U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18−cv−00578−JEB

SM,TYPE−L

DAMUS et al v. NIELSEN et al Assigned to: Judge James E. Boasberg Cases: 1:15−cv−00011−JEB
1:19−cv−01593−JEB Cause: 05:0706 Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/15/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

ANSLY DAMUS

represented by Dennis B. Auerbach COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One City Center 850 Tenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001−4956 202−662−5226 Email: dauerbach@cov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eleni R. Bakst HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 75 Broad Street 31st Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 845−5200 Fax: (212) 845−5299 TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Eunice Lee UC Hastings Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 200 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 581−8836 Fax: (415) 581−8824 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judy Rabinovitz AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549−2618 Fax: (212) 549−2654 Email: jrabinovitz@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael King Thomas Tan AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004

(212) 519−7848 Email: mtan@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION Immigrants' Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343−0774 Fax: (415) 395−0950 Email: skang@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 850 Tenth Street, NW One City Center Washington, DC 20001 (202) 662−6000 Email: asiegel@cov.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 915 15th Street, NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 601−4266 Fax: (202) 457−0805 Email: artspitzer@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 805 15th Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 888−7607 Fax: (202) 543−5999 Email: vieuxh@humanrightsfirst.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 805 15th Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 370−3317 Email: StottlemyerP@humanrightsfirst.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL/NEW YORK Appeals & Opinions 28 Liberty St. 28 Liberty St New York, NY 10005

Plaintiff N.J.J.R.
Plaintiff ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL

212−416−6325 Email: philip.levitz@ag.ny.gov TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Plaintiff ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO

Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address)

Plaintiff H.A.Y.

TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff A.M.M.

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff L.H.A.

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff E.E.C.S.

Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.I.L.M. on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated

Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dennis B. Auerbach (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eleni R. Bakst (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/09/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eunice Lee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judy Rabinovitz (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael King Thomas Tan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew E. Siegel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN Secretary of Department of Homeland Security; in her official capacity

Hardy Vieux (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Stottlemyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip J. Levitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 868 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 532−4824 Fax: (202) 616−8962 Email: sarah.b.fabian@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 307−8704 Email: Alexander.J.Halaska@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division − Office of Immigration Litigation 450 Fifth Street, NW Ste. 11300 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 532−4705 Email: genevieve.m.kelly@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 868 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 305−8627 Fax: (202) 307−8781 Email: kathleen.a.connolly@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Box 878

Defendant THOMAS D. HOMAN Acting Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; in his official capacity
Defendant REBECCA ADDUCCI Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office; in her official capacity
Defendant WILLIAM P. JOYCE Acting Director of the ICE El Paso Field Office; in his official capacity

Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 616−5573 Email: Victoria.M.Braga@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018

Defendant DAVID MARIN Director of the ICE Los Angeles Field Office; in his official capacity
Defendant JOHN TSOUKARIS Director of the ICE Newark Field Office; in his official capacity
Defendant GREG BRAWLEY Director of the ICE Philadelphia Field Office; in his official capacity

Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III U.S. Attorney General; in his official capacity TERMINATED: 02/28/2019
Defendant JAMES MCHENRY Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review; in his official capacity TERMINATED: 02/28/2019

Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Kathleen Ann Connolly (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sarah B. Fabian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Halaska (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve McCarthy Kelly (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/21/2018
Victoria Marie Braga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/15/2018
03/15/2018 03/15/2018

# Docket Text
1 MOTION to Proceed Anonymously and To File Supporting Exhibits Under Seal by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(jf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
2 ORDER granting 1 MOTION to Proceed Anonymously and To File Supporting Exhibits Under Seal. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 03/15/2018. (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
3 COMPLAINT against REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 4616090051) filed by A.M.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO,

03/15/2018 03/15/2018 03/19/2018 03/19/2018 03/20/2018 03/20/2018 03/20/2018 03/20/2018
03/20/2018
03/20/2018

L.I.L.M., ANSLY DAMUS, L.H.A., N.J.J.R., H.A.Y., E.E.C.S., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(jf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
4 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by All Plaintiffs. Case related to :Case No. 15−cv−011. (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
5 SEALED List of Plaintiffs Names and Pseudonyms for Purposes of This Litigation filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(zjf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Philip J. Levitz on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Arthur B. Spitzer on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
8 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 03/16/2018. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
9 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 3/16/2018. Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 5/15/2018. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
10 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. REBECCA ADDUCCI served on 3/16/2018; GREG BRAWLEY served on 3/16/2018; THOMAS D. HOMAN served on 3/16/2018; WILLIAM P. JOYCE served on 3/16/2018; DAVID MARIN served on 3/16/2018; JAMES MCHENRY served on 3/16/2018; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN served on 3/16/2018; JOHN TSOUKARIS served on 3/16/2018 (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
11 MOTION to Certify Class by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Ansly Damus, # 4 Exhibit 2 − Declaration of N.J.J.R., # 5 Exhibit 3 − Declaration of Abelardo Asensio Callol, # 6 Exhibit 4 − Declaration of Alexi Ismael Montes Castro, # 7 Exhibit 5 − Declaration of H.A.Y., # 8 Exhibit 6 − Declaration of A.M.M., # 9 Exhibit 7 − Declaration of L.H.A., # 10 Exhibit 8 − Declaration of E.E.C.S., # 11 Exhibit 9 − Declaration of L.I.L.M., # 12 Exhibit 10 − Declaration of Anne Daher, # 13 Exhibit 11 − Declaration of Caitlin Bellis, # 14 Exhibit 12 − Declaration of Carlos Spector, # 15 Exhibit 13 − Declaration of Elizabeth B. Ford, # 16 Exhibit 14 − Declaration of Jessica Miles, # 17 Exhibit 15 − Declaration of Joan Del Valle, # 18 Exhibit 16 − Declaration of Elizabeth Knowles, # 19 Exhibit 17 − Declaration of Rosina C. Stambaugh, # 20 Exhibit 18 − Declaration of Bradley Maze, # 21 Exhibit 19 − Declaration of Lauren Major, # 22 Exhibit 20 − Declaration of Philip J. Levitz, # 23 Exhibit 21 − Declaration of Michael K.T. Tan)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
12 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Judy Rabinovitz, :Firm− ACLU Foundation, Immigrants' Rights Project, :Address− 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10004. Phone No. − 212−549−2618. Fax No. − 212−549−2654 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5382701. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
13 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Michael K.T. Tan, :Firm− ACLU Foundation, Immigrants' Rights Project, :Address− 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10004. Phone No. − 212−549−2660. Fax No. − 212−549−2654 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5382706. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)

03/20/2018
03/20/2018 03/22/2018 03/22/2018 03/22/2018 03/23/2018 03/23/2018 03/23/2018 03/30/2018
03/30/2018 03/30/2018 04/03/2018
04/03/2018

14 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Stephen Kang, :Firm− ACLU Foundation, Immigrants' Rights Project, :Address− 39 Drumm Street, San Francisco, CA 94111. Phone No. − 415−343−0783. Fax No. − 415−395−0950 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5382708. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah B. Fabian on behalf of All Defendants (Fabian, Sarah) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 12 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Judy Rabinovitz. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/22/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 13 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Michael King Thomas Tan. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/22/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 14 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Stephen Bonggyun Kang. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/22/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that the parties shall jointly call the Court at 202−354−3300 on April 3, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. to discuss scheduling. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/23/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 4/3/2018 at 11:00 AM in Chambers before Judge James E. Boasberg. (nbn) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexander James Halaska on behalf of All Defendants (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 03/23/2018)
17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Stambaugh Declaration, # 4 Exhibit 2 − Spector Declaration, # 5 Exhibit 3 − Ford Declaration, # 6 Exhibit 4 − Miles Declaration, # 7 Exhibit 5 − Knowles Declaration, # 8 Exhibit 6 − Major Declaration, # 9 Exhibit 7 − Damus Declaration, # 10 Exhibit 8 − Daher Declaration, # 11 Exhibit 9 − Bellis Declaration, # 12 Exhibit 10 − Del Valle Declaration, # 13 Exhibit 11 − Maze Declaration, # 14 Exhibit 12 − N.J.J.R. Declaration, # 15 Exhibit 13 − Callol Declaration, # 16 Exhibit 14 − Castro Declaration, # 17 Exhibit 15 − H.A.Y. Declaration, # 18 Exhibit 16 − A.M.M. Declaration, # 19 Exhibit 17 − E.E.C.S. Declaration, # 20 Exhibit 18 − A.M.M. Supp. Declaration, # 21 Exhibit 19 − L.H.A. Declaration, # 22 Exhibit 20 − L.I.L.M. Declaration, # 23 Exhibit 21 − Keller Declaration, # 24 Exhibit 22 − Hiskey Declaration)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Genevieve McCarthy Kelly on behalf of All Defendants (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
19 STIPULATION regarding briefing schedule by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed in today's conference call, the Court ORDERS that, as generally stipulated 19 by the parties: 1) Defendants shall file a combined motion to dismiss and opposition to Plaintiffs' PI motion by April 20, 2018; 2) Plaintiffs shall file a combined opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss and reply in support of their PI motion by May 3, 2018; 3) Defendants shall file a reply in support of their motion to dismiss by May 9, 2018; 4) The parties shall appear for a hearing on the motions on May 17, 2018, at 11:00 a.m.; and 5) Briefing on the motion for class certification shall be held in abeyance until further Order of the Court. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/3/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 04/03/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Defendants shall file a combined motion to dismiss and opposition to Plaintiffs' PI motion by April 20, 2018. Plaintiffs shall file a combined

04/20/2018 04/23/2018 04/24/2018 04/24/2018 04/24/2018 05/03/2018 05/03/2018 05/09/2018

opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss and reply in support of their PI motion by May 3, 2018. Defendants shall file a reply in support of their motion to dismiss by May 9, 2018. Motion Hearing set for 5/17/2018 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25 before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 04/04/2018)
20 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . . . MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Request for Preliminary Injunction by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Parole Directive, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B Kelly Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Ex. D Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex. E Declaration, # 6 Exhibit Ex. F Declaration, # 7 Exhibit Ex. G Declaration)(Kelly, Genevieve) Modified on 4/23/2018 (td). (Entered: 04/20/2018)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 20 Motion to Dismiss; emailed to genevieve.m.kelly@usdoj.gov, cc'd 8 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Two−part docket entry, 2. Please refile document, 3. The main document should be the Motion to dismiss and not the Memorandum in support. Please docket all part of your documents 1. Motion and 2. Opposition. (ztd, ) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
21 NOTICE of Sealing of Exhibits by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
22 MOTION to Dismiss , MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A − Directive, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B − Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C − Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Ex. D − Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex. E − Declaration, # 6 Exhibit Ex F − Declaration, # 7 Exhibit Ex. G − Declaration, # 8 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
23 RESPONSE re 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Directive, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C Declaration, # 4 Exhibit Ex. D Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Ex. E Declaration, # 6 Exhibit Ex. F Declaration, # 7 Exhibit Ex. G Declaration, # 8 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
24 REPLY to opposition to motion re 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 − Behr Decl., # 2 Exhibit 24 − Suppl. Bellis Decl., # 3 Exhibit 25 − Suppl. Stambaugh Decl., # 4 Exhibit 26 − Suppl. Spector Decl., # 5 Exhibit 27 − Levitz Decl., # 6 Exhibit 28 − Suppl. Ford Decl., # 7 Exhibit 29 − Guinan Decl., # 8 Exhibit 30 − Suppl. L.I.L.M. Decl., # 9 Exhibit 31 − Suppl. E.E.C.S. Decl.)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
25 Memorandum in opposition to re 22 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 − Behr Decl., # 2 Exhibit 24 − Suppl. Bellis Decl., # 3 Exhibit 25 − Suppl. Stambaugh Decl., # 4 Exhibit 26 − Suppl. Spector Decl., # 5 Exhibit 27 − Levitz Decl., # 6 Exhibit 28 − Suppl. Ford Decl., # 7 Exhibit 29 − Guinan Decl., # 8 Exhibit 30 − Suppl. L.I.L.M. Decl., # 9 Exhibit 31 − Suppl. E.E.C.S. Decl.)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
26 REPLY to opposition to motion re 22 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 05/09/2018)

05/11/2018 05/17/2018
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27 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Hearing Transcript)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Motion Hearing held on 5/17/2018 re 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by E.E.C.S., L.I.L.M., H.A.Y., ANSLY DAMUS, L.H.A., A.M.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL. Oral arguments heard, and motion taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim) (nbn) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
28 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to the Court filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 05/22/2018)
29 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to the Court filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
30 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Eunice Lee, :Firm− UC Hastings Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, :Address− 200 McAllister Street, San Francisco, CA 94102. Phone No. − 415−565−4877. Fax No. − 415−581−8824 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−5499872. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that a conference call is set for Tuesday, May 29, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. The parties shall jointly call Chambers at 202−354−3300 at this time. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/25/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 5/29/2018 at 01:00 PM in Chambers before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed in today's conference call, the Court ORDERS that Defendants shall file any opposition to Plaintiffs' 11 Class Certification Motion by June 8, 2018, and Plaintiffs shall file any reply by June 15, 2018. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/29/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 30 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Eunice Lee. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/29/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 6/8/2018. Replies due by 6/15/2018. (znbn) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
31 Memorandum in opposition to re 11 MOTION to Certify Class filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of David Jennings, # 2 Exhibit Excerpt of May 17 Hearing Transcript)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 06/08/2018)
32 REPLY to opposition to motion re 11 MOTION to Certify Class filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpt of May 17 Hearing Transcript)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
33 ORDER GRANTING 17 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and GRANTING 11 Motion for Class Certification on provisional basis for the purposes of preliminary injunction. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/2/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
34 MEMORANDUM OPINION re 33 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/2/2018.

07/02/2018 07/05/2018
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(lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties shall appear for a status conference to discuss further proceedings in the case on 7/10/2018 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 25 before Judge James E. Boasberg. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/10/18.(nbn) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
35 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge James E. Boasberg held on 05/17/18; Page Numbers: 1−33. Date of Issuance:07/05/18. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced ab ove. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 7/26/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/3/2018.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 07/05/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed at today's status hearing, the Court ORDERS that: 1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss shall be held in abeyance; and 2) The parties shall submit a joint status report by July 17, 2018. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/10/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Status Conference held on 7/10/2018. Joint Status Report due by 7/17/2018. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim) (nbn) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
36 Joint STATUS REPORT by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 07/17/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: Per the parties' 36 Joint Status Report, the Court ORDERS that a conference call is hereby set for Tuesday, July 24, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. to discuss outstanding issues in the case. The Court ORDERS that the parties shall jointly call Chambers at 202−354−3300 at this time (in Chambers). So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/18/2016. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/24/2018 at 11:00 AM in Chambers before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed in today's conference call from chambers, the Court ORDERS that: 1) By July 29, 2018, the agreed−upon notice to class members shall be posted in all detention centers subject to the Court's injunction; 2) Such notice shall also be included in all parole advisals to class members; 3) Unless the directive notice to affected ICE field offices was sent from counsel, that notice shall be produced to Plaintiffs by July 27, 2018; 4) By that same date, Defendants shall inform Plaintiffs of the officials to whom that directive notice was sent; 5) By August 1, 2018, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs a preliminary list of all class members and where they are detained, and Defendants shall thereafter supplement that list as they learn of other class members; 6) Parole advisals to all class members shall be completed by August 14, 2018, and shall proceed on a staggered basis with approximately the first third being sent by July 31, 2018, a second third by August 7, 2018, and the final third by August 14, 2018, absent compelling reason; 7) Interviews shall occur within 7 days of the advisals unless the class member seeks more time or an exception in the Parole Directive applies; 8) Determinations shall be made within 7 days after interviews unless an exception in the Parole Directive applies; 9) Defendants shall submit a report to the Court by August 24, 2018, covering the information contained in the bullet

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points on page 3 of the 36 Joint Status Report; and 10) The parties shall appear for a status conference on August 28, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/24/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/24/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Report due by 8/24/2018 Status Conference set for 8/28/2018 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25 before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 07/24/2018)
37 NOTICE of Appearance by Hardy Vieux on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Vieux, Hardy) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
38 STIPULATION for Protective Order by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Kelly, Genevieve) (Entered: 08/01/2018)
39 ORDER issuing Stipulation and Protective Order. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 8/2/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
40 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed in today's status conference, the Court ORDERS that: 1) Until further Order of the Court, Defendants shall provide by the 24th of each month an updated spreadsheet regarding parole determinations through the 17th of that month; and 2) Plaintiffs may file any motion for discovery by September 7, 2018, with the Government's opposition due September 21, 2018, and Plaintiffs' reply due September 28, 2018. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 08/28/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Status Conference held on 8/28/2018. Plaintiffs may file any motion for discovery by September 7, 2018, with the Government's opposition due September 21, 2018, and Plaintiffs' reply due September 28, 2018. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (znbn) (Entered: 08/28/2018)
41 MOTION for Discovery Regarding Compliance with the Preliminary Injunction, or, Alternatively, MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Ford Decl., # 3 Exhibit 2 − Suppl. Spector Decl., # 4 Exhibit 3 − Hercules−Paez Decl., # 5 Exhibit 4 − Reyneri Decl., # 6 Exhibit 5 − Elder Decl., # 7 Exhibit 6 − Alonso Decl., # 8 Exhibit 7 − Gian−Grasso Decl., # 9 Exhibit 8 − Guzman Orellana Decl., # 10 Exhibit 9 − Casado Milanes Decl., # 11 Exhibit 10 − Corchado Decl., # 12 Exhibit 11 − Levitz Decl.)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 09/07/2018)
42 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 41 MOTION for Discovery Regarding Compliance with the Preliminary Injunction, or, Alternatively MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alexander J. Halaska, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 42 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. The Court ORDERS that Defendants shall file their Opposition to Plaintiffs' 41 Motion on or before September 25, 2018, and Plaintiffs shall file their Reply on or before October 4, 2018. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 9/11/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 09/11/2018)

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Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 9/25/2018. Replies due by 10/4/2018. (znbn) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Eunice Lee on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Lee, Eunice) (Entered: 09/14/2018)
44 ENTERED IN ERROR.....SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander); Modified on 9/26/2018 (tth). (Entered: 09/24/2018)
45 Memorandum in opposition to re 41 MOTION for Discovery Regarding Compliance with the Preliminary Injunction, or, Alternatively MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 09/25/2018)
46 MOTION for Limited Discovery by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (See Docket Entry 45 to view document) (tth) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
NOTICE OF CORRECTED DOCKET ENTRY: re 44 Sealed Document, was entered in error and counsel was instructed to refile said pleading as a Report. (ztth) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
47 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, JOHN TSOUKARIS re Notice of Corrected Docket Entry, 44 Sealed Document,, (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
48 REPLY to opposition to motion re 41 MOTION for Discovery Regarding Compliance with the Preliminary Injunction, or, Alternatively MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 10/04/2018)
49 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge James E. Boasberg held on 8−28−18; Page Numbers: 1−26. Date of Issuance:10−5−18. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa Griffith, Telephone number (202) 354−3247, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 10/26/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/5/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/3/2019.(Griffith, Lisa) (Entered: 10/05/2018)

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11/09/2018 11/13/2018 11/24/2018
11/26/2018 11/27/2018

50 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge James E. Boasberg held on 07/10/18; Page Numbers: 1−11. Date of Issuance:10/22/18. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced ab ove. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 11/12/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/22/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/20/2019.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
51 ORDER GRANTING 41 Motion for Limited Discovery. The Court ORDERS that the parties shall submit a joint status report by November 26, 2018. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 10/22/2018. (lcjeb1) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
52 MEMORANDUM OPINION re 51 Order on Motion for Limited Discovery. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 10/22/2018. (lcjeb1) (Entered: 10/22/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 11/26/2018. (znbn) (Entered: 10/23/2018)
53 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
54 JOINT STIPULATION for Protective Order (First Amended) by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Halaska, Alexander) Modified event title on 11/13/2018 (znmw). (Entered: 11/09/2018)
55 ORDER re 54 Joint Stipulation for Protective Order. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 11/13/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 11/13/2018)
56 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 11/24/2018)
57 Joint STATUS REPORT by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ADOPTS the parties' 57 Joint Status Report and ORDERS that: 1) The parties shall file a further joint status report by December 21, 2018; and 2) The parties shall appear for a status conference on January 3, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 11/27/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 11/27/2018)

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Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Joint Status Report due by 12/21/2018. Status Conference set for 1/3/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25 before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
58 NOTICE of Appearance by Eleni R. Bakst on behalf of A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (tth) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
59 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Victoria Marie Braga on behalf of All Defendants Substituting for attorney Genevieve Kelly (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
60 Joint STATUS REPORT by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit 1, # 7 Exhibit 2, # 8 Exhibit 3, # 9 Exhibit 4, # 10 Exhibit 5)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
61 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
62 Unopposed MOTION to Stay January 3 Status Hearing by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court GRANTS Defendants' 62 Motion and VACATES the status hearing set for January 3, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 12/26/2018. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
63 Unopposed MOTION to Stay Upcoming Deadlines in Light of the Lapse in Appropriations by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that Defendants' 63 Motion to Stay is GRANTED, and Defendants shall submit a further status report within 10 days after appropriations are restored. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 1/18/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
64 NOTICE of Restoration of Appropriations by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ADOPTS Defendants' 64 Notice and ORDERS that: 1) Defendants shall file their monthly status report for January 2019 no later than February 4, 2019; and 2) A status hearing is set for February 7, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 25. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 1/29/2019. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Status Report due by 2/4/2019. Status Conference set for 2/7/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
65 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso

02/07/2019 02/07/2019
02/07/2019 02/24/2019
02/28/2019
02/28/2019 03/14/2019 03/18/2019 03/18/2019 03/19/2019 03/21/2019 03/22/2019

Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 02/04/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Status Conference held on 2/7/2019. Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (znbn) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed at today's status hearing, the Court ORDERS that: 1) Defendants shall complete their document production by February 15, 2019; 2) The Court will proceed to rule on their outstanding 22 Motion to Dismiss and will then require an Answer; 3) Plaintiffs may move at any point to compel production of material redacted pursuant to 8 CFR 208.6; and 4) Following the filing of Defendants' Answer, the Court will set an ISC to discuss a discovery schedule, while permitting Defendants to object to any such discovery. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/7/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants shall complete their document production by 2/15/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
66 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 02/24/2019)
67 ORDER: The Court ORDERS that: 1) Defendants' 22 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; 2) The Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' APA claims; 3) The Motion is DENIED without prejudice as to Plaintiffs' Due−Process claim; and 4) The Motion is GRANTED as to the Attorney General and the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and those Defendants are DISMISSED from the case. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/28/2019. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
68 MEMORANDUM OPINION re 67 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/28/2019. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
69 ANSWER to 3 Complaint, by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS.(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: An Initial Scheduling Conference is set for April 15, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 25. The parties shall meet, confer, and submit a joint report pursuant to FRCP 26(f) and Local Rule 16.3. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/18/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Initial Scheduling Conference set for 4/15/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
70 MOTION for Reconsideration re Order, by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
71 RESPONSE re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration re Order, filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 03/21/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: Given the rescheduling of a criminal trial, the Court is no longer available on April 15, 2019, and thus ORDERS that the status in this matter is reset from April 15, 2019, to April 12, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/22/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 03/22/2019)

03/22/2019 03/24/2019 03/26/2019
03/27/2019 04/01/2019 04/01/2019 04/02/2019 04/08/2019

Set/Reset Hearings: Initial Scheduling Conference set for 4/12/2019 at 10:01 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
72 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 03/24/2019)
73 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge James E. Boasberg held on 05/17/2018; Page Numbers: 1−34. Date of Issuance:03/26/2019. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form
For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter reference d above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.
Redaction Request due 4/16/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/26/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/24/2019.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
74 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Corrected Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Corrected El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Corrected Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Corrected Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Corrected Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that: 1) Defendants' 70 Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED inasmuch as the parties need not propose a discovery schedule at this point; 2) Defendants shall by April 8, 2019, file a Notice indicating when they propose to file the administrative record; and 3) The parties shall still appear on April 12, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. to discuss further proceedings. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/1/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 04/01/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Defendants shall file a Notice indicating when they propose to file the administrative record by 4/8/2019. Status Conference set for 4/12/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
75 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Corrected Detroit Provisional Class List, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Corrected El Paso Provisional Class List, # 3 Exhibit 3 − Corrected Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 4 Exhibit 4 − Corrected Newark Provisional Class List, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Corrected Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
76 NOTICE Regarding Filing of Administrative Record by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 04/08/2019)

04/11/2019 04/11/2019
04/15/2019 04/15/2019 04/19/2019 04/22/2019 04/22/2019
04/22/2019 04/24/2019
04/29/2019 05/01/2019

MINUTE ORDER: In light of a scheduling conflict the Status Conference set for 4/12/2019 at 10:00 AM is VACATED and RESET for 4/19/2019 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/11/19. (znbn) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
77 MOTION for Order of Civil Contempt, MOTION to Appoint Special Master by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Parole Directive, # 2 Exhibit B − Watson Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C − Valdez Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit D − Status Conference Transcript Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit E − Email from P. Levitz to A. Halaska and V. Braga, # 6 Exhibit F − Supplemental Behr Declaration, # 7 Exhibit G − Noche Declaration, # 8 Exhibit H − Glicken Declaration, # 9 Exhibit I − Supplemental Hercules−Paez Declaration, # 10 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: Due to a scheduling conflict, the Status Conference set for April 19, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. is VACATED and RESET for April 22, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 25. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/15/2019. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 4/22/2019 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
78 NOTICE Regarding Los Angeles Spreadsheets by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Gabriel A. Valdez)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Status Conference held on 4/22/2019. Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (znbn) (Entered: 04/22/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed at today's status hearing, the Court ORDERS that: 1) The parties shall submit a joint status report by May 22, 2019, addressing how they wish to proceed in regard to the administrative record lodged May 8, 2019; and 2) The Government shall provide a corrected spreadsheet for the Los Angeles office by April 29, 2019, and the parties shall submit a proposed briefing schedule on contempt by May 1, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/22/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 04/22/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Government shall provide a corrected spreadsheet for the Los Angeles office due by 4/29/2019. Proposed Briefing Schedule due by 5/1/2019. Administrative Record due by 5/8/2019. Status Report due by 5/22/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
79 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin Raycraft, Apr. 24, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (April 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena, Apr. 24, 2019, # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (April 2019), # 5 Declaration of Ruben Perez, Jr., Apr. 23, 2019, # 6 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (April 2019), # 7 Declaration of Joseph Dunn, Apr. 23, 2019, # 8 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (April 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 04/24/2019)
80 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Gabriel A. Valdez, Apr. 26, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (April 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 04/29/2019)
81 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 77 MOTION for Order of Civil Contempt MOTION to Appoint Special Master filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Supplemental Watson Declaration)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/01/2019)

05/01/2019 05/02/2019
05/02/2019 05/07/2019 05/08/2019 05/08/2019 05/14/2019
05/21/2019
05/22/2019
05/22/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/23/2019 05/24/2019

82 Joint STATUS REPORT Regarding Proposed Briefing Schedule on Contempt Motion by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ADOPTS the parties' 82 Joint Status Report and ORDERS that: 1) Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Contempt Motion by May 14, 2019; and 2) Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their Motion by May 21, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/2/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 5/14/2019. Replies due by 5/21/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
83 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathleen Ann Connolly on behalf of All Defendants (Connolly, Kathleen) (Main Document 83 replaced on 5/8/2019) (ztth). (Entered: 05/07/2019)
84 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD Certification of Contents by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certification of Administrative Record)(Connolly, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew E. Siegel on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 05/08/2019)
86 Memorandum in opposition to re 77 MOTION for Order of Civil Contempt MOTION to Appoint Special Master filed by THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Parole Directive, # 2 Exhibit B, Halaska Decl., # 3 Exhibit C, July 24 Minute Order, # 4 Exhibit D, April 2019 N/A Parole Determinations, # 5 Exhibit E, Feb. 7 Hearing Transcript Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit F, AFOD Valdez Depo. Excerpts, # 7 Exhibit G, Parole Advisal, # 8 Exhibit H, Parole Denial Letter)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
87 REPLY to opposition to motion re 77 MOTION for Order of Civil Contempt MOTION to Appoint Special Master filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Valdez Deposition Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit B − Q&A Sheets)(Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 05/21/2019)
88 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD Certification of Supplemented Contents by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certification of Supplemented Administrative Record Contents)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 05/22/2019)
89 Joint STATUS REPORT by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 05/22/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: As the Court's experience has found simultaneous briefing unproductive, the Court ORDERS that by May 28, 2019, the parties shall submit a joint Notice with agreed−upon dates for sequential briefing. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/23/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
90 Consent MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Philip J. Levitz by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levitz, Philip) (Entered: 05/23/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Parties shall submit a joint Notice with agreed−upon dates for sequential briefing by 5/28/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING 90 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. The appearance of Attorney Philip J. Levitz is terminated. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/24/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/24/2019)

05/24/2019 05/24/2019
05/28/2019 05/28/2019 06/14/2019 06/24/2019
07/02/2019 07/02/2019 07/02/2019

91 NOTICE of Proposed Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
92 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin Raycraft, May 24, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (May 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena, May 24, 2019, # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (May 2019), # 5 Declaration of Gabriel Valdez, (May 24, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (May 2019), # 7 Declaration of Ruben Perez, May 24, 2019, # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (May 2019), # 9 Declaration of Joseph Dunn, May 24, 2019, # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (May 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 05/24/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ADOPTS the parties' 91 Proposed Briefing Schedule and ORDERS that: 1) Plaintiffs shall file their motion for summary judgment by July 10, 2019; 2) Defendants shall file their cross−motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiffs' motion by August 14, 2019; 3) Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion and opposition to Defendants' cross−motion by September 18, 2019; and 4) Defendants shall file their reply in support of their cross−motion by October 4, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 5/28/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Summary Judgment motions due by 7/10/2019. Response to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 8/14/2019. Cross Motions due by 8/14/2019. Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 9/18/2019. Response to Cross Motions due by 9/18/2019. Reply to Cross Motions due by 10/4/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
93 NOTICE of Appearance by Patricia Stottlemyer on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Stottlemyer, Patricia) (Entered: 06/14/2019)
94 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin Raycraft, June 20, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (June 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena, June 18, 2019, # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (June 2019), # 5 Declaration of Art Cortez, (June 21, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (June 2019), # 7 Declaration of Ruben Perez, June 20, 2019, # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (June 2019), # 9 Declaration of Joseph Dunn, June 17, 2019, # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (June 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 06/24/2019)
95 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Briefing Schedule by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Auerbach, Dennis) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING Plaintiffs' 95 Motion for Extension of Time. The Court ORDERS that: 1) Plaintiffs shall file their motion for summary judgment by July 19, 2019; 2) Defendants shall file their cross−motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiffs' motion by August 23, 2019; 3) Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motion and opposition to Defendants' cross−motion by September 27, 2019; and 4) Defendants shall file their reply in support of their cross−motion by October 15, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/2/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/02/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Summary Judgment motions due by 7/19/2019. Response to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 8/23/2019. Cross Motions due by 8/23/2019. Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 9/27/2019. Response to Cross Motions due by 9/27/2019. Reply to Cross Motions due by 10/15/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

07/03/2019 07/03/2019 07/03/2019 07/19/2019
07/24/2019
07/25/2019 08/20/2019

MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that a conference call in Chambers is hereby set for Wednesday, July 3, 2019, at 3:00 p.m. The parties shall dial into Chambers' toll−free conference−call number, (877) 402−9753, at this time (in Chambers). Chambers will contact the parties via email with the dial−in code. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/3/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephone Conference set for 7/3/2019 at 03:00 PM in Chambers before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed in today's telephone status conference and because Defendant's parole−grant rates at the Los Angeles Field Office have risen in its last Report, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs' 77 Motion for Civil Contempt shall be held in abeyance pending the rates disclosed in the next Report(s). So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 7/3/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 07/03/2019)
96 WITHDRAWN PURSUANT TO THE MINUTE ORDER FILED ON 1/29/2020..... MOTION for Summary Judgment , MOTION for Permanent Injunction by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Declaration of Andrew E. Siegel, # 4 Exhibit 1 − Declaration of Rosina C. Stambaugh, # 5 Exhibit 2 − Declaration of Carlos Spector, # 6 Exhibit 3 − Declaration of Elizabeth B. Ford, Esq., # 7 Exhibit 4 − Declaration of Jessica Miles, Esq., # 8 Exhibit 5 − Declaration of Elizabeth Knowles, # 9 Exhibit 6 − Declaration of Lauren Major, Esq., # 10 Exhibit 7 − Declaration of Ansly Damus, # 11 Exhibit 8 − Declaration of Allen S. Keller, # 12 Exhibit 9 − Declaration of N.J.J.R., # 13 Exhibit 10 − Declaration of Abelardo Asensio Callol, # 14 Exhibit 11 − Declaration of Alexi Ismael Montes Castro, # 15 Exhibit 12 − Declaration of H.A.Y., # 16 Exhibit 13 − Declaration of A.M.M., # 17 Exhibit 14 − Declaration of L.H.A., # 18 Exhibit 15 − Declaration of E.E.C.S., # 19 Exhibit 16 − Declaration of L.I.L.M., # 20 Exhibit 17 − Parole Directive, # 21 Exhibit 18 − Declaration of Anne Daher, # 22 Exhibit 19 − Kelly Memorandum, # 23 Exhibit 20 − Albence Memorandum, # 24 Exhibit 21 − Declaration of Caitlin Bellis, Esq., # 25 Exhibit 22 − Declaration of Joan Del Valle, Esq., # 26 Exhibit 23 − Declaration of Bradley Maze, Esq., # 27 Exhibit 24 − Excerpt of Transcript (Gabriel Anthony Valdez), # 28 Exhibit 25 − Excerpt of Transcript (Joseph David Dunn), # 29 Exhibit 26 − Excerpt of Transcript (Mark J. Hamilton), # 30 Exhibit 27 − Excerpt of Transcript (Diane Lynn Witte), # 31 Exhibit 28 − Excerpt of Transcript (Ruben Perez), # 32 Exhibit 29 − Declaration of Jennifer Ritchey, # 33 Exhibit 30 − Declaration of Rebecca Adducci, # 34 Exhibit 31 − Declaration of Andre Quinones, # 35 Exhibit 32 − Supplemental Declaration of A.M.M., # 36 Exhibit 33 − Sangiacomo Article, # 37 Text of Proposed Order)(Siegel, Andrew) Modified on 2/3/2020 (znbn). (Entered: 07/19/2019)
97 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin Raycraft, July 22, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (July 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena, July 18, 2019, # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (July 2019), # 5 Declaration of Art Cortez, July 19, 2019, # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (July 2019), # 7 Declaration of Ruben Perez, July 24, 2019, # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (July 2019), # 9 Declaration of Joseph Dunn, July 19, 2019, # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (July 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
98 NOTICE Regarding Status Reports by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
99 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Alexander J. Halaska)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 08/20/2019)

08/21/2019
08/21/2019 08/23/2019
08/26/2019 08/26/2019 09/03/2019 09/04/2019 09/04/2019 09/09/2019 09/16/2019 09/16/2019 09/19/2019 09/20/2019

MINUTE ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 99 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants shall file their opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment by September 20, 2019. Plaintiffs shall file their Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment by November 15, 2019. Defendants shall file their Reply in Support of their Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment by December 13, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 08/21/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 9/20/2019. Cross Motions due by 9/20/2019. Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 11/15/2019. Response to Cross Motions due by 11/15/2019. Reply to Cross Motions due by 12/13/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
100 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kevin Raycraft, Aug. 16, 2019, # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Aug. 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena, Aug. 19, 2019, # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Aug. 2019), # 5 Declaration of Art Cortez, (Aug. 19, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Aug. 2019), # 7 Declaration of Ruben Perez, Aug. 21, 2019, # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Aug. 2019), # 9 Declaration of Joseph Dunn, Aug. 20, 2019, # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Aug. 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 08/23/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that Defendants shall file any response to Plaintiffs' 98 Notice by September 3, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 08/26/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 08/26/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 9/3/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 08/26/2019)
101 RESPONSE by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS re 98 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Herrera Declaration)(Braga, Victoria) Modified event title on 9/4/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 09/03/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that the parties shall appear on September 19, 2019, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 25 for a status conference to discuss whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted and advisable in regard to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 09/04/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/19/2019 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
102 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE Attorney Eleni R. Bakst terminated. (ztth) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
103 MOTION to Permit Telephonic Appearance of Counsel by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Tan, Michael) Modified event on 9/17/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 09/16/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING Plaintiffs' 103 Motion. The Court ORDERS that Attorney Michael Tan may appear by telephone for the status hearing set for September 19, 2019, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 25. The Court will call Mr. Tan shortly before the status hearing. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 09/16/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Status Conference held on 9/19/2019. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (nbn) (Entered: 09/19/2019)
104 WITHDRAWN PURSUANT TO THE MINUTE ORDER FILED ON 1/29/2020.....Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M.

09/20/2019 09/24/2019
09/28/2019 09/30/2019 09/30/2019 10/21/2019 10/21/2019 10/22/2019 10/22/2019

NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Statement of Facts, # 3 Supplement − Defendants' Statement of Genuine Issues, # 4 Declaration of Alexander J. Halaska, # 5 Exhibit 1 − Parole Memorandum of Agreement (Sept. 2008), # 6 Exhibit 2 − Parole Directive (Dec. 2009), # 7 Exhibit 3 − Kelly Memo (Feb. 2017), # 8 Exhibit 4 − Albence Memo (Feb. 2017), # 9 Exhibit 5 − Albence Email (June 2017), # 10 Exhibit 6 − Detroit Email Response (June 2017), # 11 Exhibit 7 − El Paso Email Response (June 2017), # 12 Exhibit 8 − Los Angeles Email Response (June 2017), # 13 Exhibit 9 − Newark Email Response (June 2017), # 14 Exhibit 10 − Philadelphia Email Response (June 2017), # 15 Exhibit 11 − Hamilton Dep. (Dec. 2018), # 16 Exhibit 12 − Witte Dep. (Dec. 2018), # 17 Exhibit 13 − Valdez Dep. (Dec. 2018), # 18 Exhibit 14 − Perez Dep. (Dec. 2018), # 19 Exhibit 15 − Dunn Dep. (Dec. 2018), # 20 Exhibit 16 − Jennings Decl. (June 2018), # 21 Exhibit 17 − Adducci Decl. (Apr. 2018), # 22 Exhibit 18 − Witte Decl. (Apr. 2018), # 23 Exhibit 19 − Quinones Decl. (Apr. 2018), # 24 Exhibit 20 − Perez Decl. (Apr. 2018), # 25 Exhibit 21 − Ritchey Decl. (Apr. 2018), # 26 Exhibit 22 − Bennett Decl. (Sept. 2019), # 27 Exhibit 23 − Blank Parole Denial Letter)(Halaska, Alexander) Modified on 2/3/2020 (znbn). (Entered: 09/20/2019)
105 Memorandum in opposition to re 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN. (See Docket Entry 104 to view document). (znmw) (Entered: 09/23/2019)
106 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Ronald Whalen (Sept. 23, 2019), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Sept. 2019), # 3 Declaration of Sandra Marinelarena (Sept. 19, 2019), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Sept. 2019), # 5 Declaration of Art Cortez (Sept. 24, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Sept. 2019), # 7 Declaration of Ruben Perez (Sept. 18, 2019), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Sept. 2019), # 9 Declaration of Joseph Dunn (Sept. 2019), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Sept. 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 09/24/2019)
107 STIPULATION , Jointly, to Evidentiary Hearing Date by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 09/28/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ADOPTS the parties' 107 Stipulation and ORDERS that an Evidentiary Hearing is set for Wednesday, October 30, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 09/30/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
Set/Reset Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing set for 10/30/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge James E. Boasberg. (znbn) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
108 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Extend Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
109 MOTION to Take Deposition from Andre Quinones and Unidentified Statistics Witness by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING Plaintiffs' 108 Motion for Extension of Time. The Court ORDERS that: (1) Plaintiffs' Reply and Opposition shall be due on November 22, 2019; and (2) Defendants' Reply shall be due December 20, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 10/22/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
110 Memorandum in opposition to re 109 MOTION to Take Deposition from Andre Quinones and Unidentified Statistics Witness filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN,

10/22/2019 10/24/2019
10/26/2019 10/28/2019 10/28/2019 10/30/2019
10/30/2019 10/30/2019 10/31/2019 11/06/2019 11/06/2019 11/06/2019

KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Reply and Opposition due by 11/22/2019. Defendants' Reply due by 12/20/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
111 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Oct. 21, 2019), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Oct. 2019), # 3 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Oct. 21, 2019), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Oct. 2019), # 5 Declaration of A. Cortez (Oct. 18, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Oct. 2019), # 7 Declaration of R. Perez (Oct. 18, 2019), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Oct. 2019), # 9 Declaration of J. Dunn (Oct. 21, 2019), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List)(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 10/24/2019)
112 NOTICE of Defendants' Exhibits for Evidentiary Hearing by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Valdez Decl., # 2 Exhibit B − Quinones Decl.)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 10/26/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs' 109 Motion to Depose is DENIED. Both sides will have an opportunity to cross−examine witnesses at the hearing. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 10/28/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
113 NOTICE Regarding Supplementing the Certified Administrative Record by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS (Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge James E. Boasberg: Evidentiary Hearing held on 10/30/2019. Oral arguments heard. The Court ORDERS that the plaintiff shall file Supplemental Brief due by 11/13/2019. Government Responses due by 12/4/2019. Plaintiff Reply due by 12/11/2019. Witnesses: Gabriel Valdez, Bernard Robyn, and Andre Quinones. (Court Reporter Lisa Griffith) (nbn) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
114 Exhibit List by A.M.M., ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (znbn) (Entered: 11/01/2019)
115 Exhibit List by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (znbn) (Entered: 11/01/2019)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed at the conclusion of yesterday's hearing, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs' supplemental brief on contempt shall be due by November 13, 2019, with Defendants response due by December 4, 2019, and Plaintiffs' reply by December 11, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 10/31/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
116 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Briefs on Contempt by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 11/06/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING Plaintiffs' 116 Motion for Extension of Time. The Court ORDERS that: 1) Plaintiffs shall file their supplemental brief by November 20, 2019; 2) Defendants shall file their supplemental brief by December 11, 2019; and 3) Plaintiffs shall file their reply by December 18, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 11/6/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 11/06/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Supplemental Brief due by 11/20/2019. Defendant Supplemental Brief due by 12/11/2019. Replies due by 12/18/2019. (znbn) (Entered: 11/07/2019)

11/20/2019 11/20/2019 11/20/2019 11/20/2019 11/22/2019
12/11/2019
12/18/2019 12/20/2019 12/24/2019
12/27/2019

117 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R. (Siegel, Andrew) Modified eventon 11/25/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 11/20/2019)
MINUTE ORDER GRANTING the parties' 117 Motion to Hold in Abeyance. The Court ORDERS that the parties shall submit a joint status report by December 20, 2019. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 11/20/2019. (lcjeb2) (Entered: 11/20/2019)
118 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 77 MOTION for Order of Civil Contempt MOTION to Appoint Special Master filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Andrew E. Siegel, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Pierce v. County of Orange)(Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 11/20/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 12/20/2019. (nbn) (Entered: 11/21/2019)
119 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Nov. 20, 2019), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Nov. 2019), # 3 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Nov. 19, 2019), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Nov. 2019), # 5 Declaration of A. Cortez (Nov. 18, 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Nov. 2019), # 7 Declaration of R. Perez (Nov. 19, 2019), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Nov. 2019), # 9 Declaration of J. Dunn (Nov. 20, 2019), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Nov. 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 11/22/2019)
120 RESPONSE re 118 Supplemental Memorandum, filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, JAMES MCHENRY, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, # 2 Exhibit B, Parole Directive, # 3 Exhibit C, Valdez Decl., # 4 Exhibit D, Albence Memo, # 5 Exhibit E, Kelly Memo, # 6 Exhibit F, Valdez E−Mail, # 7 Exhibit G, Quinones E−Mail, # 8 Exhibit H, Barnard Client Parole Advisals)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 12/11/2019)
121 REPLY re 118 Supplemental Memorandum, filed by A.M.M., ABELARDO ASENSIO CALLOL, ANSLY DAMUS, E.E.C.S., H.A.Y., L.H.A., L.I.L.M., ALEXI ISMAEL MONTES CASTRO, N.J.J.R.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Excerpt of Transcript, # 2 Exhibit B − Jennings Appendix)(Siegel, Andrew) (Entered: 12/18/2019)
122 Joint STATUS REPORT by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
123 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Dec. 2019), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Dec. 2019), # 3 Declaration of A. Cortez (Dec. 2019), # 4 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Dec. 2019), # 5 Declaration of R. Perez (Dec. 2019), # 6 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Dec. 2019), # 7 Declaration of J. Dunn (Dec. 2019), # 8 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Dec. 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 12/24/2019)
124 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Dec. 2019), # 2 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Dec. 2019))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 12/27/2019)

01/23/2020 01/23/2020 01/24/2020
01/28/2020 01/29/2020
01/29/2020 02/07/2020 02/07/2020 02/24/2020
03/24/2020

MINUTE ORDER: The Court ORDERS that the parties shall submit a status report with proposals for how they wish to proceed on their summary−judgment briefing by January 28, 2020. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 1/23/2020. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 1/28/2020 (lsj) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
125 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Jan. 21, 2020), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Jan. 2020), # 3 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Jan. 20, 2020), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Jan. 2020), # 5 Declaration of A. Cortez (Jan. 17, 2020), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Jan. 2020), # 7 Declaration of R. Perez (Jan. 16, 2010), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Jan. 2020), # 9 Declaration of J. Dunn (Jan. 21, 2020), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Jan. 2020))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
126 Joint STATUS REPORT Regarding the Summary−Judgment Briefing Schedule by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS. (Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 01/28/2020)
MINUTE ORDER: Per the parties' 126 Status Report, the Court ORDERS that: 1) The parties' [96, 104] Motions for Summary Judgment are WITHDRAWN WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and 2) Plaintiffs' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment shall be due September 29, 2020, with Defendants' Cross−Motion and Opposition due October 27, 2020, Plaintiffs' Opposition and Reply due November 24, 2020, and Defendants' Reply due December 15, 2020. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 1/29/2020. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 01/29/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Summary Judgment motions due by 9/29/2020. Response to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 10/27/2020. Cross Motions due by 10/27/2020. Response to Cross Motions due by 11/24/2020. Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment due by 11/24/2020. Reply to Cross Motions due by 12/15/2020. (nbn) (Entered: 01/29/2020)
127 ORDER DENYING IN PART Motion for Contempt and setting additional measures. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/7/2020. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 02/07/2020)
128 MEMORANDUM OPINION re 127 Order on Motion for Contempt. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/7/2020. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 02/07/2020)
129 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Feb. 2020), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Feb. 2020), # 3 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Feb. 2020), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Feb. 2020), # 5 Declaration of J. Sanchez (Feb. 2020), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Feb. 2020), # 7 Declaration of R. Perez (Feb. 2020), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Feb. 2020), # 9 Declaration of P. Morgan (Feb. 2020), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Feb. 2020))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 02/24/2020)
130 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of R. Whalen (Mar. 2020), # 2 Exhibit − Detroit Provisional Class List (Mar. 2020), # 3 Declaration of S. Marinelarena (Mar. 2020), # 4 Exhibit − El Paso Provisional Class List (Mar. 2020), # 5 Declaration of J. Sanchez (Mar. 2020), # 6 Exhibit − Los Angeles Provisional Class List (Mar. 2020), # 7 Declaration of R. Perez (Mar. 2020), # 8 Exhibit − Newark Provisional Class List (Mar. 2020), # 9 Declaration of J. Dunn (Mar. 2020), # 10 Exhibit − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Mar. 2020))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 03/24/2020)

03/24/2020 04/24/2020

131 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Braga, Victoria) (Entered: 03/24/2020)
132 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by REBECCA ADDUCCI, GREG BRAWLEY, THOMAS D. HOMAN, WILLIAM P. JOYCE, DAVID MARIN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JOHN TSOUKARIS(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Whelan Decl., # 2 Exhibit 2 − Detroit Provisional Class List (Apr. 2020), # 3 Exhibit 3 − Marinelarena Decl., # 4 Exhibit 4 − El Paso Provisional Class List (Apr. 2020), # 5 Exhibit 5 − Sanchez Decl., # 6 Exhibit 6 − Los Angeles Provisional Class List, # 7 Exhibit 7 − Los Angeles Quality Assurance Certification (Apr. 2020), # 8 Exhibit 8 − Perez Decl., # 9 Exhibit 9 − Newark Provisional Class List (Apr. 2020), # 10 Exhibit 10 − Dunn Decl., # 11 Exhibit 11 − Philadelphia Provisional Class List (Apr. 2020))(Halaska, Alexander) (Entered: 04/24/2020)

 
 Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 3 Filed 03/15/18 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Ansly DAMUS, Geauga County Safety Center, 12450

)

Merritt Road, Chardon, OH 44024; N.J.J.R., Essex County )

Correctional Facility, 354 Doremus Ave., Newark, NJ 07105; )

Abelardo Asensio CALLOL, York County Prison, 3400

)

Concord Rd., York, PA 17402; Alexi Ismael Montes

)

CASTRO, York County Prison, 3400 Concord Rd., York, PA )

17402; H.A.Y., El Paso Processing Center, 8915 Montana )

Ave., El Paso, TX 79925; A.M.M., Otero County Processing )

Center, 26 McGregor Range Road, Chaparral, NM 88081; )

L.H.A., El Paso Processing Center, 8915 Montana Ave., El )

Paso, TX 79925; E.E.C.S., James A. Musick Facility, 13502 )

Musick Road, Irvine, CA 92618; and L.I.L.M., James A.

)

Musick Facility, 13502 Musick Road, Irvine, CA 92618, on )

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

Kirstjen NIELSEN, Secretary of the Dep’t of Homeland

)

Security, in her official capacity, Washington, DC 20528; )

Thomas HOMAN, Acting Director for U.S. Immigration and )

Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity, 500 12th

)

Street, SW, Washington, DC 20536; Rebecca ADDUCCI, )

Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office, in her official

)

capacity, c/o Office of the General Counsel, Department of )

Homeland Security, Mail Stop 3650, Washington, DC 20528; )

William JOYCE, Acting Director of the ICE El Paso Field )

Office, in his official capacity, c/o Office of the General

)

Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Mail Stop 3650, )

Washington, DC 20528; David MARIN, Director of the ICE )

Los Angeles Field Office, in his official capacity, c/o Office )

of the General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, )

Mail Stop 3650, Washington, DC 20528; John TSOUKARIS, )

Director of the ICE Newark Field Office, in his official

)

capacity, c/o Office of the General Counsel, Department of )

Homeland Security, Mail Stop 3650, Washington, DC 20528; )

Greg BRAWLEY, Director of the ICE Philadelphia Field )

Office, in his official capacity, c/o Office of the General

)

Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Mail Stop 3650, )

Washington, DC 20528; Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. )

Attorney General, in his official capacity, 950 Pennsylvania )

Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20530; James MCHENRY,

)

Director of the Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 5107 )

Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, VA 22041,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Civil Action No. _________
Class Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 3 Filed 03/15/18 Page 2 of 29
CLASS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiffs bring this class action to enjoin a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) policy and practice of categorically detaining asylum seekers in order to deter others from seeking refuge in the United States.
2. Plaintiffs are all asylum seekers who traveled to the United States, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, and were referred for immigration proceedings to decide their asylum claims. All of them have sponsors in the United States who are prepared to provide them with housing and ensure they attend their court hearings, and none of them have criminal records or history of violence. Yet DHS has imprisoned them during the pendency of their asylum cases, with no individualized review of whether their detention is necessary.
3. In R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015), this Court preliminarily enjoined a DHS policy of detaining families seeking asylum that was designed to “send[] a message of deterrence” to other migrants. Id. at 188-89. Applying established Supreme Court precedent, the Court held in its preliminary-injunction ruling that immigration detention could not lawfully be founded on general deterrence—which may inform criminal, but not civil, detention. The Court, moreover, found that the government’s conclusory incantations of “national security” could not support a deterrence-based detention policy. Id. at 189-90.
4. Notwithstanding R.I.L-R., DHS has now unlawfully embarked on an even broader policy of detaining asylum seekers on deterrence grounds at five U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Field Offices across the country (the
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“Deterrence Policy”). With the approval of ICE Headquarters, and in violation of a longstanding DHS directive precluding detention of asylum seekers except in unusual cases (“Parole Directive”), these five Field Offices have detained virtually all adults who request asylum at a port of entry to the United States. The five Field Offices have detained these asylum seekers based not on individualized determinations that they pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, but rather to deter other migrants from seeking refuge here.
5. Detaining asylum seekers to deter others, without even considering whether individuals are flight risks or dangers to the community, violates the Parole Directive (which generally bars the detention of asylum seekers who pose neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community), the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, even if DHS’s current parole policy were not based on deterrence, it would be unlawful for DHS to engage in virtually blanket detention of asylum seekers without individualized determinations of flight risk or danger to the community. The fact that the Policy is based on general deterrence—which cannot be a basis for civil detention—makes it even clearer that the Policy is unlawful. See R.I.L-R., 80 F. Supp. at 189.
6. Ensuring that asylum seekers have access to a meaningful parole process has become even more critical in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The Court in Jennings held that parole is the only exception to detention under the INA for asylum seekers who presented themselves at ports of entry to the United States, and that this “express exception to detention implies
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that there are no other circumstances under which [such] aliens . . . may be released.” Id. at 844 (emphasis omitted). The Deterrence Policy, however, effectively and unlawfully eliminates this opportunity for release at the five ICE Field Offices, leaving asylum seekers within these Field Offices with no meaningful way to avoid detention during the pendency of their asylum cases.
7. ICE data suggests that, as a result of the Deterrence Policy, more than a thousand individuals in the last year have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty for nothing more than seeking refuge in a nation that has provided it to countless others since its founding. Each additional day of detention exacerbates the grave risk to the mental and physical health of these individuals. Absent intervention by this Court, thousands more asylum seekers will suffer the same fate. The Court should enjoin the Deterrence Policy and require Defendants to provide Plaintiffs and other proposed class members with individualized determinations of flight risk and danger to the community before subjecting them to detention.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus); and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act). Defendants have waived sovereign immunity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702. 9. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because multiple defendants reside in this District, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this District.
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PARTIES 10. Plaintiffs are asylum seekers who presented themselves to immigration authorities at a U.S. port of entry, were found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture in their home countries, and have been referred for proceedings inside the United States to decide their asylum claims. They are all detained pursuant to the Deterrence Policy. 11. Ansly Damus, a former ethics teacher, is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing political persecution—including beating and death threats—in his home country, Haiti. Fearing for his life, Mr. Damus came to the United States in October 2016. An asylum officer found that he had a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. Although an immigration judge has granted him asylum—twice—the government appealed both determinations, and Mr. Damus has remained in detention pending the government’s repeated appeals. In late January 2017 and February 2018, the Detroit ICE Field Office denied Mr. Damus’ requests for release on parole pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, even though he established his identity, identified a sponsor with whom he could live, and showed that he poses no flight risk or danger to the community. As a result, Mr. Damus has been detained in ICE custody for the last 16 months—with no end in sight. Mr. Damus is currently detained at the Geauga County Safety Center in Chardon, Ohio. 12. N.J.J.R. is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing beating and threats from armed groups that seek to eliminate opposition to the Venezuelan government. Fearing for his life, N.J.J.R. presented himself to immigration officers in October 2017. An asylum officer found that N.J.J.R. had a credible fear of persecution
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and referred him for removal proceedings. The Newark ICE Field Office denied N.J.J.R’s requests for release on parole pursuant to its Deterrence Policy, even though he has established his identity, identified a sponsor with whom he could live, and shown he poses no flight risk or danger to the community. N.J.J.R. has been detained for over four months. He is currently detained at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey.
13. Abelardo Asensio Callol is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing persecution at the hands of the Cuban government due to his refusal to be a part of the Cuban Communist Party and attend a rally held in memory of Fidel Castro. Fearing for his life, Mr. Callol presented himself to immigration officers in December 2017. An asylum officer found that Mr. Callol had a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. ICE denied Mr. Callol parole without ever interviewing him on his eligibility for parole. Mr. Callol submitted several requests to ICE asking how to submit additional documentation that would establish his identity and demonstrate that he is not a flight risk and that he has sponsors with whom he can live. ICE has not responded to any of his requests. Mr. Callol has been detained for over three months. Currently he is detained at the York County Prison in York, Pennsylvania.
14. Alexi Ismael Montes Castro is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing harassment, assault, and threats at gunpoint in Honduras because he is gay. Fearing for his life, Mr. Montes Castro presented himself to immigration officers and sought asylum in November 2017. An asylum officer found that Mr. Montes Castro had a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. Mr. Montes Castro was not even aware that he could request release on parole until he received a
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boilerplate letter from ICE in January 2018, denying him parole pursuant to the Deterrence Policy. ICE never interviewed him to determine his eligibility for parole. ICE denied Mr. Montes Castro parole even though he provided the government with his birth certificate and explained that he had a relative in Virginia willing to provide him housing and support in the course of requesting asylum. Mr. Montes Castro has been detained for about four months. Currently he is detained at the York County Prison in York, Pennsylvania.
15. H.A.Y. and A.M.M. are a wife and husband seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing a criminal cartel in Mexico that sought to take control of their home, cattle, and farm. Fearing for their lives, the couple came to the United States in December 2017. Asylum officers found that they each had a credible fear of persecution and referred them both for removal proceedings. In February 2018, the El Paso ICE Field Office denied both H.A.Y.’s and A.M.M.’s requests for parole pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, even though they had established their identities, identified a sponsor with whom they could live, and shown that they pose no flight risk or danger to the community. H.A.Y. and A.M.M. have been detained for over two months. H.A.Y. is currently detained at the El Paso Processing Center in El Paso, Texas. A.M.M. was separated from his wife and is currently detained at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico.
16. L.H.A. is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing a dangerous gang in El Salvador, which attempted to recruit and extort money from him, and threatened to kill him and his family. Fearing for his life, L.H.A. came to the United States in May 2016. An asylum officer found that L.H.A. had a credible fear of
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persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. On June 14, 2017, L.H.A. applied for parole, but the El Paso ICE Field Office denied L.H.A.’s request for parole pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, even though he had established his identity, identified a sponsor with whom he could live, and shown he poses no flight risk or danger to the community. L.H.A. has been detained for more than twenty-one months. He is currently detained at the El Paso Processing Center in Texas.
17. E.E.C.S. is seeking asylum in the United States after the dangerous MS-13 gang in El Salvador beat him and threatened to kill him, and Salvadoran police targeted him. Fearing for his life, E.E.C.S. presented himself to U.S. immigration officers in December 2017. An asylum officer found that E.E.C.S. had a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. The Los Angeles ICE Field Office denied E.E.C.S.’s request for parole pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, even though he has established his identity, identified a sponsor with whom he could live, and shown that he poses no flight risk or danger to the community. E.E.C.S. has been detained for over three months. E.E.C.S. is currently detained at the James A. Musick detention facility in Irvine, California.
18. L.I.L.M. is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing a dangerous criminal cartel in Mexico. Fearing for his life, L.I.L.M. presented himself to U.S. immigration officers in October 2017. An asylum officer found that L.I.L.M. had a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal proceedings. L.I.L.M. submitted two requests for parole, submitting evidence of his identity and letters of support from a family member who can serve as his sponsor. The Los Angeles ICE Field Office orally denied both his parole requests without providing him any explanation or
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written decision. L.I.L.M. has been detained for over four months. L.I.L.M. is currently detained at the James A. Musick detention facility in Irvine, California.
19. Defendant Kirstjen Nielsen is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). In this capacity, she directs each of the component agencies within DHS, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Defendant Nielsen is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and policies pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103, including those laws and policies regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
20. Defendant Thomas D. Homan is sued in his official capacity as the Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE, the sub-agency that operates the government’s immigration detention system. In this capacity, Defendant Homan directs the administration of ICE’s detention policies and operations, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
21. Defendant Rebecca Adducci is sued in her official capacity as Director of the Detroit ICE Field Office. In this capacity, Defendant Adducci is responsible for ICE detention policies and operations in the Detroit District, which covers detention facilities in Michigan and Ohio, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
22. Defendant William P. Joyce is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of the El Paso ICE Field Office. In this capacity, Defendant Joyce is responsible for ICE detention policies and operations in the El Paso District, which covers detention
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facilities in New Mexico and West Texas, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
23. Defendant David Marin is sued in his official capacity as Director of the Los Angeles ICE Field Office. In this capacity, Defendant Marin is responsible for ICE detention policies and operations in the Los Angeles District, which covers detention facilities in the Los Angeles area, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
24. Defendant John Tsoukaris is sued in his official capacity as Director of the Newark ICE Field Office. In this capacity, Defendant Tsoukaris is responsible for ICE detention policies and operations in the Newark District, which covers detention facilities in the New Jersey area, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
25. Defendant Greg Brawley is sued in his official capacity as Director of the Philadelphia ICE Field Office. In this capacity, Defendant Brawley is responsible for ICE detention policies and operations in the Philadelphia District, which covers detention facilities in Pennsylvania, including those policies and operations regarding the detention of arriving asylum seekers.
26. Defendant Jefferson Sessions is the Attorney General of the United States and the most senior official in the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). He has the authority to interpret the immigration laws and adjudicate custody hearings for detained immigrants. The Attorney General delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which administers the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). He is named in his official capacity.
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27. Defendant James McHenry is the Director of EOIR, the agency within DOJ responsible for the immigration courts and the BIA. He is named in his official capacity.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Legal Framework Governing Parole of Asylum Seekers. 28. Under the INA, a person who is subjected to expedited removal who requests asylum at a port of entry to the United States must first demonstrate a credible fear of persecution in his or her home country during an interview with an immigration officer—meaning there is a “significant possibility” that the individual is eligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If an individual establishes a credible fear of persecution, he or she is then entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to adjudicate the asylum claim. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f). 29. There typically is an interval of several months between an asylum seeker’s credible-fear interview with an immigration officer and a decision on his or her asylum claim by an immigration judge. During that period, DHS must determine whether the individual should be detained or released pending resolution of the asylum claim. That resolution can take more than a year or even several years if it involves appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) or a federal court of appeals. 30. Pursuant to the INA and implementing regulations, asylum seekers who do not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community may be paroled by DHS during the pendency of their immigration cases on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c).
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31. DHS issued the Parole Directive in 2009.1 The Parole Directive defines the circumstances under which there is a “significant public benefit” to granting parole pursuant to the INA and implementing regulations. The Parole Directive provides that, absent exceptional overriding factors, an asylum seeker who has established a credible fear of persecution should be granted parole in the “public interest” and released from detention while pursuing his or her asylum claims if the individual (a) establishes his or her identity to the satisfaction of DHS; and (b) presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community. Parole Directive ¶ 6.2.
32. DHS’s policy, reflected in the Parole Directive, against the detention of asylum seekers who have credible claims to asylum ensures that the government adheres to constitutional prohibitions against arbitrary detention. Asylum seekers, including those detained at ports of entry into the United States, are “persons” who may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the Due Process Clause, as well as the INA and its implementing regulations, preclude DHS from subjecting a bona fide asylum seeker to long-term civil immigration detention absent an individualized determination that the individual poses a flight risk or is a danger to the community.
33. Until recently, DHS relied on the Parole Directive to grant parole to thousands of asylum seekers with a credible fear, based on individualized findings that their detention was unnecessary. This is not surprising: the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers who establish a credible fear lack any criminal history, pose no threat to
1 ICE Directive 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hdparole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf.
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public safety, and do not need to be detained to ensure their appearance for court proceedings.2
34. DHS has not revoked or amended the Parole Directive. Indeed, in
February 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly stated that the Parole Directive
“remain[s] in full force and effect” pending the DHS Secretary’s “further review and evaluation.”3 DHS has not withdrawn or amended the Parole Directive since that time.
35. The government also represented to the Supreme Court of the United States last year that the Parole Directive remains “in ‘full force and effect.’”4 The
government emphasized that the Parole Directive generally requires DHS “to release the
alien if he establishes his identity [and] demonstrates that he is not a flight risk or
danger,” and requires an individualized analysis that “calls for far more than checking a box on a form.”5
36. So long as the Parole Directive remains in effect, it is binding on ICE, and
its provisions must be applied to asylum seekers who establish a credible fear of
persecution. See Abdi v. Duke, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373, 2017 WL 5599521, at *28
2 See, e.g., Mark Noferi, A Humane Approach Can Work: The Effectiveness of Alternatives to Detention for Asylum Seekers, at 1, 3 (July 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/a_humane_appr oach_can_work_the_effectiveness_of_alternatives_to_detention_for_asylum_seekers.pdf (summarizing research showing that asylum seekers are predisposed to comply with legal processes). 3 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies, at 9-10 (Feb. 20, 2017) (“Kelly Memorandum”), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-thePresidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf. 4 Pet. Suppl. Reply Br., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, at 6 n.2 (U.S. filed Feb. 21, 2017) (quoting the Kelly Memorandum at 10). 5 Id. at 6-7 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017), injunction clarified, 2018 WL 798747 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-94 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2018).
B. The Unlawful Detention of Virtually All Asylum Seekers at Five ICE Field Offices.
37. DHS has, since the Trump Administration took office last year, implemented a de facto policy of denying parole in virtually all cases at its Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia Field Offices (“the ICE Field Offices”). Altogether, these ICE Field Offices detain approximately 24 percent of ICE’s total average daily detention population.
38. ICE data suggests that the ICE Field Offices likely denied at least 1,000 requests for parole by arriving asylum seekers during 2017. Between February and September 2017,6 the ICE Field Offices denied parole at the following rates: Detroit officers denied 63 of 64 parole requests, or 98 percent of cases; El Paso officers denied 349 of 349 parole requests, or 100 percent of cases; Los Angeles officers denied 326 of 354 parole requests, or 92 percent of cases; Newark officers denied 10 of 10 parole requests, or 100 percent of cases; and Philadelphia officers denied 43 of 43 cases, or 100 percent of cases.
39. This is a dramatic change from ICE’s past practice pursuant to the Parole Directive. Between 2011 and 2013, the ICE Field Offices paroled 92 percent of arriving asylum seekers pursuant to the Directive. More recently, the parole rate began to fall, dropping to less than 4 percent on average across the ICE Field Offices during the period from February through September 2017.
6 September 2017 data is the the most recent data available to Plaintiffs.
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40. Since the Trump Administration came into office, officers in the ICE Field Offices repeatedly have told detainees and their attorneys that parole will no longer be granted.
41. The ICE Field Offices are no longer following the requirements of the Parole Directive. Asylum seekers routinely are not notified of the availability of parole, in violation of the Parole Directive. See Parole Directive, §§ 6.1, 8.1 (requiring DHS officers to provide asylum seeker with parole advisal “[a]s soon as practicable following a credible fear determination”). When notification is provided, the ICE officer does not “explain the contents of the notification to the [asylum seeker] in a language he or she understands,” also in violation of the Parole Directive. Id. § 8.1. Some asylum seekers are denied parole even before they are notified of their ability to seek it, again in violation of the Parole Directive. Others are not given interviews before their parole requests are denied, likewise in violation of the Parole Directive. See id. § 8.2 (requiring parole interview generally “no later than seven days” after asylum seeker passes credible fear screening). Indeed, sometimes the ICE Field Offices simply do not respond to asylum seekers’ parole requests at all.
42. Even where the ICE Field Offices ostensibly consider parole requests, they no longer provide individualized determinations of flight risk and danger, in violation of the Parole Directive. See id. § 6.2. Instead, the ICE Field Offices issue denials that give no indication that the evidence in support of the parole request has been considered. The denials typically come in the form of very short form letters that contain boilerplate language and/or checkboxes indicating that the asylum seeker poses a “flight risk” or has not sufficiently demonstrated her identity. These form denials provide no
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explanation of why the asylum seeker has been denied parole or any indication that the request was given any individualized consideration at all, again in violation of the Parole Directive. See id. § 8.2 (“The letter must include a brief explanation of the reasons for denying parole.”). The form denials also typically come in English, including for asylum seekers who do not understand English—another violation of the Parole Directive. See id. The denials also often do not inform the asylum seeker of her right to seek redetermination of the denial, which is yet another violation. See id.
43. As a result, many asylum seekers who clearly satisfy the Parole Directive’s criteria for release are denied parole. The ICE Field Offices grant release only in extremely narrow circumstances—such as medical emergencies or a shortage in detention bed space. The result is that numerous individuals for whom detention serves no permissible purpose are being deprived of their liberty—for months or even years—as they wait for their asylum claims to be adjudicated.
44. Officials at ICE Headquarters are fully aware of and have permitted the ICE Field Offices to implement this policy. The Parole Directive specifically requires ICE Headquarters to analyze periodic reporting on parole decisions and take corrective action as needed. See Parole Directive ¶¶ 8.11, 8.12. Although ICE Headquarters has been aware of detention practices across the ICE Field Offices for more than a year, it has taken no action to require the ICE Field Offices to follow the Parole Directive.
45. Another federal court recently held that ICE officers at ICE’s Buffalo, New York Field Office violated the Parole Directive through their blanket detention of asylum seekers. In November 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York found that the government had engaged in a class-wide practice of issuing
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“blanket denials” to parole requests that failed to analyze each case “‘on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual alien’s case,’” in violation of the Parole Directive. Abdi, 2017 WL 5599521, at *23. The court granted a preliminary injunction requiring, among other things, that the Buffalo ICE Field Office “immediately adjudicate” the parole requests of a class of detained asylum seekers “in conformance with [its] legal obligations, including [its] obligations under the [Parole] Directive.” Id. at *28.
C. The Deterrence Motive Behind the Virtually Blanket Detention at the ICE Field Offices.
46. DHS’s de facto policy of denying parole in virtually all cases at the ICE Field Offices, without individualized determinations of flight risk or danger to the community, would be unlawful regardless of the motive behind that policy. But here, that illegality is exacerbated by the policy’s unlawful motive. The Deterrence Policy is plainly motivated by the Trump Administration’s goal of deterring other asylum seekers from seeking refuge in the United States. As this Court found in its preliminary injunction ruling in R.I.L-R., deterrence of others—which is a function of criminal law— is not a permissible basis for civil immigration detention. See R.I.L-R., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189-90.
47. The Trump Administration’s own words establish that the Deterrence Policy is indeed deterrence-based. Executive Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017), makes detention central to the Administration’s efforts to deter what it considers unauthorized migration. The Order makes it the policy of the Executive Branch to “detain individuals apprehended on suspicion of violating . . . Federal immigration law, pending further
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proceedings regarding those violations.” Id. at 8793. This new detention policy aims, in part, “to secure the Nation’s southern border” and “prevent further illegal immigration into the United States.” Id. at 8793.
48. On February 20, 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly issued the Kelly Memorandum, which implemented the Executive Order through “new policies designed to stem illegal immigration and facilitate the . . . . detention and removal of aliens who have no lawful basis to enter or remain in the United States.”7 The Kelly Memorandum did not rescind the Parole Directive, and, indeed, stated that the Directive “remain[s] in full force and effect” pending the DHS Secretary’s “further review and evaluation.”8 Nonetheless, the Kelly Memorandum articulated that DHS would broadly detain migrants as a means of deterring other migrants from coming to the United States. This in turn has resulted in Defendants violating the Parole Directive at the ICE Field Offices by effectuating the Deterrence Policy.
49. With respect to detention, the Kelly Memorandum states that “[t]he President has determined that the lawful detention of aliens arriving in the United States . . . pending a final determination of whether to order them removed, including determining eligibility for immigration relief, is the most efficient means by which to enforce the immigration laws at our borders.”9 To that end, “[p]olicies that facilitate the release of removable aliens apprehended at and between the ports of entry . . . collectively referred to as ‘catch-and-release,’ shall end.”10
7 Kelly Memorandum at 1. 8 Id. at 9-10. 9 Id. at 2. 10 Id.
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50. An earlier draft of the Kelly Memorandum states the Administration’s deterrence goals in even clearer terms. The draft expressly states that DHS’s new enforcement policies—including its expanded use of detention to end “catch-andrelease”—were “designed to deter illegal immigration,” and that “[t]he President has determined that the lawful detention of arriving aliens pending a determination of their inadmissibility and eligibility for immigration relief has a significant deterrent effect on illegal immigration.”11 The final version of the memorandum merely replaces “deter illegal immigration” with “stem illegal immigration,” and “significant deterrent effect” with “most efficient means by which to enforce the immigration laws.” Despite these cosmetic revisions, which were presumably made to create the appearance that the memo does not violate R.I.L-R. and the authorities on which it is based, the purpose of DHS’s new detention policies remains clear: the deterrence of migration to the United States.
51. Since the Kelly Memorandum was issued, the Trump Administration has continued to emphasize its goal of deterring migration through detention. A recent White House Framework on Immigration Reform & Border Security provides that “[t]he Department of Homeland Security must have tools to deter illegal immigration.” Specifically, the Administration pledges to “[d]eter illegal entry” by ending “catch-andrelease and by closing legal loopholes that have eroded our ability to secure the immigration system and protect public safety.”12
11 Memorandum from John Kelly, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2017) (draft) (emphases added), http://www.aila.org/infonet/leaked-dhs-memo-on-implementation-of-presidents. 12 White House Framework on Immigration Reform & Border Security (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/white-house-framework-immigrationreform-border-security/.
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52. The ICE Field Offices’ detention practices for asylum seekers directly reflect the Trump Administration’s commitment to arbitrary detention as a strategy of immigration enforcement and deterrence.
53. Notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s deterrence goals, detaining current asylum seekers will not deter future asylum seekers. Individuals who flee violence and persecution and come to the United States in fear of their lives and safety will not be deterred by the threat of detention.13
D. The Deterrence Policy Causes Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Members Irreparable Harm.
54. Defendants’ categorical detention of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, without any individualized review of flight risk and danger to the community, has caused Plaintiffs and those similarly situated irreparable harm.
55. Detention facilities for asylum seekers are punitive and abusive.14 ICE uses secure facilities to detain asylum seekers, including jails designed to hold individuals charged with or convicted of crimes. Asylum seekers detained in secure facilities are often subjected to physical and verbal abuse at the hands of security personnel. Medical and mental healthcare at ICE detention facilities is typically inadequate.
13 See Jonathan Hiskey, et al., Understanding the Central American Refugee Crisis: Why They Are Fleeing and How U.S. Policies Are Failing to Deter Them (American Immigration Council 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/understanding_t he_central_american_refugee_crisis.pdf. 14 See, e.g., USCIRF, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, Volume I: Findings and Recommendations, at 60-61, 68-69 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I. pdf.
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56. The detention of asylum seekers causes them psychological and physical
trauma. Confined detainees have little information or control over their environments and often experience circumstances similar to “sensory deprivation.”15 They develop
feelings of “helplessness and hopelessness that lead to debilitating depressive symptoms,
chronic anxiety, despair, dread,” Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and suicidal ideation.16 Some attempt suicide.
57. Asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable to trauma because detention may exacerbate traumas they have experienced in the past.17 The court in the Abdi case
found that class members’ “physical and psychological impairments” resulting from their
“prolonged confinement” established that detainees were irreparably harmed. 2017 WL
5599521, at *23. These deleterious impacts of detention begin immediately and worsen
over time.
58. Detention also impairs asylum seekers’ ability to adequately prepare for
and litigate their asylum hearings. See id. Representation is crucial to prevailing on an asylum claim,18 yet detention makes it much less likely that asylum seekers can secure
lawyers, gather evidence, and prepare their asylum cases. Detention centers under the
15 Physicians for Human Rights, Punishment Before Justice: Indefinite Detention in the U.S., at 7-11 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/indefinite-detentionjune2011.pdf. 16 Id. at 11. 17 Id. at 26-27; see also Physicians for Human Rights and Bellevue/NYU Program for Survivors of Torture, From Persecution to Prison: The Health Consequences of Detention for Asylum Seekers at 2 (2003) (study of 70 detained asylum seekers finding that 86 percent experienced symptoms of depression, 77 percent anxiety, and 50 percent PTSD). 18 See, e.g., TRAC Immigration, Asylum Representation Rates Have Fallen Amid Rising Denial Rates (Nov. 28, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491/ (reporting government data showing represented asylum seekers are five times more likely to win asylum than pro se litigants).
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jurisdiction of several of the ICE Field Offices are located in remote locations, far from pro bono immigration lawyers, making it very difficult for individuals to obtain legal advice. Detention further curtails access to counsel by imposing strict limitations on attorney access and attorney communications. For those asylum seekers able to secure representation, the conditions of detention impair their ability to develop trusting relationships with attorneys, which are necessary to prepare their claims for protection.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 59. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. The proposed class is defined as follows: (1) All arriving asylum seekers; (2) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture; and (3) who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (4) after having been denied parole under the authority of ICE’s Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, or Philadelphia Field Office. 60. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to ICE data, from February to September 2017 alone, the ICE Field Offices denied nearly 800 requests for parole by asylum seekers who passed their credible fear interviews. This data suggests that, since late January 2017, more than 1,000 asylum seekers likely have been detained and denied parole pursuant to Defendants’ Deterrence Policy, and therefore have satisfied the class definition. Many more individuals will become class members in the future. 61. Whether the Deterrence Policy is lawful presents common questions of fact and law. All class members have been subjected to a common Deterrence Policy.
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The facts and circumstances surrounding that policy thus concern all class members. The issues regarding the legality of the Deterrence Policy also apply to the class as a whole.
62. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. Plaintiffs and the class of individuals they seek to represent have all been detained pursuant to the policies and practices described above. The legal claims raised by Plaintiffs are identical to the class claims.
63. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives because they seek the same relief as the other members of the class: that Defendants be enjoined from applying the Deterrence Policy and required to determine custody based on an individualized determination of each migrant’s flight risk and danger to the community through the parole process and at a custody hearing before an immigration judge. Plaintiffs do not have any interests adverse to those of the class as a whole.
64. The proposed class would be represented by counsel from the ACLU, Covington & Burling LLP, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, and Human Rights First. Counsel have extensive experience litigating class action lawsuits, including lawsuits on behalf of immigration detainees. Counsel also have significant legal and factual expertise on the detention of asylum seekers.
65. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class by applying the Deterrence Policy to all class members. Thus, injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.
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CAUSES OF ACTION First Claim
(Administrative Procedure Act) Unlawful Failure to Follow and/or Effective Rescission the ICE Parole Directive
66. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set forth herein.
67. Pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, Defendants have detained Plaintiffs and similarly-situated persons without parole reviews that conform to the requirements of the Parole Directive.
68. Through the Deterrence Policy, DHS has violated and/or de facto rescinded the Parole Directive without providing any reasoned justification for its change in policy.
69. DHS’s violation and/or effective rescission of its own Parole Directive while representing that the Directive remains in full force and effect is unlawful.
70. Defendants’ actions are arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, in violation of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
Second Claim (Administrative Procedure Act – Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
and Implementing Regulations) Failure to Provide an Individualized Determination of Flight Risk and Danger
71. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set forth herein.
72. Pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, Defendants have detained Plaintiffs and persons similarly situated, without having made individualized determinations through the parole-review process that such detention is necessary based on flight risk or danger
24

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to the community. Defendants have done so to deter other asylum seekers from seeking refuge in the United States.
73. Defendants’ Deterrence Policy constitutes final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy. This action governs parole decisions made by ICE agents at the ICE Field Offices pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b), and will govern parole decisions made at those field offices in the future. Because of the Deterrence Policy, Plaintiffs and those similarly situated have been or will be detained without individualized parole review on flight risk or danger.
74. Under the INA and implementing regulations, immigration detention of an asylum seeker must be based on an individualized determination that the asylum seeker constitutes a flight risk or a danger to the community. Detention based on general deterrence of others is not permissible. Accordingly, the Deterrence Policy violates the INA and its implementing regulations.
Third Claim (Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution) Failure to Provide an Individualized Determination of Flight Risk and Danger
75. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set forth herein.
76. The Due Process Clause provides that “no person . . . shall be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. V.
77. Asylum seekers who present themselves at a port of entry to the United States are “persons” who may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law under the Due Process Clause.
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78. The Due Process Clause permits civil immigration detention of an asylum seeker only where such detention is reasonably related to the government’s interests in preventing flight or protecting the community from danger. Thus, due process requires an individualized assessment of flight risk or danger to the community to determine whether detention is justified.
79. In addition, particularly where detention is prolonged, due process requires a custody hearing before a neutral decision-maker to determine if detention is necessary.
80. Pursuant to the Deterrence Policy, Defendants have detained Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons without individualized determinations of flight risk or danger to the community through the parole process or at a custody hearing before a neutral decision-maker. Thus, the Deterrence Policy violates the Due Process Clause.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: a. Certify this case as a class action lawsuit, as proposed herein, appoint Plaintiffs as
class representatives, and appoint the undersigned counsel as class counsel; b. Declare that the Deterrence Policy is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law; c. Enter an order enjoining Defendants from detaining Plaintiffs and proposed class
members absent parole reviews that result in individualized determinations that detention is necessary to prevent flight or danger to the community and that conform to the other requirements of the Parole Directive; d. Enter an order enjoining Defendants from subjecting Plaintiffs and proposed class members to prolonged detention absent a custody hearing before an immigration
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Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 3 Filed 03/15/18 Page 27 of 29 judge to determine if detention is necessary to prevent flight or danger to the community;
e. Award Plaintiffs’ counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act and any other applicable statute or regulation; and
f. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and appropriate.
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Dated: March 15,2018

Respectfully submitted.

Judy Rabinovitz
Michael K.T. Tan American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation,Immigrants'Rights
Project
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004
(212)549-2618
Stephen B. Kang
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation,Immigrants'Rights
Project 39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 343-0783
Hardy Vieux(D.C. Bar No.474762)
Laura Gault*
Human Rights First
805 15th Street, N.W.,Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202)547-5692
Josie Cardoso-Rojo
Human Rights First
75 Broad Street, 31st floor New York, NY 10004 (212)845-5200

Dennis B. Auerbach(D.C. Bar No.418982) Philip J. Levitz(D.C. Bar No.1018430)
CoviNGTON & Burling LLP
One CityCenter 850 Tenth St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001-4956 (202)662-6000
Eunice Lee
Blaine Bookey
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies 200 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94102 (415)565-4877
Arthur B. Spitzer(D.C. Bar. No.235960)
American Civil Liberties Union ofthe District of Columbia
915 15th Street, NW,2nd floor Washington, D.C. 20005-2302 (202) 457-0800
Farrin R. Anello Edward Barocas Jeanne LoCicero American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation P.O. Box 32159
Newark,NJ 07102 (973) 642-2084

'Although LCvR 83.2(c)and(d)do not apply to Ms.Gault,she appears before the Court pursuant to LCvR 83.2(g), which states,"ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING INDIGENTS.Notwithstanding(c)and(d)above,an attorney who is a member in good standing of the District of Columbia Bar or who is a member in good standing of the bar of any United States Court or of the highest court of any State may appear, file papers and practice in any case handled without a fee on behalf of indigents upon filing a certificate that the attorney is providing representation without compensation." Ms.
Gault is not receiving compensation for her services.
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Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 3 Filed 03/15/18 Page 29 of 29

Michael J. Steinberg
Abril Valdes American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, MI 48201
(313)578-6814
Leon Howard Kristin Greer Love ACLU OF New Mexico 1410 Coal Ave.SW
Albuquerque,NM 87104 (505)266-5915, xl007
Witold J. Walczak Golnaz Fakhimi ACLU OF Pennsylvania
247 Ft. Pitt Blvd.,2nd floor Pittsburgh,PA 15222 (412)681-7864

Freda J. Levenson ACLU OF Ohio 4506 Chester Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44103
(216)472-2220
Ahilan T. Arulanantham Sameer Ahmed ACLU Foundation ofSouthern California 1313 West 8th Street
Los Angeles,CA 90017 (213)977-5232
Edgar Saldivar Andre Segura ACLU Foundation ofTexas,Inc. 1500 McGowen,Suite 250 Houston,TX 77004 (713)942-8146 xlll

29

 
 Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 33 Filed 07/02/18 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANSLY DAMUS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

ORDER For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court ORDERS that: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, dated March 20, 2018 (ECF No. 11), is GRANTED on a provisional basis for purposes of this preliminary injunction, and Plaintiffs’ counsel are appointed as Class Counsel; 3. Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from denying parole to any provisional class members absent an individualized determination, through the parole process, that such provisional class member presents a flight risk or a danger to the community; 4. The individualized determinations of flight risk and danger to the community referenced above shall be based on the specific facts of each provisional class member’s case. Such determinations, moreover, shall not be based on categorical criteria applicable to all provisional class members;

Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 33 Filed 07/02/18 Page 2 of 2

5. Defendants shall provide provisional class members with parole determinations that

conform to all of the substantive and procedural requirements of U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, Directive No. 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a

Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009);

6. Within seven days of this Order, the parties will meet and confer to develop a notice that

explains the requirements of this Order and provides class members with contact

information for Class Counsel; and

7. The parties shall appear for a status conference to discuss further proceedings in the case

on July 10, 2018, at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 25.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 2, 2018

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge

 
 Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 34 Filed 07/02/18 Page 1 of 38

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANSLY DAMUS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION As the events of recent months make clear, the question of how this nation will treat those who come to our shores seeking refuge generates enormous debate. While arriving foreigners may have myriad reasons for wanting to settle in the United States, a subset claims a fear of persecution in their native lands. They seek asylum here. Since 2009, the detention of those asylum-seekers has, in part, been governed by a set of principles and procedures set forth in a “Parole Directive” issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a component of the Department of Homeland Security. This document establishes the process by which ICE must determine whether an individual who has passed a credible-fear interview – the first step toward gaining asylum status – will be released from detention on parole pending a full hearing. Plaintiffs (and other members of the class they seek to represent) are noncitizens being held at five ICE Field Offices who have received a credible-fear determination but have been denied parole. Although, in the past, individuals deemed to have a “credible fear” of persecution and thus a significant possibility of being granted asylum were overwhelmingly released, Plaintiffs contend that there is a new reality in place. Pointing to the fact that parole rates have

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plummeted from over 90% to nearly zero, as well as to testimony from detained asylum-seekers and their counsel, they assert that the Government is no longer following its own Parole Directive. Plaintiffs allege that, rather than providing individualized determinations and procedural safeguards, DHS is now engaging in systematic detention.
Seeking the protections spelled out in the Directive, Plaintiffs have now turned to the courts. They filed suit in March of this year against DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, as well as Thomas Homan, the Acting Director of ICE, U.S. Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, and the directors of the five ICE Field Offices. Their Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs have been denied parole in violation of the ICE Directive, and that the Government has thereby violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants have now moved to dismiss, contending that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the various counts and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable claim for relief. The asylum-seekers both oppose dismissal and request a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to comply with the Parole Directive and to provide individualized parole determinations while this suit is pending.
Finding that the circumstances here merit that extraordinary form of relief, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motion. In so doing, this Opinion does no more than hold the Government accountable to its own policy, which recently has been honored more in the breach than the observance. Having extended the safeguards of the Parole Directive to asylum-seekers, ICE must now ensure that such protections are realized.
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I. Background A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Plaintiffs in this case are detained pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b). This statute provides that if a noncitizen “who is arriving in the United States” demonstrates an intention to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of persecution or torture, he is referred for an interview to determine whether the fear is credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the interviewing officer determines this to be the case, the INA provides that the individual “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum,” which includes a full asylum hearing before an immigration court and, if unsuccessful, an administrative appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). This detention requirement is not, however, entirely inflexible. Instead, an individual detained under § 1225(b) can be paroled “into the United States temporarily” pursuant to the discretion of the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). According to agency regulations, the Secretary of Homeland Security “may invoke” this parole authority for individuals who are “neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding,” and who meet one or more of a series of conditions – namely, “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).
It is this last factor – “public benefit” – that is the focus of the 2009 Directive, “Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture,” issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE Directive” or “Parole Directive”). See ECF No. 22-1 (ICE Directive 11002.1). The Directive explains the agency’s interpretation of “public benefit” for the purposes of determining parole and sets out a number of procedural requirements for assessing asylum-seekers’ eligibility for release. On a broad level, the Directive states that
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“[e]ach alien’s eligibility for parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual alien’s case,” and that if an asylum-seeker establishes his identity and that he presents neither a flight risk nor a danger to the public, “[ICE] should, absent additional factors . . . parole the alien on the basis that his or her continued detention is not in the public interest.” Id., ¶ 6.2 (emphasis added). More specifically, the Directive sets out a series of procedures ICE must undertake to determine whether a given asylum-seeker should be granted parole, including, inter alia, that the individual shall be provided written notice of the parole process explained in a language he understands, id., ¶¶ 6.1, 8.1, shall be granted a parole interview within seven days of a credible-fear finding, id., ¶ 8.2, shall be provided written notification of a parole determination, id., ¶ 6.5, and shall be given a “brief explanation of the reasons for any decision to deny parole.” Id., ¶ 6.5. As a result, although the Directive affirms that parole decisions are discretionary, it also establishes certain minimum procedures and processes that are to be utilized in making these determinations. Id., ¶ 4.4 (Directive “explains how the term [public interest] is to be interpreted by [ICE] when it decides whether to parole arriving aliens determined to have a credible fear” and “mandates uniform recordkeeping and review requirements for such decisions”).
B. Plaintiffs’ Detention The nine named Plaintiffs and other members of the class they seek to represent are “asylum seekers who traveled to the United States, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, and were referred for immigration proceedings to decide their asylum claims.” Compl., ¶ 2. During the pendency of their asylum determinations, however, each has remained detained, allegedly “with no individualized review of whether their detention is necessary.” Id.
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The lead plaintiff, Ansly Damus, is a former ethics teacher who is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing political persecution in Haiti. Id., ¶ 11. Damus entered the United States in October 2016 and was referred for immigration proceedings after an asylum officer determined that he had a credible fear of persecution. He was subsequently granted asylum twice, but the Government appealed both determinations; meanwhile, the Detroit ICE Field Office denied his requests for parole in January 2017 and February 2018. Id. He has therefore remained detained – at this point – for over a year and a half. Id.
Plaintiff L.H.A. (the Court has permitted certain named Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms) has been detained for even longer – over two years. Id., ¶ 16. He entered the United States in May 2016, upon fleeing threats in El Salvador. After receiving a credible-fear determination, L.H.A. applied for parole on June 14, 2017, but his request was denied by the El Paso Field Office and he remains detained. Id.
Plaintiffs Alexi Castro, H.A.Y., A.M.M., E.E.C.S., and L.I.L.M. have been detained for shorter periods (so far), but their experiences mirror those of Damus and L.H.A. Each was found to have a credible fear of persecution, each requested parole, and each was subsequently denied release and remains detained. Id., ¶¶ 14, 15, 17, 18. For two of the Plaintiffs, however, the story takes a slightly different twist. Abelardo Callol, who presented himself to immigration officers in December 2017 after fleeing persecution in Cuba, was denied parole and had been detained for over three months at the time the Complaint was filed. Id., ¶ 13. N.J.J.R., who presented himself to immigration in October 2017 after fleeing Venezula, had been detained for over four. Id., ¶ 12. In the time since the Complaint was filed, however, both men have been granted asylum and released from detention. See ECF No. 32 (Pl. Class Cert. Reply) at 15 n.6.
According to Plaintiffs, this shared experience of being found to have a credible fear of
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persecution but then being denied parole is indicative of the issue at the crux of this case – namely, the allegation that certain ICE Field Offices are no longer providing individualized parole determinations pursuant to the 2009 Directive. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs point to the steep descent of parole-grant rates in the initial months of the current administration. Citing figures showing that nearly 100% of parole requests processed by the five Field Offices at issue have been denied, Plaintiffs allege that the Government is no longer following its own parole policies.
This past spring, the asylum-seekers looked elsewhere to vindicate their claims. On March 15, 2018, they brought a class-action suit in this Court, challenging the parole regime currently in place at the Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia ICE Field Offices. See Compl., ¶¶ 21-25. They claim that these Field Offices are categorically denying parole, an approach that Plaintiffs contend is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in contravention of the APA and the INA. Id., ¶¶ 66-74. They additionally bring a freestanding allegation that the current state of the parole system violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id., ¶¶ 75-80. Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions for a preliminary injunction requiring that Defendants follow the Parole Directive during the pendency of this suit, as well as for provisional class certification for purposes of the requested injunction. Defendants oppose both Motions and separately seek dismissal of the suit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In keeping with the expedited nature of a preliminaryinjunction proceeding, the Court held a hearing on May 17, 2018, after which it ordered further briefing on the issue of class certification. See ECF Order of May 29, 2018. That briefing complete, this Opinion regarding injunctive relief now follows. Given the result, the Court does not now tackle Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
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II. Legal Standard “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A party seeking preliminary relief must make a “clear ‘showing that four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.’” League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). “The moving party bears the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,’ that the requested relief is warranted.” Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC v. Reyes, 736 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, courts weighed these factors on a “sliding scale,” allowing “an unusually strong showing on one of the factors” to overcome a weaker showing on another. Davis v. PBGC, 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This Circuit has hinted, though not held, that Winter – which overturned the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” standard – establishes that “likelihood of irreparable harm” and “likelihood of success” are “‘independent, free-standing requirement[s].’” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)); see League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 7 (declining to address whether “sliding scale” approach is valid after Winter). Unresolved, too, is the related question of “whether, in cases where the other three factors strongly favor issuing an injunction, a plaintiff need only raise a ‘serious legal question’ on the merits.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
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omitted). Regardless of the extent to which showings of irreparable harm and success on the merits can be diminished, however, it is clear that where the plaintiff can show neither harm nor success, no relief is warranted. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 26 (D.D.C. 2016). III. Analysis
At the heart of Plaintiffs’ suit is their assertion that, under the current administration, the parole practices at the five Field Offices have drastically departed from the policies and protections enshrined in the 2009 ICE Directive. Offering comparative statistics as well as declarations from detained asylum-seekers and their counsel, Plaintiffs contend that parole has been effectively eliminated as an option and detention has instead become the status quo. They attribute this shift in part to the Trump administration’s emphasis on “deterrence” and “zerotolerance” when it comes to the treatment of undocumented individuals. Defendants contest this characterization, claiming instead that there is no “deterrence policy” in place, that they continue to implement the ICE Directive, and that parole remains available to asylum-seekers at the five Field Offices.
Before turning to its analysis of these issues, however, the Court must first address two threshold complications: justiciability and class certification. According to Defendants, the asylum-seekers’ case cannot proceed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims and because they do not present a proper class. Disagreeing on both fronts, the Court will discuss these points separately before tackling the merits of injunctive relief.
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A. Preliminary Issues 1. Jurisdiction
Defendants raise a bevy of jurisdictional objections. Specifically, the Government alleges that Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the parole process are barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and their request for classwide injunctive relief by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). Ultimately, the Court concludes that these alleged jurisdictional hurdles are easily cleared by the asylum-seekers, and that their claims may therefore proceed.
One arrow Defendants pluck from their justiciability quiver relies on on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which provides:
[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. According to the Government, Plaintiffs are improperly attempting to challenge “ICE officers’ discretionary weighing of the evidence.” ECF No. 26 (Def. PI Reply) at 4. To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the determinations themselves – i.e., the actual balancing of the merits of each application for parole – this Court agrees that it lacks jurisdiction. It will, therefore, not inquire into the specific strengths or weaknesses of the parole decisions under dispute, including Plaintiffs’ allegation that certain of the proffered rationales for denial were “pretextual.” ECF No. 24 at 8-10. Yet the asylum-seekers do not rest their case on a challenge to discrete parole determinations. Rather, they allege that ICE is, as a matter of general course, not complying with the policies and procedures of the Parole Directive. In other words, they are not challenging the outcome of ICE’s decisionmaking, but the method by which
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parole is currently being granted (or denied). The question, therefore, is whether such a claim falls within the scope of § 1252(a).
As the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not entirely strip federal courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to the parole process. In that case, the petitioners challenged the Attorney General’s authority to detain them indefinitely beyond the removal period. Id. at 682. The Court held that, although §1252(a) precludes judicial review of the discretionary determination to detain a noncitizen, the petitioners were not in fact challenging such decisionmaking. Instead, “they challenge[d] the extent of the Attorney General’s authority,” a claim that the Supreme Court held fell outside the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 688.
This Court reached a similar conclusion when interpreting a parallel jurisdictional bar, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), in its decision in R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015). As here, the provision at issue in that case precluded judicial review over any decision by the Attorney General regarding the “grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” Id. at 176. Yet, because Plaintiffs in R.I.L-R. were contesting the policies underlying their detention, and not “th[e] discretionary determinations granting or denying bond or parole in an individual case,” the Court found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 177. Here, too, Plaintiffs are “challeng[ing] an overarching agency” action as unlawful – in this case, Defendants’ systematic failure to follow the Parole Directive and to instead impose detention without its safeguards and individualized determinations. Id. at 176. As a district court held last year when presented with nearly identical claims by a putative class of asylum-seekers detained at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, Plaintiffs are not asking for this Court to review the propriety of any given parole decision, but, instead, “simply seek compliance with certain minimum procedural
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safeguards when parole decisions are made” by requiring that Defendants follow the Directive. Abdi v. Duke, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). This Court agrees that such claims do not fall within the jurisdictional bar of 1252(a). Id. at 384 (“Petitioners are asking that this Court ensure that Respondents comply with certain policies and procedures in making th[e] parole decision – issues that are beyond the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”).
Defendants additionally assert that the classwide injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is jurisdictionally barred by a separate provision of the INA. See ECF No. 22 (Def. Opp. to PI) at 10-12. Specifically, they point to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232], other than with respect to . . . an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” According to Defendants, to grant relief in this case, the Court would need to enjoin the operations of ICE in carrying out its delegated powers on a classwide basis – relief that they allege is prohibited under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). See Def. PI Opp. at 10-12.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the provisions addressed by § 1252(f)(1) – a premise that is disputed by the parties – Defendants’ jurisdictional argument is easily defeated. As this Court noted in R.I.L.-R., Section 1252(f)(1) “prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes.” 80 F. Supp. 3d at 184 (citing Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010)). Put another way, “[w]here . . . a petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that allegedly is not even authorized[,] . . . the court is not enjoining the operation of [the statute], and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs do not seek to “enjoin or restrain the operation” of any provision of the INA. Instead, they ask that this Court mandate
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compliance with the Parole Directive, which addresses the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant temporary parole. As a classwide injunction in this case would not obstruct the “operation of” any statute, but merely require conduct that complies with ICE’s own Directive, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) does not stand in the way.
2. Class Certification To achieve meaningful relief with respect to DHS’s allegedly unlawful actions, Plaintiffs sensibly ask this Court to provisionally certify a class. To obtain certification, a plaintiff must show that the proposed class satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345-50 (2011). Rule 23(a) states that a class may be certified only if: (1) it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (“numerosity”), (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (“commonality”), (3) the claims or defenses of the representative are typical of those of the class (“typicality”), and (4) the class representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy of representation”). Plaintiffs must show, in addition, that: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications, (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole, or (3) questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). In deciding whether class certification is appropriate, a district court must ordinarily undertake a “rigorous analysis” to see that the requirements of the Rule have been satisfied. See Gen. Tel. Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere
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pleading standard.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. Rather, the party seeking class certification bears the burden of “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] his compliance with the Rule – that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs here, however, need only provisional class certification in order for the Court to grant their preliminary injunction. See Tr. of PI Hearing (May 17, 2018) at 6:6-8. In granting such provisional certification, the Court must still satisfy itself that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. See Berge v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Notes 2003 Amendments). Its analysis is tempered, however, by the understanding that such certifications “may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.” Bame v. Dillard, No. 05-1833, 2008 WL 2168393, at *5 (D.D.C. May 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs’ proposed class consists of all arriving asylum-seekers who “are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture” and “who are or will be detained by ICE . . . after having been denied parole under the authority of the [five] ICE Field Offices.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 5-6. The Court must therefore consider whether this class, as defined, meets the requirements under Rule 23. It will begin by addressing Defendants’ threshold contention that the class cannot be certified because certain members lack standing, and then briefly analyze the first and fourth prongs of Rule 23(a), neither of which Defendants contest. It then assesses the second and third specifications together, both of which are disputed. Finally, it considers whether Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden under Rule 23(b).
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a. Standing Defendants first attack Plaintiffs’ standing to bring a classwide suit. According to the Government, Plaintiffs’ request that this Court “certify a class that includes all arriving asylum seekers who are found to have a credible fear . . . who are or will be detained by ICE after having been denied parole under the authority of [the five] Field Offices” cannot proceed because the class definition “includes persons who have not experienced the harm Plaintiffs allege.” Opp. to Class Cert. at 28. The asylum-seekers reply that “[t]o the contrary, all class members have been denied parole pursuant to Defendants’ de facto parole denial policy and thus have suffered the injury alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 14. To establish standing, a plaintiff “must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1982)). Standing is assessed “upon the facts as they exist at the time the complaint is filed,” Natural Law Party of U.S. v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2000), and “Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997). Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately established the standing of their class members. As defined, the putative class includes only arriving asylum-seekers who have been or will be detained by the five ICE Field Offices after having been denied parole. Each of these individuals has suffered a concrete injury – detention imposed without the protections of the Parole Directive – from the Government’s refusal to grant them the Directive’s requisite
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processes and protections. Although the Government asserts that “not all putative class members have been injured by Defendants’ purported policy . . . [as] not all persons detained at the Field Offices were denied parole,” Opp. to Class Cert. at 28, this line of argument entirely ignores Plaintiffs’ definition of the class as including only those asylum-seekers who are or will be detained “after having been denied parole.” Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 15 (emphasis altered). The (albeit negligible) percentage of asylum-seekers released by the Field Offices does not, therefore, undermine Plaintiffs’ classwide standing, as they are explicitly excluded from the definition of the class.
For those individuals who are (or will be) detained after being denied release on parole, Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Government is engaging in injurious conduct, the resolution of which would likely be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court. According to Plaintiffs, their detention is the direct result of the Field Offices’ current departure from the protections of the Parole Directive in favor of de facto detention – an allegation that, as discussed in more depth below, is robustly supported by statistics and other record evidence. In light of the prior substantial grant rates under the Directive and the near-uniform detention of asylumseekers under the current administration, it is in no sense “speculative” that enjoining the Field Offices to implement the Directive would render Plaintiffs’ release far more likely. As this Circuit has emphasized, “A significant increase in the likelihood that [a litigant] would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered will suffice for standing.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lichoulas v. FERC, 606 F.3d 769, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Granting the injunctive relief in this case would mandate compliance with the procedures and policies of the Directive and would therefore result in a greater opportunity for class members’ release on
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parole. The Court is, consequently, satisfied that the requirements of Article III are met by the proposed class.
b. Numerosity The numerosity requirement is determined case by case and “‘imposes no absolute limitations.’” Bynum v. D.C., 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). Plaintiffs need not prove exactly how many people fall within the class to merit certification. See, e.g., Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, 189 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1999) (“So long as there is a reasonable basis for the estimate provided, the numerosity requirement can be satisfied without precise numbers.”). As a general benchmark, “courts have found that a proposed class consisting of at least forty members” satisfies this requirement. Johnson v. D.C., 248 F.R.D. 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Taylor v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007); Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 32. Defendants do not challenge the numerosity of the proposed class, and rightly so. Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence that a large number of asylum-seekers – well over 40 – have been denied parole at the five Field Offices, see ECF No. 17-10 (Decl. of Anne Daher), ¶ 10, and state that the “Government itself has identified nearly 800 class members.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. As discussed below, they have further demonstrated that the detention of class members is sufficiently tethered to ICE’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the protections and procedures enshrined in the Parole Directive. Nothing more is needed to satisfy the numerosity requirement under Rule 23.
c. Adequacy of Representation In order to satisfy this prerequisite, Plaintiffs must show both that (1) there is no conflict
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of interest between the named members and the rest of the class, and that (2) counsel is competent to represent the class. See Twelve John Does v. D.C., 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Johnson, 248 F.R.D. at 53-54; Taylor, 241 F.R.D. at 45; Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 35. No trace of a conflict exists here, and Plaintiffs are represented by very capable counsel from the American Civil Liberties Union and Covington & Burling LLP. Defendants, appropriately, do not dispute that these requirements have been met either.
d. Commonality and Typicality The Government, conversely, finds greater traction in citing two other prongs of the certification test. Rule 23(a)(2) – commonality – requires that Plaintiffs establish that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Class members’ claims must depend on “a common contention [that] is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. In other words, the representative plaintiffs must show that the class members have “suffered the same injury.” Id. (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit explained, commonality is satisfied where there is “a uniform policy or practice that affects all class members.” D.L. v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To demonstrate typicality, as required by Rule 23(a)(3), Plaintiffs must show that their claims are “typical of the claims . . . of the class.” Typicality means that the representative plaintiffs must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the other class members. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted). The commonality and typicality requirements often overlap because both “serve as ‘guideposts’” to determine whether a class action is practical and whether the representative plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently interrelated with the class claims to protect absent class members. See Taylor, 241 F.R.D. at 44-45 (quoting Falcon,
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457 U.S. at 157 n.13). Here, as Defendants’ principal challenge to class certification goes to both, the Court considers them together.
Contending that Plaintiffs have been unable to establish a categorical practice affecting parole at the five Field Offices, Defendants argue that a class action is an improper vehicle to challenge their alleged failure to conform with the Parole Directive. According to the Government, Plaintiffs “allege a variety of procedural and substantive violations of the Parole Directive facially unconnected to any coordinated agency action.” Def. Opp. to Cert at 1. They contend, therefore, that class certification is not available here because the asylum-seekers “cannot credibly identify any single policy or practice that bridges all their claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Put another way, under the Government’s view of the case, Plaintiffs are not challenging any uniform agency policy, but instead contest “the manner in which ICE has exercised its discretionary parole authority in more than a thousand different cases.” Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). DHS goes on to argue that the “fundamental flaw in Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification is that it does not provide any evidence linking each Plaintiff’s denied parole applications to a single or ‘indivisible’ government action capable of being enjoined ‘in one stroke.’” Id. at 27 (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350) (emphasis added).
This argument bears a striking resemblance to Defendants’ objection that Plaintiffs have not established a common injury for the purposes of standing, and, for similar reasons, the Court rejects it here as well. While it is true that the reasons for any given discretionary detention cannot necessarily be proven on an individualized basis, the Government has nonetheless conceded that ICE is required to follow the Directive when determining parole for asylumseekers who have established a credible fear of persecution. See Def. Reply at 5. Plaintiffs here
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have provided ample evidence that, in the initial months of the current administration, nearly every application for parole from such individuals has been denied. This is in sharp contrast to the prior parole-grant rates, and, as discussed in depth below, indicates a likely departure from the policies and processes mandated by the Parole Directive.
The Court can, therefore, conclude that a “common question[] of law and fact” unites the class members’ claims – namely, the allegation that the five ICE Field Officers are no longer providing the “individualized determinations” of parole eligibility and procedural protections required by the Parole Directive. See D.L. v. D.C. (D.L. II), 860 F.3d 713, 724-26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (evidence suggesting failure to follow statutory provisions satisfies commonality); R.I.LR., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (holding that “ample evidence that nearly every Central American family apprehended since June 2014 has been detained” supports conclusion that “common questions of law and fact united the class members’ claims”). Such a showing provides the “glue holding” the alleged basis for the putative class’s detention “together.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352. The asylum-seekers acknowledge that the circumstances of their detention may vary, but they have sufficiently identified a common cause and injury as a result of the current parole regime and ICE’s departure from the mandates of the Parole Directive. See Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 5-6.
The fact that the precise role this alleged failure to follow the Directive played in any specific determination may differ among the Plaintiffs does not destroy the fact that all (or nearly all) class members were subjected to the same system of de facto parole denial. Indeed, as this Circuit has held, if there is a “single” common question, “factual variations among the class members will not defeat the commonality requirement.” Hardy v. D.C., 283 F.R.D. 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Bynum v. D.C., 214 F.R.D. 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)). As the court held in
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Abdi when faced with the question of certifying the class of detained asylum-seekers at the Buffalo ICE Field Office, the question of whether Defendants were providing “certain procedural safeguards when adjudicating parole . . . determinations” is a common question that will “generate common answers apt to drive resolution of the litigation.” 323 F.R.D. at 141 (citation omitted). The court therefore rejected the Government’s contention, repeated here, that the request to certify the class could not proceed “because the claims require individualized factual determinations.” Id.; see also Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 324 F.R.D. 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2018) (no requirement under Rule 23 that “all members of the putative class will be affected by the policy in the same way”); Nio v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 323 F.R.D. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2017) (“factual variations among class members” do not trump “the overarching questions common to the class” addressing the “legal authority to implement [the challenged] policies and practices”).
This Court agrees with the sound reasoning of Judge Wolford of the Western District of New York. Contrary to the Government’s assertion that “[i]f the class is certified, the Court will be forced to hear individualized evidence of ICE’s compliance or alleged non-compliance with the Parole Directive for potentially every putative class member,” the resolution of this case would require no such piecemeal litigation. See Def. Opp. to Cert. at 32. Rather, Plaintiffs ask this Court to determine only whether, as a general matter, the five Field Offices are following the Directive or are instead systematically denying parole. Analyzing this issue thus requires only a common, programmatic analysis, as the specific facts of each denial matter not if Plaintiffs are correct in their claim that the Directive is no longer in force overall.
Nor is commonality defeated by the fact that a small percentage of asylum-seekers were, in fact, released from two of the five Field Offices. As Plaintiffs correctly note, “A policy or
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practice may satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), even when it is substantially less uniform than the near-100% parole-denial rates at issue here.” Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 5. See, e.g., Hoyte v. D.C., 2017 WL 3208456, at *10 (D.D.C. July 27, 2017) (commonality found when 43% of claims conformed to alleged D.C. practice of failing to provide interim hearings).
Finally, the Court can also dispose of Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs are unable to establish commonality because they do not allege a common motive underlying the Field Offices’ departure from the Parole Directive. See Opp. to Class Cert at 30-32, 39. As this Circuit held in D.L. II, a common motive is not required under Rule 23 when “liability does not depend on the reason for a defendant’s failure” to follow the law. See 860 F.3d at 725 (distinguishing Wal-Mart on ground that “crux of the inquiry” under Title VII “is the reason for a particular employment decision”). Here, although Plaintiffs identify “deterrence” as the motivating factor behind the lack of individualized parole determinations and compliance with the Directive, the Court need not find any such common intention in order to certify the class. The asylum-seekers’ claims rest not on the impetus behind the Field Offices’ practices, but, instead, on the very fact that they are no longer following the binding guidance of the Parole Directive. See Pl. PI Brief at 17-19, 23-26, 28-31; see also Garnett, 2018 WL 1524748, at *5 (“The question the Court confronts is simply whether the applications are being . . . processed” lawfully, “not why they are . . . not.”) (emphasis added).
The same reasoning applies to Defendants’ challenge to typicality. The Government alleges that Plaintiffs “point to no evidence that the five ICE Field Offices have engaged in the ‘unitary course of conduct’ they allege . . . and so no named Plaintiff can say that his claim is ‘typical’ of anyone else’s.” Opp. to Class Cert. at 40 (citation omitted). Again, the typicality requirement is satisfied when the claims of the class representatives “arise from the same course
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of conduct, series or events, or legal theories of other class members.” Hoyte, 2017 WL 3208456, at *4 (citation omitted). Here, it is clear from Plaintiffs’ filings and affidavits that the nine named class members have each alleged a personal deprivation of the protections of the Parole Directive, contending that they have instead been denied the opportunity for release under the Field Offices’ current practice of nearly uniform detention. Although the specific details of each named Plaintiff’s parole adjudication may vary, the crux of their allegations is typical of the claims of the putative class that the Government is no longer providing asylum-seekers with the individualized determinations and opportunities for release required under the Directive. In light of the record evidence of a current no-parole regime in place at the five Field Offices, see Section III. B, infra, such allegations are sufficiently tethered to a uniform course of governmental conduct. Defendants’ various objections thus parried, the Court finds that commonality and typicality have been established.
e. Rule 23(b)(2) To obtain certification, a proposed class must also satisfy just one of the three Rule 23(b) specifications. Plaintiffs here invoke Rule 23(b)(2), which sets forth two basic requirements: (1) the party opposing the class must have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,” and (2) “final relief of an injunctive nature or a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, must be appropriate.” Put otherwise, Rule 23(b)(2) codifies the “presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive.” Lightfoot v. D.C., 273 F.R.D. 314, 329 (D.D.C. 2011). In disputing that this cohesion requirement has been satisfied, Defendants regurgitate a variant of the same challenge they raised to standing, typicality, and commonality – to wit, that Plaintiffs have not shown that “all putative class members warrant the same relief for the same
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reasons.” Opp. to Class Cert. at 41. Once again, the Court cannot concur. Plaintiffs allege that the five Field Offices no longer follow the policies and procedures outlined in the 2009 Parole Directive. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring compliance with the Directive and mandating that the Field Offices provide the individualized parole determinations and protections required by such agency guidance. Contrary to the Government’s argument that “it is difficult to see how each individual alleged violation of the Parole Directive would be amenable to resolution on a classwide basis,” id. at 42, the asylum-seekers are not asking for this Court to remedy discrete errors in their parole determinations or to interfere with ICE’s discretionary decisionmaking. Rather, Plaintiffs ask only that the Court address an alleged systematic harm – the failure of the Field Offices to comply with the Directive. This departure from the Directive is an agency action “generally applicable” to all class members, and a determination of whether that practice is unlawful would therefore resolve all members’ claims “in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 350; see R.I.L-R., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied when class challenges agency action “generally applicable to all class members”). Rule 23(b)(2) thus poses no obstacle to class certification.
B. The Merits The undercard bouts now concluded, the Court turns to the main event: the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The Complaint provides three distinct grounds for such relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that DHS’s actions: (1) are contrary to law under the APA by failing to follow the Parole Directive; (2) violate the APA by failing to conform with the INA; and (3) abridge Plaintiffs’ due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Mot. for PI at 1-3. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ first theory warrants relief, it will focus its
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attention accordingly. In doing so, it addresses each of the four prongs of the preliminaryinjunction analysis.
1. Likelihood of Success To remind any reader whose attention may understandably have flagged: in Count I of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that DHS is no longer complying with the ICE Directive, a practice they assert is “contrary to law” under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Likelihood of success, consequently, turns on the strength of their argument that Defendants are failing to follow the Directive, and that such a departure is unlawful. This is where the rubber meets the road. Defendants contest both the premise and the substance of Plaintiffs’ APA claims. DHS contends that the asylum-seekers do not have a cause of action under the statute, that the Parole Directive does not provide a sound basis for the relief they seek, and that they do not demonstrate that the agency is in fact failing to follow the necessary procedures. Because Plaintiffs’ argument in support of this count rests in large part on a somewhat obscure area of law – the so-called Accardi doctrine – the Court will first lay out the fundamentals of this concept, next look at the question of whether Plaintiffs may raise such claims under the APA, and conclude with the alleged violations themselves.
a. The Accardi Doctrine Plaintiffs’ first APA count is based, in large part, on the “Accardi doctrine,” which they allege requires Defendants to follow the ICE Directive in adjudicating parole determinations. This doctrine arises from a 1954 Supreme Court decision, United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), in which the Court vacated a deportation order because it was issued without procedures that conformed to the relevant agency regulations. The Court
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stated that “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law supplement the bare bones” of federal statutes, and that, even in areas of expansive discretion, agencies must follow their own “existing valid regulations.” Id. at 266, 268. Two decades later, in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974), the Supreme Court returned to the doctrine – this time striking down a Bureau of Indian Affairs benefits determination because it did not comply with the procedures set forth in the agency’s internal manual. In doing so, the Court noted that Accardi’s teachings apply with particular force in those cases in which “the rights of individuals are affected,” stating that “it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where [they] are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Id. at 235.
This Circuit and district courts here have subsequently invoked the doctrine, noting that “Accardi has come to stand for the proposition that agencies may not violate their own rules and regulations to the prejudice of others.” Battle v. FAA, 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The Accardi doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions.”); Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Accardi and stating that “government agencies are bound to follow their own rules, even self-imposed procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary decisions”); Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 103 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 38 F. App'x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (judicial review under Accardi available for “claims that an agency has acted in violation of its own binding procedures where those procedures are promulgated for the protection of individuals, even where the procedures were not issued as formal regulations”); Jefferson v. Harris, 285 F. Supp. 3d 173, 185 (D.D.C. 2018). And, in the immigration context, the Second Circuit has explained that the Accardi doctrine’s “ambit is not limited to rules attaining the status of formal
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regulation,” and that it can be applied to internal agency guidance. See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 840 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (requiring that INS adhere to internal procedures in parole memorandum).
The doctrine is not without its limits, however. Courts have distinguished between those internal agency regulations that are enforceable and those that remain unreviewable – drawing a line “between procedural rules benefitting the agency . . . and procedural rules benefitting the party otherwise left unprotected . . . [or] cases in which the agency has failed to exercise discretion required by its regulations.” Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003), as amended (Feb. 11, 2003). This Circuit has articulated this distinction as meaning that “agencies cannot relax or modify regulations that provide the only safeguard individuals have against unlimited agency discretion.” Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the enforceability of agency policies depends upon whether they impose binding norms on the agency. Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 539–40; Dulles, 354 U.S. at 372. Following that guidance, this Circuit has synthesized these considerations to conclude that “an agency pronouncement is transformed into a binding norm if so intended by the agency,” a determination that takes into account the substance and intent of the agency action, as well as whether it confers individual protections or privileges. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
b. Accardi and Parole Directive The next set of questions for the Court is therefore whether Plaintiffs can bring their Accardi claim pursuant to their first APA count, and whether the Parole Directive falls within the realm of agency rules, regulations, and guidance to which the doctrine can attach. On the initial issue, Defendants contend that the asylum-seekers’ Accardi allegations present a claim without a cause of action. According to the Government, Plaintiffs’ assertion
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that the Field Offices are failing to follow the Parole Directive is “not cognizable under Section 706(2) of the APA.” Opp. to Class Cert at 26. Plaintiffs respond that the APA empowers them to challenge agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2), and that their allegation that ICE’s systematic departure from the Parole Directive is unlawful is thus actionable under that Act.
They are correct. “It has long been settled that a federal agency must adhere firmly to self-adopted rules by which the interests of others are to be regulated.” Mass. Fair Share v. Law Enf't Assistance Admin., 758 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As numerous courts have held, the Accardi doctrine therefore provides plaintiffs with a means by which they can hold agencies accountable to their own policies. See, e.g., Burdue v. FAA, 774 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Under the doctrine outlined in Accardi, a party may always challenge an agency's failure to abide by its own regulations.”) (internal citation omitted). It is clear, moreover, that such claims may arise under the APA. See Schaefer v. Geren, 607 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68-70 (D.D.C. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Schaefer v. McHugh, 608 F.3d 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing Accardi claim pursuant to allegation that Army Board for Correction of Military Records “acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law” in violation of APA § 706(2)(A)); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841, 852 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding Accardi challenge under APA § 706 and finding that “[h]aving chosen to promulgate the [] policy, the [Fish and Wildlife Service] must follow that policy”); Alamo Exp., Inc. v. United States, 613 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding APA violation by Interstate Commerce Commission because it failed to comply with internal procedure).
This connection between § 706(2) and Accardi was carefully explained in a recent opinion from the Southern District of California addressing a different form of internal agency
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guidance on immigration, the “Operating Procedures” governing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. See Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2017 WL 4340385, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017). As the court spelled out in Torres, the plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants had “fail[ed] to follow their own procedures in terminating Plaintiff’s DACA status” was properly framed as a claim that the agency’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.” Id. at *5-6. Such allegations, Torres concluded, fell well within the scope of the Accardi doctrine: “While Defendants are granted broad discretion to commence, adjudicate, and execute removal orders, a fundamental principle of federal law is that a federal agency must follow its own procedures.” Id. (citing Morton, 415 U.S. at 233-35). For an agency to violate this governing maxim, the court found, would amount to an “unlawful” action under the APA. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). Agreeing with the analysis in Torres, and with the congeries of other cases addressing Accardi claims under the framework of administrative law, the Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs have failed to identify a cause of action under the APA.
The Court finds the Government’s contention that Plaintiffs may not rely on the Parole Directive for their Accardi claim because it is not “binding” on the agency similarly unavailing. As discussed above, the premise underlying the Accardi doctrine is that agencies can be held accountable to their own codifications of procedures and policies – and particularly those that affect individual rights. Here, the policies and procedures contained within the Directive establish a set of minimum protections for those seeking asylum, including an opportunity to submit documentation, the availability of an individualized parole interview, and an explanation of the reasons for a parole denial. The Directive therefore falls squarely within the ambit of those agency actions to which the doctrine may attach. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC, 356
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F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1966) (“[O]nce an agency exercises its discretion and creates the procedural rules under which it desires to have its actions judged, it denies itself the right to violate these rules.”); Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 663 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although the [INS] internal operating instruction confers no substantive rights on the alien-applicant, it does confer the procedural right to be considered for such status upon application.”).
Defendants’ reliance on language in the Directive disclaiming that the document confers any substantive rights does not prove otherwise. The ICE Directive provides that it “is not intended to, shall not be construed to, may not be relied upon to, and does not create any rights, privileges, or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States.” Parole Directive, ¶ 10. The Government points to this language in refuting Plaintiffs’ Accardi claims, stating in its briefing that “the Parole Directive’s statement that it places requirements on ICE and its officers without creating a private cause of action should be viewed by the Court as determinative evidence of the extent to which DHS intended to be bound by the Directive.” Reply at 2-3. Yet the Government’s subsequent statement at oral argument that the Directive is, in fact, binding compels the Court to find otherwise. See Tr. at 19:12-13. It would seem that this representation is in fact the “determinative evidence” of the extent to which the agency “intended to be bound.” The Court will therefore take Defendants at their word that the Directive is binding agency policy and thus concludes that it can be challenged via an Accardi claim.
The Court additionally notes that, even absent such concession, the Accardi doctrine could well apply to the ICE Directive. This case is distinguishable from a prior Opinion in this Circuit addressing the effects of disclaimer language in agency guidance, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Miller, this Circuit held that DOJ
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guidelines for issuing subpoenas to the media – which contained language similar to that in the ICE directive – did not create legally enforceable procedural rights. Yet although Miller relied in part on the express reservation at issue in that case, it does not stand for the proposition that such a disclaimer would necessarily defeat Plaintiffs’ claim that the Directive is binding upon and enforceable against DHS. Instead, Miller explicitly distinguished Morton on the ground that the procedures contained in the BIA manual at issue in that case were “intended to benefit” individuals, whereas the DOJ guidelines provided no such protections and instead “exist[ed] to guide the Department’s exercise” of its internal decisionmaking to seek subpoenas. See Miller, 438 F.3d at 1152. As discussed above, the ICE Directive falls clearly on the side of Morton rather than Miller, as “given the nature of the guidelines themselves, and the function they govern,” the Directive was intended – at least in part – to benefit asylum-seekers navigating the parole process. Id. at 1153. The Court finds, therefore, that the disclaimer language contained within the Directive does not bar the application of the Accardi doctrine. See Abdi, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (holding that agency cannot “avoid application of Accardi by simply disclaiming any binding effect in the [D]irective itself” and that “[t]o find otherwise would render the teachings of Accardi and its progeny meaningless”).
c. Merits of Accardi Claim Having determined that Plaintiffs may invoke the Accardi doctrine, the Court must now assess whether they are likely correct with respect to the substantive claim at the heart of this case – viz., the allegation that ICE is no longer following the Directive. As an initial matter, the Court briefly addresses Plaintiffs’ assertion that the current practice at the five Field Offices of “denying parole in virtually all cases” is motivated by deterrence. See Pl. PI Reply at 2. This line of argument may well be true, see Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 6 n.2 (contending that “evidence
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of the Trump Administration’s deterrence goals continues to accumulate”), but, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, it is not necessary for the Court to delve into the basis for the agency’s alleged departure from the Directive. See Pl. PI Reply at 14-15 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction, regardless of whether Defendants have been motivated by deterrence.”); Tr. at 5:1719; 26:20-22. Because it need not resolve this issue of impetus, the Court turns instead to the record regarding the current parole regime at the various Field Offices.
It begins with the most compelling evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ case: the raw numbers. Although Benjamin Disraeli decried “lies, damn lies, and statistics,” the numbers here are irrefutable. According to records obtained by the asylum-seekers, “[D]uring the eight months from February to September 2017,” ICE’s El Paso, Philadelphia, and Newark Field Offices denied 100% of parole applications. See Pl. Reply at 1. During that same period, the Los Angeles and Detroit Offices denied 92% and 98% of applications, respectively. See Daher Decl., ¶¶ 5-1; Compl., ¶ 38. These figures, Plaintiffs assert, “constitute[] a marked departure from just a few years ago,” when ICE was also implementing the Parole Directive and granted parole to more than 90% of asylum-seekers. See id.; Compl., ¶ 39.
The Government’s response to these figures is underwhelming at best. Indeed, as counsel conceded at the hearing, in light of the numbers for the first months of the administration, “there are questions” as to whether the five Field Offices are following the Parole Directive. See Tr. at 19:19-25; Tr. at 20:17-25 (“[T]hose statistics certainly look like outliers” from the Parole Directive.); Tr. at 21:7-11 (Government is “trying to get more information” as to whether “these five offices are following the” Directive). Although Defendants now state that they are “trying to get th[e] numbers” for intervening years, see Tr. at 20:7-8, and are “in the process of retrieving more information on the parole data,” ECF No. 31-1 (Decl. of David W.
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Jennings), ¶ 10, the fact remains that the only statistics submitted in this case are those cited by Plaintiffs. While DHS may believe that such figures overcount the actual parole-denial rate, their speculation is not sufficient to rebut Plaintiffs’ assertion that the current release rate at the five ICE Field Offices is approaching zero.
Defendants’ assertion that the statistics were “cherry picked” is similarly unavailing. See PI Opp. at 14. The Government attempts to cast doubt on Plaintiffs’ figures by arguing that they strategically selected the numbers from only five ICE Offices across the nations. Yet, as Plaintiffs very reasonably note, “[I]t is those five Field Offices, and only those five, whose practices are at issue in this case.” PI Reply at 4. It therefore seems to make perfect sense for them to present numbers from those specific locales. Nor can Defendants allege that the asylumseekers have manipulated the figures from the five Field Offices at issue. The statistics presented by Plaintiffs include every parole request – more than 800 cases – recorded by ICE at those offices during the first eight months of the current administration. See Daher Decl., ¶¶ 511. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs’ analysis adequately supports their claims.
The Court notes, moreover, that the dramatic departure in parole-grant rates from years past has not been explained in any way by Defendants. The Government does not dispute Plaintiffs’ assertion that “there has been no significant change in the types of asylum seekers traveling to the United States,” Pl. Reply at 1, nor does it indicate any other change in circumstances that would lead to a shift in how the Parole Directive is being applied. See Pl. Reply at 3 (noting that “Defendants do not suggest that asylum seekers detained in 2017 suddenly became more apt to flee or more apt to commit crimes than those detained earlier, and they make no other effort to explain the numbers”). Instead, in February 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly stated that the Parole Directive “remain[s] in full force and effect,” and the
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Government represented the same to the Supreme Court just last year. See Def. MTD, Exh. B at 9-10 (Kelly Memorandum); Pet. Suppl. Reply. Br., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, at 6 n.2 (filed Feb. 21, 2017). Declarations submitted by Defendants in this case, moreover, also state that the Parole Directive remains in force. See ECF Nos. 22-3 (Decl. of Diane L. Witte), ¶ 3; 224-5 (Declaration of Rebecca Adducci), ¶¶ 3-4. Such representations – and the dearth of data supporting the allegation that Plaintiffs’ numbers are off – place the Government in an untenable position. Defendants cannot claim that the ICE Directive remains fully in effect, and yet, at the same time, provide no explanation for the sudden shift in the day-to-day treatment of asylumseekers under the current administration. Indeed, as the Government stated at argument, “The policy . . . certainly envisions case by case determinations that will result in parole.” Tr. at 20:23-24. Defendants concede that such an aim is “clear from reading the Parole Directive.” Id. Faced with the current record, the reasonable conclusion is that the five ICE Field Offices are not in fact putting this language into effect on the ground.
In addition to providing the Court with these troubling statistics, Plaintiffs support their claims with a number of declarations from asylum-seekers and their advocates. The record includes affidavits from each of the named Plaintiffs, all of whom assert various violations of the Parole Directive with respect to ICE’s adjudication of their release requests. See, e.g., Pl. PI Mot., Exhs. 12 (N.J.J.R. Decl.), ¶ 13; 13 (Callol Decl.), ¶¶ 10, 15; 16 (A.M.M. Suppl. Decl.) at 3, Exh. C. Plaintiffs’ evidence also includes the statements of attorneys such as Joan Del Valle, an experienced immigration lawyer, who asserts that she has been told by multiple ICE officials that “there is no more parole.” Pl. Exh. 10 (Decl. of Joan Del Valle), ¶ 8; see also Pl. Exh. 4 (Declaration of Jessica Miles), ¶ 6 (stating that as an immigration attorney she has been told by ICE officers that agency is “not granting parole”). Finally, there are also declarations from
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various immigration practitioners stating that ICE is now denying parole to individuals who, in years past, would have been granted release under the Parole Directive. See Pl. Mot. at 8 (collecting statements from nine declarations). In sum, Plaintiffs argue that “the evidence demonstrates that similarly situated individuals who routinely were granted parole in prior years are being denied parole under the current regime,” and that the Parole Directive is thus no longer being implemented at these five locations. See Pl. Reply at 1.
DHS marshals its own declarations, asserting that the named Plaintiffs were in fact given individualized parole determinations and that the Directive remains in place. Yet, as Plaintiffs aptly note, Defendants’ declarations rely on records that have not been submitted to the Court and are written by individuals who largely did not have direct involvement with the specific adjudications. See Pl. Reply at 5-6; Ramirez v. ICE, 2018 WL 1882861, at *14 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2018) (refusing to credit declarations from ICE officials when officials were not decisionmakers and instead based assertions on “purported review” of documents). And, even if given full weight by this Court, the statements by various ICE officials do little to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by Plaintiffs. See Huynh v. Harasz, 2016 WL 2757219, at *18-19 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2016) (denial of 215 out of 215 applications could support conclusion that agency had blanket policy of denying applications, even in light of evidence suggesting individualized review). Although Defendants have submitted copies of certain letters and forms sent to the named Plaintiffs regarding their parole determinations, these summary and often boilerplate records do little to shine light on whether the Field Offices did, in fact, provide individualized determinations and comply in full with the Directive.
Indeed, in certain cases, Defendants’ evidences cuts against DHS’s contention that it continues to follow the Parole Directive. In the case of Plaintiff H.A.Y., the Government has
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provided a declaration from Diane Witte of the El Paso Field Office, stating that the office denied H.A.Y.’s parole request because she was “a recent entrant and thus presented a flight risk.” Witte Decl., ¶ 23. This reasoning is contrary to the very concept of giving each applicant an “individualized determination,” as “recent entry” is a categorical characteristic of most, if not all, asylum-seekers. For the El Paso Field Office to conclude that such entry is, itself, sufficient to demonstrate flight risk strongly suggests that it is not conducting the particularized assessments required by the Directive. Certain of Defendants’ records similarly undermine their assertion that the processes mandated by the Directive remain in place, as they evince a lack of compliance with its enumerated procedures. See, e.g., ECF No. 22-6 (Declaration of Jennifer Ritchey), Exh. 2-5 (providing records showing that Plaintiffs Castro and Callol received letters advising them of the right to apply for parole only one day prior to receiving nearly identical boilerplate letters informing them of parole denial); compare ECF No. 23 (Decl. of Andre Quinones), ¶ 4 (stating that “parole interviews are not conducted in every case if the interview would be superfluous”) with Parole Directive, ¶ 8.2 (“Unless an additional reasonable period of time is necessary . . . no later than seven days following a finding that an arriving alien has a credible fear, a [Detention and Removal Operations] officer . . . must conduct an interview with the alien to assess his or her eligibility for parole”) (emphasis added); id., Witte Decl., ¶ 9 (discussing denial of parole for L.H.A. without interview).
In light of the drastic decline in parole-grant rates at the five ICE Field Offices, and the affidavits by the named Plaintiffs and their counsel regarding the processing of their parole applications, this Court finds that the asylum-seekers are able to demonstrate that individualized parole determinations are likely no longer par for the course. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Accardi claim that
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Defendants are not abiding by their own policies and procedures. Having decided this critical issue, the Court moves on to the remaining three preliminary-injunction factors.
2. Irreparable Harm To establish the existence of the second factor, a party must demonstrate that its injury is “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The injury must also be “both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.” Id. (quoting Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674). Finally, the injury must be “beyond remediation.” Id. Plaintiffs have satisfied this inquiry here. As discussed above, the evidence they present suggests that asylum-seekers are being denied parole without the protections of the ICE Directive. The record indicates that, instead, they are subject to a de facto “no-parole” reality, under which detention has become the default option. It is evident, moreover, that being deprived of the safeguards of the Parole Directive harms putative class members in myriad ways. See ECF No. 17-23 (Declaration of Allen S. Keller), ¶¶ 11-24 (discussing “harmful effects of immigration detention on the health and well-being of asylum-seekers”); Abdi, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 407-08 (finding irreparable harm when asylum-seekers detained at facility failing to follow Parole Directive). Although Defendants contend that Plaintiffs can seek parole redeterminations, and thus are not subject to irreparable harm, they make no showing that such requests are any more likely to be granted than the initial applications. See Def. Opp. at 24. Given that this Court has already agreed with Plaintiffs’ contention that parole requests are being nearly uniformly denied at the five Field Offices, it makes little sense to seek redetermination under the same
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regime as a route to meaningful relief. See ECF No. 25-3 (Stambaugh Suppl. Decl.), ¶¶ 6, 10

(redetermination denial consisted solely of “original boilerplate parole denial letter”).

The injuries at stake, furthermore, are “beyond remediation.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at

297. Members of the proposed class do not seek monetary compensation for their injuries.

Instead, they seek injunctive and declaratory relief requiring that Defendants follow their own

parole policies. Unlike economic harm, the harm from detention pursuant to an unlawful

departure from agency procedure cannot be remediated after the fact. Cf. Davis v. Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (economic losses are typically not

irreparable because compensation can be awarded after a merits determination).

3. Balance of Harms and Public Interest

Under the circumstances of this case, factors three and four do not require in-depth

analysis. As courts in this district have recognized, “The public interest is served when

administrative agencies comply with their obligations under the APA.” N. Mariana Islands v.

United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2009). The Parole Directive itself, moreover, states

that the detention of asylum-seekers who are neither a flight risk nor dangerous is “not in the

public interest” and therefore requires an individualized parole determination as to whether they

should be released. See Parole Directive, ¶ 6.2 (emphasis added). In light of the Court’s

conclusion that DHS’s current failure to follow the ICE Directive is likely unlawful, and that the

parole practices in place at the five Field Offices cause irreparable harm to those seeking asylum,

the Court finds that these last two factors favor Plaintiffs as well.

*

*

*

To be clear, in finding that injunctive relief is warranted in this case, this Court is simply

ordering that Defendants do what they already admit is required – follow the ICE Directive when

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adjudicating asylum-seekers’ detention. The Directive provides a framework of minimum protections for those claiming refugee status, and, as Defendants acknowledge, it is binding on the Government. To mandate that ICE provide these baseline procedures to those entering our country – individuals who have often fled violence and persecution to seek safety on our shores – is no great judicial leap. Rather, the issuance of injunctive relief in this case serves only to hold Defendants accountable to their own governing policies and to ensure that Plaintiffs receive the protections they are due under the Parole Directive. IV. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary Injunction and will grant provisional class certification. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: July 2, 2018
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 Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 68 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANSLEY DAMUS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Does the Department of Homeland Security have a policy or practice of detaining asylum-seekers in violation of its own guidance or regulations? The Court issued an Opinion on July 2, 2018, finding a likelihood that Defendants do have such a policy, leading it to enter a preliminary injunction. The Opinion did not, however, rule on DHS’s Motion to Dismiss, which was filed amid briefing on preliminary relief. The parties now ask the Court to resolve that Motion. As the Government has acknowledged, most of its arguments in favor of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims are foreclosed by the prior Opinion. The question that remains is whether Defendants’ actions also violate the Due Process Clause. The Court, however, need not weigh in on this thorny constitutional issue. The “cardinal principle of judicial restraint” is that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concurring opinion of Roberts, J.). Since a decision on the extent of the asylum-seekers’ due-process rights will not at this point affect the outcome of this case, avoidance is the proper course. The Court will, accordingly, deny the Motion to Dismiss this count, but it will do so without prejudice; as a

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result, in the event the constitutional claim ultimately becomes germane to adjudicating the rights of the parties, the Court may revisit it. Separately, the Court will grant DHS’s Motion to Dismiss two individual Defendants from this case. I. Background
The circumstances underlying this litigation were recounted at length in the Court’s prior Opinion. See Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018). Only a short summary is thus needed to set the stage. The Court begins with a refresher on the legal landscape and then turns to the procedural history of this case.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, non-citizens who seek asylum upon their arrival in the United States are referred to interviews to determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution or torture in their home countries. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the interviewing officer finds that such a fear exists, the individual “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). This detention authority, however, is not “entirely inflexible.” Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 323. Instead, asylum-seekers who are not security or flight risks can be paroled into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). In a 2009 Directive, Immigration and Customs Enforcement explained that parole would be appropriate under these provisions when an asylum-seeker establishes his identity and demonstrates that he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the public. See ECF No. 22-1 (ICE Directive 11002.1), ¶ 6.2. This Directive also requires individualized assessments, written notices of the process, and explanations of decisions denying parole. Id., ¶¶ 6.1, 6.5.
In March 2018, nine asylum-seekers who were detained after being denied parole filed this suit. See ECF No. 3 (Compl.), ¶¶ 1–2. On behalf of a class of similarly situated Plaintiffs,
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they asserted that five particular ICE Field Offices were not providing the individualized determinations required by the 2009 Directive. Id., ¶¶ 14–17. In support, they pointed to paroledenial rates at those offices nearing 100%, an almost complete reversal from the minimal denial rates maintained in the previous administration. Id., ¶¶ 37–39. Plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause. Id., ¶¶ 66–80. Soon thereafter, they filed motions for provisional class certification and for a preliminary injunction, which the Government opposed. See ECF Nos. 11 & 17. The Government also filed a Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 22 (MTD). Granting the asylum-seekers’ motions, the Court entered an Order enjoining DHS from “denying parole to any provisional class members absent an individualized determination, through the parole process, that such provisional class member presents a flight risk or a danger to the community.” ECF No. 33 (PI Order) at 1. DHS’s Motion, meanwhile, was held in abeyance. See Minute Order of July 10, 2019. After subsequent proceedings in which Plaintiffs were granted limited discovery related to the Government’s compliance with the injunction, see ECF Nos. 41 & 52, the parties now ask the Court to rule on Defendants’ Motion. II. Legal Standard
In evaluating their Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant [P]laintiff[s] ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference
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unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). For a plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). III. Analysis
The Court first addresses the Government’s arguments in favor of dismissing the APA claims, all of which were addressed by the prior Opinion. It then moves on to the due-process count and two individual Defendants.
A. APA Claims There is no need to linger on the APA claims, since DHS’s objections on that score were squarely rejected in the Court’s Opinion granting the motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants contend that these causes of action should be dismissed because (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction under the INA to grant Plaintiffs relief; and (2) the claims are unsupported by sufficient factual allegations. See MTD at 10–15. As to the first, the Court previously concluded that the “alleged jurisdictional hurdles [we]re easily cleared by the asylum-seekers, and that their claims [could] therefore proceed.” Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 327. With regard to the second, the Court found, based on the “drastic decline in parole-grant rates at the five ICE Field Offices, and the affidavits by the named Plaintiffs and their counsel regarding the
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processing of their parole applications,” that “Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their [] claim that Defendants are not abiding by their own policies and procedures.” Id. at 341. As the Government acknowledged in a recent status conference, see Status Conf. of Feb. 7, 2019, these conclusions foreclose its only arguments for dismissing these claims.
B. Due-Process Claim The Opinion did not, conversely, resolve Defendants’ position on the due-process claim. The Government asserts that it should be dismissed because Plaintiffs, as non-citizens detained upon their arrival into the United States, have no due-process rights beyond those bestowed on them by Congress. See MTD at 16 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). The Court found it unnecessary to rule on this claim for purposes of the preliminary injunction because the asylum-seekers achieved all the relief they then sought through victory on their APA claims. Likewise, it need not decide the merits of it now. This is so for two reasons. First, the merits of the constitutional cause of action rise and fall in relevant part with the merits of Plaintiffs’ APA claims. And second, the asylum-seekers request the same relief from both. Resolving the matter will therefore have no ultimate effect on the relative success of the parties or the breadth of relief awarded. The Court will thus adhere to the “longstanding principle of judicial restraint requir[ing] that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (citations omitted).
The Merits To start, under the facts alleged, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their due-process claim without also prevailing on their APA ones. The linchpin of their APA argument is that DHS has a
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policy or practice of failing to provide asylum-seekers the individualized parole determinations required by law. See Compl., ¶¶ 66–74; ECF No. 17 (PI Motion) at 16–32; ECF No. 24 (Opp. to MTD) at 3–15. There is little question that such a policy or practice, if it exists, would violate the APA. The crux of the asylum-seekers’ due-process claim is the same: DHS’s allegedly unconstitutional practice of “refus[ing] to provide individualized parole determinations.” PI Mot. at 39 (formatting modified). In order to succeed on their due-process claim, therefore, the asylum-seekers must prove that DHS has a policy or practice of refusing to provide individualized parole determinations. Yet once they have so proven, they will have necessarily prevailed on their APA claim. Resolving the legal dispute about Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is thus unnecessary to determining who will triumph on the merits in this case.
Besides being unnecessary, deciding the due-process claim would be no walk in the park. Courts across the country have divided on the right answer. Compare Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 411–15 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that persons subject to immigration detention upon arrival in United States are protected by Due Process Clause), and Perez v. Decker, 2018 WL 3991497, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (same), with Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1005–08 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that persons detained at border do not have judicially enforceable due-process rights), and Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 144 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that due process does not entitle asylum-seekers to individual hearings). Last year, with the issue squarely teed up, the Supreme Court declined to resolve it. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018). These disagreements counsel against this Court’s weighing in unnecessarily, particularly when the parties have given it less than ten total pages of briefing. See PI Mot. at 36–41; MTD at 15–17; Opp. at 16–17.
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Relief Plaintiffs also seek equivalent relief on their due-process and APA claims. If they win on the latter, the asylum-seekers will presumably obtain permanent injunctive relief requiring DHS to provide them with the individualized parole determinations required by the Parole Directive. See Compl., ¶ c. As the crux of the former is that the Due Process Clause requires individualized parole determinations, the relief they would be accorded if successful would also be the parole determinations to which they claim to be entitled. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 718 (2010) (“A court must find prospective relief that fits the remedy to the wrong or injury that has been established.”). Plaintiffs, the Court acknowledges, do briefly hint at a different due-process claim that may seek potentially broader relief. In opposing dismissal of several individual Defendants — an issue the Court addresses below — they say in a footnote that “Plaintiffs’ complaint also includes a claim that Due Process requires a custody hearing before an immigration judge as a neutral decision-maker when detention becomes unreasonably prolonged.” Opp. at 17 n.5. Based on the parties’ positions and filings throughout this case, however, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs are really pursuing such a claim. As far as the Court can tell, the footnote is the only place this theory is mentioned in any briefing. The silence in their motion for class certification is particularly notable. The proposed class, which the Court provisionally certified, includes some asylum-seekers who have not been detained for a prolonged period and thus would not be entitled to the relief sought for this claim. But “Rule 23(b)(2)” — the basis for certification here — “applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360
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(2011). A class drawn to include persons detained for any amount of time may face difficulty pursuing a class-wide claim hinging on prolonged detention.
As to the Complaint, it implies that Plaintiffs may have a separate due-process claim in a single legal assertion: “[P]articularly where detention is prolonged, due process requires a custody hearing before a neutral-decision maker to determine if detention is necessary.” Compl., ¶ 79. It also requests that the Court “[e]nter an order enjoining Defendants from subjecting Plaintiffs and proposed class members to prolonged detention absent a custody hearing before an immigration judge.” Id., ¶ d. But that is it. Considered as a whole, the Court finds that the asylum-seekers have not pursued a constitutional claim based on prolonged detention. The broader relief to which they might be entitled from such a claim thus does not necessitate a decision on the due-process issue. “If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). The Court, accordingly, will not decide the due-process question today.
One outside possibility is worth flagging: that the nature of the claims being litigated in this case will matter for determining the propriety of discovery. The general rule, of course, is that discovery is not available in an APA case — instead, such cases are litigated on the basis of the administrative record. See Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2011). No such rule exists in constitutional cases. At this point, though, the Court is skeptical that any difference in the substantive basis of the claims will matter to the availability of discovery. See Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 3d 32, 41–45 (D.D.C. 2018). In any event, if the nature of the claims is dispositive in a subsequent discovery
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motion, the Court can consider the Government’s arguments in favor of dismissing the due-

process claim at that point. For now, the proper course is to deny the Motion to Dismiss without

prejudice.

C. Individual Defendants

The Court last turns to the Government’s independent argument that certain individual

Defendants — namely, the Attorney General and the Director of the Executive Office for

Immigration Review — should be dismissed. See MTD at 17–18. Plaintiffs oppose on the

ground that they maintain a separate due-process claim seeking bond hearings for asylum-

seekers in prolonged detention and that such hearings would be supervised by the Attorney

General and EOIR Director. See Opp. at 17 n.5. As the Court has just explained, however, it is

not persuaded that Plaintiffs are pursuing any such claim. The Court thus agrees with the

Government that those individual Defendants should be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.

Date: February 28, 2019

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge

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 Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 128 Filed 02/07/20 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANSLEY DAMUS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CHAD WOLF, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION About nineteen months ago, the Court entered a preliminary injunction against several Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Offices across the country. In so doing, it ordered the Government to follow a 2009 ICE Parole Directive — a set of principles and procedures establishing the processes by which the agency must determine whether an asylum-seeker will be released from detention pending his immigration hearing. Plaintiffs — members of a class of asylum-seekers — believe that one of those Field Offices is currently flouting the injunction. They thus turn to this Court, moving to hold the Government in contempt and proposing a number of measures to ensure compliance. Following an evidentiary hearing and a second round of briefing, the Government, though maintaining it has carried out the Court’s instructions to the letter, has volunteered to implement some of these remedies. The Court appreciates the Government’s commitment to do so, but also believes some further steps are required. It will deny the Motion for Contempt but mandate certain measures under its authority to enforce its injunction.

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I. Background The underlying facts of this litigation have been set forth in detail in a prior Opinion. See
Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 322–25 (D.D.C. 2018). Because the Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with this case, it offers only a few words on the procedural history to set the stage.
In July 2018, the Court issued an injunction against five ICE Field Offices, ordering them to follow the 2009 Directive. See ECF No. 33 (PI Order); Damus, 313 F.3d at 343. To be more specific, it mandated that Defendants refrain from “denying parole to any provisional class member absent an individualized determination”; that these determinations be based on the facts of each class member’s case; and that Defendants comply with the procedural requirements of the Directive. Id., ¶¶ 3–5. Separately, the Court directed the Government to file monthly reports reflecting parole determinations at each of the five Field Offices so that it could monitor compliance with the Directive and the injunction. See Minute Orders of July 24 and Aug. 28, 2018.
The first of these reports — issued six weeks after the injunction — revealed the persistence of low parole rates across the board. Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs became concerned that the Government was defying the Court’s mandate. See Damus v. Nielsen, 328 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2018). Their concerns only intensified after practitioners in detention facilities reported that asylum-seekers were still being detained without any individualized consideration. Id. at 4. Convinced that Plaintiffs had raised a sufficient question of noncompliance, the Court permitted limited discovery. Id. at 6. In the months that followed, Plaintiffs deposed officials from each of the Field Offices at issue. See ECF No. 77 (Pl. Contempt Motion) at 2–3; ECF No. 86 (Def. Opp. to Contempt Motion) at 3.
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In the end, Plaintiffs concluded that the Los Angeles Field Office’s noncompliance with the injunction was the most glaring. See Pl. Contempt Mot. at 1–2, 2 n.2. As evidence of this, they point to the Office’s comparatively low grant rate — approximately 16% — from July 2018 to April 2019. See ECF No. 81 (Pl. Supp. to Contempt Motion) at 1; Pl. Contempt Mot. at 8. This stands in stark contrast to the rate of 43% during the years of the previous administration, which promulgated the Directive. See ECF No. 112 (Def. Exhibits for Hearing) at 2 (2011–16). They also rely on the deposition testimony of Gabriel Valdez, the Officer in Charge of the LAFO’s Adelanto Processing Center, which is currently the only detention facility operating in the Los Angeles area. See Pl. Contempt Mot. at 7–9; ECF No. 120 (Def. Response to Contempt Supp.) at 3 n.1. According to Plaintiffs, Valdez all but confirmed that the Government was falling short of its obligations — namely, by acknowledging that the injunction did not affect the parole-determination process in the least. See Pl. Contempt Mot. at 7–11. In addition, testimony from immigration practitioners on the ground, asylum-seekers underscore, confirms noncompliance. For example, these attorneys maintain that the LAFO, contrary to the Directive’s instructions, is not providing detainees parole decisions in a language they can understand. See, e.g., id., Exh. F (Declaration of Madelaine Behr), ¶ 6; Exh. I (Declaration of Elizabeth Hercules-Paez), ¶ 6.
With these grievances in mind, Plaintiffs moved for contempt against the LAFO in April 2019. In response, the Government advances two main arguments. First off, it contends that, because the Directive does not require a particular grant or denial rate, Plaintiffs’ fixation on such rates is unavailing. See Def. Opp. to Contempt Mot. at 8–9. Second, it posits that Valdez’s testimony does not stand for what asylum-seekers say it does. Specifically, the reason he
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confirmed that the Office did not changes its polices in response to the injunction was because there was no need to — it has been following the Parole Directive all along. Id. at 7–19.
With the parties unable to reach an agreement, the Court held an evidentiary hearing in October. See Minute Order of Sept. 30, 2019. It heard testimony from OIC Valdez, Andre Quinones (an LAFO Assistant Field Office Director), and an immigration practitioner. At the hearing’s end, it asked both sides to provide supplemental briefing evaluating the testimony’s effect on their positions. See Minute Order of Oct. 31, 2019. Armed with those submissions, the Court is now primed to proceed. II. Legal Standard
Federal courts have “inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). Such power is vital to “the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.” Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505, 510 (1874)). To determine whether contempt is appropriate, a court evaluates whether “the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous,” and whether such a violation has been shown “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
Along with the contempt power, a court has the authority to issue additional orders to enforce a prior injunction. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); see also Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 765 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1991) (modifying injunction to ensure compliance without contempt finding). This equitable authority is broad, “particularly where the enjoined party has not ‘fully complied with the court’s earlier
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orders.’” Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 98 F. Supp. 2d 25, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687). As with the initial injunction, however, further injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm.” Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1976). III. Analysis
In their Motion, Plaintiffs seek a finding of contempt and an order directing the Government to implement several remedial measures. See ECF No. 118 (Pl. Contempt Motion Supp.). According to them, the road to compliance entails four steps: (1) formal training to instruct LAFO staff on the requirements of the Directive; (2) a systematic quality-assurance process to ensure that asylum-seekers are afforded individualized determinations; (3) individualized explanations of parole decisions instead of boilerplate forms; and (4) the appointment of a special master to oversee the LAFO. Id. at 9–11. As just mentioned, the Court may order some or all of these measures as a means to enforce its prior injunction without having to resort to its contempt power. Facilitating resolution here, the Government has agreed to adopt two remedial measures — viz., additional formal training and a quality-assurance program. See Def. Resp. to Contempt Supp. at 18–19.
As to the former, Defendants have volunteered to: (1) train frontline LAFO staff on the Directive “with a focus on proper procedures related to serving advisals, conducting parole interviews, and making recommendations”; (2) train deciding officials on how to properly review and evaluate these parole determinations; and (3) designate an LAFO officer and ICE attorney to conduct periodic training in that Field Office. Id. at 18–19. On the quality-assurance front, the Government has proposed that the OIC of the Adelanto detention facility review a certain number of parole determinations on a monthly basis. Id. at 19 (capping assessment at 20
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cases every month). Because these measures are reasonably aimed at ensuring the LAFO’s compliance with the prior injunction, the Court will impose them.
The Government is not yet off the hook, though, as the LAFO’s parole rates continue to raise the Court’s antennae. Since the issuance of the injunction in July 2018, Defendants have considered 1,846 parole applications, denying over 80% of them. See ECF No. 125 (Def. Jan. 2020 Status Report) at 3 (1,488 applicants detained as flight risks; 46 detained as danger to community). For perspective, consider that between 2011 and 2013, the LAFO grant rate hovered around 80%. See Def. Hearing Exhs. at 2. Although that number decreased in the three years that followed, the Government still granted parole nearly 40% of the time. Id. (from 2014– 16, 1,523 grants out of 3,864 applications). Only a year later, following the change in administration, that rate plummeted to 7%. Id. This drop, of course, served as the impetus for Plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief in the first place. See Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 323–25. It is no surprise, then, that Plaintiffs’ takeaway from the recent statistics is that LAFO officials are disregarding the Court’s mandate. See Pl. Contempt Mot. Supp. at 3–4. Asylum-seekers also highlight the testimony of an immigration lawyer, who indicated that all of her clients had been categorically denied parole. See ECF No. 121 (Pl. Reply) at 2–3; id., Exh. A (Pl. Hearing Transcript) at 114:19–115:7.
On the flip side, Defendants believe that the LAFO has abided by the Directive since 2011. See Def. Resp. to Contempt Supp. at 3. To account for the persistence in low grant rates, the Government points to the testimony of its witnesses Quinones and Valdez. Id. at 6–12. At the hearing, both offered a number of reasons for why the denials have skyrocketed. For example, they recounted the influx of aliens arriving at our nation’s border without proper identification documents. See, e.g., id., Exh. A (Def. Hearing Transcript) at 43:20–25 (Valdez
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noting increase in “prepped documents”), 171:18–23 (Quinones pointing out lack of “correct or sufficient documents” establishing applicant’s identity). Unlike in years past, Valdez elaborated, recent parole applicants are not producing original identification documents. Id. at 44:14–16. Instead, they are providing copies of such documents, making it all the more difficult to suss out an applicant’s identity. Id. at 44:16–23. In his telling, scores of these aliens present nearly identical, less-than-truthful accounts about their lack of original documentation. Id. at 44:1–12 (several of those crossing through Central America alleged to have lost passports “in the jungles of Colombia”).
Valdez also noted that more and more asylum-seekers are identifying community organizations — rather than family members — as potential parole sponsors. Id. at 44:25–45:2. The problem with that, in his view, is that these organizations tend to offer a temporary residence only. Id. at 45:3–14. Without a stable living situation, an applicant is less likely to receive notifications about immigration proceedings. Id. at 58:13–59:9. And without such notice, he is less likely to show up at future proceedings, thereby posing a flight risk. Id. at 58:13–59:9.
Last, Valdez rationalized that the improved practices of his staff have played a role in the recent parole grants. Around 2014, he recalled, officers at the Adelanto detention facility were not adequately discharging their responsibilities. Id. at 42:3–9; 46:7–20. In his words, his staff did not “do[] their due diligence in verifying the date that was being submitted [and] . . . was being used to make evaluations.” Id. at 75:19–23. Concerned about these practices, Valdez has directed his officers to be more diligent when corroborating information. Id. at 47:6–8. These efforts, he explained, have been a contributing factor to the “downward trend” in the grant rates. Id. at 42:6–9.
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Although the Court found no reason to doubt the credibility of Valdez and Quinones, their testimony does not plug every hole. Start with the position that LAFO staff are now better at assessing parole applications. As Plaintiffs note, an officer’s decision on a particular application is merely “a recommendation.” Pl. Contempt Mot. Supp. at 4 (quoting Pl. Hearing Tr. at 69:24). That decision is next reviewed by a supervisor, who likewise provides only his recommendation. See Def. Hearing Tr. at 70:5–6, 21. In the last step, an AFOD — the deciding official — “start[s] the whole [evaluation] process over again” and then renders the binding determination. Id. at 71:16; Pl. Hearing Tr. at 88:24–25 (“[T]hey don’t make the decision. I do.”). Bearing in mind that every recommendation is reviewed by an AFOD, the drop in parole grants cannot be completely accounted for by more diligent lower-level staff.
As to documents, Valdez acknowledged that he had seen only “fluctuations,” not “trends” in their quality. See Pl. Hearing Tr. at 95:16–25. The data, moreover, show a descending trajectory in grant rates, not the ebb and flow one would otherwise expect. To be sure, there was one meaningful spike in those rates — in June of last year, the LAFO granted parole to more than 40% of applicants. Id. at 16:16–17:3; compare ECF No. 114 (Pl. Exhibit List), Exh. 7 (Def. June 2019 Status Report) with Exh. 6 (Def. May 2019 Status Report) (46 grants out of 108 determinations). That month appears to have been an anomaly, however. An official noted that the June 2019 rate actually resulted from the closure of other facilities in the Los Angeles area. See Pl. Exh. 8 (Declaration of Jennifer Herrera), ¶ 11. Because that led to limited detention space in LAFO centers still in operation, officials had to release asylum-seekers who otherwise would have been detained. Valdez offered “no information to challenge” that testimony. See Pl. Hearing Tr. at 18:11.
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Finally, as for potential sponsors, the hearing also laid bare the fact that most applicants continue to list family members and friends, rather than these organizations, as sponsors. Id. at 96:20–97:7. As such, Defendants’ concern about the rise of community sponsorships — and the increased flight risk associated with them — seems overblown.
In sum, the Government has failed to persuasively justify the fall in parole grants or convincingly explain that it is following the Directive. The Court will therefore order further injunctive relief using Plaintiffs’ requests as a framework.
First, they ask that LAFO staff receive training on the Directive’s requirements. See Pl. Contempt Mot. Supp. at 9–10. To that end, the Government has volunteered to implement a number of training measures — remedies that the Court has already imposed. See supra Section III at 5–6. To ensure agency compliance, Plaintiffs may assign an attorney to review the LAFO’s training procedures (or be present at some trainings) insofar as this review does not unduly intrude into ICE’s operations.
Second, asylum-seekers request a quality-assurance program. See Pl. Contempt Mot. Supp. at 10. According to them, the LAFO last engaged in a quality-assurance audit in 2016. Id. In response, the Government has proposed a systematic review process that the Court believes sufficiently addresses Plaintiffs’ concerns. See supra Section III at 5–6.
Third, they request that the LAFO provide individualized explanations of parole decisions. See Pl. Contempt Mot. Supp. at 10. Plaintiffs want more than a checked box on a boilerplate form or a cookie-cutter parole-denial letter. Id. So that asylum-seekers may be better informed of the reasoning behind a parole decision, the Court will require LAFO officials to provide a few-sentence explanation in rendering their decisions for the time being.
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Case 1:18-cv-00578-JEB Document 128 Filed 02/07/20 Page 10 of 10 Fourth and finally, the Court will decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to appoint a special master to oversee the LAFO’s compliance with the injunction. It believes that the above measures are reasonably tailored to ensure compliance. That said, it reserves the opportunity to appoint a special master if asylum-seekers can show down the line that the Government is not complying with this mandate. IV. Conclusion Given the injunctive relief outlined above, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ Contempt Motion in part. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: February 7, 2020
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