U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM

Singleton et al v. Cannizzaro et al Assigned to: Judge Jane Triche Milazzo Referred to: Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld Case in other court: USCA, 5th Circuit, 17-30896
USCA, 19-30197 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 10/17/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Renata Singleton

represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (New Orleans) 1340 Poydras St. Suite 2160 P. O. Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 504-522-0628 x. 122 Email: bruce.warfield.hamilton@gmail.com TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY

Stephanie Legros Willis ACLU of Louisiana Legal 1340 Poydras St Ste 2160 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-444-6046 Email: swillis@laaclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alec George Karakatsanis Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Washington, DC 20009 202-844-4975 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Allison B. Gotfried Venable LLP 1270 Avenue of the Americas 24th Floor New York, NY 10020 212-370-6227 Email: abgotfried@venable.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux American Civil Liberties Union Captial Punishment (NC) 201 W Main Street Suite 402 Durham, NC 27701 919-682-9563 Email: arceneauxa@gmail.com TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs Venable LLP DC 600 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001 202-344-4269 Email: gsachs@venable.com TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202-932-1276 Email: jeff@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Washington, DC 20009

202-656-5189 Email: katie@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202-894-6134 Email: arandes@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (New York/Broad) 125 Broad St. 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 646-905-8870 Email: mkovel@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume Venable LLP (New York) 1270 Avenue of the Americas 24th Floor New York, NY 10020 212-370-5500 Email: msblume@venable.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Sam Ahmed ACLU of Louisiana 1340 Poydras St Ste 2160 New Orleans, LA 70122 917-842-3902 Email: nahmed@laaclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Olevia Boykin Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Washington, DC 20009 202-287-2866 Email: olevia@civilrightscorps.org TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Second Floor Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202-844-4975 Email: ryan@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks Venable LLP Intellectual Property 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2300 Los Angeles, CA 90067 310-229-9900 Fax: 310-229-9901 Email: ssbrooks@venable.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi American Civil Liberties Union (Wash- Justice & Equality) Trone Center for Justice and Equality 915 15th Street NW, 9th Floor Washington, DC 20005 202-715-0802 Email: strivedi@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni Civil Rights Corps 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW Ste 800

Plaintiff
Marc Mitchell TERMINATED: 12/28/2020

Washington, DC 20009 202-330-2832 Email: tara@civilrightscorps.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling Venable LLP 1270 Avenue of Americas New York, NY 10020 212-503-0558 Email: twelling@venable.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth Chamblee-

Ryan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling

Plaintiff Lazonia Baham

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Stephanie Legros Willis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alicia Sharon Venable LLP Intellectual Property 2049 Century Park East Ste 2300 Los Angeles, CA 90067 310-229-9695 Email: asharon@venable.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Sam Ahmed (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi

Plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Stephanie Legros Willis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address)

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nora Sam Ahmed (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Fayona Bailey TERMINATED: 10/28/2020

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan (See above for address)

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Silence Is Violence TERMINATED: 12/28/2020

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address)

Plaintiff
Jane Doe TERMINATED: 10/28/2020

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
John Roe TERMINATED: 10/28/2020

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allison B. Gotfried (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Marie Arceneaux (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/02/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Gerald Stuart Sachs (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/08/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Jeffrey Stein (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Ashworth ChambleeRyan Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Second Floor Washington, DC 20006 202-656-5189 Email: katie@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura Gaztambide Arandes (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Louise Kovel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Steven Blume (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Olevia Boykin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/08/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Ryan Downer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah S Brooks (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Somil Bharat Trivedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr in his official capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish (Doc. 21) and in his individual capacity (Doc. 18); Terminated In his Individual Capacity per Doc. 226

Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas J Welling (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley Stanley, Reuter, Ross, Thornton & Alford, LLC (New Orleans) LL&E Tower 909 Poydras St. Suite 2500 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-523-1580 Email: rcs@stanleyreuter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Jeffrey Barbera Barbera Law Firm 4645 Carthage Street Metairie, LA 70002 504-931-0662 Email: barberalawfirm@cox.net TERMINATED: 10/26/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY
Donna R. Andrieu District Attorney's Office (Orleans) 619 South White Street New Orleans, LA 70119 504-571-2820 Email: dandrieu@orleansda.com TERMINATED: 02/05/2021
John Salm Alford Dudley Debosier, PLC (New Orleans)

622 Baronne Street New Orleans, LA 70113 504-605-3811 Fax: 9852424249 Email: jsalford@dudleydebosier.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul Stanley, Reuter, Ross, Thornton & Alford, LLC (New Orleans) LL&E Tower 909 Poydras St. Suite 2500 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-523-1580 Email: mjp@stanleyreuter.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman Stanley, Reuter, Ross, Thornton & Alford, LLC 909 Poydras Street Suite 2500 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-523-1580 Email: pmb@stanleyreuter.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L. Freeman , Jr. Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office 619 South White Street New Orleans, LA 70119 (504) 822-2414 Email: bfreeman@orleansda.com TERMINATED: 02/08/2021
W. Raley Alford , III Stanley, Reuter, Ross, Thornton & Alford, LLC (New Orleans) LL&E Tower 909 Poydras St. Suite 2500 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-523-1580

Defendant David Pipes TERMINATED: 02/08/2021
Defendant Iain Dover
Defendant Jason Napoli

Email: wra@stanleyreuter.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Arthur Mitchell
Defendant Tiffany Tucker TERMINATED: 07/22/2020

Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III

Defendant Michael Trummel TERMINATED: 07/22/2020
Defendant Inga Petrovich
Defendant Laura Rodrigue

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Matthew Hamilton TERMINATED: 07/22/2020
Defendant Unidentified Party Defendant Graymond Martin

Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address)

Defendant Sarah Dawkins TERMINATED: 07/22/2020
Defendant Jason R Williams in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney
Amicus Amici Curiae Former prosecutors, former pubic defenders, and law professors

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Richard C. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick M. Bollman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Salm Alford (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew J. Paul (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W. Raley Alford , III (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Nelson Adcock Law Office of John N. Adcock 3110 Canal Street New Orleans, LA 70119 504-233-3125 Email: JNADCOCK@GMAIL.COM

Amicus
National Alliance to End Sexual Violence

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Albert Quoc Giang Boies, Schiller, Flexner, LLP (Los Angeles) 725 S. Figueroa St. 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 213-629-9040 Email: agiang@bsfllp.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kelly L. Perigoe Boies, Schiller, Flexner, LLP (Los Angeles) 725 S. Figueroa St. 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 213-629-9040 Email: kperigoe@bsfllp.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trevor Porter Stutz Boies, Schiller, Flexner, LLP (Los Angeles) 725 S. Figueroa St. 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 213-629-9040 Email: tstutz@bsfllp.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Catherine Elena Lasky Katie Lasky Law LLC 900 Camp Street, Suite 439 New Orleans, LA 70130 504-603-1501 Email: katie@katielaskylaw.com TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY

Amicus DV LEAP

Jonathan Bloom Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (New York) 767 Fifth Ave. New York, NY 10153 212-310-8775 Email: Jonathan.Bloom@weil.com TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Kerry Ann Murphy Kerry Murphy Law LLC 715 Girod Street Suite 250 New Orleans, LA 70130 504-603-1500 Fax: 504-603-1503 Email: kmurphy@kerrymurphylaw.com TERMINATED: 10/16/2020
R. Bruce Rich Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (New York) 767 Fifth Ave. New York, NY 10153 212-310-8170 Email: Bruce.Rich@weil.com TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Victor S. Leung Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (New York) 767 Fifth Ave. New York, NY 10153 212-310-8655 Email: Victor.Leung@weil.com TERMINATED: 08/08/2018 PRO HAC VICE
represented by DV LEAP 1215 31st St. NW Suite 3729 Washington, DC 20007

Amicus
Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault

PRO SE
Catherine Elena Lasky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jonathan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Kerry Ann Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/16/2020
R. Bruce Rich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Victor S. Leung (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2018 PRO HAC VICE
represented by Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault 2133 Silverside Dr. Ste. A Baton Rouge, LA 70808 PRO SE
Catherine Elena Lasky (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jonathan Bloom (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Kerry Ann Murphy (See above for address)

TERMINATED: 10/16/2020
R. Bruce Rich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/2021 PRO HAC VICE
Victor S. Leung (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/08/2018 PRO HAC VICE

Date Filed 10/17/2017
10/17/2017 10/17/2017 10/17/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with jury demand against All Defendants (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 053L-6413667) filed by Silence Is Violence, Marc Mitchell, Renata Singleton, Fayona Bailey, Lazonia Baham, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons, # 10 Summons, # 11 Summons, # 12 Summons, # 13 Summons)Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Lazonia Baham(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Fayona Bailey(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Jane Doe(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Tiffany LaCroix(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Marc Mitchell(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Silence Is Violence(pty:pla), Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Renata Singleton(pty:pla).(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
2 Initial Case Assignment to Judge Jane Triche Milazzo and Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. (gk) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
3 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6414910) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Registration form, certificate, and declaration, # 2 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
4 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6415159) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit

10/17/2017 10/18/2017 10/19/2017 10/19/2017 10/20/2017
10/24/2017 10/24/2017

Certificate, # 3 Exhibit Registration Form, # 4 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
5 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6415180) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Certificate, # 3 Exhibit Registration Form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified on 10/18/2017 (ecm). (Entered: 10/17/2017)
6 Summons Issued as to Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (ecm) (Entered: 10/18/2017)
7 ORDER granting 3 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Anna Marie Arceneaux. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
8 ORDER granting 4 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Alec George Karakatsanis. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
9 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Iain Dover served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Matthew Hamilton served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Arthur Mitchell served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Jason Napoli served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Inga Petrovich served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; David Pipes served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Laura Rodrigue served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Michael Trummel served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017; Tiffany Tucker served on 10/19/2017, answer due 11/9/2017. (Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/20/2017)
10 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Fee previously paid) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton, Unidentified Party. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Registration form, # 2 Exhibit Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Certificate, # 4 Proposed Order)Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton added to party Unidentified Party(pty:pla).(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
12 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File by David Andrew Christenson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Notice of Submission)(ecm) (Entered: 10/25/2017)

10/25/2017 10/26/2017 10/26/2017 10/30/2017 10/30/2017 11/02/2017 11/03/2017
11/06/2017

11 ORDER granting 10 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Katherine Ashworth Chamblee-Ryan. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 10/25/2017)
13 ORDER denying 12 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (Copy mailed to David Christenson). (ecm) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
14 MOTION for Leave to File Proceed by Pseudonym by Unidentified Party. Motion(s) will be submitted on 11/15/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)Attorney Anna Marie Arceneaux added to party Unidentified Party(pty:pla).(Arceneaux, Anna) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/30/2017: # 3 Notice of Submission (Civil Only)) (ecm). (Entered: 10/26/2017)
15 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 14 MOTION for Leave to Proceed by Pseudonym; Filing attorney did not include a Notice of Submission. Notice of Submission subsequently provided to Clerk and has now been attached to the motion. (ecm) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
16 MOTION for Reconsideration re 13 Order on Motion for Leave to File. Motion(s) will be submitted on 11/29/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Submission)(ecm) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
17 ORDER denying 16 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/02/2017)
18 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint,,, by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Iain Dover(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Matthew Hamilton(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Arthur Mitchell(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Jason Napoli(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Inga Petrovich(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party David Pipes(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Laura Rodrigue(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Michael Trummel(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Tiffany Tucker(pty:dft).(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
19 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6455307) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton, Unidentified Party. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit

11/06/2017
11/06/2017 11/07/2017
11/08/2017 11/08/2017 11/20/2017 11/22/2017 11/29/2017 11/30/2017

Certficate, # 3 Exhibit Registration form, # 4 Exhibit Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
20 ORDER granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint,, as to Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr answer due 11/30/2017; Iain Dover answer due 11/30/2017; Matthew Hamilton answer due 11/30/2017; Arthur Mitchell answer due 11/30/2017; Jason Napoli answer due 11/30/2017; Inga Petrovich answer due 11/30/2017; David Pipes answer due 11/30/2017; Laura Rodrigue answer due 11/30/2017; Michael Trummel answer due 11/30/2017; Tiffany Tucker answer due 11/30/2017. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
24 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 13 Order on Motion for Leave to File, 17 Order on Motion for Reconsideration filed by David Christenson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(ecm) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
21 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint,,, by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Thomas Jeffrey Barbera added to party Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr(pty:dft).(Barbera, Thomas) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
22 ORDER granting 19 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Somil Bharat Trivedi. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
23 ORDER granting 21 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint as to Leon Cannizzaro, Jr. in his Official Capacity, answer due 11/30/2017. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/08/2017)
25 USCA Case Number 17-30896 appealed to USCA, 5th Circuit for 24 Notice of Appeal (ecm) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
26 EXPARTE MOTION for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis by David Chistenson. (ecm) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
27 ORDER granting 14 Motion for Leave to Proceed by Pseudonym. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
28 FILED IN ERROR: Refiled as Rec. Doc. 31: MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Barbera, Thomas) Modified on 12/1/2017 (ecm). (Entered: 11/30/2017)

11/30/2017 11/30/2017 11/30/2017 11/30/2017
11/30/2017 12/01/2017 12/05/2017 12/06/2017

29 ORDER granting 26 Motion for Leave to Appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
30 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Document 28 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barbera, Thomas) Modified event/text on 11/30/2017 (sa). (Entered: 11/30/2017)
31 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Barbera, Thomas) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
32 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 30 MOTION to Amend/Correct. 1. Filing attorney selected incorrect event. Correct event is Motion to Withdraw Document. Clerk took corrective action by changing the event. 2. Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the district judge. Clerk took corrective action. 28 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . Document 28 is a duplicate filing of Document 31 and will be noted as such. No further action is necessary. (sa) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
33 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/20/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
34 ORDER denying 30 Motion to Withdraw 28 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . The Clerk's office previously marked this document as filed in error. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 12/01/2017)
35 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 33 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , 31 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 12/05/2017)
36 ORDER granting 35 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply until December 29, 2017. Motions will be submitted on 1/10/2018 as to 31 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , and 33 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim .

12/21/2017 12/21/2017 12/26/2017 12/29/2017 12/29/2017
12/29/2017
01/02/2018 01/02/2018

Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/6/2017.(sa) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
37 AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand against All Defendants filed by Silence Is Violence, Marc Mitchell, Renata Singleton, Jane Doe, Fayona Bailey, Tiffany LaCroix.(Arceneaux, Anna) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
38 Request of Summons Issued as to Graymond Martin filed by All Plaintiffs re 37 Amended Complaint. (Arceneaux, Anna) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
39 Summons Issued as to Graymond Martin. (ecm) (Entered: 12/26/2017)
40 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Graymond Martin served on 12/28/2017, answer due 1/18/2018. (Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 12/29/2017)
41 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 37 Amended Complaint by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Graymond Martin(pty:dft).(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/29/2017)
42 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION To Treat Previously Filed Motions to Dismiss as Moot by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 12/29/2017)
43 ORDER granting 42 Motion To Treat Previously Filed Motions To Dismiss As Moot. Defendants' 31 , 33 Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 01/02/2018)
44 ORDER granting 41 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 37 Amended Complaint as to Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr answer due 1/25/2017; Iain Dover answer due 1/25/2017; Matthew Hamilton answer due 1/25/2017; Graymond Martin answer due 1/25/2017; Arthur Mitchell answer due 1/25/2017; Jason Napoli answer due 1/25/2017; Inga Petrovich answer due 1/25/2017; David Pipes answer due 1/25/2017; Laura Rodrigue answer due 1/25/2017; Michael Trummel answer due 1/25/2017; Tiffany Tucker answer due 1/25/2017. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/2/2018. (sa) (Entered: 01/02/2018)

01/04/2018 01/04/2018 01/05/2018 01/05/2018 01/24/2018
01/25/2018 01/25/2018 01/25/2018
01/25/2018

45 EXPARTE/CONSENT First MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 37 Amended Complaint by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barbera, Thomas) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
46 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barbera, Thomas) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
47 ORDER granting 45 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 37 Amended Complaint as to Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr answer due 1/25/2018. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/5/18. (sa) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
48 ORDER granting 46 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Robert L. Freeman, Jr for Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/5/18. (sa) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
49 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Amend/Correct 37 Amended Complaint by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(ChambleeRyan, Katherine) Modified text on 1/25/2018 (sa). (Entered: 01/24/2018)
50 DEFICIENT: MOTION to Proceed by Pseudonym by John Roe. Motion(s) will be submitted on 2/21/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Notice of Submission) Attorney Katherine Ashworth Chamblee-Ryan added to party John Roe(pty:pla).(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) Modified on 1/26/2018 (sa). (Entered: 01/25/2018)
51 ORDER granting 49 Motion to File Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/25/2018. (sa) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
52 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT with Jury Demand against Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker, Unidentified Party, and Sarah Dawkins, filed by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton, and John Roe. (sa) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
53 Summons Issued as to Sarah Dawkins - Second Amended Complaint. (sa) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/26/2018 01/30/2018 02/01/2018
02/01/2018 02/06/2018 02/07/2018
02/07/2018 02/28/2018

54 SUMMONS Returned Executed; Sarah Dawkins served on 1/26/2018, answer due 2/16/2018. (Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
55 MOTION for Leave to Proceed by Pseudonym by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 2/21/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Notice of Submission)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) Modified text on 1/31/2018 (sa). (Entered: 01/30/2018)
56 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 52 Second Amended Complaint, by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order )Attorney Matthew J. Paul added to party Sarah Dawkins(pty:dft).(Paul, Matthew) Modified on 2/1/2018 (sa). (Entered: 02/01/2018)
57 EXPARTE/CONSENT First MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 52 Second Amended Complaint, in his official capacity by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Freeman, Robert) Modified text on 2/1/2018 (sa). (Entered: 02/01/2018)
60 USCA JUDGMENT issued as mandate on 1/25/2018 as to 24 Notice of Appeal. The appeal is dismissed as of January 25, 2018, for want of prosecution. Signed by USCA clerk. (ecm) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
58 ORDER granting 56 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 52 Second Amended Complaint, as to Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr (in his individual capacity) answer due 2/28/2018; Iain Dover answer due 2/28/2018; Matthew Hamilton answer due 2/28/2018; Graymond Martin answer due 2/28/2018; Arthur Mitchell answer due 2/28/2018; Jason Napoli answer due 2/28/2018; Inga Petrovich answer due 2/28/2018; David Pipes answer due 2/28/2018; Laura Rodrigue answer due 2/28/2018; Michael Trummel answer due 2/28/2018; Tiffany Tucker answer due 2/28/2018. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
59 ORDER granting 57 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 52 Second Amended Complaint; Leon Cannizzaro, in his official capacity answer due 2/28/2018. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
61 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue,

03/01/2018 03/01/2018
03/02/2018 04/04/2018
04/05/2018 04/05/2018 04/09/2018

Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Proposed Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss, # 4 Proposed Exhibit 1, # 5 Proposed Exhibit 2, # 6 Proposed Exhibit 3, # 7 Proposed Exhibit 4, # 8 Proposed Exhibit 5, # 9 Proposed Exhibit 6, # 10 Proposed Exhibit 7, # 11 Proposed Exhibit 8, # 12 Proposed Exhibit 9, # 13 Proposed Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
62 ORDER granting 61 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages, along with Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/1/2018. (sa) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
63 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs by Defendants, Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) will be submitted on 4/18/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9)(sa) (Entered: 03/01/2018)
64 ORDER granting 55 Motion Leave to Proceed by Pseudonym. Plaintiff John Roe is permitted to proceed anonymously by pseudonym in the above-captioned litigation. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/2/2018. (sa) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
65 EXPARTE/CONSENT First MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Memorandum in Opposition by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 4/5/2018 (sa). (Entered: 04/04/2018)
66 ORDER granting 65 Motion for Leave to File Opposition in Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/5/2018. (sa) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
67 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton re 63 MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs. (sa) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
68 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by All Plaintiffs regarding 63 MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 04/09/2018)

04/09/2018
04/10/2018 04/10/2018 04/10/2018 04/10/2018 04/10/2018

69 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Fee previously paid) by Amici Curiae. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Trevor P. Stutz ISO Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Electronic Case Filing System Attorney Registration Form, # 4 Proposed Order Order Considering the Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice)Attorney John Nelson Adcock added to party Amici Curiae(pty:mov).(Adcock, John) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
70 ORDER as to Rec. Doc. 68 Request/Statement of Oral Argument. IT IS ORDERED that oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 63 ) is SET to take place on May 9, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Each side shall have fourteen minutes in which to argue. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/10/2018.(sa) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
71 ORDER granting 69 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Trevor Porter Stutz. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/10/2018. (Attachments: #1 Pro Hac Notice)(sa). (Entered: 04/10/2018)
72 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6789767) by Amici Curiae. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit DECLARATION OF ALBERT Q. GIANG ISO MOTION FOR ADMISSION PHV, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit ECF Attorney Registration Form, # 4 Proposed Order Order Considering the Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice)(Adcock, John) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
73 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing Fee $100 receipt number 053L-6789778) by Amici Curiae. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Decl of Kelly L. Perigoe ISO Motion for Admission PHV, # 2 Exhibit Cert of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Electronic Case Filing System Attorney Registration Form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Adcock, John) Modified fee status on 4/11/2018 (ecm). (Entered: 04/10/2018)
74 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae by Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, DV Leap, National Alliance to End Sexual Assault. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/2/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading Brief of Amici Curiae)Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault(pty:selreq), Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party DV Leap(pty:selreq), Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party National Alliance to End Sexual Assault(pty:selreq).(Lasky, Catherine) Modified on 4/11/2018 (ecm). (Entered: 04/10/2018)

04/10/2018
04/11/2018
04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018

75 **DEFICIENT** MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Credit Card not accepted or unavailable - payment of filing fee due within 2 business days) by DV Leap, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Assault. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/2/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Rich Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit BBloom Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit C- Leung Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Exhibit D-F: Rich, Bloom and Leung Declarations)(Lasky, Catherine) Modified on 4/11/2018 (ecm). (Entered: 04/10/2018)
76 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for R. Bruce Rich (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6793918) by The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, DV LEAP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit B- Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C- ECF Registration, # 4 Proposed Order)Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault(pty:am), Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party National Alliance to End Sexual Violence (pty:am), Attorney Catherine Elena Lasky added to party DV LEAP(pty:am).(Lasky, Catherine) (Attachment 2 replaced on 4/11/2018) (ecm). (Entered: 04/11/2018)
77 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Jonathan Bloom (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6793938) by DV LEAP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit B- Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C- ECF Registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Lasky, Catherine) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
78 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Victor Leung (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-6793958) by DV LEAP, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A- Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit B- Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C- ECF Registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Lasky, Catherine) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
79 ORDER granting 72 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Albert Quoc Giang. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/11/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
80 ORDER granting 73 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Kelly L. Perigoe. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/11/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 04/11/2018)

04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/12/2018
04/17/2018
04/18/2018 04/18/2018
04/24/2018

81 ORDER granting 76 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to R. Bruce Rich. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/11/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
82 ORDER granting 77 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Jonathan Bloom. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/11/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
83 ORDER granting 78 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Victor S. Leung. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/11/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
84 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by Amici Curiae. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/2/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, #(2) Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Pleading Brief)(Stutz, Trevor) Modified text on 4/12/2018 (sa). (Entered: 04/11/2018)
85 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by DV LEAP, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/2/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading - Brief, # 3 Notice of Submission)(Rich, R.) Modified text on 4/13/2018 (sa). (Entered: 04/12/2018)
86 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
87 ORDER granting 86 Motion for Leave to File Reply in Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/18/2018. (sa) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
88 REPLY Memorandum filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker in Support of 63 MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(sa) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
89 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton,

05/09/2018 05/09/2018 05/09/2018 05/09/2018 05/18/2018
05/21/2018 05/21/2018 05/21/2018

Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 84 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief, 85 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
90 MINUTE ENTRY for Motion Hearing held on 5/9/2018 before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Counsel appeared for the record, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 63 ) was argued and taken under submission. (Court Reporter Cathy Pepper.) (sa) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
91 ORDER granting 84 and 85 Motions for Leave to File Amicus Briefs. IT IS ORDERED that the Motions are GRANTED and the briefs shall be filed into the record. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/8/2018. (sa) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
92 Brief of Amici Curiae, former prosecutors, former pubic defenders, and law professors in Support of 67 Plaintiffs' Response/Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 63). (sa) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
93 Brief of Amici Curiae: DV LEAP, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, and National Alliance to End Sexual Violence in Support of 67 Plaintiffs' Response/Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 63). (sa) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
94 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
95 TEXT ORDER granting 94 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
96 Supplemental Memorandum filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker, in Support of 63 MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs. (ecm) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
97 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Defendants' Supplemental Brief by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/13/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed

Pleading, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

05/22/2018 98 TEXT ORDER granting 97 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/22/18. (amc) (Entered: 05/22/2018)

05/22/2018

99 Supplemental Memorandum filed by All Plaintiffs, in Opposition of 63 MOTION to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiffs. (sa) (Entered: 05/22/2018)

05/31/2018

100 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on May 9, 2018 before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Court Reporter/Recorder Cathy Pepper, Telephone number 504-589-7779. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties have 21 days from the filing of this transcript to file with the Court a Redaction Request. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/29/2018. (rsg) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

05/31/2018 101 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Supplemental Authority. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Arceneaux, Anna) (Entered: 05/31/2018)

06/01/2018

102 RESPONSE to 101 Notice of Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker (Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 6/4/2018 (sa). (Entered: 06/01/2018)

06/07/2018

103 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Defendants' Response to Notice of Supplemental Authority by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/8/2018: # 3 Proposed Order) (mm). Modified text on 6/8/2018 (mm). (Entered: 06/07/2018)

06/08/2018

104 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 103 MOTION for Leave to File Reply to Defendants' Response to Notice of Supplemental Authority. **1. Filing attorney did not include a proposed order. Proposed Order subsequently provided to Clerk and has now been attached to the motion. 2. Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/ConsentMotion Y/N?'. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte'.** (mm) (Entered: 06/08/2018)

06/11/2018 105 ORDER granting 103 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/11/2018. (sa) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

06/11/2018

106 REPLY as to 101 Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (sa) (Entered: 06/11/2018)

08/07/2018

107 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Victor S. Leung as Attorney by DV LEAP, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Lasky, Catherine) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

08/08/2018

108 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 107 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Victor S. Leung terminated for amici, The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, DV LEAP, and the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/8/18. (ecm) (Entered: 08/08/2018)

08/17/2018

109 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Mariana Kovel (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-7066994) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Attorney registration form)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

08/20/2018

110 ORDER granting 109 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Mariana Louise Kovel as co-counsel of record for plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/20/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 08/20/2018)

11/13/2018

111 Supplemental Authority Supporting rec doc. 63 Motion to Dismiss by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker of . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 11/14/2018 (mm). (Entered: 11/13/2018)

11/21/2018 112 Response/Reply by All Plaintiffs to 111 Notice of Supplemental Authority (Kovel, Mariana) Modified text on 11/23/2018 (mm). (Entered: 11/21/2018)

11/23/2018

113 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 112 Response/Reply. **Name of attorney who electronically filed this document does not match name of signatory attorney on pleading. The user log-in and password serve as the required signature for purposes of Rule 11 of the FRCP. No further action is necessary.** (mm) (Entered: 11/23/2018)

02/19/2019

114 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-7436927) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ECF Registration, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of M. Blume, # 3 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 02/19/2019)

02/20/2019

115 ORDER granting 114 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Michael Steven Blume as co-counsel for plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/20/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 02/20/2019)

02/28/2019

116 ORDER AND REASONS: Before the Court is Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs' claims not specifically set forth in the document are hereby DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/28/2019. (mm) (Entered: 02/28/2019)

03/11/2019

117 *DEFICIENT* EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-7471780) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 5 Exhibit ECF registration, # 6 Exhibit ECF registration, # 7 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified on 3/12/2019 (sa). (Entered: 03/11/2019)

03/12/2019

118 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker as to 116 Order on Motion to Dismiss,. (Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 053L-7472650.) (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 03/12/2019)

03/13/2019

119 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Ryan Downer (Fee previously paid) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of good standing, # 3 Exhibit ECF registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 3/14/2019 (sa). (Entered: 03/13/2019)

03/13/2019

120 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Olevia Boykin (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L-7476249) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments:

# 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of good standing, # 3 Exhibit ECF registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 3/14/2019 (sa). (Entered: 03/13/2019)

03/14/2019

121 MOTION to Confirm Stay of Proceedings by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) will be submitted on 4/10/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text/event on 3/15/2019 (sa). (Entered: 03/14/2019)

03/19/2019

123 USCA Case Number 19-30197 appealed to USCA, Fifth Circuit for 118 Notice of Appeal, filed by Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Laura Rodrigue, Iain Dover, Graymond Martin, Matthew Hamilton, Sarah Dawkins, David Pipes, Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Michael Trummel, Inga Petrovich, Tiffany Tucker (sa) (Entered: 03/20/2019)

03/20/2019

122 APPEAL TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 118 Notice of Appeal. (Transcript is already on file) (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 03/20/2019)

03/22/2019

124 Electronic Record on Appeal Access Granted to Matthew J. Paul, Richard C. Stanley, W. Raley Alford, III re 118 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Case Number 19-30197. Instructions for access are posted on http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/forms/instructionsfor-electronic-record-download-feature-of-cm.pdf (adp) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/29/2019

125 ORDER granting 119 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Ryan Downer, as co-counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/29/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

03/29/2019

126 ORDER granting 120 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Olevia Boykin, as co-counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/29/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Notice) (sa) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

04/02/2019 127 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 121 MOTION to Stay . (Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/02/2019 128 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by All Plaintiffs regarding 121 MOTION to Stay (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

04/03/2019

129 ORDER as to 128 Request/Statement of Oral Argument. IT IS ORDERED that the request for oral argument is GRANTED, and oral argument on the Motion to Stay (Rec. Doc. 121 ) is SET for April 23, 2019 at 10 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party is limited to 7 minutes of argument. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall not be interpreted to alter the briefing deadlines for Defendant's Motion to Confirm a Stay of Proceedings, and all briefs shall be submitted by April 10, 2019. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/3/2019.(sa) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/09/2019

130 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Confirm Stay of Proceedings by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading, # 3 Exhibit 1)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 04/09/2019)

04/10/2019

131 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 130 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Confirm Stay. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/10/2019. (ecm) (Entered: 04/10/2019)

04/10/2019

132 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 121 MOTION to Stay. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(ecm) (Entered: 04/10/2019)

04/18/2019

133 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument currently scheduled for April 23, 2019 on Defendants' Motion to Confirm Stay (Doc. 121) is hereby CANCELED. This Order does not affect the April 10, 2019 submission date for Defendants' Motion.Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Wallace, Ben) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

04/19/2019

134 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Sur-reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Stay by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Entered: 04/19/2019)

04/22/2019 135 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 134 Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Opposition. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/22/2019. (ecm) (Entered: 04/22/2019)

04/22/2019 136 Sur-Reply Memorandum filed by All Plaintiffs, in Opposition of 121 MOTION to Stay. (ecm) (Entered: 04/22/2019)

04/29/2019

137 ORDER regarding 121 MOTION to Confirm Stay of Proceedings. IT IS ORDERED that Defendants shall file into the record a brief specifying exactly which aspects of this Court's February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons that Defendants are appealing to the Fifth Circuit. Defendants shall file the brief no later than May 3, 2019, and it shall be no more than five (5) pages in length. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/29/2019.(sa) (Entered: 04/29/2019)

05/02/2019

138 Supplemental Memorandum by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker to 137 Order, in Support of 121 Motion to Confirm Stay (Paul, Matthew) Modified text/link on 5/3/2019 (sa). (Entered: 05/02/2019)

05/03/2019

139 Electronic Record on Appeal Access Granted to Mariana Louise Kovel re 118 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Case Number 19-30197. Instructions for access are posted on http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/defaultsource/forms/instructions-for-electronic-record-download-feature-ofcm.pdf (adp) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/11/2019

140 **DEFICIENT** MOTION Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1 by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/4/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) Modified on 5/13/2019 (jeg). (Entered: 05/11/2019)

05/13/2019

141 MOTION for Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1 by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/5/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) Modified text on 5/14/2019 (sa). (Entered: 05/13/2019)

05/24/2019

142 Electronic Record on Appeal Access Granted to Loren Lampert re 118 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Case Number 19-30197. Instructions for access are posted on http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/defaultsource/forms/instructions-for-electronic-record-download-feature-ofcm.pdf (adp) (Entered: 05/24/2019)

05/28/2019

143 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 141 MOTION for Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1 . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 05/28/2019)

05/31/2019

144 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply in Support of Motion by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Downer, Ryan) (Entered: 05/31/2019)

06/03/2019

145 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 144 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/3/2019. (ecm) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/03/2019 146 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by All Plaintiffs re 141 MOTION for Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1 . (ecm) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

07/02/2019

147 ORDER AND REASONS DENYING 121 MOTION to Confirm Stay of Proceedings; DENYING 141 MOTION for Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Rule 62.1, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 07/02/2019. (am) (Entered: 07/02/2019)

07/10/2019

148 Electronic Record on Appeal Access Granted to Mary McCord, Jonathan Bloom re 118 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Case Number 1930197. Instructions for access are posted on http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/forms/instructionsfor-electronic-record-download-feature-of-cm.pdf (adp) (Entered: 07/10/2019)

07/16/2019

149 ANSWER to 52 Second Amended Complaint, by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker.(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 7/17/2019 (am). (Entered: 07/16/2019)

07/17/2019

150 Electronic Record on Appeal Access Granted Jessica Ring Amunson re 118 Notice of Appeal,. USCA Case Number 19-30197. Instructions for access are posted on http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/defaultsource/forms/instructions-for-electronic-record-download-feature-ofcm.pdf (adp) (Entered: 07/17/2019)

07/24/2019 151 NOTICE: Scheduling Conference set for 7/30/2019 10:00 AM before case manager by telephone. The Court will initiate the telephone

conference call. Upon receipt of this Notice, counsel should email the case manager at Erin_Mouledous@laed.uscourts.gov to provide her with the appropriate contact information for the call. If an email is not received, the case manager will call only the attorney designated as Lead Attorney at the number listed on the case docket sheet.(ecm) (Entered: 07/24/2019)

07/25/2019

152 RE-NOTICE OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE: The Telephone Scheduling Conference set for July 30, 2019 is RESET for August 2, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.(ecm) (Entered: 07/25/2019)

08/01/2019

153 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Anna Arceneaux as Attorney by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Arceneaux, Anna) (Entered: 08/01/2019)

08/02/2019

154 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 153 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Anna Marie Arceneaux terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/2/19. (ecm) (Entered: 08/02/2019)

08/02/2019

155 SCHEDULING ORDER: Preliminary Status Conference set for 11/7/2019 03:00 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. All discovery must be completed by 9/14/2020. Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/12/2020 02:00 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. 2 week Jury Trial set for 12/7/2020 08:30 AM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Issued by clerk. (Attachments: # 1 Pretrial Notice Form)(ecm) (Entered: 08/02/2019)

09/06/2019

156 MOTION For Leave to File, Third Amended Complaint by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/25/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Proposed Pleading Third Amended Complaint)(Boykin, Olevia) Modified text/added referral on 9/9/2019 (am). (Entered: 09/06/2019)

09/17/2019

157 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 156 MOTION for Leave to File, Third Amended Complaint . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 09/17/2019)

11/07/2019 158 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: Preliminary Status Conference held on 11/7/2019. The parties discussed preliminary issues in the case. (am) (Entered: 11/08/2019)

11/14/2019

159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/4/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Declaration of Graymond Martin, # 4 Exhibit 1, # 5 Exhibit 2, # 6 Exhibit 3, # 7 Exhibit 4, # 8 Exhibit 5, # 9 Exhibit 6, # 10 Exhibit 7, # 11 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/14/2019)

11/15/2019

160 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Tara Mikkilineni (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-7976345) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Tara Mikkilineni, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit ECF Registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 11/18/2019 (am). (Entered: 11/15/2019)

11/18/2019 161 ORDER granting 160 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Tara Mikkilineni. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 11/18/19. (Attachments: # 1 Notice) (ko) (Entered: 11/19/2019)

11/20/2019

162 MOTION to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McLendon Jr. by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/18/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Medical Subpoena, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Notice of Submission, # 4 Proposed Order)(Boykin, Olevia) Modified text/added referral on 11/21/2019 (am). (Entered: 11/20/2019)

11/22/2019

163 ORDER SETTING ORAL ARGUMENT: IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument on 162 MOTION to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McLendon Jr. will be held on Wednesday, 12/18/2019 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 11/22/2019.(ajn) (Entered: 11/22/2019)

11/26/2019

164 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is

Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/18/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Submission, # 2 Proposed Order)(Boykin, Olevia) Modified text on 11/27/2019 (am). (Entered: 11/26/2019)

11/27/2019

165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/18/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text/referral on 11/29/2019 (jeg). (Entered: 11/27/2019)

11/29/2019

166 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief. **1. Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the District Judge. Clerk took corrective action. No further action necessary. 2. Attachment has duplicate description. For attachment, select either a category OR enter a description, but not both since this results in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action. No further action necessary.** (jeg) (Entered: 11/29/2019)

12/02/2019

167 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) re 165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief filed by Silence Is Violence, Fayona Bailey, John Roe, Jane Doe, Lazonia Baham, Marc Mitchell, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. IT IS ORDERED that counsel for Defendants shall file any opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply no later than Thursday, December 5, 2019. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Abu-Orf, Leila) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

12/05/2019

168 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief , 164 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/05/2019)

12/06/2019

169 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by All Plaintiffs re 165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief . (Boykin, Olevia) (Entered: 12/06/2019)

12/06/2019

170 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) GRANTING 165 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Having considered Plaintiffs' Motion, Defendants' Opposition, and Plaintiffs' Reply, IT IS ORDERED that the submission date for Defendants' 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief is hereby CONTINUED and RESET from December 4, 2019 to December 18, 2019. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall review Local Rule 7.5 for the filing deadline relevant to the submission date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/6/19. (Abu-Orf, Leila) (Entered: 12/06/2019)

12/09/2019

171 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Reset Hearing and Submission Date for Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Subpoena by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text/referred on 12/10/2019 (am). (Entered: 12/09/2019)

12/10/2019

172 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 171 MOTION to Reset Hearing and Submission Date for Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Subpoena.**Filing attorney should have changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the Magistrate Judge. Clerk took corrective action.** (am) (Entered: 12/10/2019)

12/10/2019

173 ORDER Granting 171 MOTION to Reset Hearing and Submission Date for Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Subpoena 162 MOTION to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McLendon Jr. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's 171 Motion to Quash is reset for submission with oral argument on 1/15/2020 11:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 12/10/2019.(ajn) (Entered: 12/10/2019)

12/10/2019

174 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief . (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Rule 56(d) Affidavit of Tara Mikkilineni)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 12/10/2019)

12/18/2019

175 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr,

Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/18/2019)

12/19/2019 176 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 175 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/19/19. (ecm) (Entered: 12/19/2019)

12/19/2019

177 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr (in his individual capacity), Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 159 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Requests for Injunctive Relief. (ecm) (Entered: 12/19/2019)

12/30/2019

178 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss Constitutional Damages Claims Against Supervisory Defendants Based on Qualified Immunity by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Graymond Martin, David Pipes. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/30/2019)

12/31/2019

179 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the 178 motion to Dismiss Constitutional Damages Claims Against Supervisory Defendants Based on Qualified Immunity is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' claims seeking damages against Leon Cannizzaro (in his individual capacity), Graymond Martin, and David Pipes under Count VI (failure to supervise, train, or discipline) and Count VII (failure to intervene) of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 52 ) are barred by qualified immunity and are hereby DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' 156 Motion to File a Third Amended Complaint is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/31/2019. (am) (Entered: 12/31/2019)

01/07/2020

180 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 162 MOTION to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McLendon Jr. . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 01/07/2020)

01/14/2020

181 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Protective Order by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 1/29/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Mtn for

Protective Order, # 2 Proposed Order Plaintiff's Proposed Protective Order, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Mariana Kovel, # 4 Exhibit Kovel Decl. Exh. A, # 5 Exhibit Kovel Decl. Exh. B, # 6 Exhibit Kovel Decl. Exh. C, # 7 Exhibit Kovel Decl. Exh. D)(Kovel, Mariana) Modified text on 1/15/2020 (am). (Entered: 01/14/2020)

01/15/2020

182 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: Motion Hearing was held on 1/15/2020 re 162 MOTION to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McLendon Jr. ORDERED: The motion is taken under submission. (Court Reporter Sandra Minutillo.) (ajn) (Entered: 01/16/2020)

01/17/2020

183 MOTION for Protective Order by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 02/05/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Mariana Kovel, # 4 Exhibit A to Kovel Decl., # 5 Exhibit B to Kovel Decl., # 6 Exhibit C to Kovel Decl., # 7 Exhibit D to Kovel Decl., # 8 Notice of Submission)(Kovel, Mariana) Modified text/added referral/submission date on 1/21/2020 (am). (Entered: 01/17/2020)

01/21/2020

184 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 183 Amended MOTION for Protective Order (CORRECTED Motion Papers).** 1. Filing attorney selected incorrect submission/hearing date. Correct date is 02/05/2020. Clerk took corrective action. No further action necessary. **2.Filing attorney should have changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the Magistrate Judge. Clerk took corrective action.** (am) (Entered: 01/21/2020)

01/23/2020

185 ORDER AND REASONS: Granting 162 Motion to Quash the Individual Defendants Subpoena to Dr. Ronald McClendon, Jr. as set forth in document. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 1/23/2020. (ajn) (Entered: 01/23/2020)

01/28/2020

186 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 183 Amended MOTION for Protective Order (CORRECTED Motion Papers) . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Alford, W.) (Entered: 01/28/2020)

02/03/2020 187 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Mtn for Protective Order by

Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading)(Kovel, Mariana) Modified on 2/3/2020 (pp). (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/3/2020: # 2 Proposed Order) (pp). (Entered: 02/03/2020)

02/04/2020

188 ORDER granting 187 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 2/4/2020. (ajn) (Entered: 02/04/2020)

02/04/2020 189 REPLY/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 183 MOTION for Protective Order . (ajn) (Entered: 02/04/2020)

02/07/2020

190 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8137172) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit E-File Privileges Form, # 3 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 02/07/2020)

02/11/2020

191 ORDER granting 190 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Gerald Stuart Sachs for plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Entered: 02/11/2020)

02/27/2020

192 ORDER AND REASONS: GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 183 Motion for Protective Order as set forth in document. The parties shall meet and confer and negotiate a protective order in accordance with the court's instructions herein. Such protective order shall be submitted to the court for entry within 14 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 2/27/2020. (ajn) (Entered: 02/27/2020)

03/02/2020

193 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record Patrick M. Bollman by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 03/02/2020)

03/03/2020

194 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 193 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Patrick M. Bollman for Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr., Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, and Tiffany Tucker. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/3/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 03/03/2020)

03/10/2020

195 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Protective Order per the Court's instructions in its Feb. 27 Order, by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Protective Order)(Kovel, Mariana) Modified text on 3/11/2020 (am). (Entered: 03/10/2020)

03/11/2020 196 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 3/11/2020. (ajn) (Entered: 03/11/2020)

05/13/2020

197 USCA JUDGMENT issued as mandate on 5/13/2020 as to 118 Notice of Appeal, filed by Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Laura Rodrigue, Iain Dover, Graymond Martin, Matthew Hamilton, Sarah Dawkins, David Pipes, Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Michael Trummel, Inga Petrovich, Tiffany Tucker. USCA judge name: ELROD, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES. It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellants pay to appellees the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court. (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter, # 2 Opinion)(am) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

05/29/2020

198 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Schedule by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/24/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in support, # 2 Declaration of Sarah Brooks, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit(8) Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Notice of Submission, # 17 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 6/1/2020 (am). (Entered: 05/29/2020)

06/01/2020

199 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 198 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Schedule.**Attachment has duplicate description. For attachment, select either a category OR enter a description, selecting both will result in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action.** (am) (Entered: 06/01/2020)

06/08/2020

200 ORDER AND REASONS: GRANTING 159 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/8/2020. (am) (Entered: 06/08/2020)

06/16/2020

201 MOTION to Separate Trials of Individual Defendants by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. Motion(s) will be submitted on 7/8/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Notice of

Submission)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 6/17/2020 (am). (Entered: 06/16/2020)

06/16/2020

202 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 198 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Schedule . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 06/16/2020)

06/19/2020

203 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply In Support of Motion for Extension of Discovery Schedule by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/22/2020: # 4 Proposed Order) (am). Modified text on 6/22/2020 (am). (Entered: 06/19/2020)

06/22/2020

204 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 203 MOTION for Leave to File Reply In Support of Motion for Extension of Discovery Schedule. **1. Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?'. Exparte/Consent Motions are not set for submission. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte' and removed submission date. **2. Filing attorney did not include a proposed order. Proposed Order subsequently provided to Clerk and has now been attached to the motion.** (am) (Entered: 06/22/2020)

06/22/2020

205 ORDER: GRANTING 203 Motion for Leave to File Reply In Support of Motion for Extension of Discovery Schedule. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/22/2020. (am) (Entered: 06/22/2020)

06/22/2020

206 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton re 198 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Schedule. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(am) (Entered: 06/22/2020)

06/24/2020

207 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Extension of Discovery Schedule by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/24/2020 208 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Status Conference by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton,

Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/24/2020

209 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion 198 is GRANTED. The deadline for discovery is hereby CONTINUED from 09/14/2020 and RESET to 11/14/2020. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case manager issue a new scheduling order in accordance with the new discovery deadline of 11/14/2020. Specifically, the case manager shall select a new trial and pretrial conference date and issue new deadlines for: exchanging Plaintiffs expert reports, exchanging Defendants' expert reports, exchanging Plaintiffs rebuttal expert reports, filing witness and exhibit lists, filing dispositive motions, and filing motions in limine. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/24/2020.(am) (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/24/2020

210 SCHEDULING ORDER: All discovery must be completed by 11/14/2020. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/4/2021 04:00 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Jury Trial set for 3/22/2021 08:30 AM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (Attachments: # 1 Pretrial Notice Form)(ecm) (Entered: 06/24/2020)

06/25/2020

211 ORDER: GRANTING 207 Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Extension of Discovery Schedule. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/25/2020. (am) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

06/25/2020 212 SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr re 198 MOTION for Extension of Discovery Schedule. (am) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

06/26/2020

213 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 208 motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a status conference is set for 07/08/2020, at1:30 p.m. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/26/2020.(am) (Entered: 06/26/2020)

06/29/2020

214 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, IT IS ORDERED that the status conference set for July 8, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. will be held via telephone. Counsel are instructed to call 888-273-3658 and use Access Code: 1304800 when instructed. The Court will join the call when all parties are on the line. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Abu-Orf, Leila) (Entered: 06/29/2020)

06/30/2020 215 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 201 MOTION to Separate Trials of Individual Defendants .

(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 7/1/2020 (am). (Entered: 06/30/2020)

07/01/2020

216 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker regarding 201 MOTION to Separate Trials of Individual Defendants (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 07/01/2020)

07/01/2020

217 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' request for Oral Argument (Doc. 216 ) on the Motion for Separate Trials (Doc. 201 ) is GRANTED. The Oral Argument will be held on 07/08/2020 at 1:30 p.m. via Zoom. The case manager will send the link in advance of the Oral Argument. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the telephone status conference set for 07/08/2020 at 1:30 p.m. is hereby CANCELLED. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 7/1/2020.(am) (Entered: 07/01/2020)

07/02/2020

218 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). IT IS ORDERED that the Oral Argument set for July 8, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. is hereby CANCELLED and CONVERTED to a telephone status conference. Counsel are instructed to call 888-273-3658 and use Access Code: 1304800 when instructed. The Court will join the call when all parties are on the line. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Abu-Orf, Leila) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/06/2020

219 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Separate Trials by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 07/06/2020)

07/07/2020 220 ORDER: GRANTING 219 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Separate Trials. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 7/7/2020. (am) (Entered: 07/07/2020)

07/07/2020

221 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Iain Dover, Matthew Hamilton, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker re 201 MOTION to Separate Trials of Individual Defendants. (am) (Entered: 07/07/2020)

07/08/2020

222 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: video status conference held on 7/8/2020. IT IS ORDERED that a follow up video status conference is SET for 09/23/2020 at 1:30 p.m. The video conference will be held via Zoom. The case manager shall email a link to counsel in advance of the conference. (am) (Entered: 07/09/2020)

07/13/2020

223 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record Donna R. Andrieu by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Freeman, Robert) (Entered: 07/13/2020)

07/17/2020 224 ORDER AND REASONS: DENYING 201 Motion for Separate Trials, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 7/17/2020. (am) (Entered: 07/17/2020)

07/21/2020

225 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Confirm Dismissal of Claims Against Individual Defendants by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Sarah Dawkins, Matthew Hamilton, Michael Trummel, Tiffany Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 07/21/2020)

07/22/2020

226 ORDER: GRANTING 225 Motion to Confirm Dismissal of Claims Against Individual Defendants. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 7/22/2020. (am) (Entered: 07/22/2020)

07/27/2020

227 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 223 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Donna R. Andrieu for Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr (in his official capacity). Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 7/27/20. (ecm) (Entered: 07/27/2020)

08/03/2020

228 MOTION for Summary Judgment by David Pipes. Motion(s) will be submitted on 8/19/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Declaration of David Pipes, # 4 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 08/03/2020)

08/03/2020

229 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading as to 228 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text/removed referral on 8/4/2020 (am). (Entered: 08/03/2020)

08/04/2020

230 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 229 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 228 MOTION for Summary Judgment. **Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'.

This motion will be decided by the District Judge. Clerk took corrective action.** (am) (Entered: 08/04/2020)

08/04/2020

231 ORDER: GRANTING 229 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/4/2020.(am) (Entered: 08/04/2020)

08/06/2020

232 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney John Salm Alford added to party Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr(pty:dft).(Alford, John) (Entered: 08/06/2020)

08/06/2020

233 ORDER SCHEDULING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: A Settlement Conference set for Thursday, 8/20/2020 at 9:00 AM. This conference shall take place VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A Zoom for Government link will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Counsel are to share that link with any necessary participating parties. Everyone should join the link about ten minutes ahead of the start time and wait to be admitted by the judge. The entire day has been reserved for the conference, which will be structured in two parts scheduled at 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. The required settlement memoranda, as set forth herein, are due no later than midnight on Thursday, 8/13/2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 8/6/2020.(ajn) (Entered: 08/06/2020)

08/06/2020

234 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 232 Motion to Enroll as additional Counsel of Record for Attorney John Salm Alford for Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr (in his official capacity). Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/6/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 08/06/2020)

08/11/2020

235 ORDER that a status conference shall be held via VIDEO CONFERENCE on Thursday, 8/27/2020, at 9:00 a.m., before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A Zoom for Government link will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Counsel are to share that link with any necessary participating parties. By 8/26/2020, at 9:00 a.m., plaintiffs shall submit to the court via email to efilevanmeerveld@laed.uscourts.gov a list of all depositions sought and a brief explanation of the importance of the testimony. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 8/11/2020.(caa) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

08/18/2020

236 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 228 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Against Defendant Pipes. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1. Resp. to Fact Statement, # 2 Exhibit 2. Mikkilineni Decl., # 3 Exhibit 3. Policy Manual Excerpt, # 4 Exhibit 4. Pipes Memo, # 5 Exhibit 5. Pipes Presentation, # 6 Exhibit 6.

Singleton Screening Action Form, # 7 Exhibit 7. LSBA Directory Entry, # 8 Exhibit 8. Singleton File Review, # 9 Exhibit 9. Screening Action Form QJ, # 10 Exhibit 10. Material witness warrant QJ, # 11 Exhibit 11. QJ File Review, # 12 Exhibit 12. Martin Email, # 13 Exhibit 13. Material witness warrant Singleton, # 14 Exhibit 14. Crossley Docket Sheet, # 15 Exhibit 15. Cook Docket Master, # 16 Exhibit A. Plaintiffs RFPs, # 17 Exhibit B. Brooks Decl., # 18 Exhibit C. Freeman Email May 29, # 19 Exhibit D. Freeman Email July 27, # 20 Exhibit E. Freeman Email August 18, # 21 Exhibit F. Freeman Email August 17)(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) (Entered: 08/18/2020)

08/19/2020

237 **DEFICIENT**EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8456526) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 8/20/2020 (am). (Entered: 08/19/2020)

08/20/2020

238 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: A Settlement Conference was held via video conference on Thursday, 8/20/2020. The case did not settle, but significant progress was made. Deadlines are set out in document. The Status Conference set for Thursday, 8/27/2020 will be reset. Once the deposition schedule is determined, the parties are to contact the court for a new date. (ajn) (Entered: 08/21/2020)

08/24/2020

239 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sarah Brooks (Fee previously paid) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 8/25/2020 (am). (Entered: 08/24/2020)

08/25/2020

243 ORDER: GRANTING 239 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Sarah S Brooks. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/25/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/26/2020

240 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Remaining Claims Against David Pipes by David Pipes. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Exhibit 1, # 3 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/26/2020 241 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 240 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/26/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

08/26/2020 242 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by David Pipes re 228 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(ecm) (Entered: 08/26/2020)

09/02/2020

244 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Laura Gaztambide Arandes (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC8479224) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 9/3/2020 (am). (Entered: 09/02/2020)

09/03/2020

247 ORDER: GRANTING 244 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Laura Gaztambide Arandes.. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 09/03/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 09/08/2020)

09/06/2020

245 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Olevia Boykin as Attorney by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Boykin, Olevia) (Entered: 09/06/2020)

09/08/2020

246 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 245 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Olevia Boykin terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 9/8/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 09/08/2020)

09/11/2020

248 MOTION for Extension of the Discovery Schedule by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/30/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of Tara Mikkilineni, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Notice of Submission, # 10 Proposed Order)(Brooks, Sarah) Modified text on 9/14/2020 (am). (Entered: 09/11/2020)

09/14/2020

249 ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE: IT IS ORDERED that a Status Conference shall be held via VIDEO CONFERENCE on 9/15/2020 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A Zoom for Government link will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Counsel are to share that link with any necessary participating parties. The purpose of the conference is to discuss plaintiffs' request

for additional depositions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 9/14/2020.(ajn) (Entered: 09/14/2020)

09/15/2020

250 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). The discovery status conference set for September 15, 2020, at 3:00 p.m. is CANCELLED. It will be reset for a future date to be selected by the court and parties via email. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld.(mlkw) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/15/2020

251 ORDER RESETTING STATUS CONFERENCE: IT IS ORDERED that the Status Conference set for 9/15/2020 is hereby RESET for Friday, 9/18/2020 at 8:30 AM, via VIDEO CONFERENCE before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A Zoom for Government link will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Counsel are to share that link with any necessary participating parties. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 9/15/2020.(ajn) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/18/2020

252 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: A Status Conference was held via VIDEO CONFERENCE on 9/18/2020. The parties discussed plaintiffs' request for additional depositions. The parties agreed that plaintiffs will be allowed to conduct depositions as set out in document. (ajn) (Entered: 09/18/2020)

09/22/2020

253 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Iain Dover, Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, Inga Petrovich, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue re 248 MOTION for Extension of the Discovery Schedule . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 09/22/2020)

09/23/2020

254 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Allison Gotfried (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8513081) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 9/24/2020 (am). (Entered: 09/23/2020)

09/23/2020

256 Minute Order. Proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of the Discovery Schedule 248 is GRANTED IN PART. The 06/24/2020 Scheduling Order is hereby AMENDED as stated herein. Final Pretrial Conference set for 7/1/2021 at 03:00 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Status Conference set for 11/18/2020 at 01:30 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Jury Trial set for 7/26/2021 at 08:30 AM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. All discovery must be completed by 1/9/2021. (am) (Entered: 09/24/2020)

09/24/2020 255 ORDER granting 254 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Allison B. Gotfried. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 09/24/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 09/24/2020)

10/06/2020

257 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Thomas Welling (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8534461) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 10/7/2020 (am). (Entered: 10/06/2020)

10/08/2020

258 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Jeffrey Stein (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8537526) by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Exhibit Consent to Electronic Filing form, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 10/08/2020)

10/08/2020

259 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Graymond Martin. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 10/28/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 10/8/2020 (am). (Entered: 10/08/2020)

10/08/2020 260 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 259 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence. **Document no longer deemed deficient.** (am) (Entered: 10/08/2020)

10/13/2020

261 ORDER: GRANTING 258 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Jeffrey Stein. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/13/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 10/13/2020)

10/15/2020

262 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Kerry A. Murphy as Attorney by DV LEAP, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Lasky, Catherine) (Entered: 10/15/2020)

10/16/2020

263 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 262 Motion to Withdraw Kerry A. Murphy as Attorney. Attorney Kerry Ann Murphy terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/16/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 10/16/2020)

10/19/2020

264 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Thomas Jeffrey Barbera a as Attorney by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Barbera, Thomas) Modified text on 10/20/2020 (am). (Entered: 10/19/2020)

10/19/2020

265 ORDER SETTING ORAL ARGUMENT: IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument on 259 MOTION to Compel will be held via VIDEO CONFERENCE on Wednesday, 10/28/2020 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A link to join the conference will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 10/19/2020.(ajn) (Entered: 10/19/2020)

10/20/2020

266 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Lazonia Baham, Fayona Bailey, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Marc Mitchell, John Roe, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton re 259 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence . (Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 10/20/2020)

10/22/2020

267 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Silence Is Violence's Claims Against Graymond Martin by Graymond Martin. Motion(s) will be submitted on 11/11/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 10/22/2020)

10/23/2020

268 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr, Graymond Martin. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 10/23/2020)

10/26/2020

269 ORDER: GRANTING 257 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Thomas J Welling. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/26/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 10/26/2020)

10/26/2020 270 ORDER granting 264 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Thomas Jeffrey Barbera terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/26/2020. (am) (Entered: 10/26/2020)

10/26/2020

271 ORDER Granting 268 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 10/26/2020. (ajn) (Entered: 10/26/2020)

10/26/2020 272 REPLY/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr., and Graymond Martin re 259 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence. (ajn) (Entered: 10/26/2020)

10/27/2020 273 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss Party John Roe After Settlement by John Roe. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Dismissing the Claims of John Roe)(Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 10/27/2020)

10/27/2020 274 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss Party Jane Doe After Settlement by Jane Doe. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Dismissing the Claims of Jane Doe)(Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 10/27/2020)

10/27/2020

275 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss Party Fayona Bailey After Settlement by Fayona Bailey. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Dismissing the Claims of Fayona Bailey)(Kovel, Mariana) (Entered: 10/27/2020)

10/28/2020

276 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 273 Motion to Dismiss Party. It is hereby ordered that all claims asserted by Plaintiff John Roe against all Defendants in this matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/28/20. (ecm) (Entered: 10/28/2020)

10/28/2020

277 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 274 Motion to Dismiss Party. It is hereby ordered that all claims asserted by Plaintiff Jane Doe against all Defendants in this matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/28/20. (ecm) (Entered: 10/28/2020)

10/28/2020

278 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 275 Motion to Dismiss Party. It is hereby ordered that all claims asserted by Plaintiff Fayona Bailey against all Defendants in this matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 10/28/20. (ecm) (Entered: 10/28/2020)

10/28/2020

279 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, David Pipes. Motion(s) will be submitted on 11/25/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 10/28/2020)

10/28/2020

280 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: Motion Hearing was held on 10/28/2020 re 259 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence. ORDERED: The Motion is Granted. Parties shall comply as set forth in document. (Court Reporter Nichelle Wheeler.) (ajn) (Entered: 10/28/2020)

11/03/2020 281 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 267 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Silence Is Violence's

Claims Against Graymond Martin . (Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 11/4/2020 (am). (Entered: 11/03/2020)

11/04/2020

282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Graymond Martin, Jason Napoli, David Pipes. Motion(s) will be submitted on 11/25/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15, # 18 Exhibit 16, # 19 Exhibit 17, # 20 Exhibit 18, # 21 Exhibit 19, # 22 Exhibit 20, # 23 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/04/2020)

11/06/2020

283 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Silence Is Violence's Claims Against Graymond Martin by Graymond Martin. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/09/2020

284 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 283 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 11/9/2020. (ecm) (Entered: 11/09/2020)

11/09/2020 285 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Graymond Martin re 267 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Silence Is Violence's Claims Against Graymond Martin. (ecm) (Entered: 11/09/2020)

11/09/2020

286 NOTICE of Clarification by Silence Is Violence re 285 Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 11/10/2020 (am). (Entered: 11/09/2020)

11/09/2020

287 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants, 282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Lazonia Baham, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 11/09/2020)

11/10/2020

288 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, David Pipes re 287 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants, 282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Indi . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/10/2020)

11/10/2020

289 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion 287 is GRANTED. The submission dates for Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims 282 and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims 279 are hereby CONTINUED to 12/23/2020. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this is THE LAST EXTENSION that the Court will grant in relation to these motions. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 11/10/2020.(am) (Entered: 11/10/2020)

11/18/2020

290 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: Video Status Conference held on 11/18/2020. The parties discussed the statusof the case. IT IS ORDERED that a follow-up status conference is SET for 02/11/2021 at 11:00 a.m. by Zoom Video. The case manager will send the Zoom link prior to the conference date. (am) (Entered: 11/19/2020)

11/23/2020

291 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 11/23/2020)

11/30/2020

292 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion 291 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Order is hereby AMENDED, as set forth in document. All discovery shall be completed no later than 02/19/2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 11/30/2020.(am) (Entered: 11/30/2020)

12/11/2020

293 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: A Status Conference was held via video conference on 12/11/2020. The parties discussed the status of discovery. Deadline is set herein. (ajn) (Entered: 12/11/2020)

12/15/2020

294 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Renata Singleton re 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Responsive), # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Counterstatement), # 3 Exhibit Index, # 4 Exhibit 1 - Singleton Decl., # 5 Exhibit 2 Singleton Dep., # 6 Exhibit 3 - Singleton MWW App, # 7 Exhibit 4 Tucker Dep., # 8 Exhibit 5 - Mitchell Dep., # 9 Exhibit 6 - Pipes Dep., # 10 Exhibit 7 - Eleven Types of Fake Subpoenas, # 11 Exhibit 8 Newly-Produced Fake Subpoenas, # 12 Exhibit 9 - OPDA 30(b)(6) Dep., # 13 Exhibit 10 - May 2014 Fake Subpoena Template, # 14 Exhibit 11 - 191 Fake Subpoenas Based on May 2014 Template, # 15 Exhibit 12 - Mitchell Fake Subpoenas, # 16 Exhibit 13 - Dansey Fake Subpoena, # 17 Exhibit 14 - Dansey Decl., # 18 Exhibit 15 -

Nelson Docket Master, # 19 Exhibit 16 - Porter Fake Subpoenas, # 20 Exhibit 17 - OPDA Resps. to LaCroix's Second Interrogs., # 21 Exhibit 18 - McGuire Fake Subpoena, # 22 Exhibit 19 - Apr. 21, 2017 O'Hern Email, # 23 Exhibit 20 - Apr. 26, 2017 Memo re: Notice to Appear, # 24 Exhibit 21 - Apr. 26, 2017 Email, # 25 Exhibit 22 Apr. 28, 2017 Memo re: Policy, # 26 Exhibit 23 - Incident Report, # 27 Exhibit 24 - Crim. Appearance Bond, # 28 Exhibit 25 - Nov. 2014 Avery Letter, # 29 Exhibit 26 - Dec. 2014 Jackson Email, # 30 Exhibit 27 - Singleton CourtNotify Records, # 31 Exhibit 28 - Porter and Mitchell Text, # 32 Exhibit 29 - Porter Texts, # 33 Exhibit 30 - OPDA Resps. to Singleton's Third Interrogs., # 34 Exhibit 31 - June 2015 Status Hrg. Tr., # 35 Exhibit 32 - Crossley Docket Master, # 36 Exhibit 33 - Phillips Decl., # 37 Exhibit 34 - Mitchell Resps. to Pls. RFAs)(Arandes, Laura) (Attachment 18 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachment 19 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachment 20 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachment 21 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachment 27 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachment 34 replaced on 12/16/2020) (am). (Attachments 16, 18,20, 22, 30, 33, 35 replaced on 12/18/2020 per rec. doc. 303) (am). Modified on 12/18/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/15/2020)

12/16/2020

295 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Lazonia Baham re 282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Responsive), # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Counterstatement), # 3 Exhibit Index (Exhibits to Follow))(Arandes, Laura) (Main Document 295 and Attachment 2 replaced on 12/17/2020 per Doc. 301) (ecm). (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

296 NOTICE of Exhibits by Lazonia Baham re 295 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, of Exhibits. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6, # 6 Exhibit 7, # 7 Exhibit 8, # 8 Exhibit 9, # 9 Exhibit 10, # 10 Exhibit 11, # 11 Exhibit 12, # 12 Exhibit 13, # 13 Exhibit 14, # 14 Exhibit 15, # 15 Exhibit 16, # 16 Exhibit 18, # 17 Exhibit 19, # 18 Exhibit 20, # 19 Exhibit 21, # 20 Exhibit 22, # 21 Exhibit 23, # 22 Exhibit 24, # 23 Exhibit 25, # 24 Exhibit 26, # 25 Exhibit 27, # 26 Exhibit 28, # 27 Exhibit 29, # 28 Exhibit 30, # 29 Exhibit 31, # 30 Exhibit 32, # 31 Exhibit 33, # 32 Exhibit 34, # 33 Exhibit 35, # 34 Exhibit 36, # 35 Exhibit 37, # 36 Exhibit 38, # 37 Exhibit 39, # 38 Exhibit 40, # 39 Exhibit 41, # 40 Exhibit 42, # 41 Exhibit 43, # 42 Exhibit 44, # 43 Exhibit 46, # 44 Exhibit 46A, # 45 Exhibit 48, # 46 Exhibit 49, # 47 Exhibit 50, # 48 Exhibit 54, # 49 Exhibit 56, # 50 Exhibit 58, # 51 Exhibit 59, # 52 Exhibit 60, # 53 Exhibit 61, # 54 Exhibit 63, # 55 Exhibit 64, # 56 Exhibit 65, # 57 Exhibit 66,

# 58 Exhibit 67, # 59 Exhibit 68, # 60 Exhibit 69, # 61 Exhibit 70, # 62 Exhibit 71, # 63 Exhibit 72, # 64 Exhibit 73, # 65 Exhibit 74, # 66 Exhibit 75, # 67 Exhibit 76, # 68 Exhibit 77, # 69 Exhibit 78, # 70 Exhibit 79, # 71 Exhibit 80, # 72 Exhibit 82, # 73 Exhibit 83, # 74 Exhibit 84, # 75 Exhibit 85, # 76 Exhibit 86, # 77 Exhibit 1 pt. 1)(Arandes, Laura) Modified text on 12/17/2020 (am). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/17/2020: # 78 Exhibit 1 pt. 2, # 79 Exhibit 45, # 80 Exhibit 87 per Doc. 301) (ecm). ((Attachment 6, 37, 39, 48, 77 replaced on 12/17/2020 per Doc. 301) (ecm). (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/29/2020 per rec. doc. 312: # 81 SEALED Ex 17, # 82 SEALED Ex 47, # 83 SEALED Ex 51, # 84 SEALED Ex 52, # 85 SEALED Ex 55, # 86 SEALED Ex 57, # 87 SEALED Ex 81) (am). Modified on 12/29/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

297 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, David Pipes regarding 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

298 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Graymond Martin, Jason Napoli, David Pipes regarding 282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

299 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 294 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. **Exhibits on incorrect sized paper. Local Rule 10.1E states 'All papers drafted for filing in this court shall be on 8-1/2 by 11 inch paper. Clerk has reduced images. No further action needed.** (am) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

300 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 12/16/2020. Since the formal settlement conference held on 8/20/2020, and following the steps set out at that time (Rec. Doc. 238), dozens of settlement discussions have been held with the undersigned. These discussions have resulted in settlements and dismissals of the claims of John Roe (Rec. Doc. 273), Jane Doe (Rec. Doc. 274), and Fayona Bailey (Rec. Doc. 275). The claims of plaintiff, Silence Is Violence, have now also been settled. Additional settlement discussions will be held commencing in late January. In the meantime, any parties wishing to discuss settlement may contact the undersigned. (ajn) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/16/2020

301 NOTICE by Lazonia Baham re 295 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, of Corrected Brief and Exhibits. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Opposition Br., # 2 Corrected Counterstatement, # 3 Corrected Ex. 1-1 - Baham Tr., # 4 Corrected Ex. 1-2 - Baham Tr.,

# 5 Corrected Ex. 7, # 6 Corrected Ex. 39, # 7 Corrected Ex. 41, # 8 Ex. 45, # 9 Corrected Ex. 54, # 10 Ex. 87)(Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 12/16/2020)

12/17/2020

302 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines Submission Dates for Individual Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions by Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, Jason Napoli, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/17/2020)

12/17/2020

303 NOTICE by Renata Singleton re 294 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, of Corrected Exhibits. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 13 (Corrected), # 2 Exhibit 15 (Corrected), # 3 Exhibit 17 (Corrected), # 4 Exhibit 19 (Corrected), # 5 Exhibit 27 (Corrected), # 6 Exhibit 30 (Corrected), # 7 Exhibit 32 (Corrected))(Arandes, Laura) Modified text on 12/18/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/17/2020)

12/18/2020

304 ORDER granting 302 Motion to Extend Submission Dates. Defendants are hereby granted until December 29, 2020 to reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 279) and the Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 282). Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/18/2020. (ko) (Entered: 12/18/2020)

12/18/2020

305 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Seal Exhibits in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Lazonia Baham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of Request, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text/removed submission date on 12/21/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/18/2020)

12/21/2020

306 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 305 MOTION to Seal Exhibits in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants.**Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?'. Exparte/Consent Motions are not set for submission. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte' and removed submission date.** (am) (Entered: 12/21/2020)

12/21/2020

307 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Requests for Oral Argument (Docs. 297, 298) are hereby GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oral Argument on Graymond Martin, Arthur Mitchell, and David Pipes' Motion for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 279) and Graymond Martin, Jason Napoli, and David Pipes' Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims

Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 282) is SET for January 28, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. by Zoom video. The case manager will send the link to the video prior to the conference date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 12/21/2020)

12/23/2020 308 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice by Marc Mitchell. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 12/23/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/23/2020)

12/23/2020

309 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss with Prejudice by Silence Is Violence. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 12/23/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/23/2020)

12/28/2020 310 ORDER: GRANTING 308 Motion to Dismiss Party, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/28/2020. (am) (Entered: 12/28/2020)

12/28/2020 311 ORDER: GRANTING 309 Motion to Dismiss Party, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/28/2020. (am) (Entered: 12/28/2020)

12/28/2020

312 ORDER: GRANTING 305 Motion to Seal Exhibits 17, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 73, and 81. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request to seal Exhibit 47, article by "The Lens," is DENIED. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/28/2020. (am) Modified text on 12/30/2020 (am). (Entered: 12/29/2020)

12/29/2020 313 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss claims against the Individual Defendants by Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 12/29/2020)

12/29/2020

314 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Graymond Martin, Jason Napoli. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Exhibit 21, # 3 Proposed Exhibit 22, # 4 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 12/29/2020)

12/30/2020 315 ORDER: GRANTING 313 Motion to Dismiss, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/30/2020. (am) (Entered: 12/30/2020)

12/30/2020 316 ORDER: GRANTING 314 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/30/2020. (am) (Entered: 12/30/2020)

12/30/2020 317 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Graymond Martin re 282 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims

Against Individual Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21, # 2 Exhibit 22)(am) (Entered: 12/30/2020)

12/30/2020

318 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Jonathan Bloom, R. Bruce Rich, Catherine Lasky and Kerry Murphy as Attorney by DV LEAP, Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence . (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Lasky, Catherine) Modified filers on 1/5/2021 (ecm). (Entered: 12/30/2020)

01/05/2021 319 ORDER: finding as moot 267 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 279 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/5/2021. (am) (Entered: 01/05/2021)

01/05/2021

320 ORDER: GRANTING 318 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jonathan Bloom R. Bruce Rich, Catherine Lasky and Kerry Murphy terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/5/2021. (am) (Entered: 01/05/2021)

01/06/2021 321 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Freeman, Robert) (Entered: 01/06/2021)

01/07/2021 322 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion 321 is GRANTED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/7/2021.(am) (Entered: 01/07/2021)

01/07/2021

323 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Gerald Sachs as Attorney by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 1/8/2021 (am). (Entered: 01/07/2021)

01/08/2021

324 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 323 MOTION to Withdraw Gerald Sachs as Attorney . **Attachment has duplicate description. For attachment, select either a category OR enter a description, selecting both will result in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action.** (am) (Entered: 01/08/2021)

01/08/2021 325 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 323 Motion to Withdraw Gerald Stuart Sachs as Attorney for plaintiff. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/8/21. (ecm) (Entered: 01/08/2021)

01/11/2021

326 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue by Tiffany LaCroix. Motion(s) will be submitted on 1/27/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 4 Exhibit A to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 5 Exhibit B to

Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 6 Exhibit C to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 7 Exhibit D to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 8 Notice of Submission)(Brooks, Sarah) (Entered: 01/11/2021)

01/12/2021

327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Graymond Martin, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue. Motion(s) will be submitted on 1/27/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 12, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 01/12/2021)

01/13/2021

328 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Tiffany LaCroix, Silence Is Violence, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 01/13/2021)

01/14/2021

329 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion 328 is GRANTED. The submission dates for the referenced summary judgment motions (Doc. 326 & 327 ) are hereby extended one week, to 2/3/2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 1/14/2021.(am) (Entered: 01/14/2021)

01/15/2021

330 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). Due to a conflict in the Court's calendar, Oral Argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 282) is hereby RESCHEDULED for January 29, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. The Oral Argument will proceed by Zoom video. The Case Manager will circulate the Zoom link prior to the conference date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 01/15/2021)

01/26/2021

331 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Laura Rodrigue re 326 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 01/26/2021)

01/26/2021

332 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Graymond Martin, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue regarding 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants, 326 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 01/26/2021)

01/26/2021 333 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tiffany LaCroix re 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims

Against Individual Defendants . (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 2 Exhibit A to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 3 Exhibit B to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 4 Exhibit C to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 5 Exhibit D to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 6 Exhibit E to Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 7 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Responsive), # 8 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Counterstatement))(Brooks, Sarah) (Entered: 01/26/2021)

01/27/2021

334 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Graymond Martin, David Pipes, and Laura Rodrigue's Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 332) is hereby GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oral Argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 327) and the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue (Doc. 326) is hereby SET for February 24, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. by Zoom video. The Case Manager will circulate the Zoom link prior to the hearing date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 01/27/2021)

01/27/2021

Manual Attachment Received (1 CD) re 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants filed by David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Graymond Martin. (ecm) (Entered: 01/27/2021)

01/28/2021

335 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). At the request of Counsel, IT IS ORDERED that the Oral Argument scheduled for January 29, 2021 is hereby CANCELLED. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 01/28/2021)

01/28/2021

336 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Doc. 327) and the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue (Doc. 326), currently set for February 24, 2021, is hereby RESCHEDULED for February 26, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. by Zoom video. The Case Manager will circulate the Zoom link prior to the hearing date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 01/27/2021) Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 01/28/2021)

01/29/2021 337 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: A Status Conference was held via video on 1/29/2021. The parties discussed the status of settlement. (ajn) (Entered: 02/01/2021)

02/03/2021 338 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Against

Defendant Laura Rodrigue by Tiffany LaCroix. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Brooks, Sarah) (Entered: 02/03/2021)

02/03/2021

339 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants by Graymond Martin, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Exhibit 15, # 3 Proposed Exhibit 16, # 4 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 02/03/2021)

02/04/2021

340 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 338 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Laura Rodrigue. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/4/21. (ecm) (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/04/2021 341 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Tiffany LaCroix re 326 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue. (ecm) (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/04/2021

342 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 339 Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/4/21. (ecm) (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/04/2021

343 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Graymond Martin, David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue re 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 15, # 2 Exhibit 16)(ecm) (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/04/2021

344 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Claims Against Individual Defendants 282 is hereby DENIED AS MOOT WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/4/2021. (am) (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/04/2021

345 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Donna Andrieu as Attorney by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Andrieu, Donna) Modified text on 2/5/2021 (am). (Entered: 02/04/2021)

02/05/2021

346 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 345 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Donna R. Andrieu terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/5/2021. (ecm) (Entered: 02/05/2021)

02/05/2021 347 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss by Tiffany LaCroix. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 2/5/2021 (am). (Entered: 02/05/2021)

02/05/2021 348 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Robert L. Freeman, Jr. as Attorney by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Freeman, Robert) (Entered: 02/05/2021)

02/08/2021

349 ORDER: GRANTING 347 Motion to Dismiss Party. Party David Pipes dismissed. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/8/2021. (am) (Entered: 02/08/2021)

02/08/2021 350 ORDER: GRANTING 348 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Robert L. Freeman, Jr terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/8/2021. (am) (Entered: 02/08/2021)

02/08/2021

351 ORDER denying as moot without prejudice 228 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 02/08/2021.(ko) (Entered: 02/08/2021)

02/09/2021 352 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Leon A Cannizzaro, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Alford, John) (Entered: 02/09/2021)

02/10/2021

353 ORDER: GRANTING 352 MOTION for Extension of Deadlines, as set forth in document. Status Conference set for 3/11/2021 at 09:30 AM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 2/10/2021.(am) (Entered: 02/10/2021)

02/22/2021

354 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached). At the request of Counsel, IT IS ORDERED that the Oral Argument currently scheduled for February 26, 2021 is hereby CONTINUED and RESET for March 11, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. by Zoom video. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Zoom Status Conference currently scheduled for March 11, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. is hereby RESCHEDULED for March 11, 2021 at 10:00 a.m. The Case Manager will circulate the Zoom link prior to the hearing date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo.(Bergeron, Monica) (Entered: 02/22/2021)

03/02/2021 355 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Dismiss claims against the Individual Defendants by Lazonia Baham. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 03/02/2021)

03/03/2021 356 ORDER: GRANTING 355 Motion to Dismiss,as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/3/2021. (am) (Entered: 03/03/2021)

03/11/2021

357 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: Motion Hearing held on 3/11/2021 re 326 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Against Laura Rodrigue filed by Tiffany LaCroix; 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants filed by David Pipes, Laura Rodrigue, Graymond Martin. Motions argued and taken under submission. (Court Reporter Alexis Vice.) (ecm) (Entered: 03/11/2021)

03/11/2021

358 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: Video Status Conference held on 3/11/2021. IT IS ORDERED that the parties submit to this Court a revised scheduling order seven days after consulting with the Case Manager. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties have 30 days from the date of this Order to supplement their briefing on Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants (R. Doc. 327) with argument as to why LaCroix's claims against Graymond Martin should or should not be dismissed. (ecm) (Entered: 03/11/2021)

03/12/2021

359 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld: At the request of the parties, a Status Conference was held via video conference on 3/12/2021. The parties discussed the date of the deposition of Leon Cannizzaro. In light of the continuance of the trial and the parties' ability to fashion a new pretrial schedule, and in light of the prioritization of settlement efforts, a new deposition date is to be selected during the week of April 5-9. (ajn) (Entered: 03/15/2021)

03/24/2021

360 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to File Joint Proposed Case Management Order by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 3/25/2021 (am). (Entered: 03/24/2021)

03/26/2021

361 ORDER: GRANTING 360 MOTION to File Joint Proposed Case Management Order, as set forth in document . Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 3/26/2021.(am) (Entered: 03/26/2021)

03/26/2021

362 SCHEDULING ORDER: Pursuant to the March 26, 2021 Order adopting the parties' proposed deadlines (Rec. Doc. 361), the Court establishes the following schedule as set forth in document. Final Pretrial Conference set for 10/14/2021 03:30 PM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Jury Trial set for 11/1/2021 08:30 AM before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. All fact discovery must be completed by 7/1/2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (Attachments: # 1 Pretrial Notice Form)(ecm) (Entered: 03/26/2021)

03/31/2021

363 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Against Laura Rodrigue on Grounds of Immunity by Laura Rodrigue. Motion(s) will be submitted on 4/21/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support,

# 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Notice of Submission)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 03/31/2021)

03/31/2021

364 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Arandes, Laura) Modified text on 4/1/2021 (am). (Entered: 03/31/2021)

04/01/2021

365 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion 364 is GRANTED. The submission date for Individual Defendant Laura Rodrigue's Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of Immunity (R. Doc. 363 ) shall be reset for 5/5/2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/1/2021.(am) (Entered: 04/01/2021)

04/09/2021

366 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Jason Williams. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/5/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Notice of Submission)Attorney John Salm Alford added to party Unidentified Party(pty:dft).(Alford, John) Modified text on 4/12/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/09/2021)

04/12/2021

367 Supplemental Memorandum by Graymond Martin to 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 17)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 04/12/2021)

04/12/2021

368 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims by Jason R. Williams. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/5/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Notice of Submission)(Alford, John) Modified text on 4/13/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/12/2021)

04/12/2021

369 Supplemental Memorandum filed by Tiffany LaCroix, in Opposition of 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts (Supplemental), # 2 Exhibit 1 - OPDA Policy Manual, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Pipes Depo. Tr. Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit 3 Martin Depo Tr. Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit 4 - Cannizzaro Rough Depo Tr. Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit 5 - Martin LADB Letter (SEALED), # 7 Exhibit 6 - Barra May 2014 Email, # 8 Exhibit 7 - Stevens and Harris Email, # 9 Exhibit 8 - LaCroix Subpoena, # 10 Exhibit 9 - Rodrigue Depo Tr. Excerpts, # 11 Exhibit 10 - Hayes Motion to Quash, # 12 Exhibit 11 Article - Orleans Parish Prosecutors Are Using Fake Subpoenas, # 13 Exhibit 12 - Article - Practice of Fake Subpoenas To Be Stopped by Orleans DA, # 14 Exhibit 13 - Article - New Orleans Prosecutors End Use of Controversial DA Subpoenas)(Arandes, Laura) (Main Document 369; Attachment 1, and Attachment 4 replaced on 4/14/2021

with redacted versions) (ecm). (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/30/2021: # 15 Unredacted Supplemental Memorandum -SEALED, # 17 Unredacted Supplemental Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts - SEALED, # 18 Unredacted Exhibit 3 - SEALED) (ecm). (Attachment 6 replaced on 4/30/2021) (ecm). (Entered: 04/12/2021)

04/13/2021

370 NOTICE by Tiffany LaCroix re 369 Supplemental Memorandum,,, of Corrected Brief and Exhibits. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Amended Supp. Briefing, # 2 Exhibit B - Amended Supp. Counterstatement, # 3 Exhibit C - Amended Ex. 3 - Martin Depo. Tr. Excerpts)(Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 04/13/2021)

04/13/2021 371 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Seal Brief and Exhibits by Tiffany LaCroix. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Request, # 2 Proposed Order)(Arandes, Laura) (Entered: 04/13/2021)

04/14/2021 372 ORDER: DENYING 371 Motion to Seal. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/14/2021. (am) (Entered: 04/14/2021)

04/15/2021

373 MOTION to to Strike Plaintiff's Filing, or, in the Alternative, to Seal Confidential Portions of the Filing 369 Supplemental Memorandum, by Graymond Martin. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/5/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Notice of Request to Seal, # 4 Proposed Order)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 4/16/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/15/2021)

04/16/2021

374 **DEFICIENT** MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/5/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 4/19/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/16/2021)

04/16/2021

375 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Jason R Williams re 376 MOTION for Extension of Deadlines . (Alford, John) Modified docket entry relationships on 4/19/2021 (ecm). (Entered: 04/16/2021)

04/19/2021

376 MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/5/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Notice of Submission, # 4 Proposed Order)(Arandes, Laura) Modified text on 4/20/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/19/2021)

04/20/2021 377 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that a Status Conference is SET for April 29, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. The conference will take place via Zoom Video. The Case Manager will circulate the Zoom link prior to the conference

date. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/20/2021.(am) (Entered: 04/20/2021)

04/20/2021

378 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Jason R Williams re 376 MOTION for Extension of Deadlines . (Alford, John) (Entered: 04/20/2021)

04/20/2021

379 ORDER: GRANTING IN PART 376 MOTION for Extension of Deadlines Motion(s) 366 and 368 will be submitted on 6/2/2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/20/2021.(am) (Entered: 04/20/2021)

04/21/2021

380 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 373 MOTION to to Strike Plaintiff's Filing, or, in the Alternative, to Seal Confidential Portions of the Filing filed by All Plaintiffs . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Arandes, Laura) Modified text on 4/22/2021 (pp). (Entered: 04/21/2021)

04/26/2021

381 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on March 11, 2021 before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. Court Reporter/Recorder Alexix Vice, Telephone number 504-589-7777. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties have 21 days from the filing of this transcript to file with the Court a Redaction Request. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/26/2021. (rsg) (Entered: 04/26/2021)

04/27/2021

382 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Motion filed by Tiffany LaCroix re 363 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Against Laura Rodrigue on Grounds of Immunity . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts Resp. to Defs Statement of Uncontested Facts, # 2 Exhibit A (Additional Rodrigue Testimony), # 3 Exhibit B (OPDA2194_2200))(Chamblee-Ryan, Katherine) Modified text on 4/28/2021 (am). (Entered: 04/27/2021)

04/28/2021

383 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Filing, or, in the Alternative, to Seal Confidential Portions of the Filing by Graymond Martin. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 04/28/2021)

04/28/2021 384 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 383 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 4/28/21. (ecm) (Entered: 04/28/2021)

04/28/2021 385 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Graymond Martin re 373 MOTION to to Strike Plaintiff's Filing, or, in the Alternative, to Seal Confidential Portions of the Filing. (ecm) (Entered: 04/28/2021)

04/29/2021

386 Minute Order. Proceedings held before Judge Jane Triche Milazzo: Status Conference held on 4/29/2021 by video. Defendant Graymond Martin's Motion 373 is granted in part and denied in part. As to Defendant's request to strike Plaintiff's filing, the Motion is DENIED. As to Defendant's request to seal confidential portions of the filing (Rec. Doc. 369 ), the Motion is GRANTED IN PART in accordance with this Order. Further Ordered that Defendant Graymond Martin is granted leave to file a 5-page Reply to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum (R. Doc. 369). (ecm) (Entered: 04/29/2021)

05/04/2021

387 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Against Laura Rodrigue on Grounds of Immunity by Laura Rodrigue. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 05/04/2021)

05/04/2021

388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. Motion(s) will be submitted on 5/19/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Declaration of Sarah S. Brooks, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Notice of Submission)(Brooks, Sarah) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/11/2021: # 19 Memorandum in Support Substitutes Original) (ajn). (Entered: 05/04/2021)

05/04/2021

389 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton regarding 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery . (Brooks, Sarah) (Entered: 05/04/2021)

05/05/2021 390 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 387 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/5/21. (ecm) (Entered: 05/05/2021)

05/05/2021 391 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Laura Rodrigue re 363 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Claims Against Laura Rodrigue on Grounds of Immunity. (ecm) (Entered: 05/05/2021)

05/05/2021

392 ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the submission date for Plaintiff's 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery is hereby Continued to 5/26/2021. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oral

Argument will be held via VIDEO CONFERENCE on Wednesday, 5/26/2021 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. A link to join the conference will be circulated to counsel of record via email. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 5/5/2021.(ajn) (Entered: 05/05/2021)

05/06/2021

393 **DEFICIENT** NOTICE by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton of Amended Brief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amended Memorandum)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified on 5/7/2021 (ecm). (Entered: 05/06/2021)

05/07/2021

394 Supplemental Memorandum filed by Graymond Martin, in Support of 327 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Tiffany LaCroix's Claims Against Individual Defendants and Responding to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum. (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 05/07/2021)

05/07/2021

395 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Brief by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 5/10/2021 (am). (Entered: 05/07/2021)

05/11/2021 396 ORDER Granting 395 Motion to Substitute Brief. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 5/10/2021. (ajn) (Entered: 05/11/2021)

05/17/2021 397 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by Jason R Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Alford, John) (Entered: 05/17/2021)

05/18/2021

398 TEXT ORDER (No PDF Document Attached) granting 397 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney W. Raley Alford, III and Matthew J. Paul for Jason R Williams. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/18/21. (ecm) (Entered: 05/18/2021)

05/18/2021

399 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery filed by Jason R Williams . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 5/19/2021 (pp). (Entered: 05/18/2021)

05/24/2021

400 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Alicia Sharon (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8871240) by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Consent to Electronic Filing, # 3 Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified text on 5/25/2021 (am). (Entered: 05/24/2021)

05/25/2021 401 ORDER granting 400 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Alicia Sharon. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/25/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 05/25/2021)

05/25/2021

402 ORDER RESCHEDULING ORAL ARGUMENT: IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument on 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery currently set for 5/26/2021 is CONTINUED AND RESET for Wednesday, 6/16/2021 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 5/25/2021.(ajn) (Entered: 05/25/2021)

05/25/2021

403 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 368 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims filed by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts Ex A Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts Ex B Supplemental Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 5/26/2021 (pp). (Entered: 05/25/2021)

05/25/2021

404 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to re 366 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Lazonia Baham . (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 2 Statement of Contested/Uncontested Facts, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit)(Stein, Jeffrey) Modified text on 5/26/2021 (pp). (Entered: 05/25/2021)

05/25/2021

405 EXPARTE/CONSENT Joint MOTION for Extension of Deadlines by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton, Laura Rodrigue, Jason Wiliams, and Graymond Martin. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Mikkilineni, Tara) Modified text on 5/26/2021 (pp). (Entered: 05/25/2021)

05/26/2021

406 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Stephanie Willis to be substituted in place of Bruce Hamilton by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 05/26/2021)

05/27/2021

407 ORDER: GRANTING 406 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Added attorney Stephanie Legros Willis for Lazonia Baham,Stephanie Legros Willis for Tiffany LaCroix,Stephanie Legros Willis for Renata Singleton. Attorney Bruce W. Hamilton terminated. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/27/2021. (am) (Entered: 05/27/2021)

06/01/2021 408 ORDER GRANTING 405 Motion for Extension of Deadlines as set forth in document. Depositions for trial use shall be taken and all

discovery shall be completed no later than AUGUST 2, 2021. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/1/2021. (jeg) (Entered: 06/01/2021)

06/02/2021

409 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of OPDA's Motion for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Prescribed Claims that do not Involve "DA Subpoenas" and Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit, by Jason R Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading, # 3 Proposed Exhibit 1, # 4 Proposed Exhibit 2, # 5 Proposed Exhibit 3)(Paul, Matthew) Modified text on 6/3/2021 (am). (Entered: 06/02/2021)

06/02/2021

410 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of OPDA's Motion for Summary Judgment on Lazonia Baham's Prescribed Claims that do not Involve "DA Subpoenas" by Jason R Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 06/02/2021)

06/02/2021

411 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Nora Ahmed (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number ALAEDC-8884410) by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Proposed Order)(Willis, Stephanie) (Entered: 06/02/2021)

06/03/2021 412 ORDER: GRANTING 409 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 06/03/2021. (am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/03/2021

413 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Jason R Williams re 368 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/03/2021 414 ORDER: GRANTING 410 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 06/03/2021. (am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/03/2021 415 REPLY to Response to Motion filed by Jason R Williams re 366 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/03/2021 416 ORDER: GRANTING 411 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Nora Sam Ahmed. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 06/03/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Notice) (am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/03/2021 417 Manual Attachment Received - 1 disc re 413 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Jason R Williams. (am) (Entered: 06/03/2021)

06/04/2021 418 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply and Request for Oral Argument re Docs 366 & 368 by Lazonia Baham,

Renata Singleton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading, # 2 Proposed Order)(Stein, Jeffrey) Modified text/submission on 6/7/2021 (bm). (Entered: 06/04/2021)

06/07/2021 419 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Jason R Williams re 418 MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply and Request for Oral Argument . (Paul, Matthew) (Entered: 06/07/2021)

06/07/2021

420 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 418 MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply and Request for Oral Argument re Docs 366 & 368. Filing attorney should have selected 'Yes' at the question 'Is this an Exparte/Consent Motion Y/N?'. Exparte/Consent Motions are not set for submission. Clerk modified docket text to reflect 'Exparte' and remove submission date. (bm) (Entered: 06/07/2021)

06/08/2021

421 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 418 MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply and Request for Oral Argument re Docs 366 & 368. **This Motion is not set for Hearing, if Oral Argument is requested, a separate Request for Oral Argument must be filed. Any request for oral argument must be filed separately from the underlying motion.** (am) (Entered: 06/08/2021)

06/08/2021

422 Request/Statement of Oral Argument by Lazonia Baham, Renata Singleton regarding 368 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims, 366 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 06/08/2021)

06/08/2021 423 ORDER: GRANTING 418 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 06/08/2021. (am) (Entered: 06/08/2021)

06/08/2021

424 SUR-REPLY filed by Lazonia Baham, Renata Singleton, in opposition of 368 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Renata Singleton's Claims, 366 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (am) (Entered: 06/08/2021)

06/11/2021

425 **FILED IN ERROR- SEE REC.DOC. 426**EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Leave to File Excess Pages by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Brooks, Sarah) Modified text on 6/14/2021 (am). (Entered: 06/11/2021)

06/11/2021

426 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Leave to File Excess Pages by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton. Motion(s) referred to Janis van Meerveld. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading Reply, # 2 Proposed Pleading Declaration,

# 3 Proposed Exhibit A, # 4 Proposed Exhibit B, # 5 Proposed Exhibit C, # 6 Proposed Exhibit D, # 7 Proposed Exhibit E, # 8 Proposed Exhibit F, # 9 Proposed Exhibit G, # 10 Proposed Exhibit H, # 11 Proposed Exhibit I, # 12 Proposed Exhibit J, # 13 Proposed Exhibit K, # 14 Proposed Exhibit L, # 15 Proposed Exhibit M, # 16 Proposed Exhibit N, # 17 Proposed Exhibit O, # 18 Proposed Exhibit P, # 19 Proposed Exhibit Q, # 20 Proposed Order)(Brooks, Sarah) (Entered: 06/11/2021)

06/14/2021

427 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 425 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Leave to File Excess Pages. **Document marked as Filed in Error, please see rec. doc. 426 for corrected filings.** (am) (Entered: 06/14/2021)

06/14/2021

428 ORDER RESETTING ORAL ARGUMENT: IT IS ORDERED that Oral Argument on plaintiff's 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery is RESET for Wednesday, 6/23/2021 at 11:00 AM via VIDEO CONFERENCE before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 6/14/2021. A Zoom for Government link will be circulated to counsel of record via email.(ajn) (Entered: 06/14/2021)

06/14/2021 429 ORDER Granting 426 Motion for Leave to File Reply and Excess Pages. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 6/14/2021. (ajn) (Entered: 06/14/2021)

06/15/2021

430 REPLY/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Lazonia Baham, Tiffany LaCroix, Renata Singleton re 388 MOTION to Compel Further Discovery. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q)(ajn) (Entered: 06/15/2021)

PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt

PACER Login:
Description:

06/16/2021 07:08:52

CRClearinghouse Client Code: Woo Kee

Docket Report

Search Criteria:

2:17-cv-10721-JTMJVM

Billable Pages:

30

Exempt flag: Not Exempt

Cost:
Exempt reason:

3.00 Not Exempt

 
 Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 1 of 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RENATA SINGLETON, MARC MITCHELL, LAZONIA BAHAM, JANE DOE, TIFFANY LACROIX, FAYONA BAILEY, and SILENCE IS VIOLENCE;
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEON CANNIZZARO, in his official capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish and in his individual capacity;
DAVID PIPES, IAIN DOVER, JASON NAPOLI, ARTHUR MITCHELL, TIFFANY TUCKER, MICHAEL TRUMMEL, MATTHEW HAMILTON, INGA PETROVICH, LAURA RODRIGUE, and JOHN DOE, in their individual capacities;
Defendants.

Case No. ________________________ COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

1

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 2 of 62
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This civil rights action challenges the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s unconstitutional policy of using extrajudicial and unlawful means to coerce, arrest, and imprison crime victims and witnesses. The plaintiffs in this action are victims and witnesses of crime and a non-profit organization that advocates for victims in Orleans Parish. Each has been harmed by Defendants’ unconstitutional acts. Pursuant to official policies, practices, and customs of Defendant Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, prosecutors routinely issue their own fabricated subpoenas directly from the District Attorney’s Office—without any judicial approval or oversight—in order to coerce victims and witnesses into submitting to interrogations by prosecutors outside of court. These fraudulent documents create the false impression that meeting with the District Attorney is required by law, and they threaten crime victims and witnesses with fines, arrest, and imprisonment if they do not obey. If that unlawful coercion does not succeed, Defendants routinely obtain arrest warrants to put crime victims and witnesses in jail. In the past five years alone, Defendants have sought “material witness” warrants at least 150 times. In a significant number of applications for these warrants, Defendants make false statements, omit material facts, and rely on plainly insufficient allegations no reasonable prosecutor would believe could justify the arrest of a witness or a victim of crime. If prosecutors told the whole story, these warrants would never be issued. In addition, Defendants ensure crime victims and witnesses languish in jail. Defendants habitually seek and obtain extraordinarily high secured money bonds for victims and witnesses, ranging up to $500,000, and sometimes no bond at all. These amounts often dwarf the bond
2

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 3 of 62
amounts set for criminal defendants themselves—and they ensure these victims and witnesses are trapped in jail, even when the defendant in the criminal case may be released.
Defendants then deny victims a prompt court appearance, where the victim could challenge her detention or the conditions of her release. As a result, victims and witnesses routinely wait weeks or even months in jail before they are brought before a judge. One rape victim spent 12 days in jail before her first court appearance. A victim of child sex trafficking was jailed for 89 days—including Christmas and New Year’s Day—before she had an opportunity to challenge her confinement.
Defendants’ policies are designed to create a culture of fear and intimidation that chills crime victims and witnesses from asserting their constitutional rights. As a result of these policies, crime victims and witnesses in Orleans Parish know that if they exercise their right not to speak with an investigating prosecutor, they will face harassment, threats, arrest, and jail.
For instance, when Plaintiff Renata Singleton, an accountant for a charter school system and the victim in a domestic violence case, declined to speak to Defendants, they arrested and jailed her for five days on a $100,000 bond. Upon being booked into jail, Ms. Singleton’s clothes were taken, and she was given an orange jumpsuit. When she appeared in court, she was shackled at her hands and feet. Metal chains tethered her to the other prisoners. The defendant, her former boyfriend and alleged abuser, had paid his $3,500 secured bond at arraignment and was released. He came to court from home in his own clothes. He pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to probation, avoiding a jail sentence altogether.
Ms. Singleton’s experience is but one example of the practices challenged in this action. Other crime victims have been threatened and arrested in front of their friends and family. Their names now appear online in publicly accessible arrest databases. They have had to expend
3

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 4 of 62
limited incomes on lawyers to protect themselves against Defendants’ unlawful practices. They have had to bear the toll of Defendants’ threats when they are often already dealing with trauma connected to the underlying crime.
Defendants’ actions violate the United States Constitution and Louisiana law. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendant Cannizzaro to permanently end these unconstitutional and illegal policies, and monetary damages against all individual Defendants who violated their rights.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Plaintiffs bring this action under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana law. 2. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Louisiana law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 3. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
JURY DEMAND 4. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues and claims set forth in this Complaint, pursuant to the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).
PARTIES A. Plaintiffs
5. Plaintiff Renata Singleton is a 37-year-old black woman, and a victim in a domestic violence case. The prosecutor attempted to coerce Ms. Singleton into a private meeting
4

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 5 of 62
at the District Attorney’s Office by sending her two fraudulent subpoenas. After Ms. Singleton declined to attend the private meeting, the prosecutor applied for a warrant to jail Ms. Singleton, relying on false, misleading, and plainly insufficient factual assertions in the warrant application. Ms. Singleton was jailed for five days because she could not pay the $100,000 bond the prosecutor recommended based on his factual allegations. The defendant in the case pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to inactive probation with no jail time.
6. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, a 41-year-old black man, was shot multiple times while playing basketball with his nephews. After several negative experiences with the District Attorney’s Office, including a meeting at which Mr. Mitchell felt pressured by prosecutors to testify in a way that was inconsistent with his recollection of events, Mr. Mitchell told prosecutors that he no longer wished to meet with them outside of court. Two days later, Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel applied for an arrest warrant to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness, relying on false and misleading factual assertions. Mr. Mitchell was arrested and jailed unless he paid the $50,000 bond sought by the prosecutor based on his factual allegations.
7. Plaintiff Lazonia Baham, a 49-year-old black woman, who has an eighth-grade education and was in special education classes, received a fraudulent subpoena from the District Attorney’s Office after her daughter’s boyfriend was murdered. When Ms. Baham declined to meet privately with prosecutors as the fraudulent subpoena demanded, Assistant District Attorney Jason Napoli made an application for an arrest warrant to jail her as a material witness. The application relied solely on the allegation that Ms. Baham would not communicate with prosecutors. Ms. Baham was jailed for eight days because she could not pay the $100,000 bond that Defendant Napoli had requested, based on his factual allegations.
5

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 6 of 62
8. Plaintiff Jane Doe is the victim of molestation and pornography involving a juvenile under the age of 13. When Ms. Doe was 17 years old, Assistant District Attorney Iain Dover threatened to jail her if she refused to comply with two fraudulent subpoenas demanding that she meet with him privately at the District Attorney’s Office. As a result of these threats, Ms. Doe reluctantly attended a meeting with Defendant Dover. The criminal case involving Ms. Doe remains pending, and Ms. Doe faces an imminent risk of future harm.
9. Plaintiff Fayona Bailey, a 34-year-old black woman, received a fraudulent subpoena to appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office in connection with a murder case. Assistant District Attorney Inga Petrovich and other representatives of the District Attorney’s Office threatened Ms. Bailey with a criminal fine or jail time if she did not attend the private meeting. Ms. Bailey was forced to retain and pay for a private attorney to fight the fraudulent subpoena.
10. Plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix, a 30-year-old black woman, received a fraudulent subpoena issued by Defendant Laura Rodrigue. In the document, Defendant Rodrigue demanded that Ms. LaCroix meet her privately at the District Attorney’s Office before trial to discuss a case in which Ms. LaCroix was a witness. The document threatened a fine and jail time if she did not comply. Ms. LaCroix retained and paid for a private attorney to fight the fraudulent subpoena.
11. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence is a non-profit organization based in Orleans Parish. Silence Is Violence advocates for, represents, and provides services to victims of violent crime in the New Orleans community. The organization was founded to conduct public advocacy to protect New Orleans residents from violent crime. Under Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration, it has been forced to focus instead on protecting crime victims from the coercive tactics of the District Attorney’s Office.
6

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 7 of 62
B. Defendants 12. Defendant Leon Cannizzaro is the Orleans Parish District Attorney. Defendant
Cannizzaro is, and at all relevant times has been, the final policymaker with respect to criminal prosecutions and the treatment of victims and witnesses by the District Attorney’s Office in Orleans Parish. Since being sworn into office on January 11, 2009, Defendant Cannizzaro has been responsible for the supervision, administration, policies, practices, and customs of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Cannizzaro has been responsible for the hiring, training, discipline, supervision, and control of the Assistant District Attorneys identified in this lawsuit, including the Defendants below. Defendant Cannizzaro is sued in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney.
13. Defendant David Pipes is an Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Trials in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Pipes is sued in his individual capacity.
14. Defendant Iain Dover is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Dover is sued in his individual capacity.
15. Defendant Jason Napoli is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Napoli is sued in his individual capacity.
16. Defendant Arthur Mitchell is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Mitchell is sued in his individual capacity.
17. Defendant Tiffany Tucker is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Tucker is sued in her individual capacity.
18. Defendant Michael Trummel is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Trummel is sued in his individual capacity.
7

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 8 of 62
19. Defendant Matthew Hamilton is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Hamilton is sued in his individual capacity.
20. Defendant Inga Petrovich is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Petrovich is sued in her individual capacity.
21. Defendant Laura Rodrigue is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Rodrigue is sued in her individual capacity.
22. Defendant John Doe, an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, is an individual presently unknown to Plaintiffs despite diligent search and inquiry. Defendant Doe participated in the meeting with Plaintiff Singleton at the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, further described herein. Defendant Doe is sued in his individual capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS I. The Unlawful Policies, Practices, and Customs of the Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office 23. Government officials investigating and prosecuting crime possess investigatory powers that are immense but not limitless, and they are constrained in at least three critical respects. First, if a prosecutor seeks to compel a victim or witness to submit to an interrogation under the threat of depriving that person of bodily liberty, the prosecutor must first apply to a neutral judge who will decide whether or not a subpoena should be issued pursuant to constitutional and other legal standards. 24. The Constitution also places additional substantive constraints on a prosecutor or police officer’s ability to compel out-of-court interrogations, in addition to the procedural requirement of obtaining a valid court order. For example, prosecutors cannot exploit this power as a pre-trial preparation tool in a manner that corrupts the adversarial system. As a result, the
8

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 9 of 62
situations in which such a private interview can be compelled are narrow and governed by appropriate legal and constitutional standards, none of which can be applied if a judge is not even informed of the prosecutor’s extrajudicial issuance of a subpoena.
25. Second, if the government officials want to cause the arrest or imprisonment of a crime victim or witness, they must apply to a judge to get an arrest warrant. In the warrant application, the official must accurately present all material facts so that the judge can determine whether or not the government has provided sufficient grounds to issue the warrant.
26. Third, if an arrest warrant is issued and a crime victim or witness is jailed on that warrant, she must be brought before a neutral judicial officer in an expeditious manner for a post-deprivation hearing and opportunity to be heard to ensure that the ongoing detention is necessary to serve the government’s compelling interests and that any conditions for release, like posting bail, are constitutional and lawful.
27. For years, Defendants have been routinely flouting these well-established constitutional and legal requirements, pursuant to an official policy, practice, and custom enforced by Defendant Cannizzaro: prosecutors demand that witnesses meet with them privately and outside of court, and then enforce these demands by seeking material witness warrants for those who do not comply.
28. Defendants routinely fabricate and then issue their own subpoenas directly from the District Attorney’s Office, without any judicial or clerk approval. These documents threaten individuals with arrest and imprisonment in order to coerce victims and witnesses to submit to a private interrogation that they have a constitutional right to decline.
9

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 10 of 62
29. When that unlawful coercion does not work, Defendants routinely obtain “material witness” arrest warrants by relying on false and misleading facts, by omitting material facts from their warrant applications, and by relying on plainly insufficient factual assertions.
30. Finally, after individuals have been unlawfully jailed pursuant to these warrants, Defendants seek and obtain extraordinarily high monetary bond amounts and leave victims and witnesses to languish in jail without timely access to a judge or an attorney until the Office decides to alert the court to the arrest and schedule a hearing.
A. Fraudulent and Legally Invalid “Subpoenas” 31. The District Attorney’s Office under Defendant Cannizzaro has a policy, practice,
and custom of coercing private meetings between prosecutors and witnesses by creating the false impression that the meetings are required by law.
32. To carry out this practice, the Office has systematically created and manipulated documents, styled as “subpoenas,” that command witnesses to appear at the District Attorney’s Office for private interrogations. The documents take at least three forms: standardized preprinted “subpoena” forms, unauthorized forms from the electronic “CourtNotify” system, and individualized “subpoena” forms.
34. These documents are not lawful subpoenas. 35. First, the District Attorney’s Office created its own pre-printed forms that demand the witness appear in person at the Office at a certain time and date to be questioned by prosecutors and other law enforcement officers. 36. This pre-printed document, which bears the official seal of the District Attorney’s Office, is labeled “SUBPOENA.” It warns: “A FINE AND IMPRISONMENT MAY BE IMPOSED FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS NOTICE.”
10

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 11 of 62
37. The office-wide template document includes blank spaces for the witness’s name, the case name, and the time and date the witness is commanded to appear at the District Attorney’s Office. This template allowed prosecutors to adapt the fraudulent form for use in multiple cases over multiple years.
38. The prosecutors and investigators employed by the District Attorney’s Office who deliver these documents regularly made verbal threats that witnesses who do not “obey” fraudulent subpoenas will be arrested and jailed. These threats were often reiterated both in person and over the phone.
. 39. The District Attorney’s Office has explicitly conceded that the use of these subpoenas is an office “policy.”1 40. In addition to the pre-printed form, the District Attorney’s Office also has a policy and practice of using a government-run computer program called CourtNotify to generate altered and unlawful subpoenas.
1 Charles Maldonado, Orleans Parish Prosecutors Are Using Fake Subpoenas To Pressure Witnesses To Talk To Them, THE LENS, http://thelensnola.org/2017/04/26/orleans-parish-prosecutors-are-using-fake-subpoenas-topressure-witnesses-to-talk-to-them (Apr. 26, 2017) (quoting Assistant District Attorney Chris Bowman, acting as spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office, as stating, “The district attorney sees no legal issues with this policy.”) (emphasis added).
11

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 12 of 62
41. CourtNotify is a computer program that prosecutors and public defenders use to request subpoenas for witnesses to appear for formal judicial proceedings in court.
42. The District Attorney’s Office, however, has altered the subpoenas generated by CourtNotify so that, instead of ordering the witness to testify in court, the subpoenas purport to demand that the witness submit to questioning at the District Attorney’s Office.
43. An example helps to illustrate how this unconstitutional policy is implemented in practice. On February 24, 2017, a representative of the District Attorney’s Office delivered a fraudulent CourtNotify “subpoena” to K.M., a 60-year-old homeless man who was the victim of a battery.
44. The document demanded that K.M. appear at the District Attorney’s Office—not in court—for questioning on March 3, 2017.
45. This document was not a lawful subpoena. 46. Based on CourtNotify records, Assistant District Attorney Tucker was the last person to access the March 6th subpoena before the forged document was delivered to K.M. by investigators from the District Attorney’s Office.
47. To fabricate the document, Defendant Tucker or another representative of the District Attorney’s Office under her direction took a CourtNotify subpoena that had previously
12

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 13 of 62 ordered K.M. to appear in court on March 6, 2017, and altered it so that it instructed him to appear at the District Attorney’s office on March 3rd instead.
48. This forgery is apparent because the individual who altered the document neglected to change the text at the bottom of the subpoena marking the appearance date: on the March 3rd document, the appearance date is still listed as March 6th.
49. This individual also neglected to remove each of the multiple references to the “court” and replace them with references to the District Attorney’s Office.
13

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 14 of 62
50. In addition to the pre-printed forms and the altered CourtNotify subpoenas described above, Defendant has shown reporters a third type of fraudulent subpoena.2
51. Like a lawful subpoena, the document includes the trappings of an official summons, stating that the witness is “hereby notified to appear” at the District Attorney’s Office to discuss “such matters as may be required of you,” and including a “return on service” so that a court could track whether the document was received.
52. Like the other types of unlawful subpoenas discussed above, however, this subpoena was never reviewed or approved by a court.
53. The full scope of these practices has yet to be uncovered, in part because, unlike lawful subpoenas, the fraudulent documents usually are not intentionally introduced by prosecutors in public court records.
54. But the evidence demonstrates that this policy is entrenched and its harms are widespread. A preliminary investigation based on publicly available information has unearthed the use of fraudulent subpoenas in a wide variety of criminal cases, with charges ranging from second-degree murder to disturbing the peace.
2 Paul Murphy, Practice of fake subpoenas to be stopped by Orleans DA, WWLTV (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/orleans/practice-of-fake-subpoenas-to-be-stopped-by-orleans-da/434702306.
14

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 15 of 62
55. They have been signed by at least 12 different prosecutors, nine of whom are currently still employed at the District Attorney’s Office: (1) Laura Rodrigue, (2) Jason Napoli, (3) William Dieters, (4) Tiffany Tucker, (5) Mike Trummel, (6) Arthur Mitchell, (7) Sarah Dawkins, (8) Zachary Popovich, (9) Iain Dover, (10) Robert Moore, (11) Michael Heier, and (12) Inga Petrovich.
56. At least two of these prosecutors—Defendants Iain Dover and Jason Napoli— have held or currently hold a supervisory position.
57. The number of prosecutors involved and the wide variety of cases in which fraudulent subpoenas were employed evidence a persistent pattern of violations carried out by experienced and inexperienced prosecutors alike.
58. Members of the criminal defense bar in Orleans Parish and former Assistant District Attorneys who worked under Defendant Cannizzaro confirm what this initial investigation suggests: the use of these fraudulent subpoenas has been widespread and systemic.
59. On April 26, 2017, an investigative journalist at The Lens published an article about prosecutors’ use of fraudulent subpoenas.
60. Defendant Cannizzaro initially defended the practice. Chris Bowman, the official spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office told The Lens, “The district attorney does not see any legal issues with respect to this policy.”3
61. Bowman further explained that misleading reluctant witnesses into meeting with prosecutors was precisely the reason that the Office had created the documents to look as they do: “Maybe in some places if you send a letter on the DA’s letterhead that says, ‘You need to
3 Charles Maldonado, Orleans Parish prosecutors are using fake subpoenas to pressure witnesses to go talk to them, The Lens (Apr. 26, 2017), http://thelensnola.org/2017/04/26/orleans-parish-prosecutors-are-using-fake-subpoenasto-pressure-witnesses-to-talk-to-them.
15

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 16 of 62
come in and talk to us’ … that is sufficient. It isn’t here. That is why it looks as formal as it does” (emphasis added).4
62. After facing public criticism from legal and ethical experts and the general public, Defendant Cannizzaro promised to remove the word “subpoena” from documents that were not subpoenas. The “subpoena” title would be replaced with “Notice to Appear.”
63. The newly-titled “Notice to Appear” documents inform witnesses they are “hereby notified” to report to the DA’s Office to speak privately with prosecutors about “such matters as may be required of you” (emphasis added).
64. The format of the newly proposed “notices” resembles official court documents, and like lawful subpoenas, they include a “return on service.” The documents misleadingly refer to themselves as “process of the Court.”
65. Thus, although they do not include the word “subpoena,” the “notice” documents continue to create the false impression that the witness is “required” by law to meet privately with prosecutors.
4 Id.
16

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 17 of 62
B. The unlawful jailing of victims and witnesses 1. Material witness warrants based on fraudulent subpoenas 66. After facing public criticism for using fraudulent subpoenas, Defendant
Cannizzaro claimed, “There are no consequences, there are no legal consequences for the person who is the subject of that notice if they do not show up … No case has been presented to me where someone was arrested because they failed to honor a District Attorney’s notice.”5
67. At a City Council hearing on September 20, 2017, Defendant Cannizzaro repeated this claim, and he challenged councilmembers to “show me one person who was ever arrested and convicted with one of those DA notices!”6
68. In fact, based on an initial investigation, in the past three years, Orleans Parish prosecutors applied for arrest warrants for at least ten witnesses explicitly relying on an assertion that the witness did not “obey” a fraudulent subpoena—without informing the court the subpoena was fraudulent.
69. All ten warrants were issued. Six of these witnesses were jailed—including Plaintiff Singleton.7
70. In their applications for these warrants, prosecutors represented to the court that witnesses had been served valid subpoenas, when, in fact, they had been served fraudulent subpoenas demanding private, out-of-court meetings with prosecutors.
5 Paul Murphy, Practice of fake subpoenas to be stopped by Orleans DA, WWLTV, http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/orleans/practice-of-fake-subpoenas-to-be-stopped-by-orleans-da/434702306 (Apr. 27, 2017). 6 Remarks of Leon Cannizzaro, Hearing on the Budget of the District Attorney’s Office, New Orleans City Council (Sept. 20, 2017). 7 Ms. Singleton’s experience is detailed in Part II of this Complaint.
17

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 18 of 62
71. Prosecutors relied on allegations that witnesses did not do as these “subpoenas” demanded, even though the allegation that a witness exercised her constitutional right to decline to meet privately with a prosecutor at the District Attorney’s Office is an objectively unreasonable basis to arrest and imprison a witness to or victim of crime.
72. And consistent with their broader policy and practice when seeking material witness arrest warrants, prosecutors routinely omitted critical facts in these applications in order to obtain a warrant—for example, prosecutors omit that the witness had agreed to appear in court pursuant to a subpoena and had only declined to communicate with them in private.
73. J.B. and I.E. In December 2015, two alleged victims of aggravated assault with a firearm approached public defender Thomas Frampton and informed him that they wanted to provide favorable exculpatory statements for the defendant charged in the assault case. Both victims gave Frampton signed statements exculpating the defendant. Frampton emailed the statements to Assistant District Attorney Sarah Dawkins.
74. Soon afterwards, Frampton and Dawkins discussed the signed statements. As Frampton recalls, Dawkins told him, “You know how it goes in our office. Recantations mean someone goes to jail: the defendant or the victim.”
75. Dawkins then sent fraudulent subpoenas to both victims demanding that they appear at her office for a private meeting and threatening them with fines or jailing if they did not “obey.”
76. When the two women declined to attend the private meetings with prosecutors, Dawkins made an application for a material witness warrant for each of the women. Dawkins asked the court to jail each victim unless she paid a $250,000 secured money bond. The sole factual allegation in both warrant applications was that the women had not obeyed subpoenas
18

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 19 of 62
demanding private, out-of-court meetings at the District Attorney’s Office. Dawkins did not inform the court that the “subpoenas” she referenced in her applications were fraudulent and had never been issued by a judge.
77. The judge granted Dawkins’s request based on her factual assertions, and J.B. spent six days in jail.
78. K.M. In March 2017, Assistant District Attorney Tiffany Tucker made an application for a material witness warrant to arrest K.M., the victim of a battery. The warrant application relied in part on a fraudulent subpoena, which Defendant Tucker attached as an exhibit. Defendant Tucker falsely represented to the court that the document was a “subpoena,” as that term is defined under Louisiana law. Based on these representations, the court issued the warrant to jail the victim.
79. K.M. was arrested that afternoon. He remained in the Orleans Parish Prison for eight days because he could not pay the $100,000 bond that Tucker requested based on her factual assertions.
80. B.B. B.B., an alleged witness to a murder, received a fraudulent subpoena demanding that he appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office on February 20, 2014.
19

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 20 of 62
81. When B.B. did not go to the District Attorney’s Office on February 20th, Assistant District Attorney Robert Moore sent a text message to a member of B.B.’s family. Moore threatened the family member that he would seek a warrant to arrest B.B if he did not meet with prosecutors outside of court.
82. Moore applied for a material witness warrant for B.B. Moore asserted in the warrant application that B.B. should be jailed because he would not appear “pursuant to a subpoena issued by a District Attorney investigator.” Moore asked the court to jail B.B. unless he paid a $500,000 bond. The court granted Moore’s motion. B.B. was arrested and kept in jail for five days.
83. S.B. On January 25, 2017, Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel made an application for a material witness warrant for S.B., the alleged victim of an aggravated battery. Defendant Trummel alleged that a “subpoena” was left in S.B.’s door instructing her to “report to the DA’s Office on the day of trial.”
84. This document was not a lawful subpoena. Like each of the other “subpoenas” described here, it had never been presented to or issued by a judge. Nonetheless, based on Trummel’s misrepresentation, the court issued a warrant for S.B.’s arrest. Six days later, the
20

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 21 of 62
defendant in the underlying criminal case pled guilty, and the court vacated the material witness warrant. The District Attorney never called S.B. to testify.
85. C.R. In March 2015, Assistant District Attorney Michael Heier made an application for the court to jail C.R. on a material witness warrant because C.R. had “failed to appear at the District Attorney’s Office subject to subpoena.” Heier did not inform the court that the document he called a “subpoena” was not a valid subpoena. The warrant application also asserted that C.R. had missed scheduled appointments with the District Attorney’s Office. Heier requested that the court set bond for C.R. at $250,000.
86. C.R. appeared in court, and the court agreed to release him on a $5,000 bond. Prosecutors objected to releasing C.R. instead of jailing him or placing him on ankle monitoring.
87. The defendant in the case was charged with simple criminal damage to property and disturbing the peace. She ultimately pled guilty and was given a suspended sentence and six months of inactive probation.
88. S.S. In February 2014, S.S.—the victim of an attempted murder—was jailed as a material witness because Assistant District Attorney Jason Napoli asserted in an application for an arrest warrant that S.S. did not “obey” a fraudulent subpoena ordering him to appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office.
89. Defendant Napoli attached an affidavit to his application for a material witness warrant. The affidavit asserted that his Office’s investigator “would leave an Orleans Parish District Attorney Office Subpoena along with his card in the hands of [S.S.’s] Mother or Grandmother after each visit but to no avail, [S.S.] never appeared in the District Attorney[‘s] Office on the dates listed on his subpoenas.” Defendant Napoli did not inform the court that these documents were not lawful subpoenas.
21

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 22 of 62
90. S.S. was arrested and kept in jail for 14 days. At Defendant Napoli’s request, and based on his representations, S.S. was held without bail.
91. T.J. On January 27, 2017, Assistant District Attorney Williams Dieters requested a material witness warrant for an alleged domestic violence victim because she did not obey a fraudulent subpoena. As a factual basis for the request, Dieters alleged, “[W]hat I did serve her with was, in fact, a DA subpoena … and that is a subpoena.” Dieters did not inform the court that the subpoena was not lawful. No judge had been presented with the subpoena as required by law before issuing such a document. The court granted Dieters’ motion and a warrant was issued for T.J.’s arrest.
92. Chief Judge White, who presided over the case, later learned of Dieters’ misrepresentations; she stated the she did not know the subpoena was fraudulent when she issued the warrant and would not have issued the warrant had she known.
93. Q.J. On August 12, 2014, Assistant District Attorney Sarah Dawkins submitted a warrant application for Q.J. Dawkins alleged in the application that Q.J. had not complied with a “subpoena” and that he did not answer prosecutors’ phone calls. Dawkins recommended that Q.J. be kept in jail unless he paid a bond of $250,000. Her application was approved by the Chief of Trials, Defendant David Pipes. Dawkins did not inform the court that the subpoena was fraudulent. The court then granted the application on the same day it was filed.
94. In June 2015, the defendant in the criminal case pled guilty to the illegal carrying of a weapon and misdemeanor marijuana possession-first offense. He received a six month suspended sentence and six months of inactive probation.
22

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 23 of 62
2. Material witness warrant applications that provide no reasonable basis for the arrest of a witness or victim of crime
95. The District Attorney’s Office relies on fraudulent subpoenas in its warrant applications as part of a larger policy and practice: submitting material witness warrant applications based on a witnesses’ perceived or actual refusal to speak privately with prosecutors.
96. No reasonable prosecutor would believe that a witness or crime victim can be arrested and jailed because she declines to meet with prosecutors outside of court or to submit voluntarily to interrogation at the District Attorney’s Office.
97. But in the last three years, Orleans Parish prosecutors have sought and secured dozens of material witness warrants on this basis.
98. For example, in one representative material witness warrant application, which resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant, the prosecutor alleged that the witness “ha[d] failed to respond to letters, telephone calls, voicemails, emails, and Facebook messages” from prosecutors.
99. In another warrant application, the prosecutor asked the court to jail a victim of an armed robbery who “informed the District Attorney’s Office that she would not speak to representatives of the District Attorney’s Office without a lawyer present.”
100. One such allegation—that “[t]he State has reason to fear that [the witness] will not appear in Court pursuant to a subpoena as he has failed to appear pursuant to previous appointments with the undersigned”—appears to be part of an Office-wide template for material witness warrant applications.
23

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 24 of 62
101. In December 2014, Assistant District Attorney Corey Moll relied on this allegation when he applied for a material witness warrant for the victim, J.C. The defendant in the case was charged with “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.”
102. J.C. was jailed for eight days based on Moll’s factual assertions because J.C. could not pay the $100,000 money bond that Moll requested.
103. In June 2015, Assistant District Attorney Mark Lopez used this same phrase as the sole allegation in a warrant application for the arrest of D.B., the victim of aggravated criminal damage to property. The defendant in the case was accused of damaging D.B’s Pontiac Firebird.
104. Based on his factual assertions, Lopez asked that D.B. be jailed unless he paid a $300,000 money bond.
105. The defendant in the case had been released on a $5,000 money bond. He pled guilty and was sentenced to a one-year suspended sentence and active probation.
106. In June 2016, the same factual basis appeared again in a warrant application for M.C., the victim of a sexual battery.
24

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 25 of 62
107. Prosecutors also routinely base material witness warrants on allegations that are entirely irrelevant to whether the witness will appear in court pursuant to a valid subpoena. These allegations regularly target crime victims who are poor.
108. For example, in the material witness warrant application for M.C., the prosecutor recommended that M.C. be jailed because she had “no place to live” and “no means of support.”
109. Assistant District Attorney Matthew Payne applied for a warrant to jail H.J., the victim of an aggravated battery, because she “does not have a current address.”
110. Assistant District Attorney Louis Russo sought and secured a material witness warrant for D.E., the victim of armed robbery with a firearm, before the defendant in the case had even been arraigned. In support of his application, Russo asserted to the court that D.E. likely had no stable place to live because she was an exotic dancer.
3. Material witness warrants based on false allegations and material omissions 111. Prosecutors in the District Attorney’s Office routinely base material witness warrant applications on material misrepresentations and material omissions. 112. Upon information and belief, prosecutors in Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration have based dozens of warrant applications on false allegations, including: (1) that the witness was properly served with a subpoena; (2) that the witness refused to testify; and (3) that the Office did not know how to find the witness. 113. These misrepresentations frequently supplement allegations that the witness has simply exercised her right to decline to speak voluntarily with prosecutors. For example, the material witness warrant for Plaintiff Marc Mitchell came on the heels of his decision not to speak privately with prosecutors anymore. The prosecutor’s motion explicitly and inappropriately relied on Mitchell’s decision to exercise his First Amendment rights, and alleged
25

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 26 of 62
in support of Mr. Mitchell’s arrest that he “indicated this would be the last meeting he would have with the District Attorney’s Office and did not want to move forward with the case.”
114. Prosecutors also told the court that Mr. Mitchell had refused to sign a “subpoena” for court and had bought a bus ticket to leave town. Neither of these allegations were true. The prosecutors omitted the fact that Mr. Mitchell had actually signed a subpoena to testify at trial. Based on the prosecutors’ representations in the warrant application, Mitchell was arrested and jailed because he could not pay the $50,000 money bond.
115. Critical information is also routinely omitted from material witness warrant applications. For example, prosecutors know that many witnesses’ refusals to speak to them are the predictable result of prosecutors’ strong-arm tactics to secure favorable testimony. But they omit accounts of the coercive tactics that have alienated the witness and led the witness to exercise her right to decline to meet privately with prosecutors outside formal court supervision or testimony, or without their own lawyer present.
116. Conversely, prosecutors frequently make lackluster attempts to contact the witnesses—if they fail, the witness can be arrested and put in jail, which gives prosecutors an opportunity to influence their testimony in a coercive environment. But prosecutors frequently do not accurately represent the efforts that they have made when they describe them to judges, creating a false impression that an arrest warrant is the only reasonable way to find and ensure the appearance of a victim or witness.
3. Defendant Cannizzaro’s role in the unconstitutional abuse of material witness warrant applications at the District Attorney’s Office
117. At a City Council hearing on September 20, 2017, Defendant Cannizzaro made clear that his policy is to use material witness warrants when initial outreach by the District
26

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 27 of 62
Attorney’s Office does not satisfy prosecutors that the person will communicate sufficiently with them outside of court.
118. When a councilmember criticized Defendant Cannizzaro for jailing rape victims, Defendant Cannizzaro warned that if the Council cut his budget, prosecutors would “not [be] able to work [with victims] as closely.” He threatened that the Office would increase their use of material witness warrants instead if cuts were made to his budget: “I don’t want any of you to be surprised should further cuts be made,” Defendant Cannizzaro said.
119. Not surprisingly, under Defendant Cannizzaro’s direction, the unlawful use of material witness warrants has proliferated in the District Attorney’s Office.
120. A pre-discovery review of publicly availably documents has identified more than 30 prosecutors working under Defendant Cannizzaro who have personally signed or approved material witness warrant applications based on materially false allegations, material omissions, or insufficient and irrelevant allegations.
121. Defendant Cannizzaro’s involvement has been personal. At times, Defendant Cannizzaro makes decisions about whether to jail the victim or witness in particular cases.
122. Recounting a case in which he decided to jail two witnesses, Defendant Cannizzaro said, “I instructed my ADAs to obtain an indictment and, if necessary, secure the testimony of the witnesses through the use of material witness warrants, which we were ultimately required to do.”8
8 Don’t let reluctant witnesses derail justice: DA Leon Cannizzaro, NOLA.com (June 7, 2017), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2017/06/material_witness_warrants.html.
27

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 28 of 62
123. This behavior is consistent with Defendant Cannizzaro’s reputation in the New Orleans legal community as a micromanager, often weighing in on even the smallest decisions in his assistants’ cases.
124. Defendant Cannizzaro also publicly defended an Assistant District Attorney who engaged in the unlawful conduct that is the subject of this lawsuit: after Assistant District Attorney William Dieters obtained an arrest warrant for a domestic violence victim based on a fraudulent subpoena, Defendant Cannizzaro told the press those actions were justified because the victim had stopped cooperating with prosecutors.9
C. Violation of the due process rights of incarcerated witnesses 125. Once a victim or witness is imprisoned pursuant to a material witness warrant,
prosecutors routinely leave that person to languish in jail—without access to judge or counsel— until the prosecutor decides to alert the court of the arrest and requests that a hearing be scheduled. Because prosecutors are able to control the length of a person’s post-arrest detention, they are able to create and manipulate that detention as a tool to credibly threaten witnesses and to coerce meetings and interviews while the person is in custody or afterwards.
126. In addition to the constraints on prolonged post-arrest detention of material witnesses that the federal Constitution imposes under these specific circumstances, prosecutors also routinely violate state law protections. Under Louisiana law, an arrested person must be brought before a judge within 72 hours of arrest, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. See Art. 230.1, La. C. Crim. P; see State v. Chaney, 384 So. 2d 442, 444 (La. 1980).
9 Charles Maldonado, Prosecutor tried to jail victim of alleged domestic violence after she didn’t obey fake subpoena, THE LENS, http://thelensnola.org/2017/06/14/new-orleans-prosecutor-used-fake-subpoena-to-seek-arrestwarrant-for-victim-of-alleged-domestic-violence (JUNE 14, 2017).
28

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 29 of 62
127. Yet people jailed as material witnesses in Orleans Parish regularly remain in jail without seeing a judge for days beyond this 72-hour period.
128. In general, prosecutors are responsible for decisions about when a witness or victim will come to court. Because a material witness has no right to counsel and is not brought through the magistrate process like criminal arrestees, an incarcerated witness or victim is usually brought before a judge only when the prosecutor asks the court to set a hearing for the witness.
129. The District Attorney’s Office knows when a witness is incarcerated; the Office requests the arrest warrant and bond amount and is informed when the arrest is made. Therefore, prosecutors in the District Attorney’s Office know when a witness has been kept in jail for more than 72 hours without access to a neutral magistrate.
130. However, on information and belief, the District Attorney’s Office has no procedure to prevent the unlawful and unconstitutional over-incarceration of material witnesses.
131. The District Attorney’s Office lacks such a procedure even though the Office has been held liable for the prolonged incarceration of material witnesses before. See Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1987).
132. Based on a limited review of publicly available records, within the last five years, at least 50 victims and witnesses were confined in jail for more than 72 hours before seeing a judge after being arrested pursuant to material witness warrants that Defendant Cannizzaro’s Office sought.
133. For example, P.M., a victim of child sex trafficking, was arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant obtained based on the prosecutor’s factual representations. She was
29

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 30 of 62
confined in the Orleans Parish Prison for 89 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer.
134. She was arrested on Thanksgiving Day and spent Christmas and New Year’s Day in a jail cell away from her infant daughter.
135. P.M. ultimately remained in the jail for 109 days before she was released. When P.M. left the jail, she had lost her housing and began living on the street. Shortly thereafter, P.M. lost custody of her child.
136. As another example, E.B., the victim of first degree rape, was jailed for 12 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer.
137. Yet another example is K.C., a witness in a murder case who was jailed for 18 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer. In total, K.C. spent 32 days in jail, including New Year’s Day and Christmas.
138. Despite its persistent over-incarceration problem, the District Attorney’s Office still lacks an effective procedure to ensure that witnesses and victims who are not accused of any crime do not languish in jail with no prompt opportunity to challenge their detention.
139. To the contrary, prosecutors exploit these prolonged detentions. They regularly make their decisions about when to bring material witnesses to court for a hearing on considerations relating to the underlying prosecution, without regard to the constitutional rights of the witness or crime victim.
140. In many cases, the material witness does not receive a hearing at all. The prosecutor simply requests the witness’s presence on the date of trial. Prosecutors have used the custodial status of the witness to force the shackled witness to speak privately about her testimony. The witness is released if the prosecutor decides to no longer use her testimony.
30

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 31 of 62
D. The chilling effect of Defendants’ unlawful practices 141. Unless a prosecutor complies with the requirements above and secures a subpoena
or warrant through a valid, court-approved legal process, an individual is under no legal obligation to speak with a prosecutor conducting an investigation. The right to freely decline voluntary questioning from a government official is a basic constitutional right.
142. Defendants’ unlawful practices, however, have been effective in widely chilling the exercise of the constitutional right to decline private questioning from prosecutors outside of a formal legal proceeding.
143. Plaintiffs Renata Singleton, Lazonia Baham, and Jane Doe each had exercised their right to decline to speak voluntarily with the District Attorney’s Office after receiving fraudulent subpoenas insisting that they do so. But prosecutors ultimately secured private interrogations with each of these Plaintiffs by using or threatening to use a material witness warrant, overcoming Plaintiffs’ attempts to exercise their legal rights not to speak with prosecutors outside of court.
144. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, the victim of an attempted murder, told Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel that he wanted no further out-of-court contact with prosecutors about the case.
145. Two days later, Defendant Trummel asked the court to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness, alleging that Mr. Mitchell refused to meet with prosecutors. After Mr. Mitchell was released, Mr. Mitchell met with Defendant Trummel twice to discuss his testimony because he feared being jailed again if he did not agree to the private meetings.
146. The chilling impact of prosecutors’ unlawful practices extends beyond the victims and witnesses who have personally been jailed or threatened. The practice is so commonplace
31

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 32 of 62
that the possibility that a witness or victim could be jailed colors local attorneys’ strategic judgments and affects how they counsel their clients.
147. When a client is a victim or witness in a criminal case, many defense lawyers advise the client to comply with prosecutors’ requests for out-of-court meetings, even if the client is adamantly against it and wishes to exercise her First Amendment rights. Any other approach risks arrest and retaliation.
148. One attorney whose client had been jailed for several months as a material witness considered challenging the legality of her client’s detention, but instead arranged a meeting for her to speak with prosecutors because it was the faster way to get her out of jail.
149. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence has suffered a similar and even more acute chilling effect; the organization never advises victims to decline meetings with prosecutors—even if the victim wishes to do so—for fear that prosecutors will jail the victim on a material witness warrant. In this manner, the unlawful practices challenged in this case determine how the organization itself chooses to exercise its core right to communicate in private with its members and clients, the people that it exists to serve.
150. The District Attorney’s Office has compounded these effects by threatening attorneys and other professionals with criminal charges for complaining about these practices.
151. Defendant Cannizzaro twice threatened Tamara Jackson, the Executive Director of Silence Is Violence. In 2016, Ms. Jackson submitted a formal complaint to the National District Attorney’s Association. The complaint expressed concerns about the inadequate protections the District Attorney’s Office provides to crime victims. After filing the complaint, Ms. Jackson sent a copy of it to Defendant Cannizzaro.
32

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 33 of 62
152. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Defendant Cannizzaro called Ms. Jackson and told her to be careful: if it appeared that she was encouraging victims not to communicate with his office, he could prosecute her for witness coercion.
153. This was not the first time Defendant Cannizzaro had made these threats. Three years earlier, Defendant Cannizzaro called Ms. Jackson after she stated in the press that the District Attorney’s Office failed to protect victims from violent retaliation. Defendant Cannizzaro told Ms. Jackson that if she dissuaded victims from assisting prosecutors, she could be charged with obstruction.
154. In December 2014, the District Attorney’s Office brought felony charges against an investigator for the Public Defender’s Office based on her interaction with a witness. In the same time period, prosecutors at the District Attorney’s Office had also threatened two public defenders with prosecution. As a result, although public defenders know that witnesses do not have to meet with prosecutors, they often will not tell witnesses about their constitutional right not to communicate with prosecutors because they fear retaliatory prosecution. II. Individual Plaintiffs’ Experiences
A. Renata Singleton 155. On November 2, 2014, Renata Singleton had an argument with her boyfriend,
Vernon Crossley. According to the Police Incident Report, the two “tussled over [the] phone.” Mr. Crossley grabbed Ms. Singleton’s cell phone out of her hand and shattered it. Ms. Singleton’s daughter called 911 on their landline and put her mother on the phone. Mr. Crossley was arrested and released the next day.
156. Shortly after the incident, Ms. Singleton was contacted by a victim-witness advocate from the District Attorney’s Office. Ms. Singleton told her that she had three children
33

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 34 of 62
and that her job paid by the hour; she did not want to miss work or time with her children to pursue the charges. Ms. Singleton had ended her relationship with Mr. Crossley and considered the situation resolved. She told the advocate that she just wanted to move on.
157. On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, an investigator from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Singleton’s home to deliver two documents, styled as “subpoenas” that demanded she appear for questioning at the District Attorney’s Office on April 24th. The documents were left at Ms. Singleton’s door.
158. The “subpoenas” were fraudulent. They had never been presented to or approved by a court.
159. Ms. Singleton asked a friend in law enforcement about these documents. Like Ms. Singleton, her friend assumed the “subpoenas” were lawful. But she told Ms. Singleton that, since the documents were left in the door, she had not been validly served and did not have to submit to questioning at the District Attorney’s Office.
160. On April 24, Singleton did not go to the District Attorney’s Office to speak privately with prosecutors.
161. On the same day, Assistant District Attorney Arthur Mitchell applied for a material witness warrant asking the court to put Ms. Singleton in jail. As a factual basis for his request, Defendant Mitchell relied on Ms. Singleton’s failure to appear at the District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the two documents, which Defendant Mitchell told the court were “subpoenas.”
162. Defendant David Pipes, an Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Trials, reviewed and approved Defendant Mitchell’s application for the arrest warrant.
34

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 35 of 62
163. Based on Defendant Mitchell’s factual assertions, Judge Robin Pittman issued the arrest warrant for Ms. Singleton’s arrest. At Defendant Mitchell’s request, and based on his misrepresentations, Judge Pittman set a monetary bond of $100,000.
164. On the evening of Thursday, May 28, 2015, and unaware of the outstanding arrest warrant, Singleton returned home to find that a new subpoena, requiring her appearance in court the following day, had been delivered. Ms. Singleton’s teenage son had accepted and signed it. Ms. Singleton planned to comply with the subpoena because it told her to go to the courthouse and had been served on her son.
165. Later that night, police officers knocked on Ms. Singleton’s front door. The officers said they had a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Singleton pulled the subpoena her son had signed out of her purse and showed it to the officers, explaining to them that she had just been served to appear in court and intended to comply.
166. One of the officers said that he had to arrest Ms. Singleton anyway because the District Attorney’s Office really wanted her.
167. Ms. Singleton’s police officer friend came to her house. The friend promised the officers that she would accompany Ms. Singleton to the District Attorney’s Office the following morning. One of the officers made a phone call to the District Attorney’s Office for approval. After the call, the officers agreed to leave without arresting Ms. Singleton, notwithstanding the warrant authorizing her arrest.
168. The next morning, accompanied by her friend from the police department, Ms. Singleton went to the District Attorney’s Office. She was greeted by Defendant Mitchell, who told Ms. Singleton’s friend to wait in the lobby.
35

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 36 of 62
169. Defendant Mitchell guided Ms. Singleton to a room to be questioned. At some point Assistant District Attorney Tiffany Tucker and another attorney who introduced himself as a supervisor, Defendant Doe, joined the meeting.
170. Defendant Mitchell began to ask Ms. Singleton about the incident with Mr. Crossley. Ms. Singleton told him that she was more concerned about why she had almost been arrested. She told Defendant Mitchell that she did not want to answer questions without a lawyer present. Defendant Mitchell told her she did not need a lawyer because she was not the criminal.
171. Frightened, Ms. Singleton still refused to answer any questions without an attorney present.
172. Ms. Singleton heard Defendant Doe give an instruction to call a unit, and a police officer came and arrested her on the spot.
173. As the officer walked Ms. Singleton out of the building in handcuffs, still accompanied by the people who had been in the meeting, Ms. Singleton passed by her friend, the police officer who had accompanied her to the meeting. Defendant Doe turned to Ms. Singleton’s friend and warned her that she might want to stay out of this before she lost her job.
174. The arresting officer brought Ms. Singleton to the Orleans Parish Prison. 175. Ms. Singleton had never been arrested before. She began to sob. 176. Ms. Singleton contacted her sister to let her know that she needed her to take care of her three children. Officers at the jail took Ms. Singleton’s clothes and gave her an orange jumpsuit. 177. Ms. Singleton was worried about her children. She asked her sister to tell them she was away for business. Ms. Singleton had just started work as a payroll accountant at KIPP New Orleans Schools. She was terrified that she would lose her job.
36

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 37 of 62
178. Ms. Singleton could not afford the $100,000 bond that prosecutors had requested and spent the next five nights at the Orleans Parish Prison away from her children and her job.
179. On June 2, 2015, Ms. Singleton was brought to court from the jail for the first court appearance since her arrest. She wore an orange jumpsuit and was shackled at her hands and feet. Metal chains tied her to all of the other prisoners who had court dates that day.
180. In contrast, Mr. Crossley, the alleged perpetrator, had been released months earlier on a $3,500 secured bond. He paid it on the day of his arraignment and came to court appearances from home, wearing his own clothes.
181. Ms. Singleton’s mother hired a lawyer for her. The lawyer argued for a bond reduction, which was granted, and Ms. Singleton’s mother posted $5,000 for bond.
182. Ms. Singleton was released with an 8:00 p.m. curfew and an ankle monitor. Ms. Singleton wore bell-bottom jeans to hide the ankle monitor from her younger children. During her time in jail, Ms. Singleton had lost eight pounds.
183. Mr. Crossley pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to one year of inactive probation with no jail time. Once Ms. Singleton had been jailed, the District Attorney’s office never asked her to testify.
184. Ms. Singleton’s arrest as a material witness has been a persistent source of humiliation and shame. Ms. Singleton’s mugshot can be found online. There is an entry for Ms. Singleton at policearrests.com, listing Ms. Singleton as a “suspect” and stating that she was “charged with an offense by police.”
37

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 38 of 62
185. Ms. Singleton, who has a master’s degree in Business Administration, is currently looking for a new job as an accountant. She is anxious that her arrest will prevent her from being hired.
186. Her arrest has left another mark as well: Ms. Singleton is afraid to ever call the police again.
B. Marc Mitchell 187. In July 2014, Marc Mitchell and his cousin, Christopher Chambers, took their
nephews to a neighborhood court to play basketball. 188. A man approached Mr. Mitchell, wanting to use the court. When Mr. Mitchell
told the man that his team was going to play the next game, the man argued with him. A few moments later, another man fired 28 bullets at Mr. Mitchell and his cousin. Both men were shot multiple times. Mr. Mitchell spent two months in the hospital with life-threatening injuries.
189. The District Attorney’s Office charged both men at the court, Jonterry Bernard and Gerard Gray, with attempted murder of Mr. Mitchell and his cousin. Mr. Bernard was tried first. The prosecution’s theory was that Bernard was the triggerman, but that Gray had directed the shooting.
38

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 39 of 62
190. Mr. Mitchell assisted the District Attorney’s Office in the prosecution against Mr. Bernard.
191. He signed a medical release form authorizing prosecutors to obtain his medical records. He met with prosecutors at their offices. In October 2015, he testified in the prosecution’s case against Bernard, identifying Bernard as the man who shot him. Mr. Bernard was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison.
192. As Gray’s trial approached, Mr. Mitchell met with Defendant Michael Trummel to prepare. Defendant Trummel told Mr. Mitchell that Gray was in a gang, and that Gray had ordered Bernard to shoot him.
193. Defendant Trummel repeatedly asked Mr. Mitchell if he had seen Gray gesture to Bernard to order him to shoot. Mr. Mitchell repeatedly told Defendant Trummel that he had not.
194. Mr. Mitchell was uncomfortable with how this meeting had gone. Defendant Trummel seemed more intent on telling him what had happened than actually listening to Mr. Mitchell’s account of the shooting.
195. Mr. Mitchell also did not believe the District Attorney’s Office was taking concerns about his safety seriously.
196. For example, after Bernard’s trial, a man made a gesture of a gun and pantomimed shooting Mr. Mitchell on the steps of the courthouse. Frightened, Mr. Mitchell told prosecutors what had happened, but they did not investigate the threat, and they never followed up with Mr. Mitchell about his safety.
197. On April 4, 2016, Mr. Mitchell set a meeting with Defendant Trummel to inform him that he wanted no further private contact with the District Attorney’s Office.
39

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 40 of 62
198. During that same meeting, Mitchell signed a subpoena to come to court to testify against Gray.
199. Two days later, Defendant Trummel submitted a motion to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness. The motion specifically relied on the April 4th meeting, when Mr. Mitchell told prosecutors he no longer wished to meet with them outside of court.
200. Defendant Trummel also told the court that Mr. Mitchell had a bus ticket to leave town. Mr. Mitchell had not bought a bus ticket.
201. Defendant Trummel’s motion did not explain that, after telling prosecutors he no longer wished to speak with them in private, Mr. Mitchell had signed a subpoena to appear in court for Gray’s trial.
202. Relying on Defendant Trummel’s representations, the court issued the arrest warrant.
203. The following day, two police officers came in a marked police car to the highend hotel where Mr. Mitchell worked. Mr. Mitchell was wearing his uniform: a white dinnerjacket, black tuxedo pants, and a black bowtie.
204. The police officers arrested Mr. Mitchell in the ornate hotel lobby, and placed him in handcuffs, in full view of his coworkers and the guests checking in.
205. When Mr. Mitchell asked why he was being arrested, one of the officers said that he did not know, but the prosecutor had told them to come and pick him up.
206. Mr. Mitchell was jailed at the Orleans Parish Prison on a $50,000 bond, set by the court at Defendant Trummel’s request.
40

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 41 of 62
207. While Mr. Mitchell was confined in jail, his family sought assistance from Silence Is Violence. Its Executive Director, Tamara Jackson, immediately advocated for Mr. Mitchell’s release. The following morning, the court released Mitchell on his own recognizance.
208. The day before Gray’s trial, Mr. Mitchell was again called to meet privately with prosecutors. This time, fearful of being arrested again, Mr. Mitchell came reluctantly to the private meeting, accompanied by Ms. Jackson. Again, Defendant Trummel told Mr. Mitchell about Mr. Gray’s gang affiliation and suggested that Mr. Gray had ordered Mr. Mitchell’s shooting.
209. Mr. Mitchell once again told Defendant Trummel that he knew only one thing: he got into an argument with Mr. Gray, and another man had shot him.
210. Mr. Mitchell testified truthfully at trial that he never heard Mr. Gray order Bernard to shoot him. Mr. Gray was convicted.
211. Shortly after the trial, Mr. Mitchell was called in to meet with Chief Judge White in her chambers. Ms. Jackson accompanied Mr. Mitchell to the meeting on behalf of Silence Is Violence.
212. Chief Judge White told Mr. Mitchell that she wanted to apologize for what had happened to him, and said that prosecutors in the case had misled her.
213. After his experiences with the District Attorney’s Office, Mr. Mitchell repeatedly woke up panicking and soaked in sweat. He eventually sought treatment for his trauma symptoms. Mr. Mitchell’s therapy, which was arranged by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence, addressed his arrest as a material witness.
41

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 42 of 62
C. Lazonia Baham 214. Lazonia Baham’s daughter’s boyfriend was murdered in February 2013. The
District Attorney’s Office charged a man named Isaac Jones with committing the murder. 215. Two investigators from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Baham’s home
to interview her about the case. Ms. Baham told the investigators that she had seen Mr. Jones “around the corner” on the day of the murder. By “around the corner,” Ms. Baham meant around the corner from her house.
216. After this conversation at her home, Ms. Baham spoke several times to investigator Michael Kitchens of the District Attorney’s Office. Repeatedly, Kitchens asked Ms. Baham questions about seeing Jones Uptown near Baudin Street. Each time Ms. Baham said that she did not see Jones near Baudin Street; she saw him “around the corner” from her house.
217. Ms. Baham told Kitchens that this was all she knew about the case. She could not understand why Kitchens continued to ask her about seeing the defendant uptown.
218. On one call, Kitchens told Ms. Baham that if she refused to tell prosecutors what she knew, she could be arrested.
219. After this threat, Ms. Baham stopped taking calls from Kitchens. 220. Ms. Baham told the District Attorney’s Office that she would come to court if subpoenaed, but she was adamant that she would not change her story. 221. In the months that followed, Ms. Baham received several unlawful subpoenas demanding that she appear at the District Attorney’s Office. 222. Ms. Baham did not go to the private meetings at the District Attorney’s Office. 223. On October 13, 2015, Defendant Jason Napoli made an application for a warrant asking the court to jail Ms. Baham as a material witness. In setting forth the factual basis for the
42

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 43 of 62
warrant application, Defendant Napoli alleged that Ms. Baham “refused to meet with ADA Jason Napoli and cut off all communication with the District Attorney’s Office.”
224. The application did not allege that Ms. Baham had ever missed any court appearances nor told the District Attorney’s Office she would not come to court. Defendant Napoli withheld from the court that Ms. Baham had talked with him on multiple occasions, and he omitted that she had told him that she planned to attend court. Based on Defendant Napoli’s representations, a warrant for her arrest was issued.
225. On December 29, 2015, officers from the New Orleans Police Department arrested Ms. Baham at her home. Ms. Baham was sick with a flu, and she was dressed in a bathrobe and slippers.
226. Ms. Baham spent the next eight days in jail. At Defendant Napoli’s request, and based on his representations, she was held without bond. Ms. Baham, who has an eighth-grade education and was in special education classes in school, did not understand why she had been arrested. She did not know whom to ask about why she was in jail or how to secure her release.
227. On January 6th, Ms. Baham was brought to court for the first time since she was arrested. Ms. Baham wore an orange jumpsuit and was shackled at her hands and feet.
228. Defendant Napoli brought Ms. Baham to a small room behind the Section A courtroom to speak privately with him.
229. Once Ms. Baham and Defendant Napoli were alone, Defendant Napoli repeatedly asked Ms. Baham about seeing Jones near the scene of the murder. Ms. Baham repeated that she had not seen Jones near the scene of the murder; she had seen him around the corner from her home.
43

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 44 of 62
230. Ms. Baham told Defendant Napoli that she was willing to testify, but the only thing she knew was that she had seen Jones near her home on the day that her daughter’s boyfriend was killed.
231. Defendant Napoli seemed to want her to testify to something that she knew was not true.
232. Defendant Napoli then asked Ms. Baham if she knew what perjury was. 233. Ms. Baham was released on the evening of January 6, 2015. 234. Ms. Baham has since testified twice in pretrial proceedings in the Jones case. On both occasions, Ms. Baham stated that she had seen Jones near her home at the time of the murder, and not in Mid-City as Defendant Napoli had insisted to her in private. 235. The Isaac Jones case has not yet gone to trial. Ms. Baham has appeared in court pursuant to several lawful subpoenas. D. Jane Doe 236. Jane Doe is the victim of molestation of a juvenile and child pornography involving a juvenile under 13 years old. 237. In September 2016, Assistant District Attorney Iain Dover brought a fraudulent subpoena to her home, where Ms. Doe lives with her mother. The document demanded that she appear at the District Attorney’s Office for questioning. 238. After Defendant Dover came to Ms. Doe’s home, an attorney for Ms. Doe faxed him a letter: “Please honor their right to privacy, their right to be left alone. They do not want to be badgered, bothered or harassed by anyone from law enforcement in any way.” The letter directed Defendant Dover to direct his questions to Ms. Doe’s attorney.
44

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 45 of 62
239. Defendant Dover did not leave Ms. Doe alone. Instead, even though Defendant Dover knew that the teenage victim was represented by counsel, an investigator from the District Attorney’s Office working for Defendant Dover and accompanied by a uniformed police officer, appeared at the Ms. Doe’s high school, brandishing another document10 that demanded she appear for questioning at the District Attorney’s Office the next morning.
240. Ms. Doe was called out of class to accept the document in the principal’s office. Her fellow students were at lunch, and they stared as the uniformed police officer approached her. Ms. Doe tried not to cry in front of the other teenagers.
241. Embarrassed and exhausted, Ms. Doe asked her mother to pick her up early from school. Ms. Doe stayed home for the rest of the day.
242. When Ms. Doe did not come to the District Attorney’s Office on the following morning, Defendant Dover called her attorney and left a voicemail threatening that, if the victim did not arrive by 11 a.m., he would seek her arrest on a material witness warrant.
243. A hearing in the case was held that same day. Defendant Dover arrived at the hearing with a completed material witness warrant application asking the court to jail Ms. Doe.
244. Defendant Dover told the court that the Louisiana Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights required that he speak privately and outside of court with Ms. Doe. Ms. Doe’s attorney, David Anderson, feared that if his client did not attend the meeting, Defendant Dover would follow through on his repeated threats to secure a warrant for Ms. Doe’s arrest. The court ordered Anderson to arrange a meeting for Ms. Doe to meet with prosecutors.
10 Defendant Dover contends this document was a valid subpoena. No formal request for the subpoena—a requirement under Louisiana law—is included in the clerk’s record in the case. The record also does not include a signed order from the judge granting the subpoena.
45

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 46 of 62
245. Later that day, Ms. Doe went to the District Attorney’s Office to meet with Defendant Dover. After she arrived, Defendant Dover humiliated and mocked her. Defendant Dover interrogated her about the offenses that victimized her, including a number of intimate questions. Ms. Doe cried during Defendant Dover’s questioning.
246. Despite the difficult and personal nature of the inquiry, Defendant Dover mocked Ms. Doe when she did not answer his questions. He mimicked what she said in a whinysounding voice. Ms. Doe was shaken and upset by the questioning and experience.
247. Ms. Doe and her mother considered filing a formal ethics complaint about Defendant Dover’s behavior. They have decided not to, however, for one reason: if they do, Defendant Dover might follow through on his threats to seek an arrest warrant to put the teenage victim in jail.
248. The child pornography and child molestation case is still pending in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. Trial is currently set for October 23, 2017. Ms. Doe still does not wish to meet privately with prosecutors again unless lawfully compelled to do so.
249. As a result of her experiences with Defendant Dover, Ms. Doe is terrified to speak to law enforcement for any reason. She becomes anxious when she sees a police car or police uniform. When Ms. Doe hears an unexpected knock at her door, she runs into her mother’s room to hide.
E. Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix 250. Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix were potential witnesses in two different
murder cases. 251. Each received a fraudulent subpoena demanding a private meeting at the District
Attorney’s Office prior to trial.
46

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 47 of 62
252. Defendant Inga Petrovich issued a fraudulent subpoena demanding Ms. Bailey appear at the District Attorney’s Office on March 16, 2017 for private interrogation in connection with a murder case.
253. Two investigators from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Bailey’s home to deliver the document. The document that the investigators handed to Ms. Bailey was titled “SUBPOENA,” and it ordered her to come to the District Attorney’s Office on March 16, 2017 for a private meeting. The document threatened jail and fines for “failure to obey.”
254. One of the investigators told Ms. Bailey that if she did not come to the private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office, she could be sent to jail.
255. Ms. Bailey was terrified. She had never been to jail before. 256. The investigators asked Ms. Bailey to sign the document to acknowledge that she had received it. Ms. Bailey told them that she did not want to sign anything without consulting her attorney. 257. Ms. Bailey then retained and paid for a private attorney, Anthony J. Ibert, to challenge the fraudulent subpoena. 258. Shortly after Ms. Bailey retained Mr. Ibert, a representative from Defendant Cannizzaro’s Office called Ms. Bailey and again threatened her with jail time if she did not comply with the subpoena. 259. Ms. Bailey told the representative on the phone that she was represented by a lawyer, and that her lawyer had informed her that the subpoena was not legal. 260. The representative continued speaking to her even though she was represented by counsel. The representative told her that her lawyer was wrong, and that the only way she could
47

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 48 of 62
avoid the appearance required by the subpoena was with a valid medical excuse, supported by documentation.
261. Plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix received a fraudulent subpoena in November 2016. 262. The document was identical to the one that Ms. Bailey received, including the threat of fines or imprisonment for “failure to obey.” The fraudulent subpoena that Ms. LaCroix received was issued by Defendant Laura Rodrigue. 263. Ms. LaCroix did not want to report to the District Attorney’s Office for a private interrogation. The defendant in the criminal case was the father of Ms. LaCroix’s child. She did not want to be pressured to reveal private information about him unless she was compelled by law to do so. 264. Ms. Lacroix was scared at the possibility of going to jail. She had never been jailed in her life. 265. The designated time that the fraudulent subpoena directed Ms. Lacroix to appear at the District Attorney’s Office was also a problem. She works as a school teacher, and she was one of the few teachers certified to administer statewide standardized testing to students with special needs. The appointment demanded by the fraudulent subpoena would have required her to miss one of the testing days. 266. Like Ms. Bailey, Ms. LaCroix retained Anthony J. Ibert to challenge the fraudulent subpoena. 267. In both cases, Mr. Ibert filed motions to “quash” the fraudulent subpoenas. Because the documents were not legal documents, however, there was nothing to quash. In response to Mr. Ibert’s motions, which described the fraudulent nature of the documents, prosecutors withdrew them.
48

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 49 of 62
268. The defendants in both cases were ultimately convicted at trial. Prosecutors never called Ms. Bailey or Ms. LaCroix to testify.
F. Silence Is Violence 269. Silence Is Violence was founded in January 2007 with a mission to advocate for crime victims and safer communities. As its inaugural act, Silence Is Violence organized a march to New Orleans City Hall demanding better policy and leadership on the issue of violent crime. 270. In the two years that followed, Silence Is Violence offered programming focused on local policy advocacy and community engagement. The organization sponsored letter-writing campaigns, held forums for candidates for office to discuss criminal justice issues, and offered music classes for youth to create a peaceful, non-violent activity for children and their families to share. 271. Silence Is Violence hosted regular walks through New Orleans neighborhoods to build support against violent crime, and it hosted programs for awareness events, like the National Crime Victims’ Rights week. 272. Since Defendant Cannizzaro took office in 2009, Silence Is Violence leaders repeatedly received reports from victims and families that the prosecutors, investigators, and victim-witness advocates working for Defendant Cannizzaro use strong-arm tactics to pressure victims to speak outside of court with the prosecution and to corroborate the prosecution’s theory of the case—including threats to put crime victims in jail. 273. The new Cannizzaro administration’s practices dramatically reduced the number of victims who were willing to meet with prosecutors in private out-of-court settings. When numerous Silence Is Violence clients and community members explained to its staff how the District Attorney’s Office had damaged their trust, common themes emerged.
49

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 50 of 62
274. Victims who feared violent retaliation for assisting prosecutors frequently felt that their concerns fell on deaf ears when they shared them at the District Attorney’s Office.
275. The District Attorney’s Office was reckless with witnesses’ names and identities, and its promises to provide physical protection and assistance frequently fell through.
276. Victims felt menaced and harassed by prosecutors, investigators, and victimwitness advocates from the District Attorney’s Office. The prosecutors, investigators, and advocates had shown up at their homes, jobs, and schools, raising questions about sensitive issues with their peers, their children, and their employers.
277. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, a client of Silence Is Violence, received a call from a victim-witness advocate asking for the location of his uncle’s funeral. Mr. Mitchell’s cousin had also been a victim of the attempted murder, and the advocate wanted to find him at the funeral to ask him questions. Mr. Mitchell learned for the first time on the call that with the advocate his uncle had died.
278. As victims’ willingness to assist prosecutors outside of court decreased, dozens of Silence Is Violence clients were jailed or threatened with jail for declining to meet with prosecutors outside formal legal proceedings.
279. When that happens, Silence Is Violence responds by securing legal protection for the client and, if the client is jailed, advocating for and securing her release.
280. For example, Plaintiff Marc Mitchell’s family contacted Silence Is Violence when Mr. Mitchell was arrested and jailed as a material witness. Silence Is Violence advocated for Mitchell’s release with the judge.
281. After Mr. Mitchell was released, the Executive Director of Silence Is Violence accompanied Mitchell to a meeting with the judge. Silence Is Violence staff advised Mr.
50

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 51 of 62
Mitchell about his future dealings with the District Attorney’s Office to protect him from further harm, communicated with the District Attorney’s Office on Mr. Mitchell’s behalf, and accompanied him to two further meetings with prosecutors.
282. After Mr. Mitchell’s case had concluded, Silence Is Violence helped him secure treatment for the trauma that he experienced. The treatment addressed Mr. Mitchell’s experiences with the District Attorney’s Office.
283. In another case, a homicide witness approached Silence Is Violence after prosecutors had obtained a warrant for her arrest. A Silence Is Violence staff member contacted the District Attorney’s Office. The organization was assured that the warrant would be recalled as soon as the witness gave prosecutors a statement.
284. As a result of that assurance, the victim agreed to make a statement. The victim was afraid to stay in her own neighborhood in case of violent retaliation against her as a witness to a serious crime; Silence Is Violence rented a hotel room for her and informed the victimwitness advocate from the District Attorney’s Office where the victim was staying so that they could obtain the statement.
285. Shortly after disclosing the victim’s location to the District Attorney’s Office, police arrived at the hotel room and arrested the victim, who was pregnant at the time. Silence Is Violence spent the next several days advocating for the victim’s release.
286. Silence Is Violence recently assisted the alleged victim of a robbery and battery. The victim, who was an immigrant, identified a suspect in a police line-up. She later told the Assistant District Attorney on the case that she was not sure she had identified the right person. The prosecutor told the victim that if she recanted the identification, she could be deported.
51

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 52 of 62
Shortly after this conversation, two people from the District Attorney’s Office came to the victim’s home to reiterate this threat.
287. The victim approached Silence Is Violence for help. Silence Is Violence secured pro bono counsel to protect her from the deportation threats. Silence Is Violence also hired an interpreter so that the victim could communicate with counsel.
288. As a result of these experiences, the possibility that prosecutors may seek a material witness warrant through fraudulent means and engage in other forms of retaliation for the exercise of a victim’s First Amendment rights is now a major concern that has forced Silence Is Violence to change the way it structures its operations, allocates its resources, and manages victims’ relationships with the District Attorney’s Office.
289. For instance, Silence Is Violence does not recommend that victims or their family members appear at the District Attorney’s Office without a Silence Is Violence representative present. This representative’s role is not only to advocate for the victim, but to serve as a witness if the victim is threatened, including with perjury, obstruction, or a material witness warrant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity.
290. Silence Is Violence recommends to victims that before they meet with prosecutors, they ensure that they have no open criminal charges—including unpaid traffic tickets. Silence Is Violence makes this recommendation because, based on its observations, Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration routinely uses unrelated cases as leverage to coerce outof-court meetings with prosecutors and testimony favorable to the prosecution’s theory of the case.
52

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 53 of 62
291. When clients do have criminal records, Silence Is Violence takes the lead in communicating with the District Attorney’s Office to insulate the victim or witness from potential threats.
292. This individual advocacy—particularly aimed at protecting crime victims against abuses of the subpoena and material witness warrant process by the District Attorney’s Office— has become a significant and outsized portion of Silence Is Violence’s work during the administration of Defendant Cannizzaro.
293. Resources once directed at Silence Is Violence’s core mission—public advocacy to protect victims and combat violent crime—must instead be devoted to ensuring that victims of crime are not victimized again by the District Attorney’s Office.
294. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the above Defendants were acting under color of state law.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I:
Reliance on False Statements, Material Omissions, and Plainly Insufficient Facts in Applications for Material Witness Warrants in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Mitchell, Tucker, Pipes, Napoli, Trummel, Hamilton, and Doe
in their individual capacities 295. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice, and custom of relying on false allegations, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual allegations in applications for material witness warrants violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, and Mitchell, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence’s clients. It poses an ongoing risk of
53

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 54 of 62
violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Baham and Doe, and the rights of Silence Is Violence’s clients.
296. Acting pursuant to this policy, practice, and custom, Defendants Mitchell, Tucker, Pipes, and Doe violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Singleton; Defendant Napoli violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham; and Defendants Trummel and Hamilton violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Mitchell. Plaintiff Baham faces an ongoing risk that Defendant Napoli will violate her rights in this way again.
297. The Defendants included these false statements, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual allegations in warrant applications knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The warrants for Plaintiffs’ arrest would not have issued but for Defendants’ false statements and material omissions. Moreover, no reasonable prosecutor would believe that the clearly insufficient grounds stated in arrest warrant applications could justify the arrest and detention of a witness or a victim of crime.
298. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
COUNT II: Unlawful Subpoenas Used to Seize Plaintiffs in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against all Defendants 299. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice, and custom of compelling witnesses to attend private meetings at the District Attorney’s Office by using unlawful subpoenas, accompanied by threats of arrest and imprisonment, violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Bailey, Lacroix, and Doe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence’s
54

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 55 of 62
clients. It poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe and Plaintiff Baham, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence’s clients.
300. Acting pursuant to this official policy, practice or custom, Defendant Petrovich acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Bailey; Defendant Rodrigue acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Lacroix; and Defendant Dover acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe. Plaintiff Doe and Plaintiff Baham face an ongoing risk that Defendants will violate their rights in this way again.
301. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
COUNT III: Retaliation for Constitutionally Protected Speech and Association
in Violation of First Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Cannizzaro, Mitchell, Pipes, Tucker, Napoli, Dover, Trummel,
Hamilton, Petrovich, and Rodrigue in their individual capacities 302. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice, and custom of threatening and retaliating against crime victims, witnesses and advocates who engage in constitutionally protected free speech, including the right to decline to speak voluntarily with investigating prosecutors, violated the First Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs and poses an ongoing risk of violating the First Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs. 303. Acting pursuant to this official policy, practice, and custom, Defendants Mitchell Tucker, Pipes, and Doe acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Singleton; Defendants Trummel and Hamilton acted with
55

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 56 of 62
deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Mitchell; Defendant Napoli acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham; Defendant Dover acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe; Defendant Petrovich acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Bailey; and Defendant Rodrigue acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Lacroix. Plaintiff Baham and Plaintiff Doe face an ongoing risk that Defendants will violate their rights in this way again.
304. Defendant Cannizzaro, in his individual capacity, acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established First Amendment rights of Silence Is Violence by threatening its Executive Director with prosecution for her public statements on behalf of the organization and chilling the organization’s expression of core political speech and burdening its decisions about how to advise its individual clients about communications with prosecutors. Silence Is Violence suffers an ongoing harm based on Defendant Cannizzaro’s actions, and it faces an ongoing risk that Defendant Cannizzaro will violate its First Amendments rights again.
305. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
56

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 57 of 62
COUNT IV: Prolonged Detention in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity
and Defendant Napoli in his individual capacity 306. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice and custom of causing individuals to be jailed without a prompt court appearance after an arrest on a material witness warrant violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of Plaintiff Baham, and violated and poses and ongoing risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham and Plaintiff Doe, and the rights of Silence Is Violence’s clients. 307. Acting pursuant to policy, practice, and custom, Defendant Napoli acted with deliberate indifference when violating Plaintiff Baham’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff Baham faces a risk that Defendants will violate her rights in this way again. 308. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused Plaintiff Baham’s injuries.
COUNT V: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against all Defendants
309. Each of Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices and customs described above, separately and in combination, shocks the conscience and violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs and poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham and Plaintiff Doe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence’s clients.
57

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 58 of 62
310. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to Plaintiffs.
COUNT VI: Failure to Supervise, Train, or Discipline 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official and individual capacities 311. Defendant Cannizzaro, acting in his individual capacity and official capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish, and under color of state law, failed to adequately train, supervise, and/or discipline Assistant District Attorneys and other agents District Attorney’s Office under his supervision, including all other Defendants, as to the unlawful conduct described in Counts I-V. 312. Defendant Cannizzaro acted and failed to act with gross negligence, recklessness, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. 313. Defendant Cannizzaro’s conduct directly and proximately caused the deprivations of Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights, and also directly and proximately caused the Defendants and others to deprive Plaintiffs of those rights.
COUNT VII: Failure to Intervene 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against all Defendants in their individual capacities 314. Defendants, acting under color of state law and within the scope of their employment, knew or should have known that they and others within the District Attorney’s Office were violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as described in Counts I-V. 315. Defendants each had opportunities to intervene and prevent these violations but, acting with deliberate indifference, declined to do so.
58

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 59 of 62
316. Defendants’ failure to intervene violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights.
317. Through their failure to intervene, Defendants directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
COUNT VIII: Abuse of Process under Louisiana Law Against all Defendants
318. Defendants willfully and maliciously abused the material witness statute for a purpose for which it was not designed: to coerce private, out-of-court meetings with prosecutors and to coerce testimony consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case.
319. Defendants also willfully and maliciously abused the process for investigative subpoenas set forth in Article 66 of the Louisiana Rules of Criminal Procedure. By circumventing the requirements of Article 66, Defendants avoided court oversight of investigative subpoenas, and they used them not to investigate crimes pre-indictment, but to intimidate, coerce, and threaten witnesses after criminal proceedings have already been initiated.
320. Plaintiffs Singleton, Mitchell, Baham, Doe, Bailey, and Lacroix were injured by Defendants’ unlawful actions. Plaintiffs Baham and Doe face a risk that Defendants will harm them in this way again.
321. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence was injured because it had to redirect its resources to remedy and prevent harms to its clients caused by the abuse of the material witness statute and the Article 66 investigative subpoena by the District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence faces a risk that Defendants will harm it in this way again.
59

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 60 of 62
322. Defendants’ acts and omissions directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. These injuries were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the abuse of process described herein.
323. Defendants engaged in these wrongful acts and omissions in the scope of their employment with the District Attorney’s Office.
COUNT IX: Fraud under Louisiana Law Against all Defendants
324. As pled with specificity above, by creating, serving, and/or approving officialseeming “subpoenas,” Defendants conveyed the material misrepresentation that the “subpoenas” were real, had been obtained legitimately, and had to be honored by certain Plaintiffs under threat of fines and incarceration.
325. Defendants also made material misrepresentations in seeking to jail certain Plaintiffs, including insertion of false and misleading information in, and omitting other relevant, truthful information from, material witness warrant applications.
326. The Defendants made these misrepresentations with the intent to deceive Plaintiffs.
327. Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on the authenticity, truthfulness, and lawfulness of the fraudulent subpoenas, and they were also harmed when courts justifiably relied on Defendants’ material witness warrant applications.
328. All plaintiffs were injured by Defendants unlawful actions. Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, and Silence Is Violence face a risk that Defendants will harm them in this way again.
60

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 61 of 62
329. Defendants’ acts and omissions directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. These injuries were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the fraudulent acts decribed herein.
330. Defendants engaged in these wrongful acts and omissions in the scope of their employment with the District Attorney’s Office.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief: A. Award compensatory damages to Plaintiffs and against all Defendants, jointly and
severally, in an amount to be determined at trial; B. Award punitive damages to Plaintiffs, and against all individual Defendants in
their individual capacities, in an amount to be determined at trial, that will deter such conduct by defendants in the future; C. Enter injunctive relief requiring Defendants to end the ongoing constitutional violations and violations of Louisiana law, equitable relief in the court’s discretion that ensures that the violations do not recur; D. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of Plaintiffs’ costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for all 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims; E. Order expungement of all records of the material witness warrants for Plaintiffs Singleton, Doe, Mitchell, and Baham; and F. For any and all other relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled and that the Court deems just and proper in its discretion.
61

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1 Filed 10/17/17 Page 62 of 62

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2017,

/s/Anna Arceneaux
Anna Arceneaux* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 201 West Main Street, Suite 402 Durham, NC 27701 Tel. (919) 682-5659 aarceneaux@aclu.org

/s/Katherine Chamblee-Ryan Katherine Chamblee-Ryan** Alec Karakatsanis* Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel. (202) 656-5198 katie@civilrightscorps.org alec@civilrightscorps.org
/s/Bruce Hamilton Bruce Hamilton La. Bar No. 33170 ACLU Foundation of Louisiana P.O. Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 Tel. (504) 522-0628 bhamilton@laaclu.org

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
* Pro Hac Vice applications pending
**Not licensed in the District of Columbia, practice subject to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(8), with supervision by Alec Karakatsanis, a member of the D.C. Bar.

62

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1-2 Filed 10/17/17 Page 1 of 2

I.(C). Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Bruce Hamilton ACLU Foundation of Louisiana P.O. Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 Tel. (504) 522-0628
Katherine Chamblee-Ryan* Alec Karakatsanis* Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel. (202) 656-5198
*Pro Hac Vice applications pending

Anna Arceneaux* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 201 West Main Street, Suite 402 Durham, NC 27701 Tel. (919) 682-5659

I. Defendants
Hon. Leon Cannizzaro, Jr., Orleans Parish District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
David Pipes, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Iain Dover, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Jason Napoli, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Arthur Mitchell, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Tiffany Tucker, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Michael Trummel, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Matthew Hamilton, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
Inga Petrovich, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 1-2 Filed 10/17/17 Page 2 of 2
Laura Rodrigue, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
John Doe, Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney 619 S. White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119
VIII. Related Case
Plaintiffs’ counsel submits the following notice of collateral proceedings pursuant to Local Rule 3.1. Pending in the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal is Esman v. Cannizzaro, No. 2017CA-0639. Defendant Cannizzaro is seeking the appellate court’s review of Judge Nakisha ErvinKnott’s Order granting in part Plaintiff Esman’s petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Law for public information concerning the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s use of fake subpoenas. The case in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court is Esman v. Cannizzaro, No. 17-4661.

 
 Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 1 of 92

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RENATA SINGLETON, MARC MITCHELL, LAZONIA BAHAM, JANE DOE, TIFFANY LACROIX, FAYONA BAILEY, JOHN ROE, and SILENCE IS VIOLENCE;
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEON CANNIZZARO, in his official capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish and in his individual capacity;
GRAYMOND MARTIN, DAVID PIPES, IAIN DOVER, JASON NAPOLI, ARTHUR MITCHELL, TIFFANY TUCKER, MICHAEL TRUMMEL, MATTHEW HAMILTON, INGA PETROVICH, LAURA RODRIGUE, SARAH DAWKINS, and JOHN DOE, in their individual capacities;
Defendants.

Case No. 17-10721
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

1

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 2 of 92
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This civil rights action challenges the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s unconstitutional policy of using extrajudicial and unlawful means to coerce, arrest, and imprison crime victims and witnesses. The plaintiffs in this action are victims and witnesses of crime and a non-profit organization that advocates for victims in Orleans Parish. Each has been harmed by Defendants’ unconstitutional acts. Pursuant to official policies, practices, and customs of Defendant Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, prosecutors routinely issue their own fabricated subpoenas directly from the District Attorney’s Office—without any judicial approval or oversight—in order to coerce victims and witnesses into submitting to interrogations by prosecutors outside of court. These fraudulent documents create the false impression that meeting with the District Attorney is required by law, and they threaten crime victims and witnesses with fines, arrest, and imprisonment if they do not obey. If that unlawful coercion does not succeed, Defendants routinely obtain arrest warrants to put crime victims and witnesses in jail. In the past five years alone, Defendants have sought “material witness” warrants at least 150 times. In a significant number of applications for these warrants, Defendants make false statements, omit material facts, and rely on plainly insufficient allegations no reasonable prosecutor would believe could justify the arrest of a witness or a victim of crime. If prosecutors told the whole story, these warrants would never be issued. In addition, Defendants ensure crime victims and witnesses languish in jail. Defendants habitually seek and obtain extraordinarily high secured money bonds for victims and witnesses, ranging up to $500,000, and sometimes no bond at all. These amounts often dwarf the bond
2

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 3 of 92
amounts set for criminal defendants themselves—and they ensure these victims and witnesses are trapped in jail, even when the defendant in the criminal case may be released.
Defendants then deny victims a prompt court appearance, where the victim could challenge her detention or the conditions of her release. As a result, victims and witnesses routinely wait weeks or even months in jail before they are brought before a judge. One rape victim spent 12 days in jail before her first court appearance. A victim of child sex trafficking was jailed for 89 days—including Christmas and New Year’s Day—before she had an opportunity to challenge her confinement.
Defendants’ policies are designed to create a culture of fear and intimidation that chills crime victims and witnesses from asserting their constitutional rights. As a result of these policies, crime victims and witnesses in Orleans Parish know that if they exercise their right not to speak with an investigating prosecutor, they will face harassment, threats, arrest, and jail.
For instance, when Plaintiff Renata Singleton, at the time an accountant for a charter school system and the victim in a domestic violence case, declined to speak to Defendants, they arrested and jailed her for five days on a $100,000 bond. Upon being booked into jail, Ms. Singleton’s clothes were taken, and she was given an orange jumpsuit. When she appeared in court, she was shackled at her hands and feet. Metal chains tethered her to the other prisoners. The defendant, her former boyfriend and alleged abuser, had paid his $3,500 secured bond at arraignment and was released. He came to court from home in his own clothes. He pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to probation, avoiding a jail sentence altogether.
Ms. Singleton’s experience is but one example of the practices challenged in this action. Other crime victims have been threatened and arrested in front of their friends and family. Their names now appear online in publicly accessible arrest databases. They have had to expend
3

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 4 of 92
limited incomes on lawyers to protect themselves against Defendants’ unlawful practices. They have had to bear the toll of Defendants’ threats when they are often already dealing with trauma connected to the underlying crime.
Defendants’ actions violate the United States Constitution and Louisiana law. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendant Cannizzaro to permanently end these unconstitutional and illegal policies, and monetary damages against all individual Defendants who violated their rights.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Plaintiffs bring this action under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana law. 2. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Louisiana law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 3. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
JURY DEMAND 4. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues and claims set forth in this Complaint, pursuant to the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).
PARTIES A. Plaintiffs
5. Plaintiff Renata Singleton is a 37-year-old black woman, and a victim in a domestic violence case. The prosecutor attempted to coerce Ms. Singleton into a private meeting
4

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 5 of 92
at the District Attorney’s Office by sending her two fraudulent subpoenas. After Ms. Singleton declined to attend the private meeting, the prosecutor applied for a warrant to jail Ms. Singleton, relying on false, misleading, and plainly insufficient factual assertions in the warrant application. Ms. Singleton was jailed for five days because she could not pay the $100,000 bond the prosecutor recommended based on his factual allegations. The defendant in the case pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to inactive probation with no jail time.
6. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, a 41-year-old black man with a high school education, was shot multiple times while playing basketball with his nephews. After several negative experiences with the District Attorney’s Office, including a meeting at which Mr. Mitchell felt pressured by prosecutors to testify in a way that was inconsistent with his recollection of events, Mr. Mitchell told prosecutors that he no longer wished to meet with them outside of court. Two days later, Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel applied for an arrest warrant to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness, relying on false and misleading factual assertions. Mr. Mitchell was arrested and jailed unless he paid the $50,000 bond sought by the prosecutor based on his factual allegations.
7. Plaintiff Lazonia Baham, a 49-year-old black woman who has an eighth-grade education and was in special education classes, received a fraudulent subpoena from the District Attorney’s Office after her daughter’s boyfriend was murdered. When Ms. Baham declined to meet privately with prosecutors as the fraudulent subpoena demanded, Assistant District Attorney Jason Napoli made an application for an arrest warrant to jail her as a material witness. The application relied solely on the allegation that Ms. Baham would not communicate with prosecutors. Ms. Baham was jailed for eight days because she could not pay the $100,000 bond that Defendant Napoli had requested, based on his factual allegations.
5

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 6 of 92
8. Plaintiff Jane Doe is the victim of molestation and pornography involving a juvenile. When Ms. Doe was 17 years old, Assistant District Attorney Iain Dover threatened to jail her if she refused to comply with two fraudulent subpoenas demanding that she meet with him privately at the District Attorney’s Office. As a result of these threats, Ms. Doe reluctantly attended a meeting with Defendant Dover. The criminal case involving Ms. Doe remains pending, and Ms. Doe faces an imminent risk of future harm.
9. Plaintiff Fayona Bailey, a 34-year-old black woman, received a fraudulent subpoena to appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office in connection with a murder case. Assistant District Attorney Inga Petrovich and other representatives of the District Attorney’s Office threatened Ms. Bailey with a criminal fine or jail time if she did not attend the private meeting. Ms. Bailey was forced to retain and pay for a private attorney to fight the fraudulent subpoena.
10. Plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix, a 30-year-old black woman, received a fraudulent subpoena issued by Defendant Laura Rodrigue. In the document, Defendant Rodrigue demanded that Ms. LaCroix meet her privately at the District Attorney’s Office before trial to discuss a case in which Ms. LaCroix was a witness. The document threatened a fine and jail time if she did not comply. Ms. LaCroix retained and paid for a private attorney to fight the fraudulent subpoena.
11. Plaintiff John Roe is a 36-year-old black man. Mr. Roe is the victim of an aggravated assault and has cooperated fully with police. After Defendant Sarah Dawkins secured a material witness warrant for Mr. Roe that contained several false statements and material omissions, he was arrested and jailed for three days. After his release, Defendant Dawkins has continued to threaten to jail Mr. Roe and his fiancée unless Mr. Roe agreed to meet with
6

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 7 of 92
Defendant Dawkins outside of court. The criminal case involving Mr. Roe is still pending, and Mr. Roe faces an imminent risk of future harm.
12. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence is a non-profit organization based in Orleans Parish. Silence Is Violence advocates for, represents, and provides services to victims of violent crime in the New Orleans community. The organization was founded to conduct public advocacy to protect New Orleans residents from violent crime. Under Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration, it has been forced to focus instead on protecting crime victims from the coercive tactics of the District Attorney’s Office.
B. Defendants 13. Defendant Leon Cannizzaro is the Orleans Parish District Attorney. Defendant
Cannizzaro is, and at all relevant times has been, the final policymaker with respect to criminal prosecutions and the treatment of victims and witnesses by the District Attorney’s Office in Orleans Parish. Since being sworn into office on January 11, 2009, Defendant Cannizzaro has been responsible for the supervision, administration, policies, practices, and customs of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Cannizzaro has been responsible for the hiring, training, discipline, supervision, and control of the Assistant District Attorneys identified in this lawsuit, including the Defendants below. Defendant Cannizzaro is sued in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney.
14. Defendant Graymond Martin is First Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. In his position as First Assistant District Attorney, Defendant Martin is second-in-command to Defendant Cannizzaro and is responsible for key office policies, including in connection with compliance with ethical rules and the Office’s witness contact policies. Defendant Martin is sued in his individual capacity.
7

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 8 of 92
15. Defendant David Pipes is an Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Trials in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. In his position as Chief of Trials, Defendant Pipes evaluates the performance of each Assistant District Attorney under his supervision, recommending raises, promotions, and disciplinary actions, including dismissal. Defendant Pipes is sued in his individual capacity.
16. Defendant Iain Dover is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Dover is sued in his individual capacity.
17. Defendant Jason Napoli is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Napoli is sued in his individual capacity.
18. Defendant Arthur Mitchell is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Mitchell is sued in his individual capacity.
19. Defendant Tiffany Tucker is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Tucker is sued in her individual capacity.
20. Defendant Michael Trummel is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Trummel is sued in his individual capacity.
21. Defendant Matthew Hamilton is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Hamilton is sued in his individual capacity.
22. Defendant Inga Petrovich is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Petrovich is sued in her individual capacity.
23. Defendant Laura Rodrigue is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Rodrigue is sued in her individual capacity.
24. Defendant Sarah Dawkins is an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Defendant Dawkins is sued in her individual capacity.
8

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 9 of 92
25. Defendant John Doe, an Assistant District Attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, is an individual presently unknown to Plaintiffs despite diligent search and inquiry. Defendant Doe participated in the meeting with Plaintiff Singleton at the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, further described herein. Defendant Doe is sued in his individual capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS I. The Unlawful Policies, Practices, and Customs of the Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office 26. Government officials investigating and prosecuting crime possess investigatory powers that are immense but not limitless, and they are constrained in at least three critical respects. First, if a prosecutor seeks to compel a victim or witness to submit to an interrogation under the threat of depriving that person of bodily liberty, the prosecutor must first apply to a neutral judge who will decide whether or not a subpoena should be issued pursuant to constitutional and other legal standards. 27. The Constitution also places additional substantive constraints on a prosecutor or police officer’s ability to compel out-of-court interrogations, in addition to the procedural requirement of obtaining a valid court order. For example, prosecutors cannot exploit this power as a pre-trial preparation tool in a manner that corrupts the adversarial system. As a result, the situations in which such a private interview can be compelled are narrow and governed by appropriate legal and constitutional standards, none of which can be applied if a judge is not even informed of the prosecutor’s extrajudicial issuance of a subpoena. 28. Second, if the government officials want to cause the arrest or imprisonment of a crime victim or witness, they generally must apply to a judge to get an arrest warrant. In the
9

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 10 of 92
warrant application, the official must accurately present all material facts so that the judge can determine whether or not the government has provided sufficient grounds to issue the warrant.
29. Third, if an arrest warrant is issued and a crime victim or witness is jailed on that warrant, she must be brought before a neutral judicial officer in an expeditious manner for a post-deprivation hearing and opportunity to be heard to ensure that the ongoing detention is necessary to serve the government’s compelling interests and that any conditions for release, like posting bail, are constitutional and lawful.
30. For years, Defendants have been routinely flouting these well-established constitutional and legal requirements, pursuant to an official policy, practice, and custom enforced by Defendant Cannizzaro: prosecutors demand that witnesses meet with them privately and outside of court, and then enforce these demands by seeking material witness warrants for those who do not comply.
31. Defendants routinely fabricate and then issue their own subpoenas directly from the District Attorney’s Office, without any judicial or clerk approval. These documents threaten individuals with arrest and imprisonment in order to coerce victims and witnesses to submit to a private interrogation that they have a constitutional right to decline.
32. When that unlawful coercion does not work, Defendants routinely obtain “material witness” arrest warrants by relying on false and misleading facts, by omitting material facts from their warrant applications, and by relying on plainly insufficient factual assertions.
33. Finally, after individuals have been unlawfully jailed pursuant to these warrants, Defendants seek and obtain extraordinarily high monetary bond amounts and leave victims and witnesses to languish in jail without timely access to a judge or an attorney until the Office decides to alert the court to the arrest and schedule a hearing.
10

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 11 of 92
A. Fraudulent and legally invalid “subpoenas” 34. The District Attorney’s Office under Defendant Cannizzaro has a policy, practice,
and custom of coercing private meetings between prosecutors and witnesses by creating the false impression that the meetings are required by law.
35. To carry out this practice, the Office has systematically created and manipulated documents, styled as “subpoenas,” that command witnesses to appear at the District Attorney’s Office for private interrogations. The documents take at least three forms: standardized preprinted “subpoena” forms, unauthorized forms from the electronic “CourtNotify” system, and individualized “subpoena” forms.
36. These documents are not lawful subpoenas. 37. First, the District Attorney’s Office created its own pre-printed forms that demand the witness appear in person at the Office at a certain time and date to be questioned by prosecutors and other law enforcement officers. 38. This pre-printed document, which bears the official seal of the District Attorney’s Office, is labeled “SUBPOENA.” It warns: “A FINE AND IMPRISONMENT MAY BE IMPOSED FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS NOTICE.”
11

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 12 of 92
39. The office-wide template document includes blank spaces for the witness’s name, the case name, and the time and date the witness is commanded to appear at the District Attorney’s Office.
40. There is no space on the template for a signature from the judge or clerk of court. 41. This template allowed prosecutors to adapt the fraudulent form for use in multiple cases over multiple years. 42. On at least one occasion, First Assistant District Attorney Graymond Martin distributed this template to attorneys, investigators, and victim-witness coordinators at the District Attorney’s Office, instructing them to use it exclusively. See Appendix A (email from Defendant Martin with attachment). 43. On May 13, 2014, Defendant Martin’s assistant sent an email addressed to the entire staff at the District Attorney’s Office, including Defendants Cannizzaro, Pipes, Dover, Petrovich, Napoli, Rodrigue, Tucker, and Dawkins. 44. The subject line of the email was “OPDA Subpoena Template for Your Use.” 45. The email read: “TO ALL OPDA STAFF: Please see the attached/revised DA Subpoena to be used from this date forward. Please disregard any old forms of subpoenas. Do not use any of the older subpoenas. As per the First Assistant D.A. Graymond Martin, please save the attached in a folder on your computer. Thank you.”
12

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 13 of 92
46. The template for the fraudulent subpoena, an example of which is seen above in paragraph 38, was attached to the email.
47. The prosecutors and investigators employed by the District Attorney’s Office who deliver these documents regularly made verbal threats that witnesses who do not “obey” fraudulent subpoenas will be arrested and jailed. These threats were often reiterated both in person and over the phone. The District Attorney’s Office has explicitly conceded that the use of these subpoenas is an office “policy.”1
48. In addition to the pre-printed form, the District Attorney’s Office also has a policy and practice of using a government-run computer program called CourtNotify to generate altered and unlawful subpoenas.
49. CourtNotify is a computer program that prosecutors and public defenders use to request subpoenas for witnesses to appear for formal judicial proceedings in court.
50. The District Attorney’s Office, however, has altered the subpoenas generated by CourtNotify so that, instead of ordering the witness to testify in court, the subpoenas demand that the witness submit to questioning at the District Attorney’s Office.
51. An example helps to illustrate how this unconstitutional policy is implemented in practice. On February 24, 2017, a representative of the District Attorney’s Office delivered a fraudulent CourtNotify “subpoena” to K.M., a 60-year-old homeless man who was the victim of a battery.
1 Charles Maldonado, Orleans Parish Prosecutors Are Using Fake Subpoenas To Pressure Witnesses To Talk To Them, The Lens, http://thelensnola.org/2017/04/26/orleans-parish-prosecutors-are-using-fake-subpoenas-topressure-witnesses-to-talk-to-them (Apr. 26, 2017) (quoting Assistant District Attorney Chris Bowman, acting as spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office, as stating, “The district attorney sees no legal issues with this policy.”) (emphasis added).
13

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 14 of 92 52. The document demanded that K.M. appear at the District Attorney’s Office—not
in court—for questioning on March 3, 2017. 53. This document was not a lawful subpoena. 54. Based on CourtNotify records, Assistant District Attorney Tucker was the last
person to access the March 6th subpoena before the forged document was delivered to K.M. by investigators from the District Attorney’s Office.
55. To fabricate the document, Defendant Tucker or another representative of the District Attorney’s Office under her direction took a CourtNotify subpoena that had previously ordered K.M. to appear in court on March 6, 2017, and altered it so that it instructed him to appear at the District Attorney’s Office on March 3rd instead.
56. This forgery is apparent because the individual who altered the document neglected to change the text at the bottom of the subpoena marking the appearance date: on the March 3rd document, the appearance date is still listed as March 6th.
14

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 15 of 92
57. This individual also neglected to remove each of the multiple references to the “court” and replace them with references to the District Attorney’s Office.
58. In addition to the pre-printed forms and the altered CourtNotify subpoenas described above, Defendant has shown reporters a third type of fraudulent subpoena.2
2 Paul Murphy, Practice of fake subpoenas to be stopped by Orleans DA, WWLTV (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/orleans/practice-of-fake-subpoenas-to-be-stopped-by-orleans-da/434702306.
15

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 16 of 92
59. Like a lawful subpoena, the document includes the trappings of an official summons, stating that the witness is “hereby notified to appear” at the District Attorney’s Office to discuss “such matters as may be required of you,” and including a “return on service” so that a court could track whether the document was received.
60. Like the other types of unlawful subpoenas discussed above, however, this subpoena was never reviewed or approved by a court.
61. The full scope of these practices has yet to be uncovered, in part because, unlike lawful subpoenas, the fraudulent documents usually are not intentionally introduced by prosecutors in public court records.
62. But the evidence demonstrates that this policy is entrenched and its harms are widespread. A preliminary investigation based on publicly available information has unearthed the use of fraudulent subpoenas in a wide variety of criminal cases, with charges ranging from second-degree murder to disturbing the peace.
63. They have been signed by at least 14 different prosecutors, 11 of whom are currently still employed at the District Attorney’s Office: (1) Laura Rodrigue, (2) Jason Napoli, (3) William Dieters, (4) Tiffany Tucker, (5) Mike Trummel, (6) Arthur Mitchell, (7) Sarah
16

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 17 of 92
Dawkins, (8) Zachary Popovich, (9) Iain Dover, (10) Robert Moore, (11) Michael Heier, (12) Inga Petrovich, (13) Louis Russo, and (14) Payal Patel.
64. At least four of these prosecutors—Defendants Iain Dover, Jason Napoli, Arthur Mitchell, and Michael Trummel—have held or currently hold a supervisory position.
65. The number of prosecutors involved and the wide variety of cases in which fraudulent subpoenas were employed evidence a persistent pattern of violations carried out by experienced and inexperienced prosecutors alike.
66. Members of the criminal defense bar in Orleans Parish and former Assistant District Attorneys who worked under Defendant Cannizzaro confirm what this initial investigation suggests: the use of these fraudulent subpoenas has been widespread and systemic.
67. On April 26, 2017, an investigative journalist at The Lens published an article about prosecutors’ use of fraudulent subpoenas. Before that date, the use of fraudulent subpoenas was not widely known among the public.
68. Defendant Cannizzaro initially defended the practice. Chris Bowman, the official spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office told The Lens, “The district attorney does not see any legal issues with respect to this policy.”3
69. Bowman further explained that misleading reluctant witnesses into meeting with prosecutors was precisely the reason that the Office had created the documents to look as they do: “Maybe in some places if you send a letter on the DA’s letterhead that says, ‘You need to come in and talk to us’ … that is sufficient. It isn’t here. That is why it looks as formal as it does” (emphasis added).4
3 Charles Maldonado, Orleans Parish prosecutors are using fake subpoenas to pressure witnesses to go talk to them, The Lens (Apr. 26, 2017), http://thelensnola.org/2017/04/26/orleans-parish-prosecutors-are-using-fake-subpoenasto-pressure-witnesses-to-talk-to-them. 4 Id.
17

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 18 of 92
70. After facing public criticism from legal and ethical experts and the general public, Defendant Cannizzaro promised to remove the word “subpoena” from documents that were not subpoenas. The “subpoena” title would be replaced with “Notice to Appear.”
71. At 12:50 pm on April 26, 2017, the same day that article about fraudulent subpoenas appeared in The Lens, Defendant Martin sent an email to be distributed to all Assistant District Attorneys at the Office.
72. In the email, Defendant Martin stated, “It has been brought to my attention that some ADA’s may be using forms to be delivered to witnesses in cases that may not have been approved by me as appropriate.”
73. Attached to the email was a revised “Notice to Appear” form. Defendant Martin instructed prosecutors to use this new form in lieu of other “self created or modified notice[s] that may be floating around the office,” unless approved by him.
74. The newly-titled “Notice to Appear” documents inform witnesses they are “hereby notified” to report to the DA’s Office to speak privately with prosecutors about “such matters as may be required of you” (emphasis added).
18

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 19 of 92
75. The format of the newly proposed “notices” resembles official court documents, and like lawful subpoenas, they include a “return on service.” The documents misleadingly refer to themselves as “process of Court.”
76. Thus, although they do not include the word “subpoena,” the “notice” documents continue to create the false impression that the witness is “required” by law to meet privately with prosecutors.
77. On April 28, 2017, two days after the Lens article, Defendant Martin issued a memorandum to staff at the District Attorney’s Office.
78. This time, Defendant Martin instructed them not to use the “Notice to Appear” form he had recently circulated. He wrote, “At this time I expressly revoke the use of any ‘Notice to Appear’ or any other self created or modified notice that may be floating around the office in your computer or on some network.”
79. On May 4, 2017, Defendant Martin directed his assistant to circulate to ADAs a template of a letter to send to witnesses.
80. The letter does not include overt threats of jail or fines and does not resemble an official court order.
81. However, prosecutors at the District Attorney’s Office have made such threats verbally when delivering the letter.
19

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 20 of 92
82. For example, in summer 2017, a prosecutor from the District Attorney’s Office threatened a witness with a material witness warrant over the phone when the witness told the prosecutor that she wished to consult with counsel before agreeing to speak with the prosecutor outside of court.
83. Shortly after the prosecutor made these threats, two investigators from the District Attorney’s Office arrived at the witness’s door and hand-delivered a letter matching the template Defendant Martin had advised prosecutors to use.
B. The unlawful jailing of victims and witnesses 1. Material witness warrants based on fraudulent subpoenas 84. After facing public criticism for using fraudulent subpoenas, Defendant
Cannizzaro claimed, “There are no consequences, there are no legal consequences for the person who is the subject of that notice if they do not show up … No case has been presented to me where someone was arrested because they failed to honor a District Attorney’s notice.”5
85. At a City Council hearing on September 20, 2017, Defendant Cannizzaro repeated this claim, and he challenged councilmembers to “show me one person who was ever arrested and convicted with one of those DA notices!”6
86. In fact, based on an initial investigation, in the past three years, Orleans Parish prosecutors applied for arrest warrants for at least ten witnesses explicitly relying on an assertion that the witness did not “obey” a fraudulent subpoena—without informing the court the subpoena was fraudulent.
5 Paul Murphy, Practice of fake subpoenas to be stopped by Orleans DA, WWLTV, (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/orleans/practice-of-fake-subpoenas-to-be-stopped-by-orleans-da/434702306. 6 Remarks of Leon Cannizzaro, Hearing on the Budget of the District Attorney’s Office, New Orleans City Council (Sept. 20, 2017).
20

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 21 of 92
87. All ten warrants were issued. Six of these witnesses were jailed—including Plaintiff Singleton.7
88. In their applications for these warrants, prosecutors represented to the court that witnesses had been served valid subpoenas, when, in fact, they had been served fraudulent subpoenas demanding private, out-of-court meetings with prosecutors.
89. Prosecutors relied on allegations that witnesses did not do as these “subpoenas” demanded, even though the allegation that a witness exercised her constitutional right to decline to meet privately with a prosecutor at the District Attorney’s Office is an objectively unreasonable basis to arrest and imprison a witness to or victim of crime.
90. It is a policy of the District Attorney’s Office that the material witness warrant applications must be approved by a supervisor before being submitted to the court.
91. And consistent with their broader policy and practice when seeking material witness arrest warrants, prosecutors routinely omitted critical facts in these applications in order to obtain a warrant—for example, prosecutors omit that the witness had agreed to appear in court pursuant to a subpoena and had only declined to communicate with them in private.
92. J.B. and I.E. In December 2015, two alleged victims of aggravated assault with a firearm approached public defender Thomas Frampton and informed him that they wanted to provide favorable exculpatory statements for the defendant charged in the assault case. Both victims gave Frampton signed statements exculpating the defendant. Frampton emailed the statements to Assistant District Attorney Sarah Dawkins.
7 Ms. Singleton’s experience is detailed in Part II of this Complaint.
21

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 22 of 92
93. Soon afterwards, Frampton and Dawkins discussed the signed statements. As Frampton recalls, Dawkins told him, “You know how it goes in our office. Recantations mean someone goes to jail: the defendant or the victim.”
94. Dawkins then sent fraudulent subpoenas to both victims demanding that they appear at her office for a private meeting and threatening them with fines or jailing if they did not “obey.”
95. When the two women declined to attend the private meetings with prosecutors, Dawkins made an application for a material witness warrant for each of the women. Dawkins asked the court to jail each victim unless she paid a $250,000 secured money bond. The sole factual allegation in both warrant applications was that the women had not obeyed subpoenas demanding private, out-of-court meetings at the District Attorney’s Office. Dawkins did not inform the court that the “subpoenas” she referenced in her applications were fraudulent and had never been issued by a judge.
96. The judge granted Dawkins’s request based on her factual assertions, and J.B. spent six days in jail.
97. K.M. In March 2017, Assistant District Attorney Tiffany Tucker made an application for a material witness warrant to arrest K.M., the victim of a battery. The warrant application relied in part on a fraudulent subpoena, which Defendant Tucker attached as an exhibit. Defendant Tucker falsely represented to the court that the document was a “subpoena,”
22

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 23 of 92
as that term is defined under Louisiana law. Based on these representations, the court issued the warrant to jail the victim.
98. K.M. was arrested that afternoon. He remained in the Orleans Parish Prison for eight days because he could not pay the $100,000 bond that Tucker requested based on her factual assertions.
99. B.B. B.B., an alleged witness to a murder, received a fraudulent subpoena demanding that he appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office on February 20, 2014.
100. When B.B. did not go to the District Attorney’s Office on February 20th, Assistant District Attorney Robert Moore sent a text message to a member of B.B.’s family. Moore threatened the family member that he would seek a warrant to arrest B.B if he did not meet with prosecutors outside of court.
101. Moore applied for a material witness warrant for B.B. Moore asserted in the warrant application that B.B. should be jailed because he would not appear “pursuant to a
23

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 24 of 92
subpoena issued by a District Attorney investigator.” Moore asked the court to jail B.B. unless he paid a $500,000 bond. The court granted Moore’s motion. B.B. was arrested and kept in jail for five days.
102. S.B. On January 25, 2017, Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel made an application for a material witness warrant for S.B., the alleged victim of an aggravated battery. Defendant Trummel alleged that a “subpoena” was left in S.B.’s door instructing her to “report to the DA’s Office on the day of trial.”
103. This document was not a lawful subpoena. Like each of the other “subpoenas” described here, it had never been presented to or issued by a judge. Nonetheless, based on Trummel’s misrepresentation, the court issued a warrant for S.B.’s arrest. Six days later, the defendant in the underlying criminal case pled guilty, and the court vacated the material witness warrant. The District Attorney never called S.B. to testify.
104. C.R. In March 2015, Assistant District Attorney Michael Heier made an application for the court to jail C.R. on a material witness warrant because C.R. had “failed to appear at the District Attorney’s Office subject to subpoena.” Heier did not inform the court that the document he called a “subpoena” was not a valid subpoena. The warrant application also asserted that C.R. had missed scheduled appointments with the District Attorney’s Office. Heier requested that the court set bond for C.R. at $250,000.
105. C.R. appeared in court, and the court agreed to release him on a $5,000 bond. Prosecutors objected to releasing C.R. instead of jailing him or placing him on ankle monitoring.
106. The defendant in the case was charged with simple criminal damage to property and disturbing the peace. She ultimately pled guilty and was given a suspended sentence and six months of inactive probation.
24

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 25 of 92
107. S.S. In February 2014, S.S.—the victim of an attempted murder—was jailed as a material witness because Assistant District Attorney Jason Napoli asserted in an application for an arrest warrant that S.S. did not “obey” a fraudulent subpoena ordering him to appear at a private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office.
108. Defendant Napoli attached an affidavit to his application for a material witness warrant. The affidavit asserted that his Office’s investigator “would leave an Orleans Parish District Attorney Office Subpoena along with his card in the hands of [S.S.’s] Mother or Grandmother after each visit but to no avail, [S.S.] never appeared in the District Attorney[‘s] Office on the dates listed on his subpoenas.” Defendant Napoli did not inform the court that these documents were not lawful subpoenas.
109. S.S. was arrested and kept in jail for 14 days. At Defendant Napoli’s request, and based on his representations, S.S. was held without bail.
110. T.J. On January 27, 2017, Assistant District Attorney Williams Dieters requested a material witness warrant for an alleged domestic violence victim because she did not obey a fraudulent subpoena. As a factual basis for the request, Dieters alleged, “[W]hat I did serve her with was, in fact, a DA subpoena … and that is a subpoena.” Dieters did not inform the court that the subpoena was not lawful. No judge had been presented with the subpoena as required by law before issuing such a document. The court granted Dieters’ motion and a warrant was issued for T.J.’s arrest.
111. Chief Judge White, who presided over the case, later learned of Dieters’ misrepresentations; she stated the she did not know the subpoena was fraudulent when she issued the warrant and would not have issued the warrant had she known.
25

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 26 of 92
112. Q.J. On August 12, 2014, Assistant District Attorney Sarah Dawkins submitted a warrant application for Q.J. Dawkins alleged in the application that Q.J. had not complied with a “subpoena” and that he did not answer prosecutors’ phone calls. Dawkins recommended that Q.J. be kept in jail unless he paid a bond of $250,000. Her application was approved by the Chief of Trials, Defendant David Pipes. Dawkins did not inform the court that the subpoena was fraudulent. The court then granted the application on the same day it was filed.
113. In June 2015, the defendant in the criminal case pled guilty to the illegal carrying of a weapon and misdemeanor marijuana possession-first offense. He received a six month suspended sentence and six months of inactive probation.
2. Material witness warrant applications that provide no reasonable basis for the arrest of a witness or victim of crime
114. The District Attorney’s Office relies on fraudulent subpoenas in its warrant applications as part of a larger policy and practice: submitting material witness warrant applications based on a witnesses’ perceived or actual refusal to speak privately with prosecutors.
115. No reasonable prosecutor would believe that a witness or crime victim can be arrested and jailed because she declines to meet with prosecutors outside of court or to submit voluntarily to interrogation at the District Attorney’s Office.
116. But in the last three years, Orleans Parish prosecutors have sought and secured dozens of material witness warrants on this basis.
117. For example, in one representative material witness warrant application, which resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant, the prosecutor alleged that the witness “ha[d] failed to respond to letters, telephone calls, voicemails, emails, and Facebook messages” from prosecutors.
26

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 27 of 92
118. In another warrant application, the prosecutor asked the court to jail a victim of an armed robbery who “informed the District Attorney’s Office that she would not speak to representatives of the District Attorney’s Office without a lawyer present.”
119. One such allegation—that “[t]he State has reason to fear that [the witness] will not appear in Court pursuant to a subpoena as he has failed to appear pursuant to previous appointments with the undersigned”—appears to be part of an Office-wide template for material witness warrant applications.
120. In December 2014, Assistant District Attorney Corey Moll relied on this allegation when he applied for a material witness warrant for the victim, J.C. The defendant in the case was charged with “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.”
121. J.C. was jailed for eight days based on Moll’s factual assertions because J.C. could not pay the $100,000 money bond that Moll requested.
122. In June 2015, Assistant District Attorney Mark Lopez used this same phrase as the sole allegation in a warrant application for the arrest of D.B., the victim of aggravated criminal damage to property. The defendant in the case was accused of damaging D.B’s Pontiac Firebird.
123. Based on his factual assertions, Lopez asked that D.B. be jailed unless he paid a $300,000 money bond.
27

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 28 of 92
124. The defendant in the case had been released on a $5,000 money bond. He pled guilty and was sentenced to a one-year suspended sentence and active probation.
125. In June 2016, the same factual basis appeared again in a warrant application for M.C., the victim of a sexual battery.
126. Prosecutors also routinely base material witness warrants on allegations that are entirely irrelevant to whether the witness will appear in court pursuant to a valid subpoena. These allegations regularly target crime victims who are poor.
127. For example, in the material witness warrant application for M.C., the prosecutor recommended that M.C. be jailed because she had “no place to live” and “no means of support.”
128. Assistant District Attorney Matthew Payne applied for a warrant to jail H.J., the victim of an aggravated battery, because she “does not have a current address.”
129. Assistant District Attorney Louis Russo sought and secured a material witness warrant for D.E., the victim of armed robbery with a firearm, before the defendant in the case had even been arraigned. In support of his application, Russo asserted to the court that D.E. likely had no stable place to live because she was an exotic dancer.
3. Material witness warrants based on false allegations and material omissions 130. Prosecutors in the District Attorney’s Office routinely base material witness warrant applications on material misrepresentations and material omissions. 131. Upon information and belief, prosecutors in Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration have based dozens of warrant applications on false allegations, including: (1) that
28

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 29 of 92
the witness was properly served with a subpoena; (2) that the witness refused to testify; and (3) that the Office did not know how to find the witness.
132. These misrepresentations frequently supplement allegations that the witness has simply exercised her right to decline to speak voluntarily with prosecutors. For example, the material witness warrant for Plaintiff Marc Mitchell came on the heels of his decision not to speak privately with prosecutors anymore. The prosecutor’s motion explicitly and inappropriately relied on Mitchell’s decision to exercise his First Amendment rights, and alleged in support of Mr. Mitchell’s arrest that he “indicated this would be the last meeting he would have with the District Attorney’s Office and did not want to move forward with the case.”
133. Prosecutors also told the court that Mr. Mitchell had refused to sign a “subpoena” for court and had bought a bus ticket to leave down. Neither of these allegations was true. The prosecutors omitted the fact that Mr. Mitchell had actually signed a subpoena to testify at trial. Based on the prosecutors’ representations in the warrant application, Mitchell was arrested and jailed because he could not pay the $50,000 money bond.
134. Critical information is also routinely omitted from material witness warrant applications. For example, prosecutors know that many witnesses’ refusals to speak to them are the predictable result of prosecutors’ strong-arm tactics to secure favorable testimony. But they omit accounts of the coercive tactics that have alienated the witness and led the witness to exercise her right to decline to meet privately with prosecutors outside formal court supervision or testimony, or without their own lawyer present.
135. Conversely, prosecutors frequently make lackluster attempts to contact the witnesses—if they fail, the witness can be arrested and put in jail, which gives prosecutors an opportunity to influence their testimony in a coercive environment. But prosecutors frequently
29

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 30 of 92
do not accurately represent the efforts that they have made when they describe them to judges, creating a false impression that an arrest warrant is the only reasonable way to find and ensure the appearance of a victim or witness.
4. Defendant Cannizzaro’s role in the unconstitutional abuse of material witness warrant applications at the District Attorney’s Office
136. At a City Council hearing on September 20, 2017, Defendant Cannizzaro made clear that his policy is to use material witness warrants when initial outreach by the District Attorney’s Office does not satisfy prosecutors that the person will communicate sufficiently with them outside of court.
137. When a councilmember criticized Defendant Cannizzaro for jailing rape victims, Defendant Cannizzaro warned that if the Council cut his budget, prosecutors would “not [be] able to work [with victims] as closely.” He threatened that the Office would increase their use of material witness warrants instead if cuts were made to his budget: “I don’t want any of you to be surprised should further cuts be made,” Defendant Cannizzaro said.
138. Not surprisingly, under Defendant Cannizzaro’s direction, the unlawful use of material witness warrants has proliferated in the District Attorney’s Office.
139. A pre-discovery review of publicly availably documents has identified more than 30 prosecutors working under Defendant Cannizzaro who have personally signed or approved material witness warrant applications based on materially false allegations, material omissions, or insufficient and irrelevant allegations.
140. Defendant Cannizzaro’s involvement has been personal. At times, Defendant Cannizzaro makes decisions about whether to jail the victim or witness in particular cases.
141. Recounting a case in which he decided to jail two witnesses, Defendant Cannizzaro said, “I instructed my ADAs to obtain an indictment and, if necessary, secure the
30

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 31 of 92
testimony of the witnesses through the use of material witness warrants, which we were ultimately required to do.”8
142. This behavior is consistent with Defendant Cannizzaro’s reputation in the New Orleans legal community as a micromanager, often weighing in on even the smallest decisions in his assistants’ cases.
143. Defendant Cannizzaro also publicly defended an Assistant District Attorney who engaged in the unlawful conduct that is the subject of this lawsuit: after Assistant District Attorney William Dieters obtained an arrest warrant for a domestic violence victim based on a fraudulent subpoena, Defendant Cannizzaro told the press those actions were justified because the victim had stopped cooperating with prosecutors.9
C. Violation of the due process rights of incarcerated witnesses 144. Once a victim or witness is imprisoned pursuant to a material witness warrant,
prosecutors routinely leave that person to languish in jail—without access to judge or counsel— until the prosecutor decides to alert the court of the arrest and requests that a hearing be scheduled. Because prosecutors are able to control the length of a person’s post-arrest detention, they are able to create and manipulate that detention as a tool to credibly threaten witnesses and to coerce meetings and interviews while the person is in custody or afterwards.
145. In addition to the constraints on prolonged post-arrest detention of material witnesses that the federal Constitution imposes under these specific circumstances, prosecutors also routinely violate state law protections. Under Louisiana law, an arrested person must be
8 Don’t let reluctant witnesses derail justice: DA Leon Cannizzaro, NOLA.com (June 7, 2017), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2017/06/material_witness_warrants.html. 9 Charles Maldonado, Prosecutor tried to jail victim of alleged domestic violence after she didn’t obey fake subpoena, The Lens (June 14, 2017), http://thelensnola.org/2017/06/14/new-orleans-prosecutor-used-fake-subpoenato-seek-arrest-warrant-for-victim-of-alleged-domestic-violence.
31

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 32 of 92
brought before a judge within 72 hours of arrest, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. See Art. 230.1, La. C. Crim. P; see State v. Chaney, 384 So. 2d 442, 444 (La. 1980).
146. Yet people jailed as material witnesses in Orleans Parish regularly remain in jail without seeing a judge for days or weeks beyond this 72-hour period.
147. After obtaining a material witness warrant from the court, prosecutors must arrange for its entry into NCIC with the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office. Prosecutors will then direct the Sheriff’s Office when to execute the warrant, if it does not issue on its own due to an unrelated arrest or traffic stop.
148. In general, prosecutors are responsible for decisions about when a material witness or victim is called to court. In Orleans Parish, prosecutors participate in setting matters on the docket. This is done by submitting to the clerk a form called a “set sheet,” requesting that a case be set for a hearing on a particular date and at a particular time.
149. The “set sheet” process is not normally used for criminal arrestees, who are automatically scheduled to go through the magistrate process by the clerk. However, an incarcerated witness or victim is usually brought before a judge only when the prosecutor asks the court to set a hearing for the witness.
150. The District Attorney’s Office knows when a witness is incarcerated; the Office requests the arrest warrant and bond amount and is informed when the arrest is made. Therefore, prosecutors in the District Attorney’s Office know when a witness has been kept in jail for more than 72 hours without access to a neutral magistrate.
151. However, on information and belief, the District Attorney’s Office has no procedure to prevent the unlawful and unconstitutional over-incarceration of material witnesses.
32

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 33 of 92
152. The District Attorney’s Office lacks such a procedure even though the Office has been held liable for the prolonged incarceration of material witnesses before. See Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1987).
153. Based on a limited review of publicly available records, within the last five years, at least 50 victims and witnesses were confined in jail for more than 72 hours before seeing a judge after being arrested pursuant to material witness warrants that Defendant Cannizzaro’s Office sought.
154. For example, P.M., a victim of child sex trafficking, was arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant obtained based on the prosecutor’s factual representations. She was confined in the Orleans Parish Prison for 89 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer.
155. She was arrested on Thanksgiving Day and spent Christmas and New Year’s Day in a jail cell away from her infant daughter.
156. P.M. ultimately remained in the jail for 109 days before she was released. When P.M. left the jail, she had lost her housing and began living on the street. Shortly thereafter, P.M. lost custody of her child.
157. As another example, E.B., the victim of first-degree rape, was jailed for 12 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer.
158. Yet another example is K.C., a witness in a murder case who was jailed for 18 days before she was brought to a neutral judicial officer. In total, K.C. spent 32 days in jail, including New Year’s Day and Christmas.
159. Prosecutors exploit these prolonged detentions for investigative purposes, interrogating witnesses still in detention or shortly after release, and at times pressuring these
33

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 34 of 92
witnesses to change or supplement their statements to better support the prosecution’s theory of the case.
160. Prosecutors regularly make their decisions about when to bring material witnesses to court for a hearing on considerations relating to the underlying prosecution, without regard to the constitutional rights of the witness or crime victim.
161. Plaintiff Baham, for example, was brought to court for the first time at Defendant Napoli’s request after spending eight days in jail as a material witness. Once Baham arrived in court in shackles and an orange jumpsuit, Defendant Napoli exploited this opportunity to interrogate her in a room behind the courtroom and pressure her to change her account of events.
162. In many cases, the material witness does not receive a hearing at all. The prosecutor simply requests the witness’s presence on the date of trial. Prosecutors have used the custodial status of the witness to force the shackled witness to speak privately about her testimony. The witness is released if the prosecutor decides to no longer use her testimony.
D. The chilling effect of Defendants’ unlawful practices 163. Unless a prosecutor complies with the requirements above and secures a subpoena
or warrant through a valid, court-approved legal process, an individual is under no legal obligation to speak with a prosecutor conducting an investigation. The right to freely decline voluntary questioning from a government official is a basic constitutional right.
164. Defendants’ unlawful practices, however, have been effective in widely chilling the exercise of the constitutional right to decline private questioning from prosecutors outside of a formal legal proceeding.
165. Plaintiffs Renata Singleton, Lazonia Baham, and Jane Doe each had exercised their right to decline to speak voluntarily with the District Attorney’s Office after receiving
34

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 35 of 92
fraudulent subpoenas insisting that they do so. But prosecutors ultimately secured private interrogations with each of these Plaintiffs by using or threatening to use a material witness warrant, overcoming Plaintiffs’ attempts to exercise their legal rights not to speak with prosecutors outside of court.
166. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, the victim of an attempted murder, told Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel that he wanted no further out-of-court contact with prosecutors about the case.
167. Two days later, Defendant Trummel asked the court to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness, alleging that Mr. Mitchell refused to meet with prosecutors. After Mr. Mitchell was released, Mr. Mitchell met with Defendant Trummel twice to discuss his testimony because he feared being jailed again if he did not agree to the private meetings.
168. The chilling impact of prosecutors’ unlawful practices extends beyond the victims and witnesses who have personally been jailed or threatened. The practice is so commonplace that the possibility that a witness or victim could be jailed colors local attorneys’ strategic judgments and affects how they counsel their clients.
169. When a client is a victim or witness in a criminal case, many defense lawyers advise the client to comply with prosecutors’ requests for out-of-court meetings, even if the client is adamantly against it and wishes to exercise her First Amendment rights. Any other approach risks arrest and retaliation.
170. One attorney whose client had been jailed for several months as a material witness considered challenging the legality of her client’s detention, but instead arranged a meeting for her to speak with prosecutors because it was the faster way to get her out of jail.
35

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 36 of 92
171. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence has suffered a similar and even more acute chilling effect; the organization never advises victims to decline meetings with prosecutors—even if the victim wishes to do so—for fear that prosecutors will jail the victim on a material witness warrant. In this manner, the unlawful practices challenged in this case determine how the organization itself chooses to exercise its core right to communicate in private with its members and clients, the people that it exists to serve.
172. The District Attorney’s Office has compounded these effects by threatening attorneys and other professionals with criminal charges for complaining about these practices.
173. Defendant Cannizzaro twice threatened Tamara Jackson, the Executive Director of Silence Is Violence. In 2016, Ms. Jackson submitted a formal complaint to the National District Attorneys Association. The complaint expressed concerns about the inadequate protections the District Attorney’s Office provides to crime victims. After filing the complaint, Ms. Jackson sent a copy of it to Defendant Cannizzaro.
174. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Defendant Cannizzaro called Ms. Jackson and told her to be careful: if it appeared that she was encouraging victims not to communicate with his office, he could prosecute her for witness coercion. Ms. Jackson understood that the threat was made as a direct and proximate result of her advocacy for victims and complaint to the National District Attorneys Association.
175. This was not the first time Defendant Cannizzaro had made these threats. Three years earlier, Defendant Cannizzaro called Ms. Jackson after she stated in the press that the District Attorney’s Office failed to protect victims from violent retaliation. Defendant Cannizzaro told Ms. Jackson that if she dissuaded victims from assisting prosecutors, she could
36

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 37 of 92
be charged with obstruction. Again, Ms. Jackson understood this threat to be retaliation for her comments to the press and a warning not to make further statements to reporters.
176. In December 2014, the District Attorney’s Office brought felony charges against an investigator for the Public Defender’s Office based on her interaction with a witness. In the same time period, prosecutors at the District Attorney’s Office had also threatened two public defenders with prosecution. As a result, although public defenders know that witnesses do not have to meet with prosecutors, they often will not tell witnesses about their constitutional right not to communicate with prosecutors because they fear retaliatory prosecution.
E. Supervision and training at the District Attorney’s Office 177. The supervision and training methods at the District Attorney’s Office have
encouraged and exacerbated the unconstitutional practices described in this lawsuit. 178. In some instances, supervisors have directly instructed prosecutors to engage in
unconstitutional practices. 179. For example, as alleged above,10 on May 13, 2014, First Assistant District
Attorney Graymond Martin distributed a template fraudulent subpoena form to the entire staff at the District Attorney’s Office and instructed the staff to use it exclusively.
180. In the April 26, 2017, email to all Assistant District Attorneys, Defendant Martin also explicitly instructed them to use the threat of arrest from a material witness warrant to make contact with a witness: “after the warrant is obtained one last effort to contact the witness prior to the execution of the warrant should be made where the witness is informed of the legal peril….”
10 See supra ¶¶ 42-46.
37

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 38 of 92
181. In another instance, in a training on witness recantations, Chief of Trials David Pipes suggested that prosecutors seek material witness arrest warrants with secured money bonds for recanting witnesses. See Appendix B (excerpt from training materials).
182. On the cover page of the materials distributed for the presentation, Defendant Pipes promises: “From impeachment to imprisonment, this session will cover what to do when your witnesses suddenly become their witnesses.”
183. In the same materials, Defendant Pipes describes certain witnesses as “traitors” and “cold-blooded liar[s].”
184. Defendant Pipes includes witnesses who “change [their] mind[s]” or “[do] not remember” as ways in which “your witness [will] betray you.”
185. Defendant Pipes instructs prosecutors that identifying “the traitors in your midst” prior to trial “will go a long way to making sure you get the last laugh.”
186. The presentation includes slides that appear to mock certain witnesses and victims who Defendant Pipes warns prosecutors might “betray you.”
187. More broadly, Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration has adopted supervision policies that promote a “win at all costs” approach to prosecution.
188. Prosecutors are promoted and demoted based on, among other things, the number of convictions the prosecutor has won at trial. Prosecutors who win jury trials may be rewarded with pay raises, senior attorney positions, or positions in Major Offense Trials unit, which is both prestigious and well-paid. Prosecutors who lose jury trials may be demoted to juvenile court and other less desirable and less well-paid divisions.11
11 Publicly available salary documents dated July 15, 2014, listed seven attorneys in the Major Offense Trials unit, including Defendants Rodrigue, Napoli, Petrovich, and Pipes. Defendant Pipes, who was listed as Chief of Major Offense Trials, received a salary of $115,000 per year. The remaining six prosecutors in the Major Offense Trials
38

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 39 of 92
189. On information and belief, each prosecutor’s win-loss record is tracked in a statistics book that Defendant Cannizzaro keeps in his desk. On information and belief, the Office does not track each prosecutor’s record of misconduct violations, including misconduct identified by a court.
190. One former prosecutor explained, “[I]f you lose a case, you are potentially going to be shifted off to juvenile court or child support.… [E]veryone is terrified that they will be moved and chased out of the Office.”12
191. When a prosecutor in Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration loses a jury trial, she must report to Defendant Cannizzaro himself to explain why she lost. Defendant Cannizzaro routinely yells and berates the attorney for losing during these meetings. On information and belief, in contrast, prosecutors are rarely—if ever—demoted or otherwise disciplined for ethical violations.
192. As a result of these policies, one former prosecutor explained, “[Prosecutors] will aim to seek the most convictions possible, even if this means committing misconduct. They know they will not be punished for winning so there is little incentive to comply with the law.”13 II. Individual Plaintiffs’ Experiences
A. Renata Singleton 193. On November 2, 2014, Renata Singleton had an argument with her boyfriend,
Vernon Crossley. According to the Police Incident Report, the two “tussled over [the] phone.”
unit made salaries ranging from $78,000 to $92,000. Prosecutors in juvenile court had salaries ranging from $46,632 to $64,400. The Chief of the juvenile division received a salary of $80,000. 12 Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, Geo. J. Legal Ethics 913, 934 (2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1024 934 (quoting interview with prosecutor). 13 Id. at 935 (quoting interview with prosecutor).
39

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 40 of 92
Mr. Crossley grabbed Ms. Singleton’s cell phone out of her hand and shattered it. Ms. Singleton’s daughter called 911 on their landline and put her mother on the phone. Mr. Crossley was arrested and released the next day.
194. Shortly after the incident, Ms. Singleton was contacted by a victim-witness advocate from the District Attorney’s Office. Ms. Singleton told her that she had three children and that her job paid by the hour; she did not want to miss work or time with her children to pursue the charges. Ms. Singleton had ended her relationship with Mr. Crossley and considered the situation resolved. She told the advocate that she just wanted to move on.
195. On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, an investigator from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Singleton’s home to deliver two documents, styled as “subpoenas” that demanded she appear for questioning at the District Attorney’s Office on April 24th. The documents were left at Ms. Singleton’s door.
196. On information and belief, the investigator took this action at the direction of Assistant District Attorney Arthur Mitchell.
197. The “subpoenas” were fraudulent. They had never been presented to or approved by a court.
198. Ms. Singleton asked a friend in law enforcement about these documents. Like Ms. Singleton, her friend assumed the “subpoenas” were lawful. But she told Ms. Singleton that, since the documents were left in the door, she had not been validly served and did not have to submit to questioning at the District Attorney’s Office.
199. On April 24, Singleton did not go to the District Attorney’s Office to speak privately with prosecutors.
40

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 41 of 92
200. On the same day, Defendant Mitchell applied for a material witness warrant asking the court to put Ms. Singleton in jail. As a factual basis for his request, Defendant Mitchell relied on Ms. Singleton’s failure to appear at the District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the two documents, which Defendant Mitchell told the court were “subpoenas.”
201. Defendant Mitchell attached a notarized affidavit to the warrant application, stating that, “after being duly sworn,” he “did depose and say … [t]hat he has reviewed the foregoing motion thereto and that the allegations contained therein are truthful.”
202. Defendant David Pipes, an Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Trials, reviewed and approved Defendant Mitchell’s application for the arrest warrant.
203. Based on Defendant Mitchell’s factual assertions, Judge Robin Pittman issued the arrest warrant for Ms. Singleton’s arrest. At Defendant Mitchell’s request, and based on his misrepresentations, Judge Pittman set a monetary bond of $100,000.
204. On the evening of Thursday, May 28, 2015, and unaware of the outstanding arrest warrant, Singleton returned home to find that a new subpoena, requiring her appearance in court the following day, had been delivered. Ms. Singleton’s teenage son had accepted and signed it. Ms. Singleton planned to comply with the subpoena because it told her to go to the courthouse and had been served on her son.
205. Later that night, police officers knocked on Ms. Singleton’s front door. The officers said they had a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Singleton pulled the subpoena her son had signed out of her purse and showed it to the officers, explaining to them that she had just been served to appear in court and intended to comply.
206. One of the officers said that he had to arrest Ms. Singleton anyway because the District Attorney’s Office really wanted her.
41

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 42 of 92
207. Ms. Singleton’s police officer friend came to her house. The friend promised the officers that she would accompany Ms. Singleton to the District Attorney’s Office the following morning. One of the officers made a phone call to the District Attorney’s Office for approval. After the call, the officers agreed to leave without arresting Ms. Singleton, notwithstanding the warrant authorizing her arrest.
208. The next morning, accompanied by her friend from the police department, Ms. Singleton went to the District Attorney’s Office. She was greeted by Defendant Mitchell, who told Ms. Singleton’s friend to wait in the lobby.
209. Defendant Mitchell guided Ms. Singleton to a room to be questioned. Assistant District Attorney Tiffany Tucker and another attorney who introduced himself as a supervisor, Defendant Doe, joined the meeting.
210. Defendant Mitchell began to ask Ms. Singleton about the incident with Mr. Crossley. Ms. Singleton told him that she was more concerned about why she had almost been arrested. She told Defendant Mitchell that she did not want to answer questions without a lawyer present. Defendant Mitchell told her she did not need a lawyer because she was not the criminal.
211. Frightened, Ms. Singleton still refused to answer any questions without an attorney present.
212. Ms. Singleton heard Defendant Doe give an instruction to call a unit, and a police officer came and arrested her on the spot.
213. Although both had observed that Ms. Singleton’s arrest was prompted by her decision not to provide information to prosecutors without counsel present, neither Mr. Mitchell nor Ms. Tucker took any action to prevent Ms. Singleton’s arrest.
42

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 43 of 92
214. As the officer walked Ms. Singleton out of the building in handcuffs, still accompanied by the people who had been in the meeting, Ms. Singleton passed by her friend, the police officer who had accompanied her to the meeting. Defendant Doe turned to Ms. Singleton’s friend and warned her that she might want to stay out of this before she lost her job.
215. The arresting officer brought Ms. Singleton to the Orleans Parish Prison. 216. Ms. Singleton had never been arrested before. She began to sob. 217. Ms. Singleton contacted her sister to let her know that she needed her to take care of her three children. Officers at the jail took Ms. Singleton’s clothes and gave her an orange jumpsuit. 218. Ms. Singleton was worried about her children. She asked her sister to tell them she was away for business. Ms. Singleton had just started work as a payroll accountant at KIPP New Orleans Schools. She was terrified that she would lose her job. 219. Ms. Singleton could not afford the $100,000 bond that prosecutors had requested and spent the next five nights at the Orleans Parish Prison away from her children and her job. 220. On June 2, 2015, Ms. Singleton was brought to court from the jail for the first court appearance since her arrest. She wore an orange jumpsuit and was shackled at her hands and feet. Metal chains tied her to all of the other prisoners who had court dates that day. 221. In contrast, Mr. Crossley, the alleged perpetrator, had been released months earlier on a $3,500 secured bond. He paid it on the day of his arraignment and came to court appearances from home, wearing his own clothes. 222. Ms. Singleton’s mother hired a lawyer for her. The lawyer argued for a bond reduction, which was granted, and Ms. Singleton’s mother posted $5,000 for bond.
43

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 44 of 92
223. Ms. Singleton was released with an 8:00 p.m. curfew and an ankle monitor. Ms. Singleton wore bell-bottom jeans to hide the ankle monitor from her younger children. During her time in jail, Ms. Singleton had lost eight pounds.
224. Mr. Crossley pled guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to one year of inactive probation with no jail time. Once Ms. Singleton had been jailed, the District Attorney’s office never asked her to testify.
225. Ms. Singleton’s arrest as a material witness has been a persistent source of humiliation and shame. Ms. Singleton’s mugshot can be found online. There is an entry for Ms. Singleton at policearrests.com, listing Ms. Singleton as a “suspect” and stating that she was “charged with an offense by police.”
226. Ms. Singleton, who has a master’s degree in Business Administration, is currently looking for a new job as an accountant. She is anxious that her arrest will prevent her from being hired.
227. Her arrest has left another mark as well: Ms. Singleton is afraid to ever call the police again.
44

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 45 of 92
228. Until The Lens broke its story about the District Attorney’s Office’s use of fraudulent subpoenas on April 26, 2017, Ms. Singleton did not know that her subpoena was fraudulent. Nor was she aware of the factual basis given for her material witness warrant.
B. Marc Mitchell 229. In July 2014, Marc Mitchell and his cousin, Christopher Chambers, took their
nephews to a neighborhood court to play basketball. 230. A man approached Mr. Mitchell, wanting to use the court. When Mr. Mitchell
told the man that his team was going to play the next game, the man argued with him. A few moments later, another man fired 28 bullets at Mr. Mitchell and his cousin. Both men were shot multiple times. Mr. Mitchell spent two months in the hospital with life-threatening injuries.
231. The District Attorney’s Office charged both men at the court, Jonterry Bernard and Gerard Gray, with attempted murder of Mr. Mitchell and his cousin. Mr. Bernard was tried first. The prosecution’s theory was that Bernard was the triggerman, but that Gray had directed the shooting.
232. Mr. Mitchell assisted the District Attorney’s Office in the prosecution against Mr. Bernard.
233. He signed a medical release form authorizing prosecutors to obtain his medical records. He met with prosecutors at their offices. In October 2015, he testified in the prosecution’s case against Bernard, identifying Bernard as the man who shot him. Mr. Bernard was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison.
234. As Gray’s trial approached, Mr. Mitchell met with Defendant Michael Trummel and Defendant Matthew Hamilton on several occasions to prepare. During these meetings,
45

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 46 of 92
Defendant Trummel and/or Defendant Hamilton told Mr. Mitchell that Gray was in a gang, and that Gray had ordered Bernard to shoot him.
235. Mr. Mitchell repeatedly responded that, based on what he witnessed, he did not know whether Gray was in a gang, and he did not know whether Gray had ordered Bernard to shoot him. Mitchell recalls repeatedly telling the prosecutors that he got into an argument with one man, and then another man shot him.
236. Defendant Trummel and/or Defendant Hamilton continued to ask Mr. Mitchell if he had seen Gray gesture to Bernard to order him to shoot. Mr. Mitchell repeatedly told the prosecutors that he had not.
237. Mr. Mitchell was uncomfortable with how this meeting had gone. Defendant Trummel, in particular, seemed more intent on telling him what had happened than actually listening to Mr. Mitchell’s account of the shooting.
238. Mr. Mitchell was under the impression that Defendant Trummel wanted him to testify using specific words that did not match Mr. Mitchell’s recollection of events.
239. Mr. Mitchell also did not believe the District Attorney’s Office was taking concerns about his safety seriously.
240. For example, after Bernard’s trial, a man made a gesture of a gun and pantomimed shooting Mr. Mitchell on the steps of the courthouse. Frightened, Mr. Mitchell told prosecutors what had happened, but they did not investigate the threat, and they never followed up with Mr. Mitchell about his safety.
241. On April 4, 2016, Mr. Mitchell met with Defendant Trummel and Defendant Hamilton, to inform them that he wanted no further private contact with the District Attorney’s Office.
46

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 47 of 92
242. During that meeting, and in the presence of Defendant Trummel, Defendant Hamilton gave Mr. Mitchell a subpoena ordering him to appear to testify at Gray’s trial on April 11, 2016. Mr. Mitchell signed the subpoena.
243. On April 6, 2016—five days before Mr. Mitchell had the opportunity to appear at the April 11th court date—Defendant Trummel submitted a warrant application asking the court to jail Mr. Mitchell as a material witness. The warrant application specifically relied on Mr. Mitchell’s statement during the April 4th meeting that he no longer wished to meet with prosecutors outside of court.
244. On information and belief, Defendant Trummel took this action with the knowledge of Defendant Hamilton.
245. Defendant Trummel and/or Hamilton also told the court that Mr. Mitchell had a bus ticket to leave town. Mr. Mitchell had not bought a bus ticket.
246. The warrant application did not explain that, after telling prosecutors he no longer wished to speak with them in private, Mr. Mitchell had signed a subpoena to appear in court for Gray’s trial, among other material omissions. Relying on Defendant Trummel and Defendant Hamilton’s representations, the court issued the arrest warrant.
247. The following day, two police officers came in a marked police car to the highend hotel where Mr. Mitchell worked. Mr. Mitchell was wearing his uniform: a white dinnerjacket, black tuxedo pants, and a black bowtie.
248. The police officers arrested Mr. Mitchell in the ornate hotel lobby, and placed him in handcuffs, in full view of his coworkers and the guests checking in.
249. When Mr. Mitchell asked why he was being arrested, one of the officers said that he did not know, but the prosecutor had told them to come and pick him up.
47

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 48 of 92
250. Mr. Mitchell was not given a copy of the warrant signed by the judge or the warrant application signed by Defendant Trummel.
251. Mr. Mitchell was jailed at the Orleans Parish Prison on a $50,000 bond, set by the court at Defendant Trummel’s request.
252. While Mr. Mitchell was confined in jail, his family sought assistance from Silence Is Violence. Its Executive Director, Tamara Jackson, immediately advocated for Mr. Mitchell’s release. The following morning, the court released Mitchell on his own recognizance.
253. The day before Gray’s trial, Mr. Mitchell was again called to meet privately with prosecutors. This time, fearful of being arrested again, Mr. Mitchell came reluctantly to the private meeting, accompanied by Ms. Jackson. Again, Defendant Trummel and/or Defendant Hamilton told Mr. Mitchell about Mr. Gray’s gang affiliation and suggested that Mr. Gray had ordered Mr. Mitchell’s shooting.
254. Mr. Mitchell once again told Defendant Trummel and/or Defendant Hamilton that he knew only one thing: he got into an argument with Mr. Gray, and another man had shot him.
255. Mr. Mitchell testified truthfully at trial that he never heard Mr. Gray order Bernard to shoot him. Mr. Gray was convicted.
256. Shortly after the trial, Mr. Mitchell was called in to meet with Chief Judge White in her chambers. Ms. Jackson accompanied Mr. Mitchell to the meeting on behalf of Silence Is Violence.
257. Chief Judge White told Mr. Mitchell that she wanted to apologize for what had happened to him, and said that prosecutors in the case had misled her.
258. After his experiences with the District Attorney’s Office, Mr. Mitchell repeatedly woke up panicking and soaked in sweat. He eventually sought treatment for his trauma
48

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 49 of 92
symptoms. Mr. Mitchell’s therapy, which was arranged by Plaintiff Silence Is Violence, addressed his arrest as a material witness.
259. Neither the material witness warrant application nor the warrant for Mr. Mitchell’s arrest were included in the clerk’s file, and no discussions of the material witness warrant took place on the record.
260. Therefore, until undersigned counsel obtained the District Attorney’s file through a public records request,14 Mr. Mitchell did not know the factual basis given for his material witness warrant.
C. Lazonia Baham 261. Lazonia Baham’s daughter’s boyfriend was murdered in February 2013. The
District Attorney’s Office charged a man named Isaac Jones with committing the murder. 262. Two investigators from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Baham’s home
to interview her about the case. Ms. Baham told the investigators that she had seen Mr. Jones around the corner on the day of the murder. By “around the corner,” Ms. Baham meant around the corner from her house.
263. After this conversation at her home, Ms. Baham spoke several times to investigator Michael Kitchens of the District Attorney’s Office. Repeatedly, Kitchens asked Ms. Baham questions about seeing Jones on the day of the murder. Each time Ms. Baham said that she did not see Jones near the scene of the murders; she saw him around the corner from her house.
14 Under Louisiana law, the District Attorney’s file is exempt from disclosure as a public record until the criminal conviction becomes final. Mr. Gray’s conviction became final on September 29, 2017. Undersigned counsel obtained the District Attorney’s file in the Gray case on October 3, 2017.
49

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 50 of 92
264. Ms. Baham told Kitchens that this was all she knew about the case. 265. On one call, Kitchens told Ms. Baham that if she refused to tell prosecutors what she knew, she could be arrested. 266. After this threat, Ms. Baham stopped taking calls from Kitchens. 267. Ms. Baham understood that Kitchens wanted her to provide specific testimony using specific words that did not match her recollection of events. 268. On information and belief, Kitchens took these actions at the request of Assistant District Attorney Jason Napoli. 269. Ms. Baham told the District Attorney’s Office that she would come to court if subpoenaed, but she was adamant that she would not change her story. 270. In the months that followed, Ms. Baham received several unlawful subpoenas demanding that she appear at the District Attorney’s Office. 271. On information and belief, these unlawful subpoenas were issued at the direction of Defendant Napoli. 272. Ms. Baham did not go to the private meetings at the District Attorney’s Office. 273. On October 13, 2015, Defendant Napoli made an application for a warrant asking the court to jail Ms. Baham as a material witness. In setting forth the factual basis for the warrant application, Defendant Napoli alleged that Ms. Baham “refused to meet with ADA Jason Napoli and cut off all communication with the District Attorney’s Office.” 274. The application did not allege that Ms. Baham had ever missed any court appearances nor told the District Attorney’s Office she would not come to court. Defendant Napoli withheld from the court that Ms. Baham had talked with him on multiple occasions, and
50

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 51 of 92
he omitted that she had told him that she planned to attend court. Based on Defendant Napoli’s representations, a warrant for her arrest was issued.
275. On December 29, 2015, officers from the New Orleans Police Department arrested Ms. Baham at her home. Ms. Baham was sick with the flu, and she was dressed in a bathrobe and slippers.
276. Ms. Baham spent the next eight days in jail. At Defendant Napoli’s request, and based on his representations, she was held without bond. Ms. Baham, who has a ninth-grade education and was in special education classes in school, did not understand why she had been arrested. She did not know whom to ask about why she was in jail or how to secure her release.
277. On January 6th, Ms. Baham was brought to court for the first time since she was arrested. Ms. Baham wore an orange jumpsuit and was shackled at her hands and feet.
278. On information and belief, Ms. Baham’s prolonged detention was the result of Defendant Napoli’s conduct. Defendant Napoli brought Ms. Baham to a small room behind the Section A courtroom to speak privately with him.
279. Once Ms. Baham and Defendant Napoli were alone, Defendant Napoli repeatedly asked Ms. Baham about seeing Jones near the scene of the murder. Ms. Baham repeated that she had not seen Jones near the scene of the murder; she had seen him near her home.
280. Ms. Baham told Defendant Napoli that she was willing to testify, but the only thing she knew was that she had seen Jones near her home on the day that her daughter’s boyfriend was killed.
281. Defendant Napoli seemed to want her to testify to something that she knew was not true.
282. Defendant Napoli then asked Ms. Baham if she knew what perjury was.
51

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 52 of 92
283. Ms. Baham was released on the evening of January 6, 2015. 284. Ms. Baham has since testified twice in pretrial proceedings in the Jones case. In her testimony, Ms. Baham stated that she had seen Jones near her home at the time of the murder, and not near the murder scene. 285. The Isaac Jones case has not yet gone to trial. Ms. Baham has appeared in court pursuant to several lawful subpoenas. 286. Until the news broke in April 2017, Ms. Baham did not know and had no reason to know that her subpoena was fraudulent. Nor was she aware of the factual basis given for the material witness warrant. D. Jane Doe 287. Jane Doe is the victim of molestation of a juvenile and child pornography involving a juvenile. 288. In September 2016, Assistant District Attorney Iain Dover and an investigator delivered a fraudulent subpoena to her home, where Ms. Doe lives with her mother. The document demanded that she appear at the District Attorney’s Office for questioning. 289. As a result of Defendant Dover’s persistent attempts to speak privately with her, Ms. Doe and her mother retained private counsel. 290. After Defendant Dover came to Ms. Doe’s home, an attorney for Ms. Doe faxed him a letter: “Please honor their right to privacy, their right to be left alone. They do not want to be badgered, bothered or harassed by anyone from law enforcement in any way.” The letter directed Defendant Dover to direct his questions to Ms. Doe’s attorney. 291. Defendant Dover did not leave Ms. Doe alone. Instead, even though Defendant Dover knew that the teenage victim was represented by counsel, an investigator from the District
52

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 53 of 92
Attorney’s Office working for Defendant Dover and accompanied by a uniformed police officer, appeared at the Ms. Doe’s high school, brandishing another document15 that demanded she appear for questioning at the District Attorney’s Office the next morning.
292. On information and belief, the investigator and uniformed police officer took these actions at the direction of Defendant Dover.
293. Ms. Doe was called out of class to accept the document in the principal’s office. Her fellow students were at lunch, and they stared as the uniformed police officer approached her. Ms. Doe tried not to cry in front of the other teenagers.
294. Embarrassed and exhausted, Ms. Doe asked her mother to pick her up early from school. Ms. Doe stayed home for the rest of the day.
295. When Ms. Doe did not come to the District Attorney’s Office on the following morning, Defendant Dover called her attorney and left a voicemail threatening that, if the victim did not arrive by 11 a.m., he would seek her arrest on a material witness warrant.
296. A hearing in the case was held that same day. Defendant Dover arrived at the hearing with a completed material witness warrant application asking the court to jail Ms. Doe.
297. Defendant Dover told the court that the Louisiana Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights required that he speak privately and outside of court with Ms. Doe. Ms. Doe’s attorney, David Anderson, feared that if his client did not attend the meeting, Defendant Dover would follow through on his repeated threats to secure a warrant for Ms. Doe’s arrest. As a result of Dover’s intimidation tactics, Anderson did not object. Anderson decided that the best strategy to avoid Ms. Doe’s arrest would be for Anderson to arrange a meeting with prosecutors at a more
15 Defendant Dover contends this document was a valid subpoena. No formal request for the subpoena—a requirement under Louisiana law—is included in the clerk’s record in the case. The record also does not include a signed order from the judge granting the subpoena.
53

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 54 of 92
convenient time. Ms. Doe did not want to meet with Defendant Dover, but on Anderson’s advice, she agreed to meet with him because she believed that she would be jailed if she did not.
298. Anderson informed the court that Ms. Doe would be willing to comply with the meeting. The court ordered Anderson to arrange a meeting for Ms. Doe to meet with prosecutors.
299. Ms. Doe met with Defendant Dover with counsel at the District Attorney’s Office. At the meeting, Defendant Dover humiliated and mocked her. Defendant Dover interrogated her about the offenses that victimized her, including a number of intimate questions. Ms. Doe cried during Defendant Dover’s questioning.
300. Despite the difficult and personal nature of the inquiry, Defendant Dover mocked Ms. Doe when she did not answer his questions. He mimicked what she said in a whinysounding voice. Ms. Doe was shaken and upset by the questioning and experience.
301. The defendant in the child pornography and child molestation case entered a guilty plea in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court in December 2017. His sentencing is set for February 23, 2018. Ms. Doe still does not wish to meet privately with prosecutors again unless lawfully compelled to do so.
302. As a result of her experiences with Defendant Dover, Ms. Doe is terrified to speak to law enforcement for any reason. She becomes anxious when she sees a police car or police uniform. When Ms. Doe hears an unexpected knock at her door, she runs into her mother’s room to hide.
303. Until the news broke in April 2017, Ms. Doe had no reason to know and did not know that the initial subpoena issued by the District Attorney’s Office was fraudulent, and that the second subpoena was unlawfully obtained and/or fraudulent.
54

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 55 of 92
E. Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix 304. Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix were potential witnesses in two different
murder cases. 305. Each received a fraudulent subpoena demanding a private meeting at the District
Attorney’s Office prior to trial. 306. Defendant Inga Petrovich issued a fraudulent subpoena demanding Ms. Bailey
appear at the District Attorney’s Office on March 16, 2017 for private interrogation in connection with a murder case.
307. Two investigators from the District Attorney’s Office came to Ms. Bailey’s home to deliver the document. The document that the investigators handed to Ms. Bailey was titled “SUBPOENA,” and it ordered her to come to the District Attorney’s Office on March 16, 2017 for a private meeting. The document threatened jail and fines for “failure to obey.”
308. One of the investigators told Ms. Bailey that if she did not come to the private meeting at the District Attorney’s Office, she could be sent to jail.
309. On information and belief, the investigators took these actions at the direction of Defendant Petrovich.
310. Ms. Bailey was terrified. She had never been to jail before. 311. The investigators asked Ms. Bailey to sign the document to acknowledge that she had received it. Ms. Bailey told them that she did not want to sign anything without consulting her attorney. 312. Ms. Bailey then retained and paid for a private attorney, Anthony J. Ibert, to challenge the fraudulent subpoena.
55

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 56 of 92
313. Shortly after Ms. Bailey retained Mr. Ibert, a representative from Defendant Cannizzaro’s Office called Ms. Bailey and again threatened her with jail time if she did not comply with the subpoena.
314. Ms. Bailey told the representative on the phone that she was represented by a lawyer, and that her lawyer had informed her that the subpoena was not legal.
315. The representative continued speaking to her even though she was represented by counsel. The representative told her that her lawyer was wrong, and that the only way she could avoid the appearance required by the subpoena was with a valid medical excuse, supported by documentation.
316. Because Ms. Bailey was apprehensive, given the language used in the subpoenas and the threats from prosecutors, she did not feel at liberty to travel or to leave the state until the purported subpoena was quashed.
317. Plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix received a fraudulent subpoena in November 2016. 318. The document was identical to the one that Ms. Bailey received, including the threat of fines or imprisonment for “failure to obey.” The fraudulent subpoena that Ms. LaCroix received was issued by Defendant Laura Rodrigue. 319. Ms. LaCroix did not want to report to the District Attorney’s Office for a private interrogation. The defendant in the criminal case was the father of Ms. LaCroix’s child. She did not want to be pressured to reveal private information about him unless she was compelled by law to do so. 320. Ms. Lacroix was scared at the possibility of going to jail. She had never been jailed in her life.
56

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 57 of 92
321. The designated time that the fraudulent subpoena directed Ms. Lacroix to appear at the District Attorney’s Office was also a problem. She works as a schoolteacher, and she was one of the few teachers certified to administer statewide standardized testing to students with special needs. The appointment demanded by the fraudulent subpoena would have required her to miss one of the testing days.
322. Like Ms. Bailey, Ms. LaCroix retained Anthony J. Ibert to challenge the fraudulent subpoena.
323. Because Ms. LaCroix was apprehensive, given the language used in the subpoenas and the threats from prosecutors, she did not feel at liberty to travel or to leave the state until the purported subpoena was quashed.
324. In both cases, Mr. Ibert filed motions to “quash” the fraudulent subpoenas. Because the documents were not legal documents, however, there was nothing to quash. In response to Mr. Ibert’s motions, which described the fraudulent nature of the documents, prosecutors withdrew them.
325. The defendants in both cases were ultimately convicted at trial. Prosecutors never called Ms. Bailey or Ms. LaCroix to testify.
F. John Roe 326. In the early morning hours of January 30, 2016, John Roe was attacked with an
AK-47 rifle. 327. The assailant threatened Mr. Roe, pointing the gun at him, and struck him several
times. 328. Mr. Roe escaped and fled on foot. 329. He then called the police and reported the assault.
57

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 58 of 92
330. When the police arrived, Mr. Roe provided details of the assault. 331. Michael Young was eventually arrested on this charge. 332. In the early morning hours of the day following Mr. Roe’s assault, his friend Gregory Young was murdered. Police soon focused the murder investigation on Michael Young, the same defendant charged with the assault of Mr. Roe. 333. Mr. Roe assisted and answered questions from police with respect to both the assault and murder investigations. 334. Mr. Roe provided his address, his phone number, and the name and phone number of his fiancée to the police. 335. No one suggested Mr. Roe may eventually have to testify in court. 336. After these interactions with police, Mr. Roe did not hear from anyone from the Police Department or the District Attorney’s Office for nearly 22 months. 337. Unbeknownst to Mr. Roe, starting in May 2017, the District Attorney’s Office attempted to serve a number of subpoenas for him to testify in court.16 338. None of those subpoenas were served. 339. Instead, at least four subpoena returns were filed by deputies from the Sheriff’s Department who attempted to serve them. Each was marked “incomplete address” or “subject moved.” 340. But according to court records, despite the deputies’ notes on the returns, prosecutors never attempted to have Mr. Roe served at a different address. 341. As of the present date, prosecutors or their agents have sent at least ten subpoenas to the defunct address.
16 The criminal case involving the murder of Gregory Young and the criminal case in which Mr. Roe is the victim are being tried together under the same case number.
58

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 59 of 92
342. Mr. Roe—who had no idea that prosecutors were attempting to serve him process—had moved into the home of his fiancée.
343. Both Mr. Roe and his fiancée had changed their phone numbers when they had switched carriers since his initial communications with police.
344. Nevertheless, Mr. Roe was not difficult to find, nor did he intend to be. 345. For example, Mr. Roe had provided his fiancée’s full name to the police, along with her phone number at the time. 346. Mr. Roe also maintains a Facebook account under his own name, as does his fiancée. 347. Neither Mr. Roe nor his fiancée received messages from anyone at the District Attorney’s Office or the police department on their Facebook accounts. 348. Mr. Roe never stated to the police or anyone at the District Attorney’s Office that he would not appear in court pursuant to a subpoena. 349. Nevertheless, on August 28, 2017, Assistant District Attorney Sarah Dawkins submitted an application for a material witness warrant to jail Mr. Roe. 350. Defendant David Pipes authorized Defendant Dawkins to pursue the warrant. 351. In the warrant application, the sole justification Defendant Dawkins provided was that prosecutors had been unable to reach Mr. Roe. 352. Defendant Dawkins’s application stated, “Attempts to reach [John Roe] at his home and by phone by members of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office have been unsuccessful. Messages left for [John Roe] have gone unanswered.” 353. This short statement was false and misleading in several respects.
59

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 60 of 92
354. First, neither Defendant Dawkins nor anyone else at the District Attorney’s Office left any phone message for Mr. Roe, and on information and belief, they could not have left messages, as the number the police had on file had been disconnected at that point. Defendant Dawkins knew or should have known this when she asked the court to jail Mr. Roe.
355. Second, Defendant Dawkins alleged that members of the District Attorney’s Office had attempted to reach Mr. Roe “at his home.” But as Defendant Dawkins knew or should have known, the address where service was attempted was not in fact Mr. Roe’s home because, as noted in case records dated as early as June 2017, he had moved.
356. Third, Defendant Dawkins intentionally omitted from the material witness warrant application that Mr. Roe had fully and voluntarily assisted police in their investigation.
357. At Defendant Dawkins’s request, and based on her representations, the court issued the warrant and set bond at $250,000.
358. On the evening of December 3, 2017, with no knowledge of the warrant or the unserved subpoenas that preceded it, Mr. Roe was pulled over in his car by police for a supposed traffic violation.
359. The police officers brought Mr. Roe to central lockup. An officer informed Mr. Roe that there was a warrant for his arrest and that he would stay in jail unless he paid a “sky high” secured money bond: $250,000.
360. Mr. Roe was stunned. He could not imagine why he had this warrant, especially with such a high money bond.
361. Mr. Roe was told to strip and put on an orange jumpsuit. 362. Mr. Roe still did not understand why he was being jailed. He called his fiancée and asked her to find out for him.
60

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 61 of 92
363. Mr. Roe’s fiancée looked up Mr. Roe’s case on a public database operated by the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office. She saw that he was jailed as a material witness, but she did not know what this meant.
364. When Mr. Roe’s fiancée saw that bond was set at $250,000, she began to weep. 365. The following morning, his fiancée was given contact information for a victim/witness counselor at the District Attorney’s Office. 366. Mr. Roe’s fiancée called the victim/witness counselor and asked why Mr. Roe was in jail and how she could help him get out. 367. The victim/witness counselor explained that she worked for Defendant Dawkins. Then, communicating on Defendant Dawkins’s behalf, she informed his fiancée that Mr. Roe had to “cooperate” in their case or he would have to stay in jail until the case went to trial. 368. When Mr. Roe’s fiancée begged for a solution, the victim/witness counselor stated that she would have to ask Defendant Dawkins. She reiterated that Mr. Roe had to “cooperate” or he would not be released. The victim/witness counselor did not explain what “cooperation” would entail. 369. On December 5, 2017, Mr. Roe was brought to court from the jail. 370. Mr. Roe was wearing the orange jumpsuit. He was shackled at his hands and feet, and metal chains were wrapped around his waist. He was humiliated and terrified. 371. Defendant Dawkins approached Mr. Roe. “I’ve got you now,” she said. 372. Defendant Dawkins told Mr. Roe that he would have to submit to electronic monitoring or she would not consent to his release from jail. 373. Mr. Roe agreed, and the court ordered him to submit to electronic monitoring. 374. On December 6th, Mr. Roe was released.
61

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 62 of 92
375. By this time, Mr. Roe had spent three days in jail. 376. Because he had missed work, Mr. Roe was fired from his job as a laborer with a cement company. 377. On or around December 6th, Mr. Roe met another hurdle when he attempted to set up his electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring cost $300 a month, plus fees to set up the monitoring. 378. Mr. Roe could not afford this amount, especially after missing work and being fired from his job. 379. Mr. Roe returned to court and told Defendant Dawkins that he could not afford to pay for the ankle monitor. 380. Defendant Dawkins told Mr. Roe that since he could not afford the ankle monitor, he would have to report to court once a week until Michael Young’s trial to check in with her. 381. After a brief hearing, Defendant Dawkins guided Mr. Roe and his fiancée out and spoke with them in the hallway outside of the courtroom. 382. Defendant Dawkins told Mr. Roe that if he failed to come to any check-in, he would go to jail. 383. Mr. Roe has reported to four of these required court appearances so far. 384. Each time, Mr. Roe has waited several hours for the check-in. 385. After these appearances, Defendant Dawkins regularly has held Mr. Roe outside of the courtroom to discuss the murder case. 386. During one of these meetings, Defendant Dawkins told Mr. Roe’s fiancée that she, too, was responsible for ensuring that he arrived at the check-in meetings, and that if she failed in this endeavor, she, too, would be jailed.
62

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 63 of 92
387. Defendant Dawkins has also told Mr. Roe that apart from the courthouse meetings, he must also meet with her at her office to discuss the case.
388. Mr. Roe does not want to speak with Defendant Dawkins in these private settings, but he does so because he is afraid of being jailed.
G. Silence Is Violence 389. Silence Is Violence was founded in January 2007 with a mission to advocate for
crime victims and safer communities. As its inaugural act, Silence Is Violence organized a march to New Orleans City Hall demanding better policy and leadership on the issue of violent crime.
390. In the two years that followed, Silence Is Violence offered programming focused on local policy advocacy and community engagement. The organization sponsored letter-writing campaigns, held forums for candidates for office to discuss criminal justice issues, and offered music classes for youth to create a peaceful, non-violent activity for children and their families to share.
391. Silence Is Violence hosted regular walks through New Orleans neighborhoods to build support against violent crime, and it hosted programs for awareness events, like the National Crime Victims’ Rights week.
392. Since Defendant Cannizzaro took office in 2009, Silence Is Violence leaders repeatedly received reports from victims and families that the prosecutors, investigators, and victim-witness advocates working for Defendant Cannizzaro use strong-arm tactics to pressure victims to speak outside of court with the prosecution and to corroborate the prosecution’s theory of the case—including threats to put crime victims in jail.
393. The new Cannizzaro administration’s practices dramatically reduced the number of victims who were willing to meet with prosecutors in private out-of-court settings. When
63

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 64 of 92
numerous Silence Is Violence clients and community members explained to its staff how the District Attorney’s Office had damaged their trust, common themes emerged.
394. Victims who feared violent retaliation for assisting prosecutors frequently felt that their concerns fell on deaf ears when they shared them at the District Attorney’s Office.
395. The office was reckless with witnesses’ names and identities, and its promises to provide physical protection and assistance frequently fell through.
396. Victims felt menaced and harassed by prosecutors, investigators, and victimwitness advocates from the District Attorney’s Office. The prosecutors, investigators, and advocates had shown up at their homes, jobs, and schools, raising questions about sensitive issues with their peers, their children, and their employers.
397. Plaintiff Marc Mitchell, a client of Silence Is Violence, received a call from a victim-witness advocate asking for the location of his uncle’s funeral. Mr. Mitchell’s cousin had also been a victim of the attempted murder, and the advocate wanted to find him at the funeral to ask him questions. Mr. Mitchell learned for the first time on the call with the advocate that his uncle had died.
398. As victims’ willingness to assist prosecutors outside of court decreased, dozens of Silence Is Violence clients were jailed or threatened with jail for declining to meet with prosecutors outside formal legal proceedings.
399. When that happens, Silence Is Violence responds by securing legal protection for the client and, if the client is jailed, advocating for and securing her release.
400. For example, Plaintiff Marc Mitchell’s family contacted Silence is Violence when Mr. Mitchell was arrested and jailed as a material witness. Silence Is Violence advocated for Mitchell’s release with the judge.
64

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 65 of 92
401. After Mr. Mitchell was released, the Executive Director of Silence Is Violence accompanied Mitchell to a meeting with the judge. Silence Is Violence staff advised Mr. Mitchell about his future dealings with the District Attorney’s Office to protect him from further harm, communicated with the District Attorney’s Office on Mr. Mitchell’s behalf, and accompanied him to two further meetings with prosecutors.
402. After Mr. Mitchell’s case had concluded, Silence Is Violence helped him secure treatment for the trauma that he experienced. The treatment addressed Mr. Mitchell’s experiences with the District Attorney’s Office.
403. In another case, a homicide witness approached Silence Is Violence after prosecutors had obtained a warrant for her arrest. A Silence Is Violence staff member contacted the District Attorney’s Office. The organization was assured that the warrant would be recalled as soon as the witness gave prosecutors a statement.
404. As a result of that assurance, the victim agreed to make a statement. The victim was afraid to stay in her own neighborhood in case of violent retaliation against her as a witness to a serious crime; Silence Is Violence rented a hotel room for her and informed the victimwitness advocate from the District Attorney’s Office where the victim was staying so that they could obtain the statement.
405. Shortly after disclosing the victim’s location to the District Attorney’s Office, police arrived at the hotel room and arrested the victim, who was pregnant at the time. Silence Is Violence spent the next several days advocating for the victim’s release.
406. Silence Is Violence recently assisted the alleged victim of a robbery and battery. The victim, who was an immigrant, identified a suspect in a police line-up. She later told the Assistant District Attorney on the case that she was not sure she had identified the right person.
65

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 66 of 92
The prosecutor told the victim that if she recanted the identification, she could be deported. Shortly after this conversation, two people from the District Attorney’s Office came to the victim’s home to reiterate this threat.
407. The victim approached Silence Is Violence for help. Silence Is Violence secured pro bono counsel to protect her from the deportation threats. Silence Is Violence also hired an interpreter so that the victim could communicate with counsel.
408. As a result of these experiences, the possibility that prosecutors may seek a material witness warrant through fraudulent means and engage in other forms of retaliation for the exercise of a victim’s First Amendment rights is now a major concern that has forced Silence Is Violence to change the way it structures its operations, allocates its resources, and manages victims’ relationships with the District Attorney’s Office.
409. For instance, Silence Is Violence does not recommend that victims or their family members appear at the District Attorney’s Office without a Silence Is Violence representative present. This representative’s role is not only to advocate for the victim, but to serve as a witness if the victim is threatened, including with perjury, obstruction, or a material witness warrant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity.
410. Silence Is Violence recommends to victims that before they meet with prosecutors, they ensure that they have no open criminal charges—including unpaid traffic tickets. Silence Is Violence makes this recommendation because, based on its observations, Defendant Cannizzaro’s administration routinely uses unrelated cases as leverage to coerce outof-court meetings with prosecutors and testimony favorable to the prosecution’s theory of the case.
66

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 67 of 92 411. When clients do have criminal records, Silence Is Violence takes the lead in
communicating with the District Attorney’s Office to insulate the victim or witness from potential threats.
412. This individual advocacy—particularly aimed at protecting crime victims against abuses of the subpoena and material witness warrant process by the District Attorney’s Office— has become a significant and outsized portion of Silence Is Violence’s work during the administration of Defendant Cannizzaro.
413. Resources once directed at Silence Is Violence’s core mission—public advocacy to protect victims and combat violent crime—must instead be devoted to ensuring that victims of crime are not victimized again by the District Attorney’s Office.
414. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the above Defendants were acting under color of state law.
67

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 68 of 92
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I:
Reliance on False Statements, Material Omissions, and Plainly Insufficient Facts in Applications for Material Witness Warrants in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Mitchell, Pipes, Napoli, Trummel, Hamilton, and Dawkins
in their individual capacities 415. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice, and custom of relying on false allegations, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual allegations in applications for material witness warrants violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, Mitchell, Roe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence’s clients. It poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, and Roe, and the rights of Silence Is Violence and its clients. 416. Acting pursuant to this policy, practice, and custom, Defendants Mitchell and Pipes violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Singleton; Defendant Napoli violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham; Defendant Trummel violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Mitchell; and Defendant Dawkins violated the clearly established rights of Plaintiff Roe. Plaintiff Baham faces an ongoing risk that Defendant Napoli will violate her rights in this way again. Plaintiff Roe faces an ongoing risk that Defendant Dawkins will violate his rights in this way again. 417. The Defendants included these false statements, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual allegations in warrant applications knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The warrants for Plaintiffs’ arrests would not have issued but for Defendants’ false statements and material omissions. Moreover, no reasonable prosecutor would
68

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 69 of 92
believe that the clearly insufficient grounds stated in arrest warrant applications could justify the arrest and detention of a witness or a victim of crime.
418. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
COUNT II: Unlawful Subpoenas Used to Seize Plaintiffs in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Mitchell, Napoli, Petrovich, Rodrigue, Dover, and Martin
in their individual capacities 419. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice, and custom of compelling witnesses to attend private meetings at the District Attorney’s Office by using unlawful subpoenas, accompanied by threats of arrest and imprisonment, violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Bailey, Lacroix, and Doe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence and its clients. It poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe and Plaintiff Baham, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence and its clients. 420. Acting pursuant to this official policy, practice, or custom, Defendant Petrovich acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Bailey; Defendant Rodrigue acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Lacroix; and Defendant Dover acted with deliberate indifference when violating the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe. Defendant Martin, acting with deliberate indifference, violated the clearly established rights of each of these plaintiffs by directly instructing prosecutors to engage in unlawful conduct. Plaintiff Doe and Plaintiff Baham face an ongoing risk that Defendants will violate their rights in this way again.
69

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 70 of 92
421. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
COUNT III: Compelled Speech and Retaliation for Constitutionally Protected Speech
in Violation of First Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Cannizzaro, Mitchell, Pipes, Doe, Napoli, Dover, Trummel, Hamilton, Petrovich, Rodrigue, Martin, and Dawkins in their individual capacities 422. Defendant Cannizzaro, acting in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney and an official policymaker for the District Attorney’s Office, maintains a policy, practice, and custom of foregoing legal court process and instead compelling witnesses to speak with prosecutors outside of court by issuing fraudulent subpoenas, threatening witnesses with fines and jail, seeking to jail witnesses who do not meet voluntarily with prosecutors, and leaving witnesses in jail for excessive periods of time. 423. As a direct consequence of Defendant Cannizzaro’s policy, practice, and custom, Plaintiffs Baham, Mitchell, Singleton, Doe, and Roe were each unconstitutionally compelled to speak to prosecutors. Plaintiffs Lacroix, Bailey, and Plaintiff Silence Is Violence and its clients were also injured by Defendant Cannizzaro’s policy, practice, and custom of compelling witnesses and victims to speak to prosecutors. Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, Roe, and Silence Is Violence face an ongoing risk that the District Attorney’s Office will violate their rights in this way again. 424. Defendant Cannizzaro also maintains an official policy, practice, and custom of retaliating against crime victims and witnesses who engage in certain constitutionally protected activity: (1) choosing not to speak voluntarily with prosecutors absent a lawful court order; and (2) resisting efforts by prosecutors to coerce false testimony that supports the prosecution’s
70

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 71 of 92
theory of the case. This retaliation includes threatening witnesses with jail, seeking to jail these witnesses, and leaving these witnesses in jail for excessive periods of time. This policy, practice, and custom would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercise of her constitutionally protected rights.
425. Plaintiffs Singleton, Mitchell, Baham, Bailey, LaCroix, Doe, Roe, and Silence Is Violence each suffered injury as a direct consequence of Defendant Cannizzaro’s policy, practice, and custom of unlawful retaliation. Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, Roe, and Silence Is Violence face an ongoing risk that the District Attorney’s Office will violate their rights in this way again.
426. Acting pursuant to these policies, practices, and customs, Defendants Mitchell, Pipes, and Doe violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Singleton; Defendant Napoli violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham, and she faces an ongoing risk that he or others at the District Attorney’s Office will do so again; Defendant Dover violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doe, and she faces an ongoing risk that he or others at the District Attorney’s Office will do so again; Defendants Trummel and Hamilton violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Mitchell; Defendant Petrovich violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Bailey; Defendant Rodrigue violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Lacroix; and Defendant Dawkins violated the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Roe, and he faces and ongoing risk that she or others at the District Attorney’s Office will do so again. Defendant Martin violated the First Amendment rights of each of these plaintiffs by directly instructing prosecutors to engage in unlawful conduct.
427. Defendant Cannizzaro, in his individual capacity, violated the rights of Silence Is Violence by threatening its Executive Director with prosecution for her public statements on behalf of the organization, thus chilling the organization’s expression of core political speech and
71

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 72 of 92
burdening its decisions about how to advise its individual clients about communications with prosecutors. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence faces an ongoing risk that Defendant Cannizzaro will violate its rights in this way again.
428. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to these Plaintiffs.
COUNT IV: Prolonged Detention in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity
and Defendant Napoli in his individual capacity 429. Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policy, practice and custom of causing individuals to be jailed without a prompt court appearance after an arrest on a material witness warrant violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of Plaintiff Baham and the rights of Silence is Violence and its clients, and poses and ongoing risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, and Roe, and the rights of Silence Is Violence and its clients. 430. Acting pursuant to policy, practice, and custom, Defendant Napoli acted with deliberate indifference when violating Plaintiff Baham’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff Baham faces a risk that Defendants will violate her rights in this way again. 431. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused Plaintiff Baham’s injuries and the injuries to Silence is Violence and its clients.
72

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 73 of 92
COUNT V: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Cannizzaro, Mitchell, Pipes, Doe, Napoli, Dover, Trummel, Hamilton, Petrovich, Rodrigue, Dawkins, and Martin in their individual capacities 432. Each of Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices and customs described above, separately and in combination, shocks the conscience and violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs and poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham, Plaintiff Doe, Plaintiff Roe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence and its clients. 433. Defendants’ unconstitutional acts directly and proximately caused compensable injury to Plaintiffs.
COUNT VI: Failure to Supervise, Train, or Discipline
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and
against Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes in their individual capacities
434. Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes failed to adequately train, supervise, and/or discipline Assistant District Attorneys and other agents at the District Attorney’s Office under their supervision, including all other individual Defendants, as to the unlawful conduct described in Counts I-V.
435. Defendant Cannizzaro acted and failed to act with gross negligence, recklessness, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights.
73

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 74 of 92
436. Defendant Cannizzaro’s conduct directly and proximately caused the deprivations of Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights, and also directly and proximately caused the Defendants and others to deprive Plaintiffs of those rights.
COUNT VII: Failure to Intervene
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against all Defendants in their individual capacities 437. Defendants, acting under color of state law and within the scope of their employment, knew or should have known that they and others within the District Attorney’s Office were violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as described in Counts I-V. 438. Defendants each had opportunities to intervene and prevent these violations but, acting with deliberate indifference, declined to do so. 439. Defendants’ failure to intervene violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. 440. Through their failure to intervene, Defendants directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
COUNT VIII: Abuse of Process under Louisiana Law Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Dover, Mitchell, Petrovich, Pipes, Napoli, Trummel, Hamilton, Rodrigue, Doe, Dawkins, and Martin in their individual capacities 441. Pursuant to Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices, and customs, as described in Counts I-V, prosecutors and other agents in the District Attorney’s Office willfully and maliciously abused the material witness statute for a purpose for which it was not designed:
74

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 75 of 92
to coerce private, out-of-court meetings with prosecutors and to coerce testimony consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case.
442. Pursuant to these same policies, prosecutors and other agents in the District Attorney’s Office willfully and maliciously abused the process for investigative subpoenas set forth in Article 66 of the Louisiana Rules of Criminal Procedure. By circumventing the requirements of Article 66, Defendants avoided court oversight of investigative subpoenas, and they used them not to investigate crimes pre-indictment, but to intimidate, coerce, and threaten witnesses after criminal proceedings have already been initiated.
443. Plaintiffs Singleton, Mitchell, Baham, Doe, Bailey, Lacroix, and Roe were injured by Defendants’ unlawful actions, as a direct consequence of Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices, and customs. Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, and Roe face a risk that Defendants will harm them in this way again.
444. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence was injured because it had to redirect its resources to remedy and prevent harms to its clients caused by the unlawful acts of the District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff Silence Is Violence faces a risk that Defendants will harm it in this way again.
445. Defendants’ acts and omissions directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. These injuries were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the abuse of process described herein.
446. Defendants engaged in these wrongful acts and omissions in the scope of their employment with the District Attorney’s Office.
75

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 76 of 92
COUNT IX: Fraud under Louisiana Law Against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and against Defendants Mitchell, Napoli, Petrovich, Rodrigue, Dover, Doe, and Martin in their individual capacities 447. As pled with specificity above, by creating, serving, and/or approving officialseeming “subpoenas,” Defendants conveyed the material misrepresentation that the “subpoenas” were real, had been obtained legitimately, and had to be honored by certain Plaintiffs under threat of fines and incarceration. 448. The Defendants made these misrepresentations with the intent to deceive Plaintiffs. 449. Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on the authenticity, truthfulness, and lawfulness of the fraudulent subpoenas. 450. Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, Doe, Bailey, LaCroix, and Silence Is Violence and its clients were injured by Defendants’ unlawful actions. Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, and Silence Is Violence face a risk that Defendants will harm them in this way in the future. 451. Defendants’ acts and omissions directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. These injuries were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the fraudulent acts described herein. 452. Defendants engaged in these wrongful acts and omissions in the scope of their employment with the District Attorney’s Office.
76

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 77 of 92
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief: A. Award compensatory damages to Plaintiffs and against all Defendants, jointly and
severally, in an amount to be determined at trial; B. Award punitive damages to Plaintiffs, and against all individual Defendants in
their individual capacities, in an amount to be determined at trial, that will deter such conduct by defendants in the future; C. Enter injunctive relief requiring Defendants to end the ongoing constitutional violations and violations of Louisiana law, equitable relief in the court’s discretion that ensures that the violations do not recur; D. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of Plaintiffs’ costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for all 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims; E. Order expungement of all records of the material witness warrants for Plaintiffs Singleton, Doe, Mitchell, Baham, and Roe; and F. For any and all other relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled and that the Court deems just and proper in its discretion.
77

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 78 of 92

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 2018,

/s/Anna Arceneaux Anna Arceneaux Admitted pro hac vice American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 201 West Main Street, Suite 402 Durham, NC 27701 Tel. (919) 682-5159 aarceneaux@aclu.org
/s/Somil Trivedi Admitted pro hac vice American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 915 15th Street NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 715-0802 strivedi@aclu.org

/s/Katherine Chamblee-Ryan Katherine Chamblee-Ryan* Alec Karakatsanis Admitted pro hac vice Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel. (202) 656-5198 katie@civilrightscorps.org alec@civilrightscorps.org
/s/Bruce Hamilton Bruce Hamilton La. Bar No. 33170 ACLU Foundation of Louisiana New Orleans, LA 70156 Tel. (504) 522-0628 bhamilton@laaclu.org

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
*Not licensed in the District of Columbia, practice subject to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(8), with supervision by Alec Karakatsanis, a member of the D.C. Bar.

78

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 79 of 92
Appendix A

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 80 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 81 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 82 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 83 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 84 of 92
Appendix B

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 85 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 86 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 87 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 88 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 89 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 90 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 91 of 92

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 52 Filed 01/25/18 Page 92 of 92
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 24th day of January, 2018, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and that service will be provided through the CM/ECF system.
/s/ Katherine Chamblee-Ryan Katherine Chamblee-Ryan

 
 Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 52

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RENATA SINGLETON ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 17-10721

LEON CANNIZZARO ET AL.

SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND At its core, this lawsuit alleges that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office unlawfully compelled victims and witnesses of crimes to cooperate with prosecutors. Those who failed to comply with prosecutors’ requests were allegedly threatened, harassed, and, in some cases, jailed. Plaintiffs in this case include eight people—victims of and witnesses to crimes—and an organization that advocates on behalf of crime victims. The primary tool that prosecutors allegedly used to compel cooperation was a document manufactured by the District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) to look like a court-ordered subpoena that was, in fact, nothing more than an invitation by prosecutors to meet with them outside of court. Prosecutors often threatened witnesses with jail time for failure to comply with these
1

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 2 of 52
“subpoenas.”1 Because the “subpoenas” were not actually approved by a judge, but instead were engineered by prosecutors, the documents did not give anyone the authority to fine or jail witnesses who failed to appear. Nevertheless, prosecutors often followed up on their threats by asking judges to jail witnesses on material witness warrants.2
The Plaintiffs allege that the DA’s Office operated this system for years, and it was not until The Lens published an exposé about the issue in the spring of 2017 that the practice became widely known.3 Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro and his office faced intense public criticism after the practice was publicly exposed.4 Armed with knowledge of the alleged scheme, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in this Court on October 17, 2017.5 A few months later, on January 25, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.6 Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief for alleged violations of federal and state law by the Defendants. The federal claims include violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Louisiana state law claims include allegations of abuse of process and fraud.
The Plaintiffs in this suit include Renata Singleton, Marc Mitchell, Lazonia Baham, Jane Doe, Tiffany LaCroix, Fayona Bailey, John Roe, and Silence is Violence (“SIV”), a non-profit victim advocacy group based in Orleans
1 The “fake subpoenas” described in the pleadings and briefs in this matter are referred to as “subpoenas” in quotation marks throughout this Order and Reasons.
2 See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:257. A material witness warrant, which must be signed by a judge, allows prosecutors to arrest and jail uncooperative witnesses who are “essential” to a case after it has been shown that “it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the [witness] by subpoena . . .” Id. The witness must remain jailed until either he appears in court and posts bail or testifies in the criminal matter so as to moot the alleged noncooperation. Id.
3 See Doc. 52 at 17. 4 See id. at 17–18. 5 Doc. 1. 6 Doc. 52.
2

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 3 of 52
Parish. The Defendants, all prosecutors at the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, include Cannizzaro, First Assistant District Attorney Graymond Martin, Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Trials David Pipes, and Assistant District Attorneys Iain Dover, Jason Napoli, Arthur Mitchell, Tiffany Tucker, Michael Trummel, Matthew Hamilton, Inga Petrovich, Laura Rodrigue, Sarah Dawkins, and John Doe.7 For context, the allegations underlying the claims of each of the Plaintiffs are described below.
Plaintiff Renata Singleton was the victim in a domestic violence incident in 2014 involving her ex-boyfriend, Vernon Crossley. Singleton alleges that the DA’s Office sent her two “subpoenas” after she told a victim-witness advocate that she did not want to pursue charges against Crossley or participate in any prosecution of him. Acting on the advice of a friend in law enforcement who told Singleton she had not been properly served because the “subpoenas” were left at her door, Singleton did not comply with the requests in the “subpoenas.” In response, Defendant ADA Mitchell sought a material witness warrant for Singleton. A judge granted Mitchell’s request, and Singleton spent five days in jail on a $100,000 bond before ultimately being released.
Plaintiff Marc Mitchell was shot in 2014 while playing basketball with his nephews. He testified against Jonterry Bernard, the shooter. Bernard was convicted on a charge of attempted murder and sentenced to prison. The DA’s Office also charged another man, Gerard Gray, with attempted murder in the shooting on the theory that Gray ordered Bernard to shoot Mitchell. In multiple meetings with prosecutors, Mitchell told the prosecutors that he did not know whether Gray ordered Bernard to shoot him. According to Mitchell, prosecutors continued to question him about his recollection of the events
7 This Court will use the term “Individual Defendants” to refer to all the ADAs plus Cannizzaro insofar as Plaintiffs make claims against him in his individual capacity.
3

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 4 of 52
leading up to the shooting. Mitchell ultimately quit cooperating with the prosecutors, and ADA Trummel and ADA Hamilton worked together to have a material witness warrant issued for Mitchell’s arrest. Police arrested Mitchell in the lobby of the hotel where he worked, and he spent a day in jail on a $50,000 bond before being released.
Plaintiff Lazonia Baham was wanted for questioning by the DA’s office in the 2013 killing of her daughter’s boyfriend. Baham alleges that prosecutors wanted her to testify that she saw Isaac Jones, the defendant in the murder case, near the scene of the murder. She repeatedly told prosecutors that she only saw Jones near her house, not near the murder scene. Baham ultimately stopped taking calls from the DA’s office, and ADA Napoli sought a material witness warrant for her arrest. Police arrested Baham a few days after Christmas Day in 2015 while she was sick. She spent a total of eight days jailed on the warrant before being released.
Plaintiff Jane Doe was the victim of molestation of a juvenile and child pornography. Doe alleges that the DA’s Office in 2016 delivered a “subpoena” to her home demanding that she appear at their office to meet with prosecutors. Doe ultimately complied with their request after ADA Dover allegedly threatened Doe at her high school and later arrived in court with a material witness warrant application threatening to jail Doe.
Plaintiffs Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix were potential witnesses in different murder cases who allegedly received “subpoenas” from the DA’s Office. Both ultimately hired a lawyer to challenge the “subpoenas,” and their challenges were successful. Plaintiffs allege that ADA Petrovich sent the “subpoena” to Bailey around March 2017, and that ADA Rodrigue sent the “subpoena” to LaCroix in November 2016.
4

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 5 of 52
Plaintiff John Roe was attacked with a rifle in January 2016, and Roe’s friend was murdered the next day. Police identified Michael Young as the suspect in both the attack on Roe and the murder of Roe’s friend. Investigators questioned Roe about the incidents, and he cooperated with them. Although Roe provided police with his contact information at the time, he later moved and changed his phone number. Numerous subpoenas were sent to Roe’s former address, but he alleges that he did not receive them. Nevertheless, Roe alleges that he was “not difficult to find” at the time because he maintains a Facebook account under his name.8 Having failed to reach Roe, ADA Dawkins in August 2017 applied for a material witness warrant seeking Roe’s arrest. A judge granted the request, and Roe spent three days in jail before being released.
Plaintiff SIV alleges that it has been threatened by Cannizzaro on multiple occasions and that it has been forced to alter the focus of its organizational mission—from generally advocating for victims of violent crime to protecting those same victims from zealous prosecutors—because of the DA’s Office’s use of “subpoenas” and other intimidating tactics.
On March 1, 2018, the Defendants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the claims of all Plaintiffs under Rule 12(b)(6).9 The Defendants argue first that many of the Individual Defendants enjoy absolute immunity for the claims asserted against them. To the extent that any of the Individual Defendants’ conduct is not absolutely immune from civil suit, Defendants argue that they enjoy qualified immunity. Defendants further argue that many claims are prescribed, and finally, for any remaining claims, that Plaintiffs fail to state a
8 Doc. 52 at 59. 9 See Doc. 63.
5

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 6 of 52
claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs oppose. Oral argument was held before this Court on May 9, 2018.
LEGAL STANDARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”10 A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”11 A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”12 A court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.13 To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claims are true.14 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the claim.15
LAW AND ANALYSIS This Court will first address the extent to which the Individual Defendants enjoy absolute immunity from federal law claims by Plaintiffs other than SIV before turning to whether any of the remaining federal claims by those same Plaintiffs are barred by qualified immunity.16 The Court will
10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
11 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 12 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678. 14 Id. 15 Lormand, 565 F.3d 228 at 255–57. 16 To the extent that this Court finds that any of the Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional
violation for qualified immunity purposes, this Court will note that such a finding defeats Defendants’ 12(b)(6) challenges to the same claims.
6

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 7 of 52
then analyze Defendants’ 12(b)(6) challenges to those remaining federal claims by all Plaintiffs except SIV. Next, the Court will turn to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs’ state law claims and SIV’s federal and state claims. Finally, the Court will consider Defendants’ argument that many of Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. I. Absolute Immunity
Defendants argue that virtually all of Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages are barred by absolute immunity.17 Because determining whether a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity turns on “the nature of the function performed” by the prosecutor,18 this Court must analyze the “specific activities that give rise to the cause of action.”19 In other words, absolute immunity attaches to specific conduct, not specific claims.20 If specific conduct is protected by absolute immunity, and that same conduct forms either a crucial foundation for or the entire basis of certain claims, a finding of absolute immunity may well defeat certain claims on a 12(b)(6) motion.
Plaintiffs identify five categories of conduct performed by the Individual Defendants that form the basis of their claims.21 The categories include: (1) the creation and use of “subpoenas” to induce witnesses to meet with prosecutors outside of court; (2) verbal and written threats made to witnesses; (3) the misuse of material witness arrest warrants for investigative ends; and (4) the
17 See Doc. 63. 18 Loupe v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). 19 Loughlin v. Tweed, No. 15-649, 2015 WL 3646777, at *5 (E.D. La. June 10, 2015) (Feldman,
J.) (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 259). 20 See Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Absolute immunity is not
a rigid, formal doctrine, but attaches to the functions a prosecutor performs.”). 21 See Doc. 67 at 16.
7

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 8 of 52
failure to supervise.22 This Court will analyze whether each type of conduct is covered by absolute immunity.
a. An Overview of Absolute Immunity In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman extended the common law doctrine of absolute immunity to prosecutors.23 Under Imbler, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 claims seeking damages from individuals that arise from prosecutorial conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”24 “Thus, ‘the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.’”25 On the one hand, “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune for initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, for actions taken in her role as ‘advocate for the state’ in the courts, or when her conduct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”26 “On the other hand, a prosecutor is afforded only qualified immunity for acts performed in the course of ‘administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.’”27 The Individual Defendants bear the burden of proving
22 Doc. 67 at 16. Plaintiffs identify the prolonged detention of material witnesses as a fifth category of conduct that forms the basis of some of their claims. Because this Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim on which relief could be granted with regard to their prolonged detention claims, it need not decide whether prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the conduct underlying those claims. In any event, prosecutors would enjoy qualified immunity with regard to these claims because Plaintiffs have failed to allege a constitutional violation committed by the prosecutors.
23 424 U.S. 409, 427–29 (1976). 24 Loupe, 824 F.3d at 538 (5th Cir. 2016) (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). 25 Id. at 538–39 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). 26 Id. at 539 (quoting Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 439 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 775–76 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270. 27 Loupe, 824 F.3d at 539 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273).
8

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 9 of 52
that the “the conduct at issue served a prosecutorial function” such that it is
covered by absolute immunity.28
Two points bear mentioning here. First, absolute immunity only protects
individuals from claims for damages.29 Thus, it does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims
for damages and injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his official capacity,
nor does it bar claims against the Individual Defendants for injunctive relief.
Second, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Knapper v. Connick held that
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity against state law claims in addition to
the immunity they enjoy from § 1983 claims.30 The full scope of absolute
prosecutorial immunity under Louisiana law is not clear,31 but the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Knapper cited heavily to federal law in its decision and
adopted the functional approach that federal courts employ when analyzing
prosecutorial absolute immunity issues.32 For this reason, any conduct for
which prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity in this case will apply equally to
Plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims.
28 Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe Cty., Tex., 591 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274).
29 See Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The rule in this circuit is that a Louisiana district attorney, sued in his or her official capacity, is a local government official who is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Neither absolute nor qualified personal immunity extends to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983.”) (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984)).
30 See Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 950–51 (La. 1996) (holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from state law malicious prosecution claims); State v. King, 956 So. 2d 562, 572 (La. 2007) (J. Weimer, concurring) (“A district attorney is granted broad civil immunity.”) (citing Knapper, 681 So. 2d at 950).
31 See Lester v. Caddo Par., No. 15-2008, 2016 WL 6270767, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 26, 2016) (suggesting that the Louisiana Supreme Court merely “adopted the federal rules for absolute immunity for prosecutors” in Knapper); Spikes v. Phelps, 131 F. App’x 47, 49 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether its state law doctrine of prosecutorial absolute immunity distinguishes between individual and official capacity claims).
32 See Knapper, 681 So. 2d at 946–51 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 259; Burns; 500 U.S. at 478).
9

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 10 of 52
b. Functional Absolute Immunity Analysis for Each Category of Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct i. Creation and Use of “Subpoenas”
Plaintiffs Singleton, Doe, LaCroix, and Bailey allege that some of the Individual Defendants created and delivered to them documents manufactured to look like subpoenas that had not been approved by a judge.33 Defendants argue that absolute immunity shields prosecutors from liability for such conduct because the prosecutors performed it as part of trial preparations in active cases against criminal defendants—a quintessential prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity.34 Plaintiffs respond that the Individual Defendants should not enjoy absolute immunity for such conduct because it is actually “investigative,” not prosecutorial, and regardless the conduct occurred while the Defendants “were acting outside of their authority as prosecutors.”35
In Loupe v. O’Bannon, the Fifth Circuit held that a prosecutor did not enjoy absolute immunity for ordering the warrantless arrest of a witness just moments after a judge had refused to jail the same witness.36 The court reasoned that such conduct was not protected by absolute immunity because it was “not intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
33 See Doc. 52. See also Doc. 52 at 83 (example of a “subpoena”). 34 See Doc. 63-1 at 32. The Defendants attach minute entries from state court proceedings to
filings in this case to show that the “subpoenas” were all issued after the initial trial date in each underlying criminal prosecution. See Docs. 63-4, 63-9, 88-3. The entries support Defendants’ contention except in Baham’s case, but the order of Baham’s allegations in the Amended Complaint nevertheless suggests that the relevant conduct by prosecutors also took place after an initial trial setting had passed in the underlying criminal prosecution against Isaac Jones. See Doc. 52 at 49–52. In any event, this Court takes judicial notice of the minute entries, matters of public record, without converting Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. See Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). 35 See Doc. 67 at 17. See also Loupe, 824 F.3d at 540 (noting that absolute immunity for prosecutors does not extend to conduct performed “outside the judicial process”). 36 See Loupe, 824 F.3d at 536, 540.
10

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 11 of 52
process.”37 To support its reasoning in Loupe, the Fifth Circuit cited approvingly to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lacey v. Maricopa County.38 In Lacey, the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutor who issued subpoenas to grand jury witnesses without receiving proper authorization from a court or grand jury for the subpoenas was not entitled to absolute immunity for liability stemming from such conduct.39 The court in Lacey reasoned that a prosecutor should not enjoy immunity when he “avoided taking the steps that would have protected him from suit, perhaps precisely to avoid the scrutiny of the grand jury or the court.”40 The court explained further, “[w]here the prosecutor has side-stepped the judicial process, he has forfeited the protections the law offers to those who work within the process.”41
Like the prosecutors in Loupe and Lacey, Individual Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, Pipes, Mitchell, Napoli, Petrovich, Rodrigue, and Dover side-stepped the judicial process to the extent that they created and disseminated “subpoenas” to compel witnesses to meet with them outside of court. Article 66 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure allows prosecutors to seek a subpoena from a court ordering a witness to meet with the prosecutor for questioning.42 A prosecutor need only show “reasonable grounds” to justify the subpoena’s issuance.43 The power to issue the subpoena, however, rests entirely with the court.44 The statute preserves the court’s discretion over the issuance of a subpoena by stating that the court “may order”
37 Id. at 540. 38 See id. at 540. (citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 914 (9th Cir. 2012)). 39 Lacey, 693 F.3d at 913–14. 40 Id. at 914. 41 Id. 42 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 66. 43 Id. 44 Id.
11

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 12 of 52
that the subpoena be issued.45 If a subpoena is issued, it is the clerk of court, not the prosecutor, who issues it.46 The comments to the article note that the common practice before the adoption of the article was for district attorneys to issue notices for questioning that could only be enforced through the threat of further action, such as a grand jury subpoena.47 There is no suggestion in the statute that prosecutors now have, or have ever had, the power to issue subpoenas themselves.48
Allegations that the Individual Defendants purported to subpoena witnesses without court approval, therefore, describe more than a mere procedural error or expansion of authority. Rather, they describe the usurpation of the power of another branch of government. The “subpoena template” allegedly disseminated by First ADA Martin includes language that the recipient is “Hereby Notified pursuant to LSA-CCRP art. 66 to appear before the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans.”49 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ entire scheme operated outside of the process legally required by the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.50 To find that such ultra vires conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” would give no meaning to the “judicial phase” element of the standard.51
Furthermore, that the alleged activity by the Individual Defendants took place as a means to a prosecutorial end is not dispositive of the issue.
45 Id. 46 Id. 47 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 66 cmt. (a). 48 See La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 92-366 at 2 (June 23, 1992) (“[O]nly a court, a Clerk of court or
a coroner have authority under Louisiana law to issue subpoenas. A district attorney may only request that a subpoena be issued. Therefore . . . a district attorney has no authority to issue any type of subpoena . . .”). 49 Doc. 52 at 83. 50 See id. 51 See Loupe, 824 F.3d at 540.
12

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 13 of 52
Under that logic, virtually all activity engaged in by a prosecutor would be absolutely immune from civil liability. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected expanding prosecutorial absolute immunity so broadly, noting in Burns v. Reed that “[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive.”52 When it comes to absolute immunity for prosecutors, “it is the interest in protecting the proper functioning of the office, rather than the interest in protecting its occupant, that is of primary importance.”53 This Court finds that granting the Individual Defendants absolute immunity for allegations of systematic fraud that bypassed a court meant to check powerful prosecutors would not protect the proper functioning of a district attorney’s office. It would instead grant prosecutors a license to bypass the most basic legal checks on their authority. The law does not grant prosecutors such a license.
In Imbler, the Supreme Court justified expanding the common law doctrine of absolute immunity to prosecutors by stating,
It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials. Frequently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation.54 The allegation that Defendant Martin disseminated a template of a “subpoena” throughout the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office undermines any
52 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991). 53 Loupe, 824 F.3d at 538 (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997)). 54 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425.
13

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 14 of 52
suggestion that Plaintiffs’ allegations were the result of “serious constraints of time.”55 This is not the type of conduct absolute immunity is meant to protect.
The Supreme Court in Imbler further reasoned that “[t]he affording of only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor also could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system.”56 Here, however, it was prosecutors alleged misconduct that Plaintiffs say affected the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.57 As Justice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, “[w]here the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly be ‘monstrous to deny recovery.’”58 This is just such a scenario. As such, the Individual Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged role in creating or delivering “subpoenas” to victims and witnesses of crimes.
ii. Threatening Witnesses The second type of conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ claims involves “the use of verbal and written threats to gain access to witnesses outside of court and to influence witnesses’ testimony.”59
1. Verbal Threats of Imprisonment by ADAs to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs argue that threats of imprisonment allegedly made by several of the Individual Defendants to several of the Plaintiffs should not be protected by absolute immunity.60 Defendants respond that absolute immunity extends
55 See Doc. 52 at 11–12, 80–82. 56 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426. 57 Doc. 52 at 66 (“Silence Is Violence does not recommend that victims or their family
members appear at the District Attorney’s Office without a Silence Is Violence representative present. This representative’s role is not only to advocate for the victim, but to serve as a witness if the victim is threatened, including with perjury, obstruction, or a material witness warrant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity.”). 58 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 445 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 59 Doc. 67 at 16. 60 See id. at 18–19.
14

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 15 of 52
to the preparation of witnesses for criminal prosecutions, which includes ensuring those such witnesses show up to testify at trial.61
Unlike the ultra vires creation and issuance of “subpoenas,” generalized threats of imprisonment made by prosecutors do not necessarily fall so far outside the criminal phase of the judicial process to warrant denial of absolute immunity for such threats. Although the distinction is an admittedly fine one, threatening to imprison a witness to compel cooperation in a criminal prosecution while possessing the lawful means to follow through on that threat is not the same as manufacturing documents in violation of the lawful process for obtaining court-approved subpoenas for witnesses. Threatening witnesses—particularly verbally—with imprisonment to further witness cooperation in an active criminal prosecution seems to this Court to fall into the category of “pursuing a criminal prosecution” as an “advocate for the state.”62 Holding that such conduct fell outside the protections of absolute immunity would, in fact, potentially subject prosecutors to civil liability for exercising authority they lawfully possess under the law of Louisiana and many other states. The resulting restriction of prosecutorial discretion is exactly the type of concern the Supreme Court expressed when it first addressed the issue of absolute immunity for prosecutors under § 1983 in Imbler.63
This is the result of applying a doctrine that at times “leave[es] unaddressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers” as an alternative to “subject[ing] those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”64 For these reasons, the Individual Defendants are absolutely
61 See Doc. 88 at 7. 62 See Loupe, 824 F.3d at 539. 63 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–29. 64 Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir. 1949)).
15

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 16 of 52
immune for threats of imprisonment made to Plaintiffs in active criminal prosecutions.
2. Verbal Threats by Cannizzaro to SIV Separately, Plaintiff SIV asserts claims for damages against Defendant Cannizzaro in his individual capacity based on allegations that he threatened to prosecute SIV’s executive director for obstruction of justice or witness coercion if she continued to encourage witnesses and victims to not cooperate with prosecutors. “The decision to initiate . . . criminal charges is at the core of the prosecutorial function.”65 Because the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Cannizzaro “sought to ‘persuade’ with [his] prosecutorial power,” absolute prosecutorial immunity applies to that alleged conduct.66
iii. Use of Material Witness Warrants The third type of alleged prosecutorial misconduct involves allegations that prosecutors lied in material witness warrant applications.67 In a case decided months after the parties’ briefed this Motion to Dismiss, the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Harris County considered whether prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity when applying for material witness warrants.68 The court held that “the appearance of witnesses for trial is intimately associated with a prosecutor’s advocacy,” and thus prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from claims related to such conduct.69 Because that is the exact type of conduct
65 McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984). 66 Id. 67 See Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A material witness
warrant serves the purpose of securing a witness’s presence at a trial or grand jury proceeding.”); Cooks v. Rapides Par. Indigent Def. Bd., 686 So. 2d 63, 65–66 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1996) (noting that the purpose of Louisiana’s material witness statute is “to provide a procedure to prevent a material witness from removing himself from or from being taken from the jurisdiction of the court and to insure testimony from a material witness”). 68 See Doe v. Harris Cty., Texas, No. 18-20270, 2018 WL 6039171, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018). 69 Id. (citing Harris v. Dallas Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 196 F.3d 1256 (5th Cir. 1999)).
16

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 17 of 52
from which Plaintiffs’ claims arise here, the Individual Defendants enjoy absolute immunity for this alleged conduct.
iv. Failure to Supervise Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes individually liable for supervising assistant district attorneys in a way that allowed constitutional violations to flourish, and Plaintiffs seek to hold all Individual Defendants liable for their failure to intervene in the matter. Supervising prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for claims arising from allegations that they failed to properly train or prevent unlawful conduct when the underlying conduct would be protected by absolute immunity.70 This Court believes that the same rule should extend to claims of failure to intervene. Therefore, Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes are absolutely immune from damages for their failure to supervise all conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ claims except the creation and issuance of “subpoenas.” For the reasons explained above, the Individual Defendants enjoy absolute immunity for claims seeking damages based on alleged: (1) verbal threats of imprisonment made to Plaintiffs and verbal threats of criminal prosecution made to SIV’s director; (2) misstatements or omissions in applications for material witness warrants and general abuses of the material witness warrant process; and (3) failures to supervise or intervene in the aforementioned conduct. The Individual Defendants are not absolutely immune for claims seeking damages based on allegations of: (1) creating or issuing “subpoenas” to Plaintiffs and (2) failures to supervise or intervene in the aforementioned conduct.
70 See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 345–48 (2009).
17

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 18 of 52
II. Qualified Immunity Defendants argue that to the extent their conduct is not covered by
absolute immunity, it is covered by qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court will now analyze whether the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from claims for which they do not enjoy absolute immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”71 “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”72 The Supreme Court does “not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”73 The Court has instructed lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”74
a. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Subpoena Claims Plaintiffs LaCroix, Bailey, and Doe allege that Defendants Dover, Petrovich, Rodrigue, and Martin violated the Fourth Amendment by compelling the Plaintiffs to meet with them outside of court through the use of “subpoenas.”75 Defendants argue that they enjoy qualified immunity for the conduct alleged in these claims because Plaintiffs were not “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes.76 Even if seizures occurred, Defendants argue, because
71 Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
72 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
73 Id. at 741. 74 Id. at 742. 75 See Doc. 52 at 69. The same claims also are made against Cannizzaro in his official capacity. 76 See Doc. 63-1 at 32–35.
18

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 19 of 52
the law was not clear at the time of the alleged conduct regarding whether a potential witness in a criminal case has a right to refuse to meet with prosecutors, qualified immunity should still apply.
“There is a clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”77 Nevertheless, a “seizure” must in fact occur for a violation to exist.78 “A person is ‘seized’ for Fourth Amendment purposes ‘when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the citizen.’”79 “A seizure occurs ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that they were not free to leave.’”80 Even voluntary submissions to a show of state authority can constitute seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes.81
i. Plaintiffs Bailey and LaCroix Bailey alleges that ADA Petrovich seized her in violation of the Fourth Amendment by issuing a “subpoena” that demanded she meet with prosecutors, which forced Bailey to hire a private attorney to challenge the “subpoena.”82 Bailey alleges that she did not feel at liberty to travel until the “subpoena” was dealt with.83 LaCroix makes similar claims against ADA Rodrigue.84 The Defendants respond that neither Bailey nor LaCroix was ever seized for Fourth Amendment purposes because neither Plaintiff ever complied
77 Heaney, 846 F.3d at 801 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981)). See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
78 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 79 McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16). 80 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)). 81 Id. at 691–94 (collecting cases) (holding that voluntary surrender to arrest warrants at a
sheriff’s office constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes). 82 See Doc. 52 at 55. 83 See id. at 56. 84 See id. at 56–57. The Plaintiffs also claim ADA Martin violated the Fourth Amendment by
instructing ADAs to use the “subpoenas.” See id. at 69.
19

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 20 of 52
with the “subpoena.” That is, neither Plaintiff ever met with prosecutors after receiving a “subpoena.”
Plaintiffs cite to no authority suggesting that the mere delivery of a document purporting to require a meeting with prosecutors constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.85 Substantial case law indicates that such conduct likely does not rise to the level of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.86 As such, Plaintiffs have failed to show that a constitutional violation occurred. Even if Plaintiffs’ apprehension of travel caused by the issuance of the “subpoena” constituted a seizure, the Individual Defendants still would enjoy qualified immunity on these claims because Plaintiffs fail to show that witnesses to crimes possess a clearly established constitutional right to refuse to speak with prosecutors.
Further, refusing to appear does not qualify as a seizure. Although a seizure may occur absent physical force, no matter the circumstances, “submission to [an] assertion of authority is necessary.”87 Here, Plaintiffs argue they “submitted” to the prosecutors’ show of authority—the “subpoenas”—by hiring an attorney to challenge the documents.88 But disputing a show of authority does not involve submission. Plaintiffs’ challenge
85 The only case referenced by Plaintiffs in this regard is California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), which is distinguishable from this case. Doc. 67 at 38.
86 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625–29 (suggesting that a seizure cannot occur where a plaintiff fails to comply with an official’s show of authority); Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he issuance of a citation, even under threat of jail if not accepted, does not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure.”); Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Terry cannot be read to mean that the issuance of a summons (any more than a testimonial subpoena or a call to jury duty) would constitute a seizure simply because it threatens a citizen with the possibility of confinement if he fails to appear in court.”).
87 McLin, 866 F.3d at 691 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
88 Doc. 67 at 38–39 (“Plaintiffs submitted to the fraudulent subpoenas by treating them as they would real ones and undertaking the time, expense, and travel necessary to hire an attorney to challenge them.”).
20

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 21 of 52
to the “subpoena” represented a show of defiance, the antithesis of submission. Accordingly, because neither Baham nor LaCroix was ever physically confined, nor did they ever submit to prosecutors’ show of authority, their Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Thus, the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from claims for monetary damages by Plaintiffs Bailey and LaCroix alleging that their receipt of “subpoenas” violated their Fourth Amendment rights.89
ii. Plaintiff Doe Unlike Bailey and LaCroix, Plaintiff Doe eventually met with prosecutors after allegedly receiving two “subpoenas.” The meeting, however, occurred pursuant to a court order, not in response to the receipt of a “subpoena.”90 The question, then, is whether Doe’s submission to the court’s show of authority was unlawful. The allegations made by Doe, however, focus on the show of authority by prosecutors, not the court. Doe has thus failed to allege a Fourth Amendment violation by prosecutors in this regard, and the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from this claim.91 b. First Amendment Claims
i. Compelled Speech Claims Plaintiffs Baham, Mitchell, Singleton, Doe, and Roe allege that they were compelled to speak with prosecutors against their will by the Defendants in violation of the First Amendment.92 Additionally, Plaintiffs Bailey and
89 Because Plaintiffs Bailey and LaCroix fail to allege a constitutional violation in this regard, they also have failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim based on the alleged receipt of “subpoenas” upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.
90 See Doc. 52 at 54 (“The court ordered [Doe’s attorney] to arrange a meeting for Ms. Doe to meet with prosecutors.”).
91 Because the Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that Cannizzaro had a policy of using “subpoenas” in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of witnesses and victims of crimes, Doe’s claims for injunctive relief survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
92 Doc. 52 at 70.
21

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 22 of 52
LaCroix claim that Cannizzaro’s allegedly unlawful policy of compelling witnesses to speak with prosecutors violated their First Amendment rights even though they did not actually speak with prosecutors in response to “subpoenas.”93 Defendants argue that they enjoy qualified immunity from such claims because no constitutional violation occurred and, even if it did, the Defendants did not violate a “clearly established” right.
“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”94 But “the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from ‘compelled speech’ is not absolute.”95 Indeed, if the First Amendment prohibited courts from compelling material witnesses to testify, then all material witness warrant statutes would violate the Constitution.96
At issue here is whether prosecutors’ use of “subpoenas” to compel witnesses into meeting privately with prosecutors outside of court violates the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has provided a clear standard for analyzing compelled speech claims in this context. The Fifth Circuit has suggested that the government can defeat a compelled speech claim by showing that “essential operations of government require [the speech] for the preservation of an orderly society—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.”97 The Second Circuit, however, has held that “the First Amendment right not to speak protects the
93 Id. 94 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 95 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006). 96 See W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that “the right to refrain from speaking at all” can be overcome when “essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.”). 97 United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
22

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 23 of 52
right to refuse to make false statements to the government,”98 and that “the right not to speak may be abrogated only under carefully policed circumstances.”99
This Court need not decide today whether any of the Defendants violated any of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by compelling witnesses into meeting privately outside of court to discuss active criminal cases through the use of “subpoenas.” Plaintiffs fail to show that witnesses possess a clearly established right under the First Amendment to refuse to speak to prosecutors about active criminal cases. For that reason, the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ First Amendment compelled speech claims for damages.
ii. Retaliation Claims Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment right to refuse to speak.100 Defendants argue that the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from these claims to the extent they seek monetary damages from the Individual Defendants.101 “The First Amendment prohibits not only direct limits on individual speech but also adverse governmental action against an individual in retaliation for the exercise of protected speech activities.”102 To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit must show: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused her “to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the engage in that activity;” and (3) that the
98 Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011)).
99 Burns, 890 F.3d at 85 (emphasis in original). 100 See Doc. 52 at 70–72. 101 See Doc. 63-1 at 37. 102 Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002).
23

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 24 of 52
defendant’s “adverse actions were substantially motivated against” her exercise of constitutionally protected speech.103
Plaintiffs engaged in constitutionally protected activity when they refused to speak to prosecutors absent a valid court order to do otherwise.104 Plaintiffs allege injuries in the form of threats of imprisonment that prevented them from continuing to refuse to speak.105 It appears, based on the timing of Plaintiffs’ refusals to speak and the follow-up responses by prosecutors, that the adverse actions suffered by Plaintiffs were likely motivated by their refusal to speak.106 Therefore, Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation.107 Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs’ right to refuse to speak with prosecutors absent a court order was not clearly established when the violations occurred, the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from the civil damages sought in these claims.
103 Brooks v. City of W. Point, Miss., 639 F. App’x 986, 989 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keenan, 290 F.3d at 258)).
104 See Burns, 890 F.3d at 85; Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241. 105 See Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 368 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that threatened
prosecution constitutes in retaliation for an exercise of protected speech constitutes First Amendment infringement) (quoting Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001)). 106 Plaintiff Singleton alleges that prosecutors caused her arrest immediately after she refused to answer their questions during a private meeting. Doc. 52 at 42. Plaintiff Mitchell alleges that prosecutors caused his arrest because he no longer wished to meet with them privately. Id. at 47. Plaintiff Baham alleges that prosecutors caused her arrest because she refused to meet with them. Id. at 50. Plaintiffs Doe, Bailey, and LaCroix allege they were threatened with arrest for refusing to meet with prosecutors. Id. at 53, 55, 56. 107 Because this Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation in this regard, their claims for injunctive relief and for monetary damages from Cannizzaro in his official capacity remain. That is, they have stated facts to make out plausible First Amendment retaliation claims. This holding, however, does not apply to Plaintiff Roe’s retaliation claim. The allegations do not show that Roe’s arrest was substantially motivated by his refusal to speak. In fact, Roe never refused to speak in the first place. He never got the chance because prosecutors never reached him. See Doc. 52 at 58–62. As such, Plaintiff Roe has failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, and his claim must be dismissed.
24

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 25 of 52
c. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim In Count Five of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege: Each of Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices and customs described above, separately and in combination, shocks the conscience and violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs and poses an ongoing risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff Baham, Plaintiff Doe, Plaintiff Roe, and the rights of Plaintiff Silence Is Violence and its clients.108 An executive official violates a person’s substantive due process rights when the official’s conduct is “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”109 The burden “to show state conduct that shocks the conscience is extremely high, requiring stunning evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of state law, even violations resulting from bad faith to something more egregious and more extreme.”110 The Supreme Court’s “test for the substantive component of the due process clause prohibits ‘only the most egregious official conduct,’ and will rarely come into play.”111 Plaintiffs’ allegations that prosecutors manufactured “subpoenas,” deliberately side-stepping judicial oversight of the subpoena process, appears to this Court to represent a breed of official misconduct. Claims that the practice was not only condoned but directed by top prosecutors and the DA himself only make the allegations more disturbing. This Court believes that
108 Doc. 52 at 73. 109 See Reyes v. N. Texas Tollway Auth., 861 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that
the Fifth Circuit applies the “shock the conscience” standard instead of rational basis when executive conduct is involved). 110 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 868 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010)). 111 Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 812–13 (5th Cir. 2016), as revised (June 27, 2016) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
25

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 26 of 52
Plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently shock the conscience such that they allege a constitutional violation.112
Nevertheless, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. Plaintiffs fail to cite to any case law suggesting that the Defendants’ violated a clearly established right of Plaintiffs. In their opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs cite only to Rochin v. California, in which the Supreme Court held that illegally breaking into a person’s apartment, attempting to pry open his mouth, and forcibly extracting the contents of his stomach amounted to conduct that “shocks the conscience.”113 This case is distinguishable from Rochin, and it does not support a finding that the prosecutors in this case violated clearly established law. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity for claims seeking damages based on allegations of substantive due process violations. III. Failure to State a Claim
The Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiffs’ remaining claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
a. Fourth Amendment Material Witness Warrant Claims Although the Individual Defendants enjoy absolute immunity from civil damages for Plaintiffs’ claims that the Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by abusing the material witness warrant process, claims for injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants and claims for injunctive relief and damages against Cannizzaro in his official capacity remain.
112 This finding defeats Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have failed to state a substantive due process claim upon which relief could be granted.
113 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
26

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 27 of 52
Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, Mitchell, Roe, and SIV allege that Defendants Cannizzaro, Mitchell, Pipes, Napoli, Trummel, Hamilton, and Dawkins violated the Fourth Amendment by “relying on false allegations, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual allegations in applications for material witness warrants.”114 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted.115
In Franks v. Delaware, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an official violates the Fourth Amendment when the official makes materially false statements—either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth—in support of a warrant that are necessary to a court’s finding of probable cause.116 The Fifth Circuit has extended the applicability of Franks beyond affirmatively false statements to material omissions.117 The Fifth Circuit has not, however, decided whether Franks extends to material witness warrants. But other federal courts have held that it does.118 Because innocent material witnesses deserve at least as much constitutional protection as criminal defendants, this Court believes that it is appropriate to extend Franks to material witness warrants.
Under Franks, a court must consider whether an official’s statements or omissions were “necessary to [a] finding of probable cause.”119 “The test for
114 Doc. 52 at 68. 115 Doc. 63-1 at 31. 116 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 117 Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 258 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Circuit has
interpreted Franks liability to also include liability for an officer who makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause.”) (emphasis in original). 118 See, e.g., United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-093, 2012 WL 4470776, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012); United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL 188146, at *2–5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2007); Mayfield v. Gonzales, No. 04-1427, 2005 WL 1801679, at *7 (D. Or. July 28, 2005). 119 Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. It is not clear to this Court whether the Fourth Amendment requires a probable cause finding to justify detaining a material witness. See Ashcroft, 563
27

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 28 of 52
probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’”120 This
is especially true in the context of material witness warrants. The Sixth and
Ninth Circuits have held that probable cause exists when the statutory prerequisites for arresting a material witness have been met.121 The parties seem to agree that such a standard is the appropriate one here.122
Louisiana’s Material Witness Statute requires prosecutors to show that
a witness’s testimony “is essential to the prosecution” and that “it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.”123 Thus, this
Court believes probable cause exists to detain a material witness in Louisiana
if the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the prosecutor show
that the witness’s testimony is essential to the state’s case and that it may
become impracticable to secure the witness’s presence at trial by subpoena.
U.S. at 745 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If material witness warrants do not qualify as ‘Warrants’ under the Fourth Amendment, then material witness arrests might still be governed by the Fourth Amendment’s separate reasonableness requirement for seizures of the person.”); Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 408 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The probable-cause standard may be inapplicable, however, because ‘[t]he typical arrest warrant is based on probable cause that the arrestee has committed a crime,’ which is not the standard for the issuance of material-witness warrants.”) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 745). Faced with the exact question, the Third Circuit in Schneyder v. Smith held that material witness warrants need only be supported by objective reasonableness, not probable cause. 653 F.3d 313, 322–25 (3d Cir. 2011); see Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991) (describing the probable cause standard as “more stringent” than the “lower standard” of objective reasonableness). Because material witnesses deserve as much protection under the Fourth Amendment as criminal defendants and the Third Circuit’s standard has not spread into other circuits, this Court will apply the probable cause standard to Plaintiffs’ Franks claims. 120 Fla. v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). 121 See White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1989); Perkins, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (“The probable cause required by White was a showing that the statutory requirements had been met.”) (citing White, 892 F.2d at 461); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971). 122 See Docs. 63-1 at 27, 67 at 25. 123 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:257.
28

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 29 of 52
Under Franks, to assess whether allegedly false statements and omissions were necessary to a finding of probable cause, a court must “consider the faulty affidavit as if those errors and omissions were removed.”124 A court must then “examine the ‘corrected affidavit’ and determine whether probable cause for the issuance of the warrant survives the deleted false statements and material omissions.”125 Accordingly, this Court must consider whether probable cause existed to detain Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, Mitchell, and Roe if the allegedly false statements were deleted from, and the allegedly material omissions were added to, their respective warrant applications.
i. Singleton’s Franks claims The statement supporting probable cause in the application for Singleton’s material witness warrant read as follows:
The testimony of Singleton is essential to the prosecution of the above entitled case. She is the victim of the simple battery and criminal damage to the property amounting less than $500. The State has reason to fear Singleton will not appear in Court pursuant to a subpoena as she has failed to appear pursuant to an appointment with the undersigned, and she has failed to appear in court at every other trial setting that she was issued a subpoena for. Singleton received improper domiciliary service, as a subpoena was left in the door of the residence of Singleton on March 6, 2015. Singleton did not appear for trial when it was set on March 20, 2015. The undersigned has made attempts to contact Singleton since March 2015. The undersigned attempted to contact Singleton numerous times at the phone number provided by Singleton, to no avail.
124 See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494–95 (5th Cir. 2018). 125 Id. at 495.
29

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 30 of 52
The Sheriff’s Office has made numerous attempts to serve Singleton at her primary address with no success. They have been to her residence three times and have left subpoenas in her door due to no one accepting service at the residence on her behalf.
On April 20, 2015, the undersigned contacted Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office Victim-Witness Advocate Amy Jackson, to determine if Jackson possessed alternative phone numbers for Singleton. The undersigned was informed that Singleton had never been cooperative with Victim-Witness Advocate Jackson, but did provide the undersigned with an alternative phone number for Singleton. The undersigned attempted to contact Singleton at the alternative phone number, to no avail.
Orleans Parish District Attorney Investigator Corey Porter has made numerous attempts to locate Singleton since April 20, 2015. On that day, the undersigned, accompanied by Investigator Porter, traveled to the last known address for Singleton in an attempt to serve Singleton with a subpoena and conduct an interview, to no avail.
On April 21, 2015, Investigator Porter traveled to the Astor Crowne Plaza, the last known employer of Singleton. Investigator Porter learned that Singleton had ceased her employment with the Astor Crowne Plaza approximately one month prior.
On April 21, 2015 Investigator Porter traveled to the last known residence of Singleton with a subpoena and conduct an interview. Investigator Porter observed a Toyota Camry, associated with Singleton, parked in the driveway of the residence. Investigator Porter knocked on the front door of the residence and waited for a response from someone present inside of the residence, to no avail. Investigator Porter left two subpoenas at the residence for Singleton to appear at the District Attorney’s Office on April 24, 2015.
30

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 31 of 52
On April 23, 2015, the undersigned attempted to contact Singleton at the last known phone numbers of Singleton, to no avail.126 Singleton objects to the truthfulness of the application on the following grounds: (1) that it created a misleading impression that Singleton was validly served with subpoenas for the April 24th trial date; (2) that the “subpoenas” left by Porter at Singleton’s home were not validly created subpoenas; (3) that Singleton was not home when sheriff’s deputies attempted to serve her with subpoenas at her home; and (4) that saying Singleton had “never been cooperative” with a victim-witness advocate misleadingly suggests Singleton would not respond to a validly issued subpoena.127 The problem with Singleton’s objections is that for the most part they challenge truthful statements as misleading. The application does not state that Singleton was ever validly served with a subpoena; it states that she “received improper domiciliary service” and that subpoenas were left at her door, which does not imply that proper service occurred.128 Instead, the application truthfully conveys that deputies unsuccessfully attempted to serve Singleton with a subpoena. Similarly, Singleton does not challenge the fact that she refused to cooperate with the DA’s Office. Excluding the allegedly false statements in the warrant that some of the “subpoenas” left at Singleton’s home were not actually subpoenas, and adding the omitted allegation that Singleton was not home when service was attempted on her, does not change the fact that the application as amended would contain probable cause to arrest Singleton on a material witness warrant. Such an application would still show that Singleton was a key witness
126 Doc. 63-3. 127 See Doc. 67 at 27–28. 128 See Doc. 63-3.
31

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 32 of 52
to the prosecution’s case, that service was attempted on her numerous times but never accomplished, and that Singleton had not been cooperative with the investigation by the DA’s Office in the underlying criminal offense against her. Such statements are sufficient to show that her testimony was essential to the prosecution’s case and that it may have been impracticable to secure her testimony by subpoena. As such, Singleton’s Franks claim must fail.
ii. Mitchell’s Franks claims The statement supporting probable cause in the application for Mitchell’s material witness warrant read as follows:
The testimony of Mark Mitchell is essential to the prosecution of the above entitled case. On 4/4/16 Assistant District Attorney’s Mike Trummel, Matthew Hamilton, as well as District Attorney’s Office investigator Pamela Butler, and victim witness counselor Julie Ferguson met with Mark Mitchell outside his place of work. This meeting took place after numerous text messages and phone calls in which Mark Mitchell indicated this would be the last meeting he would have with the District Attorney’s Office and did not want to move forward with the case. At the meeting Mark Mitchell stated the only way in which he would testify was if he was arrested. Mark Mitchell has given statements to the New Orleans Police Department implicating the defendant, Gerard Gray, in the above numbered case. Mark Mitchell has also testified at a trial against Gerard Gray’s codefendant, Jonterry Bernard.129 Mitchell objects to the truthfulness of the application on the following grounds: (1) it falsely says Mitchell stated “the only way in which he would testify was if he was arrested;” (2) it omits that he signed a subpoena during the April 4th
129 Doc. 63-10.
32

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 33 of 52
meeting with prosecutors agreeing to testify in court on April 11, 2016; (3) it omits that Mitchell had cooperated with prosecutors in the past and had met with them several times to prepare the case for trial; (3) it omits that Mitchell had previously testified against the co-defendant in the case; and (4) it omits that prosecutors had pressured Mitchell to “alter his account of events” to support the state’s case.130
Deleting the allegedly false statements—that Mitchell would only testify if arrested—and adding the material omissions—that Mitchell had cooperated with prosecutors in the past and had signed a subpoena in the presence of prosecutors agreeing to appear in court just two days before the material witness warrant was issued—to Mitchell’s application, this Court finds that Mitchell has stated a viable Franks claim. At least one federal district court has held that omitting the fact that a material witness had previously cooperated with investigators constitutes a particularly concerning material omission for Franks purposes.131 This Court agrees and finds it even more troubling to omit that the material witness signed a subpoena agreeing to appear in court just days before prosecutors then sought to jail the witness on the grounds that securing his testimony by subpoena may be impracticable. If the allegedly false statement that Mitchell would only testify if arrested is deleted from the warrant, the only statement left supporting the application would be the fact that he “did not want to move forward with the case.”132 That
130 Doc. 67 at 29. Mitchell additionally objects on the ground that prosecutors told the judge orally that Mitchell had bought a bus ticket to leave town, but in fact Mitchell had bought no such bus ticket. Id. Because no such fact appears in the application, this Court cannot consider it as part of Mitchell’s Franks claim.
131 See Al-Kidd, 2012 WL 4470776, at *3 (“In particular, this Court finds the omissions that the Plaintiff 1) is a United States citizen with familial and community ties to the United States and 2) had previously cooperated with law enforcement were material and necessary to the Magistrate Judge’s probable cause determination.”).
132 Doc. 63-10.
33

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 34 of 52
statement alone—particularly in light of the material omissions—is not enough to show probable cause to arrest Mitchell on a material witness warrant. As such, his Franks claim survives.
iii. Baham’s Franks claims The statement supporting probable cause in the application for Baham’s material witness warrant read as follows:
The testimony of Lazonia Baham is essential to the prosecution of the above entitled case. Lazonia Baham was notified by Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office Investigator Mike Kitchens that she was an essential witness in the above stated case and would be needed to testify. Ms. Baham refused to meet with ADA Jason Napoli and cut off all communication with the District Attorney’s Office. Despite multiple visits to her home, Ms. Baham refuses to speak with Investigator Kitchens and has refused to return multiple phone calls. The actions of Ms. Baham indicate that she is intentionally avoiding service and will not come to court on her own accord. Lazonia Baham has given statements to the New Orleans Police Department implicating the defendant, Issac Jones, in the above numbered case.133 Baham objects to the truthfulness of the application based on the following allegedly intentional and material omissions: (1) that Baham had previously spoken several times with investigators from the DA’s Office; (2) that the DA’s Office had pressured her to change her recollection of events to support the state’s case; (3) that Defendant Napoli had sent Baham “subpoenas;” and (4) that Baham had stated she would come to court if subpoenaed.134
133 Doc. 63-8. 134 Doc. 67 at 31.
34

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 35 of 52
Deleting the allegedly false statement—that Baham would not come to court on her own accord—and adding the material omissions—that she had previously spoken with investigators several times and that she told prosecutors she would come to court if subpoenaed—this Court finds that Baham has stated a viable Franks claim. Baham alleges that she told prosecutors she would respond to a subpoena. Baham’s refusal to speak with a DA’s Office investigator, without more, does not indicate that it may have been impracticable to secure her testimony by subpoena when the application fails to state whether service had ever been attempted on her and that she had said she would respond to a subpoena. As such, Baham’s Franks claim survives.
iv. Roe’s Franks claims The statement supporting probable cause in the application for Roe’s material witness warrant read as follows:
The testimony of Roe is essential to the prosecution of the above entitled case. Roe is a named victim in the bill of indictment. The State has reason to fear Roe will not appear in Court. Attempts to reach Roe at his home and by phone by members of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office have been unsuccessful. Messages left for Roe have gone unanswered. Roe has given statements to the New Orleans Police Department implicating the defendant in the above numbered case.135 Roe objects to the truthfulness of the application on the following grounds: it omits that (1) he cooperated with police near the time of the incident the DA’s Office was investigating; (2) despite having notice that Roe had moved, prosecutors only sent subpoenas to Roe’s old address; (3) neither prosecutors
135 Doc. 63-11.
35

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 36 of 52
nor police had attempted to contact Roe for nearly two years after he first cooperated in the underlying investigation; and (4) prosecutors “did not make basic reasonable attempts to locate Roe” such as attempting to reach him through Facebook.136 Roe further objects that saying “[a]ttempts to reach [him] at his home . . . have been unsuccessful” is false because prosecutors knew he had moved but had not tried to locate him at his new home.137
Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Roe, this Court will consider the statement regarding attempts to reach him at his home as false. Deleting that statement from the application and adding the facts that Roe had been cooperative from the beginning and had simply moved and changed phone numbers, this Court finds that such an application would not have shown that it may have been impracticable to secure Roe’s presence in court via subpoena. Instead, this application merely shows that prosecutors had trouble tracking down Roe. Failing to respond to subpoenas sent to an old address and to messages left at a since-changed phone number does not indicate that Roe would not have responded to a subpoena. As such, Roe’s Franks claim survives.
b. First Amendment Compelled Speech Claims Even though the Individual Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ First Amendment compelled speech claims seeking monetary damages, monetary claims against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and claims for injunctive relief against the Defendants remain. Prosecutors in Louisiana may compel witnesses to meet with them out of court by securing a subpoena from a judge.138 Prosecutors do not, however,
136 Doc. 67 at 34. 137 Id. 138 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 66.
36

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 37 of 52
have the power to force witnesses to talk to them absent a court order.139 Nor do they have the power to imprison witnesses who refuse to speak with them absent a judicially approved material witness warrant, which judges should only grant when the witness’s testimony is “essential” and the state shows “that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.”140
Plaintiffs Baham, Mitchell, Singleton, Doe, and Roe allege that they were unlawfully compelled to speak with prosecutors who used fraudulent shows of authority to secure the presence of the Plaintiffs at private meetings. Additionally, Plaintiffs Mitchell and Baham allege that the State encouraged them to change their stories, behavior that could be characterized rather innocently as a memory recollection effort or more villainously as an attempt to foster fabricated testimony.141 At the Motion to Dismiss stage, such allegations are sufficient to overcome a 12(b)(6) challenge to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment compelled speech claims against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity and against the Individual Defendants for injunctive relief.
The same cannot be said for Plaintiffs Bailey and LaCroix. Neither woman ever met with prosecutors in response to the receipt of a “subpoena.” Thus, even if prosecutors attempted to compel them to speak, neither Bailey nor LaCroix ever spoke in response to such conduct. Plaintiffs’ argue that their hiring of an attorney to challenge the “subpoenas” represents sufficient compelled speech to support their claims. This Court disagrees. Plaintiffs Bailey and LaCroix have failed to state a First Amendment compelled speech claim that is plausible on its face.
139 See id. 140 See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:257. 141 See Doc. 52 at 46, 50.
37

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 38 of 52
c. Fourteenth Amendment Prolonged Detention Claims Plaintiff Baham alleges that Defendant Napoli violated her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by causing her to be jailed on a material witness warrant then refusing to ensure she received a prompt court appearance. She also alleges an official capacity claim against Defendant Cannizzaro on the ground that Napoli was following the DA’s allegedly unlawful policy of causing material witnesses to be deprived of prompt initial appearances when she sat in jail for more than a week awaiting an initial appearance following her arrest in 2015. Plaintiffs Doe and Roe seek injunctive relief against Cannizzaro regarding the same allegedly unlawful policy, and SIV asserts a prolonged detention claim on the same grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”142 “Prohibition against improper use of the ‘formal restraints imposed by the criminal process’ lies at the heart of the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”143 Said differently, incarcerating a person without sufficient due process constitutes a textbook Fourteenth Amendment violation. In Orleans Parish, however, it is not the responsibility of prosecutors to ensure that material witnesses receive prompt initial appearances before a judge. Rule 15.0(12) of the Rules for the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court provides that “[i]f a material witness warrant of arrest is issued . . . the court shall require the moving party to file the material witness motion and the capias/warrant with the Clerk of Court.” Rule 15.0(9) further provides that
142 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 143 Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880–81 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972)).
38

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 39 of 52
“[w]henever a capias has been executed, the clerk shall place the individual on the docket and jail list of the appropriate Section . . . .”
Pursuant to Rule 15.0(12), Defendant Napoli filed a material witness motion before Judge Laurie White that was granted on October 13, 2015.144 Baham alleges that police arrested her on December 29, 2015.145 According to Rule 15.0(9), it then became the clerk of court’s responsibility to place Baham on the appropriate judge’s docket to be brought to court for an initial appearance.
Baham alleges that she was not brought to court for an initial appearance until January 6, 2016.146 It is not clear from the record why Baham spent more than a week in jail before being taken to court for an initial appearance. What is clear is that it was not the responsibility of prosecutors— but of the clerk of court—to ensure that Baham received a prompt initial appearance before a judge. As such, prosecutors cannot be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for allegedly prolonged detentions of material witnesses. Plaintiffs have thus failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment prolonged detention claim on which relief could be granted. IV. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
a. Abuse of Process Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed the tort of abuse of process under Louisiana law. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege abuse of the material witness and investigative subpoena legal processes. Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune from civil damages for such claims and that the remaining claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
144 Doc. 63-8 at 2. 145 Doc. 52 at 51. 146 Id.
39

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 40 of 52
i. Abuse of Process: Louisiana’s Material Witness Statute Because Louisiana extends absolute immunity to prosecutors to the same extent as federal law does, for the reasons explained previously in this Order and Reasons, Defendants are absolutely immune from civil damages arising from allegations that they abused the process of the material witness statute. Claims against Defendant Cannizzaro in his official capacity and those against the Individual Defendants for injunctive relief remain. To succeed on a Louisiana abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show an improper willful act in the use of a legal process and the existence of an ulterior purpose.147 Plaintiffs allege that prosecutors applied for material witness warrants—a legal process that exists to secure essential witness testimony in court—with the ulterior purpose of securing private meetings with the witnesses outside of court. The material witness statute arms prosecutors with an extraordinary tool for ensuring that witnesses with testimony necessary to the state’s case do not skip trial dates.148 The statute does not exist as a means of forcing witnesses into private meetings with prosecutors, which is exactly how Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants abused the process. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ remaining abuse of process claims survive.
ii. Abuse of Process: Louisiana’s Investigative Subpoenas As previously explained in this Order and Reasons, the Individual Defendants do not enjoy absolute immunity for the creation and use of “subpoenas” to obtain out-of-court meetings with witnesses. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants flouted the investigative subpoena process provided by
147 See Mills v. City of Bogalusa, No. 13-5477, 2016 WL 2992502, at *14 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016) (citing Waguespack, Seago and Carmichael v. Lincoln, 768 So. 2d 287, 290–91 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2000)).
148 See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:257. See also Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 749 n.2 (J. Ginsburg, concurring) (noting “the importance of vigilant exercise” of judicial oversight when analyzing material witness warrant applications)
40

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 41 of 52
Article 66 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure by serving “subpoenas” on several of the Plaintiffs with the ulterior purpose of avoiding judicial oversight.149 Such allegations amount to an abuse of process. Taken as true, Plaintiffs’ allegations show that the Defendants did not follow the investigative subpoena procedure provided for by law and that the reason for such activity was to avoid judicial oversight.150 Plaintiffs, therefore, have stated plausible abuse of process claims involving the investigative subpoena process.
b. Fraud Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, Doe, Bailey, and LaCroix also make state law fraud claims against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and against Defendants Mitchell, Napoli, Petrovich, Rodrigue, Dover, Doe, and Martin in their individual capacities. A fraud claim under Louisiana law requires a plaintiff to show that she was injured because she reasonably relied on a defendant’s intentionally deceiving misrepresentation of material fact.151 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fail to state a claim because “none of them actually appeared at the DA’s office as directed.”152 That is, even if prosecutors made intentionally deceiving misrepresentations of material fact in the “subpoenas,” the Plaintiffs suffered no injury because of such misrepresentations. As to the fraud claim by Plaintiff Singleton, this Court agrees with Defendants. Singleton alleges that she did not respond to the “subpoenas” left at her home.153 Although she eventually met with prosecutors at the DA’s Office, Singleton alleges that she attended that meeting under the threat of
149 See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 66. 150 See Doc. 52 at 75. 151 Schaumburg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 421 F. App’x 434, 442 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing Wooley v. Lucksinger, 14 So. 3d 311, 378–79 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2008)). 152 Doc. 63-1 at 43. 153 See Doc. 52 at 41–42.
41

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 42 of 52
arrest pursuant to a material witness warrant. In fact, Singleton alleges that she ignored the “subpoenas” on the advice of a friend.154 Any injuries alleged by Singleton, then, did not occur because of her reliance on alleged misrepresentations made by prosecutors. Her fraud claims must fail.
The same reasoning warrants the dismissal of Plaintiff Baham’s fraud claim. She also chose not to respond to the “subpoenas” sent to her.155 Any harm alleged by her was not because of misrepresentations in the “subpoenas.”
The allegations by Plaintiffs Doe, Bailey, and LaCroix differ in a materially different respect. Each of these Plaintiffs allege that they hired private attorneys in direct response to being served with “subpoenas.” That is, they suffered an injury—the cost of a private attorney—because they reasonably relied on the threats of fines and imprisonments that appeared as intentionally deceptive material misrepresentations within the “subpoenas.” Defendants have cited to no case law suggesting that such an injury is insufficient to establish a fraud claim under Louisiana law. At this early stage in the proceedings, Plaintiffs Doe, Bailey, and LaCroix have pleaded sufficient facts to support their fraud claims to survive Defendants’ 12(b)(6) challenge. V. SIV’s Claims
SIV alleges federal and state law claims based both on violations of its own rights and separately for violations of the rights of its clients.156 Defendants move to dismiss these claims on the ground that SIV “has failed to adequately allege any actionable violation of its own rights or the rights of its ‘clients.’”157
154 See id. at 40. 155 See id. at 50. 156 See Doc. 52. 157 Doc. 63-1 at 46.
42

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 43 of 52
a. SIV’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim Because Defendant Cannizzaro enjoys absolute immunity for his threats of prosecution to SIV, its claims against him seeking civil damages must be dismissed. SIV’s claims against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and for injunctive relief based on the DA’s Office’s allegedly unlawful policy of retaliation, however, are sufficient to overcome Defendants’ 12(b)(6) challenge for the same reason such claims by the other Plaintiffs survive. b. SIV’s Other Federal Claims Defendants move to dismiss SIV’s remaining federal claims on two separate grounds. First, Defendants argue that SIV’s claims on behalf of its clients must fail because Plaintiff Mitchell is SIV’s only client identified by name in the Amended Complaint, and “his claims fail for all the reasons explained [in the Motion to Dismiss].”158 This Court has already decided that some of Plaintiff Mitchell’s claims survive Defendants’ Motion. Additionally, Defendants have cited to no case law providing that SIV cannot make claims on behalf of clients who are mentioned without a name in the Amended Complaint.159 As such, SIV’s claims on behalf of its clients survive. Second, Defendants argue that SIV’s own claims must be dismissed because SIV has not “adequately alleged facts showing that its own rights were violated.”160 Under the doctrine of organizational standing, however, an entity may bring claims “where it devotes resources to counteract a defendant’s allegedly unlawful practices.”161 The allegedly unlawful activity need not
158 See Doc. 63-1 at 46. 159 See id. 160 Id. at 46. 161 Scott v. Schedler, 771 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ass’n of Cmty. Organizations
for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 360 (5th Cir. 1999)).
43

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 44 of 52
violate the organization’s own rights.162 Instead, all an organization must show is “that it has suffered a concrete and demonstrable, and redressable, injury as a direct result of the defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct.”163
Here, SIV alleges that it was forced to devote resources to educating and representing witnesses and victims of crime because of the allegedly unlawful policies of the DA’s Office. It need not—and indeed does not appear to—allege violations of its own constitutional rights to bring claims against Defendants.164 At the pleadings stage, SIV’s allegations are sufficient to state claims on which relief could be granted.165
This Court recognizes that Defendants do not challenge SIV’s Article III standing in their Motion to Dismiss, and that in their Reply brief they expressly reserved such a challenge.166 Thus, Defendants may challenge both SIV’s “associational” standing—its standing to bring claims on behalf of its clients—and SIV’s organizational standing at a later juncture.167
c. SIV’s State Law Claims As an initial matter, Defendants’ do not appear to challenge SIV’s fraud claims under Louisiana law in their Motion to Dismiss except to argue that
162 See, e.g., Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that organizations alleging redirection of resources caused by allegedly unconstitutional statute resulted in organizational standing for plaintiffs); Friendly House v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, 2010 WL 11452277, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010) (“The organizational Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the civil rights violations they claim will . . . require, or have already required, them to divert resources and that the violations will injure their organizational missions. Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury in fact for purposes of standing to raise their civil rights claims.”).
163 Fowler, 178 F.3d at 361 n.7. 164 See Doc. 67 at 31. 165 See, e.g., OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 612 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that
an organization possessed organizational standing where it alleged that “its time and resources [were spent] in a way they would not have been spent absent” the challenged law). 166 See Docs. 63-1; 88 at 21. 167 See OCA-Greater Houston, 867 F.3d at 610 (explaining the difference between associational and organizational standing).
44

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 45 of 52
such claims are barred by absolute immunity.168 This Court has already decided that Defendants’ alleged creation and use of “subpoenas” is not covered by absolute immunity. Because that is the alleged conduct that underlies Plaintiffs’ fraud claims, Defendants do not enjoy absolute immunity from SIV’s fraud claims.
Regarding SIV’s abuse of process claims, Defendants argue that such claims should fail because “SIV cannot satisfy the basic tort-law requirement of causation.”169 In support, Defendant argues that the redirection of resources “fails, as a matter of law, to allege a harm that was directly caused by Defendants.”170 Defendants cite to no case law to support this argument.
SIV alleges that Defendants’ use of “subpoenas” and misuse of the material witness warrant statute caused SIV to re-direct resources away from its core mission to “ensur[e] that victims of crime are not victimized again by the District Attorney’s Office.”171 More specifically, SIV has alleged that Defendants abused the legal process necessary for material witness warrants and investigative subpoenas, that such abuses were done with the ulterior purpose of coercing victims and witnesses of crimes into out-of-court meetings, and that SIV suffered damages by having to re-allocate its resources because of the alleged violations. At the pleadings stage, such allegations are sufficient to state abuse of process claims under Louisiana law. Therefore, SIV’s abuse of process claims survive to the extent they are not barred by absolute immunity.172
168 See Doc. 63-1 at 48. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171 Doc. 52 at 67. 172 For the same reasons that the other Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims regarding the
alleged misuse of the material witness warrant statute are barred by absolute immunity, so too are SIV’s.
45

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 46 of 52
VI. Prescription The Defendants also argue that most of the claims by Plaintiffs
Singleton, Mitchell, Baham, and Doe are prescribed. Plaintiffs respond that they had no reason to know the critical facts underlying their claims more than a year before they filed suit, and that in any event Louisiana tolling principles prevented their claims from prescribing.173
a. § 1983 Claims Although Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, federal courts look to state law to determine the statute of limitations for such claims.174 In particular, federal courts apply the prescriptive period that the state in which the cause of action arose provides for personal injury torts.175 In Louisiana, the relevant time period is one year from the day the injury was suffered.176 Federal courts also apply state tolling principles to § 1983 claims.177 It is federal law, however, that determines when a § 1983 actions accrues.178 When determining what accrual period applies to a § 1983 claim, courts “look first to the common law of torts” for guidance.179 That is, courts determine which tort the § 1983 claim most resembles then apply the relevant accrual period for that tort to the § 1983 claim. In no instance, however, would the accrual period begin before the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts that
173 See Doc. 67. 174 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action,
but . . . the statute of limitations . . . is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.”). 175 Id. 176 LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. 177 King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 764 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We have accordingly recognized that state equitable tolling principles control in § 1983 cases.”) (internal citations omitted). 178 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”). 179 Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017).
46

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 47 of 52
caused their respective injuries. “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. The statute of limitations therefore begins to run when the plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.”180
i. Singleton, Baham, and Doe’s Claims Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, and Doe’s § 1983 claims are prescribed because the alleged misconduct underlying those allegations occurred more than one year before Plaintiffs filed suit. Plaintiffs respond that they had no reason to know of the critical facts underlying their claims—that the “subpoenas” delivered to them were not lawfully created— until The Lens published a story in April 2017 publicly revealing, for the first time, the use of “subpoenas” by prosecutors in Cannizzaro’s office. At this early stage in the proceedings, this Court agrees. Absent the “subpoenas,” Plaintiffs’ claims would disappear. To say the Plaintiffs had reason to know documents designed to appear authentic were in fact fraudulent before such information became more widely known would stretch the “reason to know” standard too broadly. Taken as true, Plaintiffs Singleton, Baham, and Doe’s allegations show they had no reason to know of the critical facts underlying their claims until at least April 2017, which was less than a year before they filed suit.
ii. Mitchell’s Claims Defendants also argue that Plaintiff Mitchell’s § 1983 claims are prescribed because he filed suit more than a year after the alleged conduct underlying his claims occurred. Mitchell responds that he had no reason to
180 Martinez v. Hidalgo Cty., Texas, 727 F. App’x 77, 78 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
47

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 48 of 52
know about the alleged misstatements in the application for the material witness warrant on which he was arrested—the conduct underlying his claims—because the application was not legally attainable until September 2017, which was less than a year before he filed suit. Even so, Defendants argue, Mitchell had reason to know about his claims because of a meeting he had with Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judge Laurie White. Mitchell alleges that Judge White told him during the meeting “she wanted to apologize for what had happened to him, and . . . prosecutors had misled her.”181 The meeting allegedly occurred “shortly after” an April 2016 trial.182
As an initial matter, it is not exactly clear when the meeting with Judge White took place. But even assuming it took place more than a year before the initial Complaint was filed in this case in October 2017, this Court does not have before it sufficient evidence to determine whether anything that transpired during that meeting resulted in Mitchell having reason to know about his claims. Mitchell alleges that he “did not know” critical facts necessary to his claim until less than a year before he filed suit.183 Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence to overcome this allegation at the Motion to Dismiss stage.
b. State Law Claims Defendants also argue that state law abuse of process and fraud claims by Plaintiffs Singleton, Mitchell, Baham, and Doe are prescribed. These claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.184 The conduct underlying
181 Doc. 52 at 48. 182 See id. 183 Id. at 49. 184 See No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, 177 So. 3d 747, 751–52 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2015) (holding that
abuse of process claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period); Cerullo v. Heisser, 213 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2017) (holding that fraud claims are subject to a oneyear prescriptive period).
48

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 49 of 52
Plaintiffs’ claims occurred more than one year before Plaintiffs filed suit.185 Plaintiffs’ state law claims, then, are facially prescribed.
“When a petition reveals on its face that prescription has run, the plaintiff has the burden of showing why the claim has not prescribed.”186 Plaintiffs cite to Louisiana’s doctrine of contra non valentem to support their argument that their claims—even though facially prescribed—are not timebarred under Louisiana law.
“[T]he doctrine of contra non valentem . . . is an exception to the general rules of prescription.”187 The doctrine requires that prescription be suspended under “principles of equity and justice” when a plaintiff is “effectually prevented from enforcing his rights for reasons external to his own will.”188 There are four different situations in which the doctrine may apply.189 Plaintiffs argue that two apply here: fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule.190
“[T]he discovery rule . . . provides that prescription commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based.”191 “[T]he ultimate issue in determining whether a plaintiff had constructive knowledge sufficient to commence a prescriptive period is the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s action or inaction in light of his education, intelligence, and the nature of the defendant’s conduct.”192
185 See Doc. 52. 186 Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 211 (La. 1994). 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 190 See id. at 211–12 (recognizing fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule as two of the
four situations in which contra non valentem may suspend prescription). 191 Id. at 211. 192 Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 246 (La. 2010).
49

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 50 of 52
The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine of contra non valentem should only be applied in “exceptional circumstances.”193 This Court believes this case presents just such circumstances. Plaintiffs—none of whom had any experience in law—allege that the Defendants abused their authority by skirting legal requirements to coerce Plaintiffs to meet with prosecutors outside of court.194 Plaintiffs reasonably believed they had to do what prosecutors told them. For the same reasons that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not prescribed at this time, neither are their state law claims. The Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence to contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations that they should have known about the critical facts necessary to their claims more than a year before they filed suit. Plaintiffs’ inaction was reasonable considering their relatively limited education and experience in criminal law and Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent behavior. For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, Louisiana’s discovery rule suspended prescription from commencing on Plaintiffs’ state law claims until information about the alleged practices of Cannizzaro’s office became widely known beginning in April 2017.195 Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of any of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims on prescription grounds.196
193 Id. at 245 (La. 2010) (quoting Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 809 So. 2d 947, 953 (La. 2002)).
194 See Doc. 67 at 13. 195 Even though Plaintiff Mitchell’s claims do not involve receipt of a “subpoena,” for the same
reasons his § 1983 claims are not prescribed, neither are his state law claims. 196 Even if the discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, the fraudulent
concealment rule would. Claims by each of the relevant Plaintiffs involve allegations that the Defendants engaged in fraud, that the fraud effectually prevented them from pursuing their claims, and that it was reasonable for them to delay in filing suit. See Prevo v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Div. of Prob. & Parole, 187 So. 3d 395, 398–99 (La. 2015) (listing the elements of a fraudulent concealment contra non valentem claim); Harvey v. Davis, 432 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1983) (affirming trial court’s application of fraudulent concealment rule where plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme to intentionally conceal facts necessary to plaintiffs’ claims in a medical malpractice case).
50

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 51 of 52
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART. The following claims remain:
• Count I: Plaintiffs Mitchell, Baham, and Roe’s § 1983 claims under Franks for injunctive relief and damages against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and those seeking injunctive relief against Defendants Napoli, Trummel, Hamilton, and Dawkins in their individual capacities
• Count II: Plaintiffs Doe and SIV’s § 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his official capacity for the creation and use of “subpoenas”
• Count III: Plaintiffs’ § 1983 compelled speech and retaliation claims seeking damages and injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his official capacity, and Plaintiffs’ § 1983 retaliation claims seeking injunctive relief against Defendants Napoli, Dover, and Dawkins in their individual capacities
• Count V: Plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process claims seeking damages and injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his official capacity
• Counts VI and VII: Plaintiffs’ § 1983 failure to supervise and failure to intervene claims seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief from Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes in their individual capacities and seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his individual capacity regarding the alleged creation and use of “subpoenas,” and Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages from Cannizzaro in his
51

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 116 Filed 02/28/19 Page 52 of 52
official capacity and seeking injunctive relief from Cannizzaro, Pipes, and Martin for all other claims for which this Court found that Plaintiffs adequately alleged a constitutional violation • Count VIII: Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims except those seeking civil damages against the Individual Defendants based on prosecutors alleged abuse of Louisiana’s Material Witness Statute • Count IX: Fraud claims by Plaintiffs Doe, Bailey, LaCroix, and SIV against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and against Defendants Martin, Dover, Petrovich, and Rodrigue in their individual capacities Plaintiffs’ claims not specifically listed above are hereby DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 28th day of February, 2019.
____________________________________ JANE TRICHE MILAZZO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
52

 
 Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RENATA SINGLETON ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 17-10721

LEON CANNIZZARO ET AL.

SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Confirm a Stay of Proceedings (Doc. 121) and Plaintiffs’ Rule 62.1 Motion for an Indicative Ruling (Doc. 141). For the following reasons, the Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND This is a civil rights lawsuit brought by victims and witnesses of crimes against Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro and a handful of his assistant district attorneys.1 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana law by fraudulently compelling them to cooperate in criminal prosecutions. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and injunctive relief from Defendants. On March 1, 2018, Defendants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims.2 Defendants argued that they enjoyed both absolute and qualified immunity from many of Plaintiffs’ claims seeking monetary damages from the

1 This Court has previously detailed the background of this lawsuit, and it need not do so again here. See Doc. 116 at 1–6.
2 See Doc. 63.
1

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 2 of 10
Defendants in their individual capacities. Defendants also argued that, with respect to many of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs had failed to state claims on which relief could be granted and that many of the same claims were prescribed. For one reason or another, Defendants argued that all of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed.
On February 28, 2019, the Court dismissed some, but not all, of Plaintiffs’ claims.3 Shortly thereafter, on March 12, 2019, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons.4 Two days after that, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Confirm a Stay of these proceedings pending the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on Defendants’ appeal.5
In their Motion, Defendants argued that they are entitled to a stay of the proceedings before this Court while the Fifth Circuit considers their appeal. Because this Court’s decision depends in part on the issues being appealed, the Court on April 29, 2019 ordered Defendants to specify the issues they were appealing.6 In response, Defendants argued that “most of the claims in this case are encompassed within the Defendants’ appeal.”7 Plaintiffs disagree. It is their position that the appealable issues are much narrower than Defendants suggest, and that the Fifth Circuit actually lacks jurisdiction to hear some of the issues Defendants are trying to appeal.
The briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Confirm a Stay eventually led Plaintiffs to file a Rule 62.1 Motion for an Indicative Ruling. In that Motion, Plaintiffs ultimately seek a ruling from this Court that it would allow Plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their § 1983 failure to supervise and failure to intervene
3 See Doc. 116. 4 Doc. 118. The appeal bears Case No. 19-30197 at the Fifth Circuit. 5 Doc. 121. 6 See Doc. 137. 7 Doc. 138 at 1.
2

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 3 of 10
claims.8 Defendants oppose the Motion as procedurally improper even though they do not oppose the ultimate dismissal of the claims Plaintiffs seek to voluntarily dismiss.9
The Court will address Defendants’ Motion to Confirm a Stay of these proceedings before turning to Plaintiffs’ Rule 62.1 Motion for an Indicative Ruling.
LAW AND ANALYSIS I. Motion to Confirm a Stay of Proceedings
“Although appeals transfer jurisdiction from the district court to the appellate court concerning ‘those aspects of the case involved in the appeal,’ the district court is nonetheless free to adjudicate matters that are not involved in that appeal.”10 This is true even when a party appeals a district court’s finding that absolute immunity does not apply to certain conduct or that qualified immunity does not apply to certain claims.11
At this point, several aspects of this Court’s February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons bear repeating. First, the Court held that the Defendants enjoyed absolute immunity from some—but not all—of Plaintiffs’ claims.12 Specifically, the Court held that “[t]he Individual Defendants are not absolutely immune for claims seeking damages based on allegations of: (1) creating or issuing ‘subpoenas’ to Plaintiffs and (2) failures to supervise or intervene in the
8 See Doc. 146 at 3. 9 See Doc. 143 at 2. 10 Weingarten Realty Inv’rs v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 59 (1982)) (citations omitted). 11 Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have
‘jurisdiction only to decide whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that officials are not entitled to qualified immunity on a given set of facts.’”) (quoting Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). 12 Doc. 116 at 17.
3

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 4 of 10
aforementioned conduct.”13 This holding embodies the core of Defendants’ pending appeal.
This Court recognizes that Defendants are entitled to an interlocutory appeal of an order denying them absolute immunity in some respects.14 What this Court fails to recognize, however, is how such an appeal divests the Court of jurisdiction to proceed regarding Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.
In contending that “most” of Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are encompassed within their appeal, Defendants rely heavily on this Court’s alleged “denial of qualified immunity in part.”15 More specifically, Defendants argue that this Court denied Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes qualified immunity from claims based on their alleged failure to supervise and failure to intervene in the alleged creation and use of “subpoenas.”
This Court did no such thing. In a 45-page memorandum in support of their Joint Motion to Dismiss, which appeared to challenge all of Plaintiffs’ numerous claims on one ground or another, Defendants devoted two paragraphs to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 failure to supervise and failure to intervene claims.16 The section reads, in its entirety:
The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Cannizzaro, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Pipes are liable for the specific alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments described above because they failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline the attorneys and agents under his supervision. Complaint at ¶ 434. The Plaintiffs further allege that Mr. Martin “directly instructed” the other Individual Defendants to engage in the conduct that allegedly violated the Plaintiffs’ rights. However, because the
13 Id. 14 See Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 642 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The denial of an immunity
defense may be subject to interlocutory appeal.”). 15 Doc. 138 at 2. 16 See Doc. 63-1 at 45–46.
4

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 5 of 10
Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged any actionable violation of their rights, these supervisory-liability claims necessarily fail. The Plaintiffs further allege that each of the Individual Defendants is liable for the wrongdoing of each of the others because they “knew or should have known that they and others within the District Attorney’s Office were violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights” yet acted with deliberate indifference in failing to intervene. Id. at ¶¶ 437–438. Again, in the absence of any underlying actionable constitutional violations, such secondary claims necessarily fail. Further, such conclusory allegations lack the factual specificity necessary to plausibly allege that any of the Individual Defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to alleged wrongdoing by others within the DA’s office.17 To the extent Defendants raised a qualified immunity defense in these two paragraphs, this Court failed to recognize it as such. Defendants’ Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss specifically outlined qualified immunity challenges to the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ claims.18 No such challenge appeared in the paragraphs challenging Plaintiffs’ failure to supervise and failure to intervene claims.19 In its February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons, this Court granted Defendants qualified immunity from every claim seeking monetary damages from an individual to the extent that such an argument was raised.20 Defendants cannot appeal rulings that this Court did not issue.21 Accordingly,
17 Doc. 63-1 at 45–46. 18 See id. at 2–4. 19 See id. at 4, 45–46. 20 See Doc. 116. 21 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–92.
5

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 6 of 10
this Court does not believe that any issue involving qualified immunity is currently pending before the Fifth Circuit.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal appellate courts possess jurisdiction over “all final decision of the district courts of the United States.” An order denying a motion to dismiss is not ordinarily a “final decision” that falls within the appellate court’s jurisdiction.22 As stated by the Supreme Court and recently noted by the Fifth Circuit, “interlocutory appeals—appeals before the end of district court proceedings—are the exception, not the rule.”23
Here, Defendants are attempting to turn the collateral order doctrine into the rule rather than the exception. This Court is unpersuaded that Defendants’ appeal is as far-reaching as they suggest. Although Defendants could have sought certification from this Court that its February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons was a final appealable order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), they did not do so.
This Court believes that even if Defendants receive a favorable ruling from the Fifth Circuit, most of Plaintiffs’ claims will remain. That is, even if the Fifth Circuit finds that Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the creation and use of “subpoenas,” Plaintiffs numerous claims seeking injunctive relief and seeking damages from Cannizzaro in his official capacity will remain. This Court sees no reason to stay litigation that will proceed similarly regardless of how the Fifth Circuit rules on Defendants’ appeal. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for a stay is denied.
22 See Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2019). 23 Id. (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309, (1995)).
6

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 7 of 10
II. Rule 62.1 Motion for an Indicative Ruling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a) provides, in relevant part: If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.24
Under the Rule’s plain text, “a timely motion” that the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain must be made before the Court can indicate how it would rule on such a motion.25 This makes sense: courts cannot indicate how they would rule on motions that have not been made.
In this case, however, Plaintiffs are seeking an indicative ruling on a motion that has not been made. Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their Rule 62.1 Motion states:
Plaintiffs ask the Court to indicate that, with a limited remand from the Fifth Circuit for this purpose, it would either amend its February 28, 2019 order to dismiss the individual damages claims against supervisors for failure to train and failure to supervise, or, in the alternative, allow Plaintiffs to amend their Second Amended Complaint in order to withdraw the individual damages claims against Defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes based on failure to supervise and failure to intervene.26
24 FED R. CIV. P. 62.1(a). 25 See id. 26 Doc. 141 at 1–2.
7

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 8 of 10
Plaintiffs, however, have not moved either for an amendment of this Court’s February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons or for leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs argue that neither the text of Rule 62.1 nor any case law requires that a predicate motion be filed before a court can issue an indicative ruling.27 Again, as this Court has already explained, the text of the Rule clearly requires a predicate motion to have been filed—the Rule would not otherwise make sense. Although Plaintiffs cite two cases for the proposition that “courts regularly consider and act upon Rule 62.1 motions without requiring a predicate motion,”28 these two cases do not clearly support this proposition.
In the first, Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Company, the issue was whether Rule 62.1 required a party to file a predicate motion for an indicative ruling before an appeal was made, not whether the Rule required a party to file a predicate motion before filing a motion for an indicative ruling.29 The party seeking the indicative ruling in Metalcraft argued that it had actually moved for the relief on which it sought an indicative ruling in “a combined motion for [the relief it sought] . . . and for an indicative ruling.”30
Similarly, in Sterrett v. Cowan, it is unclear from the records available to this Court whether the party seeking an indicative ruling had filed a predicate motion on which it sought the indicative ruling.31 In any event, in Sterrett, the motion for an indicative ruling was ultimately granted “to Effect Terms of Settlement.”32 The relief Plaintiffs seek here—effectively a voluntary
27 Doc. 146 at 2. 28 Id. 29 Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 16-CV-544, 2016 WL 8737777, at *1–2 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 18, 2016). 30 Id. at *1. 31 See Sterrett v. Cowan, No. 2:14-CV-11619, 2015 WL 13719720, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
2015). 32 Id. at *1.
8

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 9 of 10
dismissal of a very narrow set of claims in the context of a suit with many other claims—is sufficiently different that this Court does not find the court’s decision in Sterrett persuasive.
At least two courts outside the Fifth Circuit have interpreted Rule 62.1 the same way that this Court does, i.e., that a party must file a predicate motion for relief before a court can indicate how it would rule on such a motion.33 Because Plaintiffs have not filed a predicate motion seeking any type of relief, this Court cannot indicate—at least not pursuant to Rule 62.1—how it would rule on such a motion.
Nevertheless, to promote judicial economy, the Court will make one note in the event that it may aid the Fifth Circuit in ruling on Defendants’ appeal. Plaintiffs indicated in a reply brief in support of their Rule 62.1 Motion that they “ultimately seek[] the termination of the [§ 1983 failure to supervise and failure to intervene] claims, either through a clarification of the Court’s order of dismissal or an amendment of the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 15.”34 Defendants, in opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion, made the following statement:
To be clear: the Defendants do not oppose the dismissal of the claims against Mr. Cannizzaro, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Pipes at the earliest opportunity, for all the reasons (including qualified immunity) urged in the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, the Plaintiffs’ request appears to be procedurally defective
33 Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 208, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Absent an underlying, predicate motion, there is no basis for relief under Rule 62.1.”). See Fischer S.A. Comercio, Industria & Agricultura v. United States, 36 C.I.T. 371, 371 (2012) (denying motion for indicative ruling under the analogous Rule 62.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of International Trade where the plaintiff failed to file a predicate motion on which the court could have indicated how it would rule).
34 Doc. 146.
9

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 147 Filed 07/02/19 Page 10 of 10
and an improper and disruptive attempt to influence a pending appeal.35 This Court sees no reason why Plaintiffs will not ultimately be allowed to voluntarily dismiss certain claims against Defendants. Based on Defendants’ representation in their briefing, it does not appear that they would oppose such a request—nor would it make sense to do so. As it stands, this Court recognizes that it lacks jurisdiction to alter claims that are pending on appeal. The Court’s denial of absolute immunity in one respect left pending—in a narrowed form—Plaintiffs’ claims seeking monetary damages from Cannizzaro, Pipes, and Martin in their individual capacities to the extent they failed to supervise their subordinates and failed to intervene in the alleged creation and use of “subpoenas.” It is unclear both to the parties and to this Court exactly which aspects of the Court’s February 28, 2019 Order and Reasons are before the Fifth Circuit. There is no doubt, however, that the Court’s denial of absolute immunity in some respects is on appeal. Accordingly, this Court currently lacks the power to alter the claims that Plaintiffs ultimately want to dismiss.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Motions are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of July, 2019.

35 Doc. 143 at 2.

____________________________________ JANE TRICHE MILAZZO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10

 
 Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 224 Filed 07/17/20 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RENATA SINGLETON ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 17-10721

LEON CANNIZZARO ET AL.

SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is Defendants Leon Cannizzaro (in his individual capacity), Graymond Martin, David Pipes, Iain Dover, Jason Napoli, Arthur Mitchell, Tiffany Tucker, Michael Trummel, Matthew Hamilton, Inga Petrovich, Laura Rodrigue, and Sarah Dawkins’s (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) Motion for Separate Trials (Doc. 201). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND The Court is very familiar with the facts and allegations in this case, which were laid out in detail in Order and Reasons issued on February 28, 2019 and on June 8, 2020.1 Relevant to this instant matter, however, are the following pertinent facts and allegations. This lawsuit alleges that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) unlawfully compelled victims and witnesses of crimes to cooperate with prosecutors. Those who failed to comply
1 See Doc. 116 at 1–5; Doc. 200 at 1–3.
1

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 224 Filed 07/17/20 Page 2 of 5
with prosecutors’ requests were allegedly threatened, harassed, and, in some cases, jailed. The primary tool allegedly used by prosecutors to compel cooperation was a document manufactured by OPDA to look like a courtordered subpoena. These “subpoenas” were not actually approved by a judge and did not give anyone the authority to fine or jail witnesses who failed to appear. Nevertheless, prosecutors often threatened witnesses with jail time for failure to comply with these “subpoenas.”
Plaintiffs in this case include eight people—victims of and witnesses to crimes (“Individual Plaintiffs”)—and Silence is Violence (“SIV”), an organization that advocates on behalf of crime victims. The Defendants are Leon Cannizzaro, Jr., in his official capacity as District Attorney for Orleans Parish and in his individual capacity, and other prosecutors at OPDA. Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief for alleged violations of federal and state law by the Defendants. The federal claims include violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Louisiana state law claims include allegations of abuse of process and fraud.
In the instant Motion, the Individual Defendants move this Court to try the claims against them separately from the claims against OPDA. OPDA does not oppose, but Plaintiffs oppose.
LEGAL STANDARD This Court has the discretion to bifurcate claims.2 A district court may order separate trials of one or more claims or issues “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”3 However, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned courts before bifurcating issues and ordering separate trials that the
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 3 Id.
2

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 224 Filed 07/17/20 Page 3 of 5
“issue to be tried [separately] must be so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”4 Even if bifurcation promotes judicial economy, courts should not permit it when it will lead to delay, additional expenses, and prejudice.5 Because bifurcation is discretionary, courts should balance equities before bifurcating issues.6 When a court decides to bifurcate issues and order separate trials, the court must preserve a party’s federal right to a jury trial.7
LAW AND ANALYSIS The Individual Defendants aver that all federal § 1983 claims and all claims for injunctive relief against them have been dismissed, and the only remaining claims against them are state law tort claims for fraud and abuse of process, wherein Plaintiffs seek damages arising from the Individual Defendants’ alleged creation and use of the “subpoenas.” The Individual Defendants further aver that, in contrast, “numerous claims under numerous theories remain pending against OPDA.”8 Specifically, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against OPDA under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, for damages and injunctive relief, remain pending along with Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims for fraud and abuse of process. Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants’ characterization. The Individual Defendants move this Court to order separate trials for OPDA and the Individual Defendants, arguing that they “will be greatly
4 Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D. La. 1992).
5 Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 115 (E.D. La. 1992); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Comput. Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (D. Del. 1989).
6 Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 115. 7 Id. 8 Doc. 201-1 at 2.
3

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 224 Filed 07/17/20 Page 4 of 5
prejudiced if the[] limited claims against them are buried in a complex, multiweek trial involving enormous amounts of evidence that is irrelevant to the claims against them.”9 Defendants argue that a single, unified trial would risk confusion and unfair prejudice and that separate trials would not prejudice Plaintiffs. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the state claims against the Individual Defendants and the federal claims against OPDA are not separate and distinct, but rather, factually similar.
The Court need not engage in a lengthy analysis to adjudicate this Motion. Having reviewed the memorandum of counsel and the relevant case law, this Court declines to bifurcate the trial. First, the cases that the Individual Defendants cite in support of their Motion are not dispositive; almost all of them are from courts beyond the 5th Circuit’s jurisdiction. Second, the determination of whether to bifurcate a trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Guidance from the Fifth Circuit has cautioned trial courts to only order separate trials when the “issue to be tried [separately] . . . [is] so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”10 The Individual Defendants simply fail to demonstrate how the issues at trial affecting them and OPDA are “so distinct and separable.” Third, separating the trials would inevitably cause needless delay and hamper judicial economy. Fourth, any potential prejudice that may arise from conducting a single trial can be mitigated with a jury instruction.11
9 Id. at 4. 10 Swofford, 336 F.2d at 415; Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 115. 11 Courts in this district have routinely found that jury instructions sufficiently cure prejudice
concerns. See Meador v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. CV 19-2378, 2020 WL 1332952, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2020); Robin v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 13-4807, 2014 WL 1943053, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 2014); Peace Lake Towers, Inc. v. Indian harbor Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 06-4522, 2007 WL 925845, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2007).
4

Case 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM Document 224 Filed 07/17/20 Page 5 of 5 Accordingly, this Court declines to exercise its discretion in ordering separate trials.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Individual Defendants’ Motion for Separate Trials (Doc. 201) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 17th day of July, 2020. ____________________________________ JANE TRICHE MILAZZO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5

 
 Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/21/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 19-30197

April 21, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

RENATA SINGLETON; MARC MITCHELL; LAZONIA BAHAM; TIFFANY LACROIX; FAYONA BAILEY; SILENCE IS VIOLENCE; JANE DOE; JOHN ROE,

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

LEON A. CANNIZZARO, JR., in his official capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish and in his individual capacity; DAVID PIPES; IAIN DOVER; JASON NAPOLI; ARTHUR MITCHELL; TIFFANY TUCKER; MICHAEL TRUMMEL; INGA PETROVICH; LAURA RODRIGUE; MATTHEW HAMILTON; GRAYMOND MARTIN; SARAH DAWKINS,

Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before ELROD, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. HAYNES, Circuit Judge:
This is a case about prosecutorial immunity. The Orleans Parish District Attorney and several assistant district attorneys (“Defendants”) appeal the district court’s denial of absolute immunity on claims arising from their use of fake “subpoenas.” They also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss several of Plaintiffs’ claims. We AFFIRM in part and DISMISS in part.

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 Background
Plaintiffs allege that for years, prosecutors at the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (the “Office”), under the direction of District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, used fake “subpoenas” to pressure crime victims and witnesses to meet with them. These documents were labeled “SUBPOENA” and were marked with the Office’s official seal. They directed recipients “to appear before the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans” and warned that “A FINE AND IMPRISONMENT MAY BE IMPOSED FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS NOTICE.” The Office’s use of the fake subpoenas violated Louisiana law, which requires prosecutors to channel proposed subpoenas through a court. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 66.1
A brief summary of each relevant Plaintiff’s2 experience with the fake subpoenas is in order. Plaintiff Renata Singleton is a domestic violence victim who refused to speak with prosecutors about a domestic incident. She alleges that an investigator from the Office then delivered two fake subpoenas to her home. The fake subpoenas demanded that she appear at the Office for questioning. Singleton did not comply.
1 Article 66 provides: Upon written motion of the attorney general or district attorney setting forth reasonable grounds therefor, the court may order the clerk to issue subpoenas directed to the persons named in the motion, ordering them to appear at a time and place designated in the order for questioning by the attorney general or district attorney respectively, concerning any offense under investigation by him.
Id. 2 In addition to the individual Plaintiffs who received fake subpoenas, Plaintiff Silence Is Violence (“SIV”) also brings subpoena-related claims. SIV is a nonprofit victim advocacy organization that alleges that it diverted resources to protecting crime victims from Defendants’ “coercive tactics.” This case also involves other Plaintiffs whose claims are not relevant to this appeal.
2

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 Plaintiff Lazonia Baham’s daughter’s boyfriend was murdered. The Office charged a suspect with committing the murder. Baham spoke at her home and over the telephone with two investigators from the Office about the murder. One of the investigators allegedly pressured Baham to provide testimony that contradicted her memory of the events. In the following months, Baham received several fake subpoenas demanding that she appear for private meetings at the Office. Baham refused to comply. A Defendant assistant district attorney (“ADA”) then applied for a material witness warrant based on Baham’s refusal to meet with the Office. Baham was jailed for over a week as a result. She has since testified twice in pretrial proceedings in the case, apparently pursuant to lawful subpoenas. The case has not yet gone to trial. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a victim of child molestation and child pornography. While the criminal case against the suspect was pending, a Defendant ADA and an investigator delivered a fake subpoena to Doe’s home demanding that she appear for questioning at the Office. The ADA threatened to seek Doe’s arrest if she did not comply. Due to her fear of being jailed, Doe met privately with the ADA at the Office. The defendant in the related criminal case entered a guilty plea fifteen months after Doe received the fake subpoena. Plaintiffs Fayona Bailey and Tiffany LaCroix were both potential witnesses in two different murder cases. They each received a fraudulent subpoena demanding a private meeting at the Office prior to trial. Both Bailey and LaCroix retained counsel, who moved to quash the fake subpoenas. In response to the motions to quash, prosecutors withdrew the subpoenas. Neither Bailey nor LaCroix was ever called to testify. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in federal court, asserting various federal constitutional claims for monetary and injunctive relief against the assistant
3

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 district attorneys and Cannizzaro in his individual capacity (collectively, “Individual Defendants”), and against Cannizzaro in his official capacity. Plaintiffs also asserted individual- and official-capacity claims under Louisiana state law for abuse of process (Count VIII) and fraud (Count IX).
Defendants moved to dismiss. They contended that absolute immunity barred each of Plaintiffs’ damages claims against Individual Defendants. They asserted that five of those same claims should also be dismissed based on qualified immunity. Finally, they argued that all of Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
The district court granted absolute or qualified immunity for Individual Defendants on all but two of Plaintiffs’ federal individual-capacity damages claims.3 It later granted qualified immunity on the two remaining federal individual-capacity claims for monetary damages that it allowed to proceed. As relevant here, the district court denied absolute immunity for Individual Defendants only with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims arising from Individual Defendants’ creation and use of the fake subpoenas. The court reasoned that absolute immunity did not cover Individual Defendants’ “ultra vires conduct,” which was not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” because Individual Defendants had “side-stepped the judicial process” and “operated outside of the process legally required by the Louisiana Code of
3 Absolute and qualified immunity protect only individuals from claims for damages; they do not bar official-capacity claims or claims for injunctive relief. See Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The rule in this circuit is that a Louisiana district attorney, sued in his or her official capacity, is a local government official who is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Neither absolute nor qualified personal immunity extends to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983.”). Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims (1) for damages and injunctive relief against Cannizzaro in his official capacity and (2) against Individual Defendants for injunctive relief remain.
4

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 Criminal Procedure.” The district court also granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the remaining claims for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Defendants appealed.
Jurisdiction & Standard of Review The district court had federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It had supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction over Defendants’ interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of absolute immunity. Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 2015). But as discussed in Section III.B. infra, we lack jurisdiction over Defendants’ appeal of the district court’s rulings on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. Loupe v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 2016). “In determining immunity, we accept the allegations of [the plaintiffs’] complaint as true.” Id. (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122 (1997)).
Discussion Individual Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ subpoena-related claims. They also ask us to reverse the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining claims on the merits. We conclude that (1) at this early, motion to dismiss stage, Individual Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for Plaintiffs’ subpoenarelated state-law claims and (2) we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
5

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/21/2020

Absolute Immunity

No. 19-30197

Individual Defendants first claim that they are absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ claims arising from the use of the fake subpoenas.4 Although they may yet be able to prevail on this claim, we disagree with their argument at this stage of the case.

1. Overview of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity for § 1983 Claims
The Supreme Court extended absolute immunity for § 1983 claims to state prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In that case, a criminal defendant whose conviction had been overturned sued the prosecutor, several police officers, and a fingerprint expert, alleging “a conspiracy among them unlawfully to charge and convict him.” Id. at 415–16. But the Court concluded that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims based on activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. Thus, the Court held that a state prosecutor who acts “within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” is absolutely immune from § 1983 claims for violating a “defendant’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 410.
In discussing absolute immunity, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that ‘it is the interest in protecting the proper functioning of the office, rather than the interest in protecting its occupant, that is of primary importance.’” Loupe, 824 F.3d at 538 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125). “Thus, ‘the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed

4 The only remaining claims that implicate absolute immunity are Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Louisiana law tracks federal law on absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 947, 950 (La. 1996) (“[W]e have harmonized our own state immunity rules with federal immunity principles in the past”); accord Tickle v. Ballay, 259 So. 3d 435, 438–39 (La. Ct. App. 2018).
6

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 by a prosecutor.’” Loupe, 824 F.3d at 538 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)).
Instead, the Supreme Court has taken a “functional approach” to absolute immunity that “emphasize[s] that the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). More specifically, the Court distinguishes between (1) actions taken “in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role as an advocate for the State,” and (2) “administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
In Buckley, the petitioner sued “prosecutors for allegedly fabricating evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime and making false statements at a press conference announcing the return of an indictment.” Id. at 261. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutors were not absolutely immune for allegedly fabricating evidence because they lacked “probable cause to arrest [the] petitioner or initiate judicial proceedings” at the time of the alleged fabrication. Id. at 274. Thus, the prosecutors’ “mission at that time was entirely investigative in character.” Id. Importantly, however, the Court also recognized that “a determination of probable cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken afterwards. Even after that determination, . . . a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ that is entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. at 274 n.5; see also id. at 276 (“When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same, . . . the immunity that protects them is also the same.”).
We have adhered to this functional approach to absolute immunity. We have held that conduct protected by absolute immunity “is not limited ‘only to
7

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 the act of initiati[ng judicial proceedings] itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom,’ but instead includes all actions ‘which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role as an advocate of the State.’” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–73). Thus, prosecutors are absolutely immune even for “[w]ilful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct . . . if it occurs in the exercise of their advocatory function.” Cousin, 325 F.3d at 635. But by the same token, “state prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they perform functions other than their quasi-judicial functions of ‘initiating prosecutions and presenting the State’s case.’” Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431).
The policy underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity is twofold. First, “the ‘special nature’ of the responsibilities of those engaged in the judicial process requires that such persons be accorded absolute immunity when they participate in that process.” Marrero, 625 F.2d at 507 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (noting that “public trust” would suffer if prosecutors were thinking about their own liability in making prosecutorial decisions). This is relevant because
The prosecutor’s immunity is derived from the absolute immunity accorded judges and grand jurors, an immunity necessitated by the concern that these actors in the judicial process required by law to make important decisions regarding the initiation, conduct, and merit of controversies which often excite “the deepest feelings” of the parties would be intimidated in the exercise of their discretion by the fear of retaliatory lawsuits brought by angry defendants. A prosecutor’s fear of liability could, in a variety of ways, seriously undermine the criminal justice system’s goal of accurately determining the guilt or innocence of defendants. Marrero, 625 F.2d at 507 (citation omitted) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 509).
8

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 But “when a prosecutor acts outside his quasi-judicial role, he is not making decisions comparable to those of a judge or grand juror. Thus, subjecting him to liability for such decisions will not interfere to the same degree with the effective functioning of the criminal judicial system.” Marrero, 625 F.2d at 508; see also Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343 (“We have held that absolute immunity does not apply when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal investigation, . . . when the prosecutor makes statements to the press, . . . or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application.”). So “[o]nly discretion that is quasi-judicial in nature requires absolute insulation from suit because only such discretion is so crucial to the effectiveness of the truth-finding process to outweigh the countervailing policy that government officials should be subject to suit for violations of civil rights.” Id. For this reason, “when a prosecutor makes an investigative decision” comparable to that of a police officer—such as whether to order a search and seizure—the prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. Instead, he is given the same immunity a police officer would have: qualified immunity. Id. “The second reason justifying absolute immunity for prosecutors engaged in quasi-judicial activities is that ‘the safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.’” Marrero, 625 F.2d at 509 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512). But “when a prosecutor steps outside the confines of the judicial setting, the checks and safeguards inherent in the judicial process do not accompany him, and thus there is greater need for private actions to curb prosecutorial abuse and to compensate for abuse that does occur.” Marrero, 625 F.2d at 509.
9

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 2. Whether Individual Defendants Are Entitled to Absolute
Immunity
Plaintiffs allege that Individual Defendants used fraudulent subpoenas to pressure crime victims and witnesses to meet with them outside of court. Both the Ninth Circuit and our court have issued decisions involving somewhat analogous facts. We discuss the relevant decisions in turn.
In Lacey v. Maricopa County, the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutor who had improperly issued fake subpoenas was not entitled to absolute immunity for his conduct. 693 F.3d 896, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2012). The prosecutor had created purported subpoenas and issued them to a news organization without the prior grand jury or court approval required by Arizona law. Id. at 909. The plaintiffs alleged that the prosecutor’s avoidance of the judicial subpoena process was intentional. Id. at 914. In denying absolute immunity, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[p]rosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct before grand juries because that conduct is integral to ‘the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ But we can find no justification for extending absolute immunity to the acts of a prosecutor designed to avoid the ‘judicial phase.’” Id. at 913 (citations omitted) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that usually, “the judicial process . . . serves as ‘a check on prosecutorial actions.’” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 492). But that oversight had failed in Lacey “because the prosecutor acted on his own authority, rather than securing the approvals required by Arizona law.” 693 F.3d at 914. Thus, even if authoring a subpoena might, in another context, be considered part of a prosecutor’s duties, “by avoiding judicial scrutiny, [the prosecutor’s] actions were one step ‘further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). The court concluded: “Where the
10

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 prosecutor has side-stepped the judicial process, he has forfeited the protections the law offers to those who work within the process.” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914.
Similarly, in Loupe, we held that although the prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity for her decision to prosecute the plaintiff, she was not absolutely immune for ordering his warrantless arrest. 824 F.3d at 539–40. We noted that in ordering a warrantless arrest, a prosecutor
acts directly to deprive someone of liberty; he steps outside of his role as an advocate of the state before a neutral and detached judicial body and takes upon himself the responsibility of determining whether probable cause exists, much as police routinely do. Nothing in the procuring of immediate, warrantless arrests is so essential to the judicial process that a prosecutor must be granted absolute immunity. Id. at 540 (quoting Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914). Recalling the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Lacey, we concluded that “[o]rdering a warrantless arrest is not intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process; it is conduct outside the judicial process and therefore is not protected by absolute immunity.” Loupe, 824 F.3d at 540. Defendants argue that creating and issuing the fake subpoenas was protected prosecutorial conduct because it “relate[d] to the core prosecutorial function of preparing evidence and testimony for trial.” But the Supreme Court has squarely rejected this broad interpretation of absolute immunity: “Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 495; see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (declining to extend immunity to investigative conduct merely because it might later “be retrospectively described as ‘preparation’” for a judicial proceeding).
11

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197
Based upon the pleadings before us at this time, it could be concluded
that Defendants’ creation and use of the fake subpoenas was not “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” but rather fell into
the category of “those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” See
Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe Cty., 591 F.3d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This is so for two reasons. First,
Defendants allegedly used the subpoenas to gather information from crime
victims and witnesses outside of court.5 “Investigation . . . ha[s] historically
and by precedent been regarded as the work of police, not prosecutors, and [it
does] not become [a] prosecutorial function[] merely because a prosecutor has
chosen to participate.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 173–74 (denying
absolute immunity and noting that “a prosecutor has no power to subpoena a
5 Judging from the operative complaint, it is not clear whether charges were filed in the domestic violence case against Singleton’s partner when Singleton received the fake subpoenas. We recognize that Plaintiffs Baham, Doe, Bailey, and LaCroix received subpoenas while related criminal cases were pending but, based upon the allegations before us, the fake subpoenas were never used to secure their attendance or testimony in any judicial proceeding. Thus, their situations are not governed by Cousin, in which the defendant prosecutor told a witness to falsely implicate a suspect and practiced with him on how to testify at trial while the trial was pending. See Cousin, 325 F.3d at 634–35. In Cousin, we concluded that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity because his actions were “intended to secure evidence that would be used in the presentation of the state’s case at the pending trial of an already identified suspect, not to identify a suspect or establish probable cause.” Id. But there the actions occurred during a pending trial and were designed to shape a witness’s testimony at that trial. Here, by contrast, Individual Defendants’ alleged use of the fake subpoenas on Plaintiffs occurred earlier in the process. Baham received several fake subpoenas over the course of several months after she stopped taking calls from investigators. The facts before us do not support an argument that the reasons for sending Baham the fake subpoenas qualify for absolute immunity. Doe met privately with a Defendant ADA at the Office but does not allege that the ADA expressed any intent to use her testimony in the pending trial. Both Bailey and LaCroix received fake subpoenas demanding private meetings at the Office, but the complaint does not allege that prosecutors sought to use Bailey or LaCroix’s testimony at trial. Indeed, prosecutors withdrew the fake subpoenas and never called Bailey or LaCroix to testify.
12

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 witness to appear outside of judicial proceedings to answer questions from the prosecution”). Defendants’ information-gathering is more analogous to investigative police work than advocatory conduct.
Defendants assert that their use of the fake subpoenas is like the Imbler “prosecutor’s out-of-court effort ‘to control the presentation of his witness’ testimony,’” which the Supreme Court held was “fairly within his function as an advocate.” But they overlook the context of the Court’s statement. In Imbler, the petitioner argued that the prosecutor had engaged in investigative, not prosecutorial, activity when he requested “during a courtroom recess that [police] hold off questioning [a witness] about a pending bad-check charge until after [the witness] had completed his testimony.” 424 U.S. at 430 n.32. The Supreme Court determined that “[s]een in its proper light,” the prosecutor’s “request of the officers was an effort to control the presentation of his witness’ testimony, a task fairly within his function as an advocate.” Id.
Here, in contrast, Defendants were not attempting to control witness testimony during a break in judicial proceedings. Instead, they allegedly used fake subpoenas in an attempt to pressure crime victims and witnesses to meet with them privately at the Office and share information outside of court. Defendants never used the fake subpoenas to compel victims or witnesses to testify at trial. Such allegations are of investigative behavior that was not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
Defendants also note that the fake subpoenas were all issued after charges had been filed in the underlying criminal cases. It is true that the Supreme Court in Buckley relied on the prosecutors’ lack of probable cause to conclude that they were not absolutely immune for allegedly fabricating evidence. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. But the Court also recognized that even after probable cause has been found, “a prosecutor may engage in ‘police
13

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 investigative work’ that is entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. at 274 n.5. The Supreme Court has never held that the timing of a prosecutor’s actions controls whether the prosecutor has absolute immunity. Instead, the Court focuses on the function the prosecutor was performing. See id. at 273; Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342. Defendants’ use of the fake subpoenas in an attempt to obtain information from crime victims and witnesses outside the judicial context falls into the category of investigative conduct for which prosecutors are not immune. Hoog-Watson, 591 F.3d at 438 (“[A] prosecutor does not enjoy absolute immunity for acts of investigation or administration.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In using the fake subpoenas, Individual Defendants also allegedly intentionally avoided the judicial process that Louisiana law requires for obtaining subpoenas. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 66. Their creation and use of the fake subpoenas thus fell “outside the judicial process.” Loupe, 824 F.3d at 540; see also Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914 (“[B]y avoiding judicial scrutiny, [the prosecutor’s] actions were one step ‘further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings.’” (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 342)). Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the creation and use of the fake subpoenas constituted investigative conduct for which Individual Defendants would not be absolutely immune.
Denying Individual Defendants dismissal based upon absolute immunity for their creation and use of the fake subpoenas also accords with the policy underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity. Individual Defendants allegedly violated the rights of victims and witnesses with no cases pending against them. Denying them absolute immunity will not deter prosecutors’ future decisions to charge specific defendants. Moreover, because Individual Defendants issued the subpoenas without court supervision, they operated free of “the checks and safeguards inherent in the judicial process.” Marrero, 625
14

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 F.2d at 509. As a result, “there is greater need for private actions to curb prosecutorial abuse and to compensate for abuse that does occur.” Id. This case is likely Plaintiffs’ only means of legally redressing the harms they suffered as a result of Individual Defendants’ alleged conduct. At the same time, further facts may develop that support Individual Defendants’ defense. We leave open whether Individual Defendants may satisfy their burden of showing absolute immunity at the summary judgment stage. See HoogWatson, 591 F.3d at 437 n.6 (stating in the summary judgment context that “the defendant who pleads the affirmative defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity bears the burden of proving that the conduct at issue served a prosecutorial function”). We offer no opinion on the future; we simply affirm the district court’s decision presented to us.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in denying the Individual Defendants absolute immunity for their alleged creation and use of fake subpoenas at this stage of the case.
Merits Jurisdiction Defendants also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to
dismiss a number of claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. But we lack jurisdiction over this part of Defendants’ appeal.
Defendants first argue that “[b]ecause the district court denied qualified immunity with respect to several claims against several Defendants,” we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of those claims. See Bosarge, 796 F.3d at 439 (stating that an appellate court reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds has “‘jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of [the] pleadings,’ which is an ‘issue of law’ that ‘is both inextricably intertwined with, and directly implicated by, the qualified immunity defense’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672–73 (2009)). Defendants also contend that
15

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/21/2020
No. 19-30197 even though Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims and claims for injunctive relief are “not directly at issue in this immunity appeal, the Court can and should consider and grant relief as to these claims to the extent that they turn on issues closely related to, or inextricably intertwined with, the immunity issues.”
But as a result of a recent ruling by the district court, no qualified immunity issues are currently before us. The only remaining immunity question is whether Individual Defendants are absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ state-law claims concerning the subpoenas. This question does not implicate the merits of Plaintiffs’ federal claims. We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ federal claims at this stage of the appeal.
Defendants also ask us to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims. They rely on cases in which this court, reviewing appeals from denials of qualified immunity on federal claims, exercised pendent jurisdiction to review the merits of related state-law claims.
But pendent jurisdiction is inapposite here. “Only where essential to the resolution of properly appealed collateral orders should courts extend their [collateral-order] jurisdiction to rulings that would not otherwise qualify for expedited consideration.” Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (quoting Riyaz A. Kanji, The Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 YALE L.J. 511, 530 (1990)). Defendants do not contend that resolving the legal sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims is essential to our resolution of the absolute immunity issue. We thus lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
16

Case: 19-30197 Document: 00515390634 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/21/2020 No. 19-30197 Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s holding that Individual Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged creation and use of fraudulent subpoenas. We DISMISS the remainder of Defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
17