)

03/09/2016

321 Transcript of Proceedings held on 3/2/2016, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 3/30/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/11/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/7/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 03/09/2016)

03/17/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Settlement Conference held on 3/17/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 03/18/2016)

03/23/2016

322 ORDER. This matter is set for a telephone status conference with the undersigned on March 24, 2016, at 4:30 p.m. The parties are to use the court's conference call number (888-808-6929) and passcode (5917763) for the call. The parties should have calendars available for reference. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E. Ott on 3/23/2016. (Ott, John) (Entered: 03/23/2016)

03/25/2016

323 ORDER. Counsel for the parties are to appear on Tuesday April 5, 2016, at 7:30 a.m., in the jury room on the third floor of the Hugo L. Black Courthouse for a pre-mediation strategy session with the undersigned. Clients are not required to attend. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E. Ott on 3/25/2016. (Ott, John) (Entered: 03/25/2016)

04/01/2016

324 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on the parties' informal request for a three (3) day extension of time to file a joint report as directed in paragraph three (3) of the court's March 7, 2016 Order 320 . The request is GRANTED. The parties SHALL file the joint report on or before April 4, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/1/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 04/01/2016)

04/04/2016 325 JOINT REPORT OF THE PARTIES by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 04/04/2016)

04/05/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Settlement Conference held on 4/5/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 04/06/2016)

04/15/2016

326 PROPOSED JOINT SCHEDULING ORDER by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Kalus K Johnson. (Evans, G) (Entered: 04/15/2016)

04/19/2016

327 MODIFIED SCHEDULING ORDER that certain deadlines apply as further set out: Discovery due by 8/31/2016; Dispositive Motions due by 1/26/2017; Pretrial conference ready in 6/2017; This case will be trial ready in 7/2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/19/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 04/19/2016)

04/21/2016 328 Unopposed MOTION for Seven Day Extension by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 04/21/2016)

04/21/2016

329 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on Defendant Childersburg's Unopposed Motion for Seven Day Extension 328 . In the Motion 328 , Childersburg requests an extension of time concerning the deadline for the parties to file briefs on certain issues of Alabama law and whether it is appropriate to certify questions to the Alabama Supreme Court, as set out in more detail in the court's March 7, 2016 Order 320 . The Motion 328 is GRANTED, and the deadline is hereby EXTENDED seven (7) days from April 25, 2016. Accordingly, the parties SHALL file the briefs on or before May 2, 2016.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/21/2016. (KAM, ) (Entered: 04/21/2016)

04/27/2016

330 ORDER- re: Joint Report of the Parties 325 . The court ORDERS: Request for Admission 19. The court ACCEPTS that denial as the answer to the Request. Request for Admission 23. The court CONCLUDES its denial satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. Childersburg is REMINDED of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2). Accordingly, it is FURTHER REMINDED that it may seek to amend its response pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b). Childersburg's objection to Request for Admission 24 is SUSTAINED on the grounds that the request impermissibly calls for a conclusion of law. Additionally, the parties are REMINDED of the requirements of the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2015-particularly the amendments to Rule 26. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/27/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 04/27/2016)

05/02/2016 331 Plaintiffs' Memorandum Brief Addressing the Court's March 7,2016 Order.(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/02/2016

332 Brief Regarding Policymaking Authority Over Municipal Court Judicial Functions by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/02/2016 333 Brief Regarding Municipal Policies and Practices filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/02/2016

334 JOINDER in Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. and The City of Childersburg's Briefs Regarding Municipal Policies filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/03/2016 335 Objections to Plaintiff's Subpoena filed by Susan Fuqua. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 05/03/2016)

05/04/2016

336 Unopposed Supplemental Submission to 331 Plaintiff's Memorandum Brief Addressing the Court's March 7, 2016 Order. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Investigative Report of the DOJ for the City of Ferguson, # 2 Exhibit B - Consent Degree of the DOJ for the City of Ferguson, # 3 Exhibit C - Order of Judge Hub Harrington in Burdette case)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/05/2016 337 Objection to Third Party Subpoenas filed by Velma Tinsley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/10/2016

338 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents From the City of Birmingham, Alabama by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Plaintiffs' Nonparty Subpoena to the City of Birmingham, # 2 Exhibit 2 - City's objections to Nonparty Subpoena, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Plaintiffs' 5/4/16 letter to Brian Kilgore, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Plaintiffs' 5/6/16 letter to Kayle Lawrence)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/10/2016)

05/11/2016

339 ORDER- re: Motion to Compel the Production of Documents from the City of Birmingham, Alabama 338 . Plaintiffs and non-party the City of Birmingham, SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with Exhibit B. The City of Birmingham's responsive submission SHALL be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Plaintiffs' reply submission SHALL be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submission is filed. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/11/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/11/2016)

05/11/2016 340 Objection to Non-Party Subpoena by Neal Armstrong. (Calhoun, Richard) (Entered: 05/11/2016)

05/12/2016

341 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, Or Alternatively for Protective Order by Susan Fuqua. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A part 1, # 2 Exhibit A part 2, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F)(Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

05/12/2016

342 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

05/12/2016

343 ORDER - re: Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, Or Alternatively for Protective Order 341 . Plaintiffs and Ms. Fuqua SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with Exhibit B. Plaintiffs' responsive submission SHALL be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Ms. Fuqua's reply submission SHALL be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submission is filed. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/12/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

05/12/2016

344 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on the City of Childersburg's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order 342 . The parties SHALL brief the issues raised in the Motion 342 in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached to the court's September 18, 2012 Order 10 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/12/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/12/2016)

05/13/2016

345 ORDER- This case is hereby SET for a hearing on June 7, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 7-A, located at the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse, concerning Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and related Motions 338 , 341 , 342 . Counsel for the parties SHALL appear. Counsel for non-parties MAY appear. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/12/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/13/2016)

05/16/2016

346 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 05/16/2016)

05/16/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Settlement Conference held on 5/16/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/17/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Settlement Conference held on 5/17/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

347 RESPONSE to 338 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents From the City of Birmingham filed by Birmingham, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exh A, # 2 Exh B, # 3 Exh C)(Fullerton, Frederic) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

348 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Attorney David A. McDowell by Gregory C Cook on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

PHV Fee paid: $50, Receipt# 1126-2624708 (ALND# B4601071503). (Cook, Gregory) Modified on 5/18/2016 (AVC). (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

349 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on the Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice 348 . The Motion 348 is GRANTED and attorney David A. McDowell for nonparty the City of Prattville is hereby ADMITTED Pro Hac Vice in this case. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/18/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

350 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Amanda Rowland. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Carnes, Jimmy) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

351 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Delana Weaver. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Warnes, Dan) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/18/2016

352 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Charlotte Adair. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(McDowell, David) (Entered: 05/18/2016)

05/19/2016 353 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Amber John. (Livingston, Edwin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

05/19/2016

354 ORDER - re: Motions to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order 350 , 351 , 352 , and 353 . Plaintiffs and non-parties Ms. Rowland, Ms. Weaver, Ms. Adair, and Ms. John SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached hereto. Plaintiffs' responsive submission SHALL be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Ms. Rowland's, Ms. Weaver's, Ms. Adair's, and Ms. John's reply submissions SHALL be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submission is filed. Counsel for non-parties Ms. Rowland, Ms. Weaver, Ms. Adair, and Ms. John MAY attend the June 7, 2016 Hearing concerning Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and other related, similar

Motions 338 , 341 , 342 , and 346 . (See Doc# 345 ). Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/19/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

05/19/2016

355 AMENDED MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Amber John. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Livingston, Edwin) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

05/19/2016

356 RESPONSE in Opposition to the 342 Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - 4/20/16 ltr to counsel, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Email chain between counsel)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

05/19/2016

357 Plaintiffs' Initial Consolidated Motion to Compel The Production of Documents from The City of Hoover, Alabama, and Response to Susan Fuqua's Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Affidavit of Judge Brad Bishop)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/19/2016)

05/20/2016

358 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Velma Tinsley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 05/20/2016)

05/23/2016

359 REPLY to 347 the City of Birmingham's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Brief filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

05/23/2016

360 ORDER - re: Initial Consolidated Motion to Compel the Production of Documents from the City of Hoover, Alabama, and Response to Susan Fuqua's Motion to Quash [357, and non-party Velma Tinsley's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order 358 . Plaintiffs and non-parties the City of Hoover and Ms. Tinsley SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motions in accordance with "Exhibit B," attached hereto and made a part of this order as if fully set out herein. Responsive submissions SHALL be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the entry of this order. Reply submissions SHALL be filed no later than three (3) calendar days after the date on which the responsive submissions are filed. Counsel for non-parties the City of Hoover and Ms. Tinsley MAY attend the June 7, 2016 Hearing concerning Plaintiffs Subpoenas and related Motions. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/23/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

05/23/2016

361 REPLY to Plaintiffs' Opposition to her Motion to Quash, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Susan Fuqua. (Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

05/23/2016

362 REPLY in Support of 342 Motion to Quash/Motion for a Protective Order filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 05/23/2016)

05/26/2016

363 RESPONSE in Opposition to 350 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/26/2016)

05/26/2016

364 RESPONSE in Opposition to 351 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/26/2016)

05/26/2016

365 RESPONSE in Opposition to 352 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/26/2016)

05/26/2016

366 RESPONSE in Opposition to 353 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/26/2016)

05/26/2016

367 RESPONSE in Opposition to 358 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/26/2016)

05/31/2016 368 REPLY in Support of 350 Motion to Quash filed by Amanda Rowland. (Carnes, Jimmy) (Entered: 05/31/2016)

06/02/2016

369 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order by Kenneth H. Nixon, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Holliday, Shannon) (Entered: 06/02/2016)

06/03/2016

370 ORDER- re: Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order 369 . This court has set a hearing on June 7, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. concerning Plaintiffs' Subpoenas to various non-parties. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Mr. Nixon SHALL submit any briefing on Mr. Nixon's Motion on or before 12:00 noon on June 7, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/3/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 06/03/2016)

06/03/2016

371 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition to 338 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents From the City of Birmingham, Alabama filed by Birmingham, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AC Roper Affidavit)(Fullerton, Frederic) (Entered: 06/03/2016)

06/06/2016 372 NOTICE of Filing Affidavit Supporting 341 Susan Fuqua's Motion to Quash and Opposing Plaintiff's 357 Motion to Compel by Susan Fuqua

(Attachments: # 1Affidavit of Jehad Al-Dakka)(Morse, Wayne) (Entered: 06/06/2016)

06/06/2016

373 AMENDMENT to Add Attached Exhibit D to Amber Johns' Motion and Amended Motion to Quash Subpoena by Amber John. (Livingston, Edwin) (Entered: 06/06/2016)

06/06/2016

374 SUPPLEMENTAL Exhibit in Support of 358 Motion to Quash by Velma Tinsley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Kinney, Richard) (Entered: 06/06/2016)

06/07/2016 375 NOTICE of Appearance by Wilson F Green on behalf of Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

06/07/2016

376 RESPONSE in Opposition to 369 Motion to Quash filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - 5/18/16 Ltr from Holliday, # 2 Exhibit 2 - 5/20/16 Ltr fro Parrish)(Evans, G) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

06/07/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 6/7/2016 re 357 Plaintiffs' Initial Consolidated Motion to Compel The Production of Documents from The City of Hoover, Alabama, and Response to Susan Fuqua's Motion to Quash filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, 351 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Delana Weaver, 346 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 341 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, Or Alternatively for Protective Order filed by Susan Fuqua, 338 MOTION to Compel the Production of Documents From the City of Birmingham, Alabama filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, 358 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Velma Tinsley, 352 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Charlotte Adair, 342 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order filed by Childersburg, City of, The, 353 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Amber John, 355 AMENDED MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Amber John, 350 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Amanda Rowland, 369 MOTION to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order filed by Kenneth H. Nixon, Jr. The parties shall have a face-to-face meet and confer within three weeks and shall file a

joint report two weeks thereafter. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 06/08/2016)

06/08/2016

377 ORDER-In accordance with the 6/7/2016 Hearing, the court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents from the City of Birmingham, Alabama 338 and Initial Consolidated Motion To Compel the Production of Documents from the City of Hoover, Alabama, and Response to Susan Fuqua's Motion To Quash 357 are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Nonparties Susan Fuqua's, Amanda Rowland's, Delana Weaver's, Charlotte Adair's, Velma Tinsley's, and Kenneth H. Nixon, Jr.'s Motions To Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order 341 , 350 , 351 , 352 , 358 , 369 , nonparty Amber John's Amended Motion To Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoena, or Alternatively for a Protective Order 355 , and Defendants the City of Childersburg's and CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC's Motions To Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas and, in the Alternative, Motion for a Protective Order 342 , 346 are GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. By 6/29/2016, the parties and the subpoenaed non-parties SHALL meet and confer face-to-face concerning a less costly and time-consuming process for obtaining the information sought in the Subpoenas. By 7/8/2016, the parties and non-parties SHALL submit a joint report concerning this process and the current status of that information exchange. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/8/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 06/08/2016)

06/15/2016

378 Transcript of Proceedings held on 6/7/2016, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 7/6/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/18/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/13/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 06/15/2016)

06/17/2016 379 STATUS REPORT by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 06/17/2016)

06/30/2016 380 TEXT ORDER - This case is hereby SET for a discovery status call on July 14, 2016, at 2:30 p.m., concerning the matters set forth in

Plaintiffs' June 17, 2016 letter 379 . The court will initiate the call. A court reporter will be present. Further, the parties SHALL submit position letters of no longer than four (4) pages on or before July 8, 2016. In a separate page to those letters, the parties SHALL inform the court of one phone number per party to use for the call. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/30/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 06/30/2016)

07/05/2016

381 EXPERT Disclosure Report by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - APT Payment Types, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Status Code and Status Actions, # 3 Exhibit 3 APT Payments - Warrant payments after 8/28/10 by ProbID, # 4 Exhibit 4 - APT Detail Notes, Docs - Warrant, # 5 Exhibit 5 - APT Detail Notes, Docs - Jail, # 6 Exhibit 6 - Fee Type 8/15 note, # 7 Exhibit 7 - APT Payments - to be released, # 8 Exhibit 8 - Status Details Table-Status Action T- on or after 8/28/10, # 9 Exhibit 9 - Case Activity Totals Report, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Childersburg Putative Class, # 11 Exhibit 11Pt 1 - Status Codes of Named Plaintifffs Evidentiary Docs, # 12 Exhibit 11 - Pt 2 - Status Codes of Named Plaintifffs Evidentiary Docs)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/05/2016

382 CORRECTED EXPERT Disclosure Report by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 APT Payment Types, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Status Code and Status Actions, # 3 Exhibit 3 - APT Payments - Warrant payments after 8/28/10 by ProbID, # 4 Exhibit 4 - APT Detail Notes, Docs - Warrant, # 5 Exhibit 5 - APT Detail Notes, Docs - Jail, # 6 Errata 6 - Fee Type 8/15 note, # 7 Exhibit 7 - APT Payments - to be released, # 8 Exhibit 8 - APT Status Details Table-Status Action T- on or after 8/28/10, # 9 Exhibit 9 Case Activity Totals Report, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Childersburg Putative Class, # 11 Exhibit 11- Pt 1 - Status Codes of Named Plaintifffs Evidentiary Docs, # 12 Exhibit 11 - Pt 2 - Status Codes of Named Plaintifffs Evidentiary Docs)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/08/2016

383 Position Concerning the Matters Set Forth in Plaintiffs' June 17, 2016 Letter by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Counsel for the City's Contact Information)(Leavens, Ginny) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/08/2016

384 RESPONSE to Court Order of June 30, 2016 380 by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Contact Information for JCS Counsel)(Green, Wilson) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/08/2016

385 NOTICE-Position Letter to the Court by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/08/2016 386 Letter to the Court filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/08/2016

387 RESPONSE to the Court's Order of June 8 377 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Letter from Balch Attorneys, # 2 Errata 2 - Letters from Cities' counsel)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/08/2016)

07/12/2016

388 TEXT ORDER - The conference call set for Thursday, July 14, 2016, at 2:30 p.m. is for the parties only. Counsel for non-parties need not participate. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/12/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 07/12/2016)

07/14/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 7/14/2016. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 07/14/2016)

07/15/2016

389 TEXT ORDER - The parties SHALL file a joint report on or before August 5, 2016, concerning the matters discussed on the record at the July 14, 2016 discovery call. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/14/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 07/15/2016)

07/28/2016

390 BRIEF in Support of MOTION for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Timothy and Kristy Fugatt by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 07/28/2016)

07/28/2016

391 BRIEF in Support of MOTION for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Deunate Jews by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 07/28/2016)

07/28/2016

392 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 390 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Timothy and Kristy Fugatt and 391 Deunate Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W1, # 24 Exhibit W2, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH, # 36 Exhibit II, # 37 Exhibit JJ, # 38 Exhibit KK, # 39 Exhibit LL, # 40 Exhibit MM, # 41 Exhibit NN, # 42 Exhibit OO, # 43 Exhibit PP, # 44 Exhibit QQ, # 45 Exhibit RR, # 46 Exhibit SS, # 47 Exhibit TT, # 48 Exhibit UU, # 49 Exhibit VV, # 50 Exhibit WW, # 51 Exhibit XX, # 52 Exhibit YY, # 53 Exhibit ZZ, # 54 Exhibit AAA, # 55 Exhibit BBB, # 56 Exhibit CCC, # 57 Exhibit DDD, # 58 Exhibit EEE, # 59 Exhibit FFF, # 60 Exhibit GGG, # 61 Exhibit HHH, # 62 Exhibit III, # 63 Exhibit JJJ, # 64 Exhibit KKK, # 65 Exhibit LLL, # 66 Exhibit MMM)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 07/28/2016)

07/29/2016

393 ORDER Telephone Conference set for 8/3/2016 04:30 PM before Magistrate Judge John E Ott with DEFENSE COUNSEL ONLY; defense counsel to call 888-808-6929 and use access code 5917763 to participate; Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 7/29/2016. (BST, ) (Entered: 07/29/2016)

08/03/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Telephone Conference held on 8/3/2016 (defense counsel only). (ASL) (Entered: 08/04/2016)

08/05/2016

394 JOINT REPORT Regarding Outstanding Discovery Requests by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/05/2016)

08/09/2016

395 TEXT ORDER - This case is hereby SET for an in-person status conference on Thursday, August 18, 2016, at 11:00 a.m. in chambers of the undersigned. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/9/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 08/09/2016)

08/09/2016

396 NOTICE of Appearance by Maurine C Evans on behalf of Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray (Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 08/09/2016)

08/10/2016 397 MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/10/2016)

08/11/2016

398 TEXT ORDER - The status conference currently set for August 18, 2016, is hereby RESET for August 23, 2016 at 1:00 p.m. in chambers of the undersigned. Counsel for the parties SHALL appear in person. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/10/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/11/2016

399 ORDER granting 397 Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. The Modified Scheduling Oder 327 is hereby further MODIFIED as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/11/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/11/2016 400 MOTION for Class Certification by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/11/2016 401 Brief in Support of 400 Motion for Class Certification . (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/11/2016

402 Submission of Evidentiary Matters in Support of 400 MOTION for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Peter Coons' Declaration, # 2 Exhibit 2 - JCS Training Manual Part 1, # 3 Exhibit 2 - JCS Training Manual Part 2, # 4 Exhibit 2 - JCS Training Manual Part 3, # 5 Exhibit 3

- Form Delinquent Ltr, # 6 Exhibit 4 - Form Failure to Report Ltr, # 7 Exhibit 5 - Notice to Show Cause, # 8 Exhibit 6 - Form Violation Ltr, # 9 Exhibit 7 - Petition for Revocation, # 10 Exhibit 8 - Warrant for Arrest, # 11 Exhibit 9 - Recall of Warrant, # 12 Exhibit 10 - Probation Tracker Case File, # 13 Exhibit 11 - Memo from C Ray to K Lloyd, # 14 Exhibit 12 - JCS' Amended response to PLs' 4th Interrogs, # 15 Exhibit 13 - Examples of JCS adding current probation part 1, # 16 Exhibit 13 - Examples of JCS adding current probation part 2, # 17 Exhibit 15 - Examples of returned mail, # 18 Exhibit 16 - Email chain of 3/24/14 re sending notices, # 19 Exhibit 17 - Municipal Inmate Release Authorizations, # 20 Exhibit 18 - Arrest Warrant FTOCO, # 21 Exhibit 19 - Deunate Jews Case Action Summary, # 22 Exhibit 20 Uniform Arrest Report, # 23 Exhibit 21 - Order of Probation on Gina Ray 4/26/12, # 24 Exhibit 22 - Warrant of Arrest of Jews 8/18/10, # 25 Exhibit 23 - Order of Probation on Gina Ray 2/10/11, # 26 Exhibit 24 - Gina Ray Affidavit, # 27 Exhibit 25 - Tim Fugatt Affidavit, # 28 Exhibit 26 - Kristy Fugatt Affidavit, # 29 Exhibit 27 - Deunate Jews Affidavit, # 30 Exhibit 28 - Orders of Probation, # 31 Exhibit 29 - JCS Requested jail under money paid Part 1, # 32 Exhibit 29 - JCS Requested jail under money paid Part 2, # 33 Exhibit 29 - JCS Requested jail under money paid Part 3, # 34 Exhibit 30 - Inmate Release Authorization, # 35 Exhibit 31 - Ltr from Willcox to Evans 5/1/15 re city ordinance, # 36 Exhibit 32 - Larry Ward Harpersville Deposition, # 37 Exhibit 33 Probation Tracker Case File on Gina Ray, # 38 Exhibit 34- Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition, # 39 Exhibit 34-1 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 1, # 40 Exhibit 34-2 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 2, # 41 Exhibit 34-3 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 3, # 42 Exhibit 34-4 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 4, # 43 Exhibit 34-5 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 5, # 44 Exhibit 34-6 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 6, # 45 Exhibit 34-7- Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 7, # 46 Exhibit 34-8 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 8, # 47 Exhibit 34-9 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 9, # 48 Exhibit 34-10 - Richard McClelland 2/23/16 deposition Part 10, # 49 Exhibit 35 - Gina Ray Order of Probation 7/14/11, # 50 Exhibit 36 - Failure to Appear Ltr to Gina Ray 12/7/10, # 51 Exhibit 37 - Violation Letter to Gina Ray 1/4/12, # 52 Exhibit 38 - Gina Ray's Probation Order 6/14/12, # 53 Exhibit 39 Affidavit of G. Daniel Evans, # 54 Exhibit 40 - Affidavit of Alexandria Parrish, # 55 Exhibit 14 - Examples files of Probationers PIF)(Evans, G) (Entered: 08/11/2016)

08/15/2016

403 NOTICE of Appearance by Wesley Kyle Winborn on behalf of Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Winborn, Wesley) (Entered: 08/15/2016)

08/17/2016 404 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/17/2016)

08/17/2016

405 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 404 . For good cause shown, the Motion 404 is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs SHALL file their response to Defendant the City of Childersburg's Motions for Summary Judgment 390 391 on or before September 9, 2016 . The City of Childersburg SHALL file its reply on or before September 30, 2016.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/17/2016. (KAM, ) (Entered: 08/17/2016)

08/17/2016

406 NOTICE by Judicial Corrections Services Inc of Expert Disclosure (Attachments: # 1 Expert Report of Brad Bishop, # 2 Bishop CV, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P, # 19 Exhibit Q, # 20 Exhibit R, # 21 Exhibit S, # 22 Exhibit T)(Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 08/17/2016)

08/17/2016 407 NOTICE by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC Expert Disclosure (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 08/17/2016)

08/23/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Status Conference held on 8/23/2016. The court will enter a separate order outlining the deadlines as discussed at the conference. (KLL) (Entered: 08/23/2016)

08/23/2016

408 ORDER that all deadlines apply as further set out: Discovery due by 9/2/2016; Dispositive Motions due by 1/26/2017; Pretrial conference ready in 6/2017; This case will be trial ready in 7/2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/23/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 08/23/2016)

09/07/2016

409 MOTION to Quash and Objections to Childersburg's Rule 30(b) Notice of Deposition by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 09/07/2016)

09/08/2016

410 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendants' Correct Care Solutions, LLC and CHC Companies, Inc. Motion to Quash and Objections to Childersburg's Rule 30(b) Notice of Deposition 409 . The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 409 under Exhibit B to the court's Initial Order 10 . Defendant City of Childersburg is DIRECTED to not conduct Rule 30(b) depositions of representatives from Correct Care Solutions, LLC. and CHC Companies, Inc. until the court rules upon the Motion 409 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/8/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016

411 BRIEF in Opposition to Correct 409 Motion to Quash and Objections to Childersburg's Rule 30(b) Notice of Deposition filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Letter)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016

412 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendants' Correct Care Solutions, LLC and CHC Companies, Inc. Motion to Quash 409 and a September 8, 2016 request from counsel to discuss objections to the scope of the Rule 30(b) deposition notices to Correct Care Solutions and CHC Companies. The request is GRANTED. This matter is SET for a telephone conference on September 9, 2016 at 10:30 A.M. The court will initiate the call. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/8/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016 413 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Childersburg, City of, The, Childersburg, City of, The. (Israel, Adam) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016

414 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on the Motion to Withdraw filed by attorney Adam K. Israel 413 . The Motion 413 is GRANTED, The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate attorney Israel. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/8/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/08/2016

415 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher Knox Friedman on behalf of Childersburg, City of, The (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 09/08/2016)

09/09/2016 416 MOTION to Withdraw by Childersburg, City of, The. (Boyd, David) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

417 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on the Motion to Withdraw filed by attorney David R. Boyd 416 . The Motion 416 is GRANTED, The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate attorney Boyd. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/9/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 9/9/2016. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Julie Martin.) (KLL) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

418 TEXT ORDER-The court held a telephone conference in this matter on September 9, 2016. Based on the discussion which occurred during the conference, Defendants' Correct Care Solutions, LLC and CHC Companies, Inc. Motion to Quash 409 is GRANTED. However, this decision does not preclude counsel for Defendant City of Childersburg from asking follow-up questions to representatives for Correct Care

Solutions, LLC and CHC Companies, Inc. during Plaintiffs' scheduled Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of those Defendants on September 12, 2016 and September 13, 2016. In addition, this decision does not preclude the City of Childersburg from requesting additional written and deposition discovery about the subject issues inquired of in their deposition notices at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. The court will consider such requests for additional discovery in the future and, frankly, is inclined to allow them so long as they are proportional in light of the status of the case at that later stage. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/9/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

419 BRIEF in Opposition to 390 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims of the Fugatts filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

420 BRIEF in Opposition to 391 Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Deunate Jews filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

421 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 419 , 420 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Timothy & Kristy Fugatt and Deunate Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exh. 1 - City Code, # 2 Exh. 2 - Ltr from Burnette, # 3 Exh. 3 - Harpersville Contract, # 4 t Exh. 4 - T. Fugatt Ticket, # 5 Exh. 5 - K. Fugatt Ticket, # 6 Exh. 6 - JCS Marketing Materials, # 7 Exh. 7 - City Council Minutes June 2005, # 8 Exh. 8 Jews Depo pp. 17-18, # 9 Exh. 9 - Jews Depo p. 79, # 10 Exh. 10 - Jews Depo Exh. 16, # 11 Exh. 11 - Jews Depo Exh. 13, # 12 Exh. 12 - Jews Depo Exh. 30, # 13 Exh. 13 - Jews Depo Exh. 25, # 14 Exh. 14 - JCS Recommendation of Jailing_Part 1, # 15 Exh. 14 - JCS Recommendation of Jailing_Part 2, # 16 Exh. 15 - Jews Depo p. 60)(Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/13/2016 422 Brief In Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Gina Kay Ray. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

09/13/2016

423 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 422 Brief In Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 it Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, # 29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF, # 33 Exhibit GG, # 34 Exhibit HH, # 35 Exhibit II, # 36 Exhibit JJ, # 37 Exhibit KK, # 38 Exhibit LL,

# 39 Exhibit MM, # 40 Exhibit NN, # 41 Exhibit OO, # 42 Exhibit PP)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/13/2016)

09/19/2016

424 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare the City of Childersburg's "Probation" Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/19/2016

425 Brief in Support of 424 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare the City of Childersburg's "Probation" Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/19/2016

426 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between Judicial Corrections Services, Inc & The City of Childersburg Void Ab Initoio by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/19/2016

427 Brief in Support of 426 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between Judicial Corrections Services, Inc & The City of Childersburg Void Ab Initoio. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/19/2016

428 Evidentiary Submission in Support of Partial Motions for Summary Judgment 424 , 426 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - City of Childersburg Ordinance 944, # 2 Exhibit B - Don Houston 9/12/16 Deposition, # 3 Exhibit B - Exhibits to Don Houston Deposition Part 1, # 4 Exhibit B - Exhibits to Don Houston Deposition Part 2, # 5 Exhibit B - Exhibits to Don Houston Deposition Part 3)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2016)

09/20/2016

429 MOTION for Leave to File Unredacted Version of Brief and Exhibits Under Seal by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

430 Opposition to 400 Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum Brief in Support filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Contract b/t JCS and Childersburg, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Excerpts from Securities Exchange Agreement, # 3 Exhibit 3, Part 1 of Expert Report of T. Brad Bishop, # 4 Exhibit 3, Part 2 of Expert Report of T. Brad Bishop)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

431 BRIEF in Opposition to 400 Motion for Class Certification filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15,

# 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

432 MOTION Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix I - Inaccurate Data Claims by Coons and Deficiencies of Probation Tracker Data, # 2 Appendix II - Comparison Between Plaintiffs Class Definition, and The Class Definition in Peter Coons Report)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016 433 Opposition to 400 Motion for Class Certification filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

434 Opposition to 401 , 402 , 400 Class Certification filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix I - Arrest, Jail and Duration Issues, # 2 Appendix II - Illustrations of Individualized Inquiries)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

435 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 432 Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons and Opposition to Plaintiff's Class Certification Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Part 1, Deposition of Peter Coons and Referenced Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A - Part 2, Ex 5 to Coons Dep, # 3 Exhibit A - Part 3, Ex 6 to Coons Dep, # 4 Exhibit A Part 4, Ex 7 to Coons Dep, # 5 Exhibit A - Part 5, Ex 8 to Coons Dep, # 6 Exhibit A - Part 6, Partial Ex 9 to Coons Dep, # 7 Exhibit A - Part 7, Ex 10 to Coons Dep, # 8 Exhibit A - Part 8, Ex 11 to Coons Dep, # 9 Exhibit A - Part 9, Ex 12 to Coons Dep, # 10 Exhibit A - Part 10, Ex 13 to Coons Dep, # 11 Exhibit A - Part 11, Ex 14 to Coons Dep, # 12 Exhibit A - Part 12, Partial Ex 18 to Coons Dep, # 13 Exhibit A Part 13, Ex 19 to Coons Dep, # 14 Exhibit A - Part 14, Ex 20 to Coons Dep, # 15 Exhibit A - Part 15, Partial Ex 21 to Coons Dep, # 16 Exhibit A - Part 16, Ex 22 to Coons Dep, # 17 Exhibit A - Part 17, Ex 23 to Coons Dep, # 18 Exhibit A - Part 18, Ex 24 to Coons Dep, # 19 Exhibit A - Part 19, Ex 25 to Coons Dep, # 20 Exhibit A - Part 20, Partial Ex 26 to Coons Dep, # 21 Exhibit A - Part 21, Ex 27 to Coons Dep, # 22 Exhibit A - Part 22, Ex 28 to Coons Dep, # 23 Exhibit A - Part 23, Ex 32 to Coons Dep, # 24 Exhibit A - Part 24, Ex 33 to Coons Dep, # 25 Exhibit B. Ray Bond, # 26 Exhibit C. Bond Reduced - Waived, # 27 Exhibit D. Bond Hearings)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/20/2016

436 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 432 Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Class Certification Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E - Intake Forms, # 2 Exhibit F - Employment Changes, # 3 Exhibit G - McCrimmon Documents, # 4 Exhibit H - JCS Notice Letters, # 5 Exhibit I - Subpoena Logs and Exemplars, # 6 Exhibit J - Childersburg Court Transcript,

# 7 Exhibit K - Affidavits of Substantial Hardship, # 8 Exhibit L - Part 1 - Fair Trial Account Records, # 9 Exhibit L - Part 2 - Fair Trial Account Records, # 10 Exhibit M - Hollingsworth Appointment, # 11 Exhibit N Waiver of Consent Forms, # 12 Exhibit O - Waiver of Consent Forms [Woodruff], # 13 Exhibit P - Multiple Reasons for Arrest, # 14 Exhibit Q - Arrest Logs, # 15 Exhibit R - Suspended Sentence - Tickets, # 16 Exhibit S - Suspended Sentence - Docket Sheets, # 17 Exhibit T Suspended Sentence - Probation Orders, # 18 Exhibit U - Examples of Tolling, # 19 Exhibit V - Examples of Continuous Warrant Status, # 20 Exhibit W - Standing Order on Procedures, # 21 Exhibit X Resolution 2015-17, # 22 Exhibit Y - Compliance Hearings, # 23 Exhibit Z - Deunate Jews Prison Evidence, # 24 Exhibit AA - Part 1 George Waldrop Records, # 25 Exhibit AA - Part 2, George Waldrop Records, # 26 Exhibit BB - Richard McClelland Dep Transcript, # 27 Exhibit CC McClelland Dep Ex 275, # 28 Exhibit DD - Jennifer Harris Records, # 29 Exhibit EE - Ricky Garrett, Jr., Records, # 30 Exhibit FF - Part 1 April 2011 Faxes, # 31 Exhibit FF - Part 2 - April 2011 Faxes, # 32 Exhibit FF - Part 3 - April 2011 Faxes, # 33 Exhibit GG - Marquette Felder Records, # 34 Exhibit HH - Andre Brown Records, # 35 Exhibit II - Deunate Jews Release Form, # 36 Exhibit JJ - Fine Amounts, # 37 Exhibit KK - FTOCO Different Names)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/20/2016)

09/21/2016

437 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Unredacted Version of Brief and Exhibits Under Seal 429 . Defendant has informally advised the court that Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion. The Motion 429 is GRANTED. Defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. is GRANTED LEAVE to file the referenced documents UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/21/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

09/21/2016

438 ***Document Sealed -Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 430 , 431 Motion for Class Certification-Pursuant to Order (doc# 429). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Expert Report of Brad T. Bishop, # 21 Expert Report of Brad T. Bishop, # 22 Expert Report of Brad T. Bishop) (AVC) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

09/22/2016

439 JOINDER of Defendant Childersburg's Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons 432 by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Winborn, Wesley) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

09/27/2016

440 MOTION for Leave to File Additional Pages for its Reply Briefs in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 09/27/2016)

09/27/2016

441 RESPONSE in Opposition to 432 Motion Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Status Codes, # 2 Exhibit 2 - AuditProbID, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Trouble ticket, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Deposition of Brad Bishop, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Ray audit form)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/27/2016)

09/28/2016

442 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion for Leave to File Additional Pages for Its Reply Briefs in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment 440 . The Motion 440 is GRANTED. The court understands that Plaintiffs oppose granting Defendant leave to file more than five (5) additional pages, but it cannot conceive of what prejudice would result from granting the full amount of additional pages requested by Defendant. Defendant's Reply Briefs in Support of Its Motions for Summary Judgment MAY contain up to twenty (20) pages each. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/28/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

09/28/2016

443 MOTION to Intervene by Linda Thurman, Courtnee Carroll. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Garrison, W) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

09/28/2016

444 MOTION to Strike and Exclude Defendants' Class Certification ExpertBrad Bishop by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Bishop Affidavit in Foster Case, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Bishop's invoice)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/28/2016)

09/29/2016

445 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Linda Thurman's and Courtnee Carroll's Motion to Intervene 443 . Any interested party who either objects or supports the Motion to Intervene is DIRECTED to file a response on or before October 12, 2016. Thurman's and Carroll's reply is due on or before October 19, 2016. The parties SHALL limit their briefs to fifteen (15) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/29/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/29/2016)

09/29/2016

446 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/29/2016)

09/29/2016

447 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 446 . For good cause shown, Plaintiffs' Motion 446 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their Replies in Support of Their Motion for Class Certification 400 on or

before October 7, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/29/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/29/2016)

09/30/2016 448 Unopposed MOTION for Five Day Extension by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016

449 TEXT ORDER -This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Unopposed Motion for Five Day Extension. 448 The Motion 448 is GRANTED. The City of Childersburg SHALL file its reply brief in support of its Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons on or before October 5, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/30/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016

450 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to 444 Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Exclude Defendants' Class Certification Expert-Brad Bishop by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016

451 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant Judicial Correction Services' Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Exclude Defendants Class Certification Expert - Brad Bishop. 450 The Motion 450 is GRANTED. Judicial Correction Services SHALL file its response to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Exclude Defendants Class Certification Expert on or before October 12, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/30/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016

452 REPLY Brief in Support of Its 390 Motion for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Timothy and Kristy Fugatt filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

09/30/2016

453 REPLY Brief in Support of Its 391 Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Deunate Jews filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Comparison of Jews Disputed Facts and Summary of the Citys Response)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 09/30/2016)

10/04/2016

454 Brief in Opposition to 422 Childersburg's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Gina Ray filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/04/2016)

10/04/2016

455 Evidentiary Submission in Opposition to 422 Childersburg's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims of Gina Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Petition for Revocation 7/23/09, # 2 Exhibit B - Notice to Show Cause 8/13/09, # 3 Exhibit C - Petition for Revocation 2/26/10, # 4 Exhibit D Returned Letters, # 5 Exhibit E -Daily Jail Report, # 6 Exhibit F Returned Envelope Jan 2012, # 7 Exhibit G - Daily Jail Report,

# 8 Exhibit H - Tax Return, # 9 Exhibit I - Gina Ray's W2s)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/04/2016)

10/05/2016

456 MOTION to Extend the Time to File a Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment by Childersburg, City of, The. (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 10/05/2016)

10/05/2016

457 REPLY in Support of 441 , 432 Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Affidavit of Peter Coons filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 10/05/2016)

10/06/2016

458 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Unopposed Motion to Extend the Time to File a Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment 456 . The Motion 456 is GRANTED. The City of Childersburg SHALL file its reply brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on or before October 25, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/6/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/06/2016)

10/06/2016

459 MOTION to Compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Don Houston by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 10/06/2016)

10/07/2016

460 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed the Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Gina Ray's Claims by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

461 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion to Compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Don Houston 459 . The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 459 under Exhibit B to the court's Initial Order 17 . Additionally, a review of the Motion reveals that Defendant's Exhibit B, which contains excerpts from the deposition at issue, does not include the portion of the deposition in which the alleged wrongful conduct occurred. Therefore, Defendant City of Childersburg is DIRECTED to file a complete copy of Houston's deposition with the court on or before October 11, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/7/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

462 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc.'s Unopposed Motion to Exceed the Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Gina Ray's Claims 460 . The Motion 460 is GRANTED. Defendant's Brief in Support of its anticipated summary judgment motion MAY contain up to forty-five (45) pages. Plaintiff's Response Brief opposing the summary judgment motion also MAY contain up to

forty-five (45) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/7/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

463 NOTICE of Filing of the Deposition Transcript of Don Houston by Childersburg, City of, The (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

464 REPLY in Support of Class Certification and in Opposition to JCS's Response in Opposition to Class Certification. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016 465 REPLY to 434 Childersburg's Opposition to Class Certification. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

466 REPLY in Support of Class Certification and in Opposition to CHC & CCS'S Response in Opposition to Class Certification. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/07/2016

467 Evidentiary Submission to Replies in Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Probation Orders, # 2 Exhibit A - Probation Orders, # 3 Exhibit A - Probation Orders, # 4 Exhibit A - Probation Orders, # 5 Exhibit A - Probation Orders, # 6 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 7 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 8 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 9 Exhibit B Petitions for Revocation, # 10 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 11 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 12 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 13 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 14 Exhibit B Petitions for Revocation, # 15 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 16 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 17 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 18 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 19 Exhibit B Petitions for Revocation, # 20 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 21 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation, # 22 Exhibit B - Petitions for Revocation)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/07/2016)

10/10/2016

468 Opposition and Brief to 426 Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between Judicial Corrections Services, Inc & The City of Childersburg Void Ab Initoio filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Deposition of Peter Coons, # 2 Exhibit B - Contract b/t JCS and Childersburg)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/10/2016)

10/11/2016

469 MOTION for Summary Judgment On Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016 470 Brief in Support of 469 Motion for Summary Judgment On Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies

Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016

471 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 469 Motion for Summary Judgment On Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C (Part I of II), # 4 Exhibit C (Part II of II), # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016

472 RESPONSE in Opposition to 426 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between JCS and The City of Childersburg Void Ab Initoio filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016

473 RESPONSE in Opposition to 424 , 425 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare the City of Childersburg's "Probation" Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016

474 RESPONSE in Opposition to 424 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare the City of Childersburg's Probation Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/11/2016

475 BREIF in Opposition to 426 , 427 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between JCS & Childersburg Void Ab Initoio filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 10/11/2016)

10/12/2016

476 Transcript of Proceedings held on 9/9/2016, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Julie A. Martin, Telephone number (205) 837-5266. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript

% 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/2/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/14/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/10/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/12/2016

477 RESPONSE to 444 Motion to Strike Defendants' Class Certification Expert-Brad Bishop filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/12/2016

478 RESPONSE to 443 Motion to Intervene of Linda Thurman and Courtnee Carroll filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/12/2016

479 RESPONSE to 444 Motion to Strike Defendants' Class Certification Expert-Brad Bishop filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/12/2016 480 RESPONSE in Opposition to 443 Motion to Intervene filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/12/2016

481 RESPONSE to 443 Motion to Intervene filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/12/2016)

10/13/2016

482 Opposition to 459 Motion to Compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Don Houston filed by CHC Companies, Inc. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2016)

10/17/2016

483 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion to Compel Additional Deposition Testimony 459 . This Motion is SET for a discovery conference in chambers at 10:00 a.m. on October 20, 2016. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/17/2016.(AVC) (Entered: 10/17/2016)

10/17/2016

484 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Linda Thurman's and Courtnee Carroll's Motion to Intervene 443 . The Motion 443 is SET for a hearing at 10:00 a.m. on October 28, 2016 in Courtroom 7A, Hugo L. Black Courthouse, 1729 5th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203. A court reporter will be present. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/17/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/17/2016)

10/17/2016

485 REPLY in Support of 444 Motion to Strike Defendants' Class Certification Expert-Brad Bishop filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/17/2016)

10/18/2016 486 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on an informal request from Plaintiffs to consider another discovery dispute related to the Rule

30(b)(6) depositions of CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, during the October 20, 2016 discovery conference. Plaintiffs' request is GRANTED. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek leave to file a motion to compel before the discovery conference, their request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/18/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/18/2016)

10/18/2016

487 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time & of Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/18/2016)

10/18/2016

488 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time and of Pages 487 . For good cause shown, the Motion 487 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their reply briefs in support of their motions for partial summary judgment 424 426 on or before November 4, 2016. Their reply briefs in support of these motions MAY contain up to twenty (20) pages each. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/18/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/18/2016)

10/19/2016

489 REPLY in Support of 443 Motion to Intervene filed by Courtnee Carroll, Linda Thurman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Garrison, W) (Entered: 10/19/2016)

10/20/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Discovery Hearing held on 10/20/2016. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 10/20/2016)

10/20/2016

490 ORDER-re: Plaintiff's informal request for the court to consider discovery disputes related to the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of Defendants CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC. The court discussed these discovery disputes during the 10/20/2016 discovery conference. For the reasons stated on the record during the conference, the parties are DIRECTED to comply with this order as set out. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/20/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/20/2016)

10/21/2016

491 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion to Compel Additional Deposition Testimony of Don Houston 459 . The court held a discovery conference in this matter on October 20, 2016. Based on the grounds stated on the record during the conference, Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion to Compel 459 is GRANTED IN PART. The City of Childersburg MAY send an interrogatory to Don Houston containing the question that counsel directed Houston not to answer, and Houston SHALL answer the interrogatory in the manner that he would have answered it during the deposition in his role as a corporate representative. If counsel for City of Childersburg wishes to ask followup questions based on Houston's response to the interrogatory, at an

appropriate time, Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. SHALL make Houston available for a second deposition as its corporate representative. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/21/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/21/2016)

10/24/2016

492 Transcript of Proceedings held on 10/20/2016, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/14/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/24/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/22/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 10/24/2016)

10/25/2016

493 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Page Limit for its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment by Childersburg, City of, The. (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/25/2016

494 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Unopposed Motion to Extend the Page Limit for Its Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment 493 . The Motion 493 is GRANTED. Defendant City of Childersburg's reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment on the claims of Gina Ray 422 MAY contain up to twenty (20) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/25/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/25/2016

495 REPLY Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Gina Ray Kay filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Comparison of Ray Disputed Facts and Summary of the City's Response)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/28/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 10/28/2016 re 443 MOTION to Intervene filed by Courtnee Carroll, Linda Thurman. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

10/28/2016

496 ORDER -re: Motion for Class Certification 400 and Motion to Intervene 443 . The motion to intervene is DENIED based on the discussion during the hearing held on 10/28/2016, and by consent of the parties. The motion for class certification 400 is TERMINATED,

subject to re-filing after the court decides the pending dispositive motions in this case and the anticipated motions for summary judgment to be filed by Defendants Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., and Judicial Correction Services, Inc. In light of the administrative termination of Document 400, the deadline for filing classcertification motions is hereby EXTENDED and SHALL be set by a later order. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/28/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

11/01/2016

497 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/01/2016)

11/01/2016

498 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 497 . The Motion 497 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their response to Defendant Judicial Correction Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment 469 on or before November 4, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/1/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 11/01/2016)

11/03/2016 499 JOINT STATUS REPORT by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/03/2016)

11/04/2016

500 BRIEF in Opposition to 469 JCS' Motion for Summary Judgment On the Claims of Gina Ray filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Deposition of David Perry, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Exh 341 to David Perry's Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Exh 342 to David Perry's Deposition)(Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/04/2016

501 REPLY to 468 CHCC & CCS in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Declare the Contract Between JCS & The City of Childersburg Void Ab Initio filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/04/2016

502 REPLY in Support of 472 Motion for Summary Judgment to Declare the Contract Between Childersburg and JCS Void Ab Initio filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/04/2016

503 REPLY to 475 Childersburg in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Declaring the Contract Between JCS & Childersburg Void Ab Initio filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/04/2016

504 REPLY to 473 JCS in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Declare Childersburg's 'Probation' Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection Response filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy

Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/04/2016

505 REPLY to 474 Childersburg in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Declaring Childersburg's Probation Practice with JCS Unconstitutional as a Denial of Equal Protection filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/04/2016)

11/15/2016

506 Unopposed MOTION for Additional Time and to Exceed the Page Limit for Its Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Gina Ray's Claims by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 11/15/2016)

11/16/2016

507 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendant Judicial Correction Service's Unopposed Motion for Additional Time and to Exceed the Page Limit for Its Reply Brief 506 . The Motion 506 is GRANTED. Defendant Judicial Correction Services SHALL file its reply brief in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray 469 on or before November 29, 2016. Defendant's reply brief MAY contain up to fifteen (15) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/16/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 11/16/2016)

11/17/2016

508 TEXT ORDER: This matter is SET for a telephone status conference with U.S. Magistrate Judge Staci Cornelius at 2:00 p.m. C.S.T. on November 21, 2016. All parties may participate in the status conference, but Plaintiffs, as well as CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, must participate. The parties should be prepared to discuss the schedule for producing in camera the documents identified in the Joint Status Report. (Doc. 499 ). The participating parties are DIRECTED to dial 877-336-1831 five minutes before the status conference is scheduled to begin. The access code is 2778178. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 11/17/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 11/17/2016)

11/21/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius: Status Conference held on 11/21/2016; attys Alexandria Parrish, Daniel Evans, Michael Jackson, Lane Finch, Bryan Richardson, & Conrad Anderson present by telephone; hrg adj. (chambers) (MSN) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/21/2016

509 TEXT ORDER: As noted during the November 21, 2016 telephone status conference, within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date of this order, defendants CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, are ORDERED to provide for in camera inspection the documents specified in the parties' joint status report (Doc. 499 ). Simultaneously

with the in camera production, CHC Companies, Correct Care Solutions, and Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to submit to the chambers of the undersigned a joint status report describing each category of documents at issue, together with the parties' contentions regarding whether the documents should be produced in unredacted format. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 11/21/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

11/29/2016

510 REPLY Brief in Support of 469 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiff Gina Kay Ray filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 11/29/2016)

12/01/2016

511 MOTION for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Supplemental Authority, # 2 Exhibit JIC Complaint)(Cook, Gregory) Mod (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/02/2016

512 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority 511 . The Motion 511 is GRANTED. Defendant City of Childersburg is instructed to file the Notice of Supplemental Authority and attached authority with the Clerk of the Court. Plaintiffs MAY file a response, if any, on or before December 16, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/2/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016

513 Expert Report of Chief Justice Sue Bell Cob by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Curriculum Vitae, # 2 Exhibit JIC Complaint)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016

514 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit JIC Complaint)(Cook, Gregory) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016

515 Expert Disclosure by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report of Hon. R. Bernard Harwood)(Green, Wilson) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/02/2016 516 Expert Disclosure by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 12/02/2016)

12/10/2016

517 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 12/10/2016)

12/14/2016 518 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 517 . For good cause shown, the

Motion 517 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs MAY file a response to Defendant City of Childersburg's Notice of Supplemental Authority 514 on or before December 23, 2016. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/14/2016. (AVC) (Entered: 12/14/2016)

12/21/2016

519 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Deunate Jews's Claims by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 12/21/2016)

12/22/2016

520 TEXT ORDER - This case is before the court on Defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc.'s Unopposed Motion to Exceed the Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Deunate Jews's Claims 519 . The motion 519 is GRANTED. Defendant Judicial Corrections Services, Inc.'s brief in support of its anticipated motion for summary judgment MAY contain up to thirty-five (35) pages.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/21/2016. (KAM, ) (Entered: 12/22/2016)

12/23/2016

521 RESPONSE to 514 Childersburg's Supplemental Authority filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 12/23/2016)

12/28/2016

522 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

12/28/2016 523 Brief in Support of 522 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

12/28/2016

524 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 522 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C Part I, # 4 Exhibit C Part II, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH, # 36 Exhibit II, # 37 Exhibit JJ, # 38 Exhibit KK, # 39 Exhibit LL, # 40 Exhibit MM, # 41 Exhibit NN, # 42 Exhibit OO, # 43 Exhibit PP, # 44 Exhibit QQ, # 45 Exhibit RR, # 46 Exhibit SS, # 47 Exhibit TT, # 48 Exhibit UU, # 49 Exhibit VV, # 50 Exhibit WW, # 51 Exhibit XX, # 52 Exhibit YY, # 53 Exhibit ZZ, # 54 Exhibit AAA, # 55 Exhibit BBB, # 56 Exhibit CCC, # 57 Exhibit DDD, # 58 Exhibit EEE, # 59 Exhibit FFF, # 60 Exhibit GGG,

# 61 Exhibit HHH, # 62 Exhibit III, # 63 Exhibit JJJ, # 64 Exhibit KKK)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

12/28/2016

525 TEXT ORDER -This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Motions for Summary Judgment 390 , 391 , 422 . The court hereby SETS these motions 390 , 391 , 422 for ORAL ARGUMENT on Thursday, February 2, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. in the undersigned's courtroom. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/28/2016(KAM, ) (Entered: 12/28/2016)

01/11/2017

526 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE to 514 Childersburg's Supplemental Authority filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Agreement and Stipulation, # 2 Exhibit B - Final Judgment)(Evans, G) (Entered: 01/11/2017)

01/16/2017

527 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/17/2017

528 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages 527 . The Motion 527 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' response brief in opposition to Defendants Judicial Corrections Services' and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews 522 MAY contain up to forty (40) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/17/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

529 REPLY to 526 Supplemental Response to Childersburg's Supplemental Authority filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/18/2017

530 BRIEF in Opposition to 522 JCS' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Deunate Jews filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/18/2017)

01/23/2017

531 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/23/2017

532 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of A Motion for Summary Judgment by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 01/23/2017)

01/24/2017

533 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendant CHC Companies, Inc.'s Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment 531 . The Motion 531 is GRANTED. Defendant's brief in support of its anticipated

motion for summary judgment MAY contain up to fifty (50) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/24/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/24/2017

534 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC's Unopposed Motion to Exceed Page Limit for Its Brief in Support of a Motion for Summary Judgment 532 . The Motion 532 is GRANTED. Defendant's brief in support of its anticipated motion for summary judgment MAY contain up to fifty (50) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/24/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/24/2017

535 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/24/2017

536 Brief in Support of 535 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/24/2017

537 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 535 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M - Part I, # 14 Exhibit M - Part II, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH, # 36 Exhibit II, # 37 Exhibit JJ, # 38 Exhibit KK, # 39 Exhibit LL, # 40 Exhibit MM, # 41 Exhibit NN, # 42 Exhibit OO, # 43 Exhibit PP, # 44 Exhibit QQ, # 45 Exhibit RR, # 46 Exhibit SS, # 47 Exhibit TT, # 48 Exhibit UU, # 49 Exhibit VV, # 50 Exhibit WW, # 51 Exhibit XX, # 52 Exhibit YY, # 53 Exhibit ZZ, # 54 Exhibit AAA, # 55 Exhibit BBB, # 56 Exhibit CCC, # 57 Exhibit DDD, # 58 Exhibit EEE, # 59 Exhibit FFF, # 60 Exhibit GGG, # 61 Exhibit HHH, # 62 Exhibit III, # 63 Exhibit JJJ, # 64 Exhibit KKK, # 65 Exhibit LLL, # 66 Exhibit MMM, # 67 Exhibit NNN, # 68 Exhibit OOO, # 69 Exhibit PPP)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/24/2017 538 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief and Supplemental Evidentiary Submission Under Seal by Correctional Healthcare

Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 01/24/2017)

01/25/2017

539 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief and Supplemental Evidentiary Submission Under Seal 538 that has been filed by Defendants Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. and Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. The Motion 538 is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. Defendants are GRANTED LEAVE to file the documents referenced in the Motion 538 UNDER SEAL. The court will then review the sealed exhibits and brief and determine whether there is good cause for keeping the submitted exhibits and brief under seal. While the court understands that this Motion has not been opposed by Plaintiffs, it also recognizes that this case is a putative class action and that unnamed class members might have a particular interest in access to court documents when determining whether to join or oppose a class settlement, if such a settlement were to occur. See generally Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016). Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/25/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017

540 ***Document Sealed -Supplemental Brief in Support of Judicial Correction Services' and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt-Pursuant to Order (doc# 539). (AVC) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/25/2017

541 ***Document Sealed -Supplemental Evidentiary Submission in Support of Judicial Correction Services' and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt-Pursuant to Order (doc# 539). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit QQQ Part 1, # 2 Exhibit QQQ Part 2, # 3 Exhibit RRR Part 1, # 4 Exhibit RRR Part 2) (AVC) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

01/26/2017

542 SUPPLEMENT to 469 Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 543 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 544 Brief in Support of 543 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 545 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders by Kristy

Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017

546 Brief in Support of 545 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017

547 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 545 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Probation Order for Deunate Jews, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Jordan Williams' documents, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Steven Twymon's documents, # 4 Exhibit 4 - No scanned documents in Probation Tracker)(Evans, G) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017

548 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 543 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - 2005 Contract, # 2 Exhibit B Resolution 2015-17, # 3 Exhibit C - Plan of Merger, # 4 Exhibit D - Don Houston depo, # 5 Exhibit E - Colleen Ray depo, VII, # 6 Exhibit F 06.13.14 doc, # 7 Exhibit G - David Perry depo, # 8 Exhibit H - Sec. Exchange Agrmt, # 9 Exhibit I - 02.01.16 Org Chart, # 10 Exhibit J 07/14 and 12/14 Org Charts, # 11 Exhibit K - Deunate Jews depo, # 12 Exhibit L- Jews Case Summary, # 13 Exhibit M - 01.27.09 Letter, # 14 Exhibit N- 02.03.09 Probation Revocation, # 15 Exhibit O - Capias Warrant 02.17.09, # 16 Exhibit P - 09.11.09 Arrest Report, # 17 Exhibit Q - 10.22.09 Probation Order, # 18 Exhibit R - Deunate Jews Court History Rpt, # 19 Exhibit S - Violation Report, # 20 Exhibit T - 12.22.09 Probation Revocation, # 21 Exhibit U - 01.15.10 Capias Warrant, # 22 Exhibit V - 08.18.10 Arrest Report, # 23 Exhibit W - Case File Report, # 24 Exhibit X- 10.07.10 letter to Deunate Jews, # 25 Exhibit Y 11.03.10 Probation Revocation, # 26 Exhibit Z- 01.13.11 Arrest Report, # 27 Exhibit AA - Inmate Release, # 28 Exhibit BB - Court Docket, # 29 Exhibit CC - Personal Info. Sheet, # 30 Exhibit DD - 05.17.11 Petition Revocation, # 31 Exhibit EE - 06.10.11 Capias Warrant, # 32 Exhibit FF - 02.21.12 Arrest Report, # 33 Exhibit GG - 03.08.12 Probation Order, # 34 Exhibit HH - Personal Info Sheet, # 35 Exhibit II 06.28.12 Probation Revocation, # 36 Exhibit JJ - 11.13.10 Traffic tickets, # 37 Exhibit KK - 01.13.11 Probation Order, # 38 Exhibit LL - 06.28.11 Probation Revocation, # 39 Exhibit 08.11.11 Capias Warrant, # 40 Exhibit NN - 02.26.12 Arrest Report, # 41 Exhibit OO - Alias Warrant - KF, # 42 Exhibit PP - 09.20.12 Probation Revocation, # 43 Exhibit QQ - Case Action Summary, # 44 Exhibit RR - Timothy Fugatt depo, # 45 Exhibit SS - 11.02.12 Probation Revocation, # 46 Exhibit TT - Kristy Fugatt depo, # 47 Exhibit UU - 12.03.10 Traffic ticket, # 48 Exhibit VV - 01.13.11 Probation Order, # 49 Exhibit WW Case File Report, # 50 Exhibit XX - 08.11.11 Probation Revocation, # 51 Exhibit YY - 08.11.11 Capias Warrant, # 52 Exhibit ZZ - Alias

Warrant - TF, # 53 Exhibit AAA - 02.26.12 Arrest Report, # 54 Exhibit BBB - Consolidated Appearance Bond, # 55 Exhibit CCC - Probation Order TF, # 56 Exhibit DDD - 09.19.12 Probation Revocation, # 57 Exhibit EEE - 11.02.12 Probation Revocation, # 58 Exhibit FFF 09.14.12 Traffic ticket, # 59 Exhibit GGG - Court Record TF, # 60 Exhibit HHH - Gina Ray depo, # 61 Exhibit III - File Report GR, # 62 Exhibit JJJ - MIDAS Summary GR, # 63 Exhibit KKK - Traffic tickets GR, # 64 Exhibit LLL - Bishop Report, # 65 Exhibit MMM Probation Order GR, # 66 Exhibit NNN - Case File Report GR, # 67 Exhibit OOO - 01.18.11 Capias Warrant, # 68 Exhibit PPP 01.19.11 Arrest Report, # 69 Exhibit QQQ - Probation Order GR, # 70 Exhibit RRR - Violation Report GR, # 71 Exhibit SSS - 02.10.12 Capias Warrant, # 72 Exhibit TTT - 01.21.12 Arrest Report, # 73 Exhibit UUU - Probation Order, # 74 Exhibit VVV - Ray Resp to JCS and CHC Interrogatories)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 549 MOTION for Summary Judgment by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017 550 Brief in Support of 549 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CHC Companies, Inc. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/26/2017

551 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 549 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, Part 1, # 11 Exhibit J, Part 2, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH, # 36 Exhibit II, # 37 Exhibit JJ, # 38 Exhibit KK, # 39 Exhibit LL, # 40 Exhibit MM, # 41 Exhibit NN, # 42 Exhibit OO, # 43 Exhibit PP, # 44 Exhibit QQ, # 45 Exhibit RR, # 46 Exhibit SS, # 47 Exhibit TT, # 48 Exhibit UU, # 49 Exhibit VV, # 50 Exhibit WW, # 51 Exhibit XX, # 52 Exhibit YY, # 53 Exhibit ZZ, # 54 Exhibit AAA, # 55 Exhibit BBB, # 56 Exhibit CCC, # 57 Exhibit DDD, # 58 Exhibit EEE, # 59 Exhibit FFF, # 60 Exhibit GGG, # 61 Exhibit HHH, # 62 Exhibit III, # 63 Exhibit JJJ, # 64 Exhibit KKK, # 65 Exhibit LLL, # 66 Exhibit MMM, # 67 Exhibit NNN, # 68 Exhibit OOO, # 69 Exhibit PPP, # 70 Exhibit QQQ, # 71 Exhibit RRR, # 72 Exhibit SSS, # 73 Exhibit TTT, # 74 Exhibit UUU, # 75 Exhibit VVV, # 76 Exhibit WWW, # 77 Exhibit XXX, # 78 Exhibit YYY)(Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 01/26/2017)

01/30/2017 552 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed the Page Limit by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Winborn, Wesley) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/30/2017

553 NOTICE of Corrections to 422 Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Gina Kay Ray by Childersburg, City of, The.(Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 01/30/2017)

01/31/2017

554 ORDER-The court GRANTS Dfts' motion for leave to file under seal 538 . The Clerk is DIRECTED to keep Documents 540 and 541 under seal. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/31/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

01/31/2017

555 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendants' Judicial Corrections Services, Inc. and Correctional Healthcare Companies Unopposed Motion to Exceed the Page Limit for Their Reply Brief 552 . The Motion 552 is GRANTED. Defendants' reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Deunate Jews's claims 522 MAY contain up to sixteen (16) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/31/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 01/31/2017)

02/01/2017

556 REPLY Brief in Support of 522 Motion for Summary Judgment Claims Asserted by Plaintiff Deunate T. Jews filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/01/2017)

02/02/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 2/2/2017 re 390 BRIEF in Support of MOTION for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Timothy and Kristy Fugatt filed by Childersburg, City of, The, 391 BRIEF in Support of MOTION for Summary Judgment for the Claims of Deunate Jews filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 02/02/2017)

02/06/2017

557 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time & Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/06/2017)

02/06/2017

558 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time & Pages 557 . For good cause shown, Plaintiffs' Motion 557 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs MAY file a response to the motions for summary judgment that have been filed by Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC, and CHC Companies, Inc. 543 549 on or before February 24, 2017. Plaintiffs' response briefs to those motions MAY contain up to fifty (50) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/6/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/06/2017)

02/09/2017

559 Transcript of Proceedings held on 2/2/2017, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner, Telephone number (256) 656-8239. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 3/2/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/09/2017)

02/10/2017

560 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/10/2017)

02/14/2017

561 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Time to File a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders 545 by Childersburg, City of, The. (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

562 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages 560 . The Motion 560 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' response brief in opposition to Judicial Corrections Services' and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt 535 MAY contain up to forty-three (43) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/14/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

563 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to "Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders 545 , 546 by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

564 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Time to File a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders 545 by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017 565 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the Unopposed Motions for Extension of Time 563 564 that have been filed by Defendants

Judicial Corrections Services, Inc., CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC. For good cause shown, the Motions 563 564 are GRANTED. Defendants Judicial Corrections Services, CHC Companies, and Correct Care Solutions MAY file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders 545 on or before February 23, 2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/14/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

566 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 561 . For good cause shown, Defendant's Motion 561 is GRANTED. Defendant City of Childersburg may file a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon NonAdjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders 545 on or before February 23, 2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/14/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

567 BRIEF in Opposition to 535 Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Kristy & Tim Fugatt filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/14/2017

568 Evidentiary Submission in Opposition to 535 Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Kristy & Tim Fugatt. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Fugatts Hardship Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit B - Kristy Fugatt 6/28/11 violation report, # 3 Exhibit C - Tim Fugatt 6/28/11 violation report, # 4 Exhibit D - Kristy Fugatt 8/21/12 violation report, # 5 Exhibit E - Tim Fugatt 8/21/12 violation report)(Evans, G) (Entered: 02/14/2017)

02/17/2017 569 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/17/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/17/2017

570 ORDER-In accordance with the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion 569 , Dft City of Childersburg's Motions for Summary Judgment 390 , 391 are due to be, and hereby are, GRANTED. Pltfs' claims against Dft City of Childersburg, with the exception of their request for declaratory relief, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Pltfs' request for declaratory relief is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing. This dismissal shall not affect any other right, claims, or cause of action which any Pltf may have against any remaining Dft. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/17/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

02/22/2017

571 Unopposed MOTION for an Extension of Time and to Exceed the page Limit for Its Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy

Fugatt 535 by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/22/2017)

02/23/2017

572 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time and to Exceed the Page Limit 571 that has been filed by Defendants Judicial Corrections Services, Inc., and Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.. For good cause shown, Defendants' Motion 571 is GRANTED. Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare Companies MAY file a reply brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt 535 on or before March 7, 2017. Their reply brief MAY contain up to twenty (20) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/23/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

02/23/2017

573 Opposition to 545 Partial Motion for Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

02/23/2017 574 Supplemental Corporate Disclosure Statement by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

02/23/2017

575 RESPONSE in Opposition to 545 , 546 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

02/23/2017

576 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 575 Response in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Declare Void Probation Based Upon Non-Adjudicated Offenses and Blank Orders. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Deposition of Brad Bishop)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/23/2017)

02/24/2017

577 BRIEF in Opposition to 549 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/24/2017)

02/24/2017

578 BRIEF in Opposition to 543 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/24/2017)

02/24/2017

579 Evidentiary Submission in Opposition to 543 , 549 CHC Companies, Inc.'s and Correct Care Solutions, LLC's Motions for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Organizational Chart, # 2 Exhibit 2 - CHC Cos. v. Sanders - Delaware complaint, # 3 Exhibit 3 - 3/16/16 email from Don Houston, # 4 Exhibit 4 - 3/4/16 email, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Karen Lloyd Deposition, # 6 Exhibit 6 - JCS Client

Agreement, # 7 Exhibit 7 - CHC's responses to Pls' Interrogs, RFP & RFA, # 8 Exhibit 8 - Affidavit of G. Daniel Evans, # 9 Exhibit 9 - 1219 active probationers, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Over 140k active prob - all AL - 930-11 to 6-30-14, # 11 Exhibit 11 - 126 active probationers - CBurg since 7-1-14, # 12 Exhibit 12 - over 37k active probationers - all AL since 7-1-14)(Evans, G) (Entered: 02/24/2017)

03/01/2017

580 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Time and to Exceed Page Limit for Reply Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment 543 , 544 , 549 , 550 , 577 and 578 by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Richardson, Brian) (Entered: 03/01/2017)

03/02/2017

581 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Defendants' CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC Unopposed Motion to Extend the Time and to Exceed Page Limit 580 . For good cause shown, Defendants' Motion 580 is GRANTED. Defendants CHC Companies and Correct Care Solutions MAY file reply briefs in support of their motions for summary judgment 543 549 on or before March 17, 2017. Their reply briefs MAY contain up to twenty-five (25) pages.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/2/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 03/02/2017)

03/06/2017

582 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, Maurine) (Entered: 03/06/2017)

03/07/2017

583 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 582 . For good cause shown, Plaintiffs' Motion 582 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their reply brief(s) in support of their motion for partial summary judgment 545 on or before March 23, 2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/7/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 03/07/2017)

03/07/2017

584 REPLY Brief filed by Defendants Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc re: 536 Brief, 535 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt filed by Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2017)

03/08/2017

585 BILL OF COSTS by Childersburg, City of, The. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A with Exs. A - N)(Tankersley, Will) (Entered: 03/08/2017)

03/09/2017

586 ORDER. This matter is set for a telephone status conference with counsel on Monday, March 20, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. The call-in number is 888-808-6929 and the access code is 5917763. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E. Ott on 3/9/2017. (Ott, John) (Entered: 03/09/2017)

03/09/2017

587 ORDER. The March 20, 2017 conference call is to include only the following counsel: Alexandria Parrish, Daniel P. Evans, Wilson F. Green, and Larry S. Logsdon. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 3/9/2017. (Ott, John) (Entered: 03/09/2017)

03/10/2017

Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 3/20/2017 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge John E Ott. (AVC) (Entered: 03/10/2017)

03/17/2017

588 REPLY Brief in Support of 549 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. filed by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

589 Evidentiary Submission in Support of 588 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - January 18, 2013 e-mail, # 2 Exhibit B - April 9, 2012 and April 16-17, 2012 emails, # 3 Exhibit C - September 4, 2014 e-mail with JCS Organizational Chart, # 4 Exhibit D - February 26, 2014 and March 24, 2014 e-mails., # 5 Exhibit E - Organizational Charts)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

590 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC re: 578 Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

591 Evidentiary Material re: 590 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - January 18, 2013 email, # 2 Exhibit B - April 9, 2012 and April 16-17, 2012 e-mails, # 3 Exhibit C - September 4, 2014 e-mail with JCS Organizational Chart, # 4 Exhibit D - February 26, 2014 and March 24, 2014 e-mails., # 5 Exhibit E - Organizational Charts)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

592 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

593 MOTION for Reconsideration re 569 Memorandum Opinion by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/17/2017

594 Opposition to re 585 PLAINTIFFS OBJECTION TO THE CITY OF CHILDERSBURGS BILL OF COSTS (DOC. 585) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Gina Ray's Supplemental Responses to JCS, # 2 Exhibit B - Tim Fugatt Supplemental Responses to JCS, # 3 Exhibit C - Kristy Fugatt Supplemental Responses to JCS, # 4 Exhibit D - Jews' Supplemental Responses to JCS, # 5 Exhibit E - Affidavit of Tim Fugatt,

# 6 Exhibit F - Affidavit of Kristy Fugatt, # 7 Exhibit G - Affidavit of Gina Ray, # 8 Exhibit H - Affidavit of G. Daniel Evans, # 9 Exhibit I Gina Ray Hardship affidavit, # 10 Exhibit J - Gina Ray 2016 Tax Return, # 11 Exhibit K - Gina Ray - Food Stamps, # 12 Exhibit L - Court reporter invoices)(Evans, G) (Entered: 03/17/2017)

03/20/2017

595 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages 592 . Plaintiffs' Motion 592 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration MAY contain up to forty (40) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/20/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 03/20/2017)

03/23/2017

596 REPLY in Support of 545 Partial Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/23/2017)

03/23/2017

597 REPLY in Support of 545 Partial Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/23/2017)

03/28/2017

598 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Time to File and Exceed the Page Limit for Its Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration by Childersburg, City of, The. (Espy, Chase) (Entered: 03/28/2017)

03/28/2017

599 TEXT ORDER GRANTING 598 Unopposed MOTION to Extend the Time to File and Exceed the Page Limit. Defendant City of Childersburg SHALL respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 569 on or before April 7, 2017. Defendant's response MAY contain up to thirtyfive (35) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/28/2017. (JLC) (Entered: 03/28/2017)

03/29/2017

600 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 594 Opposition (other),,, by Childersburg, City of, The. (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 03/29/2017)

03/29/2017

601 TEXT ORDER This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Unopposed Motion to Extend the Time to File Its Response 600 . For good cause shown, Defendant's Motion 600 is GRANTED. Defendant City of Childersburg SHALL file its response to Plaintiffs' objections to the Bill of Costs 585 on or before April 7, 2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/29/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 03/29/2017)

04/03/2017

602 TEXT ORDER -This case is before the court on Defendant City of Childersburg's Bill of Costs 585 . The court finds that Defendant's Bill of Costs is premature. A bill of costs must be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). But, Rule 54 defines a

judgment as an appealable decree or order and specifies that an order adjudicating the claims of fewer than all the parties does not constitute a final judgment. See id. 54(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court's order granting summary judgment to Defendant City of Childersburg was not a final judgment, and the court cannot rule on the Bill of Costs filed by the City at this time. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/3/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

04/04/2017

603 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on an informal request to clarify its earlier Text Order 602 . For the reasons discussed in that order 602 , Defendant City of Childersburg's Bill of Costs 585 is TERMINATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-filing following the entry of a final judgment in this action. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/3/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 04/04/2017)

04/07/2017 604 Opposition to 593 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 04/07/2017)

04/10/2017

605 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Pages & Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 04/10/2017)

04/10/2017

606 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages & Time 605 . For good cause shown, Plaintiffs' Motion 605 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL file their reply brief in support of their motion for reconsideration 593 on or before April 24, 2017. Plaintiffs' reply brief MAY contain up to twenty (20) pages. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/10/2017. (AVC) (Entered: 04/10/2017)

04/24/2017

607 REPLY Brief filed by Plaintiffs Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re: 604 Response in Opposition to Motion PLAINTIFFS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 04/24/2017)

05/01/2017

608 ORDER Telephone Conference set for TODAY 5/1/2017 02:30 PM before Magistrate Judge John E Ott; parties to call 888-808-6929 and use access code 5917763 to participate; Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 5/1/2017. (BST, ) (Entered: 05/01/2017)

05/19/2017

609 ORDER re 469 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 549 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 424 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, 522 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 426 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, 535 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 543 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 545 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. These motions are SET for oral argument at

9:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 13, 2017 in the undersigneds courtroom. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/19/2017. (JLC) (Entered: 05/19/2017)

05/31/2017

610 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on an informal request to reschedule oral argument on the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. The informal request is GRANTED. The motions are RESET for oral argument at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, July 24, 2017 in the undersigned's courtroom. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/31/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 05/31/2017)

06/05/2017 611 ORDER denying 593 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/5/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 06/05/2017)

07/17/2017

612 ORDER Defendants' objections concerning theproduction of unredacted documents are OVERRULED IN PART andSUSTAINED IN PART. Defendants are ORDERED to serve Plaintiffs withdocuments complying with the terms of this order by July 18, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 7/17/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 07/17/2017)

07/20/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge John E Ott: Settlement Conference held on 7/20/2017. (ASL) (Entered: 07/20/2017)

07/24/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 7/24/2017 re 469 MOTION for Summary Judgment On Claims Asserted by Gina Kay Ray filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, 522 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Deunate Jews filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, 535 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Plaintiffs Timothy Fugatt and Kristy Fugatt filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc, Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, 543 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 07/24/2017)

07/25/2017

613 TEXT ORDER: This matter was referred to the undersigned to adjudicate a discovery dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants, CHC Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (See Doc. 499). After conducting an in camera review of the disputed documents submitted by the defendants, the undersigned entered an order ruling on all materials provided. (Doc. 612). The order noted that, while the parties referred to a dispute regarding a document entitled the "2014 Securities Agreement," the agreement was not submitted for in camera inspection. (Id. at 1, n.1). The plaintiffs subsequently notified the undersigned that the defendant had produced the agreement itself, but withheld the schedules (the "Schedules") attached to the agreement. The defendants

07/25/2017
07/25/2017 07/25/2017 07/31/2017

have now submitted the Schedules for in camera review. Within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date of this order, the parties are ORDERED to submit to the chambers of the undersigned a joint status report including the parties' contentions as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the Schedules. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 7/25/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
614 ORDER the court DIRECTS Plas and Deft JCS to submit supplemental briefs discussing how cases proceeded through the Childersburg Municipal Court from a ticket to the termination of probation; Plas and JCS are also directed to discuss any circumstances where the named Plas cases deviated from the regular procedures of the Municipal Court; Deft JCS SHALL submit its supplemental factual brief by 7/31/2017; Plas SHALL respond to JCSs supplemental brief and submit their supplemental factual brief by 8/7/2017 ; Deft JCS SHALL file a reply brief responding to Plas supplemental factual assertions by 8/14/2017; JCSs briefs MAY contain up to ten pages each; Plas brief MAY contain up to twenty pages; The court expects all factual assertions to be supported by citations to the Rule 56 record. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/25/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
615 ORDER As stated on the record during oral argument, the parties MAY file supplemental briefs addressing the qualified immunity and quasijudicial immunity issues presented during oral argument on or before July 31, 2017. The parties supplemental briefs MAY contain up to fifteen pages each.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/25/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
616 ORDER In light of the newly produced documents, and with the agreement of the parties on the record, the court hereby ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 543 Motion for Summary Judgment; terminating 549 Motion for Summary Judgment; The parties are DIRECTED to submit a joint report within seven (7) days after that discovery dispute has been resolved with a proposed schedule for supplemental briefing on CHC Companies and Correct Care Solutions motions for summary judgment. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/25/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 07/25/2017)
617 Brief re 615 Order, Supplemental Brief Addressing the QualifiedImmunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity Issues in Response to the Court's Post-Summary-Judgment-Hearing Order filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 07/31/2017)

07/31/2017

618 Brief re 615 Order, PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF SHOWING JCS IS NOT ENTITLED QUALIFIED AND QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY. (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/31/2017)

07/31/2017

619 Brief re 614 Order,,, Supplemental Brief Regarding Process of Cases in Childersburg Municipal Court filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Flow Chart)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 07/31/2017)

08/04/2017

620 Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/24/2017, before Judge R.D. Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah Turner, Telephone number 205-2781780. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 8/25/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/4/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/2/2017. (JLC) (Entered: 08/04/2017)

08/07/2017

621 Brief re 614 Order,,, Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief Regarding Policies and Procedures Of Judicial Correction Services. (Evans, G) (Entered: 08/07/2017)

08/08/2017

622 STATUS REPORT pursuant to Magistrate Judge's Order (Doc. 613) by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A, # 2 Appendix B)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 08/08/2017)

08/14/2017

623 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Judicial Corrections Services Inc re: 621 Brief, 614 Order,,, 619 Brief Regarding Process of Cases in Childersburg Municipal Court filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 08/14/2017)

09/08/2017 624 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Childersburg, City of, The. (Friedman, Christopher) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

09/11/2017

625 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on the Motion to Withdraw filed by attorney Christopher K. Friedman. 624 The Motion 624 is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to

terminate attorney Friedman. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/11/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/11/2017)

09/12/2017 626 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/12/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/12/2017)

09/12/2017

627 ORDER in accordance with the memo opn entered contemporaneously, denying 424 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 426 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 469 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 522 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 535 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 545 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ; Plaintiffs requests for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Fourth Amended Complaint against Defendants JCS and Correctional Healthcare are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot, subject to repleading if Defendant JCS reenters business in the state of Alabama; Defendant Correctional Healthcare is hereby GRANTED summary judgment on all claims against it; This dismissal shall not affect any other right, claim, or cause of action which any Plaintiff may have against any remaining defendant; Plaintiffs shall file a Fifth Amended Complaint by 10/12/2017; plaintiffs MAY file any motion[s] for class certification by 11/14/2017. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/12/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/12/2017)

09/18/2017

628 STATUS REPORT ON DISCOVERY AND REQUEST FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 09/18/2017)

09/19/2017 629 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2017)

09/19/2017

630 RESPONSE to re 628 RESPONSE TO CHCC AND CCS STATUS REPORT filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 09/19/2017)

09/21/2017

631 TEXT ORDER This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time 629 . Defendant JCS does not oppose Plaintiffs' proposed extension of deadlines, but opposes Plaintiffs' request to set a deadline for motions for reconsideration. For good cause shown, and to facilitate the scheduled mediation, Plaintiffs' Motion 629 is GRANTED. The deadlines set in the court's September 12, 2017 Order 627 are EXTENDED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint SHALL be filed on or before November 27, 2017; and (2) Plaintiffs SHALL file any motion for class certification on or before December 20, 2017. For purposes of efficiency, the court encourages the

parties to file any motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment Order by November 20, 2017.Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/21/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

09/21/2017 632 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/21/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

09/21/2017

633 ORDER in accordance with the memo opn entered contemporaneously, denying 432 Defendants' Motion to Exclude/Strike ; granting in part and denying in part 444 Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude/Strike ; The following opinions from Defendants class certification expert, Brad Bishop, are EXCLUDED: (1) his testimony about legal issues unrelated to his experiences as a municipal court judge; (2) his testimony about Probation Tracker records or the contents of Probation Tracker data;2 and (3) his testimony about the practices of municipal courts that he has not presided over or personally observed. In all other respects, Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude is DENIED.Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/21/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

09/21/2017

634 REPLY to re 630 Plaintiffs' Response to Joint Report on Discovery and Request for Briefing Schedule filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

09/21/2017

635 TEXT ORDER This case is before the court on Defendants' CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC Joint Report on Discovery and Request for Briefing Schedule 628 and Plaintiffs' Response to CHCC and CCS' Status Report 630 . The court understands that the discovery dispute between these parties is resolved. After carefully reviewing the parties' proposed briefing schedules for renewed summary judgment motions by CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, the court sets the following briefing schedule: (1) Defendants CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC SHALL refile their motions for summary judgment on October 13, 2017; (2) Plaintiffs SHALL respond to the motions for summary judgment on or before November 3, 2017; and (3) Defendants CHC Companies, Inc. and Correct Care Solutions, LLC MAY file replies in support of their motions for summary judgment on or before November 17, 2017. Along with their original summary judgment filings, the parties MAY file supplemental briefs of up to fifteen (15) pages with their response and reply submissions.Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/21/2017. (KAM) (Entered: 09/21/2017)

10/13/2017 636 MOTION for Summary Judgment by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017 637 Brief re 636 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

638 Evidentiary Material re: 636 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, Part 1, # 11 Exhibit J, Part 2, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T, # 22 Exhibit U, # 23 Exhibit V, # 24 Exhibit W, # 25 Exhibit X, # 26 Exhibit Y, # 27 Exhibit Z, # 28 Exhibit AA, # 29 Exhibit BB, # 30 Exhibit CC, # 31 Exhibit DD, # 32 Exhibit EE, # 33 Exhibit FF, # 34 Exhibit GG, # 35 Exhibit HH, # 36 Exhibit II, # 37 Exhibit JJ, # 38 Exhibit KK, # 39 Exhibit LL, # 40 Exhibit MM, # 41 Exhibit NN, # 42 Exhibit OO, # 43 Exhibit PP, # 44 Exhibit QQ, # 45 Exhibit RR, # 46 Exhibit SS, # 47 Exhibit TT, # 48 Exhibit UU, # 49 Exhibit VV, # 50 Exhibit WW, # 51 Exhibit XX, # 52 Exhibit YY, # 53 Exhibit ZZ, # 54 Exhibit AAA, # 55 Exhibit BBB, # 56 Exhibit CCC, # 57 Exhibit DDD, # 58 Exhibit EEE, # 59 Exhibit FFF, # 60 Exhibit GGG, # 61 Exhibit HHH, # 62 Exhibit III, # 63 Exhibit JJJ, # 64 Exhibit KKK, # 65 Exhibit LLL, # 66 Exhibit MMM, # 67 Exhibit NNN, # 68 Exhibit OOO, # 69 Exhibit PPP, # 70 Exhibit QQQ, # 71 Exhibit RRR, # 72 Exhibit SSS, # 73 Exhibit TTT, # 74 Exhibit UUU, # 75 Exhibit VVV, # 76 Exhibit WWW, # 77 Exhibit XXX, # 78 Exhibit YYY)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017 639 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017 640 Brief re 639 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

10/13/2017

641 Evidentiary Material re: 639 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - 2005 Contract, # 2 Exhibit B - Resolution 2015-17, # 3 Exhibit C - Plan of Merger, # 4 Exhibit D - Don Houston depo, # 5 Exhibit E - Colleen Ray depo, VII, # 6 Exhibit F 06.13.14 doc, # 7 Exhibit G - David Perry depo, # 8 Exhibit H - Sec. Exchange Agrmt, # 9 Exhibit I - 02.01.16 Org Chart, # 10 Exhibit J - 07/14 and 12/14 Org Charts, # 11 Exhibit K - Deunate Jews depo, # 12 Exhibit L- Jews Case Summary, # 13 Exhibit M - 01.27.09 Letter, # 14 Exhibit N - 02.03.09 Probation Revocation, # 15 Exhibit O - Capias Warrant 02.17.09, # 16 Exhibit P - 09.11.09 Arrest Report, # 17 Exhibit Q - 10.22.09 Probation Order, # 18 Exhibit R - Deunate Jews Court History Rpt, # 19 Exhibit S - Violation Report, # 20 Exhibit T - 12.22.09 Probation Revocation, # 21 Exhibit U - 01.15.10 Capias Warrant, # 22 Exhibit V 08.18.10 Arrest Report, # 23 Exhibit W - Case File Report, # 24 Exhibit X- 10.07.10 letter to Deunate Jews, # 25 Exhibit Y - 11.03.10 Probation Revocation, # 26 Exhibit Z- 01.13.11 Arrest Report, # 27 Exhibit AA Inmate Release, # 28 Exhibit BB - Court Docket, # 29 Exhibit CC -

Personal Info. Sheet, # 30 Exhibit DD - 05.17.11 Petition Revocation, # 31 Exhibit EE - 06.10.11 Capias Warrant, # 32 Exhibit FF - 02.21.12 Arrest Report, # 33 Exhibit GG - 03.08.12 Probation Order, # 34 Exhibit HH - Personal Info Sheet, # 35 Exhibit II - 06.28.12 Probation Revocation, # 36 Exhibit JJ - 11.13.10 Traffic tickets, # 37 Exhibit KK 01.13.11 Probation Order, # 38 Exhibit LL - 06.28.11 Probation Revocation, # 39 Exhibit MM - 08.11.11 Capias Warrant, # 40 Exhibit NN - 02.26.12 Arrest Report, # 41 Exhibit OO - Alias Warrant - KF, # 42 Exhibit PP - 09.20.12 Probation Revocation, # 43 Exhibit QQ Case Action Summary, # 44 Exhibit RR - Timothy Fugatt depo, # 45 Exhibit SS - 11.02.12 Probation Revocation, # 46 Exhibit TT Kristy Fugatt depo, # 47 Exhibit UU - 12.03.10 Traffic ticket, # 48 Exhibit VV - 01.13.11 Probation Order, # 49 Exhibit WW - Case File Report, # 50 Exhibit XX - 08.11.11 Probation Revocation, # 51 Exhibit YY - 08.11.11 Capias Warrant, # 52 Exhibit ZZ - Alias Warrant - TF, # 53 Exhibit AAA - 02.26.12 Arrest Report, # 54 Exhibit BBB - Consolidated Appearance Bond, # 55 Exhibit CCC - Probation Order TF, # 56 Exhibit DDD - 09.19.12 Probation Revocation, # 57 Exhibit EEE - 11.02.12 Probation Revocation, # 58 Exhibit FFF 09.14.12 Traffic ticket, # 59 Exhibit GGG - Court Record TF, # 60 Exhibit HHH - Gina Ray depo, # 61 Exhibit III - File Report GR, # 62 Exhibit JJJ - MIDAS Summary GR, # 63 Exhibit KKK - Traffic tickets GR, # 64 Exhibit LLL - Bishop Report, # 65 Exhibit MMM Probation Order GR, # 66 Exhibit NNN - Case File Report GR, # 67 Exhibit OOO - 01.18.11 Capias Warrant, # 68 Exhibit PPP 01.19.11 Arrest Report, # 69 Exhibit QQQ - Probation Order GR, # 70 Exhibit RRR - Violation Report GR, # 71 Exhibit SSS - 02.10.12 Capias Warrant, # 72 Exhibit TTT - 01.21.12 Arrest Report, # 73 Exhibit UUU - Probation Order, # 74 Exhibit VVV - Ray Resp to JCS and CHC Interrogatories)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 10/13/2017)

11/03/2017

642 RESPONSE in Opposition re 636 MOTION for Summary Judgment PLAINTIFFS REFILED MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CHC COMPANIES, INC.S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 636) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017

643 RESPONSE in Opposition re 639 MOTION for Summary Judgment PLAINTIFFS REFILED MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CCS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 639) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017 644 Evidentiary Material re: 643 Response in Opposition to Motion, 642 Response in Opposition to Motion, PLAINTIFFS REFILED

EVIDENTIARY SUBMISSION IN OPPOSITION TO CHC COMPANIES, INC.S AND CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLCS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Organizational Chart, # 2 Exhibit 2 - CHC Cos. v. Sanders - Delaware Complaint, # 3 Exhibit 3 - March 2012 CHC email - integration, # 4 Exhibit 4 - 3 4 14 Email from Houston re CHC's cost, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Deposition of Karen Lloyd, # 6 Exhibit 6 - JCS Client Agreement, # 7 Exhibit 7 CHC's responses to Pls' interrogs, RFP and RFA, # 8 Exhibit 8 Affidavit of G. Daniel Evans, # 9 Exhibit 9 - 1,219 active CBurg prob 9-30-11 to 6-30-14, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Over 140k active prob - all AL - 930-11 to 6-30-14, # 11 Exhibit 11 - 126 active probationers - CBurg since 7-1-14, # 12 Exhibit 12 - over 37k active probationers - all AL since 7-1-14)(Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017

645 Brief re 636 MOTION for Summary Judgment PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CHC COMPANIES, INC.S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Doc. 636 filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017

646 Brief re 639 MOTION for Summary Judgment PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CCS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 639) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/03/2017

647 Evidentiary Material re: 645 Brief, 646 Brief PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENTIARY SUBMISSION IN OPPOSITION TO CHC COMPANIES, INC.S AND CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLCS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 CHC - Merger Agr_Part1, # 2 Exhibit 1 - CHC - Merger Agr_Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 1 - CHC - Merger Agr_Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 1 -CHC - Merger Agr_Part 4, # 5 Exhibit 2 - CHC emails re JCS integration, # 6 Exhibit 3 - GA Sec of State Filing Oct 2011, # 7 Exhibit 4 - CHC Emails re JCS, # 8 Exhibit 5 - CCS and CHC CEO describing merger, # 9 Exhibit 6 ACLU settlement with JCS - 2015, # 10 Exhibit 7 - Emails re Integration Plan, # 11 Exhibit 8 - Emails re Changeover to CCS policies, # 12 Exhibit 9 - CCS payroll issues with JCS div, # 13 Exhibit 10 - CCS RIF of JCS, # 14 Exhibit 11 - Non Competes w CCS, # 15 Exhibit 12 Email re Houston working for CCS)(Evans, G) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/13/2017

648 MOTION to Strike 647 Evidentiary Material,,, 645 Brief, 646 Brief Plaintiffs' Supplemental Exhibits and Supplemental Briefing by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/17/2017

649 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. re: 642 Response in Opposition to Motion, in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 636) filed by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

650 Evidentiary Material re: 649 Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 636). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - January 18, 2013 e-mail, # 2 Exhibit B - April 9, 2012 and April 16-17, 2012 emails, # 3 Exhibit C - September 4, 2014 e-mail with JCS Organizational Chart, # 4 Exhibit D - February 26, 2014 and March 24, 2014 e-mails, # 5 Exhibit E - Organizational Charts)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

651 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC re: 643 Response in Opposition to Motion, in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 639) filed by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

652 Evidentiary Material re: 651 Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 639). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - January 18, 2013 e-mail, # 2 Exhibit B - April 9, 2012 and April 16-17, 2012 emails, # 3 Exhibit C - September 4, 2014 e-mail with JCS Organizational Chart, # 4 Exhibit D - February 26, 2014 and March 24, 2014 e-mails, # 5 Exhibit E - Organizational Charts)(Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

653 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant CHC Companies, Inc. re: 645 Brief, Supplemental Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 636) filed by CHC Companies, Inc.. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

654 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC re: 646 Brief Supplemental Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 639) filed by Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

655 MOTION to Stay by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

11/17/2017

656 ORDER GRANTING 655 MOTION to Stay. This case will be stayed, beginning November 20, 2017, until January 2, 2018. The deadlines set in this action are AMENDED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to CHCC and CCS's Motion to Strike SHALL be filed on or before January 5, 2018; (2) Any motions to reconsider the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on JCS's motions for summary judgment (Docs. # 626 & 627) SHALL be filed on or before January 15,

2018; (3) Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint SHALL be filed on or before January 22, 2018; and (4) Any motion for class certification SHALL be filed on or before February 19, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/17/2017. (JLC) (Entered: 11/17/2017)

12/13/2017

657 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 12/13/2017)

12/13/2017

658 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 12/13/2017)

12/14/2017

659 ORDER re 657 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice and 658 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Deuante T Jews, Kristy Fugatt, Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt. The Motion is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. On or before December 21, 2017, Attorneys Bailey and Hardingham SHALL adhere to the following as set out herein. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/14/2017. (JLC) (Entered: 12/14/2017)

12/15/2017

PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2989987. (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/15/2017

PHV Fee paid: $ 50, receipt number 1126-2990002. (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 12/15/2017)

12/20/2017

660 NOTICE by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re 659 Order, Attorneys' Certifications (Parrish, Alexandria) (Entered: 12/20/2017)

01/05/2018

661 RESPONSE in Opposition re 648 MOTION to Strike 647 Evidentiary Material,,, 645 Brief, 646 Brief Plaintiffs' Supplemental Exhibits and Supplemental Briefing Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to CHC Companies, Inc.s & Correct Care Solutions, LLCs Motion to Strike (Doc. 648) filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

01/10/2018

662 REPLY to Response to Motion re 648 MOTION to Strike 647 Evidentiary Material,,, 645 Brief, 646 Brief Plaintiffs' Supplemental Exhibits and Supplemental Briefing filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 01/10/2018)

01/16/2018

663 MOTION for Reconsideration re 627 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 626 Memorandum Opinion by Kristy Fugatt,

Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/16/2018)

01/18/2018

664 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. 663 The interested parties are DIRECTED to brief the Motion for Reconsideration 663 in accordance with the deadlines set in Exhibit B of the court's Initial Order 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/18/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 01/18/2018)

01/18/2018 665 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 01/18/2018)

01/19/2018

666 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time. 665 For good cause shown, the parties' Motion 665 is GRANTED. The following deadlines are AMENDED: (1) Defendant JCS SHALL respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on or before February 6, 2018; (2) Plaintiffs MAY file a reply in support of their Motion for Reconsideration on or before February 13, 2018; and (3) Plaintiffs SHALL file any Motion for Class Certification on or before March 6, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/19/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/19/2018

Set/Reset Deadlines as to 663 MOTION for Reconsideration. Responses due by February 6, 2018. Replies due by February 13, 2018. (JLC) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

01/19/2018

667 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time. 665 In addition to the extensions granted in the earlier Text Order 666 , the following deadline is AMENDED: Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint SHALL be filed on or before February 13, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/19/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 01/19/2018)

02/06/2018

668 RESPONSE in Opposition re 663 MOTION for Reconsideration re 627 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 626 Memorandum Opinion filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/06/2018)

02/09/2018

669 Transcript of Proceedings held on 4/4/2013, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Anita McCorvey/ Edited by Court Reporter Sabrina Lewis. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely

electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 3/2/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2018. (KAM, ) (Entered: 02/09/2018)

02/13/2018

670 MOTION to Amend/Correct PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Fifth Amended Complaint - Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Fifth Amended Complaint Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 1 - Fifth Amended Complaint - Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 2 Complaint Comparison Part 1, # 5 Exhibit 2 - Complaint Comparison Part 2, # 6 Exhibit 2 - Complaint Comparison Part 3)(Evans, G) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/13/2018

671 REPLY Brief filed by Plaintiffs Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re: 663 MOTION for Reconsideration re 627 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 626 Memorandum Opinion filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Hardingham, Brian) (Entered: 02/13/2018)

02/16/2018

672 TEXT ORDER This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. 670 Interested parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 670 in accordance with the timelines set in Exhibit B to the court's Initial Order 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/16/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 02/16/2018)

02/20/2018

673 RESPONSE in Opposition re 670 MOTION to Amend/Correct PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by CHC Companies, Inc., Correct Care Solutions, LLC. (Finch, Fredrick) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018

674 RESPONSE in Opposition re 670 MOTION to Amend/Correct PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by Childersburg, City of, The. (Anderson, L) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/20/2018

675 RESPONSE to Motion re 670 MOTION to Amend/Correct PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2018)

02/23/2018

676 REPLY to re 675 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 02/23/2018)

03/01/2018 677 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/01/2018)

03/02/2018

678 ORDER granting 677 Motion for Extension of Time; Plaintiffs SHALL file their Motion for Class Certification within thirty (30) days after the court has ruled on the pending Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. # 636, 639), Motion to Strike (Doc. # 648), Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 663), and Motion for Leave to File Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 670). For the sake of clarity, the court will specify a deadline for Plaintiffs class certification motion in an appropriate order. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/2/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 03/02/2018)

04/26/2018 679 NOTICE of Change of Address by Brian Hardingham (Hardingham, Brian) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

05/08/2018

680 NOTICE by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re 663 MOTION for Reconsideration re 627 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 626 Memorandum Opinion PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/08/2018)

05/08/2018 681 NOTICE of Change of Address by Leslie A Bailey (Bailey, Leslie) (Entered: 05/08/2018)

05/09/2018 682 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/9/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 05/09/2018)

05/09/2018

683 ORDER for the reasons stated in the accompanying memo opn, CHC Companies Inc 636 MOTION for summary judgment and Correct Care Solutions LLC 639 MOTION for summary judgment are GRANTED; plaintiffs' claims against CHC Companies, Inc and Correct Care Solutions LLC are DISMISSED with prejudice; costs taxed against the plaintiffs; 648 MOTION to strike is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/9/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 05/09/2018)

05/16/2018

684 TEXT ORDER This case is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 663 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint 670 . The Motions 663 670 are SET for oral argument in the undersigned's courtroom at 1:30 p.m. on Thursday,

June 14, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/16/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 05/16/2018)

06/14/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Motion Hearing held on 6/14/2018 re 663 MOTION for Reconsideration re 627 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment 626 Memorandum Opinion, 670 MOTION to Amend/Correct PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE [PROPOSED] FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 06/14/2018)

06/15/2018 685 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/15/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/15/2018

686 ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 663 MOTION for Reconsideration in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/15/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/15/2018 687 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/15/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/15/2018

688 ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 670 MOTION for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint as set out herein. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/15/2018. (JLC) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

06/29/2018

689 Transcript of Proceedings held on 6/14/2018, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah S. Turner. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 7/20/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/30/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/27/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 06/29/2018)

07/06/2018 690 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Report by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/06/2018

691 AMENDED COMPLAINT FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against Judicial Corrections Services Inc, filed by Gina Kay Ray, Timothy Fugatt, Kristy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Order of Probation, # 2 Exhibit B - Mail in form, # 3 Exhibit C - Daily Tasks, # 4 Exhibit D - Order to withhold adjudication, # 5 Exhibit E Reporting for Probation form letter, # 6 Exhibit F - Violation of Terms letter, # 7 Exhibit G - Violation of Terms form letter, # 8 Exhibit H Warran Instructions, # 9 Exhibit I - Warrant Dismissal Instructions, # 10 Exhibit J - Case Management Reports, # 11 Exhibit K - Fugatts' receipts, # 12 Exhibit L - Deunate Jews' receipt, # 13 Exhibit M - JCS employees represented to be 'probation officers', # 14 Exhibit N Childerburg's termination of contract with JCS)(Evans, G) (Entered: 07/06/2018)

07/09/2018

692 TEXT ORDER-This case is before the court on the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Joint Report. 690 The parties' Motion 690 is GRANTED. The parties SHALL file a joint report with proposed deadlines on or before July 12, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/9/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 07/09/2018)

07/12/2018

693 STATUS REPORT Joint Report on Scheduling Response to Fifth Amended Complaint and Class Certification Filings by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray (Evans, G) (Entered: 07/12/2018)

07/16/2018

694 ORDER - Defendant SHALL answer or otherwise respond to the Fifth Amended Complaint on or before August 9, 2018. Plaintiffs and Defendant SHALL refile their class certification expert reports on or before September 10, 2018. Plaintiffs SHALL file any motion for class certification on or before October 10, 2018. Defendant SHALL respond to any class certification motion on or before November 9, 2018. Plaintiffs SHALL submit any reply in support of a class certification motion on or before November 26, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/16/2018. (KEK) (Entered: 07/16/2018)

08/09/2018 695 ANSWER to 691 Amended Complaint,,, by Judicial Corrections Services Inc.(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 08/09/2018)

09/10/2018

696 NOTICE by Judicial Corrections Services Inc Updated Expert Disclosure (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Updated Expert Report of T. Brad Bishop, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q,

# 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T)(Logsdon, Larry) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/10/2018

697 STATUS REPORT PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT REPORT by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - APT Payment Types, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Status Codes and Status Actions, # 3 Exhibit 3 - APT Payments - warrant payments after 8-28-2010 - by ProbID, # 4 Exhibit 4 - APT Detail Notes, Docs Warrant, # 5 Exhibit 5 - APT Detail Notes, Docs - Jail, # 6 Exhibit 6 Fee Type- 8/15 Note, # 7 Exhibit 7 - APT Payments - to be released, # 8 Exhibit 8 - APT Status Details Table - Status Action T- on or after Aug 28, 2010, # 9 Exhibit 9 - Case Activities Totals Report, # 10 Exhibit 10 - Childersburg Putative Class, # 11 Exhibit 11 - Status Codes of Named Plaintiffs & Evidentiary DocsA - Part 1, # 12 Exhibit 11 - Status Codes of Named Plaintiffs & Evidentiary DocsA - Part 2, # 13 Exhibit 11 - Status Codes of Named Plaintiffs & Evidentiary DocsA - Part 3, # 14 Supplement 11 - Status Codes of Named Plaintiffs & Evidentiary DocsA - Part 4)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/10/2018)

09/11/2018

698 ORDER This matter is also SET for a status conference at 10:00 a.m., on Monday, October 15, 2018, in Courtroom 7A before Judge R. David Proctor; on or before October 8, 2018, counsel SHALL meet and confer regarding how to efficiently address the courts rulings in prior, similar cases in this case; On or before October 10, 2018, counsel SHALL file a joint report of their recommendations in this regard. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/11/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

09/18/2018

699 MOTION to Strike 696 Notice (Other),, MOTION TO STRIKE UPDATED EXPERT DISCLOSURE by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Evans, G) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/18/2018

700 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Updated Expert Report. 699 The parties are REMINDED to brief the Motion 699 in accordance with the timelines set forth in Exhibit B to the court's Initial Order. 17 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/18/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

09/28/2018

701 RESPONSE in Opposition re 699 MOTION to Strike 696 Notice (Other),, MOTION TO STRIKE UPDATED EXPERT DISCLOSURE filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 09/28/2018)

10/01/2018

702 REPLY to Response to Motion re 699 MOTION to Strike 696 Notice (Other),, MOTION TO STRIKE UPDATED EXPERT DISCLOSURE Reply in Further Support of Motion to Strike Updated

Expert Disclosures filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/01/2018)

10/04/2018 703 ORDER denying 699 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/4/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 10/04/2018)

10/05/2018

704 MOTION MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULE by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/05/2018

705 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion to Modify Schedule. 704 The Motion 704 is GRANTED. The Class Certification briefing schedules is MODIFIED as follows: (1) On or before October 22, 2018,Plaintiffs shall, submit any motion for class certification. (2) On or before December 12, 2018, Defendant shall respond to any class certification motion. (3) On or before January 7, 2019, Plaintiffs shall submit any reply in support of their class certification motion.. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/5/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

10/10/2018

706 STATUS REPORT in Response to Court Order of September 11, 2018 [Doc. 698] by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 10/10/2018)

10/15/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Status Conference held on 10/15/2018. A separate order will be entered by the court. (Court Reporter Leah Turner.) (KLL) (Entered: 10/15/2018)

10/22/2018 707 MOTION to Certify Class by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018

708 Evidentiary Material re: 707 MOTION to Certify Class . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Declaration of Peter Coons, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Part 1 Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 3 Exhibit 1 - Part 2 - Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 1 - Part 3 -1 - Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 1 - Part 4 - 1 - Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 1 - Part 5 - 1 - Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 1 - Part 6 - 1 - Exhibits to Peter Coons' Declaration, # 8 Exhibit 2 - 9/4/14 Memo from C. Ray to K. Lloyd, # 9 Exhibit 3 - Gina ray 2/10/11 Probation Order, # 10 Exhibit 4 Alabama Appleseed, # 11 Exhibit 5 - JCS' responses to PLs' 1st Interrogatories and RFP, # 12 Exhibit 6 - Childersburg terminates JCS, # 13 Exhibit 7 - Gina Ray declaration, # 14 Exhibit 8 - Timothy Fugatt declaration, # 15 Exhibit 9 - Kristy Fugatt declaration, # 16 Exhibit 10 Deunate Jews declaration, # 17 Exhibit 11 - Hearing excerpts June 14, 2018, # 18 Exhibit 12 - Hearing excerpts January 7, 2015, # 19 Exhibit 13 - Declarations of Class Counsel, # 20 Exhibit 14 - Part 1 -

Childersburg warrants and jail releases, # 21 Exhibit 14 - Part 2 Childersburg warrants and jail releases, # 22 Exhibit 14 - Part 3 Childersburg warrants and jail releases, # 23 Exhibit 14 - Part 4 Childersburg warrants and jail releases)(Evans, G) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

10/22/2018

709 Brief re 708 Evidentiary Material,,,,, 707 MOTION to Certify Class PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. (Evans, G) (Entered: 10/22/2018)

12/05/2018 710 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 12/05/2018)

12/06/2018

711 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time. 710 The Motion seeks an extension of deadlines relating to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The Motion 710 is GRANTED. The parties SHALL file a proposed briefing schedule on or before Friday, December 14, 2018. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/9/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 12/06/2018)

12/14/2018

712 STIPULATION re 711 Order on Motion for Extension of Time, Joint Proposed Schedule by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Winborn, Wesley) (Entered: 12/14/2018)

12/20/2018

713 ORDER by agreement of the parties, depositions of experts T. Brad Bishop and Peter R. Coons shall be done by 1/25/2019; JCS's response to Plaintiffs' 707 Motion for Class Certification is due by 2/13/2019; Plaintiffs' reply is due by 3/6/2019. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/20/2018. (KAM) (Entered: 12/20/2018)

02/13/2019

714 RESPONSE in Opposition re 707 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

02/13/2019

715 Evidentiary Material re: 714 Response in Opposition to Motion for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Peter Coons Deposition Part 1, # 2 Exhibit A Peter Coons Deposition Part 2, # 3 Exhibit B Steve Pelts Deposition, # 4 Exhibit C Lynn Roberts Supplemental Declaration, # 5 Exhibit D Colleen Ray Supplemental Declaration, # 6 Exhibit E DeeAnn Smith Declaration, # 7 Exhibit F Marcy Freeman Deposition, # 8 Exhibit G Penny Hall Deposition Vol 1., # 9 Exhibit H Penny Hall Deposition Vol 2., # 10 Exhibit I Joseph York Deposition, # 11 Exhibit J Emerson Hamilton Orders of Modification, # 12 Exhibit K Khomeni Datcher Order of Modification, # 13 Exhibit L Donna Whitehead Probation Tracker Case File, # 14 Exhibit M Lewis Mallory Probatration Tracker Record, # 15 Exhibit N Lewis Mallory Stmt of Fin Aff for Bankruptcy, # 16 Exhibit O Lewis Mallory Trustee Obj to Plan

Bankruptcy, # 17 Exhibit P Issues with Coons Exhibit 11, # 18 Exhibit Q Lanoris Singleton Probation Tracker Case File, # 19 Exhibit R Probationers from Coons Dec Ex 5 w Status Code H, # 20 Exhibit S Probationers from Coons Dec Ex 5 w Status Code G, # 21 Exhibit T Darleen Hill Declaration, # 22 Exhibit U Michele Cosby Probation Tracker Case File, # 23 Exhibit V Aldarass Carter Deposition, # 24 Exhibit W Tonia Hamby Declaration)(Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 02/13/2019)

03/06/2019

716 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

03/06/2019

717 TEXT ORDER; This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed 716 Motion for Extension of Pages. The 716 Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may have up to forty-five pages for their reply brief in support of class certification. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/6/2019. (JLC) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

03/06/2019

718 MOTION to Strike Depositions in Cases Plaintiffs Were Not Present by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

03/06/2019

719 REPLY Brief filed by Plaintiffs Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re: 707 MOTION to Certify Class , 714 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

03/06/2019

720 Evidentiary Material . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Brad Bishop Deposition & exhibits - Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Brad Bishop Deposition & exhibits - Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 1 - Brad Bishop Deposition & exhibits - Part 3, # 4 Exhibit 2 - Talladega Jail Records, # 5 Exhibit 3 - Peter Coons' Supplemental Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 4 - Childersburg Production, # 7 Exhibit 5 - Peter Coons' Errata to Deposition)(Evans, G) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

03/12/2019

721 RESPONSE to Motion re 718 MOTION to Strike Depositions in Cases Plaintiffs Were Not Present filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/15/2019

722 REPLY Brief filed by Plaintiffs Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray re: 721 Response to Motion, 718 MOTION to Strike Depositions in Cases Plaintiffs Were Not Present filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

03/21/2019 723 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Conspiracy Claims by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/21/2019)

03/21/2019

724 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Probation Beyond 24 Months by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 03/21/2019)

03/26/2019 725 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

03/26/2019

726 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time. 725 The Motion 725 is GRANTED. It is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs Response to JCSs Motion for Reconsideration is due on or before April 18, 2019; and (2) Plaintiffs Response to JCSs Motion for Summary Judgment is due on or before April 26, 2019. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/26/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 03/26/2019)

04/01/2019

727 Transcript of Proceedings held on 10/15/2018, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Leah s. Turner. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 4/22/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/2/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/30/2019. (KAM, ) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

04/03/2019

728 ORDER This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Depositions in Cases Plaintiffs Were Not Present (Doc. # 718 ). The Motion has been fully briefed; Because the court may consider evidence that may not ultimately be admissible at trial in evaluating Plas Motion, the facts indicated in the depositions are limited and supported by other record evidence, and, in an event, the court is capable of disregarding irrelevant evidence, Plas Motion to Strike 718 is DENIED. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/3/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/15/2019 729 MOTION for Extension of Time by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

04/15/2019
05/03/2019 05/03/2019
05/03/2019 05/03/2019 05/06/2019
05/06/2019 05/06/2019

730 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time. 729 Plaintiffs represent that JCS does not oppose the requested extension. The Motion 729 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' responses to JCS's Motion for Reconsideration and its Motion for Summary Judgment are due on or before May 3, 2019. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/15/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
731 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
732 RESPONSE in Opposition re 724 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Probation Beyond 24 Months filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Sue Bell Cobb Deposition excerpts)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
733 RESPONSE in Opposition re 723 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Conspiracy Claims filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
734 Evidentiary Material re: 733 Response in Opposition to Motion . (Evans, G) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
735 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages 731 which was filed at 5:29 p.m. on Friday, May 3, 2019. This case is SET for a telephone conference at 2:00 p.m. on Monday, May 6, 2019. The parties are DIRECTED to call 866-434-5269 to access the telephone conference. The access code is 6022965(KAM) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 5/6/2019. (KLL) (Entered: 05/06/2019)
736 TEXT ORDER On May 6, 2019, the court conducted a telephone conference to discuss Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages. 731 As a result of matters occurring during the telephone conference, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Pages 731 is GRANTED; (2) Defendant's informal request for an extension of time to file reply briefs in support of its Motions for Summary Judgment and for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Defendant SHALL file its reply briefs on or before May 31, 2019. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/6/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 05/06/2019)

05/06/2019

Reset Deadlines as to 724 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Probation Beyond 24 Months, 723 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Conspiracy Claims. Replies due by 5/31/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 05/06/2019)

05/06/2019

737 RESPONSE in Opposition re 724 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Probation Beyond 24 Months CORRECTED filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Sue Bell Cobb deposition excerpts)(Evans, G) (Entered: 05/06/2019)

05/08/2019

738 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Granting JCS Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Kristy Fugatt's and Gina Ray's Probation Beyond 24 Months by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Bailey, Leslie) (Entered: 05/08/2019)

05/13/2019

739 TEXT ORDER-This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Ruling Granting Summary Judgment on Due Process Claim for Extending Probation. 738 By agreement of the parties, Defendant's response to the Motion 738 SHALL be filed on or before May 31, 2019. Plaintiffs MAY reply on or before June 14, 2019. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/13/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 05/13/2019)

05/29/2019

740 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Judicial Corrections Services Inc re: 724 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Due-Process Claim for Extending Probation Beyond 24 Months, 732 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/29/2019

741 REPLY Brief filed by Defendant Judicial Corrections Services Inc re: 723 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Conspiracy Claims, 733 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Jackson, Michael) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

05/31/2019

742 RESPONSE in Opposition re 738 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Granting JCS Summary Judgment on DueProcess Claim for Extending Kristy Fugatt's and Gina Ray's Probation Beyond 24 Months filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 05/31/2019)

06/14/2019

743 REPLY to Response to Motion re 738 MOTION for Reconsideration re 626 Memorandum Opinion Granting JCS Summary Judgment on DueProcess Claim for Extending Kristy Fugatt's and Gina Ray's Probation

Beyond 24 Months filed by Kristy Fugatt, Timothy Fugatt, Deuante T Jews, Gina Kay Ray. (Bailey, Leslie) (Entered: 06/14/2019)

09/26/2019 744 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

09/26/2019

745 ORDER for the reasons discussed in the accompanying memorandum opinion, 707 Motion to Certify Class is DENIED. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

09/26/2019

746 TEXT ORDER This matter is SET for a status conference, in chambers, at 9:00 a.m. on Friday, October 4, 2019. Out of town counsel may participate in the conference via telephone and are DIRECTED to dial-in to the conference by calling 866-434-5269 at the scheduled time. The access code is 6022965. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/26/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

10/04/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Status Conference held on 10/4/2019. A separate show cause order will be entered by the court. The parties shall submit a joint status report as discussed within 21 days. Reply brief and response to show cause order due by 11/12/2019. (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (KLL) (Entered: 10/04/2019)

10/04/2019

747 TEXT ORDER On October 4, 2019, the court conducted a status conference in this case. As a result of matters occurring during that status conference, it is ORDERED as follows: The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer regarding how this case should proceed. On or before October 25, 2019, the parties SHALL file a joint report regarding the results of their meeting and conference. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/4/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 10/04/2019)

10/25/2019

748 STATUS REPORT Joint Report to the Court by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 10/25/2019)

10/28/2019

749 ORDER in light of the matters contained in the Joint Report 748 the Clerk is directed to terminate the following motions: 723 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Conspiracy Claims; 724 MOTION for Reconsideration Denial of JCS's Motion for Summary Judgment on DueProcess Claim; 738 MOTION for Reconsideration ; The parties SHALL by 1/10/2020 file a joint report regarding the results of their settlement discussions and a detailed plan for how to proceed without further delay. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/28/2019. (KAM) (Entered: 10/28/2019)

11/01/2019

750 Transcript of Proceedings held on October 4, 2019, before Judge R. David Proctor. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE: The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. (A copy can be obtained at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/court%20forms/transcripts/Transcript % 20Redaction%20Policy.pdf) See Transcript Redaction Policy Redaction Request due 11/22/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/2/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/30/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 11/01/2019)

01/10/2020

751 STATUS REPORT In Response to Order of October 28, 2019 [Doc. 749] by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/13/2020

752 ORDER This matter is before the court on the parties Joint Status report in Response to Court order of October 28, 2019; In light of matters contained in that report, on or before March 20, 2020, the parties SHALL file a joint report regarding the results of their settlement discussions and, if the case has not been resolved, a detailed plan for how this case should proceed to resolution without further delay. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 1/13/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

03/20/2020 753 STATUS REPORT (Joint) by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 03/20/2020)

03/20/2020

754 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on the parties March 20, 2020, Joint Status report in Response to Court order of January 22, 2020. In light of matters contained in that Report, on or before June 19, 2020, the parties SHALL file a further joint report regarding the results of their further settlement discussions and, if the case has not been resolved, a detailed plan for how this case should proceed to resolution without further delay. The parties should NOT presume the court will continue to exercise patience with the glacial pace at which the parties settlement discussions have been proceeding. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 3/20/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 03/20/2020)

06/19/2020 755 STATUS REPORT by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 06/19/2020)

06/19/2020 756 TEXT ORDER - This matter is before the court on the parties June 19, 2020, Joint Status Report in Response to Court Order of March 21, 2020.

In light of matters contained in that Report, and at the request of Judge Ott, the parties may have an additional thirty (30) days to work on a potential settlement. On or before July 20, 2020, the parties SHALL file a further joint report regarding the results of their further settlement discussions and, if the case has not been resolved, a detailed plan for how this case should proceed to resolution without further delay. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/19/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 06/19/2020)

07/20/2020 757 STATUS REPORT (Joint) by Judicial Corrections Services Inc. filed by Judicial Corrections Services Inc (Green, Wilson) (Entered: 07/20/2020)

07/21/2020

758 TEXT ORDER - This matter is before the court on the parties July 20, 2020, Joint Status Report in Response to Court Order of March 21, 2020. In light of matters contained in that Report, this case is SET for a telephone status conference at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, July 24, 2020. Counsel are DIRECTED to dial-in to the conference by calling 866-4345269 at the scheduled time. The access code is 6022965. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/21/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 07/21/2020)

07/24/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Telephone Conference held on 7/24/2020. The parties shall notify the court with a status update on mediation efforts by 9/1/2020. (KLL) (Entered: 07/24/2020)

07/24/2020

759 ORDER in light of matters occurring during the 7/24/2020 status conference, on or before September 1, 2020, the parties SHALL file a joint report regarding the results of their settlement discussions; If the parties are unable to report that at least a tentative settlement of the Ray, Woods, Hall, Moore, Foshee, and Hamilton cases has been reached, the joint report SHALL contain an aggressive proposed scheduling order addressing all matters that remain to be conducted in this case. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/24/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 07/24/2020)

08/31/2020

760 TEXT ORDER - At the request of Judge Ott, who is continuing his efforts to mediate this case, and related cases, the parties may have an additional fourteen (14) days to work on a potential settlement. On or before September 15, 2020, the parties SHALL file a further joint report regarding the results of their further settlement discussions. If the parties are unable to report that at least a tentative settlement of the Ray, Woods, Hall, Moore, Foshee, and Hamilton cases has been reached, the joint report SHALL contain an aggressive proposed scheduling order addressing all matters that remain to be conducted in these cases. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/31/2020. (KEK) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

09/15/2020 761 TEXT ORDER - At the request of Judge Ott, who is continuing his efforts to mediate this case, and related cases, the parties may have an

additional two (2) weeks to work on a potential settlement. On or before September 29, 2020, the parties SHALL file a further joint report regarding the results of their further settlement discussions. If the parties are unable to report that at least a tentative settlement of the Ray, Woods, Hall, Moore, Foshee, and Hamilton cases has been reached, the joint report SHALL contain an aggressive proposed scheduling order addressing all matters that remain to be conducted in these cases. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/15/2020. (KAM) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/29/2020

762 STIPULATION of Dismissal - Plainiffs and the sole remaining Defendant, Judicial Correction Service LLC, stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice, each party to bear own costs. (KAM) (Entered: 09/29/2020)

09/29/2020

763 ORDER DISMISSING CASE-In accordance with the parties Stipulation for Dismissal 762 , filed September 29, 2020, the court hereby ORDERS that this action shall be, and is, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The parties are to bear their own costs, expenses, and attorneys fees. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 09/29/2020. (AKD) (Entered: 09/29/2020)

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